COMMENTARIA IN IV LIB - ROS SENTENTIARUM

Commentary on the Four Books of the Sentences of Peter Lombard

Albert the Great (c. 1200–1280), Doctor Universalis

Albert's commentary on the four books of the Sentences of Peter Lombard, composed at Paris c. 1243–1249, is the foundation upon which the entire scholastic enterprise of the high thirteenth century rests. Within these articles Albert lays the program that his pupil Thomas Aquinas would inherit and extend.

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LIBER I

PRAEFATIO

Preface

OF LORD ALBERT THE GREAT, BISHOP OF REGENSBURG, OF THE ORDER OF PREACHERS, COMMENTARIES ON THE FIRST BOOK OF THE SENTENCES. PREFACE

§ 53. I came forth from the mouth of the Most High, the firstborn before all creatures: I made that in the heavens there should arise light that never faileth, and as a cloud I covered all the earth.

§ 54. Here according to order four things are touched upon: from which according to the series of this Book the matter of the four Books is drawn.

§ 55. For in the first is noted the distinction of the persons, and the procession of one from another, when he says: I came forth from the mouth of the Most High. By the word I the speaking wisdom is supposed: but by the word mouth the Father insofar as he himself through generation is the principle of the Son as he is the Word. But neither the mouth whence the Word proceeds, nor the Word itself is without the Spirit: and therefore in the mouth and in the Word the procession of the Holy Spirit from both is signified. Which is proved from this which Damascene says in book I of On the Orthodox Faith: "In the simple and uncompounded divine nature it is piously to be confessed that the Spirit of God is indeed: because the Word of God is not more deficient than our word. But it is not pious to think that some alien spirit is poured out outside God, as happens in us composite beings." This is also what Augustine says in book IX of On the Trinity: "The Word which we strive to intimate, is knowledge with love." But by the word Most High the Father is supposed, who although he is not higher than the Son or the Holy Spirit, because there is one height of the three, just as one dignity and one honor, nevertheless by appropriation it belongs to the Father to be the Most High, because he himself is the principle of the whole divinity, as Augustine says, because he himself is a principle not from a principle: but the Son is a principle from a principle: the Holy Spirit however is not a principle with respect to any person, but with respect to the creature only, and is from both principles, namely, the Father and the Son.

§ 56. The second is that which he says: The firstborn before all creatures: in which the matter of the second Book is noted, in which creatures are treated. And by that word the creature is signified in two ways, namely, according to its going forth through creation from the first cause which is God, when he says: The firstborn, etc., and according to what is in its proper nature and universality, when he says: All creatures. For just as he says, Psalm 32:9: He spoke, and they were made. And Augustine says, that is, he generated the Word in which it was that it

should be made. It was, I say, in the Word insofar as the Word is the art of the Father full of all living reasons, that is, which all live in him and are life. Now the creature was in this Word in two ways, namely, as in a medium of knowing according to reason, and as in an operative and productive cause: and therefore, John 1:3 and 4, it is said: Without him was made nothing that was made. In him was life, and the life was the light of men. Light, I say, radiating over all known things: just as he says, Psalm 109:3: From the womb before the daystar I begot thee, in the brightness of the saints, that is, of eternal holiness and purity. But it was life according to the fact that it is the operative Word: for what with respect to some things is attributed by the Philosophers to the motion of the heaven, saying that it is immortal and without rest in the things that are, as a certain life to all existing things by nature: this primarily belongs to the Word with respect to all creatures: because all things are in him as in a cause, and are carried by him lest they perish. Hence, the Apostle to the Hebrews 1:3: Upholding all things by the word of his power. For these two (as Augustine and Anselm say) signify a twofold motion of the efflux of the creature from the Creator: for insofar as they are life in him, they flow forth from the Word, so that they may subsist in their proper nature: and insofar as they are light, by flowing forth they are manifested in the angelic intelligence. And that the Word is a principle, is clear through Augustine in book I On Genesis, thus: "Before all things let us remember that God does not work by temporal motions, as it were of his mind or body, as a man or an Angel works: but by the eternal and immutable and stable reasons of his coeternal Word." But concerning the second the same author says, in the same place, book IV, where he speaks thus: "First the light was created in which the knowledge of the Word of God by which it was created might be made, and that very knowledge would be for it to be converted from its formlessness to the forming God."

§ 57. But an objection is raised concerning this which he says: The firstborn, etc. Because this seems to posit an order of himself to the creature: and since every order is according to something common to the ordered things themselves, the Creator seems to have something in common with the creature: which is not true. SOLUTION. It must be said that the order of cause to caused is noted there, and of eternity to time: and nothing prohibits something being common, not existing univocally in both, but by prior and posterior. But that this is true is clear through Basil in a certain sermon On the Faith of the Divinity, where he speaks thus: "To receive a nature is common to the Son with every creature: but to have it naturally is proper to him, because he is from the nature of the Father." But by the other part the creature is supposed in its proper genus, namely, in itself by the name of creature, and in universality by the sign of distribution according to what is held, Genesis 1:31: God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good: where the Gloss says that everything created was good in itself: but the universality was very good.

§ 58. It follows: I made that in the heavens there should arise light that never faileth. By this however is had the matter of the third Book. For the arising of light is the arising of the sun of justice Christ our God, when through the bowels of the mercy of his, in which the orient from on high has visited us: to illuminate those who sit in darkness and in the shadow of death: in which is accepted the sacrament of the incarnation and passion. But the unfailing light from itself, although it sometimes fails from us, is the grace of virtues, of gifts, and of precepts,

concerning which it is treated in the second part of the third Book. Hence. James 1:17: Every best gift, and every perfect gift, is from above, coming down from the Father of lights, with whom there is no change, nor shadow of alteration. But this light he made in the heavens literally, because he led captivity captive, and gave gifts to men. Or, in the heavens, that is, in the Saints.

§ 59. It follows: And as a cloud, etc. By this is had the matter of the fourth Book. For a cloud is obscure, and the remains of rain, and a sign of serenity, as the Philosopher says: and by obscurity it signifies the grace of the sacraments obscured by corporeal elements. The remains of rain: because the tempest of sin and obnubilation causes the sacraments, as is held in book IV, so that man may return by the same path, by which he withdrew from God. But insofar as it is a sign of serenity, it signifies the reality of all the sacraments signified, and not contained, which is the glory of those rising again, concerning which it is treated in the second part of the fourth. This is the cloud of which it is said, Sirach 43:24: The medicine of all is in the hastening of a cloud: because by the sacraments it medicates guilt, by the glory of the resurrection it medicates misery.

PROLOGUS

Prologue

EXPOSITION ON THE PROLOGUE OF THE MASTER.

§ 60. Desiring something, etc. This proem is divided into three parts, the first of which is taken from the part of the writing or work, of which he assigns the moving causes: final, material, and formal. The second is taken from the part of those to whom the writing is written, or for whom this work is made, which begins, at Therefore it ought not. The third is taken from the part of the writer, in which the Author determines his own disposition in writing, saying that he seeks a pious reader and a free corrector in this writing, and this begins, at But in this tractate not only, etc.

§ 61. The first of these parts is divided into two, in the first of which he touches upon the moving causes on the part of God and the neighbor. In the second, however, from the moving causes he concludes also other causes of this work, at Therefore of these and hateful to God, etc.

§ 62. But the first which contains the moving causes to write, is divided into two parts according to the two branches of charity. For in the first he states the moving [causes]...

§ 1. "...on the part of the love of God." In the second place, however, he states the moving causes on the part of the love of neighbor: and this begins at the place: Not being able to resist the desires of the studious, etc.

§ 2. Furthermore, the first part, which contains the moving causes on the part of the love of God, is subdivided into four. In the first, he touches upon the moving cause on the part of the reward promised to those who write. In the second, he mixes two moving causes: one per se, the other through another, along with two retracting causes, at the place: The truth of the one

promising delights us, etc. In the third, he posits one prevailing cause, and two retracting ones, at the place: Which zeal overcomes, etc. In the fourth of these, drawn from these causes sufficient to move on the part of the love of God, he touches succinctly upon what he intends to write: next to which he disposed to execute this more prolixly below after all the other causes; and this begins at the place: In which, our faith burning, etc.

§ 3. The letter is expounded thus:

§ 4. Desiring something, etc. He offers humility, and difficulty: because "something" sounds like "a little". Hence it is written: "Lo, these are part of his ways: and seeing we have heard scarce a little drop of his word, who shall be able to behold the thunder of his greatness?"[1] The "little drop" is discourse concerning creatures. The overwhelming thunder flashing from the cloud of obscurity is discourse concerning the Trinity and unity. Now, this occurs because of the difficulty of the matter, as is held: "All things are hard: man cannot explain them by word."[2]

§ 5. Into the treasury [gazophylacium], etc. Gaza sounds like "riches" in Persian, phylassein means "to keep" in Greek: hence a gazophylacium is a repository or chest of riches. Here in this Book, however, it signifies the study of holy Church, in which the holy Doctors have deposited their books.

§ 6. Now among the ancients there was a threefold treasury. Namely, the musach, which was for the offerings of kings, concerning which it is written that "Ahaz turned the musach for the sabbath, which he had built in the temple, and the king's entry from without, into the temple of the Lord, because of the king of the Assyrians."[3] The corban or corbona was for the gifts of the priests, concerning which we read: "It is not lawful to put them into the corbona, etc."[4] The third is commonly called the gazophylacium, which was for the offerings of the people, concerning which it is written: "And looking on," namely Jesus, "he saw the rich men cast their gifts into the treasury [gazophylacium], etc."[5] Others say differently: for because we read of the musach of the sabbath, they say that in it were deposited festival offerings; and because corban in Hebrew is the same as a vow, they say that in it were deposited votive offerings, whereas spontaneous offerings were placed in the gazophylacium.

§ 7. And it follows:

§ 8. From poverty, etc. "Poverty" speaks of a lack of acquired goods, and according to a transfer to spiritual things, it speaks of a lack of an acquired habit in the intellect, which is science. "Slenderness," on the other hand, speaks of a diminution of due quantity, and transferred, it speaks of the meagerness of natural genius for the act of inventing science. Now, what follows: To climb steep things, etc., corresponds to poverty: because divine things are called steep with respect to the objects of knowledge with which science is concerned. But when he says: A work beyond our powers, this corresponds to the second, which is slenderness: because this spoke of the dullness of the natural force, which is genius.

§ 9. To climb steep things, etc. He notes that steep things are certain high things, but not elevated above the power of our intellect. A "work beyond our powers," however, is that

which is elevated above our power. Now, steep things are climbed by a threefold degree: for some approach our soul by sense, imagination, and intellect; some by imagination and intellect only; and some by intellect only. The first are merely high, the second higher, the third highest. Hence, Augustine says: "Three kinds of visions occur. One through the eyes, by which corporeal things are seen; another through the spirit, by which absent corporeal things are thought of; the third

through the intuition of the mind, by which the understood species of things is beheld."[6] And these correspond to three [sciences] in Philosophy, namely, those joined according to their definitional concept with motion and matter, which are natural things; those separated according to their concept from motion and matter, but nevertheless joined in being, and these are mathematical things; and those separated in being and in definition from motion and matter, and these are divine things, from which natural reasons are drawn to know the Creator, just as he does below in Distinctions III and IV.

§ 10. A work beyond our powers, etc., is the knowledge of the Trinity and unity.

§ 11. But it seems to be contrary to what Ecclesiasticus says: "Seek not the things that are too high for thee, and search not into things above thy ability."[7] Again, in Proverbs: "Lift not up thy eyes to riches which thou canst not have: because they shall make themselves wings like those of an eagle, and shall fly towards heaven."[8] The response is that it is beyond our powers according to itself; but when reason is helped by faith, it avails for that for which it formerly did not avail. Hence, it is written: "Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not."[9] And: "Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves: but our sufficiency is from God."[10]

§ 12. Which the zeal of the house of God overcomes, etc. "The zeal of thy house hath eaten me up."[11] And this is introduced in John,[12] and there the Gloss says: "Good zeal is that by which the mind, having cast aside human fear, is inflamed and consumed by this, that whatever wicked things it sees, it bustles to correct; if it cannot, it tolerates and groans."

§ 13. Against the errors of carnal men, etc. "The animal man perceiveth not these things that are of the Spirit of God; for it is foolishness to him, and he cannot understand, because it is spiritually examined,"[13] that is, an examination of spiritual things is made. And those whom the Master here distinguishably calls "carnal" and "animal," the Apostle commonly calls "animal." Hence the Gloss in the same place: "An animal man is so called either by life or by sense. By life, a man is called animal who is carried away by the dissolute wantonness of his soul, which the ruling spirit does not contain within the bounds of the natural order, because it does not subject itself to God, who rules it. But by sense, a man is called animal who judges of God according to the phantasm of bodies, or the letter of the law, or physical reasoning."

§ 14. With the shields of the Davidic tower, etc. "Thy neck is as the tower of David, which is built with bulwarks: a thousand bucklers hang upon it, etc."[14] Now, the neck is that by which the body is joined to the head, and in which words are formed, and it signifies the faith that joins the Church to God. The shields are the authorities of truth discovered by the Saints,

1. Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermones in Cantica Canticorum.

bearing the signs of our leaders, namely, Augustine, Jerome, and other Doctors. The armor of the strong is the syllogism and fitting similitude by which we progress in this science.

§ 15. Not being able to resist the desires of the studious, etc. Here he touches upon the moving cause on the part of the love of neighbor, and just as before, he mixes with this cause also a retracting cause, and thus there are two here. First, the moving cause is the love of neighbor. Second, the retracting cause is the detraction of the envious, at the place: Although we do not doubt, etc.

§ 16. The first has two [aspects], namely, the urgent request of the studious, because it incites the study of the listeners; secondly, also the charity of Christ in the members. The second is divided into two parts, in the first of which he describes the detractors. But because open malice cannot do harm, therefore in the second he touches upon the mode of their simulation, at the place: They have a show of wisdom in superstition, etc.

§ 17. In the first he touches upon two things, namely, that the detraction of rivals is not able to draw him back, and the description of the rivals, at the place: Because to those dissenting, etc. And this second part has four [aspects], namely the descrip-

tion of them from the proximate cause of obstinacy. Secondly, from the extrinsic suggesting cause, there: Which the God of this world. Thirdly, from the perversity of order in the soul, there: Whom an unjust will. Fourthly, from their pursuit, there: Whose profession is by tongue and style: by the first of which science is taught, by the second it is perpetuated. Or, he says "by tongue," because somewhere, although sparsely, their voice has sounded out; but "by style," on account of this, that he places his writings under the style of the Fathers.

§ 18. The charity of Christ urges, etc. To the contrary: "Man knoweth not whether he be worthy of love, or hatred."[15] Solution. Charity can be taken according to the force of the name, namely, as it is a love highly prizing the beloved, and thus we can be certain of charity through conjectures of experience; or it can be taken for the habit distinguishing between the sons of the kingdom and of perdition, and thus no one is certain on the way.

§ 19. An objection is raised concerning what he says: To truth not understood or offending, etc. For Jerome seems to say this, saying that truth breeds hatred. But to the contrary: "All the earth calleth upon truth, and the heaven blesseth it, and all works shake and tremble at it."[16] Again, in the same place: "And all men do well in its works," namely of truth, "and there is no iniquity in its judgment."[17]

§ 20. Furthermore, the Philosopher says that the end of speculative intelligence is truth; but nothing hates its end, but rather desires it. But to the contrary: "For every one that doth evil hateth the light, and cometh not to the light, that his works may not be reproved."[18] Solution. Truth per se is delightful to every man, and to every intellective and rational nature; but per accidens it offends, or has contradictors. And this accident is frequently threefold: namely, because it is contrary to what is willed (and thus the Master speaks here, as is clear in the Letter); or because it is discovered by someone who is envied; or because it reproves malice in

2. Aristotle, Metaphysics, I, 2, 982b25.

the listener, as is held: "There is one man left, by whom we may ask the Lord: but I hate him, for he doth not prophesy good to me, but evil, Micheas the son of Jemla."[19]

§ 21. Which the God of this world works, etc. "The god of this world hath blinded the minds of unbelievers, that the light of the gospel of the glory of Christ, who is the image of God," namely the invisible God, "should not shine unto them."[20] And it is expounded there by the Gloss in four ways: namely, for the just God who rules the good, and as a desert of impiety allows the wicked to be cast down into unbelief. Secondly, for the devil, who is the god and prince of this world. "For the prince of this world cometh, etc."[21] Thirdly, for pride, which is the cause of blinding. Fourthly, for the belly. Hence: "Whose god is their belly."[22]

§ 22. But an objection is raised against what he says: In the sons of unbelief, etc. Because Jerome says that no one is to be despaired of, while he is on the way. Solution. Insofar as it pertains to the mercy of God and the nature of the way, one must not despair; but insofar as it pertains to the nature of the disease, [one might]: because the sin of unbelief is scarcely abandoned, owing to the fact that it seems to allude to reason.

§ 23. They do not subject their will to reason, etc. This, according to Avicenna, is the principle of evil; as the verse also says: Thus I will, thus I command; let my will stand as reason.[23]

§ 24. For this is the perversity of right order: concerning whom it is said, "The perverse are hard to be corrected, and the number of fools is infinite."[24]

§ 25. But to those things which they have dreamed, etc. He rightly calls heresy a dream: because in a dream, images from the imagination are moved to the organ of the common sense; and a conversion of the soul upon the image occurs just as upon a thing. Thus heretics bring forth images out of their phantastic heart and are converted to them, as to the truth of things.

§ 26. To fables, etc. They seek to say wonderful things: because the Philosopher says in the first book of

the Metaphysics that a fable is composed of wonderful things.[25] "And will indeed turn away their hearing from the truth, but will be turned unto fables."[26]

§ 27. Things more pleasing, etc. "Who say to the seers: See not: and to them that behold: Behold not for us those things that are right: speak unto us pleasant things, see errors for us."[27]

§ 28. They have a show of wisdom, etc. This part, which is about the mode of their simulation, has three parts. The first contains simulations of piety; the second, the falsity and lie of the simulation, there: And this simulated piety itself. Thirdly, he posits the proof of this lie and falsity, there: By the institutions of false doctrine.

§ 29. In superstition, etc. Augustine says: "Religion observed beyond measure is called superstition."

§ 30. It follows: Because a defection of faith, etc. "Now the Spirit manifestly saith, that in the last times some shall depart from the faith, giving heed to spirits of error, and doctrines of devils, speaking lies in hypocrisy, and having their conscience seared."[28]

3. Augustine, De Trinitate, II, Prooemium, 1.

§ 31. It follows: So that there may be piety in words, etc. "Having an appearance indeed of godliness, but denying the power thereof. Now these avoid."[29]

§ 32. But an objection is raised concerning what he says: By every lie of words, etc. To the contrary: Upon that passage "There met him ten men that were lepers,"[30] the Gloss of Bede says there: "Lepers are heretics, who, as if having various colors in the same body, mix various sects now of falsity, now of truth in the same preaching." Solution. Although they do not always lie with respect to the things said, nevertheless with respect to the end they always lie: and this is how the Master understands it.

§ 33. It follows:

§ 34. By the institutions of false doctrine, etc. In this part he posits three reasons manifesting the lie of heretics. The first is drawn from fallacious institutions, that is, principles and articles. The second is drawn from the mode of things said by them: that they say novel things. Now, a "novel" thing is that which is near with respect to its beginning, there: Under a novel, etc. Against which it is said: "For by it," namely faith, "the ancients obtained a testimony."[31] And: "Pass not beyond the ancient bounds which thy fathers have set."[32] The third is drawn from the mode of disputing, which is with contention and clamors, there: Who, studying contention, etc.

§ 35. And an itching of the ears, etc. "For there shall be a time, when they will not endure sound doctrine; but, according to their own desires, they will heap to themselves teachers, having itching ears."[33] Now, an itch is from a corrupt evaporation touching the sensible organs, and heresy is similar to it.

§ 36. It follows:

§ 37. Who, to contention, etc. Ambrose, in the Gloss on the Epistle to the Romans 1:29: "Contention is the impugning of truth with the confidence of a clamor." And Cicero in the second book of his Rhetoric says that contention is an acute speech, suited both for confirming and for confuting.[34]

§ 38. While truth holds itself, etc. "The truth of the Lord remaineth for ever."[35] "Truth overcometh all things."[36] And it adds: "Truth endureth, and grows strong for ever, and liveth and conquereth for ever and ever."[37]

§ 39. Therefore, [the assembly] of these, hateful to God, etc. "I have hated the assembly of the malignant."[38]

§ 40. In this part, from the moving causes he concludes also the other causes of this work. And it has six parts: in the first of which he briefly repeats the two moving causes, namely the overthrowing of heretics, and the exaltation of the lamp of truth, which is taken according to the twofold work of the wise man determined by the Philosopher: which is that he does not lie about what he knows, and is able to manifest someone who is lying.[39]

§ 41. In the second, he touches upon the Author, there: In much labor, etc. And he says three things, namely, the labor of compilation so as to render [the readers] attentive; the mode of

composition through what he says: We have compiled, etc. For what is compiled [compactum] is joined together from diverse things, just as the questions and authorities in this work are diverse. He also speaks by supposing the Author, when he says We have compiled, because in a verb of the first person a determinate acting person is understood.

§ 42. In the third, he touches upon the matter, when he says: The light established in eternity upon the testimonies of truth, etc., that is, in eternity: because the faith that is expressed in them concerns the first and eternal truth. Hence Dionysius in the book On the Divine Names: "Faith is the unique foundation of believers, placing them in the truth, and the truth in them, with believers possessing the simple science of truth in incredible immutability."[40] And the Apostle: "For other foundation no man can lay, but that which is laid; which is Christ Jesus,"[41] that is, the faith of Jesus Christ.

§ 43. In the fourth, he touches upon the twofold form: namely, of the distinction of matter according to that act of form by which it distinguishes what is formed from others, when he says: In four books, etc. And the mode of his proofs which he uses according to the act of form by which it acts and is the principle of actions, when he says: In which the examples of the ancestors, etc. And "examples" refer to the similitudes he uses; but "doctrine" refers to authorities and other arguments.

§ 44. In the fifth, he touches upon the end, when he says: In which by the Lord's, etc. And a sincere profession of faith is the end per se; but the betrayal of heresy is the end per accidens: and it happens that these ends are attained by one and the same act, because the manifestation of truth is the destruction of falsity. Hence, Dionysius in his Epistle to Polycarp the Bishop: "Whatever this is according to the law of truth, when it has been rightly demonstrated and stands pure, everything that holds otherwise, and simulates the truth, will be reprehended, etc."[42]

§ 45. In the sixth and last, he touches upon the threefold mode of acting: namely, of attaining to the access of truth through reasons of faith, and by excluding errors, and this, there: The access of demonstrating. Secondly, he touches upon the mode between the subtle and the gross, when he says: Having tempered between both. Thirdly, he touches upon the mode between one's own invention and another's, there: But if anywhere too little, etc.

§ 46. And the lamp of truth, etc. "Neither do men light a candle [lamp] and put it under a bushel, etc."[43] Now, a lamp is a light in an earthen vessel; and here it is placed for the understanding of reason within the letter: because, as the Commentator on the first chapter of On the Divine Names says: "Authority is nothing else than the truth discovered by reason, committed to writing for the utility of posterity."

§ 47. It follows:

§ 48. He has not departed from the paternal bounds. The Master acted just as Dionysius teaches, in the book On the Divine Names: "Universally, one must not dare to say, nor even to think,

5. Pseudo-Dionysius, De Divinis Nominibus, c. 1, § 1.

anything else concerning the supersubstantial and hidden divinity, beyond those things which have been divinely expressed to us from the sacred oracles."[44]

§ 49. Therefore, this labor ought not, etc. This is the second part of the entire prologue, in which the utilities of this volume on the part of the listener or reader are determined. And he touches upon three things, namely, to whom it is useful, namely to the industrious unlearned [man]: and first he notes study, which implies some difficulty in the work; but secondly he notes a lack of science, which produces inquiry, because nothing is sought unless it is not possessed. Secondly, he touches upon the reason for its utility from

brevity, when he says: In a brief volume, etc. Thirdly, he touches upon the reason for its utility from the matter, when he says: The sentences of the Fathers. And note that Avicenna says that a "sentence" is a definite and most certain conception. Isaac, moreover, in the Book of Definitions says almost the same thing thus: "A sentence is the conception of one part of a contradiction." And from the certitude of these sentences which are collected here, it is called the Book of Sentences.

§ 50. Now in this treatise, etc. Here the last part of the entire prologue is touched upon, in which the Author touches upon his habitude toward his readers. And he touches upon three things, namely, what kind of reader he desires: that is, pious, faithful, and benevolent out of charity. Hence Bernard on the Canticles: "Before the flesh has been tamed by the studies of discipline and enslaved to the spirit, before the pomp and burden of the world have been spurned and cast away, holy reading is unworthily presumed upon by the impure."[45]

§ 51. Secondly, he touches upon what kind of corrector he wishes to have, and where: namely, a free one. Now, a corrector is free, just as a man is free. But the Philosopher says that we call a man free when he is for his own sake, and not for another's;[46] so too a corrector is free, when he corrects solely for the sake of correction, and not for the sake of mockery or envy. And concerning this, Augustine speaks well thus: "I shall love more to be examined by the upright, than I shall fear to be bitten by the perverse. For most beautiful and modest charity gratefully receives the kiss of the dove; but most cautious humility either avoids the tooth of the dog, or most solid truth blunts it: and I shall desire rather to be reprehended by anyone, than to be praised either by one who errs or by one who flatters."[47]

§ 52. Thirdly, he terminates the prologue in this, that he adjoins titles for easier finding.

DISTINCTIO I

Expositio Textus

Exposition of the Text.

§ 53. The letter is expounded thus:

6. Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermones in Cantica Canticorum.

§ 54. By the preceding grace of God, because the intellect of sacred Scripture requires revelation; hence: "Open thou my eyes, and I will consider the wondrous things of thy law."

§ 55. With diligent investigation, that is, with diligent inquiry.

§ 56. Again and again, because [it is done] through reading and meditation, or reason and revelation, or literally and mystically.

§ 57. Studious speculation, regarding the exercise.

§ 58. Modest, lest the limits of faith be transgressed.

§ 59. First concerning things, in the first three books: and afterwards concerning signs, we shall discourse, in the fourth book.

§ 60. BUT TO THE CONTRARY: 1. He already said above that things are learned through signs. But the principle of knowing something is prior to it. Therefore, one must treat of signs before things.

§ 61. 2. Furthermore, a sign causes the knowledge of a thing; therefore it is prior to it.

§ 62. Solution. This would be true if the sign and the thing were taken in the same order, namely, that the sign were the sign of that thing concerning which there is speech. But this is not true, because "things" are the enjoyable and the usable, the ones enjoying and the ones using, which are not per se signified by those signs that are treated in the fourth book. And therefore that objection does not proceed.

Divisio Textus

§ 63. Of the Old and New Law, etc. The doctrine of this book, which proceeds in the mode of disputation and is ordered toward the perfection of the intellect according to the science of Theology, is divided into three total parts. In the first of these, in a prooemial mode, he proposes the things concerning which, as parts of a subject, this doctrine is about. In the second, however, he executes the queries concerning the subject and its parts, so that science may be had of the subject and its properties [passions]. But because the matter is diffusely treated through four parts in the book, and certain parts of it are hidden, while others are more manifest (as those concerning eternal things, and those concerning the things that will be after the end of the world, are hidden; but those concerning created things are more manifest), therefore in the Epilogue at the end of the book he repeats the things concerning which he has spoken.

§ 64. Now the second part begins at the beginning of the second Distinction of the first book, there: This therefore by a true and pious faith, etc. But the third begins at the end of the fourth book, there: These concerning the feet.

§ 65. The first of these parts is contained in this present Distinction, and is divided into two parts. For in the first part, by dividing and defining through the authorities of the Saints, he investigates those things concerning which he will treat as a subject. Secondly, about to

7. Aristotle, Metaphysics, I, 2, 982b25.

execute them, he summarily collects them and touches upon the order in which he executes them: and this is in the last chapter of this Distinction, there: Of all those things therefore which have been said, etc.

§ 66. The first of these is further divided into two: in the first of which, through authorities and divisions and distinctions, he inquires: Concerning what, as its subject, is the whole of Theology? But secondly he touches upon the surrounding doubts of what he has determined, there: C, But it is to be noted that the same Augustine, etc.

§ 67. The first of these is further subdivided into two, according to the fact that two things are required for a science: namely, that it be known what it is about as its subject, and that it be known what is sought concerning it (that is, which properties [passions] of that subject and its parts, or which of its properties, are to be investigated). The first of these

contains the first chapter, where the Master proves that the treatise of Theology deals with things and signs. The second, however, begins in the second chapter, there: B, Therefore, that [is to be considered] in things, etc. And this is introduced because both things and signs are of a more common signification than is intended in this science; and therefore not all properties of things, nor all properties of signs, are inquired into here. Thus, it is necessary to determine according to which properties things and signs are to be inquired into.

Articulus 1 — How The Subject Of Theology Is Investigated

How does he investigate the subject of Theology?

§ 68. But an objection is raised against this definition, just as the Philosopher says:

§ 69. 1. Because concerning a subject, it is necessary to leave and suppose that it is. Therefore, if it is necessary to presuppose it, the Author does badly by investigating the subject of this science.

§ 70. 2. Again, Avicenna says in the first book of his First Philosophy that in no science is the subject and what is sought in it the same. But, as the Author says, the speculation of Theology is concerned with things and signs. Therefore, things and signs ought not to be sought in it. But the Author seeks them; therefore, he errs.

§ 71. The response to this is that one may consider a science in two ways. In one way, in comparison to the matter of which it is a science, and thus it is properly called a science, and it does not seek its own subject, but supposes it. In another way, insofar as it is a doctrine which has to proceed by a more facile mode of learning (as the Philosopher says), and thus certain sciences investigate their subjects: especially when they are hidden, as in the high sciences, of which the highest is Theology. And through this the solution to both is clear.

§ 72. In the first chapter, therefore, the Master touches upon five things. The first of which is the proof of the subject, through what leads into it, which is the preceding grace of God. The second is the proof of it through authority, there: For as the egregious Doctor Augustine, etc. The

8. Augustine, De Trinitate, II, Prooemium, 1.

third is the exemplification of things and signs, there: Now properly here, etc. The fourth is the conclu-
sion toward the other, namely that anyone notices this to be the form of Scripture, there: And when he has directed his intention to these, etc. The fifth and last is concerning the order of proceeding in the parts, there: Therefore, concerning these by us, etc. The letter is clear from the definition.

Articulus 2 — What The Subject Of Theology Is

What is the subject of Theology?

§ 73. But an objection is raised concerning what he says, that sacred Scripture is about things and signs.

§ 74. And four things are asked: of which the first is, what is the subject of Theology? The second, whether it is one science, or many? The third, whether it is speculative, or practical? The fourth concerns the modes of its expositions and proofs.

§ 75. Concerning the first it is proceeded thus: 1. Augustine says here that it is concerned with things and signs. And those things with which a science is concerned, by inquiring into their properties [passions] and differences, are its subjects. Therefore, things and signs are the subject of Theology.

§ 76. 2. But to the contrary: Master Hugh says in the first book On the Sacraments that the works of restoration are the matter of sacred Scripture, whereas the works of foundation are the matter of the other sciences.[48] But not all things pertain to the works of restoration. Therefore, things universally are not the subject, or a part of the subject, of this science.

§ 77. 3. Furthermore, Theology is named from Theos which is God, and logos, speech. Therefore, it is primarily about God. And the speech of a science is about its subject. Therefore, it seems that it is a science concerning God as its subject.

§ 78. 4. Again, sciences differ in nobility according to the difference and nobility of their subjects, as Priscian says. Since therefore Theology is the most noble science, it will be of the most noble subject; and this is none other than God. Therefore, God is its subject.

§ 79. 5. But further, it seems that the literal and the spiritual are the subject, because they are universally treated in it. Now, that is the subject with which a science is universally concerned. Therefore, the literal and the spiritual are the subject of Theology.

§ 80. Solution. It must be said that the "subject" of a science is spoken of in multiple ways: namely, generally and specially. Generally, in such a way that everything that is treated in a science is said to be the subject or a part of the subject. And in this way what Augustine says is true, that things and signs are the subject. Nevertheless, not absolutely insofar as they are things, nor absolutely insofar as they are signs; but insofar as they contribute in some way to the participation of beatitude. And Augustine notes this when he subjoins below, saying: But this is to be considered in things, that some things are those which are to be enjoyed, etc. As if to say:

9. Matt 5:15.

Theology does not speculate upon things absolutely insofar as they are things, but as they are ordered to the perfection of beatitude and fruition—toward which some are ordered as beatifying, but others as assisting and disposing toward beatitude, like useful things. It must similarly be said of signs, that they are not considered in the general acceptation of signs, but insofar as they demonstrate without containing, or demonstrate by containing, grace, which is the proper disposition to beatitude.

§ 81. In another way, a "subject" is spoken of specially, as that with which a science negotiates by proving properties (which are called passions) and differences concerning it through principles, namely proper ones. And in this way certain ancients said that the "credible" generally accepted is the subject of Theology. I call the "credible generally accepted" the preamble to an article [of faith], such as that God is truthful, that God is, that sacred Scripture was made by the Holy Spirit, that Scripture cannot fail, and things of this sort. And likewise the articles, which according to the division of those who published the I believe in God, are twelve; but according to another division, which is according to the things to be believed posited in the I believe in one God, are fourteen. And also that which follows upon those two on the part of good morals, such as that fornication is a mortal sin, and things of this sort. For concerning these, everything that is proven in sacred Scripture is proven. But a "special" subject is called that which is more worthy among the things considered in a science; and thus the subject of this science is God, from whom it is denominated. Yet He is not its subject merely absolutely, but according as He is the Alpha and the Omega, the principle and the end. Because thus those things which are in Him are considered in this science as principles from Him, which represent the marks of their maker: just as Augustine says, that all things cry out, "He made us, and not we ourselves."[49] But according as He is the end, thus are considered things ordered on account of Him to that end, as ordering dispositions, such as virtues, gifts, sacraments, and things of this sort.

Therefore, it must be said to the first [objection] that Augustine touches upon the subject according to its general acceptation, as has been said.

To another it must be said that the works of restoration are taken broadly by Hugh, insofar as they attain to restoration in any mode whatsoever, namely, as restoring effectively, such as God the Trinity; or by way of a mediator, such as the Word incarnate and having suffered; or by way of disposing, such as the differences of graces; or by way of showing, such as the signs of the old and new law.

To another it must be said that that objection proceeds well concerning the subject most specially spoken of, as is evident from what was previously established. Through the same also the solution to the following [objection] is evident.

To the last it must be said that the literal and the spiritual do not touch upon that which is the subject in this science, but rather a certain mode of its exposition, insofar as it is a doctrine, as will be said below.

10. Pseudo-Dionysius, De Divinis Nominibus, c. 1, § 1.

Articulus 3 — Whether Theology Is One Science Or Several

Whether Theology is one science, or many?

Secondly it is asked, whether it is one science? And it seems that it is not: because

§ 1. The Philosopher says that a science is one which is of one genus of subject but things and signs are not of one genus of subject: therefore there is not one science concerning them.

§ 2. Moreover, in this science it is treated of the life of the Patriarchs, of the state of the Angels, of the creation of the universe of things, and of morals, and of divine things, which are treated by the Philosophers in diverse sciences: therefore it seems that this science is not one science.

§ 3. Furthermore, the Philosopher says that there is one science which speculates on being as being, and those things which belong to being insofar as it is being and this is not one of the particular sciences, but is a universal science: therefore since thing and being are convertible, the science considering things as things, and those things which belong to a thing, will not be one particular science, but universal. Then thus: A universal science, although it is not united by one genus, is nevertheless united by proportion to one thing, just as first Philosophy which considers the parts of being, insofar as they look back to substance by analogy: therefore it seems that this science ought to do likewise: but it is evident that the things which are sought and treated in it cannot thus be reduced to one thing: therefore it seems that it is one neither by genus nor by proportion: thus it is in no way one.

Solution. It must be said that this science is one by proportion not to one thing that is the subject of others, just as substance is the subject of accidents: but by proportion to one thing that is the beatifying end: because in this way the beatifiable thing will be considered as participating in it, and the beatifying dispositions as removing [us] from its contrary: and the things of this world as aiding and supporting: as is plainly evident in the Letter from the authorities of Augustine.

To the first it must be said that although the things treated in this science are not one in supposit and subject, they are nonetheless one in the rationale of the said proportion.

To another it must be said that the created things in the world, and the life of the Patriarchs, and the like, are not considered in this science according to themselves, but according to a determinate rationale: for if this science were to consider the elements of the world and the things composed of elements, it would have to inquire about the principles of their actions and passions, and the other properties which are inquired into in natural Philosophy. But it receives them insofar as they come into the use of him who progresses towards beatitude: into use, I say, according to my intellect in thinking through them upon the Creator, or according to work in aiding toward beatitude, according to what is said in Canticles 2:6: His left hand is under my head, etc. Similarly, it receives the acts of the Fathers not as particular acts, because in this way there is no science of them: but as certain examples which have the force of principles in morals or in faith: for in the science which is [given] so that we may become good,

11. Luke 17:12.

that mode is more proper which is through examples, because they are more apt for works than universals: and thus it is evident how all the acts of the Fathers fall into one useful rationale, and in this mode they belong to this science.

To another it must be said that this science is not universal by the universality of being, or of a subject, as first Philosophy is: because it does not receive things insofar as they are things, but rather (as was established above from the authority of Augustine) where he determines what the treatise of this science considers in things.

Articulus 4 — Whether Theology Is A Speculative Science Or A Practical Science

Whether Theology is a speculative science, or a practical one?

Thirdly it is asked, whether it is a speculative science, or a practical one? And it seems that it is not practical: because

§ 1. Thus says the Philosopher: All practical [sciences] are sought for the sake of another, because [they are] for the sake of work: and therefore none of them is worthy to be called by the name of a free wisdom but this science is most worthy: therefore it is not sought for the sake of another, and is principally called by the name of wisdom, and among all it is the most free: therefore it is not practical.

§ 2. Moreover, the perfect in a science and the imperfect do not differ in genus: but the perfection of this science is the contemplation of God in the homeland: therefore the science which is on the way, although more imperfect, is towards the same thing: but the contemplation of truth, especially of the first and highest truth, is the perfection of the speculative intellect: therefore it seems that this science is speculative.

BUT AGAINST THIS: § 3. The life of the Fathers, prophecy, and the Gospels, and the law, and the epistles, and all the things singly which are in it, are precepts tending toward the observation of the commandments in work: therefore it will be moral, or subalternated to it.

§ 4. Moreover, James 1:25: He who looks into the perfect law of liberty, and continues therein, not becoming a forgetful hearer, but a doer of the work, this man shall be blessed in his deed: therefore it seems that it is for work, and not for speculation.

Solution. It must be said that this science is to be determined from its end: but the end is stated, to Titus 1:1 and 2, where it is said: Paul, a servant of God, and an apostle of Jesus Christ, according to the acknowledgment of the truth which is according to piety, unto the hope of life everlasting. And there the Gloss says, according to piety, that is, the religion of Christ. And he says this for the reason that there is truth in the liberal arts, but which pertains not at all to the Christian religion. But of the truth which is according to piety, there are two things: one, namely, according to piety is the worship of God in oneself and in one's members, to which pertain all things promoting that worship. But the other is the end of the intention, and this is to be conjoined in intellect, in affection, and in substance with Him who is worshipped, insofar as He is the beatifying end: and therefore this science is properly affective, that is, [it

12. Heb 11:2.

is] of a truth which is not separated from the rationale of the good, and therefore it perfects both the intellect and the affection. But such an end is not found in created things: and therefore the Philosophers did not treat of such a science: but they divided one toward the true which is in things, and another toward the good which is in them.

To the first objection, therefore, it must be said that this science is most principally called wisdom, because it is of the highest things, and in the highest mode: because it is of God through the principles of faith: but the other sciences which were invented by the Philosophers, even if they are called wisdoms because they are of high things, are nevertheless not in the highest mode, but rather through principles which are under reason. Thus I also say, that it either alone is free, or freer than the others: for a science is called free (as the Philosopher says) just as a free man, namely, because it is for its own sake, and not for the sake of another: and this is on account of the known thing which is sought in it, which is desired for its own sake: but this is principally God, whom all desire to know by a beatifying science: and therefore it is free, because this known thing is not sought for the sake of another, but for its own sake.

To that which is further objected, it must be said that cognition towards truth is not sought through the intellect alone, but through the affection and substance: and therefore it is not intellective, but affective: because the intellect is ordered to the affection as to an end.

To another thing which is objected against this, it must be said that the end of that doctrine is determined by the Apostle, to Titus 1:9, where it is said: Embracing that faithful word which is according to doctrine, that he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine, and to convince the gainsayers. But the end of the science is twofold, namely the ultimate, and that which is ordered to it. That which by some is called the ultimate end, is the beatifying affective truth: but the end short of that is, that we may become good. Nor yet does it follow that it is moral Philosophy, or subalternated to it: it is not moral, because morals are not the ultimate end in it, as has been established: it is not subalternated, because a subalternated science receives the principles and causes of the subalternating one: but this science does not receive from any [other], but has its own principles of faith and its own causes according to the intention of merit, and therefore it does not receive from others, but the others are handmaids to it.

Articulus 5 — On The Modes Of Expounding Sacred Scripture

Concerning the modes of expounding sacred Scripture.

Fourthly and lastly, it is asked concerning the mode of its expositions and probations.

And it is objected thus: Every science distinct from others has its own governing habit and its own instrument, by which it proceeds to use and to work, just as rational Philosophy has opinion, and the syllogism, or argument: this science is distinct from others: therefore it has its own governing habit in it, and an instrument.

13. Prov 22:28.

Which we concede, saying that its habit is the light of faith: but the instrument is twofold according to the twofold end of the doctrine and art, which twofold end is promised in the authority of the Apostle, namely, to exhort in sound doctrine, and to convince the gainsayers.

And with respect to exhortation it has a fourfold exposition, namely the historical, allegorical, moral, and anagogical: the number of which modes can be taken in a twofold way, namely with respect to the expositor, and with respect to the things expounded.

With respect to the expositor thus: First there occurs the sense showing the history, and therefore the historical sense is in the intellect insofar as it reflects upon sense. But there surround the intellect three things still, namely the illuminating habit which is faith, and thus in it there is the allegorical sense which builds up faith, as Gregory says. Practical intellect also surrounds it, and thus in it through reflection upon praxis or work, there is the moral sense. The third thing which surrounds it, is the beatifying end, and thus in it through conversion to it, there is the anagogical sense. But since no more things surround the intellect, there are no more senses of Scripture.

With respect to the things expounded this number is taken thus: Scripture can be considered with respect to what is intended by the writer, or with respect to what is intended by the Spirit inspiring and illuminating. If in the first mode, thus is the historical sense: if in the second mode, the intent by the Spirit is either with respect to the way, or with respect to the homeland: if with respect to the way, either according to the truth of faith, and thus is the allegorical sense: or according to the good of works, and thus is the moral: but if the intent is with respect to the homeland, then it is anagogical.

But insofar as it is the end, namely to convince the gainsayers, it has another mode. For a contradictor is not refuted except by two means, namely by the probation of truth, and by the manifestation of error. But this does not occur except through an appropriate argumentation taken from the rationale of authority, or of natural reason, or of an appropriate similitude: and thus in this mode such an argumentation will be its instrument, and (as is evident in the proemium) this mode belongs to the science of this book, but the other modes are observed in the Bible.

Articulus 6 — Whether The Division Into Things And Signs Is Good

Whether the division into things and signs is a good one?

But we must return again to the Letter, to that which Augustine says: All doctrine is either of things, or of signs, etc.

§ 1. For this division does not seem to be by opposites: because, as he says below: Every sign is also some thing: therefore one of the dividing parts is predicated of the other, and thus it is not by opposites.

§ 2. Moreover, when Augustine says, All doctrine, such is either understood of universal doctrine, or of the doctrine of sacred Scripture. If universally, then it seems to be false: because

14. 2 Tim 4:3.

Avicenna says that some sciences are of the things of nature: but some are of those things which are done by us: but some are of those things which are done by the intellect, such as to know concerning speech: but some are of those things which are done by mere will, as the moral sciences: and thus it seems that things and signs do not universally comprehend all doctrine, especially insofar as sign here is taken for a sacrament demonstrating and causing grace. But if it is understood of this doctrine only, then it still seems to be false: because some things are things and signs, like the baptismal character, and the true body of Christ, and the like.

§ 3. Furthermore, whatever is in sacred Scripture is received as a sign. PROOF: For to the ancients all things happened in a figure. But all the things of the world are received in the rationale of signifying the Creator: therefore it is the same doctrine concerning things and concerning signs: therefore not either of things, or of signs under opposition, as Augustine says.

TO THIS IT MUST BE SAID, that this division is not by opposite things, but by opposite rationales. But these rationales are the absolute, or the related to another according to the rationale of signifying. But a thing is called here absolute: because the intention of the name thing does not state a relation to something, just as a sign states the relation of a sign to the signified: which is proven by the rationale of a sign posited in the beginning of the fourth book: A sign is that which, besides the species which it brings to the senses, causes something else to come into knowledge. But a thing in an absolute understanding is taken apart from the rationale of a sign, and although it is sometimes taken in the rationale of the useful, and thus is related to something, then even that relation does not have the rationale of the relation of a sign: and thus it is evident, that it is by opposite rationales, although the supposits may sometimes be the same.

To another it must be said that just as in the original in the first book, namely, of Christian Doctrine, Augustine understands [it] universally of all doctrine: but then thing is received, whether it be caused by nature, or by our work. But sign is taken broadly for that which is instituted to signify: and thus it is evident how it comprehends the division of the Philosopher. But if we say that it is taken specially for the doctrine of sacred Scripture, then the whole is of things and signs, just as was set forth above in the question concerning the subject of Theology.

To that which is objected, that the thing and the sign are the same, it must be said that they are not according to the same respect, nor according to the same rationale: just as the character is a sign of grace, and the thing of the exterior washing: and the true body of Christ is a thing with respect to the visible species, and a sign with respect to the subsequent grace.

Articulus 7 — Whether The Sacraments Of The Old Law Conferred Grace

Whether the sacraments of the old law conferred grace?

15. Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermones in Cantica Canticorum.

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, that Of these, namely signs, there are some, of which the whole use is in signifying, not in justifying, etc. For from this it seems that the sacraments of the old law conferred grace.

§ 1. For the Apostle, to Galatians 3:12, says of the Fathers of the law: He who does them, shall live in them: but life is not except through grace: therefore the works of the sacraments of the old law conferred grace.

§ 2. Moreover, Hugh of St. Victor in the book on the Sacraments, in the eighth part of the first book, says thus: From the time that man, having fallen from the state of first incorruption, began to be sick in the body through mortality, and in the soul through iniquity, immediately God, by way of repairing man, prepared medicine in His sacraments: but He did not prepare [them] then except through the sacraments of the old law: therefore they were medicine, and not except through grace: therefore, etc.

BUT AGAINST THIS: § 1. The Apostle, to Galatians 3:21: If there had been a law given which could justify, truly justice should have been by the law: but by the law there is not justice: therefore the law from its legal sacraments could not justify.

§ 2. Moreover, to Hebrews 9:10, it is said that they were justifications of the flesh imposed until the time of correction: therefore they were not justifications of the spirit.

§ 3. Moreover, in the same place, v. 13: The ashes of an heifer sprinkled sanctifieth the defiled to the cleansing of the flesh.

§ 4. Moreover, in the same place, v. 9: They could never make the comer perfect: therefore they did not justify.

§ 5. Moreover, to Hebrews 10:1: The law having a shadow of the good things to come, not the very image, etc.

FURTHERMORE it is asked additionally, why the Master says, that some legal sacraments [did not confer grace], as though some had conferred grace, and some not?

And it is commonly said that he says this on account of circumcision which conferred grace, as Bede and Gregory say, thus: Circumcision provided in the law the same help of a salutary cure against the wound of original sin, which baptism has been accustomed to do in the time of revealed grace, except that it did not open the door of the heavenly kingdom.

BUT AGAINST THIS: § 1. A sacrament does not cause except through the mode by which it signifies: but circumcision does not signify except through removal: therefore it does not cause except that which is removed: but grace is not removed, but sin is: therefore it did not cause the conferring of grace.

§ 2. Moreover, a removal in part is not a sign of removal in whole: but in circumcision only a part was removed: therefore it did not cause the removal of that which is removed in whole, but the removal of that which was removed in part: but this is the penalty of concupiscence, and not the sin: because the sin was removed in whole, but the proneness in part: therefore

16. Aristotle, Metaphysics, I, 2, 982b25.

circumcision did not cause anything except the diminution of the proneness of concupiscence, and not the removal of sin.

SOLUTION. It must be said that there was a threefold difference between the sacraments of the old and the new law: of which the first and principal is taken on the part of the sacrament by which it causes that which it designates. For the former only signified grace: but ours signify, and cause. The second is according to Hugh of St. Victor, which is taken on the part of the mode of signifying, namely, that the former signified our sacraments, and thus were signs of signs: but ours signify grace, and are signs of things. The third is that by the former (as Hugh says) the ancient just were imbued, who did not enter the door of the heavenly kingdom: but by ours the unjust are imbued, or those who wish to lay aside injustice, and they have opened the door of the heavenly kingdom. Whence the Master speaks the truth.

To that which is objected against this, it must be said that the Apostle, to Galatians 3:12, speaks of the decalogue, and not of the works of the sacraments. Or it may be said (as the ancient Masters said, and well) that there is the work of the worker (opus operantis), and there is the operation itself (opus operatum), and this is considered according to the root from which it proceeds, which in the ancient saints was the charity of God instituting the sacraments, and the obedience of the law, and with respect to this they conferred life. But there is the worked work (opus operatum) such as a sacrificed goat or calf, and this conferred nothing: but in the sacraments of the new law it confers both.

To another it must be said that there is a preparation according to the rationale of signifying, and this God made from the beginning of the world from when man sinned, both in the law of nature, and to Moses. There is also a preparation of medicine according to the rationale of causing, and this He did not exhibit until the inception of the New Testament.

But the authorities which are adduced to the contrary, speak of the worked works.

To that which is further objected concerning circumcision, it must be said that as the objection proves, circumcision did not delete sin except indirectly. How this was is evident thus: Original fault and that guilt which is the lack of the vision of God, were annexed, and similarly annexed to these is the burning of the fomes [of sin]: and if the sin ought to be removed directly, it would be necessary that something per se would remove the sin, and consequently would diminish the burning of the fomes: but now circumcision in the person diminishes the burning which is removed in part: but because this cannot be diminished unless the guilt of lack and the fault be removed, which cannot be removed in part but [only] in whole: therefore as a consequence circumcision removes the fault. And this is what the ancient Masters said, that circumcision not per se, but through the merit of faith deleted the fault: and it did not signify this directly, but indirectly, positing its signified thing upon that which is posterior according to nature in the deletion of sin. But because a man cannot be in a middle state between fault and grace: therefore the conferring of grace follows the deletion of fault, and thus indirectly, by accident, it conferred grace, and on account of this it is excepted by the

17. Augustine, De Trinitate, II, Prooemium, 1.

Master from the other sacraments of the old law, which in no way according to themselves conferred grace: not for the reason that circumcision is from the law, but from the fathers.

To the authority of Bede it must be said that it did confer, but not in the same mode: because baptism [by] a direct operation, but circumcision indirect.

Expositio Textus

Exposition of the Text

The letter of this part is expounded thus:

To arrive, through faith and hope.

And to adhere to them, through charity.

If nevertheless it ought to be called a thing. This happens for the reason that names of this kind, according to how they fall into our intellect, signify created things or modes of creatures which do not pertain to God, just as (he says here) the very thing I speak of, res (thing) draws its signification from reor, reris (I think, you think), and thus it seems to say sometimes a being in opinion: and these do not pertain to God.

If nevertheless also a cause, because a cause is that which something follows of necessity, and God does not cause anything of necessity. Also: because a cause is proportioned to the caused thing: but God is not proportioned to any of His caused things.

A name cannot be found, etc. Anselm renders the cause of this in the Monologion, saying, that although the highest essence is named from all things which it is better to be than not to be, nevertheless if these names be accepted according to what they sound [like] among us, according to the rationales of the names they do not pertain to God, although according to the thing itself they pertain to God prior to the creature: according to the name it sounds among us that it is a subject to accidents, and thus it does not pertain to God. Similarly, essence among us is that which causes being in a composite, and thus again it does not pertain to God. And Dionysius says the same, that affirmations regarding God are disjointed [loose], but negations are true.

That the invisible things of God might be clearly seen, being understood through the things that are made, [happens] in two ways, namely through aspect, and through the relation of the useful they may be acquired to them.

And this he intimates through the following when he says: That is, as of temporal things, etc.: We enjoy known things, in which very things the delighted will rests for their own sake, that is, it rests together with the other powers because it has been said that to enjoy is an act of the will, according as the will is conjoined to the intellect, and to the other powers.

18. Matt 5:15.

Articulus 8 — Whether Things Are Well Divided Into Things To Be Enjoyed And Things To Be Used

Whether things are well divided into enjoyable things, and useful things?

It follows: Therefore that in things, etc.

In this part the Master determines what is to be sought in things, because things according to their generality, in that they are things, are not sought here: and he posits the division of things according as they come into this speculation, namely, that they are enjoyable things, or useful things, or those enjoying and using.

And he manifests this division in four modes, namely, from the effect, when he says: Those things which are to be enjoyed, etc. Secondly, from the act which is of the enjoyer upon the enjoyable thing, and of the user upon the useful thing, there, But to enjoy, etc. Thirdly, from the supposits, there, Therefore the things which are to be enjoyed, etc. Fourthly, from property, there, In the same in all things, etc. And through these the sentence of this part is evident.

But a doubt arises concerning the first division which he posits saying, that of things some are to be enjoyed,

§ 1. In every division the divided thing is simpler than the dividing parts, and it is by participation in each one of them: therefore this divided thing is also simpler than the things, and is in them by participation. But if this is granted, AGAINST THIS: The enjoyable thing is God: therefore God participates in something simpler than Himself, and thus He will be composite.

§ 2. Moreover, in every division the divided thing is common to the dividing parts: but the dividing parts are Creator and creature: therefore something is univocal to Creator and creature, which is false. The PROOF consists in this, that this division is not of an equivocal [term] in its significations: because the divided thing would not be permitted plurally, just as we do not say: Of dogs (canes), one is capable of barking, another is a heavenly star, etc.

§ 3. Moreover, it is not a division of an accident, since the substantial parts are divided: for things are not accidentally predicated of enjoyable things and useful things.

Solution. It must be said that nothing is common to Creator and creature univocally: nor even by such an analogy that the same thing is participated in prior and posterior ways by Creator and creature: because the Creator has nothing by participation, but by essence and substance. But there is a community of proportion to one thing, which substantially convenes first to the Creator: but from Him, and posteriorly under Him, and to Him, it convenes to the creature: just as life, wisdom, and the good convene to the Creator, and to the creature.

THEREFORE IT MUST BE SAID to the first argument, that it does not proceed unless the divided thing were to convene univocally to the dividing parts, which is not true, as is evident from what has been said.

Through the same the solution to the others is evident which are concerning a divided thing univocally convening to dividing parts: nor do I say, however, that it convenes to the

dividing parts altogether equivocally, but it convenes by prior and posterior according to a determinate mode of prior and posterior.

Articulus 9 — Whether Beatitude Is To Be Enjoyed

Whether happiness is to be enjoyed?

Then it is objected against this which he says: Those which are to be enjoyed, etc.

§ 1. For happiness makes us happy: therefore happiness is to be enjoyed. If perhaps it should be said, as it is commonly solved, that when Augustine says that the things which are to be enjoyed make us happy, it is understood effectively: but happiness makes us happy formally: just as whiteness makes [a thing] white formally, and a painter makes it white effectively: and therefore happiness is not to be enjoyed: because it does not make us happy effectively. If, I say, it should be said thus, AGAINST THIS: Happiness is that after which nothing else is desired. PROOF: Happiness (as Boethius says) is the state made perfect by the aggregation of all goods therefore after happiness nothing else of desirable things remains: but the ultimate is that which we enjoy, because this quiets desire: therefore we enjoy happiness.

§ 2. Furthermore, all useful things are to be referred to happiness, as Augustine says: therefore happiness is not referred to another: therefore we enjoy happiness: because we enjoy that which we desire for its own sake and not for the sake of another.

§ 3. Furthermore, either happiness is referred to another, or not: if so, AGAINST THIS: Whatever is referred to another, this is outside that to which it is referred: happiness is referred to another: therefore some of the goods is outside the referred happiness: therefore it is not the state made perfect by the aggregation of all goods, which is false. But if it is not referred to anything: therefore we adhere to it for its own sake: therefore not except by love: therefore we enjoy happiness: because we enjoy that to which we adhere by love for its own sake.

SOLUTION. It must be said that happiness is twofold, namely, created, which is put together from the goods of grace crossing over into glory, and this is the formal perfection of the blessed, elevating them to the point that they may be immediately conjoined to God. But the other happiness is uncreated, and this is substantial happiness, and is considered in two modes, namely as participated by the Saints, and thus it is God as the highest good in the Saints and the blessed: or as in itself, and thus it is happiness as in the object of happiness. I say therefore, that we enjoy uncreated happiness in both modes: but we use created happiness with the taste of the joy of fruition, because it unites us to the enjoyable thing. But we concede the common solution, that created happiness formally beatifies us, while uncreated [beatifies us] effectively as in an object, and as parti-

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participated through the substance of the highest good itself.

20. Luke 17:12.
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§ 1. To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that after formal beatitude, something else is desired: because the uncreated good is beatifying, as has been said. And to the definition of Boethius, it must be said that it is understood concerning participated uncreated beatitude: because otherwise not all goods will be in it, since the greatest of goods would be lacking without which nothing is good.

§ 2. To the other, it must be said that created beatitude is referred to uncreated beatitude: but nevertheless it is itself useful, in relation to which the fruit of uncreated beatitude is already tasted.

§ 3. To the other, it must be said in the same way.

Articulus 10 — Whether Creatures Help Man Toward Beatitude

Do creatures help human beings toward beatitude?

Next, it is inquired concerning that which he says: Those things which are to be used, tending toward beatitude, etc.

§ 1. For to the contrary seems to be what is said in Wisdom 14:11: The creatures of God have been made into a hatred, and a temptation for the souls of men, and a snare for the feet of the unwise: therefore it seems that they rather impede from beatitude than promote it.

§ 2. Again, Augustine in the book Of Confessions: "Woe to those who love your nods in place of you" .

§ 3. Solution. The force is in what he says, tending: for he implies that those who do not tend are not helped. Or better it may be said, that every creature, insofar as it shows a sign of the Creator and offers a use, helps toward beatitude, but insofar as there is a corrupted affection concerning it on the part of the one who ought to use it, it impedes and draws back, and this is by accident. And note that it promotes in three ways, namely by showing the way through a trace, and this is general to every creature: or by helping nature toward necessity and solace, like food, clothes, and the like: or thirdly, by bringing a human being back into a cognition of his own infirmity and misery, as do those things which exercise a human being.

Articulus 11 — Whether Men Are Intermediate Between Things To Be Used And Things To Be Enjoyed

Are human beings intermediaries between things to be used and things to be enjoyed?

Next, it is inquired concerning that which he says: Things indeed which enjoy and use, etc.

To the contrary: § 1. Below he says that we use human beings whom we love, and also Angels: therefore human beings and Angels are contained under things to be used: therefore they do not make a third member in the division.

21. Heb 11:2.

§ 2. Again, everything that is, is either an end, or for the end: but just as the end and that which is for the end differ, so do the useable and the enjoyable differ: therefore everything that is, is either useable or enjoyable: and thus he errs by appending a third member.

§ 3. Moreover, it is inquired further concerning that which he says: Constituted between both, etc. For from this it seems that useable things are below the human being, and enjoyable things above him. But to the contrary: Augustine in the book On Free Choice: "Virtues without which it cannot be lived rightly, and by which it is lived rightly, are maximum goods: but the powers of the soul without which it cannot be lived rightly, and by which it is not necessarily lived rightly, are intermediate goods: but the species of any bodies whatsoever, without which it is lived rightly, are minimal goods" therefore it seems a human being is not among intermediate goods.

§ 4. Moreover, we use virtues, as he will say below: and yet Augustine says they themselves are great goods.

§ 5. Again, a greater good is that by which it is lived well and no one uses badly, than that which someone can use badly: but no one uses virtues badly, as is held through Augustine in the second distinction of this volume, dist. 28: therefore virtues are a greater good than the human being.

§ 6. Moreover, that is an intermediary which conjoins the extremes: but the extremes are the beatifying and the beatificable: therefore that which conjoins them is the intermediary: but the useable conjoins them: therefore it itself is the intermediary: therefore we are not the intermediary between useable things and enjoyable things.

§ 7. Solution. It must be said that this division is given according to those things which are required for the progress of the rational creature into God: for three things are required, namely the one progressing, the way, and the terminus. The one progressing is the human being, the way is the useable, and the terminus is the enjoyable.

§ 8. To the first objection to the contrary, therefore, it must be said that according to a broad acceptance of the useable, a human being and an Angel are contained under the useable: but nevertheless they also have another relation to the way into the enjoyable, namely as using and enjoying, and according to this which a human being and an Angel add over and above the useable, they thus constitute a third member in the division.

§ 9. To the other it must be said that the useable, considered in a passive acceptance, does not denote the one using, and thus it does not suppose everything that is for the end, but only that which is as a way to the end, and not that which is as progressing on it: and therefore the end, and that which is for the end, do not altogether relate as the useable and the enjoyable, unless the useable is taken very broadly insofar as it comprehends the one using who is toward the end as progressing, and the useable which is toward the end as a way.

§ 10. To the other it must be said that "good" is taken in one way by Augustine in the book On Free Choice, and in another way here. For there the comparison of the good is attended to

according to the order of a cause to making certitude in life and work: whence a greater good is that which holds itself as an immediate and perfect cause to a good life, such as virtue, than that which holds itself as an insufficient and remote cause, such as the powers of the rational soul, the will, and the intellect, and others, without which indeed life is not right, and yet they do not make it. But the species of bodies, like beauty, health, and the like, only have a slight cause by accident and occasionally toward it. But here the comparison is attended to between the progress toward beatitude and those things which perfect it: and therefore the maximum is the beatifying: the intermediary is that which participates in beatitude: the minimal is that which does not participate, and yet helps toward the participation of it. And it is not unfitting that there be diverse comparisons according to diverse accounts of goods.

§ 11. To the other it must be said that virtues are maximum goods formed according to the perfection of life: but they are lesser in the order toward the participation of beatitude than the rational nature which participates in it according to life and taste. And through this the solution to the following is also evident.

§ 12. To the last it must be said that virtue is an intermediary, and the rational nature is an intermediary in diverse respects: for virtue is intermediate as a conjoining disposition, and similarly created beatitude. But the rational nature is intermediate through the participation of both extremes. For it itself participates in the use of the useable, and the fruit of the beatifying, and thus Augustine speaks here.

Articulus 12 — Whether The First Definition Of The Word To Enjoy Is Good

Is the first definition of the verb "to enjoy" good?

Next, it is inquired concerning that which he says: To enjoy is to inhere by love to a thing for its own sake, etc. For by this that he says, by love, to enjoy seems to be an act of the motive power.

But to the contrary: § 1. To enjoy is the highest act of the homeland according to which a human being inheres in God: therefore it will be of the highest power: but this is the intellective: therefore it seems that to enjoy is an act of intelligence or intellect.

§ 2. Moreover, there is no motion in the motive [power] unless an intellective apprehension first takes place: therefore an inherence (which is a motion) does not take place unless it is first conceived through the intellect: therefore the conception of the enjoyable belongs to the intellect before the will: therefore it ought rather to be defined through a habit of the intellect than of the will.

§ 3. It seems to the contrary, however, that it is not an act of any power: for the proper acts of the powers are denominated from them, as to see from sight, to understand from intellect: but to enjoy is not denominated from any of the powers simply: therefore it seems that it is not singularly an act of any power.

§ 4. If on account of this it is said that it is an act composed from the acts of several powers. To the contrary: As a power relates to a power, so an act to an act: but a power is not

23. 2 Tim 4:3.

composed with a power to perfect a third: therefore neither is an act with an act; therefore to enjoy is not a composite act, nor even simple, as was proved earlier: therefore it is not an act of any power of the soul.

§ 5. Again, if it were a composite act, then it ought to be defined through the habits of several powers: but it is defined only through the habit of one power, namely love: therefore it seems that it is not a composite act of some powers.

Further it is inquired: § 1. Why is it defined through love: for there are three things pertaining to the perfection of inherence, namely vision through faith, comprehension through hope, and inherence through love; therefore to enjoy ought to be defined through all of those.

§ 2. Moreover, every sin separates from God: therefore by opposites every virtue conjoins to God: therefore by any virtue we inhere in God, and not only by love.

Further it is inquired concerning that which he says: To a thing. For by this he seems to signify that we can inhere by love to something other than God for its own sake.

BUT TO THE CONTRARY: § 1. We do not enjoy properly and perfectly and for its own sake, except God, as will be said below: but a thing is defined from that which per se and properly and perfectly belongs to it: therefore to enjoy ought not to be defined through inhering to a thing in general, but to God.

§ 2. Moreover, nothing is natively apt to quiet desire except God alone. Whence Augustine in the first of the Confessions: "You have made us, O Lord, toward you, and our heart is unquiet until it rests in you" . But the inherence of fruition totally quiets desire; therefore it ought not to be defined through just any thing, but through God alone.

But to the contrary: Augustine: "Every human perversity is to enjoy things to be used, and to use things to be enjoyed": therefore it happens also to enjoy other things, therefore not God alone.

Further it is also inquired concerning that which he says: For its own sake.

§ 1. For that to which we inhere on account of love, we do not inhere for its own sake: but we inhere to the enjoyable on account of love: therefore not for its own sake.

§ 2. Moreover, some object thus: To enjoy is to inhere by love, etc., but love is a creature: therefore we inhere to a creature.

§ 3. Moreover, any creature is infinitely distant from the Creator: therefore that which conjoins us through inherence, namely love, is of infinite distance to Him: but it cannot be, because that which conjoins two things must attain to both of the conjoined things.

§ 4. Again, to enjoy, according to Augustine, is to inhere by love to a thing for its own sake: but love itself is loved for its own sake: therefore by love we inhere to love for its own sake: and of that love there is the same account: therefore this will go on to infinity.

24. Cicero, De Inventione (sometimes referred to as Rhetorica), II. Wait, usually refers to Rhetorica ad Herennium, III, 13, 23.

§ 5. Solution. It must be said to the first, that to enjoy is an act of the affect following an act of the intellect insofar as it is of this sort, and not an act of the affect simply. And I call the affect the will, and this is the highest power of the soul: because in it as in a completive its joy is perfected, and the whole affect is quieted. To enjoy is also not taken as something that remains only in speculation: because speculation of itself does not posit inherence, but can be through the distance of the thing from the speculator: but fruit posits a union and a taste of substantial sweetness more intimately founded in the complexion and nature of the thing: and therefore although the intellect is in a higher part of the soul, nevertheless it is not alone there, but also the will; and the perfection of inherence in the fruit belongs to the act of the will.

§ 6. To the other it must be said that habitually or actually, according to the nature of the intellect, it first conceives and contemplates: yet the perfection of inherence and joy does not belong to the conceiving of it, but belongs to the act of the will: and therefore to enjoy is defined through the habit of the will, because the act of the will also completes it.

§ 7. To the other it must be said that the acts of the powers are twofold: for some are of them according to themselves, that is, according as they are referred to their objects absolutely, and those are denominated from them, such as to see, to understand, to will: but some are in them according as one is ordered to another, and then something of the preceding remains in the account of the act of the following power: and there are five such acts in the order of the cognitive powers to each other only, such as to know (scientifically), to believe, to opine, and the like. For to know is not named by the name of any one power: for it is not called intellect, nor reason simply, but reason formed from the principles of which there is intellect: but there are five in the order of the motive [powers] to the cognitive, such as to elect, to use, to enjoy, and the like; and those cannot be denominated from one power: because they are not of one absolutely, but according as it is ordered to the others.

§ 8. To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that a power is not composed with a power to perfect a third power, but is well ordered to it to perfect an act of another account than the one which is its own absolutely.

§ 9. To the other it must be said that in the definition of another thing it is not necessary to posit those things which are by way of preceding dispositions: but it suffices that the completive form be posited, and thus love is posited in the definition of to enjoy, for the reason that in it it is completed and perfected.

§ 10. TO THAT WHICH IS FURTHER INQUIRED, some say that love in the definition of that which is to enjoy, is not posited with the special understanding of charity, but rather generally, according as it is a certain form of every virtue, according to what Augustine says in the book On the Morals of the Catholic Church, that virtue is nothing other than the order of love: and therefore the objection does not hold concerning that which succeeds faith, and hope: because that is not thus formal in every virtue. And according to them it must be said that fruit is confected from all the virtues. But it seems better to us, that love supposes the love of charity: because that love alone causes a perfect inherence: for because it is completive of

25. Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermones in Cantica Canticorum.

fruition, therefore it is posited in its definition: whereas the other virtues, although they dispose on the part of the subject, nevertheless do not complete. And this is evident thus: For vision denotes a conversion upon a presence only: but comprehension, which succeeds hope, denotes an adherence: but love, because it is a binding power, and an acute mobile, penetrating the beloved, as Dionysius says, denotes an inherence.

§ 11. To the other it must be said that it does not suffice that a virtue conjoin to God absolutely in order that it be posited in the definition of fruition. For the conjunction is twofold, namely through merit, and through a certain quasi-contact. For through merit every virtue conjoins to God: but through contact the conjunction occurs in three ways, namely according to presence, and this is when the intellect attains the thing in its essence, but does not necessarily hold and have it: whence it is assimilated to a mathematical quasi-contact, in which the ultimate tangentials are only together. The second is quasi through adherence and holding and having, and this is the contact of that which succeeds hope, and it is assimilated to a quasi-contact of compacted things. The third is through inherence, when one as it were enters the other, and contracts impressions and affections from its nature: and this is the contact of love, and is assimilated to a natural contact, in which the tangentials act and suffer mutually, and impress their properties upon one another. And the first mode of conjunction is as a material disposition toward fruition. But the second and third hold themselves near: but the third is completive: and this is evident from the name of that which is fruit, because this is the taste of a quieting sweetness, and that taste is elicited only from the interiors of the thing which are of the nature and complexion of that which we enjoy.

§ 12. To the other that is further inquired, concerning this that he says: To a thing, It must be said that Augustine notes the commonality of that which is to enjoy: because this happens in as many ways as it happens to posit the end of dilection in something: and this happens in one way according to sense, as brute animals enjoy foods, as Augustine says, but improperly, for the reason that although delight is in them as in an end, nevertheless they do not sufficiently apprehend the account of an end: but in those who are naturally apt to discern an end to be sought per se, or by seeking per se, it happens to enjoy whatever thing more properly: but in those who are naturally apt to discern the end of delight, and actually discern it according to right reason, it is most proper: and therefore we do not enjoy except God properly: but commonly it happens also to enjoy other things, and things other than the rational creature.

§ 13. To the other it must be said that nothing is naturally apt to quiet the rational appetite except God, according as it progresses according to right reason: but when it is averted, it takes the non-quieting as quieting, on account of a "good as of now" which it apprehends in it.

§ 14. To that which is further inquired, concerning that which he says: For its own sake, It must be said that it does not follow, if we inhere by love, that it is not for its own sake: because the word propter in the definition of that which is to enjoy denotes a twofold cause, namely efficient and final: while the word rei [of a thing] also posits the matter in which we enjoy,

26. Aristotle, Metaphysics, I, 2, 982b25.

which is the object of the act of fruition: but the word amore [by love] denotes the moving and inciting cause on the part of the enjoying affect, just as a habit has [the capacity] to excite and move a power to an act: and this is a motion of the form rather than of the efficient [cause].

§ 15. To the other it must be said that when it is said, "We enjoy a creature," the ablative can be construed with the verb in the account of a form, or in the account of an efficient and an object. And in the first way the locution is true, in the second way false.

§ 16. To the other it must be said that a creature, insofar as it is from nothing, is infinitely distant, and does not perfect a conjunction with God: but there are some creatures which on account of a likeness of the divine goodness by which they were created, are never separated from God, but whenever they are had, God is always had, such as grace making pleasing, and the chief among those is the love of charity, and those can conjoin.

§ 17. To the last it must be said that when it is said, "Love is loved by love," there is not a diverse love in the act of the verb, and in the matter of the act, and in the habit from which that act goes forth: but it is one and the same signified in different ways. Whence, just as there is no diverse vision by which I see a wall, and see myself seeing: and just as there is no diverse intellect by which I understand a man, and understand myself understanding: so there is no diverse love by which I love God, and I love loving myself, or my love. And indeed many say this: but many do not understand it. But the cause of this is: because when I say, "I understand a man," the intellective power passes over to the man through the act of understanding which is from the intellect: therefore according to reason, the same power is prior in act, as well as the acceptance of it: and so on the part of the motive [powers], when I say, "I love God": for the power of love passes over into God through the act of love, and so it is left that the same power in act passes over into the object. Since therefore the love is not diverse, it is evident that it does not go to infinity.

Articulus 13 — Whether The First Definition Of The Word To Use Is Good

Is the first definition of the verb "to use" good?

Next, it is inquired concerning that which he says: But to use is to refer that which has come into use, etc.

§ 1. For he seems to err by defining "to use" [uti] by "use" [usus]: since they signify the same thing, although in a different way. But if it is said that that mode of signifying contributes to the manifestation of the defined thing, To the contrary: Preambulatory acts are to powers according to reason: therefore also to habits. Since therefore "use" denotes a habit, but "to use" an act, rather "use" ought to be defined by "to use", than conversely.

§ 2. Further it is objected concerning that which he says: To refer, toward obtaining, etc.

For from this it seems that everything that is referable we ought to refer to an enjoyable thing: but everything that is in the will except sin, is referable: therefore every voluntary thing except sin is to be referred. Thence it is further argued thus: Everything that is referred

27. Augustine, De Trinitate, II, Prooemium, 1.

receives the account of merit from the end: therefore it seems that in all our works nothing is indifferent: because indifferent is that which is neither evil, nor good. This same thing seems to be taken from the Apostle when he says: Whether you eat, or whether you drink,... do all to the glory of God (1 Cor. 10:31).

§ 3. Further it is inquired concerning that which he says: Otherwise it is to abuse, not to use, etc.

For it is inquired: Why is it not called "abfruit" [abfructus] when someone enjoys what is not to be enjoyed, just as it is called "abuse" [abusus] when someone uses what is not to be used?

§ 4. Solution. We reply to the first in three ways: namely, either that this whole that which has come into use, has the force of one simple diction, and is a useful circumlocution: and thus the definition is good, because habits and acts are well defined through objects. Or also that the defining word use is not taken absolutely, but referred to an end, and thus it becomes a principle of cognizing that which is "to use" taken simply. Or also thirdly, that "use" posited in the definition is a superordinate and genus to its defined term, and thus it is then taken according to the definition of Victorinus, who says that "use is an act frequently elicited from a power, when someone does something," just as we say that he uses it: for thus it is superordinate to "to use," when we act by something in such a way that we refer it to another. But inferior things ought to be defined by their superordinates.

§ 5. To the other that is further inquired, whether anything is indifferent? It must be said without prejudice, that of the works of the deliberative will as it is deliberative, nothing is indifferent according to Theology. Because if it does not refer those things which can be referred, they are vain: for from the fact that they are referable, they are natively apt to have an end: and if they do not have it, therefore they are vain: because a vain thing is (as the Philosopher says) what is toward some end which it does not include. And this is called "idle" [otiosum] in the sacred page, concerning which human beings will render an account on the day of judgment, although a moderate one. But if they are referred, then they are good. But if they are not naturally apt for referring, then they are oblique from the end, either by venial, or by mortal [sin]. There are nevertheless works done beyond deliberation which do not come into the use of the will as it is deliberative, and these can well be indifferent.

§ 6. To the other that is further inquired, why is it called "abuse" and not "abfruit"? It must be said that use encloses within itself an act of reason, which is a relation to another, and therefore it can be right and not right, and this it signifies in the composition of the word: but fruit encloses in itself only a quieted will, and therefore it does not look to right and not right of itself, but from an antecedent power: and therefore it is called a perverse fruit, but the account of perversity cannot be conjoined to it in the same term, so that it might be called "abfruit".

28. Matt 5:15.

Articulus 14 — Whether There Are Three Things Which Are To Be Enjoyed

Are there three things which are to be enjoyed?

Next, it is inquired concerning that which he says: The things which are to be enjoyed are, etc.

§ 1. For to the contrary is what Damascene says, book 1, chap. 11, that the three persons agree in thing, but are distinguished by reason and cognition: therefore there are not three things.

§ 2. Again, immediately in the Text it follows: Yet the same Trinity is a certain supreme thing: therefore it seems that he says things in the plural badly.

§ 3. Again, Augustine says that in everything that is toward itself, the three persons are one: in that which is toward another, they are distinguished: but a thing is toward itself: therefore it in the singular befits the three persons in sum.

§ 4. Further it is inquired concerning that which the Master supposes in this saying: for he seems to mean that we enjoy the persons.

BUT TO THE CONTRARY: § 1. Either we enjoy a person in general, in that it is a person, or as it is determined as this or that: not in the first way, because affect does not follow the conception of something in general, or in universal: because general things do not move, because there is no act in them: therefore under a determined account: therefore we enjoy the Father as He is Father, and the Son as He is Son, and the Holy Spirit as He is Holy Spirit. Thence thus: As cognition holds itself, so does the affect following cognition. Since therefore a definite cognition of the Father passes over into the Son, because he who knows definitely one of the relatives, knows the rest, the fruition of the Father will seem to pass over into the Son, and conversely.

§ 2. If perhaps it is said that the three persons are cognized by one cognition, as some say, and therefore they have one fruition which is of them, To the contrary: Either they are cognized by one cognition in that they are one, or in that they are distinct. If in that they are distinct: therefore in that they are distinct they are cognized as one: but this is the principle of the cognition of distinct things, which is the principle of their distinction: therefore there is one principle of distinction and of union, which is impossible. But if they are cognized in that they are one: therefore fruition is of the essence per se, and not of the persons.

§ 3. Again, fruition denotes a refection in the highest good seen, had, and loved: but the truth and goodness of the three is one: therefore the fruition of the three is one: but this is by grace of the essence, and not of the person: therefore we enjoy the essence, and not the person.

SED CONTRA: § 4. In the cognition of the way it is thus, that a thing is not cognized perfectly through this that only its nature in common is cognized: but it is necessary that it be cognized in particular, and according to all its properties: therefore similarly and much more this will be in the homeland: therefore the cognition of the substance does not suffice for the

29. Pseudo-Dionysius, De Divinis Nominibus, c. 1, § 1.

cognition of glory, unless there is also present a determined cognition of the persons and their properties, and we enjoy those cognized: therefore we enjoy the persons.

§ 5. Again, will we not love the distinct persons, and their distinction? It is constant that we will. Either therefore by a love of use, or by a love of fruit: if by a love of use: therefore we will refer it to another which is better, which is false, because the essence is not worthier than the persons; therefore by a love of fruit, and thus the proposition is had.

§ 6. BUT THEN IT IS FURTHER INQUIRED, whether we will enjoy one person more than another? And it seems that we will: because just as in the order of the essence there is had one which is the first and principle of the others, and when we refer the essence to another, we stand in it: so it seems that there is in the order of nature which is in the persons, one who is the principle of the whole Trinity, because of the Son through generation, of the Holy Spirit through spiration: therefore it seems that the relation stands in Him. This also seems through what the Apostle says, I to the Corinth. 11:3: The head of every man is Christ:... but the head of Christ is God, that is, the Father, and so it seems that the Son should be referred to the Father. And this He Himself seems to do in the Gospel, saying: My doctrine is not mine, but His who sent me (John 7:16). I seek not my own will, but the will of Him who sent me (John 5:30).

§ 7. Solution. Some say to the first, that there are three things in divine matters: substance, person, and notion. But substance is a thing absolutely: while notion is an account: but person is an intermediate between substance and notion according to reason, and therefore person is a thing with respect to notion, and an account with respect to essence. And in this sense it can be said that there are three things: but in another, one single thing. But this solution does not seem safe to me: because a person is simply a thing, and never an account alone: because this sounds like something near to the Sabellians. Whence without prejudice I say, that (as a certain Philosopher says in the First Philosophy), being and thing are among the transcendentals, and the first according to the ambit of their signification, and they are those in which resolution stands, and therefore they are sayable in divine matters concerning absolute and relative things: and according as they are adjoined to these or those, they can be plural, or singular: yet on account of the absolute mode of understanding, they hold themselves more on the part of the essence.

§ 8. TO THE AUTHORITY of Damascene, however, it must be said that the persons are not distinguished by reason or cogitation alone: because this would be Sabellian. Whence the authority is to be understood cautiously, namely, so that he calls "reason" the personal relation which is really a person, and "cogitation" the intellect distinguishing the persons through personal relations of this sort.

§ 9. And to the other the solution is evident through the aforesaid.

§ 10. To that which is further inquired: Whether we will enjoy the persons in that they are persons? It must be said that if the word in that denotes the account of the object of fruit, we will not enjoy the persons in that they are persons. But if it denotes the indifference and identity of the person to the object of fruit, then we enjoy the persons in that they are persons.

30. Luke 17:12.

For although fruit per se is of God insofar as He is the highest good, nevertheless it is not of God consequently, and of the person by accident: because in God there is no consequent from universal to particular, but the same. Similarly in God there is nothing accidental, but the same. And therefore we will enjoy God, and the persons,

insofar as they are the same as the good.

§ 2. To the first objection to the contrary, it must be said that we shall enjoy the Father determinately, not indeed according to how He is related to the Son, but insofar as He, related to the Son, is the same as the highest good through His essence. And therefore the enjoyment does not pass over into the Son on account of the concept of the relation: nor does it follow that there are three enjoyments, just as there are three distinct persons.

§ 3. To the next it must be said that by a single cognition we can actually apprehend the three persons insofar as they are one, or even insofar as they are distinct according to the accounts of relation, which does not possess an absolute concept. But by cognition of this kind we apprehend them by understanding the highest good, and thus there will be enjoyment [fruit]; and we readily concede that for perfect cognition of God, it is required that He be known in the distinct persons which are the same as the highest good.

§ 4. To that which is further asked: Whether we shall enjoy one person more than another? It must be said that we shall not. Nor is it similar regarding the order of essences and the order of nature in the persons: because the order of essences posits inequality and diversity from the object of enjoyment in the lower essences. However, the order of nature in the persons posits their equality and identity in the highest good, which is the object of enjoyment: and therefore there is one enjoyment of the three, just as there is one goodness of the three.

Articulus 15 — Whether God Can Be Known By Any Created Intellect

Can God be known by any created intellect?

§ 6. Next it is asked concerning what he says: We enjoy known things, in which the delighted will rests for their own sake, etc. From this, indeed, this definition is derived: To enjoy is for the delighted will to rest in known things for their own sake. But an objection is raised concerning what he says: "in known things."

§ 7. 1. For it seems that God is neither known nor seen by any created intellect, and thus the Saints do not enjoy God as known and seen. Proof of the first point. No one has ever seen God; therefore no one has seen God face to face. If perhaps it is said that this is understood of man on the way [in via], and therefore Angels and the blessed are not excluded. On the contrary: Chrysostom on the same passage in the original: "But not even the celestial essences: the Cherubim and Seraphim themselves, I say, will ever be able to see God as He is."

§ 8. 2. Also, in the same place he posits two reasons for this, one of which he intimates with these words: How shall the creatable see the increatable? And this is founded upon the fact that

31. Heb 11:2.

the created cannot reach into the increated, since they are of an infinite distance. The second he intimates thus: Because the divine nature is simple, and disposed in one way: if therefore they saw, they would see equally: how then does one praise it as glory, another as majesty, another as holiness?

§ 9. 3. Also, in the same place treating that of the Apostle, Colossians 1:15: Who is the invisible image of God, he speaks thus: "He is the invisible image of God, because He is invisible: because otherwise He would by no means be an image. But if Paul introduced elsewhere saying, that He appeared in the flesh; you should remember, that this appearance which was through the flesh, was not made according to His substance: because since He Himself is invisible not only to men, but also to superior powers, Paul shows, saying that He appeared in the flesh, when He was seen. And so He was seen by the Angels then, when He clothed Himself with flesh: but before this they did not see Him thus, because to them as well His substance was invisible." From these it seems that God is not seen in Himself as He is, but in theophanies, that is, in illuminations, in which God appears.

§ 10. 4. Hence, Dionysius to Gaius the monk: "If someone seeing God understood what he saw, he did not see Him, but something of His that exists and is known."

§ 11. 5. Also, at the beginning of the fifth chapter of the Divine Names: "The intention of our discourse is not to manifest the supersubstantial substance, but that it is supersubstantial: for this is ineffable, and unknown, and not perfectly manifestable."

§ 12. 6. Furthermore, the same, in the Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 3: "The hierarchy makes its praisers into divine statues [agalmata], and clearest mirrors, and pure receptacles of the principal light." From these it seems to be accepted that He is not seen as He is, but by illuminations descending from Him and by statues [agalmatibus], by certain likenesses of His light.

§ 13. 7. To the same it is objected through reason: there must be a proportion of the perfection to the perfectible: but God is intelligible if He is seen through His essence: therefore God through His essence, and the created intellect have a proportion: therefore also a commensuration, which is a heresy: therefore that from which it follows is false, namely that God is seen through His essence.

§ 14. 8. Also, there is no proportion of the infinite to the finite: God in His substance is infinite in place, time, and comprehension, as Damascene says; therefore He has no proportion to the capacity of the intellect: therefore neither is He seen according to the intellect.

§ 15. 9. To this some have wanted to say that He is seen according to one attribute, or two, which are like parts of Him with respect to our intellect: and He is not seen according to the whole. But on the contrary: In any attribute He Himself is infinite: therefore it is the same for one, and for all alike.

§ 16. 10. Also, God is simple: therefore if He is seen, He is seen as a whole, because He has no part: but He is not seen as a whole: therefore nothing of Him is seen, and thus we return to the first point, namely that God, according to what He is, is not seen.

32. Prov 22:28.

§ 17. On the contrary: 1. In the first canonical epistle of John 3:2: We know that when He shall appear, we shall be like Him, because we shall see Him as He is.

§ 18. 2. Also, Chrysostom in Homily 15 on John: "Angels, because of their sleepless and pure nature, imagine nothing other than God."

§ 19. Further it is asked, whether He is also seen in theophanies, and apprehended by means of a theophany, which Dionysius posits in the Celestial Hierarchy, saying thus: The most wise Theology has therefore revealed that divine vision which is described within it, like a similitude in the form of the formless, properly called a theophany from the reduction of those seeing into the divine. The sense is, that Theology has revealed to us first through doctrine, that that illumination is appropriately, that is, aptly, called a theophany, which is in a certain form of signs that are formless to the hidden light which is in God: because it proceeds from the hidden to the outside, according to which, namely the illumination, there occurs a reduction of those seeing Him into divine things; therefore since all illuminations proceed from the hidden to the open for the one seeing, it seems that all see in theophanies only.

§ 20. Solution. To this we say without prejudice, affirming indeed most certainly, that the divine substance is seen by all the blessed. However, regarding how it is seen, we say without prejudice thus, that it is seen immediately through conjunction; such that God offers Himself to our intellect through His substance, just as the intellect does to itself; and this is what the Apostle says, I Cor. 13:12: I shall know even as I am known.

§ 21. BUT the authority of Chrysostom is to be solved by the word of the same Chrysostom, in the same place, where he says thus: "We all know God: for we have a notion of Him. But no one knows His substance and what He is, except alone He who is begotten of Him." Here the Evangelist speaks of a most certain consideration and comprehension, and as great as the Father has of the Son. And therefore it is clear that Chrysostom does not deny that the substance of God is seen, but he denies that it is so perfectly seen by any created intellect as it is seen by Himself.

§ 22. TO THE first reason of Chrysostom, it must be said that the created, assisted by the uncreated, is capable of reaching to it: although not above it. There are however those who say that the created intellect relates differently to inferior things and to superior things: because upon inferior things it pours some of its own light, especially the agent intellect, and thus it can act actively upon them: but toward superior things it behaves as receiving only, and therefore it is not properly said to have power into them, but rather they into it.

§ 23. TO THE second reason of Chrysostom, it must be said that although there are many divine attributes, nevertheless each is nothing other than the divine substance itself: and therefore in any of them the substance is immediately seen. And as to what Chrysostom says, that the substance is not seen, it must be said that just as he himself says below in the induced authority, he calls "substance" the what it is, that is, the differentiation of it through terms of essence: and because it does not have such terms, therefore its substance and what it is in this manner are not seen. He Himself also alone is adequate to Himself according to the intellect:

33. 2 Tim 4:3.

because as great as He is, so great is His intellect: but the created intellect is not as great as He is.

§ 24. By the same reasoning the solution to the following authority is clear.

§ 25. To that which is objected concerning Dionysius, it must be said that he is either speaking of the vision of the wayfarer [in via], or by "not seeing Him" he means not seeing Him wholly and perfectly: but he says that something which is His is seen: and this is to see Him: because He is substantially that thing.

§ 26. To the next it must be said that God is simply incomprehensible, and this is insofar as He is infinite: because in this way He cannot be attained, except in a qualified sense, namely by knowing Him to be infinite.

§ 27. AS TO how there are statues [agalmata] and mirrors, will be clear below at the end of the solution.

§ 28. To that which is objected through the reasons, it must be said that a sufficient proportion cannot be had toward Him from the nature of the intellect, but from the assistance of God.

§ 29. To the next it must be said that the infinite can indeed be attained, but something of it always remains outside the one attaining it: and therefore in that it is infinite it is said not to be attained. And this can be made clear thus: The infinite in quantity is (as the Philosopher says) that of which, for the one taking parts, there is always something outside to take. But in a spiritual uncreated nature there is no infinity in the quantity of bulk, but rather the quantity of power is divided outward, according to those things upon which it has power: and therefore the intellect attaining God attains Him, in such a way that much, and an infinity, of His power always remains outside it: and because His power is His essence, therefore also the immensity of His essence is outside the intellect.

§ 30. To that which is objected against the induced solution, I well concede: because in any attribute He is infinite, and thus He always remains outside the intellect: because although substance or wisdom is apprehended, nevertheless His immensity cannot be enclosed: although some apprehended thing can be attained which is His substance, even if it is not a boundary enclosing the whole, which is God.

§ 31. To the next it must be said that God is simple, and is infinite: for these are not repugnant insofar as infinite signifies the immensity of power and essence, but nevertheless He is attained by the intellect insofar as He is simple, but not insofar as He is infinite: because the infinite posits its account with respect to that which is outside the one understanding. And note that when God is said to be infinite, "infinite" ought not to be expounded privatively, so that the sense would be that He is naturally apt to have a limit, and does not have one: because thus He would be imperfect, since something would be lacking to Him which He was naturally apt to have: but it ought to be expounded negatively, so that the sense is "infinite,"

34. Cicero, De Inventione (sometimes referred to as Rhetorica), II. Wait, usually refers to Rhetorica ad Herennium, III, 13, 23.

that is, not finite in place, or time, or the comprehension of the intellect: because Damascene expounds it thus.

§ 32. To that which is further asked concerning Theophanies, we say that just as in sense perception there are two things, namely, the light under which the visible thing is perfected so that it can be seen, and the visible thing itself, like a stone or something else that is seen: and the light indeed causes the act of vision, but does not distinguish it, nor determine it to this visible thing or to that one: and just as in the natural intellect there is the light of the agent intellect which makes the possible intellect actual, yet does not determinately perfect and move it to this intelligible thing, or that one: but afterward it is determined by the intellect of the man, or the Angel, or another: and just as faith is illuminating toward what is believed, yet does not determinately lead to this article, or that one: so it is in Theophanies, that there is a descending light elevating the intellect, and not distinguishing and determining it to this or that: but that which distinguishes the intellect as an object, is the divine substance itself: and this is what the Psalmist says, Ps. 35:10: In Your light we shall see light. Hence God is seen without a medium that would be a similitude and account of the thing seen, or through which the thing seen is conjoined to the seer, and not through its substance: but nevertheless there is a medium there, disposing and bringing powers to the intellect, by which it may better attain God: and this medium is the light of divine goodness, or appearance, which is called a theophany by the saints. And thus it is clear to be true what Master Hugh says, that nothing halts us until we reach Him. And through this the solution to what is objected concerning Theophanies is clear.

§ 33. To that, however, which could be asked, Whether God is comprehensible? It must be said that comprehension is twofold, namely, that which is the touch of the intellect upon the boundaries of a thing: and in this way He is not comprehended. Hence Augustine to Paulina: We can attain God with the mind, but we can by no means comprehend Him. There is also a comprehension that is sometimes the perfect attainment of something as an end, which attainment primarily occurs by affection: and in this way God is comprehended, as the Apostle says, Eph. 3:18: That you may be able to comprehend with all the saints what is the breadth, and length, and height, and depth, etc.

Divisio Textus

§ 34. DIVISION OF THE TEXT. It is to be noted indeed, that the same Augustine, etc. In this part the Author objects against the determinations made about enjoying [frui] and using [uti]. And it has two parts according to the fact that an objection can be made in two ways, namely, against the very definition of the act of enjoying and using, and he does this in the first part: or against [the things] to be enjoyed and used, and he does this in the second part, there, F, But when men who enjoy, etc.

§ 35. The first of these has two parts, namely the objection which begins there, D, These things therefore which seem to contradict each other, etc. And according to two solutions it has two parts: and the second solution begins there, E, It can also be said, etc.

35. Ps 116:2 (Vulgate).

Articulus 16 — Whether The Second Definition Of To Use Is Good

Whether the second definition of "to use" [uti] is good?

§ 37. He introduces a doubt concerning what he says: To use is to take something up into the faculty of the will, etc.

§ 38. 1. For this definition also belongs to that which is to enjoy: for we do not enjoy anything unless it is in the faculty of our will: therefore to enjoy is to use.

§ 39. 2. Moreover, it is asked what is called the "faculty of the will"? If it is said that it is an easy power, On the contrary: According to this we would not use those things which hold difficulty in the will, such as tribulations and anguishes, which is false, because the Saints make the greatest use of these.

§ 40. 3. Moreover, Since of one thing there is one essence [esse], and a definition states the essence, it seems that of that which is to use there should be a single definition: and Augustine gives two: for above one was held, when he says: To use is that which has come into use, etc. But here another is held.

§ 41. Solution. It must be said that to use [uti] as it is defined here (as some say) is spoken of equivocally with respect to to use as defined above; to use is also taken here according to the definition of Victorinus who says that use is an act frequently elicited from a power, and thus it is superior to to use and to enjoy as defined above: and the Master seems to have sensed this, because he premises by saying that Augustine here takes to use and to enjoy differently than above. It could, however, be said otherwise, namely, that things which are directed to an end exist in two ways, namely, not including or touching the end, and touching or conjoined and proximate to the end: and concerning those which have an order to the end, if they are not conjoined to it, the first definition is given. The second, however, is given concerning those which are conjoined to the end, and those do not need the relation of order, because something of the end is possessed in them: and such are certain things of the way [viae], and certain things of the homeland [patriae]: those of the way are, for instance, the foretaste of eternal things in internal joy and affection: those of the homeland are created beatitude, which touches upon the uncreated in some manner: and therefore because the end is in some way in them, he did not say that they are to be referred to something else. How this occurs is clear thus. When it is said, To use is that which has come into use, etc., it is understood to refer to that as to the terminus of the work: and thus it leads to the end of the intention, which is truly the end. But those things in which there is such a use as is defined here, are indeed referred to another which is the end of the intention: which end, however, according to some taste, is present in them: but they are not referred to another that would be the terminus of the work, that is, in which the work ceases, because whatever the worker wills is possessed.

§ 42. To this, however, which is asked, What is the faculty of the will? It must be said that just as in the usage of speaking, a faculty is called that which makes a man able to have [something] at his command [ad nutum]: just as sciences are called faculties, because by them

36. 1 Esdras (3 Esdras) 3:12.

the power of the intellect is had at command: and the goods of fortune are called faculties, because they make a man suffice for himself and his own: so the faculty of the will is that by which the will has an easy power to will at command: and this is especially that which brings rest from work: and it is the useful thing in which the intended end is held and tasted in some way, as has been said.

§ 43. To the last the solution is clear: because of one thing there is a single essence taken with respect to one and the same cause: and with respect to different causes different definitions can be taken. Hence the first is given with respect to the proper act of the useful thing: but this one is given with respect to the effect of the useful thing touching the end.

Articulus 17 — Whether The Second Definition Of To Enjoy Is Good

Whether the second definition of "to enjoy" [frui] is good?

§ 45. Next it is asked concerning what he says: To enjoy is to use with joy, etc.

§ 46. 1. For as the useful and the enjoyable are related: so are to use and to enjoy related. Proof: Because acts are defined by their objects: but the useful and the enjoyable are the objects of these acts, to use and to enjoy: but no useful thing is an enjoyable thing: therefore no using is enjoying.

§ 47. 2. Moreover, in the Letter he says that everyone who enjoys, uses, but not conversely: therefore to use is superior to to enjoy: but from whatever the superior is removed, the inferior is also removed: therefore to whatever to use does not apply, to enjoy does not apply: but to use does not apply to irrational beings: therefore neither does to enjoy, which is false, since Augustine says that beasts enjoy their food.

§ 48. 1. Moreover, it is asked why to enjoy according to the rationale of its name is extended to irrational beings, and not to use?

§ 49. 2. Moreover, it is asked concerning the distinction of the Master: Why does he say that in the homeland we enjoy truly and properly, and fully: but here truly and properly, but not fully.

§ 50. 3. Further it is also asked, With respect to what do the three definitions given of to enjoy differ?

§ 51. Solution. It must be said to the first, that to use according to the first definition is removed from that which is to enjoy taken according to its proper rationale: but not to use according to the second definition, as is clear from what was previously said.

§ 52. To the next it must be said that to use, in the understanding of its name, includes an act of reason which is a relation to another: and therefore it cannot belong to brute animals: but it is not so concerning to enjoy, which signifies a delight of taste quieting desire, and therefore by transference it can belong to brute animals.

§ 53. To the next it must be said that three things are required for the complement of enjoying, namely an act of the will related to reason, and as to this he says properly: because

those devoid of reason do not properly enjoy. The second is that there be a reason ordering a right will, determining that which is truly enjoyment and enjoyable, and thus it is said truly, because creatures enjoying do not truly enjoy, since that by which they enjoy is not truly good and sweet. The third that is required is that the enjoyable thing be possessed through species and in abundance, and therefore he says fully: and thus in the way [in via] the Saints do not fully enjoy, but they can truly and properly enjoy.

§ 54. To the last it must be said that the first definition of that which is to enjoy looks to the form and the act. The form, I say, the completive one, which is love, as was said before: and therefore the form and the act are posited in it, namely, by the love of inherence. The second, however, touches upon the matter, and the end: the matter, when it says, We enjoy known things: the end, however, when it says, In which the delighted will rests. But the third looks to the effect of enjoyment in the one enjoying, when it says, To use with joy, etc.

§ 55. The other doubts that remain are sufficiently solved by the Master in the Letter.

Expositio Textus

Exposition of the Text

§ 56. Exposition of the Text. The Letter is thus expounded:

§ 57. How much in this life, etc. Augustine in book IX of the Confessions: Sometimes you admit me into a very unusual inward affection to I know not what sweetness: which if it were perfected in me, I know not what that would be which this life will not be: but I fall back into these things by sorrowful weights, and I am swallowed up by customary things, and I am held, and I weep much: but I am held much, so much does the burden of custom weigh me down. Here I am able to be, but do not wish to be: there I wish to be, but am not able, wretched in both ways.

§ 58. Through a glass [mirror] in a dark manner [enigma], etc. I Cor. 13:12. The Gloss, in the same place: A mirror is a vestige or image of creatures: but an enigma is an obscure allegory. And according to this, the species is posited for the genus: because according to Donatus an enigma is a question wrapped in obscurities of words: like my mother bore me, soon the same is born of me. And it is a species of allegory. But here it is posited for the allegory itself. We could however say that a mirror is twofold, namely, painted in some way with a face, and not painted, namely representing obscurely: and in the first way the image in man is a mirror, in the second way the vestige in other creatures. There are also four things that cause the obscurity of an enigma, namely because the created intellect is from nothing, on account of which it retains something of obscuration. Also secondly, from the weight of the flesh. And also, from the turbulence of sin. Fourthly also, from foreign speech: because an allegory is foreign speech: just as Uriah, devout and faithful, signifies the devil, and David, a murderer and adulterer, signifies Christ, while Bathsheba, an adulteress, signifies the Church.

Divisio Textus

§ 64. DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

38. Ps 25:5 (Vulgate).

§ 65. But when men who enjoy and use, etc. Here begins that part in which the Master posits doubts concerning the useful and the enjoyable. And it has three parts: in the first of which he asks, Whether man sometimes enjoys man, or only God? In the second he asks, Whether God enjoys us, or uses us, there, G, But since God loves us. In the third he asks, Whether we enjoy or use virtues, there, H, Here it is to be considered, etc.

§ 66. In the first chapter he does three things. First he proves that man uses man. Secondly, he objects to the contrary, there, But the contrary to this, etc. Thirdly, he solves it, there, Which Augustine thus determines, etc.

Expositio Textus

Exposition of the Text

§ 59. Exposition of the Text.

§ 60. It can also be said, etc. But on the contrary: Proverbs 13:12: Hope that is deferred afflicts the soul.

§ 61. Solution. It is true insofar as it is deferred: but insofar as it already penetrates through taste to the interior of the veil, it delights from the foretaste of the thing hoped for. Hence, Hebrews 6:18 and 19: Hope which we have as an anchor of the soul, sure and firm, and entering even to the interior of the veil, where the forerunner Jesus has entered for us.

§ 62. Which is not to be done, etc. Hence, Jeremiah 17:5: Cursed is the man that trusts in man, and makes flesh his arm. But on the contrary: Jonah 1:6: The pilot came to him: The Gloss, there: It is natural for man in danger to trust in another more than in himself.

§ 63. Solution. It must be said that in danger, where human counsel and aid can be had, trust can be placed in man, provided the invocation of God is not excluded, because otherwise it would be to tempt God: but to place total trust in man with the exclusion of divine assistance is prohibited.

Articulus 18 — Whether Man Is To Be Enjoyed

Whether man is to be enjoyed?

§ 68. It is asked, Whether man is to be enjoyed in any way?

§ 69. 1. And it seems that he is: The Apostle to Philemon, v. 20: Yea, brother, may I enjoy thee in the Lord.

§ 70. 2. Also, Ecclesiasticus [Sirach] 7:10: Enjoy the great [ones].

§ 71. 3. Also, Deut. 28:41: Thou shalt beget sons and daughters, and shalt not enjoy them.

§ 72. 4. Moreover, The same seems true by reason: because an image is directed to another: therefore the cognition of an image leads into that of which it is primarily [an image]: but this is God, to whose image man was made: therefore cognition comes to rest in God as in an end,

39. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 1, 165a24.

and begins from man; since therefore motion on the part of the mover follows cognition, it seems that our enjoyment can at least begin from man.

§ 73. Moreover, if it is conceded in some way, may I enjoy thee in the Lord, it is asked, Whether it can similarly be conceded concerning an irrational creature, that we enjoy it in the Lord? And it seems so; because it is a vestige leading to God: therefore God can be apprehended and loved in it: since therefore we love God with the love of enjoyment, it happens that we enjoy God in an irrational creature.

§ 74. Also it is asked, Whether we may enjoy a sinner in God? And it seems so: because the image of God is not destroyed in him, as is said in Psalm 38:7: Man passes in an image: since therefore God is apprehended and loved in His image, and not except by the love of enjoyment, we can enjoy a sinner in God.

§ 75. Solution. It must be said that when it is said, brother, may I enjoy thee in the Lord, the pronoun is constructed locally with the verb, and otherwise the ablative with the preposition: for the pronoun names the matter which is like an occasion for the joy that is in the verb enjoy; but the ablative with the preposition notes the end in which rest is taken: and this is plain if one looks at the exposition of Augustine who says, that because he added, in the Lord, he signified that he had placed his end in the Lord: hence this enjoyment begins from a rational [creature] on the part of the representation of the highest good through grace, but it terminates in the Lord as in the end.

§ 76. To the first, therefore, the solution is clear through the things that have been said.

§ 77. To the next and to the third it must be said, that to enjoy is taken there communally for to use with joy: or it may be said what some have said, that to enjoy the great ones or one's sons is the same as to perceive fruit from them through merit: and thus there is use in the work, but fruit in the hope of reward.

§ 78. To that which is objected by reason, it must be said that a vestige and an image, unless something else is added, do not suffice for us to enjoy them in the Lord. Because although God is represented in them according to the fact that He is three and one, or according to the fact that He is powerful, wise, and willing: yet not according to the fact that He is the highest goodness: for in this way He does not shine forth except in the effect of grace or glory: therefore we cannot enjoy any but Saints in the Lord, and therefore not irrational [creatures] nor sinners.

§ 79. And through this the solution to the whole is clear. The Letter, moreover, is clear of itself.

Articulus 19 — Whether God Enjoys Himself

Whether God enjoys Himself?

§ 81. But since God loves us, etc.

4. Matt 5:15.

§ 82. In this chapter it is asked concerning what he says: If He enjoys, us namely, He needs our good. OBJECTION. God enjoys Himself: therefore He needs His own good: therefore there is some indigence in God, which is false. But that God enjoys Himself is clear through what Gregory says on that verse of Job 40:4: If thou hast an arm like God, etc.: where he speaks thus: He is glorious who, while He thoroughly enjoys Himself, has no need of approaching praise.

§ 83. TO THIS, it must be conceded that God enjoys Himself more perfectly than any creature could enjoy Him.

§ 84. But to that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that where the one enjoying and the enjoyable thing are in diversity of essence, it follows that the one enjoying needs the good of the enjoyable thing: but where the one enjoying and the enjoyable thing are the same through substance, the argument does not hold.

§ 85. To another thing that could be asked, Whether He enjoys Himself in the rationale of essence, or of person? This was dispatched above: because He enjoys Himself by the same rationale of the object by which we enjoy Him.

§ 86. Next, concerning what he says: But God refers our use to His own goodness, etc. Attention must be paid to the authority of Gregory who, upon that verse of Job 40:5: Clothe thyself with glorious garments, says thus: He clothes Himself with glorious things, who assumed the choirs of the holy Angels whom He created, into the use of His own decorum.

§ 87. Next it is objected against what he says: But this is the highest reward, that we may thoroughly enjoy Him. ON THE CONTRARY: John 17:3: This is...

§ 1. Now this is eternal life: That they may know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom you have sent: therefore it seems that knowledge or vision is the total reward.

§ 2. Solution. The vision which is the total reward is the vision of what is loved and possessed, and this is perfected in love, and is a nourishing vision; hence, this does not differ from enjoyment, but is the same thing, differing only in its concept.

Divisio Textus

§ 19. The text itself is clear.

Here it must be considered, Whether virtues, etc. This is the last chapter of this part, in which he asks, Whether virtues are to be enjoyed?

§ 20. And this chapter is divided into two parts. In the first, he determines that virtues are not to be enjoyed, but that one acts through virtues. In the second, he says the same concerning the will and the other powers of the soul, there, So also concerning a good will, etc.

§ 21. The first part has five parts. In the first, he proves that virtues are not to be enjoyed. In the second, an objection is raised against this, there, But to others on the contrary, etc. In the third, he solves it, there, But we, etc. In the fourth, he objects against the solution, there, But someone will say, etc. In the fifth, he solves it, there, To which we say, etc.

40. Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermones in Cantica Canticorum.

Articulus 20 — In Everything That Is, Insofar As It Is, There Is Good

Is everything that is, insofar as it is, good?

§ 3. Next, an objection is raised concerning what he says:

Because God is good, we are: and insofar as we are, we are good, etc.

§ 4. 1. For Augustine says: Being is from the first being therefore he ought to say: Because God is, we are.

§ 5. 2. Also, Everything that is, insofar as it is, is good: therefore everything that is has goodness, and goodness is the same as its very being.

§ 6. 3. Also, If there were one effect of a twofold cause, the one mediate, the other immediate, by removing the mediate cause the mediate effect is not removed: as is clear with a white painting, and whiteness, and the painter. Being in God is the immediate cause of created being, while the good in God is the mediate cause of the same being: therefore, positing that God is not good, created being will still remain, which is the effect of the good that is a mediate cause.

§ 7. If you say that this is true: Everything that is, insofar as it is, is good.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 8. Even if it is understood that God is not good, created being still remains: therefore, even if it is understood that God is not good, created good still remains, which is against Boethius: therefore the first proposition is false, namely, that everything that is, insofar as it is, is good.

§ 9. Also, If there are two effects of one cause, one mediate, the other immediate, by removing the mediate cause the effect which is caused through the medium is not removed: but being is from God immediately, while the good is only in being: therefore, if it is understood that God is not good, everything that is, insofar as it is, will still be good: but this is false, as Boethius says in the book De Hebdomadibus: therefore it is not the case that everything that is, insofar as it is, is good.

§ 10. 4. Furthermore, mathematical objects are those in which there is no end (as the Philosopher says): but those things that lack an end lack the ratio of the good: therefore mathematical objects, insofar as they are, are not good: therefore not everything that is, insofar as it is, is good.

§ 11. FURTHER it is asked, Whether the good is separable from being by the intellect? It seems that it is: because Boethius expressly states this, that if the first good is understood for a moment not to be good, and yet is understood to be a being, then the things that are from it will be beings, and will not be good: but whatever things are separable according to the intellect do not accompany one another as such: therefore it is not true that everything that is, insofar as it is, is good.

§ 12. Solution. It must be said that the good and being can be considered in two ways, namely according to their intentions [concepts], or according to their supposita [subjects]. If

41. Aristotle, Metaphysics, I, 2, 982b25.

they are considered according to their intentions, then they are not convertible, nor will it be true that everything that is, insofar as it is, is good. That this is true is clear from Dionysius in the book On the Divine Names, where he speaks thus about being: Before other participations of God, being is set before them, and being itself according to itself is [prior], because through itself it is life, and through itself it is wisdom, and through itself it is the divine likeness: and whatever other existents and participants there are, they participate in being prior to all those . The same is written in the fourth proposition of the book De Causis, where it is said: The first of created things is being, and there is no other creature before it. And the commentary in the same place: Being is through creation, while the good is through information: and that which flows forth from the First, that is, God, without presupposing anything else in which it is founded, is called being by creation; whereas that which flows forth only upon the supposition of another in which it comes to be, is by information. Also, the good adds to being a relation to an end: however, the relation to an end is twofold, namely according as the end is the terminus of the motion of the efficient cause, or according as the end is by intention in the efficient cause: and in the first way things are called good which are from the good: in the second way, those which are directed to the good which the efficient cause intends, that is, which moves it to act. If, however, the good and being are considered according to their supposita [subjects], in this way they are convertible: because although the good relates to the efficient cause as it is good, and being relates to the efficient cause as it is being, nevertheless, because the efficient cause does not act except through the good of intention, therefore the good always accompanies being itself, and is not separated from it according to the suppositum, although it is separated according to the intention [concept]: and the expression insofar as indicates this identity of supposita.

§ 13. To the first objection, therefore, it must be said that if the good is taken in distinct things together with being, namely in the cause and in the caused, the good in the cause will be prior to being in the caused: because it only causes by the good, which makes it diffuse being: hence Maximus: This name 'good' does not derive its origin from elsewhere than the Greek word which is 'boao, bo', that is, I call: for 'bo', 'kaleo', 'bo', and 'I cry out', and 'I call' possess one meaning: for indeed he who calls very often breaks out into a cry: God therefore is not unsuitably called good, because by an intelligible cry He calls all things to come from nothingness into essence: and therefore it is better said that because He is good we are, than because He is we are.

§ 14. To the next it must be said that the word insofar as notes the inseparability of the good and being according to supposita, and not according to intentions [concepts]: and therefore it does not follow that goodness is the entity of that which is.

§ 15. To the next it must be said that God is not the mediate cause of anything: and therefore He is the immediate cause of both the good and being, although not according to the same rationale, as has been said: because being is related to the good as the primary cause and the subject. Nevertheless, because being is inseparable from a relation to the efficient cause diffusing being, and that cause does not diffuse except insofar as it is good: therefore it is not separated from the good except by the intellect making an impossible supposition, namely,

42. Augustine, De Trinitate, II, Prooemium, 1.

that the first cause is not good: because then its relation to the efficient cause does not remain: because it does not move except by supposing goodness, as has been said.

§ 16. To the next it must be said that mathematical objects do not have an end which is acquired through physical motion, because they are separated according to their definitive concept from both motion and matter: but they do not lack the intention of the good which is from the good and ordered to the first good.

§ 17. To what is further asked, Whether the good is separable from being by the intellect? the solution is already clear: because it is separated by intention [concept], but not by suppositum.

§ 18. The text of this chapter is self-evident.

Articulus 21 — Whether The Virtues Are To Be Enjoyed

Are virtues to be enjoyed?

§ 22. Now a doubt arises here, Whether virtues are to be enjoyed? And it seems that they are.

§ 23. 1. For Augustine says in the book 83 Questions, that just as the useful and the honorable differ, so do enjoying and using: but everything useful is to be used: therefore everything honorable is to be enjoyed: but virtues (according to Cicero) belong to the genus of the honorable: therefore virtues are to be enjoyed.

§ 24. 2. Also, Everything which is to be desired for its own sake (as was said above) is to be enjoyed, not used: but virtues are to be desired, as is said: therefore virtues are to be enjoyed, not used.

§ 25. 3. Furthermore, the good is divided by the Philosophers into the pleasurable, the useful, and the honorable: but dividing members have opposed rationales in species: therefore the useful and the honorable are opposed by special rationales: but the useful is what we refer to something else: therefore the honorable will be what we desire for its own sake: but this is to be enjoyed: therefore the honorable is to be enjoyed: but virtues are species of the honorable: therefore virtues are to be enjoyed.

§ 26. 4. [On the contrary] The things to be enjoyed are eternal and immutable: virtues are not eternal nor immutable: therefore virtues are not to be enjoyed.

§ 27. 5. Also, Augustine says in the book City of God that if virtues persuade us to love them for their own sake, they are proud.

§ 28. Solution. It must be said that virtues can be considered in two ways, namely, according to how they are habits rectifying in action, and in this way they are all desired for the sake of something else, and thus they are in no way to be enjoyed either on the way [in this life] or in the homeland [in heaven]. They can also be considered insofar as they are the disposition of the perfected subject toward the best: because in this way they essentially or substantially

43. Matt 5:15.

remain in beatitude, either in those things succeeding them, or in themselves: and thus they conjoin us to uncreated beatitude: and thus some say that through them as proximate dispositions we enjoy: yet we do not enjoy them. But it must be said slightly differently, that as Augustine says: When I love my neighbor, or God, I love him by loving, not by another love, but by the same, as was said above. Thus this enjoyment is one of God and of the virtues: because God is in the virtues: and in this way the virtues attain God: but the enjoyment will not be by reason of both [equally], but will be of the virtues as those things which remove the contrary flavor from the palate of the soul, and of God as refreshing with His own proper flavor: and thus it can also be on the way [in this life] in the enjoyment of foretaste and of hope.

§ 29. To the first objection, therefore, it must be said that if stress is laid on Augustine's word, the useful and the honorable are called the created and the uncreated: because nothing at all draws by its own power and attracts by its own dignity, except the supreme good. Cicero, however, says that the honorable is that which draws us by its own power and attracts us by its own dignity.

§ 30. To the next it must be said that for its own sake sometimes means the same as through itself (per se): and this is sometimes opposed to by accident: and thus virtue is desired through itself: because by its nature it has that whence it moves the appetite and delights its possessors with a sincere and holy delight. But this does not exclude that it is also sought for the sake of something else: which nevertheless is not without it, because the virtues, in respect to the things succeeding them, remain in beatitude, and beatitude is in God. And thus that for the sake of which they are desired is not simply separated from them, as it is from other things. Sometimes, however, for its own sake is opposed to that which is for the sake of another: and then they are not desired absolutely for their own sake, but for the sake of another in which and with which the virtues remain essentially, or in the things succeeding them.

§ 31. To the next it must be said that the useful does not have a different rationale from that which is honorable in such a way that it cannot be preserved in it: but in such a way that it does not primarily move the appetite in it: just as Cicero says in the book On Friendship, that although friendship is sought for its own sake, it nevertheless has very many utilities adjoined to it. Nor is the division of the good into the pleasurable, the useful, and the honorable a division of a genus into species, but rather it is given by prior and posterior participations in the divided whole: just as being is divided into potency and act: and yet potency is through act and act is in potency. There are, however, some who say that for the sake of is said

in two ways, namely, simply, and by reason of the end of the work which is called the terminus: and therefore virtues are desired for their own sake with respect to the work, but not with respect to beatitude: and similarly created beatitude with respect to uncreated beatitude is desired for the sake of another, but with respect to virtue through itself: but this is inadequate to say.

44. Pseudo-Dionysius, De Divinis Nominibus, c. 1, § 1.

Articulus 22 — Whether A Good Will Without The Virtues Is To Be Enjoyed

Is a good will to be enjoyed without virtues?

§ 32. Next it is asked concerning what he says:

So we say concerning a good will, etc. It is asked, I say, Whether it happens that one enjoys a good will without virtues? And it seems that it does.

§ 33. 1. Because Adam in the first state, and the Angels if they are posited to be created in sheerly natural endowments, loved God for His own sake and above all things: therefore with the love of enjoyment: therefore virtues are not necessary dispositions for enjoying.

§ 34. 2. Furthermore, Secondly from that word it seems that enjoyment is an act of the will alone: although above he made mention of the intellect, where he says that we enjoy the things known, etc.

§ 35. TO THIS it must be said that without grace and virtue there is no enjoyment.

§ 36. TO THAT which is objected, it must be said that by natural love God can be loved for His own sake and above all things: such that the word for the sake of denotes only the end, and not the efficient cause: since reason, knowing God above all things, produces that love: but when He is loved with charity and grace for His own sake and above all things, three causes are denoted, namely the efficient, material, and final: and it is signified that He Himself is especially the efficient cause, and the one disposing toward enjoyment. Some say otherwise, and not so well by distinguishing love, namely that of friendship and that of concupiscence; and they say that by the love of friendship God could be loved for His own sake and above all things, but not by the love of concupiscence: hence, since fruit posits the love of concupiscence, it does not follow that in that state man and Angel would enjoy.

§ 37. TO THE NEXT it must be said that the will is the completion of the act of enjoying: while the others are as it were material within it, as was sufficiently set forth above.

Divisio Textus

Of all things therefore which have been said, etc. Here he posits an epilogue: and secondly, he divides: and thirdly, he states the order in which he wishes to proceed concerning things and signs: and in this the present distinction is concluded.

The text is self-evident.

Articulus 23 — Whether We Shall Enjoy Through All The Powers Of The Soul

Shall we enjoy through all the powers of the soul?

Here a difficult doubt arises concerning what he says: Among those things indeed which are to be used, etc. For it seems from this that we enjoy the natural powers, that is, through them: and it is asked, whether through all of them, or through certain ones? And it seems that it is through certain ones from the aforementioned.

45. Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermones in Cantica Canticorum.

But ON THE CONTRARY: 1. John 10:9: If any man shall enter in by me, etc. Augustine: He shall find pastures, going forth in the humanity of the Savior, and within in the divinity of the Savior: and it is the sense which is fed in the humanity: therefore the senses will enjoy, because to be fed by this vision is to enjoy.

1. The same seems to be gathered from the book On the Spirit and the Soul, where it is said that sense will be turned into reason, and reason into intellect, and that [intellect] will enjoy God.

4 [3]. Moreover, the whole soul will be glorified, and will be rewarded: therefore it ought to enjoy according to all its powers.

Furthermore it is asked: Will there be revolving thoughts there? It seems not: because Augustine expressly denies this .

But on the contrary: Because we will understand this and that successively: therefore thought will revolve from one thing to another.

Solution. Act properly belongs to persons and individuals, but power belongs to nature: whence if force is applied, then the Saints will enjoy, but according to the powers of the soul which were spoken of above. There is, however, a twofold way: one is from the sensible to imagination and phantasy, and from those to reason and intellect, which is the way of the abstraction of the true. The other is the way from the higher powers to the lower: just as reason in certain matters extends itself by moving the imagination, and the imagination the common sense, as happens in a dream, and sometimes even looses particular organs for something, as in those who do the works of waking life in their sleep. Thus I say without prejudice, that through the overflow of divine sweetness from the intellect the pasture of enjoyment will descend into the imagination and sense: in such a way, nevertheless, that the sense does not lose its nature, such that it apprehends nothing but the corporeal.

And through this the solution to the first is clear: because the sense does not receive the divinity in the flesh of the Savior, but the body only: and the sweetness is by overflow from reason.

To the other it must be said, that when it is said: Sense will be turned into reason, it is to be glossed: it will be converted to reason, and from it will receive enjoyment, according as it is bent back upon it, ministering sweetness to it: nevertheless that book is not Augustine's, but a certain Cistercian authored it, and there are many false things in it.

To the last it must be said, that the whole soul will be rewarded, whence the act of enjoyment belongs to the whole soul: but it is not necessary that it receive all the differences of its rewards according to every power of itself: just as it is not necessary that one possessing riches store them in every chest of his, but some in one, and some in another. Others, however, say what they can scarcely or never prove: and therefore one should not care about their words.

46. Aristotle, Metaphysics, I, 2, 982b25.

To that which is further asked, whether there will be revolving thoughts there? It must be said, that no: but revolving thoughts are not spoken of from the fact that this is to understand this and that successively: rather, they are called revolving for three other reasons denoting imperfection, of which one is on account of the inquiry of one finding or learning: because reason does not see the whole according to causes, and effects, and properties: but then there will not be one inquiring. The second is a loathing of the understood thing in which imperfection is found: and therefore the intellect crosses over to another thing in which it may delight more, and this happens from the vileness of the thing, and the privations found in it, and its mutability, and materiality. The third cause is: because the principle of understanding here is not one for every thing, but belongs to diverse things: and therefore neither in themselves, nor in their principles can things be received here simultaneously: there, however, they are received in that which is the highest and infinite good, which is the most full light in which nothing of a thing is hidden, against the first: and in that which is the life supremely refreshing, against the second: and in that in which all things are simultaneously, against the third. Nevertheless I well concede, that if intelligible things were considered in their proper essences, the intellect would not receive two simultaneously; because it is impossible to understand how one act would be terminated upon two things, just as upon ends terminating equally. And there is no counter-instance in the intellect's understanding of composite things, since those are united in the composition, nor are they received as equally terminating: but one is received in order to the other: whence one is as subject, the other as form: whence the Philosopher says that we can know many things simultaneously, but understand them scarcely at all.

DISTINCTIO II

Divisio Textus

This therefore by a true and pious faith, etc. Here the Master begins the tract of this doctrine, the prooemial part having been finished, in which he investigated concerning what is to be treated.

And it is divided according to the character of the subject of this science into two parts, namely into the tract on things, and the tract on signs. The tract on things contains the three preceding books: while the tract on signs occupies the fourth.

Now the tract on things has a division according to the character of those things according to which they come into the speculation of the Theologian. For there are things which are to be enjoyed or beatifying, about which it is treated in the first book. And there are things which are to be used, under which are also contained the things which enjoy and use: and those are to be loved with the love of use, just as was proved in the preceding distinction: and about those it is treated in the second book. There are also things ordering the one enjoying to the

47. Augustine, De Trinitate, II, Prooemium, 1.

enjoyable, which according to something of themselves are to be enjoyed, and according to something are to be used: and about those it is treated in the third.

The first book is divided into two parts: in the first of which the Author touches upon the possible way for us of arriving at the knowledge of those things which are to be enjoyed, which are the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit. But in the second he posits the tract concerning them, namely in the fourth distinction, below, there, Here a sufficiently necessary question arises, etc.

But if it is asked, Why is the first way of arriving at the science of them not touched upon in the other books, as it is here? It must be said that this happens on account of the difficulty of this matter, which although it is the highest light and the most manifest, is nevertheless hidden to us on account of the imperfection of our eye. Whence, Psalm 138:6: Thy knowledge is become wonderful to me: it is high, etc. And, in the second book of the Metaphysics: As is the disposition of the eyes of bats to the light of the sun, so is the disposition of our intellect to the most manifest things of nature.

But the first of these parts contains four parts. For in every way of coming to the knowledge of something difficult four things are required: namely, that it be known what is to be supposed: because unless the principles of the science are supposed, the science is not acquired: and this he touches upon in the first chapter. Secondly, a foreknowledge of the intention is required: because when the end is unknown the attainment of the end is ignored, and the inquiry will be uncertain and vague: and this the Master does in the second chapter, there at B, All Catholic commentators, etc. The third thing which is required is order, as the Philosopher says in the second book of First Philosophy: The beginning of a science is not always from the things prior according to the reality, but sometimes from the things easier to the hearer, through which instruction is lighter: but sometimes conversely, and this order of proceeding the Master touches upon in the second chapter, there at G, But, as in the first book, etc. The fourth and last is the process of investigation by which the science is acquired, and this the Master posits in the fourth chapter, up to the beginning of the fourth distinction, there at D, Let us therefore propose in our midst, etc.

The sentence of the first chapter is therefore to give us the suppositions which we ought to hold, and from which as principles we can proceed in the whole science of this first book.

And the Text is easy.

Articulus 1 — Whether These Three, To Speak, To Believe, And To Understand, Are Fittingly Ordered

Are these three suitably ordered: to say, to believe, and to understand?

It is asked concerning this which he himself says: This Trinity is said, believed, and understood [to be] of one and the same substance or essence.

48. Hugh of St. Victor, De Sacramentis Christianae Fidei, I, Prol., c. 2.

1. For he seems to pervert the order: For an Angel, as Damascene says, is the messenger of intelligence: therefore to understand is prior to saying.

1. Again, to believe means to assent: but no one assents to that which he does not understand: therefore to understand also seems to be before believing, and believing before saying: as it is said, in Romans 10:10: With the heart we believe unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation. And, Psalm 115:10: I have believed, therefore have I spoken. Therefore he perverts the order.
2. If perchance it be said, that these are ordered according to what we are more able [to do] in divine matters through them: but because we say less, than we believe, or even understand: therefore this precedes. On the contrary: We understand less than we believe: therefore understanding according to this would be before believing.
3. Moreover, Augustine says, that certain things are understood before they are believed: but certain things are not understood unless they are first believed: but certain things are always believed, and are never understood: therefore it seems to be insufficiently divided.

Solution. It must be said, that these three are enumerated here according to how they are generative of the doctrine of faith in the hearer: for faith (as the Apostle says) is by hearing: but hearing by the word of Christ. And moreover on the part of the teacher, first it is required to say: because the true doctrine of faith cannot be penetrated by reason: therefore it is necessary first to assent to the things said and to believe, so that through the light of faith one may come to the intellect: and this is what is said, Isaiah 7:9: If you will not believe, you shall not understand. And it is the text of another translation: because the other says: If you will not believe, you shall not continue . Whence Anselm says, that faith seeks understanding: thus therefore the solution to the things which are asked about the order is clear.

Now to the division of believable things which Augustine posits, it must be said that he himself takes believing broadly according to how it names an act of reason, which is from an opinion aided by reasons: for the Philosopher says that an opinion aided by reasons is faith: and then it is a believable thing which is understood before it is believed: and it is a believable thing into which reason cannot enter of itself, but with a light infused into it through faith it can enter into it, such as are the articles of faith: but a believable thing which is always believed, and never understood, is what receives faith from sense alone, such as the histories of any times.

Articulus 2 — Whether "Supreme" Adds Something To "Good" When "Supreme Good" Is Said

Whether "highest" adds anything to "good", when it is said "the highest good"?

49. Augustine, Confessions, X, 6, 9 (citing Ps 99:3).

Next it is asked concerning what he himself says: which is the highest good, etc. Does highest add anything over and above that which is good? And if it is said, that it adds an excess of superabundance, a twofold absurdity seems to follow from this:

1. One is, that then a good exceeding by superabundance will be comparable to a created or uncreated good: it is clear that not to an uncreated one, because the uncreated is not exceeded by the highest good: therefore to a created one. Now the Philosopher says that every comparison is according to something univocal: if therefore the highest good is comparable, it will be univocal with a created good, which is false.
2. Another absurdity is, that the highest does not have comparison except by approach to a term, or withdrawal from a contrary: and if it is compared in the first way, there seems to be some term of the highest good, and thus it would be finite: because everything of which there is some term is finite, which seems to be against the Creed: Immense Father, immense Son, etc. But if the comparison is by withdrawal from a contrary, then it seems that there is something supremely evil from which it withdraws, which again is false: because the supremely evil is indeed that which has nothing of good: but since among goods to be is optimal, the supremely evil will not have being: and what does not have being, is not: therefore the supremely evil is not.

Furthermore it is asked, whether the highest good is simple, or composite? But it seems that it is composite: because the highest is that to which no goodness is lacking: but goodnesses are of many notions: therefore it seems to be composite from them.

But on the contrary: Among the most noble goodnesses is simplicity: therefore either it will have that or not: if not, it will not be the highest good: if yes, therefore it is not composite.

Moreover, the Philosopher calls it goodness, and being at the limit of simplicity. And it is asked in what do these differ concerning the highest good?

Furthermore it is asked, whether there can be two, or more highest goods? And it seems not.

1. Because what is spoken of by superabundance belongs to one alone: but the highest is spoken of by superabundance: therefore it belongs to one alone.
2. Moreover, Boethius and Damascene object thus: Given that there are two highest goods: either whatever of goodness one has in number, the other has, or not. If in the first way: therefore they do not differ, because the goodnesses of the one and of the other are the same in number. If in the second way: therefore what one has of goodness, the other does not have: therefore it is not the highest good, since to each is lacking what can be added to it.

Solution. It must be said, that the highest good is substantially and essentially good, to which an addition in goodness is impossible. And the word highest does not add above the intention

19. Pseudo-Dionysius, De Divinis Nominibus, c. 1, § 1.

of good, except a respect according to name to other created goods, and does not add according to reality.

Now to this which is objected, that there is a comparison by approach, etc. It must be said, that approach and withdrawal is in qualities: which can be intensified and remitted: and those are qualities participated accidentally: and thus goodness is not in the highest good, because it is its own goodness essentially: if however comparison is taken broadly, then it must be said, that it does not approach, but is the term of every good.

To this which is objected, that according to this it would be finite, we could say with the Philosopher, that a term is neither finite nor infinite, but rather finishing that which is finished. If however we apply force to this, we will say that infinite is spoken of in a twofold way, namely, privatively what is apt by nature to have a limit, and does not have it: and thus the infinite is imperfect, since every perfection is from an end: or negatively, and thus the infinite is again twofold, namely that to which a limit can absolutely be removed and denied, namely that which neither in itself is an end or has an end, nor towards anything outside: and thus again the infinite is imperfect, or even non-being. But if infinite is said in the genus of the extrinsic, that is, that there is nothing outside it which may limit it: thus God is infinite: because He is limited neither by place, nor time, nor by the comprehension of an intellect. But on account of cavilers I say, that properly speaking every finite thing is limited by a limit which is its ultimate, or the ultimate of that which contains it, or in both ways its ultimate: just as a body to a surface, and time to the now as defining it: on account of which also a definition containing neither more nor less than the essential elements of the defined thing, is called a term. But outwardly it is limited as to a corporeal or spiritual place in which a thing is contained circumscriptively or definitively.

And in neither of those ways can we say that God or the highest good is finite, but rather non-finite. But since nothing of Him is outside Himself and His intellect; in this way we can say that He limits Himself: because He is (so to speak) equal to Himself. But in comparison to lower things He Himself is the end to which all things are limited, and He exceeds each one of them: and therefore He is limiting them, not limited in them.

But to that which is objected, that a comparison is according to something univocal, it must be said that it is taken broadly by the Philosopher: and this is clear because substance is more a being than an accident is: and yet being is not said altogether univocally of substance and of accident. Or it must be understood here, that comparison is in equivocal terms, or in analogous terms, not according as they attain the ratio of equivocal terms, but according as they relate to one thing which is in them: and thus it is concerning the good which is by analogy in the highest, and in created things: but how that analogy is understood, has been said above. But we well concede, that evil is not compared by withdrawal from the term of the contrary, namely, from the good: because, as the objection says, the supremely evil cannot be as regards potency, that is, that it be so evil that it cannot be worse.

To that which is further asked, whether the highest good is simple or composite? It must be said, that it is simple: for one good in it does not add over another according to reality,

although it is saved in it according to reason. But this happens on account of the identity of what it is and being in the highest good: for where the ratio of the subject is not in a reality diverse from that to which it is subjected, nothing can be in it which makes diversity: which will be proved below, when it will be asked about simplicity. And therefore it must be said, that although all goodnesses of nobility are there, nevertheless they do not have aggregation and diversity in it, and therefore they do not take away simplicity.

To the other it must be said, that it is called highest, pure, and a good at the limit of simplicity: but highest is said in respect of the containment of goodnesses according to the differences of noble goodnesses: but pure is said on account of the unmixed nature from privation which always plots for mischief: but the limit of simplicity in the good is said on account of the non-difference of the one having goodness and the goodness had: and this is what Boethius calls that which is and being.

To that which is further asked, whether there can be two highest goods? It must be said, that no, as has been proved. And if it is objected, that two, or three, or infinite highest goods are thought to be greater than one: and since the highest good is that than which a greater cannot be thought, as Anselm says, it seems there ought to be several or infinite ones, it must be said that this is false. Several or infinite highest goods are thought, or are greater than one: for what cannot be thought to be cannot be thought to be greater than anything: but several or infinite highest goods cannot be thought to be, as the objection of Boethius introduced above proves: therefore they cannot be.

Articulus 3 — Whether God Is Seen Only By The Most Purified Minds

Are only the most purged minds able to discern God?

Next it is objected concerning this which is said: Which is discerned by the most purged minds, etc.

For the most purged soul is not except that which is purged from fault, and from misery: and those purged in such a way are only the blessed: therefore in vain is this doctrine handed down to us mortals still.

To this it must be said, that purgation is named according to the nature of those things from which the mind is purged according to the possibility of the way [of this life]: but these are on the part of the affection, and on the part of the intellect. On the part of the affection indeed first sin, secondly the proneness left over from sin, thirdly the kindling of the fomes, fourthly the occasions of sin from the outside are removed. But on the part of the intellect the presence of the body which is for sense is removed, and secondly the presence of the corporeal image from the imagination, thirdly the act of the intellect receiving from the phantasm, fourthly the act of the intellect proceeding from principles known to it according to Philosophy. For upon these four it follows that it elevates itself above itself to the light of faith: and then it discerns God to be triune and one.

37. 1 Esdras (3 Esdras) 4:38.

Articulus 4 — Whether The Divine Light Exceeds The Capacity Of Our Intellect

Does the divine light exceed the capacity of our intellect?

Next it is asked concerning this which he says: For the invalid sight of the human mind, etc.

For whatever is exceeding the power of that whose act is above it, in this way in which it is exceeding it corrupts the power: but the divine light is exceeding: therefore it corrupts the intellect: therefore it does not beatify, which is false. The first is proved through the senses which are corrupted by the excellences of sensible things. The second, moreover, is written in the Text.

Moreover it is asked, what does he call to be fixed? For in an excellent thing according as it excels, that which is exceeded is not fixed: therefore it seems, since the sight of our mind is exceeded by the divine light, that it is not fixed in it. If this be granted, On the contrary: What cannot be understood, cannot be signified: the excellent according as it is such, cannot be understood: therefore it cannot be signified, which is false: because it has been signified to us in many ways.

Next it is asked concerning this which he says through the justice of faith. For why is justice said to belong more to faith, than to another virtue?

Solution. It must be said, that an excellent thing is twofold, namely excellent in the harmony of commixture, and excellent in virtue according as it is taken abstractly from a corporeal organ: and an excellent thing spoken of in the first way corrupts the organ per se, and the power which is in the organ by consequence. An excellent thing spoken of in the second way does not corrupt, but perfects most nobly.

To the other it must be said, that to be fixed in an excellent thing happens in two ways, namely, in that which is excellent, or according to that which is excellent. In the first way it happens that the sight of the mind is fixed in an excellent thing. In the second way no: because thus it is outside that which is exceeded.

But if it is asked, how is the excellent thing signified, since according as it excels it is outside the sight of the mind which it excels? I say without prejudice, that it is not signified by any name which is thus given to it, except in a certain respect and not perfectly. And to this let us posit a simile. Let us posit by impossibility that some light is infinite, or a line: and a finite circle touches something of the light, or of that line: and let the circle be having an intellective and interpretative power, namely that it itself understands what it apprehends, and knows also how to signify it to others: the circle will signify that what it touches is indeed within it and is light, or a line: but that not the whole of the line, or of the light is contained within it, rather infinite things are outside it and this is not divided from that which it itself apprehends: whence it will signify that which it receives as if in the universal, namely to be of the nature of light, or of a line: but because it is seen not to be wholly enclosed in it, but to exceed it, it cannot itself signify it according to all the differences of its nature, and according to the whole, except in a certain respect, namely, according to how it is infinitely exceeding it: and it will

22. Prov 22:28.

say: Apprehended by me is a light, or a line infinitely exceeding me. Similarly it is concerning the created sight to the uncreated substance; because that which it receives is the divine substance, and God, and the first truth, and light: but according as it is exceeding the sight, it is not known except in a certain respect, namely according to an infinite signification.

To this which is further asked concerning the justice of faith, it must be said that justice stands for general justice, whose first act according to reason belongs to faith: because he who wishes to be justified, it is necessary that first he convert himself to God through faith: because otherwise fear will not be made in him, nor hope which move to penance: and concerning this it will be set forth elsewhere.

Articulus 5 — Whether Every Known Truth Is Inspired By The Holy Spirit

Is every truth that is known inspired by the Holy Spirit?

Next it is asked concerning this which is said in the incidental note: I do not approve what is said in the prayer, etc.

1. For it seems, that every truth is known and said by the Holy Spirit: for upon that which the Apostle says, 1 Cor 12:3: No man can say: Lord Jesus, but by the Holy Spirit, the Gloss of Ambrose says: Every truth by whomever it is said, is from the Holy Spirit.
2. Again, it is clear, that Caiaphas was not prophesying from intention: and yet the Evangelist says , that on account of the dignity of his office the Spirit gave him to speak the truth, because Jesus was to die for the nation.
3. Again, Augustine in the book On the Teacher, proves by many reasons, that the external teacher labors in vain unless the one teaching interiorly is present: therefore it seems, that every truth is from the Holy Spirit.

But on the contrary: There is truth in first propositions and in the liberal arts for which man is sufficient from the teaching of man, and his own invention: therefore it is not necessary that a new teaching grace arrive there.

Solution. It must be said, that this disputation is not against the note: because Augustine says, that the wicked see no truth: and this he retracted, because the wicked have many things from God. If however force is not applied in this, we say that in the soul, in order that it receive the knowledge of truth, four things are required: the possible intellect which may be prepared to receive: and secondly, the agent intellect by the light of which the abstraction of species is made in which the truth is, or that true thing: and thirdly, the object thing through an image, or itself, about which that truth is: and fourthly, the principles and maxims which are as it were certain instruments proportioning the possible and impossible and necessary compositions and divisions from which the true is received. Among these four, the first is receiving only: the second however is giving its light only: the third is receiving from the agent intellect, and giving the light of truth distinctly to the possible: but the fourth is moved as an instrument, and moving the composition and division of that in which the true known

or sought is. Whence certain Philosophers said, that these would suffice for the cognition of the true which is under reason. But it must be said otherwise, namely,

that the light of the agent intellect does not suffice per se, except through the application of the light of the uncreated intellect, just as the ray of the sun is applied to the ray of a star. And this happens in a twofold way, namely, according to a light merely doubled, or even tripled: doubled as if a conjunction to the light of the uncreated intellect is made, and that light is the interior teacher. But sometimes it is made to the conjunction of the angelic and divine intellect: because certain Philosophers posited the soul as an instrument of intelligence, because the intelligence impresses its illuminations into it. And this Dionysius calls the reduction of our hierarchy through the hierarchy of Angels, and Augustine says this happens in many ways. And certain Philosophers call this the continuation of intellects: because even they said that nothing is seen except through the first light.

To this therefore which is asked, whether the apposition of a new grace is required, it must be said that if grace is called any gift freely given by God, then this does not happen without grace: rather a certain Philosopher says, that even if something is known in habit, a conversion to act will not be made except through a conversion to the light of the uncreated intellect.

Articulus 6 — Whether One Errs More Dangerously In The Matter Concerning The Trinity

Is it more dangerous to err in the matter concerning the Trinity?

Next it is asked concerning this which he says: Because nowhere is it more dangerous, etc.

For this seems false: since we see many opinions handed down by the Masters in the science concerning the Trinity: and they say that the difficulty of the matter excuses.

To this it must be said, that he says more dangerous here, therefore because it is in the foundation, which being overthrown, the whole is overthrown, and not as to the magnitude of the sin: or force can be applied in this that he says, one errs, and not one opines: because to err is to defend an error: but it happens to opine concerning the contradictory of a science without danger.

Articulus 7 — Whether Nothing More Fruitful Is Found Than In The Matter Concerning The Trinity

Is nothing more fruitful found than in the matter concerning the Trinity?

Next it is asked concerning this which he says: Nor is anything more fruitful found, etc. For the moralities of sermons are more fruitful: because they convert men from sin.

Solution. Force can be applied in this that he says, more fruitful: because fruit is the refreshment in the end which is the highest good, and this is none other than God the Trinity: but moralities can be more useful. Or let it be said, that the science of the Trinity is the fruit of every science: because every science and every conversion of souls is so that that may be had in which is beatitude: and thus preachings do not have anything of usefulness, except from this, according as they are ordered to it.

Articulus 8 — What Is Better Said Of The Father, Son, And Holy Spirit: That They Are One, Or That He Is One

Which is better said of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit: that they are one [plural], or that they are one [singular]?

Next it is asked concerning those things which are said in the second part which begins, there, All Catholics however. For there is a certain note there which says: Where they spoke of the Father and the Son: he who begets, and he whom he begets, are one [singular]. For it is asked there concerning the reason for Augustine's retraction. For since the word is [singular] is a substantive verb, and signifies substance: it seems rather to follow the number of the essence, than the number of the persons: and thus it was to be said, that the Father and the Son is one.

Solution. It must be said, that although the word is signifies substance, nevertheless it signifies it as act, and by consequence as in some suppositum which renders it a person to itself: and since the verb receives number from the substance standing under it, that suppositum being numbered, it is necessary to be understood that the act is numbered: and thus it is necessary that the verb be posited in the plural number: and therefore it is better said, they are one, than, it is one. But the objection proceeds concerning substance signified as at rest, as it is signified nominally.

Articulus 9 — Whether It Is Better To Say, "The One, The Father; The Other, The Son," Or "One And Another"

Is it better to say, "The Father is one [alter], the Son is another [alter]": or "one [alius], and another [alius]"?

Next it is objected upon this which is had at the end of the same chapter: In which the Father is not one thing [aliud], the Son another [aliud], etc.

For it is asked, whether it is better to say, The Father is one [alter], the Son is another [alter], or one [alius]? And it seems that it is alter: because alius names diversity of substance: but alter names diversity of accident, or of property according to Porphyry. Since therefore the Father and the Son differ by their properties, and not by substance, it seems better to be said, Al-

...one Father and another [alter] Son, than one [alius] Father, another [alius] Son.

Further it is asked, why in the neuter gender it is not conceded that it be said, "The Father is one thing [aliud], the Son another," etc.

§ Solution. To this it must be said that alter is not as congruously said, because although property is in the divine, still property is the person, and the person is a subsisting hypostasis or substance; how this is the case will be shown below, and therefore let this be supposed. Hence since alter [another/the other] speaks only of a variation of an accident, it is not fitting in the divine.

§ To the other [question], some say that there are three things in the divine: essence, person, and notion; and to the essence the neuter gender is transferred, to the person the masculine, and to the notion the feminine. And it is already quite clear concerning the first

and the second, because, as the Grammarians say, the neuter is an unformed gender, and signifies the essence of a thing simply; and therefore when one asks by quid [what] in the neuter gender, it is answered by an essential, like "wood" or "animal." The masculine gender is formed and perfect, and similarly in a nature hypostasis and person have the perfection of distinguishing things; and therefore when one asks by quis [who], the name of a distinct person is answered, like Socrates or Plato. How the feminine belongs to a notion is not as evident, since it itself is also a formed gender, belonging to an individual and a person, which by a question made through quae [who, fem.], to which is answered a determinate hypostasis in the female sex. But they say to this that the feminine is a more imperfect gender; and therefore it is attributed to the notion, which according to the account of understanding does not signify something subsisting through itself and complete in the way a person does.

Divisio Textus

Next we must pass to the fourth part of this part, which begins there: Let us propose therefore in the midst, etc.

§ And it is divided into two parts: in the first of which he teaches how to come to a knowledge of the Trinity and unity through the canonical authorities of the Bible. But in the second he teaches the same through congruous reasons and similitudes, there, For the Apostle says, etc. And there begins the third distinction.

§ The first is subdivided into two according to the two testaments from which the authorities are drawn. For in the first he posits the authorities of the Old Testament. But in the second concerning the New Testament, there, chapter H, But now after the testimonies of the Old.

§ In the first of these there are three parts: in the first of which he principally proves the unity of essence in itself, and in the persons. But in the second principally the distinction of persons, and consequently the one essence; which begins there, chapter F, But now let us return to the proposition. In the third part he posits specially the testimonies concerning the Holy Spirit, there, chapter G, Also concerning the Holy Spirit, etc.

§ In the first of these there are three chapters: in the first of which he adduces four authorities, the first three of which prove the unity of essence considered in itself; but the fourth proves it to be one in three persons, and he applies the exposition of the fourth according to Augustine. But in the second [chapter] of the same fourth [part] he posits the twofold explanation of Hilary, who intuits it more subtly, there, chapter E, near the beginning, Likewise, the same in the fourth book, etc. But in the third [chapter] he states summarily what follows from the words of Hilary, there, chapter E, near the end, In these words Hilary, etc.

§ But first a doubt arises concerning this which he says: The very exordia of the law. For the law begins in Genesis. But this authority is taken from the twentieth chapter of Exodus, verses 2 and 3.

§ Solution. The "law" here is said to be the Decalogue; and there he begins to posit the commandments of the Decalogue.

Articulus 10 — Whether In This Science One Ought First To Proceed By Authorities

Whether in this science one must first proceed by authorities?

Whether in this science one must first proceed by authorities?

Next it is asked concerning this which is had in the third chapter, where the Author says, that according to the authorities of the holy Scriptures, etc.

§ 1. For it seems to be the converse, because: he who does not believe the faith, does not believe the authority either; therefore one must first deal with him by reasons, rather than by authorities.

§ Solution. This is true regarding an infidel, but the Master intends to say this to the faithful; and therefore since faith in this science precedes the intellect (as has been held), one must first proceed by authorities, rather than by reasons. Hence Augustine and Bernard say, that what we believe we owe to authority, what we understand to reason, and what we opine to error.

Articulus 11 — Whether "God" Is A Name Of Nature

Whether "God" is a name of nature?

Next it is asked concerning this which he says: God is a name of nature, etc.

§ 1. For this seems to be false through Damascene, where he says thus: "God [Theos] is so called from that which is thein [θεῖν], that is, to encircle and foster all things; or from aithein [αἴθειν], that is, burning, for God is a fire consuming all malice; or from theasthai [θεᾶσθαι], that is, considering all things, for nothing is hidden from him; indeed he is the contemplator of all things."

But all these derivations signify a work. Therefore "God" is a name of operation, and not of nature.

§ 2. Likewise, Dionysius in the book On the Divine Names: "Divinity is said to be that which sees all things with perfect providence and goodness, circumspecting all things, and containing them, and filling them in itself, and exceeding all things that use this providence itself." But to provide, to fill, and to contain are operations. Therefore "God" is a name of operation.

§ 3. Likewise, Maximus: This name Theos [θεὸς] is derived from the Greek verb theoro [θεωρῶ], that is, I see, or I contemplate, or I consider; or from the verb theo [θέω], that is, I encircle: because he circumspects, and providing for all things encircles them. But to circumspect and to encircle are operations; therefore it is a name of operation.

§ 4. The same is proved by reason: for he does not have a name unless given by us who name him; but we do not know him except through his works; therefore it seems that we only name him from his works. Therefore, since we call him God, it seems that "God" is a name of operation, and not of nature.

Further it is asked in relation to this: Whether divinity is communicable to a creature.

§ 1. It seems that it is: because upon that [word] of the Apostle For although there are those who are called gods, the Gloss says: "by participation in divinity." Therefore it seems that divinity is an attribute in God which is participable by a creature, and communicable.

§ 2. Likewise, it is sung of Christ: He has bestowed deity upon us; therefore the name of deity is communicable.

§ 3. Likewise, in the Psalm I have said: You are gods. And to Moses I have established you as the God of Pharaoh. Likewise, You shall not detract from the gods. Therefore it seems that this name is communicable.

§ 4. Likewise, whether it signifies providence, as Damascene says, or encirclement and containing, or even the fire of charity consuming sin: all those are communicable to a creature, because creatures provide, care for, and attend to things; therefore deity seems to be communicable.

§ 5. Likewise, the acts which Dionysius posits, to provide, to encircle, to fill, to contain, are all communicable; therefore it seems that deity is also communicable.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. Those who posit many gods err; therefore it seems that deity is a form incommunicable to creatures; therefore it seems that those who are created cannot be gods.

§ 2. Likewise, Anselm: God is greater than can be thought; but that which is greater than can be thought cannot be communicable to many; therefore it cannot be communicated; and thus divinity will be an incommunicable attribute.

Further it is asked, On what basis is the number of the derivations of Damascene and of the acts of Dionysius taken?

Still further it is asked, for the Gloss on the First Epistle to the Corinthians says [50] that "God" is said in three ways, namely, substantively, adoptively, and nuncupatively; for it is doubted, whether it is said of them equivocally.

§ 1. And it seems that it is: because equivocals are those of which only the name is common, and the account of substance is diverse; but here only the name is common, and the account of substance is diverse; therefore it is said of them equivocally.

§ 2. The same seems to be gathered from the text there, where it says, Although there are those who are called gods; it does not say, who are.

§ 3. The same [is gathered] from the Gloss's manner of speaking, which says that it is said "in three ways," because it seems to distinguish the signified of the spoken word, and not of the supposits; but such a distinction

is fitting for an equivocal term; therefore it itself is said of them equivocally.

ON THE CONTRARY: Although there are those who are called gods: the Gloss adds, "by participation in divinity."

§ 1. But whatever have one name by participation in the same common nature, are univocal; therefore "God" is univocal to God said substantively, and adoptively, and nuncupatively.

§ 2. Likewise, an equivocal term does not posit a respect of diverse things to one nature through the intention of the name; for he who named the celestial star "dog" did not look to any property of the nature of the dog, and similarly he who named the fish "dog." Therefore the intention of the one instituting the equivocal term did not look to that same thing when he instituted the second, to which he looked when he instituted it to be the name of the prior thing. And therefore Boethius calls such equivocals "by chance and fortune." But he who imposes the name on an idol has a respect to one thing, which is to provide and to contain, from which account also God substantively is called God. Therefore it seems that God is not equivocally called God.

§ Solution. It must be said that two things are to be attended to in a name, namely the form or account from which it is imposed, and that upon which it is imposed; and these are called by some the signified [significatum] and the supposit; but by the Grammarians they are called quality and substance. And if we attend to that from which it is imposed, that is, the attribute, or the form (if it is permitted to speak thus, since in God there is no form), then it is a name of operation. But if we attend to the supposit, namely, that upon which it is imposed and for which it supposits, it is a name of nature. And thus the solution to the four authorities of the Saints is clear: because Ambrose is speaking with respect to that upon which it is imposed, while the other three with respect to that from which it is imposed.

§ But if it is asked: Since that name is imposed from an operation, just as certain others are, why is that one rather called a name of nature than the others, since the others are also imposed upon the nature of God, just as that one is? It must be said that that name, God, is imposed from works which through themselves belong only to God: such as the works of universal providence, and of the containing and filling of things. And because these according to themselves belong only to God, therefore the divine nature is rather named by that one than by the others.

§ To the other it must be said that although we name him from operations, nevertheless the operations are not of the same account: because certain ones through themselves belong only to him; but certain ones through themselves and naturally belong also to a creature, although subsequently, because they are from him and directed to him: such as life, wisdom.

§ To that which is further asked, Whether divinity is a communicable attribute? It must be said that if providence, and containing, and encirclement are taken in respect to the universe, in that account it will not be communicable. For although those pre-existing others, whether in degree of dignity, or power of miracles, or merit of life, have some providence and containing in respect to others, nevertheless they fall short in at least two things, namely in universality, and in this that they do not penetrate and fill the interiors of the thing, but are as it were extrinsic. And therefore with respect to this it is incommunicable; but with respect to

50. Glossa in 1 Cor. 8:5.

the acts in their genus it is communicable; and then it is said participatively, as the aforementioned Gloss says.

§ To that which is further asked, From what is the number of the derivations according to Damascene drawn? It must be said that according to the order to creatures there are three things in God, namely wisdom, power, and goodness, or good will. And although power is first according to the account of understanding, if these three are taken absolutely without an order to actually existing creatures, nevertheless according as they are referred to the governance of a created thing, prior is the act of seeing wisdom, and secondly is the act of power encircling and containing

in being, and thirdly is the act of goodness ordering to perfection: from this that he loves all things that are, and hates nothing of those which he made. And Dionysius posits these same acts, except for the fact that he adds "filling", which posits perfection in the thing. For from this that God is in it essentially, presentially, and potentially, he orders it to perfection and holds it in being, because all things would flow away into nothingness, unless the hand of the omnipotent God contained them.

§ To that which is further asked concerning the definition of the name, it must be said that in truth it is said equivocally thus, although it is not equivocal by chance and fortune; but rather by holding itself as prior and posterior to some one thing, which is substantially and naturally in the true God, but in the Saints by a certain participation which is according to a part and imperfect; but in gods nuncupatively only through a respect of opinion, and this has the least amount of deity; because to be in opinion, is to be in a qualified sense [secundum quid], and not simply. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 12 — Who Said To Moses, "I Am Who Am," The Nature Or A Divine Person

Whether nature, or a divine person, said to Moses, "I am who am"?

Next it is asked concerning this which he says: I am who am, and He who is sent me, etc. And three things are asked, namely: Who is it who said this to Moses, whether nature or person? The second is, whether this is a proper name in God, and what it names in him? The third is, concerning the order of this name to other names.

§ To the first one proceeds thus: 1. It does not belong to essence according to the intellect of essence to speak, but to a person; but here is a certain speech; therefore it does not belong to the essence, but to a person.

§ 2. Besides, the Saints expound this concerning the Son: because through the descent the incarnation is signified; through the fire of the bush is signified the taking up of the tribulation of nature, in which however he did not lose the greenness of divinity. Hence he says: Seeing I have seen, etc. Through the liberation from Egypt is signified the liberation from sin and the devil, who is signified through Pharaoh. Therefore it seems that this belongs to a person.

§ 3. Likewise, some also wish to take this from this pronoun, I [ego], which is a demonstrative signifying a determinate person. Who [qui] also is a name having in itself a subjunctive

article, by reason of which articulation it has to signify a person determinate by his property. And thus it seems that the person of the Son said that.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. The works of the Trinity are undivided; therefore the saying of one is the saying of the other.

§ 2. Some also wish to draw this from the modes of signifying of the terms which are posited there: because I [ego] is a demonstrative of the first person, and thus has to signify the Father, who in the Trinity is not from another person, but is the principle of the whole divinity, and a principle is not from a principle. But who [qui] is a name with a subjunctive article, which demonstrates a second knowledge, and has to stand for the Son, who is as it were second, because he is from the Father. But am [sum] signifies substance as the act by which he proceeds from both, and has to signify the Holy Spirit who is from both. And therefore it is also repeated with both, when it is said, I am who am; and thus it will be a word of the three persons.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. Damascene says that it signifies an infinite sea of substance, not what he is; therefore it seems that it is a saying of the essence.

§ 2. Likewise, Jerome says that in comparison to him who is, who is immutable, the rest which are mutable are not.

§ 3. Besides, let us understand, by an impossibility, that the persons are not in that account by which they are distinguished, that is, that the Father is not in the account of the Father, nor the Son in the account of the Son, nor the Holy Spirit in the account of the Holy Spirit: still God will be undivided in himself, and a subsisting hypostasis of a rational nature divided from others. Therefore he can speak; therefore to speak is not proper to a person in the account of the Father, or the Son, or the Holy Spirit, but in the account of God; and this is what belongs to the nature. Therefore that saying is of the substance.

§ Response. To this it must be said that, just as the last objection proves, this name, He who is, without doubt belongs to the three persons, in this that they are of one substance: because this is given from the simplicity and property of the divine nature in being.

§ But to this which is objected, that to speak belongs to a person, it must be said that it is true, but not to a person distinct in this way. Rather, if there were not three persons in the accounts by which they are distinct in faith, God would still be a certain person distinct by himself from other essences and natures of things, and to him in this way it would belong to speak through a subjected creature: just as Jerome says that he spoke that word to Moses through an Angel. Nevertheless, because the Son is the word and mouth of the Father, who spoke him in the world, therefore by appropriation it is attributed to the Son.

§ To the other two, it must be said that such a demonstration and articulation does not compel it to stand for a person distinct by such a personal property, as faith distinguishes; but rather for a person which through itself is one subsisting hypostasis of a rational nature: as God is here, if it is permitted to speak thus.

Articulus 13 — Whether "He Who Is" Is A Proper Name Of God

Whether "He who is" is a proper name of God?

Secondly it is asked concerning this, Whether it is proper to God, and what it names in him?

But it seems that it is not proper: because to be belongs to all created things, and belongs to them primarily; therefore it seems that it is not proper to God alone.

Besides, what does it name in him? And Damascene says that it names an infinite sea of substance, and not what he is.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. The infinite as such cannot be named by what it is, or that it is; therefore it seems that it cannot be named by this name, He who is, or being.

§ 2. Besides, we name God by that through which we understand him; but we understand him through his works; therefore we name him through his works. Therefore it seems that we do not name him by any name which is designative of substance; therefore not by this name, He who is.

Besides, what is it that Damascene says, that it does not signify what he is? For this seems to be false: for it signifies the essence, and this is God; therefore it signifies what God is.

§ Solution. To this it must be said that the being of essence, in the pure and simple intellect of being, is proper to God. For every other being is something more than simple essence. This is proved thus: Let created being itself be taken in the absolute intellect of being, of which the Philosopher says: The first of created things is being, and there is no other created thing before it. It is true that this being does not have anything in itself besides being; nevertheless, because it is created, it necessarily posits a habitude to the creator, and this habitude is something in it, although it is in respect

of another. Hence this habitude together with the created being makes a concreativity and a composition, and thus to be simply is not proper to it. But if it is objected, that this is also in the first being, because it posits a respect to created beings, it must be said that that respect according to the thing adds nothing to it; but in a created being it is otherwise, and its respect is added upon its being.

§ Besides, in a created being there is further taken composability with another, and determinability through forms and differences of the most general genera and of other parts of being. This composability, by the very fact that it is not in being, is not in the first being. And thus it is clear how being names the divine essence, or God according to the divine essence, and not properly a created [essence].

§ To the other it must be said that the infinite according as it is infinite is not named, because according to this it is outside the one naming and understanding; but that which is infinite according as it is attained by the intellect, can be named, and signified by that very name, as was shown above.

§ To the other it must be said that it is true that our cognition begins from creatures, but it is not terminated in creatures, but in God. For we come through the effect of power to power, and through power to essence. And therefore we can name the essence, not through any creature, but from that in which our cognition stands as in its end; for otherwise we could never signify anything concerning God, except in the account of a cause to creatures.

§ To that which Damascene says that it does not signify what he is, it must be said that this is understood in two ways: for "what it is" [quid esse] is to be something [aliquid esse]; and to be something is to be a being not simply, but determinate by some species, or genus, or difference: just as to be a substance is to be something, and to be an animal is to be something, and to be good. And this is what Boethius says in the first book of De Hebdomadibus: Everything that is participates in that which is being so that it may be, but participates in another so that it may be something. And therefore he says that it is an infinite sea of substance. But if it is objected, that there is an opposition in the word of Damascene, because substance according to this does not name "to be," but rather "to be something," it must be said that he himself does not place force on the name of substance according to the account of the name, but only takes it according to the thing, according as it is convertible with simple essence. Others have said otherwise, namely, that "what it is" is the proper definition of a thing, which no divine name touches either explicitly or implicitly. But this is nothing: because God is not definable, although "what he is" can be said in him, such as substance, wisdom, goodness, and the rest of this kind. Nevertheless, it must be attended to, that none of these names which also say "what he is," produces in us a determinate notion of its signification in God, such that nothing is outside the intellect concerning the reality of the same signified. Because God is infinite according to any attribute; and therefore his profundity, and the height of nobility signified by the same, is not totally included by the intellect. For otherwise God would be comprehended, and would be rendered finite by our intellect according to this attribute, which is false: because neither simply nor according to any attribute is he renderable finite by our intellect, or by any created intellect. Nevertheless, when I say that substance, or wisdom, or goodness signify what God is, but "to be" or "what he is" signifies being, or entity, or infinite essence, or an infinite sea of substance: I do not mean to say that substance by adding something to being draws it to a part. But because such a determination is made according to the account of understanding through this name, in reality there is no addition, but equal simplicity. Nor is that account of understanding therefore false, because according to the mode of understanding it is false: because its mode of understanding which it receives from the name, it does not posit in the reality itself. But concerning this there will be a question below.

Articulus 14 — Whether "He Who Is" Is First Among The Divine Names

Whether "He who is" is the first among the divine names.

Whether "He who is" is the first among the divine names.

Thirdly it is asked concerning the order of this name to other names.

§ 1. And it seems that it itself is prior to all other names: because Dionysius says so in the book On the Divine Names: "Being itself according to itself is older than that which is life

through itself, and that which is wisdom through itself; and whatever other existing things participating, before all those they participate in being." Therefore it seems that He who is is the first among the names of God.

§ 2. Likewise, Boethius in the book De Hebdomadibus says thus that being itself in no way participates in anything; therefore it seems that it itself is simpler than all things participating in something. But substance, the good, and life, and wisdom participate in something; therefore being itself is prior to them.

§ 3. Likewise, the Philosopher in the Book of Causes: "The first of created things is being," etc.; therefore being according to the intellect is first.

§ 4. Likewise, the Commentator in the same place says that being comes to be through creation, because according to the intellect there is nothing before it in which the good comes to be; and other things come to be through information, because according to the intellect being is before them, and they are in being, like things informing it. Therefore He who is, is first.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. Damascene says that Dionysius says that the first name is the good.

§ 2. Likewise, in the order of names Dionysius executes concerning the good prior to being, in which he makes mention of the true, and the beautiful; therefore it seems that the good is prior.

§ 3. Likewise, whatever holds itself to being and to non-being according to cause, is prior to that which holds itself to being only; the good holds itself to being and to non-being, in the first cause; but being [holds itself] to being only; therefore the good is prior to being. PROOF OF THE MIDDLE PREMISE through Dionysius and through the Commentary: because boao [βοάω] and kaleo [καλέω] are the same, etc. For boao in Greek is "I call, you call," from which bonum is drawn in Latin; but kaleo is the same as "I cry out," from which kalon [καλόν] is drawn in Greek, which signifies bonum [good] in Latin, for the reason that God by his goodness calls those things which are not, as those things which are.

§ Solution. Those names can be considered in three ways, namely, according to their simple intentions: and thus being is older, and prior to all; because in the order of the primary cause according to the Philosopher in the Book of Causes, and in the order of the subject it holds itself to all others, namely, the true, the good, life, and wisdom, etc. And thus speaks Dionysius in the book On the Divine Names in the adduced authority, and the Philosopher in the Book of Causes. And thus the reason which was adduced proceeds.

§ Furthermore, those can be considered also according to the supposits in which they are, and which they do not abandon except according to a certain intellect, as Boethius wishes in the book De Hebdomadibus. And thus the true, the good, being, and the one are converted among themselves; but not life, and wisdom with these. Hence according to this mode four will be equally first, but they do not antecede the others.

§ In a third mode those can be considered in the first cause according as it is a cause, that is, according as it produces caused things. And thus being in a creature is produced by the good in the Creator. And in this mode created being is posterior to the uncreated good. And this is what Dionysius says, that the good is diffusive of its being. And that solution is according to the intellect of Dionysius, as is clear from the authorities adduced above. And through this the solution to all the questions is clear.

And note that on account of the simple intellect of uncreated being, as was said, Rabbi Moses says in the book Guide of the Perplexed [Dux neutrorum], that He who is is the ineffable name of God, and the chief among all names, by which he names this, that he himself most truly is simply without any addition.

Articulus 15 — Whether "Lord" Is A Name Of Power

Whether "Lord" is a name of power?

Next it is asked concerning this which he says, that Lord is a name of power. And it is asked what power it signifies?

§ 1. It seems to say several things according to Dionysius in the book On the Divine Names, where he says thus: "Domination is not only an excess over worse things, that is, subjects; but a perfect and all-encompassing possession of all beautiful and good things, and a true fortitude valid against falling." Therefore it seems that Lord signifies a superposition over worse things, that is, an excess over subjects, and an abundance of possession of beautiful and good things, and fortitude. And here no mention is made of power in that it is power, unless perhaps according as fortitude is a certain power.

§ 2. Likewise, Ambrose says that lord is so called from the power of ruling, and of containing the creature subject to him.

§ 3. But Augustine says that a lord is called one who has a servant; and according to this last exposition Lord does not seem to be from eternity.

§ Solution. It must be said that in the intellect of that which is Lord, one thing is principal, and another is according to the account of understanding only consequent to it, and another is like an antecedent. For superposition over worse things, that is, inferior created things, is said by the intellect of the name principally. But the containing and regimen of those to which he is superposed, is said consequently. But those things which are the cause of superposition, according to the account of understanding are said in the name like an antecedent. But the cause of superposition is the all-encompassing possession of beautiful and good things incomparably more than may be in all created things to which he is superposed. Concerning the intellect also of that antecedent is firmness, which Dionysius calls fortitude; hence another translation has firmness: so that, namely, such possession is through itself from nature; because then the beautiful and the good in him will not be able to fall. And Dionysius touches upon these four in his definition. But others touch upon that which is enclosed in the name according to a part. And through this the solution to the whole except the last is clear.

§ And it is commonly said to the other, that dominion can mean the habit of dominating, or the act: if the habit, then he is Lord from eternity; if the act, then he is Lord from time.

Articulus 16 — Whether God Is Nameable By Us

Whether God is nameable by us?

Next it is asked concerning this which he says: The Lord omnipotent is his name.

§ 1. For from this it is taken, that he is named; therefore he is nameable by us, which seems to be against Dionysius, in the book On the Divine Names where he says thus, that it is an unspeakable word, and irrationality, and unintelligibility. And another translation has: unnameability.

§ 2. Likewise, in the same, that it is a word...

inscrutable at once, and not investigable: just as there is no trace of them by which they have passed to the hidden infinity of it: therefore, if it is unknowable, it seems that it is unnameable: because naming does not occur except of the known.

1. Likewise, In the same, neither is there opinion of it, nor name, nor serious.
2. Likewise, In chapter 7, he says ineffable and unnameable: and below, It is not understood, nor said, nor named.
3. And in the last of the Mystical Theology: Neither is there reason of it, nor name, nor knowledge: therefore it seems that it is unnameable.
4. Likewise, the Philosopher in the book on Causes; The first cause is superior to narration, and tongues do not fail in narrating it except because of the nobility of its being: because it is above every cause, and it is not narrated except through secondary causes, which are illuminated by the light of the first cause.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 4. Dionysius in the book on Divine Names: The scriptures call the invisible, the most clear light: and much laudable and much nameable, ineffable and unnameable.

1. Likewise, In the same chapter and first: Theologians praise the deity, as both unnameable, and from every name.
2. Likewise, He says that it is its reason, intellect, and name.
3. Likewise, Exodus 3:15: this is my name forever: therefore it seems that it is nameable.

Solution. It must be said to this according to Augustine in the first of On Christian Doctrine, where he says thus: Since nothing worthy can be said of God, he admitted the service of human voice, and wished us to rejoice in his words. Hence it must be said that God is unnameable by a name perfectly representing what he is, or perfectly signifying it. But because of the poverty of names, he condescended to us that we might name him with a word imperfectly signifying, provided that we do not place that imperfection in him, but understand him

to surpass: and thus all things brought from Dionysius to this that he is nameable are understood. And that this is true is evident through Dionysius thus saying in the book on Divine Names, last chapter: And neither do we bring the name of goodness as agreeing with it: but with the desire of understanding something and saying about that ineffable nature, we sanctify the most worthy of names to it first. And we will indeed agree with the Theologians in this, but we fall short of the truth of things.

As to what is objected from the proposition of the Philosopher, it must be said that he speaks truly, and according to the Commentary the reason is such: because the first imports two things of itself, namely, that it is perfect in itself, and bestowing perfection on all others: but the diminished, insofar as it is diminished, has two things contrary to its reason, namely, that because it is deficient in itself from perfection, therefore it bestows no perfection on any. And therefore, because every name says what God is in a diminished way, therefore it is more unsuitable than suitable: because insofar as it is diminished, it places contraries to the two things that everyone who places God, says to be in God. But it is most truly said to be above name, and above narration: because since it is not bounded by intellect, it is signified to exceed every name, and every reason.

Articulus 17 — By What Is God Named, Whether By Everything Which It Is Better To Be Than Not To Be

By what is God named, whether by everything which it is better to be than not to be?

Further, it is asked, by what is He named?

And Anselm says that He is named by everything which it is better to be than not to be simply: but to everything which is, it is better to be a being than not to be: therefore God is named being.

Likewise, it is better to live for everything which is, than not to live: therefore He is named life: and so with others. But not for everything which is, is it better to be gold than not to be gold: because for an angel it is better not to be gold than to be gold: therefore gold does not pertain to God. Anselm uses this rule for naming God.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. It is better for everything which is, to be sensitive than not sensitive: therefore it seems that God is sensitive, which is false.

1. Likewise, others say that God is named from all things which do not pertain to privation and matter: but there are many such things for which it is better to be than not to be: just as it is better for me to be a man than not to be, etc.: therefore it seems that the preceding statement is not true.
2. Furthermore, Dionysius makes Theology of mystical names, and another of symbolic ones: therefore it seems that He is named from symbolic ones: therefore from material ones, which is against what is commonly said, that He is not named from material ones.
3. Likewise, Dionysius says that in Him it is necessary to affirm the positions of all: therefore it seems that He is named by the names of all.

Solution. It must be said that divine names are formed in two ways, namely, either from those things which according to reality are primarily in God and secondarily in creatures, and these names are called mystical by blessed Dionysius, such as being, life, intellect, wisdom, goodness, and the like: for "mystical" in Greek is the same as "secret" in Latin: and this is because that name according to its property which it has from institution signifies imperfectly and in part that which in God is perfection and in whole: and it sometimes signifies accidentally that which is substantially in God and the divine substance: and therefore the divine thing which it names remains hidden to us: because we know it to be above the name, and the tongue fails in narrating it. And therefore Dionysius explains that it is life, and not life, but above life: for it is life in reality primarily, and not life according to what the name posits: above life, because He is His own life, and inserted in us: and therefore Dionysius also says that in God affirmations are uncompounded, and negations true: because by negations it is said what He is not, like incorruptible, incorporeal, and the like: and these are simply true. But affirmation is uncompounded: because the mode of signifying in the name is repugnant to the divine thing, as has been said, especially for three reasons, namely, because it signifies composite what is of infinite simplicity, and imperfect what is most perfect, and accidentally sometimes what is substance. Hence Anselm says that father, and life, and the like, although they descend to us from God according to reality, yet the name of father sounds more familiarly to us as a carnal human father than as God. But from symbolic names according to the translation of corporeal property to spiritual it is denominated. Like stone, because solid and solidly founding what is built upon: so spiritually His solid truth is the foundation of the spiritual edifice. And in these two ways He is named by all.

According to Anselm's rule, it must be said that it is true of mystical names which name that which according to reality is primarily in God, although they do not name Him as He is in Himself.

To what is objected against, it must be said that sense is taken in two ways, namely, for the material power joined to an organ, and thus it does not pertain to God, nor even to angels: or it can be taken for the receptive or cognitive power of sensibles,

and in this way it pertains to God, and to an angel, and thus it is a condition of nobility.

To what is asked about the rule of the Masters, it must be said that it is good: because material things are called corporeal, whether they are bodies themselves, or substantial or accidental forms, which are determined by bodies, and are in bodies. Privative things, however, which pertain to defect because all those are caused by privation: like to suffer, to be changed, to be moved, to be unjust, to lie, to sin, and the like. Besides these, however, all pertain to nobility, by which it is better to be for everything which is, than not to be. And from these the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 18 — Whether The Image Supposits For The Essence Or The Persons

ARTICULUS XVUQUL.

For which the image is supposed, when it is said: Let us make man to our image?

Then it is asked about this which says:

Let us make man to the image, And two things are asked, namely, for what the image stands, either for the essence, or for the persons, or for both? And concerning the reason for the diversity of the expositions of Augustine and Hilary.

First, therefore, it is asked, Whether the image supposes the essence, or the persons? If it supposes the essence, then it seems possible to say, Let us make man to our essence, or to the essence in three; but this is not true: therefore it seems that it does not suppose the essence in itself, nor the essence in three persons.

But if it supposes for the three persons, then it seems that it ought to say, To the images, and not to the image.

If it is said (as some have said) that the image stands there for the Son. Against: The text says to our image; but the Son is not the image except of the Father: whence then the Father ought to say, To my image: and it would not be a word common to the three persons, as the Saints say.

For this reason, some have said that the image does not stand there for the uncreated image, but the created: and they wish to have this from the connotation of the preposition to, which seems to denote assimilation with the reason of some distance: because it seems to signify motion towards something, for it signifies towards a place. But if it is asked, What is that created thing to which man is made, they say that this is the reason of the image abstracting from the exemplified image in man. But against this is, that still this reason of the image will be the reason of some other uncreated thing, and concerning this the same question returns as before, Whether it says the essence, or the person? and if the person, Whether the person of the Son, or all in common?

Furthermore, that reason of the image cannot be posited except in the mind of God making man: and thus this reason of the image will be the idea to which man is made to the image of God: and thus nothing is created, but rather the creative essence, as Anselm wishes. Whence this seems to be said in vain.

There are others who say that the image stands there for the Son, and the likeness for the Holy Spirit. But then it seems the Father ought to say this word, and not commonly the whole Trinity. Likewise, the Father ought to say to my image, and to our likeness: and not commonly to say to the Son and the Holy Spirit, as the Saints expound, but to the Son only.

Solution. To these I say without prejudice, that image and likeness here say the divine essence directly, and the three persons indirectly. Whence the image is one essence in three persons imitating themselves in the same essence: and likeness is one essence by the mode of quality which according to Damascene, follows the substance: like goodness, wisdom, and such in three persons similar to themselves in goodness, and wisdom, and virtue, and such: whence both image and likeness are relative indirectly, and intrinsically. I say indirectly: because those things which are referred to themselves, are implied indirectly. I say intrinsically: because they have in themselves the relation, and also that to which it is referred: so that

they do not seek to be determined externally: as it is said, These are similar, that is, this one is similar to that one, and this one is similar to this one.

Therefore to what was first objected, it must be said that they say the essence in persons imitating themselves in it: as it has been held, they say imitating, and that in which they imitate themselves. Nor is it valid that it could be said there, Let us make man to the image, that is, to the essence in three persons: because although the essence in three persons is the same as the image, yet the mode of signifying in the name is different: and therefore the argument does not proceed: and there is there a sin of accident, or even according to some a figure of speech due to the changed mode of predicating in divine things. But we concede the other reasons which proceed against other opinions without prejudice.

Further it is asked about the reason for the diverse exposition of Augustine and Hilary. And it must be said, that Hilary in this term, image, considers two things, namely that which is implied directly, and that which is implied indirectly: and therefore he says in it can be taken the unity of essence, and the plurality of persons: and therefore he says, The image alone is not, that is, it is not of one, because it supposes many imitating themselves in one: and similarly he considers in this term, likeness, besides this alone that the image is in essence, likeness however in those things which according to the mode of signifying in the name imply quality. Augustine however considers in these terms only that which is implied directly.

Similarly these two terms: Let us make, and our, they consider diversely. For Hilary considers a double mode of signifying in them, namely, the connotation of the plural number, and in this he takes the plurality of persons: and again the mode of signifying by which they say consortium, one of them to one act in number, and the other to one form in number: for when it is said, let us make, one act in number of the word is understood to proceed from diverse supposed persons: and this cannot be unless they are one in the acting essence. Similarly when it is said, our, it is noted that of many there is one number of the reason of the image and nature: and this is what he says, that the profession of consortium by our, and let us make, removed the understanding of the singular: and thus he posits many persons. But when it is said: Neither does anyone say, let us make, this is because thus not unless by one which is nature they are referred to one act in number which is implied by let us make, and by one which is image and nature they are said to have consortium which is implied by our. Augustine however does not take in these terms except the signified plainly. But Hilary calls diversity the division of nature which is in matter by substantial forms: like man from man, and lion from man.

He calls singularity individuation: by accidents, which are not compelled in divine things: he calls solitude negation by place.

Articulus 19 — Whether Numerical Terms In Divine Matters Posit Anything

Do numerical terms in the divine place something?

Then it is asked about what the Master says in the same chapter, where he summarizes the sayings of Hilary, and says:

(which he signified by the name of consort, or plurality, not placing something, but removing it, elo.

1. And from this it seems to be taken, that according to the Master, numerical terms in the divine place nothing, but rather deny and remove something, as when it is said one person, nothing is placed around the person, but it is removed thus, that is, not two, not three: and when two persons are said, that is, not one only, or three: and when three are said, it is understood not one, or two only, or more than three.
2. And this also seems through Isidore, who says, that number is said from nod: but nod is of sense: therefore it seems there is no number except in sensibles.
3. Likewise, Boethius: Diverse in number are those in which diversity is found in numbering: but in divine persons there is no diversity: therefore neither number. But that there is no diversity in the divine, is clear in the same authority of Hilary.
4. Likewise the Philosopher: In those in which there is no matter, there is no number, except according to cause and caused: but in the divine there is no matter: therefore if there is number in them, it is according to cause and caused, which again does not fit: because it is not conceded that one person is the cause of another.
5. Likewise, Damascene says, that difference is the cause of number: but every difference is either according to matter, or according to form: according to matter it is not in the divine: therefore if it is, it is according to form. Either therefore according to the form of genus, or species; and it is clear, that in neither way: therefore it seems, that in the divine the ratio of numerical terms is not preserved.
6. Likewise, the Philosopher says, that the infinite in number is caused by the infinite in the continuous: because as much as is divided in the continuous, so much is added in number: for we know number by the division of the continuous: therefore it seems, that number is not properly except in naturals.
7. Furthermore, Number is a species of discrete quantity: therefore numerical terms place something around their subject. But in the divine there is all manner of simplicity: therefore they place nothing in them, as the Master says.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 4. The Philosopher says, that the ratio of man and of one man is the same: therefore it seems that one adds nothing above that which is one, except the indivision of the undivided form in itself, and distinguishing from others: and thus it seems to fit and place in the divine.

1. Likewise, Boethius says in the book on the Two Natures in one person of Christ, that one and being are convertible.
2. Likewise, Each thing is one from its form. Therefore, since the property of the person makes it undivided in itself, and divided from others, and thus is as it were a form, it seems that one places in persons the property.

Solution. It must be said, that the unity of essence is the essence itself: but by another reason it is essence, and another one. For essence is that whose act is to be. For Anselm says, that essence, being, and being differ: as light, to shine, and shining. But one is inasmuch as existing one in itself it is distinguished from others by its (so to speak) natural properties, which are the essence itself. And the unity of persons is the property which is the person, and the unity of notion is notion, although it is signified otherwise in the numerical term. And similarly I say of two, and three, according to which they say the iteration of the unity of person, or notions. Therefore the Master intends, that above that which the thing is, one adds nothing except indivision: and therefore he says to place nothing. But if it is attended to by which the person is one, or two, or three, then it places the property under another mode of signifying.

To the other it must be said, that number is not preserved in the divine as it is said nod of sense, but as it is said nod of intellect in whatever way distinguishing: and therefore even if this is admitted, that in the divine there is the number of persons, it is not admitted that in the divine there is simply number: because simply number is of diverse things in essence and being, which is not in the divine.

To another it must be said, that there is not in the divine diversity in number, but rather distinction; and that which Boethius says, is understood in those in which there is simply number. And I do not say this that the number of persons is number absolutely speaking.

To another it must be said, that in the divine there is not cause and caused, but principle and principled, and this suffices for the number of persons: yet that which that Philosopher says, is not altogether sufficient: because in the Angel there is much number, as Dionysius wills, even beyond this that one is the cause of another.

To another it must be said, that if difference is taken largely, then it comprehends the distinction of personal properties, and that in the divine will cause such a number as is there.

To another it must be said, that the infinite is a passion of matter: and therefore it is not necessary if the infinite in number is not caused by the division of the continuous, that on account of this number is simply caused by that. because number is found in non-materials, Or it may be said (as some have said) that number and multitude are opposed to unity: whence in as many ways as one is said, in so many ways by opposition number and multitude are made. But one is said by continuity, and one by form, and one by equality of nature and one by respect to one. In continuity, as a line is one, and a body one: by form however as a man is one, or Socrates is one. By equality of nature, as that whose attributes of natural essence are the same. By respect to one, as univocals are one by respect of one ratio to that in which they are univocal. By opposition however by privation of one number and multitude is made. For by privation of the continuous number is made by division. Similarly by division of form by matter, as in the number of individuals, or by forms or differences, as in the number of species number is made. Similarly in equality of nature according to attributes degrees, and orders in nature, and multitude are made, as the number of Angels is made. Similarly also multitude of ratios simply, and by prior and posterior makes number in equivocals, and analogicals: of another number the Philosopher speaks of numbered.

To another it must be said, that one is taken in two ways, namely, as it is converted with being: and thus it is not the principle of discrete quantity which is number and multitude: and number thus resulting is not in the species of discrete quantity, but places the form by which a thing is one or many. and thus in some way it is taken in the divine. Otherwise it is the principle of discrete quantity, and thus it is being in part, and places an accident signified around its subject: and similarly number arising from it, and thus it does not fit in the divine.

Articulus 20 — Why In Other Beings The Number Of Nature Follows The Number Of Hypostases, And Does Not Follow In The Divine

It is asked, Why in other beings does the number of hypostases follow the number of natures, and not in divine things?

But further it is asked, Why does this happen that in other beings the number of hypostases follows the number of natures, and this does not follow in divine things? For it does not follow that the Father is one God, and the Son is one God, and the Holy Spirit is one God: therefore they are three gods. For this seems to be against the common conception of the mind which is known to the intellect by itself, namely, that the number of multiple hypostases cannot be one nature in number.

Solution. It must be said that this happens because of the identity of nature and hypostasis in divine things. For hypostasis, or substance, or that which is, is found in four ways in beings. In some, hypostasis and nature, or that which is from which it is, differ: yet in such a way that nature or that by which it is, is communicable to many, and is actually communicated through the division of that which is, or hypostasis, by the act of generation: as it happens in all generable and corruptible things: like man, donkey, and other such things. However, in some, that by which it is, or nature, is communicable: and it differs from that which is, or from the suppositum, or hypostasis: but it is not communicated, because it has all its matter within itself, in which it is possible for it to be, and nothing of it is outside itself, neither by potentiality nor by act: as in the sun, and moon, and other stars: in which also the form, or that by which it is, although it is communicable, and differs from that which is, or from the suppositum, or hypostasis, and the hypostasis itself is quantifiable: yet it is never divided by act, because it has all that matter within itself in which it is possible for its form to be: and therefore the species in them is preserved in one: because this is a principle in general nature, that of all those whose matter is not entirely terminated within the form, there is an act of generation by which the form is multiplied in several numbers in different supposita. Likewise, in some, nature indeed or that by which it is, differs from the suppositum itself, or hypostasis, or that which is: yet it is simple, that which is indivisible not being from any matter: because, as Boethius says, there is no matter of spiritual things: and therefore in such things the species is also preserved in one suppositum, and is not communicated: rather it contracts individuality from the properties of the suppositum according to personal attributes accepted: and thus it is in Angels. But in divine things, that by which it is and nature is entirely indifferent from the suppositum: and therefore, with the suppositum being numbered, the nature is not divided: but it remains indifferent in all supposita of the same

nature: and therefore it does not hold, the Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God: therefore three gods: because the numerical term places its thing only around the suppositum, and not around the nature, or that by which it is.

Articulus 21 — Whether All Things Were Made In One Principle, Or In Diverse Principles, As The Manichees Say

Whether all things were made in one principle,
or in diverse, as the Manicheans say?

Whether all things were made in one principle,
or in diverse, as the Manicheans say?

Then it must be passed to that chapter, in which he principally intends to prove the distinction of persons, and consequently the unity of essence: and because he had made a digression by explaining the words of Hilary, therefore he says: Now indeed to the proposed, etc.

However, a doubt arises concerning what he says: In the beginning God created heaven and earth. For it seems to the Manicheans that he did not make heaven and earth in one principle: but in one heaven, that is, the region of light, and spirits: and in another earth, that is, the region of darkness, and the struggle of flesh against spirit: which they strive to prove thus:

1. Nothing the same in the same way makes diverse things: therefore much less contraries: but God is most the same in the same way: therefore he does not make contraries: but incorruptible and corruptible things are contraries: therefore they are not from the same principle.
2. Likewise, it is not of the most wise artificer to make something repugnant to his work: but since the soul created in the image of God is the incorruptible work of God, therefore God did not make something repugnant to it: but flesh is repugnant to it, and weighs it down: therefore the creator of the soul is not the fashioner of the body. Wisdom 9:15: For the corruptible body weighs down the soul, and the earthly habitation depresses the mind that thinks many things. And the Apostle, to the Galatians 5:17: The flesh lusts against the spirit, etc.
3. Furthermore, evil is made in the world: but everything that is made, is made by something: therefore evil is made by something. Let it be granted that it is free will, as the Catholics say: either therefore it is made by free will alone, or by free will insofar as God operates in it and moves it, just as the first cause is in the second and moves it. If in the first way: therefore free will is the first principle of evil, and consequently there are two principles: one of good which is God, the other of evil which is free will. If in the second way: therefore the good God is the author of evil: not...

...therefore, there must be a punisher of it: because no just person is the punisher of that thing of which he himself is the author.

§ 4. Similarly, Augustine says that God does not make anything by which His work would become worse: but by evil a man is made worse: therefore the good God does not make it neither in Himself, nor in another: therefore it must be that it is from another principle which is the God of darkness: because evil, as Damascene says, is intelligible darkness. If perhaps it is said, that evil is nothing: and therefore it does not need to have an existing principle. Against this: God does not punish for nothing with eternal punishments: but evil is punished with eternal punishment: therefore evil is not nothing, but something, and thus the first returns: or if force is applied in evil, the same reasoning will seem to proceed concerning sin which was made concerning evil.

To solve this it must be said, that there is only one principle, because there cannot be a principle of evil: because that would either be the highest evil, such that it could not be worse: or it would have something of good. If in the first way, then it would be non-being, as was held above: because being is one of the best things which all desire. If in the second way, then it would already be composite, and not a principle, and something would be in it of things caused by a good principle, which cannot be: and therefore an efficient principle of evil, which by its own substance is the cause of evil, cannot exist.

To the first it must be said, that this is understood concerning causes causing through motion, just as heaven, and star, and the other physical bodies: because in one way motion is not effected except by one form whatever that is: but by diverse motion in approaching and receding to the stars and diverse motions in the oblique circle in which the circles of the planets intersect each other, in which in some way are all the stars, diverse conjunctions happen, and respects and preventions, and ascents, and descents: and therefore then diverse things are caused. But God does not operate through this mode: for He remaining stable gives all things to be moved. And therefore existing in one way through diverse ideal ratios existing in His operative wisdom, He can cause diverse things, and even contraries in those contraries of which each is being: just as are contrary forms, as white, and black: but corruptible and incorruptible, and just and unjust, good and evil are not thus contrary: because one is from form, the other from a privation which is in matter, which is nothing but a defect, as Anselm and Augustine say: and therefore it does not have an acting cause: but rather the cause acting the habit which is opposed to such privation, if it fails from any of the principles of the habit, then in its action privation will fall in beside the intention of the agent, and beside this that it acts something toward it, but rather from this that it did not have in the work of the habit a sufficiency of principles which were required for the habit: just as it is to be seen in blindness in the pupil: for this is not from the intention of the formative power of the eye that there is no light in the eye, but rather because the matter or some disposition of matter fails which was required for sight, when the formative power formed the eye. And thus the corruptible is caused: because the receptive virtue of incorruption on the part of the matter in which the form is induced fails, because it is not removable from the fighting contrariety.

To the other it must be said, that the fight of flesh against spirit is considered in three ways, namely, in the cause which is the original tinder of sin, and the appetite of the contrary: and this cause sin induced, and not God. If however it is considered as a punishment, then it is

from God justly inflicting it for sin, and thus it is entirely good, because it is just: and everything that is just, is good, as Augustine says. Thirdly, it is considered in the cause of the dissolution of the body, and thus it is made from fighting principles in the body, which induces corruption from the defect of matter, and thus from the privation which is in matter it falls in beside the intention of the agent and of nature. And this is what Dionysius says, that nothing of existing things is corrupted according as it is existing: but around the existing thing the modes, commensurations, and harmonies are corrupted from the weakness of their own habit.

To that which is objected concerning evil, it must be said that evil does not have a cause whence it is, but it has a cause whence it falls in beside the intention of the cause, and beside this that it acts toward it: because toward that which is nothing, it cannot act. For free choice is an active potency, and according as it is conjoined to those things which inform acts, thus its acts are made: and if it is conjoined in deliberating with a conversion to the good of nature, its act becomes inductive of that good, and has this good for an end: if however it is conjoined with the good of political virtue, its act will be informed by that good: and if its act is conjoined with the good of grace, it will again be having that good for form and end: if however it is not conjoined to any of these, but rather is deflected from all these, then sin will fall in from the weakness and privation of those things which were required for a right work.

If however it is asked, what is the cause of that deflection? It must be said with Augustine, that it is a conversion to a mutable good, not according as it is good, nor according as it is mutable, but according as it is posited as the ultimate end of the appetite of free choice: for thus it abstracts from that which is truly the end: and therefore also this conversion does not cause evil according as it is being, that is, according as the conversion is to a mutable good, but rather according as it is abstracting from the end of immutable good, and this is a privation: and therefore evil does not have a principle except a deficient one. And of this more will be said in the second book.

But to this which is objected, that according to this evil is nothing, and God punishing sin or evil, punishes for nothing. It must be said, that although it is no essence, nevertheless it posits some essence: for privation which is no essence, nevertheless supposes a deformed matter in the lack of a due habit. Thus evil and sin although in that they are of this kind, they are no essence, nevertheless they suppose an act deformed by the privation of habit and due end: and therefore for that, since it is in our power, the sinner is deservedly punished.

Articulus 22 — Whether This Name, "God," Has A Plural

Whether this name, God, has a plural?

Then it is objected concerning this that is said: *You shall be like gods, knowing good*, etc. For it seems, that the name, God, does not have a plural.

§ 1. For God speaks of an immutable form: but an immutable form does not have plurality: therefore said in the plural it does not have signification.

§ 2. Also, God names the first principle: but first principles cannot be plural: therefore, etc.

§ 3. Also, Anselm: God is greater than anything that can be thought: but such things cannot be plural: therefore the intellect of this name, God, is repugnant to plurality.

§ 4. Also, when "Socrates" is said, the form of Socrates is signified in the name with individuating principles, which it is impossible to be found numerically the same in another, and therefore it lacks a plural: therefore similarly, since by the intellect of this name, God, those things are closed in which it is impossible to belong to another, it seems this name, God, does not have in the plural: but these are omnipotence, universal providence of the world: as Augustine says in the book on the City of God, that the Philosophers defined God, that He is a soul governing the world by motion and reason.

BUT AGAINST § 1. Genesis 3:5: You shall be like gods. And, Exodus 20:3: You shall not have strange gods before me. And, Psalm 49:1: The God of gods, the Lord has spoken. And, Deuteronomy 32:37: Where are their gods, in whom they had trust? And, 1 Corinthians 8:5: For although there be that are called gods, either in heaven or on earth (for there be gods many, and lords many).

§ 2. And if it is said as some respond, that the Saints sometimes wish rather to speak ungrammatically so that they may bring forth more significantly, than grammatically and bring forth less significantly: what will be said of the Philosophers who said and worshipped many gods: as Plato says: Gods of gods of whom I am the maker and father, etc.: therefore it seems, that it has in the plural.

§ 3. Moreover, it was held above, that it is imposed from an act communicable in some way: therefore it seems, that it has in the plural, or that it can have.

§ 4. Moreover, a certain Philosopher says, that a universal is spoken of in four ways, namely, because it actually agrees to many as man: or, because although not in act, nevertheless in potency, as a heptagonal house although there be none, nevertheless there can be many. Also, that neither in act nor in potency: but by the reason of the form it is communicable, as sun, moon, earth. Also, that it is communicable by opinion, as a chimera. Therefore it seems, that since this name, God, is communicable by opinion, that it can have a plural.

§ 5. Also, the Master expounds, dii, that is, divine persons. Since therefore divine, which is imposed from the same form in Latin, receives a plural, it seems also in Latin dii is said in the plural.

SOLUTION. It must be said, that the sentence of all the Masters is, that according to the property of Grammar this name, God, does not have a plural, as the first induced reasons prove: because although it is imposed from some communicable act, nevertheless it is not communicable except relatively, as providence, and circuiting, as was determined above: and therefore neither as to this why the name is imposed is it communicable, nor even as to this from which it is imposed can it have a plural.

TO THE AUTHORITIES therefore of those it must be responded, as the Masters say, that on account of greater significance they spoke improperly: because for a name to have in the plural simply, it does not suffice that it have a plurality of supposits, but also it is necessary that the essence and form imported by the name be divided and multiplied in them: just as

Socrates, and Plato, and Cicero are three supposits of man, and three men, and three animals, and three substances: whence since the form imported by the term God, or quasi form or nature is not multiplied in its supposits, it cannot properly speaking have in the plural.

TO THAT which is objected concerning the Philosophers, it must be said that God according to opinion, is a god who has one particular just as Aesculapius or Neptune, and the like: and thus the terms are not taken in their proper signification, and therefore thus they themselves spoke plurally: nevertheless the same men when they properly considered divinity, said that there is only one God, whom they can scarcely touch with a pure mind.

To the next following the solution is clear through the things said before.

To the other it must be said, that in no way is this name, God, a universal: because opinion is called there by the Philosopher that which is concerning a being that is in opinion only, and to whose form in opinion plurality is not repugnant: but God is according to reality, to whose nature plurality is repugnant, as was held.

To the other it must be said, that "divine" is derivative not on account of the signified, but on account of the mode of signifying: because it is a possessive name, and if it itself has a plural, it is not necessary on account of this that its primitive has a plural: just as Socratic has in the plural, but not Socrates: and this happens on account of a diverse mode of signifying.

Articulus 23 — Whether David Is The Greatest Of The Prophets

Whether David is the greatest of the Prophets? Whether David is the greatest of the Prophets?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says: He also the greatest of the Prophets and kings, etc.

For Moses seems to have been greater, to whom the Lord spoke mouth to mouth, and Elias who made fire descend from heaven, and Eliseus who raised the dead.

Solution. David is called the greatest from the mode of inspiration, and the promise of the seed to be born from him. Of the first you have: I will hear what the Lord God will speak in me. But to others He spoke through visions, and Angels, and enigmas. Of the second you have: Of the fruit of thy womb I will set upon thy throne. But Moses was greatest in the mode of apparitions, and Elias greatest in zeal, and Eliseus greatest in the working of miracles.

Articulus 24 — Whether Possession, Conception, Parturition, Etc., Are Fittingly Attributed To Divine Wisdom, Which The Wise Man Attributes To It

Whether to divine wisdom are fittingly attributed possession, conception, parturition, etc., which the wise one attributes to himself?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says: Holy, holy, holy, etc.

For upon this is to be taken the definition of holiness posited in the book on the Divine Names, where he says thus: Holiness is that according to us it is said to be free from all uncleanness, and perfect, and entirely immaculate cleanness or purity. Then let the exposition

of the induced authority of Proverbs be taken: The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his ways, etc.

§ 1. For it seems not to be fitting: because possession is of extrinsic things, and this does not fit wisdom.

§ 2. Moreover, how could it fit him to be ordained from eternity: for order posits prior and posterior in dignity, or cause, or place, or time: and none of these fits the Son in comparison to the Father.

§ 3. Moreover, to what is his conception referred, and parturition? For these are properties of carnal generation, which do not fit in divine generation.

§ 4. Moreover, what does he call the hinges of the earth?

§ 5. Also, what is it to weigh the foundations of the earth?

§ 6. Moreover, what is it for wisdom to delight playing before the Father every single day?

Response to the first, that possession is transferred to the Son according as He is the art of the Father full of the ratios of all living things: for possession is had towards one born. In this therefore he notes the distinction of God from other artificers, who not having art to hand must meditate upon the parts of matter, and think upon instruments: which divine wisdom does not require.

TO THE OTHER it must be said that the term ordained says two things, namely the order of nature which is in divine things, by which one is from the other, not by which one is prior to the other: and it posits also the causality of wisdom as art to the artifact in time, just as an eternal cause is ordained to a caused thing in time: and thus the objection ceases.

But conception of wisdom says the enclosing of the Son in the same substance with the Father. But parturition says the mode of going out from the eternal ratios into created things which go out from that art.

But hinges are those in which the conservation of the world revolves: so that the action of the primary qualities is reduced to diverse motion in heaven, and diverse motion is reduced to the one motion of the first movable thing, and that motion is further reduced to the first moving thing, which in itself remaining stable gives all things to be moved. For in these principles as in certain hinges the whole world revolves, as much in the local motion of the supercelestial things, as in the motion of generation and alteration and augmentation and diminution of the generable and corruptible things.

To the other it must be said, that to weigh is to balance by nature to the center of the first movable thing. But to found is for the species of earth to be generated and conserved by nature in the middle place, and to be moved to it by nature.

But to delight before the Father is to rest from all work in Himself. But to play is to produce the reasons of wondrous wisdom in the illustration of any creature: because it is day, when through the light of wisdom a known thing is produced: because although certain

things in nature are mixed with the darkness of privation, nevertheless in wisdom itself they are in the reason of full light and day.

Articulus 25 — How Is This Understood Which Is Said, "You, Bethlehem"

How is this understood which is said, Thou, Bethlehem?

Then it is asked concerning the exposition of the authority of Micheas: Thou, Bethlehem, etc.

It must be said, that the sense is: You are indeed very small in space and number of inhabitants among the thousands of Juda, that is, in Juda in which there are so many thousands of inhabitants or villages: nevertheless you are a great village in dignity: because out of thee, etc.

And his going forth, through eternal generation.

From the beginning of eternity, or from the Father.

From the days. It is said plurally, not that eternity has a part, as will be proved below: but it is said in comparison to temporal things, so that the sense is: From the days, that is, from eternity, with respect to which in a temporal thing many days are taken.

Also note, that the authorities induced in this chapter, hint at the Trinity in nine ways. First, from the consignified of plural number, as, Elohim or dii. Second, from the proper names of the persons, as, By the Word of the Lord, etc.: in which the Word, and the Spirit are named. Third, from the order of the words, as that, May God, our God bless us, where God is immediately conjoined twice: because the Son God is from the Father God alone. And afterwards it is subjoined a third time, God, so that the Holy Spirit is noted to be God from both. Fourth, from the number of terms, or dictions posited to praise God. Thus it says: Holy, holy, holy. For there could not be another reason why he would say it three times, and not more times, than the Trinity of persons. Fifth, from a personal act, as, The Lord said to me: Thou art my Son, etc. For to generate says a proper act, by which a person is a person. Sixth, from a personal property, when it is said, Who shall declare his generation? For passive generation is a personal property of the Son. Seventh, through appropriata, as that, The Lord possessed me, etc., where the appropriata of the Son are posited. Eighth, from the order of eternal generation to the creation of the creature in time, as in that, I came out of the mouth of the Most High, etc. Ninth and last, from the order of eternal generation to the temporal generation of the same Son, as in that, Thou, Bethlehem, etc.

Articulus 26 — How The Four Authorities Concerning The Holy Spirit Differ

How do the four authorities concerning the Holy Spirit differ?

Then note concerning that chapter: Concerning the Holy Spirit, etc., that it has four authorities concerning the Holy Spirit, of which the first is concerning the Spirit causing all things. The second, concerning the Spirit containing and governing all things. The third, concerning the Spirit ordaining in the goods of grace which He distributes. The fourth and last is concerning the Spirit perfecting by His operation the mystery of the incarnation of the Son. And this is full to consider in the authorities themselves.

Articulus 27 — When It Is Said, "In The Name Of The Father, And Of The Son, And Of The Holy Spirit," What Does "In The Name" There Mean, Essence Or Person

When it is said, In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, what does it say there, In the name, whether essence, or person?

Now indeed after the testimonies, etc. It is objected concerning this which he says: In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. For either by in the name he says essence, or person: if essence, then it seems false, because the essence is not the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit: but if it says person, then it ought to say, in the names, just as the three names of the persons follow.

And to this it must be said that it says essence: and name is taken here according to that from which a name is called: for every single name is called from the noting which it makes concerning the thing whose name it is: and because the power of the essence makes the persons noted in the sanctification of baptism and in the works of miracles: therefore it itself is the name, that is, the noting of the persons. Whence it is equivalent to this much: In the name, etc., as much as, in the virtuous essence whose power notifies the Trinity of persons.

Articulus 28 — Whether These Pronouns Mark Some Distinction When It Is Said, "From Him, And Through Him, And In Him"

Whether these pronouns note any distinction when it is said, Of him, and by him, and in him?

Then it is objected concerning this which he says: For of him, and by him, and in him are all things, etc.

For the prepositions indeed seem to note diversity, because they are transitive. But because there is one pronoun which is taken with them, it seems that they pertain to the same, and thus they seem to note nothing but the identity of the essence: and thus it does not avail for confirming the proposition of the Master.

Solution. To this it must be said, that as the objection proves, the prepositions are transitive, and from the fact that they are prepositions they have to note the distinction of the persons: insofar however as they are considered as these prepositions, they pertain to the persons distinctly: for the preposition ex notes the cause of origin, and therefore it is noted to be attributed to the Father who is a principle not from a principle: also the term ex notes the essential cause which is matter which remains one in the materiate thing, and thus it is transferred to signifying the identity of essence in the Father who is origin, and the Son who is from Him. But per notes as it were a mediate cause, and signifies the Son who is from the Father, and by Him the Father operates. But in notes containment, and is attributed to the Holy Spirit, by whose goodness all things are contained.

DISTINCTIO III

Divisio Textus

For the Apostle says, that the invisible things of God, etc. In this third distinction the Master touches that part of coming into the knowledge of the Trinity and unity, which is through reasons and similitudes. But there are two into which we are led, and two by which we are led: into which we are led are unity, and Trinity: by which we are led, reason, and similitude. And therefore it is divided into two parts: in the first of which he touches the mode of coming into the knowledge of unity by the leading of reason. In the second he touches the mode of coming into some knowledge of the Trinity by the leading of similitude, there, E, Now it remains to show, etc.

The first of these parts is divided into four according to the four reasons which the Master adduces to prove that God is, and is one: which reasons many have varied in many ways, as can plainly be extracted from the Letter. In the first the Master proves through effect that God is by the mode of a first cause. In the second through dispositions found in effects he proves that God is incorporeal, and immutable, and this begins there, C, Also in another way the truth, etc. In the third again through a disposition found in effects he proves that God is the highest good, there, D, They considered also, etc. In the fourth and last he proves that God is the species of all created species, and this through the consideration of species found in effects, there, E, They understood also the species of a body, etc. In the first reason there are three. For first the authority of the Apostle is induced which proves this way, namely, that through the caused thing to come into the knowledge of the cause is possible. Second, he shows by what man is helped in this way, namely, by two things: by rational nature, and exterior creature, there, Man therefore the invisible things of God, etc. Third, he posits the process of ratiocination, there, B, For as Ambrose says.

Articulus 1 — Whether The Philosophers Knew That God Is One

Whether the Philosophers knew that God is one?

But here a doubt falls in before we arrive at the Letter, Whether the Philosophers could know unity, or that God is, by the leading of reason? Second, if they knew, what is it that they knew, or what did they not? Third, how is this knowledge of theirs distinguished from the knowledge of faith?

Concerning the first it is proceeded thus: § 1. The Apostle says concerning the Philosophers: Because, when they knew God, they did not glorify him as God,... but became vain in their thoughts: therefore it seems, that they knew both that God is, and His glory.[51]

§ 2. Also, in the same place: God has revealed it to them: therefore it seems, that they had the knowledge of one God.[52]

§ 3. Also, Augustine in book VIII of the City of God: The Platonists consent to us concerning one God the author of the universe, who is not only incorporeal above all bodies, but also incorruptible above all souls, our principle, our light, our good. In this we prefer them to the rest. Therefore it seems, that the Platonists knew the true God.

§ 4. Also, in the same place: And thus this is the cause why we prefer them to the rest: because while other Philosophers wore out their natural talents and their studies in inquiring into the causes of things, and what is the mode of speaking, and of living: these, with God known, found where the cause of the constituted universe would be, and the light of perceiving truth, and the fountain of drinking felicity: therefore it seems, that such men knew God.

§ 5. Also: By the greatness of the beauty, and of the creature, the Creator of them may be seen, so as to be known thereby.[53]

§ 6. Also, we see this in their books. For Plato in the Timaeus induces the maker of the world making the world, and committing it to the motors of the supercelestial spheres to be explicated through propagation.

§ 7. Also, Apuleius in the book on the God of Socrates, whom Augustine induces in the book on the City of God posits one Creator of all others. Whence Augustine in book IX of the City of God: Apuleius asserts that the highest God Creator of all whom we call true, is so preached by Plato, that He alone is the one who cannot be comprehended by any reason or even slightly because of the poverty of human speech: but scarcely by wise men when they have removed themselves by the vigor of mind as much as was permitted from the body, an understanding of this God, and that also sometimes as if in the deepest darkness, a bright light inter-shines with a most rapid flashing: therefore they had knowledge of Him.

§ 8. Also, we read in the books of Aristotle, that he proves the principle of the universe is one, whose science and will and action is His substance: therefore it seems, that they not only knew that God is one, but also that He Himself is simple, because He is whatever He has.

BUT AGAINST: § 1. That God is one is an article of faith: therefore it does not fall under reason: therefore through Philosophy and reason it cannot be investigated: and the Philosophers knew nothing, except what can be investigated through reason: therefore they did not know that God is one. If perhaps it is said, that God is one is not an article. Against this: I believe in one God: there in the symbol it is posited for an article.

§ 2. Also, the Philosopher does not investigate Him in Philosophy, except through creatures, as a cause through an effect: but in Philosophy every cause is proportioned to the effect: therefore they did not investigate God, except as a cause proportioned to the effect: but such a cause is not God: therefore through an effect in this mode they do not know God, nor can they know.

§ 3. Also, in the investigation of a name through the resolution of the caused into the cause, or of the posterior into the prior, and of the composite into the simple, reason stands in the intellect of being and one: but whatever it is in which resolution stands, from the same

51. Rom. 1:21.

composition begins: therefore being itself and one in which resolution stood, is composable in those things which are resolved into it. But God and divine being are not composable: therefore the intellect resolving thus, will not come into divine being, or into the true by which God is called one: therefore through this it cannot accept that God is, or that God is one.

§ 4. Also, if there is something which being posited another is not of necessity posited, that cannot be accepted with the other being posited: as it seems if with some intellect of an Angel posited the creation of some thing or a created thing is not of necessity posited, then through the created thing it cannot be investigated concerning the intellect of the Angel: therefore by a similarity since with God posited a creature is not of necessity posited, because otherwise the creature would be from eternity, it seems that from the creature the Creator cannot be inferred: and thus through the creature the Creator cannot be known.

Solution. It must be said, that in truth (as the Saints say) the Philosophers could have knowledge of God through natural reasons.

But to this which is objected first, it must be said that that God is, and is one, in one mode are articles, and in another mode known through reasons, just as conclusions. For it can be accepted that God is through science, because He is only, and similarly that God is one: and thus they can be known things, as a conclusion through natural reason. It can also be accepted according as they in some way approach the science of what it is, on account of this that they apprehend the properties of divine being and of unity according as faith determines the attributes to be of God and of the unity of God: and thus it does not fall under reason, but rather is an article of faith.

To the other it must be said, that in Philosophy the physical cause is proportioned to the caused thing, and the motor to the movable thing: but because the proportioned thing in the virtue of causing cannot be the first thing which has influence to all things, therefore reason extends itself to proving that it is, although it may not prove except because it is only, and cannot determine its properties. Whence the Philosopher in the first book of On the Heavens and the Earth says: We have applied ourselves to magnify the glorious God creator of all things, eminent in the properties of those things which are created. Whence it is clear, that he knew that He is eminent above created things; but the reason of the eminence, and the difference, and the property of His being no one can investigate through reason. Whence also concerning such attributes the Philosophers are found to have said many errors: but concerning that God is, or because He is, and that He is one, few Philosophers who were truly Philosophers, erred.

To the other it must be said, that the resolving intellect stands in the being which is ultimate in resolution, and first in composition: but because it itself is miscible to composition, therefore it itself cannot be first. This reason knows from this that it apprehends the habitudes of being to things posterior to being. And just as it is of being, similarly it is of one. And thus it is clear, that reason proceeds further; but it is true, that not

52. Rom. 1:19.

He proceeds further by inquiring into the passions and differences, because he cannot investigate those through effect. And therefore being indeed is the first subject of Philosophy, because the subject of Philosophy is that of which the passions and differences are predicated. However, it is not simply the first, because that is not subjectible to passions, and also its passions and properties are unknown, unless they are received through faith illuminating the intellect.

To the last, it must be said that the first is false. And although with God posited, the creature is not necessarily posited, yet with the creature posited as the effect of God, it is necessary that God the creator be posited: and thus a posteriori from the creature, God can be known.

Articulus 2 — What It Is That They Have Known About God

What did the Philosophers know about God, whether only that He is?

Secondly, it is asked what is it that they knew about God? And it seems according to what was previously held, that they knew only that He is, and that He is one.

1. This also seems for another reason: because a cause infinitely distant from the caused can only be known as existing, and even that is held through the caused: but God is infinitely distant from any caused thing: therefore He is known only as existing.
2. Likewise, some object that there is no knowledge except through the abstraction of the species from the known: but from the most simple there is no abstraction: therefore of the most simple there is no knowledge: but God is most simple: therefore He is not known.
3. Furthermore, with God posited, the creature is not necessarily posited: therefore it seems that the creature manifests nothing about the Creator.
4. Furthermore, the caused does not necessarily posit the cause as existing: because with the house posited, the artisan is not necessarily posited: therefore it seems that through the creature the Creator is not necessarily apprehended.
5. Furthermore, there are many things in the creature which were even a cause of error for some, so that they posited two gods, such as the corruptible and the incorruptible: therefore it seems that the creature deceives reason as much as it aids it.

But on the contrary: In the books of the Gentiles we read that they not only prove that God is, but that He is the first, that He is a necessary being which does not fall into a category, a simple being whose substance is intellect and will and His action: therefore it seems that they knew not only that He is, but also His properties or attributes, and what He is.

Solution. It must be said that they knew only that He is and what He is not, not what He is, as was previously held. For although they knew certain attributes of Him, they did not have certain knowledge of them: just as we find some knowing His wisdom, and with this saying

53. Wis. 13:5.

that He does not have knowledge of particulars: and so it is also with others. And thus to know the attributes of God in such a way does not make knowledge of what He is, especially since the defined terms of those attributes are not known by any created intellect. And through this the solution to the last is clear.

But because the prior reasons seem to prove that there is no knowledge of God, therefore it must be responded to the first, that a cause in one way is infinitely distant, and in another way is not: if the proportion of properties between the first cause which is God and its caused is considered, there is no proportion: and therefore from that side nothing of the cause is known. But if the relation in which the caused stands to the cause according to which it proceeds from it by idea, and is contained lest it fall into nothing by perishing, and is governed so that it seeks the good, is considered, thus the cause shines forth in the caused, and is in it essentially, presently, and potentially: and thus it can be known in the caused.

To the other it must be said that that objection is vain: because that abstraction of the intellect is not the abstraction of form from matter, but rather of the species from that of which it is the species. And the most simple, just as the species itself, do not oppose this abstraction: because it does not require composition, but rather the acceptance of the intention of the thing only. In all things, however, the thing is one thing, and the intention of it in the soul is another.

Furthermore, it is not true that there is no knowledge through the proper species of the thing: for we know the cause in the species of its effects, just as the mover in the species of motion: and thus natural knowledge of the Creator can be made through the species of the creature.

To the other it must be said that although it does not follow that the creature exists if God exists: yet conversely it follows that the Creator exists if the creature exists.

Nor is it similar concerning the woodworker and the house, and God: because the woodworker is separated from the house, and his work similarly, and it passes away. Hence it also follows: If the house is, the woodworker is, or was. But in God the work is not universally separated from the creature: because after it is created, it would still fall into nothing unless it were contained by Him: and its order in the universe would be corrupted unless it were governed by Him. Yet I do not say that it follows that God was: but it follows that He is because of the reason of eternity by which He is wholly simultaneous and perfect.

To the other it must be said that in the creature mutability and corruption are measured, and are not properly caused by anything, but occur from this that the creature is from nothing, as was noted above in the question concerning the two principles: and therefore as far as it is of itself, it does not induce error.

Articulus 3 — Whether This Natural Knowledge Differs From The Knowledge Of Faith

Does this natural cognition differ from the cognition of faith?

Thirdly, it is asked, In what does this cognition obtained through natural reasons differ from the cognition of faith? And it seems that in nothing.

1. Each is through the posterior: because to know the cause through the caused is cognition through the posterior. Similarly, to receive the first truth in the light of infused faith is through the posterior: because the first truth is more powerful and more knowable than that: and whatever is in the infused habit is from the first truth according to the thing: therefore.
2. Furthermore, a thing in itself is not known except under the mixture of privation consequent to the creature from the fact that it is from nothing: and therefore Augustine calls this cognition vespertine. Similarly, the cognition of faith is in a mirror and in an enigma: therefore it seems that these cognitions agree.
3. If perhaps someone says that faith knows what is, and natural reason only knows that it is. On the contrary: Faith does not comprehend determinately according to nature what God is: therefore neither does faith know except that it is: therefore in this they do not differ, as it seems.

Solution. It must be said that these cognitions differ in at least five ways, etc.: in many other differences can be assigned. The first difference is in the comparison of science to the knower: because the natural process is subject to reason, but the process of faith is above reason. The second difference is in the principles in which the cognition itself is received: because those in natural cognition are principles known per se, such as those which are of the nature of the first principle, such as not being from another and others being from it, and not having begun because thus it would be caused, and not being moved by another, and the like; but in faith, there is an infused light which, by informing the conscience, convinces reason more by a certain love of the will than by the proof of reason: for this is the argument of things not appearing which illuminates to accept the credible. The third difference is in the efficient cause of cognition: because reason makes this by the objected creature's natural reason, as the Master says: but in faith, the first truth makes it: for if it is asked of someone, What made faith for him, he says that it is the first truth which is the efficient cause of his faith and its end. The fourth is in the known: because through natural cognition one does not approach as closely to the knowledge of what it is, as through the cognition of faith. The fifth and last difference is on the part of the subjects: because faith is in the affective intellect, even unformed, although some contradict: but the natural science of reason is in the speculative intellect. For although faith is unformed, yet it is more voluntary than rational, and it is allied with servile fear, as Gregory says: but those things which are in the speculative intellect (as the Philosopher says) say nothing about fleeing or imitating: therefore, etc.

Articulus 4 — Whether The Attributes In God Are One Or Many

Whether the attributes in God are one, or many?

Then it is inquired concerning those things which are contained in the Letter of the first chapter.

And it is objected first concerning this which it says:

The invisibles of God, etc.

For it seems not to be fitting: since attributes signify the essence, and thus are one, not many: whence they ought to be signified singularly, not plurally. Nor does the solution of the Master, which he places around the end of the fourth reasoning, seem fitting, that he says it plurally because they are signified in many ways: for according to this we could say, God is substance, and God is power, and God is wisdom: therefore God is many, or three, which is false.

Solution. It must be said that attributes have a twofold comparison, namely, to the substance of the cause in which they are, and to the effects which they connote. And in the first way, they are signified as one because of simplicity: whence I cannot infer, if God is goodness and wisdom, that He is two: because thus the comparison is made to the cause in which the attributes are. They have another comparison to the connoted things, and thus they are in a certain respect as many, although not simply many: because they are signified as the reasons of many. And therefore also the Apostle did not say many invisibles, but invisibles, consignifying the plural number, not signifying. For the plural consignified is less than the plural signified, that is, of lesser reason: for the term "many," or "two," or "three," and other numerical terms signify plurality: and therefore simply there are many around which those terms denote to place plurality: but the plurality consignified is plurality in a certain respect. And it is similar with a point in the center, which is one alone, according to which it is considered as the center by substance: yet it can be in the reason of many principles, according to which infinite lines are drawn from it to the circumference.

Articulus 5 — Whether By The Creature Of The World Man Ought To Be Understood

Whether by the creature of the world man ought to be understood?

Whether by the creature of the world man ought to be understood?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says:

By the creature of the world man is understood, etc.

1. For it seems that the Angel is more excellent than man: both on account of separation from the body, because the body which is corrupted burdens the soul, and earthly habitation depresses the sense thinking many things; and also because the Angel is the seal of the likeness of God, but man is only to the image. And Gregory says that the seal signifies a greater likeness than the image. If perhaps it is said that the rational soul is accidentally in the body, namely, that in it it may receive sciences and virtues. This is nothing: because an accident is not the substantial form of the composite: but the rational soul is the substantial form of man, of which the material part is the body. Moreover, this would be a marvelous accident on account of which it is embodied, since without the body it can receive sciences and virtues in a nobler way.

2. Likewise, the second reason also does not seem to apply solely to man: because it also applies to Angels, since the Angel is with simple and mixed things like minerals, and lives with trees, and has knowledge of sensibles with brutes, and understands with men: and thus both reasons seem to apply to him.

Solution. It must be said that man is considered in three ways, namely, in divine estimation, in his own nature, and in the end which is eternal beatitude. In divine estimation, he is the most worthy of creatures, because God so esteemed his nature that He assumed it: whence, Psalm 8:5: "What is man, that you are mindful of him?" And it follows, verse 6: "You have made him a little lower than the Angels, with glory and honor," etc. However, in his own nature, without prejudice, I say that he is inferior to the Angel, as the objection proves. But considered in the end, namely, in beatitude, he is equal to the Angel: because He has set the boundaries of the peoples according to the number of the Angels of God. For men are assumed to the dignities of the Angels. Whence, 1 Samuel 2:8: "He raises the needy from the dust, and lifts the poor from the dung, to sit with princes," etc.

To what is objected concerning the other reason, it must be said that the Angel does not have agreement with every creature in essentials: because with corporeal things he does not have agreement. But in man, simple things are preserved in humors, and mixed and complexed through the likeness of matter.

Articulus 6 — That A First Cause Is Granted

That a first cause is given.

Then it is asked how the reasoning is formed which he adduces, there, "For as Ambrose says," etc.

Solution. And it must be said that it proceeds thus: It is caused: this is evident to the senses: it has some cause: therefore that is either the first, or it has another: if it is the first, then I have the proposition: because we call that God, which is such a cause that it is not caused, and this is the first cause. However, if it has another cause, I again inquire whether it has a cause or not: however, it is evident that this does not proceed to infinity: therefore it is necessary to stop at something which is such a cause that it is not caused: but that which is not caused is uncreated: therefore that cause is not created, and this we call God.

Articulus 7 — That A Creature Cannot Create

That a creature cannot create.

Next, inquiry is made concerning the reason of what he says: But because no creature is able to do such a thing, etc.

And the reason for this is: because every creature is of finite power; therefore, it does not operate by an action of infinite power; but to bring forth something from nothing into something else is of infinite power; therefore, it will not operate by that operation, and thus nothing will be creatable: for nothing and something differ infinitely: for the Philosopher says

that between four and two, and four and three, and four and one, there can be proportion: but between something and nothing there can be no proportion: and therefore, of all natural things (as the Philosopher says) the supposition was that from nothing, nothing comes to be according to nature.

Articulus 8 — That God Is Incorporeal And Immutable

That God is incorporeal and immutable.

In another way, the truth of God, etc. This is the second reasoning in which, by the guidance of reason through dispositions found in creatures, it is proven that God is incorporeal and immutable. And this reasoning is more physical than the preceding, and is founded upon two propositions which are not proven here, but are taken as self-evident.

The first proposition is that no body is God, and this is proven thus: No body moves unless moved; every moved mover is a secondary mover; therefore, a body that moves is a secondary mover, and not a primary one. The first proof is that every moving body is composed of a mover and a mobile, like the heavens and all moving things, as the Philosophers prove: since therefore God is the first unmoved mover (as Boethius says: "And remaining stable, gives all things to be moved"), God cannot be a body.

The second proposition is that God is not a mutable spirit, and this is proven thus: Every mutable spirit is changed per se, or per accidens; the first mover is not changed per se, nor per accidens; therefore, the first mover is not a mutable spirit. The middle proof: The first mover is in no way moved; therefore, neither per se, nor per accidens. For let it be granted that the first mover is changed per accidens, namely by the motion of another, as the soul by the motion of the body, it follows that the first is receptive of accidental change, and thus it will not be in the nature of the first, because the first is always in the same way altogether. From this reasoning, it is necessarily concluded further that God is not any power in a body, like a soul, or the intellect of the heavens, as some Philosophers have said: because if it were so, it would be changed per accidens, which cannot be.

Articulus 9

That God is the highest good.

They also considered, etc. Here begins the third reasoning in which again through the properties found in the creature, it proves God to be the highest good, and consequently one: because the highest good cannot be except one, as was proven above. And the reasoning is founded upon two divisions, one of which is omitted, because it is evident by itself, namely, the division of being into substance and accident: for it is evident that substance is better than accident, because accident is only according to something; but nothing is so simply as God. The other division is that of substances, some are corporeal, others incorporeal which is an incorporeal spirit, and this is that which is not the act and perfection of any body: and it is evident that spiritual substance is better than corporeal: but since both are caused, the cause will be infinitely better than the spirit.

Articulus 10 — On Another Mode Of Knowing God

On another way of knowing God.

1. But with these reasons set forth, a doubt arises; because Dionysius teaches another way to come into the knowledge of God, saying thus: From the ordering of all existing things, as from the very proposition and having certain images and assimilations of the divine exemplars themselves, we ascend to that which is above all by way and order according to virtue in every offering, and excess, and in the cause of all! However, the Master does not teach to ascend except in the cause only.
2. Furthermore, it seems that by removal one does not ascend to God: because negation posits nothing; but positing nothing certifies nothing about anything: therefore, by negation nothing is certified and known about God.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: Against this, however, is what Dionysius says in the Celestial Hierarchy: "Negations in God are true, but affirmations are indeed incomplete."

1. And Augustine says that it is more truly known what He is not, than what He is. And the same says that he greatly advanced in divine knowledge: because although he could not apprehend what God is, yet he apprehended what He is not.

Further, it is asked about the other two ways, namely eminence and cause: because they seem to be one and the same: for when we proceed from the caused to the cause, we elevate the cause above the properties of the caused, as was said above.

Solution. It must be said that those three ways are taken according to those things in which the Creator shines forth: for either they are symbolically or figuratively fitting only, and in those is the proper way of negation or removal, as stone, lion, and the like: or according to the thing primarily in God, although according to the name they cannot be signified so perfectly, and thus they are to be expounded by eminence, as life, essence, intellect, and other such things, and these are called mystical, as Dionysius says: or as to both they agree, according to what they are from Him, and thus the way is from the caused to the cause.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that the Master does not touch here all the ways by which it is possible to come into the knowledge of God, but certain ones: to show us that we ought to seek such and similar ones.

To the other, it must be said that negation as negation certifies nothing: but negation of opposite predicaments concerning some subject, by the very fact that it removes opposites, makes it approach that which per se agrees with the subject. And an example of this is put forth by a certain Philosopher: as if it is asked what man is, and it is said that he is not a stone, and not an inanimate thing, by this negation a great inquiry is narrowed, because now man is sought among animate things only; and if it is said, he is not vegetable, now consequently he is sought among sensible things: and if it is said further, he is not brute, it will be known that he is a rational animal: and this is the definition of man found by accident through negations made concerning man. And this is the way of division in Philosophy, as it is said, God is either

corporeal or incorporeal: not corporeal: therefore incorporeal. And so further. Therefore, negation certifies inasmuch as it removes the opposite from the proposed subject: because by this it infers that which according to nature agrees.

However, affirmations are said to be incomplete, because they do not perfectly say what God is: and the cause of this is stated above.

To the other, it must be said that eminence is not the same as cause: because eminence is properly in the mystical things which always agree with God more eminently than the name expresses: but the way from effect to cause is indifferently in any caused thing, as is evident in all those here introduced by the Master.

Articulus 11 — Whether Prime Matter Is Nothing

Whether prime matter is nothing?

Whether prime matter is nothing?

They also understood the form of the body, etc.

Here begins the fourth and last reason in which the Master does three things. First, he deduces the reason that God is the form of forms. Second, he returns to the first and explains why the Apostle said: Invisible things, etc. Third, he suggests several other reasons to be taken from the dispositions of creatures.

Concerning the first, note that form here is called the form, or the reason of the thing, according to which it is ordered to the knower or knowledge, and manifests the thing in natural beauty.

But it is objected concerning this which he says -

If, however, they could lack every form, for prime matter has no form at all: therefore it is altogether nothing. Hence Augustine in the book of Confessions: It is true that formlessness, which is almost nothing, cannot have the vicissitudes of times.

The solution of this is held from Augustine, in the same place, who thus speaks of prime matter: Just as we say that what is created and formed is more good, so we confess that what is creatable and formable is less good, but still good. Hence prime matter, through the very privation it has, has an order to form, because that privation makes it desire form: and thus it has in some way a form in the appetite for form and order to it: and therefore it is almost nothing, but yet not nothing, as Augustine says.

Divisio Textus

Now it remains to show, etc. Here begins that part in which, by the guidance of similitude, one arrives in some manner at the knowledge of the Trinity. And it is divided into two parts according to a double guiding similitude: of which the first is the vestige, and about this he first deals in this chapter. The second is the image found in spiritual and rational nature, and about this he subsequently deals, there, G, Now indeed let us come to it, etc.

In the prior chapter the Master does three things. First, he shows the vestige in creatures through number, species, and order. Second, he shows how these pertain to the persons, there, In that Trinity, Third, he shows how the philosophers, etc., progressing through these, failed in the third sign, and that they saw from afar and in shadow, there, Behold it has been shown where And through this division and by the following disputation the knowledge of the chapter is made clear.

Articulus 12 — Whether Eternity Is Argued From Perpetuity, And Infinity From The Magnitude Of Power

Whether from perpetuity eternity is argued, and from the greatness of power infinity?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says:

From perpetuity indeed, etc. For this seems false: because

1. The perpetuity of creatures is the lack of an end, and not of a beginning: whence it seems from this that it cannot be argued that which lacks a beginning and an end. Similarly, the greatness of creatures is not infinite: therefore from it the infinite power of God, which is omnipotence and is called such, cannot be inferred.
2. Furthermore, since order is the relation of a thing to an end, and from the end is perfection: it seems rather from order and disposition that one is good than wise.
3. Governance also directly seems to be the work of wisdom: and therefore from governance it can be understood more that one is wise, than good.

Solution. It must be said that everything which begins in some way was in potentiality to be made before it was made: but whatever is in potentiality to be made, is made by another, not by itself. Let it be granted, that it is made by itself: therefore it makes itself: but whatever makes, acts: therefore it acts: and whatever acts, is in act: therefore it is in act: therefore it is in act, and is made simultaneously: but whatever is made, is not: therefore it is in act, and is not simultaneously, which is impossible: therefore it is necessary that everything which is made and begins, is made by that which is not made, nor began: but the perpetual is made: therefore by that which did not begin: and this is eternal: therefore it is made by the eternal: and thus from perpetuity the eternal is argued, from greatness however infinity is argued: although indeed not all infinite power shines forth in the great, nevertheless because it brings forth the great without the need of pre-existing matter and instrument, thus in the mode of acting it is known to be infinite in power and omnipotence.

To the other it must be said, that there is the order of parts in the whole continuous, which is the position of parts: and there is the universal order in the world, like the uniform mobile under the first mover, and the non-uniform mobile under the first mobile, and the motion of generable and corruptible matter under the motion of the mobile circularly and non-uniformly: and all these to complete the number of the elect, and this order is of wisdom. There is another order of each in the perfection of its end and participation of the goods possible to it from the first cause, that is, God, and this order is of goodness. Disposition, however, differs

from order: because disposition is through the forms of a thing in itself, order however is towards another.

To the last it must be said, that governance here has in itself the containment of things so that they can remain: and this is of goodness, as Augustine says on Genesis.

Articulus 13 — To Whom Properly Belongs Knowledge Through The Trace, Whether To Man Only

Whose is the proper cognition through the vestige, is it of man alone?

Here arises a threefold doubt. For it is asked, Whose is the proper cognition through the vestige? Secondly, What is the vestige? Thirdly, How is it applied to the Trinity by which it is known through it?

Concerning the FIRST, it proceeds thus: The vestige is the cognition of the Trinity through those things in which it shines forth in irrational creature: but the Angel, knowing things in their proper kind, knows the Trinity mirrored in irrational creature: therefore the Angel uses cognition through the vestige.

But ON THE CONTRARY: 1. The Apostle says that God is known from the creation of the world through the vestige: but the creation of the world is man: therefore it seems that this does not pertain to the Angel.

1. Likewise, Bernard in the book of Consideration: What need is there for steps to one already holding the throne? and he speaks of Angels who do not need the ladder of vestige and image to know God.
2. Likewise, Whosever cognition of the creature begins in God and ends in the creature's proper kind, it is not properly to know God through the creature, but rather conversely: the cognition of Angels (as Augustine says in IV on Genesis) of the creature to be known begins in God in whom they received the cognition of the creature to be made, and afterwards known in its proper kind: therefore it is not theirs to know God through the vestige.

Further it is asked according to this, Whether brute animals know God through the vestige?

1. It seems that they do, by that of Jeremiah 8:7: The stork in the heaven knows her appointed times; the turtle, and the swallow, and the crane observe the time of their coming, etc.: and, Isaiah 1:3: The ox knows his owner, and the ass his master's crib.
2. Likewise, Jonah 4:7, The Lord commanded a worm to smite the gourd: but a command does not reach him who does not know the command: therefore that worm first conceived that it should smite the gourd.
3. Likewise, Augustine on Genesis says that every soul is moved by things seen, and he introduces the example of the worm smiting the gourd of Jonah at the command of the Lord.

But On the Contrary; It is not for him to use the vestige who does not come to the cognition of the uncreated Trinity, which cognition is the end of the vestige: but such do not have such cognition: therefore they do not know through the vestige.

1. Likewise, the vestige requires a power conferring: but such do not have such a conferring and ordering power: therefore they do not have the cognition of the vestige. The first is evident by itself. The second is proved by this that the conferring and ordering power is only reason, and brutes do not have reason.
2. Solution. It must be said that cognition through the vestige has three essentials to itself: of which the first is that the vestige be known in the reason of the vestige. The second is that from it the inquisitive cognition of the Creator begins. The third is that the user of the vestige be in some way capable of the cognition of the Creator. And thus cognition through the vestige pertains only to man.

Therefore, it must be said to the first, that it does not pertain to Angels for two reasons, namely, because Angels do not need collative cognition which is quasi conjectural, because they see with a deiform intellect. Another is because the cognition of Angels does not begin from the creature, so that it comes to the Creator: but rather the contrary, as the objection proves. Hence the first reason proceeds from the insufficient.

To that which is further asked concerning brutes, it must be said that they do not have the cognition of the vestige for two reasons: one of which is, because they do not know the vestige as a vestige, because they do not confer. The second, because such an animal is not capable of the cognition of the Creator.

To that which is objected against, it must be said that (as Damascene says) such animals are rather acted upon by nature, than act through apprehension. Although indeed the kite apprehends the coming of its time, yet...

nevertheless it is incited to this by the qualities of the body, such as the heat of the season and things of this sort. A sign of this is that all animals of one species operate in a similar way, and each swallow builds a nest like another: and when one comes, another comes. But if they followed apprehension as if by a sort of reason, since apprehension would be dissimilar, their works would be most dissimilar, just as in the mechanical arts, where one does not work like another.

§ 1. To that which is objected concerning the little worm striking Jonah's ivy, it must be said that the little worm did not apprehend the command of the Lord, but struck the ivy as food: for the Lord uses the motions of animals of this sort for whatever He wills: and in this respect they are said to obey a command.

§ 2. To that which is objected concerning Augustine, that every soul is moved by things seen, it must be said that it is indeed moved by things seen, but it is not ruled according to the rational principles [rationes] of the things seen, but rather it is ruled by nature: and the fact that it is said to be moved by things seen, this is because it is moved toward the things seen.

Articulus 14 — What The Trace Is, And Whether Knowledge Through The Trace Is Useful

What is a vestige, and is knowledge through a vestige useful?

Next it is asked, what is a vestige? And three things are asked, namely: What is a vestige? Secondly, concerning the parts of a vestige. Thirdly, concerning the division of the enumeration of diverse vestiges.

§ 1. To the first one proceeds thus: A vestige is the detection of someone through the figure of a foot impressed on a road, for thus sight receives a vestige: but God is not known thus: therefore knowledge of a vestige is useless. Job 11:7: Peradventure you will comprehend the vestiges of God, and find out the Almighty perfectly? As if to say: No. Psalm 76:20: Your way is in the sea, and your paths in many waters, and your vestiges will not be known.

ON THE CONTRARY: Augustine: Through all his works he has scattered indications of his signification. Job 12:7: Ask the beasts, and they will teach you: and the birds of the air, and they will tell you. Psalm 18:2: The heavens declare the glory of God, etc.

§ 2. Further it is asked next to this, Whether the vestige is prior to the creature, or the creature according to its rational principle [ratio] is prior to the vestige? And it seems that the creature is prior according to its ratio: because a subject is prior to its property: but the creature underlies the vestige: therefore the creature is prior.

ON THE CONTRARY: Basil in a certain sermon on the beginning of Proverbs, treating that passage, The heavens declare, speaks thus: "There are certain discourses and rational principles of wisdom which before all things were inserted into creatures, that is, that very ratio is that by which each thing was procreated by wisdom, and by which even keeping silent it cries out, and professes God its creator. First of all the ratio and wisdom of things was produced, then at length their very subsistences, since already their ratio and the subsistence by which they can subsist had preceded, through which the intention of mortals is also directed to the intellect of the subsisting God." From this it is gathered that the ratio of the vestige is prior to the subsistences of creatures themselves.

SOLUTION. It must be said that a vestige is a likeness that is doubly deficient in the representation of that of which it is a vestige. In one way it is deficient: because it is a likeness of a part: because of a foot, and not of the whole. In another way: because the likeness of the part is confused, inasmuch as it also confusedly represents the foot: because it is only the lower surface, and not whether the foot is thick, or well colored, or well related to the leg and to the other parts. Here, however, "vestige" is transferred to the confused likeness of an artisan in his work, in which he does not expressly shine forth: and therefore at the end of this chapter the Master says, that seeing through a vestige, they saw the truth through a shadow and from afar,

failing in the gaze of the truth: nevertheless something is seen in the vestige, such as some distinction through appropriated attributes, although not through proper ones.

§ 3. To that therefore which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that those authorities are understood [in this way], so that God is not sufficiently comprehended through a vestige: whence Job also says: Will you find out the Almighty perfectly?

§ 4. To that which is further asked, Whether the vestige is prior, etc. It must be said that "prior" is said in two ways, namely, beginning on the part of matter, either according to being, or according to time, which are all the same, and thus the creature is prior according to its subsistence than the ratio of wisdom which it represents, as the objection proves. "Prior" can also be said according to ratio by beginning on the part of the artisan from whom the work issues forth. Thus the ratio of wisdom is prior to the vestige: just as every artisan operating through intellect first has the ratio of the work, and produces it in his mind, before he indicates it in the material work.

Articulus 15 — On The Parts Of The Trace, Which Are Unity, Form, And Order: Whether They Are Fittingly Assigned

Concerning the parts of a vestige which are unity, species, and order: are they suitably assigned?

Secondly it is asked concerning the parts of a vestige which are posited as three in the Text, namely unity, species, and order.

But it seems that there ought to be only two: because there are only two principles of composite things, namely matter and form: but a multitude of consequent properties arises from the primary multitude of component parts according to substance and according to being: therefore it seems that there ought to be only two of the essence of a vestige.

§ 1. Further it is asked about that vestige which is enumerated, Wisdom 11:21: But you have disposed all things in measure, and number, and weight.

1. For this seems false, since not all things have number: because there is no number of simple things.
2. Besides, in book IV On Genesis, Augustine says that number furnishes species to every thing: but that which furnishes species is form: therefore number is form.
3. Besides, in the same place Augustine says that weight leads every thing to rest and stability: but rest and stability belong only to located things: since therefore not all things are located, because place is not located, it seems not all things were made in weight.
4. Besides, what diversity do these names, rest and stability, signify?
5. In the same way it is asked concerning measure, about which Augustine says, in the same place, that it pre-fixes a mode for every thing. Since therefore measure is some one of beings, it seems there is a measure of a measure, and a weight of a weight, and a number of a number: and this will go on to infinity, as it seems.

6. Besides it is asked, What is that mode which measure pre-fixes, since it is said that the mode of charity is to have no mode? Whence Bernard in the book On the Love of God: The cause for loving God is God, the mode is to love without mode.

7. Besides, many beings are deprived of mode: for since according to Cicero in book I of the Rhetoric, mode is one of the circumstances of a work, and sin corrupts circumstances, it seems this mode can be corrupted and annihilated, which is against Augustine who says, that where these are nothing, there is absolutely nothing: but sin is not absolutely nothing, since it posits an act of the will.

§ 2. Further it is asked about that division of the vestige which Augustine posits elsewhere, which is of mode, species, and order. For it seems this vestige is not in all things: for nothing diminishable by sin

is in those things which cannot sin: mode, species, and order (as Augustine says) are diminishable by sin: therefore they are not in those things which cannot sin: and thus they are only in man and Angel, as it seems.

§ 3. Further it is asked concerning that division of the vestige which is posited by Augustine and Bernard, one, true, good: for one of the dividing members is said of another: because the one is true, and good: and the true is one, and good: and the good is one, and true: but this ought to happen in no good division.

SOLUTION. Without prejudice I say that the trinity of the created vestige (as Basil seemed to say above) is taken from that ratio by which the creature issues from the Creator, and according to the habitude of the creature to the Creator it shines forth in it: and therefore it is tripled through three things which are in it, so that a certain thing corresponds to power, such as unity which as it were founds the thing: and a certain thing to wisdom, such as species through which it is known: and a certain thing to goodness, such as order toward the perfect.

Yet they are also founded in the principles of the thing, as will be clear later, which although they are two, namely that which is (quod est) and that by which it is (quo est): or matter and form: nevertheless the habitudes of those principles are several: and according to their habitudes those three are taken.

§ 4. To the other it must be said, that God created all things in number: for there is no created being which does not have plurality in itself in some way, as is clear concerning being itself which is most simple to the intellect; for if it is taken as created, it will have a habitude to the Creator, as to what is prior, and it has many habitudes to posterior things, according as the word itself [ipsum] is in them by priority and posteriority: and those habitudes although they do not constitute being insofar as it is being, nevertheless they belong to the intellect of created being insofar as it is such.

And therefore it must be said that number is in any being substantially and accidentally by nature, which number is nothing else than the plurality of principles constituting it in the ratio of a created being: and this Boethius seems to mean in the prologue of book I of Arithmetic, where he says thus: "God, the founder of this worldly mass, had number as the principal

exemplar of his reasoning, and according to this he constituted all whatever things [he made] so that by fabricating reason he might find harmony through the numbers of the assigned order." Now this number, in my judgment, is nothing but the proportion of habitudes in the number of principles constituting the essence of the created thing, insofar as it is a created and determinate being in nature. Hence it is also that Boethius in the book On the Trinity says that in God alone there is no number, and in all others there is number. Thus that which truly is, is not in part, that is, it cannot be a part, nor have a part: because otherwise it would be imperfect. And it similarly follows that only this is, that is, that one truly is, and is most beautiful and firm: because it leans on nothing. Wherefore this truly one is that in which there is no number, nothing in it other than that which it is. For since according to Damascene, difference is the cause of number, and a difference of principles of this sort is found in every created thing, in every created thing there will be number, which is as a distinct being in nature, whether it be substance, or accident.

§ 5. TO THE OTHER it must be said, that number in one way is form, and in another way is not: however in every way number somewhat furnishes species: and it is the act of number to posit the numbered thing into a number with others: and a thing receives this insofar as it is terminated and divided from others: and this is done through the act of form which divides and terminates the being of matter: and thus number gives being, and is form: but then number is posited for that by which a thing is numbered, and it falls into a number: whence it does not follow then that it is even or odd: or two, or three, and the like. In another way number is the numbered principles sufficient for the being of the thing: and thus it is taken when it is said

that God made all things in number. And those principles furnish species just as in the first potency to the being of a thing there is species.

§ 6. To the other it must be said, that weight is taken broadly and strictly. Strictly, weight is the inclination of a mobile body by a straight motion to its where [place]; but broadly it is the inclination of any reality of a thing into that in which the coming-to-be of its being and of its essence rests: but its coming-to-be does not rest except in having been made, and having been made is only when the thing is perfect in being: therefore weight will be the inclination of the principles constituting the thing into the being of the thing, that is, the proper being of the thing according to the nature of this or that created thing.

§ 7. To the other it must be said, that location or stability halts motion, and therefore by an extension of the name it is in having been made: but rest expresses a certain perfection in the constitution of that for the sake of which the motion was, and therefore it expresses perfection in the form and being of the thing.

§ 8. To the other it must be said, that measure pre-fixes a mode: but mode is that beyond which nothing of the essence of the thing proceeds, as Augustine says. Whence according to this I say that mode is the termination of the principles constituting the thing under the being of the thing: so that thus there are three, namely the number of principles, and their inclination to being, and their termination or perfection under the being of the thing.

§ 9. To the same it must be said, that of every determinate created being in nature there are these three: but it is not necessary that of those three there be another three which are in them as dispositions, but that these three have three corresponding [realities] in the ideas by which they are created and inserted into creatures. Whence Augustine in book IV On Genesis: "Measure is without measure, to which what is from it is equated, nor is it itself from elsewhere. Number is without number, by which all things are formed, nor is it itself formed. Weight is without weight, to which they are referred so that they may rest, whose rest is pure joy, nor is it itself referred to another." And further below he concludes thus: "Therefore it must not be doubted that those things are outside those things which are disposed, in which all things are disposed." And thus it is clear that one will not go on to infinity there.

§ 10. To the other it must be said, that love and charity in truth according to their being have a mode, and this mode is the commensuration of the act to the lovable object: but in God the lovable object is elevated in goodness beyond what we can [reach] through affection toward Him: therefore it is said to have no mode, because it does not have a mode within our power.

§ 11. TO THE OTHER it must be said, that in truth sins are deprived of these three, but not altogether: because an act remains in them with privation and with a potential order to these: and therefore there is also deformity in the act: because if there were no act of free choice ordinable to these, then the lack of them would not induce deformity. But how a defect of this sort occurs, has been noted above in the question concerning the two principles.

§ 12. TO THE OTHER it must be said, that mode, species, and order are in all things, but not in one way: for they are in some things in two ways, as in a foot, or another organ: for if the foot is considered in itself, thus the species of the foot is the form of the foot, and its mode is its limitation to a figure, and its order is to its place in the body. But if it is considered as an organ of the walking power, thus its species will be a disposition which can be suitably moved by the walking power, and its mode the proportion of the mobile to the moving power, and its order to walking. Whence I say that mode, order, and species are diminishable in a rational creature, not considered absolutely in the being of nature, but rather according as it is considered according to the order which it has to the good of grace: for thus that ordinability is corrupted by sin: but otherwise they can be in others.

§ 13. To the last it must be said, that the one, the true, and the good, although they are convertible according to their supposits, nevertheless are not convertible according to the intentions of their names, and thus they are co-divided.

Articulus 16 — What Is The Rationale For The Enumeration Of The Diverse Traces

What is the rationale of the enumeration of diverse vestiges?

What is the rationale of the enumeration of diverse vestiges?

Thirdly, it is asked about the rationale of the enumeration of diverse vestiges: for almost everyone speaks of this, and no one assigns a rationale for what is said.

Let the vestiges found by the Saints be enumerated, thus:

1. In Wisdom 11:21, this is posited: Number, weight, measure.
2. Augustine in book IV On Genesis, posits this: Mode, species, and order.
3. Bernard, this: One, true, good.
4. In the Gloss on that Psalm 91, It is good to give praise, on that verse (v. 7): A fool will not understand these things, this is posited: Substance, species, virtue [power].
5. In the Celestial Hierarchy this is posited: Essence, virtue, and operation.
6. Elsewhere Augustine gives this: Substance, species, reason.
7. The same Augustine in book VIII of The City of God posits this: The cause of subsisting, the reason of understanding, the order of living.
8. In 83 Questions he posits this: That it consists, that it harmonizes, that it is discerned.
9. From the book Soliloquies this is gathered: The true, the beautiful, the good.
10. From the book On the Divine Names this is gathered: Light, the beautiful, the good.

There are also very many other ways of enumerating, all of which will be clear, if the rationale of their enumeration is well attended to.

§ 1. It must be noted that a thing is considered in three ways, namely in itself, and in its operation, and in comparison to man, for whose erudition the thing itself was made.

Now in itself it is further considered in three ways, namely in its coming-to-be (fieri), and in its ultimate perfection. Now in its coming-to-be are those enumerated first, namely number, weight, and measure. For number is referred (as was said before) to the substance of the constituting principles, according as one with another makes a number in constituting the whole being: but weight is referred to their inclinations to being: and measure to the proportion of the very being terminating the principles inclined to it. And thus it is also clear that the prior is always in the posterior: but it is not converted, because number is in weight, and not conversely: and number and weight are in measure, and not conversely.

§ 2. Those enumerated SECONDLY, namely mode, species, and order, are referred to the thing according as it is in being: which is clear thus: Mode is (as Augustine says) that which pre-fixes for each thing the measure of its being beyond which there is nothing of its essence: and therefore it is clear that it is from form, and where the preceding trinity is terminated, namely in measure, there this one begins, just as being is after coming-to-be. But species, since it is that by which the thing is, and the proper nature of the thing, and gives being to that in which it is, again it is clear that it does not belong to the thing except according as it is in being. But the first order of the thing is that which is to permanence and rest in that being, and to the proper place of its nature whether corporeal or spiritual, which follows from such being which is from the form of the thing. Whence the Philosopher in book VIII of the Physics says that motion to place and to form is the same, in things mobile by a straight motion. Whence it is clear how these three are in the thing according as it is. In these also the previously obtained

three are supposed: for since every motion is from measure, as Augustine says, and measure supposes number and weight, as was held, number, weight, and measure will be in mode: but since there is no species except of a modified thing

in being, species supposes mode: since therefore there is no order except of collocation and rest in the being which is from species, order supposes species. And from the Text it is clear that the labor of certain people is useless, who want to reduce all these to number: because if they are asked why the Saints enumerate them in such diverse ways, they cannot assign a reason.

§ 3. Thirdly indeed the three enumerated, namely the one, the true, and the good, are taken in the thing according as it is perfected with its ultimate perfection: which is clear thus: The one (as the Philosopher says) is undivided in itself, and divided from others: but nothing is undivided in itself, except what is contained within itself by its boundaries: and this is what is enclosed to the limits of its defining principles: but this is what is located in nature in an ordered being: whence it is clear that the one has order in itself, and consequently has all things preceding order: but since the true is that which is, by the true the proper substance of the thing is supposed: and this is taken from the nature of the pronoun and the subjunctive article, which is in the noun, both of which denote the determination of the supposit: but by the verb, is, substance is imported as an act, which substance does not belong except to an already perfected thing: and therefore the true supposes the one: but the good expresses indivision from the end, and the end is the ultimate complement, and therefore the good supposes the true and the one. And thus it is clear that these three belong to the thing according as it is in its ultimate complement.

§ 4. The SECOND consideration of a thing is according as it is in operation: and thus again it is considered in three ways, namely, according to things disposing to a work, or in the act of the work, or in the end intended by the work.

Now according to the first consideration are taken the three enumerated fourthly in the Gloss on the Psalm, namely substance, species, and virtue: for substance posits a being perfect in itself, and therefore it supposes the good, and consequently all things preceding the good: substance is also that from which act and operation proceed, because acts belong to particulars and composites: but every substance acts through form, and therefore species posits the first disposing principle to the work: but species does not elicit works except through virtue, and therefore virtue is the immediate disposing principle to the work, and therefore in it are species and substance: whence by these three it is sufficiently disposed to the work: substance from which the act proceeds, species according to which the operation is, and active virtue by which the immediate principle of the work is.

§ 5. Now the fifth three are in the book On the Celestial Hierarchy, these namely, essence, virtue, and operation, and they are in the thing according as it is in the work: for essence is posited here for nature, according as it is the principle of motion and rest: and virtue is the ultimate issuing forth of potency into the work: but operation posits the act of the work. And again it is easily clear how in these all the preceding are enclosed.

§ 6. In the sixth place indeed are enumerated substance, species, and reason, and they are in the thing according as it is in the end intended by the work: and according to this substance supposes the acting substance in act: and species posits its determination in act in this or that, which is according to the nature of its form, or being: but reason expresses the intended end: and then again the posterior always posits before itself the preceding.

§ 7. Those indeed which are enumerated seventhly, do not express something in the creature, but rather in God according to the division of the three sciences, as Augustine says, in the same place, namely natural, rational, and moral: because these show in God, that He is the cause of subsisting for natural things, and the reason of understanding for rational things which consist in pure and bare intellects, and the order of living which is sought in moral things which are not for the sake of contemplation, but so that we may become good.

§ 8. The THIRD consideration of a thing is according as it is ordered to the intellect and to the affection

of man, whom created things instruct: and thus again there is a threefold consideration of a thing, namely, as the thing is disposed to the intellect and affection, or as it is in the intellect and affection, or as it is in the effect following it according as it is in the intellect and in the affection.

And in the first way are taken those three which are enumerated in the eighth place, namely that it consists, and that it harmonizes, and that it is discerned: for nothing consists according to nature unless it consists in the perfection of power and nature: for then it consists, that is, stands similarly: but the perfection of nature is in the first three ternaries: and the perfection of power in the second three, as was held: therefore that it consists supposes all the preceding: but that it harmonizes posits an order to another, and especially to man for whom it harmonizes in the use of life: but that it is discerned posits a respect to the intellect.

§ 9. Those IN TRUTH which are enumerated ninthly are in the thing existing in the affection and the intellect; and they are these: the true, the good, the beautiful: for the true is the end of speculative intelligence, as the Philosopher says: and the good is the end of the affection: but the beautiful expresses its beautification and decency according to the rational principle of the honorable.

§ 10. Tenthly indeed the three enumerated are light, the beautiful, and the good: and they are taken according to the effect which they make in the affection and intellect, which are to illuminate, and to make beautiful, and good.

And note, that in all these and others which are posited by the Saints, the first always expresses the substance of the thing: because unless that is first supposed, nothing could be taken concerning it. But the last always expresses the complement with respect to the two preceding.

Articulus 17 — On The Attributes Of The Persons Which Are Attributed To Them By The Master

Concerning the attributes of the persons which are attributed to them by the Master.

Next, in order to have a fuller understanding of the Text, it must be seen how the Master through the words of Augustine attributes these three to the uncreated Trinity, there, where he says: For in that Trinity is the supreme origin, etc.

For if all the diversities which he posits in this chapter are gathered together, then he attributes seven to the Father, and an eighth which is proper to Him, namely, that He is the Father: for he calls Him firstly the origin of all things, and secondly the principle, and thirdly from whom, and fourthly to whom we recur, fifthly one, sixthly that He is the author of the founding, and seventhly that it is His to say let it be made.

§ 1. For the FATHER is considered in three ways, namely, as a principle not from a principle, both with respect to the persons and with respect to creatures: because although the Son and the Holy Spirit create, nevertheless they have this from the Father. The Father is also taken in His property: and the Father is taken as the end to whom all things are referred, both by creatures and by the persons: because the Son refers what He is to Him, from whom He has it that He is, as Hilary says. And similarly the Holy Spirit. But if He is considered as a principle not from a principle, He can be taken in three ways, namely in habit, or in inclination to act, or in the act itself: and these are said only according to the ratio of understanding, which ratio is imported through the names, and not that there is a distinction of this sort in reality: for the Saints were accustomed to speak of the persons in this way. Now if He is taken as in habit, then origin belongs to Him: but if as in inclination to act, then principle belongs to Him: but if in the act itself, then

that which is said, from whom all things, belongs to Him: and this plainly offers itself to one considering the rationes of the names. But if He is considered in His personal property, then it belongs to Him by appropriation to be one: because the one is undivided in itself, and undivided is extended to not being distinguished by this that it is not from another, just as the one from which every number comes is not from another. But if He is considered as an end, then to which all things are reduced or revert belongs to Him. But the two which the Master touches upon, namely author of the founding and He said let it be made, belong to Him according as the creature is from Him in act: but from whom belongs to Him through the act itself: while authority belongs to Him insofar as He operates through Himself: and to say let it be made insofar as His appropriated attribute shines forth in the work.

§ 2. But to the SON the Master also gives seven, namely truth, beauty, form, through whom the work is made, the form which we follow, the likeness of reformation, and the word: and these are adapted to the Son according to four considerations of Him. For He is compared to the speaking Father, and thus He Himself is the Word: He is also compared to the issue of creatures from God, and this in two ways, namely as the idea of the thing, and thus He Himself is called form: and as a being outside the shadows of privations of those things of which He is the idea, and thus He Himself is beauty: and as a whole containing whatever will

be in the thing, both immaterially and immutably, and thus He Himself is truth: because truth is immobile and immaterial. But if His comparison is made to the creature according as it issues from the operator, thus through whom the work is made is attributed to Him. The third consideration of the Son is according as He Himself is reducing us to the Father, as the Apostle says, Romans 5:2, because through Him we have access to the Father then He is considered in two ways, namely as an image to which we image ourselves, that is so that we imitate Him according to the mode possible to us, just as He imitates the Father through all things, and thus He is the form which we follow: and according as He recreates, as the mediator of God and men, and thus He is the likeness of recreation.

§ 3. To the Holy SPIRIT the Master also attributes six in this chapter, namely, that He Himself is delight, the goodness in which all things are contained, the grace by which we are reconciled, the peace by which we adhere to unity, and the gift of benignity, which belong to the Holy Spirit according to a threefold consideration of Him. For if He is considered in comparison to the Father and the Son from whom He proceeds, this is done in two ways, namely, according to the ratio of His procession, and this ratio is because He proceeds as goodness and love: then goodness belongs to Him. But if He is considered according to the mode by which He is related to the Father and the Son, then delight belongs to Him: because He Himself is the delight of the two according to appropriation. But if He is considered in comparison to the creature universally, then it belongs to Him to be that in which all things are contained. The third consideration is in comparison to the rational creature into which He proceeds, so as to sanctify it: and then He is considered in three ways, namely in Himself, just as He is the very first gift in which all things are given, and thus the gift of benignity belongs to Him: and in the presents of graces, and thus it belongs to Him to be the grace in which we are reconciled: and in the effect following the collation of Himself and of graces, and thus it belongs to Him to be the peace by which we adhere to unity.

§ 4. From what has been previously held, the explanation of the whole chapter is clear up to that point: The Word through whom everything that substantially and naturally is was made. He says all these things on account of sin, which neither naturally nor substantially is, but is an incidental defect from a defect of the good: whence it does not have perfect being, according to how Boethius defines being, when he says: Being is that which retains order and preserves nature.

Articulus 18 — Whether The Philosophers Were Able To Know The Trinity

Whether the Philosophers could know the Trinity?

Could the Philosophers know the Trinity?

§ 1. Next, an objection is raised concerning what he says: For it is not sufficient through the contemplation of creatures, etc. For from this it is understood that the Philosophers did not know the Trinity.

§ 2. 1. Against this seems to be what Aristotle says in Book I On the Heavens and the Earth thus: "And this indeed, namely, the ternary, is of every thing, and signifies the trinity of things;

but we did not extract this number except from the nature of things, and retained it as a law: because it is similar to natural things, and therefore in the law of Pythagoras in which he taught to worship God, we have applied ourselves to magnify the one God with sacrifices and worship according to this number: since we magnify God the Creator who is eminent by the properties of those things which are created." For here he seems expressly to name the triune God.

§ 3. 2. Moreover, Plato speaks of the Father and the Son under proper names, and of the paternal mind and paternal intellect: therefore he seems to have understood the Father and the Son.

§ 4. 3. Moreover, Augustine says that in a certain book of Plato he read the Gospel: In the beginning was the word: up to that place: The Word was made flesh.

§ 5. 4. Moreover, Trismegistus: "The monad begets a monad, and reflects its ardor into itself": therefore it seems that he knew the Father begetting, and the Son begotten, and the Love which is from both as ardor.

§ 6. 5. If perchance it is said that the Philosophers did not know the persons under the proper names of the persons, but under appropriated ones, namely power, wisdom, and goodness. Against this: An appropriated attribute is not fitting except through the intellect understanding it as agreeing with the proper attribute: therefore if the proper is not understood first, the appropriated is not understood: and so it seems that they understood the properties of the persons before the appropriated attributes.

§ 7. It is further asked: If they knew the Father and the Son in some way, did the Father approach their knowledge more under the notion of 'speaking through the intellect' than under the notion of 'Father', and the Son under the notion of 'word' than of 'Son'?

§ 8. It is further asked: Why did they fail more in the knowledge of the Holy Spirit than of the Son?

§ 9. Solution. It must be said that without doubt the Philosophers, by the guidance of natural reason, could not have determinate knowledge of the Trinity according to the proper names of the persons: and this happens on account of three things. One of which is that that knowledge has opposition to the principles by which the intellect receives science, such as that there cannot be several supposits of one nature indivisible by number; that everything which is distinguished according to subsistence, by the fact that it is related to another, is first distinct in the substance receiving that relation; that the begetter from his own substance and the begotten are not simultaneous in being; that every begotten thing is first in potency than in act, and such like, which are the principles of receiving science according to natural reason. And to all these things the opposite is the case in the distinction of persons in the Trinity: and therefore for the knowledge of the Trinity another principle higher than these is required, which is faith, or the illumination of revelation coming from above. The second is that the science of God is wonderful and fortified, and we cannot attain to it: because it exceeds and conquers us, as was proved above. The third is that the likeness in the creature representing God is not perfect, and is deficient in representing, as the Master says be-

low: because every likeness in many more ways is deficient than it agrees.

§ 2. To the first, therefore, it must be said that Aristotle does not understand the Trinity except perhaps through appropriated attributes: but there he intends, according to the commentary, that on account of three perfections of a thing, namely, in itself according as a body is perfect in triple dimension, and a line and surface are imperfect, in that one dimension can be added; and secondly according to the order of the circle in the generation and motion of the heaven and the figure of the world, in that a straight line receives addition, but a circle does not, in that it is without beginning and end; and thirdly the perfection of universality which is from the fact that it is impossible to add to the world, since it is totally from its own matter, and nothing of its matter is outside the world: on account, I say, of these three perfections of things the ancients magnified God with three sacrifices: and they did not confess Him to be triune and one.

§ 3. To the next it must be said according to Augustine in the book On Christian Doctrine, that Plato, curious in the inspection of books, descended into Egypt and Judea, to see the books of Moses and the Prophets: and there he learned of the Father and the Son, and not by the guidance of natural reason. Or perhaps if someone inspects the mind of Plato, he intends to call God 'father', and this world 'son': and therefore also there he speaks of a mother and nurse which is the matter from which the world is made.

§ 4. To the next it must be said that he calls the paternal mind the intellect of God without the distinction of the Trinity: and he calls the paternal intellect the archetypal world, just as Boethius says of God: Bearing the beautiful world in mind, He Himself most beautiful.

§ 5. To the next it must be said, as is clear before from Augustine On Christian Doctrine: but presently below we will give another answer.

§ 6. To the next it must be said that I do not know who this Trismegistus was: and I believe that the book is fabricated: for all the things which Trismegistus is said to have spoken, I found in a certain book of Master Alan of Lille which was composed concerning certain general propositions, and a commentary of the same is subjoined: yet if he was a Philosopher before the incarnation, and did not learn in the books of the Old Testament, nor through revelation, then I say that he is speaking of one God generating, that is, producing His intellect in the world, and loving all the things He made for His own sake.

§ 7. To what is objected, that an appropriated attribute is not known except by means of the proper, it must be said that this is true insofar as it is appropriated: but this appropriation to the proper properties was made by the faithful.

§ 8. To what is further asked, it must be said that they approached the Father and the Son more under the notion of 'speaking through the intellect', and under the notion of 'word', than under the notion of Father and Son: and this is because 'to speak' is equivocated into essential speaking which belongs to the three, and personal speaking which belongs only to the Father.

And in the first way it is investigable by reason. In the second way, no. Similarly, 'word' is equivocal with respect to the uncreated word which appropriately belongs to the Son: but 'Son' signifies a subsistent person, which 'word' does not do according to the notion of word in common.

§ 9. To the last it must be said that the expression of 'word' and 'speaker' offer themselves sufficiently in the divine intellect, and have some relation to one another: but the expression of 'love' does not offer itself thus: and therefore the procession of the Holy Spirit is more removed from reason.

§ 10. But now we have already arrived at it, etc. Here begins that part in which he teaches to come to the eternal distinction of the Trinity through the image. And it is divided into three parts: in the first of which he shows the distinction of the twofold image in the soul. In the second he teaches how one ascends through these images to the distinction of the uncreated Trin-

Articulus 19 — What The Image Is

ity, there, Y, And so the rational mind considering, etc. And this is the penultimate chapter of this distinction. In the third he says that it is grasped almost by way of conclusion in these likenesses, there, Z, Wherefore according to that consideration, etc. And it is the last chapter of this distinction.

§ 2. The first of these is subdivided into two, according to the two images which he posits: one of which is in the natural powers of the mind, but the other is in its natural habits, there, B, It can also in another way, etc.

§ 3. The former among these is further divided into three: in the first of which he posits those things which are required for an image. In the second, he determines certain doubts arisen concerning the determination of what was said, there, M, Here again it must be attended to diligently, etc. In the third, he touches upon the dissimilarity of this image, there, P, Nevertheless let him beware, etc.

§ 4. The former among these is still subdivided into two: in the first of which he touches upon the powers in which the integrity of the image consists, and how they are distinct, and one in substance, life, and mind. But in the second he demonstrates their equality to one another, there, H, such also are not only individual, etc.

§ 5. And because this passage is difficult, it must therefore be noted that the first part contains only one chapter, in which there are five paragraphs. In the first of these the Master determines that the image of God is to be sought in our mind, because our nature has nothing better than that part. In the second, he shows that the ratio of the image is in the mind: because it is capable of God, or because it grasps Him, there, Even in the mind itself before it is a partaker of God, etc. But in the third he shows the distinction and order of the three powers constituting the image, there, For behold the mind remembers, etc. In the fourth he shows how these are one in the substance of the mind, there, These three therefore, as Augustine says, etc.

Fifthly and lastly, he shows in what these are relative to one another, and in what they are not, there, But memory is said relative to something, etc.

§ 6. Through this division the sentence of the first chapter is clear.

What is an image?

§ 7. However, a fourfold doubt occurs here before the exposition of the Letter. For in the first way it must be asked, what is an image? Secondly, what are the things constituting an image? Thirdly, in what as in a subject is the image? Fourthly, with respect to what object or knowable thing is the image, whether with respect to all things, or with respect to something specially?

§ 8. Regarding the first one proceeds thus: Hilary says: "An image is the unique and indiscrete likeness of a thing to a thing to be coequated." Also, Hilary: "An image is the likeness and unity of a thing to a thing to be coequated." But since Augustine says on that passage of Psalm 4:7: The light of thy countenance is signed upon us, etc., that there is an image of creation, and of recreation, and of similitude, let it be asked whether it is defined in common for all those images?

§ 9. 1. It seems that it is not: because the image of creation is reason: and that has a great discretion [separation] from that of which it is the image.

§ 10. 2. Moreover, below the Master says that in great part there is dissimilarity: therefore it is discrete.

§ 11. 3. Moreover, the created image does not coequate the uncreated Trinity: therefore the definition does not fit.

§ 12. 4. Moreover, the second definition says, likeness and unity: and this does not seem to fit the image: because Augustine says in the book On the Ten Strings, that the image of a king in his son is one way, and in a gold coin another way: because in the son it is as in the same in nature passed down from the father's nature: but in the gold coin it is as in a diverse nature, and it is imprinted by an artifi-

cer. And he says that it is in us as in the gold coin: but in the Only-Begotten it is as in the son: therefore it seems that our image is not a likeness and unity to the uncreated image, but much diversity.

§ 2. 5. Moreover, since Augustine says that three things are consequent upon one another, namely equality, likeness, and image: for where there is equality, there is likeness, but not conversely: and where there is image, there is equality and likeness, but not conversely: why does he not define the image by equality, just as by likeness, since equality approaches more to the notion of an image than likeness?

§ 3. 6. Moreover, Hilary seems to be contrary to himself: because above it was held (dist. 2) where he says that an image is not solitary: but here he defines it by unity when he says, likeness and unity.

§ 4. 7. Moreover, since there is a vestige in the creature through which also some knowledge of the Trinity is received, can it be called likeness and unity?

§ 5. 8. Also, what is the difference between a vestige and an image? For if a vestige does not represent in totality, and an image similarly does not represent in totality, as the Master says, there seems to be no difference between them.

§ 6. Solution. It must be said that in truth those definitions given by Hilary are about the uncreated image which is the Son: but if they are extended to the created image (as some wish), then it must be granted that nothing prohibits that definition from fitting all three images (so to speak) by priority and posteriority; and by priority it fits the image of similitude which is in the three powers, namely memory, intelligence, and will: but by posteriority as to a subject it fits reason which is put there for the part of the mind which is in reason, that is, in the rational soul, the more excellent part: but it fits the image of recreation by effect, because it makes one actually imitate.

§ 7. To the next it must be said that the created image is indeed discrete [distinct], as it is considered in itself as a certain thing: but in the notion of an image it is not taken alone, but that of which it is the image is taken in it in one acceptation with it: because considered thus it leads the intellect into the exemplar, and therefore in one act of understanding both are grasped, because one is in the other, and thus it touches the exemplar, and is indiscrete [inseparable] from it.

§ 8. To the next it must be said that the dissimilarity which is in it is not in it as it is an image: because nothing is an image according to what is dissimilar in itself; and therefore that does not impede indiscretion.

§ 9. To the next it must be said that it is true that it does not coequate the exemplar in totality, but according to what it attains in some way, thus it strives to coequate, whence it is coequated in a qualified sense.

§ 10. To what is objected concerning the second definition, it must be said that if we wish to extend it to the created image, then there will be unity not substantially, but the unity of imitation and of leading into another through equality and likeness: and then there is unity well enough in the image of the king in the gold coin.

§ 11. To the next it must be said that likeness in one way signifies a greater agreement than equality: for likeness is the same quality of differing things: if therefore it is taken in the definition, it will express in the notion of image every equality, especially exterior: and so it will also express agreement in form, or in a figure constant regarding something: and that most of all perfects the notion of an image more than equality in quantity alone.

§ 12. To the next it must be said that Hilary is not contrary to himself: because above he willed that the image should posit multiple supposits either in the direct case or in the oblique, as was said above. But here he understands not of the unity of singularity, but rather of the unity by which, ordered to itself, they are united in this, that one is in the other by the fact that it is grasped in it.

§ 13. To the next it must be said that vestige and image differ in four ways. One is that a vestige is a confused likeness

Articulus 20 — What Things Constitute The Image

over a part of a part only, but an image is an expressed likeness in exterior things over the whole. Another is that a vestige does not signify the agreement of exterior things according as they are caused by interior things, such as of old age, fatness, color, beauty, and the like: but an image posits such an agreement in exterior things, through which something in interior things is comprehended. The third difference is: because a vestige is in all things, but an image is only in the more worthy creature, and according to its more worthy part. The fourth is that a vestige does not lead except obscurely into the attributes of the persons: but an image equally into the procession of the persons from one another, and their consubstantiality, and also equality, as will be said presently below, when the order of those powers is shown, and equality, and consubstantiality: and therefore also a vestige cannot properly be called a likeness and unity.

What are the things constituting the image?

§ 2. Secondly it is asked, what are the things constituting the image? And it is said by Augustine that they are memory, and intelligence, and will.

§ 3. Let it be asked therefore: What is memory according as it constitutes the image? And Gregory of Nyssa says that the memorative faculty is memory and the cause and storehouse of remembering. But Origen says that it is a phantasm left behind by some sense appearing in act. But Damascene says that memory is the conservation of sense and intelligence. But Augustine in Book XII of the Confessions: Memory is the present of past things. But Tully says that memory is of past things.

§ 4. Let it be asked therefore: According to which notion of these definitions does it fall into the notion of an image? And it seems that according to none.

§ 5. 1. For all these definitions suppose memory not to be a part of the rational soul, but of the sensible: therefore it seems that memory is in no way a part of the image.

§ 6. 2. Moreover, whatever considers time under a determinate difference of time is not removed from the conditions of matter, since time is one of the principal conditions of matter: but memory so considers time: therefore it is not removed from the conditions of matter. The first is evident through itself. The second is proved by what Gregory of Nyssa says thus: We are said to remember what we previously knew, or heard, or otherwise cognized: but 'previously' has a relation to past time. Thence thus: Whatever does not abstract from the conditions of matter is a part of the sensible soul, and not of the rational: memory does not abstract: therefore it is a part of the sensible soul, and not of the rational: therefore it ought not to be a part of the image.

§ 7. 3. This same thing Gregory of Nyssa seems to say expressly thus: Sensible things indeed are themselves remembered according to themselves, but intellectual things according

to accident, because the memory of thinkable things also comes to be from an assumed phantasm.

§ 8. 4. Also, Damascene: Sensible things indeed according to themselves are committed to memory.

§ 9. 5. Also, Aristotle: Memory is indeed of the intellect according to accident, but per se of the primary sensitive faculty.

§ 10. 6. Also, Aristotle: If memory were of the intellective parts, it would not be in many other animals, perhaps but in no mortal beings at all.

§ 11. From all these it is clear that memory cannot be a part of the image.

§ 12. In the same way it is asked concerning intelligence, whether it is a part of the image? And it seems that it is not: for intelligence is either the agent intellect, or the possible, or the speculative or formal, or the intellect which is called by the Philo-

sophers acquired: it is certain that it is not the agent: because that is universally active, as the Philosopher says, by which it is to make all intelligible things: and the image is not taken according to it: because in this it does not imitate the Trinity, but rather the act of light to color, and of art to matter, as the Philosopher says. Similarly it seems that it is not the possible intellect by which it is to become all intelligible things, and has all things in potency, but nothing in act: but Augustine says that the intellect which is a part of the image always knows itself. But that it is not the speculative intellect is clear: because that habit of principles, or another, if it were to imitate, would not be from itself, but rather from the part of the thing of which it is the intellect. But Augustine says that the intellect imitates of itself. Similarly it is not the acquired intellect: because that is science acquired through discovery or teaching: and then it does not imitate the Trinity in one essence of the persons.

§ 2. In the same way it seems that neither is the will a part of the image; because the will (as Anselm says) is only in two ways, namely, as the mover of the powers according as it is converted upon other powers and moves them to act, according to which it is said: I will to understand, and I will to remember: but thus it does not imitate the Trinity: because thus it is not from the intellect and memory: but rather conversely those are from the will. In another way there is the will which is converted to the willed object, and thus again it does not imitate the Trinity, but rather commands concerning imitating or fleeing the delectable or sad in works: and so it seems that none of those three is of the image which are posited in it.

§ 3. Solution. It must be said that in truth (as Augustine says) the integrity of the created image is in these three: but memory is not taken according to any of those assignments which were made: because as the Master says below from the word of Augustine, memory as it is taken here is with respect to past, present, and future things: which could not be unless it were abstracted from every difference of time, just like the intellect. And if it is asked, What is this memory, and what is its act? It must be said that this memory is nothing else than the power of the rational soul according to its higher part holding within itself the habit of the true and the good which it is according to its own nature, and the habit of the true and the

good which God is: or perhaps what is truer according to Augustine, holding within itself knowledge through the presence of essence, and not the habit of the true and the good which the soul itself is according to nature. Whence Augustine says that nothing is more present to the soul than itself to itself: but this will be treated below. But its act is not in acting, but in holding (as was already said) the presence of knowledge in essence, or in some innate habit. Whence I well concede what is objected concerning memory, that it is not taken thus here: nor do I approve what some say, that it is the conservation of species under the notion of the previously seen, or received, or possessed: because this notion concerns time, and according to all Philosophers, it belongs to that power to consider time whose it is to consider quantity, and this is the primary sensitive faculty. But if it is said that the notion of time is simple, and therefore can belong to the intellect: this is true: but the notion of time relates equally to all time, just as the notion of man equally to all men, and therefore then it does not determine this intelligible thing and that: and therefore it must be said that it simply respects no time, but is abstracted from time of which memory itself is the conservator.

§ 4. To what is asked concerning intellect or intelligence, it must be said that intelligence is called here the formal intellective power not simply, but informed with respect to a certain intelligible object, which namely is always present in the soul, just as the soul is present to itself, and God is in it essentially, presentially, and potentially: for the knowledge of God is naturally innate in us: and therefore the objec-

Articulus 21 — In What, As In A Subject, The Image Is Contained

tion does not proceed which was made concerning the speculation of other intellectual things: because although it does not imitate in others, yet in a certain one it imitates through relation to memory and will.

§ 2. In the same way must be solved what is asked concerning the will, that it is the will taken with respect to the willed object, not every one, but a certain one: and not in whatever way, but according as memory and intelligence are of the same thing, just as it is willed that the soul is, and willed that God is: the knowledge of both of which is innate to the soul naturally, as Augustine says: and through this also the solution to the whole is clear.

In what as in a subject is the image contained?

§ 3. Thirdly it is asked, In what as in a proximate subject is the image?

§ 4. 1. And Augustine says that it is to be sought and found there than which our nature has nothing better, that is, in the mind: therefore it seems that the first subject of the image is the mind.

§ 5. 2. Also, Augustine says that the mind has the image in the power of knowing, and the likeness in the power of loving: therefore the mind has the image.

§ 6. 1. But against this seems to be Augustine in Book XIV On the Trinity, who posits an image in exterior vision: as the species of the seen thing, and its image in the eye which is called vision, as he himself says, and the intention of the will conjoining both.

§ 7. 2. Similarly in the same book he posits an image in the phantasy: for there the image of the body is in the memory of the sensible soul, and the same image in the cogitation of the one imagining: but the intention of the will is conjoining both: therefore it seems that it is not in the mind alone, as the Master seems to say here.

§ 8. 3. Also, Damascene says the image is according to free choice: although nevertheless free choice is not a part of the mind.

§ 9. 4. Also, The image seems to be in the higher part of reason: because that (as Augustine says in Book XII On the Trinity) cleaves to the contemplation of higher things: since therefore the image is principally engaged in the contemplation of the higher, the image seems to be according to the higher portion of reason.

§ 10. It is further asked, Why is the image not assigned in some way to belong to the powers of the vegetative soul, just as it is assigned by Augustine to the powers of the sensible soul?

§ 11. Still it is asked concerning the Gloss on Psalm 4:7: The light of thy countenance is signed upon us, etc., where there is distinguished the image of creation which is reason, of recreation, and of similitude: for it is asked for what 'reason' stands there. If it is said, that for the rational nature. Against this:

§ 12. 1. An angel is a rational nature: and yet is not said to be made to the image. However, the contrary of this seems to be through Gregory, who says on that passage of Ezekiel 28:12: Thou wast the seal of resemblance, etc., that an angel has a more express image of God than man.

§ 13. 2. Also, Damascene: "God is the maker and creator of the Angels, leading them from non-being to being, creating them according to His own image, and giving them an incorporeal nature."

§ 14. 3. Also, On that passage of Ezekiel 28:12: Thou wast the seal, etc., the Gloss says: "The King of Tyre resigned, that is, destroyed, the image of God to which he was made." And it speaks of the devil: therefore an angel is to the image of God.

§ 15. Moreover, 1. It is asked concerning the image of recreation: for either that is grace, or virtue. If gra-

ce. Against this: Grace makes its possessor pleasing, and does not respect this power or that one: but the image consists in determinate powers: therefore the image is not grace. If on account of this it is said that it is a virtue, then it is asked, What is that virtue, or those virtues? If it is said what is commonly said, that they are faith, hope, and charity. Against this: None of those is in the memory: therefore this part of the image which is memory is not recreated.

§ 2. 2. Moreover, Bernard says that God is going to be for reason the beauty of light, for the will the multitude of peace, and for the memory the continuation of eternity: therefore it seems that light, peace, and eternity are the image of recreation.

§ 3. Moreover it is asked, Why is the image not posited in political virtues, just as in theoretical ones?

§ 4. Solution. It must be said that the image in truth is only according to the higher part of the soul, which is called mind or spirit by Augustine.

§ 5. But to that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that in exterior vision there is not an image, but a certain likeness of an image in this, that three certain things are united: yet it is not the true ratio of an image, because they are not of one substance, like those which are in the mind.

§ 6. In the same way it must be answered to that which is objected concerning the phantasy.

§ 7. To the next it must be said that Damascene calls any agreement from nature an image: and because free choice is spiritual, therefore he says it is an image.

§ 8. To the next it must be said that higher reason respects operable things, albeit through the reasons of divine right: but the powers of the image are simpler, in that they are ordered only to the knowledge of the true and the good which God is, and of that in which God is grasped as His image: and because sometimes Augustine is found to say that the image is the soul according to the higher part of reason, it must be said that he then takes the higher part broadly insofar as it comprehends the powers of the image, and synderesis, and also that part which is specially called the higher part.

§ 9. To the next it must be said that in the image specially one of the powers ought to be cognitive, because the image appropriately belongs to the Son who is the image of the Father: but none of the powers of the vegetative soul is cognitive: and therefore it in no way befits it to be an image.

§ 10. To the next it must be said that in that Gloss reason is posited for the higher part, which is called mind or spirit: and the image is in it in potency, as in a subject in which imitation can be distinguished in its powers.

§ 11. To what is asked, Whether an angel is to the image? it must be said that 'image' can note agreement in interior things only, or simultaneously in interior and exterior things. If in the first way, then I do not see why it should not be said with the Saints that an angel is to the image, just like man: since in it three powers are in one essence, just as also in man. But if it notes both agreements, then it is not to the image: for agreement in exterior things is in three ways: in that all are from one man, just as the Father is the principle of the whole deity: and in that the soul is whole everywhere in its body, as is contained below (dist. 8), just as God is whole everywhere in the world, which does not belong to an angel. But the third is in that man is unible [capable of being united] to God, but not an angel.

§ 12. To what is asked concerning the image of recreation, it must be said that it is properly speaking according to the three theological virtues, namely faith, hope, and charity. For hope, in that it expects indefectibility, expresses that which appropriately belongs to memory, because it is retentive of the divine likeness or presence: although in itself it is in the irascible faculty.

To that which is objected concerning Bernard, it must be responded that he enumerates glorifying rather than creating.

To the other it must be said, that the powers of the image are immediately in God, but the political virtues are not: and therefore in those there is not the image of recreation.

Articulus 22 — With Respect To Which Object Or Knowable The Image Is

In respect to which object or knowable thing is there an image?

Fourthly, it is asked, In respect to which object or knowable thing is an image said?

1. And it seems that it is in respect to all: because in all there is this, that the intellect can be informed from memory, and the will from both.
2. Furthermore, this seems to be what Augustine wants when he says that the whole memory is in the intellect and will, and conversely: however, these powers do not have totality except in respect to objects: therefore it seems that the image is distinguished in respect to all objects.

But ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Augustine above enumerates thus:

The mind remembers itself, understands itself, loves itself: therefore it seems that it is taken only in respect to itself.

1. Furthermore, the knower and the known have similarity with the Father and the Son: therefore the known should be as much as the knower: but when the soul knows lower things, the known is not as much as the knower: therefore in these there is no image.
2. Furthermore, in those there is not as much will as there is intellect frequently: therefore it seems that in such objects there is no image in the soul.
3. If perhaps it is said that this is true: but it is only in respect to itself, and not in respect to God. On the contrary, when it is in respect to itself, the soul itself is the object of cognition, and in the object the cognition of the intellect stands: therefore the reason stands in itself: therefore it does not lead to God: but it is of the image to lead to God: therefore in respect to itself as object there is no image.
4. If it is said against this, that it is only in respect to God: this will be against Augustine who says: The mind remembers itself, understands itself, etc. Furthermore, when it remembers God and understands, the intellect and the understood are not proportionate, but distant: therefore then the knower does not equal the known, which seems to be against the nature of the image.

Solution. To this without prejudice I say, that it is in respect to the true and good which the soul itself is, which is always present to itself, and nothing is so present to the soul, as Augustine says, as it is to itself in respect to the true and good naturally in it, which is God: how this is can be thus evident. Someone sees Hercules in the face, and then determinately knows Hercules, and his eye is formed according to the species of Hercules. Someone also

does not see Hercules in the face, but sees him in a mirror, or in a stature very similar to him: and then his vision in the sense takes one, and through that another comes into reason: and in both acts he sees Hercules, but in the first vision he sees more certainly. Thus I say, that the soul through intellect, memory, and will can be immediately carried into God: and then in act it imitates and is formed to the Trinity and unity. Someone also can turn to the powers themselves as they are from each other, and they equal themselves: and thus again it tends to the Creator, but it begins from the creature: and if sometimes by knowing itself it does not notice that from this it is led into God, then habitually or potentially it imitates. However, in respect to other knowables there is no image, in my judgment, but the intellect of lower things. However, some here say very differently, of whose opinions it would be very long to dispute.

Therefore it must be said to the first, that not in all is the intellect informed from memory: but in some the Generative intellect is memory, as in acquired habits: although conversely it is in the final.

To the other it must be said, that the whole memory is not taken there according to the multitude of all objects, but according to many reasons of knowing in respect to only two objects: and this can be seen: because if it were taken in respect to others, then the mind and knowledge would not be substance, but two diverse things.

To another it must be said, that cognition does not stand in its object, but rather is actually or potentially referred to God, as to an exemplar.

To another it must be said, that two things are attended to in the image, namely substantiality, and equality: and secondly, the beauty and charm of color: and as to the first, namely consubstantiality and equality, the image is more truly in the soul, when it remembers, understands, and wills itself, than when it remembers, understands, and wills God who is not equated to it. But if it is taken in the second way: because no charm can be without God, therefore then it more truly imitates, when the true and good which is God is taken.

And let these things said before the Letter suffice.

Articulus 23 — To Know Whether It Is Understood Of Natural Knowledge Or Of The Knowledge Of Grace

To know whether it is understood concerning natural knowledge, or concerning the knowledge of grace?

Then let the text of the first part of the chapter be taken upon this: Where in the mind. And let it be asked, Whether it is understood of human knowledge which knows God, or can know, etc., concerning the knowledge of nature according to which to know is to hold knowledge within oneself, or concerning the knowledge of grace? If in the first way, then superfluously is added this which says, or can know: because it is the same to be able to know from the power of habit, which is to hold the knowledge of God within oneself. But if in the second way, then it does not seem that the image always remains in the soul: because it is not always in grace which causes imitation.

Solution. It must be said that it can be understood in both ways: and if it is understood concerning natural knowledge, then to know is referred to the habit, and to be able to know to the power: because in these two ways the Trinity is distinguished in this distinction, as has been held above: and thus it is clear, that although to know and to be able to know are together, yet not always according to the same: because to know from habit, which is the knowledge preserved within the mind, is not the same as to be able to know from power alone. But if it is understood concerning the knowledge of grace, then to know is referred to the external imitation of the image, which is not substantial to it, but is for well-being, like color and beauty: but to be able to know is referred to the power, and to grace.

Articulus 24 — Why The Image Is Not According To The Inferior Powers

Why the image is not according to the lower powers?

ARTICULUS XXIV, Why the image is not according to the lower powers?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says:

Nevertheless, the image of that than which nothing better exists, etc. Why cannot it be the image of God according to the lower powers?

Soturio. This happens on account of the simplicity of the object which is God, and the mind itself. For these are most simply in the mind: because by essence, and therefore it cannot be in it except according to its most simple part.

Articulus 25 — Whether The Image Can Be Lost

Whether the image can be lost?

Whether the image can be lost?

Then it is asked about this: For even if the participation of God is lost, etc.

Against this, it seems to be what is said in Psalm 20: "In your city, you will reduce their image to nothing." And elsewhere, Isaiah 40:8: "The face of their countenance is burned;" therefore, the image can be lost.

Solution. It must be said that the image can be considered in its substantial aspects, which are form and figure: and that image is in the three powers, namely memory, intelligence, and will, which cannot be lost: because according to Dionysius, natural gifts are not lost. However, in these, it is according to what by knowledge naturally inserted and co-created in itself, they are turned towards the true and good which God is, and towards the true and good which the mind is. In another way, the image is considered in the beauty which is for well-being: and in place of that beauty which color and gilding and such things bring, there is in spiritual things the participation of God through grace: and with respect to this external beauty of divine rather than the distinction of persons in one essence image, the image can be lost: and thus the authorities introduced are understood, and thus it is sometimes burned by the fire of concupiscence.

Articulus 26 — Whether The Parts Of The Image Are Imprinted By The Whole Trinity Or By The Distinct Persons

Whether the parts of the image are impressed by the whole Trinity, or by distinct persons?

Then it is asked concerning this which he himself says, "For indeed the image of God is the mind which is capable," etc.

1. For if it is the image of the three persons, it seems that it is sealed in the mind in the manner in which the figure of a seal is sealed in wax: but in the figure, the head seals the head, and the hand the hand, and the chest the chest, and so on for the others: therefore, by similarity, the Father seems to seal the memory, and the Son the intelligence, and the Holy Spirit the will: therefore now the works of the Trinity in the creation of the image will be diverse, which is false.
2. Furthermore, the image does not seem to pertain to the interior, but only to the exterior, namely in the figure and composition of the members and quantity: but to remember, to understand, to will, are intimate to the mind: therefore it seems the mind should rather be called the son of the Trinity than the image: because the son is the image in the interior and exterior.
3. Furthermore, Augustine says that man is the image and likeness, having the image in the power of understanding, and the likeness in the power of loving: but the power of loving is the will: therefore the will is rather of the likeness of God than of the image.
4. Likewise, the power of understanding is only intelligence: therefore memory and also will seem to be superfluous.

Solution. It must be said that it is not so in the creation of the image, as in the impression of the figure of the seal in wax: and this is because the figure which is in the seal does not have a head in the foot, and in the hand, and in other members, but has distinct members: but in the uncreated Trinity the Father has all the essential attributes which belong to the Son, and conversely: and similarly for the Holy Spirit. Hence, although memory is attributed to the Father, nevertheless he has both intelligence, and the Holy Spirit similarly: and therefore they impress memory indivisibly, and they impress intelligence indivisibly, and will indivisibly: although by attribution of some fitting thing memory belongs to the Father, and in- telligence to the Son, and will to the Holy Spirit.

To the other it must be said that although to remember and to understand and to will are interior to God, and interior to the rational soul, nevertheless because they are not in a nature which is of one reason in God and in the soul, it cannot be said to be the son: because the father and the son are always in one nature, or at least in a nature which is according to reason one in both: this, however, is not here: and therefore the nature of the soul receives these as if certain extrinsic things: because what is quantity in material things, this is power in potentative or spiritual virtues: and what is the configuration of external lines in figure in material things, this is the fittingness of powers to act and object in potentative things: and therefore the mind is called the image of God, and not the son.

To the other it must be said that when it is said that man has the image in the power of understanding, the power of understanding is taken generally for the power ordered to understanding and for its effect: ordered to understanding is memory by holding knowledge with itself, and similarly intelligence by intuiting itself, or God in the knowledge held with itself: but when from such knowledge love always arises, the effect of those two according to their order to act is will. But when it is said having likeness in the power of loving, the power of loving is taken from the habit of charity and grace: because that habit colors the image, as was said above. Hence certain Saints say that man lost the likeness of God through sin, and withdrew into the region of unlikeness: but he was wounded in the image: and thus it is clear that the power of loving is not that will which is part of the image according to the nature of the mind.

To the last it must be said that the power of understanding is not only intelligence: but also memory, and will, as has already been said.

Articulus 27 — How These Five Differ In Order, To Know Oneself, To Understand Oneself, To Will Oneself, To Discern Oneself, And To Think Oneself

How do these five differ in order: knowing oneself, understanding oneself, willing oneself, discerning oneself, and thinking oneself?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says:

Behold, indeed, the mind remembers itself, understands itself, loves itself, etc.

1. For it seems that remembering and understanding are the same: for if memory here is taken for past, present, and future things, and understanding is of the same and in the same way, it seems that understanding and remembering are the same. But that understanding is of the same and in the same way is proven: because understanding is of the simple nature or species of a thing: these, however, abstract from all temporal difference, and in one way agree with past, present, and future, as is clear in the species or nature of man, which, insofar as it is understood, agrees with men existing under any temporal difference according to the same nature: therefore it seems that understanding is of the same, and in the same way, of which memory is: therefore remembering is the same as understanding.
2. Likewise, Augustine says that the mind knows itself: but knowing oneself is understanding oneself, since it is clear that he does not speak of sensible cognition: therefore the act of the intellect agrees with memory: but powers are distinguished by acts: therefore memory is understanding.
3. Likewise, Augustine in book X of the Trinity: It is difficult in the mind to distinguish its memory from its understanding: as if these are not two, but one called by two names, as is apparent in that matter where these are very much joined, and one is not preceded by the other in time, and love itself is not felt to be, since it is not brought forth by need, because what is loved is always present. From this two things are held, namely, that these three are always together, and that it is difficult to distinguish between them.

Solution. It must be said according to Augustine in the last authority, that although it is difficult to discern between these when they are taken with respect to those things which are always present in the soul, like the substance of the mind and God, nevertheless they have a distinction. Hence according to Augustine, to know is nothing other than to hold the knowledge of a thing with oneself: therefore, since it is clear from the above that this agrees with memory, it is evident that memory knows itself and God with this knowledge. However, to understand oneself according to Augustine is nothing other than to behold and see oneself or God in that knowledge: for it is not the same to hold the knowledge of a thing with oneself, and to behold the thing of which that species or knowledge is: and therefore it is different to understand oneself, and to know oneself: but will is the approval, or love proceeding from such a word of intellect and memory: and therefore Augustine says in book IX of the Trinity: The word which we now intend to indicate is knowledge with love: but nevertheless it is different to discern oneself, and to think oneself, than to know oneself or to understand: because Augustine says that to discern oneself is the same as to show oneself to differ from other things, and this the soul does not always do: but to think oneself is as if to co-agitate oneself, that is, to turn upon oneself, comparing the nature of the mind to its parts and powers and passions, and thus the mind does not always do: and thus the difference of these five is clear, namely, knowing oneself, understanding oneself, willing oneself, discerning oneself, thinking oneself.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that understanding is indeed of the same with the abstraction of time of which memory is, but not in the same way, because memory only knows by retaining the knowledge of the thing according to species, or according to substance, if the thing is present in the soul by itself, but the intellect beholds the thing in the knowledge which is the species of the thing or its substance if it is present in the soul by itself.

To the other, it must be said that as is clear, knowing oneself, as taken by Augustine, is not the same as understanding: and therefore that objection does not proceed.

To the third, it must be said that in truth it is difficult to distinguish between these three, which are above that which is naturally in the soul by itself: and this because then in some way they are always in act. And because the intellect always beholds, it does not seem to differ from knowing by memory: similarly because love does not proceed from the need of a thing, that is, which is sometimes not had, and then there is appetite for it: and sometimes it is had, and then there is love of it. But because it proceeds from that which is always naturally in the mind, it always proceeds: and therefore the love of oneself and of God is not perceived as the love of neighbor or another, which is sometimes in the absence of the mind, sometimes in presence: because Augustine says that the appetite of the sought thing is the same as the love of the possessed: and therefore when the mind seeks itself, when it seeks not to know, but to discern, the same appetite is greater of the thing discerned when it has had discernment of itself. Since therefore the judgment is the same concerning similar things, and since it has itself according to knowledge always, and never seeks to know itself, because what is had is not sought, it will always love itself known: but how this is, will be in the question below.

Articulus 28 — Whether Memory And Intelligence Are Relatives, As Is Said In The Text

Whether memory and intelligence are relative as it is said in the text?

Whether memory and intelligence are relative as it is said in the text?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says:

Memory indeed is said to be towards something, and intelligence, etc.

1. For this does not seem so: because relatives are those whose very being is to be towards something, as father and son, and the like: but memory, according to the act of being which is imported in the name, is not towards something: therefore it seems that he speaks falsely.
2. Furthermore, it cannot be understood that memory is memorable memory because thus Augustine would say nothing, since he wishes that these are distinguished by their relations to each other, like Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit: therefore memory is said towards intelligence, and will: and conversely those towards each other, and towards memory: but this in no way seems so: because memory is not said towards conversion with the intellect: for memory is not said intellect memory, and intellect memory intellect: and similarly will is not said towards conversion with those two.
3. Furthermore, one of the relatives is defined by the other: but one of these powers is not defined by the other: therefore they are not relative to each other.

Solution. It must be said that these are relative not simply, but in a certain respect; for there are certain things which according to the whole being that is imported in the name, are relative, like Father, and Son, and Lord, and Servant, because such names are imposed from respect, and the quality of them which they signify with substance is respect: but some are not simply signifying respect, but it is understood together in them, because they are imposed from something other than respect, which nevertheless is in no way separable from respect, like knowledge which is not separated from respect to the knowable, yet is imposed from something other than that respect. Similarly, it is with memory, which is imposed from something else, but nevertheless this is not separated from respect to the memorable: and similarly intellect places respect to the intelligible and will to the willed.

To the other, it must be said that intelligence is referred to memory, not under the notion of intelligence, but under the notion of the memorable, because thus it is grasped by memory: and conversely memory to intellect under the notion of the intelligible, and will to these two under the notion of the memorable and intelligible: but these two conversely to will under the notion of the willed. Others say otherwise, namely, that memory as memory is not towards something, but as it is parent: and similarly intellect in that it is of this kind, is not towards something, but in that it is son, or offspring: in the same way will is not towards something as will, but in that it proceeds from these two, as from one principle of itself. But this is nothing: because Augustine says memory in that it is memory, is towards something: but not in that it

is life, or mind, or essence: and therefore that solution which is against Augustine seems to be nothing.

Articulus 29 — Whether Memory Is Always In The Intellect And Will, And The Intellect In Memory And Will, And The Will In Memory And Intellect

Whether memory is always in the intellect and will, and the intellect in memory and will, and the will in memory and intellect?

Equal are also not only singular to singular, etc.

Here begins that part in which he touches upon the equality of the said powers. And it is divided into two parts: the first of which contains their equality in themselves; the second contains their equality according to their totality, and begins there, "And my whole memory," etc.

In the first chapter, he proves equality in two ways, namely, because all things are grasped by each, and each by each: just as memory grasps the intellect by itself, and is grasped by it by itself without conjunction to the will: and the will is grasped by itself by memory, and by itself by the intellect, and conversely: but all things by each, because memory grasps itself and the intellect and the will conjointly and simultaneously, and similarly the intellect with the other two conjointly, and in the same way the will grasps itself in conjunction with the other two. And this is the sentence of the first chapter.

But here arises a rather grave doubt: because according to what is said here, memory is always in the intellect and will: and the intellect is always in memory and will: because all things are in each, and this always, as Augustine proves. Prosario. That is in memory, which is present in memory, and does not stand apart: but the intellect and will do not stand apart from any part of the mind: therefore all things are in memory and all things in intelligence, and all things in will.

But on the contrary: 1. The Philosopher proves that when one power is in act, another is abstracted from act: therefore, when memory is in act, another is abstracted from act, and conversely: and when the will is in act, the other two are abstracted from act: therefore they cannot be together, as it seems.

1. Furthermore, what is it that Augustine says, that the mind understands itself, and this always, because it is always present to itself? For Augustine seems to be contrary to himself: because it was stated above, that in book XI of the Trinity he says, that for vision three things are required, namely, the seen, and the seer, and the intention of the will joining both: therefore also for understanding three things are required, namely, the understanding, and the understood, and the intention of the will joining both: however, although when the intellect understands itself, the intellect is always present to the understood, and conversely, yet the will of understanding is not always present: therefore it does not always understand itself.

2. Likewise, Augustine in book XI of the Trinity. Therefore, when the mind knows itself, it is the sole parent of its knowledge, for it is both the known and the knower: but it was knowable to itself even before it knew itself, but the knowledge of itself was not in it when it did not know itself: therefore it does not always know itself: therefore much more strongly it does not always understand itself.

3. Likewise, either to know itself is to know itself in its own nature, or to have demonstrative and natural knowledge of itself, or to behold itself according to act: for we do not say we know something in many ways. If in the first way, then the soul of anyone knows itself in its own nature according to act: but to know a thing in its own nature according to act is the most perfect consideration of the thing: therefore anyone would at all times consider the soul with the most perfect consideration, which is clearly false. If to know itself is to have natural and demonstrative knowledge of itself which teaches what a thing is in itself, and in its passions, or properties, then there is no man who does not have the whole knowledge of the soul with him: and we see this to be false, because we acquire all things with labor, study, even a little of it: but if to know itself is to behold itself through the intellect, then anyone always beholds himself through the intellect; and since we can know many things, but understand very little, we could never behold anything else through the intellect, which again is false: therefore it seems that the intellect does not always understand or see itself.

If this be conceded, on the contrary: 1. Every passive or receptive power is in act when the act is in it: and it is in act as long as the form is in it: and this is proved by induction in singulars. However, the intellect is a receptive power of the intelligible: therefore it is in act, with the intelligible act existing in it: but when the intellect understands itself, the intelligible is the same as the understanding: therefore just as the intellect is not absent from itself, so neither is the intelligible absent from it: therefore it is always in act according to this intelligible: and this is to be in act which is to understand: therefore it always understands itself.

1. Likewise, Aristotle in book III of the Soul says that the agent intellect is always in act: and since it is agent with respect to some intelligible, there will be some intelligible always terminating its action: but this is nothing other than what is always present to the intellect, and this is the intelligible which is the intellect itself: therefore the possible intellect is always illuminated by the light of the agent intellect: and this makes the possible intellect understand according to act: therefore the intellect always understands itself.

Solution. It must be said that a certain Philosopher, explaining Aristotle concerning the Intellect and the Intelligible, says that the intellect always sees itself, or always understands itself: and he says that it is the same to say that the intellect understands itself in every intelligible. For just as light is seen in every color, because color is the motive of sight according to the act of the lucid: so he says that the intellect is seen in every intelligible, because it is that which makes something intelligible in act, because its light abstracts the universal from the moving phantasm, and thus in the intelligible made according to act the

agent intellect is seen. But because the possible intellect is not a receptive power of only one thing, like the particular sense, but is receptive of all, and composes and divides the received: therefore also when it receives the intelligible in itself, it receives the subject of the intelligible with the intelligible simultaneously, although it does not receive it as a subject. And the root of this Philosopher consists in this that the agent intellect is understood in two ways, namely, as distinct in its own nature, and thus not...

It is understood in every intelligible thing: either as the act and perfection of intelligible things according as they are intelligible, and thus it is understood in every intelligible thing: just as light is also seen in two ways, namely as a determinate object in itself, and as the perfection of colors, according to what Aristotle says in the book De Sensu et sensato, that color is the extremity of the transparent in a bounded body. In the same way, the possible intellect is understood in two ways: namely, in its proper nature according as it has being distinct from other intelligible things, and thus it is not always understood in act: or according as an intelligible thing is intelligible through this, that it is in the possible intellect itself, and thus it itself is understood in all intelligible things, and thus it always understands itself. But although this solution is sufficiently suitable for saving the statement of the Philosopher, nevertheless it in no way satisfies the statement of Augustine, who intends that beneath every other intelligible thing the intellect always understands itself, and the other two: and memory always remembers itself, and the other two: and the will always wills itself, and the other two. Hence without prejudice I say according to the aforementioned things, that to remember is nothing other than to retain the notion of a thing with oneself. But to understand is nothing other than to simply intuit oneself by the species of a notion or by the essence of a notion, without consideration of oneself and discernment of one's own nature, because this Augustine calls understanding oneself: and to discern oneself and to think of oneself say more, according to him, than to understand oneself. Since therefore understanding oneself does not posit a discernment of oneself, but a simple intuition without discernment and thinking, I say that it does not posit a conversion of the intellect to something that is outside itself to which it posits an agreement or difference of itself, nor to some property of its own which is thought to be in it or not to be in it. But this intuition is perfected by two things, namely an emitted intelligible light, and an object: and to intuit oneself is nothing other than to be presented as an object to oneself in that light. Since therefore the light of the agent intellect always shines upon the possible [intellect], because the agent is the form and act of the possible, the possible intellect is always presented as an object to itself in that light: and since this is to understand oneself according to Augustine, it always understands itself. And I say the same of memory and of will: because from the notion itself love always evaporates [or breathes forth], although not distinctly: just as neither the notion itself nor the intellect are taken as distinct from other things.

Therefore it must be said to the first, that sometimes one power abstracts another from act, and sometimes helps it toward act. For sometimes acts are ordered, such that one receives from another upon the same object, and then one does not impede the other, just as the sight of a man [does not impede] the phantasy of the same man, and the intellect concerning that same thing: but when they are not ordered upon the same thing, then one strongly existing in

act impedes another from acting: just as when thinking about some intelligible thing with a strong and intense intellect, we do not notice those things which are before our eyes. But these three powers are ordered upon the same intelligible thing or object, as Augustine says: and therefore one does not destroy, nor impede the other in acting.

To the other it must be said, that for that understanding which is only being presented to oneself in the light of the agent intellect, the will is not required except as naturally following, and not according to act: but for that which is to discern one of the intelligible things from another, or to consider it in its proper nature, and parts and differences, for this an actual will conjoining both is required.

To the other it must be said, that that authority speaks of investigative memory, when it inquires about itself in comparison to another and discerns itself: because that is inquired into, and before this it was not possessed: and this is clear to one inspecting the original: because he speaks of inquiry there, when the mind seeks itself and finds itself.

To the other it must be said, that to know oneself is to have a notion with oneself, either by species or by presence, and to understand oneself is for oneself to be presented as an object in that notion and light of the

agent intellect: and the division which that argument posits, holds in discretive knowledge, and not in this which according to nature is such, as we said.

But those things which are objected to the contrary we concede in this way, that the intellect is toward itself according to act, not that it is always converted upon itself by discerning, but that it is always presented as an object to itself in the aforesaid light.

I. How does memory contain all those three?

And I remember my whole memory, and intelligence, and will together. For what I do not remember by my memory, that is not in my memory: but nothing is so much in memory, as memory itself: therefore I remember the whole. Also, whatever I understand, I know that I understand: and I know that I will whatever I will: but whatever I know I remember. Therefore I remember my whole intelligence, and my whole will.

K. How does intelligence contain all those three?

Similarly when I understand these three, I understand them all together: for neither is there anything of intelligible things which I do not understand, except what I am ignorant of. But what I am ignorant of, I neither remember, nor will. Therefore whatever of intelligible things I do not understand, consequently I also neither remember, nor will. Therefore whatever of intelligible things I remember and will, consequently I understand.

Articulus 30 — He Shows The Equality Of These Powers, Memory, Will, And Intellect

§ 30. He shows the equality of these powers, memory, will, and intellect?

And my whole memory, etc.

Here begins the second [part] of this part in which he proves the equality of these powers according to their totality: and first concerning memory, and he reasons thus:

1. Whatever is in memory I remember: the whole memory is in memory: therefore I remember the whole.
2. Also, Whatever I understand I know, and whatever I know I remember, because I hold the notion of it with me, and this is to remember: therefore whatever I understand I remember, and whatever I will I remember: therefore these three whole things are in memory.

Consequently he proves that these three whole things are in the intellect, there, Similarly when I understand these three, etc. And his argument is such: Let it be supposed that whatever I am ignorant of, I neither remember, nor will, because I do not have a notion of it with me: therefore I do not remember it: and there is no will of that of which there is no notion with me: therefore of that which is ignored, there is no will.

Having this, one proceeds thus:

Whatever of intelligible things I remember and will, this is presented as an object to me in my notion: and to be presented as an object to me in my notion is nothing other than to understand: therefore whatever of intelligible things I remember and will, I understand all these: but I remember and will all intelligible things which are in my notion: therefore I understand all things: therefore memory according to all memorable things, and will according to all willed things is in my intellect.

Consequently he proves, that the will encloses the whole memory and intelligence thus:

Whatever whole I use, the whole is enclosed in the will through the definition of that which is to use posited above which is, To use is to assume something into the faculty of the will: but I use all intelligible and memorable things: therefore I will all intelligible and memorable things: therefore the whole memorable and intelligible things are enclosed in the will.

From this it is further concluded in the same chapter, that these three are equal and one according to life, and mind, and essence: and by distinguishing he touches upon, how mind is taken: and further it is shown, how memory is taken here according as it is a part of the image.

And this is the sentence of this Letter [text].

Articulus 31 — Whether These Three, Memory, Intelligence, Will, Can Be Called Wholes

§ 31. Whether these three: memory, intelligence, will, can be called wholes?

But a doubt arises from this that he says these are whole and equal:

1. For since these are simple, such that they do not have part and part, they seem not to have totality: therefore he incorrectly says whole.
2. Moreover, let it be granted that these are parts

of the mind: but a supposition is that a whole is greater than its part: therefore it seems, that memory alone is not as great as intelligence and will together, which he already proved in the Letter.

1. The same objection is concerning equality: because equality is the same in quantity, as the Philosopher says: and these do not have quantity.

Solution. It must be said to this, that there is a potestative whole, and a whole in quantity. A potestative whole has potestative parts, and such a whole is the soul to its parts, which are the powers: and such a whole is also one power with respect to those things over which it has power as objects: and therefore we say, the whole power of Hercules can be divided into sixty, or into thirty, and a third is in twenty, and so on: and thus these powers are called a potestative whole with respect to their objects, and parts with respect to the soul.

To the other it must be said, that that supposition is understood of the quantity of dimension, and therefore it is posited in geometry: but in potestative things often one part is greater than many: but not greater than the whole: for in potestative things always what the inferior can do, the superior can also do and more: and therefore it is not converted: and therefore one of these, namely, constituting the image, is capable of as much as the other two with respect to objects, because in those they are equal, and one to one, and one to two, and one to all three: but it is true that one cannot act in as many ways upon those objects, as two or three can: because two can act in two ways, and three can act in three ways upon them.

To that which is objected concerning equality, the solution is clear: because they have a quantity of virtue, although they do not have a quantity of dimension.

Articulus 32 — Whether It Is True What The Master Says, "Whatever I Remember And Understand, This I Will"; And Whether The Evils Which We Understand, We Will

§ 32. Whether it is true what the Master says, Whatever I remember and understand, this I will: and, Whether we will the evil things which we understand?

But still further it is asked concerning this which he says: Whatever I remember and understand, this I also will, etc. For this is expressly taken in this which he says, that my will contains my whole intelligence and my whole mind.

1. For this seems false: because we understand and remember evil things: which nevertheless we do not will.
2. If perhaps someone wishes to say, as some say, that this is understood, as Augustine seems to determine here, namely while I use all that which I understand and remember: this is nothing: because thus it proves nothing: because according to this the will will not be equal to the others except in a qualified sense, namely in useful things which are loved by the love of use.
3. Therefore some have said otherwise, that it is understood of those things which are always in the intellect through themselves, just as those which have proper species in

which they are known: but evil does not have a species, but rather a privation of species, mode, and order: and therefore the objection concerning evil things does not hold. Against this is what Augustine says in book IX of De Trinitate, where he speaks of this same objection having been made, and says thus: Nevertheless since even those things which we hate rightly displease us, and are rightly disapproved, their disapproval is approved, and pleases, and this is a word: therefore it seems that this equality also holds in the notion of vices.

4. Also, Augustine, in the same place: Neither does the notion of vices displease us, but the vices themselves.

For it pleases me that I know and the definition of what intemperance is, and this is its word. From this the same is held.

1. Because of this there are others who say that this equality is not taken according to the notions of those things which we remember and which we understand and will: because we understand many things according to the notion of evil, but nevertheless we do not will them: but it is taken according to the acts of these powers upon the objects: for we will to remember evil things and to understand evil things: and this seems to be taken by Augustine in the induced authorities. But against this is what Augustine in the same book, a little later says thus: Better is the imagination of a body in the mind than that species of a body, insofar as this is in a better nature, that is, in a vital substance just as the mind is. And from this it is taken, that in the notion of inferior things there is no equality: because the notion is better than the thing known: and so since equality is required for an image, there will not be an image in the notion of such things.
2. Also, Augustine, in the same place: When we know God, although we are made better than we were before we knew, and most of all the same pleasing and worthily loved notion is also a word, and that notion of ours becomes some likeness of God: nevertheless it is inferior, because it is in an inferior nature. For the mind is a creature, but God the Creator. From this it is taken, that neither is this equality in the memory and intellect and will of God: which nevertheless seems to be against the things determined above.
3. Also, Augustine, in the same place: When the mind itself knows and approves itself, thus the same notion is its word, such that it is completely on a par and equal to it, and identical: because neither is it a notion of an inferior essence, like a body, nor of a superior one, like God. And since a notion has a likeness to that thing which it knows, that is, of which it is a notion, this has a perfect and equal one, by which the mind itself which knows is known. And therefore it is both an image and a word, because it is expressed from it, when by knowing it is co-equated to the same, and what is begotten is equal to the begetter. From this it is expressly held, that this equality is not attended to except in the notion and memory and will, by which it knows itself, and understands itself, and wills itself, and that the image also is not except by this consideration.

4. Also, Augustine, in the same book: The word which we intend to insinuate, is knowledge with love: therefore since no knowledge necessarily has love with it except when the mind knows itself, this equality is only attended to, when the mind knows itself.
5. Moreover, Not every love suffices for the ratio of an image, but it must be equal to the knowledge: but this is not except in the knowledge of the mind by itself: therefore it ought not to be taken with respect to other knowable things.

Solution. It must be said, that two things perfect an image, namely the act of imitating the exemplar, and equality: and as for the act of imitating the image is more in the knowledge of the true and good which is God, than in the knowledge of the true and good which is the mind: because in the knowledge of that [i.e., God] the act of the intellect is conjoined, but in this [the mind] it does not have God except as in a mirror. But if the equality of the image is attended to which is principally proved here, then according to Augustine, it must be said, that it can still be attended to in two ways: for either equality is taken according to the acts proceeding from the powers upon the objects only, or according to the object and the power. If in the first way, then there is equality in the cognition of God and of oneself: because as much as one cognizes about God or about oneself by that cognition, so much one loves: and as much as one loves, so much one cognizes by another cognition in natural reason of which we are speaking. But if equality is attended to

according to the objects and the powers, then it will not be, except in the knowable thing which is the mind itself, as Augustine says.

To that which is objected first, it seems well to me that that solution cannot stand: because it does not accord with the words of Augustine. And what the Master says, While I use all that, etc., it must be said, that he takes use according to the definition of Victorinus for the act of any power, according as we say, that to use is to act by some power: and the sense is: While I use, etc., that is, while by an act of the will I am converted upon all memorable and intelligible things.

But to that which is objected concerning the other solution, we say that that solution is not according to the mind of Augustine, as was proved.

To the other it must be said, that Augustine does not mean, that in such knowable things there is the ratio of an image: but rather that in every cognition there is in some way a loved notion, although that notion and that love do not suffice for the ratio of an image, for the reason that equality is lacking.

To all the others the solution is clear through the distinction posited at the beginning of the solution.

Divisio Textus

Division of the Text

Here one must attend diligently, etc.

In this part the Master determines the doubtful things arising from the preceding determination. And it has two principal parts, in the first of which he forms an objection against the determined things, and in the second he applies a solution, there, O, But now it must be seen how these three, etc.

But the objection is formed in two ways, namely from the statement of Augustine who said, that they are the essence of the soul, although nevertheless they are properties: and this in the prior chapter, M. And from the statement of Augustine, by which he says, that in a wondrous way they are inseparable, since they are referred to one another, there, N,

And these three also are referred to themselves, etc. Through this division the sentence of the Letter is clear.

Articulus 33 — Whether The Soul According To Substance Is Composite

§ 33. Whether the soul according to its substance is composite?

Here arises the question, Whether the soul is its own powers?

And because this question cannot be conveniently determined according to the intellect, unless it is first known, whether the soul itself in its substance is composite: therefore it is first necessary to ask, Whether the soul itself is composite ? And having had this that it is composite, consequently it must be determined, how its powers are related to it.

It seems concerning the first, that the soul is simple.

1. Every composite in itself is a this something [hoc aliquid] in nature: the soul is not a this something in nature: therefore it itself is not composite. The proof of the first and second is written in the second book of De Anima, where the Philosopher says thus: Let us say therefore that there is a certain genus of those things which are substance: but of this one [part] is indeed as matter, which according to itself is not a this something: but another is form and species, according to which it is now called a this something: and a third is what is from these, which is a this something. And below he concludes the second, saying that the soul is the first act of a physical body having life in potency: therefore since species and act are not a this something, the soul is not a composite substance.
2. Also, Every substance composite according to essential parts, is perfect in itself: no substance perfect in itself is the species and form of another: therefore no composite substance can be the species and form of another. But the first is proved from this that a composite by essence is not except that a thing be perfected in its proper being in itself. But the second is proved from this that having being in itself does not seek another in which it may be. Thence it is further objected from the destruction of the consequent: The soul is the species and form of another, because of a physical body having life in potency: therefore the soul is not composite in itself.
3. Also, Every essential composite, has the first parts of substance: but the first parts of substance are matter and form: therefore every composite in its being, is composed of matter and form; but the soul is not composed of matter and form: therefore it is not

composite. The first is proved from the authority induced above, in which the Philosopher says, that substance is a certain genus, of which this indeed is potency, but this is species and act: therefore whatever things are composite in the genus of substance, are composed of potency and act. The second is proved in the first book of De Anima, where the Philosopher says, that the intellect has nothing prior to itself, out of which it is, like from matter.

4. Also, Augustine in the book De Spiritu et anima: The soul is a simple substance, and is whatever it has.

5. Also, Damascene: The soul does not have another intellect besides itself: but whatever is that which it has, is simple: therefore the soul is simple. And because we have posited many things concerning this elsewhere, let these suffice here.

ON THE CONTRARY: 1. According to the Philosopher something is corruptible in two ways, namely, because it is from contraries: or because it is brought down through being upon a composite from contraries, or conjoined to it essentially, and that is corrupted by accident: but the soul is thus brought down upon a composite from contraries: therefore it is corruptible: therefore it is composite: for nothing of simple things is corrupted.

1. Also, Everything which moves another, is a being perfect in itself: but the soul moves the body: therefore the soul is a being perfect in itself. The proof of the first is, that everything which moves, acts: but nothing acts unless it is perfect in act. But the second is clear through this that the rational soul is compared to the body, like a sailor to a ship.

2. Also, A simple form does not have being except in the matter in which it is, or in reason: if therefore the soul is a simple form, it will not have being except in the matter in which it is, or in reason. On the contrary: Let the body be destroyed: therefore then the soul will not be except in reason: and this is an error.

3. Also, Everything which is a this and this,

is composite in essence: the soul is a this and this: therefore it is composite in essence. The first is self-evident. The second is written in the third book of De Anima consequently: because in the soul there is an intellect by which it is to become all things, and an intellect by which it is to make all things: and this is to act, and to suffer: and since every acting is from act, and suffering from potency, it itself will be composed of act and potency, as it seems.

1. Moreover, The first composition is from act and potency, but the second composition is from subject and accident: therefore where there is a second composition, of necessity the first is presupposed: but in the soul there is a second composition, because all posit that sciences and virtues are in the soul: therefore in it there is a first composition, which is in the essence. If perhaps it be said, that these two compositions are not ordered as cause and caused. On the contrary: To substand, and to be perfected, and to receive acts, belong to matter and are substantial properties: therefore in whatever they are found, in that there is matter, or another thing which is like matter: but they are found in every

composite with the second composition: therefore they are found for the sake of the first composition: and thus the first composition is the cause of the second. This same thing is taken from the definition of accidental form, of which it is said, that it is contingent to the composition. Also, that it happens to be in the same, and not to be in it, besides this that it is part of its being.

2. Also, Boethius in book I of De Trinitate: A simple form can be a subject to nothing. And many other things concerning this can be adduced, which are found handed down by us elsewhere.

Solution. I consent to this part, that the soul is essentially composite, but not of matter and form: and this is because, the Philosopher says in the ninth book of the First Philosophy, that matter is known through its potency to motion, and mutation: to motion, as in the heaven: to mutation, as in generable and corruptible things, according to which matter is also defined in book I of De Generatione et Corruptione, that it indeed is through itself, and primarily the subject of generation and corruption, and consequently also of the others. But in the soul a potency of this kind is not found: and therefore Boethius at the end of the book De Duabus naturis in una persona Christi, says that spiritual things do not have matter. But the Doctors say, that it is composed of that which is [quod est], and that by which it is [quo est]: and then that which is differs from matter, just as a supposit differs from the potency to the form to which it is supponated. For that which is, is a this something which is predicable of that which it is: but that by which it is is not found posited by the Author: but Boethius posits being [esse]: and this is the essence according to the act which it has in that very thing which is, that is, in a this something, or in this supposit: hence in such things the individuation of being itself is from the properties which follow the that which is itself, according to which it is a this something demonstrative to the intellect to here and now. From these things I say that the soul is composite, and an Angel similarly. Hence that by which it is differs from form: because form is separable, and is the form of a part which is matter: but that by which it is or being is not separated from that which is, and is the form of the whole, which expresses the whole being of that which it is by way of formal being, and just like the being of the species in this individual, according to what Boethius says, that the species is the whole being of individuals: because whatever is after the species itself, is from individuating principles: and in this way I say that the soul is a composite substance.

Therefore it must be said to the first, that this proposition, Whatever is composite, etc., is understood of those things which are only composite substances, and not also forms: but the rational soul is a substance and a form on account of a twofold comparison of itself to the body, to which it is compared as act and form, and as a mover: and therefore also the Philosopher does not define it there except as it is a form or species, not as it is a mover: and therefore he says that it is an act: but it is not only an act, as

he himself proves below, but also a mover, like the sailor of a ship, who is in himself a certain being and separable from the ship.

To the other it must be said, that no substance wholly perfect in itself is a species: but the soul according to one consideration of itself is a species, by which namely it confers being to a body of this kind having life in potency: but in another way it is a substance, namely as it is a mover: and therefore it is separable from it: and this is clear from this that whatever is a perfection of something in such a way that neither according to itself nor according to its parts is it an act mixed with it, that is separable from it: but the rational soul is not the act of any body, as the Philosopher says: therefore it itself is separable from it.

To the other it must be said, that the first parts of substance are diversified according to the diversity of substances: for corruptible substances with incorruptible ones (as the Philosopher says) do not have a potency of the same ratio. Similarly spiritual and corporeal things are not of the same genus. And therefore it is not necessary that the principles be of the same genus: but in incorruptible things form is taken from the intellect of the species according to being, and that which is substantiating that in which the form itself is substantiated, is taken through the intellect of that which is the supposit: just as the Philosopher says in book II of De Caelo et Mundo: When I say, heaven, I say form: when I say, this heaven, I say matter. But in spiritual things there is even less of the ratio of matter: and therefore it is taken through demonstration, when it is said, this soul, or this Angel: but this is that which the thing is. And if it be said, that the Philosopher says that the same in number is the same in matter, it must be said, that matter is taken for the property of matter which is to divide and individuate the form according to the being which it has in this subject.

To the other it must be said, that the soul is simple by a certain simplicity, namely that it is present to any power of its own through its essence and substance, which could not be if those powers were divisively distant among themselves.

To the other it must be said, that Damascene takes besides or outside against certain people who said that the intellect is not a part of the soul, but an illustration of intelligence upon it: and he does not mean that the intellect properly speaking is a part of it.

The other arguments adduced to the opposite we concede, except this alone that we do not say that it is from matter and form. For the intellect by which it is to become all things is not matter, or from matter: although it has some material potency, and this is called matter by certain Philosophers.

Articulus 34 — Whether The Soul Is Its Own Power

§ 34. Whether the soul is its own powers?

Next it is asked, Whether the soul is its own powers? But it seems that it is not.

1. Nothing is that which it has except God: the soul is not God: therefore it is not that which it has: but it has powers: therefore it itself is not its own powers.
2. Also, In everything which is below the first, to be able [posse] and to be [esse] differ more than that which is [quod est] and to be [esse]. Proof. To be able is in the genus of quality, and to be is in substance: but that which is and to be are both in substance: if therefore in

the soul that which is and that by which it is or to be differ, much more strongly do to be and to be able differ in it.

3. Also, If by essence the intellect of the soul and the will of the soul are the same: and whatever things are the same to one and the same, they themselves are the same: then the intellect will be the will.

ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Against this is what Augustine says, that they are one life, one mind, and one essence. [54]

1. Also, Augustine in the book De Spiritu...

§ 1. [so] too the soul: God is all of His own things: and the soul is some of its own things: it has natural things, such as intellect, memory, and the like, and it is all those things: it also has accidental things, and it is not those things. And there are many other things in that book concerning this.

§ 2. 3. Also, Bernard on the Canticles: I intuit three things in the soul: memory, intelligence, and will: and these three are the soul itself.

§ 3. Solution. It must be said that in truth the powers of the soul are properties, as the Master says, and in one way they are substantial, in another way they are consequent upon being. For if the soul is considered in its being according as it is a certain spiritual substance, thus they are consequent upon being, and are principled by being itself, and by what it is, just as the agent intellect would be from being itself, and the possible intellect from what it is, and the like. But if the soul is considered as a substance acting upon external things and upon the body, thus the soul is taken as a potestative whole, whose power is completed in its powers: and then its complete power is composed of the particular powers of the faculties, and thus they are substantial to it, without which it is not completed in the perfection of its ability to act.

§ 4. Therefore, to the first it must be said that the soul is not essentially whatever it has: but when it is said, the soul is its own power, it is a predication of a potestative whole concerning a substantial part of its power, which is present to it according to a complete or incomplete notion: for according to the incomplete notion there is power in the lower things, but according to the complete in the higher: because the higher part of a potestative whole always posits the power of the lower part: and because these are of the higher things, namely the powers of the image, therefore predication concerning them is more fitting: but nevertheless it is still somewhat improper.

§ 5. To the other it must be said, that those three are the soul according to a predication of a whole concerning its potestative parts taken simultaneously, but not through essence. And so that this may be better understood, it must be said that one thing is essential, and another is substantial, and [another is] an accidental accident. Essential is what is a part of the essence, in which a thing simply is in its primary composition: just as body and soul are essential to man, and 'that which is' and 'that by which it is' of the soul. Substantial, however, is what confers

being out of a certain composition upon the composite, and it is impossible for it to be lacking to the thing, as reason, and intellect, and such things which are parts completing the power of the soul according as it is the mover of the body, and which complete the being of the body, according as it is moved by the soul. Hence the Philosopher says that just as the soul is the perfection of the whole, so the parts of the soul are the perfections of the parts, and therefore they are substantial, that is, completing the substance of the soul according as it itself is the substance of the body which it moves, not in itself alone, but also in the parts: or according to itself, as reason is of the substance of its power according to itself, but sense according to a part of the power which it flows into the body in which it is. Accidental, however, is what arrives after being is complete, and does not confer being on the composite, since it is possible for the composite to be without it. Although it was said above in the objection that a natural power is in the genus of quality: it must nevertheless be said that a power is naturally considered in two ways, namely insofar as it is ordered to act and consequent upon the being of the composite, or is a principle of acting in that in which it is: and thus it is in the genus of quality. It can also be considered insofar as it is referred to constituting the power of a substance which is a form and a mover in that it is not only the perfection of the whole, but also of the parts according to its parts: and thus it is prior to being and [is among] substantial things: just as on another side one can see in the body, in which there are commixtion, complexion, composition, distinction, organization: which although they are properties of the body, nevertheless insofar as

they make the matter of the soul by which it can be moved and perfected, they are prior to being: but insofar as they are ordered to subsequent operations in which the powers of the soul operate, they are subsequent to being. And thus it is clear, that although according to the mode of predicating they are in the quality of such a power of the soul: nevertheless insofar as all of them complete this whole which is the perfect soul in its power to perfect the body and move it in whole and in parts, thus they are of the substance itself. And this is drawn from the second book of On the Soul, where the Philosopher says thus: "But it is necessary to consider in the parts what was said, namely, that the soul is the perfection of a physical body potentially having life, for if an eye were an animal, the soul would certainly be its sight, that is, the substance of the eye according to its notion: but the eye is matter, which being deficient it is not indeed an eye except equivocally, like one of stone, or painted. Therefore it is necessary to accept the likeness which is in a part, in the whole living body, such that as part is to part, so also the whole sense is to the whole body which is sensitive according as it is such."

§ 7. Here it is to be noted that 'mind' is said in four ways, namely sometimes memory: as Augustine says, that 'the mind remembers itself'; sometimes it is called the intellect examining a thing, and it is thus taken by John Damascene, and thus it is said from 'metior, metiris' (I measure, you measure), because by measuring the notions of a thing, it examines the thing: and sometimes it is called the higher part of the rational soul, in which there are the three powers of the image of the soul: sometimes it is called the whole rational soul, or intellectual nature, just as the blessed Dionysius often calls the Angels divine minds.

54. Augustine, De Trinitate, X, 11, 18.

Divisio Textus

§ 8. DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

§ 9. "Nevertheless let him beware lest this, etc." Here begins the third part of that part which is about the first image: and here the Master assigns the difference between the image and the exemplar: and upon this he posits three small chapters, in the first of which he says that in many respects the dissimilarity of the created image to the uncreated one is greater than their agreement. In the second, he touches upon a certain similarity, namely that man has these three, and is not these three: but he has them in a part of himself, and therefore that part is called the image, and the whole man by grace of that part, just as a board is called an image by grace of the picture: and this begins there, at Q, "Which can briefly be shown, etc." In the third, he shows another dissimilarity: because those three in the image are in one person: but in the exemplar the three persons are one God, and not of one God: and this begins there, at R, "Again, etc."

Divisio Textus

§ 14. DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

§ 15. "It can also in another way, etc." Here begins that part in which he distinguishes the Trinity with respect to habit. And it has four parts: in the first of which he says in which things as in parts this image is, because in mind, knowledge, and love. Secondly, he shows how one of the parts of the image proceeds from another: and this begins there, at T, "And the mind itself is like a parent." In the third, he shows their equality, there, at V, "Nor is the offspring less than the parent." In the fourth and last, he touches upon how those three are in themselves, and how they comprehend each other, there, at X, "Also each of these are, etc."

Articulus 35 — Why It Is Not Granted That The Three Persons Are Of One God, As It Is Granted That They Are Of One Substance Or Essence

§ 10. Why is it not granted that the three persons are of one God, just as it is granted that they are of one substance or essence?

§ 11. Why is it not granted that the three persons are of one God, just as it is granted that they are of one substance or essence?

§ 12. A doubt arises, Why is it not granted here that the three persons are of one God, just as it is granted that they are of one essence or substance?

§ 13. Solution. It must be said that oblique cases [e.g., genitives] note diversity either in the mode of the terms, or in the reality. But when 'God' is said, this name, God, signifies as it were contractedly, and thus it has the mode of a supposit, on account of which it also receives notional acts, and prepositions: as when it is said, God begot God, and God from God: and therefore it does not receive the signification of diversity with respect to the persons. But essence, wisdom, and the like, signify the divine essence as a form, or a habit: and therefore they can signify through that mode, as in some diversity.

Articulus 36 — How These Three In Which The Image Is Differ From The Three Assigned Above

§ 16. How do these three in which the image consists, differ from the three assigned above?

§ 17. How do these three in which the image consists, differ from the three assigned above?

§ 18. A threefold doubt arises here, namely, First, how do these three in which the image consists, differ from those three which were assigned above for the image? Second, whether it is so in these, as in the divine persons, that one proceeds from another, that is, intelligence from memory, and will from both: just as the Son from the Father, and the Holy Spirit from both? Third concerning the order, whether one of these necessarily presupposes another to itself, and one of the habits presupposes the other to itself, and similarly one of the acts is prior to another.

§ 19. To the first one proceeds thus:

§ 20. 1. Mind (as the Master says) is taken here not for the soul, but for that which is more excellent in the soul: but what is more excellent in it is a power: therefore mind is taken with respect to a power, and not with respect to a habit.

§ 21. 2. Also, the Master says that these three are one, because they exist substantially in the soul: but nothing exists substantially except a power, as was held above: therefore these three are taken with respect to powers, and not with respect to habits, as many say.

§ 22. 3. Also, he uses such a manner of speaking, "The mind knows itself, and loves itself": a habit is not to know oneself, and love oneself, but rather it belongs to the one having the habit according to the habit itself or through the habit itself to know oneself, and love oneself: therefore mind is not taken for any habit.

§ 23. 4. If perhaps it is said, as some have said, that although mind is not taken for a habit, nevertheless knowledge bespeaks a habit, and similarly love: Against this is, that when memory knows itself (as Augustine says) it knows itself present to itself, and does not seek itself as absent: therefore it is present to itself through its essence: therefore not through a habit, or through some species: therefore neither does knowledge which sounds as a known thing (as Augustine says) bespeak a habit: and thus what they say seems false. Similarly it seems concerning love: because love here is taken for the loved thing, as Augustine says, that the word is 'loved knowledge': since therefore nothing loved is in the mind, except what is known: and what is known is the substance of the mind, as it seems: love also will be a substance and not a habit, as it seems.

§ 24. Further it is asked next to this, Whether mind is taken here for memory, as some say? And it seems that it is: because to know (as Augustine says) is to hold knowledge within oneself: but this was attributed above to memory: since therefore he says here, that the mind knows itself, he attributes the act of memory to the mind: since therefore a power is defined by acts, the mind will be memory. But against this seems to be that here defining the mind, he posits the same definition which he posited above, namely, that the mind is taken here not for

the soul, but for that which is more excellent in it: and thus he defined above all that part, which contains in itself as in a proximate subject memory, intelligence, and will.

§ 25. Solution. Some say that this trinity differs from the preceding one, in this that that one is taken with respect to powers absolutely, but this one with respect to powers according as they are converted to objects which by essence are the same as themselves. But this is nothing: because the same was held above, that memory remembers itself, understands itself, etc. Therefore others say, that this whole trinity is taken with respect to habits, and that the individuals correspond to individuals, and that mind here is posited for the habit of the mind, and knowledge for the habit of the intellect, and love for the habit of the will: and they expound, "The mind knows itself" through a cause, that is, the mind makes as a habit that someone knows himself according to the mind.

§ 26. But because this opinion also has many other distorted expositions, and the habits are not united substantially, as this says: on account of this it must be said otherwise, namely, that this trinity is taken with respect to the mind, and the habits consubstantial with the mind. But how indeed habits are called consubstantial to the mind, will be in a question afterwards. I say therefore without prejudice with the Master, that mind is taken here commonly as above for the part which has the power of knowing, and the power of loving. But the power of knowing is united in two ways to one act, namely the power of memory, and the power of intellect: for here to know through

a habit is the same as to have knowledge of oneself by seeing in oneself, so that the habit of knowledge speaks of that which belongs to memory, and the intuition of oneself speaks of the act of the intellect. And if it is objected that according to this there will be a quaternity, it must be said that it is not true: because the intellect and memory according to what was held above, have but one habit: for to know is to have the knowledge of a thing within oneself: and to understand is to see oneself in that likeness, or habit, or knowledge, according as to see is nothing other than to be cast before oneself in the knowledge which one has within oneself: hence those two powers have but one habit: and therefore there will not be a quaternity, but a trinity.

§ 28. To those things therefore which are first objected concerning the mind, that it is not a habit, I readily concede.

§ 29. To that however which is objected afterwards, that knowledge too is not a habit, it must be said that it is a habit, as will be proved below: and yet according to Augustine, it is consubstantial with the power perfected by it: and similarly it is concerning love: for these things are not repugnant, that something is a habit according to some notion according to which it perfects a power for an act, and that it is of the things consubstantial to the same power.

§ 30. To that however which is further asked, Whether mind is taken for memory? Certain Masters say, that it is, and they assign the reason why it is taken for memory rather than for intellect and will: because since there are three powers, memory, intelligence, and will: memory is the first among them, and therefore closest to the substance of the mind, because it

arises from the mind alone: but the intellect from the mind mediated by memory, and the will from the mind mediated by memory and intellect. Since therefore memory is closest to the mind, they say that for this reason mind is posited for memory: but nevertheless this seems to be against the intention of Augustine in book IX of On the Trinity, where there are these words which are posited here. And therefore I say with the Master, that mind is taken here for that whole in which there are three powers, as was said above.

§ 31. To the argument however proving this opinion, it must be said that to know is taken here for seeing oneself in knowledge: because love follows upon this knowledge: yet in such a way that to see oneself is to be cast before oneself in the light of knowledge and of the agent intellect: because otherwise it would not always know itself.

Articulus 37 — Whether It Is Thus In These As In The Divine Persons, That One Proceeds From Another, For Instance, Intelligence From Memory, And Will From Both, Just As The Son From The Father, And The Spirit From Both

§ 32. Whether it is so in these as in the divine persons, that one proceeds from another, for instance, intelligence from memory, and will from both: just as the Son from the Father, and the Spirit from both?

§ 33. Whether it is so in these as in the divine persons, that one proceeds from another, for instance, intelligence from memory, and will from both: just as the Son from the Father, and the Spirit from both?

§ 34. Then it is asked, Whether there is such a procession in these powers as there is in the divine persons, and similarly in those habits? And it seems that there is: because

§ 35. 1. Whatever is in the exemplar, ought to be in some way in the exemplificate: but in the exemplar there is the procession of a person from a person: therefore there ought also to be the procession of a power from a power in the exemplificate, as it seems.

§ 36. 2. Also, Augustine expressly says, that from memory is intelligence, and from memory and intelligence is the will: therefore it seems, that one of these powers proceeds from another.

§ 37. 3. Moreover, it was held above, where the difference between a vestige and an image was assigned, that a vestige leads more confusedly, and an image more discretely not only into distinct persons, but also into the distinction of persons: but this cannot be done

unless the powers are distinguished in the manner of persons: therefore, etc.

§ 39. 4. Moreover, Powers are known through acts: but in the acts of these powers one is caused by another, for the will is only of what is known, nor is knowledge except of that of which there is knowledge in the mind: since therefore it is thus in the acts, it will be in the same way in the powers. If perhaps it is said, that this order of acts is on account of the notions of the object and of the powers, namely that the good which is the object of the will has before it the true of which is the intellect, and therefore that true makes the cognition of the true precede: this is nothing: because according to this even the true ought to have

something before itself which would correspond to memory which is first according to Augustine.

§ 40. 5. Moreover, If it is granted that this is on account of the objects: yet because acts are defined by objects, and powers by acts, this will return again to the order of the powers.

§ 41. 6. Moreover, the objects of the powers of the soul according to the Philosopher are born to inflict a passion upon the powers themselves: and the powers themselves are born to suffer from them: since therefore the agent impresses on the patient that species which the patient can receive from the agent, it seems that the perfection of these powers is from the species of the objects: therefore just as the species are ordered in the objects, so necessarily will the powers be ordered in the soul: therefore by a necessary order one proceeds from another, as Augustine seems to say.

§ 42. BUT AGAINST: § 43. 1. These powers are possessed simultaneously from the creation of the soul: therefore one does not proceed from another.

§ 44. 2. Moreover, Will even in act does not necessarily follow what is known: because there are some who know excellently, and act to the contrary: therefore it seems, that the will does not necessarily arise from the intellect.

§ 45. Solution. Without prejudice I say, that there is an order naturally between these powers. But there is one order according to nature, another according to generation, and another according to act. I call an order according to nature, when some thing in its notion posits one thing to be after another, just as reason posits sense, and sense posits the vegetative, and it is not converted. And according to this mode Augustine means that the will posits the intellect, and the intellect posits memory. Hence if someone defines the will, he will say that it is the appetite for a known good: and thus the intellect falls into the definition of the will: and it is not converted. Similarly if someone defines the intellect of which Augustine speaks, he will say that it is the intuition of oneself in the knowledge of the mind: and thus memory falls into the definition: but memory has nothing before itself except the mind as a subject. And this procession of natural order corresponds to the distinction of the persons. Therefore as to this order we concede the reasons first adduced, which without doubt are adduced according to the intention of Augustine in book IX of On the Trinity. However, the order according to generation is an order according to time, and such an order is not there. But the order of acts can be in two ways, namely from a preceding to a consequent, and that is not necessary: for it does not follow if it has the knowledge of a thing within itself, that on account of this it necessarily understands: nor does it follow if it understands, that on account of this it necessarily wills, except in one case, namely when memory remembers itself, understands itself, and wills itself: but this does not follow generally. But conversely the order is necessary, namely, if it wills, that it necessarily knows: and if it knows, that it necessarily holds the knowledge within itself: and this consequence proves the order of nature in the powers which we have stated.

§ 46. But if it is objected that Augustine says in book IX of On the Trinity, that the unknown can be loved provided it is believed, it must be said that he takes 'unknown' for what is not

known by created reason, not for that which is in no way known: for what is believed is in some way known.

§ 47. And through this the solution to everything is clear.

Articulus 38 — Whether One Of The Powers Necessarily Presupposes Another For Itself, And One Of The Habits Presupposes Another For Itself, And One Of The Acts Is Before Another

§ 48. Whether one of the powers necessarily presupposes another to itself, and one of the habits presupposes another to itself, and one of the acts is prior to another?

§ 49. Whether one of the powers necessarily presupposes another to itself, and one of the habits presupposes another to itself, and one of the acts is prior to another?

§ 50. Third, it is asked about the order which Augustine posits here, that from memory is the intellect, and from both is the will: and from the mind is knowledge, and from both is love, regarding another mode of the image.

§ 51. For to this seems to be contrary what the Gloss on Ecclesiasticus 18:1 et seq. says, that from intelligence is the will, and from both is memory: therefore it seems, that memory is appropriable to the Holy Spirit, and not to the Father.

§ 52. To this the common response of all is, that the Gloss on Ecclesiasticus distinguishes the Trinity of the image of the powers, insofar as they are disposed to acquired acts: because the intellect in those first receives knowledge, and through the intention of the will stores it in memory: and in those there is not an image except in a qualified sense, since knowledge is not substantial to the mind, and the known things are frequently lower than the knower. But in the book On the Trinity, he takes these according to the capacity of the mind for itself, and for God: because those naturally by essence are always present to the mind in the soul: and in those it is prior to have knowledge which belongs to memory, and afterwards to see oneself in it which belongs to the intellect, and afterwards to love which belongs to the will.

§ 53. But if it is objected, that Augustine says in the book On the Spirit and the Soul, that the Trinity is in the rational, irascible, and concupiscible, it must be said that it is not a Trinity simply, but in a qualified sense: for the irascible and concupiscible (as Gregory Nyssen and Damascene say) are parts of the sensitive soul: but reason is a part of the rational soul: and therefore there is not a sufficient union there, but a certain one, as was said above concerning sight and imagination, in which Augustine also posits a Trinity.

§ 54. From the aforesaid the solution is clear to all the things which are asked and determined in the Text in the first two chapters, namely S and T, up to the following text.

Articulus 39 — Whether These Three, Mind, Knowledge, Love, Together With The Knowing Being, Are One Substance And Essence

§ 55. Whether these three, mind, knowledge, love, together with the knowing entity are one substance and essence?

§ 56. Whether these three, mind, knowledge, love, together with the knowing entity are one substance and essence?

§ 57. These three since they are distinct from one another, are nevertheless said to be one, etc.

§ 58. And here arises a doubt which the words of Augustine make grave: How do these exist substantially in the soul?

§ 59. 1. And let the words of Augustine be taken in book IX of On the Trinity, where he says thus: We are admonished, if in any way we can see these things existing in the soul, and as if involved to be evolved, so that they may be sensed, and numbered substantially, or (so to speak) essentially, not as in a subject, like color, or figure in a body, or any other quality, or quantity. For whatever is such, does not exceed the subject in which it is. For this color or figure of this body cannot also belong to another body. But the mind by the love with which it loves itself, can also love something else besides itself. Also, the mind does not know itself alone, but also many other things. For this reason love and cognition do not inhere in the mind as in a subject, but these are also substantially just like the mind itself: because even if they are spoken of relatively to one another, they are nevertheless each in its own right a substance. From this authority it is taken,

that these are one substance and one essence. And Augustine also posits Plato's reason for this: because no accident in acting extends itself outside its subject in which it is: but those extend themselves outside their subject: therefore they are the substance of the mind, and not accidents.

§ 61. 2. Also, in the same place: Although the lover or the knower is a substance, knowledge is a substance, love is a substance, but the lover and love, or the knower and knowledge are spoken of relatively to each other like friends: but mind or spirit are not relative, just as neither are men relative: yet not as friends who are men can be apart from one another, thus the lover and love, or the knower and knowledge. From this it is again taken, that knowledge itself is a substance, and love itself is a substance.

§ 62. 3. Also, he himself in the same place: A part is spoken of relatively to a whole, because every part is a part of some whole: and a whole is spoken of relatively to a part, because a whole is a whole to all the parts. But since both the part is a body and the whole is, not only are these spoken of relatively, but they are also substantially. Perhaps therefore the mind is a whole, and its parts as it were are the love by which it loves itself, and the knowledge by which it knew and knows itself, of which two parts that whole consists. From this it is again taken, that these are substantial parts of the mind.

§ 63. But against this it is objected thus: Knowledge is a habit: every habit is a quality: therefore knowledge is a quality, therefore not a substance. The same is the objection concerning love. If it is said, that it is not a quality when the mind knows itself. Against this: To know oneself is to hold the knowledge of oneself within oneself: but this is done through the habit

of the true and the good which the mind is: therefore it still seems, that that habit is an accident of quality.

§ 64. Further it is asked, § 65. 1. How are these three, and the higher three which are memory, intelligence, and will, one essence, one life, and one mind?

§ 66. 2. Moreover, Augustine's reason which he induces does not seem to be valid: for there are many accidents which by acting extend themselves beyond their subject, such as the hot, the cold, etc.: for these alter the bodies neighboring them.

§ 67. 3. Moreover, It seems that Augustine's reason is against his own intention: because Philosophers say that substantial forms are not active, but rather certain accidental forms are. Hence if these extend themselves by acting outside the subject in which they are, they seem to be accidental forms.

§ 68. Solution. Without prejudice I say, that these are not the substance of the mind nor substances, unless considered in one way only, namely when the mind knows itself, and loves itself: and this is taken from Augustine in the same book, namely in book IX of On the Trinity, because after he said all the above words, he thus subjoins in the Text: But how those three are not of the same substance I do not see, since the mind itself loves itself and knows itself: and these three are such, that the mind is not loved or known to any other of things. Therefore it is necessary that these three be of one and the same essence: and therefore if they were as if confused in a commixtion, they would in no way be three, nor could they be referred to one another. And he gives the example of three rings out of gold, and a potion out of wine, and water, and honey, which are not distinct as one substance in those. Hence I say, that when Augustine says that knowledge is a substance, he understands this of the knowledge which arises from the mind, when the mind knows itself: and of the love which arises from these two, when the mind loves itself. But still it must be distinguished here, that knowledge is not taken here for the act which is from the knower upon the known: because that is not knowledge: but it is taken for a habit. But habit is twofold: one is that which is a perfection by way of a quality removing difficulty from an operative power, and such a habit is not this one. The other is that which from the fact that a present thing indi-

§ 1. [con]stantly held by the mind, it gives the faculty of operating always, and such a habit is the mind present to itself, as present: for Augustine says, that a habit is that by which someone acts when he wishes: and by taking habit in this way here, this habit will be the knowledge of the mind by which it is known to itself: but this is nothing else than its presence to itself: and then knowledge taken materially, will be the same as the mind known. But the known mind and the knowing mind are the same in substance, related to each other according to the relation of the knower and the known. But love follows according to nature such knowledge which is the mind known, and it is taken materially, that is, the mind loved: and this again will be the same in substance with the knowing and loving mind, related however by the fact that it is loved and loving. But that such knowledge and love are called habits by the Masters, this is not because there is some mediate quality in which the known mind is seen and loved, but only on account of the mode of signifying which the relations of the

knower and known, and of the lover and loved import: for they supposit as it were certain habits, knowledge and love. By the fact that knowledge and love are not relative properly, but only by the fact that they signify according to the name, that is, certain habits, they have a conjoined respect to another: just as science also speaks a respect to the knowable, which is conjoined to a habit: which it signifies according to reality: but in this it is dissimilar, that the knowledge of the mind is nothing else than the known mind, although it is another according to reason. And thus it is clear how knowledge is taken, and love, when it is said that it is the same in substance with the knowing mind. And thus Augustine understands it. And by this the solution to the first is clear.

§ 2. To the other it must be said, that in truth these three and the preceding three are one essence, one life, one mind, by a certain way of speaking: by the fact that, as the Master says, they consist substantially in life, mind, and essence. And for understanding this it must be noted, that according to Aristotle and other Philosophers, a certain potency is before the being of a thing, and a certain is after it. Aristotle also says, that the vegetative is in the sensitive, and the sensitive in the rational, just as a triangle in a quadrangle. But a triangle composes a quadrangle: because (as Boethius says) two composed triangles make a quadrangle, but three a pentagon, and so of others: therefore a triangle is in a quadrangle, as a potency in act: and a quadrangle in a triangle, as act in potency: therefore the vegetative is in the sensitive, just as the potency of a prior difference is said to be in the act of a subsequent: but the potency of the prior difference is not destroyed by the act of the subsequent, but rather it is perfected to a greater capability: for the sensitive is capable of more than the vegetative, and the rational more than these two. If therefore the substance of the soul is considered insofar as it is perfecting the body in itself and in its parts, it is necessary that it have in itself the capability of all the potencies, as constituting that universal capability of the soul, according as it confers animated being to the body both in itself and in its parts: therefore in this way its potencies are before it according to reason, and of its substance, and they confer to it the complement of being in such a capability. In this way the Master says, that they are substantially in the soul: because just as the substantial is a part of being, so the potencies are a part of the being of the soul: and thus it must not be conceded, that they are qualities or proper passions of it, except according to that mode by which every form denotes a "such" (quale), although they do not denote a "such", but a "what" (quid) in that of which they are a form, just as substantial forms and differences: and thus by such a predication they are called one essence, one life, and one mind. For as was said above, the soul can be taken either in being, or in capability: for it is compared to the body, as to its matter absolutely, according to the being which it confers to the body: and thus it is the essence of the body: and the Philosopher calls it a substance according to the definition of this body, that is, the substance of the form from which

the definition of the animated body is taken. It is also compared to the body, as it is organic: and since the organic is an instrument of potency, it itself will not be the perfection of the organic body except according to its universal capability which it has from the potencies: and because the first perfection of a body having life in potency is life, therefore it itself in that comparison is called life. It has a third comparison to that according to which it can be separated from the body, and thus it is called mind. I say therefore, that when it is said that

these three are one essence, or one substance, it is a predication of the whole potestative according to the most remote definition of parts to the whole, because the soul receives least from the capability of the potencies according as it is the essence of the body: nevertheless they are of its essence and its substance: and because that essence is not divided in parts, but is whole in any part whatever, therefore they are said to be the essence. But according as the soul is the life of such a body as organic, thus it has in itself the capability of the potencies, and as mind it substantially has the potencies in a genus: and therefore it is a less remote predication, when these are called life: because the potencies confer to such living, and therefore also living is said in many ways, namely to generate, and to use food, and to move, and to sense, and to understand, because in such living is the being of an organic body, either in itself, or in its parts. But nevertheless because these three potencies in the image are not the acts of any part of the body, therefore the predication is still remote: yet less than before: because although they do not constitute the capability of the soul in this that it perfects the organs, nevertheless they approach in the definition of a genus, that is, insofar as they are potencies: but when it is said, that they are one mind, the predication of the act of these which are in it is most proximate, as potencies preceding and constituting it: just as if I were to say, The sensible soul is substantially the power of vegetating, and sensing: for from these two ordered consequently, so that the power of sensing is after the power of vegetating, the sensible soul is constituted. In another way a potency can be considered as it is to an act which is an operation of the animated thing: and thus it is a potency after being, flowing nevertheless from the essentials of the animated thing: and thus it is a natural potency which is in a quality, rooted nevertheless according to origin in the parts constituting the soul: and thus these three are called substantial parts: because they are rooted in the parts which constitute and precede being.

§ 4. To the argument of Augustine, it must be said, that it is good, but difficult to understand: for he proves that which is prior according to nature by that which is posterior; because accidents do not have being except from a subject, although forms have a certain definition from themselves, as Avicenna says: and this is clear from the fact that the being of an accident is an 'in-being' (esse in), and accidents are not when they are not in a subject, nor do they have the virtue of acting by themselves: and therefore as to being and as to acting they follow the subject in which they are: and this he calls not extending themselves outside it: for he does not mean that they cannot alter another subject, but that they cannot do this except by the virtue of the subject in which they are. But these parts are not such, rather they are rooted in the parts preceding being, and therefore as to this they do not have this acting from a subject, but rather the subject from them, and thus by themselves without a multiplication of themselves in a medium they extend themselves to another: for when I understand a distant thing, it is not necessary that the intellect multiply itself in a medium: but an accidental form, by the fact that it follows being, in every thing into which it acts is as in a subject, and otherwise it would not act into it: and this some say belongs to every substantial form from the virtue of heaven which is in it: but whatever may be of this, this belongs to that form which is a complete substance, just as the soul, and is completed by its powers, as was said. But others have assigned diverse reasons about which it would be a waste of time to dispute.

Expositio Textus

Exposition of the Text § 5. Exposition of the Text. "And so the rational mind, etc." Here begins that part in which he applies the created image to the uncreated exemplar, and shows what can be had through the consideration of it.

§ 6. But it is objected about this that he says that he has wisdom which is from himself: but wisdom is essence: therefore the essence is begotten, which is false.

§ 7. Solution. Here I pass over briefly (because below there will be a question about this) saying, that wisdom is taken here as an appropriated attribute in which the proper is understood: because the image leads in this way into wisdom, and therefore wisdom is the Son, and the sense is: that is, the Son whose appropriated attribute is wisdom.

Expositio Textus

Exposition of the Text § 8. Exposition of the text. "Wherefore next to that consideration, etc." This is the last part in which namely, as if by concluding he determines what must be held concerning the Trinity and unity into which the image leads. Which whole is clear except this that he says, that he seems to have essentially begotten one Son from himself. For through this generation seems to be an act of the essence. If this were said, then it is objected to the contrary: because of whichever is the act, that acts by that act: the act is of the essence: therefore the essence acts by that act: but that act is the generation of the Son: therefore the essence begets the Son: and the begotten is not the begetter, as will be held below: therefore the Son is not the essence, which is false.

§ 9. Solution. "Essentially begot," that is, begot the Son having the same essence with him: and thus the objection will cease: and in the other matters the Letter is clear.

DISTINCTIO IV

Divisio Textus

§ 10. DIVISION OF THE TEXT. "Here arises a quite necessary question, etc." Here the Master begins to hand down the knowledge of the Trinity and unity according to the ways which he pre-determined. And this part of the book is divided into two parts, according as the Trinity is known in two ways, namely in itself, this is, as it is a cause through creation: and in appropriated attributes which belong to it according as it creates things, and is the universal cause of the being of all creatures: thus wisdom, omnipotence, and will belong to it, about which he treats in the second part which begins below, dist. 35, namely, "Since above we discoursed and said many things, etc."

§ 11. The first part, which is about these things which belong to the divine persons in comparison to the act of creating things which flow from them, is divided into three parts, according to three things which are required for the distinction of persons. The first of these three is, that the mode and act be determined by which

a person flows from a person, by the fact that there is a person from whom this flux is, and there is a flowing person, and again by another flux according to reason he flows from the Father, and by another the Holy Spirit flows from both: and these modes of flux of a person from a person are determined in the first part. The second which is required, is that equality and communicability remain in the nature of which the persons are, and equality of the predication of all common things concerning them: and this is determined in the second part which begins below, dist. 19, there namely, "Now after the coeternity of the three persons, etc."

§ 13. But the third is, that there be properties according to which one person is distinguished from another: and this is determined below, dist. 26, there namely, "Now concerning properties, etc."

§ 14. The first of these parts is divided into two: in the first of which he touches upon the generation of the Son from the Father. In the second, he touches upon the procession of the Holy Spirit from both, namely from the Father and the Son: and this begins below, dist. 10, there namely, "Now after the eternity of the Son, etc."

§ 15. The first of these is divided into four which circumstance the act of generation. For to every act of generation four things are required, namely the terms of the act between which it is, as from whom and into whom it is: second, a potency inclining to the act in the begetter: and third, a nature communicated through the act of generation, which is either spoken of in the begetter and the begotten, or simply remains the same in both: and the fourth is that which accrues to generation by way of an extrinsic measure, just as time measures in the generation of corruptible things, as Dionysius says, but eternity in eternal generation: and concerning these four it is treated here in four parts following one another: for concerning the terms of generation it is treated in the first: concerning the potency inclining to the act on the part of the begetter it is treated in the second, where dist. 6 begins, there, "Besides it is accustomed to be asked, Whether the Father begot the Son, etc." But concerning the communicability of nature which simply truly and incommutably remains in the begetter and the begotten, it is treated in the third which begins in dist. 8, there, "Now concerning the truth or property, etc." But concerning that which is by way of an extrinsic measure, namely coeternity, it is treated in the fourth which begins in dist. 9, there, "Now the distinction of persons, etc."

§ 16. But because furthermore there is a begetting person and a begotten person, it will not be doubted, Whether a person was in some way a term of generation? but the doubt is, whether the essence is? which is signified by two names, namely as by a concrete name, and an abstract one: and therefore this part is divided into two distinctions: so that in the first it is asked, How it stands toward generation, namely eternal generation signified under this name God, when it is said, "God begot God?" And in the second, Whether signified abstractly it can be a term of generation? and this begins in dist. 5, there, "After these things it is asked, Whether it must be conceded, etc."

§ 17. The first distinction contains the dissolution of two sophistic arguments. For in the first chapter A the Master determines, Whether God begets himself God, or another God? But

in the second he moves another doubt, Whether he begets himself God who is God the Father, or a God who is not God the Father? there, B, "But still the babblers object, etc."

Articulus 1 — Whether God Begot Himself As God, Or Another God

Whether God begot himself God, or another God?

§ 19. The first argumentation is this: God begot God: therefore he begot either himself God, or another God: if himself God: therefore the same in person begets, and is begotten: if another God: therefore there is another God than the begetting God: therefore the begetter and

the begotten are not the same God, which is false.

§ 21. To solve this the Master says, that neither is to be conceded. And his reason seems to be: because since this pronoun 'himself' (se) is a reciprocal relative, it supposits and refers back to the supposit of the verb: but the supposit of the verb is the person of the Father: and this name, God, through a verb copulating a notional act, is drawn to supposit for the person of the Father, and that [person] is not begotten: but this relative, 'another', is a relative of diversity, and regards the term adjoined to itself for the sake of form: and when it is adjoined to this name, God, for the sake of divinity it will note diversity: and since there is no diversity of deity between the Father and the Son, the Master says this must not be received: God begot another God.

Articulus 2 — What Generation Is

What is generation?

§ 23. But here a multiplex question falls in. For it is asked first, what is generation? Second, whether generation belongs to God? because if it does not belong, then the Master's question is nothing. Third, whether it belongs by priority to God or to a creature? Fourth concerning the argumentation which the Master posits and solves here, whether it has a process [i.e., whether it is valid] or not?

§ 24. Concerning the first it is proceeded thus: Damascene says: "Generation is, to produce from the substance of the begetter that which is begotten similar according to substance." The same gives another definition of divine generation thus: "Generation indeed without beginning and eternal is a work of nature, and proceeding from his substance: so that he who begets, does not undergo any mutation, and so that he is not a first God and a posterior God, and does not receive an addition."

§ 25. But it is objected against the first thus: 1. When it is said, "from the substance of the begetter," the preposition "from" notes some habitude of a cause: therefore either material, or essential: not material, because Damascene says, in the same place: "For since God is impassible and influxible, as simple and not composite, he is not natively apt to sustain passion, neither in begetting, nor in creating, nor in any operation does he need another": but every material cause is passible: therefore the preposition does not note a material cause on the part of the substance of the Father. But if it notes an essential cause, as almost all say. Against this:

An essential cause is in generation: but an essential cause is an essence: therefore essence in some way is a cause of generation: but not as an efficient, or begetting [cause], nor as an end, nor as a form, because thus it would be a term of generation induced in the begotten through generation, and this is not conceded, because thus at least it would be distinguished in the begotten, just as the essence of a born Socrates is distinguished in him, insofar as it is received through generation: therefore it will be subjectable to generation: but every subject of generation is distinguished in the begotten through the form of the begotten: therefore the essence is distinguished in the Son by the property of the Son, which is false: therefore it seems that the word 'from', can note no habitude of a cause.

§ 26. 2. Besides, it is asked, for what does "substance" supposit there? for either it stands there for nature, or for person: if for nature and it receives the preposition, and the notional verb which is "to beget," then it seems that nature is begetting and begotten. But if for person. Against this: When I say, "The Father is begetting the Son from his substance," substance speaks that which is in both, namely the begetter, and the begotten: but this is not the person of the Father: because in person the Father and the Son are not one:

therefore substance does not supposit there for the person of the Father.

§ 28. 3. Besides, it is asked concerning this that he says, "to be produced": for this seems to say an act of generation: but to be produced is to be led into the open from the hidden: and thus it seems that the Son was sometimes in the hiddenness of potency, and thus drawn out into the open.

§ 29. 4. Besides, "To be produced" says an act, either in becoming (in fieri), or in complete being (in facto esse). If in becoming, either finishable, or not finishable. If in the first way, it follows that the Son at some time was not: because what is in becoming is not, but will be when it has been completed: and I say this, if it itself is of permanent things. If in the second way, then it follows that the Son never was, but is always on the way to being. But if it speaks generation in complete being, then it follows that before this he was in becoming: because to be completed is always the term of becoming.

§ 30. 5. Item, That act which is imported through "to be produced", is intermediate between the producer and the produced: therefore it has a distinction from both, and thus there is something between the Father and the Son, having a distinction from both, which is false. If it is said, that that act is not there except according to the reason of understanding. Against this: A reason of understanding is empty and vain, which neither arises from a thing, and can in some way be posited concerning a thing: just as the reasons of mathematicians, although they cannot be posited concerning a thing according to their being which they have in nature, nevertheless they can be posited concerning the intellect of quantity which is in the thing. But this intellect of producing, as it seems, is in no way applicable to the thing itself.

§ 31. 6. Furthermore it is asked concerning this that he says, "That which is begotten similar according to substance": for this seems inconvenient: for in the divine it is not a "what" that is begotten, but a "who".

§ 32. IN THE SAME WAY it is asked concerning the second definition of Damascene. 1. For he says: "It is a work of nature": but the Master says below, that nature neither begets, nor is begotten.

§ 33. 2. Besides, Nothing seems to be said, existing as a work of nature, and producing from substance: because nature is substance, and thus generation will be a work of substance, and from substance, all of which are disproved in the following distinction.

§ 34. 3. Besides, This seems to be impossible which he says, "so that he is not a first God and a posterior God": because a common conception of the mind is, that that which gives substance and being to another, is prior to that in duration which received substance and being from it: nor is it similar concerning splendor and light, because light does not give its whole being to splendor in the luminous body, just as a father to a son: whence we do not call splendor a son of light.

§ 35. Solution. It must be said, that both definitions are good enough: and the first defines univocal generation in a genus: and I call univocal generation, that which is into a similar form and species with the begetter, just as a man begets a man: but I call generation in a genus, because the definition according to some mode belongs to divine generation, and of man, and of other creatures, for it belongs by priority and by posteriority, as will be clear below.

§ 36. It must be said therefore to the first, that the preposition "from" notes there an identity of essence. For just as in material things we say, A knife is from iron, signifying not only the matter, but also that the being of iron is being in the knife, by the fact that the matter remains in the materiated thing: so we transfer into the divine, casting off what is imperfect, and we attribute what is perfect to God. Since therefore three things are noted in such a locution, namely that iron was the subject of the operation and of its becoming by which the knife was becoming, and that the knife was in potency in the iron, and that it has the essence of iron in itself: the first two are of imperfection, and therefore they do not belong to God: but the third is of perfection, and this belongs to God, namely to have the same substance of the begetter. And if it is asked, § 37. Whether it notes a habitude of cause with respect to the essence? I say that no, but rather it posits such a habitude with respect to him who has the essence, and that is the Father, with respect to whom it notes a reason of origin, which reason although it is not properly a cause, nevertheless has in a certain way a similar habitude. But the objection proceeds in these substances of generated things which come to be, where the act is educed from potency: and this in no way belongs in divine generation.

§ 38. To that which is asked concerning substance, it must be said that substance stands for nature according as it stands under and subsists, that is, according as it is in the one having it, just as is signified in this name, God. For although the Father begets, and not the divine substance: nevertheless the Father does not beget except according to substance: for to beget is from the potency of nature according as it is nature: and therefore it is not necessary, that the substance be distinguished either in the Father, or in the Son: because just as the Father begets according to substance, so the Son is begotten according to substance and nature: because the

same power of nature which is in the Father to this that he beget, is in the Son to this that he be begotten, as the Master will say below: and therefore it is clear that it remains indistinct in the begetter and the begotten, but it is in both as the same.

§ 39. To this that is asked concerning the act of generation, it must be said that there is not there a becoming or an intermediate act between the begetter and the begotten, and the act does not say anything except a notion under another mode of signifying: because a notion names a property according as through it a person is known, but an act names it according to the reason of receiving or giving the essence: for this is true, that the Father gives the essence to the Son, and the Son receives the essence from the Father: but the reason of this giving and receiving through a mode of understanding a notional act names: for the Son through generation receives the essence from the Father, yet neither is the essence begotten, neither per accidens, but nor consequently.

§ 40. But to that which is objected, that the intellect is empty, it must be said that this is true, if by no reason could it be posited in the thing: but although it is not in the divine as becoming, or as a medium between the agent and that into which it acts, nevertheless they are in this that a person is not only a person, but also is the origin of another person who is from it, and notional acts express this very reason of originating. To the other it must be said, that the substance of the Son is not begotten, nor is the substance in the Son begotten, but nevertheless the substance of the Son is received through generation. For the rule is, that whatever a person originated from another has and whatever it is, it has and is and receives from that from which it is: and Damascene signifies this reason of having the essence when he says, that the similar according to substance is begotten.

§ 41. To that which is asked concerning the other definition. It must be said that Damascenus takes it there by reason of nature: for although nature and substance are the same in the divine, nevertheless they do not have the same reason of signifying in a name according to the definition which Boethius gives of nature: for nature is spoken of according as it is a principle of producing a similar from itself, and this principle is the Father, but according to the virtue of nature which is communicable to another supposit without its division. And thus it is clear that in this reason of nature something is attributed to nature which is not attributed to substance, although they are the same. And through this the solution to the following is also clear: because substance does not have this mode of signifying which nature has: and therefore generation is better called a work of nature, than a work of substance.

§ 42. TO THE OTHER it must be said, that by virtue of that generation it follows that one is not posterior to the other in this way: because in a nature in which nothing is in potency

before the act, the Father is not before being than the Father or the begetter: for this generation posits an order of nature by which one is from another, not by which one is prior to another, as is held below; and therefore by virtue of this generation insofar as it is this in the divine, and not insofar as it is generation simply, it has that one is not prior to another, and that the Father is not subjected to change, because he is not commuted, since he never exited from potency to act, or from idleness into operation.

Articulus 3 — Whether It Befits God To Beget

Whether to beget belongs to God?

§ 45. Then having what generation is in common, it is asked, Whether to beget belongs to God? But it seems that it does not:

§ 46. 1. For generation is for this that being is perpetuated through succession, which cannot be perpetuated through itself: but divine eternal being is in one alone: therefore generation does not belong to it, as it seems.

§ 47. 2. Item, Every generation is multiplying one essence in diverse supposits of the same nature: but the divine essence cannot be multiplied, as was proved above in the question concerning this name, God: therefore to beget does not belong to God.

§ 48. 3. Item, The Philosopher says, that every generable thing is corruptible: God is most incorruptible: therefore, etc.

§ 49. 4. Item, In every generation there is another receiving a diverse essence according to substance from the giver itself, and the essence is according to a subject just as matter in inferior things, and just as the matter of the transparent in the generation of light: but there is nothing diverse in the divine: therefore, etc.

§ 50. 5. If it is said, that it is true in those things which are generated according to a part of their nature, and not by giving the whole nature to the begotten: but the Father gives the whole essence to the Son. Against this: The Father is a simple person by the same simplicity by which the divine nature also is simple: why therefore does he beget the Son from himself, if on account of the simplicity of the essence he gives him the whole essence, much more since the person is closer to generation than the essence according to the reason of understanding, the Father gives him his own person indistinct in the Father and the Son: but on account of the indivisibility of the essence the Father and the Son are one essence: therefore much more on account of the indivisibility of the person the Father and the Son are one person: but this is false: therefore generation does not belong to God neither by grace of nature, nor by grace of person.

§ 51. 6. Besides, it is asked, to what purpose is begetting a Son attributed to God? either this happens because a nature is something better in many than in one, or because it cannot be saved in one: not because it cannot be saved in one: therefore because it is something better in many than in one, which again is false: therefore it seems generation does not belong to God.

§ 52. Solution. It must be said, that to God existing above all things and within all things generation most worthily belongs, and by this reason nothing being in potency is in him. Since therefore every nature as much as is of itself is communicable, that aptitude will not be in God except in act: therefore his nature will be communicated to multiple hypostases of the same nature. It must be said therefore, that to beget belongs diversely to diverse things: but a certain one thing is in all generations. For certain ones beget by the fact that they induce their species in the matter of a body which is outside themselves, just as simple homogeneous

bodies, as fire: for by the fact that they are homogeneous in the whole and in parts, there is nothing in them which does not stand in act under form

of the species: and therefore there is nothing in potentiality in themselves: and therefore it is necessary that they generate their species in foreign matter. However, there are some which generate by the separation of a part from their own matter, which is in potentiality under the form of the species, such as certain complex and mixed things, like vegetables and sensibles, like man. However, some multiply their forms by their presence in foreign matter, like luminous things. In all these generations, what is common is the communication of essence or form: and this happens because every form, as far as it is of itself, is communicable, and especially substantial: hence if it is not communicated, this happens from that in which it is: and this can be in three ways. One and properly: because whatever is receptive of that form has the whole within itself, as is in the species of the sun or moon. In another way: because that in which it is, is not divisible, so that it separates from itself a part in which its form is in potentiality, as is in the Angel in which that which is, is indivisible not having a part which is potentially an Angel, and a part which is actually under the form of an Angel. Thirdly: because it is not generative of itself through potentiality in another, like light, because it is not a form that changes and acts in this way. However, in divine things, essence indeed is communicable, like every essence, but not divisible: because divisibility is of imperfection, and that created essence is divided in those in which it is communicated, is of its imperfection, namely that it is not altogether simple: for if it were so simple in being, as it is simple in the notion of essence, the singulars to which it is communicated would be one in being as in notion; but the divine essence is altogether and perfectly simple and communicable: therefore it will be communicated according to being simple, unless something else impedes: however, it cannot be impeded by what is or who is, since it is indifferent from essence: therefore it will be communicated by itself: and since the act of communication of essence is only generation, there will be generation in divine things.

Hence it must be said to the first, that generation is not only for this that it perpetuates in succession what cannot remain in itself, but only for this reason is it in those essences which cannot in whole complete that which is or the suppositum in which they are: for if they completed in whole, they would not be in potentiality to another form: however, such is not the divine essence: and therefore in divine things there is not generation for this reason.

To the other it must be said, that the divine essence cannot be multiplied, so that it is divided, or given to an extraneous nature: but it can be communicated to supposits of the same nature which are the same in it by essence and being.

To the other it must be said, that that which is generable is corruptible, which through generation goes from potentiality to act, because its being precedes non-being: but that which is generated not generable which is coeternal and coexistent with the generator, is not of this kind: and therefore it is not necessary that it is corruptible.

To the objection it must be said, that that proposition is false, if it is taken generally: but nevertheless it is true in those which through generation go from non-being to being, because

in those the recipient of the form is different from the form itself by the substance of matter, and from the generator itself: but it is not necessary that every generation is of this kind, as is clear from the aforesaid.

To what is objected against the response, namely that the Father gives the whole substance to the Son, etc., it must be said that he does not give him the person: for the person is what consists in its own property: however, the property according to its notion is, because it belongs to one and not to another: but whatever is of itself or absolute, he gives it all to him. And if it is objected, that the person is substance: therefore he gives the person to him. It falls into the fallacy of accident: because although the person is substance, nevertheless many things are attributed to substance which are not attributed to the person and nothing is attributed to the person which is not attributed to substance: as distinction belongs to the person, and not to substance: and to be communicated through generation, and such things, belong to substance which do not belong to the person: for the person is what is distinguished, and therefore is not communicated through generation.

To what is further asked, Why is it attributed to the Son to generate? It must be said that it is because of the communicability of essence whose communicability is not impeded by what is, because it is indifferent from it: these are not the causes which in objecting are placed as causes.

Articulus 4 — Whether To Beget Befits The Heavenly Father Primarily, And Inferiors Secondarily, Or Conversely

Whether to generate belongs primarily to the heavenly Father, and secondarily to the lower beings, or vice versa?

Then it is asked, whether to generate belongs primarily to the heavenly Father, and secondarily to the lower beings, or conversely? And it seems that it belongs primarily to the heavenly Father:

1. The Apostle says, to the Ephesians iii, 14 and following: For this cause I bow my knees to the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, from whom all paternity in heaven and on earth is named: therefore it seems that the name of paternity descends from Him.
2. Likewise, Dionysius in the book On the Divine Names: All divine paternity and filiation is given both to us and to the supercelestial powers from the patriarchy separated from all, and the filiation from which both gods and sons of gods and fathers of gods become and are named minds: therefore it seems that the name of paternity descends to us and to the Angels in spiritual paternity: therefore much more in natural paternity which is proper: therefore generation belongs primarily to God.
3. Likewise, Damascene says: And this must be known, that the name of paternity and filiation and procession is not transferred from us to the blessed divinity: but on the contrary, it is handed down to us from there.

4. The same, this same thing seems by reason: for it most truly belongs to generate, to whom it most truly belongs to communicate essence: but he most truly communicates who communicates the same indivisibly: but this is done only by the heavenly Father: therefore it most truly belongs to Him to generate.

5. Likewise, Generation is in similar nature and form: but nothing generated is so similar in nature to the generator as the Son according to eternal generation: therefore nothing is so truly generated as He: therefore it belongs to none so properly as to God.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Generation implies change in itself which does not belong to God: therefore according to the perfect notion of generation it does not belong to God to generate.

1. Likewise, Generation seems of itself to be of an imperfect being which is in potentiality: but such a being does not belong to God: therefore it does not belong to God to generate perfectly: therefore it belongs to Him secondarily.

Solution. It must be said that to generate, like other names and verbs, is taken in two ways, namely according to the usual notion in the name, and thus all things belong primarily to creatures, and secondarily to the divine: they can also be taken according to the nature of the thing itself, and thus generation and paternity belong primarily to God, rather than to man or other creature.

To the first objection, it must be said that it is not true that generation implies change in itself, but rather accidentally, namely insofar as it is in a nature which is in potentiality and divisible: but without change it is in a nature which remains indivisible and is communicated to multiple hypostases without its own change.

To the other, it must be said that generation is not of an imperfect being except accidentally as of a subject. In corruptible things, however, an imperfect being which is matter is subject to generation: but this happens to generation according to its nature: but in another nature there is generation which is the notion of the generator, according to which it demonstrates a son having the same nature and essence with the generator, as was said above.

Articulus 5 — Whether God Begot God Himself, Or Another God

Whether God begot God Himself, or another God?

Consequently, it is inquired about the argumentation which the Master places here, namely, if God begot God: therefore, did He beget Himself as God, or another God, etc.

However, it seems that He begot another God: 1. For since this term, God, is the name of one having deity, it can be drawn to supposing for a person through the term denoting distinction: but "another" denotes distinction, since it is a relative of masculine diversity: therefore, "God," when it is said, "begot another God," stands for a person: but this is true,

God begot another person from Himself: therefore, this will also be true, He begot another God, which the Master denies in the Text.

1. Furthermore, it seems that "God" on the part of the supposit does not suppose for a person: for God according to Himself signifies only essence: but the predicate or verb does not restrict the supposit except only by reason of the time signified, namely, that it stands for present things if the verb is of the present tense: therefore, this verb, "begot," since it is a predicate, does not extract God from the supposit of substance to stand for a person: and therefore this is not true, God begot God, as it seems, which the Master nevertheless concedes in the Text.
2. Furthermore, it is inquired about the solution of some, who say that "another" on the part of the supposit can make an appositive construction with this name, God, and thus it is true: or intransitive, and thus it is false. For this seems to be nothing: because appositive construction is between the more common and the less common: but "another" is not such with respect to this name, God.
3. Furthermore, since "another" is signified in the masculine gender, it seems not to be substantivized, and thus remains an adjective, and it places otherness around the thing signified in this name, God: therefore, it will place diversity for the sake of form: therefore, the expression is simply false: since in form the generator and the begotten are the same.
4. Likewise, an adjective draws number from the substantive, but it is not fittingly said, God begot another God, or other Gods, or other God, or another God: therefore, since "another" follows the connoted number or gender of this name, God, it will be its adjective placing its otherness around itself for the sake of form, and thus the expression is false: therefore, it will be simply false.
5. But on the contrary: Otherness can be noted with respect to the supposit: for Socrates is another man from Plato: therefore, it seems that this is at least distinguishable, He begot another God.
6. Furthermore, it seems to follow the other. Himself as God, or another God: for the same and different divide being as being: therefore, it seems that they follow any being: therefore, when it is said, God begot God, it seems that either the same or another.
7. Likewise, of contradictories, one must be verified of anything. If therefore God begot God: either He begot Himself, or He begot not Himself. If Himself, then the same in person is the generator and the begotten. If not Himself, then He begot God: therefore, He begot another God, which the Master denies.

Solution. This is customarily solved in three ways by the Masters. Some say that "another" on the part of the predicate can be substantive or adjective. If it is an adjective, then they say this is false, He begot another God: because then "another" places diversity with respect to the form of this name, God: because adjectives place the form which they signify around their substantives. But if it is substantive, they say it is true thus, He begot another who is God.

Others say that it can make an appositive construction, or adjective: if appositive, it is true: if adjective, it is false. The third opinion is the Master's in the text: and we follow that, saying that neither does it follow, therefore Himself as God: nor does it follow, therefore another God, because of the reason assigned above.

Therefore, it must be said to the first, that although "another" is relative, it does not by itself denote personal distinction: and this is clear: because it is fitting to essence and person: for essence is other than created essence, and person is other than another person: and therefore it is not by itself notional, like generating, and the like. Hence, it cannot compel a substantial term to stand for a person: indeed, since it denotes otherness, and every otherness which is simply otherness, is for the sake of form, it will regard this term, God, for the sake of form: and thus the expression is false.

To the other, it must be said that there are certain acts fitting to one alone in the supposits of some nature: and when a common term in that nature supposes for words signifying such an act, it is understood that it supposes for the sake of the supposit to which that act is fitting: as when it is said, "Jove thunders, flashes," among the Gentiles it is understood as Jupiter: and such an act is generating which is fitting to the Father alone: and therefore God calls the Father, when it is said, God begot God: and it is not restricted by the verb itself, but rather calls this supposit to which that act is fitting alone.

To what is objected about the solution, it must be said that some have said thus, although it is improbable: nevertheless, to the argument against, they solved that although "another" does not have itself in the reason of the common to "God," nevertheless it can denote distinction in the person, to which person it is fitting to be God: and thus it is constructed appositively or quasi-appositively.

To what is objected about another solution, it must be said that if "another" is substantivized, then the participle "being" is understood, so that the sense is, He begot another being God: and thus "another" does not necessarily draw number and gender from the substantive: for it is fittingly said, He begot another being God, although it is falsely said.

To the other, it must be said that the same and different divide created being: and the same is said from which it does not differ by difference, but different is different in essence: hence these do not divide uncreated being which is distinct according to supposit, but indistinct according to essence.

To the other, it must be said that these are not contradictory, He begot Himself, He begot not Himself: but He did not beget Himself, and this is true: but from that it does not follow: therefore, He begot another: because that which is said, He did not beget Himself, is true: but it cannot be inferred: therefore, He begot not Himself: because those are not equivalent, as is clear from the aforesaid.

Articulus 6 — How Those Terms Supposit When It Is Said, God From God, Light From Light, Light From Light

How do those terms suppose, when it is said, God from God, light from light, light from light?

Consequently, it is asked about what is said in the symbol: God from God, light from light, etc.

1. For it seems that when it is said, God from God, the term "God" should not be restricted to stand for a person: for prepositions do not restrict the terms to which they are joined: therefore, since "God" is a substantival term, it will stand for substance: but substance is not from substance: therefore the expression is false, as it seems.
2. Furthermore, a preposition denotes distinction, as some say, and because of this it compels the term to which it is joined to stand for a person: therefore it also seems that when it is said, God is distinguished from God, the expression is true, which is false.
3. Furthermore, prepositions imply relation: therefore it seems that we can say, God is related to God, which again is false.
4. Furthermore, it is asked about this, light from light: for this seems only to signify essence, because light is not of properties, but of essential commonalities. Therefore, just as this is false, essence from essence: so also this would be false, light from light.
5. Furthermore, those things which receive distinction are not predicated of all in the highest singularity; but when it is said, God from God, light from light, each receives distinction through the notional preposition: therefore they are not predicated of all in the highest singularity: therefore the Father and the Son are not one God, nor one light.

Solution: It must be said that the preposition is notional, and it has this from the fact that it denotes essential origin: and therefore the preposition joined with this term, God, draws it to suppose for the one having deity, and this in divine things is a person, whence it renders the expression true for a person.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that in truth in such expressions the term "God" is not restricted, nor is it necessary, because although it of itself supposes for essence in a person, nevertheless it renders the expression true according to the requirement of those things to which it is joined, just as when it is said, man runs, with only Socrates running: although the term "man" equally supposes for both those running and those not running, nevertheless it renders the expression true only for Socrates, and this suffices for the truth of that expression, and this is called "appellation" among sophists. Similarly, this term, God, as far as it is of itself supposes for any divine supposit: yet because of the adjunct on the part of the antecedent it appellates the Son, and on the part of the consequent it appellates the Father.

To the other, it must be said that distinction is imported differently when it is signified in its proper signification, and differently when it is signified in the notion of a special or certain distinction, just as generating signifies a certain distinction, but not simply: and similarly the notional preposition signifies a certain distinction, because of origin, whence more is imported by notional words and notional prepositions than distinction: because although they say by their virtue distinction in the supposit, nevertheless also with this they say agreement in essence: because the begotten and the begetter communicate in one essence. Similarly, that which is from something as from origin communicates in one essence: but these words, dis-

tinguished, and separated, only import disagreement, and they denote that to be placed around the thing of the term to which they are joined: and since God is not distinguished from God thus, because the Father and the Son are one God, this is not received. God is distinguished from God.

To the other, it must be said that this is not true, God is related to God: for although the preposition is relative, nevertheless it has another mode of signifying: but when it is said, is related, the relation signified in the verb seeks its proper notion of relation to be signified by those things which are said to be related. But that proper relation is not signified in this term, God, but in this term, Father and Son: and therefore this is true, the Father is related to God.

To the other, it must be said that this term, light, signifies light in the one having it, and thus it imports concretion: because of which it stands for the one having deity, and this is the supposit or person: and therefore it is fittingly said, Light from light. And if it is objected, that according to this it should not be, Light from light, because light signifies in an abstract mode, it must be said: This is found, Light from light, in a certain antiphon on Epiphany: but it has less propriety than this, Light from light, nevertheless light although it signifies in a mode of abstraction from the subject, it does not signify in a mode of abstraction from act: and since acts are of supposits, it is properly placed by the Saints for a person sometimes: but nevertheless such expressions must be glossed, and not extended.

To the last, it must be said that although God generates God, and God is generated by God, nevertheless God is not distinguished from God, as was said above: and therefore it must be said that through the notional act distinction is not posited except in the supposit of this name God, and unity remains in form or quasi-form: and therefore when it is proved, it stands for the sake of form: and therefore it is proved singularly of all in the highest. And what is said, that those things which receive distinction, etc., must be understood that those things which receive for the sake of their quasi-form, as Father, and person, and such: because in these the quasi-form is property, and another is the property of the Father and the Son, just as another is the supposit and another person is the Father, and another the Son.

Articulus 7

Whether this is to be conceded, God begot God who is Father, or God the Father.

But still the talkative ones oppose, etc. In this part, the Master touches upon a further reasoning of the sophists objecting against divine generation. And this part is divided into three parts. In the first, he presents the sophistic reasoning and solves it. Because in the solution he had said that the Father and the Son are one God, and conversely: therefore, in the following chapter C, it is asked whether this name, God, or another essential name, can equally supposit and apposit with respect to the three persons, there, C, Some however of the truth adversaries, etc. made a digression, with the solution of the sophistic argumentation added, therefore in the third he returns to the proposed, there, D, Now to the aforementioned question, etc.

In the prior chapter, therefore, the Master presents this reasoning: God begot God: either therefore God who is God the Father, or God who is not God the Father. If God who is not God the Father: therefore God is who is not God the Father, and God is who is Father: therefore there are multiple gods, which is false. But if God who is God the Father: therefore he begot God who is himself the Father: therefore the same in person is generating and generated, which is heresy.

And the Master solves it by introducing two reasons which can be elicited from these. For when it is said, God begot God, they can infer: therefore God who is himself the Father, or God who is not himself the Father. And the Master presents these two propositions, which show one sense of these: either God who is not God the Father, or God who is God the Father: and he says the negative is true, and the affirmative is false. He presents two others such that the sense is: God who is God the Father, that is, the Son who is God, who God is Father. He says this is true, and the negative is false, namely, God who is not God the Father, that is, the Son who is not God, who God is Father: because the Father and the Son are one and the same God.

And for the understanding of this expression, it must be distinguished in the construction of these two terms, God, Father, both in the affirmative and in the negative. For if when it is said, God begot God who is God the Father, both terms are constructed as if by apposition on the same side whether before the "who is," or after by understanding, then the affirmative will be false, and the negative true: because then the sense is: he begot God who is God the Father, that is, himself the Father. For the term God, which notes the term of the act imported by the verb, begot, because of the notional act passing over itself, supposes for the Son when therefore the begot is a name having a subjunctive article, and makes the second knowledge of supposits, it refers this term, God, by the grace of the supposit, just as it supposed when it preceded: and thus the sense is, that God generating and God generated in supposit are the same whether in person, which is false: therefore its negative will be true under the same sense. But if the terms are not constructed as if on the same side, but rather one is understood to be another: not apposed, but as if joined by a middle composition, then God will stand for the essence. and if Father then supposes to be composed under understanding between them, the sense will be, the Father begot God the Son who is not Father being God: and this is true, and the Master presents this, and the affirmative is false. But if God supposes, and Father apposes, the sense will be, he begot God the Son, who the Son is not God being, or who is Father: and this is false, and the affirmative responding to it in the same sense is true; and this is the intention of the Master's solution.

However, there were some ancients saying otherwise, because they said that in affirmatives the articulate name, who, refers the antecedent differently than in negatives. For in affirmatives they said, it refers by the grace of the person, as it finds the proper notional act to which it is joined, or the matter of the act over which it is: and therefore they said, that this is false, God begot God who is God the Father. But in negatives the who is not referred thus, but by the grace of the supposit, and by the grace of the essence: and therefore they also said this is false, he begot God who is not God the Father: and this happens not so much from the force

of the name which it has in affirmatives and negatives, but also from the negation which regards the terms following formally: and therefore although the who refers by the grace of the supposit, yet the negation denies from this supposit both the form and the supposit: and therefore the expression is false: and this was the solution of Prepositivus and the reasoning. Others say, that even if in the negative these two terms, God, Father, are constructed immediately as if by apposition, then the negative expression is true: whence they concede this, he begot God who is not God the Father, just as this, he begot God who is not himself the Father: and they do this because of the article of this name who, which determines and refers the God by the grace of the supposit, and not by the grace of the form, as has been said.

But it will be said, that the affirmative is to be conceded, namely this, he begot God who is Father or God the Father: because

1. Anselm says, that he begot the same from the same itself.
2. Likewise, Augustine - God begot another self from himself.
3. Likewise, Augustine in book XV on the Trinity; Saying himself, the Father begot the Son: for he would not have said himself entirely perfectly, but either more or less would be in the word than in himself.
4. Likewise, Origen: The Father sending the Son, sent another self.

From the second authority it must be said, that if the self which is on the part after in the expression, is of the ablative case, then the expression is plainly true: because then the sense is, from himself he begot another self, that is, another from himself. But if it is of the accusative case, then another self, has the force of one term, and not of two: and then the self has as it were one part of the signification, and another the other part: so that another touches the disjunction in person, and the self the agreement in essence. However, some gloss another self, that is, most similar to himself: so that the self makes as it were a simple relation. Just as also sometimes it is simple of similar nature and not the same in number, upon which the nod of demonstration falls, as when it is said: This herb grows in my garden.

From the first which says, that he begot the same from the same itself, it is not to be understood with precision, but adding the same in essence from the same itself in essence.

To the third it must be said, that saying is not taken there for the act of generation simply: but saying is there manifesting in the similar: whence the sense is, the Father saying himself, that is, manifesting himself, begot the Son: for he would not have perfectly manifested himself, etc.: for this is well conceded, the Father manifests himself in the Son.

To the last it must be said in the same way as to the second: because another self is the same as another similar to himself in essence.

Expositio Textus

Exposition of the Text

Certain adversaries of the truth, etc.

In this chapter, which is introduced incidentally, he refutes certain ones who were saying that names signifying essence ought to be placed only in the predicate, and personal names should be subjected to them, and not conversely according to the order of correct predication in divine matters: and they were the Porretans, namely Gilbert and his followers. And here the Master introduces many authorities of Augustine, in which essence is subjected, and person is predicated. And this is the sentence of the chapter.

Articulus 8 — Whether A Proposition Can Be Formed About God

Whether a proposition can be formed about God?

Here, however, a twofold doubt arises.
One is, whether a proposition can be formed about God?
The second, if it can be formed in some way, whether the essence ought to be subjected, or only predicated, or whether both can rightly be done in divine matters?

Concerning the first, it is objected thus:
1. The most simple does not have composition: therefore, if it is signified as composite, it is signified falsely: but every composition signifies as composite.

therefore a proposition having composition cannot be formed concerning God: but every proposition has composition: therefore no proposition is true concerning God if it is affirmative.

§ 2. Item, Dionysius says that affirmations in divine matters are false, and negative ones are all true; therefore it seems that all affirmative propositions concerning God are false.

§ 3. If perhaps it is said that composition is in God according to the mode of signifying on account of the infirmity of our intellect. On the contrary: The intellect does not cure its infirmity through an error: but when it composes something in divine matters, it errs: therefore by such propositions its infirmity is not cured: therefore it ought not to use them.

§ 4. Item, vain is the understanding which in no way can be attributed to a thing: therefore it seems that the understanding of such propositions is vain.

Solution. As Augustine says: God has admitted the service of the human voice, of whom nevertheless nothing can be said worthily. Hence, just as when speaking of God in temporal terms, we use words of any tense; so when speaking of the most simple God, we use the mode of composition and the mode of division in our expressions: but when in such matters the mark of composition which is signified in the verb is occurs, it signifies identity according to the thing, and not a mode of inherence, like something inherent per se, or substantially, or accidentally.

It must therefore be said to the first, that although God is most simple, nevertheless He is signified in many ways, as was held above, in the third distinction: and from those a composition can be formed denoting the identity of the thing.

To the next it must be said that Dionysius understands it concerning the affirmative signification of incomplex terms, which do not fully show by the name what belong to God, and he

does not understand it of the affirmation of a composition which is a mark of the identity of the predicate with the subject.

To the next it must be said that our intellect is saved (or, signified) in the thing insofar as God is signified in many ways. Hence it finds in God those things which are many in the concepts of the names, although they are one in the things: and because the concept of the names is true, for He is truly wise, and powerful, and the like: and therefore it is not vain, and it is cured from ignorance, by the fact that it does not refer those compositions to God by way of inherence, but rather by way of identity.

Articulus 9 — Whether In Divine Things Essence Ought To Be Subjected Or Predicated, Or Whether Both Can Rightly Be Done

Whether in divine matters the essence ought to be subjected, or predicated, or whether both can rightly be done?

Secondly it is asked, If names signifying the essence in divine matters can be subject terms? It seems, however, that they cannot.

§ 1. For in divine matters the person is the supposit, and the essence is as it were the form and nature: since therefore in a proposition the predicate behaves in the mode of a form, while the subject behaves in the mode of a supposit, the divine essence ought not to be subjected, but predicated.

§ 2. Item, the subject is that in which a thing is, while the predicate is that which is in it: since however the essence is in the person, and not conversely, it seems again that it ought to be predicated, and not subjected.

§ 3. Item, Boethius in the book De Trinitate says that a simple form cannot become a subject.

§ 4. The same, in the book De Hebdomadibus: That which is can have something besides that very thing which it is, but to be (esse) has nothing admixed to it: but that which is in divine matters by the mode of "that which is", is the person: therefore the person can have something as inherent to it, and thus can be subjected to itself: but the divine essence is simple esse; therefore it can have nothing: therefore it can be subjected to nothing, as it seems.

Articulus 10 — Whether This Is True, One God Is Three Persons, And Three Persons Is One God, God Is Trinity; And Whether The Name Trinity Is An Essential Name

BUT AGAINST: § 1. Whatever are of equal simplicity are of equal order in being subjected and being predicated: the person and the essence are of equal simplicity: therefore they are of equal order in being subjected and being predicated.

§ 2. Furthermore, whatever things are not related to each other as higher and lower, and are not essential and substantial to each other, can equally be subjected to each other, and equally be predicated of each other: the divine essence and the person are thus related: therefore they can equally be subjected to each other, and predicated of each other. The proof of the first is: because higher essential terms are predicated of lower ones according to the

order of nature: but the essence is not higher to the person nor conversely, because otherwise there would be composition in God. The second is proved through the simplicity of the person and the essence.

Solution. It must be said that in truth in divine matters either can be subjected to the other, and predicated of the other, as the Master proves. For although the predicate takes the place of a form in predications which are made through inherence and participation, nevertheless in propositions denoting identity it is otherwise, because there either is the same as the other, and therefore either is subjected to either, and either is predicated of either. Through this therefore the solution to the first two is clear, which correctly conclude concerning a predication which is made by mode of inherence.

To the next it must be said that Boethius understands it of the subject of a thing, not of a mode of predicating, as a surface is subjected to whiteness, or as matter is subjected to form. In the same way also the following authority is understood: because that which is can have something: but in divine matters there is no such thing that can be a subject to anything besides itself. Hence this is understood in those things in which that which is differs from to be or that by which it is.

Whether this is true, One God is three persons, and three persons is one God, God is a Trinity: and whether the name Trinity is an essential name.

Then it is asked concerning this which he says: One God is three persons, etc.

For this seems false: for the term "God" stands either for the person, or for the essence: if for the essence, then this seems to be true: the essence is three persons, the like of which is not found in created things, in which the essence is not a person, nor persons: but if it stands for the person, then a person would be three persons: therefore some person is three persons, which is false.

Alongside this, it is further asked concerning this which he posits, that God is a Trinity: for since that term, "God", is supposed singularly, it seems that it ought to render the locution true for some one thing: therefore it seems that something having deity is the Trinity: therefore the Father, or the Son, or the Holy Spirit, which is false.

Item it is asked concerning this name, Trinity; for this seems to be predicated singularly of one: therefore it is essential.

But AGAINST: § 1. Essential names are predicated of single persons: therefore if the term "Trinity" is essential, this ought to be conceded: The Father is the Trinity, or a person is the Trinity, which is false.

§ 2. Item, according to the reason of understanding, the person is less distant from the supposit of the Trinity than the essence is: but this is not conceded, "a person is the Trinity": therefore much less ought this to be conceded, "the essence is the Trinity."

§ 3. If perhaps it is said that this name,

Articulus 11 — Whether This Article Of Faith Alone Is Sufficient For The Christian

Trinity, is an intrinsic relative and includes within itself relatives and their determinations: and therefore just as those relatives are predicated of a person, so also it itself is predicated of a person and of persons. On the contrary: If an intrinsic relative is explicated, it has relatives related to each other: for when I say, "they are similar," I can explicitly infer, "therefore this one is similar to that one, and that one is similar to this one": but it is not so in this name, "Trinity": therefore it seems that it is not an intrinsic relative.

Solution. It must be said in truth that this is to be conceded: One God is three persons. For since this term "one" is an adjective, it posits the unity signified around the subject of this term, "God", and the term "God" expresses unity of substance, and this is one in three persons: and therefore this is true, One God is three persons, and conversely. And this is likewise true: The essence is three persons, and conversely.

To the next it must be said that likewise this is true, God is a Trinity: and this likewise, one God is a Trinity, for the same reason. For a term in the predicate or in the subject does not restrict a term posited in the other part, but permits it to stand freely for that which renders the locution true: and therefore the term "God" stands for the essence, and not for the person: nor is it similar in created things in which the essence is divided: because in divine matters it is not so, nor is the essence there anything other than the hypostasis.

To the next it must be said that although "Trinity" signifies singularly, nevertheless it includes within itself several supposits: and therefore also the Master will say below that it is a collective name: but because in those supposits the essence is one and the same, therefore it is predicated of essential names and not of one person.

To the next it must be said that in the collection of supposits which the term "Trinity" has in itself, one person is more distant than the essence: because a person is only this or that one, which is not one in number in the collected things insofar as they are collected: but the essence is one in them even insofar as they are collected: and therefore the term "Trinity" is predicated more of the essence than of the person.

To the next [to the objection] it must be said that in truth this name, "Trinity", is a collective name of the persons and an intrinsic relative, yet it does not follow that it can be explicated in this way: and this happens because the relatives which it has in itself are not relatives of equality and equiparance, like similarity, but rather of origin: but such cannot be explicated like others, as is clear when it is said, "They are fathers": "therefore this one is the father of that one, and that one of this one" [does not follow].

Whether this article of faith alone is enough for a Christian?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says It is enough for a Christian, etc.

For there are many other articles which are to be believed: therefore this is not enough.

To this it must be said that Augustine means that in believing or investigating the causes of things, as regards the sufficiency of faith in this article, it is enough, and one need not seek the natural and proximate causes which philosophers inquire into.

Now however, as to the question itself, it can also be said that this is twofold, "He begot another God" (genuit alium Deum), from the fact that the term "another" can be taken adjectivally, and thus it is false: or substantively, and thus it is true, because then the sense is, "He begot another who is God," just as we read in John: I will ask the Father, and He will give you another Paraclete,[55] that is, another who is the Paraclete: because "Paraclete" is a substantial name, and therefore the Father is not another Paraclete than the Son, or the Holy Spirit.

And let these suffice for this distinction.

DISTINCTIO V

Divisio Textus

Articulus 1 — How Essence Is Related To The Generation Of The Son, Whether By Way Of Being Communicable Through Generation And Procession

After this it is asked, Whether it ought to be conceded that the Father begot the divine essence? etc. Here begins that part in which it is inquired whether the divine essence signified abstractly can be the term of generation: and because this question can be formed in a twofold way according to a twofold understanding, therefore it has two parts. For in the first it is asked, Whether the essence generates, or is generated: such that the act of generation belongs to it immediately as to a term? In the second it is inquired, If it does not belong to it as to a term, whether it belongs to it as that from which there is generation by mode of a material principle, and this part begins there, It is also said, and frequently read in Scripture, etc.

In the first of these the Master raises a question having four problems, namely whether the Father begot the essence, or the divine essence begot the Son, or the essence begot the essence, or the essence neither begot nor is begotten? Hence the first of these is divided into two parts, in the first of which he destroys the first problem: but in the second he destroys the second and the third, and constructs the fourth, and it begins there, It is also not to be said that the divine essence, etc.

The former is further divided into two: in the first of which he manifests the truth through reasons. In the second, he objects against it, and solves it, there, However, contrary to this seems to be, etc.

First therefore, to [show] that the Father did not beget the essence, he adduces three reasons: the first of which is, because if the essence were begotten, it would be spoken of relatively, which is not true. The second is, because according to this the Father would have begotten that which He Himself is, which again is not true, and it begins there, Item, since God the Father is the divine essence, etc. The third is, because since God the Father is as it were formally the divine essence, it is as it were the cause for Him to be: therefore if He had

begotten it, He would be by the fact that He begot, and would be God [by the fact that He begot], which is false. And he proves that this process is valid through Augustine, there, Item, if the Father is a begetter, etc.

In the others however the text of this part is manifest.

How the essence relates to the generation of the Son, whether by mode of something communicable through generation and procession?

Before the text, however, a doubt arises here: How does the essence relate to the generation of the Son?

§ 1. For that which is of nobility must be restored to divine generation: but the communicability of the essence is of nobility in every nature: therefore that must be given especially to the divine essence: therefore it relates to generation as something communicable through generation.

§ 2. Item, let us understand in divine matters that there is no generation, nor any procession: it is evident that the divine essence will not be communicated to multiple persons or supposits. But if we understand generation and procession, immediately the communication of the essence follows: therefore generation and procession are the cause of the communication of the essence: because a cause is that which being posited, something else is posited, and which being destroyed, it is destroyed.

§ 3. Item, this is taken from the reason of generation: because generation speaks of a flux of the communication of nature: therefore generation makes that communication, as it seems.

But AGAINST: § 1. Every essence which according to esse is in a hypostasis having it, if the hypostasis itself having it is incommunicable, the essence itself is incommunicable through the same esse which is in that [hypostasis]. The truth of this is evident in singulars. But the divine essence is in the hypostasis of the Father: therefore through the esse which is in the Father, on account of the incommunicability of the hypostasis of the Father, it is made incommunicable: therefore the Father and the Son do not have the same esse of the essence through generation, but only of reason: but this is false: therefore generation does not communicate the essence.

§ 2. Item, in all other things I see this, that if some things are distinguished from each other by nothing, whatever belongs to one according to the thing, belongs also to the other: but the essence and the person are distinguished from each other by nothing: therefore whatever belongs to the essence according to the thing, belongs also to the person. The first is evident through the saying of the Philosopher who says that the same is that from which a difference does not differ. The second is evident through this, that relations do not distinguish the person from the essence, and nothing else distinguishes in divine matters: therefore nothing distinguishes. From this I proceed thus: Whatever really belongs to the essence, belongs to the person: but it really belongs to the essence to be communicated to many: therefore that same

55. John 14:16.

thing belongs to the person: but this is false: therefore it is false that the essence is communicable.

§ 3. Item, in every nature I see that it is determined and individuated through the incommunicability of that in which it is: therefore similarly it will be in the divine nature: but no nature individuated in one, has the same esse of nature with that in another, but the same

from eternity He predestined certain ones who would be good and blessed, that is, He elected them that they might be good and blessed: and He predestined goods for them, that is, prepared them. But providence is of things to be governed: which indeed seems to be taken in the same way as disposition. Sometimes however providence is taken for foreknowledge. But wisdom or knowledge is of all things, namely of goods and evils: and of present, past, and future things: and not only of temporal things, but also of eternal ones. For God does not so know these temporal things that He does not know Himself: but He alone knows Himself perfectly: in comparison with whose knowledge all knowledge of a creature is imperfect.

And since we have discussed above, etc. Here begins that part which is about the cognition of the Trinity and unity, insofar as it is considered in those things which make for the sufficiency of a cause for the procession of creatures from it, which are knowledge, power, and will: for to operate nothing more is required than to know, and to will, and to be able.

It is divided however into three parts according to the three aforesaid things. In the first he treats of knowledge. In the second, of power, which begins in distinction XLII, there, Now concerning omnipotence, etc. In the third, he treats of the will, which begins in distinction XLV, there, Now concerning the will, etc.

The first of these is divided into two parts. In the first he treats of knowledge in general. But in the second he descends to the species of divine knowledge, which are predestination and reprobation: and this begins in distinction XL, there, But predestination is of salutary goods, etc.

But the first which is about knowledge in general, is subdivided into three. In the first knowledge is shown both according to the distinction and property of the names, and as to those things which are in it, as of what it is. In the second however it is shown conversely, how God is in all things made and created by Him: and this begins in distinction XXXVII, there, And since it has been demonstrated in part, etc. In the third however the Master shows the dispositions of knowledge rather than knowledge itself, namely whether it imposes necessity on things, or can be deceived, or increased, and the like? and it begins in distinction XXXVIII, there, Now therefore returning to the proposition, etc.

Further, the first is further divided into two. In the first he shows the intentions of the names, and in general, how it is concerning objects, because it is of all eternal and temporal things. In the second however he shows how it is one thing to be in the knowledge of God, and another to be in nature, and how it is differently of good and evil objects: and this begins in the following distinction XXXVI, there, It is customary to ask here, etc.

But this distinction is divided into three parts. In the first he determines generally of all names by which divine knowledge is accustomed to be signified. In the second however he moves a question which arises from the determination and distinction of the names, namely whether the knowledge of God would be in God, if there had been no future things? there, Here it ought to be considered, Whether knowledge, etc. In the third, he principally shows the objects of knowledge according to a general declaration, there, But knowledge or wisdom not only, etc.

From these the meaning is sufficiently clear: they will become clear in the disputation.

Articulus 2 — Whether Essence Is Begotten By The Father, And Whether In Divine Things There Are Two Things, The Relative And The Non-Relative, Namely Essence And Person

esse of the essence: and this is so because the properties are not posited around the esse of the essence: but they determine nothing to the individual and incommunicability, except that around which they are posited: but in creatures where the essence falls short of simplicity, by the fact that the essence is simple in reason, but not in esse, therefore it is determined and contracted to the esse of this one, and that this esse of this one is not the esse of another.

To the next it must be said that this argument proceeds in lower things, by the fact that in them there is universal and particular: and therefore it is not similar: because in divine matters there is no universal and particular, as will be proved below: but if we posit that the essence of Socrates does not differ from Socrates, then the esse of the essence in Socrates, even without individuating principles, will be the esse of Socrates: and so it is in divine matters: hence the esse of the essence in the Father is the esse of the Father: and because neither the essence nor the esse is determined by the properties, therefore both remain communicable to the Son through the same essence, and the same esse through that essence.

Whether the essence is begotten by the Father, and whether in divine matters there are two things, related and not related, namely the essence and the person?

Then it is asked concerning this which the Master says in the first reason, why the essence is not begotten there by the Father, there, If the Father were said to have begotten the divine essence, etc.

But against: § 1. According to this in divine matters there is a related thing, and an unrelated thing: but a related thing and an unrelated thing are two things: therefore the essence and the person are two things.

§ 2. Item, a person is a distinct thing, and the essence is a non-distinct thing: therefore they cannot be the same things: therefore the essence and the person are two.

§ 3. Item, on account of the opposition of relation one person is not another person: since therefore the opposition of affirmation and negation is greater on account of the opposition of contradiction, when it is said, "the person is a distinct thing, the essence a non-distinct thing," the essence ought not to be the person.

§ 4. Furthermore, notable are the sophisms of Praepositinus, who objects thus: The essence is the Father, and the Father is the essence: but the Father is the Father of the Son: therefore the essence is the Father of the Son.

§ 5. Item, this is simply true, The essence is the Son of the Father, because between the Son of the Father and the essence the distinction of relation does not fall: but whatever is the Son of the Father is begotten by the Father: therefore the essence is begotten by the Father, which is false: therefore the essence is not the Son of the Father, which again is false, because the essence is the Son, and is not the Son except of the Father, therefore the essence is the Son of the Father.

§ 6. Item, the essence is one [and the same] as he who is begotten: but he who is begotten is the Son; therefore the essence is the Son.

§ 7. Item, the essence is a begotten thing: but a begotten thing is begotten: therefore the essence is begotten, which the Master denies in the text.

§ 8. Item, the essence is the term of generation. Proof. The essence is that which is begotten, or he who is begotten by the Father: and this is the term of generation: therefore the essence is the term of generation: but the term of generation is from the Father: therefore the essence is from the Father, which the Author denies in the text in the third reason. And because it is easy to adduce many such things, let these suffice.

Solution. It must be said to the first and the second, that it does not follow, "A person is related, or distinct: and the essence is not related, nor distinct: therefore they are two things." For it ought to add: "and this thing is not that one": and thus it would follow that they are two things: and therefore it proceeds from insufficiency.

To the next it must be said that the opposition of affirmation and negation is greater

Articulus 3 — Whether In Divine Things Essence Is Prior To Generation, Or Subsequent, Or Concomitant According To The Intellect

than of relation: but when the modes of those oppositions are signified concerning the same thing, then opposite respects, namely of relatives, do not permit those to be the same in which those respects are signified: but nothing prohibits diverse things from being affirmed and denied of the same thing according to the thing, from the fact that it is taken in a diverse reason of signifying: but modes of contradiction are only signified, when it is said, "a distinct thing," and "a non-distinct thing": which is evident, because the propositions are not contradictory, but the modes of contradiction are signified in the predicate. Otherwise it can also be said, that contradiction is not noted concerning the same thing taken in the same way: for when he says, "the essence is a non-distinct thing," the word "thing" is held essentially: but when he says, "the person is a distinct thing," the word "thing" is held personally: and therefore because it is not taken as the same, there is no opposition of contradiction.

To the next it must be said that this is true, The essence is the Father: and this is true, The Father is the Father of the Son: but when he infers, therefore the essence is the Father of the Son, that

conclusion is twofold, and in one sense it follows, in another it does not. For if the term "Father" is an adjective, that is, if it expresses the form of the predicate predicated of the essence, the locution is false: because thus it would posit its reality around the essence, and the essence would be noted to beget. But if it is the subject, the locution is true, and it follows from the premises: and then it does not follow that the essence is generating.

To the next it must be said that this is twofold by the same twofoldness, The essence is the Son of the Father, namely from the fact that the term "Son" can be taken adjectivally, and thus it is false: or substantively, and thus it is true: and in the first sense a distinction would fall between the Father and the essence, and not in the second sense. But in the first sense it follows that it is begotten by the Father, and not in the second.

To the next it must be said that this is twofold: The essence is a begotten thing: from the fact that the term "thing" can be taken for the person, and thus it is true: or for the essence, and thus it is false. For it can be taken in either way, as is clear from the preceding, and in one sense an inconvenience follows, as is evident per se.

To the next it must be said that there is the fallacy of accident in the process: for although he who is begotten is the term of generation, nevertheless the essence is not the term: because not whatever belongs to one, belongs also to the other, even though they are the same in reality.

Whether in divine matters the essence is preceding generation, or consequent to it, or accompanying it through the intellect?

Whether in divine matters the essence is preceding generation, or consequent to it, or accompanying it through the intellect?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says: Since God the Father is the divine essence, etc.

§ 1. The essence in divine matters is either preceding generation according to the intellect, or consequent, or accompanying, and I say this according as it is in the Son? Not preceding. Proof. Nothing received through another is preceding that through which it is received according to the intellect: the divine essence received by the Son is through generation: therefore it does not precede generation according to the intellect. The first is evident per se. The second is written below, where it is said that the Son has nothing except what He receives through generation.

§ 2. In the same way it is evident that it is not accompanying, that is, concurrent with generation, or running simultaneously, just as the accompanying will is said to concur with the work, as is had through the following distinction according to the intellect of generation itself: therefore it seems that it is consequent: but concerning every consequent to generation I can say that it is begotten per se or consequently: therefore the divine essence is begotten either per se or consequently, which is false.

§ 3. Item, in lower things I see that this one begets this one, and consequently this one begets a man, and per accidens this one begets a son: can I thus say in divine generation that this one begets this one, and consequently God, and per accidens the Son? It seems that I can:

because the essence is consequent to generation, as has been proved: therefore it is begotten consequently. Similarly Augustine says that the Son is, because He is born: therefore nativity is the cause why He is the Son in some way.

§ 4. Item, the received and the unreceived are not the same: but the essence in the Son is received, while in the Father it is unreceived: therefore it seems that the essence in the Father and in the Son is not the same.

Solution. It must be said that the essence does not relate to generation as preceding, nor as accompanying, nor as consequent, but as the same as the begetter and the begotten.

TO THE OBJECTION however it must be said that that which is received through generation, so that its inductor into esse is the act of generation either per se or consequently or accidentally, that relates to generation as a consequent: but thus the essence is not in the Son.

To that however which is objected, that the Son has nothing except what He has received through generation. It must be said that this is true, but nevertheless He did not receive it as consequent to the act of generation, but rather as it is the same as the begetter, who nevertheless is from Him. And through this the solution to the second is evident.

To the next it must be said that this cannot be said in divine generation: for the essence is not consequent to the begotten, but the same as Him: nor yet is it begotten as the same, nor is it begotten in Him: and this is because it is the same to which another attribute belongs on account of the mode of signifying another thing which is in reality the essence and the persons: for it belongs to the essence in no way to be begotten: but it belongs to the person to beget, or to be begotten, or to proceed. And similarly also it must not be said that the Son is begotten per accidens: because the Son by the same property is this one, by which He is the Son, although considered in another way: because by that property insofar as it is a property, He is this one or someone: but in that property by which He is relative to another, by the same property He is the Son: and therefore He is not this one or someone per se through generation, and the Son per accidens: but the same, and from the same property considered differently, as

Articulus 4 — Whether In Divine Things It Can Be Said That The Father Is The Cause Of The Son

will be clear below, where it will be asked, in what reason the Father begets the Son?

To the last it must be said that the received and the unreceived can be the same, but not considered in the same way: because the essence in the Father is not received, and in the Son it is received.

Whether in divine matters it can be said that the Father is the cause of the Son?

Whether in divine matters it can be said that the Father is the cause of the Son?

Next, it is inquired concerning what is said in the third reasoning: But to the begetter, the begotten is a cause, etc.

For cause is not in divine matters: for Chrysostom says upon John, that it is not to be said that the Father is the cause of the Son.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
1. In the Gloss upon the Epistle to the Hebrews, Chrysostom says that the Father is the cause of the Son.

1. Furthermore, why is this received, the Father is the principle of the Son, and not this, the Father is the cause of the Son?
2. Likewise, in the Letter it is intended that the Father is essence, and wisdom is wise, as if essence and wisdom formally relate to the Father: which Porretanus said, which was reprehended, because thus composition is noted in God.

Solution. It must be said to the first, that he is not simply a cause, but as it were a cause.

To the other, it must be said that cause posits that which as it were follows another by necessity, and with effect, especially the efficient cause posits diversity of substance and essence: because the same cannot be effect and efficient: but not so the principle: for it says that which is in reality, and yet originating it inasmuch as before it nothing is, and others are from it.

To the other, it must be said that in such matters only the formal cause is noted in name, and not in reality. Porretanus, however, posited it in the reality itself.

Divisio Textus

However, this seems contrary, etc. This is the part in which an objection is made against what was previously determined, and it resolves, and the text is plain.

Divisio Textus

Thus also it is not to be said, etc. Here begins the part which is about the other two parts of the problem, which parts the Master here intends to destroy. And it is divided into two parts. In the first, the Master shows that the divine essence neither begot the Son, nor was begotten by itself. In the second part, however, the Master objects to the contrary through authorities, there, F,

However, the aforementioned seems to be contrary, etc.

In the first, there are two parts according to two problems which he pursues. In the first, he determines that the divine essence did not beget the Son. In the second, however, that the divine essence did not beget itself, there, in the middle of chapter E, Thus also we say that the divine essence did not beget, etc.

Articulus 5 — Whether, If The Son Were Begotten By The Divine Essence, The Son Would Be Some Thing By Which He Would Be Begotten

Whether if the Son were begotten from the divine essence, the Son would be some thing from which he is generated?

A doubt arises concerning the reasoning which the Master presents for the first problem, saying that if the Son were begotten from the divine essence, then the Son would already be a thing from which he is generated. For this seems inconvenient there. Proof: The Son is the essence, and the essence is the Father: therefore the Son is a thing which is the Father: and from the Father is the Son: therefore the Son is a thing from which he himself is the Son.

Solution. The first is simply false, as the Master says, namely, the Son is a thing from which he is generated. And when it is said, the Son is the essence, this is true: and similarly that, the Essence is the Father: but when it is further inferred: therefore the Son is a thing which is the Father, there is a double expression from the equivocation of this term, "thing": because if essential, it is true: if personal, it is false: and in this sense the conclusion follows, therefore the Son is a thing from which he himself is.

Divisio Textus

However, the aforementioned seems contrary, etc. Here it is objected to the contrary: and it has four parts. In the first, he objects and resolves through the words of Augustine. In the second, however, he proves the solution, namely, That. In the third, however, thus to be understood, etc., he objects through the words of Hilary, which have a special difficulty, there, G, However here. In the fourth, he resolves the contrary, etc., through the words of the same, there, H, But because these words he wishes to understand soundly, etc.

Articulus 6 — In Which Names By Which The Divine Persons Are Named There Is Greater Propriety, And In Which Less

In which names by which the divine persons are named, is there greater property, and in which lesser?

A doubt arises here first concerning what is said: "Support from wisdom," etc.

For it is asked in which names there is greater property, and in which lesser?

Furthermore, the Master said above in the first reasoning he brought to the first problem, that if the Father had begotten the divine essence, the divine essence would be said relatively to the Father. Therefore, it is asked if in these in any way it is said that they are said relatively: and if in any way this should be conceded?

1. Likewise, it does not seem that anything inconvenient follows from what the Master says: for God begot God: and yet God is not said relatively: therefore it seems similarly that wisdom begot wisdom, and essence essence: and yet it is not said relatively.

2. Likewise, God begot God: and yet the begetter and the begotten are one and the same God, as was held in the preceding distinction: therefore it seems that if also essence begot essence, and wisdom wisdom, it would not follow because of this that there would be two wisdoms, or two essences.
3. Likewise, what the Master says about the cause does not seem to impede: because by deity God the Father is God: and yet we have this from Augustine, that deity is born.
4. Likewise, when it is said, God begot God, it is not said because of this that he who begot, and is, and is God, although he is the same God with him whom he begot: therefore by similarity this inconvenience would not follow here, that if essence were begotten, that God who begot, and was, and was God.

Solution. It must be said that there is greater and lesser property in such terms, insofar as they are more and less removed from supposits which are per se signified by their properties: whence this is most proper, "The Father begot the Son." However, this is less proper, "God begot God": yet because "God" says having deity, it includes in itself the supposit according to that mode of signifying by which it stands under nature, and therefore it has in itself what is distinguished in generation, and also what is the same in the begetter and the begotten: and therefore this is admitted in the usage of speakers. However, if in similar cases it were extended thus, "The wise begot the wise, and the powerful the powerful," etc., all would be received under the same mode: although divine nature is signified differently in those and under this name "God," because all such names say nature in the supposit which receives distinction in generation: but if names are taken signified in an abstract mode, like essence, wisdom, etc., it must be understood that there is a double abstraction, namely from the subject, and from the act: for from the subject all equally say abstraction, but not from the act: for wisdom is to a special act, and justice, and suchlike, but not essence: because acts are of particular composites and supposits, therefore such names saying order to act, consequently say relation to the supposit: and therefore because of this order these have less property, "Wisdom from wisdom, power from power," than these, "Substance from substance, essence from essence." However, in those which name substance there is also order: because the simplest according to the reason of understanding is essence: substance, however, less, because the name is imposed from the act of standing under: similarly existence from the act of going out from others, or from another.

Some say that names which say in the divine what follows nature, like good, wise, etc., name a certain influence over created things: and since only a perfect supposit influences, because it is fitting for only the perfect to act, they say that such names are fitting to the causing cause: and therefore they have a certain concretion to the supposit. But this is nothing: because granted that it never influences, still most truly it is wise, and good, and all suchlike: however, their reasoning is founded upon the authority previously held, where Augustine said in the book "On Faith to Peter": "God the Father who most truly wished and was able to indicate himself to knowing minds, begot this to indicate himself, which was he who begot." But this is not the understanding of the authority: because according to this the knowledge of the creature would be the cause of the generation of the Son, which is false: but in that

authority the term which is consequent is noted: for in itself it is wise by formal wisdom, and consequently it influences in us: yet if it did not influence, still it would be wise.

To what is further asked, it must be said that to be said relatively in the divine is said in four ways: for to be said relatively principally, is to be relative and according to its being to be referred to another, as Father and Son are said. In the second way it is said to be said relatively, to say the relation by which the relatives themselves are said to another, as paternity, filiation, and suchlike are said relatively. In the third way it is said to be said relatively, which says the property found in the relative from this that it is relative: as innascibility is relative, because it is found in the relative from this that it is so relative that it is the principle of the whole divinity: from this it is necessary that the Father is not from another. In the fourth way something is said to be said relatively, because it according to the reason of understanding causes relation: as to generate, and to be generated, and to proceed, and procession, and suchlike are said relatively: because from this that it generates, according to the reason of understanding it is the Father, from this that it is generated it is the Son: as however it is easy to see, generation is not relation according to its signification, nor even to generate, and suchlike. And in these four ways relations are signified in the divine with the greatest property: because in all these ways they are distinguishable: and in this last way also relations are signified in prepositions noting the habit of origin, as when it is said, "God from God."

In three other ways it is said to be said relatively less properly, of which one is, to be placed for the relative with an accommodated signification, although it says the substance itself, and thus personal relatives are among the Latins, and hypostasis among the Greeks, and they only suppose the relative: and therefore they are predicated plurally of the persons in the sum: for the Father and the Son are two persons, and two hypostases. In the second way it is said to be relative, which signifies collected persons, as trinity, for it includes in itself those which are said relatively. In the third way it is said relatively, which is placed in the place of the relative, because it names the divine essence by the mode of the supposit, as God: and this is the least proper mode among all that have been said. However, essence cannot be said relatively in any of these modes; and therefore it is inconvenient that it is begotten, or begetting.

To the other it must be said that God begot God, and they are one God, because "God" includes in itself the divinity of the supposit and the unity of essence: and therefore it does not follow that there are many gods: but when it is said, essence begot essence, it does not have in itself the supposit: therefore it would be necessary that it satisfies the distinction of generation by the distinction of essence: and thus it follows, as the Master says, that there would be many essences: and therefore Abbot Joachim erred, who did not see this cause, and said that essence generates essence, and yet there is one essence: just as God begot God, and yet they are one God.

To the other it must be said that this is improper, "Divinity is born," and it should be explained, this is, it is accepted through generation, not through the generation of deity, but through the generation of the one having it.

To the other it must be said that this happens because of the concretion of this name, God, which is not in essence, as has been said.

Divisio Textus

Here indeed also that contrary, etc. Here he objects through the words of Hilary, and in the following he resolves.

And there can be doubt concerning this which he says in resolving, The Son has nothing except, that is, he has nothing according to the nature, which is God, except what he received by being born.

Articulus 7 — Whether The Son Is Well Said To Be Counsel From Counsel, And Will From Will

Whether the Son is rightly called counsel from counsel, and will from will?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said:

The Son is called counsel from counsel, and will from will, etc.

1. For Damascene says that counsel does not pertain to God, because it belongs to the ignorant: therefore the Son is not counsel from counsel.
2. Furthermore, it has been held above that will is attributed to the Holy Spirit: therefore the Son is not will from will, but rather the Holy Spirit, as it seems.

Sotunio. Counsel is said in two ways, just as to counsel: for there is counsel on the part of the seeker, and that is of the ignorant: there is also counsel on the part of the giver, and this signifies abundance and fullness of knowledge concerning those things which are doubtful to others, and thus counsel in God is called the eternal disposition of His wisdom concerning things to be done, and in this way the Son is called counsel from counsel, because in Him from the principal part counsel is fulfilled through incarnation and passion. Whence also according to another translation, Isaiah 9:6, He is called the Angel of great counsel. And, Isaiah 11:2, it is said the Spirit of counsel rested upon Him.

To the other it must be said, that although will is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, it is not proper to Him: because there is one will of the three: and therefore it is fitting for the Son to have will through this that He received it from the Father.

Divisio Textus

It is also frequently said, etc. Here begins that part in which it is asked, Whether essence in a person is, or can be, the terminus of generation from which or into which?

And it is divided into three parts: into objection, and solution, and into a chapter in which is elicited that which follows with further conclusion from the authorities introduced. The second begins there, K, With these words before the third begins there, L, omitted, etc. It is also shown, etc.

Articulus 8 — Which Act The Verb "He Received" Connects, Whether Notional Or Essential

Which act does the word "accepit" connect, whether notional or essential?

For it is asked which act this word "accepit" connects, whether notional or essential? If notional, since the Son himself in being born received essence, it seems to be a notional act over essence: therefore it is distinguished, as it seems. If essential, then it equally pertains to the Father and the Son to receive, which is false.

Likewise, it is further asked, whether this is true, "The Son is by divine generation"? Proof that it is so: The Son by divine generation has whatever he is: but this is true, "The Son is": therefore the Son is by divine generation. On the contrary: Essence is, not by divine generation.

Solution. This, "The Son is by generation," speaking without prejudice, has a calumny: for if it is understood thus, as if the being of the Son is the terminus of generation per se and in the Son, it is false. But if it is understood that indeed the terminus of generation is the Son, and he has being through generation, then it is true, and in this way it is proven: moreover, this is true: "The Son is by divine generation the Son," and the divine essence is as if formally.

To that which is first asked, which act does this word "accepit" connect? I say, that it is notional which is generation: yet I do not say that the act is terminated according to the reason of understanding first, or consequently over essence: but it is terminated in the Son in whom the essence is the same on account of two things, namely the community of essence, and also indivision. Hence, for essence to be communicated, generation makes it so: yet it is not over it per se, or consequently: which is thus proven. If it were over it first, then essence would be begotten, which is false: but if it were over it consequently, then essence would be related consequently to the Son: and thus in the Son there would be something proximate to generation, and something remote: and thus two heresies would follow, one of which is that the Son would have in himself the universal and the particular; the second is that essence would be generated consequently: and thus also consequently it would be distinguished according to the being it has in the Son, from the being it has in the Father.

Articulus 9 — Whether, When The Master Says, "He Transferred Into The Kingdom Of Charity," The Word "Charity" Joins Notional Love Or Essential Love

Whether when the Master says, "He has transferred into the kingdom of charity," the term "charity" conjoins notional or essential love?

A doubt arises here concerning what is said in the first chapter: Whether the term "charity" conjoins notional or essential love? If it is said, notional. On the contrary:

1. Notional charity is the Holy Spirit: therefore, it seems to follow that he has transferred into the kingdom of the Son of the Holy Spirit.
2. Furthermore, Augustine would inconveniently explain, who says that he has transferred us into the kingdom of the Son of his substance.

If for this reason it is said that it conjoins essential love. On the contrary?

1. Augustine explains thus: "of his beloved Son," in another exposition: "beloved" however denotes the love by which the Father loves the Son, and by which the Son loves the Father: that however is notional, because it proceeds from them insofar as they are one in loving: therefore, it seems that it conjoins notional love.
2. Furthermore, if it purely said essential, the sense would be of the Apostle's word, that it would be of the essence of the Son.

It seems further that it conjoins both.

1. For when the Apostle says, to the Colossians 1:13, from where this word is drawn, "He has transferred us," etc., it signifies us being transferred into the kingdom: but transfer is not made except of those loved by the lover: therefore, transfer is not made except through the common love of the lover and the loved: charity however is common in which the Holy Spirit proceeds to sanctify the creature to be transferred: therefore, since temporal procession in its understanding encloses the eternal, in common love is enclosed the proper notional: and thus it imports both loves.
2. Likewise, this is taken from the mode of speaking when it is said, "He has transferred us into the kingdom of the Son of charity": for only the sons of adoption are transferred into the kingdom of the Son by nature: therefore, the act of charity is noted to pass into the Son by nature, and into us: but into the Son by nature passes the notional act, because the Father loves the Son by the Holy Spirit, and conversely into us however passes the essential love appropriable to the Holy Spirit in whom it rests: therefore, it seems that it stands for both essential and notional love. This also seems from the conjunction of the two expositions of Augustine: for he explains by saying that "Son of charity" is the same as "Son of his essence," and "beloved Son": and from one exposition is taken substantial love, from the other however notional: therefore, it stands for both.

But on the contrary: A term once taken should not be used equivocally: but this term "charity" is once taken: therefore, it does not stand in a double signification.

Solution. Without prejudice, I agree in this part, that the term "charity" here conjoins both loves, namely both notional and essential, as the expositions of Augustine seem to suggest if they are joined: but it conjoins the essential in the direct, and the notional in the oblique. For the sense is: He has transferred us through common charity into the kingdom of his Son, in whom and from whom proceeds the love, in which the love of charity is given to us. And according to this intention, it does not follow that the Son is the Son of the Holy Spirit; because it does not say that charity in the direct, but it is understood in this. Nor does it follow that the Son is properly the Son of essence: because due to the notion it is understood that charity is of the Son, as of him who is bound with the Father by the bond which is from both.

To the last it must be said, that charity is not taken entirely equivocally, when it is taken for essential and notional; because one is included in the other, as the proper in the appropriated:

one understanding according to the act well receives the proper in the appropriated, because one encloses in itself the other: but it is not so with purely equivocal terms, for in those one is not enclosed in the other according to understanding.

L. That neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit is from nothing, but from something, yet not from matter.

It is also shown from those words that the Son and the Holy Spirit are not from nothing, but from something: yet not from any matter. Hence also Hilary in book XII on the Trinity says: The only-begotten God, since he is born, testifies the Father as author: since he is born from the abiding, he is not born from nothing: and since he is born before time, he surpasses all sense by being born. Here it is openly said that the Son is not born from nothing. Similarly, the Holy Spirit is not to be said to be, or to proceed from nothing: because the Son is born from the substance of the Father, that is, he is from the Father, with whom he is of the same substance, and the same substance. From which sense also is to be taken that: The Father begot what he himself is, that is, the Son who is what the Father is. And this is to be understood as Augustine opens, saying in the first book against Maximinus: the Father begot what he is: otherwise he is not a true Son, if what the Father is, is not the Son. Likewise, the substance of God begot the Son, that is, the Father substance begot the Son, who is the same substance and of the same substance. That this is to be understood thus Augustine shows, saying to Maximinus: As you say, the Spirit begot the Spirit: so say, the Spirit of the same nature: or substance begot the Spirit. Likewise, as you say, God begot God: so say, God of the same nature or substance begot God. If you believe and say this, you will not be accused further about this matter. For by these words he opens how the aforesaid ought to be understood. Similarly, the Son is born from the substance of the Father, or the Father begot the Son from his nature or essence, that is, from himself by nature and essence he begot the Son of the same essence and nature, and who is the same essence and nature. Similarly, explain that, the Son of the substance of the Father, and the Son of the Father's substance, that is, who is substance, with whom and the Son is the same substance, because the Son is consubstantial with the Father. And this sense is aided by these words of Augustine, who in book V on the Trinity says: We say three persons of the same essence, or three persons one essence. But we do not say three persons from the same essence, as if there is something there which is essence, something else which is person. By these words it is shown that it is not to be said that a person is from essence, except from the aforesaid sense: which sense

is also confirmed from what in the book on the Trinity the same says: As our knowledge is to the knowledge of God, so also our word which is born from our knowledge, is unlike that Word of God, which is born from the essence of the Father. It is as if he would say, from the knowledge of the Father, from the wisdom of the Father: or, which is more express, from the Father essence, from the Father knowledge, from the Father wisdom. From this same understanding, the Word of God the Father, the only-begotten Son, in all things similar and equal to the Father, is rightly said to be God from God, light from light, wisdom from wisdom, essence

from essence: because he is entirely what the Father is, yet not the Father: because this is the Son, that is the Father.

M. Why the Word of the Father is called the Son by nature?

Hence it is, that only the only-begotten of God is called the Son by nature, because he is of the same nature, and is the same nature with the Father. Hence Hilary in book XIV on the Trinity, speaking of Christ, says: He is the Son by nature, because he has the same nature as he who begot him.

Articulus 10 — Whether It Can Be Said, "The Son Is From Nothing"; And Similarly, "The Father Is From Nothing"

Whether it can be said, the Son is from nothing: and similarly, the Father is from nothing?

Whether it can be said, the Son is from nothing: and similarly, the Father is from nothing?

Then it is inquired concerning those things which are said in that chapter. It is also shown from those words, etc., whether the Son is from nothing, or not? However, it seems that yes:

1. For that which is from no pre-existing matter is from nothing: the Son is from no pre-existing matter: therefore the Son is from nothing.
2. Likewise, the Son is not from anything, such that "anything" is of neither gender: but not anything and nothing are equipollent: therefore the Son is from nothing.

Furthermore, it is inquired concerning the Father, whether

he is from nothing? And it seems that yes by the authority of Augustine above mentioned:

1. If the Son is from no substance: therefore the Son is from nothing: therefore since the Father is from no substance, the Father is from nothing.
2. Likewise, the Father is from nothing: therefore he is from nothing.
3. Likewise, the Father is not from anything neutrally: therefore from nothing.

On the contrary: Everything that is from nothing is created and changeable, as Damascene says: therefore if the Father is from nothing, he is created and changeable.

Solution. To such sophisms it must be said that none of the divine persons is from nothing: because when it is said, from nothing, by negation the principle is removed from the part before: but by the preposition "from" preceding the negation which remains not extinguished by the negation, because it precedes, an order of being to nothing preceding is posited, that is, that the being of that which is said to be from nothing follows non-being: and this indeed is fitting for all created things, but it is not fitting for the divine persons.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that this is true, the Son is from no matter: because there the negation of the material principle is noted: but it does not follow, therefore from nothing, because of the relation of the preposition which remains.

To the other it must be said that these two are not equipollent: the Son is not from anything: therefore from nothing. Because in the first the negation precedes the preposition: and therefore it extinguishes its relation. In the second however it follows: and therefore the relation of the preposition remains. But if it is inferred from the equipollent, It is not from nothing: therefore from

something neutrally: it is not valid again because of the relation of the preposition.

To what is further inquired concerning the Father, it must be said that he is not from nothing.

To the objection against, it must be said that in the Son it follows, because he has a relation to the principle before: and not the Father, and therefore in the Father it does not hold.

To the other it must be said that it does not follow, the Father is from nothing, etc., because this expression, nothing, stands for a person: afterwards however it is inferred neutrally, depriving the principle of existence with the order to nothing which the preposition posits.

To the other it must be said that it does not follow, It is not from anything: therefore from nothing: because in the first the relation of the preposition is deprived, in the second however it is not deprived: therefore, etc.

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DISTINCTIO VI

Divisio Textus

Furthermore, it is customarily asked whether the Father begot the Son, etc. Here begins the second part of this treatise on the generation of the Son, in which it is inquired concerning the power inclining to generation on the part of the generator, whether it is necessity, or will, or nature? However, it is divided into two parts: in the first of which it is discussed concerning the power inclining in the Father to generate. But because in lower beings the power of generating is in the begotten son, just as in the father, therefore it is inquired in the second part, whether such is also in the Son? And this begins in the following distinction VII, namely there, Here it is customarily asked by some, etc.

The first is divided into three. In the first, the Master raises the question and resolves it by the negation of both parts. In the second, an objection is made against the solution: and he resolves it, there, B, But against this it is opposed, etc. In the third, he returns to the part which he had negated, and resolves it under another sense, there, C, However, the aforementioned words, etc.

In the first of these, he does three things. First, he presents the question of the heretic under division. Second, he negates both parts of the division, there, Neither by will, nor by necessity.

In the third, he presents an instance against the division of the heretic, there, Indeed, some acutely.

Articulus 1 — Whether God Begot The Son From Necessity And Will

Whether God begot the Son out of necessity and will?

Here arises the question concerning this division:

1. It seems, however, that He begot the Son out of necessity: for what is impossible not to be, must be: it is impossible for God not to have a Son: therefore it must be.
2. Likewise, whatever in no part of itself is contingent and possible, in its entirety in essence and act is necessary: God the Father is subject to nothing contingent and possible: therefore in entirety He is necessary: therefore He is the necessary principle of the generation of the Son.
3. Likewise, in eternal things, to be able and to be are the same: but it is necessary for God to be able to beget the Son: therefore it is necessary for God to have begotten the Son: and in eternal things, to have begotten and to beget are the same: therefore God the Father necessarily begets or begot the Son.
4. Furthermore, it is impossible to detract the greatest power from the Omnipotent: but the greatest power is to generate another like Himself: therefore it is impossible to detract this power from God: therefore it is necessary to posit it in Him: therefore He begot the Son out of necessity.
5. Likewise, with nature being communicable, and nothing prohibiting it from being communicated, it is impossible to remove its communication: but the divine nature is communicable, and nothing prohibits the communication from occurring, as was said and proven above: therefore it is impossible for the communication not to occur: therefore it was necessary to generate the Son: because through generation the communication of nature occurs.
6. Likewise, the Philosopher says that things which occur: either always, like necessary things, or frequently, or rarely: but natural things occur always, or frequently, but in necessary things they occur always: it will be held below that God the Father always begot the Son: therefore He necessarily begot the Son.
7. Likewise, Dionysius in the book on Divine Names: The only supersubstantial source of Deity is the Father, neither is the Son the Father, nor the Father the Son, with hymns preserving the proper religion of each of the thearchic persons. Since therefore it is necessary for the source to flow, the Father begot the Son out of necessity.
8. Likewise, in the same, below: The Father indeed is the fountain deity: but the Son and the Holy Spirit are divine offshoots of the deity, if it is proper to say so, and like flowers, and supersubstantial lights we have received from the holy writings. From this it is held

that since the Father is the fountain deity, it is impossible for Him not to pour forth and generate the Son.

In the same way, the other part seems able to be proven, namely that He begot the Son by will thus:

1. God wills every good: therefore He wills the greatest good most: but the best is to produce the Son, and to produce the Holy Spirit; therefore He wills this most: therefore He begot Him by will.
2. Likewise, in the Omnipotent every work is subject to will: therefore since to generate (as Damascene says) is a work of nature, this will be subject to will in Him: therefore He begot Him by will.
3. Likewise, either He begot Him by will, or He begot Him not by will: if by will, I have the proposition: if He did not beget Him by will, and He begot: therefore He begot against will, or beyond will; both of which are absurd: therefore He begot the Son by will.
4. Likewise, in all generating beings in which there is purpose, the first inclination to generation is will: therefore also in God: therefore also He begot by will.
5. Likewise, whatever is done not by the will of one who has will, is not praiseworthy: therefore if the Father did not beget the Son by will, the Father is not praiseworthy in the generation of the Son, which is absurd: therefore, etc.
6. Likewise, Augustine says below: If He could beget the Son, and did not will: therefore He is envious: but He was not envious: therefore He could, and willed: therefore He begot by will.
7. Likewise, the Father saying the Word, begot the Son: but to say is always in the will of the one saying: therefore to generate is always in the will of the one generating: therefore He always begot by will.

On the contrary, it is objected thus first that it is against not out of necessity.

1. Every necessity to some act is from the power of a stronger intrinsic or extrinsic: God the Father has nothing stronger than Himself: therefore He does not generate out of necessity. The second is supposed by faith. The first is proven from this that if it is a necessity of nature, it is from the form, which is stronger in the acting thing by necessity than the matter. But if it is a necessity from the extrinsic, then it is a compelling stronger: as it takes in coercion by violence.
2. Likewise, in all those in which there is nature and will, according to due order nature is subject to will: but in God there is nature and will: therefore also in Him nature is subject to will: but what is subject to will, Augustine says is not necessary: therefore in God nothing is necessary: therefore neither the generation of the Son nor any other work, as it seems. The first is proven from the perverse order in us: because through sin

it happens that natural powers are not subject to will and reason. The second is proven by this that the highest order is in God.

Against the other part it is objected thus, namely that He did not beget by will:

1. Damascene in two places says that creation is a work of will, but generation is a work of nature: therefore He did not beget by will.
2. Likewise, things are said to be done by will in which the principal mover is will: but in every generation the principal mover is nature: therefore generation is not done by will.
3. Likewise, will is towards willed things: but willed things are external about which there is apprehension in the reason of good: the generation of the Son is not thus about externals: therefore it is not done by will.
4. Furthermore, in humans it is so that the generation of humans does not denote a work of will, but rather mechanical works which are upon other matter: therefore neither in divine things should it be said so.
5. Solution. It must be said according to Hilary in the authorities cited above, that the understanding of the sayings is from causes and therefore must be assumed in speaking: because it is not the word of the thing, but the thing's word that is subject: not every necessity is denied here, nor every will: but necessity and will according to the intention of heretics, which is necessity of violence, and coercion by an agent against will intrinsically or extrinsically: as will be clear when necessity is distinguished: for such necessity is not received by divine generation, nor by God: because the Philosopher says in the fourth book of the Metaphysics: If there were simple and eternal and immobile things, none of them would be by violence, nor against nature. It is clear therefore that such necessity of violence does not fall upon God. But they said will in God is acceding, as Augustine says, or antecedent, which is about a thing before the thing itself is, and which sometimes is with the willing one, and sometimes not: hence if such will were in God, the Father would be mutable who sometimes would will one thing, and sometimes another: and the Son would not be eternal, whose generation the paternal will would have preceded, as it preceded the creation of things. Therefore it must be said according to the Philosopher in the fourth book of the Metaphysics, that necessary is said respectively, and absolutely. Respectively it is said with respect to the intended end, or with respect to the compelling efficient. With respect to the end in two ways, namely with respect to being, and with respect to well-being: as it is necessary for being, without which it is impossible to have or preserve being, like breath and nourishment in animals: with respect to well-being, without which the intended end in well-being is not had, like the acceptance of a debt from an Athenian citizen is not had unless one sails to Athens: therefore sailing to Athens is necessary for the acceptance of the debt. With respect to the efficient, similarly it is in two ways, namely with respect to the agent outside, and with respect to the agent inside. With respect to the agent outside, as Dionysius said, that necessary is distressing, and violence is some necessity: and a

certain Philosopher Ariotas said, Violence by necessity compels me to do these things. With respect to the compelling inside, as it is said in 3 Esdras, iii, 12, that above all truth conquers: because it compels consent: and in this way the Philosopher says that necessity does not allow the one opining to return to the truth, and to be changed from his opinion. Absolutely, however, necessary is (as the Philosopher says) what is impossible to be otherwise and this is in three ways, namely per se, and per aliud, and composed of both: per se, like principles: per aliud, like a determined conclusion: from both, like a syllogism. And similarly it is in an incomplex being. Hence the Philosopher says that necessary absolutely and per se is only one simple first: for all other things composed from their components draw necessity, and the components from the first efficient: and therefore they are possible according to those from which they have necessity: because first by intellect in them they are in potency than in necessity. According to this division, we will say that only God is the necessary first. There are, however, many other ways in which the reason of necessity is not preserved except equivocally, as we are accustomed to say useful necessary, and expedient necessary.

Having these, it is easy to respond to that part of the objections which are about the necessary: for all those reasons and the authorities of Dionysius brought forward, plainly speak of the simple and absolute necessary, which is especially God: and by this necessity He generates the Son: nor does any inconvenience follow in Him.

In the same way, we distinguish multiple will in the second way. For there is will as a willing power, and it is the mover of other powers which are in the willing one, like the will of the willed outside, like food, or drink, or another, and in this way the work of will is creation: because that is outside God. But according to which will is as it were the mover of other powers, as when it is said, I will to understand, I will to walk, it can be understood according to the Master in three ways, namely antecedent as it is as it were disposing the willing one: and this is the will of premeditation about the work how it ought to be done, as the carpenter premeditates in which part of the material he will make the bottom of the ark, and in which the cover, and in which the wall. There is also the acceding will: and this in two ways, namely acceding to the work, and acceding to the willing one: acceding to the work is that which immediately precedes the work, as it is the will to work, like striking with an axe, and the like: acceding to the willing one is that which he did not always have, but it accedes to him from a new apprehension of something apprehended moving the will. The third is the will concurrent with the work, which is called concomitant: and by this will the Father begot the Son, because He willed the generation: and from this last proceed the reasons induced for this that He begot the Son by will, as is clear to one inspecting each.

But the reasons which are induced to prove that He did not necessarily beget the Son, follow from necessity by coercion: and this necessary cannot fall upon God, as has been said.

Similarly, the other reasons which are induced for this that He did not beget by will, are taken from the will of externals: the first and second and third from the preceding will, according to which the divine generation is not a work of will, as has been said.

And thus the solution to all other objections is clear at once.

Articulus 2 — Whether God, Willing Or Unwilling, Begot The Son

Whether God willingly or unwillingly begot the Son?

Then it is inquired concerning what the heretic says: God begot the Son willingly or unwillingly, etc.

For it seems necessary that one part be given, since parts are distinguished by affirmation and negation: therefore it is necessary that one be verified of anything.

Furthermore, it is inquired, Since it could in some sense be given that God willingly begot the Son, why did the Catholic doctors not give it under distinction, but simply denied it?

It must be said that these, willingly and unwillingly, are not opposed by affirmation and negation: for when negation is intrinsic with will, in one expression the will remains affirmed, but the willed thing of which there is speech is denied: whence the same is "I do not want," as "I want the contrary." And if it is objected that in the subjunctive mood the will seems to be denied, when it is said, "I want not," "you do not want," "he does not want," etc., it must be said that it is frivolous, indeed in the subjunctive mood the will also remains affirmed, according to which it is the subjunctive of this verb, "I do not want"; because then it has the force of one expression, this which is said, "you do not want," and "he does not want." But if it were divided thus, either willingly or not willingly: then it would be by affirmation and negation: and then according to the intention of the heretic to be avoided, this would have to be given, not willingly: for from this does not follow coercion, but the will approaching the willing and the willed is denied, as was said above.

To the other it must be said that the holy Doctors wished more to restrain and confound the heretic by insisting, than to dispute with him before the simple: because insistence causes silence and induces confusion, and this was expedient for the simple, that they might see him unable to succeed: but afterwards they treated the truth of the solution separately with the gentle, as the Master said above.

Articulus 3 — Whether These Authorities Of The Saints Are True, Who Say That He Begot The Son By Will

Are these authorities of the Saints true, who say that He begot the Son by will?

Then it is asked concerning what is said in the second part, B, This, however, is easy to refute, etc.

1. For certain Saints seem to expressly say that He begot by will: hence Hilary in book III on the Trinity: He begot the incomprehensible and ineffable only-begotten before all time and before the ages from those things which were unbegotten in Him, imparting all that God is through His charity and power: but charity is a disposition of the will: therefore He begot by will.

2. Likewise, Hilary: From the whole Father the whole Son is born: not from elsewhere, because nothing before the Son: not in part, because the fullness of deity is in the Son: nor in some things, because in all things: but as He willed who was able, and as He knew who begot.
3. Likewise, Origen: The Father of the Word was made a sprout bringing forth by will.
4. Likewise, To the same is the reason: for Augustine says in book IX on the Trinity, that the birth of the mind is preceded by the desire of the thing to be sought, which afterwards becomes the love of the known: therefore, since the divine birth is the birth of the mind, because it is the word, it seems that the preceding will preceded the birth of the Son.
5. Likewise, In all things in which nature and will concur in the same work, will precedes the work as inclining and moving first: and this happens because of the freedom of will; therefore it also seems that in God the work of nature, which is generation, will precedes at least according to reason.
6. Furthermore, As movers differ, so do the moved: but nature and will are two movers: therefore according to their difference is the difference of works and motions: but will is nobler than nature: therefore its work is nobler: therefore since the work of divine generation is most noble, it ought to be the preceding work.

But against this is what Hilary says in the book on Synods: If anyone says that the Son was made by the will of God as if from creatures, let him be anathema.

Solution. It must be said that the will approaching and preceding does not fall in God with respect to the generation of the Son: and the two authorities of Hilary first introduced are understood of the will concurring with the work or accompanying the work, as we said above.

To the other, it must be said that the sprout of will is called by Origen in which the pleasure of the Father rested, as He Himself said, Matthew 3:17: This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased.

To the other, it must be said that the love precedes the birth of the mind, not the birth, but of giving birth: and this is while the mind seeks what it may bring forth: but the love of the birth, which is perfect love, follows the birth according to reason: but the highest perfection is in God: and therefore there is not in Him the desire of a thing not had, or not made. Hence Augustine speaks there of the created mind seeking because of the imperfection of its knowledge.

To the other, it must be said that that reasoning holds in created rational nature, of which one part is better than another, and one commanding and one commanded. But it is not so in divine nature: and therefore in God will does not precede nature.

To the other, it must be said that if this proposition is generally understood, as the operators differ so do the works, it is false: because the works of nature of many are better

than the works of will: in God, however, will and nature are the same according to the thing: yet not of whatever there is one, of the same there is also the other: because they differ in subjects, and in reason, as the Master says in the Sentence.

But the other things that are said here are manifest by themselves.

DISTINCTIO VII

Divisio Textus

Here it is customary to inquire by some, etc. Here begins that part in which the Master asks, Whether the same power of generating is in the Son as is in the Father? It is divided into two parts: in the first of which the Master asks, Whether the Father generating the Son is something possible that pertains to the Son, or not? In the second he asks, Whether the Father by nature being able to generate the Son is a power pertaining to the Son or not? and this begins there, F, Likewise, it is asked by some, etc.

The first of these is subdivided into three. In the first, he touches upon the question and solves it. In the second, he objects through the words of Augustine against the manner of his solution, there, B, But In the third, it greatly moves us, etc. he applies the solution, there, E, Therefore it can be understood thus, etc.

The first of these is contained entirely in the first chapter, which contains in itself three things, namely the question, Whether the Father could or willed to generate the Son? and the solution of this question, there, To which cunning, And thirdly, the confirmation of this solution by a likeness, there, By a likeness also we can see this, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether The Father Could Have Or Willed To Beget The Son

Whether the Father could or willed to generate the Son?

Here arises a threefold doubt. The first is, Whether the Father could or willed to generate the Son? The second is, Whether this is to be able to do something? The third is, Whether to be able and to will are said only with respect to those things which are subject to power and will, or also with respect to others?

Concerning the first, it is proceeded thus: 1. In the preceding distinction, it was denied that the Son is the Son by the will of the Father: therefore, it seems that this part of the distinction is not true, that the Father willed to generate the Son: for whatever someone willed, he willed by will.

1. Likewise, when it is said, he willed to generate, it follows from the manner of speaking that the will preceded the act of generation: but this does not agree in divine matters: therefore, this is not true, he willed to generate.

Similarly, the other part seems false: 1. He could generate, because it is signified that power precedes the act.

1. Furthermore, in the Father there are not distinct powers, as in us, that one according to reason is a generative power by the mode of nature, and another is of reason by the mode of will commanding the act: therefore, the power of generation and the will of generating are the same: and since he did not generate by will, neither did he generate by power, as it seems.
2. Furthermore, he could generate, either by active power or passive power: because there are no more. If active, against: Active power is the principle of changing into another according to what it is another, as the Philosopher says in the fifth book of Metaphysics: therefore, there must be something that receives the action of such a transmutation: and this would be the patient from it; therefore, divine generation would be upon matter, which is absurd. But if by passive power, this is more absurd: because passive power (as the Philosopher says in the same place) is the principle of transmutation from another according to what it is another: therefore, the Father would have generated from another being transmuted, and thus he would rather be called mother than father.

For the sake of THIS, it is further inquired, Why he is rather called father by reason of his generation than mother?

And why the begotten is rather called Son than Daughter?

1. For if he is called father by reason of the fact that he is the principle not receptive of generation from elsewhere, this does not seem sufficient: because fire generates its species in the matter of air, and does not have another principle of its generation: and yet fire in the matter of air is not called the son of another fire: therefore, by reason of that principle, he cannot be called father.
2. If it is said, that by reason of this he is called father because he is the principle of generation, and because he gives substance. Against: Either he gives substance as in which the form is impressed by generation, or he gives substance as which is impressed in another recipient, or he gives the whole substance which he himself is. If in the first way, then he gives matter: because that is what is given thus, that the form which is received by generation is impressed in it: and this is absurd in divine generation: and yet he who we call father in lower things gives this substance with active power: therefore, since the superior father does not give such, either he should not be called father, or he will be called father equivocally. But if the substance which is impressed is given: since that substance is nothing but form, it would be necessary that it be other than that substance in which it is impressed, and divine generation would again be composite and material, which is frivolous. But if he gives the whole substance: since the whole substance of the Father is the hypostasis of the Father, the Father gives to the Son the same hypostasis which he himself is: therefore, the Father and the Son are one hypostasis, and one thing of nature, and one person, which is absurd: therefore, it seems

that in no way can he be called Father: nor can he who is begotten be fittingly called Son, as it seems.

Solution. It must be said to the first, that the Father both could and willed to generate or beget the Son.

To what is objected about the will, it must be said that it is not the same to say, the Son of the will, and the Son by will, and he willed to generate: for the first is absolutely false: because the work of the will is what is brought forth upon external matter to the worker, as are the mechanical works of the will of man, and the works of the will of the divine creature. And if it is objected that the will in God is the divine nature, and the Son is of nature: therefore, in some way he must be called the Son of the will. There falls the fallacy of the accident: because although nature and will are the same in reality, yet they differ greatly in the mode of signifying and attributing, as the Master proved above. However, the Son by will is in some way conceded as accompanying or concurring with the act by will. But when it is said, he willed to generate, the will is signified concerning the act of generation: and therefore it is true: because God with a concurrent act had will in divine generation.

To the other, it must be said that this is not signified by the mode of speaking in divine matters, as they are divine: because thus the word must be abstracted from time: and if this is done, then the will and the act of generation are similar: and thus the expression is true: because the Father does not have the act of generation except concurrent with will, and conversely.

To what is objected about the power which is signified in the word, could, it must be said that such arguments proceed from a wrong understanding, namely from this that what is in God is understood in the manner of creatures, in which to be able precedes to act. Hence in divine matters such things must be abstracted from time and composition: and then it will be seen that the power of generating does not precede the act of generation, nor does it make composition with it, because for God to act and to be able are the same.

To the other, it must be said that it is true that in the heavenly Father there are not distinct powers: because otherwise he would be composite. But although they are not distinct according to reality and composition, yet they are distinct in the mode of signifying and attributing, because many things are subject to power which are not subject to will: and God can do many things which he does not will: and so it is with the power of generating and the will of generating.

To the other, it must be said that if we wish to make the greatest force in acting and suffering, then in God there is neither active power nor passive power: but rather there is in him a superactive power. However, that division of the Philosopher holds in physically acting or suffering powers. Hence that active physical power seeks a subject which receives its action, this is from its imperfection: for if its action were perfect, it would produce the whole at once: and if it were perfectly noble, it would produce without composition most similar to the agent. Hence time, motion, composition, subject, all arise from the imperfection of the

agent or recipient. Hence in divine matters there is a superactive power of the Father for producing the whole Son in the same essence coeternal and simple.

To what is further inquired, Whether for this reason he should rather be called father than mother? It must be said, that yes, inasmuch as nothing is so truly called father as he, as was proved above. However, he can in no way be called mother: because mother is she who generates in herself from another: this, however, in no way befits the Father: and therefore he is only father, nor is he such a father that he needs the help of a similar one in generation, for three reasons: one of which is, because the help of a wife is given to a man on account of his imperfection which does not fall into God. The second is, that generation is received in the help from the man: and therefore it needs time of conception and impregnation and birth: in which time the son existing in potency cannot be coeternal or coeval with the parents. The third reason is, because every such born is composed of the double substance of father and mother. The first of these, however, is repugnant to the perfection of power, the second to the coeternity of the born itself, the third, however, to simplicity.

To what is objected, that only the active principle does not suffice for the reason of father, it must be said that this is true, nor is the heavenly father only an active principle: indeed he gives his substance: and I well concede, that the whole.

To what is objected against this, it must be said that hypostasis and person are substance: yet they do not suppose as substance, but as to something: and therefore there is in the argument a change of category: for that the Father is substance, is because there is no composition in divine matters, not from the reason of father, because he is father, indeed thus he is other. Hence the Master here in the Letter promises to prove that to be father is not to be something, but to be to something.

To what is inquired, Whether the begotten should rather be called Son than Daughter? It must be said, that yes: because that most perfect generation cannot be except in one entirely similar: however, a daughter is not entirely similar to the father, neither in truth nor in figure, and therefore the born in eternal generation cannot be called daughter.

Articulus 2 — Whether The Power To Beget Is To Something, Or Something

Whether the ability to generate is towards something, or something?

Secondly, it is asked, Whether the ability to generate is the ability for something?

1. And it seems that it is not: because the Master says in the Text, that the ability or will to generate the Son is not the ability or will for something.
2. Furthermore, powers are distinguished by acts: therefore, the power of that which is something will be the power by which it is able for something: and the power of that which is towards something will be the power by which it is able towards something, and not something: since therefore to generate is towards something, the ability to generate will be towards something, and not something.

3. Furthermore, the ability to generate is said to be fitting to the Father, and not to the Son, or the Holy Spirit: but the Father and the Son are distinguished in nothing except in that which is towards something: therefore the ability to generate is not something, but towards something.

4. Furthermore, in lower things it is thus, that active powers are according to properties disposing towards act, as to heat is of fire according to the property of the hot, and to shine according to the property which is light, and so of others: therefore since to generate is the act of the Father, whence he is Father, and not whence the divine substance is, the property which constitutes the power towards that act will be of the Father in that he is Father, and not whence the divine substance is: but in that he is Father, it is towards something: therefore the property making according to the reason of understanding, the power of generating in him, is towards something, and not something: therefore the power which is from that property according to the reason of understanding, will be towards something, and not something absolutely.

5. If perhaps someone might say, that this property which according to the reason of understanding...

§ 1. [...of understanding] makes the power of generating, is in the Father not only according to what makes the Father the Father, but according to what makes Him be. On the contrary: Augustine says that the Father is not by paternity, but by substance, and the Son and Holy Spirit are the same: therefore that property which makes the power of generating in the Father, is found in the same way in the Son and the Holy Spirit: therefore it will also do the same in them, because it would be absurd to say that the essence is otherwise in the Father than in the Son and the Holy Spirit: therefore the first point returns, that the power of generating is not a something (aliquid), but a toward-something (ad aliquid).

§ 2. 6. If perhaps it is said (as some have said) that when it is said, "The power of generating is in the Father," it can be understood as a disposed power, or an undisposed one: if in the first way, then it is a toward-something: if in the second way, then it is a something: and in the first way it belongs only to the person of the Father, in the second way it belongs to the nature. On the contrary: The Philosopher says that an undisposed power is indifferently related to being and non-being: but it is impossible to posit such a power to generate and not generate in God, neither in him inasmuch as he is father, nor in him inasmuch as he is nature: because Hilary says that he generates in himself by the power of a generating nature: therefore this solution cannot stand.

§ 3. 7. Moreover, When I say, "Disposed power," the disposition belongs to the same thing to which the power previously belonged: for dispositions are not given to powers so that they become something further than they previously were, but so that they are perfected for acts: therefore if a disposed power belongs to the person, and is toward-something, then the undisposed power will also belong to the same thing and also be toward-something.

§ 4. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. To the act of nature there is only the power of nature: generation is an act of nature: therefore the power of generating is a power of nature: therefore the power of generating is a power of the substance of the generator.

§ 5. 2. Moreover, Every power is rooted in something according to the account of understanding: but this is the nature, as Hilary says: therefore the power of generating will be a power of the nature and not of the person: therefore it will be a something, and not only a toward-something.

§ 6. 3. Moreover, Damascene says that generation is from the substance of the generator: therefore the power of generating is a power of the substance of the generator, and not a toward-something.

§ 7. 4. Moreover, The Philosopher says that generation is called nature, in that it is a way into nature: therefore the power of generating will be in the nature.

§ 8. 5. Moreover, The Master says here, that the power of generating is some power: but some power is a something: therefore, etc.

§ 9. Solution. Speaking without prejudice (because many have said many things here) I say, that the power of generating, according to the account of understanding, is a mean between the purely essential and the purely personal: and this is clear if it is divided: for every power is essential, but every generation is personal: hence the power of generating, taken conjointly insofar as the power is in act, is a mean between the essential and the notional or personal: and of that mean, what belongs to the power holds itself on the side of nature: but what belongs to the act holds itself on the side of the notion and the person. And if it is said that between essence and person there is no mean. The response is that this is true according to the thing: but according to the account of understanding nothing prohibits there being a mean: according to this, therefore, properly speaking, the power of generating will belong to the nature insofar as it is in this person: hence according to some account of itself it is a what (quid), according to some account of itself it is a toward-something: for many things are so essential that through their conjunction with notional things they belong to that person whose notion it is, and not to another: and if they are divided from that notional thing, they belong equally to all persons, as an example is when I say, "God generating," so that the word "generating" is placed adjectivally and joined transitively with the word "God": for then "God generating" will not be the Son or the Holy Spirit: and if the word "God" is divided by the intellect from

the word "generating," so namely that the word "generating" is understood substantivally, or a composition intercedes between the word "generating" and the word "God," then the Son will be generating, that is, he will be God who is God generating, and similarly the Holy Spirit: because the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one and the same God, as was held above. Having established these things, one must respond to the objections.

§ 11. It must therefore be said to the first, that the Master considers the ability to generate from that part by which it is united to the notional according to the intellect, and not from the other part: and therefore he says it is a toward-something, and not a what.

§ 12. To the other it must be said, that this is true, that powers are distinguished and defined by acts: but nevertheless they are not necessarily placed in the genus of acts, because acts in divine things are in the genus of relation: and therefore it is not necessary that the power be in the same genus: for to be distinguished and to be placed in a genus are not the same: because distinction is made for the sake of cognition, but genus pertains to the nature of the thing. And if it is objected, that they are defined by acts, and a definition is given through those things which are of the same nature: it must be said that active powers, whatever may also be the case concerning passive ones, do not have to be defined by acts, except as the prior is defined by the posterior: and such definitions are not of the thing, but are relative to us: and therefore since the power of generating is active, that objection does not compel.

§ 13. TO THE OTHER it must be said, that the ability to generate does not signify something belonging to the Father, except on account of this, because it is a mean not between the nature and just any person, but between the nature and the person of the Father: hence that it does not belong to the Son, is from nothing else except from that which it has of the notional of the Father, and not on account of this which it has of the essential, by grace of which it itself is called a what: hence because it belongs to the nature in the Father, if we properly wished to assign a genus to it according to the whole that is in it, we would say that it itself is a what toward-something (quid ad aliquid).

§ 14. To the other it must be said, that some powers are for producing the whole being, and others for consequent works: hence those which are for producing the whole being must necessarily be rooted in the very nature of the thing in some way, as is the power of generating, according to what Boethius defines nature, that nature is a force implanted in things procreating like things from like things. But powers for works consequent upon being are rooted in the properties of the composite, as the power of heating is rooted in the heat of fire, which is a property consequent to the being of fire: hence in divine things, according to the mode of understanding which we can have, the power of generating is rooted in the nature insofar as it is a person.

§ 15. TO THAT which is further objected, that the nature is the same in the Father and the Son, it must be said in the same way, that this is true: but the comparison of the nature to the Son and to the Holy Spirit is not the same: because in the person of the Father it is compared to the person of the Father, and has in this comparison some mean according to the account of understanding, which it does not have from the comparison of itself to the Son and to the Holy Spirit: and therefore it is not necessary that the power of generating, taken conjointly, as was said, should be in the Son and the Holy Spirit.

§ 16. TO THAT which is objected against the solution saying [that there is a] disposed power and an undisposed power, I readily concede that it is an incautious solution, and does not have proper words in divine things: and if it were true, yet still it would not contribute to

the proposition: because a disposition does not make a power to be of a certain genus, as the objection proves.

§ 17. BUT TO THOSE ARGUMENTS which are introduced for this, that the power of generating belongs to the nature, this must be conceded in the manner in which it was stated.

§ 18. To that which is finally objected from this which the Master says, that the power of generating is some power, it must be said that this is true: for to be some power is common to toward-something and to

§ 19. something: for we have said above, that the power of generating names a something and a toward-something conjointly: and through this the solution to all the objections is clear.

§ 20.

Articulus 3 — On The Things And With Respect To Which The Divine Power Is, Whether With Respect To Subjects Only

Concerning what things and with respect to what things is the divine ability, whether with respect to subjected things only?

§ 22. Thirdly it is asked, Whether ability and will in God are spoken of only with respect to those things which are subjected to His power and will, or also with respect to other things?

§ 23. And concerning this two things are to be asked, namely, concerning what things is the divine ability? And whether there is a single power for the ability to generate and for the ability to create?

§ 24. 1. Now it seems that it is spoken of with respect to subjected things only: because the Author says so in the Text, that therefore the Son is not less powerful than the Father: "because the ability and will to generate the Son is not one of those things which are subjected to divine power": but this would be nothing if the power were of anything other than subjected things: because from this the Son would not be proved equal to the Father in power.

§ 25. 2. Also, Power according to its account follows the being of the powerful one: therefore omnipotence also follows the being of the omnipotent one: but the generation of the Son does not follow according to its account the being of the omnipotent one: therefore it seems that the omnipotence of the Father is not spoken of with respect to generation. This also seems to be held from the Text: because he says, "For he did not previously will, or have the ability, before he generated: just as he did not previously exist before he generated: because he existed from eternity, and from eternity he generated: therefore the power of the three persons is one, just as their essence is one." Since therefore the power of the Son, according to the account of understanding, is consequent to the Son, but the power of generating, according to the account of understanding, is prior to the Son, it seems the power of God is only with respect to things subjected to power, and not with respect to generation.

§ 26. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. It is a greater thing to generate the Son than all the things which are subjected to divine power: therefore the strength of power is maximally considered

with respect to that: therefore it seems that if such power is not in the Son, he would fall short of the Father in the maximum strength of power, and thus will not be omnipotent.

§ 27. 2. Also, The account of a principle is reduced to the account of power: since therefore the Father is a principle not from a principle, but the Son is a principle from a principle, it seems that the Father has some power which the Son does not have.

§ 28. Solution. It must be said that the omnipotence of God is considered with respect to those things which are outside, and follow upon the common ability of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, as the Master says in the Text.

§ 29. To this, however, which is objected, it must be said that to generate is not a something (majus aliquid), but a toward-something (ad aliquid), as the Master says. Nor is the Father shown by this to be something, or powerful to be something, but rather toward-something: nevertheless I readily concede, that the generation of the Son is infinitely greater than the whole world: although in creation power appears, but in generation property: because according to this which is the account of power, the Son is not distinguished from the Father, nor the Holy Spirit, nor conversely.

§ 30. To the other it must be said, that the account of principle is twofold, namely for making, and this is reduced to the account of power: and there is the account of principle not for making, but for distinguishing and being distinguished, and this is not reduced, nay rather in that part it is only a toward-something, and not a something. But on that part which holds itself with the essence, it has the account of power, and thus is common to the three persons.

§ 31.

Articulus 4 — Whether The Power Is Univocal To The Ability To Beget And The Ability To Create

Whether the power for the ability to generate and the ability to create is univocal?

Whether the power for the ability to generate and the ability to create is univocal?

§ 33. Secondly it is asked, Whether the power for the ability to generate and the ability to create is univocal?

§ 34. 1. It seems that it is not: because one speaks of a something, the other speaks of a toward-something: but something and toward-something are not of one genus: therefore neither of one account: therefore it is spoken of equivocally concerning them.

§ 35. 2. Also, Powers are defined by acts: but the act of creating and of generating is not one: therefore power is not spoken of in one way concerning them.

§ 36. 3. Also, That cannot be taken according to one account which in a certain account belongs to the three in common, and in a certain account only to one of the three: but the power of generating belongs only to one of the three, but the power of creating belongs to all three in common: therefore it seems that power is not spoken of univocally.

§ 37. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Every equivocal thing is in some way of a diverse nature to which a diverse account corresponds: but in God there is no diversity of nature: therefore in God nothing is equivocal to another: but the power of creating is in God, similarly the power of generating: therefore power spoken of them will not be spoken of equivocally.

§ 38. 2. Also, The power of creating is really identical with the one creating, and the one creating with the one generating: therefore the power of creating is the power of generating: but things which are spoken of equivocally are distinct and not predicated of one another reciprocally, because the barking dog is not the marine dog: therefore power will not be spoken of equivocally concerning the power of generating and the power of creating.

§ 39. 3. Also, When omnipotence is said, the word "all" (omnis) which is in composition with the word "power" distributes for all things which God is able to do: therefore as much for generating as for creating, and thus for other things: but if they were equivocal, it would not be distributed for them: therefore it seems that it is not spoken of equivocally.

§ 40. Solution. It must be said that power is not spoken of equivocally concerning them insofar as power is taken abstracting from both: for otherwise it is not predicated of both, except as it abstracts from both: and according to this there remains the power which is rooted in the essence of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.

§ 41. TO THE FIRST therefore it must be said, that according as power abstracts both from generating and from creating, it does not signify a toward-something, but nay rather it signifies a something which belongs to the substance.

§ 42. To the other it must be said, that this is not true of active powers: since they are not perfected by their acts, but are previously perfected: because nothing acts unless it is perfect in being. In passive powers, however, in which there are the acts of active powers, as in a disposed patient, it is true that they are perfected and defined by acts: and in such a sense the Philosopher says that proposition in II De Anima , where he deals with passive apprehending powers, as he himself says in the same place: but in God there is no passive power: and therefore that objection is null.

§ 43. To the other it must be said, that power is taken according to one common account, according as it abstracts both from the act of creating and from the act of generating, and is in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit: but according as it is conjoined to the act of generating and creating, although it is not made other than it previously was, nevertheless it will then have another mode of signifying, by reason of which the power of generating does not belong to the Son nor to the Holy Spirit: but the power of creating belongs to the three: and the reason for this is clear from what was said before.

§ 44. These things being held, the Text of the first part is to be treated.

§ 45.

Articulus 5 — Whether The Son Can From Himself Beget Another Son, A Grandson Of The Father, And Whether The Father Can Beget Many Sons

Whether the Son can beget from himself another Son, a grandson of the Father, and whether the Father can beget several Sons?

§ 47. "But it strongly moves us, etc." By reason of this chapter it is asked, Whether the Son can beget from himself another Son who would be a grandson of the Father?

§ 48. 1. Now it seems that he can: for in lower things we see that the same force of fecundity is in the son which is in the father: since therefore the Son of God is not less perfect than a son of man, he will seem to himself have the same power of generating which the Father also has.

§ 49. 2. Also, Augustine says in the Text, not that he could not, but that it was not fitting: therefore it does not seem that it is from a defect of generative power that he did not produce a Son.

§ 50. 3. Moreover, on account of this the Son is called the image of the Father: because he agrees with him in all things: therefore also in generative power, and thus it seems that he can produce another Son.

§ 51. Moreover, it is asked next to this further,

§ 52. Whether the Father could have produced more sons than one?

§ 53. 1. And it seems that he could: because in lower things in which there is imperfect power, a father by the same power produces several sons: therefore much more can the superior Father produce several.

§ 54. 2. Moreover, the Son having been begotten, either the power of generating remained in the Father, or not: if so, since in eternal things to be and to be able are the same, the Father begot Sons: if not, then it seems that the Father failed in something once the Son was begotten, which is absurd.

§ 55. 3. Moreover, what inconvenience would there be if the progression of divine generation were unmeasured [immoderata], which Augustine posits as an inconvenience? It seems none: because the multiplication of a good makes a greater good: therefore much more the multiplication of the best: but through many divine generations there would be a multiplication of the best: therefore it seems that it ought to be.

§ 56. 4. Also, just as was held in the preceding, a nature of itself is communicable: therefore as far as it is of itself, it is just as communicable to many, as to two, or three: and thus as communicable in the Son, as in the Father: since therefore it is not contracted by distinguishing features, owing to the fact that they do not fall into it, it will be communicated: and thus it seems that the progression of divine generation ought to be unmeasured.

§ 57. BUT ON THE CONTRARY: Of no nature can there be multiplication and communication without a receiver of that nature through the mode by which a supposit receives a nature: but there cannot be a plurality of supposits, unless there is a plurality of distinguishing

features distinguishing the supposits from one another. Let us see therefore in what ways supposits can be distinguished in one nature, and let us apply all the ways to the divine nature, and see how much the plurality of its supposits can be extended. Now there is one way through the matter in which the nature is in the supposit: and it is established that this way cannot be in divine things for three causes: one of which is that every communication of nature which occurs through matter occurs through the transmutation of matter: but in God there is no transmutation. The second is, since every such communication divides the nature, such that it itself is not one in number in the supposits, but one in account only. The third is, since every such multiplication is first in potency before in act: all of which are removed from the divine nature: therefore it is clear that there is not there a communication through the particulation of matter, that is, through this, that matter particulates the nature over a supposit. Now there is another way which is through properties making and constituting and distinguishing a supposit, although what it is from which it is is indifferent: and this sole way is possible in divine things: and let the properties of origin between the Father and the Son be taken (because concerning the Holy Spirit it will be clear below) nothing will be found except paternity and filiation: but these cannot be numbered through matter, as was proved: therefore they will not be numbered except through specific differences: but every paternity is the same in species as every paternity which is of a supposit of the same nature: similarly every filiation to every filiation: since therefore several sons either of one father or of their own sons do not differ in essence, if they have a difference, that will be taken according to properties: but their filiations do not differ in species or in matter: therefore their filiation will be one only: therefore they all will be one son differing neither in essence nor in property: therefore there cannot in any way be in divine things several sons, nor several fathers by the same reasoning.

§ 58. Also, Although communication is of the perfection of a simple nature, nevertheless multiplication is of its imperfection. PROOF. Multiplication in the supposits of one nature cannot be except for one of three causes, namely the multiple desire of matter, owing to the fact that matter does not desire to be perfected only in one part, but in all parts: or owing to the fact that it cannot be saved perpetually in a few, and therefore desires to have the form in many, so that, some being destroyed, it may remain in many: or from the fact that there are many acts or motions which it cannot fulfill with a few. In the first and second way it is in human beings, and other generable and corruptible things. In the third way it is in Angels and stars. Now it is established that in none of these ways can multiplication be in divine things. For the first and second are through the parts of matter which is not in God. But the third is on account of the imperfection of the agent and mover which cannot cause diverse things by one motor: therefore such a multiplication of supposits is not in the divine nature: therefore it will not be except according to the species of the properties of origin: and thence it follows as before.

§ 59. Also, The intellect of a speaker within himself is well able according to its own nature to bring forth a word to himself: but he cannot bring forth two such words, nor does one word bring forth another word: since therefore the highest spirit generates a word through this

mode, he neither can bring forth two words, nor will a word produce another word: and thus there will be only one father and one son.

§ 60. Moreover, For the communication of nature and the joyousness of society one is sufficient: therefore others, even if they could be generated, would be superfluous.

§ 61. Solution. One must consent to these last arguments, by saying that there cannot be except one God the Father, and one Son: because they all conclude of necessity. For although the last argument is or seems to be of fittingness, if nevertheless the argument of Anselm is conjoined to it, it will be necessary, namely that whatever minimum inconvenience in God is impossible.

§ 62. It must therefore be said to the first, that the same power is in the Son which is in the Father, but not to the same thing, as is easily clear from the preceding: nor from this is there an imperfection in the Son that he does not bring forth another Son, but rather a perfection, since he himself so contains the whole being of the Son, that if there were another, in no way could he differ from him.

§ 63. To the other the Master responds below saying: "For he did not lack the ability (non enim non potuit)," that is, he was not impotent from this: but what Augustine says, "it was not fitting," conjoined to the statement of Anselm, makes an impossibility: for if it was not fitting, it was inconvenient: therefore impossible for God: if therefore the vain and the frustrated are removed from lower nature, much more so from the superior nature.

§ 64. To the other it must be said, that he himself could not be an image in the property of the Father: because thus the account of the Father would cease, since the father and the son would differ neither in essence nor in property: hence an image according to its account always saves in something the account of distinction, in which it neither agrees nor can agree with him of whom it is the image: for by this very fact that it is an image, it is from another, but this is not to be dissimilar in something, but rather in that it is not a something, but a toward-something.

§ 65. To that which is further asked, Whether he could have produced several sons? it is clear through the preceding that he could not: because those sons would differ neither in essence nor in property: and thus they would be the same in all things, and not several: and therefore it is not similar concerning a lower father, in whom several sons are distinguished through matter, and through form according to the being which they have in this matter.

§ 66. To the other it must be said, that the power of generating does not fail in the Father, nor is this to ask something, Whether it also fails for the begotten Son, as if the generation of the Son were past? because in eternity and in the eternal nothing has passed, and nothing arrives: and therefore the Son is neither before nor after the power of generation, but in the standing 'now' is always begotten, as will be held below. For he is said to be always begotten: not because his generation has passed, but because it is perfect and always [present]: because it never fails in the standing 'now' of eternity: hence that objection pro-

ceeds concerning God as if concerning a temporal thing, and therefore is not valid.

§ 68. To the other it must be said, that divine generation cannot be unmeasured: owing to the fact that hypostases cannot be multiplied beyond three: and it would be the inconvenience which was stated above, namely that either from the fact that it could not be saved in a few, or that a few supposits would not suffice for many modes of acts if it were made unmeasured: and therefore the unmeasured cannot happen in God.

§ 69. To the other it must be said, that a nature of itself is communicable: but communication demands a distinction taken according to properties diverse in species and not in matter: and these cannot be beyond three in divine things, as is clear from the preceding.

§ 70.

Articulus 6 — Whether The Three Hypostases Can Be The Father Of Some Fourth

Whether three hypostases can be the father of some fourth?

§ 72. Next it is asked concerning this which he says by objecting to the contrary: "If the Son could beget, he could be a father, etc."

§ 73. For it seems that the argument of the Master is not valid: because if he were a father according to the heretics, then the same heresy could say that paternity is, and that the son is the father of that fourth, and thus he would be father and son by diverse respects, as often happens.

§ 74. To this it must be said, that this could not be: because as Anselm says, in all things unity remains in divine things where the opposition of relation does not distinguish: but in the generation of that fourth, the Son would be opposed neither to the Father nor to the Holy Spirit: therefore by one paternity all three would be the fathers of that son, just as the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, owing to the fact that in spirating the Holy Spirit, the Father does not have a relative opposition to the Son. Now the like of this is found neither in corporal nor in spiritual nature, that by one property of a father three hypostases are the father, or the fathers of one: hence there cannot be a father of some fourth.

§ 75.

Articulus 7 — Whether Because The Son Could Be Born, He Could Also Be Changed

Whether because the son could be born, could he also be changed?

§ 77. Next it is objected concerning this: "For if he could be born, to be the Son, and thus he could be changeable, etc."

§ 78. 1. For this does not seem to be true: because to be a son is not something with respect to which or towards which there is motion: for motion and change are not in a relation: and therefore it does not seem to follow, that he could be changed.

§ 79. 2. Moreover, The Father could be incarnated, and also the Holy Spirit, as is held below: but he who is incarnated is born: therefore he is changed according to this text, which is false.

§ 80. Solution. It must be said, that although in a toward-something and toward a toward-something there is no motion per se, nevertheless toward it there is motion per accidens, which is in all the predicaments, as the Philosopher says: but per se and per accidens motion do not fall upon God.

§ 81. To the other it must be said, that incarnation does not signify an immutation of God or of the divine nature: but rather that another, namely the human nature, holds itself in another way to it, because [it is] according to union, as is to be determined in Book III of the Sentences: but here the Holy Spirit would be changed from his property, which change would fall into the divine person: and therefore the Master speaks well.

§ 82.

Divisio Textus

§ 88. DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

§ 89. "Likewise it is asked by some, If the powerful Father, etc." Here begins the second part of this distinction in which he asks, when it is said, "Is the powerful Father able by nature to beget the Son, etc.?" in which question on account of the Text the power is drawn to the essence, and is further removed from the notional act: hence there can be some reason for doubt, whether this is some power which is in the Son? And this part

contains two chapters. In the first, it is distinguished thus: the Father has the power of begetting the Son. In the second, however, it is distinguished thus: the Father has the power of generating which the Son has, there, G, also when it is said, etc.

Articulus 8 — How "Non Enim Non Potuit" Is Understood

"For he did not lack the ability," how is it understood?

"For he did not lack the ability," how is it understood?

§ 84. Next it is asked concerning this: "For he did not lack the ability, etc."

§ 85. It seems to be an unfitting exposition when it is said: "Did not lack the ability to" (Non non potuisse): because he was not impotent from this: for this cannot be extracted from the meaning of the word.

§ 86. Solution. The Master wishes that "he did not lack the ability" (non non potuit), the negation there is like a privative term: and then "for he did not lack the ability" (non enim non potuit) is worth only as much (as the ancients say) as, "for he was not powerless/unable" (non enim impotuit), so to speak: and then further it follows, he was not impotent from this.

§ 87.

Articulus 9 — Whether The Father By Nature Is Able To Beget The Son

Whether the Father by nature is able to generate the Son?

It is objected, however, concerning this which the Text says: To which we say, because the Father is not able except by nature, etc.

AGAINST:
1. The Philosopher says that to whom belongs the power, to him also belongs the act: if therefore the power of generating is of nature, the act will also be of nature: and thus nature generates, which was denied above.

1. Furthermore, if the Father is able by nature to beget the Son, since the same nature is in the Son and the Holy Spirit, in these there will be the same power: either therefore possible to act, or impossible. If in the first way: let us then suppose that the Son generates and the Holy Spirit, then from this does not follow the impossible which was disproved above: because a great impossible follows, namely that the series of divine generation is not fulfilled, as Augustine says. But if it is impossible to act, then it will be empty and vain, which is absurd.

Solution. It must be said that in truth the Father is not able except by nature, as the Master says: but power is signified differently when it is said, the power of nature generating, and the power of generating absolutely: because the power of generating by nature in that which is of this kind, does not denote power in comparison to act, but in comparison to the nature in which it is rooted, yet with some inclination to act: but when it is said, the power of generating, it is said power in act, as was said before: hence nothing prohibits conceding of the first power, that it is in the Son under such distinction, that generating can be the gerundive of an active personal verb: and then it should not be conceded that the power of nature generating is in the Son: because the sense would be that the power is in the Son which by nature could generate, even if it does not generate: because he who generates from the power of nature does not generate from necessity. But if it is the gerundive of an impersonal verb or of a passive personal verb, then it can well be conceded: because if it is the gerundive of an impersonal verb, then the sense is that the power from nature is in the Son by which someone can generate. But if it is of a passive personal verb, the sense is that the power from nature is in the Son by which he is generated: and this last sense the Master places in the Text: for all acts are of particulars and of power: but nevertheless powers are rooted in nature: and therefore according to Damascene, although power is of nature, as in which it is founded, nevertheless it does not denominate nature, but hypostasis: hence Damascene says that although in Christ there are two wills, nevertheless there is only one willing, and not two willing: and therefore it is not necessary that the act is of nature immediately, so that it is not of hypostasis. Or it may be said that this is generally true, to whom belongs the power, to him belongs the act: but it is not necessary that in the same way: because power is of someone according to nature, and act is of the same according to hypostasis, and thus it is of nature in hypostasis or suppositum.

To the other it must be said that one nature is in three persons, but the comparison of nature is not the same in them: because by relation one is distinguished from another: and therefore inasmuch as nature is in one, it is compared by the reason of power to one, accord-

ing to some act according to which the same power remaining in nature cannot be compared in another: because it is not the same act, as we said above, because the power of generating by the term generating is joined to the notion of the Father, which conjunction it cannot have in the Son or the Holy Spirit.

Articulus 10 — Whether It Is The Same Power By Which The Father Could Beget, And By Which The Son Be Begotten

Whether the power by which the Father could generate is the same as that by which the Son could be generated?

Then it is inquired concerning what the Master says: For the same power is in the Son, by which he could be begotten, which is in the Father, by which he could generate, etc.

1. For this does not seem true: because the power of the active and the passive is not the same: but to generate is active, and to be generated is passive.
2. Furthermore, the active and the passive differ, just as the efficient and the material: but the efficient with the material can never be the same in essence, as the Philosopher proves: therefore neither is the power to generate the same as the power to be generated.
3. Furthermore, even in names we see that there is not one notion by which the Father is generating, and by which the Son is begotten: therefore neither will there be one power, as it seems.

Solution. It must be said that there is one power in the notion of natural power, but not one in the notion of power to act: because power according to the notion of understanding is a mean between the nature in which it is rooted, and the act which proceeds from it, and the Master speaks according to that comparison in which it is compared to the nature in which it is rooted.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that in divine things nothing is passive: but the principiant and the principiate are scarcely admitted there: and indeed one power of nature as such can be something principiant and principiate, although this cannot be one power related to act.

To the second, it must be said that that proposition is true in those things in which there is an efficient and active, and a passive and physical matter: but the mode of the active is one thing, and the active itself is another: the mode of the passive is one thing, and the passive itself is another. For to generate in divine things is not to act, although it has the mode of the active which the Grammarian attends to. Similarly, to be generated is not to suffer except according to the grammatical mode: but for such suffering which is in the mode of signifying only, it suffices that the principiate be in any way.

To the other, it must be said that the notion compares power to act, and joins it to the act: and therefore it is not surprising if it then belongs distinctly to persons: but nature, which has power as if indistinct, does not do so: for power is not distinct except through act.

Articulus 11 — Whether That Is True, The Son Has The Power Of Generating Which The Father Has

Whether this is true, the Son has the power of generating which the Father has?

Then it is asked about that which is posited in the second chapter: and it distinguishes it, namely this, the Son has the power of generating which the Father has, etc.

For this seems not to be distinguishable, but absolutely false: because in no way does the power seem to be joined to the act, and to the relation opposed to that act: however, when it is said, the power of generating, the power is joined to the act: and when it is said, the Son has this power which the Father, it is joined to the relation of the Son and to the property, which is repugnant to the act: therefore it seems to be absolutely false.

Solution. It must be said that in truth it is twofold, as the Author says: for when it is said, the Son has, by the term "has" this determination is understood according to nature, because he has it only through nature: and thus the comparison of power to nature and to act is made: and according to the first comparison it is true, but according to the second it is false, as the Master says.

DISTINCTIO VIII

Divisio Textus

Now concerning truth or property and immutability, etc. Here begins the third part of that treatise on the generation of the Son. For since in every generation the essence is in some way joined to the begotten by the begetter, it could be believed to be divided by the communication of eternal generation: and then it would not be immutable, nor simple: and therefore it is introduced here concerning these, so that we know it is not divided, and yet communicated in the begetter and the begotten. However, this distinction is divided into three parts, in the first of which it treats of the truth and property of the divine essence. In the second, however, it treats of the immutability of the same, there, C, of God. In the third, however, of the essence alone, etc., it treats of the simplicity of the same there, D, Likewise also alone properly and truly,

The first of these is divided into two parts. In the first, it determines the truth of the divine essence. In the second, however, it objects and solves, there, B, Here diligently consider, etc.

Articulus 1 — What Truth Is, What Property, And What Incommutability

What is truth, what is property, and what is immutability?

Here, however, many doubts arise concerning the first part. But before the Letter, three things must be determined: the first of which is, What is truth, and property, and immutability, and simplicity? The second is, according to what is the number of them considered? The

third is about the signification of these names, nature, substance, essence, being, which the Master places at the beginning of this chapter.

First, what is truth? 1. Augustine says that truth is the entity of a thing: therefore it seems that the truth of the divine nature is the same as its entity.

1. Likewise, some define the true by saying that the true is the indivision of act from potency: but in divine things there is no act and potency: therefore there is not there the indivision of act from potency: therefore truth does not pertain to the divine nature, as it seems.
2. Furthermore, truth is rectitude perceptible only by the mind, as Anselm says: but this truth does not pertain only to the divine nature, but to many others, therefore this is not the truth which is sought here.
3. Furthermore, the Philosopher says that the true and the false are in the soul, according to which truth is the adequation of the intellect or mind with the thing: thus again truth will not be proper to the divine nature: or if there will be truth there, it will be in its ideas, and not in nature according to which it is nature, as it seems.

Moreover, it is asked about the reason of the exposition which the Master says, truth or property.

1. For it is evident that truth pertains to many: therefore it is not proper to the divine nature alone.
2. Furthermore, where the Master ought to proceed concerning the quantity of truth or property of the divine nature, he proceeds concerning the property of its entity: therefore it seems that truth and entity are the same.

Solution. It must be said that although the true is taken in many ways, as the objections prove, yet here the true is said to be the same as unmixed with foreign nature. For there are three foreign things especially, namely privation which is foreign to entity, and potency, and diverse or diversity in the being itself: for what is in privation is not, but has aptitude to be: but what is in potency can be: and what is from diverse things does not have its own being, because it has the entity of diverse things: hence truth is said here to be the unmixedness of the foreign to being, in the way we say true gold is not mixed with copper: and thus there will not be true being except the divine nature, which is neither subject to privation, nor in potency, nor consists of diverse things, as the Master will prove below, when it will be asked about the quantity of this truth.

Therefore, to the first, it is said that the definition of Augustine concerning the true is well fitting: because nothing is so properly that which is, as the divine nature, because it is wholly and solely that which is, and not mixed with those things which according to something are not, or are from diverse things.

To the other it must be said that even that definition is sufficiently fitting: because no act is so indivisible from potency as that which is the same: but it must be that potency is not taken for material potency: because the divine essence is neither the same as material potency, nor even indivisible from it: and this because since the divine essence is the universal mover of all, remaining stable in itself, it cannot be moved: but matter is always moved and changeable. Likewise, because the divine essence governs all things without being mixed with them, as the Philosopher says: but matter is mixed with material things: therefore it must be that active potency is taken: and then it is the same as its potency: and therefore truer, because it has being more truly as acting than as suffering: and thus the divine essence well has act and potency, and has them indivisible: because it is precisely the same according to which act is in the agent, as are interior acts, such as understanding, willing, and the like: for there are certain things outside it which hold themselves on the part of act, such as creation, recreation, governance also in some way: and those are not the same as it according to which they are in created, recreated, governed, and the like.

To what is objected from Anselm, it must be said that antonomastically and truly it pertains to it alone: because it alone is straight by itself, and all other things straight, by curvature according to potency at least are mixed, and therefore do not have complete truth, as the divine nature.

To the other it must be said that the true and false which are in the soul are from the act of the soul which is to compose or divide: and of such truth it is not asked here because that truth is in the sign, and caused by this truth.

To the other it must be said that property is the same as the disposition of truth which pertains to the divine entity alone according to that complete unmixedness, of which it has been said: for thus it pertains to no other.

To the other it must be said that in truth entity is the subject of truth according to reason, but in divine things in which there is no composition, it is the same otherwise signified in one and otherwise in another. For in entity it is signified as in a simple concept, before which nothing is conceived of the thing: because being is the first falling into our intellect: but truth touches the property of unmixedness: and therefore the Master calls entity, property, truth, the same, although not signified in the same way: because entity is the first, and older, as Dionysius says: but truth is its disposition of which it has been said: but property is according to which it follows divine being, and inasmuch as it is divine, and does not follow another being: just as we also say the property of a rectilinear triangle to have three equal to two right angles, because it follows the triangle, inasmuch as it is rectilinear and triangle.

Articulus 2 — According To What Are Truth, Incommunicability, And Simplicity Taken

Concerning what are truth, incommunicability, and simplicity received?

Secondly, it is asked, concerning what are these received?

1. For in divine things there are three, namely essence, person, notion; therefore it seems that these three ought to be reduced to those three.

But against this is that all these are of the divine nature in that the divine nature is: therefore they will not be reduced to person and notion. But according to this, since in the divine nature there is nothing to be received except the divinity possessed and possessing it, that is, nature and suppositum, it seems that these ought to be only two and not three.

1. Furthermore, we have seen that those things which are opposed contrarily, and as privation and habit, and contradictorily, are the same subject around which they are; but communicability and incommunicability are opposed contrarily, or as privation and habit: therefore they ought to be considered around the same according to the reason of the subject: but in lower things incommunicability is not around what it is, but around what it is, or the matter: therefore it seems that in divine things according to the reason of understanding incommunicability is around the same. Since therefore in divine things there is no suppositum except person, it seems that incommunicability is of the things suitable to the person according to itself, and not to nature.
2. Likewise, truth and entity according to act, which is true entity, in lower things is only by the grace of being or what it is: therefore it seems that in divine things truth pertains to essence: but simplicity is said from the privation of composite parts: therefore it seems that simplicity is from the privation of the first composite parts of being: these, however, are what it is, and being according to Boethius: therefore simplicity in divine things will be from the indifference of what it is and being in divine things.

Solution. Agreeing with the last objection, we say that these three are received in such a way that truth is taken from the being of essence, incommunicability, however, from what it is, and simplicity, however, from the indifference of both. And what is objected in the second place, that there is nothing that is in divine things or suppositum except in person, it must be said that this is true according to the thing, but from the mode of understanding, when it is said, God, divinity is signified in the possessor, and that possessor is called suppositum not in the reason of person: and by the grace of that, divine substance follows incommunicability.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that I well concede that these three are not taken from those three, because they are consequent to essence in that essence is. For although there are only those three in divine things, yet those three are not three there, because they do not make number: essence, however, although it is only one, yet it is to be considered in many ways, namely in the possessor, and outside the possessor, or according to both, as has been said.

To the other, it must be said that there is nothing to be received in nature except the possessor and the possessed:

but from this itself results a third consideration from the comparison of one to the other through indifference. To the others, the solution is clear from what was said at the beginning of the solution.

Articulus 3 — Whether The Names Said Of God, Such As Essence, Substance, Knowledge, Wisdom, Goodness, Signify The Same Or Different Things; And Whether They Ought To Be Called Synonyms Or Not

Whether the names said of God as essence; substance, knowledge, wisdom, goodness signify the same or different things: and whether they ought to be called synonyms or not?

Then it is asked about the difference of those names which the Master touches upon in the beginning, namely nature, substance, being, etc.: and for the sake of those, it is also asked about others which are wisdom, knowledge, goodness, and all that are said of God. And we will inquire two things, namely whether these signify entirely the same thing? And secondly about their composition with God, whether any composition is noted to occur there, or none?

1. It seems, however, that all things said of God essentially are synonyms: for synonyms are those which signify the same thing, although they may have different interpretations according to the name, like stone and rock: therefore, since all that multitude of essential names signify the same thing, although they may have different interpretations according to the name, yet they seem to be synonyms.
2. Likewise, synonyms are those which have only a multitude according to voice, just as homonyms have unity according to voice, and multitude according to being: but in these, nothing is found in essence or person that corresponds to that multitude, because neither substance nor accident: therefore it seems that these are most truly synonyms.
3. Likewise, Augustine says, and it was held above as authority, that in God, to be is the same as to be wise, and God is by that by which He is wise, and He is wise by that by which He is: but this could not be unless wisdom and essence named the same thing and according to the same: therefore it seems that they are only synonyms: and the same reasoning applies to others: therefore it seems that all are only synonyms.

But on the contrary: Whatever names most truly make known those from which they are imposed, if those from which they are imposed are not of one reason, the names themselves are not synonyms: but essence and wisdom in God most truly make known those from which they are imposed, and they are not of one reason: therefore they are not synonyms. The first is evident of itself. The second is proved thus: Here it is held in the Letter, that only God is truly essence. Similarly, Augustine says that only God is truly wise: but the reason of essence in that which is such is not the reason of wisdom in that which is such: because otherwise in all things to be and to be wise would be the same, which is false: therefore these names are not synonyms.

To this, some have wished to say that these names said of God differ by connotations in the creature, and do not have any difference if they are taken absolutely in God. But on the contrary: A connotation is an effect in the creature: but an effect is only from a cause as a cause: therefore these names would not be said of God except as of a cause as a cause: which is plainly false, because wisdom or wise names no cause as a cause. Furthermore, let us

suppose by the intellect that there are no connotations in the creature, I ask whether God is still wise, good, being, and suchlike? It is evident that He is: therefore that solution is null.

Furthermore, what is posterior is not the cause of diversity or identity in that which is prior: but connotations are posterior in time: therefore they are not the cause of identity or diversity of those things which are from eternity.

Therefore there were others who said that in truth God does not have a proper name, but we have given Him names: and therefore these names are transferred to Him from those things we find in creatures: and according to those, they take diversity. But on the contrary: Either these name what is properly in God, or what is figuratively in Him. If in the first way, the solution is of no value: because the question still remains, how they have a difference in signifying according to those things they name in God. If in the second way, then God is not truly life, but figuratively, nor is He truly wisdom, which is an absurd heresy. Furthermore, it was held above that such things are said of God according to the thing primarily, and secondarily of the creature.

Finally. Without prejudice, it must be said that in all such names two things must be considered, namely what they name, and in what is signified to place what they name: for when I say, sense, this name, sense, I take according to what it names only: and therefore I take it in one common reason. But if I say the sense of man, and the sense of a brute: now I take it in another and another reason, according to which I take it in that in which the signified of it is noted to be placed. Thus I say of such divine names. For if they are considered according to what they name only, then all those names have a diversity of reason of themselves: for the reason of essence is one by itself, and the reason of wisdom is another by itself, and so of others. But if I consider them according to that in which their signified is placed, this is such that it has indifference which is to be and to be something. For these three differ according to Boethius: because what is, is that which the thing truly is, and the suppositum: but to be is its essence or the act of essence: but to be something is by something drawing it to part or species: and all these are the same in the divine: because in God what is and to be are the same, and God Himself is also whatever He has: and thus in Him to be and to be something are the same. If therefore it is asked, Why is wisdom goodness, and these two the essence itself? whence is it? it will not be said that this is from wisdom insofar as it is wisdom, or from essence insofar as it is essence: but it will be said that this is because in that in which these are, there is such simplicity, that it itself is that which is its being, and its being is that which it is. From the first, therefore, is the diversity of attributes, from the second, however, the identity of things: and thus it is evident by a plain solution, that these are not synonyms even understood from eternity by God, and abstracted from all causality.

To the first, it must be said that these are not synonyms, because they do not have the same reason of the thing they signify, but they are the same in the thing, not because of that from which they are imposed, but because of that in which their significates are placed: this, however, is not in rock and stone: because those do not have the diversity of any thing, but only of the name, according to etymology, not of the thing, but of the name.

To the other, it must be said that these do not have only a multitude according to voice, but as far as the nature of their significates is concerned, they have a multitude of the reason of the thing. But that this thing is that, this does not belong to them per se, but through another in which they are.

To the other, it must be said that Augustine considers the identity of the thing which is from that these are in such a subject, and he does not consider to be wise and to be according to the intentions they name.

To what is objected against the solutions introduced, I think well that those solutions do not hold well.

Articulus 4 — How The Composition Of These Names With God, Who Is Not Composite, Can Be Verified

How can the composition of these names be verified with God who is not composite?

Further, it is asked, since these are signified to be composed concerning that in which they are, since they have complete identity from that in which they are, how can their composition be signified?

1. For every note of composition signifies that a composite is composed from diverse things: but when I say, God is eternal, or immutable, or wise, here the note of composition intervenes: therefore it signifies God to be composed from diverse things.
2. Likewise, in the first book of Physics, the Philosopher says that those who say all things are one are disturbed by the signification of composition, and they removed the note of composition signified in this verb, is, saying that it is not necessary to say that the wall is white, but the wall whitens: and they did this only because the word is signifies a certain composition, which cannot be understood without diverse composites: therefore in such cases the signification always seems false, when it is said, God is wise, God is good.
3. If perhaps it is said that in certain compositions the same is predicated of itself, as when I say, man is man, donkey is donkey. This is nothing: because in such cases the word man is subjected for the sake of what it is, and is predicated for the sake of that by which it is: and between those a composition intervenes well: but in God there is no composition.
4. Likewise, the predicate in every proposition is placed as the cause of making known the subject: and they are not the same by which something is made known, and that which is made known by it: therefore in all things a composition intervenes.

If perhaps it is said that such a composition is on the part of our intellect, which does not take the simple signified in many ways, except by composing one with another and dividing, although the composed and divided are the same. Then it is objected that according to this, all our intellect is false about God, since it does not take the thing as it is, but rather as it is not. If perhaps it is said that it is as in mathematics, that there is no falsehood in abstractions,

because they do not posit the mode of abstraction in the thing: thus here the composing intellect does not posit its mode in the thing. This is nothing: because although mathematics according to being are in natural things, and not separate from them: yet by the being of quantity they do not have a definitive reason from natural things because otherwise a wooden line and a stone line would be defined equivocally by the being of quantity, which is false: hence mathematics have something on the part of the thing, namely the nature of quantity, upon which they place such an abstraction, otherwise the intellect would be false: but in divine things there seems to be nothing from which such a composition arises.

Solution. To this, without prejudice, it must be said that the solutions of certain great Masters are very insufficient: hence it must be said that in truth in divine things there is no composition in the thing itself: however, as Damascene says, some things in divine matters signify the nature, some what follows the nature, like just and wise. Hence our intellect in such a composition is in a triple act: for if each of these names is taken according to that from which it is imposed, or according to that which it signifies, which is the same, there will be one intellect of substance, and another of wisdom, and so of others, as was said before. But if these are taken by our intellect, not as from that which they signify, but in that in which they are, they will be taken all as one and the same because of the double simplicity of it, namely the indifference of what is and being and something being, or of the having and the habit. The third act of the intellect arises from the comparison of one mode of understanding with another, as we compare that which follows the nature in the reason of following, not in the reason of identity, to the nature which it follows: and thus arises the intellect composing one with another, and forming compositions: which nevertheless the note of composition is not in God, except in the reason of the properties of those which are composed: but the note of composition is mediated by our intellect, which does not join those which according to themselves have diverse reasons without a mediating note of composition: on the part of the thing, however, this composition will only note identity. And thus it is clear how the composing intellect has something in divine matters upon which it is founded on the part of those things which it composes, if they are taken according to their proper reasons.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that when it is said, God is eternal, and such like, the composition notes identity among those things which have diversity according to their proper reasons, although they have identity from the subject: and therefore in some way the composing intellect is deceived over the diversity of reasons so that it may have composables, and over the identity of things on the part of the subject: and therefore it composes them with a composition noting the same according to the thing, in which in the same way there is diversity of reason according to the attributes to it.

To the second, it must be said that they removed the note of composition: because they said that only one thing exists in every way, namely in reality, and in reason, and in such things no composition can be posited, because in such things the intellect finds no composables in reality or reason. But it is not so in divine attributes, in which the diversity of the reason of the attributes is preserved, although not the diversity of things.

To the other, it must be said that when it is said, man is man, that this is true: because among those composed things the diversity of things is noted, namely what is and being: and therefore there is greater diversity in this composition, man is man, than in this, God is.

wise, or just. Nevertheless, when it is said, "God is wise," there is a diversity in the concept of the nature and of that which follows upon the nature: and that diversity is sufficient for the intellect making a combination by a composition that denotes identity.

To the other it must be said that there is a becoming known with respect to us, and a becoming known with respect to the nature of the thing. And nothing prevents a predicate in divine things from serving to make the subject become known with respect to us, although in the nature of the thing the subject and the predicate are the same.

But regarding what is objected against the solution of certain people, it seems that it must be conceded.

Articulus 5 — What The Difference Is Between The Attributes Of The Names Divine Nature, Substance, And Essence

What is the diversity between the attributes of the names of the divine nature, and of substance, and of essence?

Having held these things, we must look at what is said in the text.

And first, it is asked about the diversity of these names, divine nature, and substance or essence.

And it must be said that these are the same, but they differ in concept. But "nature" is taken in two ways according to its two significations, namely as it is an internal power, according to which it is defined as the principle and cause of motion and rest in that in which it is essentially and not accidentally. For thus also that force is taken which Boethius defines, that "nature is a force innate to things, procreating like from like."[56] And thus it is sometimes said that the Father generates by power. For in this sense, nature in the person is some principle of natural acts, like generating, spirating, etc. And therefore Augustine says that the Father generates the Son from his nature. And Anselm says that the Father and the Son spirate the Holy Spirit from their nature. "Nature" is also taken for form, according to how Boethius defines nature, that "nature is the specific difference informing each thing,"[57] and thus it is taken here: not that I mean to say that the divine nature is the specific difference of anything, nor that it is a genus or species (because it is neither a genus, nor a species, nor an individual, as will be clear below), but rather that according to that understanding it is taken formally, as when it is said, "the Father is the divine nature," and in this way it is frequently taken by the Saints.

But "substance" can be taken in two ways, namely from the act of standing under (substandi), or from the difference of substance which is divided against accident. And if it is taken in the first way, since in divine things there are properties under which the persons stand according to some mode of understanding, "substance" then signifies the "whatness" of

the person, in the way that Augustine says that person signifies a subsistent through itself and a substance: and thus the Greeks concede that there are three substances in divine things. But if it is taken from the difference by which it is divided against accident, then substance will be called being through itself, just as accident is called being through another. And thus substance is closer to standing for the divine essence, than for the persons: and in this sense the Latins deny that there are three substances in the Trinity.

But "essence" taken abstractly is said as formally simple, and making to be, and not making this being or that being which is specified and drawn to a part. For just as deity formally signifies God, so essence signifies being (esse) indistinctly. And thus Anselm says in the Monologion that just as light (lux), to shine (lucere), and shining (lucens) differ, so do essence (essentia), being (esse), and being (ens) differ.[58] And thus essence is that by which a thing formally is, and being (esse) is its act which it has in that which is. But that which is, is the concrete being (ens) itself. And according to this it is clear that being (ens) does not signify a simple concept before which there is nothing according to the intellect. In another way being (ens) is spoken of, according as being is the primary cause for all other things: and according to this being is first, and before it there is nothing, and thus being is closer to the divine essence. But in the first way it is closer to

the person. And therefore in the first sense it is conceded by some that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are three beings (entes). But not in the second understanding: because according to that mode the word being (ens) signifies the primary cause for all things. And thus it signifies the simple first nature according to the intellect: whence if there were a plurality in this way, it would follow that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit would be three beings (entia), which is false.

Articulus 6 — Whether Wisdom Is Said From Sapere

Whether wisdom (sapientia) is named from being wise (sapere)?

Whether wisdom is named from being wise?

Next it is asked about what he says: For just as from that which is to be wise (sapere) wisdom is named, etc.

For rather it seems to be the converse: because being wise is the act of wisdom, and the effect is rather named from the cause, than conversely.

Solution. It must be said that Augustine is speaking according to the abstracting intellect: and then it is true that the abstract is taken from the concrete, and the concrete becomes known through the act. And therefore the first abstraction is taken from the act: and thus wisdom is named from being wise.

56. Boethius, Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, ch. 1.

Articulus 7 — Whether Being Is Said Of God And His Creatures Univocally; And Whether According To Intension And Remission Being Is Said Of God And Creatures

Whether being (esse) is said of God and his creatures univocally? and, Whether being (esse) is said of God and creatures according to intension and remission?

Next it is asked about what is said: And who is more, than he who said, etc.

For from this a twofold inconvenience is concluded: § 1. Whatever things are said according to more and less, receive intension and remission: but being is said according to more and less: therefore it receives intension and remission. But if this is conceded, it follows that being itself is in the genus of accident: because essentials and substantials are not intended and remitted.

§ 2. Similarly it follows further, that everything which is, is intended and remitted. For if everything which is, is founded upon being (ens), and if being is intended and remitted, it seems that everything which is would also be intended and remitted.

§ 3. Furthermore, whatever is said according to more and less of some things, is in them according to one concept. But being (ens) is said according to more and less of the Creator and creatures: therefore it is in the Creator and creatures according to one concept: which is false, because Creator and creature are univocalized according to nothing.

Solution. It must be said that there is intension properly speaking, and there is intension in a certain respect (secundum aliquid). Properly intense is what is intense according to intrinsic causes, according to approach or withdrawal from some terminus such as from the true imposition of the name, or towards something that has it in the highest degree, as the good in the best is in God. But intension in a certain respect is when something, from extrinsic causes, or what is more true, from its order to extrinsic causes, is said to be less or more in a certain respect, or even from participating in it by a stronger difference than another. In the first way white, and hot, and the like are intended. Secondly, that is said to be more good which does not have a cause of its goodness, but is itself substantially good, than that which is good from another. And in this way that is said to be more being which is through itself, than that which is through another. In the third way substance is said to be more being than accident, and act more being than potency. And in the second way God is said to be more being (ens) and more to be (esse) than anything created. Whence the solution to the first is clear: because it is not inconvenient in this way for being

to belong to some things more and less: and this is not absolutely to be intended and remitted.

§ To the second it must be said that that objection would proceed if it were simply intended and remitted. For it does not follow: "This is in this one according to more, and in that one according to less: therefore it is intended and remitted": because where there is properly intension and remission, the quality can be intended and remitted in the same

57. Boethius, Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, ch. 1.

subject. If, however, it is conceded improperly, as was said, that it is intended, and is in diverse things according to more and less, then it must be solved by the said distinction.

§ To the other it must be said that, as has been said many times, there is not anything univocal to the creature and the Creator, as existing in both according to one concept: but something can agree according to prior and posterior. But since prior and posterior are said in three ways, as the Philosopher seems to say in book IV of the First Philosophy [Metaphysics], namely either what is participated by a stronger and weaker difference, as being (ens) of substance and accident: or as in order to the act of an efficient cause which essentially belongs to one, and other things through another approaching the mode of efficient causality, just as a doctor is called a doctor essentially, and an old woman by imitating, or medicinal instruments as those through which the act is exercised: or through a diverse respect to one end, which in one way is essentially induced in the univocal, and other things operate diversely towards its induction, just as healthy in complexions essentially, and urine healthy because indicating, and diet healthy as preserving, and medicine as helping nature. Since, I say, this is so, the analogy is in God and the creature in none of these ways. But rather in this way, that being and the like are essentially substantially in God, and in creatures through another and participatively: and not in such a way that God is diversely related to created things, or to some one thing to which the Creator and creature are related through prior and posterior, as is clear in the examples given beforehand. But because inferior things are diversely related to the Creator: for although the First relates in one way to all things according to Dionysius and the Philosopher, yet they do not relate to Him in one way. Thus therefore, according to this analogy it can be said that something is common to the Creator and the creature: however, from "more and less" said in that way which we predicted, it does not follow that they agree univocally: but it would follow, if "more and less" were taken properly, and with proper intension.

Articulus 8 — Whether The Definitions Of Eternity Given By The Authors Are Good

Whether the definitions of eternity given by the Authors are good?

Next it is asked about what he says: He is truly and properly called essence, whose essence does not know past or future, etc. For what he says here, is said by reason of eternity. Whence something must briefly be touched upon concerning eternity, because it has been treated more broadly elsewhere. Therefore it is asked, What is eternity? and what is eternal? and what things are in eternity?

§ To the first we proceed thus: Boethius says that eternity is the whole, simultaneous and perfect possession of interminable life.[59]

§ 1. But it seems inconvenient that he defines by a privation when he says, Interminable: for a privation does not certify anything except through the species opposed to it: and no mention is made of that species.

58. Anselm, Monologion, ch. 6.

§ 2. Furthermore, it seems inconvenient that since eternity is said from being (esse)—for eternity is said to be outside the limits of end and beginning—he defines it through life.

§ 3. Furthermore, the first measure according to the intellect seems to belong first according to the intellect: but being is prior to life: therefore it seems that eternity, which is the first measure, ought more to be defined by being than by life.

§ 4. Furthermore, a measure is only of what is measured: but the first measured thing is a quantum either dimensionally, or potentially, or virtually: since therefore being and

life do not signify something somewhat distended virtually, it ought not to be defined by being nor by life.

§ 5. Also, eternity is in the genus of duration: but possession of life does not signify something enduring, or a duration: therefore it is poorly defined by that.

§ 6. Furthermore, "possession" is said as if a positioning of the feet (pedum positio): and it is transferred to matters of fortune: therefore it is not properly with respect to life.

§ 7. Also, every duration is protracted: no protracted thing is whole simultaneously: therefore eternity which is a duration, is not whole simultaneously.

§ 8. Furthermore, below it will be held, But he was, who never was lacking, he is who always is, he will be who never will be lacking: and "is," and "will be," do not signify whole simultaneously: therefore what is with them, is not whole simultaneously. But eternity is with them, as it seems: therefore it is not whole simultaneously.

§ 9. Furthermore, "whole" and "simultaneous" seem to say the same thing: for the whole is that of which no parts are outside itself, and simultaneous is that whose parts stand together in itself: therefore the other is superfluous, as it seems.

§ 10. Furthermore, every whole has parts: but eternity does not have parts: therefore eternity is not well said to be "whole."

§ 11. Furthermore, Isaac in the book On Definitions says, Eternity is a continuous unintersected space: but a space seems to have parts, and not all simultaneously: therefore it seems that he speaks poorly when he says that it is whole simultaneously.[60]

§ 12. Also, Dionysius in the book On the Divine Names: Eternity is ancient, and immutable, and universal by measuring.[61] But here neither of the Authors defines by life: therefore Boethius seems to define poorly.

Solution. It must be said that in truth Boethius defines eternity according as it is in that which is truly eternal: and this is taken up by Anselm in the Monologion, where he says thus: Since the divine substance is nothing else but its life and its eternity, nor is it terminable in any way, nor except simultaneously and perfectly whole: what else is true eternity which belongs to him alone, than interminable life, existing simultaneously and perfectly whole?[62] Whence it is clear that he does not define eternity according as it is taken abstractly and formally: but rather materially,

59. Boethius, De Consolatione Philosophiae, V, pr. 6.

according as it is to consider it in an enduring thing, which is the cause of the duration of other things, whence enduring life is called here eternity, as it seems to me. But since life is manifold, namely according to being, and according to well-being: and living according to well-being according to sense, as in pleasure: and according to the intellect, as in morals: and this according to the state of morals in civil affairs, or in grace: and further according to the state of the way (via) and the homeland (patria): and further according to Creator and creature: life is not taken here properly according to Anselm's explanation except according to the intellect, and in the Creator who alone is properly eternal. But here life is taken as participated, or in itself. If as participated, thus it is in those participating in eternity, as in the Blessed who are not eternal things. But if it is taken in itself, again it is in two ways, namely as it is the act of the spirit according to the reason of understanding and the first, and thus it is not taken in the concept of a measure, except perhaps exemplarily as other things approximate to it. It is also taken as it is formally considered for duration itself: and thus it is in the concept of a measure, and it relates to other measures as cause, and measure: and as exemplary measure, and excelling measure. As cause: because Dionysius says in the book On the Divine Names: God the eternal is to be praised, according as he himself is the maker of aevum and time, existing before the ages.[63] But as an exemplary measure: because other things imitate it insofar as

they are able. For it itself is simultaneously in being (esse) and potency and act according to its comparison to the truly eternal. And the aevum goes forth from it, and imitates it simultaneously in being and to be able, but not in act which is operation: for the potency of an Angel is perfectly whole, nor does it expect an act, nor go out into it: but according to the vicissitude of understandings and affections it is not simultaneous: nay rather, as Augustine says, God moves the spiritual creature through time, and not through place. Time indeed, although perhaps it is simultaneous in its temporal being in some way, nevertheless its potency is not simultaneous, nor even its act: for by as much as the elongation of creatures from the first is made, by so much the less do they participate in its goodnesses: and this is what the Philosopher says in the book On Causes: But what is eternal to the eternal, this is also aeviternal to the aeviternal, and time to the temporal.[64] And he touches upon the imitation of the two to the third as much as they are able in the concept of measuring. But according as it is an excelling measure standing in the whole aevum and time, the present of eternity encloses the aevum by excelling it on the part of the principle, and encloses time by excelling it on the part of the principle and the end: and this is what Anselm says, that just as the present time encloses in itself every place, and whatever is in it, so every time is enclosed by the eternal present, and whatever is in it.[65]

§ To the first therefore it must be said, that what is said, interminable, is a negation following upon a positive difference, which on account of the simplicity of eternity cannot be named by us affirmatively: and thus it is clear that the negation, interminable, certifies from a presupposed positive difference.

§ To the other it must be said that eternity is in the concept of a duration, and thus it properly refers to potency: whence since the first potency of the eternal in itself is manifested

60. Isaac Israeli, Liber de definitionibus.

in life, therefore it is defined by life, and not by being. Or it may be said that eternity is defined in the eternal according to its best state, according to which also the participated thing itself makes one participate in the immobility of eternity: but this happens only in those participating in it as it is blessed life, and not through being. Whence Augustine in book XII of the Confessions: Certainly the heaven of heaven which you made in the beginning, is some intellectual creature: although by no means coeternal with you the eternity, yet a participant in your eternity, it strongly restrains its own mutability before the sweetness of your most happy contemplation, and without any lapse since it was made, it surpasses every revolving vicissitude of times by clinging to you.[66] Since therefore he defines eternity according as it is a part of beatitude, and communicating the incommutability of eternity, he defines it by life, because through being it would be incommunicable: because thus it is being without limits, which cannot belong to creatures.

§ Through this the solution to the following is also clear: because in truth the first measure is the being of an enduring thing simultaneously existing in potency: but thus it is not communicable to those which are eternal by participation in it, but rather through life.

§ To the other it must be said that a measure formally taken is of a quantum virtually, or dimensionally: but here, as I think, it is taken materially, as it is in the eternal: and therefore it does not measure except as an exemplar, to which other blessedly living things approximate as much as they are able: yet it does not measure as an exemplar of duration insofar as it is duration, but rather as an exemplar of blessed life. But to this some have said that it is defined by life to the exclusion of living things, which are not measured by eternity: but the first is more probable.

§ To the other it must be said that possession of life is said here, because the whole potency of life in act is had at one's beck and call, such that nothing of it is expected outside: and thus it is the potency of life standing in the whole duration: whence the word possession intimates standing virtually simultaneously.

§ But to this that is objected, that every duration is a certain distension, it must be said that it is not necessary that it be dis-

tended in itself: because everything which is distended in itself, has a part remote from a part: but the distension is in another, because it is from it, and under it: and thus it will be standing in itself, having under it what is distended in the temporal and the time which it excels: and it itself is not called a duration because it is distended, but because the distension under it does not fail, as Augustine says in the Text.

§ To that which is objected concerning the concept of possession, it must be said that it is transferred to another, namely to that which is had at one's beck and call, as the whole life subsisting simultaneously, in whose power of living nothing is outside itself.

§ To the other the solution is already clear: because this is false, that no protracted thing is whole simultaneously: for a protracted thing which is so protracted that no protraction under

61. Pseudo-Dionysius, De Divinis Nominibus, ch. 10.

it fails, is whole simultaneously: and this is therefore because it does not protract part from part, but stands one in the whole duration.

§ To the other it must be said that it never fails by the fact that it is present whole simultaneously.

§ To the other it must be said that whole means here the same as perfect, of which nothing is expected outside itself, or lost in the past: but simultaneous removes succession: whence whole is said by opposition to diverse parts composing an enduring thing: but simultaneous is opposed not to parts, but to the succession of parts.

§ To the other it must be said that whole is taken here according to what the Philosopher says in III Physics: But the whole and the perfect I call the same: for it is not entirely perfect, which has a part of its potency or act in the expectation of the future.

§ To the other it must be said that Isaac defines eternity formally, as it is in the concept of a measure: because thus it is taken as outside the eternal: for nothing is properly measured by something internal to it, but an internal quantity is measured by an exterior quantity, except in this way by which a number of parts measures: for thus the numbered parts in some way measure the whole. But eternity in the definition of Isaac is signified as an extrinsic adjacent measure: and he does not call it a space because it is distended by parts: because thus either the parts would remain, and then it would not differ from a continuum having position, as a line, or a surface: or they would not remain, and thus it would not differ from time: but he therefore says space, because by not failing it includes and excels all things, but by not failing it is not distended, but stands in the whole space running under it: and therefore he calls it continuous from its standing, and unintersected: because it is not intercepted by prior and posterior in the manner of time.

§ To the other it must be said that Dionysius calls it ancient from the lack of an end: and it is the manner of speaking of the Greeks, just as also certain Philosophers called the eternity of motion and of the world antiquity, although they spoke falsely. But he says immutable because it does not have prior and posterior: but he says universal by measuring, and another translation has, whole according to the whole to be measured: because on the part of the eternal it essentially measures being and to be able and act by one indivisible standing now: such that just as on the part of the eternal nothing of its potency is protracted outside itself, so the now of eternity standing, and not moving itself, as Boethius says, has nothing in the future: as the present time has, of which the first part has passed, and a part is in the instant, and a part is expected in the future.

Articulus 9 — What Is Eternal, And Whether The Pains Of Hell Can Be Called Eternal, And Whether Years And Times Can Be Called Eternal

What is the eternal, and whether the punishments of hell can be called eternal, and whether years and times can be called eternal.

62. Anselm, Monologion, ch. 24.

Secondly it is asked, What is the eternal?

§ 1. But it seems that it is God alone, through Anselm in the Monologion. *Or by this alone it is openly perceived that true eternity is in that substance alone which alone is found to be not made, but maker: since it is understood to lack the bounds of a true beginning

and end of eternity, which is proven to belong to none of the created things by the very fact that they are made from nothing*: therefore it seems that nothing is eternal except God alone.

§ 2. Also, Anselm: Eternity is of those things which are nothing other than itself: therefore it seems that nothing is eternal except God.

§ 3. Also, through reason: Every enduring being has its own measure by which it is measured: but the divine enduring being is a certain being: therefore it will have its own measure: but this is nothing but eternity: therefore God alone is eternal.

But against this: The Saints call the punishments of hell eternal. And the Apostle says kept secret from eternal times: and he speaks of the predestination of Christ. And Augustine in XII Confessions calls the Angels eternal by participation in eternity, yet not coeternal with God: therefore it seems that many things are eternal.

Solution. It must be said that eternal is that of which the proper measure is eternity. But the measuring thing can be considered in three ways, namely as adequate to the virtual quantity of the measured, and thus God alone is eternal: or as an excelling measure, and thus all aeviternal and spiritual things are included in eternity, because it does not fail for any of them: and yet none of them is eternal. In a third way it is considered as an exemplar participated by others, as much as each is able: and thus it itself is adjacent in some way to aeviternal and temporal things by its now, and by its when: as when it is said, when God is, the Angel is, and motion is: and when it is said, God now is, and the angel, and what is carried in motion. And in all these ways something is in eternity, although it is not eternal except in the first way: and eternity is taken not as it is in the eternal, but formally for duration itself. But if it is taken as participated through life, then something will be called eternal, because it participates in it through one property of it, or two, or more, according as it has greater or lesser approximation to God who most truly is eternal: whence the contemplating Angels, and the blessed, whose potency although it is defluxible by nature, yet because it stands simultaneously that it is invariable through glory, are called eternal according to Augustine. But the punishments of hell are called eternal from the participation of duration without limit. But eternal times are the years of God, which do not fail: which are not called times and years, except according to distinction to the inferior measure which is time. Or it may be said that times through the word eternal are drawn outside their own concept, and stand for the duration of eternity from which time flows.

And through this the solution to the objections is clear: because I well concede that eternity is God, and nothing is properly called eternal except God alone. But certain other things are enclosed in eternity, not eternal, nor participating in eternity, as time and temporal things: but

63. Pseudo-Dionysius, De Divinis Nominibus, ch. 10.

certain things are in eternity, and participating in eternity, and not eternal, as Angels: but certain things are in eternity and are eternal and eternity itself, as God the Trinity: but certain things participate in something similar to eternity, yet they are neither in eternity, nor eternal, nor eternity: as eternal punishments. But times are not called eternal, unless they are taken improperly just as eternity is called eternal time, or eternal times, because although it is not distinguished in itself, yet it is distinguished in relation to temporal things accidentally, as "God has endured more than six thousand years," or the like.

Articulus 10 — What It Is To Be In Eternity

What it is to be in eternity?

What it is to be in eternity?

Thirdly it is asked, What is it to be in eternity? For if eternity is the possession of interminable life, to be in eternity seems to be the same as to be in the interminable life of glory. This also seems so: because of those who are in eternal punishments, it is not said that they are in eternity, but rather their time will be into ages. And because very many things have been said about this elsewhere, let these suffice.

Solution. It must be said to the aforesaid, that to be in eternity is said in three ways, namely as measured in an adequate measure, and thus God alone is in eternity. In the second way it is said to be in eternity, as measured in an excelling measure, and thus aeviternal and temporal things are in eternity as if enclosed, as Anselm says. In the third way it is said to be in eternity as participating in the eternal itself through life, and thus the blessed are said to be in eternity: but the evil damned are not, nor are they to be called eternal: although it is conceded with a determination, namely that they are eternal in punishments.

Articulus 11 — Whether Creatures Compared To The Creator Are Said To Be As It Were Not To Be

Whether creatures compared to the Creator are said as if not to be?

Next it is asked about what is said in the Text: Because in comparison to him who truly is, they are as if they were not, etc.

Against this is: because § 1. Whatever simply belongs to anything, this is taken away from it by no comparison: but to be (esse) substantially and simply belongs to everything that is: therefore by no comparison is it taken away from it.

§ 2. Furthermore, it seems that in comparison to him they are more beings, than they are in themselves: for since created being is compared to two things according to order, namely to nothing, and to the being creating entity, it does not receive entity according as it is compared to nothing, but rather defect and mutability: therefore it receives entity from the other comparison, namely to the creating being: and thus compared to their essence they more are, and not less are, as it seems.

64. Liber de Causis, prop. 2.

§ 3. Also, Gregory: All things would fall into nothing, unless the hand of the Omnipotent contained them:[67] therefore from comparison to him they receive a stronger entity: and thus what he says is not true, that they are as if they were not, when they are compared to him.

§ 4. Also, it was held above: Because he is good, we are: therefore from comparison to him we better are, than without comparison.

Solution. To all these there is one solution, that there is a twofold comparison there, namely as to the cause of our being: and thus we are not except by comparison to him: because whatever we are, is from him, and to him, and in him containing. The second comparison is of the equiparance or similitude of proportion: and thus compared to him, we are as if nothing: because without the ratio of proportion we are distant from him: and similarly every created being: and this happens on account of three things which are of necessity belonging to our being, and of everything created insofar as it is created, namely potency according to some cause which precedes our being, and privation after we are, and matter

to be receiving: and through this the solution to the whole is evident.

Articulus 12 — Whether Words Co-Signifying Differences Of Time, Such As "Was" And "Will Be," Can Be Said Of God, And Of All Creatures; Afterwards It Is Asked About What Is Said: Of That Of Which It Is Said "Was," It Is Not, Etc

Whether words consignifying differences of time, such as "was" and "will be," can be said of God and of all creatures.

Afterwards, it is inquired concerning what is said: Of what it is said "was," it is not, etc.

Whether words consignifying differences of time, such as "was" and "will be," can be said of God and of all creatures.

Afterwards, it is inquired concerning what is said:

Of what it is said "was," it is not, etc.

For it is doubtful how those words consignifying differences of time are said of eternal, aeviternal, and temporal things. They do not seem to be said of eternal things: because such words express differences of time, which are caused by motion or mutability: but such motion or mutability is not in God: therefore, they cannot be said of God or the eternal.

Similarly, it seems that they cannot be said of aeviternal things: because their being is all at once, similarly their potentiality does not precede their being, and nothing of their potentiality is outside their being: therefore, their potentiality is also all at once: therefore, it seems that all is a standing now, and nothing past in them, nor future, nor present, in the way that the present is of which part has passed, part is in the instant, and part is future.

Similarly, it seems that neither can they be said of the being of temporal things, and let being be taken according to substance: for it is the same being according to substance throughout the entire duration of the thing: therefore, it seems that it does not take past and

65. Anselm, Proslogion, ch. 19 (cf. Monologion ch. 22).

future according to this determination, whereby it is determined here, that what is past is not, and what is future is not yet.

To this last, some say that the being of a thing is considered in two ways, especially the being of a mobile thing, namely in itself, or as it is in the potentiality of the mobile, according to which it is mobile. In the first way, they say that it is not measured by time: and thus past and future do not pertain to it per se. In the second way, it has an order to time: because the potentiality of the mobile as it is mobile is not all at once. But this solution does not solve: because this Letter intends that past and future pertain to every created being: and therefore it is proper to the uncreated being not to know past and future. This also seems by what Augustine says in VIII on Genesis, that God, neither moved by place nor time, moves the spiritual creature through time, and not through place: but the corporeal through place and time: therefore, it seems that every creature is to be changed through time: and thus past and future pertain to it. Likewise, Augustine at the beginning on John says that this word "is," when said of creatures, signifies temporal motions, but not when said of the Creator: therefore, it seems that the gloss of those is not according to the intention of Augustine.

Solution. Without prejudice, it must be said that in truth the opinion of Jerome and Augustine is that everything that is, is in some way temporal, except the Creator, and that "was" and "will be" are said in some way of all except Him. Hence, it seems to be said that when it is said of God "was" or "will be," that "was" and "will be" signify the now of eternity standing in the entire duration of aeviternal and temporal things: and therefore that duration which is made from that now is not interrupted by anything, as Isaac says, that it has not departed from the power of the eternal, so that something is awaited: but the variation which is signified in "was" and "will be" is in the lower measure which is time: just as a superior measure is understood to be distinguished when it is distinguished from the lesser measure itself: and therefore such expressions are resolved by the Doctors thus: God "was," that is, God is with respect to whose now something temporal is taken which preceded the duration of God. God "will be," that is, God is with respect to which something temporal is taken which follows the duration of God, or God enduring. Just as it is in two lines: one infinite, and the other finite: and one standing, and the other moved under it. For the infinite standing cannot be distinguished into part and part, but is distinguished in relation to the motion or distinction of the inferior. However, it is not entirely similar because time does not have permanent parts, but eternity does not have any part.

Others say that the difference of time consignified is in our intellect, and not in the thing signified: because our intellect does not take the enduring always, but with a part passing and coming. But this is to say nothing: because duration is well taken by our intellect according to the nature of the enduring: and thus it is taken as standing, or as not standing, according to how it is diversely related to the enduring things themselves.

Moreover, to what is objected, that of all creatures these words are said properly according to Augustine and Jerome, it seems to be said without prejudice, that this is their understand-

66. Augustine, Confessions, XII, ch. 9.

ing. However, how in the duration of angels or the potentiality to be there is time, it will be difficult or impossible to find, if time is said in one way. Hence, it seems this way should be chosen, that time is said in many ways. In one way, time is properly said to be the measure of the motion of the first mobile: which motion is the cause of all other motions: and that time according to the whole measures the motion of the first mobile: but according to part it measures the motions caused by it, according to what the Philosopher says, that to be in time is to be measured by a certain part of time: for thus everything that is in time is excelled by it. The proof of which is: because it is caused by motion whose first measure is time: but the cause is before the caused: therefore, the measure of the cause is before the measure of the caused: therefore, time excels it from the part before. Similarly, since everything caused by motion is measured by the period, the motion which is taken in the parts or minutes of the respects of the stars and signs and figures of the circle causing the thing, will be measured by the period. And since the number of the period is finite, of necessity the motion will be after it, and thus time: therefore, everything which according to being and motion is caused by the subject of time, is excelled by time both from the part before and from the part after: and those are properly said to be in time according to the Philosophers. And if we only say that time is in this way, time will not be one of the coequals, nor will God move angels through time in the number and succession of the affections and intellects of angels, because nothing of these is ordered to the motion of the heaven. We say, therefore, that time is said in another way to be the measure of any change, whether having a middle or not having a middle, not ordered to the motion of the heaven: and this time differs and is numbered according to temporal things, and there will not be one time of all temporal things. In the third way, time is said to be the measure of simple changes, such as willing, and understanding, and the like: and in this way, again, it will not be the same time.

If, however, it is objected that it still seems to be the same time because time is a number, and by the same number dogs and sheep are numbered, the objection is not valid: because time is not only a numbering number: rather, it is also a numbered number: for it is the number of the prior and posterior in motion: and therefore in those in which the prior and posterior of the motion of which it is the measure is in some way preserved, there will be the same time, and this is only in those which are in some way ordered to the cause of the motion of the heaven: but here it is not so: hence the number by which it is numbered, in part agrees with time, in part differs from it: hence it is clear that it is not the same time, in the second and third signification of time being accepted. Further, since time does not have continuity from itself, but from motion, and motion from space, as the Philosopher says, it is not necessary that time in the third signification be continuous, since motions are indivisible, and not continuous: and that time is only the number of those now, or the vicissitudes of affections and intellects: and thus time being taken broadly, every creature is temporal both in being, and in potentiality, and in acting. In being indeed: because it falls into nothing from itself: and what is contained, this it has from another, and not from itself, and therefore the continuous flux of being is by the nature of the temporal, and something in that continuous would pass

67. Gregory the Great, Moralia in Job, XVI, ch. 37.

unless it were contained by another. Similarly, its potentiality consequently does not stand all at once as far as it is from itself. The operation, however, is evident, that it has vicissitude: and thus it is solved what is in the Letter, that the past also has the perpetual creature as far as it is from itself and the future.

If, however, it is asked, How according to the time which the Philosophers considered, it is said that an angel was, or the substance of the heaven, or even the being of a generable and corruptible thing? We can say without prejudice, that in angels the entire duration is all at once, and there is not properly a potentiality of enduring, as the potentiality of enduring has something less than the act of duration itself: but the potentiality of enduring is in them the necessity of the continuation of being: and therefore they are not temporal, but aeviternal: and then "was" is explained, that it says now, or when of the aeviternal: but the aevum or aeviternal excels time: and therefore it is not distinguished in itself, but in comparison to it: thus an angel was, that is, some temporal creature is, with respect to which the being of the angel enduring preceded. An angel will be, that is, some creature is which if it ceased, the being of the angel enduring would be after it: just as we also said of the eternal. And similarly of the substance of the heaven: although it is not so of the substance (otherwise, the potentiality) of its motion, which continuously goes out into act, and therefore is measured by time, as a measure coequal to it.

But concerning the being of a generable thing which seems to remain the same in the whole time of its duration, it can be said, if it pleases, as was said before in the solution of others: hence although it remains the same, it is not entirely the same except according to habit due to continuous loss and restoration. Or, it can be said otherwise, that the being of a generable thing is the same remaining: yet that being is in what it is: and what it is, has enduring being, which duration is not all at once: and therefore the potentiality of its duration which is now, is always in being, and with respect to this potentiality it has prior and posterior, and past and future.

Articulus 13 — Whether The Now Of Eternity And The Now Of Time Are The Same; And Whether The Now Of Eternity And Eternity Differ

Whether the now of eternity is the same as the now of time: and whether the now of eternity and eternity differ?

Here it must be diligently noted, etc. Here begins the part in which he objects against the aforementioned and resolves. And the Master does four things in it: he objects, concedes the objection, confirms it to be so through Augustine, and fourthly explains the understanding of Jerome's words.

But here arises a doubt, whether the now of eternity, and of the age, and of time is the same?

1. And it seems that it is so: because if I say, God is now, and the angel, and that which is carried in motion or the motion itself, by the power of the expression only one measur-

ing is posited: since therefore one of them is eternal, and another temporal, it seems that there is one now of eternity, and of the age, and of time.

1. Likewise, the now of time and the now of eternity, as taken from the words of Boethius in the book on the Trinity, differ in this, that the now of eternity is standing, and not moving itself: but the now of time is flowing from prior to posterior continuously, and by this flow makes the being of time: therefore, with the differences in which they differ abstracted, one substance remains in the three: therefore let prior and posterior between which the now is be abstracted, it seems that the substance of the indivisible itself remains: the substance of indivisible duration is the now of eternity: therefore the now of eternity and of the age and of time is the same by substance.

Furthermore, it is asked, whether in any way the now of eternity and eternity differ, and the now of the age and the age itself?

1. However, it seems that they differ: because Boethius says, that the now of eternity by standing makes eternity: but the same is not the maker and the made: therefore eternity is not the now of eternity. In the same way, it is objected about the now of the age, which makes the age.
2. Furthermore, the state of the now itself is not the now itself in substance, just as on the other side the flow of the now itself in time is not the now itself by substance: therefore since eternity is the state and permanence of the now itself, the now of eternity is not eternity itself.

Moreover, when it is said, the age is standing and all at once, and the eternal is standing and all at once, it is asked whether standing and being all at once are taken in one notion? And it seems not: because if they are taken in one notion, it seems then, that eternity and the age are the same, which is false.

Moreover, it does not seem that the now of time differs from the age and eternity, except accidentally: for the now of time is the measure of the existence of the mobile nature in celestial bodies, and of the same bodies the measure is the age. Therefore the now of time is the age. The first proof, the existence of the mobile body in heaven is that which is carried in motion, and to this corresponds the now in time, as the Philosopher says: but to the renewal of its position in motion corresponds time: therefore the first is true. The second is taken from Boethius, who calls those bodies immortal, because nothing is varied in their existence: but the measure of those which are invariable is the age, if they are created. If perhaps it is said, that the conclusion does not follow: because the same can have diverse measures. Against: Adequate measures differ according to the measured, if they are in the first measured: for grains of wheat are measured by one, and liquids by another: as wheat by the bushel, oil by the jar, cloth by the ell, and so with others: therefore it seems, that since this is true, that proper measures differ according to the measured, that the conclusion follows.

Solution. It must be said to the first, that according to the opinion of certain Masters, the now of time is considered in two ways, namely according to that which is the subject of prior and posterior, and according to this prior and posterior happen to the now itself, and it is separable from them, and then it is a standing substance in itself: and according to this they say, that the now of time can be the same with the now of eternity and of the age: because according to this there is only one now of eternity, which is numbered in the whole time by prior and posterior which happen to it, and stands in eternity and the age: and according to this they understand that word of Boethius in the book of the Consolation of Philosophy: "Who orders time to go from the age," they say in this sense, that from the now of the age or the eternal by the number of prior and posterior time flows, which number however happens to the now itself, and is separable from it. Otherwise, however, the now itself is considered, as it is adjacent to the mobile, as it is in motion, or is referred to motion: for since the mobile is the same in the whole motion, the now will be the same in the whole time: but when the mobile, or that which is carried, is continuously removed from posterior to prior, or from first to last in space, the now itself is essentially joined to prior and posterior in time itself: and thus prior and posterior will be essential differences of the now itself: and thus considered it differs from the now of eternity and the age. But it seems to be said otherwise, that neither as subject, nor as substance is the now of eternity and the age and of time the same. Because the now of eternity is uncreated, but the now of the age is standing: but of time it is not standing, but flowing, as has been said: for it is considered in the whole time by prior and posterior continuously: just as also that which is carried is renewed and iterated by the renewal of position in the whole motion.

To the objection it must be said, that when it is said, God is now, and the Angel, and that which is carried, the now of eternity alone is meant there: but it is the excellent measure of the Angel, and of that which is carried: and just as the exemplar measures the exemplified, so it measures the being of the Angel, and of that which is moved: and then it does not follow, that it is the same now of the age and of time.

To the other it must be said, that the now of eternity and of the age and of time do not only differ by specific differences themselves, but they differ by themselves: because the now of time is the substance of destructible time, and similarly is the now of the age, although it is not destroyed: but the now of eternity is not destructible: and therefore by intellect with differences removed, they still differ substantially.

To what is further asked, whether the now of eternity and eternity differ? It must be said, that in nothing except according to reason.

To what is objected against, it must be said that the state of the now itself, is the now standing in some way signified: because in divine things there is no composition. Nor is it similar with time: because this is caused really on the part of the mobile in its differences: just as it is true, that the mobile is one in the whole motion, and therefore the now is one: so it is really true, that the mobile is renewed in position, and renewed from prior to posterior, or conversely: and therefore prior and posterior really differ from the now itself. But the state of

eternity does not differ from the eternal itself, except according to the reason of signifying: and therefore eternity and its now do not differ except by reason.

To what is objected, that the made is not the maker, it must be said that eternity is not made by the now itself, except according to the reason of understanding only: for according to that eternity is understood as externally adjacent, the now is referred to the substance of the eternal, and eternity to the indeficient power of it, and this power with God in God is the same, and also the duration itself: hence all these are God. And it is not signified that one makes another, except in the mode of understanding which is taken in the name. But if this question is made about the age, it will be stronger, whether namely the now of the age is the age: and according to what I can understand here, in eternal things the enduring substance is not the same, and its duration itself: but one is with the other and in the other. In eternal things, as we said above, nothing else is the duration itself, than the necessity of its immutable permanence, and that is wholly within the enduring, differing however from it. Thus it seems, that the now of the age has a difference from the age: and that the age however is wholly in it: and therefore it is indivisible, just as its now.

And if it is asked, how one indivisible can be understood in another? It must be said, that in the same way with two indivisibles taken, this is not intelligible: but if one is taken as substance, or subject, the other however as form, or specific difference specifying it, then it will be well intelligible: just as also in eternal things the necessity of the continuation of immutable being is taken in the standing and enduring itself.

To what is further asked, whether the now of time is the age? It must be said, that in no way: for the now of time is not adjacent to the existence of the mobile thing according to that the existence is invariable, but rather according to that it is the same reiterated in the whole motion. And thus its existence is not measured by the age, but rather according to that it is immobile and unmoved to form: and thus those bodies are called immortal and invariable.

To what is objected, that one thing has one measure, it must be answered, that this is true according to that it is one: but according to that it is in diverse genera of power compared to act, then nothing prohibits it from being measured by diverse measures: just as the power of the celestial body to the act which is local motion will be measured by the measure of time, and its existence thus accepted will be measured by the now of time: but its power to form, which is always joined to act, and is immutably continued in it, will be measured by the age: and its enduring existence will be measured by the now of the age.

Divisio Textus

The essence of God alone is properly said to be unchangeable, etc. Here the Master shows that the nature of God alone is unchangeable: and this in two ways, namely that it is not changed, and because it cannot be changed. But every created nature is changed by its nature, or can be changed. And from this, in this chapter, he further concludes that the divine nature alone is immortal, because the variation of the creature is death. And finally, at the end of the chapter, it is inferred that when the predicaments are referred in divine predication, they do not predicate their own essences, but substance. And this is what he says in this chapter.

Articulus 14 — Whether These Words, "Is," "Was," And "Will Be," Befit God Separately Or Together, And Which Difference Of Time Most Especially Befits The Eternal God

Whether these words, is, was, and will be, apply to God separately or conjointly, and which difference of time most fittingly applies to the eternal God?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says:

Therefore, it is said, because it always was, is, and will be, etc.

For it is asked, whether these words apply to God separately or conjointly?

However, it seems that they apply only conjointly: because if separately, then it is signified that a defect of temporal thing is present in God: therefore, it seems that conjointly, so that one may supply the defect of the other.

Likewise, it is asked, which difference of time most fittingly applies to God?

However, it seems that the present: because that alone is to be taken from time. Since therefore eternity is wholly present, it seems that the present most fittingly applies to it. But it seems that the past because this alone is necessary and immobile. Since therefore eternity is of necessary and immobile things, it seems that the past most fittingly applies to it. On the contrary, it seems that the imperfect past especially applies to it: because this time signifies the past including the present itself, and not terminated at it. Since therefore eternity in itself has perfection and necessity, and in this it is likened to the past: and it includes the present, and in this it agrees with the present: it seems that the imperfect past places agreement with respect to both.

Solution. It must be said that these words can apply to God separately according to the intention previously explained, namely that they denote distinction in the lower exemplified measure, and not in eternity: and thus they do not denote temporal defects in the eternal itself.

To the other, it must be said that among them the future applies less, because this whole is in privation and potentiality, but the present applies most: and in some respect the past especially applies: but in no way or least does the imperfect past apply because of the imperfection of the act which it signifies: however, the present applies most to it by reason of that which alone is among the differences of time, but not by reason of that which immediately will not be. And therefore what is of perfection is to be attributed to God. The perfect past applies by reason of immobility and necessity: because only that is necessary which is past: but by reason of cessation it is not to be attributed to God. The future, however, applies least among the times: yet it is properly attributed to him, as Augustine says, that he will be who will never be absent. The imperfect past, since it speaks of the imperfection of acts, applies least: yet considering the reason which the objection touches, namely the necessity of the past with the inclusion of that which is in time, that is, the present, we read in the Scriptures that the imperfect past is sometimes attributed to God according to eternity, as in John 1:1: In the beginning was the Word, etc.

Articulus 15 — Whether Being Is Proper To God Alone, And Accidental To Others; And What Subsisting Truth Is, And Enduring Cause, And The Property Of The Natural Kind

Whether existence is proper to God alone, and happens to others: and what is subsisting truth, and remaining cause, and the property of natural kind?

Then it is asked concerning what Hilary says: Existence is not an accident to God, but subsisting, etc.

For it seems that existence happens to none: therefore it seems that this is not proper to God.

Furthermore, what is subsisting truth, and remaining cause, and the property of natural kind?

Solution. It must be said that an accident is said to be what happens to be present, and not to be present, and the cause of this contingency is on the part of the subject which causes the accident. By similarity to it and not properly is an accident said here which happens to something because it is in potency not from an intrinsic cause, but from an extrinsic one which is efficient: for every created existence was in potency, and could not be as to the potency of the efficient cause: and therefore it is called an accident.

To the other it must be said, that truth is here called pure and unmixed being: and this belongs only to God: for every created existence is mixed with relations at least to external causes, and to consequences: just as this very being, although it is simple in itself, nevertheless posits a relation to the creator, and a relation to those with which it is composable: and these relations are not nothing in being: and therefore it is mixed, and not pure truth. For every created thing has mixed potency, and privation, as we said above: and therefore it is not pure: and therefore it properly belongs to God, that He is subsisting truth as to His first existence considered in itself. However, He is a remaining cause not in Himself, but compared to the caused things: for natural causes, whether they are proximate or remote, do not cause while remaining, but rather moved, and moving, and changed in themselves: and therefore they cannot be called remaining causes: but God in Himself unmoved, and in one way disposed, causes all things: and therefore it properly belongs to Him to be a remaining cause. The second comparison of God to things is, according to which He is distinguished by His properties from all things by nature: in which, however, He is essentially, presently, and potentially: and this is the property of His kind, that is, of His nature connatural, that He always has a distinct proper existence because it is not borrowed from another.

Articulus 16 — What Incommutability Is, And Whether Any Change Occurs In God

What is immutability, and whether any change falls upon God?

There can be a doubt here. What is the immutability of which he speaks here? And secondly, whether any change falls upon God, or not?

To the first, it proceeds thus: 1. From the text, it is drawn that immutability is preserving the very being, which is from the fact that it does not receive another from itself. But it seems

that this does not remove every mode of change: because one having a habit, and going forth from leisure into act, preserves the very being which it is, nor does it receive something alien from itself: and yet it is changed in some mode of change: therefore it seems that this does not suffice for the proof of true immutability.

1. Furthermore, we see in creatures many modes of change per se, and per accidens: per se, either to a substantial form, or from it: or to an accidental form, or to the perfection of quantity, or from it: as there is generation, corruption, alteration, augmentation, diminution: and there is change to position or place: which changes nothing in the mobile, but the very thing which is moved is transferred to another place: therefore it seems that that last change can be in God: because it places no variation in the substance of that which is moved. And if you say that this cannot befit Him, because He is everywhere: and what is everywhere cannot be transferred to any place: then it seems that this motion is not repugnant to the nature of immutability: but rather it is attributed to Him that He is immensity: because He is not included in place: and this is against the text which wishes that by nature motion cannot happen to Him.
2. Furthermore, it is said of the Holy Spirit that He is mobile: and of wisdom, that it is more mobile than all mobiles: therefore it seems that not every mutability is repugnant to His nature.
3. Furthermore, we see an artisan being changed by the application of forms to matter, and a carpenter who, by working, brings forth forms conceived in the mind into wood, first one way, then another: and it seems that such commutability befits God: because Augustine says in

...in the book of Eighty-Two Questions, that He creates a man by one reason [idea], and a donkey by another.

§ 5. Also, the Philosopher says that the first cause moves the first caused thing, that is, God moves the heaven: and He moves it from right to left, because His power is there, and the motion according to the moving power begins there, and it turns back by accident. But when the mobile is moved, that which is in it is also moved: therefore it seems that His power is moved. But He Himself is His power: therefore He Himself is moved by accident. And thus it seems that His nature is not repugnant to every motion.

§ 6. Besides, what absurdity would there be if He were posited to be mutated by accident? For this motion is in everything, and even in Him, as it seems: because from not creating He became creating, and from not moving the creature He became moving, and from not governing, governing. And if you say that He does this just as the desired moves the desire, and the desire moves the desiring subject, as the Philosopher seems to say: this is nothing. Because we do not posit Him only as being the desired, and thus holding Himself in one way; but we also say that He creates everything that desires Him, and carries and contains it. Therefore He seems to hold Himself otherwise than He did from eternity: therefore He is not entirely immutable.

Solution. It must be said that the nature of God alone is immutable both per se and per accidens: not only according to the faith, but also according to all philosophers who have understood anything about Him.

Therefore it must be said to the first that the cause of immutability is that it preserves the very being which it is per se, and which is in it. But this in God is not an accident which preserves its being-in, but is His substance. Now, one who has a habit and goes out to the exercise of an action does not preserve the whole being: for the act is something in the agent; and therefore this holds itself otherwise, since its act is not itself. For this reason the Philosopher also says that this is another kind of alteration: because, although it does not receive another habit than it had, yet it holds itself in another way in act. And this does not belong to God: because if the act of God is taken, such as to understand and to will, He is His own operation, holding Himself in the same way. But if His operations are taken, such as to create, and to infuse grace, and to become incarnate, He is not mutated by them, but something is mutated towards Him, by holding itself otherwise towards Him than it did before. Because creation holds itself according to reality on the part of the creature, and it posits nothing in God except the will and the idea determined to this, that this creature be made now; and this determination of the will and of the idea to the prefixed time of this work held themselves in God in one way from eternity.

To the next it must be said that local motion cannot happen to God. For although it mutates nothing in the mobile subject, yet from some mutation that happens concerning it, it is toward obtaining something which was not possessed before the motion. This is clear: because every change of place is either from the soul or from nature. If it is from nature, then it is moved to its own place, in which is the preservation of its form and of its species, and outside is corruption: therefore it finds a safety in the place which it did not have outside. If however it is moved outside its place, this will be by violence; and the force of violence is something in it which was not there: and therefore a violent motion is a disposition to corruption. But if it is from the soul: a progressive motion does not occur unless it was first from the principle of having something pleasurable through motion, and that is obtained through it. And if it is asked concerning the motion of the heaven, it is clear that it induces many things which are not possessed: for whether we say that that motion is from the desire of assimilating itself in something to the first cause, or on account of the generation and corruption of inferior things, there is always the attainment of that intent through motion, when it was possessed, or was not possessed in this way. And in no way can it belong...

...to God. Because He is immutable, lacking nothing that might be sought outside Himself; and because He is everywhere; and because He is spiritual; and an entirely simple spiritual nature cannot be moved locally per se. But concerning the motion of Angels it is to be inquired elsewhere: because an Angel is neither entirely simple, nor entirely spiritual, as Gregory says.

To the next it must be said that the Holy Spirit and wisdom are called mobile, not in themselves, but by reason of their effects and gifts.

To the next it must be said that it is one thing concerning an artisan, and another concerning God. For although an artisan perhaps holds himself in one way in his habit toward the whole house, yet when his will and apprehension approach the work, he does not hold himself in one way toward the parts of the work: because now he apprehends and wills the foundations and its parts; and afterwards in that apprehension [he wills] those things which are required for the wall and the roof. But it is not so in God: because He holds Himself in one way from eternity in the apprehension of the whole world and its parts, and in one way in the will of each thing to the prefixed space in which each would be drawn forth. And what Augustine says, "By another reason [idea]," etc., is understood by the comparison of the idea to the exemplar, and not by the comparison of the idea to itself.

To the next it must be said that if the Philosopher intends God by the first cause, then he intends only one mode of His motion, by which He moves as the desired moves the desire. Because since God is not an intrinsic and conjoined mover according to the proportion of a mover and a mobile with some mobile, it is necessary to posit another mover which is conjoined to the heaven, whoever he may be; and therefore it is not necessary that He Himself be moved, but that the mover of the heaven be moved in diverse ways by perceiving the goodnesses flowing from God, which, having been perceived, are further more perceived in the mobile according to East and West. But if he does not intend God, but calls the "first cause" the first mover among the causes of nature which move according to the proportion of the mobile —that is, that they can move only as much as the mobile itself is naturally mobile—then there is no objection. But whatever the case may be regarding this, it must not be said that God is a mover intrinsic to the heaven in which He is included, except in this way by which we posit God to be within all things but not included; and therefore the power of the rising sign [East] is not the substantial power which God is, but is a power created by Him.

To the next it must be said that an absurdity would follow, namely that He would not be the first moving [principle], and that He would not be simple. For that He would not be the first moving [principle] is clear: because the first moving [principle] is that which is moved by no mode of motion, neither per se nor per accidens. It is not moved per se, as is clear from what was previously held. But it cannot be moved per accidens, because the per accidens is not, nor does it pre-exist anything moving and moved per se, since the per accidens is reduced to the per se, as to a cause and a subject. Whence if He were moved per accidens, He would not be the first mover, but there would be something before Him.

And through this the solution concerning the first and second article is clear.

Articulus 17 — Whether God Moves Himself

Whether God moves Himself?

Thirdly it is inquired, Whether He moves Himself? § 1. It seems that He does not. Because Augustine proves in book VIII of The Literal Meaning of Genesis [68] that every motion is from an immobile [principle]; whence if a finger is moved, the hand stands still; and if the hand, the

arm stands still; and so of others. And it is also necessary that that immobile [principle] be stronger than the moved, as a certain Philosopher says:

because otherwise that which is moved would extrude the mover by its motion, such that the mover would be moved by it, or it would recede from its state or place. Therefore, since God moves all things, He Himself will not be moved in any way: therefore neither is He moved by Himself.

§ 2. Also, Boethius: And remaining stable, gives all things to be moved. [69]

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. Augustine says in book VIII of The Literal Meaning of Genesis [70], that the creator spirit moves Himself, neither through time, nor through place; but the created spirit through time, but not through place; and a created body both through time and through place: therefore it seems that He is moved by Himself.

§ 2. Also, at the beginning of the book On the Celestial Hierarchy of Dionysius: But every procession of manifesting lights, the Father being moved, proceeding optimally and largely into us, fills us. [71]

Solution. It must be said that although it may be conceded in some improper way that God moves Himself, I do not think it should be conceded that He is moved by Himself, or that He is moved simply. For He is not properly said to move Himself, because He does not move Himself in Himself, but in His gifts and effects: and He is said to move Himself when He moves a creature to this, that He may indwell it in certain gifts. This motion does not posit an alterity in Him, but rather in those things which now hold themselves otherwise toward Him than they did before. For He Himself, as Dionysius says, holds Himself in one and the same way to everything that is, but not all things hold themselves to Him in one way. Since therefore He does not move Himself except in moving the creature to Himself, it cannot be inferred that He is moved.

But it is objected that according to this solution Augustine seems to say nothing when he says that God moves Himself neither through time nor through place: for that motion by which He moves the creature is frequently in time and place. To this it must be said that Augustine speaks well: for he intends that God's motion, by which He so moves Himself that He is in the creature insofar as it is from Him, is outside of time: although the creature is in time and in place. For God's being in the creature does not make God temporal or local: and this is what Augustine intends.

To the next it must be said that the procession of lights is said to be made "the Father being moved": not that there is motion in Himself, but in the lights and gifts, as has already been said.

Articulus 18 — Whether The Divine Substance, And Universally Every Form, Can Be The Subject Of No Accident

Whether the divine substance, and universally every form, can be the subject of no accident?

68. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, VIII.

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says in the Text: Other essences or substances take on accidents, etc.

For this does not seem universally true.

§ 1. For Boethius says that a form cannot be a subject therefore it does not take on accidents. If perhaps it is said that this is understood of that which is absolutely form, and this is God alone. On the contrary: He gives an example there concerning humanity: therefore it seems that this belongs to every form.

§ 2. Besides, he himself says in the same place that everything which is subjected is subjected by grace of matter. Since therefore every simple form is not subjected, it is clear that form is invariable.

§ 3. Besides, the Author of the Six Principles seems to say this: that form is contingent to composition, consisting in a simple and invariable essence. [72] Therefore it seems that this does not belong to the divine essence alone.

§ 4. Besides, it seems to belong to prime matter: for Augustine says in book XI of the Confessions It is true that the first formlessness, which is almost nothing,

does not have the successions of times; because where there is no form, there cannot be successions of times. Therefore prime matter does not receive any form: therefore it seems that it was not mutated by accidents; and thus it seems to have been immutable in its state, just like the divine essence.

§ 5. Also, an accident does not have an accident, because otherwise it would be necessary to go on into infinity: therefore it does not belong to an accident to receive accidents: and thus it belongs to an accident that it be immutable, like the divine substance.

Solution. It must be said that it belongs to nothing to receive nothing at all, except to the divine substance alone.

To the first, therefore, which is objected concerning form, it must be said that "subject" is twofold, namely that which is a subject that is [subjected] to an accident of nature and of the individual, such as whiteness and blackness: and to this nothing is a subject except a composite of matter and form, and of quod est [that which is] and quo est [that by which it is], and such a subject cannot be a form. And there is a subject which is subjected to its own property and power, or to another of its own proper passions, and thus a form is well a subject: but that passion or property is not by essence the same as that whose property it is. And according to the first mode form is called invariable, and not according to the second mode.

But if this saying of the Author of the Six Principles is taken generally of every form, it can be said better that although a form is simple in itself, yet it is not so simple that it cannot be a part of a composite, and therefore it is composable with another, and thus mutable and variable; although it is not varied like that which is subjected to mutation. Because "mobile" is

69. Boethius, De consolatione philosophiae, III, met. 9.

said in multiple ways (as the Philosopher says), namely as the subject of motion, and as that which is cast away by motion, and also as that which is acquired through motion. And by none of these motions is God or the divine essence mobile.

But to this which is objected concerning matter, it must be said that if prime matter is called the substance of matter, according to what it is separated by the intellect from privation and from the potency of the form that is to be subjected: then what Augustine says is true, that it is outside of time, and then also it is not receptive of form, because its order to form has been removed from it by the intellect. But nevertheless it still has an aptitude to the Creator according as it went out into being from nothing: and that exit is a certain variation, which does not belong to God.

Besides, although matter is not a part, yet it can be a part: and thus it is susceptible of another, that is, its substance is composable with a potency to form, and also with form: and thus it is variable in potency. For if the order to potency is abstracted from matter, it itself will not be matter: because according to what it is, it is subjected to potency and privation: therefore by the intellect separating before it is subjected, it is subjectible to potency. If perhaps you say that it is not subjectible to privation and potency according to what it is, then it will go into infinity: because the subjectibility which is between potency and matter is also a certain potency, and to this again it will not be subjectible by itself by the same reason: but this is impossible. Therefore it is by itself subjectible to privation, and thus it is by itself variable. And this does not belong to God. Whence the objection concerning matter does not hold.

To that which is objected concerning an accident, it can be said that it is mutable, as that which is cast away and added by mutation: but God in no way.

Articulus 19 — Whether God Alone Has Immortality, What Immortality Is, And What Are Said To Live And To Die

Whether God alone has immortality, what is immortality, and what things are said to live and die?

Whether God alone has immortality, what is immortality, and what things are said to live and die?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says: Who alone has immortality, etc. [73]

What is called immortality? For immortality is a natural potency for not dying, or for resisting those things which induce death. And this seems to be only in living things: but not all variable things live: therefore it seems that they do not die.

To this it must be said that to live and to die are taken here from life commonly accepted, by which we speak of "living water," and "living stone," and the like. And this is nothing other than the complete act of a potency which is according to the nature of the thing. For when it can do that act, it is said to live, such as living water when it is in the impetus of cooling, living wine when it perfectly penetrates in taste, living rock in the solidity of its hardness: and

70. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, VIII, 20.

the effect according to the species of its consequence, such as a living sapphire when it expels poison. And since life of this sort is from the properties of things, when they are mutated in those, they are mutated in acts of this sort: and therefore they are said to die.

Articulus 20 — What Is Called Shadowed Vicissitude, And Whether It Befits Every Creature

What is called overshadowed vicissitude [change], and whether it belongs to every creature?

What is called overshadowed vicissitude, and whether it belongs to every creature?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says: Nor is there a shadow of vicissitude [alteration], etc. [74]

What is called here "overshadowed vicissitude"?

And it must be said that vicissitude is the number of a turn [change], and belongs to every creature, even a spiritual one, in the renewal of the vicissitude of affections and apprehensions. And it is called "overshadowed" because it is from privation, by the fact that the creature is after nothing, and from this that the creature is not simple: for those two things draw towards a shadow, because that which is in a spiritual nature is not as it is in the first creating light.

Articulus 21 — Whether To Be Moved Through Times Is To Be Changed Through Affections, Or Through Apprehensions Of The Speculative Intellect

Whether to be moved through times is to be mutated through affections, or through the apprehensions of the speculative intellect?

Further it is inquired concerning this which he says: And to be moved through times is to be commuted through affections, etc.

Why does he not say "to be commuted through the apprehensions of the speculative intellect"?

Also it is inquired, Whether they are varied through times when they are affected in God according to multiple reasons, namely as in the highest substance, as in goodness, as in the Creator, as in wisdom, and the like? It seems that they are. Because such things do not seem to fall simultaneously into the affection: therefore they are in one after another: therefore there is vicissitude there.

ON THE CONTRARY: Augustine says in book XI of the Confessions [75] that Angels participate in eternity by the participation of the most felicitous contemplation: therefore they are not subjected to vicissitude in it. Also, we had it above from Augustine in the book On the Trinity [76], that insofar as we foretaste the fruible here, in so much are we not in time: therefore much less are the Angels in time regarding this.

Solution. It must be said that he said "through affections" regarding the affective work which they do around us: because although Angels according to substance are outside time, yet according to their operations around us they are in time. And therefore he posited affections, because it sounds in the practical intellect, which is properly exercised around us in works, and not in speculation, because that is principally in the Word outside time, as Augustine says.

To the next it must be said that in the contemplation of God in diverse reasons [ideas/attributes] there is no vicissitude, because they do not receive them as diverse, since thus it would not be a matter of joy; but they receive them all as in one and into one which is God. For if wisdom were diverse from goodness, it would not gladden much; and conversely. But when they are received as one which is the highest essence in which contemplation begins, then there is no vicissitude, but rather a state and immobility in one, in which are found the things which are sought for knowing and for willing.

Divisio Textus

§ Division of the Text

And the same alone is properly and truly simple, etc. Here begins the third part of this distinction, in which the simplicity of the divine nature is treated: and it is divided into two parts. In the first, he shows that simplicity is proper to the divine nature in comparison to corporeal nature and to spiritual nature. In the second, he concludes from this that it does not fall into the predicament [category] of substance, there, H, Whence it is not properly called a substance.

The first is subdivided into five: of which the first is that it is simple, such that it is whatever it has. The second excludes corporeal nature from this simplicity, there, Notice first, why every, etc. And the third excludes spiritual nature from this, there, E, The spiritual creature also alone, etc. In the fourth, he solves the objection which could be made from the fact that God is spoken of in multiple ways, there, F, Here it is to be diligently noted, etc. In the fifth, he removes the accidental predicament from it, there, But what in nature, etc.

Articulus 22 — Whether The Divine Nature Is Simple, Or Composed Of That By Which It Is And That Which It Is

Whether the divine nature is simple, or composite of quo est [that by which it is] and quod est [that which is]?

Whether the divine nature is simple, or composite of quo est and quod est?

Here, however, it is first inquired concerning the simplicity of the divine nature, and two things are inquired [three are listed]. The first is, whether it is simple? The second is concerning the modes of composition, which the Master posits here. The third, why does he not posit more?

To the first it is objected thus: § 1. Everything that is has its being by one thing, and by another has that it is this thing. God is: therefore either He is being itself according to what is

being, or He is this "something". If in the first way, then He Himself is the intention [concept] of being which belongs to all things, which is frivolous: because then He would be the being which is in every particular, and general, and special difference of being, which is frivolous. Therefore He Himself is this "something": therefore by one thing He has being, and by another that He is this: therefore He is composite. And it seems that this reason compels according to our intellect, that everything which is this "something" is composite.

§ 2. Besides, God is a being, and is the first being, and God is: therefore either by the same thing He is all these, or by a diverse thing. If by the same: therefore by that by which He is a being He is first, and conversely: therefore to whatever being belongs, being first also belongs, which is false. Therefore He does not have being by the same thing: therefore by another: and thus He will be composite.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. Let it be granted that by one thing He is a being, and by another this being: therefore He is composite. But prior to every composite are its components by nature: therefore God is not first.

§ 2. Also, since every composite has its components as the principles of its being, it follows that God is not the principle of the universe.

§ 3. Also, since every composite is not necessary per se, but through its components, it follows that God is not a necessary being, and that He is not the necessary being per se.

§ 4. Also, since every composite according to its components is in potency: it follows from this that God would be a being in potency in some way. Because all these things are most absurd, it is necessary to say that God is a simple being at the limit of simplicity.

Solution. It must be conceded that God is simple.

But to this which is objected, that everything that is has being by one thing, and that it is this by another, it must be said that that proposition is of Boethius and of Avicenna in [book] VIII

of First Philosophy and it is understood, just as they themselves gloss themselves, of beings after the first, which are creatures, and second beings. For God has by the same thing that He is, and that He is this or God: and this belongs to Him on account of the non-difference of that which He is with His essence or with His being. For unless we posited Him to be "this being," nothing could be denied of Him, just as neither of being according to what it is: whence the negation of other things concerning Him follows Him, because He is "this being"; but simplicity follows Him, because "this being" does not posit a number and a difference with absolute being in Him.

To the next it must be said that when it is said "first" and "God": all these say His essence adding nothing according to reality, but only according to the mode of signifying, as has been said quite often.

73. 1 Timothy 6:16.

Articulus 23 — It Is Asked, Since Composition Is Manifold, Why The Master Touches Only The Threefold, Namely Of Parts, Of Accidents, And Of Forms

It is inquired, since composition is multiplex, why does the Master touch upon only a triple one, namely of parts, of accidents, and of forms?

Secondly it is inquired, since composition is multiplex, why is only a triple one touched upon here, namely of parts, of accidents, and of forms?

And to this it must be said that a triple composition includes every composition: for either it is a composition of that which is a part; or of that which is not a part, but adheres concretively. If of that which is a part: either it is an essential part from which this "something" and the essence of the thing is constituted, and then it is a composition of form with matter; or of that which is the quo est [that by which it is] with that which is the quod est [that which is], and he touches upon that lastly through the diversity of forms: because that form or quo est makes a diversity of number and species in things, of number through the being of the form in this matter, but of species through special differences, as a man and a donkey differ: and this composition is also in a species and subalternate genus. But what composition is in the most general genera will be had below. If, however, it is an integral part, or a virtual part which in a spiritual thing is reduced to an integral part, then it is the composition which he touches upon first, when he says, "from parts." But if it is of that which is not a part, then it is of an accident with a subject, which is not a part of being.

Articulus 24 — Whether The Nature Of God Alone Is Simple

Whether the nature of God alone is simple?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says: And the same alone is properly and truly simple, etc. For it seems false.

§ 1. For being, and true, and one are converted. And being seems to mean that in which all our intellect stands, resolving the composite into the simple. But that in which the resolving intellect stands is simple: therefore being, one, something, true, good are simple.

§ 2. Besides, the most general genera are simple on account of this, that they are the most general. PROOF. For let it be granted that they are composite: therefore their components will be simpler than them. But the simpler is the more general: therefore they will be more general than them: therefore these are not the most general genera, which is false. Therefore they themselves are simple: therefore the nature of God alone is not simple.

§ 3. If perhaps it is said that the first simple things have composition in this, that they are from another through creation. On the contrary: An efficient cause is not something of the thing, but is entirely outside the thing: therefore it makes neither simplicity in the thing, nor composition. Therefore created being, from this that it is created, is not composite.

§ 4. Besides, if no creature is simple, it seems that the resolving intellect would go into infinity. For "this something" is

74. James 1:17.

composite of quod est and quo est: therefore either the quo est itself is simple, or composite. If simple, I have the proposition, that not God alone is simple. If composite, I inquire concerning its components: either they are simple, or composite. For either there will be a standing in a simple, or the intellect will resolve into infinity. If you say that it is not absurd for the dividing intellect to go into infinity, because the potency of division is into infinity: this is ridiculous. Because this is concerning the potency of the division of a continuum according to the nature of a continuum: but we are speaking here of the division and resolution of a thing into its form.

BUT STILL further it is inquired, Why does he say, truly and properly, as if there were other things which could be simple, not truly and properly.

§ 1. ON THE CONTRARY to this is that any second thing is after the first monad: therefore according to Dionysius, it is two: therefore not simple.

§ 2. Besides, it itself is "this" and "it is": therefore according to Boethius, it has that it is by one thing, and that it is this by another.

§ 3. Besides, all things are created in number, weight, and measure: therefore nothing simply [is simple].

Solution. It must be said that God alone is truly simple, as was concluded of necessity in the first article of the question.

To the first which is objected concerning being, it must be said that that in which the resolution of our intellect stands is simple in a certain respect, and composite simply. For the resolving intellect abstracts the universal from the particular; and further the more universal from the less universal: and therefore it removes nothing but the coarcting [restricting] differences. And it is true that according to the removal of those differences being is simple: and therefore the resolution stands in it. But further it is composite and concrete with potential aptitudes, namely that it itself is after nothing, and therefore variable into nothing: and therefore privation and a potency of falling away are in it unless it is contained: and also it has an aptitude to those things with which it is composable, which aptitude is not nothing in it, as we said above: but nevertheless those aptitudes can be abstracted from it according to the intellect. But that which is of the potency of privation cannot be abstracted from created being: because it is in its definition by the fact that it itself is created.

But if it is objected that being abstracts from created and uncreated being, it must be said that this is frivolous: because from this it follows that uncreated being would be composite. For if being belonged to it and to the created through one common reason, it would be necessary that common being be coarcted in it by some difference: and thus it would have being by one thing, and this being by another: and this was disproved above. Therefore the being in which the resolving intellect stands is not uncreated being: but uncreated being is prior to it as a cause.

But to this which is objected, that one, true, and good, and something are among the first simple things, it must be said that this is frivolous: because they are not converted with being

according to their intentions [concepts], but according to their supposita [subjects]: and therefore there is no doubt that they are composite.

To the next it must be said that the most general genera are simple in the order of a most general genus, that is, that no genus is simpler than them. But genus does not mean the most simple simply. This is clear: because being is simpler than any most general genus, although a most general genus is called the most simple among univocal predicates: and therefore the most general genera have in themselves being, and a difference by which being is coarcted in them: and therefore they are composite.

To the next it must be said that the mere relation to an efficient cause does not make a composition in them, but rather this which is left in them from such an exit into being. This can be seen through a simile: for that which goes out into being through generation is from matter...

§ 1. [the matter] which is potency and under privation: and although through generation there is not a potency in the matter which was toward that form which was received through generation, nevertheless there remains a potency toward another form from the very fact that it has thus come forth into being. Similarly, from the very fact that a thing comes forth into being after nothingness, there remains a potency of tending into nothingness unless it is contained by another.

§ 2. To that which is objected concerning the resolution of the intellect, the solution is already clear through the aforementioned.

§ 3. To the last point it must be said, that there is a qualified simplicity [simplicitas secundum quid] in the creature, as was said: and this is manifold according to many modes, out of which I shall briefly set down some by touching upon them. I say therefore, that there is a certain simplicity of the first component principles, such as by which it is [quo est] and that which is [quod est], and of matter and form, which does not belong to composites from that which is and by which it is. In a spiritual nature there is a certain simplicity, such as the Angels without dependence upon corporeal matter: and this is greater than that of the rational nature in the soul: which although it lacks quantity, nevertheless has a dependence upon the body. After these simplicities there is the simplicity of those things which are in some way in a quantity, and of these some are the principles of quantity, while others themselves are quantified things [quanta] in nature. But since quantity is discrete, and continuous, and that which is as it were both in some way, the principle of the discrete will be most simple, on the grounds that it does not have a position in a continuum, such as unity is: after this will be the point, on the grounds that it has a position in a continuum, although it lacks quantity: and after this will be the indivisible which is the principle of time which is the now, on the grounds that time has in its definition the continuous and the discrete, since it is called the number of motion according to prior and posterior. Now quantified things are not simple, in such a way that they do not have parts: but those are called simple which have quantity without contrariety, such as celestial bodies. And after these, those are called simple which have contrariety,

76. Augustine, De Trinitate, IV, 1.

although they do not have both contraries mixed together, such as the elements in which there are simple contrary qualities. And further, a mixed thing from contraries which is similar in the whole or homogeneous is called simple, such as a stone which is a stone in all its parts, although it is mixed: because the Philosopher says, that pure earth is not a stone, because it does not make for continuation, but comminution [crumbling]: and thus metallic minerals are called simple. Further, sometimes things are called simple: because they have little difference in the mixture of contraries in their parts, such as the bodies of plants, which although they have a certain part which is the root, a certain which is the trunk, and a certain which is the twig and branch, nevertheless there is little difference in the mixture of these parts: and therefore they are sometimes called simple. After those are complexioned bodies which are almost similar, such as animals with a ringed [segmented] body, and certain bodies of fishes. Then there are composites from dissimilar organic parts, which also although they are very much compounded, nevertheless are sometimes called simple with respect to the subsequent composition from a body and a rational soul. Therefore God is called truly simple: because all other things are in some way composed: but properly because this belongs to Him alone.

§ 4. And note, that simplicity is twofold, namely in being which is according to the non-difference of that which is and by which it is or being, and secondly in those things which are adventitious to the nature in lower things, as accidents: and that simplicity is that He Himself is whatever He has of absolute things: for the Father has a Son, and He Himself is not the Son.

Articulus 25 — Whether The Rational Soul Is Simple Or Composite

Whether the rational soul is simple or composed?

§ 6. Next it is inquired concerning this which he says: A spiritual creature too, such as the soul is, in comparison indeed to the body is simple, etc.

§ 7. 1. For it seems, that what is composed in itself cannot by any comparison become simple: but the soul is composed in itself: therefore it is not simple in any comparison. Now that it is composed, is proved by many reasons: as Boethius says in the book De Trinitate, that everything which is below the First, is a this and that: the soul is below the First: therefore it is a this and that: therefore it is composed.

§ 8. 2. Likewise, Avicenna says: Every simple thing has its being from itself: but the soul does not have its being from itself: therefore, etc.

§ 9. 3. Likewise, Boethius in the book De Hebdomadibus: Everything that is, participates in that which is being in order that it may be, but it participates in another in order that it may be something: since therefore the soul is a this something, it itself participates in being and in another: but everything that participates in being and in another, is composed: therefore the soul is composed.

§ 10. 4. Likewise, Boethius in the book De Trinitate says, that in God there is no universal and particular: because it follows from this, that there would be composition in God: but in

71. Pseudo-Dionysius, De caelesti hierarchia, c. 1.

the soul it is possible to receive [conceive] the soul through abstraction from this soul: therefore there is in it a universal and a particular nature: therefore it is composed.

§ 11. 5. Likewise, the Philosopher says in III De Anima: In the soul one thing is that by which it becomes all things, and another is that by which it makes all things: therefore also in an Angel: therefore in the soul there is a potency underlying intelligibles, and an agent of intellect: but the agent, and the underlying thing or subject are not of the same essence in any nature: therefore the soul is composed of diverse essences.

§ 12. 6. Likewise, Avicenna in I of the First Philosophy: Everything from which something is denied, has in its nature something other than simple being: but many things are denied of the soul: therefore, etc.

§ 13. 7. Likewise, the entirely incommunicable and the communicable are not rooted in the same thing: in the soul it is possible to find the entirely incommunicable, and the communicable: therefore they are not rooted essentially in the same thing. Proof of the minor premise. The soul is this individual soul: but the principle of individuation is the principle of incommunicability: but when I say, This soul is a soul, a communicable nature is predicated: therefore in this soul there is a communicable, and an incommunicable nature: therefore it is composed through its essence.

§ 14. 8. Likewise, Boethius and Costa ben Luca say, that a simple thing cannot be a subject: therefore since the soul is the subject of sciences and virtues, it itself will be a composed substance.

§ 15. 9. Likewise, every composition of secondary things flows from a prior and essential composition: but the soul has a composition of secondary things, namely of its powers: since therefore those do not flow from something behaving in the same way as a simple thing, it is evident that it itself is composed in its nature. And because it is easy to bring forth many arguments concerning this, and these are among the stronger ones, therefore let these suffice. Therefore Augustine wrongly says that it is simple in comparison to the body.

§ 16. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Whatever is that which it has, is itself simple, by the authority of Augustine posited here in the Text: the soul is that which it has: therefore it is simple. Proof of the minor premise. Bernard on the Canticles: In the soul, I gaze upon three things, memory, understanding, and will: and these are the soul itself.

§ 17. 2. Likewise, Augustine in the book On the Spirit and the Soul says very often, that the simple substance is sight in the eye, hearing in the ear, and thus of others: therefore it itself is all the powers which it has: therefore it is simple.

§ 18. 3. Likewise, nothing composed in itself is in potency for composing another: therefore if the soul is composed in itself, it will not be in potency for constituting something. The proof of the first premise is, that nature composes simple things to the end that they may be in composites: but it does not further conjoin composites.

72. Liber de sex principiis, 1.

§ 19. 4. Likewise, the soul (as Aristotle says in II De Anima) is not a this something, but the entelechy of a physical body having life in potency: but every composite is a this something: therefore the soul is not composed.

§ 20. 5. Likewise, the soul is a form: but every form is simple: therefore, etc.

§ 21. 6. Besides, composition is from matter and form: the soul is not from matter and form: therefore, etc. Proof of the minor premise. Boethius says at the end of the book On the Two Natures in the One Person of Christ, that spiritual natures are not from matter: therefore the minor is true. But the major is proved by the ninth book of the First Philosophy [Metaphysics]: because there the Philosopher divides being into potency and act as into first principles. And because many things have been said about this elsewhere, let these suffice.

§ 22. Solution. I consent to this part, that the soul is composed of essential principles which are that which is and being [quod est et esse], but not of matter and form: although certain ones seem to say this: and this is because according to the Philosopher matter is determined through a potency toward a motion varying something in substance, or toward local motion: and since a potency of this sort is not except in bodies, there will be no matter except in bodies: yet matter will not be univocal in all corporeal things: because of corruptible and incorruptible things there is not one matter, just as there is not one potency toward motion.

§ 23. To the first therefore it must be said, that the soul is not that which it itself has: and what Bernard says is to be glossed, that it is a predication of a virtual whole concerning its part, and it is an improper predication. But if force is placed on what he says, that these three are nothing else than the soul itself, it ought to be glossed according to the sense which was noted above, that the soul is taken by him as a potential whole, all parts of which taken together are its power: thus memory, understanding, and will taken together, express the whole of the power of the soul according to its higher part.

§ 24. To that which is said from the book On the Spirit and the Soul, it can be denied because it is not by Augustine, but by a certain William the Cistercian who said many false things. But if anyone wishes to maintain it, it can be said that the soul is sight in the eye, as a virtual whole predicated of a part in which there is something of its power, on the grounds that the whole itself is essentially present to that part and to any other: although it is not present to them according to all its power.

§ 25. To the next it must be said, that this is false, Nothing composed in itself, etc., and there is a counter-instance in an organic body. But this is true that nothing composed with an ultimate composition can constitute another: and then it does not hold of the soul, which although it is composed, nevertheless can compose another: because it is not composed as a constituted this something, but it is composed as a form which is a substance perfected by the perfection of a mover, on the grounds that nothing moves unless it is perfect in itself.

75. Augustine, Confessiones, XII, 15 (Albert's text cites XI).

§ 26. To the next it must be said, that the Philosopher says this, that the soul is not one by itself, as a singular thing in nature: but it itself is a form and a first substance potent to be without a body.

§ 27. To the next it must be said, that the first composition of bodies is from matter and form, but not of spiritual things, but rather from that by which it is and that which is, or from that which is and being, as Boethius says.

Articulus 26 — Whether The Soul Is Whole In The Whole Body, And Whole In Each Part

Whether the soul is whole in the whole body, and whole in any part?

§ 29. Next it is inquired concerning this which he says: And the soul is whole in the whole, and is whole in any part of it, etc.

§ 30. 1. For it seems, that the soul is not in the whole: for the totality of the soul can only be referred to the totality of powers, on the grounds that it does not have other parts of its quantity: since therefore it is not in the body with respect to all its powers, it will not itself be whole in the whole.

§ 31. 2. Likewise, it is said by certain Philosophers that the spirit is the instrument of the soul through which it works life; since therefore the spirit (as Isaac says) arises wholly from the heart, the whole soul seems to be in the heart.

§ 32. 3. Besides, if it is whole in the whole, and in any part: therefore it is whole in the hand: therefore since it itself existing whole in some body makes that an animal, the hand will be an animal, as it seems.

§ 33. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. The soul works and senses everywhere in the body: therefore it works and senses through a power: therefore either this power is in it, or not. If not: therefore it is not continuous with it: therefore it does not sense immediately through it, which is false: therefore it does not sense except through its own power: but a power is not without a subject: therefore the substance of the soul is where its power is: but its powers are everywhere in the body: therefore it itself is essentially in the whole body.

§ 34. 2. Likewise, the form of fire is not referred to a part of the nature of fire, but to the whole: because the form everywhere perfects the matter: therefore similarly since the soul is the form of the body, it refers whole to the whole.

§ 35. But then it is further inquired whether it itself is divisible by the division of the body?

§ 36. It seems that it is: because when that in which something is is divided, it seems that it is necessary that what is in it be divided: but the soul is in the body: therefore, etc.

§ 37. But on the contrary: What is whole in the whole and whole in any part, when any part is divided, is whole in it: but what is whole in any part, is not divided by the division of the parts: therefore it seems, that the soul is not divided by the division of the body.

§ 38. Further it is inquired, Whether the rational soul is whole in the whole?

§ 39. It seems that it is not: because the Philosopher says, that the intellect is the act of no body: therefore it is not in the whole, nor in a part as an act: therefore it is also not divided by its division.

§ 40. But on the contrary: Something perfects man insofar as he is man: not the vegetative soul, not the sensitive: therefore the rational: therefore the rational soul is the act of the body of man.

§ 41. Further it is inquired, Whether the soul is in the body as in a place?

§ 42. 1. It seems that it is: because to be in a place definitively is to operate in a place, as Damascene says: but the operations of the soul are in the body: therefore it itself is in the body as in a place.

§ 43. 2. Likewise, Ambrose: Local is that which is defined by a place, so that it is here, and not elsewhere: but if the soul is in the body: therefore it is in it as in a place and is local, as it seems.

§ 44. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. The Philosopher says, that the soul is compared to the body as the container to the contained: therefore the soul is the container: therefore it itself is rather the place of the body, than conversely: because it properly belongs to a place to contain.

§ 45. 2. Likewise, the Philosopher says, that the containing of a place and of matter are not the same: since therefore the body is the matter of the soul, it will not be its place.

§ 46. 3. Likewise, place and the placed are distinct through essence: but the soul and body are united: therefore one is not the place of the other.

§ 47. 4. Likewise, every placed thing in something as in a place, is movable outside of it, with the subject and definition remaining the same: the soul is not movable outside the body thus: therefore it itself is not in the body as in a place.

§ 48. Solution. Certain ones have said, that the soul is united to the body of man by a double medium: for since the body is a gross corporeal composite, and the rational soul is incorporeal, non-bodily, and spiritual, they are distant in all properties: therefore it is necessary to have a double medium, namely an incorporeal spiritual and a corporeal one, and a corporeal bodily (otherwise, corruptible) spiritual medium: and this agrees in two respects with the body, and in one with the soul: and thus they say, that the rational soul in its conjunction to the body has the vegetative and sensitive soul in place of the first medium: and the corporeal spirit which they say is of the nature of the fifth body it has as a medium in the second ratio of a medium. But from this position it follows, that the vegetative and sensitive soul in man would be dispositions to the rational soul: therefore they will be accidents, which is absurd. For it is against the Philosophers, namely Avicenna in VI of the First Philosophy, that the vegetative and sensitive soul are not in man as a substance, but as a potency, in which the rational soul is founded: and thus the rational soul is the act of man insofar as he is man: and the sensitive and vegetative are its potential parts. This is also against Aristotle in book XVI On Animals, where he says, that just as the body is one, so also the soul is one. Besides, it

could not easily be proved, how that spirit is of the nature of the fifth body, since the Philosophers say that it is air by nature, or a medium between fire and air.

§ 49. And therefore, feeling otherwise, we say that the soul is considered in three ways, namely as the form of the body, and according to its essence, and as a mover insofar as it is the efficient cause of all the works of the animated body. If it is taken in the first way, I say that it is whole in the whole, and is united immediately, unless you wish to say, that the dependence of one to the other is a medium: but that potency is imported in the name of form, and in the name of matter, on the grounds that we say that the soul is the substantial form of such a body, namely a physical one having life in potency: and in this way I well suppose, that it is whole in the whole. According to another consideration of its essence, I say that it is an indivisible essence, and its whole essence is present to any part of it, namely to the intellect, and to sense, and thus of others: and since its powers are divided throughout the body, and it itself is essentially present to each one, it itself through its essence only is whole in the whole. But if it is considered as it is a mover, thus it is the efficient cause of works, and it is not the efficient cause of works except through all its potential parts: whence thus it is as it were constituted from its powers as parts, and thus it is in the whole wholly, in such a way that it is not whole in any part.

§ 50. It must be said therefore to the first, that the soul has totality by many considerations, namely one with respect to its powers, and another which Augustine touches upon in book IX of De Trinitate, with respect to its essential attributes, such as are life, essence, substance, and spirit: for with respect to these it can be whole in the whole body: because in any part there is life, and substance, and spirit, and soul, and principle, and form: and according to all these in being it is in the ratio of a certain totality in being. A whole is also said to be the same as perfect: and thus again it is whole in the whole, and in any part. But if totality is said from the universality of powers, it will be whole in the whole, but not whole in any part.

§ 51. To the next it must be said, that the spirit is the instrument of the soul with respect to its first operations, which are vital, natural, and animal: for through the vital spirit it flows in life, and pulse: but through the natural one natural works, such as to nourish, augment, and generate: but through the animal one animal works, such as are sense, and motion: and these belong to it, according as it is the mover of the body: but according to this that it gives being, it does not have a medium.

§ 52. And if it is objected, that according to the Philosopher for living things to live is to be: therefore living whose instrument is the vital spirit, is being: and thus it uses it in order to give being. It must be said, that this is impossible: because it does not use an instrument unless it is: therefore the soul using the instrument is already in the body before the instrument by reason of form: and therefore, when it is said, that for living things to live is to be, it is understood of the act of life which is the soul, the effect of which gives animal being, and this is to be life and to live: but it is not understood of living which is through spirit and pulse.

§ 53. To the next it must be said, that it does not make the parts to be animals, because it is not in them as a soul, but as a potency of the soul: but a potency does not make an animal,

because the potency itself is not through a proper being, but through the being of that whose potency it is: just as any part is through the being of its whole which it has in it. But it is true, that if the part were divided, then the potency itself would be the soul, and the member would be the animal: whence the Philosopher says, that if the eye were an animal, sight would be its soul.

§ 54. To the next it must be said, that the rational soul itself is not divisible by the division of the body: for something is said to be divisible by the division of the matter in which it is, namely because when the matter is divided it itself is greater in the greater part, and lesser in the lesser, and equal in the equal: and thus by the division of matter only forms having a position in a body are divided: and positional things per se or by accident, such as whiteness, color. In a second way something is said to be divided by the division of the body, which remains according to one ratio in any divided part, but not greater in the greater, and lesser in the lesser, and equal in the equal: and thus substantial form is divided in homogeneous things, or things close to the nature of homogeneous things, such as stone, and wood: for in a plant when a part is divided each part convalesces through grafting: and this is also the case in certain animals having almost similar members throughout the whole body. But the rational soul is divided in none of those ways: and it does not have this insofar as it is a form, nor insofar as it is a substantial form: because thus any substantial form would have this: but it has it insofar as it is a substance having parts distant in work, and from this seeking a great diversity of organs in the body in which it is: and this is the statement of the Commentator above the beginning of book II of De Caelo et Mundo.

§ 55. To the next it must be said, that the rational soul expresses two things, namely that it is a soul, and that it is rational: if it is taken as a soul, then it is the act of the body, and it has flowing from itself powers, of which certain ones are affixed to organs, and certain ones are not: and by that man is man: and I concede well, that by the sensitive or vegetative man is not man, since in man they are not except as potencies, and not as acts of the body. But if it is taken only as it is of reason, then it is the act of no body, that is, of no part of the body: because those powers of its are not affixed to organs, although they receive through apprehension from a potency affixed to an organ, as is the phantasy, or memory, or estimation.

§ 56. To the next it must be said, that the soul is not in the body as in a place: because thus the soul would not be in the body except by accident.

§ 57. But to the objection on the contrary, it must be said that it is not defined in the body as a placed thing in a place: because that which operates in something distinct through essence from it, is said to be defined [confined], and not that which operates as united to it, as the objections made to the contrary prove.

Articulus 27 — Whether The Soul Is Well Demonstrated To Be Composite On Account Of Its Accidents

Whether the soul is well proved to be composed on account of its accidents?

§ 59. Next it is inquired concerning this which he says: For since it is one thing to be artful, etc.

§ 60. For it seems, that this does not induce composition: because an accident is not in it as a part of the thing, as the Philosopher says: but nothing composes except a part: therefore from this it is not proved that the soul is composed.

§ 61. To this it must be said, that Augustine proves it well: because from this it is taken, that it is composed in two ways, namely in its essence, and by the composition of concretion. In its substance indeed: because nothing can be the subject of an accident except what is in itself composed: and this is proved by Boethius in the book De Trinitate, where he says thus: A simple form cannot be a subject. From this therefore that the soul is the subject of accidents, as of arts, sciences, and virtues, it is left that it is composed.

§ 62. It must be said therefore to the objection, that Augustine intends, that the accidents demonstrate that essential composition: and moreover they make a composition of concretion, in which it is not required that the component be a part.

Articulus 28 — Whether It Follows Well: The Divine Essence Is Simple, Therefore Immutable

Whether it follows well, The Divine essence is simple: therefore immutable?

§ 64. Next it is inquired concerning this which he says: For nothing simple is mutable, etc.

§ 65. This is now the third ratio of simplicity which is extracted from the Text. For the first was according to the non-difference of that which is and being, on the grounds that there is no part there. But the second, that it was not a subject of accidents. But the third is this: because the divine essence is immutable: and this is proved thus:

§ 66. Everything that is mutated, is mutated either according to the whole in position, or toward a form. If it is mutated in position or in place, it is composed of a mover and a movable, as was noted above. But if it is mutated toward a form, it will be the subject of that form, and thus again composed. Therefore it is evident, that what is entirely simple cannot be mutated. What therefore is thus entirely immutable, is also called simple.

§ 67. Besides, what is mutated, is mutated through a privation which is in it: but a privation is not except in a composite of that having the privation and the privation or potency: therefore what is entirely immutable, will be entirely simple: and this is the intention of Augustine.

Articulus 29 — How God Is Named Something Symbolically

How is God symbolically named something?

How is God symbolically named something?

§ 69. Next it is inquired concerning this which he says: And whatever else seems not unworthily to be said, etc.

§ 70. For it seems that God is named something symbolically or through similitude, as lion, and stone: which nevertheless befits Him unworthily.

§ 71. Solution. Augustine understands this of those things which according to the reality are found first in God, although by name they imperfectly represent them: and this Augustine calls 'to be said worthily', because it is better simply for any thing to be than not to be, in the way which was said above.

Articulus 30 — Whether There Can Be Accidents In God, And Whether He Causes Them

Whether there can be accidents in God, and whether He causes them?

§ 73. Next it is inquired concerning this which he says: But what in the divine nature, etc. On the contrary: It seems that an accident is in God. God creates an accident; either therefore by univocal generation, or equivocal. Not equivocal: because equivocal generation is, when the ratio of the generated is not in the generator, as the sun generates a plant or man: but univocal, when the ratio of the generated is in the generator or creator. But there is not anything created by God, whose proper ratio is not in Him, as Augustine says: therefore it seems, that the ratio of all accidents is in God: and where the ratio of an accident is, there is an accident: therefore an accident is in God, as it seems.

§ 74. Solution. It must be said, that every species of motion is reduced to an immobile mover according to that species of motion, as the motion of a lower thing to the motion of the heaven, and the motion of the heaven to the mover of the heaven: and if that is a motion, it is reduced further to the first mover simply, as the motion of a hot thing is reduced to the motion of fire, and the motion of fire to the motion of the star of Mars, or of another which in itself is not disposed by that quality, and thus of others. So it is concerning the variation of accidents and temporal things, that they are reduced according to themselves to the first causing them, which is disposed by none of them.

§ 75. But to this that is objected, it must be said that if the ratio of hot is in God, nevertheless He is not hot, or white on account of the ratio of white: for this ratio is not the definition of white, but is like a ratio in the first cause, from whose power not quality such things proceed.

Articulus 31 — Whether The Nine Predicaments Of Accidents, Both According To Genera And According To Species, Can Be Attributed To God; And Whether God Can Be Understood As Good Without A Quality

Whether the nine categories of accidents as much according to genera as according to species can be attributed to God: and whether God can be understood as good without quality?

§ 77. Next it is inquired concerning this which he says: Let us understand God, as much as we can, as good without quality, etc.

§ 78. 1. For against this it seems to be, that from whatever the genus is removed, the species is also removed: therefore if He Himself is without quality, He Himself is also without goodness, as it seems.

§ 79. 2. Likewise, when it is said, great without quantity, it does not seem that quantity is removed from Him by reason of genus only, but also by reason of species: because He is in no species of the discrete or of the continuous.

§ 80. 3. Likewise, creator without need of Himself: Creator expresses a relation: therefore he ought to say creator without relation, just as he said in the others.

§ 81. 4. If perhaps it should be said, that this ought not to have been said: because relation does not change the mode of predicating in divine things. This is against Boethius, who says in the book De Trinitate, thus: But when someone applies these, that is, other categories besides relation, into divine predication, all things which can be predicated are changed: but relative to something is not predicated at all: therefore it seems from this that relation is most of all removed from divine things.

§ 82. 5. Likewise, he seems to speak badly, Presiding without position [situs]: because Boethius says concerning position and posture thus, that position and posture cannot be required in God: therefore it seems, that position is removed both by grace of the genus, and by grace of the species.

§ 83. 6. Likewise, since position is the ordering of parts in a whole or in a place, or in the universe, it is evident that it does not befit any spiritual creature: therefore much less God.

§ 84. 7. Likewise, it is objected concerning this which he says, Whole everywhere without place: for where and when predicate nothing in that of which they are said, as Boethius says: therefore since these predicate nothing in that of which they are said, it is not necessary to remove them from divine predication: because they do not make a composition.

§ 85. 8. Likewise, concerning when it seems frivolous that it predicates nothing: because if I say, God is always, the when of eternity is predicated: but God is His own eternity: therefore it seems that it predicates something in Him which is He Himself.

§ 86. 9. Likewise, it is objected concerning this which he says, Making mutable things without mutation of Himself: because Augustine says in the book LXXXIII Questions, that to make befits God even more properly than others: therefore by reason of its genus it ought not to be removed from God.

§ 87. 10. Likewise, it is objected concerning this, And suffering nothing: because God seems to suffer, as the Creed says, Crucified, died, and was buried.

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Solution. To this it must be said that all the most general from the genera of accident have two things in themselves, namely that they are accidents, and the difference by which they are distinguished from each other: for that quantity is quantity, it does not have from that which is accident, but from that which is dimension or measure of substance within or without. Similarly, that quality is quality, it does not have from that which is accident, but from that which is disposition of natural substance or adventitious within or without: and so it is with others. However, from that which they are accidents, all say order to substance. Whence the
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Philosopher in the beginning of book XI of the First Philosophy: It has been said about being to which other categories of being are attributed, where it has been said about substance: for many things are called beings according to which they regard the definition of substance, as quantity, quality, and others which are said in this way. Similarly, by the difference by which they participate in the nature of accident, they also regard the category of substance: as is clear through the same authority, as quantity in the reason of measure, quality in the reason of disposition, etc.: therefore, since in this way it is imperfect being, and being in another, all which predicate something in that of which they are predicated, by reason of genus are removed from the divine. And to this again to be understood it must be noted that Boethius says that some of the categories predicate something to be in that of which they are predicated: but some assist extrinsically: but some predicate the thing to have relation to that which is extrinsically adjacent, as place, and time. Whence quality, and quantity, and acting, and being acted upon, and position, and habit, predicate something to be in. But relation assists extrinsically, as right, and left: for the same can be right and left without its change. But when and where predicate that which from the adjacency of the external measuring is left. Therefore, those which predicate something to be in because of the genus which places order to substance, are removed in the genus:

but that which by reason of difference agrees in the species, because through difference it says order to act or to end, and not subject, therefore in the species it is predicated: especially if that species is constituted by difference of dignity, as good, wise, etc. But those which are extrinsically assisting to another, by reason of that which is the nature of accident in them, are not predicated, but are changed into substance: but by reason of that which they add in the most general, they do not say order to substance, and therefore they remain.

And through this now the solution to the first is clear, and to that which is objected, why it is not said without relation related. But those which predicate that which is left from the adjacency of the external measuring, are removed: indeed in place according to which it implies circumscription, and this is in particular: as if it were said to be somewhere, not somewhere, and of this kind: and if it were said, it was, and will not be. Whence in such it is not necessary to exclude except that which is of part and imperfection: and therefore it excludes time: because this is imperfect, as was held before. And through this the solution about where, and when is clear. But some are also imperfect in the genus of accident, and also by that which they add, as position which is of corporeal things, and being acted upon which is of the imperfect, and habit which is of corporeal things: and therefore those are simply removed, unless by translation they agree to God. And through this again the solution to those which are objected about them is clear.

To the second it must be said that quantity properly is only of corporeal things: but nevertheless it is taken here for the quantity of power.

To another it must be said that change causes relation, as the Philosopher says: but change is of the needy, and therefore that which sounds imperfection, especially removes.

To another it must be said that the understanding of Boethius is that formally the negation regards the distribution of the sign, so that the sense is: It is not altogether predicated, that is, it is not

altogether predicated: because it is changed by reason of the nature of accident which is in it: although it retains the predication of the difference which it superadds: because that makes it to be to another: and this Boethius intends when he says that it is not altogether predicated in the divine.

To another it must be said that position says the ordering of parts, and it is not in spiritual things except by reason of order which is preserved there: because that which is there of corporeal nature, or local, this does not agree to God: and therefore position is preserved there according to the part of its reason which is order.

To another it must be said as above it was determined about where.

To another it must be said that in truth when it is said, God is always, eternity is signified, and the adjacency of it according to reason, which is nothing other than God: because otherwise there would have been many from eternity: but Augustine removes time which is the exemplar of eternity, and it is imperfect which by always can be understood.

To another it must be said that acting is taken in two ways, namely physically, and thus nothing acts unless it is acted upon and changed: and this is the agent in our use accepted: and this Augustine attends here. It is also said that the agent which without change of itself brings forth the species of the act, and this does not agree except to God - and this is the perfect agent, and this is the agent of which Augustine intends, when he says that acting agrees only to God: because namely every perfect agent is with respect to the act: but the perfect is especially that which is never acted upon, but universally acts all things.

To the last it must be said that God is acted upon by reason of the suppositum of man, and not by reason of the divine nature: and therefore that objection is sophistical.

Articulus 32 — Whether The Predicament Of Substance Can Be Attributed To God, Such That God Is In The Predicament Of Substance

Whether the predicament of substance can be attributed to God, such that God is in the predicament of substance?

Whether the predicament of substance can be attributed to God, such that God is in the predicament of substance?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says;

Whence neither is He properly called substance, etc.

1. The reasons of the Master which he uses, saying that God is not in the predicament of substance, can be these: Whatever is in the genus of substance, is either by way of principle, or by way of genus, or by way of being contained in the genus. If by way of principle, since the principles of substance are only two, namely matter and form, if

God were in the genus in this way, He would be matter or form. But if by way of genus, then God would be the most general predicable univocally of all contained in the genus of substance. But if by way of being contained, then He would be either subalternate, or most specific, or individual: and none of these is God: therefore He is not in a genus.

2. Likewise, the genus of substance in itself has being, and another by which substance is substance: therefore it has two in itself: therefore it is composite: but God is not composite: therefore substance is not said of Him univocally with others: therefore He is not in the same genus with others.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. God is substance: either it is true, or false. If true, either substance is predicated there as a substantial predicate not converted, or not. If not: therefore it is predicated as an accident, which is false. If so: therefore since every substantial predicate not converted is predicated of something as a genus, it seems that God is substance as in a genus. If it is said that this is false, God is substance. But on the contrary: Whatever is, is substance, or accident: therefore God is accident, which is false: therefore He is substance.

1. Likewise, God is per se existing, such that nothing exists per se as much as God: but substance is a thing per se existing, therefore God is substance, and substance is God.

Solution. It must be said that in truth God or the divine essence is not in any genus as the first reasons for the Master prove: and when it is said substance, it is not said substance from the act of standing under second substance or accidents: but it is said substance being not through another, which is divided against being from another, and being in another: and Boethius and Dionysius call that substance to be above every substance: because this causes all substances, and they imitate it.

To what is objected, whether it is an essential predicate? etc. It must be said that when it is said, God is substance, the same is signified in the subject and predicate, although in another way, because in God there is not what is and by which it is: and therefore it is not an essential predicate unless converted: because substance is not predicated except as the same under another mode of signifying: for those arguments are in created things, not in divine things.

But if it is objected, By conversion substance is God: therefore every substance. It must be said that it does not follow, for although it is essential, yet it is predicated as the same to the subject: and that should not be converted, nor distributed, because the sign does not regard those which are of diverse nature. Whence when it is said, every substance, substance is not distributed for the substance of God, but only for the creature, and for those that expression is false.

To the other it must be said, that in the way which was said before, speaking of per se existing, God is most excellently per se existing: otherwise not.

Articulus 33 — Whether Hilary Well Touches Upon Every Mode Of Composition By The Four Which Are Set Forth In The Text

Whether Hilary touches upon every mode of composition well through the four things that are set forth in the Letter?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says:

God is not from composites, etc.

Namely, whether Hilary touches upon every mode of composition through these four? For the first composition which is in the thing is from essential parts, which are that which is and that by which it is, which are in the thing from which the universal and particular are taken: and he touches upon that first, when he says, God is not from composites, etc. The second composition is of the first things, which are from matter and form, in which composition matter is subject to privation, which is weak and imperfect. The third is the composition from the influence of the celestial body over the lower things, because every mixture and generation of lower things is reduced to the motion of the heaven as a cause: but the higher body moves through the influence of light over the darkness especially of the two elements, which are earth and water. For these abound more in the bodies of mixtures: for the dry terrestrial is the terminative of this kind of aqueous, and the moist aqueous is the continuative of the dry, and thus the mixture is made by the moving light of the higher bodies through presence, or through aspect, or through some application to a star regarding, or conjunction, or opposition, or other properties, which are determined in the science of the stars. To this mixture follows the composition of complexioned and organic things to the spiritual nature which is the soul.

The first is of the celestial body and the angel and the rational soul. The second is of the prime matter to the form of the element. The third is of the elements to the form of minerals. The fourth is of the complexioned to the form which is the soul.

To the first is opposed life in the whole: because in the composite life is of the active essence, and that which is has life participatively. But to the second is opposed virtue because of the defect of privation which is weak. To the third is opposed light in the whole because of the opaque and dark of the lower elements. To the fourth is opposed being spirit in the whole because of the disparity of the gross and earthly body to the spiritual nature of the soul which is composed with it.

Articulus 34 — Whether Relation Can Be In God With His Simplicity Preserved

Whether relation can exist in God without compromising His simplicity?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says:

And with such simplicity and certainty, etc.

1. For since relation is a being, and does not turn into substance, it seems in divine things to be substance and accident. Therefore, at least a composition of concretion.

2. If perhaps it is said that relation does not signify something as inhering, but as assisting, as Boethius seems to want, and the Porretanians said. To this it seems to follow the heresy of Sabellius: for if relation signifies nothing in reality, it seems that it does not constitute the thing in which it is. But in divine things we have nothing that can constitute persons except relations. Therefore, it seems that if they are nothing in reality, there is no distinction of persons, but only a trinity of names, as Sabellius says.

3. Furthermore, relation seems in divine things to change the mode of predication, just as other things do: because the Father is something in Himself, even if He does not have the Son: for He is most truly a subsisting substance: therefore, it seems that the relative signifies substance: therefore, it changes the mode of predication.

4. Likewise, the Father is most truly the suppositum and hypostasis of the divine nature: but every suppositum of substance is substance, as is evident by inducing each suppositum of man, angel, dog, donkey, and so on: since therefore the divine nature is substance, its suppositum will be substance; therefore, the relative changes the mode of predication in divine things.

Solution. It must be briefly said, because it will be discussed below, that relation has in itself, namely the nature of an accident, and that it is a certain property, and from this it has to inhere solely, and it has in itself that it is opposed to another relatively, and from this it has to be determined externally, as when it is said, Father of the son, and son of the father. And as to the first, it changes the mode of predication, because regarding that, its mode of predication is the mode of an accident making a composition of concretion with the subject in which it is, and it is predicated denominatively of it: and such predication cannot be in God: and therefore in divine things it loses the nature of an accident, and the nature of a property remains inasmuch as it is a property, namely that it is fitting to one alone: and further, the understanding of relation to another remains to it, as has been said: and therefore some have said that in divine things relation is nothing in the person, but is the person itself, and that by which the person is to another, wishing by this to say that it loses the nature of an accident, and thus does not inhere, and retains the nature of property and relation.

But what Boethius says, that relation is assisting, he understands regarding the second, namely regarding the nature of relation, as relation, and not regarding the nature of property which is in relation. From this it is clear that it does not take away simplicity: because it would not take away except by the nature of an accident as it is an accident, which by introducing a diverse being, that is, a being of a diverse nature from substance, would make a multiple being, and a composition of concretion between them: for the person does not have any accident, but is most truly substance and suppositum. And this opinion will be more discussed below.

Articulus 35 — Why, Since There Are Many Attributes Of The Divine Essence, Does The Master Determine Only Concerning Three, Simplicity, Identity, And Unity

Why, since there are many attributes of the divine essence, does the Master determine only concerning three, simplicity, identity, and unity?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says:

Behold how great is identity, how great is unity, etc.

For it is doubtful, since there are many attributes of the divine nature, why does the Master treat here only of these three?

And to this it must be said, that the Master, as is evident, treats here of simplicity, and the others as they relate to the generation of the Son, about which he principally intends here: and because in lower things generation follows, so that the begotten, or generated, is first in potency, and does not receive the unity of the essence of the Father according to act, due to the imperfection of the lower nature: and it follows secondly, that the essence itself is changed from potency into act: and thirdly, that it is divided according to one being in the Father, and according to another being in the begotten. Therefore, concerning these three by opposition, the Master treats in divine generation in which the begotten receives the true essence without changeability, and in simplicity, because it is one in the Father and the Son, etc.

DISTINCTIO IX

Divisio Textus

Now let us approach the distinction of persons, etc.

Here begins the fourth and last part of the treatise on the generation of the Son: in which it is discussed concerning itself with respect to the measurer outside according to reason. For as the Philosopher says, what is external to the eternal, this is coeternal to the coeternal, and time to the temporal, on account of one reason of measure in common. Hence it is proven in this distinction that the Son is coeternal with the Father. However, it is divided into three parts. In the first, it is proven that the Son is coeternal with the Father against the Arian heretics. In the second, it is inquired with what fitting words the eternity of the generation of the Son is expressed, there, K, Here it can be asked, When. In the third, the objection of Arius is resolved from the words of Hilary, there, P,

But the heretic will say, etc.

The first of these is subdivided into two. In the first, it is proven that the generation is coeternal with the generating Father. In the second, it is shown to be ineffable, there, H, But you ask of me, he says, etc.

The first of these is further divided into four. First, indeed, he manifests the coeternity of the Father and the Son. Second, he sets against it the objection of the heretics, there, CG, But

against this says the heretic. In the third, he sets the response of Augustine to the objection of the heretic, there, D, Who. And he adds what Augustine says against the objection of the heretic, there, E, If the Son of God, etc. In the fourth, against the same heretic, he sets the response of Ambrose, there, F, And he also joins to the Arian question the rational invective of Ambrose against the heretic, there, G, Tell me, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether Eternity Is The Divine Essence

Whether eternity is the divine essence?

Whether eternity is the divine essence?

Here before the Letter it is necessary to inquire, if eternity is the divine essence: and if it is, in what manner it is understood to be adjacent to the procession of persons: and thirdly, in what mode it is distinguished from age and time: so that it may be known that the generation of the Son is not eternal or temporal, as the heretics said.

From the first it proceeds thus:
1. Anselm says in the Monologion, that eternity is of those things which are not other than itself: therefore eternity is the same as the divine essence.

1. Likewise, Eternity is without beginning and without end: but nothing of this sort is except God: therefore eternity is God Himself.
2. Likewise, Everything that is, is either creature or creator. If creature: but every creature is mutable, as Augustine says, and it has been held in the preceding distinction: therefore eternity itself is mutable, which is against the definition of Dionysius set above, that eternity is ancient and invariable, etc.: therefore, etc.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
1. If eternity is nothing other than God: therefore to be in eternity is to be in God: but all things in a certain way, namely as in an excellent measure, are in eternity: therefore all things are in God as in a measure, which is false.

1. Likewise, Eternity is a duration extrinsically adjacent: but nothing extrinsically adjacent is that to which it is adjacent: therefore eternity is not God, since it is adjacent to the duration of God.
2. Likewise, Measure and measured are not the same: but eternity is a measure, the being of God is the measured: therefore, etc.

Solution. It must be said that eternity according to the thing is the same as the divine essence enduring, and the duration itself, because whatever is in God is God: but it has another mode of signifying. Just as the knowledge of God and any other divine attribute, although it is the essence of God, yet it does not follow that whatever is in knowledge is in the essence of God or will. Similarly, although the enduring essence of God is the same as eternity, it does not follow that whatever is in eternity is in the enduring essence of God. And in such matters the

mode of predicating is changed, which induces a fallacy of figure of speech, or what is more true, of accident. Because although they are the same in reality, it does not follow that whatever is fitting to one is fitting to the other. For it is not inconvenient that the divine essence is not in the reason of essence, but in the reason of duration is the measure of enduring things.

To the other it must be said that eternity does not extrinsically adjacently to objects, except according to reason: for according to the thing it is within, because God is His duration.

To the third it must be said that this holds in lower things, that the measure is not the measured itself essentially. But in the higher nature in which there is nothing that is not itself, it does not hold, except according to reason: because measure and measured are the same in reality, although they differ in reason.

Articulus 2 — How Eternity Is Understood To Be Adjacent To The Procession Of The Persons

How is eternity understood to be adjacent to the procession of persons?

Then it is asked, How is it understood to be adjacent to the procession of persons?

1. For that which is immense neither certifies the quantity of anything, nor is certified by any quantity: but eternity is immense, the procession of persons is also immense, and the divine essence is immense: therefore it seems that none of these is adjacent to the other as a measure.
2. Likewise, the indivisible measures nothing, nor is it measured. Prosario. Every measure is for the sake of having certainty of quantity: but the indivisible does not have quantity: therefore it is not measured. Similarly, it does not measure quantity when taken multiple times: therefore it cannot be a measure: therefore it seems that it is not adjacent as a measure.

Solution. It must be said that eternity is in a certain way infinite, and in a certain way not infinite, and similarly God or the enduring divine being. For if the divine being is taken as infinite privatively, namely that it is naturally apt to have an end and does not have one: thus neither God nor eternity are infinite. But if it is taken negatively, that is, not finite: again it can be taken in two ways, namely that it is not finite because it is extended in parts without end: and in this way God or his eternity is not said to be infinite. But God and his eternity are said to be infinite because both, existing wholly at once, neither lacked, nor lack, nor will lack, and this is the infinite which is constituted in the state of the most perfect, which rejects nothing from itself, nor accepts anything: and this infinite does not contradict the reason of measure and measured, but the infinite accepted in the first and second way.

To the other it must be said that the indivisible in the reason of the indivisible does not measure because it is certain, not according to quantity, but in itself: but eternity is an indivisible having extension, not indeed in parts according to succession or potentiality, but rather as not deficient to something that stands or runs under it: and thus although it is

indivisible, it is not taken as indivisible, rather in the reason of duration extended in this way, and thus it measures. And the divine being accepted in this way as enduring is measured by its duration, which is the same as its being or divine essence.

Articulus 3 — How Eternity Is Distinguished From Aevum And Time, And Whether Some Non-Living Things Are Measured By Aevum, And Whether Aevum Is In One As Eternity And Time Are

How eternity is distinguished from the age, and time, and whether some non-living things are measured by the age, and whether the age is in one as eternity and time?

How eternity is distinguished from the age, and time, and whether some non-living things are measured by the age, and whether the age is in one as eternity and time?

Thirdly, it is asked about the distinction of eternity from the age, and time. For the age is the measure of those things which are altogether at once: therefore it seems that it is the same as eternity.

Proof that the age is altogether at once. 1. Just as we see that the prior and posterior in time are caused by the prior and posterior in motion, and the whole being at once in eternity is caused by the simplicity of the eternal, so it is necessary to derive the properties of the age from the property of the everlasting: but the being of the everlasting does not have the potential to be before being, nor power without act in any way: therefore, since not being at once is caused by power rejecting and receiving act, those things will be altogether at once, whose potential is always in act or in being.

1. Likewise, every succession of time is caused by motion: therefore in whose being there is no motion, they have no succession: but the being of the everlasting has no motion: therefore they cause no succession in their measure: therefore the age, which is their measure, is altogether at once, as it seems.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Whatever things are altogether at once, are truly immutable: but true immutability is true eternity, as Augustine says: therefore whatever things are altogether at once, are eternal: therefore the everlasting are eternal, which is false: therefore the everlasting are not altogether at once.

1. Likewise, the enduring being of an Angel is not its duration: since therefore duration is nothing but the extension of being indeficient, it seems that the Angel does not have that part of its duration which it will have after a thousand years: therefore its whole duration is not at once: therefore the everlasting is not altogether at once, since it is that duration or adjacent to it.

According to this, it is further asked, Whether some non-living things are measured by the age?

1. For thus Boethius says in the book on the Trinity, that the philosophers gave being at once to immortal bodies. Therefore it seems that it is not only the measure of Angels.

2. Furthermore, the Philosopher says that necessary and impossible things are not in time: but many necessary things are not God himself, like immutable things: therefore it seems that since they are not eternal, nor temporal, they are measured by the age.

On the contrary, it is asked, If the age is in one, just as eternity and time?

It seems so: because the Philosopher says that each thing is measured by the smallest of its kind: but the everlasting in as much as they are of one kind: therefore they are measured by some smallest of that kind: therefore it will be in that as in subject and cause.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 4. Eternity is in one: because, as Anselm says, there cannot be more than one without beginning and without end: time however is in one, because all moved things are reduced to one, as to a cause: but this is not so in the everlasting: for they are neither one only, nor are they reduced to each other as to a cause: therefore it seems that they are not in one.

1. Likewise, of spiritual and corporeal things there is not one kind: since therefore the age is of spiritual things, it does not seem that it can be of corporeal and celestial things: and thus it seems that there will be two ages, by one of which spiritual substances are measured, and by the other corporeal ones.
2. Furthermore, the reason of quantity is not the same in both: therefore neither is the same measure: therefore the age of the Angel, and of the bodies which Boethius calls immortal, is of a different reason: therefore not all the everlasting can be reduced to one age, as it seems.
3. Furthermore, the substantial being of generable and corruptible things seems to be the same in the whole duration of time: but time is not the measure of that which is the same in the whole duration, but rather the measure of that from which something is rejected and received: therefore it seems that it is necessary to find a third thing, which measures the substantial being of those things which are generated and corrupted.

In conclusion. It must be said without prejudice, that the age is altogether at once, just as the everlasting. For in the everlasting there is not the reason of indeficiency, that power continuously receives act: but rather the necessity of continuation and indeficiency is, namely that they are so complete, that there is nothing from potential to being that is not complete: and therefore their power stands in being with immobile duration. But nevertheless the being at once of eternity and of the age is equivocal for two reasons: one of which is, because in the eternal the standing immobile power is the same as act: or what is more proper, because there is no perfect or perfectible power in it, but simple enduring being: but in the everlasting there is perfect power, although not perfectible, and not simple enduring being. The second is, because the eternal has from itself that it is standing being, and not moving itself in enduring being: but the everlasting has this from the hand of the all-containing God: but in this it abounds over others, because in itself it does not have the cause of the struggle why its being in itself should begin to differ, as the mobile has in as much as it is mobile. And from this it is clear, that it does not follow if the age is at once, that it is eternity: because being is not of the

same reason in both, nor is the everlasting by its nature immutable in being as the eternal: and therefore it does not have true eternity as the eternal.

To the other it must be said, that the enduring being

The eviternal does not have its own duration, nor does its duration have parts: because duration cannot have parts unless they are successive, and then something on the part of the enduring would be the cause of the duration, which is not the case with the eviternal: because the necessity of being in them is immobile, with nothing causing the essential principles to be distant from themselves: but their duration, in the manner of indeficient standing and immobile, falls under the notion of being extended and measured: which necessity of being, however, is alien in them than from themselves, as has been said: whence they already have the cause of indeficient duration after a thousand years.

To the question, Whether they are not alive in the eviternal, as in a measure? it must be said that they are: for the being of celestial bodies is not mutable, and is not measured by the now of time according to which man is considered as immobile to the substantial or accidental form: but the now is adjacent to it according to that which is carried as one in the whole motion, which according to something is in the terminus from which the motion is, and according to something in the terminus to which the motion is: and therefore Boethius calls those bodies immortal bodies: because nothing in their substance comes or goes.

To what is further asked, Whether the eviternal is in one? there are those who, induced by reasons, say that it is not: but I do not see what prohibits it from being in the most simple eviternal, and others being measured by comparison to it.

To what is objected against, it must be said that the whole cause of reduction to one is not that the same is the cause of others, but because that motion is the most simple of other motions: and therefore by the quantity of the circle, or part of its motion, it certifies other motions: and in this respect the eviternal is reduced to one which is of simpler essence: because in that the potency is in act, so to speak, more standing, or more stable than others.

To another it must be said, that corporeal things as corporeal are not in the same genus with spiritual things, nor are they measured by the same measure: for corporeal things as dimensioned are ordered to local motion which has before and after: but the being of corporeal things as they are necessary essence, in which nothing departs or recedes, are reduced to the same genus of potency with spiritual things, which potency is not the potency of matter ordered to motion, but a potency standing in complete act immovably.

To another it must be said, as has already been said, that corporeal things, as has already been said, are not reduced to the eviternal by dimensional quantity, but rather by the potency which is the necessity of continuous being.

To another it must be said, that the being of temporal things, or essence, or by whatever other name it is called, is not measured by the eviternal, but by the now of time as it is of time: and this for two reasons: one of which is, because it is one in which there is variation due to continuous loss, just as the now of time is not one in substance joined to the prior and

posterior and according to being. Another reason is: because although it is simple and remaining in itself, yet according to the being it has in the subject which is matter mixed with contraries, it has an order to motion and change, and does not stand in its complete potency to which nothing comes, as the potency of the eviternal stands.

There are, however, some saying otherwise in this question, namely that eternity has neither before nor after: time, however, has before, not after: the eviternal, however, has before, and does not have after. And this is not well intelligible, if we ought to cause the eviternal from the potency of the eviternal, as the Philosopher teaches to cause time from the mobile which is in motion, and eternity from the eternal. Since the eviternal is the property of the eviternal, just as time is of motion, and eternity of the eternal, it must be caused by the principles of the eviternal. And then it cannot be understood what they say, because how the potency to enduring being has something before and nothing after in the eviternal, cannot even be well imagined.

Articulus 4 — Whether The Son Is Other Than The Father

Whether the Son is other than the Father?

Whether the Son is other than the Father?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said in the Text: In which the Father is not one thing, the Son another, the Holy Spirit another; although personally He is other, etc.

For if the Son is other than the Father, this happens by reason of principle: because the Father is indeed the principle of the Son: therefore, since it is conceded that the Father is the principle of the whole divinity, and is the principle of divinity in Himself, it seems that the Father is other than the whole divinity, and other than Himself.

1. Likewise, Augustine says that the Father is not from another than from Himself: therefore the Father is from Himself: and yet He is not distinguished from Himself: therefore by this that the Son is from the Father, it does not seem by this to be distinguished from the Father.
2. Furthermore, if "other" denotes distinction: therefore it posits distinction in that in which it denotes diversity: but it is a relative of the diversity of substance: therefore it seems that it denotes distinction of substance in the Father and the Son: since therefore there is not diverse substance in them, it does not seem that the Father is other than the Son.
3. Furthermore, we do not say, Socrates white is other than Socrates black: rather he is the same, but different: therefore it seems that "other" seeks diversity of substance: if therefore the Father is other than the Son, it seems there is diversity of substance between them.
4. Furthermore, since in inferiors concerning all of which we can say, these are others from each other, we can infer: therefore that one is one, and that one is another: therefore it

seems that also in divines we can say, the Son is other than the Father: therefore the Father is one, and the Son is another: and this the Master denies in the Text.

5. If it is said that this happens because of different gender, namely masculine and neuter. On the contrary; gender only opposes mode: therefore it does not change the true signification: if therefore otherness denotes in itself diversity of substance, it will denote it in the masculine just as in the neuter, as it seems.

Furthermore, we well concede concerning something, that it is its own cause, as concerning the free: for he who is free is his own cause, as the Philosopher says: can we in the same way concede concerning the Father, that He is His own cause? It seems so: because Augustine says that He is from Himself: therefore He is His own cause.

Furthermore, if He is from Himself, can it be conceded that the Father is the principle of Himself? It seems so: because the preposition denotes the relation of some principle: therefore the principle can be placed in the place of itself.

But on the contrary; it was held above that no thing generates itself so that it is. Furthermore, no person in divines is distinguished from itself: therefore neither is any from itself, nor is generated from itself, as it seems.

Solution. It must be said without prejudice, that this is improper, the Father is from Himself, and by the preposition no relation of cause to itself is posited: and therefore it does not have any affirmation by which the relation of the preposition is expounded, but is expounded only negatively, the Father is from Himself, that is, He is not from another.

Therefore it must be said to the first, that when it is said, the Father is the principle of the whole divinity, "whole" does not have distribution for the sake of some parts: because the persons are not parts of divinity, but the whole there and the perfect are the same: and therefore the Master expounds below, because the principle of divinity in the Son through generation, and of divinity in the Holy Spirit through procession: whence when it is said, that He is the principle of divinity, divinity does not fall under the relation or act of principle, as over that which is the terminus of the act, but as over that which is in Himself, who is the terminus of the act: because He is the principle of the Son in whom is the whole divinity, and of the Holy Spirit in whom is the whole divinity: however, the relation of principle to itself is not expounded except negatively, namely that it is not from another: and it does not follow that He is distinguished from Himself, or from divinity.

Or, more subtly it can be said, that just as in inferiors the generating father is the principle of the born, and to this it follows that he is the principle of the communication of his nature, because the born receives the nature of the father from the father himself: so according to the mode of understanding it is in divines, whence when it is said, the Father is the principle of divinity, the sense can be, as that by which divinity is communicated, and thus it is true, because the Father by His generation communicating His divinity gives to the Son, and by His procession gives it to the Holy Spirit: although indeed divinity is not distinct, yet to the act of distinction according to the intellect follows the actual communication of divinity: and in this

way it does not follow that the Father Himself is distinguished from divinity, but rather, that in divinity He unites and communicates who is from Him, and is distinguished from Him.

To the other the solution is clear from what was said before.

To the other it must be said, that "other" is a relative of diversity: yet because it is an adjective, it receives substance from its subject, and around that it places its form, and since that is the substance which is hypostasis, and not nature, it denotes only the distinction of person and not of nature.

Furthermore, although it is an essential name taken by itself, yet by a personal adjunct it is drawn to stand for a person, and again according to this reason it denotes otherness only of person.

To the other it must be said, that it is otherwise concerning Socrates white, and Socrates black, because there are not supposed there different subsistents: but the Father and the Son do not differ by any accident, but rather by their subsisting persons they are distinguished.

To the other it must be said, that it is otherwise in inferiors in which the common nature is multiplied, and divided according to being. But in divines this does not happen: but rather one in number remains in three: neither gender, because it is formless, is referred to substance which is taken as indistinct: but masculine and feminine, because they speak of formed essence, are referred to person: and therefore what follows in humans does not follow in divines: but "who" would be changed into "what," and a fallacy of figure of speech would occur.

But to what is objected concerning mode, it must be said that in translative signification mode makes much: although in proper signification, with terms retained, it does not vary signification: and this is done because translation is made for the sake of mode principally: and therefore since these are in divine predications from translation, for the sake of formed gender distinction is placed, and for the sake of formless divine nature is placed, because that is in no way distinguished.

To the other it must be said, that when it is said, that the free is its own cause, it is understood of the final cause, namely that it is not for another: and in this way any person is its own cause, because it is for itself, and not for another end. But when it is said, its own cause, absolutely it ought not to be conceded, in my judgment: because it denotes the relation of efficient cause principally: and therefore said by itself it would denote, that the same is the efficient cause of itself, which is false.

To the other it must be said, that I do not think this should be conceded, the Father is the principle of Himself: although this is in some way conceded, the Father is from Himself, therefore not from another: because principle not only says the order of privation to before, but also the relation of act to following: and therefore it is not the same to be from Himself, and to be the principle of Himself. Whence this is improper, the Father is from Himself: but this is false, the Father is the principle of Himself: but this is still more false, the Father is the cause of Himself, so that cause says efficient cause. Whence from that, the Father is from

Himself, it cannot be inferred: therefore He generates Himself, or proceeds from Himself, or is distinguished from Himself, or is other than Himself: but according to the said sense it can be concluded, He is from Himself, therefore He is not from another.

Articulus 5 — Whether The Father Is Before The Son

Whether the Father is before the Son?

Then it is asked concerning what is said in the first argument: "Nor yet was the Father before the Son," etc.

1. For the Father is the substance from which the act of generation proceeds: therefore, according to reason, He is before that act, and according to reason, generation is before the begotten: because Augustine says that whatever the Son has, He has through generation: therefore the Father, at least according to the reason of understanding, is before the Son.
2. Furthermore, this seems according to the order which the Church places in naming the persons, when it is said, "Father and Son and Holy Spirit": in which order the Father is named first.
3. Likewise, the Father is a principle not from a principle: but the Son is a principle from a principle: therefore the Father is prior to the Son at least according to reason, for a principle not from a principle, according to the reason of understanding, is before a principle from a principle.
4. Furthermore, as Augustine says in the book on the Trinity: It is heresy to attribute to God what cannot be found in either spiritual or corporeal creatures: but in no creature is it found that one substance proceeds from another and is coeternal with the one from which it proceeds.
5. And if you object concerning the splendor proceeding from a luminous body, there is no objection: because this procession is not substantial: but it would be similar if one luminous body proceeded from another; therefore it seems that it should not be attributed to God.

If perhaps you say that in lower things cause and effect are correlatives: and the Philosopher says that correlatives are simultaneous: this again is nothing: because although the cause, insofar as it is a cause, is with the effect, yet the substance of the cause is necessarily before that which is caused, and thus again it is evident that it is contrary.

Furthermore, the similarity that is brought forth is none: because even when splendor proceeds from fire or from the sun, according to reason the objection of the luminous body is prior to the splendor. For if the luminous body is not objected, there will not be splendor in that to which it is objected: therefore it follows, if there is splendor, the luminous body is objected: and not conversely, because it can be impeded: therefore the objection of the body is prior by nature: because that from which the consequence does not convert is prior by nature: and if it still converts, because nothing impedes, still the direct objection of the luminous body

is the cause of the splendor: and the Philosopher says that the cause is prior by nature: therefore the Father is before the Son by nature, and thus then the objection of the heretic holds as to this.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. The nature of eternity is, as was held above, that it is all at once: therefore those things that are eternal and in eternity, and eternity itself, none of them even according to the reason of understanding precedes another: but generation, and the generator, and the begotten are eternal and in eternity and eternity: therefore none of them even according to nature precedes another, nor even according to reason.

1. Likewise, in temporal things, those are said to be simultaneous which are in the same place or in the same time: therefore much more are those which are in the same now of time. But the now of time, because of the relation it has to before and after, is more variable and diverse in itself than the standing and unmoving now, which is the now of eternity: but in that are the generator, generation, and the begotten: therefore it is impossible even to understand how one precedes another.
2. Likewise, in those things in which there is a before and after, this will necessarily be caused by the intellect, or by time, or by place, or by dignity according to morals or nature. But that in divine things they cannot be caused by before and after according to time and place is clear: because divine things are neither defined nor circumscribed by place or time: therefore if there is a before and after there, this will be according to intellect, or cause, or dignity of nature or morals; but not according to the dignity of morals, because there is nothing to say in degrees of honor in morals that is in the Father, which does not also pertain to the Son: therefore this will be according to the dignity of nature if it is according to dignity.

But on the contrary: Because they are of one nature in number, to which nothing happens neither in the Father nor in the Son: therefore they will be equal according to this, and not one prior to the other: therefore two modes remain according to intellect and cause. According to intellect, however, that is prior from which the consequence does not convert: but this prior is simpler and more general than its posterior: but between the Father and the Son there is the same simplicity: therefore in this way they do not differ by prior and posterior: therefore no mode remains unless the prior is the cause, which even the heretics posited.

But on the contrary: In whatever things the cause is prior to the caused, that cause has from another that it subsists, and from another that it is a cause. For let it be granted that it has from the same that it subsists, and this is signified or this something, and that it is a cause: since from causality it has that it is a cause, from the same it will have that it is this something: and since causality is simultaneous by nature with the caused, it will be simultaneous with the caused in that it subsists and is this something, and thus in no way is it prior, which is contrary to what is posited: therefore if it is prior, it has from another that it is this something, and from another that it is a cause: therefore from the destruction of the consequent, if it has from the same, it is simultaneous according to being and according to intellect: but the Father has from the same that He is the suppositum of the divine nature or hypostasis or person, and

that He is Father: therefore if He in that He is Father, according to nature and intellect is simultaneous with the Son, He also in that He is hypostasis and person, is simultaneous with Him. The first is sufficiently proven. Nothing distinguishes in divine things except relation: but with the distinguishing ceasing, the distinction and the distinct cease: therefore with the relation removed from divine things, there will not be anything distinct there: therefore there will not be supposita or hypostases there: therefore that the Father is the hypostasis of the divine nature He has from paternity: therefore the minor is proven, namely that from the same is hypostasis and Father: therefore He in every way by nature and intellect is simultaneous with the Son, and can never be understood to be before Him. And this reasoning is very good and notable: because it makes many things understood about the distinction of persons.

1. Likewise, I see in lower things certain degrees of simultaneity of cause and caused: for some act as if by the action of matter, that is, that in their action producing species similar to themselves, they need matter which receives, and from which the species itself is drawn out from potency to act, like the elements: and all those need time in their action, so that the act itself cannot be simultaneous with its agent in time. I see others which act only by the action of their form, like light in the luminous, and similarly those things which proceed by the act of light, like colors to the eye or to a mirror: and I see that those do not need time, because their presence suffices for generation, and those generated by them are simultaneous in time with them: therefore since the divine essence is incomparably more formal than these, in the divine essence the generating principle and the begotten will not only be simultaneous in time or space of eternity, but also by nature according to intellect.
2. Likewise, in intellectual nature there are degrees: for the intellect of man is seeking and finding knowledge of itself, as Augustine says, in the way that to understand oneself is to discern oneself, and to think about oneself: there is also the angelic intellect knowing itself without inquiry, so that knowing in it is not after the intellect knowing in time: therefore since God is incomparably simpler and more perfect in His intellect, He will be simultaneous in eternity and nature, the intellect itself, and to say Himself through intellect: but to say Himself through intellect is to generate the Son: therefore the Father and the Son are simultaneous in intellect and nature.

Solution. To the last arguments, assent must be given, because they are necessary: for it is not to be said that even the Father is before the Son in intellect: because then the reasons here introduced by the Saints would not be valid, like that. If there was a time when He was, and the Father was not, He was changed from not being Father to being Father, and the like. Hence the Catholic faith confesses that the Father neither according to being nor according to intellect precedes the Son in any way of priority, namely order, time, place, dignity, cause, or intellect.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that as it was proven in objecting, the Father has from the same that He is the hypostasis from which is generation, and that He is Father: and therefore according to intellect neither as agent nor as Father is He before the Son: but in

lower things it is otherwise, as Ambrose says, because the carnal father does not have from the same that he is the generating hypostasis, and that he is father: and therefore the father in lower things, the substance which is hypostasis, is before the son.

To the other, it must be said that a principle not from a principle and a principle from a principle does not posit prior and posterior, as has already been proven, but rather simultaneity from the reason of relation: and if they posit order, it will not be order simply, but the order of nature which will be treated below: and that is the order by which one is from another, not by which one is prior to another.

To the other, it must be said that the Church cannot express what is without the order of prior and posterior without the order of words: and this happens here, as Gregory says in this distinction, that we stammer the high things of God. Because the voice is silent not only of men, but also of Angels in the expression of the procession of persons, as Ambrose says. Hence as simple things with complex and composite words, and eternal things with temporal, so also do we announce those things which are simultaneous with ordered words, of which one precedes and another follows. However, the Church intends by its order which it holds in pronouncing the three persons, to teach the order of nature, by which one is from another, not by which one is prior to another.

To the other, it must be said that creatures are imperfect to represent the Creator: and therefore when something similar to both is found, it must be exalted by the intellect and attributed to God more eminently, as the Psalm teaches, "Man will approach to the heart of the high," etc. Hence the coeternity of creatures, although it is not similar there according to intellect: yet it indicates in the Creator coeternity according to intellect and the thing itself.

To what is objected, that it is not similar concerning the ray or splendor, it must be said that this happens because of the imperfection of the creature.

And from these and the objections, the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 6 — Whether It Is Rightly Said, The Son Began Because He Has A Principle

Whether it is rightly said, the Son began because he has a principle?

Then it is asked concerning this which is held in the objection of the heretic, where he infers: Everything that is born has a principle, further he concludes: The Son is born: Therefore he has a principle, etc. does it not follow?

1. For it seems to follow: because it is new, which as to its principle is near: but everything new began: therefore everything that has a principle, began.
2. Likewise, the Philosopher says, that principle and beginning are the same: therefore what has a principle has a beginning: but what has a beginning began: therefore from the first, what has a principle began. But the Son has a principle: therefore he began: and thus it seems, that the conclusion of the heretic follows, which God forbid.

But on the contrary: Psalm 80:9-10: Israel, if you will hear me, there will be no new god in you: but new is what began: therefore there will not be for us a God who began.

Solution. The heretic is deceived by the equivocation of principle: for there is a principle of essence, and there is a principle of the order of nature. The principle of essence posits the inception of that which is principled by it: but the principle of the order of nature does not posit, rather it posits co-eternity, as has been proven.

To the first objection, it must be said that it is true, that the new is now first being, and that it is near as to the principle of essence: but it is not new to which the principle is near according to the order of nature by which one is from another, and not one prior to another.

To the other it must be said, that there is a principle within, and a principle without. The principle within is before which nothing is of the thing, and it is the first part of the thing, and this is converted with the beginning, if beginning is properly taken, because the beginning of a thing is in which the thing begins: and this is within all things which have a beginning: and of this principle, we do not speak, when we say, that the Father is the principle of the Son.

Articulus 7 — Whether It Can Be Said That The Son Is Coeternal With The Father, And Whether In Divine Things There Is Anything Adjectival, And Whether, As We Say, The Father And The Son Are Two Persons, So We Can Say That The Father And The Son Are Two Gods, Two Wise Ones

Whether it can be said that the Son is coeternal with the Father, and whether in divine things there is something adjectival, and whether, just as we say, the Father and the Son are two persons, we can thus say that the Father and the Son are two gods, two wise ones?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said:

That the Son is coeternal with the Father, etc.

1. For from this it follows that the Father and the Son are two coeternal persons: therefore they are two coeternals: and this seems to be against the Athanasian Creed: Not three eternals, but one eternal.
2. Furthermore, there is one eternity of the three: therefore it seems that the three are one eternal, yet not one simply.
3. Likewise, in other adjectives which predicate that which follows the nature, as Damascene says, we cannot predicate in the highest degree of the three except in the singular number: for if I say, the Father is wise, the Son is wise, I cannot infer: therefore the Father and the Son are two wise ones: therefore it seems, neither in this case.
4. If it is said that adjectives take number and substance from their substantives, and thus since persons are substantives of such adjectives, they take number and substance from them, and around them they place their force, and thus they can be predicated in the plural, so that it is said, the Father and the Son are two wise ones. On the contrary: Wise ones or wise is a name: therefore it signifies not only substance, but also quality: but

that quality is wisdom: since therefore there is one wisdom of the three and eternity, even if the substance which is hypostasis falls into the plural, the adjective cannot fall into the plural.

5. Likewise, if I say, Socrates and Plato are white, although the term "white" takes a pluralized substance, yet this does not suffice for plurality: but also it is necessary that there be multiple whitenesses there, as it seems: therefore similarly in divine things, although both the Father and the Son are multiple and person, yet since their wisdom and eternity is one, such adjectival names cannot be predicated of them in the plural.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. It seems less that a substance signifying because of the mode of the adjective imported into the verb falls into plurality, than that which does not signify substance by itself, and falls into plurality if it is verbally signified, as is held in John 10:30: I and the Father are one: therefore much more adjectives.

1. Furthermore, a thing is closer according to the reason of signification than adjectives: and yet above we had, that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are three things: therefore also adjectives can be predicated of multiple persons.

According to this, it is further asked, if there is something adjectival in divine things?

1. For we had in the preceding distinction...

...that those categories of the dialectical art do not apply to God: because God Himself is whatever He has that is said of Him, and there it is the same to be wise as to be: but what signifies substance is substantive, and not adjectival or not retained adjectivally: therefore in divine predication nothing is adjectival or retained adjectivally.

1. Likewise, Boethius says that the other categories besides relation, when one refers them to divine predication, all are changed into substance: therefore they can be held adjectivally.

Further, it is asked according to that, Why can I say, the Father and the Son are two persons, and the Father and the Son are two: and I cannot say, the Father and the Son are two gods, or two wise ones according to some? For it seems that I can say: because "two" is a numerical term, denoting the notions by which persons are numbered: therefore the term joined to it is understood to stand for a person: therefore when it is said, the Father and the Son are two gods, two divine persons are understood: therefore when the Father and the Son are two divine persons, the Father and the Son are two gods, as it seems.

Solution. Without prejudice I say, because here there are many opinions of many, that three diversities are found concerning adjectives. For sometimes they have three things drawing to adjectivity, and only one to substance, and this in divine matters: because we speak only of those: and sometimes they have only two: and sometimes they have one which is joined to two or three, denoting the plurality of persons, although it does not act in the manner of an adjective, yet it greatly contributes to the relation of the adjective to this or that: for from it is

known whether it places the adjective itself concerning the person, or concerning the substance. For example, the adjective verb is adjectival, and similarly the participle and the noun: but the adjective verb and participle have three things from the nature of the adjective, namely the mode of signifying inherence, and that mode by which they signify acting, and also that mode by which the verb signifies with time, and also the participle, although less inasmuch as it is nearer to the noun: but the noun has only two, namely signification, and mode: signification, because it signifies an adjacent thing, and what is inherent: and if it is not in divine matters, and not from the reason of its signified, as we say there are certain adjectives by signification and not by mode. However, by mode, because they also have the mode of the adjective: because they signify by the mode of concretion, as when it is said, wise, good, and the like. To these also is joined by composition a preposition denoting the correlations of person to person, as when it is said, coeternal, coequal, or equipotent, and such prepositions, or adverbs contribute to the fact that such adjectives in the nominative case speak of the supposita of persons, and essence in the oblique case. I say therefore, that verbs and participles having three or four of these, according to understanding are nearer to persons than to essence: and therefore they are predicated of many in the plural, as the Father and the Son are wise, know, can, are, will, and all such: and participles similarly, as the Father and the Son are knowing, wise, being, powerful: so that each of those is a participle principally retained. However, in nouns when there are only two, of which one has only the mode of the adjective, the ancients said that they should not be said in the plural: but the moderns considering that because of that alone it takes substance and number from the person, when it is joined to it, said that they can be predicated in the plural. I believe that they can, but less properly: and therefore such expressions should not be extended, but interpreted, when they are found. However, if a preposition or adverb denoting the correlation of persons to each other is joined to any adjective, then without doubt they should not be said except in the plural of many in the highest, as the Father and the Son are coeternal, and not coeternal, and equipotent, and not equipotent.

According to this distinction therefore it must be said to the first, that Athanasius attends to the predication of the term in divine matters, because in divine matters: and he takes it from the signification of eternal, and not from the mode of signifying: nevertheless, however, attending to the mode of the adjective, it could be conceded: two or three eternals: and from this it does not follow, that there would be multiple eternities, as will be clear below.

To the other it must be said, that although there is one eternity, yet this excludes the plurality of supposita, and that plurality suffices for the plural number in the adjective.

To the other it must be said, that those things which follow nature, considering according to their significates, are not predicated of many in the plural: but according to the mode of concretion nothing prohibits, as has already been clear.

To what is objected, that such names signify substance with quality, it must be said that it is true: but they signify their quality inherently: and therefore from that mode their plurality suffices in supposita, and it is not necessary that the thing signified be multiple: and if this is in lower things, it must be said that this does not require the adjective name to signify the

plural number, but this happens accidentally from the plurality of supposita differing by substance and essence, which is not in divine matters.

To the other it must be said, that it falsely posits in the argument, namely that for the plural number of the adjective the plurality of the thing it signifies is required, for this is not true: but this happens in lower things accidentally, namely because the supposita in which the thing signified by the adjective is differ substantially. Hence if we suppose the impossible, that Socrates and Plato have one whiteness, it is still true, that Socrates and Plato are white by reason of the plurality of supposita.

To what is further asked, If there is anything adjectival in divine matters? It must be said that yes as to mode, but not as to inherence by composition. And this Augustine understood above, where by this he wished to remove the composition of accident, not the mode of signifying from divine simplicity. And by this also the solution to what is objected concerning Boethius is clear.

To what is further asked, it must be said that numerical terms are adjectives, and in divine matters they signify the notions by which persons are distinguished and numbered: but when they are placed with a verb signifying substance, they place their things concerning the form of that, and signify it to be numbered: and therefore placed by themselves concerning persons they are true, and also similarly joined with personal terms, as the Father and the Son are two, the Father and the Son are two persons: but when they are placed with essential terms, they number the forms of essentials: and because there is one essence, therefore the expressions are false: yet it is otherwise with participles and nouns, and it is otherwise with adjectival nouns than with substantive nouns, as is clear from what was said before.

Articulus 8 — What The Difference Is Between Lumen, Lux, Splendor, Ray, Reflection Of The Ray, Of The Splendor, And Of The Light; And Whether The Example Of The Splendor Is Fitting, Etc

What is the difference between light, illumination, splendor, ray, reflection of the ray, splendor and illumination: and whether the example of splendor is suitable, etc.?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says:

Just as the splendor which is generated by fire and diffused, etc.

1. What is the difference between light, illumination, splendor, ray, reflection of the ray, splendor and illumination?
2. Furthermore, the example does not seem to be suitable: because splendor is not of the essence of fire, so that it is the same in number with it in essence, that is, that it has the same essence in number.
3. Furthermore, it is asked whether a more suitable example could be found? For splendor is in another matter and nature than fire: however, the matter which has properties is one in them; hence it would have been a more suitable example in matter, as it seems.

Sotorio. To the first, it must be said according to Damascene and Avicenna, that a luminary is a shining body having light in its composition: just as the greater luminary is called the sun, and the lesser luminary is called the moon. However, illumination signifies that which has already flowed from the luminous and is received in the transparent medium, which has received it in its depth, not only on the surface: just as air is more transparent and fire, and water less, and also the fifth body as far as it is apart from the stars is transparent. For the Philosopher says that air is transparent or lucid, according to how it communicates with the perpetual superior body. However, a ray is a luminous visual line proceeding from the luminous body to direct opposition. Splendor, however, is properly the diffusion of rays through reflection to a polished plane, such as to metal or polished stone, or to a mirror, or to water: however, reflection also occurs to high bodies although not as much. However, the reflection of the ray is the refraction of the ray incident on the reflecting body at equal angles: for it has been proven in Perspective that the reflection of the ray always occurs at an angle equal to the angle of the incident ray: and therefore when the ray falls perpendicularly, it is reflected into itself: because otherwise it would follow that not all right angles would be equal. However, the reflection of illumination is the alteration of the transparent or terminated body to more illumination from the reflected rays, just as we see that nearby places in which the reflected rays do not fall are more illuminated from the diffusion of illumination occurring from the reflected rays.

To the second, it must be said that of earthly things, as Hilary says, the comparison to God is none. And if we sometimes bring forth examples of comparison against us, let no one think that they contain the reason of perfection in themselves. For splendor is neither a person, nor is it the same in essence with the luminous or light: but in this a likeness is taken, that it is coeval.

To the third, it must be said that as blessed Bernard says in the fifth book of Consideration, there is no unity which is as great as the unity of the three persons in one essence: which is thus proven. For among the unities of natural things there is a threefold unity, namely of form, matter, and subject. However, of form there is a threefold, namely of genus, species, and the indivision of form in that which is this something and the same in number. However, of matter as of parts in the whole: because they are from the same matter, especially if it is homogeneous. However, the unity of the subject is more that which is of the subject and passion. However, among these unities, the unity of species is greater than that of genus, and the unity of the indivision of form in the individual is greater than that of species, and this same is greater than that of matter: because matter, although it is one through the subject, nevertheless has many properties which are not it, by which, however, it is not numbered, and therefore its unity admits an alien nature: which the indivision of form in that which is this something does not do. This also is greater than that of the subject and property: because the property is not of the same essence with the subject: but the indivision of form does not admit an alien essence: and that which is the greatest, differs much from the unity of persons, in which neither an alien essence is admitted, nor is there a difference of universal and particular, nor a difference of what is and being: all of which are found in that which is this

something. And therefore on the part of matter an example could not be set, nor on the part of the form of the individual because of the diversity of universal and particular, and what is and being: but light and splendor are of the same form, although on the part of the recipients there is some diversity: and therefore with respect to coeternity especially the example is more suitable: because in other unities of form and matter there is no coeternity: for to the position of matter form is not posited, nor to the position of genus is species posited, nor to the position of species is the individual posited: but to the position of the luminous object splendor is posited, and conversely.

Articulus 9 — Whether The Father Is Wise By Begotten Wisdom, Namely, The Son As Object

Whether the Father is wise by the begotten wisdom, namely the Son as object.

Whether the Father is wise by the begotten wisdom, namely the Son as object.

Then it is inquired concerning this which says:

If the Son of God is the power and wisdom of God, etc.

And here two things are inquired: of which one is, whether the Father is wise by the begotten wisdom as object, although He is not wise by it as if formally: and this must be inquired because some have said and written this.

The second is, if this is neither true nor catholic, whether Augustine's reasoning avails anything against the heretic, which is posited here?

To the first, it is objected thus: If I say thus, my intellect understands itself, there the intellect falls into a double notion, namely in the notion of understanding and in the notion of the understood. Let us suppose, therefore, that the intellect in the notion of the understood is a sufficient reason and species of all knowables, then it is not necessary for me to have anything in my intellect to understand things, except the intellect as it is objected to the understanding intellect: but thus the Son is generated by the Father: because it is the same, as Anselm says in the Monologion, for the highest spirit to understand and to say itself: therefore, when saying itself, it generates its word and the reason and art of all things, it understands whatever it understands by this word and not by another.

From this it follows further, that it can understand nothing except by the Son, because it does not receive species from things, and species are not with it except as the ideal reasons of the word.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:

1. Let us suppose the Son does not exist, per impossibile, still He who is the Father understands Himself and all things: therefore He does not require the Son for His understanding.
2. Furthermore, this is the abuse which Augustine reprehends above, because although in the created image it is so, that the whole does not understand except by understanding,

the whole does not remember except by memory, it does not will except by will: yet who would dare to say, that in that highest Trinity the Father does not understand except by the Son, etc.

Solution. It must be said to this, as will be proven below, that the Father is in no way wise by the Son: yet it is not the same to not be wise by the Son, and to not understand by the Son. For to understand by the Son can be, as if to understand from the Son, and to understand in the Son. In the first way, it does not pertain to the Father, but in the second way, it pertains to Him in some way, although not in the way in which the objection is made. And to this it must be known, that the Father receives nothing from the Son, neither understanding, nor to understand, nor by which He is made understanding, nor the object: but all that the Son has, He receives from the Father. To understand and to say in the highest spirit is equivocal: because it can be essential, and personal: for when the Father says Himself, it cannot be that to say is the same as to generate, but it is essential, and the Holy Spirit says Himself in this way and the Son: and one is the saying of the three, just as one is the essence of the three. But when the Father says the Word which is the Son, then to say is the same as to generate: and this saying does not pertain to the Son, nor to the Holy Spirit, just as neither does generating pertain to them. But when it is said, the Father understands all things in the Son, the sense is that the Father understands the Son as the Son is the art and reason of all living things: but the Son is understood in this way as He understands Himself to be the principle of the Son in this reason: because the Son has nothing which He has not received from the Father.

And thus it is clear, that the Father by understanding Himself thus understands all things in the Son, and receives nothing from the Son, rather He gives to the Son.

But if you ask, Whether this is simultaneous or successive?

It must be said that it is not only simultaneous, but simple and one: because nothing is multiple in the knowledge and understanding of the Father. But it is true, that in lower material things, the intellect in us proceeds from the reason of the principle to that which is from the principle, and from that to that further, of which that principled is the further reason.

To the first objection, therefore, it must be said that the Son is not the object of the intellect, or the reason of the intellect of the Father, or the medium, or the species, or by whatever name it is named: because thus the intellect of the Father would be something receiving from the Son for the purpose of understanding: but the Father by Himself understands the Son, and all things of which the reason is the Son or the Word.

Articulus 10 — Whether The Argument Of Augustine Which The Master Brings Forward Treats Of Begotten Or Unbegotten Wisdom

Whether the reasoning of Augustine, which the Master adduces, proceeds concerning begotten or unbegotten wisdom?

Secondly, this being supposed, it is asked, What is the value of Augustine's reasoning?

It seems that it is nothing: for either he argues concerning begotten wisdom, or concerning unbegotten wisdom. If concerning begotten wisdom, then it seems that the Son is the wisdom of the Father by which He is wise, which the Master will disprove below. But if he argues concerning unbegotten wisdom, then from this the co-eternity of the Son cannot be inferred: for it does not follow, if the essence is co-eternal with the Father, that on account of this the Son is co-eternal with the Father.

Solution. It must be said that Augustine argues concerning unbegotten wisdom, as it is appropriable to begotten wisdom, that is, to the Son: for the appropriated supposes the proper, nor can appropriation be made unless according to the intellect with the proper pre-existing: and thus unbegotten eternal wisdom infers begotten co-eternal wisdom.

Articulus 11 — On The Word Of Ambrose: First He Was, And Afterwards He Became Father

On the word of Ambrose: First he was, and afterwards he became Father.

On the word of Ambrose: First he was, and afterwards he became Father.

Then it is inquired concerning what is held in the second reasoning of Ambrose against the heretic: Therefore God first was, and afterwards he became Father.

1. For this does not seem to hold: because relations occur in something without its change. Let there be here a three-cubit wood, and in Rome a two-cubit wood, and let this wood here be cut so that it becomes one cubit, then it becomes equal to the wood in Rome: therefore equality is made in the wood in Rome, which relation is made without any change in the wood in Rome: therefore it does not hold, if the Father is relative, and before he was not relative, let him be changed.
2. Likewise, whatever predicates nothing to be in that of which it is predicated, coming or departing from that of which it is predicated does not cause change in it: but relation predicates nothing to be in that of which it is predicated: therefore coming or departing from the relative shows no change in it. The first is proved: because every change is either per se or per accidens, either in that the whole mobile is transferred in place or to a place, or that it receives another form which it did not have before, which now is in it. The second is written by Boethius in the book on the Trinity.

Solution. It is one thing concerning relatives of origin, either according to cause and caused, or according to principle and principled as said: and it is another thing concerning other lower relatives which are founded upon something else. For the first relations are not caused without a substantial act which is generation: and therefore such suppose change in the subject if they newly occur.

Moreover, it is one thing concerning relatives in divine and lower things. For in divine things relation is also in the reason of property making a person in personal being: and therefore there the coming of relation follows personal change: although in lower things in

some relations change does not follow in both of the relatives from the coming of relation, but in one it always follows.

To the other it must be said that Boethius does not consider relation according to that which is a certain property having as it were the force of a difference in the constitution of a person: but he takes the relative, and not the relation: and he considers the relative only according to the respect which it implies: and because according to that the whole is to another, and not to itself, as Augustine says, therefore he says that it predicates nothing in the relative: and this is true as to the respect of the relative, and not as to this that relation is a certain property which according to the reason of understanding is in the relative.

H. It is ineffable how the Son is, and does not have a prior Father: just as the mode of generation is unintelligible and ineffable.

But you ask me, says Ambrose, how if the Son is, he does not have a prior Father? I also ask you, when or how do you think the Son to be generated? For to me it is impossible to know the secret of generation:

the mind fails, the voice is silent, not only mine, but also of the Angels: above Powers, and above Angels, and above Cherubim, and above Seraphim, and above all sense it is: because it is written, The peace of Christ is above all sense. And if the peace of Christ is above all sense, how is not such a generation above all sense? Therefore put your hand to your mouth: it is not permitted to scrutinize the heavenly mysteries. It is permitted to know that he is born, it is not permitted to discuss how he is born. It is not permitted for me to deny that, to inquire this is fear. For that generation is ineffable. Whence, Isaiah 53:8: Who shall declare his generation?

Articulus 12 — Whether The Divine Generation Can Be Known Or Signified

Whether divine generation can be known or signified?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says in the following chapter H: For to me it is impossible, etc.

1. For what is not known is not signified: but divine generation is signified to us in many ways: therefore it is known in some way.
2. If you say that it is not signified except in a certain respect, according to which it is ineffable. On the contrary: We have many statements concerning things fitting to generation, namely that it is in the same essence, that it is coeternal, and such things which signify something stated about divine generation.
3. If perhaps you say that we know and signify that it is, but not what divine generation is. On the contrary: Knowledge that it is exists in two ways, namely through effect or through remote cause: but generation is not signified to us through remote cause, nor even through effect alone: therefore it seems that it is signified to us what divine generation is: and thus it is known and signified.

1. Furthermore, to know a thing in its own proper nature is to know it according to the differences by which it is distinguished from others which are in the same genus with it: but we have such differences handed down to us by the Saints, namely that it is without conversion of the generator, that it is not from potency to act, that it is immaterial, that it does not divide being or essence, such as we have from Augustine, and Damascene, and Boethius: therefore it seems that generation is known in its proper nature: but the knowledge of a simple thing incomplexly in its proper nature is the knowledge of what the thing is in its proper nature: therefore it seems that we know what divine generation is: therefore it is not true what Ambrose says here.

But on the contrary: To know what it is, is to know the proper terms of the thing within which the whole nature of the thing is enclosed: but thus it does not happen to know God: because thus He would be comprehended or enclosed in our intellect, which was disproved above: since therefore divine generation is God, it does not happen to know or signify what it is.

In summary. It must be said, as the Philosopher says in I De Anima, all understanding which is of what it is, is of terms: for the terms of practical understandings are: for all are for the sake of another, namely for the sake of that which is considered: but speculative reasons are terminated: and every reason or definition is, or demonstration in which understanding stands, and all definitions are defined to the defining.

And therefore I say that it does not happen to know what God or anything divine is, because it cannot be defined by us: but it will always be according to something of itself outside us, as we said above in the question concerning the knowledge of God: and this Ambrose understands when he says that divine generation is not known by us, nor even by Angels: because through what it is, it is known only by Him who is God the Trinity: but we have knowledge of divine things as there is knowledge that it is: and I well concede that we know more about it than that it is ineffable.

To what is objected against, it must be said that it is true that concerning the knowledge that it is in demonstrations, which is the knowledge of the conclusion, it is held in those two ways: but thus divine generation is not known, but rather as incomplex, whose knowledge is not perfectly held through defining it: and this is knowledge similar to that which is knowledge that it is, and it is to know in the universal, and not in its proper nature according to what it is.

To what is objected concerning its differences, it must be said that it is not signified to us by differences except in two ways, namely negative or privative: as that it is impassible, immaterial, inconvertible, and such things. These differences do not certify, except because the constituting differences are positive. Other differences which are positive are remote: as that it is in the same substance, or consubstantial: for those are not proximate: whence in such things it still remains hidden, according to what mode it is in the same substance: and therefore although it is distinguished by those differences by some, yet because they are not converted with it by constituting, they do not specify generation: and therefore it is still unknown what

generation is: and therefore Ambrose does not say that it is simply impossible to know generation, but that it is impossible to know the secret of generation, because its secret is what it is: but it is not secret what it is not: and this is known and stated: whence it is effable in a certain respect, and not simply.

Articulus 13 — Whether Angels Speak

Do Angels speak?

Do Angels speak?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said:

The voice is silent, not only mine, but also And four are inquired, of the Angels, etc., namely, how do Angels speak? and whether they can speak all things? and whether all to all, or some to some? and concerning the hearing of others the speech.

Concerning the first, it is proceeded thus: 1. Basil says in a certain homily upon that Deuteronomy xxvii, 9: Attend, and hear, etc.: God, who created us, granted us the use of speech, so that we might reveal the secrets of the heart to each other through the ministry of the word, so that with mutual affection of nature each of us might bring forth to his neighbor the secrets of counsel as if from certain hidden dwellings: for if we lived with the soul only naked and uncovered, we would be known to each other only from the movements of the mind and the intentions of thoughts. From this it is understood that Angels, since they are stripped of the body, become known to each other without speech: therefore they do not need speech: and nothing is vain in them: therefore they do not speak.

1. Likewise, Job xxv, 17, upon that, Gold or glass shall not equal it, Gregory says that in the resurrection the mind of each one will not be hidden from the eyes of another by corporeality. Therefore much more, since the nature of the Angel is more spiritual, what is in one Angel will not be hidden from another: and thus they do not need speech.
2. Likewise, Basil: Since the vigor of the soul is covered by the veil of the flesh to indicate and bring into public view those things which are moved in the depth of the heart either by thoughts or senses, we need names and words. From this it is understood that where there is no veil of flesh, the use of speaking is not necessary. But in Angels there is no veil of flesh: therefore they do not speak.
3. Likewise, 1 Corinthians iv, 5, upon that, Do not judge before the time, the Gloss says, that deeds and thoughts, good or evil, will then be open: and because all things will then be known, then all will be able to judge concerning themselves and others. From this it is understood that even the wicked will then see the thoughts of all: therefore much more strongly do Angels now see: and from this it follows again that they do not speak.

4. Likewise, Augustine: In the homeland there will not be thoughts wandering from here to there, or from there to here: but we will see all things at once. Therefore, since Angels are now blessed, they do not need speech, but all things are seen at once.
5. Likewise, Gregory in book IV of the Dialogues: What is it that they do not see, who see all things seeing? and he speaks of Angels. If therefore they see all things, they see also those things which are in each other: and thus they do not need speech.
6. Likewise, Augustine in the book on the Good of Marriage: After this pilgrimage there will be a time when the thoughts of all will be open to each other, nor will they oppose each other. Therefore, since in the future we will be like Angels, as the Lord says, Matthew xxii, 30; therefore Angels now see each other's thoughts, etc.
7. But against this is what the Gloss says, 1 Corinthians xiii, 1, that the higher ones signify to the lower ones what they have perceived of God's will by nods and signs.
8. Likewise, Boethius: Whatever a lower power can do, a higher power can also do: since therefore man, who is lower in power, can speak, an Angel can also speak.
9. Likewise, Isaiah vi, 3: They cried out one to another...

To the second. In Zechariah one speaks to another, and in Daniel.

According to this, it is further inquired, if it is conceded that they speak, how do they speak? And it seems the Gloss, on Corinthians viii, 1, says that they speak by nods and signs. But this seems not to be able to stand: because,

1. A nod serves more for the demonstration of the thing itself than for speech.
2. Likewise, those signs are either from nature or from agreement. If from nature, then they will be the same among all. But if by agreement, then before speech, the discipline of language is required, which is also frivolous to posit in Angels.
3. Likewise, Damascene says that they transmit their intelligences to each other without a voice by spoken word. But because elsewhere many things have been said about this, let these suffice.

Solution. I concede that Angels speak, and as to how they speak, according to what I think, to see this it is necessary to presuppose a certain likeness. Let us posit two lights distant from each other: for one of those lights to penetrate the other, only three things are required, one of which is that one is directly ordered against the other in position, and that no medium prohibiting and closing one from the other is interposed, and that there is a distance proportionate to the power of changing, because a light existing in Paris will not change up to a light that is in Rome. But if we posit that one of those lights is cognitive of the other, and conversely, and that they have freedom of will: then it follows that they will know each other, if they wish: and they will not know, if they do not wish. For Augustine says that light and species of intelligibles are always in the soul, yet the soul does not always understand, because it does not wish: hence if the will closes the intellect to itself, namely that it does not

understand in act, much more does it have the power of closing itself from another: thus therefore I say, that it is in Angels, that they are intelligible lights, as Dionysius says: and therefore for them to speak to each other, nothing is required except the will of communicating their intelligence to another, and conversion to it in order, and conception of their intelligence by way of expression to another: for we understand differently, and we think differently in order of expression to another. For we understand when we have knowledge: but we think when we confer among ourselves, and we order to expression when we take our thought in some sign to another. And no more is required in my judgment for the speech of Angels. But this sign is nothing other than the intelligible species with order to another, and the will of communicating, as it seems to me.

To the first, therefore, that is objected, it must be said that Basil intends that we do not need speech uttered by the attraction of air: but he does not intend that we do not need spiritual speech in the way determined in the said.

To the other it must be said, that there is a certain mind created by that which causally beatifies: just as the mind of beatitude in which are the gifts of the soul, from the overflow of which there are also gifts in the body: and of that it is true, that it is not hidden from the eyes of any of the blessed: because this is nothing other than that each blessed sees in another the quantity of glory of soul and body which he has from God: but something is in the mind caused by free will, in which the power of the will can: and that is called the proper concept of the heart of each, and that one will not see in another without speech: and the first likeness is in wine moistening glass: because through the glass the color of the wine is seen: thus in the glory of the body the glory of the mind is seen and considered.

To the other the solution is clear from what has been said: because Basil speaks of the need for speech that sounds in the air.

To the other it must be said, that that Gloss speaks of the causes of condemnation or salvation: because those each will see in another, so that the condemnation of the wicked and the salvation of the blessed may appear more just: but yet from this it is not removed that speech is still necessary both for the good and the wicked, for those concepts which are subject to free will to be expressed to another.

To the other it must be said, that fleeting thoughts are called thoughts running from the obscurity of a trace or image or enigma and mirror of faith, to have knowledge of God, which here begins from creatures. But then it will not be so: because we will see God in Himself, and other things ordered to beatitude in God at once: because there they are at once, where they are as one simple thing, which is the cause and idea of all. But yet for that knowledge it is not removed that which each has of the concept of his heart: and that is not shown by the word, because it is not beatifying: but speech is required for it.

To the other it must be said, that Gregory speaks of those substantial to beatitude, and not of others. Or it is said, that he speaks of the sufficiency of the subject, not of knowledge according to act: this is to say, that God in whom all things can be sufficiently seen without a medium, is presented to them: and in this respect there is nothing that they do not see, that is,

can see: yet it is not true, that all actually see all things in Him: because then each would have as many things seen and known in Him as another: and thus they would be equal in the number of things known.

To the other it must be said, that Augustine does not speak of things known which are subject to free will, but of things known in which beatitude is substantially, that is, in which God beatifying as beatifying results in the mind and in the body consequently.

To that which is objected against, I well concede that they speak,

To this, however, which is inquired, How do they speak? I say with the Gloss that by nods and signs: and a nod is called there the order and conversion to another with the will of being made known; and with the determination of the likeness which he has with himself to the thing. But a sign is called the form which is in the Angel, which is a sign and likeness of the thing, because intelligence is full of forms from its creation, which forms are likenesses of things not indeed received from things, but from creation: and they are likenesses of the whole order of universal or particular causes to the things made, which are, and to future things: and under their determination to this thing or that Angels express whatever they wish to speak.

To the first, however, that is objected against, it must be said that a nod here is an intelligible demonstration, for which the order of one to another with the will of being made known suffices.

To the other it must be said, that a sign is from nature, but the determination is at the will of the Angel: and therefore the discipline of language is not required: and it is similarly as if I have the likeness of a man with me, and by will I convert it to express and signify this one or that one: and let us posit, that this suffices for speech to you: for it is clear then, that then you would not receive anything from me: but by determining the natural likeness of the thing, to this the community of the likeness of man would be restricted to you; so that in that which you have with you, you would understand my concept: and this Damascene calls transmitting intelligences to each other without a voice by spoken word.

But it is objected: because it is necessary, that something excites the listener to perceive: and that exciting thing he must receive from the speaker: therefore he receives something from him: and thus something goes out from one to another, and one is in potency to another.

To this it must be said, that he receives nothing at all which he does not have from natural things,

as is speech: because as we said before, conversion alone suffices for excitation: hence by this very thing that he sees him turned to himself, since each is an intelligible light, and the will is not closing, knowledge in the listener is determined to what the other wishes to express.

Articulus 14 — Whether Angels Speak All Things

Whether Angels speak all things?

Whether Angels can speak all things?

Secondly, it is asked, Whether they can speak all things?

And it seems that they cannot: because no one can express what they do not have in cognition; but contingencies dependent on free will are not in their cognition. Therefore, they cannot express those things. The first is clear. The second is proven by the fact that they only know those things whose forms they received in creation; however, they then received only those things which occur according to the course of nature, as is clear from Augustine on Genesis, that they received the cognition of each thing to be made through the work of disposition and adornment and propagation before it was, in the Word or from the Word: therefore, it seems that concerning those things which purely fall under free will, they do not have the power to express.

But on the contrary: Boethius says that whatever a lower power can do, a higher power can also do; but we can speak all things that are in our heart, whether dependent on nature or on free will: therefore, so can they.

Solution. To this it must be said that Angels can express all the concepts of their heart just as we can, and they have this from nature, so that they do not need a word: because even demons speak in this way. Just as in us, as long as the concept of the mind is in the sole power of free will, it is then known only by us and God: so it is in them; but just as in us the pronouncement orders the concept to the natural instruments of pronouncing or hearing, and then it is naturally heard: so in Angels the order of conversion to another with the will of expressing causes hearing in one, and it is speech in another: and by that conversion, the concept which was subject to free will is drawn out beyond itself to the natural in some way, and then it is intelligible by another, as was said before.

And what is objected, that they do not have cognition of those things which purely fall under free will, is true as long as they are only in free will: but when they are ordered to the order of pronouncement, they are now natural: because just as it is natural for us to hear someone speaking, whether they wish it or not, as long as they speak: so it is natural for an Angel to hear, or to receive one turned towards them with the will of expressing, and the likeness of the thing to the thing determined by the intention of making that thing known to another: and this Basil calls the motions of intentions by which we would make ourselves known to each other, if only we lived with a naked and uncovered soul.

Articulus 15 — Whether All Angels Speak To All, Or Certain Ones To Certain Ones, And Whether Distance Can Make For Them An Impediment To Speech As With Us

Whether all Angels speak to all or some to some, and whether distance can cause an impediment to speech for them as it does for us?

Thirdly, it is asked, Whether all speak to all or to some?

1. It seems, however, that only some speak to some, according to the Gloss on the words of the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 13:1, which says that superiors signify to inferiors what they have understood of the will of God by gestures and signs, which are called tongues.
2. Furthermore, to speak is to illuminate concerning the concept of the heart: therefore, since illuminations descend from superiors to inferiors, and not conversely, it seems that only superiors speak to inferiors, and not conversely.

But on the contrary: Among us, we can all speak to all indifferently by nature; therefore, since Angels are not of lesser power than us, it seems that they can all speak to all.

Likewise, it is asked, If distance can cause an impediment to speech for them, as among us one does not hear us who is more or less distant beyond what we can break the air? It seems so: because we read that Angels cry out to one another. But a cry is not necessary except because of deafness or because of distance: however, deafness does not occur in Angels: therefore, the cry is because of distance, as it seems.

Solution. I say without prejudice, that there is a twofold speech among Angels: one which is called illumination by Dionysius: and that is concerning those things which are manifested in the Word, and are not of the substance of beatitude in particular, but are of the dispensation of the future world and sacraments and the Church: and it is true that that speech descends from superiors to inferiors: because by that illumination superiors purify, illuminate, and perfect inferiors themselves. However, there is another speech concerning what is conceived in the heart itself: and by that speech both good and evil speak, and all to all.

To what is asked concerning distance, it must be said that distance makes nothing in them, but only the order of conversion to another by the intention of making oneself known.

To what is objected concerning the cry, it must be said that the cry of an Angel signifies the greatness of expression, not the necessity of the hearer, or the space of distance between the hearer and the speaker.

Divisio Textus

Here it can be asked, Since generation is made by the Father, etc.

Here begins the second part of that distinction, in which the Master teaches with which words the eternity of divine generation is to be expressed.

And it is divided into four parts: of which the first proves that it is more fittingly expressed with words of past and present time taken together. In the second, he objects against this through the words of Origen, there, L, Origen indeed upon Jeremiah. In the third, he solves, there, M, he says, etc. But in the fourth, from the solution of such Authors, he draws out how and with which words one must speak about divine generation, there, O, Let us therefore say the Son, etc.

Articulus 16 — Whether Angels In Their Speakings And Hearings Use Tongues, Ears, Or Certain Organs

Whether Angels in their speaking and hearing use tongues, ears, or certain organs?

Lastly, it is inquired concerning the organs of those hearing and speaking.

For since an Angel is a separate substance, it seems not to have organs, nor even powers determined to such organs: just as souls separated from bodies have, as is read concerning the tongue of the damned rich man and the finger of Lazarus.

But if this be conceded, then it seems that their speaking and hearing add nothing beyond understanding according to act, which is false: because this does not have the nature of speech.

To this it must be said without prejudice, that Angels have spiritual tongues: and these are nothing other than the power of communicating their counsels and concepts to one another.

To what is objected, that their speaking does not seem to be anything but understanding according to act, it must be said that three things concur to speaking, namely understanding according to act, and conversion to another under the will of making known, and the intention directing likenesses to the things about which there is speech. Similarly, to hearing these concur, namely conversion to the speaker, and the will of receiving the concept, and the direction of likeness to the same thing.

And if you ask, How can it be that when one is converted to another, and conversely that one is converted to this one? It must be said that this happens because of the light of the intelligence of one directly to another: for just as the ray of corporeal light is applied to another, so also the ray of spiritual light of one intelligence in one Angel is applied to the ray of the intelligence of another Angel: and in this way they are also applied to souls in revelation. Hence it is also clear that neither does the commonality of forms impede understanding, since it is always determined by direction to the thing: nor are they deceived by equivocal and amphibological things: because the determined thing excludes all those.

Articulus 17 — Whether It Is Permitted To Scrutinize The Supernal Mysteries

Is it permissible to scrutinize the heavenly mysteries?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said:

It is not permissible to scrutinize the heavenly mysteries, etc.

For all the holy Doctors have scrutinized the mysteries of the Trinity and have discussed them: therefore it seems that all have sinned.

To this it must be responded by what Bernard says on the Song of Songs: The Spirit scrutinizes not only the hearts and reins of men, but also the depths of God: and whether to our matters or to others, I securely follow Him wherever He may lead; only let Him guard our hearts and our understandings, lest perhaps when He is not present, we think He is present, and we follow our own sense deviating instead of Him. Hence those scrutinizing the scru-

tinies by their own sense, wishing by the force of reason to break into the secrets of God rather than to be introduced by the teaching of the Spirit, are here reproved, just as the infidels who do not keep the boundaries of the articles of faith: but those studying and inquiring with piety are not reproved.

Articulus 18 — Whether The Generation Of The Son From The Father Is Finite Or Infinite

Whether the generation of the Son by the Father is finite or infinite?

This question arises at the beginning, whether the generation of the Son by the Father is finite or infinite?

1. It seems, however, that it is infinite; because in eternity nothing is otherwise: therefore, if the Father begot, it is true that He is still generating: but a generation which is always in the act of generating is never finished: therefore it seems that the generation of the Son by the Father is infinite.
2. Likewise, whatever is in God is not limited by duration, or place, or intellect: divine generation is in God: therefore it is limited by none of these: therefore it seems that He is always being generated.

ON THE CONTRARY:
1. Whatever is always in the process of being generated is never in the state of having been generated: therefore, if the Son is always in the process of being generated, He is never in the state of having been generated, which is false, because He would not be the Son unless He were generated.

1. Likewise, whatever is always in the process of being generated is never completed by generation: therefore, if the Son is always in the process of being generated, the Son is never perfect and completed by generation, which again is false: therefore His generation is not infinite.

If you say that to be in the process of being generated and to be in the state of having been generated are the same. On the contrary: Either they are simultaneous in duration, being generated and being in the state of having been generated, but not by nature: or simultaneous by nature and time. If in the first way: therefore, to be in the process of being generated is prior by nature to being in the state of having been generated: but in all such cases the prior implies the posterior, and not vice versa: for it does not follow in the thousandth year, if it is generated, therefore it is being generated: but it follows well, if it is being generated, therefore it is generated: therefore, since it is now true that the Son is generated, it is not true that He is being generated: which is false, since faith accepts such expressions, the Son is always being generated: as the Master here proves.

If you say that the generation of the Son is finite to the state of having been generated. It seems to be false: because then it was at some time incomplete, and in the state of having been generated it became complete.

Furthermore, at some time it was in the process of being generated, at some time in the state of having been generated, and thus there is variation in eternity, which cannot stand with the aforementioned.

Likewise, is it to be conceded at least according to the intellect, that to be in the process of being generated is before being in the state of having been generated? It seems so: since the Son does not receive the being which He is, except through generation: therefore generation, as it seems, is before. If this is granted: it is contrary to the intellect of eternity, which posits the whole eternal being simultaneously.

Solution, it must be said that this question has no place in divine matters: because there is neither finite nor infinite there. It is not infinite: because that is most imperfect, of which the parts to the receiver there is always something outside to receive: and therefore even in natural mathematics the infinite is only in that which is finite in act, and in potentiality in that and not in act: for the infinite which is by iteration or regeneration of the same circular motion without the interposition of rest is infinite, cannot be there: because the same generation is not always repeated without rest, as the infinite motion of the circle is said to be by regeneration with respect to natural principles: hence in no way is there the infinite thus accepted, except in the way which was said above, that the infinite is not finite, or measured by time, place, or the power of the comprehending intellect. Nor is the finite there: because the finite is said, either that which attains completion after motion, when namely after moving it is in the state of being moved: and thus it cannot be in the utterly immutable divine matters. In another way, the finite is said to be contained within boundaries terminating it within or without: as a thing is terminated to its form and figure, or to its essence, outside of which there is nothing of the thing. But outside as a thing is terminated to place. And neither of those applies to divine matters: because no boundary is constituted for God's essence: although He is finite to Himself, yet He is not finite to anything created: since He is always not enclosed, but incomparably outside. Hence we say that divine generation is neither finite nor infinite, but simple. For the simple, as the Philosopher says, is neither finite nor infinite.

Nor should it be said that to be in the process of being generated differs from being in the state of having been generated: because it has already been proven above, that there is no becoming preceding the Son, nor any action between the Father and the Son, through which the Son proceeds from the Father: but generation expresses the reason through which the Son is from the Father: hence generation actively understood is the same as paternity or Father, although they differ in the mode of signifying. Similarly, generation passively accepted is the same as the Son differing only in the mode of understanding. And therefore there is nothing to inquire, whether to be in the process of being generated and to be in the state of having been generated are simultaneous in time and nature: or one is prior to the other by nature, but not by time? Because they are in neither way. For the same is not simultaneous with itself, because simultaneity is of diverse things, which are in one place or time: but to be generated and generation and the Son in divine matters and to be in the state of having been generated are the same, yet signified differently: and therefore there is neither prior by nature, nor by eternity, nor by space. But when it is said, the Son is generated by the Father, the mode is

signified by which the Son is from the Father. When it is said generation, the reason of that existence by which He is from the Father is signified. When it is said, the Son is generated, the mode is signified by which that which is of the Father is in the Son. When it is said, Son, the determination of having a principle in comparison to that principle is signified. And because all these modes are of the same in signifying it diversely, therefore faith has admitted all words of time expressing the mode of such existence. And through this the solution to the whole is clear: for I do not posit there becoming, or act, between the Father and the Son: but the word importing the act of generation in human matters, when transferred to divine matters, is abstracted from acting or suffering and time, and retains only the reason of its act, which reason in divine matters expresses the notion signified in this or that way: and therefore all that is there is perfect, nothing in becoming, nothing in having been made: but the Son is a demonstration from the Father, perfect from perfect, and one from one.

Articulus 19 — Whether The Son Can Always Be Said Born And Begotten; And What The Three Tenses Denote In The Participle, The Verb, And The Adverb, When It Is Said, The Son Is Always Born

Whether the Son can always be said to be born and begotten? And what do the three tenses signify in the participle, verb, and adverb, when it is said, the Son is always born?

Then it is asked concerning what is said there: Let us say more truly, always born, etc.

In such expressions where two tenses are signified, only one determines the comparison: and the other is with respect to which the other is taken: as when it is said, he is loved, the present tense which is taken by the word "is," is not the measure of the act or passion which is imported by the word "loved," but rather the past tense which is signified in what I say, loved: and the tense is taken with respect to the present to which that past is terminated: therefore it seems, that similarly when it is said, the Son is always born, that the past refers to the generation, and the present is now to which the past is terminated.

Furthermore, when it is said, Always born, three tenses are implied: and it is asked, What do those three signify concerning the divine generation?

Furthermore, it is asked, Which of these tenses is more fitting to the divine generation?

Solution. It must be said, that such participles, born, and begotten, must be abstracted from the connotation of time, and similarly verbs: and it must be understood to retain only that which is of nobility in them as to the differences of time connoted: just as the past must be abstracted from pastness, and it must retain necessity. because the past is necessary only among temporals: and therefore the verb or participle of the past tense signifies concerning the divine generation only by necessity. Similarly the present is only in times as entity: therefore it must be referred in divine matters, and mutability and temporality must be abstracted. But the future is closer to being than the past, because the future will be at some time, but the past has already ceased: therefore the future must be taken by reason of being which does not cease from time, and then it is fitting to divine matters: but the future moreover signifies being in potentiality, and not in act: and this does not fit divine matters.

From this it is clear that the first objection is none: because verbs or participles do not signify temporal motions in divine matters, but are referred to divine matters by reason of what they have of perfection.

To what is asked, What do the three tenses signify in the verb imported, participle, and adverb? It must be said, that the adverb signifies the indeficiency of eternity, the participle however signifies the necessity of generation, and the verb signifies the entity of it.

Articulus 20 — Whether The Generation Of The Son From Mary The Virgin Is From The Father Or From The Whole Trinity

Whether the generation of the Son from the Virgin Mary is from the Father or from the whole Trinity?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said:

Although by this which he says today, it can also be understood as day, etc.

1. For this seems false: because neither the Father nor the Holy Spirit begot him from the Virgin Mary. For he is by temporal generation on earth without a father: just as by eternal generation in heaven he is without a mother.
2. Furthermore, since the three commonly made his incarnation, according to this which is said, the three were commonly fathers, and begot him: therefore the Son begot himself, which is false.

Solution. It must be said that Augustine spoke improperly, and according to temporal generation if it is said that the Father begot, it must be explained as begot, that is, made that he be generated: and it is a similar mode of speaking, Matthew 3:9, upon that, "God is able from these stones," etc., where the Gloss says: In testimony of this matter God begot a daughter from Sarah, that is, made that she be generated from Sarah.

Articulus 21 — Whether The Son Is Always Begotten By The Father, As Splendor From Light

Whether the Son is always begotten by the Father, like brightness from light?

Whether the Son is always begotten by the Father, like brightness from light?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says:

As often as light has arisen from which brightness arises, etc.

For this seems false: because according to this the Son would be begotten many times, which is heretical.

Response. It must be said that divine generation is not repeated, as brightness is repeated: but because generation only signifies the reason by which the Son is from the Father: and that is continuously demonstrated, and not once and ceases: therefore faith receives that the Son is always begotten; and from this then it does not follow that his generation is never completed,

but that the reason of the existence of the Son from the Father is continuously demonstrated in the Father and the Son.

However, how brightness is continuously generated from light, Augustine proves in book VI on Genesis, thus: What has been illuminated is not illuminated further: but the air is continuously illuminated by the sun when the sun is present: therefore it can never be said that it has been illuminated: and in such cases to be illuminated and to have been illuminated are simultaneous: but nevertheless usage has it that it is said to be illuminated, because now for the first time it receives light: however, it is said to have been illuminated, when it already receives.

Articulus 22 — Whether Only The Living Is Born From The Living

Whether only the living is born from the living?

Then it is inquired concerning what Hilary says there, N, "But that which is born living from the living has the perfection of nativity," etc.

For this seems false: because a child is born from the living: and yet does not have the perfection of nativity: for it is born from a living father and mother.

To this it must be said that nothing is born from the entirely living, except that which is born from the very first life: and therefore only the Son is born from the living. And this is proven thus: In the generation of simple minerals, nothing is living: because those do not live: just as if the luminous brings forth light, or an element its species, or from the mixture of elements stones or metals are made. However, in the generation of living things, there is a twofold mode, namely from one generating, and from the dead: as in those which are born from putrefied things, whose mode of generation we touched upon above: and in those it is clear that it is not generation from the living. But from the living generating, neither in plants, nor in animals, nor in humans is generation made except from seed, which does not live in the act of the soul: and from that from which, as essentially remaining in the born, generation is not made from the living. But in divine things, if the preposition denotes identity of essence, because nothing except the living is in the Father, generation is made from the very life and the living, and this Hilary attends to when he says that it cannot be except living that which is born from the living. Hence, John 5:26: "As the Father has life in Himself, so He has given to the Son to have life in Himself."

Articulus 23 — Whether What The Master Says Is Truer, Not From Derivation But From Power

Whether it is more true what the Master says, neither from derivation, but from virtue?

Whether it is more true what the Master says, neither from derivation, but from virtue?

Then it is inquired concerning what he says, there, N, Neither from derivation, but from virtue, etc.

1. It seems that things in the Father are derived into the Son: because generation is a certain derivation.
2. Furthermore, Dionysius and Anselm compare the Father to a fountain, and the Son and the Holy Spirit to streams.

Solution. It must be said that there is not properly derivation in generation except that which is sometimes in becoming: but this does not pertain to divine generation: and this Hilary calls being from virtue: because whatever is in becoming, is in the potentiality of infirmity.

However, Dionysius and Anselm say that in the Father is the fountainhead deity on account of the generative and processive virtues: yet it is not necessary that all things which are in the fountain and streams be transferred to divine generation or procession: because

in symbolics not all things are considered, but only those which proclaim nobility: hence from the stream is transferred no more to the Son than that he is from another, just as a stream is from a fountain.

Articulus 24 — How It Is Understood When He Says, That It Is The Image Of Innascibility

How it is to be understood when it is said, "To be the image of unbegottenness?"

Next, it is asked concerning what is said there, "N, To be the image of unbegottenness," etc.

For this seems false: because an image is, as will be evident below, a certain imagined and indistinct likeness of one thing to another. However, the Son is not indistinct from the Father with respect to unbegottenness, but rather the Father is unbegotten, and the Son is begotten.

Solution. It must be said that the abstract is to be reduced to the concrete: and the sense is, "of unbegottenness," etc., that is, of his unbegotten, it gives him to be the image.

Other things that are said up to the end of this distinction are easily evident from what has been said before.

DISTINCTIO X

Divisio Textus

Now indeed after the eternity of the Son, etc. Here begins the part which is about the procession of the Holy Spirit, and it is divided into two parts: in the first of which it treats of his eternal procession. In the second, however, it treats of his temporal procession which begins in distinction XIV, there, A,

Furthermore, it must be diligently noted, that the procession is twofold, etc.

The first is further divided into three: in the first of which it is treated of the mode of his procession in name. In the second, of his procession in comparison to the terminus from which, which begins in distinction XI, there, A, Here it must be said that the Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son. In the third, of the difference of the procession of the Holy Spirit, and the generation of the Son, which begins in distinction XIII, there, A, After this it must be considered, such as we, etc.

The first of these parts is contained entirely in this distinction, which is divided into three parts: of which the first contains, how it is attributed to the Holy Spirit, that he is charity or love. The second contains, that as love he proceeds from the Father and the Son, which begins there, F, Now indeed what I began In the third it is assigned to show, etc. the reason of this name, that he is called the Holy Spirit by proper name, there, H,

Here it must be noted, that the Holy Spirit in the Trinity is specially called, etc.

In the first of these are contained five: of which the first has, that just as the Holy Spirit is of the Father and the Son commonly, so he insinuates the love of both. The second has the proof of this through the Canonical of John, there, B, John The third, however, has the proof in the Epistle, that charity in the divine is said essentially and personally, there, in the middle B, I do not know why as wisdom and Father, etc. The fourth has the proof through example, there, D, For by many examples. The fifth has the proof, that the Holy Spirit is charity of which John says, that God is from God, there, under the beginning E, However, the Holy Spirit where he is said to be charity we find, etc.

From these the sentence of Lifiere is clear through the whole distinction.

Articulus 1 — How The Names Which Are Attributed To The Holy Spirit Differ, Love, Dilection, Charity

How do the names differ which are attributed to the Holy Spirit, love, affection, charity?

A question arises first concerning this which says: The Holy Spirit is love, and two things are asked: first, whether charity or affection of the Father and the Son. The first is about the difference of these names which it touches. And secondly, whether the Holy Spirit proceeds as love?

1. It seems, however, that there is no difference: because Augustine says on that of John, 21:16 and 17: Simon son of John, do you love me? and he adds at the end saying, Do you love me? that love and affection are the same: therefore it seems that they do not differ.
2. Likewise, Dionysius in the book On the Divine Names: It seems to me that the theologians take the name of affection and love as common.

Likewise, in the same place, Dionysius reproves those distinguishing between affection and love, saying that they make force with light sounds, as if we could not signify four by twice

two, and native land by birthplace: therefore it seems that love and affection and charity are the same.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
Isidore says that love is of rational and irrational beings, but affection is only of rational beings: therefore it seems that they are not the same.

1. Likewise, we say that we love many things which we do not love out of charity: therefore love and charity are not the same.
2. Likewise, even in base love we well introduce the name of love, but not the name of charity: therefore these are not the same. Similarly, we place order in those things which we love out of charity: but in affection there are many things: because we love food, drink, and such things: yet we do not have charity towards those: therefore it seems there is a difference in them.

Solution. It must be said that love and affection and charity in gratuitous gifts name the same, yet according to different considerations: yet considered in themselves they relate as superior and inferior: for if these are placed around gratuitous love only, then they name the same habit according to different consideration of its act. For love signifies the adhesion of affection to the good itself which is loved. However, affection signifies the same affection, according to which it is from the choice of reason preferring it over other goods which are loved, as it is said in the Song of Songs, 5:10: My beloved is chosen from thousands. But charity names the same affection, according to which it places the loved under inestimable price: for dear is said what is esteemed of great price, as it is held in Song of Songs 8:7: If a man gives all the substance of his house for love, he will despise it as nothing. However, if these three are not considered around gratuitous love, but in themselves, then they differ as genus and species. For every affection is love, but it is not converted: and every charity is affection and love, but it is not converted: because then love is in things loved sensibly and rationally, but affection is in things loved rationally only, charity however in gratuitous things only.

To that which is first objected, it must be said that the Lord there asked three times to receive the confession of Peter, not about love, but about the circumstances of love, according to blessed Bernard, which are to love sweetly which is of love insofar as it is love, and to love wisely which is of affection insofar as it is affection, and to love fervently which is of charity insofar as it is charity: and Augustine does not intend to say there that these do not differ in reason, but that they do not differ in reality.

To that which is objected concerning Dionysius, it must be said that Dionysius does not reprove those distinguishing in the reason of names: but rather speaks against some who said that love should not be taken in a good signification, and therefore should not be placed in divine things: against whom he also adduces that of Wisdom 8:2: I became a lover of her form. And that which the holy Ignatius martyr said of the Lord Jesus Christ: My love is crucified. Hence the same names love, which is affection, although under another reason of the name.

Articulus 2 — Whether The Holy Spirit Proceeds As Love, And Whether Charity In Man And Angel Is A Habit Of The Will

Whether the Holy Spirit proceeds as love, and whether charity in man and angel is a habit of the will?

Secondly, it is asked, whether the Holy Spirit proceeds as love? And it seems for multiple reasons that it does not.

1. First thus: Every name that does not name as a distinct being, but as in another, does not pertain to a person existing by itself: however, love, that which it names, says to exist in something: therefore, it does not perfectly pertain to a person existing by itself: the Holy Spirit is a person perfectly by itself, therefore it does not pertain to it to proceed as love.
2. Likewise, love is of that in which the affection rests: therefore, it is always taken as proceeding into another: however, the Holy Spirit does not proceed into another, rather it remains in itself distinct: therefore, it does not proceed as love.
3. Likewise, the divine persons are perfect hypostases, like the Son and the Father; however, no love according to the reason of love says hypostasis, but habit, and accident of hypostasis: therefore, the Holy Spirit does not proceed as love.
4. Likewise, the Spirit is loved by the Father as much as the Son: therefore, love is the middle bond of the Father and the Holy Spirit: if therefore the Holy Spirit is love, it will be love of love, which is in nothing, because thus it would go into infinity: therefore, the Holy Spirit does not proceed as love.
5. If perhaps you say that love says something distinct from the lover: and therefore that distinction makes personality and person. On the contrary: the divine essence is its love by which God loves himself and others: yet when it says distinction according to the name, it is not distinguished from the Father: therefore, such distinction is not sufficient to make a person. Furthermore, the Father names a distinct substance, and similarly the Son, and generation says the act of nature in the communication of nature from the Father to the Son: however, love neither says substance according to the name, nor does it say the reason of substantial procession: therefore, it seems not to pertain to personal distinction.
6. Furthermore, since in intellectual nature there are other powers and other habits than will and love, it seems that the procession of any power into habit or act should make a personal distinction, just as the power which is towards the arduous, which is called irascible, is divided against the concupiscible, whose habit love is attributed to the Holy Spirit.
7. Likewise, the apprehension of good is before the love of good: and thus it seems according to nature that the apprehension of good proceeds in God before love: and thus that procession should more cause a person than this one.

8. If perhaps you say that the apprehension of good pertains to the Son, because he is the art and reason of the Father. On the contrary: truth is ascribed to the Son: therefore, the apprehension of good, since it differs according to reason, like speculative and practical intellect, seems to pertain to the distinction of another person.
9. Likewise, since there are many motions and passions of the concupiscible, like to desire, to wish, why is no distinct person taken according to these acts or habits?
10. Furthermore, in the mind love proceeds from the mind as an act, not as a distinct power: therefore, it seems that no person in the divine should be distinguished according to this procession.

If perhaps for this reason it is said that the Holy Spirit does not proceed as love.

On the contrary: 1. A certain Philosopher says that separate spiritual substances are divided by the power of intellect and will, and no more: therefore, just as in God we have one personal procession on the part of the intellect, so we should have one on the part of the affection: but that is only of love: therefore, love will denote a personal distinction in the divine.

1. Likewise, well-living men do not agree in nature only, but rather seek the consent of friendship: because the Philosopher says that friendship is happiness, or not without happiness: therefore, the Father and the Son, since they do not agree in fewer things than we do, also agree in the consent of friendship: but friendship always breathes love, therefore the spirated itself is love, and proceeds as love.
2. Likewise, Hilary in the book on Synods: What is written, that they are indeed three by substance, but one by consonance, has no calumny: because with the Spirit named, that is, the Paraclete, it is more fitting to predicate unity by consonance than by essence, through the similitude of essence. From this it is taken that the Father and the Son do not only agree in the similitude or identity of essence, but also in the consonance of love: therefore, since that love existing in God cannot be anything but God, that consonance will be the Holy Spirit.
3. Likewise, when our mind loves itself, there is something in it which is the love of itself, just as the knowledge of itself: but the knowledge in the divine corresponds to the person of the Son: therefore, to love will correspond another person, and we call that the person of the Holy Spirit.

Solution. We say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as the love by which they love each other: and this reason especially compels: because it is absurd to posit that the Father and the Son agree in nothing insofar as they are distinct: however, they agree in essence insofar as they are one: but we see that in every rational and non-rational nature all delights and joys which they can have in life insofar as they are different persons, are all founded upon mutual love: for which reason also certain Philosophers posited the principles of all nature as strife and friendship, as if one by nature from the very principle of the

universe would take something divine, namely friendship, which gathers and unites: but the other would have, namely strife, from the very privation of matter conjoined to itself: whence the Father and the Son in that they are distinct persons, agree in this love which proceeds from them by which they love each other: and that is the Holy Spirit.

To the first objection, therefore, it must be said that love can be considered in two ways, namely according to that which it names, and thus it does not name a complete hypostasis, just as neither does the word: for the word of our intellect is knowledge, which is accidental to the intellect. In another way it is considered according to the proportion to the nature in which it is, namely divine or human: and according to this it will be perfect or imperfect, just as the word: whence since in the divine nature nothing is imperfect, it is necessary that the Spirit proceeding from the persons as they are persons be a perfect person in substance.

To the other it must be said that the Holy Spirit proceeds as into another, and remains in itself distinct: for these are not opposed; for insofar as it is referred to the Father and the Son as to one principle of itself, thus it remains in itself distinct from both by relative opposition, but insofar as it proceeds in the reason of personal love, nothing prohibits that it proceeds from the Father into the Son, and conversely from the Son into the Father, especially since this is true, the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Spirit, and the Father loves the Son by the Holy Spirit, and the Son loves the Father by the Holy Spirit: in all of which it is taken what is of procession, and what is of love which specifies the mode of proceeding: and if the procession is taken in itself, it will only cause the distinction of the one proceeding from those from whom it proceeds: if the mode by which it is specified is taken, thus the bond of the Father and the Son in the bond of love which is the Holy Spirit is caused.

To the other it must be said that this is false, no love according to the reason of love, etc.: because the love of the divine persons to whom only the perfection of substance pertains, and not accident, is perfect love in hypostasis.

To the other it must be said that the Holy Spirit is loved by the Father and the Son with essential love, and not with love which is distinguished from the Holy Spirit: and this is clear in a similar case: because whether we attend in an image, or in distinct men, love never causes another love by which that is loved. In the image indeed, because we clearly see that from the knower and knowledge love is caused of that which is known: but further love is not caused, but the love itself is loved with the same love. Similarly among different men consensus causes love by which men conspire and agree: but from this love another is not caused by which that is loved. If you say that it is not similar: because love in lower things is not a distinct person lovable: according to this I more easily have the proposition, that there is not another love: for that person is in no way distinguished from other persons except in relative opposition: that second love either is distinguished by relative opposition from the first, or not. If so: therefore they differ by a special property from it: therefore just as the Father and the Son insofar as they are one principle of the Holy Spirit, are not called personal love: so that second love should not be called love, but be denominated by another opposed property, as is done in the Father and the Son, which is false. If however it does not differ, I have the proposition that it is the same as this, and they are not two, but one love.

To the other it must be said that the divine essence is the love of the Father and the Son, but otherwise than personal love. For as we have said, to posit the agreement of the Father and the Son in essence only, this is little: indeed if we posit, though impossible, that the Father and the Son are not one God, as they are, but two and perfect, they would still agree in the love which proceeds from them even as distinct, and insofar as they are persons: and that love which thus proceeds from them as distinct is not whence they are one in essence, is personal and notional: whence that the essence is love and is said, this is not of the Father and the Son insofar as they are distinct persons, but rather insofar as they are one God: and therefore it is not of them as from them, but rather it is of them as he is; therefore it is not distinct; but the personal which is of them, not whence they are one God, but insofar as they are conspiring persons, that is of them as from them: and therefore that is distinguished from both.

To the other it must be said that spiritual nature is manifold: for some is that which is referred to a body of many and dissimilar parts, like the rational soul to an organic body: and that has the variety of many parts according to the proportion to the parts of the body, which it perfects and moves by its parts: but some does not have such a relation to the body: and therefore it is not necessary that it has parts of this kind: whence the Commentator says on the metaphysics, that in separate substances no powers are manifested except of intellect and will: and whatever may be of this, whether it is true or not, it must be said that those substances do not have many of the various powers which are of the soul in the body, and especially of the vegetative, and also they do not have certain of the sensitive soul: for although they know particular sensibles, and thus are said to have sense, sense will be said equivocally to our sense, because our sensitive cognition is not in act unless varied by the alteration of those sensibles, which would be absurd to posit in such substances. Similarly, however, in God according to this it will not be to posit according to nature virtues except of intellect and will: because they will be of greater power in him than in us: because intellect will be with respect to sensibles and universals, and will with respect to all goods: and thus it is not necessary that there are more persons proceeding according to more powers.

Regarding the habits, however, which that objection also inquires, it must be said that according to reason there are many habits of rational substance, but none is demonstrative of intimate affection except charity: for all others are either imperfect, or towards something external, and not towards that which is in the same nature: but love is especially intimate, and towards that which pertains to the society and union of the same nature: and therefore according to it the procession of a person is taken, and not according to other habits.

The same objection, however, raises the question about the irascible, namely that according to it a person should be taken just as according to the concupiscible: and this objection is made by some supposing that in the nature of the rational soul as it is rational, and in the nature of the angel, and in the divine nature, according to reason there should be concupiscible and irascible: and this is not held by any Author at all, except by that book which is falsely ascribed to Augustine, which is called On Spirit and Soul. For the Philosopher at the end of the first Ethics, Damascene, Gregory of Nyssa, and Avicenna, say the contrary. Similarly, the Gloss on the beginning of Ezekiel which recounts the opinion of Plato, who placed the concu-

piscible in the liver, but the irascible in the gall: and the reason for this is because those powers are named from the passions which are anger and concupiscence: but to all (even those who know little) it is clear that passions are not of rational nature, but are inferent or inflicted in sense: whence we can plainly say that the question supposes falsely, namely that in a wholly spiritual nature there is the concupiscible and irascible, in which properly there is will: because as the Philosopher says, in the rational there is will, in the irrational desire and spirit.

If, however, according to this it is asked, Whose power then is charity which is posited in God and in the angel? It must be said, of the will. If it is objected that love also names a passion, and thus is of some part of the sensitive soul, and not of God or the angel. It must be said that it is not true generally: but through bodily act, and having a contrary, it is true that it names a passion, but not love which says the affection of rational will. If, however, no force is made in this, but we wish to concede a double irascible, and a double concupiscible, namely human and sensible, then we say that it is not similar concerning the habit of the irascible, and the concupiscible: because the irascible is with respect to that which is external, which is to be repelled through victory over it: but the concupiscible is with respect to those things which are to be united within, and with respect to the uniting: and therefore according to the habit of the concupiscible there is the procession of a person, and not according to the habit of the irascible.

To the other it must be said that apprehension of all is attributed to the Son, and especially the apprehension of good: because that causes love to be breathed, and is operative as art operates: for speculative is in the universal, and is not of things except in potential existence. Although speculative and practical differ, yet according to speculative the word which is the Son is not taken, because that word (as Augustine says in book VIII of On the Trinity) is knowledge loved, and therefore is in the reason of the best: but according to speculative by appropriation it is not so fitting to take a person for two reasons, one of which is: because it is from the thing proceeding inwardly into speculation: and therefore it has the opposite mode to the procession of person from person: but practical is proceeding from the intelligent into work, and therefore that is more similar to the procession of persons. The second reason is that speculative is not of the thing in its proper nature, but rather in the universal reason in which the thing is only in potentiality: but practical is of the proper nature of the thing: and therefore again it more fittingly pertains to the procession of persons, who take their proper nature from the person from whom they proceed.

To the other it must be said that to the Son speculative is not attributed except by a less proper attribution: because the ideal intellect in the divine is operative of all ideated things which proceed into work: and that according to Augustine in the book of LXXXIII Questions, is attributed to the Son.

To the other it must be said that supposing that charity or love are of the concupiscible in spiritual nature, none of the other acts says complete and intimate inclination of affection to the beloved: and this is thus proved: To will says the act of the will by itself, which is common to the intimate and complete, and not to the intimate and incomplete. The rest, however, are

evident through Psalm 118, 20, where it says: My soul has longed to desire your justifications. Whence to long is less than to desire, to desire however is still less than to will, and to will is less than to love from charity.

To the last it must be said that it is otherwise concerning the image created by God: because the image in many things is dissimilar, especially in the simplicity of nature and perfection: and therefore what is accident in it, the divine hypostasis is distinct in God, as is clear from the things said before: yet if anyone considers the things noted by Augustine above, love and knowledge are not altogether accidental to the mind, but according to some mode they are substantial.

Articulus 3 — Whether The Word Properly Belongs To The Son

Whether the word properly belongs to the Son?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said:

Just as properly the word of God is also wisdom, etc.

For from this it is taken that the word properly belongs to the Son.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
1. The Father says himself, the Son says himself, and the Holy Spirit says himself: therefore either what is said by them is a word, or it is not. If it is a word, and the word proceeds from the one speaking: therefore the Son proceeds not only from the Father, but also from himself, and from the Holy Spirit. But if it is not a word. On the contrary: When a word is not said by the one speaking, nothing is said: therefore the Son saying himself and the Holy Spirit saying himself, say nothing, which is absurd.

1. Furthermore, as Anselm says in the Monologion: Each one says himself in another or in the other two: therefore it seems that not only the Son is called the word.
2. Furthermore, it is said of all creatures, as it is said in the beginning of Genesis 1, 3: God said: Let there be light, etc., and Psalm 32, 9, and 148, 5: He said, and they were made - he commanded, and they were created. But this saying is creating; therefore, since this saying belongs equally to all, it will belong to all that the word proceeds from them.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
1. Augustine: In that is the Word by which the Son is: but the Son is by generation by which he is distinguished from the Father, and from the Holy Spirit; therefore the word is by the same distinguishing generation.

1. Likewise, Anselm: Indeed I see a wondrous and ineffable thing, namely three speaking, of whom each one says himself and the other two: and yet one sole word, and to be the word of only one, because of the Father: therefore it seems that the word is taken only notionally.

Solution. It must be said, the question of the Word is long and difficult: and it will be treated in its place below: but here it suffices, in my judgment, that the word is said in two ways, namely essentially, and personally: and the word said essentially appropriately belongs to the Son, but personally it belongs to him only properly. For just as we have two names on the part of the Holy Spirit, of which one belongs properly, as the Holy Spirit: but the other said in one way belongs properly, and in another way belongs appropriately, namely love, or charity: so it is on the part of the Son that he has one name belonging only properly, namely Son: but the other said in one way belongs properly, in another way belongs appropriately, and this is the word.

To the first objection, therefore, it must be said that to say is equivocal to essential saying by which each one says himself and another, and to notional saying by which only the Father by saying generates the Son. But there are those who say that to say is said in three ways, namely essentially in the way each one says himself: and essentially connoting an effect in the creature, by which each one says the creature: and notionally, by which only the Father says the word, and in this third signification alone the word responds: and this is true that the personal word responds: but that in the other two significations no word responds, is absurd: because he who by saying does not say a word, says nothing, because nothing is said except a word.

To the other it must be said, that Anselm wishes to say, that from the plurality of those speaking the reason of the word is not multiplied by appropriation: for the word, by whomever it is said, or even by all, or by two, is always more appropriable to the Son than to another.

To what is objected concerning Augustine it must be said that by that the Word is by which the Son is, that is, by that relation it is called the Word, although not by that reason of the name: and this he understands of the word said personally.

Articulus 4 — Whether The Holy Spirit Is Properly Named Charity

Whether the Holy Spirit is properly called charity?

Whether the Holy Spirit is properly called charity?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says:

And yet the Holy Spirit is properly called charity, etc.

1. For this seems to be false: because whatever is common to the three cannot be proper to one: but charity is common to the three: therefore it cannot be proper to the Holy Spirit.
2. Furthermore, charity seems more to be appropriated to the Father: because in a certain antiphon concerning the Trinity the Church sings:

Charity is the Father, grace is Christ, communication is the Holy Spirit.

1. Likewise, charity is the form of virtues, and thus all virtues receive something from charity: therefore it is more similar and appropriable to the person from whom others receive, than to that which receives from others what none receives from itself: but this is the Holy Spirit: therefore it does not belong to the Holy Spirit.
2. Likewise, charity is the end of the commandment, as the Apostle says, to Timothy 1, 5. But the end belongs to that to which we ultimately return according to the order of nature. But this is the Father, as was held above: therefore it seems charity is not proper to the Holy Spirit.

Furthermore, essence is called charity in the divine. Similarly, the Holy Spirit is called charity. And similarly, a certain charity is implied when it is said, the Father and the Son love each other: for in the word love a certain charity is implied. And it is asked, How do those charities differ in the divine?

Solution. It must be said, as was held before, that charity is twofold: for it is personal and essential: and the personal is properly called the Holy Spirit, so that no other is: but the essential is called itself appropriately, but commonly any other.

To the first, it must be said that properly is implied in the authority of Augustine by appropriately.

To the other, it must be said that charity is taken in two ways, namely in itself, or to its proper act: and according to how it relates to other virtues. In itself, it is itself in the genus of love, and pertains to the Holy Spirit: and this is its proper consideration. But if it is taken as it is compared to other virtues, thus it has the nature of a certain principle to other virtues, and thus it is fitted to the Father.

And through this the solution to the two following which proceed in that consideration of charity is clear.

To the last, it must be said that in the divine there is essential charity, and notional, and personal. And this is clear by reason, and example. By reason thus: the Father and the Son love each other inasmuch as they are one in nature: and in this love necessarily also the Holy Spirit is included who is of the same essence with the Father and the Son: whence the word love says the act of essential charity. But when I say thus, the Father loves the Son with the love which is the Holy Spirit, a twofold love is implied, namely notional in the word by which the Father and the Son are one by inspiring love: and another love is implied by the name which is, with the love which is the Holy Spirit. By example, however, the same is shown: for the bridegroom and bride love each other in the agreement of nature and society which is among men well agreeing: and from such love other good companions pertaining to the same life are not excluded: and this love as much as it can, corresponds to essential love. The bridegroom and bride also love each other to the act of communication of nature through generation: and from this love even the begotten offspring is excluded: and this corresponds, as much as it can, to notional love inasmuch as the Father and the Son are the principle of the

Holy Spirit: which love is not the Holy Spirit, because the Holy Spirit is not the principle by which the Father and the Son breathe the Spirit, just as neither is the Son the paternity by which the Father generates the Son. The third love is by which they are pleased in the begotten offspring: and this would be more similar if the offspring were love: because then they would love each other in that love: and this love corresponds to personal love. Another more fitting example is in the mind. For let us suppose memory does not generate understanding, yet it loves it inasmuch as it pertains to the same nature of the mind with itself: but if we suppose, as it is true, the concord of memory and understanding in producing its will, the concord of producing itself will say a love similar to notional love in the divine: but with the will now produced, by the will binding memory and understanding they love each other again: and it will be love as personal.

Expositio Textus

Exposition of the Text

Then it is inquired concerning that which he says

As by the name of the Law sometimes together Where thus in Scripture are all things, etc. sought?

And it must be said, that in John 15:25, the Law

is put for the whole Old Testament, where the Lord says: That the word might be fulfilled which is written in their law: They hated me without cause: for this is written in Psalm 118:161: which is not called the Law, except because it is of the Old Testament, which is also an instrument, because it instructs, and just as an instrument shows the harmony of the letter to the spirit, and types to the truth. Similarly there, 118:4: Blessed are the undefiled in the way who walk in the law of the Lord: for there the whole Scripture can be called the Law. And there, Psalm 1:2: In the law of the Lord is his will, and in his law he shall meditate day and night. Concerning the law given through Moses is this John 1:17: The law was given through Moses, grace and truth came through Jesus Christ. Also, Ecclesiasticus 24:33: Moses commanded us a law in the precepts of righteousness. And, Deuteronomy 33:2: In his right hand a fiery law.

Articulus 5 — Whether Wisdom Is Not Proper, But Only Appropriable

Whether wisdom is not proper, but only appropriable?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says:

Just as therefore we properly call the only Word of God by the name of wisdom, etc.

1. Here indeed a doubt can be: that wisdom is appropriable, and not proper: but charity is appropriable and proper, what is the cause of this?
2. Likewise, since the Word is appropriable and proper, as was shown before: why not similarly wisdom?

3. If you say that wisdom in the wise is as a perfection of him according to knowing:

and therefore it cannot be proper: because then the Father would know as if formally by the wisdom which is from him. On the contrary: In the same way I see that love is in the lover as a perfection, either to love or to cherish: therefore it ought not to be proper, but appropriated.

I answer. It must be said without prejudice, that the reason of this saying depends on the reason of the names: because thus charity says what it says as proceeding into another, or towards another: whence Augustine says that

charity cannot be had less than between two. But wisdom says what it says as inhering in the wise himself, as if from another about which there is wisdom, because wisdom is about things: and although in God it is the cause of things, and not caused by things, yet it does not say this by its name: and therefore it could not fittingly be proper to the procession of persons: and through this the solution to the first and last is clear.

To the middle it must be said, that the Word says as proceeding from another, of which it is the intention and likeness, especially when someone speaks of himself: and therefore it encloses in itself the reason of that which is to be from another, just as charity or love: and therefore since by being from another the proceeding persons in the divine are distinguished, those names were apt to represent more than others.

Articulus 6 — Whether The Holy Spirit Is The Love By Which The Father And The Son Love Themselves And Us, And Also By Which We Love God

Whether the Holy Spirit is the love by which the Father and the Son love each other and us, and also by which we love God?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said:

The Holy Spirit is not only the love of the Father and the Son, by which they love each other and us, but also the love by which we love God, etc.

1. For this seems false for the first part: because the love by which the Father and the Son love us denotes an effect in the rational creature: but every such name is essential, because that effect is commonly of the whole Trinity: therefore that love is not specifically the Holy Spirit.
2. Likewise, there is one operation of the three: but to love us is the same as to make in us the grace by which we love God: therefore it is indivisibly of the three: therefore it does not specifically denote the love which is the Holy Spirit.
3. Likewise, Dionysius says in the book On the Divine Names: Love is a simple virtue by itself motivating towards a certain unitive concretion from the good to the extremity of beings, and from that again consequently through all to the good, reflecting itself from the same, and through the same, and in the same, and always revolving in the same way. Therefore, since this procession of love and reflection into the first good loving is

commonly of all persons, it does not seem that the Holy Spirit is specifically that charity by which God loves Himself and us.

4. Likewise, this seems to be against Augustine here in the last chapter of this distinction, where he introduces that of the Apostle to the Colossians 1:13: He has transferred us into the kingdom of the Son of His love, thus saying: therefore there is not in that Trinity the charity of God unless the Holy Spirit, the Son is also the Holy Spirit.

Solution. It must be said, as was said above, that there is a threefold charity in the divine, and that threefold charity is signified in four ways, and sometimes even in five ways. For charity is signified essentially sometimes by itself alone: as when it is said, God is charity. Sometimes it is also signified notionally alone: as when it is said the Father loves the Son, insofar as distinct persons existing agree in spirating. It also signifies personally alone: as when it is said, charity is God from God: as Augustine says here in the preceding chapter, by the context and consequence which he takes from the epistle of John. It is also sometimes signified simultaneously essentially and notionally: as when it is said, He has transferred us into the kingdom of the Son of His love: and this was proven above. It is signified in the fifth way sometimes essentially and notionally and personally simultaneously: as when it is said, the Father and the Son send, or give the Holy Spirit. For there in the connoted effect essential charity is understood, and in the notion of mission notional, and in the gift itself which is given personal charity is understood. And the Master takes it in this last way here.

Therefore, it must be said to the first that although by the connoted effect essential charity is understood, yet not only the effect is there: indeed in that effect which is appropriable to the Holy Spirit, the Holy Spirit is understood to be sent: and thus notional with that, and personal is understood: whence essential is understood in such in the direct, and notional, and personal in the oblique: and this will be more clearly declared below when it will be disputed about mission.

To the other it must be said, that there is one operation of the three: but the appropriation of that operation does not equally belong to the three, but sometimes the operation is appropriable to one person, but separable from the mission of that person: as political virtue or the goodness of gratuitous grace is appropriable to the Holy Spirit, yet the Holy Spirit is not necessarily sent in the conferring of this grace. However, sometimes the operation of the three persons is appropriable to one among the persons, and inseparable from the mission of one person: as created charity given to the rational creature, which is appropriable to the Holy Spirit, and inseparable from the mission of the Holy Spirit in him to whom the gift of charity is conferred: and then by reason of appropriation and inseparability in such the notional and personal is understood in the essential.

To the other it must be said that Dionysius defines love universally, not as it is of this or that. But universally I say, as proceeding from the first good effecting in all beings something either to be or to live or to sense or to understand or something of natural or superadded good. And it returns into the source whence it emanated, reordering all beings to it according to the appetite of good, according to which we say, that good is what all things desire: and he

does not speak specifically of the love which is charity: yet even that love is appropriable to the Holy Spirit, although the mission of the Holy Spirit is separable from it.

But the solution of Augustine's difficulty is clear from what was said before.

Articulus 7 — Whether The Holy Spirit Proceeds From The Father Into The Son, And Is Reflected From The Son Into The Father, So That He Is The Love Of The Son For The Father, And Of The Father For The Son; And Whether This Is A True Locution: The Father And The Son Love Themselves By The Holy Spirit, And The Father Loves Himself By The Holy Spirit, And The Father And The Son Love Themselves With The Love Which Is The Holy Spirit

Whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father into the Son, and is reflected from the Son into the Father: so that it is the love of the Son for the Father, and of the Father for the Son: and whether this is a true expression, the Father and the Son love themselves with the Holy Spirit, and the Father loves himself with the Holy Spirit, and the Father and the Son love themselves with the love which is the Holy Spirit?

Then it is asked concerning what is said in the penultimate chapter F, concerning the word of Jerome: The Holy Spirit is neither the Father nor the Son, but the love which the Father has for the Son, and the Son for the Father, etc.

For it seems from this that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father into the Son, and does not rest there, but is reflected from the Son into the Father: and this seems false.

1. For whatever proceeds from someone into someone or something else, is either received by that into which it proceeds, or not. If it is received; therefore it seems that the Son receives the Holy Spirit from the Father: and this implies a need for the Spirit to be in the Son, which is absurd.
2. Furthermore, either the Son receives what he has, or what he does not have. If what he has: therefore the reception is of what is had, which is not intelligible. If perhaps you say that he does not have it in this way: therefore a variation is posited concerning the Son: because he is in a different way by receiving what he has from the Father, than he was before he had it, or than by not receiving it: and this is heretical.
3. Furthermore, it is asked concerning the converse when it is said that it is the love of the Son for the Father: therefore the Father also receives from the Son, either what he does not have, or what he does not have in this way as he receives: and this is absurd: therefore it seems the Holy Spirit is not the love of the Father for the Son, and of the Son for the Father.

Alongside this, it is further asked concerning the ancient question, when it is said, the Father and the Son love themselves with the Holy Spirit, whether this is a true expression, and in what relation the ablative is constructed with the verb?

1. But it seems false: because this is false, the Father is wise with the wisdom which he begot: therefore by a similar reasoning this is false, the Father and the Son love themselves with the love which proceeds from them: but this is the Holy Spirit: therefore this is false, the Father and the Son love themselves with the Holy Spirit.
2. Likewise, in divine matters there is no other loving than being: therefore if the Father and the Son love themselves with the Holy Spirit, they are the Holy Spirit. And it is proven that the argument holds above, where the Master and also Augustine argue similarly, that the Father is not wise with the wisdom which he begot: because there is no other knowing than being: hence if he were wise with the wisdom which he begot, he would also be the wisdom which he begot.
3. Likewise, let us suppose, by impossibility, that the Holy Spirit does not exist, it will still be true that the Father and the Son love themselves with some love, which is the truest love: therefore it seems that they do not love themselves with the Holy Spirit: because with the Holy Spirit posited, that love is not taken away from them.
4. Likewise, it is objected more strongly thus: Whatever has equal opposition to two, is not referred to them, except as to opposites relatively. The Holy Spirit has such an opposition of relation to the Father and the Son insofar as they are one principle of the Holy Spirit: therefore it is not referred to them, except as one of the relatives to the other opposite: therefore it is not referred to them, as the form of love uniting and connecting them.
5. Likewise, one of the relatives cannot be understood to be the form disposing the other: therefore since the Holy Spirit is relative to the Father and the Son, the intellect does not even grasp that it can be the form uniting and connecting the Father and the Son: but such a form or quasi-form is implied in the word loving: therefore the expression is simply false.
6. Likewise, nothing is the same principle of opposition and of union or connection: the procession of the Holy Spirit is the principle of relative opposition: therefore it cannot be the principle as a form uniting or connecting.

Furthermore, it is asked: 1. When it is said, the Father and the Son love themselves with the Holy Spirit, what kind of act does the word love signify? For it either signifies an essential act, or a notional act. If essential: then it follows that they are the Holy Spirit: because according to this, being is the same as loving there: but this is false: therefore it does not signify an essential act. But if it signifies a notional act. On the contrary: According to this, in its place could be put a verb that denotes that act, and according to this we could say, the Father and the Son

breathe with the Holy Spirit: but this is false, because they do not breathe with the Holy Spirit, but rather the Holy Spirit.

1. Furthermore, if it signifies a notion: either the notion by which the Father and the Son are distinguished from each other, or that in which they are one. If in the first way: then it would signify paternity or filiation, which is clearly false. But if in the second way it signifies a notion: then it seems that it signifies that notion which is a principle: therefore I can say, the Father and the Son originate the Holy Spirit with the Holy Spirit: and this again is false.

Furthermore, it is asked, why is this admitted, the Father and the Son love themselves with the Holy Spirit: but not this, they breathe with the Holy Spirit: since breathe and love signify the same notion?

Furthermore, it is asked concerning the relation of the pronoun to the verb: for it seems to be reciprocal, or retransitive. If it is reciprocal, then the love which is implied in the act of loving is noted to pass into the same from which it proceeded: for the sense is, the Father loves himself with the Holy Spirit, and the Son loves himself with the Holy Spirit.

But on the contrary: A verb denoting a notion, denotes it in the reason of distinction to the person in which the opposite notion is: therefore there should not be a transition of the act from the same to the same, but rather the distinct should be noted to proceed from the distinct. But if it is transitive so that the sense is, the Father and the Son love themselves with the Holy Spirit, that is, the Father loves the Son with the Holy Spirit, and the Son loves the Father with the Holy Spirit, as the authority of Jerome suggests. On the contrary, because according to this it is noted that the Son has an act of love from the Holy Spirit towards the Father, and conversely the Father towards the Son: therefore the Holy Spirit does not have from them, but rather they from him.

Alongside this, it is further asked, whether this should be conceded, the Father loves himself with the Holy Spirit, and the Son loves himself with the Holy Spirit?

But it seems not: because the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, and one not without the other: therefore when they are signified separately, they are signified as multiple principles, and not as one: therefore this is false, the Father loves himself with the Holy Spirit.

But on the contrary: For if the Father cannot love himself with the Holy Spirit: either this is because he is unable to breathe the Holy Spirit without a helper, or because he does not wish to, and both are absurd: therefore this is true, the Father loves himself with the Holy Spirit: and similarly this, the Son loves himself with the Holy Spirit.

Further, it is asked concerning the relation of the ablative to the verb: for it cannot be constructed in the reason of an efficient cause: because the Holy Spirit is not the efficient cause, that the Father and the Son love themselves.

If perhaps you say that in divine matters there is no cause, but a principle. On the contrary: But this is false, the Holy Spirit is the principle of that which the Father and the Son love themselves: therefore neither in the reason of a cause, nor in the reason of a principle can that ablative be constructed. Nor is it constructed in the reason of matter: because the Holy Spirit is not the matter concerning which alone is love, nor in which alone, nor from which, nor even a material disposition: therefore since matter is not taken in multiple ways, it seems that it is not constructed in the reason of material cause. Nor can it be constructed in the reason of final principle: because the Father and the Son do not love themselves for the sake of the Holy Spirit, but for their own sake. Furthermore, the end moves: and according to this the sense would be that the Holy Spirit moves the intention of the Father and the Son to love themselves: which again is false, because thus the Holy Spirit according to reason would be before the love which is implied in the verb, just as the end in intention is before the work of the efficient. Nor does it seem that it could be constructed in the reason of formal cause: because form is the disposition of the agent to the act: therefore the sense would be that the Holy Spirit is the form disposing the Father and the Son to love themselves: and according to this the Father and the Son would have from the Holy Spirit as from a form, that they love each other: which is absurd: because they do not have from him, but he has all that he has from them.

Because of these and similar things, Master Simon of Tournai says that that ablative is not constructed in the relation of any cause, but is placed in the designation of a sign: and therefore this is the sense, the Father and the Son love themselves with the Holy Spirit, that is, the Holy Spirit, one in person spirated commonly from the Father and the Son, is a sign that the Father and the Son love themselves.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. According to this, the divisions which Jerome posits would not be true, namely, the Father loves the Son with the Holy Spirit, and the Son loves the Father with the Holy Spirit: because the Holy Spirit is not a necessary sign that the Father loves the Son, and conversely: because without this it can be understood that the Father loves the Son.

1. Furthermore, a sign is a sign to someone who knows by that sign: but it was not necessary for the Father and the Son to make a sign of their love to themselves: therefore this sign will be with respect to the created: therefore if we suppose no created thing exists, then this will be false or nugatory, the Father and the Son love themselves with the Holy Spirit.
2. Furthermore, the begotten wisdom and created wisdom is a sign that the Father is wise: therefore it seems that the Father is wise with the begotten or created wisdom.
3. Likewise, created love is a sign that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit love themselves: therefore it seems that according to this we can say that the Father and the Son love themselves with created love: because created love is a sign that they love themselves.

Likewise, it is asked alongside this if this is conceded, the Father and the Son love themselves with the love which is the Holy Spirit, and which is more proper?

Solution. It must be said without prejudice to the first, preserving Jerome, that the Holy Spirit is the love by which the Father and the Son love themselves: but to understand how such expressions are true, and how they are denied by some and conceded by others, it must be noted beforehand that when it is said, the Father and the Son love themselves with the Holy Spirit, the verb love is notional, and implies the active procession of the Holy Spirit, and moreover implies the mode of his procession: just as the verb is begotten, not only says the procession of the Son from the Father, but also says the mode of the procession of the Son. But because the mode of the procession of the Holy Spirit is that he proceeds as love: therefore it says the mode in the principal signification, but says the procession consequently according to the intellect. However, some attending only to the procession signified in the verb, denied this, the Father and the Son love themselves with the Holy Spirit, because of the objections made: and they said that Augustine retracted it in its similar, namely when he retracted this, the Father is wise with the begotten wisdom. But because it is not the custom of Augustine, unless he makes mention specifically of this, therefore it must be said otherwise, because when it is said, the Father and the Son love themselves with the Holy Spirit, the ablative has a double relation to the verb, according to which there are two in the verb: for there is in it active procession, and to this the ablative cannot be in the relation of any cause: but it will be as in the reason of principle or sign, as Tournai says. But because this is not the principal signification in the verb, but rather the mode of procession: therefore the ablative can be in the reason of a quasi-formal cause to the verb: as some others said. How the ablative should be understood in the reason of a quasi-formal cause is explained below: and thus consequently to the end of the doubts.

To what is first objected, it must be said that from that expression it is not taken that the Son receives the Holy Spirit from the Father as not had: but rather receives from him that the Holy Spirit proceeds from him: because this is the Father loving the Son with the Holy Spirit, the Son receiving from him that love proceeds from him in which they are united and concord. But when it is said, the Son loves the Father with the Holy Spirit, there is no other sense, except that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, in which he is united with the Father: and therefore it is clear that from the false understanding of the verb those arguments proceed.

To what is further asked concerning this, the Father loves the Son with the Holy Spirit, and the Father and the Son love themselves with the Holy Spirit, I say without prejudice that all are true.

To what is objected against, it must be said that it is not similar concerning wisdom and love, as we said above: because wisdom says a comparison to the wise only: but love says as from the lover, and thus it is more fitting to the distinct person, and moreover loving implies a notional act, since it says an act preceding and passing from the lover: knowing, however, does not say this: rather it passes to the wise than from him, and is more receiving than giving or acting.

To the other it must be said that if the Holy Spirit is supposed not to be, there will be in divine matters only loving said essentially: and this loving is where the Father and the Son are one according to essence: and therefore from that it does not follow that the person is: but

then there will not be complete perfection in divine matters, since the communication of the divine nature by the mode of love is lacking: for if there are no persons, some perfection will be lacking in God, namely the communication of nature, not that one person needs another, but because the power of nature is not demonstrated in communicability unless there are multiple hypostases in it, as will be proven below.

To the other it must be said that the Holy Spirit says two things, namely being from another, and the mode by which he is from another: and as to this that he is being from another, he implies only relative opposition: but as to the mode which he adds, he says connection: and this is not inconvenient, as is found in many relatives, as here: the genus and species themselves, which as to relation are opposed, yet if what is genus is considered, it is part of the species, and is rather a principle of agreement than of difference and opposition.

To the other it must be said that it is true as the relative is taken in the reason of its opposition: but if something is added to the relative for the sake of which it is not opposed, it can be unitive and quasi-formal, as is seen when I say, formal cause: for if I attend to the reason of causality and the reason of the caused, they are opposed, and one is not the form of the other: but if I attend to the reason of the form which the formal cause places above the intention of causality, it is that which is the unitive relative, and the form of its correlative which is the caused.

To the other the same solution applies, that on the part where it is the principle of opposition, it is not the principle of connection and form.

To the other it must be said that this verb love says a notion, yet in a different way than this verb breathe: because breathe does not say anything but the act of procession absolutely and in itself, and for the sake of that act the verb cannot be determined by the ablative, except as Tournai said, in the designation of a sign: but in this sense the Saints did not write this authority: but love adds over the act of procession the mode of proceeding by which the Holy Spirit as love and as gift proceeded or proceeds: and therefore since here there is a certain form, as will be clear later, it receives the determination of the ablative in the relation of a quasi-form of some kind.

To the other it must be said that principle, even if it says the same notion, yet it says only as the act of procession from which, and does not specify the mode, as love does.

To the other the solution is already clear from what has been said.

To what is asked concerning the pronoun, it must be said that in my judgment both are true, namely that it is reciprocal, and noting retransition. And if it is said to be reciprocal, to the argument made the response has already been given. because love does not say only the act of distinction and procession, but also adds the mode, and that agrees with the form or quasi-form which is in it in some way from which it is: and this will be clear at the end where the objections concerning the relation of the ablative are solved. But if it is retransitive: then again it is true, as Jerome says. And it has been solved above what is objected, that from this it does not follow that the Father receives something, or that the Son needs something, but that from them is the love by which they concord inasmuch as they are distinct persons.

Indeed, I concede that the Father loves himself with the Holy Spirit under this sense which I place in the verb thus, From the Father is the Holy Spirit by the mode of love, which love

The personal unity itself and binds to those things which it loves as if a certain form.

To that which is further inquired concerning the relation of the ablative, it must be said that by considering the mode of the notional act which is implied in the verb, the ablative is constructed with the verb in the relation as if of a form. But there is a twofold form, namely according to being, and according to well-being. In the notion of form according to being, the ablative is not constructed with the verb. However, the form according to well-being is still taken in two ways, namely absolutely which rests in that of which it is the form, and regarding another proceeding from that of which it is the form: just as when I say, "he is wise with wisdom," the ablative indicates a form resting in that of which it is the form, and not in the notion of proceeding from the wise one, as was said before. But when I say, "these love themselves with friendship," friendship is the form, and the form depends on the verb to the verb. But this form encloses three things in itself, namely that it is proceeding from those who love themselves, and that it is not in them absolutely, and that friendship is as if a medium binding. Similarly, according to the notion of understanding, it is taken in divine matters, when it is said, "the Father and the Son love themselves with the Holy Spirit," the Holy Spirit is not taken there as the Holy Spirit, that is, according to which it is only a person in itself one and distinct from others, according to what is signified in this name, Holy Spirit: but it is taken as the bond and love: and therefore it is as if a form proceeding from both loving, and in respect of both loving, because they love each other: and it is in itself the bond of both.

To what is further inquired concerning the position of Master Simon, it must be said that it can be sustained, if "they love" says nothing but the act of spirating: and then it is taken in aptitude with respect to the spirated person.

To that which is further inquired, Whether the Father and the Son love themselves with the love which is the Holy Spirit, it must be said that this is true, and more proper than that, "the Father and the Son love themselves with the Holy Spirit."

Articulus 8 — Whether The Holy Spirit Is The Unity Of The Father And The Son, And How The Holiness Of Each

Whether the Holy Spirit is the unity of the Father and the Son, and in what manner the sanctity of both?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said:

For whether it is the unity of both, or sanctity, or charity, etc.

For it is understood either of the unity of essence, or of person. It is evident that it is not of essence: because although the Holy Spirit is essence, yet He is not either of the two, as Augustine says here: but the unity of essence is both of them. If, however, it is the unity of person. On the contrary: the Father and the Son are not one person: therefore the Holy Spirit is not the unity of their person.

If perhaps it is said that it is the unity of notion. On the contrary: That notion will be only the common active spiration: but the Holy Spirit is not that notion: therefore it seems that in no way is He the unity of the Father and the Son.

Further it is inquired, In what manner is the sanctity of the two said? For in what manner it is charity, has already been established.

Solution. The unity is personal, which person is the Holy Spirit, not as the Holy Spirit, but as love: and let the unity be understood as a form with respect to this act which is in any way living by the union of consent and love, which union proceeds from the united, and is neither of the united, as two stones are sometimes united by some moisture proceeding from both: although that example does not suit so great a matter. Hence also, just as in physics it does not follow that everything which has the act of one makes simply one, and everything which has the act of form is simply the form of that in which it is: thus it seems to me truly to be said of the Holy Spirit as He is signified by personal love: for He is the unity of the Father and the Son, not that He is indistinct and one with the Father and the Son personally: but because He unites them in that they are distinct persons, in the consent of love: and thus also when it is said, the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Spirit, it has the act of a certain form: just as friendship or love is a form: yet not in such a way that He disposes the Father and the Son as a form the formed, but because He unites, and to unite is the act of form: and thus it is clear that it does not follow that the Father and the Son are made one person in Him: but it follows that they agree, and He is their concord.

To this which is inquired, In what manner is sanctity said? It must be said that this has according to another name of His which is spirit: because spirit is free from material impurities and obscurities: and therefore He who is the spirit of others by appropriation, is called the purity of both and sanctity.

Articulus 9 — Whether The Holy Spirit Can Be Called The Middle Person

Whether the Holy Spirit can be called the middle person?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said:

It is manifest that not any of the two is that by which each is joined.

1. For from this it seems that the Holy Spirit is the middle person in the Trinity: which is against the order of the Church which thus pronounces, Glory to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Spirit.
2. Likewise, according to the order of nature, a principle not from a principle is before a principle from a principle, and a principle from a principle is before not a principle with respect to the person from a principle which is a person or persons: but the Father is a principle not from a principle, the Son however is a principle from a principle, the Holy Spirit however is not a principle with respect to any person, but from a principle: therefore it seems not to be a middle joining, but rather the last originated.

If perhaps you say, that the Spirit as it is love is the middle, as it is the Holy Spirit it is the third. On the contrary: As it is love, it proceeds from both, but that which proceeds from both according to the order of nature is posterior to both: therefore that solution is not true.

To this without prejudice it ought to be responded, that no order which is simply order, is among the persons: for the order of nature is not simply order: which is evident, because every order posits prior and posterior according to some mode: but when the order of nature is defined, it is defined by the negation of prior and posterior thus: The order of nature is that by which one is from another, not by which one is prior to another; which however without prior and posterior is in the divine, cannot be enunciated without prior and posterior: and therefore in the enunciation of the persons one is placed before another, so that the order of nature may be signified: and through this the solution to the two objections is evident.

According to the second which is asked, How then is the Holy Spirit both a middle and in some way the last? It must be said that according to the order of nature it is the third person: but because it proceeds as love, and the act of love is to unite and join, through this act it is called the middle.

To the first objection, it must be said that it is well conceded, that it proceeds from both, and many middles are, which however proceed from both extremes, especially among friends whose consensus of each tends into the other: and that middle has the act of living through the mode of concord: and it is customary to place something similar in the composition of a proposition, which because without the composed it is not understood, in some way it proceeds from the composed: and yet the middle joining is the composed itself: and although it is the middle in position, yet it is said to be the note of it that it is the third adjacent, but yet it is not entirely similar.

Articulus 10 — How The Father And The Son Are United In A Twofold Way

How are the Father and the Son united in two ways?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says:

And they are not by participation of something, but by their essence: nor by the gift of a superior, etc.

From this indeed it seems that essence proceeds from essence: but whatever proceeds is distinguished: therefore essence is distinguished from essence or from person, both of which are disproved above.

Soturio. Augustine intends to say that the Father and the Son are united in two ways in essence, which is not participative in them: but each is the whole essence, and the essence is the whole Father and the whole Son: for that is had participatively which is had according to a part of its essence, or according to a part of its power, as animal from man, because it is not had according to its whole power, because its power is to be predicated of many and to be in them. Similarly, man from man is had participatively: and briefly speaking, anything superior from its inferior: because the superior is particularized and contracted in the inferior. But in this way essence is not particularized nor contracted in the Father and the Son: but because

the Father and the Son are not only one in essence, but also in that they are distinct persons they have a commonality proceeding from them in that they are persons, thus also they agree in the gift of their love, which neither of them is. Nor does nature permit, nor does intellect grasp, that what proceeds from a distinct person is the same in person with that from which it proceeds: yet it has the reason of uniting by the mode of distinct from the united as love and friendship, as was said above: and this is what he says, that by their gift they maintain unity as in the bond of peace.

Articulus 11 — Whether The Holy Spirit Is Something Common To The Father And The Son

Whether the Holy Spirit is something common to the Father and the Son?

Then it is asked concerning this which says:

The Holy Spirit is something common, etc.

In what manner is it common?

Response. In two ways, namely according to the notion of principle, because it is from both: and according to the notion of mediator, and the act of love and form, because it joins and unites: but dissimilarity is posited to the friendship of inferiors: because that which unites two friends is not a substance, nor a hypostasis distinct from them participating in such a nature of man with them: but in divine things, on account of perfection, it is a distinct hypostasis, and is a supposit of the same nature: whence just as the word there has the proper act of the word, and yet is a hypostasis: so love there has the proper act of love, and yet is a distinct hypostasis and one person in the Trinity: and this is intended.

Articulus 12 — Whether There Can Be More Divine Persons Than Three

Whether there can be more divine persons than three?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says:

Therefore there are three, and no more, etc.

And here is the question, Whether there can be divine persons more than three? And secondly, Whether it is necessary that there be these three, and not others?

However, it seems that there can be more, and there ought to be.

1. For Boethius says that essence contains unity, but relation multiplies the Trinity: but relation is not without the extremes of relation: therefore according to what the number of relations requires, there will be a multitude of persons: since therefore one relation seeks two extremes, two relations will require four extremes, and thus there will be four persons, and not two.
2. Likewise, Behold from another, and not being from another suffice in the genus for the distinctions of persons, or it is necessary to add the species: if they suffice in the genus: therefore since there are only two, namely being from another, and not being from

another, it seems that there are only two persons. But if it is necessary to add the mode in species, it seems that many persons are made. For just as there is being from another through generation, so there is being from another through spiration, and from another through the communication of life, and so concerning other divine attributes: therefore according to this already there will be many persons.

3. Furthermore, Just as we have one person according to being from another through generation, and one according to being from another through spiration: so it seems that we ought to have one according to not being from another through generation, and another according to not being from him through spiration: therefore already we have at least four, two according to not being from another, and two according to being from another.

4. Likewise, In the genus I see that these differ: not being from another, not being from another from whom another, not being from another from whom none, not being from another from whom others in diverse modes of procession, not being from another from whom others in one mode of procession. Therefore it seems that we ought to have five persons, who are not from another. Similarly, it is easy to find many modes according to being from another: therefore it seems that we ought to have very many persons.

5. Likewise, On the contrary, it seems that there are only two: for no relation multiplies the Trinity except the relation of origin: but that is constituted by one simple act, which is generation: therefore there ought not to be persons, as it seems, except determined by generation: but those are only the begetter and the begotten. Therefore it seems that there ought not to be divine persons except the Father and the Son.

6. Likewise, There are objections similar to those which we noted above concerning the Son. Either the Holy Spirit has spirative power, or not. If so: therefore he spirates another spirit, or the power in him would be idle, and that another, and so on to infinity. Similarly, either this power fails in the Son and the Father, the Holy Spirit having already been spirated, or not. If not, it will be in vain, or they will spirate many other spirits. If it fails: therefore they have changed and have become impotent to effect what they could once effect. Concerning the generation of the Son, it has been explained above.

But because all infidels chatter against the faith concerning the number of persons, let us propose effective reasons to prove, as much as human ingenuity can, that the number is sufficient to be three.

Unity either according to genus, or according to species. Not according to genus: because in the genus nothing is referred, and nothing is in the genus that is not with some species: therefore it distinguishes according to species: and let it be supposed here that relation is of origin, and not another, because this will necessarily be proved below: since therefore being from another and not being from another are relations in the genus, they do not distinguish the Trinity: therefore it is necessary to add upon being from another, and not being from another: and let us inquire by what added this can be specified? For if I say thus, not being from another through generation, negation does not specify unless it is understood to be from

another in a mode other than through generation: but in that which is in no way from another, it does not specify if it says part of the community which is in negation in the genus: for that which is in no way from another, is not from another through generation, but it is not converted: therefore not being from another through generation is part of that which is not being from another simply, and thus it does not posit anything upon it: therefore it is necessary, that it be determined on the part after by affirmation thus, who is not from another from whom another. Then indeed something affirmative is added: but since this is still in the genus, it does not specify: therefore it is necessary further to specify thus, who is not from another from whom another in this mode or that, which determines origin in the species of person, just as through generation, or spiration.

Now I will show that there cannot be except these two specifying modes.

1. In the simple divine spiritual nature there is nothing to understand on the part of what is, except nature, and intellect, and will: but nature is indivisible, and this has been proved above: therefore if it were to be multiplied, this would be on the part of intellect and will. The intellect says itself, and says another: but when it says another, that is outside its essence: and therefore it cannot be a hypostasis: because every hypostasis is within the nature of which it is a hypostasis: therefore by saying itself, it says that which is within the nature: but the said is distinct from the sayer: therefore there is there a distinction in hypostasis, and one in nature: and it has been shown above, that to say for the highest spirit is to generate: therefore we have one mode which produces two persons, namely the begetter and the begotten: and that mode has been proved above: and it has been proved there that there cannot be except one begetter, and one begotten. On the part of communication through will, that which proceeds already remaining within the nature of that from which it proceeds, is nothing but love: and since it does not have diverse opposition to the Father and the Son, it is necessary to proceed from both, as will be proved in the following distinction. Since however in the divine there is not a multitude of properties through matter, but only species, there cannot be love of love, or another love, just as it has been proved above that there cannot be a Son: therefore there cannot be except three persons.
2. Likewise, In the image the word does not produce a word, nor does the sayer say another word than one: nor does love another love, nor word: because it is the love of the word, not that the word is said or begotten by love: but thus it will also be in the divine: therefore there are only three persons.
3. Likewise, Nothing is manifested except in two distinct modes, namely by the mode of true word and by the mode of good: for if nature is manifested, the mode of manifestation is not distinct: therefore since the Father who is the principle not from a principle, manifests himself in the procession of persons, he will not manifest himself except in these two modes: but good is after true, and thus the Holy Spirit will be from the Son to whom true is fitting.

4. Likewise, Perfect joy is in three, not in two: for two are not united except by nature and natural things, and this does not complete perfect joy unless they are also united in that which is one in them distinct, as is love or friendship: therefore since that in the divine cannot be except perfect, there will be a person in the divine, and thus there will be three persons.

Solution. We say that there are only three persons.

To all things, however, which are objected to the contrary, it must be said that according to being from another, and not being from another, no person is taken unless more is added: just as the objection made also proves. Hence three things must be considered in that which makes a person, namely that it is a property in a determined species, and that it is a property of origin, and that it has relative opposition to everything from which it is distinguished: hence since not being from another is not a property determined in species, and similarly being from another, no distinction is taken according to those. But not being from another from whom another through generation, and not being from another from whom another through spiration, are indeed properties determined in species, but they do not have opposition: and therefore they do not constitute diverse persons, but only one. Similarly being from another when it is in the genus, makes none: but being from another through generation, and being from another through spiration, do not have opposition among themselves and therefore necessarily belong to one person just as the preceding: or it is necessary that some opposition be sought between them: and this is the opposition, that being from another through spiration says being from the Father and the Son, and therefore being from another through generation, and being from another through spiration, do not belong to one.

And from this the solution to all objections that were objected concerning relations, and concerning what is being from another, and not being from another, is clear: for it is necessary that each relation posits two extremes that are diverse persons: because one relation does not have one opposition to another: and therefore two respects can belong to the same.

From what is objected concerning the power of spirating, it has been solved above in its similar concerning the generation of the Son: because if another were spirated, it has been shown that it would have no difference to this one, and thus it would not make a number.

Articulus 13 — How This Name Spirit Specially Suits The Holy Spirit, And How Holy Is Said

How this name Spirit specially pertains to the Holy Spirit, and how it is called holy?

How this name Spirit specially pertains to the Holy Spirit, and how it is called holy?

Then it is asked concerning what is contained in the last chapter there, "Here it is to be noted, that the Holy Spirit," etc.

And it is asked concerning this name which is the Holy Spirit, how it specially pertains to the Holy Spirit?

For Spirit is accustomed to be put in Sacred Scripture for the principle of life, as in John 6:64: "It is the Spirit that gives life; the flesh profits nothing." And in Genesis 1:2: "The Spirit of God moved over the waters," because in the waters first appeared the soul of life.

Since therefore there is one life of the three, Spirit ought not properly to be referred to one person.

If perhaps it is said that it is called from spirituality, this again is nothing, because this properly pertains to the divine nature. If it is said that Spirit is called from breathing, this again is nothing, because to breathe pertains to all.

Solution. It must be said without prejudice, that it is called from breathing; but to breathe is said from emitting spirit: for spirit is from the innermost affections, whence the emission of love is the emission of spirit: both because the warm makes to breathe, and love is the divine fire which makes the affection to breathe: and also because men agreeing conspire in a kiss in which there is the conjunction of the breathing mouth to the breathing mouth, so that the conjunction of spirits inwardly may be noted. In this way, since the truest conjunction is between the Father and the Son in the Spirit, the conjunction itself is called spirit. Holy, however, is added, because it signifies sincerity towards the act of breathing. For there are certain names which, said absolutely, denote general habits, like good, holy, and the like: and joined with others ordered to some act, they denote goodness towards that act, as when it is said good-citharist, and the like. Thus it is called Holy Spirit on account of the purity of holiness and immateriality of conspiring love in the Father and the Son: and because it proceeds as love: therefore it has congruence from the name which is Holy Spirit.

And through this the solution to the objections is easily apparent.

DISTINCTIO XI

Divisio Textus

Here it must be said that the Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son, etc.

Here begins that part in which it is discussed concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit by comparison to the terminus from which, or to the principle from which it proceeds. And it is divided into two parts: in the first of which he proves that it proceeds from both the Father and the Son.

In the second, however, he proves that it does not proceed more fully from one than from the other, and this begins in distinction XII, there, A, It is asked, Since the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, etc.

This distinction, which contains the first part, is divided into four parts: in the first of which he shows that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. In the second, he presents the oppositions of the Greeks to the contrary, there, B, The Greeks, however, say the Spirit In the third, he resolves, there, C, etc. We In

however determine those words thus. The fourth and last reduces the confession of the Greeks to ours, there, D, It must be known, however, that the Greeks confess, etc.

The text, however, is clear by itself.

Articulus 1 — What It Is To Proceed

What is to proceed?

Before the Letter, five things are to be inquired: of which the first is, What is to proceed?

Second, Whether to proceed according to one reason is fitting for each person proceeding, and in how many ways it happens that procession occurs in the divine?

Third, Whether the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son insofar as they are one, or insofar as they are many?

Fourth, If it proceeds from them insofar as they are one, whether the uniting is essence or notion or person?

Fifth and last, concerning the spirative power, how it is in the Father and the Son, and whether it is one in the three?

To the first, it is proceeded thus: 1. To proceed signifies the exit of something from something: therefore, if there is procession in the divine, there will be an exit from something there. But on the contrary: Of those not distant by identity, there is no recession from one another: the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are not distant by identity of nature: therefore, there is no recession of them from one another: but every procession is a certain recession: therefore, procession is not fitting in the divine.

1. Furthermore, Procession is taken from a processive motion: but that motion is caused by need, as the Philosophers say, therefore it seems that it is not fitting for the divine.
2. Likewise, Every procession is from something into another: but no person is thus from something that it is into another, but rather that it is in itself: therefore, procession is not fitting for the divine.
3. Furthermore, The motion of procession is enclosed in a certain circle, as the Philosopher says: for desire is first moved by the desirable, and afterwards the desirer is joined to the desirable by processive motion: and thus the circle is enclosed in the external thing, because the desirable is the first mover from which is the motion, and into which the processive motion ultimately returns.
4. Likewise, Desire moves into the thing, and having been accepted, it returns into itself, and thus the circle is enclosed in the desirer: can I say that procession is taken in the divine by the likeness of that motion? For it seems so by Trismegistus who says that the monad generates the monad, and reflects the ardor into itself.
5. Likewise, By Dionysius in the book On the Divine Names, where he thus says: Sometimes indeed the words say love and affection, sometimes the lovable and the beloved.

For of this indeed is the cause, and as an emitter, and as a progenitor: but he himself is, and this indeed is moved: but that moves, or because he is of himself, and to himself he is inductive and motive. The sense is that God the Father is the cause and principle of love and affection, and is the ultimate beloved and loved, and moves by love, and is moved as beloved: therefore, it seems that he leads himself in love as to himself and into himself: therefore, there is there as it were a circular procession.

6. Likewise, This seems by the authority of Jerome in the preceding distinction, which says that the Holy Spirit is the love by which the Father loves the Son, and the Son the Father. But if this is conceded: On the contrary: because according to this something the Father receives from the Son: therefore, it seems that the Spirit does not have a procession which is in the divine from the Son into the Father.

7. Likewise, Gratuitous love proceeds from liberality alone, as Richard of Saint Victor says: but due love more from the debt of justice: since therefore the Father owes nothing to the Son, but all things the Son to the Father, it seems that the Son does not exhibit gratuitous love to the Father: but this is the Holy Spirit: therefore, there is no procession from the Son into the Father. But if anyone would wish to say this, it follows from this that the Son does not love the Father with gratuitous love, and that he does not love him with the Holy Spirit: all of which are against the authorities of the Saints.

8. Furthermore, In circular motion one is the principle from which the motion, like the right: but another is from which the return, but not from which the motion, because there is no motion except from the right. Thus it seems to be in this procession: for that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, this he has from the Father, and thus it seems still to save the likeness of processive motion.

9. If perhaps you say, as some have said, that there is not there a likeness of procession to local processive motion, because the Son is not as to whom as to the terminus the Holy Spirit proceeds, so that there is a likeness of procession in straight motion: nor is the Son as through whom he returns into the Father, because thus the Son would have a deficient power to breathe the Spirit, as the left is deficient with respect to the right: but there is there procession as the caused proceeds from the cause. If, I say, it is thus said, all things seem false which were above determined concerning the exit as nexus and as unity and as conjunction of both: for the caused does not join another with the cause: therefore, it seems that it still returns that there is a circular exit, as in processive motion love proceeds from the lover into the beloved and returns into the lover.

10. But on the contrary: Damascene: Therefore, we believe in one Holy Spirit God and life-giving proceeding from the Father, and resting in the Son. that it proceeds from the Father, and does not return: and thus it seems processive either to the likeness of the caused from the cause, or to the likeness of straight motion from one to another.

Likewise, the procession of the Holy Spirit is according to origin: because to proceed from another is to be from another: but according to origin, nothing proceeds except the caused from the cause: therefore, it seems that in this way it is taken in the divine.

Solution. It must be said that no likeness according to truth can demonstrate eternal procession, just as neither the generation of the Son: yet according to something, taken by a distant likeness, the reason of procession is taken from the procession of the caused, and according to another from the procession of processive motion. For the Holy Spirit proceeds by reason of the person distinct from the Father and the Son, as from one principle: and in this respect, the likeness is more taken from the procession of the caused from the cause, which by its procession exits from it and is distinguished from it: and in a certain way, the efficient cause, and the caused is the effect of the efficient cause. But according to what is attended to the mode of procession, because namely it proceeds as love: thus it has likeness to another which is in processive motion, as to love which moves in processive motion: for the lover in a certain way goes out into the beloved thing, and the beloved in returning love in a certain way returns, and the love itself is the medium going out from them. And in this respect, there is a likeness, although slight, to processive motion. But in this respect that the Holy Spirit is in the same essence with the Father and the Son, there is dissimilarity to the procession of the caused from the cause: because the caused of the efficient cause is not of the same essence with the cause. But in this respect that there is no procession distant by place and motion, there is dissimilarity to processive motion.

Therefore, it must be said to the first, that although there is no distinction there by nature and being, there is nevertheless a distinction there by local distance, a distinction (I say) of the person proceeding from those from whom it proceeds.

To the other, it must be said that procession, insofar as it is a movement to another place in which there is desire, indicates need: but there is a certain procession of self-communication, about which Dionysius says that the good proceeds into all participating in the good: and that procession happens from largesse, and that most fittingly pertains to the procession of persons, which does not show need, but communication of nature by the mode of love.

To the other, it must be said that the mode of procession on the part where it is local and needy, is from one into another: but the likeness is not taken from that, but rather as love proceeds from someone whom it unites with the one whom it loves: just as the love of appetite in the processive movement proceeds into the desired, and if the desired could love, conversely its love would proceed into the lover: but still this is not similar in all respects, unless one love proceeded from the lover and the beloved, and those two loved each other with that love.

To the other, it must be said that in truth the Father loves the Son with the love which is the Holy Spirit, and conversely the Son loves the Father with the love which is the Holy Spirit: yet it does not seem to be conceded that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father into the Son, and conversely: because when it is said, it proceeds into the Son or into the Father, by the preposition "in" the relation of the principle is not noted, but rather of the recipient. Hence, since the Father and the Son relate to the Holy Spirit as a principle, it is not conceded that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father into the Son, and less is it conceded conversely: and in this respect it does not have similarity with a circle in which the motion of procession is

enclosed: but in this respect that the power of spirating and the processive power of the Spirit is from the Father in the Son through generation: and this is referred to the Father: for by the denotation of authority in the Father, it has some similarity with a circle, although remote, as it is in all similar earthly things when they are referred to the divine.

To the other, it must be said that the Father reflects the ardor upon himself through the recognition of the authority of spirating, as has been said.

To the other, it must be said that Dionysius speaks there of essential love, which moves itself to the outpouring of gifts into rational nature, angelic and human, and even into all natural things, and moves them to be reordered into God: so that they may love either by natural appetite, or rationally, or by grace, or glory.

To the other, it must be said that the authority of Jerome does not intend that it proceeds from the Father into the Son, and conversely: but that it unites in some way not properly the Father and the Son: and about that mode of union it has been said.

To the other, it must be said that there is no debt in the divine: for debt sounds obligation: although in one person there is authority and principle to another, yet they are of one honor: and of equal dignity because of the unity of substance: and therefore the Son pours out gratuitous love, just as the Father does.

To the other, it must be said that with respect to this, that in the circular processive motion and also of the heavens there is right and left, the likeness is not taken: because this without doubt does not agree: because although the Son has from the Father that it proceeds from him, yet he is with the Father one principle of the Holy Spirit, so that in the Son the spirative power is in no way deficient.

To the other, it must be said, as was said above, that in part the procession of the caused has similarity, and in part it does not.

To what is lastly objected from Damascene, it must be said that he does not intend to say that the Spirit is not of the Son: because he says below that we say the Spirit is of the Son, but we do not say from the Son: and this is true that it is not from the Son as the author of spiration: and he wishes to say this by saying that it rests in the Son: because neither does the Son render the spiritual power, nor does he transfuse it into another who would breathe with the Father and the Son, just as he received the power of spirating from the Father. Yet there are those who simply say that Damascene here savored the opinion or error of the Greeks. Whatever, however, may be of this, the gloss we have placed is true: and thus it can be sustained especially since his sayings in the Sentences and by the Masters are very venerably received: and the Master in the Sentences says of him that the book is catholic, and that Pope Eugenius had it translated.

Articulus 2 — Whether Proceeding Belongs Univocally To The Son And To The Holy Spirit, And Why Procession Is Added To Spiration Rather Than To Generation

Whether to proceed univocally is fitting for the Son and the Holy Spirit, and why procession is more attributed to spiration than generation?

Secondly, it is asked, Whether to proceed by one reason is fitting for the Son and the Holy Spirit?

For the Son says of Himself, "I proceeded from God": and it is said of the Holy Spirit, "The Spirit proceeds from the Father": either therefore univocally, or equivocally. If univocally: then there is only one mode of procession in the divine, which is false, because the Son proceeds by generation, the Holy Spirit by spiration not by generation. But if equivocally: then they have nothing in common: and thus if one is from another, the other will not be from another, which is false.

Further, it is asked, Since to proceed is common to generation and spiration, why does spiration retain it more than generation? For it seems it ought to be the reverse: because to proceed by being born is to proceed by the procession of nature: but to proceed as love from consent does not seem to be to proceed except in a certain way: and thus it seems that the Son proceeds more properly than the Holy Spirit.

Solution. Some say that it is said univocally both in reason and in the name of the genus: and this reason is to go forth from others or from another personally. But this is nothing: because in the divine there is no reason of genus, or species, or of anything common as common, except of that which is common in reality and nature. Hence I say, that when it is said of the Son that He proceeds, the same is signified in the subject and predicate under another mode of signifying. Similarly, when it is said of the Holy Spirit that He proceeds. This mode of signifying is a certain intention of the commonality of procession to the act of procession of both the Son and the Holy Spirit, and in the reason of procession it has one reason.

To that which is objected against, it must be said that a different mode occurs because of another signification of generation, and of procession, and of spiration, and it ought not to be said that generation and procession are species and genus in the divine, and similarly neither spiration and procession.

To what is further asked, it must be said that generation according to intellect, although not according to reality, adds upon procession in which the reason of proceeding is signified, namely filiation: because it is of the Son to be born and generated. But the spiration of the Holy Spirit, I do not dare to say, adds nothing or less than the generation of the Son: but yet it is by the mode of love, and love according to its name does not sound in someone distinct like the Son: therefore it retains the name of procession, which indicates at least the distance of distinction. There are however those who say that spiration adds less to its procession than generation: because spiration according to its name does not indicate the substantial flow of person from person: and therefore it retains the name of the genus: just as the proper is said to be a convertible predicate: yet since there is a double convertible predicate, namely essential as definition, and accidental convertible, the accidental name of the proper retains: and thus it happens in many things.

Articulus 3 — Whether The Holy Spirit Proceeds From The Father And The Son Insofar As They Are One Or Many

Whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son insofar as they are one or multiple?

Thirdly, a difficult question is asked, namely, whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son insofar as they are one or one, or insofar as they are multiple?

It seems that He proceeds from them insofar as they are multiple.

1. For either the Father and the Son are one breathing the Holy Spirit, or multiple. If you say that they are multiple, on the contrary: to the plurality of supposits follows the plurality of acts even in divine matters: because it is not said, "I and the Father are one am," but it is said, "I and the Father are one are": but when it is said "breathing," the participle signifies an act: therefore it receives plurality from the plurality of supposits: but the Father and the Son are multiple supposits: therefore the Father and the Son are breathing, and not one breathing.

2. Likewise, active spiration is a property: therefore it does not belong to the essence to determine it, because no property determines the essence: therefore it belongs to the Father and the Son insofar as they are persons: however, the Father and the Son are not one person: therefore it belongs to them insofar as they are multiple: but they breathe insofar as they have the property of breathing: therefore they breathe the Spirit insofar as they are multiple, and not insofar as they are one.

3. Furthermore, when this word "one" is joined to personal or notional terms, it signifies the unity of person: but the Father and the Son are not one person: therefore they are not one something: but one breathing is one something by equivalence: therefore the Father and the Son are not breathing.

4. Likewise, two persons cannot be understood to be united in a personal act. Proof: Two persons cannot be understood to be united where they are diversified and distinguished: but in personal acts they are distinguished from each other: therefore two persons are not one in a personal act: but to breathe is a personal act: therefore the Father and the Son are not even one, much less one in any personal act.

5. If it were said that they are united like an aggregated power from multiple powers is united to an act, as in the pulling of a ship, and in the lifting of a stone - this is nothing: because according to this it would follow that neither of them could breathe by themselves, which is an absurd heresy: therefore it seems that they breathe it by themselves insofar as they are multiple.

6. Likewise, is not the Holy Spirit the love by which the Father loves the Son, and conversely the Son the Father? It is clear that it is so. But love is theirs insofar as they are distinct persons, because otherwise it would be essential love: therefore insofar as they are multiple: but this is to be the spirit of their love, which is to be love from them:

therefore He proceeds from them insofar as they are multiple, and not insofar as they are one.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Nothing one as a simple one is caused by two immediate to it according to one mode of causing, because otherwise the caused would be simpler than the cause, which cannot be: therefore neither in divine matters can this be by reason of principle: since therefore the Holy Spirit is one simple, He cannot proceed from two according to one principle reason, unless it were said that He is a principle as Father in one way, and as mother in another, which is absurd: because from this it would follow that the Spirit is begotten, and materially from one, and actively from another, and it would follow that He is from the mixed divinity of two, and it would follow that He came forth from potentiality to act, and many other absurdities: therefore such cannot be posited.

1. Likewise, in numbers it is so that a more composite number always follows a simpler one proceeding from it, as Dionysius says: After the monad the dyad, and after the dyad the triad, and so on with others. Therefore it seems that in divine matters one as one cannot be from two according to one principle reason, since this example cannot be found in creatures.
2. If you say that an example is found: because natural heat in the seed (as the Philosopher says) is one, and acts in triple power, namely of fire, and of heaven, and of soul: this is nothing: because that thus united does not produce a simple, but rather a composite: for that heat in the power of the element prepares the matter by attracting the homogeneous to itself, and separating the heterogeneous gross not apt for generation. In the power of heaven or stars it acts towards the specific form, and operations following the composition of the species. In the power of the soul it acts towards the influence of life. But the Holy Spirit is one simple, and to the same in Him is the principle of spiration of the Father and the Son: therefore it seems that this is not intelligible, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from two as they are two.

Solution. Without scruple of ambiguity it must be said that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, as they are one, and not as they are multiple: yet He proceeds from them as multiple. Hence, saying one, He proceeds from two, as two are one in breathing: and therefore it is necessary to respond to almost all the reasons induced both for one part and for the other.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that the Father and the Son are not one breathing because of the reason of the objection: yet they are one in breathing: because breathing says the act of supposits, and does not say so principally a comparison to the Spirit, or to the spirative power in the Father and the Son: but yet they are one principle: because principle names a notion according to comparison to the spirated and principled, and in comparison to the spirative power. Breathing, however, has no comparison except to the supposits of those who breathe: and because those are two, the Father and the Son are two breathing, not one: but one principle of spiration.

To the other it must be said that active spiration is a property, which does not determine the essence, but the persons of the Father and the Son. And to what is objected, that one property is not of two subjects, it must be said that this is true in those supposits which are divided from each other by essence and substance: for in those what is in one, the same in number is not in another: but to two supposits which are in no way diverse, except between them the opposition of relation, the same can be in insofar as they are not relatively opposed: but the Father and the Son are such supposits of divine nature, and according to which they are compared to the spirative power and to the Holy Spirit, they do not have relative opposition between themselves: therefore according to this they remain the same, and thus one in number will be, what in this comparison is in them: this, however, is the property of breathing: and thus they are one principle of breathing the Holy Spirit.

To the other it must be said that I concede that the Father and the Son are not one who is the principle, nor one breathing: because the "one" would be an adjective, or a substantive: and in either sense the expression would be false: because the "one" would always say the unity of the person breathing: but as it is said, they are one principle, or one in breathing.

To the other it must be said that in a personal act importing the reason of opposition and distinction of persons, one cannot be united to another according to the thing nor according to the intellect: as the Father and the Son are not united in generating: because generating says the reason of opposition between the Father and the Son: but in an act not importing the reason of opposition between them, of necessity they are united, since in all things they are the same except where the opposition of relation divides them.

To the other I well concede that they are not thus united: but as one in breathing.

To the other it must be said that although personal love is of those distinct, as was proven in the preceding distinction, yet it does not proceed from them as they are distinct: but as one, and therefore that objection is not valid.

To what is objected on the contrary, it must be said that in lower things to cause a composite it is necessary to construct a multiple mode of causing because one mode of causing would not produce except one: but in higher things there is not a cause, but a reason of principle, and the Father and the Son together do not make a composition of principle: rather because of their indivisibility, which is between them in all things in which they are not distinguished by the opposition of relation, there is in them one principle from which they breathe.

And by this also the solution to the following is clear: because namely the aggregation of the prior number with an added unity constitutes the subsequent, and the following is more composite than the preceding: but not so are the Father and the Son aggregated by something added, or they alone existing together constitute the Holy Spirit.

To the other it must be said that concerning natural heat it is not similar: because the simple is not that which consists of diverse powers. But the Father and the Son as one principle accepted do not make a composition: and therefore with one and the same and in the same way having and according to the same spirative power they breathe the Holy Spirit.

Articulus 4 — Whether The Father And The Son Are United Insofar As They Are The Principle Of The Holy Spirit, By Essence, Or By Notion, Or By Person

Whether the Father and the Son are united inasmuch as they are the principle of the Holy Spirit, through essence, or through notion, or through person?

Fourthly, it is asked whether the Father and the Son are united inasmuch as they are the principle of the Holy Spirit, through essence, or through notion, or through person?

It seems, however, that they are united in essence, because Anselm says that through the essence of the Father and the Son, the whole deity is in the Holy Spirit.

Likewise, it is ridiculous to believe that on account of the relation of the Father, the whole deity is in the Holy Spirit: therefore it seems that they breathe the Holy Spirit inasmuch as they are one in essence and nature.

Likewise, this seems because in divine things there are only three, namely essence, notion, and persons: but the persons are distinct, the notions indeed distinguish: therefore they do not unite: therefore if the persons are united by something, this will be essence: but the Father and the Son are the principle of the Holy Spirit as they are one: therefore it seems that this one is one of essence.

Likewise, to breathe is to give the divine essence to the Holy Spirit: therefore the procession of the Holy Spirit is substantial, because in proceeding it receives substance, just as the Son: therefore it seems that just as generation is an act of nature and substance, as Damascene says, so also to proceed: and thus it is reduced to the unity of the substance of the Father and the Son.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
1. The same unity of essence which is in the Father and the Son is also in the Holy Spirit: if therefore this unity in the Father and the Son is a sufficient cause of breathing the Holy Spirit, it will also be sufficient in the Holy Spirit that it breathes the Holy Spirit, which is false.

1. If perhaps you say that in the Holy Spirit the relation has opposition to breathing, and in the Father and the Son it has relation of opposition to being breathed, and the Father and the Son breathe through the unity of essence: the Holy Spirit, however, does not breathe through the unity of essence, but is breathed. On the contrary: According to this, the inconvenience returns which was disproved above, namely that the divine essence is distinguished in person, and thus the divine essence in one person is other than the divine essence in another person, and according to this also the properties determine the essence in person: all of which the Catholic faith rejects: therefore it does not seem that they breathe it through being one in essence.
2. If for this reason it is said that they breathe it through being one in the notion which is spiration. On the contrary: Notion is a property which according to the reason of understanding is principled from the act of breathing; for Augustine says that the Father is father because he begot: therefore both the Father and the Son are one principle because they breathed the Holy Spirit: therefore spiration is not the cause of breathing, but

rather caused by breathing. Furthermore, it follows what Anselm says is ridiculous, namely that relation or notion would be the cause that the whole divinity is in the Holy Spirit, nor can it be said that they breathe it inasmuch as they are one perfect.

Solution. It must be said without prejudice, that the Father and the Son breathe the Holy Spirit inasmuch as they are one in the spirative power: just as the Father generates the Son inasmuch as in him is the generative power, which is not in the Son nor in the Holy Spirit, as was proven above: but the unity of the spirative power encompasses the unity of essence, and the unity of notion, because it is a medium between person and essence according to the mode of understanding, as was proven above concerning the power of generating. And if it is asked, what is this spirative power? it will be determined in the following article of the question.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that Anselm speaks truly, that essence is the cause as in which as in a root is that power: but nevertheless essence alone is not a sufficient cause.

To what is objected against it, it must be said as above concerning the generative power, that although the essence of the three is one, yet the comparison of essence to notions and relations in the three is not the same: especially because power signifies essence in the powerful, and not in itself. I say, however, that there is not one comparison, because it is not compared to the same reason in the three.

To what is objected, that essence according to this is determined by property, it must be said that it is false: for it is not the same to compare essence to property by identity with this person or that which is to be determined: because to be determined is to be distinguished by property: but to compare to this is to show essence in this or that person as identical to it, and to cause natural operations in it as power is the cause.

To what is objected, that notion is after the act of breathing according to the reason of understanding, it must be said that in divine things it is not true: for it cannot act unless it is a distinct person: but it is not distinguished except by property: therefore the distinguishing and the distinguished, that is, person and property according to the reason of understanding are before the notional act: but in lower things in which relations are caused by motion and change, what is objected is true.

Articulus 5 — How The Spirative Power Is In The Father And The Son, And Whether It Is One In The Three, And How The Spirative Power And The Generative Power Differ

How the spirative power is in the Father and the Son, and whether it is one in the three, and how the spirative and generative power differ?

How the spirative power is in the Father and the Son, and whether it is one in the three, and how the spirative and generative power differ?

Fifthly and lastly, it is asked concerning the spirative power, how it is in the Father and the Son, and whether it is one in the three?

And it proceeds thus: 1. To breathe in lower things is said in two ways, namely, to emit a spiritual substance, in the way we say moisture breathes, because it is vaporized in the air: and in this way we are accustomed to call rare bodies spirit, like wind or air, as there according to the exposition of Chrysostom: "The Spirit breathes where it wills: and you hear its voice," etc. and there, according to the exposition of Basil in Hexaemeron: "The Spirit of God was moving over the waters"[77]; where spirit is called air according to Basil.

In another way, we say certain living things or all breathe, like those which have life or life support from the drawing of the spiritual substance which is air, directing and subtilizing it, inspiring and expiring in retained spirit, like those breathing and inspiring, like those which have lungs and a windpipe.

However, we say all breathe according to the spirit generated from the evaporation of moisture in nourishment to the heart or to the member which is in place of the heart, and there it is digested, so that natural, vital, and animal operations occur in it, according to how it is directed to different things: for according to nature, spirits arise from the heart, as humors from the liver. If therefore in the divine there is a spirative power, it seems it should be in some of these.

However, it seems that none is fitting. For the first is not fitting, since evaporation, whether corporeal or spiritual, is to a more subtle nature than the evaporating and breathing: but the Holy Spirit is not of a more subtle nature than the Father and the Son. The second also is not fitting: because thus the Holy Spirit would be something extrinsic coming to the Father and the Son, which was the heresy of a most impious Theodoric, who said the Spirit was an alien power from the Father and the Son: and this was also the heresy of Nestorius and Sabellius, who posited only one person in the divine, as there was one substance, and said the Spirit was the servant of all liberty of the Father and the Son, as an alien power supervening upon us serves us. The third again does not seem fitting: because that evaporation is from something extrinsic ingested into us through the operation of natural heat: but nothing of such things falls into God: therefore it seems that in God there is no spirative power.

1. Furthermore, that power would either be essence or person: if essence, it would belong to all: but if person, then it would be this person or that and not another, which again is false. If you say it is a notion, this is false: because notions are not separated from divine persons according to reality. Hence what is not in some person is not a notion: but whatever is in a person, it is itself: hence since it is not some person, it will not be in some person as a notion in it.

But if for this reason it is said that there is no spirative power in God. On the contrary: Whose is the act, his is the power: but the act of breathing is in God: therefore there is power in him for breathing.

Solution. We say that in truth the power of breathing is in the Father and the Son, and it is a medium between essence purely and person purely taken in every same way as the generative power is a medium. And if you ask, by what similitude? I say,

that to emit spirit there is in it a spirative power: for what in lower things is the attraction of spirit, this is from need for the cooling of the chest: but if from superabundance a man could emit his spirit, so that in it he would communicate the nature of a spiritual mind, this would be in some way similar: for thus it is in the Father and the Son that they agree not only in unity of essence, but also in the consent of spirit in will. Hence just as the Father communicates nature through generation, so also the Father and the Son communicate nature through the emission of such a spirit: and from this spirit which is a spiritual nature, the spirative power is said to be in the Father and the Son. However, I concede well that the similitude is not taken from corporeal spirits except very remotely: although some say that the similitude is taken from corporeal spirit: but I fear to say this, because according to this the spirit would metaphorically agree with the divine, and similarly the power of breathing in God would be said symbolically. Hence I believe better that it is said from the power of emitting the Spirit to whom the divine nature is communicated, as it is communicated through generation to the Son.

To what is asked, Whether it is essence or person? It must be said that whatever is in the divine is essence, because nothing is distinguished from essence, nor is essence distinguished from anything: yet it is not the same because of this mode of signifying: and according to the mode I say it is a medium between essence and person: and because the root is essence, and the act is of the person. Hence power taken with act and in act is a medium, according to something of it holding the reason of one, and according to something the reason of the other.

And note that if it is asked, how do the generative power and the spirative power differ? It must be said that it is clear to respond to this through comparison to acts: because then they differ as to breathe and to generate. But if they are taken in the root, it must be said that they do not differ in reality, but in reason: because the generative is rooted in the root according to what is nature: but the spirative is rooted in it according to what is will, not indeed will compared to the outside as to the caused, but will of love communicating as much being as is the communicator himself.

Articulus 6 — It Is Asked Concerning The Controversy Of The Greeks And The Latins On The Procession Of The Holy Spirit, Whether He Proceeds From The Father Only, As The Greeks Say, Or From The Father And The Son, As The Latins Say

It is asked concerning the controversy of the Greeks and Latins about the procession of the Holy Spirit, whether He proceeds from the Father only as the Greeks say, or from the Father and the Son as the Latins say?

Then it is asked concerning what is said:

Greet however, etc.

77. Genesis 1:2

And it is asked here concerning the controversy of the Greeks and Latins about the procession of the Holy Spirit. And we will first present the reasons and authorities for the Greeks, afterwards for the Latins we will solve the reasons and authorities of the Greeks.

§1. Dionysius, however, says that the Father is the fountainhead deity: therefore it seems that the Son and the Holy Spirit are streams: but no stream arises simultaneously from a fountain and a stream: therefore neither does the Holy Spirit proceed from the Son, nor conversely the Son from the Holy Spirit.

§2. Likewise, Dionysius in the book On the Divine Names: The Father indeed is the fountainhead deity. But the Son and the Holy Spirit are the offspring of the deity, thus it must be said, the offshoots of the divine nature, and as flowers, and as supersubstantial lights we have received from the holy writings. But neither the offshoots of the same root, nor the flowers of one branch, nor the lights of one light or luminous thing are reduced to each other according to the principles of origin. Therefore it seems that neither is the Son from the Holy Spirit, nor conversely the Holy Spirit from the Son.

§3. Likewise, Dionysius, in the book On Mystical Theology: In the theological outlines we praised the most principal affirmative theologies, how the divine and good nature is said to be unique, how certain things are said to be triune according to it, paternity and filiation, whatever this is or what the theology of the spirit wishes to show, how from the immaterial and indivisible good in the heart the lights of goodness have sprung forth,

and from that which in itself and in themselves and in each other remained in eternal sprouting and abiding inseparable. And according to the commentary, it calls the heart the Father according to that of Psalm 14:2: "My heart has uttered a good word." Therefore, the sproutings of the Son and the Holy Spirit are from the heart which is the Father: therefore, it seems that although they are in Him as in the principle of origin, and in themselves in personal existence, and in each other according to the identity of nature, yet according to the origin of nature, the Spirit is not reduced to the Son, nor conversely. Hypotyposes, however, is the same as divine persons. The other words of authority are plain.

1. Likewise, Damascene: "Taught by the Spirit of God following with the Word, and manifesting its operation, we understand not a subsistence deprived of expiration." From this it is taken that the Spirit follows the Word and manifests its work: therefore, it does not proceed from the Word.
2. Furthermore, Damascene: "We believe in one Holy Spirit, God, and life-giving, proceeding from the Father, and resting in the Son."
3. Likewise, the same, chapter 11: "We say the Holy Spirit is from the Father, and we name Him the Spirit of the Father: but we do not say the Spirit is from the Son, yet we name Him the Spirit of the Son." John 1:33: "Upon whom you shall see the Spirit descending and remaining upon Him, He it is who baptizes." Since the temporal descent manifests the eternal procession, as will be proven below, it seems that He proceeds from the Father and rests and remains in the Son, as the Greeks say.

4. Likewise, in the legend of Saint Andrew it is said: "Peace to you and to all who believe in one Father, and in one Son, His Lord Jesus Christ, and in one Holy Spirit proceeding from the Father and remaining in the Son."
5. Likewise, Gregory Nazianzen, who is called the Theologian: "Just as the rays of solar light proceeding from it are neither always cut off from the light nor from each other, and they shine or emit the grace of light to us: in the same way, the Son and the Holy Spirit, the twin ray of the Father, have sent the light of charity to us, and are joined to the Father. And just as from a certain fountain of waters two streams flow, divided in position, yet possessing one and the same quality: in the same way, the Father, the fountain of life, through a certain river of the Son and the Holy Spirit sends grace to us: and they have proceeded to us, and nevertheless have existed inseparable from the Father. From this the same is taken.
6. The reasons also of the Greeks are above that of Dionysius in the book of Divine Names, chapter 1, that universally we should not dare to say anything about the substantial deity except those things which are expressed to us from the holy scriptures: and since it is nowhere read in the Gospel that the Spirit proceeds from the Son, it should not be said: or the reasons which the Master places in the Letter concerning councils and anathema.
7. Likewise, we see this in similitudes: for splendor and ray arise from the sun, so that neither through the other,
8. Likewise, in mind and knowledge and love there is the conversion of the mind to love except that knowledge precedes.
9. Likewise, love sometimes precedes knowledge, as Augustine says, just as the ardor of seeking before it is known: therefore, that ardor proceeds from the mind alone.
10. Likewise, in the external spirit when the word is pronounced, we see that before the sound of the word the spirit is drawn in which the word is formed, and it proceeds from the speaker into the work of the word which is manifestation: therefore, it seems that the Spirit is of the Word as in which it is manifested, but of the Father as from whom it proceeds.

But on the contrary: There are many reasons and authorities, both in the Gospel and in the originals of the Saints, whose sufficiency the Master adduces in the Letter.

The reasons, however, are these:

1. The Spirit is posited by us and them to be distinguished from the Son: therefore, the distinguishing property is between the Son and the Holy Spirit: but distinguishing in the divine is only the opposition of relation: therefore, between the Son and the Holy Spirit there is the opposition of relation: but no relatives are opposed to each other from this that they are referred relatively to some third, but rather they agree: therefore, the Son and the Holy Spirit are not opposed from this relatively to each other, but they

agree and are united, that both are from the Father: therefore, it is necessary that one is from the other: but no one says the Son is from the Holy Spirit: therefore, it is necessary to say the Holy Spirit is from the Son.

2. Likewise, between the Father and the Son remains complete identity except for that which is to the other: therefore, similarly from the same cause between the Son and the Holy Spirit remains complete identity except for that which is to the other: either therefore that which is to the other is distinguished in that which is to the other, or not: if not, this is false: because thus they would be distinguished absolutely: therefore, it is distinguished inasmuch as it is to the other: but if neither the Son is from the Spirit, nor conversely, in no way is one referred to the other: therefore, in no way is one distinguished from the other, which is absurd: therefore, it is necessary that one is from the other.

3. Likewise, if something of the absolutes were in one which is not in the other, not whatever one would have, the other would have: but the Son and the Holy Spirit, if one is not from the other, are not distinguished except by absolutes: because they have no relation to each other: therefore, not whatever one has, the other has, which is false. Perhaps if it is said, that in this they are distinguished from each other, because they proceed diversely from the same. Against: That mode either says an absolute being, or a relative. If absolute: then it necessarily follows, that they are divided in essence and substance: because every absolute being supposes substance in the divine.

If, however, it says relative. Against: Relative or to something is, whose very being is to another. I ask therefore, what is that other to which the being of the relative is: if any other: therefore, the Father would not be only the Father of the Son, but also of any other, which is absurd: if, however, that other to which the being of the relative is, is the relative opposite: therefore, from this that the Son is to the Father, he does not have being which distinguishes him from the Holy Spirit: because the relative neither is a being nor has being, except to that to which it is by opposition: therefore, it returns to the first that from this the Son and the Holy Spirit are not distinguished from each other, that both are referred diversely to the Father.

1. Likewise, in all things between the Father and the Son remains identity except for that which is to the other: therefore, in whatever the Father is not opposed to the Son, he is the same to him: but in spirating he has no opposition to him: therefore, in spirating he is one with him.

2. Likewise, it is evident that every communication of nature posits an order to one from which that communication is, as in men, and in all others: therefore, if in the divine nature there is communication of nature to the persons themselves, an order of nature is posited to one: but there is no order if two are from one immediately, because then neither is ordered by nature to the other: therefore, it is necessary that of two one is from the other.

If perhaps someone is so insane as to say that not in all things are the persons one except for the opposition of relation, he is convinced by the nature of divine simplicity: because from this it follows, that neither one nature nor one simple thing are the persons, but something of the absolutes makes number with another: or something of the absolutes is in one which is not in the other. He is also convinced by the authority of Dionysius in the book of Divine Names, where he says all other things are united: and by many authorities of Boethius in the book of the Trinity

who proves here, that if relation were to say something absolute, it could not be in God, unless it made composition or agreed with all persons.

Solution. We say in truth, that it is an error to say the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, and it is to defend heresy: since both the Saints say this who were the fathers of the councils, as is proven in the Letter, and reason compels it, and the canon of the Gospel intimates this, as will be clear below. However, the reasons of the Greeks and authorities are not difficult to solve.

From that which Dionysius speaks, it must be said that the likeness is not taken from earthly things to God, except as that which is in part signifies that which is in the whole: for when he compares to sprouting branches, or flowing streams, or germinating flowers, it is evident that in all these there is not one essence in number, nor is whatever is in one of the essence also in another. Hence, since in this no one says that likeness can stand, it is clear that in more things it is dissimilar than similar.

Regarding other authorities, it must be said that Damascene would speak truly if he compared the Holy Spirit to the incarnation of the Word: because Augustine says that the word of the heart is like the Word begotten from eternity, and this is the word of the mind: but the word in voice is like the Word in flesh: and just as the spirit manifests the word in voice, not however in the heart: so the Spirit sent by the Father worked the flesh of the Word in which it would be manifested to us. But if he speaks to the inner word, the comparison is false: because that word is conceived by the mind alone, and from it and the mind the spirit of love, not of sound or voice, is diffused or emitted.

Regarding what is objected from Gregory Nazianzen, and the life of blessed Andrew, and from John, it must be said that they speak of the mission of the persons of the Son and the Holy Spirit, who were sent by the Father, so that the Father is not read to be sent: they do not, however, deny that the Spirit is sent by the Son: because this is read in the Gospel. And according to humanity, the Spirit descended in Him and remained in His soul and rested in Him, because He did not find in others where His foot could rest delightfully, like the dove sent from the ark: hence the authorities do not compel.

To what is objected by reason, it must be said that it is of no value: because those reasons suppose falsely: for splendor proceeds from rays, although it also proceeds from the luminous body. And this is for the Latins who say the spirit proceeds from both. Another is similarly false: because Augustine says that indeed we can love the unknown, and we believe that it

exists: hence, concerning that of which there is no knowledge nor science, nor belief, there is no love: and so it is necessary that knowledge is first from the mind either in act or in habit.

Articulus 7 — What It Is To Be Contrary To Sacred Scripture

What is contrary to Sacred Scripture?

Next, it is inquired concerning this which he says:

If anyone preaches something else or in another way, that is, contrary, etc.

For that exposition does not seem suitable: because not just anything else is contrary.

To this it must be said that in expositions such a principle holds, that nothing else is except contrary: for everything that pertains to declaration is within; and that which is not within is contrary. Hence Anselm: Every truth of Sacred Scripture is truth, which does not contradict Sacred Scripture.

It is also inquired what is the rule of faith which he touches upon, there, which however goes beyond the rule, etc.

And it must be said that the rule of faith is the concordant sense of the Scriptures with the articles of faith: because by those two regular precepts the Theologian is governed.

Articulus 8 — Whether It Is The Same To Say The Spirit Is Of The Son, And The Spirit Is From The Son

Whether it is the same to say that the Spirit is of the Son, and that the Spirit is from the Son?

Whether it is the same to say that the Spirit is of the Son, and that the Spirit is from the Son?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said:

Since it is not otherwise for the Holy Spirit
For although it may be held for this
to be of the Father and the Son, than to be from the Father and
the Son, the reason is from the nature of the genitive which according to
its name denotes origin: yet there are
many other relations which it denotes,
as when I say, the cloak of Socrates, or
the form of an image, or the nature of man: in
none of which does it denote the origin of a principle.

Solution. It must be said that in truth
in divine matters it cannot be otherwise: but in
creatures it is not necessary that the genitive
always denotes the relation of origin, although
it principally denotes it: and therefore it is
named from it. However, the reason why in

divine matters it must be the same, was said above:
because divine things cannot have
diversity and distinction which oblique
constructions denote, except only
according to relations of origin. If therefore in
this expression, Spirit of the Son, the oblique
denotes a distinction between the Spirit and
the Son, that will be according to the relation of origin:
and thus it follows, that it is the same for
the Spirit to be of the Son, and from the Son.

Articulus 9 — Why The Latins Dared To Add To The Creed Issued In The Council, Who Proceeds From The Father And The Son, Since The Greeks Were Not Called To This, Nor Was A Council Convened

Why the Latins dared to add to the creed issued in the council, "Who proceeds from the Father and the Son," when the Greeks were not called to this, nor was a council convened?

But the Greeks ask, How we dared to append to the creed issued in the council, and why in the addition their bishops were not called, or why a council was not convened?

To all these Augustine responds that nothing was added that was not understood in it: because what is understood and included in another, if this is expressed, ought not to be said to be added: but what lay hidden included, is manifested: just as concerning the descent into hell nothing is contained in the second creed, and it is permitted to add both for us and for them. However, it was necessary to add the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son: as the doubt of the Greeks themselves still proves.

Moreover, it was not necessary to call them to this, since the authority of publishing was with the Roman Church: especially since it is permitted to any particular Church to promulgate what is Catholic, on account of some necessity through chant and public readings.

And note, that eight general councils were celebrated in the primitive Church: four by the Apostles, and four by the Fathers. By the Apostles, the first for the election of Matthias in the place of Judas. The second, concerning the election of the seven deacons. The third, concerning the imposition of circumcision not being imposed on those who believed. The fourth, concerning not prohibiting lawful things to the Jews at that time on account of scandal, lest it be believed that the Old Testament ought to be rejected as sacrilegious. And these four are enumerated in a certain Gloss on Acts chapter one. There were also four of the Fathers, namely the Nicene, Ephesine, Chalcedonian, and Constantinopolitan.

Articulus 10 — Whether The Holy Spirit Proceeds From The Son As Word, Or As Love

Whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son as word, or as love?

Whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son as word, or as love?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said:

The Spirit of wisdom cannot hear from the Son speaking what he does not know, since this very thing is what is uttered by the Son, etc.

For from this it follows, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son as word, and not as love.

To this it must be said, that to speak is to manifest oneself: moreover, the intellect manifests itself by the word: and such speaking taken notionally is fitting only to the Father: and to be uttered thus is fitting only to the Son. However, speaking taken essentially is fitting to the three. Moreover, speaking is also a manifestation of affection or will: and this manifestation does not occur in the word, but in love proceeding from affection or will: and thus the Holy Spirit is uttered by the Son or by the word.

DISTINCTIO XII

Divisio Textus

Likewise, it is asked, since the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and from the Son, etc.

Here begins the part in which the Master proves that He does not proceed first and more fully from one than from the other.

And it is divided into two parts: in the first of which he shows that He does not proceed from the Father before the Son. In the second, however, he proves that He does not proceed more fully or principally from one than from the other, and resolves the authorities which seem to be against this, there, C, Now it must be discussed what was secondly asked.

In the first part there are two things, namely, the objection, and the solution which begins there, B, These and questions of this kind more laborious than fruitful.

From this the sentence of the first chapter is clear.

Articulus 1 — Whether The Holy Spirit Immediately Proceeds From Both

Whether the Holy Spirit proceeds immediately from both?

A doubt arises here first in the text, whether the Holy Spirit proceeds immediately from both?

It seems that it does not: because 1. In divine things there is an order of nature by which one is from another, and according to this order the Church ordains the Son before the Holy Spirit: therefore it seems that He proceeds more immediately from the Son than from the Father.

1. Likewise, in the mind it is such that love proceeds immediately from knowledge: since therefore the mind is the image of the Trinity, it seems similarly in the Trinity that the

Holy Spirit proceeds immediately from the Word, and thus is immediately from the Son.

2. Likewise, in the vestige it is such that the good is immediately after the true: since therefore the true is attributed to the Son, and the good to the Holy Spirit, it seems the Holy Spirit is more immediately from the Son than from the Father.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Whatever belongs to someone principally, and not principally to another, will be more immediately from the principal than from the non-principal: the Holy Spirit proceeds principally from the Father (as the Saints say), but not principally from the Son: therefore He proceeds more immediately from the Father than from the Son.

1. Likewise, what belongs properly to someone, and not properly to another, is more immediately to the one to whom it belongs properly than to the one to whom it belongs not properly: but the Saints say that the Holy Spirit proceeds properly from the Father, but not so properly from the Son: therefore He proceeds more immediately from the Father than from the Son.
2. Likewise, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, the Father has from Himself: but that He proceeds from the Son, the Son has from the Father: and what belongs from oneself, belongs more immediately than what is had from another: therefore He proceeds more immediately from the Father than from the Son.
3. Likewise, whatever the Son has even of absolutes, He refers to the Father, as my doctrine is not mine: therefore similarly it is in the power of breathing the Holy Spirit. Therefore it belongs more immediately to the Father than to the Son.

But on the contrary to both it seems that equally: because

1. Whatever proceeds from two, not as two, but as one, is simple and indivisible, this proceeds equally from both, the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, as was proven in the preceding distinction: therefore He proceeds equally from both.
2. Likewise, let it be granted that He proceeds unequally: therefore the Father and the Son are not equally referred to the act of breathing: but whatever are not equally referred, are not referred to the act by one numerical property: therefore the Father and the Son do not have one numerical property in breathing, which is false.

The rest that could be objected have been resolved in the preceding distinction.

Solution. It must be said that the Holy Spirit proceeds equally immediately from both: although some say otherwise: but their opinion is now abolished: and this because the Saints commonly say that He proceeds from them inasmuch as they, being distinct in their persons, are one in substance: and this is understood, as was explained above, that substance and essence are not taken here absolutely: but as it is in the relation of power which, joined to the act, is made as a medium according to the intellect between the purely essential and the purely personal: and thus in such a comparison nature is one in the Father and the Son being

distinct, because in this no relation of opposition divides them: and according to this, that He proceeds from them as they are one, He proceeds equally immediately from both.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that order in divine things does not posit prior and posterior, nor mediate and immediate: because the order of nature is not an order simply, but in a certain respect, namely by which one is from another, not that one is prior to another according to the intellect, as was proven above: for in divine things to be a person is not other than to be relative. And since relatives are simultaneous by nature, the persons will also be simultaneous by nature, and according to the intellect.

To the other, it must be said that the created image in many ways falls short in representing the exemplar: yet it can be said that the word and love proceed equally from the mind, although love is from both: especially if we posit the word as coeternal with the mind, as Augustine seems to say.

To the other, it must be said that in the vestige there is order, and in this it does not correspond to the Trinity: but only in some union of three in one substance.

To what is objected in the opposite, it must be said that the Saints say that it belongs principally to the Father: not to designate that He is more immediate to the procession than the Son, but to note that authority is with the Father, according to which He, being the principle not from a principle, is the principle of the whole divinity in the Son and the Holy Spirit.

To the other, it must be said that it is said to belong properly to the Father, from the fact that He does not receive from another as the Son does: and not therefore because He is more immediate: hence it is referred principally to authority, and properly to the mode of having the power of breathing.

To the other, it must be said that to have from another, or not to have from another, does not cause mediate and immediate, but authority and subauthority.

To both it must be said that it refers to the author: not as to one who is more immediate in breathing, or more powerful, or more efficacious.

Articulus 2 — Whether The Holy Spirit Proceeds First From The Father Rather Than From The Son

Whether the Holy Spirit proceeds first from the Father than from the Son?

Then it is inquired concerning what is said in the Text, that if the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, etc., it seems that it proceeds first from the Father: because

1. The Philosopher says: I say the first and the principle are the same: but the Father is the principle not from a principle: therefore it proceeds first from the Father.
2. Likewise, the Philosopher says that the first cause is that in which there is stability: therefore the first principle is that in which there is stability: since therefore in the order

of nature which is in the divine, there is no stability except in the Father, the Father seems to be the first principle of the spiration of the Holy Spirit.

1. Likewise, the first cause, according to the Philosopher, is that which causes without another being supposed: therefore similarly the first principle is that which begins without another being supposed. But the Son begins the Holy Spirit with the principle of himself being supposed, because the Father is supposed: but the Father is not supposed by another: therefore it seems that the Father is the first principle of the Holy Spirit, and the Son is the second principle.
2. Likewise, it is conceded by the Saints that it proceeds principally from the Father: why is it not so conceded that it proceeds first from the Father?
3. Likewise, it seems that the objection of the heretic holds: because born or not born are opposed as affirmation and negation concerning the same: therefore one must necessarily be granted: because there is no medium of affirmation and negation.

Solution. We say that it must not be conceded that it proceeds first from the Father; because since the first implies order, and every order posits prior and posterior, it must be said that it proceeds posteriorly from the Son.

Therefore, first it must be said that the first and the principle are converted in the reason of cause: but although we say that there is a principle in the divine, we do not say cause because of the reason assigned above: and therefore the principle and the first are not converted in the divine.

To the other it must be said that the first cause is that in which there is stability in the resolution of caused things into the cause: but such a resolution is not in the divine: because the caused is not in the same simplicity with the cause: and therefore it does not so simply receive the being of the first cause, as it is in itself: because of which the resolution of the caused to the cause has place by abstraction of that which it has from the first cause, and by addition: but in the divine it has no place because of the uniform simplicity in all persons: for in the same simplicity the Son has the essence, in which it is in the Father: and therefore there is no first or second cause with respect to another.

To the other it must be said that the first cause causes without another being supposed, because the first does not add over the second, but rather abstracts: but the second cause therefore does not cause unless the first is supposed, because the second adds over the first, and does not abstract on the contrary, namely of the first cause: but because in the divine persons there is no such abstraction, and such addition, therefore there is no first cause, and no second, nor first or second principle.

To the other it must be said that principally according to the understanding by which it is accepted by the Saints, it does not posit the first, but authority in the Father: as was said in the preceding question.

To the other it must be said that although born and not born have the mode of opposition of contradictories: nevertheless the propositions in which they are posited are not contradictory, namely this, either it proceeded when born, or it proceeded when not born: because negation is not carried to composition, and therefore both are affirmative. There is an instance: Let it be that Socrates is not a musician, this is false, Socrates is a musical man, and similarly this, Socrates is a musical non-man: although man and non-man have the mode of opposition of contradictories. But if according to this mode it is inferred, the Spirit proceeded from the Son when born, or did not proceed from the Son when born: then it seems it must be said that both are double: for when I say, it proceeded from the Son when born, two times can be signified: one by the adverb which signifies now close to the present, as the Philosopher says: but the participle signifies past time: and then those two times are ordered, that the adverb says now signified next to which the act or passion imported in the participle is terminated, and thus the expression is false under this sense, the Son was first born, and afterwards the Holy Spirit proceeded: and in the same sense the contradictory is true. But if the participle is abstracted from time, and signifies the perfection of nativity, and the adverb says the present of eternity, as was noted above, the affirmative is true and the contradictory false under this sense, the Holy Spirit proceeded while the Son was born with perfect nativity: for from this neither priority of one nor the other is signified, but rather simultaneity according to the mode of eternity.

But then there can be a doubt, if the proposition is distinguishable, why Augustine denies it simply. And to this it must be said that he denies it by occasion of calumny: because the simplicity of faith flees calumny: or perhaps because the heretic took it in the first sense only.

Articulus 3 — Whether The Holy Spirit Proceeds More Fully From The Father Than From The Son

Whether the Holy Spirit proceeds more fully from the Father than from the Son?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said:

Now it must be treated that secondly it seems indeed to proceed more fully from the Father: because

1. On account of which each thing is such, that is more such: but the Son does not spirate except on account of the Father who gives him to spirate: therefore the Father spirates more.
2. Likewise, that which principally belongs, belongs more than that which does not principally: therefore the Father spirates more,
3. Likewise, every primary cause more

It influences more upon causality than the secondary: but the Father is a principle not from a principle: therefore, He influences spiration more than the Son.

Soturio. All arguments of this kind are easily solved by the aforementioned: because the Father does not spirate more than the Son: and what the Philosopher says, he understands concerning causes in which there is not equal influence: for if from principles influencing upon the conclusion we know the conclusion, it is necessary that we know the principles more: however, such diversity is not between the Father and the Son: because although the Father gives, and the Son receives, nevertheless He receives the same, and according to equal simplicity and power as it is in the Father, and through what is received, He is equally powerful with the Father giving, except that in the Father there is authority.

To the other, it must be said that principally it does not posit more, but authority, as has been said.

To the other, it must be said that the Father is not the first cause of the Son, nor even the primary principle, on account of the reasons stated in the preceding question.

Articulus 4 — Whether The Holy Spirit Proceeds More Principally From The Father Than From The Son

Whether the Holy Spirit proceeds more principally from the Father than from the Son?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said:

From whom does the Holy Spirit principally proceed, etc.

For it seems false: because

1. If I give you a horse, the right in my things, from then you also have authority over the horse: therefore, since the Father has given the Son equal right in His own, so that He can breathe with the same authority, it seems the Son breathes as the Father, and thus principally, neither authority nor priority nor fullness can be noted: therefore the statement simply seems false.
2. Furthermore, if this is conceded, the Holy Spirit is from the Father principally, can it similarly be conceded by opposition, the Holy Spirit is from the Son secondarily? It seems so: because it is said principally with respect to secondarily.

Response. It must be said that the Holy Spirit is said to proceed principally from the Father on account of the authority which is in the Father.

To that which is objected against, it must be said that if you give me a horse, the right in your things, I can use your things equally as you: but unless I am ungrateful, I always refer the bestowal itself to you: and thus it is between the Father and the Son: because the Son refers to the Father what is truly His, because from Him.

To the other it must be said that it cannot be conceded, the Spirit is from the Father principally, and from the Son secondarily, and the cause of this is: because the authority of the principle does not imply the notion of prior or first in the Father, as was shown above: and therefore it is not opposed to secondarily, but to that which has from another that the Holy Spirit proceeds from Him: and this is conceded and true.

Articulus 5 — How The Holy Spirit Is Said To Proceed From The Father In Different Ways: Principally, Properly, And Per Se

How is the Holy Spirit said to proceed differently from the Father principally, properly, and per se?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said:

From the same sense it is said to proceed properly from the Father.

What different thing does it say principally, properly, and per se, which are here attributed to the Father? For none of those apply except by reason of authority: therefore it seems that these three are the same.

Solution. I say that they say the same thing, namely that the authority of procession is in the Father, but by different reason: because in authority there are three things: one which first originates whatever is originated in the divine; and by reason of this it applies to Him principally. Another is that He does not have this from another, and by reason of this it applies to Him per se. The third is that this applies to Him alone, and by reason of this it applies properly: because proper is what applies to one alone.

Articulus 6

Concerning the word of Hilary where it is said, "May I merit your Holy Spirit, who is from you through the Only-begotten."

Then it is inquired concerning this word of Hilary: "May I merit your Holy Spirit, who is from you through your Only-begotten," etc.

From this it seems to follow that the principle is in the Son through authority: just as a prefect does this through the king: for by the virtue of the preposition authority is denoted in the accusative matter.

Soturio. The preposition is placed equivocally with different cases: for sometimes it denotes authority in the case to which it is joined; sometimes sub-authority, as some say: however, the word sub-authority is not found placed by the Saints. But it must be said that it sometimes denotes authority, if authority is placed in another, as when it is said, "The king acts through his prefect." Thus Hilary says here, and intends that the Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son, and because the Son has this from the Father: as is also explained here.

Articulus 7 — Whether Whatever The Son Has, He Has From The Father Through Generation

Whether whatever the Son has, He has from the Father through generation?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said:

Whatever He has, the Son has from the Father, etc.

1. But He does not have except through generation: therefore, through generation He has whatever He has: but He has the procession of the Holy Spirit from Himself: therefore, through generation He has that: therefore, the procession is through generation, which is false, since they say there are different emanations.
2. Likewise, if whatever the Son has, He has from the Father: therefore, whatever the Holy Spirit has, He has from both: therefore, what proceeds from both, He has from both: therefore, what proceeds from the Father, He has from both: therefore, what proceeds from the Father, He has from the Son, which is false.

To avoid such sophisms, it must be said that whatever the Son has, He has from the Father through generation: but it does not follow that everything He has is by nature, as was determined above: because the Son is born, and is by generation, and other things are in Him through identity with the begotten: and thus the processive power is in Him, or active spiration.

To the other, it must be said that whatever the Holy Spirit has, He has from both separately and conjointly: because He has everything from the Son, and everything from the Father: but what is inferred: therefore, what proceeds from both, etc., we can say as it is commonly resolved, that it is a change of category: because to proceed is not a what, but a relation.

But because it could be objected that according to this, Augustine's reasoning proving that the Son has from the Father that the Spirit proceeds from Him would not hold: because whatever He has, He has from the Father. Let this be conceded, that whatever He has, He has from both, and let it be conceded conjointly only: and if it is later inferred: therefore, He has from the Son that which proceeds from the Father, it is clear that it does not follow: because it proceeds from an immobile supposition to a mobile one.

If, however, it is objected that this is contrary to what was said, namely, whatever He has, He has from both separately and conjointly, it must be said that it is not: because the first supposition is only for substantial things: but when the second is assumed, in the distribution of the term it is enclosed, even notionally fitting: and because the notional is in both conjointly, therefore it is not surprising if the mode of supposition varies. Or it can be said that even Augustine's reasoning does not hold concerning the Son except by the grace of the matter: for in form it errs by changing what into a relation.

DISTINCTIO XIII

Divisio Textus

After these things, it must be considered, as much as from such as we are, etc.

Here begins that part, in which the Master determines the difference between generation and procession. And it is divided into two parts: in the first of which he shows that the Holy Spirit cannot be said to be begotten, because he is not born as the Son. In the second, however, he determines that he cannot be said to be unbegotten, because he is not from no other, as the Father, there, E, Now it must be considered, since the Holy Spirit.

The first of these has three parts: in the first of which he touches upon why the Holy Spirit is not said to be born or son, but only to proceed. In the second, he touches conversely, why the Son is said to be born and to proceed, there, B, But when the Holy Spirit is not said to be born, etc. Thirdly, he shows that the distinction between being born and proceeding is ineffable while we live here, there, C, Between the generation of the Son, etc.

Articulus 1 — What Is The Difference Between Generation And Procession In The Divine

What is the difference between generation and procession in the divine?

What is the difference between generation and procession in the divine?

A doubt arises concerning the first, about the difference between generation and procession. It seems, however, that there is no difference for many reasons, some of which are universal and probable, and some are proper.

The universal ones are these: 1. A difference is not assigned between species and genus, but between species and species of the same genus: therefore, since everything that is born proceeds, and not conversely, as Augustine says in this reading, there is no difference between generation and procession, as it seems.

1. Likewise, those things which distinguish hypostases of the same nature either differ in number or in species. If in number: this cannot be, because to differ in number is to differ in matter: therefore, if divine hypostases are distinguished by things that differ in species, they must be distinguished: but to proceed and to be born do not differ in species: therefore, there is no such difference between them that constitutes different persons.
2. Likewise, whatever according to one reason of its name is common to many, does not distinguish between them: therefore, similarly, whatever according to one reason of its name is common to the Son and the Holy Spirit, does not distinguish between the Son and the Holy Spirit: but to proceed according to one reason of its name is common to the Son and the Holy Spirit: therefore, it does not distinguish between them.
3. Furthermore, it seems to be proven from the properties that there is no difference: for every emanation or flow of something from something is either distinguished by the term from which, or by the term to which, or by the emanation itself, or by any two of these together, or by all three: but in the divine there are two emanations of the Son and the Holy Spirit, each from the substance of the Father, and each in substance, and each in a substantial manner of emanation, because nothing of accident is mixed, and neither

receives less of the substance of the Father than the other: therefore, it seems that they differ in nothing.

4. If perhaps you say that the Holy Spirit is from two: this does not solve it: because even if it is posited that He is from one, still the Holy Spirit will not be the Son, as the Greeks say. But if you say that the Son is the image of the Father, and not the Holy Spirit: this again does not solve it: because not being similar in those things which are as if externally convenient does not dissolve the reason of generation and filiation, as long as such emanation is there substantially similar: but the Holy Spirit is in all substantial things similar to the Father, therefore there is no distinction between the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit.
5. If perhaps you wish to say that there is a difference in the mode of emanation thus: because generation is into a likeness in species and form and reason, but procession is not: this is nothing: for we do not dispute about the name, but about the thing itself: therefore, since the Spirit is similar to the Father in form, in species, in nature, in substance, and in all absolutes, it seems that the Spirit will be born like the Son.

If perhaps you say that generation is a work of nature, but procession is a work of will, because the Spirit proceeds by way of love. On the contrary: the work of will, as Damascene says, is creation, therefore according to this the Spirit would be created, which is false: therefore, the procession of the Spirit will not be a work of will according to that reason by which the work of will is divided against the work of nature: it returns, therefore, again, that the procession of the Spirit is a work of nature: and thus the Spirit is born like the Son.

1. Likewise, in lower things there is motion and change, and motion and change together: and philosophers determine that motion is from subject to subject, because nothing can be moved by any species of motion unless it is actually being and subsisting: but change is made simply between substance and non-substance: but change joined to motion is in matter subject to forms having contrariety: which, I say, matter proceeds and goes forth to the act of some form. But all such motions and changes are determined and drawn into species according to the term to which they are. Therefore, although in the divine there is lacking that which is of motion and change, because there is no exit from potency to act: yet since the terms between which divine emanations are do not lack, it seems that they ought to be distinguished according to the terms: but this term in both cases is nothing but substance and suppositum: therefore, it seems that both emanations, namely of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, are of one reason: therefore, there is no difference between one and the other.
2. Likewise, in every nature in which there is communication according to the flow of origin of hypostases, there is one reason for the exit of all hypostases of that nature. This is proven by induction in individuals, man, donkey, lion, and so on: therefore, since in the divine there is no communication of nature to multiple hypostases except according to the flow of origin, it will seem that there is one reason for the communication of

nature in the Son and the Holy Spirit: therefore, it seems that there is no difference in the emanations of one and the other.

3. Likewise, in every nature thus I see, that where there is the same reason of nature in species, in those there is also the same reason of supposita: for because Socrates and Plato are of one reason in this common which is man, they are also of one reason in this following common which is suppositum: for Socrates is not a suppositum of man by another reason than Plato: because then suppositum would be said equivocally of them: therefore, since the divine nature is not only of one reason, but also in number in the Son and the Holy Spirit, it seems that the same reason of suppositum is in them: therefore, if one is the Son, so is the other: or if one is not the Son, neither is the other.

4. Likewise, everything that is distinguished from another is either distinguished by substantial difference or accidental: but there is no accidental difference in the divine: therefore, if the Son and the Holy Spirit differ, they differ by substance: and this is false: therefore, it seems that if one is said to be born, and the other is said to be born: or if one is said to proceed, and the other is similarly said to proceed.

5. Likewise, it has been held above that there is only one relation of origin in the divine: but there is one relation of origin in all originated in one nature, as is proven by induction in individuals: therefore, it seems since both, namely the Son and the Holy Spirit, are originated, that they have one reason of origin.

6. Furthermore, the similarities that are introduced do not seem to hold: for when it is said that from the sun proceeds light and heat, of which one is attributed to the Son, the other to the Holy Spirit: it is not a true similarity: because although both are from the sun, yet one is only from that which is natural to the sun, and disposes it, namely light: but heat is not: because the sun is neither hot nor cold in its nature, as is proven in natural philosophy: therefore, according to this, the Holy Spirit would be an effect of the Father in an alien nature, and would not proceed in the divine nature, which is false.

Furthermore, if the sun emits rays by looking at Saturn or another star, it will never heat it: therefore, if the divine sun emits light into that which is of the divine nature, from this no heat proceeds, as it seems: therefore, the similarity by which generation and procession are distinguished is of no value.

If perhaps you say that from the sun proceeds a ray and light: and so two are distinct: then still the similarity does not hold, because light is a quality disposing the ray and the sun, and is not of diverse property: therefore, it seems according to this, that still it cannot be distinguished between the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit.

But if you say that in fire a true similarity of distinction is found: because from fire proceeds light and heat, and both come from fire. Again, this does not hold for two reasons: one of which is that light is not natural to fire, as Alexander the Philosopher says: because it does not shine in its sphere: otherwise it would cover the stars from us, because luminous bodies cover those things which are behind them: just as one star eclipses another when it is

subjected to it between our sight and that which is higher. The other reason is: because even if we grant that fire shines by its nature, yet heat and light are not reduced to the same nature in fire: but one to light, and the other to heat: from this, therefore, it then follows that the Son and the Holy Spirit would not be from the same nature of the Father, which is heresy.

1. Furthermore, if these are distinguished from each other, just as the distinguisher relates to the distinguished, so distinction relates to distinction, and the distinct to the distinct: but the distinguisher differs substantially from the distinguished, because there is no accidental distinction in the divine: therefore, distinction from distinction, and the distinct from the distinct differ substantially: but the distinct are the Son and the Holy Spirit: therefore, the Son and the Holy Spirit differ substantially: whatever things differ substantially, one of them has some substance which the other does not have: therefore, there is some substance in the Son which is not in the Holy Spirit, which is false and heretical: therefore, the two emanations do not differ among themselves.
2. Likewise, in all things in which there is univocation of one common nature, there is one univocal act by which one nature is propagated from one. This is proven in individuals. Therefore, if there is univocation of the divine nature in the Son and the Holy Spirit, there will be an univocal act by which that nature is received from one Father: therefore, if the Son receives by generation, the Holy Spirit also receives by generation: or if the Holy Spirit receives by proceeding, the Son will receive in the same way.

If perhaps someone wishes to insist on the first proof in stars, in which there is one nature, and yet they are not propagated from one star: the instance is ridiculous: because stars are not of one nature which is the form of the species: because if this were true, since it is determined that they are also of one matter not diversified by foreign impressions, but only having potency for circular motion, every star with every star would be of the same effect, which is absurd, and against the experts of the stars.

But if perhaps someone wishes to insist by angels: the instance is even less doubtful: because it is not proven that angels are of the same species: or if they are, as some say, it is not an instance: because in them there is no communicable nature, as was proven above: but the first proposition is about those in which nature is communicable by the act of origin or property.

1. Likewise, there does not seem to be a difference which some have newly found here, namely that there are two things in the divine nature, namely being or essence, and its spirituality: and therefore according to these two there are two acts of communication of nature, namely generation which communicates being and essence, and procession which communicates spirituality. Either spirituality is called a divine attribute, by which the divine nature is distinguished from the corporeal nature; or spirituality is called the spirative power, about which it was held above. If in the first way: then what they say is nothing:

because this is in no communicable nature, that by one act of origin the essence of it is communicated, and by another according to reason the property of its differences from other natures of other things: for in the generation of man this man is born, and by the same generation consequently has, that he is rational, that he is biped, that he is an animal capable of discipline, and all other such things: therefore, it seems that the communication of such spirituality does not admit a different act of its communication from the act of communication of essence or nature. Furthermore, the same inconvenience will return as before: because by generation the Son receives both nature and spirituality, and by procession the Holy Spirit receives both nature and spirituality of nature: therefore, it seems that to generate and to proceed are the same.

If perhaps you say that the Son according to the prior receives nature, and according to the posterior receives spirituality, or by this that spirituality is the same to him: but the Holy Spirit according to the prior receives conversely, namely spirituality, and receives nature by this that it is posterior to that, or by this that it is the same to him, because in the divine there is no prior and posterior. On the contrary: everything that receives some nature and the substantial property of that nature, according to the prior and per se receives nature rather than the property which is consequent, or the same to it: therefore, there is no reason that you say the Spirit per se receives spirituality, because this is against all understanding.

Likewise, every hypostasis per se is subject to nature, and consequently to the property of nature: therefore, since the Spirit is a hypostasis of the divine nature, it will per se be subject to nature and consequently according to understanding to the property of the same or attributes.

Likewise, since in the divine nature there are many attributes equally notional as spirituality, such as eternity, immutability, simplicity, goodness, power, and such: why would there not be some communication of nature according to hypostases according to all? If you say that this is because those regard act, but spirituality regards nature: this is plainly frivolous: because immutability, simplicity, eternity, determine no act, but nature alone.

But if it is said that spirituality is not taken here from the spirituality of nature, but from the spirative power, this is another matter: because the spirative power (as was proven above) is per se, or in person: then I ask if that spirative power produces perfect in the reason of spirit, and not nature: or perfect in the reason of nature, and not in the reason of spirit: or perfect in both: and then either the production is first of nature, and because of identity of the reason of spirit: or conversely per se the production is of spirit, and because of identity of spirituality to nature it is also the production of nature: because it cannot be varied in multiple ways, unless you say that it is equally of both, or of neither: but what is said here because of identity, therefore it is because in the divine because of all simplicity there is no prior and posterior, but the same: yet the reason is different.

If in the first way, namely that procession says the production of spirit, and not of nature, it follows the heresy of Sabellius, that the Holy Spirit does not receive nature from the Father by proceeding: and it is also against the authorities of Augustine introduced here. If in the second way, namely that procession says the production of nature, and not of spirit, it follows that the

Holy Spirit should not be called spirit, but Son, which again is false. If in the third way, namely that procession says the production of perfection in nature, which production is also spirit because of the identity of spirituality to nature: then it follows that the Spirit will proceed in the same way as the Son: for divine generation is the production of perfect in nature, who is also perfect spirit, because spirituality has identity with nature: and this again is false. If in the fourth way, namely that

procession says the production conversely of spirit, and by identity says perfect in nature. Against this is that every production of that is per se which is immediate to the producing act: but this in every communication of nature is the suppositum of nature: therefore, it is not prior of the attribute, than of him who is perfect in nature. If in the fifth way you say, this example is found neither in spiritual nature, nor in corporeal nature, that two are in one equally ordered to one act as its terms according to reason. If in the sixth way you say, then it follows that the Spirit in the divine is produced by no production, which is frivolous: therefore, the new opinion cannot stand.

But perhaps because of these reasons, unless other stronger ones were introduced to the opposite, heresy would be confirmed. Hence, thus it proceeds to the opposite:

1. Every possible communication of the divine nature is to be given to it: therefore, since communication of distinct persons in love is possible to it, that is necessarily to be given to it: therefore, there will not be to it only communication of nature by the act of nature, but there will also be communication of love by the act of love: therefore, that love which is from distinct persons, is either something, or nothing. If it is nothing: therefore, it is not love. But if it is something, either distinct, or not distinct. If not distinct: therefore, this is not a distinct person, but rather it is from nature. But if it is distinct, it is either a property, or a person. Not a property: because a property is in a person, not from a person: and distinguishing, not distinguished: therefore, it remains that it is a person: and thus I have the proposition in two conclusions of the intent: one of which is that the Holy Spirit is a person. The second is that the mode of His procession is not the mode of the procession of the Son.

because they are one in nature. And if I ask you, Why is the Son of the same nature with the Father? you will say because He is begotten from the Father: and what is born, by being born receives the nature of Him from whom He is born. Now I ask further, If the Father and the Son can have any communication besides nature? Prove that they can: because it is so among those who are of the same nature, that in the society of life each gives to the other of his own in love and friendship: therefore, the Father distinct from His own can give to the Son, and conversely: but that is love: therefore, love is distinct between the Father and the Son, and as they are distinct, not however as they are one in nature: but that which the Father thus gives, is either from the Father distinct, or from Him as He communicates in nature with the Son. If in the first way: then I have the proposition: because then love is from the Father and the Son, and is distinguished from their persons more than the Son from the Father. If in the second way: therefore, that love does not proceed from the proper of the Father, and from the proper

of the Son: and thus the Father and the Son will be less deficient in loving than I and you: because I can bestow love on you from my own, and you on me. If perhaps you say that that love is not a person: this is nothing, because this was proven above. But if you say that that love is in the Father by the virtue of the divine essence, and thus is not proper: this again is nothing: because even the power of generating is in the Father by the virtue of the essence: and yet to generate is proper to the Father, and not to the essence: therefore, although the spirative power of love is in the Father and the Son by reason of the essence, nevertheless to love which says the exit of this love from both, will be proper and distinctive: so also in me and you the power of loving each other is in us by the virtue of the common nature to me and you: and yet to love each other is proper to me and you.

1. Likewise, in the lower noble nature I see a double mode of procession: na-

For nature proceeds into communication through the act of generation, which, due to imperfection, is from potentiality to act: but the will of one proceeds into another through love, which process, due to the imperfection of nature, is accidental: since, therefore, the inferior nature is exemplified by the superior, it seems that these two processes are more noble in the superior nature: therefore, there will be generation there without the transition from potentiality to act, and there will be the procession of love without accidental nature: and thus, just as the Son is generated according to substance from the Father, so the Spirit proceeds according to substance from both: and yet one mode is not the other.

1. Likewise, of whatever processes the proper principles are different, they themselves are different: but the principle of love is the will, the principle of generation is nature: therefore, the procession of the Holy Spirit differs from the generation of the Son, just as will and nature differ. If perhaps you say that in God the will is the same as nature, it is not an instance: because it was proven above that although such attributes are the same in God, yet they are not synonymous, and they differ in relation to acts: but here I take nature as nature is the principle of generation, and the will as the principle is love, therefore the induced reasoning proceeds without the impediment of an instance.
2. Likewise, since there are two communions in a noble nature, one to being, the other to well-being, both will have something corresponding in God, since both are of nobility: but that which is to well-being in a noble creature differs from that which is to being in the communicated thing, and in the mode of communication: because the thing communicated in one is the essence of nature, but the thing communicated in the other is love: since therefore there is complete simplicity in the superior, if those communications are inferred in the divine, it is necessary that they do not differ in the nature of the thing, but in mode: because otherwise they would not be two: therefore, in the divine, the mode of the procession of the Son differs from the mode of the procession of the Holy Spirit: and yet that which is communicated in both modes will be substantially one, which is nature or substance: and this is true.

3. Likewise, it is objected by similitudes: for we see a likeness in the human and angelic mind, which is the image of the Trinity, that one is the process of knowledge from the mind, and another is the process of love: and yet the same thing is loved and known, as the substance of the mind: therefore, similarly it will be in the divine.
4. Likewise, we see from the sun proceed light and a ray, and in the ray from the same sun proceed a vivifying power: since therefore the Spirit gives life, and the Son infuses the light of knowledge, it is clear that both these arise in a different way, yet together from the divine sun.
5. Likewise, the mode of proceeding as the nexus of distinct things is not the same as the mode of proceeding as distinct: but every Son, whether in God or in nature, proceeds from the Father as distinct, but every love proceeds as connecting the distinct: therefore, the mode of procession of these two is not the same.

Solution. It must be said that in truth the procession of the Holy Spirit differs from the generation of the Son: and the middle of these last reasons shows the number and reason of the differences: and there are in total seven differences that can be collected.

The first is on the part of the principle from which: because one is from the power of generating in the Father, but the other from the spirative power: which, although they do not differ according to the thing, yet they are truly and not synonymously in God.

The second is what Augustine touches on here, that the Son is from one, but the Holy Spirit is from two: not as from a father and a mother, but as from one and the same reason of power spirating him.

The third is because the procession of the Holy Spirit is from the communion of the consensus of the Father and the Son as distinct: but the Son is according to the communication of nature: which, although again in God they are the same in thing and subject, yet this identity does not impede the diversity of mode in proceeding: because identity is caused by the attribute of simplicity and does not take away the proper reason from each communication.

The fourth is according to those proceeding: because the Son proceeds as distinct in being, but the Holy Spirit in the mode of well-being of the distinct: which, however, does not take away the perfection of nature from him: because in the divine whatever is through well-being or being, is all perfect in substance and hypostasis: and therefore Augustine also says that the Spirit is the joy and delight of the two.

The fifth is again taken from the part of those who proceed: because the Son signifies the reason of receiving nature, but the Holy Spirit signifies the reason of receiving and connecting those from whom he receives, as was determined above.

The sixth is taken according to the aptitude of those proceeding: because the Son, by the fact that he is a son, signifies nothing but a relation to the Father: and therefore does not posit an aptitude for being given, since he is from nature, but an aptitude for being bestowed upon: but the Holy Spirit, by the fact that he proceeds as love from the liberality of the Father, posits an aptitude for being given: and therefore Augustine says that from eternity he proceeds as

donable: for the gift is of the Father and the Son which they bestow upon each other with gratuitous love: it is also further donable to us although it is never given.

The seventh difference is what Augustine also touches on in book XIV of the Trinity, that love is in the mind, not as born, but as spirated: because its appetite is indeed tenuous in the mind, even before it generates its knowledge: which appetite, however, becomes love of the already born knowledge: and therefore it is rather the union of parent and offspring than born: and this difference of Augustine is founded on this, that uniting some two, it is necessarily distinguished from both: and therefore love, which is the union of parent and offspring, will necessarily not have the name and reason of parent, nor will it have the name and reason of offspring.

Having these, it must be responded to the objections in order.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that between genus taken as genus and species no difference is assigned: because genus and species are according to the thing more reasons of agreement than differences, although according to these names species and genus, which are names of second intention, are opposed relatively, as Porphyry says: but between species and genus placed for species and in place of species, a difference is assigned: and so it is here: because procession expresses the special mode of the emanation of the Holy Spirit. Nor is there force here from species and genus: but whatever community of those things which are not converted to each other, is called the habit of genus and species: because in the divine there is not species and genus, as will be shown below.

To the other it must be said that in this way taken to proceed, as has been said, to proceed and to be born differ in species: and this objection is founded on a falsehood.

Moreover, it is also false that numerical differences always differ by matter: because the Philosopher says that number is also made by the difference of cause and caused without matter, just as there is number also in intelligent agents according to ten orders, which according to the Philosophers are caused by the first intelligence which is God. Or, if this seems extraneous, then let us rely on the word of Damascene saying that difference is the cause of number, and the number of persons will be the cause of the distinction of persons: and just as we say numbered things differ, so we say the cause of number differs and therefore just as distinct persons differ by the number of persons, so the distinguishing properties differ by the number of properties. However, I concede well that in no one person or in two or three are there two different properties only in number, and not in species of properties: because there are not two paternities, nor two filiations, nor two innascibilities, and so of others.

To the objection it must be said that that which is the principle of agreement is not the principle of distinction: just as that which is proven of many is the principle of agreement of many concerning that: but this way is not taken here, when the difference between generation and procession is sought, but rather the word proceeding specially expresses the emanation of the Holy Spirit.

To the other it must be said that if we speak from the proper, as it is necessary in the divine, then the emanation of the Holy Spirit is distinguished from the emanation of the Son,

both as to the principle from which, and as to the terminus into which, and as to the emanation itself. For the principle from which is the procession of the Holy Spirit, is the spirative power, or the consensus of the Father and the Son: but the principle from which generation is per se from the Father, is the generative power as generative. Similarly, the terminus into which, as it can be taken in the divine, in one part is the Son, and in the other is personal love, or the gift of the Father and the Son. The mode of emanation of one is generation, of the other is notional love or spiration.

To what is objected concerning the reason of the image, it must be said that it is well conceded that this does not operate much for distinction.

To what is further objected against, that the flow of the Spirit is substantial and from substance and into substance, it must be said that it does not impede the assigned difference: because that which in the divine is by the grace of the simplicity of nature, does not take away the proper from the persons: but if it did take away, then the objection would proceed. For although the Father is truly the divine nature, and the Son is truly the divine nature, yet the Father is not the Son: and although generation is truly the divine nature, and procession is truly the divine nature, yet generation is not spiration or procession in this way said, nor is the mode of generation the mode of procession: and this happens because from the substance from which the Son proceeds, the Holy Spirit does not proceed in the same mode of signifying; but the Son is from it according to what is the generative power in the Father, but the Holy Spirit is from it according to what is the spirative power in the Father and the Son: and this is what Dionysius says in the book on Divine Names, where he says thus: There is also a distinction in the supersubstantial theologian: not which I said only that according to the very union immixed and unconfused each of the principal persons is placed: but that also those things which are of the supersubstantial fecundity of God, are not converted to each other. From this it is taken that in the unity and simplicity of nature there are distinctions of persons and properties immixed and unconfused, and they are not converted to each other because of the simplicity of nature: because, as Dionysius says there, the only substantial fountain of deity is the Father, nor is the Son the Father, nor the Father the Son, preserving the hymns the proper religiously of the thearchic persons. Therefore, the proper are not converted over themselves from the simplicity of essence: and therefore although substance is love, substance is the Son, and substance is the power of spirating, and substance is the power of generating, and substance is generation, substance is also spiration: it does not follow that generation and spiration do not differ from each other: just as it does not follow, Substance is the Father, and the same substance is the Son: therefore, the Father and the Son are not distinguished from each other.

To what is objected, whether they differ in this way, that the Son signifies according to the reason of generation a flow in similar species and nature, but the Spirit does not: it must be said that the Holy Spirit is not in similar nature and substance and reason as the Son, although they differ in mode of signifying and property, as is clear from the prehabited.

To the other it must be said that in inferiors there is potentiality and its exit to act which is motion or change or both: and the terminus is in which motion is in motion to be, or changed to be: and such is not to be posited in the divine. And if you say that according to the reason of understanding spiration is the Spirit, just as generation is the Son: although it is not generation producing the Son from non-Son, nor spiration producing the Spirit from non-Spirit: then I say well that the Spirit and the Son are distinguished, because one proceeds as love, but the other as son: and thus their emanations are denominated from them, namely spiration from the Spirit, and generation from the Son. And if you object that in both there is the acceptance of substance, this has already been solved: because this does not impede distinction.

To the other it must be said that in inferior nature there is not communication in whole and perfect: for the generating communicates nature through generation, and divides a part, nor does it give the whole: and it gives the very thing it gives, in material potentiality, from which, however, a similar in species can be made, and not having the same nature in number with the giver: and this is of great imperfection: for every nature which can communicate itself the same in number and species, does this much more willingly than it communicates itself in species only. And the proof of this is: because if in communication the safety and permanence of nature which is instilled through appetite in each one is sought, permanence is sought much more intensely in the same nature in number than in the same species: and this experiment teaches everyone, as the Apostle says to the Romans, viii, 22. And further, I to the Corinthians, v, 4: For we who are in this tabernacle, that is, body, groan being burdened, because we do not wish to be unclothed, but to be clothed upon, that what is mortal may be swallowed up by life. Similarly, if the joy of society in multiple hypostases is sought, it is greater in those joined in the same nature in number, because those hypostases cannot dissent from themselves, than in the same species and not in number: and therefore since in inferiors this best communication of nature cannot be, that is sought which is possible after it for inferior nature, namely that it be communicated in species. Similarly, inferior nature when it communicates intimate affection, would willingly in affection wish that its substance proceeds into the one whom it loves as itself, and in the love itself the substance would be: but because of materiality and ignobility this cannot be: and therefore the two imperfect modes of communicating in inferiors are in the superior nature according to perfect reason, namely the communication of nature, so that the begotten and the begetter are in the same nature: and the communication of consensus, so that the consensus itself is substance and suppositum: hence that in inferior nature there is only one mode of communication of nature, this is from imperfection, as has been shown.

To the other it must be said that although of one reason is the communication of suppositum, it is not necessary that the same is distinguishing supposita: for this is in no nature, that the same property which by conferring singularity supposes this nature, is also conferring singularity to another which underlies the same nature: and therefore that objection was sophistical, as if from the reason of suppositum one reason of distinguishing supposita could be had.

To the other it must be said that this is nothing to ask, whether these modes differ by substantial or accidental difference: just as it is not anything to say in the divine, whether persons differ by substantial or accidental differences: because discourses are to be inquired according to matter: hence it must be said that they differ by properties which are not accidents, but because of complete simplicity they are substance: yet they are not substantial differences, because they do not make differ according to substance and essence, which is one in number in the divine, but they make persons be distinguished by their properties: and the properties themselves are distinguished by themselves, because otherwise it would go into infinity.

To the other it must be said that this is true, that there is no distinction in the divine except through relations of origin: but it has already been shown that the reason of origin in the divine is not one, but double: for the Father is the origin of the Son through generation, and the Father and the Son are the origin of the Holy Spirit through procession: and it has been shown that in a nature of complete perfection the communication of love has joined to it the communication of nature in the love itself and gift.

To what is objected against the similitudes introduced, it must be said that each similitude is quite good, provided it is understood properly: for as we said above from the authority of Hilary, the comparison of earthly things to God is none: and if we sometimes bring examples, let no one think they contain in themselves the perfection of reason. Hence we say that from the sun is light, and heat: but heat is said equivocally to the heat of the element, and the heat of the sun: for unless there were heat from the sun, the Philosopher would not say in book XVI of Animals, that seed moves by the heat of the sky, and the heat of the element, and the heat of the soul: but it is true that that heat, as I said, is not of one reason with the heat of inferiors: for just as motion according to place is referred to the first immobile, so it is necessary that all altering is referred to the first altering, not moved according to altering quality: for every true alteration is reduced to the alteration of the primary qualities, and the alteration of the primary qualities to the elements, and these further to the virtues of the stars which alter and are not altered, as the Philosopher says in the book on the Nature of the World. But it is true that in this the similitude fails, that to one simple essence of the sun light and heat cannot be reduced: because as Dionysius says, the caused receive the goodness of the cause in an inferior mode than it is in the cause itself. And therefore one in number which is in the sun operating these two signifies as much as it can also one simple in the divine nature.

In the same way I say to what is objected against the similitude taken from fire: because at least in inferior fire one species of fire is light, as the Philosopher says, and one fire is shining and heating, although not with simple virtue. But because by eminence we rise from the caused to the cause, we understand the procession of persons to be in a simple nature in the Creator.

To the other it must be said that this is not true, If generation and spiration in the divine differ, that they differ substantially, nor even accidentally: for it has been shown above that in the divine there are not those proper differences: but there is there a property which is

substance: hence generation which is substance, differs from procession which is substance, and yet they do not differ substantially: and the reason for this was clear above.

To the other it must be said that the first proposition is true, although some bring instances which we have posited, and some wishing to evade it bring an instance in Eve, who did not receive human nature through generation. But the instance is none: because the miracles of God do not vary anything in the natural habits of predicates to their subjects in propositions. Therefore conceding the first, we say that this which in inferiors is only one mode of communication of nature, and not communication of nature through love and whom we love, this is of imperfection, as has been shown above: which if it is removed, and another which is of nobility is attributed to God, the proposition will be true: and yet in God there will be a double mode of communication of nature through the consensus of wills, and through generation.

To what is objected, that this communication is not according to the spirituality which is an attribute of the divine nature, as much as I can understand, it seems to be conceded. But I concede well that it is according to the spirituality which is the spirative power, as has been determined above.

To what is asked, Whether it is primarily and per se of nature or spirituality, or spirit, it must be said that in the divine nothing is prior, and nothing is posterior: but according to the intentions of names by which emanation is signified, the spirative power per se posits reason to spirit in that it is spirit or love: but everything that proceeds in the divine from a distinct person, is perfect in substance and distinct, therefore by the identity of hypostasis with such a reason of love, that love which proceeds is a perfect and distinct hypostasis: and this seems to be the intention of Augustine in book VI of the Trinity, where he says thus: The Spirit is something common of the Father and the Son, whatever it is: but the very communion, consubstantial and coeternal is: which if it can be conveniently called friendship, let it be called, but more aptly it is called charity: and this also is substance, because God is substance, and God is charity!, Here he intimates that by the intention of the name of the spirative power per se the procession of love is posited: but because everything is perfect which is in the divine, therefore love is substance and a perfect hypostasis: and therefore it seems to be conceded that production per se is spirit, and because of the perfection of the divine nature and the identity of substance with love, the spirit produced is a perfect person: and this is the fourth of the six modes which the objection touches.

To what is objected against, it must be said that immediate and mediate is not in the divine: but I concede well that according to the reason of understanding by the name, the spirative power per se is to the spirit: and this is act not terminus, but as terminus: and this can well be in the divine, where there is a double communication of nature, as we have said: just as when I say, I love that which proceeds per se from me, in the act of the word love is signified.

And what is objected, that to the act of communication of nature the hypostasis is immediate as it is this substance, it must be said that this is true in the act in which nature is

communicated in nature, that is, in generation: but in the other mode of communication it is not true: but rather it is the converse.

Articulus 2 — Whether The Holy Spirit Can Be Said To Be The Son Of Both From Whom He Proceeds

Whether the Holy Spirit can be called the Son of both from whom He proceeds?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said in the first chapter, there, "And the Holy Spirit would be called the Son, He would certainly be called the Son of both," etc.

For this reasoning does not seem to hold: because although He does not proceed from both, there will still be a difference between generation and procession: and Augustine ought to have assigned that.

If you say that even if He does not proceed from both, nevertheless the Spirit would be called of both, just as the Greeks say He is the Spirit of the Son, but not from the Son: and thus it would follow that if He were the Son, He would be the Spirit of the Son. On the contrary: Because this would be true when it is said, "Spirit of the Son," the genitive would be construed in the relation of efficient cause or principle, and it could not have another construction.

To this it must be said that Augustine's objection is founded upon necessary reasoning and upon the authority of the canon. However, the necessary reasoning is placed above, where it was proven that the Holy Spirit proceeds from two. That authority is held in Romans 9, where the Apostle says in the relation of efficient cause: and this was proven above, where it was asked if it is the same for the Spirit to be of the Son and from the Son.

The Apostle says the Spirit is the Spirit of the Son. And I well concede that according to truth it cannot have construction except in...

Articulus 3 — Whether Procession Is Of The Notion Of Generation And Spiration, And Why The Name Procession Pertains More To The Holy Spirit Than To The Son

Whether procession is of the nature of generation and spiration? And why the name of procession remains more with the Holy Spirit than with the Son?

Then it is asked concerning what is said in the second chapter B, there, "But when the Spirit is not said to be begotten," etc.

For from what Augustine says there, it seems that procession is of the nature of generation and spiration: for it is predicated of them, and not convertibly:

either therefore as being of their nature, or as not being of their nature. If you say as being of their nature, I have the proposition, that it is said univocally. But if you say, that as not being of their nature, then it agrees with them accidentally: and this is false: because accident is not in the divine.

But if it is granted, that it is predicated as a genus, it is asked why the name remains more with the Holy Spirit than with the Son?

Likewise, if it is a genus, it follows that the universal and particular are in the divine, which is repugnant to the supremely simple, as Boethius says.

Solution. As determined above

I say, that neither as a genus, nor as an accident, is anything predicated in the divine neither of essence nor of person nor of notion: but indeed something is predicated in the divine as signified with a more common intention than that of which it is predicated: for although in the divine the same thing is always in the predicate and subject, yet there is another mode of signifying: and therefore the distinction thus made does not hold, if it is predicated, that it is predicated as being of the nature of the subject, or it is predicated as not being of the nature of the subject: because those two are not opposed as contraries: but thus it is to be divided, it is predicated as being, etc., or it is not predicated as being, etc. I concede this, it is not predicated as being, etc. In that sense which is denied, it includes the whole predicate and the determination of the predicate.

But if it is asked, How is it predicated? It must be said that it is predicated as the same under another intention of signifying.

To that which is asked, Why does the Holy Spirit retain the name? it has been answered above, and it has been asked. But this can be said, that it retains it because when procession is said in inferiors in two ways, namely in a processive motion, and in the egress of the caused from the cause, the emanation of the Holy Spirit places some similarity to both, as has been proven above: but the emanation of the Son places similarity only to one, namely to the exit of the caused from the cause.

Articulus 4 — Whether The Holy Spirit Is From The Father Not As Born, But As Given Or As A Gift, And Whether The Son Proceeds As A Gift

Whether the Holy Spirit is from the Father not as born, but as given, or as a gift: and whether the Son proceeds as a gift?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says:

He proceeds from the Father not as born, but as given or as a gift, etc.

For this does not seem true.

1. For the nature of what is given and of a gift does not seem to be immediate to the procession or to the one proceeding: but rather it seems to be consequent according to the understanding of the one who proceeds: for each thing is first in itself, than in comparison to another: therefore the proceeding Holy Spirit is first Spirit in itself, than it is compared to another: but given and gift imply a comparison to the giver and to the one to whom it is given: therefore it seems that these follow the one proceeding, and thus Augustine says nothing:

1. Likewise, Given and gift is the Holy Spirit in time: but the temporal is not the nature of the eternal: therefore since the procession is eternal by which the Holy Spirit proceeds, it does not seem to proceed as given or as a gift.

Solution. It must be said that he proceeds as a gift: for it has been proven that he proceeds as gratuitous love: but the nature of gratuitous love in that which is gratuitous, is the primary nature of the gift which is given: because whatever is given mutually by those who love, gratuitous love is prior to that and the cause of that: and therefore Augustine says that the love which is the Holy Spirit, is the gift in which all gifts are given.

But it must be said from the perspective that in this procession there is something other than in that.

which is of nature as nature is: because what is first there, this here is added by identity: whence the gift of love proceeds here by itself, which nevertheless is a perfect person on account of the perfection of the divine nature and the identity of simplicity: and this was proven above in the first question of this reading.

Ap unico dicendum, that the gift said from the act of giving is fitting to the Spirit in time, but said from aptitude it is fitting to Him from eternity.

But it does not seem that Augustine's distinction holds: because even the Son proceeds as a gift. As Isaiah 9:6 says: "For a child is born to us, and a son is given to us." But nothing is given in time unless it was giftable from eternity.

Therefore, the Son proceeded from eternity as giftable.

Solution. It must be said that the Son does not proceed as a gift: because the notion of generation does not express the notion of the first gift, like gratuitous love, but expresses the notion of the first existing: and therefore the Master says below, that the Son proceeded from eternity, not as a gift, but as one who could be given, because He is from another: and therefore He could have the one giving and sending Him. And therefore the objection holds concerning the Son which was first made, and concerning the Holy Spirit, that the notion of gift follows the being of the Son according to understanding: but the notion of gift is of the very notion of the procession of the Holy Spirit, as love is, and proceeds from those who love.

Articulus 5 — Whether The Twelve Modes Of Generation Posited By The Heretic Arius Are Sufficiently Posited, And Whether Others Are Also To Be Added

Whether the twelve modes of generation posited by Arius the heretic are sufficiently posited: whether also others are to be added?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, "Among the true generation of the Son," etc.

I take the twelve modes of generation which Arius, disputing against Victorinus, introduced, who although he was a heretic, nevertheless the modes are notable and good.

The first is according to the flow of a line from a point, if by its motion it could make a line.

The second is according to the emission of a ray from the sun or another luminous body.

The third is according to the sealing of a character, as a figure is made in wax by a seal.

The fourth is according to the infusion, as when from God a good will is infused into a man.

The fifth is according to the exit of a property or accident from the principle of the subject.

The sixth is according to the abstraction of an intention from this particular, as the species of things are generated in the soul.

The seventh is according to the excitation, as free will excited by grace or another proceeds into the generation of acts.

The eighth is according to the transfiguration, as from bronze a statue is made, and as a figure in the figure of an incision.

The ninth is according to the production: as motion proceeds from the first immobile.

The tenth is according to the exit of a species from generation through the exit of differences dividing the genus and constituting the species.

The eleventh is according to ideation, as the external ark is from the ark which is in the mind of the ark-maker, and the health of this cured one is from the health which is in the soul of the physician.

The twelfth is according to birth, as a human son is born from a human father.

However, it is clear that that heretic does not enumerate all modes of generation: because many are born from putrefaction, and from vegetables, especially from the power of the stars which he did not touch upon: and therefore it was insufficient: and therefore he is reproved by Victorinus, and it is shown that none of these generations has a full likeness to the divine generation.

Articulus 6 — Whether This Is To Be Granted, That The Father Is The Author That The Holy Spirit Proceeds From The Son, And That The Father Is The Author Of The Son's Filiation, And That He Is The Author Of The Essence In The Son

Whether it should be conceded that the Father is the author of the fact that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, and that the Father is the author of the filiation of the Son, and that He is the author of the essence in the Son?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there,
Since the Father is the author of the procession, who begot such a Son, etc.

1. Therefore, that the Spirit proceeds from the Son, the Father is the author: but He is not the author except by generating: therefore it seems that the Father, by generating, is the author of the procession of the Holy Spirit: but of whatever the Father is the author by generating, that is the Son:

therefore it seems that the Holy Spirit is the Son, which is false.

1. Likewise, of whatever the Father is the author by generating, He begot that: He is the author of the procession by generating: therefore He begot the procession, or at least begot it in the Son.
2. Likewise, can this also be conceded, that the Father is the author of the filiation of the Son? It seems so: because if filiation is in the Son, this is through the generation of the Father: therefore it seems that He is the author of the filiation of the Son.
3. Likewise, can this also be conceded, that the Father is the author of the essence in the Son? It seems so: because He is the author that the essence is in the Son: therefore He is the author of the essence of the Son.
4. But, of whatever the Father is the author, He is distinguished from that: but the Father is the author of the essence of the Son: therefore He is distinguished from the essence of the Son: but from whatever He is distinguished, this is not predicated affirmatively of Him: therefore the Father is not the essence of the Son, which is false.
5. By the same reasoning, it is proven that the Father is not the processive power or procession by which the Spirit proceeds from the Son: for if He is the author of that (as Augustine says), then He is distinguished from it: and from whatever He is distinguished, this is not predicated affirmatively of Him: because the distinct and that from which it is distinguished are opposed relatively in the divine: therefore the Father is not the principle of spiration which is in the Son. Which is false: because the person is its property: whence since the same property in number is in the Father and the Son for spirating the Holy Spirit, the Father is the principle of the Holy Spirit which is in the Son: and from this it seems further to follow a conclusion which seems most absurd in the divine, that of whatever the Father is the author, this is from Him: and if He Himself is that of which He is the author, He Himself is that which is from Him: which above was considered heresy.

Solution. It must be said that the Father is the author of the Son, and of all those things which are in the Son as they are in the Son: and I well concede that of all those things which are in the Son, the Father is the author through generation or by generating.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that that argument does not follow: for if I grant this, the Father by generating is the author of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son: it does not follow that He Himself is the author by generating the Holy Spirit: but it follows that He by generating is the author that the Spirit proceeds from the Son, and this is true.

To the other, it must be said that this is false, of whatever the Father is the author by generating, He begot that: nor does it hold in human matters: because the father is the author of the heart of the son by generating, yet he did not beget the heart, but the son: for the act of generation of the person is only of the hypostasis, and other things are made in the hypostasis: but authority regards all things whatsoever either per se and primarily, or per accidens and consequently are had through generation: whence He neither begot the procession per se, nor

begot the procession in the Son: but He begot the Son who by being born received the procession, as all other things in which it is not opposed relatively to the Father.

To the other, it must be said that the Father is the author of the filiation of the Son, and this by generating: yet He did not beget the filiation, as has already been said.

To the other, it must be said that the Father is not the author of the essence in the Son: but I well concede this, that the Father is the author, that and because, or why the essence is in the Son: because although authority is with respect to all things which are in the begotten, yet it is not with respect to those things which in some way relate to generation as terms, whether per se or through another, whether primarily or consequently: but the essence, neither in itself, nor in another person, relates in any way as being from another: but the essence in the Son is not essence according to the mode of understanding, but rather the reception of essence, and

the mode of having it: and therefore that can in some way be referred to the authority of generation.

To the other, it must be said that authority is the cause of distinction, in the way it is referred to the generated or to the begotten: but it is referred to the begotten universally, not primarily, nor per se: whence it is not the cause of distinction simply, but in a certain respect: for example, when it is said, the Father is the author that the essence is in the Son, it does not follow that the Father is distinct from the essence, or from the essence in the Son: because in neither way is He the author of the essence: but it follows from this, that the essence is in the Son, this has from the Father: and in one way the Father has the essence, and in another way the Son: because the Father has it not from another, but the Son has it from another.

To the last, it must be said that the Father is the author of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son as it is from the Son: but from this, as has already been held, it does not follow that the same active procession is not in the Father, but that the Father does not have it in the same way as the Son has it: and this is true: because the Father has it from Himself, and the Son has it from the Father: and this distinction is in the mode of having, not in that which is had.

Expositio Textus

Exposition of the Text

Then it is asked concerning those three things which he touches upon, namely, "I do not know," "I am not able," "I am not sufficient," etc.

How do they differ? For it seems to be a repetition of the same thing.

And it must be said to this, that "not to know" indicates a lack of habit in knowing; "I am not able," however, indicates a lack of reason for the understanding of divine things; "I am not sufficient," however, indicates the obscurity which remains even after the illumination of faith, on account of the obscurity of the mirror and enigma.

Articulus 7 — Whether The Inference Is Valid: The Spirit Proceeds Temporally From The Son; Therefore From Eternity

Whether it follows well, the Spirit proceeds temporally from the Son: therefore from eternity?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says:

To signify also proceeding from himself, he would openly show by breathing, etc.

For the argument does not seem to hold from temporal procession to eternal: because the Greeks concede that he is sent by the Son; yet they would not concede that he proceeds from the Son.

Solution. The argument is good: because as will be proven below, eternal procession is signified in the temporal: for to be sent is to be known that it is from another through an effect appropriable to the person: and therefore if it is signified to proceed temporally from the Son himself, of necessity also from eternity it proceeds from him: and this will be shown below.

Divisio Textus

Now it must be considered, etc. Here begins the second part of this distinction, in which it is shown that the Holy Spirit ought not to be called unbegotten. And it is divided into four parts; in the first of which it is shown through Augustine that the Spirit is not called unbegotten. Secondly, through Jerome it is shown that it is called unbegotten, at the place, F, "Jerome, however," etc. In the third, he resolves the contradiction of these, at the place, G, "But to this which seems," etc. In the fourth, he proves the solution, at the place, H, "That Jerome understood it thus," etc.

Articulus 8 — Whether The Holy Spirit Can Be Said To Be Unbegotten

Whether the Holy Spirit can be said to be unbegotten?

A doubt arises concerning the first chapter, whether the Holy Spirit can be said to be unbegotten?

It seems that it can.

1. For the Sophists give as a rule, that a proposition with an infinite predicate is equivalent to a negative, as "this is not a man" and "this is a non-man": therefore, since this is true, "the Holy Spirit is not begotten," it also seems that this is true, "the Holy Spirit is unbegotten."
2. Likewise, the Holy Spirit is either unbegotten or not unbegotten. If it is unbegotten, I have the proposition. But if it is not unbegotten, then it is not non-begotten: but this is equivalent to "is begotten": therefore, since this is false, "is not non-begotten" will also be false: therefore, this too, "is not unbegotten": therefore, that was true, "is unbegotten": and Augustine denies this.
3. Furthermore, it is given as a rule, that if two terms relate as superior and inferior, and both are negated, or conjoined with negation, the inferior becomes superior, and vice

versa: for example, man and animal relate such that man is inferior to animal: but non-man is superior to non-animal, since non-man can be said of more things than non-animal. Therefore, by similarity, since being from another and begotten relate as superior and inferior; if negation is conjoined to them, unbegotten will be verified of more things than not being from another. But not being from another is verified of one, namely the Father: therefore, unbegotten is verified of at least two: therefore, it will be said of the Holy Spirit.

Solution. It must be said with Damascene, that what I say unbegotten is said in two ways: for he says thus: "It must be known that unbegotten, written with one 'n', signifies the same as not made. Unbegotten, written with two 'n's, shows that it is not generated: and he says that in the first sense, begotten and not begotten distinguish between natures, namely created and uncreated: because the divine nature is unbegotten, that is, uncreated, according to which begotten is said from genesis, that is, from creation. However, unbegotten in the second meaning is common to both created and uncreated nature: because someone in the divine nature is unbegotten, as the Father alone, as Damascene says, and some others even in created nature are said to be unbegotten, such as the first individuals of all animals, that is, individuals which are not born, but made by condition, like the first two donkeys, and the first two lions, and the first two humans, and so on.

However, note that according to the property of the Latin language, this distinction does not exist: because unbegotten with two 'n's signifies nothing in the Latin language: but what is not generated, we say unbegotten. And therefore it must be said otherwise, that unbegotten can receive the preposition in two ways, namely in the force of privation, and in the force of negation. If it receives it in the force of privation, then it will not be said except of the unborn, yet apt for this, that it be born or generated: and thus it can be said neither of the Father, nor of the Holy Spirit, nor even of the Son. But if it receives the preposition in the force of negation, then it can negate negation outside the genus, or in the genus. If outside the genus: then unbegotten is as much as non-begotten being, or non-being begotten simply: and thus it is universally verified of all not from others or existing from another: and also of those which are from another or from others, provided they are not by generation from another or from others. But if it negates in the genus of divine nature: it can still make a triple negation, namely that the negation only negates the genus of generation, or only the generation itself leaving the genus, or both together. For example, the genus of generation is being from another: therefore, the sense can be, unbegotten, that is, not being from another: so that the negation stops there: and in this sense Augustine takes it in the first chapter of this part: and thus it is fitting only to the Father. Or the sense can be, unbegotten, that is, being from another not by generation: and thus the negation does not end except at the species of the begotten, and not at the genus: and thus it is fitting only to the Holy Spirit: but in this sense none of the Saints used this expression. In the third way, the negation can be understood to end at the whole which is in the begotten, that is, at being from another by generation together and conjointly, so that unbegotten is the same as not being from another by generation: and it commonly fits the Father and the Holy Spirit: and in this sense Jerome takes it.

Therefore, having this distinction, it must be answered to the first, that when it is said that a proposition with an infinite predicate is equivalent to a negative, infinite and privative are not taken as the same. For non-begotten is not the same as unbegotten, nor conversely, except in a certain sense, as has already been said. Hence, although Augustine concedes that the Spirit is non-begotten, according to which the negation negates the whole that begotten posits: he would not concede, however, that it is unbegotten: because this properly fits the Father, and is a notion of the Father according to which the negation negates only the genus of the begotten, that is, being from another: because thus it fits only the Father.

To the other, it must be said that the Holy Spirit is unbegotten, and is not unbegotten in different senses, as has already been shown, and therefore the solution to that is also clear.

To the other, it must be said that unbegotten, according to which the understood negation negates the whole, becomes superior to not being from another: but in that sense Augustine does not use it, but Jerome, as has already been said.

Articulus 9 — Whether Not To Be From Another Is A Notion Of The Father, And Whether The Father And The Son Can Be Said To Be The Same Principle Of The Holy Spirit

Whether not being from another is a notion of the Father, and whether the Father and the Son can be said to be the same principle of the Holy Spirit?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says:

The Father, he says, alone is not from another, etc.

1. For if not being from another is a notion of the Father, it seems also by opposition, being from another is a notion of the Son and the Holy Spirit, which is false: therefore neither is not being from another a notion of the Father.
2. Likewise, just as the Father is unbegotten, so also He is unprocessible: therefore it seems that this ought to be His notion, just as unbegottenness.
3. Furthermore, just as to be unbegotten in one sense belongs to the Father and the Holy Spirit, so to be unprocessible belongs to the Father and the Son: why then is it not posited to be one of the properties of the Father and the Son in common, just as Jerome posits unbegotten to belong in common to the Father and the Holy Spirit? If you say that this is hindered by commonality: because what is common does not have the intention of the proper: because the proper is what belongs to one alone. This is nothing: because active spiration according to which the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, is common to the Father and the Son: and yet it is a notion: therefore the reason of commonality does not impede the understanding of the notion.

It is further asked, if we say the Father and the Son are a principle through one notion, whether we can concede that they are the same principle?

1. It seems that they are: because they are a principle: therefore they are either the same principle or a different one: because the same and different follow every being insofar

as it is a being: but the Father and the Son are not a different principle of the Holy Spirit: therefore they are the same.

2. On the contrary: Above, the Master did not wish to concede concerning the Father and the Son, that they were the same God, or another God: yet he conceded that they were one God: therefore since the union of the Father and the Son in the common notion by which they breathe the Holy Spirit is not greater than in the divine essence, it seems that it should not be conceded that they are the same principle, or another or different.

Solution. It must be said to the first question, that three things are required for the being of a notion: one of which is principal from which also the term of the notion is derived, namely that through it the person is made known, or the person of whom it is a notion, or of whom it is a notion. The second is that it sounds some dignity: because the name of person sounds dignity, whether of nature or of office: but commonly it sounds the dignity of nature: hence we do not call individuals of other natures besides the rational persons, like this wood, or this stone, because they do not have the honor of the image in which is the likeness of the divine persons. The third is that it somehow has the nature of relation to another: because other properties in the divine cannot be, except relations of origin, as will be proven below.

With these things established, it is easy to respond to the objections.

To the first, it must be said that being from another does not pertain to dignity from itself: and therefore it cannot be a notion. I say from itself: because from some added mode, it could denote the dignity of being a being from another; which in lower things belongs to vile things, like to a hair worm, to a louse: these are examples of Augustine: therefore from itself it does not denote dignity in the person: but if it were added to be from another through generation, then generation would bring dignity to it which it does not have from itself: because the begotten (as Hilary says) is in the honor of the begetter: for the admiration of the honor of the begotten is in the honor of the begetter: and this was established above. But not being from another from itself denotes dignity, both in higher and lower things: because what is not from another, by that very fact is most perfect and most known: and therefore that is a notion of the Father.

To the other, it must be said that unbegottenness is a notion which includes in itself unprocessibility as a part of itself: and this is clear from the distinction placed above concerning what is unbegotten according to which the negation denies the genus of the begotten: because thus it is only a notion of the Father: then unbegottenness is the same as not being from another: and what is not from another, is neither generatively from another, nor even processively from another. Or it may be said, if it pleases, that begotten and processible are related as superior and inferior: therefore if negation or privation comes, what is inferior becomes superior, and conversely: therefore ingeneration or unbegottenness is superior to unprocessibility: and thus in unbegottenness unprocessibility is understood: and this is the solution of some, and it is not valid: because when it is said that through negation the less common becomes more common, it is not understood except of the supposits of which it is said, that this can be predicated of more than that: and not that it is placed in the understand-

ing of that as a part: for although man is a part of animal, and with man posited animal is posited: and similarly with non-animal posited, non-man is posited: yet it is not a part which falls essentially under non-man: just as man under animal by which it is defined.

Furthermore, I pose an objection concerning inspirable, which was posed concerning unprocessible: and then their solution is not valid: but it is necessary to return to the first solution.

To the other, it must be said that unbegotten according to which it commonly belongs to the Father and the Holy Spirit, according to the understanding of Jerome, is not a notion: for thus it only avails as much as not being from another through generation, so that the negation regards the whole conjointly: and this is not dignity, because it is not from another through generation, but very unworthily is from another, as is clear in the examples of Augustine, as the worm is not from another through generation, but from another through putrefaction: and therefore there is no further question concerning processible or inspirable.

To that which is further asked, whether the Father and the Son can be said to be the same principle of the Holy Spirit? Without prejudice I say, that they cannot: and this because of the article which is enclosed in the understanding of what is the same, which denotes the identity of the supposit and person: but the Father and the Son, although they are one God, yet they are not the same God, taking "the same" in the masculine: and similarly although they are one principle, yet they are not the same principle: because they are not the same person, but they themselves two persons are one principle.

To that which is objected against, it must be responded as above, that they are neither the same principle nor different: because different requires the otherness of form which is not there: the same however requires the identity of person which again is not there: and what the Philosopher says, that the same and different follow every being insofar as it is a being, it must be said that he understands of created things, and not of uncreated persons.

Articulus 10 — What ‘Unbegotten’ Predicates When It Is Said, ‘The Holy Spirit Is Unbegotten’: Essence, Person, Or Notion; And By What Community, Namely Either Of Reason Or Of Thing, It Is Said Of The Father And The Son

What does "unbegotten" predicate when it is said, "The Holy Spirit is unbegotten," whether essence, person, or notion? And by what commonality, namely either of reason or of thing, is it said of the Father and the Son?

Then it is asked concerning what is said there, in this chapter F, "The Holy Spirit is not the Father, but unbegotten," etc.

What indeed does "unbegotten" predicate when it is said of the Holy Spirit, either essence, or person, or notion? Because there are not multiple in divinity. It is evident that it does not predicate essence: because thus it would equally pertain to the three, which is false. Nor person, as is clear in individuals: for it is evident that it does not predicate the person of the Holy Spirit: because the Holy Spirit is not predicated of the Father, but unbegotten is predicated of him. But if it is said that it predicates notion. On the contrary: There are only

five notions, three of the Father and one of them he has with the Son, one of the Son, and one of the Holy Spirit.

Furthermore, when it is commonly said of the Holy Spirit and of the Father, by what commonality is it said? Either of thing, or of reason? If of thing: therefore some one notion is in the Father and the Holy Spirit, just as some one is in the Father and the Son, which is false: since there are only five notions, as the Master will prove below. But if by commonality of reason: therefore there is a universal in the divine, which Boethius denies in the book on the Trinity.

Solution. When "unbegotten" is predicated of the Father and the Holy Spirit, it does not signify a notion, as was proven above, nor essence, nor person; but it is a negation consequent to the mode of existence of the Holy Spirit: just as from the very fact that someone is a man, it follows that he is not a donkey, nor a stone: so from the very fact that the Holy Spirit is spirated, it follows that he is not begotten: and from the very fact that the Father is not from another, it follows that he is not begotten.

To the other it must be said, that it is common of reason, as the consequent negation is common: but that does not posit a substantial or accidental universal: and therefore it does not follow that in the Trinity there is a universal and particular: for from the fact that a man is not a stone, he is not something per se, or per accidens: for affirmation can cause negation, but not conversely negation affirmation: whence from the fact that

the Spirit is spirated, he is not begotten, or unbegotten: but it is not converted that from this he is spirated, or something, which is unbegotten, in that reason taking "unbegotten" in which Jerome takes it, as was said above.

Articulus 11 — Why ‘To Be From Another’ And ‘For Another Not To Be From Him’ Are Not Said To Be A Notion Of The Holy Spirit, And Why There Is No Emanation Of Essence

Why being from another and another not being from it is not called the notion of the Holy Spirit: and why there is no emanation of essence?

Then it is asked concerning what is said in the last chapter, there, Everything that is, either Here indeed under the unbegotten according to the unbegotten, or begotten, or made, etc.

Jerome comprehends the Holy Spirit.

1. Therefore it is asked, Since being from another, and another not being from it, is fitting to the Holy Spirit, why is that not called the notion of the Holy Spirit?

It seems that it ought to be said: because 2. Not being from another and another being from it, and being from another and another being from it, and being from another and another not being from it, is fitting to the divine persons: and what is fitting to one is not fitting to another: therefore they are fitting as properties: because properties

there are, which distinctly pertain to the divine persons; therefore these are properties.

It is asked, Why is there no emanation of essence, since Jerome here touches upon what is made, and what is not made?

1. For in lower things we see that something emanates from a created essence, which is not itself.
2. Further, It seems that essence according to this division of Jerome has a property that determines it: for it is either unbegotten, or begotten, or made: because Jerome comprehends all under these three. It is evident that it is not made, nor begotten: therefore it is unbegotten: therefore it is determined by the property of unbegottenness: but whatever is determined, is distinguished: therefore the divine essence is distinguished.
3. Furthermore, Jerome in this division places the same thing twice, namely that which is not made, nor begotten, but unbegotten: therefore it seems that the same is divided against itself, which cannot be, for man under animal is not divided against man.
4. Again, It seems false to say, when he says, What is made, and born, and reborn, is man: for many men are never reborn, like Gentiles and Jews.

Solution. To this it is easy to solve according to what was determined above.

To the first, it must be said that not being other than something does not imply any dignity; and therefore it cannot be a notion.

To the other, it must be said that concerning the divine persons, some things are said singularly as notions, and some also as negations which follow the mode of existence of notions or persons: and those negations do not imply special notions, as was shown before.

To the question, it must be said that from the divine essence there could not be an emanation of persons: because it is one in three, and that from which there is emanation is distinguished.

To that which is objected against, it must be said that the inferior essence is not simple: and that which it emits is not itself: and this due to complete simplicity cannot pertain to the divine essence.

To the other, it must be said that unbegotten according to the understanding of Jerome does not denote a notion, but a common negation following the mode of existence, as was said before.

To the other, it must be said that Jerome does not place the same thing twice in the division, but in the exemplification he shows that part which is unbegotten and not made, to be verified for two in common: and this can well happen in any division, that something of the dividing is verified for one, and another for two.

To the last, it must be said that Jerome takes rebirth according to aptitude, as is clear in examples: because man is apt to be reborn, but not a brute animal. Or it can be said that he does not speak universally for all, but for some who are Christians.

DISTINCTIO XIV

Divisio Textus

Furthermore, it is diligently to be noted, that it is twofold, etc.

Here begins that part in which it is treated of the temporal procession of the Holy Spirit.

And it is divided into three parts: in the first of which this procession is determined according to the comparison to the sender, or to that from which it is. In the second, two modes are determined, namely visible and invisible of this procession: and this begins in distinction XVI, there, Now concerning the Holy Spirit it must be seen, etc. In the third, however, the name consequent to this procession on the part of the one proceeding, which is gift and given, is determined: and this begins in distinction XVII, B, there, Furthermore it is diligently to be considered, when the Holy Spirit is said, etc.

The first of these is subdivided into two: in the first of which it is proved that the Holy Spirit is sent and given by the Father and the Son, and not by men. In the second, however, it is asked, Whether He is sent and given by Himself, or not? and this begins in distinction XV, there, Here it is to be considered, when the Holy Spirit is given to men by the Father, etc.

This distinction which first occurs, is divided into two parts. In the first it is shown that the Spirit is sent by the Father and the Son. In the second it is shown that He is neither sent nor given by men, there, D, Here it is asked, Whether and the virtues of the saints give or can give, etc.

In the former there are three parts through three chapters: in the first of which it is shown, that the procession of the Holy Spirit is twofold, namely eternal and temporal. In the second, it is specially treated of the temporal procession of the Holy Spirit, there, B, Concerning the temporal procession, etc. In the third it is shown, that not only His gifts, but also the Spirit Himself proceeds in the temporal procession, there, C, There are some who say, etc.

Articulus 1 — What Temporal Procession Is

What is temporal procession?

Here before the Letter arises a doubt, What is temporal procession? what is temporal apparition? what is temporal mission? and what is temporal giving? and how does one of these differ from another? and in how many ways does procession occur? and what does temporal procession add over eternal?

Therefore, let it be asked first, What is temporal procession?

1. The Master says here at the beginning of the lesson, that the procession of the Holy Spirit is the bestowal of grace in time. However, this does not seem to be fitting: because grace is created: therefore, in the bestowal of grace, there is no procession of the Holy Spirit.

2. Furthermore, according to this, it seems to follow that the Holy Spirit would be the grace bestowed: because the Holy Spirit is His own procession.

3. Likewise, the procession of this grace, or proceeding in grace of this kind, seems equally to pertain to the whole Trinity. This is proven by Dionysius in the book On the Divine Names, where he says thus: Divine action of itself in discretion is a procession fitting to the good of divine union and super-unity, multiplying itself in the plurality of gifts, equally pertaining to every person, it seems that this procession would be of any person. If you say that Dionysius speaks of eternal procession, it is proven false by what follows subsequently in the Letter thus: United indeed are according to divine discretion incomprehensible traditions, substantifications, vivifications, sapientifications, and other gifts of goodness which is the cause of all, according to which they are praised from participations and participants not participatively participated. He speaks of divine attributes, which through connoted many are, and cause them in us. Therefore, since this equally pertains to any person, it seems that proceeding is of any person. But on the contrary: Only he proceeds who is sent: only he is sent who is from another, as Augustine says: therefore, only he proceeds who is from another: therefore, it does not pertain to the Father to proceed.

Solution. It must be said that without doubt to proceed temporally pertains only to the Holy Spirit and the Son, and properly pertains to the Holy Spirit, if we take proceeding as it is divided against generation, as was explained above: and then procession is quite well said to be the manifestation of the Holy Spirit in the bestowal of the gift making pleasing to sanctify the creature: which definition can plainly be gathered here in the first chapter.

To the other, it must be said that although eternal procession as such does not denote something created, yet it can be manifested through something created; and according to which the proceeding Spirit is thus manifested, it is called temporal procession.

To the other, it must be said that Dionysius does not speak there of such a procession as is sought here by us. Hence it must be noted that there is a twofold procession of divine goodness into beings: for one is of the good, according to which the good is diffusive of itself and being through the act of creation, according to which mode he calls those things which are not as those which are: and thus the good proceeds into all things, according to which it is said, God saw all things which He had made, and they were very good. And although it is equally related to all things, yet other things are not equally related to it: and therefore Dionysius says that what is imparticipable is participated: in itself indeed imparticipable, because it is equally present: but in others which are not equally present to it, participated: because something receives according to being only: something according to being, and life: something according to being, living, and sensing: and something according to being, living, sensing, moving, and understanding: and so of others: and to this procession is not joined the procession of the Holy Spirit as in which it is manifested. But there is again a procession of the good in the effects of grace making pleasing the rational nature, such as charity, and the like: and because such things manifest gratuitous love towards us, therefore in these is manifested

the bestowal of the first gift: and this is the Holy Spirit: therefore in these is manifested the procession of the Holy Spirit.

Articulus 2 — What Temporal Apparition Is

What is a temporal apparition?

Having considered this, it is necessary to inquire, What is a temporal apparition?

1. Cassian says: It is said to have appeared when it is suddenly shown. And, it is said to have appeared when it shines with unusual brightness. In every temporal procession, there is the unusual brightness of grace, it seems that apparition and mission are the same.
2. Furthermore, He does not come unless he is sent to us: but he who appears, comes: therefore he is sent to us.
3. Furthermore, This seems through what is held, to Titus, 1, 11 and 12: The grace of God, our savior, has appeared to all men, instructing us, that denying ungodliness, etc. Therefore, apparition is for sanctifying the creature. Since, therefore, as it is said here, mission is for the same, it seems apparition is the same as mission.

But on the contrary: Augustine: Let us not rashly say which person of the Trinity appeared to any of the Fathers or Prophets in any body or likeness of body, unless some probable indications surround it with the context of the reading. For the very nature or substance or essence, or whatever other name it is to be called, that which God is, whatever it is, cannot be seen corporeally. But through the subject creature, it is to be believed that not only the Son or the Holy Spirit, but also the Father could give a signification of himself in corporeal form or likeness to mortal senses. From this it is taken, that apparition is either of the divine essence through the subject creature: or if it pertains to the person, this will be by the grace of essence and not of the person. To confirm this, many things can be introduced from the same second book on the Trinity, but for this one suffices.

Sorurio. We say that apparition, as it is said of those manifestations which were made to the Fathers of the Old Testament, namely to Abraham and Lot and Jacob and others, was properly for the manifestation of the essence either in itself, or according to what is in the persons existing as one in number, and the person uniting.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that Cassian defines apparition in the first signification according to the usage of speakers, according to which something is suddenly produced, which was not known, and whose investigation cannot be found: and that common ratio is both of the apparition which is the manifestation of the divine essence through the subject creature, and of the mission or procession of the person. However, if according to the ends apparition and procession are considered, they are defined by different definitions: because apparition is the manifestation of essence, and procession is the manifestation of person.

And through this, the solution to the following is also clear. For the manifestation of both, namely of essence and of person, shines as a new light to us: because by our reason we cannot enter into it.

Articulus 3 — What It Is To Be Sent, And What Mission Is

What it is to be sent, and what is mission?

Thirdly, it is asked, What it is to be sent, and mission?

And this definition is taken from Augustine, where he says: Just as to be born is to be from the Father for the Son, so to be sent is for the Son to be known to be from Him. And just as for the Holy Spirit to be the gift of God is to proceed from the Father, so to be sent is to be known to proceed from Him. Nor can we say that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son: for indeed the same Spirit is not said in vain to be of the Father and of the Son. To be sent, in the common signification, is to be known to be from another.

BUT IT IS OBJECTED:

1. Everything that is known, is known through something else: therefore it ought to have been placed in the definition of what it is to be sent, that by which it is known.
2. Likewise, Knowledge is appropriated to the Son: therefore it seems that to be sent does not pertain except to the Son, which is against the Letter, because the Spirit is sent just as the Son. If you say that that by which it is known is not knowledge, but a created effect in a rational creature appropriable sometimes to the Son, sometimes to the Holy Spirit. On the contrary: That effect is commonly of the whole Trinity: therefore it manifests the whole Trinity, to which however it does not pertain to be from another.
3. Furthermore, If some effect appropriable were to the Son, and showed the Son to be from another, it would seem that it would be wisdom, and knowledge, and faith, and other gifts which pertain to the intellect: but these manifest the Holy Spirit, as is held by that of the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 12:7 and following: To each is given the manifestation of the Spirit for utility. To one indeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge according to the same Spirit, to another faith in the same Spirit, which manifests the Spirit also in the gifts of the intellect: therefore no grace manifests the Son to be sent from another: and thus according to this definition to be sent does not pertain to the Son, which is false.

Furthermore, If by effect it is manifested to be from another, this will not be except appropriately, because that effect properly is of the whole Trinity: but appropriated things do not lead to proper things, as was proven above: therefore it seems that from such effects it is not known that someone is from another, but rather power, wisdom, goodness which are appropriated.

Solution. It must be said that in truth Augustine most excellently determines mission, when he says that to be sent is to be well known to be from another: I concede that this is done

through effect, but not any effect whatsoever: but two things are required, namely appropriability to the proper, and that it be an effect of grace making one pleasing, to which is always joined the procession of the person, and the person itself: for the person itself must be shown present in a new way with its effect, if it is to be said to proceed temporally, as will be clear below.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that that effect is implied in the reason of knowledge: because invisible knowledge is not made except in something that is created.

To the other it must be said that knowledge in that it is knowledge is attributed to the Son: yet that by which knowledge is received is not attributed to the Son, as was said in the objection.

To what is objected, it must be said that wisdom is considered in two ways, namely compared to act: and thus it is appropriated to the Son, and manifests the mission of the Son. Or it can be considered in comparison to the end: because namely it is to lead to charity and merit: and thus it manifests the mission of the Holy Spirit: and this is not inconvenient: because often in the same gift the mission of both is manifested: just as also each is sent for the reduction and sanctification of the rational creature.

Articulus 4 — What Giving Or Donation Is, And How They Differ

What is giving or donation, and how do they differ?

Fourthly, it is asked, What is giving, or donation, which more truly pertains to God?

The Philosopher says, however, that a gift is something given irretrievably. From this it is understood that donation or giving is the conferral of an irretrievable gift.

But against this it is objected: In God's gift, whether of nature or of grace making one pleasing, something else is conferred by God which He does not take back, nor hopes to be returned: therefore it seems that giving is then present.

But on the contrary: Here it is asked about the giving with which or by which God gives Himself: but He does not give Himself in every gift, but with grace making one pleasing: therefore it seems that in that there is not donation or giving.

But if this is granted: then it seems that donation or giving is the same as mission: because when He gives such an effect, that effect will be appropriable to some person: and thus it shows that it is from another: therefore it seems that mission and giving are the same.

Solution. It must be said that donation or giving (since here they are taken for the same) is the conferral of some grace which makes one pleasing: and this irretrievably: because God's gift cannot be returned to Him. But because every gift is conferred in the first gift which is gratuitous love, therefore every gift of such grace is called the gift of the Holy Spirit.

To what is objected about natural gifts, it must be said that those are given and are called: and not according to the donation sought here, namely in which and with which the first gift

is through the presence of some effect of an agent for the reduction of the erring rational nature to sanctification.

To the other it must be said that giving, or donation, and mission, do not differ in matter and end: because the matter of both is the effect of grace making one pleasing, and the end of both is to reduce the rational creature to sanctification: but they differ in the reason of the act imported in the name, when it is called mission, and when it is called donation. For mission imports a comparison to the sender, because it is not sent unless a messenger from the sender: and it imports a comparison to him to whom it is sent, because it is sent to the rational creature: and it also imports the reason of the business for which the mission is made. Donation, however, imports only the last two, namely to whom it is given, and the end of the giving.

If perhaps you object that every giving is from some giver, just as mission is from a sender. It must be said that mission imports a distinct person sent: for what the messenger brings is not properly said to be sent, nor the messenger, but this is given through him who is sent: donation, however, does not import the messenger or the sent one, because many things can be given without an intermediary messenger: and therefore donation does not import a person who is from another, as mission does: and in this way it does not express the comparison of personal distinction from the giver as mission does.

Articulus 5 — How Temporal Mission, Procession, Apparition, And Temporal Giving Differ From One Another

How do temporal mission, procession, apparition, and temporal giving differ from each other?

Fifthly, it is asked, How do these differ from each other?

And it seems according to what has been determined, that temporal mission and procession are related as convertible terms: because to whomever it is fitting to be sent, it is fitting to proceed, and conversely: for it is not fitting to be sent unless existing from another, and to proceed also is not fitting unless from another.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Procession is a property of the Holy Spirit, and not of the Son: I speak of passive procession: but it is fitting for the Son to be sent: therefore these three are not convertible.

1. Likewise, no one is sent unless a messenger: but he who is not a messenger also proceeds: therefore to be sent and to proceed are not the same, nor are they convertible.
2. Likewise, it has been stated above, that to proceed is said partly by similarity to a processive motion, and partly by similarity to a procession or exit caused by a cause: but neither of these is the reason of being sent: therefore it seems that these are not the same.

Likewise, apparition and temporal procession seem to be related as superior and inferior: because in every mission there is an apparition, but it is not convertible: for in every mission there is suddenly something shining and divine appearing through affection: therefore in every mission there is an apparition.

But against this is that 1. Apparition is not called by the Saints any manifestation made, unless it is through a subject creature, whether united to it or not united: but mission is not always so: therefore not every mission implies an apparition.

1. Furthermore, apparition is indeed made through Angels: as in the apparition of Abraham in the valley of Mamre: and in the apparition of Moses. But mission is never made except immediately through divine persons. Therefore mission is not an apparition nor a species of it.

Likewise, it seems that giving is none of these: because giving can be done without the manifestation of the giver through a subject creature, and thus it is not an apparition: and it can be done by one who does not proceed from another, and thus it is not a procession: and it can be done without an intervening messenger, and thus it is not a mission: therefore it seems that all these differ from each other.

Solution. It must be said that these have a difference from each other: because, as the object is, apparition as we use it here is not made except through a subject creature: and every apparition that was made to the ancients was made through the dispensation of Angels, and was ordered to the apparition of the Word made in flesh: and that this is true is taken from Augustine, where he says thus: All those things which were seen by the Fathers, when God presented Himself to them according to His dispensation at a time suitable, were manifestly made through a creature. And if it is hidden from us how He made them through the ministers of Angels, we nevertheless say from our sense that apparitions were made through Angels. But that they are ordered to the end of the apparition of Christ in the flesh, the same Augustine says thus: Whatever things were done before for the sake of making the faith by which we might be cleansed to contemplate the truth in things produced from eternity, and related to eternity temporally, were either testimonies of this mission (namely of the Son in the flesh), or the mission itself of the Son of God. Therefore, it is established that apparition is principally for manifesting the divine nature, either in itself or in persons: although indeed under some number Angels sometimes appeared, as three were seen by Abraham, and two by Lot: and in this there seems to be a manifestation of the number of persons: nevertheless, principally the unity of nature was manifested: and therefore it is said of Abraham, that he saw three and adored one: and therefore it is clear that apparition is not a procession or temporal mission, nor even its genus.

To the first objection, that where there is a mission, there is knowledge of the one existing from another through another, and thus an apparition. It must be said that there is equivocation in apparition: because apparition is called by the Saints a manifestation through an assumed creature to the sense: but the knowledge which is in the mission is to the intellect.

Likewise, in the New Testament persons appeared: as the Father in the voice, and the Spirit in fire, tongues, and breath, and the Son in flesh: but these are called visible missions about which there will be discourse below: but now we speak only of the apparition of the Old Testament.

However, procession and mission (as the objection also proves) do not differ except according to reason: because procession only signifies the comparison of the one proceeding to the one from whom it proceeds: and if it is called temporal procession, again it only adds the connotation of effect in the creature: but mission signifies that comparison, and further the comparison to the one to whom or in whom it is sent. However, giving does not signify the distinction of the person announcing. Hence these three differ: because procession principally signifies the distinction of the one proceeding from the one from whom it proceeds: but mission principally signifies the distinction of the messenger to the one announcing, and to the one to whom the announcement is made: however, giving principally connotes the effect.

Articulus 6 — In How Many Ways Procession Or Mission Takes Place

In how many ways does procession or mission occur?

Sixthly, it is asked, In how many ways does such a procession or mission occur?

For it seems that it cannot be reduced to an artificial number: for if it occurs to recall the rational creature, and that is recalled in many ways, it seems that procession and mission occur in as many ways.

If perhaps it is said that it does not occur to recall the rational creature. On the contrary: Augustine: Since we have been exiled from this immutable joy, yet we have not been cut off and severed from it, so that we do not even in these mutable and temporal things seek eternity, truth, and blessedness: for we do not wish to die, nor to be deceived, nor to be disturbed: divine visions suitable to our pilgrimage have been sent to us, by which we might be admonished that what we seek is not here, but that we must return from here to there: for unless we were dependent on it, we would not seek it here. Therefore, it is evident that the mission is for the purpose of recalling him who has gone astray: and thus it seems that it occurs in infinite ways, in which also the error occurs.

Solution. It must be said that materially it occurs in many ways, which cannot be reduced to an artificial number: but the formal ways do not extend beyond four: for when in the effect with which there is always a person being from another, it becomes known: and this is either internally to the intellect, and thus it is through the gift of intellect, or through the gift of affection, and behold two ways: or this is externally to the sense ordered to the intellect, and then it must occur in an assumed creature: and that is either united to the one assuming, as in the case of the Son who was sent into the world through the assumed human nature: or it is assumed not united, as is the sounding voice, and the tongue, and the dove, and such things, about which inquiry will be made in their proper place below. And through this the solution to the whole is evident.

Articulus 7 — What The Temporal Procession Adds Over And Above The Eternal

What does temporal procession add over the eternal?

Seventhly, it is asked, What does temporal procession add over the eternal?

It seems, however, that it adds nothing: because 1. Everything to which addition is possible is in potency to that which it does not have: but in eternals, nothing is in potency to that which it does not have: therefore the temporal cannot add over the eternal.

1. Furthermore, it does not seem that temporal procession signifies anything except eternal procession with an effect in the creature appropriable to the proceeding person: but that effect is only of the person on the part of the creature, and not on the part of the proceeding person: therefore it is not added to it: therefore it remains as simple as before: therefore it seems that nothing is added.

If this be said, On the contrary: Eternal procession does not in any way receive this denomination by its own grace that it is or is called temporal: if therefore it is called temporal, it seems that this is by the grace of something added: therefore the temporal adds something.

Solution, It must be said to this, that in truth nothing can be added to the eternal substantially and accidentally: but nevertheless something can relate to it differently than it did before: and thus I say here, that temporal procession includes in itself the understanding of eternal procession, and adds a relation which is caused by this, that the rational creature by the gift of God relates to it differently in grace than it did before. And although these cannot be added so as to make something numerically one, yet these can be signified together by one name, as is temporal procession: whence procession adds in the mode of understanding and signifying, although it does not add in reality, so that the temporal makes the eternal or an accident of the eternal.

And from this also the solution to both objections is clear.

Articulus 8 — Whether The Master Here Determines Well Concerning The Temporal Mission

Whether the Master here determines well concerning the temporal mission?

Having seen these things which are as it were an aid to this whole treatise, we must approach the Letter.

And first it is asked concerning this which he says:

Furthermore, it must be diligently noted, etc.

1. For it seems that this treatise on the temporal procession is poorly placed: since the Master here treats of those things which pertain to the eternal God, but these things pertain in time, it seems poorly introduced here.

2. Likewise, there are certain things pertaining to God temporally, concerning which the Master will determine below: therefore, among those this treatise ought to be placed, as it seems.

3. Furthermore, the mission into the flesh is treated in Book III of the Sentences: since therefore

that principal of all missions, as it seems, the Master ought to have treated simultaneously there also of those missions which he touches upon here.

Solution. It must be said that it is not treated here of those inasmuch as they are temporal, but inasmuch as in the temporal the eternal enclosed is made known: and therefore because the distinction, namely the eternal emanation of persons, is known in the temporal, therefore this part is introduced.

To the other it must be said that other things which belong to God from time, as Creator and Lord when He is called from dominion, according to act do not show the distinction of persons: and therefore with those this could not be ordered.

To the other it must be said that in the Second Book of Sentences it is treated of those things which pertain to the incarnation according to the truth of the assumed nature and the assuming: and this is not of the nature of mission: because mission can be in a creature not united. But here something is touched upon, although little, as they are substantial to the mission showing the eternal exit of the Son from the Father, as it may be evident in the following distinction, in which it is touched upon the mission of the Son into flesh, not only in flesh.

Articulus 9 — Whether The Procession Of The Holy Spirit Can Be Said To Be Twofold, And Whether There Are Two

Whether the procession of the Holy Spirit can be called twofold, and whether there are two?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, that the procession of the Holy Spirit is twofold: namely eternal, etc.

1. For it seems that this is false: for if the procession is twofold: either it is the same repeated, or there are two processions, and therefore it is called twofold. It is evident that it is not in the first way: because an eternal procession cannot be repeated. Nor does it seem to be true in the second way; because the temporal does not add upon the eternal except an effect connoted in time or temporal: therefore it seems that there are not two.

2. Likewise, a difference in accident does not make two, as long as the subject is one: for Socrates white and Socrates musical are not two, but one: therefore similarly, since the eternal procession is in the temporal, and nothing more except its comparison to this effect to which it was not previously compared, those processions seem to be one, and not two.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
1. One is external, and the other temporal: and the eternal is not temporal: therefore there are two.

1. Likewise, one is the Spirit in itself, the other in man sanctifying: therefore, since these are two, there will be two processions here.

Solution. To this it must be said that in truth according to substance there is here only one procession of the Holy Spirit: as the first reasons prove, nor does the Master say that there are two: but he says that one is twofold: however, because it receives an addition in time, therefore in this respect it is said to be doubled.

To that which is objected against this, it must be said that one is not removed from the other by reason of what is procession, but by reason of the added: hence the procession with the effect signified is not the procession without the effect signified: not indeed in subject, because in subject they are the same: but by the defining reason of each, one from the eternal, and the other from the temporal: for by reason of this opposition of reasons one is removed from the other.

To the other it must be said that this temporal addition is by comparison to man sanctifying, and does not diversify the subject, but only the reason from the added.

Articulus 10 — Whether The Procession Of The Holy Spirit Can Be Said To Be Temporal

Whether the procession of the Holy Spirit can be called temporal?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said in the second chapter B, there, Concerning the temporal procession, etc.

1. For it seems that it is not rightly called temporal: because the work of the Spirit, and the work of the Trinity is above time: therefore, since that which is called temporal adds nothing beyond that except the effect with which the Spirit is, it seems it is not rightly called temporal.
2. Likewise, Augustine says thus: Therefore it seems, that according to which we grasp something eternal with the mind as much as we can, we are not in this world, that effect lifts above the world and time, that it itself is much more above time and the world: and thus incongruously it is called a temporal procession from that effect.

Solution. We say that temporal is said in many ways: for temporal is said which lies under and makes to lie under the variation of time: and thus time is said to be the cause of corruption, because through motion and change it makes to be distant what is: and thus procession into creature is not said to be temporal, because it makes to be nearer to true incorruption. It is also said to be temporal, whose origin is in time, even if it is not varied according to its being with time: just as the creation of this soul is in time, which nevertheless is not corrupted in time. It is also said to be temporal which as to its beginning is in time, although as to its act it is outside time: just as the temporal procession which makes us in some way according to our

possibility to attain the eternal: and in this way grace is in time, and other things which elevate us to God which are given to us in time.

Articulus 11 — Whether Power Ought To Be Attributed To The Father Or To The Holy Spirit

Whether virtue ought to be attributed to the Father or to the Holy Spirit?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says:

He is the virtue which went out from him, etc.

1. Against this is what is said, 1 Corinthians 1:24: Christ the power of God. Therefore, it seems that virtue is appropriated to the Son: and thus it manifests the procession of the Son, and not of the Holy Spirit.
2. Furthermore, it seems that virtue is attributed to the Father. For the Philosopher says that virtue is the ultimate of power in a thing: but power is attributed to the Father: therefore also virtue: therefore much more it manifests the mission of the Father, if it can be sent, than of the Holy Spirit.

Solution. Virtue is twofold, namely natural power virtue, and operative virtue. Operative, however, is twofold, namely towards being, and towards well-being. But the virtue of natural power is ordered to the attribute of the Father, to whom is attributed the power of natural strength, because it has the nature of a principle not from a principle, but a principle has the nature of power: but the word and wisdom of the practical intellect also have the virtue of operating towards being, and since this virtue is towards being as an operative idea, this is attributed to the Son.

Furthermore, the strength of fortitude in battle is attributed to the Son, because he by fighting in the flesh conquered the strong.

However, there is a virtue operating towards well-being, according to what the Philosopher says, that virtue in the most difficult things is operative of the best: and according to what Augustine says, that virtue is a good quality of the mind by which one lives rightly, which no one uses badly: and to this likeness is also called the virtue of healings and miracles: because it heals externally in testimony of the interior healing, as the Psalm says: Who forgives all your iniquities, who heals all your diseases.

And through this the solution to the objections is clear.

Articulus 12 — How Often The Lord Sent The Holy Spirit, Whether Twice Or Thrice

How many times did the Lord send the Holy Spirit, whether twice or thrice?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said:

After the resurrection, the Lord Jesus twice gave the Holy Spirit, etc.

1. For it seems that He gave it thrice: because even before the resurrection He sent them and gave them power over all demons, and to heal the sick: and after the resurrection, He gave it to them by breathing, saying: Receive the Holy Spirit: whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them. And thirdly, He gave the Holy Spirit from heaven, Acts 2:3-4: And it sat upon each of them: and they were all filled with the Holy Spirit.
2. Furthermore, what is it that through Him charity is diffused: for diffusion is of the humid, which does not pertain to charity.
3. Furthermore, why is this diffusion more attributed to charity than to any other virtue?

Solution. To the first, it must be said that to insinuate the two precepts of charity, He gave it twice, that is, in two places, because in heaven where the glory of God, who is to be loved by charity, shines more, and on earth where the neighbor converses with us. But that He gave the Holy Spirit before the passion, this was also ordained to the love of neighbor: and thus in this respect it does not make a number. However, if the acts of the Spirit, or of the mission, are considered, then He gave it thrice: because first before the passion for the operation of miracles, after the passion for the power of the keys of the ministers of the Church, after the ascension for the conversion of the Gentiles: and this is evident by the adjuncts to each bestowal of the Holy Spirit. For first it is said that He gave them power over all demons, and to heal the sick. Secondly, it is said: Receive the Holy Spirit: whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them. Thirdly, it is said: They began to speak with other tongues, as the Holy Spirit gave them to speak.

To the other, it must be said that diffusion is taken metaphorically from the humid which fertilizes divided through dry earthly parts: because thus charity waters dry earthly hearts to fertility.

To the other, it must be said that charity alone cannot be without form, and it makes every quantity of merit: and therefore it is in this respect spread and diffused in the power of God.

Articulus 13 — Whether It Befits The Holy Spirit To Be Sent Or Given, And Why More Befittingly To The Holy Spirit Than To Another Person, And Why It Does Not Befit The Father To Be Sent As The Son And The Holy Spirit

Whether it is fitting for the Holy Spirit to be sent or given, and why more to the Holy Spirit than to another person, and why it is not fitting for the Father to be sent as the Son and the Holy Spirit?

Then it is asked concerning those things which are said in this chapter C, "There are some who say that the Holy Spirit, God Himself, is given," etc. For many reasons, the opinion of those seems to be true.

1. First: because what is whole everywhere is lacking nowhere: therefore it is sent nowhere: because what is sent passes from place to place: therefore it seems, since the Spirit is everywhere, as Ambrose says, that it is sent nowhere.
2. Likewise, if before the mission it is everywhere essentially, and presentially, and potentially, after the mission it does not seem that there is anything more in that to which it is said to be sent, except only a created gift: therefore it seems that it is not given itself otherwise than it was present before, but only its gift.
3. Likewise, the created effect is commonly of the whole Trinity, and not of one person more than another: therefore by reason of that effect, either any person is said to be sent, or none: but not any, therefore none.
4. Likewise, that is properly given which is had for use after it is conferred. But the Holy Spirit is never had for use, but for fruit by holy men: therefore the Holy Spirit is not given or sent, but only its gifts.

Further it is asked, Why is it more fitting for the person of the Holy Spirit to be sent or given than the Son?

1. The Son came for the chief mission when He came in the flesh: therefore it is more fitting for Him to be sent than the Holy Spirit.
2. Likewise, to whomsoever the highest in something is fitting principally, to that one it is also fitting principally to be what is from that one: but by the merit of the Son the Spirit is sent: by the merit, I say, by which He merited for us the Spirit in the passion: therefore it seems that it is principally fitting for Him to be sent.

Further it is asked, Why is it not fitting for the Father to be sent and given? For there are certain gifts appropriable to Him, as also to the Son and the Holy Spirit.

Solution. It must be said that to be given in gifts is especially fitting to Him who proceeds from eternity as a gift, in whom other gifts are given: and this, as is clear from the aforesaid, is none other than the Holy Spirit.

To this, therefore, which is first objected, it must be said that the Spirit is everywhere as God, because He is God: but nevertheless by this effect by which He is manifested in the saints, He does not show Himself everywhere: and therefore with respect to this He is said to be sent: because He is personally and essentially present in a special way where He thus operates: but in every place He is in general ways, namely presentially, potentially, and essentially.

To the other it must be said that after the mission the Holy Spirit is especially in the saints: but this specialness refers to the work, not to a different mode of the Spirit, and with respect to

this that the saints are related to Him differently than before, and differently than another thing.

To the other it must be said that the effect of holiness as an effect is commonly of the Trinity, but as it is of holiness, it is not equally appropriable to the Trinity, but rather by reason of holiness it places a fittingness to the proper of the Holy Spirit, which is the gift or love in which all gifts are given.

To the other it must be said that this is given which is had for use, and which helps for use: although grace effected is had for use, nevertheless the Spirit helps for use, because otherwise grace would not be able to effect anything unless the Holy Spirit were present by Himself, as will be clear below.

To that which is further asked, Why is it more fitting for the person of the Holy Spirit to be sent or given than the Father or the Son? It must be said that if the reason of giving is considered apart from the reason of mission, then it is clear to render the reason: because the Spirit proceeds as a gift, not the Father and the Son. But if the reason of mission is considered: then it can still be considered in two ways, namely with respect to that comparison that the sent is said to be from another: and thus it is fitting for the Son to be sent, as the Holy Spirit. It can also be considered

the mission to the end of the mission, which is the sanctification of the rational creature: and that end is more appropriable to the Holy Spirit than to the Son: but concerning the Father it is clear, because it is in no way fitting for Him to be sent according to Augustine, because He is not from another.

To that which is objected against, it must be said that in the visible mission, namely the chief mission is fitting to the Son: because He united the visible creature to Himself: and it was more fitting for Him to be sent in that mission than the Holy Spirit, as is proved in the Second Sentences: but in the invisible mission the Holy Spirit is missible, as the Son: or more, because He has a greater appropriation in sanctifying gifts.

To the other it must be said that the mission in the flesh was the highest of missions in two ways, namely because others without it would not have availed for redemption, and because it was made by the union of the created effect by the Trinity: but in the interior personal sanctification it is equally or more fitting for the Holy Spirit to be sent.

To that which is further asked, Why is it not fitting for the Father to be sent and given? It must be said that it is not fitting for the Father to be sent for the reason already said: because of what Augustine says, that to be sent is to be known to be from another: but the Father is not from another. Whether, however, the Father gives Himself, the Master will determine below, and it will be determined later.

To what is objected, that certain gifts are appropriable to the Father, it must be said that this is true: but those of themselves are not grace-making: for power does not make grace: and therefore since mission or giving is not made except in those things which sanctify, it does not follow that in those gifts the Father gives Himself; nevertheless the Son says of the Father: "We

will come to him, and make our abode with him." But this happens, because the three persons inseparably inhabit holy souls, whence in that abode only the Spirit is sent, as is clear from what precedes: "If anyone loves me, he will keep my word: and my Father will love him, and we will come to him," etc. For in the bestowal of love only the Spirit is sent by reason of appropriation, yet not only the Spirit inhabits, but the inhabitation is of the three together.

Articulus 14 — Whether The Holy Spirit Can Be Said To Be Food And Drink

Whether the Holy Spirit can be called a cube, and a drink?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said:

We have drunk one Spirit, etc.

1. For it seems that the Spirit is not a drink: or by what likeness is it called a drink?
2. Furthermore, what is it to drink the Spirit? It seems that this is to be infused with His gifts.
3. Furthermore, on that Isaiah iv, 1: We will eat our own bread, etc., the Gloss says that the women are the gifts of the Holy Spirit: but the food of the women is the Father, as also of Christ: but our food is Christ who descended from heaven as the living bread. Therefore, it seems that the Spirit is refreshed by the Father as by bread: but we are drunk with the Spirit: and these do not seem to agree.
4. Furthermore, it is more fitting for the Son to be a drink: because it is thus said, Ecclesiasticus xv, 3: He will drink the water of saving wisdom. And, Proverbs ix, 5: Drink the wine which I have mixed for you, says Wisdom.

Solution. It must be said that in truth the Spirit can metaphorically be called food and drink. It is called a drink, as Augustine hints here, inasmuch as it restrains the ardor of secular thirst. Hence, John vii, 38: He who believes in me..., rivers will flow from his belly, etc. It is called bread inasmuch as it strengthens the heart in grace.

To the objection concerning the Gloss, it must be said that the Father is put there for the will of the Father: and the will of the Father is called the food of the women effectively, namely because they make us be refreshed in the will of the Father: as Christ said: My food is to do the will of Him who sent me. And note that the gifts of the Spirit refresh: but unless they have two things from the very substance of the Spirit, which is with the gifts in us, they do not satisfy: of which one is the taste to remove distaste, the other is the power of refreshing, because everything that is not the Creator does not satisfy the mind of man.

To the other, it must be said that to be a drink can be fittingly attributed to the Son and to the Spirit by different considerations: for if the effect is considered, which is the restriction of secular thirst, it is done only through the taste of the Spirit, of which Gregory says in the Moralia: Having tasted the Spirit, all flesh and carnal delight becomes insipid. But if the moisture of the drink is considered, whose act is to carry nourishment to the members, this is

fitting to the attributes of wisdom and prudence, which have to moderate in the acts of the gifts how much should be given or indulged to each.

Articulus 15 — Whether, The Holy Spirit Not Being Present, The Father Can Infuse His Love

Whether, with the Holy Spirit not existing, the Father can impart His love?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said:

There is one Holy Spirit, who is given to all, although separately, etc.

1. For if the Holy Spirit does not exist, if this, namely, is posited as impossible, still God will love the rational creature, and will infuse His love into them: therefore it seems that the imparting of love is not the mission of the Spirit.
2. Furthermore, let us suppose there is no person in the way that faith distinguishes persons: I ask, whether it still befits God to be sent? It seems not: because to be sent is to be known to be from another: but then no one will be from another: therefore it seems that it does not befit Him then to be sent.

On the contrary: He will still be perfectly able to save: but salvation cannot be except through that which, by sanctifying, calls back those who stray: therefore it seems that with this being sent, He can still send and give, and be sent and given.

Solution. It must be said that if we posit the Holy Spirit not to exist, there will be no love in the divine except essentially only: and that would be infused into hearts, as has been said: but this will not be the mission of anyone, for it is not of the Son, this is clear, because it is not an effect appropriable to the Son: but that it is not of the Father, is clear, because the Father is not from another.

To the other it must be said, that if no person is posited to exist, there will not be any mission properly speaking: but still God can give Himself in the effect of grace.

Articulus 16 — Whether Holy Men Can Give The Holy Spirit

Whether holy men can give the Holy Spirit?

Whether holy men can give the Holy Spirit?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, D, Here it is asked, Whether also the holy men, etc.

For here begins that part in which it is determined whether holy men give the Holy Spirit, and it is shown that they do not. And it has three chapters, in the first of which he shows that

they do not give. In the second, that they cannot give, there, E, and what is more, In the third, he objects to the contrary, and etc. solves, there, F, But this seems contrary, etc.

1. For it seems that holy men can give the Holy Spirit: because it was said to them: Receive the Holy Spirit: whose sins you forgive, they are forgiven them. But sin is not forgiven except through the Holy Spirit: therefore they give the Holy Spirit.
2. Likewise, He who gives occasion of harm in the judgment of men is judged to have inflicted harm: therefore if the ministers of the Church do that to which the Holy Spirit incessantly follows, it seems that they themselves confer the Holy Spirit.
3. Likewise, We see in material lights, that one kindled can further kindle others: therefore it seems in the interior spiritual light, that a man kindled in the grace of the Holy Spirit can further kindle others, and thus confer the Holy Spirit.
4. Likewise, Angels illuminate, purify, and perfect each other: therefore since the ecclesiastical hierarchy is according to the example of the heavenly hierarchy, it seems that also among holy men one can purify, illuminate, and perfect another: but they cannot do this except by conferring the Holy Spirit: therefore etc.

Solution. It must be said with the Master, that holy men, nor even the ministers of the Church, give, nor confer the Holy Spirit. And the reason for this is: because he who gives the Holy Spirit has authority and influence at least over the effect, in which the Holy Spirit is given: and this effect is grace making one pleasing, which is only from God alone through efficient cause and authority.

To the first, therefore, which is objected, it must be said that Christ gave them the ministry in which the Holy Spirit is had, that is, for the dispensation of the sacraments: but he did not give them authority and efficiency.

To the second, it must be said that he who gives occasion of harm is judged guilty, but is not judged to have efficiently inflicted harm, unless he acts with him who inflicts harm: but in the conferring of the Holy Spirit, the operative power of man cannot operate anything: but it can operate towards it and under it: and therefore it is not similar: because created power can be towards the infliction of harm, not towards the conferring of the Holy Spirit.

To another, it must be said that in lights the kindling of one to another happens because of material similarity: because through that it is one combustible and food of fire, like another: but there is not such similarity of operative power in God, and in ministers in the conferring of the Holy Spirit.

To another, it must be said that the purging of Angels is from the habit of dissimilarity in the cognitive power, that is, from the habit, or habitual ignorance, or unknowing of some hidden thing to be revealed: and to be illuminated is to receive light in that in which it is seen: but to be perfected is to be converted according to this light to the source of light, that is, to the eternal Word. Hence all these three are on the part of the intellect and by the mode of doctrine, and the effect of doctrine: and in this way the ministers of the Church can well do: hence

by teaching another, to illuminate, and to purge from ignorance, and to perfect by showing the knowledge of the word of God to lead to God: but this sometimes follows grace, sometimes not: and that it sometimes follows, this is from the superior infusing cause and operating.

DISTINCTIO XV

Divisio Textus

Here it must be considered, when the Holy Spirit is given to men, etc.

Here begins the second part, in which the Master discusses the mission of the Holy Spirit according to the comparison to the principle of mission, inquiring, Whether He is sent by Himself?

And this distinction has three principal questions. The first of which is, whether the Holy Spirit is sent by Himself? and this is concluded in the first chapter A. The second is about the mission of the Son, through which the mission of the Holy Spirit is proven: and it begins there, B, "Lest you wonder." The third is, why the Father is not read, etc., to be sent? and it begins there, N, "Here it is asked, Why the Father," etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether Mission And Giving Are Temporal And Eternal As Procession Is

Whether mission and giving are temporal and eternal like procession?

Here arises a doubt before the Letter, whether mission and giving are temporal and eternal like procession?

It seems, however, that they are: because
1. To be sent is to be known to be from another: but to be known can be on the part of the aptitude of the known, or on the part of the knower according to act: as Augustine also says that the Spirit is a gift from eternity according to aptitude; therefore, since the Son and the Holy Spirit are from another from eternity, it is fitting for them from eternity that they are sent according to habit or aptitude.

1. Furthermore, in this same reading it is held that some said that according to eternal generation the Son is said to be sent, and they are not reproved: therefore, since this cannot be unless mission is eternal, it seems that to be sent according to mode is fitting from eternity: and thus there will be a double mission, eternal and temporal.
2. Likewise, to be given or a gift pertains more on the part of the creature than to be sent, as was proven above: but it is fitting for the Holy Spirit from eternity that He is a gift: therefore, much more that He is sent.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
1. To be sent is to be known to be from another in an effect appropriable to a person, by which

the propriety of that person is understood: but the effect is only in time: therefore, mission and giving are not eternal.

1. Likewise, it was held above that mission implies a relation to him to whom it is sent: but he to whom the mission is made is not from eternity.

Solution. It must be said to this that mission and giving are said only temporally or from time.

To what is objected against this, it must be said that the knowledge which is implied in the notion of mission is the knowledge which is made in an effect appropriable to a person, as was objected in the contrary.

To the other it must be said that according to eternal generation, mission is not said according to the complete notion of mission: but there is congruity to this that the begotten can be sent: because from this very fact that he is from another, he can be sent: and this is what those who said this intended, and not that his mission was from eternity.

To the other it must be said that from eternity the Spirit is called a gift from the aptitude of giving: but mission, giving, and names of this kind are verbal, and they regard more the act of mission which is only in time: and therefore they are not said in a double way: like procession which of itself more implies a relation to the principle from which, than to him to whom it proceeds or can proceed.

Articulus 2 — Whether The Holy Spirit Is God, And Also A Gift Or A Thing Given, And Whether The Holy Spirit Is Given By Himself

Whether the Holy Spirit is God, and also a gift or given thing, and whether the Holy Spirit is given by Himself?

Whether the Holy Spirit is God, and also a gift or given, and whether the Holy Spirit is given by Himself?

Then it is asked concerning what is said in the Letter of the first chapter A, there, To which we say, that the Holy Spirit is both God and a gift or given, etc.

It seems this is false: because
1. The giver and the given have a substantial distinction: but the Holy Spirit, as He is God, and as He is a gift, does not have a substantial distinction: therefore it does not befit Him to give as He is God, and to be given as He is a gift.

1. If perhaps you say that the giver and the given in this place do not differ substantially. On the contrary: Immediately in the Letter assigning the reason why the Holy Spirit is the giver as God, it says: Since however the donation or giving of the Holy Spirit is the operation of God, and the operation of the three persons is common and indivisible, therefore the Holy Spirit is given not only by the Father and the Son, but also by Himself. However, the operation of the three persons is not to the substance which is the Holy Spirit: therefore the Holy Spirit is not given: therefore here also the giver and the given differ substantially: and thus the proposition is held.

2. Likewise, whatever is given is separated from the giver, or from the dominion of the giver, or receives the communication of another dominion. For example, it is separated from the giver when I hand over something given to you: however, from dominion when, although it remains with me corporally, yet I no longer have dominion over the thing given to you: it receives another dominion if I give you the power of communication in my goods. In none of these ways does the Holy Spirit give Himself. Therefore it is simply false that the Holy Spirit as God is the giver, and as a gift is the given.
3. Furthermore, a gift is personally and from eternity: if therefore He is given as a gift, He is given according to His personal being which He has from eternity: but according to that which is from eternity, He is God the giver: therefore according to that which He has and is from eternity, He is both the giver and the given, which is false.
4. Likewise, in every giving there is authority of the giver over the given: but the Holy Spirit has no authority over Himself: therefore He does not give Himself.
5. Likewise, every given thing is from the giver, for the given is from the giver: since therefore the Holy Spirit is not from Himself, the Holy Spirit does not give Himself.

Further it is asked concerning this, the Holy Spirit is given by Himself. For in this proposition "by" denotes the relation of an efficient cause in the ablative: but the Holy Spirit does not have any relation of such a principle with respect to Himself: therefore this expression is false, the Holy Spirit is given by Himself: which Augustine places in the Letter.

If perhaps you say that the Holy Spirit as the eternal substance the same with the Father, can have a relation with respect to Himself, as He proceeds in time. On the contrary: This is not conceded, the Holy Spirit in time or today is from Himself eternally: therefore it seems that He has no relation of cause in the proposition: and thus the expression is false.

Solution. In this question there are many very diverse opinions: for some say that to give and to be given are said in two ways. In one way according to which the intention of the giver denotes authority with respect to the given, and the given under authority with respect to the giver: and thus the Holy Spirit does not give Himself, nor is He given by Himself. In another way it is said improperly that the giver is for influencing, and to be given is for being inspired or sent: and thus they concede that the Holy Spirit gives Himself, and is given by Himself: because He influences Himself, and is inspired by Himself into the minds of the faithful: and this opinion is founded on that of Augustine which is held here, If the Father and the Son give the Holy Spirit, and He does not give Himself: therefore the Father and the Son do something which the Holy Spirit does not do. For from this Augustine implies that when he says, the Holy Spirit gives Himself, he understands nothing but the work of inspiration into the minds of the faithful: and this is the opinion of the ancient Prepositivi and William.

Others say that to give in the accusative does not denote authority with respect to the given: but a difference according to reason suffices: and therefore they concede that the Holy Spirit as considered in Himself is the giver, and is given according to what is in this or that whose mind He inhabits: and they do not concede that to give is the same as to send, or to

proceed: and they say that the same can be the giver and the given, and that the reasons introduced do not follow.

A third group says, with whom it seems to me more to be agreed, that there is a double giver and given: for they sometimes place these in dominion, and in which there is that dominion or quasi-dominion: because no one gives unless he is the master of it, and in which he has authority. In this way neither the Father gives, nor the Son, nor the Holy Spirit the Holy Spirit. But sometimes it is said the giver with respect to the given, not from the power of dominion, but from the force of love: as there is giving among friends, in which giving one gives well to another what he has, and what he himself is, as a friend says to a friend, I give myself to you: and in this way since the Holy Spirit is the gift in which all gifts are given, they concede that the Holy Spirit gives Himself. For if among inferiors, they say, a friend gives himself to a friend: and if the love which is between them were a perfect person, each of the friends would give himself entirely: thus since in the divine the Holy Spirit is love, they say that He gives Himself, and this seems more probable.

According to this therefore I respond to the first, that the giver and the given according to the first intention denote a substantial distinction of the giver and the given, but not according to the second.

To the other it must be said that in the giving of the Holy Spirit there are two things. One which is the principal gift, which is the Holy Spirit given: the other is the gift which is given in Him, and with Him. In Him, I say, because He according to Augustine is the gift in which all gifts are given: with Him however I say because grace is infused by the Holy Spirit, and with respect to that which is given in the gift of the Holy Spirit, and with Him, the operation of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit is placed: because this is an effect in the creature substantially differing from the Holy Spirit.

To the third it must be said that whatever is given according to which the giver has dominion over the given, and from the reason of authority and dominion has the authority of giving this: either it is separated from him in place, or use, or it passes into the community of another lord: but not in the giving where the reason of the giver is founded only in love: because there the giver remains whole, and is wholly given to another and from himself, as previously appeared in the example of friends and their love, if that love were a person, and could give itself.

To the fourth it must be said that personally it is a gift and from eternity by the aptitude of giving, as Augustine says: but although from eternity it is a gift, and a person, yet the reason of giving according to the mode of signifying is not the reason of the person: for a gift is said from the aptitude of passive donability, namely that it can be given: but a person is said in itself. And therefore inasmuch as it is a person and God, it has the power of giving actively: and inasmuch as it is a gift, it has the congruity to be given passively. And therefore in that argument there falls the fallacy of the accident. Because although the person and God and the gift is the Holy Spirit from eternity, yet it is not necessary that everything which befits it inasmuch as it is a gift, befits it by the same reason inasmuch as it is one person in the Trinity.

To the fifth it must be said that although the given according to act is not in time, yet it does not follow that nothing eternal befits it: for the eternal can be the reason of that which happens in time: just as every gift is the reason why it can be given in time.

To the sixth it must be said that this is false, that in every giving there is authority of the giver over the given: for this proposition is not true except in that giving where the reason of giving is power from dominion over the given, or from authority: but such is not here, as was evident.

To the other it must be said similarly, that to be given in the giving whose reason is founded in the power of dominion or authority, says as proceeding from the giver: but not that which is founded in the force of the love of friendship.

To what is further asked, Whether the Holy Spirit is given by Himself? the Doctors are found to be diversified. For some say the passive is less proper than the active, because of the reason which the objection touches. Others on the contrary say the active is less proper than the passive: because they say that the relation of the preposition "by" is referred to the connoted effect: of which the cause is the Holy Spirit, just as the Father. It seems to me that the passive is true, and less proper than the active, as the first say: and the relation of the preposition does not then denote the cause with respect to the effect, because the effect is not supposed in the thing of its cause, but rather the Holy Spirit: but the preposition denotes according to this not authority, but the power of giving from the force of love or virtue: and from this it cannot be inferred, He is given by Himself: therefore He is from Himself: or therefore He has authority with respect to Himself: or therefore He has the reason of a principle with respect to Himself: because that does not require such a giving, whose power consists wholly in the freedom of will and love. This sense seems to confirm the intention of the Letter: because when it ought to prove that He can give Himself, it introduces that it is of His power and freedom there where it says: For it cannot be said not to be of His power, of which it is written, The Spirit breathes where He wills: In the freedom of will He has, that He gives Himself: and this freedom does not place authority with respect to Himself, but consists there in the force of the love of those to whom He gives Himself.

Articulus 3 — Whether No Gift Is Given Except The Holy Spirit, And Whether The Body Of Flesh Is Other Than Flesh

Whether no gift is given except by the Holy Spirit, and whether the body of flesh is other than flesh?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said:

Just as the body of flesh is nothing other than flesh, etc.

1. For from this it follows that no other gift is given except the Holy Spirit: and this is not true, because virtues and grace are also given to us, as is evident from the definition of virtue given by Augustine, which is a good quality of the mind. And, Wisdom 7:11: "All good things came to me along with her." And, Wisdom 8:6: "She teaches temperance and prudence, and justice, and virtue, than which nothing is more useful in life to men."

Therefore, it seems that the gift of the Holy Spirit is something other than the Holy Spirit.

2. Furthermore, the body of flesh seems to be something other than flesh: because a body signifies a composition from dissimilar members, such as a foot and a hand: but flesh does not signify this: therefore, the body of flesh is something other than flesh.

But he intends to say that in name and construction nothing else is signified than the Holy Spirit: for when it is said "the gift of the Holy Spirit," due to the transition of the oblique, someone might believe that divinity is between the oblique and the direct. Hence Augustine wishes that the oblique with the direct has an intransitive construction: just as when it is said, "the body of flesh" or "creature together."

To the last, it must be said that Augustine calls any body that has three dimensions: and thus the body of flesh is flesh, and the body of bone is bone: and he does not call a body animated which is composed of different dissimilar organs.

Articulus 4 — Whether The Father Can Do Something That The Holy Spirit Cannot

Whether the Father can do something that the Holy Spirit cannot?

Then it is inquired concerning this argument which is made, namely, that the Holy Spirit cannot give Himself, etc.

For it seems not to hold: because the Holy Spirit cannot breathe the Holy Spirit, and the Father can breathe Him; and yet from this it does not follow that the Father can or does something that the Holy Spirit cannot or does not do, since to breathe is not something, but towards something: therefore, similarly, this does not hold, since according to the Master, to give is the same as to proceed temporally.

Solution. It must be said that the argument holds here because of the connoted in the creature, which is enclosed in the understanding of what it is to give: for this operation belongs to those things which are subjected to power: and therefore, if the Holy Spirit were excluded from this, it would follow that the Father could do something that the Holy Spirit could not.

Articulus 5 — It Is Asked Whether Those Three Propositions Are True, Namely, 'The Spirit Sends Himself', 'The Spirit Is Sent By Himself', And 'The Spirit Proceeds From Himself'

It is asked whether those three propositions are truly, namely, the Spirit sends itself, and the Spirit is sent by itself, and the Spirit proceeds from itself?

Then it is asked about what is said:

But if it gives itself, then it also proceeds and is sent by itself, etc.

For there is doubt here, whether the Holy Spirit sends itself? And if this is conceded in some way, there will still be doubt about this, whether the Holy Spirit is sent by itself? And if

these are conceded in some sense, this doubt remains, whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from itself?

For it seems here to be false, the Holy Spirit sends itself.

1. For it was held above, that to be sent is to be known to be from another. Therefore, from whom any of the persons is sent, it is known to be from that one: but the Holy Spirit sends itself, as you say: therefore the Holy Spirit is from itself, which is false: because Anselm says, that neither nature admits, nor the intellect comprehends, that the same is from itself.
2. Likewise, when it is said, it sends itself, the suppositum of the verb is in which authority is noted with respect to that which is supposed in the pronoun: but this is the same, when the relative refers to the same as is in the antecedent: therefore in the expression it is signified that the same has authority with respect to itself: therefore, since this is not true, the expression seems to be false.
3. Likewise, the sender and the sent require at least personal distinction: but this is not here, when it is said, the Holy Spirit sends itself: therefore the expression is false.
4. Likewise, the Father is not sent by anyone (as Augustine says) because he is from no one: therefore similarly neither does the Holy Spirit send itself, because it is not from itself.

If perhaps you say, as above, that it is the power of conferring by the force of love, and by the force of authority: and by the force of love the Holy Spirit sends itself, just as it also gives itself. On the contrary: To give by its intention does not imply a comparison to eternal procession, since below this is conceded, the Father gives himself: but to be sent includes in itself procession: therefore it is not similar: because neither by the force of love, nor by the reason of authority or dominion does the Holy Spirit have that it is from itself: therefore in no way does it send itself, as it seems.

If perhaps you say, that in truth this expression is false, nor does Augustine posit it but the Master. And that the Master in this says something false. On the contrary: Augustine says:

The Spirit sends itself, and gives itself. Therefore not only does the Master say this, but also Augustine.

Further, it is asked about this, the Holy Spirit is sent by itself.

1. For passion is always inflicted by another, although not action: therefore the passive more implies the reason of being from another than the active: therefore it seems that the passive has a greater reason for falsity than the active.
2. Likewise, the intellect does not comprehend that the same acts and suffers with respect to the same: therefore since this is signified by this expression, the Holy Spirit is sent by itself, it seems to be false.

But on the contrary: Augustine says. Then. And this is sent to each one, when it is known and perceived by someone, as much as it can be known and perceived, authority is placed below in this same distinction in the Letter. But such knowledge is made in us by the Holy Spirit: and it is truly said, that this knowledge is from the Holy Spirit and is sent by it: therefore it seems, if this is to be sent, that it is truly sent by itself.

Further, it is asked about this, the Holy Spirit proceeds from itself. For this seems false: because according to what was said above, to proceed does not imply a comparison except to the principle from which: therefore since the Holy Spirit itself is not its own principle, it seems that in no way does it proceed from itself.

If it is said, that it does not proceed from itself simply, but proceeds from itself into the creature.

On the contrary: 1. Procession into the creature shows the eternal, and adds nothing else: therefore if according to the eternal it does not proceed from itself, according to the temporal it should not be shown to proceed from itself: therefore it remains that this is false, the Holy Spirit proceeds temporally from itself.

1. Likewise, from whomever the genus is denied, any species of that genus is denied: but the Spirit does not proceed from itself: therefore neither by temporal procession, nor by eternal does it proceed from itself.
2. Likewise, from whomever the act of nature is denied, the mode of that act is also denied: but procession from itself is denied of the Holy Spirit: therefore the mode should also be denied, namely that it proceeds from itself temporally.
3. Likewise, because the Father is not from another, therefore it does not suit him to be shown to be temporally from an act: therefore similarly, because the Holy Spirit is not from itself, therefore it does not suit him to be shown to be temporally from itself: but it is shown, when it is said to proceed from itself: therefore that expression is false.

Solution. As we said at the beginning of this distinction, concerning the exposition and truth and propriety of these expressions, a discordant opinion of the Doctors is found. There are those who, by the reasons introduced above, say all these are false, the Spirit sends itself, the Spirit is sent by itself, the Spirit proceeds from itself: and they say that if they are found in authority, they should be explained thus, the Spirit sends itself, that is, from the Spirit is the effect in which it is known to be sent. But because they are found expressly in the authorities of the Saints, and here conceded by the Master, it seems difficult to me that they are said to be false. Hence others say, that to send and to proceed are said in two ways, namely properly, and improperly. Properly, when it implies the distinction of the messenger and the one sending: and thus it is not taken in these expressions. Sometimes, however, to send is the same as to give: and thus it is taken less properly: and in this sense they concede these, and they wish to draw this from the Letter, where the Master says, that the Holy Spirit gives itself, and is given by itself: which is itself to proceed temporally and to send. The opinion of others is, that it is not the intention of Augustine and the Master to say, that to give or to send are the

same, except according to reason and suppositum, not however according to intention: and they say, that when it is said, the Holy Spirit sends itself, two things are implied in the verb. One from the principal signification of the verb; because to send signifies mission, just as to walk signifies walking. The other is what is in the verb, namely the effective act of that which is connoted, which is conferred in time to whom the mission is made: and therefore they say, when it is said, the Holy Spirit sends itself, that the Holy Spirit does not render the suppositum to the verb except for the sake of the second. But when it is added itself, the act of this verb, to send, passes into two: of which one is in the other: and therefore they are as one conjoined: for the effective act of the connoted passes over that which is effected in the mission itself: but because in that the Spirit is manifested, as existing in it in a special way, therefore it also passes over the Spirit not simply, but according to which it exists specially in that: so that by the temporal mission the Spirit is not made simply, but is made to exist there in this way in which it was not before, and this is shown by the reason of that effect: just as we also say that the Word is not made, but nevertheless is made according to the flesh, so here the Spirit is not made by the mission, but is made by the mission itself that it is in this otherwise than before: and this opinion more agrees with the sayings of the Saints: and therefore it pleases me more. Therefore the sense is, the Holy Spirit sends itself, that is, from the conferring of the Spirit by which it gives itself, there is an effect in which the Spirit is manifested to be from another, and in this it is sent: because the principal signification of the verb from the mission itself shows to be from another: because otherwise it would not suit it to send from itself.

To the objections, therefore, it must be said in order.

To the first, that the Spirit sends itself: and I well concede, that passive mission makes known that the sent is from another: but active, that the sent is from that which is sent: but it has already been said, that for the sake of the principal signification the act of mission does not go out from the suppositum of the expression, but for the sake of the act causing those effects in which it is known to be from another: and therefore the pronoun shows the passive mission to be in the Holy Spirit, but the suppositum does not show the active mission to be in it: and under this mode the sense is, the Spirit sends itself, that is, from the conferring of the Spirit in which it gives itself, there is an effect in which it is known to be from another: and this is true.

To the other it must be said, that the suppositum in that act of which it is the suppositum does not seek authority in the apposite: because this mission is from the power of love, not from the power of authority or dominion, as was said above in another question.

To the other it must be said, that it is true, that to send and to be sent for the sake of the principal signification require distinct persons: but not for the sake of the other act which is also common to the three persons, namely the effective conferring of that gift in which the Holy Spirit is made to be present: and therefore it is not necessary that the Holy Spirit be distinguished from itself.

To the other it must be said, that it is different in the Father: because in the Father the principal signification of the verb which is passive mission as it holds itself on the part of the apposite, can be saved neither with respect to itself, nor with respect to any other: because in no way is it from another so that it can be sent: and therefore it cannot be signified to be from another. But in the Son and the Holy Spirit the passive signification of the verb is saved according to which it passes into the reciprocal pronoun: although it is not saved with respect to that suppositum, but absolutely with respect to the suppositum which is understood to act with the suppositum the same act: because the act denoting the effect in the creature is common to the three persons: and all persons are supposed in the expression by the nature of the verb, although only one is signified in the expression: and therefore the verb as to the act of donation has all for suppositum: but as to the act which the mission adds, it has for suppositum the persons to whom the mission suits.

If, however, you ask, Why is one person more expressed there than another, if that act is common? The response is, that this is done, because that act is more by appropriation manifesting of one person than another: as wisdom conferred shows the Son, and grace the Holy Spirit.

To what is further asked about this, the Holy Spirit is sent by itself: I say without prejudice, that this is more improper than the active, for two reasons: because here passive mission is signified with respect to itself, and because a preposition is placed denoting the principle: nevertheless it must be conceded, because the Saints posit it: and then it is conceded under the same sense, that the verb is divided according to the acts imported, namely of conferring, and of mission: and it is referred according to one act to the suppositum of the Holy Spirit, and to other persons, although it suits it appropriately: and according to the other act it is referred to the persons according to the intellect acting with it. And by this the solution to all that was objected against that proposition is clear.

And note, that there are some who briefly and lightly extricate themselves here, and say, that properly the Father and the Son send the Holy Spirit, but the Holy Spirit does not properly send itself: and therefore it is said to send itself, because it approves its mission made by them as of something spontaneous it is said, it makes itself do this, because it does this from the freedom of its will and from love.

To what is further asked about this, the Holy Spirit proceeds from itself: I say, that in my judgment this has less propriety than any of the others: nevertheless because the Saint says it, I concede it under this sense, that it is understood of passive temporal procession: and then I explain it just as that other, the Holy Spirit sends itself. Because although procession does not say anything except comparison to the principle from which, nevertheless when temporal determination is added, comparison to the effect is also added, and to that into which it proceeds.

To what is objected against it, it must be said that temporal procession shows the eternal: but it does not show it to be from the same suppositum which is signified in the expression, as was said before.

To the other it must be said, that when it is said temporal, it is not placed by this in any species of procession of the Holy Spirit: for it does not come as a difference, but rather as an accident, not to the procession in itself, but it happens to it on the part of the term into which the temporal procession is: and therefore it also divides its reason: because temporal procession is procession in a certain respect.

And if you object, that according to this it should not infer it. It must be said, that it does not divide in the act of procession, but rather in the mode of signifying it: because temporal can be signified in a suppositum to which it does not suit, as when it is said, the Spirit proceeds from itself, the passive eternal procession does not suit this suppositum which is signified as acting it, except for the sake of the act of donation of the effect in which the Spirit is and is given, and not for the sake of the principal signification: and therefore also as to this it does not infer it. For I cannot infer, the Spirit proceeds from itself temporally, therefore it proceeds from itself: but thus, therefore it proceeds from whomever it proceeds.

To the other it must be said, that this is not the mode which regards the principal signification in the verb, as specifying it, but rather dividing it, as it is signified in such a suppositum, as was said.

To the last it must be said, that it is not similar concerning the Father: and the reason for this was said before: because the principal signification of the act does not have place in him with respect to any suppositum.

Divisio Textus

Then it is asked concerning the second part which begins there, "But do not wonder," etc. For the entire treatise on the mission of the Son is introduced, so that the mission of the Holy Spirit may be proven.

However, it is divided into two parts. In the first, he shows who sent the Son. In the second, he declares the modes of his mission.

Here it is asked, Whether only once, etc.

The first is subdivided into three parts. In the first, he shows that for God to be sent by God is possible. In the second, through the words of Ambrose and Augustine, he shows that the Son is sent by the Holy Spirit, there, D, AND. In the third, he shows that also by himself, that the Son was sent by the Holy Spirit, etc., he was sent, there, E, Then he shows that he was given also by himself, etc.

Articulus 6 — Whether The Mission Of The Son Is More Manifest Than The Mission Of The Holy Spirit

Whether the mission of the Son is more manifest than the mission of the Holy Spirit?

Whether the mission of the Son is more manifest than the mission of the Holy Spirit?

1. However, here arises a doubt concerning the first: because the reasoning of the Master in the text seems not to hold from the lesser as it does: because in Christ there are diverse natures, although not diverse persons: and thus, by the grace of diverse natures, it is more fitting for Him to send and be sent than for the Holy Spirit: therefore, his reasoning is not from the lesser.
2. Likewise, Augustine says that it is equally fitting for the Son and the Holy Spirit to be sent: therefore, one cannot be proven by the other.

Solution. It must be said that it is a reasoning from the similar confirmed by authority, because by the power of authority it takes the form of inferring its similar. Or it must be said that the mission of the Son is more manifest than that of the Spirit: and therefore that is proven by this. Or it may be said that it is from the lesser: because to the Son, as far as the nature of the principle is concerned, it is more fitting to send than to the Holy Spirit: according to which it is more fitting, that it is fitting for more reasons, than that which is fitting for fewer.

In opposition, it must be said that although in Christ there are diverse natures, nevertheless to send and to be sent is fitting only to the person: but it is true that it is fitting to Him by the grace of the natures which are in Him: and thus it is also fitting for the Holy Spirit to give and be given, as was said above, although it is not fitting for Him to make and be made, because He is not united to the affections in which He is given. Hence, although the Son was not made in the flesh, He was still given in the flesh, while He was in that flesh, just as the Spirit is essentially in the gifts in which He is given.

Articulus 7 — Whether Each Divine Person Can Be Sent, And What These Words Mean, 'To Send' And 'To Be Sent'

Whether any divine person can be sent, and what these words, to send and to be sent, signify?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said, at the end of chapter B, "Therefore the Son and the Holy Spirit were sent where they were."

1. For this seems impossible: because on Ezekiel, xvi, the Gloss of Jerome says: "What is within cannot be sent." Therefore, since any person is in the divine nature within itself, it seems that it cannot be sent.
2. Likewise, in bodily sending it is such that the sent is naturally separated from the sender: therefore it seems that this also ought to be in spiritual sending; therefore it seems that it is not fitting for any of the persons to be sent.
3. Furthermore, it seems that the sender always comes with the sent: for that which is one and the same with the messenger always comes wherever the sent or messenger comes: but the Father is one and the same with the Son and the Holy Spirit: therefore it seems that the Father comes wherever the Son and the Holy Spirit are sent: but wherever someone comes by himself, he does not need a messenger: the Father comes by himself

to all to whom he sends the Son and the Holy Spirit: therefore the sending of the Son and the Holy Spirit is superfluous.

If perhaps you say that he comes by the unity of nature, but not by the effect connoted in the creature: this is false, because that effect is common and indivisible.

For the sake of this, it is further asked, what do these words, to send and to be sent, signify?

1. And it seems by Augustine in book IV on the Trinity, and here by the Master, that they signify the commendation of the principle: therefore they are notional. This same thing seems by this, that they do not pertain to all: because to be sent does not pertain to the Father: therefore it is distinct and notional.
2. Likewise, it will be had below, that by this that the Father sends, and the Son is sent and the Holy Spirit, it is not shown that the Father is greater than the Son or the Holy Spirit: but this cannot be if they were essential words: therefore they seem to predicate a notion or notional act.
3. Likewise, Augustine says, as was had above, that to be sent is to be known to be from another. But a person is not known to be from another by essence or by essential things. Therefore these words are notional and imply distinction.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Notional things pertain from eternity: but these pertain from time: therefore they are not notional.

1. Likewise, every word connoting an effect in the creature signifies the divine essence: for this rule has long been given: but these words connote an effect in the creature: therefore, etc.

Solution. It must be said to the first, that Jerome either speaks of bodily sending, or he understands that what is within by the indistinction of person and nature, that this cannot be sent: but the first seems to be the understanding of Jerome, because he says that what is associated in the body, this cannot be sent.

To the other it must be said, that in spiritual sending where sending is not a change of place, but the reception of a new effect in which the person is known, a change of place is not required: because a change of place is due to the imperfection of the sent, who cannot cause in every place that to which he is sent, because he is not everywhere.

To the other it must be said, that I well concede this, whether the sending of the Son is into the world, or the sending of the Son and the Holy Spirit is into the mind, that the sender is always with the sent. Of the first Christ says: "He who sent me is with me, and has not left me alone: because I always do what is pleasing to him." Of the second, he himself says: "We will come to him (namely I and the Father and the Holy Spirit), and we will make our abode with him." But yet in the argument it must be cautioned, that although the Father is one with the Son, yet he is not the same with the Son, unless the term "the same" is taken neutrally.

To what is objected against, it must be said that the sending is not superfluous, nor is the reason of the sent destroyed: because sending is (as was said above) showing faith according to the distinction of persons, which it shows in an effect appropriable to one more than to another: but it is true that it would be superfluous if it were for nothing else except that the Father (because otherwise he could not come through the Son sent, and through the Holy Spirit) would come to us. For this would be absurd and unfaithful to think. For the Father can come by himself, just as the Son and the Holy Spirit. But the sending is useful to us, as was said: because it shows us the faith of the distinction of persons.

To what is further asked, it is responded diversely by the Doctors. For some say that these words primarily signify distinction, and secondarily essence for the sake of the connoted effect. But some say conversely: and I think that they speak more truly. For there is something essentially essential like essence, substance, and suchlike: and something is personally personal, like the Father generating: and something is personally essential, like God from God: and something is essentially notional, or personal, like to send and to be sent: for by this the effect over which the act is imported by the word, they signify the divine essence, and they co-signify by the mode of their signification the distinction of persons.

And by this the solution to all objections is clear: because the notional co-signified makes it so that it does not pertain to all persons to send and to be sent: but the effect makes it so that they pertain from time, and that they are referred to the divine essence.

Articulus 8 — Whether The Son Is Said To Be Sent By The Very Fact That He Was Made

Whether the Son is said to be sent by the very fact that He was made?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says:

He shows that the Son was sent by the very fact that He was made, etc.

1. For this does not seem so: since His mission is referred to something other than His making: because He can be sent often, but not often be made flesh.
2. Likewise, it is fitting for the Holy Spirit to be sent, but not to be incarnated: therefore, He was not sent by the very fact that He was made.

To this it must be said that Augustine says this because the mission of the Son into the world is known from the fact that He was made flesh: because that mission is united in reality with the incarnation, although the intention of one and the other is different.

To the objection, it must be said that the mission into the world cannot happen often: but the mission into the mind can happen often, as the Master will show below in the Letter.

To the other, it must be said that it is not fitting for the Holy Spirit to be sent into the world: because this is united with being incarnated: and Augustine speaks here of that mission which is into the world.

Articulus 9 — Whether It Befits The Holy Spirit To Send Or To Give The Son

Whether it is fitting for the Holy Spirit to send or give the Son?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said:

Now the Lord God has sent me, and the Spirit. From this indeed it is desired to infer that he was sent by the Holy Spirit: although it is said that this is fitting to him according to man, according to which he is also lesser than the Father and the Holy Spirit, and himself.

It is asked according to this, Whether it is fitting for the Holy Spirit to send the Son into the mind? It seems that it is:

1. Because the Son sends himself: therefore by the term "sends" authority is not implied with respect to the supposit which the verb supposes; therefore it seems that it can be conceded.
2. Likewise, Whoever is from another, it is fitting for him to be sent with respect to each one, as the Master seems to say here: but the Son is from another: therefore it is fitting for him to be sent by each of the persons: therefore it can be conceded that the Holy Spirit sends the Son.

But on the contrary: Neither is the Son from the Holy Spirit: nor does the Holy Spirit operate through the Son, because the preposition could not denote the relation of a principle with respect to the Son: since therefore there are not more in the expression than the signification of mission and effect in the creature, it does not seem to be conceded that the Holy Spirit sends the Son.

Furthermore, this does not seem to be conceded, that the Holy Spirit sends the Son into the flesh: for it is one thing to send into the flesh, and another to send one existing in the flesh. For to send into the flesh is not fitting except for one existing beyond the flesh. And thus it is not fitting to send the Son except as he is an eternal person: but thus the Spirit does not have authority with respect to him: therefore it seems that the Holy Spirit does not send him into the flesh nor into the mind.

Further it is asked, if the Holy Spirit gives the Son?

It seems that not: because the giver in the given either has the power of authority, or of love. But the first the Holy Spirit does not have in the Son: but it seems that neither the second, because the Son is not the gift of love, rather this is the Holy Spirit, and since the gift of love of this kind effects power, it does not seem to be fitting for the Holy Spirit with respect to the Son, but rather for the Son with respect to the Holy Spirit.

Solution. It must be said that some distinguish here a threefold mission, namely into the mind, and into the flesh, and to preach: and they say that the Holy Spirit does not send the Son by the first two missions, but by the third: and they say this because of the reasons introduced: and this is the opinion of William of Auxerre: and it is drawn from the Letter, where Ambrose says:

Well does he say, The Spirit of the Lord is upon me: whence because as the son of man he is anointed, and sent to preach. It is implied that the Saints speak of that sole mission, when they say the Holy Spirit sends the Son.

Others are who say otherwise, agreeing that it is fitting for any person to send, but not for any to be sent: for it is not fitting for the Father to be sent, but for the Son and the Holy Spirit. Whence any person can send that one to whom it is fitting to be sent: and this because the term "send" does not denote authority in its supposit with respect to that over which the act of the verb passes, which is passive mission: but it receives the supposit for the sake of the common act which causes the connoted effect in which the sent person is known: and because this the Saints seem to feel who prove the mission by comparison of this effect, therefore this opinion pleases us more: let us agree therefore with the first two reasons proving this.

To that which is objected, that the Son is neither from the Holy Spirit: nor does the Holy Spirit operate through him: it must be said that it is true: but this is not required to be sent by the Spirit: but it suffices that the Holy Spirit operates the effect in which the Son is and is known as being from another, as we said above.

To what is asked, Whether he sends him into the flesh? It must be said according to this opinion, that yes: because he operates the flesh in which he is known: and the Son is being from another: and this does not require any authority in the supposit of the word with respect to the matter of the act, or with respect to the apposite.

To what is further asked, Whether the Holy Spirit gives the Son? I concede that yes in the same sense: and it is not necessary that there be any power or authority signified in the Holy Spirit with respect to the Son: because when it is said, the Holy Spirit gives the Son, the term "Spirit" does not suppose the verb except as to the effective act of the connoted effect, as was previously held: in which effect however the Son is taken as being from another: and thus it is plain to respond to all.

Articulus 10 — Whether The Spirit Can Be Called The Spirit Of Christ, And In Christ

Whether the Spirit can be called the Spirit of Christ, and in Christ?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said:

According to divinity, the Spirit is not above Christ, but in Christ.

For from this it seems to imply the opinion of the Greeks to be true, that the Spirit is of Christ, as also resting in Him, and proceeding indistinctly from the Father.

Solution. The term "in" has to denote many relations, namely the identity of nature, according to which each person is in the other: and it has to denote the simultaneity of nature, according to which one of the relatives has being together with the other, and in the intellect of it: and in this way, it understands the Spirit to be in Christ: and from this it follows that the Spirit is from Christ, as was proven above.

Articulus 11 — Whether This Is To Be Granted, 'The Trinity Sends Itself Or Gives Itself'; And Whether The Father Sends The Son, And The Son Sends Himself And The Spirit; And The Spirit Sends Himself And The Son; And Whether The Father, Son, And Holy Spirit Send The Son And The Holy Spirit

Whether this is to be conceded, that the Trinity sends itself or gives itself: and whether the Father sends the Son, and the Son sends himself and the Spirit: and the Spirit sends himself and the Son: and whether the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit send the Son and the Holy Spirit.

Then it is asked concerning this which is said:

The Trinity gave him, for it is asked according to this, if this is to be conceded, that the Trinity sends itself? And it seems that it is not,

1. Because the Trinity is not from another: since therefore to send is to be known to be from another, it seems that the Trinity does not send itself.
2. Likewise, if the Trinity sends itself, the Trinity would be sent by itself: therefore also the Father would be sent, which is against Augustine saying that the Father alone is not read to be sent.

On the contrary:
1. Augustine says that the Trinity will descend into the minds of the faithful: since therefore it does not descend unless sent, it seems that it sends itself.

1. Furthermore, the image of the Trinity is in the soul: therefore it seems that the Trinity is known in it; and to be known in effect causes mission: therefore it seems that the Trinity sends itself.

Further, I ask, if the Trinity gives itself? It seems that it does not: because it does not have any authority with respect to itself.

It is further asked, if the Father sends himself and the Holy Spirit, and the Holy Spirit sends himself and the Son according to what was said above: whether I can infer in the plural: therefore the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit send the Son and the Holy Spirit?

It seems that it is so: because a singular doubled infers its plural: but in the premises singular missions are doubled: therefore it infers the plural.

But on the contrary: When I say, the Father sends the Son and the Holy Spirit, in the supposition of the verb authority is noted with respect to the apposite, and also the operation of the connoted effect: but when I say, the Son sends himself and the Holy Spirit, or conversely, authority cannot always be noted, therefore in another and another reason the term "to be sent" is taken: but many things said equivocally do not infer any plural: for it does not follow, this is a barking dog, and a celestial one: therefore these are dogs: therefore it seems that I cannot infer in the plural.

Solution. It must be said that, as I think, this is not to be conceded, that the Trinity sends itself, because the Trinity is not from another, as the first two reasons prove.

To that which is objected against, it must be said that it proceeds from the insufficient: for the operation of the effect in which it is known is not sufficient: but it is necessary that it be known to be from another and that it is from another by the very reason of passive mission: nor is the image such an effect as is required for mission, because that is an effect recalling and sanctifying the creature, which would stray unless it were sent to it, as was proven above by the words of Augustine.

To that which is further asked, it must be said that the Trinity gives itself, according to which to give signifies the power of giving from love alone: for this power anyone has with respect to himself in the bestowal of himself to him whom he loves: and by this also the solution to that which could be objected against is clear.

To what is further asked, whether the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit together send? Some, induced by reason, say that they do not: but I do not see why it cannot be conceded that they send together, especially since we have in the Scripture that the Son with the Father and the Holy Spirit sends himself.

To that therefore which is objected against, it must be said that the diverse relation of the supposition does not make an equivocation of mission: especially since by the grace of that act, which is to operate the connoted effect in him to whom it is sent, the three persons are equally referred to that word.

Divisio Textus

Here it is asked, Whether once only, etc.

Here the Master begins to distinguish the modes of the mission of the Son.

And this part has three parts. In the first, namely in the first two chapters, he raises the question concerning the modes of mission, and determines it. In the second, he shows that according to one of these modes the Son is sent, and according to the other once only, there, L, behold, etc. In the third, he shows that according to one mode he is sent into the world, and according to the other not, there, M, Furthermore it must be noted, that with these two modes, etc.

Articulus 12 — Whether It Is True That The Father Sanctified Christ

Whether it is true that the Father sanctified Christ?

Whether it is true that the Father sanctified Christ?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said:

How the Father sanctified him, etc. itself.

For that is sanctified which from not holy is made holy: and this does not befit Christ who was never not holy.

To this it must be said that to sanctify is taken here for to make holy: not in such a way that he was not holy before and afterwards was made holy: but that the whole was made at once, namely the subject and holiness.

Articulus 13 — Whether The Son Can Be Said To Have Come From Himself

Whether the Son can be said to have come from Himself?

Next, it is inquired concerning this which is said:

But to this it is objected, if the Son from Himself, etc.

For it seems that it is also not fitting for Him according to the form of God: because even according to the form of God He is not from Himself: therefore neither does He come, nor does He do anything from Himself: because the rule is that whatever a proceeding person is, and whatever a proceeding person does, he has and does from the person from whom he proceeds.

Solution. Without doubt, the expression can be verified in one way, etc., according to the form of God, if the pronoun denotes distinction: because then the sense is, I did not come from Myself only. However, if the negation regards the pronoun according to the operation of coming only, it cannot be verified except according to the form of a servant: because He Himself according to the form of God was the cause of His coming, just as the Father.

Articulus 14 — Why The Son Is Sent In Two Ways Rather Than The Holy Spirit

Why is the Son sent in two ways rather than the Holy Spirit? And why did the Father not appear except in a voice, and the Son in flesh, the Spirit in a dove, fiery tongues, and in breath?

Here arises a doubt concerning the two modes of the mission of the Son, namely, why is He sent in two ways rather than the Holy Spirit?

For it seems that the Holy Spirit is also sent visibly and invisibly, namely when He is perceived by the mind, and when He descended upon Christ in the form of a dove.

Furthermore, the Father appeared in a creature not united to Himself, similarly the Holy Spirit: why is it not read that the Son ever appeared in a creature not united to Himself? And if you say that the three appeared to Abraham as a sign of the three persons: and thus the Son appeared in a creature subject not united to Himself: or that He appeared to Moses in the flame of the burning bush. This is nothing because it was shown above that all these things were done through the ministry of angels appearing in the person of God. But I inquire about the assumed creature, in which the divine person appeared by Himself, as the Spirit in the dove, and the Father in the voice, and the Spirit in tongues and in breath: for thus it is not read that the Son appeared, except when He assumed flesh.

Furthermore, why did the Father not appear except in a speaking voice, but the Son only in assumed flesh, and the Holy Spirit in a threefold assumed creature: as in a dove, fiery tongues, and the breath with which the Son breathed upon the disciples?

Solution. It must be said to the first, that the Son has two modes of mission visibly, namely in a creature united to Himself, and invisibly when He is sent into the heart: because He alone is unifiable with the assumed creature: and this will be proven below.

To the objection, it must be said that visibility is not so much considered here in the mode of the mission of the Son as unifiability: and that is lacking in the mission of the Holy Spirit.

To the other, it must be said that the Son ought not to appear in a creature not united: because He had congruence to union, but the other persons did not: and therefore other apparitions were made on account of His own: for what is unifiable with a creature, not united, is not congruent to appear.

To the other, it must be said that the Father is accustomed according to eternal generation by saying to generate: and therefore He has congruence to manifest Himself by speaking in a voice: because thus He is manifested in the personal act by which He relates to the Son: and especially in the voice which says, "This is my beloved Son," etc.: for inasmuch as it was a voice, it manifested the speaker: and by what was said, it showed the Father: so that in both ways the generator and the Word and the Son are shown: of which one signifies the manifestation of the intellect, the other of nature. But the Holy Spirit operates in three ways, namely in gifts ordered to acts of work, and in the remission of sin, and by removing from earthly to heavenly things: and as to the first, He is shown in the dove, as to the second in the fire which is of a consuming nature, and as to the third in the spirit of breath which is spiritual: as it is also sung of Him: "You inspire to make men spiritual."

Or it may be said that the Spirit has something from the name of gift, which is properly said: and something from the name of love, which is again properly said: and something from the name of the Holy Spirit, which is again properly said: and as to the first, He appears in the dove: as to the second in the fire, because love is fire: and as to the third in spiritual breath: and because there are not more proper names of the Holy Spirit, therefore there are not more visible missions of Him. But the Son has congruence to unite to Himself the assumed creature, and therefore He did not appear in the non-united: but human nature has congruence to be united, and therefore in it alone was the Son sent.

Articulus 15 — Whether The Eternal Generation Is Also A Mission

Whether eternal generation is also mission?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says:

According to which also he could be said to be sent, etc.

For this does not seem so: because eternal generation does not imply a relation to a terminus to which; but mission implies a relation to him to whom it is sent: therefore eternal generation is not mission.

It must be said to this, that it was not the intention of these, that eternal generation is mission, but that it makes a congruity to mission: for he who is begotten is from another; and he who is from another can fittingly be sent.

Articulus 16 — Whether The Son Is Sent Into Pious Souls, Or Only The Holy Spirit, And This With Grace Making One Pleasing, Or Without It

Whether the Son is sent into pious souls, or only the Holy Spirit: and this with grace making one pleasing, or without it?

Whether the Son is sent into pious souls, or only the Holy Spirit: and this with grace making one pleasing, or without it?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says:

When He thus transfers Himself into pious souls, etc.

For pious souls are the souls of the Saints: therefore it seems that the Son is not spiritually sent except into the Saints.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
1. The Holy Spirit is sent to sanctify the creature: and two cannot be sent for the same purpose, unless each of them is insufficient by itself: therefore it seems that when wisdom transfers itself into holy souls, this is the mission of the Holy Spirit and not of the Son.

1. Likewise, all sanctification is of goodness: but goodness is an attribute of the Holy Spirit: therefore it seems that the mission into souls is of the Holy Spirit and not of the Son.
2. Likewise, it has been held above that the mission is for sanctifying and recalling the rational creature, which had strayed: but this cannot be done except through grace making one pleasing: therefore, since the Holy Spirit is sent in that, it seems that the Son is not sent into pious souls.
3. Likewise, to constitute friends of God is properly of love: therefore, since (as it is held) the mission constitutes friends of God, it seems the Holy Spirit is sent, who is properly love in the Trinity.
4. Perhaps you might say that the mission of the Son is in that which constitutes Prophets, which pertains to the illumination of the intellect: and the mission of the Holy Spirit is for the perfection of the affection in constituting friends of God through love.

On the contrary: 1 Corinthians 12:4 and following, among the gifts of the Spirit, in which the Spirit is properly manifested, wisdom, knowledge, faith, the working of miracles, prophecy are placed: therefore it seems that both show the mission of the Holy Spirit, and not of the Son.

1. If perhaps you say that the Son is sent in the illumination of the intellect without grace making one pleasing, as some say.

ON THE CONTRARY:
1. Mission is not that He is present who was not present before, since each person is present everywhere: but that He is present otherwise, or for another purpose, who was previously present essentially, presentially, and potentially.

1. Similarly, mission is not such that only the gift of the person is present, and not the person: because thus the person itself would be falsely said to be sent: therefore, since He cannot be present otherwise or for another purpose except through grace making one pleasing, it is necessary that both the mission of the Son and the mission of the Holy Spirit are in grace making one pleasing.
2. Furthermore, concerning the mission of the Son, two things are said here, namely that He transfers Himself into holy souls, constitutes friends and Prophets: and another which says, "Send wisdom from your holy heavens, that it may be with me and labor with me, that I may know what is pleasing to you at all times." Neither of these is without grace making one pleasing. Therefore, since we cannot speak of mission except as we have received from the Saints, it seems that it should not be said that the Son is sent without grace making one pleasing.
3. Likewise, Wisdom 1:4: "Wisdom will not enter into a malevolent soul, nor dwell in a body subject to sins." Therefore, since wisdom entering into the mind is wisdom being sent, it seems that it is not sent except to the pious.
4. Likewise, the mission of wisdom into the world was in the bestowal of the greatest grace: therefore, since one mission corresponds to another: for it is sent into the mind, that the grace of the mission into the world may avail for us: it seems that the mission into the mind is in the bestowal of grace.

Solution. It must be said to the first, that just as the open missions of the Son and the Holy Spirit were ordered, so also are the hidden ones: and both are always for the same end, although not always for the same act. For as Bernard says:

First the Son came, and taught faith: and therefore I concede this,
afterwards the Holy Spirit came, and...

ignites to love.

which according to the intentions of the Saints, neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit is sent except in grace making one pleasing: for the Holy Spirit is not called a gift, which the Father and the Son give to each other, but because they give to us: in this way the Son is also said to be given, not because something is given that is had without him, but because he himself is given in the gift ~ as it is said, James 1:5: If any of you lacks wisdom, let him ask of God, who gives to all abundantly, and does not reproach. Hence I say, that in the end these missions are not distinguished, but in the proximate act because the Son illuminates the intellect, and the Spirit ignites the affection. And through this the solution to the first is clear.

To the other it must be said, that the end of the mission is sanctification and return: and this is not only of the Holy Spirit: because return signifies the showing of the way, and in this respect it is of the Son: and it signifies the attainment of the good, and in this respect it is of the Holy Spirit. For they are sent together: yet neither is imperfect, nor is superfluous: because it is necessary on account of the double part of our soul, which is intellect and affection.

To the other it must be said, that although grace in general, and with respect to the act which is to make pleasing, is attributed and shown to the Holy Spirit, yet this grace or that is, or can be attributed to the Son: and therefore when the mission is in the conferring of particular grace to the intellect or affection, I say that then the Son is sent.

To the other it must be said, that to establish friends two things are required, namely the knowledge of friendship and of the friend, and of those things through which friendship is contracted and preserved, and this is of the Son: and the other is what is the love of the friend, and the foundation of love, which is honorable and part of the honorable, as the Philosopher says, and in this respect the Holy Spirit is sent.

To the other it must be said, that prophecy is said in four ways according to Augustine, namely by corporeal vision, spiritual, intellectual, and by the dignity or congruity of the perception of the secrets of God. As it is said of Abraham the Prophet, of whom, Genesis 17:17 and 18, it is said: Shall I hide from Abraham what I am about to do, since he is to become a great nation and in Psalm 104:15: Do not touch my anointed ones, and to my Prophets, etc. And with respect to this last, two things are required for prophecy, namely illumination, and grace making one pleasing: and in this alone prophecy is a complete mission, but not in the other three, except in a certain way: for to infuse revelation is one thing, and to transfer wisdom into the soul itself is another: for in the first wisdom is not sent except in a certain way, but in the second it is sent simply.

To the other it must be said, that the distribution of all spiritual gifts pertains to the Holy Spirit according to that property of the Spirit, which unites and vivifies the mystical body: because in that manner, just as our spirit divides to each member proportionally to itself, so the Holy Spirit uniting the Church, divides gifts as he wills: but yet the gifts themselves considered in themselves, sometimes show the Son: and in this manner the Apostle speaks, as is clear to one considering the circumstances of the Letter.

To the other it must be said, that as it has been proven, thus it is shown that such an opinion is false.

Articulus 17 — Whether Our Knowledge Is Of The Substance Of The Mission, Such That Knowledge Is Required For The Mission, And Whether Someone Without It Can Be Worthy Of Hatred Or Love

Whether our knowledge is substantial to mission, such that knowledge is required for mission? And whether someone can be worthy of hatred or love?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says:

And then to each is sent with whom he is known, etc. It seems, therefore, that our knowledge is substantial to mission.

1. But against this is that mission is especially made to the simpler ones, who have more grace in the office than in knowledge: for an old woman sometimes knows little or nothing, and yet it is sent to her more frequently than to a great theologian knowing much.
2. Furthermore, Ecclesiastes 9:1: Man does not know whether he is worthy of love or hatred. But to whom the Holy Spirit is sent, and to whom the Son is sent, if he knows the mission, he knows himself to be worthy of eternal life: therefore he knows himself to be worthy of love: and thus the word of Ecclesiastes is falsified.
3. If you say that no one knows as a man: but Augustine says that insofar as we perceive something of this mission in the mind, to that extent we are not in this world: and thus in this life something can be known, as the Apostle knew about himself, when he said: Do you seek proof of him who speaks in me, Christ?
4. And, to Romans 8:38: I am certain that neither death, nor life,... nor any other creature can separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord. If, I say, you say thus. Against: Job 3:23, concerning that, To a man whose way is hidden, and God has surrounded him with darkness: there Gregory says that the chief cause of weeping for a holy man is that he does not know whether he is worthy of hatred or love: because there is a way that seems right to a man, and its end leads to death.
5. Likewise, By what will a man know that the Holy Spirit is sent to him? For the acts of the Spirit are very similar to the acts of nature or the heart: as in this very act which is to love, it can be seen: for I can know that I love God for himself, and above all things: but whether this proceeds from charity, I cannot know, since the Philosopher determines that a truly brave man, by the grace of good, and for the sake of the good of virtue, even despises life: and yet that does not necessarily proceed from charity.

Similarly, the Apostle says, 1 Corinthians 13:3: If I deliver my body so that I may burn, but have not charity, it profits me nothing: for the sake of God I can set aside life: and yet I may not know that I have charity: therefore I may not know that the Holy Spirit is sent to me.

Solution. Knowledge is required for mission, as it seems to me, but not all, but threefold, namely one which is on the part of the known, namely that I feel in myself the gift in which as in a sign the person sent can be known: but I call a sign that which has the act of grace making one pleasing, and is appropriable to the Son or the Holy Spirit. The second is habitual knowledge. The third is conjectural from signs, as if I see myself able to easily do what one not having grace either cannot do, or can do with great difficulty: if I see my spirit to be free from vain hope, and vain love, and vain joy, and fleeting sadness, and worldly fear, and the like. And I think that triple knowledge suffices according to habit for mission, and I say that it is not necessary for knowledge to be present according to act. And through this the solution to the first is clear.

To the other it must be said that Ecclesiastes does not exclude knowledge from a sign, and conjectural, and habitual: for to whom the Spirit is sent, he has the habit in which this can be known, if the eye is opened, or through revelation after death.

To the other it must be said that the Apostle speaks there of the indwelling of Christ through the operation of miracles, and the power of signs, which he had experienced in himself. And this is not to be sent wisdom except in a certain way, as was previously held.

To the other it must be said that the Apostle either speaks there from a revelation made to him beyond the common law, or he speaks from conjectures.

But to what they say, that certain knowledge is required, I believe it to be false what they say.

Articulus 18 — Whether The Holy Spirit Was Sent More Fully After The Incarnation Than Before, And Whether The Celibacy Of John Is To Be Preferred To The Marriage Of Abraham

Whether the Holy Spirit was sent more fully after the incarnation than before? And whether the celibacy of John is to be preferred to the marriage of Abraham?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said:

He was also sent before the incarnation,

and to all the saints, etc.

For it can be a doubt, whether he was sent more fully before the incarnation than after? For it seems that he was sent more fully after: because the grace of the New Testament is fuller than that of the Old: since therefore the mission is for the sake of grace, it seems that the Son or the Holy Spirit is sent more fully in the New than in the Old.

Against this is what Augustine says in the book on the Good of Marriage, that the celibacy of John is not preferred to the marriage of Abraham: therefore neither are other gifts preferred, as it seems.

To this I respond with Augustine in the book IV on the Trinity, chapter 20, thus: What the Evangelist says, that, And below, the Spirit was not yet given, because Jesus was not yet glorified: how is it understood except that certainly that giving or mission of the Spirit after the glorification of Christ was to be, such as never was before: for neither was it none before, but it was not such there: It was necessary for the coming of the Spirit to be shown by sensible signs, so that it might be shown that the whole world and all nations established in various tongues would believe in Christ through the gift of the Holy Spirit, so that what is sung in Psalm xvi, 4, might be fulfilled: There are no speeches nor words, whose voices are not heard.

According to this, it must be distinguished, that there is a mission in personal grace, and a mission ordered to the conversion of the world, and there is an invisible mission, and a mission in a visible sign. Therefore, personal and invisible missions are related before and after the advent, as exceeding and exceeded: because to certain persons there more grace was

infused, and to certain persons more here. But the universal and visible mission was such after, as never was before.

To the first, therefore, it must be said, that it is true what is objected concerning the condition of the state: but certain persons existing there in the Old Testament (as Augustine says) pertained to the New: and certain conversely.

To what is objected in opposition, it must be said that this is true what Augustine says concerning the habit of continence, which was greatest in the Patriarchs: but concerning the act of continence and the state, virginity is preferred to every marriage.

Articulus 19 — Whether The Holy Spirit Is Sent To The Angels

Whether the Holy Spirit is sent to the Angels?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said:

As it also fills the holy Angels, etc.

For from this it seems that the Spirit is sent to the Angels.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Mission is not to the same one who is in the state of messenger: but the Angel is often the messenger of mission, as it seems: because when the Son was sent into the flesh, the Angel announced it: and when the mission ought to be made in the mind, the Angel assists in this by guarding and suggesting, as Bernard says: and by running between the soul and God, presenting the vows and desires of the soul to God, and bringing grace to the soul: therefore it seems that mission is not made to the Angels.

1. Likewise, Mission is not made except to one who is distant: but he who is always in the secret of the house is not distant: therefore mission is not made to the Angel.
2. Likewise, Mission is made (as Augustine says in the authority cited above) so that he who had wandered might be recalled: a good Angel never wandered: therefore mission is not made to the Angel.
3. Likewise, Mission is made to sanctify the creature, but to sanctify is to make holy from not holy: this cannot be done in an Angel, nor has it ever been done: therefore, etc.

But on the contrary: 1. Mission to one who is holy is not to be future according to this except once, namely in the first grace, which is false: because Augustine says that he is sent as many times as he perceives something of interior grace: but this happens often.

1. Likewise, Here it is said that the Son is often sent invisibly.

Solution. We say that mission is made in the perception of grace and in the increase of grace: because the Spirit is always felt to be present differently than it was before, and it is sent to the Angels, and is sent with regard to new revelations: although grace which is substantial as a reward is not increased in them.

To what is first objected, it must be said that the Angel is not a messenger in that mission, so that he himself with grace would enter the mind: but he is a messenger as one serving the Lord who is sent, and preparing the way by the removal of impediments, and this through an operation external to the mind, such as suggestion, and teaching, and exhortation, and the like: but not as inspiration which is intrinsic to the mind: and therefore to it mission is made, and is made.

To the other it must be said that the distance which this mission requires is not local: but as nature is distant from grace: because through nature and natural things it cannot be had, but from God alone: and therefore since the Angel is thus distant from grace, mission is necessary to him.

To the other it must be said that to recall the wandering is twofold, namely who has already wandered, or lest he who is on the way might wander: and in this second way mission is to the Angel and to the Saints, who already nevertheless have the Holy Spirit: although they are not confirmed like the Angel, and therefore they need more frequent mission.

To the other it must be said in the same way, that sanctification is made in the increase of grace, and in the first grace: because sanctification is said in three ways, namely to make substance and grace together as in Christ: or to make nature and add grace, as in the first man and good Angel: or to make from not holy, holy, as in converted sinners.

Articulus 20 — Whether The Soul, By The Mind Grasping What Is Eternal, Is Essentially In Heaven And Outside This World

Whether the soul, by understanding what is eternal, is essentially in heaven and outside this world?

Whether the soul, by understanding what is eternal, is essentially in heaven and outside this world?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says: For we also, insofar as we understand something eternal, are not in this world.

1. For from this it seems to be taken that the soul, by understanding something eternal, is essentially in heaven, although accidentally, namely because it perceives by the mind that which is in heaven.
2. Which also seems to be able to be proven by many reasons thus: The soul is not related to a place except accidentally: for it is not in this place in which I am with my soul, except because the body in which it is, is in this place: if therefore being in some place accidentally makes it substantially be there, since it is accidentally in heaven, it will be there substantially and essentially.
3. Likewise, a form does not determine a place for itself per se, even a corporeal one: because we see that the same form according to the reason of the form is in every position of the body above and below. Hence thus: No form determines a place for itself

per se, but accidentally: but everything of this kind is in all places to which it is accidentally determined: therefore a form is in all places to which it is accidentally determined: but the soul is the most noble of forms: therefore the soul is in all places to which it is accidentally determined: but it is accidentally determined to that which it apprehends: therefore it is in the place of that which it apprehends by the mind: therefore since that which it apprehends by the mind is outside the world, it will be essentially as in a place outside the world.

4. Likewise, this seems to be said by Augustine, that the soul is more truly where it loves, than where it is. Likewise, the Apostle: Our conversation is in heaven.
5. Likewise, Dionysius in the book On the Divine Names says that by the power of prayer we do not draw God, who is present everywhere, to ourselves, but we extend ourselves into God.

But on the contrary it seems that

1. A form does not have natural being except in matter: and natural being is the proper being of a form: therefore the soul by that which it is, is only in the matter of the body.
2. Likewise, it is the same in some things moving towards form and towards place, as the Philosopher says, because the mover gives to the mobile both its form and all natural consequences of it: and the Philosopher says that the natural consequence of the form of fire is the higher place: therefore it seems that a form in its being determines a place.
3. Likewise, if I say, a form is in matter: either it is in matter accidentally, or per se. It is evident that not accidentally: because thus no one thing would be constituted in nature: therefore it is per se in it: therefore it is more related to the place of the matter, than to the place of another to which it is not joined except accidentally.

Solution. It must be said that the soul according to that which it is and by essence, as long as man lives, is only in the body. But in whatever it thinks about or is affected by, it is as in an object, to whose place in its essence it is referred neither per se nor accidentally.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that Augustine speaks, that we are not in this world as to the mode of knowing or living: because according to the way of the world we know through a mirror in an enigma: but insofar as we apprehend something eternal, we know by somewhat touching the species, and we are abstracted from the material things of this world.

To the other, it must be said that it is true that the soul is not in a corporeal place except accidentally: but that accident is joined to it by nature: for through the body it is in a place, and unless it were essentially in the body, it would not be in the place of the body: and therefore through that in which it is not essentially, but rather that is in it by essence and likeness, it does not have any place either per se or accidentally.

To the other, it must be said that a form per se, that is, without matter, does not determine a place for itself, because thus it is simple: but thus it is only by intention: but by its being in matter it determines a place for itself: so also, that it moves to that place, unless it is

prohibited, as the Philosopher says. But being thus is not accidental, as accidental is that which can be present and absent to the same in a remaining nature: but it is accidental, as it is fitting through another, namely through that which is in matter: and this is natural, not accidental to the form, if accident is properly taken according to the nature of accident. Hence a form is to be considered in three ways,

namely as it is understood, and thus it is a species in the soul of the one understanding, and the species which is in the soul of one is not the species which is in the soul of another: or as the reason of a common nature, abstracting from any particular, and thus it is in each of its particulars and always: or according to the being which it has in nature, and thus it is in that which is this something: and not accidentally, but naturally: for it is absurd to say that a form has being in matter accidentally, unless in this way taking accident which is fitting through another: but this accident does not oppose the substantial and natural: as it is evident, that by this accident Socrates is accidentally an animal, and yet to be an animal substantially and naturally is fitting to Socrates.

To the other, it must be said that Augustine calls more truly being, more nobly being, and not more truly in nature: because the soul and any form has more nobly being in a more noble cause, than in itself: because in the first cause it is not mixed with privations and material things, as in itself or in the body.

To the other, it must be said that by the power of prayer we draw ourselves into God: not by place, but by merit, so that we may be present to Him otherwise than we were before.

N. Why is the Father not said to be sent, when He is known by someone as the Son?

Here it is asked, Why is the Father not said to be sent, when He is known in time by someone, like the Son? To which we say, because in Him is the authority of the principle, which does not have from whom it is, from whom are the Son and the Holy Spirit. For the Father is (as Augustine says in the same book) the principle of the whole divinity: or, if it is better said, of the deity. For, as Augustine says in the same: If God the Father had also willed, He would appear visibly through a subject creature: yet most absurdly He would be said to be sent by the Son whom He begot, or by the Holy Spirit who proceeds from Him, but He is fittingly said to be sent, who appeared in the flesh: but He who did not appear in this way is not said to have sent.

Divisio Textus

Then it is asked concerning the third part of the distinction which begins there, "Here it is asked, Why is the Father not said to be sent?"

And it is divided into two. In the first, he shows that the Father is not sent. In the second, he shows that the Son and the Holy Spirit are not lesser because they are sent, there, "Therefore some heretics thought," etc.

Articulus 21 — Whether The Father Gives Himself, Or Is Given By Himself

Whether the Father gives Himself, or is given by Himself?

There is a doubt here, Whether the Father gives Himself, or is given by Himself? For it is sufficiently established from the aforesaid that He cannot be sent or proceed. However, it seems that He does not: because according to the Master, to give oneself is to proceed from oneself temporally and to be sent: but this does not befit the Father: therefore neither does giving.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
1. To give says nothing except to confer a gift: therefore, since the Father has power from the freedom of love, just as the Son and the Holy Spirit, the Father can give Himself just as the Son and the Holy Spirit.

1. Likewise, just as wisdom is appropriated to the Son, and grace to the Holy Spirit, so power to the Father: therefore, since hope confers ability, it seems that He gives Himself.

Solution. The Masters concede that the Father gives Himself, and is given by Himself: and that giving does not mean sending according to reason, nor proceeding: and this has been sufficiently determined above: yet they do not say that He has an effect so distinct as the Son and the Holy Spirit: because although ability is attributed to the Father, yet the ability of holy souls is in the gifts of intellect and affection: and therefore it is not manifested by giving Himself, as the Son and the Holy Spirit: and therefore it is not so posited by the Saints, that He gives Himself as the Son gives or the Holy Spirit.

But on the contrary: The Father is the principle of the whole divinity: therefore of Himself.

Solution. It does not follow: because the sense is, that He is the principle of the Son and the Holy Spirit in whom is the whole divinity: however, it is said that it is better said of deity than of divinity: because divine being is perpetual being: and this is communicable to creatures, according to what the Philosopher says, that all things desire divine being, and for that they do whatever they do: but deity is the form from which this name God is imposed, which is not communicable to creatures, as noted above.

DISTINCTIO XVI

Divisio Textus

Now concerning the Holy Spirit it must be seen, etc.

Here begins the part which is about the modes of the mission of the Holy Spirit: and there are two modes, namely visible and invisible. The Master treats of the visible first in this distinction: but of the invisible consequently in the following, there, Dist. XVIT, A,

Now let us approach, etc.

However, this distinction is divided into two parts. In the first, he determines how the Holy Spirit is said to be sent in a visible mode. In the second, how He is not said to be lesser

than the Father on account of that visible mission, although the Son is said to be lesser than the Father on account of that mission, there, C,

But first it must be asked, since the Son is said, etc.

Articulus 1 — What It Is To Be Sent Visibly, And Whether There Was A Visible Mission In The Old Testament As In The New, And Whether The Father Can Be Sent As The Son

What it is to be sent visibly, and whether visible mission was in the Old Testament as in the New, and whether the Father can be sent as the Son?

In the first part, there is only one chapter, around which a doubt arises before the Letter, What it is to be sent visibly? and secondly, Whether this mission is fittingly made to all or to some? and thirdly, Whether it is for the grace making one pleasing or freely given? and fourthly, Whether it was fitting to be done through the Son or the Holy Spirit?

To the first, it proceeds thus: 1. If to be sent visibly is to appear as a person with a visible sign, as Augustine seems to say in the Letter, since in the Old Testament persons often appeared with visible signs, it seems that this mission was often made in the Old Testament.

1. Furthermore, this also seems for another reason: for visible mission is ordered to the invisible: but the invisible was often made in the Old Testament: therefore also the visible. For the first. In the Letter, Augustine says that in those visible creatures the Holy Spirit was present, so that through them it might be shown that the Holy Spirit was in those to whom those creatures came. The second is proved, Wisdom 9:10: Send her from your holy heavens, and from the throne of your greatness, that she may be with me and labor with me. For this was said in the Old Testament: therefore it seems that such a visible mission was then.
2. Likewise, If a visible creature is showing something divine, it suffices for the reason of visible mission: since, as we had above, the Father appeared in a visible creature, it seems the Father was sent. Genesis 16:2, He saw three, and worshiped one.
3. If you say that these visions of the Father were administered through Angels, and therefore mission is not understood in them: this does not excuse the objection for three reasons: the first of which is that Augustine says that it is most absurd to say that the Father, if He willed, could not appear in a visible creature: therefore, assuming that He appeared, nothing inconvenient should follow: but it follows that He was sent: therefore this does not seem inconvenient: and this was denied above. Therefore, etc.
4. The second reason: Because if an irrational and unintellectual creature (if it may be allowed to say so) suffices to demonstrate the mission of a person, like a dove or breath: much more an intellectual creature, and especially an Angel. For in that, something divine is known so much more, as it is nobler and more divine: since therefore such missions of Angels were often made in the Old Testament, it seems that persons were sent, and even the Father.

5. The third reason is from the authority of Daniel, where it is read that the Ancient of Days sat, and the books were opened before Him. And, Isaiah 6:1, I saw the Lord sitting upon a high and elevated throne, etc. Nor can you say that this was an Angel in the person of God: because the Seraphim do not cry out to an Angel, Holy, holy, holy, nor will an Angel judge in the person of God.

6. If perhaps you say that this was a revelation, and not an apparition, or mission. Against: Such a showing, whatever it may be, was constituting Prophets: because we call Prophets those to whom these things were done: but the proper effect of mission is to constitute Prophets and friends of God, as we had in the preceding distinction, from Wisdom 7:27: Through nations, it transfers itself into holy souls, constituting friends of God and Prophets. Likewise, let us make force in what it says, through nations: therefore not only in our nation, but also in the nation of the Fathers these things were done: therefore it seems that then a visible mission was made, and that the Father and individual persons were sent.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: To Galatians 3:19, The law was put in place by a mediator, ordained by Angels, until the seed should come to whom it was promised. Therefore it seems that all the visions of the Fathers were through the hands of Angels until the advent of Christ. Above, however, it was proved...

it was held that a person is not said to be sent, except in an effect, in which he himself is otherwise or for something else than according to how he is everywhere: and this is held in the Text by Augustine; therefore in such visions no person was ever sent.

§ 1. Also, Augustine in book IV of On the Trinity, says that it would be absurd for the Father to be said to be sent either by him whom he begot, or by him who proceeds from him, even if he is said to have appeared. Therefore, since everyone who is sent, is sent by someone, and the Father cannot be sent by anyone, it seems that he is not sent.

§ 2. Also, Augustine in book IV of On the Trinity, as was established above: To be sent is to be known that one is from another. But the Father is not known to be from another: therefore he is not sent.

But further, against this it can be objected: § 1. Because power is attributed to the Father: therefore, since he effects power in us, he comes into us, just as the Son through wisdom, and the Holy Spirit through charity.

§ 2. Also, this is conceded, and was established above: 'The Father is from himself'. But according to his being from himself, it seems that in the same relation of the preposition, this ought to be conceded: 'He is sent by himself', and 'The Father sends himself'.

§ 3. Also, Augustine, proving that the Holy Spirit sends himself and gives himself, proves it by this: that he is of his own power: and this was established above in the preceding distinction. But he would not be of his own power, if he could not send and give himself. Therefore, by a similar reasoning, the Father will not be of his own power, if he cannot send

and give himself. Since therefore all the persons were always of their own power, all were always able to send and give themselves, both in the Old and in the New Testament.

Solution. Supposing what was determined above, it is easy to answer these objections. For we say that to appear and to be sent are not the same thing: and we well concede that the Father could appear in a subject creature through the ministry of an Angel and by himself, and still can: but he cannot be sent because of the causes assigned above: because passive sending supposes the fittingness of a messenger, and a formal reason in the subject: and that formal reason is 'to be from another', which is not fitting for the Father. Therefore he could appear, but he could not be sent.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that although wherever there is a visible sending, an appearance of some person occurs by a visible sign, it is not convertible: because a visible sending adds two things over and above an appearance, namely, to exist from another, and to be present by himself otherwise or for something else than as he is everywhere. But this is not read in the Old Testament, as will be clear later: because the persons are not read to have been by themselves in those signs which appeared.

To the next, it must be said that a visible sending is not ordered to just any invisible sending, but is ordered to the invisible sending which founds and plants the Church. For the visible does not always precede the invisible, even in the New Testament: but it preceded it, so that the abundance of the copiousness of the Spirit might be signified as being with those to whom the visible sending was made, so that from their copiousness it might overflow into the founding and planting of the Church.

To the next, it must be said that the reason has already been stated why this does not suffice: and why the Father could not or cannot be sent.

To what is objected, that a sending of this sort ought to have been called an angelic appearance in the Old Testament: It must be said that in truth that solution which some posit does not suffice: but there is another reason which we have stated, because to be sent adds to appearing, as has been said.

To the next, it must be said that an intellectual creature better shows the unity of essence in the three persons: but it does not so show the effect of grace or the mode of the procession of a person from a person: because of its own nature it does not so express the properties of grace and of procession. For an Angel does not proceed from an Angel, as breath from one breathing: nor is innocence and aptitude for immolation for the redemption of the firstborn proper to an Angel, as it is to a dove: nor is it proper to an Angel from nature to have that whereby it convenes with the act of charity. And therefore an Angel in the number of persons appearing, and by the power of interpreting through speech, can produce faith in the Trinity and unity, although it does not have a fittingness to fulfill a sending through itself. And another reason is that a gift is given by the one sent, as by an efficient cause: but I mean the gift of sanctifying grace, which is in every sending. But an Angel cannot be the cause of grace, nor ought it to be understood to be the cause: therefore neither can it be sent in that sending: nor even if it were sent, would it be useful: because grace would be believed to be from him, and thus it would

draw one into idolatry. A third reason is, because the one sent with grace is held to be gliding into the substance of the soul of the one to whom the sending is made, as was established above in the preceding distinction. But an Angel cannot glide into the substance of our mind: therefore a sending of this sort cannot be administered through him. A fourth reason is, because since grace is created, if it were separated from him by whom it is sent, either he would be a creature, or he would be wholly subject to vanity, just as every creature is. Therefore, in order for grace to be able to separate us from vanity, and join us to the divinity, it is necessary that the one sent, who is with grace, be God. And for these reasons, a sending of this sort cannot be fulfilled, except through a person proceeding from another. But others posit other reasons which do not prove anything, namely, that it was fitting for a sending to begin from afar, and afterwards by approaching to draw nearer to God: and therefore in the Old Testament it was fitting for it to be done through Angels, but in the New Testament through persons. But this is nothing: because according to this, even the invisible sending which was made to all the Saints in the Old Testament ought to have been done through Angels, which is false.

To the next, it must be said that the things seen by Isaiah, Daniel, and Ezekiel, were not, properly speaking, appearances, nor sendings, nor processions, but revelations in imaginary vision, which was made to many: because 'appearance', strictly taken, is said to be the showing of the unity of essence in some figure seen by the senses. But if 'appearance' is taken [broadly], then it will be a genus for revelation, sending, and the like.

To what is objected to the contrary, it must be said that such things seen do not make Prophets: because thus Pharaoh would have been a Prophet, which is false: because he was not a Prophet except in a qualified sense: because, as Augustine says in book XII of The Literal Meaning of Genesis: Someone is not called a Prophet simply speaking except from an intellectual vision: and therefore Joseph was a Prophet of the things seen by Pharaoh, and Daniel was a Prophet of the things seen by Nebuchadnezzar and Belshazzar. But I well concede that they were constituted Prophets from the invisible sending of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. But what, when, concerning what, and why they should prophesy, was shown to them by revelations of the three modes of vision, namely, corporeal, imaginary, and intellectual. However, there are those who say that the Spirit was then sent, not insofar as he is holy, but insofar as he is spirit: because a spirit reveals, but does not sanctify: and the gift of prophecy does not make one Holy, but a seer: whereas in the New Testament he was sent as holy, who sanctified in those visions. But this does not solve the issue: because no one was ever holy, unless the Spirit was sent to him: and therefore if it belonged to the state of the Old Testament that he not be sent as holy, neither would he be invisibly sent as holy. Hence the first solution is better.

To what is objected, that appearances were made through Angels, I well concede it: because Augustine holds this in book IV of On the Trinity, and Dionysius in The Celestial Hierarchy. But yet it is not thereby removed that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit could have appeared by themselves, as Augustine says in the same place.

To what is objected against this, that the Father is not said to be sent, it must be said that power is attributed to the Father: but, as has been said, a person is not said to be sent with

respect to just any gift, but only in a gift in which he himself is, and is possessed: whence if the Father were given in that power, it would be sanctifying power. But that power is not distinct from the gifts of the intellect and the affect, because through gifts of this sort we are powerful in acts of grace: therefore the giving of the Father does not have a distinct gift from that in which the Son is given, and in which the Holy Spirit is given: and therefore it is not expressly found among the Saints that the Father gives himself, or is given by himself.

There are, however, concerning this doubt, three other opinions, of which one is, that the Father gives himself, and is given by himself: and this is not very common. Another says that he does not give himself, nor is he given by himself: because the power which is appropriated to him, is presupposed in the sending and giving of the Son and of the Holy Spirit: because no gift is given to us unless the capacity for that gift, as a power, is presupposed: and therefore, since this capacity is in us by nature (for we are created capable of receiving grace), it is not necessary for the Father to be given in that. The third opinion, which I approve more, is what was said earlier, that the Father well comes in the Son and the Holy Spirit, but he is not given, nor does he give himself: and even if it is conceded that he gives himself, nevertheless it is in no way conceded that he is sent by himself, or sends himself, as was said earlier.

To the next, it must be said that this is conceded: 'The Father is from himself', according as it is expounded by negation thus: The Father is from himself, that is, he is not from another. But to be sent imports affirmatively 'to be from another', as was established above: and therefore it is not fitting for him to be sent.

To the next, it must be said that the Father is of his own power, and always was, and will be, just like the Son and the Holy Spirit: but from that power nothing can be concluded except that he himself works with the Son and the Holy Spirit that effect which he gives in the sending. Because the word to be sent states two things, namely the act of operation, and the effect which is given in the sending. And according to this act, it is itself common to the three persons: and it consignifies from the mode of signifying of the principal signified thing, which is passive sending, 'to come from another', and as to this it does not state any power, but only the formal reason of origin, which does not belong to the Father. Therefore, Augustine's proof was regarding the first, that the Spirit gives himself, just as others give him, and not regarding the second.

To what he further wished to conclude, that this power is in the Old Testament just as in the New, it must be said that the invisible sending existed from the time man was created upon the earth: for no one could ever do any meritorious good without the invisible sending. But a visible sending could not exist in the Old Testament, that is, it ought not to have existed out of fittingness: because that sending is for demonstrating the copiousness of grace, and for the propagation of grace, which did not exist while the first tabernacle still had standing: because Jesus was not yet a man, and not yet glorified. But what the reason for this is, is determined in that question where it is asked, 'Why did he delay his advent, and why was it fitting for the observance of the letter to precede the spiritual sense?'

Articulus 2 — Whether Visible Mission Ought To Be Toward All Who Are Of The New Testament

Whether the visible sending ought to be to all who are of the New Testament?

Secondly it is asked: Whether this visible sending ought according to fittingness to be to all or to some?

And let us ask, Whether to all who are in the New Testament? Because it has already been established that it was not fitting for it to be done in the Old Testament.

It seems that it should be, because: § 1. It is said: I will pour out my spirit upon all flesh, etc. And again: But even upon my menservants and maidservants in those days I will pour out my Spirit. Therefore it seems that it ought to visibly descend in this way to all.

§ 2. Also, when he first came in tongues of fire, no one was excepted, but [he came] upon all, namely a hundred and twenty men and women. Therefore it seems that neither afterwards ought a sending of this sort to be withdrawn from anyone.

§ 3. Also, afterwards while the Apostles were preaching, as Peter in the house of Cornelius, and others, the Holy Spirit fell upon all who heard the word: therefore, etc.

§ 4. Also, the fact that this is not done, can generate despair in us from the fact that it was then done commonly, [leading us to think] that we are not among those to be saved: therefore, etc.

§ 5. If it should be said that those were given to us as seed from which the crop of faith might grow and be multiplied: but now is the time of harvesting what has been sown, and not of sowing any further: this is false. Because it is said: Let him who hears, say: Come. And in the Gospel the lazy servant who hid his master's money is condemned. Therefore it seems that there still remains a time of sowing: therefore he still ought to descend in this way.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. It will be proved below in the following article of the question, that this sending indicates the fullness of the redundance and copiousness of the Spirit. But the Spirit is not given to all unto redundance. Therefore it is not fitting for this sending to be made to all.

§ 2. Also, in the works of farmers we prove this, that young saplings are treated with many fosterings which are not given to an already robust tree. Therefore it similarly ought to have been done in the planting of the Church. Since therefore this sending was for the planting of the Church, it was not fitting for it to be done in a Church already robust.

§ 3. Also, faith grows strong in one way, and has merit in another way: because it grows strong well and is made robust from the hearing of reason, and the sight of a miracle. Yet from these it does not have the formal reason of merit, but rather insofar as it recedes from reason and sight, and leans wholly upon the first truth. Since therefore a visible sending is for the growing strong of faith, it ought not to have been applied in the time of meriting through faith after faith has grown strong.

§ 4. Also, the sendings of the Holy Spirit correspond to the sendings of the Son. But in the sending of the Son that which was visible was first exhibited: so that while we know God visibly, through this we may be caught up into the love of invisible things. But afterwards it was expedient for the Apostles that the bodily presence be withdrawn, so that thus their affection might pass over to the love of the invisible deity. Therefore it similarly was fitting to be done in the sending of the Holy Spirit, that first a visible species be exhibited, through which the Spirit might be known to be present, and afterwards it might be withdrawn, so that we might rest in the invisible substance of the Spirit.

Solution. Consenting to these last arguments, each of which by its own middle term states one reason why it is not always and to all fitting for this mode of sending to be done, we say to the first that Joel speaks of the state of the primitive Church, when it was the time of the planting of the faith.

To the next and to the third it must be said in the same way, that it was then done for this reason, so that men, amazed by the visible miracle, might hasten to the end.

To what is objected by reason, it must be said that this does not compel us to despair: because we are already built up unto faith: because from those who heard, the faith has been confirmed unto us, God testifying with signs, and miracles, and distributions of the Holy Spirit according to his will, as is said in the Epistle to the Hebrews.

Moreover we perceive a better presence in the gifts: for as the Apostle says: The Spirit himself gives testimony to our spirit, that we are the sons of God.

To the next it must be said that although every man ought to call another to the faith and conversion of morals, yet it is not necessary that he call by miracles: because already the very multiplication of the faith is a witness to the truth of the faith: and because it suffices for showing the truth of the faith to have shown miracles and visible signs at one time. For if the faith was previously proved through these, it will be proved and true into eternity. Whence those things which were done then, are now to be reported to others, not exhibited again, as John says in his first canonical epistle: That which was from the beginning, which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled, of the Word of life,... we declare unto you.

Articulus 3 — Whether Mission Belongs To Grace Making One Pleasing, Or To Gratuitously Given Grace

Whether the sending is of sanctifying grace, or of gratuitously given grace?

Thirdly it is asked, Whether this is a sending of sanctifying grace or of gratuitously given grace?

§ 1. It seems that it is of gratuitously given grace, because it is exterior. But nothing exterior outside of man is sanctifying grace. Therefore it seems that this sending is not of sanctifying grace.

§ 2. Also, Aristotle says in Book IV of Meteorology, that through what is open we judge concerning the hidden. Therefore through the act of this sending we judge what grace it is the cause of. But its act is tongues, prophecy, and the like, all of which state nothing except an act of gratuitously given grace. Therefore that sending is toward the act of gratuitously given grace.

§ 3. Also, an invisible sending is toward the act of sanctifying grace, as was proved above. Since therefore it is superfluous to have two modes for perfecting the same thing, especially in the case of a perfect operator, a visible sending will not be toward the same grace. Therefore it will be toward gratuitously given grace.

§ 4. Also, the sending of the Son is toward gratuitously given grace, because it is toward the illumination of the intellect in revelation, and prophecy, knowledge, and the like. Therefore much more can the sending of the Holy Spirit be toward gratuitously given grace; and he is not interior toward that: therefore exterior.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. From an adequate enumeration of parts it is proved that this sending was never exhibited except to demonstrate the fullness of redundance in sanctifying grace: because it was exhibited in three modes: by breath, by fire, by a dove. And it is clear in each one, how the Spirit showed the redundance of grace, as will be shown below, when the sufficiency of the number of these sendings will be shown. Therefore it is manifest that it does not show gratuitously given grace.

§ 2. Also, the Spirit would not be said to be sent, if only his gift were given, as was established above. Therefore the Spirit is said to be sent then, when he is shown through the gift to indwell through grace. But he does not indwell through the gift of gratuitously given grace: for an authority says that he is in the Saints alone through indwelling grace. But he is in many who are not holy through an act of gratuitously given grace. Therefore he himself is not sent, neither visibly, nor invisibly, except through sanctifying grace.

§ 3. Also, in the Text we have from Augustine that through those visible creatures it was shown that the Holy Spirit was in those to whom those creatures were sent. And we see that an abundance of redundance was in all those to whom such a sending was made.

Solution. It must be said that in truth this sending is ostensive of redundant grace, and it is multiplied according to the mode of redundance, as will be clear later.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that it is not exterior in such a way that it is not interior: because the mode of visible sending is ostensive of the invisible Spirit invisibly sent: and therefore the fruit of the sending is within, although the motion of the visible species is without.

To the next it must be said that to judge through a manifest thing is twofold, namely, so that a judgment of the immediate cause is had through an open effect, and as the cause of a cause or the formal reason of a cause is had through an effect. For example, by seeing the open act of prophecy or of tongues in act, the habit which is the cause of this act, as immediate to it, is immediately grasped, and this is the habit of gratuitously given grace. But further consider-

ing the time of the act, and the mode of the act, namely that it is for the propagation of the faith, and the time of the new Church, I know that in them is the Spirit overflowing into some through sanctifying grace. Just as also in natures, by seeing a motion, I know the mover and the formal reason of the mover then rather than at another time, and in this way rather than otherwise.

To the next it must be said that toward the same thing as the same thing, two modes would be superfluous; but toward the same thing as having itself otherwise, they are not superfluous. Because one is toward the inspiration or reception or augmentation of grace, but the other is toward showing the redundance of the same.

To the next it must be said that according to some the Son is not sent except in gratuitously given grace. For they say that if it is sanctifying, it is referred to the sending of the Holy Spirit. But this was disproved above. Whence I say that this is false, that the Son is sent in gratuitously given grace: because when one is sent, all three come and indwell, although through that effect all three are not said to be sent.

But if anyone should object against what was said, that the Spirit visibly fell upon the multitude of those hearing the word: but it is not read that he overflowed in all of them. It must be answered that the falling upon the multitude shows the redundance in the one preaching the new faith, and on the part of him upon whom he falls, it has the formal reason of a fostering of the new faith, as we said above: and therefore it is also not expressed by what sign the Spirit fell upon them, but only that he appeared in a visible sign, which indicated the redundance in the Apostles: but now it is not in the Church because of those causes which have been stated.

Articulus 4 — Whether The Visible Mission Ought To Have Been Performed More Through The Son Than Through The Holy Spirit, Or Conversely

Whether the visible sending ought to have been done more through the Son than through the Holy Spirit, or conversely?

Fourthly it is asked: Whether it was fitting for this sending to be done more through the Son, than through the Holy Spirit, or conversely?

It seems that through the Son: because § 1. The Son is the word indicative of the Father, and the mouth speaking the Father: as it is said: No man has seen God at any time: the only begotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father, he has declared him. Therefore, since this sending is toward instruction unto the faith, it was fitting that it should be done through the Son.

§ 2. Also, that visible sending is toward planting the faith. But Bernard says that the Son came, and taught the faith: therefore it was fitting for the Son to be sent in such a sending.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. The Lord said to his disciples: The Paraclete, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name, he will teach you all things, and bring all things to your mind, whatsoever I shall have said to you. Therefore full instruction is through the Holy Spirit. Since

therefore the truth ought to have been manifested to the world, it was fitting for it to be done through the sending of the Holy Spirit.

§ 2. Also: It is not you that speak, but the Spirit of your Father that speaks in you. Therefore for speaking in the conversion of the Gentiles the Holy Spirit is to be sent, not the Son.

Solution. It must be said that it was fitting for the Holy Spirit to be sent in a non-united visible creature, but the Son in a united visible creature.

To what is first objected, it must be said that instruction pertains also to the Holy Spirit. For there is instruction through interpretation and speaking, and this is fitting to the Word and to him who is the mouth of the Father. And there is instruction not through a word, but through the inspiration of truth, and that is fitting to the Spirit of truth, that is, to the one proceeding from the truth, who announces those things which he receives from the truth: as was done in the sending of the Holy Spirit: for the Spirit illuminated unto the full understanding of those things which had been heard from the Son.

To the next it must be said in the same way that insofar as hearing causes faith which is through the word of Christ, thus it was fitting for the faith to be taught through the Word sent into flesh. But insofar as faith is the assent to the first truth, it cannot be had except through inspiration. Whence also the Apostles who before were flexible in their assent, although they had faith through the hearing of the word, were afterwards confirmed, when they had assent through the inspiration of the Holy Spirit sent into them. And this the same Lord notes at the end of Luke, saying: But you, sit in the city, until you be endued with power from on high.

Articulus 5 — Why There Are Two Modes Of The Mission Of The Son And Of The Holy Spirit

Why are there two modes of the sending of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit?

Next it is asked concerning this which he says in the Text in the first chapter, there, at A, To which we say, that just as the Son is said to be sent in two modes, etc.

And there is a doubt, why there are two modes of sending of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.

§ 1. For since there are two parts of man, namely body and soul, it seems that in neither mode is he said to be sent to the body, as some wish to render the reason. Therefore it seems that both modes ought to be taken according to the parts of the soul. But since we are the image of God, according to the three powers it seems that there ought to be three modes of sending.

§ 2. Also, a sending is for recalling the rational creature, as was established above. But it is recalled according to the rational, irascible, and concupiscible [powers]. Therefore there ought to be three modes of sending.

Solution. We say that there are only two: because since a sending shows the distinction of a person from a person, it could not be shown except through a thing perceptible in the intellect in itself, or through a thing received from sense: and therefore so that the distinction on the

part of the proceeding persons might be sufficiently determined, he was sent by a sensible sign and by an intelligible species.

Also, since a sending brings grace, the grace could not be other than personal which is conferred in a visible sending, or universal which overflows into all, and that is effected by the visible sending of each person.

To those things which are objected to the contrary, it must be said that all the perfections of those powers, and the three habits of those virtues are reduced to the invisible sending. Which although it is done in one mode in genus, yet it is not done in one mode in species.

Articulus 6 — Why The Son Appeared In A Creature United To Himself, And The Holy Spirit Did Not Appear In One United To Himself, And Whether That Dove In Which He Appeared Was A Natural Animal, And Concerning The Motion Of The Dove, What It Was Like

Why did the Son appear in a creature united to him, and the Holy Spirit did not appear in one united to him? And whether that dove in which he appeared was a natural animal, and concerning the motion of the dove, of what sort it was?

Why did the Son appear in a creature united to him, and the Holy Spirit did not appear in one united to him? And whether that dove in which he appeared was a natural animal, and concerning the motion of the dove, of what sort it was?

Next it is asked concerning this which he says, there, It is readily understood concerning the Holy Spirit, etc.

And here three things are asked: of which the first is, Why did the Son appear and was sent in a creature united to himself, and the Spirit in a non-united [creature]?

Secondly it is asked, Why the Holy Spirit, and for what purpose, was he sent to the Son, since the Son was never sent to the Holy Spirit?

Thirdly it is asked, Since the Father appeared in a sound, why did he only appear in an audible creature and upon the Son, and never upon any other man.

To the first one proceeds thus: The Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son: therefore he seems to have a greater formal reason of sending than the Son. Therefore it seems, since 'to be from another' is the formal reason of unibility, that the Holy Spirit is more unible to an assumed creature than the Son.

But because this was sufficiently noted above the beginning of the third [book], let it be asked: Whether the dove in which the Holy Spirit appeared was a true and natural animal or not?

It seems that it was an animal: because § 1. The Spirit of truth ought to feign nothing. But it would be fictitious, if it were only the figure of a dove, and not the truth. Therefore it seems that it was a true dove.

§ 2. Also, the tricks of demons are to delude the senses of men through certain figures. Therefore this does not befit the Spirit of truth.

§ 3. Also, he appeared in a dove because of the properties of a dove. But those properties do not befit anything except a true dove. Therefore it was a true dove, as it seems.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. The Saints say that that dove, having completed its office, reverted into its pristine matter. But this would not have been the case if it were a true dove. Therefore it was nothing but the figure of a dove.

§ 2. Also, if it had been a true dove, it would not have led to another thing. Therefore it seems that in order for it to lead to another thing, it was fitting that it not be a true dove. Just as the Doctors also say that the species of bread and wine in the sacrament of the Eucharist are in it so that they may lead to another thing.

But then it is asked: What moved it by local motion, if it was not alive? For nothing is moved by progressive local motion except a true animal. That dove was moved by local motion. Therefore it was a true animal.

Solution. It must be said that the Holy Spirit is not unible to any creature, because everything which in hypostasis is united to some nature, is one person in the Trinity; whence he could not be united to an irrational nature, because it would be unfitting that a dove be God, or some brute animal. But it was fitting for the Son to be united to a rational creature, which is man, the reason for which is assigned in the third book of the Sentences. And the reason is not that the Spirit is from two, but the Son from one, that he himself is more unible than the Son: because the formal reason of unibility is not attended to in this.

To the next it must be said that that dove was a species of a dove, and not a natural and true animal.

To what is objected to the contrary, it must be said that it is not feigned nor false that which shows this for the sake of which it is assumed. Whence that species was true, because it directly showed that for the sake of which it was assum[ed]...

To the other, it must be said that this was not the nature of an animal, but rather an act of grace, as will be evident later.

To the other, it must be said that the tricks of demons are for deceiving men, as Peter says in the Itinerary of Clement, but the miracles of Christ are for instructing men in those things which are useful to them: and thus are those apparitions: for we cannot say that the dove was an animal, just as neither are tongues a member of an animal.

To the other, it must be said that it is one thing to understand properties according to translation to spiritual things, and another to have properties connatural to oneself. According to translation in the intellect, properties are well received in the species of a dove, although in that species there are not natural properties.

To the last, it must be said that that which is moved by a mover united to itself and by a progressive motion, that is an animal: but the dove was not moved in this way, rather it was

moved by a mover not united to itself: which motion was the will of God, to whom all things obey.

Articulus 7 — Why The Holy Spirit Is Sent To The Son, And Never The Son To The Holy Spirit

Why is the Holy Spirit sent to the Son, and never the Son to the Holy Spirit?

Secondly, it is asked, Why the Holy Spirit was sent to the Son, and never the Son to the Holy Spirit?

For it seems that He ought not to have been sent to the Son: because

1. Every mission, as was held above, is for the sanctification of the creature: but Christ did not need sanctification: therefore the Holy Spirit ought not to have been sent to Him.
2. Likewise, an external mission shows an internal one: therefore it seems that the Holy Spirit was also sent internally to Christ.
3. Likewise, it is never read that He was sent to the Father, nor is it read that the Son was sent to the Spirit: therefore, since mission signifies need in the one to whom the mission is made, it seems that neither ought the Holy Spirit to have been sent to the Son.

I answer, the Spirit was not sent to the Son per se, that is, on account of the need of the Son: but to show the abundance of that fullness, of which it is said, John 1:16: "Of His fullness we have all received, and grace for grace." For He was sent to Him in baptism, in which Christ received nothing: but baptism received from Him: because, as Bede says, by the touch of His most pure flesh He conferred regenerative power to the waters: and the visible mission of the Holy Spirit signified that abundance and copiousness.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear: for it is not similar concerning the Father and the Holy Spirit, from whom the sacraments did not flow, as in whose persons they were not performed, as they flowed from the person of Christ.

Articulus 8 — Why The Father Appeared Only In An Audible Sound, And Not In Another Bodily Species

Why did the Father appear only in an audible sound, and not in another bodily form?

Thirdly, it is asked, Why did the Father appear only in an audible sound, and not in another bodily form? For from the audible form it could not be known that it was the Father who appeared.

Solution. It must be said that the Father of the Word, who with one word which He begot, as Augustine said, spoke all things, and they were made, fittingly appeared in the sound and voice expressing the generation of the Son, even in the re-creation. And although sound in general does not manifest the Father, nevertheless, the articulated and literate sound naming the Son declares Him when it said: "This is my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased: hear Him."

Articulus 9 — Why The Holy Spirit Appeared Only In These Three Species: Of Tongues, Of A Dove, And Of Breath

Why did the Holy Spirit appear only in these three forms: tongues, dove, and breath?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said:

Upon the Lord Himself, He descended in bodily form as a dove, etc.

For it is doubtful, why is it read that He was manifested only in these three forms, namely in the form of a dove, in the form of fiery tongues, and in the form of breath.

To this it must be said that in the Holy Spirit three things are considered, namely person, procession, and the nature of the gift. If the nature of His personality is considered, He is charity: and through this, He establishes a likeness to fire: the effect of this fire was then the abundance of grace in the conversion of the world: and therefore in tongues, the fire was figured, so that the session would signify the permanence in the Church of the fire which is charity and divine fire: the tongues, however, the knowledge of speech which the Apostles received: whence it is sung of Him:

The fire with quivering light
Brought the form of tongues,
That they might be fluent in words,
And fervent in charity.

But if it is considered in the gifts, thus it is signified in the dove, which is read to be fruitful, simple, and mourning, and without the gall of malice in the liver: because such things His gifts make in the Saints. But if the mode of His procession is considered, He proceeds from the Son as the spirit of life and holiness, conferring upon the whole Church sense and motion, because He proceeds from the head: and in this respect, He is manifested in breath.

Divisio Textus

But first, it must be asked, since the Son is said to be lesser than the Father, etc.

Here begins the second part of this distinction which has three chapters, and three parts: in the first of which it is shown that the Son is lesser than the Father according to humanity. In the second, it is shown that he is lesser than himself according to humanity, there, D, Note. In the third, however, it is shown that the Son, insofar as he was made man, etc., the Father is said to be greater than the Son: yet the Son is not lesser than the Father, insofar as he is God, there, E, Hilary, however, seems to say, etc.

Articulus 10 — Whether, Besides The Interior Invisible Mission, An Exterior Mission Was Necessary

Whether, besides the interior invisible mission, an exterior mission was necessary?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says:

That by external visions the hearts of men, etc.

1. For those visions either sufficed for the knowledge of the hidden divinity and the distinction of persons without the interior mission, or not: if so, then the interior mission was useless.
2. Furthermore, since the interior confers grace, it would seem then that the knowledge of the Trinity could be had without grace, which is false, as was shown above. But if it was necessary for the interior to be present, since it teaches through inspiration, it seems then that the exterior was useless.

Solution. It must be said that in truth the exterior is a testimony of the interior, as it is said in the Text: because it was signified that in those to whom such a mission was made, or to whose preaching and intercession it was made, there would be overflowing grace, as was said: and therefore the exterior procession was not useless for the state and time.

Then it is asked concerning this which he says:

Who was not more in those creatures, etc.

For this does not seem so: because something is more known to be present through a greater effect: but it effected more in those than in others: therefore it was more in those.

Solution. This reasoning errs from the fact that it changes the discrete into the intensive: for it does not follow that if it was present in more ways, that it was more present, unless those ways caused intensity: hence the Master rightly says that it was present for another purpose.

Articulus 11 — Whether Christ, Insofar As He Is Man, Is Less Than The Father, And The Holy Spirit, And Himself

Whether Christ, insofar as he is man, is lesser than the Father, and the Holy Spirit, and himself?

Here, however, a doubt arises, whether Christ, insofar as he is man, is lesser than the Father, and himself, and the Holy Spirit? because this question returns to the same in those three ways.

1. It seems, however, that he is: because insofar as he is man, I can say that he is made, and a creature, and suchlike, all of which imply lessening: therefore, he, insofar as he is man, is lesser than the Father, and himself, and the Holy Spirit.
2. Likewise, all the Saints say this in agreement.

But ON THE CONTRARY:
1. Christ, insofar as he is man, is man: if therefore Christ, insofar as he is man, is lesser than

himself: therefore Christ is lesser than himself: and this cannot be, because no thing is lesser than itself.

1. Likewise, Christ does not seem to be of more than one quantity: therefore it seems that according to that he is either greater only, or lesser only, or equal.
2. Likewise, Christ, insofar as he is man, is lesser than himself: therefore Christ, insofar as he is man, is not equal to himself: because lesser and greater are opposed to equal.

Solution. To respond to such things is easy: because when it is said, Christ insofar as he is man is lesser than the Father and the Holy Spirit, it is absolutely true. But if it is said, Christ insofar as he is man is lesser than himself, it can refer to the antecedent with determination, and it is false: or without determination, and it is true: because it then supposes only the person simply: and then it does not follow, therefore Christ is man: because when it is said, Christ is man, it is said Christ being man, and this says nothing but the person. In the person, however, the term "insofar as" indicated the condition of nature, as the Master says.

Similarly, when it is said, Christ insofar as he is man, is equal to himself, this is true, if "to himself" refers to the antecedent with determination: if without determination, it is false: and this whole solution is founded on the fact that the term "insofar as" says nothing but the cause according to the condition of nature: but if it were to say the unity of the person, then when it is said, Christ insofar as he is man, the sense would be, Christ as man personally is lesser than himself, and the expression would be false: and true, if it were said he is equal to himself.

Articulus 12 — Whether An Angel Is Better Than Man Or Conversely

Whether an Angel is better than a man or vice versa?

Whether an Angel is better than a man or vice versa?

Then it is asked concerning this which says:

"Thou hast made him a little lower than the angels," etc.

1. For it seems this is false: because man even absolutely seems to be nobler than an angel: because if the best horse is better than the best donkey, then a horse is simply better than a donkey: but the best man is better than the best angel: therefore man is simply better. The first is written in the Topics of TL. The second is proven through Christ, who is the best among all creatures and above all.
2. Likewise, what the wise man chooses is more to be chosen: but the wisest, because the wisdom of the Father, chose human nature and not angelic: therefore human nature is better: for what is more to be chosen is better.
3. Likewise, what is in better things is more to be chosen: but human nature is in the best, because in the Son of God: therefore it is better than angelic.

4. Likewise, Augustine: Between our mind and God there is nothing intermediate. Therefore nothing is better this side of God: because what is closer to God is better. Therefore angelic nature is not better.

5. Again, 1 Corinthians 6:3: "Know ye not that we shall judge angels?" The Gloss says that the judgment of comparison will be between men and angels, and some men will be found superior to some angels. Therefore it seems that we are either greater or equal.

Likewise, Deuteronomy 32:8, according to another translation: "He set the bounds of the people according to the number of the angels of God." But the bounds of man would not be set according to the bounds of angels by a just God, unless we could be equal in virtue and merit. Therefore it seems that angels are not superior to us.

1. Likewise, Augustine against Maximinus: Human nature, which the Son of God assumed, who could not be corrupted by sin, is nothing better except God alone.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Psalm 8:6: "Thou hast made him a little lower than the angels." And, Hebrews 2:9: "But we see Jesus, who was made a little lower than the angels for the suffering of death, crowned with glory and honor."

Here some place and concede an error because of such objections: God is supremely liberal and supremely good: therefore He flows into each one as much of His goodness as he is capable of: if therefore an angel were more capable by nature than man, He would flow more into him: but He flowed more into man, because of the grace of union: therefore by nature man is more capable of divine nobility and goodness than an angel.

1. Likewise, among men, he who has better natural qualities will necessarily have greater grace: therefore from the effect, he who receives greater grace has better natural qualities: but man receives greater grace: therefore he has better natural qualities than an angel.

2. Likewise, if there are two things, one of which is for the sake of the other, that is better and more worthy for which the other is, than that which is for it: but man and angel are two such things, and the angel is for the sake of man. Proof: "He shall give his angels charge over thee, to keep thee," etc. And, Hebrews 1:14: "Are they not all ministering spirits, sent forth to minister for them who shall be heirs of salvation?" Therefore man is better and nobler than an angel.

3. But if this is conceded, it is against Dionysius, because he wants that according to the grades of beings there is proximity to God: hence intellectual nature is closer than rational. And against Augustine in the eleventh book of Confessions, where he says that the angel was created near to God.

4. Likewise, it will be against philosophy, which posits the rational soul as an instrument of intelligence or angel.

5. Likewise, it will be against reason: because illumination descends from the superior to the inferior: but illuminations are made by angels in the souls of men, as Augustine says in the eleventh book on Genesis.

Solution. Without prejudice, we say that angelic nature considered in nature is much nobler than human: and it is nobler even than the rational soul considered in its nature: because it is natural for the rational soul to be united to the body, and this unibility makes it more material and closer to matter than if it were an angel: yet human nature, insofar as it is referred to unity with God, and as it is referred to the state of beatitude, is equal or better than angels, and this is to be better or equal in a certain respect. It is referred to unity with God in two ways, namely according to that which is united to God from our nature in Christ: and according to that from which is taken that which is united, as in the Blessed Virgin, in whom the Holy Spirit came with the power of the Most High, purging her, and conferring the power of the Word of God to her together with generative power, as will be had below: hence she is also more worthy than any pure creature, and is exalted above the choirs of angels to the heavenly kingdoms. According to the relation to the state of contemplation, it is true that we will be equal to angels: because according to the grades of the lot of angels will be our assumption into the kingdom.

Therefore, to the three things first objected from the considerations of the Philosopher, it must be said that they hold in those things which are such per se and from nature, and not per accidens and in relation to another. Thus our nature is not in Christ, nor chosen by Him.

To the other, it must be said that Augustine speaks of the mode of contemplation, and not of nature. But if you object that Augustine says in the book on the Quantity of the Soul, that the nature of the soul has something inferior as the soul of a sinner, something superior as God, something equal as an angel. Again, I say that the equality is not referred to nature, as nature is, but to the state which is possible to nature through merit; because the nature of the soul as a soul is inferior to the nature of an angel.

To the other, it must be said that this again is referred to merit, which we attain by the gift of God, and not to nature.

To the other, it must be said, as was said above, that the assumptibility of man does not make his nature better than the nature of an angel: because it does not belong to him from his natural qualities.

To the other, it must be said that God pours out twofold gifts, namely natural, and these He pours out according to the capacity of nature: for example, to matter having only the potentiality for place, He infuses the form of heaven. But to prime simple matter having potentiality for place and form, He infuses the form of an element: but to mixed matter only, He infuses the form of a mineral: but to mixed and somewhat complexioned matter in similar parts, He infuses the form of a vegetable soul: but to mixed complexioned matter composed of dissimilar organs, He infuses the form of a sensitive soul: but to matter most approaching equality, and receding from contraries to some likeness of heaven, He infuses the form which He creates in His image, namely the rational soul. He pours out other gifts which are gifts of

grace: and those He does not give according to the proportion of nature, but rather according to His liberality, and the effort of the one preparing himself to receive. For that He gives from liberality is evident in the Gospel, where He says: "I will give to this last even as to thee." That He also gives according to effort is evident where He says: "He gave... to each according to his own ability, and straightway took his journey." There indeed ability is taken for effort.

To the other, it must be said that it is false that he who has better natural qualities has greater grace: but it is true that if there are two who have equal grace, and not equal natural qualities: he who has better natural qualities will have better use in acts: but yet from this it does not follow that he has greater merit in easier use: because the difficulty of acting sometimes also contributes to some greater merit, or to some condition of greater merit.

To the other, it must be said that the fact that angels guard us and serve us does not show their nature to be less worthy, but their charity and obedience, and our need: but the true reason would be concerning those things which by the order of nature are so disposed that one is for the sake of the other, as the corporeal for the spiritual, and the brute for the rational.

Articulus 13 — Whether The Father Can Be Said To Be Greater Than The Son, And The Son To Be Less Than The Father

Whether the Father can be said to be greater than the Son, and the Son lesser than the Father?

Whether the Father can be said to be greater than the Son, and the Son lesser than the Father?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said: Hilary, however, seems to say, etc.

For it seems false: because greater either signifies relation or essence. If it signifies relation: then its correlative will be in the Son, and thus the Son will be lesser. But if it signifies essence: then it is simply false what is said.

To this some say that the Father is said to be greater because he has three notions, namely innascibility, paternity, and spiration: the third of these is in the Father and the Son, and therefore by that he is not said to be greater: but paternity has an opposite relation by which the Son is not said to be lesser: but the third is innascibility, by which namely the Father is said to be greater: because truly in that he has a nature corresponding to him in the Son, therefore the Son cannot be said to be lesser by the opposite respect. But this is nothing: because Hilary here in the text says that the greater is the giver: but the giver is by paternity: therefore the greater is by paternity.

Therefore it must be said that by the authority of generation he is greater, and the term "greater" signifies only the authority of the principle: but because by the reason of relation in the opposite it is placed by nature as equal in all things, therefore it does not follow that the Son is lesser, but equal to the greater: for he who is born does not proceed into less, but equal in nature and essence and in all things. And this is the intention of Hilary, as is clear to one considering the text of the chapter. However, it would be otherwise if the relation of the Father implied excess like lordship: because then it would follow that the Son would be lesser.

DISTINCTIO XVII

Divisio Textus

Now let us proceed to assign the mission of the Holy Spirit, etc.

Here begins to show the invisible mode of the mission of the Holy Spirit. And this distinction has two parts: in the first of which the Master touches upon what is the mode of the invisible mission. In the second, however, he objects certain things to the contrary and resolves them, there, G, Here it is asked, If charity is the Holy Spirit, etc.

The first is divided into three parts: in the first of which he prefaces certain things that are required to understand this mission in two small chapters. In the second, it is proven that the Holy Spirit is the charity by which we love one another and God, there, C, But lest in so great a matter. In the third, he concludes the proposition, which is said to be sent invisibly, when the charity by which we love God is infused into us, there, F, For then it is said to be sent or given to us, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether The Charity By Which We Love God Is The Holy Spirit Or Some Created Habitual Gift

Whether the charity by which we love God is the Holy Spirit, or some created habitual gift?

Here arises before the Letter a common question, whether the charity by which we love God is the Holy Spirit?

It seems, however, that it is so both by authorities and by reasons. But because the Master presents many which seem very express, therefore let us insist on the reasons thus:

1. Nothing more unworthy can the inferior join to the superior: but no creature not rational is more worthy than a rational creature: therefore it cannot join it to a superior nature: charity is created, as you say, and not rational, because neither man nor angel: therefore it cannot join man to a superior nature: but it joins: therefore from the destruction of the consequent it is not a creature.
2. Likewise, nothing of finite essence has infinite power or act: charity, if it is a creature, is of finite essence: therefore it does not have the power for an infinite act: but it has the power for an infinite act: therefore it is not of finite essence: therefore it is not created essence. For it has an infinite effect: Rational nature and God are infinitely distant: and yet they are joined by charity: therefore charity is uncreated.
3. Likewise, the heresy of Pelagius is that man from himself has that by which he pleases God: therefore that by which man pleases God is better than man: but no accident is better than man: therefore charity by which man pleases God is not an accident: therefore it is a substance: either created or uncreated: if created, which is better than man, it cannot be except a confirmed angel, which is absurd: because neither does he have from

himself that by which he can please God: therefore it must be that it is an uncreated substance, and thus it will be God.

4. Likewise, every form, according to the opinion of Aristotle, is in some way drawn out of matter: if therefore charity is a form, charity is drawn out of matter: but it is not drawn out of matter: therefore it is not a form: therefore it seems that it is the divine substance in us.
5. Likewise, every creature is subject to vanity: but vanity does not befit truth, and especially uncreated truth: if therefore charity is created and an accident, it will be more subject to vanity than man who is a substance: therefore it cannot join to the first truth: but it joins: therefore it is not a creature: therefore the creator is the charity by which we love God and each other.
6. Likewise, the soul by itself without a medium gives life to the body: since therefore God is the life of the soul, by himself he is the life of the soul: but charity is life, as Augustine, the Master, and Hugh of Saint Victor say: therefore charity is God.
7. Likewise, nature accomplishes with the fewest: because where one agent suffices, it does not place two: since therefore the Holy Spirit is more perfect than nature, he will work with fewer additions: but he can move by himself to love God and neighbor: therefore he will not use a habitual medium in that motion.
8. Likewise, light by itself illuminates the air: since therefore charity is a certain light dispelling spiritual darkness, it seems that God by himself is that light without any habitual medium.
9. Likewise, every power of a mover, the closer it is to the mover, the simpler and nobler it is: but none is so close as that in which it moves in itself: therefore that is the noblest: but the Holy Spirit is the mover of the soul: therefore he will move in the noblest motion by himself: but the noblest motion is the act of charity: therefore he operates by himself in that act, and not by any habit.
10. Likewise, the work of recreation ought to correspond to the work of creation and beatification: but he created by himself, and he will beatify by himself without a medium: therefore he also recreates by himself without a medium.

Likewise, recreation chiefly consists in charity which divides between the children of the kingdom and of perdition, as it says below in the Letter: therefore the recreating charity is God himself.

1. Likewise, the Pelagian heresy seems to hold that some creature can be joined to God by itself: but nothing joins anything to God unless it is joined to God by itself: therefore it is Pelagian heresy to say that what joins us to God is created: but charity joins us to God: therefore it is Pelagian heresy to say that the charity by which we love God and ourselves is a created habit.

2. Likewise, nothing makes a man and his work worthy of eternal life unless it is better than eternal life or equivalent to it: charity makes a man and his work worthy of eternal life: therefore it is something better than eternal life or equivalent to it! but nothing created is better than eternal life or equivalent to it: therefore charity is not something created in us.

3. Likewise, every created being has mode, species, and order: therefore if charity is created, it has mode, species, and order: but mode, species, and order, in all those in which they are, can be diminished: therefore in charity they can be diminished: but diminished they deform: therefore charity can be deformed: therefore it can become formless, which is absurd: for a form cannot be formless: since therefore charity is a form, it cannot be formless: therefore it is not created, but creator.

4. Likewise, in every kind of work the subject is more powerful than the accident, because the accident is caused by the subject: if therefore charity is an accidental habit in the subject which is the soul, as you say, it seems that in the work of love the subject which is the soul is more powerful than charity, which is the heresy of Pelagius: because if it were more powerful, it could love without a habit: therefore charity is not an accident: and it is not a created substance, as is evident to anyone easily: therefore it is a divine substance, as it seems.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. No power acts well unless it is perfected by a habit, either natural, acquired, or infused: therefore much less can it perform the highest and chief act: but the greatest and chief of all acts is to love God meritoriously: therefore for this a habit perfecting the power is especially required.

1. Likewise, in every work God operates in the operating power, as he himself says, "My Father works until now, and I work" Either therefore he operates in the willing will differently than in other powers, or in the same way. If differently, that other mode cannot be on its own part; therefore it will be on our part, not unless by something added to the power in this act, which is not added in others: therefore something is added to the power: but that which is added to the power ordered to the work is a habit: therefore he operates this act through a habit. If perhaps someone is so insane of mind that he says nothing is added, it follows that he does not operate differently in the will than in a stone, and thus he does not grace the worker, which is false and absurd.

2. Likewise, if because of these reasons which have been induced, charity is not some habit in us, it follows by the same reasons that grace is also nothing in us. But the Pelagian heresy did not exclude God from the soul operating in the way he is in all creatures operating: therefore from this position follows the Pelagian heresy, as it seems.

3. Likewise, of a man who is in charity, we say that he is holy: and let us suppose, by the impossible, that he has no virtue except charity, he is still holy: therefore either he is formally good and holy by some habit, or not. If by some habit: therefore that habit will be nothing other than charity: therefore charity is a created habit. If there is no habit by

which he is holy and good: therefore God is the denominative goodness and holiness of this, which is absurd.

4. Likewise, according to the Master, the act of charity is created, but not the habit: let us therefore speak of someone sleeping who is in the state of salvation: either he has charity, or not. If not: therefore he is not worthy of eternal life while he sleeps, which is false. If so: it is clear that not by act: because while he does not act, the act is not: nor by habit: therefore there is no more in charity than in a stone in which also the Holy Spirit is potentially, present, and essentially.

5. Likewise, children according to this will not have charity, except as stones have it. If you say that it is not similar: because they have the aptitude to perform the act of charity. On the contrary: This aptitude does not...

§ 1. is in some habit: therefore it is in a material potency only, which is absurd.

§ 2. Solution. Here there are certain absurdities spoken by some: for they concede with the Master [Lombard] that the charity by which we love God and neighbor is uncreated: but because, as the reasons introduced above prove, it is the Holy Spirit, which the Master also strives to prove in the Text, they therefore say that the Holy Spirit is that charity. And just as light has a twofold being, namely in itself, and at the extremity of the transparent medium terminating at a body, and there it is the hypostasis and essence of colors, as the Philosopher says: so they say that the Holy Spirit in Himself illuminates the soul, and thus has the act of grace which they call the light of the soul: and He has being in a will conformed to Him, and there He has being by the ratio of charity. And they say that this union with a rational creature, although it is operatively of the three persons, because all operate it simultaneously, nevertheless unitively to Himself and in Himself it belongs only to the Holy Spirit, not to the Father, nor to the Son: just as also the Son united our nature to Himself, and the three persons commonly and indivisibly made this union: but only the Son united our nature to Himself and in Himself. And they say the Apostle felt this He who clings to God is one spirit: and not "is one Father". Moreover, they wish to add a reason to their error: because the Son proceeds as Son by the act of generation as by nature, and therefore He united a nature to Himself; whereas the Spirit as Spirit proceeds as love, because it is the perfection of the will, and therefore He united the will to Himself, although by a far inferior union than that by which the Son united flesh to Himself: because the Son united flesh to Himself in eternity, whereas the Holy Spirit united the will to Himself separably: and therefore they say that He Himself is the charity perfecting the will. But this is foolish: because in the third book of the Sentences it is proved that the Holy Spirit is in no way unible.

§ 3. Moreover, that union is either by grace or by nature. If by grace; therefore it is necessary to have an intermediary habit of grace: and thus the same inconveniences follow concerning grace as concerning charity, namely that an accident conjoins to God, that the created unites to the uncreated, and such things as were concluded above. But if it is by nature: since there is one nature in all of us, this union would be one with respect to all of us, which is false.

§ 4. Moreover, when it is said that light at the extremity of the transparent medium terminating at a body is the hypostasis of color, it is not the hypostasis of one color in a determinate body: but rather in this way it is the hypostasis and formal being of all colors which are actually visible in a non-transparent body, which is called by the Philosopher determinate by its effect, because it determines vision, such that vision does not pass through it: therefore if this similitude has any validity, it seems then that no virtue is anything in us, but that a virtue is a union or mixture of the Holy Spirit with the potency of our soul.

§ 5. Also, in their similitude a certain very gross falsehood is supposed, namely that the being of a color is nothing else than the extremity of the transparent medium in a determinate body: and this is against the Philosopher, who touches upon the generations of colors in many places of his books from the action of primary qualities and passions: whence it remains that the formal being by which a color actually is, it has from the extremity of the transparent medium in the determinate surface of the body in which the color itself is, and it does not have material being from the same extremity of the transparent: for when the extremity of the transparent body is not in act luminous, the colors are still according to material being in the surface of the determinate body. Whence it is clear that a falsehood is supposed in the adduced similitude.

§ 6. Therefore, just as commonly almost all the better [thinkers] agree, one must contradict the Master in this part, and say that the charity by which we habitually love God and neighbor is not the Holy Spirit: but the Holy Spirit appropriately

§ 6. (cont.) is not properly the charity by which we effectively love God and neighbor: for the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit commonly effect this in us, although appropriately the Holy Spirit, because He Himself is properly charity, and thus He is the exemplar of our charity, and He is the distributor of gifts in whom all things are given: for which reason in the book De Spiritu et Anima He is said to be closer to us. And this single solution is adapted to all the authorities adduced in the Text.

§ 7. To the arguments, however, one must respond in order. To the first, saying that "more unworthy" is said in two ways, namely more unworthy in genus, and more unworthy according to the ratio of the good. Charity, through the fact that it is an accident and in the genus of accident, is something more unworthy in genus than a substance. But if the ratio of the good is considered, then it is more worthy than any created good: because the ratio of the good is in it, because it is the effect most similar to the goodness of God, such that even God Himself is never separated from this effect, but is always given with it to him to whom charity is given: and therefore also insofar as it is a similitude of the goodness of God, and has God in itself for another purpose than other creatures, whence He Himself can conjoin a nature inferior in the ratio of goodness to a superior nature.

§ 8. To another, it must be said that charity considered in itself is of finite essence and virtue: but insofar as it acts through the ratio of a good similar to the goodness of God, having God operating within it, it can thus conjoin things infinitely distant, that is, without proportion.

§ 9. To another, it must be said as was said in the solution to the first.

§ 10. To another, it must be said that there are forms in the matter from which things are made, and those are educed from matter by a physical agent. There are also forms in the substance and potencies of the soul by order to God and the state of beatitude, and those are all from the giver of such forms, who is God, creating clean hearts in us, and renewing a right spirit within our bowels.

§ 11. To another, it must be said that charity does not join us [to God] through the fact that it is a creature, but according to what it is: a similitude and a certain emanation of the goodness of God, and God from the same goodness in it is joined to the soul.

§ 12. To another, it must be said that it is not similar concerning the soul: because the soul relates to the body as mover and form, and therefore it is immediate to it just as the form of matter: but the Holy Spirit relates to the soul as a mover not conjoined according to essence.

§ 13. Moreover, there is a proportion between the soul and the body: but between the soul and God there is none, but an infinite distance: and therefore it is necessary that it be conjoined by a medium.

§ 14. And perhaps this is also false, that the soul per se is the life of the body: for there is a twofold life by which a body is called living, of which one is life through an efficient cause, and this is the soul: the other is an influx into the body from the soul, and adheres to the body as form, and this second is similar to habitual charity, but the first to the Holy Spirit.

§ 15. To another, it must be said that that medium is not required on account of the imperfection of the operating Spirit, but rather on account of our imperfection: because our affect cannot proceed into act with the Spirit, unless it is perfected by a habit congruent to that act.

§ 16. To another, it must be said that the first shining thing moves through the influx of light which is not itself, but is a light flowing forth from it into that which is moved by the first shining thing. So it is here that charity is as it were a light flowing forth from the Holy Spirit into us: but the Holy Spirit is as it were the sun, the fount of light and heat in us.

§ 17. To another, it must be said that the virtue of the first mover is so simple that, as it is in Him, it cannot be received by anything created: whence just as it is in the first movable thing, that it must have a property disposing itself to receive the influx of the motion of the first mover, whatever that property may be: so it is on the part of our affect, that the influx

§ 17. (cont.) of the Holy Spirit to the most worthy act which is to love, it will not receive according to what is immediate to the Holy Spirit: but there must be a habit elevating the potency so that it is possible to receive the influx of the Spirit to the act.

§ 18. To another, it must be said that the work of recreation corresponds to the work of creation in some respect, and in some respect not. For the work of creation is factive of substance, but the work of recreation is of well-being: and therefore in the former there could not be a habit by which the work of creation would be received: because prior to substance there is no habit. But the work of recreation does not educe a substance to being, but to well-being only: and for that well-being which holds itself formally with us, we need a habit. But

they agree in this, that each is from God operating through Himself: in creation giving a substantial form giving being, but here an habitual form giving well-being.

§ 19. To another, the solution is clear from what was said before.

§ 20. To another, it must be said that charity, according to the fact that it is conjoined to God through the similitude of His goodness, is availing for eternal life, not by condignity, because eternal life is God, to whom nothing is condign: but by divine estimation, because God does not exact from us for eternal life as much as it is worth, but as much as we are able to give from His gift: but the greatest price we can offer from His gift is charity and the act of charity.

§ 21. To another, it must be said that charity is species, measure [modus], and order of the will ordered to the good according to how it is diversely considered: for insofar as it is a form, it is species: but insofar as it has a certain power for act, it is measure: but order is with respect to the end, according to which it is the bond of perfection. But in itself it also has these things: because the ratio of form, and the ratio of its power, and the ratio of order to the end are something in it. Nor is it true that in all things these three are diminishable without the destruction of the substance. Whence this charity is not lost while the subject remains.

§ 22. To the last, it must be said that a subject is not more powerful than an accident, unless considering both according to the nature of its genus, namely the subject in the ratio of substance, and the accident in the ratio of accident. But grace and charity have other considerations: because even according to the Philosopher we do not say a man is altered when he attains virtue, but rather perfected. Whence habits of this kind have the ratio of perfecting according to well-being from the fact that they are a certain influx of divine largesse and goodness, etc.

Articulus 2 — Whether The Son Could Be Sent In Such A Way That The Holy Spirit Is Not Sent

§ 23. Article 2 Whether the Son could be sent, such that the Holy Spirit is not sent?

§ 24. Then it is asked concerning what he says in the Text in the second chapter of the first part, there: Which charity since it is so in us, that it makes us love God, etc.

§ 25. For there is still a doubt on account of some, whether the Son can be sent, such that the Holy Spirit is not sent? For it seems that He can:

§ 26. 1. For to be sent is to be known that He is from another: but the Son can be known to be from another, such that the Holy Spirit is not known to be from another: therefore the Son can be sent, such that the Holy Spirit is not sent.

§ 27. 2. Also, there are many revelations of hidden things in dreams and visions, just as in prophecies, in which grace making pleasing is not conjoined: therefore since the Son is said to be sent in the grace of the perfection of the intellect, the Son is sent such that grace making pleasing is not possessed.

§ 28. 3. Also, in the Psalm A good understanding to all that do it: therefore it seems that to those not doing it there is a bad one, and yet it is an understanding: therefore since the Son is sent in the grace of understanding, the Son is sent without grace making pleasing.

§ 29. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. First let it be asked of those who induce these reasons, where they have read from any of the saints that He is sent to non-saints? And not even one authority is to be found: and behold we will posit many, that [He is sent] in grace making pleasing. Augustine in book IV of De Trinitate: Wisdom is sent in one way that it may be with man, it was sent in another way that it may be man. For He transfers Himself into holy souls, and constitutes friends of God and Prophets, just as He also fills the holy Angels. But it is certain that He does not constitute friends of God except by grace making pleasing. Therefore from the words of Augustine it is gathered that the Son is sent in grace making pleasing.

§ 30. 2. Also, Augustine speaking of the spiritual mission of the Son says thus in book IV of De Trinitate: When He is perceived by anyone's mind in time, He is indeed said to be sent, but not into this world: for He does not appear sensibly, that is, He is not present to bodily senses. For we too, according to what eternal thing we grasp with the mind, are not in this world: and the spirits of all the just even living in this flesh, insofar as they savor divine things, are not in this world. Here again it is clear what he says, that the Son is sent in the gifts of grace making pleasing.

§ 31. 3. Also, Augustine in book II of De Trinitate says that the man assumed by the Word did not have the Word, as other holy wise men who had the Word sent to them. Behold, here too he says Saints.

§ 32. 4. Also, at the end of that book it is determined that God is not with the wicked: if therefore the Son is sent in a spiritual mission to be with man, as Augustine says, He is not sent to the wicked.

§ 33. Solution. It is easy to adduce many things to

§ 33. (cont.) this: because the Saints concordantly imply this: whence I say, as above, that the revelation of hidden things is one thing, and the mission of the Son is another. For the revelation of hidden things can be done even through Angels without the mission of the Son: for the Son is not said to be sent unless He Himself arrives with an effect. Whence just as the Holy Spirit is not said to be sent except in the gifts in which He Himself is: so I believe that by an absolute mission the Son is not said to be sent except in the gifts of grace making pleasing, in which He Himself is with man: and how this can well be in the mission of the Holy Spirit, has already been said above. But if the Son is said to be sent in other gifts, this will be in a qualified sense and not absolutely: just as the Holy Spirit too is sometimes said to be sent in a qualified sense and not absolutely. But how the same gifts belong to the Son and the Holy Spirit, has been diversely explained above.

§ 34. To the first, however, which is objected, it must be said that the Son, in the mission which is a mission absolutely, ought to be known to be from another and to be with us, as is said in Wisdom Send her from Thy holy heavens, and from the throne of Thy majesty, that she may be with me and may labor with me, that I may know what is acceptable with Thee at all times. For that is

infused gratuitous knowledge. But if someone objects that charity alone makes us pleasing, he does not know what he objects: because although charity alone cannot be unformed, nevertheless it is not its act to make us pleasing, but rather of grace, and of each virtue according to something.

§ 35. To another, it must be said that the Son is not said to be sent in all revelations of hidden things, as has already been held.

§ 36. To another, it must be said that the Son is sent in gratuitous understanding, and not in another except in a qualified sense.

Articulus 3 — Whether One Who Loves His Neighbor Also Loves Love, And What Things Are To Be Loved Out Of Charity

§ 37. Article 3 Whether he who loves his neighbor, also loves the love itself, and the things that are to be loved out of charity?

§ 38. Then it is asked concerning what he says: But lest in so great a matter, etc.

§ 39. For here the division is first to be taken: because this part has three chapters: in the first of which it is proved that charity is God. In the second, that it is the Holy Spirit, there, D, But since fraternal love is God, etc. In the third, he excludes a response which could be made, namely that it was said by causality, there, E, But lest perhaps someone say, etc.

§ 40. Here a doubt arises first concerning what he says: He who loves his neighbor, it is a consequence that he especially loves the love itself, etc.

§ 41. For this seems false: 1. For if he loves the love, the love is lovable out of charity: therefore there are not only four things to be loved out of charity, as Augustine says, namely God, ourselves, and the body, and the soul of the neighbor.

§ 42. 2. Also, in natural potencies it is the case that the same potency is not over the object and the act: because when I say, I see

§ 42. (cont.) white, and I see myself seeing white, it is not the same potency by which I see white, and by which I perceive myself seeing white: but the first is by a particular or proper sense, and the second by the common sense. Therefore it seems that neither do we love the object and the act with the same habit.

§ 43. 3. Also, the same thing does not denominate itself: for it is not something to say, whiteness is white: or even that the denomination be made verbally, as if to say, whiteness is whitened: therefore by similarity it is nothing to say, love is loved.

§ 44. 4. Also, I love love: either with the same love, or with another: not the same, as has already been proved: therefore with another: and again I love with a love, and again that one, and thus it will go to infinity, which is false: therefore I do not love love.

§ 45. 5. Moreover, in Augustine's argument there seems to be a fallacy of equivocation: because when I say, I love God, the word love imports the act of loving: but when I say, I love love, it imports a habit, as it seems: therefore it does not proceed directly by arguing.

§ 46. Solution. Without prejudice I say that Augustine argues according to how an exemplary cause is received in the exemplated: whence the sense is, he who loves God loves the love in the exemplar, according to how it results in that [created love]: for uncreated charity results in the created, and thus in it as in its mirror it is loved.

§ 47. To the first, therefore, it must be said that there are four lovable things from the order of charity, which are referred to beatitude, as beatifying, and beatifiable, namely God, and ourselves, and the body, and the soul of the neighbor: and in the neighbor another order is included, that first those more conjoined, and after this those less conjoined, and so on even to enemies: nevertheless many other things are referred to charity, either as useful, or as enjoyable, or as dispositions, or perfections of the soul so that it may go out into meritorious acts: and thus love is loved, and other virtues.

§ 48. To another, it must be said that if this proposition, that it does not belong to the same potency to reflect upon its act and object, is proposed generally, it is false: because according to this we would not be able to know the ultimate act of the ultimate potency, or the potencies would have to be infinite. Whence we say that the proposition is understood of potencies situated in such organs, whose complexion from their components is not except for the perception of one genus of contrariety, or if it perceives other contraries, that those as proper effects are caused from one contrariety. For example, sight is a potency situated in the eye, whose composition is from a crystalline humor and an habitual humor: and because the crystalline humor from its transparency is receptive of color, and from the compression which air has, it is retentive better than air: and moreover because the humor of water is a corporeal humor: but the humor of air is a spiritual and incorporeal humor, as the Philosopher says. Moreover, because the habitual light which is in it somehow makes the species of color in act: therefore it does not receive except what is in the genus of color, and the act of color which is light, and so it is of the other senses besides touch which is not so much a sense as a difference of animal: because every animal has the sense of touch, and sometimes has no other except perhaps taste, according to which it is a certain touch, not according to which it is an indicator of flavor. In those, therefore, that proposition is true, and not in others: for I do not see myself seeing by sight, but by the common sense, whose necessity is, as Avicenna says, that I may perceive the acts of particular senses, and the compositions of proper sensibles, so that by the same potency it may be judged that this white thing is sweet, and that common sensibles in which the proper ones are can be apprehended. But in other potencies which can compose and divide

§ 48. (cont.) the proposition is false. Whence by the same potency I can love some object, and the love itself.

§ 49. To another, it must be said that in the book De Trinitate this is found: whiteness is white, and many others: but without doubt they are not proper: and therefore I say that there is not a denomination here, when I say, I love love, when I love a lovable thing: for I say that by numerically one act I love the love and the loved thing: but they differ: for love is the appetite of the will tending to the good or to the desired thing, and that appetite is primarily of its act, and consequently of the object: and the one is there on account of the other, because

the act is on account of the object: and therefore it follows that I love the loved thing on account of itself, and the love pleases me on account of another: because I do not seek the act to go out of the potency on account of the act, but rather on account of the object: and thus both are in the appetite: and then the love of love is the appetite of the act, and the love of the loved thing is the love tending into it, and these are simultaneous: whence there the same thing does not denominate itself, as when it is said, whiteness is whitened.

§ 50. To another, it must be said that as is already clear, it will not go into infinity: because the act of love stands in the appetite, from which it proceeds: and that appetite does not have another appetite, but rather is moved by that which is loved, and that [loved thing] moves by itself what is in the ratio of the first mover in this order: but the loved thing stands in the love which is signified in the verb, when it is said, I love.

§ 51. To the last, it must be said that in truth love is taken in another ratio in the conclusion, and in the premise: but nevertheless it follows well by the mode which was said in the beginning of the solution: because no one loves a friend, unless he has love, and wills this with the appetite of the will: and in that love, as in a cause and exemplar, uncreated love results: and therefore he has with himself, where he may find and love God whom he ought to love.

§ 52. But if you object, that God results in any creature, and thus there would be the same reason concerning any creature. It must be said that it is not similar: because in this it results as in an exemplated thing, and it results as the innermost part of our affect which is love. But in others it results as in a vestige and in an image: or if it results in an exemplated thing as it does in life, and wisdom, and such gifts, nevertheless it does not result in them as the innermost part of our affect: and therefore in those our love is not thus borne into Him.

Articulus 4 — Whether The Neighbor Whom We Love Is Less Known To Us Than Love Itself

§ 53. Article 4 Whether the neighbor whom we love is less known to us than the love itself?

§ 54. Then it is asked concerning what he says: For he knows more the love by which he loves, than the brother whom he loves.

§ 55. 1. For this seems false: because we know a brother by sense, imagination, and intellect, but love only by intellect.

§ 56. 2. Also, if the love of which he speaks is uncreated charity, the regulative and exemplar of our charity, what he says seems entirely false: because the eye of our intellect towards the most manifest things of nature is similar to the disposition of the eyes of a bat towards the light of the sun: therefore much more towards those things which are supernatural.

§ 57. 3. Also, 1 Timothy Who inhabits inaccessible light: whom no man has seen, nor indeed can see.

§ 58. 4. Also, Exodus Man shall not see me and live: and, John No man has ever seen God. Therefore it seems that the neighbor is much more known to us than God: whom nevertheless he here calls charity on account of His presence in the soul.

§ 59. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Whatever things are known by themselves, are more known than those which are known through others, just as

§ 59. (cont.) principles [are known] more than conclusions: the first things are known by themselves: therefore more than other things: but God is maximally first: therefore He is known by Himself.

§ 60. 2. Also, whatever things are more present in the intellect, are more known, because presence is the cause of knowledge: but things which are in the intellect by their essences according to what they are, are more present than those which are in the intellect only by their similitudes: therefore they are more known: but love, according to what it is in the intellectual soul, is [present by its essence], the neighbor only by similitude: therefore love is more known than the neighbor.

§ 61. 3. Thence it is objected further: Whatever things are so present that they are penetrating the substance and that which is the intellect in its totality, and there is nothing of the intellect which they do not penetrate: those are more present than those which are present to the intellect as an intrinsic presence: uncreated charity is present as penetrating the whole intellect, but created [charity] as only intrinsically present: therefore uncreated charity is more present than created: and the things which are more present, are more known, as Augustine says: therefore it seems that God is more known to us than whatever else is or can be.

§ 62. Solution. Speaking without prejudice I think here one must distinguish in the intellect: for there is a certain intellect in us receiving from a phantasm, and in that [intellect] knowledge perishes if sense perishes: whence one born blind does not demonstrate concerning colors. But there is another intellect not receiving from a phantasm, but in the light of the agent intellect only, and in those things in which it is illuminated even by a more ample light than is the light of the agent intellect, such as is the divine ray, or the ray of angelic revelation: nor do I understand this to mean that there are two intellects in number and subject, but two by mode of conversion to the superior and inferior: as Augustine says in the book City of God, bringing in Apuleius the Platonist in On the God of Socrates, who said that the Philosophers could not see God except by abstracting themselves from the flesh by the intellect, and even then only fleetingly as by a twinkling light. For the first mode is as it were general for us while we are on the way. But the second will be more in act after the way.

§ 63. If therefore it is asked, How is the intellect more potent for understanding? it must be distinguished: because from its own nature it holds itself more to the superior, but from the state of this life more to the inferior. Similarly I distinguish on the part of that which is known: for something is so known according to its own power, that it itself is the light and ratio for knowing other things: and if the power of knowledge or of the intellect is considered on the part of the object moving the intellect, what is known in its proper light and is the ratio of knowing other things will be more known than that which is only known in an alien light:

and in this way the Philosopher says in the beginning of De Anima, that the knowledge of the soul is more certain than the knowledge of the animated body: because the soul is the principle by which the accidents and works and passions of animals are known. Another knowledge is according to the power of the knower and of the intellect which is moved by that which is known, and according to that mode things which are posterior in nature are frequently more known, as an effect more than a cause: and in this way it is said that our intellect, like the sight of an owl to the light of the sun, holds itself towards those things which are most manifest in nature.

§ 64. This distinction being had, I say that God and uncreated charity and all things which are in the soul by potency, are more known in the first mode of the intellect, and according to the power of the intelligible object moving. But a brother and a neighbor and all things which approach the sense, are more known in the second mode of the intellect, and according to the power of the intelligent subject. And Augustine seems to feel this: because he plainly explains it thus: and more known because: more present, because

§ 1. ...interior, because more certain", now it is easy to respond to the objections.

§ 2. To the first, therefore, it must be said that this proceeds concerning the intellect in the second way, and according to the power of the one understanding: and Augustine is not speaking of this. And in the same way it must be said that the Philosopher is speaking of the intellect receiving from a phantasm.

§ 3. To the next it must be said that a human being is said to live a human life, and to understand in a human manner, and this is by receiving from a phantasm.

§ 4. To the next it must be said that not to live is called to die with respect to the act of the life of the intellect joined to the flesh and to phantasms; but if someone sees [God], he then lives the life of the homeland [i.e., heaven] with respect to the intellect.

§ 5. To the next it must be said that no one has ever seen God in substance as to what He is: because this is to comprehend Him, as was said above; nevertheless, many have seen the substance of God.

§ 6. To the next it must be said that all those things which are objected to the contrary proceed according to the first mode of intellect, and according to the power of that which is known: and not according to the phantastic intellect, nor according to the power of the one understanding in the way [of pilgrimage], in which a great frequency of sensibles and phantasms blinds the eye of the intellect considered according to the first mode.

Articulus 5 — Whether Someone Can Know In This Life That He Has Charity

Whether anyone in this life can know that he has charity?

§ 7. Next it is asked concerning this which he says: Because interior, because more certain, etc.

§ 8. 1. For from this it seems that charity is certain to us in ourselves: therefore someone in this life can know that he has charity.

§ 9. 2. This also seems to be the case through that text of the Apostle (Rom 8:38): I am certain that neither death, nor life... nor any other creature will be able to separate us from the charity of God, etc.[78]

§ 10. 3. Again, if charity is more certain to us than our neighbor: but we know our neighbor in such a way that we do not doubt about him: therefore it seems that we also know ourselves to be in charity in such a way that we doubt nothing about our charity.

§ 11. 4. Again, charity is a light (1 John 2:10): He who loves his brother remains in the light but light is manifested by itself: therefore it seems that none of the just has any doubt about his charity.

§ 12. On the contrary: Ecclesiastes 9:1: Man does not know whether he is worthy of love or hatred.[79]

§ 13. Solution. It must be said that no one, without a revelation made to him, can know that he is in charity, for two reasons, one of which has already been stated: because although charity is manifest of itself, nevertheless it is not manifested to us in this way on account of the tumult of concupiscence and of phantasms in our hearts. Another reason is: because natural love sometimes has an act most similar to the act of charity: and therefore one is seen in place of the other, namely, natural love in place of gratuitous love.

§ 14. To the first, therefore, it must be said, as was said in the preceding question, that this is true with respect to the first mode of intellect and of the intelligible, and not with respect to the second mode of both.

§ 15. To the next it must be said that either the Apostle is speaking from a revelation made to himself, or he calls it knowledge of charity from a sign of fervor, and the like.

§ 16. To the third, a response was given in the first solution and in the preceding question.

§ 17. To the next it must be said that charity is a light effectively, because it repels the darkness of sin: and even if it were a spiritual light essentially, which however more befits

§ 1. ...truth, it does not follow that it would be seen by itself on account of the causes previously stated, even though it were visible of itself.

Articulus 6 — Whether God Can Be Seen By Us In This Life Through Himself Or Through A Species

Whether God in this life can be seen by us through Himself or through a species?

§ 2. Next it is asked concerning this which he says: He who loves his brother remains in the light, etc.

§ 3. 1. For it seems from this that divine charity is a light: but light is seen by itself: therefore it seems to follow from this that God here in this life is seen by us through Himself: therefore He is seen through a species.

§ 4. 2. Furthermore, if He is seen in a species which is a likeness, what species will be assigned to Him? For no species can be abstracted from Him: and if He Himself creates something in our intellect, that will not be His species which is the formal ratio for knowing Him: therefore it seems that either He is not known, or He is known through Himself. If you say that He is seen through an effect. On the contrary: This vision also belongs to those who do not have charity, and even to those who do not have the Catholic faith: therefore it seems that since one having faith and charity, in whom God exists by His essence and inhabiting grace, sees with a more noble vision, that he sees Him who is God Himself through a species.

§ 5. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. The Apostle, 1 Corinthians 13:12: We see now through a mirror in an enigma: but then face to face. Now I know in part: but then I shall know, even as I am known.[80]

§ 6. 2. Again, 2 Corinthians 5:6-7: While we are in the body, we are pilgrims away from the Lord (for we walk by faith, and not by sight).[81]

§ 7. Solution. Certain people, moved by these arguments, say that God is seen here through a species: but the vision is so slight that it cannot be called a vision. But this does not seem to be the case unless perhaps in rapture, when a human being does not use the intellect abstracting from a phantasm. And therefore it seems to me that God, present in the soul, is discerned in His effect which is the grace given to us, and especially in charity, which is the best and most intimate of the virtues, and most similar to the homeland [heaven], because essentially and substantially it remains in the homeland, although its mode is different.

§ 8. To the first, therefore, it must be said that charity is a light through the effect of light, which is manifold: but there are only four more principal acts of it. The first of these is to repel darkness by illuminating. The second is to show those things that lay hidden, and this especially insofar as it is at the extremity of the transparent touching bounded bodies: because thus it brings color and colored things into act. The third is to dissolve and heat by the multiplication of rays, according as that which illuminates is opposed more perpendicularly, because according to that proportion reflection occurs at more acute or more obtuse angles. The fourth effect does not belong to all light, but to that of heaven, namely to move to species [form] through a vivifying power, as it were, of natural generable and corruptible things. I say, therefore, that charity and truth divide these acts between themselves: as to illuminating, it more befits truth, and as to the expulsion of the darkness of ignorance and infidelity; but as to the expulsion of sin which is born from corrupt affection, it more befits charity, because charity covers a multitude of sins.[82] But the second belongs entirely to truth. The third, however, belongs entirely to charity, speaking essentially. The fourth belongs to both: because both make fecund —truth the intellect, and charity the affection.

§ 1. To the next it must be said that God is seen here by us in the species of His likeness, which is the effect of His grace in us, and that effect of grace is not a common effect.

78. Romans 8:38-39.

Articulus 7 — Whether Charity Is The Greatest Of All The Gifts

Whether charity is the greatest of all gifts?

§ 2. Next it is asked concerning this which he says in the second chapter of this part, where it is said: If among the gifts of God nothing is greater than charity, etc.

§ 3. 1. For wisdom seems to be the greatest of the gifts: because it is enumerated first among the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

§ 4. 2. Again, wisdom has charity within itself, and they are not convertible: because wisdom [sapientia] is spoken of from tasting [sapere] with savor [sapor], and savor is with charity: therefore it seems that wisdom is a greater gift.

§ 5. 3. Again, the Son is sent in wisdom: therefore it seems to be at least as great as charity, in which the Holy Spirit is sent: therefore it does not seem true that charity is the greatest of gifts.

§ 6. Solution. It must be said that charity is

§ 1. ...the greatest of all gifts simply, just as Augustine says here.

§ 2. But to the first that is objected, it must be said that wisdom is called the first gift among the gifts enumerated there, which according to Gregory are given as an aid to the powers or faculties. Or it may be said better: That wisdom is placed first, it has this from the savor of charity conjoined to it: because wisdom is nothing other than the savor of God in His gifts or in Himself, which savor charity produces, and therefore wisdom will not be greater except by accident and not essentially: because the fact that it is the first gift, it has from charity: and therefore charity, which has this from itself, is greater.

§ 3. To the next it must be said that this causes greatness by accident: because, as Augustine says, in those things which are not great in bulk, to be greater is the same as to be better. Thus charity, which is the form of every good and the bond of perfection, is the best of gifts.

§ 4. To the next it must be said that the Son is sent in wisdom, this is true: but nevertheless wisdom does not assume equality from that order: because the intellect is further ordered in us to the affection. For the intellect is good for all those who do it . And therefore also the perfection of the affection, in the order of the end, is better than the perfection of the intellect: and since charity in the perfection of the affection is the ultimate and the best, charity is the greatest of gifts.

Articulus 8 — Whether Patience Is The Substance Of God, And Whether Faith, Hope, Salvation, Patience Have Exemplars In God

Whether patience is the substance of God? And whether faith, hope, salvation, and patience have exemplars in God?

79. Ecclesiastes 9:1.

§ 5. Next it is asked concerning this which he says: God's substance is our patience, but because it is from Him to us.

§ 6. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. According to the common opinion which is now held by almost everyone, our charity is not the substance of God, but is from Him to us: therefore it seems that it is similar.

§ 7. 2. If you say that our charity is an example of divine charity: but patience, and faith, and the like, do not have a corresponding exemplar in God: and therefore charity is called God, but not patience. On the contrary: Nothing is created by God without an exemplar: therefore neither is patience.

§ 8. 3. Furthermore, what shall be said of salvation, when it is said my salvation, is salvation not exemplarly in God?

§ 9. Solution. It must be said that some [virtues] imply an imperfection, such as faith, hope, and patience: faith on account of its form and act, hope on account of its genus which is expectation, patience on account of its subject, and salvation also looks to the evasion of a danger: thus patience and salvation are in a passible subject, and therefore do not have an exemplar in God.

§ 10. Therefore it must be said to the first, that charity is from God, as the ultimate and best, to which our affection is related in the genus of virtue: but the other gifts are not so: and therefore He shines forth more in charity than in the others.

§ 11. To the next it must be said that the exemplar of a virtue is not called the idea under which everything that is created is created: but that is called an exemplar which is primarily in God according to reality, such as life, wisdom, charity, and the like.

§ 12. To the next, the same must be said.

Divisio Textus

§ 4. Here it is asked, If charity is the Holy Spirit, etc. Here begins the second part of this distinction, in which the Master resolves objections against himself. And it is divided into three parts: in the first of which he objects by reason and resolves. In the second, he objects by authorities and resolves, there, L, It was said above, that the Holy Spirit, etc. In the third, he objects by one authority, by which he especially seems to be opposed, and resolves, there, Q, They also adduce other reasons, etc.

§ 5. In the first part there are three chapters, of which the first contains an objection: the second, the solution, there, H, Therefore we respond to these, etc. The third, a confirmation of the solution, as is clear in the Text, there, K, But so that it may be more certain, etc.

80. 1 Corinthians 13:12.

Articulus 9 — Whether Charity Alone Divides Between The Sons Of The Kingdom And Of Perdition, And Whether With Every Increase Of Charity The Holy Spirit Is Said To Be Sent, And Whether He Is Sent In Gifts Other Than Charity

Whether charity alone divides between the children of the kingdom and of perdition? And whether in any augmentation of charity the Holy Spirit is said to be sent? And whether He is sent in gifts other than charity?

§ 13. Next it is asked concerning this which he says: It is the only thing that divides between the children of the kingdom and the children of perdition.

§ 14. For this seems false: because any virtue is separated from the vice contrary to it: therefore not only charity.

§ 15. Furthermore it is asked, whether we ought to say that the Holy Spirit is sent in other gifts which are given through Him, as it says here?

§ 16. It seems not: because with those He is not present through inhabiting grace: but one who is sent is sent so that He may be present to us, just as His gift is: therefore it seems that the Spirit is not sent with them.

§ 17. Again it is asked, whether in any augmentation of charity the Holy Spirit is said to be sent?

§ 18. It seems not: [because] He is not present for anything else than before, but for a greater degree.

§ 19. Solution. It must be said that no virtue universally divides except charity: because it itself in one way is the form of all, and therefore it is had with no vice: but the other virtues only exclude one vice, and not all.

§ 20. To the second it must be said that, as I think, He is not said to be sent simply except in charity, but in a qualified sense in the others, namely that He is sent in the others as He is Spirit, and not as He is holy.

§ 21. To the next it must be said that there is a sensible augmentation through a sign, and an insensible augmentation. For example, incipient charity remaining in the state of beginners is augmented, but insensibly: but that which changes the state, so that one is now proficient, and becomes perfect, in that augmentation which is sensible through a sign, I say that the Holy Spirit is sent: and this is what Augustine says: The Spirit and charity are given to the one not having it so that he may have it, and to the one having it so that he may have it more: in the Text of the following part [83]. But He is not said to be sent by reason of an augmentation which is insensible, for the reason that in a mission there is cognition through an effect, as was said above.

G. Whether it must be conceded that the Holy Spirit is augmented in man, or had or given more or less?

81. 2 Corinthians 5:6-7.

§ 1. Here it is asked: If charity is the Holy Spirit, since it is augmented and diminished in man, and is had more and less through different times, whether it must be conceded that the Holy Spirit is augmented or diminished in man, or had more or less? For if He is augmented in man, and given and had more or less, He seems to be mutable: but God is entirely immutable. Therefore it seems that either the Holy Spirit is not charity, or charity is not augmented or diminished in man.

§ 2. Again, charity is given to the one not having it so that he may have it, and to the one having it so that he may have it more fully. If therefore the Holy Spirit is charity, He is given to the one not having Him so that he may have Him, and to the one having Him so that he may have Him more fully. But how is He given to the one not having Him, since He as God is everywhere, and whole in all creatures: and how is He given or had more fully without any mutation of Himself?

H. Response to the first question.

§ 3. Therefore we respond to these things, saying that the Holy Spirit or charity is entirely immutable, nor is He augmented or diminished in Himself, nor does He receive more or less in Himself: but in man or rather to man He is augmented and diminished, and given or had more or less, just as God is said to be magnified and exalted in us, who nevertheless in Himself is neither magnified nor exalted. Thus the Prophet: A man will approach a deep heart, and God will be exalted [84]. Upon which passage an authority says: God grows great not in Himself, but in the heart of man. Thus therefore the Holy Spirit is given to man, and having been given is given more amply, that is, He is augmented, and is had more and less: and yet He remains immutable.

Articulus 10 — Whether Charity Can Be Increased Or Diminished

Whether charity can be augmented, or diminished?

§ 6. Here arises a difficult question concerning this which is supposed here: Charity is augmented. And it is said by the Master that it is not augmented essentially, but to us, or in us. But almost all the moderns say the contrary.

§ 7. But it seems that it is not augmented:

§ 8. 1. For in those things which are simple, if one is added to another, nothing greater is produced: therefore if the essence of charity is added to the essence of charity, nothing greater is produced: therefore it cannot be augmented.

§ 9. 2. Again, if I add a point to a point, I have doubled the point, but extensively I have not made a line: therefore by similar reasoning, if I add the essence of charity, I have produced nothing greater as if by a continuous extension, but I have doubled the charity. But this is nothing: because even if charity is posited to be augmented, it is not always augmented in double.

§ 10. 3. Again, whatever things are augmented, are augmented either through something added, or through multiplication in themselves, as the Lord did with the five loaves; or through rarefaction, or through production [elongation], like those things which are hammered so that they become longer. Now it is clear that charity is posited by the Masters to be augmented in none of these ways, except by addition or by multiplication. But on the contrary: That which is augmented by addition has in itself a power whence it unites the added thing to itself. What then is that power in charity converting another part of charity into itself? Nor can it even be imagined, as it seems. If it is said that it is added like fire to fire. On the contrary: Fire passes into the place of fire, etc., as into that in which its species is preserved: therefore it seems that there would need to be present such a moving power

§ 1. ...for the added charity, which would move it to the end that it be united to it: and what is that? But if you say that it is multiplied in itself. On the contrary: What is simple is not multiplied in itself: just as if a point were multiplied a thousand times, it will not produce a magnitude: therefore charity is not augmented in this way.

§ 2. 4. Again, for what purpose is it augmented? Because the least charity is able to resist any temptation, as they say, and the least charity suffices for the merit of eternal life: therefore, since it is not had except for these two things, it seems that charity is augmented superfluously. If you say that it is augmented in power, and not in essence: this seems unable to stand: because a power is not except in an essence as in a subject: thus so much essence can do so much, and has so much power, and unless it is augmented it cannot do more.

§ 3. If on account of this it is said that charity is not augmented. On the contrary:

§ 4. 1. Upon that passage of Psalm 83:6 He disposed ascensions in his heart, etc. The Gloss: The steps by which he ascends, because he always progresses in his heart: for the more he has loved, the higher he ascends.

§ 5. 2. Again, upon that text of the Apostle, 2 Corinthians 12:15: I will most gladly spend and be spent myself for your souls, the Gloss: Perfect charity is that one be prepared to die for the brothers. But is it perfect as soon as charity is born? Indeed, it is born that it may be perfected: and when it has been born, it is nourished: and when it has been nourished, it is strengthened: and when it has been strengthened, it is perfected: and when it comes to perfection, it says: I desire to be dissolved.[85]

§ 6. 3. Again, a reward is due to charity: but a greater reward is due to one than to another: therefore there is a greater charity: therefore it can be augmented.

§ 7. 4. Again, John 15:13: No one has greater love than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends.

§ 8. Further it is asked in this part, whether it can be diminished? And it seems that it can: because contraries are about the same thing: but augmentation and diminution are contraries: therefore it seems that if charity is augmented, it could also be diminished.

83. Peter Lombard, Sentences, Book I, Dist. 17.

§ 9. On the contrary: Nothing is diminished except by something diminishing it: if therefore charity is diminished, there will be something diminishing it: either God, or the will in which it is, or sin. It is clear that neither God nor the will does so: because God gives and augments it, and the will possesses it. But if sin diminishes it: it is either venial or mortal. Not venial: because it does not attain to it, because it is not in the higher part of the soul: nor mortal, because it cannot stand with it in the same [subject]: but every diminishing thing is with the diminished thing in the same [subject]: therefore it is not diminished.

§ 10. If you say that it is augmented, and yet not diminished, for the reason that augmentation belongs to it by nature: this is nothing: because a contrary which is present by nature is always in one way, like heat in fire, and not greater, nor lesser except by accident: but augmentation is in charity in such a way that from a lesser it is made greater; and if it were to return to its prior quantity, charity would be said to be diminished.

§ 11. Solution. It must be said that this question is one and of the same nature regarding the augmentation of all the virtues: I concede, however, simply that charity is augmented by the addition of essence to essence: and it seems to me quite clear that the Master has spoken falsely in this part.

§ 12. To the first, therefore, it must be said that there is a simple in a continuum having position, and this added to another produces nothing greater: and there is a simple in the discrete having order, and this added to another makes a discrete plurality: an example of the first is the point, but of the second, unity. There is also a simple which does not have the extension of mass, but of power: and this added to another

§ 1. ...makes it greater in essence and power, and not in mass.

§ 2. To the next it must be said in the same way, that it is not similar concerning a point: because a point is equal to a point: but the essence added to charity, and that to which it is added, are not necessarily equal, but lesser.

§ 3. To the next it must be said, as I have already said, that it is augmented by addition.

§ 4. But to this which is asked about a unitive power, I say that they are united to each other by themselves in the will, which is the proper subject of both, just as fire to fire in the place of fire: and the very identity of species in the added thing and in that to which the addition is made, makes an easy transition of one into the other.

§ 5. To the next it must be said that although the least charity suffices to resist, it nevertheless does not suffice equally easily: thus, just as nature not only gives species to matter, but also a fortification of the species on account of subsequent alterations: so it is in grace: not that even a small grace is weak with respect to sin, but because its subject is weak: and therefore it is necessary that it be greatly fortified by the informing habit. Similarly, although the kingdom is due to the least charity, nevertheless a greater one merits an augmentation of reward.

84. Psalm 110:10 (Vulgate).

§ 6. To that which is further asked: Whether it can be diminished? It must be said that it cannot: and I fully concede that the solution which some give—that charity cannot be diminished because augmentation is natural to it—is not valid: but as the objection proves, it is not diminished for this reason, that there is nothing diminishing it: but something destroying it, or augmenting it, is found.

§ 7. Note however, that charity progresses in four ways: namely, as to its radication in the subject from duration; as to the facility of operating according to it, from the custom of the affections and works of charity; as to the number of merits from the multitude of works; and as to the mode of fervor from the actual consideration of the benefits of God: just as novices are sometimes more fervent than others, from the fact that they are actually and newly moved concerning the benefits of God: and that which moves newly provokes more fervor. Besides these four ways, there is its proper augmentation through addition, etc.

Articulus 11 — Whether The Spirit Was Given To Christ Not By Measure, So That His Grace Is Infinite

Whether the Spirit was given to Christ not by measure, such that his grace is infinite?

Whether the Spirit was given to Christ not by measure, such that his grace is infinite?

§ 1. Next it is asked concerning this which he says in chapter K, But to Christ who is the Son of God, the Spirit was given not by measure. Therefore it seems that his grace is infinite, which is false.

§ 2. Solution. Grace in itself is finite: but through union it attains to divinity in its work: because the agent in grace is God and man: and therefore by reason of the union it can be called infinite: and this is proven and exemplified below .

Articulus 12 — What Is Meant By This Which Is Said By Elisha, Let Your Spirit Be Double In Me

What is understood by what is said by Elisha, 'Let your double spirit be in me'?

§ 3. Next it is asked concerning this which he says in the same chapter K, I beseech you that your double spirit may be in me? according to the understanding of the Text.

§ 4. It must be said that in Elijah the spirit was twofold, for prophecy and miracles: and Elisha asked for this, not that he might have double what Elijah had. But according as it is introduced here, then the Spirit was for one thing in Christ, that is, for virtues: but in us it is doubled not in quantity, but in effect: because it is in us for virtues, and for the repulsion of sin.

§ 5. However, in that solution by which the Master resolves the last authority, where he says in chapter S, around the middle, To which indeed it can be said, that some acts, etc., the Mas-

82. 1 Peter 4:8; Proverbs 10:12.

ter openly begs the question: because the very same thing is in the question which he himself supposes in the solution.

DISTINCTIO XVIII

Divisio Textus

§ 6. Here it is asked, Since the Holy Spirit, etc.

§ 7. Having completed the treatise on the twofold procession of the Holy Spirit, the Master treats here of the relation determining the Holy Spirit according to the aspect of his procession. For just as filiation, from the aspect of procession which is generation, determines the Son: so to be a gift, from the aspect of procession which is the spiration of love, determines the Holy Spirit: and the Master treats of this here.

§ 8. And this whole part is contained in this distinction, which is divided into three parts: in the first of which the Master determines the ratio of a gift, that is, how this name applies to the Holy Spirit. In the second, he touches upon the proof that He has this name from the aspect of procession, there, G, And it must be noted, that just as the Son by being born received, etc. In the third, he concludes from the ratio of the name, that through this name gift He is referred to the Father and to the Son: but through this name given [datum], He is not only compared to the Father and the Son who give, but also to us who have received, and He is called ours, there, L, And according to this that He is eternally a gift, He is referred to the Father and the Son, etc.

§ 9. In the first part of these parts there are three things, in the first of which it is asked: Whether through the gift gifts are given? In the second, why He is called a gift and something given, there, B,

§ 1. Moreover it must be diligently considered, etc. In the third he touches upon the fact that from an eternal property He has that He is a gift, but not that He is a given thing [datum], there, E, But it is called a gift not only from that, etc. Through this the meaning is evident.

Articulus 1 — Whether Through The Gift Which Is The Holy Spirit All Other Gifts Are Given

Whether through the gift which is the Holy Spirit, all other gifts are given?

§ 2. But here a doubt arises concerning the first chapter: Whether through the gift gifts are given?

§ 3. It seems not: because 1. Generally, motion does not occur through motion: because the Philosopher says that there is no alteration of an alteration, and universally there is no mutation of a mutation: therefore by similar reasoning a gift is not given through a gift.

85. Philippians 1:23.

§ 4. 2. Again, it seems that this would proceed to infinity: because if this is the reason that gifts are given, that they are given in a gift, it is necessary that that gift also be given in a gift, and so on for the others: therefore this will proceed to infinity.

§ 5. 3. Again, when I say, in a gift gifts are given: either all, or some. If all: therefore the gift in which all gifts are given, is given in a gift: therefore there is some gift besides all gifts, which is false. If some, and not all: therefore that gift in which those gifts are given does not have a general influence over the collation of gifts: therefore it does not have the ratio of causality with respect to all gifts, which is unfitting, because that gift is the Holy Spirit.

§ 6. 4. Again, the Son is one of the things given to us. Whence, Isaiah 9:6: For a child is born to us, and a son is given to us. Therefore this gift is given in the Holy Spirit. But to be given in a gift means that the gift has the influence of a cause over that which is given: therefore the Holy Spirit has the influence of a cause over the Son, which is false, as it seems, because the Spirit is from the Son, and not conversely.

§ 7. 5. Again, let us suppose, by an impossibility, that the Holy Spirit does not exist: either the Father and the Son would still be equally liberal as before, or not. If not: then they have their liberality from the Holy Spirit: which is false. If so: then they will still give gifts, and not in this gift: therefore it seems that this is not the reason that the Holy Spirit is the gift in which other gifts are given.

§ 8. Solution. It must be said that the Holy Spirit is the gift in which other gifts are given: and in this gift gifts are given. And the reason for this is that whatever anyone gives to someone gratuitously and liberally, he first before that gives him love, and in that he afterwards communicates to him of his goods, and gives to him both himself and whatever he gives.

§ 9. Therefore it must be said to the first, that there is no alteration of an alteration, that is, such that alteration is to alteration as to the terminus of a motion, because thus there would never be rest, and thus also there is no mutation of a mutation: but frequently one motion is the cause of another, and one alteration is the cause of another. Thus I say here, that the first gift is the cause of all the others, as was said: because in the first gift there is given to us the love of God, which is the Holy Spirit, who is called a gift from eternity.

§ 10. To the next it must be said that this will not proceed to infinity: because just as in the cause of motions one stops at the first motion which is the cause of all inferior ones, so in gifts one stops at the first gift which is the cause of all secondary ones.

§ 11. To the next it must be said that not all gifts are given in a gift other than themselves: because the first gift is given in itself: because it itself is gratuitous love, in which both it itself and all other secondary gifts are given.

§ 12. But to what is objected to the contrary, it must be said that the first gift flows into itself by itself, yet it does not have causality with respect to itself: because the Holy Spirit Himself...

gives itself, and sends itself: but through this the generation or causality of influencing over all created gifts is not removed.

To the next, it must be said that the Son is given insofar as he is born and made: and insofar as he is thus given, he is given in this gift which by appropriation is the Holy Spirit, as the Master determines in book II of the Sentences. Hence, John 1:16 God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son. But the Son according to eternal generation does not have the nature of a gift, because thus he is not from the Holy Spirit: but his temporal generation is from the Spirit and in the Holy Spirit.

To the next, it must be said that, if by an impossibility it were posited that the Holy Spirit does not exist, it follows that the Father and the Son do not send and give a personal love, in which all other gifts might be given: but it follows that gifts would be given in essential love, to which it does not belong to be sent, nor to proceed temporally from them, just as it does not belong to the essence. Hence it does not follow that they receive something from the Holy Spirit, but that then they will not send love, nor does love proceed temporally: because the fact that a temporal procession includes in itself an eternal one is from the personal property of the Spirit, not from any defect of the divine essence.

Articulus 2 — Whether There Is One Notion Of Gift And Of The Given

Whether there is one concept of "gift" (donum) and of "the given" (datum)?

Then it is asked regarding the second chapter B, Moreover it must be diligently considered, etc.

Whether there is one concept of a gift, and of the given?

But it seems that this is so: because § 1. Of the movable and the moved there is one concept of substance, not differing except by act and potency; but a gift is called such by the fact that it is given: therefore they will have one concept.

§ 2. Furthermore, in all things act is nobler and better than potency: since therefore "the given" belongs according to the act of giving, but "gift" from potency, it seems that it more nobly belongs to the Holy Spirit, and is first "given" rather than "gift".

§ 3. Furthermore, James 1:17 makes a distinction between gifts and things given, when it says: Every best given thing and every perfect gift is from above, etc. According to the Gloss there, "given" refers to natural things, but "gift" to gratuitous things: but it is certain that both are given by the Holy Spirit, and in both the Spirit divides to individuals as he wills: therefore it seems that it belongs to the Holy Spirit to be "given" just as much as to be a "gift".

§ 4. Also, the Philosopher says that a gift is an unreturnable giving: therefore giving is related as superior to gift: therefore it is prior according to the intellect: therefore it more befits the general gift in which all things are given: therefore the Holy Spirit is more called a giving or a given, than a gift: the contrary of which is determined in the Text.

Solution. It must be said that "gift" properly belongs to the Holy Spirit, and not "the given", or "giving", or even "donation": and the cause of this is threefold. One is, because "gift" is a noun, and signifies substance with quality: but the quality of a gift is "donability" [the capacity

to be given] which is posited concerning that which is the gift, that is, the Spirit proceeding as love: hence since donability, which is the quality that is the principle of understanding a gift, posits nothing but an order to giving, it more befits eternity, than "the given", which is a participle and cosignifies time. Similarly, "giving" and "donation" are verbal nouns, and thus cosignify temporal acts, although they do not cosignify times. Another cause is that a gift is an unreturnable giving, as the Philosopher says, and only the Holy Spirit is so given that he can never be repaid on account of his power. Hence, Psalm 115:12 What shall I return to the Lord, for all the things he has returned to me? The third cause is, because a gift refers to gratuitous things, whereas "the given" refers to natural things: and gratuitous things are better than natural things: and therefore the nature of a gift more befits the best of all gifts, than the nature of the given.

Therefore it must be said to the first, that "gift" and "the given" do not only differ by potency and act, but also by the aforementioned reasons.

Furthermore, that potency which is in a gift, as the Master says, is not a potency with respect to the gift, that is, such that it is somewhat deficient regarding the perfection of the gift, but it is only with respect to an act toward another, that is, toward the receiver of this relation: and therefore that act which is signified in "the given" is not as something coming to it, in which namely the gift itself is effected or perfected in act: but rather in which through the gift itself the one receiving it is perfected. Hence that objection does not proceed except concerning natural potencies which are perfected by their acts coming to them, toward which they are also defined.

To the next, it must be said that an act which is the perfection of a form, is nobler than the potency and the disposition of such a potency, and "gift" and "the given" are not related as such an act [and potency]: but rather the gift is itself the highest perfection, and the act of giving which is awaited, is an act with respect to another, that is, with respect to the one receiving that gift for their own perfection: for if that act came to the gift as to a potency, it would be necessary that it change something in it, which is absurd. Hence through it the gift rather comes to the receiver, and changes them for the better.

To the next, it must be said that although in us gratuitous things are distinguished from natural things, yet in God giving it is not so: for he gives all things in one gratuitous gift which is the Holy Spirit, just as he also makes all things by one word which is the Son.

To the next, it must be said that "giving" does not fall into the definition of "gift" according to which it is convertible with "the given", as it is taken here by the Master: but as it is a universal noun, and abstracts from the concept of a gift, and of the given: and thus it does not follow, that "the given" as signified here, priorly belongs to the Holy Spirit than "gift".

Articulus 3 — Whether It Is Proper To The Holy Spirit To Be A Gift

Whether it is proper to the Holy Spirit to be a gift?

Then an objection is raised against the first principle of the fourth chapter D, there, Because the Holy Spirit is called both a gift, and a given or donated, etc.

§ 1. For from this the Master seems to mean that it is proper to the Holy Spirit that he is a gift. But on the contrary: the nature of a gift seems to be a consequent of the nature of him who proceeded. Proof. From this he has the nature of a gift, because he proceeded as love: therefore it seems that it is a common consequent rather than a proper being.

§ 2. If you say, that it is a consequent, but proper, not common. On the contrary: the Son also proceeded as one who can be given, as is said in the Text in this same distinction: therefore the nature of a gift is a common consequent, and not proper.

§ 3. Also, those things which are proper to the persons are signified in personal acts, as when it is said, "The Father generates the Son," "generates" cosignifies paternity, and "to generate" filiation: therefore it seems that if to be a gift is proper to the Holy Spirit, I could say, "The Father and the Son eternally donate the Holy Spirit": either therefore they donate the Spirit to each other, or to others: not to each other, because this is denied here in the Text, and it would signify indigence: nor do they donate to others eternally, because there are no others: therefore the Spirit is not a gift properly, but by appropriation, as it seems.

§ 4. Also, I see in other proper things, that not only do they not belong to another person, but also that they can never belong: for the Son is neither the Father, nor can he ever be the Father, nor viceversa : therefore it seems that if the Holy Spirit is properly a gift, that the nature of a gift can never belong to another: but this is false: because what is given freely and unreturnably, is a gift, as was determined in the preceding question: the Son is given freely and unreturnably: therefore he is a gift.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. The nature of a primary gift is the communion of love: but the communion of preceding love does not belong to anyone except the Holy Spirit: therefore the nature of a gift does not belong except to the Holy Spirit.

§ 2. Also, the Son is either given out of love, or not. If not, this is absurd, because it is against the Gospel saying, God so loved the world, etc. If so: therefore that love, according to the concept of understanding, is given first: therefore the Son does not have the primary nature of a gift: therefore to be a gift does not belong to him properly.

Solution. It must be said that to be a gift belongs to the Holy Spirit properly: if the nature is taken from the primary gift proceeding from him who donates or has to donate. For the donor and the gift have a relative distinction: and the gift is going out from the donor: and is that which primarily has the nature of a gift: and this is nothing but love proceeding from the Father and the Son: for essential love does not have a distinct and distinguishing procession, and therefore falls short of the nature of a gift. But the Son does not proceed as love, but rather as Son, who could bestow gratuitous love, and upon whom gratuitous love could be bestowed.

To that therefore which is first objected, it must be said that the nature of a gift is not a consequent of procession, or of a general intention, but is a consequent of procession in species, which is spiration: because spiration from spirative power (as we said above) immediately produces love: but if procession were taken according to a general intention, then it would be true, that it would be a consequent according to the intellect.

To the next, it must be said that to be a gift is proper to the Spirit, the cause of which was stated at the beginning of the solution.

To the next, it must be said that "proper" is multiplex, namely that which posits nothing but respect to the persons from whom it is distinguished in a personal act, and that proper in divine things has a personal act in which it is signified, such as Son and Father. There is a certain proper which does not posit respect through a personal act, but rather through privation, such as innascibility: and this is not signified in a personal act. Similarly there is a proper which is from the nature of an act in the proceeding person, and this is "gift": because that the Holy Spirit is a gift, this is from such a procession, because namely he proceeds as love: and because this posits the order of his communication in the nature of a gift also to others, by the simple personal act itself which only notes the distinction of one from another, it cannot be signified. And the reason for this will be more evident below in the following questions of this distinction.

To the next, it must be said that under the nature of a proceeding and primary gift this proper does not belong to others, nor can it belong. For the Son, even if he is given, nevertheless does not proceed as a gift: nor is he also in the nature of a primary gift, as was said before.

Articulus 4 — Whether The Holy Spirit Is Called Holy Spirit In That He Is Gift, And Gift In That He Proceeds

Whether the Holy Spirit is thereby called the Holy Spirit, by which he is a gift: and thereby a gift, by which he is proceeding?

Then it is asked concerning what he says, E, For he is thereby called Spirit, by which he is a gift: and thereby a gift, by which he is proceeding, etc.

For this seems false by reason of the first part, and the second.

§ 1. For there is one concept of spirit, and another of gift. Proof. If he were never given, nor had the nature of a gift, he would still be spirit both essentially and personally: therefore he is not thereby called spirit, by which he is a gift.

§ 2. Also, Spirit is manifested in the act of spirating, which is an eternal act noting nothing but the distinction of an eternal person from an eternal person: but gift is spoken of according to relation to the act of donating, which is not an eternal act, but temporal, in that the Father and the Son do not give the Holy Spirit to each other, but to us: therefore it seems that he is not spirit by that by which he is a gift.

§ 3. From the other part it also seems false, namely that he is a gift by that by which he is proceeding: because if we posit that he never has the nature of a gift or is given, he would still proceed from the Father and the Son: therefore he is not a gift by that by which he is proceeding.

Furthermore. From the statement of Augustine here it seems to be accepted that "gift", "spirit", "proceeding", and "love" signify the same notion: and this does not seem to be true: because of one notion there is one concept by which it makes a person known or causes him

to become known: but the spirit is not manifested by one concept under these names: therefore these do not signify one notion, as it seems.

On the contrary: § 1. There are five notions, of which three are in the Father, two in the Son, but one is numerically the same in the Father and the Son: therefore it is left that in the Holy Spirit there is only one: therefore by whatever proper name he is signified, nothing can be signified but one notion.

§ 3. Also, the Father and the Son have one notion, according to which they are related to the Holy Spirit: therefore there is only one in the Holy Spirit responding to that: therefore only one notion is signified in all the proper names of the Holy Spirit.

Solution. It must be said to the first, that when Augustine says that he is a gift by that by which he is spirit, or vice versa: it ought to be understood in the same property, not in the same concept of the name: because I readily concede that there is only one property in the Holy Spirit, but it can be signified in diverse modes: and therefore it has diverse names. Through this the solution to the following is clear.

To that which is further asked, it must be said in the same way: because in truth he would still proceed if he were not a gift: but this does not remove that he is not called a gift by the same proper- -ty by which he proceeds: but it forces the conclusion that in another mode that property is signified by both names.

To that which is further asked, it must be said that Spirit, proceeding, love, and gift signify the same property, which is a notion under a diverse mode of signifying. For Spirit signifies [him] as from the spirative power of the Father and the Son: but proceeding signifies [him] as the act by which the distinction is made: but love signifies the mode determining the procession. But gift adds to love the habitual disposition of communicating to another: and therefore according to the mode of understanding the order is thus, that he is the proceeding spirit, as love, who is a gift communicable to friends or to the rational creature.

But if you object, that a notion is named from "becoming known" [innotescendo], because it causes to become known: and since the Holy Spirit becomes known in many modes by these names, those names seem to signify many notions. It must be said that these many names follow from one, namely that the spirit thus proceeds: and therefore they really signify one notion, differing only in the mode of signifying.

Articulus 5 — Whether Gift Also Implies A Relation, Like Father And Son, Distinguishing The Holy Spirit From Both

Whether "gift" also imports a relation like "Father" and "Son", distinguishing the Holy Spirit from both?

Then it is asked concerning what he says, E, But this relation does not appear in this name. But it appears when it is called the gift of God, etc.

For from this it is accepted that "gift" is a relation distinguishing the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son: but this does not seem to be true: because

§ 1. Relatives are those whose very being that they are, is toward another: but a gift is something in being, although that something is from another, and is given to another: therefore it seems that "gift" is not relative.

§ 2. Also, if it is relative; then it has a correlative in divine things to which its respect is determined: but that will be nothing but the donor: but this does not seem to be true: because if the gift of the donor is a gift, then also the song of the singer is a song, and song would be a relative, and similarly the reading of the reader will be a reading: and this is nothing: therefore it seems that no relation appears in this name "gift".

§ 3. Also, through the nature of a gift he is compared to creatures: for the Holy Spirit is called our gift: but nothing having a relation to a creature is distinctive in divine things: therefore it seems that being a gift does not distinguish. PROOF OF THE MIDDLE PREMISE, because the first is evident. That which has a relation to created things, connotes an effect in potency or act, and every such thing signifies the divine essence, which distinguishes nothing in divine things.

§ 4. Furthermore, why is it more manifested in this name "gift", than in this name "spirit": for the spirit is as much called the spirit of the spirator, as a gift is called the gift of the donor.

§ 5. Also, "spirit" seems to relate more convertibly to the power of spirating, than "gift": therefore it seems that the eternal relation appears more in this name "spirit", than in the name "gift".

§ 6. Also, "Spirit" more names a hypostasis perfect in itself in being, than "gift": because a gift can be a thing which is not a person: therefore the distinguishing relation seems to appear more in the name "spirit", than in the name "gift".

§ 7. Also, that which belongs to another person neither through itself nor consequently manifests a relation through itself more than that which belongs to another consequently, but not through itself: but "gift" consequently belongs to the Son, whereas to be the Holy Spirit in no way belongs except to the Holy Spirit: therefore the distinguishing relation is more manifested by the name of the Holy Spirit, than by the name of gift.

Solution. It must be said that relation is considered in two modes: namely through itself, and as mixed with another being. Through itself, as servant, lord, master, disciple, and father, and son, and suchlike. But mixed with another being, as we say that action posits respect to passion, and agent, and patient, and suchlike: and therefore some Philosophers also said that relation was not a genus of being, but was a respect scattered across all genera of beings. Hence I say without prejudice, that in this second mode according to the concept of understanding it is signified in this name "gift": because without a doubt not the whole of what is imported by the name, is toward another: but it signifies something around which a respect is posited to the giver, and to him to whom it is given, or will be given. But it is not thus in this name "father", or "son": because "father" in what it is according to the signification of the name, is toward another, and similarly "son".

Therefore it must be said to the first, that it is not proved that it is not relative, but that in its intention it is more than a relation: and I readily concede this according to the mode of understanding.

To the next, it must be said that donor is its correlative, as is said here in the Text: and then it is not similar: because other names which are imported from the habit of some act or office, do not signify the name of the first cause and origin, like donor: because the singer has this from a habit, or office, and thus from another: but the donor is a donor by himself by his own liberality.

Also, the donor donates from his own what proceeds from himself as from an origin: and this is not in the others. Hence those signify an order to exercising some act, and do not so import a relation of origin.

To the next, it must be said that through the nature of a gift he is not compared to creatures unless the gift is taken in act: and therefore this does not prevent it from signifying a relation: but this is true, that it adds something, as it seems to me: whereas "son" and "father" add nothing according to the mode of signifying.

To the next, it must be said that with respect to the connoted effect it posits a causality common to all persons: because that is the effect of all persons: but the nature of the gift in which other gifts are donated, is not common, nay it is proper: and that nature of a gift is signified by "gift" when it is said to be proper to the spirit: and this is notable on account of what follows.

To the next, it must be said that Augustine says that relation appears more in the word "gift", in so far as "spirit" more signifies the spirituality of the nature, than a being from another: whereas "gift" in its name determines a being from another.

To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that although a gift could be a non-proceeding person, nevertheless in divine things the first gift can be nothing but a proceeding person: and Augustine attends to this.

To the next, it must be said that the Holy Spirit as he is signified in this name, is not signified as a person being from another: because those names rather signify a property of nature as an attribute, than a person. Hence it was said above, that this which belongs to both in common, is attributed to him properly, in that he proceeds from both: but the nature of a gift does not belong to both: but it so belongs to the Holy Spirit, that not to the Father, or to the Son.

To the next, it must be said that "gift" in the nature of the first proceeding gift does not belong to the Son, neither primarily, nor consequently: but the nature of "the given" can belong to him consequently and not through itself.

Articulus 6 — Whether The Son Can Be Said To Be Given From Eternity

Whether the Son can be called given from eternity?

Then it is asked concerning what he says, E, The Holy Spirit... proceeds from eternity. But because he so proceeded that he was donable, he was already a gift, etc.

§ 1. For it seems that by the same reason the Son is called given from eternity: because either he was so begotten that he could be given in time, or not. If not: therefore it seems that there is a repugnance of his giving in time to eternal generation: and this is false: but rather we had above, that some even called eternal generation a mission: because it gives the habitual disposition to the fact that the begotten could be sent, because he is begotten by another. If however he was so begotten from eternity that he could be given, then by the same reason the Son will be called given from eternity, just as the Holy Spirit a gift.

§ 2. Also, just as I see that created effects in a creature, some are concerning the perfection of affection, in which the Holy Spirit is said to be given, and by reason of his aptitude to this from eternity is called a gift: so there are certain gifts concerning the perfection of the intellect in which the Son is given, and by reason of his eternal aptitude to this he himself also seems to be called a gift or given: therefore it seems that not only "gift" but also "given" belongs to the Son from eternity.

§ 3. Also, if this is the cause that he is called a gift, that the Father or the Son was going to give him in time, the temporal seems to be the cause or reason of the eternal: which is evidently incongruous, since rather it is vice versa.

§ 4. Also, I posit, that creatures never exist, or will exist: it seems, that still the nature of the eternal is not removed; but "gift" has the nature of the eternal, because it belongs from eternity: therefore it seems that he is not called a gift by this, that he was going to be given in time. If you say, that then it posits an aptitude to a creature which could be, although it will not be: I posit then, that neither could a creature be: for there will still be the distinction of persons: and thus the spirit proceeds in the nature of a gift, if to be a gift belongs to him from eternity.

§ 5. Also some object, that if "gift" signifies an order to a creature, therefore it connotes an effect potentially in a creature: therefore it signifies the divine essence, because the rule is, that every diction connoting an effect in a creature signifies the divine essence. And they solve this by saying that it is true of those connoting an effect, not in potency, but in act.

But on the contrary: the one whose act of creation is the effect in the creature, the same one's is the potency: but the act belongs commonly to the three: therefore also the potency: therefore by reason of order or potency the word "gift" seems to signify the essence, and not the person.

Solution. Without prejudice I say, that the word "gift" signifies nothing but the nature of the Holy Spirit: and I say this simply assenting to Augustine.

But for solving the objections, such a distinction has been invented by many glossing this passage, that the word "gift" is spoken of in three ways. In one way, that it signifies nothing but a respect to the Father and the Son. In a second way, that it adds over that respect an order to the time in which it could be given. In a third way, that over the respect and the order it

adds the act by which it is given. And they say that in the first way it belongs from eternity, even if nothing is ever going to be to which it could be given. In the second way it belongs from eternity, but cosignifies the essence on account of the objection lastly made: and it belongs on this condition, that something will be or could be to which it is given or to be given. In the third way they say that it does not belong except in time. But this is against the nature of a gift: because the first understanding is outside the nature of a gift: and therefore it cannot be accepted in the distinction of the term. Hence everywhere Augustine assigning the nature of a gift, says that it was to be given. And therefore I say that the latter two are of the nature of the term, but not the first sense: and I say nevertheless, that it is spoken of personally in the second sense. And in the third it is spoken of personally cosignifying the essence.

To the first therefore it must be said, that "given" does not belong from eternity: because it is a participle and cosignifies time: and therefore it does not belong except according to act: and therefore also the Son cannot be called "given" from eternity. To the next it is already solved above: because although the Son proceeds from the Father, and from this he could be sent and given, nevertheless by his procession itself he does not signify the nature of the first gift, as the Holy Spirit does, proceeding as love.

To the next, it must be said that effects in the intellect do not have the nature of the first gift on the part of the giver: but rather love which responds to the perfection of affection.

To the next, it must be said that the temporal is neither the cause nor the reason of the eternal: but rather vice versa. Hence it must be said that when it is said that the spirit is called a gift because he was to be given in time, the word "to be given" or "going to give", as when it is said the Father is going to give the Holy Spirit as he is a gift, they do not signify the cause or the reason, but rather the term, and the consequent of the nature of a gift. And the sense is: Because the gift was a gift, therefore giving followed. But if you wish to infer, that if he gives, he gives a gift: and thus the nature of a gift seems to be inferred from the given, and thus to be caused. It must be said that it is a causality of consequence, and not of the consequent: and thus the effect well infers the cause. And there is a causality of the consequent: and thus the effect does not infer the cause, but rather vice versa: and thus it is here. Hence when the eternal is inferred from the temporal, there is nothing but the reason of consequence, and not of the consequent.

To the next, it must be said that even if creatures could not be, the spirit is still a gift, and the reason is in this that he could give, if there could be a receiver: for from the fact that the reason for receiving is removed, the nature of the gift is not removed.

To the last, it must be said that when it is said, a diction connoting an effect signifies the essence, it is understood of potency and act. But that connotes an effect which by its name posits causality toward the effect: but the word "gift" does not do this, but rather posits the nature of that in which every effect is given: and that is the first love, which also is not effective; and therefore that is not essential. But when it is spoken of from the act of giving,

then it posits causality toward the effect: and therefore then it cosignifies the essence, and the notion at the same time.

Divisio Textus

Then it is asked concerning what he says: And it must be noted, that just as the Son, etc.

For there begins the second part of the distinction. And it has two parts: in the first of which he shows, that the Son by being born receives that he is the Son, and God, and the divine essence, and the Holy Spirit by proceeding. In the second he shows, that from this it does not follow, that the Son by nativity is God, and the Spirit by procession is God, there, H, Here arises a question, If the Son, etc.

The first has only one chapter.

Articulus 7 — Whether This Is True: That The Son Received By Being Born, Or Has By Being Born, That He Is God, Or The Divine Essence

Whether this is true, the Son received by being born, or has by being born that he is God, or the divine essence?

Concerning which it is doubted, Whether this is true, "The Son by being born received that he is God", or "by being born is God, or the divine essence"?

It seems, that not: because § 1. Whatever he is by being born, this distinguishes him from the generator: if therefore he is God by being born, God or the divine essence is distinguished from the Father, which is false.

§ 2. Also, Whatever the Son is by being born, that is born: therefore if the Son is the essence by being born, it itself is born. The same objection precisely is concerning this, "The Spirit by proceeding is God, or the divine essence."

To this some say, that this is simply to be conceded, "The Son by being born receives", or "The Son by being born has that he is God and the divine essence": just as the Master says here in the Text: and this is because, in such a locution, the word "by being born" determines nothing but the suppositum: and the sense is, the Son who by being born is the Son, receives that he is God or the divine essence, or has this.

But when it is said, "The Son by being born is God, or the divine essence": they say, that the gerundive can signify the cause with respect to the predicate: and thus the locution is false, because nativity does not reach the divine essence, as was proved above.

Or it can be expounded by "while": so that the sense is, "The Son while he is born, has the essence", so that it notes concomitance: and thus they say it is true. And this does not seem to be of the intention of the Text: because in the Text we have, that nativity bestows the essence upon the Son, which seems

to imply a cause. But to this it must be said that this distinction is to be supplied: because although the gerund expresses the ratio of an original principle, which can determine the

composition of the verb on the part of the subject alone: so that the sense is, "The Son by being born," that is, he who by being born is the Son, receives, or has, or is God, or the divine essence. Or, the determination can be referred to the composition by signifying an act passing over into the predicate: and thus it is false, because it would follow that the essence was born in some way: and the objections proceed in this sense, and therefore the solution to them is clear.

Divisio Textus

§ 5. Next it is asked concerning the last part of this distinction which begins, at L, And according to this that he is eternally a gift, etc.

And it has three parts: in the first of which he touches upon how he is called spirit; in the second why he is not called our son, since he is given to us, at M, Here it is asked, whether also the Son, etc. In the third it is asked, from the fact that the Spirit gives himself to us, and from the fact that he is referred to us, whether he is also referred to himself, at N, After this it is asked, whether the Holy Spirit is referred to himself?

Articulus 8 — Whether This Is True: The Son Is God By Nativity

Whether this is true: "The Son by birth is God"?

§ 1. Next, it is asked concerning this which he says, at H, To which we briefly answer, that neither is the Son the essence by birth, etc.

For the same reason seems to apply to this, "The Son by birth is God": and to this, "The Son by being born is God": and if it is distinguished, that the word by birth determines the composition of the verb on the part of the supposit, it will be true.

§ 2. To this it must be said that indeed it is distinguishable. But because the ablative has an understood preposition, which properly has to determine the composition on the part of the predicate, and thus the causality of birth with respect to God or the essence seems to be noted: therefore the Master denies it.

Articulus 9 — Whether These Three Are The Only Modes Of Generation: By Defection, Procession, And Derivation

Whether these are the only three modes of generation: by defection, procession, and derivation?

§ 3. Next, it is asked concerning this which Hilary says: By defection, or protension, or derivation, etc.

For by these they state three modes of generation: and it is asked, In what do they differ?

§ 4. And it must be said, that everything that is born from something materially, either goes out from potency with the casting off of the form previously existing in the matter, or goes out retaining the substantial form of that thing. If in the first way, Hilary calls it being generated by defection, as a stalk from a grain. But if it is generated in such a way that it retains the

specific form, then it receives nothing but a form of art, and that form is through the extension, or collection, or diffusion of matter: and in the first way something is produced from iron and metals which are produced by the extension of matter; in the second way a lake from a stream; and in the third way a stream from a spring: and he includes these latter modes under one.

Articulus 10 — With Which Divine Names This Pronoun, Our Or My, Can Be Conjoined

With which divine names can this pronoun, "our", or "my", be joined?

§ 6. But there is a general question here: With which divine names can this pronoun, our, or my, be joined?

§ 7. 1. For it is said, "our God," although the word God does not signify a relation to us: therefore it seems that it is not joinable only with those that posit a relation to an effect in the creature.

§ 8. 2. Also, it is said "our Father," although the word Father expresses an eternal relation by which a person is distinguished: therefore it seems that for the same reason it should be said "our Son," and "our Holy Spirit."

Also, Isaiah 9:6: A Son is given to us. And what is given to us, is ours: therefore he is our Son.

§ 9. 3. Also, of the Holy Spirit we properly say, "our Spirit": and we do not say, "our Holy Spirit": but this cannot be on account of the ratio of spirit, because it is said, "our spirit": therefore it will be on account of the ratio of holiness. ON THE CONTRARY: He himself works holiness in us just as spirituality: therefore by reason of both he ought to be called ours.

§ 10. 4. Also, why is he not called "our gift," since a gift expresses a relation to him to whom it is given? Now nothing is so truly ours as that which is given gratuitously: but the gift is given to us gratuitously: therefore it is our gift.

§ 11. 5. Also, in essential names that signify attributes, as wisdom, goodness, and the like: for it is not said, "our wisdom," nor "our essence": but it is said, "our salvation," "our patience," "our strength," and the like: what is the reason for this?

§ 12. SOLUTION. It must be said that four things are required in order that a term signifying the divine essence or a person can receive this pronoun, our, or my, or your, or his: the first of which is, that it signifies an effect in the creature. The second is, that it signifies the relation of the agent to that effect. The third is, that it does not signify a distinguishing relation in the divine [persons]. The fourth is, that it does not signify the relation of a form in comparison to that in which that form is. The divine essence, and deity, and the like, are lacking in three of these, namely in the first, second, and last. And certain others are lacking also in certain ones, as is easy to see.

§ 13. To the first, therefore, it must be said that God signifies as in one having deity, and is imposed from certain acts signifying an effect in the creature: and those are, to provide supremely, and the like, as was said above in the question concerning this name, God.

§ 14. To the next it must be said that when it is said, "our Father," the ratio of paternity is taken, either from creation or recreation: and therefore the whole Trinity is our father. But it is not so of the Son: because he cannot properly be called "our Son," because he is from us through an existence of grace or nature: although he himself says, that whoever does the will of the Father, he is his brother, and sister, and mother; and this is true under a determination, namely according to the fact that he simply is our Father.

§ 15. To the next it must be said that when "spirit" is said, the effect of spirituality is also noted, by reason of which he is called ours: but when "holy" is added, it is a circumlocution for the name of the eternal person: and therefore then it is referred to us.

§ 16. To that which is objected, by virtue of what is this so? It must be said that this is by virtue of both conjoined: because the conjoined is discrete, and the disjoined belongs to the whole Trinity, just as the connoted effect.

§ 17. To the next it must be said that gift [donum] expresses the eternal relation by which he is referred to the Father and the Son, and therefore he cannot be called "our gift". But to that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that the given [datum] is ours, but not the gift, such that the word our and the word gift are construed from the same part of speech: because then the word our says that in that relation he relates to us which is imported in the name: and according to this if he were our gift, it would be necessary that he be a gift from us: and if he were our son, if the word our were construed immediately with the word son, he would be a son from us: which since it is false, he is not called our son, nor our gift. And it does not follow: He is given to us: therefore he is our son, or our gift: and it is the fallacy of accident, because it belongs to him to be ours under the ratio of a given thing [datum], but not under the ratio of a gift [donum] or son, unless the word our and the word son or gift are not construed from the same part of speech: so that it is said, the son is our given thing, and the gift is our given thing.

§ 18. To the next it must be said that wisdom expresses the order of a form to that of which it is the form, and therefore it is said to be its being: and therefore he himself is not our wisdom, because it would be signified that we are formally wise by him: but patience, hope, salvation, strength, firmament, all express an effect caused in the creature, and by God: and they import causality from the mode of signifying: and therefore with such things the word our is joined from the same part.

DISTINCTIO XIX

Divisio Textus

§ 19. Now after the coeternity of the three persons, etc. Here begins the second part of this tractate on the Trinity, in which the Master treats of the equality of the persons. For to the distinction of the persons in the divine, as was said above, it was required that there remain equality of

essence in the nature under which they are distinguished, and equality of predication: and concerning these the Master determines up to distinction XXVI.

§ 20. It is divided into three parts: in the first of which he treats of those things in which is considered the equality of the persons. In the second, however, concerning the diversity of names spoken substantially and personally, so that the notional and personal ones may be taken, about which he intends: and this begins at distinction XXII, at After the aforesaid it seems to us that we must discuss the diversity of names, etc. In the third he treats of the numeral expressions which are to be joined both to the essential and personal and notional ones: and this begins at distinction XXIV, at This must be diligently inquired, since in the Trinity, etc.

§ 21. The first of these has two parts, namely that which is about those things in which the equality of the persons is considered, and that which is occasioned by this, namely what is meant when it is said, "the Father alone," since equality posits plurality: and concerning other significations of exclusive expressions, which begins at distinction XXI, at Here arises a question drawing its origin from the aforesaid.

§ 22. The former of these is further split into two: in the first of which, hunting for those things in which equality is considered, he proves that the three persons are equal in greatness. In the second, he proves that they are equal in power, at distinction XX, at Now it remains to show how any of these persons, etc.

§ 23. This distinction is divided into three parts: in the first of which he shows in what equality consists. In the second, he shows how they are equal in greatness, at C, Now therefore it remains to show, etc. In the third, he repeats in order to add certain things, at E, It must therefore be known that there is such equality in the Trinity, etc.

§ 24. The first of these has three chapters: in the first of which he hunts for those things in which there is equality. In the second he shows that they do not really differ from the essence, at B, Although these are enumerated as if diverse, etc. In the third he says that concerning the equality of eternity it has already been had: hence it remains to speak of greatness, at the end of chapter B, But because of eternity, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether In The Divine There Can Be Equality

Whether there can be equality in the divine [persons]?

§ 25. Here a doubt arises before the Letter. Whether equality is in the divine [persons]? And if it is, then it is asked, Since in the divine [persons] there is also identity and similitude, why does the Master not make a special tractate about them?

§ 26. To the first one proceeds thus: 1. From whatever cause and caused are removed, the unity of dimensive quantity is the cause of equality: and this is not in the divine [persons]: therefore it seems that neither is equality.

§ 27. 2. Also, From whatever genus and species are removed [so too its properties]: but the genus of equality is proportion, and this is not in the divine [persons]: therefore neither is

equality. PROOF OF THE MINOR. For proportion is the commensurability of quantities: and this does not apply to the divine.

§ 28. 3. Also, equals are, as is said in Geometrics, those which when placed upon each other do not exceed, nor are exceeded: but one person is not placed upon another, neither in dignity, nor in application: therefore it does not belong to them to be equal.

§ 29. 4. If perhaps you say that these reasons have place in those things which are of great bulk: but the equality of the persons is considered in the quantity of power. ON THE CONTRARY: Nothing is equal to the infinite: but the power of any of the persons is infinite: therefore it does not have the ratio of equality.

§ 30. 5. Also, that which is altogether one and the same, is not equal, because equal posits many: but the power of the persons is altogether one and the same: therefore it seems that it does not have the ratio of equality.

§ 31. 6. Another way again it is objected to the contrary: for that which is altogether simple, has no quantity: but that which has no quantity, has no equality: therefore since in the divine there is absolute simplicity, there seems to be no equality.

§ 32. SOLUTION. I say that in the divine there is equality: and I well concede that in the divine there cannot be dimensive quantity, which Augustine calls the quantity of bulk: but there is the quantity of power.

§ 33. Hence it must be said to the first, that the cause of equality which is the identity of power in things, is not removed from the divine: and therefore there can be equality in them.

§ 34. To the next it must be said that proportion is of diverse things in substance: and therefore it is removed from the divine. Above it was shown, that if some genus is removed from the divine, it is not necessary that on account of this the species be removed: because a species sometimes is not transferred to the divine by reason of the genus, but by reason of the difference which it adds over the genus: and so it is here. PROOF. For equality is the proportion of some things to each other according to one quantity: and by reason of that which is to have one quantity of power it is transferred to the divine, and not by reason of the antecedent which is the proportion of diverse things.

§ 35. To the next it must be said that that definition is given of equals in dimensive quantity, which the geometer considers: but equality in some power is just to be able to do as much as that one, and this applies in the divine.

§ 36. To the next it must be said that when the power of the Father is said to be infinite, it is not understood as infinite in such a way that his power would exceed him: but it is understood as infinite because it is not limited by anything extrinsic: and the reason for this was explained above: and in this way the infinite which is most finite to itself, has an equal, although it does not have an equal outside its essence: hence thus the power of the Son is equated to the power of the Father, and conversely. Certain others solve this otherwise saying that the infinite is equal to the infinite. Hence and if the power of the Father is infinite, the power of the Son is also infinite: and thus it is equated. But this is nothing: because the infinite

does not participate in the ratio of equality: because its quantity is not certain neither in itself nor toward another: and so it is not equated: because it is impossible even to understand it to be equated by something whose quantity is always being taken. Hence the first solution is truer.

§ 37. To the next it must be said that although the divine power is altogether the same, yet this power belongs to many persons, and is had by many persons, and for the sake of those it has a comparison, because they are many who are equated in one power. But this is true that if there were one in itself, and of one only in person, then the ratio of equality could not be assigned.

§ 38. To the next it must be said that the divine power in itself has no quantity: but the quantity of power is considered outwardly, namely according to objects and acts. For we say that Achilles and Hercules are of equal power, when one can conquer as many as the other: and when one can do every act which the other can do: and so we say in the divine, that such equality is not repugnant to simplicity: for whatever the Father can do, the Son and the Holy Spirit can do, and conversely.

Articulus 2 — Since In The Divine There Is Likeness And Identity, Why Does The Master Not Treat Those As He Does Equality

Since in the divine there is similitude and identity, why does the Master not touch upon them just as equality?

§ 39. Secondly it is asked, Since in the divine there is similitude and identity, why does the Master not touch upon them just as he touches upon equality?

§ 40. 1. It seems, however, that he ought to touch upon identity, because the Philosopher says that one in substance causes the same: but one in quantity causes the equal, and one in quality causes the similar: but Boethius says, and it was held above, that all predicates referred to divine predication except relation, are changed into substance: therefore it seems that those which express quantity of power, and those which express quality, in the divine predicate substance: therefore it seems that from one power or wisdom is caused the same, and not the equal or similar.

§ 41. 2. Also, things which are the same are more one, than those which are equal: but of the persons in the divine nature and its attributes there is the greatest unity, as Bernard says in book V of On Consideration: therefore it seems that there is identity of them in it, and not equality.

§ 42. 3. Also, those which are altogether the same, are equal, and not conversely: therefore it seems that it is more fitting for the persons to be united by the union of identity, than of equality.

§ 43. 4. Also, the three persons are distinguished by properties, and agree in substance: but agreement of substance makes the same: therefore it seems that in those things which he touches upon in the Letter, identity is caused, and not equality.

§ 44. Furthermore it is asked, Why does he not treat here of the similitude of the three persons, since similitude seems more properly to belong to the persons than equality?

§ 45. 1. Because there are certain things in the divine, as Damascene says, which predicate substance: and certain things which predicate that which follows upon it, as just, and good: therefore since of the three persons there is one justice, and one goodness, there will be one similitude of the three persons: and thus the similitude of the three persons is to be determined.

§ 46. 2. Also, those things which follow upon substance have a difference among themselves: for there are certain things which in respect to some of their species properly belong to spiritual substances, but certain things belong only to corporeal ones: just as quality in respect to disposition, and habit, and natural potency and impotency, properly belongs to spiritual ones: but quantity, especially continuous to which belongs the ratio of magnitude, does not belong except to corporeal ones: therefore it seems that quality is closer to divine predication than quantity: therefore also the unity of quality is more properly in the divine than the unity of quantity: but the unity of quality makes the similar, while the unity of quantity causes the equal: therefore in the divine the similitude of the persons is more to be determined than equality.

§ 47. SOLUTION. It must be said that in truth one in substance makes the same, and one in quantity makes the equal, and one in quality makes the similar, as the Philosopher says in V Metaphysics. But this was not to be determined concerning the same: because the same with that to which it is the same, does not express the distinction of a person. But here it is not determined except concerning those things which express the unity of distinct persons. Hence also it was proved above, that the Son is neither the same God as the Father, nor another God, but he is well equal: because the word same wishes to have the identity of a person, while another the diversity of essence: but since in this whole part of the book the Master determines concerning the distinction of the persons, he ought not to have touched upon identity in a principal tractate, nevertheless he touches upon it here incidentally, how one person is in another by the identity of essence. But similitude says far too little in the divine: because it does not follow, as Augustine says, if some two are similar, that they are continuously equal: but conversely if they are equal in quantity of power, it follows that they are similar, because the quantity of power is also according to the capability of those things which according to their name signify quality, as the capability of wisdom, and the capability of goodness, and the like: and therefore equality most of all belongs to the distinction of the divine persons.

§ 48. To the first therefore it must be said that although in the divine with respect to the thing all predicaments predicate substance or relation, nevertheless not with respect to the mode of signifying: because certain ones predicate by the mode of quality, and certain ones by the mode of virtual quantity. But if it is asked, What underlies this mode? this was expounded above.

§ 49. To the next it must be said that those things which are the same, are more one than equal things: nevertheless identity does not so apply to distinct persons insofar as they are distinct, as has already been said: and therefore this is not determined.

§ 50. To the next it must be said that this is false, that those which are altogether the same are equal: because they do not have the distinction which is required for equality: and therefore that reason does not proceed.

§ 51. To that which is further asked, it must be said that similitude does not suffice for the distinction of the persons, as was said before: because although of itself it has the distinction of similar things, because Boethius says that similitude is the same quality of differing things: nevertheless it does not express that one person has as much as another, as is required in the divine persons.

§ 52. To the next it must be said that although quantity intrinsically belongs to corporeal things, nevertheless it is not thus transferred into the divine, but rather for virtual quantity, as was said before: and therefore its one equates the distinct persons: but the one of quality does not equate one to another: and therefore quantity is more fitting than quality: but this is only drawn from the reason that quality is transferred into the divine in more species than quantity. Hence it must be said and better, that although quality in its species might better be transferred into the divine than quantity in its own: nevertheless nothing prohibits the one which is in quantity from being more fitting than the one which is in quality: because the one of quantity equates the persons, but the one of quality does not equate, as was said before.

Articulus 3 — In Respect Of What Equality Is Taken In The Divine

In respect to what is equality taken in the divine persons?

§ 38. Next it is asked concerning what he says:

None of these either precedes the other in eternity, or exceeds in magnitude, or surpasses in power, etc. For he means that equality consists in these things.

§ 39. But it is objected: 1. Since it is possible to take equality according to any species of quantity: and he posits one which corresponds to an extrinsically adjacent quantity, such as eternity which corresponds to time: while he posits another which corresponds to continuous quantity according to its species, which is magnitude: and he posits a third which corresponds to virtual quantity, which is power: it seems that something ought to correspond also to place and number, so that there would be perfect equality among them.

§ 40. 2. Also, Augustine says that in those things which are not great in bulk, it is the same thing to be greater and to be better: therefore it seems that in respect to what is magnitude, it is not equality that is denoted, but rather likeness: because good and better imply a comparison in quality, and not in quantity. If perhaps you say that great and small are qualities spoken of concerning quantity: this is nothing: because the rationale of equality is not considered in respect to those qualities, but rather in respect to their subject.

§ 41. 3. Also, Since Augustine says that in the divine persons there is no quality of bulk, but of power, it seems that magnitude is the same as power: and thus there are only two things in which equality is considered, and not three, as he enumerates in the Text.

§ 42. Solution. It must be said that the three things in which equality is considered all imply virtual quantity, for the reason that another kind of quantity is not compatible with the simplicity of the divine nature. Now this power is considered according to a threefold compass, namely of duration, and of place, and of work: by which three things everything that is limited is limited. For by a duration standing completely whole at once, the three persons include in the present 'now' all time and aevum, and whatever is in aevum and time; and by the compass of place they include every place, and whatever is in it, and are not included; and by the compass of power they include every operating power, whether according to nature, or according to the purpose of free will, or even above nature, and are not included. Since therefore in these three ways God includes everything that is, and is not included, in these three is found the perfect virtual quantity befitting the divine nature: and since the three persons agree in this mode of inclusion, this quantity is one in them, and causes equality.

§ 43. To better understand this, let us show that God in all these ways includes every created thing, and is not Himself included, but exceeds them. Anselm says that just as in the present 'now', which is the substance of time, there is every place, and everything that is in place; so in eternity is all time, and everything that is in time. Now it is established that there is still more in Him: because He is in that which had no beginning, and will have no end: therefore eternity is a measure including all time, and all aevum for the same reason, and excelling both, both in regard to the things measured and in regard to duration: in regard to the things measured indeed, because He measures the eternal, as the Philosopher says: What is eternal is to the eternal, this is the aeviternal to the aeviternal, and time to the temporal. Similarly, it is established that God is everywhere essentially, potentially, and presentially: therefore He is in all things through essence, and through the power of containing and operating, and through the presence of knowledge: therefore He is in place and the placed. Furthermore, He is in Himself, He who infinitely exceeds everything that is. Therefore His magnitude encompasses everything that is, and is not included in everything that is: but still remains outside as infinite: and this again belongs to all the persons: this therefore is magnitude.

§ 44. Also, Every capability is not a capability except through His capability and in His, and furthermore His capability brought forth every being and capability, and remains infinite in Himself with respect to Himself: therefore also in virtual power He includes everything that is, and is not included: and this is what we intended. Therefore, according to this threefold compass, the three things are taken in which the equality of the divine persons is considered.

§ 45. To the first objection, therefore, it must be said that magnitude corresponds to place, in the way in which God by His compass places, that is, contains, and preserves, and encompasses everything that is, and is not included by it: and magnitude is not taken here from those things which intrinsically measure substance, like a line, surface, and solid: because

those by their concept imply a quantity of bulk, and therefore cannot be fitted to the divine: but place implies containment, which is a matter of nobility, and therefore according to the property of containment it can be fitted to the divine. Number, however, exists in a plurality, and therefore the equality of individuals to individuals cannot be considered according to number, which is what is intended here: but rather the equality of many to many is considered according to number.

§ 46. To the next it must be said that Augustine understands this as a consequence, and not principally: because in truth virtual quantity differs in concept from its goodness: but a greater goodness always follows a greater quantity of power in spiritual things: and therefore equality is considered in respect to the principal of power, and not likeness.

§ 47. To the next it must be said that magnitude is taken here for the magnitude of power: but power is not spoken of according to a single rationale: and therefore power here is taken strictly, namely according as it signifies the compass of every work, which can demonstrate the perfection of the operative power: for God can do all that, and can do more: but magnitude refers to another compass, which is as it were according to the rationale of a placer including all things, and not included in all things nor in anything.

Articulus 4 — Whether Equality Belongs To The Three Persons, Such That Each Is Said To Be Equal To The Other

Does equality belong to the three persons such that each is said to be equal to the other?

§ 48. Next it is asked concerning what he says:

Neither to the Son, nor to the Holy Spirit... is the Father prior, or greater, nor the Son to the Holy Spirit.

For from this it seems that there is mutual equality among the persons. But ON THE CONTRARY:

§ 49. 1. This will seem to be contrary to what will be said later, that in the Father is unity, in the Son equality, in the Holy Spirit the connection of unity and equality: therefore it seems that the Father is not equal to the Son, but rather the converse.

§ 50. 2. Also, "Equal", by its very concept, seems to posit another prior to itself: as when it is said, "This one is equal," it is understood to whom he is equal: but the Father by His concept does not posit another prior to Himself: therefore it seems that equality does not belong to the Father.

§ 51. 3. Also, It seems also that it does not belong to the Holy Spirit: because the Holy Spirit does not proceed, as it seems, through an act of nature, but rather of the will, because He proceeds as love, and to love signifies an act of the will: but those things which proceed in this way do not proceed as equal to him from whom they proceed; therefore it seems that from the rationale of procession equality does not befit the Holy Spirit, but only the Son, who proceeds through an act of nature, which is generation.

§ 52. 4. Also, It does not follow: this is the love of that one, therefore it is equal to him: but it well follows: this is the son of that one, therefore he is equal to him, unless nature falls short: since therefore in the divine it does not fall short, it seems that only the Son has equality by His concept, and not the Father nor the Holy Spirit.

§ 53. 5. Also, Dionysius: In things equally powerful it is possible for things to be equal and similar among themselves and to be reciprocated: but in causes and the caused we do not admit reciprocation. Since therefore the Father is the principle of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, it seems that according to Dionysius's rationale the Son is not equal to the Father, nor the Holy Spirit equal to the Son or the Father.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 54. 1. As was established earlier, one in quantity is equality: hence equality is nothing else than one quantity of distinct things: since therefore the threefold compass of power is one in the three persons, as was proved earlier, it seems that all three persons are equal to one another.

§ 55. 2. Also, Athanasius in the Creed: The three persons are co-eternal and co-equal to one another.

§ 56. Solution. We say that the three persons are equal to one another, as was proved last.

§ 57. To what is objected first, it must be said that in the Son there is equality according to a certain rationale of something appropriated, not proper: and a certain one of the objections touches upon that rationale, namely, that insofar as the rationale of procession goes, He emanates from the Father in an equal nature. And because "equal" by its rationale always supposes one to whom it is equal: and this rationale is also touched upon in another objection: but although it can be appropriated to the Son in some way, it is nevertheless not proper, in such a way that it would not belong to the others.

§ 58. To the next it must be said that it does not posit one prior, but supposes one on account of the distinction which is signified in the word: and therefore it belongs to all the persons, but not to one person [alone]: rather to one in

comparison to another in whom there is the same virtual quantity.

§ 59. To the next it must be said that although a procession of the will does not import equality by the rationale of emanation in general, nevertheless it does import it as it exists in the divine: because in the divine an emanating person cannot but be equal in all things: however, those who appropriated it to the Son considered that rationale which is posited in the objection.

§ 60. To the next it must be said that love as love is not equal to the lover, nor is a word as a word equal to the speaker: but love as it is in the divine, and the Word as the Word of God, necessarily have equality with the speaker and the lover, as has been said.

§ 61. To the last it must be said that Dionysius is speaking of the comparison of creatures to the Creator: because God is the cause of those things: and they cannot be equated to Him: but

the persons are equally powerful, and one is not the cause of another, but rather the principle: and therefore they can be equal to one another.

Articulus 5 — What These Names Signify, Equality And Equal, Likeness And Like; And Whether The Father And The Son And The Holy Spirit Can Be Called One Equality

What do these names signify, 'equality' and 'equal', 'likeness' and 'like': and whether the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit can be called one equality?

§ 62. Next it is asked concerning what he says, there:

Behold, Augustine briefly assigned in what the equality of the three persons consists, etc.

For it can be a matter of doubt what these names signify, 'equality' and 'equal', and 'likeness' and 'like'?

For it seems that they signify notions: because § 63. 1. Whatever things in the divine note distinction, signify those things by which that distinction occurs: but these things in the divine signify those things by which that distinction occurs: but these are the notions: therefore these signify notions.

§ 64. 2. Also, Hilary says that a likeness is not to itself: therefore neither is an equality to itself: therefore these signify the persons who consist in plurality and relation.

§ 65. 3. Also, Essential terms are predicated in the singular concerning many collectively: but these are predicated of many collectively in the plural: for we say that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are not one equal, but plural equals: therefore these do not signify the essence, as it seems.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 66. 1. The three persons are not one in personality, because the personality of one is not the personality of another: and oneness is required for being equal: therefore they are not equal in personality: therefore it is necessary, if they are equal, that they be equal in essence and in essential attributes.

§ 67. 2. Also, In terms of notions the persons are unequal, because the Father has three, the Son two, the Holy Spirit one: therefore if they are equal, this will be in essence and in essential attributes.

§ 68. 3. Also, The threefold compass of virtual quantity which was determined above belongs to a person on account of the essence, and not on account of any determinate person: therefore it seems that 'equal' and 'like' signify the essence, and not a notion, or person.

§ 69. FURTHER it is asked, Whether it can be said: The Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one equality?

§ 70. And it seems that it can: because they are one essence which is the equality of the three: therefore it seems that they are one equality.

§ 71. Solution. It must be said that these names 'equal', 'like', and 'likeness', and 'equality', in their concept include two things, namely the distinct persons, and the unity of essence. But when they are taken as concrete terms, then they signify the persons directly (in recto), and the

essence indirectly (in obliquo): and when they are taken as abstract terms, the converse happens, namely that they signify the essence directly and the persons indirectly: but nevertheless they always retain both: and by

From this, the solution to almost all the objections is clear. That it is such, as was said, is clear if those expressions are expounded: for "equal" means persons having one quantity, and "similar" means persons having one quality; and it is clear that in this exposition the persons are in the nominative case, and the essence is in an oblique case. But if they are taken as abstracts, the contrary happens: because equality is the same quantity of distinct persons, and similarity is the same quality of differing things or persons, where the essence is in the nominative, and the persons are in the oblique.

Therefore, it must be said to the first arguments, that all things which conclude do not follow from the fact that they signify only notions or persons, but because they signify the persons in the nominative.

To those arguments, however, which are to the contrary, they compel nothing more than that the essence in those names is said in the oblique.

To the next, it must be said that, in my judgment, it should not be conceded that the three are one equality: because although the essence is there signified in the nominative, nevertheless the persons are also signified. And it is not valid: They are that in which equality is, such as essence and power; therefore they are equality. The sophistic topic of the accident falls in here, on account of the diverse mode of signifying in "equality" and in that in which that equality is noted, whether this be power or essence.

Note, therefore, that these things are intrinsically relative when they are uttered plurally. They are extrinsically relative when they are uttered in the singular, and they require an outward determination. For instance, "These are equal" is intrinsically relative, enclosing in itself those things which are referred to themselves, and they are determined by themselves intrinsically. But when it is said, "The Son is equal," it is necessary to add, "to the Father and to the Holy Spirit," or to both. They are, however, relative in such a way that they also consignify the essence in the oblique, as was said.

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Next is to be taken up that part in which he shows the equality of the persons according to magnitude; which is divided into two parts. In the first of these he shows that on account of equality one person is in another, and this begins there, C, "Now in itself, therefore, it remains to show," etc. But the second proves that on account of equality the ratio of part and of universal and of matter and of compounding [contemperationis] is removed from God, there, F, "But let us now return to the proposition, and press on with what was begun," etc.

In the first there are three chapters: in the first of which there is nothing but a transition from what has been said to what is to be said. In the second, it is shown that the equality of magnitude is in the essence, there, D, "It is therefore to be known," etc. In the third, it is shown

as a consequence of this that each of the persons is in another, there, E, "And thence it is, that the Father is said," etc.

Articulus 6 — Whether In Eternity There Are Years From Generation To Generation

Whether in eternity there are years from generation to generation?

Next it is inquired concerning this which he says: "Your years are unto generation and generation."

§ 1. For eternity is indivisible: therefore it seems that years do not apply to it. For a year is the return of the sun to some point of the zodiac, in which its motion is fixed, just as in Aries, or in another place: therefore it seems that a measure of this kind does not apply to eternity: therefore he speaks badly.

§ 2. Moreover, what is it that he says, "Unto generation and generation"? For if by this he means to say that God does not pass away in the passing of the succession of generations, this seems to be too little: because even the earth, as Ecclesiastes says, stands forever, while a generation passes away, and a generation comes.

§ 3. Similarly, if generation and generation are restless and do not stand still, for as long as God wills, namely up to the generation which is collected out of all generations, and this is said to be the generation of the Saints, it is necessary that it havein every succession of generations a restless mover. But this cannot be by nature except the motion of the celestial bodies: therefore it seems that the years of that motion are also in the generation of generations: and therefore it does not apply to God alone, as it seems.

ON THE CONTRARY: Afterwards he premises in the same Psalm, verses 27 and 28: "They," that is, the heavens, "shall perish: but you remain, ... and your years shall not fail." Therefore it seems that it befits God alone.

Solution. As was said above, the years of God are said to be His eternity, not distinguishable in itself, but in relation to lower measures. And the year of God is called eternity exceeding the revolutions of years. For however many revolutions of years are taken, eternity exceeds them infinitely before and after, because the duration of eternity before and after is infinitely as great: whence it does not follow that eternity is divided or distinguished in itself. And through this the solution to the first is clear.

To the next, it must be said that the generation of generations is called the number of the elect collected out of every generation, as Augustine says here. But in that succession the earth does not stand still in such a way that it is not mutable according to disposition and part. For presently, through the circular generation of the elements and the mixture in the elements, the earth is transmuted according to a part, and not according to the whole. But at the end of the world, it will be altered in its active and passive qualities, and in the things caused from them. But it is true that it will stand forever according to substance: for Augustine says that the figure of this world passes away, but not its substance.

To the next, it must be said that the motion of heaven and heaven itself will stand as long as the succession of generation lasts. But nevertheless they are referred to time. For heaven is referred to the "now" of time, as to a measure: and motion itself according to its parts is in time, as in a number; but time is in it as in a cause, and in heaven as in a subject. But God is neither changed like the earth, nor referred to time like heaven and motion.

Articulus 7 — Whether Three Persons Are Something Greater Than Two, And Two Than One

Whether the three persons are something greater than two, and two greater than one?

It is a doubt here what he says in the fourth chapter, D, there, "Nor are two persons together anything greater than one," etc.

§ 1. For this seems to have a counter-instance in all discrete and collective things: for one is a part of two, and every part is less than the whole. Therefore it seems that two persons are something greater than one, and three greater than two.

§ 2. Similarly, we will hold below that this name, "Trinity," collectively signifies the persons. Therefore, since anyone of a people is a part of the people, it seems that one person is something less than the whole Trinity.

§ 3. Also, one person is related in some mode to the Trinity, either as the same, or as equal, or as greater, or as less. Not as the same, because otherwise it would be necessary that by supposing that person, the Trinity would be supposed, which cannot be. Nor as greater, nor as equal, as it seems, because equals which are of one essence are converted upon themselves: but the predication of the Trinity is not converted to any of the persons. Therefore it seems that it relates as less: therefore one person is not as much as two or three.

Solution. It must be said that "as much" [tantum] and "how much" [quantum] declare here an equality in that which is quantity, and not in the number of notions or persons. This [number] however is not simply a number, as will be shown below. For in the number of notions which the notions make, two persons are more than one, and three are more than two or one, but they are not something more, or greater. And the process in the first argument is from the discrete to the continuous; whence the fallacy of figure of speech occurs.

To the next, it must be said that "Trinity" is not a collective noun: because the form of a collection is simply "many," and "one" in a qualified sense. But the Trinity unites the persons simply in one nature. It is said to be like a collective noun, however, in that it collects all the persons in itself, not as parts, but as one in nature, which is not a whole to them, but the same to each one of them: which is not the case in a quantitative or integral whole.

To the next, it must be said that one person is related to the Trinity in two ways: because "Trinity" says two things, namely, a collection of persons, and a union. As to the discretion of the things collected, one person relates as in a lesser notional discretion than the collection of the three. But to the union, it relates as equal and the same: because it is the same as the unity of the essence and is equal through the essence to all three together. Whence in my judgment, no response is to be given to such [arguments] without a distinction of this kind.

Articulus 8 — Whether The Father Can Be Said To Be In The Son, And One Person In Another

Whether the Father can be said to be in the Son, and one person in another?

Next it is inquired concerning this which he says: "And thence it is, that the Father is said to be in the Son," etc.

For it seems that these things fit according to no mode of saying "in another".

§ 1. For the Philosopher says in Physics IV: "It must be apprehended in how many modes something is said to be in another. Therefore, in one mode, indeed, as a finger in a hand, and generally parts in a whole. But in another, as a whole in its parts: for the whole is not apart from the parts. In another, as man in animal, and generally species in a genus. In another, as a genus in a species: and generally in the ratio of the species, a part of the species. Furthermore, as health in hot and cold things, and generally form in matter. Furthermore, as the affairs of the Greeks in the king, and generally in a primary mover. In addition, as in a good, and generally in an end: and this is that for the sake of which the rest are, and are made. But the most proper of all is as in a vessel, and generally in a place." From this it is accepted that the mode of something being in another is said by these eight enumerated modes, or nine if the last is divided into two: because there is place as a vessel, and also place not as a vessel, but immobile, which is simply place. But it is established that in none of these modes is one person in another: therefore it seems that simply one is not in another.

§ 2. Also, when it is said, "The Father is in the Son," the preposition, since it is transitive, necessarily imports some distinction. But there is no distinction except according to a relation of origin. Therefore it seems that it notes the authority of the Father towards the Son. But when it is said conversely, "The Son is in the Father," by the same reasoning it will note a distinction, and not under the same ratio as first: therefore it seems that not by the same reasoning is the Father in the Son, and the Son in the Father, and the same reasoning goes for the Holy Spirit.

§ 3. Also, for those things of which one is to the other as distinct alongside distinct, neither of them is in the other. But the Word from eternity was alongside God, as distinct alongside distinct: therefore it seems that He was never in the Father, nor the Father in Him, and thus what is said here is nothing.

§ 4. Also, the word in seems to import a twofold habitude when it is said that the Father is in the Son, namely, the unity of essence which is touched upon here by Hilary and Augustine and Ambrose, and also the existence of relatives which Damascene touches upon: for one of the relatives is in the other through the intellect. Therefore it seems that once posited, it would be taken equivocally according to two habitudes.

§ 5. Also, three illustrious Doctors expound this concerning the unity of essence. And I ask, in what habitude is the word in taken there, and let us say, "The Father is in the divine essence, and the Son is in the same essence"? For either it is as in a whole, which is noted

below, or it is as in a form, or as in a place: but it is established that it is in no way. Therefore the word in does not note the habitude of the essence, and thus it is badly expounded.

Solution. It must be said that in truth, as was said in objecting, the preposition notes a twofold habitude, namely of origin, or relation, and of the identity of essence. And as to that which is of relation, not in the same mode is the Father said to be in the Son, and the Son in the Father, and similarly concerning the Holy Spirit.

To the first, it must be said that it is taken here in none of those modes: because the Philosopher there does not touch upon the modes by which something is in something, except those which have some similarity with that mode by which something is in another as in a place, because he intends to treat only of that there. It could, however, though remotely, be reduced to that by which what is caused is in the cause: because although there is no cause in divine things, there is nevertheless the potency of a principle there.

To the next, the solution is already clear through what has been said before.

To the next, it must be said that the word "alongside" [apud] notes a distinction of perfect and equal according to the mode of signifying. For in corporeal things, this term notes lateral vicinity, and that vicinity posits equality. Nevertheless, in divine things it does not preclude that one of the distinct persons can be in the other, both through the intellect of the principle and of what exists from the principle, and also through the unity of the essence. But in corporeal things, which cannot be of one essence if they are distinct, it is true that the conclusion of that reasoning follows.

To the next, it must be said that although person and essence differ according to the mode of signifying, nevertheless they are really the same. And therefore both the personal distinction and the essential unity can sometimes be signified by one term. And it is not an equivocal sign, because one is taken in the other, just as was also explained above.

To the next, it must be said that it is not properly said, "The Father is in the divine essence," but it could be said, "The Son is in the nature or essence of the Father," or conversely. There, some distinction would be noted, not indeed of essence to person, but of person to person, which with Himself is one in essence. If, however, it is conceded, then it must be said that for the preposition a transition in the mode of signifying suffices, not in the thing. And that mode of signifying will be that the Father is in the essence as a "who" in a "by which it is," and the essence in the Father as a "by which it is" in a "who." And because in divine things there is indifference between the "who it is" and the "by which it is," therefore the preposition is expounded through the identity of the thing. And this cannot be reduced to any of the Philosopher's modes, because neither did he posit all of them, but those which had a similarity with the last one, which he intended to treat, as was said.

Next it is inquired concerning this which he says: "The nature of human intelligence does not grasp the ratio of this saying," etc.

For this seems false: because above, similars, a vestige, and an image were given to represent this.

To this it must be said that no similar represents it sufficiently, and this is what Hilary intends.

Articulus 9 — Whether The Son Adds Anything Beyond That Which He Received From The Father

Whether the Son adds anything upon that which He received from the Father?

Next it is inquired concerning this which he says: "For if He received a part of the same one who begot, then neither is perfect," etc.

For this seems false. Because either the Son adds something upon that which He receives from the Father, or nothing. If He adds something, the Father does not have the whole of what the Son has, which is heretical. If He adds nothing, then either He has the whole and the same, or He does not have the whole, but something else. If in the first mode, then the Father and the Son are in whole the same, which is false, since it was denied above that they are even the same God. But if He does not receive the whole but something else, then He is not equal and the same in essence with the Father, which again is absurd. Therefore it seems that that speech which is said here is false.

If by chance you say that the Son adds a property which is not a "something" [aliquid], but a "towards something" [ad aliquid]. On the contrary: If the Son adds that, He adds it only to that which He receives from the Father; but He receives the essence. Therefore He adds it to the essence; therefore the property determines the essence, which is false: because thus the divine essence of the Son would not be the essence of the Father, just as the person of the Son is not the person of the Father. Therefore it seems that He adds neither a "something" nor a "towards something," and thus remains utterly the same.

Solution. It must be said that the Son adds nothing at all to that which He receives from the Father. Nor nevertheless does it follow that the Son is simply the same as the Father; but it follows that the Son in what is received is the same as the Father, and this is absolutely true.

But if you ask, In what then are the Father and the Son distinguished?

It must be said, in the fact that the one is receiving through generation, whereas the other is giving. And these things do not distinguish the received thing from him from whom He receives, but rather the receiver from the giver. And therefore it is clear that because He receives as much as He is, therefore it follows that the receiver and the giver are equal. But because that one is giving, this one receiving, therefore it follows that they are not the same, but one and another; and through this the solution is clear.

Articulus 10 — Whether Everything That Is Born Is Born From A Double Kind, Namely Male And Female

Whether everything that is born is born from a double gender, namely male and female?

Next it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, "Not through a double conjunction of agreeing genders," etc.

For not everything that is generated, is generated engrafted-ly [insitive] or through a double conjunction of agreeing genders.

And to this it must be said that Hilary is speaking here of the generation of a living thing, as is clear in the text itself. But a living thing is either sensitive or vegetative. In the sensitive, however, in every such thing that is perfect, that is, which has from itself to produce another such as itself is, it is necessary that there be a double commixed gender, namely male and female. Because in every animal, as the Philosopher says, there is male and female, except in the eel, in which male and female has never appeared: and therefore fishermen also say that eels are generated from the superfluity of other fishes. Certain ones are also imperfect, which cannot produce another such as they themselves are, such as those which are born from putrefaction. But a vegetative living thing grows strong through an engrafting virtue, that is, through a force engrafted into it: and therefore one plant is engrafted into another, because as the Philosopher says, a plant everywhere impregnates and is impregnated; and Hilary removes these two modes here in the divine generation, in which a living thing is born into a living thing.

Articulus 11 — Whence It Happens That Something Degenerates, And What Its Causes Are

From whence does it happen that something degenerates, and what are the causes of it?

Next it is inquired concerning this which he says: "While nativity does not degenerate the nature of God," etc.

For in what does nature degenerate?

And to this it must be said that it degenerates for many causes. One and the chief of which is that generation is from the superfluity of nourishment, in which the formative virtue is originated from the generative virtue which is in the father, as was noted above. And therefore our generation, which is from the assumption of nourishment, is useful in the assumption of what is alien, and thus it becomes degenerate, which does not apply to the divine. Similarly also, the same thing in heaven does not move toward the generation of all things: because heaven in its constellation does not hold itself in the same mode, but by continuously mutating the site and proportions of aspects, it moves otherwise and otherwise. A third is that matter is not mobile and commiscible in the same mode. And all these things he intends to remove from divine generation. But how ours is new and receiving a new thing, has been set forth above.

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"But let us now return to the proposition," etc. Here he begins to show the equality of magnitude of the three persons through the removal of the ratio of part, of genus, of species, of matter, and of compounding from the divine things; and he does this in the first part of this part. In the second, he objects against it, there, N, "To these things it seems to be opposed," etc. In the third, he solves it, there, O, "But these things, which are said here," etc.

With respect to the first five, there are five chapters in the first part. And the first of them is that the divine essence is not said of the persons as an integral whole whose constituent parts are the persons.

Articulus 12 — Whether The Essence Is Predicated Of The Persons As A Certain Whole

Whether the essence is predicated of the persons as a certain whole?

And about this there happens here a doubt. First, whether the essence is predicated of the persons as a certain whole?

But it seems that it is: § 1. For the divine essence is predicated of the three and of each of them singly. Therefore it seems that it is a whole to them, and the persons are parts.

§ 2. Also, whatever is removed from something and does not differ from it in genus or species or number, seems to be a part of it. But any person is removed from the Trinity, not differing from it in genus, or species, or number: therefore any of the persons is a part of the Trinity.

§ 3. Also, two are more than one. Therefore they are a whole to one; and similarly three to two and to one. Therefore it seems that they are a whole to two and to one: and thus it seems that one person is a part of the Trinity, and similarly two.

§ 4. Also, in the Letter the "whole essence," the "whole Trinity" is often said. Therefore it seems that it is a whole, and thus in divine things there is the ratio of a part and the ratio of a whole.

§ 5. Also, let it be given that the Father is the whole deity and the whole God. Then either the Son is that same thing, or another. Not another: therefore the same. But whatever things are utterly the same according to reality as one and the same thing, they themselves are the same according to reality. But the Father and the Son are the same according to reality to one and the same deity or essence. Therefore they themselves are the same according to reality. But whatever things or persons are the same according to reality are distinguished by no reality. Therefore the Father and the Son are distinguished by no reality. And the heresy of Sabellius comes upon us, who posited the Trinity in names alone. Therefore it seems that the Father is not the whole divine essence: therefore He is a part.

§ 6. Also, by another way it seems to be proved that whole and part are in the Trinity: for in no nature is it such that a thing of nature is made from nature alone. For if nature alone made a thing of nature, since it has itself in one mode, it would make a thing of nature in only one mode. But this is false even in divine things, because the things of the divine nature are three. Therefore it seems that the nature is in a person with something else. Therefore the nature seems to be an essential part of the person.

§ 7. Also, Boethius: Everything that is participates in "to be" so that it may be, and it participates in some other thing so that it may be "this." But the Father is "this." Therefore He participates in two things, namely in "to be" so that He may be, and in paternity so that He

may be this or that one. And thus again it returns that an essential part of the Father or of another person is the divine essence.

§ 8. Also, this seems so, because we have very often had it that Augustine says that the Father is not by that by which He is the Father: because He is the essence, and by paternity He is the Father. Therefore the essence seems to be an essential part of the Father.

Solution. It must be said that no ratio of a whole and no ratio of a part is in divine things. And this is so because every whole is composed of its parts, and I say this if it is truly a whole. But a part is imperfect in relation to its whole. And neither of these applies to divine things: because simplicity is repugnant to the first, and perfection is repugnant to the second.

Therefore it must be said to the first that the divine essence is predicated convertibly of a person. For this is true: "The Father is the divine essence," and "The divine essence is the Father." But if it is objected thus: "The Father is whatever is the divine essence," it is still true. And if one proceeds further, "The divine essence is the Son: therefore the Father is the Son," it is clear enough that the "what" is mutated into a "towards something" (relative). Whence the argument does not follow. Whence whatever is the divine essence is the Father, and conversely. But if this argument is made concerning this name, "Trinity," thus: "The Father is something [aliquid] of the Trinity, and not the whole Trinity: therefore He is a part of the Trinity." It must be said that this is false: "The Father is something [aliquid] of the Trinity"; because the word aliquid notes a partition. But if it is proposed thus: "The Father is someone [aliquis] of the Trinity," then it is true. If afterwards one proceeds further thus: "He is someone of the Trinity, and not the whole Trinity: therefore He is a part of the Trinity," it is already solved above. Because that the Father is not the whole Trinity, this is not impeded by the unity of the Trinity, but by the plurality of the persons signified in this name, "Trinity". Whence from this it does not follow that the Father is a part: but it follows that the Father is not as many as the three united together in one essence are, as we said above.

To the next, it must be said that this proposition, "Whatever is removed from something," etc., is understood thus, that that thing be in it as having act-being in it and not in itself: like a foot in Socrates, or another part in its whole. But the persons do not have themselves thus in the Trinity: because in the Trinity they do not have being in potency. Nor is the Trinity in them as a whole in its parts. But rather the persons are signified in this name, "Trinity," as taken together: and therefore any one taken per se is removed from the Trinity, and the Trinity from it. And the cause of this has already been said.

To the next, it must be said that this is true, that two are more than one: and thus I well concede that two persons in the number which the relations make, are more than one. But nevertheless one is not a part of two, nor is that unity a part of any binary. And this is clear thus: In inferior things there is the substantial form of each thing, whose act is to bound the thing in itself and to separate it from others in which the same form in number is not present through act. Therefore the act of that form, namely to bound in itself and to divide from others, makes the thing itself to be one, and is its unity. And therefore, because those unities which are in two things and follow from substantial forms are not one, nor unum, therefore it

follows that the unity of this one and the unity of that one, aggregated, make a binary, and three a ternary, and so on, according as the Philosopher says that we know number by the division of a continuous whole. In divine things, however, the essence does not divide, but rather unites the persons. And therefore the unity of a person as a person is not the essence, but a notion or relation distinguishes in divine things, and this notion or that notion makes the unity of a person; for it makes the person to in-exist and be distinct from another. And therefore this person and that person are two persons in the number of notions. But because a notion does not divide a person from a person essentially, therefore it does not simply make a plurality. Therefore it neither simply makes a binary. Whence although there are two persons in divine things, there is nevertheless not a binary: and although there is a plurality of persons there, there is nevertheless not a multitude. And therefore I do not think it should be conceded that one in divine things is a part of two, even a discrete part, as unity is a part of a binary or a ternary. But I well concede that one person is not as many as two or three, and two are not as many as three, nor as few as one: because the number which a notion makes in divine things is not simply a number: and this will be more fully determined below.

To the next, it must be said that the holy ones call a whole the same as what is perfect: just as the Philosopher says in Physics III: "I say whole and perfect are the same."

To the next, it must be said that the Father is the whole deity and the whole God, and the Son similarly. But what is subjoined afterwards, "Whatever things are the same to one and the same," etc., it must be understood that this is true according as they are the same to it. But there is no predication or comparison of the persons to the essence there except in the ratio of the absolute concerning the absolute. For whatever is compared to the essence in divine things is compared as absolute to absolute. For a relative is not to another except to that to which it is opposed, and therefore compared to the essence it is not to another. Whence from that proposition it does not follow that the Father and the Son are the same, but that in all absolute things they are the same, and in those in which they are referred to one another, they have a distinction.

To the next, it must be said that the divine essence is not a part of the Father, nor as he says, of another person: and it is true that the essence has nothing added to itself in the Father by which it constitutes a person. Because it has already been said that nothing is compared to the essence in divine things except with respect to absolute identity on account of its ultimate simplicity. But although paternity does not differ in reality from the essence in the Father, nevertheless it differs in the mode of signifying: which, although in comparison to the essence it is a mode and not a reality, is nevertheless a reality in comparison to the opposed person. And therefore the persons do not differ only in the mode of names. But if on both sides it were a mode, namely on the part of the essence and on the part of the person, then the persons would differ only by a difference of names, as Sabellius said.

To the next, it must be said that even according to the Philosophers, the First participates in nothing except being, and neither does it participate in that so as to take a part of it, as was disputed above. But for someone to be a father, it suffices to have something differing from

being in the mode of signifying, which mode is a reality not connumerable to the essence, but in comparison to another person which is a reality of the same nature.

To the next, it must be said that Augustine intends that He is not by that by which He is the Father, and He is the Father according to the mode of signifying which is a respective reality, although it is not a reality diverse from the nature.

Articulus 13 — Whether Faith Precedes The Intellect, Such That Nothing Is Understood Unless It Is First Believed

Whether faith precedes intellect, so that nothing is understood unless it is first believed?

Whether faith precedes understanding, such that nothing is understood unless it is first believed?

Next, it is asked concerning what is said in this chapter G, "Let him pray that he may understand what he believes," etc.

For from this it seems to follow that faith precedes understanding.

But on the contrary: Because Augustine says that to believe is to think with assent; but assent is only of one who understands to whom assent is to be given: therefore understanding is before faith.

They commonly resolve this by saying that there is understanding that something is, and this understanding precedes faith; and there is understanding what a thing is, or how it is, and this follows faith.

You will find another solution noted above.

Articulus 14 — Whether In The Divine There Is A Communicable Notion Or An Incommunicable One

Whether in the divine there is a communicable or incommunicable nature?

Next, inquiry is made concerning the second part, where from the divine it removes the predication of genus, there, H, here it must be added, that there is such equality, etc.

And two questions are asked here: the first of which is, Whether in the divine there is a communicable and incommunicable nature?

The second, however, Whether in the divine there is a universal and particular nature?

Concerning the first, it proceeds thus: 1. In whatever there is a uniting one, and another distinguishing in one nature, in these there is a communicable and incommunicable nature: in the divine there is a uniting of persons in one nature, because of essence: and in the divine

there is a distinguishing of one person from another, because of property: therefore in the divine there is a communicable and incommunicable nature.

1. Likewise, In the divine there is that which is predicated of each hypostasis, and is that which is predicated of another: therefore in the divine there is communicable and incommunicable.
2. Likewise, Damascene says, that in the divine the common is considered in reality, but by reason that which is divided: therefore there is communicable and incommunicable.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Communicable and incommunicable are either caused by the same principle of essence, or by different ones. If by the same: therefore the same is the principle of community, and of singularity or distinction: but whatever is the principle of distinction, is opposed to community: therefore the same is the principle of community, and opposed to community, which is not intelligible: therefore they are caused by different ones. But to whatever different things belong, that is composite: therefore God is something composite: and thus it follows, that He is not the first being, nor supremely simple, which is false: therefore in Him there is not communicable and incommunicable.

1. Likewise, Communicable says that which one can be in many, incommunicable however that which cannot be in one alone: therefore these in the divine are the same, the same in number is in many, and is not in many at the same time and once: therefore contradictories are verified of the same. But if they are different, and are in one: then that one is composite in the divine, which is absurd: and this even the infidel Ethnics say.

Solution. It must be said, that in the divine there is communicable and incommunicable, or to speak more properly, common and proper: but they differ in the divine, and in humans or in created things: because in created things one is in many by reason of non-being, and the proper is constituted by individuating matter. In the divine, however, the common is in reality and being: because the same thing in number and being which is in the Father, is also in the Son and Holy Spirit: the proper however or distinct is not nature, but the property constituting, or existing hypostasis, which is distinguished by relation (otherwise, revelation).

To the first, therefore, it must be said, that the principle of communicability in the divine if we wish to force the power, there is none: because the divine essence is its own community. But if we take it according to the reason of understanding, then the principle of community is the common nature, and the principle of incommunicability is the personal property or relation: and the property is the divine nature in reality, but differs from it in the mode of signifying. And if you ask, Whether that mode can be placed in reality? I say, that in comparison to the essence it is only a mode, but in comparison to another person it is a thing distinguishing person from person: and this is not inconvenient. But if an example of this is sought in lower things, it must be said, that it cannot be found because of the excessive simplicity of God: just as in lower things it is not found, that the same is essentially substance, and goodness, and wisdom: but yet in God even the Philosophers have proven this to be so: and

therefore the ancient Masters say, that although the essence is the same as the notion, yet the notion is not supposed by the essence, nor conversely.

To the other it must be said in the same way, that the common is in many, and the proper in one alone, if it is truly proper: and these indeed do not differ in reality in God because of simplicity, but yet they differ in act and supposition and mode of signifying: and the cause of this was noted above, because they do not have this by their own grace, that they are the same, but from that in which they are: and therefore they do not lose from this that which they properly have to effect, namely to agree with many, or with one alone.

Articulus 15 — Whether In The Divine There Is The Universal And The Particular, As The Communicable And The Incommunicable

Whether in divine things there is the universal and the particular, as the communicable and the incommunicable?

Secondly, it is asked, Whether in divine things there is the universal and the particular?

And it seems that there is.

1. For that which is predicated of many is universal: but essence and God in divine things are predicated of many: therefore it is universal.

1. Likewise, the universal is everywhere and always, as Aristotle says, that is, in every particular of its own, and always following it: thus the divine essence is in each person, and always follows the person: therefore it is predicated of the person as universal.
2. Likewise, the universal is that which is in many and of many: essence is of many and in many: therefore it is universal.

If perhaps you say, that it is being in many not divided from them: because it is in each of them through the being of that in which it is. Yet it seems to fit according to this reasoning even more to superiors than to inferiors: because the divine essence is in persons not divided from them, and is in individuals through the being of persons, for it does not have distinct being from persons: and it is also of many, because it is predicated of them: therefore it seems that it is in the notion of universal and the person in the notion of particular.

Likewise, it is already conceded, that the common and communicable is in divine things: but everything communicable causes the notion of universal: therefore the universal is in divine things, as it seems.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:

1. Boethius says, that in divine things there is not the universal and the particular: therefore in God the essence is not universal.

1. Likewise, if in God there were the universal and the particular, since they say two things to be that in which they are, namely what is, and by which it is, it would seem that in God what is, and by which it is, differ, and thus he would be composite.

2. Likewise, if there is in God the universal, either genus, or species, or difference, or property, or accident. But genus and species are proven here in the Letter not to be in God. Concerning the others, it is also evident by themselves: because they are predicated in what sort: but essence is predicated of the person in what: therefore it is not universal in divine things.

But if this be conceded, it is asked, Why in divine things it is conceded to be communicable, and not universal and particular, since those two seem to be the same in these two?

Solution. It must be said, that in divine things, as the ultimate reasons prove, there is not the universal and the particular: and the cause is touched upon in objecting.

TO THE FIRST, therefore, it must be said, that persons are not simply many, as is clear from what was said before. But the universal requires a multitude in act or potency which is simply multitude, and thus essence is not predicated of persons as of many.

To the other, it must be said, that essence is not thus compared to persons according to being everywhere and always, as the universal to the particular: because the universal is compared to the particular which is under it, adding to it something which is not itself, by which it is made particular, and this the person does not do.

To the other, it must be said, that essence indeed is in persons and is predicated of them: but it is not predicated of them, nor is it in them as of many and in many: because persons are not absolutely many.

To the other, it must be said, that communicable is said in two ways, namely according to the community of thing and being, and this cannot be of one nature in those which are simply many: and this communicability is in divine things and does not cause the universal. There is another community not of being, but of reason, according to the intention of the thing abstracting from this and from that: and this community is of those which are simply many, in which there is one nature by reason, and this causes the notion of universal and particular: hence this is not in divine things.

And through this the solution to what was lastly asked is clear.

Articulus 16 — Whether In The Divine The Essence Is A Genus

Whether in divine things essence is a genus?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says,

there, "If essence is a genus, the species however is person," etc.

For it seems not to hold: because
1. Many species are predicated of one alone, like the sun and the moon.

1. Furthermore, we have often above in the words of Hilary, that he called essence a genus: therefore it seems that it itself is a genus.

Solution. Augustine here speaks of those universals which have many supposits: and concerning those, it does not have an instance,
when the form is multiplied according to the multiplication of supposits according to being:
but the divine nature has many supposits, and yet according to being it is not multiplied in them.

To the other it must be said, that the manner of speaking of Hilary, that he calls nature a genus, is not that it is matter, or the first subject, or the principle of generation: but because it generally agrees with persons not as a universal, but as the same and common according to thing and being, as was said before.

Articulus 17 — Whether The Three Persons Differ Numerically In The Divine

Whether the three persons differ in number in the divine?

Then the part is to be taken in which he solves the objections to the contrary, which begins there, O,

These things, however, which are said here, etc.

For there the question arises, Whether the three persons differ in number?

It seems that they do.

1. For those things differ in number which are not joined to each other in number: but the three persons are not joined to each other in number, but rather are distinguished from each other; therefore the three persons differ in number.
2. Likewise, Damascene says that difference is the cause of number: but the three persons differ: therefore number is caused in them: therefore they differ in number.
3. Likewise, Either they differ in number, or in genus, or in species, or they do not differ at all: but not in genus or species, as has been proven: therefore it remains that either they differ in number, or they do not differ at all: but they do not not differ at all, because this would be the error of Sabellius: therefore it remains that they differ in number.
4. Likewise, To whatever it is fitting to be distinguished from each other, to those it is fitting to be numbered: but it is fitting for the divine persons to be distinguished: therefore it is fitting for them to be numbered. Thus: To whatever it is fitting to be numbered, those differ in number: it is fitting for the divine persons to be numbered: therefore they differ in number.
5. Likewise, To whatever the number by which we count is applicable, those differ in number: the number by which we count is applicable to the divine persons: therefore they differ in number. Proof of the minor. For we say, one person, two persons, three persons: but one, two, three, are the number by which we count.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:

1. Isidore in the book of Etymologies says that number is called as if the nod of the member, that is, of division: but in the divine there is no division: therefore there is no nod of division there: therefore there is no number there: therefore neither do they differ in number.
2. Likewise, the Philosopher: In those not having matter there is no number, except according to cause and caused: but in the divine persons there is no cause and caused, nor matter: therefore there is no number there: therefore the three persons do not differ in number.
3. Likewise, the Philosopher says that we know number by the division of the continuous. But in the divine there is no such division: therefore there is no number there.
4. Likewise, Whatever differ in number, are simply many: but the divine persons are not simply many, as has been proven above: therefore the divine persons do not differ in number.
5. Likewise, If Socrates is musical, white, and a lyre-player, from this he is not said to be many in number, but rather one in number having many properties: therefore similarly, since the three persons are one God in number, distinguished however by the properties which are in the divine persons, they ought not to be said to differ in number.

Solution. It must be said that the three persons do not differ in number which is simply number, but they differ in the number of relations or in the number of persons: and this is not simply to differ in number: because, as we said above, the form dividing as dividing is the cause of number, and therefore the substantial form itself by cause speaking is the unity of the thing. I say, however, substantial form, because accidental form does not divide: which is evident from this because many can be in the same without division of the subject: but many substantial forms cannot be in the same: which is thus proven: Substantial form is said, because it makes the substance in act in being and reason: in act and reason being is to be through its own species and nature: but in nature there is only one being of one thing, and one thing which has one being: therefore, since each thing is only one, as Boethius says, each thing has only one being: therefore only one substantial form which gives that being.

And if you object about the form of the subordinate genus and up to the most general in species, it is a ridiculous objection: because it is determined in another science that all those are in potency to the last which is act. Therefore, this substantial form, because its first act is to terminate being in this of which it is the necessary form, consequently divides from others, and thus causes the unity which is the principle of number, by which this aggregate with another is found to differ by its own unity from another, and thus to differ in number. But now it has been shown above on this same distinction that such division and termination is not in the divine persons: therefore there will not be simply number there: but a certain number of persons, namely which is according to the distinction of relations, by which the persons are referred to each other.

Therefore, the solution of Damascene brought forward in the text is sufficiently fitting,

But to what was first objected, it must be said that from that it is obtained that the three persons simply differ in number, but that they are distinguished in such a way that they are not joined to each other: and this is in the number of persons or properties, and not simply: and these are not properly said to differ, because to differ is the act of difference: but they can be said to be distinguished, because distinction says less than to differ, and suffices for it the act of relation.

To the other it must be said that difference is the cause of number: but it must not be conceded that by any difference the three persons differ: but rather they are distinguished by properties.

To the third it must be said that the three persons differ in none of those ways: for that division has place in those which are divided from each other according to essence: but they are distinguished in the number of persons, as has been said: and therefore it does not follow that the persons are entirely the same.

To the other it must be said that this proposition is false, To whatever it is fitting to be distinguished from each other, etc., because to be distinguished says less than to differ: and therefore by what they are distinguished, they are not numbered except in a certain respect.

To the other it must be said that the number by which we count is abstracted from the numbered: and where the numbered are simply divided from each other by their essences, there the abstract number has complete distinction: but such a number is not applied to persons, but rather the number of properties or relations, because that alone is fitting for persons: and therefore the number by which we count is said primarily and secondarily, of the number of persons and the number of creatures, and is found primarily in lower things, but secondarily in persons.

Articulus 18 — Whether It Can Be Conceded That God Is Threefold

Can it be conceded that God is triplex?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says in the last part, in which he repeats to add in that chapter T, Furthermore, since God is said to be trinus, yet he ought not to be said triplex.

1. Against this, it seems to be what Isidore says, that God is multiplex.
2. Likewise, in Wisdom 7:22, it is said the Spirit is multiplex.

Likewise, God is signified in many ways in attributes.

1. Furthermore, why is it not conceded that God is triplex? For triplex can be where there is unity: for one cloth can be triplex: therefore, that does not seem to be the cause which is touched upon in the Letter.

To this, it is easy to respond: because triplex indicates multiplication by the excess of parts three times, and this in discrete things: in continuous things, it indicates the folding of part over part three times: and neither of these is fitting to the divine.

To the first objection, it must be said that Isidore spoke most improperly, and he calls multiplex or triplex the same as trinus.

To the second, it must be said that those refer to the Spirit in effects which are multiplex.

And if you object: therefore, with respect to effect, it can also be said triplex. It must be said that it cannot: because thus limitation would be posited to its effects, which cannot be placed in any determined number, due to the excessive largeness and goodness of the Spirit.

To the other, it must be said that the cause is good: because truly one is, as Boethius says, in which there is no number, and it is not this, and this: and this is because it is truly simple, and to this such a trinity cannot be fitting.

Articulus 19 — Whether In Corporeal Things One Can Be As Much As Three

Whether in corporeal things there can be one as much as three?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said in the last chapter U: In corporeal things, there is not as much one as three together, etc.

Against this, indeed, some bring an instance concerning light, which is with air in the same place without increasing: and concerning fire which is with glowing iron in the same place without increasing: therefore, there are as much two as three, or two as one.

To dispute about this is not of the present business: but here it suffices, that this is neither held from authority, that light is a body: nor is it true, that in glowing iron there is another body than the iron itself: whence both instances are absolutely false: and this would be easy to prove, if this were the intention here.

DISTINCTIO XX

Divisio Textus

Now it remains to show how some of the persons, etc.

In this distinction, the Master shows the equality of the three persons in divine power, which is substantial. And it is divided into three parts: in the first of which, containing two chapters, namely A and B, he shows through authorities that the persons are equal.

In the second, containing four chapters, against the heretic he shows in four ways that the Son is equal to the Father. And the first proof is from the reason of generation; because the begetter and the begotten are equal by the power of nature. The second is in the second chapter, namely D, through the authority of John 16:15: "All things whatsoever the Father has,

are mine." The third is in the third, namely KE, through reason, that otherwise he would have been impotent or envious. The fourth is in the fourth, namely F, through human likeness.

In the third part, he responds to the objections of the heretic in the last part of this distinction, there, G, "But perhaps you say, by that very thing," etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether Power According To Every Kind Of Cause Is In God, Or Only According To Some Kind

Whether power according to every kind of cause is in God, or according to some kind only?

Whether power according to every kind of cause is in God, or according to some kind only?

Here, however, before the Letter, three doubtful points arise, the first of which is, Whether power according to every kind of cause is in God, or according to some kind only?

The second is, Whether the power of one reason is to the power of creating and the procession of persons?

The third is, Whether that power has an order according to the reason of intelligence, and which of them is prior?

1. It seems, however, that all power is in God, by this that all power is of nobility: therefore every kind of power ought to be attributed to Him.
2. Likewise, it is established that He is efficient: but three coincide in one, as the Philosopher says: therefore He is also formal and final: therefore the power of formal and final cause is in Him: and this is commonly said, whence also the verse is said:

Efficient cause is God, formal idea,
Final goodness, material hyle.

1. Likewise, it is said in Apocalypse 22:13, that He is Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end, but the end and form are the same.

But concerning the power of material cause, it seems it can be proven thus, and it is an objection of a certain Greek Alexander, and David of Dinant, a Latin:

1. Whatever things are, and in no way differ, are the same: God and prime matter are, and in no way differ: therefore they are the same. Proof of the minor (because the first is established): Things that are entirely simple have no difference: because what has difference is composite: but God and prime matter are simple: therefore they have no difference: therefore they are the same: therefore God is the material power of all, just as efficient and other causes.
2. Likewise, God abstracts from every being that is drawn into a part of being: but every actual being is drawn and determined into a part of being: therefore He abstracts from every actual being: therefore only being in potentiality remains: therefore being in

potentiality is the first. But the first is that before which nothing can be understood: but that first before which nothing can be understood is God: therefore being in potentiality and God are the same: but being first in potentiality posits prime matter: therefore God and matter are the same.

3. Likewise, whatever must be presupposed before every becoming, and after every corruption, is without beginning and end: material power must be presupposed before every becoming, and after every corruption: therefore material power is without beginning and end. The first is evident by itself. The second is proven by this that in every becoming something must be presupposed as a subject, and after every corruption it is necessary to leave that into which things that are corrupted are corrupted, and this is material power: therefore it is without beginning and end: and nothing is without beginning and end except God: therefore in God is material power just as the power of other causes.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
1. The Philosopher says that the efficient is never made: therefore universally the efficient is not universally made; universally the efficient is God, because He acts whatever is made: but universally made is matter: therefore God and matter or material power are not the same.

1. Likewise, the Philosopher: The first rules things except that it is mixed with them: but matter is mixed with all: therefore matter is not God, nor is material power divine power.
2. Likewise, nothing is so imperfect as that which is perfected by all things coming to it; prime matter is perfected by all things coming to it: therefore it is most imperfect.

Likewise, nothing is so perfect as that which gives to all and receives nothing: the first efficient gives to all and receives nothing: therefore God is most perfect. Hence thus: The most perfect and the most imperfect are most distant: God is supremely perfect, prime matter supremely imperfect according to nature: therefore they are most distant and different.

Solution. It must be said that in God is the power of universally efficient cause and the substance of matter, and forms in it. In nature, however, there is no power of effecting except form, and similarly in art. But the power of formal cause is understood in two ways: for it is an intrinsic form giving being, and existing as part of that to which it gives: and this is not God. It is also formal externally, and the formal exemplar is to the exemplified, as a wooden shoe is to a shoe: and thus God is a formal cause by idea. But the final power is He Himself: because for Him all things are, are made, and stand, they seek Him as they can. But the power of material cause in no way, as necessarily proven, agrees with Him.

To what is objected, it must be said that many things differ which differ by themselves, and it is an instance to the argument, man and donkey differ rational and irrational: but rational and irrational differ not by a difference which they include as part of themselves, but by themselves, otherwise it would be necessary to proceed to infinity in differences.

To the second, it must be said that uncreated being is not abstracted from being as simpler from less simple. And this was proven above: but it is abstracted as a common proportion which is truly and properly in God and simply, but in creature received and concreted with relations. Similarly, being in potentiality is not posited by being which is the first formal principle of being: which is evident from this that being which is first in the abstracting intellect is divided by potentiality and act. Hence even if the first reason would not impede, yet it is falsely supposed in the objection.

To the other, it must be said that matter is not presupposed before every becoming, unless becoming is strictly taken for motion, or change which is with motion. But if becoming is taken generally for being created, matter is not presupposed: for that becoming, since it only says now first to exist created before which nothing was of the created, does not require a subject: and by that becoming matter is brought into being. Similarly, although matter will never have an end, yet it could fall into nothing, if the hand of the Omnipotent did not sustain it.

Articulus 2 — Whether The Power Of Operating In The Divine Is Univocal With The Power Of Generating And Spirating

Whether the power of operating in God is univocal with the power of generating and spirating?

Secondly, it is asked, whether the power of operating in God is univocal with the power of generating and spirating?

It seems that it is so: because both are in God: and what are in God, are of one simple nature, therefore of one reason according to nature: therefore the power of operating, and that by which the persons proceed, are univocally in God.

§ 1. But on the contrary. Power is defined through act, and the acts are not of one ratio [i.e., conceptually the same]: therefore, neither are the powers.

§ 2. Solution. This was determined above, namely that power considered in the root of power, which is the essence, is of one ratio: but considered as it is conjoined to an act, it is of another ratio.

Articulus 3 — Whether In God The Power Of Spirating Is Prior To The Power Of Operating

Whether in God the power of spirating is prior to the power of operating?

§ 3. But then thirdly it is asked: Which is prior in God?

§ 4. It seems that it is the power of operating: because that is essential, and the essence, according to the order of reason, is prior to the person: therefore the essential power is prior to the personal power.

§ 5. But on the contrary: Anselm says that the procession of the persons is the cause of the procession of creatures: as is also evident in that verse: He spoke, and they were made; he com-

manded, and they were created and in the other, By the Word of the Lord the heavens were established, etc. . Expounding which, Augustine says: He begot the Word in whom it was [ordained] that it should be made since therefore the cause is prior to the caused, it seems that the power by which the persons proceed is prior to the power of creating and operating. The same is drawn from John 1:3: All things were made through him: therefore it is necessary to presuppose the Word and the power of the procession of the Word to all things.

§ 6. Solution. To this it must be solved in the same way as immediately before, that power is considered in two ways, namely, according to the root in which it is: and thus the power of begetting, spirating, and creating is one and the same: but the power of begetting and spirating is for one thing in the Father, and for another in the Son and the Holy Spirit, as was said above: yet it is one and the same in the three persons. But if it is considered as determined to an act, thus it is one power and another [i.e., distinct powers]: and the power of begetting and spirating, according to the order of understanding, is prior to the power of creating, as was proven in the objection: and through this the solution to the whole is evident.

Articulus 4 — Whether The Holy Spirit Alone Can As Much As The Father And The Son

Whether only the Holy Spirit can do as much as the Father and the Son?

§ 7. Next, it is asked concerning that which he says in the Letter in the first part, where he says that neither can the Father and the Son together do more than the Holy Spirit alone.

§ 8. For if only the Holy Spirit can do as much as the Father and the Son: then the Father cannot do as much as the Father and the Son, which is false.

§ 9. To this it must be said that this proposition is twofold, only the Holy Spirit can do as much as the Father and the Son: by reason of the fact that the exclusive diction, namely the word solus [alone/only], can stand in the subject, and thus the statement is true under this sense: only the Holy Spirit, etc., that is, he who alone is the Holy Spirit, such that another is not the Holy Spirit, can do as much, etc. But if it stands around the subject in comparison to the predicate, hence it excludes the other persons from the participation of the predicate, and thus it is false, and in this way proceeds the objection made to the contrary.

Articulus 5 — Whether The Father, The Son, And The Holy Spirit Are Equal In Power

Whether the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are equal in power?

§ 10. Next, it is asked concerning that which he says in the second part, there, B, Whether the Powerful could generate or beget the powerful, and the omnipotent not [beget] the omnipotent.

§ 11. For it seems that the reasoning of the heretic holds: 1. For either to be able to beget the Son is to be able to do something, or not. If not: then Augustine's reasoning made against the heretic does not hold, when he says, Either he could beget an equal, and would not: or he would, and could not: or he could, but would not. If he would, and could not, therefore he was impotent: for if to be able to beget is not to be able to do something, if the Father could not do this, it does not follow that he was impotent: but this does follow, as he says below:

therefore to be able to beget is to be able to do something: and this the Son cannot do: therefore the Father can do what the Son cannot do, and thus they are not equal in power.

§ 12. 2. Also, there is having from oneself essentially and personally: and there is having from another essentially and personally: and two middle ways, namely having from another personally and not essentially: and having from another essentially and not personally. But that last mode cannot exist, since whatever essence is from another, all its persons are from another: but I see that not to have from another essentially and personally belongs to the highest po-

wer; to have from another personally and essentially belongs to impotence: therefore, to have from another personally and not essentially will be partly of power, and partly of impotence: and this belongs to the Son and to the Holy Spirit: therefore their powers are mixed with impotence, and thus they are not equally powerful with the Father: therefore they are not equal in power.

§ 13. 3. Also, the Father operates through the Son, and not conversely: therefore there is something according to power that the Father can do, which the Son cannot, nor the Holy Spirit: therefore they are not equal.

§ 14. 4. Also, nothing received from someone is equally powerful to the giver: but the power of the Son and of the Holy Spirit is received, while the Father's is giving: therefore it is not as nobly in the Son and in the Holy Spirit as in the Father.

§ 15. 5. Furthermore, power is attributed to the Father on account of something special, and not to the Son, nor to the Holy Spirit: therefore it seems that power belongs to him more according to something than to the other two.

§ 16. 6. Also, the notion of principle is a notion of power: but a principle not from a principle has a greater notion of principle than a principle from a principle, or than what is not a principle of a person, but [proceeds] from both principles: but [to be a] principle belongs to the Father: therefore the Father's power is not equal to the power of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and thus the objection of the heretic seems to proceed.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 17. 1. The begotten, unless the nature degenerates or the begetter is deficient, is produced into all things similar to the nature with the begetter: since therefore power is among the principal things of a nature, the Son is necessarily produced into a similar power with the Father.

§ 18. 2. Also, those whose nature is one and the same in number, of those there is one power of that nature: of the three persons there is one nature and the same in number: therefore their power or potency is one.

§ 19. 3. Also, whatever things are such that every work of theirs is indivisibly of all of them, the operating power is one in number: the three persons are thus in every work of theirs: therefore their power is one in number: therefore it is equal.

§ 20. 4. Also, let it be granted that the Father's is greater. On the contrary: the power of the Son and of the Holy Spirit is infinite, which can be evident in the act of creating; which by educing something from nothing (which are infinitely distant) is proven to be infinite: but the Son and the Holy Spirit create: but nothing is greater than the infinite: therefore the Father's power is not greater than the Son's power: and it was granted that it would be greater.

§ 21. Solution. It must be said that the three persons are entirely equal in power.

§ 22. And it must be said that to be able to beget the Son is to be able to do something [aliquid posse], and it is to be able to do towards something [ad aliquid posse], as was explained above. For if power is taken by comparison to that in which it is rooted, then it is to be able to do something, and it is one in the three persons, although not towards the same thing in all three. But if it is taken according to conjunction to the act, then it is not to be able to do something, but to be able to do towards something, and thus it belongs only to the Father. But the heretic denied that this belongs to the Son according to both modes at once: and therefore Augustine's reasoning proceeds, that this would belong to impotence, namely, not to have the fecund nature which is in the Father, because thus it is to be able to do something.

§ 23. To the next it must be said that to have from another personally, not essentially, is not a middle between those extremes: because those extremes are distant without proportion, and therefore they do not have a middle: but rather, to have from another personally and not essentially signifies the authority of a principle in one, and sub-authority in the other, and equality in what is had or that which is had by both.

§ 24. To the next it must be said that when it is said, "the Father operates through the Son," the preposition does not denote an instrumental cause, but only authority in the Father according to the notion of origin, and therefore they are equal in the work.

§ 25. To the next it must be said that that proposition is true in things receiving in a diversity of nature, such as a body from a spiritual nature, and an element from the heaven, and the like. But in those which are univocal agents and according to the same nature, even in creatures it is false, unless it is understood that with respect to this it is not equally noble: because the received, as it is received, is in potency, and afterwards becomes in act; and then it is false in God, because the Son is not receiving in potency and afterwards changed to act.

§ 26. To the next it must be said that power is attributed to the Father on account of the notion of principle, which is in him for the whole divinity: but a principle of itself posits power: yet a notion of principle of this sort does not make the Father more powerful, but the author, as has been said quite often.

§ 27. To the next it must be said that that notion of principle, although power is appropriated to it, nevertheless does not strictly signify power, but the property of origin: and therefore it does not take away equality in power from the Son and the Holy Spirit.

Articulus 6 — Whether God Willed But Could Not, Or Could But Did Not Will, To Make Creatures Better

Whether God willed, but could not: or could, but did not will to make creatures better?

Whether God willed, but could not: or could, but did not will to make creatures better?

§ 28. Next, it is asked concerning Augustine's progression which he posits, there, E, Either he could not, etc.

§ 29. For there seems to be an objection: because either he willed and could make me better: or he willed, but could not: or he could, and did not will. If in the first way: therefore I was made the best, and the same reasoning applies to any creature. If he willed, but could not: therefore he is impotent. If he could, and did not will: therefore he was envious.

§ 30. Solution. It must be said that an inferior nature cannot be equated to God, and is a work of his will, and not of his nature: but generation and procession are in the same essence: and therefore the Son and the Holy Spirit can participate in equality: whence it follows in that nature, and not in an inferior one.

§ 31. But if you object that according to this he ought to have made at least all creatures in the best possible way in that nobility of which they were perceptible. It must be said that it does not follow: because the inferior nature looks to its principle, which is the will and ordering wisdom: and therefore it goes forth in degrees competent to the beauty of the universe: but the superior nature is not subject to this, and therefore it is necessary that his emanations be according to equal persons.

Articulus 7 — Whether There Is Order In The Divine

Whether there is order in the divine [persons]?

Whether there is order in the divine [persons]?

§ 32. Next, it is asked concerning that which he says in the last chapter G, Of equality, however, of what sort and how great he is, etc.

§ 33. For this does not seem right: because of what sort [qualis] signifies similitude rather than equality: because, as was held in the preceding distinction, oneness in quality produces similitude.

§ 34. To this it must be said that in God there is only the quantity of virtue [i.e., power], and that is well rooted in that which according to the mode of signifying signifies quality: for Augustine says that in those things which are great not by bulk but by virtue, to be greater is the same as to be better.

§ 35. Next, it is asked concerning that which he says: Neither when the Son is said to be begotten by the Father, is inequality of substance shown, but the order of nature, etc.

§ 36. For from this it seems that there is order in the divine [persons]: which can also be proven by reason:

§ 37. 1. For a cause, in the order of nature, is prior to the caused: but Chrysostom says on the Epistle to the Hebrews, and Damascene, that the Father is the cause of the Son: therefore in the order of intelligence and nature he is prior to the Son.

§ 38. 2. Also, according to the order of understanding, a principle not from a principle is prior to a principle from a principle: therefore it seems that in the divine [persons] there is a prior and a posterior according to the intellect.

§ 39. 3. Also, when it is said, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are three persons: either there is an aggregation there without order, or with order. If without order: then there is a confused aggregation there, which is unfitting. But if with order: then there is a prior and a posterior person there: therefore a prior and a posterior.

§ 40. 4. Also, above we often held that the Holy Spirit is the third person in the Trinity: but it is not said of the Father that he is the third or the second person, but the first: therefore there is a first, second, third there: but these names are orderable: therefore there is an order there according to prior and posterior.

§ 41. But on the contrary: If there is a prior and posterior there, this will be according to some mode of priority. But it is established that priority in time or duration is not in the divine persons, nor priority in dignity: therefore there is priority in cause or in intellect there: but what is prior in nature and intelligence is simpler than what is posterior: therefore the Father would already be simpler than the Son, and the Son would add something to the Father, which is false, and a heresy. But if there were priority in nature there, in the same way in which what is prior in nature is prior in cause: then it follows (since the caused is of greater concretion or composition than the cause, or posterior to it) that the Son would be more composite than the Father or posterior in being, all of which is absurd: therefore there is no prior and posterior in the divine [persons]: therefore neither is there order, since every order signifies a prior and posterior.

§ 42. Furthermore, it is asked next to this, what the phrase order of nature signifies? Whether a person, or the substance, or a notion? If a person, then it would signify some person, and then the order of nature would be the same as the order of a person, which is not true, because it is not verified of any person in particular. If it signifies the substance, then the order of nature would be the same as the order of substance, which again is not true, because in the sub-
stance there is no order, nor is it ordered. But if it signifies a notion, then it would signify some [particular notion], and this again is unfitting, as is evident to one running through the individual notions. If you say that the word order does not signify order on the part of the things ordered, but signifies the notion of order. On the contrary: The notion of order is taken from the notion of prior and posterior: and there is no notion of prior and posterior in the divine [persons], as was proven: therefore there is no notion of order there. But if you say that the word order signifies the ordered things themselves, and the word nature signifies that in which the notion of order is attended to: this again does not seem right, because the divine

persons are one in nature and not ordered [within it]: therefore it seems that Augustine spoke most improperly.

§ 43. Solution. To this it must be said that in the divine [persons] there is order in some way, not a prior and posterior, just as this is supposed in the Letter: and the order is not order absolutely, but order in a qualified sense. For since order of itself signifies two things, namely distinction, and prior and posterior, here it is abstracted from the latter, namely from prior and posterior, and only distinction remains to it. But when of nature is added: since nature is, as the Philosopher says, that from which the sprouting thing sprouts, it is understood that one of the distinct [persons] is from the other, and not that one is prior to the other. Whence I say that the phrase order of nature is to be taken as if having the force of a single term, so that from the first part distinction is had, and from the second the notion of one existing from the other.

§ 44. To the first, therefore, it must be said that in the divine [persons] there is no cause: because a cause is that to whose being another follows: whence cause and caused posit a prior and posterior. But the Greeks use this noun, "cause," for that which we use "principle," which signifies less than a cause.

§ 45. To the next it must be said that a principle not from a principle is not prior to a principle from a principle, but simultaneous, as was proven above: because in a principle not from a principle, a principle from a principle is understood: nor does it ever precede even by the intellect. And the things that can be objected to the contrary were objected and solved in distinction IX above.

§ 46. To the next it must be said that there is no confused plurality in the divine [persons]: because there is an order of nature there, and not order absolutely: and therefore there is neither confusion there, nor prior nor posterior.

§ 47. To the next it must be said that the Church, when ordering the persons, pronounces one first and another afterwards, and this happens on account of the defect of our material intellect: and the Church refers the order of pronunciation to the order of nature, and not to a prior and posterior according to order absolutely.

§ 48. To that which is further asked, it must be said that the phrase order of nature supposes the essence not according as it is essence, but according as it is nature, that is, according as by its virtue there is the power of the procession of one person from another: for although the essence does not beget, yet the Father begets by virtue of the essence as it is a nature. It therefore draws the essence into a person not absolutely, but as it is a nature taken in the aforesaid way: and therefore the order of nature and the order of substance or essence are not the same because of their diverse mode of signifying.

§ 49. And through this the solution of all the things that were objected concerning this is also evident.

DISTINCTIO XXI

Divisio Textus

DIVISION OF THE TEXT,

§ 50. Here a question arises taking its origin from the aforesaid, etc. Here begins that part which is occasioned by the preceding: for since it was held that the three persons are distinct in the community of the essence, it seems that solitude cannot be multiplied concerning any one of them: and therefore in this part it is asked, How are exclusive dictions posited concerning the subject or predicate in the divine [persons], whether concerning the persons, or even concerning the essential terms?

§ 51. And this distinction is divided into three parts: in the first of which the Master touches upon how exclusive dictions are adjoined to a proposition having personal terms on both sides, as when it is said, the Father alone is the Father. In the second, however, he touches upon how they are adjoined to propositions having personal terms on one side, but essential terms on the other, such as the Father alone is God, or the Father is the only God, or the Trinity is the only God: and this begins there, B, After these things it is asked, Whether just as it is said, the Father alone is the Father, etc. In the third, however, he objects against what has been determined, and solves it, there, C, But again it is asked how we call the Trinity itself the only God, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether Exclusive Terms Can Be Posited In The Divine

Whether exclusive dictions can be posited in the divine [persons]?

§ 52. Now a question falls here before the Letter: Whether exclusive dictions can be posited in the divine [persons]?

§ 53. It seems that they cannot: 1. For above, in the words of Hilary, it is said that God is not to be confessed by us as solitary: therefore solitude is not fitting to the divine [persons]: since therefore exclusive dictions imply solitude concerning those things to which they are adjoined, it seems that those dictions are not competent to the divine [persons].

§ 54. 2. Also, above, in the words of Ambrose, it is said that the Father through the intellect is always in the Son, and the Son in the Father, and the Holy Spirit in both: if therefore a diction excluding the Son from the Father is appended to any of the persons, there will be an implication of a falsehood, and thus the statement will be false: but this is what an exclusive diction does: therefore it seems that those dictions are not competent in the divine [persons].

§ 55. 3. Also, an exclusive diction adjoined to something excludes other things which are not that thing: but every exclusion is with respect to something that is participated by that concerning which the exclusion is noted: but the Father has nothing which the Son and the Holy Spirit do not have: therefore it seems that a diction noting exclusion can never be posited concerning any of the persons in the divine [being].

§ 56. 4. Also, in the Letter Augustine says that this is true, the Father alone is the Father, and that solitude concerning the Father is not noted, but others are excluded from the fellowship of paternity. Let it be asked, therefore, Whether it can similarly be said, the Father is the only Father? And it seems that it can: because its expository [propositions] are true, namely, the Father is the Father, and no other than the Father is the Father: therefore the Father is the only Father. On the contrary: The Father is the only Father: therefore the Father is the Father alone: therefore he is not with the Son and the Holy Spirit, which is false.

§ 57. 5. Also, this is not true, not only the Father is the Father. Proof. The Father is the Father existing with the Son and with the Holy Spirit: therefore not only the Father is the Father: therefore its contradictory is false, namely this, the Father alone is the Father: which nevertheless Augustine concedes in the Letter.

§ 58. 6. Also. it is asked next to this, Whether

this is true, the Father is the Father? It seems that it is: because the Father is the Father, and is not anything other than the Father, for the essence is not anything other than the Father: therefore the Father is only the Father.

§ 59. But on the contrary: Augustine says that to be the Father is not to be God: therefore the Father is not God, which is false: therefore also this [is false], the Father is only the Father. And the same objection applies to this, the Son is only the Son: and to this, the Holy Spirit is only the Holy Spirit.

§ 60. Solution. It must be said that according to what Augustine and the Master imply here, an exclusive diction can be posited concerning divine things, and especially in the subject, and concerning the name of a person which is as it were singular in the divine [persons], such as Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit: for since according to Aristotle, "alone" is the same as "not with another": the phrase not with another signifies a privation of association: and therefore it does not properly apply to a term which in its supposition and signification imports association, as every common term does, such as man, donkey, and the like: whence one does not properly say alone donkey or alone man, unless first there is adjoined to the common term (which is to be the subject of this diction "alone") something that draws it away from the association of community which it imports, so that it might be said one single man: but it is properly adjoined to a singular diction, as when it is said Plato alone, or the Father alone: for the names of the determinate persons in the divine [being] have a certain similitude with proper names: and therefore an exclusive diction can be adjoined so that it is said, the Father alone or the Son alone. But then, concerning what pertains to the preceding chapter, if a personal predicate follows so that it is said, the Father alone is the Father, it must be said that the statement is threefold: and in two senses it is true, and in the third it is false. For this diction "alone", since it is an adjective, can absolutely make an implication of its form concerning the subject which is its subject: and then it will note solitude concerning the subject, and thus the statement is false, as was proven through the words of Hilary: because the Father is neither to be confessed as solitary nor as singular. An exclusive diction can also stand in the subject, and deprive association with respect to the form in the subject: and then the sense is, the Father

alone is the Father, that is, he who is the Father in such a way that another with him is not the Father, is the Father. Or it can be appended to the subject in comparison to the predicate, namely to exclude others from the participation of the predicate: and because the predicate and the form of the subject are the same in a statement in which the same is predicated of itself, this statement will be true in either sense: but the second sense is the one Augustine posits in the Letter: and through this distinction the solution to almost all that was objected is now evident.

§ 61. For to the first it must be said that Hilary takes the exclusive diction according as it notes the implication of solitude, and Augustine does not take it thus.

§ 62. To the next it must be said that although one of the relatives is understood in the other, nevertheless it is not so understood in it that it participates in the same form of relation with it as that to which it is determined: for there are two things in relatives: one by grace of relation, and the other by grace of opposition. By grace of relation one is understood in the other; by grace of opposition one is excluded from the form of the other: and therefore an exclusive diction, not excluding the first, but noting the second, namely that it does not participate in the form with another, can well be posited in the divine [persons], and will not note solitude.

§ 63. To the next it must be said that participation in the divine [persons] is taken broadly, namely for having something in whatever way, and thus one person participates in something which another does not participate in: because he has his own property by which the Father is the Father, and the Son [has] filiation.

§ 64. To the next it must be said that this can be conceded just like the first, the Father is the only Father, that is, under the same distinction, and then it does not hold [to infer]: therefore the Father is the Father alone. Because when an exclusive diction follows its subject or is predicated of it, it can note solitude predicated of it: and because in the predicate it arrives more on account of the form, it is inclined to that sense, as when it is said, man runs alone, or Socrates runs alone, it is noted that he runs solitary even if others run: whence since the Father is not solitary, it is not to be said that the Father is the Father alone: just as we do not say, the Father is the solitary or singular Father.

§ 65. To the next it must be said that this, Not only the Father is the Father, is not true except in that sense in which the word solus [alone] notes the implication of solitude concerning the Father, and in this sense its contradictory was denied above.

§ 66. But to the objection it must be said that this is absolutely true, the Father is only the Father: for if something is predicated of some subject with an exclusive diction, those things which are essentially signified in that predicate are not excluded from it, as when it is said, Socrates is only a man, it does not follow: therefore he is not an animal: but it follows that he himself is nothing other than a man. So here it does not follow, the Father is only the Father, therefore he is not God, or the divine essence.

§ 67. But to the objection to the contrary, it must be said that Augustine speaks of the ratio [concept] of the name, and not of the ratio of the thing: for thus it is true that he is not wise by

that by which he is good: although according to reality wisdom and goodness are the same in God.

Articulus 2 — Whether This Is True, That The Father Alone Is God

Whether this is true, that the Father alone is God?

§ 68. Next, it is asked concerning that which he says, B, After these things it is asked, Whether just as it is said, etc. For here the Master denies this, the Father alone is God.

§ 69. 1. But it seems that it is true: for its expository [propositions] seem true, namely, the Father is God, and he who is not other than the Father is God: therefore the Father alone is God.

§ 70. 2. Also, if this is false, the Father alone is God: then its contradictory will be true, namely not only the Father is God:

§ 1. Therefore, either several Fathers are God, or the Father is not God: for if that is true, that the Father alone is not God, it is verified by grace of the other of them, namely because either several fathers are God, or the Father is not God: for a negation cannot regard the predicate by removing it from the subject, except by grace of an implication, or by grace of the predicate.

§ 2. Solution. It must be said that this proposition, "The Father alone is God" [solus Pater est Deus], is twofold, namely from the fact that the negation can stand in the subject, or in comparison to the predicate. If it is referred to the subject in comparison to the predicate, the expression is false: because thus it excludes the other persons from the participation of the predicate. But if it stands in the subject absolutely, it is still twofold, namely from the fact that it can denote the implication of solitude regarding the Father, and thus again it is false: or it can denote the exclusion of the other persons from the participation of the form of the subject, and thus it is true, and it is proved in this way.

§ 3. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 3 — Whether This Is True, The Father Is God Alone, And This, The Father Is One God Alone

Whether this is true: "The Father is alone God", and this: "The Father is one alone God"?

§ 4. Next, it is asked concerning this which he posits in the same place, B: The Father is alone God, etc. [86]

§ 5. And he says in the Letter, that if alone [solus] is on the part of the predicate, some concede that the Father is alone God.

§ 6. This seems unfitting: 1. For since the word alone [solus] signifies the privation of association, it does not seem proper to place it around a common term: therefore it is meaningless to say, "The Father is alone God": just as it is meaningless to say, "Socrates is alone man."

§ 7. 2. Also, if the word alone [solus] is in the predicate, it will be an adjective of this term, God [Deus], and thus it will denote similitude [or solitude] concerning Him. Therefore, "The Father is alone God" is the same as "The Father is a solitary God": but this is false, as Hilary determined above: therefore this too is false, "The Father is alone God."

§ 8. 3. Also, the exclusive word, alone [solus], is said to differ from this word only [tantum], which also denotes exclusion in two things, namely that only can be joined to a common term, but alone to a singular one: and that only denotes the adequation of the predicate with the subject, whereas alone denotes the privation of association. Therefore it seems that this cannot be accepted, "The Father is alone God," unless the word alone [solus] has the same force as alone taken adverbially [solum], so that the sense is: "The Father is alone God," that is, only God [solum Deus], that is, merely God [tantum Deus]: but this is true, "The Father is merely God": therefore this too is true, "The Father is alone God": and yet the Master denies it in the Letter.

§ 9. 4. Furthermore, the Master in the Letter seems to say that the exclusive word is an adjective of the predicate, and he expounds it by the mode in which it is an adjective of the subject thus: "The Father is alone God, and no one other than the Father is God." For thus it is clear that the exclusion is denoted as being made concerning the subject in comparison to the predicate. Therefore he expounds it badly: because Augustine intends that it should fall in the subject, as is clear in the exposition, and he himself says that it falls in the predicate.

§ 10. Furthermore it is asked concerning this proposition, "The Father is one alone God," whether the word God is taken essentially, or personally? If essentially, then the sense is, "The one alone God is he who is the Father": against this which Hilary says, that we must not confess a solitary God. But if personally: then the sense is, "The one alone person is he who is the Father": and this too is false, because there are several persons.

§ 11. Solution. To this it must be said that when it is said, "The Father is alone God," the expression is twofold from the fact that the word alone can be added to the subject: and then a distinction must be made, as was said immediately before. But if it is added to the predicate: then without doubt it is posited improperly and almost incongruously, because it is joined to a term which is a common expression in divine things. However, on account of the Master, it can be said that it can be taken adverbially, and thus it is true: or nominally, and then it will denote solitude concerning God, and then it is false: for although we confess one God, nevertheless we do not say a solitary God: and although we say one alone God, nevertheless we do not say that God is alone: and the reason for this is clear from what was said before.

§ 12. Therefore it must be said to the first, that the Master takes alone [solus] in place of this word only [tantum].

§ 13. To the other the solution is clear through what was said before.

§ 14. To the following it must be said that it is not posited properly: but, as was said, adverbially.

§ 15. To that which is further asked, it must be said that this is true: "The Father is one alone God": and the word God is taken essentially. Nor does it follow from this: "therefore God

is solitary": for although he is one alone God, it does not however follow that he is alone God absolutely: because the word one denotes distinction concerning the form of God, and the exclusive word arriving excludes a plurality from the participation of that form, to which plurality or multitude the unity imported by the word one is opposed: but when alone is said absolutely, solitude would be denoted: because otherwise the word alone would not be congruously added to it, as was said.

§ 16. To that which is objected concerning the Master's exposition, it must be said that in truth Augustine intends that it should fall in the subject: but the Master takes the sense according to the order of the words, and not according to the intention of Augustine.

Articulus 4 — Whether This Is True, The Trinity Is God Alone

Whether this is true, "The Trinity is alone God"?

§ 17. Next it is asked concerning this which he posits in the same place, B: The Trinity together is properly said to be alone God, etc. [87]

§ 18. For this seems altogether false, or incongruous: because since the word alone cannot be an adjective of a common term posited in the predicate, nor of the subject, because it does not agree with the subject in gender: it seems meaningless to say, "The Trinity is alone God."

§ 19. If perhaps you say that the word God is not an altogether common term like man, because the essence in the divinity is incommunicable: this is nothing: because it has a community of supposits. But the word alone, by reason of the exclusion which it imports, signifies the privation of association in the supposits: and thus it seems to be incongruously added to it.

§ 20. To this it can be said, either that this word alone [solus] is posited adverbially for alone [solum], or only [tantum]: or that it is referred to the subject, not by grace of the gender, but by grace of the content: but this seems to be nothing, since the supposits are plural, and the word alone is of the singular number; and therefore it stands there for only [tantum].

§ 21. But against this solution it is objected thus, that according to this, this is true: "The Trinity is only God." I ask therefore, whether this is also true by a simple conversion, "Only God is the Trinity," or "Alone God is the Trinity"? It seems that it is: because God is the Trinity, and nothing which is not God is the Trinity: therefore alone God is the Trinity, or only God is the Trinity.

§ 22. But against: "Alone God is the Trinity": therefore the Father is the Trinity, and the Son is, etc., because I can descend in God. And if you say that it is immobilized by the exclusive word, then I take the same thus: "God is only the Trinity: therefore the Father is only the Trinity."

§ 23. Solution. It must be said that when it is said, "God is only the Trinity," the expression is true: but when it is said, "Alone God is the Trinity," in such a way that the word alone is pos-

86. Lombard, Sent. I, d. 21, c. 2.

ited for the word only, again it is true, because the supposition is immobile, and it excludes from the participation of the predicate those things which have opposition or otherness to the form of the subject: hence it does not exclude the persons. But when it is said, "God is only the Trinity," the expression can be twofold, namely that the word only denotes the adequation of the predicate to the subject with the privation of excess: and by reason of the adequation which regards the subject by grace of its form, a descent cannot be made in the subject, so as to say, "therefore the Father is only the Trinity." Or it can, according to the intellect of the word only, make an essential exclusion with respect to other things which have an essential opposition to the predicate: and in this sense it is true. Or it can denote exclusion with respect to the form of the predicate: and thus the expression is false: because then it follows, "God is only the Trinity: therefore God is not the Father, nor the Son": because since the signification of this noun, Trinity, is as it were collective, it will then exclude the singular persons from the subject through the predication. § 24. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 5 — Whether An Exclusive Term Added To The Father Excludes The Son, Etc

Whether an exclusive word added to the Father excludes the Son, etc.

Whether an exclusive word added to the Father excludes the Son, etc.

§ 25. Next it is asked concerning this which he says in the last chapter, there: Nevertheless, as Augustine says, etc. [88]

§ 26. For this does not seem to be so: for since the Father has otherness from the Son, it seems that if the exclusive word is posited for the Father, it would exclude the Son.

§ 27. But against: The Father and the Son are more one and the same than Socrates and Socrates' foot: but when I say, "Socrates alone is in the house," Socrates' foot is not excluded: therefore by similarity, on account of a greater identity, when it is said, "The Father alone is wise," the Son is not excluded.

§ 28. Solution. It must be said that all such expressions are twofold by the same distinction which we stated above, namely that the exclusive word can denote the implication of its form concerning the subject, or be added to it denoting the privation of association: and this in two ways, namely in comparison to the form of the subject, or in the participation of the predicate. And in the first and last sense, the expression is false, but in the middle sense it is true.

§ 29. Therefore to the argument which was made, that another person is not excluded by the exclusive word: it must be said that although there is greater identity and less diversity between the Father and the Son, than between a whole and a part, nevertheless that distinction which is between the Father and the Son posits an otherness of persons, by grace of which there can be exclusion: but that which is between a whole and a part does not: and therefore an exclusion of the part from the whole does not occur there.

§ 30. And note that some distinguish this proposition, "The Father is alone God," from the fact that the word alone can be posited for only, and then they say it is true: or from the fact

87. Lombard, Sent. I, d. 21, c. 2.

that it can denote the adequation of the predicate to the subject, and thus they say it is false: because although the Father is God, nevertheless he is not so God that God does not also belong to others: and thus the Master seems to wish in the Letter, and in this sense the word alone comes as it were for only, so that it denotes adequation: but that sense is very improper. And this is what the Sophists say in other words, that an exclusive word posited in the predicate can exclude from the participation of the form of the predicate, or from the participation of the subject: as when it is said, "this man alone runs" [iste solus currit], or "runs alone" [currit solus]. If it excludes from the participation of the predicate, the sense is that this man runs and no one else. But if from the coparticipation of the subject, the sense is that even if they run, nevertheless no one participates in the course with him in the same place: and according to this sense the exclusive word properly follows the term from whose participation it denotes exclusion: as when it is said, "the abbot alone eats" [solus abbas comedit], the sense is different from when it is said, "the abbot eats alone" [abbas comedit solus]: and thus the Master intends that it be accepted in the last way, so that the sense is, "The Father is alone God" [Pater est solus Deus], or "is God alone" [est Deus solus]: because thus it is false: and nevertheless by truly and subtly considering in every sense the exclusive word is retorted to the subject, unless it is posited for only [tantum].

Articulus 6 — Whether This Is True, No One Knows The Father Except The Son

Whether this is true, "No one knows the Father except the Son"?

§ 31. Next it is asked concerning this which he says: No one knows the Father, except the Son, etc. [89] For either the word except [nisi] makes an exception from the word no one [nemo] according to how it is taken for creatures, and thus it says nothing: or according to how it stands for the uncreated, and thus again it says nothing, because from one there is no exception.

§ 32. And to this it must be said that it makes an exception from it according to how it commonly stands for both: and thus the Holy Spirit is not excepted, because He participates in the predicate by the same reason as the Son: and this is what he intends to say in the Letter: for on account of the unity of knowledge in the three, one cannot be supposed for participating in an essential predicate, unless another is also supposed, since their essence is one.

DISTINCTIO XXII

Divisio Textus

§ 33. After the aforesaid it seems to us that we must discuss, etc. [90] Here begins that part which is about the diversity of names, which is wholly introduced to the end that this name, person, may be received, about which he most intends to treat.

88. Lombard, Sent. I, d. 21, c. 3.

§ 34. Hence this part is divided into two: in the first of which he treats of the division of names. But in the second, concerning this name, person, about which he principally intends: which begins at distinction XXIII, there, A: To the aforesaid must be added, since all names, etc. [91]

§ 35. That distinction is divided into three parts: in the first of which he posits a twofold or threefold division. In the second, he posits certain rules or principles about the mode of predication of those names which are received through the division, there, E: Therefore it must be known, that those which properly, etc. [92] In the third he posits the proof that those which seem to predicate quantity or quality, in divine things predicate substance, there, F: For God is not great, etc. [93]

§ 36. Here however some ask: Whether God is nameable, or not? If He is nameable, whether He is nameable by one name, or by several? And thirdly it could be asked: What do names name in God? And whether they are first of Him, or of lower things, and by what modes are they named? All of which have been determined, as much as we could, in distinction II of this volume: and therefore are not to be repeated here.

Articulus 1 — Whether Every Name Said Of God Signifies A Property, Or The Essence, Or Is Said Of God By Transference

Whether every name said of God signifies a property, or the essence, or is said of God by translation?

§ 37. Therefore here occurs first a question concerning the division of Ambrose which is touched upon, there: By which the faith may shine more purely, etc. [94]

§ 38. For according to this division every name said of God, either signifies a property, or the essence, or is said by translation.

§ 39. 1. But the division seems to be insufficient: first, through the fact that below he posits a division of six members. Secondly, because certain things belong to God from eternity, which signify none of those, such as person, Trinity, and the like: for these do not state a property: because a property is in a person determining it.

§ 40. 2. Also, certain essential names are said relatively, such as similar, equal: and certain ones relatively to creatures: therefore the division seems insufficient.

§ 41. Furthermore, essential names do not signify substance in one mode: because some signify substance as substance, but some as that which follows upon substance, such as virtue, and the like.

§ 42. 3. Also, Damascenus gives another division in the first book, chapter 12, where he seems to hint that some names signify an infinite ocean of substance, not what it is, like this name, He who is: but some the name of an operation, like God; but some as that which follows upon substance, like just, good, and the like; but some a habitude to those things from which He is distinguished: like Lord, King, Pastor, Creator. For of those which are subjected, He is Lord: and of those which are ruled, King: and of those which are pastured, Pastor. But some

89. Matt. 11:27.

signify that which He is not, like immense, incorporeal: therefore it seems that the division of Ambrose is not sufficient.

§ 43. 4. Also, unbegotten signifies neither a relation, nor a substance, nor is it said by translation: therefore it does not fall into any of the parts of Ambrose's division.

§ 44. 5. Furthermore, Dionysius posits a great diversity of names by order in the book On the Divine Names, such as good, being, life, wisdom, justice, virtue, salvation, liberator, equality, inequality, great, small, other, similar, dissimilar, rest, motion, omnipotent, ancient of days, peace, per se life, per se virtue, holy, king, lord, perfect, one. But all these cannot, as it seems, be reduced to this division.

§ 45. 6. Furthermore, it seems that every name said of God falls under one member of Ambrose's division, namely that which is to be said translatively: for the Saints say that of God we can say nothing properly by human voice: therefore whatever is said of God by human voice, is said by translation, and nothing by property: and thus it seems that none states a divine property, nor majesty, but all are said by translation.

§ 46. Solution. It must be said that the divisions of all the saints are sufficient: but they are not taken in one mode. The division of Ambrose, although it is of three members, yet has to be reduced to two twofold divisions thus: Every name said of God, is either said properly by a property of the thing, or is said by a translation of the similitude of the thing. If it is said properly, either it states a property by which a person is distinguished from a person, or it states the essence: for into these two divisions falls every name said of God. And the reason for the first division is this, that a name states the thing from which it is imposed, and the thing to which it is imposed: that thing to which the name is imposed, is for the Grammarian the substance of the name: but that from which it is imposed, since it is the principle of understanding that which is said by the name, is the quality of the name. Therefore that from which it is imposed, is either priorly in God and posteriorly in the creature: and thus it is said properly, like eternal Father, essence, life, wisdom, and the like. But if that from which it is imposed is repugnant to the divine nature, then it is said of God translated by some similitude of corporeal things to divine things, like stone, lion, splendor, mirror, and the like. This therefore is the reason for Ambrose's division: hence his division is general, and comprehends the divisions of all the others.

§ 47. Therefore to that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that person and Trinity signify a property indistinctly: because in divine things a property or relation is signified in many modes, as we said above: for some signify toward something as toward something, like Father: and some signify toward something as toward itself, like paternity, and the like: but some signify that which is toward itself, like good, substance, and the like: but some that which is toward itself as toward something, like similar, and equal: and there is no instance in Trinity and person: because they enclose relative things in themselves.

90. Lombard, Sent. I, d. 22, c. 1.

§ 48. To the other it must be said that Ambrose does not specially consider those modes, but rather generally: and therefore all such things fall under those which express the majesty of the divine essence, either in itself or in the persons, either eternally or temporally.

§ 49. To that which is objected concerning Damascene's division, it must be said that he divides only the essential names: but those either connote an effect in creatures, or they signify the essence without an effect. And if in the first mode: then they are like Creator, King, and the like. But if they signify the essence, either distinct or indistinct in itself, or as following upon, or that which is not. If in the first mode: thus it is He who is, essence, substance, etc., because He who is states something indistinct and not placing in number, as was noted concerning this name, He who is. Substance states something distinct, and similarly essence, and the like. But that which follows upon substance, is either as a habit, or following an operation: according to the intellect of a habit, like good, wise: following an operation, like God. But that which He is not is stated by immense, and the like, which notify God by negation: and according to what sort of negations can name and notify, has been expounded above.

§ 50. To the other it must be said that below it will be proved that unbegotten states a relation: because there Augustine will give as a rule, that in the same genus in which an affirmation affirms and posits, in that same the negation denies.

§ 51. To the other it must be said that Dionysius divided the divine names throughout the treatise of four books: for concerning some he treats in his book which he calls On Hypostases, that is, On Persons: in which he determines concerning one member of this division of Ambrose, namely concerning those which state properties in divine things. In another he touches upon those which are said of God according to translation, which he calls a symbol, and concerning this he made the Symbolic Theology: which two books we do not have. Others are names expressing the majesty of the divinity: and these can be attended to in two modes, namely according to the significates from which they are imposed, and according to the mode of predicating which they have in divine things. And concerning their significates Dionysius treats in the book On the Divine Names through thirteen chapters, in three of which he determines the mode of proceeding and receives the material: but in the ten remaining ones he touches upon the names themselves. But the mode of predicating them, according to how they sound in the names themselves, he determines in the book which he calls Mystical Theology from the Greek which means secret, because the thing itself remains secret, and cannot be named wholly as it is: and the cause of this was stated elsewhere.

§ 52. But if it is asked, From what is the number derived which Dionysius touches upon in the ten chapters of the book On the Divine Names?

§ 53. The response is that he touches upon them according to how they are manifested in the cause as the cause of such effects in creatures, especially rational ones. Therefore they are either according to a cause regarding being, or well-being, or perfection in both. If they are in the first mode, it is either according to the disposition of the cause inclined to the effusion of the caused thing: or according to those things which it diffuses by causing. If in the first mode,

91. Lombard, Sent. I, d. 23, c. 1.

then it is good: hence he says that the good is diffusive of itself and of being, to which four others are necessarily conjoined, namely love, light, zeal, and to the good further is conjoined the beautiful: for these state as it were dispositions of the good in the first cause: for just as zeal follows upon love, so the beautiful follows upon light: for light states the irradiations of the eternal reasons by which everything is created, while the beautiful in the creating cause states the descent of the order of ordering wisdom, as Boethius says: "Bearing the beautiful world in His mind, Himself the most beautiful." [95] But love and zeal incline on the part of the will: love to effects generally, but zeal to more proximate effects, because zeal is an ignited love into something special: and therefore he touches upon all these with their privatively opposed evil in one chapter. But if they state an effect effluent into being, it is either with respect to being in a genus which is the foundation of beings, or in a species. If in a genus: then it is being [ens]. If in a species: then it is life: because, as the Philosopher says, the first of created things is being, and there is no other creature before it; and concerning life he says, that life for living things is being: and this is true of specified being. And both are taken generally: because it does not fall into divine predication except generally: for the being of an element or of an elemented thing is not predicated of God. Similarly vegetative, or sensible, or rational life, is not predicated of God: but rather being and life abstracting from every created thing. But if it is an effect according to well-being, it is either absolute in the rational creature, or in one in comparison to another. If absolute in one: then they state the perfection of rational nature according to nature, or according to the state into which it fell. If in the first mode, either according to the intellect, and thus it is wisdom: or according to the effect, and thus it is virtue: or according to reason or the ordering intellect ordering that which is in the affect toward another, and thus it is justice which is considerative of order. But if they regard the state of peril into which we fell, either a general one which is exhibited to all, and then it is salvation from fault and penalty: or a personal and special peril, and in that is noted the liberator. But if it is in one in comparison to another, either according to virtual quantity, or according to the quality of goodnesses. If in the first mode, either the comparison is according to proportion, or according to excess without proportion. If in the first mode, thus it is unequal: if in the second mode, thus it is great and small. But if it is a relation of one to another according to the participation of goodness which states quality: either it is as distinguishing in the degree of participants what is not the same, and thus it is other and same: or it is according to the comparison of one to another by way of proportion, and then it is similar and dissimilar.

§ 54. But in the third mode there are effects from which God or perfect being is named: and this in three modes, in which everything that is, has itself toward perfection, namely according to motion toward God, according to a moving virtue, and according to this that it receives from Him that which perfects. But according to motion in two ways, namely according to the fact that motion is from Him in being moved, and in attaining Him. If in the first mode, it is motion, and in the second mode rest. But according to the virtue moving all things to Himself it is in two ways, namely according to the virtue in itself, or the disposition of the virtue: in itself it is the omnipotent who can make and move all things: but according to the

92. Lombard, Sent. I, d. 22, c. 2.

disposition of the virtue it is the ancient of days. But according to that which He flows in by perfecting, the consideration is threefold, namely according to perfect substance, and according to perfect virtue, and according to quietation in the end: and in the first mode it is perfect, and one: and in the second mode per se life toward nature, and per se virtue toward a superadded perfection: but the quietation in the end is peace. And the kingdom follows in all these, which befits Him not causing, but containing what is caused, and according to that He is holy, king, and Lord: and holy insofar as He rules unmixed, but exceeding all materially polluting things: Lord moreover toward supposits: but king toward the discretion of order and natural law.

§ 55. To the last it must be said that translation is twofold, namely according to the thing, and according to the name. Translation according to the thing in divine names is only in symbolic ones, in which signification is translated to signification: as "the meadow smiles," because a certain dilation is generated in the flowering of the meadows: and thus God is said to be crapulous or drunk: as it says, Psalm 77:65: And the Lord was awaked as one out of sleep, and like a mighty man that has been crapulous from wine. But the translation of a name is when the name does not sufficiently represent that which it is assumed to signify, as all names said of God.

Articulus 2 — Whether Some Names Belong To God From Time, And Whether They Belong At Once To All, Or To Some And Not To Others, Etc

Whether any names belong to God from time, and whether they belong simultaneously to all, or to some, and to some not, etc.

Whether any names belong to God from time, and whether they belong simultaneously to all, or to some, and to some not, etc.

§ 56. Next it is asked concerning another division which the Master adjoins, saying: To these must be added certain things, etc. [96]

§ 57. For here a twofold division is posited in one, namely that certain ones belong to God from time, and are said relatively to the creature: and these either belong to all the persons commonly, like Creator: or to some, like sent, given.

§ 58. And this does not seem to be able to stand: because: 1. To whatever something belongs from time, that is mutable: but God is not mutable: therefore nothing belongs to Him from time.

§ 59. 2. Also, every relative depends on its correlative: but God does not depend on any creature: therefore He is not said relatively to it.

§ 60. 3. Furthermore, sent and given state an effect in the creature: therefore they signify the divine essence commonly: therefore they can be said of all the persons.

§ 61. 4. Furthermore, given and donated (as was held above) do not state being from another: therefore it seems that they belong to all.

93. Lombard, Sent. I, d. 22, c. 3.

§ 62. Solution. This part of the division is reduced to the division of Ambrose, to that member, that certain ones intimate the majesty of the deity. That is to be further divided also: and then it includes this which is said here thus: those which signify the essence, either in itself, or with the connotation of an effect. For if in itself: then they belong from eternity. If with the connotation of an effect: then they belong from time. Therefore they either signify the essence as agent only, like creator: or as agent with the consignification of a person existing from another, like sent, given, as was held above.

§ 63. Therefore it must be said to the first, that to belong to God from time does not posit a mutation in Him, but rather in those things which are made, as was said elsewhere.

§ 64. To the other it must be said that the creature depends by a real respect on the Creator, and not conversely except according to the intellect: because the dependence of the respect of the creature cannot be understood without a correspect in the Creator, although it states nothing but a reason in Him, and not a thing which is diverse from Him.

§ 65. To the other it must be said as above, that sent and given enclose relations in themselves.

§ 66. To the other it must be said that the Master takes given and donated for sent.

Articulus 3 — Whether In The Divine This Name "Trinity" Denotes A Plurality Of Persons And Is A Divine Name

Whether in the divine matters this name, Trinity, signifies a plurality of persons, and whether it is a divine name?

Then it is inquired concerning what he says: Moreover, there is one name which is not said of any person individually, etc.

§ 1. For what he says seems false: because this name, Trinity, designates as it were a collective plurality of persons. But a collective plurality is simply plural, and one in a certain respect, namely according to the form of the collection, which has minimal unity: but the Trinity is the most simple and most true unity of essence: therefore it does not signify a collective plurality of persons.

§ 2. Moreover, Bernard in book V of De consideratione to Pope Eugenius says, that among all unities the unity of the Trinity holds the highest point: but among all unities a collective unity is inferior: therefore Trinity does not mean a collective unity.

§ 3. Likewise, if this name, Trinity, signifies a plurality of persons, it does so either with order, or without order. If without order: then there seems to be a confusion of persons: for when many are collected into one without order, confusion is generated, and not union. But if it signifies [them] with order: then there will be a prior and a posterior among the ordered [persons]: and thus it seems that in no way does it signify a collection of many.

§ 4. Likewise, when the Trinity is said to be the unity of three, the unity seems to be numbered in the three: but the unity is either the essence, or not. If not: then there is some

unity in which they agree besides the essence. If it is the essence: then the essence is numbered in the three, which is false.

§ 5. Likewise, this name, Trinity, is either absolute, or relative. If absolute: then it ought to be predicated individually of the persons: and this is false: because this is not true, The Father is the Trinity. But if it is relative to another; then it seeks to be determined by something outside, which also does not befit it: therefore it seems that it is not a divine name.

§ 6. Moreover, Trinity seems to be repugnant to divine simplicity. For Boethius says, that the iteration of the same reality in unity does not introduce number: as when it is said, Tullius is one, Marcus is one, Cicero is one, I cannot infer: therefore Marcus Tullius Cicero are three: therefore by denying the consequent, where number is inferred, there is diversity: but in the Trinity number is signified: therefore diversity: but in one and the same most simple thing there is no number: therefore since God is entirely simple, He ought not to be signified by this name, Trinity, which imports number.

§ 7. Likewise, nothing having anything intelligible prior to itself is entirely simple, or at least it is not the most simple: this name, Trinity, posits prior to itself both the understanding of the numbered person, and of the unity of the essence: therefore the Trinity is not the most simple: therefore it is not a divine name, as it seems.

Solution. It must be said with the Master, that Trinity signifies all the persons at once as it were collectively: however, it does not signify a collection, but a quasi-collection. For it differs in two ways from the form of a collective name. One of these is that it unites the things it collects into what is simply one and most simple, because it unites them in the most simple unity of the essence (although the name is not imposed from this unity): but a collective [name] does not signify a union except in the form of a collection, which has unity in a certain respect, and plurality simply. Another difference is: that the things which they collect simply have a multitude without order, such as a heap, or a people, or a crowd. But that they [the divine persons] do not simply have multitude was proved above[97]. But that they are not en-

-tirely without order was also proved above because in the persons there is an order of nature. And through this the solution to the first three is evident.

To the fourth, it must be said that the unity is not numbered by the word of three (trium): because then it ought to say three unities: but the persons are numbered, and the unity falls there as uniting those which are numbered, according to the mode of number that exists in divine matters.

To the next, it must be said that this name, Trinity, is relative to another, as Boethius clearly says in the book De Trinitate, thus: Whence it happens that this very [name] Trinity is also said in relation to another. But it is intrinsically relative: because it encloses in itself those things to which their relations are determined.

And if you object, that the Trinity is the unity of three: and thus by reason of being a unity, it signifies the essence: and by reason of being of three, it signifies a relation (ad aliquid): and

thus it will signify the essence, especially since unity falls in the nominative (in recto) in its definition, but the word of three in the oblique. It must be said, that this name, Trinity, is imposed from the collective distinction of the persons, and not from the unity: and therefore although, through the mode of signifying by a name which is said abstractively, the essence is signified in the nominative: nevertheless according to the rationale of its imposition and the reality, it is the converse, namely that the essence is signified in the oblique, and the persons collectively in the nominative: because Trinity has to be expounded as, three united in one essence.

But if you ask, Why on account of abstraction does it signify the essence more in the nominative, and the persons in the oblique, than conversely?

I say, that supposits can never be signified abstractly: because it is against the nature of a supposit that it be abstract: but a form is well abstracted: and therefore since the persons are supposits, they cannot be imported in the nominative in an abstract name.

But if you ask, Why then was a name not imposed concretively, which would signify the collective persons in the nominative?

To this it must be said, that this is contrary to collection and naming: because a name wants to be imposed from some one form: and since supposits as supposits do not signify one thing, there cannot be one name imposed from the supposits: but there could be a name of a supposit imposed both from the supposits and from the uniting form through the mode of collection: for no name is imposed except from a form.

Moreover, the form of a collection among all forms is the least uniting, and therefore that of which it is the form is only [signified] obliquely: as we say, a heap of stones (acervus lapidum): and we do not say, a heap stones (acervus lapides): and therefore since Trinity is imposed from such a collective form of distinction, it will regard the persons obliquely.

To the next, it must be said that the Trinity of persons is not repugnant to the simplicity of the essence: because the persons do not divide the essence, nor is the essence composed or divided in them. But this is the rationale regarding three diverse [things]: and therefore the number of persons does not posit diversity, but only a distinction of relation according to origin, which is the least of all distinctions: and yet in divine matters it suffices to constitute persons, although it does not vary the essence.

To the next, it must be said that although in the name's mode of signifying something is prior to the understanding of this name, Trinity, nevertheless in reality nothing is prior: and therefore it does not signify composition.

Articulus 4 — Whether This Name, Incarnate, Belongs To One Person Or To All

Whether this name, incarnate, belongs to one person, or to all?

Then it is asked about what he says: There are also certain names which in time, etc.

96. Lombard, Sent. I, d. 22, c. 1.

§ 1. For this seems false: because incarnate, if it only signifies the divine essence with an effect in a creature, then belongs simultaneously to all the persons, which is absurd.

§ 2. Likewise, every temporal name fitting God signifies the divine essence, and connotes an effect in a creature: but this name, incarnate, is of this sort: therefore it signifies the divine essence, and connotes an effect in a creature: and thus it belongs commonly to all, which is heresy.

Solution. It must be said that incarnate and humanized do not signify a relation according to the name, but enclose a relation in the supposit: because its supposit is the Son in Himself (per se): and the divine essence is not incarnate in itself, and through itself, but in the Son and through the Son: and this was proved in Book III of the Sentences.

To the next, it must be said that when it is said, that every name, etc., it is understood of those names which belong to God actively, such as creator, and the like: but incarnate, humanized, belong receptively and unitively: and this does not belong to all, but to one, namely the Son.

Articulus 5 — Whether Negative And Privative Names Fall Under The Six Differences Of Names Which The Master Puts In The Text

Whether negative and privative names fall within the six differences of names, which the Master posits in the text?

Then it is asked about what he says: Behold we have assigned six differences of names, etc.

§ 1. For it seems that negative or privative [names] do not fall into those six differences of names, such as immense, uncreated, and the like: which nevertheless especially belong to God.

§ 2. If perhaps you say, that the Master prefixes a division of those things which he intended to treat: and he does not intend to treat negative [names]: and therefore he does not touch upon them: because they predicate nothing in God: but rather, as Damascene says, they say what God is not. According to this, neither ought he to have prefixed concerning transferred [names]: because they also do not predicate anything in God, but are said by transference.

§ 3. Likewise, according to what is this divi-

-sion of six members taken, since it was shown above that the tripartite division of Ambrose sufficiently comprehends all names said of God?

Solution. To this it must be said, that privative [names] are not of the Master's intention, as the objection implies: because they do not predicate anything in God, but rather show what He is not: or if they are [included], they are reduced to the essence insofar as a negation in some way certifies and hints at what the thing is, as we showed above.

To the next, it must be said that the Master does not suppose symbolical [names] here, except only those which in some way show the proper [characteristics] of the persons, such as

character, splendor, and the like: and he does not intend here the science of symbolical [names]: because that belongs rather to the science of allegories, than to the disputation which is treated in this book.

To the last it must be said that the three modes added to Ambrose's division are contained under the tripartite division: for those things which signify a property, either signify it as distinguishing, or as a distinct supposit. And in the first mode signifies paternity, in the second mode Father. But if as a distinct supposit, either from eternity, or in time. If from eternity, either properly, or commonly. If commonly, either as of individuals, or as collectively of all. In time indeed, as incarnate, humanized: but from eternity properly Father: commonly of individuals person: commonly collectively Trinity. But hypostasis, substance, and the like, signify as person. Similarly those which [signify] the essence, either from eternity, or in time. If from eternity, either affirmatively, or negatively. If affirmatively, either by way of substance, or by way of an adventitious substance. If by way of an adventitious [substance], either as virtual quantity, or as quality, and so of others. But if substance, either as abstract, or as concrete, or as substantiating in the concrete. Abstractly indeed substance, as essence, divinity, and the like: concretely however God: substantiating following the substance in the concrete, as powerful, or wise, great, and good, and the like: but negatively, as immense, uncreated, and the like. But if in time, either according to a cause actually causing, or containing, or governing, or according to a habitude to those things which are caused. In the first mode creator. In the second and third mode governor, provider, salvation, and liberator, and the like. In the third Lord, king, and the like. And thus it is clearly evident by what art these names are multiplied.

Articulus 6 — Whether The Four Rules Concerning The Divine Names Are Well Assigned By The Master

Whether the four rules concerning divine names are well assigned by the Master?

Then it is asked about the rules which he posits in that part where it begins, there, E, Therefore it is to be known, etc.

For there the four rules which he gives are gathered: the first of which is, that those things which properly pertain to the individual persons, are said relatively to one another. The second is, that those which signify unity, are said toward themselves and substantially. The third is, those which are said substantially, are predicated of all individually, and are predicated of all together singularly, and not plurally. The fourth is, those which are said relatively, are not said substantially.

§ 1. Against the first it is objected: This name, person, pertains to the individual persons, and yet is not said relatively: therefore that rule is not universal.

§ 2. The second is instanced by similar and equal and same, which are said relatively, and yet signify substance.

97. Footnote missing in source text.

§ 3. Likewise, the third is instanced by this name, person, which, as he will say below, signifies substance, and yet is predicated of them plurally in summary.

§ 4. The fourth is instanced by this, that everything that is predicated, is predicated through accident, or through substance: but in divine matters there is no accident: therefore substance: therefore a relation which is predicated in divine matters,

is predicated through substance: and thus what he says is false.

Solution. It must be said that person does not signify a relation determined in itself, but in a certain community of proportion, as will be said below. Or it may be said, that person is said relatively in the supposit: although it does not signify a relation in the mode of signifying by the name.

To the next, it must be said that similar, and equal, enclose a relation in themselves, and that in which they are united and equalized: and therefore such things signify in the concrete the essence in the oblique, and the persons in the nominative: and when they are signified abstractly, the converse happens, as was determined above.

To the next, it must be said that person signifies a relation in the supposit, although in the mode of signifying it does not import it, but substance.

To the next it can be said, that in divine matters there is no accident, because as to the nature of the predicament of relation, relation does not retain in divine matters the mode of predicating [as an accident]: but as to the mode which it adds, namely to be toward another (ad alterum esse), and as to this it has an opposition to substantials, which are predicated not toward another but toward themselves.

Articulus 7 — Whether Augustine Says Well, One Great, Not Three Great Ones

Whether Augustine says well, One great, not three greats.

Then it is asked about this, Not three greats, but one great, etc.

For it was conceded above, that adjectives can be predicated substantially of the persons: and there nine reasons are assigned. And therefore here it must be said that if the word three (tres) is a substantive only, and the word greats (magni) an adjective, then they can be called three greats: because then it will take its number from its substantive: but Augustine takes the word magni here substantively, and the word tres adjectively: and the same reason applies to the others.

Articulus 8 — Whether What Is Participated In The Divine Can Be Greater Than The Participant

Whether the participated in divine matters can be greater than the participant?

Then it is asked about what he says in the last chapter at the beginning, there, So that he is as it were a participant of it: otherwise any magnitude would be greater, etc.

95. Boethius, De consolatione philosophiae, III, m. 9.

For this does not seem so, because he can participate in whiteness or humanity: and yet that whiteness or humanity is not greater than himself.

Solution. It must be said, that nothing is participated properly, unless a part of it is taken: but every form of itself is universal: and although it is entirely in this [subject] as to its being (quoad esse), nevertheless it is not entirely within the substance as to its potency (quoad posse), because it can be in another, for otherwise it would not be universal: although according to how it is in this one, it is not and cannot be in another: yet that which is in this one, can be in many others: and therefore it is taken in part of its power. But thus it follows, that every participated thing is greater in potency, than that which participates in it. But this does not apply in divine matters: since there is nothing outside God greater than Himself, neither according to being, nor according to potency: but the whole of what He is, where there is no universal and particular, as was proved above.

DISTINCTIO XXIII

Divisio Textus

To the aforesaid it must be added, that since all names, etc. Here it is treated of this name, person, which is excepted from the rule that is given in the preceding distinction concerning substantial names.

This part is divided into three parts, according as three things are considered in this name, person, namely the signified, concerning which it is asked first, Whether it signifies substance, or property? There is also considered in it the community of predication: and concerning that it is asked in the second part, there, C, Therefore here a difficult question arises, etc. There is also considered in this name, person, the distinction of singularity: and concerning this it is asked in the third, namely Whether diversity and singularity are in the divine, there, I, Now sufficiently, as I think, etc.

In the first of these parts there are two chapters: in the first of which the name of person is excepted from the generality of the previously held rule. In the second however it is proved, that it signifies substance, there, B, But that person is said according to substance, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether In The Divine There Is Or Can Be A Person

Whether there is or can be a person in the divine?

And because the major difficulty of the book consists around this treatise, therefore before the Littera two things are asked here, namely whether a person is in the divine, or can be? Secondly, given that it is, whether it signifies substance or property? For this it would be necessary to know before the definition of person.

But it seems that a person is not in the divine:

94. Ambrose, De Fide, II, c. 4.

§ 1. For in lower things we see nothing of such great composition as a person is: therefore nothing is so repugnant to maximal simplicity: but maximal simplicity is in the divine: therefore no personality can be there. But that person signifies the maximal composition, is proved thus: This somewhat (hoc aliquid) in a rational nature is the ultimate of natural composition, in which are the compositions of all the preceding: for the composition of an element from form and matter by determined contrariety, and the composition of a mixed [body], and the composition of a complexioned [body], and the composition of a heterogeneous [body] in dissimilar organic members, and the composition of body and vegetative, sensitive, and rational soul is posited in that which is this somewhat in a rational nature. But there is another composition of natural and individuating accidents which make a person: and this triple [composition] is also supposed

in a person: therefore person encloses in itself every kind of composition, both substantial and accidental: and thus the first proposition is established.

§ 2. Likewise, there is no person which does not substand a common nature and a distinguishing property: but nothing substands thus except a subject: therefore what is not a subject nor substands a nature, is not a person. But Boethius says, that in the divine there cannot be a subject, since it is a simple form: therefore neither can a person be there.

§ 3. Likewise, that which is of maximal division according to nature, is maximally repugnant to the most simple unity: but person is of maximal division according to nature: therefore a plurality of persons is maximally repugnant to the most simple unity. The first is established. The second is proved by the fact that in nature there is only potency and act, and a composite from both: but those things which are plural in potency, are not plural except in a certain respect: but form in the same nature is according to reason at least one: but a composite differs from a composite by natural form and natural matter: therefore both are divided by it: therefore its plurality is maximally repugnant to the first simplicity.

§ 4. Likewise, a per se one is not distinct from another if it does not have a distinction of substance from which is all number of persons: but substance in the divine is not numbered: therefore it does not admit a plurality of persons: therefore in the divine at least there is not a person in this mode, in which we posit persons there.

§ 5. Likewise, this seems so through Augustine[98], and is posited here in the Littera, where he says, that it was not therefore answered three persons to the heretics asking what three, so that it might be said: but so that it might not be kept silent: therefore it seems that person ought not to be said to be in the divine.

§ 6. Likewise, Anselm in the Monologion: "Although I can say Trinity on account of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit who are three, nevertheless I cannot proffer by one name on account of what three, as if I should say, on account of three persons: just as I should say unity on account of one substance: for three persons are not to be thought, because all the persons so subsist separated from one another, that it is necessary that there be as many substances as there are persons."[99] Likewise, in the

same place: "In sum and essence just as there are not many substances, so there are not many persons." From these it is accepted, that person does not befit the divine.

ON THE CONTRARY:

§ 1. Richard of St. Victor in his book De Trinitate says: "Fearing where there is no fear, they would rightly fear that the persons be said according to substance, if person signified only a substantial being, and did not consignify anything" therefore it seems that person is in the divine: and that those who fear to say it, fear where there is no fear.

§ 2. Likewise, in the Littera, we have that it is more fittingly said three persons, when it is asked, what three? than anything else.

§ 3. Likewise, person signifies a distinct thing of a nature, and a person is more signified by who, than by what: because what asks about an indistinct nature, but who about a distinct one: but in the divine there are several distinct someones: therefore since the divine nature is an intellectual nature, there are distinct someones of a rational nature there: therefore from differences there are persons in the divine.

§ 4. Likewise, a person is a per se one: but the Father is a per se one, and the Son is a per se one, and the Holy Spirit is a per se one: therefore there are several persons there: therefore, etc.

§ 5. Likewise, Richard: "A triple personal distinction is found, namely by property alone, by origin alone, by property and origin together. In Angels by property alone, in

God by origin alone, in man however by property and origin together. Therefore person is in the divine."

§ 6. Likewise, the ultimate and most perfect of a rational nature is a person: therefore personality signifies the ultimate rationale of perfection: but whatever is of perfection, ought to be attributed to God: therefore the rationale of personality ought to be attributed to God, and maximally, as it seems.

§ 7. Likewise, it was proved above that the divine nature is communicable: but the communion of an intellectual nature cannot even be understood unless that which communicates it is understood: but everything communicating an intellectual nature is a person: therefore there are persons in the divine.

Solution. Without doubt and hesitation it must be conceded, that in the divine there are several communicating the divine intellectual nature: and because such communicating [ones] are necessarily distinct, therefore it is necessary to concede that there are persons in the divine, and that the rationale of personality belongs to them, although not in entirely the same rationale by which personality is found in human and angelic nature, as will be evident in what follows.

TO THE FIRST therefore it must be said, that maximal composition happens to a person from the nature by which it communicates with others in the genus of form and matter: for

98. Footnote missing in source text.

therefore it is necessary for it to be drawn by many things to perfection, to which alone the rationale of personality belongs. But if it found that perfection in the first [principle], it would not need to be drawn by so many compositions to it: whence if the nature of an element were intellectual, a composition would not be necessary, because this element having the nature of an element more commonly would be a person: and this is evident, because in Angels personality does not require a composition of this sort, and in the divine it does not require any composition.

To the next it must be said, that according to Richard, there is a difference between subsisting (subsistere) and existing (existere): for that subsists which is per se distinct by a property which is in it as in a subject: but that exists which is per se distinct from origin, that is, from the mode of origin, namely because from the rationale of origin it is distinguished from that which is from it, or from which it is: whence properly speaking in the angelic nature the persons are subsistences only: because one of them is not distinguished from another by the fact that one is from the other, or the other from it: but by the properties by which they subsist and substand, their personal distinction is found in them. But in the divine properly speaking the persons are existences: because they are distinguished by the mode of origin or relation which is not in the distinct as in a subject, but rather (as Augustine and Boethius say) predicates that which is toward another, and not what is toward itself according to the mode of origin by which the one is from the other. But in human matters distinction is accepted according to both, namely substanding the collation of individuating properties, and according to the mode of origin by which a person is educed from a person: and therefore the substanding or subsisting ones are called by essence. But other Doctors of Sacred Scripture take subsistences broadly for hypostases existing per se in whatever way: and therefore they call the divine persons subsistentes or subsistentiae.

To the next it must be said, that although a person in a created intellectual nature is of maximal division among those things which are the same, because it is of greater division than form according to itself: nevertheless this happens to it, namely insofar as it is in this nature: for the constitution of a person is from the fact that it is a per se one according to whatever mode of existence in an intellectual nature, and therefore this argument does not proceed.

To the next it must be said, that having a substance divided in persons happens from the ignobility of a formal nature, since the nature of a created form divided in many remains one in rationale through its being (per esse), and thus strives for unity, it is shown sufficiently in many: since if it could, even according to being and according to that which it is, it would remain one: but because it is not fully simple, therefore there accidents to it a division of this sort in the persons and hypostases in which it is. But in the divine in which there is full simplicity, the mode of existence according to origin induces a rationale of otherness and personality: and yet the substance, that which it is, remains undivided: and we well concede, and will prove below in the following distinction, that there is not simply number in the divine, and that the number of persons or notions is not simply number: and this is so,

99. Reference to Anselm, Monologion.

because in no way do we posit that substance is numbered in the divine, neither according to itself, nor according as it is in a person.

To the next it must be said, that Augustine does not mean that one ought not to say three persons: but that it is not said by the rationale by which it is said in lower things, where by the substance of form and matter, or that which is and by which it is, the persons are divided from one another.

To the next it must be said in the same way, that Anselm means nothing else, except that the mode of existence in the divine does not make a person exactly as in human matters.

Articulus 2 — Whether Person In The Divine Signifies Substance Or Property

Whether person in the divine signifies substance, or property?

Secondly it is asked, What does person signify?

It seems that [it signifies] substance: and because almost the whole difficulty of this treatise consists around this article, let as many arguments be taken as can be elicited from the Littera.

And six are elicited, five from the second chapter of this distinction, extracted from the words of Augustine.

The first which he says: "It is not one thing for God to be, another to be a person, but entirely the same."

The second is what he says: "In this Trinity when we say the person of the Father, we say nothing else than the substance of the Father."

The third is what he says: "A person indeed is said toward itself, not toward the Son or the Holy Spirit: just as God is said toward Himself, and great, and good, and just."

The fourth is what he says: "Just as for Him to be is this, which is to be God, which is to be great, which is to be good: so for Him to be is this, which is to be a person."

The fifth is from the words of the Master, where he says: "When it is said, the Father is a person, let this be the sense: the Father is the divine essence."

The sixth is in the third chapter C of this distinction, where he says: "We wish to preserve at least one vocabulary for this signification, by which the Trinity is understood, lest we be entirely silent when asked what three they are, since we confess that there are three."

§ 1. Since therefore to what nothing is congruously answered except substance, it seems that this name, person, signifies substance. And this Augustine says in many places[100].

§ 2. Likewise, Anselm in the Monologion: "As many persons as there are, so many individual substances there are[101]." Therefore person signifies substance, although it consignifies property with substance: and the authority was had above.

§ 3. Likewise, Master Hugh of St. Victor: "There is only one substantial name, which is said of individuals in the singular: yet in sum it is pronounced not in the singular, but in the plural, although nevertheless it is said toward substance: and this is person[102]."

§ 4. Likewise, this is taken from the definition of person which Boethius gives in the book De Duabus naturis in una persona Christi, thus: "Person is an individual substance of a rational nature." For since in the definition...

through individuals: if substance falls in the direct case (in recto), it is necessary that 'person' be in the genus of substance.

§ 5. Also, through Boethius's reasoning by which he hunts down the definition of person: because person is either in the genus of accidents, or of substance: not of accidents: therefore of substance. Also, in the genus of substance there are first and second [substances]: and the first (otherwise, person) does not signify the second, because thus in one nature there would only be a person in species: therefore it means the first: and not of just any substance, but of a rational one: therefore person is a first substance in a rational nature.

§ 6. Also, whether 'person' is said as 'sounding by itself' (per se sonans), according to the etymology of the word, or 'one by itself' (per se una) according to the composition of the word, it belongs to nothing but substance: because nothing is one by itself, except this 'something' (hoc aliquid) in substance: for form is common of itself, while matter is in potency: therefore a being that is one by itself is nothing but this 'something' in substance: for accidents do not sound by themselves, nor are they one by themselves: therefore, etc.

§ 7. Also, whatever belongs to perfection ought to be attributed to God: but it belongs to highest perfection that those things which share a nature in lower beings are one by themselves and subsist by themselves: therefore this belongs all the more to higher beings: therefore the divine persons subsist by themselves: therefore they are substance, or subsistences: therefore 'person' in divine matters signifies substance.

§ 1. To the contrary is what Boethius says thus: that if the persons are divided, but the substance undivided, it is necessary that a word which takes its origin from the persons does not pertain to the substance: since therefore no word draws its origin from the persons themselves as much as 'person', it seems that it does not pertain to the substance.

§ 2. Also, Boethius: Essence contains unity, but relation alone multiplies the Trinity: since therefore this noun 'person' is spoken of the three in the plural, and is multiplied, it seems that it pertains to relation alone.

§ 3. Also, Augustine says: "When the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are called three persons, let no masses or intervals be thought of, no distance of any unlikeness whatsoever, so that one is understood to be slightly less than another, or in whatever way one can be less than another, so that there is neither a confusion of persons, nor such a distinction by which anything is unequal. But if it cannot be grasped by the intellect, let it be held by faith, until it shines in our hearts, as He says through the Prophet, Unless you believe, you will not un-

100. Footnote missing in source text.

derstand." From this it is gathered, that nothing however small of substantial attributes is in one which is not in another: since therefore the personality of one is not in another, it seems that 'person' does not signify substance.

§ 4. Also, in no nature can the same thing be the principle of incommunicability and of communicability: but in divine matters (as Richard says) person is the principle of incommunicability, while substance is of communicability: therefore 'person' does not signify substance.

§ 5. Also, property is what makes number in divine matters, as was held before, and will be held again in the following distinction: but it makes a number of persons: therefore person is that which is constituted by property: but this is not substance, because properties do not determine substance: therefore it seems that 'person' does not mean substance.

§ 6. Also, in whatever category the inferior of some genus is contained according to its nature, into that same category the genus itself falls according to nature: but under 'person' as under a common intention we take the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, and these are in the category of 'towards something' (relation) according to their nature: therefore also 'person',

which is common to them according to reason, [must fall into that same category].

§ 7. Also, when 'person' is said, this word is imposed from something: but it is said as if 'one by itself' (per se una): but 'by itself' sounds of singularity: therefore it seems that it is imposed from the singularity of a rational nature: but singularity in divine matters is only from property: therefore it seems that it signifies property.

§ 8. Also, Richard says, that 'person' is the same as 'existing by itself alone according to a certain singular mode of existence of a rational nature': therefore it seems to signify the singularity of notions.

Upon this, so that the question may shine forth more, eight opinions are to be received, which are diversified here by the Doctors, as is found in their writings.

For there are those who say that this noun, 'person', receives different significations according to different times, as will be held below in the text: for they say that before the questioning of the heretics it signified nothing but the divine substance distinct from other essences, just as this man and this angel are distinguished from others: and then it was said that the Father and the Son are one person, just as they are one substance and one essence. But after the questioning of the heretics, this noun 'person' was instituted so that in the plural it would signify property or relatives, but in the singular, substance: and therefore when it is said, 'The Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are persons', it signifies relatives: but when it is said, 'The Father is a person', it signifies substance. But it received a third institution from the usage of the moderns, according to whose usage since the time of Boethius it only signifies a relative, both in the singular and in the plural.

101. Reference to Anselm, Monologion.

There are a second group who say that this noun, 'person', has one signification when posited by itself, and another when adjoined to a numeral or a disjunctive or partitive term: so that when it is said, 'three persons', 'another person', 'a distinct person', it signifies notionally a relative and that which is towards another.

There are a third group who say that it absolutely signifies substance, not that which is the divine nature or essence, but that which is the hypostasis. For they say that just as 'essence' signifies essence, and 'man' signifies man, so 'person' signifies person: and by 'person' they understand a distinct substance, according as substance is named from 'substanding' (substando) to a property.

There are a fourth group who say that 'person' is an equivocal noun, and sometimes signifies the essence, sometimes the person, sometimes a property.

Also, there are a fifth group who say that 'person' signifies substance and property: but substance in the direct case (in recto), applying the reason of their statement: because person is said as if 'one by itself': and the word one there speaks of substance, which falls there in the direct case: and the word by itself speaks of property, which is somehow implied obliquely.

There are a sixth group who say conversely, that 'person' signifies property in the direct case, and substance in the oblique case (in obliquo) in divine matters: and they prove this through the definition of Boethius, who says that person is 'the individual substance of a rational nature', wherein 'of a rational nature' falls in the oblique case: and this opinion belongs to almost everyone, and its author is William of Auxerre. And immediately after him, Simon of Tournai defended this.

There are a seventh group who say that 'person' signifies a first substance, distinct by an incommunicable property: for substance is signified in one way when 'substance' is said: and in another way when 'man' is said: and in another way when 'Socrates' is said. For in the first way it is signified in the community of a genus. In the second way, with the specialty of a species. In the third way, with the singularity of socrateity or individuality. And this seems to be the opinion of Richard of St. Victor, and is also defended by some of the moderns.

The eighth is, that 'person' has the signification of substance and of property:

but concerning that substance which it imports, it posits neither a property, nor the number which property makes: and this opinion holds a sort of middle way among all, and this seems to me more to be true: and therefore let it be explained more fully. When it is said, 'The Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God', substance is signified in one way by the word God, which is the predicate: and in another way by this verb, are, when it is said, 'These three are one God': for when it is said, 'These', etc., the pronoun signifies the substance, which acts as a supposit and is distinguished: but the word are imports the same [substance] through a respect to the nature, and the word God imports the same as common. Hence I say that 'person' signifies substance as it is signified by the word these and by the word are, and not as it is signified by the word God: and therefore, because it cannot be understood that

102. Reference to Hugh of St. Victor.

there are three unless such a substance falls into a plural signification, it is necessary that this noun, 'person', fall into plurality when it is spoken of all of them in sum. But by this substance thus acting as a supposit (sic supposita) there is imported into the intellect of 'person' not only the substance, but also the property constituting the persons indeterminately and in a common ratio.

And that it is so, is proved through three Authors, and through an analogy. For Augustine says at the beginning of Book VII of On the Trinity: "Every essence which is spoken of relatively, is also something except for the relative, just as a man who is a master, and a man who is a servant, and a horse which is a beast of burden, and a coin which is a pledge: and if he were not a man, that is, some substance, there would not be one who was spoken of relatively: and if the horse were not a certain essence, there would not be that which is spoken of relatively as a beast of burden. Therefore if a father is also not something to himself, there is no one at all who can be spoken of relatively to another or to something." From this it is gathered, that this and that person gives the understanding of a supposited substance, and also the understanding of a property: therefore also 'person', which speaks of a supposited substance in common, includes both in its understanding, namely the person [substance] and the property. The second author is Boethius in his book On the Two Natures in the One Person of Christ, who hunts down the definition of person from the supposited substance and the distinguishing property, and concludes it thus, that person is 'the individual substance of a rational nature'. The third is Richard in his book On the Trinity, saying: "Person signifies a substantial being from some singular property." Therefore we confidently confess that persons in the divinity are spoken of according to substance, and signify substance, and that there are multiple persons there, not multiple substances: because there are multiple there having one and indifferent being from a different property. And so the unity there is according to the mode of being, the plurality according to the mode of existing: unity of essence, because it is one and indifferent being: plurality of persons, because there are multiple existences.

This is also proved by an example: because in lower things 'person' signifies a substance supposited to a common nature: but it is supposited to the common nature through the individuation which it has from matter and its proper accidents: but it is from its ignobility that it is divided by the matter in which it is, such that that which is in this one, is not in that one: and thus in the two it is ignoble, namely because it is divided, and because it is compounded with that which individuates it, by a twofold composition, namely an essential one with matter, and an accidental one with individuating accidents. If therefore we give to God what belongs to nobility, and take away what belongs to ignobility, 'person' in divine matters will signify a supposited substance: yet not one divided, nor compounded in that into which it is supposited, or in which it is: and therefore the unity of the persons always remains in the substance, and the number is taken according to the mode of existing from another, just as Richard said. But that this is true, namely that nothing absolute signified in the person is numbered, is gathered from Augustine at the end of Book VII of On the Trinity, where he says thus:

"Or if it pleases, for the necessity of disputation, even with relative names excepted, to admit a plural number, so that it may be answered by one noun when it is asked,

what the three are, and to say three substances or three persons, let no masses or intervals be thought of, no distance of any unlikeness whatsoever, so that one is understood to be slightly less than another, or in whatever way one can be less than another, so that there is neither a confusion of persons, nor such a distinction by which anything is unequal." From this it is gathered, that the plurality of persons or substances cannot be referred to something absolute signified in this noun, 'person', because then something of the substance would be in one person which would not be in another: and thus there would at least be an inequality, that two would have more of the essence than one alone, which is heretical to say: and therefore one must speak cautiously here, namely that 'person' signifies a supposited substance with a singular property in which number is admitted according to the mode of existence, and the separate substance is not numbered: and when it is said, 'There are two persons', or 'There are three persons', or 'There are multiple persons', the number is referred to the person according to the property of existence, and not according to a multitude of the signified substance.

These things being held, it must be said to the first argument, where Augustine says: "It is not one thing for God to be, and another to be a person, but entirely the same," that this is true: and he speaks of the supposited substance which is not other, nor does it have another being when supposited with a property of singular existence and when signified as a common nature, but it has another mode of signifying, and by reason of that mode it falls into plurality, whereas this noun, 'God', does not.

To another it must be said, that when we say the 'person of the Father', what is said is the supposited substance which is 'who it is' (quis est) in the Trinity, in which properly speaking there is no 'that which is' (quod est): but when we say the 'substance of the Father', we say 'by which it is' (quo est): and so that Augustine might note the indifference of 'who it is' and 'by which it is' in divine matters, he therefore says that we do not say one thing by the one and another by the other, although we speak with a diverse mode of signifying.

To another it must be said, that person is spoken of towards itself by reason of the signified substance: but nevertheless this is not the whole signification of this word, 'person', as is evident from what was said previously.

To another and the following and again the following, the solution is evident from what was said previously.

To that which is objected concerning Anselm, it must be said that Anselm does not intend to say that it does not signify substance, but that in divine matters it is not said in such a way that the substance is numbered, as happens in lower things: and that it does not make a composition of the personal property with the supposited substance which it imports.

To that which is objected concerning Richard and Hugh, the solution is evident: because this is straightforwardly conceded.

To that which is objected concerning the definition of Boethius, it must be said that 'individual substance' is taken broadly for what is incommunicable in whatever way, whether it is incommunicable according to substance, or according to the property of existence alone: for thus it applies to the divine: for the Father has all things common with the Son except the property of his existence: and so it is also in the other divine persons.

To that which is objected concerning the hunting of the definition, it is well conceded.

To another it must be said, that as Boethius says, and also the Master, 'Person' is named from 'sounding by itself' (per se sonando) according to etymology: or it is named 'one by itself' (per se una), as Simon of Tournai says, and the word by itself denotes the property of existence in divine matters. But one does not speak of the unity of the essence in my judgment, as he said, but rather the unity of the person which follows from the distinction of the property, as we said above, and as will be determined again in the following distinction. For a person is one by itself through its personal property.

But I well concede, that it signifies substance in the way that was said.

But to that which is objected to the contrary, to the first two which are of Boethius, it must be said that Boethius does not take the principal signification in 'person', which is the supposited substance spoken of absolutely: and this is because he does not intend to speak there of the signification of the noun, but rather of plurality: and because plurality does not fall by reason of the substance, but by reason of the property of existence which is a relation of origin, he therefore says that it does not signify substance but relation.

To another it must be said, that Augustine says this, so that plurality and number may not be twisted back to the substance which is signified in the noun, but to the mode of existence.

To another it must be said, that this is true, that in no nature is the principle of communicability and of incommunicability the same: but in the divine nature a diverse mode of understanding suffices: and this is because in lower things which are composite, 'that which is' (quod est) and 'by which it is' (quo est) are diverse, and 'who it is' (quis est) and 'by which it is' are diverse: but in divine matters properly speaking there is no 'that which is' and 'by which it is': but there is most truly 'who it is' and 'by which it is', but they are not diverse in reality, because otherwise there would be a universal composition there. Hence the nobility of divine simplicity removes the diversity between 'who it is' and 'by which it is', but it does not remove the truth, because most truly there is a 'who it is' there, and most truly there is a 'by which it is' there: and therefore from the mode of understanding 'who it is', personality and what is incommunicable are taken: and from the mode of understanding 'by which it is', nature is taken, and nevertheless 'who it is' signifies the supposited substance, although it consignifies with it the property of the mode of existence by which a person exists in the divine.

To another it must be said, that the person is numbered by reason of property: hence it is numbered as constituted by property, and not in substance: and this will be better explained in what follows in this distinction.

To another it must be said, that when 'Father' is said, substance is also signified with a singular property, as was expressly evident through the authority of Augustine taken from Book VII of On the Trinity, at the beginning of the book: and therefore it falls into the theological category of substance by reason of the substance, and into the category of relation by reason of what is consignified with the substance.

To another it must be said, that indeed singularity, using the word singularity broadly, is by reason of property: but that is not the entire signification of the word.

But to the opinions introduced I wish to contradict in no way: because the matter is difficult: and let each one follow what pleases him more.

Divisio Textus

Next, the second part of this distinction is to be taken up, where he says: Therefore a question arises here.

For in this the community of this noun which is 'person' is inquired into.

And it is divided into three parts. In the first, the reason for the community is inquired into. In the second, the question is solved as to why three gods are not spoken of by the same reason of community, there at F, But it is asked, When we say the Father and the Son, etc. In the third it is asked, Why do we not say three essences, there at G, But here another question emerges, etc.

The first part has three chapters: in the first of which the question is proposed. In the second, it is solved, there at Because we wish, etc. In the third, the universal reason for the necessity of this locution is explained, both among us and among the Greeks, there at D, By what necessity not only the Latin, etc.

From this the sentence of the Text is evident.

Articulus 3 — Why In The Divine We Say Three Persons, Not Three Substances

Why in divine matters do we say three persons, not three substances?

A question incidentally arises upon this which Augustine says, in the first chapter, there at C, Why do we not say that these three together are one person, just as one essence, and one God?

§ 1. For here Augustine says three (tria in the neuter): and since three in the neuter speaks of substance, it seems that substance is numbered and plurified when it is said, three persons.

§ 2. Also, Anselm in the Monologion says that they are more aptly said to be three substances: therefore substance is numbered. Also, Augustine at the end of Book VII of On the Trinity says that they are called three substances: therefore as before. This same thing is held here in the Text, and Damascene and Chrysostom say it often. Also, Hilary in the book On the Synod: They are indeed three through substance, but one through consonance: therefore it seems expressly that substance is numbered through three, and that they are one by consensus. Also, in the same place: They said there are three substances, teaching persons through substances, not separating the substance of the Father

and of the Son by the diversity of a dissimilar essence: therefore it seems that the substances are diverse in number, and the essence is one.

§ 3. Also, nothing is individuated and made one in number, except through substance: the Father is one person in number, and similarly the Son: therefore multiple persons which have multiple unities, are multiple substances in number. Proof of the first point: every category other than substance speaks of nothing but an accidental form: but this is not made one in number, but rather that which has being as this form or that: but it does not have being as this form or that, except insofar as it is in this subject or that: therefore no other category has an individual except substance alone: therefore it is proved, that every one in number is one by the unity of substance, and multiple in number are multiple by the plurality of substance: since therefore the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are multiple persons, it seems that they are not multiple except by reason of numbered substance.

§ 4. Also, many things happen to a noun, namely gender, number, case, and the like: but all those accidents except number speak of a mode, while number wishes to have a proper signification with respect to the substance which the noun signifies as one or multiple, as is evident when it is said, 'man', and when it is said, 'men', the quality which the noun signifies in each man is one: but the substance signified in the same is not one: because we rightly say, 'Socrates is a man': and we do not say, 'Socrates is men': therefore it seems that every noun of plural number posits a diversity in the substance which it signifies: therefore when it is said, 'multiple persons', the substance will be numbered in this noun, 'person'.

§ 5. Also, if a noun has a plural by reason of property, any singular thing would have a plural, because many things happen to one, as the Philosopher says: and thus we would say 'two or multiple Socrateses' by reason of the grammar and music which are in Socrates, which is false: therefore number is posited concerning substance.

§ 6. Also, since the Father has multiple properties, namely innascibility, and paternity, and active spiration, we would say the Father is 'multiple fathers' or 'persons', which is false: therefore substance is numbered in the noun 'person' when it is spoken in the plural.

But to the contrary: Substance is one in number in the three: or else necessarily one has something which another does not have: and one is not in another, if the substance is diverse: and one works something which another does not, and again the three persons would not agree in substance any more than three men do: all of which the Catholic faith abhors: therefore it is necessary to say that the substance is not numbered. If perhaps you say that the substance is numbered, but not divided: this is not intelligible: because nothing is numbered, except what is distinguished.

Solution. We say without prejudice, that we expect these questions concerning 'person' to be better solved in the homeland (heaven), than we are able to do on the way (on earth): but nevertheless so that we do not seem to pass it by,

It must be said to the first, that it is commonly said that tria (three in the neuter) is posited there for tres (three in the masculine), for the reason that the hypostases are numbered, and

not the substance. But why the masculine is attributed to the persons, and the neuter to the essence, has been expedited above.

To another it must be said, that in the statement of Augustine and Anselm and Hilary, 'substance' is posited for 'hypostasis', and is taken from the act of substanding to a property: just as will be determined in the following chapter, when it is asked concerning the four Greek nouns.

To another it must be said, that plurality which is simply multitude, is not in divine matters, as was proved above: and since there is no simple plurality in divine matters,

a simple plurality is not signified by the personal nouns either, but only a certain kind.

To another it must be said, that a noun which signifies a substance with a quality, and a diverse one at that, is a noun of a composite: and therefore it is not a noun which worthily names God: because in God quality and substance are the same: and therefore in lower things in which there are simply multiple things, there is a plurality in the substance which speaks of 'that which is' (quod est): but in God, in whom 'who it is' (quis est) does not differ from 'by which it is' (quo est), plurality cannot be posited in anything substantial or absolute: but only, as Richard says, it is posited in the mode of existence: and therefore 'who' is plurified on the part of the mode of existence, but not on the part of the substance: and therefore also the plurality consignified in a divine noun is not of the same ratio as the plurality of a created noun: hence when it is said, 'three persons', the sense is, three distinct in the property of existence, and not distinct in substance or in any essential thing: but in lower things, three persons are different through being and substance, which speaks of that which is.

To another it must be said, that plurality cannot be taken from just any property, but from a property of origin according to the mode of existence, because many of these do not belong to one, nor do two belong to one according to the same mode: as it belongs to the Father not to be from another from whom another is, which does not belong to another: but it belongs to the Son to be from another through generation, and to the Holy Spirit to be from others through spiration: for nature does not admit such properties to be present in the same thing (as Anselm says), since they are opposed: nor does reason grasp how they could belong to one: and therefore a number of such properties suffices for the divine hypostases, especially since (as Hilary says) property is a subsisting and perfect person: because in divine matters nothing is accidental: but the property in the person, whose property it is, is the subsisting and perfect person himself, as Damascene says.

To another it must be said, that although there are multiple properties in the person of the Father and of the Son, nevertheless only one alone is personal, which makes the person to be a person according to the mode of understanding: and this will be determined below.

Articulus 4 — What These Names Signify According To The Greeks, nmodowmoy, ovalware, Srdotacic; And These According To The Latins, Essence, Subsistence, Substance, And Person

What do these nouns signify according to the Greeks, prosopon (πρόσωπον), ousiosis (οὐσίωσις), hypostasis (ὑπόστασις), and ousia (οὐσία), and these according to the Latins, essence, subsistence, substance, and person?

Next it is asked concerning this which he says in the fourth chapter, there at D, By what necessity not only the Latin, etc.

For a question arises here concerning the four words of the Greeks and Latins, which among the Greeks are ousia, ousiosis, hypostasis and prosopon: but among the Latins, Marcus Tullius (Cicero) posited four corresponding to them in order, namely essence, subsistence, substance, person.

§ 1. And it seems that they are badly taken by the Saints: because Boethius says in his commentary on the book of Categories, that ousia is composite from first matter and first form: but ousiosis is first form, and hypostasis first matter: therefore it seems that ousia does not signify a simple and divine essence, as Augustine seems to say here.

§ 2. Also, Augustine and Jerome posit 'subsistence' for a composite or individual: but according to Marcus Tullius, subsistence among us is the same as what is ousiosis among the Greeks: but among the Greeks that sounds of a substance signified in genus or species, as Boethius says: therefore it seems that subsistence ought to be posited more for a person which is common, than for a person which is singular.

§ 3. Also, Boethius says that the Greeks do not call anything hypostasis except individuals of a rational nature, and they do not call other individuals of a lower nature by that noun: therefore it seems that 'substance' is the same as prosopon or person: and thus there ought not to be anything but three words, and not four.

§ 4. Also, in no nature can there be anything but one primary subject, and one ultimate predicate: but Boethius says in the book On the Two Natures in the One Person of Christ (from which all these things are drawn) that person is nothing but a subject: therefore none of the others can name a subject: therefore since in a nature there is nothing but 'that which is' (quod est), on the part of which person is taken, and 'by which it is' (quo est) on the part of which essence is taken, it seems that the other two are superfluous.

§ 5. Also, in created nature there is nothing but the universal and the particular: therefore there ought not to be anything but two nouns distinguishing them.

§ 6. Also, since among those four there are two extremes, namely essence and person: and two middle terms, namely subsistence and substance: and substance is closer to essence according to the intellect: therefore it ought not to be posited for person, as he says...

Augustine, but rather for the common nature.

Solution. It must be said that according to different Doctors, and the different reasons for these names, the use of these terms is different: for in philosophy, hypostasis is called the first matter, and usiosis the first form, and usia the composite: the reason for this acceptance is as follows: because all causality according to any genus of cause must necessarily be reduced to the first cause in that genus, as the Philosopher says in the second book of the first philosophy, just as all heating is reduced to fire: therefore, since it is supposed that matter is first, everything that is supposed for the sake of material property is supposed and subsists: if therefore substance, or hypostasis (otherwise, usiosis) which is the same, is taken from the act of subsisting first, it will necessarily sound from that which is the first reason of subsisting, that is, the first matter: subsistence, however, sounds that which is subsisting in itself needing nothing, as Boethius says. However, form does not need matter, but rather is something divine and best which is desired by matter, and does not desire: and therefore, with the consideration prehabited, subsistence or usiosis is taken for the first form. Essence, however, is that from which being is, and whose act is to be, as Boethius and Tullius say: however, being is not the act of essence unless it is in matter, and therefore they called it the composite: and thus the mode of acceptance of the Philosophers appears sufficiently. Ipécwnoy, however, is rather a poetic name than a philosophical one, unless perhaps the Poet is called a philosopher: because he imitates the Philosopher, composing a fable from wonders, as the Philosopher says. However, xgdewndv is the same as a face in a mask, because actors in theaters represented different sex and property by sounding under the masks of different faces, either of Medex, or Simon, or another: and therefore because sound reflected in a hollow solid begins from the acute, therefore also the Latins call xpdcwnov a person, with the penultimate circumflexed: which although it is against the composition of the word, which is composed from pro and sono, nas, which has the first short: nevertheless because it is so according to the property of the instrument by which it sounds, it is produced, and in accent circumflexed: and because also they were accustomed to represent persons of great dignity in this way, to whom a short syllable does not suit, whence as another Poet speaking of such magnates said oldi for il: so also here the person produces and circumflexes the penultimate, because in this way it expresses the greatness of such more. Therefore, this is the acceptance of these terms among the Philosophers.

The Master Prepositivus places here another acceptance which is taken according to the tradition of Boethius in the book on the Two Natures in one person of Christ, saying that in the category of substance two things are to be considered, namely the substance of the subject, and the substance which is the subject. The substance of the subject is that which is of the natural substance, which is the category: and this (as he says) is taken by the name oda!zc among the Greeks, and by the name essence among the Latins. However, the substance which is the subject is subsisting in itself needing nothing: and that is genera, and species of substance, to which accidents do not happen, as Boethius says, that is, accidents of nature, such as white, black, and the like: and this is called subsistence, and odctwas: or it is the substance of accidents, and this is the first substance which is most properly called, that is, Snéstastc, and substance among us. However, person and nodcwnov refer to the property which notes the authority of dignity in morals, or nature: and this is not so much of Preposit-

ivus, as of Boethius, and Marcus Tullius: but the use of these among Augustine and Jerome, who concede that there are three subsistences, and not three substances, varies somewhat.

And therefore it must be noted that in substance, that is, in the nature of substance, there are two things, namely that by which it is, and that which it is. However, that by which it is is considered in two ways, namely as it is in itself simple, not commingled with any particulars: as when it is said, man is a species, and risible: and this is proper, and not common, since it cannot be predicated of anything according to that intention: and this some say is essence. Nature is also taken as common, as predicable of individuals: and thus man is an appellative name, if it is so taken in the nature of man: and thus among Boethius it is called usiosis or subsistence, among Augustine and Jerome it is called substance or usiosis: because according to them substance corresponds to usiosis and not to hypostasis. However, if nature is considered according to that which it is, it is considered in two ways: either by the respect which it places to the nature to which it subsists, and then it is called substance among Boethius, and éréctass, or subsistence according to Augustine and Jerome: or by respect to the property, and then it is called according to all person and tpdcwroyv. But this acceptance does not seem to agree with the Authors who say that the essence of a thing is said and predicated of that of which it is the essence: and therefore it must be said that only one thing according to the intellect of Augustine and Jerome is taken from the part by which it is, which is essence. However, others are taken from the part of that which it is: and substance indeed according to them places respect to that by which it is: for which reason also it is easily understood among the Latins, as sometimes it is placed for essence, sometimes for suppositum: and therefore the Latins did not want to concede three substances. However, subsistence according to them places respect to individuation: although in these two according to Anselm and others it is the converse. But person places a special respect to the distinction of the property pertaining to the dignity of morals or nature.

Therefore, consenting to this last opinion, we respond to the objections: and the solution to the first is already clear by the fact that these are taken differently among the Philosophers than among the use of the Saints.

To the other it must be said that Augustine and Jerome take subsistence differently than Tullius: and the reason for this has already been said because of the doubtful acceptance of the word substance among the Latins: which is sometimes taken for essence and common nature: and therefore also among the Latins it names the nature of the first category: but Tullius takes it according to what is said from the act of subsisting only.

But if you ask, Why did the Saints not take it in this way? It must be said that the Saints expressed faith to the simple: and therefore they did not want to use doubtful words, lest the simple could be seduced according to error, while they were ignorant of the multiplicity of the name.

To the other it must be said that the Greeks take hypostasis for that which is most distinct: and this is only the composite in the ultimate composition. However, the composite in the ultimate composition is that which is from the ultimate matter and from the ultimate form

according to nature. However, the ultimate matter is the organized human body, for this is of greater composition than any body as to organization: and the ultimate form in nature is the rational soul. And therefore they call the individual of rational nature hypostasis. And from this the reason is clear for what is said in the letter, that they do not call three persons three zpécwna, but three hypostases: because according to the property of their language it sounds more: but among us the name of person is not superfluous: because that which corresponds to hypostasis among us is of doubtful signification, that is, substance.

To the other it must be said that although there is one first subject, and one ultimate predicate, nevertheless the subject is to be considered in many ways: and therefore it can be signified in as many ways as has been said.

To the other it must be said that the particular is the subject in three ways, and thus it takes three names according to the last opinion.

To the other it must be said that that objection proceeds according to the understanding of Marcus Tullius, and Anselm, and Boethius: but because of the doubtfulness of the name substance, Augustine and Jerome used subsistence in place of substance.

Articulus 5 — Whether This Name, Person, Is Common To Several, Namely To The Father, The Son, And The Holy Spirit

Whether this name, person, is common to several, namely to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit?

Then it is asked concerning this which says:

If three persons are said to be, that which is person is common to them.

For from this it is held that person is common to these three.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:

1. If it is a common predicate of the three: either as being of the nature of the three, or as not being of the nature of the three. If as not being of the nature of the three, this is accidental to the three, just as white is predicated of snow, and of a swan, and a pearl. But if it is predicated commonly, as being of the nature of the three, either convertibly or not convertibly. If convertibly: therefore person is converted with the Father: therefore of whatever person is predicated, and Father: which is false, because person is predicated of the Son, but not Father.

1. But if it is predicated as being of the nature of the three, and is not converted, it will necessarily be a genus, or a species: therefore in the divine there is a genus, or a species: which above was disproved.
2. Likewise, Whatever is predicated of several by one reason, is abstract and abstracted by the intellect: person is predicated of the three by one reason: therefore it abstracts from all and is abstracted by the intellect. But whatever is abstracting and abstracted by the intellect from those of which it is predicated, is universal; therefore person is universal: therefore universal is in the divine, which Boethius denies.

3. Likewise, Universal is that which is in many and of many: but person in the divine is in several and of several: therefore it is universal to them.

4. If perhaps you say, that it is common according to reason alone, and is common according to the thing: and person is common according to reason alone, and not according to the thing. On the contrary: Common according to the thing in the divine is common according to being: and no universal has real community, but has community according to reason, to which corresponds in the thing the community of person: because although it has being in this, it can nevertheless be in another, and multiply according to being in those in which it is: and this seems most rightly to agree with person: because person has being in the Father and the Son, and multiply according to being in them: because we say, that three are several, and not one person: therefore person as universal is predicated of the three. If perhaps you say, as almost all evade, that person is common according to negation: and this negation does not cause universal: because nothing is so distant that it does not well communicate in negation: just as God and a stone agree in not being a goat, or in another according to negation said: this is nothing because the individual is not such a negation that it places nothing, but rather a negation consequent to that which is per se one: therefore person although not by reason of individual substance, nevertheless by reason of that upon which individuation is founded, will cause universal.

Likewise, When it is said, Person is individual substance, substance falls directly in the intellect, and person as individual of that substance disposition and property: therefore it signifies substance more principally affirmatively, than it signifies the reason of disposition negatively: and thus that solution seems to avail nothing.

Likewise, Boethius says, that every person signifies substance ultimately subject and supposed: but this understanding is not negative: therefore it is nothing that some say, person is common according to negation,

Conclusion. It must be said without prejudice, that there is a twofold community, namely of being, and of reason. But community in being and essence the same in number, cannot be found except in the divine hypostases, and not in any created nature: because every created thing is composite, and therefore the same in number according to being cannot be in diverse and distinct subjects. But community of reason is manifold: for some is according to common nature by the same reason participated by several, which common nature is abstracted from each of them, and according to being in each of them having composition with that which contracts it to this and to that: and that nature makes universal, and according to the whole power which that nature has, it is not in one, although it is in it according to being: therefore that nature exceeds each of those, of which it is predicated as to power: and because it is in it according to its whole being, therefore it is the reason of each of them of which it is predicated, or part of its reason, or simply, as in genus, or species, and difference: or in a certain respect, as it is in property, and accident. There is also community resulting from the proportion of some to one, which agrees to each, yet according to diverse: just as there is

community of proportion of the governance of a ship and of a school, to the governor and the scholar: which yet agrees to the ruler by nature according to the art of governing, and to the scholar according to the art of teaching letters: because yet the habit is similar, therefore the respect to the act of governance is common to them. And such a habit is also found in natural things: for when it is said, Socrates is a man, Plato is a man: it is common to Socrates and Plato this very thing which I say man: and this by the reason of universal nature. But when I say, these are men, Socrates and Plato are supposed by the demonstrative name: and thus it is common to them, that they are supposits of man, and the respect of the supposit and the habit to that which is according to nature common, is determined by the verb sunt: and this community of the supposit is nothing else than a similar habit of them to the nature which is common to them. And because in the divine person signifies substance, as above determined, and signifies it as supposit, therefore by such community person is common to the three. But the difference is in this that the reason of the supposit in inferiors is universal by accident: because it happens to Socrates and Plato to be supposits by this that man according to the same nature is predicated of them. But in the divine person is not universal: because in reality it is not exceeding the subject of which it is predicated, when it is said, Father is person: for it is the same in subject and predicate, differing yet according to the mode of signifying: and similarly when it is said, Son is person: and if it is abstracting from both, that abstraction is only according to our intellect, and not according to the nature of the thing: just as in all divine names some property is always found, as above determined. And in this way also I say concerning the community of relation, or distinction, or incommunicability, unless adding this, that when it is said, Father and Son are related, and relative, or Father and Son are two supposits, or Father and Son are incommunicable, or Father and Son are hypostases, or Father and Son are persons, or Father and Son are God: because the first of these communities is taken by one respect to the act of relation, the second by one respect to the act of property, the third by one respect to the negation consequent to the act of property, the fourth by one respect to the reason of the supposit ordered to property, the fifth by one reason of the supposit ordered to the act of property pertaining to dignity: but the sixth by one respect of the supposits to nature: therefore only that predicate, namely God, says common in reality and nature. It is also hinted by Augustine that he says, that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are three things to be enjoyed: and thing according to Hilary says thing by nature, that is, of which it is to generate, or to be generated, or to proceed: because these acts demonstrate the mode of existence, therefore the community of this name, thing, will be the seventh: and it posits only one habit of the three to nature alone. Hence none of these makes common in reality except one, namely the sixth: but all the others are communities of proportion or habit to one in common reason, which common is not abstract, as simpler from less simple: because nothing is there simpler than another: but there is there a common reason according to the mode of our intelligence, which in all names fails from God.

To the first therefore it must be said, that person is predicated of the three: not as being of the nature of the three, because of the most simple there is no definitive reason: nor is it predicated by accident, but it is predicated as the same in subject of which it is predicated, and exceeding it by the nature of the thing, but according to reason only, to which nothing in

reality responds except the community of nature: because since the nature is common, the same similar proportion of them to it follows; and that similar proportion is really founded in those proportioned to nature and in nature: and the name which names that community, is common only of reason according to that proportion, not common really as said.

To the other it must be said, that although it does not exceed substance in reality and nature by any common which it imports, yet it leaves a similar proportion to the same in another: and from that similarity such relative names are imposed, person, hypostasis, and thing of nature, and incommunicable, and suchlike: and by reason of that proportion they exceed, although not in reality: and therefore according to predication they are not converted with their subjects.

To the other it must be said, that for universal it is required, that it abstracts from those of which it is predicated, as common nature abstracts from its inferiors which contract it by those by which it is composed: but here it is not so, but only the similarity of proportion is imported in these names: and the common abstract does not say one nature which is in both, but common which is in our reason only founded in the similarity of proportion or habit of the three persons to one.

To the other it must be said, that person is not said of many: because three are not many, as above proved: and even if they were many, person would not be said of them as universal, as already said: and therefore that reason does not proceed.

To the other it must be said, that although in universal there is not according to being community, there is yet community according to one nature which agrees to all: but in the divine it is not so: for person does not say any one nature which agrees to the three, and is contracted in them to this and that person: and therefore in them there is community according to the reason of proportion only.

Articulus 6 — Whether In The Divine There Are Three Substances As There Are Three Persons

Whether in divine things there are three substances just as there are three persons?

Whether in divine things there are three substances just as there are three persons?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said in the following part, there, F, But it is asked here, When we say Father, etc.

1. For it seems that we can say three substances, and three gods: because person signifies substance: therefore as many as there are persons, so many are substances.
2. Likewise, a person is an individual substance of a rational nature: therefore three persons are three individual substances of a rational nature.
3. Likewise, if the commonality of person is the cause that it is said plurally of three, where there will be the same cause, there will be the same effect: therefore we ought to

say multiple gods. Nor can Scripture provide an impediment: because Scripture does not contradict anywhere.

4. Likewise, if the understanding of diversity impedes that we do not say multiple substances or multiple essences, since in the notion of person substance falls directly, it seems also the understanding of diversity impedes that person is not said plurally of three.

Solution. It must be said that in truth Augustine does not give the whole cause why we do not say three gods. Hence, although person signifies substance, nevertheless it also implies a distinguishing property on account of which it receives a plural number, as was said above: however, God and essence and substance imply no distinction of themselves. And through this the solution to the first and to the last two is clear.

To the second it must be said that a person is an individual substance which is a hypostasis. For since in the notion of person there is a threefold incommunicability, namely of the universal, of the part, and of the assumable: hence man in common is not a person, and the soul which is a part of man is not a person, and human nature in Christ is not a person: hypostasis does not say incommunicable except in opposition to the nature of the universal: and the other two incommunicabilities are implied by the term "individual." Hence, as was said above, concerning the substance which person signifies, number is not posited: because, as Richard says, it does not pertain to the notion of person, whether there is one substance, or multiple, as long as they are distinguished under a common nature according to the mode of existence.

Articulus 7 — Whether In The Divine There Are Three Hypostases And One Essence

Whether in the divine there are three hypostases and one essence.

Whether in the divine there are three hypostases and one essence.

Then it is asked concerning this which says

Three hypostases one essence, etc.

1. For hypostasis is the same as substance, but there are not three substances.
2. Furthermore, a contradiction seems in the text below, where Jerome says that this name hypostasis is not of good suspicion.
3. Furthermore, in what does hypostasis differ from person? For if you say that hypostasis signifies distinguishable not distinguished, this is nothing, because in the divine to be and to be able are the same. Furthermore, in the divine power is the same as act. Likewise, Boethius expressly says that the Greeks do not call an individual of rational nature by this name: therefore, as it seems, there is no difference.
4. Likewise, since hypostasis sounds the same as substance among us, and God signifies nature and substance and not as essence, Damascene says that it signifies having deity:

why do we not say three gods, just as three hypostases and three substances? For Anselm in the penultimate chapter of the Monologion, and Augustine at the end of book VIII on the Trinity, and it is held in the Gloss, concede that three substances can be said, provided it is understood sanely. Therefore, it seems that we can more say three gods, since God is a name of operation, as Damascene says, and the operation of God does not oppose plurality.

Solution. It must be said that in truth among the Greeks this name hypostasis has something different from the mode of signifying and something different from use: for from the mode of signifying (because it is imposed from the act of subsisting) it has that it is placed for first substance, that is, for an individual of the first category. Among us, however, substance is of doubtful signification, as was previously held: and therefore we do not use substance as they use hypostasis. From the use of the Greeks, however, it has that it is not placed except for an individual of rational nature: and in this way again it does not have our use: yet the reason for this use was assigned above: and through this the solution to the first is clear.

To the other it must be said that in the first times before its signification was determined by the Catholic Fathers, it was not of good suspicion: but afterwards it was determined.

To the other it must be said that although hypostasis signifies distinct according to the use of the Greeks, it does not, however, signify the reason of distinction in the name itself, and this reason the person expresses.

To the other it must be said that although God is imposed from operation, it is not imposed on operation, but on nature: but also that operation from which it is imposed is not communicable: for from three operating by the power of one essence, the operation does not receive plurality in the substance of operation, but perhaps in the mode of consignifying, as when it is said: Let us make man to our image and likeness.

Articulus 8 — Whether In The Divine There Is Diversity, Singularity, And Solitude

Whether in divine things there is diversity, singularity, and solitude?

Now sufficiently, as I think, etc.
Here begins the last part of the distinction, and it has two chapters: in the first of which he proves that in divine things there is no diversity, nor singularity, nor solitude. In the second, however, that God is not multiple, there, K, And as in the Trinity, etc.

1. However, it seems that in divine things there is diversity: because plurality is caused by diversity: but plurality is in divine things: therefore also diversity.
2. Likewise, whatever things are distinct, are diverse: the divine persons are distinct: therefore diverse.
3. Likewise, it seems there is solitude and singularity: because it was stated above, that we can say, only the Father, and only the Son: but "only" denotes singularity, and solitude: therefore there is singularity, and solitude.

Solution, It must be said that diversity, properly speaking, has opposition to identity: but identity is only from the substantial: and therefore diversity is only where there is division through substantial forms according to diverse being: but division is through the separation of matter: however, difference is properly through natural form, or accidental, according to which difference is commonly accepted: and therefore in divine things there is no separation, nor diversity, as it is said, because separation implies distance in place or nature: but for distinction it suffices that one is not the other through the relative property of origin. And through this the solution to the first two is clear.

To the other it must be said, that although the exclusive expression is received, yet not according to what is categorematic and makes implication of similarity, but according to what is syncategorematic and stands in the subject.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear: so that solitude in divine things refers to sequestration in place, but singularity to the privation of a consort, and individuation through accidents: because thus both are removed from divine things.

And this concerning this distinction.

DISTINCTIO XXIV

Divisio Textus

Here it is necessary to inquire diligently, etc. Here the Master begins to deal with numerical terms. And this part has two distinctions: in the first of which he determines concerning numerical names in themselves. In the second, concerning that about which it is posited, which is as if numbered in divine things: and this begins in distinction XXV, there, A,

Furthermore, it must be considered, etc.

The first part is subdivided into three: in the first of which the Master proves that in such numerical expressions quantity is not posited in divine things. In the second, he shows what the words signifying the distinction of number mean, such as distinct, discrete, there, G, When however we say, In the third, he shows what it is that certain saints say the Trinity is multiple, there, K, Here it must not be omitted, etc.

In the first of these there are six parts. In the first, he raises the question. In the second, he shows that such do not posit, but remove, there, B, If diligently, etc. In the third, he adds an example concerning the signification of one, there, C, When indeed it is said, In the fourth, he adds an example concerning the signification of many, there, at the beginning of chapter D, Likewise, when it is said In the fifth, there are many persons, etc.

In the fifth, he adds an example concerning the signification of three, there, E, also when we say there are three persons, etc. In the sixth, he adds an example concerning the signification of two, there, F, Similarly when it is said, there are two, the Father and the Son, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether There Is Number In The Divine

Whether there is number in the divine?

Here before the Letter it is necessary to inquire two things, namely whether there is number in the divine? And, whether it is univocally in the divine and in creatures?

Concerning the first, it is proceeded thus:
1. Isidore says that number is said to be as if it were the nod of a member, that is, of division: but there is no division in the divine, because the Father is in the Son, and conversely: the Holy Spirit is in both, and conversely: therefore there is no number.

1. Likewise, Boethius in the book on the Trinity: This is truly one which is not divided, and he understands concerning the divine of which there is no number: therefore in the divine there is no number.
2. Likewise, from whatever genus and species are removed: but in God there is no quantity: therefore neither is there the species of quantity which is number.
3. Likewise, Number, as the Philosopher says in the tenth book of the Metaphysics, is multitude measured by one: but God is simply immense: therefore in Him there is no number.
4. Likewise, whether we take number mathematically, or according to what is in the numbered thing, it seems number does not pertain to God: for mathematical number, or that by which we count, as Boethius says in the book on the Trinity, is made by the iteration of the same unit, its aggregation constituting the whole number: but in that aggregation the whole is greater than any part: but in God there is nothing of this sort: therefore such number does not pertain to God. But if number is taken in the numbered thing, it is the same to be in number as it is to be in the measure of its discrete quantity: but this again does not pertain to God, as the Master proves here: therefore in God there is no number.

But ON THE CONTRARY:
1. Unity is potentially every number: but God, as Boethius says, is most absolutely one, so that He seems to be the first one: therefore in Him is potentially every number.

1. Likewise, the Philosopher in the tenth book of the Metaphysics holds that the simplest in any genus is the first one measuring all others which are of the same genus: but God is the simplest in the genus of substance: therefore He is the first one by which all others are measured.

Likewise, the Philosopher, in the same place: In substance it is necessary that there be one at the same time: for this is similar in all things. And there the commentary says these words: One in substances is that which is the principle of their being, and the principle of their number which exists in substances: and he intends, when this is joined with what is declared in the book of Physics, namely that the first mover or first cause is indivisible and impartible not having magnitude at all, this is the first mover absolute from all matter: and it will be

declared later, that this is not only the principle as mover, but as form and end: and then it will be declared, that this is the one of which it is proven, that it is the principle of substance: just as it is declared that it is the ultimate act to which no potentiality is mixed at all.

1. Likewise, the Philosopher, in the same place: For that which is not divided, is said to be one, according to that which is not divided: but God is most indivisible: therefore most one: therefore it pertains to Him to be one.

and this is the potential number, and the measure of the number is: therefore, etc.

1. Furthermore, we say that He is one, Deuteronomy 6:4: Hear, O Israel, etc.: and we say that there are three persons, 1 John 5:1: There are three who give testimony in heaven. Therefore, there is in Him a potential number, and an actual number, as it seems.

Sorvrio. Here it is necessary to distinguish that number is considered in many ways. For there is the number of discrete quantity which is an aggregation of units, so that it makes in it a distinction of the lack of continuation between unity and unity, as the Philosopher says: for if there were continuation between unity and unity, as between point and point in a line, it would not be a discrete quantity. And from that reason, the Master seems to proceed in the text: because without a doubt, no such distinction separating one from another is or can be in the divine, where the Father is in the Son, and the Son in the Father.

In another way, number is taken from the side of the thing numbered: because that according to which it takes the notion of one which is potentially a number, it takes the notion of number: however, it takes the notion of one from the form, not according to what the form is, but according to what it terminates that to which it gives being: for there are three acts of the form or of that by which a thing is what it is. The first is to give being. The second, however, is to give the notion of nature. And the third is to terminate: and from this last act of the form is the notion of one: because through this it is made undivided in itself, and divided from others: and this is its definition: and this the Philosopher intends when he says that that which is not divided is called one according to what it is not divided. In this way, we rightly say that this thing is one, this thing and that are two: and in this way, we rightly say that God is one: but we cannot personally say in this way that the Father is one, and the Father and the Son are two, since they are not divided from each other by being and form: in this way again

the Master rightly says that in the persons there is no number.

In the third way, we say number, that which goes forth by the likeness of numbering the power of one: and this in two ways, namely according to matter, and according to form. According to matter: as we say ten ells to be the number of the quantity of cloth, because the ell is repeated ten times in the quantity of the cloth: and in this way, we say a line is ten aliquot parts. According to form, however, especially in the exemplar: as we say those things which have been made, and are, and will be, are the number of divine exemplars: and this one is called a measure by the mode of principle to being, and by the mode of exemplar form. as the first cause is one numbering the caused, not that it is repeated in them, or that its

repetition is the quantity of them, as some have misunderstood, but that the form of each one through relation to it and the exemplar is one, and all exemplar forms make a multitude. In this way, we say God alone is one, who is the principle and exemplar of the whole multitude of creatures: and this one is not potentially many by its repetition, but potentially of many effects and exemplars: and this is the intention of the Philosopher in the authority placed above, and the intention of the Commentator. And this is what Dionysius says in the book On the Divine Names:

Theology praises the whole thearchy as the cause of all by the name of one. And one God the Father, and one Lord Jesus Christ, and one and the same Spirit because of the exceeding simplicity of the whole divinity, in which all are singularly gathered and super-united, and preside super-substantially. For which reason also all things rightly return and are placed back to it, from which, and through which, and in which, and to which, all things are, and are coordinated, and remain, and are contained and fulfilled and converted. Al- in his Metaphysics, in the third division of being, thus: In the first way, that one singular signified is most truly called one, in which there is no multitude, nor impotence, nor even in effect, as the essence of the Creator: since God is not divided in effect, nor is He receptive of division. Therefore, He is free from multitude in being and power and effect, whose name is exalted: He therefore is truly one.

In the fourth way, number is said from the side of the thing numbered according to something and not simply, namely the caused plurality by any distinguishing whatsoever as we also say a point continuing in the middle is two, because we use one as two, namely in the notion of end and principle, and we say the center in a circle is many in the notion of lines going out from it to the circumference: and in this way, we say a person is one distinct by its property of origin, and two persons are more distinct by such a property of origin: and in this way alone, number positively falls in the divine: and in this consideration of number, the Master is diminished: because this number is not simply number, but according to something, which the distinguishing and determining property effectively makes: however, the person is numbered by that number, as we said above.

Therefore, it must be said to the first, that according to that reasoning of Isidore, number does not fall in the persons, unless division is largely taken for distinction: and one then does not say the distinction of sense or eye to the thing demonstrated, but rather the distinction of intellect.

To the other, it must be said that Boethius speaks of one according to the notion of the name: because that is one which is undivided in itself, and divided from another: especially, however, that is undivided which is neither actually nor potentially divisible, nor capable of multitude: and to this is added a third condition, that it is most one indivisible in power and act, and whose nature is not other in it than the nature of unity. And a fourth is added which makes it even more one, namely that it is not repeatable so that neither by its division nor by aggregation is it capable of multitude: and with these four conditions joined in one, nothing is one except God alone. For in the first way, it is one, which has one form terminating itself. In the second way, one is a point: but in it, the nature of the point is one thing, the nature of unity

another; because a point is a substance having position in the continuum, since it is in the notion of first and last and middle. In the third way, unity itself is one: because unity by itself is one indivisible in power and act: but it is aggregable to another in the constitution of number. In the fourth way, however, God is indivisible in power and act, having no other nature of unity than Himself, and not aggregable to another for constituting multitude: but if He is the principle of multitude, this will be effectively and exemplarily, as has been said: and thus Boethius understands. However, in this way, we do not seek number in the persons.

To the other, it must be said that this argument does not follow: and the reason has been assigned above, because sometimes a species is referred in the divine not because of the nature of the genus which is in it, but because of the nature of the difference which it adds above the genus. Hence Augustine says that He is great without quantity, etc. And similarly, I say that persons are numbered and yet the quantity of number is not placed around them, because they are numbered by a certain number, and not by a number which is simply number.

From another, it must be said that according to that reasoning of number, number does not fall in the divine, as was previously held.

To the other, it must be said that in the number which places quantity around the numbered, it is true that the whole is greater than its part: but the number of persons places no quantity: and therefore it does not follow there that two are greater than one, or three something greater or something more than one: and this has also been proven above, namely in distinction XVIII.

To those which are objected to the other part, it must be said to the first, that God is most truly one essentially: but it does not befit Him to be a number in power, except effectively and formally, as has been said.

To the other, it must be said that there is a double measure: one namely certifying quantity: and that begins either from the indivisible simply, or from the indivisible according to agreement, because that is of certain quantity. From the indivisible simply: as unity is indivisible, and its repetition certifies discrete quantity. From the indivisible according to agreement: as in weights or liquids or dry or continuous things, one mark, a bushel, a palm, and other things of this kind are said to certify by their own reason, in which we place the first known quantity. Another is the measure of the nature of some genus, and this is made by the relation of all those which are in that genus: therefore, it adds that it has that nature most simply, and is the cause of the being of that nature in others: and thus motions are measured by the first motion, and numbers by one number and not by unity, and creatures by the Creator, and all substances by one first substance: and more is one substance which more approaches the first substance, and less one which more distances itself. And in this way, the Philosopher says that intelligence is one, and is not divided by participating in the multitude of the goodnesses of the first cause, but is more united: because by participating in more goodnesses, it more approaches to one: and in this way, Dionysius says that the divine ray as a

vivifying power fills us, and converts us to the unity of the aggregating Father and the divine super-simplicity.

To the other, it must be said that we rightly concede that God is most one, and in this way which we have said.

To the other, the solution is clear from what was said before.

Articulus 2 — Whether Number Is Univocally In The Divine And In Created Things, And Whether God Is More One Than Unity Itself

Whether number is univocally in the divine and in the created, and whether God is more one than unity itself?

Secondly, it is asked, whether number is univocally in the divine and in the created?

It seems that it is not: because
1. Nothing is univocally common to God and creature: therefore neither is number.

1. Likewise, it has been said that God is one with a unity constituted by a fourfold condition of unity: but no creature is thus one: therefore there is not one reason for His unity and that of inferiors: therefore neither is there number.

But ON THE CONTRARY:
1. Whatever things are said according to more and less, are comparable: God and creature are said to be one according to more and less: for God is said to be more one, and creature less: therefore they are comparable. Hence thus: Whatever things are comparable, are univocal, as the Philosopher says: Creator and creature are comparable in one: therefore they are univocal in the same: therefore one is said univocally of the Creator and of creatures: therefore also number.

1. Likewise, it follows well, this is, and that is: and this is not that, nor part of that, nor whole of it: therefore they are two: but God is, and stone is: and God is not stone, nor whole, nor part of it: therefore God and stone are two: but nothing is counted together unless in that in which they are univocal: for we do not say that an ass and a man are two men, but two animals, because they are univocated in animal: and stone and animal are two substances, or two bodies, and so of others: therefore God and creature are univocal in number.

But on the contrary it is objected:
1. Since one is part of two, it seems to follow from this that God is part of this number, which is false, because God is part of nothing.

1. Likewise, since all units in number are in potency to the last, whose addition completes the species of number, it follows that the unity of God would be in potency to another unity, by which it completes the binary, or ternary, or quaternary, and so of others,

which can be counted together with God: and this is an abuse: therefore God cannot be counted together with creature.

According to this, it is further asked, whether God is more one than unity itself?

And it seems that He is not: because
1. In unity there is nothing but unity, and thus it is most simple: therefore God is not more one than unity.

1. Likewise, if unity were not most simple, then there would be something before unity according to nature: and this is false: therefore it is the first: therefore God also cannot be understood, as it seems, to be more one than unity itself.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
1. In everything that is below the first, there is this and that, as Boethius says: unity is below the first: therefore there is this and that.

1. Likewise, the Philosopher in the book of the Fountain of Life: The first thing that receives from the first, receives by receiving two: because the recipient and the received: therefore since created unity receives its being from the first, it will be two, and not one.
2. Likewise, all things are created in number, weight, and measure: therefore also unity is in a certain number essentially constituting itself.

But here again there seems to be a contradiction of intellects, that unity is undivided, and that it is number or two or three.

Solution. It must be said to the first, that number is not said univocally, nor even unity of the Creator and creature, as the first reasons prove: but it is said equivocally, not indeed equivocally by chance and fortune, as dog, and ass, vessel, and animal: but by equivocation of analogy to one and not according to which being is analogous to substance and accident, or healthy to animal and urine, or doctor to artisan and clyster: but according to the analogy of the caused and exemplified to the cause and exemplar as was previously determined.

To what is objected against this, it must be said that if we wish to force the matter, there is no comparison between Creator and creature: because according to the nature of comparison, those things which are compared according to more and less, are susceptible of equality: and therefore the comparison is abusive, when we say God is more one than creature, and it is as much as to say: God is more one, as God is first and per se as cause and exemplar one: and creature less one, that is, from Him and to Him exemplified and related, is one. However, there are those who say, equivocal analogues are comparable: but this could not be sustained, if those who dispute against it: because analogy in creature and Creator is not according to the analogy determined in creatures, which is touched upon by the Philosopher in III of first philosophy.

To the other it must be said, that the Creator cannot simply be counted together with creature: because they are not counted together to constitute any species of number, unless

units univocally: and therefore the comparison is abusive, when it is said, God and stone are two: and it is resolved into these, God is one, and from Him is one stone, which is not Himself: and by this the solution to the following is clear. Or it may be said, as some say, that number is taken broadly according to the consideration of the common people for the aggregation constituting one number: and thus God can be counted together, but not properly.

To what is further asked, it must be said that God is more one with created unity: and I concede well, that in unity there is this and that. For unity is and is the principle of distinction, and it is evident by itself that it does not have being from the same, and to be the principle of distinction: whence Boethius, Everything that is, participates in another to be, that it may be, in another truly it participates that it may be this.

From this, however, what could be objected against this, that one is converted with being, will be solved below, because this does not impede: because it is not asked here about one, but about unity which is in no way converted with being, although one is converted. In this way also I concede, that unity itself receives as two being: and in this way I concede, that it has mode, species, and order, as was determined above.

To what is objected against this, it must be said that there is no contradiction of intellects: because the reason of unity and plurality are not posited concerning the same according to the same reason: for unity is said by the reason of indivisible in nature remaining discrete in parts, but it is said two or number by the reason of the caused and constituted in the species of creature. For unity differs from a point, and the nature of that difference is in unity: it is otherwise in the nature receiving that difference, as potency receives act: therefore it is this and that. And by this the solution to the two following is clear: for unity is not simply simple, nor simply first, but simple and first in the nature of the discrete having permanence in parts.

Articulus 3 — Whether Unity Or The One Posits Something Or Nothing, And How It Is Opposed To The Many; And How The One Which Is Convertible With Being Differs From The One Which Is The Principle Of Number

Does unity or the one posit something or nothing, and how is it opposed to the many? And how do the one that is convertible with being and the one that is the principle of number differ?

Then it is asked concerning what is said in chapter B of the first part, there, "The use of these words seems to have been introduced for the sake of removing," etc.

Here it seems to be held from the Letter that unity posits nothing: and this some also seem to prove thus:

1. The one is undivided in itself and divided from others: by the grace of the first part it is evident that it adds nothing upon being except a certain negation: and similarly by the grace of the second part, because each thing is divided from others by the fact that it is not another: since therefore negations posit nothing, it seems that the one posits nothing either in God or in creatures.

1. Likewise, in the authority placed above in the first doubt of this distinction, in the second acceptance of number, that which is not divided according to that which is not divided is called one: therefore the notion of non-division is the notion of the one: therefore its notion consists in negation or privation: therefore it posits nothing.
2. Likewise, the Commentator there says that the one and the many are opposed as privation and habit, and that the one is the privation of division which makes the many: therefore since privation posits nothing except the subject, it seems that the one posits nothing.
3. Likewise, the Commentator says that being and the one are synonymous: therefore the one adds nothing upon being: therefore the one adds nothing upon this being: therefore it leaves nothing positively.
4. Likewise, that which is related to something by addition is not convertible with it, but is drawn to less: the one is convertible with being, as the Philosopher says - therefore it is not related to it by addition: therefore nothing is posited by the one, when it is said, this thing is one.
5. Likewise, whatever is related to being by addition is not the first principle in likeness to being: but the one is the first principle in likeness to being: therefore it is not related to being by addition: therefore the dictum of the Master is verified, that it posits nothing not only in God, but also in no creature, as it seems.

If perhaps you would say that the one is not the first: this is against Aristotle in the first philosophy in many places. And if perhaps you do not consider this inconvenient, it will be against Dionysius in the book on Divine Names, where he thus speaks of the one: "The one is the inexpressible cause of all things: for nothing of existing things is not participating in the one." And this is against Boethius in the book on the Two Natures in one Person of Christ, where he says: "What is not one is altogether nothing": and thus it is proven that the one is first like being.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. If the one signifies privation: and habit is before privation, then multitude is before the one, which is false: because the one is before all the many, as Dionysius says. If you say that in truth multitude is before the one, whence Aristotle in X Metaphysics says: "And the one which is not divided is known through the one which is divided: for multitude is more sensible: and what is divided is more sensible than what is not divided: therefore the discourse about the many is before the discourse about the indivisible with respect to sense." On the contrary: For this is a perverse understanding of the word of the Philosopher: for if with respect to sense the one is taken from the many, just as the intelligible is abstracted from the sensible, it does not follow from this that the many are before the one,

unless as the particular singular is before the intelligible universal. But habit by nature precedes privation. And therefore that dictum does not oppose the induced reasoning.

1. Furthermore, what will be answered to the reasons of Avicenna in the first philosophy thus objecting: No privation constitutes its habit: every multitude is constituted by the one: therefore the one is not privation with respect to the many.
2. Likewise, all things posterior by nature have virtue from that which is prior by nature: multitude has virtue only from unity: therefore unity is prior by nature: therefore it is not related to the many as privation to habit.
3. Likewise, no privation is preserved in its habit by what it is: unity is preserved in the many by what it is: therefore, etc.
4. Likewise, no privation is an essential part of habit: unity and the one are always part of the many: therefore as before.
5. Likewise, no repeated privation induces habit, but rather deprives: the repeated one induces the many: therefore also as before:

and other infinite reasons can be induced for this.

1. Likewise, the one is reduced to form, but privation to matter: therefore the one and the many are not related as privation and habit.
2. Likewise, nothing is opposed to the same thing by two kinds of opposition: but the Philosopher says that the one and the many are opposed relatively; therefore they are not opposed as privation and habit.
3. Likewise, of whatever opposites both are posited as being in the species of those, there is no opposition as privation and habit: the one and the many both are posited as being in the species: therefore as before. The first is evident by the definition of habit and privation. The second is proven by what the Philosopher says, that the one is the measure of the many, and is opposed to it as being to being.
4. Likewise, according to the Master it seems here that they are opposed as two privations: because he says that neither does the one posit anything in the divine, nor even the many or the several.

Solution. It must be said that the intention of the Master is to remove the quantity of number from the divine, and not number, nor any notion of number, but only the position of numerical quantity. And to understand this, it is necessary to pre-note how the principle of number, namely unity, is posited in any thing: because any thing is countable with another by the fact that unity is in it: because aggregation constitutes number.

I say therefore that everything that is one is one from form: but form is the being and notion of the thing. And again its termination is from form, as was said before in the solution of the first doubt of this distinction. And from this last act the thing is called one. But that one

is to be considered in two ways, namely as it is constituted by the act of form, and as it is the measure of that which is called the one form. And considered in the first way, it is convertible with form, and the terminating form is the unity of the thing. But in the second way, since nothing is measured except as much as in potency or act, that unity is the principle of number, and it is not convertible with being, but it follows each being: for each being is measured by unity discerning it from another being to which it is countable: and in this last way the one posits the principle of discrete quantity in the thing which is called one: and in this way it is not in God. But in another way we say with respect to us, and not according to nature, that we know number by the division of the one: and because division deprives the notion of unity with respect to the indivision which the one posits, therefore we say that number is the privation of the one in that in which there is number: and because the one is said by continuity, equality of nature, form, and unity with respect to one form: just as we say one line by continuity, we know number by the privation of the one in the line through division, as the Philosopher says that we know number by the privation of the continuous. We say by equality of nature one, just as we say one Angel, and many Angels by the privation of equality in the powers of nature to the angelic work, just as we distinguish that they differ by the subtlety of essence, and the perspicuity of intelligence, and consequently by the participation of gifts, as the Master says in II Sentences, that they differ by the degree of nature, and the order of gifts: for according to this inequality in my judgment not only orders are multiplied, but also Angels: and their multitude or number is known by the privation of this equality. But we say one by form, and we say many by the privation of the unity of form through the being of different things and differences. Thus we say Socrates and Plato are many men, and many animals. By respect to the one we say univocals are one, like man and donkey in animal: and we say many are in which this kind of unity is deprived, as in equivocal things which refer not to one, but to different things: and in anagogical things which although they refer to one, yet not by one and

the same respect: and in this way considering the one according to formal reason, each excludes the other: and this the Master considered when he said that such things would note removal or exclusion: because by these considerations a smaller number well excludes a greater, and a greater excludes a smaller, by the formal opposition which they have to each other, as will be clear below in solving.

To that therefore which is first asked concerning the opposition which is between the one and the many: it must be said that some are diversified on this in three ways.

1. For some wish to say that they have opposition as privation and habit: and some, that as contraries: and some, that as relatives: and all these opinions are true according to something else, and also a fourth, that they have no opposition from themselves, which is Avicenna's. For the Commentator on Aristotle's Metaphysics seems more to say that they are opposed as privation and habit: and some refer this to the notion of the one which is given by privation: but many say that the notion is given by habit: and this is

nothing: because the pure Philosopher seeks more about the nature of the thing itself, than about the intentions of names.

2. Furthermore, that the one is thus defined or explained, this happens to it insofar as it is first. For first things, since they have no prior to themselves, must be explained by negation. And note that some say that the one in substance is named by a privative name: but in quantity positively, like similar and equal. Similarly, multitude in substance positively, and in others privatively, like dissimilar and unequal. And they give the reason that this happens because substance is first, and therefore more unknown to us than others. But this is much: because if the one in others is known, also multitude is known: and thus each should be named in other categories by a positive name.

3. Furthermore, the Philosopher does not say that the one is one in substance, but rather that the same is one in substance: and this is said positively: because it is relative, as Boethius says. Hence the same, similar, and equal, say one related to different things: and the multitude of all these is named privatively, like different, dissimilar, and unequal, all of which are explained by negation.

Hence it must be said that there is one indivisible reduced to matter or the disposition of matter, and one reduced to the nature of form: just as we say one by continuity and one by form: and when we say one by continuity, we say one by matter: because continuity is a disposition of matter: but whatever is one by continuity is potentially many: but every potentiality is in the genus of privation, especially the potentiality of matter, which is the potentiality of the continuous: which is evident, because the continuous is potentially passively many, and not potentially actively. Therefore the one reduced to the unity of matter has opposition to the many as privation to habit: because such unity is susceptible of multitude: and this is the intention of the Philosopher and the comment saying this. But the one which is reduced to form has three considerations, namely according to the formal reason of the one, and according to what it is, and according to what is proximate and consequent to it. Considered in the first way, it has the opposition of contrariety to the many: because each is posited in the species, and mutually expel each other from the same susceptible: and this some attend saying in their comments on the same book, that the one and the many are opposed contrarily. But if the one is taken according to what it is, it has no opposition to the many, but rather is the principle of the many, and is preserved substantially in the many itself. And this Avicenna attends saying that it has no opposition: because neither does privation make habit, nor is it preserved in it; nor does the contrary make the contrary, nor is it preserved in it according to nature, nor is the relative preserved in the relative.

as a part, neither affirmation nor negation can be in such opposition. For if one is taken according to the reason closely following, which is the reason of measure, then the one which is certain is measuring the many which is uncertain: and thus they are opposed as measure and measured: and this is intended by Aristotle in the tenth book of the Metaphysics, and the Commentator there, and Avicenna in his Metaphysics, saying that one and many are opposed

relatively. But it is distinguished there in relatives, that some are such that each depends on the other, and each posits the other, as father and son, and master and servant. However, some are such that one depends on the other, and not conversely: and therefore there one posits the other, and not conversely, as knowledge and knowable: and thus one and many are opposed relatively: because many posits one, and it is not converted. Hence Dionysius in the book On the Divine Names: Without one indeed there will not be multitude, but without multitude there will be one: just as unity is before every number and multiplication. And from this distinction almost all questions are solved.

Therefore, it must be said to the first, that indivision is the reason of the one which is converted with being, but it is not the reason of it according to which it is the principle of discrete quantity: and that indivision is not absolutely privation, but is a negation following the act of form, as was said above: and therefore it is not proved by this that one is the privation of many: for this which is to be privative of many does not happen to every one, as was said, and through this the solution to the following is clear.

To the other it must be said, that being and one coincide in the thing named by each, and in this respect they are synonymous, but not according to the reasons of those names: otherwise it would be tautology when it is said one being, joining both: for being in itself does not imply distinction; and therefore one, although it does not add any nature, yet adds distinction which follows from the act of form: and therefore the Doctors say that they are converted according to supposita, and not according to their intentions.

From the axiom it must be said, that one adds upon being, but adds nothing upon the suppositum of being: and therefore before the intention of one is the intention of being, and the intention of being is simpler than that of one: but that which is being, and that which is one, are converted: and through this the solution to the following is clear up to the end.

However, the objections which are made to the contrary conclude necessarily except the first: for that does not follow, even if it is granted, that one and being are opposed in some way as privation and habit: because the privation which is according to nature after the habit is that which posits nothing except the subject: but even when we say one is the privation of many, still one is reduced to being by continuity or form: and therefore it is not absolutely privation, and therefore one according to nature precedes many: and through this the solution to the whole is clear.

There are some here saying marvelous things, which I do not know if anyone can understand. For they say that one and many are simply opposed as privation and habit, and that the Master takes one for unique, and that one adds nothing upon being even according to intention, because Aristotle says that the reason of the thing and of the one thing is the same: and therefore when God is said, one God is understood: and if one is added, this is done for the sake of signification or distinction. And all these things in my judgment are not true. For although God is one God, yet unity is not signified in the name, and therefore it can and should be added. However, the other things above have been proven to be false.

Articulus 4 — Whether Numerical Terms In The Divine Predicate The Essence Or The Person

Whether numerical terms in divine things predicate essence or person?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says:

For when it is said, one God, the multitude of gods is excluded.

Here three questions arise, namely, whether numerical terms in divine things predicate the divine essence or person? Second, whether they are predicated univocally of essence and person and notion? Third, whether the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit can in any way be called one?

To the first, it is proceeded thus:
1. It has been held above as a rule, that every name not said relatively, in God predicates essence: numerical terms are not said relatively: therefore they predicate essence.

1. Likewise, Boethius says all predicaments are turned into substance in predication except relation: such terms, however, signify being in the predicament of quantity: therefore they are turned into substance in predication.
2. Likewise, the reason of the thing and of one thing is the same, and the predication of essence and of one essence is the same: therefore since essence predicates nature and substance, in divine things one and two and suchlike will predicate essence.
3. Likewise, one is converted with being: therefore it predicates what being predicates in divine things: but being predicates substance: therefore also one.
4. Likewise, the consignified does not vary the reason of the signified, for white, white, white signifies the same: therefore also one signifies one, one, one but one in divine things predicates substance: therefore one and one.

ON THE CONTRARY
Whatever signifies essence, is said singularly of the three and of one: therefore if one and many or two or three predicate essence, we can say, the Father is two, and the Father is many, and the Father and the Son are one: which being false, it is clear that these do not predicate essence.

Solution. It must be said that in the masculine they do not predicate essence except from an adjunct substantive, around which they place their thing, and they take substance from it: as if I say, the Father and the Son are one God, or something of this sort; and this agrees for a threefold reason, namely the discretion which such names have in principal signification, and of the genus which says the discretion of person, because in rational nature there is no formed being unless distinct in person: and by reason of the article included in such names. However, in the neuter gender, although two of these remain, namely the discretion of the signified and the article, yet they do not have the third which especially draws to the person: because the genus does not happen to the name except on the part of the substance signified and determined according to the mode at least: and therefore then they predicate essence.

To what is first objected, it must be said that such names say relation: for they are consequent to the act of the distinguishing property: for relation is in many ways in divine things, as noted above.

To the other, it must be said that in God such names do not say quantity, nor are they taken in the species of quantity, as was said before.

To the other, it must be said that this is true according to which one is converted with being: and I well concede that those terms when placed with an adjunct, predicate the nature of that in divine things - but when placed absolutely in the masculine gender, they are substantivized, or adjectively referred to persons. By this the solution to the following is also clear.

To the other, it must be said that it is different in white, etc., because one and one are from the act of form generally accepted in every being: but white and suchlike say a determined species: and therefore numerical terms are not equivocated according to their application to different things: because measure does not take its reason from the measured: for otherwise it would not be the same number by which we count dogs and men: but it takes diversity from the different reason of measuring, like a bushel and a yard: but because number in every species of quantity is simpler, therefore it does not take diversity of reason from the measured, but it can be appropriated to one genus, which is not appropriated in another: and therefore absolutely said one, one, one, are of one reason: and yet one is referred to person, and one to essence, when taken absolutely for the reason previously stated.

Articulus 5 — Whether Unity Or Numerical Terms Are Predicated Univocally Of Essence, Person, And Notion

Whether unity or numerical terms are predicated univocally of essence, person, and notion?

Then it is asked, whether it is said univocally that one is of essence and of person?

It seems that it is so: because

1. It is not said equivocally simply, but by prior and posterior of Creator and creature: but between essence and person there is no prior and posterior: therefore it is said in both from the same: therefore univocally.

1. Likewise, either there is one unity of essence and person, or two. If two: therefore essence and person are two, which is false: therefore it remains, that it is one.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:

1. When it is said, the Father is one, the sense is, that is, distinct by notion: but when it is said, essence is one, the sense is, that is, undivided in itself, and divided from others: therefore it is not said by one reason that essence is one, and person is one.

1. Likewise, one is undivided in itself, and divided from others: therefore if the Father is one, he will be divided from others, which is false: because the Son is in the Father, and conversely.

2. Likewise, one and being are converted: therefore by the same the Father is one by which the Father is father: therefore by paternity he is one: but the divine essence is not one by paternity, but by itself: therefore it is not said according to one reason, but equivocally, as it seems.

To this it must be said, that it is said by one reason, and not equivocally: for it is unity abstracting from this one and that, and that is of one reason in any one: because although it is from diverse forms, yet it is abstracted from them by one act according to reason which is to determine, and to finish, and to distinguish: and therefore a stone is one by its stoneness, and fire is one not by stoneness: and yet one is not said equivocally: because just as stoneness distinguishes a stone, so woodenness wood, and therefore unity from both is of one reason: and therefore in this respect it could be said, that unity when it is said of essence, it says unity of essence, and when it is said of person, it says unity of person: and although essence is distinguished by itself, person however by property, yet unity will not be of diverse reason. But if unity is considered according to supposit, then it will be entirely of one reason, but said by prior and posterior in essence and person.

And according to this it must be said to the first, that although there is not prior and posterior according to the thing between essence and person, yet there is prior and posterior according to the reason of understanding.

To the other it must be said, that there is one unity in reality, and not in the reason of understanding, if unity is taken in the being of that which is one, and not abstracted from it: and therefore something agrees with one which does not agree with another.

From the other the solution is clear from what was said before.

Articulus 6 — Whether The Father And The Son And The Holy Spirit Can In Some Way Be Said To Be One

Whether the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit can in any way be said to be one?

Whether the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit can in any way be said to be one?

Then it is asked, Whether the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one?

It seems that they are: because
1. They are one eternal, and the term "eternal" does not divide the notion of one: therefore, I can infer separately: therefore, the Father and the Son and the Spirit are one.

1. Likewise, if by reason of the substantiation of that which is eternal, three are one eternal, why not similarly by reason of the substantiation of the term "one," the Father and the Son are one.

Solution. It must be said that it is not to be conceded except with an adjunct subject, from which the term "one" receives the substance which it proves of several together.

To the first, it must be said that although it does not divide, yet it determines its signification to the nature in which the Father and the Son are united.

To the other, it must be said that the term "one" signifies that which follows essence and person: and whatever is distinct, whether it is distinct essentially or personally: and therefore in the masculine subject it does not imply something special in which the union of the Father and the Son is understood: this, however, the term "eternal" or "immense" does not do.

But if it is said that according to this we could concede, three are being: it must be said that some concede this: but the term "being" signifies nature more than the term "one": because "one" names by way of disposition applicable to anything, but "being" by way of subject and nature.

Articulus 7 — What It Is To Be Distinguished In The Divine

What is it to be distinguished in the divine?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, G, "When, however, we say, the persons are distinct," etc.

For here begins the second part of the distinction, in which he touches upon what the notional terms, distinct, discrete, trinity, signify. And according to these three in order, there are here three chapters: and all these are clear, if it is understood what it is to be distinguished and discerned.

Therefore, distinction in the divine is an act following the notion, insofar as it is a personal property: for thus one person is distinguished from another. Discretion, however, is the same according to the order and number of persons, which is in the divine: for discrete things are numerable. But confusion is the composition of those things which are numbered together, disordered: and in the divine, it signifies the acceptance of the same under different names, as Sabellius used to say. Alienation, however, signifies a cutting off by the removal of one from another, as Arius used to say.

Articulus 8 — Whether It Is Well Said That God Is Triune And One; And Whether The Trinity Is The Unity Of Three

Whether it is well said that God is triune and one: and whether the trinity is the unity of three?

Whether it is well said that God is triune and one: and whether the trinity is the unity of three?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said in the last part K: "Trinity indeed is manifold and numerable: because trinity is the unity of three."

1. For it seems to be contrary, that the Father is the unity of three, because He is the essence which is the unity of three: therefore the Father is trinity.

2. Furthermore, since it is said that trinity is numerable, why is it not said that God is three, or two: since everything numerable according to some species of number is numerable.

3. Likewise, when it is said, God is triune and one: either the term "God" supposes the essence, or the person. If the essence: therefore the essence is triune, which is false. If the person: therefore some person is triune and one, which is false: therefore it seems it should not be conceded that God is triune and one.

But on the contrary: In the hymn it is sung, "The machine of the whole world is governed by the triune and one."

Solution. It must be said to the first, that in the argument there falls the fallacy of accident: just as if it were proceeded thus, Socrates is every animal, because animal is one in which all animals are united. However, some say that when it is said, trinity is the unity of three, it is the etymology of the name: but concerning this we have spoken above, because although according to the name it implies essence directly, yet according to the signification of the thing it is conversely: and therefore trinity is three united in one essence.

To the other it must be said, that God is not numerable: and if trinity is said to be numerable, this is understood of a certain number, namely of notions and persons, and not simply: nor does this number exclude the simplicity or unity of essence, but rather solitude and singularity.

To the other it must be said, that this is true, God is triune and one: and the term "God" supposes the essence in the supposit in common: and therefore by reason of the essence it is fitting to Him to be one, and by reason of the supposits to be triune, supply, to be.

DISTINCTIO XXV

Divisio Textus

Furthermore, it must be considered, with this name, person, etc.

Here begins the second part in which the Master approaches the consideration of the person which is numbered with numeral words. And thus this distinction is divided into two parts: in the first of which he presents the reasons and opinions of those saying that the person in singular and plural always signifies substance. In the second, however, he presents his own opinion, that in the plural, from the time of the response of the faithful to the question, what three? it does not signify essence, but the substance which the Greeks call éxderasw, there, H,

It must be known, therefore, that this name, person, etc.

In the first part, he presents four chapters, in the first of which he raises the question. In the second, he presents the reason set above from the authorities set above, there, B,

For the person, as Augustine said above. In the third, he presents the reason taken from the nature of the interrogative word, there, C, It can also be shown otherwise, etc. In the fourth, he presents the opinion of those following these reasons, there, D, To some it seems, that by the name of person, etc.

Articulus 1 — What A Person Is According To The Definition

What is a person according to the definition?

Two questions arise before the Letter, namely, what is a person according to the definition? And, whether it is univocal in divine and created persons?

To the first, the definition of Boethius is set forth: A person is an individual substance of a rational nature in the book on Two Natures in One Person of Christ. Another definition is given by Richard in his fourth book on the Trinity thus: We call a person someone distinguished from all others by a singular property. Also, below, in the same place: A divine person is the incommunicable existence of the divine nature. Also, below, in the same place: A person is an existing by itself according to the singular mode of existence of a rational nature. Another is given by the Masters, namely, A person is a hypostasis distinct by a property pertaining to dignity.

However, it is objected against the first: because 1. The Master says that that description of Boethius does not apply to divine persons.

1. This is also shown by reason thus: Whatever is not of a rational nature is not a person: God is not of a rational nature: therefore, He is not a person. The first is evident by itself. The second is proved by the fact that rational is a divisive difference of animal: but God is not an animal, because He is not a body: therefore, He is not rational.
2. Also, when it is said, of a rational nature, nature is taken in some community: but this community is contracted in a person by what it adds: therefore, a person in addition relates to nature: therefore, it is composite, which is false, since in divine things the person and nature are of the same simplicity.
3. Furthermore, when it is said, substance, essence, person, nature: why did he not say that a person is an individual substance of a rational essence or substance, as of nature?

If perhaps you say that a person is of the same simplicity with nature, and adds nothing: because it is not said as being of the essence of the defined which falls obliquely in the definition, as when it is said snub or snubness is the curvature of the nose, and lame is the curvature of the leg, only one is said: because what falls obliquely there is not of its essence. If, I say, you say thus. Against:

1. It is otherwise in the definition of substance, and otherwise in the definition of accident, as the Philosopher says in the seventh book of Metaphysics, because in the definition of substance accident is not received, but in the definition of accident it is necessary to receive the subject, either determined, as in a proper passion, or undetermined, as in

others. Therefore, when a person is defined, it is either defined as a supposed substance, as Boethius expressly says that a person names a supposed substance, or it is defined as a common or proper accident: because there is no middle to give, if it is defined in the first way: therefore, nothing is placed in its definition that is not of its essence in some way: and of a rational nature is placed in its definition: therefore, it is of its essence in some way. But if it is defined as an accident: then mention of the subject ought to be made in the definition, which again is false.

2. Also, the Commentator, in the same place, says that those things which fall obliquely in the definition of accidents are in the place of differences specifying the accident: and those which are in the direct, are in the place of genera: and this is evident: for when snubness is said to be the curvature of the nose, by the term curvature it does not differ from lame, because both are curvature, but by the term nose: therefore, what falls obliquely in such definitions is the subject around which the essence of the defined accident is per se. If therefore it is similar to what is brought forth as similar, rational nature will denote the subject around which the person is, which is false.

3. Also, either rational nature is of the substance of any person, or not. If it is of the substance: then the objection seems to proceed. If not: then it relates to it accidentally, which again is false.

4. Also, Boethius, seeking the definition of a person, divides substance by rational and irrational, and universal and particular: therefore, the term rational nature in the definition contracts, as a constituting difference: and thus it will be of the intellect of the person.

5. Also, rational nature is predicated directly of any person: for Socrates is a rational nature, and Gabriel is a rational nature, and the Father is a rational nature: therefore, it is either predicated as an accident, or as a substance: not as an accident as is evident to anyone: therefore, as a substantial predicate: therefore, it is of the intellect and reason of the subject: and I thought no one would doubt this: therefore, the first reason seems to follow, because a person seems to be of greater composition than rational nature.

Further inquiry is made about what it says substance: for either substance is taken there for essence, or for hypostasis. If for essence: therefore, essence is individual: but individual denotes distinction, which it places around substance: therefore, this distinction is placed around essence: therefore, essence is distinguished, which is false.

Also, if a person is an individual substance, three persons are three individual substances: because with the multiplication of the defined, the definition will necessarily be multiplied: if therefore a person says essence: therefore, three persons will be three individual essences, etc., which is heresy.

Also, if it says hypostasis: then what is added, individual substance, seems superfluous. To this can also be added that Boethius, seeking this definition, divides substance into universal and particular, and contracts by what he adds individual, because universal substance is not a

person: therefore, it seems that substance stands in the place of what is as second substance: but this is not hypostasis: therefore, substance is not the same as hypostasis.

Also, Boethius says that the Greeks do not call ὑπόστασις, except an individual of a rational nature: therefore, hypostasis is the same as a person: and if substance were the same as hypostasis, the same would fall in the definition of itself.

If perhaps you say that substance signifies essence, but supposes a person: and what I say individual is added to it for the explanation of the supposit, which is implicitly in it: as when it is said, God the Father generates, the term God signifies essence, and supposes the person of the Father because of the term generates: because it belongs only to the Father: and yet the term Father is not added superfluously: because it explains the supposit, which was implicitly in the term God. If, I say, you say thus. Against:

1. According to this, the term substance supposes a person indeterminately, and signifies essence: and then I ask, What makes it suppose thus? for when God is said absolutely, it does not suppose a person, but signifies and supposes essence: but it can be drawn from the notional adjunct because of the mode of signifying, because it signifies concretely to suppose for a person.
2. If you say that the term individual compels to suppose: then it is objected as before, that it will stand for common substance which is essence, and the term individual does not restrict it except by placing its thing around it: therefore, distinction is placed around the divine essence.
3. Furthermore, the mode of signifying is not the same in the term God, and in substance: for we do not concede that substance generates, although we concede that God generates God: therefore, it does not properly stand for a person as the term God: and thus that solution seems unable to stand.

Further inquiry is made, What does individual predicate? For it either says only negation, as some say, or it says something positively. If it says only negation: since then negation alone constitutes nothing, and restricts nothing, it seems neither to constitute a person by that, nor even to restrict substance. But if it says something positively, namely individuation by something distinguishing, then it relates to substance by addition: and thus a person will be composite.

Other definitions do not need to be disputed: because their doubts will be evident from the solution of these.

I say therefore without prejudice, agreeing with some before me, that if the property of the thing which is a person is considered, a person is more properly in divine things than in creatures. But if the use of the name which is a person is considered, I say that according to that definition of Boethius it does not apply to divine things, unless it is explained thus, that substance is existence, as Richard says, as explained above, and individual says distinct by property, and rational nature is placed for intellectual divine. And in this way, I respond to the objections.

To the first, it must be said that the Master regards the use of those names which are placed in the definition of a person, and not the thing which is a person.

To the other, it must be said that rational is said commonly, and properly. Commonly as it is primarily and secondarily in divine, angelic, and human nature: and then rational nature is discriminative of true and false, and good and evil: properly, however, it is taken as Isaac says, that reason begins in the shadow of intelligence, because intelligence receives in the deiform intellect. Reason, however, inquiring, and studying, and discoursing (as Dionysius says) has acceptances because of its greater obscuration, and therefore it falls in the definition of man: and it is a divisive difference of animal. It is true, however, that Gregory in the Homily of Epiphany calls an Angel a rational animal: but this is explained elsewhere, that it is called an animal not from the nature of an animal, but rather from the power of an animal, as Dionysius seems to want, because it has the power of discriminating sensibles and rationals.

To the other, it must be said that in truth the entirely simple can have no definition: but it is simple, as simple: and it is simple, as not simple: simple as simple, like being, and essence, and the like, in whose definition nothing can be placed that would not be posterior to them according to the intellect, and of which they would not be predicated without conversion. Simple, however, as not simple, is what is indeed simple in reality, but nevertheless according to the mode of understanding has something prior: and such is a person, and the rest which we define in God. Hence I well concede that rational nature is of the intellect of a person, as being of its essence.

But if it is asked, Why is it placed obliquely? It must be said that as Dionysius says, a person names a supposed substance, and that in creatures has some diversity of the thing to na-

...in the divine, however, there is diversity according to the mode of understanding, not according to the thing: and this diversity is conveyed by the oblique which is transitive.

To the other, it must be said that nature places a relation to the thing of nature: because the thing of nature is in two ways: namely, as subject to the thing, and as constituted by it. However, the person is the thing of nature, but substance and essence do not imply such a relation: and these are fittingly placed in the definition.

From the opposite, I concede well that it is not similar concerning the definition of an accident: because there is no definition of an accident except in a certain respect: but a person is not defined thus, but rather a rational nature is something of the person either in reality, as in lower things, or in the mode of understanding, as in higher things.

To what is further inquired about substance, what does it signify? It must be said that substance is said in four ways. For sometimes substance is said as opposed to accident: and according to this, it names the nature of the first category, or the thing which is common to the first substance and the second, preserved in both: but this substance is nothing other than a being existing per se, by reason of that which is to exist per se, opposed to accident, which is a being existing in another, as Aristotle takes substance in the first philosophy in book IX, at the

beginning, where he says: It has been said about being to which other categories of being are attributed, where it has been said about substance: for many things are called beings according to how they receive the definition of substance, such as quality, and quantity, and others which are said in this way. Secondly and thirdly, substance is said by the divisive parts of this, namely first and second, according to which we call the first from the act of standing under the second and accident: but the second from the act of standing under the first and accident, which also subsisting is fitting to it by reason of the first in which it has being, and not by reason of itself: as is clear, when it is said, white man, the white refers to the man by reason of the supposit which is the first substance, and not by reason of the signified which is the second. In the fourth way, substance is said to be the whatness of each category: and some call this the logical substance: as Aristotle says: If someone, having placed a cubit magnitude, were to say that what is placed is a bicubital magnitude or quantity, he says what it is, and he says how much, and he signifies how much: and if, having placed whiteness, he were to say that what is placed is color, he says what it is, and he signifies quality. Therefore, we can say that substance signifies substance in common, or that it is placed for hypostasis. If we wish to speak in the first way: then we will say that although it signifies substance, it does not, however, suppose it, but supposes for hypostasis.

To this, however, it is asked, What compels it to stand for hypostasis? It must be said that of itself it can stand for either, namely for the common nature which is as the second: and for hypostasis which is as the first substance, and by the adjunct of the individual it will stand for hypostasis, although it signifies substance: and this seems to be the intention of Boethius, because in this way he seeks the definition.

To what is further objected, that according to this essence will be individual: it must be said, that it is not: because an adjective does two things concerning the substantive to which it is joined: for it restricts it, and places its thing around it: as is clear, when it is said, white man: for we say that man has signification and supposition: and it is not necessary that the adjective places implication around both, but around that of which it is first an accident, and this is the supposit: and consequently, the man is not restricted in signification, but rather in supposits. Thus I say here, that substance signifies substance in common, and the adjective regards it according to that to which distinction per se is fitting, which is conveyed by the individual: and therefore it places distinction in the supposit: and therefore it is also clear why the individual is not superfluous: for substance would not have that by which it is drawn to stand for an incommunicable supposit, unless the individual were added.

To what is proved, that substance of itself says supposit, and the individual explains: I concede well, that it does not seem true to me, as the objection proves.

To what is objected, that by multiplying the defined, etc. I respond, that I do not know what prohibits, that in this sense we can say three individual substances of rational nature: because substance stands for supposit: and this fits well into plurality, because distinction (as has already been held) is not placed around the essence which is the signification of substance. But if we wish to say that substance signifies hypostasis, as some Masters say: then we will say that the addition of the individual is not superfluous: because although hypostasis is

a distinct supposit, it does not, however, import the reason of distinction in the name: and this reason of distinction is signified, when it is said individual. Just as when it is said, God the Father generates, the God says the supposit of the word which imports the notional act of the Father: nor is Father added superfluously, because it says the reason by which the supposit is referred to such an act, which is signified by the property of the Father, when it is said, God the Father.

To what is further inquired about the individual, without prejudice I say, that it is understood positively: for the negation consequent to the position leaves the positive before itself.

To what is objected against, it must be said that by reason of affirmation separation of it from common substance is not expressed, but by reason of negation: and therefore it is named by negation, when it is said individual substance, so that it is the same as incommunicable substance.

However, the other definitions of Richard are all given by comparison to that which individuates the person. And the first says this in common according to what is fitting to God, Angel, and man. The second, however, only divine. The third seems to correct the definition of Boethius, that it is better said existence than substance. The fourth says the subject of the person, and the property in common. However, the definition of the Masters is given by comparison to morals or civil matters, according to whose likeness the name is generally transferred to individuals of rational nature.

Expositio Textus

Exposition of the Text

Then it is asked concerning what is said in the fourth chapter of the first part, there, D,

The Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are three persons, that is, they are three having in common what is person, etc.

These said that person signifies nothing but essence, and supposes the same, and connotes distinction sometimes one, sometimes many. One, as when it is said, the Father is form, that is, by itself one: for there by the term "one" essence is supposed and signified: and by the term "by itself" distinction is connoted. However, many distinctions, as when it is said, the Father and the Son are persons, that is, they are one, and distinct from each other.

But it seems that from this opinion heresy follows thus: This person is the Father: here according to these there is no demonstration except of essence: and the essence of the Father is the essence of the Son: therefore the person of the Father is the person of the Son, which is false and heresy: and therefore this opinion is not to be adhered to. But according to what was said above, it must be said that person signifies a substance supposed with property, as Dionysius says.

Divisio Textus

Then take the second part of the distinction which begins there, E, It must be known therefore, that this name, etc.

For this part is divided into three: in the first of which the Master touches upon the signification of this name, person, according to his opinion. In the second, however, the expositions of authorities in which numerical words are placed, or noting distinction with this name, person, according to that opinion, there, J,

Now let us examine, Whether according to In the third he proves, the same reasoning, etc. that person in divine matters makes a threefold understanding, there, L, in the end: From the aforementioned it is gathered, etc.

In the first of these there are four chapters, in the first of which he presents the opinion, that it signifies substance and hypostasis. In the second he applies proof, there, F,

The sense of the Ethics is aided, etc. In the third he responds to the question of the heretics made by what thing, according to that opinion, there, G, To this however that they In the fourth he excuses what they say, etc., he had said three things, there, If, Let it not move you, etc.

Articulus 2 — Whether Person Is Univocal In The Divine And In Creatures

Whether person is univocally in the divine and in creatures?

Secondly, it is asked, Whether it is univocally in God and in the creature?

It seems, however, that it is not: because
1. Richard says that in God persons are distinguished by the property of origin only: but in angels by natural properties, not of origin: but in humans in both ways. Therefore, it seems that person agrees in a threefold manner with a threefold rational nature.

1. Likewise, nothing is univocal to God and creature, as has often been proven above: person agrees with God and creature: therefore, not univocally.

BUT on the contrary, it seems that univocally: For nothing prevents however much distant things from participating in the same common reason of negation, as God and stone not walking: but the perfection of person consists in negation, namely the individual which is ultimate, and person is completive: therefore, it seems that it agrees univocally.

Further, if it is conceded that it agrees by prior and posterior, it is asked, To which does it agree by prior? It seems that it agrees prior to the creature: because in it all things are found according to the property which are placed in the definition of person: but it is not so in God who is altogether simple: therefore, it agrees prior to man.

Solution. I say without prejudice, that it agrees by prior and posterior: and indeed the thing is prior in God than in inferiors, but according to the use of the name it is prior in inferiors.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that person, insofar as it abstracts from this and that mode, to the distinction of the divine person remaining under the same nature, the personal distinction in inferiors is referred: because as was said above, that they are distinct one in nature or diverse in nature, this does not make for the reason of person, but only to exist solely by itself according to the mode of rational nature: and therefore it is more truly person in the divine, where it is not divided from another, but distinguished, than in inferiors.

To the other, it must be said that it is true that nothing is altogether univocal, nor is it simply equivocal that which is found in the creature and in the Creator.

To the other, it must be said that the individual is not simply negation, like not walking, in God and in stone: and therefore it is not similar: and yet some concede the conclusion because of the argument.

To what is further asked, the solution is clear from what was said before.

Articulus 3 — Whether In The Divine There Is Any Other Commonness Than That Of The Divine Nature Or Essence

Whether in the divine there is another commonality than that of the divine nature or essence?

However, here arises a doubt concerning what is said in the first chapter, there, E, at the end:

When therefore we say three persons, etc., where it does not signify the essence, that is, the divine nature which is common to the three persons, but the subsistences.

For this seems false:

1. For there is no commonality in the divine except of nature: but person is common: therefore it signifies nature.
2. Furthermore, Person is common, and nature is common either by the same commonality or by another: not by another, because nothing else in the divine is common to the three: therefore by the same; therefore it signifies essence. If perhaps you say, that it is common in reality, and is common in reason: and person is common in reason, and essence in reality. On the contrary: Either something underlies reason, or nothing. If nothing: then it is empty and vain. If something: either it is nature, or another: and from there proceed, as before.

Furthermore, the Master seems to imply, that person signifies one thing in the plural, and another in the singular: and this is impossible, because the plural only duplicates its singular, and does not vary the signified.

Solution. It must be said according to what was said above, that there is no commonality in the divine except essence: but from that many are signified consequently, as was noted above in distinguishing: and I well concede, that those following commonalities are commonalities of reason.

To what is objected against this, it must be said that something in reality corresponds to reason: because it is really signified, when it is said, three persons are one God: otherwise, commonality of substance is said differently by the term God, and differently by the term are, and differently by the term these or persons: and although there is one commonality of nature imported in all, yet not under the same mode of signifying: because in the term persons it is imported as in supposits, and in the term are in the relation of supposit to nature, and in the term God as in common nature according to reality: and this was determined above: and therefore in one falls plurality, in another not.

To what is asked concerning the opinion of the Master, it must be said that he is not of that opinion, but rather, that person signifies the subject substance, as was proved above: but he intends, that although it signifies it, it does not yet suppose it, because in its intellect it encloses the incommunicable imported by the term individual, which falls in its definition: and that he places concerning the supposit, and not concerning the signified, as was said in the question concerning the definition of person: and therefore he intends to say, that in the plural it places number concerning the supposit, and not concerning the signified: for its supposit is signified by subsistence, or hypostases, as was said above in the question concerning the four names.

Articulus 4 — Whether In The Divine It Can Be Admitted That There Are Three Beings

Whether in divine matters it can be admitted that there are three beings?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, F, Three beings, etc.

For Anselm says in the Monologion, that essence, to be, and being differ, just as light, to shine, and shining: therefore being is nothing but essence being; but three are one essence: therefore they are one; therefore not three beings.

Solution. Beings can be held participially: and thus it is conceded, three beings, that is, three who are; because thus in itself it encloses the thing of its verb with this name; and thus the Master understands. But if it were taken nominally, then it would have a calumny. But then it must still be said that it can be taken according to the mode of signifying, because it says concretively: and then it is referred again to the persons: namely, in such a way that the term three is substantive, and the term beings is active. But if it is taken absolutely for essence, and is substantive, the expression will be false: although someone might say that being is general, and can be referred to the person and to the nature equally: and then there will not be the same reasoning concerning almighty, or eternal, or other: but nevertheless the art of directing oneself in such expressions is noted above.

Articulus 5 — Why It Is Well Said, Of The Same Essence, And Not Of The Same God; Why Each Person, And Not Each God; And Why It Cannot Be Said, Three Persons Of The Same Essence

Why it is well said, of the same essence, and not of the same God: why each person, and not each God: and why it cannot be said three persons from the same essence?

Then it is asked concerning what is said in the second chapter F, towards the end: Augustine... says three persons are one essence or of the same essence, not from the same essence, etc.

For the reason of this is asked.

1. Similarly, why do we say, of the same essence, and not of the same God are the three persons: since the term God and essence say the same thing?
2. Likewise, we well say, each person, although person signifies substance: yet it is not said, each God: and the reason for this is asked.

Solution. It must be said that when it is said, from the same essence, the preposition from implies a cause, and especially a material one: and since essence does not relate thus to persons, therefore that is not accepted.

To the other it must be said that essence signifies nature by way of form: and therefore although it is the same in reality with persons, yet it differs in the mode of understanding, just as one is from whom it is: and this diversity in the mode of signifying is implied in the oblique, when it is said, three persons of one essence: however, God does not say as by which it is, but rather names deity in him who has it: and therefore it says, as one is in common: and therefore such diversity in the name in the mode of signifying is not implied.

To the other it must be said that person says supposit: and that is multiplied in the divine: and therefore the distributive expression finds there the matter of its distribution. However, God names substance concretely, and not supposit, unless perhaps from an added notional term: and therefore it does not allow a distributive sign to be joined to it.

Articulus 6 — It Is Asked Concerning This Question, What Three, And What Three Things

It is asked concerning this question, What are three, and what are three things?

Then it is asked concerning the third chapter, G, there, To this, however, which they say, etc.

For it seems that nothing was asked except the essence because the hypostases were certainly presupposed with their properties in the word of John, when he said, Father, Word, and Holy Spirit: therefore, concerning them, it was not asked: since therefore there is nothing more in the persons, except the essence, it seems that the essence was asked. But on the contrary: This also was certainly presupposed in the word of John, when he said, And these three are one: therefore it seems that nothing could be asked, and thus the question was useless.

Solution. Without prejudice, I say that the question was useless: because the whole faith was expressed in the word of John, as the objection proves. However, it should be noted that the term "what" sometimes seeks a definition or part of a definition: and sometimes seeks a subjective part of the nature or common essence: as when it is said, what is man? it is answered a rational animal, or an animal. Or when it is asked, what swims in the sea? it is answered a fish. For in the first way the essence is rendered, and in the second the subjective

part: and in this way it could ask, what subjectively were the three, that is, that some substantive would be answered which would be said in common of them, insofar as they are many: and because person signifies a subject substance, as was evident above from the words of Boethius, therefore the faithful admitted the question, and answered that they were three persons.

Articulus 7 — Whether We Can Concede There To Be Three Substances, Or Three Hypostases, As Three Persons

Whether we can concede that there are three substances, or three hypostases, just as there are three persons?

Then it is asked concerning the fourth chapter H, where it says: "Do not be moved, that we said three things."

For Damascene says that the three persons agree in reality, and are distinguished by reason: and in lower things it is the converse, in which by reason it is considered what is one, but in reality what is divided.

Solution. This was solved above in the first distinction: for he does not wish to say that the persons are distinguished by reason alone: but he calls reason relation, because the nature of relation consists in a certain comparison: nor does he intend that the nature of lower things is one only by reason, but that in a certain respect it is one, and simply a certain plurality, because according to the being of nature: therefore he says that it is one by reason.

Expositio Textus

Exposition of the Text

Now let us examine, etc. This second part is divided into three chapters. In the first, he shows how it is said, "one is the person of the Father, another of the Son," etc. In the second, he shows how it is said, "the Father is another in person," there, K, Then. In the third, he explains, it is asked, etc., how it is said, "another is the person of the Father," etc., differently than he had done in the first chapter, there, L, In this way also indeed, etc.

However, here arises the question, whether we can say, "there are three substances or three hypostases," just as we say, "three persons"?

And it seems that we cannot: because substance signifies nature, and hypostasis is the same. Likewise, there is one substance of the three: therefore not three.

Solution. It is easy to respond to this according to what has been predetermined: because substance, due to the ambiguity of the name among the Latins, is not received in the plural; however, among the Greeks, it seems that "hypostasis" is in place of "person": and therefore they are called three hypostases; and although sometimes it is found, as by Augustine and Anselm, "three substances," substance is taken from the act of subsisting, and for hypostasis.

Expositio Textus

Exposition of the Text

Then note concerning the last part of the distinction which begins there, L, around the end:

From the aforesaid it is gathered, etc., that the three acceptations of person are thus taken, that person signifies a substance subject with a property: and therefore for the sake of the signified the first signification of it is taken, which is essence: for the sake of the supposit or subject the second is taken, which is hypostasis: for the sake of the property the third.

Expositio Textus

Exposition of the Text

Then it is asked concerning what Jerome says: There is absolutely no degree in the Trinity, etc.

For this seems false: because it was said above that there is order in the divine? Therefore degree.

And it must be said that it does not follow: because degree implies a distinction by inferior and superior; however, order of nature does not posit that one is prior to another, but that one is from another: and beware lest you concede that there are degrees in the Trinity: because some concede this by positing an extraneous signification.

DISTINCTIO XXVI

Divisio Textus

§ 11. DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Now concerning the properties of the persons, which frequently, etc. Here begins that part which is concerning the properties distinguishing the persons.

§ 12. And it is divided into three parts. In the first the Master determines concerning all the properties, whether proper or appropriated, whether befitting God from eternity or from time. In the second, he determines concerning the comparison of the persons to one another according to properties of this sort: and this begins below, Dist. XXXII, there, A, Here arises a question deduced from the aforesaid. In the third, he treats of the comparison of the properties to the essence and the person, there, Dist. XXXIII, A, After the above it is necessary to be considered and inquired more intimately, etc.

§ 13. The first of these is further subdivided into three. For there are appropriated properties befitting the persons from eternity: and he treats of these first. There are also appropriated properties befitting God from time: and he treats of these secondly, below, Dist. XXX, there, A, For there are some things which from time of God, etc. There are also properties appropriated to the persons not properly, yet befitting them from eternity: of which he treats

thirdly, there, Dist. XXXI, A, Moreover it must be considered, since the three persons are coequal to one another, etc.

§ 14. The first of these is further subdivided into

three: in the first of which he determines three personal properties in common. In the second he determines a property of the Father which is of a person, not personal: and this begins in Distinct. XXVIII, there, A, Moreover it must be considered, that not only three, etc. Thirdly, he determines a property of a person, not personal, which is commonly of the Father and of the Son, but not of the Holy Spirit: and this begins, below, Distinct. XXIX, there, A, There is besides another name, noting a multiple relation, etc.

§ 16. Further, the first of these is subdivided into two. In the first he determines concerning the three personal properties exactly as they are signified by proper names. In the second exactly as they are signified by other names, there, Dist. XXVII, A, Here it can be asked, Whether the properties which Hilary posited, etc.

§ 17. Moreover this distinction is divided into two parts: in the first of which he determines concerning the name hypostasis, for the reason that properties are referred to the hypostasis. In the second, he determines concerning the properties, there, B, Now concerning the properties of the persons, etc.

Articulus 1 — What Hypostasis Is

What is a hypostasis?

§ 19. Here it is asked, What is a hypostasis, and whether it is in the divine [persons] by the same ratio as in lower things, and how it relates to the essence, and also how it relates to the person, and whether it remains through the intellect, abstracting personality from the person, or not?

§ 20. To the first one proceeds thus: 1. Here in the Text Jerome says, that a hypostasis, according as we say three hypostases, is a perfect subsisting person: for this is gathered from the Text.

§ 21. 2. This Boethius also seems to say in the book On Two Natures in One Person of Christ thus: Far more significantly calling the individual substance of a rational nature by the name of ὑ όστασις. Therefore according to the use of the Greeks ὑπόστασις is the individual substance of a rational nature: therefore it is the same as a person. But against this: Hypostasis falls into the definition of a person: because the definition of a person is posited above, that it is a hypostasis distinct by a property pertaining to dignity.

§ 22. 3. Moreover it is objected more strongly, Hypostasis speaks either of something absolute in the divine, or something respective. If absolute: therefore it speaks of the essence: but this is not distinguished: therefore hypostasis is not distinguished, which is false: because even according to the Saints and the Masters hypostasis is distinguished by a property. But if it speaks of a relation. Against this: Relation in the divine is distinguishing: therefore hypostasis is distinguishing, not distinct, which again is false, as the Master says below,

because the Father does not just express a property, but a hypostasis distinct by a property: therefore it seems that hypostasis can in no way signify anything in the divine.

§ 23. 4. If perhaps you say, that it expresses first substance, whence also it is the same as ὑπόστασις among the Greeks, and first substance among the Latins, as Boethius says. Against this: that first substance is an absolute being: but in no absolute being are the Father and the Son distinguished: therefore in hypostasis they are not distinguished, which is against the Saints.

§ 24. 5. Also, If they were distinguished in some substantial thing, something would be substantially in one which would not be in another, which is a heresy.

§ 25. 6. Also, They are more separated in lower things, which are separated through the whole hypostasis, than those which are separated through a "by which it is" [quo est] only, or through a "that which is" [quod est] only. Pro-

-bation. Let it be that some are united in a quo est, and not in a quod est: these are separated in part of their essence, and not in the whole. Let it also be that some are united in a quod est, and not in a quo est: these also are not separated except in part of their essence. But those who have separated hypostases, are separated in the whole. Therefore it seems, that if the hypostasis of the Father and of the Son in the divine is another, that this would be a greater otherness, than if they were others in nature alone: and this argument proceeds, if hypostasis speaks of an individual substance: therefore it seems, that the Father and the Son are not distinguished in hypostases, unless hypostasis speaks of a property alone.

§ 27. Solution. It is difficult here to avoid an inconvenience. Yet it can be said, that the name hypostasis can be considered in two ways, namely according to that which the hypostasis is, and according to what is signified by the name. And if it is considered according to that which the hypostasis is, then it is true that it is the same as a person. But if it is considered according to what is signified by the name, then it speaks of a distinct thing not determining the ratio of the distinction: whereas person speaks of a distinct thing by determining the ratio of distinction in common: while Father and Son speak of a distinct thing by determining the ratio of distinction in species.

§ 28. Therefore it must be said to the first, that Jerome here attends to the thing, and not to the ratio of the name.

§ 29. To another it must be said, that Boethius speaks of the use of the name among the Greeks, the ratio of which use was assigned above in the preceding distinction.

§ 30. To that which is objected against it, it must be said that hypostasis falls into the definition of a person: not that it is less according to the thing, but because it expresses less according to the mode of signifying by the name.

§ 31. To another it must be said, that hypostasis expresses a suppositum relatively: and therefore hypostasis is relative and to another: and therefore in hypostases the persons are not one, but rather in essence. And if the reason for this is asked, I say without prejudice, that it is otherwise in the divine than in lower things: because in lower things relation is an accident,

and preserves the nature of both: and according to what relation is, it is to another: but according to what is an accident, thus it is in a relative only. However, in the divine, relation is relation, and not an accident, but rather substance: and therefore there is no relative accident there, but the very suppositum of the relative is really relative by itself: and nevertheless the substance is being through itself, in the way in which we call substance a suppositum. But taking substance in this way, namely for a perfect suppositum, which is "who" or "someone": in the divine the persons do not communicate in substance, but are distinguished: and the suppositum in this way is to something, and substance in itself perfect: and these are not repugnant in the divine, as has already been shown. Whence I well concede, that in all things which are simply absolute, the persons agree, and are one: nevertheless from this it does not follow, that in a substance of this sort which is a suppositum, they are one: because I do not see how the heresy of Sabellius does not follow from this.

§ 32. To another it must be said, that this is true, that that which hypostasis expresses, it expresses by the mode of a first substance not determining a distinguishing property from its name: but this substance is the substance of a relative, although it does not express it by the mode of a relative or of a relation: and it is not, according to the mode of understanding, the substance which is common to the three, although it really is that: and therefore that substance is distinguished.

§ 33. And as to what is objected, that the same thing according to the mode of understanding cannot be distinguishing and distinct. It must be said, that this is true: yet the same thing in reality can be distinguishing, and distinct, and not distinct: because essence and person and relation are the same in reality, and relation is distin-

-guishing, and person distinct, and essence not distinct.

§ 35. To another it must be said, that if the persons were distinguished in some simply absolute substantial thing, then it would be true that they would not be one in all things: but the substantial thing which is a hypostasis, is not simply absolute: for it is related, expressed through the mode of an absolute, and therefore it cannot impede the unity of the persons in essence.

§ 36. To another it must be said, that it is otherwise in lower things than in higher things: because hypostases in lower things differ through matter and form and through composite substance: but hypostases in higher things are distinguished through the mode of existence, as was said above: and that mode of existence is signified as a relation, and as in a relative: and according as it is signified as a relation, thus it causes notions in the divine: but according as it is signified in a relative, thus it is distinctive of hypostases.

§ 37. But if you ask, Whence comes the distinction of hypostases in which there are relations, namely whether they have a distinction other than through relations, it will be determined below in this question.

Articulus 2 — Whether Hypostasis Is In The Divine In The Same Respect As In Lower Things, And Whether It Is More Truly In Lower Than In Higher Things

Whether hypostasis is in the divine by the same ratio as in lower things? and, Whether it is more truly in lower things than in higher things?

§ 39. Secondly it is asked, Whether it is in the divine by the same ratio as in lower things?

§ 40. But it seems that it is not: because in lower things although the distinction of a hypostasis is known by properties which are not found in another, nevertheless it is not caused by them, but rather by this matter and this form, according to what is said, That by which a thing is moved to be one, is matter: but matter and form are principles of substance: and this "something" is a composite substance. But in the divine the distinction of hypostases is not caused thus: because Damascene says that the three persons are the same in all things, except ingeneration, and generation, and procession: and Augustine says, that they are the same in all things, except that which is to another. Therefore distinction in higher things is caused by properties.

§ 41. But against: Every property according to the intellect is subsequent to the subject whose property it is: relations in the divine are properties of hypostases: therefore according to the intellect they follow them: therefore hypostases according to the intellect are distinct before properties. The FIRST is proven from the saying of Boethius in the commentary on Porphyry, who says, that although a property always follows the subject: yet because it is not from things constituting being, it is from the generation of accidents: but it is true, that it is a flowing accident from the principles of the species, and therefore always and everywhere follows the species. But the SECOND is supposed by the saints.

§ 42. Further it is asked, Whether hypostasis is more truly in higher things, or in lower things?

§ 43. It seems, that in lower things: because where the distinction is truer, there the ratio of hypostasis is more truly preserved, provided it is in a rational nature: but the distinction through substance is truer than through property: therefore the ratio of hypostasis is truer in lower things, than in higher things.

§ 44. Against: Ephesians 3:15: From whom all paternity in heaven and on earth is named. Therefore from there the name of hypostasis and person comes here: therefore it is more truly there: and this was shown above in the question concerning the generation of the Son [103].

§ 45. Solution. I say without prejudice, that hypostasis has distinction from one thing

in higher things, and from another in lower things, just as the objection proves: because in higher things there is no distinction except in properties, and not in the essence which may be signifiable as a quo est, nor even as a quod est: for the three are one essence, and the three are one God: but it is true, that the three are not one "who", or one "someone": because "who" and "someone" express supposita.

§ 47. But to that which is objected against this, I say that although property according to itself, according to the intellect, is after that whose property it is: nevertheless in the divine it is not so: and this happens because in the divine a property is not only in the ratio of a property, but rather it has in some way the act of a constitutive difference with respect to the person: for the property is constituting the person: I do not say, that it is a difference, but as to this it has an act similar to it, and therefore through the intellect it is prior; and therefore the distinction of hypostasis according to the mode of understanding, is before all generation, as a cause before what is caused. But local motion in this or that which has progressive motion, is after the generation of this or that.

§ 48. To that which is asked further, it is easy to respond: because the thing is more truly in higher things, but the name is more truly preserved in lower things: just as we also said concerning person.

§ 49. To the objection it must be said, that division is not of the ratio of hypostasis, but rather the mode of existence whether in unity of substance, or in diversity, as was said above.

Articulus 3 — How Hypostasis Relates To Essence

How does the hypostasis relate to the essence?

Thirdly it is asked: How does the hypostasis relate to the essence?

It seems, moreover, that the essence is part of its understanding [de intellectu ejus, i.e., included in its concept]:

§ 1. For an essential predicate is part of the understanding of the subject, just as animal is part of the understanding of man, and man is part of the understanding of this man: but when it is said, "this hypostasis is God," or "the divine essence," it is an essential predication and in the nominative case [in recto]: therefore this is part of the understanding of hypostasis.

§ 2. Furthermore, Hypostasis [Ὑπόστασις] is said from that which is 'hypo' [ὑπό], which is 'under', and 'stasis' [στάσις], which is 'position': therefore it is supposed [placed under] to something: but there is the same notion of subject and supposit, insofar as the word 'under' is concerned: therefore hypostasis signifies that which is placed under a common nature: therefore the common nature is in it: therefore it relates to the nature, as that in which the nature is and is understood.

§ 3. Again, the Philosopher says that he who says one thing in a certain way says many things: because he says those things which are in it in act through the intellect: but superior things are in act in inferior things, and inferior things in potency in superior things: since therefore hypostasis is incommunicable, yet the common nature is understood in it in act, and the same notions apply to person: therefore it seems that both hypostasis and person signify the common [nature] in this mode.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. Every inferior thing in which its superior is actually understood, relates to its superior by addition, and is of greater composition than it: hypostasis and

103. Cf. Albert the Great, In I Sent., d. 9.

person do not relate by addition to a superior: therefore they are not of greater composition than it: therefore they do not relate to the essence as an incommunicable inferior.

§ 2. Again, if hypostasis added something: either this would be the same as that to which it is added, or diverse. If the same: then it would not be added, because the same is not added to itself. If diverse: then it would necessarily introduce composition, which is a heresy, because nothing composite is in God. If perchance you say, as is commonly said, that what is added is the same in reality [re], but diverse in the mode of understanding, On the contrary: To this mode

of understanding, either something responds in reality, or nothing. If nothing: then it is empty and vain, as Boethius says. But if something responds in reality, then the same thing follows as before. If you say that it is not empty and vain, because it is not referred to existence [ad esse]: just as the Philosopher says that there is no falsehood on the part of those abstracting, because it is not referred to existence: and thus he says that it is not a falsehood when demonstrating a line to be one-foot long, which is not one-foot long. This is nothing: for this is not the understanding of the Philosopher: nor indeed did any Philosopher ever understand this, that the understanding of a thing which can in no way be referred to a thing, is not empty and vain: for although the demonstration by which I demonstrate that a straight line touches a sphere, cannot be referred to the existence of a quantified thing which is wooden or leaden: yet I refer it to the reality which is the nature of quantity: and although I might demonstrate concerning a non-one-foot line that it is one-foot long, yet I refer it to the reality which is the line understood through that which I have drawn in the continuum: but this mode of understanding can in no way be referred to the reality of which it is. If perchance you say, as some say, that this is the mode of understanding through the name [per nomen]: this is nothing: because it is not asked here concerning the common signification of a name, but rather concerning the divine reality which is signified in the name.

If perchance on account of this it is said that it adds nothing to the essence. ON THE CONTRARY: Whatever things are altogether the same, whatever is said of the one, is also said of the other: but of the essence it is said that it is one in reality: therefore the same will be said of the hypostasis.

Solution. It must be said without prejudice, that the essence is signified in the hypostasis, as a common nature is signified and predicated in its inferior: not that in divine things there is universal and particular, but because there is communicability there, as the reasons introduced first prove.

But as to this which is asked, Whether it adds anything? It seems to me that it does not add in reality, but in the mode of understanding, which mode of understanding is really signified, when it is said, "the hypostasis is distinct," or "the hypostasis is incommunicable." Hence it must be said that although it cannot be referred back [retorqueri] to reality in every mode, yet it is referred back to reality in some mode. And that this may be understood, the opinion of the ancient Doctors concerning this must be noted, because that something is added to another is known in two modes, namely because it makes a composition, or because it belongs

to it what does not belong to another; and in inferior things it is in both modes: for this and this make a composition, and it belongs to this [particular thing] to be incommunicable and distinct in individuating features, which does not belong to man in himself: but in divine things there is only the other [the second mode], because the added thing does not induce composition, for the reason that it is really the same, but it induces a diverse supposition, as the ancients say, and well, as it seems to me: because with one supposed, the other is not supposed, for the reason that something belongs to one which does not [belong] to the other: for it belongs to the hypostasis to be distinguished, and to generate, and to be numerable by such a number as is in divine things: none of which belongs to the essence. And the author of this invention was Praepositivus. Through this, therefore, the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 4 — In What Way Hypostasis Relates To Person

How does the hypostasis relate to the person?

Fourthly it is asked: How does the hypostasis relate to the person?

§ 1. It seems, moreover, that it is as the distinguishable to the distinct: because

§ 1. The definition posited above includes distinction in itself, when it is said: "A person is an individual substance of a rational nature"

However, hypostasis does not include in itself a made distinction.

1. Furthermore, the Master often says that properties are in hypostases: but they are not in them except as in distinct things: therefore, hypostases without properties are distinguishable.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. In divine things, nothing is in potentiality: therefore, there the distinguishable and the distinguished are the same: therefore, hypostasis and person are the same.

1. Likewise, Damascene says that in all things they are the same except for unbegottenness, begottenness, and procession: therefore, whatever is before this is of the unity of essence: therefore, if hypostasis is before this, it is of the unity of essence: but this is false: therefore, hypostasis has the understanding of property: therefore, it is the same as person.

Solution. It must be said that in divine things nothing is in potentiality as the objection proves: and therefore hypostasis according to reality is person: and I further concede well that with hypostasis supposed, person is supposed: because whatever is fitting to person is fitting to hypostasis, namely to be distinguished, to be begotten, to beget, to proceed, and all such things.

However, it is true that it is signified differently by the name hypostasis, and differently by the name person. And to understand this, it must be noted that in lower things there are four, namely the thing of nature, subject, supposit, individual, to which also in rational nature a

fifth is added which is person: and we understand the thing of nature as composed of matter and form, or what is and by which it is, in nature and under common nature, and this is this something in nature. However, supposit adds to the thing of nature a relation to common nature, to which it is supposed as incommunicable. Subject, however, as the Philosopher says, is a being complete in itself, an occasion for another to exist in it: and this has a relation to accident, although it is not in the understanding of its name the habit of accident: and this is called by Aristotle substance, and by the Greeks ὑπόστασις. However, individual is having individuating accidents. Person, however, in rational nature signifies incommunicable according to mode, except only the understanding of composition, which is not in divine things. However, four are found posited by the Saints, namely the thing of nature which Hilary posits, and supposit, and hypostasis, and person: for individual and singular are not properly in divine things. And the thing of nature will be in divine things here, who, or someone in divine nature: however, supposit by relation to common nature: hypostasis, however, by relation to property: but person is hypostasis distinguished by property.

To what is objected first, it must be said that it does not follow from this that they are distinguishable: but it follows from this that they imply in the name a relation of the distinct to the distinguisher, which relation the name person does not imply, but rather it implies the distinct itself insofar as it is distinct: just as when I say, this heaven is heaven, the term this heaven implies the relation of matter to form, as the Philosopher says: yet it does not follow that that matter was ever without form according to nature.

To what is objected against, it has already been answered.

To the other it must be said, that (as has been said) the distinguished in divine things in my judgment according to understanding is after the distinguisher: therefore that objection does not proceed: and yet it does not have in itself the understanding of property, but rather of relation to the distinguishing property.

Articulus 5 — Whether By The Intellect Hypostasis Remains With The Property Subtracted

Whether by the intellect the hypostasis remains with the property subtracted?

Whether by the intellect the hypostasis remains with the property subtracted?

Fifthly, it is asked, Whether by the intellect the hypostasis remains with the property subtracted?

It seems that it does: 1. For the Father has from the same that he is someone, and that he is Father: or not from the same. If from the same: but the Son also is someone: therefore he has from the same as the Father: for someone and someone in that which is of this kind, do not have difference: but the Father has by paternity that he is someone: therefore also the Son, which is false: therefore not from the same he has: therefore separated by the intellect paternity from the Father, he is still Father someone, and Son someone and Holy Spirit simil-

arly: but he is not someone, unless hypostasis: therefore hypostases remain abstracted from personality.

1. Likewise, Everything that falls in the definition of another, can remain with that separated from that which adds it in whose definition it falls: hypostasis falls in the definition of person: therefore with that separated which adds person, hypostasis still remains: but it adds only property: therefore with the property separated, hypostasis still remains.
2. Likewise, When I say distinguishing and distinguished, I say two: but of two any one is separable from the other, which is not in the reason of it: but distinguishing is not in the reason of the distinguished according to that which it is, although perhaps it is in the reason of it according to that which it is distinguished: therefore when hypostasis says distinguished according to that which it is, it seems by the intellect to remain if properties are separated.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Persons do not have number except made by relations: therefore with relations removed there remains only unity: therefore not hypostasis, because hypostasis is numbered in the divine. The first is proved by Boethius, who says that essence contains unity, but only relation multiplies trinity. And by Anselm in the book on the Procession of the Holy Spirit, who says that three in all things there are the same, where the relation of opposition does not distinguish: and therefore the conclusion follows.

1. Likewise, No intellect distinguishes anything in any nature, unless it has some principle of diversity, or division, or distinction: but in the divine there is no principle of distinction except the relation of opposition: therefore with that principle ceasing, nothing is distinguished in the divine. If perhaps you say that hypostasis remains distinct by itself from another: this is the most open heresy of Arius: because then there would be three substances divided by that which they are substances, and by this there would be three gods. But if you say that hypostasis remains, but cannot be numbered, but remains in the reason of some one. Against: That one, either it will be the same in number in all persons, or different. If the same: then three would be one hypostasis, which is false. If different: therefore property essentially divides it, as division is made in inferiors, which is false.

Solution. Speaking without prejudice I say, that personal property cannot be abstracted from the person, so that something remains: for neither nature remains, nor hypostasis: and this is thus proved: Abstraction can only be in two ways, namely of the universal from the particular, or of form from the matter in which it is, or from that in which it is as in matter. If we speak of abstraction in the first way, then the common is abstracted from the incommunicable, and not conversely: because the abstracted is simpler than that from which abstraction is made, and also something cannot be abstracted from another in which it is only by potentiality, but in which it is by act: whence since superiors are in inferiors in act, and are simpler than them, they are abstracted from them, and not conversely: and therefore with individuation or singu-

larity abstracted from this man, nothing remains of this man. And in this way abstraction of the common nature from divine persons cannot be made: because nothing is simpler than nature than person, nor is it universal to that, but as the same, unless perhaps you wish to speak broadly of abstraction, as you say it is abstracted: because it can be understood without persons, as Jews and Pagans understand it. But if we speak of abstraction of form from the subject in which it is, again this cannot be done in the divine: because properties in the divine do not have a subject or suppositum before them, but rather they are the suppositum, as paternity and Father, and so of others: although indeed with the suppositum Father paternity is supposed, yet property properly speaking is nothing in the Father, so that the "in" notes diversity of property to the substance of the same. But this is true, that something belongs to property, which does not to hypostasis, namely to distinguish: and something belongs to hypostasis which does not belong to property, namely to be distinguished: whence properties according to which they are signified by themselves, are not signified as things, but rather as reasons of persons: persons however according to which they are signified in themselves as things: for paternity in the divine is rather the reason of the Father than a thing: and I say this, as they are taken by abstracting words: therefore when by the intellect (as the objection proves) property is before hypostasis, as distinguishing it, and its being is to be distinguished, and nothing else, it is necessary that with property removed, nothing remains of hypostasis. But it is not so in inferiors: because being in inferior hypostases is not being of the distinguished only, rather it is being of a certain nature and substance subsisting in itself, not needing property for it to be, but for it to be known. But it is not so in the divine: because if hypostasis had from something to be hypostasis, and from another to be distinguished, it would be necessary that in being hypostasis by substance absolutely said one of the persons would be distinguished from another, as in inferiors: and this was the heresy of Arius. Whence it is necessary to say, that from the same it has to be hypostasis and to be distinguished.

Therefore it must be said to the first, that from the same the Father has that he is Father, and that he is someone. And if you say, that the Son is someone, I say that the "someone" is not common to them by one intention, but rather by the proportion of one relation to diverse: because the Father is someone by the relation of hypostasis to his property, and the Son is someone by the relation of his hypostasis to his property: and these relations make a common proportion, or proportionality, which is still a lesser community.

To the other it must be said, that hypostasis falls in the intellect of person, not as diverse in reality, as has been said, but as the same not in the same way signified by the name: and therefore that objection does not proceed.

To the other it must be said, that when it is said, distinguishing and distinguished, according to the reason of understanding two are said, yet one is not separable from the other because the distinguished does not have being of the distinguished except from the distinguishing: and this has already been said: because this is its being according to hypostasis, although it is not its being according to nature: because in nature it is not numbered, nor is hypostasis numerable: whence hypostasis as hypostasis is in the divine, and being of the dis-

tinguished, although in the name it imports a relation to the distinguishing, and not distinction.

But if you object, that with paternity not understood, still the Father is someone, because unbegotten: this is nothing because it will be shown below, that unbegottenness is not a personal property, but rather of the person: and he is not someone in any nature except from the distinguishing of personality, that is, by making personality. Whence the Father would then be unbegotten, as the divine nature is unbegotten, and not from a property distinguishing from another person of the same nature, but rather as an attribute of his nature distinguishing from other things which are not with him in the same essence.

The reasons however brought forward in the contrary, seem to me necessary: although some in this article say otherwise, as is clear to one inspecting their writings.

Divisio Textus

Now concerning the properties of the persons, let us see, etc. This part in which the Master discusses the properties is divided into four parts:

In the first part, the Master shows that three personal properties belong to the three persons. In the second part, he shows that those properties do not belong accidentally, there, C,

Wherefore it must be known, not entirely. In the third part, the Master shows that, etc., according to which sense filiation and procession or gift are said to be personal properties of the Son and the Holy Spirit,

there, D, Here it is asked, How it is said to be proper to the begotten God, etc. In the fourth, he determines certain doubts concerning this, there G, Here it can be asked, Whether the Father, or the Son.

From this, the sentence is clear, because the Letter will be explained in the disputation.

Articulus 6 — Whether There Is Relation In The Divine

Whether in the divine there is relation?

Here, however, three things are to be inquired, the first of which is about relations. The second, about notion. The third, about property.

Concerning relation, two doubts arise here before the Letter, namely whether there is relation in the divine? And secondly, whether it alone multiplies the Trinity?

To the FIRST it is proceeded thus: 1. Relation either signifies some being, or only a notion. If it signifies some being in the divine: either it is the same as substance, and nothing more: or it is something more. If it is only substance: then to be relative is the same as to be substance: therefore, to the distinction of the relative follows the distinction of substance, which is the heresy of Arius. But if it is something more, and in that more the persons are distinguished: then the person is of greater composition than substance, which again is heresy. But if relation is only a being in notion: then they differ only according to notion, which are distinguished by

relation. Divine persons are distinguished only by relation. Therefore, they are not distinguished except according to notion, which is the heresy of Sabellius.

1. Likewise, there are two things in relation if the thing is posited to be. One is what is an accident: and the other is what is respect. Either, therefore, with respect to neither, or with respect to one. If with respect to both remains in the divine, or with respect to neither, or with respect to one. If with respect to both: but every accident requires a subject: therefore, it is necessary to posit a subject to be in the divine, which was disproved above. If with respect to neither: then there will be in the divine only a notion, and from this follows the heresy of Sabellius as before. If with respect to one or with respect to accident, or with respect to respect. If with respect to accident, it follows again that there is composition in the divine. If with respect to respect: but in this way (as Boethius says) it is assisting: therefore, in the divine there are relations assisting extrinsically: and thus relations will not be God: therefore, it seems, that relations are not in the divine.
2. Likewise, in lower things we see, that the simplest things are distinguished and denominated by themselves: just as unity is one by itself, and differs from a point, since therefore in infinity any person is simpler than unity, it seems that it refers to another by itself, and not by relation.
3. Likewise, although relations are not properly terms of motion, yet they are not born except through motion, for there is no father except he who has begotten from his substance: in God however, nor in persons is there any motion: therefore, it seems, that neither are there relations.
4. Likewise, God is more distant from a creature, than one person from another: but by itself without real relation it is distinguished from a creature: therefore, it seems, that also by itself one person is distinguished from another.
5. Likewise, in lower things it is sometimes found, that the relative according to its substance is relative. For a creature is referred to the Creator: either by itself, or by a relation which is not itself. If in the first way: the proposition is held. If in the second way: then with the relation separated from the substance of the creature, it is no longer referred to the Creator, which seems false: therefore

in the substance itself there is still a relation, either the same with the substance, or another: and thus it will go on to infinity: therefore, it is necessary, that according to substance it is referred.

1. Likewise, that relation by which a creature is referred to the Creator, is a creature: therefore it is also referred: either by the same relation which it is, or another: and thus it proceeds to infinity, as before: therefore something is referred substantially in lower things: therefore much more this is fitting for divine persons because of greater simplicity.

2. Likewise, matter by itself (as some say) is referred to form. For if you say, that by means of potency it is referred: that potency, either is matter, or form, or composite, or substance, or accident. It is clear that it is not matter: because thus matter would be of matter. Nor form because thus form would be before the first form. Nor composite, as is clear by itself: because the first composite is from first matter and first form. Nor substance, as is clear by itself: because it would be form, or matter, or composite: and this is disproved as before. Nor accident: because matter is not susceptible of accident, except through substantial form, as in many places is proven in Philosophy: for the advent of accident is the motion of the subject to the subject: and therefore what is moved according to accident, must be actually being: therefore matter itself by itself is potency to form: otherwise also form would not be immediate to matter, and thus from first matter and first form there would not be truly one: all of which being inconvenient, it seems that matter by itself is referred to form: therefore much more person is referred to person because of greater simplicity.

But against this it is opposed in many ways Thus:

1. The Father has relation to the Son either by itself or by something else according to the mode of understanding. If by something else: then I have the proposition: because this will be relation in the Father. If by itself only: but when it is said, the Father breathes the Holy Spirit, there also

the Father by itself has relation to the Holy Spirit by the same notion: therefore in the same way the Father generates the Son, and breathes the Holy Spirit: therefore the Holy Spirit is the Son: because they are the same according to notion, which are in the same way from the same: but this is inconvenient: therefore it is necessary to posit relations also beyond the understanding of persons in the divine.

1. Furthermore, Generation is in the divine, and only spiration. Either therefore these are referred to the hypostasis by the same notion, or by different. If by the same: therefore generation is spiration: because those acts are the same, supply, at least, which are referred by the same notion to the agent: but this is false: therefore they are referred by different notions to the Father: therefore it is necessary to posit different relations corresponding to these acts.
2. Likewise, as Richard says, persons are distinguished by the property of origin, and by property alone, and by property and origin: in God however they are distinguished by the property of origin: the property of origin is that which determines the mode of existence: but that is nothing but the relation of origin: therefore in the divine it is necessary to posit relations, as it seems.

Solution. I say relations are in the divine, as the last reasons prove, and now I speak of relations which are persons, and in persons according to the mode of understanding: because although speaking really relation is nothing in the person in the divine, yet according to the

mode of understanding it is distinguishing in the distinct, and the person being supposed, relation is not supposed: and thus we posit in one person multiple relations.

To that therefore which is first objected, it must be said that relation signifies a being of respect which is to another, and that is the same with substance: yet it is not supposed, the substance being supposed: and therefore to its distinction does not follow the distinction of substance: for what in lower things makes

diversity of thing, this in the divine makes diversity of supposition. And there is an instance to the argument: the person is entirely the same with nature: but there are multiple persons: therefore multiple natures: for the theological category is changed, and thus there occurs the fallacy of figure of speech, or even of accident: because although they are the same, yet not everything that is fitting to one is fitting to the other.

To the other it must be said, that relation in the divine does not preserve the nature of accident, as the Master proves in the following part of this reading: and the reason for this was said above: because it is not taken up in the divine by reason of genus, but by reason of the difference which it adds to generation: nor does it follow that it is assisting: because when in lower things relation has two, namely the nature of accident, and what is to another: in the divine it is turned into substance with respect to the nature of accident, like all other things which name accident, and are predicated of God: and therefore relation which is in lower things is in the relative, and makes it be referred to another, in the divine it is relative according to substance, and makes itself be referred to another: and therefore it is not extrinsically assisting only.

To the other it must be said, that the simplest things are distinguished by essential or substantial distinction: but relation does not imply such a distinction in the divine, but rather three are one in essence. Hence if we say a point differs from a point in that one is a beginning, and the other an end, and unity from unity of the same genus in the simplest, we will still posit distinction according to relations. So it is in the divine: because, as will be clear in the following article, nothing is composed from what is added to it by respect of relation, but it still remains simple as before, provided only the respect of relation is added to it.

To the other it must be said, that relations are otherwise in the divine, and otherwise in lower things: in the divine indeed they are the relations of modes of existence, but in lower things they are caused by modes of existence: and this is because relations are distinguishing, and according to understanding before rela~ tives: and this was clear in the preceding question about hypostasis: but still in the following distinction there will be a question about this: and therefore it is not substantial to relation that it is constituted from motion, but it happens to this relation or that.

To the other it must be said, that greater difference causes greater distinction: and therefore God is essentially distinguished from creatures: but from the supposit of the same divine nature the supposit of the same nature cannot be distinguished, except by the smallest distinction: and this is not essential, because that is the greatest, but rather the distinction of relation: and therefore by relation it is necessary to be distinguished.

To the other it must be said, that I well concede, that something is referred to another by itself, like the Creator and the created relation itself: but I do not concede this about substance, or another creature. And to the object it must be said, that if the relation of the creature is separated from the substance of the creature itself, it will no longer be a creature, nor will it be referred to another: and this is not inconvenient according to understanding: for Boethius says in the book on Hebdomads, that those things which are not separated in act, are well separated in understanding: for it is well understood that a stone is not created. And if you object, that first not understood, the second is not understood: it must be said that this is true of the first as first and the second as second: and it is not true of the second according to what it is: for this is well intelligible without dependence on the first.

To the other it must be said, that I do not believe this to be true, that matter by itself according to what it is, is referred to form: because I do not say potency which is privation, is entirely the same with matter: but I say it is the order of matter to form. And if you say: Either it is matter , or form, etc. It must be said, that this does not hold: because potency is a being in a certain respect, and not simply: hence just as motion, which is the exit from potency to act, is defined by potency to act, because it is existing in potency and in act: so I say, that potency has something of the notion of matter if it is referred to that of which it is, and something of form if it is referred to that which it is. And therefore also it does not follow, that form is not immediately united to matter: because potency is not reduced except to the being of matter and form. Although all these things were conceded, still it does not follow that person by itself would be referred to another person, for the reason already stated: because by themselves some things can be essentially distinguished, but not personally in the same nature existing: because they have less distinction, than essential,

Articulus 7 — Whether Relation Alone Multiplies The Trinity

Whether relation alone multiplies the Trinity?

Secondly, it is asked, whether relation alone multiplies the Trinity?

It seems that it does not: because
1. The divine persons are of the highest perfection: however, relation among beings is not a being of the highest perfection, but rather less than any other being having being: therefore it seems that relation ought not to distinguish the Trinity.

1. Likewise, a being whose existence is towards another is posterior to a being whose existence is towards itself. Proposition. Given that nothing is towards itself, nothing will be towards another: but it is not converted: therefore a being in itself is prior to a being towards another: but the first being ought to distinguish the first of all, if it is distinguished by any being: since therefore the persons are in the first, it seems that they ought to be distinguished by an absolute being.
2. Likewise, substance is not caused by a being which is reduced to it as to a subject, but rather it causes it: but relation in divine things is reduced to the person as that of which

it is: therefore it does not distinguish it, nor does it make it according to the mode of understanding in personal being.

Likewise, if relation multiplies the Trinity, as Boethius says, it multiplies it by the being which it has: however, it has only a respective being: therefore it gives it only a respective being: but by this it is not substantially: therefore the divine persons will not be substantially subsisting, which is the heresy of Sabellius: therefore it seems that the Trinity is not distinguished by relation alone.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:

1. Of beings, one is substance, another is accident: and substance is truer than accident.

Likewise, of accidents, one is an absolute being, and another is a respective being: and the respective is less than the absolute: because it is born and removed without any change of the subject, as is clear from Boethius: for a boy who is born, through the year according to the diversity of his growth, will make many likenesses, disparities, equalities, inequalities, which are in no way changed according to that kind of change: therefore relation has the least of being: therefore its multiplication most fittingly suits the multiplication of the most simple: but this is God: therefore among all categories nothing so fittingly multiplies the Trinity as relation.

1. Likewise, Avicenna in the first Philosophy says that the addition of relation makes nothing composite.
2. Likewise, let there be something simple, as God is, it has the relation of the first to the second, and the relation of cause, and many other relations.
3. Likewise, this is clear in unity and point: which although they are simple, yet there are diverse reasons of relations in them: therefore relation makes nothing composite: therefore its multiplication most fittingly suits the most simple.

1. Likewise, among relations some are simpler than others: for some are immediately relative, as those which are according to the mode of origin, as cause is referred to the caused, and conversely: but not so the similar and equal: because those are founded upon an absolute being, as upon quality: and in the same way different are dissimilar and unequal: therefore since relations of origin are founded upon nothing except upon the existing itself, they are simpler than others: therefore they most fittingly suit the divine persons because of the highest simplicity.

And this must be conceded, that in the number of genera nothing so suits as relation, and in the species of relation nothing so suits as the relation of origin, by which one is from another, and by this it is distinguished from it.

Therefore it must be said to the first, that whatever is in divine things is most perfect: for when we refer the predications of inferiors to the divine, we reject all imperfections: and therefore that relation is an imperfect being is not referred to the superiors, but rather that

which is not varying in the simplest essence, and it is most perfect inasmuch as it is in divine things, although it is imperfect in itself.

To the other it must be said, that this is true, where being towards another is as the nature of an accident: but this is not in divine things, as was previously held: rather relation in that part takes the predication of substance.

To the other it must be said, that it must be conceded what Augustine says, that in all things the Father and the Son are one, except in that which is towards another: yet that being towards another encompasses that which is to be a true suppositum, and to be a true person: because these in divine things are not repugnant.

Articulus 8 — What Notion Is, And In What It Differs From Relation

What is a notion, and in what does it differ from a relation?

Then it is asked about the notion, namely, what is a notion, and in what does it differ from a relation?

1. Boethius says, however, that a notion is a simple concept of the mind: but such is only a universal purified from matter and the appendages of matter: therefore it seems that a notion is the same as a universal.
2. Likewise, the Master wishes that a notion is that by which a person is known: but by relation a person is known: therefore it seems that relation is a notion.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. A relative is that whose being is to have another: therefore it is not definitively a relation of one person: but a notion is given to one person: therefore relation is not a notion.

1. Likewise, there is some notion which is not a relation, such as "unbegotten," which seems to sound a negation: therefore it seems that not every notion is a relation in the divine.
2. Likewise, in lower things the notion of a thing is not abstracted from that by which the thing is what it is: for that which is the formal principle of being a thing is also the principle of understanding it: therefore it seems that notions in the divine ought more to be taken from the part of essence than from the part of persons.

Solution. It must be said that relation and notion differ according to the intentions of the names: because, as the objection proves, a notion is that by which a thing is known: but relation is that by which it is referred to another. However, in the divine it is not taken entirely according to the definition of Boethius: because in the divine there is no universal. And furthermore, the notion of persons is not taken from the common of persons, but rather from the proper: and this...

§ 1. ...this occurs because what is common is not a principle for understanding what is proper. Hence, since the persons, under the ratio of persons, are known by their own proper

features, it was necessary to adopt notions that cause them to be known on the part of proper features, and not on the part of what is common. Through this, the solution to the first and the last objection is evident.

§ 2. To the next it must be said that relation and notion are sometimes the same in the supposit, yet according to the intentions of the names they are not the same; and therefore, according to supposits, they are not interchangeable, because ingeneration [innascibility] does not signify a relation except speaking broadly, just as Augustine says below, that a negation is in the same genus as its affirmation. Through this, the solution to the whole is evident.

Articulus 9 — What The True Properties Are In The Divine, And How They Differ From Relations And Notions

What are truly properties in the divine things, and how do they differ from relations and notions?

§ 3. Next, it is inquired concerning property.

§ 4. 1. For the Philosopher says that a property is what belongs to all, to it alone, and always. But here, a property does not belong to all, because what belongs to the Father does not belong to the Son; therefore, it seems that those things assigned here are not truly properties.

§ 5. 2. Furthermore, Boethius says that a property is among those things consequent to the species. But above it was proved, in the question concerning hypostasis, that the properties of the persons are, through the intellect, prior to the hypostases, even though in reality they are always simultaneous. Therefore, it seems that they are not properties, but rather substantial forms.

§ 6. 3. Furthermore, it seems that not all of them are properties, because there are some that belong to many, such as principle or active spiration, which belongs to the Father and the Son; therefore, that is more common than proper.

§ 7. Next it is inquired: In what do properties differ from relations and notions?

§ 8. And it seems that they differ in nothing. 1. For in divine things, nothing is posited by the Doctors except three things, namely notion, person, and essence; therefore, everything that is in divine things is reduced to one of these. But properties cannot be reduced to the persons, nor to the essence; therefore, they are reduced to notions. Therefore, it seems that a property and a notion are the same thing.

§ 9. 2. Also, there are certain things found in the persons which do not constitute the persons themselves, just as innascibility does not make the Father to be the Father. Since, therefore, properties constitute the number of the persons, it seems that things of this kind are not properties.

§ 10. Solution. It must be said that the understanding of a property is to belong to one alone, and always. And therefore, whatever is found in a person that belongs to one alone and

always, this is a property of the person. From this it is evident that none of the properties is essential, because what is essential is common, and belongs to all.

§ 11. To the first, therefore, it must be said that the Philosopher assigns property to the species; and because a species is said of many and is in many, therefore it is necessary that this property belongs to all the supposits of the species, and to the species alone, and always, because it always follows the essential principles of the species. And just as essential things do not abandon the thing of which they are essential, neither does that which immediately follows from them. But the Saints assign property to the persons, and not to the common nature; and therefore it is not necessary that these proper things belong to all.

§ 12. To the next it must be said that although the Philosopher in the Topics seems to say that a property is sometimes from things prior by nature, nevertheless in truth the essence of a property

is always from things posterior. For if it is said, "man is an animal capable of learning," that which is prior by nature there than man contributes more to the goodness of the property than to its essence, because Boethius says that although a property always accompanies the subject everywhere, nevertheless, because it is not among those things constituting it, it is of the genus of accidents. But property is not taken in this way in divine things, and there is a dissimilarity in two respects. First, because by the Philosophers a property is assigned to the common nature, which is the species, and not to the incommunicable hypostasis; whereas in divine things, a property is assigned to the incommunicable, and not to the common nature. Another dissimilarity is that a property in lower things does not constitute that of which it is a property, but rather is constituted by it; whereas in divine things, according to the ratio of understanding, it is the reverse. And therefore, the property of the Creator and of the creature are not entirely of the same ratio.

§ 13. To the next it must be said that we do not posit substantial forms in divine things for two reasons. One of which is because a form composes, but a property does not make an essential composition, because it is not of the essence; hence, the name of property transferred to divine things does not indicate essential composition. Another reason is because a substantial form is the form of a part, which is matter, whereas property is the name of a perfect thing. And therefore the name of property is more fitting for divine things than the name of form.

§ 14. To the next it must be said that properties differ from relation according to name, and sometimes also according to supposit. According to name, because a relation is toward another, whereas a property only respects that of which it is a property. According to supposit, because what is common to many can well be a relation, but it cannot be a property properly speaking; just as common spiration is a relation of the Father and the Son to the Holy Spirit, yet it is not a property. And similarly, innascibility is a property, and not a relation, except by taking relation broadly, as will be determined below.

§ 15. To the next it must be said that there is a difference in properties, because some are called "personal" by Praepositinus, and some "properties of a person" only. Personal properties are those by which, according to the ratio of understanding, persons are constituted and

denominated, such as paternity, filiation, and passive spiration. But properties of a person are those which are found in persons in such a way that they belong to one alone, such as innascibility in the Father.

§ 16. And from these things it is evident that a personal property and a property of a person relate as superior and inferior, because every personal property is also a property of a person, but not conversely. But a property of a person and a relation relate as intersecting terms [exceeding and exceeded], because a certain relation is a property of a person, such as paternity, and a certain one is not, such as common spiration; and conversely, a certain property of a person is also a relation, such as filiation, and a certain one is not, such as innascibility.

§ 17. Furthermore it is evident that a personal property and a relation relate as inferior and superior, because every personal property is a relation, but not conversely; for common spiration is a relation, yet not a personal property.

§ 18. Also, furthermore it is evident that both the property of a person and a personal property relate to a notion as inferior and superior, because every property, whether of a person or personal, is a notion; but not conversely, because common spiration is a notion, and not a property. But a relation relates to a notion as an inferior to its superior, because every relation is a notion, and not conversely, for the reason that innascibility is a notion and not a relation, unless taking relation broadly, as has been said.

§ 19. Also, furthermore from this it is evident, according to the more common opinion which is defended by almost everyone today, that there are five

notions, namely: innascibility, paternity, filiation, common active spiration, and passive spiration. There are, however, four relations: paternity, filiation, common spiration, and passive spiration. There are also four properties of a person: innascibility, paternity, filiation, and passive spiration. But there are only three personal properties, namely: paternity, filiation, and passive spiration.

Articulus 10 — Whether In The Divine There Are Finite Or Infinite Relations, And All Are Assisting

Whether in the divine things there are finite or infinite relations, and whether they are all assistant?

§ 20. Next it is inquired concerning that which he says in the Text, ch. B: It is the proper of the Father alone, not because he himself is not born, etc.

§ 21. 1. For this seems false, because below he will say that innascibility is a property of the Father on the grounds that it belongs to the Father alone; therefore, the property of the Father is that which belongs to the Father alone; therefore, it is the property of the Father because he himself is not born; and he denies this here.

§ 22. 2. Also, from what he says here, it seems to be accepted that there are three properties, and no more. And if you say that this is understood of personal properties only, which the

Master determines exclusively here and in the following distinction, it at least seems that relations are infinite, thus: Whatever is generated without any mutation of the person and accidentally from the habitude of another to it, is multiplied according to those habitudes in which a relation is thus generated. Therefore, it is multiplied according to the habitudes of others to it. The first premise is posited by Boethius in the book On the Trinity, and by Avicenna in the First Philosophy. Thence I proceed further: the habitudes of others to any of the beings are infinite, and they come and go continuously; therefore, there are infinite relations in any being; therefore, much more so in God, who holds Himself more immediately to any being than any created being to another.

§ 23. 3. Also, it seems that there were also infinite relations in God from eternity. For the habitude of one to another makes a relation; but one holds Himself to another according to every attribute from eternity, which is why they are called equal, similar, the same, and the like. Therefore, since such attributes are infinite, such habitudes seem to be infinite, and thus from eternity there were many relations.

§ 24. 4. Also, from eternity there were in God the rationes [reasons/accounts/ideas] of all things, which cannot equally be called rationes except through a respect to things to be created. Therefore, those rationes were from eternity in Him and were infinite. Therefore, there are not only three.

§ 25. 5. If you say that those do not constitute the persons, but these do. On the contrary: A respect of greater diversity is toward things diverse in hypostasis and nature, than a respect to things distinct in hypostasis only and not in nature. But the first respect does not distinguish the persons; therefore, neither does the second.

§ 26. Furthermore, it seems that relations of this kind existing from eternity in God were assistant, and were not God. And these are the objections of Gilbert de la Porrée and Simon of Tournai.

§ 27. 1. For either the Father is God by that by which He is the Father, or by another. If by the same: but He is God by the essence, by which the Son is also God; therefore the Son is the Father. Or thus: He is Father by paternity; therefore by paternity He is God; and since the Son is God, the Son is God by paternity, which is incongruous. If by another: then there is something in God which is not God, but another; and then I have the proposition, that the relation assists God, and is nothing in Him.

§ 28. 2. Also, in the Posterior Analytics, this is posited as immediate: Substance is not

quantity; therefore, by a similar reasoning, this as well: Substance is not relation, because the most general genus in both, for its own sake and not for another's, is removed from the first most general genus. Therefore, relations even in divine things predicate nothing in the divine things.

§ 29. 3. Also, Boethius expressly says this, that a relation predicates nothing in that of which it is a relation, but it assists it, and says how it holds itself to another. Therefore, it seems that relations assist, and are not God.

§ 30. 4. Also, Richard of St. Victor says that relation is not so much a genus of being, as a being sprinkled in every genus of beings; therefore, it seems that it is more a ratio than any nature, because nothing in reality is sprinkled in every genus of being.

§ 31. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Augustine said above that if God is not great by that greatness which He Himself is, but by participation, then His greatness is greater than He is. Therefore, by a similar reasoning, if the Father is not Father by that paternity which He Himself is, His paternity is greater than He is.

§ 32. 2. Also, it is objected more strongly: Porretanus posits that his relation is either some being in divine things, or nothing. If it is something: then it must be a substance, or an accident. If an accident, it will be in some subject, and that will be a composite varied by the accident; all of which are absurdly understood of God. If it is a substance, then I have the proposition: that it does not assist, but the relative itself is the substance. If, however, it is nothing: then since the persons are distinguished by nothing except solely by that which is toward another, as Augustine and the Catholic faith say, the persons are distinguished by nothing. But what is distinguished by nothing, is entirely nothing; therefore the persons are entirely nothing but names alone, which is the heresy of Sabellius.

§ 33. 3. Also, whatever is distinguished only by an assistant from without, that is not distinguished from another by itself. The divine persons are distinguished by a relation assisting only from without to their hypostases, and by themselves; and this again is close to the heresy of Sabellius.

§ 34. 4. Also, that which is assistant to God from eternity, is either a created being, or uncreated. If created: then it was created from eternity, which is a contradiction of the intellect, because the created has an opposite ratio to the eternal. If uncreated: therefore it is God, or two gods, or even created things, or there were infinite ones, which is false.

§ 35. But if you say, as some moderns say, that relation is a mean between being and non-being, for the reason that it is the ratio of a thing, and not a thing; nor is it even the ratio of a thing absolutely, but it is the ratio of the comparison of a thing to another thing. On the contrary: This ratio either posits something in the thing outside the mind of the one reasoning, or nothing. If it posits something: then I have the proposition, because then it will be a genus of being, and not solely a ratio. If nothing: then its ratio is empty and vain. And what is more difficult, from this it follows that the divine persons, which are distinguished by nothing except by that which is toward another, differ only by reason alone, and are not really distinguished. And because Sabellius said this, he was condemned as a heretic.

§ 36. 5. Furthermore, in the Preface the Church sings: And in the persons property, and in the essence unity, and in majesty equality is to be adored. If therefore the property in the persons is to be adored as God, it will not be an assistant adhering only extrinsically.

§ 37. Solution. It must be said that the opinion of the followers of Porretanus is both false and heretical, and was condemned by Pope Alexander at the Council of Reims. Hence we say neither that infinite

relations existed from eternity, nor that relations assist, nor that relations are nothing. But we confess that four relations exist from eternity, and that these are God; and that relations even in lower things are something, and exist in [them], and are present [to them]; whereas in higher things they neither are present to nor inhere in them, properly speaking, but are the relative things themselves, as was determined above.

§ 38. To the first, therefore, it must be said that there are certain relations really existing in both relatives in lower things, such as those which are generated by the mutation of both, like all relations of origin. And these relations express the truest mutual respect toward each other, and they always demand diverse hypostases in which they reside, like father and son; for there is never a father in lower things except by his own mutation, nor ever a son by the mutation of another but by his own. But certain others are indeed always said convertibly and toward each other, but they are not necessarily generated from the mutation of both, but of one only; and those are the ones that are not simple, but are founded upon another being of quantity, or quality, or something else of this sort, such as similar, equal, right, left, and the like. And there are some relatives which are neither said by the relation of both convertibly, nor are generated by the mutation of both, such as knowledge and the knowable, and one and many, as Dionysius and the Philosopher say, and like Creator and creature. For it does not follow that if knowledge is toward another, the knowable must also be toward another according to that which it is; nor does it follow that if the knower is mutated, the knowable is mutated. Hence, because relation spoken of in the first mode has the truest and solely most simple being of relation, that relation, with mutation removed from the relatives, is transsumed [applied] into divine things, as we said before. And if you object to me that in lower things every relation is founded in another being, since it is an accident, and the being of an accident is to inhere—I answer that I do not understand it to be founded in another being in this way, but rather to be founded in another as in a cause, not in a subject. Just as the Philosopher says that one in substance makes the same, and one in quantity makes equal, and one in quality makes similar, even though both (namely equality and quantity) are founded in one subject which is substance. However, in this way nothing is subordinated in which there is paternity, or filiation, or any relation of origin, because origin is according to the substance of the hypostasis; and therefore such a relation has an immediate order to the originating or originated hypostasis.

§ 39. It must be said, therefore, to the first, that Master Hugh seeks nothing but personal properties only, which are relations, although they are not the sole ones.

§ 40. To the next it must be said that the relations which really exist in the relative according to origin are not infinite, as has already been shown. But the relations that do not arise from origin, but from the mutation of another, in my judgment are not real relations in both, but in one only, and in the other there is the ratio of correspect and not the reality [res] of relation. And this ratio is not empty, because it is founded in the habitude of a real respect in the other of the relatives.

§ 41. To the next it must be said that the habitude of one to another according to attributes is not a habitude properly, but a unity of distinct things. And that does not import another real relation, except of distinct things under that one; and therefore, since the distinguishing

relation is only fourfold, there will be no more than four relations from eternity. Similarly, equal and similar, by reason of that in which there is similitude and equality, do not signify a relation, but the ratio of equals and similars; and then they import the same four relations by distinguishing, as was said above.

§ 42. To the next it must be said that the respect of the eternal rationes is a ratio, and not a reality diverse from God. And if you ask: In what was that ratio? I say that ratio in three ways

is spoken of, namely: in the aptitude of the thing about which it is (and thus it is in potency); and in the reason of the created reasoner; and in the reason of the Creator. In the first and last way, a ratio could be from eternity, because it posits nothing other than God; but in the middle way, no. Hence, from this nothing can be proved.

§ 43. To the next it must be said that in some respect, there is a greater distinction in a relation respecting a diverse being in nature and hypostasis, than to one distinct in hypostasis only; and in some respect, it is not true. For if the greater distinction is that which is founded upon a greater (that is, more distinct) thing, thus it is true; but the relation does not make it so, but rather becomes so from it. If, however, it is called a greater distinction from a more distinguishing relation, it is not true, because nothing distinguishes so much as that which is according to origin; for concerning that, Anselm says that neither does the intellect grasp, nor reason permit, that opposite respects could be in the same supposit.

§ 44. To the next it must be said that by that reality He is Father by which He is God, but not by that ratio and mode of understanding. This mode of understanding in the divine things is not nothing, but rather is really signifiable, since with deity posited [supposed], paternity is not posited; as when, speaking really, we say: "paternity distinguishes, and deity does not distinguish"; and then the objection does not proceed, as is self-evident to anyone.

§ 45. To the next it must be said that, as was held above, God is great without quantity, yet not related without relation; for according to something relation can be transferred into divine predication, whereas quantity cannot be transferred. And the reason for this was stated there, and let it be sought there.

§ 46. To the next it must be said that Boethius intends that it predicates nothing absolute insofar as it is a relation, because in this way it is a certain habitude to another. However, according to that which it is, it predicates something in the relative in lower things, and is the relative itself in higher things.

§ 47. To the next it must be said that Richard does not speak according to how it is a certain nature divided against other beings, but according to its supposit and cause. For it is caused in some way by all genera of beings; but nevertheless, it is a certain nature divided against every being.

Articulus 11 — How And With Respect To What The Notions In The Divine Differ, And Whether The Several Properties Which Are In One Person Differ In That Person

How and with respect to what do notions differ in the divine things? And, do multiple properties which are in one person differ in that person?

§ 48. Next it is inquired concerning what he says there, ch. B: He briefly assigned these three properties of the three persons, etc.

§ 49. For from this it seems that notions differ according to properties.

§ 50. And it is inquired: By what difference? 1. For in divine things there is no difference, except what is according to origin, that one is from another. But such a difference is not in the notions, because one is not from another; for paternity never produces filiation.

§ 51. 2. Furthermore, this is false: "Paternity generates," but this is true: "Paternity distinguishes." Therefore, it seems that they do not differ in the divine things.

§ 52. Furthermore it is inquired, which is more difficult: Whether multiple properties which are in one person differ in that person?

§ 53. 1. It seems so, because since they are only in that person, if they had no difference in that person, they would simply have no difference at all.

§ 54. 2. Furthermore, this is false: "Innascibility in the Father is paternity in the Father." Therefore, since a removal or negation of one from the other is not made

except by reason of diversity, it seems that those properties in the person in which they are, have diversity.

§ 55. 3. Also, whatever has number in something, it is necessary that it has distinction in it. But we say that three properties, or relations, or notions are in the Father, and two notions are in the Son; therefore, in the Father and the Son those notions are distinguished.

§ 56. But on the contrary: As the persons hold themselves to the essence, so do the notions to the person. But the persons are not distinguished in the essence, but are one; therefore the notions are not distinguished in the person, but are one, as it seems.

§ 57. Solution. It must be said that the notions are distinguished by themselves; for the principles by which things are distinguished, are distinguished from each other by themselves, just as man and donkey differ by specific differences, and those differences themselves do not differ by other differences, but by themselves.

§ 58. To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that distinction according to origin is twofold, namely, to that which is from an origin (or is the origin), and to that which is the ratio of the origin. And in this second way, distinction according to origin is referred back to the distinction of notions; and through this the solution to the second is also evident.

§ 59. To that which is further inquired, it must be said that notions are only in the persons, and they have distinction in them.

§ 60. To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that the persons are not so united in the essence that they are one person, but rather they are one essence; and therefore they are called one [neuter], not one [masculine]. So also the notions are not so united in the person that they are made one notion; but they are made one person, which nevertheless is not composed of them, just as the essence is not composed of the persons. But it is true that notions are not called one on account of the unity of the person in which they are, because the word one [unum] in the neuter gender refers back to the essence. Hence, the notions are not one on account of the person, but on account of the simplicity of the essence. From the person, however, they do not have distinction, nor even unity; because they are distinguished by themselves, and insofar as they are referred to notional acts.

Articulus 12 — Whether, The Person Being Supposed, The Notion Is Presupposed

Whether, with the person posited, the notion is posited?

§ 61. Next it is inquired concerning that which he says, there, ch. B: They denote relations which are not accidental to God, but are in the persons themselves from eternity, etc.

§ 62. 1. For it seems that from this it follows that with the person posited [supposed], the notion is posited: for whatever things are entirely the same in reality, with one posited, the other is posited.

§ 63. 2. Furthermore he says this, that the notion is the substance, but the notion is more immediately ordered to the hypostasis than to the essence; therefore it seems that this notion in the person is proper and immediate. But the person generates; therefore the notion does as well; and thus it seems that with the person posited, the notion is posited.

§ 64. 3. Also, faith is not as determined in the number of notions as in the number of persons, and those who say that notions in the divine things are nothing besides the persons are not condemned; therefore it seems that according to the Catholic faith, notions are nothing besides the persons; therefore, with the person posited, the notion is posited.

§ 65. But on the contrary: Whatever things hold themselves in such a way that with one posited, the rest is posited, in those things whatever is attributed to one is attributed to the other. But it is not so concerning notion and person: because the notion distinguishes and is not distinguished; whereas the person is distinguished and does not distinguish. Therefore, with the person posited, the notion is not posited.

§ 66. We concede this, saying to the first that although person and notion do not differ in reality, nevertheless they differ in the mode of understanding;

which mode is really signified when it is said, "the notion distinguishes," and "the person is distinguished." Hence, for one to be posited when the other is posited, identity of reality does not suffice; but it is necessary in addition that this be present: that whatever belongs to one, belongs to the other.

§ 67. To the next it must be said that although the notion is immediate to the person, and the person to the substance, such that there is no intermediate predicate by which the persons

participate in the notion or the essence, nevertheless this does not suffice for the one to be posited when the other is posited. But it is necessary that the one be immediate to the act and attribute of the other; just as generating is the act of the person, and this does not belong to the notion or the essence. And therefore when one proceeds thus: "the notion is the person; the person generates; therefore the notion generates," the fallacy of accident occurs, for the reason that an extraneous element is assumed, which does not belong [to it] according to the ratio of understanding.

§ 68. To the next it must be said that although some say notions do not exist, they refer this to the respect according to which they are abstractly signified. But if they were to say that nothing distinguishes the divine persons, this would not be Catholic. And therefore it is necessary that notions be posited in some way, either implicitly or explicitly; and then not everything that belongs to the notion belongs to the person; and thus, with one posited, the rest is not posited.

Articulus 13 — Whether There Are Only Three Notions In The Divine

Whether there are only three notions in the divine things?

§ 69. Next it is inquired concerning that which he says: It is also shown to be a property of the Father, that He has a Son, etc.

§ 70. For here occurs the question concerning the number of notions. For above it was proved that they are finite, and they are in the persons, and they are not assistant. But it seems that there are only three, and this is the common objection:

§ 71. 1. For every notion is some one of the three persons; but the persons are not multiplied except by three; therefore neither are the notions.

§ 72. 2. Also, one person as a person cannot be known except in one way, just as it itself only has being in one way. Since, therefore, a notion is for the cognition of the person, it seems that there are no more than three notions.

§ 73. 3. Also, the property of origin in the divine things makes the persons. But each thing is known in the same way in which it is constituted in being according to the ratio of understanding; therefore, it is known by the property of origin. But the property of origin in the divine things is only threefold, namely: he who is not from another; he from whom another is by generation; and he who is from another by spiration. Therefore, it seems that there are no more than three.

§ 74. But it seems that there are six, because: 4. Anselm says so in the book On the Procession of the Holy Spirit: Furthermore, there are six differences of the Father and the Son arising from these names, namely: to have a father, not to have a father, to have a son, not to have a son, to have the Holy Spirit proceeding from Himself, not to have the Holy Spirit proceeding from Himself. Since, therefore, six are enumerated here, and besides there is innascibility which is not touched upon here, it seems that there are seven notions.

§ 75. 5. Also, we have one notion [for Him] who is not from another; therefore we will have another [for Him] who is from another; and [for Him] from whom another is; and [for Him] from whom none is; and [for Him] who is from another, from whom another is. Therefore it seems there are at least six notions.

§ 76. 6. Also, it seems that there are no more than three: because innascibility is in one, but it seems that paternity and filiation are one: for the road from Thebes to

[...like the road to] Athens, which is from Athens to Thebes: therefore, by a similar reasoning, the comparison of the Father to the Son is the same in essence as that of the Son to the Father: but 'paternity' names the comparison of the Father to the Son, and 'filiation' conversely: therefore paternity and filiation are the same. By the same reasoning, active and passive spiration are the same: therefore there are only three notions.

§ 7. Again, it seems that there are only two: because a negation makes nothing known: since therefore innascibility is a negation, it seems that it is not a notion: and paternity and filiation and active and passive spiration are two (as has already been proved), it seems that there are only two.

Solution. To this it is easy to reply, by supposing that three things are required for this itself to be a notion of a person. For 'person' is a name pertaining to dignity, as was determined above: therefore it is not known except by a property pertaining to dignity. I say therefore that it must pertain to dignity, and express that dignity specifically, and be a principle of knowing the person: since therefore 'not to be from another' does not belong except to one alone, it is clear that what it states specifically, it also states as a dignity: because 'not to be from another' is a dignity, and it states a formal reason of knowing: and therefore innascibility is a notion and a dignity of the Father, because in the order of nature two persons cannot 'not be from another'. But 'to be from another' does not determine specifically, and in general, it does not state a dignity: and therefore it is not a notion but something consequent upon a notion. Likewise 'that from which another is', although it states or seems to state a certain dignity, nevertheless because it does not determine specifically, it does not define the notion of a dignity: and therefore it is not a notion. But 'to be from another' by generation is of a dignity, because it imports an equality and communication of nature, and likewise 'to be from another' by spiration: and therefore those declare notions. Likewise, 'that from which another is' by generation, and 'that from which another is' by spiration specify the principle of knowing, and therefore they also import a dignity. Therefore the notions are five only, namely: 'he who is not from another', which states innascibility; 'that from which another is' by generation; and 'that from which another is' by spiration; and 'he who is from another' by generation; and 'he who is from another' by spiration.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that although any notion is of some one of the three persons, it does not however follow that there are only three: because they do not take their number from the persons, but rather from themselves, according as by them the persons are divided differently in personal being, and their dignities are known.

To the next it must be said that the property of origin is manifold, according to the relation of before and after, and it is not merely according to the number of those things which are originated by those properties.

To the next it must be said that Anselm calls the differences 'distinctions of persons', according to those things which commonly or properly follow the persons: just as 'not having a son' is a certain common thing, from which no dignity is known: hence he does not intend there to prove the number of notions.

To the next it must be said that 'not to be from another' states a dignity and does so specifically, whereas 'to be from another' does not state it in this way: and therefore it is not similar.

To the next it must be said that some concede that argument. But it must be said otherwise, that just as in an action there is that which is an accident, and according to this it is in the agent: and there is that which is the action, and according to this it is from the agent in the patient: so it is in a relation: hence paternity is in the Father, and according to what is toward the Son, so it is still in the Father with respect to the Son, and conversely of filiation: and therefore a relation according to what it is, is only in the relative which it denominates, although by respect its correlative is co-understood: and therefore a relation according to what it is, is not in the middle. Hence the road from Athens to Thebes is not similar: because that, according to what it is, is in the middle: but it is similar concerning the comparison of Thebes to Athens, and conversely: because the termini of the road, although they are compared to one another, nevertheless differ according to what they are: and the same goes for paternity and filiation. For active and passive procession the reasoning is completely the same: and therefore those relations differ.

To the next it must be said that it is not absolutely a negation, but posits something in the Father, as will be clear below. Or let it be said that negations make something known, as was proved above. But the first solution is truer.

Articulus 14 — Whether It Is Lawful In Divine Matters Without Sin To Hold Different Opinions And To Speak About The Notions, Since Some Posit More, Others Fewer

Whether it is permitted in divine matters to hold different opinions and speak differently concerning the notions without sin, since some posit more, some fewer? And, whether a false opinion makes a heretic?

Next it is asked concerning what he says there, at D: Here it is asked how 'proper to the born God' is said, etc.

Here two things must be determined, namely: how did anyone dare to posit notions in divine matters, especially since it seems that Doctors contradict one another in a matter of faith? And secondly, what is required for gratuitous filiation?

To the first one proceeds thus: § 1. One says there is no property or notion, another posits infinite ones, another five, another three: but some of these are contradictorily opposed, namely that there is no notion, and that there is some notion: therefore one of them will be

false: but a lie, as Augustine says, which is in the doctrine of faith, is the greatest of all lies: therefore it seems that such diversity of opinions cannot be without mortal sin.

§ 2. Again, it was held above that nowhere does one err more dangerously than in the matter of the Trinity: since therefore this error is in the matter of the Trinity, it seems to be the most dangerous.

§ 3. If you say that Scripture has not determined it: and therefore there can be opinions concerning this. It is asked, what is called Scripture? If the canon of the Bible is called Scripture: just as it does not determine five notions, so too it does not determine that there are three persons: therefore there could also be diverse opinions concerning this: which is false: because one who asserted that there are not three persons would be reputed a heretic. But if the canon of the Fathers is called Scripture, it seems plainly false: because below we shall have that Augustine names and posits the notions.

To this it must be said that on account of the difficulty of the matter, those holding diverse opinions here not out of presumption, but out of reasoning, are excused: because a false opinion does not make a heretic, but rather the presumption of assertion and defense, as the Master says below.

To the first therefore it must be said that they do not contradict in reality when saying that there is no notion, and saying that there are some notions: because those who say there is none, posit that the persons are distinguished by themselves, and thus implicitly they posit the notions, but not distinct from the persons except according to intention: because it is impossible to posit the distinguishing and the distinguished to be the same by intention. But those who posit the notions do not say they differ in reality from the persons, but by supposition and mode of understanding. Nor is it a lie: because they do not speak with the intention of deceiving, but rather opine that which they believe to be true. But he who says what is not true and thinks it to be true, does not lie, as Augustine says.

To the next it must be said that the number of notions refers to the number of persons: and therefore it does not have a special article of the Creed, and therefore there is not as much danger there as in another matter which is expressly determined by the Fathers.

To the next it must be said that although Augustine names notions and properties, he nevertheless does not show how they are distinguished from the persons: and he does not determine whether they are as notions, or only in what is known by them, or whether they are to be posited in themselves: and therefore there can be opinions concerning that.

Articulus 15 — What Is Required For Gratuitous Filiation

What is required for gratuitous filiation?

What is required for gratuitous filiation?

Next it is asked, what is required for gratuitous filiation in general, which the Master here seems to touch upon as threefold, namely by making or creation, and by re-creation, and by external generation, etc.

But because many things have been said about this elsewhere, let them be sought there: for there it was disputed concerning the filiation of adoption, and filiation by nature and the grace of union, and by making. This alone is to be noted here, that although other things are made according to the exemplar which they have in the divine mind, nevertheless God is not properly called their father, nor are they sons: because a son is one who has the image of the maker in another way, like man, and Angel.

But those things which are said in the following part by the Master are plain enough through those things which were treated concerning the Holy Spirit.

Here it can be asked whether the properties which Hilary, etc.

Here begins that part in which the Master determines concerning the same three personal properties which have been discussed, insofar as they are signified by other names. And it is divided into four parts: in the first of which the Master touches upon other words in which the same properties are signified under another mode of signifying. In the second he touches upon how these properties distinguish the persons inseparably, there, at D, For those properties, each to each, to each, etc. In the third he touches upon how certain persons are signified by other names with the same relations, especially the person of the Son, there, at E, Here it is not to be passed over, that just as Father and Son, etc. In the fourth he touches upon how, by essential names posited for personal ones, the same persons and properties are also expressed, there, at H, Here it is asked, when it is said God from God, etc.

In the first of these there are three chapters: in the first of which he raises a question. In the second he resolves it, there, at B, To which without prejudice, etc. In the third he assigns the reason for the solution, there, at C, Yet it does not seem to us to be entirely the same, etc.

DISTINCTIO XXVII

Divisio Textus

Articulus 1 — Whether It Is The Same To Have Begotten The Son And To Be Father

Whether it is the same to have begotten the Son, and to be the Father?

A question arises here first concerning the Master's intention: Whether it is the same to have begotten the Son, and to be the Father?

§ 1. And the Master introduces one argument in the Text that it is not the same: because if it were the same, whatever one applies to, the other would apply to: but it applies to the divine essence to be the Father: therefore it applies to the divine essence to have begotten the Son, which is false.

§ 2. Against this it can be objected thus: It is not the same if baptism is performed in the name of the begetter and the begotten, and in the name of the Father and the Son: for if it is performed in the name of the begetter and the begotten and the gift, it is not reputed as

baptism: but if it is performed in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, it is reputed as baptism: therefore it seems that they do not signify the same thing.

§ 3. Moreover, the Master says in the third chapter of this part that when 'Father' is said, a hypostasis is signified with a property (otherwise, paternity): but when 'begot' is said, nothing but the property is signified: therefore the same thing is not signified, as it seems.

§ 1. But on the contrary it seems that this is false: 'the essence is the Father', just as this: 'the essence begot': for if the essence is the Father, it is the Father only of the Son: therefore this is true: 'the essence is the Father of the Son': therefore it follows further that the essence begot the Son, and that the essence is said relatively, and that it is distinguished: all of which were denied above: therefore it seems that the Master's proof is worth nothing.

§ 2. Again, if those properties are other than these, then by the same reasoning they are also other when it is said: 'The Father is distinguished from the Son', and 'is related to the Son', and 'produces the Son': therefore there would be very many relations: therefore it seems that they are entirely the same.

Solution. It must be said to this that they are the same in reality under another mode of signifying. But this mode of signifying is diverse on account of three things: the first and principal of which is what the Master touches upon in the Text, that 'Father' and 'Son' and 'Holy Spirit' are names of hypostases and properties: but 'to be begotten' and 'to beget' are names of properties only. The second reason is: because since 'father' signifies the property concretively, and 'to beget' concretively, the mode of concretion is diverse: for when 'white' is said, the subject with whiteness is signified, because that is the substance of the name: but when 'to become white' is said, an inhering accident without a subject is signified, and this is because an act has in itself a substance, as that from which it is: and although it is in some substance according as it is an accident, yet because it is signified as an act, a substance of this kind in which it is, is not signified in it: and therefore it is signified as not enclosing a subject and substance in its significate. The third is: because 'to beget' and the like signify properties in general, and not in species: for it does not follow if something begets something that it is its father: nor if something is begotten that it is its son, as we have determined from Augustine. Having held these, the initially introduced arguments are to be conceded.

To that however which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that when it is said 'the essence is the Father', the locution is twofold from the fact that 'Father' can be taken adjectivally, and thus it is false, and in this sense it is disproved: or substantively, and in this sense it is conceded by the Master, that is: the essence is he who is the Father.

To the next it must be said that multiplication cannot be made beyond the three personal properties: because verbs of this kind, 'to distinguish', and 'to refer', and the like, signify rather that which follows from the properties than the properties themselves, and do not specify them. Therefore, since a genus adds nothing above the species, and is not counted along with it, verbs of this kind are not called special notions: however, note that the followers of Gilbert of Poitiers, positing infinite notions, conceded those objections.

Articulus 2 — Whether The Father Is Father Because He Begot, Or He Begot Because He Is Father, And Whether The Properties Determine The Persons, And Whence The Determination Comes

Whether the Father is Father because he begot, or begot because he is Father? And, whether the properties determine the persons, and whence does the determined come?

Next it is asked concerning what he says in the second chapter B, He is always Father, because he always begot the Son, etc.

For it seems from this that he is Father because he begot: therefore according to the rationale of understanding, to beget is prior to being the Father.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. Only a distinct person begets: for there are no acts except of distinct particulars: therefore the begetter is a distinct person: but he is not distinguished except by paternity: therefore the Father is prior to generation according to the mode of understanding: and thus he is not Father because he begot: but rather he begot because he is Father.

§ 2. Again, let us separate by intellect the property from the persons: either therefore something remains, or nothing. If nothing: then I have the proposition, that the properties make the persons: and thus he begot because he is Father. If something: either that is the essence alone, or something else. If the essence alone: then the arriving property determines the essence, and is posited concerning it, which was disproved above, and will again be disproved below. If something else: either this is distinct in the persons, or not. If distinct: then in the divine there is something distinct before the distinguishing principle according to reason: because nothing distinguishes except the property, and we have posited that not to be. If that is not distinct: then it is the essence: because nothing is indistinct in the persons except the essence, and from that it follows, as before, that the notions are posited concerning the essence, and that they determine it, which is false.

§ 3. Again, in the second part of this distinction the Master says that the properties determine the persons: and it is asked, whence comes the determined? For we clearly see whence the undetermined in the persons comes, namely the essence: and we clearly see whence the determining principle comes, because this is the property. But the third, which is the determined, since that cannot remain if the property is removed, it is asked, whence does it come? For it cannot be said that this, according to the mode of understanding, is the property: because then the determining and the determined would be the same according to the intellect, which cannot be.

§ 4. Again, some object: Either he begets because he is Father, or because he is God, or because he is God the Father, or because he is innascible, or because he is the spirative principle: for it cannot be considered in more ways. If he begot because he is God: then since the Son is God, he too would beget, which is false. If he begot because he is Father: this is against Anselm in the book On the Procession of the Holy Spirit: because he says that it is ridiculous to say that on account of the relation of the Father the whole divine essence is in the Son. Hence Anselm says in the same place that he begets because he is God: and he spirates

because he is God. If because he is God the Father: this cannot be, since the grace of neither belongs to him, as has already been proved. Again, in the Text it seems to be said that he is rather God the Father because he begets, than conversely that he begets because he is God the Father. But if because he is innascible: this does not seem to be so: because thus he is not compared to the Son, but rather to a principle before himself by privation. But if because he is the spirative principle: then he would rather spirate than beget. Moreover, since the Son is the same principle, the Son would also beget. Therefore it seems that it is in no way appropriate for him to beget.

Solution. It must be said without prejudice, just as we also said above in the question concerning hypostasis, that in divine matters it is otherwise than in lower ones: because in lower ones relations are only relations, and they are born from mutations. In divine matters, however, they are not only relations, but also properties, and they even have a certain act similar to a constitutive difference in that they constitute the persons: and therefore in higher matters relations are prior to notional acts according to the intellect, as the objections prove: and the saying of Augustine which he mentions here, must be referred to the relations according as they are only relations: because it is true that the Father is not referred to the Son insofar as he is a person constituted in himself, but rather because he begot him.

To this which is asked further: If the notions or properties are separated, whether something remains, or nothing? It must be said, in my judgment, that nothing remains except perhaps the essence which is common in the persons, not as determined by the properties.

And to what is further asked: Whence comes that which is distinguished, since it does not remain? It must be said, as above, that the distinguishing principle, according as it is distinguishing, is only in the distinct: and the distinct, according as it is distinct, is only in the distinguishing principle. In divine matters, however, properties are not taken as certain beings, but only according to the act of distinguishing: nor hypostases as certain beings absolutely divided by substance, but only as divided by relation (ad aliquid): which nevertheless in divine matters is not an accident according to reality, but substantial: and therefore when one is posited, both are posited: and when one is removed, both are removed: and thus the solution to all that is asked about this is clear.

To that which is further asked, whether he begets because he is Father, etc. I say that he begets because he is God the Father: and when Anselm says that he begets because he is God, he touches only on part of the cause: because the power of begetting is from the nature in the Father, but the act and property belongs to the Father.

To that which is objected to the contrary, the solution is already clear: because it has been shown that because he is Father, he begets: and not because he begets, is he Father. There are some however who say that he begets because he is innascible, because thus he seeks a companion to whom he may communicate his delights. But they, saving their peace, do not understand the question: because when it is asked whether because he is Father, or conversely, it is asked about the formal reason of the begetter as he is a begetter, and not why he begets.

Expositio Textus

Exposition of the text

Next it is asked about what the Master says in the second part of this distinction, there, For those properties, each to each, etc.

For this seems false: because the incommunicable does not have to be determined, but rather the common and universal: therefore it seems that since nothing is common except the essence, that it has to be distinguished and determined.

To this it must be said that there is a common as universal, and this has to be determined and distinguished according as it is contracted to this or to that: there is also a common by the whole reality, that is, which as a whole belongs to each of its supposits, and this does not have to be determined, but is rather the hypostasis, which is not common except by reason, as was proved above.

Articulus 3 — What Word Is

What is the word?

Next it is asked concerning the third part of the distinction, there, at E, Here it is not to be passed over, etc., where he says that 'word', and 'image', and 'begetter', and the like, declare the same hypostases and notions which 'Father' and 'Son' and 'Holy Spirit' declare. But because enough has been said about 'begetter' above, and there will be a treatise on 'image' below, let five things be asked here concerning the word, namely: What is the word? And, what things are appropriate to the word? What is it for the highest spirit to speak? Whether it is an essential word just as it is sometimes 'to speak'? And, to the similitude of what word in lower things is it said?

CONCERNING THE FIRST one proceeds thus: § 1. Augustine says in Book IX of On the Trinity: The Word which we now intend to discern and intimate, is knowledge with love: but knowledge is not said personally: therefore it seems that neither is the word: this is against what is determined here.

§ 2. Again, Augustine, in the book of Eighty-Three Questions says that in Greek Logos signifies both word and reason in Latin: but in this place, In the beginning was the Word, we better interpret it so that it signifies not only respect to the Father, but also to those things which were made by the Word as operative power. Since therefore operative power is essential, and not only personal, it seems that the word is not always the Son.

§ 3. Moreover, a word is called the expression of a concept in the heart of the speaker, that is, of the one intuiting by the intellect: and this is not always loved knowledge, as Augustine says in the same place, in Book IX of On the Trinity: therefore it seems that it is badly defined by loved knowledge. For Augustine says that we disapprove of the knowledge of some things.

§ 4. Again, a word is about the thing of which it is, and is declarative of it: since therefore the speaker manifests himself, it does not seem to declare a personal distinction in the same way: and thus it is not appropriate to the Son.

§ 5. Again, why is this, that the born Son is expressed in the canon by 'Word': since 'Son' speaks more of a distinction and personal perfection in a common nature, than 'Word'?

Solution. It must be said that Augustine defines the word according as it is manifested in an image in which a word proceeds from the mind, just as the Son from the Father, as is said in the Psalms: My heart has uttered a good word. And because equality is not perfect, as Augustine says, except when the mind speaks itself, and then it is always knowledge with love: because it speaks itself as great as it is: and it loves itself as great as it is: and therefore then the word is always with love.

To the first therefore it must be said that knowledge is said in two ways, namely as art or wisdom, and this essentially applies to the three: but it is appropriated to the Son. Knowledge is also said of the speaker, as proceeding from the speaker which is as manifesting the speaker, and not as possessed by the speaker himself as a form of a knowable thing: and this is said personally, because that is a word which is said relatively: and Augustine intends this one.

To the next it must be said that Augustine in the book of Eighty-Three Questions takes the word according as it notes an effect in a creature, and consequently signifies essentially and personally, or the essence in the person: and therefore it is not to the point: because Augustine intends that in the Gospel it signifies in both ways, namely personally when it is said, In the beginning was the Word: but essentially by connoting a notion, when it is said, All things were made through him, namely the Word, and without him was made nothing that was made.

To the next the solution is clear through what was said before.

To the next it must be said that a speaker does not manifest himself except in that it proceeds from him: and the procession itself speaks of a personal distinction. For in this, as Damascene says, the word of God abounds from our word, just as the spirit of God from our spirit.

To the next it must be responded through the word of Chrysostom in the second homily on John, where he says thus: The Evangelist called him the Word: for because he ought to teach that this Word is the only-begotten Son of God: so that no one might suppose a passible generation, anticipating by the appellation of 'Word', he destroys every pernicious suspicion, showing both that he is the Son from him and impassibly. From this it is gathered that the Saints wish the word to be that which immaterially proceeds from the speaker, completely manifesting the speaker, in that it has in itself neither more nor less than the speaker.

Articulus 4 — What Are The Things That The Saints Attribute To The Word, And With Respect To What They Are Taken

What are the things which are attributed to the word by the Saints, and according to what are they taken?

Secondly it is asked, what things are appropriate to the word?

And let four authorities be taken on this, namely of Jerome in the Helmeted Prologue, where he says thus: Logos in Greek signifies many things: for it is word, and reason, and computation, and the cause of each thing, through which individual things are which subsist: all of which we rightly understand in Christ.

Again, Damascene says that the Word of God is subsisting in itself, elective, and operative, and omnipotent.

But Basil says thus: To the Son of God are attributed sense, wisdom, virtue, light, word: sense, by which all things are known; wisdom, by which all things are disposed: virtue, by which all things are perfected: light, by which all things are declared: word, by which all things are enunciated.

Dionysius in the book On the Divine Names, says that God is called word: because he is the bestower of wisdom and intellect, as having the causes of all things in himself, as taking and walking through all things, as more simple than every simplicity. Since therefore there are so many diversities of the Saints concerning the attributes of the Son, which all belong to him according as he is the word, and not according as he is the Son: it is asked, according to what are they taken?

§ 1. Again, since the Son is called Word by that by which he is the Son, as will be clear below, it is asked whether he himself can be called many words, just as 'many reasons' and 'many ideas' are well said?

§ 2. Moreover, since reason is said here as the reason of a thing, and not the reason of a ratiocinating act, because that is not appropriate to God, insofar as it is composite, proceeding from one to another, according to what mode does computation belong to him? For that seems to consist in a certain finite actual multiplication, and thus it is repugnant to the simplicity of the word, as it seems.

§ 3. Moreover, that it is the cause of each thing, this does not seem to be appropriated to the Son, but rather to the Father to whom power is attributed, since every cause sounds more of power than of word.

§ 4. Again, those things which Damascene says do not seem to be proper, but essential to all the persons, or able to belong to none: for to subsist in itself, and to be operative, and omnipotent, do not belong more to one than to another, and thus they are not proper to the Son. But to be elective, since there is no election except of the unknown, as the same Damascene says, does not seem to belong to anyone: for nothing is elected except about which there was first inquiry and counsel: and counsel is had about the doubtful or unknown.

§ 5. In the same way all the things which Dionysius says seem to belong equally to all.

§ 1. Solution. It must be said that the statement of Jerome explains the multiplicity of the name according to Greek usage, although all can be turned back to the Son: and this is true, that they revert to him, according as he himself is the Word. And there is a twofold consideration of the Son insofar as he is the Word, namely according as it is taken notionally only: or according as it is taken notionally, connoting the essence through a respect to creatures. In the first way, he is called Word. In the second way, it can be taken in three ways, namely in the

rationale of an end which is an exemplary form, and thus it is called the rationale of a thing (ratio rei). In the second way, in the rationale of a formal exemplar, and thus it is called computation (supputatio) on account of the respect of exemplars to the number of the proportion of the existence of things. In the third way, according to an efficient cause through an exemplary form, and thus it is called the cause through which things subsist. Nor is this unfitting: because an exemplar ad extra has these three things in itself, namely that it is an end, and that it is an exemplar, and that it is operative, insofar as it is of the practical intellect: and the exemplar of a chest holds itself thus in the artisan who makes the chest.

§ 2. Damascene, however, as it seems to me, does not intend to assign the property of the Word insofar as he is the Word, but those things which show in him the perfection of the person in comparison to our word, which is imperfect, and an accident of the intellect. But this perfection is in two things, namely in substance, and in power. In substance he touches upon it, when he says "subsisting through himself," just as it belongs to a person to subsist. For Boethius says that subsistence is that which is in itself and through itself, and needs nothing [else] for this, that it be. In power, however, in two ways, namely natural, and that which is for a work ad extra. The natural is expressed through the fact that he calls it "elective," as if potent from the proper election of the will at its pleasure. Ad extra, however, the power is either indeterminately complete before the work, and thus he is omnipotent: or in the work, and thus he is operative. And I well concede that this belongs to any divine person, as showing personal perfection in it.

§ 3. But this which Basil says is turned back to the Son according as he is the Word connoting a respect to creatures, and an effect in creatures: and therefore it does not belong from eternity to the Son, except according to habit, and not according to act. Therefore it is to be noted that the word belongs to the practical intellect, according to how it is taken by Basil: and thus it has something of cognition, and something of work. But according as it has something of cognition, that is in two ways, namely absolutely, or ordered to another. If to another: then it is the word by which an enunciation is made: because this operates in us. If absolutely: either it is by the mode of a principle for cognizing, and thus it is the light, by which all things are declared to us. Or by the mode of the cognized: and this is in two ways, namely simply, or in order to God: and in the first way it is sense, in the second way wisdom: because, as he himself says, wisdom consists in order. But if it has work: then it is ultimate power which is supreme.

§ 4. The division of Dionysius, however, is taken entirely according as the word connotes a respect to creatures, and connotes an effect in them. But this effect is attended to in two ways, namely according to the proper and immediate act of the word: or according to that of which or concerning which it is the word: for the proper act of the word is to give wisdom and intellect through interior hearing, just as Psalm 84:9 says: I will hear what the Lord God will speak in me: and thus he is the bestower of wisdom and intellect. But if it is taken by comparison to the thing concerning which it is: this happens in three ways, namely as in a cause, as in an effect, as in a property of the first cause ruling the effect. In the first way, it is having the exemplary causes of all things in itself. In the second way, seeing all things. In the third way, it

is simpler than all simplicity: because, as the Philosopher says, it rules all things by penetrating, except that it be commingled with them.

§ 5. To the next it must be said, that the Son cannot be called multiple words: because a word is properly the word of the speaker as principally of a principle: but a rationale (ratio) has its intention not from him from whom it is, but rather from the part of that concerning which it is: and since this is manifold, it admits plurality. Nevertheless, the Son is not properly said to be multiple rationales, but to have multiple rationales: and although he himself is that which he has, nevertheless the mode of understanding is diverse.

§ 6. To the next it must be said, that computation does not have multiplicity on the part of the one computing, but on the part of the creature: and therefore that multiplicity does not impede simplicity, just as the multiplicity of ideas does not.

§ 7. To the next it must be said, that he is the cause through which things subsist, and this is formal, which belongs to the exemplar: and there is the cause by which they are, and this is the efficient which is attributed to the Father.

§ 8. To the next it must be said, that elective is not so called from election according to what is exquisitely sought from counsel, but rather from the liberty of the chooser, namely because he does and posits that which he wills.

§ 9. To the next the response is evident through the division.

What is it for the supreme spirit to speak?

Articulus 5 — What It Is For The Supreme Spirit To Say

What is it for the supreme spirit to speak?

Thirdly it is asked, What is it for the supreme spirit to speak?

§ 11. 1. Anselm, however, says that to speak in the heart is nothing other than to intuit by cogitating. And Damascene says that the rational is divided into an interiorly disposed discourse, and a proffered one: and that the interiorly disposed discourse is a movement of the soul occurring in excogitation without any enunciation. But this kind of speaking does not signify the procession of the word from the speaker. Therefore it seems that this speaking does not belong to the Father speaking and generating the word, for the proper act of the word is to give wisdom: but rather it is taken in likeness to exterior locution.

§ 12. 2. Moreover, excogitation does not seem to belong properly to the supreme spirit: because cogitation is co-agitation, and has a certain collation and composition: therefore it does not belong to him.

§ 13. But if you say, that this speaking is to intuit by seeing, it seems that this speaking would belong to him even without the Son. For let us posit that the persons are not in the mode in which the Church distinguishes them; still, God, by seeing through the intellect, intuits himself: therefore he speaks himself according to these definitions of speaking.

§ 14. If perhaps you say, that it has a likeness to our exterior speaking: just as Damascene seems to mean, that the word is manifested in the drawn spirit [breath], which becomes its vehicle, and the matter in which it is formed and figured. Against this is what is said in the Gloss of Bede on the beginning of John, and in book XV of On the Trinity by Augustine, who intend that he who can see the word of the mind, not only before the corporeal voice, but even before the images of voices interiorly, can weigh some likeness of the uncreated Word.

§ 15. Solution. According to the intentions of the Saints, God's speaking is in likeness to interior diction, and it is to intuit himself by cogitating or seeing: but nevertheless, to speak differs from to understand oneself, and to cognize oneself: for to understand oneself signifies nothing but the conversion of the intellect upon itself: to cognize oneself is to hold or have a notion of oneself within oneself: but to speak oneself is to manifest oneself through something proceeding from oneself, which is similar to the one understanding himself: just as our word manifests our concept.

§ 16. To this, however, which is objected concerning cogitation, it must be said that cogitation is properly not in God: but cogitation is posited for the conversion of himself upon himself: not that conversion is even properly there, because conversion also signifies composition: but that he is cognized by seeing himself as he is.

§ 17. To the next it must be said, that in my judgment, "to speak" is equivocal to natural being and personal being: for I do not see how it could be said that God, the persons not being understood, could not speak himself, and manifest himself: indeed it even seems an impotence if he cannot: but this speaking will be essential, and a word personally proceeding from him does not respond to it: but to speak, which is to manifest oneself in a personal word similar to oneself, only belongs to the Father, and the word only to the Son.

Whether "word" is sometimes said essentially, just as "to speak"?

Articulus 6 — Whether Word Is Sometimes Said Essentially, As Saying Is

Whether "word" is sometimes said essentially, just as "to speak"?

Fourthly, that is asked on account of which the whole question was raised, Whether "word" is sometimes said essentially, just as "to speak"?

§ 19. It seems, however, that it is: because 1. Anselm says that the Father speaks himself, and each of the others: and the Son and the Spirit speak themselves, and each of the others: either therefore they speak themselves perfectly, or imperfectly. If imperfectly: then they are impotent to speak themselves. If perfectly: since a word responds to perfect diction, there will be some word spoken by each of them: but this will not be except the essence, or whichever person: therefore "word" can be called the essence, and whichever person.

§ 20. 2. Also, Either the Father can speak the Spirit in that he is the Holy Spirit, or not. If so: I have the proposition, that the Holy Spirit will be the word of the Father perfectly manifesting the speaker in that he is the speaker. If not: then he will be more impotent than us.

§ 21. 3. Also, In lower things we can speak all things, so that by whatever word we manifest our concept: therefore this more belongs to the supreme spirit: therefore it seems that "word" is not said in one way.

§ 22. 4. Also, Let us posit that the persons which faith posits do not exist, I ask, whether God would still speak himself, or could speak? If he speaks: either he can perfectly manifest himself by diction inasmuch as it is of himself: or not. And thence the process is as before.

§ 23. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Augustine here in the Letter frequently says, that by that he is called the Word, by which the Son: but to be the Son does not belong to the essence: therefore neither does to be the Word.

§ 24. 2. Also, Anselm says, that I see a certain wondrous and inexplicable thing, that each one speaks himself, and any of the others: and yet there is but one word.

§ 25. Solution. To this must be forenoted the statement of Anselm before the end of the Monologion, where he says thus: "Certainly the Father and the Son and their Spirit are not three speakers, although each single one is a speaker: nor are there many things which are spoken, since each one speaks himself and the other two." And below: "Just as his is knowledge and intelligence: for so it is to know and understand, that it is nothing other than to speak, that is, to intuit as present what he knows and understands: for it is necessary that just as the individual Father, and the individual Son, and their individual Spirit is knowing and understanding, and yet together these three are not multiple knowing and understanding ones, but one knower and one understander: so each individual one is a speaker, nor yet are all three together speakers, but one speaker." Here it is liquidly evident that since these three are spoken by themselves and by each other, there are not multiple things which are spoken. What is spoken there except their essence? If

therefore that is only one, there is only one thing that is spoken.

§ 26. From this it is evident, that "to speak" is said essentially, and personally: and therefore I say without prejudice, that "word" is taken in three ways. In one way, according as it is converted with the dictum manifesting the intellect of the speaker: and thus it will be said generally with respect to any speaker. In another way, according as it adds upon this the procession and personal distinction from the speaker: and thus to speak only belongs to the Father, and to be the word only belongs to the Son: and thus it is taken properly by the Saints. In a third way, according as it adds upon these two a respect to creatures: and thus it signifies the persons, and notes the essence. And in the first way each one speaks himself, and anyone speaks another. In the second way only the Father speaks only the Son. In the third way God speaks all creatures, according to what is said, He spoke, and they were made, that is, he generated the word in which they were that they might be made.

§ 27. Through this the solution to those things which are objected first is evident.

§ 28. To the next it must be said, that there is only one word: because the divine essence does not make a number with anything that is in divine things: but nevertheless it is not spoken in one way, but in three ways, as is already evident.

To the likeness of which word in lower things is the word in divine things said?

Articulus 7 — According To The Likeness Of Which Word Among Lower Things Word Is Said In The Divine

To the likeness of which word in lower things is the word in divine things said?

Fifthly and lastly it is asked, To the likeness of which word is it said?

§ 30. For Augustine distinguishes in book IX of On the Trinity a fourfold word, speaking thus: "For in one way words are spoken which hold spaces of time in syllables whether they be pronounced, or cogitated: in another way everything which is known is called a word, impressed on the soul as long as it can be proffered from memory and defined, although the thing itself displeases: in another way when what is conceived in the mind pleases." Therefore the word is fourfold, namely twofold with syllables, namely cogitated, and pronounced: and twofold impressed on the soul of a pleasing thing, and of a non-pleasing thing. Damascene, however: "The word is the natural movement of the intellect according to which it is moved, and understands, and cogitates, like its light and splendor." "Again, the word is that which is internal and is proffered in the mind." "And again the word is the angel [messenger] of intelligence." But on John a threefold word is intimated, namely of the heart which is in the concept itself before the images of voices are meditated, and the word which has the image of a voice, and the word of the voice. The Masters also distinguish a threefold word, namely of the thing, of the voice, and of the species of the voice.

§ 31. There is also the word of the speculative intellect, and of the practical intellect.

§ 32. And it is asked, With which of these words does it agree more?

§ 33. To this it must be said, that almost all these divisions are referred to the same thing: for what Augustine calls the word with syllables not pronounced, this is the same as what Damascene in the second division posits as enunciated in the heart, and what in the third division is posited to have the image of a voice, and in the fourth is said to be of the species of the voice, and not of the voice, namely when the heart meditates the species of voices in which it expresses its intention. But what Augustine calls the enunciated word, this is the same as what Damascene in the second division calls an angel, that is, a messenger of intelli-

-gence, and what in the third division is called the word of the voice, and similarly in the fourth. But what Augustine calls the word impressed on the soul, that is, a pronounceable notion without the species of a voice, and without a voice, that is, which before a voice is proffered, is with the one meditating or cogitating, this is what Damascene in the second division calls the movement, or light of intelligence: and in the third division it is called the word of the heart, and in the fourth it is called the word of the thing, because there is nothing more in that word than the thing spoken: but it is not so in the others, where there is more than the thing spoken: because [it is] either the species of the voice, or the voice itself. But it is true that Augustine subdivides this into a placid notion, and into a non-placid notion: which the others do not do.

§ 35. It must be said therefore, that the eternal Word can be considered in three ways, namely according to the eternal procession, and thus it most agrees with the word of the heart: which is evident, because concerning that Damascene says in the same place: "Indeed the first word is the natural sprout of the intellect, always springing from it naturally." But the Word in the flesh, this is the word having a likeness with the word of the voice: because just as that has more than the thing spoken, so the Son has more than the Father from the assumed flesh, in which he was manifested to us. And this Augustine says in book XV of On the Trinity and on John.

§ 36. TO THE LAST, however, it must be said, that the word illuminates and operates: and as to the act of illuminating it agrees with the speculative word: whence, Ecclesiasticus 1:5: The fount of wisdom is the word of God on high. But as to the operative act it agrees more with the word of the practical intellect. But as to both at once it agrees with the word of intelligence extending itself from speculation into practice, that is, operation.

Whether the Son is called the image of the Father? and,

Articulus 8 — Whether The Son Is Called The Image Of The Father

Whether the Son is called the image of the Father? and,

Whether the Holy Spirit is the image of the Son? and, What is called an image?

§ 38. Next it is asked concerning this which he says, at the end of chapter E, A son is said relatively, also relatively is said a word and an image, etc.

§ 39. 1. For "image" belongs to the whole Trinity: therefore it is not said relatively.

§ 40. 2. Also, By that he is called word, by which [he is called] son: therefore the rationale of word, son, and image is the same. And this is false, since Damascene says, that the Son is the image of the Father, and the Holy Spirit is the image of the Son: and the whole Trinity is called an image.

§ 41. To this it must be said, that "image" sometimes signifies the representation of an operating principle in diversity of essence: just as the image of the emperor is in the gold solidus, as Augustine says: and thus it signifies one essence in three persons. But sometimes it is called the image of a principle in the same essence expressing itself in a similar according to nature, and that image in all things equals that of which it is the image, and thus only the Son is called the image of the Father.

§ 42. To the first it must be said, that by the same rationale by which there is a personal relation, the Son is called word and image, but not by the same rationale of the name and of the mode of signifying: for he is called son insofar as he is a thing of nature through the act of nature which is generation: but he is called word insofar as he is the manifestation of all the interior things of the Father, which are the inmost things of the heart, and therefore the word is said to be eructated from the heart: but he is called image in representation, as it were, of

exterior things: because he is another from him, just as he himself from the Father, as Richard says.

§ 44. To the next it must be said, that the Spirit is called image, not because he proceeds as an image, but rather as a gift, but according as image signifies the essential likeness according to which anyone is called the image of another. But Damascene does not put force in this, that an image is called as if exemplated by another, but only in essential similitude and equality.

Whether only the Son is called God from God?

Articulus 9 — Whether The Son Alone Is Said God From God

Whether only the Son is called God from God?

§ 46. Next it is asked concerning the last part where he says: For not both together are God from God, but only the Son is God from God, namely from the Father, etc.

§ 47. 1. For according to this it seems that the Holy Spirit is not God from God, which is false: and Augustine contradicts this above, where he expressly says, that the Holy Spirit is God from God, and the Son is God from God.

§ 48. 2. Also, When it is said, the Holy Spirit is God from God, and the Son is God from God: either they are the same God from God, or another God from God. If the same: then the Son and the Holy Spirit are not one and another. If diverse: then they are not one God: both of which are false.

§ 49. To this it must be said, that the Holy Spirit is God from God just as the Son is: and the word "only" does not exclude anything except the respect of the Father: and the rationale for this is, because exclusion is of the opposite: but when "God from God" is said, the proper notion of the Son is not signified, but rather the common one, which is to be from another: but in this it is not opposed to the Holy Spirit, but to the Father only: therefore nothing is excluded except the Father.

§ 50. TO THE NEXT it was already responded above, that neither the same, nor another, but the same in essence, and distinct in person: and the rationale for this was said there.

§ 51. Division of the Text

DISTINCTIO XXVIII

Divisio Textus

Moreover it is necessary to consider, etc. Here the Master begins to treat of the non-personal properties of the persons, which are two, namely innascibility, which is of one person: and therefore he acts concerning that first in this distinction: and concerning the common principle, namely active spiration, by which the Father and the Son are the principle of the Holy

Spirit, which is the property of two persons: and concerning this he acts in the second part, there, Moreover there is another name, etc., in the following distinction.

§ 52. But this distinction is divided into four parts: in the first of which the Master investigates the rationale of innascibility. In the second, he introduces Ambrose arguing the novelty of the name, since it is not read in the Scriptures, there, D, But it is not proper to be silent on that, etc. In the third he asks, Whether it can be said by the same intellect that the Father is not the Son, by which it is said that the unbegotten is one thing and the begotten another? there, E, Moreover it is usually asked, etc. In the fourth and last he asks, Whether only the Son is called begotten wisdom just as only he is called image and word? there, F, It is also to be known, that just as only the Son, etc.

§ 53. The first of these is subdivided into three. In the first it is proved that the unbegotten is in the predicament of relation, and that it is the same as not begotten, or not son. In the second it is asked, Whether only the Father is called not begotten, just as only the Father is called unbegotten? there, B, Therefore it is usually asked here, etc. In the third, the name of the notion by which the Father is called unbegotten is determined, there, C, But if you wish to know, etc.

§ 54. But note here, that above, Distinction XIII, chapter E, Now it must be considered, since the Holy Spirit is not begotten, etc., three questions were determined concerning innascibility, which can be brought here, namely in how many ways it is said, and how it is a notion of the Father alone, and how it belongs to the Father and the Son and also the divine essence. Therefore what was determined there, let it be supposed here.

If the unbegotten is a notion, whether there are more notions than five?

Articulus 1 — Whether, If Unbegotten Is A Notion, There Are More Notions Than Five

If the unbegotten is a notion, whether there are more notions than five?

§ 56. But here two other questions occur before the Letter, namely, If the unbegotten is a notion, whether by the same rationale there are more notions than five?

§ 57. And secondly, Whether the unbegotten could be a notion, even if there are not more notions than five?

§ 58. To the first it is proceeded thus: 1. If both negation and affirmation make a notion, since any person could

become known in four ways, there will seem to be twelve notions of the three persons. Proof. For it belongs to the Father not to be from another by generation, and not to be from another by spiration. Similarly it belongs to the Son not to be from another by spiration, and to be from another by generation: from whom another is by spiration, and not from whom another is by generation. Similarly it belongs to the Holy Spirit to be from another by spiration, and not to be from another by generation: from whom another is not by spiration, and from whom another is not by generation. Therefore it seems, that the notions are twelve, if "not to be from another by generation or spiration" is a notion of the Father.

§ 60. 2. Also in the first letter of the first chapter we have,[104] that the Father differs from the Son by the authority of generation, and he also differs by the property of innascibility. From this I conclude two conclusions: of which the first is, that to per se make a person differ from a person is the rationale for why a notion and property is posited in divine things: since therefore the Father differs from the Holy Spirit, because he is not from another by spiration, it behooves that inspirability is also a notion of the Father with respect to the Holy Spirit. The second is, because since in divine things there is no difference except according to the opposition of relation, if the Father differs from the Son by innascibility, there is in the Son an opposite relation corresponding to that which is innascibility: and thus the Son has three notions, namely nascibility, filiation, and active spiration. If perhaps you say, that in the Son one follows upon the other: because it follows: he is the Son: therefore he is born, but it is not converted: but a genus with a species in the same does not make a number. This is nothing: because something becomes known by the mode of one born, which does not become known by the mode of a son, as Augustine intimates in book II of this volume.[105] Since therefore this is a notion in divine things, which makes known, nascibility will be a notion of the Son.

§ 61. 3. Also, Relations in divine things are rationales or properties distinguishing person from person: therefore those which say such oppositions, and can belong to the Trinity, those are properties: but "not to be from another" and "to be from another" have such an opposition in divine things: therefore they make two properties.

§ 62. 4. Also, "To be from another by generation" and "not to be from another by generation" again make such an opposition: therefore those also make two: and thus there will be four.

§ 63. 5. Also, "To be from another by spiration" and "not to be from another by spiration" also make two: and thus there will be six at least. If you say, that by negating the superior, the inferior is also negated: and thus "not to be from another" negates also "not to be from another by spiration," and "not to be from another by generation": and thus those do not make notions. This seems to be nothing: because according to this "not to be from another" will be the notion of the Father: and this is posited by no one, but rather innascibility is posited as his notion. But it is certain, that one species of emanation being negated from someone, the other is not necessarily negated: whence since the innascible or unbegotten negates only "to be from another by generation," it behooves that the Father still becomes known in another way, by which he himself is also not from another by spiration.

§ 64. 6. Moreover, According to this response, although the superior being negated, the inferior is negated: not only the superior being posited is the inferior posited: therefore it seems, that in the other persons there ought to be affirmative notions, namely "to be from another": and thus to the Son and Holy Spirit one notion belongs in common.

§ 65. 7. Also, Boethius says, that only relation multiplies the trinity, but essence contains the unity: therefore between things which have no opposition of relation, those will be the same, or in the same: but "to be from another by generation" and "to be from another by spiration" have no relation of opposition:

therefore they belong to the same: and thus the Son who is from another by generation, is also from another by spiration: and similarly the Holy Spirit: therefore there are more notions.

§ 67. 8. Also, There is one notion in which the Father agrees with the Son, although the Son is from the Father: therefore there ought to be another notion in which the Father agrees with the Holy Spirit and another in which the Son with the Holy Spirit: for otherwise they would not seem to be sufficiently distinct: for the Father alone is distinguished from the Son alone, and the Son alone from the Holy Spirit alone, and the Father and Son together from the Holy Spirit alone: therefore also the Father and Holy Spirit together from the Son alone, and the Son and Holy Spirit together from the Father alone: and thus it seems, that there ought to be many notions, if there are notions other than personal ones, as the Master says here.

§ 68. Solution. It must be said, as was supposed above, that the notions are only five, and the relations four, and the properties of a person four, and the personal properties three, just as was proved above. For a person as a person, only becomes known through that which sounds the dignity of nature: for a thing of nature becomes known in one way, and an individual in another, and a person in another. For a thing of nature as a thing of nature has to be discerned through the act and rationale of nature, according to which we say, that a thing of nature is that which is produced by an act of nature, that is, by an act by which the nature is communicated to its hypostases or supposits: and that act in divine things is twofold, namely to generate, and to spirate: but through either act the thing of nature becomes known in two ways: because the thing of nature is begotten, and the thing of nature is generating: and the thing of nature is spirated, and the thing of nature is spirating: yet there are not four divine things of nature, because to be spirating does not have an opposition to being generating, nor to being begotten: and therefore necessarily the generator and the begotten are one principle of spirating. An individual, however, properly is not in divine things, but becomes known through individuating principles. A person, however, only belongs to a more worthy thing of nature: and therefore a person as a person, does not become known except by a property of dignity or habitude.

§ 69. We say therefore to the first, that "not to be from another by generation" does not posit an absolute dignity according to the order of nature which is in divine things: and to understand this, it is to be noted that in every nature in which an order of nature is posited by which one is from another, and not one prior to another, it is necessary to posit a principle of that order. I do not say a beginning: because a beginning more respects a principle of duration than an order of nature. Therefore if it is necessary to posit a principle, it behooves that that principle become known by some notion: but a principle since it does not have a prior, cannot become known by an affirmation prior to itself: therefore it is necessary, that it become known by a negation: therefore it will become known by "not to be from another according to the order of nature." But whether "not to be from another" posits nothing, or posits something, will be determined in the following article of the question. Therefore it is evident, that by whatever special negation being posited, the principle of the whole divinity according to the

104. Peter Lombard, Sentences.

order of nature will not become known in this mode as a principle: and thus it is evident, that "not to be from another by generation," and "not to be from another by spiration," are not notions of the Father, nor can they be. But that same principle, which is the principle of this order of nature, must become known: I do not say from the posterior part, because there is no prior and posterior there, but from that part by which another is from him: and this according to genus does not posit dignity, but sometimes indignity: but in species it posits dignity in the act in which nature is communicated, just as generation is, and just as spiration is: therefore from that part there will be the notions of the Father, paternity, and active spiration. But supposing the same order of nature, that which is from a principle according to the general mode of being from another, does not become known as a person, but in the special mode in which by specific virtue...

of the difference it is shown that a worthier nature is given to Him: and those acts are generation, and spiration. Therefore, to be from another through generation, and to be from another through spiration are notions of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. Just as in lower things, to be from a man does not communicate a nature worthy to constitute a person, because what is from a man is sometimes an unworthy thing; but to be from a man through the generation of a man communicates the nature. However, not to be from another through generation, and not to be from another through spiration (as has already been proven) do not constitute, nor do they make known any dignity of nature. And thus it is clear why there cannot be twelve, but only five notions of a person as a person.

§ 2. To another it must be said, that a difference of distinction does not simply make a notion of a person, but a difference of distinction of a person as a person. But a principle not from a principle can be made known in the manner of a person in three ways, namely, regarding what is prior by negation: and I well concede that unbegotten does not mean there the negation of a special emanation, but of the general "not being from another": the reason for which was determined above: and thus the first question ceases. In another way it is made known with respect to those of whom it is the principle, and by one notion to one, and by another to the other, according as there are two acts of communicating a worthy nature, namely generation, and spiration: and this has been determined above.

§ 3. To another question the solution is already clear: because nascibility, or being from another, does not of itself express a notion of a person as a person: because not everything that is born from something receives a nature of dignity from it: nor does everything that is from something receive a nature of dignity: but everything that is a son by nature receives the nature of the dignity of the generator. Thus also the spirative power produces nothing but what is similar to itself in nature. And therefore nascibility is not a notion: and through this the solution to the following is clear.

§ 4. To another it must be said, that not being from another is the same as being unbegotten, as was proven above: and therefore those six revert to five: because not being from another through generation does not posit the ratio of a principle in the order of nature: nor

105. Augustine, De Trinitate, II.

even not being from another through spiration: but not being from another simply. And therefore they cannot be notions of anyone: for they do not state the ratio of a principle in the order of nature, nor the ratio of the reception of a worthy nature, as do generation and spiration.

§ 5. To another it must be said, that innascibility according as it befits the Father alone, and not the Holy Spirit, is the same as not being from another, in this way by which not being from another makes known the principle of the whole godhead.

§ 6. To another the solution is clear through what has been said, and similarly to the following.

§ 7. To another it must be said, that although to be generated and to be spirated are not opposed relatively, nevertheless the one spirated and the one generated are opposed relatively. Because I well concede this according to what was said above, that the Greeks err, and therefore how they themselves distinguish the Holy Spirit from the Son, I do not labor to determine here: because it seems to me to be impossible that one is not the other, if between them there is no opposition of relation, as was determined above. And therefore the Father and the Son are one in spirating, and the Holy Spirit is distinguished from both.

§ 8. To another it must be said, that there cannot be a notion in which the Father agrees with the Holy Spirit, and another in which the Son agrees with the Holy Spirit: because in that by which the Father would communicate to the Holy Spirit, an order of nature would be denoted, and thus it would be necessary for there to be some fourth from the Father and the Holy Spirit, which was disproved above, and thus there would be a multitude into infinity: and similarly it would be necessary that there be another

according to that notion in which the Son would agree with the Holy Spirit: and thus there would be two proceeding from the Holy Spirit.

§ 10. Moreover, that in which the Father would agree with the Holy Spirit would not have an opposition to the Son: therefore the Son would also agree with them in it: therefore that notion would already agree with the three, and thus it would be common to the three: and nothing is common to them except essence: therefore that notion would already be said of them according to essence: and therefore that argumentation does not proceed. Whence it is clear, that innascibility is a notion, and that there are only five notions.

Articulus 2 — Whether Innascibility Is A Notion Of The Father

Whether innascibility is a notion of the Father?

Secondly, it is asked, Whether innascibility is a notion of the Father?

It seems, however, that it is not: for innascibility is either explained negatively or privatively. If negatively, on the contrary: Negation by itself certifies nothing: therefore negation cannot be a notion, because a notion is that which makes known. But if it is explained privatively, multiple inconveniences follow: one of which is that privation implies imperfection: and according to this, a person of dignity would be made known through imperfection, which is inconvenient. The second is because privation leaves aptitude: and thus

the innascible Father would be apt to be born, but would not be born, which again is false. The third is because privative opposites occur around the same thing: therefore, nascible and innascible must occur around the same person according to the order of nature: but nascibility belongs to the Son: therefore, innascibility would also have to occur around the Son, and not around the Father: therefore, it seems that innascibility is not a notion of the Father.

If perhaps you say that negation makes known, as Rabbi Moses the Egyptian says in the book called "Guide of the Perplexed": especially in divine matters. And Augustine confirms his statement, saying that if you cannot know what God is, you have nonetheless accomplished not a little in knowledge if you know what He is not. On the contrary: According to this, one negation does not sufficiently notify. For if I say, God is not an element, leaving that God is something, this negation does not make knowledge of God according to the doctrine of that Philosopher: because there are still many other things that are not an element, and also are not God: therefore, it is necessary to add more restrictive negations: for the more universal that which is denied, the less common the negation is: and the more particular that which is denied, the more common the negation is: for Socrates is not verified of more things than not man, or not animal. Therefore, it seems that here too it is necessary to add more negations before sufficient knowledge of the principle of the order of nature is had.

Further, it is asked what more touches the proposed matter, Since the notion of a principle is not of the principle being not from another absolutely, as was proven in the preceding question, why is it not said by the general name of the Father's notion to be not being from another, but by the special one which is unbegotten, which sounds the same as not being from another through generation? If perhaps you say that generation and spiration are ordered, and according to the order of nature generation is before spiration, and with the prior denied, the second is denied, but not conversely: this is nothing: because this was disproven above, where it was shown that the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son already born, nor not born: because both are eternal, and neither places the order of the prior to the other, nor even the order of cause: by this it is said that the Father is unbegotten,

it is not understood as unprocessible, or in another way not being from another.

If perhaps you say that generation is to being, and spiration to well-being, and with the emanation according to being denied, the emanation according to well-being is denied: this is also heretical and false: because spiration in divine matters takes the substance of the Holy Spirit, and being, and well-being: and there well-being is the same as being. But it is false, because nothing prevents me from not being from someone through being, and yet my well-being depending on him: just as my well-being can be from a king, although I am not the king's son. Therefore, it seems that this solution is not suitable.

Solution. Without prejudice, I say that innascibility is a notion of a principle not existing from a principle. Hence it must be understood that it is a negation founded upon being: for negation is otherwise of first things, and otherwise of subsequent things: just as if I say, man is not an animal, man is not a donkey: the following negation is caused by the opposition or disparity of predicate and subject: which disparity is caused by opposite differences constitut-

ing the predicate and subject: and therefore that negation has something prior to it in which it is founded, which is not entirely the same as those of which it is a negation, but is prior to them. But when I say the first which has nothing before it, the negation is founded upon the nature of the first, which is not prior to the first, because nothing is prior to the first, but it is the first itself: and therefore it cannot be explained by affirmation, as another negation. For if I ask and say thus: man is not a donkey, you will say that it is true. If I ask further, Why is this? you will say, because he is a rational animal, and rational animal and irrational are removed from each other by opposite differences: and thus you cause the negation by an affirmation which is prior to the negation, and is prior to the negated. But if I say the first before which nothing is, you say that this is true. But if I ask, Why is this true? you say, because the first is the first: and indeed you posit an affirmation which is prior to the negation, but you do not posit an affirmation prior to that of which it was a negation, because the negation was of the first: therefore, that cannot be made known by affirmation: and thus it is made known by negation, as Augustine says here.

I say, therefore, that innascibility is not to be explained privatively, but negatively: but it is twofold, namely in genus, and outside genus. Therefore, if the negation denies all that is in the genus of principle, then innascible will be the same as not being from another principle according to the order of nature. But if it only denies what is in its opposite in genus, then it was said above that it would also belong to the Holy Spirit according to the words of Jerome placed by the Master there, and explained by us.

As for what is objected, that negation does not make something known: it must be said that this is true per se, and of negation outside genus: but such a negation is not that which falls in the notion of the first, and of the principle.

To what is further asked, Why is it said innascibility, and not existence from another? it can be said if it pleases, that although generation and procession do not have the order of prior and posterior, or of immediate and mediate, as was proven above, yet they have the order of nature, by which the proceeding is from the begotten: and this is evident in the image because love does not proceed from the mind unless knowledge is supposed, which is loved, and loves: and therefore Richard says that love tends into another. And Gregory that charity cannot be less than between two: and therefore with generation according to the principle removed, spiration is also removed.

And therefore, non-being from another through generation, when it removes the generative principle, also removes the spirative principle, because it would not breathe love except with him whom it begot: however, it is not conversely so: and this is very much against the Greeks. For from this it is necessarily concluded that the Holy Spirit is from the Son, and that the Son has this from the Father, just as if the Father were spirated from another, it would necessarily be required that that other begot another with whom the Father would breathe.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear: because although spiration and generation do not have the order of prior and posterior, cause, or nature, or dignity, or time, yet they have the order of nature, which is in the divine, so that the begotten is the principle of the

spirated: and thus the spirated according to this order posits the begotten spirating: if therefore the Father were spirated, it would be necessary for another to be begotten from another father. Therefore, when by opposition the unbegotten denies that the same is spirated, and not conversely: this is the reason why it is said unbegotten, and not unspirable.

But if it is asked, Why does it not say with the general name "unprocessible," so that both are simply removed? It must be said that the Father is a principle not from a principle according to the order of nature: and therefore in its notion it is necessary to express the reason of this order, according to which it is not from a principle: however, the reason of this order is not expressed by a general name, but by a special one: therefore the negation ought to be in the special, which nevertheless according to the order of nature is the principle of another act, just as the begotten of the spirated.

But if it is asked, Whether the Father could breathe the Spirit without the Son? this has been solved above.

Articulus 3 — Whether Innascibility And Paternity Are One Notion Or Two

Whether innascibility and paternity are one notion, or two?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, A, He designates another notion than Pa. For this seems false: because

1. Innascibility in the Father seems to be the same as paternity: for a property either constitutes the person, or the person is made known through it: but the person of the Father is sufficiently made known and constituted by the property which is paternity: therefore innascibility is either the same in the Father, or it is superfluous.
2. Likewise, In divine things nothing is distinguished except by the opposition of relation: but there is no opposition of relation between paternity and innascibility: therefore they are the same notion according to reality.
3. Likewise, Innascibility seems to say nothing except a certain comparison of the Father to the privation of a prior principle: but such a comparison adds nothing except negation: therefore since negation causes no difference, it seems that it does not express another notion than paternity.
4. Likewise, In divine things there is no number except from hypostasis: therefore properties are not numbered except from the number of hypostases: therefore all properties of the same person are one according to what they are in it: therefore innascibility in the Father does not differ from paternity in the Father.
5. Likewise, In the Son, nascibility is not another property from filiation: therefore it seems that neither in the Father is innascibility another from paternity.

Solution. It must be said that innascibility is one notion in the Father, and paternity another: because the distinction of notions is according to the mode of making known the person as person, that is, according to the reason of dignity: as was said above, in the order of nature it

is necessary for the principle to be not from a principle: and that is made known in every thing which is a principle not from a principle: therefore there will be one mode of making it known from that part by which it is not from a principle, and another from that part by which it is a principle, and one mode is not the other. From that part by which it is made known as not from a principle, innascibility is the notion. From the other part it is made known according to the reasons by which it is the principle of the whole divinity: but this is by generating and spirating: and therefore there will be two notions of the Father, one paternity, and the other common spiration.

To the FIRST, therefore, it must be said that innascibility is not superfluous: because by paternity the Father is sufficiently made known in the reason of principle: yet he is not sufficiently made known inasmuch as he is not from a principle: and this belongs to him personally, and pertains to the dignity of the person, according to which in the order of nature the Father himself is posited as a principle not from a principle.

To the second it must be said that really nothing is distinguished in divine things except by the opposition of relation, that is, that the distinction makes a thing per se being and subsisting: and thus a notion is not distinguished from a notion, but rather according to the mode of supposing and attributing, as was said above.

To the third it must be said that it does not express a comparison of paternity, but of that which is the Father according to that reason by which he is a principle not from a principle: hence that reason proceeds from falsehoods.

To the fourth it must be said that there is no number of distinct things in divine things, except of persons only: nor does a notion in divine things have distinct being outside of persons, and it is numbered according to the reasons of making known and attributing. Yet I say well that relation and notion is a thing in divine things, although it is not numbered outside the person: but its diversity is made known according to the diversity of the mode of signifying in attributing, as was said above.

To the fifth it must be said that nascibility according to the same reason makes the Son known, according to which filiation makes him known, namely according to which he is from a principle in the order of nature: and therefore nascibility and filiation are not a different notion in the Son: but not according to the same reason does innascibility and paternity make the Father known, according to which in the order of nature he is a principle not from a principle: and therefore in the Father innascibility is a notion in another mode, and paternity: just as in the Son filiation is another notion, and common spiration: because the Son is not made known through them according to one reason, according to which he is referred to the order of nature, as a principle from a principle.

Articulus 4 — Whether, With Paternity Not Understood, The Father Would Be A Who, Because He Is Unbegotten

Whether, with paternity not understood, the Father would be someone, because unbegotten?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said, there, A, It is not to say unbegotten, which is to say Father, etc.

1. Therefore it seems that, with paternity not understood, still the Father would be someone, because unbegotten: therefore this is false which seems to be proven above, that with personality abstracted from the person, the hypostasis does not remain.
2. If perhaps you say that it is so in the Father, but it is not so in others. On the contrary: Because by the same reason it is not the same to say Son, and spirating: therefore with filiation not understood, still the Son will be someone, and thus the hypostasis of the Son remains.
3. Likewise, This is proven by another reason. It is well conceded, This one is begotten: therefore he is from another: but it is not converted: therefore to be from another by understanding is prior to being generated: therefore it can be understood without that: therefore with filiation not understood, still it is understood to be from another: but this does not pertain except to hypostasis: therefore with personality abstracted, hypostasis is understood, which was denied above.
4. Likewise, Augustine says, and it is held in the Letter, that it is one thing to be the Father, and another thing to be Father: for it is not the same, is Father, and Father is: and is Son, and Son is: but the Father is by the same by which the Son is, because the Father is essence: and the Son is by the same, because in divine things whatever is, is essence: therefore it seems that to be hypostasis according to understanding depends on essence: and with notion not understood, still essence is: therefore since to be hypostasis is from essence, hypostasis in divine things can be without the notion existing.
5. Likewise, The absolute is in all things before the relative: but it has been often held above, that person is absolute: therefore also hypostasis: because since there are two things of the understanding of person, namely hypostasis and property, the being of the absolute cannot have person from property: therefore it remains that it has from hypostasis: therefore hypostasis is absolute: therefore by understanding it is before the relative.

Solution. We still persist in this that with property not understood, neither is hypostasis understood nor does it remain: because we do not see how the heresy of Arius, or the heresy of Sabellius, is declined, if by understanding hypostasis is posited before property: and this has been sufficiently proven above.

Wherefore we say to the first, that with paternity not understood, etc., that this can be in two ways: for paternity is a relation, and a personal property: and paternity can be not understood as it is a relation, because it can be understood as not begotten not having a Son: and thus it is true what Augustine says. But the order of nature is destroyed: for the Father has no order of nature to the Son except by reason of paternity. Wherefore thus with paternity not understood it is true that the hypostasis of the Father remains, and not of the Son: because the order of nature is destroyed by which one is from the other. In another way it is the

property constituting the person in personal being: and since negation does not constitute, the understanding of unbegottenness will not constitute the Father: and in this way with paternity not understood, the Father will not be someone: and hypostasis is removed, with the property taken away.

To the other it must be said, that although spiration is a notion of the Son, yet it is not his personal property: and therefore spiration according to the reason of understanding presupposes filiation for itself, as it is a personal property: for it cannot spirate unless the person is constituted: and this is done through filiation.

To the other it must be said, that this follows in those things in which the universal is abstracted from the particular, and the simpler from the less simple: and yet according to being it is conversely. Wherefore when it is said, this one is begotten: therefore he is from another: our understanding is not stopped upon being from another, but passes on to generation, because that determinately fixes the understanding: for a thing is not taken in the universal except in potency: wherefore the understanding seeking the nature of the thing and being, does not rest in the universal: and therefore according to the being of the person, to be from another, is after to be from another through generation, and after to be from another through spiration: and according to the thing it is the same, and not simpler than those: because such abstraction cannot be done in divine things, as was proven above: and if it were in divine things, it would be only according to reason, and according to being it would be conversely.

To the other it must be said, that it seems to me well to be conceded, that hypostasis has a relation to essence, and a relation to property: and from the relation to essence it has being, and similarly property: because all being in divine things, is of essence, and from essence: but yet the number and being of hypostasis, that is, that hypostasis is hypostasis, it has from the property on the part after: because by number and by being hypostasis as hypostasis depends on property.

To the other it must be said, that hypostasis is not absolute, as was proven above: because if it is posited as absolute, the heresy of Sabellius, or of Arius, follows inevitably, as it seems to me: but it is said to be relative in two ways, namely as the reason of relation, and thus the relative is notion, and relation or property: and as that which is said to something, and this is the suppositum of relation, which is hypostasis. And if it is asked, Whence comes this suppositum, since it does not remain with the relation removed? It must be answered, because it is posited with the relation posited as it is distinguishing: otherwise relation is not posited in divine things. Yet the argument is not valid: because relation is manifold, as was said above, namely simple, and composite. And simple is according to origin: and some of those arise from change, as cause and caused, and father and son in lower things: and these presuppose their supposita according to understanding. Some are for the being of the suppositum constituting it, by which posited the suppositum is posited: and therefore some say not badly, as it seems to me, that these properties carry their supposita with them: and therefore these relations are according to the reason of understanding before their supposita.

Articulus 5 — Whether Begotten And Unbegotten Signify A Being In The Same Predicamental Genus

Whether begotten and unbegotten signify being in the same category?

Then it is asked concerning what is said there, A, around the middle: "Moreover, the negative particle does not cause that which is said relatively without it, etc."

1. For this seems false: since it does not have an order to the category except through the coordination of predicables, if the coordination of predicables is denied of it, the category is denied of it (as it seems): but the coordination of predicables is denied of it, because the proper predicate of the category is denied of it, such as begotten, or the proper subject of some genus: therefore it seems that begotten and unbegotten do not signify being in the same category.
2. Likewise, whatever is in a category is in it as the most general, or as a subaltern, or as the most specific, or as an individual. However, unbegotten signifies none of these, because it perfects none of these through negation: therefore it seems false that begotten and unbegotten are in the same category.
3. Likewise, nothing has an order to diverse genera in one and the same way: but unbegotten is said of relation, and not relation: therefore unbegotten does not signify being in a category determinately.
4. Likewise, relation and non-relation do not differ except by the negative particle which is added to the other: therefore, according to the reasoning of Augustine placed here, they are in the same genus: but whatever is in a genus, the most general is predicated of it: therefore the genus of relation is predicated of non-relation: therefore non-relation is relation, which is impossible: therefore what Augustine says here is false.
5. Likewise, according to this, there would be two most general in any category: for non-relation is not of lesser commonality than relation: and this again seems ridiculous, and against the authority of the art of categories.

If perhaps you say that it is true that the name of the category is denied when it is said substance non-substance, relation non-relation, quality non-quality, and the like. On the contrary: because the negation, the more it is joined to the less common, the more common it is: if therefore the negation is more common according to the scope of predication, it causes that it cannot remain in the same category with the affirmation, much more does the less common negation cause this, as it seems.

The true solution to all these arguments is one: because when it is said non-begotten, or non-substance, or any other negation, the negation can be considered for the sake of negation: and thus, since negation is non-being, it does not fall into any genus, nor is it ordered to any genus. Or it can be considered by reason of the negated thing: and thus the negation is necessarily ordered to the affirmation preceding it according to understanding, as we said in the first article of the question, and thus non-substance is reduced to substance as to a genus,

and non-relation to relation as to a genus: for just as privation is not known except through habit, and division through composition: so negation in this way is understood through affirmation. Hence the Philosopher says that in non-being, being is understood, and altogether in affirmation negation: and in this way he says that the straight is the judge of itself and of the oblique: for by the straight we know both it and the oblique.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that by reason of the negated thing, the order is left, although not by reason of the negation.

To the other, it must be said that that proposition is false, but it is true of those directly ordered in the category: for there are some in the category as predicates and subjects of the same category, and some are in it according to reduction: and this in two ways, namely as principles, like matter and form to substance, and point and unity to quantity, and the like. However, some are reduced, like those about which judgment is made through them: and thus privations and negations are reduced to a genus: because they are known through the habit of the genus.

To the other, it must be said that that reasoning proceeds from the part of the negation, and not from the part of the negated thing.

To the other, it must be said that it is not necessary that the genus of the category be predicated of those which are in the category in any way through reduction to it, but only of those directly contained in it.

Through which the solution to the following is also clear: because it does not make the most general, but is reduced to the same as the habit of affirmation.

Articulus 6 — Whether Innascibility Can Be Predicated Of Paternity; And Whether Paternity Is Innascible; And Whether The Essence Is Innascible

Whether unbegottenness can be predicated of paternity? and, Whether paternity is unbegotten? and, Whether essence is unbegotten?

Then it is asked concerning what is said there, A, towards the end: Just as the son is referred to the father, and not the son to the non-father: so the begotten must be referred to the begetter, and not the begotten to the non-begetter.

1. For it seems that although paternity is not the same notion as unbegottenness, as Augustine says here, because by paternity the Father is referred to the Son, in the begotten, however, to the non-father: nevertheless, it seems that one is predicated of the other, so that it is said, paternity is unbegottenness. For whatever things are united in the same in the divine, cannot have opposition of themselves: paternity and unbegottenness are united in one hypostasis: therefore they do not have opposition: therefore one can be predicated of the other, so that it is said, paternity is unbegottenness.
2. Likewise, although the attributes of the divine nature differ according to the reason of understanding, when goodness and divine wisdom are said: nevertheless, because of the simplicity of that in which they are, one is predicated of the other: and we say,

divine wisdom is divine goodness: therefore similarly, since paternity and unbegottenness are united in the Father, not as diverse things, but according to the mode of understanding, it seems that because of the simplicity of the person one is predicated of the other: and we can say, paternity is unbegottenness.

3. Likewise, it follows well, the Father is not the Son: therefore paternity is not filiation: therefore similarly by opposition, the unbegotten is the Father: therefore unbegottenness is paternity.

Again it is further asked, Whether it could be said, Paternity is unbegotten?

It seems so: because paternity is the Father: and the Father is unbegotten: therefore paternity is unbegotten.

Likewise, the Father is not begotten; and not begotten is the same as unbegotten, as is clear from the text: therefore paternity is unbegotten.

Again it is asked, Whether essence could be said to be unbegotten?

It seems so: because essence is not born, nor from another: therefore it is unbegotten.

Solution. It must be said that one of these notions is predicated of the other: and it cannot be said, Paternity is unbegottenness: just as it cannot be said, the reason for knowing the Father insofar as he is not from a principle, is the reason for knowing insofar as he is the principle of the Son: and just as it cannot be said, the relation by which the Father is referred insofar as the Father is not from a principle, is the relation by which the Father is referred to the Son: for a notion takes its being as a notion from the reason for being known, and a relation takes its being as a relation from the reason for being referred.

Therefore, it must be said to the first, that paternity and unbegottenness do not have any opposition according to any genus of opposition, but they have disparity, according to which they are taken as notions and relations, not according to which they are taken as the thing which is the Father, or the person of the Father, or the divine essence: for this, that they are united in one person, does not confer upon them the reason of one notion, nor the reason of one relation: just as in lower things, from this that whiteness and music are united in Socrates, it is not conferred upon them to be one quality, but one quale.

To the other, it must be said that it is different concerning the attributes: because they do not retain their own mode of predicating, but they take the predication of substance: however, relations retain their own mode of predicating, and therefore by those proper modes of referring and predicating they differ from each other.

To the other, it must be said that it follows well: but there is a double cause: for not only is the cause of this the distinction of supposits, but also the diversity of relations: and one of those causes is preserved in the properties which are in the same person: for it does not follow, if the concrete is predicated of the concrete for the sake of the subject, that the abstract is predicated of the abstract: whence it does not follow, white is musical: therefore whiteness is music.

To what is further asked, Whether paternity is unbegotten, and essence unbegotten? It must be said that each is double, from the fact that the term unbegotten can be held adjectively, and thus it is not to be conceded, because thus unbegotten would be predicated inherently of each: or it can be held substantively, that is, the unbegotten is the Father: and thus each is to be conceded.

Articulus 7 — Whether Origin Also Can Be Called A Notion

Whether origin can also be called a notion?

Next, it is inquired concerning what is said in the words of Hilary, chapter C, "Property, namely in each one of origin and innascibility," etc.

Therefore, it seems that origin expresses a property: however, it does not express filiation, because from origin is also the Holy Spirit and has origin: therefore, it seems that there are more notions than five.

Solution. Origin is simply understood according to emanation to being: such an origin is called generation according to the account of the name: and therefore it is placed here for the passive generation of the Son, although according to the name it expresses something more common than generation.

Articulus 8 — Whether An Accident Can Be Separated From Its Subject

Whether an accident can be separated from its subject?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says:

That nevertheless the relative is not an accident, because it is not mutable, etc.

However, this does not seem to follow: because there are many accidents in lower things which are not changed, like an inseparable accident.

To this, however, some say that an accident is compared to a subject in two ways, namely, proximate and remote:

and although it is sometimes separable from the proximate and immediate, yet it is separable from the remote: as having three angles equal to two right angles, although it is not separated from a rectilinear triangle, yet it is separated from a figure or triangle simply: because a triangle which has one side arcuate can have three greater than two right angles.

Otherwise, it can be said, and perhaps better, that an accident is compared to something as to a subject only, and from that it can always be separated: it is also compared to something as to a subject and cause, and to that which falls in the definition of it, and from that it is not separated: but this is not from the nature of the subject, but rather from the nature of being and definition.

Articulus 9 — Whether Image Is Said Relatively; And Whether The Son Alone Is Said To Be Image

Whether image is said relatively? and, Whether only the Son is called image?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said in the last part, there, F, It must also be known that just as only the Son is called word and image, etc.

For from this it seems that image is said relatively. And this does not seem so:

1. For image, as Hilary says (and it is placed below), is the indistinct and unique likeness of a thing to a certain thing to be known and imagined: but this seems to agree both to the Son and to the Holy Spirit: although the Son and the Holy Spirit agree in no notion: therefore it cannot express a relation.
2. Likewise, Damascene says that the Spirit is the image of the Son: therefore it seems that it does not express a relation.
3. Likewise, of two similar and two equal things, each is equal to the other, and similar to the other: therefore, since image posits only similarity and equality, it seems to refer to both one and the other: and thus both the Father is the image of the Son, and the Son of the Father. Perhaps you will say that the Son is the image because he proceeds as begotten: but the Holy Spirit does not proceed as begotten, but as given: but what is given by someone does not have the notion of similarity from this that it is a gift: but what is born, from the very notion of its procession, has the notion of similarity. On the contrary: Above we had that great is he who gives such a gift as himself.

Furthermore, it is not permitted for us to say that the Holy Spirit is not equal to the Father: nor is it permitted for us to say that the Holy Spirit is not similar to the Father: therefore, since from these two an image is made, it seems that it is not permitted for us to say that the Holy Spirit is not the image of the Father and the Son.

1. Likewise, you will say that the Son has from the notion of procession that he is an image, and not the Holy Spirit: either it is understood according to the general notion of procession, or specifically in divine things. If in the first way: this is nothing: because thus it is not asked about persons, because by the same reason you could say that the Holy Spirit by reason of procession is an accident: because what proceeds generally by way of love is an accident, and not a person. But if the procession is considered in divine things: then the reason is worth nothing: because the perfect unity and likeness of nature is communicated to the Holy Spirit by spirating, just as to the Son by generating.

Furthermore, that reason is only according to reason, since we seek the thing and the reason of the thing: therefore it seems that this is nothing.

If for this reason you wish to say what we said above, that image posits agreement with externals, namely figure and color: and therefore it is referred to the Son according to the property which is as if extrinsically present in this that another is from the Son, just as from

the Father, but not from the Holy Spirit, and that is the reason of Richard. On the contrary: According to this, among the Greeks the Son would not be the image of the Father: because they do not posit the Holy Spirit to proceed from the Son.

Solution. Augustine says in the book On the Ten Strings, that the image of a king is otherwise in the son, and otherwise in a solid gold: because in the son it is by nature, in solid gold it is impressed in an extraneous nature: and he wishes to distinguish between this that the Son of God is called image, and that man is said to be according to the image. And therefore it seems to me that three things concur to the understanding of image, namely first that it is in another, because nothing is an image to itself: and therefore since the Father is referred to nothing before himself according to the order of nature, he cannot be called image: and therefore Hilary says below, that the Son is referred to the unbegotten, and that in this way the Father is called the head of the Son. The second is that it leads to one only: for there cannot be an immediate leading imagined into two, as they are two: but a mediated one can, namely that it first leads into one, and consequently into another: hence the Father as he is other than the Son in person, cannot have an image which equally leads into his person, and into the person of the Son: and therefore the Holy Spirit cannot be an image, who according to the order of nature is referred equally to both: nor can he even have two images, even if it were posited that the Holy Spirit proceeds from him alone, as the Greeks say: because those images would be assimilated according to one reason, and thus in themselves they would have no distinction. The third is that it perfectly fulfills: and this agrees to the Son and the Holy Spirit equally, although not for the same reason: because to the Son by reason of filiation, which in its reason posits this fulfillment by the act of nature, because it is generation: but to the Holy Spirit it agrees by spiration which has in its reason the spirative act which is the act of love: and by this it is clear how only the Son is called image.

Therefore it must be said to the first, that image according to the mode of understanding posits more than similarity and equality, as has been said: and by this it is also clear to the third.

To the other it must be said that Damascene does not attend in the image except to that in which the fulfillment of the image is noted: and this is the unity of substance: and therefore he calls the Holy Spirit image.

To the other it must be said that nothing prohibits saying that the Son by reason of procession has the similarity of nature, and the Holy Spirit has the same, but it does not fall into the reason of his procession, because he does not proceed as begotten, as has been said above from the words of Augustine.

To the other it must be said that Richard attends to the sign of the image: because namely the Son is one from one: and the sign of this is that from him and from the Father is another: and

Then his reason attends through that sign according to which it is of the understanding of the image.

Articulus 10 — Whether The Word And Native Wisdom Are The Same; And Whether In The Word There Is Always Understood A Reference To The Creature; And What Saying Adds Over Understanding

Whether the word and wisdom born are the same? and, Whether in the word is always understood a relation to the creature? and, What does saying add over understanding?

Then it is asked about what is said, there, F, Let us take it to be said when the word is spoken, as if it is said born wisdom, etc.

Therefore, it seems that the word and wisdom born are the same.

On the contrary: An ordered and perfect word does not proceed except from a wise one according to wisdom: but the Son is the word to whom nothing is lacking: therefore, he proceeds from wisdom: therefore, proceeding from the speaker, he receives wisdom from the wisdom of the speaker. For we had above, that the good begot the good, and the wise begot the wise: therefore, it seems according to the order of nature the word places wisdom before itself.

But against this is what is said, Ecclesiasticus 1, 5: The fountain of wisdom is the word of God in ex. Therefore, the word is pouring out wisdom: but whatever is poured out from something, is posterior to it by understanding: therefore, wisdom is posterior to the word.

Further, it is asked here, Whether in the word is always understood a relation to the creature?

For this seems so, because
1. All things were made through him?: therefore, all things were in him from eternity life and light: therefore, since life and light place a relation to creatures, the word also places the same.

1. Likewise, the Word is the art of the Father: but art (as Augustine says) is full of the reasons of all living things. Therefore, since those reasons place a relation to the creature, it seems that also the word in which those reasons are.
2. Likewise, Anselm says, that with the same word the Father speaks himself and every creature; therefore, it seems that the relation of creatures is in the word.
3. Likewise, He spoke and they were made. On that Augustine says, that is, He begot the Word in which they were to be made. And he says on Genesis, that it is not to be believed, that the Father spoke as many times as it is put, God said, in the text of the letter > because he begot one word alone, through which he made all things. As also Job said, xxxiii, 14: God speaks once, and does not repeat the same a second time,

But on the contrary: When it is said, the Father speaks himself, no relation is placed except to the Father alone: therefore, when the generation of the word is expressed there, it seems that the word does not necessarily place a relation to the creature.

Further, it is asked here, what does saying add over understanding?

And it seems, that nothing. For Anselm says, that for the highest spirit to say is to behold by thinking: but this all happens by the act of the intellect: therefore, it seems, that it adds nothing: and thus to say and to understand are the same.

Likewise, If the cogitative power does not suit God: this is nothing: because then I will place there by seeing, and then I have the proposition.

Again then I ask, What does seeing say different from beholding? For if they say the same, then one is superfluous in the definition of the word which Anselm places. But if they do not say the same: either they refer to the same intellectual power, or to another. If to the same: then it seems,

that they say one act: and thus one is superfluous. This also seems by the reason of the name: because intuition is the same as sight: therefore, to see by seeing is the same as to see by seeing: and there is an abundance of this word, intuition, as it seems. But if you say, that they refer to another power: therefore, to say is not the act of the intellect alone, nor is it a simple act, but composite.

If for this reason it is said, that to say is the same as to understand.

On the contrary: Understanding is an essential act: therefore, also to say, which is false. Moreover, it seems that to say in divine things does not suit the intellect: because the intellect in the image is referred to the Son: therefore, when the Son is called the word, it is necessary that the mind in divine things, which is attributed to the Father, speaks and not the intellect.

Solution. To the first it must be said it seems, that the word does not always place a relation to creatures, but sometimes places a relation to the speaker alone, according to which it is taken only notionally not signifying the divine essence by relation to the creature, as was held above in the preceding distinction. Hence when it is asked, Whether according to understanding it places wisdom before itself? It must be distinguished, that there is a twofold wisdom: eternal, and created: and it is agreed, that it pours out created wisdom by relation to creatures, according to which it is an art full of the reasons of all living things. But eternal wisdom is essential. And I well think, that according to the reason of understanding that is before, in the way we say the essential before the notional and personal in divine things, not in reality, but by a certain reason.

And by this the solution to all the objections of the first article is clear.

also the solution by the distinction made earlier.

To what is further asked, it must be said according to some, who (as I think) well say, that to say adds according to the reason of understanding over understanding three things: of which one is, that understanding only says the assimilation of the intelligible to the intelligent, and therefore has only a comparison to the object which does not proceed from the intelligent itself, but rather remains in it and is united to it: but to say says a comparison to the object which is said, and to a certain effect which it produces: and that is the word or saying which proceeds from the speaker. The second is, that both indeed, namely understanding, and saying, sound a certain manifestation of the understood and said: but there is a difference in

mode: because understanding manifests to itself and within, but saying manifests as if to another and outside: and therefore in saying personal distinction is more noted: hence we say, that to say notes a notional act, but understanding never, but is always essential. The third is, that to say also sometimes notes an operative power to those things which are made in the word, but understanding never: and therefore it is not said, He understood, and they were made: but He said, and they were made.

To what is asked about the definition of Anselm, I well think that to behold by thinking is not as properly said as by seeing. And what is asked, whether they say the same act? It must be said, that yes: but according to this mode in which we defined to say by those two, we will say that although they say the same act, not however in the same mode of signifying: and therefore it is not a redundancy: and seeing is taken there as it suits the acting intellect which does not see by receiving something, but rather by emitting light from itself: for this suits the procession and generation of the Son. Therefore, this emission of light is said by seeing: but to behold is to fix the sight with diligent consideration: and this suits the perfect assimilation of the word to the speaker, so that namely all things are in the word, which are in the speaker, to such an extent that it seems he spoke another himself, as Anselm says in the Monologion, and Augustine at the beginning of the seventh on the Trinity, that the Father speaking the word, spoke another himself: for he would not have perfectly spoken himself, if something were less in the word than in himself, not that he personally begot himself, but because by speaking he begot one most similar to himself.

To the other it must be said, that although in the image it is so, that there is mind, intellect, and will, yet in divine things these are not so: because the Father is not the mind of the three or memory, nor the Son the intelligence of the three, nor the Holy Spirit the will of the three: but these are essential in divine things: and therefore to say properly suits the paternal intellect, according to which to say is taken notionally.

Articulus 11 — Whether, As It Is Said, The Word Is The Same As Native Wisdom, So It Can Be Said That The Holy Spirit Is Proceeding Goodness

Whether, as it is said, the Word is the same as begotten wisdom: thus it can be said, that the Holy Spirit is proceeding goodness?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said,

in the same place, F, the Son is the Word, the same as begotten wisdom, etc.

1. For by the same reasoning it seems it can be said, that the Holy Spirit is proceeding goodness.
2. Likewise, if "begotten" indicates a notion, as Augustine says, and wisdom the essence, just as the Father is the essence which the Son has begotten, thus it seems the Father is wise with begotten or generated wisdom, since wisdom denotes the essence, as Augustine says: and this is false.

Solution. Concerning this, it is treated below in the Letter: and therefore here it can be briefly said to the first, that there is not the same reasoning concerning goodness and wisdom: because goodness only indicates the object of charity, but wisdom in some way according to the reasoning of the name indicates that which is the Word, as it is saying the Father, and all created things: and therefore wisdom can more receive the notion of the Word, than goodness of the Holy Spirit.

To the other it must be said, that although wisdom is essential, nevertheless begotten wisdom at the same time is drawn to the notional: just as also the Master explains in the Letter, that the same is begotten wisdom and begotten wise: and therefore the Father cannot be said to be wise with generated wisdom: nor does this follow: he is wise with the wisdom which is the Son: therefore he is wise with generated wisdom: because the "what" is changed into "to something."

DISTINCTIO XXIX

Divisio Textus

There is moreover another name, indicating a multiple relation, etc.

Here the Master determines concerning the common spiration which is neither a property of the person, nor personal, but a notion and relation.

However, this distinction is divided into three parts: in the first of which he shows the commonality of this name, principle. In the second, how the Father and the Son are the principle of the Holy Spirit, there, C, Then in the same book he continuously shows, etc. In the third he inquires, Whether they are one principle by notion, or diverse? there, D, The Father and the Son are one principle, etc.

The first has three chapters: in the first of which he says that principle is said in three ways, as is clear in the Letter. In the second he shows that it is said personally from eternity, but essentially to the creature it is said temporally, there, B, The Father from eternity is the principle of the Son, etc. Then he determines, from which sense all things are said to be from God as from a principle, there in the middle of chapter B, When therefore we have heard all things are from God, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether Principle Is Univocal In Its Three Accounts, Namely Notional, Personal, And Essential; And Whether The Father Is Said To Be The Principle Of The Son, And The Father And The Son The Principle Of The Holy Spirit, Univocally

Whether the principle is univocal in its threefold consideration, namely notional, personal, and essential? And, whether the Father is called the principle of the Son, and the Father and the Son the principle of the Holy Spirit univocally?

Here, however, before the Letter, two things are to be inquired: of which the first is, Whether the principle is univocal in its threefold consideration?

Secondly, Whether it is first said by the intellect essentially or personally?

To the first, it is proceeded thus:
1. The eternal and the temporal are not univocal in one: but in the Letter we have, that the principle of creatures is from time, but of persons from eternity: therefore they are not univocal in one: therefore the principle said notionally, personally, and essentially, are not univocal.

1. Likewise, the principle said to creatures and to persons is not founded upon the same respect, or of one reason: because one is of essence, and the other only of person: therefore the principle which is caused by such is not of one reason.
2. Likewise, if they were of one reason, it would be necessary that they unite in some one nature existing in them: and this is not true, because essence is not the principle of the Holy Spirit, although essence is the principle of creatures.
3. Likewise, to create, to breathe, and to generate are different acts by reason: therefore it seems that they do not agree in one reason of principle: because the reason of principle is taken from such acts.

Further, it is inquired for the sake of the first part, namely that it is said the Father is the principle of the Son, and the Father and the Son the principle of the Holy Spirit, whether it is said univocally?

And it seems that it is not: because
1. To generate and to breathe are not univocal acts: therefore neither is the reason of principle which is taken from such acts.

1. Likewise, the principle of the Son and the principle which is the Son, it is impossible that they are of the same reason in the divine: because the principle of the Son can never be the Son, but he himself is the principle of the Holy Spirit: therefore they are not of the same reason.
2. Likewise, they do not name the same notion: therefore they are not of the same reason, as it seems.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
1. Basil says that to receive is common to the Son with every creature, but to have by essence is proper: but what he receives causes the reason of principle: therefore the reason of the principle of the Son and of the creature is according to something common: therefore univocal. By the same reason, the principle by which the Father and the Son are the principle of the Holy Spirit will also be univocal.

1. Likewise, the multitude and paucity of supposits do not make an equivocal term: but the principle of creatures agrees to three, the principle of the Holy Spirit to two, and the

principle of the Son to one, therefore it seems that they differ only in more and fewer supposits: therefore the principle is not equivocal in those significations.

2. Likewise, species with genus does not make equivocation: therefore when the principle is said commonly, and specified by generating, breathing, creating, it will not have equivocation in those species.

3. Likewise, for the sake of the notional principle it is objected, that the relation will not be equivocal, as it seems, provided that it is univocal upon which it is founded: but the principle by which the Father is the principle of the Son is founded upon the act of nature by which the Son receives essence from the Father, and in the same way the Holy Spirit receives the whole essence as the Son: therefore the principle seems to be said univocally.

Therefore, it must be said that the principle can be taken in two ways, namely from the common reason of receiving from another: and this is common to the eternal principle and the temporal by prior and posterior, as Basil intimates: and that is univocal to generation and spiration, not by univocation of genus or species, but of proportion: this proportion is founded upon this commonality, that just as the Son has essence from another and not from himself, so neither does the Holy Spirit, and conversely. But if the reason of the principle is taken from the special mode of receiving, namely by generation, spiration, creation, then it will be said in three reasons of three: and by this the solution to the whole is now clear.

To the first, it must be said that although nothing is univocal to the temporal and the eternal, yet something is analogous by the analogy often determined above: and this is equivocal in that it can induce a sophistical place, which is equivocation: but it is not equivocal by chance and fortune, but according to prior and posterior said: and this intimates Basil's saying that to receive is common to the Son with every creature, but to have by nature is proper, who alone is from the nature of the Father.

To the other, it must be said that the respect in the common analogy is one, as has already been said, by which it is determined to receive this and that in common.

To the other, it must be said that they unite in the common reception by the said analogy.

To the other, it must be said that that reason proceeds from the reason of the principle from the special mode of receiving said, and that is not univocal.

To what is further inquired, it must be said that those reasons induced all proceed from the principle said from the species, and not from the common in genus or proportion: and it is true that it is not of one reason to the Son and to the Holy Spirit.

To those which are objected on the contrary, it must be said that Basil does not attend to receive except in the community of analogy, and not in the community of univocation.

To the other, it must be said that it is not only the multitude and paucity of supposits, but also by another and another reason said of them, according to which the reason of the principle is taken from the special act.

To the other, the solution is now clear by the things said in the beginning of this solution.

To the last, it must be said that although each receives, yet they do not receive by the same reason, nor by the same act: and upon that the relation is principally founded, and not upon nature, as the objection supposes.

Articulus 2 — Whether, According To The Notion Of Understanding, A Principle Said According To Essence Is Before A Principle Said Notionally, Or Conversely

Whether according to the reason of understanding
the principle according to essence
is said before the principle notionally
said, or conversely?

Whether according to the reason of understanding
the principle according to essence
is said before the principle notionally
said, or conversely?

Secondly, it is asked, Whether according
to the reason of understanding the principle
according to essence is said before
the principle said notionally, or conversely?

And it seems that what is said essentially
is before: because

1. According to the reason of understanding,
   essence is before person: therefore what is said
   essentially is before what is said personally.
   The first is proved by what was held above,
   that person is from essence
   as if formally, and not conversely.

2. Likewise, In every nature in which there is
   an order of nature, nature is before that
   order according to the reason of understanding:
   but the principle of creation is of nature, and
   the notional principle is of the order of nature:
   therefore the principle of creatures is before
   the principle said personally.

3. Likewise, The absolute is before
   the relative: because, as was said above by
   Augustine, every relative is also something
   else, and otherwise it would not be relative, because
   otherwise it would be necessary that relation be founded

on nothing: therefore since the principle
of creatures is of those said absolutely, because of
essence, and the principle said personally
is of the relatives, the principle
said essentially to creatures will be before
the principle said personally to the person of the Son and
Holy Spirit.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
1. From eternity the Father is the principle
of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, but in time
is the principle of creatures: and the eternal
is before the temporal: therefore the principle
said notionally is before the principle
said essentially.

1. Likewise, Anselm wishes that
the procession of persons is the cause of the procession
of creatures: and this also Augustine intimates,
when he explains that, God said, let this
or that be made, that is, the Word
begot in which it was to be made.

Solution. To this it is easy to solve:
because a similar question was held above concerning
the power of generating, and the power
of creating. And it must be said that the principle
said notionally is before the principle
said essentially to the creature
simply, but in a certain respect it is
conversely: because if the principle is taken from
relation alone, or from that in which is
the relation, namely essence, then from eternity

God is the principle of creatures, and this
is the principle in a certain respect and not
in act: and thus the first reasons proceed.
But if it is taken in the true reason
of principle, it will be taken from act: and thus the
reasons made in the contrary proceed.

Articulus 3 — According To What Account Principle Is Taken When It Is Said, The Father Is A Principle Without Principle, Either Essentially Or Notionally

According to what reason is the principle taken, when it is said, the Father is a principle without principle: either essentially, or notionally?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, at the end of chapter A, Therefore the Father is a principle without principle, etc.

1. It is asked, According to what reason is the principle taken, when it is said, the Father is a principle without principle: either essentially, or notionally? If essentially: therefore it will be taken in the same reason, when it is said, the Son is a principle from a principle: and thus he will have an essential principle: therefore either in such a way that he is from the essence, or in such a way that his essence has a beginning like a creature: and both are heretical: therefore the principle is not taken essentially. But if it is taken personally: therefore it will be taken in the same way, when it is said, that the Holy Spirit is a principle from both principles: and this again is false, because the Holy Spirit is the principle of no person. But if you say, that it is taken differently, when it is said of the Father, that he is a principle not from a principle: and differently of the Son, when it is said, that he is a principle from a principle: and differently of the Holy Spirit, when it is said, that he is a principle from both principles: this is nothing: because since this is the assignment of a certain division, there will be no division unless the principle is taken in one reason.

1. Likewise, When the Father is said to be a principle not from a principle: either the principle negated and affirmed is taken in the same way, or not. If in the same way: therefore just as he is not from a principle generating and spirating, so he will be the principle of both the Son and the Holy Spirit, because a term once posited is not to be used equivocally: and this is false. But if in different ways: then he speaks without art.

In the same way, it is objected concerning this, the Son is a principle from a principle: and this, the Holy Spirit is a principle from both principles.

The solution to this is light, if the aforementioned in the two prior questions are considered. And it must be said, that the principle is taken in the common reason of analogy. Hence when it is said, the Father is a principle without principle, it is taken without principle in a common way, and to be a principle in a common way: and similarly of the Son: for it suffices for the truth of the proposition, that it is verified in one way of him: just as if in one way a man is white, he is white. Thus in one way being from a principle, he is from a principle and not without principle: and in one way being a principle, he is a principle: but it is not so in negatives: and therefore the argumentation which some make is not valid, the Son in one way is not from a principle, because he is not from a principle creating, and in another way is from a principle generating: therefore it can only be said not from a principle as from a principle.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 4 — Whether The Father And The Son Are One Principle Of The Holy Spirit, Or Several

Whether the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, or several?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said:

The Father and the Son are the principle of the Holy Spirit, etc.

Therefore, either they are one principle, or several. If several principles: this is denied in the Literal in the last and penultimate chapter of this distinction. But if they are one principle.

Against: 1. Whatever things are numbered, receive number from supposits: but the Father and the Son are said to be several supposits, therefore when the term "principle" is placed in those supposits, it necessarily receives plurality and thus the Father and the Son are several principles of the Holy Spirit.

1. Likewise, if they are one principle: either one which is the Father, or one which is not the Father. If one which is the Father: therefore the Father and the Son are the Father, which is false. If one which is not the Father: therefore the Father is not the principle of the Holy Spirit, which again is false: therefore in that they are one principle of the Holy Spirit.
2. Likewise, either principle signifies essence, or notion, or person. If essence: therefore it would also pertain to the Holy Spirit, which is false. If notion. Against: One property in number does not pertain to distinct supposits: but the Father and the Son are distinct supposits: therefore they are not determined by one notion. If person: then the Father and the Son will be one person, which again is false: therefore in no way are the Father and the Son one principle.

Furthermore, if they are one principle, what unites them in the reason of principle? for nothing unites persons in the divine except essence: therefore it seems that they breathe the Holy Spirit, insofar as they are one in essence: and this Anselm expressly says. But since the Holy Spirit is one in essence with them, it follows from this that he himself breathes the Holy Spirit: and this is false.

Solution. It should be noted that concerning this there are five diverse opinions.

Some say that when it is said, the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, that the term "one" signifies the unity of essence. And they rely on the authority of Anselm. And to the argument which is made against, they respond that it signifies the unity of essence not simply, but in the persons of the Father and the Son as they relate in one way to the Holy Spirit whom they breathe: and although it is the same essence in the Holy Spirit, it is not compared to the same, because not to the same reason of principle: and they must say that principle signifies the reason which is the reason of the act of breathing according to what is in the Father and the Son, and they are one in essence. And this opinion is not very irrational,

although some reject it because it does not seem to be well understood in the exposition, which is here set forth.

Others say that the term "one" here signifies the unity of agreement, and not the unity of essence, or person, or notion: and therefore the sense is, the Father and the Son are one principle, that is, they are one principle: so that "one" is taken almost adverbially. And this is nothing: because the unity of agreement does not make one notion in number: but it is evident that one notion in number is that by which the Father and the Son breathe the Holy Spirit, as is shown in the treatise on the Holy Spirit.

Others say that "one" denotes only a sign of union in love, so that the sense is, the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, that is, the Holy Spirit is a sign, that he is from them insofar as they are one: because just as from the same insofar as the same, there is only one: so one insofar as one, is not from diverse insofar as they are diverse: and this was introduced by Simon of Tournai.

The fourth say that "one principle" is a name specially invented for this, so that by it is expressed the mode of existence of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son: and therefore it does not require a plural number because of the distinction of supposits: because it is invented so that by it is expressed the mode of existence of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son: and therefore it does not require a plural number because of the distinction of supposits, because it is invented for this that it signifies the unity of notion in two supposits. But if from these is asked the reason for the invention of this name rather than another, then they must return to the question: and therefore among all this opinion is the least probable.

The fifth say, and this pleases me more, that it signifies the unity of notion in two supposits united in nature, and in the spirative or principative power of the Holy Spirit.

And according to this it must be responded.

To the first, that the term "principle" determines the person of the Father and the Son, not in that they are distinct, because the reason for their distinction is not the reason why the Holy Spirit is from them: because paternity expresses the common reason by which the Son is from the Father, and filiation expresses the reason why the Son relates to the Father: but it is determined by the principle which is in them as the spirative power: and because in that the Father and the Son are one, therefore it cannot draw the number of the principle denoting that from the plurality of supposits. And it is similar, as if we suppose Paul and John to be one in essence, and diverse in persons, but to be something from them insofar as they are one: for that will not be predicated of them plurally: because although it agrees with their supposits to do that and not with the essence, nevertheless the reason for that is not taken from the reason of their distinction. And so it is here: because it is fitting for the Father and the Son to breathe the Holy Spirit, and the act itself which they breathe is only of the supposits: nevertheless because the reason for the act is not taken from the reason of their distinction, therefore it is not necessary that the name which denotes the reason of that relation takes plurality from the plurality of supposits.

To the other, it must be said that they are one principle which is separately the Father, and which is the Son: because the reason of the principle is not from the distinction of the Father and the Son. And if further it is inferred: therefore the Father is the Son: it must be said that this does not hold: but it follows: therefore the Father and the Son are one principle, or the Father and the Son are in the same reason a principle, or the Father is a principle in the same reason in which the Son is, and conversely. For when it is said the principle which is the Father, the article denotes the implication and determination of the supposit, and the supposit of the Father is not the supposit of the Son. But when it is said one principle, only the unity of the reason of the act in them is denoted, according to which the Holy Spirit proceeds from them, without such determination of this or that supposit in which they are distinct.

To the other, it must be said that it expresses the unity of the notion. To the objection against, it must be said that one notion does not agree with distincts as they are distinct, but insofar as they are one in spirative power, and that is one in number in them: for the power of breathing expresses the nature in the Father and the Son as by the virtue of which they have that they breathe, and the principle expresses the reason of the act: just as also the power of generating and the Father, as we said above.

Articulus 5 — Whether Just As The Father And The Son And The Holy Spirit Are Called One Creator, So The Father And The Son Can Be Called One Spirator

Whether just as the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are called one creator, so the Father and the Son can be called one spirator?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said in the second part of the distinction, there, To the creature there is one principle, just as one creator.

1. For by similarity it seems that also the Father and the Son are one spirator to the Holy Spirit.

Likewise, they are one in spirating: therefore, one spirator.

1. Likewise, they are not called one principle except by reason of spiration: therefore, it seems that they are rather one spirator than one principle.
2. Likewise, principle denotes order to act and the reason of the act: therefore, if they are called as spirator: therefore, just as they are called one principle, so they ought to be called one spirator.
3. Likewise, the act of spirating is one in them: therefore, since spirator is a verbal noun, denoting the exercise of that act, they are and are called one spirator.

ON THE CONTRARY:
They are two who spirate: therefore, they are two spirators: however, it does not follow, they are two who are principle: therefore, they are two principles.

Solution. It must be said that the Father and the Son are not one spirating, nor one spirator, but two spirating and two spirators. And the cause of this is: because participles and verbs and all verbal nouns take the mode of signifying from the verbal act, either with time or without time signified, and however essential some things are, when they are signified in the mode of act with time, they take plurality from supposits, as is clear when it is said: I and the Father are one, where the substantive verb signifying essence falls into plurality: because it cannot be understood how from three supposits one act proceeds with time signified as in the verb or participle it is signified. And therefore we say that the Father and the Son are many who spirate, and many spirating, and many spirators. But it is true that this last has less of propriety than the first two:

however, because spirator is a verbal noun, therefore also predicated of diverse supposits it is treated in plurality.

Therefore, it must be said to the first, that it is not similar: because creator denotes the act of essence or substance, and not of the supposit which is person, in this mode of taking person by which faith distinguishes persons: but spirator denotes a personal act.

To the second, the solution is clear from what was said before.

To the other, it must be said that principle denotes order to act by this that it denotes the reason of the act which is notion: but spirator denotes the exercise of that act.

To the last, it must be said that although the act is one, it is not however signified as one, when it is referred to many supposits: and this happens more in the verb and participle: and also in the verbal noun it happens, although less by this that it is abstracted from time.

Articulus 6 — Whether The Father And The Son Are The Same Principle Of The Holy Spirit

Whether the Father and the Son are the same principle of the Holy Spirit?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said in the third part, there in the middle of chapter C, "Relatively to the Holy Spirit they are one principle."

For it is asked here according to this, Whether the Father and the Son are the same principle of the Holy Spirit?

However, it seems that they are, because

1. Unity in substantial things makes the same: therefore, since the principle does not belong to the Father and the Son accidentally, as is often proven above, it seems that since the Father and the Son are one principle, they are the same principle of the Holy Spirit.
2. Likewise, unity not multiplied makes the same: but here the unity of the principle in the Father and the Son is not multiplied: therefore it makes the same: therefore they are the same principle of the Holy Spirit.

3. Likewise, the same and different divide being: therefore they are either the same principle or different: but it is clear that they are not different: therefore the same.

ON THE CONTRARY:
That identity will either be substantial, notional, or personal. It is clear that it is not notional: because if it made identity in distinct persons, then also notional diversity would make diversity in the same person, and thus the Father would be different from the Father in three ways, and the Son would be different from himself because of the two notions he has: both of which are false. But if it denotes personal identity: then the principle would posit persons: and we could not say that the Father and the Son are one principle, which is denied in the Letter: because according to this the Father and the Son would be the same person. But if it denotes identity of essence, then it would also belong to the Holy Spirit.

Solution. It must be said that it is not conceded by the Masters that the Father and the Son are the same principle of the Holy Spirit: because this name "same" due to the included article is distinctive of the supposit, and would denote identity of supposit in the Father and the Son.

TO THE FIRST, therefore, it must be said that in substantial things in which there is unity in every respect in supposit, essence, and notion, that unity causes the same, but not in those in which there is not unity in every respect.

To the second, it must be said in the same way, that although that unity is not multiplied by reason of notion, yet it supposes many in the supposits: and therefore it cannot cause the same.

To the third, it must be said that the same and different follow being and divide it where they are attributed for the sake of the same: but here it is not so: for the same regards the supposit, and therefore it does not agree: and in this sense it would indeed be different: but different properly regards essence: and therefore again it does not agree, as was held above. But in inferiors in which the unity of supposit follows the unity of essence, and conversely, and the diversity of essence the diversity of supposits, and conversely, in respect of the same they can be attributed: and therefore there they divide being.

Articulus 7 — Whether For The Notion By Which The Father And The Son Are Called The Principle Of The Holy Spirit, We Do Not Have A Proper Name

Whether the notion by which the Father and the Son are called the principle of the Holy Spirit does not have a proper name?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says in the last part where he says: If indeed it is asked, what is that notion which he notes there as principle? We do not have its name, etc.

It seems that he speaks falsely: because we call it common spiration.

Furthermore, why is it that there is not a proper name for that notion, as there are names for others?

Solution. It must be said that it could not have the name of a property, because it does not pertain to one alone. Similarly, it could not have the name of a relation, because a relation is founded upon one supposit: but this upon two: and since every notion is by the mode of an adhering form, although in reality it is substantial, therefore the name of a property, as it is in two, since every form is in one, will be repugnant to the imposition of names: and therefore this in both is not named.

Likewise, we can say that just as the Holy Spirit, because he is common to the Father and the Son, has a proper name which is common to both, so also because he proceeds from both, the procession ought to be assigned by a common notion.

Articulus 8 — Whether, If "Principle" Signifies A Notion, We Can Say "Principle" Of A Principle

Whether the principle signifies a notion, whether we can say principle of a principle?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says:

It is not paternity itself or filiation: rather a certain notion which is of the Father, etc.

Here two things are asked, of which the first is, If the principle signifies a notion, whether we can say principle of a principle.

The second is, Why God is not called fivefold from five notions, and the Father is not called threefold from three notions, and the Son twofold from two: just as God is called threefold on account of three persons?

To the first it is proceeded thus:
Above it was held, that we can only say this of that with essential names: but we can say principle of a principle: therefore principle does not signify a notion, as the Master expressly says here.

Solution. It must be said, that principle is taken in three ways, namely commonly to the essential and personal. Likewise, commonly to the procession of the Son and the Holy Spirit. And specially to the special procession of the Holy Spirit. And in the first way alone can principle be said of a principle, and not in the second: because thus it is essential when it is taken commonly. Hence that objection does not proceed.

Further it is said, that principle is said with respect to the creature, and this is essential: and with respect to the person, and this is notional: and according to the first it is said here principle of a principle, and not in the second way.

Articulus 9 — Why From The Quinary Of Notions God Is Not Called Quinary

Why is God not called "quinus" from the quinary of notions?

Secondly, it is asked, Why is God not called "quinus" from the quinary of notions?

It seems that it ought to be so: because 1. Just as the number of persons relates to the essence, so the number of notions relates to the person: but the unity of essence does not

exclude that God is called "trinus" because of the three persons: therefore the unity of the person of the Father does not exclude that the person of the Father is called "trina," and the person of the Son "bina," and God "quinus."

1. Likewise, there are five notions: therefore there is a quinary of notions: and there is also the unity of essence. Therefore, since the unity of essence and the ternary of persons suffice for the concept of "trinus," the same unity with the quinary of notions will suffice for the concept of "quinus."
2. Likewise, it follows well, there is a quinary of stones: therefore there are five stones. Therefore it similarly seems to follow, there is a quinary of notions in the divine: therefore there are five known: but five known are five persons: therefore there are five persons in the divine.
3. Likewise, nothing is numerable in the divine, unless it consists in plurality: but that which is absolute does not consist in plurality: therefore only that which is towards another is numbered: but this is only the notion: therefore only notions are numbered: therefore it seems that it ought to be called "quinus" rather than "trinus."

Solution. It must be said that in no nature does a property as a property make the number simply which is of supposits, unless by effectively constituting persons: and this is done only by a personal property: and therefore three properties in the divine only make the number: and three hypostases are numbered in the way that number can be in the divine.

To the FIRST, however, some respond that innascibility and principle are as if parts of paternity, and are one in the Father. And this is absurd, that one notion is a part of another, since the number of them is taken from the modes of being known, or of referring, as was held above. Although all five notions in essence are one which is essence, they are not, however, one notion: hence this is nothing. But it must be said that the notions are distinct: yet the person is not called "trina" or "bina" from them: because a notion does not make a number unless it is personal, and it is not numbered, but rather the hypostasis: and therefore the number of the notion has less of the concept of number than of persons.

To the SECOND it must be said that five notions do not make five persons which are fitting to be numbered under essence: because a notion does not signify an existing per se perfect, and distinct in itself, like a person, but rather signifies an existing in another according to the mode in which that in which it is, is known: and many such modes can agree to one supposit.

To the other it must be said that it does not follow: just as it does not follow, there is a quinary of modes of being known of stones: therefore there are five stones. Nor does it follow, there are five modes by which this is known or referred: therefore there are five known: because in many ways one and the same can be known and referred.

To the LAST it must be said that it proceeds from falsehoods: because a hypostasis which is not absolute is enumerated in the divine: and to this number is properly attributed, and not to the property, or notion.

DISTINCTIO XXX

Divisio Textus

For there are certain things which are said of God from time, and are fitting to Him temporally, etc. Here begins that part in which it treats of those relatives which are fitting to God from time.

However, this part is divided into two parts: in the first of which he determines concerning those things which are fitting to God temporally. In the second, however, he resolves the question which he deferred in Distinction XVIII, last chapter, Whether the Holy Spirit, when He is said to be given temporally, is referred to Himself: and this begins in the last chapter of this distinction, there, C, Here the question proposed above can be resolved, etc.

In the first part, four things are determined according to the four chapters which are introduced here: of which the first is that certain things are fitting to God temporally. The second, however, is the solution of the objection, whether He is the lord of time from time, there, B, But here someone will say, etc. In the third, he resolves the question, Whether according to this, that something is said temporally of God, something happens to God? there, B, §2: How then will we obtain, etc. In the fourth, he specifies concerning certain things fitting to God temporally, such as refuge, salvation, father, lord, and suchlike, according to which He is called ours, as was determined above: and this begins there, in the middle of chapter B, §3: How also is He called our refuge? etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether Something Is Said Of God Temporally

Whether something is said of God temporally?

Here first arises the question, whether something is said of God temporally, or not?

It seems that it is not:

1. For every predication is either per se or per accidens: however, a predication per accidens is in two ways, namely, either because the nature of the predicate is accidental, or because it agrees by the grace of another, as it agrees with a figure to have three angles equal to two right angles, or with an isosceles. If therefore the temporal is predicated of God: either it is predicated per se: and then it always agrees: because whatever agrees per se, always agrees: therefore these are predicated from eternity: therefore what is also predicated only from time, is predicated from eternity, which is false. But if they are predicated per accidens: either in the first way, and then an accident is in God, and from this many inconveniences follow, namely first, that He is composite, because an accident is not present except in a composite. Secondly, that He is changed per accidens. Thirdly, that something is in Him, which is not Himself. Fourthly, that He is not the first: because the first is altogether immobile: and many other things which are easy to conclude from this.

If perhaps it is said on account of this, that they are predicated per accidens, according to which an accident is agreeable by another: that other will either be inferior, or superior: just as

I see, that having three angles equal to two right angles is accidental to a figure, and accidental to an isosceles: indeed to an isosceles, because it does not agree with it by its own grace, but by the grace of a superior which is a rectilinear triangle: however, to a figure, because it agrees by the grace of an inferior: and whatever will be said, it will be absurd: because genus and species and suchlike are not in God. Nor can you say, that it agrees by the grace of one attribute, and not by the grace of another: because by the grace of essence it agrees with Him to create.

1. If perhaps on account of this you would want to say, that it is predicated by cause. Against: There is a different predication when it is said, the day is the sun shining upon the earth: and another when it is said, the sun by shining makes the day: because when it is said the sun shining upon the earth, it does not follow: therefore the sun is the day: but when it is said, the sun by shining makes the day, the act of the sun is predicated. Similarly, when it is said, God is creator, it seems to be predicated here what is only in God, and His proper act not agreeing with another: therefore it is not predicated according to cause.

Likewise, When it is said, the day is, etc., I can infer: therefore the day is from the sun shining upon the earth: if therefore the predication is similar, when it is said, God is creator, it seems that I can infer: therefore the creator is from God: and this is false: therefore those are not predicated of God by cause.

1. Likewise also, according to the grammarian, verbal names ending in or signify the relation of the substance of the agent to the act: since therefore to create is the proper act of God, which cannot even be communicated by any creature, it is not predicated by cause only of God as creator, but rather by essence.
2. Likewise, What is predicated by cause, signifies that which does not agree with the same of which it is predicated by its own essence: as if I say thus, digestion is completion by natural and proper heat from opposing passions, I cannot infer, that natural heat is digestion: therefore if similarly the predication were by cause, we could not infer, that God is creator.
3. Likewise, In all other efficient causes I see, that there is not predication according to cause, but rather by inherence, when they are said of those which denote the proper act of that cause: therefore also here the predication is by identity according to inherence: since therefore they cannot agree thus, it is clear that nothing seems to be said of God from time.
4. Likewise, What is predicated of something, is either convertible with the subject, or of the nature of the subject, or agreeing per accidens: therefore if these are predicated of God, either they are predicated convertibly, and this is false, since they do not agree from eternity: or as beings of the nature of the subject, that is, of God of whom they are predicated, and this again is false, because thus they would be prior: and this is false,

because they are posterior, since they do not agree from eternity: or per accidens, and this again is false, since nothing is accidental to God.

If on account of this it is said, that nothing from time agrees with God. Against this is all that is held in the Letter,

Solution. It must be said, that many things from time agree with God, as it is said in the Letter: nor are they predicated in one way: but some are predicated by cause, as salvation, which is to be explained according to Augustine, that is, from Him is my salvation: and thus also it is said my hope, and my patience. However, some, as Damascene says, are said, which predicate the relation to those from which they are distinguished, as creator, shepherd, father, and suchlike: for since authority tells us what suchlike predicate, because the relation to those from which they are distinguished, and here we have that according to relation they are said of God, we cannot deny that they are predicated of Him, and not according to cause. And this seems absurd to me, that it is said in the same way God is our creator, and our salvation, or our hope.

To what is first objected, it must be said that suchlike predicate as to what it predicates, is of per se agreeing, that is, substantially, because it predicates the substance of God: however, as to the mode of signifying or predicating, it predicates it as having itself to another which it brought into being, and this is not placed in the substance of God itself, but rather in the dependence of the thing which it brought into being to itself: because indeed suchlike dependence is not to be understood by our intellect, unless we also understand the relation of God to the creature, therefore according to intellect we name the essence in that relation. If you ask, whether something corresponds in reality? it must be said that yes, namely that most true action, by which He brought the creature into being: which although it is that substance, yet it is not signified in the same way: and that mode of signifying is imported in the name.

To what is asked, Whether it is a predicate per se agreeing, etc. I say, that it agrees per se, that He Himself is creator: because it agrees with Him alone: yet it is not necessary, that it always agrees: and this is because it names the agent cause by intellect and will: and therefore although it agrees with Him alone, and by the grace of His essence and omnipotence, yet it is not necessary that it always agrees.

Some however say, that it agrees per accidens, and they distinguish a twofold per accidens, namely that which is an inherent accident, and that which agrees by the grace of another which is extraneous, because it is not present on account of itself: and thus they say, that it agrees with God to be creator by the grace of the connoted in the creature, and not by the grace of itself. But this I do not dare to say, that something agrees with God not by the grace of itself: because rather it agrees with the connoted to be by the grace of the divine essence, than conversely. Hence it seems to me to be said in the first way, that suchlike words signify the divine essence with relation in the mode of signifying to which the act of the first agent is subject: which although it is the same in substance with God, yet it is different in the mode of signifying, and it agrees with Him by the grace of the agent's power. Nor yet does it follow, that it agrees from eternity: because that relation which it imports with the essence, our

intellect does not finish without the creature to which it relates. Hence although it has itself in one way from eternity, and does not create in mode as to itself, yet the creature is created in mode, and before it is not created: and this happens on account of the wisdom predestining and preordaining the exit of creatures into being. Hence it does not follow, that it always agrees: because it is otherwise in voluntary things, and otherwise in those which act beyond intention and will by nature alone.

But what is said, that suchlike are predicated according to cause, although some say this, yet it does not seem reasonable to me: and therefore I concede those things which are brought forward to disprove this.

To the other it must be said, that although in other efficient causes it is predicated inherently that which denotes the act of the cause, yet it is not so in the first cause: because its act is its substance, although it is not signified in that mode, but in relation to the effect: which relation does not denote change in the cause, but in the effect, as will be clear below: and in the cause it denotes nothing, because it denotes the act which agrees with the person, as to create, which does not agree with any created.

To the other it must be said, that it is not predicated according to conversion as to always, but it is well predicated according to conversion as to only: because it agrees with God alone to be creator. If however it is asked, Why not always? It must be said, that the work of God is the will of God according to the act producing the willed: and that indeed is from eternity, as then it is produced, although the thing is not produced from eternity: and since this name creator names the producing act itself, therefore it does not agree from eternity, and it adds nothing except relation to the effect, which indeed is the relation of God in our intellect, founded upon the agent's power or act: and therefore the intellect is not void. Hence it does not avail, it predicates the essence of God: therefore it agrees from eternity: because it does not predicate the essence absolutely, but in the relation of the agent cause according to act, as has been said.

Articulus 2 — Whether These Names, Creator, Lord, King, Etc., Predicate Some Accident In God

Whether these names, creator, lord, king, etc., predicate some accident in God?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says:

They are said relatively according to accident, not that it happens to God, but that it happens to creatures, etc.

For it seems that they predicate an accident which happens to God: because

1. An accident is, as the Philosopher says, that which can be present and not present in the same: but to be a creator can be for God to be and not to be: therefore it seems that these belong to God by accident.
2. Likewise, when it is said creator or lord, this accident of the relation of cause, or of the supposition of dominion, is in something: either in God, or in the creature. If in God, I

have the proposition, that some accident is in God. If in the creature: but to whomever the relation which this name creator imports and which lord imports belongs, there it belongs to be creator and lord: therefore the creature is creator and lord of the creature, which is false: therefore it seems that it is necessary that it be posited to be in the creator.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
1. A simple form cannot be a subject: but God is a simple form: therefore he cannot be a subject: therefore in him there is no accident.

1. Likewise, an accident belongs only to a composite: therefore if an accident is in God, he is composite: and from this follow all absurdities, which also in the first article of this distinction are concluded.

Solution. It must be said that these names do not predicate an accident by proper predication, but by consequence: for it was said above that they predicate the essence in relation to the effect in the creature: whence that added relation consequently leads to the effect. And this is the accident which is consequently understood from their relation, namely the dependence of the creature on God according to the coming into being: or according to supposition, as lord: or according to kingdom, as king: for this dependence is in the effect, and not in God, although it is signified in a certain relation to that which depends on him: and therefore the variation of the creature from non-being to being brings about the name: and therefore the Master says that it names an accident, because it happens to the creature, and not to God.

To the first it must be said that it does not belong to God to be present, or not to be present: because it is implied there that it is present as an accident: but it can be signified in relation to that which sometimes is, and sometimes is not, because of the dependence of the created on him, and because of the act by which he brings forth into being: and from this he himself is not changed who from eternity holds himself in the same way: but rather that which holds itself to him to which he is, as to himself dependent, is named by such a name.

To the other it must be said that this relation is in our intellect, and posits in God the essence signified in such a way, yet it does not posit anything new: for there are certain relatives, to whose coming and going the change of the other extremes suffices, as we said above: and if they are named from the relation by which they hold themselves to their correlatives, the relation posits nothing in them except the relation existing in reason alone: yet more still is here, because the divine act: which although it is essence, as was said, yet is not signified in the same way, just as also predestination which is only of future things because of the relation imported by the preposition.

Articulus 3 — Whether The Aforementioned Names Signify The Essence Or Something Else

Whether the aforementioned names signify the essence or something else?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, "This relative appellation from time is to God."

Further, it is inquired here, what do names of this kind signify? For they either signify the essence, or towards something. If the essence alone: therefore they are fitting to Him from eternity. If towards something, since these are not fitting from eternity, as the relations of the persons, something is added to God.

Likewise, this rule is true which the Doctors give: Every name signifying an effect in the creature signifies the divine essence: therefore it seems that they signify the essence, and nothing more.

Solution. It must be said that here the Doctors are diversified in three ways. Some say that in a name there are two things, namely, that to which it is imposed, and that from which it is imposed: and names of this kind, as to that to which they are imposed, signify the essence: but as to that from which they are imposed, they signify a relation to those by which God is distinguished, or the divine essence: and therefore for the sake of that...

they are not said from eternity. But against these it is objected: because from whom this name "creator" is imposed, it is the act of creating: and that does not belong except to the creating God: and if "creator" sounds in habit or power, and not in act, the proposition is more easily held: because power and such habit do not belong except to God. Therefore, some wish to amend the solution of these: and they say that such names, both with respect to that to which they are imposed, and with respect to that from which they are imposed, signify the divine essence, but on account of the connoted they do not belong from eternity: and this is laughable, that "creator," "king," and suchlike, are imposed from the divine essence, since these names altogether suggest something else, as Damascene says, that they signify the relation of those from which the essence and God are distinguished. And therefore the opinion of Damascene pleases me, that they signify the essence under such a relation to inferiors: which relation is founded in the relation of the thing to itself, and in the act by which it brings forth or governs them. Hence creation holds itself on the part of the creature: but the act of creating is in God, and is the same as Himself, because it is His will that it then be done: and in such a relation the name is imposed: and therefore although it signifies the essence, it does not, however, belong from eternity, because such a relation as a relation was not from eternity, although the essence was thus disposed from eternity: and therefore it is well conceded, that they say such names are relative with respect to that from which they are imposed.

Articulus 4 — Whether Time Can Be Said To Have Begun

Whether time can be said to have begun?

Whether time can be said to have begun?

Then it is asked concerning what is said in the second part, there, B, "It does not take from time to be the lord of time."

From this it seems that time began: and this seems to be against certain philosophers. For the Philosopher says in VIII Physics, that Plato alone generated time, and says it began with

the heavens: and he says this reproaching Plato. And if it is said that he speaks falsely, what will be answered to his arguments thus?

1. Whatever is always taken in its beginning and end according to substance, it never begins nor ends: time or times are always taken in their beginning and end according to substance: therefore it never begins nor ends. The first is evident by itself: because a thing beginning is not taken in its end, but a thing ending is not taken in its beginning. The second is proven from this, that of time nothing is taken except the now which is its substance: and that is the beginning and the end: according to the past indeed the end, and according to the future the beginning: therefore before any now there was time, and after any now there will be time.
2. Likewise, if it began: either it began in itself, or in another. If in itself: therefore it was before it began. If in another: therefore it was in that, which again is absurd.
3. Likewise, either it began in the divisible, or in the indivisible. If in the divisible: therefore since before that there was a part of the divisible, and it was not, before the beginning of time, namely the beginning time, there was time, which is false. If it began in the indivisible: therefore divisible time was in the indivisible which cannot be understood. But if you say that the beginning of time was the beginning of the now itself. Against: Either it began in itself, or in another. If in another: then it was in another: and this is either of time, or of eternity, because the age was not before time. If of time: then time was before the first time. If of eternity: therefore time was in eternity as measuring its beginning: and this is false, because eternity measures nothing variable: therefore it seems that in no way did time begin.

Solution. I say agreeing with the last argument, that the beginning of time was in its indivisible which is now.

To that which is objected, that then it was in the indivisible: it must be said that it does not follow, since it is successive: but it follows that it was continuous after this, and from this it is one: because its continuation began from that: for although time is not in the now, yet it is well continued to the now and from the now, just as a line from a point and to a point.

To the first which seems to prove that time did not begin to be: it must be said that the Philosopher speaks of the time which is adjacent to the first movable: because this is a passion of circular motion: and therefore in that there is nothing to be taken which is not the beginning and the end: but in that which is adjacent to rectilinear change, there is to be taken the now which is the beginning and not the end: and thus we posit that times began: and this is not contrary to the saying of the Philosopher. How time is said in many ways, it was noted above.

To the other it must be said that it began in its now, as has already been shown, because we take it to be adjacent to motion or change as if rectilinear: and although the age is simpler than time, yet the age began from time, because the exit of the age into temporal and variable being is according to reason.

Articulus 5 — Since These Names, Servant, Creature, And The Like, State A Real Relation, Whether In The Creator Some Real Relation Corresponds To Them

Since these names, servant, creature, and similar, signify a real relation, whether in the creator some real relation corresponds to them?

Since these names, servant, creature, and similar, signify a real relation, whether in the creator some real relation corresponds to them?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said in the third part, there in § 2 cap. B, How then shall we obtain nothing according to accident said of God, etc.

For here, for the understanding of all that has been said, it must be asked, since such names, servant, and creature, signify a real relation: whether some real relation corresponds to them in the creator, or nothing?

For it seems that it does correspond. 1. For the Philosopher says in the Categories and in Book V of the Metaphysics, that relatives are of two modes: for some are towards something, to which this very being which they are towards another they are: but some are said towards something, and sometimes they are not so towards something, that both are towards the other: but one is towards the other, and not conversely except according to saying, as one and many, and knowledge and known, and measure and measured, and suchlike. Those which are towards something in the first mode, in both relatives they posit a real relation: and therefore they are said to be convertible, and posited they posit, and removed they remove themselves equally. Since therefore such are, lord servant, king subject, creator creature, it seems that in both such a relation is signified.

1. Likewise, Either both relations are posited in the creature, when it is said, creator creature, or both in God, or one in God, and the other in the creature. If in the first mode: then it seems, that the creature has a double relation to the same, which is impossible.

Likewise, According to this opposite relations according to the same are in the same, which is more impossible: because opposites in act as opposites, in no way are or can be in the same. If in the second mode, the same follows: and furthermore the proposition is held, that some relation from time is in God. Therefore it remains, that it is in the third mode: and thus to the relation of the creature in the creator something corresponds according to the thing.

1. Likewise, Of which neither is intelligible without the other, one of them posited in one, it is necessary the other be posited in the other, if they are opposites: thus however all relatives said to be convertible are: therefore if the relation of the creature is posited in the creature, it is necessary the relation of the creator be posited in God.
2. Likewise, Does not God act more truly than any creature, as Augustine says? for that which pertains to the category of action, is proper to him alone: therefore it is possible to signify the agent itself under relation to the act.

3. Likewise, God creates this thing: but every action is in act, as in matter: therefore it seems, that the thing subject to the act and sustaining the act, has a real relation, and by the same reason the agent.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 4. All such relations said to be convertible, and not always agreeing, are caused by change: but God is immutable: therefore in him such names do not signify real relations.

1. Likewise, Every such relation is an accident: therefore by inhering it makes composition: and this again does not befit God: therefore such names do not signify a real relation.
2. Likewise, Every such relation makes dependence in the relative: but it is absurd, that God depends on the creature: therefore it does not signify a relation in him.
3. Likewise, Every such relative is fitting to be determined externally: but it is absurd that we say God can be determined by a creature, even as to something.
4. Likewise Dionysius says, that in causes and caused we do not receive reciprocation: therefore they are not said to each other, as it seems.

Solution. To this I say, as before, that such names name the divine essence under the relation to the creature, which relation in God posits only the act, which is the same with the will and substance of the agent: and the dependence which is added, is in our intellect, and not in God. And this is done because our intellect takes real dependence in the creature, which as real dependence it cannot understand, unless it also posits a relation in the cause, which will not be entirely in vain, because it is supported by the act of the cause, although it does not signify an accident in God: and for the sake of that relation the names have their connotations in the creature.

Therefore it must be said to the first, that in truth such relatives are said to be convertible, not that in both there is a real relation, but because it is according to the aforementioned mode of understanding.

To the other it must be said, that really in God a relation is posited for the sake of the act, although it does not really signify an accident in him, but something to be from him which depends on him according to the thing, and not conversely except according to the mode of understanding.

To the other it must be said, that we posit a relation by the mode of understanding in God, which however signifies nothing adventitious, and in the mode of understanding it is according to which something is related to God the agent thus or thus.

To the other it must be said, that God acts without change of himself per se, and per accidens: and therefore really the signified does not arise because of the relation of another to him, as has been said.

To the other it must be said, that when it is said, God creates, there is not an accident according to the thing mediating between the agent and the act, but rather the very new existence of the thing without any created becoming is said: and therefore although the word denoting the act has matter in the expression and subject, as when it is said, the soul is created, yet according to the thing it has none at all, because there is no becoming there: but the act as it is in the agent, is nothing other than the will according to the act of existing the thing now, which will from eternity is related according to one mode.

But to what is objected against, it must be said that such relatives do not always require change and real relation in both relatives, as is clear in double and half. For let there be two cubits: and one is changed by the cutting of one cubit, now it is made half, and it will be subdouble, and the other double, without change of itself: although double and subdouble are said to be convertible, and thus we can say of creator and creature: and those relations which thus note relation according to intellect only, from the fact that something is related to something not changed, were called by Gilbert of Poitiers assisting, and to predicate nothing in that of which they were said. Yet we can say, that the intellect positing them in God is supported by the act of creating, and governing, and ruling.

But it must be said, that not every such relation is an inhering accident, as has been said: nor even in the creature is this true, as was clear in the example of double and half.

To the other it must be said, that the creator of himself does not have dependence, but rather by such a name is signified the dependence of another to him: as king is a relative, and yet signifies that others depend really on him, and similarly lord.

To the last it must be said, that to be determined according to the name, is a determination which our intellect needs, not because our intellect imposes a name under such a relation.

Articulus 6 — Whether These Names, Lord, King, Etc., Belong To God From Eternity

Whether these names, lord, king, etc.,
are fitting to God from eternity?

Whether these names, lord, king, etc.,
are fitting to God from eternity?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said in the last part of this part, there, in § 3 cap. B, "Ste et pater noster esse incipit," etc.

1. For it seems that such names can be fitting from eternity: for it is said lord, as Ambrose says, by the power of restraining the subject creature: and this is fitting from eternity.
2. Likewise it is inquired, Why is it not distinguished in such things, that they signify in act and habit, as in others, as is gift, and suchlike? For from eternity God has the aptitude of creating, and the habit of giving: therefore it seems that in some sense they are fitting from eternity.

3. Furthermore, These are fitting in eternity, as he himself says, Exodus 11, 15: God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob:... this name is mine forever. And why are they not fitting from eternity as in eternity?

Solution. It must be said to this in my judgment, as Augustine says here, that these are not fitting except from time: because they do not regard habit, but act: for relations as such follow acts, not aptitudes, as is clear: for from this a thing is not said to be subdouble to another, that it can be subdouble. And if it is sometimes found that lord is fitting from eternity, I believe it is taken improperly. However, creator, since this is the name of an agent according to act, is not fitting except from time: and through this the solution to the first two is clear.

To the other it must be said, that the creature will indeed remain without end, although it did not remain without beginning: and therefore since such things connote effect in the creature, they are not fitting from eternity, but are fitting in eternity.

Articulus 7 — Whether God Is Called Lord Of Time From Time

Whether God is called the lord of time from time?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, in the 4th chapter B, Hz these things are openly shown, etc.

1. For it seems that he is also the lord of time from time: because time is one of the created things: therefore just as he is the lord of others from time, so also of time: and this is against the things said above.
2. Likewise, if to any coming forth of a creature into being time corresponds, then also to the coming forth of time into being time corresponds: and thus there will be time of time: and this is nothing to say.
3. Likewise, it seems to be the lord of time from eternity: because thus says Boethius in the book of the Consolation of Philosophy: Who orders time to go from eternity.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
Eternity is created: therefore its coming forth into being was measured by time: therefore eternity is from time, and not time from eternity, as Boethius seems to say.

Solution. It must be said that of time there is not time, nor measure of measure: and therefore although time as it is adjacent to change, is coeval according to the thing, yet it is the measure of others: and thus it is before according to reason: because that coming forth was never in becoming, but in the demonstration of the creature now first, before which now of the creature there was nothing.

To the other it must be said, that the coming forth of time into being did not have a measure: because really it was not before time.

To the other it must be said, that eternity began in the eternal things, namely in the empyrean heaven and in the angels: and therefore according to reason it is from time to measure its coming forth into being.

But what Boethius says, must be understood of time and eternity, as they now are: because thus eternity measures temporal things: and time goes, that is, flows from eternity: and this notes from eternity. But it may be said more lightly, to place eternity for eternity, and the preposition to note order and cause: so that the sense may be, Who orders time from, that is, after eternity: and to go from eternity, to create exemplarily from it: because as the Philosopher says, what is eternal to the eternal, this is eternal to the eternal, and time to the temporal.

Articulus 8 — Whether The Holy Spirit Is Related To Himself, Since What Is Given Is Related To The Giver

Whether the Holy Spirit is referred to Himself, when the given is referred to the giver?

Then the question is asked concerning the last part of the distinction, there, "Here the question proposed above can be solved," etc.

For it seems false to say in the Text: for it concedes that the given is referred to the giver, and that the Holy Spirit gives Himself, and yet is not referred to Himself: and it concedes that the appellation of the given is referred to the giver: and He Himself is the giver: therefore He is referred to Himself, as it seems.

Solution. It must be said that to be referred according to the appellation of the gift not simply, but to the giver, is to be referred in a certain respect: and the Master well concedes that in such a way the Holy Spirit is referred to Himself in a certain respect: but to be referred to Himself is to be simply referred to Himself: and this he intends to deny in the Text, as is clear to one examining diligently.

DISTINCTIO XXXI

Divisio Textus

Furthermore, it must be considered, since there are three persons, etc.

Here begins that part in which the Master touches not on what is proper, but on what is appropriated. And it is entirely contained in this distinction, which is divided into three parts: in the first of which the Master touches on what such words as "similar," "equal," mean, upon which certain appropriations are taken. In the second, he touches on three appropriations to the persons according to the assignment of Hilary, there, C, "Therefore it must not be omitted here." In the third, he touches on what the illustrious man, etc., appropriated according to the assignment of Augustine, there, G, "It must also be known," etc.

The Master himself in the Letter divides the first part into two: in the first of which he inquires whether "similar," "equal," and suchlike are said relatively or according to essence. In the second, however, he determines what similarity and equality signify, there, B, "We also say the same about similarity," etc.

And through this the meaning is clear.

Articulus 1 — Whether The Master Here Determines Well Concerning Appropriations

Whether the Master here determines well concerning the appropriated?

However, two questions arise here before the Letter: one of which is, Why does the Master place here a treatise on the appropriated?

Secondly, In what respect is the reason of appropriation considered?

However, it seems that it ought not to be placed here. 1. For all these names are essential: therefore they ought to be determined among the essentials.

1. Furthermore, equality was treated above: therefore it seems superfluous to be repeated here.
2. Likewise, Equal and similar are not placed here among the appropriated: therefore it seems that they ought not to be treated in this treatise, which is about the appropriated.

Solution. The appropriated derive their reason from the proper: just as the accidental derives its reason from that which is per se: and just as that which is for the sake of another derives the reason of cognition from that which is for its own sake, and therefore the treatise on the appropriated is to be placed immediately after the treatise on the proper.

To the ARGUMENT, it must be said that they are not so essential that they do not, through the reasons of their names, place an approach and proximity to the proper, and therefore they are joined with them.

To the other, it must be said that similarity and equality are taken in two ways, namely according to that in which there is equality and similarity: and this is essence, as was said above: and according to the reason of the name which more approaches the reason of one person than another: as he will say below, that equality is in the Son and similarity. And some Saints say that according to something it is in the Son, and according to something in the Holy Spirit: and in this way it is taken here in the treatise on the appropriated.

Through this also the solution to the following is clear: because in the first way he treated of them above, and in the second way he treats of them here.

Articulus 2 — By What The Rationale Is Considered In Appropriations, And Whether, With No Proper Term, Something Can Be Appropriated

Concerning what is the reason considered in appropriated things? And, whether, with the proper not existing, something can be appropriated?

Concerning what is the reason considered in appropriated things? And, whether, with the proper not existing, something can be appropriated?

Then it is asked, In what manner is appropriation made?

It seems, indeed, that there is none. 1. For eternity, image, and use are essential things equally pertaining to one and to another: therefore, no appropriation is made concerning them.

1. Likewise, whatever things agree according to property are not said of all: but these are said of all: therefore, they are not appropriated.
2. Likewise, that which is appropriated to someone is that which always agrees with him and not with another, but these agree with all: and similarly unity, equality, and concord: therefore, they are not appropriated.
3. Likewise, it seems that by the contrary, the proper ought to receive the appropriated: as Augustine says, that power is to the Father, because the elders fail, lest it be believed that He fails: wisdom to the Son, because the younger are foolish, lest it be believed that the Son is unwise: goodness to the Holy Spirit, lest it be believed that He is a spirit of wrath: therefore, it seems that eternity agrees not with the Father, but with Him who is from the beginning, and image with Him to whom it less agrees, and use with Him who is less for use: and thus all seem to be assigned inappropriately.

Likewise, it is asked, If with the proper not existing, there is or can be something appropriated?

It seems so: because 4. God will still be eternal, and one, and wise, and powerful, and good: therefore, since these are appropriated, it seems that with the proper not existing, they still remain appropriated.

1. Likewise, these appropriated things are not appropriated by us: for this appropriation is not made only with respect to our intellect, but also in the very significations of these things the reason of appropriation is imported: because otherwise one would not be appropriated more to one than to another: therefore, since such appropriated things have always been in God, even with the proper not existing, they would still remain, as it seems.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: The proper falls into the reason of the appropriated: therefore, with the proper not existing, there will not be the appropriated.

Furthermore, if the appropriated is that which approaches the reason of the proper, it is necessary to presuppose that reason according to which there is an approach: but this is the reason of the proper: therefore, it is necessary always to suppose the proper before the appropriated.

Solution. It must be said that the appropriated can be taken in two ways, namely according to matter, and this is according to that which is appropriated: and according to form, that is, according to the reason of the appropriated as such. In the first way, I say that it is without the intellect of the proper. In the second way, however, never: because the appropriated is nothing other than, according to the agreement of thing and name, to have some approach more to the proper of one person than of another: and therefore the Master says below, that eternity

signifies the notion of the Father which is innascibility: not because the thing of eternity agrees only with the Father, but because according to the agreement of reason it approaches the Father, as will be clear below when it is asked about each. And through this the solution to the first is clear.

To the other, it must be said that the proper and the appropriated are not the same: just as image and to the image are not the same: and not the same for its own sake and for the sake of another: for the preposition notes a certain approach of that which is remote: hence the removal notes that they are not truly proper: but the approach notes that through some reason not of the thing, but of the property of the thing, they agree with the proper of one person more than with the proper of another.

To the other, it must be said in the same way, that according to the nature of the thing it is indeed common, but by the grace of property there is an agreement with the proper: just as eternity is indeed common to the three: yet because the eternal is without beginning the principle of others, through this it agrees with Him who is the principle not from a principle more than with Him who is the principle from a principle.

To the other, it must be said that appropriation is not simply made by the contrary: but the explanation of appropriation is sometimes made by the contrary accidentally, and for the exclusion of error: and this Augustine intimates in the very words, and it will be had below.

To the other, it must be said that with the proper not existing, there would not be the appropriated according to the reason of the appropriated: although perhaps it would still be in the reason of the essential attribute, as is clear from the distinction previously posited.

And through this the solution to the last is clear.

Articulus 3 — Whether Likeness And Equality Are Said Relatively Or Of Themselves

Whether likeness and equality are said relatively, or to themselves?

ARTICULUS TI.

Whether likeness and equality are said relatively, or to themselves?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said in the Text: Just as similar, so also equal is said relatively.

1. For this does not seem so, since likeness, as it is said in the Text, is nothing other than indifferent essence in three. But indifferent essence is said to itself: therefore it seems that likeness and equality are said to themselves.
2. Furthermore, if these speak of relation, what relation do they speak of? If any of the personal ones, it would be necessary that they belong to those persons alone: and this is not true, as was held above, and it is held here, that there is one likeness and equality of the three.

Solution. Above: many questions were asked about this. And it must be said as there, that these names, similar, and equal, are said relatively, connoting essence when they are taken

concretely: and they denote in their supposits indeterminate relations of their relatives: and this is clear when they are explained. For the persons are similar, being distinct, having the same essence according to attributes signifying quality according to the mode of understanding: such as wisdom, goodness, and the like. However, the persons are equal, being distinct, having the same essence according to the reason of virtual quantity, such as power, virtue, and being everywhere, and the like. However, when they are signified abstractly, then they signify the essence considered in the aforementioned way, and connote the persons obliquely: for likeness is indifferent essence according to attributes signifying quality in three: and equality is indifferent essence according to attributes of quantity in three: and through this the solution to all that can be asked is easily clear.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that when indifferent essence is said, two things are said, namely essence which does not signify relation, and indifferent which supposes the persons related to each other, in which the indifferent essence is.

To the other, it must be said that they speak of relation indeterminately: and through this they require distinct supposits which are referred to each other.

Articulus 4 — Whether The Name Of Likeness Posits Something In The Divine

Whether the name of similarity posits something in the divine?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, Whence to some it does not seem unlearned to say that the name of equality or similarity does not posit something, etc.

1. For this seems expressly false: because if similarity is indifferent essence, then it posits indifferent essence: and this is to posit something.
2. Likewise, in lower things these names posit something: therefore, since in higher things they posit substance, in lower things quality or quantity: and substance is more truly being than quality or quantity: therefore it seems that they more truly posit in higher things than in lower things.
3. Furthermore, if you say that they signify negation: because thus it is explained, the Son is equal to the Father, because neither greater nor lesser: then by the same reasoning every predicate which is said of something through essence or through accident posits nothing, because from that follow the removals of opposite predicates and those disparate from the same subject: as when it is said, man is an animal, it follows, therefore he is not a stone: and when it is said, man is white: therefore he is not black: and this is false: therefore it is necessary that they posit something.
4. Likewise, it is known per se, that negation is not first in the intellect: therefore that negation by which it is said, the Son is neither greater nor lesser, is founded in some prior affirmation: therefore in that affirmation they posit something.
5. Likewise, it seems that similarity and equality are the same in the divine: because each is explained for indifferent essence in the three: therefore since they are the same which are of one definition, similarity and equality will be the same.

6. Furthermore, Augustine said that to equality pertains the question by which it is asked, why, of what kind, or how much it is?

To the origin indeed, who, of whom it is: therefore to the same pertains quality and quantity in the divine: but indifferent quality causes similarity: therefore in the divine, similarity and equality are the same.

1. Likewise, it seems that these two are the same as identity: because one in substance makes the same: but everything that of itself speaks quality or quantity in inferiors, is turned in the divine into the predication of substance, as Boethius says: therefore they predicate substance, and thus make identity in the divine, and not similarity or equality.

Solution. It must be said that they posit in the divine, and must be explained positively. And those things which the Master says in the Text are negations consequent to the opposite comparison which is according to more and less: and the Master does not intend to say, except that they do not posit something different from substance, as they do in inferiors: for as it is said in the first of Euclid: Equal is that which, being supposed to something, neither exceeds nor is exceeded. And this exposition by negation happens to the equal insofar as it is first in the genus of proportions, because as Boethius teaches, all inequality arises from equality, and is reduced to it: because equal is taken according to one in the proportions of quantity, and so it is with similar in the comparison of qualities: although properly in those there are not signifiable species of comparison, as species of proportions in quantity are signified. And through this the solution to the first four is clear: for it has been shown what the Master intends in the Text, and whence the consequent negation comes more in these than in others.

To that which further seems to prove that in the divine similarity is equality, and conversely: it must be said that although indifferent essence causes both, it is not considered in both according to the same mode of questioning: because in similarity it is considered according to the indifference of the attributes of wisdom, and goodness, and others, which according to the mode of speaking say quality. In equality, however, it is considered according to the attributes saying virtual quantity in the eternity of duration, and the magnitude of existing everywhere, and the power of operating.

To another it must be said that what is such not simply, but according to something considered, pertains to the question of quality, according to which the attribute saying quality is a virtue ordered to act, just as science by its virtue makes one consider, and according to the power to know is the faculty of considering well or badly: and in this respect it makes equality, but in itself it makes similarity.

To another it must be said that all those attributes are substance: but according to this the reason for distinguishing between attributes is not taken, as was proven above: but rather according to the mode of understanding: for thus in inferiors the Philosopher says, that if someone with a bicubital magnitude placed, should say that what is placed is to be quantum, he says what it is, and quantum signifies what: so also in superiors when it is said, God is substance, God is wise, it is indeed said what in both, but it is not signified in the mode of

understanding: and therefore for the sake of certain attributes the persons are said to be one, and for the sake of certain similar, and for the sake of certain equal: and I think, that they ought not to be said the same: because it was held above, that the Father and the Son are not the same God and this because the same has in itself an article, which determines the suppositum which is the person: and therefore since they are not the same suppositum, they will not be the same God, it also has in itself the unity of substance, and for the sake of this it could well be said: but it cannot be said, that they are another, or different God.

And from this also further the solution of the question is clear, which could be asked, why one in substantial attributes in divine persons does not make the same, as one in qualitative makes similar, and in quantitative makes equal? There are, however, those who distinguish this, the Father and the Son are the same God, from the fact that the same can be masculine and substantive, and thus false: or neuter and quasi-adjective, and thus true: but this distinction has neither art nor reason: because the same is neither by voice nor by signification an adjective, but signifying and discretive of substance.

Moreover, if it were of the neuter gender, it would be incongruously added with this name, God, which is masculine: just as it is incongruously said, the Father and the Son are this God.

C. On the sentence of Saint Hilary, where he shows the properties in the Trinity of persons.

Therefore it is not to be omitted here, that the illustrious man Hilary, assigning the properties of persons, says in the Father is eternity, species in the image, use in the gift: which words are of such difficulty, that Augustine labored greatly in their understanding and explanation, as he himself says thus: he shows in book VI on the Trinity: Someone when he wished to briefly insinuate the properties of each person in the Trinity: Eternity is, he says, in the Father, species in the image, use in the gift. And because a man of no small authority in the treatment of Scriptures and assertion of faith stood out (for Hilary placed these in his books), having scrutinized the hidden understanding of these words, that is, of the Father, and of the image, and of the gift, of eternity, of species, and of use, as much as I am able, I do not think he followed him in the vocabulary of eternity, except that the Father does not have a Father from whom he is: but the Son is from the Father, so that he may be, and so that he may be coeternal with him. For the image, if it perfectly fulfills that of which it is the image, is itself equal to it, not that to its image: in which image he named species. I believe because of beauty, where there is such congruence and first equality, and first similarity differing in no thing, and in no way unequal, and in no part dissimilar: but responding to the identity of that of which it is the image: where there is first and highest life, to which it is not other to live, and other to be: but the same and first and highest intellect, to which it is not other to live and other to understand, but the same this is one as a perfect word, to which nothing is lacking: and a certain art of the omnipotent and wise God, full of all reasons of living and immutable things: and all are one in it, as it is one from one, with which one: there God knows all things which he made through it.

D. On the Holy Spirit why it is called use?

There is, however, an ineffable complex of the Father and the image, which is not determined without enjoyment, without charity, without joy. Therefore that love, delight, happiness, or blessedness (if indeed it is worthily said by any human voice) was briefly called use by him, and in the Trinity is the Holy Spirit not begotten, but the sweetness of the begetter and the begotten, pouring forth with the largeness and abundance of the unbegotten all creatures according to their capacity, and in themselves they are infinite. Whoever sees this either in part, or through a mirror in an enigma, let him rejoice knowing God, and give thanks. But whoever does not see, let him strive through the piety of faith to see, not through blindness to calumniate: because there is one God, but nevertheless Trinity. Behold, you have how the words of Hilary previously mentioned are to be taken, although they are of such profundity, that even with the exposition applied, human sense can scarcely in any way understand them: since even the explanation of them, which Augustine here issued, has much difficulty and ambiguity in itself.

E. That according to this exposition the properties of the three Persons are not distinguished there.

For according to the aforementioned exposition, the three properties previously assigned are not distinguished here, but the hypostases themselves are shown to be distinct from each other. However, by the name of eternity the same property seems to be designated, which this name notes, unbegotten. But let us see what it is that he says:

The image if it perfectly fulfills that of which it is the image, is itself equal to it, not that to its image. For he seems to say, that the Son who is the image of the Father, is equal to the Father, not the Father to the Son: since both the Son is said to be equal to the Father in Scripture, and the Father to the Son: but the Son has this from the Father that he is equal to him, but the Father does not have it from the Son: and yet the Son is fully and perfectly equal to the Father, that is, the image to that of which it is the image.

F. Why Hilary is said to have assigned the properties of persons in the aforementioned words, when there are not expressly properties there?

Therefore Hilary is said to have assigned the properties of persons in the aforementioned words, because he placed the relative names of persons, namely of the Father, of the image, and of the gift, which are said relatively of the persons, and note the properties by which the persons are distinguished. For thus the Holy Spirit is said to be a gift relatively, just as a gift. However, he did not signify the properties themselves by the other three names, according to the aforementioned exposition of Augustine, except by the name of eternity alone, by which he did not wish paternity itself to be understood, but that notion by which he is said to be unbegotten.

Articulus 5 — Why Eternity Is Appropriated To The Father

Why is eternity appropriated to the Father?

Then inquiry is made concerning the second part where it says, there, C, "Therefore it must not be omitted here, that the illustrious man," etc. And three questions are asked: the first of

which is, Why is eternity attributed to the Father? Secondly, Why is the image attributed to the Son? And thirdly, Why is use attributed to the Holy Spirit?

To the first, it proceeds thus: 1. Whatever name is said equally of the three, is not attributed specially to any one: but we say in the Athanasian Creed: "Eternal Father, eternal Son, therefore eternal Holy Spirit": thus eternity is not attributed specially to any one.

1. Likewise, above it was proven the coeternity of the persons equally: and there, that if the Father is eternal, that also the Son is eternal: therefore it ought not to be specially referred to the Father.
2. Likewise, coeternity according to the mode of understanding signifies a space not intersected, as Isaac says, which is a measure extrinsically adjacent to a being enduring without variation and end. Thus also Dionysius says, that eternity is ancient and invariable and universal in measuring: but this equally pertains to all: therefore it is not specially attributed to the Father.
3. Likewise, if we take according to the definition of Boethius, that eternity is the possession of interminable life all at once: again it equally pertains to the three: therefore it is wrongly attributed to one, namely the Father.
4. Likewise, inquiry is made concerning the solution which some propose, that it signifies the essence which is common to the three but connotes the notion of the Father, and therefore it is attributed to the Father. And they wish to have this from, the words of the Master below, where he says, that it says the same notion as unbegotten.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Whatever says the essence and connotes the notion of one person, on account of this that it signifies both, cannot be said of all: just as "is sent," and "proceeds temporally," and the like: therefore if eternity in its understanding encloses the notion of the Father, it will not be said of the other persons, that they are eternal.

1. Likewise, I cannot say, that the Son is the divine essence, and unbegotten: therefore since eternity is as valuable as essence and unbegotten, I will not be able to say, that the Son is eternity or eternal.

Solution. It must be said, that eternity is not proper to the Father, neither per se, nor by connotation of his notion: but it is appropriated, because in its reason it more approaches the Father's property which is unbegottenness, than to the property of another person: and this is thus evident: Eternity is the possession of interminable life. But what is interminable, is a principle not from a principle: which although it essentially pertains to all persons, yet according to some reason the Son has a principle, and the Holy Spirit has a principle: but the Father in no way: therefore the reason of eternity more approaches the Father's property, than another's.

And through this the solution to all objections is evident. They err indeed who say it connotes the notion of the Father: because a word connotes that which it encloses in its

understanding with the principal signification: and in this way the attributes of the persons are not distinguished, as has been said.

Articulus 6 — Why Image Is Appropriated To The Son, And Why The Son Is Called The Species Of The Father

Why is the image appropriated to the Son? and,
Why is the Son called the species of the Father?

Why is the image appropriated to the Son? and,
Why is the Son called the species of the Father?

Secondly, it is inquired concerning the image which is appropriated to the Son: and because above the reason was shown clearly enough why the image properly belongs to the Son, from that it can also be sufficiently elicited why the image, essentially said, is appropriated to the same: because, namely, it has a reason approaching that which is proper to the Son.

Here, however, the question remains concerning the two definitions of the image, which are touched upon in the note of Hilary, which is assigned here in certain books: of which the first is this:

1. The image is of that thing to which the imagined species is indifferent: but the indifferent species is of the Father: therefore the image is of the Father: not therefore of the Son, for the Son is the indifferent species of the Father.
2. Likewise, What does the term "imagined" say? If it is the act of imitating, as is commonly said: therefore the image is of the thing which the image imitates: but this is the prototype, as Damascene says, or the exemplar, as is commonly said. Therefore it seems that the exemplar should be placed as proper to the Father, and not eternity in this ternary which Hilary places: because otherwise it would not correspond to itself.
3. Likewise, Why is the Son called species? For species is either taken as in logic, or as in natural things, or as in spiritual things. If in the first way: then species is predicated of many numerically different things: and this does not belong to the Son. But if in the second way: then species is the form giving being and reason: and this again does not belong to the Son. If in the third way: then the Son would be the reason according to which the Father formally knows, and thus would be wise with begotten wisdom: which again is false, as will be proved in the following distinction. If you say that here species is called beauty, as Augustine seems to say in the Letter. On the contrary: The beauty of the image is rather from the superaddition to the image, as is the charm of color in the commensuration of parts in members and color, than in the figure of the image itself: since therefore these are of goodness and grace which are superinduced to the spiritual image by the Holy Spirit, it seems that beauty more belongs to the Holy Spirit than to the Son.

4. Furthermore, Everything that is placed in this definition belongs to the Holy Spirit: for the Holy Spirit is the indifferent species of the Father and the Son: therefore it is the image, and species ought to be appropriated to it.

Further, it is inquired concerning the second definition: The image is of a thing to a thing imagined and an indiscrete likeness.

1. For since the image is sometimes smaller, and sometimes larger, as is evident in the statues of idols and saints, it does not seem to be of a thing to a thing equated.
2. Furthermore, Since there is discretion in all those in which there is an image and exemplar, for the image is not of itself, it seems that it wrongly says indiscrete.
3. Likewise, Since the image is to a thing equated, it rather seems to be a quality than a likeness.

Further, it is inquired, By what reason is species appropriated to him who is thus an image? For there is no beauty except from substance: and thus it seems there is one species of the three, just as there is one essence of the three.

Solution. It must be said that the two definitions which he touches upon in the Letter are diversified in that one is of the image according to which it is from the exemplar: for thus it has an indifferent species with that: just as wax with the figure of a seal, from this that according to impression it is from the seal. But the other is given of the image, according to which it is to the exemplar into which it leads: for it leads into that by this that it is an imagined and equated likeness to it.

To the first, it must be said that when it is said, The image is of that thing, etc., the term "image" is constructed with "of that thing," in the relation of efficient and terminus together: because the image is from that thing, and to demonstrate that thing: and therefore it does not follow that it is that thing: because there is no construction in the relation of subject to form: just as when it is said, the image of a statue or of bronze.

To the other, it must be said that the term "imagined" says the act of imitating: and yet the reason of the exemplar is not attributed to the Father, because it does not belong: but the reason of the principle to the image. For the image is not necessarily made from the first exemplar efficiently, just as the idol of Peter or Aesculapius is made by an artisan: but the image in divine things is from that of which it is the image, as from a principle: and because the reason of the principle is not imported in the exemplar, but in eternity, as was previously held: therefore eternity is attributed to the Father.

If, however, it is objected that the reason of the principle is also diminished, because it does not import imitation: just as the exemplar saying imitation does not say principle: and thus neither belongs to the Father by comparison to the image. It must be said that it is not true: for the reason of the principle is imported by eternity, and the mode of principiating by the image, because the image does not have an absolute understanding, but a relative one: and therefore from the image the exemplar is understood, but the principle is not understood: so

that both may be understood in the Father, eternity is expressed in the Father, and the exemplar is co-understood in the image.

To the other, it must be said that the species which is appropriated to the Son (as Augustine says) is the same as beauty: and according to reason the convenience is only in the Son: and this because of the reason of his emanation which is generation: because he receives the species and form of the Father, as the form of nature and substance. But the Holy Spirit receives the essence proceeding as a gift, which by its reason does not say form, and species of that from which it proceeds: and therefore although that which is species is in the three, yet the reason of species and beauty says more access and convenience to the proper of the Son, than of any of the others. To the other, the solution is evident from what has been said.

To what is objected concerning the second definition, it must be said that in statues there is not a perfect representation, because there is not a proportionate quantity: here, however, the image is defined as fulfilling and perfectly representing that of which it is the image.

To the other, it must be said that it is not understood here of the indiscretion of the person, but rather of the indiscretion of convenience in that in which there is an image: for if in that convenience it were discerned, then it would be incongruent, and it would not be an image.

To the other, it must be said that the image says quality concerning the said quantity: and therefore it is rather called likeness than equality, so that by reason of that which is quantity, it equals: and by reason of that which it places concerning quantity, it assimilates.

To what is further inquired, Why species is attributed to the Son or to the image, it has already been solved in the prehabited.

Articulus 7 — Why Use Is Attributed To The Gift Or To The Holy Spirit

Why is use attributed to the gift or to the Holy Spirit?

Thirdly, it is asked, Why is use attributed to the gift?

1. For use is that which is assumed into the faculty of the will, to refer to another: but the gift or gift of the Holy Spirit is not referred to another, therefore it seems that use does not belong to it. If you say that it belongs to it by effect: because it makes good use of the other gifts: this is nothing: for when what is appropriated to the Father and the Son belongs to them from eternity, what is appropriated to the Holy Spirit will not correspond directly, unless it also belongs from eternity.
2. Furthermore, in the Letter Augustine says that the love of the Father and the Son, or delight, or happiness, or beatitude, is called use by Hilary: but these belong from eternity: therefore also use.

Solution. It is easy to solve here: because to use has been defined in two ways above, namely to use of the way, and to use of the homeland. For to use of the way is that which has come into use, to refer to another by which it is to be enjoyed. But to use of the homeland is what falls into the definition of enjoying, as Augustine said above, that to enjoy is to use with joy,

not yet of hope, but already of the thing: and according to this the Father and the Son use themselves: and use in reason approaches love and delight which is the Holy Spirit: because such use is made only by love and delight.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 8 — Whether The Son Is Rightly Called The Father's Art

Whether the Son is rightly called the art of the Father?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said, there, at the end of chapter C, "A certain art of the almighty and wise God full of all reasons of living things," etc.

1. For whatever someone knows, he knows by his art: if therefore the Son is the art of the Father, the Father knows by the Son.
2. Likewise, in the text it says: "He knows"; therefore the Father is wise by the Son whom God begot all things which He Himself made through that art, as it seems.

Solution. These reasons would conclude well if art and intellect and wisdom were properly said of the Son, and not appropriately. Hence it is true that the Father knows all things in His art and in His intellect: yet it does not follow that He knows by the Son, because there is one art of the three, and one intellect of the three, just as there is one essence of the three: but intellect and art and wisdom signify a relation and approach to the Son, according to which He is the Word, more than to the Father or the Holy Spirit: and therefore it is more appropriated to the Son than to the others.

Articulus 9 — Why Unity Is Attributed To The Father

Why is unity attributed to the Father?

Then it is inquired about what is said in the third part, there, G, Mlud also needs to be known, that of the same, etc.

And three things are inquired: the first of which is, Why is unity attributed to the Father? The second, Why is equality attributed to the Son? The third, Why is the connection of equality and unity attributed to the Holy Spirit?

To the first, it proceeds thus: Dionysius suggests in the book On the Divine Names 2, that one is said in six ways. For he says thus about one: One is the cause of all things in an inescapable manner: for nothing of existing things is not participating in one. And by this, he suggests the one which is the principle of beings, and it is converted with being, according to which we say that one and being are principles transcending every genus. And he adds again about unity, saying: Every number participates in unity: and by this, he seems to suggest the unity which is the principle of number, because unity is potentially every number. Then in order, he sets forth four other modes, saying thus: For there is no multitude not participating in one: but those things which are many in parts are one in whole: and those which are many in accidents are one in subject: and those which are many in number and powers are one in

species: and those which are many in species are one in genus. Therefore, in these six ways, one is said: so that one is always said in some way as form. He sets forth another seventh mode of one which is according to efficient cause, saying thus: Those which are many in processes are one in principle. Again, he sets forth another, namely the eighth mode according to the universal cause of all, saying thus: There is not that which is the cause of all one of many one: but before every one and multitude, determining. Therefore, to these modes, the modes of one are reduced: so that six are taken from form, and two from efficient cause in general or universal, which is the first cause. However, it is evident that unity does not pertain to God except in the last mode. Since therefore that mode pertains equally to the three persons, it does not say specially appropriated to the Father.

Furthermore, it is further inquired about the division of Dionysius, Why does he not set forth one according to matter, as he sets forth according to efficient and form?

Likewise, the efficient does not cause one, nor many in the thing: because it is outside the thing: therefore it seems that nothing is said one according to the efficient.

Likewise, the Philosopher sets forth one perfect: and this is not touched here.

Likewise, one is set forth per accidens in three ways, namely accident and subject: or two accidents in the subject, as grammatical and white in Socrates are one: or two accidents in a third accident, as musical and white in the coming are one: and this is not touched here.

Solution. It must be said that about one and unity, the principal intention is not here:

but as much as suffices here for understanding why unity is attributed to the Father, it must be noted that unity of itself has three things, when properly taken, namely indivisibility, and privation, and the notion of principle. For unity is both indivisible, and is first, and is the principle of number: and in these three, the notions of the Father are akin to it: because division is twofold, namely in itself, and to go out from another by division: in itself, as quantity is divided: to go out from another by division, as the caused is divided from the cause: and according to the notion of approximating to the Father, it does not pertain to be divided in itself, nor to any person: but in some way, the Son and the Holy Spirit go out from the Father, not by division, but by distinction. However, the Father is not from another: and therefore by this that he is not from a principle, he places the suitability to the notion of one.

Likewise, unity is first: and the first is before which nothing is: and therefore it is attributed to the Father by reason of innascibility.

Likewise, unity is the principle making number from its substance repeated: and by this, it suits the Father by reason of the authority of generating and spirating, who from his substance not repeated, but remaining the same, produces the Son and the Holy Spirit: and by this, it is clear that according to the second mode, unity is taken which is appropriated to the Father. It can also be taken according to the first mode: because the principle is not from the principle, in which all things are united which go out from it: as is the Father, as is proved in the note which is placed here, and begins:

If anyone the unbegotten, etc.

And by this, the solution of all things objected about this that unity should not be attributed to the Father is clear.

To that which is inquired about the division of Dionysius, it must be said that it is the best: because he makes a special treatise in the same chapter about the perfect: however, it can be reduced to one in the third mode said, which is one in whole: because the Philosopher says,

I say the whole and perfect the same. However, every one per accidens is reduced to

one in subject, for there is no accident to accident except in subject: and although materially this can vary in many ways, nevertheless all are reduced to one in subject. Similarly, one in continuity is reduced to one in whole: because both of those have multitude in the potentiality of division of parts.

But what is objected about causes, it must be said that although the thing is not one, or many from the efficient cause: I say nevertheless, that the first multitude is caused by the distinction of the efficient cause and effect: and therefore also in some things, number cannot be found except by the distinction of cause and caused, as in intelligences according to those who posit intelligences as separate substances, and one under another according to the orders of the movers of spheres. Or it may be said that there is an efficient cause as efficient only, and there is an efficient cause with the notion of exemplar: and that second is sometimes in which those things which are of one exemplar are united: but this is not the intention of Dionysius, but the first: because the principal unity according to him is less than the unity of genus.

If however it is inquired, According to what is division taken? It can be said that one is said simply, and according to something: and if it is said according to something, then it will be one by that which is outside one: and this is the efficient cause in general, or universal: and thus two modes are taken, namely the eighth, and the seventh. If however it is said simply one: either per se, or per accidens. If per accidens: then it is the fourth mode. If however it is said per se: either from the form which gives being, or from the form which is unity itself. And if from the form which is unity itself according to which it is denominatively predicated of number, thus it is the second mode. If however from the form which gives being: either it is taken as principle, or as determining and distinguishing in this being or that. If in the first mode: then it is one converted with being: and thus it is the first mode. If in the second mode: either it gives being to nature: and thus it is the third mode.

because in that the form of the whole is compared to the material parts, to which being is given according to nature by the form itself. Or as it gives being of reason: and this is either the whole being, and thus it is one in species: or it is as part of being, and thus it is one in genus.

But if it is asked, Why does Dionysius, when he touches upon one in species, say that there are many in God in number or in power? For a multitude whose unity is species is not different in power only, but in number, as it seems: which is also evident through the specific definition which Porphyry gives, that species is what is predicated of many differing in number alone. It must be said that it is more simply and absolutely caused by the division of

matter, as we said above: but the multitude in separate substances and Angels is by the number of what is, and the number of that is known by the distinction of powers. Therefore, since the supercelestial essences are divided into three, namely into substance, power, and operation, we know the number through operation and power in a different proportion of power relating to substance in this and that Angel: and therefore he posits the multitude of power with the material multitude. Whether, however, Angels differ in species or not, is another question.

To that which is objected concerning the material and final cause, it must be said that the final is consequent to the perfect thing: and therefore one is not taken from it. But in the material, one and many are in potency. Therefore, since one follows being, it follows the form as giving being, and the efficient as making being.

Articulus 10 — Why Equality Is Attributed To The Son, And Also Likeness

Why is equality attributed to the Son, and also likeness?

Secondly, it is asked,
1. Why is equality attributed to the Son, when it has been determined above that it belongs equally to the three?

1. Likewise, if I am equal to you, it follows well that you are also equal to me: therefore, by a similar reasoning, the Son is equal to the Father, and the Father is equal to the Son.
2. Perhaps you will say, as is commonly said, that the notion of equality begins in the second, and not in the first: because every proportion and comparison presupposes that to which it is proportion and comparison: and therefore, since the Father is not from another, the notion of equality does not extend to the proper notion of the Father. On the contrary, because according to this, equality should also be appropriated to the Holy Spirit, as to the Son.
3. Furthermore, you seem to say something false: for in geometry you often make demonstrations supposing that the same angle is equal to itself: therefore equality seems to be in one.
4. Furthermore, since likeness also begins in the second, presupposing that to which it is similar, why is likeness not appropriated to the Son as equality is?

Solution. It must be said that equality is attributed to the Son by reason of the image, to whose notion the proximate reason of equality approaches: for it follows, if it is an image, that it is equal, and it is not converted.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that common equality has been determined above, by reason of that in which equality is: and this is the indifferent essence, and thus it is attributed equally to the three. However, if the reason of the name is considered, it is more closely related to the image than to the other.

To the other, it must be said that this follows by reason of that in which equality is, which is in me and in you: but nevertheless the reason of equality begins in that in which equality is made, not in that in which there is first so much quantity; and therefore, since the Son has indifferent virtual quantity from the Father, but the Father is not from another, equality is more closely related to the Son than to the Father.

To the other, it must be said that the solution is good. To that which is objected against, it must be said that the Holy Spirit is indeed equal, but here it does not have the reason of equality by reason of emanation: because by the name of gift it is not necessarily signified something equal to the giver, as by the name of image and son it is signified equal by nature.

To the other, it must be said that equality does not happen to one angle as one, but rather as it is referred to different ones to which it is understood to be added or subtracted: and by reason of those different ones it is said to be equally added or subtracted.

To the last, it must be said that likeness says agreement in a diminished way. For however much it agrees with another, it will be similar: but it will not be equal unless it agrees in so much quantity of power: and consequently it must agree in the whole essence.

Articulus 11 — Whether To The Holy Spirit Ought To Be Attributed The Concord Or Connection Of Unity And Equality

Whether to the Holy Spirit ought to be attributed the concord or connection of unity and equality?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is attributed to the Holy Spirit, the concord or connection of equality and unity. For a nexus is among the connected: but the Holy Spirit according to the order of nature is from the Father and the Son: and therefore in naming it is expressed.

Solution. As was evident above, the Holy Spirit is the nexus proceeding from the Father and the Son, through this that it is the love of both, that is, from both: for love does not proceed only from the lover, but also unites the lover with the beloved: and by the grace of that union it is called a nexus by Augustine.

To the objection on the contrary, it must be said that it is a nexus as if by a force binding, and that can be over the connected, and it is among those which it connects as a medium: but the nexus by which the Holy Spirit is called a nexus, not by force but by the sweetness which emanates from the lovers, sweetly binds: and therefore by the order of nature it is from both of the connected: and in the naming of persons by the Church it is expressed after both.

Articulus 12 — Whether The Father And The Son Can Be Called One

Whether the Father and the Son can be said to be one?

Whether the Father and the Son can be said to be one?

Then it is inquired concerning what is said in the Text, there, I, Me it ought to be said, that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are rightly said to be one, etc.

For it seems that they ought to be called one absolutely: because

1. One is one essential, since every one is from form: therefore the Father and the Son are one, just as one nature.
2. Likewise, when I say, one God, if one denotes distinction, as the Master says, then it would draw this term, God, to stand for the person: and then the expression would be false for each person: therefore it seems that the Father and the Son are not one God.
3. Likewise, this white and this musical in Socrates differ more than the Father and the Son. The reason. For they differ by whiteness and music, which are absolute beings: although they agree in the subject. However, the Father and the Son are not distinguished by something absolute: therefore since I can say, this white and this musical with Socrates pointed out, is one, so that one is substantivized, it seems that much more I can say, the Father and the Son are one: and this is denied in the Text.

Solution. It must be said that it cannot be said, the Father and the Son are one: and the reason often stated is, because one in the masculine signifies a formed being, which pertains to the notion of person: but in the neuter an unformed being, which pertains to essence: and therefore neither adjectively nor substantively can it be said. The Father and the Son are one: and through this the solution to the first and second is clear.

To the other it must be said that distinction is signified in two ways, namely as conceived, and as exercised: as the Sophists say concerning negation, when it is said I deny, thus, negation is signified as conceived, which does not have the act of negation: and therefore the proposition in which it is placed is affirmative: as when it is said, I deny the world to have been from eternity. However, negation is signified as exercised, which has the act of negation, and therefore makes the speech negative, which is signified when it is said, I am not a donkey, no one is a lion, no man is a stone, and the like. Similarly, in divine matters certain names signify distinction implicitly, like numerical terms: but some as conceived, like distinct, related, and the like: but some as exercised: as when it is said generating, or generated, and the like. And those alone draw this term, God, and certain others signifying substance to stand for the person: and therefore we cannot say, the Father is another God than the Son, or a distinct God from the Son, but one God with the Son, and God generating God the Son: for since other and distinct signify only the concept of distinction, they place that concept around the form signified in this name, God: and therefore the expression is falsified.

Articulus 13 — Whether Paul And Apollos, And The One Who Plants And The One Who Waters, Can Be Called One

Whether Paul and Apollos, and he who plants and he who waters, can be said to be one?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said there, in the middle of chapter I, Paul and Apollos, who both were men, and thought the same, etc.

1. For it does not seem sufficient for them to be called one, because they are men, and one subjects: because such unity simply leaves plurality: therefore they are not simply called one.

Likewise, if you say that they are united in the indivisible spirit: this is nothing: because this makes one Spirit, as it says in the Letter, and it is not absolutely one. But here it is said simply, that he who plants and he who waters are one.

1. Furthermore, it seems to be a convenience even in the pleasing of evil: can we say from such pleasing that they are one? It is evident that not: therefore neither here are Paul and Apollos one.
2. Likewise, sometimes the good disagree among themselves, and each is moved well and meritoriously: therefore it seems that they cannot be said to be one from consensus.

Solution. It must be said that Paul and Apollos are said to be one in nature, nature taken in a certain way, and not simply. For there is a nature from which the first sprouting sprouts, and thus faith in the first founders of the Church was in the reason of nature: and it is still in those preaching the faith, as such a nature: and in that nature Paul and Apollos were united: and this understanding is taken from the Gloss there: because it wishes that they were one in nature in planting and watering: and I well concede that that solution is nothing, which says those are one which are united in the indivisible first by consensus and love: for they are not one unless something is added, namely one, like one spirit, or one heart, and one soul, and the like.

To the question, however, whether those consenting in something can be said to be one, or something one, like spirit, or heart, and the like? It must be said that they cannot. For their consensus is in that which does not unite in something, but rather is divided according to what is held by them.

Furthermore, it must be said that the Saints can well dissent in what is willed, but in the form and end of willing they do not dissent: because each wills what he wills out of charity, and for God, even if they sometimes will different things, just as the Angels in heaven.

Articulus 14 — Whether, Given Two Unbegottens, It Would Follow That There Are Two Gods; And, Whether The Son Is The Head Of All, And The Head Of Christ Is God; And, Whether All Creatures Are Referred To God

Whether, with two unbegotten posited, it would follow that there are two Gods? And, whether the Son is the head of all, and the head of Christ is God? And, whether all creatures are referred to God?

Then it is asked about the notes placed here by Hilary: and first about this: "If anyone unbegotten," etc.

For this is introduced for the purpose that through it is proven that it properly belongs to the unbegotten to be one.

1. But what he says, that with two unbegotten posited, it follows that there are two gods, seems not to follow: because relations do not distinguish essence, but only persons: but when two gods are said, this would be through the division of essence.
2. Likewise, unbegottenness is a negation rather than an affirmation, as was held above: therefore from the multitude of that, a multitude of gods does not follow.

Moreover, it is asked about what is said in this same note, that the head of all is the Son, and the head of Christ is God?

1. For when it is said that the head of all is the Son, it is understood as the head through conformity of nature, or through deity. If in the first way: then the Son is not the head of all.
2. Furthermore, then the head would be taken equivocally in the following word: because through humanity Christ is the head of all men, or at least in humanity: and in this way, his head is not God the Father. But if it is understood through deity, in this way the Father does not seem to be the head of the Son: because he is not greater than him: but the head implies the notion of height and degree. If you say that it does not imply degree, but principle. Against this is what is held in the Letter at the end of the same note, where it says that to one God all things are referred by this degree and this confession.

Moreover, it is still asked about what is said in the same note: For thus to one unbegotten, the beginning of all through the Son we refer all things.

For it seems that the immediate relation of the creature is to two, namely the Son and the Holy Spirit: because both were sent to bring back the rational creature, and thus the immediate relation of two is to one: therefore the order of nature is not preserved: because in no order are two equally referred to one: because it would happen that those two would not have order in themselves: and this cannot be in anything in which the order of nature is posited.

Solution. It must be said that Hilary spoke subtly and well here. For as we said above, in every order of nature it is necessary to posit the principle of that order, from which others, and itself not from another, and from which another which is from another, and from which none: because otherwise the order of nature would not stand, and there would be disorder: and therefore if two unbegotten were posited, there would be two who are not from another from whom others. Since therefore they would not be distinguished in properties, since each would be a principle not from a principle, it would be necessary that they differ by essence, and thus there would be two gods: and this is the intention of Hilary.

Therefore, it must be said to the first, that notions do not divide: but the order of nature would require this, as has already been shown. Through this also the solution to the following is clear,

But what is further asked, it must be said that the head is taken according to deity in both cases, and does not imply degree in the Father with respect to the Son, but only principle: but it posits principle and degree with respect to nature: and this degree Hilary understands.

To what is further asked, it must be said in my judgment, that there is not an immediate relation of two to one according to the order of nature, and therefore it is clear that the Greeks err: whence the Spirit sent converts into himself and into the Son, and the Son into himself and into the Father: and there the relation to another ceases. But nevertheless one conversion is into three, according to what is first taken in the order of essences: and thus Hilary does not speak, but commonly according to what conversion is made both into the first essence and into the relation of persons to each other. For the person who is from another refers into it by the order of nature what it has from it.

Another note of Hilary begins below, and that one perhaps seems expressly, etc.: it should fall at the beginning of this distinction in which it is treated of the similar and equal. But the intention of Hilary is to speak against the Sabellian heretics, who are also called Patripassians, because they say that the Father suffered in the Son: and he says that Sindeus first said that the three persons were three by substance, and by consonance one: and therefore the Arians said three substances, and not to be one being except in the consonance of will: and he says that this was not the intention of the Fathers to assert heresy, but to exclude the error of Sabellius, who eludes the number of notions, that is, falsifies the number of persons, saying the same in substance and person to be the Father when he willed, and when he willed the Son, and when he willed the Holy Spirit. Whence they intended that substance be taken from the act of substance for subsistence and person: and consonance would not say only conformity of wills, but unity of essence and connection, which is the Holy Spirit: and therefore consonance which imports both was more conveniently said than unity of essence, which only imported the other.

But in other things, the Letter is manifest by itself.

DISTINCTIO XXXII

Divisio Textus

Here a question arises derived from the aforementioned, etc. Having dealt in the preceding treatise with the properties, here it is discussed the comparison of the persons to each other according to those properties, and the comparison of the properties to the persons and the essence. And therefore it is divided into two parts: in the first of which the comparison of the persons to each other according to those properties is shown. In the second, however, it is asked how the properties relate to the persons and to the essence: and this begins in the following distinction XXXIII, there, A, After the aforementioned, it is considered internally, etc.

However, this distinction is divided into four parts: because in the pre-discussed it was said that the Spirit is the connection of the Father and the Son, therefore it is asked here in the first part, Whether the Father and the Son love each other with the Holy Spirit, or through the Spirit.

However, because this is conceded, it seems by similarity to be conceded that the Father is wise with the begotten wisdom: and therefore in the second part it is asked about this, there, C, Furthermore, it must be diligently investigated, etc. However, because this is not conceded, therefore in the third it is asked, Whether there is only one wisdom in the divine or several? there, F,

After these things it is usually asked by some, In the fourth, however, it returns to the first question, showing it to be insoluble, there, H,

Furthermore, it must be diligently noted, etc.

From these the sentence is clear.

Articulus 1 — Whether These Are True, The Father Loves The Son With The Holy Spirit, And The Father And The Son Love Themselves With The Holy Spirit

Whether these are true, the Father loves the Son with the Holy Spirit, and the Father and the Son love each other with the Holy Spirit?

However, a question arises concerning this expression: the Father loves the Son with the Holy Spirit, or the Father and the Son love each other with the Holy Spirit: which, although it has been disputed above, nevertheless, due to the diversity of opinions, must be touched upon here differently than above.

However, it seems to be true: because, 1. In a certain letter to blessed Bernard, Hugh of Saint Victor says thus:

If the Holy Spirit were called love, then by a similar reasoning (just as also of your heart, just as the Holy Spirit is called the love of the Father and the Son, who, I ask, could deny that you love with the Holy Spirit, that is, with your love? the same intention) the Father and the Son love each other with the Holy Spirit, who is their love.

1. Likewise, in the same place: If you rightly say to love with the love that proceeds from you, why should the Father and the Son not rightly be said to love with the love that proceeds from them? The Son loves with the Holy Spirit. Hence Master Hugh adds, in the same place: And it seems he says this because the question is solved, which they think insoluble, which they say and write is insoluble.
2. Likewise, in the same place: If the Holy Spirit is the love of both, why is it not said that the Father loves with the Holy Spirit, that is, with his love? why is it not rightly said that the Son loves with the Holy Spirit, that is, with his love?
3. Likewise, in the same place: The human mind is not love, but love proceeds from it: and therefore it does not love itself, but with the love that proceeds from itself. But the

Father is love, and the Holy Spirit is his love: and therefore the Father loves with himself, and loves with the Holy Spirit: he loves with his own love, he loves with his love.

4. To this there are also the authorities of Augustine here, and above, in distinction X, introduced, and the authorities of Jerome, which lie above in the letter.
5. This also seems by reason: because with every love someone loves, and something is loved: but the Holy Spirit is most truly love: therefore with it someone loves, and something is loved: but it is not love, except of the Father and the Son: therefore with the Holy Spirit the Father and the Son love.
6. Likewise, as Master Hugh says, why is it feared to concede this: the Father and the Son love each other with the Holy Spirit? If because of what follows, that they are with the Holy Spirit: this does not follow: because neither in lower things, nor in any nature, does the lover receive being, or love from the very love by which he loves: but rather by loving, love proceeds from him, and being is received from the lover: therefore it seems, that it ought most properly to be conceded.

And if you say, that it is feared because of the similar: because it follows, that he would be wise with begotten wisdom: this is nothing: because it is evident, that wisdom according to the mode of understanding does not proceed from the wise, but into the wise from the thing about which there is wisdom: but all love proceeds from the lover, as was also shown above: therefore fear is feared where there is no fear, as it seems.

1. Likewise, the Holy Spirit is love and affection not only properly, as Augustine says, but also appropriately. Let us take therefore according to which he is charity or love properly: I ask, if this charity is perfect, or not? It is evident, that it is: therefore it elicits the most perfect act of loving: not unless in him whose charity it is: therefore the Holy Spirit in the Father and the Son elicits the act of affection: just as therefore you love with the affection of virtue, so it seems, that the Father and the Son love with the affection which is the Holy Spirit.

If perhaps you say, that there is a double charity in the divine, namely essential, and personal. Essential makes to love in the Father and the Son, but personal does not. Against: Personal is not more imperfect than essential: since therefore the perfection of affection is in this that it elicits an act, personal can elicit that act, just as essential, as it seems.

1. Likewise, In the image as knowledge is distinguished from the mind, so love from both: and yet I can say, the mind knows with the knowledge it generates, and loves with the love that proceeds from it: therefore it seems that similarly it ought to be conceded in the divine.
2. Likewise, the Father in his personal word says the Son, and says all things, as Anselm says: therefore it seems, that just as with the word he says all things, so it can be conceded, the Father and the Son love with the Holy Spirit.

If perhaps you say, that when it is said, the Father says all things with his word, the word connotes an effect in the creature, by reason of which it can be the principle of saying: but when it is said, the Father loves, nothing is connoted: and therefore it cannot be added with the Holy Spirit, because authority and the reason of the principle would be noted with respect to itself. Against: According to this, this will be true, the Father and the Son love us with the Holy Spirit: and since that loving is being, just as that by which they love each other, it seems the same inconvenience follows from that and from this: therefore it seems, that properly and from eternity it is true, the Father and the Son love each other with the Holy Spirit.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: If for this reason it is said, that it is true, there are many reasons in opposition, one of which is in the letter, namely that

1. To love is to be: if therefore he loves with the Holy Spirit, he is, or they are with the Holy Spirit: and this is absurd.
2. Likewise, To love is to will the good, and one is the will of three, and one good of three: therefore one affection of three: but that is not from the Holy Spirit: therefore it cannot be said, that they love each other with the Holy Spirit.
3. Likewise, Goodness is attributed to the Holy Spirit: therefore since the Father and the Son are not good with the goodness of the Holy Spirit, it seems that similarly they do not love with the affection which is the Holy Spirit.
4. Likewise, In no other notion is one person denominated from the property of another: but when it is said, the Father and the Son love, etc., the love determines the Father and the Son, since it is the notion of the Holy Spirit: therefore it seems, that falsely: it is necessary therefore, that it stands essentially the love.

Solution. It must be said, that here there are many opinions, as is gathered from the writings of the Doctors. There are some who say all such expressions are false, and retracted in their similar. Hence just as the Father is not wise with the wisdom he begot, so he does not love with the affection that proceeds from him. The second say, that it is true, but not proper, and they reduce it to propriety: the Father and the Son love, etc., that is, with the affection which is essentially said, but is appropriable to the Holy Spirit. Hence the ablative, with the Holy Spirit, according to them stands there as proper, by reason of which appropriation is made just as it is improper to say, the Father knows with the Son, because he knows with the knowledge which is appropriable to the Son.

Against these two opinions it is objected thus, that not only Augustine, but also other Authors not only posit this that the Father and the Son love each other with the Holy Spirit, but also many Philosophers prove: and Augustine introduces a reason which is held here in the letter, and above.

Furthermore, If according to appropriation it were fitting only to the Holy Spirit the affection by which the Father and the Son love each other, then it should not be removed from the Father and the Son: but it says here, that not otherwise and similarly, that one of the two is the affection by which each is joined: therefore because these opinions preserve unity with

their own gift, as in the bond of peace: they directly contradict the words of the Saints, therefore more and more learned do not hold these opinions.

However, there are third who follow Simon of Tournai, who say that it is true and proper: but when it is said, the Father and the Son love each other with the Holy Spirit, the ablative is constructed in the designation of a sign, so that the sense is, the Father and the Son love each other: and the sign of this is, that one Spirit proceeds from them commonly. Against these, however, it is again objected: When it is said, these two friends love each other with the love that proceeds from them, the ablative is constructed formally, and in the relation of a formal cause: therefore similarly here when it is said, the Father and the Son love each other with the Holy Spirit, or with the love which is the Holy Spirit, it is constructed in the relation as if of a formal cause.

To this, however, they say, that it is not similar in lower things and in the divine: because in created love according to the intellect there are two things, namely that love is, and that it is the form of the will not existing by itself. As to the first, love proceeds into the beloved, and in this respect the similarity holds. As to the second, it has the relation of form to the lover, and in this respect it does not have similarity, because the Holy Spirit does not inform the Father and the Son: but is a person in itself and according to itself one and distinct. Thus they solve the objection made above, namely that with every love someone loves and something is loved: and if the Holy Spirit is love, that the Father and the Son love with the Holy Spirit. For they say, that it is understood of love which is the form of the lover, and love proceeding, but not of love distinct personally from the lover: hence they say, that with the Holy Spirit the Father loves nothing formally. Thus they also solve to the other, namely that if charity is perfect, it elicits the act of loving in him whose charity or affection it is said to be. For they say, that this is true of charity which is perfect as a form, not of that which is perfect as a person, for with this the Father and the Son do not love, except as a sign of affection, and not formally and thus therefore it is clear how the opinion of Tournai is preserved.

But the fourth opinion is of Auxerre, and concedes all those objections, saying that the ablative is constructed in the relation of a quasi-formal cause. And against that opinion it is objected thus:

1. Everything that is as a form, is resting in that of which it is the form or quasi-form, and does not have being distinct by itself: therefore if the Holy Spirit to the Father and the Son loving each other is as a form, he is resting or quasi-resting in the Father and the Son, and does not have being distinct by itself: but this is false and heretical, because the Holy Spirit is a distinct person existing by itself.
2. Likewise, If it is as a form, then it is as a perfection of the loving Father and the loving Son: therefore the act of loving the Father and the Son have from the Holy Spirit: just as the act following the form, is had from the form of which it is that act: and this again is impossible, since the Father and the Son have nothing from the Holy Spirit.
3. Likewise, Form according to reason is before the act of which it is the principle: therefore love is before loving with love: but this is false, because by loving proceeds the

love which is the Holy Spirit, just as by generating proceeds the Son: therefore it seems impossible, that it is constructed in the relation as if of a formal cause.

To this, however, preserving that opinion, it can be said, that there is an interior form, and an exterior form. Interior as that which confers being if it is substantial, or which confers well-being or in some way being if it is accidental. Exterior, however, is twofold, namely containing and terminating the thing, as place: and to which the thing is made as a paradigm or exemplar. And in none of those ways is that ablative said to be constructed in the relation as if of a formal cause, but it is as a form which has the act of form, and falls from the act of cause: for when I say, formal cause, I say two things, namely causality, and this has influence over that which is caused: and I say moreover form, and this has many acts, namely to give being, to give reason, to terminate, to unite: and in this last act the Holy Spirit is as a form of the Father and the Son, namely because he unites the Father and the Son, not effectively (for this is impossible), but as that in which they are united, and this is imported by the ablative.

And by this the solution to all those objections is clear: because those are taken from the part-

...the form according to which the act has others, and according to which it is a cause, and not from that act alone which is to unite in something.

But there are others who concede all these things and introduce a fifth opinion, namely that in truth when it is said, "The Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Spirit," the ablative is constructed in the reason of effect, and not of form or sign: and this seems to be the opinion of Master Hugh of Saint Victor in the letter on the procession of the Holy Spirit to Blessed Bernard, where he says thus: "That the Father is said to love by the Holy Spirit is not so understood, that the Holy Spirit exists as the author and origin of the love which the Father is, and loves what he loves by choice: but that the Father breathes forth that love by which the Son is loved, and the Holy Spirit is, and exists as its author and origin. Therefore, the Father is said to love by the Holy Spirit: not that he has love through him, but that he exhibits it: not that he receives love from him, but that he himself bestows it." This is what Hilary and Augustine say here, that the Father operates through the Son not because he receives anything from the Son, but because he is the author and origin of the power operating in the Son.

But it seems to be against this, that when it is said, "The Father operates through the Son," or "by the Son," an effect is noted in the creature into which the work passes: but when it is said, "The Father loves the Son by the Holy Spirit," or conversely, no effect is noted into which love passes, but rather it is signified to pass into the Son, or conversely into the Father, when it is said the Son loves the Father by the Holy Spirit. But to this those who hold this opinion say, that although in this expression, "The Father loves the Son by the Holy Spirit," the ablative is the matter of love in the expression, yet it is not so in reality, but rather the Son as well as the Father signifies the substance or person from which the act proceeds: and therefore in reality the Holy Spirit is the terminus of that act: because there is a double communicability of the superior nature, as was said above, namely by generation and spiration which is imported by love: and therefore just as when it is said, "The Father speaks by the Word," it is noted by the

Word not the reason of speaking on the part of speaking, but rather as if the effect of the act: so when it is said, "The Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Spirit," the matter of the word is noted as if the effect by the Holy Spirit.

But because this mode of speaking is most foreign, therefore I think, as was said above, that the ablative is constructed in the relation of the existing from the principle which has the act as if of form in uniting, and this opinion is then the sixth, and it encompasses two, namely the fourth and the fifth. And it is similar when it is said, "The Father speaks all things by the Word": for by the Word it is said to exist from the principle through the act of speaking, that is, as if the effect of the speaking: and moreover it says the reason of those things which are said in the Word, which nevertheless are not said in the Word, except by the speaking of the Word. Thus here it must be said, that the Father and the Son love each other, so that the "each other" is held reflexively: for then considering the Word insofar as it is notional, it is principled that which is supposed in the reality of the ablative, and it is as if the effect of the Father and the Son loving. But because the mode of procession must also be considered, because it proceeds as true love connecting, therefore then the accusative "each other" becomes the matter of the word into which it passes. And this is explained above, and all other things, namely what the word says, whether essence or notion: and if notion, which notion: and if it says spiration, why in its place this word "spirates" cannot be put, so that it would be said, "The Father and the Son spirate the Holy Spirit by the Holy Spirit": and many other things which were touched upon above.

According to this opinion, therefore, which more agrees with the Saints, it must be said to the first, that we well concede all those reasons which prove that which is undoubtedly posited by the Saints, and is proved and explained, as is clear from the words of Master Hugh. But nevertheless care must be taken not to draw too much from those reasons. For when it is objected, that by all that which is truly love, someone loves something, it must be said, that by that as a form resting in the subject, it is not necessary, but as an effect having the act as if of form, it well agrees in the divine.

To the other it must be said, that it must not be conceded, that the love which is the Spirit elicits the act of love in the Father: for that proposition does not hold, except in those whose nature is perfect to the act in itself, because they need a habit perfecting the act: but it is not so in the divine: and therefore personal love is produced by the notional act of love of the Father and the Son, and according to the reason of understanding it does not elicit that act, but emanates by that act.

To the other it must be said, that essential love also does not properly elicit in God, but is the same with God. But that personal love does not also elicit, is not from imperfection, but rather from perfection, because it is a distinct person, and not a form perfecting the operative power which is the will.

To the other it must be said, that it is not altogether similar concerning the image: because knowledge and love are accidents: and therefore the mind loves with love which is form and

accident. But in the divine it is not so: but each person is distinct, needing nothing, although all persons are one in essence.

To the other it must be said, that the Father speaks by the Word, as was said above: because it is consigned with the creature with respect to which the Word is the reason of speaking on the part of the thing said, although it does not have the reason of principle on the part of the speaker. Nevertheless it is not altogether similar in love, as was also touched upon by objecting to the contrary.

To that which is objected against, it must be said that although to love is to be, yet it is signified in another way, namely as a notional act: nor does the ablative relate to the verb in the same relation as it relates to the preceding nominative and the following accusative: because to the verb it relates as effect, or as if effect: but to the extremes of the verb which are signified by respect to the oblique, it relates in the relation of connection, as was said before: and therefore it does not follow, that they are from the Holy Spirit: but it would follow, if the ablative were constructed in the relation of efficient cause with the verb.

To the other it must be said, that there is one will: but notional love adds above the will a notional act of the person: whence this love is not the same as to will good to someone.

To the other it must be said, that goodness is attributed to the Holy Spirit: but it is not a notional act by which the Holy Spirit is signified as proceeding and connecting: and this is all clear above.

To the other it must be said, that this word, "loves," does not say denomination from the property of the Holy Spirit: but rather, since love can be signified in five ways, as was held above, it says here a notional act which is with respect to the Holy Spirit, and does not denominate the Father and the Son by the notion of the Holy Spirit, but rather it says common spiration, under another reason to be said.

Articulus 2 — Which Of These Are More Proper, The Father And The Son Love In The Holy Spirit, Or Through The Holy Spirit, Or With The Love Which Is The Holy Spirit, Or With The Love Which Proceeds From Him

Which of these are more properly, the Father and the Son love by the Holy Spirit, or through the Holy Spirit, or by the love which is the Holy Spirit, or by the love which proceeds from Him?

Which of these are more properly, the Father and the Son love by the Holy Spirit, or through the Holy Spirit, or by the love which is the Holy Spirit, or by the love which proceeds from Him?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said, there, A, If the Father or the Son is said to love through the Holy Spirit, etc.

For here it seems to concede that the Father and the Son love by the Holy Spirit, and through the Holy Spirit, and by the love which is the Holy Spirit, and by the love which proceeds from them. And it is asked, which of these are more and less properly?

Again, when it is said, the Father and the Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit, and it cannot be said, they are referred by the Holy Spirit, or they breathe by the Holy Spirit: it is asked, with which words the ablative alone is received, or the preposition with the case? For we say that the Father and the Son are united and connected by the Holy Spirit, and suchlike.

Again, since it is conceded by the Saints that the Father and the Son are connected and united by the Holy Spirit, and suchlike: it is asked, whether it should be conceded that the Holy Spirit connects and unites the Father and the Son? For this seems to be conceded from the conversion of passive into active.

To this, without prejudice, it can be said that that ablative when it is placed by itself has less impropriety than when it is placed with a preposition: because the preposition implies some mode of causality, since it has been sufficiently proven above that the ablative falls under the notion of causality: yet it is in no way conceded that the Father and the Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit: because the preposition denotes a cause as a quasi-efficient principle: but this is received and placed in the text, the Father and the Son love themselves through the Spirit, although it is less proper than this, the Father and the Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit: because the "through" when joined to the case, which is of a distinct or diverse supposit from the direct, which is placed in the same expression, as the Prepositivus says, denotes the notion of a principle in the matter of the case, as, the Father operates through the Son, and similarly this, They love through the Holy Spirit. But this is most proper, the Father and the Son love themselves in the Holy Spirit: because that preposition "in" denotes the union of connection, and the agreement of bond. This, however, is more proper, They love themselves by the love which is the Holy Spirit: because love more properly signifies the thing connecting, than the Holy Spirit: and therefore this, They love themselves by the proceeding love, is less proper, because the "proceeding" draws the love, so that it says to be from them, and not to be uniting.

To the other it must be said that the "they love" indeed says the same notion as "they breathe," but it says in another mode of signifying. However, "they are referred" says a relation to another: and therefore it does not receive the determination of the ablative, as "they love" does: and the full reason for this is sufficiently noted above.

To the other it must be said that all verbs denoting union in the principal mode of signifying, as "they love," "they connect," "they unite," "they delight," and suchlike, receive the determination of the ablative, which implies that union: but not others, as "they are referred," and "they are distinguished," and the reason for this is clear from what was said before.

To the other it must be said in my judgment that active are not to be conceded: because then causality would be carried in the subject of the active verb: but passive are conceded, and the action of that passion is not placed in the matter of the ablative simply, but in a certain way, namely through the act of uniting, as was said.

Articulus 3 — Whether The Father Is Wise With Begotten Wisdom, And Whether The Father Knows Himself In The Son Or In The Word

Whether the Father is wise with begotten wisdom? and, Whether the Father knows Himself in the Son or in the Word?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said in the second part, there, C, Furthermore it must be diligently investigated, etc.

For it seems that the Father is wise with begotten wisdom.

1. For above there was a proof of the coeternity of the Father and the Son through this word of the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 1:24, Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God. Augustine says, the Father was never without power, and without wisdom: therefore the Son is coeternal with the Father. From this it is taken that the Son is the wisdom of the Father: but every wise one is wise by his own wisdom: therefore the Father is wise with begotten wisdom, since the Son is begotten.

1. Likewise, above in the words of Augustine, where he proves the Trinity of persons, he says,

He saw that without wisdom he is not, and therefore he understood him to be a foolish heretic: to have wisdom, which is begotten from him. Therefore the Father is wise with begotten wisdom.

1. Likewise, immediately before this reading, in the words of Augustine where he says: This is one as a word through Therefore Perfect, to whom nothing is lacking: and a certain art of the omnipotent and wise God, full of all reasons of living and immutable things: and all are ONE in it, as it itself is one from one, with which one: there God knows all things which he made through it. Therefore the Father knows in the Son all things which he made: therefore he knows through the Son, and is wise with begotten wisdom, as it seems.
2. Likewise, Augustine in book XV of On the Trinity: Therefore God the Father knows all things in Himself, and knows also in His Word: but in Himself as Himself, in His Word however as that which is of all those things which are in Himself. They know each other, the Father and the Son: but the Father by begetting, the Son by being born. And all things which are in their essence, and in their knowledge, and in their wisdom, each of them sees simultaneously. The Father knows by begotten wisdom: and thus the proposition is held.

But against this the Master objects in the Letter.

Solution. It must be said that the Father is not wise with begotten wisdom, nor in begotten wisdom. For when it is said, the Father is wise with begotten wisdom, by those ablatives a relation of form to the wise Father is imported, and thus being is imported: because being wisdom and being essence are the same in the divine: and therefore that is false. Similarly,

when it is said, the Father is wise in begotten wisdom, so that the determination in begotten wisdom is referred to the participle wise, and not to the Father, then it is noted that he has the reason of his wisdom in the Son: and this again is not true: whence also that is false. However, when it is said, the Father knows all things in the Son: and when it is said, the Father knows all things in the Son, so that under the distribution the Father does not fall, but the Holy Spirit, and the Son, and the created, with respect to which the Son is the principle: it seems to me that it can be conceded: because something is known in something in two ways, namely as in the habit of knowables, which, I say, habit informs the wise: and thus it is not conceded. In another way, having knowledge of some principle according to every mode by which it can influence over those of which it is the principle, we say we know all things in that principle to which or of which it is the principle: and yet it does not follow that we receive anything from that principle. Let the true opinion of the Philosophers be supposed, who posit the movers of the spheres, and let the first mover influence over the mover of the sun's heaven: but the mover of the sun influences over all generated and corrupted things, and sufficiently: then it will be true that the first mover knows all things, which as in principle are in the mover of the sun in itself, and knows all created things also in the mover of the sun: and yet it receives nothing from it, but rather by knowing thus it confers: for every intelligence, as the Philosopher says, knows that which is within it, by that which is its cause, not by that which it receives something from it. Thus therefore we say the Father knows all things in the Son, of which the Son is a sufficient principle, by the fact that he begot him in the reason of such a principle. And this is the understanding of the three authorities lastly introduced. And this certain ancient Doctors of this city wished to say, saying that this word of Augustine, the Father knows all things in the Word, of which the Word is: is double, from the fact that this determination in the Word, determines the word knows, or knows, on the part of the knower, and thus it is false: or on the part of those of which there is knowledge, or science, which are the matter of the act of the word into which it passes, and thus it is true, because the Son is a sufficient principle of the known, not however a principle of the knowledge.

But if you ask, Whether it must be conceded that the Father knows Himself in the Son, or in the Word? For it seems that yes: because in that which is manifestative of something, that which is manifested in it is known: but the Word is manifestative of the speaker: therefore the Father speaking is known in the spoken Word: therefore it seems that the Father knows in the Son.

To this it must be said that I think it must not be conceded. For although Augustine says that the Father by generating the Son, spoke Himself another: yet it is commonly glossed that Himself another stands there for most similar to Himself: for the Son cannot be the reason that the Father knows, although he is the reason that he is known by someone, as he himself says: Father, I have manifested your name to men! And by this the objection is solved: because the Word does not manifest so as to give knowledge to the Father, but rather by receiving from him, it manifested to others. Therefore it must be considered in all such things, that with respect to those of which the Son is the principle, and a sufficient reason for knowing, such expressions are conceded, the Father knows all things in the Son, of which the Word is, and the like.

And note that some simply deny these expressions: and say they are retracted in a similar one to itself, when Augustine retracted this, the Father is wise with begotten wisdom. But presumption seems thus to impose silence on the words of the Saints.

To that therefore which is first objected, it must be said that Augustine speaks there of the wisdom which appropriately belongs to the Son: but this is unbegotten, or not begotten, and essential: for although in that which is wisdom, it does not conclude the Son to be, yet in that which is appropriated, it concludes that with the non-existence of the proper, there will not be something appropriated: therefore from the destruction of the consequent, with the appropriated posited, the proper will be posited.

By this also the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 4 — Whether The Father Is Wise With Begotten Wisdom, And Whether It Can Be Granted That The Father Is Wise In The Son Or Is Wise Through The Son, Just As It Is Granted That The Father Knows In The Son

Whether the Father is wise with begotten wisdom?
and, Whether it can be conceded that the Father
is wise by the Son, or is wise through the Son:
just as it is conceded, the Father knows in the Son?

Whether the Father is wise with begotten wisdom?
and, Whether it can be conceded that the Father
is wise by the Son, or is wise through the Son:
just as it is conceded, the Father knows in the Son?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said,
there, C, at the end: From these it is clear, that
the Father is not wise with begotten wisdom,
etc.

For this seems false: because
the construction of the formal cause is noted in
the ablative: and the Father has no cause.

Solution. This objection is worthless: because
by such a construction the mode of causality is not
noted, except in the mode
of understanding through the name, and not in reality.

But note, that this is a useful question,
Why according to Augustine, in every
construction as if formal, is being referred?
Because that construction speaks of the relation
of form to subject only: and since
form gives being in some way simply,
or in a certain respect, in divine matters it is always

taken as being simply, because every such mode of predicating is converted into substance: but in the construction which is of efficient cause it is not so, because that sometimes has relative predication.

But it is asked, Whether it can be conceded, the Father is wise by the Son, or is wise from the Son, or is wise through the Son; just as it is conceded, the Father knows in the Son?

To this it must be said, that it cannot: because the habit of construction is not similar, but rather the cause of knowledge is imported with respect to the Father: and since the Son is not the principle of any of those things which are in the Father, it must not be conceded.

Articulus 5 — Whether The Son Is Wise With Unbegotten Wisdom

Whether the Son is wise with unbegotten wisdom?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said:

After these things it is usually asked by some, etc.

For it seems that the Son is also wise with unbegotten wisdom:

1. For He is wise with essential wisdom: and essential wisdom is unbegotten wisdom: therefore He is wise with unbegotten wisdom.
2. Likewise, the Son is unbegotten essence: and to be is to be wise: therefore He is wise with unbegotten wisdom.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY!

Hilary says: He has nothing except what is born, therefore the Son does not have it: and the admiration of the honor of the begotten is in the honor of the begetter: unbegotten wisdom.

Likewise, Unbegotten is a property of the Father: therefore it does not pertain to the Son.

Solution. It must be said that although unbegotten is said in many ways: and in one way it pertains to essence, and to essential things: nevertheless, in the usage of the Saints it is taken for the property of the Father: and therefore we have above, that it does not pertain to the Holy Spirit, nor even to essence: and therefore it must not be conceded that the Son is wise with unbegotten wisdom. For as it has been held above, although wisdom is an essential name, nevertheless it can supposit a person from what is notionally adjoined to it: and therefore unbegotten wisdom is the Father, and begotten wisdom is the Son.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that wisdom by itself is essential: but with an adjunct it is essential drawn to supposit for a person.

To the other, the solution is clear in the same way by saying there.

Articulus 6 — Whether The Son Is Wise Of Himself, Or Through Himself

Whether the Son is wise by himself, or through himself?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said there: "The question is usually asked, Whether the Son is wise by himself, or through himself?" etc.

It seems that neither of these should be conceded: because all things which the Son has, he has from the Father, and through the Father: therefore not through himself.

Solution. It must be said that the distinction given in the Text is reasonable. For that which is through itself is opposed in two ways, as is gathered from two considerations of the third book of the Topics: for the Philosopher says that that which is through itself is more to be loved than that which is through another. And from this it is taken that through itself and through another are opposed. He also says the same, that that which is through itself is more to be loved than that which is through accident. And from this it is taken that through itself is opposed to that which is through accident: and according to this, this distinction proceeds, that the Son is wise through himself, according to which "through itself" is opposed to that which is through accident: but not wise through himself, according to which "through itself" is opposed to that which is through another as its principle. But in no way should it be conceded that the Son is wise from himself, or operates from himself: because "from himself" is not opposed to that which is through accident, but only to that which is from another.

Articulus 7 — Whether We Can Grant That The Son Operates Through The Father, And One Person Through Another, And Every Agent Short Of God Is Weak

Whether we can concede that the Son operates through the Father, and one person through another, and every agent besides God is infirm?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said:

Let him be infirm not acting from himself, unless he acts from God.

1. For from this it seems that everything which does not act from God as the same essence to itself is an infirm agent.
2. Furthermore, when it is said: the Father acts or operates through the Son, it is customary to say that the "through" denotes in the Son to exist from that principle by which it operates through him: and some call this subauthority. And the reason for this is asked.

Likewise, the three are equally immediately referred to the work: therefore it seems that no one operates through another.

1. Likewise, if it is a sufficient reason that the Father operates through the Son, because the Son is from him: then also by the same reason we can say that the Father and the Son operate through the Holy Spirit, because the Holy Spirit is from both: and this is not found.
2. Likewise, just as the preposition in inferiors sometimes denotes subauthority in the casual adjunct to it, as when it is said, the king operates through the bailiff: so conversely it sometimes denotes authority, as when it is said, the bailiff operates this through the king, because he cannot do it by himself: therefore it seems that in some sense also in divine matters we can concede that the Son operates through the Father: and this is not found.

Solution. It must be said that the Father operates through the Son, as Master Hugh of Saint Victor says, thus saying in a certain letter to Bernard: Without doubt what the Son acts, the Father acts, from whom he receives to act and to be able to act. But that he is said to operate through the Son is not so understood, as if the Son is the author and origin of the power which the Father is, and which he wills he operates: but that the Father is the origin of the power, which the Son is, and which operates for the good pleasure. Thus therefore the Father operates through the Son, because to him as to the principle is referred the power and work by which the Son operates.

Therefore it must be said to the first, that it is well conceded that every other agent besides God is an infirm agent, either because it needs an instrument and motion, as the movers of the heavens which the Philosophers posit, who cannot influence except through the body, and through its motion: or because they are also deficient in themselves, as the elements, and the elemented which are generated and corrupted acting in each other. But God remaining stable by his power acts all things: and therefore he alone is the perfect agent.

To the other it must be said, that the "through" denotes a cause moved by another cause, and especially in the genus of efficient cause, or formal, and not of material or final, as striking through a stick, and the like. The sun also acts through heat, and the universal through a more particular form: and therefore because the Son by appropriation is the power and exemplary wisdom of the made things, this preposition's relation in the work of the three is more fitting to him than to another.

To the other it must be said, that it is not said of the Holy Spirit: because although he has the operating power from the Father and the Son, it is not appropriated to him, but rather the end and the good which is the containment of the work in being, and good: and therefore the Father and the Son operate more in the Holy Spirit containing their work, than through the Holy Spirit.

To the other it must be said, that the preposition "through" never denotes authority in its casual, if it is different from the thing of the preceding nominative, unless improperly. Hence

when it is said, the bailiff acts through the king, it is resolved, that is, through the king's power which is in him. Hence the relation of the king to the work is not denoted there by this that he has from the bailiff, or by himself, but rather the conjunction of his power with the operating bailiff: and since such are improper, they are not extended into divine predications, and therefore this is not received, the Son operates through the Father.

Articulus 8 — Whether There Is Only One Wisdom Of The Father

Whether there is only one wisdom of the Father?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said there, F, After these things it is usually asked by some, etc.

For it seems that not: because.
1. By the same reason by which the Son is wise with begotten wisdom, likewise also the Holy Spirit is wise with proceeding wisdom, and thus there is unbegotten wisdom, and begotten wisdom, and proceeding wisdom, and essential wisdom.

1. Furthermore, Wisdom is said of wisdom: therefore it seems that distinction falls between wisdom and wisdom: and thus there are multiple wisdoms.

Solution. It must be said that, as the Master says in the Text, these objections are evident to all, and they do not hold in divine matters: because such names, wisdom, God, and certain others indeed signify the divine essence, but by the grace of the adjunct they suppose for the person: and therefore distinction falls there by the grace of the supposit, and not by the grace of the signified: and therefore just as it does not follow, God of God: therefore there are different or two gods: so it does not follow, wisdom of wisdom: therefore there are two or different wisdoms: but it follows: therefore in divine matters there are two or more who are one wisdom, and one God: and through this the solution to the second is clear.

To the first it must be said that the Spirit is wisdom: but it is not conceded that it is proceeding wisdom: because wisdom is not appropriable to love, but rather to the speaker and the word: just as in the image wisdom is referred to knowledge and mind, and not to will.

DISTINCTIO XXXIII

Divisio Textus

After the aforementioned things are considered internally and subtly, etc.

Here the Master compares the notions and persons to the essence in which they are. And it is divided into two parts: in the first of which the Master shows that the notions are in the persons and essence by identity. In the second, however, he shows that the persons are compared to the essence by the identity of essence, and this in the following distinction XXXIV, there, A, "To the aforementioned it is to be added," etc.

This distinction is divided into two parts: in the first of which the Master shows that the notions are the persons in which they are, and the notions are also the divine essence. In the second, he introduces the reasoning of certain heretics in opposition, and resolves it, there, D, "However, some deny this," etc.

In the first part, he does three things: the first of which is that he proves the properties to be in the persons, and to be the persons. Secondly, he shows the same from the nature of divine simplicity, there, B, "And when concerning simplicity," etc. Thirdly, he concludes from those that the properties are also the divine essence, there, C, "For that the property is also the divine nature," etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether It Is Lawful For The Properties To Be Signified By An Abstract Name, As Paternity

Whether it is permissible for properties to be signified by an abstract name, such as paternity?

However, the first question arises here, Whether it is permissible for properties to be signified by an abstract name, such as paternity, and the like?

However, it seems that it is so: because
1. What is signified in a general abstract manner, can also be signified in a specific manner: it is said, however, in the preface of the Trinity: And in the persons, property, since property is a name expressing its thing in the abstract: therefore, this is permissible in the specific.

by notions it happens, that it is said paternity, filiation, and the like.

1. Likewise, in divine things, properties are in the manner of accidents in lower things: but such are signified abstractly: therefore, also in divine things they can be signified abstractly.
2. Furthermore, some things agree with them according to which they are understood by themselves, as to distinguish, and to make relatives, and the like: therefore, in this manner without the hypostases in which they are, they can be signified: since therefore signified without hypostases, they cannot be signified except abstractly, it seems that it is permitted for us to speak of properties in an abstract manner.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. In lower things, that which is not predicated denominatively, but according to substance, does not have an abstract, as man, and animal, and rational, and the like: but that which is predicated denominatively only, as white, whiteness, and the like: but in divine things nothing is predicated according to denomination and accident:

therefore nothing is permitted there to be signified in an abstract manner.

1. Likewise, that which is signified in an abstract manner is said in a simpler manner than that which is taken concretely: but nothing in divine things is simpler one than another: therefore one ought not to be signified as abstract, and another as concrete.

2. Likewise, the abstract notes that there was composition in the concrete from which it is abstracted: but in divine things nothing is composed: therefore nothing is permitted to be abstracted.

Solution. It seems to be said, that according to the thing nothing is abstract in divine things. For a double necessity compels us to signify something in an abstract manner both in essential and notional things. In essential things, as when we say, essence, wisdom, deity, divinity, substance, and the like. In notional things, as when we say paternity, filiation, relation, property, and the like. One of those necessities is chiefly the mode of attributing: because when we say, the Father is referred to the Son, and is referred to the Holy Spirit: unless we were to say that relation is something, it would be necessary that the Father would relate to the Son and the Holy Spirit in the same way: and this is not true. Likewise, when it is said, hypostasis is distinguished, and property distinguishes, we attribute to hypostasis what we do not attribute to property: for this reason compels in some way to signify property, which is not signified as person: and this cannot be except by abstracting.

Another reason is the instance of heretics in disputation: because they compel us to discern in the intentions of names: and since our intellect is material, and cannot grasp the simple except by way of composition, as it is accustomed in lower things, it grasps in the same way in higher things, not indeed saying a composed thing, but discerning among those things which are the same thing, according to modes of attributing and supposing: because I would well concede this, that unless there were something in which our intellect, signifying one without the other, were founded, it would be empty and vain: but it is founded in diverse attributes, which are referred to hypostasis and property, as has been said.

I say therefore to the first, that in divine things the whole being is from the being of essence: and although there is no accident in divine things, nevertheless property in that which is in another, not being by itself, is signified as able to be understood without it: and therefore it is abstracted. But thus it is not in substantial things: because from those is substantial being: and therefore they cannot be abstracted as denominative: because with them abstracted, the subject would not remain.

To the other it must be said, that nothing there is simpler abstract than concrete: nor therefore is abstraction made, but rather that it is signified to have a different supposition from that from which it is abstracted: and this as to the mode of understanding, which in the thing places nothing except as much as has been said, namely supposing diversely with diverse adjuncts.

To the other it must be said, that composition is not noted to have been, but rather to be signifiable in another way: because in divine things, as has already been said, one is not separated from another as being of one nature from being of another nature, as accident from subject: but it is made as an indication of diverse attribution, namely that something is said of one, which is not said of another, and conversely.

Articulus 2 — Whether A Notion Is Something In The Person, And Whether It Is The Person Itself

Whether a notion is something in the person, and whether it is the person itself?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said there, in the middle of chapter A, How would they be, if they were not in them? and how would they be in them, if they were not the persons themselves? etc.

From this, indeed, two things seem to be held, namely, that a notion is something in the person, and that it is the person itself.

Against the first, however, it seems to be objected thus:

1. The property of relation is caused by motion: but in divine persons there is no motion: therefore in divine persons there is no relation.
2. Furthermore, In what manner of speaking is a property indicated to be in a person, or hypostasis? It is evident, that it is only as an accident in a subject, according to the reason of understanding.
3. BUT on the contrary:
   The subject according to the reason of understanding is before the accident or property: because it falls in its definition, as the Philosopher says in the seventh book of the first Philosophy: but it has been proven above, that a personal property according to the mode of understanding is before the hypostasis: therefore it is not in the person as a property in a subject.

Furthermore, it seems that it is in it as a form in a subject: because a form gives being: and similarly a personal property makes the person, as has been proven above. But on the contrary: A form is either substantial or accidental. Not substantial: because that is not in a subject as a subject, because a subject, as the Philosopher says, is a being complete in itself, an occasion for another to exist in it: but rather it is in matter as its act and perfection: thus, however, a property is not in a person. But if it is as an accidental form: then it will be according to the intellect after the hypostasis, and not before: but this has been refuted.

If for this reason it were said, as Prepositivus said, that a property is not in a person, but is the person. Against this seems to be what is said here in the Letter, that in persons there are properties, no one dares to deny, since authority openly proclaims:

And in persons property, and in essence unity.

Against the other part, namely that a property is the person, it is objected thus:

1. If a property is the person: then any property which is in a person, is predicated of that person: therefore, since common spiration is a certain relation, it is predicated of the person: therefore, common spiration is a person. Either therefore it is a person being from another, or not being from another. If in the first way: then it is not the Father, which is false. If in the second way: then it is not the Son, which again is false: therefore

it seems that some notion is a person: and the same reason applies to all: therefore no notion is a person, as it seems.

2. Likewise, In lower things the simplest are distinguished by themselves: therefore, since divine persons are most simple, it seems that they are distinguished by themselves: and from this it is concluded, that not only are notions not persons, but that notions are nothing at all.

3. And this Prepositivus conceded, and said that there were no notions except in the manner of speaking: as when it is said, I ask your clemency, that is, I ask you, the clement one: thus he said, let property be adored in persons, that is, the person who is properly the Father, or the Son, or the Holy Spirit. But against this are certain reasons already touched upon in part, and solved above: because from this it seems to follow, that since the Father is a simple person, and no property is in him, that he would relate in the same way to the Son and to the Holy Spirit: and it would be the same to say, the Father generates, and the Father spirates. But to this he said, that it is the same, but the connoted things differ: for he said, that although the Father signifies only the person, yet it connotes something, namely the existence of the Son: and similarly the giver. But because this position has been abolished, and it seems not to agree with the words of the Saints, therefore it does not seem to be consented to.

Therefore, the solution will be, that we say properties are in persons, and persons, as the Master here says: in persons, however, as diverse from them in the mode of understanding and attributing: but the persons themselves, as the same in reality existing with them, as also with the essence: because whatever is in God, God is.

To the first, therefore, it must be said, that it is otherwise with relations which are according to the mode of existing and the order of nature, and with those which are accidental: because the former in divine things are before the thing, as has been noted fully enough above, and they are not caused by motion and change except accidentally: because if change in lower things could be abstracted from the mode of existing by which one is from another, they would be caused by the mode of existing without motion: and therefore it happens that they are caused by motion. In divine things, therefore, where there is no motion, they are caused by the mode of existing alone, or rather they make by distinguishing the mode of existing, as has been held above, insofar as they are personal properties.

To the other it must be said, that the mode of speaking in, is reduced to that mode by which a property is in that of which it is a property, to which it confers distinct being: and therefore it is partly as a form, partly as a property, and partly as the same signified in another way: as a form, because it confers personal being: as a property, because it distinguishes: as the same signified in another way, because it is the person, and yet as the reason of its distinction from another person of the same nature: and therefore this mode of speaking in, cannot be perfectly reduced to one mode: because the comparison of earthly things to God, as Hilary says, is none: but from many it is necessary to gather that which is in one: and when many have been gathered, they will not yet perfectly represent.

And through this the solution to all that is objected concerning the first part is clear.

As to what is objected concerning the second part, it must be said that a property is the person: and this is because of the simplicity which requires this, that whatever is in the person, is the person itself: just as whatever is in God, God is, as the Master says in the Letter.

To what is objected against this, it must be said that common spiration is a person being from another, because it is the Son: and it is a person not being from another, because it is the Father: and this is not inconvenient.

But if from this someone were to object: therefore it is being from another, and not being from another: therefore affirmation and negation are verified of the same. It must be said according to the Doctors, that this is double, spiration is being from another, from the fact that the term being can be held adjectively, and as referred to its substantive to what I say spiration: and thus both are false, namely, spiration is being from another, and spiration is not being from another: and they do not differ by affirmation and negation, since both are affirmative: and it is signified in the affirmative, that spiration is proceeding from another, and this does not happen, as will be proven below: because although a property is a person, yet the person supposed is not supposed by the property. In the negative, however, spiration is signified as distinct by the property of innascibility: and this again does not agree: because a property distinguishes, and is not distinguished. But if the term being is substantive: then the affirmative is true, namely, spiration is being from another, that is, he who is from another, because he is the Son: and the negative is similarly true, spiration is not being from another, that is, he who is not from another, because he is the Father who is not from another: and they are not opposed by affirmation and negation, as is evident per se.

To the other it must be said, that although the simplest are distinct, nevertheless nothing prohibits there being reasons for distinguishing in them: just as in every simple except the first, simplicity is one thing, and the simple itself is another: and thus although divine persons are most simple, nevertheless nothing prohibits according to the mode of understanding and attributing to accept the reason of their distinction, and that is the notion, because the notion as distinguishing signified, is understood as the reason of the person rather than understood as some thing.

To what is further objected concerning the opinion of Prepositivus, and of certain others, it seems to be conceded. For against Augustine it is expressly, that the Father signifies only the hypostasis, but connotes the Son: just as creator signifies only the essence, but connotes the effect: because we have had above, that these names, Father and Son, do not signify only hypostases, but also properties.

Articulus 3 — Whether The Properties Are The Divine Essence

Whether properties are the divine essence?

Whether properties are the divine essence?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said, there, "For indeed the property is also the divine nature," etc.

And two things are asked here: of which the first is, Whether properties are the divine essence?

The second is, Whether essential adjectives, said in any way, are said of notions, or not?

To the first it is proceeded thus:
1. Whatever is in God, God is: but property is in God: therefore God is: therefore property is the divine essence.

1. Likewise, If it were not the divine essence, and yet in some way it were in the divine essence, then it would make a composition of diverse things: and this does not suit the most simple: therefore it must be, that it is the divine essence.
2. Likewise, Every mode of predicating by accident in divine things is changed into substantial, even in relation, as was held above: because although relation in that which is relation retains its proper mode of predicating, yet relation as an accident does not remain in divine things: therefore, since in comparison to essence and person property has no comparison except as an accident, from that part it takes substantial predication, and thus property will be substance.
3. Likewise, If property were not God, nor God were property by simple conversion: therefore it would be better, or worse than it: but not better, because nothing is better than God: nor worse, because nothing worse than God can be in Him.
4. Likewise, If it were not God, it would not be said to be adored as God: which is against the song of the Church, when it says: "And in the persons property, and in essence unity, and in majesty equality is adored." Therefore it remains, that properties are the divine essence.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
1. To distinguish and not to distinguish are contradictorily opposed: therefore they do not suit that which is entirely the same according to the thing: but one suits the notion, the other the essence: therefore essence and notion are not entirely the same according to the thing.

1. Likewise, If essence is property: either in that which is essence, or by another. If in that which is essence: therefore whatever suits property, suits also essence, which is false. If by another it is given: If you say, that in that which is person. On the contrary: In the following distinction it will be proved, that person is not other than essence.
2. Furthermore, According to this it would seem that person is more immediate to essence than property: and thus person according to intellect would be before property, which above is disproved.

Solution. It must be said without doubt, that property is the divine nature and essence, as the reasons first induced prove.

To that which is objected first on the contrary, it must be said that to distinguish and not to distinguish are opposed contradictorily according to mode, but not that they require a diverse thing, but a diverse mode of signifying suffices for it: and that mode is really signified, as when it is said, property distinguishes, essence is not distinguished in divine things, as often said above.

To the other it must be said, that essence is property, not inasmuch as essence, but inasmuch as it is most simple: and I well concede, that it is not to posit mediate and immediate in divine things, except according to the mode of understanding: and then according to that mode it is allowed that person is closer to essence than property, not however from this it happens, that essence is property, because it is person: but rather from this that it is most simple, as it says in the Letter.

To that which is objected, that if it suits by the grace of another, that it suits by accident, it must be said that it does not follow: because we do not say, that it suits by another, but rather by the same signified in another way: and such by another is in divine things said another by the mode of supposing and attributing, and not another according to the thing.

Divisio Textus

Then it is inquired concerning what is said there, "D, Extrinsecus affixe sunt": and thus to prove by reasons, etc. For here four reasons of the heretics are set forth, as the Master says: of which two are set forth in this chapter, and in the following chapter the response is set forth. The third, however, is set forth in that chapter, "F, Ceterum hereticorum," etc., and it is responded to in that, "G, Quorum audaciae." The fourth is set forth in that, "resistentes," etc., "H, Sed forte queras, Cum he." And in the same is set forth "proprietates," etc., the response. Afterwards, to these four they apply authority, "I, Verwmtamen." And it is set forth "re nondum desistunt," etc. The response, at the end of the same chapter: "Nos autem aliter ista intelligenda," etc.

And in this is the end of this distinction. °

Articulus 4 — Whether In The Divine, Essentials Signified In Whatever Way Are Predicated Of The Notions

Whether in divine matters, essentials signified in any way whatsoever, are predicated of notions?

Secondly, it is asked, whether essentials signified in any way whatsoever, are predicated of notions?

However, it seems that they are not: because we do not say that paternity creates, although we do say that paternity is the divine essence. Likewise, we do not say, Paternity is wise. Likewise, we do not say, it does not distinguish: nor do we say, Paternity is incarnate: nor do we say, Paternity is triune: since all such things express essential adjectives.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:

1. I see that certain notional things, like paternity, are said to be immense, uncreated, and suchlike: and these adjectives are essential: therefore, essential adjectives are said of notions.

1. Likewise, just as notional adjectives relate to notions, so do essentials to essence: therefore, according to a transmuted proportion, just as notions to essence, so essentials to notional things: but notions are predicated of essence, and conversely: therefore, essentials of notional things.

Solution. It must be said that essential adjectives can relate in four ways, by which they are not predicated of the notion, namely if they are essentials by way of essence, if they are essentials appropriated to the person, if they are essentials co-understood with the person, and fourthly, if they are essentials by way of divine act. Essentials by way of essence are, as not distinguishing, not signifying relation, and suchlike. Essentials attributed to persons are those which are said concretely: because they signify essence in persons, as wise, powerful, and suchlike. Hence it is foolish to say that paternity is wise. However, essentials co-understood with the person are as triune, incarnate: and therefore we do not say, paternity is triune, that is, one of three: just as we say, essence is triune, that is, of three. However, essentials by way of act are as creates, governs, and suchlike: because it is not said, paternity creates, or governs the world. However, all other things can be said, and especially negatives, as immense, uncreated, and suchlike.

And through this, the solution to all objections except the last is clear.

And concerning the last, it must be said that the transmuted proportion does not hold in all things, but only in proportionals: and those are diverse: and therefore when the proportion is changed, then it does not hold in this process: because the notion relates to essence as the same to it, but the notional does not relate to the essential in this way, because it differs from it in the mode of attributing. And there is an instance: just as animal relates to some animal, so man relates to some man: therefore, by permutation, just as animal relates to man, so some man relates to some animal: but this is false: because animal and man relate as superior and inferior, but some man does not relate as superior to some animal, but rather conversely: because it follows

some man is: therefore some animal is: and it does not hold conversely. Therefore, a proportion of this kind does not hold in things that are simply diverse, such that one is not part of the other.

But if it is asked concerning those four conditions, why they make an exception in substantial adjectives?

It must be said that although essence is a property, yet the modes of signifying have a certain opposition: and from there comes the first condition.

Similarly, with the person supposed, the notion is not supposed: and from there the third is drawn: because then something agrees with one, which does not with another.

Likewise, the notion is signified in the abstract, and as being in another: and therefore those things which express as existing per se personally do not agree with it, as wise, good, and suchlike: and from there the third is drawn. Also, it is not the notion's to act, but the person's, and from there comes the fourth reason for exception.

Articulus 5 — Whether The Divine Relations Are Attendant, As Gilbert Of Poitiers Said

Whether divine relations are assisting, as Gilbert Porretanus said?

Because this error is said to have been of Gilbert Porretanus, whom, however, as it is said, he retracted and condemned, humbly acquiescing to the councils of Saint Bernard, in the council of the Bishops of Reims: therefore these reasons are to be considered more diligently.

Therefore, two things in this chapter are founded upon this, that relations or properties in the divine do not predicate something that is inherent, but that is affixed externally in comparison to another: and this is proven by two reasons leading to the impossible.

The first is this: Let it be granted that a property is inherent to a person: since nothing is inherent to a person unless it is entirely the same as the person itself according to reality, the property itself will be entirely the same with the person according to reality: but whatever is entirely the same as a determinate thing does not determine it, but is determined with it: therefore the property does not determine the person, but is determined with it. And this is the first reason. But the property determines the person: therefore it is not the same with the person: since nothing is inherent to the person, unless it is the person itself, because otherwise it would be composite, the property cannot be inherent to the person: therefore it adheres only as affixed externally.

The second reason also leads to the impossible and is founded upon this, that the principle of uniting and distinguishing is not the same: but the essence is that by which the divine persons are united: however, the property is the essence, as you say: therefore the property is that by which the persons are united: therefore the property will not be distinguishing, which is false: therefore the property is not the essence, but affixed externally. Nor can it be said that here is an accident: because nothing there is extraneous to another, nor differing in any way according to reality. From this it is clear upon what these reasons of Gilbert are founded.

But if perhaps you would want to say that this foundation is false, namely that the distinguishing relations are affixed only. Against this, it can be objected in this way first: because Boethius says this, that relations are affixed, and predicate nothing in the relative: therefore by the place from authority it is so. Furthermore, the authority is proven in this way: Whatever can come to a subject and be removed from it without any change of the subject, from the comparison of another to it: that is nothing in the subject, but assists it in comparison to another: relation comes to the subject in such a way: therefore it assists in comparison to another, and does not predicate anything in the subject. The first is proven thus: Let it be granted that something comes to a subject that is inherent to it without its change: therefore that subject has what it did not have before: therefore it is otherwise disposed informally than before, the subject remaining actually being: therefore it is altered: but it was posited that it is

not changed. The second is proven thus: With the man remaining in the same way, someone is made now right, now left: and these are called relations, therefore, etc.

If perhaps you say that it is well proven from this that they are not inherent, but not that they assist as affixed externally. Against: Whatever is in no way of the intrinsic things essentially or accidentally, and yet is taken in something, another being taken in another, that must be assisting externally: relation is in no way of the intrinsic things essentially or accidentally, and yet is taken in this, another being taken in another: therefore it is affixed, or assisting, or adhering externally. The first part of the first is already proven above, namely that relation as far as its nature is concerned, is in no way of the intrinsic things essentially or accidentally: because if one were of the intrinsic things, all would be. The second part is proven by this rule of relatives, that it does not happen that one of the relatives is taken definitely without the other: therefore relation is always taken to be inherent to this, in some way extrinsically taken: therefore it places nothing in this, but rather in another the comparison of that to this, and in this the comparison of this to another. The second is evident from the antecedents.

If perhaps you would want to say that this relation according to this does not suffice for the distinction of persons, because thus in themselves the persons would be nothing: again it can be objected concerning Gilbert thus: Whatever is not distinguished by something absolute, but by that which is to another, only that suffices for the distinction of relatives: the divine persons are thus distinguished: therefore the distinction of relatives suffices for them. The first is per se known. The second, however, is often had above from Augustine.

These, therefore, as far as I can estimate, are what moved Gilbert more in the first reason here introduced.

In the second reason, however, he seems to suppose two propositions, without which the reason is worth nothing, namely that the uniting and distinguishing are not entirely the same, but differ in something: and that what is said according to intellect alone is not the cause of the distinction of the thing. And he wants to have the first proposition as per se known:

because if you wanted to disprove it, as some of the moderns have labored, the absurdity is easily shown: for they bring us three examples, the first of which is, that differences which are diverse in themselves, are united nevertheless in the indivisible potency of the genus: and this immediately appears to be nothing by three reasons: because although the genus in the nature of the simple universal is indivisible, yet it is divisible in potency: however, the essence which unites the persons is in no way divisible. The second reason is, that differences are not one in the genus, unless they are beings in potency, but not in act: however, the persons are existing according to act in one essence. The third reason is, because differences coming to the genus divide it according to being: however, persons coming to the essence do not divide it according to being: therefore there is nothing of what you say.

Therefore others say that this union is as rays of different stars are united in the same point of earth or air: or lines terminated at the same point. But this is nothing: because being terminated at the same point does not confer one being to the lines, nor even to the rays.

Again, others seek to subtilize, and say impossibilities thus: Let us suppose one line is divided into two: these two lines are together: therefore they have the ends together: therefore in the same: therefore they are terminated at the same point: therefore they are united in that: and yet they are distinct. Or, if you would say that one is terminated at another point than the other: therefore the point would be contiguous and continuous and consequently would be a point, which is refuted in the beginning of the sixth of the Physics: but this is absurd. For from this many inconveniences follow: Let it be granted that the line is thus divided: therefore two lines proceed from the same point drawn in the same direction, which are diverse: and this is against the fourteenth proposition of the first of Euclid. Let us suppose, that those two lines before they are drawn to another point, cut a third line: therefore since they are together, making no breadth, they will make right angles around themselves, or equal to two right angles: therefore those two lines drawn from one point, making two right angles around themselves, or equal to two right angles, are diverse: and the contrary of this is said by the Theorem: If two straight lines from a point of one line which they cut, go out in different directions, which make two angles around themselves either right or equal to two right angles: those two lines are directly joined to each other, and one line: and for example let the line divided be A B, but cut Cc D.

Again, Gilbert could destroy this in another way thus: Let the line be divided in the aforesaid way, and yet converge at the same points: and let another line be drawn from the first point of it in a continuum, and from the point of that let another divided line be drawn, as the first to the end of the first divided line: so that a triangle is enclosed: therefore according to this from the point of one undivided line which is ze f, to the same point a four straight lines can be drawn: which is impossible: because thus a line would be in a line, and an indivisible in an indivisible.

Furthermore, it is also proven according to nature: because just as between two points there is a line, so between any two lines there is a surface: therefore between those conterminal divided lines there would be a surface: and two straight lines would contain a surface, which is against the last proposition of the first of Euclid, which is this: Two straight lines enclose no surface.

But if it is asked, How then is the impossible solved by which it is proven? It must be said according to him, that the line on the part which is the terminus, is not together: because a terminus with a terminus is never together, because to be together is to have the ends in the same: however, the line is the terminus of the surface, not by this that it is terminated at a point, but according to this that it is indivisible according to breadth: whence it cannot be in length together with another line: but on the part by which it is terminated, it has...

the ultimate: and therefore it can be together with another: because two lines are terminated at the same point, and are together in that: and therefore it is clear that he assumed falsely when he said: If a line is divided, that those two lines would be together in length: because this is impossible: but rather they will not be together, but will intercept a finite

surface if they are with a third, or infinite if taken in themselves. With these things established, it is clear upon what Gilbert was supported in the first position.

His second position is this: What is said according to the intellect alone is not a cause of difference in reality. And from this he wants to have that if property and essence differ in the mode of understanding alone, that the distinct persons will be only according to the intellect: and this is the heresy of Sabellius. However, he can argue in this way: because that difference which is according to the mode of understanding alone, either can be posited in reality in some way, or not. If not, I have the proposition: because nothing makes a real difference. But if it can be posited, let it be posited, and then there will be a real difference, and Gilbert's proposition is obtained, because properties really differ from the divine essence.

Considering this, some moderns say that such a learned man did not err: and they bring forth reasons by which they prove that it is permissible to have diverse opinions in divine matters. But because this heresy was condemned from the mouth of its author in the council of Reims, therefore it is objected against thus: A relation is either something in the relative, or nothing. If he says, that it is something: therefore in every relative there is something, which is truly relative: because I speak of those relations which according to being towards another are in both of the relatives: therefore the proposition is obtained, that the relation is inherent, not adherent. But if you say, that it is nothing. Against: it is either something, or nothing. If nothing: therefore neither absolute, nor relative: therefore distinct persons by properties, are not distinct by anything.

If you say it is something; it will either be substance, or accident: not substance: therefore accident: therefore it inheres in something, as in a subject, and thus it must be posited that it is inherent: and since in divine matters nothing is inherent according to accident, it must be posited that in divine matters substance and essence is as to this that it has of the nature of accident, and has another mode of predicating as to this that it adds over accident respect: and this is against Gilbert. Much has been disputed about this above: and therefore let that suffice.

Solution. Clearly it can be responded to the objections of Gilbert: by saying to the first, that it is false, that relations in divine matters do not predicate something that is inherent, but that it is affixed in comparison to another: unless force is made in this that it is inherent, because the preposition notes diversity: but we take inherent by the mode of understanding, and not by diversity of the thing: for in relation it is to consider the nature of accident, and according to that it does not posit respect except to the substance which is the subject of other genera: and as to this relation, like other genera, changes its mode of predicating: and thus the property itself is the person in which it is, and consequently the essence in which the person itself is. It is also in the same to consider what it is towards another: and thus it retains its proper mode of predicating: and indeed then by that which is substance, but it does not predicate nor signify substance: because, as Augustine says, and it has been held above, that which signifies substance, is not said relatively to another: and Boethius, attending to this alone, says it is affixed extrinsically.

To the other it must be said, that the property is the same with the person which it determines as to the comparison of the subject, and of that which is inherent, as has already been said: but because the property in reality had more than inherent, because it had to another being which made it to be relation, and this it retains really in divine matters: therefore the person being supposed, the property is not supposed: and therefore the property is distinguished, and the hypostasis or person is distinguished. And if you object: therefore the person is composite, it is already clear that what you say is nothing: because it is not composed in that which is towards another, but in that which is inherent: but from that part by which it is inherent, its mode of predicating is converted into substance, and it is made the same to it: and therefore it does not induce composition: although it is really signified to be in the person, when it is said, the Father is distinguished by his property from the Son: and that consideration is very notable, that nothing makes composition with another, except by this that it is inherent, and not by this that it is to another being. And therefore those saying relations are converted into substance as to inherent, and remain as to another being, save the truth of the relations: and yet they induce no composition: and this Gilbert ignored, not considering except the second, and not the first.

To the other it must be said, that relations are not only affixed, as has been said, but beings themselves substance.

To the fourth of Boethius it has already been responded.

To the other it must be said, that there are many kinds of relations as has been held above: but the relations which are in divine matters according to the mode of existing make the very distinct: and therefore there they have also more solid being, than in lower things, as has been shown above.

To that which is further objected, it must be said, that relation is taken, with another certain thing which is outside, being taken: but relation by that which is accident and in divine matters substance, is not so taken: and therefore

it is insufficiently considered by this the nature of relation.

To the other it must be said, that persons are distinguished by that which is towards another: yet so, that also the hypostasis which is substance, is towards another: for these two do not conflict in divine matters, as has been held above in the question of hypostasis, at the beginning of distinction XXVI.

To that which is further objected about suppositions, it must be said that uniting and distinguishing are the same according to the thing which is substance, and are not the same in the mode of predicating which relation has from that part by which it is not compared to substance, but to outside, as has been said: and therefore from this the solution of all those things which were objected from the first supposition is clear.

To the similar things induced I well concede, that they are worth nothing: for they do not show how properties and persons are united in one, nor how they are one.

To that which is objected from the second supposition, it must be said that this difference is not so understood that it cannot be signified in reality: but it is not signifiable in this way that it does not make a difference: by that which is inherent, it makes no difference, as has already been held: therefore from that part it is not really signified: but from that part by which it is towards another relatively, I can say, that essence is not really towards another, and person is really towards another: therefore the intellect founded in that, and attributing something to one which does not belong to the other, will not be empty and vain.

And thus the solution to the whole difficulty which is objected from the positions of the Pictavian is clear.

Articulus 6 — In What Manner The Properties Are In The Essence

How are the properties in the essence?

Then it is asked concerning what is said in that chapter: "Moreover, the wickedness of heretics," etc.

1. In which is posited another argument of Gilbert, that if a property is in the essence, and every property is in one and the same essence, and in whatever the property is, it denominates that: therefore the same thing is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.

By reason of this argumentation, it is asked, How are the properties in the essence?

However, it seems that they are not in it: because 2. In whatever they are, they determine and distinguish that: but the essence is neither distinguished nor determined: therefore the properties are not in it.

1. Likewise, In what way would they be said to be in it? Not as in a subject, because thus they would make a composition: nor otherwise, as it seems: therefore they are not in it.

Solution. It is easy to solve according to what has been determined. Therefore, it must be said to the first, which is extracted from the letter, that there is no denomination unless where the nature of an accident is preserved. However, that is not preserved in the divine: rather, they are turned into substance in that comparison in which they have the nature of an accident in lower things.

To the other, it must be said that they do not determine except by what they have: but they do not have opposition except by what they are towards another: and with that comparison, they are not referred to the essence, but to the outside, it is clear that they do not determine the essence, but the person which is compared to that person which is distinguished from itself.

To the other, it must be said that the mode of saying "in" is according to reason alone:

because in reality it is the same, but by reason of the name it is as existing in another, and not by itself: but substance according to the reason of the name is conversely.

Articulus 7 — Whether The Notional Terms, According To The Mode Of Understanding, Stand More Closely Toward The Hypostases Or Persons Than Toward The Essence Itself, And Whether By Reason Of This Nearness Personal Adjectives Are Said Of The Notions

Whether the notionals, according to the mode of understanding, are more closely related to the hypostases or persons than to the essence itself? And, whether by reason of this closeness, personal adjectives are said of the notions?

Then it is asked concerning what the Master says in the following chapter, where he solves this reasoning, there, G, "It is not so entirely in the divine substance," as in the hypostases themselves, etc.

For from this it seems to follow that the notionals, according to the mode of understanding, are more closely related to the hypostases or persons than to the essence itself.

It is asked whether by reason of this affinity personal adjectives are said of the notions?

However, it seems that they are; because:

1. Certain essentials are said of the notions, which are more distant from them, as was previously proven: therefore it seems that much more are personals said of them.
2. Likewise, both, namely person and notion, are incommunicable: therefore what is said of one is also said of the other.
3. Likewise, person and notion are the same immediately according to the intellect: therefore what is fitting to one is fitting to the other.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
1. The Father generates and spirates: therefore if personals are said of the notionals, paternity generates and spirates, which is nothing to say.

1. Likewise, person is distinguished: therefore notion is distinguished.

Solution. To this it must be said that personals are not said of the notions: because personal adjectives as such either belong to the person in itself, as being distinct: and then they cannot belong to the notion due to the opposite mode of signifying, because notion is signified as the reason distinguishing, not as a thing distinct existing by itself: or personals are those by which a person emanates from a person, as generates, spirates, which signify a personal act: or they are said adjectively of persons, as they are generating, spirating, according to which those participles are held adjectively: and then they cannot belong to the notions: because notion is not signified as acting, but rather as the reason of the agent in that act: for acts are of hypostases and individuals: and in such a way notion is not signified. But if they are adjectives signified notionally, again they do not belong: because then they express the reason how one person proceeds from another.

One paternity is not the Father, if the Father is held adjectively: because it follows that he would have begotten the Son: nor is filiation the Son for the same reason, as was said above, that this is false, essence is the Father, if it is held adjectively: however, the person is

predicated of the property when the name of the person is held substantively, just as it is predicated of the essence: and just as this is true, essence is the Father, that is, essence is he who is the Father: so this is true, paternity is the Father, that is, paternity is he who is the Father: but the person is not predicated except of its notion, as was previously held.

To what is objected against, it must be said that essentials are predicated of them because of the identity of the subject and of what is signified in it: but personals do not express the relation of the subject, but rather the relation of the distinct and acting: and therefore they are not predicated: but persons are predicated, which imply the same relation of the subject.

To the other it must be said that although they agree in that both are incommunicable, yet they differ in the reason of incommunicability: just as Socrates and the individuating principles of Socrates are incommunicable: one as that which is incommunicable, the other as making the incommunicability in him: and therefore it is not necessary that what is fitting to one is fitting to the other.

To the other it must be said that person and property are immediate according to the thing, but not according to the mode of signifying: and therefore they are predicated of themselves really: but it is not necessary that whatever is fitting to one is fitting to the other: but it is true that whatever is fitting to one by this that it has a comparison to it as to a subject only, this is also fitting to the other: but this is not to be referred, to be distinguished, to be generated, and the like.

Articulus 8 — Whether Personal Adjectives Are In Some Way More Closely Related To The Notions Which Agree With Them Than To Others

Whether personal adjectives are in some way more closely related to the notions that agree with them than to others?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, G, Therefore although paternity and filiation are in the divine essence, etc.

1. For it can be doubtful whether personal adjectives are in some way more closely related to the notions that agree with them according to reason, as generation to paternity, than to filiation or spiration? For then it seems that those personal adjectives can agree with such notions.
2. Likewise, Paternity, and this word, generates, say the same, as all the Doctors teach; therefore, since the same is predicated of itself, it seems that I can say, paternity generates.

Likewise, Paternity is Father: Father generates: therefore paternity generates, it seems that it proceeds from immediates: because the immediate property is person, and the notional act is

immediate to the person: therefore the person can be the medium for concluding the notional act from the notion.

1. Likewise, When it is said, generates, nothing is of the understanding of the word except the supposit and the act: the supposit can be predicated of the notion, but the act is the same with the notion: therefore on neither side is it impeded: therefore I can say, as it seems, that paternity generates.

ON THE CONTRARY:
1. If paternity generates, therefore because it is Father: then much more does the essence generate, because it is Father, and from it the Father has the power of generating, in the way it is said to be a cause without which not, because unless the divine essence were, it would not have the power of generating: but this is false: therefore also that.

1. Furthermore, Generation is an act of nature and substance, as Damascene and Hilary say: but the notion does not signify as substance, but as being in another.

Solution. It must be said to the first, that no distinctive act of person agrees with the notion, nor any adjective in whatever way signified, provided it is a personal adjective, as was previously held: and the closeness of that reason cannot cause this, because that is not the cause of identity, but rather the relation of the subject to that which is in it, as was previously said: because in that relation simplicity causes identity: but that the notion does not have to the act, but rather the notion signifies the reason according to which such an act agrees with the acting person, as paternity is the reason why the Father generates.

To the other it must be said, that although it is the same in reality, it is not, however, signified as the same: and therefore it is not the same in attributing and supposing.

To the other it must be said, that although generates does not say more in the thing said, it does say more in the mode of speaking: because it says the supposit, not as being per se only, but as the substance from which the act proceeds, and in that comparison it does not agree with the notion entirely. Similarly, it says the notion as act, and not as a disposition resting in the agent, as it is the reason of the act: and therefore again on that side it does not entirely agree.

Articulus 9 — How These Words Of Augustine Are To Be Taken, "Not That By Which The Father Is, He Is Substance"

How these words of Augustine are to be understood, "Not in that the Father is, is He substance."

How these words of Augustine are to be understood, "Not in that the Father is, is He substance."

Next, note concerning the final solution by which the master resolves the authority of Augustine introduced by them, namely this: "Not in that the Father is, is He substance: not in that the Word is, is He substance."

For the objection of the Pictavian and the solution of the Master are founded upon the duplicity of that proposition. For "in that" signifies a cause as if formal, as Augustine says.

Therefore, when it is said: "Not in that the Father is," it can be a negation of the cause "is substance," as if formal: and thus the proposition is true, and it holds the understanding of the Master, which is true, and is Augustine's. Or, it can be a negation under causality, so that causality is the negation, as the sophists say: and thus the proposition is false, and it supports the Pictavian. And in the first way, the sense is, "Not in that the Father is, is He God," that is, paternity is not the quasi-formal cause by which the Father is God, but deity: and this is true according to the reason of understanding. In the second way, the sense is, "In that the Father is, this is the cause that He is not God": because then separation falls between that by which the Father is and God: and thus paternity would not be God, as Gilbert said.

DISTINCTIO XXXIV

Divisio Textus

To the aforementioned, it must be added that certain men of perverse understanding, etc.

Here begins the second part, in which a comparison is made of the person to the essence, namely whether they are the same or different.

And it is divided into four parts: in the first of which the Master shows there is no diversity between the person and the nature. In the second, he provides the reasoning for how power, wisdom, and goodness are appropriated to the three persons, there, F, &z. In the third, concerning the aforementioned, etc., he provides the reasoning of this name 6poosstos, there, I, Mte it must not be omitted. In the fourth and last, he provides the reasoning, etc., of the metaphorical sayings about God, and he provides the epilogue of this treatise on the Trinity.

The first of these is divided into two. In the first, he shows the person to be the essence. In the second, he provides the reasoning why three persons are said to be of one essence, and not of one God, there, E, Here it must be considered, since God is, etc.

In the first part, there are three things, namely the proof of the question, and for solving the same, the introduction of the error by the authority of Hilary, there, § 2 cap. A, And this is testified by Tertio, the testimony of Hilary is set forth, etc., the solution of the same authority, and the demonstration of the truth, there, B, Some say this not understanding, etc.

And from these, the sentence is clear.

Articulus 1 — Whether Person Is Essence, Or Not, As Gilbert Of Poitiers Said

Whether the person is essence, or not, as Gilbert Porretanus said?

However, here arises the question of Gilbert, to whom this error is attributed, although Porretanus later corrected himself, Whether the person is essence?

However, it seems that it is not: because

1. In no nature are affirmation and negation simultaneously verified of the same: if therefore the person is essence, person and essence are the same in reality: but the person is incommunicable, while essence is communicable: therefore it is true to say of the same in reality, that it is communicable and not communicable, and common and not common, and proper and not proper, and distinct and not distinct, and related and not related, and all such things: since therefore this is impossible, it seems that it is impossible for the person and essence to be entirely the same in reality. If perhaps you say that according to something one agrees with it, and according to something else the other: then it follows that the same there is one and the other, and thus it would not be entirely the same.

1. Likewise, in divine things remain two categories, of which neither passes into the other, namely substance, and relation: but no two categories exist except by the fact that one is not the other: therefore relation is not substance: the person is relation, because the Father is to the Son: therefore the Father is not divine substance.
2. Likewise, essence in some relation is related to the person: either therefore as entirely the same, or as differing in some way. If as entirely the same: therefore the Father is entirely the same as essence, and the Son is entirely the same as essence: but whatever things are united to the entirely same are the same, they are the same among themselves, as the Philosopher says: therefore the Father is the Son: and this reasoning seems to be implied in the Text, namely that this led Gilbert to say this.
3. Likewise, the Philosopher says that if we bring even the slightest difference, we will show that it is not the same, at least we will show that it is not entirely the same: but we say essence is common in reality, but we say the Father is proper in reality: therefore a real difference is found: therefore person and essence are not entirely the same.
4. Likewise, the common conception of the mind is that different hypostases cannot entirely participate in the same reality: because, let it be granted that they are entirely the same: therefore they agree in that which is entirely the same: therefore since this is in all, it makes entirely the same: and thus there would not be multiple hypostases: therefore this is true, that different hypostases will not entirely participate in the same: however, the three divine hypostases have one nature or essence: therefore essence is not the same in itself.
5. Likewise, the Philosopher says that from the first substance there will be no predication at all: but, as was held above, the person is as the first substance: therefore it is not predicated of anything: therefore neither will it be predicated of essence, so that it is said, the divine essence is the Father.
6. Likewise, we have often had that the Father is divine essence, and that there is construction there according to the formal cause: therefore the divine essence is related to the hypostasis, as form to the formed. But between those there is opposition of cause and caused: since therefore cause and caused are never the same, essence and hypostasis will never be the same. However, here Gilbert introduces, or can introduce, the

sophisms of Prepositivus, which we have set forth above. For let it be granted that essence is person: then this will be true, essence is the Father: but the Father is the Father of someone: and not unless of the Son: therefore essence is the Father of the Son: therefore he begot the Son.

Likewise, he is the Father of someone: not unless by paternity: therefore paternity inheres in essence: therefore it determines it.

Often it is objected according to the sayings of blessed Bernard on the Canticles.

1. For Gilbert says on the book of Boethius on the Trinity; Deity by which God is, not which God is. Either therefore something is greater, or equal, or less than God. It is clear that it is not greater. If however equal. Against: Equal does not make itself equal: because it is not powerful in itself: therefore this deity does not make God. If less: therefore God degenerates, becoming God through that, which again is absurd: therefore deity is he who is God: therefore it is hypostasis and person.
2. Likewise, if it is not the same: therefore the person is composed of that, and of some other: therefore it is not simple, which is heretical.
3. Likewise, every composite is resolvable into its components as prior and simpler than itself: therefore God would be resolvable into other things prior and simpler than himself, and thus neither would he be first nor simple, which is absurd.
4. Likewise, every composite has its being from another or from others: therefore God would already be the creation of another God prior to himself, which is false.

Solution. It is clear to anyone that the last arguments are necessary, and the previously introduced ones are sophistical: and seeing this later, Gilbert corrected his statement, in which also, as will be said, he first had a sound sense, although he uttered incautious words.

Therefore it must be said and simply believed, that for the sake of the simplicity of God, being and what is, and essence and person do not differ in him in reality: however, they differ in the mode of supposing and attributing.

But if you ask, Whence this happens, since it is entirely the same in reality, that different things are attributed? It must be said that that simplicity removes composition by removing diversity from those things which are united in the same in it: and if those diverse things remained, then they would make composition like form and matter in composition: but although it thus removes composition, yet it does not remove the truth of each of them, as we said above about the attributes. For although the wisdom of God is the same with the substanding due to simplicity, nevertheless the wisdom of God is most truly wisdom: otherwise, there would be something in the wisdom of God that would not be in the essence of God. Thus, this simplicity of person does not remove the truth of hypostasis, nor the truth of nature: and therefore it remains communicable.

And through this, the solution to the first is clear: because although person and essence are the same, nevertheless each retains those things which are of its own proper reason: and thus

contradictories are not referred to the same in that reason by which it is really reason, because really the incommunicable pertains to the person, and really the communicable pertains to the nature, and so with others.

To the other, it must be said that the modes of predicating do not remain there because relation is an accident, for in this respect it passes into substance: but because it is towards another, and this is proper to the person, not hindered by simplicity: because simplicity does not remove the truth of nature, but only the diversity of the communicable and incommunicable which are in the same.

To the other, it must be said that this argument would hold if they were entirely the same: so that one by the power of its nature and identity of reason would be the same with the other: but they retain diverse reasons, because truly the incommunicable is one, and truly the communicable is the other: and therefore with the reason of that which is incommunicable, the Father is opposed to the Son relatively: and similarly the Son by the reason of that which is incommunicable, is opposed to the Father relatively: it does not follow that one is the other, but only that it is the same with itself in substance. And we can imagine something similar to this in a point and unity: for let us suppose a point by that which it is, to be united to unity by that which it is: and yet each retains the property of its nature: we say that the point with unity is entirely the same in substance and essence: and yet it is opposed to it in relation to the continuous: because unity has a relation to the discrete: and then it follows that having a relation to the continuous, it is entirely the same in substance with that having a relation to the discrete as such. However, that similarity fails, as all earthly similarities do.

To the other, it must be said that by making force in difference, the proposition is true: but because essence is common, it posits rather agreement than difference: just as if we prove animal to be a genus, and to be the genus of man, by this we prove more that it is man, than that it differs from man: and if it were simple, we would prove by this that it is common to man, also that it is the same as man: whence that nature is communicable does not posit the cause of difference, but rather of unity and agreement with all persons in which it is.

To the other, it must be said that it is not a common conception of the mind, unless in the nature in which the "what it is" differs from "that it is": and in that it is necessary to multiply "that it is" according to being, according to which hypostases or "what it is" are multiplied: but in divine things it is not so: therefore it is not necessary to conceive that there. To that by which it proves, the solution is clear from what was said before: because although simplicity makes the identity of person and essence: it does not remove the truth of each: and therefore as to the reason of person which is real, because it is truly of property and hypostasis, those hypostases are still many.

To the other, it must be said that this is nothing: because from the first substance there will not be predication according to the coordination of predicables in a genus: and this is what the Philosopher intends to say: but that it is not truly predicated of anything, he does not intend: but in divine things it can also be predicated of the common, as we showed above where this question was treated.

To the OTHER, it has already been solved above many times.

Articulus 2

Does the person of man differ from nature according to the reason of intelligence?

Then it is inquired about this which he says, there, D, around the middle: "We do not, however, deny that some distinction is to be had through the reason of intelligence," etc.

For either something underlies this reason of intelligence, or nothing. If nothing: then it will be empty and vain. If something, then there is a difference according to the thing, and not according to reason only.

To this it must be said, that something responds in the thing. Hence it must be noted, that in lower things when the common nature is in the supposit, it is signified in two ways according to the thing, namely as diverse when it is said, nature is simple, and Socrates is composite: and it is signified as something suitable to it which does not suit Socrates, as when it is said, that it is predicated of many, but Socrates of one or of none. In divine things, however, nature cannot be signified as diverse from the person, because it is the same: yet really something suits it, which does not suit the person, and conversely: and therefore the Doctors say, that with nature supposed, the person is not supposed, and upon that is founded the reason of intelligence.

And note, that from this place is drawn that much common saying, that it is distinguished according to the reason of intelligence.

Articulus 3 — Whether It Is Lawful To Say, "Three Persons Are Of One Essence"; And "Three Persons Are The Essence," As "Of One Essence," And "One Essence Of Three Persons"

Whether it is permissible to say, the three persons are of one essence: and the three persons are essence, as of one essence, and one essence of three persons?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, Here it must be considered, since God is the divine essence, etc.

For when it is said, the three persons are of one essence, it seems to denote the indivisibility of the nature's being in the three persons: since therefore God and deity are the same in the divine, it seems that by the same reason it can be said, that it is of one God: and this he denies in the Text.

1. Again, Can it be said, the three persons are of the essence, as of one essence?

It seems so: because there is made a comparison of the formed according to the reason of understanding to the form, just as in that when it is said, the three persons are of one essence.

1. Again, Can it be said, one essence is of three persons, or the essence of three persons: just as it is said, the three persons of one essence?

It seems so: because just as it is to compare the person to the nature, so conversely the nature to the person: and thus one can be said in the same relation in which the other is said.

However, It seems that none of those can be said: because they are oblique transitives and denote diversity: and since there is no diversity between essence and person, it seems that comparison ought not to be made except in the direct, so that it is said, the three persons are one essence.

Solution. It must be said, that it can well be said, the three persons of one essence, so that the construction of the oblique with the direct is in the designation of essence: or better, as we speak from the proper, in the designation of the simplicity of essence in the three. Yet it cannot be said, of one God due to the different mode of signifying essence in this name, God, and in this name, essence: because in the abstract it is signified as a nature which is the form of something, but in the concrete it is signified as standing by itself, and not as the form of something: and therefore the transition of the oblique is not preserved according to the reason of understanding, when it is said the three persons of one God: just as also in inferiors it is said, the three persons of one human nature, yet it is not said of one man, except by possessive construction.

To the other it must be said, that when the oblique is constructed in the designation of essence, there must be two genitives, or one having the force of two, as a woman of excellent form, or a man of bloods, or a man of disgrace: and therefore it is not well said, the three persons of essence: because the same relation of construction is not preserved.

To the other it must be said, that it is well said, one essence of three persons, and essence of three persons: but not in all is the same relation of construction preserved: for when it is said, the three persons of one essence, the construction of the oblique imports two things, namely the relation of the form to the formed, and the designation of the simplicity of the form: but when it is said, one essence of three, or essence of three, only one is imported: and therefore also one direct suffices, where previously two obliques were required, of which one would import designation, and the other form: just as grammarians say of these two, a woman of excellent form, and the excellent form of a woman: because the relation is varied: and therefore by changing the oblique into the direct, and conversely, the construction is changed, so that I can say, the excellent form of a woman and the form of a woman: and yet we do not thus say, a woman of excellent form, and a woman of form.

To the last it must be said: that by the oblique is noted the transition according to the reason of intelligence, which does not posit diversity of person and nature, but rather the truth of each.

Articulus 4 — Whether Power, Wisdom, And Goodness Make The Highest Good

Whether power, wisdom, and goodness make the highest good?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, From the aforesaid it is evident, etc.

For there he says that power, wisdom, goodness make the highest good: and this does not seem so: because the highest good is that to which nothing is lacking that has the nature of good: but it is not true that every nature of good is comprehended under these three.

Solution. It must be said that in the perfection of these three all good is contained: for every good is either of nature, or superadded. But perfect and omnipotent power is never except in a perfect and omnipotent nature. But the superadded, either are according to the intellect, and then they are reduced to the true: or according to the affection, and then they are reduced to the good. But other things are not simply good, such as corporeal and sensible things: and therefore in the perfection of these three consists the highest beatitude.

Articulus 5 — Whether The Appropriation By Which Appropriated Things Are Attributed To God Is Made Only Through Us And By Us

Is the appropriation by which things are attributed to God made solely by us and from us?

Then it is asked concerning what is said there, G, "Therefore the prudence of sacred eloquence took care to do this," etc.

1. For from this it seems that appropriation is made only by us and from us: but this is inconvenient, because if we did not exist, wisdom would still be appropriated to the Son: therefore it seems that it is not true that the prudence of sacred eloquence did this.
2. Likewise, if there is no other reason for appropriation except through connotation to created things, then eternity and unity should not be appropriated to the Father: because those belong from eternity, and do not belong through connotation.
3. Likewise, in 1 Corinthians 1:24, it is said, "Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God." Therefore power is appropriated to the Son: but power is the ultimate of potency: therefore potency is appropriated to the Son: not therefore to the Father, the contrary of which is said in the text.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what some say, that such appropriations are not made by us: and for two reasons, namely for the avoidance of error, and the expression of truth: and they say that power is attributed to the Father for the avoidance of error.

But on the contrary: If no diversity occurs in the mode of understanding except for the avoidance of error: then it seems that among those not erring we can say that power is attributed to the Father, and not appropriated: but this is false: therefore there is something on the part of the thing why it is appropriated.

Solution. It must be said that appropriation can be considered in two ways: according to aptitude, and according to act. According to aptitude, it is on the part of the thing, as was said above: for one attribute has a closer relation to one person than to another: and therefore it is appropriable to that one. However, according to act, appropriation is made by men skilled in sacred Scripture, for various reasons, namely to avoid error, or to express truth, and for this reason to show more the reason of distinction in properties: and the two preceding causes

must always suppose the third: because unless there is unity in the thing, appropriation would not be well made.

And through this the solution to the first two is clear: because the Master supposes a greater convenience of the reason of power to the property of the Father than to another person.

To the other it must be said that power is attributed to the Father for three reasons: two of which are on the part of the Father's property, and one on our part. One is because power is a principle, as the Philosopher says. For active power is the principle of transmutation into another, according to what it is another: but the principle according to the first reason approaches more to the principle not from a principle, than to the principle from a principle. The second reason is because there is no wisdom unless power preexists, and there is no perfect goodness unless it presupposes wisdom and power: just as the Son is from the Father, and the Holy Spirit from both. The third reason is taken from the text on our part: for although virtue is in the genus of power, it nevertheless adds something by reason of which it belongs to the Son, namely the ultimate of power: and because the Father works the world through the Son, and redeems the world through the Son, the Son himself is in whom the greatest things of the Father's power are fulfilled: and therefore virtue is attributed to him.

To what is further asked concerning the causes of appropriation, which some posit, the response is now clear: because it was shown above that the true cause of appropriation is that this or that attribute approaches more to the property of one person than another. Other things that could be objected were touched upon above in distinction XXXI.

Articulus 6 — Whether By Transference All The Names Of Creatures Can Be Attributed To God; And Conversely, Whether The Names Of God Can Be Attributed To Creatures

Whether by translation all names of creatures can be attributed to God? And conversely, whether the names of God can be attributed to creatures?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, K, Furthermore it must be known, that in the assignment, etc.

For there, by touching upon the reason of translation, he teaches to attend to similarities:

1. However, since every creature is a vestige, it seems through this that from every creature a translation is made to God, so that God is called by the name of all creatures.
2. Likewise, Dionysius says that He is all-namable.
3. Likewise, Dionysius: In Him it is necessary to affirm the positions of all. Therefore, from all a translation is made to God. But this seems to be nothing, so that God is called devil, wolf, toad, and the like.
4. Likewise, it seems that all names are said of God translatively: because it is not properly univocal, when it is said, God is life, and the soul is life: therefore by translation.

5. Likewise, it is asked, whether from nobler creatures a translation is made, so that God is called seraphim and cherubim? This does not seem so: because it is nowhere read in Sacred Scripture.

6. Furthermore, it also seems that translation is made conversely from God to creatures, as the Psalm 81, 6 says: I have said: You are gods, etc.

Solution. It must be said that this question is for the most part determined above. Therefore, it must be said that translation is made from all things which preserve and express nature without vice and harm of deformity: hence from the devil it cannot be, because it is the name of a deformed nature: and similarly from the frog, and toad, because it is the name of a nature with properties of deformity and harm.

And if you object, that God is said to be signified by the serpent? It must be said that the serpent imports something good through cunning and wisdom: and also the serpent in itself has the medicine of poison, for its flesh is effective against poison: but not so the toad, or another vile unclean thing. Hence Augustine says that the fox is never taken in a good signification, because it expresses deceptive cunning: but the wolf is sometimes taken in a good signification, as Benjamin is said to be a ravenous wolf.

And from this the solution to the first three is clear: because the word of Dionysius is understood of those which do not sound deformity of themselves.

To the other it must be said, that not all are said translatively: and the reason is said above.

To the other it must be said, that from nobler and from inferior things a translation can be made: but it is not made, as Dionysius says, from nobler things, lest there be an occasion of error, namely lest those noble things be thought to agree by property: and also because they are not so known to us: but translation is made from more known things, and those are sensible to us.

To the other it must be said, that translation is not in those which participate the same by prior and posterior: hence from God a translation is not made to us, but rather that which is in God first, this is in us later similar to that, and properly is in us: but the similarity which is required in translation, is a similarity not according to the thing, but according to the agreement of the properties of the thing.

DISTINCTIO XXXV

Divisio Textus

And since we have discussed above, etc. Here begins the part which is about the knowledge of the Trinity and unity, as it is considered in those things which make the sufficiency of the cause for the procession of creatures from it, which are knowledge, power, will: for to act, nothing more is required than to know, to will, and to be able.

However, it is divided into three parts according to the three aforementioned. In the first, it deals with knowledge. In the second, with power, which begins in distinction XLI, there, A, Nane. In the third, it deals with omnipotence, etc., will, which begins in distinction XLV, there, A, Now concerning will, etc.

The first of these is divided into two parts. In the first, it deals with knowledge in general. In the second, however, it descends to the species of divine knowledge, which are predestination and reprobation: and this begins in distinction XL, there, A, Predestination indeed is concerning salutary goods, etc.

However, the first, which is about knowledge in general, is subdivided into three. In the first, knowledge is shown both according to the distinction and property of names, and as to those things which are in it, as concerning which it is. In the second, however, it is shown conversely, how God is in all things made and created by Him: and this begins in distinction XXXVI, there, A, £¢. In the third, however, the Master shows that it has been demonstrated in part, etc., the dispositions of knowledge more than the knowledge itself, namely whether it imposes necessity on things, or can be deceived, or increased, and the like? and it begins in distinction XXXVI, there, A, Now therefore returning to the proposed, etc.

Furthermore, the first is further divided into two. In the first, it shows the intentions of names, and in general, how it is concerning objects, because concerning all eternal and temporal things. In the second, however, it shows how it is different to be in the knowledge of God, and to be in nature, and how it is differently concerning good and evil objects, and this begins in the following distinction XXXVI, there, A, It is usually asked here, etc.

However, this distinction is divided into three parts. In the first, it determines generally concerning all the names by which divine knowledge is accustomed to be signified. In the second, however, it raises a question which arises from the determination and distinction of names, namely whether the knowledge of God would be in God, if there were no future things? there, B, Mie. In the third, it principally shows what ought to be considered, Whether knowledge, etc., objects of knowledge according to the general declaration, there, D, Knowledge or wisdom not only, etc.

From these, the sentence is sufficiently clear, and will be clear in the disputation.

Articulus 1 — Whether The Knowledge Of God Is Univocal With Our Knowledge, Or With The Knowledge Of Angels

Whether the knowledge of God is univocal with our knowledge, or the knowledge of Angels?

Whether the knowledge of God is univocal with our knowledge, or the knowledge of Angels?

Here, before the Letter, a double doubt arises. One is, Whether the knowledge of God is univocal with our knowledge, or that of Angels?

The second is, Whether the knowledge of God is universal or particular, or in act or in habit?

For it seems that it is univocal, not said by prior or posterior, thus:

1. An efficient cause acting according to the form of the efficient produces an effect univocal with the cause, as fire produces fire, man produces man, and the like: but the knowledge of God is the efficient cause of our knowledge, and acts according to form: therefore it seems that our knowledge, which is effected by His, is univocal with His knowledge. The first is evident per se, the second is proved by the authority of Origen saying: God is called wise and knowing, according to which He fills us with wisdom and knowledge.
2. Likewise, no exemplar is equivocal with the exemplar in the form of the exemplar: the knowledge of God is the exemplar of our knowledge, and our knowledge is exemplified: therefore it seems that our knowledge is not equivocal with His. The first is because it seems that it is equivocal in form, since even in matter it disagrees, then the exemplified will not be in any way similar in species with the exemplar, and thus it is not more exemplified by it than by something disparate from it: therefore it must be univocal in form. The second is evident by what Dionysius says in the book on Divine Names: Praising the wisdom of God exceedingly, we say that it is the cause of all mind and reason and all wisdom and prudence.
3. Likewise, this seems by a likeness: for a seal impresses nothing except what is according to the species of the figure in itself, and nothing else is received in wax: therefore, since the created mind is like wax, and the wisdom of God is the seal, it seems that we receive wisdom of the same species with His, although the subject is not of the same nature: just as neither is the wax in which the impression is made, and the copper impressing.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Nothing is univocal with the Creator and creature: therefore neither is knowledge. The first is often proved.

1. Likewise, the knowledge of God is the cause of things, as will be shown below; but our knowledge is caused by known things: therefore these knowledges are not of one nature.
2. Likewise, knowledge, like every other form, inheres according to the power of the subject: because a nobler subject is of nobler knowledge, even among men: therefore, since God infinitely exceeds every created mind, His knowledge also infinitely exceeds ours: therefore it will not be of one nature.

Solution. It must be said according to blessed Dionysius in the book on Divine Names, that the knowledge of God is not univocal with our knowledge, nor even with the knowledge of Angels: how this is, let it be taken from his words. For he says thus about the knowledge of God: Supersapient and all-wise, the cause of sense, and wisdom itself per se, and the substantiating of all and particular. That is, the knowledge of God is of things as substantiating and wisdom and cause of all of which it is, whether it be whole or universal, or part or particular.

Therefore it is evident that by knowing Himself as the cause of all, He knows both Himself and all other things universally or particularly existing.

But about the knowledge of the Angel he says thus, in the same place: The virtues of angelic minds have simple and good intellects not in divisible parts or from divisible, or sensible or diverse reasons gathering divine knowledge, nor from any common to these at once. But existing clean from all material multitude, they intellectually and immaterially uniformly understand the intelligibles of divine things. The sense of these words is that Angels do not receive knowledge by beginning from created things, which are many and divided and material: nor do they receive by diverse powers, as by proper sense, and common, and imagination, and memory, and the like: nor do they come from some common as universal to the knowledge of those sensibles which are with us, but deiformly by something similar to the divine mind given and impressed to them from creation. But yet that knowledge is not the cause of being, nor does it know by this that it is a cause, since an Angel is not the creating cause of anything.

But about the knowledge of man he says in the same place, thus: Rational souls have senses indeed diffusively and in a circle going around the truth of existing things, and failing from unitive powers in divisible and very wide variety. This is, that the rational soul receives knowledge: but the rational is collative: and therefore it begins from many in which by comparing it is diffused, and is led around in a circle around the truth of existing things. And this can be understood thus: because the first light to which the examination of truth is made, is in the soul itself the agent intellect, and from that it begins by placing it around the signs and causes of things, so that it may receive the probable, or necessary, and what is received it reduces to the intellect: and thus in the intellect the circle is concluded, according to which sometimes it receives the caused from the cause, and sometimes conversely: therefore he says circle.

From these it is evident that neither of the knowledges of creatures is univocal with the knowledge of the Creator: but each imitates it as much as it can: and therefore it is said by prior and posterior, in the way that was said above, that first it is in God, and from Him, and to Him, as much as possible in the Angel and in man.

Therefore it must be said to the first, that it is a cause acting according to species in two ways, namely to matter proportioned to the same species, as an agent and generating univocally, as fire produces fire, and man produces man: and thus God does not cause: because to the divine essence no receiving matter can be proportioned. It is also a cause acting according to form and species to a nature not proportioned to the same species, as the sun acts on air, or another diaphanous receptive of light: and yet the light received is not of the same nature in the sun, and in the air, but it is more ignoble and more diffused and more obscure in the air than in the sun: and in this way God acts in such attributes which are communicable to creatures, as wisdom, life, essence, and the like. Hence it does not follow that what is received is univocal with that from which it is received.

To the other it must be said, that the exemplified imitates as much as it can, more in the Angel, and less in man as long as he is on the way: and because it approaches more to this than to another, it is not said to be more exemplified of this than of another.

To the other it must be said, that it is not similar about the seal and wax: because although wax is not matter proportioned to the natural form of the seal, yet it is matter proportioned to the form of art which is engraved in the bronze, and therefore it can receive the form of the same figure: but the mind of the Angel and of the soul is not proportioned to the divine essence, nor to knowledge as it is divine: and therefore it must receive in an inferior way, as the nature of this inferior state requires.

Articulus 2 — Whether Divine Knowledge Is Universal Or Particular; In Act, Or In Potency, Or In Habit

Whether divine knowledge is universal or particular? In act, or in potency, or in habit?

Whether divine knowledge is universal or particular? In act, or in potency, or in habit?

Secondly, it is asked, Whether divine knowledge is universal or particular, or in act, or in potency, or in habit?

It seems, however, that it is universal, or in the universal.

4: For knowledge is said to be in the universal, which is of something as it is in its universal, not compared to this particular or that: but no cause is more universal than that which is the cause of all: therefore to know through it, is to know through the most universal: but God knows by knowing it: therefore His knowledge is most universal.

1. Likewise, that knowledge is most in the universal, which is through that in which nothing of the properties of the thing is found: but God is the cause in which nothing of the properties of the thing is found: therefore He knows most in the universal. The first is evident by itself. The second is proved by this, that the properties of one thing cannot be found in the same with the properties of another thing: since therefore God is the cause of all: either the properties of all must be in Him, which is absurd: or none of the properties of anything, which is true, and then the proposition is held.
2. Likewise, to know in species, is to know in the universal: and to know in genus, is to know more in the universal: and to know in the most general, even more: and to know in being which is the principle of the most general, even more: therefore to know in that which in simplicity exceeds all said, is most to know in the universal: but God knows through that, because through Himself: therefore, etc.
3. Likewise, to know in the universal, is to know in that which is not a proper medium to conclude that: and the more it is receded from the proper medium, the more the thing is known in the universal: but it is most receded from the proper medium in that through which nothing however common caused can be concluded of necessity: therefore to know through that, is most to know in the universal: but this is God. For God is a

certain cause of all, but nothing caused is necessarily concluded through Him: therefore to know through Him, is most to know in the universal: but He knows through Himself: therefore, etc.

ON THE CONTRARY:
1. Knowledge in the universal is imperfect knowledge, in which a thing is known only imperfectly and in potency: but the knowledge of God is the most perfect of all knowledge: therefore His knowledge is not knowledge in the universal. For the first. Things in their universals are only in potency, for with the animal posited, man is not necessarily posited: therefore they cannot be known in their universals except in potency: and thus the first is evident. The second is evident by itself.

1. Likewise, to know in the universal, is to know what is determinable by something added, so that it becomes knowledge in its proper nature: but the knowledge of God is in no way determinable: therefore His knowledge is not in the universal.

Then it is asked, Whether it is knowledge in the particular?

It seems, however, that it is so: because
1. To know in the particular, is to know the proper nature of the thing: but God knows the proper natures of all: therefore His knowledge is particular knowledge, as it seems.

1. Likewise, if to know in the particular is to know through the immediate related to the proper nature of the thing, since God is more immediate to every thing than anything else, it seems that by knowing through Himself, He knows in the particular.

ON THE CONTRARY:
Knowledge in the particular and proper nature, varies according to the diversity of those from which the proper nature is.

of each: but the science of God is unchangeable: therefore it is not science in particular, as it seems.

Further, it is asked, Whether His science is in potentiality, or in habit, or in act?

1. It seems, however, that it is sometimes in potentiality: for Gregory Nazianzen says that the thought of God is the work of God: therefore before the work there is no thought in act, and after it is in act when the work is: therefore it was in potentiality, as it seems: and since in God thought and science are the same, it seems that the science of God is sometimes in potentiality.
2. Likewise, We do not say that God does all that He can do: therefore the operative power of God is in potentiality to other things which will never come into act: therefore similarly on the part of the intellectual power it can be posited in potentiality with respect to something knowable, which God will never know: and thus there is nothing inconvenient, as it seems, to posit the divine intellect to be in potentiality sometimes.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: If it is possible that it is in potentiality, and goes out into act: therefore it will go out from potentiality to act: but this is a kind of alteration: therefore it seems that God can be altered by a kind of alteration.

1. Likewise, Whatever is in potentiality, by the fact that it is in potentiality, falls short of perfection: therefore if the divine intellect according to science is in potentiality, it falls short of perfection and will not be supremely perfect.
2. Likewise, Whatever is in potentiality, by that very fact something nobler and better can be thought: therefore if the divine intellect is in potentiality with respect to something, something nobler and better can be thought by it. The first is proved by the word of the Philosopher in IX of the first Philosophy, where he says that act is nobler and better than potentiality. But that the conclusion is inconvenient is proved by Anselm in the Proslogion saying that God is a better good and greater than can be thought.
3. Likewise, There are reasons against this from the Philosopher: because if it were in potentiality, since nothing being in potentiality brings itself into act, it would be necessary that His intellect would have another intellect more divine than itself, that is, nobler,
4. Likewise, Since nothing being in potentiality goes out into act unless composed with itself, it would be necessary that it would be composite.
5. Likewise, Since everything moved is wearied from the labor of motion, unless moved circularly and by nature in some way, it would be necessary that doctrine and discipline and consideration would induce weariness and corruption in Him, which is most absurd: therefore His science is never in potentiality. If perhaps you say that this last reason of the Philosopher is not necessary. On the contrary: Let local motion be excepted, and let us speak only of alteration: it is evident that the altering form is present according to the power and nature of the subject: therefore if this form is not present and ought to be present, it is necessary that the principles of the subject be otherwise disposed: because it cannot be that the same being disposed in the same way is naturally apt to receive something, and to be without it in a proximate disposition: therefore it is necessary that such alteration in some way varies the principles of the substance: therefore it induces weariness and pain: because whatever removes the principles of distance, and makes them differ in various ways, this is laborious and painful.

Further, it is asked, Since it cannot be in potentiality, whether it is in habit?

It seems, however, that it is: because 1. We will have below that His science is the cause of things: therefore if it were always in act, it would always cause things: but it does not always cause things: therefore sometimes it is in habit.

1. Likewise, Every science which is through the species of knowables is habitual science: the science of God is such: therefore it is habitual. The first is proved thus: Habit is nothing other than the order of the species of knowable things in the knower: but God,

as is said here and in the following distinction, has in Himself the species of all knowables.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the book On the Good of Marriage says that habit is that by which one can act when the time is: therefore since God can always consider when He wills, He has the habit of science: therefore His science is science in habit.

3. Likewise, Doctors frequently use this expression, that the Lord can say dominion in habit, or in act: and in habit it is fitting for Him to be Lord from eternity, but in act from time: therefore to posit science in habit in God does not seem to be inconvenient.

But on the contrary: 1. Going out from habit to act, as the Philosopher says in II of the Soul, is altered in some way: but God is in no way altered: therefore His science does not go out from habit to act: therefore it is not in habit.

1. Likewise, Habit is something diverse from the one having it: therefore it does not befit God: because in God nothing is diverse from Himself.

2. Likewise, Habit is for the perfection of a power which of itself cannot or cannot readily go into act: but such a power is not the divine intellect: therefore it does not have habit: therefore neither science in habit.

Therefore it is further asked, If He always knows in act?

It seems, however, that He does: because 1. The most perfect in anything is to be attributed to God: but science in act is the most perfect of all sciences: therefore it is to be attributed to Him.

1. Likewise, Science in act is through that which is actually present to the intellect: but God is always present to Himself: therefore He always knows in act, because He knows only through Himself.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: Given an efficient cause, the effect always follows: but the science of God is the efficient cause of creatures: therefore to the science of God in act there always follows the production of the known in act. The first is known per se. The second is proved from this that the science of God is not speculative, but practical: but that existing in act is always joined to work: therefore the proposition is established. Since therefore He did not know all things in act from eternity (as is held at the end of this distinction), it seems that all things, not only the world, would have been from eternity, which we clearly see to be false, because neither I nor you have been from eternity. Therefore it seems that God in no way has science, since He neither knows in universal, nor in particular, nor in potentiality, nor in habit, nor in act.

Solution. It must be said that as the Commentator says on XI Metaphysics: The science of God is neither science in universal, nor in particular, nor in act: because these differences of science are of that science which takes the science of one from the preknowledge of another,

which is as a principle and sign of that: and this does not befit divine science: and therefore such differences of universal and particular do not befit it.

To that therefore which is first objected to prove that He has science in universal, it must be said that God is a universal efficient cause, but not predicable and determinable to essence: and from such a universal it is not said to know in universal: because in an efficient universally acting, which is not proportionate to the made, neither is the thing known in universal, nor in particular: just as the cause itself is neither part of the essence of the thing as genus, nor its own essence or nature.

To the other it must be said that to know through that in which there is nothing of the properties of the thing, is not to know in universal, but rather to know through that in which there is nothing of the properties in act, but it has all properties in potentiality: and this universal is not God: and therefore it is clear that the science of God is not in universal.

To the other it must be said that it is indeed true that God does not fall under a principle, nor under a genus: but this is not because He is something more universal than being or genus, for this is impossible, because nothing more universal than being can be thought: but this is from His simplicity, as was proved above. But that objection proceeds as if God is outside the community of being by way of universal scope.

To the other it must be said that God is not a medium for concluding something necessarily with respect to us who do not know the proportion of the caused to Him: but to Himself He is a sufficient medium of knowing, who knows every influence which He influences into the caused in whatever way it is from Him: but if something is not from Him, this will be privation: and that is known by Him in habit, as will be clear below: nor is that being, although it leaves being which is subject with aptitude to habit: yet this does not make in universal because as it is habit, to know a thing in universal, is to know a thing in that in which it is in universal as species in genus, or caused in remote cause, not restricted, but restrictable.

To that which is further asked, Whether His science is science in particular? It must be said that it is not: because science in particular is the science of a thing from those things which are of the proper nature of the thing: but God does not know thus, but through Himself.

To the first therefore it must be said that it is not sufficient to know in particular to know the proper nature of the thing, but it is necessary to know from the properties of the thing: and this does not befit God.

To the other it must be said that God is not immediate to the natures of things as existing from the proper nature of something, but incommiscibly and immaterially, as Dionysius says, and distinct from every nature of things.

To what is further asked about another division, namely whether science is in potentiality, or in habit, or in act? It must be said that the science of God is in no way in potentiality, or in habit, but always in act, as the objections induced to this necessarily prove. For to be in potentiality, it is necessary that the intelligent has a possible intellect, and that is material and

imperfect of itself, and in no way fitting to the divine nature. Similarly, there is no habit except of the possible intellect, for the intellect by which it is made all things, is related to the habit of knowing as matter to form: and since the possible cannot be in God in any way, habitual science cannot be in God in any way. Whence it remains that it is in act, and always acting, receiving nothing, and having nothing which He is not.

To the first therefore which is induced to prove that His intellect is in potentiality, it must be said that the thought of God is improperly taken: because to think is of the ratiocinative power, and causes collative science which Dionysius calls discursive discipline: but by Gregory thought is posited for simple practical intelligence: and it is true that this suffices for work, according to which the work is: but from eternity this intelligence according to act stands in this that not from eternity, but then when the world began, Angels and others were brought forth: and therefore before the work worked, and after, and in itself, it behaves in the same way: therefore it is never changed from potentiality to act.

But if you say the objection proceeds from the work working, and not worked: it must be said that this is false: because that is the essence of God: for essence and power and operation in God are the same: and therefore before that no potentiality can be posited: and how this is, will be clear in the solution of the last article.

Moreover, it must be said that in God there is only active potentiality: and that is not in potentiality with respect to the worked, but rather the worked is in potentiality with respect to it, and it in act: but the operation of the power from the power itself, neither is distant in God nor differs: and therefore in no way is it in potentiality to it.

To that which is further induced, that He knows in habit, It must be said that this does not follow, as will be clear below, from this that science is the cause of things, that science in act makes that the caused thing is with the cause, but rather the opposite follows.

To the other it must be said that to know through species or ideas, does not make habitual science, unless those forms or ideas are forms perfecting the intellect to act: as the objection made to the contrary well proves: and therefore that reason proceeds from the insufficient because it should be added, it is science through a species diverse from the knower himself which perfects his intellect to act.

To the other it must be said that Augustine defines habit as perfecting the power and expediting to act: but God in all His power is perfect and expedited through Himself.

To the other it must be said that habitual in the discourses of Doctors does not sound habit, but rather something similar to habit, namely not connoting act effected in the creature, just as one having habit does not necessarily act, but acts when he wills.

To that which is objected against the last, it must be said that this does not follow in the first cause: which is clear in this way: for the first cause is without measure distant from the caused: therefore the caused in no way can be assimilated to it: therefore neither in eternity.

Moreover, The cause is that to whose being another follows: therefore it is necessary that the caused follows: therefore it will not be coeternal with the cause in being: because it is caused according to its being.

Whence to the argument it must be said that the first cause is related in one way to all its known things from eternity, and it from eternity is ordering the exit of the known: and from eternity your idea and mine are ordered and determined to this that now you go out into being, and similarly I. But there is no determination of the divine intellect to this that it be made from eternity: but He in Himself from eternity determined that then or then it be made. Therefore it does not follow, if His science is the cause of the thing, and His science is from eternity in act, that creatures are made from eternity. And it is similar: just as if we posit the determination of my practical intellect now to be to some work which will be done by me after three years, and my intellect stands continuously, that then it will be done and not before: and my understanding that it be done then, is a sufficient cause for the production of the thing: then indeed my intellect in all prior time will be in act sufficiently causing that thing, and yet the thing will not be except after three years are completed.

And by this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 3 — Whether There Ought To Be A Proper Treatise On Knowledge, Power, And Will; And, In Virtue Of What Those Three Are Taken

Whether there ought to be a proper treatise on knowledge, power, and will? And, upon what are these three taken?

Then it is inquired concerning those things which are around the Letter, and first concerning this which he says, there, A, however, some species demand a special treatise, etc.

For it seems that this is not true: 1. For these are essential appropriable to persons: therefore, with others among the essential appropriable, they ought to be determined, and not in a special treatise.

1. Likewise, since the knowledge of the cause pertains to the knowledge of the caused: and these are causes of creatures, it seems if they demand a special treatise, that with creatures they ought to be determined in the second book of the Sentences, which the Master does not do.
2. Likewise, what is called a treatise? For he himself in his Prologue says, he divides this whole book only into four treatises: therefore, since this according to him is contained in the first book, it is contained in the first treatise: therefore, it does not have a special treatise.
3. Furthermore, it seems the Master errs in the execution of these three: for since power is before wisdom and will, he ought first to execute concerning power than concerning wisdom: and he does the contrary.

4. Likewise, power is the attribute of the Father, and wisdom of the Son, as was held in the preceding distinction: therefore, according to the order of nature which is in the persons, it ought to have been determined first concerning power than concerning wisdom.

Here it is inquired concerning the sufficiency of these three.

1. For it seems that the number abounds over those things which are required for causing: because these three suffice for an imperfect agent who is an artisan man: therefore, for the most perfect agent fewer are required: therefore, it seems that this ternary abounds superfluously.
2. Likewise, we see that nature acts more perfectly than practical intellect: and this is evident in the works of alchemy: because alchemical gold does not gladden the heart, nor is it so producible by hammers without cutting, as gold which nature produces.

Furthermore, in many things art falls short of nature: therefore, since God is the most perfect agent, his action will be more similar to the power of nature than of art: but for the operation of nature, only power is required, and not knowledge, and will: therefore, the treatise on knowledge and will does not pertain to this treatise, as it seems.

Solution. It must be said that although they are essential appropriable, yet the knowledge of them cannot be determined from the same principles entirely, from which the knowledge of others is determined: for others are determined through the relations of persons to each other, or through the unity or simplicity of essence: but these must be determined through the intention of the cause: because these speak of dispositions from which it is inclined to cause the creature. And if you object, that according to this, above they ought to have been placed among those things which agree from time, it must be said that it is not true: because these do not agree from time, but rather they speak of those attributes by which those things which are from time proceed from God: and so they are before time: and those things which agree from time are not before time, but after according to the reason of understanding.

To the other it must be said, that with creatures they do not fall into the same treatise: because from the principles of creation and creature they cannot be determined, but they have their own determinations fitting from eternity: nor does every cause with the caused fall into the determination of the same science or book, but only that which is proximate.

To the other it must be said, that a treatise is here called a special part of the same knowable determinable through other principles: just as God according to those things which agree to him from eternity and temporally, is the matter of this first book: and therefore that which is concerning those things agreeing to him from eternity, is of the science of the first book: but yet it is called a special part, because it cannot be determined by the principles previously had.

To that which is further objected concerning the order of execution, it must be said that these three which he touches here are considered in two ways, namely in themselves, or in

relation to work. Considered in themselves it is true, that power is before knowledge and will: but in relation to work, knowledge is as directing, and power as executing: and so power is operating after knowledge and will.

But if it is asked, Why does he execute concerning will after power? It must be said, that operating power is not in all ways joined to will, although in none is it against will: because the will of God speaks of inclination to the good which is from him: but power is efficient to being: and since being by its intention is before good, it is determined concerning power before will. Others say, that with respect to objects knowledge is more common than power: because knowledge is of goods and evils, but power is of goods only: but they do not give the reason why power is before will. Through this also the solution to the following is clear.

To that which is further inquired, it must be said that the number of these three is abundant: for these are of the perfection of the first cause: which is thus proved: The first cause either acts by necessity, or by intention, having the reasons of its works. If by necessity: then it will be bound by the necessity of nature to act, and it will be imperfect, ignorant of the reasons of its work, which is absurd. But if it acts by the freedom of will: either it will have the reasons of the work, or not. If not: then it acts imperfectly: because the Philosopher says, that even art ignorant of the reasons of the work, but only operating, is less honorable than that which knows the reasons: just as architecture is more honorable than the usual: therefore it is necessary, that it knows and wills. But that it can, no one doubts.

It must be said to the first against this objection, that in these the distance of the perfect agent from the imperfect is not considered, but rather in this that the inferior agent has these three as diverse in itself, and from itself, and that it acts through an instrument: but God has these three the same in himself: because knowledge is power, and conversely: and the same to himself, because he is his own power and his own wisdom: and he acts without an instrument through himself. Whence he is the most perfect agent.

To the other it must be said, that although nature is a more perfect cause in acting than art, yet nature does not have this insofar as it is proximate, but from the influence of the first mover: for specific forms (as the Philosopher seems to want) are from the influence of the heavens upon proximate moving and acting causes. The influence of the heavens is from the influence of the first mover. And therefore it is necessary, that nature receiving falls short of it. Therefore it receives the power of operating, and not knowledge and will, because it is not a rational and spiritual nature: whence that nature does not have these three, is not of perfection, but of defect from the first mover.

Articulus 4 — Whether The Master Well And Sufficiently Enumerates The Parts Of Knowledge, And In Virtue Of What They Are Taken

Whether the Master enumerates well and sufficiently the parts of knowledge, and according to what they are taken?

Then it is questioned concerning the division of names which he places, there, A, concerning knowledge, foreknowledge, providence, disposition, predestination, will, and power, etc.

For it seems he enumerates incompletely, since below he also treats of reprobation.

Furthermore, it is questioned, According to what is the multiplication of these names taken?

Solution. To this it must be said that from what has been stated, it is sufficiently understood how knowledge, power, and will are taken. Concerning the others, however, there can be a threefold multiplication: of which one and the first is according to how they relate to each other, and one adds upon another. Therefore, the habit of practical intellect can be considered in itself, or in comparison to another. If in itself: then it is called knowledge. If, however, in comparison to another, which is added to it as contracting it: either it is according to the reason of the medium through which it is insofar as it is knowledge, and then it will be called the same as wisdom, because wisdom is knowledge through the highest cause which is difficult for man to know, as the Philosopher says: and concerning wisdom, it will be treated below. It can also be contracted through disposition to act: this disposition either notes the order to be to act, and then it is foreknowledge or providence, which is the same, which note the order to be according to precedence to the effect: or the disposition can be on the part of that which is joined to the act: and this according to the order of things to the end, or to each other, and then it is disposition: or according to conserving the thing itself, and then it is providence: or especially to those things which are rational, and then it is predestination.

There can also be multiplication according to those objects which are simply knowable, or determined in some difference of time or being. If in the first way, then concerning them is knowledge which is of eternal, and temporal, and present, and past, and future things. If, however, they are knowable contracted: either this contraction is through the difference of time, or through the species of being. If in the first way: either commonly, or specially. If specially: then it is predestination with respect to the good of grace and glory, and the creature ordered to grace and glory. If commonly: either with respect to the thing in itself, and thus it is foreknowledge: or with respect to the order of things, and thus it is the eternal disposition concerning future things. If, however, it is through the species of being contraction: then it is providence, which predetermines perfection according to being and remaining.

Or thus: Knowledge is either with respect to the knowable as it is with the knower only, or as it is something placing around the known. If in the first way: either with the order of the knower to the known, or absolutely. If absolutely: then it is knowledge. If with order then it is foreknowledge. If, however, something is placed around the known: either commonly, or specially with respect to the more worthy creature. If commonly: either it is with respect to being, and then it is disposition: or with respect to well-being, and then it is providence, which signifies care for the well-being of things in the governance of God. If, however, it is specially with respect to the more worthy creature: then it is predestination. Other modes can also be found, but they are not necessary.

To the objection, however, it must be said that reprobation has something, with respect to which there is no divine operation, as the fault of the reprobate: and therefore among those in which the practical knowledge of God is determined, it ought not to be enumerated.

Articulus 5 — Whether The Knowledge Of God Is Eternal And Immutable

Whether the knowledge of God is eternal and immutable?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says:

Here it must be considered, etc.

1. For whatever is in God is eternal: but the eternal is immutable and necessary: therefore, it seems that by no position made can it be changed: and thus, given that nothing will be future, if before the position He was foreknowing, even afterwards He will be foreknowing.
2. Likewise, knowledge depends on the knowable, and is said relatively to it: therefore, given that there is no knowable, it follows that there is no knowledge: therefore, the Master says nothing in solving this question, that given that nothing will be future, then there will not be foreknowledge, but the knowledge by which God foreknows future things before they happen still remains.
3. Likewise, just as there is knowledge of future things, so there is of present and past things: therefore, since God is signified especially with respect to future things according to which He foreknows, His knowledge ought also to be signified by some special name with respect to past things, and by some with respect to present things, and thus it would be said that He has memory of past things, and speculation of present things, as it seems, which is false: therefore, He ought not to be called foreknowing.
4. Likewise, in our intellect there is incomparably less simplicity than in the divine intellect: but the intelligible of our intellect, because of simplicity, is not here and now, but everywhere and always, as the Philosopher says: therefore, the divine intelligible will also be abstracted from all difference of time: therefore, it ought not to be signified by a name importing the difference of future time, as it seems.

Solution. It must be said to the first, that what is in God is eternal and immutable: but nothing prohibits it from being in one relation and reason and another, according to which something is related to it in one way than another: for as Avicenna says in the first Philosophy, from the fact that something is referred to something, nothing is composed or changed: because however much something is taken as simple and immutable, by the very fact that it is first said, it is posited as relative, and yet from this it is not composed nor changed. Hence, although the knowledge of God according to what it is, is immutable: nevertheless, it is signified by one relation and another, according to how it is related to the future, or is not related to it: and therefore the Master speaks well.

To the other, it must be said that the knowledge of God does not depend on the knowable: but rather the knowable, which is the creature, depends on the knowledge of God, as on a cause: and therefore in divine things the contrary happens to what the Philosopher said. For the Philosopher says that knowledge is referred to the knowable, but not conversely of necessity: for knowledge posits the knowable, but it is not converted: but in the knowledge of God

the knowable is referred to knowledge, and not conversely: because in lower things knowledge is caused by the knowable, but in God the opposite: and therefore, with the knowable not existing as created, or even not being future, the knowledge of God is not destroyed: because it receives nothing from the knowable, but rather causes the knowable.

To the other, it must be said that knowledge of the present is concomitant with the thing, and knowledge of the past as such follows the thing: and none of these befits God, but only the knowledge preceding the thing befits Him, just as the eternal cause precedes the temporal caused: and therefore it is not called the memory of God or present contemplation, but only foreknowledge.

To the other, it must be said that what is known by God is altogether timeless, nor is the difference of time posited concerning the known, according to what is in the knowledge of God, but it is posited concerning the being of the known thing: because this is related as following knowledge, according to which the caused follows the cause: and therefore with respect to that it is called foreknowledge.

Articulus 6 — Whether This Name, Creator, Signifies The Divine Essence

Whether this name, creator, signifies the divine essence?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, C, Nevertheless creator is said relatively, so that it does not signify the essence, etc.

1. For this seems to be against the rule of the Doctors, that every name said of God connoting an effect in the creature signifies the divine essence.
2. If perhaps you say that it signifies a respect to creatures. On the contrary: Respect to creatures is also signified by prescience: therefore if one does not signify the essence, neither does the other: or if one signifies, so does the other.

Solution. It must be said, as above, that creator, as Damascene says, signifies the relation of God to those things from which he is distinguished: and that relation supposes the essence, as around which it is posited: and the understanding is not false on account of the act of creation, although it does not signify a relation really inherent from time: and therefore the Master says that it does not signify the essence.

To the other it must be said that prescience in the principal signification from which the name is imposed gives to understand the divine essence: because it imports the essence not hathe quality of relation, except from the composition of the preposition: and therefore the Master says

that it signifies essence, and not creator.

Articulus 7 — Whether There Are Ideas In The Divine Mind

Whether in the divine mind there are ideas?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, There, Therefore all things are said to be in God, etc.

For here arises the question concerning ideas, about which for the understanding of the following we inquire four things: of which the first is, Whether there are ideas in the divine mind? Second, Whether in the reason of speculative or practical knowledge? Third, Whether there is one idea, or many? Fourth, Whether there are ideas of all things in God, or not of all?

To the FIRST it is proceeded thus:
1. Augustine says in the book of Seventy-Three Questions: Ideas are the reasons of things. From this it is taken, that they are stable and immutable, which are contained in the divine intelligence. And since they neither arise nor perish, according to them, however, the form is said, all that which can arise and perish! Ideas are, and for what they are, and where they are: and therefore this authority is very notable.

1. Likewise, in the same place: All things are created by reason: nor by the same reason man, as horse: for this is absurd to think. Therefore, each is created by its own reasons. But these reasons are not to be thought to be except in the mind of the creator: for he was not beholding anything placed outside himself.
2. Likewise, Augustine in the book of Retractions: Nor did Plato err in this, because he says there is an intelligible world, etc. For Plato called the intelligible world the very eternal reason, by which God made the world: which whoever denies to be, it follows that he says God made what he made irrationally.
3. Likewise, in the book of the City of God he says: Plato posits ideas: and whoever denies them, he does not doubt to be unfaithful: because he denies the Son of God.
4. Likewise, Boethius in the book of the Consolation of Philosophy says:

You lead all things from the supreme example, beautiful most beautiful [himself]
Bearing the world in mind...

1. Likewise, to the Hebrews XI, 3: By faith we understand the worlds to be framed by the word of God, so that from invisible things visible things were made. But there ideas and reasons of the archetypal world in the mind of God are said.
2. This is also proved thus by reason: It is established, that God does not act by the necessity of nature, as was held before: therefore he acts by intellect: but every agent by intellect has with itself the reason of the work and the exemplar, or it is ignorant of what it does: therefore since God knows what he does, he has with himself the reasons of all his operables: and these are called ideas: therefore he has ideas with himself.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
1. More is opposed by that which is in diverse essence, than by that which is distinct, remaining in the same essence: therefore with respect to that which is in diverse essence, there is greater opposition in God, than that which is in God among those things which are of the

same essence: but the respect among those things which are of the same essence, makes in the divine the distinction of persons: therefore the respect to that which is of diverse essence, will make a diversity of essences, since it is of greater opposition: but such is the respect of ideas: therefore ideas in God will make a diversity of essences, which cannot be: therefore there are no ideas in God.

1. Likewise, Every diversity which is in causes and caused, it is necessary that it be reduced to one principle of the universe, because otherwise there would be many principles: but more one principle is that which is one in essence and reason, than that which is indeed one in essence, but many in reason: therefore it is necessary, that this be taken as one in essence and reason: therefore in it there are no ideal reasons.
2. Likewise, we see this in the principles of nature: for every diversity which is in proper natural qualities, is reduced to the first active and passive qualities, namely the differences of the elements, hot, cold, moist, dry: but the multiple diversity of the action of those qualities is reduced to the diverse motion of the heavens, less diverse, however, than is the action of the elements: but the diversity of the motion of the heavens, since it is multiple, is reduced to the number of the movables which are eight or nine, and the diversity of these again is reduced to the first mover: therefore it is necessary, that the first into which all reduction is made, be one in reason, and according to the diversity of reasons it moves: and this being given there will not be ideas: therefore ideas are not, as it seems.
3. Likewise, If there are ideas, for what are they? For it is superfluous in the cause, that which is not for the production of the caused, as it seems: but the diversity of generated and corrupted can be caused otherwise, according to what the Philosophers say, that the nature of the sphere is not to make uniformity in those things which are in one nature and of one reason. But the nature of the sphere having many stars, is to make diversity of figure and form in generated and corrupted. But the nature of the sphere of the moon is to move water according to diverse position into diverse mixture, so that the mixed may be continuous, because pure earth does not make continuation, but comminution. But the nature of the sphere of the sun is to move fire to the emission of heat moving and digesting and maturing the continuous mixed. But the nature of the spheres of the five other planets is to move the air, because there are many motions in the air, because those planets are of many diversities in motions of declination, and involutions, and descent, and ascent, and station, direction, retrogradation, and the like. Therefore, since from that diversity the diversity of forms is sufficiently caused, as it seems, the position of ideas is superfluous.

Solution. It must be said, that without doubt even speaking philosophically it is necessary to posit ideas, as Augustine says: because otherwise it would follow, that God without reason by which he would know the world, created the world.

Therefore it must be said to the first objection, that relation does not diversify, except by that which it has of the nature of opposition: for the logicians say, and it is true, that it is

argued otherwise from relatives insofar as they are relative, and otherwise from opposed relatives insofar as they are opposed: for insofar as they are relative, being posited they posit themselves, and being removed they remove themselves: but by that which they are opposed, it follows that one is not the other: and therefore in persons in which there is relation really, it is true that they are distinguished, and are removed from each other. But the intellect of God to created things is a relation according to reason, but of created things to him according to reality: and therefore the creator essentially indeed differs from created things, but respect from respect does not: because between respect and respect there is no opposition: and therefore by that relation God is only one principle, as will be clear below: and those respects in him do not have distance, or opposition, or diversity, although they are signified plurally: because they are to diverse things.

To the other it must be said, that all diversity without doubt is reduced to one essentially and in reason with respect to itself: but it is not the principle of the universe and diversity, unless it is referred to diverse things: and therefore those reasons with respect to respects are multiplied on the posterior part, namely according to what they are on the part of creatures ordered to him, but on his part not, because he by himself is the cause of each caused: and so still it is left to be an idea in the reason of those respects to created things.

To the other it must be said, that I well concede this, that such reduction is in natural causes: but that does not remove the immediate respect of each to the first: for the first is not such, as some erring Philosophers said, that it has immediate influence over the first movable, and not over others: but it immediately influences all, and also through others it influences: and on the part of that respect by which it influences the being of each, the ideal reason is posited.

To the other it must be said, that the necessity of ideas is: because the diversity of stars and images and proportion of positions from the motion of the spheres, would never make diverse form, unless it were influenced by God who is the principle of the universe: and also the received reason of form could not influence, unless God more immediately influenced, as it is held, John v, 17: My Father works until now, and I work. And therefore it is necessary to posit ideas, which are the reasons of those forms.

Articulus 8 — Whether The Ideas Are In The Divine Mind In The Notion Of The Speculative Knowable Or Of The Practical

Are ideas in the divine mind in the manner of speculative or practical knowledge?

Are ideas in the divine mind in the manner of speculative or practical knowledge?

Secondly, it is asked whether there are ideas in the manner of speculative or practical knowledge?

It seems, however, that they are only practical: because

1. Ideas are for making: therefore they are exemplars of things to be done: such things,

however, belong to the practical intellect: therefore ideas are according to the manner of practical intelligibility.

1. Likewise, Augustine above called them reasons, saying that man is formed by one reason, and horse by another: therefore they are in God as practical, and not as speculative.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
God has speculative knowledge of the world: for it is not sufficient that He knows how to make the world, unless He also knows every nature of the world: therefore it seems that it is necessary to posit ideal reasons in that manner.

Solution. It must be said that ideas imply a relation to the thing, and therefore they are properly speaking according to the practical intellect.

To what is objected in the contrary, it must be said that God has all knowledge both of Himself and of the world: but nevertheless, because the speculative intellect, insofar as it is speculative, posits nothing concerning the thing, therefore from that part it does not have an ideal relation. However, the practical intellect posits the reason it has within itself concerning the work, according to what the Philosopher says, that the health which is in the animal, or in man, is the health which is from the health that is in the soul of the physician: wishing by this to prove, as the Commentator says, that the first mover is in some way the form of those things which are formed by it. If you say that although the speculative intellect posits nothing concerning the thing, yet it receives from the thing: and therefore from that part it has ideas: this is false in God: but it is true in us: because our knowledge is caused by things, as was held above: but God, by understanding Himself, understands all things: and the multitude of ideas is not from His part, as will be made clear later, but is only understood from the relation of the ideated things to Him: and the speculative intellect is not as properly ideal in God as it is speculative, as the practical is according to what it is practical. It is, however, true that God contemplates Himself as the principle of all things, and thus in some way as exemplar and cause: and therefore some say that He understands Himself as an idea.

Articulus 9 — Whether In God There Is One Idea Or Many

Whether in God there is one idea, or many?

Thirdly, it is asked, Whether in God there is one idea or many?

1. And it is argued from a certain consideration which is in the second of the Topics, and only one which is this: If someone were to say that knowing is understanding, it must be considered in one and many if they differ: for if they differ, this is not that. However, it is established that the idea is the divine essence, because nothing is in God except God: therefore, since the essence and idea are the same: and the essence is one, there will be only one idea: for if there were many ideas, according to the consideration introduced, the essence would not be the idea.
2. Likewise, in the soul it is such that the power of understanding is not entirely simple, because it is born to have many reasons: therefore, if the intellect of God had many

ideas, it would not be entirely simple, which is false: therefore, there are not many ideas.

3. Likewise, if there are many: either in reality, or in reason. If in reality: then it follows that more things than three were from eternity, which is heretical: because there were no things from eternity, except the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, who are three things, as Augustine says in the book on Christian Doctrine. But if they are many by reason alone: but Boethius says that a reason is empty and vain, which cannot be placed around a thing: therefore that reason will be empty and vain. And if you say that Boethius's statement is contrary to the Philosopher's, who says that there is no falsehood in abstractions: and some gloss this, because abstraction is not placed around a thing, and thus we can understand something that is not in the thing. On the contrary: there would be falsehood in abstractions if they abstracted what can neither be nor be abstracted by definitive reason, like flesh from lead, or bronze: for flesh is never found in lead, or in bronze: but a circle and a straight line are found in one reason in different materials in species: and therefore it can be abstracted from each of them, because none of those materials falls into its definition. But it is not so here: because nothing can be given around whose definition or being you place the reasons of many ideas.
4. If you say that plurality is caused by things related to God, as causing through intellect. On the contrary: Temporal things are: but the temporal is not the cause of the eternal: therefore things do not cause many reasons to be in God.
5. Likewise, before things existed, there was no relation of many to God: therefore then they did not cause such plurality of reasons: and thus these reasons were not from eternity, as it seems, but only one idea: therefore plurality would be more in things than in ideas, which is against Augustine in the book of Eighty-Three Questions, who says: Let it not be that we place the reason of those outside God! It signifies them to be plural in God.
6. Likewise, if things cause unity and multitude in ideas: since unity and composition and necessity and contingency are also consequent to things, it seems that ideas also receive unity and composition, etc., from things: which is false, since Augustine says that they neither arise, nor perish, nor change, but are stable.
7. Likewise, if the multitude of created things is the cause of the multitude of ideas: therefore the multitude on the part of things is pre-understood to the multitude of ideas: but the multitude of created things is from time, and the multitude of ideas from eternity: therefore that which is from time is pre-understood to that which is from eternity, which is impossible: therefore it seems that ideas are in no way many.

ON THE CONTRARY:
1. If this is conceded, it will be against the statement of Augustine introduced above, that God does not form man and horse by one reason.

1. Likewise, the reasons of a thing are proper to the thing itself: but in proprieties there is difference and multitude: therefore it seems that proper ideas and reasons are many. If you say that God has ideas only of universals, as some have said, and does not have proper ideas: from this follows the heresy that He does not know things properly, but only commonly: which was disproved at the beginning of this distinction: because God knows through an idea: and of what there is no idea, there is no cognition in the divine mind, or it is known as a privation, as the Master will say below about the cognition of evil.

Solution. It must be said without prejudice, that an idea is considered in three ways, namely according to what it is, and thus it is the divine essence and divine intellect, and it is one alone. Likewise, it is considered in comparison to the one understanding through the idea, or operating, and thus again it is not many, but only one: because the one understanding is one indivisible. Thirdly, it is considered in relation to the works themselves of which it is the idea, and thus it has plurality on the part of respect to them. Hence, in my judgment, it is better said to be the idea of many, than many ideas. Dionysius gives an example of this in the center of a circle, which is the principle of lines going out to the circumference, and also of the circumference, because the whole circumference is generated from it, and is moved from it, as the wise say: and it indeed is one according to what it is: and if we suppose in it to be both the mover of the circumference, and to move through the lines going out, just as from the axis the spokes move the circumference in a wheel, the center in comparison to the whole motion is one: but in comparison to the lines by which the motion of the whole is made, it is in the reason of many, and it is rather one of many than many: but nevertheless the respects will be in it according to the relation of many to it. Hence it is properly signified when it is said that it is in itself one of one mover receiving many diversely: but this multiplicity of respects is caused by those things which are outside it, and therefore it is not multiplied in itself. By a similar understanding of this kind, let us understand the immobile nature of God causing and moving the whole wheel of the world: by the lines going out let us understand the individual created things, by which the succession of created things, as if by circular generation, the world is moved: and let us then say that that immobile first, is one principle, yet of many going out from it: and let us say that an idea names, not the thing itself according to what it is, but rather its respect to that of which it is the principle: and since that respect is multiplied according to the multitude of those principled, it follows that ideas are many and reasons: but nevertheless that there are not many intellects, or moving principles.

Therefore, let it be said to the first, that that consideration is understood of those in which one is placed as the same to another absolutely, whether essentially, or accidentally in an absolute (which pertains to the book on accident) is signified: as if it is said that man is an animal, it follows that many men are many animals: and if it is said that man is white, it follows that many men are many whites. But in relation it is otherwise: because it is multi-

plied by that which is outside the relative as to the respect in which it is necessary to gather that which is referred to it: and therefore it does not follow that if the essence is the idea, that just as there is only one essence, so there is only one idea.

To the other, it must be said that it is otherwise in the soul: because the soul has received forms, which are caused by many, and therefore many making comparisons in it. But in God it is not so, as has already been seen: because He is the cause through His knowledge, and through His intellect: and therefore there is only diversity of respects, and not of species, or forms: and therefore no composition is induced in Him: because, as shown above, from relation alone nothing is made more composite than it was before, especially in those relatives in which real dependence is not in both of the relatives, but in one only, as it is in the idea and the ideated.

To the other, it must be said that there is multitude by reason alone, and even less, if it can be less: because there is multitude by reason, and multitude in reality, and there is multitude of reason above the thing. Multitude by reason alone is multitude of what is signified together from the signification of another: as for example, if I am white, and you are black, and you become white, without any change made in me, there are here many similars: and the plurality which is imported by the term similars, is signified together by the relation of you to me, not by my relation but by my correlation to you: because with one similarity placed in you, it is necessary to signify another in me: which however is not caused by anything that has come to me. This multitude is even more directly in the center of a circle, which is the principle of lines: for with the lines signified plurally, it is necessary to signify the plurality of respects of the center to them: and thus there is multitude of reason signified together in ideas: and therefore perhaps it is frequently found among the Saints, that they say ideas signifying plurality only together, and they do not say, or rarely say many ideas, importing plurality by the principal signification of this word which is many. But the plurality of the thing is sufficiently clear. Similarly, the plurality of reason which is placed around the thing.

To the objection therefore that is made against it, it must be said that the temporal is not the cause of the eternal, because creatures do not cause the eternal: but nevertheless the eternal can be signified together in some way with the temporal, and be made known in some reason with the temporal, in which it is not signified or made known as it is eternal: and therefore that reason is not empty and vain, since it is placed around the thing in some way, namely not considered in itself, but as it is made known through the comparison of the temporal to it: for this suffices for the intellect to be preserved.

To the other, it must be said that although things in themselves and in their proper being are not from eternity: yet in potency they are from eternity. And if you ask, In what potency? I say that in the potency of the efficient cause. But if you object, that according to this they are not many, and therefore they are not referred as many to ideas. It must be said that things according to what they are there, are not many: yet as they are signified to be going out, they are as many, and thus as many they are referred to their ideas according to which they go out: and in this the multitude signified according to reason is caused, which is the least of all

pluralities: because the things themselves are in potency, and the respects in potency: and the signified together plurality is only of reason signified together, and not of the thing signified.

To the other, it must be said that one and many follow being in itself, whether it is signified in cause, or in potency, or in effect: and diversity, and opposition, and composition, and mutability, and materiality, and necessity, and contingency, do not follow things according to what they are in themselves in any way, but rather according to what they are created after not being: because the creatable is changeable, and the changeable is composite, and diverse, and opposed to another, and so on with others: and therefore they cannot be transferred to things signified in cause, as one and many: yet it does not seem to me to be said that there are many ideas, although we say ideas signifying together plurality: and if we were to concede that there are many ideas, we would not have to concede many or diverse ideas because of this: because any difference suffices for plurality, but not for multitude: the sign of which is that we say in the divine persons there are many, but not many properly speaking.

To the other, it must be said that to pre-understand the multitude of creatures happens in two ways, namely as of existing, and thus it is false: or of going out from the cause, and thus it is true, that the temporal is pre-understood not as temporal to the eternal: because the eternal indeed cannot be caused by the temporal, but insofar as it is signified with it, it can receive some reason of signifying together, which is not signified without it.

Articulus 10 — Whether In God There Are Ideas Of All Things, And Especially Of Prime Matter

Whether in God there are ideas of all things, and especially of prime matter?

Then it is asked, whether in God there is the idea of all things, and this especially on account of prime matter: because

1. If an idea is the reason of form, it does not seem to have a relation except to form: therefore not to matter, as it seems.
2. Likewise, an idea is a principle of knowing: but everything that is known, is known by form: therefore it seems that there is no idea of matter.

But on the contrary.
Whatever is created has an ideal reason in the divine mind, or of the Creator: prime matter is created: therefore it has an idea in the mind of the Creator. If perhaps you say that prime matter is known through form: this is nothing, because we inquire about that knowledge by which it is known through itself.

Furthermore, it is absurd to say that you say God takes knowledge of one thing through another, as we do: because then there would be something of which He would have knowledge only accidentally, and not through itself, which is false: therefore He knows prime matter through itself.

If perhaps you wish to say that privation is not separable from matter: because through itself it is potency to form, as some say. Against this there seem to be three inconveniences: the first of which is that something is below the first in its potency. The second is that privation is not known by God except through habit, as the Master will say below. Since therefore the potency of matter is privation, it does not have its own idea in which an idea is formed. The third inconvenience is as before, that matter is known by God through another, and not through itself in its own nature.

Solution. Without prejudice I say that God knows matter and makes it immediately through the idea of matter. For although according to Boethius and Avicenna, those things which are only in potency, like matter, or always mixed with potency according to the succession of itself from potency to act, like motion and time, or mixed with potency to that which is contrary to the act in which they are, like the void and the infinite, are not fully intelligible by us: nevertheless they are known by God with full intellect: and therefore I say there is an idea, the species of the efficient, which it imitates as much as it can in effect. Some things imitate it according to potency only, like prime matter: and some according to act mixed with potency in succession, like motion and time: or in rest, like the void or the infinite: but some by reaching to a determined form in act not mixed with a nobler or ignobler, like creatures which are determined in mode, species, and order of their proper nature.

And by this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 11 — Whether Creatures, Once Made, Became Known To God In Another Way Than They Were Known As To Be Made

Whether creatures were known to God in a different way when made than they were known to be made?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, BE, I do not dare to say that they were known to God in a different way when He had made them, than in that way in which He knew them to make them, etc.

For it seems that this is false: because 1. Each thing is related to being as it is related to truth. But truth simply is known in a different way and is better known than truth in a certain respect: therefore, being simply is better and in a different way known than being in a certain respect: but creatures from eternity before they were made were only in a certain respect, namely in the potentiality of the efficient and exemplary cause: therefore, they were known only in a certain respect: and afterwards they are known simply: therefore, they were known in a different way when made than they were known to be made.

1. Likewise, either God knows those things which are from eternity simply, or only in a certain respect. If in a certain respect: therefore, His knowledge was imperfect, and afterwards it was perfected. If simply, and things were only in a certain respect: therefore, He knew otherwise than they were: therefore, He was deceived, which is false.

2. If perhaps you say, as Augustine and Anselm say, that things are more truly in God than in themselves: because in Him they are life and light, as Augustine says, and

creative essence, as Anselm says: in themselves, however, they are evening or darkness, and mutable: and therefore they are more truly known where they more truly are. On the contrary: The truth of a thing is from the form of the thing: but the form giving the proper being of the thing was never in God: therefore the truths of things were never in God: therefore a thing is not more truly in God than in itself.

1. Likewise, the truth of the nature of this thing is not from that which is common, namely to itself and another, but from its own proper form: because in the common it is only in potentiality, but in its truth it is in actuality. Since therefore in God it is not in its own proper, but in common to itself and another: and it is not in Him in actuality, but only in potentiality: it will not be truly in Him: therefore it will not be more truly in Him than in itself.

2. And because there is doubt about this, let the very words of the Author be taken as they lie. Augustine says in book XI of the City of God, thus: Angels know the creature itself better there, that is, in the wisdom of God, as in the art by which it was made, than in itself: and therefore they know themselves better there than in themselves. For they were made, and are other than He who made them. Therefore there as in enduring knowledge, but in themselves as in evening. From this it is taken, that Angels also know themselves better in God than in themselves: and they do not know themselves better, unless where they are better and more truly: therefore they are seen to be better and more truly in God than in themselves. Anselm, however, in the Monologion says thus: It is not doubtful to anyone that created substances are much otherwise in themselves than in our knowledge: for in themselves they are through their very essence, but in our knowledge not yet their essences, but their likenesses. Therefore it remains that they are so much more truly in themselves than in our knowledge, as they are more truly somewhere through their essence than through their likeness. Since therefore it is also established, that every created substance is so much more truly in the Word, that is, the intelligence of the Creator, than in itself, as the creative essence exists more truly than the created essence, how will the human mind comprehend what kind of saying of God that is, and that knowledge of God, which is so far superior to created substances, if our knowledge is so far surpassed by them, as their likeness differs from their essence? From this it is taken, that things are more truly in God than in themselves, which seems to be against what was previously proven.

But still against this it can be objected, 2. When it is said, the Creature is in God: either it is understood of the creature which is, or of the creature which is not. If of the creature which is: since it has nothing in the genus which is not in some of the species, all species of creatures could be inferred universally, because the predicate is rendered equally to the subject by reason of all: therefore the donkey is in God, and man is in God, which is false. But if of the creature which is not. On the contrary: When it is said, the Creature is in God, the term

creature supposes the verb of the present tense: therefore it is restricted to stand for the present: therefore the creature supposes there for that which is predicated presently: and it was said, that it supposes for that which is not: therefore it is simply false, the Creature is in God.

1. Likewise, the word of Augustine seems to imply an impossibility, namely that he knows equally and in the same way those things which are, and those things which are not. For God knows those things to be which are: and in the same way He knows those things which are not: therefore He knows those things to be which are not: which is impossible: because if He knows, then it is true what He knows: and thus it is true that those things which are not, are: and this is contradictory to be verified at the same time about the same.

Solution. Without prejudice it can be said, that when it is said, Creatures are better and more truly in God than in themselves, that there the comparison is made of the double being of the creature: and this must be simply taken abstracted from this being and that, in which the comparison is made. And to understand this, let us distinguish the fourfold being of the creature, namely the first in its own nature. The second in the reason of nature which is abstracted from that which is in its own nature. The third which is of nature in the exemplar of the first cause existing, and not simply. The fourth is that which is common to all these, which is the being of the creature existing in whatever way. I say therefore, that in the sayings of the Saints the third being is compared to the first, and the second according to the reason of the fourth: because every comparison is in something common to both of the compared: but the excess of the comparison is not according to the same in which the comparison is, but according to the compared: and therefore the third being according to that which it is, exceeds the first and second: and this is plain which the Saints intend, when they prove that it is more truly there, because there is the creative essence. However, the comparison is not made, so that both of the compared are referred to the being of the creature in nature, as that which is according to something and simply is referred: for it must be referred to the same if the comparison is to be made in that: and therefore this is not attended to. Whence that the creature in itself is simply, and in God according to something, this does not contribute to the proposition according to the intention of the Saints: because the comparison is made here in the reason of the common which is the fourth being, which extends itself to being simply and according to something: and the excess is noted according to the truth and nobility of the compared to each other, as we said before.

Others say thus, that the being of the thing is one thing, and the thing being is another: and they concede, that the being of the thing is more truly in God than in itself, but not the thing. But then still the same question will be about the being of the thing: for the being of the thing is never called by anyone except by which the thing is that which it is: and thus to the being of the thing follows the thing being, although the being of the thing and the thing being itself are not the same. Whence it is necessary to return to the superior solution, as it seems to me.

But if we wished to solve according to the man, and not according to the intention of the Saints, we would say that when it is said the thing is better and more truly in God than in itself, that there is a double expression from the equivocation of that which is better and more truly: for if the term better is an adverb, the sentence is false. But if a noun, it is true: because the thing in God is God, who is more true than the creature: and then the objection would cease: but nevertheless this is not the intention of the Saints.

To the other it must be said, that God from eternity knows all things simply, and not according to something: but He does not know all things from eternity to be simply: for when it is said, He knows all things simply from eternity, the term simply is referred to the act of the word as it is referred to the suppositum, not as it passes over the appositum: whence in the object a sophism is made from composition and division.

To the other it must be said, that the truth of the thing is twofold, namely absolute which is in the thing itself, and that is the indivision of act from potentiality: and it is the truth which Anselm defines, which is rectitude perceptible only by the mind, and that is in the thing in comparison to the highest rectitude, which is the measure of others: and this is true when the thing is to that, to which it is in the mind of the creative wisdom: but nowhere is it so true as there. And from this it does not follow that the thing is in nature, but only to be in whatever way.

To the other the solution is clear from what was held in the preceding question: because there it was shown, that the idea is appropriated from relation: and therefore every thing is in the divine mind as in its own idea, although the mind itself is common to all.

To the authority of Augustine introduced for the opposite part, it must be said that without doubt in the divine mind, in which the thing is only according to something, it is better known than in itself. And to understand this it must be noted, that there is a twofold according to something. One is in which the thing is indeed according to something, but it itself is the whole and perfect intention of the thing, as is the species received from the thing in the intellect: for the thing is not in the intellect except according to something, and yet that is the perfect intention and reason of the thing: and therefore in that it is perfectly known. Another is according to something, which is in it according to something, as according to part, or according to potentiality: and in that it is not known except according to that which it itself is not the reason and perfect intention of the thing, but of the part or potentiality of the thing. Thus therefore it is clear how the thing is according to something in the idea, which since it is life and light penetrating the innermost of the thing, it illuminates better for knowing than any intention can do, which is abstracted from the thing itself: and this is the intention of the words of Augustine, and Anselm: and therefore they name that diurnal from full light, or matutinal from growing light, knowledge. But that which is in its own nature, which is through form mixed with matter and privation and potentiality, and consequently wrapped in darkness, they call evening knowledge.

To that which is secondly objected against the saying of the Saints, it must be said that when it is said, the creature in the Creator or in God, is God or the creative essence, this

determination is referred, in God or in the Creator, to the suppositum before it provides the suppositum to the verb: and therefore before the difference of the present signified in the verb, it is extracted outside its own reason to stand for that which is according to something and not simply: and then the verb coming has the present confused as it is fitting to that suppositum: and therefore that division does not proceed, either for the creature which is, or for the creature which is not.

To the other it must be said, that when Augustine says, that in the same way he knows those things which are, and those things which are not, he does not intend, that his knowledge in the same way passes over the known when they are and when they are not, because this is impossible, since thus opposites are placed around the same, as the objection proves: but he intends, that on the part of the knower there is the same mode, because he receives nothing from them: and therefore whether they subsist to his knowledge, or not, through the proper being of the creature nothing is changed in him.

Articulus 12 — Whether All Things Are In God Life And Light; And If So, Whether In The Notion Of The Speculative Or Of The Practical

Whether all things are in God life and light? And if so, whether in the reason of the speculative or practical?

Then it is asked concerning what is said there, E, "All that was made is said to be life in Him," etc.

For this also seems by what Augustine says above the beginning of John: "Behold how I can, I say to your truth: the ark in work is not life, the ark in art is life, because the soul of the artificer lives in which all these things are before they are brought forth. Thus the wisdom of God according to which all things were made contains all things before it fabricates." Let Augustine be granted, it is false to suppose in his similar induction: for the species in the intellect neither lives nor is life, but is an accident of the intellect itself.

Likewise, it is asked whether they are life and light by reason of the speculative intellect or practical?

For it seems that by reason of the speculative: because light properly belongs to it: therefore, when light is joined with life, both should be referred to the speculative.

Against this again it seems that 1. Evils follow the speculative intellect in God, yet it is not said that they are life in Him.

1. Furthermore, since wisdom, power, will, say those things which are required for creating a creature: it seems that things existing in the cause are rather in it as power, wisdom, will, than as life and light. If you say according to what is commonly said, that power, wisdom, will, are not communicated to creatures going forth, but light and life: this is clearly false, because not all created things live and shine. If you say that these are communicated to creatures according to their genera, which are corporeal and spiritual: because some corporeal things live, and all spiritual things: and some corporeal

things shine, and some spiritual things. Against: When all things are said to be in God as life and light, this is not understood according to genera, but also according to species and individuals: therefore it seems that in species and individual it ought to participate in those.

Again it is asked, if all things are in God as life and light, whether it should be conceded that all things in God live and shine?

1. It seems so: because life by itself always flows into life, and light by itself always into light: since therefore in God there cannot be anything but life by itself and light by itself, it seems that they live and shine.
2. Likewise, it seems that they should rather be called being and true and good in the first cause, than life and light: because being and good and true and one are among the first participated from God: but life and light are not generally participated, since Dionysius says in the book On the Divine Names, that life does not extend beyond the life of plants.

Solution. It must be said that all things are in God as life and light, and this according to the property of the cause, and not according to the property of the caused: for this belongs to the creature not in itself, but according to what is in the first cause. Life, however, is the act and continuous spirit in what is or in the body. In the cause, however, life is taken according to what is a continuous act, which is the cause of the continuity of being, according to what the Philosophers said about the motion of the heavens, that it is something immortal and without rest, as a certain life existing by nature in all things: and therefore this being belongs according to the relation to the cause of all, according to which it is the cause by creating and disposing through ideas the continuation of the whole nature: for we do not posit the motion of the heavens as the first cause of the continuity of being and diversity of species, but rather the perpetuity of God through practical knowledge causing both being and diversity and continuity in itself: and in this respect, it is called the life of the whole nature. Therefore, as Augustine says in the book On the City of God, some Philosophers called it the soul of the world, governing and moving the world by motion and reason: although they were reprehensible in this, that they called the Creator who is the life of nature (because He moves continuously and contains) the soul and not the Creator of the soul. In this way, therefore, the creature is said to be life in Him, because it is the idea moving the world by motion and reason into the continuity of generation. Light, however, is according to the reason of the idea, according to which also the Philosophers posited two things, namely that it moves by motion, and in this respect it belongs to it to be the life of nature: and by reason, and in this respect it belongs to it to be light. The creature, however, going forth from Him does not participate in these: because they do not belong according to what goes forth, but according to what is in the reason of remaining in Him, as has been said.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that what Augustine says is true, because the idea of the ark in the mind of the artificer is life in this way, because it is moving and light for making the ark: nor is the idea an accident, because in every intellect there is a double species, namely

of the thing, and of the species. For the intellect, as the Philosopher says, is the species of species, just as the hand is the instrument of instruments: and this is especially true of the agent whose light is the species of all intelligibles, because through it simple intelligibles are made: and this species is not an accident, but a moving life in the practical intellect, and contemplation in the speculative. And in this respect, Augustine speaks truly.

To what is further asked, it must be said that the first and proximate relation of the creature, as life and light, is in the practical intellect, because that life and light being, is the cause of continuity in the whole nature by the fact that it is the principle of the whole created being: but yet it also understands things speculatively: but in this way it is not properly said to be life and light, but only light can be said.

To what is objected, it must be said that light is the ruler of work in the practical: and this belongs to the operative idea: and therefore light pertains to the practical, just as to the speculative.

To another, it must be said that power, wisdom, and will, do not say that which is proximate to the going forth of creatures: because that which is proximate is in some way the reason of the creature, as it is the idea: and therefore since every relation is always in the proximate according to the reason of the creature related to the cause, they are not called power, wisdom, and will, but rather life and light, which are fitting to the idea, as has been said.

To another, it must be said that it is not to be conceded that all live and shine: because when life and light are verbally signified, then the creature is noted as a substance from which the act of life and light goes forth: and this does not fit: because as has already been said, these belong to the creature according to what it is the creating idea, not according to what is signified by actual being: for nothing acts unless it is actual: and therefore the creature cannot then be said to live and shine.

To another, it must be said that being and good and true and one flow from the Creator upon the creature universally: and therefore they not only belong to the creature according to what is remaining in the Creator, but also according to what is in itself: and therefore they do not say so.

Furthermore, although being is indistinct, yet true, one, and good, say certain distinctions: and because the creature in the Creator is not in distinct being, therefore again it does not fit.

Articulus 13 — Whether Creatures Are Called Beautiful According As They Are In The Act Of Existing, Or According As They Are In The Divine Mind

Whether creatures are said to be beautiful according to that which they are in the act of existing, or according to that which they are in the divine mind?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said, there, "The beauty of the field is with me," etc.

For as Tullius says, beauty consists in commensuration: it is evident, however, that to be commensurated and proportioned does not belong to a creature except in the act of existing: therefore it does not belong to it according to that which it is in the mind of the Creator.

To this it must be said, that beauty is called the proportion of the exemplar, not in such a way that I say the Creator is proportioned to the creature, but because each thing proceeds from its own ideal reasons: and therefore things are then said to be beautiful in the Creator on account of the removal from those things which disfigure, such as the two privations, namely because it is after nothing, and therefore the creature is changeable, and that privation which is in matter and materiality and mutability and composition: for all these disfigure the being of the creature, and they follow from privation, just as diversities follow from negation, and diversity from composition, and mutability from one to another: for these the creature does not receive from the Creator, but they occur in it, from the fact that it is brought forth into being after it was nothing. Whence also the Manichean, not seeing how these follow from privation, posited that these were from the God of darkness. But that it is so as has been said, is taken from Boethius in the book "The Consolation of Philosophy," who thus says:

"You lead all things from the supreme example, most beautiful one bearing the world in mind, and forming with a similar image."

Articulus 14 — Whether To Be In God Is To Be In The Knowledge Of God; And, Why, Just As Ideas Or Reasons Are Said To Be Many, Are Sciences Or Wisdoms Not Said To Be Many, Or Words Many; And, How Paradigms, Exemplars, Ideas, And Reasons Differ

Whether in God to be is to be in the knowledge of God? And, why, just as ideas or reasons are said to be many, sciences or wisdoms or words are not said to be many? And, how do paradigm, exemplars, ideas, and reasons differ?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says:

In God are all things, or with God, or with God, or in Him life, etc.

However, it is doubtful if to be in God is to be in the knowledge of God, as is hinted here.

Likewise, it is asked, why are ideas or reasons said to be many, and not wisdoms or sciences or many words?

Likewise, when I say paradigms, and exemplars, and ideas, and many reasons? By what is the difference of these attended to as to the name?

Solution. It must be said, as was held above, that the plurality of ideas or reasons is rather consigned by respect to things, than signified in that which is idea, or in that in which is idea. Therefore, wisdom, and art, and science, since they hold themselves more on the part of the wise and the divine essence, than on the part of the things about which they are, because wisdom, art, and science, denote habits resting or situated in the soul: it is clear, that they cannot be signified plurally. And similarly, the word does not denote a relation except to him whose word it is: but idea and reason and exemplar do not thus: and therefore they have a consigned plurality.

To the other, it must be said, that paradigm is said from "xapa" which is "near," and "deype" which is "teaching," as if teaching by that which is near, as is the form of wood in the figure of a shoe: and therefore because ideas are outside, they are called paradigms: and therefore Boethius calls the forms which are in matter, images of those, because the image imitates: therefore he calls those forms, because they remain outside, and are forming. Species also are sometimes called according to how they are referred to knowledge. However, exemplar is properly to whose likeness something is made by respect to it, and not by extension over it: whence ideas are called exemplars according to which the craftsman of nature regards them in themselves, when he produces the forms of nature. Idea indeed is said from "idos" in Greek, which sounds the first form, just as "hyle" sounds the first matter: and because those powers are and remain outside, therefore ideas are said by respect to form. However, reason pertains to the end: because from the end is taken the name and reason of the thing, as the Philosopher says. And therefore by respect to the end of the work are called reasons those which are in the divine mind.

DISTINCTIO XXXVI

Divisio Textus

It is customary here to inquire, Since all things are said to be in the knowledge of God, etc. Here begins that part in which it is asked, Whether it is the same to be in knowledge as to be in the essence of God, or in God? And there it is inquired about the diversity of the objects of divine knowledge.

It is divided, however, into three parts. In the first, he touches upon how it is to be in the knowledge of God, or foreknowledge. In the second, he touches upon how good and evil are known by God, there, B, After the aforementioned it is asked, In the third, because the knowledge of God, etc., is causative of things, he shows how it is the same to be in God and in the knowledge of God, which is to be from him and through him and in him: and how it is different, there, D,

Therefore, let us diligently examine, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether The Being Of All Things In God Belongs To Power Or To Wisdom Or To Will, Or To All Of These

Whether all things being in God pertains to power or wisdom or will, or to all these?

To understand the solution of the Master which he presents in the first chapter that contains the first part, it is necessary to inquire into two things, namely, whether all things being in God pertains to power, or wisdom, or will, or to all these?

Secondly, in what these three differ: being in God's knowledge, and being in God knowing, and being in God?

To the first, it proceeds thus:

1. Nothing is in God according to its own nature except God Himself. Therefore, it remains either that nothing is in God absolutely, or that it is present according to power: not, however, according to the power of matter, because He is not the matter of anything: therefore, according to the power of the efficient cause, everything that is said to be present will be in Him: therefore, not according to wisdom and will.

1. Likewise, there is to consider a cause actually acting, and to it corresponds an effect in act: and there is to consider a cause able to act, and to it corresponds the possibility of being caused. Since, therefore, from eternity things were in God, not according to actual being, but according to the fact that they could be made, they were in God: but to this corresponds the power of the cause: therefore, as it seems, things are in God with respect to power.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY, it seems that with respect to wisdom: because

1. Things are in God through idea and reasons: but ideas and reasons are ordered to wisdom and intellect: therefore, things are in God according to wisdom.
2. Likewise, Augustine said above that the Son is the Word of the Father, and the art full of the reasons of all living things. Since, therefore, living reasons and those which are life and light have an order to intellect and to wisdom, it seems that things are in God with respect to wisdom.
3. Likewise, this seems from the intention of the Master: because here in the treatise on divine knowledge, he determines how things are in God: therefore, it seems that by reason of knowledge they are in God.

But it seems again, that by reason of will:

1. For Damascene says that creation is the work of will: since, therefore, it belongs to Him to produce the creature, in which the creature itself is, it seems that the creature is in the will.

1. Likewise, in every voluntary motion and work, the principle is will: since, therefore, things are in God as in their principle, it seems that they are more in God by reason of will than of wisdom or power.

Solution. It must be said that since things are in God as life and light, and this by reason of practical intellect, three things are necessarily supposed, namely, knowledge of operables, and power ordered to work, and will of the work. And therefore it must be said that, properly speaking, things are in God knowing, able, and willing their production: however, they do not place a formal respect except to knowledge: and therefore the Master intimates that they are in God with respect to knowledge. For there are three things in a thing as it proceeds from the artisan, namely, the operation or production of the thing, and being, and the reason of the

thing operated or to be operated. And since the thing with respect to operation is referred to the artisan, it is then proximally according to reason referred to power, and with respect to the being of the thing it is proximally referred to will which contains being and gives it, because as Dionysius says in the book On the Divine Names: Good is diffusive of itself and being. But if it is considered with respect to reason, then it is exemplified by the art of the artisan, and its relation will be to wisdom. Therefore, the Master, seeing that the operation of the thing and being are neither in God nor from eternity, but only reason: says that things are in God with respect to wisdom, which corresponds to the reason of the thing. However, if the whole is considered which is required for the production of the thing, and being, and reason, then things are in God knowing, and able, and willing: and thus it is clear to respond to the objections while preserving the intention of the Master.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that when we say God does not act actually, but potentially from eternity, it is not understood of power which is divided against knowledge and will, but of power in common: and therefore that objection is solved.

To the other, it must be said that power corresponds to that which can be with respect to the becoming of the thing: but not with respect to the reason according to which the creature was from eternity in the Creator.

To those which are objected concerning wisdom, it must be conceded.

To that which is objected concerning will, it must be said that will, according to the reason of understanding, is the first mover: yet in the will itself there is not the reason of the work according to which the creature is said to be in God. Hence Damascene intends that creation is the work of will, to which will moves, and not nature as to the generation of the Son.

To the other, it must be said in the same way, that the creature can be referred to will as to the motivating principle for it to be brought forth and to exist: but not as to that in which is properly the exemplary reason of the creature.

Articulus 2 — Whether To Be In God As Knowing Is The Same As His Knowledge

Whether being is the same in God knowing, and His knowledge?

Secondly, it is asked, Whether being is the same in God, and in God knowing, and in knowledge:

It seems, however, that it is so: because (as all Philosophers will)

1. Knowledge is nothing other than the assimilation of the knower to the thing known through the reason of the known and the species: therefore, there is nothing in the knowledge of God, of which the reason is not in God knowing: and this is being in God: therefore these three are the same, namely being in the knowledge of God, and in God knowing, and in God.

1. Likewise, Augustine says in book XV of On the Trinity that to know is to hold the knowledge of a thing within oneself: therefore, similarly, to know is to hold the knowledge of

a thing within oneself: but it is the same to be in the knowledge of God as for God to know some thing: just as it is the same to be in my knowledge as for me to know some thing: therefore, to be in knowledge is to have the knowledge of a thing within oneself: but whatever knowledge is within the knower, that according to that knowledge is in the knower: therefore, these two are the same, to be in knowledge and to be in the knower: therefore, they are the same if they are referred to God, so that it is said to be in the knowledge of God and to be in God knowing.

2. Likewise, nothing is to be in God, except the reason of the knowledge of a thing being in Him: and this was to be in the knower: therefore, the third is also the same with those two.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Evils are in the knowledge of God, as it is said here in the letter: yet they are not in God: therefore, it is not the same to be in God and to be in the knowledge of God.

1. Likewise, whatever in any way has the reason in the knower speculatively or practically, this is in the knower: but they are not in God (as it is held at the end of this distinction) except those of which He is the author: therefore, it is not the same to be in God as to be in God knowing: because not all things which He knows speculatively will God operate, or will He be their author.

Solution. It must be said that these three relate as superior and inferior: because whatever things are in God, are in God knowing, and in the knowledge of God: but it is not converted. For those things are properly said to be in God, which are in Him as life and light, in the manner which was explained above: but in God knowing are those things which He knows speculatively or practically. However, in His knowledge are those things which He knows per se or per accidens, like evils which He knows, as Augustine says, because He does not find them in Himself: and because they are deformed by the art which He Himself is.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that the knowledge of a thing is in two ways, namely of that which is known per se: and concerning this, what is objected is true. It is also known per accidens, as privation, and to that there is no assimilation, but it is known through its opposite: as the Philosopher says, that the straight is the judge of itself and of the oblique: we know the straight by the straight and the oblique itself: and therefore it is not entirely the same to be in knowledge in any way, and to be in God knowing: because for being in knowledge, assimilation of the knowable to the knower is not required, but for being in the knower it is required.

To what is further objected, that those things are in God, of which the reasons are in the knower: it must be said that it is not true: but rather those things are in Him, of which He is the operative cause. However, He does not operate all things of which He has knowledge: because He has knowledge of many eternal things which He does not operate, and He has knowledge of many things which He will never operate, so that multitude is referred to at-

tributes: for if they are said to be in God, there will be an equivocal mode to being a creature in God, as is evident to anyone by itself.

To the other, it must be said that to know is to hold knowledge within oneself in any way, either per se or through another: and therefore it does not follow what is later inferred, that the reason of that is in Him who knows: because sometimes it does not have reason, but is known through its opposite: and therefore God knows evils well, and evils are in His knowledge: yet it does not seem to be conceded that they are in Him knowing, or in Him.

Articulus 3 — Whether God Knows And Cognizes By One Or By Many

Whether God knows and understands by one, or by many?

Whether God knows and understands by one, or by many?

Then it is inquired about what is said, there, A, He chose us before the foundation of the world.

For this seems to imply in Him the distinction and multitude of things: and therefore a very grave question must be asked here, about which almost all the ancient Philosophers hesitated against the divine intellect. For since choice is the choice of some things from others, there seem to be diverse things in the divine intellect: and therefore it must be asked, Whether He knows by one or by many? and if He knows by one, Whether He knows only one or many? and if He knows many, Whether His intellect passes over those many or not?

However, other articles of this question, namely whether He knows particulars, or infinites, and universals, and composites, we will place below in their proper places.

To the first of these, it proceeds thus: 1. One in the notion of one is not a principle of knowing except one: therefore if God knows by one, it seems that He knows only one, which will be proven false below.

1. If perhaps you say, that that one is the reason of many and of all: therefore it is false that He knows by one and in the notion of one: but He knows one by one which is in the notion of many. But on the contrary: That reason which is the reason of many: either it is understood in such a way that it itself is the reason of all: or that in it is the reason of all. If in the first way: then that by which He understands, is the reason of all: therefore one and the same is the reason of all, which is not intelligible, because all things that are, are of very distinct reasons.

Furthermore, it is heresy to say that God is the reason of all: because the reason of a thing is something of the thing. Hence God according to this would be something of all things, which is false: therefore it is not understood in this way that the reason of all, that that by which He understands, is the reason of all.

1. Therefore if it is so taken, that in it is the reason of all, On the contrary: That reason of all, either is one, or is many. If many: then again I have the proposition, that He does not

understand all or many by that one, but rather by those many reasons. If however it is one, the same impossibility follows as before, that some one is the reason of all, which no wise person concedes.

If however you say, that that by which He understands, is indeed one in itself, but in relation many, as was said above about the plurality of ideas. On the contrary: Since therefore from eternity God understands by that one, from eternity such a relation will stand: therefore it is necessary in some way from eternity to be the extremes of the reason. However, the extremes of those relations: either are things existing in the potentiality of the efficient cause, or existing in their proper forms. If in the first way. On the contrary: According to that potentiality things are indistinct: therefore the relation to them existing thus, is a relation to the indistinct: therefore it will not cause a distinct cognition of the thing: therefore God does not know things distinctly, but only in the potentiality of the cause, which is an error, because thus His knowledge would be most imperfect. If however from eternity they are in their proper forms, to which the relation is made: this cannot be except in one of two ways, namely either that things are in nature from eternity: and this cannot be according to the Catholic faith: because thus the world would have been from eternity: or that the forms of things are without the things themselves to which the respect is made: and then since they cannot be except in God, nor can there be many relations to them unless there are many, three inconveniences follow: one of which is, that the forms of things are in God, and are not the medium by which they are known by God. The second is, that there is plurality in God besides the plurality of respects. The third is, that the ideas of things are in God as known, and between the ideas and the knower there is something medium by which God knows, which is multiplied in things by relation to the ideas. Therefore it seems impossible that God knows by one, which is in the notion of many: nor again does He know by one in the notion of one: therefore in no way does He know by one.

1. Likewise, It is one thing to know that a thing is, and another what a thing is: just as one question is why, and another question is what. Either therefore God from eternity knows what a thing is, or not. If not, and now He knows: therefore it seems His knowledge is received from things, which is absurd among all even the Gentile Philosophers. If however from eternity He knows what a thing is, and this is not known except by the proper reason of the known thing, He has with Him the proper reason of the thing: but the proper reasons of things are many: therefore He does not know by one, but by many, as it seems.
2. Nor can you here evade as some wish to evade, that you say, that by knowing Himself to be the principle of all and each He knows all: for by knowing the efficient principle of a thing, I can still be ignorant of the proper reason of the thing: because that is not received from the efficient, since the efficient is nothing of the being of the thing, and the proper reason states the being of the thing. Hence He can thus by knowing Himself, know the thing to be: but He cannot have the proper knowledge of the thing from that.

3. Likewise, The similitudes induced by the Saints do not seem to be valid. For let us suppose the center in a circle to have the reason of a principle to the whole circumference, and to all lines going out to any point: by this you still do not have, that the center knows what the circumference is in its proper reason, or what the lines are: but it will know only that the lines are and the circumference, but it will not know what they are, unless it has in itself the proper reasons of the circumference and of the lines: both of which are impossible to agree with the center: therefore the similitude induced is worth nothing, as it seems.

4. Likewise it seems, that nothing prohibits the divine intellect from being indeed one, and yet not understanding by one: namely, that in it result the reasons of all, and they are in it: just as we see, that in a mirror result the images of diverse things, and the mirror itself receives no multitude or composition by this: therefore it seems, that it is posited without reason, that He understands by one.

If for this reason it is said, that He understands by many, and not by one. On the contrary: Many in one intellect cannot be understood to be without diversity from the intellect itself, and without composition. If therefore God understands by many, He has in Himself, and from Himself diverse things, and in His intellect: inducing composition. However, the first is proven by a self-evident proposition, that whatever things are diverse among themselves are not the same to any one: if therefore the many things which are in the divine intellect, are diverse and many, they are not the same with the intellect itself of the first, that is, of God, and they make composition in Him, which is absurd.

1. If perhaps you wish to say, that these reasons proceed, as if He understands by another, when He understands by none but Himself. Hence there is nothing to ask, whether He understands by one, or by many? because neither by one, nor by many: because He understands by Himself: and there is nothing in Him as a medium of understanding. On the contrary: At any point marked on a line it is possible to use it as two, namely as a beginning, and as an end. Therefore since God is simple, either He understands so that He uses Himself as one, or as two. If as one: either this is only as understanding, or as that by which He understands only, or as understood only: and whichever is given, there will be in His intellect the privation of the other two. For if He uses Himself as He is considered in Himself as intellect, then He understands only in potentiality, and thus He will be (as the Philosopher says) as if He were sleeping, because the sleeping person understands in potentiality: and it will not be most noble. If however as that by which He understands, this is nothing: because that by which He understands, cannot be taken as in itself only, but in relation to the understanding and the understood. The same follows if He uses Himself as that which is understood, because then He understands others.

Likewise, When I say, God understands by Himself, there necessarily three things are signified according to the reason of understanding: otherwise it is signified then as supposing for the verb, and otherwise by the ablative "by Himself," and otherwise as that into which the act

of understanding passes: therefore in the divine intellect a medium of understanding is taken according to reason: and this whether it is the same, or different, the reasons induced above hold about it. However, it seems, that it is necessarily different: for matter never coincides in the same with the efficient, and form: since therefore the intellect itself to that by which it understands, is as matter to perfection, it seems that it is never the same to it: therefore if there is in God something by which He understands, it will not be the same with His intellect, as it seems.

Likewise, This was the reason why the Philosophers were compelled to posit an agent intellect: because the same cannot be the intellect, and that by which it understands, for nothing acts upon itself to perfection: therefore it seems, that that by which God understands, is not the same with His intellect.

Solution. Without prejudice it must be said, that God understands by Himself, as He is the species, and idea of all intelligible, and every reason of the known and light. And this is thus proven: In us there is a double intellect, namely agent, and possible, and a third is made when the possible is led into act. However, if I ask, What leads it out? You say, that the agent. And if I ask, By what does it lead out? You say, that by the species of the thing. If indeed I ask, What makes the species of the thing to be in the notion of the simple, and abstract, and intelligible? You say, that the light of the agent: just as the light of the sun acts upon colors to sight: therefore it remains, that the light of the agent intellect is the act of every intelligible: just as the light of the sun, the act of every color. Let us therefore suppose the light of the agent intellect to be of infinite power: then it follows, that with nothing taken it will perfect the possible in every act of intelligibles, and besides that it receives some species by which it perfects it: because the agent then in the possible, the agent will be the species according to that which it is, and the act of simplicity and intelligibility in it. Thus however we posit the divine intellect, not only acting in things something, as form, but acting the things themselves according to substance: therefore He is the species of every thing: and thus by knowing Himself, He will know all that is, as the saints say.

Therefore it must be said to the first question, that He knows by one only which is Himself, and He is the reason and ideal species of all. Hence I well concede, that He is the reason of many.

To that which is objected against, it must be said that nothing prohibits one in one way relating to all, although not all relate to it in one way, from being the reason of knowing all: but there is not one reason of all, stating what a thing is: and this is not negatively: because we posit, that God is immediate by essence, presence, and power, to the thing, and to every part of the thing. However, that which is objected, that it is not the reason demonstrating what it was to be, I well concede, and I say, that multitude is by relation, as was supposed above.

To that which is objected on the contrary, it must be said that it is not necessary, that the extremes of relation are in act: otherwise it is about the relation signified in that which is according to reason only, and otherwise it is about the relation of that which is in nature. For if I say, These are contradictory, it is impossible that relation is posited between extremes being

in nature, because one of the contradictories is non-being. Similarly when I say, this is the reason of knowing, the reason posits relation to that which is, or was, or will be: and therefore it is not necessary, that that reason of relation is posited about the existing, unless in potentiality ordered to the production of things in the future: and that is well in God.

To that which is objected, that that potentiality is indistinct: it must be said, that it is true, that things are not distinctly existing in potentiality: because they are not distinguished except by their own: but just as reason is distinguished, so also is potentiality, namely to the future and this and that, of which the reason is God: and this does not compel, that this and that is, except according to the potentiality of the future: because there is not in God potentiality only, but the potentiality of this and that which are future to which there is from eternity the relation of ideas, because God foresaw them in Himself, according to which He is the reason of those things which He was going to make: and this does not make the things to be substantially distinct, but distinct in cognition only, from the fact that the reason of cognition is referred to them.

To that which is objected against this that He does not understand by many, I well concede: but He understands by one related to many which are in a certain way, namely according to potentiality and foreknowledge, as was said.

To that which is objected, that it is one thing to know that a thing is, or that it will be: and another to know what a thing is: it must be said, that God knows both: nor yet is there a reason which states what a thing is: because He is as a paradigm, according to which is exemplified what is the being of a thing: and therefore by Him is known what a thing is; just as by the form of the thing, and definition, and more certainly for so much: because He is more intimate to the thing than even the form is intimate to the formed: for He does not have only relation to the thing as efficient, but as efficient, and paradigm, and end: and thus He is the efficient principle of knowing any thing.

To another it must be said, that it is indeed true, that by knowing Himself to be efficient, it is not a sufficient reason why He knows the thing: but by knowing Himself to be efficient, and exemplar, and end: for from these is taken every reason of knowing, because He is not matter: and from matter there is no reason of knowing, unless it is taken with form: and thus it is clear, that those who say well say, that by knowing Himself to be the principle of all He knows all.

To another it must be said, that no similitude in the whole can represent the divine. Hence the similitude induced by Dionysius, represents according to part: but by eminence it must be referred to the Creator: because He is both the principle and reason and end of all things which are from Him.

To another it must be said, that the divine intellect cannot be posited in such a way in which diverse things result as in a mirror: because in a mirror for things to result in it, diverse things are required, at least four: of which one is receptivity, and that is from glass or metal placed polished in which is made an equal and smooth surface. Another is that it is terminated like glass extinguished by lead on the other surface, and metal or stone from a solid and

dense terrestrial mixture. The third however is the process of light into it: because otherwise the form would not be impressed according to the natural, or the ray would not be reflected according to the perspectival. The fourth however is the direct and proportional opposition of the mirror to that which is impressed. Hence it is clear, that composition is multiplicable in the mirror, but none in God: hence it cannot be posited thus.

To that which is further asked, it must be said that He understands by Himself: but I well concede, that it is in a double notion, namely of the understanding, and of that by which He understands as if formally.

To that which is objected, that that by which understanding is made is not the same with the intellect: it must be said that this necessarily concludes concerning the possible intellect. However, in God we posit no such, but universally agent: and therefore He understands by Himself: for He understands as agent, and in Himself He understands as He is the exemplary species of all things.

And by this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 4 — Whether God Understands Only One, Or Several, Or All Things

Whether God understands only one thing, or many, or all?

Whether God understands only one thing, or many, or all?

Secondly, it is asked whether He understands only one thing, or many, or all?

It seems, however, that He understands only one thing: because 1. He understands only Himself, as the Saints say: since therefore He is not many, it seems that He does not understand many.

1. Likewise, if He understands many things, He will be the reason for many things either sufficiently or not sufficiently. If sufficiently: therefore He can be the middle in a demonstration to conclude all things, which is false: because nothing can be concluded by positing God as the middle in a demonstrative syllogism. But if He is an insufficient reason for knowing: therefore He, in knowing Himself, knows things imperfectly, which again is false: therefore it seems that He does not know many things, or all, but only Himself.
2. Likewise, if He knew other things besides Himself, since the knower is perfected by the known, He would be perfected by things other than Himself, and thus would have another intellect more divine than Himself: which also the Philosopher in the second book of Metaphysics considers inconvenient.
3. Likewise, since all things besides Himself are vanity, if He knew other things besides Himself, He would know things more vile than Himself: and this also according to the common opinion is vile, because it is more expedient to be ignorant of viler things than to know them.

Solution. Here is an error very close: because if we understand God to understand only Himself, He would be more imperfect than us, because we understand ourselves and other things. But if we say He understands all things, it seems His intellect is composed of diverse things: and therefore a middle way is to be chosen, so that we say He understands all things, but by Himself, not receiving anything from all things or from any one thing:

but rather understanding to cause all things according to the being of nature and reason.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that He understands only Himself, if "Himself" is in the ablative case: but if it is in the accusative case, then He understands Himself and all other things by the fact that they are in Him as life and light.

To the second, it must be said that God cannot be the middle in a syllogism: because it is of the essence of the conclusion if it is a propter quid saying, and it is proportionate to the thing concluded, and the reason of the thing enters into the substance of the conclusion, none of which is fitting to God: yet He is a sufficient reason for knowing with respect to Himself, not to us, by the fact that He is the exemplary reason of the thing, and immediate, and present to every thing.

To the other, it must be said that this holds only in an intellect receiving from a thing, which is not the agent of the thing, but is acted upon by the thing itself: such, however, is not the divine intellect, as has been said: but He is the agent of all things, and the exemplary reason of them.

To the other, it must be said that nothing prohibits a more noble being from understanding a viler thing, provided it receives nothing from it, but rather confers upon it even that which it is: for thus no pollution follows in the noble. But in us it is otherwise: because we understand by receiving from the thing: and therefore we are frequently polluted by the intellect of vile things, because the proneness to move us to concupiscence is joined to such things understood in us, which would not happen if we, in understanding them, were the agents, and they did not in some way act upon us to understand in act.

Articulus 5 — Whether The Intellect Of God Has Any Transition Over Things From One To Another

Whether the intellect of God has any transition over things from one to another?

Thirdly, it is asked, Whether the intellect of God has any transition over things from one to another?

It seems indeed that it does:
1. For everything that understands some extreme by means of something, it is necessary that it comes from the means to that extreme: however, God understands all things by Himself as a

means or through Himself as a means: therefore, it seems that He transitions from Himself to created intellects.

1. Likewise, this seems to be signified in the expression where it is said: God understands all things by Himself: for it is constructed differently with the verb "all things" and differently with "by Himself."
2. Likewise, He does not understand all things without understanding this and that: therefore, it seems that He transitions from one to another according to the order and number of intellects: therefore, there is a certain transition in the divine intellect.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY!
Every transitioning intellect has something prior and posterior: however, nothing is prior and posterior in the intellect of the eternal God: therefore, the divine intellect does not transition from one to another.

Solution. This last point must be conceded without any ambiguity: and although we cannot signify it in speech due to the composition of our intellect, nevertheless, the intellect of God is indivisible, and indivisibly is of Himself, and of others, and of many, and of all, and of each singularly: and this is due to the universality and infinity of His power in understanding: and therefore it cannot be signified by us in speech.

And through this, the solution to the first two is clear: because they proceed as if we posit the intellect of God as ours, which we do not intend, but because we cannot speak otherwise about Him.

Articulus 6 — Whether Evils Have In God A Species Or An Idea, Or Are Known Insofar As They Are Discordant From Art; And, Whether They Are Known By God According To The Speculative Or The Practical Intellect; And, Whether Evil Is In God Life And Light

Whether evils have in God a species or idea, or are known inasmuch as they discord from art? and, Whether they are known by God according to the speculative or practical intellect? and, Whether evil is in God life and light?

Whether evils have in God a species or idea, or are known inasmuch as they discord from art? and, Whether they are known by God according to the speculative or practical intellect? and, Whether evil is in God life and light?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says:

After the aforesaid it is asked, Since all things are said to be in God, etc.

And specifically the Master asks here about evils: and his solution is, that evils do not have in God a species or idea, but are known inasmuch as they discord from art: and all the Doctors acquiesced to the solution of the Master.

But on the contrary it is objected thus: 1. To know something through its opposite, and not through itself, is to know by accident: but accidental knowledge is weak and infirm know-

ledge: therefore it ought not to be attributed to God, to whom all better things are to be ascribed.

1. Likewise, Evil is not pure privation, but has something of good: as Dionysius says, that evil is nothing other than a particular good: therefore it seems, that that which has being, either is not from God, which is rash to say: or if it is, it will have an idea in God: therefore that which is evil, has an idea in God: therefore it is not known only through the opposite.
2. Likewise, When I say fornicating, I do not only say defect, but also an act proceeding from the power of free will: but that act is something: therefore either it is from God, or from another principle: not from another principle, because there is no other principle: therefore from God: therefore it has an idea in God, because we will have in the last part of this distinction, that everything which is from God, has an idea in God.

But Then it is asked, Whether that act is life and light in God?

However, it seems that it is not: because in itself it has nothing of the dispositions of life and light. But on the contrary: Things are not life in God except on account of the idea: but these have an idea: therefore they are life and light in God.

Further it is asked concerning the solution of some here saying, that evil is known by God according to the speculative intellect, and not the practical. For this seems to be against reason because

1. Of opposites there is one science, and one power: if therefore good is known by God according to the practical, in the same way evil will be known.
2. Likewise, The true abstracts from good and evil: for there is true good, as God to be: and there is true evil, as you to be a sinner: but every true is known by God per se, not by accident: therefore true evil will be known by God per se, not by accident: and thus there is nothing that the Doctors say, that evils are known by God by accident.

Solution. To this it can be said according to the common solution, that evil is known by God by accident, and according to the speculative intellect and not the practical. And this is thus proved concerning the first part: For although evil has a subject, yet that subject is not separable from it except according to the intellect alone: and therefore its subject is not referred to the cause except conjoined with deformity: but conjoined with deformity it cannot be referred except to free will as to a cause, and not further to God: therefore evil does not have an idea in God: for God does not influence the act with deformity, but the act alone, and deformity falls into it from the defect of free will. Concerning the other part it is proved thus: because (as Priscian says) proherctic words desire the infinite...

Therefore, as I know how to make a house, and I do not know the house. Hence, if God knew evil with operative knowledge, He would know how to make evil, and could make evil, and would make evil: all of which are false. It is clear, therefore, that since they cannot say, He

knows how to make evil, but only that He knows evil, that this is speculative knowledge, and not practical, because speculative words do not desire an infinitive denoting work, but rather an active in which the act of the verb passes: and thus the solution of the Doctors is proven with respect to both parts.

Therefore, it must be said to the first, that when it is said, God knows evil per accidens, the term per accidens refers to the verb on the part of the matter of the act: and this is on the part of the known, and not on the part of the knower: and therefore it denotes a defect in the known, and not in the knower.

To the other, it must be said that the act insofar as it is an act, is from God, and has an idea: but not the evil act insofar as it is evil, but in the species of the act itself evil is known: because it is a voluntary act deficient from good. And through this also the solution to the following is clear.

To the other, it must be said that it is not to be conceded that evil has an idea in God, nor that it is life in God, nor that it is from God: but the act according to the intellect separated from deformity, will no longer be evil: and therefore according to that which is thus, it can be life in God and have an idea: but from this it does not follow that evil is in God, as has already been shown.

To that which is further objected concerning the solution of the Doctors, it must be said that evil and good which are ordered to the doing of the knower, are in him according to the practical: and this indeed is in us, but not in God: and therefore evil does not have praxis in the cognition of God, unless we would say that reprobation is with respect to evil: but this will be inquired below.

To the other, it must be said that there is the truth of the sign and there is the truth of the thing. The truth of the sign abstracts from good and evil: and this God knows well per se: and this has an idea in God: but in the truth of the thing evil is not true, since it is the corruption of the species itself from which it ought to be true in reality: hence it rather fails from form than has form: and therefore it is not true.

Articulus 7 — Whether God Knows Diverse, Composite, Material, Contingent, And Temporal Things

Whether God knows diverse, composite, material, contingent, and temporal things?

Then it is asked concerning this which says:

He has always known all things, both good and evil, even before they were made, etc.

For here it can be asked, Whether He knows diverse, and composite, and material, and contingent, and temporal things?

1. For it is not of the simple as simple to know diverse things as diverse: but God knows by one simple [act]: therefore it seems that He does not know diverse and many things.

2. Likewise, Composition cannot be understood without composites, nor complexity without complex things: whence then does God know composite and complex things?
3. Likewise, Materiality is a cause of knowability, not of intellectual cognition: since therefore the senses do not have means by which to apprehend material principles, whence will God know them?
4. Likewise, Human knowledge is more imperfect than God's: and since in it there are only necessary things, not contingent ones: therefore much less in the knowledge of God: therefore God, as it seems, does not know temporal nor contingent things.

Solution. It must be said with Dionysius, that He knows composite things simply, and diverse things by unity, and material things immaterially, and contingent things by necessary knowledge, and temporal things timelessly, but with knowledge always standing: and how this may be, let it be pre-understood in us that there is a double form in which a thing is known, namely of abstraction which the speculative intellect uses, and of composition which the practical uses in knowing: for since (as Avicenna says in the first Philosophy) the speculative intellect is only receptive, and from the body and known things, it cannot use anything in knowing except the form of abstraction: because a thing is known only through that which is the nature of the thing: and this is not in us, but must be taken from the thing itself: therefore it is that it abstracts from the thing itself. But since it is not joined to the thing except through bodily organs, in which the form of the thing is first impressed, therefore it must also later receive from the body: and thus the reason of Avicenna's saying is clear, that the speculative receives from things and from the body, placing nothing concerning any of those. But the practical uses forms of composition: and the cause of this is that the practical is productive of the thing: but a thing is not made through that which it already has, but rather through the form which it does not have: and since it is not in the thing, it will be in the maker: therefore he will place it concerning the thing, and will not receive anything from the thing itself. Thus also it seems not to receive from the body, but to place the motive power in the nerves and muscles for the operation drawing out the form of art in external matter. And to the likeness of this form of composition are the ideas in the divine mind, not received from things, but making things: they make things by drawing them out of nothing: and therefore from that nothing every defect arises, and this negation of one from another, from which diversity is caused, and consequently composition, and contingency, which are founded in mutability and materiality. Thus therefore temporal things in their idea are timeless, but they receive temporality from nothing: and composite things in their idea are simply one, and complex similarly, and so of others: therefore referred to that idea, which is a sufficient reason for knowing all things, as has been said, all things are indeed known most perfectly: and yet simply, compositely, immaterially, timelessly, and in the mode of necessity.

But if you object, that one idea is in itself, and nothing after which things flowed into being, causes nothing at all: but the defect from the perfect which is nothing, falls into those things which are after it: but we see diverse things formed and perfect, and many creatures: what then causes that multitude? I say, that two things cause it: one as becoming, the other as

making. Becoming is matter next to nothing, and flowing into being after nothing, as Augustine says: and therefore because it is imperfect in many ways, it is not itself according to one part of itself receptive of all perfection: and therefore that it may have the reason which it can have at once, it was necessary for it to be divided according to acts: and thus multitude was introduced on the part of the becoming.

Likewise, According to every part of itself it is not receptive of all perfection which it is born to have: therefore it was necessary to have succession in forms: and thus mutability and contingency were introduced. And thus it is plainly clear, how diversity and mutability and composition are caused from nothing, after which matter which is near to nothing, and strives towards some being, flowed into being. But on the part of the maker there is wisdom in number, weight, and measure, disposing all things: because it gives form to matter and the parts of matter by order and proportion: and this is what Plato said, that according to the merit of matter from the giver of forms all forms are given.

And through this the solution to all questions except the last is clear.

And To this it must be said, that our knowledge is caused by the thing, and therefore it varies according to the thing: which if it is necessary, and in a necessary mode, that is, through a necessary medium, it is knowledge itself: otherwise, it is either opinion or doubt. But the knowledge of God is through ideas making things: and therefore it follows the conditions of the knower and not of the known, as was said before: and since the knower himself is not subject to contingency, his knowledge will always be necessary, even concerning contingents.

Articulus 8 — Whether God Knows What He Will Do, What He Has Done, What He Can Do And Will Never Do, And Finally Things Actually Infinite

Whether God knows what He is going to do, what He has done, what He can do and will never do, and finally infinite things in act?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said, there, "And hence it is, that only good things are said to be in God, not evil," etc.

For it is asked, if those things are in Him as life which He Himself is going to do? If this is said: then past things do not seem to be in Him as life, since He is not going to do them, but has done them. If this is conceded, it will be against what was previously denied, that according to this He is differently disposed in knowing towards the past and the present.

It is also asked concerning those things which He will never do, but nevertheless can do, whether they are in God as life and idea?

1. And it seems that they are not: because as the Saints say, an idea is with respect to the ideated: therefore what will never be ideated does not have an idea in the divine mind.
2. Likewise, His knowledge (as will be had below) is the cause of things: therefore if He has an idea of something, it will be caused, and it will be of future things: therefore from the destruction of the consequent, if something will not be, it will not be known by God, as it seems.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
It is true that God can do more things than He does: therefore He knows that He can do more things: but He knows all that He can do, because He knows His entire infinite power: therefore He knows more things than He does: and not except by idea: therefore some things have it in His mind which will never be.

Here also the question has a place where it is asked, whether God knows infinite things in act?

It seems that He does: because
1. Augustine says in the book "The City of God," that the philosophers have proven the species of numbers to be infinite: and he says that numbers, however infinite, are nevertheless infinitely known by that knowledge, concerning which prophecy says that His knowledge is without number. Therefore it seems that He knows infinite things in act: but infinite things in act He will never do: therefore He knows those things which He will never do.

1. Likewise, His power is not limited: therefore it is always towards more things than any sum can be taken: and He knows His entire power: therefore He knows infinite things in act.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
When I say infinite in act, according to the notion of the infinite, it is understood in two ways, namely infinite in act to the created intellect, or infinite in act simply. If infinite to us: then it is not a question: because He knows more things than we can think. But if infinite simply. On the contrary: Infinite in act simply is always beyond the one receiving it according to its greater part: therefore God receiving it as infinite in act always leaves it according to its greater part to be outside Himself, which is absurd, because thus God would not comprehend His own knowledge.

But if you say that the intellect of God is infinite in act, and therefore comprehends that infinite. On the contrary: If the intellect of God is infinite in itself, it is most imperfect, which is absurd: for it is not infinite to God, but to the creature, because it is not limited by the creature.

Furthermore, let it be granted that it is infinite simply, still it cannot be said that the infinite includes the infinite: because whatever will be included and comprehended, that will immediately be limited, and another will exceed it: therefore it is nothing that is said, that God knows infinite in act, because infinite in act is nothing.

Likewise, the infinite is not found except according to the mode of quantity. Therefore let the infinite be taken in virtual or potential quantity, and in dimensional quantity which is continuous, and in discrete quantity which is number.

I return therefore to the first. If I say infinite in power, I have not said infinite in act, but only in potentiality, namely because it is not to assign what it can do to such an extent, without taking more in which it can: and that which is to be taken is not taken in act, but in potentiality. But if the infinite is taken in the continuous, I cannot take by addition, since it is to take a quantity to which nothing can be added according to reason: as is a circle. Therefore

it must be that the infinite is taken according to division in that, so namely that the divided part is not as an aliquot part, but according to the reason of the whole divisible is taken: for then nothing is taken so small that it is not divisible into two equal parts: therefore also this is infinite with respect to taking the divisible: and this is in potentiality: therefore it is only in potentiality. Likewise, I will take in number in which there is infinite by addition not division: because it is to take in it the indivisible in act, as is unity, but it is not to take a sum to which unity cannot be added, constituting another species of number: but unity is addible only in potentiality: therefore also infinite is only in potentiality: therefore nothing is infinite in act: therefore God does not know infinite in act.

I answer. It must be said to the first, that God knows the past in the same way when it has passed, as He knew when it was future: and it is life in Him: for it is not for this reason said to be life in Him, that it is or is not: but because it is an idea moving to the containment and permanence of the universe's being, as was previously explained in the preceding distinction. For although He is not going to do the past, nevertheless He is its author: and this suffices for an idea.

To the other it must be said, that God knows what He is never going to do: because He knows Himself, and He will never make Himself: but something which is not Himself, which He is not going to do, He does not know, except in this way in which we say He knows evils.

And therefore now it is solved to the following by saying, that such things do not have an idea in Him: because it is not an exemplar except to something exemplified related: and such things do not have this kind of relation, but are only known in the power of the operator.

To the objection on the contrary, it must be said, that God knows His entire power, and He knows that He can do more things than He does: but by this He knows nothing except Himself according to that power.

And if you object, that He knows what He can do: I say that He knows those things as they are, namely in their possibility, and not in execution to work: and from that part in which they are in potentiality, they are not other than Himself, but from that part in which they are disposed to explanation to work: nevertheless I well concede, that He knows Himself to be able to do some things which if He did, they would not be the same with Himself: but it is not in those things which He will not do, to take the known which is not Himself.

To that which is asked concerning the knowledge of the infinite: I say without prejudice to some saying otherwise, that I cannot see how the infinite is in act: or if it is posited to be, I do not see how it can be comprehended even by the infinite: nevertheless I do not say that God is infinite to Himself. Hence I say, that God knows the notion of the infinite in this way in which it is in potentiality, and not in that in which it is in act: because thus it is nothing: and in this way the infinite according to theology indeed is in three, as has been proven, although according to the natural philosopher it is in only two: because no natural power is infinite except perhaps according to succession in moving: and this also according to nature only: although the command of God can impose an end to the mover, and to the motion, and to time.

Others say differently, distinguishing in God a threefold knowledge, namely of simple knowledge, of vision, and of approbation: and they say, that by simple knowledge He knows what He is not going to do as infinite: but by speculative knowledge of vision He knows what He is not going to do, yet whose species is with Him: but by knowledge of approbation He knows what He is going to do, and this has an idea. By this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 9 — Whether The Knowledge Of God Is Well Divided Into Knowledge Of Approval And Simple Knowledge

Whether the knowledge of God is well divided into the knowledge of approbation and simple knowledge?

Then it is asked concerning what he says there, "Because He knows them in such a way that He also approves and they are pleasing," etc.

Here the Master seems to imply a double acceptance of knowledge, namely, simple knowledge and the knowledge of approbation.

However, it seems false: because
1. The knowledge of approbation adds upon the knowledge of simple knowledge: therefore it is signified that there is composition in God, which is false.

1. Likewise, it seems to be diminished: because there is the knowledge of reprobation by which evil is known: therefore it seems he ought also to have posited that.
2. Likewise, it seems not to be the solution which some give, that he did this because evil is not in God: for this seems false: for the Prophets read in the book of eternity, and they read the evils and sins of the peoples: since therefore it is not read unless written, it seems evil is in God.

Solution. It is easy to solve this: although the knowledge of approbation adds something, because it adds affection according to mode, yet it adds nothing according to reality: because affection in God is the same in reality with vision.

But one must beware here of the solution of some which is false, saying that it adds nothing that is in God, but that it adds what is from God: since evil is not from God. For this is false, and against what is said, Genesis 1:31: "God saw all things," etc. Where Augustine says, what He had made

that there is signified the vision of approbation, by which it pleased Him to make, it pleased Him that they remain. Pleasing, however, is in operation, and not from Himself.

To the other it must be said, that the knowledge of reprobation adds nothing that is in God upon the knowledge of simple knowledge, and therefore it is not enumerated as diverse with it: but the cause of reprobation is outside God and not in God.

To the other it must be said, that it is not yet proven that the mirror of eternity in which the Prophets read is God Himself, although some say this, and perhaps falsely. And if this is

conceded for the sake of argument, then it must be said that they did not know evils as written there, but as discordant from the book. Hence, by this that they did not find individual virtues and works, they received revelation by the power of the mirror, that contrary things were in them: yet I rather believe that they did not see God, but received revelation from God of good and evil deeds.

Articulus 10 — Whether It Is The Same To Be In God, And From God, And Through Him; And To Be, Live, And Move In Him

Are being in God, and from God, and through Him the same: and is being in Him, living, and moving the same?

Are being in God, and from God, and through Him the same: and is being in Him, living, and moving the same?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says:

Therefore, if we diligently examine, etc.

For it seems that this is not true: because 1. The Gloss explains on Romans 11:36, as

From Him, and through Him, and in Him pertains to the persons actually causing the creature. Hence it says that "from Him" is attributed to the Holy Spirit on account of the containing goodness. But when it is said, "All things are in God," this is not said by reason of the containment by which creatures actually exist, but by reason of the idea by which they are in God from eternity: therefore it seems that "in" is taken equivocally: and thus it is not the same to say.

1. Likewise, Acts 17:28 says that in Him we live, and move, and are. Therefore, since we are in Him from eternity, we are moved and live in Him from eternity, which is false.
2. Likewise, if we are said to live in Him from eternity, because in Him we live: then it seems that we are said to be moved in Him from eternity, because in Him we move: and essentially in Him, because in Him we are, which is false: therefore it seems that these three are not the same, namely, to be in God, and to be from Him, and through Him, and to be in Him, to live, and to move.

John 1:3-4: All things were made through Him, and without Him was made nothing that was made. In Him was life, and the life was the light of men, etc.

Solution. It must be said that in part of the signification, being in God and in Him is the same, as it is enumerated with from Him, and through Him: for being in God says two things according to the reason of understanding, namely, to have the idea, and to be God the author of the idea of that idea: and as to this last, "in" is taken.

In the same way, it must be said to the other, that God in comparison to created things is taken in three ways, each of which in itself supposes the preceding. The first is to be in God, as in a cause only. The second is to be in God, as in a cause actually causing. The third is to be in

God, as a cause actually causing and ruling and containing. And the first mode does not posit the creature to be: but the second posits the creature to be now first: the third, however, supposes it existing in perfection. Hence in the first mode it is said, What was made, in Him was life and light. In the second mode, From Him, and through Him, and in Him are all things. In the third mode it is said, In Him we live, and move, and are. And thus it is clear how these modes enumerated here differ.

To the other it must be said that this is false, that we are said to be life in Him, because in Him we live: but rather since every substance is divided into three, namely, being, power, and operation, those three are touched upon being in God ruling and containing, when it is said: We live according to the power of life, and we move in operation, and we are according to essence: from Him, however, is said on account of the power of the Father, through Him on account of the wisdom of the Son, and in Him on account of the goodness of the Holy Spirit.

Articulus 11 — Whether Things Are In God By Reason Of Person And Not Of Essence Or Notion

Are things in God by reason of person, and not of essence, or notion?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says:

Furthermore, it must be known that although there is indicated a distinction of persons, etc.

For from this it seems to be taken that things are in God by reason of person, and not by reason of essence, or notion. This is also proven by another reason: because that is in God, of which He Himself is the author: but authority and work belong only to the person, because all acts are of particulars, and not of nature.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Let us suppose the persons do not exist, yet God will be the author of the creature: therefore, since He knows all things which He works, in Him will be all the reasons of His works: therefore this belongs by reason of nature, and not by reason of person.

1. Further, it seems that this belongs by reason of notion: because Augustine and Anselm say that by His Word He says all things which He makes. But the Word is the Son alone. Therefore, since in the Word are the reasons of creatures, it seems this is by reason of notion, and not of nature.

Solution. It must be said that by reason of nature the reasons of things are in God.

To the first, it must be said that to create is an act of the person, insofar as the person is an individual substance of rational nature: and this person would still be God, even if He were not Father and Son and Holy Spirit. Hence that objection does not prove that it belongs to persons thus distinguished as faith distinguishes.

To the last, it must be said that this belongs to the Son appropriately, and not properly, just as to be the wisdom and art of the Father, as was shown above: and therefore it does not remove that it belongs to the substance per se.

F. That not all things which are from God are also of Him: but conversely.

It must also be annexed here, that not all things which are said to be from God, ought also to be said to be of Him. Because, as Augustine says in the book On the Nature of Good: "From Him" does not entirely signify "of Him." For what is of Him can be said to be from Him: but not everything that is from Him can be said to be of Him, because it is not of His substance. For heaven and earth are from Him, because He made them: but not of Him, because not of His substance. Just as if a man generates a son, and makes a house, the son is from him, and the house is from him: but the son is of him, the house, however, is of earth and wood, not of him.

Articulus 12 — Whether It Is The Same To Say "From Him" And "Of Him"

Whether it is the same to say, from him, and about him?

Then it is inquired about this which he says, there, F, This does not entirely signify from him, what about him, etc.

For it can be doubted whence this arises, since from and about seem to always denote the relation of cause?

I respond. It must be said that this preposition from is more general in signifying origin than the preposition about: for from sometimes denotes origin and not coessentiality, as we say, we have peace from the king: sometimes it denotes order in the same substance, as when it is said, from morning becomes midday: for the same thing now which was substantially morning becomes midday, although it passes in the notion of morning, and remains in the notion of now and substance: sometimes it denotes order only, as when it is said, from the games comes Olympia, that is, after that. However, about always denotes origin with consubstantiality: and this is the cause of the statement.

DISTINCTIO XXXVII

Divisio Textus

And since it has been demonstrated in part, etc. Here begins the part in which the Master shows how God is in creatures as a cause in the caused essentially, presentially, and potentially.

However, it is divided into two parts: in the first of which the Master shows God to be everywhere and in every thing. But since to be in a place, it follows to be moved through place: and to be in a thing, it follows to be changed according to the thing: therefore in the

second he shows God to be immutable with place or thing changed, namely there, I, Since the divine nature is truly and essentially in every place, etc.

The first is divided into three. In the first, he determines the modes by which God is everywhere, and explains those which can be explained. In the second, he raises questions following from his determination, there, C, But you ask, where did God dwell, etc. Thirdly, he returns to the explanation of the first mode according to the opinion of some, who indeed spoke truly, but nevertheless insufficiently, there, F, From the aforesaid it is clear, that God is everywhere wholly by essence, etc.

In the first there are still four chapters, in the first of which he simply states the modes by which God is in things. In the second, he proves by authority that God is in all things essentially, presentially, potentially. In the third, he proves him to dwell specially in the Saints. Fourth, to know the mode of inhabitation, he refers to those things which have been determined above concerning the mission of the Holy Spirit.

From these the sentence of the first part is clear.

Articulus 1 — Whether God Is Everywhere And In Every Thing

Whether God is everywhere, and in every thing?

Before the Letter, four questions arise here, namely whether God is everywhere, and in every thing?
Secondly, Whether it is the same to be everywhere, and in every thing?
Thirdly, Whether it is the same to be everywhere, and in every place, and to be anywhere?
Fourthly, Whether it is fitting for Him to be everywhere from eternity, or not?

TO THE FIRST, it is proceeded thus:
The world is: therefore God is everywhere conserving the world. In the following prosarium. Let the world be taken for the whole universe of creatures, so that none is excepted. Thus: It is conserved in being: therefore there will be one conserving the world: but every conserving is in the relation of cause to the conserved: since therefore cause and caused are not the same, the world and the one conserving the world will not be the same: therefore the one conserving the world will not be the world, nor anything of the world: but it is conserved everywhere: therefore the one conserving the world, which is neither the world nor of the world, will be everywhere: this is none other than God: therefore God will be everywhere.

Perhaps you will say, that He conserves through the influence of some power which is not Himself: for as we see, that the generator not only influences the generated with the species, but also influences the dispositions of matter by which it resists subsequent alterations: thus God can do. On the contrary: It will be of the same to give being, and conservation in being: because what gives being, also gives the consequences of that being. I therefore inquire about that power influenced by the first: for it is evident, that it has being in the conserved and from the first: therefore either it conserves itself, or it is conserved by another. It is evident, that not by itself: because thus the same would be cause and caused: therefore by another. Therefore either that is created, or not. If created: then it will go on to infinity; therefore it must be said,

that that conserving is God: since therefore conservation is everywhere, and the conserving God will be everywhere.

1. Likewise, From everyone who knows what God is (as Anselm says) it is posited that God is something greater than can be conceived: therefore either He will be posited within every thing only, or outside only, or within and outside simultaneously. If within only, or outside only, it follows that He is something terminated: therefore He is not greater than can be conceived: because something greater than Him can be conceived: therefore it remains, that He is within all things, and outside all things, and above all things, and below all things: therefore He is everywhere.
2. Likewise, Gregory says, that all things which were made, were made from nothing, and would tend to nothing unless the hand of the Omnipotent contained them. But it is evident, that they were made from nothing everywhere: therefore everywhere it is necessary for the container to be present: therefore the container itself is everywhere.
3. Likewise, Damascene: Whether according to power, or according to goodness, or according to wisdom, or according to time, or according to place, it falls short of perfection, it will never be God: but to fall short of perfection according to place, is not to be everywhere: therefore God...

since it lacks in no perfection, it will be everywhere.

1. Likewise, the power of preserving itself in being is a power of no neediness: therefore, it is of God alone: since therefore every thing is from something, and needs that from which it is, that power of preserving itself cannot be given to any creature: therefore, to no place, nor part of the world: therefore, it is from God Himself immediately: therefore, God is everywhere conserving the world.
2. Likewise, let it be granted that God gives the world the power of preserving itself, still it is necessary that that habitual power be received from the world and from God: but between every receiver and received there is a certain essential connection, unless it is a receiver through an influence which is carried through some medium: therefore, it is necessary that everywhere the part of the world conserved spiritually touches God, or there will be some medium: but it is evident that there is no medium, because between the one bringing forth a thing from nothing and the thing brought forth there cannot be a medium carrying or acting: therefore, it is necessary that God be present everywhere.
3. Likewise, it is assumed by all, and it has been proven in the premises, that every creature has an exemplar in God, and that every nobler thing is to be attributed to God: because it is held according to the reason of imitation to the eternal exemplar. From this I proceed thus: This creature is here: therefore here is to take place and located and the filling of place and salvation and containment of the located: and another creature is elsewhere, and the same are to be taken in it, and thus of each. Let us see therefore what is of nobility in each thus taken: it is evident that it is not the distinction of nobility,

because that follows diversity and the partibility of matter: but containment and filling and salvation in every place and located are of nobility: therefore these are had from the exemplar. Therefore, let the distinction which is of ignobility be removed, and let what is of nobility be attributed to God, it follows that God is everywhere in every place and located filling and containing and saving: therefore God is everywhere.

4. Likewise, let us consider the universal being, and that universal which is most universal, for it is the universal essential likeness of many: but this can be according to species according to the reduction to one of those which differ by matter only, and it can be according to genus one in the reduction to one of those which differ in species and being, and according to analogy and proportion to one in the reduction of effects to one cause which has it according to itself, but others from it: but it is evident that this last is most universal: therefore, it is evident that every universal is in many and of many: I ask therefore, What of those is of nobility, and what of ignobility? I propose that it is of ignobility to be in many. For by this the universal is contracted and dies and is corrupted: according to being it is contracted to the being of the particular, and is destroyed, because with the first destroyed, it is impossible for any of the others to remain. I propose however, that to be of many is of nobility: because the universal by that has the scope of predication, and that it is everywhere and always, especially taken in the third way, because this is common to God and creature: therefore the universal according to this is exemplified from the divine being: since therefore according to this some universal is in every thing and everywhere, much more God, because it is necessary that every exemplified thing fails from the first exemplar.
5. Likewise, the first of all causes influences more on all others which are simply second, although in the order of nature some are first: but I see that the primary in the order of nature remains essentially and presentially and potentially in all seconds, although it is contracted and determined in them, and this is of ignobility: and therefore also some Philosophers said that unity is the first form which by its iteration constitutes all other forms: therefore, with what is of ignobility removed, the first of all causes will be in all others essentially, presentially, potentially. If perhaps you say that this is not true, that the first cause in the order of natural causes is in the second: it is evident that you speak falsely: because to be, to live, to sense, are formal causes ordered in nature: and being is in life, and life in sense, and the sensitive in the intellective in all those ways: and thus continuous matter is in matter having contrariety, and this in the mixed, and this in the complexioned, this again in the composite with distinct organic members.

These reasons suffice for the proof that God is everywhere, because some deny this, who are called philosophers: and they bring these reasons in the contrary:

1. It is nobler to make works permanent without an artificer, than permanent in the presence only of the artificer: for it is said, Deuteronomy 32:3-4: "Give magnificence to our God. The works of God are perfect," etc. Therefore, His works remain, even with Him separated from them.

2. Likewise, this can be done by a lower artificer, like a carpenter: therefore much more by a higher one.
3. Likewise, we see nature do this: because the generator not only influences the species or makes it, but also the dispositions by which it is conserved from those altering to the corruption of the species: therefore, God also does this.
4. Likewise, he is weak in the kingdom who cannot govern unless present: therefore this will also be more a sign of weakness in God, if He cannot contain creatures unless present.
5. It can also be objected more strongly thus: The celestial virtues, which are most efficacious, do not conserve immediately, nor act, but through the mediation of the elements: therefore it seems, since God is more similar to nobility than ignobility, that He also acts thus.
6. Likewise, if God is everywhere essentially, presentially, potentially: therefore He operates all things: therefore it seems that no nature has its own operation: and this is against Damascene, who says that every nature has its own operation. And this is also against all the sciences of the Philosophers.
7. Likewise, what is objected about the order of causes does not seem to hold, because it holds only in essential causes: but in efficient causes it does not hold, for in these the first efficient cause is not in the second by essence or by presence, but by power only: but it is true that with the first not moving, motion will be taken away from all others, but God is the efficient cause of things, not formal, nor material.

Solution. It must be said that the first reasons conclude the truth.

And to these last it must be said that what it says, "It is nobler to make," etc., is simply false: and this is necessarily proven thus: Every conserving thing is from some cause which is before the thing itself, whether it is efficient, or formal, or material: but in the work of God, when He makes things, nothing precedes the work except Himself alone: therefore His work which is conserved will not have conservation except from Him: and whatever is in Him, is Himself: therefore it will not have conservation except from Him essentially conserving, that is, that He is essentially present conserving.

Hence, that a lower artificer makes something conserved in being, is because there is something preceding his work, which of itself conserves the form impressed by the artificer: and if it were not so, it would not be conserved. And an example of this is if he impresses the form of a seal in some matter not having beforehand the power of conserving, as if a seal is impressed on water, the form is not conserved except in the presence of the sealer, and with the sealer removed it is destroyed: and thus it is also with nature, whose work is preceded by matter, although art and nature operate the form in matter in different ways: because as the Commentator says on the ninth book of the Metaphysics, nature makes the form from matter, by this that it transmutes the matter from the form it previously had: but art does not properly

make from matter, but in matter, because it removes the form from the matter it previously had: and by this the solution to the three following objections is evident.

To the other it must be said that the celestial virtues move according to the diversity of their position to different things: and therefore they have motions of declinations, ascensions, and descensions, and occultations, and preventions, and oppositions, and the like: and therefore it was necessary for them to be distant from the matter of generable and corruptible things, so that they could move all thus in different ways: and all these except the sole mover are of imperfection. For if they could do it in one way, and not with so many motions, they would be nobler: since the Philosopher says that a thing is better which has goodness in one motion, than that which has it in many motions: hence it is not necessary that God in this be assimilated to them.

To the other it must be said that this would be true if we posited only one cause: but we say that the first cause is immediately present to all, so that they can have their own works and their own causes. And if you object that in the same genus of causality there are not two immediate causes of one thing, it must be said that these are not of the same genus: because God is not commiscible with the thing, and therefore does not take away from it its own nature. To what is objected about the king, it must be said that this is true in those things which are situational: because by this is known the power of it to extend beyond its essence: hence as much as in these from this a greater and nobler power is proven, so much is proven to be a more contracted and ignoble essence, which does not follow its power. But God has all things most noble: and therefore it is necessary that the essence be commensurate to the power, since neither is limited by any place.

To the other it must be said that it is true that efficient causes in nature are ordered: and they do not touch each other except through the influence which one has over another: and this is of imperfection, as has already been said: because the essence has diminution from the power: and therefore this is not to be attributed to God.

Articulus 2 — Whether It Is The Same For God To Be Everywhere And To Be In Every Thing

Whether it is the same for God to be everywhere, and to be in every thing?

Secondly, it is asked, Whether it is the same for God to be everywhere as to be in every thing?

It seems, however, that it is not: because 1. The Philosopher says that the nature of place is marvelous: therefore it is more marvelous for something to be in a place than to be in a thing: therefore in God it is not the same to be in a place and for God to be in a thing.

1. Likewise, Not every thing is a place: therefore to be in a place and to be in a thing are diverse: therefore also in God it is not the same to say God is in a place and God is in a thing.

2. Likewise, When it is said God is in things, only the relation of cause is implied: but when it is said God is in a place, more is implied, because the nature of containment: therefore they are not the same, as it seems.

3. Likewise, Let us suppose there is no place, and yet there are celestial spirits: then it will be true that God is in every thing: yet it will not be true that God is in every place: therefore they are not the same.

4. Likewise, These two modes are converted upon themselves, God is in things, and all things are in God, as is held from the premises, and from those things which are said here: for every thing which is from God is in God, and God is in that thing which is from Him: but I cannot thus say, God is in every place: therefore every place is in Him: therefore it is not the same mode of understanding, and the same connotation here and there, as it seems.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. In the Text it is held that it is the same for God to be everywhere as to be in every located thing.

1. Likewise, In what sense is it said that God is everywhere? For either this is said properly, or through cause. If properly, then the properties of place are referred to Him. But these are the properties of place, to contain, to terminate, to preserve: none of which is fitting to place in comparison to God. Therefore this is said only through the causing and conserving cause: but in the same way it is said to be in every thing: therefore it is the same for God to be in every place and in every thing.

Solution. In my judgment, it is not the same for God to be everywhere and for God to be in every thing: just as the relation of cause through the essence of causing and conserving the thing to the conserved is not the same, and the relation of place to that from which it has the power of containing the located: for when it is said, He is everywhere, or in every place, God is noted to be in the place as holding the place in being, and giving it the power of containment: but God does not give the power of containment to every thing in which He is, but He gives it to those things which are proper to His conservation.

Therefore it must be said to the FIRST and SECOND, that the Master does not intend that those two are the same, but that one follows from the other: because if He is in every thing, since place is a thing, it follows that He is in every place: but yet a different relation is implied in the preposition here and there.

To the other it must be said, that God is said to be in things as causing and conserving through the presence of His essence and power: but beyond this a special effect is added, when it is said to be in a place, namely because He gives the place to contain the located and to preserve.

To the fourth it must be said, that the properties of place are not referred to Him except as to a cause: and yet, as already said, something else is connoted when it is said, God is in a place, and God is in a thing.

Articulus 3 — Whether It Is The Same For God To Be In Every Place, And Everywhere, And Wheresoever

ARTICULUS

Whether it is the same for God to be in every place, and everywhere, and wherever?

Thirdly, it is asked, Whether it is the same for God to be in every place, and everywhere, and wherever?

It seems that it is so: because

1. Each of these terms expresses the whole in a place: therefore it is the same that is expressed by each of these terms.

1. Likewise, by each of these terms the same is connoted, because the place has being and the power of containing from God existing in it: therefore it seems that in all these the same is expressed.

ON THE CONTRARY:

1. Anselm says that in every place is that which is commensurate with any place: but God, since He is indivisible, is not commensurate with any place, and yet He is everywhere, as Augustine says: therefore it is not the same to be everywhere and to be in every place.

1. Likewise, God is wholly everywhere: yet He is not properly said to be wholly in every place, because He is not extended by spatial magnitude, as Augustine says: therefore it is clear that these two are not the same, as it seems.

Solution. To this, without prejudice, it must be said that, considering subtly, they are not the same. For there is a comparison to ubi, which is not a comparison to place properly speaking: just as the comparison of the first movable is to ubi through motion, although it is not compared to place: because it is neither in place, nor moved in place properly speaking, except as the Philosopher says near the end of the sixth Physics, that it is moved in place according to form, and not according to subject: and this more indicates a relation to ubi than to place. Hence, to be in every place expresses the whole of place with the distinction of place and the relation of the located to the place. But everywhere expresses the whole of ubi itself, not so expressly importing the distinction of the parts of ubi, and of that which is in place to the located. And we can take a likeness of this. For just as it is in distributed universals, so also it is in distributive signs. However, I can consider the universal as a simple essence, or as a nature capable of being multiplied, or as a nature already actually communicated, multiplied, and distinct: therefore it expresses the simple essence of ubi itself or nature: but the syllabic addition which is added, adds communicability: but by saying wherever, distinct multiplication by parts is added, and thus it also expresses being in every place. Hence, this is less improper, God is everywhere, than this, God is wherever, or in every place: yet both are found among the Saints.

Therefore, it must be said to the first, that although each of these terms expresses the whole in place: yet it is not expressed in the same mode of signifying: and therefore they are not equally improper expressions.

To the other it must be said, that the same is noted in all, but with greater and lesser distinction.

Articulus 4 — Whether It Belongs To God From Eternity To Be Everywhere And In Every Thing

Whether it is fitting for God to be everywhere from eternity, and in every thing?

Fourthly, it remains to be asked, Whether it is fitting for Him to be everywhere from eternity, and in every thing?

It seems, however, that it is so: because 1. Whenever there is a relation of the caused to the cause, then there is also a relation of the cause to the caused, or perhaps prior: but because of the relation of the caused to the cause, all things are said to be in God from eternity: therefore much more because of the relation of the cause to the caused, God will be said to be everywhere from eternity, and in every thing, as it seems.

1. Likewise, If to be everywhere says nothing but to give the power of containing in every place, since from eternity He is able to give such power, He will be said to be everywhere from eternity.
2. Likewise, If because of the power of conserving He is said to be in every thing, since from eternity He has such power, it seems that from eternity He is in every thing.
3. Likewise, From eternity He is in every thing that is, because He is in Himself: therefore from eternity He is everywhere, because to be everywhere is to be in every thing that is. If perhaps you say that it is equivocal for God to be in every thing that is from eternity, and for God to be in every thing. This is nothing: because one reason is universal in all past, present, and future things: and it would be one even in eternal things, if from eternity there had been another: therefore to be everywhere or in every thing is not said equivocally in those.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: When it is said, God is in every thing, the extent of the divine essence is signified, which is its magnitude, as was held above: and the effect of conservation in being is signified: but that effect was not from eternity: therefore neither was God in every thing from eternity. If perhaps you say, as some wish to defend, that this is true, God is everywhere from eternity: but not this, God is in every thing from eternity. On the contrary: When it is said, God is everywhere, here similarly the effect is connoted which is the conferring of place, so that it may have the power of containing: but this effect was not from eternity: therefore this is false, God was everywhere from eternity.

Solution. In my judgment, both are false: and this namely, God is in every thing from eternity: and this, God is everywhere from eternity, as the last reasons prove.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that God is not said to be in things in the same way as things are in Him: because when things are said to be in God Himself, by this the existence of things is not posited: but when He is said to be in things, things are posited to actually exist because of the connoted effect: whence this proposition, whenever there is a relation of the caused to the cause, etc., is understood of the caused existing in the nature of the caused, and not in the nature of the cause: otherwise it is false.

To the other, it must be said that God is not said to be everywhere or in things from the power of conserving, but from the act.

To the last, it must be said that this is true, that from eternity He is in every thing that is, because He is in Himself: but it does not follow: therefore from eternity He is in every thing: and there is a fallacy of the qualified to the simple: for in the first, the term "thing" is restricted by the implication placed around it to stand for eternal things only, and afterwards it is inferred as if it were held absolutely for all.

Articulus 5 — Whether God Is Well Said To Be In Things In Five Modes

Whether God is rightly said to be in things in five ways?

Then it is questioned concerning those things which are said in the Text: and first concerning this which is said, there, A, He is present, potentially, essentially in every nature, etc.

It seems that this is nothing to be said: because
1. Either these modes are taken on the part of God who is present, or they are taken on the part of the creature in which He is present. If on the part of God: since He is related in one way to everything that is, it seems that there are not five modes as determined. But if on the part of the creature: this seems insufficient:

because that which operates in one creature does not operate in another: and thus there will be infinite modes, and not only five, as is touched upon here.

1. Likewise, when it is said, God is present through grace: either this adds something on the part of God, or it only denotes an effect connoted on our part. If in the first way: then God is related to things in a deformed manner, which is heretical: because thus He would be multiform. If in the second way: then with respect to Him it is the same to be present through essence and through grace: and thus it is not a special mode.
2. Likewise, the relation is of the caused to the cause, just as of the cause to the caused: therefore, since in one way things are in God only, it seems that in one way and not five God is in things.
3. Furthermore, what is it to be present, potentially, essentially God in things? If you say, as it seems to imply in the Text, that this is because essence is from His essence, and the power of the thing from His power: then the third cannot be adapted unless you say that the presence of the thing is from His presence: but this is nothing: because not every thing is present to itself, since to be present to itself implies self-knowledge.

Likewise, let us circumscribe the power of the thing and the presence: then the power of the thing will not be from the power of God, nor the presence from the presence: and yet God will still be in the essence of the thing essentially, present, potentially; therefore, that solution is nothing, as it seems.

1. But if you say that these are taken according to the attributes of the persons: this again seems to be nothing. Let the attributes themselves be considered: then essentially it can be appropriated to no person. And if you say that power is attributed to the Father, and presence to the Son by reason of knowledge: then the attribute of the Holy Spirit is not found.

Likewise, with the persons circumscribed, God would still be in all things essentially, present, potentially.

Likewise, the Father is in all things essentially, present, potentially: and similarly the Son, and similarly the Holy Spirit: therefore these do not pertain to the persons, as they are distinguished by proper or appropriated attributes, but insofar as they communicate in the divine essence.

Solution. It must be said without prejudice, that these modes by which God is in the creature can be varied in three ways. In one way on the part of the connoted thing: because according to what is in the exemplar, so it flows into the exemplified, namely that the essence of the thing is from the essence, and the species of the thing from the presence: which species flows from the idea which is the species in the divine mind, and the power of the thing is from the power, as is implied in the Text below. In another way, we can say that in God five are taken, namely substance: or essence apart from the understanding of the persons, and three persons, and the fifth which is essence in the person. We can therefore say that to be in things essentially is taken according to the essence considered in itself. But to be in things through power is taken according to the attribute of the Father, which is power. But to be in things present is taken according to the attribute of the Son, which is knowledge. But to be in the Saints through indwelling grace is taken according to the attribute of the Holy Spirit, which is goodness. But to be in the man Christ through union is taken according to the essence in the person, because the essence in the person is incarnate.

But if you object that if the persons are not understood, God will still be in things essentially, present, potentially. It must be said that if the persons are not understood, the attributes of the persons will still remain: and through them it will be the same: because the essence is still before power, and the three, namely wisdom, power, and goodness, will make the essence create creatures, and gratify the rational: and thus that acceptance is still preserved.

But if we wish to speak more subtly and more to the point, we will say

that the simpler something is, the greater its scope: and that which is at the end of simplicity encompasses all things: therefore, to be God everywhere essentially is caused by simplicity: and this Augustine says in the Text. But the Philosopher says that the subtle is

penetrative of parts, and of the part of parts. But nothing is more subtle than the most simple: whence the Apostle says to the Hebrews 4:12, that the word of God is living, and effective, and more penetrating than any two-edged sword: and reaching unto the division of soul and spirit, of joints also and marrow, and is a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart. And it follows, v. 13: All things are naked and open to His eyes. Therefore, presence is from penetrating subtlety, so that neither intrinsically nor extrinsically anything is hidden from the thing. Similarly, the first has to influence all power over all following: and with the power of the first abstracted, it is abstracted from all others: because the Philosopher says that without the first mover none of the secondaries moves. Let us say therefore, that two act under God: purpose or free will, and nature: and by comparison to nature He is present essentially, potentially, present: and they are reduced to simplicity, subtlety, and pure reason of moving according to the cause taken by reason of understanding. But to purpose it is compared as elevating it above nature: and this does not happen except through grace, and therefore in that it is through indwelling grace: and because purpose is also nature, therefore it has the three modes presupposed by which it is in nature. But the mode by which it is in the man Christ is special and miraculous.

Having these, it must be answered to the first, that these modes are taken on the part of both, namely God and the creature. And what is objected, that God is related in one way to everything that is, it must be said that this is understood in such a way that He is related in a mode not varied by essence, or by something added to Himself: yet He is not related in the same reason of exemplar to everything that is, as is easily evident to anyone.

To the other it must be said, that when it is said that He is present through indwelling grace, another connoted thing is noted which more elevates nature, and another reason of exemplar is noted, namely of good will, because the Spirit is given with His gifts, although He is not other than He was before, yet He is given for another than He was previously held: if however it must be conceded that He was previously held: for they do not have the Holy Spirit in whom He is essentially, present, potentially: and although one does not add another thing above another, yet it adds another mode of signifying, which suffices in divine things, as has often been said.

To the other it must be said, that although the relation of the caused to the cause as to being present is in one way, yet it is not so conversely: and this happens because the cause does not need the caused: and therefore it suffices to signify that the caused was in the cause only: but the caused needs the cause much more, and therefore that respect is reduced to more modes by which the cause is in the caused because of the need of the caused.

To the other it must be said, that I well concede that that solution solves less well.

To the other it must be said, that if they ought to be taken according to the attributes of the persons, it seems to me that it should proceed as we said at the beginning of the solution: because unless someone wishes to expound forcibly, he will not be able to reduce the mode which is essentially to be present, to another person.

And through this the solution to the whole is evident.

Articulus 6 — Whether God Is In Things In Many Modes, As One Way In The Temple, Another In Heaven, Another In The Soul

Whether God is in things in many ways, as
differently in the temple, differently in heaven, differently
in the soul?

Whether God is in things in many ways, as
differently in the temple, differently in heaven, differently
in the soul?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says,
there, A, towards the middle: Whom he himself
as the most beloved temple, etc.

For it seems that God is in things in many ways, and in heaven differently than
in the temple, and in this differently than in other
places, and in the just soul differently than in others.

Solution. I well concede that God is in different things in many
ways, and it can thus be said (as the Saints say) that God is in
heaven, as in which the works of his glory shine forth: in the world, however, as creator and
governor: in the Angel, as savor and
adornment: in the Church, as the father of the family in
the house: in the faithful soul, as the bridegroom in
the bridal chamber: everywhere, however, essentially
by conserving and sustaining, potentially
by presiding and governing, presentially
by knowing: by grace, however,
inhabiting in the just: by efficacy in
the sacraments: by mystery and sign in
the dove, and breath, and fiery tongues:
as in the place of propitiation in
the temple: whence, Genesis 28:16: Truly
the Lord is in this place. And, there, verse 17:
How awesome is this place! This is none other than the house of God, and the gate of heaven.
By union, however, in the whole Christ: but
to the soul alone in hell, to the body
alone in the sepulcher. And in many other
ways which anyone, if he thinks by himself,
can find.

Articulus 7 — Whether God Is Everywhere And In All Time; And, Whether It Must Be Granted That God Is Here, Or There, Or Elsewhere Than Here

Whether God is everywhere, and at every Time? and, Whether it must be conceded that God is here, or there, or elsewhere than here?

Whether God is everywhere, and at all times?
And, Whether it should be conceded that God is here, or there, or elsewhere than here?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said, there, A, towards the middle: Hilary most openly teaches that God is everywhere.

For it seems that this is false: because
1. Either it is understood properly that God is everywhere, or by metaphor. If it is said properly, it seems not to be fitting: because Anselm says in the Monologion that nothing is in place and time, unless it follows the laws of place and time: but God does not follow the laws of place and time, since He is not measured by anything as being at rest, nor as in motion: therefore God is neither in place, nor in time.

1. Likewise, Anselm, in the same place: Therefore, in no place or time is the supreme essence said to be: because it is contained by nothing else at all: therefore it is clear, that it is not properly compared to place. But if you say that it is compared to place by metaphor. On the contrary: Let the properties of place be taken, which are to contain, to preserve, to circumscribe, to terminate, to be immobile in itself, but to be moved locally by it and from it: none of these can be fitting: therefore it seems that by metaphor the nature of place does not fit God.

Likewise, Anselm in the Monologion: If the manner of speaking would allow, it would be more fittingly said to be with place, or with time, than in place or in time: for more is signified to be contained when it is said to be in another, than when it is said to be with another: therefore it is clear that the properties of place cannot be transferred to God.

1. Likewise, if it is said to be everywhere, or in place, because place is present to Him, as Anselm says, and He is present in every place: then it seems that this also fits others, just as matter is absent from no place, but is present to all places: and thus this will not be fitting to God alone.
2. Likewise, the Philosopher says in the fourth book of Physics, that we would not seek place, unless there were motion: since therefore no motion fits God, it seems that no place fits Him.
3. Likewise, to whomever the nature of something is repugnant, to the same the universality of that nature is repugnant: as if a man is not a donkey, he cannot be every donkey, although perhaps the converse of the proposition is not true, that to whomever the universality of something is repugnant, to the same the nature of that which is distributed is repugnant: but to God (as has already been shown) the nature of place is

repugnant: therefore also everywhere, which says the universe in place, will be repugnant to Him, as it seems.

4. Likewise, since there is a double place, as the Philosopher says, namely place as a vessel, and place as place. Place as a vessel, as the ship is the place of the sailor. Place as place, as the river is the place of the sailor's navigation: will both be transferred to God, so that it is said to be everywhere, because it is in place in both ways mentioned? If it is said that yes. On the contrary: Place as a vessel is moved, and what is placed in it is transferred, as wine in an urn: therefore God is transferred from place to place, and creatures are transferred in Him. But if He is in place which is place as place: then He Himself is moved from place to place, which is heresy, which in the following part of this distinction is disproved. But if you say that He is neither such a place, nor is in such a place: then it follows inevitably, that He is not everywhere: and this is denied by the Saints in the Letter.

Further it is asked, Whether it should be conceded that God is here or there, or here or elsewhere, or elsewhere than here?

However, it seems that yes: because
1. As Anselm says in the Monologion, not because He is present to this place, therefore is He prohibited from being present to that or that place or time simultaneously and similarly. Therefore it seems that He is here and elsewhere, and elsewhere than here.

1. Likewise, Anselm, in the same place: For He is in no way prohibited or compelled by the law of places or times to be or not to be somewhere or sometime, which in no way encloses His being within place and time: but God does not enclose His being within place: therefore He is not compelled when He is here, not to be elsewhere: therefore He is here, and elsewhere than here, as it seems.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
Here and elsewhere indicate the distinction of place, and elsewhere than here indicates the comparison of place: but the distinction of places posits the distinction of what is placed, since in no genus are two places simply simultaneously and at once of one number of things: but such a distinction does not fall into God: therefore it seems that such things should not be conceded.

Solution. I say without prejudice, because when it is said that God is in place, and what is placed in place, the relation of this preposition "in" is taken equivocally: which is thus proved. There is one comparison of spiritual things to corporeal things according to being in, and another of corporeal things to corporeal things. For if I say, wine is in the bottle, it is a comparison of corporeal to corporeal by being in: and therefore in such things those are most properly said to be in which are in as what is placed in place, the relation of place to what is placed is understood there: and the containment which the preposition imports is posited around that to which something is in: and to be contained and to be terminated is posited around that which is in. But when a comparison of spiritual things to corporeal things is

made, the whole contrary is made: as when it is said, the soul is in the body: for then the containment which the preposition notes is posited around that which is in, and to be contained and to be terminated is posited around that to which it is said to be in. Similarly therefore when God is said to be everywhere or in every place (because now I do not make force between those two, because above the difference is shown) here a comparison of spiritual to corporeal is made: therefore the spiritual will be the containing, and yet it will be said to be in: and the corporeal will be the contained, and yet it will be said that something is in it. But if you ask, what is the reason, that the containing is said to be in, and the contained is said to which another is in? I say, that every containing in being is intrinsic, because they do not contain in being the external things of a thing except by intrinsic containings in being: and therefore when the spiritual contains in being, it is necessary that it itself be signified to be within. Thus therefore we say God is everywhere, and in every place, by this that He gives being to place and the containing power: and therefore Boethius and Anselm who thus explain, that He is everywhere, because He is present to every place, do not say the whole, but part of this predication, God is everywhere.

According to this therefore it can be answered to the first objections: because we can say, that most properly and more than properly in this way it is said that God is in every place, and also metaphorically: because in this it agrees with what is placed that it is in, because it fills the place of this kind with containing power and the nature of place: but not as what is placed, because then it would not be metaphor, but property.

To the other it must be said, that Anselm intends, that He is neither included nor measured by place and time.

To the other it must be said, that matter is not thus present to place: because it does not have distinct being in place: but the first termination is through form, and through that it is referred to place: because the Philosopher says, that the same is the motion to form, and to place.

To the other it must be said, that place as immobile to which and from which motion is made, is sought because of motion: but place as surrounding and defining only, is not sought because of motion: because the Philosopher says, that even to mathematicians place must be given, which however are abstracted from motion and from matter: and therefore that reason does not compel.

To the other it must be said, that to whomever the nature of something is repugnant, according to which its nature is repugnant to it, according to the same mode the universality of that nature is repugnant to it. But to be in place according to the inherence of where, which is signified when it is said to be in place, is repugnant to God, because He is not circumscribed by place: but to be in place causally fits God, and in this way it also fits God to be everywhere.

To the other it must be said, that nothing prohibits, that God is in both places in the manner mentioned: because from this it does not follow, that He Himself is changed, as is clear from what was said before.

To that which is further asked, in my judgment it can be said, that these expressions are less proper, as the objection proves: but because this is found in the Letter below, that He is wholly elsewhere, and Anselm says this, these expressions must be received: but then what is ignoble must be separated, so that distinction and discretion signified are not referred to God. However, that is most improper, God is elsewhere than here, because in such a comparison, the adverb is accustomed to note the relation between the affirmation of a thing in another place, and the negation in this place: whence of the absent we say, that he is elsewhere and not here, unless a conjunction is added coupling thus, God is elsewhere also than here: for then by the grace of coupling which wishes to note coupling among similars, it would be noted to be in both places, and to be absent from neither.

Articulus 8 — Whether It Belongs To God Alone To Be Everywhere; Then It Is Asked About That Which Is Said There

Whether it is fitting for God alone to be everywhere?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said, there,

Whether it is fitting for God alone to be everywhere?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said, there,

A, towards the end: Why is it everywhere, which is proper to divinity, etc.

1. For it seems that this is false by what is held in the first of the Posterior Analytics concerning the universal, that since it is of all, and always, and is everywhere: therefore it is not proper to God, because what is proper is that which is fitting to one and only one.
2. Likewise, the Gloss on that of Psalm 147:15: His word runs swiftly: says that swiftness is everywhere, not only in horses or men. But if you say that the universal is everywhere not simply, but in each of its particulars: and this is to be everywhere according to its scope, which nevertheless does not encompass all. Against this, let us take the universal which is from the reduction of all effects to the first cause: for this universal will be everywhere, and always: because it is of God and every creature: therefore it is not proper to God.
3. Likewise, let us suppose there is one sole substance: therefore that substance will be in all in which God is: therefore it is not proper to God.
4. Likewise, let us suppose there is one sole man: his soul will be in the whole body wholly: and there is no place except of the body: therefore it is everywhere like God: because with such a supposition made, God also then will not be in more.
5. Likewise, let us suppose that one body is of such dimension, that it fills the whole concavity of the circle of the world, that body will be everywhere, as it seems: therefore this is not proper to God.

Solution. It must be said that these and all other such sophisms are solved by the fact that the term "everywhere" is taken equivocally, when it is said that a universal or some common thing is everywhere, and God is everywhere. For that which is referred to place is distinct. But that which is referred as to a subject or suppositum is referred to that in which it has being in nature and is undivided from it: and in this way the universal is everywhere, and always: but God is in the first way, because He, distinct from all, is in all, giving to place the power of containing by which it is place, and to the located the power of filling by which it is located.

To that which is objected, that one sole substance is posited: it must be said that it will not be said to be everywhere, but in one sole place: because although there is no place more than this, yet there can be more things in which it is not: but there cannot be things in which God is not: and this is the true solution. It can also be said that even then it is not wholly everywhere: because it is not wholly in the whole place, and in each part of the place: but God is thus everywhere.

To the other it must be said, that the soul does not have a comparison to the body as to place, but as to matter and mobile; and therefore the supposition is false in the argument.

To the other it must be said, that even if there is one such body, this will not be wholly in each particle of place: and therefore the instance does not hold.

Articulus 9 — Whether To Be In By Grace Is To Be In Simply, Or Only In A Certain Respect

Whether to be present through grace is to be present simply, or only in a certain respect?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there,

In the Saints indeed He dwells, in whom He is through grace.

1. For it seems from this that to be present simply is said to be present through grace: and to be present essentially is said to be present in a certain respect to God: for it is to dwell in someone, where He remains simply: but not to dwell, where He does not remain, except in a certain respect.
2. Likewise, Where someone dwells, someone remains there: therefore it seems, that if He does not dwell, that He passes: and thus God would pass from those in whom He is commonly through essence, presence, and power.
3. But on the contrary: The being of a thing and well-being, are as simply and in a certain respect: therefore since through this that God is present essentially, presentially, potentially, He gives being: but through this that He is present through grace, He gives well-being, it seems that

to be present essentially, presentially, potentially, is to be present simply: but to be present through grace, is to be present only in a certain respect.

Solution. It must be said, that to be present through grace, says simply, and nobly to be present.

To the first, it must be said, that to be present through grace supposes to be present commonly: and it is a perfection with respect to it on the part of the creature to be perfected, although not on the part of God perfecting.

To the other, it must be said, that the dwelling which is implied through grace is not opposed to transience, but is said from the rest of the will effectively: because namely it makes the will of the Saints through grace remain and rest in itself: and this does not make to be present in a common way.

To the other, it must be said, that although to be present in a common way gives being, nevertheless it does not give being except naturally: and this is not complete with the best completion: and therefore it is better to be present through grace than only in a common way: nevertheless I do not say, that to be present in a common way, says to be present in a certain respect: because both are to be present simply, although they do not connote equally good effects.

Articulus 10 — Whether It Is The Same To Be In Essentially, By Presence, And By Power

Whether it is the same to be essentially, presentially, and potentially present?

Whether it is the same to be essentially, presentially, and potentially present?

Then it is asked concerning what is said there, B, around the middle: Thus also God, since He is in all things essentially and wholly, etc.

For it can be asked, Whether it is the same to be essentially present as to be presentially present and potentially present?

For if it is the same: then it seems that it would have sufficed to say essentially present, and it would not have been necessary to add presentially and potentially. However, it seems that it is the same according to Boethius, Anselm, and Augustine, who explain one for the other, and through the other.

Further, it is asked, Whether it is better for the creature to be in God, or for God to be in the creature?

1. However, it seems that it is better for the creature to be in God: because this is eternal, but the other is from time.
2. Likewise, the creature in God is the creative essence, but the creator in the creature leaves behind the created essence: therefore it is nobler and better for the creature to be in the Creator, than conversely.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
Everything simply is better than something according to a certain respect: but the creature in the Creator is only according to a certain respect: however, when the Creator is in the creature, He has being simply: therefore it is better for the Creator to be in the creature, than conversely.

The solution is to say that questions of this kind are of little value.

To the first, I concede well that it is not the same: and how these modes vary is sufficiently clear. To what is objected against, it must be said that the Saints explain one through the other, by the fact that one follows from the other: for to be presentially and potentially present, it follows to be essentially present: because otherwise in God nature would be more contracted than power, as was explained above.

To the other, it must be said that there is no comparison: because to be present is said equivocally: because the creature is in the Creator only according to a certain respect, namely according to the idea, as a cause in a cause operating through intellect: but the Creator is in the creature containing and preserving and filling: and therefore it is of no value.

But if you ask, What is better and truer for the creature to be? To this it was solved above in distinction XXXV.

Articulus 11 — Whether God And The Holy Spirit Are In The Devil And The Damned, And Can Be With The Wicked And The Just

Whether God and the Holy Spirit are in the devil and the damned, and can be with the wicked and the unjust?

ARTICULUS XI,
Whether God and the Holy Spirit are in the devil and the damned, and can be with the wicked and the unjust?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, B, around the middle: But the wicked, although they are there where he is, who is absent nowhere, etc.

1. For if God is in all things: therefore he is in the devil and in the damned: and since the Holy Spirit is everywhere and in all things, the Holy Spirit will be in the devil and in the damned, which even the hearing of the faithful abhors.
2. Furthermore, it seems that God is with the wicked: because Augustine says thus in the book of Confessions: You were with me, and I was not with you: and he speaks of himself as he was in a state of wickedness.
3. Likewise, according to the customary mode of the habit of this proposition, it seems that it cannot be said that God is with the just: because it is thus given as a rule, that the preposition, with, denotes such an association: and it places principalship in the ablative to which it serves: whence we say, that the soldier is with the king, and not conversely: therefore it seems that the Saints are with God, and not he with the Saints, nor he with the impious.

Solution. It must be said to the first, that God is in all things: yet there are certain names which speak of a thing according to what it is substantially, but under deformity, such as the devil, fornication, and the damned: and in such things it ought not to be said, God is, unless a determination is added, namely that God is in the demon insofar as he is by nature, and similarly in others. Although in some way it is said that God is in the demon, yet it ought not to be conceded that the Holy Spirit is in the demon: because the Holy Spirit is present through

inspiration and holiness: and therefore it properly belongs to him to be present through grace: and if it is said to be present in others, a determination ought to be added, that the Holy Spirit as God is in all things.

To the other it must be said, that with is said in many ways: for sometimes it denotes simple association, and thus God is in all things, and all things with him, unless by the name itself they speak of a separation of society, such as the demon, and fornication, and suchlike: but sometimes it denotes association and principalship in the ablative, and then the Saints are said to be with him, and not conversely, as the objection proves. But sometimes it denotes association and cooperation: and thus God is said to be with the wicked because of presence, and not the wicked with him, because they do not cooperate with him: but thus he is said to be with the Saints, and the Saints with him.

Divisio Textus

But if you ask, where did God dwell before the Saints existed?

Here begins the second part of the first part of this distinction: in which the Master raises three questions against the determinations in order in three chapters: one of which is, where did He dwell before the world? Secondly, he excludes the error of those saying that the soul so filled the body that entrance was not open to God, and they were the Tertullian heretics, who said that God was of human form, and the soul also of human form: and to have a head in the head of the body, and feet in the feet, and so concerning others: and this begins, there, D, It must also be seated, because as Augustine says, etc. In the third, he inquires, How does He dwell in some not knowing Him, and in some knowing Him He does not dwell, there, E, That also is marvelous, etc.

Articulus 12 — Whether God Is In Himself And Dwells In Himself; And, Whether It Can Be Conceded That God Is Nowhere, And That He Is Elsewhere Than In Himself

Whether God is in Himself and dwells in Himself? And,
Whether it can be conceded that God is nowhere, and that He is elsewhere than in Himself?

Whether God is in Himself and dwells in Himself? And,
Whether it can be conceded that God is nowhere, and that He is elsewhere than in Himself?

A doubt arises, however, whether God is in Himself, or dwells in Himself?

1. It seems, however, that He is not: for prepositions are transitive: therefore they require diversity: but God has no diversity in relation to Himself: therefore He is not in Himself.
2. Likewise, the Philosopher says that all posited that nothing is in itself: therefore neither is God in Himself.

Further, it is asked whether this should be conceded, that God is nowhere?

It seems that it should not: because the contrary is in the Letter, where Augustine says that no one dares to say that God is nowhere. But on the contrary: What is not properly in any

place, that is nowhere properly: God is not properly in any place: therefore He is nowhere properly.

Likewise, it is further asked whether it should be conceded that God is elsewhere than in Himself?

It seems that it should: because He is in all creatures, which are not Himself: therefore He is in others than in Himself: therefore He is elsewhere than in Himself.

Further, it is asked whether it should be conceded that He is in another than in Himself?

And it seems that it should: because He is in the stone: therefore He is in another than in Himself.

Solution. It must be said that God is in Himself.

To that which is objected against, it must be said that for the transition of the preposition, the diversity of the mode of understanding according to attributes suffices, so that it is said to be in Himself, according to which He is called the heaven of God, and God completing the heaven: for thus He is heaven according to which He contains Himself, so that nothing of Him is outside Himself: but the contained is that which is God, which is within His majesty, and the ambit of essence adequate to Him.

To the other, it must be said that nothing is in itself in one and the same way accepted: because thus the same would be the container and the contained, and by the same reason.

To that which is further asked, it must be said that this should not be conceded, God is nowhere: because as said above, it is proper to God to be everywhere: and therefore in this way it does not befit Him by translation that is to be present and to be in place and located, giving to place to be and to contain, and to the located to fill and to be: whence the objection made above supposes a falsehood: but this is true, that it does not befit Him to be in place as a located body seeks place.

To the other, it must be said that that should be conceded: because the comparative adverb places a comparison between those things which are equivocal: because there is not the same relation of the preposition when it is said God is in Himself, and when it is said to be in all things, as is clear from the aforesaid. And if there were the same relation, it would seem to be noted that He is elsewhere, and not in Himself: and this is false.

To the other, it must be said that I would well concede this, God is in another and in Himself: but not this, God is in another than in Himself: and the cause of this has been said: because comparison seeks a univocal reason in the compared: and that is not here. Moreover, it seeks one negative, and the other affirmative. Whence it seems to follow that He would not be in Himself, if it were said to be in another than in Himself: as it is in others, when it is said, Socrates is elsewhere than in Paris, or Socrates is in another thing than in the Church, or than he is himself.

Articulus 13 — Whether God Is Well Said To Dwell With Himself And To Be With Himself

Whether God is rightly said to dwell with Himself, and to be with Himself?

Whether God is rightly said to dwell with Himself, and to be with Himself?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said there, C, towards the end: He dwells with Himself, and is with Himself.

For the Gloss says upon the beginning of John 1:1: The Word was with God, as one with another: therefore it seems that the term "with" denotes personal or substantial distinction: but God is not thus distinguished from Himself: therefore it is not properly said that He is with Himself.

Solution. To this it can be said that the Gloss at the beginning of John does not take personal distinction from the force of the preposition, but from the property of the Son which is signified there, when it is said, the Word: and therefore when the preposition is taken without those in divine matters, it does not denote such distinction: hence it ought to be explained here as if negatively thus, with Himself, that is, not outside Himself, or with another.

Articulus 14 — Whether A Spirit, Both Created And Uncreated, Can Be Said To Be In A Place; And, Whether Two Spirits Can Be In The Same Place

Whether a Spirit, both created and uncreated, can be said to be in a place? And, whether two spirits can be in the same place?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said there,

It is said, unless most foolishly, that the Holy Spirit does not have a place, etc.

1. For it seems from what is said here, that nothing prevents being in the same place except a body to a body, because two bodies cannot be in the same place, as the Philosophers prove: therefore, according to this, two created spirits can be in the same place. And if two: therefore infinite, or all, because there is no greater reason for two than for infinite: but this is denied by all commonly.

2. Likewise, if two created spirits cannot be in the same place: either this is because they are spirits, or because they are created. If because they are spirits: therefore the spirit which is God, and the spirit which is the soul, cannot be in the same place, which is false. But if because they are created: therefore the soul and the body, since both are created, cannot be in the same place, as it seems, which again is false: therefore two spirits can be in the same place.

3. Likewise, spirits and body are of greater composition than spirit and spirit: if therefore spirit and body can be in the same place: therefore much more two created spirits will be able to be in the same place, as it seems. If it is said that God and a created spirit are in the same place, but two created spirits cannot be in the same place because of confusion: this is unreasonable: because a greater distinction is required of the created to the uncreated, than of the created to the created. If therefore the created with the created cannot be in the same place because of confusion, much less will the created be able to be with the uncreated in the same.

Furthermore, nothing seems to be said, that a spirit is in a place:

1. For the Philosopher says in the fourth book of Physics, that we do not have one difference of a point and the place of a point: since therefore an Angel, or any other spirit, is more indivisible than a point, because it does not have position in the continuum which a point has, it seems that no Angel is in a place.

2. Likewise, place and time are quantities: therefore place is the boundary of the located, and not within, as is evident per se: therefore outside: therefore it is necessary that something is bounded to it contained within itself: therefore the contained will have a boundary of the same reason and quantity with it: but such a boundary is only of a quantified body: therefore nothing is in a place except a quantified body: therefore not an Angel.

3. Likewise, we can speak of place in two ways, namely mathematically, and naturally. If we speak mathematically, then it will be the center of the place and the located, and they are joined to the common boundary of the particle lo-

...[lo]cated, to which also the parts of the place are joined, as Boethius says in his commentary on the book of Categories. But in this way we cannot say that an Angel or a spirit is in a place. If, however, we speak of place physically, then place will be locating in itself by reason of some nature which it has, through which it inclines the located thing in itself in motion: just as we see a light thing ascend upward, because its species is generated and preserved there; and a heavy thing descend downward, because of the fact that it is generated there; and so again it is ridiculous to say that created spirits are in a place.

§ 4. Also, everything that determines a place for itself, determines it to an equality with itself: but nothing is equal to another, unless there is in it the same rationale of quantity that is in the other: but an Angel is not so related to a corporeal place: therefore, etc.

§ 5. Also, how great is the place of an Angel? For if it is of some quantity, then it cannot be in a smaller [place], which is false: therefore it seems that it is not in a place. If perhaps you say that it is in a place accidentally, namely by an assumed body, just as the soul is: we are not asking about this here. If however you say that it is in a place by the definition of its work, namely that its work is in this place, and not in another: according to this, God also is defined in a place, because His work is here, and not elsewhere, which is false: therefore this is not the reason why an Angel is said to be in a place.

§ Solution. It must be said that things are said to be in a place in many ways. For certain things, in themselves and according to their nature, need a preserving and containing place, such as all generable and corruptible things; and this for two reasons: of which one, and the principal one, is that the extremities of such things are determined by acting and suffering contrariety; and unless there were an extrinsic containing preserver, on account of the continuous containing of those very passions they would have a flowing away and destruction in their extremities.

§ And if you ask, whence does place have this property, that it preserves the located thing, since even the extremity of the locating body has contrariety, and so by fighting it seems rather to corrupt than to preserve? It must be said that that place which is as a locating vessel, has this from the influence of place simply [speaking]. Now place simply, insofar as it is preserving, is only twofold, namely simply up, in contact with the circumference of the sphere of the moon; and simply down, which is to be in the center, which has a nature of preserving from the whole sphere, by which it is equally regarded always. Another reason is that any thing is weaker in its extremities than it is in its internal parts; and therefore nature determines a container for it in its extremities. Speaking of place in this way, motion is to a place, and from it: and nothing is in a place, except what is generable and corruptible; nor is anything moved from it, nor to it, except what is movable by a rectilinear motion: and the sphere of the moon and all superior things are in no place in this way.

§ In another way we can speak of place insofar as it is mathematical space, as Boethius seems to mean: and thus it has the property of containing, but not preserving; because its containing will only be to encompass extrinsically; and in this way we say that all bodies are circumscribed by place, except the ultimate sphere.

§ In a third way we speak of place insofar as there is a distance of position in it, even if it does not include: and in this way we say that even the ultimate sphere is and is moved in a place according to form, and not in subject, as the Philosopher says at the end of the sixth book of the Physics. And the commentary explains that this is according as they are designated in the circumference of the circle of altitude. For in them a diverse altitude is taken according to position, although the whole subject of the sphere always remains in the same place: for as the Philosopher says, the circulation according to form taken from A is not the same as that which is taken from B, or C. In none of these ways is a created spirit said to be in a place.

§ In another way we speak of place accidentally, when we say, "While we are in a place, the accidents and forms that are in us are in the same place"; and thus again we do not say that an

Angel is in a place: because thus it would always assume a body when it was in a place. But we say that an Angel is in a place definitively, and by the definition of its work: because namely the work, neither on the part of the efficient cause, nor on the part of the effect, is referred outside the place in which it is consequently; therefore the operating substance is understood to be within this place; and this is what Damascene says, that it is here in such a way that it is not elsewhere.

§ Having these things, the answer to all of that which was asked secondly about the place of an Angel, except the last point, is clear.

§ And to this it must be said that, although the work of God is defined on the part of the work worked [i.e., the effect produced], and upon what God operates, such as a man or a soul, nevertheless the working work [i.e., the operation itself] is not defined: because this is the substance of God, and it is everywhere, just as He is. But the works of an Angel are defined in a place both on the part of the operating substance, and on the part of the worked work, and on the part of that upon which or about which it operates; and place is not referred to it according to a greater or lesser quantity, but as defining, that is, distinguishing from another place.

§ To that which is first asked: Whether two spirits can be in the same place? I concede with the Doctors that they cannot; and this on account of the confusion of operations, not on account of the resistance of their nature to a corporeal place, because they do not fill it.

§ To what is objected against this, it must be said that God's working operation can neither be confused, nor discriminated: it cannot be confused, because it itself is the distinct essence of the operator, mixable with nothing; but it cannot be discriminated, because it is not referred to this place, so that the distinction of place is posited on the part of its operator, as in other things that are created: but rather it relates in one way to any place whatsoever, although places and located things do not relate in the same way to Him operating in them: and through this the solution to all the objections is clear, except to this one: whether they are impeded insofar as they are spirits, or insofar as they are created. And it must be said to this that they are impeded insofar as they are created spirits: because thus they have a limited essence, which cannot be referred to a work in every place.

Divisio Textus

§ Division of the Text

From the aforesaid it is clear that God is everywhere, etc. This is the third part of this first part, and it has three chapters: in the first of which he shows that a certain unintelligible thing is contained in these words: and this is understood as regards the spiritual things which God operates in any creature, which surpass human powers to know. In the second, he posits the diminished exposition of certain [people], there, G, Certain men, however, immense, etc. In the third, he poses a certain question, Whether He can be defiled by the filth of those in whom He is? there, H, It is also usually asked by the same ones, etc.

Articulus 15 — Whether Little Children Pertain To The Temple Of God

Whether infants belong to the temple of God?

Next it is asked concerning this which he says: Infants belong to the temple of God, etc.

For this does not seem so: because infants do not know.

§ And to this it must be said that it belongs to them through the sacrament, not from the use of grace, but from the habit [of grace]: and he calls this a gift of the Holy Spirit, not a use, because there cannot be a use unless the use of free choice exists.

Articulus 16 — Whether God Can Be Said To Be In A Place

Whether God can be said to be in a place?

Now a doubt arises concerning the first, because God does not seem to be in a place, but rather to be a place, by the fact that He contains and preserves, and the motion of hearts and of Angels is toward Him.

§ But to this it must be said that He Himself is called a spiritual place by reason of those properties: but He is said to be in a corporeal place in another comparison, which was stated above.

Articulus 17 — How God Is In All Things And Is Not Defiled

How is God in all things and not defiled?

It could also be asked, what is the cause that the soul is affected by the passions of the body joined to it, but is not defiled: while solar rays are neither affected, nor defiled, but only touch positionally; but God is neither affected, nor defiled, nor does He touch positionally, but is in all things?

§ And to this it must be said that the natural union between the soul and the body is the cause of being affected; but the fact that it does not have common matter with the body out of which it is made, this is the cause that it is not defiled. But rays are neither united, nor do they have one matter in the genus of potentiality to motion and to mutation: but nevertheless they are determined by position in themselves, if they are bodies; or accidentally, if they are not bodies: and therefore they do indeed touch, but they are neither affected, nor defiled. But God is neither united by nature, nor does He have matter, nor position: therefore He is neither affected, nor defiled, nor does He touch positionally: yet He attains by His essence, presence, and power powerfully from end to end as regards effect, and disposes all things sweetly as regards the participation of good, and gives to each according to its capacity.

Articulus 18 — Whether It Is The Same To Be In A Place And To Be Local; And, How They Belong To God, To The Created Spirit, And To The Body

Whether to be in a place, and to be local, are the same? And, how do they apply to God, to a created spirit, and to a body?

Whether to be in a place, and to be local, are the same? And, how do they apply to God, to a created spirit, and to a body?

A doubt arises, Whether to be in a place, and to be local, are the same?

§ Now it seems that they are: because § 1. To be local is nothing but by the relation of place to the located thing: and this relation is implied when it is said, "this is in a place": therefore it seems that these two are the same.

§ 2. Also, to be in time is to be temporal: therefore since place is an extrinsic measuring quantity, to be in a place is nothing but to be local.

§ Also, to be in time is to be measured by a certain part of time, as the Philosopher says: therefore to be in a place will be to be measured by place: similarly therefore, since every such thing is local because it is measured by place, to be local and to be in a place will be the same.

§ 3. Also, since place is not a substance, it will be an accident: but an accident denominates that of which it is an accident: since therefore place is not an accident except of the located thing, as it seems, it will denominate it: but that denominative is implied by "local": therefore it seems that to be in a place and to be local are the same.

§ 4. Also, whatever is in a place, is located in a place: but whatever is located in a place, is local: therefore whatever is in a place, is local. The first is self-evident. The second is proved: because to be local is attributed to nothing except through the fact that it is located in a place. But to the contrary is everything that is held in the Text: because God is in a place, and yet He is not local in a place.

§ Solution. It must be said that to be in a place, and to be local, are not the same: because to be in a place belongs by priority and posteriority and equivocally to three things, namely to God, to a created spirit, and to a body: for if we say that God is in a place by taking the rationale of the saying from the property of place, then God will be in a place equivocally, and an Angel, and a body: because God is in a place by giving being to the place and the power of containing; but a created spirit will be in a place posteriorly, because namely it is so in one that it is not in others; whereas a body will be essentially in a place to which we assign a beginning, a middle, and an end according to place. If however we take the property of the located thing, when we say that God is in a place: then it does not belong to God properly to be in a place, but by a transferral, which transferral is made from the property of the located thing by which it fills the place: because God fills spiritually, not making distance like a body, nor distinguished in a place like a spirit: but through the fact that He is not lacking in influencing being to the place and to the located thing and all the powers of both. But to be local, according to Anselm in the Monologion, is to follow the laws of place: and the laws of place are to terminate the located thing by distinguishing and containing extrinsically, so that nothing of the located thing is outside the place: and this law is followed both by a created spirit and by a body. Another law is to circumscribe according to parts of distance and of power: so that a part of the located thing is in a part of the place, and the whole in the whole: and this law is followed only by a body, but nevertheless differently, as was held above through a distinction. Now place still has other laws, namely to preserve, to be immobile

unless perhaps accidentally, to have connaturality with the located thing, and the like: of which laws we have no need here.

§ To the first therefore it must be said that this is true, that the laws of locality, so to speak, are only from the relation of place to the located thing: but the relation of place, as has been held, is not the same to everything that is said to be in it: nor is it true that everything that is in a place is as something located in a place: for what is located properly is nothing but a body; although nevertheless a created spirit is in a place definitively, and is not located, nor local, except in a qualified sense, as he says in the Text.

§ To the next it must be said that this is false, that to be in time is to be temporal: because the Philosopher says that to be in time is said in many ways: for the 'now' is in time, as the substance of time; and the 'before' and 'after' in time, as the parts of time; and the 'much' and 'little' in time, as passions: but this is true, that to be in time as in a measuring thing, is to be temporal: and similarly I well concede that to be in a place as in a measuring thing, is to be local: but through this it will not be held that to be in a place in any way whatsoever is to be local.

§ To the next it must be said that place is an accident not existing through its essence in the located thing, but in the locating thing: for place, according to its essence, is the surface of the body encompassing and including another body: but even if it were to denominate the located thing, it would not be necessary that it denominate the being that is in the place: because to be in a place and to be located are not the same, as has been held.

§ To the next it must be said that this proposition is false, "Whatever is in a place, is located in a place," unless it is understood of that which is in it primarily and essentially.

Articulus 19 — Whether The Divine Essence Is Entirely Non-Local And Incircumscriptible And Immovable

Whether the divine essence is entirely non-local and uncircumscribable and immobile?

Next it is asked concerning this which he says, there, I, § 2: Therefore the divine essence alone is entirely non-local and uncircumscribable, etc.

For this seems false. For Augustine says to Orosius that God moves Himself without place and time.

§ Also, Dionysius, in the book On the Divine Names, speaks of processions appropriate to the good, by which God moves Himself and proceeds into everything that is, according to the analogy of each one to participate in His goodness.

§ Also, Habakkuk 3:13: You went forth for the salvation of Your people. And such things are often found in sacred Scripture, that He goes forth in the Saints, and walks in the Saints: and many other objections concerning this can be found above where immutability is disputed.

§ Solution. It must be said with Boethius that He Himself remaining stable gives all things to be moved: and wherever it is read that He moves Himself, or proceeds, or walks, it must be

referred to the effect, because He makes the Saints proceed in Himself, or creatures advance, or walk; or to an assumed creature.

Articulus 20 — Whether Every Change Happens In Place Or Time

Whether every mutation occurs in place, or in time?

Next it is asked concerning this which he says, there, In these two ways, namely in place or in time, mutation occurs, etc.

For these two ways seem to have been taken entirely without art: because

§ 1. There is no motion of time: because time is not a motion, nor a subject of motion, but rather a property: therefore not everything that is moved, is moved in time.

§ 2. Also, time intrinsically is a passion of local motion, to which it is referred as an accident or property, and as a number and measure: but it is not referred to other motions, except as a number and measure: therefore it ought not to be divided against local motion.

§ 3. Also, time is divided into parts which are taken in local motion, such as months, and days, and years: but it is not divided into parts which are taken according to parts of the motion of alteration, so that one part of time is said to be as great as this part of alteration or augmentation: therefore it seems that he is saying nothing.

§ Solution. It must be said that Augustine here takes motion broadly, according as motion is distinguished from the potentiality of the mobile thing, which relates to motion in any way whatsoever.

§ And so that this can be better understood, it must be said that motion is distinguished in a twofold way: namely, on the part of the mobile thing, according as we say that one motion is from non-subject to subject, and another is from subject to subject; and sometimes it is distinguished according to the terminus to which the motion is directed, and in which there is nothing more of the motion: as when we say that there are six species of motion, namely generation, corruption, alteration, augmentation, diminution, and mutation according to place. But on the part of the subject it is further distinguished in a twofold way: as when we say that there is motion according to potentiality to 'where' [location] only, and there is motion according to potentiality to 'where' and to form: to 'where' only, as in the heaven; to 'where' and to form, as in elements and elemented things. In this way motion is distinguished here, when something is said to be mobile according to place, and something according to time: because there is something which has potentiality to 'where', like every body as much as it is in itself: and I say this on account of the empyrean heaven, which some posit as immobile: but a certain thing is mobile according only to the potentiality of the vicissitude of some form in it: and that time which is the measure of this vicissitude, is by nature and intellect prior to local motion and prior to the time which is the measure of it, as we proved above: and thus all the objections cease. But of what sort that time is, and whether continuous or not, should be inquired there.

Articulus 21 — Whether God Is In All Things Not Enclosed, And Outside All Things Not Excluded; And, How God Is Said To Be New And Old

Whether God is in all things not included, and outside all things not excluded? And, How is God called new and ancient?

Next it is asked concerning this which he says, there, 1, towards the end: He Himself is more interior to every thing, because in Him are all things, etc.

For from this place is taken that saying, that He is inside not included, and that He is outside not excluded. And it seems to be impossible that He should simultaneously be inside, and not included, and the like.

§ But it must be said that this is said for the reason that He does not follow the laws of place, nor is He in a place as a located thing, but rather as the presence of His substance influencing being and power and operation to all things: and since it is not possible to accept any thing outside of which there is not another, therefore He will not be inside in such a way that He is not outside, and so for the others.

§ Now "more ancient" speaks of the duration of eternity, but "newer" speaks of the novelty of effects and influences: because in Himself He is not to be called new, because new is that which as regards its beginning is near; and Scripture says, that there shall be no recent God in you; and we held above that He is not new. Or He can be called new on account of the novelty and recency of His power, which He had from eternity.

Articulus 22 — Whether An Angel Is Moved According To Place

Whether an Angel is moved according to place?

Next it is asked concerning this which he says: But concerning the mutation of place, or according to place, a great [question arises] among the inquirers, etc.

For here falls the question of the motion of an Angel, which I divide into three parts, so that its difficulties may be more elucidated.

The first will be, Is it moved according to place? The second, How is it moved according to place? The third, Whether its motion is in time, or in the 'now'?

§ To the first it is proceeded thus: § 1. The Philosopher before the end of the sixth book of the Physics, posits arguments for the fact that what is indivisible according to quantity is not moved, of which one is this:[106] Nothing moved through place traverses in a space first what is greater than itself, rather than what is less, or equal: therefore if an indivisible is moved through space, it first traverses what is less, or equal, rather than what is greater: but it is impossible to traverse what is less, because thus something would be less than the indivisible: therefore it will traverse what is equal: but what is equal is indivisible: therefore it takes up the space by indivisibles: but there are in any given space infinite indivisibles: and it does not happen to traverse infinites in a finite time: therefore in however long a finite time it will not

be moved through a space of one palm, or half a palm: since therefore an Angel is indivisible, it seems to be immobile according to place.

§ 2. Also, let an Angel be moved from A to B: it will traverse therefore the space which is in the middle: but whatever is moved, is partly in the terminus from which, and partly in the terminus to which: but what is partly and partly, is divisible according to quantity: therefore the Angel would already be divisible according to quantity, which is false: therefore it is immobile.

§ 3. Also, the Philosopher says that a motion of an indivisible would only be if time were composed of 'nows': but time is not composed of 'nows': therefore there is no motion of any indivisible.[107]

§ 4. Also, let it be granted that it is moved through space: therefore in a lesser [time] it will be in a part of the space, than in the whole: therefore however small a space is taken, in a lesser space will be that which is moved slower than it: but to every mobile according to place it is [necessary] to determine in space what is equal to it: therefore in an indivisible space which is equal in the divisible thing, it is possible for something to be in a part of the space, when that [former] thing is in the whole: therefore the indivisible is divided, which is impossible: therefore an indivisible is not moved.

§ If perhaps you say, as they commonly wish to evade this, that the Philosopher is speaking of an indivisible which has position in a continuum: because this is somehow connatural with space: and therefore these arguments hold for it; but an Angel is not indivisible in this way: and therefore they do not hold for him. Against this: Either these arguments conclude concerning an indivisible according as it has position in a continuum, or according as it is an indivisible only, or according to both. If in the first or last way: therefore according to this a unity could be moved: because it does not have position in a continuum, nor is it an indivisible having position in a continuum: and this has been denied by the Philosophers even more than that a point could be mobile: therefore it is clear that that solution is nothing.

§ Also, it is strange, if the force is in this, that a point has position in a continuum, that the Philosophers have taken no argument from this to prove that an indivisible is not moved: but all arguments are brought forward from the rationale of indivisibility.

§ 5. This same thing is proved by common arguments thus: Every motion is on account of indigence: but an Angel, especially a blessed one, has no indigence: therefore he is not moved.

§ 6. Also, no act is naturally owed to anyone, unless he has within himself the potentiality for that act: but motion is a certain act: therefore it is not owed to anyone, except to one in whom there is potentiality for that act: but we cannot say how there is within an Angel potentiality for natural rectilinear motion: because thus he would be heavy or light: therefore if there is within him potentiality for motion, it will be processional [i.e., walking, flying, etc.]: but potentiality for that motion is completed in organs which are feet, or wings, or fins in

106. Aristotle, Physics VI.

swimming things, or rings in reptiles, all of which it is an abuse to posit in an Angel: therefore he is not moved.

§ 7. Also, in everything that is moved, the mover is one thing, and the moved is another; therefore if an Angel is moved, the mover will be one thing, and the moved another: and it is either impossible or difficult to find these two in an Angel: therefore it seems that he is not moved.

§ 8. Also, in everything that is mobile locally except only circular motion, there is also potentiality for all or certain other motions, and especially for generation: but it is not so in an Angel: therefore he is not mobile according to rectilinear motion, which is to descend from heaven, and ascend, and the like.

§ 9. Also, no naturally mobile thing is mobile to contrary places, and [to] the place of incorruptible and corruptible bodies. The truth of this is clear: because no naturally mobile thing is moved both upward and downward, and no voluntarily mobile thing is moved to a place contrary to its nature, but to a place in which its nature is preserved: hence flying things are not moved upward into the fire, or to the place of the sun; nor do swimming things go out onto dry land: therefore if an Angel is mobile, he will not be moved except to a place agreeing with his nature: and that is the empyrean heaven in the genus of bodies: therefore he is never moved to us on earth.

§ 1. But against this are the authorities of all the Saints, especially of Damascene in book I, chapter 17, where he says thus: An Angel indeed, by the velocity of his nature, and because he readily and swiftly passes through, is said to operate in diverse places.[108] If therefore he passes through, therefore he is moved.

§ Also, the same: They are immediately found everywhere wherever the divine nod commands, by the agility of their nature. Many other things are also easy to adduce, and certain sufficiently explicit ones are held here.

§ 2. But by reason it is objected thus: Nothing having a power in no way multiplicable in a medium and not existing everywhere according to its essence, can operate except where it itself is: an Angel is such a substance: therefore he does not operate except where he himself is. Proof of the second premise (because the first is self-evident): an Angel is a substance defined in a place, as is proved here in the Text.

§ Also, an Angel has the power of an intellectual substance of which the medium that is between heaven and earth is not susceptible, because this is an inanimate body. From thence it is proceeded thus: an Angel does not operate except where he is: but he operates in diverse places not simultaneously, but successively, as Damascene says: therefore he is in diverse places successively: but this is to be moved through place, or a consequent of local motion: therefore an Angel is moved locally.

§ Solution. It must be said that Angels are moved locally, as the Saints say, whatever may happen concerning the sayings of the Philosophers.

107. Aristotle, Physics VI.

§ To the first, however, which is objected to the contrary, I say that it is indeed true that an indivisible of whose very being is indivisibility itself, is immobile according to place, nor does it have a place: because, as the Philosopher says, we find not a single difference between the place of a point and the point itself.[109] That indivisibility is also of the being of a unity and of a point, is clear from this, that each according to its being, is the principle and terminus of a quantum: and this could not be unless indivisibility were of the things constituting them according to their rationale, and therefore they are also defined by the rationale of indivisibles: as when it is said, "a point is that which has no part": but an Angel, although he is indivisible according to quantity, nevertheless that indivisibility is a consequent of his being, and is not called his essence: and therefore he can have motion according to another consideration of his being, namely insofar as he himself is a spiritual substance, whose power overcomes every prohibition: and this Damascene calls the velocity of his nature:[110] for he overcomes the distance of space, so that his motion is not proportioned to space; and he overcomes the distance of time, so that his motion is not proportioned to time, nor is it measured by time; and he overcomes the resisting thick and thin, so that his motion is through every plenum, whether thin or dense, as if it were a vacuum, with nothing resisting the mover or the moved, and we say that this motion is above nature, not against, or below nature: and through this the solution to the first three arguments is clear.

§ To the next it must be said that it seems to me that that solution does not solve [the objection]: because without doubt that is not the intention of the Philosopher which that solution pretends.

§ To the next it must be said that motion is not always on account of indigence, but sometimes it is for the demonstration of power, as runners frequently run; and sometimes it is for the showing of obedience, as a soldier in no way indigent joyfully accepts the occasion to move himself in the service of the king, in which there is sometimes neither an indigence of the king nor of the soldier, but the king gives the occasion to the soldier, and the soldier shows his obedience. We could however say that it is on account of our indigence, or for meriting the glory which they received before merit.

§ To the saying of the Philosopher, however, it must be said that he does not intend [to speak] of supermundane motion, but of natural and processional [motion].

§ To the next it must be said that such a power was given to an Angel in the creation of his nature.

To the next it must be said, that this is true of natural and progressive motion, and not of that which belongs to supermundane substances.

To the next it must be said, that in an Angel there is the moving will: and that which is the Angel, is the moved: just as in an animal the soul is moving, and the body is moved: and therefore it has a diversity of mover and moved: for the form can be the mover, and the matter the moved, as in ascending fire: and this accidentally: because fire existing in act as fire, is not outside its place except accidentally: and the substantial form can complete this potency by

108. John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa, I.

ascending, to which [form] potency is given on account of indigence, although the act is sometimes exercised without indigence.

To the next it must be said, that this is understood in those things in which the same motion is toward form and toward place, as in heavy or light things: because in those the mover is the generator, or that which does not prohibit or does not remove an impediment: just as a stone descends, which is upon a column once the column is removed. But in an Angel there is no such motion, as is evident from what was said before: since, as can be gathered from the Philosopher in book VIII of the Physics, the generator and the mover according to place are the same: for by the fact that the generator gives its form to the generated thing, it also gives it all the accidents consequent upon that form: and the chief among those accidents is local motion: and therefore if some thing is generated outside its place, on account of something detaining it, once the detaining thing is removed, it is moved per se to its place, which motion however is from the first generator, which gave it its species and the accidents consequent upon the species.

Articulus 23 — Whether An Angel Is Moved According To Place By Passing Through Space

Whether an Angel is moved according to place by passing through a space?

§ 1. Secondly it is asked how it is moved according to place: namely whether by passing through a space, or not?

And it is objected thus: 1. Everything that passes from extreme to extreme: either passes through a medium, or remains in one extreme and generates itself or something similar to itself in the other, or is simultaneously in both extremes. But it is certain that the second and last modes are impossible: for an Angel does not generate another Angel, nor is an Angel here and there, because if that which is there is outside because it is here, the Angel would be outside itself, which is impossible: nor can it be said that it is everywhere, because this has already been disproved, and the contrary is said in the Letter: therefore it does not come from this place to that except by passing through a space.

1. Moreover, Damascene says that when it is on earth, it is not in heaven. Either therefore it comes by passing through, or not. If not passing through: and when it is here, it is not there: it is necessary that it be generated here. But if by passing through: then I have the proposition, that it passes through a medium.

If perhaps you say that it is moved in the manner of our intellect: because it is [concerned] with this which is beyond the sea, and immediately with this which is in Cologne, or another city, without passing through all the media: this is nothing: because we are not asking about the motion of an intelligence through intelligibles, which is not a motion of substance, but a turning of the intellect upon that which it has within itself: and because each is conjoined to the intellect without a medium, namely that which it thinks of existing beyond the sea, and

109. Aristotle, Physics IV.

that which it thinks of existing in Germany, therefore it can turn itself upon this and that, without passing through media: but we are asking about the motion of an angelic substance, which comes from place to place: whence it is clear that this answer is nothing.

If perhaps you wish to say, that the distance indeed is a distance, but it is not a distance to it, as some say, and give an example: just as if between heaven and earth there were a vacuum, then the center would be immediate to the circumference. Against this: That vacuum: either leaves a distance of place but deprived of any localized thing: or it posits nothing. If you say that nothing, then what you say is nothing: because there will be neither distance, nor circumference, nor center, nor anything: but if it leaves a distance between the extremes, then you posit a falsehood, that the center would be immediate to the circumference.

1. Moreover, It seems impossible that there is a distance, and it is not a distance to it: because what simply is, can be compared to nothing in respect to which it is not: for the Philosopher says, That which in itself is a substance, in respect to nothing and in nothing can be an accident: and what is something in act, in respect to nothing can be nothing in that act.
2. Moreover, Let there be two termini, namely A and B, and let the Angel be moved from A into B. And let AB be divided at C. Then I proceed thus: The motion of the Angel is into B: therefore in the whole of B it will rest after motion, and will be in "having been moved" (in motum esse): therefore it is necessary if it is moved, that it be moved in C: but C is the middle space: therefore it is moved in the middle: therefore it is false what you say, that the distance is not a distance to it.
3. Moreover, Whatever is in something in which it first is in "having been moved", is necessarily taken before this in "being moved" (in moveri), but an Angel when it is on earth, is taken as in that which first is in "having been moved": therefore whatever is of the space before this in it, is as in "being moved": therefore it is moved through a medium.

ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Everything that is moved through a medium, is partly in the terminus from which, and partly in the terminus to which: an Angel is moved through a medium, as you say: therefore it is partly in the terminus from which, and partly in the terminus to which: but everything of such a sort is divisible: therefore an Angel is divisible, which is openly false.

1. Moreover, Everything that is moved through a medium, would sooner be in the middle than in the extreme: therefore an Angel would sooner be in the middle than in the extreme, which is false: because Damascene says that they are immediately found wherever the divine nod commands.

SOLUTION. Speaking without prejudice I say, that it passes through a medium, and that the medium is a distance, but not to it, because by its power of moving it overcomes it. And this

110. John of Damascus.

we can see through a similitude. For the Philosopher says before the end of book VIII of the Physics, that every infinite power, just like magnitude and multitude, excels every finite thing: and therefore he demonstrates there, that if there were an infinite moving power, it would move the motion which it infuses into the movable thing in a 'now': but we cannot say that the power of an Angel is simply infinite, just as we do not say its essence is infinite: but we say it is not finite in proportion to any corporeal moving power: and therefore if an infinite corporeal power would overcome the distance of a space, much more shall we say the power of an Angel overcomes it: and therefore I say, that it passes through the space indivisibly: and the whole space is made for it as one indivisible thing: because its motion is according to will: for it was said above, that the movable thing itself is that which has the transit of its motion in its will, and equally in its power towards the remote or towards the near. We concede therefore the first reasons proving that it passes through a medium: although it passes through it as one indivisible thing in respect to the moving power.

But to this which is objected against this, that it is not a distance to it: I respond, that it is indeed always a distance, but it does not cause it to be distant concerning motion, on account of the victory of the moving power: and this well happens in many things, as has already been said of an infinite power moving through a distance, which necessarily overcomes the medium by the velocity of motion.

But to this which is objected, that there is a motion from A into B, and let it be divided at C: I say that it has no place here: because such demonstrations have no place except in those motions only, in which the power of the mover and the quantity of the movable thing and the distance of the space are proportioned: but this is not so here, and therefore it has no place.

But if you raise a strong objection, that according to this it will be simultaneously in "having been moved", and "from which it is moved", and in "being moved", as the second objection proves: I say without prejudice this is not true: since "simultaneously" is taken according to the rationale of those things which are said to be simultaneous: for mathematical things are said to be simultaneous according to place in one way, between the ultimates of which there is no medium: and natural things are said to be simultaneous in another way, as those whose ultimates act and suffer upon each other. Similarly also it is said to be simultaneous in time or measure in another way: and therefore I do not say that an Angel is moved in time, as will be evident in the following article, but its motion is in a 'now': and I can say, which seems more probable to me, that "from which it is moved", and "through which it is moved", and "in which it is in having been moved", are three 'nows' following each other: and then no absurdity follows: because then it will not be simultaneously "being moved" and "having been moved": and it is then possible to assign a 'now' in which it is moved, and a 'now' in which it rests: and yet those three do not make a quantity unless perhaps a discrete one, which has no medium: and nothing is required to be proven, except perhaps only this, that 'nows' can follow each other in the motion of an Angel, as will be proven in the following question. And through this the solution to the first objections is evident.

To that which is objected to the contrary, I respond that that objection and the following do not hold in that which by the power of moving overcomes the distance of the medium.

Articulus 24 — Whether The Motion Of An Angel Is In Time Or In The Now

Whether the motion of an Angel is in time, or in a 'now'?

§ 1. Thirdly it is asked, Whether the motion of an Angel is in time, or in a 'now'?

And it seems that it is in time: because 1. Every motion has a prior and posterior, as its essential parts: every prior and posterior is in time: therefore the motion of an Angel is in time.

1. Moreover, Every motion is of the number of successive things: but every successive thing has its being in parts, of which one is after another: therefore the motion of an Angel has such a being: but everything that has such a being, is in time: therefore the motion of an Angel is in time.
2. Moreover, Avicenna says in his Sufficientia, that motion is the exit from potency to act in continuous time, not suddenly: therefore the motion of an Angel is also of this kind: therefore it is in time.
3. Moreover, Aristotle in the third book of the Physics: Motion is the entelechy of that which exists in potency according as it is in potency: therefore motion has a being mixed with potency. Either therefore it has act and potency in respect to the same thing, or in respect to diverse things. If in respect to the same thing: therefore according to the same thing there is potency and act, which cannot be: therefore it is left that these two are in respect to diverse things: the act therefore will be according to what is the way into act, because a way into something, attains that into which it is the way: and the Commentator says this on book III of the Metaphysics, that motion is called a being, because it is a way to a true being; and potency will be according to what is from another certain thing which it casts off: but to cast off and to receive are not simultaneous, but in respect to diverse parts of time: therefore it seems that no motion can be in a 'now'.
4. Moreover, Let it be granted that it is in a 'now': but suppose another stronger Angel is moved over the same space: therefore since the swift one divides time, it will be moved through that space in less than a 'now': therefore it is to take less than an indivisible, which is impossible: therefore as before.
5. Moreover, Against what was supposed above, it is objected thus: The Philosopher says that between any two indivisibles of any genus it is possible to take a composite in the same genus: and this is written in the commentary on book VI of the Physics: although it is also hinted at from the text of the book, that between two points is a line, and between two lines a surface, and between two surfaces a body: for since there is no terminus without something terminated, it is necessary that this be true.
6. Moreover, Between two 'nows' there is time: and so it is in every continuum: therefore it is impossible to take three 'nows' in which no medium falls between, as it seems.
7. Moreover, The Commentator subtly proves in book VI of the Physics that in every motion there is a certain division of the movable thing and of the space, thus: Let a motion

> out of A be granted: therefore in the whole of A it will rest: and let a place proximate to A be taken which is B: therefore into B that which is carried through the space is moved: but everything that is moved, is partly in that from which, and partly in that into which: therefore that which is carried, is partly in A: therefore by moving into B it intercepts partly of place A, from which the motion is: therefore between A and B there is a place: and so it is always to be taken: therefore it is necessary that every motion be divisible by the division of space: therefore the time measuring it is also divisible: and thus no motion happens to be in a 'now', nor do any 'nows' follow each other, as it seems.

But against this some object thus: In those things in which there is no medium, in these 'to become' and 'to have been made' are simultaneous: but in simple generation there is no medium: therefore it happens simultaneously in it 'to become' and 'to have been made', and 'to be mutated' and 'to have been mutated': and they call simple generation the generation of a substance, which is between opposites by contradiction in which there is no medium: and this indeed they say, but do not prove: nevertheless they adduce it as a similarity, so that they may prove an Angel simultaneously 'to be moved' and 'to have been moved'.

But for them it can be objected thus: As being simply is to being in a certain respect, so generation simply is to generation in a certain respect: but being simply is opposed to non-being simply, and being in a certain respect is opposed to non-being in a certain respect: therefore since generation in a certain respect is from non-being in a certain respect, as white from non-white, which nevertheless is something: generation simply will be from non-being simply, and thus generation is a mutation out of nothing: but between nothing and something there is no medium: and 'to become' is not distanced from 'to have been made' except through a medium: therefore in every transmutation of substance 'to become' and 'to have been made' are simultaneous, that is, in the same 'now': much more therefore can this be in the motion of a spiritual substance.

But this seems a marvelous philosophy which agrees with no Philosopher, but rather all concordantly say two things opposed to these: of which one is, that nothing by nature becomes from simply nothing. The other is in book VI of the Physics, that 'to become' and 'to have been made' are never simultaneous: for what becomes, is not: and what has been made, is: it follows therefore that the same thing is, and is not: unless perhaps you answer so absurdly as to say that in substances what becomes is: which is completely ridiculous: because in substances this is more true, "What becomes is not", than in accidents, since in accidents something of the extreme is in the becoming itself, in substances absolutely nothing: because substantial form is not more and less, like accidental form. Therefore others say, that there is a difference between a 'now' and an instant: because a 'now' is the indivisible of time which is its substance. But an instant is what is taken between two times, as if what stands upon (instat) from the side of our signification. And it is true what they say, that between any two 'nows' there is time, but not between any two instants: because if I signify time at one instant, nothing prohibits you from being able to signify it at the proximate instant following that in time: and therefore they say an Angel is moved in an instant, and not in a 'now'. But this does not agree with truth: because accepting 'now' thus, there are not two 'nows' in the whole time,

but one only; just as that which is carried, is one in the whole time, and one in the whole motion.

Besides, the philosopher Averroes assigning the difference between the continuum of a line, and the continuum of time, says that it is possible to take two points in the continuum of a line, but not in the continuum of time, which does not remain, nor has position in its parts: and therefore if what they say were true, what the Philosopher says would be nothing: therefore it is left, that the Philosopher intends that between any two 'nows' there is time, according as a 'now' is terminating motion: but also between any two moments or 'having-been-mutateds' of motion it is: and thus it is taken in the signification of an instant predicted by them: therefore the solution is not valid.

SOLUTION. It seems to me as was said above, that time in sacred Scripture is said in many ways: and it seems that that which has no relation to the motion of the heavens, as to the cause of its motion and rest, that that is not in the time of the motion of the heavens, as numbered in a number, or measured in a measure. For the philosopher Rabbi Moses says that every motion of this nature is reduced to the motion of the heavens, which caused this nature to be moved: but it is certain that the motion of an Angel cannot be reduced to the motion of the heavens as to a cause: therefore it will not be in the time of the heavens as in a number and measure. But another time which is taken besides the order of movable things to one cause of motion, is in the movable thing itself as in a subject, and differs for each movable thing. And therefore, just as we take the continuity of time and discretion and substance in that which is a property of the motion of the heavens: discretion, because it numbers by the two which are prior and posterior: continuity from the space through which the motion is, because in no discrete place is the movable thing taken, but as through anything in which it is like a flowing place by renewing the site of continence; and substance, by the fact that that which is carried, is one in the whole motion: so we must consider in this part the nature of time itself according to the nature of the motion and the movable thing. But it is certain that the Angel moved, that is, who is carried, is indivisible: and thus the same thing which is adjacent to it, is indivisible: but it is not commensurated with the place through which the motion is: therefore "before" and "after" is not taken in place: since therefore the prior and posterior in motion would be from those things, its motion will not have a prior and posterior. The distance of space also is overcome by the power of the moving force: therefore space will not make a continuous motion for it. It remains therefore (as we have said) that there are only as it were three indivisibles of its motion: or one adjacent to it, yet taken three times, which is the same thing, namely, according as it is in the place from which, and in the place through which, and in the place to which the motion is: and nothing will continue this number of these 'nows': now therefore it is plain to answer the objections.

For to the FIRST five it must be said, that those propositions do not hold, except in physical motion: but the motion of an Angel is not physical, as is already evident, nor ordered to the physical.

To the next it must be said, that if the motion of an Angel is from A into B, it is impossible that A and B be divided by the motion at C: because the whole space interjacent to an indivis-

ible motion is as one indivisible: but in an indivisible, indivisibles are not divided, but divisibles whose termini are indivisibles: and therefore that reason concerning the motion of an Angel does not hold.

To the next two it must be said, that this is not true except in a motion which has continuity from space, and continues time by its continuity: and it has already been shown that this does not belong to the motion of an Angel.

To the solution of the others who say that the "being moved" of an Angel and "having been moved" are simultaneous, it must be said that if they speak the truth, that truth is not intelligible: for although they say one is simple, nevertheless it is in a twofold ratio: and insofar as it is the end of the past, they say it is adjacent to the motion of an Angel: and insofar as it is the beginning of the future, they say it is adjacent to that which is "having been moved". But against this is, that although it may be in a twofold ratio, nevertheless it is not in a threefold ratio: and we take in an Angel a terminus from which, and through which, and into which: whence that solution is not well intelligible. But the proof by which they prove their statement is entirely false and absurd: because this is impossible, that "to become" be with "having been made", and "to be mutated" with "having been mutated": the reason for which the Commentator renders upon book VI of the Physics, saying that generation and corruption are not mutations made accepted per se in nature nor are they ever separated from alteration: and therefore generation is the end of a motion which is alteration, and corruption similarly. For it is said, and it is true, that motion has a twofold end, namely of the same genus which is "to have been moved", and of another genus which is in alteration: just as generation is corruption: and in local motion of a luminous body the illumination of a directly opposed diaphanous body: for the illumination of a house to every part opposite the candle follows the motion of the candle, and the illumination of that horizon whose ascendant is the degree in which the circle of that altitude is signified follows the motion of the sun according to the circles of altitude. Whence it must be said, that since generation is corruption, it is conjoined to alteration, and the thing is corrupted at the instant in which it is "to have been generated": because this is the end of that motion and mutation: and this well happens, that the motion is to a 'now', although not in a 'now': just as a line is to a point, although not in a point or from points.

To the FIRST argument therefore it must be said, that generation simply is not of being in universal, but is of being simply, that is, of a substance to which is subjected non-being simply, that is, non-being, which is not simply with the nature with which the composite is a being simply, and in potency non-being simply, but in a certain respect: but in generation in a certain respect, being simply is subjected through substantial form, and non-being in a certain respect, that is, according to the privation of that into which the generation in a certain respect is: for since in all of nature the generation of one is the corruption of another, it is necessary to give being to the corrupted thing through substantial and accidental form, and this is subjected to physical generation, according as every generation is with action and passion, and from contrary into contrary: whence according as it is a generation of substance only, thus according to the intellect matter itself only is supposed to the mutation: but according as the

generation of one is the corruption of another, matter with the substantial form as receding is supposed: but according as it is generation with action and passion, matter is supposed with the receding form, and the contrary accidents and properties of that form: and so it always is in nature: and therefore we ought not to say that "to become" and "to have been made" are simultaneous, and "to be corrupted" and "to have been corrupted" are simultaneous: but "to have been corrupted" and "to have been generated" can be simultaneous in respect to diverse things, namely according to the ratio of end and beginning, and "to be corrupted" and "to be generated" simultaneous in respect to diverse forms, namely the receding and the arriving.

But it must be NOTED, that concerning this question on account of its difficulty there are many opinions, some of which are held as heretical now by moderns. For certain philosophers explaining the Old Testament concerning the missions of Angels, such as Rabbi Moses, and Rabbi Elieser, and Rabbi Joanna, said that Angels are moved, but all powers obey them according to a nod: and therefore by the effect of those obeying powers they say they are moved, and not otherwise: and this (because it is contrary to Sacred Scripture) is a heresy. There were others who said that an Angel is simultaneously in several places, and this is its "being moved", and even in all if it wishes: and this also is held for a heresy, since it has a definite substance according to the sayings of the Saints, and cannot be in several places simultaneously. There are others who say that its motion is by its will, and it is moved in a 'now' if it wishes, and it is moved in time if it wishes. Others say that not in a 'now', but in an imperceptible time, which is to be moved suddenly: and therefore it seems to us that it is moved in a 'now'. Others say that it is moved in one 'now' according to two ratios: and therefore its "being moved" and "having been moved" are simultaneous. And others say otherwise, such that there are not two perfectly concordant in this question.

Articulus 25 — Whether In One Spiritual Place Two Spirits Can Be Without Constriction Of Themselves

Whether in one spiritual place two spirits can be without mutual constriction?

§ 1. Next it is asked concerning this which he says: If there were many spirits here, they would not thereby constrict the place, etc. For this seems to be against Damascene saying thus: But an intelligible place is where it is understood, and an incorporea nature is where it doubtless is, and operates, and is not corporeally contained, but is understood. Thence I proceed thus: As a corporeal place is to a body, so an intelligible place is to a spirit: in one corporeal place diverse bodies cannot be without constriction: therefore in one spiritual place diverse spirits cannot be without mutual constriction, as it seems.

Besides it is asked next to this, What is called an intelligible place by Damascene? For if some intelligible nature is said, as is God, or an Angel. That does not seem right: because one Angel is not the place of another Angel, since it is not a terminus including it: similarly the Master will deny below that God is a place, and in a place properly, since He is not a corporeal nature. But if an intelligible place is called a place in which an intellectual nature is: then it seems an intelligible place and a corporeal place are the same, and there is no distinction between a corporeal place and a spiritual place, as it seems.

SOLUTION. It can be said, as was held above, that things are in a place in many ways: and that place is said in many ways: for there is place properly, and there is place said by some translation from the property of a place. A place said by translation from the property of a place can be a spiritual nature, as the Philosopher says in book III of On the Soul. Well indeed do those who say, namely the Philosophers, that the soul is the place of the species of a thing, because it is not wholly intellective, and is not species in act, but in potency. And place is taken there from the property of a place, which is to save, because the species have an incorruptible being in the intellect: just as in corporeal nature a thing is saved in its proper place: and because the motion of species is to the possible intellect, and they rest in it, and are moved by it existing immobile. Similarly we can say that God is the intelligible place of an Angel: and in the following chapter Bede says that Angels run within God, wherever they are sent, because He contains them and encompasses them with the ambit of His containing power. But place is properly said in two ways, namely definitively and circumscriptively: and of both it has been said above. But the intellectual place is said definitively by Damascene from its relation to an intellectual nature, which is an Angel: and therefore it is divided against the corporeal, because the corporeal is said from relation to a corporeal nature contained per se or accidentally in it: just as we say accidents are in a place, which are situal in a place. And through this the solution to the whole except the first is evident,

To WHICH it must be said, that the Master here takes a place which has corporeal continence: for since a spirit does not fill, it can be in the same place with any body: and one will not constrict another: but it is not so of an intelligible place, which is taken from the relation of a place to an intellectual nature defined in it, which is determined to a place by its work: for it is impossible for one such relation to be made to two Angels: and therefore it is impossible for two Angels to be in the same place.

Articulus 26 — Whether Angels Are Circumscriptible

Whether Angels are circumscriptible?

§ 1. Next it is asked concerning this which he says in the following chapter N, Created spirits in a place... are in a certain way local and circumscriptible, etc.

1. For he seems to be contrary to himself: because above he had said they are not circumscriptible.
2. Besides, that is said to be circumscribed in a place, whose parts are copulated to the terminus of the place, so that its beginning is in the first part of the place, and its middle in the middle, and its ultimate in the ultimate: but Angels are not in a place in this way. If perhaps you wish to say with Gregory and Damascene, that created spirits are corporeal in comparison to the uncircumscribed Spirit, and therefore...

they are circumscribed by place. This does not seem so: because just as that which is substance in itself cannot be an accident with respect to anything, as the Commentator says on the book of Physics, so that which is spirit in itself cannot be a body with respect to anything.

Solution. To this it can be said with Damascene, that Angels are said to be and are circumscribable in a certain way, and not simply. For thus Damascene says:

Angels are circumscribable: for when they are in heaven, they are not on earth: and when they are sent by God to earth, they do not remain in heaven. Here it is posited to be defined by place. It could also be said, as Damascene, that circumscribable is said in three ways, namely that which is comprehended by place or time or comprehension: and thus an Angel is said to be circumscribed, not by place or time, because it is not exceeded by time, but is comprehended according to what comprehension is taken from Augustine in the book On Seeing God to Proba, that we comprehend that of which we look around the limits: just as everything existing of definite essence is comprehended. And in none of those three ways is God said to be circumscribable.

To the other it must be said, that spirit is in no comparison said to be body: but not everything corporeal is body: because it is said to be corporeal from the property of body, and it is said to be corporeal from the nature of body. Indeed, corporeal from the property of body can be an Angel, because it agrees with body in the definition of place, namely to be here and not elsewhere, and in circumscription by comprehension: but it is not corporeal from the nature of body: and because those properties of body are more evident compared to an Angel to God, therefore the Saints say that in comparison to God, Angels are corporeal.

Articulus 27 — Whether One Wisdom In Number Can Be In The Minds Of Different Persons

Whether one wisdom in number can be in the minds of different individuals?

Then it is asked concerning what is said in the following part, O, there, But rather as

From this, indeed, some wish to hold that one wisdom in number is in the minds of different individuals. And therefore their arguments must be set forth, so that it may be seen whether this is in two wise men, one of whom is greater in body than the other, etc.

1. The first is this: If it is not one in number, but in species: then Augustine's example is not valid, because God, existing the same in number, is in all places.
2. Likewise, if they are the same in species only, and different according to number: since two according to number are something more than one, it seems false to say Augustine, who says in the Letter that two wisdoms are not something more than one alone.
3. Likewise, that man is an animal, is a true statement known by many: therefore it is either the same truth, or different in the minds of different individuals. If the same, I have the proposition. If different: then it will be common to all those truths: and thus it is a common statement, and not singular: and thus the proposition in which it is stated that man is an animal, is necessarily common, and not singular, which is false.
4. Likewise, when man is said and understood by different individuals: it is either the same understood, or different. If the same, I have the proposition: because since the truth of complexes is from the understanding of incomplexes, it will also be the same

truth in complex propositions and statements among all. If it is not the same: then this which I say, man, is common to those: and thus it will not be the most specific species, but a subordinate genus.

5. Likewise, the more powerful the agent, the more its effect will be similar to it: if therefore a form existing in matter, in which it has a more ignoble being than in the intellect, can generate something similar to itself, such that it is the same to it according to existence: much more a form existing in the intellect, in which it has a more noble being, will generate something existing from itself the same to it: as if I could see your thoughts, they would generate themselves in my mind in the same number.
6. Likewise, being in the intellect and intellect agrees more than being in matter and intellect: but the same in number can be in matter, and in intellect: therefore much more the same in number can be in intellect, and intellect.
7. Likewise, if they are not one in number, it will happen that Angels will be ignorant of many more truths than they know: for each will know those which are in his own mind, and will be ignorant of all those which are in the minds of others, which are much more: and this is inconvenient.

These are their arguments. But against them, it can be objected thus:

1. Aristotle says, that if forms are absolute from the things of which they are (as Plato said), then nothing will be known through them: therefore if the form which is in the soul is other than the form which is in the thing, the thing will not be known through it: but the thing is one from whoever knows it: therefore that by which it is known, will be the same to it: but whatever are the same to one and the same, they are the same: therefore also the species existing in the souls of all who are of the same things, will be the same: and this is the proposition: because knowledge consists of those species.
2. Likewise, in those things which are without matter, the intellect and what is understood are the same: speculative knowledge, and what is speculated, are the same: but in every intelligible (as the commentary explains) the intellect is the same, whether matter: therefore in every intelligible the intellect and what is understood are the same, and speculative knowledge is the same with what is speculated. Hence it follows, that the species in the soul is the same as the species outside in matter: but whatever are the same to one and the same, they are the same: therefore also in the minds of all speculative knowledge is the same in number.
3. Likewise, in the book On the Soul, the one who understands according to act is entirely the thing understood. From this position deduced as before, it seems to follow the same.
4. Likewise, whatever power is to some act, itself reduced to act, has that act the same in number to which it was, and not in species: but the intellect is a power to the species of things understood: therefore itself reduced to act, has the act of the thing the same in number, not in species: therefore the same form in number is in the intellect and in matter: and deducing as before, it follows that the knowledge of all is one in number.

The first of the last argument is evident by itself. The second is written in the third book of On the Soul, where Aristotle thus says: The sensitive part of the soul, and that which can be affected by sciences, are of this power: this indeed, that which falls under science: that indeed, the sensible. But it is necessary that either the things themselves, or the forms in the soul be: but the things themselves are not in it indeed, for the stone itself is not in the soul, but the species. Therefore the soul is like the hand: for the hand is the instrument of instruments: and the intellect is the species of species, and the sense is the species of sensibles. And he intends, that things according to nature are not in the soul, but forms both according to intellect and according to sense, as is clear in the exposition of the commentary.

5. Likewise, the objection of the commentary to the same is thus: Whatever is separated from here and now, and other things contracting to the individual, is the same among all, because it is everywhere and always: but every intelligible is separated from here and now, and other individuating things: therefore it is the same among all, and everywhere and always: therefore the speculative intellect is the same in all souls.

Behold the reasons which are added to the reasons of those, and seem stronger than those previously set forth.

But on the contrary, it is objected thus: 1. The Philosopher says, that knowledge is an act and quality of the soul, and a habit denominating the soul: and Augustine confirms this above, where he proves the nature of the soul to be changeable, saying that it is one thing to be wise, another to be inert: but one accident cannot be in different subjects: therefore it cannot be, that one knowledge in number is in the souls of different individuals.

1. Likewise, it will happen according to this that the same truth in number is known and forgotten, which can be considered inconvenient.
2. It can be objected more strongly thus: Let it be granted, that the substantial form of the thing which is in the soul, is in the thing, and conversely: I ask, in what way is it in itself:

either indeed as in matter, or in a perfectible power, or in any other way whatsoever. If you say in the first way, as the Philosopher seems to want. Against: Every form gives being and act and the reason of the power which it perfects: therefore the intellect receives being and reason from the form of a donkey or goat, which is absurd. But if you say, that it is otherwise in itself: since therefore no form can be without a subject, it will be in something as in matter: because Aristotle says in the eighth book of Metaphysics, that for this reason the Philosophers thought matter to be the substance and alone, because without it subsisting, nothing of the others subsists: therefore it is necessary to posit, that the donkey is in the soul through matter and form, which is denied by the Philosopher.

1. Likewise, of two acts or more different in species or genus, there is nothing susceptible at the same time: but the intellect is susceptible of all forms at the same time: therefore it

does not receive them as they are substantial the same in number as they are in the thing.

2. Likewise, every form is inherent, whether it is substantial, or accidental: and if it is not inherent, it is not: therefore if the same form is in the soul which is in the thing itself, it is inherent in the soul as a form: but it does not have from matter and accidents, that it gives being and reason to matter outside, but from itself: therefore since it is in the soul by itself, it gives it being and reason: therefore the intellect understanding a donkey, is a donkey, and so of others, which are ridiculous.
3. Likewise, all Philosophers agree in their metaphysics to place knowledge in the category of quality, namely Avicenna, Algazel, and Aristotle, their master, and also Augustine in his Predicaments.

Solution. It must be said in my judgment, that the species which are in the soul, are not the same in number with the forms of things outside: nor is one knowledge the same with the knowledge of others. Hence there is deception in the arguments previously introduced. For it is to consider the species in the soul in two ways, namely in comparison to the soul in which it is: and thus it is an accident and passion existing in the soul, according to which the Philosopher says, that voices are signs of passions which are in the soul. It is also to consider it inasmuch as it is the intention of the thing: and thus since it is one thing, it is one intention among all: and if that intention is numbered on the part of those intending through it to the thing, there are as many as there are intending through it.

To that therefore which is first objected, it must be said that Augustine's example holds on the part of the intention constituting knowledge, according to which it is numbered on the part of the thing, because thus it makes the thing known.

To the other it must be said in the same way, that in this way speaking two knowledges will be the same.

To the other it must be said, that this and the following compel little: for it is not said to be a singular statement from this that the species of the statement in the soul is one, but on the part of one intention of the thing in this soul and that: for thus nothing would be singular: for Socratity is not one in the senses of all, and yet it is singular by the singularity of the thing which it determines. And by this the solution is also clear to the following. But that it is true, is clear: because nothing is a genus to those things which add nothing over it: and similarly it is not a species to those things which add nothing over it. But the intention of man in common receives nothing added to itself in my soul and yours and his, and therefore it is not made common by these, nor is it common to them, but remains singular, as before.

To the other and to the following it must be said, that those arguments proceed from falsehoods: but falsehood is supposed in this, that the form in matter generates the same to itself by existence, since the Philosopher expressly says to generate it in a similar species, because the same in individual and the same in number cannot remain. In the following also falsehood

is supposed, in this namely, that the same species in number is in the soul and in matter outside: and how this is, will be clear below.

To all those which are objected from the words of the Philosopher, that it is said the intellect according to act is the thing understood, and knowledge and the known are the same according to act: this is well true as far as this that both are in act from one act which is the species of the thing. For if I ask you, what makes the matter of the thing in act, you will say that the species of the thing. And if I ask you, when the intellect receives the thing in the intellect, what makes it be in act, you will say again, the species of the thing: therefore they are the same in act, because from the same act which is in the thing, it is according to being, in the intellect however according to which it is a separate intention: and thus it is clear, that the being of the act itself is not the same, although it is always the act of the same, namely of the thing: but in one as the intention of the thing, and in the other as giving being to the thing: and therefore they are not the same in number: and this the Philosopher intends. Others however say, that this is not understood except in intellectuals separated by being, as is an Angel, and the like: but because they say false, therefore it is not to be cared for: for this is not the intention of the Philosopher: and if it were, he would say false: because in those it is less true than in others.

To the argument of the Commentator it must be said, that he takes the intention on that part by which it is compared to the thing of which it is the reason and intention: and thus it is clear what he says: because thus it is numbered by the number of the thing, and not by the number of those intending through it: as was said before.

Articulus 28 — Whether It Should Rather Be Said That God Is Somewhere, Or That Other Things Are In Him

Whether it should rather be said that God is somewhere, or that other things are in Him?

Afterwards, it is inquired concerning what is said there, O, at the end: In Him are all things rather than He is somewhere, etc.

1. For it seems to be contrary to itself: because before it was conceded that God is wholly here, and is in a place, and that place exists.
2. Furthermore, it seems to be against Augustine what is said that an Angel is moved, and not God, since Augustine says that an Angel is not moved through place.

But to solve this is easy according to what was previously held, so that it may be said that God is not somewhere, according to which somewhere can participate in the distinction of place concerning the located, because thus it would remove from Him that He could not be in other places, and that God is not properly a place, but by translation from some property of place.

To the other, it must be said that Augustine (as is determined in the Letter) says that an Angel is not moved locally: because he does not measure himself by space, as was held above:

but it cannot be denied catholically that Angels are moved, since canonical Scripture says this, and not only when they have assumed bodies: as Zechariah said: The Angel who spoke in me.

Articulus 29 — Whether God, In Doing Something Which He Did Not Do Before, Is Changed

Whether God, by doing something which He did not do before, is changed?

Then it is asked concerning this: To this, however, it is usually opposed, etc.

For it seems that God is changed by this, that He does what He did not do before: for action is in some way in the agent: and this action of this thing was not from eternity.

But this has often been resolved: because, as it has been said, in the agent there is the will that it be done in this way, and this has remained from eternity unchangeably in one way.

Articulus 30 — Whether A Thing Is Conceived To Be Filled By God Before Matter By Form, And Place By The Thing Located

Whether a thing is conceived to be filled by God before matter by form, and place by the located?

Afterwards, it is asked concerning what is said there, P, towards the end: Similarly, it ceases to be in those in which it was before, etc.

For prime matter is something of beings, and it relates to form, and therefore it is said to be empty; and it relates to God, and in this respect again, unless it has God in itself, it will be said to be empty: and again, place is said to be empty with respect to the located unless it has it. Therefore, it is asked, which of these fillings is prior according to the reason of understanding?

1. It seems that it is that of matter to form: because that is according to essential dependence, but the others are not.
2. Likewise, Form fills matter by being essentially united to it: but the others are not essentially united to it.

But on the contrary: It is necessary that with matter existing, place is containing matter: because of which even Hesiod posited the first filling to be of place: therefore, the filling of the located is prior to the filling of matter.

But on the contrary: As soon as place and matter are posited, God is posited in them as containing and preserving: therefore, it seems that this is first.

Solution. I concede the last reason: for first there is the filling by God, and secondly the filling by form, and thirdly the filling of place according to the reason of understanding: which is thus evident. The giver of any being and containing is prior to the giver of this distinct being: but God gives any being and contains, form however gives distinct being: whence a thing is first filled by God, and first depends more on God filling, than matter on form. But that the filling of matter by form is prior to the filling by the located is evident: because form is something of the thing filling, place however is nothing of the located.

Likewise, Form is only in matter:

but a thing is not in place except through form and matter.

To the first objection, therefore, it must be said that that dependence is not for matter to be matter, but for it to have actual and distinct being through form: and although this is essential, yet it is not prior: because essential being does not make first, but rather first being according to the order of the present and containing cause. Through this also the solution to the second is evident.

To what is objected concerning place, it must be said that unless we say space is place, as some said who posited a vacuum from bodies, yet not separate, place is not necessarily pre-understood when body or corporeal matter is understood: and therefore that objection proceeds from a falsehood. Nor is that opinion true, that place is the distance of space, as is proven among the Philosophers: but place is the extremity of some body surrounding in itself some body: and thus every body is in place.

DISTINCTIO XXXVIII

Divisio Textus

Now therefore returning to the proposed matter, let us persist in the undertaking, etc. Here begins that part in which the Master determines certain properties following divine knowledge, such as not being able to be deceived, being a cause, and not being able to be increased.

And therefore it is divided into two parts: in the first of which the Master determines, Whether divine knowledge is the cause of things? and, Whether it can be deceived or not? And in the second he inquires, Whether it can be increased? which begins in the following distinction XX XIX, there, Furthermore it is accustomed to be asked, Whether the sentence of God, etc.

The first is divided into two. In the first he inquires, Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things? In the second, Whether it can be deceived? there, And, To this however which was said above, etc.

The first of these has three parts. In the first he proves that it is the cause of things. In the second, he objects to the contrary, there, B, If it is so, it is therefore the cause of all. In the third, however, he determines the matters, etc., there, D, This therefore which seems to be a contradiction, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether The Foreknowledge Of God Is The Cause Of Things

Whether the foreknowledge of God is the cause of things?

A doubt arises here, whether the foreknowledge of God is the cause of things?

And it seems that it is so: 1. For whatever things are such that one precedes another, and with the former posited the latter is posited, and with the former removed the latter is removed: these are related as cause and caused. The foreknowledge of God is related in this way to that which He knows, which is antecedent to that, and with it posited the thing in the future is posited, and with it removed the thing is removed: therefore, the foreknowledge of God is the cause of things. The first is proven by induction in all things.

If perhaps you say that Augustine solves this by the example of the memory of past things: for it follows, if you remember something, that it necessarily was: although your memory is not the cause of the past. This solution is nothing: because still those are related as cause and caused: but the past precedes the memory and causes it, and therefore that consequence holds from effect to cause: but the foreknowledge of God precedes things in the future: therefore, it seems that it is their cause.

1. Likewise, the production of all future things pertains to nature taken broadly, so that it also includes the accidental cause, which is chance, or purpose taken broadly, and includes fortune: since therefore nature does nothing unless God operates more immediately: nor does free will unless God operates the same more immediately, God will be the cause of all future things: but He is not the cause operating by the necessity of nature: therefore by art and knowledge: therefore the knowledge of God is the cause of all future things.
2. Likewise, in an artisan it is so, that practical knowledge is the cause of the work: therefore also in God it will be so.
3. Likewise, He knows this future: therefore it will be of necessity: either it follows, or it does not. If not: then the opposite of the consequent can be verified with the antecedent, namely something not being future, which nevertheless God knew to be future: which cannot be: because as Boethius says in the book of the Consolation of Philosophy, this would not be knowledge of future things, but a fallacious opinion: therefore it seems this follows necessarily.
4. If indeed you say that it is true by necessity of the consequence, and not of the consequent. This seems to be nothing said: because we see in all things in which the antecedent is by its nature conjoined to the consequent always, and it is necessary in itself that it causes not by necessity of the consequence only, but also of the consequent: as when it is said, if man is, animal is: but it is true, that where the antecedent is contingent in itself, there it is not caused except by necessity of the consequence. However, this antecedent God foreknows all future things is necessary in itself, and always posited. If therefore its relation to the consequent is necessary, it seems the consequent has necessity of the thing, and not of the relation only.
5. Likewise, it is conceded by all, that the knowledge which God has is the most noble of sciences, and is the goddess of sciences, as the Philosopher says: but the most noble of sciences is knowledge through a necessary cause, and especially the most simple and highest cause, and which the knower knows himself: therefore God knows through

that: therefore His knowledge is the cause of the known: therefore His knowledge is the cause of the future thing.

6. Likewise, as the known is related to knowledge, so the future is related to foreknowledge: but the known is caused in itself by knowledge, as was held above in the Letter: especially that which is known per se, as whatever is not evil: therefore the future is related in this way to foreknowledge: therefore the future is caused by its foreknowledge.

7. Likewise, the instance which the Master puts concerning evils seems to be worth nothing, because the knowledge of evils is not through a proper cause: for evil does not have a cause and is reduced to an accidental cause in that it is known through the cause of the habit: as we say a doctor knows sickness: therefore it seems, since the knowledge of God is the knowledge of all future habits and knowledge through a cause, that it ought to be conceded that His knowledge is the cause of all, although not in the same way, as it seems.

8. Likewise, all knowledge is either through a cause, or through an effect, or through a sign. But if through a sign: then it makes a fallible opinion, and as Boethius says, it is impious to posit this in God. Therefore it will be either through a cause, or through an effect. But not through an effect: because God knows through Himself, and He is not the effect of any known thing: it remains therefore, that it is through a cause. But it is not a cause except with respect to the known: therefore the foreknowledge of God is directly said to be the cause of the future thing.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Let it be granted that it is a cause: it will be either mutable or immutable. If immutable in causing, it will follow that everything caused by it happens immutably: and thus every contingent thing will be necessary, which is false.

1. Likewise, He knows that He can do things which He will never do: therefore His knowledge is not a necessary cause of things.

2. It is objected more strongly thus: Nothing preceding another, placing none of its properties around it, is the cause of it: the foreknowledge of God precedes future things, so that it places none of its properties around future things: therefore it is not a necessary cause of future things insofar as they are future. The first is proven by this that from a necessary cause there is a necessary effect, and from a contingent cause a contingent effect: and thus necessity and contingency are placed around the effect by the cause. The second is proven from this, that foreknowledge is eternal, immutable, and timeless: and we see all opposite dispositions around the effects of future things.

Solution. Without prejudice I say, that foreknowledge, as also the knowledge of God, is the cause of certain future things, and is not the cause of certain others. For the solution of some saying that the knowledge of God is not the cause of some things does not please me: because the knowledge of God can be twofold, namely of simple knowledge, and of approval: because simple knowledge does not imply an order to the future, according to which it is of those

things which can be but will not be: and therefore with respect to those it cannot be taken as foreknowledge. Here, however, it is more asked if foreknowledge is the cause, than if knowledge is the cause? Hence it seems to me, that it is the cause of some things, and not of others: yet it has an order of precedence and certainty to all, as will be clear below: as Augustine says, Of all things which are naturally and preserve nature and do not corrupt it, foreknowledge is an operative and productive cause: but of evils it is not a cause: yet it preordains and foresees them: but it is true, that the necessary and absolute contingent of the thing is in no way caused by it, but rather by proximate causes, whose dispositions the effect follows.

because those things are causes through essence in the effect.

But if it is asked, Whether the foreknowledge of God is universally the cause of future things? I concede well with others, because there are future evils, of which the foreknowledge of God is not the cause: just as neither is art the vice against art, which nevertheless art foreknows and corrects. Thus, therefore, with the question understood, whether it is universally the cause of future things, it can be responded to the objections.

To the first, by saying that it proceeds from the diminution of those things which are required for the cause of a thing: for it is required that there be precedence in time or duration, or in the order of nature: and a relation of one to another is required, and efficiency or constitution of the following by the causality of the preceding is required: and that last is lacking in foreknowledge and the foreknown. And the instance is, that if you suppose me to know future contingents: for it follows: If I know the future, it will be: because otherwise my knowing would not be knowing, but opining: and then my knowledge precedes and has order to that which is inferred from it: and yet it will not be entirely the cause, but rather it is caused by another cause which is free will. And similarly foreknowledge from nothing which operates under it removes the reason of causing: and therefore something is done by those things which operate under foreknowledge, which is not done by it.

To the other, it must be said that nothing existing can be made in the future of which God is not the cause and foreknower: but some defect as evil can occur in the future of which indeed He is foreknower, and not cause, because it occurs from the defect of the second cause, and not of Himself, as has often been said above.

To the other, it must be said that even in art, art is not the cause of vice, but can foreknow it: just as art working in knotted wood knows that the wood does not obey the beauty of the image to be impressed: and yet it does not make that defect, but it happens from the defect of the wood. But for this reason there is a difference, that in the power of free will it is to remain in defect, or to obey the artisan in perfect beauty: and therefore divine knowledge foreknows both, but makes only one.

To the other, it must be said that when you say, God knows this or foreknows: therefore it will be of necessity: I say that if there is a necessity of consequence, it follows well because of the order of foreknowledge to the foreknown. But if it is a consequence of necessity or of the consequent or of the thing, which is the same: I say that it does not follow, neither in the good of which foreknowledge is the cause, nor in the evil of which it is not the cause.

To what is objected, that the antecedent is necessary by necessity of the thing, and not only of position, we could say that when it is said, God foreknows this, that this proposition on the part of the foreknown still depends on the future: and therefore it does not take everything in the foreknower alone, and therefore it must have the necessity of position, so that namely that will be future which He foreknows: and thus all Doctors commonly say: and therefore it is false what is posited as true. If, however, we would wish to say otherwise, we could concede that this antecedent is necessary in itself, God foreknows what is future: and yet in the consequent there is not caused necessity of the consequence, and not of the thing: and this for the reason that when the consequent is caused by the antecedent, so that it gives it the cause of the thing and necessity, it must have not only a necessary order to it, but also give it being and its properties and dispositions: and this the first cause does not do to any caused thing: and this happens for two reasons: of which the first is, because no caused thing can receive the properties of the first cause because of its infinite distance and nobility above every caused thing. The other cause is: because those contingent caused things are essentially caused by some proximate contingent causes, from which the mode of causality is not removed by the first cause through its influence over the caused thing, and therefore in that it does not follow, that if the cause of this effect is necessary, that the effect is necessary and immutable. And it is similar as if the approach of the sun in the oblique circle is a necessary cause of generation, yet it is not necessary for generation to occur: because there can be an impediment on the part of proximate causes, as in a place of perpetual cold: and therefore the Philosopher says concerning these non-proximate causes, that someone about to walk will not walk, and Ptolemy in the Centiloquium, that a wise man will rule over the stars: because the proximate causes are disposed by contrary dispositions: and therefore it is clear that the first cause does not posit absolute necessity, but of order: or not of the consequent, but of the consequence through foreseeing.

To the other two it can be absolutely conceded, that the foreknown which is naturally is caused in that mode of causality which has been said, by foreknowledge.

To the other, it must be said that the instance of the Master is good, because it has been proven above, that God does not know evil except by speculative knowledge: and therefore it is not reduced to a habit which is deprived in God Himself, but rather which is deprived in the cause which is free will and the evil act, of which thus conjointly God is not the cause: and therefore God has no efficiency towards evil: but He sees from afar by accident, just as privation is seen: and it is true, that in this way through a deficient cause in act it is known: but this is not God, but rather free will: but free will thus deficient in act God knows through Himself.

To the other, it must be said that the knowledge of God is through the cause which is Himself: but it is not necessary because of this, that it is the cause of the known: because the known sometimes has no cause except a deficient one, as has often been said.

Articulus 2 — Whether Any Truth Was From Eternity Besides God

Whether any truth existed from eternity besides God?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, A, around the middle: God did not know these from any time, etc.

1. For since every truth is known by God, and nothing is known unless it is true, it seems possible to prove that some truth or many truths existed from eternity: but nothing is known by God unless every truth: therefore every truth is known from eternity by God: but whatever is known, is true: and whatever is true, is: therefore every truth is from eternity, as it seems. If perhaps you say, that each thing is related to being as it is to truth, and not conversely: whence since all things were not from eternity, not all things will be true even from eternity. On the contrary: Nothing is known unless it is true: and all things are known from eternity: therefore they are true from eternity: but being is pre-understood to truth as cause to effect: therefore all things were from eternity, as it seems.
2. Furthermore, Augustine seems to prove the soul immortal in this way: because if that which is in it is incorruptible, and cannot be without a subject, its proper subject will be perpetual: but truth is eternal, and is in the soul, as in a subject: therefore the soul is immortal and perpetual. But that truth is eternal, he proves thus: Either it is true that truth is from eternity, or not. If it is true, I have the proposition. If not: then the contradictory is true, namely that truth was not from eternity. If the contradictory is true, something is true: and if something is true, truth is: therefore with truth posited not to be from eternity, it follows that truth is from eternity. Similarly, it is concerning the destruction of truth, if it can be destroyed: for either truth will endure without end, or not. If not: let the opposite be granted, and then with truth destroyed, something will be true: and not unless by truth: therefore to truth not being, it follows that truth is: therefore it is perpetual before and after: and so it seems that with respect to it, foreknowledge cannot be posited.
3. Likewise, if at the beginning of the world, when the world began, I say thus: the world was, it is evident that it is false: therefore the contradictory was true, the world was not: therefore something was true before the world. The same follows concerning the instant of the inception of any thing which begins.
4. Likewise, this proposition, the world will be, or the world is going to be, is true, either it is true from eternity, or not. If so, I have the proposition: because then it follows that many truths were from eternity. If not: then the contradictory is true, namely the world is not going to be: but what is not going to be, will never be in any present or past: therefore it was never true, this, the world is, or the world was, which is false: therefore it is evident that the first is true, the world is going to be: and similarly Socrates is going to be. But since all these are true from eternity, as it seems, the knowledge of God will not be before them, and so it will not properly be called foreknowledge with respect to them. However, it has sometimes been conceded that many truths are from eternity which are not God.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
Every opposition is concerning some same and one thing, to which it is reduced as to the subject of which it is: therefore if such a reduction follows, this proposition is not true: therefore its contradictory is true: it is necessary to say that the opposition of contradiction is from eternity: but since it cannot be in itself, it is reduced to some one thing, as to matter: therefore it is also necessary to posit that from eternity: but there is nothing concerning which every opposition is, except prime matter: therefore prime matter will be from eternity: for prime matter is subjected in everything which is per se a subject, as a certain Philosopher says: but this is heresy: therefore also that from which it follows, namely that there are many truths which are not God from eternity. Nor can anyone say that those truths are only relations: for the relation of opposition is only in opposites: therefore if there is a relation, the subject of the relation will be: and so it is necessary for the propositions themselves to be from eternity, which is false.

Solution. I do not think it is catholic to say that many truths were from eternity, which are not God.

Whence I respond to the first, that whatever is known is true, that proposition is true of a twofold knowledge, namely of that which is the cause of the known, and of that which is caused by the known. And when it is conceded of that which is the cause of the known, because the knower is an agent through intellect and will, it does not further follow that whatever is true, is: because when it was said, whatever is known is true, the known was not posited except according to the condition of the knower, and not according to the property of the nature of the known: and so it is clear how that process is impeded. If it is true of the knowledge which is caused by the known, there truth follows being, and knowing follows truth as effect to cause: and in that the process does not hold: because such knowledge is not from eternity.

To the objection of Augustine it must be said, that it is a sophism, nor does he assert, except in this way in which enunciable truth is posited in the divine mind only: for thus there is only one truth, which however is of many through relation to them, as we said above concerning ideas.

Therefore it must be said, that just as privation is not understood except through habit, so negation is not understood except through affirmation: and therefore no affirmative being accepted, no negative will be accepted. Whence I say, that this is false, truth was from eternity, for two reasons, namely because there was no proposition: and because the composition does not hold by reason of determination: and when it is inferred, therefore the contradictory is true: I say, that it does not follow unless a proposition is supposed: but that is not, because it is impossible for the negative to be first: and therefore since before this, truth was not from eternity, no affirmative can be accepted, it will not be accepted: and therefore it has no contradictory, with such a position made.

Similarly I say of this, the world was, and of its contradictory, and in the same way of all others.

But concerning what is asked of this, the world is going to be is true, whether it was true before the world? I say that it was not: because there was no proposition: for if there is nothing before the world, nothing can be subjectible and predicable before the world: therefore there could not be a proposition: because from what a thing is, or is not, according to Aristotle, speech is said to be true or false. However, if it is asked concerning the thing and not concerning the truth of the proposition, I well concede, that the world was going to be, and that the world could be: but this is referred to ideal reasons, and to the power of the efficient cause.

Articulus 3 — Whether The Knowledge Of God Is Caused By Things

Whether the knowledge of God is caused by things?

Whether the knowledge of God is caused by things?

Afterwards, it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, C, Origen however on the epistle to the Romans, etc.

For here Origen seems to want that the knowledge of God is caused by things: otherwise, the causal conjunction which he posits would not denote any relation.

To this, it is also opposed thus:
1. Whatever is, which neither in itself nor in any of its causes has immutability, that is not known in itself nor in any of its causes, unless it is: the contingent of the future is such: therefore it is not known, unless when it is. The first is proved thus: Let it be granted that it has immutability in some of its causes: therefore, when that cause influences over that caused thing, according to which that caused thing is in itself, there will be immutability also in the caused thing: and thus it would no longer be contingent, which is against the position. Nor is there an instance concerning generated flowers and plants and the sun: because the sun does not influence over them according to an immutable order, but rather according to a diverse mode: for the act of the sun before it comes to them is mixed with contingent and mutable powers: and those influence contingently: and therefore even if the sun had intellect, it could not know the caused thing unless the caused thing existed.

1. Likewise, whatever follow each other necessarily, either both are from the same cause, or one is from the other: but foreknowledge and the foreknown thing follow each other: therefore either both are from the same cause, or one is from the other: but both are not from the same cause: therefore one is from the other: therefore since foreknowledge is not always the cause of the foreknown, the foreknown will sometimes be the cause of foreknowledge or knowledge, as it seems.
2. Likewise, God knows me to read, it follows well: therefore I read. I ask therefore, whence the place? It seems that it is not from the cause: because it also follows, God knows me to lie: therefore I lie: and it cannot be the place from the cause: therefore it will be from the effect, as it seems: therefore the thing is the cause of knowledge.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
1. The most noble knowledge is attributed to God: but the most noble is through the cause: therefore His knowledge is not caused by anything.

1. Likewise, if His knowledge were caused, since His knowledge is His essence, His essence would be caused, which is false.
2. Likewise, since His knowledge is eternal, but the known is temporal, it follows that in His knowledge the temporal would be the cause of the eternal, which is false.
3. Likewise, it cannot be said that it is a cause without which not: because even that is nobler than the effect: but nothing is nobler than divine knowledge.

Solution. I say that Origen does not intend concerning the cause of the thing, but concerning the cause of the consequence: and that is taken from the effect to the cause, just as conversely.

Therefore, it must be said to the first, that the knowledge of God surpasses all knowledge: for although an artisan pre-conceives the form of the whole work, and does not receive it from the work, yet many things happen contrary to the work from the making of instruments, and the inequality of matter, which he cannot know except through the effect: but the highest artisan in this surpasses all knowledge, that He foreknows all that He will do, and whatever will happen to Him from the mutability and defect of secondary causes which operate under Him: because otherwise His knowledge would be imperfect. Whence it is clear, that the accepted similarity from the sun and other agents is not similar, because an artisan cannot know the outcome of his work in act and its event: but God knows this whole due to infinite power in knowing.

To the other, it must be said that it is true, that those follow each other: but this is for the sake of the order of knowledge to the known, and conversely: and not for the sake of causality, as was said before.

To the other, it must be said that in divine things the place is generally from the convertible, but in some things the place is from the cause: for it is otherwise in divine things, and otherwise in human things, due to the diversely spoken knowledge, as was held above.

Articulus 4 — Whether The Foreknowledge Of God Imposes Necessity Upon Things

Whether the foreknowledge of God imposes necessity on things?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said, there, To this, however, which was said above, namely that the foreknowledge of God cannot be deceived, etc.

This is a very general question: for it has a place in faith, and prophecy, and foreknowledge, whether namely they can be deceived? And it is disputed by the same reasons.

1. However, it seems that it imposes necessity on things: because Boethius says thus in the last of the Consolation of Philosophy: If therefore it seems that foreknowledge can be twisted otherwise than things foreseen, the foreknowledge of the future will no longer

be firm, but rather an uncertain opinion: which we consider it impious to believe about God. It imposes necessity on the thing.

Likewise, there: But if with Him, and there are many other things there about this. The most certain source of all things nothing can be uncertain, the event of those things which He has firmly foreseen is certain.

1. Likewise, Anselm in the book on the Harmony of Foreknowledge and Free Will says thus: If anyone considers the understanding of the word properly, by this very fact that it is said to be foreknown, it is pronounced to be future: for nothing is foreknown except what will be, because knowledge is only of truth: wherefore when I say that when God foreknows something, it is necessary for it to be future:

it is the same as if I say, If it will be, it will be of necessity. It is a certain true conditional, whose antecedent is verified without the consequent: therefore it is necessary: therefore also this, If God foreknows something, it will be of necessity: therefore foreknowledge infers necessity.

1. This also is held in the Letter, from Augustine, that it is impossible for the foreknowledge of God to be deceived; therefore it seems that it imposes necessity on the thing.

This also seems to be able to be proven by reason thus:

1. When it is said, God foreknows this future: therefore it will be of necessity: either it follows from the necessity of the consequent, or not. If it follows, I have the proposition. If it does not follow: therefore it can not happen: therefore it can be given that it will not happen: because given the false and not impossible, what happens will be false, and not impossible. But if it will not happen, and God foreknew it: therefore He is deceived in foreknowing, which is against the Letter.
2. Likewise, When it is said, God foreknew this, this is true from eternity: but nothing of contingents is eternal: therefore this proposition is not contingent. If therefore a contingent follows from this, a contingent can follow from a necessary: let it therefore be contingent to be otherwise, then the opposite will be verified with it, which cannot be: therefore the antecedent infers the necessity of the consequent.
3. Likewise, this is true of the past, God foreknew this one would sin: therefore it is necessary: therefore for God to have foreknown this, is necessary: but what is known as necessary, is necessary in itself, or it will be badly known: therefore it is necessary for this one to sin.
4. Likewise, This one to sin is foreknown from eternity: but the thing is not from eternity: therefore if this proposition is changed, that change will not be on the part of the thing: therefore it will be changeable on the part of the knower: but this is impossible, as is held from the Letter: therefore neither on the part of the thing, nor on the part of God is it changeable: therefore it has necessity, as it seems.

But against this are the inconveniences of Boethius, that prayers perish, and the just is made as the impious: because all things will be of necessity: and now sins will not be sins, and chance perishes, and free will perishes, and nothing will be contingent: all of which are false: therefore foreknowledge does not impose necessity on foreknown things.

The solution of this question is to be taken from Boethius and Anselm.

Boethius determining it says thus:

For I will answer that the same future, when it is referred to divine knowledge, is necessary: but when it is considered in its own nature, it seems entirely free and absolute. For there are two necessities. One simple, as it is necessary for all men to be mortal. The other of condition, as if you know someone is walking, it is necessary for him to walk: for what one knows, that cannot be otherwise than known: but this condition does not at all contract that simple necessity: for this necessity is not made by its own nature, but by the addition of condition. Therefore these futures, when referred to the divine intuition, become necessary by the condition of divine knowledge: but considered by themselves, they do not cease from the freedom of their own absolute nature. Boethius to this, that if the necessity of condition is understood, then these are truly: what He foresaw, will happen of necessity: if God foreknew this one to sin, he will sin of necessity, and the like. But if absolute necessity is understood and by itself and according to its own nature considered in itself, then all are false.

Anselm also intends to say this by other words saying thus: Necessarily every future is future, but by a following necessity which compels nothing, when future is said of a thing not always necessary, although it is future. To this that there is a certain necessity of the nature of the thing, and this follows the thing in itself: but there is a necessity of position which follows the thing from this that it is posited to be future in this way or not future: and that because it follows the relation of the thing rather than the thing, it is said to compel nothing.

To the same returns what the Masters say, that there is the necessity of the consequent, and the necessity of the consequence: and it is well conceded, that the foreknowledge of God causes the necessity of the consequence, but not of the consequent.

Having this, it can be answered to the first, that God indeed foreknows all things, and also operates those things which are naturally so: but because they do not take on the properties of their causality, therefore nothing prohibits them from being contingent and changeable in themselves: and that in those changeable things the knowledge of God can be certain, this is not from this that it takes away their changeability, but rather from the infinite power of foreseeing wherever that which is changeable turns: and by this the solution is also clear to all the authorities subsequently introduced.

To the first objection by reason, it must be said that when it is said, God foreknows this: therefore it will be of necessity: it does not follow from the necessity of the consequent, and the cause of this has been said: but it follows from the necessity of the consequence, and because the necessity is of the relation of the antecedent to the consequent, therefore although the opposite of the consequent in itself is possible, yet to the antecedent it is impossible: and

therefore if the opposite is posited now destroying the antecedent, it follows, if that will not be, that God never foreknew it.

To the other it must be said, that this indeed is true from eternity, God foreknew this one would sin if he sins: yet the known depends on the future: and therefore it takes necessity not simply, but in a certain respect, namely as it falls under knowledge: but this is only the necessity of condition, and not absolute: and in this way the opposite of the consequent is not verified with the antecedent.

To the other it must be said in the same way, that although that as to the fact of foreknowing is of the past, yet as to the act which is signified to go forth from the known, it depends on the future: and therefore on that part it can be absolutely contingent, although it has conditional necessity.

To the other it must be said, that although this one to sin is foreknown from eternity, yet on the part of the thing it can depend on the future: and therefore on that part it can be contingent, as has been often said.

And these concerning this distinction.

DISTINCTIO XXXIX

Divisio Textus

Furthermore, it is customary to inquire, Whether the knowledge of God can be increased or diminished?

Here begins that part, in which the Master inquires, Whether the knowledge of God can be increased?

And it is divided into two parts: in the first of which he determines that it cannot be increased. In the second, however, he objects to the contrary, and resolves, there, B, etc. Here it is opposed by some thus, etc.

The text of the first part is evident by itself.

Articulus 1 — Whether The Knowledge Of God Can Be Increased

Whether the knowledge of God can be increased?

A doubt arises concerning the first part, namely, whether the knowledge of God can be increased?

It seems, however, that it can: because
1. Of any knowledge, the knowable things can be increased, that knowledge can be increased, at least materially: but the knowable things of divine knowledge can be increased: therefore,

the knowledge itself can be increased. The first is evident by itself. The second is assumed from the text: because the works of God are knowable, and those can be increased.

1. Likewise, the knowledge of God is according to rational ideas: but ideas are created by the ideata, as was held above by Augustine: if therefore some new things can be created, new ideas can be in God: but through ideas there is knowledge: therefore it seems that the knowledge of God can grow, even on the part of ideas. If perhaps you say that God knows all things of the same species by one idea, and thus with multiplication made in the individual, it does not follow that multiplication is made in the ideas. This is nothing: because if ideas are not determined to individuals, God would not know singulars except in the universal and in potentiality, and this is false, as will be said in the last chapter of this distinction.
2. Furthermore, it is not inconvenient to say that God can make new species which He never made, and new worlds having nothing similar with this one: therefore, since those cannot be made without ideas, there will be an idea of those in the divine mind: and thus according to ideas, it seems that the knowledge of God can be increased.

If perhaps you say that an artisan makes one house and another, and all by the same art: and similarly God can make by one idea. On the contrary: although an artisan can make all houses by one art, yet he cannot make a hexagonal, square, and round house by one species, nor does one species of house know one house to be distinct from another: therefore, since God makes a difference by form and property, or can make many such, and discern one from another, it seems that His knowledge can also be increased according to ideas.

1. Likewise, knowledge and the known are relative, so that knowledge is referred to the knowable: therefore, since relatives are multiplied, with one of the relatives multiplied, if the knowable things can be increased, much more can the knowledge itself.

But on the contrary is what is objected in the text: because

1. The knowledge of God is the essence of God: therefore, if knowledge can be increased by that which is, the essence itself can also be increased according to ideas.
2. Likewise, nothing eternal is increased or diminished by the temporal: but the knowable things which can be made, all are temporal: therefore, they neither increase nor diminish the eternal knowledge of God.
3. Likewise, it can never be that the caused increases or diminishes the cause, but rather conversely: but the knowledge of God is the cause of all things that are made: therefore, it is neither increased nor diminished by them.

Solution. It seems to me, as the Master says, that the knowledge of God can neither be increased nor diminished.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that the things that are known can be increased, but they cannot be increased except by the knowledge operating those many things, and thus by

the very fact that we posit the knowable things to be able to become many, we posit the knowledge from eternity to have been of many operable things: and thus it would not be increased from the fact that many things would be made: and thus the Master will solve below in the following part of the reading: just as it cannot be understood how the caused is increased with respect to number, and the reason of cause and causality is increased from that: so it cannot be understood that from the known the knowledge of God is increased, because by that very fact it is presupposed to have been of that as a knowing and causing cause.

To the other, it must be said that more ideata can be made than are made: but by the very fact that they are made, they are posited to have ideas: and therefore from those the number of ideas is not increased, which is not a number simply, as was said above.

But if you ask whether the knowledge of God can be of more things than it is? This I well concede: but it does not follow from this that it can be increased: because to be of more things posits only the potentiality for there to be more, which more things, however, if they were, or were posited to be, would be presupposed to have been in divine knowledge, and thus would induce no variation in the knowledge itself.

...is said, that knowledge is increased, it is signified that to a knowledge already existing in some quantity, according to the things known, something new is added, which it is wicked to say concerning the knowledge of God: therefore it itself cannot be increased, but it can be of more things, from which it would not be increased if they existed: for since the most excellent must always be attributed to God, it is necessary to assign to Him a knowledge even greater than can be understood: and this is that which cannot be increased either in itself or according to the things known.

Articulus 2 — Whether God At The Same Time And By The Same Knows And Understands Many Things

Whether God simultaneously and by the same knows and understands many things?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, A, around the middle: Each of them sees simultaneously, etc.

From these, two things seem to follow, namely that God knows many things and understands many things simultaneously and by the same, and that He Himself knows mutable things immutably.

Against the first it is objected thus: § 1. The Philosopher says: We can know many things, but understand very little: therefore it seems that one intellect in act is only of one thing.

§ 2. Also, it is impossible for one act to be terminated at diverse terms simultaneously and at once: but to understand is one act: therefore it cannot be terminated simultaneously and at once at diverse terms. Nor does it seem that this can even be understood: because no similar thing is found: for one line in one part cannot be terminated at diverse points: therefore neither can it be understood how it is possible to be done: therefore it seems that it is necessary for the intellect to pass from here to there and from there to here, the contrary of which is said in the Letter.

ON THE CONTRARY: James 1:17, it is said: With whom there is no change, nor shadow of alteration: therefore there is no alteration in the intellect of God, nor can there be: therefore He understands many things by one and the same, and simultaneously, and in act: because it was proved above that His intellect is always in act.

Solution. It must be said that there is no passage in the intellect of God, as the last reason proves: but He understands Himself by one and the same mode having the being which it is, and simultaneously.

To the first and second objects, it must be said that this is true in all those things in which the acts differ from the essence of the agent: but not so in God: whence His act which is to understand, is His essence: and just as His essence is the species and cause of all things, having itself in one mode, so also is His act: and therefore the similes brought forward are not valid: but nevertheless that is more express concerning the center and the lines going out from it, as we expounded above.

Articulus 3 — Whether God Knows Changeable Things Immutably, And Knows Opposites In The Same Way

Whether God knows mutable things immutably, and knows opposites in the same way?

To the second we proceed thus: To know mutable things immutably is to know mutable things otherwise than they are: but to know any thing otherwise than it is, is to be deceived: therefore it seems that if God knows mutable things immutably, He Himself is deceived in them.

Here also falls the question concerning the knowledge of opposites, whether He knows them in the same way?

It seems that He does: because § 1. He knows a thing in the same way when it is, and when it is not: but for a thing to be

and not to be, are opposites according to affirmation and negation: therefore He simultaneously knows contradictories, as it seems: therefore much more so other opposites.

§ 2. Also, if He knows a thing as it is, it is necessary that He knows it under the differences of time: therefore He knows that I will read when I am going to read, and knows that I have read when I have read, and knows that I read when I read: but everything that falls under the difference of time is mutable: therefore God knows the mutable temporally and mutably, as it seems. But if you say that He does not know things temporally, it follows from this that He would have no knowledge of a thing when it is and when it is not, but would know things indistinctly and confusedly: and this is imperfect, and not to be attributed to God.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. Every reception is according to the power of the receiver, and not of the received: knowledge is a certain reception, as the Philosopher says: therefore it is according to the power of the receiver, and not of the received: but God, knowing, is immutable: therefore His knowledge is immutable.

§ 2. Furthermore, in the Letter this is denied: therefore it seems that His knowledge is not of mutable things mutably.

Solution. It is easy to solve this according to what was said above, namely that the word 'mutably' [ly mutabiliter] can determine the verb on the part of the matter over which the knowledge passes, and thus God knows mutable things mutably, and temporal things temporally, and opposites in opposite ways: or it can refer to the verb by comparison to the knower, and thus He knows mutable things immutably, and temporal things intemporally, and opposites in one simple way.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that He is not deceived: because even among us the knowledge of mutable things on the part of the knower is immutable, because the formal concept of mutable things is immutable: but since the formal concept is the intention of a mutable thing, the mutability of the thing is known through that intention when it is referred to the thing to which mutability happens. And the cause of this is because by the fact that it is immutable, it is not referred to the thing, but is referred to it according as it is the formal concept and intention of the thing which is mutable: and thus it is clear how in all things the mutable is known immutably.

To the other it must be said that God knows opposites by one thing, which is the formal concept of the thing whether it is or is not: because to Him a thing cannot pass away, but always remains in the same mode, yet His knowledge does not pass over the thing in the same mode: or, to speak more faithfully, the thing is not compared to Him in one mode: and therefore He knows the thing to be when it is, and He knows it not to be when it is not, from the fact that the thing is compared to being or to non-being: and this is more about the knowledge of complex things or enunciables, concerning which it will be inquired later.

To the other it must be said that He intemporally knows all things which fall under the difference of time: and this is so because the difference of time happens to a thing according as it is in its proper being, and not according as it is in God through an idea. But that He is certain in knowing things distinctly, this is because He not only knows the thing, but also any composition and division of the thing with any thing or from any thing: and this incomplexly and incompositely, as will be said below.

And if you object that our intellect is not thus of a complex thing as of an incomplex thing. The response is that this is so because our intellect through its substance is not its own intelligible, nor does it give the mode to the intelligible, but rather receives from it, and therefore it is varied according to it: but it is not so of the divine intellect, which is that by which He understands, and it gives to the intelligible both to be in itself, and every composition and division.

Articulus 4 — Whether God Knows Actually Infinite Things

Whether God knows infinite things in act?

Whether God knows infinite things in act?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, A, towards the end: The Father and the Son with the Holy Spirit simultaneously know and see all things.

For there can still be a doubt, although it was dispatched above, whether God knows infinite things in act?

It seems that He does: because § 1. To any finite thing addition is possible: but to the knowledge of God no addition can be made: therefore it itself is infinite.

§ 2. Also, Augustine in book XII of The City of God says that the species of numbers, infinite in themselves, are not infinite to the knowledge of Him whose knowledge has no number. Therefore it seems that He knows infinite things in act.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. Whatever is known, is rendered finite by the comprehension of the knower, especially if he knows perfectly: therefore if God knows the infinite, He by knowing renders it finite: therefore it is not infinite absolutely.

§ 2. Furthermore, the infinite in itself cannot be understood how it could be finite to another: therefore neither will it be finite to God.

§ 3. Also, the species of numbers are not infinite in act, but in potency: if therefore God knows them to be infinite, He knows what is not, which is impossible.

To this some say that knowledge is threefold, namely of intelligence, of vision, and of approbation: and the knowledge of intelligence is that by which a thing is understood simply. But the knowledge of vision is that which passes over things according as they are or are not under the difference of this composition or that. But the knowledge of approbation is that which is of goods of which God is the author. But against this it is objected: That knowledge which is called intelligence is either rendered finite by the ideal formal concept of the intelligible, or not. If you say yes: but to every idea there corresponds an ideated thing, or can correspond: therefore to that idea which is of the infinite, an ideated thing corresponds, or can correspond: therefore the infinite can be in act: which I cannot understand, if it is true.

Also, if you say that that idea is not for this purpose that an ideated thing can be brought forth under it, but that God may cognize the infinite by it. On the contrary: Either He cognizes it as it is, or otherwise. If otherwise, He does not have true knowledge of it. But if as it is, since it neither is nor can be except in potency, the intelligence will only be of the infinite in potency: and concerning this we do not contend.

Solution. It seems to me that the infinite in act is always imperfect, nor is it in God, nor in nature: but I readily concede that God cognizes the infinite as it is finite.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that it is impossible for any addition to be made to God: because He is something greater than we can think: which is not understood dimensionally, or in multitude, since He is solely one and simple: but because no good can be thought of, but that He is it, and more than can be thought of: but the infinite is nothing of good and perfect, but rather imperfect: therefore it is not understood thus: because, as we said above, it can also be understood how the infinite includes the infinite: yet there are many things which we think of, which are not God: nor is this a mark of imperfection, but of perfection: and His

knowledge is infinite in this way: because nothing can be thought of or be, which if it were, would not be in His knowledge, and in the mode according to which it is in His knowledge: because He by understanding Himself to be able to do infinite things, understands infinite things according as they are infinite in potency.

But TO THE SOLUTION brought forward I respond, that either I do not understand what is posited, or intelligence speaks only of the relation of the intellect to the thing, according as it is in whatever way, namely in potency, or in an ideal formal concept having a comparison to that which will be in act, as was expounded above.

Articulus 5 — Whether The Knowledge Of God Is Of Enunciables

Whether the knowledge of God is of enunciables?

Whether the knowledge of God is of enunciables?

Afterwards it is inquired concerning this which he says in the second part, there, B, His knowledge is only of those things which are, or were, or will be, etc.

For according to this it seems that His knowledge is of enunciables.

Which is also proved otherwise: because § 1. Since many things are enunciables, unless God knew them, He would not know all things which are, or will be.

§ 2. Also, otherwise His cognition would be more imperfect than ours: because I not only know you, but I also know you to be, and to read if you are reading, and the like: therefore it seems that God also knows the like.

§ 3. Also, God not only knows subjects, but also knows to be in them all predicates which can be in them: therefore He knows complex things and enunciables, as it seems.

§ 4. Also, otherwise it would follow that He would not know the Antichrist to be future, or Caesar to have been, which is absurd.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. He does not know except through an idea, but an idea is not of complex things: because there is no complexity in God: therefore it seems that He does not have notice of enunciables.

§ 2. Also, the soul, on account of its simplicity, is not simultaneously except of one thing: therefore since God is more simple, He will not be according to His intellect except of one thing: therefore He will not be of complex things, as it seems.

Solution. It must be said that the intellect of God is of complex things incomplexly: for complex things are to be referred to a simple thing, and that to God, which He not only knows as it is simple, but in every complexity which can happen to it from composition, and thus by one thing which is the formal concept not only of being, but of all aptitudes, He understands all complexities and compositions.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that it is otherwise concerning our intellect and His: because our intellect is not the cause of the thing or of the composition of the thing, but by

receiving from things it cognizes things: and therefore since the thing is diverse, the same cannot be received from diverse things, and therefore the intellect will be composite: but His intellect is the cause of every thing and the formal concept of every thing, and therefore through one thing which is the cause and formal concept, the thing can be understood, and the composition of the thing with another thing: because the idea is not the formal concept of the thing in itself, but in the composition of all things and division which it can have essentially or accidentally.

And from this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 6 — Whether Now God Can Know Or Foreknow, As He Could Have Known Or Foreknown From Eternity

Whether God can now know or foreknow, just as He could have known or foreknown from eternity?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says: Thus He can now know or foreknow, just as He could have known or foreknown from eternity.

§ 1. For this seems false: because in our knowledge it follows that if I can know something which I do not know, my knowledge is varied.

§ 2. Also, if I can know something now, it does not follow from this that I had known it before: therefore it seems that these consequences do not hold in God.

Solution. It must be said that it is not similar: but just as the knowable thing is related to our knowledge, so His knowledge is related to the knowable thing. Whence just as in us it follows, there is no knowable thing: therefore there is no knowledge: so conversely it follows, in God there is no knowledge: therefore there is no knowable thing: and just as in us these two are incompossible , namely that I should have knowledge of some knowable thing, and that that knowable thing should not be: because immediately upon my having the knowledge, it follows that that knowable thing is, because my [knowledge] is not effected except by that knowable thing: so in God these two are incompossible, that something should be and that the knowledge of it should not be: because the knowledge of God is the cause of it: and because it is not a cause except from eternity, it follows that from eternity it is the cause of it: and therefore in God to be able to know now and to be able to have known from eternity are the same: and these two are incompossible, that something should happen now, and that He Himself did not know it from eternity: although each according to itself is possible, because one is implied in the other: and when it is posited that something is which will never be, it is posited by consequence that God always knew it, from this, because His knowledge is the eternal cause or prevision of it. And upon this sense the Master proceeds.

Articulus 7 — Whether It Must Be Granted That God Can Know What He Previously Did Not Know

Whether it is to be conceded that God can know what He previously did not know?

Afterwards it is inquired concerning this which he says: Therefore He cannot newly or from time know or foreknow anything, etc.

For it is inquired, whether it is to be conceded that God can know what He previously did not know?

And it seems that He can: because § 1. This is hinted at in the last part of the following opinion which he brings forward, that God can know more things than He knew, because it can pass over more things.

§ 2. Also, some object: God can now create what He does not create, and create more things than He creates: therefore similarly He can know more things than He knows.

ON THE CONTRARY: Since knowledge is referred to the knowable thing, if He can know what He previously did not know, it seems to follow that He can have a knowledge which He previously did not have: and this is for God to be altered from imperfect knowledge to perfect.

Solution. It seems to me that it should not be conceded.

But to that which is objected concerning the Letter: I say that he does not intend that some things can happen over which the knowledge of God passes in a new mode, but he intends that some things can happen, over which there would have been knowledge from eternity. And thus He would not know except what He previously and from eternity knew.

To the other it must be said that it is not similar concerning creation: because that posits nothing in God, but in the thing outside: but knowledge is in the knower himself, and therefore the knowledge of a new thing cannot advene to Him without His variation: because that new thing would posit an ideal formal concept in God, which, unless it had been in Him from eternity, posits a variation concerning Him.

Articulus 8 — Whether God Can Know More Things Than He Knows

Whether God can know more things than He knows?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says: Also it is said by some that God can know more things than He knows, etc.

But it seems that this opinion is true: because § 1. More things can be than are: but the knowledge of God, as is held in the preceding chapter, is only of those things which were or will be or are: therefore He can know more things than He knows.

§ 2. Also, He knows whatever He can make: but He can make more things than He makes: therefore He can know more things than He knows.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. God knows whatever He can make: and He cannot know more things than He can make: therefore He cannot know more things than He knows.

§ 2. Also, in eternal things to be and to be able are the same: therefore if He can know more things than He knows, then He also knows more things than He knows, which is impossible.

Solution. In my judgment this composite proposition is false: God can know more things than He knows, just as the Master previously distinguished. And as to what this opinion says, that His knowledge can pass over more things than it passes over without mutation: I understand it thus, that this is because, positing that there be more things, it follows that He had known more things from eternity. And concerning the sun, which some posit for a simile, it is not similar: because in the sun there is no formal concept of cognizing those things over which it shines: which if it were in the sun, it would not be possible for the sun to pour forth the light of intelligence over those things of which there would be no formal concept in it: and thus it is also in God. Whence since He does not receive the formal concepts of intelligibles anew, it is necessary that He has them with Himself from eternity. And through this the solution to the first is clear.

To the second it must be said that He can make more things than He makes, but not know more things in this mode than He knows, except as to be able to know and to be able to have known from eternity: and if more things are posited to be, it is supposed by implication in the supposition, that He knew them from eternity, as was said above.

D. Which seems contrary to that sentence in which it was said above, that God always and simultaneously knows all things.

But to that which was said before, namely that God always and simultaneously sees all things, what Jerome says in the exposition of Habakkuk seems to oppose: It is absurd, he says, to reduce the majesty of God to this, that He should know through single moments how many gnats are born, or how many die, how great is the multitude of fleas and...

...of flies, or how many fishes swim in the waters, and the like. Let us not be such foolish flatterers of God, that while we thrust His providence down even to the lowest things, we are injurious to ourselves, saying that the providence of the irrational and the rational is the same. Here Jerome seems to say that God does not have knowledge or providence of those lesser things: but if this is so, then He does not know all things simultaneously and always. Let us therefore know that this was said in such a sense, that it denies that God knows those things alternately or particularly, nor did He thus cognize them through diverse moments of times, just as through various moments some of them fail, some begin. Neither does He provide for them and other irrational things in the same manner as for rational things. For is there (as the Apostle says) care for oxen by God? And just as there is no care for oxen by God, so neither for other irrational things. Yet Scripture says, that He has care of all things. Therefore He has providence and care universally concerning all things which He founded, so that each one has what is due and suitable to it. But He has special providence and care concerning rational things, to which He handed down precepts, and prescribed for them the law of living rightly and promised rewards. He does not have this providence and care concerning irrational things. And therefore the Apostle says, that there is no care for oxen by God: yet He provides for and cares for all things, that is, He governs all things, who makes His sun to rise upon all, and gives rain*. Therefore God knows how great is the multitude of fleas, gnats, and flies, and fishes: and how many are born, or how many die: but He does not know this through single moments, rather simultaneously and at once all things. Neither does He know thus, that He has the same

providence of irrational and rational things, that is, that He provides in entirely the same mode for irrational and rational things. For to rational things He both gave precepts, and delegated Angels for their custody.

Articulus 9 — Whether God Has Knowledge Of Singulars

Whether God has notice of singulars?

Whether God has notice of singulars?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says last, there, D, But to that which was said before, etc.

For it seems that God does not have notice of singulars: because § 1. Boethius says that it is universal while it is understood, singular while it is sensed.

§ 2. Also, every intellect is of universals, as the Philosopher says: because the intellect is simple, and it is necessary that the intelligible be simple: but nothing of singulars is simple: therefore nothing of singulars is present to the intellect.

§ 3. Also, the Philosopher in XI Metaphysics proves that it does not understand anything other than itself, because otherwise its intellect would become vile in vile things, which it is better to ignore than to know: therefore it seems that He does not have notice of singulars.

ON THE CONTRARY: For according to this there will be more things ignored by Him than known.

Also, Boethius in book V of The Consolation of Philosophy:

To Him looking upon all things from on high /No earthly masses resist: /Night does not stand in the way with black clouds. /What are, what were, and are to come /He discerns by one stroke of the mind: /Whom, because He alone looks at all things, /You could call the true sun.

Solution. It must be said with the Master, that God knows all things small and great.

And to that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that there is an intellect abstracting form from the thing, and it is necessary that this be purified on account of the materiality which it has in the thing outside, and that is our intellect. Another is the intellect having forms or ideas compositionally as exemplars with the thing, and those are of the universal or of the particular, in such a mode that it is abstracted from neither, and therefore they are not repugnant to the simplicity of the intellect: because the intellect has them with itself, and such are the ideas and forms under which the Angels understand.

To the other it must be said that the Philosopher understands this of the intellect abstracting from things because it is necessary that it take away the conditions of matter from that which it abstracts, and assimilate it to itself. But it is not so of the intellect which is for making the thing through the form of composition: for that has a simple form with itself, which is not determined to this or that by the conditions of matter, but through a relation to this or that: and through it the universal and the particular can be understood, and the universal in the particular, according to the diverse relation of the thing to that form.

To the other it must be said that the Philosopher does not intend that it understands nothing other than itself, as was expounded above: but he intends that it does not understand through anything other than through itself, because by understanding it receives nothing from things. But how His intellect does not become vile, was dispatched above.

DISTINCTIO XL

Divisio Textus

But predestination is of salutary goods, etc.

Here begins that part in which the Master determines concerning divine knowledge according to its species.

And it is divided into two. In the first he determines concerning the species of foreknowledge which are predestination and reprobation. But in the second he touches upon certain questions concerning foreknowledge and knowledge, commonly consequent upon the knowledge of God considered according to

genus and considered according to species, which begins in the penultimate chapter of the following distinction XLI, there, F, Furthermore it is necessary to consider, whether all those things which He once knows, etc.

But the preceding is still divided into two. In the first he determines the species of foreknowledge, which are predestination and obduration. But in the second he inquires, whether they have any cause in the predestined, or the foreknown? And this begins at the beginning of the following distinction, XLI, there, A, But if we inquire the merit of obduration, etc.

This distinction is divided into two parts. In the first he touches upon predestination, in the second reprobation, there, D, And since predestination is the preparation of grace, etc.

In the first part he does five things: of which the first is, that he touches upon what things predestination is about. Secondly, he shows that the number of the predestined is certain, there, B, None of the predestined seems, etc. Thirdly, it is objected against sophistically, there, B, §2: But to this some object, etc. Fourthly, he objects more strongly, there, C, Nevertheless they still insist, etc. Fifthly and lastly he solves, there, C, §2: In the solution of this question, etc.

But the sentence is manifest of itself, because the Letter is plain.

Articulus 1 — To Which Attribute Predestination Ought To Be Reduced, Namely To Power, Wisdom, Or Will

To which of the attributes predestination ought to be reduced, whether namely to power, wisdom, or will?

But here, before the Letter, eight things are to be inquired: of which the first is, to which of the three attributes predestination can be reduced, whether to power, or to wisdom, or to will?

Second, what it is in reality and by definition? Third, whether it is of a being, or of a non-being? Fourth, whether it is eternal, or temporal? Fifth, whether it is solely of a creature, or also of another? Sixth is, whether it is of every rational creature, or solely of man? Seventh is, whether it is of every man, or of certain men only? Eighth and last, whether predestination is multiplied according to single predestined persons, or all the predestined are in one, namely in Christ?

Therefore let it be inquired first, Whether it is of power, or wisdom, or will or goodness?

But it seems that it is of knowledge: because § 1. The Master above, at the beginning of distinction XXXV, posits predestination among the names by which knowledge is signified: therefore it is reduced to knowledge.

§ 2. Also, to destine is only in the mind of the one proposing: but to propose is to pre-conceive concerning doing something: but conception is according to the intellect foreknowing the work: since therefore predestination is such a pre-conception, it seems that predestination falls under knowledge.

§ 3. Also, in whatever genus the superior is to something, in the same is the inferior which is received under it: but foreknowledge is in the genus of knowledge: therefore predestination, which is under foreknowledge, as was held above,[111] will be in the genus of knowledge.

But on the contrary it seems to be in the genus of power: § 4. Because, as is held here, predestination is the preparation of grace: but preparation is an act of power: therefore also predestination, as it seems.

§ 2. Also, predestination is eternal, and let this be supposed here, because it has to be proved below: but the predestined are not from eternity, except in the potency of the efficient cause: therefore it seems that predestination is reduced to power, because it is of the power of the efficient cause.

Similarly it seems that it is ordered to the will: § 1. Because it is defined through the will: for Augustine says that predestination is the will or purpose of having mercy.

§ 2. Also, grace and glory which are effects of predestination, are indicative of goodness: but goodness is a disposition of the will: therefore also predestination.

§ 3. Also, 1 Timothy 2:4: Who om-

§ 1. ...[om]nes homines vult salvos fieri, etc. [112] However, the will for salvation is from predestination: therefore it seems that predestination is ordered toward the will.

§ 2. SOLUTION. It must be said that predestination is in the genus of effective or practical knowledge, and thus it has something of knowledge and something of will: and because these incline a potency toward a work, therefore it also has something of the act of a potency. But that which belongs to practical knowledge gives it its being; whereas that which belongs to the will and to potency is in it by way of a property, according as the will concerns what is

known practically, and according as the operating potency extends itself through the work to do it: and therefore the first reasons are to be conceded.

§ 3. To that which is objected concerning potency, it must be said that this belongs to predestination as if consequently according to the ratio of intelligence, namely because such knowledge is directed toward a work.

§ 4. To that which is objected concerning the will, it must be said that such knowledge is always conjoined to the will: but nevertheless predestination rather takes its name from the side of knowledge than from the side of the will: and nothing prohibits something, according to diverse things that are in it, from being ordered under diverse genera.

Articulus 2 — What Predestination Is In Reality

What is predestination in reality?

§ 5. Next it is asked what it is? And this is divided into two, namely, to ask first, What is it in reality? and second, What is it by definition?

§ 6. TO THE FIRST one proceeds thus: 1. It seems that predestination is something created, and not God: because when I say, "this man is predestined," I say something by signifying passively: therefore I signify that this is from another in him: but such a mode of signifying does not befit God, because He has nothing from another: therefore the predestination of the predestined is not God.

§ 7. 2. Moreover, nothing that is God denominates this person as predestined: therefore predestination is not God.

§ 8. 3. Again, action and passion are beings which have opposite respects to each other: which is evident from their definitions when it is said, "action is that according to which we say that we act upon that which is subjected"; and "passion is the effect and inference of action." Therefore they do not apply to the same thing, nor can they be in the same thing. Since therefore God is the one predestining, He Himself will not be the predestination by which this or that person is predestined: therefore since predestination belongs to the predestined, predestination is not God.

§ 9. 4. Again, when it is said, "God creates," the reality of the verb which is creation, is the same as the eduction from nothing into something: but this eduction, as a form, is in what is educed: therefore it is in the creature, and not in the Creator: therefore similarly predestination will be in the predestined, and not in God: therefore really it is not God.

§ 10. 5. Again, it seems absurd that God should be called the reprobation of the damned. Since therefore predestination posits no more in the creature than reprobation does, it seems also that predestination is not God.

111. See above, dist. XXXV.

§ 11. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Nothing is from eternity except God alone: but the predestination by which all those who will be saved are predestined, is from eternity: therefore it is God.

§ 12. 2. Again, when it is said, "predestination is the purpose of having mercy," nothing falls in the nominative case in the definition that is not God. Similarly when it is said, "the preparation of grace in the present and of glory in the future": for preparation is God preparing, since God as agent is His own action: but grace and glory fall there in oblique cases: therefore it seems that the predestination of the predestined is God Himself.

§ 13. SOLUTION. Speaking without prejudice, I consent to the last two reasons, that predestination, according to that which it is in reality, whether it is taken from the side of the one predestining, or from the side of the predestined, is always God. For if it is taken in that which is predestination, it posits nothing in any time: and if it sometimes has an effect in the predestined one with respect to whom it is, this happens to it from the side of the connoted effect. It must be known, therefore, that predestination is as it were a mean between God predestining and man predestined, and predestination itself denotes the habitude of God proposing to save toward saving: and therefore predestination is not posited in the predestined one, according as he exists as diverse from God in his proper nature, but according as he is in the knowledge of the Creator: but according to this that he is there, it was proved above that he himself is the creative essence, and not a created nature: therefore that which it thus posits concerning him, is not distinguished from the divine essence, but is the divine essence itself, and the respect to the thing which God will work in the future is co-understood.

§ 14. IT MUST BE SAID therefore to the first, that when it is said, "predestined," it is not signified there passively except as to the mode with respect to us, and not according to reality: for the sense is, that this man is foreseen to be saved, and the word "foreseen" does not posit anything according to reality outside the one foreseeing, although it posits a respect as to something, which in the future will be other than God, about which the effect of predestination will be. Hence for such a mode of signifying actively or passively the diversity of reason is sufficient which is between the one foreseeing and the foreseen, not in itself, but in the ideal reason in which it was from eternity.

§ 15. To another it must be said, that predestination is not formally in the predestined: because it does not denote a form whose being would be absolutely terminated in him, but rather a respect toward saving, for which it suffices that it be in a qualified sense, namely in idea, so that such a form is signified in him.

§ 16. To another it must be said, that the one predestining and the predestined are not related simply as active and passive according to nature, but only according to some mode of signifying in which the dependence of the one to be saved upon the Savior is noted according to reason, that is, of an efficient cause, and not conversely.

§ 17. To another it must be said, that it is not similar: because when it is said, "God creates," this does not belong to God except from time: hence it names not only a respect to the

creature, but also an effect in the creature, and that can essentially be the reality of the verb, although it is from God: but when it is said, "God predestined Peter or Paul," nothing is noted except a respect to the creature, which is fitting from eternity, and therefore it posits nothing outside of God.

§ 18. To another it must be said, that in my judgment it is not absurd that God should be called reprobation: for in reprobation only two things are said, namely the foresight of iniquity, and the preparation of punishment: and each, which falls in the nominative case in the definition of reprobation, names the divine essence with a respect to that which falls obliquely in that definition, namely iniquity and punishment: of which the first does not posit its proper species in God, but the second does have a species there. Hence I do not reckon it absurd that God should be called the reprobation itself by which the iniquitous are reprobated.

Articulus 3 — What Predestination Is By Definition

What is predestination by definition?

§ 19. TO THE SECOND one proceeds thus, and many definitions of predestination are posited: for we have one here in the Letter [of Lombard] in the last chapter of this distinction: "Predestination is the foreknowledge and preparation..." "...of the benefits by which whoever are liberated are most certainly liberated" .

§ 20. Another is Augustine's in the book On Faith to Peter: "Predestination is the preparation of a gratuitous donation" .

§ 21. Another is Augustine's in the book On the Predestination of the Saints: "Predestination is the purpose of having mercy" .

§ 22. Again, "Predestination is the destination of someone to an end."

§ 23. Again, the Masters posit another: "Predestination is the preparation of grace in the present and of glory in the future."

§ 24. But it is objected against the first: because 1. Predestination does not seem to posit a preparation that adds something above foreknowledge: for since there are three things: the divine essence, and the respect to the creature, and the effect in the creature: foreknowledge denotes the first two, and not the third: but preparation also denotes the same two, and not the third, because since preparation is from eternity, it does not denote the effect in the creature: therefore it seems that the one adds nothing over the other: therefore one is superfluously conjoined to the other.

§ 25. 2. Moreover, benefits are manifold, not all of which fall under the ratio of sanctifying grace: which nonetheless liberate from some evils: is predestination therefore of these? It seems not: because we do not say that there is a predestination of the scourged, although it is said, 2 Maccabees 6:13: "Not to suffer sinners to act according to their own judgment for a long time, but straightway to apply punishments, is a sign of an extreme benefit" .

112. Aristotle, De Anima, III.

§ 26. 3. Again, Damascene says that God does not compel to virtue, nor persuade to vice . Therefore it seems that predestination does not most certainly liberate.

§ 27. 4. Again, the most certain mode is the mode of demonstrative necessity: but predestination does not have this mode in liberating, because it does not take away liberty from free choice: therefore it seems that predestination does not most certainly liberate.

§ 28. Similarly it is objected concerning the second, which is said to be "the preparation of a gratuitous donation." 1. For a thing is not said to be prepared when it is not, except in an efficient cause, as is evident: for when it is said, "a house is prepared," it is not understood to be prepared by the fact that there is an artisan who is knowledgeable and powerful, but rather when the wood is hewn and the parts of the house are erected: therefore similarly the preparation of a gratuitous donation is not except when free choice is already prepared to receive, and when grace is infused: but these are not from eternity: therefore the preparation of a gratuitous donation is not from eternity: but predestination is from eternity: therefore it is poorly defined by preparation.

§ 29. 2. Again, a gratuitous donation is that which is given without merits, because a gratuitous donation is nothing other than that which is given gratis: therefore it seems that according to that definition it would only be of the first grace, and not of glory, or of subsequent grace which is given after prevenient grace: which is contrary to the last definition.

§ 30. Similarly it is objected concerning the third. 1. For predestination is from eternity: therefore it seems that it is not caused by anything temporal: but misery is temporal: therefore it seems that predestination does not regard the state of misery, except accidentally: therefore it is not the purpose of having mercy, as it seems, except accidentally: therefore predestination should not be defined by this.

§ 31. Again, according to this it would not apply to all who are nevertheless predestined, such as the Angels and Christ: for no misery was alleviated in them.

§ 32. Again, man would have been predestined even if he had not sinned: and yet no misery would have been taken away from him.

§ 33. 2. Moreover it is asked, whether it is understood of the misery of fault or of the misery of punishment, or both? And it seems that it is of the misery of fault: because it used to be said that predestination necessarily posits final grace, but this relieves only fault and not punishment. But on the contrary: Grace and glory remove punishment and fault: but predestination is the preparation of grace and of glory in the future: therefore it seems that it is understood of both miseries.

§ 34. In the same way it is objected concerning the following, that "predestination is the destination of someone to an end." 1. For if the end unto which the destination is directed is posited there, it necessarily presupposes the principle of the same destination, and the medium through which the destination is: what therefore are those?

§ 35. 2. Again, since to destine is equivocal to proposing and sending, it seems rather to be taken for proposing, than for sending. PROOF: For no one is sent except he who is: but he who is not is predestined: therefore to predestine is not to destine someone, but rather to destine something beforehand in purpose, just as it is said, 2 Maccabees 6:20, concerning Eleazar, that he destined not to admit illicit things for the love of life . This also seems so through John Damascene, where he calls predestination predetermination but predetermination belongs rather to one premeditating than to one pre-sending someone into something.

§ 36. 3. Again, if predestination were the destination of someone into something else, it would not be called the preparation of grace and glory: because grace and glory are not directed to something: but rather it would be called the preparation of the Angel or man who is directed.

§ 37. Finally it is also objected against the last one: because 1. Present grace and glory in the future denote something in time, whereas predestination denotes nothing in time.

§ 38. 2. Again, Damascene says that providence and predestination are of those things which are not in us, or in our power but glory in some way is in our power through grace, for it falls under merit, which is in our power: therefore it seems that predestination is not of grace and glory?

§ 39. Moreover, since there is a single definition for a single thing, it is asked: According to what are the assigned definitions taken?

§ 40. SOLUTION. It must be said that predestination is defined as to something of itself in all those definitions: and because there are many things in it, therefore many definitions are given. For predestination can be defined in itself, or according to some state of being predestined. If in itself: then it has in itself a remote genus, and the coarctation of that genus through the act of the operating cause, and its effects. Or also the name of predestination can be attended to. I say therefore that the first is given through the remote genus which is foreknowledge, and is contracted through the act of the operating cause, and the proximate effect which is the benefits most certainly liberating. The second, however, considers only the act of the operating cause and the effect. But the last considers the proximate and remote effect, which is effected mediatingly by another: because grace in some way effects glory. But the third is given according to the state of the predestined person who is in misery, such as man after sin. The fourth is the reason explaining the name of predestination. And through this the solution to the last objection is evident.

§ 41. To the first, however, it must be said that although predestination does not denote an effect in the creature, yet by the mode of signifying it adds something above foreknowledge: because foreknowledge of itself does not posit causality toward the foreknown, but preparation denotes the sufficiency of causality toward the act and effect.

§ 42. To another it must be said, that predestination is not properly except of grace, and of glory, and other things are indirectly operating toward liberation, such as by satisfying, or humiliating, or merely rendering: but grace directly works liberation, which makes one worthy of eternal life, and directs into the kingdom: hence also other benefits are common to

the predestined and the non-predestined, but not final sanctifying grace: and therefore it is evident that this is the effect of predestination.

§ 43. To another it must be said, that predestination does not compel to virtue, but nevertheless it finally produces it in the one freely accepting and willing: because although he is not forced to accept it, yet it will inevitably incline the will to accept it.

§ 44. To another it must be said, that in foreknowledge and predestination there is not the certitude of demonstration: because they are not causes through which salvation can be inferred by necessity of the reality, but by necessity of consequence only, as we said above concerning the infallibility of divine foreknowledge, and again it will be shown below, when it is asked concerning the certitude of the number of the predestined.

§ 45. To that which is objected concerning the second definition, it must be said that it is otherwise in a created artisan, and the uncreated artisan: because the created artisan does not produce matter, but only prepares it, receiving it from outside. But God both produces that which is necessary for the work, and operates by preparing in it. For there are three things, namely art, nature, and God. Art operates upon matter by impressing the species of art, not by giving to matter a conservative power of the form which it impresses, as is evident in the figure of carving, which the stone retains not from a power that it receives from the artisan, but by the power which it has from nature. But nature gives the form and things conserving the form: for when the generator gives the form and by transmuting the matter from the form which it previously had, and from the accidents and powers which it previously had, by giving the form, it gives all the accidents to the composite from that form which conserve the form in matter. But God does the whole, and matter, and form, and properties: and therefore sufficient preparation is in Him alone knowing, being able, and willing even before He acts: but it is not so in matter, and still less in art: hence the simile which was brought forward as a simile was not similar.

§ 46. To another it must be said, that some say with Damascene, that predestination per se is only of grace, and of glory consequently, and not primarily, because it is given to our work which is in our power. But it can better be said, that Damascene speaks truly: but then predestination is of three things, namely of grace, and merit, and glory. And grace indeed is not in our power, such that it is from us according to what it is, although we can work something toward it, namely by doing what is in us. But merit is not in our power insofar as it is meritorious, because this is from grace: but nevertheless it is from our power in another way, namely because the meritorious act is from us: for free choice gives the act, and grace informs it. But glory is not in our power according as it is abundant beyond merit: for it is related to that which is in our power, by the fact that it is given to meritorious acts: and this is not in all, because in infants the effect of predestination is not work, but grace and glory only.

§ 47. To that which is objected concerning the third, it must be said, that it can well be said that this definition regards the state from the side of the predestined, which God foresees: and that by this definition predestination does not apply to all the predestined, but only to fallen man. Or if we wish to extend predestination generally, then we say that misery in the defini-

tion does not regard a misery that is in the predestined, but which would be if there were not the effect of predestination: for mercy precedes by showing mercy, lest he fall into misery: and with this misery an Angel would be miserable and also human nature assumed in Christ, if it were separated from the grace of union, or had not then been assumed: and the definition has no doubt.

§ 48. TO THE LAST which is objected against that definition, it must be said that it can well be understood of both miseries according to order, so that first fault is removed through grace, and punishment through glory.

§ 49. To that which is objected against the following definition, it must be said that in truth the end of destination, and the medium, and the principle are there. But the principle is the purpose, and the preparation of grace is as it were the medium which is set out in the course that is in time, and glory is as the end: and therefore this destination begins from eternity, and is directed through the time of the whole course, again into eternity.

§ 50. To another it must be said, that destination is understood to fall into the ratio of predestination in both ways. In one way by reason of the purpose of the one destining, and in another way by reason of the direction. To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that although no one is destined except him who is, nevertheless he who is not in his proper nature can be predestined, although he is in God's knowledge: because the preposition compounded with the verb notes the precedence of eternity to time.

§ 51. To another it must be said, that preparation is understood in both: but God prepares by electing those whom He directs, and He prepares for them the goods by which they become fit for direction: however, the effect of grace and glory alone is expressed, because those denote the medium and end of the direction, which predestination, signified in the abstract, imports.

§ 52. To that which is objected against the last definition, it must be said that the preparation of grace and glory does not posit grace and glory according to act, but only from the side of the preparer: and therefore it does not follow that predestination has anything from time.

§ 53. To another the solution is evident through the aforesaid.

Articulus 4 — Whether Predestination Is Of Being Or Of Non-Being

Whether predestination is of a being, or of a non-being?

§ 54. Thirdly it is asked, Whether predestination is of a being, or of a non-being?

§ 55. But it seems, that it is of a being: because 1. It is said, Romans 1:4: "Who was predestinated the Son of God in power." There Origen posits such a text: "Who was predestinated in power": and he says upon that in the Gloss: "Destination is of him who is" . Therefore it seems that predestination is of a being.

§ 56. 2. Again, predestination is preparation: but preparation is of a being: therefore also predestination.

§ 57. 3. Again, election is, when two things are proposed, the pre-opting of one, as Damascene wills therefore election is of a being: therefore also predestination: because predestination is only of the elect.

§ 58. 4. Again, predestination is only of what is known: but what is known is a being: therefore predestination also is of a being.

§ 59. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Ephesians 1:4: "He chose us in him before the foundation of the world": but before the foundation of the world we were not: therefore predestination does not seem to be of a being.

§ 60. 2. Again, predestination is eternal: but the predestined are not from eternity: therefore, etc.

§ 61. 3. Again, it was held above from Augustine, that they are elected who are not: neither does he who elects err, nor did he elect vainly: therefore it seems that it is not of a being.

§ 62. SOLUTION. It must be said that predestination, as predestination, is not of a being simply, but of a being in a qualified sense, that is, in divine knowledge, as has been frequently expounded.

§ 63. TO THE FIRST, however, it must be said that predestination indeed is only of a being: but predestination denotes an order of precedence to the predestined one, and therefore it can be of a non-being: and Origen does not contradict this. But if you say that he takes destination and predestination for the same thing: then I respond, that destination thus written does not posit a being simply, but in a qualified sense in divine knowledge.

§ 64. To another it must be said, that preparation is not posited here except according to habit with respect to the sufficiency of the preparer, and not with respect to the act which posits grace in the creature.

§ 65. To another it must be said, that election does not posit here except those existing in a qualified sense, namely in the knowledge of the elector: and pre-opting is of those whom He knows will receive grace well, and will use it well: yet they are not posited to be absolutely.

§ 66. To another it must be said, that the known in us posits a being prior in nature or in time: but in God it is conversely: because His knowledge does not depend on a being as on a cause, but rather conversely a being depends on it, because it is caused by it.

Articulus 5 — Whether Predestination Is Eternal Or Temporal; And, Whether It Puts Something In Time In The Predestined

Whether predestination is eternal or temporal? And, whether it posits anything in time in the predestined?

§ 67. Fourthly it is asked, Whether it is eternal, or temporal?

§ 68. But it seems to be eternal: because 1. It is a species of foreknowledge: therefore since foreknowledge is eternal, predestination itself will also be eternal.

§ 69. 2. Again, it has been proved that it itself is God predestining: but nothing is God except what is eternal: therefore predestination is eternal.

§ 70. 3. Again, the purpose of having mercy denotes only what is eternal: therefore since predestination denotes the purpose of having mercy, it will be eternal.

§ 71. ON THE CONTRARY: Nothing eternal is defined through what is temporal: predestination is defined through what is temporal, because through grace and glory: therefore it is not purely eternal.

§ 72. Next to this it is asked, Whether it posits anything in time in the predestined?

§ 73. But it seems that it does: because, on John 1:47 et seq., the Gloss says that it was better for Nathanael to know both natures in Christ, than to be predestined . Since therefore the comparison is between univocal goods, and the knowledge of the two natures in Christ was a temporal good, it seems that it posits something temporal in the predestined.

§ 74. Again, it seems false what the Gloss says, because even a wicked and damned person can know both natures in Christ: therefore since predestination is only of those to be saved, as is held in the Letter [of Lombard], predestination seems to be something better than the knowledge of the two natures in Christ. If perhaps you say, that this is so, because predestination posits nothing in the predestined, whereas knowledge posits something. Against: According to this there can be no comparison: because of that which is not, there is no comparison to that which is.

§ 75. Again, at least it posits final grace: and that is something, and is better than the knowledge of the two natures in Christ.

§ 76. SOLUTION. It must be said that predestination posits nothing in the predestined for the present, but leaves final grace as an effect: yet it always denotes a respect to the predestined, although it does not necessarily connote an effect for the present: and therefore of itself it is eternal, and not temporal: for the effect, which is grace and glory, falls obliquely in the definition of predestination, and they are nothing of the essence of predestination, although they are those things toward which its respect of causality is noted.

§ 77. And through this the solution to the objection is already evident: because an eternal thing denoting a respect to a creature can well be defined through that creature, provided that it falls obliquely in its definition.

§ 78. To that which is further asked, it must be said that it posits nothing of itself in the creature, nor does it posit the predestined creature to be, but nevertheless it denotes a respect toward it.

§ 79. To this, however, which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that according to the intention of the Gloss two things are compared to a third taken per se, and this according to state, and not according to personal grace or personal good: for predestination runs in the Old Law, and the Law of Grace, or the Law of Christ: but the knowledge of the two natures in Christ through the presence of the Redeemer, was only in the New Law: and therefore the knowledge of the natures does not exclude predestination, but rather leads to it through the

effect of grace: and therefore comparison is made of the grace of the New Law, which shows the grace to which we are predestined, to the state in which we were nothing but predestined to grace, and did not possess it, that is, the grace of redemption, through which our grace is worth whatever it can be worth, as the Master says in III Sentences . And thus the Gloss is clear.

§ 80. And through this the solution to the following objections is also evident.

Articulus 6 — Whether Predestination Belongs to the Rational Creature Alone, or Also to Another

Whether predestination is of the rational creature alone, or also of another?

§ 81. Fifthly it is asked, Whether it is of the rational creature alone, or also of another?

§ 82. But it seems that it is also of another: because 1. This is said in the Letter [of Lombard] at the beginning of the reading, that predestination is of saving goods, such as are virtues, and grace, and glory, which are not rational creatures.

§ 83. 2. Again, Augustine says that punishments are predestined for the wicked: therefore it seems to be of the good and the bad, the rational and the irrational.

§ 84. ON THE CONTRARY: Nothing is destined except a rational creature: therefore it seems that neither is anything predestined except it.

§ 85. Again, it seems that there is no predestination to glory: because he who is predestined is always predestined: but it is certain that he who is destined to something, when he is in it, is no longer predestined, just as the Saints existing in glory do not have any further end to which they may be destined: therefore if glory were their ultimate end, they would not be predestined when they are already glorified, which is false, because they are always predestined: therefore it seems that predestination is not.

§ 86. SOLUTION. It must be said to the first, that predestination is taken in two ways, namely commonly, and properly. Commonly it denotes the foresight and preparation of a mansion only, not determining this mansion or that: and thus punishments are said to be predestined for the wicked. Properly it denotes the foresight and preparation of a mansion, and the cause of the mansion, just as grace is the cause of the mansion. Hence Augustine upon that, "I go to prepare a place for you" says that He predestined the mansions. But in this way it is still taken in two ways. For predestination is spoken of as of whom, or who is predestined: and it is spoken of as through what, and as toward what. In the first way it is only of the rational creature. In the second way it is of the goods by which the rational creature is liberated, and toward which it is directed. And through this the solution to the first part of the question is evident.

§ 87. To another it must be said, that predestined can be taken participially and nominally. If participially: then even with glory already obtained someone is truly said to be predestined, because concerning the past it will be true to say that God predestined him. But if it is taken nominally, and is as it were a verbal noun: then still the glory which he obtains can be

considered in two ways, namely in itself according as it is the end of predestination: and thus he will not quite properly be called still predestined. Also, the continuation of glory and its immensity from the side of the object in which glory is can be considered, which cannot be finished: and thus the blessed continually enter glory, and can still be called predestined.

§ 88. And through this the solution to the following part of the question is evident.

Articulus 7 — Whether Predestination Is of Every Rational Creature, or of Man Only; And, Whether Christ Is Predestined

Whether predestination is of every rational creature, or of man alone? And, whether Christ is predestined?

§ 89. Sixthly it is asked, Whether it is of every rational creature, or only of man?

§ 90. And it seems that it is not of the Angels: because 1. Predestination is the preparation of grace in the present and of glory in the future: but in the Angels, according to some, grace did not precede glory: therefore it seems that they were not predestined.

§ 91. 2. Again, if predestination is the purpose of having mercy, it seems not to befit the Angels, in whom either misery never was, or if it is in them, it is irremediable, as in the demons.

§ 92. 3. Again, to be destined belongs to one who is distant: but one distant as to the act of contemplation is only one using a mirror and an enigma but an Angel does not use a mirror and an enigma, but sees face to face: therefore neither does the name of predestination befit him, as it seems.

§ 93. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. No sanctifying grace is possessed by a rational creature which is not prepared and foreseen by God: since therefore the standing Angels received grace, it was prepared and foreseen for them: and these two fall under another predestination: therefore they are predestined, as it seems.

§ 94. 2. Again, no one receives the mansion of beatitude for whom the mansion itself is not foreseen and prepared: therefore since an Angel received the mansion, it was prepared and foreseen for him: therefore he was predestined to it from eternity, as it seems.

§ 1. Further, it is asked next to this, Whether Christ is predestined?

§ 2. It seems that he is: According to Romans 1:4: Who was predestined the Son of God in power, according to the spirit of sanctification, by the resurrection of our Lord Jesus Christ from the dead.[113] Moreover, Augustine and Ambrose say this. Moreover, Origen says in the same place, "He is destined who is." Therefore it seems that not only was he predestined, but also that predestination, which was from eternity, belongs to the person.

§ 3. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. To the eternal, no antecession [i.e., priority or preceding] can be noted: the Son of God is from eternity: therefore with respect to himself no antecession can be noted. But predestination notes an antecession to the one predestined: therefore it does not belong to the Son of God. If perhaps you say that it belongs to him as to his human nature

which was not from eternity: this seems to be nothing: because predestination properly belongs to the person, and not to the nature: hence we say that Peter and Paul are predestined, not their souls or bodies.

§ 4. Furthermore, Augustine expounds this concerning the person, and not the nature.

§ 5. 2. Also, let it even be granted that it is understood concerning the nature, it still seems not to belong to him: because in Book III of the Sentences it is said that grace was natural to that man: therefore it seems that the nature had no antecession to grace, neither in order nor in time: therefore he was not destined to grace.

§ 6. 3. Also, He was always a comprehensor [i.e., one who has attained the beatific vision]: therefore he was always full of glory: therefore he was never destined unto it.

§ 7. Solution. It must be said that predestination belongs to every rational creature, both of men and of Angels, and it is also of Christ the man insofar as he is a man; such that a distribution is made for the genera of individuals, not for the individuals of genera. But this I well concede, that a rational creature is not related to predestination in only one way: rather, man has the antecession of eternity to his person and nature, and an order of nature to grace, and a state of the way [i.e., earthly pilgrimage] progressing in grace to glory. The Angel, however, indeed has an antecession of eternity to his person and nature, and an order of nature to grace —according to some in nature only, according to some also in time—but did not have the distance of a way from grace to glory: though according to some he did have the distance of a way from confirmation, which was the complement of glory and the perfection of beatitude. Christ, however, did not have the antecession of eternity to his person, but to one of his natures, nor an antecession of nature to the grace of union or to the habit of his soul, nor even a distance of a way between grace and the glory of his soul in himself, but only in his members: in himself, however, he had the distance of a way between grace and the glory of his body. And thus it is clear how the things that pertain to predestination are found by priority and posteriority in the predestined man, the Angel, and Christ.

§ 8. To the first, therefore, it must be said that grace in the Angels, according to all, preceded glory as to confirmation, although not as to the habit of glory.

§ 9. To the next it must be said that mercy preserving from misery is saved in the Angels and in man according to the first state, as was said above.

§ 10. To the next it must be said that distance is manifold, namely in the mode of contemplation and in the way of progressing to beatitude. In the first way he had no distance, but in the second way he did, if beatitude or a part of beatitude is called confirmation.

§ 11. To that which is further asked concerning Christ, it must be said that predestination belongs to the person in the nature, and not according to himself: and thus all the sayings are saved, namely of Origen, Ambrose, and Augustine: because then it is with respect to the person, and it belongs to him with respect to the person to be destined into nature and grace simultaneously and glory. However, it does not belong to him to be so predestined [in him-

113. 1 Timothy 2:4.

self]: but with respect to the nature alone it belongs to him to be predestined into the grace of union: whereas with respect to the person in the nature it belongs to him, as Augustine says, to be preordained into the grace of reconciliation, so that the preordination is referred to the person, not as the grace of the person, but as the grace of the nature.

§ 12. To THE OBJECTIONS, however, it must be said that although predestination is of the person, nevertheless it is not necessary that the grace of the person belong to him, but rather the grace of the nature.

§ 13. To the next it must be said that grace is said to be natural to that man, not because it is his nature, but because it is for his being a person: hence predestination also properly refers to the supposit of the man insofar as he is this man.

§ 14. To the next it must be said that although there was no distance of a way for grace from the habit of glory, there was nevertheless in some respect in the body and in the soul: and in the body as to the glory of the body, while in the soul as to the fact that before death he co-suffered with the body, whereas after the resurrection he did not: and in Book III of the Sentences the Master says that Christ merited for himself impassibility in the soul and immortality in the body.

Articulus 8 — Whether Predestination Is of All Men, or Only of Certain Ones

Whether predestination is of all men, or only of some?

§ 16. Seventhly it is asked, Whether predestination is of all men, or only of some?

§ 17. It seems, moreover, that it is of all: because 1. The Apostle says, 1 Timothy 2:4: Who wills all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of his name. Therefore he prepared grace and glory for all: because preparation (as was held earlier) is only from the will of the one preparing.

§ 18. 2. Also, Anselm says that there is no cause why certain ones do not have grace, because God was unwilling to give it: but rather, because while he extends it, they are unwilling to receive it: therefore it seems that, on his part, he prepared it equally for all.

§ 19. 3. Also, James 1:5: If any of you lacks wisdom, let him ask of God, who gives to all abundantly, and does not reproach. Therefore he is prepared to give to all. Also, to the Romans 10:12: The same is Lord over all, rich unto all who call upon him.

§ 20. 4. Also, the Eternal, as Anselm says, encloses within itself all time and all things that are in time: just as the present time encloses in itself every place, and all things that are in place: therefore it relates equally to all temporal things: since therefore predestination is eternal, it seems that it relates equally to all.

§ 21. 5. Also, Dionysius says, and also the Philosopher, that the first relates equally to all things: but not all things relate equally to it.

§ 22. 6. Also, Apocalypse 3:20: Behold, I stand at the door and knock. Therefore it seems that he prepared for all.

§ 23. ON THE CONTRARY: Many are called, but few are chosen. Since therefore election belongs to the one predestining, he rejects some, and predestines others.

§ 24. Also, Baruch 3:27: These the Lord did not choose.

§ 25. Also, Malachi 1:2 and 3: Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated. And here many things can be adduced concerning this.

§ 26. Solution. It must be said that predestination is not of all, but only of some, namely of those prepared for grace and glory. What the reason for this is, must be determined in the following distinction, where it will be asked, Whether predestination has any cause?

§ 27. To THE FIRST, therefore, it must be said that according to Damascene, this is understood concerning the antecedent will, and not the consequent. For the antecedent will is that which does not have a relation to, nor posits an effect toward our cause, that is, toward our merits: for the will considered thus produces nothing except toward salvation. But the consequent will is that which is from our cause, according to which, by foreseeing malice, he reprobates some, and elects others, that they might use grace well.

§ 28. To the next it must be said that this is true with respect to him: because otherwise we would not be culpable for not receiving grace: but predestination does not signify only the will to give, but also the preparation of grace for those whom he foresaw will wish to receive it: hence it signifies a relation to the receiver. Therefore, although the will of the giver is one with respect to all, nevertheless his relation to the receiver and the non-receiver is not one, and predestination names this relation. It is clear, therefore, that predestination does not relate in only one way.

§ 29. To the next it must be said that this authority speaks of the apposition of grace in the present: for that is denied to no one congruously asking for it.

§ 30. To the next it must be said that this is true of eternal things which are taken as eternity is a measure excelling all time: but it is not true of eternal things related to certain temporal things: and predestination signifies such an eternal thing, and therefore it is not related in one way to all.

§ 31. To the next it must be said in the same way, that when a relation is not adjoined, the first is related in one way to all things: but if a relation to this or that, in this way or that way, is adjoined, it is not true: and the same mode of solving applies to the following points.

Articulus 9 — Whether Predestination Is Multiplied According to Individual Predestined Persons, or All the Predestined Are in One

Whether predestination is multiplied according to the individual predestined persons, or are all the predestined in one?

§ 33. Eighthly and lastly it is asked, Whether predestination is multiplied according to the individual predestined persons, or are all the predestined in one?

§ 34. It seems, moreover, that we are all predestined in Christ: because 1. The Apostle says to the Ephesians 1:4, that he chose us in him, that is in Christ, before the foundation of the world: since therefore election belongs to predestination, it seems that he predestined us in him.

§ 35. 2. Also, to the Ephesians 1:10, he says that in him he restored the things that are in the heavens and the things that are on earth: and he restored nothing which he did not foresee and prepare from eternity: therefore it seems that he also predestined in him all the things restored: but all the predestined are restored: therefore all the predestined are in him, as it seems.

§ 36. ON THE CONTRARY: Predestination is the preparation of grace, etc.: but by one preparation Christ and Peter are not prepared: therefore neither is there one predestination. But concerning this it has been sufficiently said elsewhere, namely in Book III of the Sentences.

§ 37. Solution. It must be said that we are not predestined in Christ absolutely, but as to something: for there is formally gratifying grace, and as to this we are not predestined in Christ: because our grace was never essentially in Christ. There is also the grace expediting our grace to act with respect to the fact that it can avail us, and as to this we are predestined in Christ: because, as the Master says in Book III of the Sentences, our penance would not avail us, nor our works, unless Christ had satisfied for us: and thus the inducted authorities are understood: and through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 10 — Whether Predestination Can Be without Foreknowledge; And, Why Reprobation Is Rather Called Foreknowledge than Predestination

Can predestination be without foreknowledge? and, Why is reprobation called foreknowledge rather than predestination?

§ 39. Next it is asked concerning those things which are said in the Letter of the first chapter, A, where it says: That it cannot be without foreknowledge, etc.

§ 40. For this seems to be false: because they are species of knowledge divided by opposition, in that foreknowledge is said to be of evil things, but predestination of good things.

§ 41. FURTHERMORE I ask, Why did reprobation retain the name of the genus rather than predestination?

§ 42. Solution. To this it must be said that here in the Letter, foreknowledge is taken as a genus to predestination and to foreknowledge strictly accepted: and thus it is true that predestination is not without foreknowledge.

§ 43. To the next it must be said that reprobation with respect to foreseen iniquity does not signify any causality or effect in God: but predestination adds this, and the notion by the added difference contracts the genus: but reprobation does not, and therefore it retains the name of the genus.

§ 44. And if you object that it adds causality to punishment, it must be said that punishment is not prepared from the will in the same way as glory: rather it is prepared by respect to our work, and God does not will it except by a consequent will.

Articulus 11 — Whether Both the Counting Number and the Counted Number of the Elect Are Certain; And, Whether One Written in the Book of Life Can Be Blotted Out from It

Whether both the numbering number and the numbered number of the elect are certain? and, Whether one written in the book of life can be deleted from it?

§ 46. Next it is asked concerning this which he says in the second chapter B: None of the predestined seems able to be damned.

§ 47. For there he touches upon the number of the elect, concerning which it must first be asked, Whether both the numbering number [i.e., God's knowledge] and the numbered number [i.e., the individuals themselves] of the elect is certain? Secondly, By what certainty is it certain? Thirdly, Whether one can take the crown of another? because he seems to say this in the Letter.

§ 48. To THE FIRST one proceeds thus: 1. Upon that passage of Luke 5:6: Their net was breaking, the Gloss says: Not as many enter from the Jews, as are predestined to life. Therefore it seems that the numbering number and the numbered number can be diminished. Therefore by the same reason it can also be increased.

§ 49. 2. Also, Deuteronomy 1:11: May the Lord add to this number many thousands. The Gloss there says, To this number, namely the one pre-defined in the knowledge of God, by which he knows who are his. Therefore to that pre-defined number something can be added: therefore it seems that it is not certain.

§ 50. 3. Also, Job 34:24: He shall crush many, and innumerable ones, and shall make others to stand for them. The Gloss of Gregory there says: As some fall, others are allotted the place of life. Therefore it seems that at least the numbered number is not certain.

§ 51. 4. Also, Apocalypse 3:11, upon that text, Hold what you have, etc., the Gloss says: As some fall, others are sub-inducted into their place.

§ 52. 5. Also, Exodus 32:31 and 32: Either forgive them this trespass, or if you do not, delete me from your book which you have written. Therefore someone is deletable from the number of the predestined: therefore the number can be changed.

§ 53. 6. Also by reason the same is proven thus: Posit any designated number you wish, and let one of them be existing now: either he is of free will or not. If not: then he cannot merit, nor demerit: therefore he will not be in the kingdom of heaven on account of merit: therefore he is not of the number of the predestined, and this is contrary to the premise. If, however, he is in a state of flexible free will: therefore he can transgress. Let him transgress therefore, since when a possible is posited nothing impossible follows: and if he transgresses, it is possible for him to die in such a state. Let him die therefore, still nothing impossible ought to follow: but then it follows that the number of the predestined is diminished: therefore it is possible for the number of the predestined to be diminished.

§ 54. 7. In entirely the same way it is proven that it is possible for it to be increased. Let someone from those who are not included in that number be posited to exist now: he has free will: therefore he can do what is in him: and by doing this, God will inevitably give him grace.

Let us posit therefore that he dies in that grace: it is established that he will be saved: therefore the number of the predestined can be increased.

§ 55. ON THE CONTRARY: There is nothing of all future things which, according to number and species and matter and supposit, God ignores: therefore he himself knows how many and who will be saved: therefore it is impossible that an addition or subtraction could finally be made to the number of those to be saved: therefore it is impossible for anything to be added or subtracted to the number of the predestined.

§ 56. FURTHERMORE, let us inquire concerning the reasoning of certain ones saying that an addition or subtraction cannot be made to the number by which God numbers the predestined, but rather to the numbered number: for they say that God numbers more and fewer without variation of himself in the same way that a unit numbers a greater or lesser multitude, according to what the Philosopher says generally, that number is a multitude measured by one.

§ 57. But this seems impossible: because 1. It is absurd to attribute fallible and imperfect knowledge to God, and that knowledge is imperfect which does not know all things even in their proper supposits, by which things are distinguished from one another: therefore God already knows personally all who are to be saved.

§ 58. 2. Also, Whatever he knows is infallible, as was held in the preceding questions: therefore it is impossible for addition and subtraction to be made to it, and thus the numbering and numbered number is certain to him, even regarding the persons.

§ 59. Solution. Without prejudice I think it must be said that the number before God is certain in both ways: namely both formally according to discrete quantity, and materially as to the supposits of those who are numbered: because otherwise divine knowledge would be fallible and imperfect. And I say that just as he is certain in two ways as to the number, so too he is certain in two ways as to the one numbering: because in predestination there are two things, namely the knowledge of so many, and the will of so many: and the will looks to something in our work, because he wills as many as will make good use of the grace to be given by him, and no more: and if more were to make good use of grace, then from eternity he would have willed more, and now he would will more.

§ 60. Therefore to the first it must be said that that Gloss is understood of a specific case, and not universally: and the sense is: Not as many enter from the Jews then, that is, in the primitive Church, as are the Jews to be saved universally in the whole time of the world: because many will enter at the end of times, when they will see themselves deceived by the Antichrist.

§ 61. To the next it must be said that that Gloss is understood concerning the pre-definition of present justice: for that number is certain, and yet it is increased, and it is diminished from day to day: because there can be more and fewer: although even that is certain to God.

§ 62. To the next it must be said that Gregory speaks of present justice, which makes a place of life, not absolutely, but as to the condition of the state as it is now.

§ 63. To the next it must be said that this is also understood concerning the crown of temporal justice: but below this will be more fully inquired into.

§ 64. To the next it must be said that it is not so understood that someone who is inscribed by the provision of final grace should be deleted from the book: but Moses was speaking from an impossible supposition. As if he were to say: Just as it is impossible that you delete me, so it is impossible that you do not forgive the trespass: or he said this concerning the election of glory which is owed to a leader, which would not be had if he had not been the leader of the people: and not concerning election absolutely.

§ 65. To that which is objected through reason, it has already been frequently answered: because if you posit any predestined person now, I say that it is possible for him to sin and to die in sin: but if he were to die thus, he never was predestined; for these two are possible: a predestined person can sin, and a predestined person can die in sin. However, these two are impossible: this person is predestined, and he died in sin: just as these two are: this person dies without final grace, and he was foreseen to die in final grace. Hence when it is said, "A predestined person can die in sin," it is conceded on account of the power of free will: but nevertheless this power can never be reduced to act: because then contradictories would be verified simultaneously, namely "this person is foreseen to die in grace finally" and "this person is not foreseen to die in grace finally": because God foresees whatever happens: and through this the solution to the following argument is clear, because it is similar to this one.

§ 66. To that which is further asked concerning that opinion, it must be said that if it is correctly understood, it is true: for it calls the one number the divine foreknowledge preparing grace: and this indeed is one, and does not receive variation from the things themselves which are predestined, nor is it properly iterated in all the predestined: but rather the predestined are referred to him thus numbering through various effects of grace. Nevertheless, because that number does not signify the divine essence absolutely, but according to the signification of preparing knowledge, and this posits a respect to the thing: if the thing is always taken under that respect, it is impossible for that numbered number not to be certain: but if the numbered thing is considered in itself, then it can be of the number, and it can not be, on account of the flexibility of free will. It is not, however, so understood that the knowledge of God should pass over someone to be saved, and that he not be saved.

§ 67. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 12 — With What Certainty the Number of the Elect Is Certain

By what certainty is the number of the elect certain?

§ 69. Secondly it is asked, By what certainty is the number of the elect certain?

§ 70. 1. For certainty is a species of truth which is immutability or necessity in truth: but all truth is the truth of a thing: therefore it seems that if the number of the elect is certain, it is certain by the certainty of the thing, that is, by the quantity of those to be saved.

§ 71. 2. Also, we see the truth of a thing, and we see the truth of a sign: and we see that the truth of a sign is from the truth of the thing, and the necessity of the sign is from the necessity

of the thing: and we use the term "thing" generally, according to how it is in simple and composite things: just as the Philosopher also says, From the fact that a thing is or is not, speech is true or false: and he calls the being and non-being that of composition or division. Since therefore knowledge is the assimilation of the understood thing, the truth of knowledge will seem to follow the truth of the thing: therefore both certainty and necessity follow the necessity of the thing, and contingency follows contingency, as it seems.

§ 72. 3. Also, when it is said, "God's knowledge or predestination is true": it is understood either concerning the truth of the thing, or concerning the truth of the sign. It seems that it is not concerning the truth of the thing: because the truth of a thing is not referred further to signify something else, nor is it properly about another. But when we say, "God's knowledge is certain," or "God's predestination is true," that is referred to a thing further on: therefore it has the truth of a sign, and not the truth of a thing. From this I argue further: The truth of a sign, in its genus and species of truth, follows the truth of the thing: the truth of predestination is the truth of a sign: therefore it follows the truth of the thing in its genus and species of truth. If this is granted. On the contrary: The thing itself is entirely contingent: because it is entirely under free will. Proof: Because this entire universal which is contingent in its singular particulars by whose grace the predicate is attributed to it, is also contingent in the universal: but this universal proposition, "all the predestined are to be saved," is contingent in its singular particulars, and by the grace of the singulars the predicate is rendered: therefore the universal itself is contingent: for this man and that man are contingently related to salvation, and again the attainment of salvation is participated in by singulars, and not in the universal by all, such that it is by none: therefore it seems that this entire proposition is contingent: "every predestined person will be saved." From this I argue further: No contingent number is certain: the number of the elect is contingent, as has been proven: therefore it is not certain by any certainty.

§ 73. Solution. It must be said without prejudice that the number of the elect is certain by a certain certainty of immobility or a kind of necessity, which above we called consequent or respective necessity: because the reasoning is the same here, and in the case of the foreknown.

§ 74. To that, however, which is asked, By what certainty is predestination certain? I say that just as in the case of foreknowledge, so also of predestination there is a certainty in some respect having agreement with the certainty of a principle. This can be seen as follows: God's predestination is the cause of grace in free will, and God's foreknowledge is in some way a cause: and because each is an eternal cause, it is necessary that it be immobile. But because the effect is temporal, therefore it cannot take on the properties of the cause: and therefore the cause remains necessary, and the effect contingent. Therefore, as to the fact that it is a cause, it has the truth of a principle: but as to the relation of the contingent effect to it, it has a similitude with the truth of a sign, because it does not infer except from a supposition: just as when a sign is posited the signified is posited, and when the signified is posited insofar as it is such, the sign is inferred, and not absolutely. Hence it must be said that it is otherwise in knowledge caused by a thing, and in knowledge which is the cause of a thing: because in knowledge caused by a thing, the knowledge receives its truth from the thing, and the species

of truth which is contingency or necessity: hence it can also sometimes not receive the species, although it receives the genus of truth, because that which is necessary can be known contingently. But the knowledge which is the cause of a thing receives nothing from the thing, but the thing receives from the knowledge: and it receives indeed truth, but not the species of truth, because God knows temporal and mutable and contingent things immaterially and in a necessary mode: and therefore those inducted reasons do not diminish the certainty on the part of God predestining, but they show that each of the predestined in himself is contingently related to being predestined, and to being of the number of the elect.

§ 75. To that, however, which is objected, that the truth of knowledge is referred to the thing, it must be said that this is true: but it is referred as to that about which it is, not from which it is as from a cause: and therefore it does not follow the species of the truth of the thing: and if it is said to be a sign, this will not be absolutely, but as to an agreement with a sign: because when posited it posits the thing, on account of the relation of the knower to the known, because in all things the knowledge and the knowable have some proportion, whatever that might be. And through this the response to the whole can be clear.

Articulus 13 — How This Authority Ought To Be Understood Where It Is Said, "Hold What You Have, Lest Another Take Your Crown"

How ought this authority to be understood which says, Hold what you have, lest another take your crown?

§ 77. Thirdly, It is asked concerning this which he says at the beginning of chapter B, Hold what you have, lest another take your crown.

§ 78. From this Augustine argues that the number of the elect is certain, saying: If another does not take it unless this one loses it, the number of the elect is certain. But according to this it seems that only the numbering number is certain, and not the numbered number: and this is contrary to what has been said, because thus God would have imperfect knowledge.

§ 79. Furthermore, the same difficulty arises concerning one and concerning all: for either God is certain in his knowledge concerning this predestined person, that he knows whether he will be saved, or not. If not: then he is ignorant of some future things: because one or the other of them is immutably future, that he will be saved, or he will be damned. But if he is certain, since the reason is the same concerning anyone, the premise is concluded, that he has certain the numbered number of those to be saved: and thus what Augustine says seems to be nothing.

§ 80. Also, it is understood either concerning the crown of present justice, or concerning the crown of final justice. And in the first way: this does not seem to be so: because that [present justice] is destroyed on account of a subsequent sin, and is not given to another: for when present justice is dead, there is no crown of it. But if concerning the crown of final justice: this seems even less so: because that is not given except to him who merited it, and who was foreseen to have it: if therefore it is of this sort, no one is foreseen to have it except him: therefore it is not given to another.

§ 81. Solution. To this it can be said that Augustine quite congruously proves from that authority that both numbers are certain: and the sense is: If another does not take it, unless this one loses it, etc., that is, if this one does not lose it another will not take it: so that in this the possibility for loss is noted on the part of the predestined person, yet not loss according to act, according to how he stands under predestination: and similarly the possibility of taking it is noted on the part of the non-predestined person, but not the act of taking it, according to how he is under the relation of foreknowledge. For just as was said, both numbers are certain: but the Lord speaks of the possibility of free will according to how it is considered in its own faculty.

§ 82. To this, however, which is asked, Whether it is understood concerning the crown of present justice, or of the glory of beatitude? It must be said that either can quite probably be sustained; but it is commonly said that it is understood concerning the crown of present justice: and another takes this, while a work done by others of the mystical body avails him: and this one who sins, dies. But if concerning eternal...

[that another's] crown be received: this is understood thus, that another receives [it] while the saints and the blessed rejoice concerning this: because the Holy Spirit wrought such works through him, to whom nevertheless they ultimately contributed nothing: for thus the Saints will glory in eternity concerning every good work done in charity by anyone whatsoever.

Articulus 14 — Whether One Predestined Can Be Damned, and One Foreknown Saved

Whether the predestined can be damned, and the foreknown saved?

Then it is inquired concerning what he says there, B, § 2: To this, however, they object, etc.

For that objection seems not to be valid, nor even the solution which he later posits by distinguishing that it can be understood de re (of the thing) or de dicto (of the statement), when it is said, The predestined can be damned: because

§ 1. If whiteness were inseparable from some subject, we would not distinguish this [proposition], it is possible for a white thing to be black, on the basis that it could be de re or de dicto: just as we do not distinguish this [proposition], it is possible for a swan to be black: because whether it is de re or de dicto, it is always false. In the same way, since predestination is a form or relation inseparable from the predestined, the subject of predestination will never be in potency to a form contrary to predestination: but this is damnation: therefore it seems that this is impossible in every way, The predestined can be damned.

§ 2. Also, an eternal relation is disposed in the same way whether the thing to which it is directed exists or does not exist, and exists in sin or in grace: but predestination bespeaks an eternal relation, as was established: therefore that relation is immovable, however the thing may vary: but while that immovable relation exists, there can never be damnation: therefore it seems that it is impossible for any predestined person to be damned, whether it is taken de re or de dicto.

§ 3. Also, if this were possible: then it would be possible that the predestined become foreknown [i.e., to damnation]: therefore one foreseen for eternal life would be foreseen for eternal death: which can in no way be, because then there would be great deception in the divine foresight.

§ 4. Also, the Gloss seems to say this on Psalm 68:29: Let them be blotted out of the book of the living: where it says this: "This is not to be understood as if God writes someone whom He later blots out." Therefore, since no transmutation of foreknowledge occurs, it seems completely impossible both de re and de dicto that the predestined could be damned.

ON THE CONTRARY: The First Cause does not remove causality from any of the secondary causes: for we see with our own eyes that nature operates contingently, temporally, and materially, although God operates toward the same thing immutably and immaterially: therefore neither in the will does He remove the causality of the will: therefore the effect of damnation and salvation still depends on free choice: therefore it is not necessary that one or the other come to be determinately.

Solution. It must be said that predestination does not infer necessity, except that of a condition, as was previously established: for nothing prevents, as Boethius says, that something compared to diverse things has in itself possibility and necessity, not of the thing, but of consequence.

Hence to the first it must be said that predestination does not inhere absolutely in a thing, but in a thing compared to another: and besides, in the manner in which it inheres, it does not remove the potency for the contrary: because it does not remove the flexibility of free choice: but it is not so when it is said, a swan can be black. For that term, swan, expresses the subject equally and the cause for whiteness with an impossibility for the opposite, and leaves no potency for the opposite form.

To the next it must be said, that the eternal relation behaves in the same way: but the thing can behave toward it in many ways: and therefore, since the subject exists with the potency for the contrary, it has some possibility for the contrary.

To the next it must be said, that that objection proceeds in the composite sense: for it is well conceded, that one foreseen to be saved, insofar as he is such, will not be damned, otherwise foresight would be deceived.

To that which is objected concerning the Gloss, it must be said that God blots out no one. But nevertheless Scripture does not remove the possibility of damnation, as was said before.

Articulus 15 — What Is Understood by the Implicit Condition When It Is Said, "The Predestined Must Necessarily Be Saved"

What is understood by an implicit condition, when it is said, It is necessary that the predestined be saved?

Afterwards it is inquired concerning what he says there, B, around the middle: For the understanding of the implicit condition makes truth in the statement, and impossibility in the truth. For

what does he call an implicit condition? Also, it does not seem true what he says, because no truth is impossible: therefore nothing makes an impossibility in the truth.

Solution. To this it must be said, that by implicit condition he understands the hypothesis of predestination in the predestined, namely that predestination is always implied concerning this one: so that the proposition is de dicto, and not de re, when it is said, it is necessary that the predestined be saved: or, if this one is predestined, he will necessarily be saved: because then the understanding of this condition implying predestination concerning this one, and including the mode of necessity, makes truth in the statement (de dicto), that is, in that proposition, according to how it is de dicto, and not de re, and consequently it makes an impossibility in the truth, because it makes a truth impossible to be otherwise: and this is what he intends.

And through this the solution to the objection is evident.

Articulus 16 — Whether It Is Necessary That the Predestined Be Saved

Whether it is necessary that the predestined be saved?

Then it is inquired concerning what he says there, But they still insist, etc.

For the reasoning seems to be necessary: since § 1. The Philosopher says, that with a major premise of necessity, and a minor of absolute inherence (de inesse), a conclusion of necessity follows thus: Every A must necessarily be B: every C is A, or some C is A: therefore every C or some C must necessarily be B. Similarly this, Every predestined person must necessarily be saved: Peter is predestined: therefore Peter must necessarily be saved. If perchance it is said, that the Philosopher's statement is understood of simple inherence (de inesse simpliciter), and not of inherence as of now (de inesse ut nunc): for it does not follow, Every man must necessarily be an animal: some white thing is a man: therefore some white thing must necessarily be an animal: for here the minor is of inherence as of now. On the contrary: The minor is this, Peter is predestined: but this is true concerning the past: therefore it is necessary according to the thing, although the mode of necessity is not added: therefore it is of simple inherence, and not of inherence as of now, as it seems: therefore the conclusion follows, that Peter must necessarily be saved.

§ 2. Also, it is necessary that one who is presently predestined was always predestined and will always be predestined: someone is presently predestined: therefore he always was and will be predestined: but he who always was and is and will be predestined, cannot be damned: therefore he who is presently predestined, cannot be damned: therefore again the minor premise was of simple inherence: and thus the conclusion followed.

§ 3. Also, the solution that the Master posits in the Text does not seem to be a solution, namely that God now could, and can [do] whatever He could from eternity, and differences of time do not remove or add anything to His power: but He could from eternity not have predestined this one who is presently predestined: therefore He can also now bring it about that he was never predestined, and thus he who is presently predestined could have not been predestined, and can presently not be predestined: and if he can presently not be predestined, he can be damned: therefore he who is presently predestined, can be damned. This is the Master's solution in the Text, and the reason of the solution.

§ 4. And it seems to solve nothing: since we are asking what God has done concerning this one whom we now posit to be predestined, and not what God can do.

§ 5. Also, although God could from eternity not have predestined him, because then predestination was not supposed in him, nevertheless because it is already supposed to be, He cannot bring it about that he was not predestined: because otherwise contradictories would be verified concerning the same thing, namely that this one was predestined from eternity, and this one was not predestined from eternity: and similarly these two, this one was foreseen from eternity to be saved, and this one was not foreseen from eternity to be saved: and this one from eternity is going to be saved, and this one from eternity is not going to be saved: and many other incongruities which follow: therefore it seems that that solution which he posits in the Text is null.

§ 6. Also, although the power of God in itself does not have anything past or future, but behaves in the same way: nevertheless power signified with a connotation does not behave in the same way to every time, nor to all things; but when it is said, God predestined this one, demonstrating any predestined person, or definitely supposing him, power is signified with the determination of the direction of this one to salvation and the foresight of the salvation of this one: since therefore this does not behave in one way, what the Master says in solving seems to be nothing.

Therefore others come saving the Master's solution, and saying that in the syllogism posited beforehand, namely, every predestined person must necessarily be saved: this one is predestined, etc., the minor is of inherence as of now and of the contingent, as they say. Hence just as Aristotle expounds this doubly, Every A is contingently B: but everything which is contingently A, is contingently B: and thus it does not posit absolute inherence, but contingent inherence: and everything which is A, is contingently B, and thus it posits absolute inherence: so they wish to expound this, This one is predestined, so that the sense is, this one who happens to be predestined: and then the conclusion does not follow, that this one will necessarily be saved. But that solution has no reason among all solutions: because although that concerning the contingent is expounded doubly by Aristotle, nevertheless that concerning absolute inherence is not expounded doubly: but this, This one is predestined, is of absolute inherence, and not of the contingent.

If perchance you say, that it is of inherence contingently, it will still be against this solution, that it cannot be expounded doubly.

Also, if it is of inherence contingently, it happens that it does not inhere after it has inhered: therefore for this one, after he is predestined, it happens that he will not be predestined: which is impossible according to all: since there was never a mutation of those relations concerning the notions which "predestined" and "foreknown" import: therefore it is evident that that solution does not solve.

Therefore again others come and object to the proof of the minor premise posited above, namely that when it is said, This one is predestined, this is a certain true fact in the past: therefore it is necessary: and they say that this does not follow, because the counterexample to that

statement is manifold: for if it is negative concerning the past, it will not be true: just as that the Antichrist was not is not necessary, because it can be falsified. Also, if it is affirmative and with a universal sign, they say that it is not true: just as that every animal was in Noah's ark is not necessary. Also, if it is a past dependent on the future, again it is not true: just as here when it is said, This one is predestined, this one is foreseen to be saved, the salvation of this one is still of the future: and therefore they say, that that proof by which it is proven to be of simple inherence and not as of now, was not valid: and this solution has many who consent to it. But that it is null is easily proven thus, first concerning the counterexamples which they bring: because they are sophistical and do not object. For the first is nothing to the proposition: because the rule is given concerning words and deeds: and these are named in the Text: but negations are neither words nor deeds. Moreover the second counterexample is absolutely false: because if a universal affirmative true of the past is posited, it will be necessary just as a particular one. Moreover the third counterexample upon which the whole solution rests is completely null: because if I say thus: I thought about the future Antichrist, this is of the past by reason of the act imported through the verb, although the object or matter of the act is dependent on the future: and since truth is in the composition of the verb, the truth of the statement will be judged according to the time considered (or, consignified) in the verb: but this is past: therefore the truth of this statement will be judged of the past, and it will be a necessary proposition: since if I thought about the future Antichrist, it is impossible for me not to have thought it. But if you wish to object otherwise and say, when it is said, The Antichrist was future, this is of the past and true: and yet it can be falsified, because the Antichrist can not be: and if he will not be, he was not future: then this counterexample will not be to the proposition: because in this proposition, The Antichrist was future, nothing is posited as said or done in the past, but only the order of the future to past time is enunciated there. But when it is said, This one is predestined, there it is posited that the vision of God is directed upon the salvation of this one: and if it is directed, it is impossible that it is not directed. But it is true, that it would be a counterexample, if nothing were imported in this proposition, This one is predestined, except the order of the future to past time: and it is not true, as was already evident.

Therefore there are again others, and they say, that in this, This one is predestined, nothing follows by reason of pastness: because if we remove the past, still the same thing follows: which can be evident thus, God presently foresees this one to be saved, or God presently predestines this one: and if this is posited to be true, still the same thing follows as before: therefore by reason of the past it cannot be inferred that that [proposition] is of simple inherence, or of inherence by necessity: hence if this is contingent, God foresees this one to be saved, this also will be contingent, God predestined this one to be saved: and if this is contingent, this one is predestined [praedestinatur], this also will be contingent, this one is predestined [est praedestinatus]: the reason for which is, because pastness is posited concerning an eternal divine act, to which it belongs only in the mode of signifying with respect to us: and therefore just as these are compossible, God predestines this one, and can not predestine [him]: so these two are compossible, This one is predestined, and can not be predestined. But on the contrary: Although eternity in itself posits no precedence and futurity, nevertheless the order of eternity to temporal things of necessity

posits after and before, and prior and posterior. But when it is said, This one is predestined, eternity is not posited as it is signified in itself, but rather its relation to a temporal thing:

therefore it necessarily posits having been prior with respect to that temporal thing: therefore by reason of that a necessity will be caused, just as also in a past word or deed, and much more so.

Moreover, let it be that the necessity of salvation follows from the present: as when it is said, This one is predestined, with this it is impossible for this to be verified, This one is foreknown [to damnation], or this one will not be saved: because when it is said, This one is predestined, this is the same as he is foreseen to be saved, and salvation is prepared for him, and he will die in final grace, and he will use the grace given to him well: with all of which it is impossible for their contradictories to be verified: therefore it seems that none of those solutions is fitting.

Solution. Without prejudice it must be said, that here one must exclaim with the Apostle, to Romans 11:33: O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God! How incomprehensible are his judgments, and how unsearchable his ways! We say however by asserting two things, namely that no one is compelled to sin, or to do good, and that God in His knowledge cannot be deceived: and therefore we must return to the prior solution, and say that the major premise is twofold, namely that it can be composite or divided: whether de re or de dicto, namely, every predestined person must necessarily be saved: and if the minor is assumed in the composite sense thus, someone is predestined, or this one is predestined, the inference will not be valid, except with a reduplication thus: therefore this one insofar as he is predestined, will be saved of necessity: since if some predicate agrees per se with a middle term like salvation to the predestined, and is assumed under the middle term, the conclusion does not follow per se, except with a reduplication of the form of the middle term concerning it: just as, Every white thing necessarily scatters vision: the horse is white: it does not follow: therefore it necessarily scatters vision, except insofar as "white" is reduplicated: and in this way the aforesaid argumentation does not infer [its conclusion]: hence it is evident, that it proceeds in the divided sense.

But to this that is inquired concerning this [proposition], This one is predestined, whether it is of simple inherence, or of inherence as of now? It seems to me that it must be said, that if he is predestined, that is, if this is posited, then it is of simple inherence: but nevertheless it does not follow, that he will necessarily be saved: and the cause of this was determined above: because although predestination is a necessary order to salvation, nevertheless it does not remove from the subject the potency of the contrary order which is rooted in the flexibility of free choice: but other forms posited concerning a subject do not do this, as was said above.

It must be noted however, that certain Masters say regarding the above-disproved solutions, that if they can be defended, they are easier than this solution.

Others also say, that the knowledge of God behaves in the same way to more known things and to fewer, and to diverse and opposite things: and therefore they say, that the knowledge of God remains invariable in the same way, if one foreseen to be saved is not saved, as if he is saved: and if more are saved than were foreseen to be saved, and if as many, and if fewer: and I cannot understand this solution, for the reason that foreknowledge and predestination do

not express knowledge on the part of the knower only, but connote a relation to this one and to that one determined in number. However anyone can choose for himself an opinion from these which are more pleasing to him.

Divisio Textus

And since predestination is the preparation of grace, etc. Here begins the second part of this distinction, in which he treats of reprobation: and it is divided into two parts. In the first he touches upon its cause. In the second he touches upon its effects, there, D, § 2: Therefore just as God's predestination properly is foreknowledge, etc.

But a doubt first occurs concerning what he says in the beginning, there, And since predestination is the preparation of grace, that is, divine election, etc.

Articulus 17 — Whether It Befits God To Choose

Whether it befits God to choose?

For it is inquired concerning election, Whether it befits God to choose?

And secondly, What is election? And thirdly, Whether election according to the reason of understanding is before predestination, or after? Fourthly, For what is it? Fifthly, Of what is it?

Concerning the FIRST it proceeds thus: § 1. Damascene says, that election does not fall onto God: because the divine nature is not possible [i.e., susceptible] to ignorance: therefore it seems, that it does not befit Him to choose.

§ 2. Also, to choose is, when two or more things are proposed, to prefer one to another: therefore election is of things behaving dissimilarly: but the eternal will of God behaves similarly, because as it is said, I Timothy 2:4: He wills all men to be saved therefore election does not befit Him.

§ 3. Also, eternity is further removed from corrupt nature than any temporal thing: but the state of innocence if it had persisted, would have made all good: therefore there would not have been election: therefore since eternity is further removed, election is repugnant to eternity, as it seems. But that there would be no election if the state of innocence persevered, Augustine seems to say, saying, that if all were good or bad, there would be no election.

§ 4. Also, there is no distance of one from another, where all are the creative essence: but from eternity they were not anything except in the divine mind, in which all are the creative essence: therefore there was no election from eternity, because all election is of things behaving dissimilarly.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. To Ephesians 1:4: He chose us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and unspotted. Therefore it seems, that there is election.

§ 2. Also, John 13:18: I do not speak of you all: I know whom I have chosen. And in many other places.

§ 3. Also, distinction from the mass of perdition is not made without election: since therefore He distinguishes no one whom He did not foresee from eternity would be distinguished, election befits God from eternity.

Solution. Election is spoken of in many ways. For election is called the act of reason following counsel and inquiry and deliberation concerning things to be done, and this election only befits a nature which is subject to ignorance: and Damascene removes this election from God.

Another is election positing only discernment in the chosen, and not inquiry and doubt in the chooser: which election is the separation of that which is known to be good or future good, from another which is known to be evil or future evil: and this is eternal not temporal election which befits God: and through this the solution to the first is evident.

To the next it must be said, that the antecedent will of God prior to our work behaves similarly: and this will does not have a connotation in us, except the rational nature alone which He gave us: and this in all is ordered to eternal life and salvation. But there is another consequent will which posits the relation of foreknowledge to future good or bad merit: and that is of things behaving dissimilarly, and it befits it to prefer one to another.

To the next it must be said, that the eternal insofar as it is eternal, is further removed from the state of corruption than the temporal state of innocence: but as regards the foresight of sin and merit, it is more certified concerning those that will behave differently to grace: and therefore it more befits Him to choose: for to election neither is conjoined substantially, namely neither the more removed from the state of corruption, nor the less removed: but only the certification of those that were to behave dissimilarly to grace.

Nor is this true that if there had been no sin, there would not have been election: for although there would not have been an election of the good from the bad, there would nevertheless have been of the more good from the less good: and this is what Augustine says: If all things were equally good, the divine beauty would not be manifested in the highest good.

To the next it must be said, that in the knowledge of God not only all [persons], but all things also behave similarly: but the knowledge of God is not only of them as they are there: because as they are there, one is not better than another, but all are one highest good: but the knowledge is also of them as they are future, as was very often said above: and as regards this election falls among them.

Articulus 18 — What Is Election

What is election?

Secondly it is inquired, What is election?

§ 1. But Damascene says, that to choose is when two or more things are proposed, to prefer this to those. But the Gloss says, on Romans 8:1 and following, that the number of the elect is certain. Therefore election seems to express final grace. But against this seems to be the election of Judas among the twelve, as the Lord says, Have I not

chosen you twelve? and one of you is a devil?

§ 2. Also, Romans 8:30: Whom he predestined, them he also called. But to call also expresses through an interior cry the separation of one from another: what then is the difference between calling, and election?

§ 3. But if you should say, that calling is temporal: hence the Gloss on the same passage says, that to call is to help knowledge concerning faith. Then I ask, What is that help? For it is either a grace freely given [gratia gratis data], or making pleasing [gratia gratum faciens]. If freely given: then that is given to many, which cannot be: because it follows, in the same place, Romans 8:30, that whom he called, them he also justified. But if it is grace making pleasing: this does not seem [correct], because that already precedes justification. Therefore it seems, that it could only be eternal election.

§ 4. Also, between the application of grace which justifies, and eternal predestination there seems to be nothing except the election of one from another or separation, so that it is discerned to whom grace is to be applied, from another to whom it is not to be applied: since therefore calling precedes justification, election seems to be the same as calling.

Solution. It can be said, that election according to its notion is not the same as calling. For calling is not divided by the Saints except in three ways, namely the calling of non-being to being: and this is of creation, according to what is said, Romans 4:17: Who calls those things that are not, as those that are. And calling through interior grace, according to what the Gloss says, Romans 8:30, that to call is to help knowledge concerning faith. And thirdly to call through exterior preaching, as is said, Matthew 4:19: He called them, namely Peter and Andrew saying: Come after me, and I will make you to become fishers of men. Hence no mode of calling befits the eternal. But election is not accepted by the Saints except in three ways, namely for the eternal foresight of separation, and for the separation which is made through the application of grace in the present whether it is final or not: and through election to a principate or apostolate or dignity. Of the first, Ephesians 1:4: He chose us in him before the foundation of the world. Of the second, John 15:16: You have not chosen me: but I have chosen you, and have appointed you, that you should go, and should bring forth fruit, etc. Of the third, John 6:71: Have I not chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil? And it will be evident, that one of these dividing [members] is eternal. It can therefore be said, that election does not look except to final grace separating according to the purpose of the chooser, and not ours: but calling is to exit, namely so that we exit from the mass of perdition, and thus it looks to interior grace with the motion of our reason discerning faith and grace: and thus it differs in two things, namely both in this that it is temporal, and in this that it has the motion of reason conjoined to itself, because properly nothing is called except that which uses reason: but it agrees in a third, namely that it posits final grace, just as also election when it is taken properly. It could also be said, that they differ not in object, but in the rationale of the object: since election generally taken is of the final good: but calling is of that which uses reason toward the final good.

And through this the solution to the first two is evident.

To the next it must be said, that that help is understood of the help of grace making pleasing: and it is grace informing free choice so that it consents more quickly to the motion of faith, and it does not precede justification in time, but in nature, just as also the motion of faith: and thus it is evident how it is between eternal election, and justification which it precedes not in time, but in nature.

And through this the solution to the whole is evident.

Articulus 19 — Whether Election According to the Notion of Intelligence Is Before Predestination or After

Whether election according to the reason of understanding is before predestination, or after?

Whether election according to the reason of understanding is before predestination, or after?

Thirdly it is inquired, Whether election according to the reason of understanding is before predestination, or after?

But it seems, that it is before: because

§ 1. One is not chosen into the kingdom, unless separated from the mass of perdition: therefore predestination presupposes election to have been made. But on the contrary: Dilection according to reason seems to follow predestination. PROOF: Dilection is of the good: but one is not good except through grace: and grace is from predestination: therefore also dilection: but election follows dilection, because He does not choose except those whom He loves: therefore election also follows predestination: for what is prior to the prior, is prior also to the posterior.

§ 2. Also, Ephesians 1:4 and 5: He chose us in him before the foundation of the world, who hath predestinated us unto the adoption of children through Jesus Christ unto himself, according to the purpose of his will therefore the purpose of the will is the reason for election: therefore it is prior to it according to the reason of understanding: but the purpose of the will is predestination: therefore predestination is prior to election, as it seems.

Solution. It seems to me it must be said, that election taken absolutely precedes predestination, as the first reason says, and dilection spoken of simply precedes both: and this is evident thus: Dilection inclines to separate one from another, and to love unto the end of salvation: therefore dilection precedes election, and election predestination on the part of the lover and chooser and predestinator. Similarly dilection is of the good: but election is of the finally good: but predestination is of the finally good, and directed to the end of salvation: and thus it is evident how the object of one adds to the object of the other: and thus again dilection is prior to and simpler than election, and election than predestination.

To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that that dilection of which he objects, is dilection from present justice, not eternal dilection.

To the next it must be said, that the Apostle does not intend that predestination is the reason for election in itself, but rather conversely: but he means to say, that it is the reason for election on the part of the effect which is the application of grace, because the cause of that is nothing but the purpose of God. Hence, Romans 9:11 and 12, he says on the contrary: That the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of works, but of the will it was said to her: That the elder shall serve the younger where it is expressly implied, that election is the reason of the purpose or predestination.

Articulus 20 — For What Is Election

For what is election?

Fourthly it is inquired, For what is election?

But it seems, that it is for manifesting the reason of divine goodness: because Augustine says thus in the book City of God: God dispensed well, so that He would not damn all, nor liberate all: for if all were liberated, what is owed through justice would lie hidden: if all were damned, what grace bestows would lie hidden. Therefore it seems, that the optimal dispensation of God's goodness is manifested through election.

§ 1. But to the contrary: Because then the rational creature seems to receive some advantage from the fall.

§ 2. Solution. It is not difficult to respond to questions of this kind, nor is it useful to dispute them for long. Because election can be made on account of many things: yet it is made, in my judgment, for the showing of justice which is revealed in the subsequent use of free choice, when the elect spontaneously adheres to grace, and the non-elect spontaneously turns away from grace.

§ 3. To the authority of Augustine it must be said that Augustine rather shows the optimal mode of ordering wisdom than its goodness, although both appear there.

§ 4. To the other it must be said that an advantage is not acquired from the fall of the person [per se], but per accidens, insofar as through grace the fall is ordered to the good: just as the Gloss says on Romans 8:28, upon that text, "We know that to them that love God, all things work together unto good, to such as, according to his purpose, are called to be saints" the Gloss says, "Even falls."

Articulus 21 — Whose Is Election

Whose is election?

§ 5. Fifthly and lastly it is asked: Whose is election?

§ 6. Now it seems to be of all, because: 1. The grace of God is lacking to no one, provided one wills it: therefore He elects all.

§ 7. 2. Also, Saul was elect, and Judas was elect. And if you say that this was the election of present justice. To the contrary: Let us posit that they died in grace; therefore they will now have final grace; therefore they are truly elect. But if you say that foreknowledge posits in

them a future final sin, and this cannot stand with final grace. To the contrary: It has already been established that election, according to reason, is prior to predestination: therefore the necessity of the consequence which is from predestination does not infer the necessity of election: and thus it seems to belong to some who are not finally good.

§ 8. But to the contrary: Election posits final grace: therefore it cannot be except of those who are finally good.

§ 9. Solution. It must be said that election posits final grace.

§ 10. But to that which is first objected, it must be said that although grace is equally present to all of us, we nonetheless do not bear ourselves equally to it, and the respect of grace to us is not one [and the same], as was said above.

§ 11. To the other it must be said that election, according to the reason of intelligence, follows foreknowledge taken generally: because otherwise it would not know whom or for what it was electing: but it is true that it precedes predestination: and from it [predestination] it receives the necessity of condition, as has been frequently disputed above.

Articulus 22 — Whether Predestination Is the Cause of the Bestowal of Grace; And, Whether It Is a Necessary, Contingent, Common, or Proper Cause

Whether predestination is the cause of the apposition of grace? and, Whether it is a necessary, contingent, common, or proper cause?

§ 12. Next it is asked concerning what he says in this chapter, D, § 2: The effect of predestination is the apposition of grace, etc.

§ 13. 1. For if predestination is the cause of the apposition of grace: will it be a necessary cause, or a contingent one, or a common one, or a proper one, whether it be necessary or contingent? It seems that it is necessary and proper: but when such a cause is posited, the effect is always posited: since therefore predestination is from eternity, the apposition of grace will also be from eternity, which is false: therefore it is not necessary and proper.

§ 1. But if you say that it is a common necessary cause: then through something added it can become proper: therefore that [added thing] is either temporal or eternal. If temporal: then it will be created and prepared by predestination: and I ask concerning it, whether its predestination was its necessary and proper cause, or not? If not: then again something must have been added: and again I ask concerning that, and this will go on to infinity: therefore that first temporal thing will have predestination as its necessary and proper cause. Since therefore that thing intervenes between predestination and the apposition of grace, it seems that the apposition of grace occurs when that thing is added to predestination: but that thing is added from eternity, because its predestination is a necessary and proper cause: therefore the apposition of grace is from eternity.

§ 2. Also, according to this it follows that something temporal would be from eternity, which cannot be: therefore that added thing is not temporal. But if it is eternal: yet an eternal thing added to an eternal thing makes nothing but an eternal thing: therefore from eternity

predestination is the necessary cause of grace: therefore the apposition of grace is from eternity, which is false.

§ 3. But if it is said that it is a contingent cause, whether proper or common, two absurdities will follow, namely that there is something contingent in God, and that grace will be caused by predestination by no necessity, either of consequence or of the consequent; and this is false.

§ 4. 2. Also, if it is a cause, it will only be a voluntary cause: but every will is related to opposites: therefore it seems that it is no more the cause of the apposition of grace than of non-apposition.

§ 5. 3. Also, if it is a cause: it is either a material, or formal, or efficient, or final cause. It is evident that it is not material: because there is no matter in God. But if it is called efficient. To the contrary: Predestination is not without foreknowledge: but foreknowledge is according to ideal forms: therefore it has to be reduced to the formal [cause]. But to the contrary: The will of God is the efficient cause of the things willed: but the predestination of God is according to His will: therefore it is an efficient cause.

§ 6. Solution. I say that it is a necessary and proper cause: but this is twofold, namely that which demands something in the other as a disposition; and that which demands nothing, because the dispositions are presupposed in the matter, just as fire is the proper and necessary cause of ignition: yet ignition does not follow in ice, because a contrary disposition is in the matter: nonetheless we would not say that this is because fire is a contingent or non-proper cause of ignition: because a contingent cause is one which lacks something of the necessities for causality, or which lacks something for proportion to the effect. So it can be said that God or predestination is a necessary cause, not by a necessity of coercion, but by a necessity of unfailingness with respect to itself, and this according to habit: because according to act there is not always the caused effect and the necessary disposition in the rational creature for the reception of grace, which is the effect of predestination. And through this the solution to the first is evident.

§ 7. To the other it must be said that it is a voluntary cause, but determined to the willed object: for this does not remove liberty from the will. Hence an undisposed will is of opposites, but one disposed through the conception and determination of the willed object is directed to one thing, and can be turned away from it. But it is not so in God: because His will is not changed from one willed object to a contrary willed object, because this belongs to imperfection and defect, as is determined in Book II of the Sentences.

§ 8. To the other it must be said that it can be reduced to three causes, namely the efficient with respect to the will, and the formal exemplary with respect to foreknowledge, and the final with respect to the disposition of the will: because it is His will for the sake of which He apposes grace.

§ 9. And through this the solution to the whole is evident.

Articulus 23 — Whether Hardening Is an Effect of Eternal Reprobation; And, Whether God Is the Cause of Reprobation

Whether obduration is the effect of eternal reprobation? and, Whether God is the cause of reprobation?

§ 1. Next it is asked concerning the following phrase where it is said: Obduration seems in some way to be the effect of eternal reprobation.

§ 2. For this does not seem so: for every effect has something of causality from the cause: therefore God would now be some cause of sin: and I reckon this impious. But if you say, as he seems to say in the Text, that God is the cause by not imparting grace: this seems to be nothing: because Anselm says that the reason why this man does not have grace is not because God does not want to give it, because He extends grace to all: but rather because he does not want to receive it: therefore He is not the cause by not imparting, since He imparts to all insofar as it depends on Him.

§ 3. If perhaps you say that God is a cause just as the absence of a sailor is the cause of the endangerment of a ship, but his presence [the cause] of its safety: this again is nothing: because Augustine says that God is present to all: just as light is even with the blind, although the blind are not with the light. But if the sailor, insofar as it depended on him, were always present to the ship, he would never be said to be the cause of the endangerment of the ship, but always of its safety, and the endangerment of the ship would always be caused by something else. But if you say that He is the cause of obduration, just as nature is the cause of rest, namely by not moving: this is still more absurd: because nature is the cause of rest per se, and of motion for the sake of rest, as is proved in Book V of the Physics: therefore it is clear that it would be heretical to attribute this to God.

§ 4. Solution. It must be said that in no way, neither per se nor per accidens, is He the cause of obduration: as has been necessarily proved, as it seems to me.

§ 5. But to the saying of Augustine which is in the Text, it must be said that it is to be glossed concerning permission, that is, He permits them to be obdurated, from the fact that they do not want to receive the grace that is always prepared for them: yet He orders the obduration to many goods, lest it be entirely unseemly: and with respect to this it is said, "The Lord hardened the heart of Pharaoh, etc." , so that causality toward obduration is not denoted, but permission: while causality is retorted to the ordering of the obduration into the goods which are elicited from the obduration by God, even against the will of the obdurate one.

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But if we seek the merit of obduration and mercy, etc.

§ 6. In this part the Master inquires whether predestination has any cause. And it has four parts: in the first of which he shows that it does not have a cause in itself: but obduration has a cause on the part of the effect, whereas predestination has a cause neither in itself nor on the part of the effect. In the second, he posits an objection to this, whether the foreknowledge of merits can be the cause of predestination, there, B, Yet some have opined, etc. In the third, he posits an objection against what was determined, and solves it, there, C, Yet to these it seems to be contrary, etc. In the fourth and last he posits the heresy of some, which had its origin by reason of inquiring into this profundity, there, D, But many seeking to render a reason concerning this profundity, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether Predestination Can Be Helped by the Prayers of the Saints

Whether predestination can be aided by the prayers of the Saints?

§ 7. But for the understanding of the first part one must ask three things: of which the first is, Whether predestination can be aided by the prayers of the Saints? Second, Whether predestination falls under merit? Third, Whether the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination or reprobation?

§ 8. To the first one proceeds thus: 1. In Genesis 25:21, it is said: "Isaac besought the Lord for his wife, because she was barren: and He heard him, and gave conception to Rebecca": although it was nonetheless predestined that Isaac was to have seed through Rebecca.

§ 9. 2. Also, in the same place Gregory says that predestination is aided by the prayers of the Saints.

§ 10. 3. Also, Augustine advises that prayer be made for those to be called, because it may have been thus predestined,

so that they are not called except through the prayers of the Saints. Many similar things are found from the Saints.

§ 2. 4. Also, through examples, we see Paul converted at the prayer of Stephen, and the Centurion (as Bernard says) at the prayer of the Lord: therefore one can merit first grace for another: but it is less to persevere in received grace than to receive grace: therefore one can merit even final grace for another: but having final grace is convertible with being predestined: therefore he can merit predestination for him.

§ 3. 5. Also, James 5:16: "Pray for one another, that you may be saved" but being saved and being predestined accompany each other: therefore predestination is acquired through prayer.

§ 4. BUT TO THE CONTRARY: 1. The prayer of the faithful is temporal, but predestination is eternal: but the eternal is not caused by the temporal: therefore predestination is not caused by the temporal: therefore predestination is not caused by the prayer of the Saints.

§ 5. 2. Also, nothing caused by another essentially is equally prior to that which is its cause and posterior to it: the predestination of someone is equally before the prayer of the Saints

and after it, because it is from eternity: therefore predestination is not caused by the prayer of the Saints.

§ 6. Solution. It must be said that predestination can be considered in two ways, namely [that] of purpose and of preparation: and this is essential to predestination. And on that part it cannot be aided by the prayers of the Saints. It can also be considered on the part of the effect, which is grace apposed in the present: and this can be aided by the prayers of the Saints: and in this way the reasons first introduced proceed.

§ 7. But to the reason introduced [about meriting], it must be said that someone can merit first grace and perseverance in it for another: but it does not follow from this that he can merit predestination for him: because although having final grace and being predestined are convertible according to subjects [supposita], they nonetheless do not signify the same thing, nor are they the same essentially, because persevering in grace finally expresses nothing but something temporal, but predestination expresses something eternal, namely the purpose and preparation of grace from eternity, which does not fall under merit: and therefore that reason does not proceed. And through this the solution to the following [reason] is also evident.

§ 8. Now as for those things which are objected to the contrary, it is clear that they do not conclude concerning the effect of predestination, but rather concerning that which is essential to predestination, which is eternal.

Articulus 2 — Whether Predestination Falls Under the Merit of the Predestined, So That Someone Merits Predestination for Himself

Whether predestination falls under the merit of the predestined, such that someone merits predestination for himself?

§ 9. Secondly it is asked: Whether predestination falls under the merit of the predestined, such that someone merits predestination for himself?

§ 10. It seems that it does, from a similarity in the opposite: because, as is said in the Text, 1. We find the merit of obduration: therefore there also seems to be some merit of predestination.

§ 11. 2. Also, he who gives an occasion for loss seems to have given the loss: therefore much more he who can do something whereby he may have grace and persevere in it, seems to be able also to merit and work something toward his own predestination: but if someone does what is in him, he himself will have grace, and can persevere in it: therefore he can also be predestined.

§ 12. 3. Also, one having grace in the present merits eternal life: but eternal life is a greater good than being predestined: therefore he can also merit that he be predestined.

§ 1. 4. Also, if predestination is repugnant to merit: this will be either on the part of itself, or on the part of the effect, or on the part of the end. Not on the part of itself: because in itself it is God predestining, and all the Saints merit God. Not on the part of the effect either: because many merit grace to be given to them by the Lord, which having been given, their

grace increases. Nor on the part of the end: because that is glory: and glory indeed falls under merit.

§ 2. 5. Also, below Augustine says that in some sinners there precedes something by which they are worthy of justification, and in others [something] by which they are worthy of obduration: therefore it seems that predestination falls under merit.

§ 3. 6. Also, on John 1:47 and following, the Gloss says that it was better for Nathanael to know both natures in Christ than to be predestined and to remain under the shadow of death or of the law: but the knowledge of both natures in Christ falls under merit: therefore also being predestined, which is a lesser good.

§ 4. BUT TO THE CONTRARY: 1. Every merit is after the effect of predestination, which is the apposition of grace: but predestination as a cause precedes the effect of predestination: therefore every merit is after predestination: therefore it is not the cause of predestination.

§ 5. 2. Also, every merit is temporal: but the temporal is not the cause of the eternal: therefore, etc.

§ 6. 3. Also, grace falls under some merit: but that merit will be an act informed by grace, because every merit is an act informed by grace: but it does not inform an act unless it is possessed: therefore grace is possessed before merit: therefore it is not acquired through merit, but is possessed so that merit might be present. If therefore the effect of predestination does not fall under merit, much less does predestination itself.

§ 7. Solution. It must be said that predestination falls under merit neither with respect to its proper effect, nor in itself: for the proper effect is final grace given in the present: and before first grace there is no grace through which anyone could merit, but someone can merit an increase of grace: but this is not the essential effect of predestination.

§ 8. It must be said therefore to the first, that it is not similar: because through ourselves we can sin, and thus be the cause of our obduration, because this is an impotence rather than a potency: but from ourselves we cannot merit, but only from the grace of God: and therefore obduration has a cause in us, but predestination does not.

§ 9. To the other it must be said that although man can work something toward having grace, he nonetheless cannot be the cause of grace: because his work is nothing but as a disposing cause in the subject, which disposition of itself does not even suffice to remove the contrary act, although it habilitates to the good through good acts: and thus he is not the cause, but God alone.

§ 10. To the other it must be said that this is to merit an increase of grace and not first grace, or predestination: and although having eternal life is a greater good in genus than being predestined, nevertheless predestination, by reason of its antecedence to the meritorious work, does not fall under merit, although eternal life falls under it: for the cause why it does not fall under merit is not because it is a better or a lesser good, but because it is not ordered to merit.

§ 11. To the other it must be said that by reason of the eternal antecedent to merit, predestination is repugnant to merit. For although it is God, nonetheless the mode of signifying is not the same: and therefore it is not necessary that if one falls under merit, the other also falls under merit. Yet even by reason of the effect which is first grace, it is repugnant, as was proved by objecting to the contrary.

§ 12. To the other it must be said that very improperly

are the words of Augustine taken which are posited below. For Augustine speaks of works done in mortal sin, which are of the genus of goods, and he says that the sinner habilitates himself to grace through this, so that the Holy Spirit may more quickly illuminate the heart of the man: and this makes them worthy, that is, congruous with a certain congruity of gratuitously given grace [grace gratis data], for the reception of grace: and on the contrary, he who falls from vice to vice, is abandoned, so that he who is in filth may become still more filthy: and therefore he is called unworthy for grace, that is, less congruous.

§ 2. To the last it must be said, as above, that in Nathanael there was a comparison of the state of the New Law to the Old Law in which the shadow was, as has been said.

Articulus 3 — Whether the Foreknowledge of Merits Is the Cause of Predestination

Whether the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination?

§ 3. Thirdly it is asked: Whether the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination and reprobation?

§ 4. And it seems that it is, first through authorities, then through reasons.

§ 5. 1. For the Gloss says: "Grace having been subtracted, Esau was justly reprobated": but justice is a rendering for merits: but there were no merits except in foreknowledge: therefore merits in foreknowledge were the cause of reprobation.

§ 6. 2. Also, the Gloss, in the same place: "Esau was reprobated through justice itself": and from this follows the same thing as before.

§ 7. 3. Also, in the same place, the Gloss of Ambrose: "I will give grace to him whom I know will return to me with his whole heart after error." Therefore the foreknowledge of conversion is the cause of the collation and preordination of grace: therefore it is the cause of predestination. Whence he adds: "This is to give to whom it should be given: for pearls are not to be given to swine, nor what is holy to dogs." [114]

§ 8. 4. Also, in the same place: "What did He hate in Esau, but original sin? What did He love in Jacob, but the gratuitous gift of mercy?" Now it is evident that it does not speak of the sin that was [presently there], because in this Jacob and Esau were similar: and therefore if He hated one on account of this, He ought to have hated the other: because concerning similar things (as Boethius says) the judgment is the same: therefore it seems that this is to be referred to foreknowledge: and thus the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination or of reprobation.

§ 9. 5. Also, in the same place: "God gives grace to him whom He knows will devotedly serve Him and obey His commandments": now it is evident that it does not speak of the grace of present justification, because that is often given to one who abuses it: therefore it speaks of the grace of predestination: therefore it is from the foreknowledge of merits.

§ 10. 6. Also, Origen on Numbers 5: "God, from the purpose of the heart which He foresaw for Himself, before they had done anything good or evil, said, in Malachi 1:2-3: 'I have loved Jacob, but Esau I have hated.'" Therefore it seems that the foreknown purpose of the heart of those twins was the cause of the predestination of the one, and of the reprobation of the other.

§ 11. 7. Also, the same seems to be the case in Genesis 18:17 and following, where the Lord says to Abraham: "Can I hide from Abraham what I am about to do, especially since he is to become a great nation...? For I know that he will command his children, and his household after him, to keep the way of the Lord, etc." [115] Therefore the foreknowledge of merits is the cause why He predestines some and not others, as it seems.

§ 12. And this is proved by reason: because

§ 1. 1. The will, as Damascene says, is rational, and if it is not rational, it is not will: since therefore the wills of showing mercy and not showing mercy are in God, those wills will be rational: therefore they will proceed from reason according to the reason of intelligence. But there is no reason which does not discern why it should be given to one and not to another: therefore it seems that God discerns this: but this cannot be done except by foreknown merits: therefore the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination or reprobation.

§ 2. 2. Also, no election of a wise man is of those things which have no distance [i.e., difference]: but the most wise God from eternity elected some, and reprobated others: therefore it was necessary that they differed in some way: but they could not differ from eternity, except in the foreknowledge of merits: therefore it seems as before.

§ 3. 3. Also, it belongs to a wise man never to determine anything in the will, unless he foresees as much as he can, what end and outcome it can attain in reality: since therefore God is supremely wise, He never determines the will of reprobating or showing mercy, except from the prefinition of future merits which foreknowledge foresees: and thus again the same follows as before.

§ 4. 4. Also, by a similarity, if an earthly king must elect attendants and soldiers, as much as he can, he inquires beforehand of what custom and character they are, and whether they are faithful or not, so that from past things he may learn what he ought to presume about future ones: and if he could foresee future things, he would elect from future things more than from past things: therefore since God sees future things, it seems that He predestines and reprobates from the foreknowledge of future merits.

§ 5. 5. Also, if a father of a family knew which of his sons would dissipate the inheritance, and which would conserve it, he would distribute the inheritance to his sons according to the

114. Matthew 7:6.

foreknowledge of their future acts: therefore it seems that since God can do this, He Himself elects according to the foreknowledge of merits.

§ 6. 6. Also, it is objected more strongly thus: It would seem to be cruelty in God, if He were to make such a man, and immediately reprobate him in whom no cause of future reprobation were seen: since therefore there is no cruelty in God, He reprobates from the prevision of merits.

§ 7. 7. Also, a wise artisan does not make a vessel useful for nothing: since therefore the reprobate are useful for nothing, it seems that they ought not to be made by God.

§ 8. If perhaps you say that predestination cannot be from merits: because every merit is from grace, and thus grace, which is the effect of predestination, precedes every merit; therefore merit is rather from predestination, than conversely. That seems to be nothing: although this solution is written in the Text: because a similar thing cannot be said concerning reprobation: for there penalty is not prepared except for our work, which is from us, not from God.

§ 9. Also, although merit is from grace, and grace is not from us, nevertheless, as Augustine says in the Text, both of these are ours on account of the consent of free choice, and thus that foreseen consent can be the cause of the predestination of some, and dissent the cause of reprobation: whence it is clear that this solution does not solve the doubt of the question.

§ 10. But against this it is objected thus: 1. Of the first cause there is no cause: but the will of God is the first cause: therefore of the will of God there is no cause: therefore neither is the foreknowledge of anything the cause of the will. And that the will is the first cause is proved thus: The practical intellect is not a cause except through the will: because it does not move except through the will: therefore the first reason of causality rests with the will. If perhaps you should say that the will is the efficient [cause], and future merits hold [the place of] the final cause, as some have said: this is very absurd: because it is a physical axiom that nothing does anything for the sake of something less worthy and baser than itself: but future merits are less worthy than the will of God. Similarly the Scripture says, that "for the sake of

§ 1. Himself He has created all things" therefore it is left that there is no cause of the predestining or reprobating will.

§ 2. 2. Also, foreknown merits are future: therefore if they were the cause of predestination or reprobation: either this is because they are foreknown merits, or because they are future, or because they are foreknown as future. If in the first way: this cannot be: because as foreknown, they are only in the ideas, and do not differ by the differences of good and evil: and therefore there would not be made a discernment of the predestining and reprobating will. But if because they are future, or because they are foreknown as future: then by reason of futurity, in which they ought to take the difference of good and evil, they would be referred to predestination or reprobation: therefore the temporal under the temporal reason of futurity is

115. Genesis 18:17-19.

the cause of the eternal, which is impossible: because just as time flows from eternity and aeviternity, so does the temporal from the eternal.

§ 3. Solution. It must be said with Augustine here in the Text, that predestination and reprobation do not have any cause. But it must be distinguished, that cause is manifold, namely efficient, and formal, and final, and material: and indeed it does not have an efficient cause, nor a material, nor a formal, nor a final one. But the end is twofold, namely the end of intention, and the end of the work: and I call the end of intention that which is intended by the efficient [agent], just as beatitude is intended by the one working well: whereas I call the end of the work that at which the work terminates: and this is sometimes temporal: just as going to Matins terminates at receiving the established offerings: and receiving sacred orders terminates at having a prebend: and such a thing adjoined to the end can be the reason of the work, yet it will not properly be the final cause, because the final cause is that which quiets the intention per se and entirely. Similarly it must be distinguished in predestination, that something there is eternal, such as the purpose; and something is determinable to time, such as the collation of grace. And on the part of the eternal it has neither a final cause nor a reason, properly speaking: because a reason also in some way elicits the work, but future merits in no way elicit the purpose of God. However, on the part of the effect in which predestination and reprobation are determinable to time, they have the reason of merit, though not a final cause. But because it is difficult to respond to the Glosses introduced, therefore one must respond to each individually.

§ 4. It must be said therefore to the first, that Esau was justly reprobated for two reasons. One is what Anselm says, that whatever God wills is just: whence we could say that justice there is called the equity of the divine will. The other reason is, so that justice there may mean the debt of penalty to fault, and reprobation may be posited for obduration or condemnation, as the Master said in the last chapter of the preceding distinction.

§ 5. To the other it must be said in the same way.

§ 6. To the other it must be said that the knowledge of merit expresses there the reason of the collation of grace, not the cause of predestination: nor does it speak there of predestination according to itself, but of the effect determinable to time.

§ 7. To the other it must be said that this Gloss has a special difficulty, and I think that original sin is not there called a habit only, because in that Esau and Jacob were similar: nor is Esau taken there for a little child, but for a nation, and Jacob similarly. Whence the original [sin] in Esau is the fomes [tinder of sin] related to the gaping toward concupiscence in the nation not to be liberated through Christ, because it refused to consent to the grace of redemption accomplished through Christ. But in Jacob, [it is] the gaping toward grace in the faithful people who will consent to Christ, through whose redemption the grace of that people is expedited for meriting: and this grace is called the gratuitous gift of mercy. These [words end here]

§ 1. ...however, they are the reason for hatred not on the part of eternal reprobation, but on the part of the preparation of punishment, and from another aspect, the reason for the conferring of grace.

§ 2. To the next it must be said, according to the aforesaid, that the Gloss touches upon the reason for the application of grace, and not the cause of predestination. The reasons do not touch [upon this], except that the will...

§ 3. To the next it must be said that Origen touches upon the state of two peoples, and their diverse relation to liberating grace: and that diverse mode can be the reason for the liberation of some, and the damnation of others.

§ 4. The same solution also applies to the following authority from Genesis 16:17 and following.[116]

§ 5. To that which is objected by means of reason, there is one solution for all, namely that that will of God is not irrational on the part of the effect and the thing willed: and this has already been conceded, although in itself it has no cause.

Articulus 4 — Whether, Just as the Will of God Is as a Cause in Predestination, So Also It Is in Reprobation

Article 4. Whether, just as the will of God stands as a cause in predestination, it also stands thus in reprobation?

§ 7. Next, it is inquired concerning those things which are in the Text, at C, However, it seems to be opposed to these things, etc.

§ 8. 1. For it seems to follow from the determination of the Master, that the will of God stands not only as a cause in predestination, but also in reprobation, since this was denied in the preceding distinction, in the last chapter.

§ 9. 2. Also, foreknowledge of the foreknown also seems to be the cause of damnation. For Augustine says in the book City of God that if the Church knew of some who were foreknown to eternal death, it would pray for them no more than for the devil: therefore it seems that it is necessary that they be damned.

§ 10. 3. Also, I infer thus: This man is foreknown: therefore he will be damned: and I ask, from what topic is the argument drawn? It cannot be from the effect: because the foreknowledge of God is not caused by future things, for then a temporal thing would be the cause of something eternal, and God's knowledge would depend upon future things, which is absurd. Therefore the topic is from the cause: therefore God is the cause of the iniquity of the damned, which is false. Therefore there is no relation there of the inferred to the inferring, and yet the argumentation holds, which is incongruous.

§ 11. SOLUTION. It must be said that God is in no way the cause of iniquity, but He is the efficient, not the meritorious, cause of damnation.

§ 12. To the induced authority it must be said that it carries no necessity except the immutability of the consequence, and not the necessity of the thing, as has frequently been said above: because foreknowledge does not remove the faculty of free choice: and therefore, together with it, the potency for the opposite is always present.

§ 13. To the next it must be said, as above, that the relation of this argumentation is one thing when it is said, This man is foreknown to sin: therefore he will sin: and another when it is inferred thus, This man is foreknown to be damned: therefore he will be damned.

§ 14. For in the first argument the topic is not from the cause or from the effect, but from a convertible term supposed by hypothesis: for one of these follows upon the other, and conversely, this man will sin: therefore he is foreknown to sin: therefore he will sin: and yet neither is the cause of the other. In the other argument, however, the topic is from the cause: because God is indeed the efficient cause of damnation. One is posited to follow the other, as is objected. But if you object that, if the topic is from a convertible term, then one posited according to being posits the other, and when one is, the other is. It must be said that this is not true: because the reason for their convertibility is not that one is from the other, as from a cause, as man and capable of laughter: but only because the knowledge which is had of it follows the fact, and is not caused by it.

Articulus 5 — Whether The Knowledge Of God Is Changeable

Article 5. Whether the knowledge of God is variable?

§ 16. Next, it is inquired concerning the last part of this treatise which begins there, at F, Furthermore it must be considered, whether all those things, etc. In which the Master touches upon whether a mutation of knowledge and foreknowledge falls upon God?

§ 17. And first he determines concerning the mutation of foreknowledge, secondly concerning the mutation of knowledge, there, at G, But concerning knowledge we speak otherwise, etc.

§ 18. The Master concedes in the Text that God foreknew something which He now does not foreknow: and it does not follow that He has changed, but rather that the foreknown thing has changed.

§ 19. But concerning this a question arises: because foreknowledge speaks of a relation of God's knowledge to future things: but this relation is in something: not unless in the knowledge of God. Therefore, when the relation is varied, some mutation has been made in the knowledge, as it seems.

§ 20. But this was solved above, by showing that a relation is varied when one of the extremes is varied, without any mutation of the other: and therefore the Master speaks the truth, that this posits a mutation only in the known thing, and not in God the knower.

116. Romans 8:28.

Articulus 6 — Whether God Knows All Complexes, Such as Propositions and Enuntiabilia That He Once Knew

Article 6. Whether God knows all complexes, such as propositions, and enunciables which He once knew?

§ 22. But a doubt arises concerning the second part.

§ 23. And it is divided into three parts, of which the first is, Whether God knows all complexes, such as propositions, and enunciables which He once knew? The second is, Whether those complexes are always true, as some have said? The third is, Whether by the First Truth all things are true which are true, as some others have said?

§ 24. To the first, one proceeds thus: 1. God knows whatever He knew. Proof. Whatever knows through something that relates in one way to being and to non-being in all time, that is not changed in its knowledge. But God knows through ideas that relate in one way: therefore He is not changed in knowing.

§ 25. 2. Also, a knowledge which relates in one way is more noble than that which relates in various ways: but the more noble in any genus is to be attributed to God: therefore His knowledge is of such a kind: therefore He knows whatever He knew.

§ 26. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Aristotle says in the book of the Posterior Analytics that knowledge is corrupted in three ways, namely by the corruption of the knower, and by the corruption of the knowable object, and by intervening oblivion: but it is evident that things known by God are changed and corrupted every day: therefore there will be a mutation on the part of the knower according to knowledge.

§ 27. 2. Also, He knows whatever He knew: and whatever is known, is true: therefore whatever God knew, is true. But He knew that you would be born: therefore it is true that you will be born, as it seems: which is false, because you have been born.

§ 28. 3. Also, a passage in the thing, even without oblivion and mutation of the knower, varies the knowledge, as the Philosopher maintains: since therefore such a passage frequently occurs on the part of things, the knowledge of God seems to be varied.

§ 29. If perhaps you should say that in those arguments there falls the fallacy of figure of speech and of accident: God knows whatever He knew: but He knew that you would be born: therefore He knows that you will be born: from the fact that a what is changed into a how (a mode of being). Against this: I take this proposition, Whatever proposition God knew, He knows, or whatever enunciable: but He knew this proposition, Socrates will be born, and this enunciable, Socrates is to be: therefore He still knows it. And whatever is known, is true: therefore this is true, Socrates will be born, and it is true that Socrates is to be born, which is false: therefore He does not know whatever He knew.

§ 30. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. God's knowledge receives nothing from things: therefore when things are varied, it itself is not varied, but remains stable.

§ 31. 2. Also, nothing eternal is varied according to the variation of temporal things: God's knowledge is eternal: therefore it is not varied according to the variation of temporal things: therefore whatever God knew, He still knows.

§ 32. SOLUTION. It must be said that if we were to follow for a moment the ancient opinion of the Nominales [Nominalists], we would say that God knows whatever He knew: and then we would say that a proposition or enunciable which is once true, will always be true. But a numerically one enunciable is not to be resumed except with respect to the same time, as when it is said, that the world will be is true: that is true by reason of eternity anteceding time. But if it is now resumed, it must be resumed by reason of the same time: but this is not signified now as future or present, but it is signified as past: therefore it is signified by this, that the world was is true, and that the world would be then, and that it was now, is also one enunciable and true by reason of the same time, but it signifies in diverse modes. And this is plainly extracted from the Text: because the Master solves it thus. And by holding that opinion of the Nominales, it is plain to respond to the objections. But because this is not probable, that the world will be and the world was are one enunciable, because the Philosopher proves in the Categories that one statement without any mutation of itself, but by the mutation of the thing, is susceptible to contraries: because from the fact that a thing is or is not, the statement is true or false: therefore it seems to me that they are two enunciables, the world will be, and the world was, and one is true, and the other false. And it seems to me that, speaking of complexes, God does not know whatever He knew, on account of the passage and transmutation which is on the part of things: nor do I place force in that solution, that a what is changed into a how: because it seems to me to be an evasion. But how God by simple knowledge knows both composites and complexes, has been determined above.

§ 33. To that, however, which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that this posits no mutation in God, but only that the knowable objects relate otherwise to His knowledge than they previously related. Hence His knowledge passes over the thing otherwise when it is, and otherwise when it is not.

§ 34. To the next it must be said that the most noble knowledge is that which, without mutation of the knower, knows concerning each thing in the mode just as it is: because to know in one mode, whether it is or whether it is not, posits confusion in the divine knowledge and an imperfection, and therefore such knowledge is not to be given to God: and therefore it must be posited that that other mode of knowledge passing over the thing when it is and when it is not, posits a mutation in the knowable object and the known.

§ 35. To that which is objected again lastly to the contrary, it must be said that although He receives nothing from things, nevertheless He posits a respect towards them, and that respect is varied when the thing is varied.

§ 36. To the next it must be said that the eternal is not varied in itself, but for a respect to be varied which is in time, is nothing incongruous, as has frequently been seen above.

Articulus 7 — Whether Enuntiabilia Are Always True

Article 7. Whether enunciables are always true?

§ 38. Secondly it is inquired, Whether enunciables are always true?

§ 39. It seems that they are not: because 1. From the fact that a thing is or is not, a statement is true or false: therefore a proposition or enunciable which is sometimes true, is not always true.

§ 40. 2. Also, according to this Aristotle would have said nothing, when he says that a statement is susceptible to contraries according to the mutation of the thing.

§ 41. But the reasons of Anselm are against this. For truth is a rectitude perceptible only by the mind, namely when a thing does that which it received from the First Truth that it should do: as the sign that I sit, or that I am sitting, signifies this, whether I sit, or not. Therefore it seems that in whatever mode the thing is varied, it itself always preserves in signifying a rectitude perceptible only by the mind. Therefore it always preserves truth: therefore what is once true, is always true, because the same reasoning applies to all others.

§ 42. SOLUTION. According to Anselm it must be distinguished that in signs there is a twofold rectitude, namely to do that which it received from the First Truth that it should do, and to do that for the sake of which it received it from the First Truth. Just as this statement, that I sit, received from the First Truth that it should signify that I sit, whether I sit or not: and it received it for the sake of this, that it should signify that I sit, while I am sitting: and should not signify it, while I am not sitting. Because any sign received to signify for the sake of this, that it signifies what is to be, and what is not to not be: and not that it signifies to be what is not, or conversely.

§ 43. It must be said therefore that the first truth is in the sign, according to the rectitude which it has in signifying: but the second is in it, according as the thing signified is equated to it. And thus in the second a twofold rectitude is supposed, namely of the sign, and of the thing: but in the first only one of them. Now the sign has the first in that it is a sign: and therefore that is inseparable from it. But it has the second insofar as it is equated to the thing of which it is the sign; and therefore that is mutable, as the thing is rendered: nevertheless according to Anselm who considers subtly, the curvature is more from a defect of the thing, than of the sign. And therefore Anselm says that truth is inseparable from the sign: just as to burn or to heat is inseparable from fire.

§ 44. With these established, it is plain to respond to the objections.

§ 45. For to the first two it must be said that they proceed concerning the second truth which is caused by the thing being equated with the sign, and it is well conceded that that is mutable.

§ 46. To those which are objected to the contrary, it must be said that all proceed according to the truth spoken of in the first mode.

Articulus 8 — Whether All Things That Are True Are True by the First Truth

Article 8. Whether by the First Truth all things are true which are true?

§ 48. Thirdly it is inquired, Whether by the First Truth all things are true which are true? And we speak of truth spoken of in the first mode.

§ 49. It seems that they are: because 1. Anselm says in the book De Veritate: Do you think that there is anything anytime, or anywhere, which is not in the Supreme Truth, and which has not received from there what it is insofar as it is, or that it could be other than it is there? And he responds that it is not to be thought.

§ 50. 2. Also, in the same place: Whatever truly is, insofar as it is, this is what is there: and you can conclude absolutely that everything which is, truly is: therefore because it is no other than what is there.

§ 51. 3. Also, nothing is incommutable except the First Truth: the truth of wood is incommutable: therefore it itself is the First Truth.

§ 52. 4. Also, in the same truth is one sign in which another is, since all things are what they are in the First Truth: therefore all things are true by one truth, as it seems.

§ 53. 5. Also, according to this that they are in the First Truth (as Anselm says in the Monologion), they are that which truth itself is: but truth itself is true by eternal truth: therefore every sign is true by eternal truth, as it seems.

§ 54. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. The truth of a sign is in the sign, as a form in a subject. If therefore a sign is true by the First Truth, the First Truth will be the form of many signs, which is heretical.

§ 55. 2. Also, in those in which there is no one reason of signifying in number or species, it is impossible for there to be one rectitude in number or species: therefore it is impossible for them to have one rectitude: but rectitude is truth, as Anselm says: therefore it is impossible for all things to be true by one truth.

§ 56. SOLUTION. Anselm does not intend all things to be true by one truth, except in a certain respect, namely exemplarily, and effectively: and this is true. Because the exemplar of the rectitude of signifying is one: and God is the cause of truth wherever there may be truth. And therefore that truth which is in signs can be considered in two ways, namely according to the procession from the exemplar into the sign: and thus the truth is one in Him from whom it proceeds, but not one by the unity of that into which it proceeds. Just as lines proceeding from the center to the circumference are united by the unity of the center, but are discerned by the diversity of the arcs upon which they fall on the part of the circumference: and therefore formally and essentially they are many truths: but exemplarily and effectively they are one.

§ 57. To the authorities of Anselm it must be said that he does not understand things to be the First Truth essentially, but exemplarily: and thus he also understands things to be in the First Truth: since he himself is speaking of things which exist in their proper natures.

§ 58. To the next it must be said that truly incommutable is nothing but the truth and essence First which is God: but the incommutability of the content in being is the incommutability of the sign, because an existing sign which is contained in being by God, cannot not signify: it can however not be a sign, and thus not signify.

§ 59. To the next it must be said that this is not true, except speaking exemplarily.

§ 60. To the last the solution is plain through the aforesaid.

DISTINCTIO XLII

Divisio Textus

Division of the Text. Now it must be treated concerning the omnipotence of God. Here begins that part which is concerning omnipotence.

§ 62. And it has three parts according to a threefold consideration of omnipotence. For it can be considered according to those things by which it has to be defined: and thus it is treated in this distinction. It is also considered according to the property which belongs to it according as it is rooted in the divine essence, which is that it cannot be limited and bounded in its ability: and thus it is treated in the following distinction 43, there, at A, Some however glorying in their own sense, etc. It can also be considered according to the mode by which it goes out into an operation: and thus it is treated in distinction 44, there, at A, Now that remains to be discussed, etc.

§ 63. This distinction is divided into three parts. In the first he posits that by reason of which it is called omnipotence: because through that it has to be defined. In the second he removes certain things, which declare impotence, from divine potency, there, at B, But it is inquired, How it is said to be able to do all things, etc. In the third, concerning the determined things, he objects and solves, there, at E, Here therefore to those considering diligently, the work of omnipotence appears according to two, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether Omnipotence Belongs to God; And, Whether He Acts with His Whole Power in His Omnipotence

Article 1. Whether omnipotence belongs to God? and, Whether He Himself acts by His total power in His omnipotence?

§ 65. Now five dubitable matters arise around the beginning: of which the first is, Whether omnipotence belongs to God? The second is, Whether it is proper to God to be omnipotent, or whether this can also belong to others? The third is, By reason of what that is in the essence, according to the account of the intelligence, does this follow the proper divine essence? The fourth is, What corresponds to it in the creature? The fifth and last is, Whether it is equated to the will and to knowledge, or is it broader?

§ 66. To the first one proceeds thus: 1. The Philosopher says in the fifth book of First Philosophy, that active potency is a principle of transmutation into another, insofar as it is another: [117] therefore every active potency supposes something upon which it acts. But God who creates, supposes nothing, but makes the whole: therefore He does not have an active potency. Now it is evident that He does not have a passive one: therefore it seems that He has none.

§ 67. 2. Also, every potency is towards another, because it is towards act: therefore something is of greater perfection than any potency: but nothing is of greater perfection than God or anything which is in God: therefore there is no potency in God, as it seems.

§ 68. 3. Also, let it be granted that there is a potency in Him: either it is conjoined to act, or not. If so, since a work accompanies a potency conjoined to act, it seems that a work always accompanies that potency. But the potency of God is from eternity: therefore the work will also be from eternity. But if you say that it is not conjoined to act: therefore it is conjoinable to something, which is not in it: and thus it is mutable, and perfectible by some perfection, which is false.

§ 69. 4. Also, in nature nothing is in vain: therefore much less in God. But the Philosopher says that if in nature there were some active potency to which no passive potency responded which would be completed by it, it would be in vain in nature: because some agent could enact some act, which nothing could receive.[118] Therefore it seems that if there is omnipotence in God, that it is necessary to posit some passive potency which receives every act of His: and this cannot be: therefore omnipotence seems to be in Him in vain. But nothing is in vain in Him: therefore, etc.

§ 70. 5. Also, we find in God a threefold mode of acting, namely natural, animal, and a quasi-artificial act. For we say that God generates, and God spirates: and in these there is the communicability of nature according to the distinction of hypostases: and we say that God knows, and wills, and the like: and these are quasi-animal acts: and we say that God creates, and governs. But no act is present without a potency: since therefore potencies are defined by acts, there will seem to be a threefold potency in God.

§ 71. 6. Also, in inferior things which are exemplated and regulated by superior things, we find that natural acts are not predicated univocally with their potencies, nor animal acts with their potencies, nor acts of art with these two: since therefore the inferior things are exemplated by the superior things, it seems that neither in superior things are the potencies which are towards those acts predicated univocally.

§ 72. 7. Also, in superior things we say that God can generate, and always generates, as was held above: and we say that God can know, and always in act knows and is aware: why then can we not say thus, God can create, and always creates? For it seems that it ought to be said: because whatever potency is less perfect before the act than in the act itself: hence since nothing imperfect falls into Him, He seems always to create.

§ 73. Also it is inquired next to this, Whether He Himself acts these threefold acts by His total power?

§ 74. It seems, however, that He does not: because when it is acted by the total power, the act equates to the power, so that that which is the object of the power is as great as the power itself. For the Father generates as much as He Himself is: therefore as much as His power is: and similarly He spirates. Similarly when He understands Himself, He is as intelligible as the intellective power. Therefore since the created thing is not as great as the creating power itself, He seems not to act in that action according to the total power, but according to a part.

§ 75. ON THE CONTRARY: If He acts according to a part, then the power is divisible: and this cannot be, since it is entirely simple.

§ 76. SOLUTION. It must be said that God is supremely powerful: such that He alone is truly powerful, whose power has nothing of infirmity intermixed.

§ 77. To the first, however, it must be said that His power is truly active, and no other: because, as Augustine says, the predicament of action truly belongs to God alone, because He acts without His own motion and passion.[119] But regarding what the Philosopher defines as active potency, such that it supposes that upon which it acts, it must be said that that is not of the essence of the definition of potency, but happens to it insofar as it is in an imperfect nature. But of the essence of the definition of potency, there is no more than that it is a principle of transmutation: and according to this it belongs to God, whose power transmutates non-being into being, and being in potency into being in act, and being in act into something better. Hence every transmutation is from that which in no way is transmutated and moved, as from an acting and moving power.

§ 78. To the next it must be said that a certain potency is towards another, which is the act, which is in the agent of the act, although as an act it is from it: and of such a potency it is true that it is more imperfect before the act than in the act itself, as is an understanding potency before the act, and universally what is in habit or potency before it proceeds into act. There is also a certain potency which is not in potency before the act, except according as the act is an effect, not something adventitious to the operating potency: and thus the power of God with respect to certain things is in habit, namely because the operated work does not immediately follow, although in that work nothing new comes to the power: for just as God is His power, so He is His action, as the Philosopher proves. Hence it is clear that He is not of greater perfection after the act, and when He is already in act, than before.

§ 79. To the next, some say that the power of God can be compared to a twofold act, namely to an interior one, and an exterior one. The interior they call such as to understand, and to will: and thus it is always in act. The exterior they call such as to create: and thus it is not always in act. But this solution does not solve the reasoning.

§ 80. Furthermore, when God creates, He does not act by an exterior action: because as Psalm 32:9 says: He spoke, and they were made: He commanded, and they were created.[120] And Augustine says that He creates by His Word, namely by speaking the Word. And Gregory Nazianzen: First indeed God thought up the heavenly essences: and His thinking was His work. Therefore it is clear that creation, according as it is in the Creator, posits nothing extrinsic.

117. Aristotle, Metaphysics, V.

§ 81. And therefore it must be said that all His potency is always in act, but not in an act which is an effect: since the effect cannot be at the same time with the acting potency. And of this an example has often been posited above: because God's operative knowledge and power and will, that something be made, are the efficient cause in the creature, since it is wisdom ordering and positing in created things the order of time and dignity and nature. Hence from eternity God knew and willed and said in the Word, that this should be made now, and that then, and this of this nature, and that of another. From this however no mutation is posited in God.

§ 82. To the next it must be said that nothing is in God in vain: but nevertheless it is impossible that His active potency have some passive potency responding to it, which could receive as much as that can enact: for it is not for this, but rather for the showing of the divine perfection. For it is impossible that it be demonstrated in a created effect: but it is demonstrated, according as it is infinite in the generation of the Son, and the procession of the Holy Spirit: and therefore it is not idle. But if it were for creating, according as it is infinite, and it were not demonstrated in creating, then it could be called idle.

§ 83. To the next it must be said that generation, and spiration, and understanding, and willing are not properly called acts: because nothing is enacted there. But if act is taken broadly and improperly, then it must be said that the power of God is considered in two ways, namely in comparison to the essence in which it is as in a root, and in comparison to the act. And according to the first mode it is not a power, except one. In the second mode, however, it will be varied according to the act, as was said above, where also certain things can be found which are dismissed here, namely whether power is predicated univocally of the power to generate and to create, and whether there is one power of the three according as it is the power to generate, and which is prior according to the account of intelligence, the power to generate or to create, and certain other things.

§ 84. To the next it must be said that it is otherwise in inferior things: because those powers are not founded in one essence, as in superior things: because all things which proceed from the first are multiplied, and are compounded, and receive exemplated in many what in the simple first is in one. For I well concede that the power of generating more respects nature, as nature is the principle from which the first pullulating thing pullulates, and the power of understanding and willing is according to relation to a spiritual nature turning back upon itself, as the rational soul does, which is exemplated by that power. But the power of creating by which it quasi-produces ideal accounts into ideated things, is more represented in mechanical art by the power of operating on artificial things. But all these in divine things are one, although there is a distinction in the account of the attributes.

§ 85. To the next it must be said that we do not say, God always creates according to act: because the act of that power is understood as the effect. Nevertheless I well concede that that power is never prior to the act which is to will and to know when and how it should be made: for this is the action of God which is the same as Himself, as has frequently been said.

118. Aristotle.

§ 86. To that which is further inquired, Whether He Himself acts by His total power in His omnipotence? It must be said that He does: but the enacted thing cannot be enacted infinitely, and just as the power is infinite: and this is because it is a certain thing enacted in a diversity of essence from the agent Himself: and therefore it is necessary that essences be finite: and since potency follows essence, the potency will also be finite: although God acts by His total power, as far as concerns Himself. There is also another reason: because wisdom limits the act itself, that is, that which is enacted: and thus, so that there may be a more perfect beauty which results from the grades of limited essences.

§ 1. But whether anything can be made better than it is made will be clear below in [distinction] 4.

Articulus 2 — Whether Omnipotence Is Proper to God Alone

Whether omnipotence is a proper attribute of God alone?

§ 2. Secondly, it is asked whether omnipotence is an attribute proper to God alone, or not?

It seems that it is not. 1. On Colossians 1:22, regarding the text, He has now reconciled in the body of his flesh through death, etc., the Gloss says as follows: "If as mortal and dead he can reconcile, now as glorious and immortal he can do all things." But it is evident that this is attributed to Christ according to his human nature; therefore, to be able to do all things does not belong to the divinity alone.

§ 3. 2. Also, on that same text, 1:20: To reconcile all things. The Gloss: "He can do all things through himself, so that nothing is excepted which cannot be provided through him." From this, the same is held as before.

1. Also. Omniscience belongs to divine perfection just as omnipotence does; and since the soul of Christ had the knowledge of all things, it seems that it also had omnipotence.

But because this was investigated in the third book of the Sentences, let it therefore be asked: whether this belongs to faith?

§ 4. But it seems that it does. Matthew 17:19: If you have faith like a mustard seed, you will say to this mountain, 'Move from here to there,' and it will move. And it follows: Nothing will be impossible for you: therefore all things are possible: therefore faith can do all things, as is also said in the text of Mark 9:22 therefore it seems that this does not belong to God alone.

Also, since the working of miracles is communicated to faith, and in a certain way the ability to do all things, it is asked whether this is by uncreated power operating on account of faith, or by created power? If uncreated: then it does not seem to belong to faith. But if created: then I ask, why is this given to faith rather than to charity, which is more perfect than faith?

119. Augustine, De Trinitate, V, c. 8.

§ 5. If on account of these authorities it is said that omnipotence can belong to something other than God. On the contrary:

1. Among all power, the highest power is to be able of itself: but this cannot belong to anything that is from another: therefore it seems that omnipotence belongs to God alone.
2. Also, to create is an act educing something from nothing: but nothing is not proportioned to being: therefore it is an act unproportionable to any created power: therefore it cannot belong to a creature.

§ 6. Solution. It must be said that omnipotence is an attribute proper to the divine nature alone. And regarding what is objected through the two Glosses concerning Christ according to his human nature, it must be said that it is understood of the person in the human nature: and this person is indeed omnipotent just as the Father is. Concerning this, however, very many things are found on the third book [of the Sentences], where it is also resolved how the knowledge of all things is given to him, but not the power of all things.

§ 7. To what is further asked about faith, it must be said that when it is said that all things are possible for the one who believes, the distribution is accommodated only for those things above nature which serve for the demonstration (e.g., to transplant into the sea, and it will obey you) and proof of faith: because faith is in a certain way proved through miracles. But certain things show the ultimate infinity and immensity of power, such as creating the world from nothing, or conjoining the divine nature with the human in one person: and these I do not think are subject to faith.

§ 8. To the next objection, it must be said that faith raises a human being to omnipotence, which is an article of faith, and which proves the whole faith: but this is not the case with charity: because charity does not regard anything but the good as its object: nor does it seek to be proved, but rather to inhere: and therefore this is more congruent with faith.

§ 9. To the next, it must be said that in the way faith works all things that prove it among the people for whom signs are necessary, it can be said that a created power flowing into faith from uncreated power does this, so that the primary power of operating is the uncreated power, and under it operates the created power of faith.

Articulus 3 — It Is Asked, Since Every Proper Attribute Is Among the Things That Follow the Essence, as Boethius Says, by Reason of That Which Is in the Divine Essence or Substance, Whether This Omnipotence Follows the Divine Essence; And, Whether Immutability or Omnipotence More Immediately Follows the Divine Essence

It is asked: since every proper attribute is among those things following upon the essence, as Boethius says, by reason of what is in the divine essence or substance does this omnipotence follow the divine essence? And, whether incommutability or omnipotence more immediately follows the divine essence?

120. Ps. 32:9.

§ 10. Thirdly, it is asked: since every proper attribute is among those things following upon the essence, as Boethius says, by reason of what is in the divine essence or substance does this omnipotence follow the divine essence?

§ 11. It seems that omnipotence follows the essence insofar as it is not from nothing.

1. For the first defect impeding perfect ability is due to the fact that the creature is from nothing: therefore it seems that the opposite is the cause of the opposite: therefore not to be from nothing will be the reason for production from nothing.
2. Also, it will be held below that omnipotence belongs to God insofar as he can do all things that he wills, and suffer absolutely nothing: but to suffer all things is according to vertibility and mutability: therefore, by way of opposites according to the cause of immutability, to be able to suffer nothing will be the case: but the reason of mutability is entirely to be from nothing, as Damascene says: therefore to suffer nothing is according to the fact that it is not to be from nothing, as it seems, that is to be omnipotent: therefore omnipotence follows not being from nothing, as it seems.

§ 12. ON THE CONTRARY: Omnipotence is determined through the will, as is often held in the text [of Lombard], because the Lord is called omnipotent because he can do all things that he wills to be done: therefore it follows the will: therefore it does not immediately follow not being from nothing.

Also, two proper attributes cannot follow the same thing according to the same respect in a substance: but incommutability follows not being from nothing, as was proved above: therefore omnipotence does not follow that.

§ 13. Further it is asked, which of these follows the divine essence more immediately, incommutability or omnipotence? It seems that it is incommutability: because

1. Augustine says that true incommutability is true eternity: therefore incommutability follows the ratio of eternity: but this belongs to the essence itself enduring always: therefore incommutability also: but omnipotence is determined toward acts: therefore this does not follow as immediately as incommutability.
2. Also, incommutability refers to nature: but omnipotence refers to acts and objects that are outside the divine essence: therefore omnipotence seems not to be from God immediately, as incommutability is.

§ 14. ON THE CONTRARY: Incommutability is communicated to someone, such as the blessed: but omnipotence to no one, not even to the man Christ: therefore omnipotence is more immediate than incommutability.

§ 15. Solution. It must be said that omnipotence is a proper attribute of the divine substance, and it follows the perfection of the essence in which someone is. For although in God there is nothing according to reality that distinguishes that which is (quod est) and that by which it is (quo est), nevertheless there is a difference there between that by which it is and who

it is (quis est), which is the person, not indeed according to a real difference, but according to a difference of reason. Whence, just as the Philosopher says in the book De Anima that form is in the ratio of a threefold cause, namely formal insofar as it gives being and nature, and final insofar as it is intended by the efficient cause, and efficient insofar as after perfection in being it is converted into a principle of acting: so we can say according to the understanding's reasoning in divine matters, that omnipotence follows the substance or essence insofar as in the person it is converted into a principle of acting, and this follows the perfection in being which the person gives, speaking quasi-formally, or to that which is called who it is or what it is. And I readily concede that it does not follow the essence from that part by which it is not from nothing, except remotely, but rather incommutability follows it from that part. Whence I readily concede that true incommutability follows the essence more immediately than omnipotence.

§ 16. Therefore it must be said to the first objection that it is true that an imperfection of power follows the creature from the fact that it is from nothing, but not immediately; rather, by means of the vertibility which immediately follows that.

§ 17. To the next, it must be said that suffering nothing follows the perfection of the essence, insofar as it has nothing of matter or of the properties of matter. And this is according as that which is does not differ from that by which it is, and conversely: and this does not immediately follow not being vertible, but remotely; but rather, not being vertible follows not beginning from a turning [i.e., from change or creation from nothing].

§ 18. To what is objected concerning the will, it must be said that omnipotence is not determined by the will except on the part of the object which is freely chosen, and this also applies to any other power to which an object is proportioned and which cannot operate otherwise.

§ 19. To what is objected on the contrary, it must be said that incommutability, as was proved above by many authorities, is communicable to no one: but incommutability according to act, not according to potency, is communicated, just as power is, although not omnipotence, just as neither is true incommutability.

Articulus 4 — What Corresponds to the Divine Omnipotence on the Part of the Thing

What corresponds to divine omnipotence on the part of the thing?

§ 20. Fourthly, it is asked: what corresponds to it on the part of the thing?

And it seems that nothing does: because 1. Everything that is in a creature seems to be being, or true, or good: for these are among the primary things: but being does not correspond to power, because power is prior to being: and the true corresponds to knowledge, and the good to will: therefore it seems that nothing corresponds to power.

§ 21. 2. Also, just as what acts in actuality relates to being in actuality that is produced, so power acting relates to being in potency that can be produced: but what acts in actuality

produces the first created being: therefore power acting produces no created thing: therefore nothing in the creature corresponds to power.

1. Also, power extends to those things that will never be: therefore it does not necessarily connote anything in the creature.

If this is conceded, that nothing in the creature corresponds to it to which it may be referred.

On the contrary: 1. Every name said of God that connotes nothing in a creature designates the essence alone: power is such a name: therefore it designates the essence alone, as it seems: therefore it seems that whatever can be said of the essence could also be said of power, which is false.

1. Also, according to this, what was held above would be false, where the Master says that these three demand a special tract: because they are said of God in respect to creatures.

§ 22. Solution. It must be said, as above, that neither power, nor knowledge, nor will connote an effect in the creature: because if this were so, they would not belong to God from eternity; rather, they signify the divine essence with respect to the creature. And I readily concede that power regards possible being proportioned to the power of the maker, and proportioned to being made, not that it is proportioned to the power of the maker in quantity, so that it is as great as the power: but it is proportioned according to the decency of the operator. And how this is so will be inquired below in the question, What God can do, and what he cannot do? But that possible being is not posited to be except in the power of the maker, just as the knowable is not posited to be except in an idea or in potency, and the willed only in potency. But this being in potency is not absolutely nothing, although it is nothing in actuality, or in a proximate cause which is the matter or form of a thing.

§ 23. And through this the solution to the first three objections is clear. To what is objected to the contrary, it must be said that it does indeed signify the essence, yet it posits a respect to being in potency to be created: and therefore not everything that is said of the essence applies to it.

Articulus 5 — Whether the Divine Power Is Equal to the Divine Knowledge

Whether divine power is equated to knowledge?

§ 24. Fifthly and lastly it is asked: whether power is equated to knowledge?

It seems that it is not: because knowledge is of good and of evil, but power is only of good: therefore knowledge extends to more than power.

§ 25. ON THE CONTRARY: Knowledge being posited posits power, and not conversely: therefore power extends to more and is prior to knowledge: for it follows, he knows: therefore he can know; but not conversely.

Also, it seems that power follows the will: because

1. Thus it is said, Wisdom 12:18: For power is present to you when you will. Therefore the will is prior to power.
2. Also, Anselm in the book Cur Deus homo says that in all those having power and will, power follows the will: such as I can walk if I will, I can speak if I will, and the like: therefore it is thus also in God: therefore the will is prior to power.
3. Also, Luke 5:12, on the text, Lord, if you will, you can make me clean: Ambrose says: "The will of God is power." But because in the following distinction very many things are held concerning this in the text, let these therefore suffice.

§ 26. Solution. Above, the order of these three was disputed, and let those points be presupposed here.

But it must be said that power is considered in three ways. In one way, as it is the genus of all powers however designated, and thus it is not toward an act, but it follows [i.e., is a broader category applicable to] knowledge and will and any other power, as a genus to a species: and in this way power precedes the will and knowledge: and Richard says that from power is knowledge, and from knowledge and power is love. In another way, power is spoken of as compared to a work indefinitely: and in this way we say that God can do many things by his absolute power which he neither does nor will do. In a third way, power is spoken of as regulated by operative art, and executing what is pre-conceived by wisdom and willed by the will: and this is only of those things which will be, or have been, or are.

§ 27. Also, knowledge is taken in two ways, namely for speculative knowledge which is of both good and evil, and for the knowledge of approbation which is of good only.

Also, the will is also taken in two ways, namely as it is the general mover of all faculties and powers to act, as it is said, I understand, because I will; I eat, because I will; I walk, because I will.

I say therefore that power spoken of in the first way precedes the other two: but in the second and third ways it does not. And knowledge spoken of in the first way precedes power spoken of in the second and third ways. And the will in the second way is spoken of in relation to the willed object, which is good: and spoken of in this way, it is equal with power spoken of in the second and third ways. And knowledge spoken of in the second way is equal with power and will taken in the ultimate way.

And from this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 6 — Whether God Can Do Every Impossible Thing, Both Per Accidens and Per Se

Whether God can do every impossible thing, both per accidens and per se?

§ 28. Next it is asked concerning those things that are said in the text [of Lombard], there at A, How God is truly called omnipotent: whether because he can do all things, etc.

For it seems from this that he can do impossible things. Which also seems true for several other reasons.

1. For it is impossible for nature that something be from nothing: and yet God can do this: therefore he can do the impossible.

§ 29. 2. Also, nothing and something are more distant than something and something: therefore it is a greater distance for something to be made from nothing than for something to be made from something: but he makes something from nothing every day in the creation of rational souls, and he did so in the whole world: therefore much more can he make something from whatever is something, such as a contrary from a contrary, and a disparate from a disparate, and a habit from a privation, and conjoin relative opposites.

1. Also, nature successively makes one contrary from another well enough, and an opposite from an opposite: since therefore God infinitely exceeds the power of nature, he can make opposites to be true simultaneously.
2. Also, God shows certain things in his work which are of greater power than those, such as the union of God and man: for God and man are more distant than man and donkey: therefore if he could make it so that someone is simultaneously God and man, he can make it so that someone is simultaneously man and donkey.

§ 30. 5. Also, two substantial forms that have contrary properties and differences are more distant from the same matter than two accidental forms: but he conjoined substantial forms, such as created and uncreated, and mortal and immortal, etc.: therefore he can conjoin accidental ones, however distant, such as white and black, and other opposites, as it seems.

1. Also, it is more impossible that an act of a power be conjoined with a contrary habit remaining in the power, than that contrary acts should be present on account of diverse and contrary habits: but God did the first, when he made a Virgin remaining a Virgin to give birth: therefore he can also do the second, namely that someone be simultaneously blind and seeing, and that he see and not see.

§ 31. 7. Also, Luke 1:37: No word will be impossible with God: it is evident that he excepts nothing: therefore it seems that all things are possible for him. Also, Mark 14:36: Abba, Father, all things are possible for you.

1. Also, we see that through the Saints he does things impossible for nature to do, such as those we call miracles: therefore it seems that through himself he can do those things that are impossible absolutely speaking.

Also, there is no boundary to infinite power: therefore it is not bounded by the impossible: therefore it can do every impossible thing.

§ 32. Further it is asked concerning what is said, that God cannot do the impossible per accidens.

For this does not seem so: because 1. The impossible per se is more impossible than the impossible per accidens: but he can do the impossible per se, such as a Virgin giving birth, making a dead man live, and the like: therefore much more can he do the impossible per accidens.

1. Also, in the impossible per accidens, nothing causes the impossibility except pastness: and this already is not, because the Philosopher says that the past is not: but in the impossible per se, the cause of impossibility is an opposition which is: therefore since non-being resists the operator less than an opposed being, it seems that he could more easily do the impossible per accidens than the impossible per se.

§ 33. Also it is asked concerning what Jerome says: Although God can do all things, he cannot make a virgin from one who is corrupted.

For this seems entirely false: because 1. Only two things are required for virginity, namely integrity of body and purity of mind. But it is evident that God can do the first, as Jerome himself also says; and penance which restores to integrity can do the second. Therefore much more can God. Therefore he can make a virgin from one corrupted: and this was impossible per accidens: therefore he can do the impossible per accidens.

1. Also, he can do the impossible per se, such as making a woman from a rib, and a calf from a trunk, as Anselm says, and a dragon from a rod, and conversely: therefore he can do the impossible per accidens, and the impossible per se.

§ 34. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Augustine says on Genesis that God cannot nor does operate anything contrary to the causal reasons which he primitively inserted into nature: but impossibilities are contrary to these reasons: therefore God cannot do impossibilities.

1. Also, no artisan from the same art has the power of operating opposites, because thus the same thing would be the rule of opposites and in one way, which cannot be: therefore neither can he make opposites according to one art of operating: but it is evident that this natural course is patterned upon the divine art: therefore to do contrary to this course is to operate contrary to the eternal art: but to operate contrary to the art is to operate contrary to wisdom: since therefore God cannot do anything contrary to his wisdom, God also can do nothing contrary to the course of nature.

§ 35. 3. Also, One building, and another destroying, what utility is there in either? [121] If therefore the power of God is most ordered, and he built the machine of the world usefully, just as he cannot have useless power, so he cannot act contrary to the natural course, as it seems.

1. Also, Augustine against Faustus: "The proposition by which we say something has been is true for this reason, because that of which we say it has been, already is not: God cannot make this proposition false, because he is not contrary to the truth." From this it is gathered that God cannot do the impossible per accidens.

§ 36. Also, in the same place: "God, the creator and founder of all natures, does nothing contrary to nature, just as he does not act contrary to himself: therefore it seems that God could do nothing contrary to nature, just as he does not act contrary to himself:" therefore it seems that God does nothing contrary to nature.

Also, in the same place: "God never does anything out of power to uproot the institutes of his own reason:" but it is evident that he would uproot them if he operated contrary to the reasons instilled in nature: therefore he can do nothing contrary to nature.

§ 37. Solution. It must be said, in my judgment, that possible being is the object of divine power. But since every object ought to be proportioned to that power of which it is the object —just as the true as a sign is proportioned to opinion, and the true through a cause is proportioned to the intellect and to knowledge, and so it is in all others—so too it is necessary that possible being be taken as proportioned in some way to the power operating and making it. Now, it can be proportioned in two ways, namely to the making of the maker, and to the being made of the thing to be made; that is, in comparison to the maker, and in comparison to the matter and to the thing which is made. In the first way, conditions are placed around it which do not weaken the power of the efficient cause, and do not ennoble it less: such as that it does not induce deterioration in him, such as dying, sinning, eating, and the like, concerning which it will be treated in the second part of this reading; and if these are not found in the possible itself, we say God can do it. But the proportion to being made is such that it does not simultaneously have opposition, since I certainly think that the power of God which is infinite could indeed make opposites simultaneously; nevertheless, I do not think that they can be made simultaneously: since being made is proportioned to the potency of matter and of the created being. But making is proportioned to infinite power. And thus it seems it must be conceded that God can do many things by his power which nevertheless cannot be made in creatures, because of the impediment of opposition and confusion: opposition, as in opposites; and confusion, as in the unions of forms differing in species, such as that the same thing be a human and a donkey, and the like.

§ 38. These things being seen, it is easy to answer the objections.

For it must be said to the first objection that although nothing and something are more distant than contrary opposites or privative opposites, nevertheless they are not more contrary in creation, because in that they are not posited simultaneously in the same thing, but according to order: and therefore there is neither contrariety in being made there, nor contrariety in making: but nevertheless this is shown to be impossible for nature, and not absolutely.

§ 39. To the next it must be said that a contrary being made from a contrary, presupposing a subject or transmutable matter, is not a matter of great power, because nature also does this: and therefore this does not show omnipotence in God. But that contraries should be simultaneously in the same thing according to the same respect, this is contrary to being made, and therefore it is not attributed to the operating power.

121. Ecclesiasticus 34:28 (Vulgate 34:28).

§ 40. To the next it must be said that although God infinitely exceeds the power of nature, nevertheless he does not make contraries and opposites to be simultaneously: not because he is powerless to do this, because he indeed has the power of educing both simultaneously: but because they cannot be made simultaneously.

§ 41. To the next it must be said that God and man are distant without proportion: and therefore the uniting power was an infinite virtue in one of the united parts, namely in the divine nature. But in other things that might be united, an infinite virtue could not be posited in one of the united parts, but rather a repugnance would be found: and therefore others cannot be thus united, although God could unite them.

§ 42. To the next it must be said that substantial forms are more distant according to comparison to matter (because one matter is not simultaneously possible for two substantial forms) than accidental forms in a genus: but they are not more distant than contrary accidental forms in the ratio of contrariety: because between those there is a repugnance and the destruction of one by the other, and therefore they are not united, nor can they be united.

§ 43. To the next it must be said that there is some potency to giving birth in a virgin remaining a virgin, but it is bound: and although it is not released to act except by corrupted virginity through a natural release, nevertheless it could be released to act by a power that is above nature while the bond remains; and therefore that act is not contrary to the potency, although it has a difformity with the bond of virginity. But contraries and privatively opposed things destroy one another when posited: and therefore it is contrary to their ratio to be able to be simultaneously: and therefore a blind man remaining blind cannot see, even by a miracle: but a virgin remaining a virgin can give birth by a miracle: because in the blind man the whole order to sight is removed, but in the virgin an order to giving birth is posited, although the potency is bound.

§ 44. To the next it must be said that nothing is impossible for God to make, which does not imply impotence: but toward being made, not all things are possible with God.

§ 45. To the next it must be said that that argument is not valid—if he works miracles through the Saints, that he could do certain impossibilities, that is, incompossibilities, through himself—unless it is referred to making, and not to being made: but it follows that he himself through himself, and not from another, can do greater things out of proportion to these, provided they are compossible: for incompossibilities in being made are opposites, the positing of one of which destroys the other, and conversely.

§ 46. To what is further asked about the impossible per accidens, it must be said with Augustine and Jerome that the impossible per accidens cannot be made, and therefore God is not said to be able to make it.

§ 47. To what is objected to the contrary, it must be said that the impossible per se is taken in two ways. First, as that which does not have potency to another from the fact that a repugnant form is present in it: as we say that it is impossible for a human to be a donkey, or to be made a donkey. And from this is not removed the potency by which any creature can be made whatever God wills, such as a calf from a trunk, or a donkey from a human. In the

second way, the impossible is that which arises from the impossibility of two opposites. The impossible spoken of in the first way is itself twofold, namely according as something with a disparate form is compared to another nobler form, as a trunk to a calf: and this is not repugnant to the order of wisdom, although it is repugnant to nature, because it is the form of this particular thing. And according as something is compared to a less noble form, as when it is said to be impossible for a human to be or be made a donkey: for that is repugnant to the order of nature, because the rational is not ordered to the irrational as to a more perfect thing, but rather conversely: and it is also repugnant to the order of wisdom. Whence I say that all these impossibilities are not possible to be made: but when it is said that God can make them, one is more elongated from his power than another: yet nevertheless, in each of them, matter is presupposed in the ratio of obedience; but in the impossible per accidens, matter is not posited, because it yields into non-being, and therefore that is more elongated from divine power.

§ 48. Whence to the argument it must be said that the impossible per se is more impossible than the impossible per accidens: this proposition can be understood in three ways. First, regarding the ratio of the impossible, and thus it is false: because the ratio of the impossible is spoken of from privation, and a privation does not admit of more and less: whence in this way every impossible thing is equally impossible. In a second way it can [be understood]...

§ 1. ...understood with respect to distance from the potency of obedience: and thus again it is false: because the impossible by accident is more distant than the impossible per se. Thirdly, it can be understood with respect to repugnance to being, which is imported from the fact that it is impossible, and thus it is true: because the impossible per se is more repugnant to being than the impossible by accident: because the impossible by accident could have been, whereas the impossible per se never could have been, nor can be, nor will be able to be, even though God is always able to do it.

§ 2. Through this, the solution to the following is also clear: because although the past is not, from this very fact there follows a greater distance from the potency of obedience.

§ 3. To that which is asked concerning the saying of Jerome, it must be said that Jerome does not deny that she can be restored in mind and body with respect to the state of immunity from fault: but the past cannot not have been past, according as that which has been said or done can no longer be taken up: but now she is a virgin, because now she is intact, but not because she was never corrupted.

§ 4. To the other, it must be said that it was not in the rib, as Augustine says, that a woman should be made from it, but rather that she could be made from it: and in this nothing is signified except the potency of obedience, about which inquiry will be made later.

§ 5. To those arguments which are objected to the contrary, one must respond similarly, by saying that He does not work against the rational principles which He implanted in nature: but He implanted twofold principles, namely seminal ones which are unfolded through the work of nature, and also through the work of good and bad Angels, sometimes with greater speed than through nature: just as Augustine says that the operation of the magicians was natural with respect to the seminal order, but not with respect to the act: and He also

implanted certain causal rational principles of obedience, which He does not unfold except in miracles sprung up through time, since every thing has the potency of obeying the command of the Creator: and against these He works nothing, but operates according to them by supernatural operation.

§ 6. To the other, it must be said that potency considered absolutely is more general than is practical art or science: and therefore that objection does not proceed, except concerning an executing potency, and not concerning potency considered absolutely. But whether He can work against His wisdom will be clear in the following distinction.

§ 7. To the other, it must be said that He would not destroy it if He worked other things or things opposite to these: because by positing other things these are not destroyed: but by positing opposite things, it follows that these were not works: therefore they will not be destroyed: because whatever course of nature He Himself had given, that would be natural.

§ 8. To the following arguments the response is clear through those things that have been said.

Articulus 7 — Whether and How God Can Do All Things

Whether and how God can make all things?

§ 9. Next, inquiry is made concerning this which he says there, "God can indeed do all things, but He does not do except what is fitting to His truth, etc."

§ 10. For it is asked, What are truth and justice called here? For truth is in words and in deeds, and whatever He would make, would have truth: therefore it seems that this is not the reason why He makes these things, and not others.

§ 11. Also, it is most just that He should make whatever He willed: therefore it is not more just that He should make these things than others.

§ 12. Also, what is it that Augustine says in the text: "God could make all things simultaneously, but reason prohibited it"? It seems no reason prohibited it: because Augustine himself on Genesis says that He made all things simultaneously. And, Ecclesiasticus 18:1: "He who lives forever created all things simultaneously." Therefore no reason prohibited this, as it seems.

§ 13. Furthermore it is asked, What is that reason? For it is either created or uncreated. If created: then it cannot prohibit the Creator, whose power nothing resists. But if it is uncreated: then it seems that something uncreated prohibits an operating power, and thus there would be contrariety in God, which is false.

§ 14. Solution. It must be said that truth and justice are to be referred here to the eternal preordination concerning things to be made: for this is the first truth in which all things to be made were life and light, before they were in themselves, so that truth is called art, and predetermining wisdom, and justice is that which befits the one predetermining the work: because it is fitting that He does not change, nor however would it misbeseem Him if He did

that thing: but change would misbeseem Him if He were to come from one predetermination of things to be made into another, led as if by repentance concerning the first.

§ 15. To that which is asked about reason, it must be said that "reason" here denotes the created order of nature proceeding from the uncreated ordering reason: and that order prohibits all things from being simultaneous.

§ 16. To that which is objected, that all things are simultaneous, it must be said that he does not understand "simultaneously" here according to the mode by which all things are simultaneously in the formal and material principles of nature, but simultaneously by a simultaneity of all individuals in the same time: because in this way the whole work of nature would perish, which is through succession and generation, and the qualities of the elements would be useless, since they would not act toward generation and corruption, and the motion of the heaven would be useless, and the whole order of nature would perish: and for this reason He did not make all things simultaneously, although He could have done this.

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§ 25. "Here it is to be diligently considered, etc." Here begins the third part of this distinction, in which the Master gathers up those things concerning which divine omnipotence is considered, and he objects in the following chapter F to the contrary, and solves in the third, chapter G, and in this the distinction is finished.

Articulus 8 — Whether God Can Walk, Speak, Sin, Die, Be Deceived, Become Wretched, and Be Conquered

Whether God can walk, speak, sin, die, be deceived, become miserable, and be conquered? Whether God can walk, speak, sin, die, be deceived, become miserable, and be conquered?

§ 17. Next, inquiry is made concerning this which he says there at B, "For He cannot walk, or speak, etc."

§ 18. For I infer thus: 1. God can do all things: therefore He can walk and speak. If it does not follow: therefore to walk and to speak speak of impotence: and this is false, because they speak of potency and dignity: therefore it seems that these things ought not to be excepted.

§ 19. 2. Also, it is objected concerning the following which is to sin. For the Philosopher says that the potency of the depraved is to be chosen: therefore He Himself can do depraved things, because nothing of choiceworthy things is lacking to Him: therefore he seems to speak falsely.

§ 20. 3. Also, he himself in chapter C enumerates four things which God cannot do, namely die, be deceived, become miserable, and be conquered: and it is asked, according to what are those taken?

§ 21. Solution. It must be said that God cannot walk, nor speak: and this is because, since this verb "can" [potest] is prohaeretic [i.e., indicates choice or capacity applied to an action], if it

were joined with an infinitive signifying the act of that potency, that act would be understood to be compared to the subject of this verb "can", as to that in which the action is present, just as when it is said, "I can build": whence, since a comparison of this sort is understood here, the proposition is false.

§ 22. To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that walking and speaking indeed do not bespeak impotence, but they are not exercised without impotence: because to operate with bodily instruments belongs to imperfection: and therefore the Master says that by reason of that which belongs to potency in them they are not removed from the divine power: because God can make a walking, and a speaking, that is, so that someone walks.

§ 23. To the other, the response was made in the second book of the Sentences, that the potency of the depraved is not choiceworthy insofar as it is of the depraved: but the potency of the depraved insofar as it is free, is choiceworthy: and this is shown, because it is not obligated by the necessity of nature to the good, as the potency of fire to burn. And that which the Philosopher says, that God can do depraved things, must be understood materially, that is, He can do certain things which currently are depraved, which however if He Himself were to do them, would not be depraved.

§ 24. To the other it must be said that of those four, certain ones indicate a defect in being, certain ones in well-being: in being, as to die: in well-being, as the others: and then to be deceived is referred to a defect of the cognitive potency, but misery to the potency of affect, but to be conquered to resisting another in both, namely in intellect and in affect.

Articulus 9 — Whether the Simply Possible Is Said According to Inferior Causes or Superior

Whether the possible is said simply according to inferior causes, or superior ones?

§ 26. But here there arises a question, upon which all the preceding depends: Whether the possible is said simply according to inferior causes, or superior ones? § 27. Now it seems that it is according to inferior causes: because 1. The possible follows that in which potency for becoming is first found: but this is matter: therefore it seems that the possibility and impossibility of something becoming or not becoming follows matter and the disposition of matter.

§ 28. 2. Also, unless the possible were said according to inferior causes, nothing will be impossible: because "no word shall be impossible with God."

§ 29. 3. Also, Aristotle in Physics II reprehends those who posited chance and fortune in the heaven, on the grounds that in perpetual things there is ordered necessity: therefore much more so in eternal things: since therefore for a possible to become is for it to be possible not to become, it seems that the possible is not according to superior causes, but inferior ones.

§ 30. 4. Also, the necessary and the contingent are taken according to inferior causes: because otherwise all things would be necessary: therefore it seems that the possible is too.

§ 31. 5. Also, the Commentator on the ninth book of the First Philosophy says: Nothing is in potency in anything, except what can be educed from it by one natural mover: therefore it seems that the impossible is not said except according to natural causes: therefore not according to superior causes.

§ 32. But if this is conceded, ON THE CONTRARY: 1. 1 Corinthians 1:20, on that text, "Has not God made foolish the wisdom of this world?" the Gloss says: "The wisdom of this world judges as impossible what it does not see in the natures of things. God made this foolish by declaring possible what it judges impossible": therefore the possible simply is said according to superior causes.

§ 33. 2. Also, if the possible were not said except according to inferior causes, then this would not be true: "Before the world was, it was possible for the world to be." Also, this would also be impossible: "It is possible for a rational soul to be made": because it does not have an inferior cause. Also, this would not be possible: "It is possible for this man to be justified." Also, concerning a blind man who has been illumined it is true that he now sees: therefore since any act posited as now, infers a capacity for the act before this now, it will be true that before he was illumined, it was possible for him to see. Also, a Virgin gave birth: therefore it was possible for a Virgin to give birth: either one must say that all those things are impossible: or one must say that the possible is said according to superior causes.

§ 34. Solution. In my judgment it must be said that the possible is always posited concerning something: and according to the form and matter of that concerning which it is posited, a judgment must be made about it: for things are not in potency in the same way: therefore the possible said concerning them will not be said in the same way: but the possible is in that which becomes in comparison to the efficient cause which has it to make it. Now some name as possible a matter with a disposition contrary to that which is said to be able to become: as when it is said, a blind man can see, and a virgin can give birth. Whence it seems to me that such things should not be called possible before the act: because the potency and the act are given to them simultaneously. But some are ordered according to the potency of becoming only under divine power, as it is possible for the world to be made, and it is possible for an Angel to be made, and every created thing is possible: and in these no possibility is supposed except that of obedience to the will of the Creator, not with anything disposing to the contrary: and therefore those are conceded as possibles of the efficient potency only, although "possibility" is less properly called the potency of the efficient cause, but more properly it is called a complete power [potestas completa], whereas possibility is called the imperfect potency of matter, and potency is common to both.

§ 35. Therefore it must be said to the first objections, that those arguments well conclude concerning the possible which has potency with a disposition of matter: because they are not in potency to anything contrary to the disposition and form which they have: and if it comes to be simultaneously, potency and act are conferred upon them by a superior power.

§ 36. To those things which are objected to the contrary, it must be said that in such things nothing ordered to the contrary of that which becomes is supposed, when it is said, "this man

can be justified," and "the heaven and an Angel can be made," or "a rational soul," although concerning the soul there is another reason than concerning the others. But when it is said, "a blind man can see," and "a virgin can give birth": it seems to me that they are false, because by virtue of the noun concerning which the potency is posited, a disposition and necessity to the contrary of that which is said to be able to become is signified. Whence such things posited in act do not infer their potencies before the act in past time: because before the act they had no potency for that act.

§ 37. To the Gloss, it must be said that worldly wisdom judged such things impossible for God, and in this it was foolish: because nothing is impossible for Him. However, some feel differently, saying that the possible and the necessary are varied according to the sciences: whence they say that the possible in nature is said according to inferior causes, but in theology according to superior causes. But this does not seem right: because what is possible simply, is possible everywhere, and the same holds for the necessary and the impossible.

Articulus 10 — Whether Omnipotence Can Belong to Others Than God; And, Whether It Is Common to the Three Persons; And, Whether It Can Belong to the Blessed

Whether omnipotence can belong to others besides God? and, Whether it is common to the three persons? and, Whether it can belong to the blessed? Whether omnipotence can belong to others besides God? and, Whether it is common to the three persons? and, Whether it can belong to the blessed?

§ 38. Next, inquiry is made concerning this which he says in the last chapter, there, "But perhaps you will say, Neither does the Father give to the Son, etc."

§ 39. For from this it seems that to be able to do all things could belong to another than God, even if he has that power from another.

§ 40. BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. If some proper attribute follows a certain substance by reason of some principle which is in another substance, if that principle is incommunicable, the proper attribute will be incommunicable: but omnipotence follows the divine substance by reason of the perfection of being in this hypostasis, as was held above: therefore unless that perfection is communicable, omnipotence will be incommunicable: but that is incommunicable: therefore omnipotence too.

§ 41. 2. Also, if he could do all things, then he could also create, which is false, because to create is an act of infinite power, since being and nothing have no finite proportion, and whatever is created is educed from nothing.

§ 42. Also it is asked further, Whether omnipotence is common to the three persons, just as the essence in which the power is rooted?

§ 43. And it seems that it is: because 1. All essential attributes are common: therefore power is too.

§ 44. 2. Also, if there were not one power of the three, one would have something of the essential attributes that another would not have, which would take away equality from them.

§ 45. BUT ON THE CONTRARY to the first it is objected thus: The perfection of beatitude consists in perfect power, and perfect knowing, and perfect goodness, because all goods are reduced to those: but perfect power is nothing but omnipotence: therefore it seems that omnipotence is communicated to all the blessed.

§ 46. Also against the second: because the Father can generate the Son: but the Son cannot: therefore not whatever the Father can do, the Son can also do, as it seems.

§ 47. Solution. It must be said that power is communicable: but omnipotence in no way, just as the first two arguments prove.

§ 48. To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that there is perfection in the highest degree, and this does not belong except to God alone: and there is perfection according to the possible mode of a glorified creature, and this perfection is what beatifies the blessed.

§ 49. To that which is further asked, it must be said that there is one power of the three, and similarly omnipotence.

§ 50. To that however which is objected to the contrary, it has been disputed and answered above.

DISTINCTIO XLIII

Divisio Textus

DIVISION AND EXPOSITION OF THE TEXT.

§ 51. "Certain men glorying in their own sense, etc." This distinction, in which the Master inquires into the infinity of divine power, is divided according to those things which those who strive to disprove the infinity of divine power object. Now there are three, as is said in the Text, namely verisimilar reasons, by which they object first. Secondly, fabricated causes are posited, by which they object, there, D, § 3: "They also add saying, God does or leaves aside nothing, except by an optimal and reasonable cause, etc." Thirdly, they object through authorities perversely understood, there, E, "But to these those scrutinizers who, etc."

§ 52. Now there are three chapters in the first part: in the first and second of which, namely A and B, the Master introduces two verisimilar arguments, of which the first is this: God cannot do except what is just and good to be done: but whatever is just and good to be done, all that He does, because otherwise He would be convicted of omission: therefore whatever He can do, He does: therefore He cannot do more than He does. The second is this: God cannot do except what justice demands: but justice does not demand to do except what He does: therefore He cannot do except what He does.

§ 53. But in the third chapter C, the Master solves these two arguments: and the intention of his solution consists in the distinction of this proposition, "God cannot do, except what is

just and good to be done." For in this locution there is posited this verb, "can" [potest], which has the force of amplifying, and it is posited concerning God as powerful: and this which I say, "is just and good to be done," falls under this verb, "can," as the matter in which the act of that power which the verb copulates is terminated: therefore the locution is twofold, namely that it can be understood that it first falls under the verb having the force of amplifying before it is restricted by the verb "is" [est], to a present "just and good": and then the word "is" [est] will not copulate the present time, but a confused time, corresponding to potency: and then it is true under the sense which the Master posits, "God cannot, etc.," that is, He cannot do except what would be good and just, if it were done. If however on the contrary "just and good" is understood to be restricted first by the verb "is," to a present good and just: then the locution is false: because then it would follow that God could do nothing, except what now is just and good to be done.

§ 54. There is entirely the same solution in the second and third argument, which he posits in the same chapter C, § 2. And it has two branches, of which the first is this: God cannot do, except what is fitting: and it is not fitting to do, except what He does, because otherwise He would omit it: therefore He cannot do except what He does. The other branch is: Either He ought to leave aside what He leaves aside lest He do it, or not. If yes: but He can do nothing which He ought not: therefore He can do nothing which He does not do. If no: therefore He leaves aside something of what is owed, which is false. And the Master applies the same solution which was posited before: and adds, that this verb, "ought" [debet], sounds badly concerning God: because He is not obligated except perhaps by a promise. Now this error is said to have been that of Master Peter Abelard.

§ 55. Also, it is to be noted that some solve these objections otherwise through the equivocation of potency, saying that when it is said: "God cannot do except what He does," if it is understood of potency conjoined to act, the locution is true: but if of absolute potency, it is false. But this solution does not dissolve it: because the objection proceeds concerning potency simply.

§ 56. Through this therefore the dissolution and sentence of the first part is clear.

Articulus 1 — Whether the Power of God Is Infinite

Whether God's power is infinite?

§ 57. Now three doubts arise here, of which the first is, Whether God's power is infinite, as he seems to suppose in the Text?

§ 58. The second is, Whether it can be limited to an act, or not?

§ 59. The third is concerning this which he says in the Text, Whether it extends itself to other things, than what it is good and just to be done in a work? that is to ask, Whether He does some things, which it is neither good nor just to be done? § 60. To the first one proceeds thus: 1. Hilary says: "What is impossible for man to understand, is possible for God": but it is impossible to understand the infinite: therefore according to power He Himself is infinite.

§ 61. 2. Also, Hilary: "It is a small thing that God can do what He wills, nay rather He can do what He says: for it belongs to perfect power that the nature of the maker can do that which the speech of the speaker can signify."

§ 62. 3. Also, Basil: "God can do more, than you could cogitate."

§ 63. 4. Also, on that Psalm 118:81 and 114: "And in your word I have super-hoped": the Gloss says: "God's power is above everything that man can understand."

§ 64. 5. Also, Damascenus says that the infinite is that which is circumscribed neither by place, nor by time, nor by intellect: but God's power is circumscribed by none of these: therefore it is infinite.

§ 65. 6. Also, God's power responds to His essence: but His essence is infinite: because it is not limited to anything, on the grounds that it has neither a beginning, nor an end: therefore His power too.

§ 66. 7. Also, every virtue (as is said in the Book of Causes) the more it is united, the more it is infinite: but His is maximally united: therefore, etc.

§ 67. 8. Also, even the Philosophers say that the mover of the heaven is of infinite power, because it moves with an infinite motion and in infinite time: therefore it seems that much more so will God be of infinite power.

§ 68. 9. Also, if He is of finite power, He is limited to something: therefore that thing is finite: therefore a greater than it can be cogitated: therefore God is not greater than can be cogitated, which is disproved by Anselm: therefore it seems that God is of infinite power.

§ 69. BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Nothing in every way infinite is perfect, as the Philosopher says: but He is in every way of infinite power: therefore He is in no way of perfect power. If perhaps you should say that the saying of the Philosopher were not true, it is proved thus: Every perfection is either an end, or from an end: but it is certain that God does not have the perfection of power from another end: therefore He Himself is perfect, because He is essentially the end according to power: but no end is infinite, because it would limit nothing if it were infinite: therefore it has been proved that the infinite is the most imperfect thing: therefore it does not belong to God, neither according to essence, nor according to power.

§ 70. 2. Also, we find in natures a finitable infinite, and this is an imperfect perfectible: for on that part by which it is finitable, it is perfectible: and on that part by which it is infinite, it is imperfect like prime matter: therefore if something is infinite in no way finitable, that will be more imperfect than the most imperfect thing: if therefore God in essence or in power is an infinite in no way finitable, He Himself will be more imperfect than all things.

§ 71. 3. Also, the infinite is a passion of the continuous or the discrete: but to God there is neither the continuous nor the discrete: therefore, etc.

§ 72. 4. Also, it is a condition of material potency: therefore it does not belong to God, or to His power.

§ 73. 5. Also, the more noble is always to be attributed to God: but the end is more noble: therefore it is better that His power be called an end, than that it be called infinite.

§ 74. Solution. It must be said that the infinite is said in multiple ways. For it is said negatively, so that it is said "not finite": and thus we have said above, that if one insists on the word, God is an infinite, that is, not finite: and a point is infinite, and a form, and a place, and everything that is an end, and in no way is it limited: yet God otherwise than other things: since God is not limited in three ways, namely by a defining intellect, whose task is to define, in that it circumscribes the whole thing through the terms of the thing's essence: and thus God alone limits Himself, because nothing of Himself escapes His intellect: and thus God comprehends Himself, because otherwise His intellect would be less than Himself: whence to Himself He is not infinite. But in this way He is not limited by any other intellect, nor by place, however much there might be in expansion whether in reality or in intellect, even if as many many worlds as possible were posited, God is not limited by them, but rather limits and contains them, as was said above. Nor is He limited by time: because the "now" of His eternity in enduring excels the time before and after. But in another way "infinite" is said according to the definition of the Philosopher in Physics III, that the infinite is that of which to one taking parts there is always something outside to take: and this can be said in two ways, namely according to passive potency, and thus it is in the continuous and discrete: and according to active potency, and thus it is in the sole power of God: so that it is said, since just as the infinite in the continuous is considered according to a division which does not stand still at the parts within the continuous, so the infinite in an active power is that the power does not stand still in any supposed effect according to magnitude and according to multitude.

§ 75. Therefore it must be said to the first, that that objection does not proceed except concerning the infinite according to passive potency, and not active: because an active power does not receive any perfection from an act, but rather through the act it gives perfection to others. Nor however do we say that God is infinite, such that He is not an end: but rather by the limitation by which an end is called limited, God and His power and whatever He is, is the most limited of all things: and the same solution applies to the others.

Articulus 2 — Whether the Power of God Can Be Limited with Respect to Acts or Not

Whether God's power can be limited to acts or not?

§ 76. Secondly it is asked, Whether God's power can be limited to acts, or not?

§ 77. But it seems that it cannot: because 1. Nothing infinite can be limited on that part by which it is infinite: but it was held that God's power is infinite toward acts: therefore it cannot be limited toward acts.

§ 78. 2. Also, Master Hugh of St. Victor says: "Just as time does not equal the eternity of God, nor does place equal His immensity: so neither does sense equal His wisdom, nor virtue His goodness, nor a work His omnipotence." Therefore it is not finitable to any work.

§ 79. 3. Also, we see that the infinite insofar as it is in the continuous is never finished, because its act is always mixed with a potency for a further act of the same account, as the

Philosopher says: therefore neither will omnipotence be finished, because always with any effect taken the reason of the power of the agent is still left over further.

§ 80. 4. Also, if it is finitable, let it be finished in an instant: therefore after that it is not powerful: but that which could do both this and more would be more powerful: therefore God is not more powerful than can be cogitated, which is false.

§ 81. BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. God's power does not extend itself beyond God's wisdom: therefore the power is as great as the wisdom: but the wisdom is the full art of all the living rational principles: but those principles are of those things which are, and have been, and will be: therefore they are finite: therefore the power is finite too, as it seems.

§ 82. 2. Also, Hugh of St. Victor says that power is executing, and wisdom is disposing: but He does not dispose infinite things: therefore neither is power in executing toward infinite things: therefore it stands still.

§ 83. 3. Also, whatever God can do, that can become: and let this be given: but whatever things can become, can be posited to be, and it will not be inconvenient: because if a false and not impossible thing is posited, what happens is false and not impossible: let it be therefore, that they are in act: therefore more things cannot then become: therefore neither can God make more things: therefore His power stands still.

§ 84. 4. Also, every creatable thing can be posited as created: therefore then there will not be anything more creatable: therefore neither can God then ali-

§ 1. [whether God is able] to create anything more: therefore His power will come to a standstill.

§ 2. Solution. To this, some say that power has a twofold act, namely, that which is to make, and that which is to have been made [i.e., the effect]. Therefore, a power which is infinite, in whatever way it is said to be infinite, can be posited in the act which is to make, but it cannot be posited in the act which is to have been made: because the infinite is never in being, nor in having been made. But it can be said better and more technically that there is a certain power to an act which is simply an act, and there is a certain power to an act always mixed with potency to the same act in species or in number. Therefore, a power which is to an act simply, can be posited in that act in such a way that nothing of the potency remains toward that act, or toward one similar to it in species—just as the combustible [passes] into being combusted, because what is combusted cannot be further combusted or burn. But a power which is to an act that is always mixed with potency toward a similar act in species, is a power which is toward an infinite act, whether the power be spoken of passively or actively. Hence a continuum will never be posited as so divided that it is not still divisible according to the same ratio of division by which it was divided. Therefore, God can never be posited to have acted or to have made so many things that He does not still have the power of operating, just as before.

§ 3. Conceding, therefore, the reasons first introduced,

§ 4. It must be said to the first objection raised to the contrary, that executive power is that which measures itself to the art of things to be made, but not absolute power: and this was explained above.

§ 5. To the next, the same solution applies.

§ 6. To the two following, it must be said that an infinite creatable is in the power of the agent, just as the creating [act] is; and therefore it is evident that it cannot be posited in any act without potency still remaining.

Articulus 3 — Whether God Has Done or Can Do Things That It Is Neither Good Nor Just To Do; And, Whether He Can Do What Is Unjust, Either Beside or Against Justice; And, Whether He Can Damn Peter and Save Judas

Whether God has made or can make some things which are neither good nor just to be made? And, Can He do the unjust, or besides or against justice? And, Can He damn Peter and save Judas?

§ 7. Thirdly, it is asked: Whether He does or can do some things which are neither good nor just to be made?

§ 8. It seems that He can: because 1. On that passage of Ezekiel 20:39: If... you pollute my holy name, etc., the Gloss says: "What He thought to do by justice, He did not do by clemency" . Therefore, it seems that He did something which was not just to be done.

§ 9. 2. Also, on Jeremiah 2:2: I have remembered you, pitying your youth, etc., the Gloss says: "The merciful God is prepared to save through mercy those whom He cannot save through justice." Therefore, it seems that He does many things which are not just.

§ 10. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. On 2 Timothy 2:13, concerning the verse: He cannot deny Himself, Augustine says: "Since He is just, He cannot deny His own justice, for thus He would deny Himself."

§ 11. 2. Also, justice in God is the same as His power. Therefore, if He can do nothing except from power, He will be able to do nothing except from justice.

§ 12. 3. Also, He can do nothing except justly: this is conceded by the Master [Peter Lombard] in the Text. Therefore, doing justly and being able to do are the same. Therefore, He can do nothing except from justice, as it seems.

§ 13. 4. Also, let it be granted that He does something apart from justice: therefore that deed will not

be just. But he who does what is not just, is unjust. Therefore, it seems that He would be unjust, which God forbid.

§ 2. ALSO IT IS ASKED: If it is granted that He can do what is not just to be done, must it be granted that He can do the unjust, or besides or against justice?

§ 3. FURTHERMORE, certain curious men ask: Can He damn Peter and save Judas?

§ 4. It seems that He can: because by the prayers of the blessed Gregory, Trajan was recalled to life; but it is certain that Trajan was damned, since he was a pagan. And if he lived afterward, he could have done penance, and thus be saved. Therefore, He can save the damned; therefore, by the same reason, He can damn the glorified.

§ 5. SOLUTION. It must be said that God can do what is not just to be done, if the phrase "what is not just to be done" falls under the amplification of power imported by the word "can," as we distinguished above.

§ 6. To the first, therefore, it must be said that justice is spoken of in many ways, as has been said elsewhere. But in that Gloss, justice is called the strict rendering of a debt for merits. Yet in another way, justice is spoken of concerning the essence of divine goodness, and thus clemency is not without justice. Hence it does not follow that if in this work justice is not preserved according to the aforementioned rationale, it is in no way preserved in it.

§ 7. To the next, it must be said in the same way, that it speaks of the justice of a debt for the merits of the Ninevites, and not of justice absolutely spoken of in any way whatsoever.

§ 8. To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that there, justice is called the equity of the divine will, which God never forsakes or denies.

§ 9. TO THE NEXT, it must be said that although justice and omnipotence are the same in their subject [supposito], they nevertheless differ in their connotations. And therefore something belongs to one which does not belong to the other.

§ 10. To the next, it must be said that according to the aforesaid, it is clear why it is conceded by the Master that God can do nothing except justly; and similarly that conclusion, "therefore He can do nothing except from justice," which is twofold by the same twofold distinction.

§ 11. To the next, it must be said that if it be granted that God does something which right now is not just (because it is not, nor will it be), it does not follow on account of this that it would not be just: because by the very fact that He does it, it is just. Hence these two are incompatible: that God does what He does not do, and that this thing is not just; nevertheless, each of them is possible taken in itself. And this is so because in the one, by the intellect, the opposite of the other is included: for in this—that God does what He does not do—it is included that God can only act justly, and by that very fact whatever He does is just.

§ 12. To the next, it must be said that God can do nothing unjustly or besides justice, because this posits an indecency and a contrariety to the honorable, and this does not fall into God. But a mere negation, when it is said that which is not just, does not posit anything, but removes that which is just at present, and consequently leaves the power for it to be just if it were done by God, by the same rationale by which what He now does is just.

§ 13. TO THAT which is asked, Whether He can damn Peter and save Judas? It must be said that He certainly can by His absolute power, but not by His power related to the order of wisdom.

§ 14. To that which is objected concerning Trajan, it must be said that this was done by dispensation to manifest the glory of God: for he who is finally damned can in no way be recalled to the state of those to be saved.

§ 1. D. The third reason of theirs.

§ 2. They also add other things, saying: "God cannot do except what He ought; but He ought not to do except what He does. For if He ought to do other things, then He does not do everything He ought; but if He does everything He ought, and cannot do except what He ought, therefore He cannot do except what He does.

§ 3. "Also, either He ought to omit what He omits so as not to do it, or He ought not. If He ought not, He does not omit it rightly. But if He ought to omit it, therefore He ought not to do it. But if He ought not, nor is it fitting, it does not behoove Him to do it; and if it is neither fitting nor does it behoove Him to do it, therefore He cannot do it. Therefore He cannot do except what He does; nor can He omit that which He does, because He ought to do it; and what He ought to do, He cannot omit." But as it seems to me, this word "ought" (debet) holds poison. For it contains a manifold and convoluted understanding, and it does not properly apply to God, who is not a debtor to us except perhaps by promise; but we are debtors to Him by our commission [of sins]. But that the poison may be evacuated, distinguish the sense of the word: "God cannot do except what He ought," that is, except what He wills, is false. For thus He Himself can be said to "ought" to do something, because He wills it. But if it be said, "He cannot except what He ought," that is, He cannot [do] except that which, if He were to do it, would also perfectly befit Him, it is true.

§ 4. They also add, saying: "He does or omits nothing except by the best and most reasonable cause, although it may be hidden from us, according to which it behooves Him to do and omit those things which He does or omits. For the reason is with Him, by which He does these things and omits those; which reason is eternal, and always remaining, besides which He cannot do or omit anything. Therefore, with that remaining, He cannot omit what He does, nor do what He omits; and thus He cannot do except what He does." And to this we respond, determining the ambiguity of the expression. For when it is said, "the best reason or cause is with God, by which He does all the things He does, and omits those which He omits," it is indeed true; because in Him there is a most equitable and most upright will, by which He does and omits what He wills, against which He cannot act, nor besides it can He act. And certainly He would not

act against it, nor besides it, if He were to omit those things which He does, or do those which He omits: but with the same reason and cause remaining, He could have done other things, and omitted these. Although, therefore, the reason is with Him, by which He does these and omits those, nevertheless He can, according to the same reason, both omit what He does, and do what He omits.

§ 2. They also add: "There is a reason for Him to do what He does, and not other things; and He cannot do except what there is a reason for Him to do, and thus He cannot do except what He does. Also, there is a reason for Him to omit what He omits, and He cannot not omit

what there is a reason for Him to omit; and thus He cannot not omit what He omits." And to this we say that the expressions are ambiguous, and therefore to be determined. For if, when it is said, "He cannot do except what there is a reason for Him to do," you understand that He cannot do except those things which are reasonable, and those which, if they were done, would be reasonable, the sense is true. But if you understand that He cannot do other reasonable and good things, except those which He wills and does, the understanding is false.

§ 3. Also, they append another thing, saying: "If God can do otherwise than He does, He can therefore do what He did not foreknow; and if He can do what He did not foreknow, He can operate without foreknowledge; because He does everything which He foreknew He would do, nor does He do anything which He did not foreknow. But if it is impossible for anything to be done besides His knowledge, therefore everything which is foreknown must necessarily be done: therefore for something else to be done than what is done, is by no reason possible; therefore nothing can be done by God except what is done." But this question concerning foreknowledge can easily be determined through those things which were said above, when foreknowledge was treated.

Expositio Textus

Exposition of the Text

§ 4. They also add, saying, etc. Here begins the second part, in which he [the Master] posits their contrived causes; and they are called contrived causes because they are feigned by the mind, and are not true.

§ 5. Now there are three, of which each is posited with its solution in one chapter in order. The first cause which they posit is this: God cannot do anything unless a reasonable cause preceded that work: because as it is said in Job 5:6: Nothing upon earth is done without a cause; and Plato in the Timaeus: Nothing comes to be whose origin a legitimate cause has not preceded. But there is no reasonable cause except of those things which are done; because if it were of other things, God would be negligent, in that He would not do those things which reason demands to be done: therefore He can do nothing except what He does. And this proposition: "God can do nothing of which a reasonable cause or reason has not preceded," must be distinguished, as was said before in the earlier reasons.

§ 6. The second reason taken from a con-

trived cause is this: God cannot do except what there is a reason for Him to do: but the reason is that these things be done which are done, and not others; therefore He cannot do except those things which are done and not others. And the first premise must again be distinguished as before; and this reason is in the second chapter following.

§ 2. The third reason taken from a contrived cause, is in the third chapter D, § 5. And it is this: God cannot do except what He foreknows He will do; but He does not foreknow He will do except what He does; therefore He cannot do except what He does. And again the first premise must be distinguished as before.

Articulus 4 — Why God Did Not Work Miracles Among Certain People

Why did God not work miracles among certain people?

§ 3. Now to these things, those investigators, etc. This is the last part, in which they introduce authorities to confirm the same thing, and it is easy.

§ 4. But here a question is raised concerning that which he says, there: Why miracles were not done among certain people, etc.

§ 5. For it seems that there is a twofold inconvenience there, namely, that miracles [lit. powers] were displayed to those who did not care, and this was casting pearls before swine; and they were withdrawn from others, to whom they would have profited.

§ 6. But To this it must be said that God's judgments may be marveled at, but not discussed: because the judgments of God are a great abyss; and this solution is in the Text, and is truer than all the rest.

§ 1. However, the Gloss in the same place says that He did not display them to the Tyrians and Sidonians because He knew many of them would not believe, whom He spared lest their sin be increased out of contempt for the miracles; and He knew that those who, if they had done penance, would not remain in penance. But He displayed them to the people of Chorazin and Bethsaida, who were of the Jews, to whom it was fitting first to speak the word of the kingdom of God, so that the Apostles, being despised by them, might then turn to the Gentiles without reproach, and their damnation might appear more just, and the law might be shown to be fulfilled by Christ. And all these are solutions of fittingness; but the one which is posited in the Text is the true one, namely, that now we do not know, but in the light of the face of God we shall see.

DISTINCTIO XLIV

Divisio Textus

§ 2. Now that remains to be discussed, etc. In this distinction, the Master investigates the mode of omnipotence on the part of the work.

§ 3. And there are three questions here, of which the first is: Whether He could have made the universe better than He made it? And the Master concedes this.

§ 4. The second question is: Whether He could have made this which He made, in a better way than He made it? And the Master concedes this, there, at C, After these things it must be considered, Whether in another way, etc.

§ 5. The third is: Whether God can now do whatever He could ever do? And this begins there, at D, Furthermore it is wont to be asked, Whether God, etc. And the Master concedes this also.

Articulus 1 — Whether God Could Make Things from Eternity; And, Whether He Could Have Made the World Earlier Than He Made It

Could God make things from eternity? And, Could He make the world earlier than He made it?

§ 6. Now concerning the first, three questions arise, of which the first is: Whether He could make things from eternity?

§ 7. The second: Whether He could make better things than He made?

§ 8. The third: Whether the good of order itself which is in the universe, could be better?

§ 9. To the first, one proceeds thus: 1. Certain Philosophers proved the world to be eternal: therefore it seems at least that it could have been from eternity.

§ 10. 2. Also, we see this in many effects which essentially come to be from a certain cause: and yet the cause does not precede them except in nature, and not in duration—just as Augustine himself says concerning the sun and illumination, and the example is given above. Therefore it seems that it could also be thus in the case of the world.

§ 1. 3. Also, Boethius seems to mean this in Book V of the Consolation of Philosophy, saying that eternity is not before the world by some space, because it is itself simple.

§ 2. 4. If perhaps you say that a creature could not be from eternity, lest time, which is co-understood with the creature, be made equal to eternity, and the creature to the Creator. This seems to be nothing: because Boethius proves that this does not happen, even if the world is posited to be from eternity; for times would still be successive, and the creature variable, as he himself says: therefore the creature is still not equaled to the Creator.

§ 3. 5. Also, a sufficient cause, lacking nothing for acting, always acts, or it is idle, as it seems. But God from eternity was a sufficient cause for making or creating the world. Therefore, He created the world from eternity, or He was idle. But idleness does not fall upon God. Therefore, it seems He created the world from eternity.

§ 4. 6. Also, if He could not from eternity, and afterwards could, it seems that He was changed in His power: therefore He could at least do it from eternity.

§ 5. 7. Also, Boethius says: Whom no external causes compelled to fashion. Therefore He does not depend on anything outside Himself. Therefore, whatever He can do, He can do from eternity. Therefore, He could make the world from eternity.

§ 6. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Whatever God could make from eternity, could be made from eternity. Therefore, if God could make the world from eternity, the world could be made from eternity. Against this: A created thing is that which has being after nothingness; but an eternal thing is that which has no beginning. Therefore, no created thing is eternal.

§ 7. 2. Also, to have a beginning of existence according to duration, and not to have it, are contradictorily opposed. Therefore, they will not belong to the rationale of one and the same thing and according to the same respect. But to have a beginning of duration is of the rationale of a created thing: therefore, not having a beginning of this sort cannot belong to it.

But it would belong to it if it were from eternity: therefore the world cannot be from eternity, as it seems.

§ 8. But then it is asked further alongside this: Whether He could make it earlier than He made it?

§ 9. And it seems that He could: because eternity has no limit [lit. end] before it. Therefore, however much "before" is taken into infinity, it always remains distant. Therefore it seems that it could be made earlier: and yet it would not be from eternity.

§ 10. If perhaps you say that eternity has no "before," and therefore the question is null, because there is no prior and posterior in that which is simple. Against this: Whenever a creature is made, time is simultaneously made with it. But this is now less than seven thousand years. I ask, therefore, whether it could have been eight or ten thousand? It seems so, because nothing is impossible for God. Therefore it seems that He could make it earlier than He made it.

§ 11. Also, although eternity does not have a part, both a "before" and "after," nevertheless it is itself unfailing from eternity, and differs from the temporal and the aeviternal with respect to unfailingness. Therefore, something can be prior and posterior under it: and then the first reason stands, that God could make the world earlier than He made it.

§ 12. But then I proceed further thus, by anteriorizing into infinity: therefore the world could have been made infinitely before it was made. But to be made infinitely earlier is to be made without a beginning. Therefore, it could have been without a beginning of duration; therefore, eternal. For Boethius says that a single moment has a proportion to whatever space of time is finitely accepted.

§ 13. ON THE CONTRARY: It is certain that infinite time can never be traversed. Therefore, if the world had begun an infinite time before, it would never be possible to arrive at this day in which we now are. But this is false. Therefore, the world could not be made infinitely before it was.

§ 1. SOLUTION. In my judgment, it must be said that when it is said, "God could make the world from eternity," this is twofold, from the fact that the term from eternity can determine this verb could [i.e., He had the power from eternity], and thus it is true; or it determines to make it be infinite [i.e., making an eternal world], and thus it is false. For I well concede that it belongs to the rationale of a created thing not to be from eternity, nor to be able to be made so. For when it is said, "God can make the world or all things," we said above that a possible being which is related to power must be taken in a twofold proportion: namely, to the making [active power] and to the being made [passive potency]. But when it is said, "God can make a created thing from eternity," the created thing which is under power has neither proportion, because it is neither fitting for the Maker that a thing made be equaled to Him in anything; nor can this be made due to the condition included within it.

§ 2. To the first, therefore, it must be said that those Philosophers who proved this, erred, and they did not suppose anything to be created out of nothing: rather, they said the incor-

ruptible parts of the world are from eternity, and the corruptible ones are conserved in being unto infinity through mutual action and passion. But supposing that things are created, it is impossible to posit along with this that they were from eternity. Whether it is necessary that creation exist, has to be investigated at the beginning of the second book.

§ 3. To the next, it must be said that this is true in those things in which action is by a necessity of nature, seeking nothing outside in order to cause—like a luminous body which demands nothing in order to emit light. But God does not cause in this way, because all things would agree with Him in form, just as light agrees in the light of the illuminator. However, it is true that certain gentile Philosophers said this, that an intelligence is a ray of the first cause, and the heaven a certain ray of the intelligence; and thus further they strove to prove things to be from eternity. But this is frivolous, and easily disproved, as will be clear elsewhere.

§ 4. To the next, it must be said that eternity does not precede by a space of distension (which is properly space), because it is itself simple; nevertheless, it precedes by duration of being, and by cause, according as duration is called the unfailingness of being: and this is what Boethius intends.

§ 5. To the next, it must be said that I well concede if we were to posit time not to have a beginning, that time would still not be eternity: because eternity is standing simultaneously, whereas time would be no less successive than it is now; nor would the creature be co-equaled to the Creator in all things, but it would nevertheless be equaled in this, which is not to have a beginning in enduring being. And this very thing I say is impossible. Hence Boethius speaks there from a hypothesis of the false—namely, what would follow if the world were posited to have been from eternity.

§ 6. To the next, it must be said that God always could; but the thing could not be made from eternity; and therefore nothing follows concerning idleness. Because it belongs to a wise agent to consider not [only] what he himself can do, but what can be done in the thing; and not only this, but also what can be done fittingly for himself, and usefully for the things made.

§ 7. To the next, it must be said that no mutation falls into Him: because He always holds Himself in one way, although things hold themselves in diverse ways in Him. And an example of this has often been posited concerning the divine will and intellect. Hence, the fact that the thing is not from eternity is because it could not be made so; which He Himself always, in one uniform way, could make.

§ 8. To the next, it must be said that His power does not depend on the work on account of this, but rather the work depends on His power: but nevertheless, because the work is of another essence than Himself, therefore it cannot have that perfection which His power has, but will fall short of it. And this indicates the imperfection of the work, not the dependence of the efficient cause.

§ 9. But if you object that God's works are perfect, as it is said in the Canticle of Deuteronomy ; I respond that they are perfect

in their own genus, but not with the perfection of the divine essence, which would be demanded for it to be able to be equaled to the power of the efficient cause.

§ 2. But to those things which are objected to the contrary, it seems to me they must be conceded.

§ 3. TO THAT which is asked further, Whether He could make it earlier than He made it? It seems to me a foolish question: because given that "earlier" is taken for some number of years, the very same question results as there is now. For I readily concede that God could have caused the world to have already stood for a thousand thousand years: and if He had done this, we would still ask the same thing as we do now. And therefore the question is void, since it has been shown that it could not be eternal, because this is against the rationale of a created thing.

§ 4. But to this which it objects, that by anteriorizing to infinity it seems to take away the beginning of duration; I say that this is false: because however much "before" you accept, it is finite: and nothing remains with respect to the infinite except the potency of accepting [more]. In eternity, however, there is per se no beginning, and in act it has no beginning. Hence time indeed would then be principated [have a beginning] according to act, but able to have a further beginning [earlier still], yet not able to be without a beginning, because it is posited to be created.

§ 5. BUT TO THIS which it objects, that if time were posited as infinite in this way, it would never be possible to arrive at this day; we can concede the conclusion, because it is in our favor. But because he proves it sophistically, it must be said that if we were not to posit time as infinite, as certain Philosophers did, we would [nevertheless] posit it as infinite by the succession of the motions of heaven. And this infinite is unfolded through aliquot parts, which are the hour, day, month, and year; and in this infinite it happens that one can take determinate parts, but it does not happen that one can come to an end or a middle of the whole duration. Hence one easily arrives at this or that day, but this day is no part which, being taken a number of times, would measure the whole succession, because then the infinite would be posited as finite. But nevertheless, we do not posit time to be infinite by the succession of motions in this way: because time began, and similarly motion, and both will also be finished, as was said above.

Articulus 2 — Whether God Could Have Made the Things That He Made Better

Could God have made better those things which He made?

§ 6. Secondly, it is asked: Whether He could make better things than He made?

§ 7. And it seems that He could not: because 1. Dionysius says that it belongs to the best to produce the best. [122] Therefore it seems that He created each and every thing in the best state it could have.

§ 8. 2. Also, Plato: "Furthermore, because He was best, envy was banished far from Him." [123] Therefore, He gave to each thing as much as it could receive of His goodness. But this

means not being able to do better. Therefore it seems that He could not make things better than He made them.

§ 9. If perhaps you say that He made it best in this way, because He made each thing in every goodness of which it was susceptible. Against this: He Himself gave the capacity, and He also filled it; therefore, since He is best, He gave each thing the maximum capacity, and filled it. Therefore, simply speaking, it seems that He could do nothing better than what He did.

§ 10. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. It is certain that prime matter is capable of the noblest form. Therefore God could have given to every part of matter that form which is the noblest, so that the whole universe might be informed by a rational or intellective soul. But that which is animated by a rational soul is better and nobler than a stone.

therefore He could have made a better stone than He made.

§ 2. Also, there is no capacity of any creature that is not finite: therefore God could have made it greater: but if He had made it greater, it would be capable of a better good. Therefore something better would be given to it than it presently has: because otherwise there would not be a right proportion of capacity to that by which the capacity is filled, which would not befit the wisdom and goodness of God. Therefore He could have made individual things better than they are.

§ 3. Also, the Master proves this by two arguments in the text, which are evident to one who inspects them, and he concedes this.

Solution. This question only asks about the goodness of individual things in themselves. And therefore I say that it can be understood in two ways, namely concerning the goodness of things that are in themselves supposed in their proper natures and genera: or concerning things existing in the power of the Creator alone. If it is understood concerning things existing in themselves: then it can still be understood in two ways, namely concerning the goodness following the substantial being of each thing, or following its well-being and accidental being: and if it is understood in the first way: then I say that no thing could have been made better than it was made, although God could have made it better. And this is because then the capacity of the material and formal principles of each thing is supposed: and with those being supposed, concerning the substantials nothing better could have been made from those principles than was made. But if it is understood in the second way, namely concerning accidental being, or well-being, I say that it could have been made better and worse, just as things are continuously changed into better and worse. But if the question is understood concerning things not supposed except in the power of the Creator: then I say that they could have been made better and worse in both substantial and accidental being according to His will: and in this way the Master takes the question in the text.

And through this the solution to the first two is clear: because the words of Dionysius and Plato are understood concerning the bringing forth of things into substantial being from those

122. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, Cap. 4.

principles of nature, which presently exist and are supposed to exist in the seminal causes in the works of the six days.

To the other one it must be said that God gave that capacity, but He did not give the maximum that He could give. And if it is asked, why is this? I say that from wisdom He did not dispose to give a greater one, and He did not will to give a greater one: and why He did not will it, I am ignorant of, but He Himself knows. But it is true that this given capacity, with respect to substantial being, could not be filled better: because, as Plato says, forms are given according to the merits of the matter: and therefore to a nobler matter a better form is given, and to each thing a form according as it is capable, as Avicenna says: and he posits a simile in the sphere of fire, which heats only a certain matter less proportioned to its species; but a certain more proportioned matter it heats, and dissolves, and makes to shine: but another maximally proportioned matter it heats, dissolves, illuminates, and ignites. And thus it is also concerning God the giver of forms, that He fills all things in substantial being according to their capacity, some with the form of an element, some with the form of a mixed body, but some with a vegetative soul, and some with a sensible soul, and some with a rational soul, according as they recede more from the act of contrariety to the temperament and uniformity of complexion: because in this they approach the nature of heaven, as he himself says: and through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 3 — Whether God Could Have Made Better the Goodness That Results from the Order of the Universe Than He Made

Could God have made the goodness that results from the order of the universe better than He made it?

Thirdly, a more difficult question is asked, namely whether the goodness that results

from the order of the universe, God could have made better?

It seems, however, that He could: because § 1. Between those things that are infinitely distant, there can be infinite degrees higher than the inferior, and inferior to the superior: but God and the highest creature, whatever it may be, are infinitely distant: therefore between God and an Angel there are infinite degrees capable of being filled with ordered goodnesses: but if those were made, the world would be ordered more closely to the best, which is God Himself, than it presently makes it: therefore the goodness of the order would be greater than it presently is: for whichever among the goodnesses of order more closely attains to the highest good, that one is better and greater.

§ 2. Also, it was possible for God to whom nothing is impossible to make the first and last in the universe better, just as first matter, and an Angel: concerning which Augustine says in book XII of the Confessions, that first matter is near nothing, and an Angel near God: therefore the middle things will also be better: therefore the whole universe will be better, and the order better: therefore also the goodness resulting from the order will be better.

123. Plato, Timaeus, 29e.

If perhaps you say that the world is like a cithara, in which if one string is stretched to a better sound, it indeed has a better sound in itself, but that better sound disturbs the whole harmony, and therefore brings more confusion and evil to the cithara than it has in itself: so also if this thing were made better than it is, it would confound the other things ordered to it. On the contrary: let only the temperament of the cithara be considered, I ask whether the cithara can have a better harmony, if all the strings, and not only one string, are made better? It is established that it can: therefore God could have made any creature better, and not only one without the other, than He made it: therefore then the order would be better and the harmony sweeter, as it seems.

§ 3. Furthermore, the Master expressly says this in the text, and reckons the opposite to be a heresy.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. Upon that text of Genesis God saw all the things that He had made, etc.: the Gloss says that they were good in themselves, and they were very good but in the universe they were the best: but nothing can be made better than the best: therefore nothing better can be made by the goodness of this universe, nor could it.

§ 2. Also, the universe is of such great goodness that even that which is evil in itself confers completion upon it; therefore since nothing better could be made than that which even ordains evil into good, it seems that nothing better could be made than the universe.

§ 3. Also, Augustine: You have made two things, O Lord: one near You, and the other near nothing. Therefore a greater and wider order of goodness could not even be thought of, as it seems, than from nothing to near God: therefore it cannot be made better.

§ 4. Also, he who says "the universe" excepts nothing: therefore no goodness is lacking to the universe: but nothing can be made better than that to which nothing is lacking in goodness: therefore nothing can be made better than the universe.

Solution. Without prejudice I say that the universe can be considered in three ways, namely as it is supposed in being, and as it is supposed in the power of the efficient cause alone: and in some things supposed to be, and in others posited to be in the power of the efficient cause alone. If it is supposed in being: then it seems to me that in these things that are, a better natural harmony could never be made than was made: and this according to the goodness of nature, and not according to accidental goodness or the goodness of grace: because what better thing can be thought of than that the generable and corruptible are reduced to the motion of the oblique circle, and of those things that follow the oblique circle and have to be reduced to the uniform motion of a difform movable, and that this is reduced to a uniform mover uniformly behaving itself always and toward all things? Similarly, that the evil of one is ordained to the good of another, just as the corruption of one to the generation of another, and the persecution of a tyrant to the patience of virtue, and the probation of faith,

nothing better can be made, with these things existing, as it seems. But if the whole world is supposed only to be in the power of the efficient cause: then it seems to me that He could have made a better world, and better ordered: just as a cithara with all other strings, or placed

otherwise by an artisan knowing infinitely the contemperations of harmonies. But if it is posited in the third way, namely partly to be in reality, and partly in potency, as if we posit heaven and motion, and asses and earth to exist, and nothing more except in the divine mind and divine power: then it seems to me that without the confusion of the harmony of the world the remaining things cannot be made better with respect to substance than they were indeed made, although in nothing do I restrict the power of God who can always do what He wills: but I speak of being made: and I say this because an ass has a twofold goodness, namely in itself, and of comparison: and in comparison to a horse the ass is vile, but compared to a man it is still viler and less good: therefore if all other things were made better, the ass would be made less good with the goodness of comparison than it ought to be, and thus the harmony of the universe would be disturbed. But only in the middle way, namely that the thing is in the divine power alone, does the intention of the Master proceed in the text.

It must therefore be said to the first, that the degrees of beings are not taken in this way, because thus the world would always remain imperfect: but they are taken according to the participable goodnesses of God, such as to be, to live, to sense, to understand, to be incorruptible, to be a cause, and the like: and thus the universal order is filled: because those things that are participable from the attributes of God make the degrees: and those are filled in three ways, namely in the goodnesses of grace, just as all things are to man, and man to grace, and grace to God through Christ: and in the order of evil to good: and thus there could not be a closer order with these things existing.

But all the following objections proceed concerning the universe supposed in the power of God alone, and in this way they are conceded.

But to those things that are objected to the contrary, it must be said to the first three, that they do not proceed except concerning this universe which is supposed to be in the nature of things: and in this way what they conclude is conceded.

To the other it must be said that it is one thing to speak of this universe, and another of the notion of the universe according to the name. For this universe does not have many things which it could have if God willed: but the notion of the universe according to the name has all things: and concerning this nothing is asked here: hence that objection does not contribute to the proposition.

Articulus 4 — Whether God Could and Did Not Will, or Willed and Could Not, To Make a Better World

Whether God could and did not will, or willed and could not make a better world?

Next it is asked concerning this which he says in the text, there, A, For if He willed and could not, He is weak, etc.

For this argument does not seem to be sufficiently solved by the Master.

Hence it must be said, as was said above, that it is one thing in that which can be equalized by nature, like the Son and the Holy Spirit: but another in that which is of a diverse essence, because this cannot be equalized even however much it grows. And the simile of this is: if a

finite line is taken, and a point is augmented by points: then the point can be augmented to infinity, and yet it will not be equalized to the line nor proportioned to it. So it must be said that the augmentation of created goodness respecting uncreated goodness is like the addition of a point: and therefore however much it grows, it will neither be proportionable, nor will it be equal.

But if you object that it is not similar: because a point is indivisible, and by indivisibles it cannot grow, because indivisibles are not quantified, and therefore it is not augmented: but created goodness is quantified, and therefore if it is added to infinity, it will be equal to the infinite. It must be said that in all those goodnesses always with the added thing there is also added the rationale of distant infinitely: because whatever it will be, it will be a created good: therefore whatever it is, it will be distant without proportion: and therefore it will never become proportionable and never equal: nor is this envy, but rather the order of wisdom: because envy is with respect to those things that can be equalized or at least proportioned, as Gregory says upon that text of Job Truly anger kills the foolish, and envy slays the little one.

Articulus 5 — Whether Christ, the Blessed Virgin, an Angel, and Adam Could Have Become Better Than They Were Made; And, Whether Christ Belongs to the Universality of the Works of God; And, How It Is Understood That the Blessed Virgin Is Exalted above the Choirs of Angels

Whether Christ, the Blessed Virgin, an Angel, and Adam could have been made better than they were made? and, Whether Christ is of the universe of God's works? and, How it is understood that the Blessed Virgin is exalted above the choirs of Angels?

Whether Christ, the Blessed Virgin, an Angel, and Adam could have been made better than they were made? and, Whether Christ is of the universe of God's works? and, How it is understood that the Blessed Virgin is exalted above the choirs of Angels?

Next it is asked concerning the second part of this reading, there, After these things it must be considered, Whether by another or a better, etc.

Moreover, a question occurs here concerning certain optimal things, as concerning Christ, and the Blessed Virgin, and an Angel, and Adam, whether they could have been made better?

Let it therefore be asked concerning Christ, Whether He Himself is of the universe, or not?

It seems, however, that He is: because § 1. Thus says the Apostle You are the body of Christ, and members of member. And in the same place the Gloss says: Members of member, that is, of the head, which is a member: it is established, however, that the head is of the universality of the members: therefore Christ is of the universe just like the other members.

§ 2. Also, Hilary says above: Christ is therefore the head of all: therefore it seems that He Himself is of the universe.

§ 3. Also, whatever is less than that which is of the universe, that is of the universe more than that: Christ is less than something that is of the universe, because He was made a little less than the Angels, who are of the universe: therefore as before.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. Christ is constituted over all the works of the hands of God: therefore He Himself is not of the universe of works, as it seems.

§ 2. Also, whoever is the cause of the whole good of the universe, cannot be something of the universe: but Christ is the cause of the whole good that the universe has: therefore, etc.

Further it is asked, Whether Christ could have been made better?

It seems, however, that He could: because His soul was created: therefore His goodness was finite, just as His essence: therefore it could be greater.

Also, His body was created: therefore by the same reason the goodness of His body could be greater.

ON THE CONTRARY: John The Spirit is not given to Him by measure: but what is not by measure, is immense: and what is immense, cannot grow: therefore the goodness of Christ could not grow.

Further it is asked, Whether the Blessed Virgin could have been better?

It seems that she could not: because § 1. Anselm says that it was fitting that that Virgin whom the Father chose to be the mother for His Son, should shine with that purity than which a greater under God cannot be understood: therefore it seems that she could not grow in goodness.

§ 2. Also Augustine says: You have made two things, O Lord: one near You, and the other near nothing. Therefore an Angel was near to God: but we sing the saying of Jerome concerning her: You are exalted above the choirs of Angels to the celestial kingdoms. Therefore she is nearer than the near: but nothing can be understood to be able to approach further by growing: therefore she could not be made better.

§ 3. Also, under God united to man nothing is closer than to be materially the same as the united one: but the matter is taken from her: therefore she is the closest: therefore she cannot be better.

ON THE CONTRARY: A creature is simple: therefore it is of finite goodness: therefore it can be understood to grow: and what you can understand, God can make, and much more: therefore she can be made better.

Further it is asked concerning an Angel. § 1. Because it seems better, what is more glorious: but it seems more glorious to advance to beatitude by struggle and merit, than without them: therefore it seems that man was made better than an Angel.

§ 2. Also, it is in the text that a nature that can sin is better than that which cannot sin: therefore a state possible for sin is better than a state impossible for sin: and the same follows as before.

§ 3. Also, from this it follows that the weaker a state is and having greater occasions for sinning, provided it does not have necessity, the better it is: and these things are frivolous, and concerning them it has been asked elsewhere: hence these suffice here.

Solution. It must not be conceded that Christ is of the universe, but over the universe.

To that therefore which is first objected, it must be said that by the very fact that He is said to be the head, He is signified to be over all things: but He is said to be a member not of all things, but of the Church with which He has a conformity of nature, and not just any member communicable to others, but rather that which is eminent over all, and flows the motive and sensible spirit into all, as was said upon the third [book of Sentences]. Through this also the solution to the following is clear.

To the other it must be said that Christ is not made less than the Angels except by dispensation and relatively, namely in that He assumed a passible nature. But because that nature is united and not bare, therefore also in it He is over all things, and not orderable with all things.

To that which is asked further, it has been sufficiently discussed as much as I could in the third [book]: yet here it can be said that if we consider Christ united as He is in the truth of reality, then the grace of man is conjoined to the infinite good, and with respect to this that He has union with it in being, by which union nothing can approach more to the highest good, and thus He cannot grow nor be made better: and in this way the Spirit is given to Him not by measure. But if simple grace not reaching to union were considered, which consideration is only according to the intellect: then He could grow, and the grace would be finite.

And through this the solution to those things that are objected concerning Christ is clear: because the objections proceed in those two ways.

To that which is further asked concerning the Blessed Virgin, I certainly think that whatever a pure creature capable of God can perceive, all this was communicated to the Mother of God: and in that consideration the reasons first adduced proceed. But the divine power is not restricted, so that He could not have made a capacity greater than that of a man and an Angel, and then grace also could grow: and in this way the reasons to the contrary proceed: and therefore the solution to them is also clear.

Yet it must be noted that although she is said to be exalted above the choirs of Angels, and above the choirs of Archangels there is nothing except the divine altitude: nevertheless she is not exalted to equality with the divine altitude: because as was said before, the distance is beyond measure: and therefore although she is higher than all the Angels, yet she still is distant from the divine dignity without a measure of proportion.

To that which is further asked concerning man

and an Angel with respect to the state of struggle, it must be said that it is goodness relatively, namely according to the more laudable: and concerning this only those reasons proceed. There is also goodness absolutely which perfects according to a nobler act and a higher degree: and concerning that it does not hold: and therefore speaking with respect to this, concerning the power of God alone, each could have been made better, just as the Master also concedes in the text.

Articulus 6 — Whether God Can Always Do What He Could

Whether God can always do what He could?

Next it is asked concerning the last part of this distinction which begins there, D, Furthermore it is usually asked, Whether God, etc.

It seems, however, that God can always do what He could:

§ 1. For everything not now able to do what it could, is either changed in its power, or its power depends upon another which is changed: but God's power is neither changed in itself, nor depends upon another: therefore He can now do whatever He once could.

§ 2. Also, whatever behaves always in one way, can always do the same thing: but God behaves always in one way: therefore He can always do the same thing.

But to the contrary are the instances that lie in the text.

Solution. It must be said that the Master seems to have been of the opinion of the Nominalists. Hence the solution of the Master consists in this, that one power is always signified, which is referred to the same thing, although it is signified in a diverse mode of signifying in a verb or adverb pertaining to time. Hence he says that it is the same power by which He could create the world, and by which He could have created the world: and his solution is clear in the text. But it seems to me to be said more truly and more probably that there is power considered absolutely, and this is always the same: and there is power conjoined to an act, and this is determined according to the mode of signifying to the thing which is referred to it: and the rationale is not the same in that relation: and by this He cannot now do whatever He could, nor does this posit a mutation in Him, but in the thing into which He has power.

To the first therefore it must be said that His power does not on account of this depend upon the thing, but rather from the fact that the thing depends upon it, there arises a diverse habit of relation of the thing to the power, and conversely, by which the thing is related otherwise to the power before it is made, and when it is being made, and when it has been made.

To the other it must be said that although God behaves in one way toward things, yet things do not behave in one way toward Him: and from those habits there are made diverse relations, by which the power is signified diversely.

But above we have shown that it is not unfitting for the eternal to receive from the temporal some mode of signifying.

DISTINCTIO XLV

Divisio Textus

Now concerning the will of God something according to our sense, etc.

This tractate concerning the will is divided into two parts. In the first the Master treats of the will of God according to itself, and according to comparison to the things willed. In the second, concerning the comparison of our will to His will: and this begins at distinction XLVIII, there, B, That also must not be passed over.

Further, the first is divided into two. In the first, he treats of the will of God and the thing willed. In the second, he treats of the mode of fulfillment of the divine will in distinction XLVII, A, there, For the will of God is always efficacious, etc.

The first is further subdivided into two. In the first it is treated of the will and the division of the will according to itself. In the second, he posits certain doubts about the things willed of the divine will, below, at distinction XLVI, there, A, Here arises a question, For it has been said, etc.

This distinction is divided into two parts: in the first of which he treats of the will of God according as it is the first cause of all creatures. In the second, he posits a distinction concerning the multiplicity of the divine will, there, F, Here it must not be passed over by us, etc.

The prior is further subdivided into two: in the first of which he treats of the will according to comparison to the one willing. But in the second he treats of the same according to

comparison to the things willed, of which it is the cause, there, D, This therefore supremely good will, etc.

The prior of these has three chapters: in the first of which he says that the will of God is the divine essence. In the second, he raises an objection against this, and responds to it. But in the third he confirms his saying.

And through this the meaning is clear.

Articulus 1 — Whether There Is Will in God

Whether there is will in God?

However, three doubts occur here, before the text, of which the first is, Whether there is will in God? The second, What is His will? And the third, concerning the introduction or location of this tractate concerning the will.

To the first it is objected thus: § 1. Every appetite is significative of indigence: but in God there is no indigence: therefore there is no appetite. The first is proved by this, that appetite is moving toward that which is not had, as the Philosopher says. The second is evident per se. Thence further it is objected thus: No appetite is in God: every will is an appetite: therefore no will is in God. The first is established from the prior syllogism. The second is proved in the third book of De Anima, where appetite is divided by will, and desire which is the appetite of the sensible soul.

§ 2. Also, Augustine in the book De Libero arbitrio: The will is a rational motion, presiding over sense and appetite: but it is established that in God there is neither sense, nor sensible appetite, because Augustine speaks of that: therefore neither is there will.

§ 3. Also, every will is for pursuing something, or fleeing it: but God neither pursues nor flees anything: therefore He wills nothing: therefore as before.

§ 4. Also, the will is a rational power, having itself to opposites: but God has Himself in one way: therefore, etc.

§ 5. Also, the will is a contingent cause of things: but God is a necessary and always standing cause: therefore God does not have a will, as it seems.

§ 1. But to the contrary is what is said in the text.

§ 2. Also, the Apostle says According to the purpose of His will. And, in the same place According to the counsel of His will. And in many other places.

§ 3. Also, by reason: An agent by intellect is better than an agent by the necessity of nature, since the first knows the reason of the work, but the second does not: but God is the most noble agent: therefore He is an agent by intellect: but He does nothing of such things except what He wills, and when He wills: therefore God has a will.

§ 4. Also, the most free thing in a rational nature is the will: therefore it is both the best and most noble: therefore it is to be attributed to God.

§ 5. Also, the Philosopher in the XI of First Philosophy says: Will is His action: and therefore wakefulness, and sense, and intellect, are very voluptuous: and hope, and remembrance are on account of these. And he intends to show that to God must be given a will, which is always in act, and is His action: because for God to act is nothing else than for God to will that this be done: just as also for us the will always conjoined to the thing willed is the best, and voluptuous, as are wakefulness, and sense, and intellect according to act: and the sign of this is that hope and remembrance do not have voluptuousness except in relation to those.

Solution. It must be said that will is in God even prior to than in us, and more properly.

But to the first it must be said that of the will something is by accident, and something is per se. But per se it has four things; of which one is concerning nature, namely that it is of a rational nature, and in reason: as Aristotle and Damascene say, that every will is rational: and if it is not rational, it is not will. The second is that it is the most free thing of a rational nature: and this is its property: for it has one liberty from the proximate subject in which it is, that is, the nature of an intellectual spirit, which is not the act of a body as fixed to an organ: and therefore it is not obligated to matter or its appendages. It has another liberty from itself, according as it is a power able to accept an object, or not accept it, because it operates spontaneously. The third is its comparison to the good: because the will is always of the good, and especially of the highest good which all things desire, as the Philosopher says: and this highest good would not bring joyousness to God, unless He were its will: and this is what the Philosopher excellently touches upon in VII of the Ethics, where he says according to the translation which is from the Greek: Therefore for him whose nature is simple, always the same operation will be the most delectable. And so it is, because God always delights with one and simple delectation. For not only is motion an act, that is, a perfection and complement, but also immobility and delectation are more in rest. But the fourth and last is that the will is also

the cause of all things which are made as if by an artisan. For the Philosopher says in VI of First Philosophy, that the principle of all artificial things is the will: but God operates by the mode of an artisan, and by the mode of the necessity of nature.

Therefore to what he first objects concerning the will, it must be said that this is true in an indigent nature: since as Aristotle says in VII of the Ethics, just as in God immobility is voluptuous, so in an indigent nature motion is because of the malice of indigence: but God rests in the eternal good, which is wholly within Him. And these are the words: Transmutation is the sweetest of all things according to the poet Homer, because of a certain malice: just as an easily transmutable man, who is malicious, and a nature which needs transmutation, for it is neither simple nor modest.

Through this the solution to the three following is also clear.

To the last it must be said that this does not belong to the nobility of the will, that it can do evil, because this is not to be able: but it follows upon a created unconfirmed will from defect, because it flowed into being after non-being: but that it has power for opposites contradictorily, namely that it can do this, and can cease from it, and can do another: for this power shows that the will itself is obligated to nothing: and this well belongs to God, who is obligated to nothing.

Articulus 2 — What Is the Divine Will; And, Whether It Is the Same as the Essence of God

What is the divine will? and, Is it the same as God's essence?

Next it is asked, What is the divine will?

It seems, however, that it is not the divine essence: because § 1. Whatever things are the same, every thing that is attributed to one, can be attributed to the other: but there are many things in the will, which are not in the essence: such as all created goods which are in the will of God containing and willing them, yet not all things are in the essence: therefore the will and the essence are not the same.

§ 2. Also, whatever things are altogether the same, the same thing added to both still does not

makes them diverse, but they remain the same. If, therefore, the will of God is the essence of God, and the will for this is the essence for this: but the will for this exists, indicating a created man: therefore God is the essence of this, which is false.

§ 3. If perhaps it should be said that the will differs from the essence, not in itself, but in what it connotes. On the contrary: It does not belong to the ratio of the will that it connotes something: for I can say, God wills himself to be three and one, and wills to generate the Son: and nothing outside God is connoted. Therefore it seems that this is not substantial to the will, that it connotes something: therefore it seems that the will of God is not the essence of God.

ON THE CONTRARY: Whatever is not the whole of what it has, is not simple: the will is had from God, and he himself is not his will: therefore God is not simple, which is false.

Solution. It must be said that the will is the essence of God: but it differs in its mode of signifying, as has been shown quite often above concerning the divine attributes: and therefore the first objection is invalid.

To the next it must be said that it is true, where that which is added to both, is added under the same ratio in which they are the same. But this does not happen here: but rather when "the will for this" is said, the word "this" expresses the object of the will according to a ratio of understanding which differs from the essence: and therefore it is not necessary that it be the essence of this. And it well follows thus: Intellect and will are the same in reality: but really the intellect of God does not differ from the will of God: therefore really the essence of God and the intellect are the same.

To the next it must be said that the will of God does not always connote a willed object outside, or even a relation to a willed object outside, because it is eternal, and with respect to eternal things: but it always differs from the essence in its mode of signifying and understanding, because as was proved above, substance, will, and intellect are not synonyms.

Articulus 3 — Whether in This Place the Treatise on the Will of God Is Well Situated

Is the treatise on God's will well situated in this place?

Thirdly, it is asked about the situation of this treatise in this place.

§ 1. The will of God is his action, as was held in the authority from the Philosopher introduced above: but nothing is more immediate to the effect than the action drawing it out: therefore the will is most conjoined to the work: therefore it comes after power and wisdom.

§ 2. Again, the will seems to antecede power and knowledge: for everyone who operates through the will first wills, and afterwards by his knowledge orders the work, and by his power executes it: therefore it seems that the treatise on the will should have been first, and on power last.

§ 3. Again, Master Hugh of St. Victor: "Will moves, wisdom disposes, power operates." Therefore the will is first.

§ 4. Again, Dionysius says that the good is diffusive of being. But to be diffusive of being is through creation: therefore the first thing inclining towards creation is the good, which is a disposition of the will. But everything inclining has something inclinative towards the work: therefore that inclinative thing which is inclined by the will is more immediate to the work: but this is the executing power: therefore it seems that the will is before power.

ON THE CONTRARY § 1. For if the will, as the text says, is the whole first and proximate cause of things, it seems that the will should be determined in the same book as the things themselves,

that is, in the second book of the Sentences, and not here.

§ 2. Again, power according to its ratio abstracts from the will: for it follows, "the will is: therefore power is"; but not conversely. Therefore power is prior in nature to the will:

therefore the will is related by addition to power according to the ratio of understanding. But the more determined every cause is, the more proper and conjoined to the effect it is: therefore the will is more immediately conjoined to the work than power.

Solution. It must be said, as was said above, that power is considered in many ways, and so is the will. However, the will which is treated here is the will related to the willed object and conjoined to it: and this is the sufficient cause for creatures to exist: and therefore it is the cause operating and drawing out things.

To the second, it must be said that that objection proceeds concerning the will taken in another way, namely that of which it was said above that it is the mover of the other powers: and this is not compared to the willed object.

To the next it must be said that that authority is understood in the same way.

To the next it must be said that the statement of Dionysius rather argues for the fact that it is the immediate cause: because as Augustine says, and it was held above, "Because God is good, we are: and insofar as we are, we are good."

And what is objected further does not hold, except in those agents in which the will is not a sufficient cause: for there the will operates through other powers affixed in the members, as through instruments. But in God it is a sufficient cause for everything he wills: and therefore it is not necessary that it incline any other powers.

To the first on the contrary it must be said that it is not necessary on account of this to place the treatise on the will in the second book of the Sentences, because the science of the cause does not have to be determined in the same book as the caused thing, except only in those causes which are proximate to the caused things, and whose nature and property the caused thing itself has in itself. And this is evident: for although the stars are the causes of the generation of various things, yet the natures and motions of the stars are not determined in the book on the generation of animals or plants, but what is determined therein is concerning proximate causes univocal with the caused things themselves. And the will is not such a cause of creatures: and therefore it is not to be determined with creatures.

To the last it must be said that this is nothing to the point: because this does not object concerning power related to the work, which is divided against the will among those things required for the work, but rather concerning power which is a genus to everything that can do something by knowing, or willing, or operating.

D. That the supremely good will of God is the cause of all things that are naturally: whose cause is not to be sought, because it has none, since it is eternal.

And so this supremely good will is the cause of all things which naturally are made, or have been made or will be made: which is preceded by no cause, because it is eternal. And therefore its cause is not to be sought. For he who seeks its cau-

se seeks something greater than it, since nothing is greater than it. Hence Augustine in the book of Eighty-Three Questions: "He who seeks why God willed to make the world, seeks the cause of God's

will. But every efficient cause is greater than that which is effected. But nothing is greater than the will of God. Therefore its cause is not to be sought." The same in the book Against the Manichees: "If any say, 'Why did it please God to make heaven and earth?' It must be answered to them, who desire to know the will of God, and seek to know the causes and will of God, that the will of God is itself the cause of all things that are. For if the will has a cause, there is something that precedes the will of God: which it is wicked to believe. He therefore who says, 'Why did God make heaven and earth?' It must be answered to him, 'Because he wills.' For the will of God is the cause of heaven and earth: and therefore the will of God is greater than heaven and earth. But he who says, 'Why did he will to make heaven and earth?' seeks something greater than the will of God: but nothing greater can be found. Let human temerity therefore restrain itself: and let it not seek what is not, lest it not find what is." Behold, by these authorities it is openly insinuated that there is no cause of the will of God: and therefore it is not to be sought.

Divisio Textus

And so this supremely good will, etc. This part has three chapters. In the first of these, he indeterminately shows that the will is the cause of all things. In the second, he shows that it does not have a cause, but is first. In the third, he shows what things it is the cause of, namely of those things which are as facts, and those are permanent things: and of those things whose being is in becoming, as those which he calls motions: in which certain other things are also understood, as will be evident in the disputation.

Articulus 4 — Whether the Divine Will Is a Cause

Is the divine will a cause?

Concerning the first chapter three doubts arise, of which the first is: Whether the will is a cause? The second is: Whether it is the cause of all those things which are subject to God's power? The third is: Whether it is a proper or common cause, a contingent or a necessary one?

To the first it is objected thus: § 1. Augustine in book VIII of The City of God says thus: "This is the reason why we prefer the Platonists to the rest, because while other philosophers wore out their talents and studies in seeking the causes of things,[124]

and what might be the mode of learning and living: these, having known God, found where the cause of the constituted universe was." But it is established that the light of perceiving truth is attributed to wisdom, while the font of imbibing happiness is attributed to the goodness of the will: therefore the cause of the constituted universe is referred to power: and thus power is more the cause of the universe of creatures than the will is.

Again, a little before this, in the same place: "Whatever philosophers have sensed these things concerning the supreme, good, and true God, that he is the effector of created things and the light of things to be known, and the good of things to be done, that from him we have both the principle of nature, and the truth of doctrine, and the happiness of life: we prefer all these to the rest, and confess them to be nearer to us." But again it is sufficiently evident that

the light of things to be known, and the truth of doctrine, are referred to knowledge; while the good of things to be done and the happiness of life are referred to the goodness of the will: therefore that he is the effector and principle of nature is referred to power: therefore power is the cause of things more than the will, as it seems.

§ 2. Again, if the will is the cause of things, what kind of cause will it be? It is established that it is not a material cause, because God is the material cause of nothing. Similarly, it will not be a formal exemplar cause: because this is attributed to wisdom. It cannot be an efficient cause either: because power operates and effects. Therefore it will be only a final cause: and so it ought not to be called the efficient cause of things, but rather power.

But against this is what is said in the text.

Solution. To this it must be said that the will of God, which signifies the divine essence with respect to the willed object, and connoting an effect, is the cause of created things: because that is the will that a thing be made, and this is the sufficient action of God for everything that is made to be made.

To the sayings of Augustine in the book The City of God, it must be said that he speaks according to the vestiges of God found in creatures, in which in some way the Trinity of the operator shines forth. But the will of God is not operating without knowledge, and therefore in what is operated by the will there shines forth a vestige of knowledge. Nor is the will operating without the ratio of power, and therefore a vestige of power shines forth in the work. Nor is it operating without the intention of the supreme good, and therefore a vestige of the supreme good shines forth in the work. Nevertheless, the entire work depends on the will in order to be made: and the vestiges of the others shine forth for the reason that they are not separated from the operating will.

To the next it must be said that it itself is the efficient cause: but its disposition, which is goodness, is the final cause.

And as to what is objected concerning power, that according to this it will not be a cause, it must be said that power according to the ratio of power does not suffice for a thing to be made: because when someone is able and knows, then the complement is the will so that he makes it, and it is made. And therefore power is efficient, but not determined, and as a proper and sufficient cause according to its ratio.

Articulus 5 — Whether the Will of God Is the Cause of All Things That Are Subject to His Power; And, Why God Is Not Called Omniwilling, as Omnipotent and Omniscient

Is the will of God the cause of all things that are subject to his power? And, why is God not called omnivolent, just as he is called omnipotent and omniscient?

Secondly it is asked, whether it is the cause of all those things which are subject to power?

It seems that it is: because § 1. God can only do good things, for the reason that to do evil things belongs to impotence: but the will of God is for every good: therefore it is

124. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, VIII, c. 10.

for all those things concerning which there is power.

§ 2. Again, God can do nothing except what he wills himself to be able to do: therefore everything he can do, he wills himself to be able to do. But no one unless foolish wills himself to be able to do evil: therefore God, since he is supremely wise, wills himself to be able to do good only: therefore he can do good only and wills it: therefore power and will are concerning the same thing.

§ 3. Again, as knowledge is related to the true, so is power to the good: but knowledge is of every truth, and only of truth: therefore power is of every good, and only of good. And God wills every good: therefore he wills by his will everything which he can do by his power.

§ 4. Again, God can do nothing which cannot be done with him as author. But what can be done with him as author is good: therefore whatever he can do is good, and he wills it all: therefore he wills all that he can do.

ON THE CONTRARY: "All whatsoever God willed, he made in heaven and on earth," etc. If therefore power is of all those things of which there is will, he made in heaven, etc., all whatsoever he could make: and this was proved above to be false.

FURTHER it is asked, if God is called omnipotent because he can do all things, and omniscient because he knows all things, why is he not called omnivolent? For it is said in the text, nothing is done against his will.

If perhaps you say: because evil things are done which God does not will. ON THE CONTRARY: We have one sign of the will concerning the evil that is done, namely permission: therefore even this is subject to the divine will.

SOLUTION to the first objections, there is one solution, because it is founded on the same thing: namely that it should be said that when it is said "God can do all things," or "God can do good things," that which falls under power is amplified to a being possible to be, which will never be made, which however God could and can make. But the will is related to that which was, or is, or will be, as is said in the text. And therefore although both are with respect to the good, they are nevertheless not of equal scope in the good: because one looks to the good in potency, but the other to what was, or is, or will be in act.

To that which is asked further, why is he not called omnivolent? It must be said that the reason is touched upon well enough in the objection.

And to what is objected to the contrary, it is said that permission is not a sign of the will that God wills this which is done by him who does evil, but that he wills something concerning it, as will be said below. But omnipotence is referred to possible being, or future, or being in act, or past: and the will is referred only to what was, or is, or will be: and therefore he is not omnivolent as he is omnipotent, nor omnivolent as he is omniscient.

Articulus 6 — Whether the Divine Will Is the Common or Proper, Necessary or Contingent Cause of All Things

Is the divine will a common or proper, necessary or contingent cause of all things?

Thirdly it is asked, whether it is a proper or common cause, a necessary or contingent one?

It seems that it is common, because: § 1. That is common from which the being of the caused does not follow. But the being of the caused does not follow from the will of God from eternity: therefore the will of God is a common cause.

§ 2. Again, it seems that it is contingent: because Augustine says: "What by the will

is done, is not done out of necessity: but what is done and not necessarily, is done contingently: therefore what is done by the will is done contingently: therefore the will is a contingent cause."

ON THE CONTRARY § 1. A common cause is one needing something in order to cause: the will of God needs nothing: therefore it is not a common cause.

§ 2. Again, every common cause is determinable by something addible to it: the will of God is determinable by nothing: therefore as before.

Again it seems that it is not contingent. Every contingent thing is mutable: for Aristotle says: "What is contingent to be, is contingent not to be." But God in power and knowledge and will is altogether immutable: therefore his will is not a contingent cause.

Solution. This question was noted above in the question: Whether predestination has a cause? And as was said there, the will is a determined and proper cause of all things. But it does not follow that if it is from eternity, the effect is from eternity: because this is impeded on the part of the order of wisdom, and on the part of the caused thing, to the ratio of which belongs that it flowed into being after non-being: and through this the solution to the first is clear.

To the next it must be said that it itself is not a contingent cause: but of the contingent and the necessary it itself is the necessary cause. But necessity is multiplex, as was distinguished above: and in God simple necessity well falls, which is immutable, which sounds neither of coercion nor of obligation.

To the saying of Augustine it must be said that he is speaking of the will of the creature and not of the Creator.

Articulus 7 — Whether the Will of God Has a Cause

Does the will of God have a cause?

Then it is asked concerning the second chapter of this part where he says, there, D, around the middle: If the will has a cause, there is something that precedes the will of God, etc.

For the will of God seems to have a cause.

§ 1. For every will of a wise person proceeds from a rational cause: and this is to the praise of one acting wisely: since therefore God is supremely wise, and acting wisely, it seems that there is a rational cause for his will.

§ 2. Again, Ephesians 1:3[125], on that verse, According to the purpose of his will, namely God's: the Gloss says that the will of God is from reason.

§ 3. Again, above, in the prologue of this book, the Master said that this is the cause of all errors, that the will is not subjected to reason: therefore since God is absolved from all errors, his will is ruled by reason.

§ 4. Again, according to this it would be easy to demonstrate everything through a cause, and to solve all queries, by saying, "God wills this, and you ought not to seek another cause."

ON THE CONTRARY: In us it is thus, that the ratio of our will is the willed object, because the willed object is a mover according to its ratio or that of the good, and therefore our will depends on the willed object. But the willed object of the divine will is caused by the will itself: therefore it is not the ratio or cause of the will: therefore from that part it does not have a cause. On the part of the willer, however, the will is the same

as the substance: therefore also from that part it has no cause: therefore simply there is no cause of the divine will.

Solution. It must be said that neither in foreknowledge, nor outside foreknowledge does the will of God have any cause: but nevertheless it can have a ratio at which the will is terminated according to act. And what the difference is between a cause and a term or ratio, was said above in the question on the cause of predestination.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that the will of God is always a rational cause: but it is never from a rational cause: because this is not understood except of those agents whose will is changed by the willed object and is caused. And this, as was proved, is not the case in the will of God: because in such wills the willer depends on the willed object: and he is said to be of rational will because he wills rational things and rationally.

To the next it must be said that the Gloss says that it itself is rational for the reason that it is a ratio unto itself: because it cannot be unjust, for nothing is more just than that this should be done which God wills: because he wills nothing but good: because by that very fact every good is good, because God wills it.

To the next it must be said that it is understood of the will of man, which is not the ratio of the willed object, but rather takes its ratio and cause from the willed object, and not of the will of God in which there is the total contrary.

To the next it must be said that the will of God is not a cause which is a middle term of demonstration, and already that is not sought in the solution of doubts: but rather there are sought causes connatural and coessential to the effect: and those it is difficult to find.

Divisio Textus

Here it is not to be passed over by us, etc.

Here begins that part which is about the distinction of the will. And it has two parts: in the first of which he divides the will of good pleasure [beneplacitum] and the will of sign. In the second, however, he divides the will of sign into five: and this begins there, G: But sometimes according to a certain figure of speech, etc.

Articulus 8 — Whether the Divine Will Is the First Cause of All Things

Is the divine will the first cause of all things?

Then it is asked concerning what he says in the third chapter, there, E: The will of God is the first and supreme cause of all species and motions, etc.

§ 1. For if it is the first, it is not lawful to seek another before it: and if it is supreme, and supremely sufficient, it is not lawful to seek another after it. Therefore it seems that everything that the philosophers searched out in natural, mathematical, and very many other causes is superfluous. Similarly too, the original texts of the Saints, who render many other causes of the divine works, are superfluous.

But if you say that this is the vanity of the philosophers, and has no truth: this is a wonder, that a vanity having no truth still stands and has not been disproved.

§ 2. Again, according to this it seems that nature also does nothing, nor is powerful to operate anything; because the sufficient cause of all things is the will of God: therefore heat does not burn, but the will of God burns: and man does not speak, but the will of God speaks, and so in all things: and this is ridiculous, as it seems.

§ 3. Again, this seems false which he says, that monstrous and natural things are made by the will of God alone: since natural things have determined causes, and monstrous things are reduced to the defection and superfluity of matter, or the disproportion of the informative virtue to the matter, as the philosophers say, or the inordinate division of the seed: therefore they are not made by the will of God alone.

§ 4. Again, the defect of the luminaries [i.e., eclipses] has determined causes, discovered and written from the proportion of the motions of the sun and moon according to the return to the head or tail of the dragon [the lunar nodes], and according to the proportion of the motion of the head and tail, and the motion of the latitude of the moon, and the proportion of aspect according to the circles of altitude in which conjunction or prevention or opposition occurs, and according to the distance of the latitude of the climate: therefore it seems that the cause of all these has been subtly investigated.

Solution. Without prejudice I say with the Lord in the Gospel of John, 5:17: My Father works until now, and I work: and therefore all whatsoever the will makes, God makes more in nature and will: but he himself operates as the immediate universal cause. And this is wonderful:

125. Actually Ephesians 1:5, "secundum propositum voluntatis suae."

because one cause is immediate to each thing at the same time, and yet universal to all: and if other causes operate anything, they receive it from the will of God operating and containing and moving them. But nevertheless they move not according to the divine properties, because they cannot reach those: but according to their own proper properties and forms and quantities, and it was lawful for the philosophers to seek those, just as it still is. And Augustine speaks here of certain philosophers who excluded the will of God from the works of nature, saying that he can only move the first mobile thing whatever it may be, while other things are moved in various ways according to their distance from him: and those who followed vanity, passed into vanity, and their foolish heart was darkened, just as Cicero, who denies that there is foreknowledge, so that he may establish chance and fortune and the republic; and the Commentator [Averroes] on the Physics and Metaphysics, who denies that God immediately operates in everything, so that he may establish for each its proper action according to the proper nature it has.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 9 — Whether the Will of Good Pleasure Is Multiple, as the Will of Sign

Is the will of good pleasure multiplex, just as the will of sign?

A doubt arises concerning the first, whether the will of good pleasure is multiplex, just as the will of sign?

It seems that it is, because: § 1. Will is distinguished according to willed objects: but God wills many things by the will of good pleasure, because he wills all the good things that are done: therefore it seems that it itself is multiplex.

§ 2. Again, in the text we have that it is good, and well-pleasing, and perfect. These three

differences, however, do not belong to it except according to that which is referred to diverse willed objects: therefore it seems that it itself is multiplex.

§ 3. Again, the knowledge of God is distinguished according to the modes of knowable things, so that some is called simple knowledge, and some of good pleasure, and some absolute foreknowledge: therefore it seems that the will of good pleasure also receives such a distinction.

Solution. To this it must be said that this will receives a multiplicity, as the Master distinguishes in the text. And this is the cause: because on its own part it has but one thing, which is the divine substance: and on the part of all willed things there is one end, which he wills in all things, and this is God himself and his goodness and justice. From other things, however, it has neither unity nor multiplicity, because they are outside it: and it does not depend on them, but rather the reverse.

And through this the solution to the first is clear, which proceeds concerning a will whose end is the willed object, and which depends on the willed object as upon an end and cause.

To the next it must be said that these are said of the divine will according to its effect: because, namely, it makes approved the good of the precept, and the well-pleasing of counsel, and the perfect of supererogation: or because it quiets our will in his own according to the conjunction of the good, and according to the property of the good which is the sweetness of fruible goodness: in which the delighted will rests: and this is the well-pleasing, because the well-pleasing is that in which the will is fed and satiated in the conjunction of all goods: for this is perfect, in which nothing is lacking.

To the next it must be said that it is not similar concerning knowledge: because knowledge respects things according to the order and distinction of good and evil, in which it is: but the will is referred to things in one way, namely under the ratio of the good, because it is the cause of things, not caused by things.

Divisio Textus

DIVISION OF THE TEXT,

Sometimes indeed according to a certain figure of speech, etc.

This part which is about the will of the sign has four parts. In the first, he sets forth signs in general. In the second, he discusses three together, at the place, H, however I believe. In the third, about precept and prohibition, etc., two together, at the place, L, also permission. In the fourth and last, he sets forth almost an epilogue, at the place, M, therefore what has been set forth above, etc.

Articulus 10 — Whether the Divine Will Is Mutable

Is the divine will mutable?

Then it is asked concerning what the Master says, there, F: It neither receives multiplicity, nor mutability, etc.

For it seems to be mutable: because § 1. Gregory says on that verse of Isaiah 38:1: Give charge concerning your house: that the Lord changes his sentence, and not his counsel. But the sentence is expressive of the will: therefore he changes his will.

§ 2. Again, at least the will of sign seems to be mutable: because sometimes he commanded something, which he afterwards revoked; and he said something, which he revoked: as is plain in Abraham, and Nineveh, and Hezekiah.

§ 3. Again, he willed Caesar to be at sometime, and now he does not will it: therefore the will is changed.

§ 4. Again, he did not from eternity will the world to be, but to be going to be [fore]. But now he wills the world to be, but not to be going to be [fore]: therefore the will is changed, as it seems.

§ 5. Again, the will has a relation to the willed object: therefore when the willed object is changed the will is changed, because when one of the relatives is changed, the other is also changed.

ON THE CONTRARY: The Master said above in the text that the will is not spoken of relatively. Similarly it was held that it does not depend on the willed object, but conversely: therefore it is neither multiplied, nor mutated by willed objects.

Solution. It must be said that no will of God is mutable, neither the will of good pleasure, nor the will of sign: for although the will of sign is granted to be multiplex from the multiplicity of things signified (because multiplicity can be attributed to God through a cause, but not mutability, because it sounds of infirmity and impotence which God neither has in himself, nor has as a cause: but it falls in from the defect of creatures).

To the first, therefore, it must be said that Gregory calls the sentence a prophetic enunciation, which concerns inferior causes, and is enunciated through a respect to them: and because those are mutable, that sentence is also mutated, but not the counsel, because the counsel is the eternal disposition concerning things to be done.

To the next it must be said that the will of sign is immutable: because the will of God is always signified in one way, although the thing signified is varied, because the will is not always concerning it. But whether even then the sign is false, or not, will be determined below.

To the next it must be said that just as the Master said above concerning knowledge, that it is the same with respect to past, present, and future things, provided that it is the same knowable object: so it must be said here, that the same willed object is that Caesar is, and that Caesar was. But for Caesar to be in the past, and for Caesar to be again now, would not be the same will: and the reason for this was assigned twice above.

To the next it must be said in the same way: because the will that the world is going to be, and is now, is the same: but on the part of the willed object a diverse time has approached.

To the next it must be said that the will speaks of a respect to the willed object, as the objection proves: nevertheless, according to the things said above, this respect does not posit a real relation added to the divine essence: but it posits a real one in the thing, and according to a ratio of understanding in God: and this is what the Master understood above, when he said that the will is not spoken of relatively.

Articulus 11 — Whether There Are Only Five Signs of the Divine Will

Whether there are only five signs of the divine will?

A doubt arises concerning the first part about these signs:

§4. For these signs signify that that concerning which they are, is the will of good pleasure. However, since frequently it is not so, these signs seem to be false and deceptive.

§2. Likewise, they seem to be more than five: just as there is good and better, so there is evil and worse: therefore, just as with respect to good we have a precept and counsel which is of the better, so with respect to evil we ought to have a prohibition and dissuasion of the lesser evil, which is venial.

§3. Likewise, Dionysius says that good is from one whole and sole cause, but evil is in every way from the corruption of any circumstance: therefore, evil is of greater division than good: but we have three with respect to good, namely precept, counsel, and operation: therefore, we ought to have more than three with respect to evil: and thus again there will be more than five.

§4. Likewise, between good and evil there is an indifferent medium: therefore, it seems, since this often happens, that with respect to that there ought to be some sign of the will.

§5. Likewise, the vain and idle are not properly evils: therefore, they ought to have a special sign.

§6. On the contrary, it seems that they ought to be fewer: for fulfillment and permission regard all things, whatever are done, evil and good: therefore, those suffice, as it seems.

§7. Likewise, when he dealt with wisdom, he did not give a sign of wisdom, nor signs of power when he dealt with power: therefore, neither ought he to have given signs of the will.

Solution. It must be said to the first, that these signs do not signify that the will of God is always concerning that about which the signs are set: but either concerning this, or something about this: and this especially in permission: and therefore they are not false signs: because from the very malice, which is done with God permitting, it is determined that that is not subject to the will per se, but by occasion, inasmuch as some good is occasioned from it. But in others, the sign is that the will is concerning the same thing about which there is a sign, although sometimes it is not concerning the same: and thus then again it does not fail, because it does not deceive: for God then wills our will to be concerning that which is signified, until by another sign revealing the will of God, it is revoked, as was done in Abraham.

To the other it must be said, that although there is good and better, and evil and worse, yet evil of itself signifies that which all ought to flee from by intention, and if it happens, to amend: and therefore it regards a common prohibition made to all. But it is true, that in that mortal evil is prohibited directly, but venial evil indirectly: but good according to its differences does not so commonly regard all: and therefore it has different signs on account of different states.

To the other it must be said, that evil is of a broader division by way of corruption: because it is generated from the corruptions of many, for any corrupted circumstance induces evil: but good requires the integrity of all together. But because for the diversity of states good is of a broader division, and according to this the signs are multiplied, because evil in whatever way it is done, regards only one state which is to be fled from, but not so good.

To the other it must be said, that the indifferent as such is not among those concerning which there is a sign, except of operation: because signs are given according to the differences of those things which corrupt or order in morals and grace.

To the other it must be said, that the vain and idle are reduced to evil prohibited indirectly.

To the other it must be said, that science in its object does not regard diverse reasons, because in all there is one reason of the true. Similarly, neither does power in its own: because it could only be a possible being: but it is not so with respect to good of which there is goodness, because there are differences of good with respect to different states: and there are also corruptions of good, which ought to be prohibited from happening: and if they happen, they ought to be ordered so that they are not disgraceful.

But if it is asked, By what are these signs taken?

It can be said, that on the part of the signified they can be taken thus: because either the sign is good, or evil. If good: either it has a sign with respect to its being done in the future, or with respect to itself in the present. If in the first way: either it is that to which all are bound, and then it is counsel. But if it is in the second way: then it is operation, because God works all our works in us, as it is said, Isaiah 26:12. But if it is with respect to evil: either future, and then it is prohibition: or present, and then it is permission.

On the part of the rational creature to whom these signs are given, they are taken in this way. The sign is either with respect to the detestable, or with respect to the desirable. If with respect to the detestable: either that it may not be done, or of what is done. In the first way it is prohibition, in the second way permission. If with respect to the desirable: either that it may be done, or of what is done. If that it may be done: either according to the state of perfection, and thus it is counsel: or according to the common state, and then it is precept. If with respect to what is done, then it is operation. And these five are contained in this verse:

He commands, and prohibits, permits, counsels, fulfills.

Articulus 12 — Whether There Is Counsel in God

Whether there is counsel in God?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, H, "Therefore, however, precept," etc.

For it seems that counsel is not present in God: because Damascene says that counsel is of the ignorant; but God is ignorant of nothing.

Solution. To which it must be said that "I counsel" is said from "I give counsel" and "I seek counsel." In the first way, it signifies an abundance of counsel, and thus it pertains to God: and then the counsel of God is the predetermination of certain better goods, so that appetite may arise in those. However, counsel taken in the second way is of the ignorant: and in this way, it does not pertain to God, and Damascene speaks of this.

Expositio Textus

Exposition of the Text

Then it is asked concerning what he says there, "Either by allowing them to happen, or by doing them himself." For from this it seems that there are only these two signs: because, as he says here, these encompass all things that happen.

And it must be said to this, that it follows well if a sign were given only with respect to the present deed, but it is also given with respect to the future: and then the other three also have a place.

Articulus 13 — Whether God Rightly Commanded Abraham To Sacrifice His Son

Whether God rightly commanded Abraham to sacrifice his son?

Then it is questioned concerning this which is said there, "He commanded Abraham to sacrifice his son, yet did not will it," etc.

1. For it seems that He ought not to have commanded it.

Likewise, why did He test him? For it is evident that the Lord Himself well knew how great was the virtue of Abraham: hence it was not necessary to test him for His own sake.

1. Likewise, it seems that Abraham was not bound to obey Him, because He commanded him against Himself. For Augustine says that God cannot act against the seminal reasons which He implanted in prime matter, because otherwise He would act against Himself: therefore, much less can He act against the reasons of natural law, which He implanted in the human heart: but natural law says that an innocent son should be spared: therefore, against this he ought to have believed nothing, but rather to have thought that it was an angel of Satan transformed into an angel of light.

If you say that He who established it dispensed it: this is nothing, because if He first implanted it well, then there was no reason for dispensation afterwards: but if He implanted it badly, then by believing the natural law in the human heart, He erred, which is inconvenient.

Likewise, Augustine wills, and also the Philosopher, that certain things are so conjoined with evil that they cannot be done well: and among these is to kill the innocent, and especially an innocent son: therefore it seems that Abraham ought in no way to have believed that this was from a good God, and thus he ought not to have obeyed.

Likewise, God did not will this, as was evident from the outcome: therefore, if he had obeyed, he would not have done the will of God: therefore he would have sinned: to what end then did He command it?

Solution. Some say here that God commanded the son to be offered, but not to be killed: and this could well be done, with the natural law preserved. But this is nothing: because it is read that he carried fire and a sword in his hands. Hence it is evident that he intended to kill, as is sufficiently held from the text. And therefore it must be said here as concerning the

taking of the goods of the Egyptians against the will of their owners, and the taking of the harlot by Hosea according to blessed Bernard in the book on the Dispensation of the precept and rule, that evils by the power of God are separable from evil ends, and conjoinable to good ends, as this, namely that Abraham wished to kill his son by command as a sign of the future redemption to be made by the killing and sacrifice of Christ, in which the whole Christ is offered, but the human nature only signified by the ram is killed, and the divine as Isaac is freed: and in the harlot of Hosea, in which lust is not intended, but the dismissal of the Synagogue and the calling of the Gentiles is signified: and the taking of the vessels of Egypt in the figure of the despoiling of the sciences and virtues of the world in the service of Christ: and then those things can be commanded by God alone, to whom such separation of ends and conjunction is possible.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that God commanded this to show him as tested to Himself, so that he might presume more of himself, which is good for the humble, and to show others an example of obedience.

To the other it must be said that such things are of the precept of natural law, conjoined to their ends: but separated from others, and conjoined to others, they are not: and then God does nothing against the reason which He implanted: for they are not against it, but are conjoined to others: for to offer a son to killing, so that future liberation may be shown through the killing, is not against natural law.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

DISTINCTIO XLVI

Divisio Textus

Here arises a question. For it has been said, etc. Here the Master raises doubts concerning the determinations in the preceding distinction. And it is divided into two parts. In the first, he objects concerning the will of good pleasure, proving that sometimes it does not have effect. In the second, he introduces two opinions on this matter, whether it is good for evil to occur, or not? And this begins there, D, Therefore since it is established that all good things which happen, etc.

In the first part there are three chapters: in the first of which he introduces authorities in which there seems to be an objection against what was previously determined. In the second, he determines one authority taken from the Gospel. And in the third, he determines another introduced by the Apostle.

Divisio Textus

And therefore, since it is established that all good things that happen, etc.

Here begins the second part, and it is divided into two parts. In the first, the Master raises a question and follows one opinion responding to it, namely, of those saying it is good that evils happen, and good that evils exist, and that God wills evils to happen and evils to exist, but does not will evils. In the second, however, he presents another opinion to which he himself seems to consent, because he pursues it more extensively: and it is also more wholesome and sound, there, F, Those indeed who say, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether the Will of Good Pleasure in God Can Be Impeded by Anything

Whether the will of good pleasure in God can be hindered by anything?

A doubt arises here, whether the will of good pleasure can be hindered by the things that have been said?

It seems that it cannot: because
1. He has done all things whatsoever He willed. Likewise, who resists His will?

1. Likewise, by reason, the will of God is the cause of the willed, as was previously held; therefore, since it is not a contingent cause, but a necessary one, it cannot be changed: therefore, neither can it be hindered.
2. Likewise, foreknowledge which is with respect to evil does not have causality towards it, yet by necessity of consequence it cannot be deceived in that which is foreknown: therefore, much less the will of good pleasure, which is the predetermined cause of the willed.

1. But on the contrary is what is objected in the Letter, that He wills all men to be saved: yet not every man is saved.
2. Likewise, the will of itself is towards opposites: therefore, it seems that it is not the necessary cause of anything.

Solution. And it must be said that the solutions of the Master concerning the authorities introduced revert to two modes, one of which is that when it is said: As often as I willed, that is, as often as I willed to gather your children, that is, some of your children, so often your will did not consent to me, but nevertheless could not hinder. The other concerning the Apostle: Who wills all men to be saved, etc., that is, all who are saved, are saved by His will, and against it or without it, none.

Another solution of this second authority is that it is a suitable distribution for the genera of individuals, and not for the individuals of genera: because He wills some to be saved from all, namely from the circumcision, from the uncircumcision, from the prelates, from the subjects, from the rich, from the poor, etc.

But because these solutions seem to leave that the whole salvation depends on the will of God, and nothing on our will by consenting and cooperating, therefore it seems more to be said with John Damascene, that God wills with antecedent will, and not consequent: and both

are the will of good pleasure. But when it is said antecedent will, it is understood as the will which is the divine essence, connoting effects ordered to salvation on the part of nature and grace: as is the bestowal of rational nature which could recognize the good, and seek the recognized, and find the sought from the largesse of the highest good, and adhere to the found: such an order of salvation is in all men. Similarly, on the part of grace, the mission of the Redeemer, the payment of the price for all as to sufficiency, the establishment of laws ordering life: for he who ordained these, willed all men to be saved: and this is called antecedent, because it precedes in these both our consent and our work.

But another is consequent which is of the willed ordered to our work, as the will of retribution whether for good or for evil: and by this He does not will all to be saved, because it would be contrary to justice: and therefore Damascene says that this second depends on our cause.

Our masters of the time say the same with Damascene in two other ways. Some thus, that God wills every man to be saved as to Himself, but not as to the present or future deeds of man from eternity: and this returns to the same. Others say the same with more subtle words, namely that there is a double will, namely absolute which is simply and absolutely compared to the willed which is willed per se and not through another: for just as then the knowledge of God is compared to every truth, and power to every possible being by the power of the efficient, so the will per se will be of every good and not unless of good: and in this way He wills every man to be saved. There is another will depending on the foreknowledge of merits, not as from a cause, but as from a concomitant reason, as we said above: and by this He does not will every man to be saved: and this also returns to the same.

To that therefore which is objected by reason, it must be said as above, that the will of God does not have the necessity of coercion, but of immutability from the order of cause to the caused, that is, of will to the willed: and this does not take away freedom from it, but rather confirms it, as has often been explained above.

Articulus 2 — Whether It Is Good That Evils Be Done or That Evils Be

Is it good that evils happen or that evils exist?

Here arises a doubt concerning the question itself, Whether it is good that evils happen or that evils exist?

And it seems that it is so. 1. By many authorities which lie in the Letter.

Likewise, Boethius in Book V of the Consolation of Philosophy: The divine power is good, therefore if to God all evils are good: evil is good, it simply seems that evil is good: therefore it is good that it happens.

1. Likewise, Augustine in the book of Confessions: You, Lord, to whom nothing is evil, nor to your entire creation: because there is nothing outside you that can break or corrupt the order you have established. Evil is not evil to God, and it is not evil to the entire creation: for since it is outside God, it cannot break the order God has established: and

since He is the best, nothing can corrupt the best, but rather adorns it: because it makes goods more commendable: therefore since it harms nothing, and contributes adornment, as is held from these words, it is good that evil happens.

2. Likewise, Apocalypse 22:14: He who is filthy, let him be filthy still: the Gloss says: Because it could be objected that it would be evil to prophesy to the wicked, since they would be punished more severely from it: it is said to him not to cease for this reason: because it is just that he who is filthy, let him be filthy still. But what is just, as Augustine says, is good: therefore it seems that it is good that evil happens.
3. Likewise, it is good in every way to punish guilt, because in this the beauty of divine justice results: but guilt is a certain punishment: therefore it is good that guilt happens, and that evil happens. Whence Augustine in the book of Confessions: You have commanded, Lord, and it is so, that every disordered appetite is a punishment to itself. It is placed in the Book of Sentences in the Letter, that between the first apostasy and the last sin, all sins are guilt and punishment: since punishment is good, it seems that it is good that all those sins happen.
4. Likewise, every ordered thing is good to be and to happen: evil is ordered, as is held in the Letter by Augustine in the Enchiridion: therefore it is good that evil happens and exists.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. It is not good to happen: what does not happen from the best, as from a cause and author: but evil does not happen from the best as from a cause and author: therefore it is not good that evil happens.

1. Likewise, evil is the corruption of good: but nothing corrupting good is good to happen: therefore as before.
2. Likewise, every active infers its passive, and conversely: therefore if it is good that evil happens, it is good to do evil: and this is against the Apostle saying: Let us not do evil that good may come: whose damnation is just.
3. Likewise, it is not evil for good to happen: therefore it is not good for evil to happen.
4. Likewise, what is evil, its generation is evil, as Boethius wants in the Topics: therefore for evil to happen is evil: therefore not good.
5. Likewise, every moral good is principally good from the end: but evil is the corruption of the end: therefore for it to happen is evil: therefore not good.
6. Likewise, evil in deeds is only from happening, because this is the cause of evil in the soul, because from an evil act a bad disposition and bad habit and guilt remain: therefore if it is good that evil happens, all things that follow from evil happening will necessarily be good: which is absurd.

Solution. It must be said that the Master introduces two opinions: of which the first is false in my judgment, but the second is true. For I think that this is absolutely false, it is good that evil

happens or exists: and this similarly, God wills that evil happens or exists: because it is converted with the other: for if God wills every good, and whatever He wills, is only good: if it is good that evil happens, God wills that evil happens, and conversely. But if it is determined thus, that evil happening is an occasion for good, for which reason evil is permitted to happen: then it will be true: or, as Jerome will say below, that evil happening is some good, as the evil of Judas benefited us, not insofar as it is evil, but insofar as it is an occasion: then it can be conceded with such an added determination. But speaking absolutely, I think that all are false, as the second opinion says: and if such propositions are found absolutely posited by the Saints, I say that they must be understood with determination.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that evil in itself is good for the divine virtue: for this is determined: because in it is shown in what it is good: and that good is not placed in evil happening as in a subject, but only as in an occasion, and in the divine virtue, as in a subject: because it makes the virtue shine, as in Pharaoh: for it is necessary that everything that opposes the divine virtue also serves it, as Gregory says. For when he does not want to do the will of God freely, it is necessary that he be subjected by force to the punishing justice.

To the other, it must be said that it is understood in the same way: because to God it is not evil what He does, but an occasion of the good of the beauty of justice: but Boethius places only one occasion of good: Augustine, however, places three: for one good is occasioned which is the beauty of justice: as from robbery the beauty of the judge's justice is occasioned, while the thief appears on the gallows. Augustine touches upon another comparison of occasion, when he says that even to the entire creation it is not evil. Because it is an occasion of double good, namely because it shows goods more commendable, because contraries placed next to each other shine more. And it is also an occasion of utility: and this still in two ways, namely in the one doing evil, but after the deed, and not when it is done: as one who is negligent, and from the sin perpetrated is pricked, and becomes fervent and humble. And secondly, in others: and this in many ways: for some are made cautious from the fall of this one, as Horace says: For your matter is at stake when the neighbor's wall is on fire.

Some, however, are made merciful, compassionate to him, and praying for him. Some, however, by the tedium of life which is mixed with so many evils, sigh for the eternal: as Psalm 119:5 says: Woe is me, that my sojourning is prolonged! I have dwelt with the inhabitants of Cedar, that is, with sinners. Some, however, are moved to zeal, as Psalm 73:3 says: I was envious of the wicked, seeing the peace of sinners. The patience of some is also exercised, and virtue is tested: as through tyrants martyrs are tested. And in other ways also which are easy to find. Although it is good that these happen, it is not good that evil happens, because it is not the cause of these, but only the occasion.

To the other, it must be said that that from Apocalypse 22:11 is difficult to solve: but as far as I can understand, justice is twofold, namely retribution for merits: and thus it is not just that he who is filthy, let him be filthy still: just as it is not just that he who steals, let him steal still: but it is just that he be hanged, and he be condemned. Another justice, however, is from the congruence of negligence: so that because God gave time for repentance, and he negligently delays to convert to the Lord, it is just that he be abandoned by God: from which it

follows that he who is filthy, let him be filthy still. And therefore I do not think that what is said, it is just, notes the order of becoming filthy, and still being in filth, except through a medium: for the immediate order is noted to be abandoned by God: from which it further follows that he is overcome by sins, and becomes filthy still: and thus also from the justice which is from the congruence of negligence, it does not follow except accidentally. But if it is still conceded that it is just, it does not further follow that it is good: because good does not denote such an order as just: for just regards the general order of guilt to punishment, and restitution to merit: but good denotes the perfection which is from the end absolutely. Nor is it valid, everything that is done justly, is done well: and everything that is just, is good, and that is done justly, and is just: therefore it is done well, and is good: because when I say, that it is done justly, it is done well, there justice is placed in the ordaining, and similarly goodness: and when it is said, that it is just, it is good, it is understood in that which is of this kind, that is, according to the relation to the ordaining: but when it is said, this happening is just, just is not placed around this except accidentally and externally: and therefore it does not follow that it is good except with determination, as was said before.

To the other, it must be said that sin in that it is sin, is not punishment: whence sin has a double comparison to free will, namely as it is free turned away from the unchangeable good by its own will, and thus sin and evil proceed from it. It is also compared to it as it is bound and drawn by the necessity of concupiscence and the fomes and custom and induced evil habit: and thus in some way it is a punishment following sin: and this is not to be punishment simply, which is inflicted by God or which simply orders guilt, but only in a certain respect, namely justice which is from the congruence of negligence of conversion, as was said above: and this seems to be what Gregory intends when it is said, Sin which is not erased by repentance, by its weight soon draws to another.

To the last, it must be said that evil is ordered: but the good of that order is not placed in it, but rather in another: and therefore it does not follow that by the goodness of the order it is good to be or to happen, but rather, that some good of the order is elicited in another outside it from its happening or being.

Articulus 3 — In What This Goodness Is Placed When It Is Said, "It Is Good That Evil Be Done"; And, Whether It Is Good To Do Evil; And, Whether It Can Be Conceded, "It Is Good That Malice Be Done"

In which this goodness is posited, when it is said, Is it good for evil to happen? and, Is it good to do evil? and, Can it be conceded, It is good for malice to happen?

Then it is asked concerning what they say and concede, there, H, For those who say that God wills evils to be or to happen, etc.

And two things are asked according to these: of which the first is, In which this goodness is posited, when it is said, It is good for evil to happen?

The second, however, is, Into what as into the willed does the will pass, when it is said, God wills evil to happen or to be.

Concerning the first, it proceeds thus: Every note of composition notes the inherence of the predicate to the subject: therefore, when it is said, It is good for evil to happen, it is noted that good inherently is to that which is evil to happen: however, it is evident that it does not inhere as a form in the subject, nor essentially, nor even accidentally, nor as the same: therefore it does not inhere: therefore that expression is false.

However, if you perhaps say that that good is posited to inhere in the doer: this is nothing: because the doer of evil by the very fact that he does it, becomes evil: therefore good through evil happening is not posited in him. However, if it is said that it is in him to whom evil is done: this is not general in every evil, as in fornication, for there both the agent and the patient become evil: therefore it would not be generally true according to this opinion, that it is good for evil to happen.

Likewise, it is further asked according to this opinion, Whether it is to be conceded, that it is good to do evil? by this that the passive infers its active, and conversely.

Likewise, Whether it is conceded, that it is good for malice to happen? For it is evident and in the letter of the preceding chapter it is held, that neither is conceded, that it is good for evil to be, or that God wills evil.

Solution. It must be said to the first, that according to this opinion goodness is predicated of evil happening, or of evil being, not according to inherence, but by occasion: because every other in-

The understanding of this opinion seems to me false. And then it must be noted that a cause per se has influence over a cause or causality. However, a cause per accidens causes in some way, although not per se. As it is said, Polycletus is per accidens the cause of the statue, or a white man is the cause of the statue, if the sculptor is called Polycletus and is white. But occasion is a medium between a cause per accidens and chance and fortune. For chance does not have causality, although it happens to reach an end: as a horse leaving a house which is later burned is saved by chance, and would not be saved unless it left. However, occasion does not have causality of itself, but per accidens it becomes some cause, not per accidens that it is inherent in it, but that it is compared to something else. And therefore it is less direct than a cause per accidens, because that causes per accidens what is inherent in it, which it makes. However, it is more than chance, because there is an intention towards the good in the one ordering and in the one who turns it into good: whence that good is placed as in a subject in the one to whom it is ordered in the occasion of good: and this according to act sometimes: and sometimes according to potency, as when no one is conscious of evil: but sometimes potency is placed in the maker from the order of the preceding state to the subsequent, as we said before. Hence when it is said, "Good is to make evil," the sense is, to make evil is or can be the occasion of some good according to the order to another who uses evil for good.

To the other it must be said that that opinion would not concede this, "Good is to do evil," because to do does not imply a comparison except to the doer: and in that no good is occasioned, but rather evil.

To the other it must be said that this would be even less conceded by this opinion, "Good is for malice to be done," because malice only implies privation: and this of itself is not ordainable, but by the grace of the subject it is passively and not actively ordered.

Articulus 4 — Into What, as into the Willed Object, Is the Will Noted To Pass, When It Is Said, "God Wills Evil To Be Done or To Be"

In what way is the will noted to pass over into the willed, when it is said, God wills evil to be done or to exist?

Secondly, it is asked, In what way is the will noted to pass over into the willed, when it is said, God wills evil to be done or to exist?

It seems, however, that it passes over malice: 1. For every will passes over into the willed: but when it is said, God wills evil to be done, this willed is referred to the will by reason of that which is evil. Therefore, evil is the reason of the will, because every willed is the reason of the will willing it.

1. Likewise, when one thing is willed by someone, the willed or its conjunction becomes convertible by necessity, unless the will is foolish. But evil being done is conjoined with doing evil, and with malice inseparably: therefore, if the will is wise and choosing, it will pass over one, it will also pass over the other. And it does not avail, it seems, if you wish to insist, by saying that words pertaining to the act of the soul are indeed of one, and not of the other, although they are conjoined: because that will does not proceed to the willed, but it is that of which Aristotle says in the book of the Ethics, that even of impossibilities there is a will: and this by some is more accustomed to be called velleity than will.

2. Likewise, Augustine says, and this authority is placed here, that it is good for evil to be done: and this God wills, because otherwise He would not permit it.

If perhaps you say that God permits: and this is by the will of sign, and not of good pleasure. On the contrary: Neither beyond the will of good pleasure, nor against it, is anything done: because nothing is done, as Augustine says, which does not proceed from the inner court of the highest Emperor: therefore it seems that He wills it by the will of good pleasure.

1. Likewise, when I say thus: God permits, this word, permits, predicates the divine essence as willing: therefore it predicates the divine will which is God: therefore the will of good pleasure: and thus by the will of good pleasure He wills all that He permits: therefore the will of God seems to pass over malice, as over the willed.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Evil, in that it is evil, does not move, nor can it move any will: because every willed is either good, or an apparent good: therefore much less will it move the divine will.

1. Likewise, God hates evil, and evil displeases God, and God punishes evil: but no one wills that which he hates, and which displeases, and which he punishes: therefore God does not will evil to be done.
2. Likewise, Ezekiel 18:23: I do not will the death of the sinner. And he speaks of the death of sin: therefore He does not will evil to be done: because this is the death of the sinner.
3. Likewise, God is the author of that which He wills: if therefore He wills evil to be done, He Himself is the author of evil.
4. Likewise, Anselm says that the power of doing evil is neither freedom nor a part of freedom: therefore it is of ignobility: therefore much more the will of evil: therefore it is not to be attributed to God.

Solution. It must be said in my judgment that this is false, God wills evils to be done: and if it is found among the Saints, it must be determined thus, God wills the good which is elicited from the evil done, on account of which He permits evil to be done: and in this sense this opinion concedes, and otherwise, as I think, it is false.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that the will of God does not pass over evil, as over the willed: because that expression is improper, and evil is not subjected to the will as evil, or as it is in being done per se, but as it is the occasion of the good elicited. And then still the will of good pleasure is not referred to it, but to that which is subjected, and to the occasion is referred the sign of the will which is permission.

To the other, it must be said that this is not true even in one wisely willing, unless that which is said to be willed is per se willed: but this is not here, as has already been said.

To the other, it must be said that when it is said, God permits this to be done, the divine essence is not predicated as will only, but also a relation to malice is noted: and therefore permission is not the will of good pleasure, because good pleasure does not posit a relation except to good: and therefore here (as we have said) in one is placed the sign, and in the other the will: for the sign is placed in the preceding, but the will in the consequent by occasion.

To the other, it must be said that those things which proceed from the intellectual court of the highest Emperor, from Him being in one way, do not proceed in one way according to themselves: and therefore with respect to some things there is permission, and with respect to others elicited from them there is will.

Divisio Textus

DIVISIO TEXTUS,

Those indeed who say by the will of God, etc.

Here begins the second opinion which is divided into three parts: in the first of which the arguments introduced by the preceding opinion are resolved. In the second, however, the reasoning proving this opinion to be true is set forth, there, K, If anyone therefore diligently, etc. In the third, he objects sophistically, and resolves, there, N, Now it has been sufficiently shown, that with God as author, etc.

However, in the first solution there are four chapters, of which the first is about the distinction of negative expressions with words expressing the will or non-will of God. The second, however, is about the solution of the words of Augustine. The third is about a certain distinction of good given by Jerome. The fourth, as a conclusion from the aforementioned, is about how and to whom evils are beneficial.

Articulus 5 — What Difference There Is Between These Propositions, To Be Unwilling For This, And Not To Will This, And To Will That This Not Be Done

What is the difference between these propositions: to not will this, and to not want this, and to will this not to happen?

For the understanding of the first chapter, it is asked what the difference is, according to this opinion, between to not will this, and to not want this, and to will this not to happen?

Likewise, it is asked whether all things that are said to happen, whether good, indifferent, or evil, proceed from the will, or are against the will of God according to this opinion?

And to this it must be said that when it is said, "I do not will," such that the negation is included by composition with the verb "I do not will," then it does not negate the will composed with it, but only refers to the willed object: whence the sense is, "I do not will this to happen," that is, "I will this not to happen." However, when the term "I do not will" has the declension "I do not will," "you do not will," "he does not will," etc., all that are declined from it have the same force. Whence when it is said, "he does not will this to happen," the expression is twofold, from the fact that the term "he does not will" can be in the force of the word, and then the will remains not negated, but the willed object: and it can be in the force of the sentence, and then the will is denied to be about this.

From this it is understood that these are equivalent: "I do not will this to happen," and "I will this not to happen," and one infers the other. However, these two: "he does not will this to happen," and "he wills this not to happen," relate as superior and inferior: because this, "he wills this not to happen," refers to this, "he does not will this to happen," but it is not converted, because this, "he does not will this to happen," has two senses of its truth, of which this, "he wills this not to happen," has only one. Therefore, this opinion says that God does not will evils to happen, according to which the term "does not will" is in the force of the sentence: and therefore it does not follow, if someone infers: therefore he wills evils not to happen, because he does not will that either: because if the will is denied of one, it is not for this reason affirmed of its opposite.

To the second question, therefore, it must be said that not all things that happen, happen with God not willing, or willing: but with willing or not willing, such that the term "not

willing" is in the force of the sentence: and therefore this opinion is good, because it avoids all inconvenience.

Articulus 6 — Whether Evil Is Expedient For The Universe, And Contributes To The Completion Of The Universe

Whether evil is expedient for the universe, and contributes to the completion of the universe?

Then it is inquired concerning what is said in the third chapter of G, there, "God judged it better to make good from evils," etc.

For from this it seems to follow that evil is expedient for the universe, and contributes to the completion of the universe.

1. And this seems to be accepted here in Latéera in three expressed authorities: and a certain Gloss of Origen on that Numbers xxii, 20, where it is said, "God came to Balaam at night," etc., says thus: It is to be noted that the wisdom of God has disposed all things, so that nothing is idle, good or evil: yet He does not make malice, which, having been found by others, He does not prohibit, although He could prohibit it: however, He uses it for necessary causes: for through the wicked themselves in whom malice exists, He tests those who strive for glory: for if malice were destroyed, there would be nothing to oppose virtues: but virtue, if it had no contrary, would not shine forth.
2. Likewise, on the words of the Apostle, to the Romans viii, 28, the Gloss says that God uses the wills of men to incline them wherever He wills, whether to good or to evil.
3. Likewise, no good should be lacking to the universe: but the good of comparison of good to evil so that it may shine forth is a certain good: therefore it should not be lacking to the universe: but this cannot happen unless evil exists: therefore evil contributes to the completion of the universe.

ON THE CONTRARY:
1. Dionysius says that evil is disordered: therefore, since it does not make the good of order, it does not seem to contribute any good: for it would contribute the good of order if it contributed anything.

1. Likewise, the Philosopher says that white is unmixed with black: therefore, the whiter is more unmixed with black: therefore also the better will be that which is more unmixed with evil: and thus the universe will be better if there were no evil in it.
2. Likewise, since evil is the privation of good, it deprives the universe of some good, which would be present if evil did not exist: therefore, if evil did not exist, many goods would be in the universe, which now are not: and thus the universe is less good because evil exists, as it seems.

Solution. It must be said, as the Masters say, that some reason of good would be lacking to the universe if evil did not occur: and concerning this reason, it has already been said above: and thus they concede that it is good for evils to occur, because this is the occasion of some good.

To what is objected on the contrary, they say that it is not similar in good and in other privations: because the good that is taken away from one is conferred to another: and they bring forward for themselves that, "Take away from him the mina, and give it to him who has ten minas," and that, "Hold fast what you have, that no one may take your crown." And therefore nothing is lost of good in the universe, although it is lost in this one. Moreover, it is added from this, that evil is some reason of good: and therefore they say that it is good for evil to occur, and that it contributes to the completion and adornment in that it adds more reasons of usefulness or expediency, and the adornment of justice. But this solution either I do not understand, or it seems entirely false: because it is evident that the same in number which one loses, another does not receive, nor does the universe itself, but rather it perishes from the universe: the same in species and perhaps another had it before, and just as another could receive it. However, the reason of good which is elicited from evil by the reason of usefulness or expediency or the adornment of justice indeed has: but it seems strange to me if the good per se, and the good of joy, which would be in the universe of goods, could not compensate for that good of comparison which is elicited from evil: and therefore it seems to me that speaking per se evil does not contribute to anyone, nor to the universe: but it is true that it contributes to good to allow evils to occur: because if evils are not allowed to occur, then there is necessity for good, and then the reason of praiseworthy good and virtue would perish, and the reason of reward would perish: but allowing evil to occur does not posit on the part of God, except the free power of doing what He wills, which nevertheless can be inclined to evil: and this power is not evil, because even according to the Philosopher the power of the wicked is to be chosen.

To what is objected first by the sayings of the Saints, I say that they speak of evil, supposed, which is true, that with the universe mixed with goods and evils, nothing better could be made from evil than that it be ordered into good: and thus those things which are said in the Letter are understood, and that original Gloss.

To the other it must be said that all those things are true of evil already posited in being or occurring: but if it were not, the universe would be better than it is now.

To the other it must be said that still the good of comparison would remain according to the degree of good and better: and if that reason of good did not remain, then I say that a better one would remain, by which it would be compensated.

To the other it must be said that Dionysius says this by syllogizing to the inconvenient, and not by asserting: or if it is introduced assertively, then he speaks of the use of evil posited in being or occurring: and not of the comparison of the universe to being good in whole, and to being evil in some part of the universe.

Articulus 7 — With Respect To What The Division Of The Goods And Defects Which The Master Enumerates In The Text Is Taken

Upon what is based the division of goods and defects which the Master enumerates in the Text?

Then they inquire about what is said in the third chapter, there, "H, For there is something which is good in itself," etc.

Although this should be discussed more in the second book of the Sentences, where it deals with the differences of the good, yet it can be asked here,

Upon what is based this division of goods and defects which he enumerates here?

And it must be said that a moral act has a double comparison to the agent, namely, as to the intending agent and proportioning his work to the matter: and thus a good work proceeds both in itself and for the one doing it because of the intention, and because it is done by the agent proportioning to the due matter. But others arise from particular defects. For if it fails on the part of the intending agent, when the intention is to do a good work, and faith directs the intention, as Augustine says, that work will be good in itself, and for the one for whom it is done,

but not for the agent. However, if it fails on the part of the matter proportioned to the work, then it will be good for the one doing it, and in itself, but not for the one for whom it is done. But if it is deficient in itself, then

it fails for the agent who wills this badly and intends badly: yet a good occasioned from it is elicited.

Expositio Textus

Exposition of the Text

If anyone therefore, etc.

The Master here presents three reasons, confirming this opinion from the sayings of Augustine. The first is that God would be the source and author of evil: because He would be the author of something by which man becomes worse, who is His work. The second, which is placed in the second chapter L, is that evil is done by man in whom there is a deficient cause of evil, and not by God. The third, which is placed in the third chapter M, is that God cannot be the cause of tending towards non-being: but he who does evil tends towards non-being.

Articulus 8 — Whether A Good Can Come From Evil To Someone Doing Evil

Whether to someone doing evil, good can result from evil?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said in the fourth chapter, there, I, For to such, as Augustine says in the book On Correction and Grace, etc.

For from this it seems that to someone doing evil, good results from evil.

1. And this Damascene seems to say expressly, that sometimes the Lord permits a man to fall, so that coming to his senses afterwards, he may adhere to good more fervently and strongly.

2. Likewise, Augustine: I dare to say that it is useful for the proud to fall into some open sin, from which they may displease themselves who, already pleasing themselves, have fallen. This is also said here in the Letter, and it was said before this.

ON THE CONTRARY

1. Good is not evil to anyone: therefore evil is not good.

1. Likewise, Do not do evil, and it will not seize you.
2. Likewise, It would not be useful for a sheep to be thrown into the teeth of a wolf, so that afterwards it might flee its teeth more strongly: therefore by similarity, neither is that useful.

Solution. I say in my judgment, that the whole is understood concerning the utility of occasion, and not per se: and this utility appears more from the aftermath: and therefore then first is the occasion of good: and therefore when evil is together in the doer, there is no occasion, but from the aftermath, when it is in detestation: and thus I understand the authorities introduced.

Articulus 9 — Why God Permits Evil To Be Done, If He Is Not The Author Of Evil

Why does God permit evil to occur, if He is not the author of evil?

A doubt arises concerning the first point, Why does God permit evil to occur, if He is not the author of evil?

For either He permits it justly, or unjustly. Not unjustly: therefore justly. On the contrary: Therefore justice, either that which is the rendering according to merits, or that which is the fittingness of His goodness or will or power. Not in the first way: because that justice ought to inflict punishment for sin, not permit it to be added by sinning. Likewise, not in the second way: because no equity agrees with evil. Likewise, nor in the third: because in the opposite His goodness and beauty shine forth more.

1. Likewise, in the text it says this is a place from the lesser. A wise man does not do that by which his work becomes worse: therefore neither does God. And this is not true: because just as this place is from the lesser, a soldier can capture an army, therefore also a king, is by affirming: thus a place from the lesser according to Boethius infers only by affirming.
2. Furthermore, it seems false what it says. For wisdom is opposed to ignorance, not to knowledge: therefore a wise man can sin in himself and in his work.

Likewise, the Philosopher in the Ethics says, that there are some who, fleeing to reason, seek to philosophize and to be good, just as the sick who indeed listen attentively to doctors, but do nothing of what is to be done: and just as they will never have a well-cured body thus cured, so neither will they have a soul thus philosophizing: therefore Augustine supposes falsely in the process.

Likewise, the Philosopher says, that knowledge contributes little or nothing to virtue: therefore the wise can sin.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: Seneca proves, that disturbance does not fall upon the wise: because one is not disturbed except concerning virtue: and no one can take that away unless it wills itself: and then it will not be wise: therefore every wise person is perfect in virtue: therefore he does not do that by which his work becomes worse.

Solution. It must be said, that God permits evil to occur, with justice fitting to His equity and goodness: because if He did not allow it, the reason for praiseworthy and rewardable good would be removed, as was previously held.

To what is objected against, it must be said that from the opposite there would not be such fittingness: because the reason for praiseworthy virtue would perish, and goods would be done as if by necessity: and therefore that permission does not regard evil except accidentally, because not for itself, but for another, namely that it may be commendable.

To what is further inquired, it must be said that that reason is from the greater: but the thing from which it is inferred is lesser: and this is intended.

To another it must be said, that the wise is called from knowing, and objects hold concerning that: and the wise is called from the savor of practical and honorable things, and concerning this is understood the saying and reason of Seneca.

Divisio Textus

Now it has been sufficiently shown that evils do not occur with God as the author, etc. Here begins the last part, in which there are three chapters: in the first of which the Master presents a sophism, as is evident in the Letter. In the second, however, he responds, and in the third, he approves the second opinion among the opinions first introduced.

Articulus 10 — Whether One Doing Evil Tends Toward Non-Being

Whether the one doing evil tends towards non-being?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said in the following chapter, there, M, "Indeed, he who works evil tends towards non-being," etc.

1. For it seems according to this, that sometimes the one doing evil arrives at non-being: for nothing tends towards that to which it can in no way arrive.
2. Likewise, being is not opposed to evil: because the evil exist, and demons exist, and the good and the best (as Dionysius says), inasmuch as they are, desire to be, to live, and to understand. Therefore, it seems that the one who does evil does not tend towards non-being.
3. Likewise, if evil is said to tend towards non-being because it corrupts natural good: since natural good is finite, it seems that sometimes it can be so corrupted that nothing remains of it.

4. Likewise, it does not seem true what is said, that God is not the author of tending towards non-being: because it is said, Deuteronomy 32:39: "I will kill, and I will make to live": but whom he kills he makes tend towards non-being. Likewise, Jeremiah 10:24: "Correct me, O Lord, but in judgment, not in your anger, lest you reduce me to nothing." Therefore, it seems that he reduces something to nothing, and thus is the author of tending towards non-being.

Solution. The first part of this distinction is to be treated in the second Sentences, where a special treatise on this is placed. However, as pertains to the present treatise, it must be said that evil causes tending while it is intended: evil, however, is intended as privation, and not as habit: and therefore it is not intended by approach to something, but rather by recession from good: that recession, however, is infinite in the potentiality of removal and division from natural good, as will now be evident: and therefore it will never return to nothingness by the corruption of evil.

To the other, it must be said that there is a twofold being, namely the being of nature by which the nature itself is in itself: and this is not corrupted by evil of fault: but evil of punishment is contrary to it: because Augustine says that punishment is not evil, except because it is contrary to good nature. Another is the being of natural good: and this consists in the proportion of rational nature to grace, and consequently to glory: concerning which Boethius says in V of the Consolation of Philosophy, that being is that which retains order and preserves nature. And this evil corrupts: because evil is nothing other than the corruption and privation of that: and the worse it is, the more it causes distance from good: therefore it corrupts, because corruption is the habitual distance of order in good.

To the other, it must be said that natural good, although it is essentially finite, as every created essence, is nevertheless potentially infinite, just as every continuum is divisible into infinity, because no division divides it from the matter of being and the form of the continuum: and therefore it remains again divisible. Thus the good of nature, because no corruption removes the reason and form of natural good, but only makes it less proportionate to the good of grace and glory, and thus it always corrupts more.

To the other, it must be said that death is not determined to God as to a meritorious cause, but as to a judge inflicting it: but here it speaks of tending to evil by merit and the corruption of good: and in this way death is not the corruption of good, but rather the corruption of natural being, and by reason of punishment, not of evil of fault.

Articulus 11 — What Truth Is

What is truth?

By reason of the sophism considered, it is asked here about truth: first, What is it? Second, In how many ways is it said? Third, about its conversion with the good and being and one. Fourth, Whether it is eternal or not? Fifth, Whether it is simple and immutable?

Sixth and lastly, Whether all things are true by one and the first truth?

To the first, it can be objected thus: Anselm says in the book on Truth, that truth is rectitude perceptible only by the mind. Augustine in the book on True Religion, that the true is that which is. Hilary, however, says that the true is manifestative or declarative of being. Avicenna says in the first philosophy that truth is understood to be absolutely inherent in singulars, and is understood to be eternal, and is understood to be the disposition of speech and intellect which signifies the disposition in the external thing when it is equal to it. For we say, this expression is true, and this sentence is true. From this it is gathered that singulars have a certain truth, which is a thing, as Augustine says: according to which we also say, this is true gold, and this is a true donkey, and this is a true man: and that there is eternal truth, which is the necessity and cause of all truth: and that there is truth of speech according to which we say, this enunciation is true, or this enunciable is true: and that there is an adequation of things and intellects, as when we say, this intellect is true, referring this to the concept of the intellect about the thing as it is.

Therefore, inquiry is made about the first definition. 1. For rectitude is a passion of the continuous as form: but truth is intelligible: therefore it seems that the genus of rectitude does not belong to truth.

1. Likewise, the straight is that whose middle does not depart from the extremes: therefore it has extremes and a middle: therefore it has parts: but some truth is indivisible, like the first: therefore it seems that that definition does not generally apply.

Similarly, it is objected about the second.

1. The true is that which is: therefore from the conjugates, truth is the entity of the thing: therefore its being and what it is are the same: therefore it itself is what it has: and this belongs only to God: therefore all truth would be God, which is false: therefore the definition is null.
2. Likewise, being is that which is: and the true adds over being, because otherwise they would be synonymous: therefore the true is something more than that which is, as it seems.

Inquiry is also made about the third: For each thing is declared and manifested by that by which it is: but being is from essence as from a formal cause: therefore it seems that essence is declarative of being, and not truth or the true.

In the same way, it can be objected about that which Avicenna hints at in the last part of the authority introduced, that truth is the adequation of speech and what is said, or intellect and what is understood: for it sometimes happens that the sign is not adequate to the signified, as Anselm says, and yet there is truth in the sign.

Solution. It can be said that truth is taken in many ways, as will be clear in the following question: but Anselm defines truth according to its relation to the first truth: so that the first truth is said to be truth per se, while others are said to be truths by comparison to it: and then the rectitude of which Anselm speaks will be called the proportion or comparison of each

thing to that which is in the first truth: but this inflexible rectitude is the first truth itself, which is always equal to that to which it is: and according to the descent from it, it is in others.

To what is objected, it must be said that it is a fallacy of equivocation: because the due of justice is also called rectitude, and many other things.

§ 1. To the other objection it must be said that the first truth is the principle, middle, and end: and these are the same in reality itself, although they differ in notion. And it is the principle according to the intellect of the powerful or power; the middle according to the notion of wisdom through the notion which is life and light; and the end through goodness: and all things that are true under it are called both right and true according to that respect in which their means (such as the ideated things) are more or less continued with their extremes, that is, with the principle from which they come forth through creation, and the end to which they are determined by the creator herself, who directs their order to herself. And this is what Anselm says, that each thing is true when it is in this and for this which is in the first truth; just as a measured thing is said to be truly measured when its principles, means, and ends are continued with the measuring thing.

§ 2. To another objection regarding Augustine's definition, it must be said that the entity of a thing, or that which is, is taken in two ways: either in itself, or as a supposed nature of some sort. And thus, as I think, it would not be well said that truth is the entity of a thing, or that the true is that which is. Entity is also taken according to the mode of determination to a species: and thus truth is the entity by which a thing truly is, and the true is that which truly is. But if entity is taken insofar as it is supposed by the name "entity," then in truth entity would be the first creature, according to what the Philosopher says, that the first of created things is being (esse), and nothing else is created before it; and "that which is" will be said to be that which has being (esse), which is the act of entity or essence thus understood. But if "that which is" is taken insofar as it implies some determination regarding being (esse), then it is not drawn to a species: and then it truly is, because each thing truly is when it is drawn to its proper species from a determinate nature, just as we say "true gold" and "true color" and "true body" and "true science." And this seems to be the meaning of "that which is": because that which is, is that which truly is in nature. And thus it is clear that truth and entity are not altogether the same. And this will be more evident below.

§ 3. To another objection it must be said that if the true is taken generally, insofar as it is convertible with being, it does not need to add any nature; but it adds some respect, and that suffices for them not to be synonyms.

§ 4. To another objection it must be said that that Philosopher considers the true only as it is caused by a thing, and therefore according to the Philosopher truth is not in a sign except according to a relation to the thing, nor even in the intellect: and therefore he says in book VI of the First Philosophy that one statement is false of another. Anselm, however, takes the truth which is in a sign from the proportion to the first truth, which it imitates as much as it can; and because that does not depend on a thing, it is therefore not changed when the thing changes. And this will be explained below.

§ 5. The previously held definitions are taken such that the first is given about truth which is said by priority and posteriority of created and uncreated truth. The second is given in comparison to a thing generally. The third in comparison to a thing related to the intellect by which it is apt to be known. The fourth is about the truth of complexes, which is in a sign, and the compounding intellect.

Articulus 12 — In How Many Ways Truth Is Said

In how many ways is truth spoken of?

Secondly it is asked, In how many ways is truth spoken of?

§ 6. Anselm seems to posit the truth of a sign, and the truth of a thing: and to divide the latter into the truth of a thing according to species, and the truth of actions, according to what is said in John 3:21: "He who does the truth comes to the light, that his works may be made manifest, because they are done in God." And of the devil, John 8:44: "He was a murderer from the beginning, and he stood not in the truth:... he is a liar, and the father thereof." But the truth of a sign is divided by him according to the division of signs, of which some are given, such as a voice, a circle, and monks' signs, and the like; and some are natural, as smoke is a sign of fire, and the like.

§ 7. Therefore it is asked, whether truth is said of all these modes univocally, or by priority and posteriority? And whether there are more modes than those enumerated?

§ 8. It seems, however, that it is by one notion. For the same divided thing, to which one notion applies according to all dividing parts, is said univocally of all those dividing parts; truth is such a divided thing; therefore it is said univocally of all of them. The first is proved by this, that to be said univocally is to be said by one name and notion. The second is written by Anselm, who says that it belongs to both created and uncreated truth to be a rectitude perceptible by the mind alone.

§ 9. But against this is what is commonly objected, that there is nothing univocally common to the created and the uncreated; but truth is created and uncreated; and created truth is not true in one way, but some as a sign, and some as a thing, and the like has other differences in being true; therefore truth is not univocal in all of them.

§ 10. Furthermore it is asked, whether truth is said in still more ways?

§ 11. It seems that it is: because we speak of the truth of human nature, which does not seem to be included [in the preceding list]; therefore there are multiple truths.

§ 12. SOLUTION. It must be said according to the Philosopher in books IV and VI of the First Philosophy that in all things said by analogy, there is always one thing supposed, which is said primarily and per se to be that analogical thing, and afterwards all other modes are taken according to a proportion to its notion. For example, "healthy" is said according to analogy of an animal, and urine, and food, and medicine: therefore "healthy" is supposed to be said properly and primarily and per se of an animal, but in all other things according to a proportion to something else: hence the health which is in an animal is in a certain way the same as

the health which is in urine, and food, and in others: but it is in an animal as a form of the equality of humors; whereas in urine it is as indicative, not of being in the urine, but of being in the animal whose urine it is. Behold, the health which is in the animal and the urine is numerically the same: and so it is of the others. But this is true, that this proportion is analogically diversified on the part of the things proportioned to that one thing: because the notion of indicating in urine, and the notion of preserving in food, and the notion of causing in medicine, are not one notion, but they are compared to one numerically: and therefore they are united in it, and denominated by it, because it is the end. And the same is in all other things said analogically, although it appears less in some. Thus therefore Anselm means to say that there is one rectitude supposed per se and primarily, which is never bent from the extremes: and in all others there is a rectitude imitating this as much as it can, in that it rightly does what it ought, equating by a certain mental extension the means of its rectitude with the principle from which it is, and the end for which it is: and this is found in a thing when it is what it ought to be, and in an action when it does what it ought, and in a sign when it does what it ought, and so of others.

§ 13. To the objection that it is said by one notion, it must be said that it is said by one notion according to analogy, and not one in genus and species. Nor is it sufficient for some divided common thing to be said univocally of its dividing parts that it be said by one notion taken in any way whatever: but it is necessary that it be one, as of one genus, or of one species.

§ 14. Are there more truths than those mentioned by Anselm? It can be said that all can be reduced to those. Because the truth which is in virtue is reduced to the truth of action, according to what the Philosopher says, that regarding the true which is in words and deeds, the mean indeed is a virtue: but the doing which is toward the greater is pride, and he who has it is called proud: but that which is toward the lesser is irony or derision. And according to what we call the truth of human nature to be, which belongs to the nature of man, whether he is on the way or in the homeland after the resurrection: that too is reduced to the truth of a thing from its nature and form.

§ 15. And note that although Augustine says in the book On True Religion that the false is what imitates something and does not perfect it, nevertheless it is not properly called false except in opposition to the truth of a sign. For the false, the vain, the mixed, the unstable, and the undue are opposed to the true said in manifold ways. For instance, to the true in an enunciation the false is opposed according to what Aristotle says, that the false is what is not compounded, or is impossible to be compounded, as a contingent false, and an impossible false; and according to what we say, that an imagination is false, or the common sense, or a definitive statement, when it signifies otherwise than it is in reality. But the vain is opposed to the truth which is in words and deeds pertaining to life: and thus we say that vain is what imitates something and does not perfect it: and Augustine calls it false, just as we call a false coin what imitates a true one and does not complete it, and the like. But the mixed is opposed to the true which is true in species: as we say false gold, which is mixed with another metal, although it is not properly called false, but mixed. Unstable, as we say the before and after are

not the truth of time, but the "now" itself, because the before and after do not remain, whereas the "now" remains one in the whole motion: and this is what Augustine says, that truth is founded in the permanent. And in this way we call successive beings true less truly than permanent beings: and among the successive, those are less truly beings which are destroyed according to substance and being, like motion; and more truly those which indeed perish according to being, but remain in substance, like time. But the undue is chiefly opposed to truth according as it is a certain rectitude exemplated by the first truth, for nothing diverges from it unless it is that which does not do what it ought to do from the first truth.

Articulus 13 — Whether The True Is Convertible With Being, The One, And The Good, And Whether The Intellect Of Negative Enunciations Can Be Reduced To Being

Is the true convertible with being, one, and good? And, can the intellect of negative enunciations be reduced to being?

Thirdly, it is asked concerning the conversion of the true with being, and one, and good.

§ 16. It seems that it is not convertible: for that which is only in the soul is not convertible with that which is in the soul and outside: but the true is only in the soul: therefore it is not convertible with being, which is in the soul and outside the soul.

§ 17. The first proposition is evident by the notion of convertible things. The SECOND is proved by the word of Aristotle at the end of the sixth book of the First Philosophy, where he speaks thus: "For the false and the true are not in things like good and evil: so that the true is like the good, and the false like the evil: but in the cognition." And he means that good and evil are absolute differences of being, and of what truly is in nature: but the true and the false are not, but are caused by the dividing and compounding cognition. But there is no cognition concerning simple things and concerning that which is. And this is evident if one inspects the exposition of the comment.

§ 18. Also, a little after that: "Let us therefore now dismiss being which is as it were by accident, and which is as it were true: for the cause of one of them has no definition, namely the accident, and the cause of the other is cognition: and both are in a diminished genus of the genera of being, and they are not of those things which signify the essence of being: and therefore let them be dismissed." Therefore it is proved that truth and the true are only in the soul, and that it is itself incomplete being: therefore it is not convertible with being, as it seems.

§ 19. Also, in book VI of the First Philosophy he says that truth is the end of speculative intelligence. And since there is no end there outside the intelligence, it will be inside the speculative intelligence: and thus the same follows as before.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 20. 1. In the Categories Aristotle says: "In that a thing is or is not, a statement is true or false." But on account of which each thing is such, that thing is more so. If therefore a statement is true on account of the thing, the thing will be more true: therefore truth will be primarily in the thing.

§ 21. 2. Also, as essence is to being, so truth is to the true: therefore by permutation, as the true is to being, so essence is to truth, and conversely: but every being is true, because Augustine says that the true is that which is: therefore every essence is truth: therefore essence and truth are the same, as it seems.

§ 22. 3. Also, in the first truth three things are posited upon one creating substance, namely unity, truth, goodness: therefore it seems that even in the inferior things flowing from the first cause, these are found founded upon any essence whatsoever, namely unity, truth, goodness: therefore it seems that these four are convertible: being, one, true, good.

§ 23. 4. Furthermore, it seems that these are also altogether the same: for either they are altogether the same, or not. If they are the same, then I have the proposition. If not: then they differ. But nothing differs except what comes forth from one common thing through dividing differences: therefore it is necessary for these to have some common thing in which they agree; but this common thing will be prior and simpler than them, which is impossible, since nothing is prior to being, and especially essence. Similarly, these four are said by all to be primary simple things, which are convertible among themselves: therefore nothing is prior to them. It is left, therefore, that these are entirely the same.

FURTHERMORE, it is asked here concerning the intellect of negative enunciations, how are they reduced to being?

§ 24. For some negative statement seems to posit absolutely nothing, and yet is true: therefore the true is not universally caused by being, nor is it convertible with being. For example, if I say thus, "Caesar is not a man": for this (as some say) posits nothing. And if it is doubted concerning that, I posit this, "A goat-stag is not a fligax" [i.e., a meaningless term], or "A chimera is not a goat-stag," which neither according to its extremes, nor according to its composition, seems to suppose any being: therefore it seems that neither is this universally true, that the true is convertible with being; nor this, that as each thing has itself toward being, so it has itself toward the true; nor this, that in that a thing is, or is not, a statement is true or false.

§ 25. SOLUTION. To this, without prejudice, it can be said that these four are convertible when taken concretely, namely being, one, true, good, in the nominative (in recto), namely that a being is good, and true, and one, and so of all. But if they are taken abstractly, I do not believe that they are according to right predication, except in God, but not in creatures: because I do not believe that this is true, "essence is truth," or "goodness," or "unity." This, however, is improper, "essence is true," and "truth is a being," and "goodness is true": yet this is more improper, "essence is a being," or "good," than these, "truth is a being," or "truth is one." The reason for this is thus evident through the Philosopher in the Book of Causes, who says that the first of created things is being or essence, and no other creature is before it: therefore there is not something in which essence is founded, like that around which a thing becomes, as the form of some subject: and therefore also according to the order of nature, essence in the notion of essence cannot be except created from nothing. But all other things (as the Commentator says there) are made by information around the essence: and he gives an

example of the good, which according to the order of nature prefixes to itself the intellect of the essence in which it is. Therefore it is clear that essence speaks its notion as founded upon nothing, and prior in all things. Hence, speaking thus of essence, it will not be said to be truth itself, but "of truth": because truth is posited around it: and it will not be said to be goodness, but "of goodness." But of unity there is another reason, which will be evident below.

§ 26. But if you ask, why is it not called true and good, since truth and goodness are posited around it?

§ 27. I say that, speaking of a simple essence, it cannot be said that it is not understood as informed according to its notion. Hence Boethius in the book De Hebdomadibus: "That which is, has something besides that which it is: but being (esse) has nothing admixed." In the same way truth will not be called essence, but "of essence," properly speaking. It is the same way concerning goodness. However, according to the supposits spoken concretely, they are convertible: because whatever is, is a being, true, good, and one.

§ 28. But if you ask, whether one has itself from an addition to the other?

§ 29. I say that if an addition of another nature is understood, just as form and matter are of another nature, and substance and accident are of another nature, then one does not add upon the other. But if an addition is understood according to a notion of respect to the attribute of the first cause, then one adds upon the other a notion of respect, because then essence will be said to be flowing from the first essence, truth flowing from wisdom, and goodness flowing from goodness: and therefore every being is true, and one, and good; every true is a being, and one, and good, and so of the others. But nevertheless, abstractly speaking, they are not convertible, properly speaking.

§ 30. To the first objection, therefore, it must be said that the true is spoken of in multiple ways. For the true is called from truth, which is a disposition of being generally flowing from the first cause: and this is not only in the soul, but also in the thing. There is also specially the true, which determines the composition into which there is the consent or dissent of reason: and this is the true, which is only in an indicative statement, and in a certain way is in the enunciation, and in a certain way in the thing, and in a certain way in the soul alone. In the enunciation it is as in a sign: and therefore Aristotle says that the signification of incomplex things does not of itself signify either true or false. But in the thing it is as in a cause: but in the soul it is as in the maker of the note of composition, which the truth of the proposition determines: for when I say, "the swan is white," the predicate indeed belongs to the subject without a medium according to reality, for there is no medium by which whiteness is made in a swan: but nevertheless it cannot be signified thus by the intellect: and therefore the intellect saying one thing of another interposes a note of composition: and therefore the Philosopher says that it is only in the soul as in completing that which the truth determines into which the consent of reason is. And therefore because the composition can be made in many ways, therefore such a true is not determinable through the reality of any predicate per se. Nevertheless, it is referred to being according to causality. And he is not speaking there of the true which is the general disposition of being.

§ 31. To what is objected concerning the Categories, it must be said that when Aristotle says, "In that a thing is or is not, etc.," the word "is" ought to be taken according as it means the being of composition or division: and this is what some say, according as it means being, and not essence: for the being of composition is the non-being of division; but essence is of the subject or predicate taken absolutely. And then again he does not speak of the true which generally disposes being, but of the true which is the cause of the true, into which there is the consent of reason or § 32. To the other it must be said that the proposition is true: but when it is permuted, the permutation does not happen by reason of the same habitude which was before: and this can be seen thus: for when it is said, "As essence is to being, etc.," a comparison is made of each abstract to its concrete, as of a form to that whose form it is: and in this there is a similar habitude: but when it is permuted and it is said, "therefore as the good is to that which is, etc.," then the comparison is made by reason of the identity of the supposit: and this well is between the true and the good, but it is not between essence and truth by the reason previously introduced: and therefore that permutation is not valid.

§ 33. To the other it must be said that that argument well concludes that these four must be in every created being, which flows from the first being thus disposed: but because the created being is not able in totality to imitate the simplicity of the first cause, therefore those things which are predicated there of themselves in the nominative both abstractly and concretely, those in inferior things are predicated concretely of themselves in the nominative, but abstractly in the oblique, as was said above.

§ 34. To the other it must be said that these are not the same: nor nevertheless do they have one thing in which they are united as in a prior thing, and from which they proceed through a difference. For this is not general in all things, but only in those which proceed from one as from a genus. But those which are from one as by analogy to one, do not have this: for there the first through itself relates to all subsequent things and is in them, although it differs from them: and the cause of this is, because the notion of the difference by which it differs from the others, makes it to be prior. But in others which proceed from one genus, the notion of the difference is the cause to itself, so that it is coeval with the others from which it differs: and therefore it must have something prior from which it proceeds, just as those from which it differs. Hence it must be said that essence itself is ordered as prior to truth and goodness: and yet it differs from them.

§ 35. To what is further objected concerning the truth of negatives, I say without prejudice that every truth of an enunciation, whether affirmative or negative, is reduced to being: and this is proved in this way: for it is certain that before any intellect of a negation, one must take an affirmation, since a negation is not intelligible, just as neither is a privation, except through the habit: if therefore an affirmation is reduced to being, it is necessary that a negation also be founded in being. Hence this proposition, "Caesar is not a man," is true, and it enunciates that what is not, is not: which negation however refers to a composition regarding being, although not simply, but in a certain respect (secundum quid). Similarly when it is said, "a goat-stag is not a fligax," or "a chimera is not a goat-stag," there is there in the extremes a respect to being according to parts, and in the whole to being in opinion: and this suffices for the being about

which an enunciation is made, since it is not necessary that everything which can be enunciated be a ratified being in nature, since the Philosopher says, "It happens to be enunciated that what is, is, and that what is not, is, and that what is not, is not: and concerning those things which are outside present time." Similarly it happens to deny everything that anyone has affirmed, and to affirm what anyone has denied. And therefore it is clear that this is true, that as each thing has itself toward being, so it has itself toward the true: for what is in opinion, is not simply non-being: and similarly what is in the notion of preterition, is not simply non-being: and again what is future in the potency of matter, is not simply non-being.

Articulus 14 — According To What Order The One, The True, The Good, And Being Relate To One Another

According to what order do one, true, good, and being relate to one another?

§ 36. But if it is asked, According to what order do one, true, good, and being relate to one another?

§ 37. It must be said that according to the Philosopher, before all things are being and one. For the Philosopher does not posit that the true and the good are dispositions generally accompanying being: nor is the division of being according as it is being, through the true and the good. Because the Philosopher does not consider being according as it flows from the first being, both one and wise and good, but he himself considers being according as the intellect rests in it, resolving the posterior into the prior, and the composite into the simple, and according as it gathers all things by priority and posteriority: and therefore he does not determine concerning the true and the good through this mode, but concerning the good which is the end to which motion is directed: and therefore he says that not even one demonstration in mathematics is through the notion of the good.

§ 38. And therefore thus considering these things generally, as the Saints considered them, we will say that among these, namely essence and being, is first in nature, around which as a substratum to itself the others are posited. But unity and one follow essence through indivision: and therefore unity does not posit any real disposition around it, but only the intellect of a privation, namely of indivision, and therefore it is proximate to essence. But the true implies a relation to a form at least exemplary, through which it has a notion of manifestation: and therefore Hilary says that the true is the declarative of being: for there must be in anything some principle of understanding, through which it is ordered to the intellect. But goodness and the good imply a respect to an end outside, from which the thing is, and toward which it is: for because He is good, we are: and insofar as we are, we are good. And how this may be, was expounded above in the first distinction. I say this, however, because these are posited by the Saints as primary and in everything: and although in some we find the form and the end inside, nevertheless not in all, nor in the primary things.

Articulus 15 — Whether Truth Is Eternal

Is truth eternal?

Fourthly, a difficult question is asked, which we also touched upon above, Whether truth is eternal?

§ 39. And what was said above I will not repeat here: but it can be objected thus:

§ 40. 1. In divine things there are found properties and persons which are distinguished from one another: and this is true from eternity, "The Father is the Father": and this, "The Son is the Son": and this, "The Holy Spirit is the Holy Spirit": and negatively, "The Father is not the Son," "The Father is not the Holy Spirit," and "The Son is not the Holy Spirit," and the like. If therefore the extremes of these enunciations are many from eternity, it seems that from eternity the truths of those enunciations are many: therefore there are many truths from eternity.

§ 41. 2. Also, it is objected concerning other propositions, in which there is not as much force, as "The Father is God," and "The Son is God," and the like, in which by reason of one of the extremes the composition expresses something indistinct: and those stand less in plurality than the higher ones.

§ 42. Also, God from eternity knew you would be, and I would be, and an ass would be, and so of individuals: therefore each of them is true from eternity. The PROOF of this: because nothing is known unless it is true, and especially by divine science: but my future being, and yours, and so of others, are many: therefore God knew many things from eternity: and He knew nothing except true things: therefore many true things were from eternity: and nothing is true unless it be true by truth: therefore many truths were from eternity.

§ 43. If perhaps you say that this does not follow:

because, as Anselm says: The creature in the Creator is the creative essence, and things from eternity in God were not as many, but one: and therefore there were not many true things from eternity. On the contrary: this is conceded, God from eternity knew all things; and this similarly, God from eternity knew many things, and also knew the plurality of many things: but He knew nothing but true things: therefore He knew many true things. For although God's knowledge is not caused by the thing known, nevertheless there cannot be knowledge of this or that which God knows from eternity just as He does now, unless that and this are in some way supposed to be. For otherwise, if knowledge in no way regarded the knowable, then this statement would be verified just as much of an ass as of a man, God from eternity knows that a man will be, because he will be, which is false. Therefore, it is necessary to suppose the knowable to be in some way in knowledge: therefore, many true things and their truths will be from eternity.

Further, it is asked next to this, Whether truth itself is eternal?

§ 1. And Augustine seems to prove this in the book of Soliloquies as follows: Let it be granted that truth at some point began. Then thus: That truth has begun is true; and it is not true except by truth: therefore truth was, even [the truth] that did not begin.

§ 2. Also, if truth began, this is true, truth will begin, even before this instant in which truth will begin: therefore truth will be even before truth begins.

§ 3. Also, posit that it is not eternal: therefore this is true, that truth is not eternal; and it is not true except by truth: therefore truth was from eternity. The same is proved, if it is granted that it can cease.

If perhaps you were to say that Augustine is speaking about uncreated truth, and not about the truth of a thing or of a created enunciation.

§ 1. On the contrary: because then it proves nothing: because he wishes to prove the soul immortal through this, that truth cannot perish; and since it is not in a subject except in the soul, it is necessary that the subject of truth be immortal. Now it is clear that the soul is not the subject of uncreated truth, in such a way that it would be saved in the soul itself as in a subject, but rather it is essentially, presentially, and potentially in the soul, just as in any other created being.

§ 2. Furthermore, he gives an example concerning the truth of enunciables: therefore he does not understand [it] of uncreated truth, as it seems.

§ 3. Also, he says, in the same place: Upon the perishing of a chaste person, chastity does not perish, and upon the perishing of a true thing, truth does not perish. But in God neither truth nor the true perishes: therefore it is clear that he is not speaking about this.

§ 4. Also, Augustine says in the same place that no one judges anything to be true without it, namely without truth. But it is clear that we do not judge true things by the first truth, but by the truth which is the rationale of true things;

Also, from this truth another argument is extracted which is this, namely, suppose that truth were not: then either something will be intelligible, or not. If not, this will be incongruous, since there are still many things: because, as Boethius says, if it is momentarily understood that the first good does not exist, there will still be white things, and other things of this kind. Therefore, similarly, if the first truth and other truths are understood not to exist, there will still be other things: and the intellect is naturally apt to understand them: therefore they will be intelligible. But on the contrary: No one judges the true except through the rationale of truth: therefore, if that does not exist, judgment perishes: and all intellect is through the judgment of truth: therefore understanding perishes if truth does not exist: but this is incongruous: therefore the first truth and simple truth cannot even be thought not to be, in such a way that there would remain any understanding in any intelligible nature.

If, again, you should wish to say that this is true of the first truth. On the contrary: The first truth is indeed in all things, but nothing is denominated by it: for when we say, this thing has an essence, we do not understand [it] of the divine essence: therefore when we say, this true thing is true, it will not be true by the first truth, although the first truth is in it: therefore when Augustine says that upon the perishing of a true thing truth does not perish, he does not understand [this] of the first truth, but of created truth, as it seems.

But on the contrary: Anselm says in the book De Veritate: When I said in my Monologion, when was it not true that something was going to be? I did not say it as if this statement, which asserted that something was going to be, had been without a beginning; or that this

truth was God: but since it cannot be understood that when this statement existed, truth was lacking to it, so that through this, because it is not understood when this truth could not exist (if there had been a statement in which it could exist), it is understood that that truth was without a beginning, which is the first cause of this truth [126]. From this two things are taken, namely Anselm's excuse for what he was said to have said, that the truth of enunciations was from eternity, and that [such] truth is not eternal.

§ SOLUTION. It must be said that no truth is eternal, except uncreated truth: and because it is one and simple, therefore that truth alone is from eternity.

As to what is first objected, it must be said according to what was said above, where it was shown that although the essence and the property and the persons are undivided, nevertheless all being that is in divine things depends upon the essence. For the Father is the essence, and the property has no being except [as] the essence: and therefore although the properties are distinguishing, nevertheless they do not make anything but a plurality of persons, and not a plurality of truths of the persons; but there is only one truth of the three, just as there is one essence.

But if you object concerning enunciations and propositions: I say that such composition and complex is not in divine things, but in our intellect composing and dividing, as the Philosopher maintains. For he says in Book III of De Anima that the understanding of indivisibles is found in those things in which there is no falsity, nor even the truth of an assertion; but where there is the false and the true, there is already a certain composition of concepts [127]; and this is especially true in divine things. Hence such enunciations by way of compositions must be reduced to simple things; and then those things will be the persons, whose plurality does not effect diverse truths, but one.

To the other it must be said that I readily concede that God from eternity knew what He knows now, and that from eternity He knew many things, and from eternity all things, and that He knew that you would be, and me, and so of others; and that these things from eternity are true in His mind. But from this it does not follow that there are absolutely many true things from eternity, or many truths from eternity. And to understand this, it should be noted that when it is said, God knows all things or many things from eternity: I readily concede, as was proven here and above, that knowledge posits the knowable according to some mode, and not absolutely; and it posits the distinction and plurality of knowables relatively, and not absolutely. For because the knowable depends on knowledge, just as an effect upon a cause whose rationale is the cause itself, just as the rationale of the artifact is in the artisan: therefore the sense is, God knows this or that future thing from eternity, that is, the rationale of this or that is in God, according to which He sees this and that. Hence I readily concede that the rationales of many true things are in God from eternity. And this statement, there are many true things in God from eternity, is not to be conceded so properly: because when it is said 'many true things', a distinction of plurality on the part of the things is implied there more than when it is said 'many rationales'. Now things, as they are in their cause, are not distinct, although their distinction is known, for the reason that the rationale of the distinction is also

in the cause relatively, as was said before. And this statement is in no way to be conceded, that many truths are in God from eternity, because truth is spoken of as an abstraction , and it pertains to the essence: just as also the knowledge by which things of this kind are known, although it is of many things, is not nevertheless many, but only one. From this it is further evident that much less is it to be conceded when it is proposed absolutely without determination thus: 'many true things are from eternity', and 'many truths from eternity'. For as was said above, when it is said 'the true in God', or 'truth in God', or 'the creature in God', by the determination the term to which it is joined is drawn outside of its own rationale, and is posited to be only relatively, as in a cause which is efficient and intelligent.

As to what is further asked, whether truth can be destroyed, and whether it began? I say that he is speaking either of the first truth, or of created truth. If of the first, I readily concede that it cannot perish, and it did not begin.

But if you ask whether it can be understood not to be? I say that there is a double sense to that question: for either it is understood thus, that it is posited not to be, and this very thing is afterwards to be understood, so that the act of understanding passes over onto it: and I say that this is impossible. PROOF: because judgment is not made except according to the rationale of truth: therefore it would be necessary for the first truth to be posited after it is posited not to be: hence this is repugnant to what was posited.

To that which is objected concerning the good, which Boethius posits not to be, it must be said that it is not at all similar: because the good is the perfection of the affect, and without it the intellect is well perfected. But this is true, that just as in the intellect understanding perishes if the first truth is not supposed, so on the part of the affect loving perishes if the first goodness is not supposed: because if the first goodness does not exist, there will not be any good patterned after it: and since every good is good through relation to it, there will not be anything good: therefore nothing will be the rationale of love in the affect, just as nothing will be the rationale of judgment in the intellect, if the first truth does not exist by the same rationale. That question can also be understood [in the sense] that it is posited simultaneously that the intellect and truth do not exist, and this can be posited per impossibile. But if it is asked about created truth, I say that it began and does not cease, but it would cease unless it were contained by the first truth.

But if you object thus: If it began: therefore it is true that it sometimes was not. I say that it well follows: because it was not from eternity, provided that force is not placed on 'sometimes' as signifying time, but it is taken transumptively so that it signifies the order of eternity to time: because now it is true to say that 'sometimes' from eternity there was no truth, and afterwards there was.

But if you infer from this: therefore before it began, it was true to say that truth will be: I say that it does not follow: because nothing was true before this by created truth, neither this nor that, nor was there a proposition, nor an enunciable, as was said above in the question on the same topic.

126. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book VI (Epsilon).

But if you infer thus: Truth was not from eternity, or it was from eternity: this is a division by contradictories. I say that this, 'truth was not from eternity', is not the contradictory of that, unless the negation refers to the whole, and negates 'from eternity': and then the negative is true, and the affirmative is false.

TO THE OTHERS the response is sufficiently evident through what was said above.

As to what is further asked concerning the understanding of Augustine: I say without prejudice that Augustine intends to prove the immortality of the soul from the immortality of created truth, but not from its eternity. And this is evident thus: Those things which are through creation from the first truth, are also out of nothing; and therefore just as they have something by which they are mutable, so they have something by which they approach immovable truth as much as they can: some indeed in the singular, such as incorruptible substances; but some in an universal rationale, such as those which are abstracted from motion and the matter in which they have their being and mutation, and in this way the rationale of truth is in the soul, as in a subject, and it has mutability according to what is a creature, but it does not have mutability through being, because it is removed from that in which it has being: and this is what Augustine says, that upon the perishing of a true thing truth does not perish, that is, the rationale of truth. Therefore, since truth so called cannot be destroyed, although it began: because its rationale remains, and it does not remain except in a subject which is the intellect, it is necessary that the intellective soul be perpetual and immortal. And this I think is the opinion of Augustine. Others say that he argued thus, by proving the soul to be capable of the first truth: because nothing capable of it is mortal, therefore it follows that the soul is immortal.

But if you ask whether it is possible for created truth to perish? I say that yes, if God so willed, but not absolutely. But if you ask that it be posited, and then infer: therefore that truth has perished is true; therefore something is true, and true by truth; therefore truth is or will be after it has perished. I say that if we posit that there is no true thing and no truth, this will not be true: 'that truth has perished is true', for this is repugnant to what was posited. And if you say that this is incongruous according to the Philosopher: because it happens to enunciate that what is not, is not. I respond that it is a great incongruity, but from your hypothesis this follows: therefore it is not incongruous in a disputation: and through this the solution to the whole is also evident.

Articulus 16 — Whether Truth Is Simple And Immutable

Whether truth is simple and immutable?

Fifthly it is asked, Whether truth is simple and immutable?

But it seems that it is not simple: because § 1. Boethius says that everything that is, has its being as one thing, and that which it is as another; and the First is excepted, in which there is no 'this and this' . Therefore it seems that truth is not simple.

127. Augustine, De vera religione.

§ 2. Also, Avicenna says that that from which something can be negated, is composite and not simple: but many things are negated of truth: therefore it is not simple.

§ 3. Also, Boethius says that in every simple thing to be and that by which it has [being] are the same: but in truth it is not the same, as was proven earlier: because it itself is not an essence, although it has an essence: therefore it is not simple.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: Truth is among the first dispositions of being: therefore it does not have anything prior from which it may be composed: therefore it is simple.

If you say that it is a creature, and thus is from another: this is nothing: because the efficient cause does not make a thing to be composite, since it is extrinsic to the thing.

FURTHERMORE it is asked, Whether it is immutable? And it seems that it is: because § 1. Anselm says that the truth of a sign is in the sign, whether the thing exists or does not exist; because 'that I am sitting' signifies that I am sitting, whether the thing is so or not: therefore it does what it ought: therefore it is right: therefore true.

§ 2. Also he says that the truth of a sign remains, whether the sign is or is not: and he proves this thus: Let it be granted that the sign is not; either it is right for the thing which does not have a sign to be signified, or not. If not: therefore if a sign is given to it, that sign does not do what it ought: therefore it will not be right: therefore also not true, which is false. But if it is right to be signified, that rectitude will be something, either of the sign or of the signified. Not of the signified. PROOF: because when it is said, this is right to be signified, it is understood that the signification is signified: therefore that is the rectitude of the sign, because otherwise the rectitude of the sign and of the signified would be one, which cannot be: therefore the rectitude of the sign remains, [even] when the sign does not remain: therefore it is immutable.

FURTHERMORE, it seems that the truth of a thing is also immutable: because what mutability falls into this truth: 'a rectilinear triangle has three angles equal to two right angles'; or into this: 'two and three are five'? It seems that none does.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. Psalm 11:2: Truths are diminished among the children of men . But a diminution is a certain mutation.

§ 2. Also, Augustine says that sometimes truth in the intellect is less, and sometimes greater, and sometimes equal to the intellect: these are certain mutations.

§ SOLUTION. It must be said that truth is the first form in its genus, just like goodness, unity, and entity, although they have an order, as was said before: and therefore I do not believe that any of them is composed of that which is (quo est) and being (esse), according to which is means a certain being in itself, into which the being that is the act of the essence is diffused. But I readily concede that truth in itself has several understandings, because it has the understanding of essence obliquely, as that of which it is; and it has its own understanding, and therefore it is not equivalent to God in simplicity. And I think the same should be said of every form which is first in its genus.

But if you object, saying that essence is a being, and truth is true, unity is one, and goodness is good. I say that all these indeed are found in Augustine in the book De Trinitate,

where this is also found, 'whiteness is white, and blackness is black'; which nevertheless the Philosopher denies: and therefore it is evident that Augustine is speaking improperly. For the concrete is noted to be posited about the abstract. Nor is what is commonly said valid, that first intentions reflect upon themselves. For whence is this obtained? Because this is contrary to reason: and the authority does not state what the custom of some has introduced: because the most simple things can least of all be signified as subjects with respect to the very forms which they signify. Hence it is well found that unity is that by which any thing is one.

But if you say that Augustine says so: I say that he says that unity is one, and goodness is good: but not that the first [forms] are reflected upon themselves. Thus, saving Augustine, it must be said that just as being, which sounds of concretion, is said of the abstract insofar as it is the first understanding, and of concretes by composition: so it is in the other firsts. But the expressions are improper: for when it is said, 'essence is a being', it is the same as if it were said, 'essence is essence': and then no composition or concretion out of that which is (quod est) and that by which it is (quo est) is noted. And similarly when it is said, 'truth is true', it is the same as if it were said, 'truth is truth', and so of the others.

And through this the solution to what is asked concerning the simplicity of truth is evident.

To what is asked concerning immutability, it must be said, as was said before, that truth has some immutability through the fact that it is patterned after the first truth which is absolutely immutable: but it is not absolutely immutable, insofar as it is out of nothing.

As to the objections of Anselm, I readily concede the first, distinguishing concerning a twofold truth: because the sign which is an enunciation has a certain truth of composition: and this is effected by the thing, and it is mutated when the thing itself is mutated: and therefore the Philosopher says that one and the same statement, by a mutation of the thing, is susceptible of contraries, namely of truth and falsity . It has another [truth] in the rectitude of signifying, according to what it is in the genus of signs: and this is not mutated when the thing is mutated, and of this Anselm speaks.

But as to what he further speaks of concerning this, whether it remains when the sign does not exist, and he seems to prove [that it does]: I do not consent, except according to one mode which will be manifested in the following question. To his argument I respond thus: When he says, 'When the sign does not exist, it is right for the thing to be signified': I say that it is true by the rectitude of the aptitude of the thing to consignify, or to have a sign: and this rectitude does not posit any rectitude to exist except in potency, and it will be reduced into act when it will have a sign. To that which he objects, however, that it cannot be the rectitude of the thing: because the thing ought to be signified by that rectitude, and the signified and the signifying cannot be the same: I say that it cannot be the same in the same way, but the rectitude of the thing is essentially signifiable, and therefore it is naturally apt to have a sign, and this habitudo is posited when it is said: 'It is right for the thing which does not have a sign to be signified.' And thus it is evident that the argument is not valid, unless it be made in this way: 'It is right to be signified': and every right thing has the exemplar of its signifiability in the first

truth, by which it is regulated and declared in the first light: for thus it is true that that rectitude always remains, because that is the first truth, as will be evident below.

To what is asked concerning the truth of certain things impossible to be otherwise. I say that such things have an immutability of comparison, and not absolutely. For the truth of this, 'a rectilinear triangle, etc.', has immutability from the fact that the subject posits the cause of the predicate: for a rectilinear triangle supposes that any exterior angle together with the interior angle is equivalent to the two [interior angles] opposite to it, and the exterior together with the interior is equivalent to two right angles: and therefore necessarily the interior together with the two opposites is equivalent to two right angles: and so it is in other mathematical things. But this immutability is of a certain kind according as they approach more closely to the first truth, and through the fact that they are simpler than those things which are in matter through being, which are doubly mutable, namely through being, and insofar as they are creatures.

To what is objected in opposition, it must be said that truth is diminished in that this is diminished in the natural good under truth, and not otherwise, unless we speak of created truth according to its being, not according to its rationale.

Articulus 17 — Whether All True Things Are True From The First Truth Formally

Whether all true things are true formally by the first truth?

Lastly it is asked, Whether all things are true by the first truth?

And here two things are asked, of which the first is, Whether they are formally true by the first truth? The second is, Whether effectively?

To the FIRST one proceeds thus: § 1. Augustine says in the book De Vera Religione: All things which are created by the eternal God consist as fabricated through His truth. Therefore they would not consist, if they did not consist through truth: therefore truth is the form containing them in being, and it is in them as a form.

If you say that this is true of an exemplary form, which is outside the thing, and this is indeed the divine truth. ON THE CONTRARY: If I speak thus: 'The animal is healthy, and the urine is healthy', I do not predicate a different 'healthy' of the urine and of the animal, although these two are related to health in a different way: therefore, since truth is said by priority and posteriority of the divine and the created, those things which are true in creatures do not signify another truth than the uncreated one, but they signify it in a different way: and it still returns [to this], that all things are true by one single truth.

§ 2. Also, Anselm objects that the time of all temporal things is the same: because it is in one uniform and simple motion, which is the cause and measure of all motions: therefore, since the first truth is incomparably simpler, and is in God who is the cause of all things, it itself will be numerically one for all true things.

§ 3. Also, the good is spoken of in two ways, namely by essence, and by participation: and when it is participated, nothing else is participated than that which is good by essence: for

otherwise what Augustine says in the book De Trinitate would be nothing: 'A man is good, a face is good, this and that is good: take away this and that, and you will see the good of every good' [128]. Therefore by similarity truth will be twofold, by essence and by participation: and then each true thing will participate in only one truth numerically.

§ 4. Also, the good is essentially in every creature, and similarly truth, and God. But it is clear that He, as good, is the exemplary cause of all good things: and as truth, the exemplary cause of all true things. Now for an exemplar, nothing else is required for it to be the intrinsic form of a thing, except that it be in it. For in this it differs from that which is truly a form: because the exemplar is outside and the form is inside. Therefore, since the first truth has both, namely that it is an exemplary form, and it is internal in every true thing, it itself seems to be the form of every true thing.

§ 5. Also, 'a body is colored', 'a body is composite', and 'a body is true', all these have an exemplar in God. But it is clear when it is said, 'a body is colored', that color is not in God, but the exemplar of color. Similarly neither is composition in God, but the exemplar of composition. Therefore since it approaches more closely when it is said, 'a body is true', there is something there beyond the first exemplar: but what is beyond the exemplar, is the internal form of the thing. Therefore it seems that the first truth is the formal truth of the thing which gives being to the true thing.

§ 6. Also, when it is said: 'The world will be', 'the world was', and 'the world is': supposing that as each thing relates to being, so it relates to the true, it will not be true in past and future things, except relatively, namely according as they have causes in nature or matter. But in the present there is being absolutely. If therefore in this one, 'the world will be', the divine truth is predicated: and in this one, 'the world is', created truth is predicated, uncreated truth will be predicated of that which is not absolutely true, and created truth of that which is absolutely true: therefore divine truth will be relative with respect to created truth, which is incongruous: therefore in the present the divine truth will be predicated, especially since the present is verified for the sake of the same thing with respect to which it was called future.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. Hilary says that upon the perishing of water, the truth of water perishes. Therefore it is not true by the first truth, because that does not perish.

§ 2. Also, every thing seems more false than true in comparison with the first truth: because Augustine says in the book De Vera Religione that what is false is what imitates something, and does not fulfill it [129]. But every created true thing imitates the first truth, and does not fulfill it. Therefore it is more false in comparison with it, than true.

§ 3. Also, there is not the same measure of duration for the created and the uncreated, but for the uncreated it is eternity, and for the created aevum or time: therefore neither is there the same measure of truth, as it seems.

§ 4. Also, since the true is that which the thing is, if the first truth were participated in every true thing as a form, the first truth is the being of all things, which is false.

§ SOLUTION. It must be said that it happens in two ways to speak of the true in comparison with truth: since as was said above, truth is said by priority and posteriority according to Anselm's distinction of the first truth and others: and in all such things, as the Philosopher maintains, the respect of proportion to the first remains in the secondary ones; and therefore if we speak thus,

Then the first truth will be in all true creatures, as in those individuating it, and imitating it as much as they can: and in this way, it will be as a certain measure, to which each thing that is called true is measured, as we said before: and this is the understanding of Anselm. And this is evident in the examples he gives of time, which is of all temporal things, and of the ell to various cloths. But if a comparison is made of the true to the form giving being to the true, by which form it has being in its truth, as every form in its formed thing: then I say that truths are multiplied according to the number of truths, and each has its own truth, and in this way the true is caused by the thing, and the truth of composition by the relation of the composed, and the truth of division by the relation of the divided: and in this way, the Philosophers inquire about the true. According to these, therefore, it is easy to respond to the objections.

Therefore, it must be said to the first, that from that authority it is not held, except that truth is the exemplary cause, to which created truths are proportioned.

To what is objected against it, it must be said that things are not said to be true in that relation alone, but rather because they have some truth, which they imitate as much as they can: and if this truth were not, they would not have the reason of proportion. In this way, it is not in urine: because in urine there is not held the health, which is proportioned to that health which is in the animal, but it has something indicating it, like the digestion of humors, and the like. And this is because analogy to one is not said in one way, but in many ways. For it is said necessary per se, and necessary per posterius: and yet although necessary per posterius regards proportionally the necessary said per prius, there is in some way some necessary formally in that which is proportioned to the necessary said per se: and thus the Philosopher understands what he says in IX of the first philosophy, that each thing is measured by the smallest and simplest first of its kind: as motion by motion, and units by unit, and men by man, and so of others. For generally in all things, which by prior and posterior approach to the reason of one.

To the other, it must be said that it is not similar concerning time and temporals, if we speak according to the comparison of the true to truth in the second way, but in some way it is similar speaking in the first way: but it does not follow from this, that that one truth is the form of all truths, but the rectitude to which they are proportioned: just as neither is time the form of all temporals, but the number by which they are numbered.

To the other, it must be said that this is false, that the uncreated good essentially informs created goods: but rather they are said to be good by the form of created good, which nevertheless is further proportioned to the uncreated good, as we also said about the true and truth.

128. Augustine, De Trinitate, VIII, 3.

But to the saying of Augustine, it must be said that he does not mean that by abstracting from this good and that, the uncreated good remains in itself, but it remains in the reason of good, as in a sign the exemplar shines: and this which he says, "You will see," is understood as the good of every good, of the vision which is of the first goodness in that which proportionally approaches to it. To the other, it must be said that God is in all things essentially and presentially, but not as the form of the thing: because it is further required, that as a part, and that condition fails: therefore it is evident that it is not the form. To the other indeed, it must be said that the exemplar of all is in God: but nevertheless not all can be referred in him, so that they are first essentially in him, and later in the creature, but only the mystical. But the others which are symbolic are not so referred. And the difference of goods according to my ability has been explained above. And therefore it is evident that those which are mystical have more: because they are exemplarily and essentially first in God, than in creatures: but the others only exemplarily. And therefore it is evident that that objection proceeds from diminution.

To the last, it must be said that this proposition, "the world will be," was not true, because neither was the proposition before the world: and this was shown above, unless it is posited in the divine mind: and if it is posited there, then it was previously answered to that above, where it is asked, "If truth is from eternity?" But if no force is made in this: then it will be said that in the past by reason of pastness eternal truth is not posited, nor even in the future by reason of futurity, but by reason of order to the present time: for eternity precedes time. And therefore such words do not predicate temporal motions, as Augustine says, when they are referred to the divine. And then it is evident that the argumentation does not follow: because it proceeds as if the future and past were taken by reason of the imperfection of time.

Articulus 18 — Whether Every Truth Is From The First Truth Efficiently

Whether every truth is efficiently from the first truth?

Secondly, it is asked whether every truth is from the first truth? And this is the intention of the Letter.

However, it seems that it is so: because
1. The Philosopher says that from the fact that a thing is or is not, a statement is true or false, and this was conceded above. Since therefore truth is founded in being, and every being is from the first being, every truth will be from the first truth. But against this is what the Master objects in the Letter thus: That evils happen, therefore that evils happen, is true: from the first truth, as from an efficient and exemplary cause.

But if you say according to some, that truth is twofold, namely of the complex and the incomplex, and the truth of the thing: it is understood by the saying of Augustine who says that every truth is from the first truth, concerning the truth of the thing, and the truth of the incomplex sign, but not of every truth of complexes. Against: Every truth which is in the complex is reduced to the incomplex and their relations. Similarly, every truth of the sign is

129. Augustine, De Vera Religione.

reduced to the truth of the thing, as to a cause. But it is evident that if the effect is from God, it is necessary that also the cause is from God, and conversely. Therefore, with the truth of complex things being from God, it is necessary also that the truths of complex signs are from God, and conversely.

Therefore, others come by solving differently, saying that there is a multiple composition or division, namely of position, and privation, and negation. Of position, as when it is said, Peter is a man, or a man is an animal. Of privation, as when it is said, Peter is blind. Of negation, as when it is said, Peter is not a man, a man is not a stone, or a tragelaph is not a fligax, and the like. But again this is worth nothing: because although privation is nothing in itself, yet it leaves being, and according to this it is referred to being: and concerning the truth of negatives it was shown above: it is that it is reduced to being. Let us suppose, however, that every being is from the first being. Therefore also the truth which is founded in being.

But if perhaps you wish to solve, as the Master says in the Letter, by the instance of argumentation, as when I say thus: Let it be that you say a man is a donkey: and therefore I who hear this, say thus, I hear you speaking: your speaking is true: therefore I hear the truth. It does not follow, rather I hear falsehood: and this happens because the medium is varied in the first and in the second. For when it is said, I hear you speaking, the act of hearing passes over this which I say, you speaking, for the sake of the attribute only, namely speaking. But when it is said, your speaking is true, it is not said to be true of this which I say, you speaking, by reason of the attribute, but by reason of the coherence and composition of one with the other. Hence when it is afterwards inferred, therefore I hear the truth, the conclusion does not follow: because it is signified as if the act of hearing passes over your speech, by reason of the truth of some statement which you say: and this cannot be, because it was posited that you say falsehood, namely that a man is a donkey.

However, the Master's example is, by which he infers this instance, God prohibits theft from happening: theft happening is true: therefore God prohibits the truth. Yet, it does not follow: because in the first the act of prohibition does not fall except by reason of the suppositum over the following statement, and not by reason of coherence or composition. But when it is said, theft happening is true, it is regarded by reason of composition and coherence: and therefore the conclusion does not follow. If, I say, you wish to solve with the Master. Against: When it is said, This one steals, the proposition is true: either the truth is founded in the subject and the act composed with it without deformity: or in the composition with deformity. If in the first way: therefore with deformity separated, the statement will still be true, which is false: because if deformity is separated from the act, this statement will be false, this one steals, or this one sins, or this one does evil. Therefore, the truth regards the composition of deformity with the act in the subject. But this composition is really something: and I am silent about the sign, because the Master insists on this: therefore this composition is from the first being: therefore its truth is from the first truth, as it seems.

Solution. It must be said that it is one thing concerning the truth of the sign, and another concerning the truth of the thing: because as was said above, everything that is in any way, it is right to signify, and this is not evil: and therefore that truth of the sign which it has insofar

as it is a sign, is always from the first truth: but because it ought to measure further the truth of the thing, so that there would be an adequation of the sign and the signified, this adheres to the being of privative composition and false: just as the figure of the human body, which is a sign of the soul and life, adheres to the dead body: for then privative being and false are deflected from the rectitude of the sign.

But if we speak of the truth of composition according to the thing: then I say, that truth is reduced to the first truth, just as its entity is reduced to being: for not every being reverts to the first being as to its entire and immediate cause, but only the perfect being: for there are other agents under God, such as nature and will. Hence just as there is a composition of something with a deformed act, so it is caused: but it is a composition deficient on the part of the deformed act: therefore it is immediately reduced to a deficient cause, which is a truth deficient from the first truth, and it is free will. However, whatever of being is in that truth of composition, reverts to the first truth. And the example of this was placed above, that God in such composed truths is, as a virtue influencing motion in the leg, which equally influences both in the straightness of one leg and in the curvature of the other leg: and therefore whatever of gait is in limping, is reduced to the virtue influencing motion, because from it is the whole, but of the defect of limping nothing is from it. So whatever of being and truth is in such compositions, is from the first being and truth, but nothing of the defect: and according to which the truth of the thing is only what we speak of, that also fails, where being fails. And according to this response it does not follow that evil is from God, or that evil happening is from God.

But if you ask, In what is the truth of the sign founded? I say, that in the universal thing, and that is indeed from God, as was said before.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 19 — Whether Every Truth, By Whomsoever It Is Said, Is From The Holy Spirit

Whether every truth, by whomever it is spoken, is from the Holy Spirit?

Whether every truth, by whomever it is spoken, is from the Holy Spirit?

Then it is questioned concerning what the Master says in chapter O, there, "Truth, by whomever it is spoken, is from the Holy Spirit."

For this seems false, since many truths are evil.

Likewise, there is truth in mathematics, for which the Holy Spirit is not required, as it seems.

Likewise, since truth is attributed to the Son, and not to the Holy Spirit: why does he not say that truth is spoken by the Son rather than by the Holy Spirit?

Solution. It must be said that according to the Gloss, it is not understood generally, but concerning truth pertaining to piety, which is to say 'in heart, mouth, and deed': because Anselm says that the saying of the deed is more powerful than that of the mouth; and he gives

the example of someone in a garden from whom it is asked which herbs are poisonous and which are healthy: who judges by word the poisonous ones by calling them healthy, and eats others which he calls poisonous: because he speaks more by deed than by mouth.

Therefore, it should be said according to this, that to speak is to manifest, and to speak truth is to manifest truth: and this manifestation is perfect when it is obscured by no part: and this is not done unless truth pertaining to piety is spoken according to the affection and demonstration of the deed. And this is said according to the Gloss, and thus the objections cease.

But for the sake of the disputation of the curious Masters, it can be otherwise satisfied, that this is understood of every truth insofar as truth is manifestative of the being of anything whatsoever: and then we will say that nothing is said thus manifesting from which the inspiration of the Spirit is abstracted, as Augustine says in the book Soliloquies, and it was placed above in 2, that in every understanding of truth it is necessary for the illumination of the Spirit to be present, which the Philosophers have called the illumination of intelligence: because every judgment of truth is according to the rule of the first truth. And then generally it is true.

To the first, therefore, it must be said, that how the truth by which evil is said to be done is true as from the first truth, was explained in the preceding question.

To the other, it must be said that although the Son is truth, yet it does not pertain to him to manifest truth by inspiration: because this is to teach inwardly, and this pertains to the Holy Spirit, as Christ says, "He will teach you all truth: and He will announce to you things to come." Some, however, force this in what the Apostle says, "No one can say: Lord Jesus, except in the Holy Spirit." Because he adds the cause as if moving, and says the containment as if truth is contained in the Holy Spirit, although it does not move the speaker. But this seems frivolous: because the authority of Ambrose explaining the saying of the Apostle places it from the Holy Spirit. But it is true that it is not necessary, for one who speaks truth in this way, to have the Holy Spirit, as is clear from the aforementioned.

Certain things, however, useful for this, were noted above.

DISTINCTIO XLVII

Divisio Textus

Indeed, the will of God is always efficacious, etc.

In this distinction, the Master returns to the proposition, showing the will to be efficacious. And it is divided into three parts: in the first of which he proves the proposition through the words of Augustine. In the second, he explains against which will something can be done, and against which nothing, there, B. In the third, as we said above, the will of God is understood in different ways, etc. However, he makes a summary of the said things, there, C.

From the aforementioned, it is clear, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether The Will Of God Is Always Efficacious

Whether the will of God is always efficacious

Here arises the doubt, Whether it is true what is said, that the will of God is always efficacious?

It seems, however, that it is not.
§1. Let us suppose someone is predestined: it is certain that the good pleasure of God is that he be saved. I ask, therefore: either this person can sin by free will, or not? If so: let it be supposed he dies immediately in that sin: then indeed he will be damned, and the will of God is hindered.

§2. Likewise, evils happen as we see every day: either therefore by the will of good pleasure, or against the will of good pleasure. If by the will of good pleasure: then God wills evils: and he who wills evils has a bad will: therefore God according to this could have a bad will, which is absurd. But if against the will of God: then the proposition is held, because then the will is hindered.

§3. Likewise, it is more noble and more powerful, against which nothing is done and nothing besides it, than against which nothing is done and something besides it: therefore the will of God would seem more noble, if nothing were done against it, and nothing besides it: therefore it seems that evils ought not to be said to be done besides it, as the Master says in the Book in solving the aforementioned reasoning.

§4. Likewise, Genesis 44: I am. If therefore this is of the power of Pharaoh: without your command no one will move hand or foot in all the land of Egypt of man, so that nothing is done besides it, much more is it of the power of the divine will.

Solution. This is easy to determine, if what has been previously held is recalled to memory, because it must be conceded that evils are done besides the divine will, as the Master says, and in the last authority it is taken without for against.

To the first, however, it must be said that if this one is predestined, the will of good pleasure is for salvation, and without doubt he will be saved: and yet he can well not be saved, but it is not compatible with the will of good pleasure, that he die in sin, although it is possible in itself, and this has been shown above.

To the second it must be said, that there is a will considered in itself, and from this proceeds the said reasoning: and there is a will governing others, and it is of the nature of that will, that it does not compel those things which are under it, lest it take away their own nature from them: because otherwise the reason for praise and virtue would be destroyed, as has been said above: and thus besides that will something can be done.

Articulus 2 — Whether Evil Is Ordered Or Disordered

Whether evil is ordered, or disordered?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, A, around the middle: So wisely sought, etc.

For by this he means that evil is orderable: and this does not seem so, because

1. Evil is the corruption of order: and whatever corrupts order is disordered: therefore evil is disordered.
2. Likewise, nothing is so well ordered that evil does not corrupt it: therefore it seems that it is contrary to order.
3. Likewise, every good is determined according to the reason of order, because it is ordered to another, or order is to it as the first good to which that is ordered: therefore it is ordered to that: therefore it seems that everything ordered is good, but evil is ordered, therefore evil is good, which is false.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: Augustine in book XI of the City of God speaks of the order of the universe, which is distinguished by certain antithetical interpositions of evil: as Ecclesiasticus says, God created all things double: one against one, and two against two, and against evil good, and the like. Likewise, Isaiah 45:7: I am the Lord creating light, and making darkness: creating evil, and making good. And Augustine introduces the example of music, in which harmony is sometimes made by the interposition of silence. Therefore also evil, sometimes interrupting good, contributes to the beauty and harmonious composition of the universe.

Solution. It must be said that evil, considered in itself and by itself, has neither order, nor cause, nor intention, nor will, as Dionysius says: but it is unfruitful and sluggish: yet compared to another, it has an order which is not placed in itself, but in another with respect to it: just as the beauty of white next to black is not placed in black, but in comparison to black in white: and in this way Augustine speaks, and the authorities introduced proceed. However, the reasons introduced here proceed in the first way.

And in how many ways good is elicited from such has been explained above in the preceding distinction.

Articulus 3 — Why Nothing Can Be Done Against Permission, And Yet Something Is Done Against Precept And Counsel And Prohibition

Why can nothing be done against permission, and yet something is done against precept and counsel and prohibition?

Then it is questioned concerning this which is said in the second part, there, B, around the beginning:

By His permission, all evils are done, etc.

For it is doubtful why nothing can be done against permission: and something is done against precept, and counsel, and prohibition.

1. For permission, since it is with respect to evil, is more distant from the will of good pleasure than precept or counsel, which is with respect to good: therefore, less ought to be done against precept than against permission.
2. Likewise, on that of Psalm 104, 37: He brought them out with silver and gold, the Gloss says that sometimes the same is precept and permitted: therefore, if something is done against precept, something can also be done against permission.
3. Likewise, according to that Gloss, precept and permission seem to be one sign: therefore, they are not five, as was said above.

Solution. It must be said to the first, that nothing is done against permission, as we said above: because it is joined to the work as operation: hence this is not because it is with respect to evil, but by reason of the existence of the work: and therefore it is not necessary that it be so in precept or counsel with respect to which there is still freedom of doing or not doing. Hence that objection does not put the cause for the cause: because it is not the cause that nothing can be done against it due to proximity to the will of good pleasure or distance.

To the other, it must be said that the same according to the same and with respect to the same cannot be precept and permitted, but with respect to different things, namely as permitted with respect to those who carried away out of avarice: and precept with respect to those who out of obedience. And through this, the response to the following is also clear.

However, it must be noted that permission is said in four ways, namely with respect to and this is properly called concession, as in 1 Corinthians 7, 25: Concerning virgins, I have no commandment of the Lord, etc., on that, But if they do not contain themselves, let them marry: and on that, Whom she wills, let her marry, only in the Lord: the Gloss says that he permits virgins to marry, that is, he grants. It is also said that God permits what is not prohibited, and it is with respect to venial evil, as on that, Be angry, and sin not, the Gloss says that he permits what is of necessity. It is also said to permit what is not punished with temporal punishment, although it is punished with eternal, as in Matthew 19, 8, a bill of divorce is permitted to be given to wives due to the hardness of their hearts, as the Lord says. Fourthly, it is said to permit what is not impeded, and yet it is restrained since it is evil: and this is only the permission sign of the divine will.

DISTINCTIO XLVIII

Divisio Textus

It must also be known that sometimes the will of man willing the same thing is evil, etc. In this last distinction, he discusses the conformity of our will to the divine will.

And it is divided into three parts: in the first of which the Master touches upon the measure of conformity in general. In the second, however, the manner of conformity in the passion of Christ, there, B, "That also is not beyond—". In the third, however, he shows how we ought to have the same disposition in the passions of the Saints, which God wills, there, E, "If indeed it is asked, Whether in the same way it is to be felt about the passions and martyrdoms of the Saints?"

Articulus 1 — Whether It Is Possible For Us To Conform Our Will To The Divine Will

Whether it is possible for us to conform our will to the divine will?

Here, however, five doubts arise first: of which the first is, Whether it is possible for us to conform our will to the divine will?
Second, In what does that conformity consist?
Third, however, If that conformity is in many things, whether one sometimes excludes another, or all can be together?

Fourth, however, Whether all are bound to conformity, or not?
Fifth and last, Whether we are bound to conform in the willed, which does not agree with us to will: but nevertheless we know that God wills it?

To the first, it is proceeded thus:
1. There is no conformity of infinite distances: the will of God and the will of man are infinitely distant: therefore there can be no conformity between them.

As the heavens are exalted above the earth, so are my ways exalted above your ways, and your thoughts. Therefore also the will from the will: therefore there is no proportion or conformity.

1. Likewise, on Psalm 32:1: "Rejoice, ye just, in the Lord": the Gloss says: As much as God is distant from man, so much is the will of God distant from the will of man. From which follows the same.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
1. Whoever shall do the will of my Father who is in heaven, he is my brother, and sister, and mother. Therefore we can conform in the willed.

1. Likewise, on that Psalm 32:1: "Praise befits the upright": the Gloss says: The upright are those who direct their hearts according to the will of God, which is the rule of our will.

Solution. It must be said that there is a conformity of perfect assimilation, or of determined proportion: and in this we cannot conform. There is also conformity in something, which is conformity imitating the perfection of His will in the willed and the form of willing and the end, and in this we can conform to Him. And through this the solution to the first is clear.

To the second, however, it must be said that Isaiah speaks of the wicked, whose hearts had willed and causes of willing in earthly things, with which God did not agree: because they did not seek nor will heavenly things.

To the other, it must be said that this is true of conformity according to the homeland: because in that we cannot, nor even in that which is of perfection, although we can imitate according to our possibility.

Articulus 2 — In What The Conformity Of The Divine Will And Ours Consists

In what does the conformity of the divine will and ours consist?

Secondly, it is asked, In what does this conformity of wills consist?

However, it seems that it cannot be in anything. 1. For in created wills there is no conformity except in the willed, which is the reason of the will and the cause and object: but in divine matters, the will is not caused by the willed, but rather the reverse, as was held above: therefore it seems that there can never be conformity in the will.

1. Furthermore, let us grant that it is in the willed: in the text it is proven that this is not meritorious conformity: but only about that is the question: therefore conformity is not considered in the one willed.
2. If perhaps it is said that there is conformity in the end of the will, which end is willed by God: so that man wills what He wills, for something that God wills. Then if someone were to will to steal in order to feed the poor, he would conform his will to the divine will: because God wills the poor to be fed, for which he wills to steal: therefore it seems that neither in the reason of the will, as the first argument proves, nor in the willed, nor in the end of the will can this conformity be.
3. If perhaps you say that we ought to will something that we know Him to will. Still, it must be insisted: because I know Him to will what He operates: and yet I can will it demeritoriously, as is in the text from the example of the two sons at the death of the father.

Finally, it is asked, To which will ought we to conform ourselves, whether to the will of the sign, or to the will of good pleasure?

It seems, moreover, that [we ought to conform] to the will of good pleasure: because.

§ 1. There is greater conformity to the will which is will simply speaking [simpliciter], than to that which is only in a qualified sense [secundum quid]: but the will of good pleasure is will simply speaking, while the will of sign is so in a qualified sense: therefore, there ought to be conformity to the good pleasure.

§ 2. Again, sometimes it concerns that which God does not will: therefore, we would then be conformed in a qualified sense, and deformed in will simply speaking.

ON THE CONTRARY: No one can will except what is known: the will of good pleasure is unknown to us: therefore, we are not bound to be conformed to it in the will of good pleasure.

MOREOVER it is asked: To which sign ought we rather to be conformed?

It seems, moreover, that [we should conform] to the precept: because we are obliged to precepts: therefore, since we are also obliged to conformity of will, conformity will be according to the precept.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. A prohibition also obliges: therefore, we are bound to conform to it.

§ 2. Again, an operation declares and shows the good pleasure of God, because whatever He operates, concerning this is His good pleasure: since therefore the greatest conformity is that of good pleasure, we are most bound to conform ourselves to the will of operation.

FURTHERMORE, it is asked on account of certain people: Are we bound to conform ourselves in will to the will of sign which is permission?

It seems that we are: because if God were to unwill [nollet], that which He permits would not happen: therefore, it ought to please us, as it seems: because otherwise we do not harmonize with His will.

Solution. It must be said that there is conformity in a qualified sense, and conformity simply speaking. Conformity in a qualified sense is in the willed object [volito] alone: and this alone is neither demeritorious nor meritorious: because it consists solely in the matter of the will, and a material principle is open to opposites, and can be informed in any way whatever, whether well or badly. But conformity simply speaking is according to two modes, namely by the perfection of the way [viae], and the perfection of the homeland [patriae]: and by the perfection of the way in two further modes, namely of sufficiency, and of abundance. The perfection of sufficiency is in two things, namely in the form of willing, and the end of the will, and not necessarily in the matter, but sometimes yes, and sometimes no. Now I call the form of willing charity: so that out of a similar charity I may will whatever I will, out of which God wills that which He wills: and the end of the will is that for the sake of which it is, such as the glory of God to which all our will is referred. These two suffice even with a diversity of the willed object, as is clear in the text concerning the example of the good son. But the perfection of the homeland is according to four modes, so that one wills the same thing, and from the same form, and on account of the same thing, and what God wills him to will: and the first is as the matter concerning which the will is, the second as the form, the third as the end, the fourth as the effective motive.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that the will is not considered in this regard: because this is a property of the divine will, according as it is the cause of creatures: and in this mode it is not compared to us.

To the other it must be said that this reason touches only upon that conformity which is in a qualified sense, and not simply speaking.

To the other it must be said that in this there is no conformity: because God does not will that we do evil for the sake of good.

To the other it is also conceded, that there is no conformity except in a qualified sense and imperfectly.

To that which is further asked, I say without prejudice, that because we do not know the good pleasure of God, it suffices if we are conformed to the precept and the operation: but if we were to know the good pleasure, I well concede that we would be more bound to be conformed to it.

To what is objected concerning prohibition, it must be said that it consists rather in nilling [nolente] than in willing: and therefore in it there is no conformity simply speaking.

To what is objected concerning permission, it must be said that, as has been established, God does not will that which He permits: but it happens beyond [praeter] the will of God: and therefore with respect to it there is no conformity. And some say the contrary of this on account of the objection made: and this I reckon an error.

Articulus 3 — Whether, If In Several Things There Is Conformity Of The Divine Will And Ours, One Excludes Another By Repugnance

Whether, if there is a conformity of the divine will and ours in many things, one excludes another through repugnance?

Thirdly it is asked: If that conformity is in many things, as has already been established, whether one excludes another as if through repugnance?

And it seems that it does: because § 1. In the Gloss on the words of the Apostle to the Romans 5:9, a threefold willing is distinguished, namely of nature, of grace, and of vice: but according to the willing of vice it is certain that no conformity is considered; nature, however, is not repugnant to God: therefore according to it there can be conformity: and similarly grace is always conformed. Nevertheless, we see in Christ that one seems to exclude another, when He said, "Not as I will, but as Thou wilt" .

§ 2. Again, there are in us four modes of wills, namely nature, and the deliberative will, and the will of grace, and that which is the will of reason as it is nature: and this is proved in the third book of the Sentences, distinction 17 . But it is certain that deliberative reason is sometimes repugnant to nature in the willed object. Therefore it seems that if there is conformity according to one, there cannot be according to another.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. It is said in the text that it matters much what is congruous for a man to will, and what is congruous for God to will: therefore, God wills us to will what is congruous to us according to nature: but these are natural things, such as the preservation of life, and the like: therefore in these we are bound to conform ourselves to His will: therefore that conformity is not excluded by the will of reason or of grace.

§ 2. Again, God operates in nature in a twofold way, namely according to the natural course of propagating things according to the seminal causes which He inserted into nature, and He operates above nature through the power of miracles: and the one is not contraried by the other, because Augustine says that He cannot act against the causes which He inserted into nature: therefore, similarly, since He has inserted in us the will of nature, He Himself does not demand any conformity of will which excludes it.

§ 3. Again, we see that He Himself commanded this, that we should relieve the needs of the poor: therefore we are bound to do this: therefore we are bound to will that they not be poor: and yet we know that He Himself wills them to be poor, because otherwise they would not be poor: therefore it seems that conformity consists in many things, of which one does not exclude another.

§ 4. Again, often God commands one thing, and operates another: since, therefore, these are signs to which we are chiefly bound to conform our will, it seems that conformity does not consist according to the same thing, but according to diverse things, of which one does not exclude another.

Solution. To this I say without prejudice, that conformity is considered according to diverse things. But just as it is in nature, that diverse movers are referred to the same mobile object in diverse ways, but all follow one which predominates: so it is in diverse conformities of diverse wills, that all follow one conformity, and yet each retains its own proper movement of conformity: as, for example, the first mover in the first mobile body has nothing but one simple movement: but in the second, the second mover has the movement of the first from East to West, and in this it is conformed to the first: and it has a proper movement from West to East, in which it does not discord according to the intention of the movement, although in the movement of the stars it seems to have something proper: because it moves with that movement as the first mover impresses into it the desire of causing the mixture of elements for generation: and there cannot be a mixture, unless with two movements moving against each other, one is forced to go into the other: and this is the cause of the movement of the latitude of the stars and planets from North to South, and from South to North. Therefore, in the intention of moving there is conformity: because even in their proper movement the second movers do not have a movement except that which the first mover impresses and flows into them. So I say, that there is in man a twofold will following God's will moving us, namely the will of reason, and the will of nature. The will of reason is conformed in a threefold way if it can be, namely in the willed object, in the form of willing, and in the end. But the will of nature is conformed in this, that it is congruous for us to will it, that is, what God wills us to will, as the Master says in the third book of the Sentences , and its movement is not excluded, although the movement of reason orders and dominates it: for it would seem impious and cruel, and against the congruity of human nature, that concerning ourselves and others we should will cruel things, such as that men suffer, and be poor, and be afflicted, and that those useful to the Church should die when they are dying, and the like. Hence I believe that we are bound not to will this by human piety, although we commit them to the Lord according to the will of reason.

Therefore it must be said to the first, that in Christ there was both conformities: for He willed not to die by the will of nature: and God the Father willed Him to will this: and thus He was conformed: and this conformity here is called according to human congruity. And He willed to die according to reason. And these are not opposed: just as also in higher things there are diverse movements, yet not opposed, but all are conformed in the intention of the first moving principle, which influences moving to all others.

To the other it must be said, that the will of nature never of itself is repugnant to the will of reason, although sometimes it is about the contradictory: but under reason it shows what is congruous to it, and what God wills it to will: for if it were to begin to rebel against reason, since the latter is upright, it would no longer be the will of nature, but of vice: just as if an inferior mover were to wish to impede a superior one from moving.

Articulus 4 — Whether All Are Bound To Conform Their Will To The Divine Will

Whether all are bound to conform their will to the divine will?

Fourthly it is asked, whether all are bound to conform their will to the divine will?

And concerning this two things are asked: of which the first is, whether all are bound simply speaking to conformity? But the second, whether they are bound to that special conformity which is in the willed object?

To the first it is objected thus: § 1. All are bound to be upright: but they are not upright unless they are conformed, as the Gloss introduced earlier says: therefore all are bound to be conformed in will.

§ 2. Again, all are bound to the precepts of charity: but charity makes friends: therefore all are bound to be friends. But

Tully says in the book on Friendship, that it belongs to friends to will the same thing therefore all are bound to this, as it seems: therefore they are bound to be conformed in will, as it seems.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. Some are obstinate, and some, what is more, are damned, who cannot conform their will: therefore they are bound to the impossible. But if you say that they are absolved by obstinacy and damnation: then they bear profit from their malice, which is unfitting.

§ 2. Again, someone, while he is sinning, cannot conform: therefore he sins by a double sin, both because of the act of sin which he does, and because he does not conform his will to the divine will.

Again, someone is bound continuously to conform himself, if he is bound: therefore as long as he does not conform, he continuously omits [to do so]: therefore he continuously sins, as it seems.

TO THE SECOND it is objected thus, and they are the common objections of all, from the Gloss on that of Psalm 100:4: "A froward heart did not cleave to me": which says that

§ 1. "He has a froward and distorted heart, who does not will what God wills" therefore when we know Him to will something, we are bound to will it.

§ 2. Again, God cannot will anything but what is just and good: but we are altogether bound to be just and good: therefore we are bound to will what He [wills], because not unless conformed in will can we be just and good.

ON THE CONTRARY: If I had one will, and you were to will the contradictory, those two wills would be discordant: therefore similarly, with God willing one thing, and you the contradictory, they are discordant wills: and yet Augustine in the text praises him who wills the contrary of that which God wills: therefore we are not bound to conformity in the willed object.

Furthermore it is asked, whether there can be contrarieties between God's good will, and man's good will?

It seems that there can: because § 1. Two brothers had contrary wills, as is said in the text: therefore that which is contrary to the will of the other, is also contraried to every will conformed to that one: but God's will is conformed to him who is bad: therefore the good brother's will is contraried to the divine will.

§ 2. Again, when God wills something, it is good and holy, because He Himself willing this is His goodness: therefore he who does not will this, is contraried to the goodness and justice and holiness which is God Himself: and yet he is good because he is praised by Augustine: therefore two just and holy wills can be contrary.

§ 3. Again, an intellect dissonant from the first truth, is contrary to the first truth: therefore a will dissonant from the willed object of the first goodness and will [is contrary to it]: but such is the one which Augustine praises in the text: therefore they are contrary, and yet good and praiseworthy.

Solution. It must be said that all are bound to the conformity of the way, as was said before: and this is for an upright heart to be directed, namely to the form and end of the divine will, and to will what God wills us to will. However, as to that which is objected concerning Tully, it must be said that it is understood thus, that it belongs to friends to return to one willed object through the intention of the end, and not always of the matter.

To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that the obstinate can lay aside their obstinacy, and then conform: and therefore they are not absolved from the obligation. But the damned are not in a state of conforming themselves: and therefore because they did not conform themselves when they could, it is inflicted upon them in perpetuity also to be able to do nothing unto repentance, and therefore they report a loss, not a profit: for it is an intolerable loss to be unable in perpetuity to be conformed.

To the other it is said commonly, that affirmative precepts oblige always, but not for always [*semper, sed non ad semper*]: and therefore the sinner does not always omit while he sins: but he omits while he actually thinks that he ought to prepare himself for the grace of conformity, and does not do it.

To the SECOND it must be said, in my judgment, that we are not bound except in the mode stated above, namely that our will ought to follow without resisting [*non resultando*]: yet we can have our own [will] in a movement that does not resist: and this is what some say fittingly enough, that the will ought to be conformed, but a conditioned velleity, namely if God were to will it to happen otherwise, can be not conformed: and this velleity by which we

would will another thing if God so willed, some call an imperfect will. And the sayings of all revert to the same thing.

To the other it must be said, that the will is not just from the willed objects, but from the mode and end of willing: and therefore it is not necessary that there be conformity altogether in the willed object.

To that which is further asked, to all except the last there is one solution, namely that conformity in someone is not considered with respect to the material principle alone, but with respect to the form and the end: and therefore those wills which do not concord in matter, nor even discord, because one follows the other, and they have the same forms and ends, are concordant: but those which are conformed in matter, and have diverse and contrary forms and ends, are deformed.

To the LAST it must be said, that it is not similar concerning the intellect and the will: because the true is the whole cause of the intellect according to the species of speculation. But the willed object is not so related to the will: rather it is necessary that the form and end be present, as was said before.

Articulus 5 — Whether We Are Bound To Conform In The Object Willed Which We Know God Wills, Yet It Does Not Befit Us To Will This

Whether we are bound to conform ourselves in the willed object which we know God wills, but yet it is not congruous for us to will this?

Fifthly and lastly it is asked, whether we are bound to conform ourselves in the willed object which we know God wills, but yet it is not congruous for us to will this?

It seems, however, that we are not. § 1. Micah 2:11: "Would that I were not a man having the spirit, and rather spoke a lie." Behold, he desires what is congruous for him to will: because it is congruous for no one to will the destruction of his own nation and of his own people, which he had prophesied: and thus he knew that God willed it, and yet by willing he desires the contraries.

§ 2. Again, Jeremiah 28:1ff: when Hananiah, a certain false prophet, was prophesying that the city was not to be handed over into the hand of the king of Babylon, although Jeremiah knew that the Lord willed the contrary, out of human compassion he said: "Amen, the Lord do so": the Gloss there says: "He desires that to happen which he falsely states God to will" .

§ 3. Again, if the Blessed Virgin willed Christ to suffer torment, then she was a wondrous mother, since she so grieved, that of her it is said, Luke 2:35 [Albert cites 2:33]: "And thy own soul a sword shall pierce." Therefore we are not bound to will what is not congruous out of human piety for us to will, even when we know God to will it, because we see Him fulfilling this.

§ 4. Again, the Saints bewail the sins of men, even though they know that God wills them to be in sins, as some say: but no one wills this which he deplores.

§ 5. Again, let us suppose it has been revealed to me concerning someone that he is to be damned; I still ought to pray for him and out of my will: therefore I ought to will him to be saved.

§ 6. Again, let us suppose my own damnation has been revealed to me: if therefore I will myself to be damned, I will to sin: and this is against conformity: therefore by doing contrary to conformity, I will be conformed, which is absurd.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. If I am not bound to will what I know God wills, then I can will the contrary: therefore also do the contrary: therefore I can without sinning act against His will, which is false.

§ 2. Again, Augustine says that he is impious to whom divine providence is not pleasing: but providence is concerning all willed objects: therefore those ought to be our willed objects, and to please us.

Solution. It must be said as before, that our will ought to follow, but yet it can have something proper to itself. And through this the solution to the first two is clear: and there is no deformity: because God wills us to will this. Through this also the solution to that which is objected concerning the Blessed Virgin is clear.

To the other it must be said, that it is founded upon something false: because God never willed the sin of anyone: but all sins happen beyond the will of God, as was proved before in the text of the preceding distinction.

To the other two it must be said, that they are foolish positionings: because such a revelation does not take away the freedom of choice: therefore neither is there a returning to God's faculty. Hence no one is so revealed to be damned but that he can be saved: and I reckon it foolishness what some say, that in such a case he would not sin who willed himself to be damned, and another to be damned: for this is altogether contrary to the order of nature and of grace and of reason, that one should will himself to be separated from God. Hence in my judgment God does not will us to will this: nay rather, He wills us to will the contrary by every will of nature and of reason and of grace.

Articulus 6 — Whether All The Saints, And Especially The Blessed Virgin And The Apostles, Willed The Passion Of Christ

Whether all the Saints, and especially the Blessed Virgin and the Apostles, willed the passion of Christ?

Next it is asked concerning this which he says, there at chapter D, "From which the question is solved," etc. For it seems that all the Saints willed the passion of Christ: because all were expecting the redemption: therefore they desired the death of Christ.

Again it is asked, whether the Blessed Virgin and the Apostles willed it?

Solution. According to what was previously held, this is no question [i.e., this poses no difficulty]: because the Master well determines in the text, that all willed the end of the

passion, and the passion itself referred to the end, but not the passion simply speaking: because this would be against that which is congruous for us to will, namely the punishments and death of an innocent and the best man. Thus also is it to be judged concerning the passions of the Saints. But in comparison to the agents and killers, in no way ought we to will it: because neither did God so will it, as is held in the text.

Articulus 7 — Whether The Demons Persuaded The Jews Who Were Crucifying Christ Concerning His Passion

Whether the demons persuaded the Jews who were crucifying Christ to His passion?

Next it is asked concerning this which he says in the last chapter E, there, around the end: "Because they did by a bad will the very thing that God by a good will willed to be done," etc.

For it can be asked, whether the demons persuaded this, or not?

For it seems that they did not: because § 1. Matthew 27:19, on that verse, "Have thou nothing to do with that just man": the Gloss says that just as the devil initiated death through a woman, so also now he willed to impede the death which is the cause of life through a woman . Therefore it seems that they did this by their own malice, and not by the persuasion of the demon.

§ 2. Again, Peter was called Satan, because he willed Christ not to die: but he was not Satan by nature: therefore by a similitude of will: therefore Satan did not will Christ to die, as it seems.

§ 3. Again, no one wills that by which his empire is destroyed: but through the death of Christ the empire of the devil was destroyed: therefore the demons, since they are most astute, did not will this.

But against this is what the Apostle says, 1 Corinthians 2:8: "Which none of the princes of this world knew: for if they had known it, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory." And one Gloss expounds this of the demons therefore they persuaded Him to be crucified.

Solution. It must be said that at first they persuaded it, but afterwards when they sensed the efficacy of His deity through the joy of the Saints and the congruity of the time and of prophecy, they grieved, but could not revoke it, for the reason that then human malice willed to perpetrate the decree of the Father concerning our redemption accomplished through Christ: to whom is honor and empire for ever and ever. Amen.

LIBER II

PROLOGUS

Prologue

D. ALBERT THE GREAT, BISHOP OF REGENSBURG, ORDER OF PREACHERS, COMMENTARIES ON THE SECOND BOOK OF SENTENCES. PROLOGUE.

I saw the Lord sitting upon a high and elevated throne: and the house was full of His majesty: and those things which were under Him filled the temple. This word is read in Isaiah, vi, 1: and from it is drawn the material of this Book.

For by this which is said: I saw, the intellect of the Author is noted: because this he could not know, except by the Spirit teaching.

But by this which is said: the Lord, the exclusion of errors posited in the beginning of this Book in the first distinction is noted. For by this is signified one Creator and ruler of the world: not as various erring ones said that there are diverse and various principles.

But by this which is said: Sitting upon a high and elevated throne, a double superior creature is noted. For in the word a double elevation of the throne is noted, when it is said high and elevated. Therefore, one throne which is high, is the angelic nature, in which as on a throne the Lord sits: as the Psalm Lxxix, 2 says: Who sits upon the Cherubim. Whence also it is said in this vision, because the Seraphim stood above it. And again, Your throne, O God, is forever and ever. Concerning this high throne is the first part of the Book, after the proemial part in which the Creator of all creatures is determined, who is called in the beginning of this word, as we said. Another throne elevated, as if outside the matter and impressions of corruptible and generable things which are under the sphere of the moon, elevated. For that does not have height as the first, but properly elevation: because it, which from the common matter of all bodies was made by the Creator, thus in its form is perfected, that neither in place, nor in motion, nor in impression, it agrees with the lower. And therefore it is said, Isa. LXvi, 1: Heaven is my throne, but the earth is the footstool of my feet. This is also what the Philosopher says in the first book of On the Heavens and the World, that all the ancients agree in this, that heaven was the seat and habitation of God.

But by the following word: The house was full of His majesty, another part of the visible creature is taken, which is from the matter of generable and corruptible things: because the house is this world, which is entirely filled with creatures indicating the majesty of God, by this that all proclaim: He made us, and not we ourselves. And concerning this part both of the

superior and inferior creature is treated in the second part of this treatise: so that the proemial part contains one distinction. But the first part of the executive part, which is about the high throne, which is the angelic nature, continues from the second distinction which begins there, About the angelic up to the twelfth which begins there, thus nature, etc. These about the angelic. In the second, however, which begins there, it is determined about the condition of nature, etc. the superior and inferior corporeal nature: which as to the superior is signified by the high throne, as to the inferior by the majesty filling the house, that is, the world, and lasts up to the sixteenth distinction which begins there, These things having been discussed, etc.

In the second part of this word the third part of the treatise is noted. For by this which it says: Those things which were under Him, etc., the special subjection of man to God and the inferior state is noted. For as Augustine says: God created the angel near Himself, but the matter of corruptible things near nothing, which also the material world follows from it: and He placed man in the middle between Himself and the world: so that it might serve Him, and all this might yield to the good of man.

By this which it says: Those things which were under Him, it notes the inferior state of man, and the order to obey. But by the consignification of time in the word: Were, the imperfection of obedience is noted, by which he fell: because that word consignifies the imperfect past, whose act is not completed to the present, as of the perfect past. But by the temple is noted the corporeal and spiritual paradise, in which as in a temple for the conversation of holiness and experience man was placed. For it is called a temple from templor, aris, which is a word we do not have in use, except in its compounds, as contemplor. And this is what is said in Genesis: He placed man in the paradise of pleasure, to work, and. And Augustine explains it about the work of experience, by which in creatures he might keep that which the Creator uses.

But by this which is said: They filled, the propagation of generation is noted, which in blessing the first parents received, when it was said to them: Increase and multiply. And concerning these things is treated from the sixteenth distinction to the end of this Book.

And by this the material, and division, and mode of proceeding is clear.

OF THE SECOND BOOK OF SENTENCES OF PETER LOMBARD, ON THE CREATION AND FORMATION OF CORPORAL AND SPIRITUAL THINGS, AND MANY OTHER THINGS PERTAINING TO IT.

DISTINCTIO I

Articulus 8 — Whether The Number Of Men To Be Saved Is According To The Number Of The Fallen Angels, Namely Whether The Number Of Men To Be Saved Makes The Tenth Order

Whether the number of humans to be saved corresponds to the number of falling Angels? namely, Whether the number of humans to be saved makes a tenth order?

§ 13. Then it is inquired concerning this which he says last, there, G, It is also to be noted, that the tenth order is read to be concerning humans, etc.

§ 14. For from this it seems that the number of humans to be assumed corresponds to the num-
ber of falling Angels: and this is what certain authorities seem to say. On that Psalm 44:17, You shall make them princes, the Gloss says: "He chose the poor to exalt to the orders of heaven, which are made from humans and Angels." [130]

§ 15. Also, on that, Every place that your foot shall tread, etc., the Gloss says: "If I shall have been able to conquer the devil, if I shall have merited that the Lord crush him under my feet, consequently I will have his place in the heavens." [131]

§ 16. Also, in the same place, "He shall not have his place, who does not tame all the motions of anger."

§ 17. Also, to this are those things which the Mas-

ter says in the Text from Gregory and Augustine.

§ 1. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Angels excel humans in natural [endowments]: therefore it seems that [they do] also in grace: therefore humans cannot arrive at the state of Angels: therefore it is necessary that they make a tenth order.

§ 2. 2. Also, let it be that the Angel had not fallen (as Anselm says), human beings were foreseen for glory: therefore they would be saved: therefore then, as it seems, they would not have entered into the place of the falling Angels: therefore they would make a tenth order.

§ 3. 3. Also, humans will have bodies: therefore they will be less noble in this respect than a wholly spiritual substance: therefore the same place and order of beatitude is not fitting for them: therefore it is necessary to constitute a tenth order.

§ 4. 4. Also, this seems to follow from the Gospel of Luke 15:8 et seq., where the human is signified by the tenth drachma, which would not be unless they made a tenth order.

§ 5. 5. Also, no wise person coordinates those things which are not of the same order according to nature: but a human and an Angel are not of the same nature: therefore neither are they of the same order according to nature: therefore they are not to be coordinated in glory, as it seems.

§ 6. 6. Furthermore, the Blessed Virgin at least seems to make a special order: because she is exalted above all the choirs of Angels to the heavenly kingdoms, according to Jerome.

§ 7. SOLUTION. As for one part of this question, namely how many are taken up, there is no one who can answer, except Him alone to whom the number of the elect to be placed in supernal felicity is known: but nevertheless the Master touches upon two opinions in the Text. But the third is of those who say that as many virgins will be taken up as there were falling and standing Angels, and of others as many as there are all others: and what is true concerning this, no one can prove.

§ 8. To the other part of the question, namely whether a human makes a tenth order? It must be said that it is tenth in number, and thus makes a tenth, as the Master says: and [whether] it is tenth in degree, and thus it will never be a tenth.

§ 9. TO THOSE THINGS which are objected to the contrary, it must be said that although Angels excel in natural [gifts], they nevertheless do not [necessarily excel] in grace: because grace is given according to the quantity of merit and preparation, not according to natural [gifts] alone.

§ 10. To the next it must be said that [a human] would not make a tenth in degree: because the fact that he supplies the place of the falling ones, this is not the cause of the creation of the human: but this happens by accident, namely because he fell. Nevertheless he would have been saved, and exalted in glory according to his own degree, and not into the ninth degree, if he had not fallen.

§ 11. To the next it must be said that it is called the tenth drachma with respect to number, and not with respect to making a tenth degree.

§ 12. To the next it must be said that some have said (I know not why, since no reason persuades this) that humans will be in the aqueous heaven, and Angels in the empyrean: but this is nothing: because our bodies will then be ennobled beyond the nobility of the empyrean: and therefore there is no objection concerning the body: and through this the response to the third is also evident.

§ 13. To the last it must be said that the Blessed Virgin has a special degree: but she does not make an order: because an order sounds of a multitude in one common degree: but to her this is special on account of the dignity of the Son.

Divisio Textus

It follows, God said: Let the waters under the heaven be gathered together into one place, etc. Here it is treated concerning the final distinction about which the Master determines three things, namely, how the distinction was made, and where the waters were gathered, and why the seas are called in the plural.

Concerning the first, however, three things can be asked: of which the first is about the sufficiency of the works of distinction. The second, concerning the plants, whether they

130. Ps. 44:17 (Vulgate).

pertain to distinction or to adornment? The third, concerning harmful plants from moisture and form, such as thorns and poisonous ones, whether they were made then or not?

Divisio Textus

The proemial part is divided into two parts according to the two works of the wise man, namely, not to lie about what he knows, and to be able to manifest the unknowing: but first the Master excludes errors concerning the principle of the universe, and secondly shows the exit of all creatures in their kinds from one principle, there, C, around the middle: Therefore let us believe in the things, etc.

The first of these is subdivided into two: in the first of which the Master specifically excludes the error of Plato: but in the second the error which they say is of Aristotle, there, B, towards the end: Aristotle, etc.

Likewise, the prior has three parts: in the first of which he shows how by the word of Moses the error is excluded in general: and the errors of others. But in the second he shows what it is to create, and what creation is: and distinguishes it from making and operating, there, AS § 2: And to create properly, etc. But in the third he returns to the proposition, showing what is understood when God is said to make something, from, B, Nevertheless it must be known, etc.

Here questions arise: and first concerning the triple exposition of that which the Master sets forth as the foundation of his whole intention, namely, in the beginning God created heaven and earth.

Articulus 1 — In How Many Ways That Authority, In The Beginning God Created Heaven And Earth, Is Expounded

In how many ways is that authority expounded: In the beginning God created heaven and earth?

In how many ways is that authority expounded:

In the beginning God created heaven and earth?

There is indeed one exposition, that is, in the Son who is the beginning, God created heaven and earth, that is, the higher and lower, that is, the visible and invisible.

Another is, In the beginning of time God created heaven and earth, that is, the angelic and corporeal nature.

However, concerning the first thus: 1. Beginning sounds power: therefore it is more appropriate to the Father than to the Son.

1. Furthermore, if appropriation is made, it is either made by reason of the act, or by reason of the name of the beginning, or by reason of the preposition: because there are no more there. However, it is clear that not by reason of the act: because the act of

131. Deut. 11:24.

creating is common to the three persons: therefore. Likewise, not by reason of the name: because the beginning said essentially, as it is taken here, is also common to the three. Likewise, it is either the beginning in the reason of the first, or in the reason of the proximate. If in the reason of the first, then it is more fitting to the Father than to the Son: because the Father is the beginning not from a beginning, but the Son is the beginning from a beginning. If by reason of the proximate, On the contrary: Thus it seems to fit the Holy Spirit: because goodness, as it is held below, is the cause inclining to act according to the act. Likewise, not by reason of the preposition: because that names containment, and this fits the Holy Spirit, as it is held in the Gloss on the words of the Apostle to the Romans 11, 36, on that: From him, and through him, and in him. That in him, it says because of the Holy Spirit: therefore by reason of that it is not appropriated to the Son.

2. If you would say, that the Father works through the Son: and this is signified, when it is said in the beginning to create, that is, in the Son, or through the Son. On the contrary: According to this, this is true, the Father creates through the Son: but the Word creates, according to which it is active, and in the agent being is signified, it is clear that it signifies essence: therefore creation is a divine action of essence. Hence it proceeds thus: Creation is essence: therefore to create is to be: just as essence and being differ: so creation and creating differ. Hence further: To create is to be: the Father creates through the Son: therefore the Father is through the Son: which is false: therefore this was not to be conceded, the Father works through the Son, or creates through the Son.

3. Again, Why did he not say: The Father creates through the Son, if he intends this: since he would have said this more easily than that?

4. Likewise, If through names a middle cause (as almost all say) which fits the Son, why did he not say: Through the beginning God created heaven and earth, just as he said: In the beginning God created heaven and earth?

It is also objected against the second exposition which is, In the beginning of time he created, etc.

For it seems this is false > because 1. Time (as Boethius says) is the measure of the motion of movables: but there was no motion in the beginning, because every motion (as the Philosopher says) is from subject to subject, nor can anything be moved that is not in act, because motion follows form, and not before it (as the Philosopher says): therefore neither was time from the beginning: therefore not all things were made and created in the beginning of time.

1. Likewise, the mobile is naturally before motion: and since time is a passion of motion, this also is naturally before time: therefore the mobile which is matter and heaven was not made in the beginning of time, but rather time was made after the mobile itself.

However, it could be inquired here, In what did time begin? but about this according to my ability it was said in the first book of Sentences.

It is also objected against the third exposition which is, that before all things God created heaven, that is, the angelic nature: and earth, that is, the matter of the four elements. And I will object few things: because according to those this question will have place.

However, it is objected: 1. As the Philosopher says, the first of created things is being, and there is no other creature before it: therefore the angelic nature and prime matter are not first, as it seems.

1. Likewise, Ecclesiasticus 16, 1: He who lives forever created all things together: therefore not first Angels, and prime matter of the elements.

Solution. It must be said, that all these expositions are fitting, and they establish this proposition in firm truth; so that by it every error can be excluded. For the first which says the cause, excludes every error positing multiple principles. However, the second which posits the beginning of time and temporals, excludes the eternity of the world, and matter, and exemplars, and atoms, and void, about which it will be said below. However, the third which posits Angels created with bodies, excludes the subtle error of the Philosophers, which few consider, namely, the eternity of intelligences, and the extension of the influence of intelligences to the creation of lower things: and this will be declared.

Therefore, it must be said to the first, that appropriation is made from the order of words: because there God is said, whose is the authority of the beginning; and it is subsequently inferred, that the Spirit of God was carried over the waters: therefore it is consequent that by the beginning the Son is understood, so that the whole Trinity is indicated to us in its works (as Augustine says).

It can also be said, that the beginning sounds a double cause, namely efficient, and in this respect it would more fit the Father, and it sounds exemplary in which the sensible world is, and in this respect it more fits the Son, who is the wisdom and art of the Father. And by this the solution to the first is clear.

To the other it must be said, that appropriation is made by reason of the order of words: which although not all are expressed here, yet they are placed in Genesis: however, the act according to which it says the exit of the idea from the idea in the agent through the intellect also in some reason fits the Son, in which it does not fit others.

To this, however, which is objected concerning the Holy Spirit, it must be said that both fit the Son by the mode of containment pre-receiving only in the ideal form, namely, by the mode in which the end contains in the perfection of goodness.

To the other it must be said, that when it is said, God creates, creation is signified to be in God in act: but it is not in reality except according to reason only, as it was said in the first book of Sentences, and it signifies not only the divine essence, but moreover the relation to those by which it is distinguished, and it connotes the effect in the creature: and for the sake of these it is not true, that creation is only essence, and nothing more: and therefore to create is not to be. Whence that sophism does not proceed.

To another it must be said, that it could not be conveniently said, The Father creates through the Son: because the Son signifies only the relation by which he is referred to the Father, and does not signify as the principle from which being created flows: but this the name of the principle imports.

To the other it must be said, that through names some containment, and thus the Son would not be signified except as power: but in names a double relation of the principle, namely, as from which and as in which containing, in this way in which the artifact is contained in the art: and therefore it is better said in the beginning, than through the beginning.

To what is objected against the second, It must be said that time is not taken here as the measure of motion, but broadly as it says the measure of movables and mutables in being proceeding from nothing. And the modes by which time is taken according to my opinion by the Saints, I placed in the first book of Sentences.

To the other it must be said, that the mobile is naturally before motion, which is its property: but according to nature it is not before its mutation to being: and to that mutation we say time measuring is adjacent.

To what is objected concerning the third, It must be said that the objection is solved: because first is said in two ways, namely, according to the reason of form and simplicity, and according to the order of substance in being. According to the reason of form and simplicity nothing is before being: because all things are in some way related by addition to being, even one, and true, and good, as it is shown in the second book of Sentences. But according to the order of substance in nature and being, the opinion of all Philosophers is, that the first intelligence is the first caused by the Creator of the universe. But what they call intelligences, we call Angels: and then that exposition stands, because creation rather regards being, than the order of simplicity. However, in abstraction it is made through the intellect.

If, however, it is objected, that then it is not a fitting exposition according to this with respect to the other part, namely, concerning the earth: It must be said, that indeed: because even according to the Philosophers matter is posited first before anything is made from it.

To the other it must be said, that he understands all things together in created matter, and not in distinct forms: however, about this it will be inquired below in the works of the six days, when the opinion of Augustine will be compared with the opinions of other Saints.

Articulus 2 — Whether The Error Of The Manichaean Who Posited Many Principles Is Well Refuted By The Master In The Text

Is the error of the Manichaean, who posited multiple principles, well refuted by the Master in the Text?

Then it is inquired concerning what is said there, A, Moses... refuting the error of certain ones who opined that there were multiple principles without a principle.

This error, however, is of Plato, which the Master places in the Text, and because in some way he turns all things back to one principle, it seems disputable against the Manichaean, who posited multiple principles according to the same genus of causality, namely, according to the reason of the efficient cause, which error he proved thus:

1. Good and evil are opposed: therefore more good is more opposed to more evil, and simply good is simply opposed to evil: because if more follows upon more, and simply follows upon simply: but simply evil is the principle of evil: therefore there is a principle evil and of evil.
2. Likewise, the Philosopher says in the second of the first Philosophy, that there is a standstill in causes, and they do not proceed to infinity: just as everything hot is reduced to what is per se hot, and so with others: therefore it is necessary, since some cause of evil is found, because the will (as the Saints commonly concede) is reduced to a cause of evil, which is simply evil: therefore there is something per se evil, which is the principle of evil.
3. Likewise, just as accidental being is reduced to per se being, and to everything that is accidental something per se corresponds: so being said by participation is reduced to something that is said by essence, and what is said by essence corresponds to it. However, multiple evil is said participatively; as an evil man, and an evil soul, and an evil act, and an evil habit: therefore something is per se evil that corresponds to it, as it seems, this is, the principle of all evil: just as good said by essence is the principle of all good said by participation.
4. Likewise, nothing that is the same in the same way is the principle of contraries: but good and evil are contraries: therefore they do not flow from the same principle.
5. Likewise, no good makes its work worse: but by evil the work of good becomes worse: therefore evil is not from good: therefore a principle of evil will be given to it, as it seems.
6. The same objection is made concerning spiritual and corporeal, corruptible and incorruptible things, which do not seem to be from one principle, in no way receiving variation: therefore it seems that evil is the principle of corporeal things, and good of spiritual and incorruptible things. For the Philosopher says at the end of the first Physics:

The other part of the contradiction is multiple, therefore it seems that they are not imagined to be from one principle, namely, matter, with some intellect pretending to it.

1. Likewise, John 8:44: He was a murderer from the beginning, and did not stand in the truth, because there is no truth in him: when he speaks a lie, he speaks of his own, because he is a liar, and the father of it.
2. Likewise, some Philosophers could not reduce moving principles to one: but they posited mixture to be matter, and strife and friendship as moving.

3. Likewise, Matthew 12:33: Either make the tree good, and its fruit good: or make the tree evil, and its fruit evil. And there Rabanus says, that evil always proceeds from an evil root: but the root denotes the principle of evil: therefore it is necessary to posit a principle of evil.

And it is not difficult to bring forth many similar reasons.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Evil sounds like the privation of good: therefore evil universally is the privation of good universally: but the good that all desire is being, as a certain Philosopher says: therefore evil universally is deprived of all being: therefore it is not: and what is not, is the principle of nothing: therefore evil is not a principle.

1. Likewise, to restrain evil is of the genus of good power: but good power is something good: therefore it does not lack universal good: therefore it has the power of restraining and universally destroying evil: therefore it will destroy it: because it is good itself to destroy and restrain.
2. Likewise, if the soul is from a good principle and the body from an evil one, it ought to seek release from the body: now, however, it most firmly seeks communication: therefore it is from the same principle, as it seems.
3. Likewise, this seems marvelous, that a good principle, as if obeying evil, as soon as the evil organic body is, makes the soul itself to be infused: but it is absurd that good and evil agree in acting: therefore there is no evil principle.

Solution. It must be said that the heresy of the Manichaean never had a defender in science: because it never had a rational position, which could even seem probable to one slightly literate.

Hence it must be said to the first, that this is worth nothing, because good substantially per se is substantially good, and that does not have an opposite.

Moreover, evil does not receive intensity to any term, since it is privation: but rather by recession from good: and therefore although there is something worse than evil, there is not, however, a supreme evil than which nothing could be worse: because the recession from good is potentially infinite.

To the other it must be said, that evil does not have a cause, but is a defect incidentally. Hence that reasoning is founded upon a falsehood.

To the other it must be said, that evil is said nothing participatively, but rather privatively: for it is evil because it does not participate in good, which it is naturally apt to participate in.

To the other it must be said, that this is true of the first agent and by necessity of nature, but not of the agent by will and intellect, for this can make evil and good.

To the other it must be said, that God is not the author of fault, whence his work is worse because that is first: and this is sufficiently proven in the first book of the Sentences.

To the other it must be said, that this is false: because spiritual and corporeal things can be from the same agent by will and choice: but I concede well, that privation is not from him: because privation is nothing.

If, however, it is objected, because privation seems to be something: because the Philosopher posits it as a principle. It must be said, that it is not any essence in itself, which is privation, but it leaves the subject with an order to form: and therefore privation is the cause of potency; because nothing is in potency except through privation of that to which it is in potency.

To the other it must be said, that the philosophers did not posit strife and friendship as moving from outside, but within in the mixture of contraries: for friendship and love are in the act of the mixed mean, but strife in the extreme mixable opposites.

To the other it must be said, that the evil tree does not here name a principle, but the will under evil: and this in that which is of this kind is not a cause, except of an evil act. In the same way, the good tree names the will under grace. And then neither is posited as the first principle. And this is the intention of Rabanus.

Articulus 3 — Whether The Error Of Plato, Who Posited Three Principles, Is Well Refuted By The Master, And Whether Matter Is Eternal

Is the error of Plato, who posited three principles, well refuted by the Master? And, is matter eternal?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says:

For Plato thought there to be three principles, etc.

Here indeed arises the question concerning the error of Plato. For it seems that Plato did not suitably posit matter as eternal, nor the exemplar. And because the error of Plato concerning matter supposes two things, namely, that it is eternal, and that it is one for all: initially we will inquire three things, namely, Whether matter is eternal? And secondly, Whether it is one for all? And thirdly, concerning the exemplars which Plato posited.

TO THE FIRST, it is proceeded thus: 1. Every becoming, since it is an accident, must be founded in some subject: creation is a becoming: therefore, to be created must be founded in some subject. But every notion of a subject that is subjected to motion or change is the notion of matter: therefore, matter is presupposed before creation, and before every becoming. That matter is subjected in becoming and changing is taken from the Philosopher in the first book of Generation and Corruption, who says that hyle is primarily and per se the subject of generation and corruption: if therefore matter is always posited before creation, it is never created.

1. Likewise, every operation of one making something is terminated at this something, and never at matter and form by themselves alone: creation is the act of making something: therefore, it is never terminated at matter, but at this something which is

composite. The first is proven in the seventh book of the first Philosophy by many reasons: the second, however, is supposed from the Letter in the following chapter. Hence thus: Creation is upon this something first: but every this something is composite, and presupposes its components according to nature: therefore, matter is before any created thing, and before creation.

2. Likewise, the work of the first agent is most perfect: but matter is most imperfect: therefore, it is necessary that it is not the work of the first agent, but is presupposed before: therefore, matter is from eternity.

3. Likewise, whatever is before every becoming and after every corruption, itself neither becomes nor is corrupted: matter is such: therefore, it is neither made nor corrupted. The proposition concerning matter, because the first is evident by itself: Every becoming is from matter, and every corruption is into matter: but from which there is becoming is before becoming, and into which there is corruption is after corruption: therefore, matter is before every becoming, and after every corruption: therefore, it neither begins nor ceases. And upon this reasoning the Philosophers relied.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 4. If it is from eternity: either it was under form, or by itself alone. If in the first way: Every composite is preceded by its components: matter under form is composite: therefore, its components precede it: therefore, there is something before that which is eternal, which is false. If however...

without form it was. On the contrary: Thus it is only in potentiality, and what is only in potentiality is not: therefore, prime matter was not from eternity.

1. Likewise, Nature in operating is more perfect than art, because art gives form without transmutation of matter, and nature with transmutation: therefore, since the first in the potentiality of operating surpasses both, it is necessary that it draws out the whole matter from nothing.

2. Likewise, an agent in lower things acts through form, and has something of potentiality mixed in, because it is composite, and therefore cannot act except by drawing out form: but God is an agent who is wholly form, having nothing of potentiality: therefore He will act not only form, but also matter.

Solution. It must be said that matter is not eternal, although many Philosophers have posited this, and we will pursue their reasoning more in their opinions below. Therefore, it must be said to the first, that creation does not denote an act or passion which is intermediate between God acting and that which is drawn out from non-being: but rather a relation consequent to that which now first is from nothing, and before was not: and then the objection ceases plainly. And the reason for this is: because it is of a perfect agent to act not by an intermediate action, in which a thing is first in becoming than in being. However, there are others who say otherwise, namely, that to be created is to become, and that becoming is an accident: and yet it is not something in a subject, but is in something as in a cause: but I do not understand this,

that an accident has being, and is not in a subject, unless this is by divine miracle. Others say, that to be created is to become, and is simultaneous with being, and is co-created with the created thing: whether this is true will be inquired below. A clearer way is, that truly creating is nothing other than to make a thing be after it was not without an intermediate change.

To the other it must be said, that this is true of a composite agent, in which there is something of potentiality that does not act, as is nature and the artificer: because in them there is no principle of acting except form, and therefore they do not act except by producing form upon matter, and therefore their action necessarily always terminates at the being of the composite. But it is not so with the Creator in whom there is nothing in potentiality, and therefore He acts the whole according to His will. This response will oblige us below in the questions concerning the errors of Aristotle to a more difficult question: because from it seems to follow the eternity of the whole world, as will be clear below.

To the other it must be said, that this is of little value, since the most perfect agent does not act by necessity of nature, but by will and wisdom: but the perfection of wisdom consists in order according to the best mode of the universe: and this is to make an incomplete being, which is all form in potentiality, and none in actuality: because otherwise it could not be referred to the whole universe.

To the other it must be said, that matter is not before all becoming, if becoming is said to be the action of creating: because with that nothing is except to make by His command a thing now be after it was not of it either in potentiality or in actuality, that becoming does not presuppose any potentiality to itself: because it is not properly becoming, since all becoming is between two terms of which one is privation and the other form, and above one numerically subject under privation and form, whether according to the being of privation and form, as has been held. But from that reasoning nothing more can be concluded, except that prime matter does not enter into being through generation, nor does it depart from being through corruption, and this indeed is most true, and in this sense matter is proven to be ungenerated by the Philosopher, and it is conceded to be true by all understanding the truth, and in no way does it oppose the inception of matter through creation.

Articulus 4 — Whether It Is True What Plato Supposed, That There Is One Matter Of All Things

Whether it is true what Plato supposed,
that the matter of all things is one?

Whether it is true what Plato supposed,
that the matter of all things is one?

Then it is secondly inquired about this which Plato supposes, that the matter of all things is one.

For it is proven that he supposes this from the following: otherwise he would have to give

a fourth principle, which would receive certain exemplars from the craftsman, with the same necessity with which he posits matter with respect to forms. And it seems that he posits well:

1. For nothing is made by the craftsman that is not this something perfect in nature (and we speak of those things which are in nature by themselves): but it is necessary that this something has something by which it is, and something by which it is this something: therefore it is necessary for him to posit matter by which it is this something, just as form is posited for it by which it is.

2. Likewise, every form is common of itself, and this is proven from the fact that those things which are of one species, which is the ultimate substantial form, do not differ except by matter and the dispositions of matter: therefore there is no thing which has from that by which it is, that it is this something: therefore it is necessary that it has from matter. Since therefore all things which truly are in nature, are this something, all things which truly are communicate in matter.

3. Likewise, it is impossible that the same thing is the principle of communicability and incommunicability. But when I say heaven, I say form: and when I say this heaven, I say matter under this form: and so it is in Angels, and in all other things: therefore in all things incommunicability and singularity is on the part of matter, and communicability and community on the part of form. Since therefore it is to be accepted that the universal and particular are in everything that truly is in nature, it seems that for all things which truly are in nature, one matter is posited.

4. Likewise, it is evident that a proper passion is not found outside its proper subject: to subsist and to sustain is a proper passion of matter: therefore outside of matter it is not found, and by the grace of matter it is fitting for anything: but this is fitting for Angels, and the soul, and heaven, the element, and

the elemented: therefore in all things there is one matter,
as it seems. The first is evident by itself. The second
is proven from this that each thing is fitting for that
in which it is first found: but to subsist and to sustain is not fitting
for form first, because it inheres and
is sustained: nor even for the efficient cause, and this is evident by
itself: nor even for the end, because it also inheres and
is sustained: therefore since it is of something to be,
it remains that it is fitting for matter, and
thus the proposition is held.

If you say that these reasons conclude in no
way: because even when I say,
this whiteness, I say incommunicable: and
when I say, whiteness, I say communicable:
and again I say, that the genus is determined in the species
and sustains the difference as
potency to act: and yet I do not say that
in any of these there is matter. That is nothing:
because it is objected concerning those things which truly are:
this whiteness in nature will not be this
whiteness, unless because it is in this subject as in
matter. And this is evident: because if it is abstracted,
it will be conjoinable to many, and thus
common. Similarly, the instance concerning the genus
is not to the purpose: because we
speak according to being in nature: the species
however is not this something, but rather
a certain quality: yet because of that which
is said to sustain the difference as potency
to act, the genus is in the place of matter, as the
Philosophers say, although no genus is truly
matter.

1. Likewise, the Commentator on the eleventh book of the first
Philosophy says, that this is matter
which is in being beyond every form.
From there it proceeds thus: Every form
distinguishes from something: therefore everything distinct
is formed. But if the universal distinguishing
is abstracted from beings, there will remain

only the common which is
matter. But it is evident that the distinction of all
beings can be abstracted: therefore in
all beings remains one and truly
what is matter: therefore the matter of all things is
one.

1. Likewise, the Philosopher says, that the same
   in number and the same in matter, are the same and
   do not differ: but everything that is
   in nature, is this something and one
   in number: therefore it has matter: but every
   secondary matter is reduced to
   primary matter as (the Philosopher says)
   all liquefiable things into quicksilver,
   and quicksilver into water: therefore
   the primary matter of all things is one, as it seems.

ON THE CONTRARY:
1. Matter is known and determined by
potency and motion or changes,
For the Philosopher says before the end of the first
Physics: But natural substance
is not knowable through analogy. Just as to
a statue bronze, or to a bed wood, or
to other things having form, unformed matter
relates before it receives
form: so it relates to substance,
and this something which is: analogy is not one in
all: one in all.

If you say that this is the opinion
of Aristotle, and he does not speak of primary matter,
but rather of secondary which is not one in
all. On the contrary: Primary matter is
the primary potency to being in act in nature,
because we speak only of that: but no
potency is knowable except through act and
motion: for the Philosopher says, that
motion indicates potency, and its reason is:
because potency is only of that which is not
had, and this is not acquired except through
motion: therefore of that which there is not one
motion or of one reason in kind to act,

of that with another there will not be one matter.
But it is evident, that there is not one motion
of spiritual and corporeal things, and
corporeal and incorporeal things: therefore there is not
one matter of them.

1. Likewise, Boethius says expressly in
   the end of the book on the Two Natures in one
   person of Christ: For every nature
   in
   corporeal substance relies on no foundation of matter:
   but there is no
   body to which matter is not subject.
2. Likewise, in the same place, Because another thing relies on the foundation of matter as a body, another
   does not need a subject of matter at all as
   incorporeal: it can in no way happen that
   a body is transformed into an incorporeal species.
3. Likewise, in the same place, There is no
   matter in incorporeal things. Of this, however, elsewhere
   more things have been disputed: and therefore these here suffice.

Solution. It was never the opinion
of the great Philosophers, that the matter of all things
is one. And if it is objected concerning
Plato in the book of the Fountain of Life, I respond that
with me those books have no authority
at all: because they do not proceed from
the proper discipline or natural science. For he who in nature neglects the reasons of motion and
sense, since all nature is of
sensible and mobile things, prepares himself to
deceive himself and others. Hence I say not only
that there is this something, which is from matter and
form, but that which is from potency and act.
Because with me every cause of potency is
privation, and that which does not underlie privation
in any way, there is no potency: and
as much as it underlies privation, so much it
has of potency and no more: and therefore the Philosopher says
that of generable and
incorruptible things there is not one matter, nor one genus:

although of both there is
matter and genus, but not of one reason. Because
potency to place or where, and potency to
form is not of one reason: just as neither
motion to where, and motion to form.
Boethius confirms this statement in the book on
the Two Natures in one person of Christ.
But of spiritual things which are this
something, there is no matter in my judgment: but
in them there is that which is, and by which it is: of which
neither is ever separated from the other,
so that that which is says this something which truly
is in nature, by which it is says the principle
of understanding and subsisting itself in such
being: and of this there is no potency to motion or change, except equivocally with
others which are moved and changed: because
it is known among the wise, that in that
way through knowledge and ignorance there are not
properly motions and changes.

According to this, therefore, I say to the first,
that I well concede, that this something
says substance: but I do not call this
matter, nor is it matter.

By the same I respond to the following: because
it is not this matter which makes this
something only, but of that which is that which
is in spiritual things.

By that the solution to the following is evident.

To the other it must be said, that to subsist and
to sustain are not said univocally of
all sustaining and subsisting things, and this
alone is lacking to that reason, that if
it had it, it would be concluded necessarily that
the matter of all things is one. And in this also
the Author of the Fountain of Life fails: for not
in one reason does that subsist which is in
being by itself, and in no way in potency to
motion, with that which is always in being,
but in potency to where: and with that which
is in potency to being, and where. And this
is because in the natures of things it is not

taken according to logical intentions, but
rather according to the being of the thing itself, as he wills.
For this (in my judgment) was the cause of
controversy between Plato and
Aristotle, that he wished to follow the reasons of universals,
and from those sought the principles of things.
Aristotle, however, not so, but from
the natures of things sought the principles of things.

To the other it must be said, that if
the forms of things were separated by
the intellect, the same subsisting thing would not remain, but two, or
three. Hence it must be noted, that it is one thing
to resolve the particular into the universal, and another
to resolve a thing into its principles of
being: and then the principles will not be the same
which are always in being and never in
potency to being, and those which are in potency
before being: and then it is not concluded, that
there is one matter.

To the last it must be said, that one
in number and matter are one, this cannot
be generally true, nor is it generally
said: because at least there is an instance
concerning God who is one in number, yet
is not one in this or that matter.
Hence I understand this of those things which
are individuated by matter. Hence another
Philosopher says, that in those things which are not
from matter and do not have matter,
number is only through cause and
caused. Yet I do not approve of that statement
in whole, as will be evident below: because
all Philosophers err generally in
the position of Angels. But we say, that nu-
mer in such things is from that which is
the principle of distinction and
incommunicability or singularity.

Articulus 5 — Whether Plato Well Posited The Exemplar To Be One Principle, And In What Plato Erred

Whether Plato rightly posited the exemplar as one principle, and in what did Plato err?

Thirdly, it is questioned concerning the exemplars which Plato posited.

For this does not seem absurd: 1. For above in the first book of the Sentences it was said that Plato posited ideas in the divine mind, as Augustine says in the book of Eighty-Three Questions: whoever denies these, denies the Son of God to exist: therefore it seems that this position is not inconvenient.

1. Likewise, Boethius in the preface of the first Arithmetic says thus: It is established, however, that the knowledge of numbers, the creator God of this human structure had the first exemplar of his reason, and to this joined he constituted whatever by fabricating reason, to find harmony by numbers of assigned order. This cannot be understood by mere mathematical number: therefore it is necessary that it be understood of the ideal number which preceded all ideated things.
2. Likewise, whatever form is potentially in prime matter, it is necessary that it preceded according to reason in the first mover, since in him is the archetypal world: therefore to posit the exemplar in this manner is not inconvenient.
3. Likewise, Boethius in the third book of the Consolation of Philosophy:

Whom external causes did not drive to fashion the work of flowing matter: but the inherent form of the highest good, free from envy. Since all things from the supreme leader's example, the most beautiful himself bearing the world in mind, and forming with a similar image: you command perfect parts to complete perfectly. It is therefore clear that exemplars are to be preferred to inferior things: therefore in this Plato did not err, as it seems.

If you say that he erred in this, that he did not posit exemplars in the divine mind, but outside God himself: this would be against Priscian, who in the smaller volume says that he posited ideas in the divine mind before they proceeded into bodies: therefore it seems that he erred in nothing.

But against this is that Plato posits ideas for two reasons, namely, for the principle of knowledge, and for the principle of generation, and to the first part his reasoning proceeded thus:

1. There is no knowledge except of incorporeal and universal things, which knowledge is in all things: therefore all things are in incorporeal and universal things.
2. Likewise, the sciences of things are not one: therefore the principle concerning them is not one - therefore it is necessary to posit a multitude of ideas according to genus in species. It is established, however, that to posit ideas in this way as having been from eternity is heresy: therefore Plato erred in positing exemplars or ideas.
3. On the other hand, he erred: because he reasoned thus, Nothing acts beyond its species: but to be a man and a donkey is beyond the species of the first qualities of agents and patients: therefore it is necessary to give those forms another agent of the same species with them: therefore the idea of a donkey makes a donkey, and the idea of a man makes a man, and so with others.

4. Likewise, nothing comes into act except through that which is in that act: everything that is generated comes into act according to form: therefore through something that is always in that act: but this is not found in matter: therefore it is necessary that it be posited outside matter. And thus again it seems to follow that it is necessary to posit one man outside matter in ideas, who generates others, and a donkey, and so with others. And therefore Aristotle imputes to him that he posited a third man, and a third donkey: because he posited one in the ideas, and another mathematical one conjoinable with material things, because mathematics are by being in matter: and therefore he said that the composition of all things is from incorporeal and corporeal, and this also seems to touch in the beginning of Arithmetic: and the third which is singularity. It is therefore clear that this is heresy: therefore Plato errs in the position of exemplars.

Furthermore, what compelled Plato to posit matter, and the craftsman and the exemplar, and not the end?

For the craftsman is reduced to the efficient cause, the exemplar to the form, and matter is posited by its proper name. It seems, indeed, that the efficient principle and prime matter can be reduced to the same. And that is the error of David of Dinant, and he objected thus:

1. Whatever things are, and in no way differ, they are the same: God and prime matter are, and in no way differ: therefore they are the same. The first is clear. The second is proved by the nature of simplicity: because in simple things there is no difference: and those which have no difference, in no way differ.
2. Likewise, Being abstracts from every distinct being: but the efficient and matter have distinct being: therefore, with the distinguishing abstracted, what remains is the same which is in both: therefore the same underlies the efficient and matter: therefore they are reduced to the same, as it seems.
3. Likewise, Abstraction is only of form: therefore that which remains after all forms is the same in all. It is established, however, that being through the intellect is before every determined being: therefore before the created and uncreated: therefore the same is in the created and in the uncreated: but this has been proved to be matter: therefore it seems that the craftsman and matter are reduced to the same, and this the most foolish one conceded, who never understood anything truly and well: and therefore he said that prime matter and God and will or mind were the same, and nothing was the principle of the universe except that, although it is the most indivisible and imperfect of all.
4. And he said this was signified in the temple of Pallas, in whose superstition it was written: Pallas is whatever was, and he said Pallas is whatever is, and whatever will be: whose veil no man ever could reveal to man. Prime matter, and its veil to be form, and many revealed this veil up to the forms of the Creator and the created, and the efficient and form: and no one revealed the veil, and by revealing proceeded further except himself, because he alone revealed in all. Although in this he also lied, because he received this error from others: for I found this error written in a very ancient book in a

certain monastery in Germany, and that book was inscribed to a certain Alexander the Greek.

But against that error it is objected thus:

1. It is impossible by the intellect that the same be the first maker and the first made: but every second form of matter is made: therefore it is necessary that it have a maker before it. If therefore to be Creator, or to be God, is the form of matter: it is necessary to posit another maker. The first is proved thus: If the first maker is made: but to be made before it is, is in potency: therefore the first maker before it is, is in potency.
2. Likewise, Nothing is a maker except what is actually acting: nothing actually acting except being in act: therefore the first maker is the first agent in act, and the first being in act and prior to what is in potency being: but in potency being is not actually being: therefore the first being in act is not actually being: therefore contradictories are verified of the same.
3. Likewise, If the first maker and the first made are the same: therefore the same makes itself: but what makes itself and suffices for itself to this, always makes itself: therefore the first maker always makes itself: therefore it is always in becoming: therefore it is never in being: therefore never in making: therefore if the first maker makes itself, it never makes itself. And because it is foolish to seek reasons against madness which no one ever said according to Philosophy, therefore these suffice.

Solution. It must be said that Plato undoubtedly errs in the manner of positing exemplars, and this in four ways: one of which is that he thought the knowledge of God, like that of others, was caused by them, and to be forms in God distinct from the intellect of God: which Aristotle disproves in the first book of Metaphysics. Secondly, because he thought that they were not only in God, but also with him generating beings according to nature in their own forms. And he posited them to be from eternity with God: because he did not see how proximate causes could bring forth any form which was not of their species. Thirdly, because he said not only to be so, but also that mathematical things are under those which are abstracted from natural things, and are the principle of knowledge in those who have knowledge of things: if this is true which he said, to learn is to remember. If indeed he posited learning to be receiving discipline, that was not held. Fourthly, because he posited that those forms remain in corporeal things, even when the particulars in which they are are destroyed: because the being of particulars is one thing, and the being of those forms is another. And these are gathered from various books of Aristotle who imputes these to him: and it also seems to be extracted from the Timaeus, as is clear to one inspecting the chapter on the gods of gods.

Let us therefore say to the first, and the four following, that to posit ideas in that way is true and holy: and the reason how they are posited is explained in the first book of the Sentences.

But to the arguments proving his error, it must be said to the first, that when it is said that knowledge is only of universals and incorporeals, this is understood according to reason, and

not according to being: but he took it according to being. For the reason of a corporeal thing is incorporeal which is taken through those things which are of the species, and not of matter.

To the other it must be said, that the sciences of things are not one, if things are taken in part: but nevertheless the sciences in the cause of all through that cause are one and the same, and thus the knowledge of God about all things is one and the same, as was disputed in the first book of the Sentences.

To the other it must be said, that this is false, Nothing acts beyond its species: but it is true what the Philosopher says, that every generation is from the convenient: because between the agent and the act there is a proportion of active and receptive or passive power: hence the agent in the seed of man or another is threefold: elemental, specific, and celestial: and to these virtues joined to the agent is the formative power of the seed. The elemental is as the heat of fire directing and dissolving, the moisture continuing and mixing, and the dry terminating and shaping, the cold however holding and coagulating. The specific however is: because the seed has in itself the power of the soul of man, and the seed of another has in itself the power consequent upon it from this that it is the seed of such a species or such. The celestial however is as the force of the sun, or the moon, and other planets, and stars: and from these the active is proportioned to this form, or that. The passive however is proportioned in receiving: because not anything is receptive of any form, but proportionate to itself by virtue and temperament of complexion, and composition of dissimilar parts if it is from dissimilars: and therefore exemplars posited outside matter are of no use, as the Philosopher says, for generation: because if they do not touch, they do not act: and no transmutation follows: therefore neither generation.

To this however which is asked, What compelled Plato to posit the craftsman, and matter? It must be said, that Plato saw well, as the last arguments prove, that matter and the efficient never coincide in the same according to the thing: and since he saw that the first efficient has nothing of potency, nor is it composite: he thought that although in itself it could not be impeded from act, yet it could be impeded from the defect of the recipient of its operations. Since therefore form is in some way in the efficient, he saw well that it could in some way give it from itself. But because nothing is in potency to itself, potency was not in it: and therefore it could not produce it from itself, as it seemed to him, and therefore he gave it to itself from eternity. And this reason compelled all Philosophers to posit matter as eternal. But the deception is in this, because they proceed as if God acts by necessity of nature: because then without doubt it would be impeded if it did not have into what to imprint its actions. But we posit that he acts by command, and thus brings it forth from nothing. And with this position made, nothing impossible follows which all Philosophers feared. But they saw well that the end follows according to the being of that of which it is the end: and therefore no one posited it as a principle.

To the other however which is objected concerning the error of David of Dinant, it must be said that it is most foolish and ridiculous: because nothing differs so much from anything, as God and prime matter: since both are simple in their own...

in a way, because they are not of one nature simply: and they differ from each other as all first things differ from one another, as we said in the first book of the Sentences.

To the other it must be said, that being which abstracts from every being, does not abstract from the first efficient cause: because nothing is simpler than that: but this is the being which he himself is, and others have being in proportion to him: and therefore that reasoning is null.

Likewise, created being which abstracts from every created being is not said univocally of every created being: therefore in this way by a double impediment that reasoning does not proceed, that something is common, as prior, to the first efficient cause and to prime matter.

And from this the solution to the following is clear: there is a double separation or abstraction, namely, of form from matter, and this belongs only to composites, and of intention from that of which it is the intention: and this belongs to all, and indicates no composition. For nothing is so simple, whose intention is not abstracted by the intellect when it is understood: yet this abstraction is not made from the created and the uncreated: because before the uncreated there is nothing at all: and therefore the being which is abstracted is not univocal, but said according to proportion of the uncreated and of others, as is often found said in the first book of the Sentences.

To the last it must be said, that this was not the intention of the Poets veiling Pallas: but this which Augustine said, that they saw God, but did not fully know him: as it is held in Acts 17:23, that the Apostle passing by saw an altar on which was written, "To the Unknown God": because he cannot be sufficiently known. And he, as Bernard says on the Canticles, is the being of all things, not material, but causal. But the veil signified ignorance of him, and distance from human knowledge. Or if it is said, that those idolaters erred, it is not inconvenient, since they erred in many things.

Articulus 6 — Whether The Definition Of Creation Which Says, To Create Is To Make Something From Nothing, Is Good

Whether the definition of creation, which is stated as,
To create is to make something from nothing, is
good?

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To create is to make something from nothing, is
good?

Then it is inquired concerning this which says,
A, §2: To create properly is to make something from nothing, etc.

And three things are inquired, namely, concerning this
definition of creation. And secondly, Whether
creation is an act communicable to another?
And thirdly, Whether it is miraculous or
natural to create?

To the first, thus it is proceeded:
1. To make is posited in the definition of that
which is to create: if therefore to make is
to act, and to create is to make, creation will be an action:
but action (as it is held in the book of the Six
principles) is according to which in that
which is subjected, we are said to act: therefore
something is subjected to creation in which it acts:
therefore creation supposes a subject which
is matter, which above is denied.

1. Likewise, Every making is in something as
   in a subject: creation is making: therefore it is
   in something as in a subject. But everything
   which is in a subject presupposes that subject according to nature:
   therefore again creation seems
   to presuppose a subject.
2. Likewise, Creation itself is either created,
   or uncreated: it is evident that it is not uncreated,
   because thus it would have been from eternity: therefore created.
   But everything created is created by some creation:
   therefore there is creation of creation. If this is granted, this necessarily
   will proceed to infinity: because concerning
   the creation of creation a similar question arises, and
   thus further infinitely.
3. Likewise, Creation is the creation of the created: either
   therefore it is understood as construction in the notion
   of the subject, when it is said creation of the created, or in

the notion of the term. If as the subject, Against:
Creature is that which is made through creation:
therefore creature signifies the made of creation.
But the made is the terminus of making: therefore
the created signifies the terminus, and not
the subject. If this is conceded, Against:
Every made precedes making: but that
making is created, and not Creator: therefore
something created precedes every created,
which is false.

1. Likewise, That making, since it is an accident,
   is in some subject: and thus again
   it returns that it is necessary to presuppose

matter in which it is, which is not created:
therefore it seems that it is more fitting to say
that creation is nothing.

Solution. It must be said that to create is
to make something from nothing, in the manner in which
to make is fitting to God. For the Master says
in the Text concerning God, that for Him to have willed
is to have made: because His will is sufficient for
all things. And therefore it seems to me to be said, that just as He does not operate
presupposing a subject for Himself, nor
presupposing an instrument: so there is no
intermediate action between God acting, and
between the creature made: but His making
is the complete will for this that the thing
may be which now is not, or was not before: and this acting signifies to create: and not
according to the thing does it signify more a relation
than an action, but according to the notion
it signifies this more as acting.

But if it is objected, that relation
follows its extremes, and thus creation is after
the creature, it must be said that this is true
of a certain relation: but of
the relation which is according to the action of God creating
it is not true. And through this the solution
to the first is clear.

To the other it must be said, that this making
is nothing other than the made being after
nothing, which was never in making. And
therefore in the very made beginning now first
to be, that is, which now is, and was not before,
there is making, as in a subject, and it is co-created
to it: and therefore it is not necessary to presuppose
a subject for it.

To the other it must be said, that creation itself
is co-created creation, and not by another
creation, but by itself. Nor does the objection proceed,
unless we were to grant that there is a making of which
the creature is the terminus: and this we do not concede,
as is clear from what was said before.

To the other it must be said, that the notion
of the terminus here and the notion of the subject is one, and therefore
this: because creation does not signify the motion of making
according to the thing, but according to the notion
of existing, namely, according to which
something is after nothing: and in that notion
the creature is as the terminus, according to which
it posits the making of God: and it is as an accident
to the created, and then it signifies the property of relation,
and then the creature is as
the subject. But nothing prohibits the same
to be constructed in diverse relations, according to
which it is diversely understood. And
through this also the solution to the following is clear.

Articulus 7 — Whether Creation Is Communicable To Another

Whether creation is communicable to another?

Secondly, it is asked, Whether creation is communicable to another?

And it seems that it is: because
1. It is greater to make a pious person from an impious one than to create heaven and earth: but making a pious person from an impious one is communicated to another: because it is done through the sacraments and prayers of the Saints: therefore, creation can also be communicated to another.

1. Likewise, the Master says in the Third Book of Sentences, and in the fourth treatise on the Power of Baptizing, that God could confer upon some thing the power to create something, but not itself: therefore, etc.
2. Likewise, some Philosophers posited that intelligences create souls, and one intelligence another: just as the first creates the second, and the second the third, and so on: therefore, it seems that it can be communicated.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
1. It is not the act of any agent that is in some way in potency to make anything except a form in a composite. Proof: because according to that which itself is in potency, it cannot act: but all things that are below God are in some way in potency: therefore, they make only a form in a composite: therefore, they do not create. And this is also evident in nature and art, which always make presupposed matter.

1. Likewise, between pure being and pure non-being, there is no proportion: therefore, an infinite distance: therefore, it is of infinite power to bring something forth from nothing. But nothing is of infinite power, except that which is of infinite essence: but nothing is of

infinite essence, except God: therefore, nothing can create even the smallest thing except God.

And this seems to be conceded.
To the first, therefore, it must be said that grace in the justification of the impious is not created except by God alone: but to the disposition of the subject, the merit of the Saints or the sacrament can operate: just as even the rational soul is not created except by God, but nature can operate to prepare the body for it.

To what the Master says, it must be said that he speaks of operation through will or prayers, that is, that something would be created at the will of the creature or prayers: yet not through the creature itself, as operating by its own power, or by a power joined to it: because that also would be created: since all the gifts of God, except the Holy Spirit, are created and of finite power.

To the other, it must be said that it was not, I think, the intention of those Philosophers to say that Angels were creators, but rather that they were illuminators of those things which were under them, and in some way movers: and therefore they intended to express the order of Angels to souls, and that they cause them in well-being, and not in being: thus also Alpharabius says that the soul is an instrument of intelligence, to which it communicates from the light of its splendor.

Articulus 8 — Whether To Create Is A Work Of Miracle

Whether to create is a work of miracle?

Thirdly, it is asked, Whether to create is a work of miracle?

It seems, however, that it is: because 4. All operations either fall into nature, or art, or miracle: it is evident, however, that to create does not fall under the other two: therefore it falls under miracle.

1. Likewise, Chrysostom says that the work of the divine will alone is a miracle: however, creation is the work of the divine will alone: therefore.
2. Likewise, Gregory at the beginning on Ezekiel distinguishes prophecy into that which is of the present, and of the past, and of the future: and his example which is of the past is that Moses knew the beginning of the world: and this is what this text says, that inspired by the Spirit of God, In the beginning God created heaven and earth: if, however, it is so: therefore it appears above our faculty of knowing: however, this is a miracle, as Augustine says, namely, that which is arduous and unusual, which appears above the hope and faculty of the one admiring: therefore it is miraculous, as it seems.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: The work of creation is for the restoration of the nature of the world: however, by a miracle nature is not restored: because a miracle rarely happens, but nature always happens in one course: therefore it seems that it is not a work of miracle.

Likewise, it is asked according to this, Why does he say: We grant that it is a work of will, not of nature: since to create is common to the three: and whatever is fitting to the three, is fitting to them by the grace of nature, as it has often been proven in the Beginning of the book?

Solution. It must be said that creation is properly a divine work. However, it seems miraculous to us, because we cannot do it, because it does not lie under the demonstration of reason: and therefore even the Philosophers did not know it, unless perhaps someone from the sayings of the Prophets: but by demonstration no one ever investigated it. Among some indeed certain probable reasons are found: but they do not prove sufficiently: and thus the first reasons proceed. For I well concede that it is miraculous to us, and appearing above our faculty.

To the other it must be said that it is for the restoration of nature, but not from the natural part: and therefore it is miraculous. For just as the illumination of the blind restores the nature of the eye in this one, and the restoration is miraculous, but sight is natural: so creation restoring the whole nature is miraculous, but the operation of the created is natural.

Moreover, it must be said that it is called a work of will according to which it is divided against the generation of the Son, and the procession of the Holy Spirit: because will is with respect to the willed which is in some way outside the nature of the one willing: but nature is with respect to those things which are within.

And this has been sufficiently discussed in the first book of Sentences, where it is asked.

Articulus 9 — Whether To Make And To Create Are The Same, Or Whether One Extends Further Than The Other

Whether to make and to create are the same, or one is in more than the other?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said there, A, § 2: "To make indeed not only," etc.

1. For according to this it seems that to make is in more than to create or to operate: therefore something is common to the work of the creature and the Creator, which seems inconvenient.
2. Furthermore, what is the difference between to make and to operate?

Solution. It must be said that if these are properly considered, then to make implies motion, as the Master says in the Text, and thus properly belongs to nature which acts with motion and with change, according to what is said in the book "On the Six Principles": because every motion will be established in action, and every action in motion; however, to operate will be only of the will or intellect in mechanical and voluntary things, but to create is of God. But if these are considered broadly, then in a certain way to make is common, and its species will be to create and to operate: however, sometimes to operate is also taken commonly.

In conclusion, it must be said that there is not something common univocally: because to make is not said univocally of the making of God and of the creature.

Articulus 10 — Whether Aristotle Determined Sufficiently That The World Is Eternal, As Is Imputed To Him

Has Aristotle sufficiently determined the world to be eternal as is imposed?

Has Aristotle sufficiently determined the world to be eternal as is imposed?

Then it is asked concerning what he says, there, B, § 2: Aristotle indeed posited two principles, etc.

Here, in order to know the opinion of Aristotle, it is necessary to inquire into two things. First, whether Aristotle has sufficiently determined the world to be eternal as is imposed upon him? Second, concerning the nature of the two principles, which he is said to have posited from eternity here by the Master.

Since we have treated this matter elsewhere, we will take a shorter path here, and we will present seven ways which Rabbi Moses collected in the second collation of the book "Guide of the Perplexed" 1, and we will see how much they can conclude.

The first way is from the nature of the motion of the circles, and it is at the beginning of the VII Physics, and it is collected in four arguments.

The first is that the authority of all the ancients agrees in this, that the motion of the heavens did not begin, except for one, namely Plato. And this argument of the ancients is founded upon two propositions. One is that the motion of the heavens is the principle and cause of all things that are moved and come to be after they were not.

The second, however, is that whatever is the first principle of all making and beginning of all things, that this neither was made nor began: because otherwise it would go to infinity.

And these propositions are easy to prove: but because they are conceded by almost all intelligent people, therefore let us proceed from them

thus: Whatever is the principle and cause of all making and beginning, it itself neither was made nor began: the motion of the first mover is the principle of all making and beginning: therefore it neither was made nor began.

Another argument along the same way is leading to the impossible. For let it be granted that it began: either therefore it began as Empedocles posited, or it began as Anaxagoras posited. Empedocles posits that the motion of the universe of substance begins many times, and ceases many times: because he said that the material principle is a mixture of all things, and the movers were two, namely strife and friendship: and with friendship moving, diverse mixtures and contraries come together into the act of one generated by chance and fortune: and therefore by this chance the heaven was made, and this the earth, and so of others. Whence is that which he said there, the heads of the Germans being without necks, which were later distinguished by strife and friendship. Strife, however, moves according to him, when contraries are resolved in the corruption of the generated: and he said this happens many times, even according to the whole universe: as it is said of him, that he posited this to happen in the great year which is called the Empedoclean year, and consists of thirty-six

thousand years, as they say (but this is not authentic but fictitious), because the motion of the fixed stars, which is the motion of the eighth sphere, according to Ptolemy is over the poles of the circle of the signs from the West to the East, in a hundred years, according to the division of the circle, in the three hundredth degree one, and it is completed in thirty-six thousand years according to the division of the circle into three hundred and sixty parts, which are called degrees. Anaxagoras, however, posited all things to be mixed, except the agent intellect, and that motion began only once by the agent intellect in the mixture making distinction, and making

the mobile and its first motion. Therefore both of them agree in this, that motion began from the defect of the mobile: because the mobile was not always, therefore its motion was not always, but began. But they differed in this: because one posited two movers not always in the same way, namely Empedocles, strife, and friendship. The other, namely Anaxagoras, posited one mover and in one way, but that it does not always move due to the defect of the mobile.

And against this Aristotle objects thus: If motion was not always: either this was because the mobile was not, and therefore there was not motion, as both of them said: or because even if the mobile was, nevertheless it was not moved, because the mover was not in one way disposed to it always: as Empedocles alone said. If in the first way: therefore the mobile had to be made first, which was not without a change of itself to being: therefore it was changed to being, or to the form of its species. But every change is caused by local motion: therefore local motion was moving to the being of the first mobile: therefore local motion was before the first local motion began, which is impossible: therefore it did not begin in this way. If however it began in the second way, then there was the mobile and the mover: but it did not move, because it was not disposed to motion: therefore it had to be disposed: but to be disposed is to be altered: therefore it was altered. And whatever is altered, is moved by another first motion causing the alteration, which is local: therefore again it follows that motion was before the first motion: which is impossible: therefore motion did not begin.

The third argument or way is from the nature of time taken there: because time is a passion of motion, and nothing of time is to be taken except the now: but the now is always a middle between the past and the future: therefore before any now, the past is to be taken: and after any, the future is to be taken; therefore it never began, and it will never cease: therefore neither motion, since time is a passion of motion: therefore neither

the mobile, since motion is a passion of the mobile.

The fourth argument is to this that it is not destroyed by the same reason: because the same inconvenience would occur, namely, that after local motion there would be motion, due to the alteration or corruption of the mobile, or of the movers: because it does not fail unless the mover or the mobile, or both, are otherwise disposed.

These four arguments are found at the beginning of the VIII Physics.

The second way also goes to both, namely, that motion neither began nor ceased: and it is by the reason of matter, and it is placed at the end of the first Physics thus: Let it be granted

that matter began to be. But whatever began to be, is moved and changed to being, and is not changed except from privation and upon matter: since therefore the being of a thing precedes its becoming, and becoming places matter upon which it is, matter will be before it begins to be matter, which is impossible: therefore it did not begin. In the same way it is proved that it does not cease. Because everything that is corrupted, is corrupted into matter: therefore it is in matter after the nature is corrupted, which is impossible: therefore matter is ungenerated and incorruptible: therefore also the world according to its first principles.

The third way is collected from the nature of the heavens, whose matter is removed from generation and corruption: as all reasoning people agree, that for this reason it is the place of God incorruptible. And this is founded upon three arguments: one of which is, that everything that is generated, is corrupted in a determined time. The second is, because the heavens are not corrupted, nor otherwise disposed from the first time of the consideration of the Philosophers. The third, that with the heavens remaining, its motion is, and the whole world remaining. From these it is argued thus: Everything generated is corrupted in a determined time: the heavens are not corrupted in a determined time: therefore the heavens are not generated: therefore they did not begin. Since therefore it produces by its motion animals

and plants, and is as a certain life to all existing things, even the generation of inferiors did not begin. And this is drawn from the end of the first Heaven and World, and it is proved in many ways there.

The fourth way is not of Aristotle, but is of some of his Greek Commentators, such as Alexander, and Themistius, and some Arabs, such as Averroes, and others, and it is this: Nothing began to be which was not previously in possibility: but every possibility is in matter: therefore nothing began to be, which does not go from potency to act: therefore it is moved: and thus before the first motion there will be motion, which is inconvenient: therefore the world did not begin.

The fifth way is of the same: If the Creator now creates, and before this did not create, he is in potency to creating. But nothing in potency being, extracts itself from potency to act: therefore the Creator has another more noble than himself who extracts him from potency to act, which is inconvenient: therefore he created the world from eternity, and it did not begin.

The sixth way is of the same: because every agent by will, now acting, and before not acting, needs one of two things, namely, either removing the impediment of its action when it wills to act, if there is something that prohibits: or awakening the will, when it now wills, and before this did not will. And they prove this by a likeness in us acting something by will. But both of those are absurd to believe about God: because to one it follows that he is impotent, and to the other it follows that he is otherwise disposed and changeable: therefore he did not begin to create.

The seventh way is taken from the same: and yet it is founded upon certain propositions of the first Philosophy, namely that the order of the first mover to motion is his substance and his will. Therefore just as his substance never failed him, so motion and the mobile never failed

him. The first, however, is proved from this: because whatever is in God, God is, since he is simple.

Whence also those who wonder open their mouths against the faith, saying: What is the cause that he created the world yesterday, and not the day before, or a year before?

To the same, the Doctors bring many arguments: but I will present two, namely, that of the infinite mover is infinite motion: God however is an infinite mover: therefore infinite is the motion: and it is not infinite in speed: therefore it is necessary that it is infinite in time. And this is founded upon the end of the VIII Physics, and upon certain propositions of the penultimate chapter of book XI of the first Philosophy. The second is that the same disposed in the same way, always does the same: therefore from eternity he moved as now.

Likewise, certain authorities of Catholic Doctors seem to say this. For Boethius says in the fifth of the Consolation, that it suffers the condition of time: although that (as Aristotle judged of the world) neither ever began to be, nor will cease, and its life is extended with the infinity of time: yet it is not such that it is believed to be measured by eternity. Therefore it seems, that the world and time did not begin: and yet it does not follow that they are eternal.

The same, a little below: Whence not rightly those who when they hear that Plato saw the world not having a beginning of time, nor about to have an end: in this way they think the world made by the creator to be coeternal. For it is one thing to be led by an interminable life, which Plato attributed to the world. Another thing is to have the whole presence of an interminable life at once, which is manifestly proper to the divine mind. Nor should God be seen as older than created things by the quantity of time, but rather by the property of a simple nature. From this it is taken, that not by a duration having any progressive quantity was God before the world, but by the property of a simple nature, as a cause having the whole effect present to himself. In this authority also another difficulty

is, namely, that he says according to Plato time did not begin: since this opinion was not of Plato, but of Aristotle: Plato however said time began with the heavens: as also appears in the Timaeus.

Likewise, some object thus: God creates the world by goodness: but from eternity he is good: therefore from eternity he creates.

Likewise, it is not necessary, that a cause precedes its effect by the quantity of duration: as appears in two examples of Augustine, namely, of the foot in the dust and the footprint: for the footprint would be eternal, if the foot in the dust were eternal.

Likewise, of the ray upon the rising and the elevation of the sun. For the day is made by the sun ascending over the hemisphere: and yet it is not after the sun's ascent: therefore even if the Philosophers concede that God is the principle of the whole world, as all concede, it is not necessary to posit because of this that the world began.

But against this are arguments, of which we will also examine the power of inferring, for this reason lest the simple be confused by the unbelievers, if perhaps they incautiously propose them.

1. The stronger way is, that if God is the cause of the world and the heavens, and intelligible by him, and whatever is under him (as the Philosophers say) either he is the cause of their substance, so that they have from him substance and substantial being: or according to some accident or property only. If in the first way, it proceeds thus: Whatever receives substance from something, and is not always in becoming, it is necessary that it sometime begins: therefore not from eternity: therefore all things began according to substance. If however they do not receive substance from him, as from a cause, then not all things are reduced to one, as to one principle of the universe's being: and this is against them, who in their metaphysics multiply prove, that all things are reduced to one, as to the principle of the universe's being. And this says

, and Alexander in a certain letter says, that it is the opinion of Aristotle and all the Philosophers.

If however you say, that it is true, if these things are made: but I say, that their being is becoming. Against: The heavens and the intelligence which is first among those which the Philosophers posit, are complete in themselves with the greatest completion: therefore from the same universally becoming is removed: because this is imperfect: therefore it is necessary, if they are a cause, that they are sometime caused.

If you say, that the first cause is an intelligence altogether simple, and acts by the necessity of nature, like light, and its act is the first intelligence after it, and after the act of that is the third intelligence, and those are not equally simple with the first intelligence which is the cause of all; then necessarily I will have the proposition, that all things began.

And to see this more clearly, let us see the opinion of the Philosophers. For they say, that the first intelligence because nothing of it is potential, produces only the intelligence which is after it and of the first order among movers. That indeed is proved to be distant from the first cause which is not composite, by this that it returns upon its essence, because it understands itself: and so it is composite, and has something of potency, which is the understood, and something of the splendor of the first, which is the intellect and of the nature of the universally acting intelligence: and therefore that intelligence can produce two things, namely, the orb which it moves, and the intelligence of the second order: and therefore because the first orb flows according to causality from the intelligence of the first order, it is moved by one motion only. The second intelligence, however, again becomes more composite, than that which is of the first order among the caused. And therefore from that part by which it is in potency it produces the second orb, which is moved by two motions: and from that part by which it is in it the nature of the universally acting intelligence, flows from it the intelligence of the third order, and so on to the sphere of the moon, cu-

the law of the mover produces the understanding of the said order, which irradiates upon rational souls.

But that this whole is absurd is easily proven. For it is asked, Whence comes the matter which is in potentiality to the intelligence of the first order, since it is not possible for motion in place and will not be assigned. Likewise, it is asked, Whence comes the matter deformed in the parts of the heavens, so that some are stars pervious, some similarly, some otherwise naturally to the intelligence of the second order? and again it is not assigned. Likewise, it is asked, Whether that matter, namely of the heavens and stars, is one matter according to nature, or diverse? If one: therefore it has one motion, since Motion indicates the nature of matter even according to the same Philosophers. But if diverse: therefore it does not flow from one simple intelligence according to the order which they posit: therefore it is clear that the position is null. For they posit that from one simple there is only one double: and from that somewhat double two are caused, according to the order of nature, and not two matters of one caused. If you say, that it is not proven, that there are two matters according to the nature of the stars, and of the heavens, this is nothing: because it is already presupposed by them that motion indicates matter, and it is known, that the motions of each heaven, and its star, or its stars, which are in it, are diverse.

1. Likewise, Another way seems to me strong against that position, namely, because every diversity must be reduced to some one principle according to the aforementioned Philosophers: just as the elemented to the elements, and to their places: and places to the orb: because what is nearer to the heaven, will communicate with it in splendor, and subtlety, and color because of motion: and according to distance from it they thicken and condense. But we see in the second heaven the greatest diversity: which is the eighth heaven, and is called of the fixed stars.

Therefore I ask, What is the principle of this diversity, that in one place some stars are near and many as in the Galaxy: but in another there are more and distant, and greater and lesser of diverse effects? For either this is from the principle acting and ordering them: or from chance and fortune: or it is the principle itself. But if in the first way: either that principle does this by necessity of nature, as fire burns, or by choice. If by necessity of nature: since that principle is intelligence, it must be that intelligence would be more multiple than the mixed: because the mixed is less composed than the composed from diverse parts in form, as flesh, and bone: and heaven, and diverse stars. But if it does by choice and wisdom, then it is concluded for our faith, that God does it as He wills, and when He wills, and not from eternity. But if it is by chance, Aristotle does not say this: because he wills, that nothing happens by chance except what rarely happens: but in the higher things there is always one mode: therefore nothing happens there by chance. But if it were by itself a principle, then many forms would be the first principle, which is false: therefore it remains, that God acts and

does it by free will, as He wills, and when He wills: therefore eternity is not concluded. And these reasons are collected from the Philosophers, namely Moses, and others.

1. Many introduce another, and it is this, that nothing is infinite in act, neither in magnitude, nor in multitude. Therefore let it be granted, that the world had no beginning, then it follows that there were infinite revolutions before this revolution, and infinite deeds before this deed which now is: but it is not possible to traverse the infinite: therefore it would never happen to come to this deed which now happens, and up to this day which happens in the present revolution: but this is false: therefore the world began at a determined time. And this reason is introduced by the Commentator on the seventh of the Physics, And he says, that speaking of his law, he objected it to the Philosophers, and strives to dissolve it as much as he can: and yet he cannot avoid saying that infinite things preceded in revolutions and deeds, but per accidens: because revolutions are distinguished with respect to us, and preceding deeds do not have a substantial order to this deed: and therefore he concedes, that infinite deeds per accidens well precede that which now happens: because thus by substantial order there is no passage through all those up to this. And it is quite clear, that the solution is weak.
2. Likewise, Many object, that in no way is a creature comparable to the Creator: therefore neither in duration: therefore it ought not to be without a beginning of duration, as God is.

But let these suffice here: because all other places where Aristotle said otherwise about this have been inquired: and it has been shown what can, and what cannot be concluded from them.

Solution. Without doubt nothing is more probable even according to reason, than that it began, as Moses said, and this is to be held by faith. But it is impossible, that it began by motion and generation: or ceases by motion to another form, or corruption to another matter: and this alone those reasons, which are Aristotle's, prove: whence they conclude nothing against faith.

And by these the solution to all those things which have been brought up to the fourth way, which is not Aristotle's, but of the Commentators who without doubt introduced heresies, is clear. And to that it must be said, that this is false. Nothing begins to be unless it is first in potentiality. But it is true in those things which begin to be by generation with matter supposed. But of created things which begin by the will and choice of the creator, it is false: unless the possibility of the creator's power is understood: but this is improper: because nothing properly according to the Philosophers is in potentiality according to the efficient cause, but according to matter ordered in some way to that form to which it is said to be in potentiality: because the Commentator gives the rule on the ninth of the first Philosophy, that nothing is in potentiality in another, unless it is drawn out of it by one mover: as an idol in bronze in potentiality, because it is drawn out by the art's mover: and bronze in quicksilver and pure and pure sulfur, because by the heat of the sun in the bowels of the mountain the mineral is drawn out of it, and so of others.

To the fifth way it must be said, that it is an instance of the universally acting intellect in us, which sometimes extracts intelligible species, and sometimes not: without it being in potentiality. If you say, that the intellect acts universally, but phantasms are not always present: and therefore that it does not always understand them, this is not from its defect, but from the absence of that in which it acts, I do not make force of this: because whether it is so, or otherwise, that proposition has an instance: and I say, that in God it does not conclude who acts when He wills, and is not in potentiality.

To the sixth way it has been answered in the first book of the Sentences, because the will of God is determined from eternity that it be of this, and that it be done now, or then: and therefore it needs no one removing an impediment: and yet it is not new according to the things willed.

To the seventh it must be said, that although the substance of God is His will, and conversely, and by His substance He moves: yet one is connotative of will, and another of substance: and therefore that reason is weak concluding nothing.

To the ADMIRATION it must be said, that they are more to be mocked who seek against the art handed down by them: because the question being solved the same question remains. For let us suppose, that the world lasted a thousand years, or however much as now: still the same is entirely asked.

To another it must be said, that of the infinite mover moving according to infinite power, there must be infinite act: but of the mover by choice and will there is motion as long as he wills, and as long as he wills.

To another it must be said, that the same being in the same way, which is the reason of diverse things by exemplar and ideas can produce diverse things according to those reasons: but this word is said of the moved body which causes by necessity of its essence and its motion, and of that the proposition is true.

To the authority it must be said, that he does not intend, that God did not precede the world by eternity: but that He did not precede by duration which is properly divisible quantity: because every such quantity is caused by the quantity of the body. Whence if there were not continuous quantity of space, motion would not be continuous, nor even time. And from this it is clear that they err marvelously who say that the age, which is in the simple not according to some space, is continuous quantity. But Boethius speaks from hypothesis explaining the definition of eternity: because even if time were interminable, still it would not be all at once and perfect, and thus it would fall short of eternity: because it would be distant from simplicity by motion, and from perfection at once: because it would descend into infinite succession of time.

To another it must be said, that by the property of simple nature it notes the eternity by which God precedes the world.

To another it must be said, that God is good from eternity: yet it does not follow, that He creates from eternity, unless goodness would create the world substantially and not voluntarily.

To another which is objected about similars, it must be said that they do nothing to the purpose: because those act by necessity of nature: but God does not, but by free choice of will.

Divisio Textus

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, C, §2: Let us therefore believe of the created things, etc.

Here begins the second part in which the Master touches upon how creatures proceed from God.

And it is divided into five parts: in the first of which the Author treats of the cause of the existence of the universe in general. In the second, he treats specifically of the cause of the rational creature in kind, there, D, And because its blessedness does not avail. In the third, specifically of the mode of creation, there, H, And as it was made. And in the fourth, he treats specifically of the creation of the rational soul, and why it is joined to the body, there, K, So it can also be asked, With greater, etc. In the fifth, he finishes the proemial part, and connects himself to the following treatise, there, L, From the premises it appears the rational creature, etc.

Articulus 11 — Why It Is Imputed To Aristotle That He Said Two Things Were From Eternity, Namely Prime Matter And The First Mover, And What Are Those Three Things That Are Imputed To Him

Why is it imputed to Aristotle that he said there were two things from eternity, namely, prime matter and the first mover? And, what are those three things that are imputed?

Secondly, it is questioned concerning the nature of the principles that are imputed to him.

1. For what is said here is not found in his books that have come to us. However, at the end of the first book of the Physics, he posits three principles of nature, namely, matter, form, and privation. And this is neither false nor heretical: because motion cannot have fewer principles. And he speaks there only of such principles in general. However, the third thing that is imputed to him is not found.
2. Furthermore, there seems to be a contradiction in the text: because he says that he posited two, and exemplifies with three.
3. Likewise, since Epicurus (as is held in histories) also erred in positing the eternity of the world, why is that error not touched upon here?

Solution, that Aristotle in truth does not say this, that there are three or two principles of the world. But he proves that two did not begin through motion, namely, prime matter and the first mover: and therefore it is imputed to him that he said two are from eternity. And when

two are said, then the principles of nature essentially constituting nature are touched upon: as matter and form: because privation does not constitute, but is cast aside through motion to form. However, when a third is said, then the first mover is said or touched upon.

To the other, it must be said that Aristotle seems to say a third in the eleventh book of the Metaphysics, where he says thus: The first principle of all things is neither moved substantially nor accidentally, but moves: and makes the first motion eternal.

To the other, it must be said that Epicurus posited the void and atoms: and he did not say that he did not posit.

Articulus 12 — What Is The Cause Of The Being Of The Whole Universe

What is the cause of the creation of the entire universe to be?

What is the cause of the creation of the entire universe to be?

A grave question arises concerning the first, about the flow of all created things from God, and this question holds the fruits of this entire science, if it could be well investigated.

1. It seems, however, through the Letter, that nothing is caused in created things except through the act of creation: because it says thus: Let us believe: therefore there is no other cause: therefore the cause of created things, celestial or terrestrial, visible or invisible, is nothing but the goodness of the Creator, etc., so there are no natural causes.
2. Likewise, causality which is removed from superior causes cannot belong to inferior ones: but the making of natural things is removed from Angels, who are the movers of the spheres, as many Catholics also say: therefore it is also removed from the motion of movables, and from the motion of inferior causes. The second is subjected in the Letter in the following, namely, that Angels do not make things, although they minister. The first is proved from what Aristotle says in the VIII Physics, that if the first movers do not move, motion will also cease in the second: because it descends in order from the superior to the inferior.
3. Likewise, some further subject thus: Whatever makes something, does not bring it from potentiality to actuality, except through that which is in act: therefore it is necessary that the maker and the made be in act of the same species. In that act, however, there is nothing in the seed of this generated, nor is there anything in the stars in act of that generated: therefore it is necessary that the specific form be given through creation.
4. Likewise, an accident does not make a substance: but the first qualities which are in matter are accidents: therefore they do not make the substantial form. Nor does anything move and transmute matter, except that: because nothing touches matter, except that: therefore it seems that it cannot be induced by them. Since therefore there is nothing else in the made, except God alone who is everywhere, it seems that every form is given by Him through creation.

5. Likewise, nothing acts beyond its own species: the powers of the first qualities and of the stars act in this generable matter: therefore not beyond the species. However, man or donkey is not of their species: therefore they do not act the form of a donkey, or of a man, or of another: therefore it is necessary that it be brought forth into being through creation. The first is proved from this that every action is from a form, and therefore does not exceed it. The second is evident by itself.

6. Likewise, it seems to follow from that which is held, John 5:17: My Father works until now, and I work. And, John 15:5: Without me you can do nothing. And, John 1:3: All things were made through him, and without him nothing was made. And, to the Hebrews 1:3: Upholding all things by the word of his power. Through these and others which we had above in I Sentences from Augustine, that because the Philosophers could not see God, it was permitted to the vanity of the Philosophers to seek proximate causes.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Damascene says that there is nothing which does not have its own operation: therefore it seems that every thing operates something.

1. Likewise, the same says that if a thing does not have its own operation, it also does not have its own nature: and the Philosopher says the same in the first Ethics, that every thing has some operation according to its nature: therefore it seems that not only God is to be said to make the whole.

2. Likewise, according to philosophical reasons, from one simple thing there is only one immediately: and from one which is in itself possible, and has necessary being from the first, there can be two: one moved, and the other not moved: therefore it seems if this is true, that he does not immediately operate all things.

3. Likewise, we see that with the sun approaching, those things which are around us, the vegetative things emit flowers: and with it approaching more, their moisture is directed into cooking and ripening, and in the state of color they are dried and sweat out so that they become suitable for eating: therefore other bodies of animals and of men are changeable in their bodies, and in seeds for generation, and so of others: therefore it seems that both the superior and inferior act some forms.

4. Likewise, Job 36:33: Do you know the order of heaven, and will you set its reason on earth? therefore the order of heaven operates something in nature: because its reason cannot be set on earth.

5. Likewise, it seems that God made the orbs and elements with moving powers in vain, if there were only matter, and in no way would they act forms, and according to this nature would be more imperfect than art: because art makes some form: but nature none according to that saying: If all forms are created by God. Which because they are absurd, it cannot be said that the act of creation is terminated to any form.

If you say that nature operates the form by bringing it forth from matter, and God, and more immediately God than nature: this seems to be nothing, because

1. Two according to the same reason of causality do not order to the same equally immediate, because each would act one per se: and thus there would be two in act, and not one. And this is the objection of the Commentator on VIII Physics.
2. Likewise, one would be superfluous: for if both are equally immediate, neither receives causality from the other: therefore one does not depend on the other: therefore the other is superfluous.
3. Likewise, it is impossible for two agents differing in species and genus to have an act that is one in species per se: but God and the efficient cause of something proximate, whatever it is, differ in species and genus, and each acts per se: therefore it is impossible for their made or act to be one: therefore it is false that both act equally immediately.

Solution. The opinions of both the Philosophers and the Doctors of Sacred Scripture concerning this question must be noted.

Note therefore, that the opinion of the ancient Philosophers who were before Aristotle is divided into four ways: and all supposed two propositions, which being ill-understood were for them the source of error. One of these is, that from nothing nothing comes. The other was, that everything which brings something from potentiality to actuality is similar to it in act according to species. Therefore the Epicureans first came saying: If from nothing nothing comes, it is necessary to suppose matter, and its place, and therefore they posited the void and atoms. Likewise, if a thing does not come into act except through that which is in act: since no thing is in act before it is made, it follows that no thing has a true substantial form: and generation is nothing but the congregation of atoms, and corruption the disgregation of the same: and the forms which seem are from the order of atoms in the composed congregation; so round sharp atoms constitute fire, and broad square ones earth, and so of others. And its defenders were Democritus and Leucippus.

Others because of the same propositions said there are only mixtures of elements, and in a certain ratio bone is constituted, and in a certain flesh, and so of others: of which nothing is truly form: but strife and friendship moving them agree. And the follower of that opinion was Empedocles.

Others saw things truly have forms, and because they did not see that they could be brought forth from potentiality, but if they were made when they were not before, it would follow that something would be made from nothing, they conceded all to have been from eternity in matter actually, but hidden: and then a thing is made, when its form begins to be discerned, with others obscuring it divided from it. And they posit all things to be in all, and the elements to be infinite: because every homogeneous thing in parts is an element according to them. And this opinion was defended by Anaxagoras. And if it is asked, What discerns the forms which were hidden? they say that the intellect acting pure and unmixed.

The fourth because of the same cause posited the forms of all things to be threefold, namely, eternal generating, and mathematical which are the principle of sciences, and particular generated. And this was held by Plato and prevailed until the time of Aristotle. The science which was held of this opinion is from a certain ancient Philosopher, named Pythagoras.

Those however who proceed by the way of Aristotle, and strive to expound him, like Alexander, and Avicenna, and Averroes, and others, are diversified into two parts: and they agree in one, and differ in two. For Avicenna and almost all others concede this, that that which is in potentiality does not come into act, except through that which is always in act. And Averroes and some others with him deny that: but they also differ in this that Avicenna supposes, that every form is given by an intelligence from which all forms flow, and that it is full of forms, and has influence over nature, when through the motion of the heaven and proximate causes the matter is prepared: and also has influence over the possible intellect in us; and every form is an irradiation of its splendor. And he calls this intelligence the intelligence of the tenth order: because he supposes, that there are nine first caused by order before the elements and elemented, namely nine spheres, and ten intelligences. And how this is proved, would be very long. But Averroes does not agree with him in this: because he says Aristotle feels, that all forms are in potentiality in matter, and all are drawn out from it by proximate movers, according to the communication of triple power, namely elemental, and of the heaven, and formative power in the seed, as was said above: and this is more probable.

Our Doctors however have two ways, namely, that all forms are created, and that the act of creation completes every motion of nature, and that nature does nothing except preparing the matter. And this opinion is defended by few. The second is, that God operates in nature and with it, in that he gives it to be and to operate and contains it principally in itself: and that his operation is not separated from the work of nature, so that he acts in one part, and nature in another. And this is more probable. And I think, that it is true. According to this it must be said, that after the works of the six days nothing new was created: because creation supposes nothing. Propagation however supposes the work of nature: and I well concede, that this is ordered, so that the diversity of the inferiors is carried into the motion of the heaven diversely approaching and receding to the inferiors because of the diversity and obliquity and rectitude of the circles, and this again diversity in the movers from the posterior of the movers to the first up to God, whose power and essence is not separated from anything up to the last, which is so moved that it in no way moves. And thus universality consists in him, as in its source and heart: because the whole flows from him, and is contained by him, and is governed, and is turned back into him.

And this is the cause that Augustine says, that his goodness is the cause of all, and does not exclude because of this secondary causes, which have no power of causing except from him containing.

To the other it must be said, that Angels are said not to be creators, but they are indeed causes through the motion of many natural things.

To the other it must be said, that this proposition is false: Nothing comes into act except through that which is in act, and it was responded to above, unless perhaps it is said that the exemplary reason by which that which is made, is in the divine mind its act: but this is said improperly.

To the other it must be said, that an accident as an accident does not make a substance: but according as it is a natural property of the element joined to the celestial power, and to the formative power in the seed it indeed makes the substantial form, by transmuting the matter from which it is drawn out.

To the other it was responded above how something acts or does not act beyond the species.

To all the authorities introduced it must be said, that they do not intend to show except that God principally acts, by whom withdrawing his action, none of those would act or remain in being. And this is true according to the Philosophers.

Articulus 13 — Whether The Soul And The Angel Agree In Species Or Differ In Species

Whether the soul and Angel agree in species, or differ in species?

Whether the soul and Angel agree in species, or differ in species?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, D, And he distinguishes it in this way, so that a part would remain in its purity, etc.

Because indeed he says part, it seems that the angelic nature is a part of the nature of the soul;

1. And this cannot be, unless they are of the same species: therefore it seems that the rational soul and Angel are of the same species.
2. This also seems for another reason. For there is one species of those whose ultimate constitutive difference is one: but the ultimate constitutive difference is one, namely, rational: therefore it seems that the soul and Angel are of the same species. The first is evident by itself. The second is taken from the Letter: because he says both natures are rational.
3. Likewise, Gregory says that man is every creature: because he is with stones, lives with trees and plants, feels with beasts, and reasons with Angels: therefore man and Angel agree in the ultimate constitutive difference.
4. Likewise, the impression of the image is the same (as Gregory says) in the rational soul and in Angels: therefore one species.
5. Likewise, those whose perfection according to grace and glory is one, they are the same in species: but the perfection of rational souls and Angels according to grace and glory is one: therefore they are in one species. The first is proven from this that different perfect things are not proportioned to the same proportion. But it is evident that perfections are given according to the proportion of the perfect. The second is evident

from that Deuteronomy xxxii, 8, according to the translation of the Septuagint: He set the boundaries of the peoples according to the number of the sons of God.

6. Likewise, the active and possible intellect in us is more distant than the active intellect and Angel: but the most noble of the soul is the active intellect, which does not make a difference in species with the possible: therefore much more will it make the same species with the active intellect in the Angel.

If you say that the intellect of the Angel is deiform, but the intellect of Man is not: because this one is brought from potency to act, but not the intellect of the Angel which has concreated species, Against: Perfect and imperfect according to the same form do not vary in species: because otherwise a weak eye and a strong one would be of different species, which is false: therefore it seems that this does not impede.

If you say that the Angel is not unifiable to the body, the rational soul is so: this seems first false, because -

1. The Philosopher says that the intellect is the act of no body.
2. Furthermore, Union is a certain relation which according to nature follows the being of its extremes: but what follows being (as Boethius says) is of the accidentals: therefore neither does it constitute species, nor does it diversify the constituted.
3. Likewise, it is separable from the flesh: therefore it seems that this does not make them to be of different species.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. To whom there is some nature common according to species, to them it is common what follows that nature in as much as it is itself. If therefore to the soul and Angel there is one nature according to species, they will also have common consequences of that nature. But the consequences of the angelic nature (as the Master says below) are four, namely, subtlety of essence, perspicacity of intelligence, and personal discretion, and free will. But it is evident that personal discretion, nor even the perspicacity of angelic intelligence agrees with the soul: therefore they are not of the same species.

1. Likewise, whatever are of the same species, are of the same order according to nature, or injury would be done to the other: therefore if the soul and Angel are of the same species, they are of the same order according to nature. The proof of the first: because any part of fire is upwards, and any frog in the swamp. The second is assumed from the hypothesis. Thus: The soul and Angel are of the same species: therefore of the same order: therefore if the Angel is upwards before the face of God, there also according to nature will be the soul: and if the soul is downwards unifiable to the body, there also will be the Angel, which is false: therefore the soul and Angel are not of the same species.

Solution. It must be said that the soul and Angel differ in species: and how this is to be understood must be noted, that in the whole potential the parts of species are distinguished

according to the order of power in more and more: and therefore just as rational says the species of the soul beyond sensible.

according to what is in the brute, in which the sensible is as a species: although in man it is as a potency, like a triangle in a tetragon: thus the intellectual constitutes a species beyond the rational species, although the rational is in it according to the reason of potency. And this is known through the act and medium of understanding: for the intellect of Angels is without collation and inquiry, and is perfected by the forms of the universal order of natural causes in the first instant of their creation: but our intellect is not perfected except by collation and inquiry: and therefore it is in shadow with respect to that, and it does not have species except those accepted for the perfection of knowledge. And this is what Isaac says in the book of Definitions, that reason is created in the shadow of the intelligent, and the sensible soul in the shadow of the rational soul, and the vegetative in the shadow of the sensible soul, and the orb in the shadow of the soul, and the elements in the shadow of the orb: because the perspicacity of intelligence is without collation and inquiry, and therefore its setting with the remaining cognition of the true simply is the power of reason which inquires and collates. And this Dionysius calls discursive sciences, or disciplines: because by collating they run from one to another. And he does not say that the Angel has such sciences, but simple deiform ones. And where reason falls, so that there is no acceptance of the good and true simply, but as now in material and sensible appendages, there begins the power of the sensible soul: and again in the setting of that and the retention of natural motion only, it induces the vegetative: and again the simplicity of the soul inasmuch as it is the first under that induces the orbs, and so of others.

Therefore, it must be said to the first, that it is a part according to the remote genus, and not according to the species.

To the other, it must be said that the ultimate constitutive difference is not one as has already been shown, but adds a degree that varies the species.

To the other, it must be said that by the saying of Gregory, agreement is posited only in the genus: and this is clear by this, that the sensible in man and brute are not of the same species: since it is in the brute as form and specific difference, but in man as potency only.

To the other, it must be said that weak and strong do not diversify the species, but other and other names, as has already been shown.

To the other, it must be said that union is founded upon the nature of the soul: because it naturally depends on the body, and this is clear: because in comparison to the body, it is defined, and therefore it does not say only relation, but also specific difference: but because the ultimate specific differences are frequently unknown to us, therefore we name them by convenient signs, and sometimes by two more remote differences joined we describe one.

To the other, it must be said that although it is separable, yet still by proportion it has unibility to the body: and when it is separated from the body, it is not separated from unibility.

K. Why is man instituted in such a way that the soul is united to the body?

It is also customary to ask, Since the soul seems to be of greater dignity if it had remained without the body, why is it united to the body? To which it can first be said:

Because God willed it, and the cause of His will is not to be sought. Secondly, it can be said that God willed it to be united to the body in order to show in human condition a new example of the blessed union which is between God and the spirit, in which He is loved with the whole heart, and is seen face to face. For the creature would think it could not be united to its Creator with such proximity as to love and know Him with the whole mind, unless it saw the spirit, which is the most excellent creature, so lowly, that is, to the flesh which is from the earth, united in such love, that it cannot be constrained to wish to leave it: as the Apostle shows, saying: We do not wish to be unclothed from the body, but to be clothed over: by which it is shown that the created spirit is united to the uncreated Spirit with ineffable love. Therefore, for the example of the future society, which was to be perfected between God and the rational spirit in its glorification, He joined the soul to bodily garments and earthly dwellings: and made the clay material to vegetate to life sense: so that man might know, because if God could join such disparate natures of body and soul into one federation and such great friendship, it would by no means be impossible for Him to elevate the humility of the rational creature, although far inferior, to the participation of His glory. Therefore, because for the example of the rational spirit it was humbled in part to the companionship of the earthly body: lest perhaps it might seem too depressed in this, Divine providence added that afterwards with the same glorified body it might be elevated to the companionship of those who remained in their purity: so that what it had received less from the dispensation of its Creator, it might afterwards receive glorified by His grace. Thus, therefore, our Creator God, disposing rational spirits by various lot according to the judgment of His will, established for those whom He left in their purity a dwelling above in heaven: but for those whom He associated with earthly bodies, a habitation below on earth: imposing on both a rule of obedience, so that those might not fall from where they were, and these might ascend from where they were to where they were not. Therefore, God made man from a double substance: composing the body from the earth, but making the soul from nothing. Therefore, also souls are united to bodies, so that serving God in them they may merit a greater crown.

L. After the sacrament of the Trinity, it is to be treated of the tripartite creature, and first of the more dignified, that is, the Angelic.

From the foregoing it appears that the rational creature was distinguished into Angelic and Human: of which one is wholly spiritual, that is, Angelic: the other is partly spiritual and partly corporeal, that is, Human. Since therefore it is to be treated of these, namely, of the spiritual and corporeal creature, of the rational and of the non-rational: first it seems to be treated of the rational and spiritual, that is, of Angels: so that our reason may intend from the contemplation of the Creator to the knowledge of the more dignified creature: then it may descend to the consideration of the corporeal, both of that which is rational, and of that which

is not rational, so that the sacrament of the uncreated Trinity may follow the tripartite creature, and the document of those things concreted and contingent to it.

Articulus 14 — Why The Soul Is United To The Body, Since It Would Have Been Of Greater Perfection For The Soul To Have Been Without The Body

Why the soul is united to the body, when it would have been of greater perfection for the soul to be without the body?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, K, It is also accustomed to be asked, When of greater, etc.

For the first reason of the Master seems to be nothing: because if he had not united the soul to the body, the same reason could be assigned altogether.

Solution. It must be said that the third cause is good, and other causes can be assigned, namely, so that through the mediation of man, corporeal nature could participate in God, which it could not do by itself: because otherwise the whole universe would not be referred to God. Because just as man has in the soul the vegetative, sensitive, and rational, which are all the grades of life: so according to the body he has elements, and mixtures, and complexions, and compositions, which are all the grades of corporeal matter: and therefore through the mediation of man all things are referred to God.

Another cause is: because the rational soul is naturally perfected through sense, although after death it will have another perfection: and therefore according to the order of nature it ought to be united to the body.

DISTINCTIO II

Divisio Textus

Concerning the angelic nature, therefore, these things are first to be considered, etc. Here begins the executive part, and above it is divided.

However, the first part, which is about the simple spiritual nature, is divided into two: in the first of which it treats of things pertaining to its nature; in the second, however, of those things which pertain to its distinction through aversion and conversion, and this begins in distinction V, there, A, After this consideration leads to inquire, etc.

The first of these is further subdivided into two: in the first of which it treats of extrinsic things, namely, what they are like in substance, and in natural powers, and in habits they are made, and this begins in the following distinction, there, A, Behold it has been shown, etc.

However, this distinction is divided into two parts: in the first of which it shows when they were created; in the second, however, where, and this begins, there, F, Now it has been shown, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether The Angel Was Created Before Or After The Ages, Or Is One With The Other Four Coevals

Whether an Angel was created before or after the heights, or is one with the other four coevals?

This question first arises concerning the time of the creation of Angels.

It seems, indeed, that they were created before other things:

1. For thus Hilary says: It is not a great thing that before heaven and earth God the Father begot our Lord Jesus Christ, since even the Angel is found to be more ancient than the creature of heaven and earth: it is not one of the coevals.
2. Likewise, Damascene: Some say that before every creation they were begotten, as the theologian Gregory says. First indeed God conceived the heavenly and angelic powers, and His conception was His work. Others, however, after the first heaven was begotten. But since all confess before the formation of man, I agree with the theologian Gregory. For he said that the intellectual substance was first created, and then the sensible, and then that which is from both, namely man.

1. Likewise, it seems to be proven by reason thus: Whatever substance is related to other created things as foreknowing their coming into being before they come into being in their own nature, it is necessary for it to precede all others in creation. But the Angel is such a substance related to other created things: therefore, the Angel preceded all others in creation. The first is evident by itself. The second is taken from Augustine, who thus explains, "let it be," and "he made," and "it was made," so that the first refers to the Word, the second to the knowledge of Angels, the third to the existence of the thing in its own nature.
2. Likewise, Augustine: You made two things, Lord: one near You, and the other near nothing: it is near the Word. But to be near the Word is to be near the cause of the coming forth of creatures into being: therefore, since it has the power of knowing, it will know them in the Word before they come into being: therefore, it precedes their being in their own nature.
3. Likewise, a substance moving towards the being of another substance and influencing it, it is necessary for it to exist prior to that whose being it moves and upon which it influences: Angels (as the Philosophers say) are substances moving towards the being of the elements and the elemented, and influencing the being and motion of the spheres: therefore, it is necessary for them to exist prior to the elements, and the elemented, and the spheres; therefore, they ought to have been created first, as it seems.
4. Likewise, to the one simple thing, that which is least of composition and of no quantity is more akin than that which has the composition of quantity and the termination of contrariety: but the Creator is one simple thing, the Angel is of least composition, because according to the Philosophers it has no composition except of the possible

insofar as it understands itself, and of the necessary insofar as it flows from God and understands Him: but the spheres have quantity and potentiality to place, and the elements contrariety: therefore, the Angel is more akin than corporeal things: therefore, it also flows from Him first.

If you say that this does not follow: because all things flow equally. On the contrary: the Creator is related in one way to everything that is: therefore, on His part there is no difference: but if there is a difference, it is on the part of the creatures being related differently to Him: therefore, it seems that the efflux should be determined according to the order of the creature, and not according to the order of the Creator.

1. Furthermore, the order of creation should correspond to the order of nature: but nature orders the mover before the moved, and the incorruptible before the corruptible, and the spiritual before the corporeal, and the simple before the composite: therefore, since Angels are incorruptible, spiritual, simple movers, it seems that they were created before all others.
2. Likewise, Plato seems to say this: O gods of gods, whose maker and Father I am. Thus he infers: I, etc. Of these I will make the seed, and I will hand it over to you: it will be yours to carry out equally. For this seems to be understood, that they have influence on the being of the generable: therefore, they ought to have been before all things, as it seems.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. On the part of God creating, there is no difference in the exit: therefore, since the creature was not before creation, on its part also no order could be taken: therefore, there is no reason for it to be made sooner or later.

1. Likewise, we see that the rational soul, which is the mover and perfection of the body, is not made before the body, but after its organization: therefore, if Angels are the movers of the higher bodies (as some say), they ought to have been made after them similarly.
2. Likewise, Moses intends to refute the errors of various people concerning the beginning of the creation of the world. But it was the error of many that God created the world through Angels: therefore, to refute this, they ought not to have been created before, but either with the world or after it. Hence Damascene: Whoever says that Angels are the creators of any substance, they are all of their father the devil. For creatures coming forth are not creators. But the maker, provider, and sustainer of all is God, who alone is uncreated.

Solution. It must be said that Angels were made not in duration, but in the order of dignity before corporeal creation. And to understand this, Augustine's distinction from the Confessions must be taken, that one thing is said to be prior to another, namely by eternity, as God precedes all things: by dignity or choice, as the better and nobler is preferred to the less noble or useful, and in this way the fruit precedes the flower: by origin, and in this way sound

precedes song, because modulation in sound makes song: and by time, and in this way the flower precedes the fruit.

Therefore, to those things introduced from Hilary and Damascene, and to those things introduced in the Letter, because wisdom is the first of all created: it must be said that they speak of the priority of dignity, not of duration or time.

To the other, it must be said that that priority of understanding a thing to be made, even according to Augustine himself, does not posit a priority of duration, but of the order of nature: and thus Augustine solves it, so that knowing a thing to be made does not posit in act the knowledge before the existence of the thing: but simultaneously with the thing itself, it posits its thought, that is, of every thing to be made as far as it is from the order of the causing cause, and I can have, namely, the knowledge of the thing made, when it is already made.

To the other, it must be said that even the Angel is not immediately near the Word except in the order of nature, and not of time in the order of the exit of creatures.

To the other, it must be said that that reasoning proceeds from the opinions of the Philosophers, and is founded partly on doubtful propositions, partly even on false ones according to our faith. For it is doubtful who is the mover of the heaven. Ptolemy, and Albatenius, and Albumasar, and all astronomers say that the heaven is moved by the will of God, and this is our confession. But Aristotle and all natural Philosophers say that it is moved by an intelligence, as the desiring is moved by the desired, and whether Angels serve God in the motion of the spheres, or not, is uncertain to us: however, we hold most certainly according to the holy Fathers, that not all are occupied around the motion of the heavens, even if there were as many heavens as there are stars, as some of them presumed to say: because it is handed down to us that some assist, some minister around us: however, that some even move the heaven, it seems according to the exposition of one saint by that word of Matthew, XXIV, 29: And the powers of the heavens shall be moved. For Bernard in the book to Eugene explains this about Angels.

But whatever may be about the doubtful things, to the reasoning introduced it must be said that even according to the Philosophers who posit that opinion, the reasoning is not valid: because they do not understand the order of time, but of nature: just as the matter of the element is prior to the element, yet it never lacked the element, nor the elemental qualities themselves.

To the other, it must be said that that also does not conclude except about the order of nature, or dignity, and not of time.

To the other, it must be said that the order on the part of the created does not impede, because the creature was not: and also because the degree of dignity does not infer the order of time, as in many things it has already been evident, because otherwise the soul would precede the body in time. By this the solution to the following is evident.

To the other, it must be said that it does not intend that they are prior to other created things, but that He gave them the power of moving the stars for the propagation of nature: but the order of creatures the Creator Himself instituted.

Articulus 2 — Whether There Is One Matter Of All Spiritual And Corporeal Things

Whether there is one matter of all spiritual and corporeal things?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, C, "He who lives forever created all things at once."

For by this two things are held, namely, that all things are at once in their proper species: and concerning this will be that question about the opinion of Augustine. And another exposition is that he created all things at once in matter, and from this it is left that the matter of all things is one in number.

1. And this also seems to be by that of Job, 40:10: "Behold Behemoth, whom I made with you." But Behemoth by nature is an Angel: therefore an Angel is of the same matter with man: therefore with flesh and bones.
2. Likewise, of spiritual and corporeal substances there is one genus: because otherwise there would be more categories than ten: therefore, since that genus is not vain, it will have something corresponding in reality: and it is certain that it is not form, because the form is not one of corporeal and spiritual things: therefore their matter is one.
3. Likewise, this seems to be said by Porphyry: because he wills that genus is in place of matter.

Other things that can be objected to this were moved in the preceding distinction.

On the contrary is what Aristotle says in the XI of the First Philosophy, that of corporeal and incorporeal things there is not one genus. And the Commentator explains that genus is taken there for matter: therefore much less of corporeal and spiritual things is there not one genus.

Likewise, Averroes on the II of the Metaphysics says: "It must be known, however, that genus is not matter, but is a general form: but it agrees with matter in that it sustains difference in constituting species, and in that difference is potentially in it."

Solution. It must be said, as Boethius wills, that of spiritual and corporeal things there is not one matter, as we said above. Because also according to the Philosophers, spiritual things or intelligences which we call Angels, indeed have a composition of the possible and the necessary, which parts our Doctors call "that which is" and "by which it is": and Boethius seems to call "that which is" and "being." Because that possible is never in potentiality, nor can it be; but because it depends on another, namely on the first cause, therefore in itself it is said to be possible: and because it particularizes and divides that by which it is, which of itself is common, like every form. Hence the incommunicable and communicable make in the Angel a composition: and this is signified when it is said, "Angel" and "this Angel."

To the first, therefore, it must be said that the authority of the Saints is not entirely adduced: because they adduce that all things were made at once in matter or likeness, like the soul of man with Angels: because they have a certain likeness in the genus of nature.

Likewise, I say that Scripture intimates that not of all corporeal things is there one matter: because it says heaven and earth were created. For if heaven were of the common matter of all others, it would not have been necessary to say except one of them, and it would have sufficed.

To the other it must be said that this is a vile sophism: because there is a double form, namely, of matter which is part of the essence: and that is not predicated of the composite, because (as Avicenna says) form as form does not have that it is predicated of that of which it is the form: but it has this inasmuch as it is a form consequent to the whole composite according to its whole being: and this is the species of which Boethius says that it is the whole being of individuals. And it is a form consequent to the composite according to part of being, and this is genus: and this form places a likeness essentially in the whole or in part of the essence: and this corresponds to it according to being, or thing, and matter.

To the other, the response is clear by the saying of the Commentator.

Articulus 3 — Whether The Empyrean Heaven Is A Body, And Why The Philosophers Did Not Know It

Whether the empyrean heaven is a body? And, why did the philosophers not know it?

Then it is inquired about this which he says, there, F, It has already been shown when the angelic nature was created, etc.

For here falls the question about the empyrean heaven: and we will inquire three things about it, namely, whether it is a body? And granted that it is, whether it is movable, or uniform, or not? And granted that it is not movable, whether it has an order according to some influence on the other lower orbs?

To the first, it is proceeded thus:

1. Everything that is moved in place per se, is in place: everything that is in place, is surrounded by another body: therefore everything that is moved locally per se, is surrounded by another body: the ninth sphere is moved in place per se: therefore it is surrounded by another body: therefore it is necessary to posit a tenth body: and this we call the empyrean heaven.
2. Likewise, before every multiform, a uniform must be posited: but the ninth sphere is multiform, since it has right and left: therefore it is necessary to posit another uniform body before it, and this we call the empyrean.
3. Likewise, that which has the best perfection without motion, is before that which has it with motion: and that which has it with one motion, is before that which has it with multiple motions: but the ninth heaven has perfection with one motion: therefore before

it, there will be posited another body, which has it without any motion, and this we call the empyrean heaven.

4. Likewise, it is necessary that the universe be perfected in its ultimate by something perfect: but everything that is moved is imperfect: therefore it is not perfected in something that is moved, unless in some unmoved body: therefore that will be posited: but this we say is the empyrean.
5. Likewise, the saints say expressly, and this is a stronger reason why we posit it: because namely the holy Fathers who knew the Father of heaven and heaven better than others by the revealing Spirit, have handed this down to us.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Place and the placed are of the same nature: because the Philosopher wills that the same is the motion to place and to form, and the same mover: but the placed in the empyrean heaven is only a spiritual substance: therefore the empyrean ought to be a spiritual substance, not a corporeal one.

1. Likewise, place is that to which there is motion: but the motion of the Angel is towards God: because Augustine says, What in bodies is weight, this is in spirits love: and the love of the Angel tends towards God: therefore the empyrean heaven, which is the place of Angels, is God.
2. Likewise, Bede says, that within God and they run out wherever they are sent: this is held the same.
3. Likewise, place is containing and preserving of the placed: but this with respect to the Angel does not agree except to God alone: therefore the empyrean which is the region and place of Angels, is God himself and not some body.

Furthermore, it is asked, if the empyrean heaven is a body, why did the philosophers not know it, who have examined the natures of all bodies, especially if the reasons previously introduced have some necessity, as it seems to many: for since they are natural and not founded upon faith, they could see them just as we do.

If you say, that the Lord did not wish to reveal this to them, this is nothing: because He revealed His invisible things to them through reasons, which was greater.

Solution. It must be said with the holy Fathers, that the place of the blessed is the empyrean, and a body separated from the volatility of the world, and not investigable by reason: because whatever is known about heaven, is known through sight, or motion: and the empyrean is subject to neither. But other principles compel us which I will place in the following article of the question.

All the previous reasons which seem strong to some, are founded upon false propositions among the philosophers of this world.

For the major in the first proposition is, because whatever is moved in place per se, is in place per se, and this proposition is shown false by the Commentator on the sixth of the

Physics before the end, where Aristotle speaking against Zeno says, that the first mobile is moved in place according to form and not according to subject: and the Commentator shows there by necessary reasons, that the gloss is bad which some said, that it is moved according to part and not according to whole: because parts are not moved per se, but per accidens by the motion of the whole. Likewise, because the whole cannot be moved unless all its parts are moved: whence he says, that nothing prohibits something from being in place per accidens, and being place per se, and being moved in place per se: and this is because motion does not depend on place. But these are of another business. From this it is clear, that that reason does not necessarily conclude the empyrean heaven to be, and to be a body: but other principles must be sought.

The following reason is founded upon this: Before a multiform body is a uniform body: and this is impossible among the philosophers: because a spherical body moved is not reduced by the Philosopher to a uniform, except as an intelligence is uniform: whence it is impossible for such a body to be: because it would already be of the perfection of the order of intelligence.

The third reason is founded upon this, that before a moved body is a movable body: and this is also impossible: because the greater perfection than a body can have according to nature, is itself being always conjoined to its operation which is circular motion, or simple motion, or multiple and manifold.

The following reason is ridiculous: because immobility in a body of ultimate perfection is according to nature.

The following reason is good and compels, and its compulsion will be evident consequently: because we find other principles from which it will not be sophistically proven that body to be.

To what is objected against it, it must be said, that this argumentation would hold, if the Angel were in place per se: but that place is not given to him except by congruence: because among other corporeal things it is more noble, and therefore it more congruently fits a more noble nature.

To the following it must be said, that the spiritual place of the Angel is God: but the place of habitation by congruence is the empyrean heaven: and many things have been noted about this in the first book of the Sentences: If the Angel is in place, or is moved in place, and how and in how many ways he is in place: and therefore I will omit all those here: and there it was also said if two or more Angels are in the same place, and how large is the place of the Angel.

To what is further asked, why did the philosophers not know?

It must be said, that Bede in the Letter solves this excellently: because from the volatility of the world, if it were not secret in this way, we indeed would perceive one star to be more or less distant than another through the diameter of the stars more or less: but we cannot distinguish the number of stars, spheres, and heavens: whence because that is neither subject to sight, nor investigated through the reason of motions as the ninth is, therefore it is not

known by the philosophers. For the ninth, although it is not subject to sight, yet by the necessity of motion it is proven, as Alpetragius proves quite conveniently: and to that below in the works of the six days we will still place reasons.

Articulus 4 — Whether The Empyrean Heaven Is Immobile And Uniform Or Not

Whether the empyrean heaven is immobile and uniform, or not?

Secondly, it is asked, Whether it is mobile and uniform, or not?

And it seems that it is uniform: because

1. In the text it is said that it is called fiery not from burning, but from splendor: therefore the whole shines with light, as it seems: therefore it is uniform.

1. Likewise, the empyrean heaven is the region and place of contemplation: but those who contemplate are wholly in the light: therefore by congruence the place assigned to them ought to be full of light.
2. Likewise, light expands the sense in external things and gladdens the heart: therefore, since it is assigned by congruence to the blessed spirits, it ought to be wholly luminous and uniform.
3. Likewise, the closer one becomes to God through contemplation, the more one is removed from divided multitude (as Dionysius says) and approaches the one: therefore the congruous place will also be posited as uniform: because otherwise it would not correspond according to proportionality.
4. Likewise, this is what is sung: Eternal light will shine upon your Saints, O Lord. And it was prefigured in that word of Exodus where the children of Israel dwelt, there was light.

1. Likewise, Psalm 88:16: "Lord, they shall walk in the light of thy countenance."
2. Likewise, 1 Timothy 6:16: "Who dwells in inaccessible light." Since therefore this light is diffused among the blessed in the place of contemplation, it is fitting by congruence that this place be luminous.
3. Likewise, Hell, the place of the damned, is a place assigned to perpetual darkness: therefore by opposition, the empyrean heaven, the place of the blessed, is assigned to perpetual light.

That the empyrean heaven is immobile is thus proved:

1. Fruition is a withdrawal from all motion and imperfection: since therefore the empyrean heaven is the place of those enjoying, it is itself removed from all motion, and of most peaceful quiet.

2. Likewise, every motion is on account of need, even the motion of the heavens according to the Philosophers: therefore since there is no need whatsoever in the place of contemplation, the empyrean heaven is immobile.

These, however, are the proper principles from which the holy Fathers posited the empyrean heaven to be, and immobile, and full of light.

BUT AGAINST the first part it is objected thus:

1. The nature of fire is not noble, and rather is given in the torments of the damned: therefore from its nature the empyrean heaven ought not to be.
2. Likewise, a shining luminous thing (as Avicenna says) must have constant parts. And this is proved, because stars eclipse each other, and cover each other due to the constancy of parts in them, which another part of the subtle orb does not do: and stars shine, and other parts of the orb do not shine: therefore if the empyrean heaven is luminous, it seems to be subject to sight, and not to be subtle and simple.

Likewise, it is objected against the other part, namely, because it would seem to be of the fastest motion.

1. For Alpetragius says, and posits it as a common understanding of the mind, that the closer a body is to the first mover, the faster it moves: but among all bodies none approaches the first mover as the empyrean heaven does: therefore none is of such fast motion as it.
2. Likewise, every quantum is necessarily in potentiality to place: therefore it is mobile: because potentiality to place causes mobility, at least insofar as the orb is in potentiality to place: but in perpetual things being and being able are the same: therefore the empyrean heaven, since it is quantum, is moved.

Solution. It must be said that the empyrean heaven is in no way moved, and in no way is deformed.

To what is first objected, it must be said that it is not called fiery from the nature of fire, but from the congruence of the property of light, and from names known among us.

To the other it must be said, that it is always called shining from the nature of the most simple luminous thing, and I well concede, that it does not shine so as to project rays visible to us: because this does not suit the excellence of its simplicity. For the splendor of light is said in many ways, namely, of the light of the wisdom of God, and of angelic intelligence, and of the most simple body, and also of the dense body subject to our sight, and in these ways it is said more and less properly, and so much less properly as they are distant from the first.

To the OTHER part it must be said, that the whole is immobile, and the proposition which is introduced is understood of the approach which is according to the access to the mover as the mover is: and thus it is not here: because that body does not compel us to seek and posit

anything except the state of the blessed in glory, and not the generation and motion of lower things.

To the other it must be said, that quantity by itself does not cause potentiality to motion, unless something else is added: and this is clear: because abstract things have quantity, and yet they are immobile: but the potentiality to place will cause the addition of a natural property inclining to achieve something possible through motion, and a mover joined to it.

Wherefore a certain Philosopher says, that five things are necessary for the orb to be moved: of which the first is that there be some good and best not joined to it by substance. Second, that it desires to be joined to it by natural desire. Third, that it is possible to achieve it through motion. Fourth, that it has a mover joined to it. Fifth, that it continually acquires what it desires: because thus its motion is perpetuated. Some, however, add the disposition of the mobile according to the right, whence motion arises, and according to the left through which rotation is made. But the Philosophers pronounce doubtfully about this: and whatever may be about this, it is clear that from quantity it does not have a natural order to motion, nor does it by itself cause potentiality to place.

Articulus 5 — Whether The Empyrean Heaven Has An Order Of Influencing Over The Other Spheres, And Whether The Sun Illuminates The Empyrean Heaven

Whether the empyrean heaven has an order of influencing over other spheres? And, whether the sun illuminates the empyrean heaven?

Thirdly, it is asked, whether it has an order of influencing over other spheres?

And it seems that it does: because

1. Whatever is first in any genus, influences over the second: but the empyrean heaven is first in the order of heavens: therefore it influences over the second.

1. Likewise, since right and left are in the second, it is necessary that they are caused by something: not, however, by the mobile itself of which they are: therefore they are caused by the empyrean heaven, as it seems.

Here it is asked, since stars and the sun are luminous above as below, and the luminous projects rays from its center everywhere, whether the sun illuminates upwards the place of Angels in the empyrean heaven?

It seems that it does: because the sun emits rays by necessity of nature: therefore it emits to every part wherever the center of its perspicacity goes: but this is to every part: therefore it illuminates upwards.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY is what is said, Apocalypse 21:23: That city has no need of the sun, nor the moon, to shine in it: for the glory of God has illuminated it, and its lamp is the Lamb.

Solution. It must be said that it is secret to us concerning this heaven which the holy Fathers have not handed down: nevertheless, if it is said that there is a twofold state, namely,

of the generation of the elect to complete the number of the predestined, and to the order of this state is placed the order of the movable spheres: and another is the state of rewards in another age resting in contemplation, and to complete the order of this the empyrean heaven was created: it does not seem to me inconvenient, and then we say that the tenth heaven does not have influence over the ninth, because it is placed in another order, and therefore it is also not disordered and useless. And this is also the reason (as I think) why it will not be renewed on the day of judgment, nor rewarded further than it is rewarded now: because that state does not grow nor is amended, unless perhaps in accidental reward, not substantial.

To the other it must be said that right and left (as the Philosophers wished) are taken according to differences of position not simply, but according to what is ordered by motion to attain that which it intends from the influence of the splendor of intelligence. And this is clear from this, because otherwise that part which is right would sometimes be in the West. And again from this, that the right of the planets and the circle of signs is on the left of the first orb, as the Philosopher wishes in the second book of On the Heavens and the World, if anyone looks subtly there.

This again is clear from this, that the right in any heaven is twofold, and similarly the left, as Ptolemy says in his Quadripartite. For the right aspect is from the East to the middle of the heaven, and the left is from the middle of the heaven to the descending sign which is the West: and again the right is from the West to the angle of the middle earth, and again the left from the angle of the middle earth to the angle of the ascending sign which is the East. This again is clear from this, that in the eccentric orb and epicycle there are different rights and different lefts. And again from this, that the orb of the moon has another right according to the center of the epicycle, and another according to the point of the elevation of the apogee in the deferent, and a third still according to the point of the head and tail of the dragon which its circle makes from the intersection of the equant. And because some are ignorant of these, therefore they say marvelous things about the right and left of the heaven. Hence right and left are not caused in the heaven from the empyrean heaven, but rather from the disposition of God as we believe, or from the order of God and the influence of intelligence, as all the Philosophers say.

To what is further asked, whether it is illuminated by the sun, or stars, I say that I do not know: but I affirm this from the Apocalypse, that it does not need illumination: and if it is illuminated, this is for the well-being of congruence. And this has testimony from Saint Basil on that: "The voice of the Lord cutting the flame of fire." For Basil says that the cutting of the flame of fire is so that the light of fire is given upwards to the elect, and the heat downwards to the reprobate. For it is fitting that the light of the whole dwelling flows to the good of the glory of the inhabitant, and the horror of the opacity of the whole world to the place of the damned, so that thus is verified that of Wisdom, 5:21: The orb of the earth will fight with him against the senseless.

Articulus 6 — Whether In The Empyrean Heaven There Is Any Vocal Praise, By Which The Morning Stars Are Said To Have Praised God

Whether in the empyrean heaven there is some vocal praise, by which the morning stars are said to have praised God?

§ 51. Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, F, near the end: When the morning stars praised, etc. [132].

§ 52. For from this it seems, that the praise is vocal: because this is also hinted, Isa. 6:3: They cried one to another. And in Revelation 14:11: And they have no rest day and night, etc. And it is easy to collect many other things to this point.

§ 53. BUT AGAINST: 1. Damascenus says, that they pass their counsels to one another without speech uttered by voice.

§ 54. 2. Also, Gregory: The voice of Angels in the praise of the Creator is in the very admiration of intimate contemplation.

§ 55. 3. Also, Voice does not seem to be able to be made without breathed air broken and struck: but since such things are not there, it does not seem that vocal praise can be there.

§ 56. 4. Also, The praise of the mind is nobler than of the mouth: therefore it seems, that that is going to be there.

§ 57. 5. Also, Uniformly of the blessed there is one mode of praise: but to Angels according to their state vocal praise does not befit: since therefore the beatitude of men will be like that of Angels, it seems that vocal praise also does not befit men.

§ 58. Solution. Concerning this the sentence of the holy Doctors is doubtful, and I rather think, that either there is no vocal praise there, or if there will be, it will not be except in demonstration of the power of the praiser, so that in this the beauty of wisdom may be shown which so ordained the organs that they could burst forth into such a voice. when the morning stars gave praise together, etc.

§ 59. And according to this it must be said to that which is objected concerning breathed air, that I well think that it will not then be through that mode in which it is now, but rather through sounds modulated in the nature of the body of the orb of the empyrean heaven: and we say, that there is no corruption of nature nor ignominy there, if it is struck, and a glorious tongue is formed into a voice: but rather it is more glorious, if the glorious voice of the praise of the Creator is formed in it.

§ 60. To the others the solution is clear: because they do not prove except by a mode of congruity, and that congruity can be attended to which is of the mode of wisdom in the use of ordained organs.

§ 61. And note, that Angels are called morning stars insofar as in them preexisted the morning knowledge of the light of this world in the exit of all creatures into being. For a star [sidus] is called from the sideration and brightness of a star: because, as Isidore says, it is

considered by sailors observing them. And stella (star) is called from standing [stando]: because when the orb is moved it itself is not moved in the same way, as the Astronomers say, but also has another motion: or because according to Aristotle it is not moved except by the motion of its circle, and not through itself. But an astrum is called a great star, or rather one constellation, like the Pleiades, or Hyades, which are named constellations, or the Dog which is a black star shining in the foot of Orion.

Articulus 7 — What The Heaven Of The Trinity Is

What is the heaven of the Trinity?

§ 63. Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, Here it is usually asked, If in the empyrean heaven, etc.

§ 64. And two things are asked here concerning the heaven of the Trinity, namely, what it is, and what is in it?

§ 65. But it seems, that the heaven of the Trinity is a body.

§ 66. 1. Whatever things are truly posited in one division of one common thing, are of one genus: but the heaven of the Trinity is posited by the Saints with other heavens in the same division: therefore it is of the same nature as other heavens: but other heavens are a body: therefore

the heaven of the Trinity is a body, as it seems.

§ 68. 2. Also, Everything to which differences of position befit, is a body: differences of position befit the heaven of the Trinity: therefore it is a body. The FIRST is clear through itself. The SECOND is proven through the saying of Lucifer, who says: I will ascend into heaven therefore he was above the empyrean heaven: but being above speaks of position.

§ 69. BUT AGAINST: 1. Anselm says that God is greater than can be thought: therefore nothing encompassing Him is posited: therefore neither a corporeal heaven.

§ 70. 2. Also, Damascenus says, that He is infinite for this reason, because He is circumscribed neither by place, nor by time, nor by intellect: therefore He is not a body.

§ 71. Solution. It must be said, that the heaven of the Trinity is not a body: but is the same as the sublimity of God, as the Master says in the Text. Note however, that heaven expresses three things of its ratio, namely, the sublimity of nature and of place and of dignity, and containment from the fact that it encompasses all things, and it expresses a place of highest rest and delight. Therefore God will be called the heaven of the Trinity according as He Himself by the sublimity of active power most nobly encompasses and contains Himself perfectly, and all other things, and supremely rests in Himself and is delighted.

§ 72. To the first therefore it must be said, that the common element in which the common [genus] of the heavens is taken, is a commonality of proportion and analogy from such prop-

132. Job 38:7.

erties as have been stated, expressed rather than from things dividing the nature of the ninth heaven: and therefore the objection does not proceed.

§ 73. To another it must be said, that this which in corporeal things is position, this in spiritual things is order: and therefore he signified the order of dignity rather than a position by the word of ascending.

Articulus 8 — What There Is In The Heaven Of The Trinity

What is in the heaven of the Trinity?

§ 75. Secondly it is asked, What is in the heaven of the Trinity?

§ 76. But it seems that God is not in it: because

§ 77. 1. The Philosopher says that nothing is in itself: therefore since the heaven of the Trinity is the same as God, it seems God is not in the heaven of the Trinity.

§ 78. 2. Also, The Philosopher says in the book On Heaven and Earth, that outside heaven there is neither place, nor time, but a blessed life: therefore it seems since God is a blessed life, that He ought rather to be said to be outside heaven than in heaven.

§ 79. 3. Also, Christ according to his humanity seems to be in the heaven of the Trinity: because thus it says, Psal. 18:7: His going out is from the end of heaven: and his circuit even to the end thereof. But it is certain, that the egress was not through the laying down of deity, but through the assumption of humanity from the heaven of the Trinity: therefore the return was to the same, and thus according to humanity He is in the heaven of the Trinity.

§ 80. 4. Also, This Stephen says, Act. 7:56: Behold I see the heavens opened, and the Son of man standing on the right hand of God. Psal. 109:1: Sit thou at my right hand.

§ 81. 5. Also, It seems that the Blessed Virgin is in the heaven of the Trinity. For it was held above, that the empyrean heaven immediately as it was made, was filled with holy Angels: and this is not understood of the filling of a place, just as grain fills a sack, but rather of the distinction of orders in beatitude: but concerning the Blessed Virgin it is read in the epistle of Jerome On the Assumption of the Virgin, that she is exalted above the choirs of Angels to the celestial realms. Since

therefore the choirs of Angels fill all the altitude of the empyrean heaven, it seems that she is exalted beyond the empyrean heaven, and beyond that there is nothing except the heaven of the Trinity: therefore it seems, that she is exalted into that.

§ 83. Solution. We say, that in the heaven of the Trinity there is nothing except God the Trinity, the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit: because to be in the heaven of the Trinity is to be in the equality of the eminence of God.

§ 84. To the first it must be said, that nothing in one mode of signifying is contained in itself. But although God and the heaven of the Trinity are the same, nevertheless they differ according to the mode of signifying, and that diverse mode of signifying suffices for the transition which the preposition denotes.

§ 85. To another it must be said, that this is said of the corporeal heaven, not the spiritual, which is the heaven of the Trinity: and the Philosopher wishes to say, that the blessed life is neither included, nor excluded by place, as was said in the first book of the Sentences: nor is it said to be outside heaven as in a place, but rather in an object which is not included by heaven.

§ 86. To another it must be said, that the person of the man Christ is in the heaven of the Trinity, but not the human nature, but rather in the better goods, and the disposition of this is greater and not more sufficient. And what the right hand of the Father is, is noted below.

§ 87. To that which is objected concerning the Blessed Virgin, it must be said that she is not exalted in place beyond the distinctions of Angels, but in dignity, and order. And this is clear thus, because in the heaven of the Trinity is the beatifying only, and this is not included in the empyrean heaven, but in that of the Trinity: and there is the beatified only, and this is included in the order of the distinction of Angels: and there is the beatified working toward the redemption of others to be beatified through reparation, and this is where human nature is united, to which the Blessed Virgin is subjoined, for the reason that from her that nature was accepted: and those two natures pour forth light upon all other blessed ones. And concerning Christ it is certain through that Revelation 21:23: The lamp thereof is the Lamb. Concerning the Blessed Virgin it is understood through that Revelation 12:1: And a great sign appeared in heaven: a woman clothed with the sun, and the moon under her feet, and on her head a crown of twelve stars. This woman is the blessed Virgin and mother: clothed with the sun, that is, with the dignity and brightness of her Son who is called the sun: the moon under her feet, that is, the militant Church still subject to monthly defects, fallen before her feet to postulate indulgence: a crown of twelve stars is the universality of all the blessed, which is proven: a crown is a circle, and signifies the circle of signs: and to the circle of signs every star which is in heaven is reduced through the twelve images which are called signs: and therefore through the twelve stars all the blessed are signified, who are on her head like a crown: because they receive light from her, and into her all the Saints pour back this which they have of dignity and grace under Jesus her Son, and under God.

DISTINCTIO III

Divisio Textus

§ 88. DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Behold it is shown where the Angels were soon as they were created. Here the Master begins to treat of intrinsic things pertaining to the first state of the creation of Angels.

§ 89. Now it is divided into three parts, according to the three questions which the Master touches upon here. The first is about the natural properties of Angels. The second is about the habits of grace or malice, asking, Whether they were created in grace, or in malice, or in

neither, or not? And this begins in the fourth distinction, there A, After these it is to be seen, Whether, etc.

§ 90. The first of these contains three particles: in the first of which he treats of those things which are naturally attributed to the angelic creature. In the second he treats of the difference of Angels in participating in those attributes, there, B, Here it is to be considered, etc. In the third he posits their agreement according to equality in other things, there, C, And just as in the aforesaid, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether The Angel Exists, And Has An Order In The Universe

Whether an Angel exists, and has an order in the universe?

Whether an Angel exists, and whether it has an order in the universe?

Three questions occur before the Letter, of which the first is: Whether an Angel exists? The second: What it is according to its nature? The third: Whether an Angel is the same thing that the Philosophers posited as an intelligence?

Therefore, to the first it is objected thus: § 1. Aristotle says in Physics VIII , that if of two composed things one is found by itself, it is necessary that the other also be found; and although the Philosopher himself intends this concerning the composition of a mover and a mobile, nevertheless the Commentator says that this is also true in mixed things, as is evident in mead: for since water is sometimes found by itself, it is necessary that honey also sometimes be found by itself. But in the lower realm we find corporeal substance by itself, and substance composed of the corporeal and the rational incorporeal: therefore it is necessary that rational incorporeal substance also be found by itself. Now, this we call an Angel: therefore Angels exist.

§ 2. Again, everything that is moved is moved by something; the heavens are moved: therefore they are moved by some mover. But since the heavens are incorruptible according to their nature, it is necessary that they be moved by a separate incorruptible substance, and this some call an Angel.

But because those are the arguments of certain people and are entirely worthless, as will be clear later, therefore, using Catholic principles, let it be objected otherwise thus:

§ 1. The wisdom ordering the going forth of creatures into being completes the grade of beings in all things. Since, therefore, there is something above the rational of a more perfect power short of God and communicable to a creature, the ordering wisdom will complete that, and the intellectual nature is more perfect than the rational, as was clear above in the question concerning the difference between the soul and an Angel: therefore wisdom will make it. Now, that is called an Angel by the sacred Expositors: therefore the Angel exists.

§ 2. Again, Aristotle says near the beginning of De Animalibus VIII , that nature completes the grades in all things; for it does not immediately transfer itself from a marine swimming thing to making a stepping thing, except through all intermediaries: for it makes a certain thing that dwells in the sea and seeks food on land, and a certain thing that dwells on land

and seeks food in the water, and so concerning others. But Wisdom is much more ingenious: therefore it seems that it completes all grades. Therefore, after the uncreated spirit, which is neither circumscribed by place nor defined by place, whom we call God, He does not immediately make a body: but in the order of nature He makes a created spirit, not circumscribed by place, but defined by it: and this we call an Angel: therefore Angels exist.

§ 3. Again, in creatures there is found one thing near to nothingness which is prime matter, deficient in all form, as Augustine says therefore it is necessary that something be found near to God. But this cannot be a body, nor a composite of body and spirit: therefore it is a simple spirit: and this we call an Angel: therefore the Angel exists.

§ 4. Again, the good is communicative of itself; therefore it communicates being in all ways in which it can be communicated. But we see that it is communicated through the intention of nature, and it is communicated through the intention of cognition in symbols and figures, as to men having sense and a rational intellect: therefore it is necessary that there be something to which that is communicated, namely, through intuitive intellect openly, or else the order of the creating wisdom would not be complete.

But if you should say that the first truth and goodness is not communicated to us in symbols except from sin, and not from nature, that is plainly false: because before Adam had sinned, the Lord God took the man and placed him in the paradise of pleasure, so that he might work and guard it. Augustine says that he ought to have read God in the works of nature. Moreover, He would otherwise have given us sense uselessly.

ON THE CONTRARY: There is nothing in the universe that does not have an order to another: as is clear, that the higher things are movers, and the lower things are mixable by their motion, and the generated things are moved and mixed. Therefore, if Angels exist, it is necessary that they have an order: because there are many more Angels than there are motions, and mobile things, and stars of the heaven.

If you say that they are ordered to the ministry of the elect. On the contrary: If there were no sin, we would not need their ministry: therefore this was not the reason for their creation.

If you say that they are ordered to assist God, this does not seem to be the case, because God does not need their assistance. Therefore it seems that Angels do not have an order in the universe: and whatever does not have an order in the universe, does not exist: therefore Angels seem not to exist: and therefore, perhaps, some have said that there is no Angel whatsoever.

Solution. If it is permitted to prove through the authorities of the Canon and the Bible in this disputation, Scripture abounds regarding this in many ways from the New and Old Testament. But we have undertaken this disputation against certain modern Philosophers who hold erroneous views about Angels.

Therefore, I well concede that the first two arguments are ridiculous in this matter: because the statement of the Philosopher is understood concerning composites from a distinct mover and a distinct mobile, of which one does not have being in the other like form in matter, just as

the moving heaven is a moved thing, or something else, and the moved earth is a non-mover: therefore there will also be a non-moved mover. But the statement of the Commentator is understood concerning things mixable by their substance, when they are divided, and could be divided. For if the proposition is taken generally, it is necessarily proved that the soul of an ass is separated immortal: because a body is found by itself, and a composite from a body and the soul of an ass: therefore the soul of an ass exists [by itself], which is a heresy. Hence it does not hold in those things which are composed like form and matter, and whose separation from each other removes the ratio of the conjoined thing: because a body separated from a soul does not have the ratio of a conjoined body.

To the other, however, it must be said that it is insanity: because we will never deviate into this error of saying that Angels are necessary for the motion of the celestial spheres, although we do not deny that they can move them; but their number and the reason for their creation do not depend upon that.

To the last it must be said that there are two orders of the world: one according to the state of generation, and the other according to the state of beatitude and grace. In the first state the Angel does not have a necessary order, but in the second, because in their lots and grades the rewards of graces are distinguished.

Articulus 2 — What An Angel Is By Definition

What is an Angel by definition?

Secondly, it is asked, What is an Angel?

And John Damascene gives this definition: An Angel is an intellectual substance, always mobile, free in choice, incorporeal, ministering to God, receiving immortality according to grace, not by nature.

But this definition seems to be open to criticism in the tenth book of First Philosophy because

§ 1. Of the corporeal and incorporeal there is not the same genus: therefore much less of the corruptible and incorruptible. If therefore corporeal things are in the genus of substance, incorporeal things are not in it.

§ 2. Again, whatever things are in some genus, their participation is through one mode of the principles of that genus: therefore if the Angel is in the genus of incorporeal substance, they will participate in the same way. And this is false: because if certain people say that Angels are from matter, nevertheless they say that matter and the matter of corporeal things are of a different mode.

If you say that substance is predicated of them by priority and posteriority. On the contrary: A genus is not predicated of those things which are in the genus by priority and posteriority, but a principle can be predicated of principled things by priority and posteriority. If therefore substance is predicated by priority and posteriority of the corporeal and the Angel, the Angel is not in substance as in a genus. But on the contrary is the fact that

Porphyry posits the first division of substance by corporeal and incorporeal: therefore, since a difference added to a genus makes a species, it seems that incorporeal substance is in the genus of substance.

Again it is objected concerning the second particle, namely, intellectual:

§ 1. For spiritual or incorporeal is more a difference touching nature, and intellectual touching more the power: therefore it ought to be defined by incorporeal or spiritual rather than by intellectual.

§ 2. Again, why does he not posit rational, since this is more common, and more common differences ought principally to be posited near the beginning of a definition?

Furthermore, it is objected concerning what he says, Always mobile.

For this seems in no way fitting:

§ 1. For according to the Philosopher, that which is always mobile is maximally imperfect: therefore if the Angel is always mobile, it will be maximally imperfect according to its nature.

§ 2. Moreover, it is understood either concerning motion according to place, or according to will, or according to nature. That it is not according to place is evident: because it is not always moved according to place. Moreover, some of them are never sent: therefore they are never moved: and yet they are Angels. If according to will, this again does not seem so, because only some were moved according to will, and others were afterwards confirmed in what they will: therefore they are not always mobile. If in the third way, this is absolutely false: because then it would behoove them to be altered and generated according to substance, which is absurd; therefore they are not always mobile.

Furthermore, it is asked concerning what he says, Free in choice.

§ 1. For since other things accrue to it, such as personal distinction and simplicity of essence, why did he not posit those just like this one?

§ 2. Again, what is not equally participated by those having a common nature ought not to be posited in the definition of that nature, because otherwise equivocation would occur. But to be free in choice is not equally participated by Angels: therefore it ought not to be posited in the definition of an Angel. The first part is evident in itself. The second will be written immediately in the Letter in this distinction.

It is also objected concerning what he says, Incorporeal.

§ 1. For Damascene says in the same place that with respect to God they are only corporeal, but with respect to us they are incorporeal. Therefore, if it belongs to them respectively to be corporeal and incorporeal, whichever of the two is accidental to them, not defining the Angel substantially.

§ 2. Again, what in itself is a substance can be compared to nothing with respect to which

it is not a substance. If therefore Angels in themselves were incorporeal, they can be corporeal with respect to nothing: but they are incorporeal.

Concerning the following point which he says, Ministering to God, it is objected: because since demons are Angels, it is not fitting for them to minister to God: therefore the definition is not convertible.

Again, concerning the last point which he says, Receiving immortality according to grace, not by nature.

For this seems false: because

§ 1. Nothing is naturally mortal except what is composed of contraries, as the Philosopher says, and this on account of the mutual action and passion of the contraries, and also on account of their motion toward contraries, because the light part in a mixed body strives upwards, but the heavy downwards, and thus they will sometimes separate, and corruption will occur. But it is not thus in an Angel: therefore it is not mortal according to its nature.

§ 2. Again, the Philosopher also seems to wish in the first book of De Coelo et Mundo that the heaven is immortal, which nevertheless is a body: therefore much more will Angels be immortal by nature.

§ 3. Again, it is not fitting to say that demons have grace, and yet they are immortal: therefore immortality does not accrue by grace, but by nature, as it seems.

§ 4. Again, nothing dies or is corrupted unless by something stronger acting upon it. But nothing short of God is stronger than an Angel: therefore nothing will corrupt it: therefore by nature it is immortal, as it seems.

Solution. It must be noted beforehand that this description of an Angel belongs as much to the good as to the bad, and below, in the second question concerning Angels, we will lay down one that belongs to the good Angels only, and in the following treatise concerning motion, we will lay down another that belongs to the bad Angels only.

Therefore, this definition which belongs to the good and the bad has substance for its genus, and adds six differences from other things which are in the same genus. That he therefore says, Intellectual, distinguishes it in my judgment from other animated substances, such as the vegetative and the sensible. But that he says, Always mobile, distinguishes it from the first substance which alone is immobile by nature. But that he says, Free in choice, distinguishes it from those things which do not have free choice, such as animals. But that he says, Incorporeal, distinguishes it from bodies, such as the heaven and the elements. But that he says, Ministering to God, distinguishes it from man who ministers to himself on account of indigence, to which the Angel is not subject: and this with respect to act. But that he says, According to grace, distinguishes the Angel from those things which are subject to corruption, because through grace and the benefit of creation they received the benefit of immortality. Some, however, say that ministering to God is not posited there except by occasion of the good Angels: and I do not think this is true: but according to the nature of an Angel, every act of his is ordered to the ministry of God. And it is not thus in the works of men.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that the Philosopher does not speak there of a predicable genus according to some common ratio, but of a genus which is a primary subject or matter: because otherwise it would be false.

To the other it must be said that it is not necessary, for some things to be in one genus, that they be from the same principles of that genus, but that there be in them a proportion to one ratio of principles. And this is well saved in Angels; because in them it is possible to find active and passive potency, although it is not possible to find matter and form, as will be clear later. For Aristotle says: In every nature it is possible to find something by way of potency, and something by way of act. For an Angel is in a certain way a potential being through the possible intellect, and is a being in act through the agent [intellect].

To the other it must be said that intellectual separates from more things than incorporeal,

because it separates from the rational soul according as it is strictly taken: whereas incorporeal does not separate from it, but from corporeal substance, with which the rational soul communicates.

To the other it must be said that rational, as Augustine and Isaac say, is not the proper difference of an Angel, but rather of man and the rational soul.

To the other it must be said that always mobile is said by choice or will; and always is added so that it may be understood that this belongs to it of itself in every state of its being, even if it is not moved through grace: and thus the objection ceases.

To that which is objected concerning what he says, Free in choice, it must be said that two among the attributes are referred to the substance according to nature, namely, subtlety of essence and personal distinction: and therefore they cannot be taken in place of differences: because differences are taken on the part of the act or the form: but perspicacity of intelligence is posited in the first difference, and free in choice is posited here.

To the other it must be said that as to the habit of the power which is free choice, it is not by priority and posteriority: but rather by things ordering to the act: and this will be more discussed below. Hence it suffices to say here that in one way it receives more and less, and in another way it does not.

To that which is objected concerning the other difference, it must be said that an Angel is absolutely an incorporeal substance: and that it is said by Damascene and Gregory to be a body, is not said on account of the nature of a body, but on account of a property of a body, which is to be contained and defined by a place: and therefore those two objections are sophistical.

To that which is objected concerning the last point, it must be said that in my judgment he calls grace there a gift given with nature. For every created nature, insofar as it is brought out of nothing, would tend into non-being, if the hand of the omnipotent God did not hold it together: and by this hand I understand nothing other than the will, for a nature separated from contraries to remain in being: for in that He removed it from contrariety, He willed it to remain incorruptible. And Plato seems to mean this in the Timaeus , who says that they are in-

deed dissoluble by nature, but remaining by the will of the Creator: although this is better understood of the planets, which Plato thought to be fiery, and therefore corruptible by nature.

And through this the solution to the first three is clear: because the Philosopher speaks of another mode of mortality and immortality.

To the last it must be said that there is no stronger agent except God, and He does not destroy what He has made: but Damascene calls nature the defect which is in any created thing from the fact that it went forth into being after there was nothing of it.

Articulus 3 — Whether Theologians Call Angels Those Separate Substances Which Philosophers Call Intelligences

Whether the Theologians call Angels those separate substances which the Philosophers call intelligences?

Thirdly it is asked, Whether we call Angels those separate substances which the Philosophers call intelligences, as some contentiously presume to defend?

It seems that we do: because; § 1. Avicenna says thus, that intelligences are what the common people and the speakers in the law call Angels. § 2. Again, Algazel says this same thing before the end of his Metaphysics. § 3. Again, Rabbi Moses says this in the second collection of the Guide for the Perplexed therefore it seems that they understand this.

§ 4. Again, the Philosophers posit intelligences as separate substances, and we call Angels separate spiritual substances: therefore we intend to say the same thing by

Angels that they do by intelligences, as it seems.

§ 5. Again, an intellectual substance does not have anything before it in the order of the universe according to the Philosophers except the first cause: and we say the same concerning Angels: therefore it seems that we intend the same thing by Angels that they do by intelligences.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. No Philosopher ever posited that intelligences are moved locally, but rather they write that they are immobile. We say an Angel is a messenger, because it is frequently sent moved locally: therefore we do not understand the same thing.

§ 2. Again, every Philosopher positing intelligences says that they move the heavens, as the desired object moves the desirer: but we do not say this of Angels: therefore, etc.

§ 3. Again, all Philosophers agree in this, that the number of intelligences is in one of three ways, namely, either according to the number of the mobile spheres, or according to the number of motions, or according to the number of stars which are in the mobiles: but we repute all these things absurd concerning Angels: therefore, etc.

§ 4. Again, every Philosopher positing intelligences says that one is the cause of another in the order of nature, not of time: but we say none of these things concerning Angels: therefore, etc.

Now it might be that someone says that I do not understand the Philosophers speaking of intelligences. But to this I answer that it is true that I understand little; but it is not uncertain to me that this is the intellect of the Philosophers speaking of intelligences. And what is certain to me is that anyone saying that Angels are intelligences, and are moved locally, or even immediately move the heavens, and not only as a desired object moves a desirer, that he never knew the nature of an intelligence, nor understood the Philosophers speaking of intelligences. For they posit only one single intelligence which is a necessary being, and from its splendor and its possible [aspect] which never fails it, as they say, it brings forth an intelligence of the first order; and from that, according to the orb and with the soul of the orb, an intelligence of the second order; and from that the third orb and an intelligence of the third order, and so on up to the intelligence of the tenth order, which is the mover as a desired object of the sphere of active and passive things, which is brought forth from the distinction of places under the orb of the moon, whose intelligence's splendor they say is every form of the matter of generable and corruptible things, and the form of the possible intellect. And all these things we repute erroneous when said of Angels.

And therefore I consent to this part, that an Angel is not the same thing that the Philosophers said an intelligence is, nor do I even say that they are intelligences, as is found below in the question concerning the works of the fourth day, and concerning the heavens: because it seems to me that this cannot be posited Catholically.

To the first three it must be said that those Philosophers speak according to their own intentions: but we do not posit Angels to be thus.

To the other it must be said that we separate Angels by a different separation than they separate intelligences. For they posited that they were not conjoined to matter, nor had material forms, but simple universal ones which are the rational principles of the heaven's motion: but they determined the intelligence to a determining mover who receives the species from the splendor of the intelligence, and moves its heaven to the attainment of that mobile species so that it may be produced in being. But we repute this foolishness, who say that God causes and disposes the world according to His will, and we separate all Angels from matter, and from a determination to a mover and to the motion of any body: but they direct their intention to God alone through contemplation, and to us through ministry.

To the other it must be said that the order of the universe according to the Philosophers is entirely other than according to us. Because they posit the order from one, that from that which is necessary and one, nothing can [proceed] except one which is possible and necessary: possible indeed in itself, and necessary from the first. And from that which is two, two are brought forth, namely its heaven, and another intelligence, as we said above; and the heaven [is brought forth] through motion, and by which a part approaches something and recedes from something is the principle of diversity; and from the part of the intelligence other intelligences are also brought forth. But we posit the order thus, that the corporeal and spiritual exist simultaneously from one agent in accordance with the liberty of His will, and not by nature and necessity, as they posit. And we say that the Angel is first after God not in the order of cause, but in the order of status and dignity.

Articulus 4 — Whether An Angel Is A Simple Substance

Whether an Angel is a simple substance?

Next, it is asked concerning what he says there at A, And indeed four things seem to be attributes to Angels, etc. And five things are asked: of which four are concerning those in order which he enumerates, but the fifth concerning all in common.

Therefore it is asked first: Whether an Angel is a simple substance?

It seems, however, that it is not: § 1. For the Philosopher says: Everything that is one in number, is one through matter. But an Angel is one in number: therefore it is one through matter, as it seems. But nothing has matter unless it has form: therefore an Angel is composed of matter and form.

§ 2. Again, Boethius in the beginning of his book De Trinitate This is truly one which depends on nothing, in which there is no number. And he intends this concerning God alone: therefore everything that is a 'this something' [hoc aliquid], in nature is said to have number: and thus it is composite.

§ 3. Again, Boethius, in the same place: A simple form cannot be a subject. Therefore if an Angel is a simple form, it cannot become a subject: but it is the subject of grace, and of knowledge, and of many other things: therefore it is not a simple form. And it is certain that it is not simple matter: therefore it is composite.

§ 4. Again, Boethius, in the beginning of the book De Hebdomadibus [133], saying: What is it to have something besides that which it itself is: but being has nothing admixed to it. Therefore an Angel is not simple being, since it can have something besides that which it itself is: because it itself is not whatever it has: therefore being in it is one thing, and that which it is [quod est], is another: therefore it is composite.

§ 5. Again, Boethius, in the same place: Whatever is this 'something', has one thing by which it is, and another by which it is something. But it is certain that an Angel is a 'this something': therefore it has one thing by which it is, and another by which it is a 'this something': therefore it is composite.

§ 6. Again, the Philosopher, in the beginning of the book De Anima [134] maintains that matter is not a 'this something', nor even form, but the composite: therefore since an Angel is a 'this something', it seems that an Angel is composite.

§ 7. Again, in everything in which it is possible to receive the universal according to nature, and the particular, in that thing there is composition: for the Philosopher says, when I say 'heaven', I say form: when I say 'this heaven', I say matter. Therefore since according to nature it is thus said 'Angel', and 'this Angel', composition seems to be supposed in it.

§ 8. Again, Avicenna says that every form is common of itself: therefore if it is individuated, this is not unless upon something which is the foundation of being upon which it is founded. But it is certain that the nature of an Angel is individuated in this Angel: therefore there is a foundation upon which it is restricted: therefore it has matter and form.

§ 9. To this some have wished to say that there is a composition from the nature of the universal and particular form, just as the Philosopher says concerning the heaven, When I say 'this heaven', I say matter: when I say 'heaven', I say form, and they call this logical composition. And there is a composition from that which is (quod est) and by which it is (quo est), and they call this metaphysical. And by these two compositions they say an Angel is composed. But there is a third composition which is from form and matter, which is physical composition: and they say this does not belong to an Angel.

And it seems strange to me if those who say this understand what they say: for every essential composition of what is not a subject and an accident is from some essential form. But that can only be the form of the whole, or a part of the whole. For example, 'man' and 'this man' has a composition: for there is a universal form consequent upon the whole composite, as a certain Philosopher says: and therefore it can also be predicated of that whose form it is. But if it is not such, then it is necessarily the form of a part: thus the form is the form of a nature, and that is the other part of the composite, and it is not predicated of the composite: since, as Avicenna says, a form does not have that which can be predicated insofar as it is a form, but rather insofar as it is the form of the whole, being in a certain way the same as that of which it is predicated. Therefore it seems that the division of that composition is only twofold: because 'that which is' (id quod est) is the same as the particular; and 'by which it is' (quo est), or being (esse), is the same as the universal nature.

Again, I say thus: If there is there the form of the whole, it is necessary that it flows from the whole; therefore it presupposes composition in that whose form it is, as it seems.

§ 10. Again, of those things which are in a genus, there are the same principles of participating in that genus. But Angels are in the genus of substance: therefore they will participate in the genus by the same principles by which other substances participate in it. But these are form and matter: therefore Angels are from matter and form, as it seems.

§ 11. Again, Philosophers say that all intelligences which are short of the first cause are composed of possible being and necessary being. But possible being is the being of matter: therefore it seems that they are from matter and form.

§ 12. Again, in De Anima II, the Philosopher says that in every nature there is potency and act: therefore also in an Angel. But potency and act are form and matter: therefore an Angel is from matter and form.

§ 13. Again, whatever belongs to many things and not by itself, and belongs to something by itself: it is necessary that it belongs to all of them by grace of that alone which is in all of them: just as because having three angles belongs to the isosceles, the equilateral, and the scalene, and not by itself, and to the rectilinear triangle by itself, it is necessary that it belongs to them by grace of the nature of the triangle which is in them. Thus, 'to stand under' [substare, be a subject] belongs to many things, because to all substances: and not by itself, because Boethius says that a simple substance cannot stand under. Again, it belongs to

133. Boethius, De Hebdomadibus.

matter, and by itself: because it cannot be reduced to anything prior. Therefore to all things to which it belongs to stand under some form, it belongs to them by grace of the matter which is in them: but this belongs to all Angels: therefore all Angels are from matter and form, as it seems.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. Augustine says that the soul is a simple substance: therefore much more so the Angel: therefore it is not composite.

§ 2. Again, the Master says here that simplicity of essence is an attribute of an Angel: therefore an Angel is simple, as it seems.

§ 3. Again, a point is simple, and yet has position in a continuum: therefore much more so is an Angel simple who is indivisible, such that it does not have position.

§ 4. Again, the propositions of Boethius by which it is proved that an Angel is not simple do not seem to be valid: because every form is simple: and yet I can say that there is whiteness, and this whiteness. Again, I can say that this whiteness is this...

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something [a "this something"], and yet it itself is simple: therefore "this something" does not imply composition: therefore the reasons previously adduced do not seem to be valid.

§ 2. Solution. My opinion has always been that an Angel is composed of essential parts, but not of matter and form: because I do not say that matter is the first principle of the composition of substance in general, but of moved substance: and therefore where there is no potency to motion, I do not say that there is matter unless matter is taken very broadly and improperly. For it seems to me that the Philosophers do not speak of matter unless it is under some privation. However, I well say that if it is called a foundation, that then it is [composed] of matter and form: because the Philosopher says in book VII of the First Philosophy [Metaphysics] that the foundation [subject] is neither "how much", nor "of what sort", nor any of the other predicaments. But Boethius in the book On the Two Natures in the One Person of Christ does not call matter thus, nor do the natural Philosophers, nor does the Mathematician speak of matter in this way.

§ 3. Yet there are some who say that matter varies in three ways, namely, that some is determined by substantial form alone: and according to this we say that matter is part of a substance, even though it is never in potency to the substance of which it is a part, as in perpetual things. Some, however, is determined by substantial form and quantity, and is never in potency to being, but is in potency to "where" [location], as in the heaven. And some is determined by substantial form, quantity, and quality, as the matter of generable and corruptible things. Therefore, when it is asked, "Whether there is one matter of corruptible and of perpetual things?" It must be said that it is not one: because thus says Boethius and all the Philosophers: for the reason that it is not called one by reason of the subject alone, but also by reason of potency: and potency is not of one ratio in them. In the same way, when it is

134. Aristotle, De Anima II.

asked, "Whether there is one matter of corporeal and incorporeal creatures?" It must be said that it is not one: because although the first foundation in itself is one, nevertheless the matter is not one. Because matter names a potency which is not of one character [ratio] in those things which are moved according to place, and those which are immobile according to place, unless perhaps definitively [by definition]. And I well agree with this opinion, and especially because of this: because it seems impossible that some property should be in diverse things which is not in them by grace of some common substance: but a property common to many, both spiritual and corporeal things, is to stand under and sustain a form. Therefore it is necessary to posit a common substance which is in them: and this, in my judgment, will not be called matter, but a foundation. Another reason is the one adduced above in objecting, that of those things which are in the same genus, it is necessary that there be one common habitude to the principles of that genus: but it is manifest that the indivisible principles of a genus, the subject, are the foundation, and the being of the substantial form. And through this the solution to all the things which are adduced is clear: because they do not conclude concerning matter absolutely, but concerning this foundation which is a part of substance and founds being: since, as we said above, matter will not be predicated of them except equivocally, as is clear in the ratio of potency.

§ 4. To the first, however, which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that Augustine is speaking of the simplicity of individuality, and not of the simplicity of the being itself which is a "this something."

§ 5. To the other it must be said that the Master calls simplicity the elongation from matter and materiality which causes ignobility and dullness, and he does not speak of simplicity by privation of composition.

§ 6. To the other it must be said that a point is simple by privation of the division of a continuum: but an Angel is not called simple by that simplicity, because he has no relation to a continuum, but rather in the aforesaid manner.

§ 7. To the other it must be said that if we are speaking of this whiteness according to its being, then it is not "this whiteness" except through the fact that it is in this matter. But if you speak of this whiteness insofar as it is a certain terminated form consisting within its own constituent differences, then its intellect [understanding] is absolute, as Avicenna says: but then "this whiteness" and "whiteness" do not imply the universal and the particular, but rather the universal differing in its consideration [ratio], namely considered in itself, and as terminated under its essential differences. Whence it is clear that Boethius speaks truly, if a "this something" is taken according to being: and so the saying of Boethius is understood.

§ 8. And from this it is again clear that an Angel, since he is a "this something", is without doubt composed of a foundation and the being that is founded in it: and I say this for this reason, because potency is not properly posited [in him] except perhaps to act: because the Philosopher says, "In perpetual things, to be does not differ from to be able" [Metaphysics IX]: for the reason that this "to be able" was never without "to be", and potency is said equivocally

in them [perpetual things] in relation to other things which are in potency to a "where" or to a form.

Articulus 5 — Whether A Personal Distinction Belongs To The Angels, So That Each One Is A Person

Whether personal distinction is fitting for Angels, such that each one is a person?

§ 9. Next it is asked concerning personal distinction. For it seems that personal distinction is in an Angel as in God and man. 1. It is determined through the proposition laid down earlier as a principle, that if some attribute [passio] is present in several things, it is necessary that it is present in them by reason of some common substance to which that attribute per se belongs: personal distinction is present in God, in men, and in Angels: therefore it is necessary that it is present in them in a common way. But it is present in man and in God through the ratio of the order of nature proceeding or emanating from one: therefore it is present in an Angel in this way, as it seems: which is false, since one does not produce another by generating or spirating.

§ 10. 2. Also, Master Richard of St. Victor says that personal distinction is either by origin alone, as in God; or by property alone, as in Angels; or by property and origin together, as in man. And from this many inconsistencies seem to follow, one of which is that personal distinction seems to belong to man through more things than to an Angel. And since personal distinction was one of the assigned causes of inassumptibility in Book III of the Sentences, it seems that man was less assumptible than an Angel, which is not true.

§ 11. 3. Another is: because whatever things differ by a property alone, differ only accidentally, because every property is of the genus of accidents, as Boethius says: but the personal distinction of Angels is only by a property alone: therefore Angels differ only accidentally, which is impossible. Therefore distinction in them is not by a property alone.

§ 12. Solution. It must be said that, as Richard says, a person is a being existing per se alone according to a certain singular mode of existence of a rational nature, as was explained in Book I of the Sentences: and therefore because every Angel exists per se alone in the mode of his existence in an intellectual nature, therefore each one is a person, and personal distinction belongs to them.

§ 13. Therefore to the first it must be said that personality is in God, in Angels, and in men, by prior and posterior [analogically]: and this was proved in the first book of the Sentences. And therefore a convention of proportion is sufficient, by which this common attribute may be referred to the three natures: and they say that this is the supposit of a rational creature, because this is found in God, Angel, and manand therefore it is not necessary that the mode of distinction be one, as the objection seemed to prove.

§ 14. To the other it must be said that Master Richard generally touches upon the things making and showing personal distinction: for in divine things the relation of origin makes it, but in human things the individuation over this matter, and in Angels the individuation of the being of the Angel's nature over this foundation. And the argument does not hold: "Man is

distinguished by more things than an Angel: therefore he is more distinct in person." And there discrete quantity is changed into the mode of continuous [quantity] through intension. Nor is it true that personal distinction impedes assumptibility: but rather because a person is never a person, like a man, unless first it is a person in potency, and afterwards becomes a person in act: and therefore before it becomes in act, since it does not yet have its own singularity, it can be assumed into the singularity of another: and this is not so in an Angel, whose singularity was never in potency.

§ 15. To the last it must be said that in truth properties show the singularity of a person and do not make it: but the foundation makes it, particularizing being, and individuating being itself per se over itself. But because in Angels this is remote from knowledge, therefore we know it by properties: just as also in logic, matter dividing and contracting a form makes the individual: but nevertheless it is known by a collection of individuating traits.

Articulus 6 — Whether A Naturally Inborn Reason Belongs To The Angels, On Account Of Which There Are In Them Memory, Intelligence, Will

Whether naturally implanted reason is fitting for Angels, on account of which there are present memory, understanding, and will?

§ 16. Thirdly, it is asked concerning naturally implanted reason, on account of which memory, understanding, and will are present.

§ 17. 1. For either reason is taken here for cognitive reason, or for practical reason which is divided against the irascible and concupiscible. If in the first way, then it seems that will is not present on account of it: because will is not present according to speculative reason. If in the second way, then it seems that it also contains free choice within itself: therefore there will only be three attributes: because free choice is a faculty of reason and will; of practical reason, I say, not speculative or theoretical.

§ 18. 2. Moreover, it is asked how memory is present in Angels, since according to the Philosopher memory per se belongs to the primary sensitive part? But an Angel does not have the part which is the sensitive soul.

§ 19. 3. Also, memory is determined with a difference of time: but the pure intellect abstracts from all time: since therefore the intellect of an Angel is pure, it does not seem that memory is fitting for Angels.

§ 20. 4. Also, since the intellect in us is divided into the intellect by which it becomes all things, which is called possible, and the intellect by which it makes all things, which is called agent, and the formal intellect which is speculative or acquired: is the intellect under these differences in Angels? It seems not: because their intellect was never in potency, but always perfect: but the possible intellect is that which is in potency to act: therefore an Angel does not have a possible intellect. But if you say this, then it follows that he also does not have an agent intellect: because the agent is what perfects the possible, by abstracting forms and placing them in it: since therefore the form is placed in it from the beginning of creation, it seems that

he never needs an agent: since therefore there is nothing superfluous in an Angel, it seems that he has neither an agent nor a possible [intellect].

§ 21. 5. Moreover, what is the difference between intellect and understanding [intelligentia]?

§ 22. 6. Also, it is shown concerning the will, because it is a part of free choice as appears from its definition: therefore it seems that free choice would be superfluous.

§ 23. 7. Moreover, it seems that by reason of these three an Angel is to the image [of God], just like man. But on the contrary: concerning man alone in creation was it said: Let us make man to our image and likeness.

§ 24. Solution. It must be said to the first, that reason is not taken for a spiritual potency, but rather for the higher part of the spirit, which is suited by nature to be carried to God through the habit of the true and the good impressed upon it naturally from God: as was also said in the question concerning the image of man in the first book of the Sentences. And therefore there is no point to the question, "Whether it is taken there for cognitive or practical?" But reason is taken in this way in the Gloss on Psalm 4:7: The light of thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us: for there the Gloss says that the image is threefold: of creation, of re-creation, and of likeness: and this was explained in the first book of the Sentences. And the image of creation, as the Gloss says, is reason, and reason is taken for the purer part of the mind, which contains memory, understanding, and will.

§ 25. To what is objected concerning memory, it must be said that memory is taken here as it is accepted by Augustine, which is not only of past things, but also of present and future things, that is, which abstracts from every difference of time: and it implies nothing but a treasury of the knowledge of natural habits toward those things which are naturally known, and naturally loved: such as the true and the good that is God, and the true and the good that the mind itself is. Hence the act of this memory is not to reflect upon that which it previously knew or saw: but rather its act is to know: and this "to know", as Augustine says, is nothing other than to hold the knowledge of a thing with oneself. And that act is not "to act", but rather to hold the habit which is called knowledge: and through this the solution to all the things objected concerning memory is clear.

§ 26. To what is objected concerning understanding [intelligentia], it must be said that here it is taken as it is a part of the image: and then the act of understanding according to Augustine is to intuit itself in the present knowledge which it has, or to intuit God in the knowledge of the true and good of God which it has with itself. And in this way it always intuits itself and God: because that intuiting does not mean being actually considered, but rather the thing whose knowledge it is being objected [presented] to itself in the light of knowledge: and this always happens in one way. And therefore Augustine says that the soul always understands itself, but does not always discern and think about itself: because it is always objected to itself in the light of the knowledge which is naturally impressed upon it, which is "to see" or "to understand"; but it does not always discern itself from other known things, which is "to think", as Augustine says: and the same applies to an Angel.

§ 27. But to what is asked, "Whether an Angel has a possible and an agent intellect?" It must be said that "possible" is named from potency with privation, and in this way he does not have a possible intellect, and in this way the objection proceeds. But "possible" is also called that which is the subject in which the species of knowable things are founded, and in this way he has a possible intellect perfected from the beginning of his creation, and an agent [intellect] illuminating over the possible: and through this the solution to those things which are objected concerning the differences of the intellects of the Angel himself is clear.

§ 28. To the other it must be said that according to the Philosopher the act of the intellect is accustomed to be called understanding [intelligentia], and [so is] a separate intellectual substance moving the movers of the spheres. But intellect is called by them the potency of the rational soul, or of an Angel, which receives species individuated from matter and from the conditions of matter. But Richard of St. Victor says that understanding [intelligentia] is called the intellect of divine things, as of God; whereas intellect is of other things, namely when it is referred to understanding

worldly things: but it is taken here by the Master for the intellect of Angels, which is simpler than the human.

§ 29. To what is objected concerning the will, it must be said that an Angel has a will: and although will falls into the definition of free choice, nevertheless it is not free choice, as will be clear below, where this will be asked about: because free choice receives something from reason, and something from will: and therefore it is called a faculty of both: although nevertheless it is a determined potency in itself.

§ 30. To what is objected, "Whether man or Angel is to the image of God?" It must be said that an image is so called from imitation. Therefore the imitation of the image can be considered with respect to the unity of essence in the three persons only: and thus an Angel is to the image of God, just as man is: and also by simpler potencies, and even by a simpler essence, he expresses the unity in the Trinity. But if the ratio of imitation is considered with respect to the unity of essence in the three persons, and the order of the nature of the persons, then man will be to the image, and not the Angel: because man has three potencies in one essence: and also man has the principle of his whole genus and of his nature, just as in the Father is the principle of the whole deity: and this is not in an Angel.

§ 31. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 7 — Whether Free Choice Is An Attribute Fitting To Angelic Nature, And Whether It Is Also In Angels And Men According To One Reason

Whether free choice is an attribute fitting for the angelic nature? And, whether it is also in Angels and men by one ratio?

§ 32. Fourthly, it is asked concerning free choice. For this does not seem to be a natural attribute: because natural things are not lost: but the flexibility of free choice is lost: therefore it is not an attribute of nature. The first is self-evident. The second is proved from the fact that those confirmed either in good or in evil cannot be bent to opposite acts.

§ 33. But on the contrary: In both it was flexible into whatever it wished: therefore according to one ratio.

§ 34. Also, it is asked, "Whether free choice is in Angels and men by one ratio?"

§ 35. But it seems not: because Damascene says that our free choice freely inquires and freely takes counsel: but these are not fitting except for a doubting and ignorant nature: since therefore the intellect of an Angel is deiform, it does not seem that these are fitting for his free choice.

§ 36. Solution. It must be said that free choice is fitting for Angels by nature: but its freedom is not flexibility to good and to evil: because flexibility to evil, as Anselm says, is neither freedom, nor a part of freedom: but it is free in doing what it wishes, namely, that it is not bound to one act, like a natural agent power, and that it is not impelled to the necessity of an act such that it could not abstain if it wishes: and this freedom always remains with an Angel, to whatever he turns himself. But that he is not inclined to evil when he is confirmed in the good, this is not from coercion, but from a spontaneous immobility in the good, which is confirmation: and similarly, that he is not inclined to the good after confirmation in evil, this is from spontaneous obstinacy, the cause of which will be asked below.

§ 37. Through this the solution to the first is clear.

§ 38. To what is further asked, "Whether free choice is said univocally in Angels and in us?" It must be said that it is saidby prior and posterior [analogically]: because in Angels it is freer than in us: because they do not forsake liberating rectitude. But in us it is freer than in the damned. And concerning this it will also be asked below in distinction 35, which is entirely about this. Nevertheless it can be said of us and of others by one common ratio, namely the free faculty of doing what one wishes.

Articulus 8 — Whether Four, Or Only Three, Or More, Are Attributes Of Angelic Nature

Whether four, or only three, or more are the attributes of the angelic nature?

§ 39. Fifthly, it is asked concerning all these in common.

§ 40. But it seems that there are only three attributes, because:

§ 41. 1. In the following chapter the Master enumerates only three, saying that the first consideration is of substance, the second of form, the third of power. Indeed, a person is a substance, wisdom is a form, choice is a power: therefore it seems that there are only three.

§ 42. 2. Also, it seems that there are many more: because ingenuity is fitting for every Angel, as are the irascible and concupiscible: and so it seems that there are many more.

§ 43. 3. Also, it seems that there are only two: because the Commentator [Averroes] on book XII of the First Philosophy says that separate substances, on account of their simplicity, have only two potencies, namely intellect and will: therefore it seems that there are only two attributes.

§ 44. Also it is asked, "According to what are these attributes taken?"

§ 45. Solution. It must be said to this universally first, that there are two things in an Angel: his substance considered in natural being, and the potencies consequent upon and perfecting that substance to act. Substance considered in itself is either taken from the side of "that which is" (quod est), and thus it is personal distinction; or from the side of "that by which it is" (quo est), and from that side it is subtlety, or simplicity of essence. But the potencies to act: either according to order unto God, or according to order to works. Unto God is the naturally implanted reason, and in that is memory, understanding, and will; but unto works is free choice.

§ 46. Therefore to the first it must be said that the Master comprehends under substance the two things which are comprehended according to substance, although he expresses only one.

§ 47. To the other it must be said that ingenuity is the same in substance with reason, except that it sounds of a power receiving knowledge through the innate force of reason.

§ 48. To the other it must be said that the Commentator there divides only potencies, not essential attributes.

§ 49. To what is objected concerning the irascible and concupiscible, it must be said that they are not properly in Angels, except equivocally: because they are properly parts of the sensitive power. And if they are said equivocally to be in an Angel, then it must be said that they are reduced to the will, or to free choice, which seems truer to me.

Articulus 9 — Whether In The Four Attributes Of Angelic Nature Angels Admit Of More And Less, And Are Intensified And Remitted

Whether in the four attributes of the angelic nature Angels admit of more and less, and are intended and remitted [intensified and relaxed]?

§ 50. Next it is asked concerning what he says: Here it is to be considered, whether in spiritual substance, etc.

§ 51. For here the Master says that Angels receive more and less in these things: and this does not seem so: because

§ 52. 1. Whatever things follow a species insofar as it is a species, just as a species does not receive more and less, so those things do not receive more and less, as it seems.

§ 53. 2. Also, this seems so in individual cases: for that one is not simpler than another seems so, because whatever things name a thing as in its terminus do not admit of intension and remission, nor more nor less: but simplicity names as in a terminus: therefore it does not receive more and less.

§ 54. 3. Also, all simplicity removes composition: but among composite things, one is not more composite than another, because privations are neither intended nor remitted; therefore neither is simplicity.

§ 55. 4. Also, of indivisibles, one is not more indivisible than another: but simplicity posits indivisibility: therefore it seems that one is not simpler than another.

§ 56. 5. Also, the same seems true concerning personal distinction: because if they differ in that, then that difference will be notable between the highest and the lowest Angel. But on the contrary: By the same personal distinction by which the highest is distinguished from the lowest, conversely the lowest is distinguished from the highest: therefore they do not admit of more and less, as it seems.

§ 57. 6. Also, concerning the perspicacity of remembering or understanding or willing, it seems that it does not admit of more and less: because if this diversity is in them according to the intellect, it is necessary to reduce it to some principles causing it, just as in us the speed of ingenuity is reduced to the hot moving well, and to the moist easily movable; and the goodness of memory into the dry not easily deletable, and the dry retaining, and such things. But it is manifest that we do not find such principles in an Angel: therefore it seems that all are of the same perspicacity.

§ 58. 7. In the same way it seems concerning free choice: because this freedom is only from coercion, from sin, and from misery, as will be held below: and it is manifest that all have those freedoms: therefore in free choice they do not admit of more and less.

§ 59. Solution. It must be said that in three attributes Angels admit of more and less: but I cannot see how they admit of more and less in the fourth, namely in personal distinction: and therefore I concede the argument made for this.

§ 60. But to the first I answer, that although these things follow the common nature in Angels, nevertheless they are founded upon the nature according to its being which it has in the Angel: and because its being is not one, therefore also those things are not in one way. And it is similar concerning ingenuity among us, which follows the human nature according to the being which it has in this man, and in that one: and therefore it is not in one way. But if they followed the common nature according to itself, as having three angles follows a triangle, I would well concede that they would not receive more and less. And this solution does not state the cause.

§ 61. Otherwise it can be said, that these attributes are considered in comparison to the common nature, and thus they do not receive more and less: and in comparison to act, and thus they do receive it. And this solution is less good.

§ 62. To the other it must be said that simplicity

in an Angel is not said except relatively [secundum quid]: whence also the Master in the Letter [Lombard's text] sometimes explains it by the subtlety of essence, sometimes by tenuity: but it is true that where simplicity is said absolutely, there the thing is named in its terminus: and this is not except in God alone.

§ 63. To the other it must be said that this is false, that all simplicity removes composition absolutely: but it is true that it removes some [composition], namely that which is from quantitative parts by the quantity of mass: although it leaves the composition of essence, and

of subject and accident, and that which is from virtual parts. And therefore it does not imply an omnifarious privation of composition.

§ 64. To the other it must be said that of indivisibles, in that they are indivisible, one is not more indivisible than another: but they can be divisible by another ratio through the intellect of parts, although they are not divided by effect [in reality]. And in that ratio one can be more indivisible than another, just as God is more indivisible than an Angel: and in other things this is also easy to see.

§ 65. To the following [argument], it seems to me it must be conceded.

§ 66. To the other it must be said that diversity in the perspicacity of remembering and understanding in others is reduced to the same principles: but not in us: because in us the conditions of opposite complexions thrive in memories and in ingenuity: because melancholics [thrive] in memory, and sanguines in ingenuity. But in Angels memory is nothing but the holding of the knowledge of the simple mind, and understanding is the intuition of the thing in that knowledge: and therefore they are reduced to one principle: and this is in them the diversity in the subtlety of essence: for this is followed by the fact that some have simpler forms, and some less simple ones, as will be determined below.

§ 67. To the other it must be said that even if all are free from coercion by nature, they are not nevertheless equally unimpeded to act: because better natural endowments are more unimpeded to act. And similarly grace equally frees all from fault, because the least grace leaves no fault behind, and this is freedom as to the terminus from which (a quo); but they are not equally free as to the terminus to which (ad quem): because a lesser grace does not equally enable to act as a greater one. And it is the same way concerning glory with regard to liberation from misery, and in comparison to the act of glory. But nevertheless here the Master speaks only of natural freedom, which is from coercion: because he treats only of the natural endowments of Angels.

Articulus 10 — Whether The Angels Who Were More Subtle By Nature Were More Perspicacious In Wisdom, So That Grace Is Proportioned To Nature And Thus Was Given To Them, Or According To The Striving Of Free Choice

Whether the Angels who were by nature more subtle, were by wisdom more perspicacious: such that grace is proportioned to nature: and thus it was given to them, or according to the effort of free choice?

§ 68. Next it is asked concerning what he says there, B, towards the end: For those who by nature are more subtle, and by wisdom more perspicacious, etc.

§ 69. It seems this is false. 1. For let us suppose that one who has lesser natural endowments prepares himself amply: since therefore God regards our effort, it seems that He infuses more of grace into him.

§ 70. 2. Also, let us suppose that someone having grace with lesser natural endowments devotes himself all day to good works, and another with better endowments does not: it is

manifest that God the just rewarder rewards his labor by increasing grace to him, and not to the other: therefore grace does not respond to natural endowments alone, as the Master seems to say.

§ 71. BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Matthew 25:15: He gave to each according to his proper power. And the Gloss says: that is, according to the capacity of natural endowments.

§ 72. 2. Also, let it be granted that it does not fulfill nature : therefore something which is apt to receive it remains empty, which is impossible, since Dionysius says that God's goodness diffuses itself over all intellectual faces, according to the proper analogy of each one.

§ 73. 3. Also, in Psalm 144:16: Thou openest thy hand, and fillest every animal with blessing.

§ 74. 4. Also, grace is in free choice, as Augustine says, like a rider on a horse, and an agent in act: but these are always proportioned: therefore the quantity of gratuitous gifts is according to the quantity of natural endowments.

§ 75. 5. Also, in Angels one cannot reduce the diversity of grace to any diverse preceding thing, except to the diversity of natural endowments: because no effort or merit preceded, especially according to those who say the Angel was created in grace: therefore at least in Angels grace was given according to the distinction of the natural degree.

§ 76. Solution. It must be said that it is not generally true that grace is proportioned to nature, as the first objections prove. But nevertheless I think this is true in Angels: because I am of the opinion that they were created in grace, as I will subsequently show: and therefore I concede the last objection. But nevertheless those who are of the opinion of the Master can say that in an Angel some preparation preceded the reception of grace, which God also regarded. And through this the solution to the last is clear.

§ 77. Therefore to the first it must be said that the Gloss there calls the capacity of natural endowments both the natural potency and the effort of it, according to what we say, that whatever precedes grace in us belongs to natural endowments.

§ 78. To the other it must be said that the least grace fulfills nature and superabounds. But the proof of this is that the least grace elevates nature above itself. And therefore that objection is not compelling: because a vacuum does not remain on account of this, namely, that He does not confer a greater grace. But in the authority of Dionysius, analogy is taken with respect to natural goods, and not with respect to gratuitous goods: and this is clear to one diligently inspecting his book.

§ 79. To the other it must be said that by that [animal] is named the desire gaping for grace: and it is not gaping except through preparation as much as it can.

§ 80. To the other it must be said that free choice is the horse: but through exercise and preparation it is made more apt to have a better rider, and according to this the proportion is taken.

Articulus 11 — Whether It Belongs Equally To All Angels That They Be Immortal

§ 2. Whether it belongs equally to all Angels that they are immortal? § 3. For it seems that it does not belong to them equally that they are immortal: because it was held above, that immortality belongs to them through grace, and not through nature. § 4. But to this the solution is that it belongs to them through nature and grace: because that grace, as was expounded above, is nature. § 5.

Divisio Textus

§ 6. Division of the Text § 7. DIVISION OF THE TEXT. § 8. "That too seems worthy of investigation, etc." Here begins the second question on the creation of the Angels, namely, whether they were created in grace, and malice, or not? § 9. And it has four parts: in the first of which he introduces the opinion of those who say all were created simultaneously: some in grace, some in malice. In the second, he introduces the opinion of others saying that none of them was created in grace, but all good by the goodness of nature, there, F, "But to others it seems, etc." In the third, he objects against the former opinion, and expounds the authorities which seem to favor it, there, G, "And therefore Augustine rooting out the opinion, etc." In the fourth and last, he asks about the natural knowledge, and natural love of the Angels, there, I, "Here it is usually asked, What wisdom, etc." § 10.

Articulus 12 — Whether All Angels Were Created In Grace, Or In Simple Nature

§ 12. Whether all Angels were created in grace, or in simple nature? § 14. Whether all Angels were created in grace, or in simple nature? § 15. Now three questions arise concerning the first, the first of which is, Whether all Angels were made in grace or in the simple goodness of nature? § 16. Second, Whether the Author of all good could make an Angel, or anyone evil? § 17. Third, Whether, although not malice itself, He could nevertheless have made one existing in malice, as the first opinion which he introduces seems to want? § 18. TO THE FIRST one must proceed chiefly by means of authorities: because concerning the state of an Angel our reason falls short. § 19. Therefore it seems, that all, both those who fell, and those who stood firm, were created in grace. § 20. 1. For Anselm says in the book De Casu diaboli, thus: "Those Angels who preferred that 'more' which God did not yet wish to give them, rather than to stand in the justice in which they had been made, with that same justice judging

§ 21. [them], they by no means obtained that on account of which they despised Him, and they lost the good which they held: therefore all were created in justice." § 22. 2. Also, the same, in the book Cur Deus homo, at the beginning of the book: "It is certain that rational nature was made for this purpose, that it should choose and love the supreme good above all things, not for the sake of anything else, but for the sake of the best. For if for the sake of another, it loves not it, but the other. But it cannot do this unless it is just. Therefore, so that it might not be rational in vain, it was simultaneously made just and rational for this purpose." Behold, here is simultaneously held both the authority, and the reason for the authority. § 23. 3. Also, Ibid., "As long as by choosing and loving it does what is just, for which it was made, it will be miserable: because it will be needy, not having what it desires against its will, which is

exceedingly absurd. Wherefore rational nature was so made, that by enjoying the supreme good it would be blessed." From this it is gathered, that it was also made blessed. And yet this will be discussed below. § 24. 4. Also, Augustine in book XIII of the Confessions: "Blessed creature which knows no other thing, since nevertheless itself would be another thing, except by your gift, which is borne over every mutable thing: as soon as it was made, it was raised up without an interval of time in that calling by which you said, Let there be light, and light was made. For in us time is distinguished: because we were darkness, and we are made light: but in that [creature] as it was said, what would it be unless it were illuminated: and thus it was said, that it was not first superfluous and dark: and thus it appears that it always was light: not that it might be otherwise, and being converted to the unfailing light it was light. Let him who can, understand. Let him who cannot, pray that he may receive from God." Behold, from this authority two things are gathered, namely, that they were created in grace and beatitude, and the solution to what is usually objected, that by the formless heaven the nature of the Angel is understood: because he says, that that distinction is made, so that the cause of conversion may be noted, not an interval: because the Creator converts it by calling it, and not it itself. § 25. 5. Also, the same, in book XII of the Confessions: "The teacher of your servant (namely Moses) when he recalls that in the beginning you made heaven and earth, is silent about times, is silent about days. For doubtless the heaven of heaven which you made in the beginning, is some intellectual creature, although by no means coeternal with you the Trinity, nevertheless greatly a partaker of your eternity, restrains its mutability because of the sweetness of your most happy contemplation, and without any fall from the time it was made, by clinging to you, exceeds every rolling vicissitude of times." From this again it is evident, that from the time it was made, it is in grace, in beatitude, and in contemplation. § 26. 6. Also, Augustine in book XII of The City of God: "Indeed, in no way according to any space of time were those spirits previously darkness, whom we call Angels: but as soon as they were made, they were made light: they were not merely created thus, that they might be in whatever way, and live in whatever way: but also illuminated, that they might live wisely and blessedly. From this illumination certain Angels turned away: and therefore they did not obtain the excellence of a wise and blessed life, which without doubt is none other than eternal life." From this authority it is evident, that he even reputes it absurd that the Angels were not created in grace. § 27. 7. Also, Augustine, ibid., "He who created the Angel with a good will, was simultaneously forming its nature, and bestowing grace: for never is it to be believed that the holy Angels were without a good will and chaste love." § 28. 8. Also, Augustine in the book On Rebuke and Grace: "Even if the Angels were blessed before they fell, there was nevertheless something to be added to their beatitude if they had persevered, until they should receive the fullness of supreme beatitude as a reward of their abiding."

§ 29. 9. Also, Augustine in the book De Fide ad Petrum: "God created the Angels eternal, and implanted in them the faculty of knowing and loving the deity: whom He so created, that they themselves might love Him." § 30. 10. Also, Ibid., "Angels and men, by the fact that they were made rational, received by divine gift the eternity and beatitude of God in the very creation of their spiritual nature, so that if they unceasingly clung to the love of their Creator, they would simultaneously remain eternal and blessed: but if by the proper choice of their liberty they

strove to do their own will against the command of their Creator, beatitude would depart from the contumacious according to their demerits." § 31. 11. Also, Augustine on Genesis According to the Letter says, that that creature is always day: because in it not the withdrawal of superior light, but the distinction of inferior knowledge makes morning and evening: therefore it is not to be said that it was created without grace. § 32. 12. To the same point there are three arguments: For God always offers Himself in one way just like the sun: therefore since there is no obstacle, He always pours forth the light of His grace: but in the first instant of the creation of the Angel there was no obstacle: therefore He infused grace into him. § 33. 13. Also, If they were created before grace, I ask, whether they were moved by will or intellect deliberating, or not? If not, then when they were able, they were idle. § 34. Moreover, It is a fiction to say, that they were not moved. If they were moved, that act could be informed by charity: therefore God informed him in whom He found no obstacle. § 35. Moreover, What would be the cause that He created them indifferent? It cannot be said that they might merit grace, because no one merits first grace: therefore there would be no cause: for it cannot be said, that He did this so that grace might be distinguished from nature, because it can be distinguished in many other ways, and could be: therefore it seems to be a fiction, that they were created without grace. § 36. BUT AGAINST: § 37. 1. Augustine on Genesis According to the Letter said thus upon that: In the beginning God created, etc. "The beginning of the creature is insinuated as still having the formlessness of imperfection: but a commemoration of the Son is made, who is also the Word, by the fact that it is written, God said, let there be: so that by the fact that He is the principle, He might insinuate the beginning of the creature existing from Him still imperfectly: but by the fact that He is the Word, He might insinuate the perfection of the creature called back to God, so that it might be formed by clinging to the Creator." From this it is gathered, that the creature was first made formless, and afterwards formed. § 38. 2. Also, Ibid., "The creature, although spiritual and intellectual or rational, which seems nearer to that Word, can have a formless life: because just as it is not the same thing for it to be as to live, so neither is the same thing for it to live as to live wisely and blessedly." From this the same thing is gathered as before. § 39. 3. Also, Ibid., "From Him from whom the spiritual creature exists that it may be and live, to Him it is turned, that it may live wisely and blessedly." § 40. 4. To the same point it is objected by reason: because the state of the way is prior to the fatherland: therefore the state of nature must also be prior to grace: because as merit relates to reward, so nature relates to grace. § 41. 5. Also, In natures potency precedes act: therefore also in the being of grace the potency which is in natural things alone, must precede the habit of grace: therefore it seems, that it belongs to them to be created in natural things. § 42. 6. Also, Whatever things are given unequally to those which are of the same nature, those things are not given with nature: because in all things which are given with nature, there is equality: but grace was given unequally to the

§ 43. Angels: therefore it was not given with nature. § 44. Solution. Without prejudice it seems to me, that the opinion of the Saints is, that the Angel was created in grace: and therefore taking up that position, I will solve the objections which were from the words of Augustine, just as Augustine solved them, namely, that those things are said for the distinction of being, and not of time. Whence he intends, that the beginning of the creature is in

natural things in the order of nature before grace, and not in the order of time. Similarly when he says, In the beginning He created, he signifies God as the principle of nature: and when he said, Let there be light, he signifies the same calling to form, not in the order of time, but of nature: because nothing is called, unless it is, to this especially that it be informed by grace: and thus Praepositivus used to say. § 45. To another it must be said, that he could well be moved by natural knowledge and love to the exercise of nature, yet not by a meritorious motion: because Augustine says that the Angel had [that] whereby he could stand: but he did not have [that] whereby he could advance. This however according to another opinion is understood concerning advance to confirmation, and not concerning advance to merit. § 46. To another it must be said, that the reason has already been stated, why He created them indifferent. But yet I say this, that as far as I can understand of the mind of the original [authors], the Saints were plainly of this opinion, that they were created in natural and gratuitous things simultaneously. § 47. BUT TO THE ARGUMENTS we will say, that although God relates Himself in one way, yet He is a voluntary agent: and when He gives one gift, He wishes him to whom He gives to experience his own powers: and therefore He wished that the Angel should test himself in natural things, and see that he would not suffice for himself, and thus he would be more grateful for the grace which he would receive in its proper time. § 48. TO THE FOURTH OBJECTION it must be said, that the state of the way relates to the confirmation of beatitude as preceding in time: and this is so, because beatitude depends in some way on merit, as will be held below: but nature cannot merit grace: and therefore it is not similar on this side and that. § 49. But if we wish to sustain the other opinion, that they were created in natural things alone, then we shall gloss light in the words of Augustine as the splendor of natural things, and we shall call grace innocence. § 50. To another it must be said, that this proposition is false, that those things which are given with nature, are given equally: but those given with nature refer to act and habit: because neither is nature equal, as was held above: yet it is not proven whether Angels are of the same nature and species. § 51.

Articulus 13 — Whether God Could Make An Evil Angel

§ 53. Whether God could make an evil Angel? § 55. Whether God could make an evil Angel? § 56. Secondly, It is asked on account of the error which is posited in the Text, Whether God could make an evil Angel? § 57. It seems, that He could: because § 58. 1. He who operates by will, operates what he wills, and it is not to be said why he does so: but God operates by will: therefore He can do what He wills: therefore He can make an evil Angel. § 59. 2. Also, the Apostle to the Romans 9:21: Or does not the potter of the clay have power out of the same lump to make one vessel indeed unto honor, but another unto dishonor? And it is certain, that he is speaking of God: therefore it seems, that He can make an evil Angel and man. § 60. 3. Also, He Himself made those whom He knew would be evil: therefore by the same reason He could make evil ones. § 61. BUT AGAINST: § 62. 1. Augustine says, that God is not the avenger of that thing, of which He is the maker: if there-

fore He Himself made the Angel evil, He Himself could not be the avenger of evil, which is false: therefore He cannot make an evil Angel. § 64. 2. Also, It belongs to the good to bring

forth good things: but God is the best: therefore He does not make anything except the good. § 65. 3. Also, Boethius says, that this is the reason of the good, because it is from the first good: but God is the first good: therefore nothing evil can be from Him. § 66. 4. Also, Augustine: A wise man does not make that by which his work becomes worse: therefore much less does he make a depraved work: but God is most wise: therefore nothing can be evil, according as it is from Him. § 67. Solution. I concede, that God by no power of His, neither by His ordained wisdom, nor absolute, can make an evil work: because this is not to be able, but is of extreme foolishness and impotence. Whence I say, that He made the Angel good: but He could have made him better, if He had willed. § 68. To the first it must be said, that it is true, that God made the Angel as He willed: but He could not make him evil: because He makes nothing except what is His willed object, and the good for which he is made, and neither the good nor the willed is ever evil. § 69. To another it must be said, that that authority is understood of the work of God by which He knows that certain ones will be evil, whom nevertheless He Himself made good. Whence the expression is improper, when it says, that it was a vessel unto dishonor, so namely that the preposition notes consequence, and not the end, that is, that it terminates in dishonor: but dishonor is not an end moving the efficient cause. § 70. To another it must be said, that nothing is similar: because those whom He knows will be evil, become evil without God as author: whom nevertheless He Himself makes: because He does not will to interrupt the course of nature in them: and also because He knows for what goods, their evils will be able to be useful. § 71.

Articulus 14 — Whether An Angel Can Become Evil In Such A Way That God Would Not Be The Author Of That Malice, But Immediately In The Same Indivisible Instant Be Made And Evil At Once

§ 73. Whether an Angel can become evil, so that God would not be the author of that malice, but immediately in the same indivisible [instant] he would be made and evil simultaneously? § 75. Whether an Angel can become evil, so that God would not be the author of that malice, but immediately in the same indivisible [instant] he would be made and evil simultaneously? § 76. Thirdly it is asked, Whether an Angel could become evil, so that God would not be the author of his malice, but immediately in the same indivisible [instant] he would be made and evil simultaneously? For thus posits the opinion which is recited in the Text. § 77. But it seems that he could: because his 'having been made' is measured by an indivisible 'now': because every 'having been made' is in a 'now', and 'to be made' and 'to be moved' are in time. If therefore at some time he was made evil, and that 'having been made' is also in an indivisible 'now': either therefore 'to have been made evil' and 'the Angel to have been made' are in the same indivisible [instant], and then I have the proposition: or in diverse ones, and then since between any two 'nows' there is a middle time, there will be some time in which he is evil. § 78. BUT AGAINST it seems, that this cannot be: because every creature is from nothing: therefore by its own weight and defect it tends to nothing, unless it is supported by grace: but grace was not supporting it: therefore it tended to nothing: therefore it sinned: because this is to tend to nothing. § 79. Moreover it is asked, Whether it could have sinned in the first instant when it was made? § 80. It seems, that it could: because § 81. 1. It could will evil, since it had a

perfect will: therefore it is not unfitting to posit: for a false but not impossible thing being posited, what follows is false and not impossible: therefore those who say, that the Angel is evil from the beginning of its creation, are not to be reprehended.

§ 82. 2. Also, It is certain, that it was moved from the beginning of creation: because such optimal natural endowments cannot be idle: either therefore it was moved ordinately, or inordinately. If ordinately. Against: To be moved ordinately is to be converted: therefore it was converted, which is false. If inordinately, I have the proposition: because to be moved inordinately is a sin: therefore from the beginning of its creation it sinned. § 83. 3. Also, If it did not sin from the beginning of its creation: therefore it stood for a time in natural things alone. BUT AGAINST: Fire stands upwards by the same power by which it is moved upwards, when it is violently depressed: therefore also the Angel stands by the same power by which it is elevated: but it is elevated by the power of grace: therefore it does not stand except by the power of grace, which is false, because the Angel did not fall from grace according to the opinion of the Master in the Text. § 84. 4. Also, There are two extremes, namely nothing, and being: and two others good, and evil: but no creature can of itself tend to being: therefore neither to the good: therefore of itself it tends to non-being, and to evil: therefore the Angel if it did not have grace, immediately tended to evil: therefore it sinned from the first instant of creation. § 85. 5. Moreover, Many authorities concerning this are introduced in the Text. § 86. BUT AGAINST: It seems, that this is a heresy: § 87. 1. For every principle of something through deliberative will is prior to it in nature and time: the first Angel is the principle of its own sin, through deliberative will: therefore it is before its sin in nature and time: therefore there was a delay of creation between creation and the fall. Proof of the first. Every deliberation presupposes to itself the conception of that about which the deliberation is and comparison, and it is certain that apprehensions of this kind are in time. But the second is self-evident. § 88. 2. Also, If the Angel had been evil in the first instant, the lesser ones would never have seen him except as evil: therefore they would never have consented to his election. § 89. Solution. It must be said, that there was a delay between his creation, and the fall. Whence I say to the first, that his 'having been made', and 'having been made evil', were not in one instant: but there was a middle time. § 90. BUT TO THAT which is objected, that the creature of itself tends to non-being: I say, that it is true unless it is held by the hand of the omnipotent God: but that hand is not sanctifying grace: and in this the author of that opinion was deceived: because sanctifying grace is not in a stone, and yet it is contained: and it is not in a demon, and yet it is contained. § 91. TO ANOTHER it must be said, that it could not happen, that it sinned from the beginning: because it was necessary to be moved beforehand by other motions which were not sin, in the knowledge of itself, and of God, and of others: and these required time. § 92. If it is objected, that it was not necessary to be moved beforehand according to act, but according to habit only: I do not think that is true: because when one desires to be equated with another, or to be preferred, it is necessary first actually to know and compare both. § 93. To another it must be said, that it was moved by natural knowledge and love: and those were not inordinate, but ordered by the order of nature, which order does not suffice for conversion to the Word by inhesion: therefore their objection does not have any force. § 94. To another it must be said, that an Angel from natural things alone can stand in the good of nature, but not in the

good of grace: and therefore he does not take standing and being elevated as the same: because he could stand in nature through nature, and be elevated in nature through the same, but through that he cannot be elevated to grace: just as also air is well elevated out of water to the place of air, but not to the place of fire, unless another species is given to it. § 95. TO ANOTHER it must be said, that evil is

from nothing: but yet man can tend to evil, and not tend: because it is voluntary, and not natural: and his nature although it is from nothing, yet it does not have the whole of what it has from nothing as the principle of its existence, but it has its whole essence from God, and therefore in Him it can stand. § 97. BUT IF it is objected, that no one perseveres without perseverance: but to stand implies the act of perseverance: therefore since perseverance is a virtue, no one can stand without virtue: that is ridiculous: because perseverance is said in three ways. In one way it is said as the purpose of sustaining what is difficult until the end of the fight, and for this there is a certain virtue which is a part of fortitude. In a second way, it is called the gift of perseverance which is given at the end of life to the Saints, when the end of labors is reached: and this is not a virtue, but the effect of a virtue continued unto the end. In a third way, perseverance is called the continuation of that state in which something is unto the end, or up to a time, and thus it adds nothing above the state in which one is persevering: and thus the Angel could persevere in natural things, that is, continuously hold himself in them, until he fell: and this is not a virtue in any way. § 98.

Articulus 15 — Whether Angels Know Through Species

§ 100. Whether Angels know through species? § 102. Whether Angels know through species? § 103. Next it is asked about what he says, there, § 104. "Here it is usually asked, What wisdom, etc." § 105. For the Master says this about the threefold knowledge of Angels, namely that they knew that they were made, and by whom they were made, and with whom they were made, and they had some notice of good and evil. Below we will ask about the morning and evening knowledge of Angels, and now about the natural knowledge of Angels. § 106. Let us therefore ask three things here, of which the first is by what do they know, or what is the ratio of the known? § 107. Second, Whether their science is universal or particular about things? § 108. Third, Whether their science is the form of all particular casual, and fortuitous things, and of those things which are caused by free choice? § 109. TO the first one proceeds thus: § 110. 1. No one knows anything whose species is not in the knower himself, or its essence: if therefore Angels know things: therefore the species of things, or their essence is in the

knowers themselves. The first is evident by this that there must be an assimilation between the knower and the knowable: and there is no assimilation (as Augustine says) except by one of two ways, namely, that the thing be essentially in the knower, as charity, and as the intellect itself, and God, or the like: or that the species of the thing be present to the intellect. But the second is written in the Text here. § 112. 2. Also, It does not happen that the knower is borne upon the knowable, unless something leads it which is the species and ratio of the knowable: but nothing leads the knower, except what is in it: therefore the species and ratio of every knowable is present to the knower. The first is evident from this that the intellect of itself

relates equally to every knowable, and is not borne more to one than to another, unless something should lead it. But the second is self-evident. § 113. 3. Also, To God who is most simple, even in the ultimate degree of simplicity, we attribute a species, which according to reason is the medium of knowing, differing in mode of signifying, not of being, from the knower himself: therefore since the Angel is below the first, we shall attribute to him species differing essentially from the knower himself: therefore he has species. § 114. 4. Also, This seems true by that proposition in the book De Causis, that an intelligence is full of forms: therefore it seems, that similarly the Angel, although according to our intention an intelligence is not an Angel.[135] § 115. BUT AGAINST: § 116. 1. Those species either are after the likeness of ideas, or they are the species of things: if after the likeness of ideas: therefore he knows all things through them which God knows, which is false. § 117. 2. Also, There is only one idea in itself by which God knows everything which He knows: if therefore the species in the mind of the Angel are after the likeness of that, it seems that the Angel knows all knowable things by one single species. § 118. BUT AGAINST: § 119. 1. God can therefore know all things by one single thing, because He Himself is the immediate cause of all things, remaining one and the same: but the Angel does not relate thus to things: therefore he cannot know all things by one single thing. § 120. 2. Also, It is impossible, that besides the first cause something be taken which is the ratio of all things, so that it is proper to each one: but nothing is known in its proper nature, except by its proper ratio: therefore if the Angel knows things in their proper nature, he must have multiple rationes which are appropriated to proper things. But if you say this, since proper things at least in potency are infinite, it is necessary to posit infinites in the Angel: and whatever things are in him, are in him in act: therefore an infinite in multitude is something in act, which is impossible: therefore he does not seem to know through species of this kind received from God. § 121. But if you say, that they are species received from things. AGAINST: The reception of species does not occur except through abstraction: but abstraction does not occur unless the abstracting powers are posited first, namely sense, imagination, and phantasy: therefore since the Angel does not have things of this kind, he cannot understand things through species of things abstracted from things. § 122. If you say, as some do, that he knows through the presence of the thing, it is asked then about that presence: for presence by itself does not cause knowledge, but it is necessary that there be a cognizable reception: but this does not occur without the immutation of the knower by the knowable itself: but this reception must have a proportion to the medium and to the receiving power, as we see in sense: and nothing of such things can even be feigned in an Angel: therefore it seems, that neither does he know through such species. § 123. FURTHERMORE it is asked, Is proximity required in the knowledge of an Angel? § 124. It seems, that it is: because § 125. 1. Every agent and patient relate to each other in a determined and proportioned position, beyond...

which the agent cannot act upon, and the patient cannot suffer from the active: but the knower and the known are related as agent and patient: therefore they require such a proportion of proximity.

§ 2. 2. Also, otherwise it would seem that the Angel would know everything that is in the world: because everything that he knows is near to or remote from him: if therefore he relates to this indifferently, it seems that he knows them indifferently: and this seems absurd, because according to this the devil existing in hell would know every sin in the world, especially since he greatly desires to know them: therefore if the will suffices for knowing, and proximity according to place is not required, he will know all things: and the same is true of a good Angel with respect to the good things that are done.

§ 3. And so that the whole may be comprehended in a summary, this question is difficult, and in the three ways by which it is usually solved, an impossibility always occurs. For if we say that the Angels have one species similar to the first idea, the impossibility occurs that one and the same is the common reason of common things, and the proper reason of proper things, and the same is the proper reason of diverse things in no way agreeing with each other, which cannot be understood. But if you say by the second way, that there are many species, it is necessary that they be multiplied according to all things known by Angels, because otherwise they are not of use, and then three impossibilities follow: one of which is that the Angel knows all future things according to contingents and necessaries which will be: because all knowledge of that is had by the knower whose proper reason is with him: but the reason of all future, present and past things is posited in Angels in this way: therefore he has knowledge of all things: and this is not said by the Saints: because they say that Angels and demons do not know future contingents. Another impossibility is posited above, namely that infinite things would be in the knowledge of the Angel; because future things are innumerable. The third inconvenience, which is the greatest, is that the species of some thing would be in some knower besides God, which is neither in itself nor in any ordered cause, like those things which happen by chance and fortune and from a cause per accidens. But if we wish to evade by the third way, that they receive new reasons from the presence of things, then it is necessary for us to give them powers proportioned to sensible things which either act or suffer from them: and this is impossible.

§ 4. Solution. The authority of Dionysius on this matter in the book On the Divine Names is to be noted beforehand: The utterances say that Angels know the things that are on earth, not according to senses knowing indeed existing sensible things, but according to the proper power and nature of a deiform mind [136].

§ 5. Therefore it is to be noted that concerning this question there are four modes of opinion. For some say that the intellect of Angels is totally acting and has nothing besides itself, and receives nothing, but by itself, as if sending out its spiritual light, knows all things, and they give the example of the sun: because if it were alive and intelligent, by its light which it posits over us it would know all things which are, and would receive nothing from them: and this opinion was of certain Doctors of great authority, and would be good if it could be understood, how then the knowledge even of absent

135. Liber de causis, prop. 10.

things would remain with the Angel: because with the sun withdrawing its rays, if it were intellectual, the intellect of things would not remain with the sun, unless it abstracted and retained species, which they do not say is done.

§ 6. Therefore others said that the Angel, when he was created, received the forms and species of all those things which are done by nature in an ordered course: but he learns chance and fortuitous things anew, just as we do. And this opinion is nothing, and wondrous: because it posits that he learns, and yet receives nothing from things: or if he receives, it does not determine the mode of reception.

§ 7. Moreover, natural things (as the Philosopher proves in VI of First Philosophy [137]) frequently depend on accidental and unordered causes, as on the will: for example, it is natural that a man is generated from the seed of a man: but the severing of the seed depends on the will of the one severing through voluntary acts of the mingling of seeds: therefore according to this he must continually learn even the greater part of natural things. Also, the sounds of words, the journeys of men, and all mechanical arts, whose principle is the will, it will be necessary to continually learn: and yet no mode of learning by receiving from us is posited for him: or if it is posited, that mode by which an intellectual and simple substance receives from corporeal things will be wondrous: and therefore among all, this opinion seems less probable.

§ 8. Therefore the third are those who say that God has ideal reasons in Himself for knowing and operating: and these, when He wished to unfold them through creatures, He divided, and inserted into nature the reasons for operating, and into the Angel the reasons for knowing: and therefore nature and the Angel relate to God: the Angel indeed as receiving the science of the artisan, and not the work: but nature as receiving the work, and not the science: and by the mediation of these the Angel knows whatever of sensible things is in the world. But still this opinion seems to have less [truth]: because certain things are voluntary, which when they are done are manifested in sensible organs, of which man, when they are manifested, receives knowledge through natural powers: and those the Angel cannot know through these species, and thus he is more imperfect than man.

§ 9. The fourth opinion is the one I understand better, although there are many difficulties in it: however, because it is better saved, and fewer inconveniences follow, therefore I choose it, saying that the Angel in the principle of his creation received the species of the universal order of natural causes, both proper and common, and those are applicable to everything that happens in nature: and therefore by their mediation he knows everything he wishes, except this alone which remains in free choice, the reason for which will be rendered below.

§ 10. And so that this may be better understood, I say that the first and common causes are according to the order of the stars, whether they be from the number or from the proportion of motions, whether from the images of the fixed stars, whether from the aspects and exaltations and triplicities or whatever others of the planets, and under this is the order of the distinction of elements, and under that the order of the action and passion of active and passive qualities in the mixture of elements, and after this the order of mixture in complexions, and after this

136. Anselm, De casu diaboli.

the order of complexion to the composition of organic bodies, and all that order according to the whole reason of agreement and difference is impressed upon him from creation according to the species of knowing, except those things which are voluntary and chance and fortuitous. But voluntary things are either remaining in the sole will, as to will: or they are proceeding to the body: and this in three ways: because either they proceed in an interior sign, or an exterior: interior, as is the procession of spirits into what is willed, and the concourse of blood to desiring, and the dilation of the heart: but exteriorly as the mutation of the face, the suffusion of redness, and the like, and according to this then it is reduced to causes in matter, which are hot, humid, dry, cold. The second mode is, when it proceeds into a work which is completed through the organs of the body: as to speak, to walk, and the like: and then again it is reduced to natural principles. The third mode is in mechanical arts, when the operation of art is done whose principle is the will, and it is clear that again it touches corporeal nature. But all these voluntary things are known a posteriori: because they are after the will which is their principle. Chance and fortuitous things, Boethius in the Consolation of Philosophy teaches

to reduce to nature: because just as being per accidens relates to being per se, so a cause per accidens is reduced to a cause per se. For example, fleeing a burning house by chance a horse is saved: and if I know someone digging a grave there, I will not necessarily know the finding of the treasure, and this will be fortuitous: but then that chance and fortuitous thing is known by that which is the cause per se and priorly: because what is per se is prior to that which is per accidens. Therefore I say that the Angel received the species of this order of causes from the common down to the proper in creation according to the reason of their diversity, and not according to matter and number: because if he had received them according to matter, particular species of all things would be in him, and he would know all things. Whence I say that every reason of the diversity of those causes is in him, and it is applicable to everything that is and will be: and therefore it is apt that through it everything that is may be known. I take a likeness of this from Avicenna in First Philosophy [138], who seems to say that the movers know things, receiving nothing from things, and he gives the example of the knowledge of an eclipse: for he knows the eclipse otherwise who saw it by observing it with an astrolabe or other instrument, and receives its beginning and middle: and he knows otherwise who has in himself the knowledge of every motion of the sun and moon, and of the dragon's head, and of the time of their courses. For the first receives his knowledge from the sun and moon: but the second nothing, nor does he ever need looking: because his knowledge is applied to the thing: and therefore I think the Angels know thus.

§ 11. According to this therefore I respond to the first, that the first three reasons are good, and necessarily conclude that the species of knowables are with the Angel: and I say that they are with him in the said mode.

§ 12. But to that which is objected concerning the book Of Causes it must be guarded against: because the Philosophers speaking of intelligences posited them to be causes: for an intelligence full of forms explicable through the motion of some orb, insofar as it is full of

137. Anselm, Cur Deus homo, bk. 1, ch. 1.

forms, is desired by the mover of the orb, and moves it as the desired [moves] the desiring: and therefore the intelligence of the first order has more universal and simple forms, which are explicated through the one and simple first motion in the one and simple mobile: and the intelligence of the second order will be full of forms explicable by the twofold motion of the oblique circle, and less universal: and so in descending: because thus the Philosopher understands that it understands all intelligible things; what is above it, because it is caused and informed by it: and what is below it, because it itself is the cause to it according to that reason that every form is from the splendor of the intelligence upon that informed by that form. But we repute this ridiculous: because we do not speak thus of Angels, but rather posit them to be separate substances, not determined to any mobile: and therefore we say they have forms which the Creator put in them for knowing the things of this world, each in proper and common nature, as they will.

§ 13. To that which is asked, Whether those forms are similar to ideas? I say that in some things they are similar: they are similar in this that they are the reasons of things which are known through them: and because they are neither universal, nor particular, as will be determined in the following article of this question: and because they are simple, according to what the Angelic intellect demands: and because they are not forms abstracted from things, but rather by the mode of an art making things, or rather by the mode of the reason of art. But they are dissimilar, because they are not operative as ideas in God: and because they are not one in essence, in my judgment, but many according to the diversity of the reasons of causes by which according to reason the reasons of near and remote natural causes can be varied. And through this it is clear that it is not necessary, that by their mediation the Angel knows all future things, like God, according to which He knows by one the many things which are not united in anything.

But how they are posited concerning the thing to be known, will be clear later.

§ 14. To this which is asked, Whether they are similitudes of things? It must be said that they are in a certain mode, and they are not in another mode: for they have a similitude with the thing, just as the reason in the mind of the artisan has a similitude with the artifact: but conversely the form of the artifact is from the form which is in the mind of the artisan, as Aristotle says in VII of First Philosophy [139], that the house in stones and woods is from the house which is in the soul of the builder, and health in hot and cold, is from the health which is in the soul of the doctor: whence the doctor does not need to receive anything for knowing health. Thus neither does the Angel receive anything for knowing a thing: and yet contingents and voluntary things and chance and fortuitous things and the like whose course is not ordered, he does not know before they are: and this will be explained below in the third article of this question.

§ 15. To that which is asked, Whether the presence of the thing is required? I say that in all things which do not happen always in a certain order, as the generations of material chance things, and the events of fortuitous things, and the works of the will, there must in a certain

138. Augustine, Confessions, bk. XIII, ch. 3.

mode be presence before he knows: but this presence does not say presence in a near or remote place, but presence in the nature of natural causes, in that mode in which we said voluntary things are reduced to natural causes through signs and organs, and chance things to a cause per se: but when he knows them, he receives nothing from them: but rather he posits the reason of the proper cause which he has with him, around them: and by that exposition it is determined, that it be proper, and this will be explicated below.

§ 16. To that which is asked concerning proximity of place or remoteness, I think speaking without prejudice, that it does nothing: because there is no proportion of spiritual things to corporeal according to site, but rather according to order: but conversion alone through the will to know suffices to determine this.

§ 17. But how science or the conception of this is done by him, or in him, remains to be said below.

§ 18. And through this the evasion from the impossibilities which occur to the three objected ways of solving is also clear.

Articulus 16 — Whether The Knowledge Of The Angels Is Universal Or Particular, Namely That The Species Or Forms Through Which They Understand Are Universal Or Particular

Whether the knowledge of Angels is universal or particular, namely whether the species or forms by which they understand, are universal or particular?

§ 19. Secondly it is asked, Whether these species or forms are particular, or universal?

§ 20. And it seems that they are universal: because 1. Boethius says that the universal is what is understood, but the singular while it is sensed: but Angels do not have a sense by which their intellect is determined: therefore the species always remain universal.

§ 21. 2. Also, the Philosopher wills that nothing is understood unless it is simple, because there must be a proportion between the intelligible and the intellect: but the intellect is simple: therefore also the intelligible: but it is not simple as long as it is received in those things particularizing it, which are matter and individuating things: therefore the intelligible is remote from those: therefore it is received as everywhere and always: therefore as universal: therefore whatever is understood is a universal species, as it seems.

§ 22. 3. If you say that this does not seem true: because we also understand things in proper nature, and we receive the universal in itself, and in being according to which it is in this or in that: and since the Angel is more potent

in understanding than us, the Angel will have that mode more potently than us: this is nothing: because we cannot understand the universal according to being, except through the appearance of individuating things and matter: and this individuation is not done through universal intentions: because the reason of whiteness individuates nothing, nor even the reason of place or matter, but this whiteness, and this place: therefore also the determination

139. Augustine, Confessions, bk. XII, ch. 9.

of our intellect to particulars of this kind, will be through reflection to the parts of the sensible soul in which those particular species are, and through reflection of assent. Since therefore such powers are not in the Angel, it is impossible for his intellect to be determined to particulars.

§ 23. 4. If you say, as some say, that the intellect in Angels takes the place of sense and intellect in us, and therefore it is equally of both, namely universal, and particular: this can in no way be, as it seems: for there must be a proportion between knowing and known, just as between potency and act, as the Philosopher wills in III De Anima: but the universal is purely simple, but the particular with matter and individuating things: therefore it is impossible that the same thing and behaving in the same mode, be proportioned to both.

§ 24. 5. But if you say that the same thing behaving not in the same mode, is proportioned to them: then we return to the whole difficulty of the question: because then I ask, what makes it diversely behave to that, since powers affixed to organs which are proportioned to the particular are lacking to him?

§ 25. But if you say that the Angel does not know except the universal, the greatest inconvenience follows: because

1. Particulars cannot be inferred from universals, because they are not in it except in potency: therefore Angels will not know particular things, which is against Dionysius induced above.
2. Also, According to this the whole office of custody which they do concerning us will perish: because we are particulars, and our works particular, and it is worth nothing to us for the species of man to be guarded, unless we are guarded in the individual.

§ 26. But if you say that it is false what the Philosophers say, that the intellect is of universals, but rather it is also of particulars: this is nothing: because although it were not already a dictum of the Philosopher, it is proved that it is true in the preceding reasons, through this that there must be a proportion between knowing and known.

§ 27. Solution. It must be pre-noted that diverse sentences even of Authors show the difficulty of this question. Whence Isaac and Rabbi Moses, Philosophers of the Jews, coerced by this difficulty, took away from the Angels which according to law they are coerced to posit, the notice of particulars, and said those Angels to be intelligences moving orbs, and not to know particulars, but rather to influence into orbs or movers of orbs simple forms, which are determined to particulars through the diversity of motion and matter and accidents of matter: and therefore the diversity of particulars neither descends from the intelligence, nor is known by it except *per accidens*, namely insofar as it is caused through the motion of the orb, and not as it is this or that. But others erring more, said Angels not to be around us, but only around God, and to receive universal revelations, and according to precept to command matter to obey them that this or that be done.

§ 28. But all these we refute in our faith, and we must seek a way competent to faith: and therefore it can be said that those species are neither universal, nor particular, but to knowing

the universal and the particular: and this is thus clear: Universal and particular divide the abstracted species: for if it is received with matter and those things which particularize it, we say it to be of this, and particular: but if it is received without these, then it is received as it is one among

all, and thus it is everywhere and always the same and in every past and in every future, and then we say it to be universal. But there is also a form not of abstraction, but of composition, and this is twofold. For there is a certain one proceeding from the artisan into the artifact, and this without doubt it is necessary to be simple, according as it is in the mind of the artisan: and just as it goes out, thus it receives the conditions of matter and matter, and such is the form of human art. The other is according to the mode of the first artisan, of whom nothing is made in matter, neither his substance, nor the species which is in him: but the species which he is, and is in him, is the reason regulating and making this species which is produced by his virtue in matter: and similar to this according to something we posit the species of Angels by which they know: for they are regular to them for knowing things, whether they be universal, or particular: but they are not something of particulars, or of universals: and therefore it is clear that division by universal and particular does not compete to them, just as neither to the first idea.

§ 29. And then it does not rest to us to solve, except two, namely what proportion is between intellect and species, and whether one is universal and particular?

§ 30. To the first I say that there is a proportion of simple to simple: because the species in him is according to the efflux from God in creation, and then has simplicity not depurated from particularizing things, but which is through imitation of the first idea as much as it can.

§ 31. To the other it must be said that the particular and universal of that which is not divided except by the sole division of matter is one in number Species in the cognition of the Angel: but the universal species is another, which is divided by formal division through differences, as the most general, and subaltern.

§ 32. But what individuates and determines to knowing this and that, will now be a question.

Articulus 17 — Whether The Knowledge Of The Angels Is Of All Things, And Of Casual And Fortuitous Things, And Of All Things That Can In Any Way Come Into Cognition

Whether the science of Angels is of all things, and of chance things, and of fortuitous things, and of all things which in whatever mode can come into notice?

§ 33. Thirdly therefore it is asked, Whether his science is of all things, and of chance things, and of fortuitous things, and of all things which in whatever mode can proceed into notice?

§ 34. And it seems that so: because all things whatever are done in whatever mode, whether from a cause per se, or from a cause per accidens, provided they are done, we know through natural powers which we have without any revelation: therefore since the Angel is not more imperfect, he also will know all those through nature without revelation.

§ 35. But then it is asked, What determines or contracts his species, that the species be made the reason of knowing this or that? For that by which a common thing is made proper, cannot be common, but proper: since therefore there is not a proper of this kind in the Angel, as is proved above, it is impossible that he has that, except by receiving from the thing of which that is the proper: and then the first difficulty returns, that it behooves us to give the Angel powers by which he receives that proper, which I repute absurd.

§ 36. If you say that the will of knowing appropriates, then I ask, Whence comes the will of knowing this? For the will of this is not except with pre-existing notice of this: because of the unknown there is no will: therefore when you say, the will of knowing this, you already posit the notice of this to be with him: and I ask, Whence did that come? and in the solution of this reason is the whole difficulty of this question.

§ 37. However because of the depraved intellect of some it is asked concerning this, How does one Angel understand another Angel who is next to him through equality of nature? For it seems that by understanding him he is substantially the same with his intellect: because Aristotle says thus in III De Anima: "In those things which are without matter, the intellect and what is understood are the same" "for speculative science and what is speculative are the same" . But the Angel is without matter: therefore when he is understood, he is the same with the intellect of the understanding Angel. And he says the same elsewhere also, but let this suffice.

§ 38. Solution. It must be said that the Angel does not have science of future contingents: but he knows them when they are done, receiving nothing from things, but rather positing his species which he has, around them. And to understanding this it must be noted that, just as Avicenna and Alfarabi recite, the opinion of some was concerning the sense of sight, that the sensible would not behave itself in some mode as agent to sight, as conferring species to sight, but rather that the visive power itself virtually would go out in an emitted ray, and place itself under the sensible thing, and by positing itself around it, would be determined to seeing this or that, receiving nothing from it, and afterwards with itself the soul would form an image of that thing, by which even with the thing absent it would imagine it: thus we can say, not indeed approving the opinion of those, but receiving a simile, that the Angel has species with himself, and what the reception through sense does to our species, the direction to place and to those things which are in place spiritual or corporeal, convenes to his species: and therefore that direction which is conversion in the will of knowing located things in a place which is known to him, because place has necessity of order in nature, but not all located things: whence by directing himself to place under the species which he has, he is certified concerning located things, and his species are determined through direction to the thing, and when he retracts himself, the intention of determination remains with him, not which he received from things, but which he himself made through the direction of himself to the thing, and under that he knows the thing, even when he does not direct himself: and thus he will not have determinate cognition of future contingents, except when they are, and thus in this mode he knows all particulars: and the whole difficulty is solved, as it seems.

§ 39. But if it is asked, What excites him to directing himself to this place? I say that the will of knowing those things which are in that place, which however are not determined through notice with him: just as my will when I know a place and indeterminately know something to be in the place or not to be, excites me to directing sight there, and then if my sight would go out, it would receive notice of the thing by positing itself around it, and receiving nothing from it: but returned it would form an image similar to it.

§ 40. But to this which is objected concerning the cognition of the Angel, it must be said that the objection proceeds from a bad understanding of the letter of Aristotle: because the Angel is not simple with the simplicity of the intelligible: because the simplicity of the intelligible is an intention abstracted from this individuating thing: and that abstraction is in the Angel, just as in an ass equal: but Aristotle speaks there, how the intellect in act behaves to the intellect in potency, and says that the intellect in act is just as the thing understood, and is the same to it: because both the thing and the intellect are in one act which is the science of the thing understood. And this is what he adds, that speculative science, that is, the species of the speculative intellect, is the form of the thing and the act. Whence he speaks there of every intelligible according to act: and therefore in the end of the chapter he says that the intellect is the species of species, and sense the species of sensibles,

just as the hand the organ of organs: and therefore there is no objection: for the Angel is understood through species, just as an ass

but differently by us, and differently by Angels.

§ 41. K. Whether they had any love of God, or of each other?

It is also usually asked, Whether they had any love of God or of each other? To which it can be said that they had natural love, as memory, intellect, and genius, by which they loved God and themselves to some extent: by which however they did not merit.

Articulus 18 — Whether The Angels Had Love, Either Of God Or Of Themselves, For One Another

Whether the Angels had love of God or of each other?

§ 42. Then it is asked concerning this which he says there, It is also usually asked, Whether they had any love of God or of each other, etc.

§ 43. And that question is concerning natural love, Angels not being understood except in the state of natural things, whether they could love God above themselves, and above all things?

§ 44. It seems that they could not : because 1. That love is of charity: and charity according to this exposition they did not have.

§ 45. 2. Also, This is to love God from the whole heart, and from the whole mind, and from all powers: but this precept (as Augustine says) is not fulfilled even by him who has grace as long as he is in the way: therefore much less the Angel in the state of natural things could fulfill this.

§ 46. 3. Also, This is the highest of merits: but to the highest of merits nature does not suffice: therefore neither could he do this in the state of natural things.

§ 47. 4. Also, This is the highest of rewards that with the whole heart above all things we love God: therefore to this nature does not suffice.

§ 48. 5. Also, Bernard says that nature is curved in itself, and loves nothing except itself, and for its own sake: therefore it seems that nature does not extend itself to loving the first for His own sake, and above all things.

§ 49. ON THE CONTRARY : 1. Either he loved God for His own sake, and above all things: or not. If so, I have the proposition. If not, therefore he loved himself more than God: therefore from the means he made an end: therefore he sins mortally.

§ 50. 2. Also, If he loved himself more than God: therefore by love he adhered to himself for his own sake: therefore he enjoyed himself, as it seems: therefore he mortally sinned.

§ 51. 3. Also, In the first state he knew God to be good above all things, and per se: therefore by the same reason, the will not existing weaker than the intellect, he also could love Him for His own sake and above all things. If you say that he was not bound in the first state, since he could not: this is nothing: because he who does not have grace and is in sin, is more impotent than the Angel: and yet he sins mortally if...

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...he sometimes makes a path into an end, and enjoys the creature more than the Creator.

§ 4. Also, if natural things are said to be those that are apart from sanctifying grace, then we read in the books of the Philosophers and Stoics that some loved the moral good (honestum) in which they placed happiness for its own sake and above all things, such that they rather suffered themselves to be killed than to withdraw from the moral good. If therefore nature can do this in a lesser good, much more an Angel, stronger than a human in all natural endowments, could do this toward a greater good, namely the uncreated.

§ Solution. It must be said that there are two opinions here. One is of William of Auxerre, who concedes the objections first introduced and resolves the subsequent ones, saying that love is twofold, namely of friendship (amicitiae) and of concupiscence (concupiscentiae). Friendship is that by which I will good to myself and to another. But concupiscence is that by which I desire things to enjoy them. According to the first mode, I love a friend. In the second mode, I love food or something sweet to me which I want to enjoy.

§ He says therefore that with the love of friendship they could not love God more than themselves, because they willed a good for themselves more intensely than for God; but they willed a greater good for God, namely with the love of concupiscence, since the divine good is sweeter than the Angelic, they loved God more than themselves, and yet referred this to themselves. And to the objection about sin, he says that they were not obligated unless grace was received.
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§ To the other it must be said that they loved the moral good with a love of concupiscence, and not of friendship, and because by its fruition it was bitter for them to lack it, they chose rather to die.

§ To the other it must be said that it is different for a human: because he is in a state in which he ought to have grace; and if he does not have it, this is from his own fault; but the Angel was not, because a time of proving of his natural endowments was given to him, as was said above; just as a puppy is not called blind before the ninth day.

§ But Philip the Chancellor says otherwise, and I think more truly, namely that in the first state, even if they are not supposed to have charity, they could love God even for His own sake and above all things. But when it is said "for His own sake," the word "for" can denote only one cause, namely the final cause, and then it is fitting for natural love, which is not caused effectively by the first goodness, but is directed to it as to an end, and is caused by the natural cognition of the highest good. And then it is not of charity, nor of merit, nor is it the highest degree either on the way or in the homeland. But if it denotes two causes at once, namely the efficient and the final, then it is an act of charity, and the highest on the way according to the mode of the way, and the highest in the homeland according to the mode of the homeland. And about this many things are noted in book III of the Sentences, distinction XXVII, on charity.

§ Through this the solution to all that the others object against him is clear, except to the statement of Bernard. And to this it must be said that natural reason is considered in two ways: namely as nature, and thus it is curved according to its own mode; and as deliberative and inquisitive of the moral and the good, and thus it can love something more than itself, as many have done who never had charity.

DISTINCTIO IV

Divisio Textus

§ "After these things it must be seen," etc. This distinction has two parts. In the first it is asked, whether He created them blessed? In the second, whether perfect? there, D, "Moreover to this which was asked," etc.

§ In the first of these there are three: in the first of which he shows that they could not be blessed if the events of their lives were uncertain, and that they did not have foreknowledge of their fall or confirmation. In the second he seems to say that the good had foreknowledge of their confirmation, there, A, §2: "Moreover it is asked, why it was not," etc. In the third he returns, showing that none had foreknowledge of his fall or confirmation, there, B, "But this rather by opining," etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether The Definition Of An Angel Given By Dionysius Is Good

Is the definition of an Angel given by Dionysius good?

§ Here, regarding the first part, three questions arise, of which the first is concerning the definition of the good Angel which Dionysius posits. Second, whether the Angel was created blessed or not? Third, whether he could foreknow his fall or not?

§ To the first, the definition of Dionysius is taken which he gives in the book On the Divine Names, saying thus: "First, the Angel is an image of God, a manifestation of the hidden light, a pure mirror, most clear, uncontaminated, undefiled, unblemished, receiving the whole, if it is fitting to say, beauty of the good-formed deiformity, and causing to shine purely in himself, as much as possible, the goodness of the silence which is in the hidden places." [140]

§ But it is asked here, what is called an image?

§ 1. For it is either an image of creation, or of likeness, or of recreation. It is not of creation or of likeness, because this belongs to the good and the bad. Therefore it is of recreation. Therefore this will be in glory, or some grace which causes one to imitate God.

§ 2. If therefore this is said, it seems that it only applies to the superiors: because they alone are informed by God immediately, whereas the others are informed by them. Therefore only the superiors are the image of God, and the middle ones are images of the superiors, and the inferiors are images of the middle ones.

§ 3. That this is true is taken from Dionysius, who says in the book On the Divine Names: "That the most holy and advanced powers existing, and placed as it were in the vestibules of the supersubstantial Trinity, have from It and in It both to be, and to be deiformly; and after them the subjects and the extremes down to the Angels." [141]

§ Further it is asked, how does "manifestation of the hidden light" apply to him? Is it according to the mode of a theophany, or not?

§ And it seems that it is: because the Commentator says on the Celestial Hierarchy: "For the spirits themselves also have their signs and demonstrations by which they are educated immaterially about the invisible things of God." And a little below: "Which signs, regarding those things which are according to us, are invisible: but regarding that much invisible and inaccessible light of the deity, they are as if outside, and proceed to demonstration. Wherefore the signs themselves which supervene upon minds or souls inwardly illuminated are called theophanies or divine apparitions, because when they come to manifestation, that which is completely hidden is demonstrated." [142]

§ But then it seems that that hidden light is not essentially God, but a light which is a sign or demonstration of something knowable about God. This also seems to be through Dionysius himself who says in the book On the Celestial Hierarchy that "theology calls the vision which is described in it a theophany, as a divine likeness in the form of the formless, that is, of signs which are the form of those divine things which do not properly have a form." [143] Therefore, according to this, the good Angel would not be immediately blessed from God being united to him, nor will he see God as He is. Therefore neither shall we after death, which is a condemned heresy, and against the canonical epistle of John, who says that "we shall be like Him, and we shall see Him as He is." (1 John 3:2).

§ But if you say that that light leads into God, so that afterwards one is immediately joined, as Dionysius seems to mean in the same place a little later, saying: "It is called a theophany as if by it a divine illumination is made for those seeing, which the divine things themselves holily perfect." Then I ask about that reduction: for it is certain that according to the order of the hierarchy one reduces another, as will be disputed below in the tractate on the Orders; therefore it seems that one is to another that manifestation of the divine light.

§ Further it is asked concerning the third that he says, "a pure mirror".

§ 1. For a mirror is receptive of the form of a thing, and not of the essence; but the Angel receives the divine essence by itself rather than the form.

§ 2. Also, a mirror placed in the dark receives more than one placed under the rays of the sun. But the Angels stand immediately

under the rays of God; therefore it seems that they cannot be mirrors.

§ 3. Furthermore, whenever he calls them—especially according to another translation—agalmata (images), is agalma the same as a mirror?

§ It seems that it is, because the Commentator says that agalma is the same among the Greeks as "image" or "mirror" or "likeness" among us. Since therefore one, by illuminating another, leads him to this, that he is made the agalma of him according to Dionysius, it seems that one is a mirror to another.

§ Then I ask, is everyone a mirror to everyone, or not? If not: this does not seem right, because then not everyone could signify his intention to another; therefore it seems that everyone is a mirror and agalma to another. BUT AGAINST THIS: Illumination descends and does not ascend; therefore it belongs to the inferior to be only a mirror, and to the superior to be the manifestor of illumination. Therefore it seems that in this assignment, "manifestation of the divine light" and "pure mirror" do not refer to the same Angel.

§ Further it is asked concerning the fourth thing he says, that "he receives the whole beauty of the good-formed deity".

§ For this is impossible, because thus God would be circumscribed by some created intellect, which cannot be.

§ Similarly concerning the last thing he says, that "he causes to shine purely in himself the goodness of the silence which is in the hidden places".

§ 1. For the Angel does not do this, but rather God.

§ 2. Furthermore, how is it in the hidden places, and how is it silence, if he causes this to shine in himself? For splendor does not suffer to be in hidden places, because all things which are shining in the light are manifested by the light itself.

140. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, cap. 4.

§ Solution. It must be noted that Dionysius here gathers five things which apply to the Angel illuminated and beatified through the contemplation of the Word, of which three are taken in the beatified nature of the Angel, and those three follow one another.

§ And one is that he is capable of the beatifying substance: and for this five dispositions are required, namely removal from the impure thing that impedes. The second is purity, so that he is on all sides of his own nature apt for the penetrating deity; just as a mirror, insofar as it is a mirror, is capable of an image; and purity removes the nature of the opaque, which would not receive. Clarity, moreover, posits the polishing of it, lest perhaps something obscure in one part should overshadow another. And three dispositions follow through removal from things that accidentally darken, namely contamination, defilement (coinquinatio), and blemish (maculatio). And contamination properly happens from the lesion of a touch leaving an infection; defilement, however, from the touch of filth; but blemish from the staining of an infected spirit proceeding from the eyes, just as a mirror is blemished at the sight of a menstruating woman. And these are figuratively referred to the blessed spirits: because capacity is there regarding virtual nature, and purity through removal from matter inducing opacity, "because the corruptible body weighs down the soul, and the earthly habitation depresses a sense thinking many things" (Wisdom 9:15). But clarity is from equality through removal from penal state: because tribulation (as the Philosopher says) makes virtue unequal. Uncontaminated, however, speaks of the removal from the contact of those behaving badly: because from fellowship an infecting touch adheres. Undefiled, however, speaks of the removal from the filth of vices; and unblemished speaks of the nobility of the spirit depurated in them from every defect of menstruosity and mutability. And this is the first with its conditions.

§ But the second is that, according to

act, he receives the incident light from God, which indeed falls as a whole, but is not received except according to capacity.

§ And the third is that he reflects it at pure angles: because every reflection of incident light is at pure angles, as is proved in the Perspectiva. But this reflection will not be except into the same line beginning directly into God, so that the heat of the ardor of perpetual charity may be excited. And these two he touches upon by the two things he subjoins, namely "receiving the whole, if it is fitting to say," etc., and by that: "And to shine purely." But the first two are taken according to the conformity of the Angel filled with God to God: and one indeed is the manifestation of the divine light in himself, just as burning iron manifests fire; and the other is the conformity of the one manifesting to the manifested, and this is the image of God.

§ And through this the solution to the whole is already almost clear.

§ For to that which is objected about the image, it must be said that it is taken in none of those modes, but rather for the said conformity.

141. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, cap. 4.

§ To the other it must be said that all, in the vision which is the reward, stand immediately under the rays of the sun and are informed by God; but in other revelations one is illuminated by another, and of these it will be spoken below.

§ To that which is objected about Dionysius, it must be said that he does not intend that not all are informed immediately by the Word, but rather that according to proportion the superiors receive the Word supremely, the middle in a middle mode, and the inferiors in an extreme mode. Yet all stand in the vestibules of the Trinity, clothed with the light of God as with a garment (Psalm 103:2).

§ To that which is further asked, it must be said that he manifests the hidden light, as was said; and this is not the light of theophany by which one illuminates another, but of the theophany by which anyone is illuminated by God.

§ To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that such objections and calumnies of the sacred books come from the fact that it is not understood that theophany means two things, namely the light of glory elevating the intellect and comforting the phantasm, and this is created glory which is united to the intellect of the Angel; it also means the intelligible distinguishing and perfecting the intellect, and this is nothing else than God. Just as also in the sense of sight there is light perfecting, and color determining sight; and in our intellect there is the light of the agent intellect elevating and illuminating, and the intelligible distinguishing. For the nature of the intellect cannot be fixed there unless it is comforted by the light infused into it by God. And then the objection ceases: because then that light is a sign, not in which God is seen as in a medium, but under which, as it comforts the intellect, the intellect is immediately fixed in God.

§ To that which is asked about the mirror, it must be said that a material mirror, from its imperfection, does not receive except in the dark. But that is not so: because it does not receive the rays of the divine light on its surface only, like a material mirror, but rather into its depth and inmost parts.

§ To this which is asked about agalmata, whether one can be an image to another? It must be said that not properly, nor even a mirror spoken of in this way, because it speaks of the capacity of glory. But one can be to another an occasion or cause of some illumination pertaining to a work, for the reception of which one is not called a mirror or image in this way which is considered here, except perhaps relatively (secundum quid). And I well concede that all speak to each other, but not all illuminate each other, as was noted in the second book of the Sentences.

§ To that which is objected about the fourth, the solution is already clear, because God exhibits Himself wholly, but He is received according to the capacity of each one, such that He is wholly inside, but not inclosed , so that He is also wholly outside: and this is what he intends to say.

§ To the last it must be said that the divine light by itself is most manifest, and is not hidden except because it is inaccessible to be comprehended. And therefore it is called silence,

because nothing participating in it speaks it entirely, just as it speaks itself in the Trinity of persons; and therefore it is called hidden, because no one knows it by comprehending, except the Trinity God.

Articulus 2 — Whether An Angel Was Created In Beatitude

Whether the Angel was created in beatitude?

§ Secondly it is asked, whether the Angel was created in beatitude, or not?

§ And it seems that he was: because § 1. Thus says Augustine in the book On Rebuke and Grace: "The Angels although created... therefore were made blessed." [144]

§ But because he says this many times in many places on Genesis, let it be objected to the same through reason.

§ 2. For beatitude consists in the vision of the Word. But the Angels in the first state saw the Word: therefore in the first state they were blessed. The first is proved by the saying of Augustine, that the Angels were formed by conversion to the Word, by seeing it. The second is proved by this, that the Angel could not see the creature to be made in the Word, unless he saw the Word: therefore it seems that he was blessed.

§ 3. Also, Augustine in book II On Genesis says thus: "Not like us did the Angels advance to perceiving wisdom, so that they might catch sight of the invisible things of God being understood through the things that are made, they who from the moment they were created enjoy the very eternity of the Word in holy and pious contemplation: and looking down from there upon these things, according to what they see within, they either approve what is done rightly, or disapprove of sins." [145] Therefore if they enjoy from the moment they are made, it seems that they were made blessed.

§ 4. Also, Augustine in book IV On Genesis: "Morning is when with the cognition of the creature one rises into the praise of the Creator." [146] Therefore it is clear that they were enjoying, and seeing, and praising: but these acts seem to be of beatitude; therefore it seems that they were made blessed.

§ BUT AGAINST THIS: § It is held in the Text that he is not blessed who is uncertain of his fall; but the Angels were uncertain of their fall. Since therefore from the beginning they were not confirmed, it seems that they were not blessed.

§ Solution. It must be said that the Master sufficiently hints at the solution of this question in the Text, that beatitude is spoken of in many ways: namely according to the best state of natural endowments without misery, and thus the first man and the first Angel, each according to his own state, was blessed. Sometimes a species of beatitude is called beatitude, and thus it is said: "Blessed is the man who fears the Lord" (Psalm 111:1). Sometimes it is called the state perfected by the aggregation of all goods: thus only those confirmed with God are said to be blessed. Sometimes it is called the state of all goods which are substantially the very thing

143. Pseudo-Dionysius, De coelesti hierarchia, cap. 4.

which is called blessed: and thus nothing is blessed except God alone. And through this the solution to the first is clear.

§ To the other it must be said that according to those who say that the Angel was not created in grace, it is necessary to say that it happens in two ways to see the Word, namely as He is the art and reason of things to be made, and as He is the object of beatitude. In the first mode the Angels saw; in the second mode the blessed saw.

§ But if it is asked, how does it happen that one is separated from the other? I say that in comparison to the act of the soul, or of a spiritual substance, this is easy: because those things which are not separated in reality, the intellect well separates; and it happens that one and the same thing is understood in one respect and not in another; especially since that eternal mirror is voluntary, and shows itself as it wills, and in whatever respect it wills, and how much and when it wills.

§ To the other they say that it is understood of natural piety and contemplation, not of beatitude.

§ It follows to the last. Furthermore, it can be said that praise is of things known through nature in the Word, and not through grace.

Articulus 3 — Whether The Evil Angels Were Able To Foreknow Their Fall Or Not

Whether the evil Angels could have foreknown their fall, or not?

§ Thirdly it is asked, whether they could have foreknown their fall?

§ And it seems that they could: because § 1. God, supremely loving our salvation, ought to have given all occasions for standing. But foreknowledge of the fall is a caution aiding to stand; therefore it seems that it was expedient to foreknow the fall.

§ 2. Also, the Lord revealed his fall to Peter, saying: "Before the rooster," etc. (Matthew 26:34). Therefore it seems that He ought to have done the same for the Angel.

§ 3. Also, let us posit that He had revealed it to him, what inconvenience would follow? It seems that none would: because He forewarned man lest he fall, when He had said: "In whatever day you eat from it," etc. (Genesis 2:17). Therefore it seems that it would have been good also for the demon.

§ 4. Also, the Lord could reveal this, whose power is constrained in nothing; therefore he who would receive this revelation could foreknow this.

§ BUT AGAINST this are four arguments of Anselm in the book On the Fall of the Devil, of which the first is this:

§ 1. Knowledge is only of certain and necessary things. But the fall of the Angel was contingent before it happened; therefore he could not foreknow it, unless perhaps from God to whom nothing is contingent. [147]

142. Maximus the Confessor (or John of Scythopolis), Scholia on the Celestial Hierarchy.

§ 2. But if you say that he could have had an estimation about his fall. Against: Anselm says: Let it be granted that he had an estimation of his fall. Either he willed the future fall, or not. If he willed it, then by that very falling will he already fell; therefore he fell before he fell, which is false. But if he did not will it: then he grieved about his future fall; and the more he grieved, the more miserable he was. Therefore the more he foreknew his fall, the more miserable he was. But the more he grieved about his fall, the more just he was: and the more just he was, the more happy he ought to have been. Therefore, from the first, the more he grieved, the more happy he ought to have been. And earlier it was held that the more he grieved, the more miserable he was. Therefore whence he ought to have been more happy, thence he was more miserable, which the order of justice does not permit. Therefore he could not foreknow his fall.

§ 3. Also, the third reason is: Either foreknowing his fall, he willed to hold the rectitude in which he was created, or not. If so, then he willed to persevere in it: because no one holds it unless by willing to persevere. But willing to persevere, he thought he ought to persevere, and he foreknew his fall: therefore foreknowing his fall, he thought he ought to persevere, which is absurd. But if he did not will to persevere: then he already fell; therefore he fell before he fell, which cannot be.

§ 4. But the fourth is this: Either he would have avoided the fall, or not. If he had avoided it: either by love of justice, or not. It is certain that it was not by love of justice: because the subsequent event of the matter proved this; and when a fall is not avoided by love of justice, the heart has already fallen through the affection of falling. Therefore he fell before he fell through the affection of falling. But if he had not avoided it, then his knowledge would have been useless, which is impossible, since it is written in the Text that knowledge is the fruit of piety.

§ Solution. With the holy Doctors it must be said that he could not foreknow his fall, and the reason Anselm touches upon sufficiently in objecting.

§ To the first therefore it must be said that it would not have been an occasion for standing, but rather for despairing: because he well knew the possibility of falling, on account of the fact that he was not confirmed; and again he well knew that falling he would from strict justice deserve to be eternally punished, but he (as Anselm says) perhaps did not think that God would do this which He could justly do. And therefore when it is asked about the foreknowledge of the fall, since he well knew the possibility of the fall, it is asked only about the act of falling; and foreknowledge of that would rather induce despair than caution.

§ To the other it must be said that Peter did not receive this as spoken from foreknowledge, but as an admonition of caution, which did not need to be done for the demon, because he well knew that he ought to beware lest he fall.

§ Also, it is not similar concerning Peter: because Peter fell not from a state of repenting, but in a state with the possibility of rising again; but the demon falling, simultaneously with

144. Augustine, De correptione et gratia, cap. 10.

this fell from the state of repenting. Because as Damascene says: "What death is in humans, this the fall is in Angels." [148]

§ To the other, the solution is clear through the arguments of Anselm, who deduces to many inconveniences. And besides them there are two: a certain punishment of sadness would precede the fault, and the falling Angels would be induced into the suffocating sadness of despair, before they had merited any evil.

§ To the other it must be said that God could reveal it. But positing that He had revealed it, I say that since it still depended on the free choice of the Angel, he would have accepted this as revealed by the Lord not only from foreknowledge, but for caution.

§ But as to the other things which could be asked here, namely whether the good Angels could foreknow their confirmation, or foreknow the fall of the evil Angels, what the Master says in the Text is quite sufficient.

DISTINCTIO V

Divisio Textus

§ "After these things consideration adduces," etc. This part is divided into two: in the first of which it is treated of aversion and conversion. But in the second, of the distinction of the orders; and this begins at the beginning of distinction IX, there, A, "After the foresaid things it remains," etc.

§ The first of these is divided into four: in the first of which aversion and conversion are posited. In the second, who were turned away, in the following distinction, there, A, "Furthermore it ought to be known," etc. In the third, of their works and the powers ordered to works, in distinction VII, there, A, "It was said above that Angels," etc. In the fourth, it treats of their apparitions through assumed bodies, there, "It is also accustomed to be turned in question," etc., and there begins distinction VIII.

§ But in this distinction there are four: of which the first is, What is aversion? Second, by what as a power were they turned away and turned towards? there, B, "For they all had free choice," etc. In the third, he says what was added to the converted, and taken away from the averted, there, C, "But if it is asked," etc. In the fourth it is asked, Whether they merited, or do merit the beatitude perceived? there, G, "Here it is usually asked," etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether It Was Possible For An Angel To Fall

Whether it was possible for the Angel to fall?

§ Here, moreover, three things are asked before the Text, namely: Whether it was possible for the Angel to fall? Second, What was his first sin? Third, What did he appetite?

145. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, lib. 2, cap. 8.

§ To the first it is objected thus: § 1. Aristotle says that the intellect is always right: but the phantasy is right and not right. But in the Angel there was nothing moving the appetite except the intellect. Since therefore it is impossible that from a rightly moving thing an inordinate motion or sin be elicited, it seems that the Angel could not fall through sin.

§ 2. Also, in the Angel there was a deiform intellect: but a deiform intellect does not err. Therefore the Angel never errs; therefore neither did he sin, because every perverse act is from some error, as Augustine says.

§ 3. Also, the nature of the Angel by itself was ordered to the good, nor was there anything that would depress it: therefore it tended into that, because all things that are desire the good. But tending into that, he could not sin: therefore he could not fall, as it seems.

§ 4. Also, every will proceeds from some cognition. But then he knew that God was good above all things. Therefore since affection follows cognition, it seems that he also loved God above all things: therefore he never sinned.

§ BUT AGAINST this is: § 1. The fight which we daily experience from him, and everything that is in the Text.

§ 2. Also, reason: because the will is not obligated to what is known, although it wills nothing except what it knows; therefore it can be deflected from it when it wills. Therefore it was possible for the Angel to sin.

§ 3. Also, Augustine says that the cause of the first sin is nothing but the will, namely one good indeed by nature, but failing from the good in act. Therefore since the Angel had free will, he could sin, as it seems.

§ Solution. To the first it must be said that the intellect is considered in two ways, namely in comparison to its proper object; and this is the true absolutely if it is speculative, or the good absolutely if it is practical. And then it is never not right, nor does it ever err: because thus it proceeds only from the principles of the true and the good absolutely, and in those there is no error. There is another consideration of the intellect in comparison to one's own proper good: and thus it is not moved by the good according as it is good, but to the good according as it is proper, and this is as good for now and for oneself. And in this deception is frequent: and in this mode the intellect of the Angel was not right.

§ To the other it must be said that it is deiform: because it does not need collation and inquiry to choose and to receive knowledge, but it is not deiform to the effect that it would always imitate God; and spoken of in the first mode, it can be deflected and can sin.

§ To the other it must be said that every nature, insofar as it is nature, is by itself ordered to the good; but nevertheless through free choice it can be deflected from it.

§ To the other it must be said that if the will proceeds from cognition, it does not follow from this that if a cognition of something were held, that thing would be loved. But rather the fallacy of the consequent falls in, because positing cognition, the will does not necessarily will

146. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, lib. 4, cap. 24.

the known thing; nor does it even will it as much as it knows it, and conversely sometimes it has more of affection concerning that which it knows, as is clear in charity on the way, which sometimes loves more than it knows.

Articulus 2 — What Is The First Sin Of The Angel

What is the first sin of the Angel?

§ Secondly it is asked, What was the first sin of the demon?

§ Moreover it seems that it was avarice: because § 1. The Apostle says that "the root of all evil is cupidity" (1 Timothy 6:10). But the sin of the devil was the root of all evil, because it was the first; therefore it was avarice.

§ 2. Also, Augustine says that from it the devil is the devil; therefore it was the first sin.

§ 3. Also, upon that of Psalm 79:17, "Things set on fire," the Gloss says that every sin is either from an evil humiliating fear, or from an evil inflaming love. And because fear also comes from self-love, since therefore cupidity is excessive love of one's own good, it seems that the evil of the Angel proceeded from avarice.

§ ALSO IT SEEMS that it was from pride, because § 1. Thus it is said, Sirach 10:15: "The beginning of all sin is pride."

§ 2. Also, Augustine says, and all others, that the Angel first sinned from pride: therefore, etc.

§ 3. Again, Psalm 35:12: Let not the foot of pride come to me, etc. Therefore, the foot of the first sinner was pride. But that sinner is the Angel. Therefore, the first sin of the Angel was pride.

BUT it seems that it was an omission. For when he saw his own beauty, and the divine altitude, he ought to have compared them, concluding that he ought not to extol himself above God, or to an equality with God. But he did not make this comparison; therefore, he omitted it. Therefore, an omission was the first sin.

Again, it seems that it was infidelity. For no wise person strives to obtain something that he does not believe can be done. But the Angel was most wise; therefore, he was not striving to obtain something that he did not believe could be done. But he was striving to obtain equality with God, as is said in the Letter; therefore, he first believed that this could be done. But this is infidelity, [namely to believe] that something could be equaled to God. Therefore, it seems that infidelity was the first sin of the Angel.

Solution. It must be said that the first sin, absolutely speaking, was pride, because an undue appetite for dignity is properly the vice of pride.

To the first, it must be said that avarice or cupidity is spoken of in three ways. In one way, it is called a habitual taking-pleasure in one's own good, and in this way it is the same as lust (libido), and in this way it is called the root of all evil, but it is not itself any special sin. In another way, it is called an immoderate actual will for a mutable good; and in this way it is

147. Anselm, De casu diaboli, cap. 21.

still not distinguished into a species of vice, because every vice wills some mutable good with an immoderate appetite. This is evident from the definition of sin which Augustine gives, that sin is to cling to mutable things, spurning the immutable good. And thus it accompanies every sin, and thus it is not a root. In a third way, avarice is called an immoderate appetite for having things that promise sufficiency in life, which are riches and money. And in this way it is taken properly, and it is one of the capital vices. And in this way it is evident that it was not the first sin of the Angel. And through this the solution to the first three objections is evident, because they proceed according as avarice is a root, and not a special sin.

To that which is objected concerning pride, it must be said in the same way that pride is spoken of in three ways. In one way, it is a habitual appetite for altitude; and that is the beginning of all sin, because unless one were to set oneself on high above the will of the one commanding and above the precept, one would not sin. And thus it is the beginning; and it is the same in substance as avarice, which is the root, as Augustine says: "Let us beware of pride and avarice, not two evils, but one evil." But yet they differ in the rationale of that of which they are principles, because there are two things in sin, namely aversion and conversion. On the part of the conversion to the mutable good, avarice is the root; on the part of the aversion, the root is pride. And because it belongs to the root to give moisture and sap, and the sap of love is on the part of the conversion, therefore avarice is called the root. But because aversion is the form of sin, because it makes it evil, and this is the beginning of sin and apostasy, therefore pride is properly called the beginning, not the root, and the beginning of apostatizing from God. And therefore both are written: Pride is the beginning of all sin, and Pride is the beginning of apostatizing from God. In another way, pride is called an immoderate appetite for extolling oneself in whatever matter; and thus it is a common vice which contains under it vainglory, hypocrisy, boasting, and the like, which seek to excel. In a third way, it is called most properly the appetite for excelling in a degree of dignity or prelacy, and thus it is one of the capital vices, and it is the first sin of the demon, because he

desired the perfection of power over others in the degree of dignity and prelacy.

To that which is objected concerning omission, it is commonly resolved that this is false, [namely] that he was bound to compare [his beauty with the divine altitude], because he could have avoided [sinning] otherwise than by comparing. Furthermore, even if he had compared, it was still not necessary that he not desire it, even after the comparison; and therefore the objection is null.

To the last, it must be said that an election preceded by which he desired that altitude. Furthermore, he did not desire an equality of parity in all things, but in that to which he would have attained if he had stood firm; and therefore there was no infidelity in him. However, some say that judgment is threefold, namely, of reason as it is speculative, of reason as it is about operable things, and of reason as it is giving a verdict about the work to be done by oneself; and he errs only in this last one, not in the first two. And therefore he erred according to how every evil person is ignorant, and not in infidelity.

148. John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa, lib. 2, cap. 4.

Articulus 3 — What Did The Angel Desire When He Sinned

What did the Angel desire when he sinned?

Thirdly, it is asked: What did he desire? § 1. Now it seems that he desired equality with God through that passage of Isaiah 14:14: I will be like the Most High. [149]

§ 2. Again, through many things which are said in the Letter, that he wished to be like God.

§ 3. Again, Anselm also seems to prove that he wished to be greater than God. For whoever desires not to be subject to God, and to obtain this against God: in that he desires not to be subject, he desires equality; but in that he wishes to obtain it against God, he wishes to be greater than God. The devil desired this; therefore he wished to be greater than God.

BUT AGAINST this are the strong reasons of Anselm, thus:

§ 1. That which cannot be thought cannot be desired. The equality of God cannot be thought; therefore it cannot be desired. The first premise is evident from the fact that nothing is desired unless thought announces it beforehand. The second premise is evident from this, that to him whose quantity exceeds all thought, nothing equal can be thought or feigned.

§ 2. Again, we had above in the Letter from Augustine that he desired that to which he would have attained if he had stood firm. But to equality with God he would never have attained; therefore he never desired equality.

§ 3. Again, Augustine says of Adam that it is not to be believed that a man endowed with a spiritual mind could have been seduced into believing that he would be like God; therefore neither could the Angel, since he was endowed with a much more spiritual mind.

§ 4. Again, although the will can be of impossibilities, yet in a wise person there is no will of impossibilities with a striving to obtain them. But in the Angel there was maximal wisdom, as is said in Ezekiel 28:12: Full of wisdom, and perfect in beauty; and there was in him a striving to obtain what he desired. Therefore, it was not impossible for him. But equality was always impossible for him; therefore he never desired divine equality, as it seems.

FURTHERMORE it is asked: Did he sin by desiring to be like God?

§ 1. It seems not: because 1. This is promised to the elect. 1 John 3:2: We know that when he shall appear, we shall be like to him, because we shall see him as he is. Therefore, if it is promised, it can and ought to be desired. Therefore, this is not a sin; therefore much less was this a sin in the Angel who was higher, and ordained to a higher reward if he had stood firm.

§ 2. Again, to desire to be assimilated to God, this is to be converted to God. To be converted is praised in Scripture concerning the other Angels; therefore it seems that it would also be praiseworthy in this one.

§ 3. Again, the rationale of goodness in every crea-

ture is to be assimilated to the first good as much as it can. And a thing desires to be that which it desires, as Boethius says. Therefore, the Angel, by desiring this, desired a good in which he might become good; therefore he ought not to have fallen through this.

§ 4. Again, a conversion to a mutable good is either evil because it is to a mutable good, or because it is a conversion. If in the first way, then God would be the author of evil, because He is the author of the mutable good. If in the second way, then every conversion would be evil, which is false. Therefore, it seems that the Angel did not sin in this.

§ 5. Furthermore, Anselm says that he wished to have beatitude without labor; but in the will for beatitude he did not sin; therefore, if he sinned, this circumstance made it so: without labor. Therefore, his sin was rather in the flight from labor than in the appetite for altitude. But this is the sin of acedia (sloth); therefore acedia, and not pride, was the sin of the Angel, which is contrary to what was proven above, as it seems.

Solution. It seems to me that it must be said with Augustine and Anselm, that he desired that to which he would have attained if he had stood firm. Whence it must be known that, just as Augustine and Boethius prove in the book On the Consolation of Philosophy, all things desire beatitude. And although beatitude is a state made perfect by the aggregation of all goods, nevertheless there are three principles in it, namely perfect power, perfect knowledge, and perfect will. The demon, therefore, desired beatitude with respect to perfect power; but the first man desired beatitude with respect to perfect knowledge. Now this perfection consists in three things, of which one is the substance of that power itself, confirmed and supported, not declining through infirmity. Another is to have that power of oneself, and not from another. The third is not to expect it through merit under another, but to have it without merit, just as a superior has it. And with respect to the first, it is not a sin for a rational creature to desire perfect power. As to the second two, [the sin is] namely that he wishes to have from himself what cannot even be from himself; and that he wishes to snatch at once what is to be expected from merits under the grace of another. For this bespeaks the perversity of the order of the rational creature. Whence according to Anselm, the sin of the demon consists in these two things. Whence, with respect to the first, he desired that to which he would have attained if he had stood firm, but not with respect to the second. Again, with respect to the first, he did not desire a likeness of parity or equality, because he did not desire as much power as God, because he could not think this. But with respect to the two—namely the second and the third—he extolled his own will, and preferred it to the divine will. And with respect to this he wished to snatch it against God; and thus in a certain respect (secundum quid) he wished to be greater than God or equal.

With these points established, it is easy to respond to the objections.

For it MUST BE SAID to those things which are in the Letter, that he desired equality in the mode of having, but not in the very substance of the thing desired.

To the next, it must be said that this proceeds concerning the quantity of the desirable thing, and this is well conceded.

149. Isaiah 14:14.

To the next, it must be said that he would have attained to perfect power, but not to the mode of having it.

To the next, it must be said that he did not desire equality in the quantity of parity, but in the likeness of having.

To the next, it must be said that the striving for the mode of having was caused by the consideration of his own beauty; for it seemed to him that it would be just for this to be granted to him. Whence, Ezekiel 28:17: Your heart was lifted up in your beauty. [150] Others say that ambition believes it can do more than it can.

To the next, it must be said that there is a likeness of imitation which is to be desired with the order and mode of having it from another who is superior, and concerning that the three objections proceed which are posited in order:

and a likeness of equality in the mode of having, and concerning that they do not hold; and this likeness was in the appetite of the demon.

To the next, it must be said that it is evil in neither way, but rather in the mode of conversion: because, namely, he is converted to a private good, as to an end as that which is to be enjoyed. Because then it is an averting conversion, and in this way was the conversion of the Angel to his own beauty.

To the last, it must be said that to have it without the labor of merit was not the rationale for willing or desiring, but rather the rationale was elation from the consideration of his own beauty, so that from this it seemed worthy to him that in this he should be like God. In acedia, however, the flight from labor is the rationale of the sin.

Articulus 4 — Whether To Be Turned Away Is To Have Hatred Or To Envy

Whether to be averted is to hate or to envy?

Then it is asked concerning what he says there, at A, To be averted is to hate or to envy.

For this seems impossible: because § 1. Thus hatred would be the first sin of the Angel, which was disproved above.

§ 2. Furthermore, envy would have been first in the Angel, which cannot be, because hatred is not envy, nor conversely.

§ 3. Again, hatred (as Gregory says) is inveterate anger. Therefore anger would have preceded that sin, and anger would have been the first sin, which seems to be the case in the Apocalypse, where it is said: Woe to the inhabitants of the earth, because the devil has come down to you, having great wrath. [151] But in his heart he carried to the earth the sin which he had conceived in heaven; therefore it seems that anger was first.

§ 4. Again, what is said in the Letter seems false, that he hated God. Because God alone is good through Himself, and is the highest good, and is entirely desirable, as is said in the

Canticles. Therefore no rationale for hatred can be in Him; therefore neither can the demon hate Him.

§ 5. Again, nothing seeks to be assimilated to that which it hates. But the demon wished to be assimilated to God; therefore he did not hate Him, as it seems.

Solution. It must be said that hatred is the first thing following aversion, as an effect follows a cause; but it was not the first sin causing the aversion of the demon, but rather pride. For as soon as he was averted, the infernal fire was kindled in him, and from then on he hated the judge justly judging. And through this the solution to the first is evident.

To the next, it must be said that his envy was with respect to man, not God, because he envied man the salvation which he himself had lost. Nor does Augustine intend to say that envy was the first sin through its essence, but through its cause: because wherever the mistress pride precedes, the handmaid envy follows, as is implied in the Letter.

To the next, it must be said that hatred here is called rooted anger, not indeed through custom, because it was new, but rather through confirmation, because he simultaneously fell, and in the fall was confirmed or made obstinate.

To the next, it must be said that he does not hate God as God, or as good, but as judge, whom he perceives in the impedance of his iniquitous will and the infliction of penalty; therefore because these things are continuous. And it is said that the envy is continuous, as Psalm 73:23 says: The pride of those who hate you ascends continually; [152] and John 15:24: They have hated both me and my Father. [153]

To the next, it must be said that he sought to be assimilated to God not through the same mode in which he hated Him, but through another, as was determined above.

Articulus 5 — What In Angels Is Aversion And Conversion, And What Is Confirmation And Obstinacy

What in the Angels is aversion and conversion? And, what is confirmation and obstinacy?

What in the Angels is aversion and conversion? And, what is confirmation and obstinacy?

Then it is asked concerning that which he says there, at C, But if it is asked, whether after creation, etc.

By reason of this there can be a doubt: What is conversion, and what is aversion; or confirmation, and obstinacy?

§ 1. For it is certain that afterwards they had free choice just as before; therefore it seems that they can be deflected into what they wished just as before. Therefore they are not confirmed.

150. Ezekiel 28:17.

§ 2. Again, confirmation sounds involuntary; therefore [it implies] an amission of praise in the work. Therefore it seems that the Angels are not praiseworthy in the fact that they adhere to God.

§ 3. Again, they have a rational power before just as after, and conversely. But every rational power from its nature is toward opposites; since therefore its nature is not taken away from it, it seems that afterwards the indifference to good and to evil remains just as before.

Solution. It must be said to this that just as material potency is toward an act; and because it cannot attain an act which totally satisfies its appetite, therefore by having one act, it is in potency to another. But if it were to attain one totally fulfilling its appetite, as is the case in the sun and the stars, it would no longer be in potency. So it is concerning the rational power in the way [i.e., in via, in this life], that it does not attain any of the desirable things totally fulfilling its appetite and reason, and therefore with respect to opposites it is separable from both. But in the fatherland [i.e., in patria, in heaven] it will be conjoined to the desirable thing whose sweetness it tastes, ceaselessly penetrating it without disgust and without an appetite for another; and

because this is infinite, therefore it is never averted from it, nor will it wish to be averted, nor can it. But this is not an inability, but the highest ability; and it is not coercion, but a spontaneous will immobilized in the quiet of its desire from the taste of a good which can never be finished, nor generate disgust, and which calls the whole appetite to itself.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that although free choice is toward opposites, nevertheless it is not for the sake of opposites, but rather so that it might adhere to one; and therefore when it finds that beyond which there is nothing to seek, there will be rest in it.

To the next, it must be said that praise is not lost, because the will remains spontaneous, but immobile, for the reason that the infinite sweetness calls and converts the willing—not coerced—will entirely into itself. And this is the inebriation of which the Psalmist says: They shall be inebriated with the plenty of thy house, etc.

To the next, it must be said that it will always be rational and discerning opposites and many things; but one thing will be preferred to all, which totally possesses the affection; and it cannot do another, not out of coercion, but because it totally occupies the affection, so that nothing is sought besides or outside it.

Articulus 6 — Whether The Evil Angels Always Sin, And Whether Every One Of Their Acts Is Evil

Whether the evil Angels always sin, and whether every act of theirs is evil?

But then it is asked concerning the obstinacy of the evil angels.

For it seems that they always sin, and that every act of theirs is evil.

151. Apocalypse 12:12.

§ 1. Because, on 2 Corinthians 6:15, What concord hath Christ with Belial? the Gloss says: "Just as Christ does all things well, so the devil does all things badly."

§ 2. Again, on 1 John 3:8, From the beginning the devil sinneth, the Gloss says: "Beginning to sin, he continuously sins even unto the end."

§ 3. Again, Augustine says in the book City of God: "The mind of the demons, oppressed and subjugated by the vices of the passions, directs whatever of reason it naturally has to deceive, and does so the more fiercely the greater the cupidity for harming possesses them."

§ 4. Again, on that word of the Apostle to the Romans 14:23: All that is not of faith is sin, the Gloss says that the whole life of infidels is sin. Since therefore the demon is of more ample malice than the infidel, it seems that the demon is so coerced toward evil that he never does anything except evil.

§ 5. Again, Psalm 73:23: The pride of those who hate you ascends continually.

§ 6. Again, Habakkuk 1:17: He ceases not continually to kill. [154] And he speaks concerning the figure of the devil regarding Naboth. Therefore it seems that a good act never proceeds from him.

§ 7. Again, the confirmation of the good and the obstinacy of the evil are related through opposites. But from the good a bad act can never proceed; therefore from the evil a good act can never proceed. Therefore it seems that they are coerced toward evil.

BUT AGAINST this there seems to be: § 1. What is said, James 2:19: The devils believe and tremble. But to believe is good; therefore they are not entirely obstinate in evil.

§ 2. Again, he went out from obsessed bodies at the command of the Lord; and this was good. Therefore he is not entirely confirmed in evil.

§ 3. Again, God is more prone to have mercy than to punish. Therefore, although He confirmed the good Angel in Himself so that he could not will evil, nevertheless He ought not to have permitted it thus that the evil one be made obstinate

so that he could not will good at all.

§ 4. If you say that he believes under coercion, and went out of the obsessed bodies under coercion with a murmur. Against this: Augustine says that a man can do other things unwillingly, but he cannot believe unless willing; if therefore the demon believes, he believes willingly; therefore he is not coerced.

§ 5. Again, when he went out of obsessed bodies, at least he consented to the act, and he did this willingly. Therefore he wills something of good.

§ 6. Again, synderesis is totally extinguished in no one; therefore neither in him. But its office is to remurmur [i.e., to cause remorse or protest against evil], and this is good. Therefore there is something of good in him. If you say that it does not remurmur in him. Against this: Because the remurmuring is the penalty of the worm which (as Isaiah says) dies not.

152. Psalm 73:23.

Furthermore, some evil of penalty would thus be taken away from him, which is unfitting; therefore it murmurs in him.

§ 7. Again, his nature is not totally destroyed; therefore neither are the natural operations; and those are something of good. Therefore he is not entirely obstinate in evil.

§ 8. Again, Dionysius says concerning the demons, that they concupisce the good and the optimum, such as to be, to live, and to understand; but this is good. Therefore they are not entirely obstinate in evil.

Furthermore, this seems to be the case from the comparison of the fall of the Angel to the fall of man.

For just as the Angel desired equality in power, so man desired equality in knowledge; therefore one sinned as much as the other. Since therefore man falling was not immediately obstinate, but had room for penance, it seems that the Angel similarly [should have].

BUT AGAINST: § 1. His free choice is not coerced; therefore he can will the good of grace. But whoever efficaciously wills the good as much as is in him: therefore he prepares himself for this, and that suffices. Therefore the demon can return to grace, as Origen said.

§ 2. If you say that man sinned at the persuasion of another, whereas the Angel did not, and therefore man could be redeemed through another, but not the Angel. This seems to be nothing, because to sin through oneself or through another are circumstances not varying the sin according to genus or species. Therefore they do not infinitely aggravate the sin of one over the sin of another. Therefore the Angel ought to have been admitted to penance, although he ought to have sustained a heavier penance than man.

§ 3. If you say that reason in man was clouded by the flesh, and therefore his sin was more excusable, whereas the Angel sinned against a deiform intellect, and therefore it is inexcusable. Against this: Although reason was less clear in man, nevertheless it was not infinitely distant from the intellect of the Angel, for in both was written the natural law. Therefore the fall of one ought not to have been infinitely aggravated over the other, as it seems. But if this be conceded, it is contrary to Apocalypse 12:8, where it is said that they prevailed not, neither was their place found any more in heaven. [155]

§ 4. Again, Damascene says: What death is in men, this the fall is in Angels: because just as men after death, so Angels after the fall are insusceptible to penance.

BUT then it is further asked, whether by the evil acts in which they are obstinate, they demerit continuously?

§ 1. For Isaiah expressly says this, that they sin continuously, and their torments grow continuously.

§ 2. This also seems from the fact that what they do proceeds from an evil root and an evil intention; therefore they sin.

153. John 15:24.

§ 3. Again, if from the fall they had an inability to sin any further, then the fall would seem

to sponsor them in something; and this is not true. Therefore it seems that the devil sins continuously.

BUT AGAINST: § 1. If his penalty and sin grow continuously, it seems that his penalty could become infinite, because the increase will have no end.

§ 2. Again, since sin takes away the good of nature, it seems that the whole [of nature] could be taken away, since it is finite, and there is no reason why a subsequent sin would take away less from the natural good than the preceding one.

§ 3. Again, after death a man does not sin, nor does he demerit anymore. Therefore it seems that neither does the devil after the fall.

Solution. It must be said that the act of the devil can be considered in two ways, namely according to its substance, and thus sometimes it can be generically good (de genere bonorum); and according to the circumstance of the agent, and thus it is always evil, as it seems to me, and proceeds from an evil will, and he is obstinate in it. Now diverse people assign the cause of obstinacy in diverse ways. For some say (as was touched upon in objecting) that the cause is: because he sinned through himself and not through another, and against a deiform intellect. Others, however, [say] that because the devil is simple, therefore he totally converts himself to that to which he converts himself; and therefore when he converts himself to evil, he wholly clings to evil; and when he converts himself to good, he wholly adheres to good. But I repute this solution foolish, because although he is simple in the division of essence, nevertheless he is not simple in the quantity of power which is capable of many things; and this is evident in the ministrative, ministered, and assisting power in the good Angels. But others [say], to whom it seems one should rather consent, that free choice was given for the way (ad viam), so that through reason it might see true and false, and true and truer—not that it might rest in both, but in one, namely which is the first truth; and that through the will it might prove good and better, and rest in the optimum. And therefore when it is conjoined to the highest good and first truth, it is so informed that it no longer finds anywhere it might be deflected. And by contrast, when it is deflected all the way to the end of the way, it is inflicted upon it from the order of justice not to be able to recede from the evil to which it is conjoined through election; and this is the cause of obstinacy. And this is taken in Ezekiel 32:26 and following, where it is spoken of the sepulchers of the king of Babylon, and Meshech and Tubal, etc. And it is subjoined that their swords are under their heads, and their iniquities are in their bones. [156] And by the sword is understood the affection of the act of sin by which they fought against God. But by iniquities in the bones is understood the immobile rooting of the habit in the powers of the soul.

AND ACCORDING to this, it must be said to the first, that the Gloss says that the devil did all things badly, but not all evil things; because by doing he sins, but nevertheless from the deed it is not always a cause of sin for him.

154. Habakkuk 1:17.

To the next, it must be said that it is understood with respect to the comparison to the root of the evil will.

To the next, it must be said that he directs the vivacity of his genius against us; but nevertheless he is sometimes restrained so that he elicits a deed which is generically good, although it is not done well.

TO THE NEXT, it must be said that when it is said, The whole life of infidels is sin, this means, in sin, because never is either venial or mortal sin remitted to them without grace. Nevertheless, not every act of theirs is evil in substance, nor indeed do they do all things badly; because often throughout their whole life infidels have some political virtues, and the acts of those are neither evil, nor do they become evil.

To the next, it must be said that pride always ascends in affection, although in effect it is repressed. Through this the solution to the following is evident.

To the next, it must be said that they are contrary-

the states of confirmation and obstinacy with respect to affection, and not with respect to work.

TO THAT which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that the believing of the demons is like a conclusion and not like a principle; for they are coerced by the very opening of truth, just as a stubborn person is by the violence of a demonstration. And therefore Augustine is not speaking of that [believing], but rather of that which is like the argument of things not appearing, which is treated in the third book of the Sentences.

To the next, it must be said that the departure was good, but the mode of departing was evil, because he went out with indignation and murmuring.

To the next, it must be said that God does not condemn beyond condignity; because it would be condign that He should reduce to nothing him who so proudly opposed Himself. But He inflicts upon him the inability to be able or willing to be averted, from the order of justice rendering for merits.

To the next, it must be said that he does not consent to the act of departing spontaneously, but coerced by the force of superiors.

To the next, it must be said that synderesis remurmurs against three things, namely the good omitted, the evil committed, and the evil of penalty. And in the devil they say it is extinguished with respect to the first two, but not with respect to the third. And this is not of praise, but of vituperation, because this is to remurmur against the order of divine justice. But this seems surprising, because synderesis is the worm whose proper act is to gnaw on account of crime or sin, and to testify that he who committed such things is worthy of penalty; and this remains as a witness to divine justice, and unto the accumulation of damnation. And therefore it seems to me that it remurmurs in the damned even against the evil of the fault committed; but a motion [of will] does not follow because of the affection for the opposite; but

155. Apocalypse 12:8.

that is not his [deliberative] act, but rather the act of nature which is not entirely destroyed in him.

TO THE SAYING of Dionysius, it must be said that he is speaking with respect to nature; and no motion of deliberation follows that concupiscence, but rather indignation and aversion; because he is indignant even with his own being, and with his understood nature, insofar as it lies oppressed under penalties by justice.

To that which is further asked, the solution is evident through what was said before, both concerning the Angel, and why he is obstinate, but not man: because man fell on the way (in via), but not from the way; whereas the Angel [fell] at the terminus of the way, and therefore from the way into obstimacy.

BUT IF it is asked, why one had a longer way than the other? I say that the Angel did not know these things [creatures] so that from them he might learn the Word; but rather from the revealing Word he knew these things, and he was created alongside the Word. But man was placed over the creatures of the world, so that in them he might see the Word, and, passing through all things, might come to adhere to the Word. And therefore it was fitting to posit a longer way for man than for the Angel. However, those reasons are good which the Masters touch upon, as is evident in objecting. Another is also touched upon by the Saints: that divine foreknowledge could not be deceived and frustrated concerning man. But if the first man had not had room for penance, no one of his descendants would ever have been saved, and the human race would have perished in one; and the foreknowledge which had foreseen many to be saved from men would have been frustrated. The Angelic nature, however, is separated, and it could not perish by certain ones perishing. And therefore foreknowledge was saved in the others.

NOW TO THAT which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that the demon does not will the good, and (in my judgment) immobly wills the evil. And speaking thus of the power proceeding from habit, he cannot will anything except evil; but from nature he can will the good; but that nature is oppressed by the rooting of the habit, so that it can never break forth into act. And therefore that objection is null.

TO THE NEXT, it must be said that that is not...

principal cause, but a concause: but rather that is the cause which was stated.

§ 2. To the next it must be said that this can well be a single cause: because a deiform intellect and a clouded reason are disproportionately distant, even though both are finite: for it well occurs that two things are finite, and yet have no proportion, such as the diagonal of a square and its side or edge. Another cause is that those things from which they fell are not proportioned, such as the immortality of a spirit and of an animal body, and the paradise of spirits and of bodies: and the contemplation of creatures in the Word, and the contemplation of the Word in creatures: and those things caused their ingratitude to be of a disproportionate quantity.

156. Ezekiel 32:27.

§ 3. To that which is further asked, Whether they continue to demerit?

§ 4. It seems to me that they do not: and to the saying of Isaiah I say that he speaks of accidental punishment and torment, namely that which is the worm of conscience, and to be punished for more things, but not to be punished more sharply and with a more bitter fire.

§ 5. To the next it must be said that this would be true unless the very thing that thus proceeds from a bad will were a torment [supplicium] to him, and therefore it is rather a punishment: and if he has guilt, it is not demeritorious of a greater evil, except accidentally, as it seems to me. However, there are those who agree with what Isaiah says, and thus they prove the objections.

§ 6. To the next it must be said that the fall did not profit them: but rather this is an obstinacy in the perversity of a bad will that is greater than every punishment for them, as Bernard says: "For eternity he will not obtain what he wills: and what he does not will, he will endure in perpetuity."

§ 7. Those who are of another opinion respond to the arguments to the contrary. To the first, saying that their punishment increases until the day of judgment: because until then they can sin by harming others.

§ 8. To the next they say that the sin does not take away in quantity as much as the first: but nevertheless it takes away in proportion, for example, that the first takes away a thousandth part: but the second not as much, but a thousandth part of the remainder: and so then the division will go on into infinity as in a continuum.

§ 9. To the last they say that it is not similar: because a man after death does not harm another as a demon does: because he is not given over to the exercise of temptation: but this solution is easy to disprove: and therefore it is abandoned.

Articulus 7 — Whether The Angels Merited Their Beatitude, And If They Merited, Whether Before Or After Glory Was Received

Whether the Angels merited their beatitude, and if they merited it, whether before or after receiving glory?

§ 10. Next it is asked concerning what he says: "Here it is usually asked, Whether in that very confirmation, etc."

§ 11. For there is a question here: Whether the Angels merited their beatitude? And if they merited it, whether before or after?

§ 12. But it seems that they merited it: because 1. Beatitude is in the character of a reward: therefore it should not be entirely given, but also rendered for merits: therefore they must have had merits for the reception of beatitude. 2. Also, Either it is given to the worthy, or the unworthy. If to the worthy: since no one is worthy unless he has merited, it seems that it is not given except by merit. 3. Also, Anselm says that this was the sin of the devil: that he wanted to have without merit what he would have received through merit if he had stood firm: therefore the others who did not fall received it through merit. 4. Also, It is established that in their

conversion they had a movement of free choice informed by grace: because it is held in the Text that they could not be converted without grace: but every movement of free choice informed by grace is meritorious: therefore they had it through merit.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 13. Conversion and confirmation were simultaneous: but after confirmation they do not have merit, nor before conversion, if they were created in natural things, as the Master says: nor was confirmation a merit for them, but glory: therefore they never merited, as it seems.

§ 14. Further it is asked, If they could merit after receiving glory?

It seems that they could: because 1. We often see that a soldier receives his stipends before his military service, and afterwards merits them: therefore it seems that it could similarly be done in the Angel. 2. Also, Otherwise the best and most worthy services they perform around us would be of no value to them if they did not merit by them: therefore it seems that they merit. 3. Also, Charity merits: therefore greater charity avails more for merit: but their charity is maximal: therefore they merit maximally.

ON THE CONTRARY: 1. If the lower ones merit, then it seems that the higher ones are dealt with unjustly: because they are not sent, so that their glory would not increase from merit. 2. Also, If they merit: then something of their glory depends on the service of men, which I consider absurd. 3. Also, Suppose that they merit: and let us posit that one of the lower ones merits, and not one of the higher ones: therefore a lower one can merit so much that he ascends to the rank of the higher ones: therefore he can change his orders, which is absurd.

§ 1. SOLUTION. There are three opinions here, of which two are held by almost a few: but the third is more celebrated. And the Master touches on two of these in the Text: the first of which is that they did not merit either after, or before: the other, that they merited after. And neither of these is held much. The third is that by converting themselves to God they merited: and that merit preceded the reward in cause, not in time: and that is also touched upon in the Text. But through the works they perform around us, they merit accidental rewards: such as rejoicing over the progress of their ward, and the like: and that is the common way of almost everyone. But when someone says that the Angels were created in grace, there would be no doubt to them that merit had preceded both in cause and in time: and I think this is true according to the intention of Augustine and Anselm.

§ 2. However, sustaining the common way, we can say to the things asked, by conceding the first four concerning the merit that precedes in cause: and this suffices for the first.

§ 3. But to that which is objected on the contrary, it is clear that it does not hold except concerning precedence in time: and thus merit did not precede: and if it follows, this will be in respect to an accidental reward.

§ 4. To that which is further asked, we can say that it is not similar concerning a human remunerator who needs service, and concerning God: and therefore it does not follow in God: for what He Himself gives, He does not give in hope of service, but freely.

§ 5. To the next it must be said that they are not of no value: but to serve God in this is glory for them, and the gain of an accidental reward.

DISTINCTIO VI

Divisio Textus

§ 1. "Moreover it must be known, since just as of the greater ones," etc. In this distinction those who fell are discussed. And it is divided into five parts: in the first of which those who fell are discussed: in the second, to what they fell, there, B, "And by the merit of such great pride," etc. In the third, concerning the order of prelacy of the demons, there, D, "And just as among the good," etc. In the fourth, it is touched upon where they remain continually, there, E, "But it is usually asked," etc. In the fifth, the power of Lucifer is specifically discussed, there, F, "But of Lucifer," etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether That Angel Who Was The Head Of The Falling Angels Was Of The Order Of The Higher Or Of The Lower

Whether that Angel who was the head of the falling Angels was of the order of the higher ones or the lower ones?

§ 2. But here before the Text three things are asked: the first of which is, Whether he who was the head of the falling ones was from the higher ones or the lower ones? Second, concerning the appetite of the lesser ones consenting to him. Third, concerning the mode of persuasion, whether he persuaded them of his will, and concerning the time.

§ 3. To the first, that he was from the higher ones, many things are introduced in the Text. But it is shown by reasons thus: 1. One of the lesser ones would not have presumed to obtain equality with God: therefore since Lucifer wanted to obtain equality with God, he himself was either of the greatest, or the greatest. 2. Also, He himself said that he wanted to exalt his throne above the stars: but for a lower one it is not to exalt above the stars, unless he first came to the equality of the stars: therefore it seems that he himself was not of the lesser ones.

ON THE CONTRARY to this seem to be reasons and authorities. § 4. 1. For Damascene says: "Of the Angelic powers he who was set over the earthly order and to whom the custody of the earth was committed by God, was not made evil in nature: but existing as good, and made by the Good, and having no path of malice in himself at all from the Creator: not bearing the illumination and honor which the Creator had bestowed on him, was changed by the power of his free will from that state which is according to nature, into that which is contrary to and beyond nature." But it is established that according to the order of the Hierarchy the higher ones are not set over the earthly order: therefore it seems that he himself was of the lower ones. § 5. 2. Also, Augustine touches on this question upon Genesis, saying thus: "Now let this complex suffice: either from the beginning of his creation the devil fell by impious pride from the beatitude which he would have received if he had willed: or that there

are other Angels of lower ministry in this world, among whom he had lived according to some non-prescient beatitude of theirs, and from whose society he fell with his Angels subjected to him as an Archangel, through the impiety of pride: but this can by no means be asserted, that is a marvel if it can." From this it is gathered that it is at least doubtful from which order he was who was the head of the falling ones.

§ 6. Solution. It must be said that without a scruple of a question this Lucifer was of the higher ones, or simply superior: and although Augustine, who wanted to assert few things about the orders of Angels, did not determine this

yet Gregory expressly asserts this, saying: "Are there not orders of Angels, with which orders indeed that first Angel existed adorned and covered for this reason: because while he was set over all the troops of Angels, he was brighter in comparison to them." Also the Gloss says upon that of Isaiah 14:12: "You who used to rise in the morning": "The Devil created in the beginning of the world, and glorious among the Angels."

§ 7. To the saying of Damascene therefore, it must be said that he presided over the earthly order by the descent of illumination, and not by a consortium of order.

§ 8. To the saying of Augustine it must be said that he does not say this asserting it, but reciting the error, not the opinion, of others.

Articulus 2 — Of What Sort Was The Appetite Of The Lesser Angels Who Fell With Lucifer

What was the appetite of the lesser Angels falling with Lucifer?

§ 9. Secondly, it is asked about the appetite of the lesser ones. 1. For it is established that they were punished with a similar damnation: therefore they sinned with a similar kind of sin: therefore they too wanted to be like God. 2. Also, If Lucifer desired this to which he would have come if he had stood firm: it seems that for the same reason these did too: therefore it seems that each of them wanted to have perfect power of himself, and not under another: therefore it seems that the lower ones did not consent to Lucifer more than he did to them. 3. Also, They were all spirits: therefore they desired some spiritual altitude: but since this was not in the prelacy of the world, it could not be other than that equality with God of which it was had above: therefore it seems that their appetite was the same as his.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 10. They knew well that they could not arrive at equality with Him: since by a striving to obtain that they did not desire that they be equal to God, as it seems.

§ 11. Solution. Our Doctors say in this place that they all wanted something higher than they were created: but this was only to say that the lower ones in the exaltation of the higher ones wanted to obtain this, but he through himself. And they give the example: "Just as some canons promote an unworthy one, so that when he is promoted they themselves are also exalted." And thus both are true: both that they desired altitude, and that they consented to him: and through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 3 — It Is Asked Concerning The Time And Mode Of The Suggestion Of The Other Angels, And Why The Battle Is Attributed To Michael, And Who Are The Leaders By Whom They Were Drawn Away

It is asked concerning the time and mode of the suggestion of the other Angels: and why the battle is attributed to Michael? and, Who are the ropes by which they were drawn down?

§ 12. Thirdly, it is asked about the time and mode of suggestion. 1. For it could not be done in a single moment that the first Angel consented to malice, and persuaded it to others to which he himself consented: and they consented to him, and afterwards all simultaneously strove to obtain it: therefore it seems that for some time he was evil in heaven. 2. Also, This seems, Revelation 12:7, where it is said that "there was a great battle in heaven: Michael and his Angels were fighting with the dragon," etc. But in that battle there was a delay, as it seems. 3. Also, This seems, 2 Peter 2:4, where it is said: "If God did not spare the sinning Angels, but drawn down to hell by ropes," etc.: but a drawing down indicates a delay. 4. Also, Revelation 12:4 it is said that the tail of Lucifer drew a tenth part

of the stars, and cast them to the earth: but the drawing of a tail indicates persuasion and consent to malice, all of which import a delay.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. What death is in men, this the fall is in Angels: therefore as soon as he conceived malice, he was deformed, and pressed downwards by the weight of iniquity: but they did not consent in time: therefore it seems that without delay and without persuasion they simultaneously consented with him, and with him were immediately pressed downwards.

§ 2. Further it is asked, Why is this battle attributed to Michael, since he is not read to be of the higher ones, since he has the use of the office of the exterior ones, and in Daniel it is expressly held that he is the prince of the Jews, and from the Saints that he is now the prince of the Church?

§ 3. Further it is asked, Who are the ropes by which they were drawn down into this dark air to be tortured in Tartarus on the day of judgment?

§ 4. Solution. It must be said that there was no other persuasion there except occasional, namely because seeing him to be a most excellent creature, they approached by consent to his desire, so that they might be promoted in him: and therefore occasional persuasion is called his tail by which he drew them: and this was simultaneous with his desire in time, but not in cause, or nature: and by this the solution to the first is clear.

§ 5. To the next it must be said that that battle expounded anagogically says nothing other than the contrariety of the appetites of the good and bad Angels, of the converted and the averted.

§ 6. To the next it must be said that the drawing down by ropes is the condemnation by the holy Angels through the application of the sentence which they received from the Lord concerning the fall.

§ 7. To the next the solution is clear through what was said before.

§ 8. To that which is further asked, Why is the battle attributed to Michael?

It must be said that according to the Text that battle refers to the Church: and thus the Gloss expounds in the same place, and then he who is set over the Church deservedly fights for the Church. But if it is expounded anagogically, then that battle is attributed to Michael for the sake of his name, not his order: because Michael is interpreted "Who is like God," who is rightly said to fight against him who desires to be like God.

§ 9. To the next let the exposition of the Gloss be taken, which says thus: "Ropes are the cords by which sailors suspend sails, so that when the breeze blows they may leave the tranquility of the port, and always entrust themselves to ambiguous gusts: to which ropes the efforts of unclean spirits are fittingly compared, who as soon as they were driven by standing pride, erected themselves against the Creator, and by the very efforts of their elation they were snatched into the depth of the abyss."

Articulus 4 — Whether, Just As Among The Good Some Are Over Others, So Also Among The Evil Some Are Over Others, And Whether There Is Among Them An Order Of Prelation Which Will Cease After The Day Of Judgment

Whether just as among the good some preside over others, so also among the evil some preside over others, and is there an order of prelacy in them which will cease after the day of judgment?

§ 10. Next it is asked concerning this which he says: "And just as among the good Angels some preside over others," etc.

For this does not seem true: because 1. Good has the character of order, but evil the corruption of order: therefore since the Angels fell from good, they seem also to have fallen from the character of order. 2. Also, A grade is usually taken for the dignity of altitude: but they fell from all dignity: therefore from all character of order, as it seems. 3. Also, It seems that they all should have fallen into the grades of one vice only, so that namely they would all preside over one vice, because they all sinned with one sin: therefore they should also have been punished with one punishment: therefore they should have taken grades of damnation in one vice. 4. Moreover, How is this true, what he says in the Text, that "until the day of judgment Angels [preside over] Angels," etc.? For below the Master says that order is not

only according to offices, but also according to grades of nature and of grace: but they will not have these grades equal after the day of judgment: therefore it seems that the orders will remain, and will not be destroyed.

§ 1. Solution. It must be said that order is twofold, namely of comparison according to greater or lesser altitude, and that is the order of proper power: and from that they did not fall: because power is always just, even that which is committed to the evil. Another is the order of perfection to an end: and from that the demons entirely fell.

§ 2. To the next it must be said that although they are most unworthy, yet through this they are ordered by God's justice to offices which cannot belong to the good Angels, such as torturing the evil, and exercising the just, and the like.

§ 3. To the next it must be said that although the sin was one in species, yet it also brought with it envy and the affections of other sins, and in these they are permitted to exercise men.

§ 4. To the last it must be said that the offices of mission and exercises will cease, and that one is tortured by another: but the distances of rewards and punishments according to mansions will not cease: and in the first way the Master understands it.

Articulus 5 — Whether The Gloomy Air Is The Proper Place Of Demons

Whether the dark air is the proper place of demons?

Whether the dark air is the proper place of demons?

§ 1. Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, E, "But it is usually asked, Whether all in this air," etc.

And two things are asked, of which the first is, Whether this is their proper place, and why it is called heaven? And the second, Whether it is dealt justly or unjustly with souls, that they immediately descend into hell, when demons are permitted to be in the air?

§ 2. To the first one proceeds thus: 1. Boethius says that the common conception of the mind is that spiritual things are not in a place: therefore it seems that they are not detained violently in any place: therefore the demons are not detained violently in this dark air. 2. Also, In whatever place something is detained violently, it is naturally moved away from it: if therefore Angels are detained violently in this air, it seems that they would naturally be moved away from it, which is false. 3. Also, A thing is violently in a place, which is detained in a place contrary to its proper liberty: but demons desire to be in this way: therefore it seems that it is not a violent place for them. 4. Also, They say to the Lord: "Have you come... to torture us before the time?" Also, "We beg you not to command us to go into the abyss": therefore it seems that they dwell here willingly, and in the abyss violently: therefore they are not projected to this place.

§ 3. Moreover it is asked, Why is this place called heaven? For heaven sounds of a place of light and delights: but this air is dark and entirely penal: therefore it seems that it should not be called heaven.

§ 4. Also, It is said in this same distinction that it is not granted to them to dwell around us: therefore it seems that they would dwell more willingly on earth than in the air between heaven and earth: and it seems that it would even be more fitting: because they do not dwell here except for a time in order to tempt men: but they cannot tempt men unless they are with men: therefore they ought to dwell here with us.

§ 5. Also I ask, How far up can they ascend in the air? For the superior part of the air which is near fire is vehemently hot, in which are generated perpendicular fires, and shooting stars, and comets, and the like. And it seems that since the heat of fire properly afflicts demons, that there would be the proper place of their habitation.

§ 6. Moreover, Since fire is hottest in its own sphere, it seems that there the demons ought properly to dwell, because there they would be maximally tortured, and not here in the air with us.

§ 7. Solution. It must be said that there is a place deputed to a thing according to nature, and a place deputed to it according to the congruity of its state. A place according to nature is not due to Angels, neither good nor bad: but a place according to the congruity of state is due to them: and this is twofold, namely according to the state of creation, and thus the place is the empyrean heaven: and according to the congruity of the state of beatitude, or of fault: and thus the place according to beatitude is the presence of the face of God: but according to fault it is twofold,

namely according to the merit of the fault, and thus it is hell which is called a mansion, or domicile, and habitation: or according to office, and this is a place in the dark air around us: for because they have foul offices, therefore they inhabit darkness: but because they exercise us, they are not far from us. And through this the solution to almost the whole is clear.

§ 8. For to the first it must be said that it is understood of a place deputed according to nature.

§ 9. To the next it must be said that their desire is from the wicked will of tempting: but yet a just and justified power of tempting is granted.

§ 10. To the next it must be said that they dwell here more willingly: because they consider themselves ruined when the power of harming us is taken away: for the envious one always delights in the punishments of others.

§ 11. To the next it must be said that it is named heaven from three things, namely because it has something of light, of delight, and something of the figure of heaven: it has weak material light, and weaker where demons dwell than here around us, as will soon be clear in the following. Moreover, spiritual light of faith, and charity, and other virtues, and stars, namely the Saints as luminaries shining in this world, and they radiate here, although not in them: because just as in heaven, so also on earth he strives to draw a third part of the stars. For since there are good combatants in the active life both in heaven and on earth, and there are others desiring to be equal to God in the felicity of this world, he draws those men: but of the other two troops, none. For this reason too it is called heaven, because it has the delights of grace in the Saints: but in demons the delights of envy in the subversion of the good, just as it is a solace to the miserable to have companions in their punishments. Also, it has communication with a figure: because namely it contains something of this world, namely earth and water. But the place of hell is crushed and pressed by all the elect: and therefore it does not indicate heaven, but the perpetual oppression of those who are detained there: however, below in the treatise on the works of the six days we will posit a question upon the number of heavens which Strabo posits, in which the aerial heaven is contained, and there the reason will be more clear.

§ 12. To the next it must be said that demons would more willingly dwell here: however, because in His anger God does not forget to show mercy, He did not permit them to dwell

here, lest they should harm too bitterly, both by appearing corporally, and by inflicting spiritual harms.

§ 13. To the next it must be said that according to the Philosophers there are three regions of the air, which some call zones, but others interstices: superior, inferior, and middle: and the superior is indeed luminous, and tranquil, and of subtle air, and vehemently hot, for which reason it is also named aestus [heat] by the Philosophers; but it has light, in my judgment, not from fire, but from the vicinity of the stars: and therefore because the shadow of the earth is contracted and diminished there, on account of which the rays of the sun remain in it longer. But this part which is around us touches a solid element, which is the earth, and a polished element of flat surface, which is water: and therefore there is a great reflection of rays here, on account of which a great light is generated here. But the middle between these is vehemently cold, and dark: because it lacks the cause of both illuminations: and therefore it is tempestuous, and there are generated tempests, and snows, and hailstorms: and this is the habitation of demons: for which reason some holy Fathers say that they stir up clouds, and thunders, and the like to the harms and terrors of men: and therefore that place of dark air is deputed to them. But how much that place is distant from the earth has been measured by the Philosophers, but it is not the place here to determine this.

§ 14. To the next it must be said that although heat

is there, and also in the fire, yet there is a purity and tranquility there, which are not congruent to a troubled spirit for habitation.

§ 15. Through the same also the solution is clear, why it is not granted to them to dwell in fire since it is hot.

Articulus 6 — Why It Is Not Granted To The Souls Of The Damned To Dwell Here With Us Until The Day Of Judgment, As To Demons

Why it is not granted to the souls of the damned to dwell here with us until the day of judgment, like the demons?

§ 16. Secondly it is asked, Why it is not granted to souls to dwell here with us until the day of judgment, like the demons? And because this is one of the errors of the modern Greeks, namely, that no one descends into hell until the day of judgment, therefore it must be disputed more amply against this.

§ 17. But it seems to make for them, that 1. A man is not more to be condemned than a demon: but it is granted to the demon to dwell here until the day of judgment, although sometimes they descend with the damned, as is said in the Text: therefore this should also be granted to the souls of the damned. 2. Also, God grants to some souls to be purged (as Gregory says) to be purged in the same place in which they offended: therefore it seems that He ought to grant a habitation for a time at least to the damned. 3. Also, Some Platonists posited a second and third generation, and some a simple permansion, before there would be a reversion to a companion star. For the first incorporation was into the body of a man: but if he behaved well in it, and was killed or otherwise died before the time of his period, the soul

remained around the place of the sepulcher, and until the completion of the period, and then it was reverted to the companion star. But if a woman behaved badly in the first incorporation, she receives a second generation into the body of a female of the same species: and if in that she again behaved badly, she receives a third generation into the body of a brute congruent to her motions, namely of a swine if luxurious, a dog if irascible, a lion if rapacious, and so of others. But this physical sentence did not entirely have its origin from nothing: but it does not seem to have provided an occasion except the remaining of some souls: therefore it seems that they remain. 4. Also, Aristotle says in On Sleep and Waking, that what is said by men, either in whole or in part is true: for otherwise it would not be probable in definition, since it is said, that is probable which seems so to all, or to the most: but many holy men seeing visions say, and some write, that they saw the damned going in this world, full of fire, and appearing around the places of their sepulchers, and causing restlessness to those delaying there, and speaking with some: therefore it seems that there is some truth in that opinion.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 18. 1. An Angel before he fell was disposed from the grade of nature, so that he would provide a support of illumination to falling man: therefore in him the utility ought not to entirely perish, therefore it was fitting that they remain around us for exercise. § 19. 2. Also, Why would the damned remain? For it is established that immediately they must have in themselves the fire of hell which they merited: but that fire is not more tolerable here than there: therefore it would not profit them, even if they remained here. § 20. 3. Also, Some holy man converted from sins, seeing the places and societies in which he sinned, is indignant with himself, and flees those places and societies: therefore since the damned already know through their punishments that they acted badly in those places, the penance of the places...

§ 1. ...they would be punished more than consoled: therefore it is not fitting for them to remain here. § 2. 4. Also, it is certain that they would not remain for the exercise of temptation, since by nature they are not ordered to this: therefore, since this place is assigned only for the exercise of temptation or for repentance, it would be necessary that they remain for repentance: but they are not susceptible to repentance after death: therefore they would remain uselessly, as it seems. § 3. Solution. It must be said that it seems to me to be heresy [to say] that they remain [permanently]: but that they appear without remaining, this seems to me to be true according to the sayings of the Saints. But that they do not descend into hell as to a place of perpetual habitation, this without doubt is a heresy in which many of the Orientals are, and it is derived from the error of Pythagoras, and from the error of Plato. § 4. Through this, therefore, it must be said to the first, that a greater or lesser condemnation is *per se* in the quantity of the penalty, and in the place of perpetual horror: but in a place of temporary habitation there is no condemnation except *per accidens*, because it is not permitted for demons to remain here except *per accidens*. § 5. To the other it must be said that it is otherwise concerning souls to be purged: because some need very light purgation, as Blessed Gregory says: and they, so that an example of caution may be given to others, are shown in the places in which they offended, and sometimes they are liberated in the same place. But concerning the

damned it is not thus: because if they appear, this is for the sake of the caution of the living: but immediately again they pass into hell to penal and horrible places: so that just as they inwardly suffer burning wherever they go, so outwardly they may have a horrid and dark place congruent to their sins. § 6. To that which is objected concerning the Platonists, I say that absolutely and simply it is an error, and not to be believed: but it had its occasion from the idolaters, who called forth the souls of men through the operation of demons as an instrument of their fallacy: so that they might be as it were witnesses to the cult of idols: and thus it would be all the more difficult for them to recede from them: and the Dream of Scipio is founded as it were upon such an error. § 7. To the other it must be said that there is some truth in the apparitions, but none in the habitation until the day of judgment: and this is proved from the rich man clothed in purple: because as soon as he died, he was buried in hell. And from Isaiah, where it is said of the dead Nebuchadnezzar: "Hell from beneath is moved for thee to meet thee at thy coming"; and in Ezekiel, and in many other places.

Articulus 7 — Whether Demons Daily Descend To Hell, Or Are Continually Around Us

Whether demons daily descend to hell, or are continually around us? § 10. Next it is asked concerning what he says there, at E, That they daily descend into hell, etc. From this it is also left [to be concluded] that they are not here also around us. § 11. 1. Also, Augustine says this, that sometimes they are mixed in our blood, and cause it to boil in concupiscence; and mixed in flavors to provoke gluttony. § 12. 2. Also, Gregory says that a certain demon was sitting upon a lettuce, and a nun bit into it, and from then on it obsessed her. § 13. 3. Also, in the Gospel, Now many demons went out, and a legion of demons entered into the herd of swine: therefore it is undeniable that demons are frequently with men, and in men.

§ 1. ON THE CONTRARY: § 2. The common opinion of the Saints is that demons carry fire with them wherever they go: and the Gloss says this. Now it is certain that that fire is upon that [text] of James: The tongue... is an unquiet evil, etc. It inflames the wheel of our nativity, being set on fire by the corporeal hell therefore it burns by the necessity of nature, and not according to will: therefore as often as it approaches a combustible thing, it burns it: and since it is infinitely hotter than ours, as the Saints say, it ought to burn to ash all obsessed bodies, and buildings, and clothes, and everything it approaches: and we do not see this happen: therefore it seems that some demons do not carry fire with them: or that fire is not corporeal, or that demons are not here with us, none of which the holy Fathers who handed down the faith to us admit. § 3. Solution. It must be said that demons are here, as the first objections prove, and they have corporeal fire with them, and are themselves kindled by that fire. § 4. But to the 1 which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that the fire does not act merely in nature, and as fire: but rather that force is material, and moved merely as an instrument. But the primary mover and director is vindicating justice: and that fire is as an instrument of that justice: and therefore it does not act except upon those things against which justice directs it in condemning for vindication. And then the objection ceases which certain infidels sometimes made against us. § 5. But whether it is possible for a spirit to be tormented by corporeal fire, we will find arguments at the end of the fourth book of the Sentences: persuading of this, the Lord granting, by excluding the arguments of the infidels who do not believe there is a hell.

Articulus 8 — Whether God Acts Justly And Well With Man, Granting Him To Fight Against A Combatant Who Is Stronger Than He

Whether God acts justly and well with man, giving him to fight against a champion who is stronger than him? § 8. Next it is asked concerning what he says there, at F, near the end: They think he tempted the first man. For from this it seems God acts unjustly with man, since He gives him to fight against a champion who is stronger than him. But that the demon is stronger than him, is proved: § 9. 1. Job: There is no power upon earth that can be compared to him. § 10. 2. Also, in the judgment of men this would be unjust, that some weak person should be judged to fight with an infinitely stronger one: rather, let there be a proportion between the fighters. § 11. 3. Also, must we hold the opinion that a weak person is tempted by a weaker demon, and a strong person by a stronger one? § 12. Solution. It must be said that I consider it most foolish [to say] that there is a proportion between the forces of the fighting demon and the resisting man: although some have said this. For this whole fight consists in consent: and this will is equally free from coercion in all rational creatures: therefore Bernard says that an enemy who cannot conquer except one who is willing is weak. And therefore in this there is equality and the possibility of resisting: and thus all objections cease.

Articulus 9 — Whether A Demon Defeated By One Of The Saints Can Tempt And Conquer Another, And Whether He Can Tempt The Same One In The Same Sin

Whether a demon conquered by one of the Saints can tempt and conquer another, and whether the same one in the same sin? § 15. Next it is asked concerning what Origen says: I think, he says, surely, that the Saints fighting back, etc. For reason also supports this: because § 16. 1. Otherwise it would not be an equal fight: because if the demons could diminish the number of our soldiers, and we could not diminish their army, it would not be an equal fight: therefore it seems that those conquered by one Saint cannot tempt another at least in the same genus of sin, as the Master says. § 17. 2. Also, he himself says in the Letter that the demon who first conquered Adam was conquered by Christ: and therefore bound and captured: therefore it seems that it is similarly so with other Saints conquering their demons. § 18. 3. Also, we see this in the custom of men, that someone conquering his enemy does not conquer him only so that he may not harm himself, but also so that he may not harm his friends: therefore it seems to be similarly so in spiritual victory: therefore it seems that they lose the power of assailing others when they are perfectly conquered by one, at least in that sin. § 19. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Because according to this, in the last times they ought to have the least power of tempting, their number having been diminished from the beginning of the world by many thousands of Saints: but this is false: because those times will be of graver temptation than there ever were times upon the earth. § 20. 2. Also, after a thousand years Satan will be loosed at the end of the world, and will tempt others again, he who was perfectly conquered by Christ: therefore also other conquered ones can still tempt. § 21. 3. Also, the power of tempting is not given to them to conquer, but the power for exercising the Saints is said to be handed over to them: but a conquered one can provide exercise, just as one not conquered: therefore it seems that there is no reason why the power of tempting should be taken from them. § 22. 4. Also, it is asked concerning the third opinion which is not posited here, which

says that one perfectly conquered by one Saint cannot tempt him any more concerning the same sin. For it is asked, What is it to conquer perfectly? For as long as the fight lasts there is no perfect victory: but as long as life lasts, so long does the fight last: therefore it seems that a perfect victory does not happen before death. § 23. If you say that in one actual temptation there is one actual victory: according to this, in one day I can conquer a thousand demons, and thus I can cast many away from me: and this is wonderful if it is true, and at least it can in no way be proved. But if the fight is perfected in death, then

there is no question: because then neither in this nor in another, neither he nor another can tempt. § 2. Furthermore it is asked, What are called the thousand years, after which Satan will be loosed? For already one thousand two hundred and forty-six years have elapsed: and he is not yet loosed. § 3. Solution. I confess that I do not know what is true concerning this question: but it must be left to the judgment of God, whether from the victory of the Saints some are suspended from the fight of those sins in which they are conquered, or whether it is otherwise. But this seems to me, that all will fight in the end with all their forces, knowing that they have a short time. But the last opinion does not please me: because it is supported by no reason, or authority, as is evident in the objection to the contrary. § 4. To the last, therefore, it must be said that the thousand years are to be taken here not from quantity, but from the figure of the number: because a cubic number and a square number are the end and root of a perfect number: for perfection is in the end, and the denarius [ten] is the final limit of digital numbers [digits 1-9]: but the centenary number [hundred] is the final limit of the decades of numbers through digital numbers: and the millenary number [thousand] is the final limit of the decades of the number of hundreds numbered through a decade: and therefore it signifies the perfect collection of the number of the Saints, who are squared by political virtue, and rise up in triform perfection by faith, hope, and charity: and then it will be the end of the world when Satan will be loosed.

DISTINCTIO VII

Divisio Textus

§ 5. Division of the Text § 6. Above it was said, that the Angels who persisted, through grace, etc. Here the Master begins to treat of the works of the converted and the averted [angels]. § 7. And it has two parts: therefore there are certain works of the Angels which they work without assuming a body, and concerning these is the first part: but there are certain others which they work assuming a body, and concerning these is the second part, which begins in the following distinction, there at A, It is also customarily asked, etc. § 8. This distinction is divided into two parts: in the first of which the Master treats of the confirmation of free will in the good, and obstinacy in the evil: on the grounds that free will is the cause of works. But in the second he treats specially of the works which both the good and evil Angels do by transmuting things, there at E, And although the evil...

Articulus 1 — Whether The Same Free Choice That Was In The Good And Evil Angels Before Confirmation Is In Them After Confirmation

Whether the same free will that was in the good and bad Angels before confirmation, is in the same ones after confirmation?

Whether the same free will that was in the good and bad Angels before confirmation, is in the same ones after confirmation? § 2. Now a threefold question falls here, namely: Whether the same free will that was in the good and bad before confirmation, is in the same ones after confirmation? Secondly, Whether it is freer in the confirmed, or the unconfirmed good? Thirdly, Whether it is freer in the good than in the evil, or conversely? § 3. For all other questions that could be asked concerning this have been determined in the preceding [distinctions]. § 4. TO THE FIRST one proceeds thus: 1. Immobile and mobile divide being simply and do not belong to the same thing: before confirmation free will is flexible or mobile from the good, and afterwards it is immobile: therefore it is not the same. § 5. 2. Besides, nothing that remains the same in number and species is susceptible to opposite differences: mobile and immobile are opposite differences: therefore they are not of the same free will remaining the same in species and number. § 6. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. The immortality of the first state and the immortality of the second state do not differ through the substance of the potency, although they differ through the habits received: but just as the potency holds itself toward the first and second immortality, so free will holds itself toward this and that liberty: therefore it is the same free will in substance. § 7. 2. Also, liberty from coercion and liberty from misery do not differ through the subject: but before confirmation there was in them liberty from coercion, but afterwards liberty from misery: therefore these do not differ through the substance of the potency, as it seems. § 8. Solution. It must be said that the potency is one and the same, as was proved in all the last [distinctions]. § 9. But it must be said to the first, that mobile and immobile when they are referred to the same principles, then they divide being: but not when they are referred to diverse ones: whence what is mobile by nature can be the same as what is immobile by grace and glory. § 10. To the other it must be said that they are not opposite differences: because they do not proceed from one through the same division: because immutability is from the liberty of grace and glory, but mobility is from the liberty of nature alone: and these are not reduced to one division.

Articulus 2 — Whether Free Choice Is Freer In The Non-Confirmed, As In Us, Than In The Confirmed, Namely The Good Angels

Whether free will is freer in the unconfirmed, as in us, than in the confirmed, for instance the good Angels? § 13. Secondly it is asked, Whether it is freer in the unconfirmed, than in the confirmed? § 14. And it seems that it is so: 1. For by as much as a potency is capable of more things, by so much does it seem to be freer; but a potency which is capable of good and evil is capable of more things than one which is capable of good only: therefore that one seems to be freer: and this is in us: therefore in us free will is freer than in the confirmed Angels. § 15. 2. Also, by as much as a potency in its act or work recedes more from the mode of a natural potency, by so much does it seem to be freer: but a potency which can do good and not

do good and the contrary, recedes more than that which can do good only and not what is contrary to the good: therefore since ours is such, and that of the confirmed Angels is only toward the good, it seems to be freer in us than in the other confirmed ones. § 2. But against this is: because 1. By as much as a potency needs fewer things for the expedition of an act, by so much is it freer: but the Angels do not need age, inquiry, and experiment, and art, and doctrine to choose the good: but we need all these things: therefore, etc. § 3. 2. Also, obligation to matter takes away liberty: therefore by as much as a potency is more separated from matter, by so much is it more free: but that which is not united to a body is more separated than that which is united: therefore it is more free: but the free will of the Angels is not united to a body: therefore, etc. § 4. Solution. To this it must be said that the free will of the confirmed Angels is freer than ours: for that free will is complete in liberty which can serve neither from nature nor from the habit of confirmation: but that is freer which is capable of certain things through nature and habit, but falling from the good, can return: and that has the lowest liberty which is not capable of the good except through nature, and through a habit conjoined in evil. § 5. To the first, therefore, it must be said that the plurality of things which it is capable of does not belong to liberty, unless it pertains to power and liberty, and not to impotence and servitude: for he is not called more powerful or freer who can conquer one and can be conquered by another, than he who can conquer only: because to be conquered is to lack power [not to be able]. Thus also to be able to be conquered by sin is extreme impotence and servitude: and it is the same to be able to do evil, and to be able to be conquered by evil, although they differ in their mode of signifying. § 6. To the other it must be said that through the ability to do evil, free will is rather bound to matter and material things, than it recedes from them: because every evil arises from an aversion from the incommutable Good, and a conversion to a commutable good: and therefore that does not indicate a dissimilitude to a potency unbound to matter, but rather posits an approach to it. § 7. And if it is objected concerning this which is said: He who could transgress, etc.; let this be sought as solved in book III of the Sentences, where the free will of Christ is disputed.

Articulus 3 — Whether Free Choice Is Freer In The Good Angels Than In The Evil

Whether free will is freer in the good Angels than in the evil ones? § 10. Thirdly it is asked, Whether it is freer in the good than in the evil? § 11. 1. And it seems that it is so through Anselm, who divides free will into the accepted, and the not accepted: and the accepted into having rectitude, and not having it: and having rectitude, into having it amissibly [losably], and not amissibly: similarly lacking it, either it lacks it recoverably, or irrecoverably. And he says that it is freest in one having the not accepted having rectitude amissibly, and after this in one having the accepted lacking rectitude but recoverably, but in the lowest degree in one having the accepted lacking rectitude irrecoverably. § 12. 2. To the same there also seems to be a reason: because it seems to be so much the freer, by as much as it serves less: but in no way does it serve in the confirmed ones, whereas in those evil ones it serves: because everyone who commits sin is a servant of sin: therefore it is freer in the good than in the evil.

§ 1. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. There is the saying of Bernard, who says that liberty from coercion is not more in God than in a creature, but in God it is more powerful: and not more in

the good than in the evil, but in the good it is more ordered: therefore it seems that it is equally present. § 2. 2. Also, liberty from coercion denotes the privation of coercion: but privations do not receive more and less: for one is not more naked than another, nor one more blind than another: therefore since liberty is founded in privation, it seems that it is equal in all to whom it belongs. § 3. Solution. It must be said that it is freer according to the degrees which Anselm posits. § 4. But to that which is objected through the authority of Bernard, it must be said that liberty from coercion is spoken of in two ways, namely according to absolute privation, and thus it is true what Bernard says: or according to that in which the privation is founded. Just as in natures privation is in two ways: for one is founded in matter to which form is absent, and the other which is founded in a contrary form: so it is here: because liberty is founded in a form which is not obligated to matter: and in this it is contrary to a natural form: whence with respect to this form referred to works, it happens to be freer and less free, according to whether that [form] is more and less noble, or more or less expedited to act. § 5. And through this the solution to the following is also manifest.

Articulus 4 — Whether Demons Have A Threefold Knowledge: One From The Subtlety Of Nature, A Second From The Diversity Of Times, A Third From Revelation

Whether demons have a threefold knowledge: one from the subtlety of nature, the second from the diversity of times, the third from revelation?

Whether demons have a threefold knowledge: one from the subtlety of nature, the second from the diversity of times, the third from revelation? § 2. Next it is asked concerning what he says: And although the evil Angels through malice, etc. § 3. For it is asked concerning this threefold knowledge of demons which they have. But it seems that they have none: § 4. 1. For free will is wounded through sin: therefore both reason and will: therefore just as the will is confirmed in evil, so reason ought to be confirmed in the false: and since nothing except the true is known, the knowledge of demons seems to have perished. § 5. 2. Also, evil Angels are called darkness: but darkness is more opposed to the light of the intellect than to the charity of the affection, because darkness is the privation of light: therefore it seems that demons are deprived of the light of reason. § 6. 3. Also, there is no evil will which is not preceded by an evil choice: nor is there an evil choice which is not preceded by an evil judgment: nor an evil judgment which is not preceded by an evil cognition and error: therefore from the first there is no evil will which is not preceded by an evil cognition and error: therefore since demons are universally corrupted in will, they will be universally corrupted in the cognition of the true. § 7. 4. Also, the good is diffusive of being, and not the true: therefore the good adheres more inseparably to created things diffused by the goodness of God, than the true: therefore if demons are universally corrupted toward the good, they will also be universally corrupted toward the true: but this corruption is not except through the removal of cognition: therefore it seems that they have lost all cognition. § 8. 5. Also, Dionysius: The evil of the demon is against the deiform intellect: but that is to know through innate species, as was said before in the question concerning the cognition of Angels: therefore it seems that demons do not know through species of this kind: nor do they even know through sense, because they do not have a sense: therefore they have no cognition. § 9. 6. Also, Dionysius, in the same place: The evil of

the demon is irrational fury, mad or demented concupiscence, and wanton fantasy. But fantasy is a power receiving a phantasm made from the motion of sense: therefore it seems that there is no intellectual cognition in a demon. § 10. Also, why is it called wanton fantasy, and irrational fury, and mad concupiscence? § 11. Further it is asked concerning that knowledge which is through the length of experience. For experience is the cognition of sensible things: and the demon does not have this, since he does not use a sense. § 12. 7. Also, revelation from supernal spirits does not happen except through illumination: but demons are not illuminated, since they are addicted to perpetual darkness: therefore it seems that none of these cognitions is fitting for a demon. § 13. Solution. It must be said that Augustine speaks excellently here, and Isidore receiving from Augustine, that demons have a threefold cognition: for either the cognition is natural, and that is through species received in creation, concerning which it was held above that in those things demons do not differ: or through acquired cognition: and this in two ways: either concerning those things which are above reason, and concerning these nothing certifies except revelation: or concerning those things which

are contingents concerning the future, of which a sign precedes in nature, as in the motion of heaven, or the disposition of the elements, or the disposition of animate bodies: and concerning these it is through experience and conjecture. § 2. To the first objection, therefore, it must be said that reason does not thus encompass the good just as the will does: and therefore corruption through evil principally corrupts the will, and not reason except according to what is simply considerative of the true and the good: and this is to know what does nothing or little for virtue: but to will and to work does much. § 3. Or let it be said more plainly, that there is speculative reason, and practical reason: speculative reason in an Angel is not corrupted, and this is not a part of free will, but the practical is corrupted, according to what it chooses for itself, and this is a part of free will. Whence Dionysius says: Their natural gifts having been given, we by no means say they are changed: but they are intact, and most splendid. § 4. To the other it must be said that a demon is perfect darkness in the light that induces heat, and of this kind is the cognition approving the good: but in a vain light, which is light without fruit, they are not darkness, but rather they shine, as Dionysius says. § 5. To the other it must be said that there is no will which is not preceded by an evil choice to itself, that is, to the very one who wills evil: because unless choice determines, he himself will not will. But it is not necessary that he does not have the knowledge of choosing the good: because many have the best knowledge of things to be chosen, and act to the contrary, as the Philosopher says. § 6. To the other it must be said that that good which is concreated with the creature, because it is from the Good, is a good in a qualified sense (secundum quid), and not the good of grace: and this the demon has not lost in its entirety: but that does not belong to him, except insofar as he is, and not simply. But the true which is convertible with being is in him insofar as he is: but this is not the true which is the end of the speculative intellect. And therefore the whole objection proceeds through an equivocation: because we are speaking of the corruption of the good of grace and the natural good ordered to grace, and not of the good which is convertible with being: and we are speaking of the true which is the end of the speculative intellect, and

not of that which is convertible with being. § 7. To the other it must be said that the intellect can be called deiform in three ways, namely from the intelligible, and from the imitation of grace, and from the similitude of an act: from the intelligible, as when it is of God, and just as a contemplative man can have a deiform intellect: from the imitation of grace, and thus the Saints have a deiform intellect: to have a deiform intellect from the similitude of an act is, in understanding, not to need collation and inquiry, but immediately to see all things of which a knowledge can be had through reason: and in this last way Angels have a deiform intellect, and by so much more, because they have it within themselves, not receiving their intellect from things: and in this last way the evil of the demon is to be against the deiform intellect, that is, against the law [right] of the deiform intellect: because he acts against the judgment of such an intellect: and a soul sinning against the judgment of such an intellect, is a soul sinning against the judgment of a well-disposed reason. § 8. To the other it must be said that, as the Commentator says upon the book De Anima, fantasy among the Greeks is spoken of equivocally, from phantazo, which is I appear, and thus it is sometimes posited for the possible intellect: and from a phantasm, and thus it is the sensible part of the soul. And in the first way it is in the evil Angel, in the second way it is not. § 9. But if it is asked, why is it called wanton fantasy? I say that the intellect of the demon is called fantastic, that is, apparitional from obscure signs: because it is not contiguous with the irradiation of the first light. But it is called wanton [brazen/impudent]:

§ 1. ...because he knowingly attacks the truth, especially what is true according to piety. For he is properly called "impudent" [protervus] who impedes the true process which he knows to be true; while he is "ignorant" [ignorans] who is disposed to the contraries of the principles; but he is "unknowing" [nesciens] from whom knowledge is universally absent. It is called "irrational fury" [furor irrationalis] because fury is of itself irascible, and fury is boiling anger; and this ought not to be according to the order of reason, except against what is harmful to the good and the honorable. But a demon is not angered except at the good and the honorable, at which one must never be angered: and therefore it is called irrational fury. But "mindless concupiscence" [amens concupiscentia] is concupiscence without a mind: because the mind orders concupiscence with respect to the good and the delectable, but of evil as evil there is no concupiscence essentially; and therefore, because evil essentially pleases the demon, it is called a mindless concupiscence.

§ 2. To the next it must be said that he receives experiential knowledge from natural signs, and especially when he wishes to deceive, just as in the motion of the stars certain future things are prognosticated, and in the signs of the clouds; and he predicts these things to deceive, so that he may be believed even in false things. Sometimes also he knows the human mind in exterior or interior signs: interior signs, such as the concourse of spirits and blood; exterior signs, such as a blush, or pallor, and the like: and this not by receiving something from the things, but rather, as we said above, through the forms which they have within themselves, which are determined to this sort of figure or signs.

§ 3. To the next it must be said that illumination does not accompany that revelation: because they happen through simple expression, which anyone can have with anyone, the evil with the good, and conversely; and the inferior with the superior, and conversely.

Articulus 5 — Whether Demons Can Foretell Future Things, And What The Difference Is Between Demons Foretelling Future Things And Prophets, And By What Mode The Demon Inspires His Prophets

Whether demons can predict the future? And, what is the difference between demons predicting the future, and Prophets? And, by what mode does a demon inspire his prophets?

§ 4. Next, it is inquired concerning what he says: Sometimes these same unspeakable spirits, etc. For here falls the question concerning the divinations of demons.

§ 5. For it seems that they can predict the future: because 1. Men by art can know the future for a long time ahead: therefore much more the demons, who have much greater knowledge. But that men can know the future is clear through the Astronomers, who judge concerning the events in a whole life through the constellation of nativity, and concerning the events in a whole year through the science of revolution from the beginning of the year, and concerning the events in twenty years through the science of the cycle in the conjunction of Jupiter and Saturn from triplicity into triplicity: therefore much more do demons prevail in this.

§ 6. If you say that they err, and those things are not known through the stars. On the contrary: Augustine in Book V of The City of God says thus: "It could not be altogether absurdly said that certain astral influences have power only over the differences of bodies, just as in the solar approaches and recessions we see even the seasons of the year vary, and in lunar waxings and wanings certain kinds of things are increased or diminished, like oysters, and shells, and the wondrous tides of the Ocean, but that souls and the wills of the soul are not subjected to the positions of the stars."

§ 7. If you say that it is not denied that they have an effect upon bodies: therefore he who foreknows the proportions of their motions over many years, he can predict the future accidents of bodies over many years.

§ 8. If you say that they have no power over our souls and wills, even Ptolemy testifying to this in the Centiloquium, and saying that the wise man dominates the stars: this is not denied; but yet none of the Saints denies this, but that souls drawn by the bodily dispositions of choler, blood, and the rest, are more quickly moved to anger, and the like: therefore from the signs of bodies a conjecture can be had concerning the signs of wills.

§ 9. 2. Also, we find that through the traces of the navel of the firstborn infant certain midwives prognosticate concerning the number of children that woman is going to bear in the whole time of her life unless impeded by accident, and often tell the truth: therefore it seems that demons prevail much more in this.

§ 10. FURTHER it is inquired: Since they themselves predict certain future things, what difference is there between them and the Prophets?

§ 11. It seems that there is none: because a Prophet speaks of future contingents, and the demon likewise: therefore they do not differ.

§ 12. FURTHER it is inquired, by what mode do they inspire their Prophets, just as the evil spirit said: I will deceive Achab... I will go forth, and I will be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets .

§ 13. 1. For it is certain that an equal cannot act upon an equal: but our mind is immediately subordinated to God: therefore by nature it is equal to an Angel, as some say: therefore superior to a demon: therefore a demon cannot impress anything upon it.

§ 14. 2. Also, the demon himself is not the creator of any thing, as will be held below: therefore neither of the species which the lying Prophet has in his soul, and in which he sees the future: since therefore so many future things are seen in them, it seems that he could never reveal the future to his Prophets.

§ 15. SOLUTION. That I may speak without prejudice concerning hidden things, I say that demons can know future corporeal things ordained in some way to the course of nature, in three ways: namely, through the course of the stars, and through the dispositions of natural things, and through revelation made to them. But those things which do not have a course reducible into the order of natural causes, I think that they have no foreknowledge of these, just as neither does a man who involves himself in divinations, as Augustine says in Book V of The City of God, and in many other places: and through this I concede the divinations of the stars to that extent, just as Augustine does, and no more.

§ 16. TO THIS which is objected concerning those things which depend on free will, I say that insofar as they depend on free will, they are not known through the stars: but insofar as they are signified in the dispositions of bodies, an uncertain conjecture is had concerning them. Whence Damascene distinguishes, just as Aristotle does in the book On Sleep and Waking, between a cause and a sign: because a cause is that upon which another thing follows: and thus the stars are signs of wars and of voluntary actions, not causes, namely insofar as the wills of men are drawn by the disposition of bodies toward certain mobilities and affections; just as the physician also says that a good complexion signifies good morals, and a bad one bad morals, and just as he says that melancholic people are envious and perfidious, not keeping faith, and the like: and these are signs which frequently fail.

§ 17. To that which is inquired concerning the difference between Prophets and demons predicting the future, it must be said that the demon says those things which he receives from another, or sees in the course of nature: whereas the Prophet says those things which he knows through inspiration.

§ 18. TO THAT which is further inquired, I think it should be said without prejudice, that the demon does not inject species into the soul of his Prophet, but rather from the ones existing there he elicits a new understanding of future things. For it is in a certain way similar regarding species and letters: because just as the same letters diversely combined and ordered make comedies and tragedies, so also the same species diversely ordered express diverse present, past, and future things. For just as the Philosopher says in Book II On Sleep and Wak-

ing: "The senses being bound by sleep, the agent intellect is made potent to extract from phantasms certain signs of future things, in which prognostications are received": so it can be said that the application of the natural light by which the intellect of the demon thrives to the light of the intellect of the false Prophet, elicits certain things which show the future, and sometimes true things, and sometimes false, but always with the intention of deceiving: and in this way is the inspiration of the false Prophet.

§ 19. To that however which is objected to the contrary, it can be said that my soul in merit of reward can be equated to an Angel, but not in the mode of perceiving illuminations, just as Alexander said in the book On the Motion of the Heart, that the soul is perceptive of the illuminations which are from the First [Cause] by the ultimate revelation.

§ 20. To the next it must be said that although the demon does not have the light of grace, he nevertheless has a very strong light of nature, and uses it for evil, namely to deceive men through pseudo-prophets.

Articulus 6 — Whether Illusions Can Be Brought About By Demons, And How They Do Them

Whether illusions can be done by demons, and how do they do them?

§ 21. Next it is inquired concerning what he says there, By whose knowledge and power also magical [arts], etc. And four things are inquired here, because the operation of magical art is done in two ways: one in the illusions of those things which appear and are not; the other in the transmutation of certain things according to truth. First it is inquired, How are illusions done by demons? Secondly, How can they transmute bodies? Thirdly, Whether they can induce substantial forms? Fourthly, Whether demons are aided in these by a constellation, or not?

§ 22. To the FIRST one proceeds thus: 1. A certain magical girl seemed to have the appearance of a horse, and being brought to a certain abbot, he said: "This girl is not a horse: but pray that the species by which you are impeded from seeing her form may be taken away from your eyes, and then you will see that she never was a horse": therefore it seems that illusions of this kind are rather in the eyes of the beholders, than in the bodies in which they appear to be.

§ 23. 2. Also, if they were in the bodies in which they appear to be, then with respect to every beholder those bodies would appear in one way: but this is not true: because a holy man sees in one way, and a sinner in another way: therefore the forms of illusions are not in the bodies in which, etc.

§ 24. 3. Also, that form would necessarily be in something as in a subject: therefore either in the same thing in which that to which it is superimposed is, or not. If in the same, then two substantial forms would be in the same thing, namely the form of the illusion, and the natural form, which cannot be. But if in another, this can only be the surrounding air: and this is impossible: because air does not contain form, but rather scatters and diffuses it.

§ 25. 4. Also, since the same air does not always remain around that body in which the form of the illusion appears, that form would not remain, or it would be necessary that it be numerically the same in diverse subjects, which is impossible. But if you say that it is impossible according to nature, but not for a demon: this is absolutely nothing: because a demon is weaker than nature, and it is also contrary to the principles of that art: because this is supposed in it by a certain author speaking to his disciple, and saying: "Know that the nature of impossibility is firm, and what anyone strives for contrary to necessity does not endure."

§ 26. SOLUTION. It must be said without prejudice that those forms are not in the things in which they appear to be, but rather in the eyes and senses of the beholders. How this happens, may be understood through the authorities of three Philosophers, in which we can see it through a likeness.

§ 27. For Aristotle says in the book On Sleep and Waking, showing how simulacra in sleeping seem to be sensed things received not according to the truth of the thing: "Not only while awake are motions made from simulacra, both those which are extrinsically and those which are in the body: but also when this passion occurs which is called sleep, and they appear more then: for during the day they are repelled while the senses and intelligence are operating, and they are exterminated, just as a smaller fire next to a great one, and small sorrows and delights next to great ones: but while they are at rest, even the small simulacra float to the top. But at night because of the vacation of the particular senses and the impotence of acting: because from the exterior things toward that which is done intrinsically there is a reflection of heat, they are referred to the principle of sense, and they become manifest when the disturbance is calmed." And he intends to say, according to the exposition of the commentary, that the motion of heat in sleeping is collected intrinsically in the place of digestion, and from it evaporations are made to the head, which evaporation, being cooled by the brain, descends into the organs of the senses, and weighs them down, by removing the heat, and closes, and immobilizes them: but in flowing from the anterior cell, the sensibles received earlier flow, and internally touch the organs in their principle, that is, in the common sense: and then they seem to be sensed most truly, and the soul is converted to them, just as to things received through the sense.

§ 28. Avicenna says altogether the same thing, and Averroes says the same in the book On Sleep and Waking. We can therefore say that demons in the works of illusions cause some species to flow from within to the organs of the senses, whenever it happens that the sense looks at or is compared to that sensible around which the magician is operating: and thus they delude the eyes and senses, since there is no truth in the thing.

§ 29. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 7 — How And In What Manner Demons Transmute Bodies, Namely Whether With An Assumed Body Or In Another Way

How and in what way do demons transmute bodies, namely whether by an assumed body, or in another way?

§ 30. Secondly it is inquired, How do they transmute bodies? For it seems that they cannot do this without an assumed body: 1. For the Philosopher says in Book XVI of On Animals: "If it does not touch, it does not act, and alteration does not follow": but demons do not touch physically, nor mathematically: therefore they do not act on bodies, nor transmute them.

§ 31. 2. If you say that this argument does not hold even according to the Philosophers: because there are separate substances which act and transmute bodies, according to what Aristotle seems to say, that the work of nature is the work of intelligence. On the contrary: No Philosopher ever conceded this, that there should be any motion in this transmutable matter, which would not be reduced to the motion of another body moved by a spiritual mover: just as the work of art is reduced to the artisan who is moved by the soul, but it is not immediately reduced to the soul; just as also the motion of this generated thing is reduced to the motion of heaven which is moved (as they say) by its spiritual mover, whoever he may be. But if you say that it is simply: because the demon collects seeds, as is said in the text, and by means of them he transmutes. Then I ask, by what mode does he collect them, with what hands, or by what mover, since he does not have a body, and there will be no mode to find it, as it seems.

§ 32. 3. Also, nothing not united to some matter by the union of form or mover, can transmute any matter: a demon is not united to this matter by the union of form, because he is not in it as in a subject: nor by the union of a mover, since between the mover and the mobile there is always a proportion: therefore it seems that he does not move or transmute it.

§ 33. If you say that there is an intrinsic mover, and concerning this it is true what is objected: and there is an extrinsic mover, and concerning this it is false, just as nature is the mover of a ship not united to the ship. On the contrary: A sailor will never move a ship except through those things by which his motion is proportioned to the ship, as by the rudder, and the helm, and the sail, and the like: but there is nothing of such sort between the moving demon and this moved matter: therefore it seems that he does not move it. But if this is conceded, it does not seem how we see that they move clouds together, and mix mixtures, and make transmutations, just as they turned rods into serpents, and the like: therefore it seems that they transmute even without an assumed body.

§ 34. SOLUTION. It must be said that demons according to the words of Augustine transmute bodies, and collect seeds, and the like: how this happens must be understood through a likeness. Certain Philosophers, like Avicenna in Book VI of his Naturalia, and Algazel in his Physics posit fascination, such that the soul of one man through a look or proximity impedes the progress of the works of another man, by a power spiritually going forth from one soul, and operating upon another. But I say this not approving that saying: because I firmly believe that fascination does not harm someone having firm faith in the Lord, nor can magical art harm him, nor does it do any of these things which are feared about such matters: but in this we can see that there are certain operations containing a species insofar as it is this species, which do not belong to any of the principles of that species, and these belong to the species according as it is in this individual and in another individual of the same species, or they do not belong, or according to a lesser degree, just as, for example, that the sapphire cures an anthrax, and the emerald breaks the inclination to coitus, and that the diamond restrains the

magnet from attracting iron, and the like. So we can say that spiritual substances insofar as by nature they are superior to corporeal things, a power transmuting and moving bodies follows them: but it is only to say that corporeal things having powers of this kind act by those powers through the necessity of nature present in that to which the power is proportioned, and at another time that power is not active except in potency only: but spirits have this according to the liberty of the will closing or opening the power, according as they are proportioned to the matter into which that power acts.

§ 35. BUT THEN we shall say to those things which are objected first, with one solution, that the Philosopher speaks there about the action which is from active qualities, which are elemental, and not about operations having species. Or it may be said better, that when the Philosopher says: "If it does not touch, it does not act, and alteration does not follow," that it is understood not of the touch of the substance of the agent, but of the touch of the power: for unless it touches the mobile, alteration never follows.

§ 36. But if it is inquired, How does it touch, namely whether it multiplies itself in the medium all the way to the mobile, just as a hot thing moves? Answer. It seems to me, that it does not: but rather from the proportion of the acting spirit to that into which it acts according to a command, a transmuting power is made in the body: but in corporeal things acting through powers which follow their species, I well believe that the power arrives through the medium all the way to the thing into which they act.

§ 37. To the next it must be said that if Philosophers are called necromancers, then certain Philosophers posit that mode which was stated: but a natural philosopher does not posit it, because it cannot be determined through natural principles.

§ 38. To the next it must be said that in such an operation there does not need to be a union through substance, but only according to the proportion of power: and through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 8 — Whether Demons In Transmuted Bodies Can Induce Substantial Forms

Whether demons can induce substantial forms in transmuted bodies?

§ 39. Thirdly it is inquired, Whether demons can induce substantial forms in transmuted bodies? It seems that they cannot: because 1. On that text of Exodus [157], And they also did, namely the sorcerers, as the Gloss of Strabo says, "it must be known that the devil deluded the eyes of the spectators with figments, so that things remaining in their nature, seemed to be something else": therefore it seems that they did not make serpents from rods, but they seemed to: therefore it was an illusion, and not a transmutation.

§ 40. 2. Also, in the same place Augustine says in the beginning of a certain great Gloss, that the rod of Moses swallowed the rods, not the dragons: for it could swallow what was, not that which was not.

§ 41. 3. Also, in the time of the Antichrist there will be a demon of greater power than there was then, or is now: and yet then he will not be able to perform true miracles: therefore

neither now true transmutations. But that he will not be able to perform true miracles then, is seen in the Second Epistle to the Thessalonians, [158] where it seems to be said, that those miracles will be according to the working of Satan in lying signs and wonders: therefore it seems that they do not truly transmute bodies to certain forms.

§ 42. 4. Also, it is said in the text, that they do not operate except like farmers: but those do not transmute to a form, but aid nature: therefore demons do likewise: therefore it seems that if a transmutation also happens sometimes, nature does it.

§ 43. 5. Also, art does not transmute from a substantial form into a form: because Aristotle says in IV Meteorology: "Let the artisans of alchemy know that species cannot be transmuted": therefore neither demons, because they do not operate except by the mode of art.

§ 44. 6. Also, on that text of the Psalm, He sent immissions through evil Angels, Augustine says: "Those things which are done wondrously in creatures, we do not dare to attribute to evil Angels." Since therefore the wondrous is something arduous and unusual which appears beyond the hope and faculty of the one admiring, it seems that evil Angels do no such thing: and since a sudden transmutation of bodies into certain forms is such a thing, it seems that Angels cannot do this.

§ 45. 7. Also, nothing has the power of transmuting bodies to which the patient itself already is subjected by them: an evil Angel is subjected to the elements, because he suffers from corporeal fire: therefore he does not have the power of transmuting elements to something composed out of the elements.

§ 46. 8. Also, that body which demons transmute to a form, from what agent will it have the form? For every form is from a commensurate [moving agent], as the Philosopher says in Book VII of First Philosophy. But it is evident that a demon is not commensurate in genus or in species with the educed form: therefore it is not from him.

§ 47. If you say that by the same reason substantial forms are also not from God acting and transmuting: this is invalid: because with God is the cognitive and operative exemplar of all things: and this is not with a good or evil Angel: therefore it seems that demons in no way can transmute bodies to any substantial form.

§ 48. BUT AGAINST this is expressly what is said in the text; because 1. They collect seeds and transmute bodies according to the will of God permitting, either to deceive the deceitful, or to prove the elect.

§ 49. 2. Also, Augustine, in the Gloss on that text of Exodus And they also did, namely the sorcerers, etc.: "Although demons are evil, they have not lost their nature: therefore while through incantation the sorcerers try to make something of theirs happen, they run about the world, and suddenly bring the seeds by which this is done, and thus from them, God permitting, they produce new species of things." Here it is expressly said that new species are produced by the power of demons, God permitting: therefore they transmute to a form.

157. Exod. VII, 11.

§ 50. 3. Also, in the text it is said, And the sorcerers also did likewise. But it is not said there, "But the sorcerers seemed to do likewise."

§ 51. 4. Also, Job says: [159] There is no power on earth that can be compared to him: therefore it seems that if the power of art operates upon the transmutations of bodies, like alchemy, that demons much more prevail in doing this.

§ 52. 5. Also, Augustine says that God ordained the world, placing the spiritual substance over the corporeal. But the more powerful and the one placed over another are disposed in the order of mover and transmuter to the inferior: therefore it seems that demons can transmute bodies to new species.

§ 53. 6. Also, it is read in the lives of the Saints and in the legend of Saint Bartholomew, that they seemed to cure those whom they had harmed before, while they ceased from harming. But it seems that this is a small thing for them, according to those things which are said here. For if they can collect seeds for a sudden transmutation of a body into another form in species and genus, as is the transmutation of a rod into a serpent, it seems that much more can they collect seeds to reduce an unequal complexion to equality: therefore it is not unfitting to say that they most truly healed the sick even through nature.

§ 54. 7. Also, it is conceded of the physician that he heals: therefore much more must it be conceded of the one knowing better and operating more subtly: but the demon both knows better and operates more subtly: therefore it seems it must be conceded of him that he most truly cures infirmities.

§ 55. SOLUTION. What is true about this question, I think only God and the Angels who operate these things fully know: nevertheless, insofar as can be had from the doctrines of the Masters and at the same time of the Natural philosophers, then I think that they induce no permanent substantial form, except only that which would also easily be produced from putrefaction.

§ 56. And for understanding this, it must be noted that the transmutation of bodies is in four ways: one of which is of mixable things to the act of a mixture only, in which the mixable things remain according to the truth following their proper species, although they do not remain according to the form of their species, just as composite medicines are mixed, like theriac, and electuaries, and the like: and in such things there are certain powers, which follow the individual things received, and nature, which is sagacious, divides them when they are received. But another is what follows the act of the mixture insofar as it is from all of them, as in theriac to resist poison follows the act of the mixture insofar as it is from all the things which are received in it: but the comforting of the heart, and of the liver, etc., follows the particular things received: just as is also seen in artifacts: because a house has certain things from its parts, certain things from the whole conjoined, like being worth a hundred marks.

§ 57. Another is the transmutation of a body into its components: just as we say fire transmutes bodies, because it has a vehemently active quality.

158. 2 Thess. II, 9.

§ 58. The third is through the stripping away of properties, and the giving of others through liquefaction and feeding [cibatio] and sublimation and distillation, by which alchemists operate: and in this way by a sufficiently known operation bread is made, and ink, and the like. And I think that they do not give substantial forms, just as Avicenna also says in his Alchemy: the sign of which is: because in such operated things properties containing the species are not found: whence alchemical gold does not gladden the heart, and alchemical sapphire does not cool burning heat, nor does it cure the windpipe, and an alchemical carbuncle does not put to flight a vaporable poison in the air. And the experiment of all such things is in this, that alchemical gold is consumed more in the fire than the other, and similarly alchemical stones: and again they do not last as long as the natural ones of that species. And this is so, because they do not have the species, and therefore nature has denied them the powers which are given with the species for the conservation of the species.

§ 59. The fourth transmutation is through nature, and then I think that from God who is the first author of all things, every substantial form is given by a celestial power: and from it also are given the properties conserving those species. But in this transmutation certain things are easily transmutable, such as those of similar bodies, and their generation is easy, like frogs, and serpents: for they are made easily by a little heat of putrefied things even by art aiding nature, just as Avicenna says that from hair, especially of women, placed in a hot humid place under the sun in a fitting place under the earth, serpents are somewhat made, and from orache in the hollow of a putrefied tree, and dripping rain, frogs are made. And Avicenna narrates that even from a light cooking sometimes in one moment, just as in his land a field appeared full of silkworms, and they all made silk, although it was not as good as the other, because they did not have fitting nourishment from mulberry leaves: and from a moderate rain sometimes infinitely small frogs are generated.

§ 60. Therefore in the three genera of works, namely the first, the second, and the third, I believe demons are capable by their power, but not in the first part of the fourth: and if they make animals which would also be made from putrefaction and suddenly, then it is necessary that they be aided in some way by nature, as Augustine says in the text: but into perfect animals I do not believe they can [transmute] in any way.

§ 61. TO THE FIRST therefore and the second it must be said, that Strabo and Augustine (as appears to one inspecting the Glosses) speak in doubt, whether they are truly operations or only illusions: and therefore they say Glosses for either side.

§ 62. To the next it must be said that I well think, that, God permitting, some true miracles not by the power of the demon, but of God, will happen in the times of the Antichrist: but they are also called lying signs fittingly enough: because although they are truly wondrous in themselves, yet they are for inducing into error, or for holding in error those who have merited this.

§ 63. To the next it must be said that this is understood regarding the last part of the fourth mode of transmutation.

159. Job XLI, 24.

§ 64. To the next it must be said that it may well be, that art of itself cannot induce a form, as was said before: but it can aid nature, and thus the demon does.

§ 65. To the next it must be said that it is not to be attributed to demons as operating, but as disposing to this, that they happen in certain works which easily happen even under any power of the heaven with a little putrefying heat.

§ 66. To the next it must be said that demons suffer from fire according to the order of vindicating justice, and not according to the order of nature: but they operate in transmutating according to the order of nature, and not the order of vindicating justice.

§ 67. To the next it must be said that every form which is the species and act of matter, is from some commensurate moving nature, and these are putrefying seeds, and the like.

§ 1. ...drawing forth the radical [moisture] with the natural heat to the surface: and because there it touches the cold air, therefore its viscosity is hardened there and dried into a skin against which the evaporating heat is beaten back, and by its motion it makes a mixture of another complexion, into which, because it is sufficiently disposed, a sensitive soul is infused. But this seems miraculous, that the animal the magician spoke of emerges: and this is from the subtlety of the demons collecting those seeds, which they dispose toward the form of the generation of that animal: nevertheless the form is given by God principally, and by celestial virtue secondarily.

§ 2. To the first five [arguments] which are objected to the contrary, I readily concede regarding such a mode of operation, as has been said.

§ 3. To that which is objected concerning the restitution of health, it must be said that when they harm, then they cure by themselves: but in other things only by the operation of nature, and I readily think they did this for their worshippers, God permitting: but I readily think that if the limbs were mutilated, in which there is no restorative power on the part of nature, they could not restore them.

§ 4. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 9 — Whether Demons In Their Works Are Helped By Constellations Or Not, And Whether The Science Of Images Is Brought About By The Operation Of Demons Or Not

Are demons in their works aided by constellations, or not? and, Is the science of images done by the operation of demons, or not?

§ 5. Fourthly it is asked, Whether demons in their works are aided by constellations, or not?

§ 6. Now it seems that, just as is read in the books of Images, when the moon is in one sign, demons are more easily called than when it is in another: now this cannot be, except because they know they are then aided by the signs and aspects of the planets toward the easier effect of what the necromancer intends, as it seems. That this is true, Aristotle says in the book On the Mansions of the Moon thus: "When selin descends to albethaim, make [images] for the love of

the rulers of the earth, cast idols, and call the Angels to you": and it is established that this is not understood of good Angels: therefore evil ones come more easily then than at another time. Selin is the same as the moon. Albethaim is a certain constellation which is in the second mansion of Aries, such that to the first mansion are given thirteen degrees and seven minutes of the image of Aries: therefore it seems that superior bodies aid demons in accomplishing such works.

§ 7. By reason of this it is also asked concerning the science of images, whether it is done by the operation of a demon or of nature?

§ 8. And it seems that by the operation of a demon: because § 9. 1. Such science is prohibited: but it would not be prohibited if it were done by the operation of nature: therefore it is done by the operation of a demon.

§ 10. 2. Also, Such science does not seem to have a reason: because those things that are done through nature are done by the action and passion of primary qualities: but there none of those acts or is acted upon: therefore it seems that such things are done by the operation of demons.

§ 11. BUT AGAINST this is, because § 12. 1. We see nativities vary according to substance and according to consequent operations from constellations, just as Ptolemy says in the Tetrabiblos, that if the sun is in a certain degree and minute of Aries, human generation does not occur: and if seed then falls into the womb, a monster will be born. And so that it may be believed, I proved this by experiment in two upright and good matrons, from whom I perceived that they gave birth to monsters, and asking the time from them and equating the stars, I found that they had conceived according to their estimations when the sun was around that same degree and minute.

§ 13. 2. Also, Avicenna says in his book On Animals, that the cause of monstrous births in dissimilar seeds cannot be the nature of the seed: since dissimilar seeds, like those of a pig and a human, and a human and a dog, and a dog and a pig, do not aid each other, but corrupt. And he says that there is no cause that a birth should have the head of a dog, or a human the foot or head of a pig, except the aspect of a star to the ascendant or the face of the ascendant in the hour of the fall of the seed into the womb: therefore it seems that this is natural: now the science of images differs from that impression only as art and nature: because if nature then effected such an image as is made by art, it would have more easily and better those marvelous things which the aspect of the star imprints, than an image made by art: therefore it seems that there is nothing there of the work of demons, but only the work of art and nature.

§ 14. SOLUTION. It must be said that I do not contradict this, that demons appear more willingly under one aspect than another, and under one constellation than under another: and of this I think there are three principal causes, although perhaps there are many others. One is because, since they do their works imperfectly, those signs or stars would give them greater perfection, so that from this they would seem more powerful, and seduce more easily. Another is, so that they make the magician himself or the Chaldean less horrified of them, since it seems to him that the nature of heaven contributes to the effect of that operation. The third is,

because they would want to lead the magician himself to this, that he would believe some divine power is in that sign, and thus through idolatry he would apostatize from the faith. This I think was the reason why some adored the stars, and wrote books of prayers for the invocation of the planets: and through this the solution to the first part of the question is clear.

§ 15. TO THAT which is further asked, it must be said that without doubt, just as is also proven above by the authority of Augustine, the risings and aspects of the stars have a great effect in the works of nature and art: but nevertheless they do not have [an effect] over our free choice, as Damascene says. But the art of images is therefore evil, because it inclines to idolatry through the divine power that is believed to be in the stars: and because images were only invented for vain or evil things, like for seducing women, or for opening locks, or immobilizing ships, or inducing terrors, or such things: and therefore through this the solution to the following part of the question is clear.

Articulus 10 — How The Operations Of Demons Are Distinguished From Those Things That Are True Miracles, And Whether Evils Are Done Through Good Angels Or Through Evil Ones

How are the operations of demons discerned from those that are true miracles? and, Are evil things done by good Angels or by evil ones?

How are the operations of demons discerned from those that are true miracles? and, Are evil things done by good Angels or by evil ones?

§ 16. Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, G, Nor is it to be thought that to these transgressors, etc.

§ 17. For from this it seems that they truly form those things, or that such things truly come to be at their operation.

§ 18. If so then it is asked, How will the operations of demons be discerned from those that are miracles according to truth?

§ 19. It seems, that in no way: because if Pharaoh's sorcerers had always done [miracles] throughout all the plagues just as Moses did, there would have been no difference between the works of Moses and the magicians: therefore it seems that they could not be distinguished.

§ 20. Also, If anyone wanted to say that it must be discerned: because demons do harmful things, but good Angels do useful things. Against this is what Augustine says upon that Psalm: He sent... inflictions by evil Angels. It follows that we must say even Sodom was overturned by evil Angels: and this seems to be absurd: because they were received first by Abraham, and afterwards by Lot, as is held.

§ 21. Also, In the Itinerary of Clement Niceta said to Peter: "Just as you operate contrary to nature, so too does Simon whom we have followed: for we see images walk, dogs sing, and other such things:" therefore there is no discernment.

§ 22. BUT AGAINST: 1. Since a miracle is given to infidels so that they may be led to the faith, it seems according to this that it would not be a sin for them if they believed false miracles: and this is false.

§ 23. 2. Also, To the Hebrews: God testifying by signs and portents, and various miracles, etc.: therefore a miracle is a way to the faith: therefore in no way ought it to be permitted that a true miracle be done by a subverter of the faith.

§ 24. But if this is conceded, again it is false: because the Lord says of some doing true miracles, who say to Him: Lord, Lord, did we not prophesy in your name, and cast out demons in your name? And afterwards: Depart from me, you who work iniquity: therefore it is common to the good and the evil to do these miracles.

§ 25. SOLUTION. It seems well to say that doing miracles is common to the good and the evil: but concerning the discernment between the miracles that magicians and demons do, and those that Prophets do by good Angels, it seems to me that it can be said that in three things they are to be considered: of which one is, because the things that demons do are either vain or evil, as is said. But good Angels, even if they sometimes harm certain people, this itself is good, because those whom they harm have deserved this, and this is useful for the good either for the liberation or for the extermination of those who oppressed the good. The second difference is, because although sometimes the work they do seems to be the same in species, nevertheless it is not referred to the same thing: but rather the evil ones even openly refer this to the impediment of the faith, as if the faith ought not to be believed on account of miracles which can also be done by infidels. The third difference is on the part of the doers: because, as is held: The magicians hiss in their incantations: but a Prophet does this by an honest invocation of God. Just as

the prophets of Baal wounded themselves with lances and knives and such things.

§ 26. To that which is further asked, Whether good Angels inflict harm on the evil? There is a twofold opinion: because Jerome seems to favor or say that it is the evil ones who do it, but at the command of the good. Whence Moses says to the sons of Israel those things which he had learned from the good Angel: He will not allow the smiter to enter your houses: and according to this the authority of Augustine is understood, that it is not always evil ones who command harms to be done, although those executing the command are always evil. Others say that good Angels through the justice of God sometimes inflict harm on the evil by themselves.

§ 27. TO THAT which is further asked concerning the miracles of the good and the evil, it must be said that simulators and hypocrites do miracles through simulated justice, and God wills this so that others may be edified to the good: but the good through true justice, but the evil, by the very fact that they are evil, cannot harm in this way through miracles. Whence Augustine: "The saints do miracles through public justice, hypocrites through signs of public justice: but magicians through private contracts of an initiated pact with demons."

§ 28. And through this the solution to the whole that is asked about this article is clear.

Articulus 11 — Whether Good Angels Can Work Miracles As Demons Do, And Why Men Cannot Do This

Whether good Angels can do miracles like demons? and, Why can humans not do this?

§ 29. Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, K, around the middle: Whence by whatever Angels the neighboring causes from the elements, etc.

§ 30. For from this it seems that the good too can operate these things: and this is seen by another reason: because

§ 31. 1. There is one order of Angels which are called Virtues, whose [role] is to do miracles: therefore they can do this much more than the evil ones.

§ 32. 2. Also, The good are related to those operations by grace and nature, but the evil by nature only: therefore, etc.

§ 33. 3. Also, Upon that Psalm: He sent... inflictions by Angels, etc., the Gloss says that both the good and the evil can do that.

§ 34. BUT THEN it is asked, Why can good humans not do this, since virtue is stronger than nature?

§ 35. Also, Since grace elevates to God that which is further away, since they could convert rods into serpents, why could they not also conversely convert serpents into rods?

§ 36. SOLUTION. It must be said that good Angels both know how and can do more of these things that are beyond nature than the evil ones, as the first reasons prove: but they cannot do them as those ones do: because those ones do them for the subversion of the faith, and this is impotence.

§ 37. TO THE OTHER it must be said that the grace of humans is not substantially ordained to this, but to that which pertains to salvation: and therefore it can do the latter, and not the former, unless a new gift is given which is not grace making pleasing [gratum faciens], but rather freely given [gratis data].

§ 38. TO THE OTHER it must be said that according to the way of nature, an animal is readily made from wood through putrefying things, but not conversely: because in putrefaction the evaporating heat draws with it the moist, and that is soft, and apt for the body of an animal: but it does not happen conversely, except rarely, as is read of certain animals, that they were converted into stones, and of the wife of Lot into a statue of salt.

§ 39. Others say that the natural order is from the vegetative to the sensitive, and not conversely: and therefore they could do this, and not conversely.

Articulus 12 — Whether It Is Evil To Use Magical And Mathematical Powers, And Whether Mathematical Figures Are Harmful

Whether to use such magical and mathematical virtues is evil? and, Do mathematical figures harm?

§ 40. Next it is asked concerning what is said in the last chapter, there, That also must be known, etc.

§ 41. Whether to use such magical and mathematical virtues is evil and an apostasy from the faith, as some say?

§ 42. For it seems not: because § 43. 1. Not a human, but a demon operates: therefore that operation is not referred to the human.

§ 44. 2. Also, Frequently such things are very useful, namely the finding of lost things, caution from thieves, and the manifestation of robbers: therefore it seems that such things are not evil.

§ 45. It is also asked concerning the figures of the mathematicians, who make no conjurations and no sacrifices nor incantation, but operating only to the aspects of the stars, sometimes predict useful things: therefore in such things there seems to be no apostasy.

§ 46. Also, Did not God confer power on herbs, and words: therefore much more on the stars: therefore in such things there is no evil. BUT AGAINST this are the multiple words of Augustine who says that they do all things by the works of demons.

§ 47. SOLUTION. It must be said that in such things there is an apostasy either of mouth or of work. For if they are done through invocations, conjurations, sacrifices, fumigations, and adorations, then a pact is openly initiated with a demon, and then there is an apostasy of the mouth there. But if it is done only by a simple work, then it is an apostasy of work: because that work is expected from a demon: and to expect something from a demon or to will to perceive something through him, is always a contumely of the faith, and therefore an apostasy.

§ 48. To that which is asked concerning the works of the mathematicians, here it is commonly said according to the words of Augustine, that they are to be avoided especially in images and rings and mirrors and characters, lest the use of idolatry be induced, as was determined above.

DISTINCTIO VIII

Divisio Textus

§ 49. It is also customary to be versed in questioning among the doctors, etc. In this distinction three things are said. First, concerning the bodies of Angels? Second, concerning the apparition of God in an assumed body, there, B, Nor is it to be doubted, etc. And third, concerning this, Whether evil or good Angels can substantially slide into [illabi] the souls of humans, there, F, That also is most worthy of consideration, etc.

§ 50. Now it is easy to subdivide these parts.

Articulus 1 — Whether Demons Or Angels Have Bodies, And Whether It Is To Be Conceded That Angels Are Corporeal In Comparison To God

Whether demons or Angels have bodies? and, Whether it must be conceded that Angels are corporeal in comparison to God?

§ 51. Circa the first part we will ask five things, namely, Whether demons or Angels have bodies? Second, Whether they sometimes assume bodies? Third, What is it to assume? Fourth, from what nature they assume them. Fifth, concerning the acts which they operate in them.

§ 52. TO THE FIRST we proceed thus: For it seems that all Angels have bodies by nature:

§ 53. 1. For Augustine says: "For on account of this also by divine providence to those, whom it is established are more powerful than us, are given certain gifts of more powerful bodies, so that that by which we are preferred to them, might also be commended to us in this way to be cultivated with much greater care than the body, and that we might learn to despise corporal excellence itself, which we knew demons to have, in comparison to the goodness of life, by which we are preferred to them, since we too will have immortality of bodies, not such that the eternity of punishments will torture, but such that purity of souls will precede." From this it is gathered that demons have bodies naturally united to them: therefore by the same reason Angels do.

§ 54. 2. Also, Ibidem: "For just as it could be done that the aerial birds are not only not preferred to us terrestrial ones, but are even subjected to us on account of the dignity of the rational soul, which is in us: so it could be done that demons, although they are more aerial, are not therefore better than us terrestrial ones, because air is superior to earth: but humans are to be preferred to them for this reason, since the hope of pious humans is in no way to be compared to their despair." From this the same is gathered as before.

§ 55. 3. Also, Ibidem: "Apuleius himself calls human a terrestrial animal, who nevertheless is far preferred to aquatic animals, although Plato prefers the waters themselves to the lands: so that we may understand that the same order is not to be held, when dealing with the merits of souls, which seems to be the order in the grades of bodies: but that it can be done, that a better soul inhabits an inferior body, and a more decent [soul] a superior one." From this the same is gathered as before.

§ 56. 4. Also, Ibidem: "Apuleius defining demons, says they are animals in genus, passive in soul, rational in mind, aerial in body, eternal in duration. Now of these five the first three are common to them with us, the fourth is proper, the fifth they have in common with the gods." From this the same is gathered as before.

§ 57. 5. Also, Ibidem: "If demons were virtuous and wise, they would not be worshiped: how much less are aerial animals not worthy of divine honor, rational for this, that they might be miserable: passive for this, that they are miserable: eternal for this, that they cannot end their misery." And because to this many authorities are supplied, therefore let these suffice.

§ 58. 6. By reasons it is objected thus: Gregory says that he preached a rational animal to the Jews as ones using reason: and he understands this of an Angel: but a rational animal is composed of body and soul: therefore Angels have bodies united to them by nature.

§ 59. 7. Also, Bernard says thus: "Since now they fulfill their ministry without a body, especially among those living in a body. Finally it is not [possible] to run about, nor to pass from place to place, except for bodies."

§ 60. 8. Also, Ibidem: "Every spirit except the uncreated needs a body, the animal one so that it may serve, the angelic one so that it may be able to profit [others], the human one so that it may acquire beatitude:" and he says this frequently in the same place, namely in four places.

§ 61. Also, Augustine seems to mean this: therefore it is so.

§ 62. Also, Ibidem the Saints argue that they speak, and eat, and do other bodily acts: therefore they have bodies, as it seems: therefore it is necessary to say this.

§ 63. BUT TO THE CONTRARY is what Dionysius says in his books frequently, that they are divine minds, and spiritual lights, immaterial, and incorporeal. And Damascenus, that existing as intellectuals, they are substances in intellectual places: therefore they do not have bodies.

§ 64. 9. Also, By some it is objected thus,

that if two things are composed, of which one is found without the other, it is necessary that the rest also be found by itself: now there is a certain composition of spiritual and corporeal substance, and the corporeal is found without the spiritual: therefore the spiritual also without the corporeal: therefore it is necessary that some spiritual [substance] be by itself without a body.

§ 65. 10. Also, There are grades in spiritual substances, namely vegetative, and sensitive, rational, and intellectual. And the vegetative is found by itself, and the sensitive and vegetative together, and the rational with these two: but the intellectual is the act of no body: therefore intellectual substance ought to be found without a body.

§ 66. BUT THEN it is further asked, Whether it must be conceded that Angels are corporeal in comparison to God, and in themselves spiritual and incorporeal?

§ 67. It seems that they are: because 1. Gregory and Damascene say this expressly.

§ 68. 2. Also, Whatever is contained in a place and demands a place by which it is enclosed, is a body: but an Angel is contained in a place: therefore an Angel is at least respectively a body.

§ 69. 3. Also, Nothing receives the actions of an acting body according to corporeal and material quality, except a body: demons receive the actions of an acting body according to corporeal quality, because [they receive] heat: therefore they have bodies, as it seems.

§ 70. SOLUTION. Among certain Fathers, as are blessed Bernard and others, this was posited among opinable matters, Whether Angels have bodies, or not? Whence Bernard says: "But

as for Angelic bodies, whether they are natural to the spirits themselves, just as to humans theirs are, and whether they are animals just as humans, immortal however, which humans are not yet: furthermore whether they change and turn those bodies in whatever form and species they wish when they wish to appear: densifying and solidifying them as much as they wish: although nevertheless in the truth of themselves they are impalpable on account of the subtlety of their nature, and entirely unattainable by our sights: or whether indeed subsisting as simple spiritual substance, they assume bodies when there is need, and again having fulfilled the work lay them aside, to be dissolved into the same matter from which they were assumed; I do not wish that you ask of me. The Fathers seem to have felt diverse things concerning such matters, nor is it clear to me whence I should teach either one, and I confess I do not know. But I also judge that the knowledge of these things does not confer much to our profits." From this it is gathered that in antiquity the Saints opined diverse things concerning these matters: but now the truth has been more discussed, and it has been found that Augustine said these things by hypothesis, and by referring to the opinions of others: and therefore it is in no way to be doubted that Angels are spiritual substances, and have no bodies naturally united to them.

§ 71. To all the first authorities it must be said that there Augustine speaks by hypothesis against the Platonists, that if it were supposed that demons naturally have aerial bodies, they still would not be to be worshiped as gods by humans: because humans are preferred to them by the dignity of the soul: and the more unworthy is not to be worshiped by the more worthy. And anyone diligently considering the circumstances of the letter will find that this is so.

§ 72. To that which is objected concerning Gregory, it must be said that animal is said in two ways, namely properly, and then it is called animal from its nature, and thus Angels are not animals: and from a property sometimes broadly, which property is to live and to have cognition of sensibles, and thus an Angel is called a rational animal: because it agrees with the human in the power of ratiocinating, although not in the mode.

§ 73. To the other it must be said that Angels well run about without a body, but not by commensurating themselves to a place: and in this way Bernard understands in his saying: because by commensurating themselves they are not moved except in an assumed body.

§ 74. To the other it must be said that an Angel in

ministry does not universally need a body, but in a certain one according as it acts in the presence of the senses for the solace of those to whom it appears: and concerning this the saying of Bernard ought to be understood, if he says anything. But nevertheless Bernard himself also leaves his saying in doubt: and therefore nothing can be proven by his saying.

§ 75. To the other it must be said that such acts are done with assumed bodies not united to them, concerning which it will be asked below.

§ 76. To the other it must be said that although it was shown above that that argument is not valid: nevertheless I concede it.

§ 77. To that which is further asked, it must be said that Angels neither in themselves nor in comparison to God are bodies: since it is impossible that something be a body in comparison to another, and not a body in itself.

§ 78. To the sayings of Bernard, Gregory, and Damascene, it must be said that they are called corporeal as to a remote agreement with a body, and this is to be circumscribed in place, since God is not terminated in place: but nevertheless they are not circumscribed except definitively, whereas a body is circumscriptively in place.

§ 79. To the other it must be said that I think this is false, that an Angel needs a place for its existence or proper work, although some say this: but in a certain ministry on account of our indigence, it is necessary to assume a body.

§ 80. To the last it must be said that this is entirely absurd, and very alien, that demons need a body, so that they can be tortured by fire: because according to this even our souls stripped of their bodies would need bodies when they go to hell or purgatory.

§ 81. How however does that fire act on a spiritual substance? it must be said that it acts as an instrument of avenging justice, just as was said above, and is proven.

Articulus 2 — Whether Good And Evil Angels Can Assume Bodies, And For What They Need Assumed Bodies, And What Moves Bodies Of This Sort

Whether good and evil Angels can assume bodies? and, For what do they need assumed bodies? and, What moves such bodies?

§ 82. Secondly it is asked, Whether they sometimes assume bodies?

§ 83. Now it seems that it is impossible for them to assume bodies: 1. For it is necessary that between every assumer and assumed there be a proportion: but there is no proportion between an Angel and a body: therefore it is impossible for it to assume a body.

§ 84. 2. Also, Just as a spirit unible to a body by substance is related to the body, so a spirit not unible to a body by substance is related to separation from a body: but a spirit unible to a body by substance is not made except in a made body: therefore another spirit is never except separated from a body: therefore they never assume bodies.

§ 85. 3. Also, What is it that would move the body to clothe the Angel? for this will be either nature, or art. If nature: therefore by nature it would be united to it, which is false. Furthermore, the nature by which a body is moved is hot, and cold, and other such elemental qualities: but none of such moves a body to an Angel. But if you say that art: now every art moving and mutating a body needs an instrument: therefore it seems that it needs an instrument: and what is that? If you say that God forms the body for them, as seems to be said in the text: according to this it is easy to solve: because if God willed, even the spirits themselves would be converted into bodies: but this seems to be fictitious: therefore it seems that the whole was done in certain illusions, what is read about the bodies

of demons and blessed Angels.

§ 86. 4. But it also seems that they do not need the assumption of bodies: for good Angels only need them on account of us: if they need them on account of us, but we do not need anything from them except custody, and that they ward off demons, and that they illuminate souls: and they do all these things more nobly without an assumed body than with an assumed [one]: therefore it seems that it is superfluous to assume a body.

§ 87. 5. Furthermore, Since our soul is a spirit, a spirit is more easily applied to it than a body: therefore it would also be useless to assume a body.

§ 88. 6. Similarly, Demons intend principally the subversion of souls; and they achieve this more by spiritual temptations than by corporeal apparitions: because if seen they would be fled if they assumed bodies: therefore it is entirely superfluous to assume a body.

§ 89. BUT TO THE CONTRARY is what Bernard says: [160] "Therefore since without the adminicle of a body neither the bestial spirit can pay the debt of civil condition, nor the spiritual and celestial creature fulfill the ministry of piety, nor the rational soul be sufficient to consult for salvation for its neighbor as well as itself: it is clear that every created spirit, whether to aid, or to be aided and simultaneously aid, is altogether in need of corporeal solace." From this it is gathered that it needs the assumption of a body in the ministry of good, and the exercise of evil: and because concerning this many things are easily found, let these suffice.

§ 90. SOLUTION. Here some searching with scrutiny have erred, saying that Angels can never assume bodies, like some Philosophers of the Jews, but they say that the forms of images obey them: and these things were only in the illusions of images, and not in the truth of assumed bodies: especially on account of the inconveniences which seemed to follow later in this question. But others wishing to evade, feigned that they naturally had bodies united to them. But the Catholic Doctors walk in the middle, saying that they indeed do not have bodies naturally united to them, but they assume them according to the will and ordination of God.

§ 91. AND ACCORDING to this it must be said to the first, that there is no natural proportion of form to matter, or of a natural mover to its movable, between an Angel and an assumed body. But the proportion of the body is attended to the act of the enjoined ministry which it exercises by the ordination of God in the body: and therefore when sent to such an office the adjoined body obeys, whether that body be organic, like the body of the ass, and of the serpent: or animated and formed for this, like those in which the three appeared to Abraham. And through this the solution to the first is clear.

§ 92. To the other it must be said that it is not similar: because the order of a separated spirit is one, and that of a spirit conjoined to a body by nature is another: because a separated created spirit is ordained so that it may operate around a spirit conjoined to a body: and therefore the act of the work sometimes demands the assumption of a body.

§ 93. To the other it must be said that nothing moves that body except the will of the Angel: for just as was held in the preceding distinction, this power follows the nature of the Angel insofar as it is superior to a body, so that the inferior nature obeys it at its nod, and especially

in these acts which are according to divine ordination in ministering to or exercising the elect: nevertheless it can well be that mediating elemental seeds they suddenly move and turn into diverse species.

§ 94. To the other it must be said that not in all the ministries or exercises which they do around us do they need a body, but in some they need a body so that they may operate to the sense, and in some the form of an image...

...images of a body so that they operate upon the phantasy, and in certain intelligible species so that they operate upon the intellect. Nevertheless, I readily concede that a demon cannot act immediately upon the intellect, although he can arrange phantasms, and also illuminate in some manner with the light of his own intellect, as will be evident below, in order to deceive the intellect of a human being.

§ 1. To the other argument it must be said that a false premise is supposed, because sometimes a human being is more effectively and perfectly instructed and deceived from sense than from imagination or intelligibles. And this is due to the connaturality of our intellect, which is accustomed to draw all its intelligibles from sense and sensibles, and because the particular sense is not deceived with respect to its proper sensible. The phantasy also, and even the composing intellect, which operates from the phantasm, frequently err.

Articulus 3 — What It Is To Assume A Body, And How Speech Occurs In Angels With An Assumed Body, And How In Us, And How An Animated Body, As A Serpent Or An Ass, Through Imagination And The Senses And The Animal Spirit Was The Cause Of That Voice Which Sounded Through Its Mouth, Or Not

What is it to assume a body? And, how does speech occur in Angels who have assumed a body, and how in us? And, how was an animated body, such as a serpent or a she-ass, the cause of that voice which sounded through its mouth, by means of imagination, the senses, and animal spirit, or was it not?

§ 2. Thirdly, it is asked: What is it to assume a body?

§ 3. 1. If this is the same as to move it, then it seems that Angels assumed Sodom, because they moved it to burning. And this is of little weight.

§ 4. 2. If it is said that to assume a body is to clothe oneself with it, so as to appear to anyone, and to perform some operations appropriate for the time. ON THE CONTRARY: An Angel speaks in that body; but speech does not occur without the conception of those intentions which are expressed through the tongue. Therefore, there must be a way by which they descend from the conceiving intellect to the uttered speech, just as in us the intellect is continuous with the imagination through the union of the intellectual part with the sensible part. And therefore, the intention of the intellect receives bodily images in the organ of imagination, and has that continuity with the common sense, and there receives sensible imaginations; and on the part of the common sense there is a continuity with the tongue through

160. Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermones in Cantica Canticorum, Serm. 5.

the nerves, from which they flow into expressed speech. However, there is nothing of such a kind between the body of the Angel and the intellect conceiving what it speaks. Therefore, it seems that it is impossible to express by voices that which it intends, but every voice of his will be non-significative.

§ 5. 3. But if you say that the Angel generates intentions of significations in those voices. ON THE CONTRARY: We held in the preceding distinction that they are not creators of any form, but operate like farmers; therefore, they cannot generate those intentions in the sound which they utter.

§ 6. Furthermore, every form is generated by its proper effective principle. Therefore, concerning the form which is the intention of signification in the voice (which the Philosopher calls the power of the voice, and Augustine similarly), the generator will have the proper effective principle. But it is certain that this is not nature, because nature does not use such things. Therefore, it is necessary that the intellect in some way be continuous with the organ or instrument by which that voice is formed; and then the same conclusion returns as was had before.

§ 7. In the same way it is asked: If that body which is animated, such as a serpent or a she-ass, was the cause of that voice which sounded through its mouth, by means of imagination, the senses, and the animal spirit, or not?

§ 8. It seems that it was: because something is done more easily and aptly by a natural mover than by a violent one; but the soul of that animal was the natural mover of the body; therefore, it ought to have been done by it.

§ 9. But on the contrary: The imagination of that animal and its common sense are not apt for the intentions of intelligible sentences to flow into or through them for the formation of a voice. Therefore, since those voices were uttered significatively of sentences conceived by the intellect, it seems that they were not uttered by the mediation of the powers of those animals.

§ 10. FURTHERMORE, it is asked concerning the organs of the senses which appear in such bodies. For it is certain that every diversity which is in a natural body is due to the diversity of powers which is in the soul, as the Commentator says on Book II of De Anima. Therefore, it seems that there is also an eye in the assumed body so that the Angel might see through it, and an ear for hearing, and so on for the others.

§ 11. BUT AGAINST this is: 1. That then the Angel would have cognition of sensibles by receiving something from the sensibles themselves; and this has been disproved above.

§ 12. 2. Furthermore, the visive power of a human being would not see through the eye of an ass, because it has no proportion except to its own connatural organ. However, Angels and demons appear in diverse figures. Therefore, it seems that those members which are seen in them are useless.

§ 13. SOLUTION. Speaking without prejudice concerning hidden things, I say that for an Angel to assume a body is to clothe himself with it for operating and appearing according to

the congruity of the office which he then intends to manifest and perform; and I think that the body follows the Angel's command, obeying him.

§ 14. As for what is asked about speech, I say that there is a twofold opinion about the generation of intention in uttered speech. For some say that the very intention which is in the intellect flows out through the imagination and common sense; and I think that this is false, because the intellect does not form species but receives them from things, and therefore if the very same ones flowed out, they would not remain there after teaching. The other opinion is true: that the intellect, mediating through the powers of the sensible soul, striking and shaping voices in the drawn-in spirit, generates something similar to them in sounds, just as art generates in matter a species similar to itself; and I think that this is true. But Angels can easily do this, yet with the sole difference that the Angel generates them through a body not united to himself, whereas the intellect does so through a united one.

§ 15. To the objection to the contrary, it must be said that there is no continuous pathway there, neither in an animated body like a serpent, nor even in an inanimate one; yet it does not follow that Angels create them, but they furnish aid so that they are drawn out from their proper matter, just as they also do in the transmutation of bodies, as was said above. But this is nothing other than the formation of figures in sound, because when that is had, the sign of the intellect is had.

§ 16. To the other, it must be said that, as I think, the tongues of those animals were moved immediately by the Angel, and not by their own soul; and therefore they were not rational, nor did they imagine such voices when they were uttered.

§ 17. To the other, it must be said that, as I think, the Angel is present in his totality in that body, and is not distinguished according to powers corresponding to the likenesses of the organs which appear in those bodies. Hence, I do not see that I can sustain that he hears through the ear and sees through the eye, and so on for the others; yet they are not useless, because they serve to render intelligible the ministry of obedience or the malice which they exercise around us, and for this reason they also appear in diverse forms.

Articulus 4 — Whence Angels Assume Bodies, Whether From The Elements Or From The Nature Of The Heaven, And Whether They Form Bodies Gradually Or Suddenly

From where do Angels assume bodies, whether from the elements or the nature of heaven? And, do they form bodies gradually or suddenly?

§ 18. Fourthly, it is asked from what body they assume them, whether from the body of heaven or from the elements?

§ 19. 1. If it were granted that it is from heaven, then a part of heaven would have to be torn away from another part; therefore, it would be divisible and corruptible, which is disproved by the Philosopher at the end of Book I of De Caelo et Mundo.

§ 20. 2. Furthermore, a body which, through its motion, is according to nature the cause of all generation and corruption, cannot be understood to be generable and corruptible. How-

ever, such is any body, whatever it may be; because the body approaching and receding obliquely and directly must cause the divided transmutation which appears. Therefore, if this body is not heaven, you will have to seek another; and if you do not find it, you will grant that one: therefore, it is impossible for it to be divided; therefore, they do not assume bodies from there.

§ 21. 3. Also, that body by its nature cannot have any motion except circular in some way; therefore, Angels would never come to us in it, but would always revolve around the center of the earth.

§ 22. 4. Also, that body is not receptive to any figure except a circular one, as is proved in Book II of De Caelo et Mundo. But Angels appear in the figure of men and lions and many others, as Dionysius says; therefore, they do not take bodies from heaven.

§ 23. But if you say (as is hinted in the Text) that good Angels take a body from the upper air, and evil ones from the lower. To this follows a manifold absurdity. The first of these is that air is hot and moist, but mostly moist; therefore, it is least capable of being bounded by its own boundary, but always flows into other things. Therefore, wherever it is moved, it will be continuous with the air to which it is thrown; therefore, the body of the Angel does not remain distinct from the whole air when it is moved in it. Second, since the moist is primarily non-bodily—such as air—it is in no way retentive of figures; it follows that the body of the Angel would be of no figure, except accidentally, if it were poured into a vessel and had the figures of the vessel as long as it is in the vessel; and it is ridiculous to say this of Angels. Third, because since they often move from us into heaven, those bodies would be burned in the fire, and those of demons in hell. Fourth, because since every body is divisible, those bodies would be cut, so that part would fall from part, which many have tried to do to demons and could not. To object via authorities here is superfluous, because infinitely many are available.

§ 24. SOLUTION. Without prejudice I say that they form bodies from air; but they have the power, through natural seeds, of thickening and mixing air: because just as air is naturally condensed by contracting cold into water, and water into earth; and by rarefying heat earth and water into air. Hence I say that an Angel can do suddenly what nature does gradually. And I readily concede that they do not hold figures unless they are mixed to a thickness; and again they are suddenly turned into invisible subtlety by the application of other seminal causes. And therefore, if they are cut, they are almost instantly made continuous again, and not with another body; because they are bounded by seminal causes that mix and thicken them; and I understand this is what the Text means to say when it says that they change and turn them as they wish.

§ 25. And through this the solution to the whole is clear, because I well think that it was foolish to say that those bodies were of the nature of heaven.

Articulus 5 — Inquiry Is Made Concerning The Acts Of Angels: Whether The Good Can Eat, And The Evil Generate, And Whence The Evil Have The Seed Of Their Generation

It is asked concerning the acts of Angels: Can the good ones eat, and the evil ones generate? And, whence do the evil ones have the seed of their generation?

§ 26. Fifthly, it is asked about the acts which they perform in those bodies, and especially about two, namely using nourishment, which the good Angels have often done, and generating, which the evil ones are said to do.

§ 27. Now, they seemed to truly eat: because 1. The patriarch Abraham, who was spiritual and it is probable that he had discernment, offered them food, and they ate; therefore, it seems that they truly ate.

§ 28. 2. Also, it does not befit Angels, who are messengers of truth, to delude men with fantastic prestidigitations; therefore, it seems that Angels showed nothing in themselves which they did not do according to truth.

§ 29. 3. Also, although they are immortal and have no need, it does not follow from this that they did not truly eat: because even the Lord rose again in an immortal and impassible body, and yet he truly ate and drank, as is read in the Gospel.

§ 30. 4. Also, they truly spoke; and there is no greater reason why they should truly perform one bodily act rather than another; therefore, they also truly ate.

§ 31. But if this is granted, then it follows that they truly digested food, and truly incorporated something into themselves; and since this is done for the restoration of what is lost, it will be necessary that something in those bodies would be lost by natural heat; these are absurdities, besides other unclean things that would follow from this.

§ 32. From the opposite side it is also asked concerning evil Angels, whether they generate?

§ 33. It seems that they do: because we read most truly of incubi and succubi demons; and we have seen persons known by them, and places in which a man can scarcely ever sleep through the night without a succubus demon coming to him.

§ 34. Also, the public rumor concerning Merlin, the son of an incubus, testifies to this, as it seems.

§ 35. But then it is asked, whence comes the seed? For either it is cut off from the same body, or a foreign one is brought in. If from the same, this cannot be, because this is not human.

§ 36. Furthermore, although seed is cut off from the whole body, nevertheless for its greatest part it is cut off both from the brain, and the liver, and the heart, and especially from the brain; and such interior members are not in those assumed bodies, because they would be superfluous.

§ 37. Furthermore, according to the judgment of Aristotle, spirit indeed retained in the viscosity of the seed, having in itself a threefold power from the heat of the element and of heaven and of the soul, performs the work of an informative power. Moreover, physicians say

that a threefold spirit is retained in the viscosity of the seed, namely animal, natural, and vital; and that this spirit does the whole thing; and whence does that spirit come into the body assumed by a demon?

§ 38. If you say that he assumes the body of a dead man when he wishes to perform such acts, and cuts off such a thing from it by making it himself through motion, and seeds of heat drawn in the elements. Against this is that it is dead; and if the whole were to melt, it would not make seed apt for generation.

§ 39. Also, it does not have the principle to which that act belongs, namely the vegetative soul. How then is it posited to generate?

§ 40. But if you say (as Augustine seems to say) that he takes seed from the polluted and transfuses it, or makes himself a succubus to one, and an incubus to another, and thus transfuses it. This does not seem to be the case: because the Authors teach that even on account of the length of the genitals or unsuitability, the seed evaporates in emission, and the spirit exhales from it, so that it is not apt for generation; therefore, it will exhale much more when transported from place to place.

§ 41. Also, if such a kind of demons intends generation primarily, then he could place the received seed into the womb of a woman without coitus. Why therefore does he coit with them, especially since the delay of coitus contributes to the exhalation of the seed? If you say that the seed of the woman is also required for generation, and therefore he coits in order to cut this off. On the contrary: According to Avicenna, this can be cut off through the motion of the womb; therefore, since he can move the womb, it seems that coitus is superfluous.

§ 42. If you say that seed is not necessary for conception, because Isidore says that mares in an island of Portugal conceive from the wind. This is nothing: because he does not say that women can do this from the wind; and we are speaking of the conception of a woman by demons. Furthermore, Isidore says many things in that book on Animals which are not well proven.

§ 43. SOLUTION. It must be said, without prejudice, that Angels do not truly eat. For there is a twofold eating, according to Augustine in Book XXII of The City of God, namely of need, and of power. That of need is the one we use, when food is incorporated into us to restore what is lost. But that of power is the one by which a natural power for eating is proven to be present, but not a need; and thus the Lord ate after the resurrection; but nevertheless the food was reduced into pre-existing matter, just as rainwater by the sun, and combustible things by fire.

§ 44. But I cannot well posit either of these in an Angel: because to posit in some substance the natural power of some work which was never in it, and which if it were present would be contrary to its nature, is empty and vain to posit in the works of God and of nature; but thus the Angel stands with respect to eating. And this is what Raphael said, Tob. 12:19: "I seemed indeed to eat and to drink with you: but I use an invisible meat and drink, which cannot be seen by men."

§ 45. TO THAT which is objected concerning Abraham, I say that he indeed recognized the ministry of the Trinity to be figured in them, but he did not recognize them to be Angels until after the meal; and this is not incongruous, nor does it show lesser sanctity.

§ 46. To the other it must be said that Angels did such things by referring them to something spiritual and moral, just as the Lord feigned that he would go farther; and according to the relation to that, it was not a prestidigitation, but truth.

§ 47. TO THE OTHER question concerning generation, I do not know what to say according to truth; but this seems more probable, that they are succubi to one and incubi to another; nevertheless, I understood most truly recently from someone who is still living, that while he was subjugated by the vice of effeminacy, at a certain time countless cats appeared around him when he was polluted, licking up and carrying away the seed with the greatest wailing and noise.

§ 48. TO THIS however which is objected concerning the evaporation of the seed, it can be said that they surround it with similar seeds of natural heat, and thus keep it warm and retain it, just as it is sometimes reserved for a time after emission in the seminal vessels, so that it does not perish.

§ 49. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Expositio Textus

Exposition of the Text Exposition of the Text.

§ 50. Then it is asked concerning the second part of this reading, there, B, And it is not to be doubted, etc.

§ 51. But this whole reading is found disputed to the best of my ability in the first book, in the tractate on the visible mission of the Holy Spirit. And as for the last chapter D, it is disputed in the first part of the third distinction of the first book of the Sentences; and therefore we must pass to the last part of the distinction, there, E, That also seems most worthy of consideration, etc.

Articulus 6 — Whether Demons Substantially, And Also Good Angels, Enter Into The Bodies Of Men

Whether demons, and also good Angels, substantially enter the bodies of human beings?

§ 52. That also seems most worthy of consideration, etc. We ask five things here: the first of which is, Whether demons and also good Angels substantially enter the bodies of human beings? Second, Whether they can substantially glide into minds and souls? Third, What is it to immission (send in) and to enkindle? Fourth, concerning the modes of immission and enkindling? Fifth, To which part of the soul can they send in, and to which not?

§ 53. To the first of these the procedure is easy, thus: 1. Nothing is cast out of a body unless it is in it; a demon is cast out of a body; therefore he is in it. But that he is cast out, the Gospel and the miracles of the Saints prove.

§ 54. 2. Also, many are read to be possessed by demons; but to be possessed is for the pathways of the animal powers to be impeded lest they reach to the act of human discernment; since therefore these pathways are inside and not outside, and an Angel is where he operates, a demon must operate interiorly; therefore he must be present interiorly; therefore they are inside.

§ 55. 3. Also, Augustine says: They persuade in wondrous and invisible ways, and through that subtlety of their bodies they penetrate the non-sensing bodies of human beings without an assumed body.

§ 56. 4. If you say that he applies himself to the body from the outside, and presides interiorly through energy and operation. I ask what this means? For we see that however inordinately they behave in sense, discernment is not thereby perverted interiorly, unless those things reach it through some operation. Now energy (energia) is spoken of in two ways, namely from en, which is "in," and ergon, which is "labor," as it were interior labor; and from en, which is "in," and ergon, and ge, which is "earth," as it were laboring interiorly from an earthly complexion, namely the foolishness of melancholy. And in either way energy will not make one labor interiorly with foolishness, unless by operating some disturbance interiorly: and if this is the demon by himself, it is necessary that he be present interiorly.

§ 57. 5. Also, the body does not resist him; why therefore will he not reach interiorly?

§ 58. 6. Also, Augustine says that he mixes himself into the blood and makes it boil into anger or foam into lust; therefore it seems that he is present interiorly.

§ 59. 7. Also, it is read in the Gospel that he tore some people when exiting; therefore he must be interiorly.

§ 60. BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Upon that text, The Lord is in his holy temple, the Gloss says: "An unclean spirit can preside over idols from the outside, he cannot be on the inside"; therefore much less can he be inside in a body.

§ 61. 2. Also, the soul is in the body totally in the whole; therefore since the demon is also in the body in some part, he will be with the whole soul; therefore two spirits will be in that part in one spiritual place.

§ 62. 3. Also, in the Text there is that which the Gloss on Acts 5:3 says, that Satan fills, not indeed by entering, etc.

§ 63. 4. Also, What is your name? And he says to him: My name is Legion, for we are many. And since a legion is six thousand and sixty-six, how could they be in so small a body?

§ 64. 5. Also, why did they want to be uselessly occupied there, when one could vex beyond the victim's strength?

§ 65. SOLUTION. I have no doubt that many human beings have had and do have a demon in their body interiorly; and many are also aided by good spirits existing interiorly for many good contemplations and actions. And therefore I concede the first part of the objections.

§ 66. As to that which is first objected to the contrary, I say that the Gloss is understood to mean that he is not exteriorly like an essential part which makes one natural composite with the whole idol; but interiorly with respect to place he can well be.

§ 67. TO THE OTHER it must be said that the soul is not in the body as in a place, as was shown in the first book of the Sentences. And therefore it does not exclude another spirit from the same place, provided that that place is corporeal.

§ 68. TO THIS which is objected from the Text, I say that he does all those things inside; but Bede understands that by doing these things he does not enter into the soul, nor into the body, nor into the will substantially.

§ 69. To the other it must be said that this question is foolish; because all spirits are of no quantity, and they do not constrain themselves more in a small place than in a large place.

§ 70. To the other I think it must be said that this was done so that the power of demons over human nature as a result of sin might appear; and consequently they might acknowledge the grace of the one benignly and powerfully liberating.

Articulus 7 — Whether Demons Substantially Glide Into The Minds And Senses Of Men, So That They Substantially Enter Into The Substance Of The Powers Of The Soul

Whether demons substantially glide into the minds and senses of human beings, so that they substantially enter the substance of the powers of the soul?

§ 71. Secondly it is asked, Whether they substantially glide into the minds and senses of human beings, so that they substantially enter the substance of the powers of the soul, which are the senses, imagination, phantasy, intellect, will, and the like?

§ 72. It seems that they do: because 1. The Philosopher says that if an impartible touches an impartible, it touches it entirely; therefore if an impartible is joined to an impartible, the whole will be joined to the whole; therefore interiorly and exteriorly; therefore it is necessary that it glide in.

§ 73. 2. Also, Luke 4:33, on that text, There was a man having an unclean demon, the Gloss says: "The demon had entered whence the Lord had departed"; therefore it seems that since the Lord had departed from the substance of the soul, that the demon entered into the substance of the soul.

§ 74. 3. Also, some argue by a similitude from the body: because among bodies the more noble penetrates the less noble; just as they say heaven penetrates all other bodies, and they say fire is in iron; similarly light, since it is a body (as they say), is in the same place with another, and penetrates it; therefore it is thus in the order of spirits. Since therefore demons and good Angels are by nature of a subtler essence than souls, it seems that they substantially penetrate them.

§ 75. BUT AGAINST this is: 1. In the Text and in many places of testimonies, it seems that only God the Trinity glides in.

§ 76. 2. Also, if it were to glide in, then essence would be colimited with essence; therefore both would be terminated by one spiritual terminus; but those of which one is the numerical terminus are one terminated thing; therefore those two spirits would be numerically one spirit, which is impossible.

§ 77. SOLUTION. It is foolish to say that either good or evil Angels glide substantially into minds.

§ 78. To the first therefore it must be said that this is true in an indivisible which has no potency for divisibility; but concerning an indivisible which has virtual quantity, it does not hold: because that is divided by the quantity of powers that are distant in potentiality, which cannot be in others.

§ 79. To the other it must be said that that Gloss speaks of entry through the effect of malice and not through substance.

§ 80. To the other it must be said that those things are most false, nor did any Philosopher whose sayings are approved ever hold that heaven is in the same place with any body and penetrating it, and that light is a body, and that fire is corporally in iron. But they are fictions of men erring in natural science, and absurd among Philosophers; and they are not Philosophers who prove this by demonstrative reasons.

Articulus 8 — What It Is To Insert And To Inflame, Namely Whether Both Good And Evil Angels Insert Their Concepts Into The Hearts Of Men And Inflame The Kindlings Of Vices In Ministering

What is it to send in (immittere) and to enkindle (incendere)? That is, whether both good and evil Angels send their concepts into the hearts of human beings, and enkindle by administering the fomentations of vices?

§ 81. Thirdly it is asked, What is it to send in and to enkindle?

§ 82. For it seems that both good and evil Angels send their concepts into the hearts of human beings. Hence, 1. In Psalm 77:49: He sent... immissions through evil Angels. And of the good: The Angel of the Lord will send in, etc.

§ 83. 2. Also, John 13:2: When the devil had now put into the heart that he should betray him, etc.

§ 84. 3. Also, Damascene: "They cannot inflict violence on anyone; for it is in our power to receive their immissions."

§ 85. 4. Also, Gregory in the Gloss upon that text of Job 19:12, His robbers came together, and made a way for themselves through me, etc.: "Malignant spirits who make a way for themselves in the hearts of the afflicted, sometimes among the diverse things which they endure exteriorly, do not cease to send in their thoughts." From these and many others it is evident that both good and evil Angels send in.

§ 86. But against this is what is said in the Text. And the same in the Gloss, Matt. 15:11, upon that text, Not that which enters into the mouth, etc.

§ 87. In the same way it is proven from the Text that they enkindle by administering the fomentations of vices.

§ 88. And for the sake of this the question is: What is it to send in, and what is it to enkindle?

§ 89. SOLUTION. Without prejudice I say that "to send in" is spoken of in two ways, namely to put inside, or to first make exteriorly and afterwards inject. I say therefore that the forms which are inside—not made by the demon, but received from sensibles, or impressed by God—the devil and a good Angel adhering interiorly can send, by ordering them to diverse compositions and divisions, in which the soul may read, and consequently be moved to its will; and in this way the cited authorities understand "to send in." Also, to send in is to make exteriorly and afterwards inject. And in this way he does not send in: because he himself cannot make new species by creating, and this is certain; but if he were to make them by abstracting, they would not be proportionate to the powers of the soul, even granting that he could do this; but nevertheless it was shown above in the question on the natural abilities of Angels that an Angel cannot do this, namely abstract species. And in this way Bede understands it. Through this the solution to the query is clear.

§ 90. As for "to enkindle," I think that it is in two ways. In one way by the very ordering of species, so that they express thoughts of concupiscence or anger. And in another way by drawing the heat of the complexion to this, and by protending the corporeal spirits, so that from these an inclination is made toward consent.

Articulus 9 — Which And How Many Are The Modes Of Immission By Which The Devil Interposes Himself, And What Are The Modes Of Temptations

What and how many are the modes of immission by which the devil insinuates himself, and what are the modes of temptations?

§ 91. Fourthly, it is asked concerning the modes of immission.

§ 92. Now Augustine touches upon certain modes in the book 83 Questions, saying: "The demon gives himself to figures, accommodates himself to colors, adheres to deeds, hides deceit in words, subjects himself to odors, infuses himself into tastes, disturbs the mind with tenebrous affections, and darkens the senses, and with certain fogs darkens the passages of intelligence through which the ray of the mind is accustomed to spread the light of reason." Now of these (as is evident) the demon seems to do some from this number on the outside, and some on the inside.

§ 93. Also, Gregory touches upon other modes of temptation and immission in a manifold way, saying first the general mode, Job 41:11, in the Gloss upon that text, Out of his nostrils proceeds smoke: "Out of his nostrils proceeds smoke, by whose noxious inspirations depraved thought is born in human hearts, through which the gaze of the mind is blunted."

§ 94. But he touches upon a more special mode, Job 18:10, upon that text, His snare is hidden... upon the path, saying: "The enemy looks upon the morals of men, to which vice they are

closer; and those things he places before the face of the mind, to which he easily sees each one inclined."

§ 95. Also, Gregory in the Morals, upon that text, Behold Behemoth whom, etc.: "To his faithful servant the Lord insinuates all the machinations of the cunning enemy: everything which he seizes by oppressing, everything which he flits around by insinuating, everything which...

...by threatening he terrifies, everything that by persuading he flatters, everything that by despairing he breaks, everything that by promising he deceives.

Also, on 1 Peter 5:8, He goes about seeking whom he may devour, the Gloss says:

"He goes about like an enemy besieging closed walls: he explores whether there is any part of the walls less stable, by whose access he might penetrate to the interior: he offers illicit forms to the eyes, so that by sight he may destroy chastity: he tempts the ears through melodies, so that he may soften Christian vigor: he provokes the tongue by insult: he instigates the hand in provoked men to slaughter: he promises earthly honors, so that he may take away heavenly ones: and when he cannot secretly deceive, he adds open terrors: deceitful in peace, violent even in persecution." Therefore, since there are so many modes of entering and injecting [thoughts], it is asked according to what they are taken?

Also, it is asked whether in all bodily modes he needs the assumption of a body, and in spiritual ones the laying aside of the same?

For it seems to some that the tempter from without always needs an assumed body: because

1. He first tempted Adam through an assumed body: but nevertheless this is not necessary, because according to this it would behoove him always to come in the body of some assumed animal.
2. Also, nothing mixes itself with flavors unless it is a body: therefore in such a genus of temptation he seems always to need an assumed body.

But against this is that 1. He intends only to deceive a spirit: and the application of a spirit to a spirit is easier than of a body to a spirit.

1. Also, he often tempts concerning spiritual things: therefore then he does not need a body.

§ Solution. It must be said that the modes which Augustine posits are general and are multiplied according to those things in which his effect can reach the soul. Now he posits seven, of which five are outside, and two inside. Of those five, four are taken according to the delectables of the senses, namely sight, hearing, smell, and taste. And according to sight the first mode is taken, which is in two things, namely in the sensed object of the common sense which is maximally known by sight, as when he gives himself to figures, because we maximally know figure through sight, although it is the proper sensed object of the common sense. In the second mode, when he accommodates himself to colors: and this mode is according to the

proper object of sight. But according to hearing there are two, namely one according to sound in relation to harmony, when he adheres to sounds; and another according to articulate and literate voice, when he causes a lie to lie hidden so that he may deceive more efficaciously. And afterward he takes two according to smell and taste, which are evident per se. But it is asked: Why is none posited according to touch? And to this it must be said that there it would not lie hidden in such a way, because touch does not receive its sensible object without matter, like the others. For according as taste is indeed not touch but an indicator of flavor, thus it has a proper delectable besides touch. The other two which are inside: one is taken according to the order of concupiscence set in motion in comparison to the effect; and the other according to the order of a disturbed phantasy to the intellect.

Gregory, however, in his first word expresses only generally how all of them occur. But in the second he touches upon the mode which is by the assistance of complexion [temperament] and custom. The third is the authority of Gregory, according to the two things inclining to evil, which are love wrongly inflaming, and fear wrongly humbling. For love behaves inordinately toward the good, and with respect to that there are three modes. The first of these is by experiencing, to which good of mutable things a human is more easily inclined, and with respect to that is "to circumvallate by insinuating." But once the good is possessed toward which there is an inclination, there follows the excitation of affection into it: and this is what he "deceives by promising." The third is the labor for attaining and for

remaining in it when it is perceived: and this also he "flatters by persuading": for from the sweetness of the desired or possessed good he posits reasons of persuasion and flattery. But if it is according to fear: either it is on the part of the body, and then often he "snatches by oppressing," because he can oppress the body; or on the part of a future evil, or on the part of a past one. If on the part of a future one, then he "terrifies by threatening"; if on the part of a past one, then from the consideration of that he many times "breaks by despairing."

Now the modes which are in the Gloss of Peter are taken in three ways, namely according to the things attracting reason from without, according to the instruments of sinning, and according to spiritual objects. The first mode is carnal ordered to the spirit. The second is of the flesh and the spirit simultaneously. The third is of the spirit in comparison to carnal things. According to the first there are two modes: according to sight, and hearing; and not according to the other senses: because only these are disciplinable, as the Philosopher says in the book De Sensu et sensato. And through this the objection which could be made about the others is solved. The second two modes are taken according to two general instruments of sinning. For since sin is in words and in deeds, the general instrument of sinning will be the tongue, of which James says that inflamed by hell, it sets on fire the wheel of our nativity. The hand, however, is the general instrument for works, of which the Philosopher says in De Anima III that it is the "organ of organs"; and in De Animalibus XVI, that nature gave man a hand for an instrument and weapons. But the third two are according to spiritual objects, both according to a perverse order to the good of this world (and thus he "promises earthly honors"), and according to a perverse order from the evil of punishment, and then he openly

prepares, by himself or his own, "terrors": because through this, contempt rises into scandals, as it says.

To that which is further asked, whether in all these he needs the assumption of a body? It must be said that no: because the matter of corporal things (as was noted above in the preceding distinction) obeys him at his nod and for mixtures; but sometimes he does assume one, when he sees that that mode avails him more.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 10 — To Which Part Of The Soul The Malignant Spirit Can Insert, And To Which Not, And Whether He Can Act Upon The Intellect And Upon The Affection, And Whether A Demon Or A Good Angel Sees Our Thoughts

Into which part of the soul can the malignant spirit inject [thoughts], and into which can he not? And, whether he has power over the intellect and over the affection? And, whether a demon or a good Angel sees our thoughts?

Fifthly, it is asked into which part of the soul the malignant enemy can inject [thoughts]?

1. For there is in us a power receiving outside with the presence of matter, and a power inside receiving the similitudes of bodies without the presence of the matter, as imagination, phantasy, estimation, and memory. There is also a certain one receiving species purified from all matter and the appendages of matter. Similarly, there are three substances existing above us according to the nature by which we are united to the body, namely, God, the good Angel, and the demon. Therefore it seems that according to the congruence of dignity in the powers, there ought also to be an order of those injecting into them. Therefore, since God works upon the intellect, the good Angel will not work except upon the phantasy, and the demon only upon the sense.
2. Also, Augustine says that between our mind and God there is no medium: therefore nothing is posited under it except God; but everything that impresses species in something is above it: therefore nothing impresses species on our intellect except God alone: therefore as before, the phantasy will be left to the good Angel, and the sense to the evil Angel.

But against this it seems: 1. The serpent first attacked the woman: and this is the inferior part of reason, as Augustine says. Therefore it seems that he can have power over our intellect: for he can do much more over ours, than over the woman's, which was not corrupted by the first sin.

1. Also, it seems that he has power over the intellect: because he did not lose his natural light. Therefore, from his natural intellect he can radiate upon phantasms and impress them upon the possible [intellect]. For nothing more is required for the possible [intellect] to become in act, except that there be a light extracting the intelligibles, and phantasms, and those things which are extracted.

2. Also, it seems from what is said in the book De Causis, that the soul is therefore the instrument of intelligence, because it impresses intelligibles in it; but the demon has not lost the nature of intelligence, but was sometime an intelligence: therefore he can still impress upon the intellect of the soul.

Also, it seems that he has power over the affection: because 1. They are "incendiaries" of evils, as is said in the text. Now "to set on fire" is said with respect to the affection, because heat is in the affection: therefore the demon has power over the affection.

1. Also, Hosea 7:4 says that they are all adulterers, like an oven heated by the baker. But according to the Gloss, the baker is the devil; and it speaks there of the love of idols which has nothing corresponding to itself in the body: therefore he inflames the will, as it seems.
2. Also, he has power over the intellect (as some say): therefore also over the will; because both of these powers are in the imagination; and also the intellect is prior to the affection or the will.

Further it is asked here, Whether a demon or a good Angel sees our thoughts?

Now it seems that they do: because 1. Otherwise he would not know to what things he ought to inflame more or less.

1. Also, Augustine in book XII of De Genesi ad litteram: "Evil Angels know thoughts, because they predict many things which they would not predict if they did not know thoughts."
2. Also, Augustine: "Angels can hide thoughts from the soul: but the soul cannot hide thoughts from an Angel."

But against this is what all say, that no one knows the heart of man except God alone.

§ Solution. It must be said to the first with common opinion, that God alone immediately operates upon the will: whereas the good Angel by the order of grace, not of nature, operates upon the intellect by illuminating it; and the demon, because he fell from grace, cannot operate on our intellect except consequently: namely, because he orders the phantasms in one way or another, so that from them this or that results in the intellect. Yet I well concede that from his natural light he can flow something into the phantasms, whence that which he intends results more clearly in the species; but I do not think that this light can flow upon the possible intellect: but rather for this the light of the agent [intellect] is required, because the agent is substantial, since the agent acts by itself, just as light shines by itself; and its understanding is similarly its own work, and not of anyone besides itself.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that the order is not that: because in man the affection is further than the intellect; and the phantasy is not much more perfect than the sense; and the interior and exterior powers of the sensible soul are, according to the degree of nature, all under the demon; but the intellect, in which there is a disposition to grace, is ordered to the

ministry of the good Angel, who nevertheless can also [operate] upon the interior affections. But the proper subject of grace, which

is from God alone, is ordered here with God alone operating in it.

To the next it must be said that this is understood as regards the will of the mind in which God alone operates, and not as regards the intellect. Or it can be said that this is understood according to the comparison to the end which is beatitude, and not absolutely: just as it was also glossed above in the first distinction of this book.

To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that although the woman signifies reason in the spiritual marriage of the mind, as Augustine says, nevertheless the serpent itself did not attack her on the part of reason, but on the part of the sense ordered to reason.

To the next it must be said that he scatters this light for the increase of malice as much as he can, but not upon the mind, but upon the species ordered to the mind, the reason for which has already been said.

To the next it must be said that that incension is not in the affection, but in things ordered to it, as was said above.

To the next it must be said that he "bakes" through things inciting concupiscence ordered to the mind. Through the foregoing, the solution to the following is clear: because I believe that statement to be false, and not to belong to every Angel, but only to the good one, and this on account of grace, not on account of nature.

To the next it must be said that this happens on account of the colimitation of the body and the soul: because immediately the motions of the mind move the body, even however much it is a spiritual object. Nevertheless, if it is of joy, the heart is dilated, and the spirits flow into it; and if it is of sadness, it is constricted, and the blood runs back to cool it: and in those signs he sees it.

To that which is further asked, it has already been solved above: because they do not see thoughts except those which have some sign in the body: and concerning those the first authority of Augustine is understood.

Note also, that some have said that the demon is like a mirror in which the forms which he wills appear: and thus he objects himself to the intellect; and then our intellect reads in him, such that he does not act upon our intellect, but the intellect does this in itself. But this is wondrous if it can be proven, that a spiritual nature is so specular when it wills. And if this were conceded, it is wondrous if our intellect, receiving all science from the phantasm, so knows how to read in him.

Also, according to this it seems wondrous to me that he does not always object himself to the intellect so that it is always occupied concerning the reading of those things which he objects. If you say that the intellect averts itself. Against this is that the demon who follows is swifter; and again he objects, unless perhaps it closes its eyes with some covers. And because such fictions lack reason, therefore let them be dismissed.

DISTINCTIO IX

Divisio Textus

After the aforesaid things it remains to know concerning the orders of Angels, etc. Here the Master begins to treat of the distinction of orders and offices. And it has two parts: in the first of which he treats of those things which pertain to the distinction of orders: and this terminates in this distinction. But in the second he posits those things which pertain to the office of ministry: and this begins in the following distinction, there, A. This also must be investigated, etc.

This distinction has five parts: the first of which contains the distinction of hierarchy, and of order. The second the reasons of the names, there, C. These names to them, etc. In the third he inquires, Whether these orders are from nature or from grace? there, D. Now it remains to inquire, etc. In the fourth he inquires, Whether all the Angels of the same order are equal? there, F. Besides it must be considered, etc. In the fifth he inquires, Whether the number of orders will be augmented from the assumption of men, so that a tenth order will be made from assumed men? there, G. It must also be noted, that a tenth order, etc.

From these and the disputation the sentence will be clear.

Articulus 1 — What Hierarchy Is According To The Definition

What is a hierarchy according to definition?

What is a hierarchy according to definition?

Now four things to be inquired occur here, namely what is a hierarchy? And concerning the division of hierarchy, and concerning the connection of hierarchy, and what is an order, and the multiplication of an order?

TO THE FIRST one proceeds thus:

In the Celestial Hierarchy Dionysius posits such a definition of hierarchy, saying: "A hierarchy is indeed according to me a divine order, and science, and action, assimilating to the deiform as much as possible, and proportionally ascending into the likeness of God toward the illuminations divinely infused into it."

In the same place a little below he posits a second, saying thus: "Whoever says hierarchy, universally declares a certain sacred disposition, an image of the divine beauty in hierarchical orders and sciences sacrificing mysteries of proper illumination, and assimilated as is licit to its proper principle."

Our Masters, however, also posit a third, namely this: "Hierarchy is the ordered power of sacred and rational beings retaining due dominion in subjects."

Against the first it is objected thus: 1. Order is a part of hierarchy: therefore it ought not to be posited in its definition: but rather conversely.

1. Also, science does not seem to belong to all who are in a hierarchy, since it belongs only to the Cherubim: therefore it ought not to be posited.
2. Also, since charity is a higher gift than science, and belongs to the first order, hierarchy should rather have been defined by the first of its gifts than by the second.
3. Also, action belongs only to those ministering from the second and third hierarchy: but the most potent hierarchy does not act, but assists: therefore it is badly defined by action.
4. Also, this does not seem true which he says, assimilating to the deiform as much as possible: because not all hierarchies receive illuminations immediately from God, but some from Angels: therefore they sometimes assimilate to the Angeliform rather than to the Deiform.
5. Also, this seems to follow from what he says in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, that it belongs to every hierarchy to become a cooperator with God, in this that some are purging, and some purged: and some illuminating, and some illuminated: and some perfecting, and some perfected.
6. Also he says that every divine law is to reduce the lowest through the first means, and through the means. Therefore it seems that not all assimilate to the deiform as much as is possible. If you say that this is understood as regards what he says, that the divine goodness proceeds inegressibly through all things, and fills each thing according to the analogy of its capacity: this is nothing: because according to this it will not be proper to hierarchy: but rather each of the beings from the first goodness according as it is from it, in this mode assimilates to the deiform as much as possible.
7. In the same way it is objected concerning the last which he says, ascending into the likeness of God toward the illuminations divinely infused into it. For ascension signifies a change of degree: therefore it seems that Angels continually advance in heaven: therefore those who were in one choir can be elevated to the first of another choir. If you say that this does not fit: because with an inferior advancing,

the superior also advances: this is nothing: because still nothing less follows but that the inferior can come into the degree in which the superior is now.

It is also objected against the second: 1. It is asked what sacred disposition universally says? For if disposition says ordination, just as another translation seems to will, then it does not state a sufficient determination through this that he says, a certain sacred, etc.: for the institutes of the Fathers are certain sacred ordinations universally, and yet they are not a hierarchy.

1. Moreover, What does he call an image of the divine beauty? For an image pertains rather to natural things than to superadded gratuitous things, as is evident from the things disputed in Book I of the Sentences.

2. Also, concerning this that he says, in hierarchical orders and sciences of proper illumination: for there are hierarchical acts, to purge, and to perfect, just as to illuminate: therefore he ought to have said, of proper purgation, and of proper perfection, just as he said, of proper illumination.
3. Also, to sacrifice according to the law is to offer oneself or one's own to God, and from this to be consecrated: and in hierarchies it seems to be in the converse order: because illuminations are rather sacred because they are from God, than because they are offered to God.
4. Also, a mystery is the same as a secret: but Angels are in the open [vision] of the face of God: therefore a mystery does not seem to apply to them.
5. Also, when he says, to its proper principle, it is asked what does proper principle supposit? If you say that [it is] God: then it seems to be entirely unfitting: because God is a common principle in them and not a proper one. But if you say that it supposits something else: then it cannot apply to a hierarchy: since a hierarchy (as is said in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy) is a similitude and unity to God as much as possible.
6. Also, what he says, as is licit. For the licit (as the Gloss on the first epistle to the Corinthians says) is what is prohibited by no sin: and thus each one can ascend as much as he can: nor is there anyone who would prohibit him.

It is also objected concerning the third, because it seems diminished: because 1. Since there are three things about a hierarchy, namely order, science, and action: this definition makes no mention of science and action.

1. Also, what it says, of sacred and rational beings, does not seem to apply: because hierarchy is saved in the prelates of the Church who are also called hierarchs: and yet many of them are not sacred.
2. Also, what it says, in subjects, does not seem to touch upon hierarchy except by comparison to inferiors, and it is not fitting: because the comparison to a superior is also more essential to a hierarchy than to an inferior, since in ascent there is perfection, in descent purgation and illumination.
3. Also, what it says, retaining due dominion in subjects, seems to be against the precept of the supreme hierarch Christ, who says to his hierarchs: The kings of the Gentiles lord it over them, and they that have power, etc.[161] Also, 1 Peter 5:3: Neither as lording it over the clergy. Also, Bernard to Eugene: "Do not seek to lord it, lest all iniquity lord it over you."
4. Also, since there are many gifts of other orders just as of the Dominations, why is it not defined by the gifts of the others just as by this one?

Lastly it is also asked: According to what are the three said definitions taken?

§ Solution. Without prejudice to others I say that the first definition is given according to those things which are essential to a hierarchy, and according to its proper effect in the substances which are in it. For order and science and action are of the substance of a hierarchy: and from these a similitude to God is effected in the ordered substances, and an ascent according to the infused illuminations. The second, however, is given through the composition of the copy to the exemplar. And the third considers the proper substance which is ordered in the hierarchy, and in which the hierarchical order is saved. Whence none of these definitions touches upon the divine hierarchy which is in the three persons: which some call supercelestial. And this is clear from the words posited in the definition: because similitude to God and unity and ascent into God as much as possible, is not expounded of God except absurdly. And I say this on account of some who wish to extend these definitions: but it is true that they are common definitions for the celestial and the ecclesiastical: nor is it found from Dionysius that there is any supercelestial hierarchy: for it is absurdly said that the divine persons are ordered in science and action: for although there is in them an order of nature, nevertheless there is not in them an order of science and action: and therefore the saying of Bernard, which is said of the celestial hierarchy, has neither authority nor unity: and therefore that was never handed down by Dionysius, nor defined.

We say therefore that the first collects those things which are substantial to a hierarchy.

And to the first object it must be said that order is said in two ways, namely an ordered thing: and thus order is a part of hierarchy, and does not fall into its definition. Order is also said as the concept [ratio] of order: and this in two ways. In one way it is called the common concept which is taken from whatever sacred science and action, and thus it defines hierarchy. In another way it is called a special concept taken from a special gift, and as it is charity, or science, or rest, or some other such thing: and thus it defines an order, not a hierarchy. In the first way it is an order. In the second way definitive of a hierarchy. In the third way definitive of an order.

To the next it must be said that science is taken here generally for the participation of the divine illumination, and not specially for the gift of science by which the Cherubim are denominated: and that this is true is taken from Dionysius, in the same chapter saying thus: "For the perfection of each one allotted a hierarchy is this, to ascend according to proper analogy into the imitation of God, and most divinely of all, as the eloquent sayings state, to become a cooperator with God, and to show the divine action shining forth in oneself according to what is possible: seeing that the order of a hierarchy is that some indeed purge, and others truly are purged: some however illuminate, and others are illuminated: and some perfect, and others are perfected." The reception of illumination therefore and the effusion are of the substance of a hierarchy: and its reception is called through science, but its effusion through action.

And from this the solution to the following is clear, and to the third after this: because if science were taken here from a special gift, then there could be an objection about charity: but

161. Luke 22:25

it is not so: similarly action is not taken for the action of ministry, but rather for the effusion of illumination in which the superior is made a cooperator of God for the illuminated.

To the next it must be said that every hierarchy assimilates to the Deiform in every illumination: for the superior does not effuse something of its own upon the inferior, but rather the divine light, as the Apostle says: For we preach not ourselves, but Jesus Christ our Lord.[162] And again: For I judged not myself to know anything among you, but Jesus Christ, and him crucified.[163] And through this the solution to all that were objected concerning that part of the definition is clear.

To the next it must be said that Angels continually advance not in merit, but in the perception of the highest illuminations. For the font of that light cannot be exhausted, since it is infinite. Now those illuminations are reasons for glorying in a new way, yet they do not exalt the degree of beatitude in the substantial reward: and therefore that which is objected does not hold.

To that which is objected concerning the second definition, it must be said that disposition is called ordination according to degrees of perceiving illumination, as will be clear below, and it is restricted through this that he says sacred, and through the consequents which are science and action, in which is hierarchical disposition: and therefore that objection is of little avail: since statutes are referred to the order of science which is from illumination.

To that which is objected concerning the reason of an image, it must be said that this definition is given through the conformity of the copy to the exemplar. For the similitude and conformity of God illuminating results in the illuminated through this that he who is the true light fills them and shines from them, just as fire in glowing iron: and this conformity of participated light, is called here an image, and not agreement in natural similitude. And that it is so, is taken from the words of Dionysius speaking thus: "But a hierarchy perfects its subjects as divine agalmata, clear and clean mirrors receptive of the principal light and the divine ray. Now agalma phiasotos, that is, praisers and subjects, is the same as image or similitude according to another translation."

To the next it must be said that although to purge is a hierarchical act and similarly to illuminate, and similarly to perfect, nevertheless purgation and perfection follow from illumination: purgation indeed on the part of the subject into whom the light is infused: but perfection on the part of the end into which the illuminated is reduced, as will be clear below when the disputation will be about those acts: and therefore illumination is posited here rather than perfection, or purgation.

To the next it must be said that this whole sacrifice is understood effectively: because they are made holy and sacred from such an order, the divine light descending into them: and therefore the objection does not hold.

To the next it must be said that it is occult as regards immensity and not as regards substance: for no one receives that light in such a way that he encloses it, such that nothing of

it is outside him: but rather the whole remains outside: because it is not divided by being inside and outside: for otherwise that light would be comprehended, which cannot be.

To the next it must be said that proper here says the removal of that which is from another: because although an Angel illuminates an Angel through this that the splendor of deity shines through him, nevertheless he does not convert and assimilate him to himself, but to the proper principle of illuminations, which is the Lord God alone: and therefore the proper is not called here private, but that which through itself and not through another emits the rays of illuminations.

To the next it must be said that licit imports there the limitation of degree according to the state of reward and nature: because to progress beyond that into the divine light is not possible: and thus in unequal clarity there is equal joy, as Anselm says, and star differs from star in glory.[164]

To that which is objected concerning the third, it must be said that it does not consider except the substances in which is the order of hierarchy: and therefore it does not posit science and action.

To the next it must be said that the order of Prelates is holy, although they themselves are unclean: and therefore, as Augustine says with Dionysius, they are to be counted who have fallen from a sacred order.

To the next it must be said that the descent of illumination is from superiors, and that...

is more substantial to a hierarchy, and the reordering to God is, as it were, a consequence of the illumination.

To the next it must be said that Christ did not forbid that dominion, but rather the dominion of ambition: for that dominion (as Dionysius says) expresses a position above, or an excess belonging to the firsts, and the possession of all beautiful goods, and a firmness incapable of falling.

To the next it must be said that dominion expresses an ordered superposition toward inferior subjects: and because this is substantial to a hierarchy, it is therefore defined by that rather than by another.

§ 1. Article 2 How and in what way is a hierarchy divided?

Articulus 2 — How And In What Manner The Hierarchy Is Divided

How and in what way is a hierarchy divided?

Secondly, it is inquired concerning the division of hierarchy.

We reject, however, the fictitious words of some, invented against the opinion of Dionysius, which are found in no translation.

For some say that he divides the hierarchy into epiphania, hyperphania, and hypophania. And they say that epiphania is the first, and they define it, inventing extraneous things in order to

falsify the words of Dionysius, that it is "a distributed result, free of judgment, by the fire of warming affection, at the height of a loftier intellect." But these are not the words of Dionysius, nor his sense: because he in his whole book does not attribute freedom of judgment to the Thrones. But they are spoken according to Gregory: yet they are not Gregory's, and therefore must be rejected as vain. They define hyperphania thus: "Hyperphania is a divine illumination partaking of itself, marking with inter-scalar reverence, teaching the use of dominating, and warding off what is contrary." And they say that Dionysius says the first on account of the Principalities, whose role is to teach inter-scalar reverence. The second on account of the Dominations. The third on account of the Powers: which is contrary to Dionysius, who never posited the Principalities in the second hierarchy, but in the third: and it is contrary to all the other Saints, who although they seem to posit the Principalities in the second hierarchy, nevertheless do not put them before the Dominations. Also, the act is against the words of the Saints: because no Saint gives to the Principalities the proper act of revering. The third they define thus: "Hypophania is a divine participation meeting the laws of nature, revealing secrets according to a discrete participation." And they say that "meeting the laws of nature" is said on account of the Virtues. And this immediately appears false: because Dionysius places the Virtues in the second hierarchy. But "revealing secrets according to discrete participation" is said on account of the Archangels and Angels: because Archangels announce greater things and Angels lesser things.

§ 2. There are others who wish to divide the hierarchy according to a threefold conversion, namely to God, and to the Angel, and over man: and that according to the conversion to God the first is taken, according to the conversion to the Angel the second is taken, and according to the conversion over man the third is taken. And this again cannot stand: because in the middle hierarchy two orders, however they are taken, whether according to Dionysius or according to others, do not express a conversion to the Angel, but over the soul, such as the Virtues and Powers according to Dionysius; and Principalities, Dominations, and Powers according to others: therefore it seems that Dionysius did not reasonably posit three hierarchies.

§ 3. Therefore there are others who wished to take the division according to the attributes of the persons, so that the first is taken according to the goodness of the Holy Spirit in love and contemplative knowledge and tranquility: but the second according to the Father to whom power is given, because Dominion, Virtue, and Power express names of power: but the third according to the wisdom of the Son, because it belongs to Princes to think about what is worthy of a prince: while Archangels know secrets, and Angels common things. But this is an adaptation, and not a substantial distinction.

§ 4. Solution. It must be said that the division of a hierarchy is taken according to the proportion of illuminations, as Dionysius holds: and that every celestial adornment is divided according to assisting and ministering according to a threefold movement of Angels, of which the first is to constantly circle eternal knowledge and be moved obliquely toward the providence of subjects, and yet not to be deflected from the contemplation of the beautiful and good

163. 1 Cor. 2:2

about which the choirs act: and to be moved straight when they provide for those having less, correctly passing through all things: therefore those perfections can be taken according to the reception of illumination from God, or according to that to which it ordains. If in the first way, it will be the first hierarchy, which entirely expresses conversion to God in receiving illumination. And that this is true is stated by Dionysius, who says that the properties of the first hierarchy are six: of which the first is that it purely sees many and blessed contemplations. The second, that being illuminated it sees simple and immediate flashes. The third, that it is filled with divine food. The fourth, that it is filled with much first-given outpouring, and solely the domestic and unifying unity of divine refreshment. The fifth, that having been filled by much communion and cooperation with God, it is made worthy of it, as much as is possible, by a likeness of good habits and actions. The sixth, because it is superimposed, knowing many divine things by participation in divine knowledge and cognition as is permitted, having been made thus. From these it is understood that its proper role is to receive illuminations immediately from God more than all the others: but the received illumination ordains to power and action: and according to power the second is taken, and according to action the third.

§ 5. And that this is true is gathered from the words of Dionysius, who says that the proper characteristics of the second hierarchy are these, namely that it has deiform properties in this, that it is indeed purged and illuminated and perfected, as has been said, by divine illuminations instilled in it secondarily through the first hierarchical disposition, and conveyed through that middle stage by a second manifestation. The third, however, is taken according to action: and this again is evident through the words of Dionysius saying thus concerning all three: "One must consider the most excellent hierarchy to be that which is proximating the occult primordially, secretly forming it; to order the second: but the second, which is completed by the holy Dominations and Virtues and Powers, presides over the hierarchy which belongs to the Principalities and Archangels and Angels. The first hierarchy indeed more manifestly: but the one which is after it more occultly: and to direct the manifestative disposition of the Principalities, Angels, and Archangels to human hierarchies consequently, so that there may be ascent, conversion, communication, and unity in an ordered progression toward God." Whence the division is accepted thus, that the first receives illumination by way of divine light, in which there is supreme rest and joyfulness, and it descends from that by way of supreme power into the middle, and from that to the most complete action into the third.

I have, however, noted this at length elsewhere in a treatise on the Angels, where a more subtle rationale of these things is found.

§ 6. Article 3 Are the members of a hierarchy connected to each other?

Articulus 3 — Whether The Members Of The Hierarchy Are Connected To One Another

Are the members of a hierarchy connected to each other?

164. 1 Cor. 15:41

Thirdly, it is inquired concerning the connection of the hierarchy. For everything that issues from one through division must be connected in something: but the division of a hierarchy issues from one common principle through division, which is the definition and name of hierarchy: therefore it must necessarily be connected in something.

Also, since there are three orders in any hierarchy, and they agree through the formal rationale of that hierarchy, and are distinguished in the formal rationale of the orders: there must again be a connection in the act of that hierarchy.

And it is further asked, what is that connection still, since they are not perfectly equal, as the Master says below? One must again find a difference and a connection between the persons of any order: because if they did not have a special connection, they could not be reduced into one order; and if they did not differ, they would not be distinguished by higher and highest in the same order.

Still further, since in the same person one can accept an inferior power by which he is converted to lower things, and a purer superior power, the illumination must necessarily have a difference according to the power of those faculties, so that the whole person is reduced to God: therefore it is necessary that there also be a connection and distinction there.

But against this seems to be what Dionysius says, that those who are of one hierarchy are equipotent in the act of that hierarchy: therefore much more will those who are of one order be equipotent in the gift and act of that order.

§ 7. Solution. It must be said that without doubt Dionysius means that there is a fourfold connection in the Angels, and he himself touches upon this in the book on the Celestial Hierarchy. For there is a connection of the threefold hierarchy in order, knowledge, and action, which are substantial to the hierarchy: and a distinction in the mode of receiving illuminations. And there is a connection of the orders in the substantial act of one hierarchy, such as of the first in receiving simple and flashing divine illuminations not proportioned to the others, and of the second in the act of power, and of the third in action concerning us: and the distinction is in the acts of the gifts of the orders. The connection in the act of the gift, however, will be of the persons in one order, and the distinction in the participation of the illuminations. And the connection in the reception of illumination is in one person: but the distinction is according to the superior or inferior faculties participating in it. And these have been proved at length elsewhere through the words of Dionysius.

To this therefore which is objected, it must be said that he does not mean they are equipotent simply, but relatively, namely in the act of the hierarchy in common. And similarly those who are of one order are equipotent in the formal rationale of that gift, and not in the quantity of virtue according to that gift.

§ 8. Article 4 What is an order, and what is the multiplication of an order?

162. 2 Cor. 4:5

Articulus 4 — What Order Is, And What The Multiplication Of Order Is

What is an order, and what is the multiplication of an order?

Fourthly, it is inquired what an order is? and concerning the multiplication of an order.

The Master says in the text that an order is a multitude of celestial spirits who are likened to each other in some gift of grace, just as they also agree in the participation of natural gifts.

Against this, however, it is objected that: 1. According to this, human beings by themselves make one order: because they are not of the Angelic nature. Since therefore the Angelic nature is part of the definition of an order, man will make a tenth, which will be disproved by the Master below.

1. Also, those things which are not of the same nature are not of the same order in the grade of nature: but the grade of nature is part of the definition of an order, as is evident through the last member of this division: therefore man will not be assumed into the number of the orders of Angels.
2. Also, just as there is a distinction in participating in illuminations among the Angels: so there is also among souls: therefore it seems that souls make three hierarchies and nine orders, just like the Angels: therefore there will be eighteen orders at least, and six hierarchies.
3. Furthermore, it seems to be false what the Master says, that they agree among themselves in some gift of grace: because orders are read of even among demons, as was held above. Therefore grace does not make an order, but nature.
4. Also, that nature makes it, was held above. But if this is conceded, it will be against the text: because the Master proves here that orders are not from nature, but from grace.

§ 9. Also, it is inquired concerning the contrariety of Dionysius, and Gregory, and Bernard: because Dionysius places the Virtues according to the order of the middle hierarchy, and Gregory and Bernard place them in the first order of the last hierarchy, and the Principalities in the second order of the middle one.

Solution. It must be said that in this part Dionysius is to be believed, whom Gregory also adduces in commendation of his own words: and because it is believed that he learned this from Paul. It must be said therefore that an order is called here the rationale of an order from the participation of some gift of grace: and that rationale is well present in natures diverse in species, provided they agree in the rationale of the participation of that gift: and thus Angels and men would only make three hierarchies and nine orders.

To that therefore which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that in this definition some material aspects of an order are posited, such as the multitude of celestial spirits: and some which express an inclination of disposition to the order, such as the agreement of natural gifts: and some as perfecting the formal rationale of the order, such as similarity in a gift of grace: and this last, which is the perfective principle of the order, regards men and Angels equally: but the first two do not diversify, since they are material.

To the next it must be said that although the participation of illuminations differs in Angels and in blessed souls according to the subject, nevertheless it does not differ according to the formal rationale, and therefore it does not make another species.

To the next it must be said that there are no orders among demons except relatively, namely according to the distinction of natural gifts, as the Master will say there.

§ 10. To the next it must be said that without doubt Gregory (as is evident to one who diligently attends to his words) does not intend to rank the orders, but only to enumerate them: but Dionysius intends both, namely to enumerate and to rank. According to Dionysius, therefore, the orders are multiplied thus, that the orders of the first hierarchy are taken according to the rationale of conversion to God for the reception of illuminations. Thus conversion to God is either in relation to Him, or in motion toward Him, or in perfectly possessing Him. If in the first way: then it is the Seraphim, because seeing and knowing means nothing else but to be converted to a present sight. But charity means motion: because it is mobile and acute and superfervid, as Dionysius says: and then it is the Cherubim. But according to the third is taken the Throne in which God rests, while He makes it rest in Himself. But according to this multiplication the order is not considered: but rather according to the dignity of the gifts: and there is lesser dignity in merely possessing: because this belongs to possessing perfection according to the intention of nature, and not necessarily to knowing and loving it: but more perfect is possessing and knowing: and most perfect is possessing and knowing and loving: and therefore the Seraphim are first, the Cherubim second, and the Thrones third.

§ 11. The second and third hierarchies, however, according to Dionysius are taken according to those things to which the illuminations are ordered: and the second according to the power which immediately and completely proceeds from the possessed illumination. The perfection of power or potency is in three things, namely in being high and excellent: depressing and weakening [the opposition]: and according to this are the Dominations. The second perfection is toward the act, which is in the ultimate and most difficult of power: and according to this are the Virtues: because a virtue is the ultimate of power regarding a thing: and therefore Dionysius defines them according to virility in fulfilling every will of God: and therefore also miracles, which are of the highest power in act, are attributed to those Angels by the holy Fathers. The third perfection is that it be ordered to the praise of the good and the punishment of evildoers: and according to this are the Powers: and therefore warding off the contrary powers of evil men and demons is attributed to them.

But the three orders of the last hierarchy are taken according to Dionysius from the action to which the illumination perfects: for the perfection of action is either with respect to many ordered under one according to a law: and to these belong the Principalities, such as Michael the Prince of the Church, and the Angel who was the prince of the Persians, and so for the others. Or it is perfection in the revelation of God's will: and this in two ways, namely in those things which are secrets and mysteries pertaining to the recreation of all: and to these belong the Archangels; or for the revelation and custody of those things which concern the life of individuals: and to these belong the Angels.

But Gregory and Bernard, according to the Masters, place the Virtues in the lower group: because they have singular works: and then it can be ordered thus, that the middle hierarchy is taken according to power in common, and the lowest according to particular acts, and the middle is then multiplied according to the multiplication of power: for Kings and Popes and Potentates are of singular power, and the Dominations correspond to them: and there is power more distinct as a principle, and the power of cities and congregations, and to these belong the Powers. But singular works are either arguments of faith like miracles, and to these belong the Virtues; or revelations, and then it is doubled as before. But if anyone wishes to refer to another treatise disputed concerning this, he will find more things discussed, both to a greater extent and differently: and there he will read what is posited as proper to individual orders according to Dionysius, and disputations concerning each order one by one, and concerning their hierarchies, and concerning their acts, and all the words of Dionysius which he says about this.

Through these and those things the text is clear up to that point.

§ 12. Article 5 Whether superior Angels, since they have the gifts of the inferiors excellently and powerfully, ought also to have their names? and, What do they signify under the diverse endings, M, N, B?

Articulus 5 — Whether The Higher Angels, Since They Have The Gifts Of The Lower Excellently And Powerfully, Ought Also To Have Their Names, And What They Signify Under The Diverse Terminations, M, N, B

Whether superior Angels, since they have the gifts of the inferiors excellently and powerfully, ought also to have their names? and, What do they signify under the diverse endings, M, N, B?

"These names [belong] to them not for their own sake, etc."

But there it is inquired: 1. Since the superiors have the gifts of the inferiors excellently and powerfully, as Dionysius says: it seems also that they ought to have their names, but not conversely.

1. Also, if the inferiors have the gifts of the superiors, although less powerfully, and the denomination is from the better, it seems that they ought to be denominated from the superior gifts: and this does not happen.
2. Also, if those names were given to them for our sake, then it seems that all ought to be named from guardianship: because we name them through the effect of guardianship, and not through the office of contemplation: and this does not happen: because we name some Seraphim, and Cherubim, Thrones, and Dominations, which do not denote an effect of guardianship concerning us.
3. Also, certain names are common only, such as that they are called spirits, and celestial essences, and celestial minds - but certain ones are proper only, such as Seraphim, Cherubim, and Thrones, etc.: but certain ones are common to all and proper to some,

such as Virtues, and Angels : for all are called Virtues, and all Angels: therefore I seek the reason for the diversity among these names.

4. Also, Cherubim and Seraphim are terminated in different ways: for sometimes by the final letter N, sometimes by M, and sometimes it is called Cherub, and Seraph: and I seek the reason for this diversity.

§ 13. Solution. It must be said with the Master that all have the gifts of all, and they have the gifts equally: such that there is as much of one as of another: although one does not have as much as another. But just as there is a distinction in general and special gifts, so they yield to each other in general names: because some refer to contemplation, such as charity, knowledge, and rest in a seat: and those are left by the inferiors as more worthy, to denominate the superiors. But some refer to the action of power, and this either indistinctly or distinctly: indistinctly, like Virtues and Powers: but distinctly, like Principalities, Archangels, and Angels. But Dominations are named from power, not in comparison to action, but rather in imitation of the first principle from which all power descends: and therefore they are not read to be sent at any time. There is also a special distinction, which is expressed in the names themselves, such as charity, knowledge, and the like. And from this the solution to the first and second is clear.

To the third it must be said that although the superiors do not operate around us, nevertheless their gifts happen around us: for the gifts of all happen in us, although through the inferiors: and therefore we name them by those: for otherwise the militant Jerusalem would not descend from the triumphant new Jerusalem, adorned like a bride for her husband, as is said in Apocalypse 21:2.

§ 14. To the next it must be said that certain names express the nature in the genus in which all Angels agree. And these names occur in four ways according to how the nature can be named: for either indistinctly, or distinctly in genus: or they are named by things superadded to the nature, yet consequent upon the nature itself. In the first way they are called celestial essences. In the second way celestial spirits. In the third way they are named in two ways, namely on the part of the speculative intellect: and thus they are called minds, or intelligences, or divine intellects. Or they are named on the part of the motive affection: and thus they are called celestial souls: because the soul (as Anselm says) is the mover of the other faculties, according to which we say, "he did this from his soul." Sometimes they are also named from power: because it is common to all, although not to this or that: for it is not a perfect substance lacking its proper capability: and then they are called Virtues. But sometimes they are named from the act: because just as a substance has its proper virtue, so it also has its proper work: and then they are called Angels.

And if it is objected that an Angel is the same as a messenger: and to announce is not the proper work [of all]: therefore they are wrongly denominated by it. I answer that this is true, if to announce at a distance alone is called the office of a messenger: because then it will be proper to one troop of Angels. But if it is taken commonly in an active sense for to illuminate, and through illumination to announce something deiform to another who sees the divine

light in it, then it will be common to all to announce: and thus all are called Angels. And therefore Dionysius, solving this question, namely why all are called essences, spirits, virtues, and angels, says that supermundane essences are divided into three: into substance, virtue, and operation: and according to substance he wishes to take the name of spirit, according to virtue the name of virtue, according to operation the name of Angels.

To the last it must be said that those terminating in N are of the neuter gender, and signify the entire troop of one order: and therefore they are of plural number. But those terminating in M are of plural number and masculine, and signify several persons of that troop: but Seraph and Cherub are said of some singular person of the troop. Whence the verse: "Say haec Seraphin [neuter plural], say hi Seraphim [masculine plural], say hic Seraph for that one [masculine singular]."

§ 15. Article 6 Whether the order in Angels is from nature or from grace? and, What names did the falling Angels retain?

Articulus 6 — Whether Order In Angels Is From Nature Or From Grace, And What Names The Fallen Angels Retained

Whether the order in Angels is from nature or from grace? and, What names did the falling Angels retain?

Then it is inquired about what he says there, "Now it remains to inquire, etc." 1. For that the order is from nature seems to be held above, where it was said that they had a distinction in nature corresponding to the orders.

1. Also, it was held above that Lucifer was from a superior order: and in the same place, that the demons still retained the names of the orders from which they fell, such as Powers and Princes.

Also it is further inquired in relation to this, Why are demons called Powers, and Princes, and evil Angels, and not Seraphim? Why are they also called Cherubim, as in Ezechiel 28:14: "Thou art a cherub stretched out, and protecting"? but they are not called Thrones:

Also it is further inquired, Whether they will be evacuated? And because this was disputed above, it is inquired, Why does the Apostle say principally of three that they will be evacuated, namely of Power, Principality, Domination.

§ 16. The solution is plain from things previously held above: because they have a natural disposition from nature, but the perfection and complement of the order from grace.

To the next it must be said that the falling demons retained those names which can be had with mortal sin, and not the others, such as charity, and rest in God: and therefore they are not named by those, because they are depraved by vice.

To the next it must be said that those which denote prelacy and governance are principally said to be evacuated: but the others which denote a distinction of grace alone are not said to be evacuated thus: because the grace will remain, but the prelacy according to act will cease.

§ 17. Article 7 Do Angels differ only in number or also in species, or do even those who are in diverse orders and hierarchies differ in genus or species? and, Are those who are in one order equal?

Articulus 7 — Whether Angels Differ Only In Number Or Also In Species, And Whether Those Who Are In Diverse Orders And Hierarchies Differ In Genus Or In Species, And Whether Those Who Are In One Order Are Equal

Do Angels differ only in number or also in species, or do even those who are in diverse orders and hierarchies differ in genus or species? and, Are those who are in one order equal?

Then it is inquired about what he says there, "Furthermore it must be considered, Whether all Angels, etc."

Here it is necessary to ask three things in order under one question: Do Angels differ only in number or also in species? And, Do those who are in diverse orders and hierarchies differ in genus or species? And thirdly, Are those who are in one order equal?

To the first it is thus objected through physical reasons:

1. Multiplicity in number is due to two things, namely because the matter is not totally within the form: and because it is not only in one, but in succession: but neither of these is in an Angel: therefore there is no multiplicity in him by number under one form of species. That the first is true is evident: because matter desires form, as the female does the male, and the base does the good: therefore matter or potency which is imperfect in nothing, and base by no privation, will desire nothing at all: and such is the potency in perpetual things whose potency is inseparable from act.
2. Also, in all those things whose matter is one in species, there is one act by which that matter is drawn from one into another. There is no instance of this unless someone brings an instance to the present matter. But in Angels there is no such act. Therefore they do not differ solely in number, but also in the nature of the species.
3. Also, every multiplication is made by something making a division in that which is prior by nature or time: but matter (as the Philosopher says) is not before the form by nature, but after: therefore Angels do not have multiplication from this sort of division: therefore another [cause] is left, namely that through diverse specific rationales they issue from one genus, which is before them by nature, not by time: but things thus divided differ in species: therefore it seems that all Angels differ in species.
4. Also, we see this in the noblest body in the genus of bodies, that its distinct parts, such as the orbs, and stars differ in species, as is known from their effects: therefore it will also be so in the nobler spiritual nature: but that is the Angelic nature: therefore all differ in species.

§ 18. But against this, 1. There seems to be the statement of Damascene, that all are intellectual substances, and have one work, dwell in the heavens, and praise God with hymns: therefore

they agree in substance and work, since there is no substance which does not have its proper operation.

1. Also, they are of one perfection, for all contemplate in the Word: therefore, since the perfection of diverse natures is not one, it seems that they are not of diverse natures. But the grade of nature seems to vary the species of nature, as regards the perfection which follows the nature.
2. Also, he who is of a certain order agrees more in something with him who is with him in the same order, than with him who is not in the same order: but with him who is not in the same order, he agrees in grace: therefore with him who is in the same order, he agrees in grace and in the nature of the species.
3. Also, to have hypostases in one common nature is a certain passion belonging to God, to an Angel, and to man: therefore they agree in something common, and in something they have a difference: but it belongs to God in one nature numerically, not multiplied by species, nor by number: but to man in one nature multiplied by number, not by species: therefore to an Angel in one nature multiplied by number, and by species, as it seems.
4. Also, the goodness of God appears greater in this, that diverse natures participate in it, and flow from it, than in this, that only one does: therefore it seems that God created them differing in nature.

§ 19. But against this seems to be that: 1. The same reason applies concerning souls: and yet souls do not differ in species. And if you say that this is on account of the body: this seems to be nothing: because it is separable from the body: therefore an active soul would then differ in species from another soul.

1. Also, more and less do not vary the species: but it was held above that Angels do not differ except according to a greater or lesser simplicity of essence: therefore it seems that they do not differ in species from this: or if it is said that this makes a diversity in species in an Angel: therefore it seems that it ought to do so in souls as well: because they too differ thus, as the Master says in the text below.

Furthermore it is inquired, whether those of one order are equal?

And it seems that they are: because 1. Dionysius says that those who are in one hierarchy are equipotent: therefore much more those who are in one order.

1. Also, those whose gift is one and first, their capacity is one: but of those who are of the same order, the gift is one and first: therefore the capacity is one: therefore they are equal in natural and gratuitous things.
2. Also, otherwise it would seem to follow that Lucifer's place would have remained empty: because no one would have been proportioned to that place: and this is unfitting: therefore another in the same order equal to him rose up into his place.

If this, however, is conceded, it will be against what is said in the text.

Also, what Dionysius says, that they are not equal: and therefore in the same order there is a superior illuminating, and an inferior illuminated, as we said above.

§ 20. Solution. It must be said that concerning the first and second there are three opinions: for some, on account of the first reasons, concede that all Angels differ in species, and this seems to me more probable than all others: because in truth no other can be well defended rationally. There are some who say that those who are of the same order are in one species: and those who are in diverse ones are in diverse species: and that those who are in diverse hierarchies differ still more. Thirds say: and this is the more common opinion among the Doctors, because they do not gladly receive the previously held reasons, that all are in one species: and because it is easy to sustain the other opinions, according to this one we will respond to the objections, saying that multiplication is twofold, namely in length which occurs through succession, and this requires potency preceding act: and the other to which the first reasons are adduced, and this multiplication is not in Angels. But there is a multiplication in breadth, and this God completed at once.

in creating: and the rationale for the distinction is not derived from one translating its nature into another, but rather from the order of offices, just as the celestial spirits are distinguished, and the arguments first adduced hold nothing concerning this.

§ 1. To what is objected to the contrary, according to the two former opinions it can be said that from the words of Damascene it is not held that they are of one species, but that they are of one nature in genus.

§ 2. To the substance [of the argument] it must be said that it has no force: because according to this even the soul would be of the same species as the Angels: and therefore this argument was resolved above, where the difference between an Angel and a soul is inquired into.

§ 3. To what is further inquired, according to the last opinion it must be said that those degrees are in superadded powers, and not in the substantial species of nature: just as we also see that a human differs from a human through superadded things, and not through species. But that solution is not according to Philosophy, which reduces this diversity to the matter of the body. But this is supposed by that opinion to be also in a spiritual substance from the order of the creating wisdom, which made the Angels unequal in natural [gifts] on account of the distinction of offices.

§ 4. To the next it can be said that in superadded things [an Angel] agrees more with one who is of its own order, than with another: but not in substantial diversity, or agreement.

§ 5. To the next it must be said that that property is not distinguished in this way: but rather because in an Angel [it is] according to a multitude in breadth from the order of the Creator, but in a human [it is] in length according to the order of generation.

§ 6. To the next it must be said that goodness in a multitude of species shines forth in the order of the universe: but in the order of one nature it shines forth according to a multitude of individuals.

§ 7. To what is objected to the contrary, according to the other opinions it must be said that it is not the same concerning souls: because souls are not so separated that they are not the substantial forms of bodies: and therefore they receive their being in a body, even though according to their being they do not depend on those bodies: and of one power according to reason there is one act according to reason: and therefore souls are of one formulation [rationis]: because the power is of one formulation.

§ 8. To what is objected to the contrary, it must be said that the order to the body is never separated from the soul: and therefore that objection has no force.

§ 9. To the next it must be said that more and less are sometimes founded upon diverse forms through the less noble and more noble ordered to the same thing, just as to know more and less in the sensible and rational: and then it is true that they do not vary the species, but show a variation of species: and thus more and less is in the simplicity of essence and perspicacity of intelligence of the Angels: and therefore they show a diversity of species.

§ 10. To what is further inquired, it must be said that no one in the whole heaven, according to Dionysius, is equal to another.

§ 11. To what is objected to the contrary, it must be said that they are equipotent in the formulation of the act of hierarchy, such as to be converted to God, or things of this kind: but they are not equipotent in participating in the deiform light which is participated in the hierarchy, and in divine assimilation.

§ 12. To the next it is resolved above, because humans who are inferior in nature advance through the pursuit of virtue and receive the degree of superiors: and thus the place of Lucifer is supplied.

DISTINCTIO X

Divisio Textus

§ 14. This also is to be investigated, Whether all those, etc. Here the Master begins to treat of the missions of the Angels.

§ 15. And it has two parts: in the first of which it is asked, Whether all are sent, or certain ones? But in the following distinction, he inquires concerning the custody which they have over us, there, Dist. XI, A, That also is to be known, etc.

§ 16. That distinction is divided into three parts, according to the three opinions introduced here: of which the first is that not all are sent. The second, that all [are sent], there, C, Here a question arises, etc. The third, that not all are sent to us: but certain ones to the middle ones, as

superiors, and the middle to the inferiors, and the inferiors to us: and this begins, there, F, But others say, etc.

§ 17. And this alone is the opinion, as it seems to me, which has little reason, and has very many authorities against it: because Virtues and Principalities and Powers are expressly read to have been sent, and to have offices concerning us, such as to work miracles, to ward off demons, and to order and distinguish and govern principalities: and yet this opinion has several followers.

Articulus 1 — Whether Angels Are Sent, And For What They Are Sent

Whether Angels are sent? and, For what reason are they sent?

§ 18. Concerning the first part there are two things to be asked, namely whether Angels are sent? And, Whether being sent diminishes their glory?

§ 19. Now it seems that they are not sent: because 1. An impartible thing cannot be moved simultaneously by diverse motions, but turns its whole self to whatever it turns itself: an Angel is impartible: therefore it cannot be moved simultaneously by diverse motions: if therefore it assists, it cannot simultaneously minister with this.

§ 20. 2. Also, a messenger is superfluous to one who can indicate to someone distant from himself with equal facility without a messenger: but God could do this: therefore a messenger is superfluous: therefore since a superfluous thing cannot be in the ordination of God, an Angel is not sent, as it seems.

§ 21. 3. Also, the Son is sent, and the Holy Spirit, namely to reorder the rational nature, which had been turned away, as was held in the first book of the Sentences. Therefore since each of them is most sufficient, it seems that an Angel is sent superfluously.

§ 22. ON THE CONTRARY are those things which are said in the Text.

§ 23. SOLUTION. It must be said that an Angel is sent: and this occurs on our account, and not on account of God's indigence.

§ 24. Now to the first it must be said that although an Angel is an impartible substance,

it is nevertheless divisible, that is, in the quantity of its power: and it can assist and minister simultaneously.

§ 1. To the next it must be said that the mission is on our account: because God inspires, and so that an intermediary may be made on our part, He also sends an Angel suggesting the same thing that was inspired.

§ 2. To the next it must be said that each mission, both of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, is most sufficient: but nevertheless because we are fragile, we therefore need more things holding us in goods, inwardly and outwardly.

Articulus 2 — Whether The Glory Of The Angels Is Diminished When They Minister And Are Sent

Whether the glory of the Angels is diminished when they minister and are sent?

§ 3. Secondly it is asked, Whether their glory is diminished when they minister?

§ 4. It seems that it is not: because 1. Bede says that they run within God, wherever they are sent: therefore they are not deflected from contemplation.

§ 5. 2. Also, Gregory: "Angels, when they come to us, never recede from innermost things in contemplation."

§ 6. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Aristotle says in the book De Somno et Vigilia that when one power is in act, another is withdrawn: therefore since the contemplation of the Word draws the appetite and will of the Angel so much into itself, it seems that simultaneously with this it cannot diligently minister around us.

§ 7. 2. Also, it is impossible for the same thing to be moved simultaneously by diverse motions according to the same thing: but to contemplate and to minister are diverse motions: therefore the same Angel cannot be moved by them simultaneously, as it seems.

§ 8. SOLUTION. It must be said that it ministers and contemplates simultaneously.

§ 9. To the first, therefore, it must be said that it is true that one work is not the rationale and cause of the other: but the ministry is caused from contemplation: for because they read in the Word that this is the will of God, they are therefore borne to the ministry. And the act of ministry never begins from our side: for they do not learn from us in what things they ought to minister, but rather always from the Word: and therefore they are withdrawn from neither.

§ 10. Through this the solution to the following is evident.

Articulus 3 — Whether All Angels Are Sent Or Not

Whether all Angels are sent, or not?

§ 11. Concerning the second part it is to be inquired, Whether all are sent, or not? It seems that they are:

§ 12. 1. Heb. 1:14: Are they not all ministering spirits, sent to minister? and other things which are introduced in the Text: therefore all are sent. [165]

§ 13. 2. Also, Damascene: "Those who pre-eminently stand out above the others give their illuminations, dispensing and helping those things which are according to us:" therefore all are sent.

§ 14. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Dan. 7:10: Thousands of thousands, etc. In the same place, the Gloss: "There are more who minister than who assist."

§ 1. 2. Also, our body is so disposed that one member helps another: therefore since they are more powerful in the mystical body, they ought to help us by ministering.

§ 2. SOLUTION. It is to be noted that we have disputed about this very diffusely elsewhere, and whoever wishes can insert this: but for the present it must be said that there are three opinions concerning this which are plainly posited in the Text by the Master, but nevertheless according to the opinion of Dionysius not all are sent. And if we believe that Dionysius wrote the vision of Paul, then it seems he is to be followed more than others.

§ 3. And therefore it must be said to the authorities introduced that all are ministering and sent into the ministry of salvation: but this is by ministering illuminations, not by ministering around us.

§ 4. To the next it must be said that Damascene says this plainly, which was already said in solving the first, and he understands it in this way.

§ 5. But concerning all the others a prolix tract is held elsewhere.

Articulus 4 — Whether One Angel Enlightens Another; And Whether One Purges Another, And From What He Purges, Since He Has No Sin

Whether one Angel illuminates another? and, Whether one purges another, and from what does it purge, since it has no sin?

§ 6. Then it is inquired concerning the third opinion, Whether one illuminates another?

§ 7. And it seems that it does not: because 1. Augustine says that he has a chair in heaven who alone teaches the heart of a human: therefore he alone also teaches the heart of an Angel.

§ 8. 2. Also, Augustine in a certain sermon On the Image says that between our mind and God there is nothing intermediate: therefore there is no intermediate illuminating Angel: therefore neither do they illuminate each other.

§ 9. But if this is conceded, it will be against Dionysius in the book On the Celestial Hierarchy, who says that some are illuminators, purgers, and perfecters: and others illuminated, purged, and perfected in every hierarchy and in every order.

§ 10. Next to this it is also further inquired, if one purges another, from what does it purge, since it has no sin?

§ 11. SOLUTION. What was disputed elsewhere, this I do not wish to corrupt here: because such prolixity could not be posited here. But it must be said briefly that they illuminate each other and us.

§ 12. To what is objected to the contrary, it must be said that God alone teaches as the first efficient cause, but not the only one, in such a way that it would exclude the cooperation of the Angel and the human: and the Angels illuminate as cooperators.

§ 13. To the next it must be said that this is understood only with respect to beatifying things, and not in others: for He Himself alone beatifies the human and the Angel: but in other illuminations one receives from another, and the superior from the inferior.

165. Heb. 1:14.

§ 14. To what is further inquired, it must be said that purgation is from the confusion of similitude, as Dionysius says. But confusion is called here not the opprobrium of sin, but rather the non-united intellect in light: and it is purged from that by the immission of light, not by casting out something else: because light by its presence and absence makes a mutation, just as a substantial form does.

§ 15. And if it is asked concerning the difference of these

acts, I say that light is effected in a holy one, and in this respect it is purgation: and the light itself is something in substance, and this signifies illumination: and it orders toward seeing something in God which was not seen before, and in that is perfection: and therefore they are one in substance, and three in formulation.

§ 1. And concerning this you will find explanations individually elsewhere with a prolix disputation, such that all the words of Dionysius are [expounded].

DISTINCTIO XI

Divisio Textus

§ 2. That also is to be known, that the good Angels, etc. Here the Master treats of the custody of the Angels, and touches on three things: of which the first is that they guard. The second is, Whether individuals have individuals? there, B, Now it is wont to be asked, etc. The third is, Whether they advance in merit? And he touches on two opinions concerning this, there, D, Furthermore that ought to be considered, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether It Belongs to an Angel to Guard; And to Which Angels It Belongs to Guard

Whether it is fitting for an Angel to guard? and, To which Angels is it fitting to guard?

§ 3. Here six doubts fall upon the first [point], namely, Whether it is fitting for an Angel to guard. Secondly, Whether it is fitting for a human to be guarded? Thirdly, concerning the time of custody. Fourthly, concerning the effect. Fifthly, If Antichrist will have a guardian Angel? Sixthly, Whether a human would have had [one] if he had not fallen? All these are disputed elsewhere.

§ 4. To the first one proceeds thus: 1. Luke 22:27: Who is greater, he who reclines, or he who ministers? is it not he who reclines? therefore it is not fitting for the greater to minister to the lesser: but an Angel is greater than a human, both in nature and in state: therefore it is not fitting for it to minister to a human. [166]

§ 5. 2. Also, that God has ministers conveying His will to us, this seems to sound like a defect in His power.

§ 6. 3. Also, that He has some who ward off contrary powers, seems likewise to be a depression of His power.

§ 7. 4. Also, if you say that they convey our desires and prayers to God, this again sounds like an imperfection in Him who knows all our things before they happen: therefore it seems altogether unfitting that Angels minister.

§ 8. ON THE CONTRARY to this, 1. There are the authorities of Jerome and Gregory introduced in the Text by the Master.

§ 9. 2. Also, it belongs to mercy to apply a support to the falling weak: since therefore the human is weak and falling, it seems that it is congruous that he have a guardian.

§ 10. 3. Also, rational nature is threefold, namely divine, angelic, and human: and the angelic is intermediate: therefore according to the order of mediation, it is fitting that it be around both. But it is not around the divine except by assisting: but it cannot assist the human, because it does not receive beatitude from the human: therefore it is fitting for it to minister to the human.

§ 11. 4. Also, the charity of the way is so great that it induces the greater to come to the aid of the lesser: since therefore the charity of the homeland is greater, it induces the Angels to this, that they minister to us.

§ 12. SOLUTION. It must be said that it is fitting for an Angel, especially

from the five lower orders, to guard: and this for three reasons. The first and principal is on our account: because God, on account of our indigence, multiplies for us on all sides the causes of our salvation, inwardly and outwardly, as will be evident in the following article of the question. The second is the order of angelic nature, which is intermediate between two rational natures, namely the Creator's and ours: and this was touched upon in objecting. The third cause is the descent of illuminations: because, as Dionysius says, the law of divinity is to neglect order in nothing, but to lead back the middle things through the first, and the last things through the middle.

§ 1. Therefore it must be said to the first that to minister is as it were from the right of condition and obligation: just as an inferior ministers to a superior, and a servant to his lord: and in this way Angels do not minister to us. There is also ministering from the order of charity, and of nature, and of office: and in this way Angels do minister to us: because to minister in this way belongs to a superior: so that charity looks to the indigence on our part: the order of nature is referred to the intermediate state between us and the Lord of the Angel Himself: but the order of office is referred to the order of the celestial hierarchy above the ecclesiastical in the order of receiving illuminations.

§ 2. To the next it must be said that these do not mean a diminution of power in God, unless we were to posit this on account of God's indigence: but we do not do this, but rather on account of the indigence of the human, and the ordination of wisdom disposing all things

166. Luke 22:27.

in number, weight, and measure, ordering the nature of the Angel and of the office between us and God.

§ 3. And through this the solution to the whole is evident.

Articulus 2 — Whether It Is Fitting for a Human to Be Guarded by an Angel

Whether it is fitting for a human to be guarded by an Angel?

§ 4. Secondly it is asked, Whether it is fitting for a human to be guarded?

§ 5. It seems that it is. 1. Ecclus. 17:14: Over every nation he has set a ruler. The Gloss: "that is, a ruling Angel": whence the highest order of the lowest hierarchy is called the order of Principalities, that is, of Angels who preside over diverse kingdoms, nations, and provinces. [167]

§ 6. 2. Also, Matt. 18:10: Their Angels, that is, of the little ones, always see the face of my Father. The Gloss: "They are not to be despised to whose custody Angels are sent." [168]

§ 7. 3. Also, Ps. 90:11: He has given his Angels charge over you. The Gloss in the same place: "This is said of the head by reason of the members." [169]

§ 8. 4. Also, Isa. 62:6: Upon your walls, O Jerusalem, I have appointed watchmen. The Gloss: "The walls are the Apostles, the watchmen are the Angels." [170]

§ 9. 5. Also, Ecclus. 33:15: Good is set against evil, and life against death: so also is the sinner against a just man. And so look upon all the works of the Most High, two and two, and one against another. And, in the same place, 42:25: All things are double, one against another, and he has made nothing to be lacking. But it is established by experience that we have bad Angels as exercisers: therefore something would be lacking in the works of the Most High, unless He had also given a good one as a guardian. [171]

§ 10. 6. Also, it is fitting for an indigent one that a guardian be applied: but the human is indigent, as experience teaches: therefore he needs a guardian.

§ 1. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. The best human was stronger than every Angel, namely Christ: therefore the human is simply stronger than the Angel: therefore he does not need a guardian.

§ 2. 2. Also, 1 John 2:27: His unction teaches you concerning all things. Therefore we do not need an Angel teaching. [172]

§ 3. 3. Also, the fomes [tinder of sin], and sin, and the devil incline to evil: and against the fomes we have the sacraments, against sin grace, against demons God as a helper: therefore it seems that the custody of an Angel is superfluous.

§ 4. 4. Also, the least charity is able to resist whatever temptation: therefore a human having charity does not need another guardian: therefore the custody of an Angel is superfluous: but nothing is superfluous without a vice: therefore the custody of an Angel seems not to ought to be.

§ 5. SOLUTION. It must be said that the custody of an Angel is very necessary for us.

§ 6. To those things which are objected to the contrary, it must be said to the first that this argument is invalid: because this is an accident, insofar as Christ was God, and not simply.

§ 7. To the next it must be said that unction teaches inwardly: and on account of many withdrawing things we also need something persuading and suggesting outwardly: and this is the guardian Angel.

§ 8. To the next it must be said that that does not proceed: because causes of salvation superabound over occasions of perdition for all: and yet there is no superfluity there, because even nature not only gives necessary things, but also comforting things and things holding in the being of the form what it gives: for if nature were to give nothing but form, that form would be destroyed by the slightest agent to the contrary, and thus the product by nature would not remain: and therefore it gives powers conquering contrary dispositions in matter, and resisting subsequent alterations: and thus God also does. Nevertheless we can also say that the things that were touched upon incline to evil, and moreover occasions of evil which we [have from] those suggesting: and therefore against the bad Angel we have a good one, and God against sin, and grace formally disposing so that God may inhabit in us: and against the fomes the sacraments: and against things suggesting evil, the unction which teaches all things.

§ 9. To the last it must be said that charity, as much as it is from itself, suffices well: but as much as it is in us weak and infirm ones, it frequently fails: or to speak more properly, we fail it.

Articulus 3 — It Is Asked Concerning the Time of Guardianship, Namely When an Angel Is Appointed to Us for Guardianship; And Whether Angels Always Guard Those to Whose Guardianship They Are Appointed, or Sometimes Abandon Them

It is inquired concerning the time of custody, namely when an Angel is deputed to us for custody: and, Whether Angels always guard those to whose custody they are deputed, or sometimes abandon them?

§ 10. Thirdly it is asked concerning the time of custody.

§ 11. 1. Jerome seems to say in the Text that an Angel is deputed to us at the rise of nativity.

§ 12. 2. Also, if custody is owed to the infirm: then it is most owed at the time of greatest infirmity: but this is infancy: therefore it is most applied then.

§ 13. 3. Also, Christ said concerning the little ones, Let the children come to me, and do not forbid them. And Matt. 18:10: Their Angels always see, etc. [173]

§ 14. 4. Also, in the womb when the offspring is formed, there is a soul created to the image of God, which in many ways from interior and exterior dangers can be frustrated from the grace of regeneration: it seems that custody is owed to it.

167. Sirach 17:14 (Vulgate).

§ 15. ON THE CONTRARY: A benefit is exhibited in vain to one who

cannot recognize [it]: but the little ones in the womb and in infancy do not have the use of reason so as to recognize: therefore the benefit of the ministry of Angels is exhibited to them in vain.

§ 1. FURTHERMORE it is asked here, if Angels always guard, or sometimes abandon the guarded?

§ 2. Now it seems that sometimes they abandon.

1. Jer. 51:9 (actually Josephus): Let us cross over from these seats. And this same voice was heard in the air in the Passion of Christ, as is read in the Gospel of the Nazarenes. And Michael said it, abandoning the Synagogue, and transferring himself to the Church. Therefore sometimes they abandon. [174]

§ 3. 2. Also, Jer. 51:9: We have cured Babylon, and she is not healed: let us forsake her, etc. The Gloss: "The physicians are the Angels, whom we repel from us when we do not acquiesce to their counsel." [175]

§ 4. 3. Also, Jer. 17:6, on that, A land of saltness, the Gloss: "which has neither God as a guest, nor the protection of Angels."

§ 5. 4. Also, let us posit that it is revealed to an Angel that he whom he guards is foreknown to eternal death: and then either he abandons, or not. If he abandons, I have the proposition. If not: then he makes him sin more: because he contemns the monition of the Angel: which he would not do, if he did not have a guardian Angel: therefore it seems that it hinders and does not profit him. Since therefore he at least intends not to hinder him, it seems that he then falls away from him.

§ 6. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. A good one is more fervent in guarding than a bad one in impugning: but a bad one never abandons a good one: therefore neither a good one a bad one.

§ 7. 2. Also, although he could know someone to be damned, nevertheless he can still impede many evils, and thus he attains the effect of his custody.

§ 8. 3. Also, no one is to be despaired of while on the way: but a physician does not abandon one who is not despaired of: therefore since Angels are physicians, they never abandon on the way: and this is to be conceded.

§ 9. To the first therefore it must be said that (as I opine) an Angel is given to the offspring formed and animated in the mother's womb, even before it is born.

§ 10. To what is objected to the contrary, it must be said that it does not behoove the guarded to understand: because the Angel does not do his obedience on account of this, that it may be understood by us, but rather so that the glory of God may be promoted in us.

§ 11. To what is further inquired, it must be said that an Angel never abandons, as the last arguments prove. And all the authorities introduced before have one solution, namely that

they are said to abandon when they exhibit tribulation, and thus they abandoned Babylon, otherwise they never abandon.

§ 12. But nevertheless here certain ones say otherwise, namely that sometimes they subtract the office of custody, and do not abandon locally unless the human rushes from sin into sin: and the multitude of sins makes him at length return to God. But this I would not dare to say: because it does not seem consonant with the charity of the Angel that he would not do whatever he can against sin, saving the liberty of the human's choice: because no one is to be coerced to good or to evil. But what one authority says in the third argument, that the physician's abandonment is condemnation, is to be understood, that is, a sign of condemnation, when on account of sins he exposes to tribulation unless you be corrected.

§ 13. To the next, the solution is evident through the objection to the contrary: because although he might know someone to be foreknown, he nevertheless impedes many evils in him: and thus his custody works toward a more tolerable damnation.

Articulus 4 — What Are The Effects Of Angelic Guardianship

How many and what are the effects of Angelic guardianship?

§ 1. Fourthly, it is asked concerning the effect of guardianship. And twelve are assigned by the Masters. § 2. The first is to loose from the bonds of sins: And behold an Angel of the Lord stood by... The chains fell from his hands. [176] § 3. The second is to strengthen on the way. An Angel said to Elijah: Arise, eat, for a great journey remains for thee. [177] § 4. The third is to ward off demons: He himself restrained the demon from my wife. [178] § 5. The fourth is to teach: Now I have come forth to teach thee, and that thou mightest understand. § 6. The fifth is to console: Be of brave mind, etc. § 7. The sixth is to reveal secrets. Three Angels expressed the mystery of the Trinity, and of the unity, and of Christ who was to be born: and therefore there follows what one of the Angels said: Shall I be able to hide from Abraham what I am about to do, since he shall be etc. § 8. The seventh is help against enemies: An Angel of the Lord went forth, and struck down a hundred and eighty-five thousand in the camp of the Assyrians. § 9. The eighth is to rebuke for offenses: An Angel of the Lord went up from Gilgal to the place of Weepers, and said: I brought you out of Egypt, and brought you into the land. And after: And you were unwilling to hear my voice. Why have you done this? § 10. The ninth is to remove hindrances to the good: and this is signified where an Angel struck the firstborn of Egypt, while whom were living the people of the Lord could not depart from Egypt. And: Behold I send my Angel. § 11. The tenth is to lead and conduct on the way: I will lead, and bring back. § 12. The eleventh is to mitigate temptation: and this is signified where Jacob wrestled with an Angel, and received a blessing: and this availed against temptation from a demon. And he was strengthened against his brother, by the Angel saying, etc., and this signified the mitigation of temptation from the world. And the sinew of his thigh withered: which signifies the mitigation of temptation from carnal delights. § 13. The twelfth is to pray and offer prayers: When thou didst pray with tears,... I offered thy prayer to the Lord.

169. Ps. 90:11.

Articulus 5 — Whether the Antichrist Will Have a Guardian Angel; And Whether Christ Had an Angel Deputed to Him

Will Antichrist have a guardian Angel? and, Did Christ have an Angel assigned to him?

§ 14. Fifthly it is asked, whether Antichrist will have a guardian Angel or not? § 15. Now it seems that he will not have one: because § 16. 1. Upon that text, Neither shall he regard any of the gods, for he shall rise up against all things: but he shall venerate the god Maozim in his place: the Gloss says, namely the devil, in himself and wherever Antichrist shall be. [179] If therefore he will have the devil in himself, it seems that he will in no way have the protection of Angels.

§ 1. 2. Also, another gloss in the same place seems to say, that even in his mother's womb he is to be nourished by the ministry of a demon, and after birth to be fed and educated. § 2. 3. Also, according to the Apostle, with the devil instigating and operating who will entirely possess him, the coming of Antichrist will be according to the operation of Satan. [180] § 3. 4. Also, Damascene says that Antichrist will lack the protection of Angels. § 4. 5. Also, Damascene: That man will be generated from fornication, and will take up every act of Satan. For God, foreknowing the iniquity of his future will, concedes the devil to dwell in him. Therefore it seems, that a good Angel would do nothing with him. § 5. 6. Also, by reason the same seems true, that a good Angel intends to harm no one: but contempt for his protection would harm that man and aggravate his sin: therefore it seems, that one will not be given to him.

§ 6. Further it is asked concerning this, whether Christ had an Angel assigned to him? § 7. It seems that he did: because § 8. 1. In the Psalm: To his Angels, etc. The Gloss: It can be taken concerning the whole Christ. [181] Therefore as much concerning the head, as concerning the members. § 9. 2. Also: An Angel from heaven appeared to him, strengthening him. [182] Therefore much more did he have an Angel guarding him: because it is less to guard, than to strengthen. § 10. 3. Also: And behold Angels approached, and ministered to him. [183] § 11. 4. Also, his dignity was not less than that of others: if therefore it is the dignity of the human soul that Angels are assigned to it for guardianship, it seems that much more were they assigned to Christ. § 12. 5. Also, he himself had an evil Angel exercising him: therefore much more ought he to have had a good one guarding him. § 13. 6. Also, an Angel does not only guard in spiritual things, but also in the body: but Christ was passible in the body: therefore he needed guardianship in that part, as it seems. § 14. 7. Also, Bede says upon that text, Angels approached, that Angels are described as having ministered to Christ and strengthened him as a testimony of both natures. If therefore ministry was a sign of divine nature, and strengthening a sign of human nature, it seems that he needed the guardianship of Angels. § 15. 8. Also, upon Tobit the Gloss says, that the evil Angel never left him, and stood on the arm of the cross when he died. Therefore from opposites neither did the good Angel. § 16. 9. Also, the lesser ought to be guarded by the greater, as was established above: but of Christ it is said, Thou hast made him a little less than the Angels: therefore he ought to have had the guardianship of Angels.

170. Isa. 62:6.

§ 17. If this be conceded, a great misery follows, namely that being conjoined to deity he would still need another guardian: for his persecutors could never do anything against him, except when deity exhibited him to the passion: therefore he never had a guardian.

§ 18. Solution. To the first there are opinions: for some say, that Antichrist will have a good Angel who will be assigned to him: but he will withdraw from him, from the moment he exalts himself above all that is called God. But this opinion has today expired. The opinion of others is, that he will have a good guardian Angel, who will never withdraw from him even until death: and this for three reasons, namely so that his condemnation may appear more just: and so that the order of wisdom may stand, which on account of him ought not to be broken, so that what is done for others is not done for him. The third and principal cause is: because it seems impossible, that an Angel should not impede him from many sins, especially

because he will not permit the occasions of certain sins to come to the presence of his senses: and divine goodness is so great, that it procures impediments to sin even for the most wicked, and therefore the guardianship of the Angel is not entirely frustrated in him.

§ 2. To the authorities therefore first adduced it must be said, that this is said with respect to the principal effect of guardianship, which is to withdraw from sins: for this Antichrist will never do. But as to what is said about his being nourished by the devil, this is understood as to the dispositions by which the demon operates for the incitement of the bodily constitution or of foods, as was said above.

§ 3. To all the others the solution is clear through the things which are objected to the contrary.

§ 4. To that which is further asked concerning Christ, it must be said that it is the opinion of all, that Christ never had a guardian Angel: because without doubt this would be the greatest impiety to opine concerning the redeemer.

§ 5. To those things therefore which are objected, it must be said to the first, that God gave command to the Angels concerning the whole Christ, but not equally, but that they should guard the members, and minister to the head.

§ 6. To another it must be said, that in the same place it is solved by the Expositors, that it was nothing but the exterior strengthening of congratulation to a strong Christ, and not of interior disposition: and therefore the Doctors have been accustomed to say, that his comforting was to bear himself in the manner of one comforting.

§ 7. To another it must be said, that he did not have an evil Angel tempting him interiorly. But this solution belongs to certain thinkers, and it is not valid: because even Adam did not have him inside in the first state. Whence it must be said, that it is not similar concerning an evil Angel, and concerning a good Angel: because the evil one is given for the trial of fidelity and constancy: and in Christ there was a temptation of dispensation, namely because wisdom so dispensed, that he who had conquered by tempting, might be conquered by being tempted:

171. Sirach 33:15; 42:25.

whence the temptation of Christ is referred to our salvation, and not to an exercise, which would have brought some good to himself. But a good Angel is given on account of need, which was none in Christ: and therefore he could not have a good guardian Angel.

§ 8. To another it must be said, that the strengthening of the Angel is a sign of human nature, not through any fortitude which the Angel had given him, but because he was congratulating the strong sufferer: and thus through sadness and passion it is ordered to the proof of human nature, and not from need.

§ 9. To another the solution is clear through what has been said: because it is not similar concerning a good Angel, and an evil Angel.

§ 10. To another it must be said, that in the argument there is the fallacy of taking what is qualified as absolute: because Christ is not lesser except very improperly and in a qualified sense, namely in that he was passible in the flesh, not in that he was needy or flexible [in will].

Articulus 6 — Whether Man Would Have Had a Guardian Angel If He Had Not Fallen

Would man have had a guardian Angel if he had not fallen?

§ 11. Sixthly it is asked, whether man would have had a guardian Angel if he had not fallen? § 12. Now it seems that he would not: because § 13. 1. He would not have been inclining to sin: therefore he would not have needed one comforting him in the good. § 14. 2. Also, Man would have been confirmed if he had stood firm, just as the standing Angel: therefore he would not have needed a guardian Angel then. § 15. 3. Also, on account of the body he did not need one, because he could not die unless he sinned: therefore in no way did he need one, as it seems.

§ 16. But on the contrary: it is established that he had an evil Angel as an exerciser: therefore he ought also to have had a good one as a guardian.

§ 17. Solution. It must be said, that he had a good guardian Angel in the first state.

§ 1. But to the first objections there is one solution, that guardianship is more a preservative medicine than a sanative one: and therefore the Angel was operating toward this, that man should not fall.

§ 2. To another it must be said, that after confirmation he would not have had a guarding Angel.

§ 3. But whether he would still have received illuminations through an Angel in the state of an animal body, until he should be transferred into the paradise of Angels, and the body be clothed with heavenly clarity, I do not determine: but indeed this seems to me more probable, than the opposite.

Articulus 7 — Whether Angels Advance in Merit

Do Angels advance in merit?

172. Sirach 17:14 (Vulgate).

Do Angels advance in merit?

§ 1. Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, D, Furthermore that ought to be considered, etc. § 2. And it is asked, whether Angels advance in merit?

§ 3. But because this was disputed above, where it is asked concerning the merit of Angels, therefore certain things can briefly be touched upon here thus: § 4. Out of charity they minister around us: but an act informed by charity is meritorious: therefore Angels merit by ministering.

§ 5. Further it is asked concerning the contradiction which seems to be among them, as in Daniel, where it is said: The prince of the kingdom of the Persians resisted me for twenty-one days. And in Job: Who maketh peace in his high places.

§ 6. Also, concerning the sadness with which they are said to be saddened, as in Isaiah: The Angels of peace shall weep bitterly.

§ 7. Also, concerning what Bernard says, that although Angels are impassible, they are nevertheless not incompassible [i.e., incapable of compassion].

§ 8. Solution. The Masters pass briefly over this here: but elsewhere it is diligently treated concerning these things. § 9. And it must be said, that the common opinion is, that Angels do not merit: because their charity informing their acts is in them a reward, not a merit, as was said above.

§ 10. To another it must be said, that the contradiction is nothing but a dissent in the object willed by one and the other, and it is reduced to concord through the illumination of that which God wills: because in this they all agree.

§ 11. To another it must be said, that Angels do not weep: but signs of sadness in effect, not in affect, are called their weeping, when sinners are not converted.

§ 12. To another it must be said, that the affect of compassion is there taken improperly for congratulation in the good, and displeasure in our evil, which we do, or suffer.

DISTINCTIO XII

Divisio Textus

§ 13. These things concerning the condition of the Angelic nature, etc. Here begins that part which is concerning corporeal creature, and it is divided into two parts. § 14. In the first the Master treats of the work of creation. But in the second concerning the work of disposition and adornment: and this begins in the following distinction XIII, there, A, Now the first of distinction, etc.

§ 15. Now this distinction is divided into four parts: in the first of which the Master recites diverse sentences of the Fathers concerning the manner of creation. But in the second he explains the work of creation, there, C, Therefore according to this tradition, etc. In the third, he moves two questions concerning the work of creation, namely whether unformed matter was created entirely, or under some form, and where was the matter of the sensible world created? there, E, Concerning which thing before we treat, etc. In the fourth and last, he says certain things to be foretasted concerning the mode of the distinction of divine operation, there, G, Now it remains that the disposition, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether All Things Were Made at Once, as Augustine Says, or Were Disposed Through the Number of Six Days

Were all things made at once, as Augustine says, or distributed through the sixfold number of days?

§ 16. The first question occurs concerning the first part about the opinion of Augustine who says, that all things were made at once in matter and form. And to the opinion of others who feel otherwise, Augustine objects thus: § 17. 1. He that liveth forever, created all things together. [184] And he who says all things, excepts nothing: therefore all things were created at once, and not through a sixfold number. § 18. 2. Also, the Gloss of Gregory, in the same place: When heaven and earth are described as made at once, at once spiritual and corporeal things, at once whatever arises from heaven, at once whatever is produced from the earth is indicated as made. But it is established, that stars are from heaven, and plants, and animals from the earth. Therefore heaven and earth, and stars and plants and animals were made at once, and not successively through six days.

§ 1. 3. Also, Augustine objects through that which is held: These are the generations of heaven and earth, when they were created, in the day that the Lord made heaven and earth: and every shrub of the field before it sprang up in the earth, and every herb of the region before it grew. [185] Therefore in the day in which the Lord made heaven and earth, he made the shrub of the field and the herb of the region. Therefore the third day was with the first day: and the same reasoning holds for the others: therefore the works of the six days were made at once. § 2. 4. Also, this seems more expressed through another translation, which Augustine introduces: and it says thus: This is the book of the creature of heaven and earth, when the day was made, God made heaven and earth and the herb for fodder. Therefore when the day was made, God made heaven and earth and the herb. Now the day made cannot be understood as that which is from the bearing of the sun: therefore it is another day which God made when he made all other things: but that day before corporeal light cannot be except the Angelic nature: therefore with the Angelic nature God made all things: therefore all things at once. § 3. 5. Also, through that text of Job: Behold Behemoth whom I made with thee. [186] But Behemoth is an Angel, who first when he was made, the day was made: but man is commemorated as made on the sixth day: therefore the work of the sixth day is made with the work of the first day: therefore also the rest were much more made [at once]. § 4. 6. Also, Augustine leads the one saying the opposite to an inconvenience.

174. 1 John 2:27.

For if all things were made in confused matter only, then nothing was distinct: therefore neither was there a circle in which light might be rotated: therefore since a day is not made except by the circular rotation of light, even day was not then, neither the first, nor the second, nor the third: but it first began in the fourth. § 5. 7. Also, Day is made for the solace of those dwelling on the earth: but then no one inhabited the earth: therefore day would have been in vain, unless all things were made at once: but there is nothing in vain and empty and useless in the works of God: therefore it seems, that all things were made at once. § 6. 8. Also, if someone should say, that day was then made by the emission and contraction of light. Augustine objects to the contrary: since a luminous body does not illuminate by contracting and emitting rays, like the eye, since it does not have anything covering it, and acts by the necessity of nature. § 7. 9. Furthermore, that emission and contraction is neither proved by reason, nor by the authority of Sacred Scripture: therefore it is condemned with the same facility with which it is asserted. § 8. 10. Also, it is established, that God produced the work of the first day in a moment: it is asked therefore, why did he rest for twenty-four hours, since an artificer who is not wearied in his work, does not know how to cease from work, as long as something remains of the work to be perfected? but the cause of this is not easy to find. And Augustine hints at all these reasons in diverse places of his books on Genesis literally.

§ 9. Furthermore, for the same opinion it can be objected thus: § 10. 1. Of the most perfect agent the work is most perfect: but the most perfect work is completed in form and matter: therefore it seems, that all things were created by the supreme artificer perfect in form and matter. § 11. 2. Also, Aristotle often uses this argument, if something is better done by one than by many, and suddenly and at once than successively, that nature so operates which expedites itself by the shorter means it can: therefore much more the supremely potent God: but it is better to make at once than successively, and by one than by many: therefore it seems, that God made all things at once. § 12. 3. Also, the terminus of every operation is a composite and not matter alone: and

the truth of this is clear by induction in art and nature: therefore the terminus of divine operation is also a composite: but a composite is perfect from matter and form: therefore creatures were made at once perfect in matter and form. § 2. 4. Also, if prime matter was made: either therefore it was made naked without all form, or under the form of a mixture. If naked, this cannot be: because even the Master in the third part of this reading will say below, that it cannot subsist without all form: because thus it is in potency and intellect only. If however it was made under the form of a mixture. On the contrary: miscible things are distinct in time and substance before the mixture, as the Philosopher proves: therefore before that mixture there must have been distinct things in their forms. § 3. 5. Also, miscible things would not be mixed unless by something moving to the mixture: but there was nothing moving to that mixture: therefore it seems, that all things were not made at once in the form of mixture and confusion. § 4. To these and similar reasons Augustine consents: and also certain Philosophers positing the world to have begun through creation, hold the way of Augustine, and Rabbi Moses, and certain others.

175. Matt. 19:14; Matt. 18:10.

§ 5. BUT ON THE CONTRARY it is objected through the opinion of other Saints: § 6. 1. For Chrysostom says upon John: It was fitting that creatures be generated, but not at once: and man with woman, but neither these at once: therefore not all things were made at once. § 7. 2. Also, Gregory in book XXXII of the Moralia: The substance of things was created at once, but was not formed at once according to species: and what stood forth at once through the substance of matter, did not appear at once through the species of form. § 8. 3. But because the authorities of Gregory, Jerome, Basil, Bede, Ambrose, Dionysius, Damascene, Alcuin, Strabo, and of very many other Fathers besides Augustine, abundantly overflow to this. § 9. 4. Let the authority of Augustine also be introduced. For he says in the book of Confessions: Didst thou not teach me, that before thou didst form that unformed matter, there was not anything, neither color, nor body, nor figure, nor spirit, yet not entirely nothing: for there was a certain formlessness without any species. Therefore it seems, that God created unformed matter first, and afterwards formed it. But if anyone wishes to accept it, he will find many authorities similar to this in books XII and XIII of the Confessions. § 10. 5. Also, Augustine says upon Genesis: Greater is the authority of this scripture, namely Genesis, than the perspicacity of all human ingenuity. Since therefore Scripture pronounces six days, it seems that it is a temerity of ingenuity and presumption to say that all things were made at once. § 11. 6. Also, this opinion seems also agreeable to Philosophers, that first things were made in the confusion of a mixture. Whence Ovid: Before the sea, and lands, and the heaven which covers all things, There was one countenance of nature in the whole orb, Which they called Chaos, a rude and indigested mass. § 12. 7. Also, Boethius in the book on the Consolation of Philosophy: Whom no external causes compelled to fashion The work of floating matter. § 13. 8. Also, Aristotle in the first of the Physics: Some segregate inherent contrarieties from one mixture, just as Anaximander said: and whoever others say that there is one and many, as Empedocles and Anaxagoras. § 14. 9. Also, Plato in the last part of the Timaeus says thus: For the mixed generation of the sensi-

§ 1. -ble world consists from the act of necessity and intelligence, with intellect dominating, and by salutary persuasion drawing the rigor of necessity to the best acts. Therefore it seems, that this opinion is truer. § 2. 10. Also, by reason it can be objected thus: nature in all its work is regulated by some exemplar of divine work: but it is established, that in the work of nature potency precedes act in time: therefore this is prefigured in the divine work: but the work preceding nature is none other than the work of creation, and disposition, and adornment: therefore it seems, that in it too potency preceded act: therefore matter was made before, and afterwards distinguished through forms. § 3. 11. Also, the sudden and the successive cannot be simultaneous: but the work of creation is sudden, because between being and nothing there is no medium: but the work of distinction is in motion to form and to place, both of which are successively in time: therefore the work of distinction and of creation are not simultaneous. Since therefore all the works of the six days besides part of the work of the first day, are of the work of distinction and adornment, they could not have been made at once with the work of adornment. § 4. 12. Also, there are four termini of diverse mutations, namely being, nothing, potency, and act: but it is established, that these termini are ordered, such that nothing is before potency, and being absolutely is before being in act through form: therefore in the same

168. Matt. 18:10.

order the mutations which are between those termini stand to each other: therefore the mutation of creation which is between being and nothing, will be before the mutation of distinction and adornment which is between potency and act: therefore not all things were made at once.

§ 5. Solution. Speaking without prejudice, nothing seems to me truer than that which Augustine says: nevertheless I will solve the reasons for both opinions, and let him prevail who can prevail.

§ 6. Solving therefore first for Augustine, his word upon which his solution is founded must be accepted. Therefore he says thus in the book on Genesis literally: § 7. Just as voice is the matter of words, but words indicate formed voice: and yet he who speaks does not first emit an unformed voice, which he might afterwards collect, and form into words: so God the creator did not make matter prior in time, and afterwards form it through the order of whatsoever things as if by a second consideration: for he created formed matter: but because that from which something is made, although not in time, is nevertheless by a certain origin prior to that which is made from it, Scripture could divide by times of speaking, what God did not divide by times of making.

§ 8. According to this therefore we will say to the first that is objected, that it was fitting that they not be made at once by the order of nature, but by the order of time: and this mode of solving applies to all authorities of all the Saints.

§ 9. To that which is objected from his words in the book of Confessions, it must be said that he himself takes there "before" and "after" to be made according to the order of nature, by which the foundation of nature is before all things founded in it. But the foundation, as the Philosopher says, is neither qualified, nor quantified, nor having any form: and therefore it is in potency alone, and according to reason: and this reason Augustine pursues there.

§ 10. To another it must be said, that Augustine does not derogate Scripture: because he does not contradict it, but expounds it: but he derogates the authority of Scripture, who says that what is contained in it is false.

§ 11. To that which is objected through the Philosophers, it must be said that they plainly erred: because positing a mixture, as Empedocles, they posited nothing to be in the mixture except what are called elements: and they said this is done many times in any generated thing, and that friendship and strife move to the exit of things

into being through generation, as was noted above. And of that opinion Ovid seems to have been. Others following Anaxagoras and Anaximander, said that that mixture is from infinite similar parts, remaining there under their proper forms, such as flesh, and bone, and nerve, and blood, and the like: and they posited elements to be infinite, and all things to be in all things, and the latency of forms: all of which are erroneous, and expounded above. And therefore the holy Fathers did not posit a mixture of this kind, but rather the confused matter of the four elements, with God alone making the distinction in it. And so is understood the authority of Boethius. And according to Augustine, that mixture precedes in nature only, and

176. Cf. Josephus, Bell. Jud. VI.5.3 (often cited in Latin tradition as Migremus hinc or Transeamus ex his sedibus).

not in time: just as also the mixture of humors in man is the cause of complexion, and does not precede it in time: and the shining sun [is the cause of] the emitted ray, and yet does not precede it in time.

§ 2. To that which is objected through reason, it must be said that nature is regulated by the divine work, which however it cannot imitate in whole, as is clear, because it cannot make anything out of nothing: but it imitates it as much as it can by having potency in place of nothing, and in place of that which God makes suddenly and at once, it operates in time and successively.

§ 3. To another it must be said, that distinction is not made successively except by nature, and not by God: and therefore it could be simultaneous with the work of creation.

§ 4. To another it must be said, that those things, on account of the perfection of the agent, did not have their mutations simultaneously in time: but in nature which is an imperfect agent, it is otherwise.

§ 5. But because there are Doctors who opine also for the other side: therefore it must be solved also for them.

§ 6. To what therefore is first and second objected, it must be solved through Gregory himself, because that Gloss is taken from book XXXII of the Moralia, chap. 10: and there below the Gloss there follows in the original: For the sun, moon and stars are held to be made in heaven on the fourth day: but what proceeded in species on the fourth day, stood forth in the substance of heaven on the first day by condition. On the first day the earth is said to be created, and on the third day the shrubs are described as established, and all green things: but what brought itself forth in species on the third day, was undoubtedly on the first day in that substance of the earth from which it arose.

§ 7. To that which is thirdly and fourthly objected through the text of Genesis, Gregory responds in the same place thus: He who had named heaven and earth, and shrub and herb created on diverse days, now manifests them made in one day, so that he might clearly show that every creature stood forth at once by substance, although it did not proceed at once by species.

§ 8. To another it must be said, that man was made with the Angel as to the body in the prime matter of the elements, and as to the soul in likeness: because the Angel was created in the image of God in three powers, just as man.

§ 9. To the other things which Augustine objects, it must be said that for the rotation of that light it was not necessary that there be a special circle: because that of matter which yielded into a quantified body, was then more moved, and by its nature was borne circularly just as it also does now.

§ 10. To another it must be said, that the cause of day is not that inhabitants on the earth might see the light: but rather then the local motion itself and the deiform immutation through the rotation of light moved the liquid matter to an easier distinction: because the motion by distracting, and inducing heat, worked toward this that fire should be made near

177. Jer. 51:9.

the circumference, and similarly light through immutation: but the gross matter by that very fact

§ 1. ...they fled more by distancing from the circumference: and therefore that motion was ordered to the easier distinction of the parts of matter, not because God needed this instrument, but because the nature of the thing required this.

§ 2. To the next it must be said that Damascene says that by emission and contraction night and day came to be in the first three days: and if we wish to maintain this, then we will say that there is emission through rising and setting: and thus what he says is true. And there is emission through drawing in and covering: and thus what he says cannot be true, unless we posit that it is animate, and has closing and opening [parts], just as eyes have.

§ 3. To the next it must be said that a created thing is not immediately perfect. For the perfection of a thing is twofold: one is in being, and this it received from the divine work in the first state; and the other is in acting and in relation to other things, and a thing does not have this unless a circulation is completed over it: because thus in every direct and oblique aspect it is proportioned and moved by the higher [bodies]: and therefore it does not receive the impressions and motions of all [at once]: and therefore appropriately another day was always awaited in a new work.

§ 4. To what is objected by common arguments, it must be said that the action of the agent is not only according to the power of the agent, but also according to the power of the patient, and according to what is more fitting to the patient and to that which is made: and therefore, since God intended to establish nature in the first works of the six days, he made them according to what was more fitting to those works, and this was so that, just as one was the cause of another according to nature, so also it would precede it in time.

§ 5. To the next it must be said that it was not better, as has already been shown.

§ 6. To the next it must be said that this also was resolved above, in the first distinction: and it is true only of an agent that does not act upon the whole substance of a thing, but upon a part of the substance: but God is not such an agent.

§ 7. To the next it must be said that there is a mixed thing [directed] to the act of the mixed thing removing each of the miscible elements from its proper act: and the objection proceeds concerning this. There is also a mixed thing which has act in the miscible elements, but is not determined to a place, which place contributes to the generation and conservation of the species: and concerning this it is not true. Rather, what is undetermined in place is determined according to the first generation of the world: and therefore it is clear that the order of wisdom does not contradict the order of nature.

§ 8. To the next it must be said that it is not necessary that anything move toward a mixed thing undetermined in place besides the will of the maker determining from his own will, but toward a mixed thing that makes a new complexion from the miscible elements of the mixed

178. Jer. 17:6.

thing, it is necessary to posit a mover according to place, and according to active and passive qualities.

Articulus 2 — Why Prime Matter Is Rather Called by These Names, Earth, Water, Abyss, Than by Others

Why is prime matter rather called by these names, earth, water, abyss, than by others?

§ 9. Next it is asked concerning this which he says, there, C, He also calls the same an abyss, etc.

§ 10. Here it is asked, 1. Why is prime matter rather called by these three names, earth, water, abyss, than by others?

§ 11. 2. Also, since Aristotle reproves Hesiod, because he said that the receptibility of place and of matter are the same, why does Scripture say this, that matter is void and empty, which are properties of place?

§ 12. 3. Also, why does he here sometimes call matter confused, and sometimes mixed, since according to the Philosopher there is a difference between the confused and the mixed?

§ 13. To the first, however, it must be said that there are three properties by reason of which it is called by three names, of which the first is to receive form. But the receptive power is chiefly perfected by aqueous humidity: and therefore it is called by the name of water: because water receives every figure to which it flows, just as matter receives every form. Also, in matter there is the property of holding the received form: and by reason of this it is called earth: because the retentive power is perfected by the cold and dry, which are properties of earth. Also, matter does not have being except through form, and therefore the being of matter is through form, and therefore without it it is base and indefinite: and as to this it is called an abyss, being without a base, and without the brightness of beauty, and indefinite.

§ 1. The others must be resolved by a distinction: because matter has certain things in which it agrees with place, namely because the advent of form is into it already existing, and the departure [is] from it remaining one and the same in number: just as a thing is moved to a place, and from it remaining unmoved: and as to this the properties of place are attributed to it in comparison to form. Whence also the Philosopher in Physics IV sometimes calls a vacuum that in which there is no 'this somewhat', nor corporeal substance: as some say that a vacuum is the matter of a body.

§ 2. To the next it must be said that mixture is the union of altered miscible elements, as the Philosopher says: and this belongs to the matter of the four elements: but confused things are conjoined, not removed from their forms, nor united in a middle act: and this belongs to that chaos by reason of the matter of heaven which is not the same as the matter of the four elements, according as matter is taken which is judged by its potency to motion, because there is not a single potency to place and to form: and because both were then conjoined in that first chaos, therefore he posited mixed and confused.

179. Daniel 11:37.

§ 3. The other things in this reading are evident.

DISTINCTIO XIII

Divisio Textus

§ 4. The first operation of distinction, etc. Here he begins to treat of the work of distinction and adornment. And according to this it is divided into two parts: in the first of which he posits the work of distinction. In the second he posits the work of adornment: and this begins in the Work of the fourth day, there, Dist. XV, A, It follows, God said: Let there be luminaries, etc.

§ 5. The first of these is divided into three parts: in the first of which he treats of the distinction of extreme from extreme, that is, of the luminous from the opaque: and this is the work of the first day. In the second, he treats of the distinction of the middle from the extreme which is higher: and this is the work of the second day, there, Dist. XIV, A, God also said: Let there be a firmament, etc. In the third, he treats of the distinction of the middle from the extreme which is lower, there, Dist. XIV, E, It follows, God said: Let the waters be gathered, etc., and this is the work of the third day.

§ 6. But this reading is divided into three parts: In the first of which he touches upon those things which were distinguished on the second day. In the second, however, [he treats] certain doubts concerning them, there, D, Here it must be noted that days, etc.

§ 1. In the third he posits two doubts on the part of the worker, namely how he spoke, and how the Father works [through] the Son, there, G, Furthermore it is to be investigated how, etc.

Articulus 1 — What the Work of Distinction Is; And How It Is Multiplied Through the Sixfold Number of the First Days

What is the work of distinction? And, how is it multiplied through the triad of the first days?

§ 2. A question arises concerning the work of distinction, What is it, and how is the work of distinction multiplied through the triad of the first days?

§ 3. 1. To the first thus: the Master in the preceding distinction, in the penultimate chapter, said that in six days God distinguished, and reduced into their proper forms, all things which he had made materially together: therefore distinction is every work besides creation, whether it be adornment or distinction: therefore it is not divided from the work of adornment.

§ 4. 2. Also, in the last chapter, in the word of Alcuin it is said that God works in four ways. First in the Word, disposing all things. Second in matter, creating. Third, distinguishing through forms. Fourth, propagating. And again no mention is made of adornment. Therefore it seems that adornment and distinction are not works having diversity.

180. 2 Thessalonians 2:9.

§ 5. 3. Also, every distinction is through form: and whatever is informed is distinguished in being, and adornment is nothing but the reception of form: therefore it seems that to adorn a thing is to distinguish it.

§ 6. ON THE CONTRARY: Augustine and the Master say below that certain things pertain to distinction, and not to adornment, such as the works of the first days: therefore the work of distinction is not the work of adornment.

§ 7. Further it is asked, According to what is the number of distinctions taken?

§ 8. For if distinction is taken according to the number of forms, since there are four primary qualities, and besides the properties of heaven, the distinction ought to be of a larger number. But if according to the nature of the distinguished things, since there are four elements, and in addition the fifth body, it seems that there ought to be five distinctions, and not only three.

§ 9. Solution. It must be said that, in my judgment, three things are required for the establishment of nature, namely the substance of principles, and their determination to forms according to which they act and are acted upon, and move and are moved: and their determination to the univocal action of this and that species. For example, nature does not act, as the Philosopher says, if there are only contraries: because there will be no common subject. But if there be a subject without contraries it will be neither active nor passive: because as the Philosopher says, fire and air and earth do not act except according as they are contraries.

§ 10. Also, if there be a subject, and contraries, and also the places of contraries, because contraries cannot be together, and there be no mover to a determined species univocally and universally, nature will not be complete: since then there will be nothing but the mixture of contraries, and a man will not be generated, nor a horse, and the like. Therefore there must be a third thing which acts toward a determined work in species universally, such as the stars: and which acts toward the same work univocally, such as a man generating, and an ass, and an ox, and the like: and therefore Damascene says that the first hypostases of any animals whatsoever were created.

§ 11. I say therefore that the substance of principles is given through the work of creation, which presupposes nothing to itself according to the intellect. But distinction towards universally acting and moving forms toward mixture-

§ 1. [mixture], which is required in all generation, is had through the work of distinction: and the determination of motion to a species, whether it move universally, as the stars: or univocally, as a generator that sheds seed, is had through the work of adornment: and through this also the sufficiency of the works is evident. Now this is drawn from a certain word of Augustine, who seems to say that the work of the first six days is to establish and institute nature: and I will adduce his authority below in this distinction.

§ 2. To the first three objections, therefore, it must be said that distinction is spoken of in two ways, namely broadly, and strictly. Broadly it is the distinction of matter through any

specific form whatsoever: and in this way it comprehends under itself the work of adornment. In another way distinction through form is called an inclination to a place in which there is a universal mover, or an agent, or a patient, just as the Philosopher says, higher things moving and lower things moved, and higher things acting and lower things acted upon: and thus it does not comprehend the work of adornment. It must be known, however, that Alcuin needs a pious interpreter: because the Father does not properly work in the Word: because to generate is not to work: whence he spoke improperly.

§ 3. To that which is further asked concerning the number of distinctions, it must be said that, as was determined above, prime matter is not called merely a mixed thing, but also confused: because the matter of the fifth body is not mixed with the elements: and therefore the distinction of the parts of that matter cannot be multiplied through the properties which are found in the elements alone: but there are certain common properties in the elements and the fifth body, and according to them it is taken. Therefore there is the luminous per se, and the opaque per se: and the moving per se, and the moved per se: and the moving, and the luminous from another. Therefore what is moving and luminous per se, is by nature the higher extreme: and their distinction from each other is the work of the first day, as will be shown below: because I think the light which is distinguished from darkness to be nothing other than the nature of the luminous moving [body] from the nature of the opaque moved [body], that is, the nature of the fifth body from the nature of earth: this therefore makes one distinction. But the middle has a distinction with respect to both of the extremes: for according as it agrees with the luminous moving [body], because it is itself a transparent moving [body], it is necessary to distinguish it from the higher extreme: and this is done on the second day, when the waters which are under the firmament are distinguished from those which are above the firmament: and this will be evident in the distinction of the following reading. Also, it agrees with the opaque, because it can also become a dark moved [body]: and therefore it needs a third distinction which is made on the third day, when the waters which are under heaven are gathered into one place, and the dry land appears: for in the distinction of water, as the Saints say, the other elements are understood to be distinguished, such as air and fire. And through this the solution to the whole is evident.

Articulus 2 — Whether That Light of Which It Is Said, And He Divided the Light from the Darkness, Was a Bright Cloud, or a Body, or the Form of a Body

Whether that light of which it is said, And he divided the light from the darkness, was a lucid little cloud, or a body, or the form of a body?

§ 4. Next it is asked concerning this which he says, there, B, If it is asked, What kind of light that was, etc.

§ 5. For it is asked here concerning the light. For what the Master says does not seem true, that it was a lucid little cloud: since vapor is twofold, as Aristotle says, namely of earth or of

182. Luke 22:43.

water, and every cloud is from vapor: but from earth and water nothing is made luminous per se: therefore neither was that light a little cloud, as the Master seems to say.

§ 6. Further it is asked, whether that light was or is a body, or the form of a body?

§ 7. But it seems that it is the form of a body: because 1. Aristotle says in De Anima II: 'Light is neither fire, nor altogether a body, nor an emanation of a body; for it would be some body, and thus it would be fire, or the presence of something of this sort in the lucid; for it is not possible for two bodies to be in the same place.'

§ 8. 2. Also, in the same place, 'But light seems to be contrary to darkness: darkness is the privation of this habit from the lucid': but a habit is not a body: therefore neither is light.

§ 9. 3. Also, the Commentator in the same place above, 'From this it is evident that light is the habit of the diaphanous, and not a body.'

§ 10. 4. Also, in the book On Sight and the Nature of the Eye the Philosopher says, 'Light is not a body, but an accident of air.'

§ 11. 5. Also, in the same place, 'Light is not a body, but an affection of a body.'

§ 12. 6. Also, Avicenna in the sixth book of his Naturalia (Sufficientia), in the chapter on sight: 'Light is an affection of a body having light, when it is opposed to it directly without the interposition of an opaque body.'

§ 13. 7. Also, in the same place, 'Light is a quality which is the perfection of a translucent body according as it is translucent.'

§ 14. 8. Also, in the same place, 'Light is a quality which a translucent body borrows from a lucid body, and the translucent body is made by it actually translucent.'

§ 15. To the contrary: 1. There seem to be certain words of Augustine. For he says to Volusianus thus, 'This is the sense of men who are able to think of nothing but bodies: whether these'

§ 1. 'thicker ones, such as moisture and soil: or more subtle ones, such as of air and light.'

§ 2. 2. Also, in the same place, 'Two liquids are mixed, so that neither preserves its integrity, although in the bodies themselves light is mixed uncorrupted.'

§ 3. 3. Also, in book III of De Libero Arbitrio: 'in bodies light holds the first place.'

§ 4. 4. Also, in book VII On Genesis: 'How is the soul something of that genus (of bodies), since the highest of that same genus is nothing but light.'

§ 5. 5. Also, in the same place, 'The soul administers the matter of its thicker body, that is, a certain moist earth, which is turned into the quality of flesh, through a more subtle nature of body, that is, through light and air.'

§ 6. 6. To this same point some object thus: Because light in the air is either per se or per accidens. If it is per accidens: therefore it is in it through another which is its first subject, since

183. Matthew 4:11.

everything per accidens is reduced to what is per se, as they say: but it will not be possible to find a mediating thing through which it is in the air: therefore it is in it per se. If it is an accident: therefore it is demonstrable of air through the form of air: and this is not true: therefore it is not an accident of air: therefore it is a body.

§ 7. 7. Also, either the same light is in the East and the West: or another generated by it. If the same: this does not seem possible to be, that the same thing be in different subjects and places, since an accident does not exceed its proper subject. But if another generated by it: therefore an accident in one subject generates a likeness to itself in another subject: therefore it touches another subject: therefore it exceeds its own.

§ 8. 8. Also, nothing reflects light except an opaque body: let us suppose, therefore, that there is a vacuum between heaven and earth: therefore light will pass through that vacuum and fill it: if therefore it were an accident, it would be necessary that it be in that vacuum without a subject, which cannot be: therefore it is a body.

§ 9. 9. Also, two accidents of the same species are not in the same subject: but two lights of the same species are unconfused in the same subject: therefore light is not an accident. Proof. The first premise is evident per se. The second is evident from Dionysius and experience: because when two candles are lit, light is multiplied from both, and when one is extinguished, it is diminished.

§ 10. These are the arguments, some of which seem to them insoluble. But we have already disputed in our treatise On the Soul, introducing all the opinions on this matter: and also whether sight occurs by emitting outward, or only by receiving inward? And there are posited very many arguments of Aristotle and Avicenna and Jacob Alkindi and the perspectivists, and Gregory of Nyssa: and therefore we will not labor further here: since here principles have been laid down by which the statements of Aristotle and Avicenna and the natural philosophers may be resolved, and it has been shown that certain false things were supposed by the perspectivists, which being changed and others posited, all the conclusions of the book of Perspectives, and On Sight, and on the fallacy of sight are maintained, without contradicting Aristotle in anything, by saying that light is an accidental form.

§ 11. To that which is objected through the first authority of Augustine, it must be said that if there is force in the words of Augustine, then from the same authority it follows that moisture is a body, which nevertheless names a quality of water. But it is clear that it shines by a received property of a body through which the body is understood: whence those words compel nothing.

§ 12. Also, the same mode of solving applies to the other things he says: for because light is a positional form in a body: therefore we imagine a body and the quantity of a body through it: and this occurs to carnal men wishing to imagine something noble: because among bodies

none are found more noble than those which are luminous. Whence it must be known that Augustine is to be believed more than the Philosophers in those things which are of faith and

173. Matt. 19:14; Matt. 18:10.

morals, if they disagree. But if he were to speak about medicine, I would believe Galen or Hippocrates more; and if he speaks about the natures of things, I believe Aristotle more, or another expert in the natures of things.

§ 2. To that which is objected by argument, it must be said that that argument is sophistical, and this is certain among those who expound the art of the Posterior Analytics. But an accident is twofold, namely of the individual, and it happens to be present: and nothing is demonstrated of it, nor can it be demonstrated of anything: and this is light in the air. There is also an accident of the species: and this can be present per se, or be present through another: and if it is present through another, it is reducible to what is per se: just as having three angles equal to two right angles is per se in a rectilinear triangle, [but] per accidens, that is, through another, in a triangle accepted absolutely, and per accidens also in an isosceles: otherwise the redness of that woman in her cheek would have to be reduced to something per se, and this is frivolous. Whence it is clear that that argument compels nothing.

§ 3. To the next it must be said that light is a form of the air, which always comes to be when the illuminating [body] is present, and multiplies itself in the medium, and alters it when there is no direct opposition to the primary illuminating [body]: as is evident in a ray passing through a window: for from the base of the wall inside the house a straight line cannot be drawn to the sun, and yet the air is illuminated by a large ray entering through the window, and this is on account of the alteration of the neighboring air: but it is multiplied through reflection against a solid body, especially if it is polished on a flat surface: but its generation per se is from the opposition of the illuminating [body]. Whence simultaneously and at once it is generated in the East and the West, and in every part of the diaphanous from which a straight line can be drawn to the sun, and to the illuminating [body] which is its proper generating [cause]: and therefore the Commentator says on Physics IV, that illumination is the end of local motion

§ 4. just as generation is the end of alteration: and therefore both happen suddenly: because the end of motion is indivisible: but that motion is the ascent of the sun above the horizon according to circles of altitude: because according to them the declination of the ascent of horizons in which light is generated varies: and this form is always finding the diaphanous in the ultimate disposition of its susceptibility, and demanding nothing for its generation except the presence of the illuminating [body]. And all these things have been proven elsewhere: and the whole philosophy of the Arabs bears witness to these.

§ 5. To the next it must be said that if a vacuum were posited between heaven and earth, there will be no diffusion of light there, as Aristotle expressly implies, contradicting him who said that, positing a vacuum, an ant could be seen if it moved in heaven. And Aristotle says that, positing a vacuum, nothing would be seen at all: and that argument proceeds from a false supposition.

§ 6. To the next it must be said that that is invalid: because every cause generating a certain quality, when it itself is multiplied, intensifies it: and when it is diminished, remits it: and

184. Ecclesiasticus 18:1.

therefore there is one light in the air from two candles, but more intense than when there is only one.

§ 7. But to what could be objected against me here by someone from the Author of perspective, which is of little reputation among us, I say that insofar as what is there is about natures, he is not to be believed against the Natural philosophers: for he has no business speaking about this, whether a ray or light is a body or not, as Avaricus says in his commentary on the geometry of Euclid: and therefore he acted foolishly by inserting such things into his book. Furthermore, we are not lacking the perspectives of other Philosophers: such as of Aristotle and others who posit entirely different principles.

§ 8. But what some object, that if the ray were mixed, all things would seem to be thoroughly mixed: but it would be thoroughly mixed if light were a quality: therefore all things ought to be seen thoroughly mixed: is invalid: because even if we posit that we see by inward reception,

we do not posit that colors are mixed according to the being which they have in the air: because things whose being is always in a state of becoming, are not distracted by the motion of the subject, but rather they are always becoming according to direct opposition: and this is especially the case in light and colors, as the Commentator says on the books De Anima: because they are in the medium more according to a spiritual being than other sensibles: and this is so because they are in act from the generation of light which is according to nature in the diaphanous prior to the hot and cold, and the moist and dry: because it is in it according as it agrees with the perpetual higher body: but other sensibles do not have the same generating [cause].

§ 2. But to what is first objected concerning the little cloud, it must be said that the Saints spoke by similitude: because a thin cloud elevated on high, touched by the light of the sun, receives brightness: thus that first created light did not have so great a brilliance, as is said in the Letter [Lombard's text], as the sun: and therefore it is likened to a lucid cloud, and through this similitude is called a little cloud: whence also it is said afterwards that the sun was made from it.

§ 3. But nevertheless it must be known that there are three opinions concerning that little cloud. One is that it passed into the sun: and this is true for the greatest part. Another is that it is around the sun: and this is not probable: because since the sun does not stick to the same parts of the circle, when the sun would have a distance beyond thirty degrees, it could be seen at sunrise and sunset. The third opinion is: and this I think to be truest, supposing that not all things were created together, that that little cloud was not one, but rather many; because the light which is gathered in all the stars, was then dispersed in different parts of the matter of heaven, as we see in the galaxy: and afterwards it was conglobated in the stars.

185. Genesis 2:4-5.

Articulus 3 — Whether the Six Days in Which All Things Are Said to Have Been Distinguished and Adorned Are Called Six in Several Ways

Whether the six days in which all things are said to be distinguished, and adorned, are called six in multiple ways?

§ 4. Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, D, Here it must be noted that days in different ways, etc.

§ 5. For here it seems that day is not spoken of in different ways: because even in the first three days each day had a span of twenty-four hours: therefore it is spoken of in the same way before and after.

§ 6. Furthermore it is asked concerning that order of day and night, which the Master touches upon in the following chapter.

§ 7. 1. For he touches upon three orders, namely of the night following upon the preceding day, so that the day begins from morning and terminates in the morning, and of the preceding night with the following day, and the computation is made from evening to evening [and] of the third preceding night to the following day; what is the reason for this?

§ 8. 2. Furthermore, in fastings the Church does not seem to observe this: because she does not fast the preceding night, but the following: and thus her work seems to tend from light into darkness.

§ 9. Solution. To the first it must be said that day, as regards the efficient cause, is diversified in the first days and in the following ones: because in the first three days the efficient cause was one or several lights rotated around in the beginning: but in the following three it was the sun.

§ 10. Also, if it is taken in the span of a circuit according to time, it is still spoken of equivocally: because when light was made, one revolution of one or several lights was called a day: but after the sun was made, the revolution of the sun is not called a day, but rather the revolution of the equinoctial [equator] with as much of an arc of the same equinoctial as rises with as much a part of the ecliptic as the sun traverses by its proper or natural motion in the span of one revolution of the equinoctial: therefore it is evident that the span is not spoken of in the same way.

§ 11. Also, for another reason I think the Master distinguishes between those days and the following ones: because the motion of that light was not in a determined circle and therefore had only one revolution of twenty-four equal hours: but the sun makes one natural day unequal to another; because that part of the ecliptic which it describes in the span of one revolution, existing equal, rises in unequal times, and with unequal arcs of the equinoctial: which happens for two reasons, namely on account of the obliquity of the zodiac from the equinoctial circle: and on account of the obliquity of horizons from the circle of signs. Therefore the first three natural days were equal: but the following were unequal: and this is the cause of the distinction.

186. Job 40:10.

§ 1. To the next it must be said that the Master renders a sufficiently fitting reason for those orders: because the work of the first six days is of God who has nothing of darkness admixed: and for this reason it was to be terminated from light to light: and this is also the reason why in the works of the six days mention is nowhere made of night. But afterwards we fell from light into sin: and therefore it happened to us that day was converted into night, and the preceding day would be finished in the following night: so that the preceding night is computed as the beginning, and the beginning of the following night as the end.

§ 2. But after Christ rose in the dawn, we keep the feast as if from midday of the preceding day even to midday of the following: and we add that part on account of veneration: and this especially accords with the prophecy concerning the Savior which says, His going out is from the highest heaven, and his course even to the highest thereof because the Astronomers call the highest of heaven the middle of heaven [midheaven].

§ 3. But to what is objected concerning the fast of the Church, it must be said that fasting is satisfactory for sin: and therefore it corresponds to the order of sin, and not to the order of grace.

Articulus 4 — Whether God Created The World From Eternity, Since He Begot The Son From Eternity

Whether God created the world from eternity, since he generated the Son from eternity? And, why is it not conceded, the Father is through the Son?

§ 4. Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, G, Furthermore it is to be investigated, etc.

§ 5. It is asked, I say, How did he speak, that is, generate the Word?

§ 6. For since he generated thus from eternity, it seems that he created the world from eternity.

§ 7. Also, if it is conceded that the Father works through the Son: why is it not conceded that he is through the Son, and is wise or knows through the Son?

§ 8. Because very many things have been disputed concerning this in the first book of the Sentences, let these suffice.

§ 9. Therefore it must be said to the first that it does not follow: because the generation of the Word is according as he is the Son: and therefore the creature cannot be produced with the Son from eternity: but from eternity he generated the Word in whom it was that it should be made, that is, in whom was the reason of every creature from eternity, by which rea-

it would be made in time, whenever He wished, and just as God wished.

§ 1. To the other it must be said, that the supposit of the verb gives person to the verb: and that person is related in different ways to the nature of the verb, and to the determination of the verb: because when it posits a subject for the verb, the verb does not signify something

181. Psalm 90:11 (Vulgate).

whose principle is the person, but rather it signifies that which the person is: and the determination of the verb will denote the cause and principle of that essence. Hence if it were said, 'The Father is through the Son', it would be understood that the Son is the principle of the Father so that He might be, which cannot be. Similarly when it is said, 'knows', or 'is wise': although it is in the active voice, nevertheless in signification it is passive: because it signifies to receive or to have, and therefore again the determination would signify the principle of something that would be in the Father; and this cannot be: for the whole is the converse: because the Father is the principle of the Son: and all that are in the Son, He has from the Father: but with verbs signifying a work that is from the Father, the principle and cause of that work is posited there in the supposit of the verb: because the supposit is that from which the act and work proceed: and therefore the determination then cannot denote the principle: but it will denote in its oblique case a cause existing as if from another, which is called by the Masters a mediate cause: and therefore this is accepted, 'The Father operates through the Son', and not this, 'The Father is or knows through the Son'. And in this sense the Master expounds it.

DISTINCTIO XIV

Divisio Textus

§ 1. And God said: Let there be a firmament, etc. Here is posited the work of the second day, in which the intermediate nature is distinguished from the higher extreme. And concerning this work the Master raises five questions: of which the first is concerning the waters above the firmament. The second, concerning the nature of heaven, there, B, But certain people [say] heaven, etc. The third, concerning the shape of heaven, there, C, It is also customarily asked, etc. The fourth, concerning the motion of heaven, there, in the middle of cap. C, It is also asked, if it stands, etc. The fifth, why the work of this day lacks a blessing, there, D, After this it is customarily asked, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether the Waters Are Above the Heaven or the Firmament

Whether waters are above heaven, or the firmament?

§ 1. Concerning this question we shall ask three things, namely: Are waters above heaven or the firmament? Second, According to what properties are they transferred [metaphorically]? Third, Whether that aqueous heaven has any motion, or not, and what is that motion?

§ 2. To the first one proceeds thus: It seems moreover, that waters are above heaven: because 1. Scripture says this here, which it is not permitted to contradict: because Augustine says, treating the same question, that greater is the authority of this scripture, than all the perspicacity of human ingenuity. 2. Likewise, In the hymn of the three children, Bless the Lord, all waters that are above the heavens. And, Ps. 148:4, Let all the waters that are above the heavens praise the name of the Lord. 3. Likewise, Basil says, that waters are there literally to restrain the

malice of Saturn: and certain people strive to prove this: because by as much as a circle is larger, by so much more swiftly it is moved in the diurnal motion: but Saturn has the largest circle among the planets: therefore it moves most swiftly: but from motion there is heat: therefore it ought to be of maximum heat according to nature: and yet it is of maximum frigidity: therefore it seems, that this is on account of the waters which are nearer to it. 4. Likewise, Bede says that dew descends from those waters: therefore it seems, that there are not only waters there, but also resolvable ones descending to us. 5. Likewise, in the lesser world we see the cold-humid posited above the hot and the fount of heat, just as the brain above the heart: therefore since it is an exemplar of the greater world, it seems a similar thing ought to be in the greater world: therefore the cold-humid ought to be above the fount of heat which is the sun: therefore it ought to be above the heavens. 6. Likewise, the Philosophers of Egypt said, that the retrogradation of the planets is caused by vapor elevated from the Ocean, which is attracted by the planets: and after the humor is attracted they are weighed down, and by descending they recede backward: therefore if the humor of the Ocean ascends all the way there, also in the beginning of the world waters could be suspended there in vaporizable drops. 7. Likewise, Augustine in book II On Genesis says against the Philosophers, that if every body is divisible to infinity, and water is divided by rarefaction, such that it ascends to the middle interstice of the air, more divided it will ascend higher: therefore it can be divided so much, that it remains there and is diffused above the heavens: therefore also in the first

condition of the world it could be suspended there.

§ 3. To this also can be adduced many authorities of the Saints: because they are found copiously.

§ 4. BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. According to nature, there is one place and one nature for what is movable circularly, and another for what is movable by a straight motion: water is movable by a straight motion, whereas heaven circularly: therefore they must be ordered by distinction in one place and in another place. If therefore heaven is ordered upwards towards the empyrean, water must be ordered downwards. 2. Likewise, the heavy is not above the light: but water is heavy: therefore it is not above fire: therefore much less above heaven. 3. Likewise, the corruptible by nature is not above the incorruptible: but water is corruptible by nature: therefore it is not to be ordered by determination to a place above heaven which is incorruptible by nature. 4. Likewise, the boundless by its own boundary, is not contained in a place, unless determined to the boundable by its own boundary: but the boundable by its own boundary is the dry, and the boundless by its own boundary is the humid: therefore the humid must be located next to the dry: therefore not above heaven: because heaven is not dry. 5. Likewise, As the spiritual humid is related to the spiritual dry, so the corporeal humid to the corporeal dry: but the spiritual humid which is air, is ordered next to the spiritual dry, that is, next to fire: therefore the commiscible corporeal humid which is water, will be ordered next to the commiscible corporeal dry, which is earth: therefore not above the heavens. 6. Likewise, the Philosopher says, that the nature of a clod, and of the whole earth is the same: and the motion of a clod, and of the whole earth is the same: and the place of a clod, and of the whole earth is the same: therefore it is similar in water: therefore if the natural place of water is here

next to the earth, the natural place of all water will be the same, and the natural motion to that place: therefore that which is above the heavens, if it is univocal to this water, is contained there violently, and upon the cessation of violence it descends to the place of this one. If you say, that the reason of nature is not to be sought here, but the power of a miracle, because God does whatever He wishes: this is absurd: because Augustine treating the same question in book II On Genesis, adduces the same response, and says thus: Nor let anyone say that this is done by the omnipotence of God. For it is asked how God made the natures of things, not what He may operate concerning them through a miracle of His power! 7. Furthermore, This which Basil says that they are there to restrain the malice of Saturn, seems to be false: because certain fixed stars in the firmament are most hot: yet they are more immediately conjoined to the waters than Saturn is. 8. Furthermore, If heaven is igneous, as some say, and fire especially in its own place has heat in the highest degree, and heat is consumptive of the contrary element: it seems, that of necessity such waters are consumed. If you say, that they persevere there with glacial solidity, like crystal: this again seems false, because although crystal is indissoluble, as the Philosopher seems to intend: nevertheless it is not inconsumptible by fire, whence it still follows, that it would be consumed by fire. 9. Furthermore, Demonstrations are had concerning this that vapors can ascend, and no further than into the region where they are consumed by heat: therefore it seems, that it is nothing, that there are waters there according to the letter. 10. Furthermore, What compels us to posit the element water there, since in all places above water is posited for prime matter, and not for the element? 11. Likewise, the Master said above, as it seems to some, that beyond the place of the firmament that mass was extended, which in

its lower part was thicker and grosser, but in its higher part existed as rarer and lighter and more subtle, of which rarer substance certain people think were the waters which are said to be above the firmament: therefore there is already an ancient opinion, that the element water is not there, but rather a rarer, lighter, and more subtle part of prime matter.

§ 5. SOLUTION. Without prejudice, that way pleases me more, that the element water is not there, but rather a part of prime matter, which is called water: and to understand this, it must be known that when the distinction of confused matter had to be made from the higher and the lower, and of the middle from both, it could not be made through active and passive elemental qualities: because according to those, matter belongs only to the elements, as was shown above, and there is not one matter of the whole confusion: nor could it be made according to the nature of heaven alone, because thus again there would be no agreement with the elements: but it is necessary that it be distinguished according to that which agrees with both: and this is the perspicuous and luminous in itself, or by accident: and thus on the first day the luminous nature which is heaven, was distinguished from darkness, that is, the opaque nature which is the earth, and according to the opinion of Augustine, who says that all things were made simultaneously, heaven is called day by cause, and the earth night by cause. But on the second day, the nature of the middle elements between heaven and earth, and the higher nature of heaven has a distinction, and on account of its receptibility of form and mobility to a place determined by the Creator it is called water: hence the waters which are above heaven, is the crystalline heaven, which is called thus not from the nature of crystal, but

from similarity, and is called vaporizable water, because as the Philosophers say, it is of such subtlety, that it is not even subjected to sight, but is comprehended by reason alone: and this will be proved below: and this exposition pleases me, on account of what Augustine says, that the beginning of Genesis is to be expounded thus, so that it may not be mocked and cast away by the Philosophers.

§ 6. But according to what properties water is there, will be clear in the following article.

§ 7. To the first therefore it must be said, that the authority of sacred Scripture is not contradicted, when it is expounded, otherwise even Augustine himself would contradict it, who found many senses of how waters could be there: one of which is, that this air is there called heaven, above whose middle zone they are suspended vaporizably. He gives another in the book of Confessions, saying that the waters which are above the heavens, are incorruptible and immortal: and this understanding which we follow here, is also that of the ancients, as is evident from the sayings above.

§ 8. To the two following authorities, it must be said that he does not speak of the element, but rather of those things concerning which it has been spoken.

§ 9. To that which is of Basil, it must be said, that he speaks from the hypothesis of certain Philosophers, who said that literally waters descend there vaporizably, and cool certain stars, and that certain others are kindled on account of the dryness of having drunk less humor: and if such a thing happens to be done, it follows that it is not unfitting, if water was above the heavens for this same purpose.

§ 10. To the saying of Bede it must be said, that he calls heaven there the middle interstice of this air, concerning which it is said, The birds of heaven ate them.

§ 11. The fifth argument is solved in the solution of the first argument.

§ 12. To the other it must be said, that those Philosophers plainly lied. But if it is objected, that also Ptolemy seems to feel this in the [Tetrabiblos]: it must be said, that he himself does not feel this except according to the effect only: nevertheless Albumasar reproves him concerning this, saying that on account of that he was not the great Ptolemy who made the Almagest: but nevertheless I do not care much about their sayings, since certain of them have lied about many other things.

§ 13. To the saying of Augustine it must be said, that

he himself speaks, founding a reason against them upon the hypothesis of the Philosophers, just as Basil also does: because if their position is true, it follows that there is nothing unfitting for waters to be above the heavens.

Articulus 2 — It Is Asked According to What Property the Waters Are Above the Heaven or the Firmament

It is asked according to what property waters are above heaven or the firmament?

§ 1. Secondly it is asked, According to what properties are there waters there?

§ 2. For waters have a perspicuous [nature] receiving and holding light more than air, as the Philosopher says, and they have a fluxible humid miscible with earth, and a heavy descending downwards: but it is fitting, that according to the heavy they are not determined to this that they be above the heavens: because since the first distinction is, as Augustine says, to the natural place of each thing, it cannot be that that place is the natural place of water insofar as it is heavy: similarly neither insofar as it is commiscible with earth, because the nature of heaven is not commiscible with the elements, for otherwise it would be generated and corrupted circularly: therefore it is necessary, that it be determined upwards as to the perspicuous holding light.

§ 3. Likewise, This seems to consent to nature, that the perspicuous is in a body, as the Philosopher says, insofar as it agrees with the perpetual body above: therefore especially the perspicuous holding light, which the perspicuous of air or of fire does not do, but rather of water. Moreover, the proof of this is not only through the saying of the Philosopher: but that fire is not shining in its own sphere, except in opposition to some illuminating celestial body, Alexander the Philosopher proves by one natural reason, and another demonstrative. The natural one is this: because the rare in ultimate rarity does not shine: but fire in its own sphere, is rare in the ultimate of rarity: therefore it does not shine. The sign of this is, that fire in wood, or in oil next to a lamp where it is hotter, does not shine, but is perspicuous, and does not cover there that which is behind it: but posteriorly where it is condensed by the frigidity of the circumstanding air, it shines, and there it covers bodies which are behind it: as he himself and Avicenna say is the proper characteristic of every shining body. But the demonstrative one leading to the impossible is thus. Let it be given, that fire shines in its own sphere: therefore it illuminates the shadow which is from the interposition of the earth to the sun through all parts in circuit: therefore after the fire there would be nothing of the shadow of the earth: which is false, since it is extended all the way to the sphere of Mercury. Likewise, since the moon is after the fire, it would follow that the moon would never be eclipsed, which is after the fire: therefore fire does not hold light except in opposition to an illuminating [body]. But that air does not hold it, this is evident to sense. But that water holds it, is proved in the book On Vision through a supposition: because with some metal or white stone posited in the bottom of a vessel, and in darkness clear water poured over it, it will be seen under the light held by the water: and thus also rubies are tested which do not shine by themselves in darkness, for in water they immediately begin to shine: but this cannot be unless some light retained in the water resolves the color of the ruby, and in act makes it shine and immutate the sight.

§ 4. But against this it seems to be, that 1. Fire on account of the rarity of its substance does not shine in its own sphere, since aether is incomparably rarer than fire, aether also ought not to shine. 2. Likewise, Since the ninth heaven which is called crystalline, is more mobile than that of the stars or of the planets and more subtle, it ought not to shine: therefore it is badly said that water is transferred there according to the property of the perspicuous holding light.

§ 5. Likewise, What is the necessity of positing that aqueous heaven? For it is certain, that it is not subjected to sight, as Alpetragius says: how then

is it apprehended to be? For we cannot collect the number of movables in the heavens except through instruments and sight: therefore where sight fails, there no movable will be posited. If you say, that only the Saints posited it, and not the Philosophers: this is nothing: because even Damascene says, that the Philosophers apprehended this heaven: and upon this the Astronomy of Alpetragius is adduced who objects thus: From one simple immobile immediate motor by nature there can be only one motion: the first movable is immediate to the first motor: therefore in it from the first motor there is only one motion: but the sphere of the fixed stars has two motions: therefore it is not the first movable. But that there are two motions in the sphere of the fixed stars, is evident, because in it is the diurnal motion, and furthermore there is there the motion of the stars upon the poles of the circle of signs according to Ptolemy and Aristotle in the book On the Causes of the Properties of the Elements, by one degree in a hundred years, and according to al-Battani in a somewhat lesser time, and according to Thabit according to the access and recess of the head of Aries and Libra: therefore it is necessary to posit another first movable before that one: for just as the Philosopher says, the first cause moves the first caused thing, and the first motor whoever he is, is only one: therefore it is necessary to posit a ninth heaven to which the diurnal motion is referred, which revolves upon circles equally distant from the equinoctial, and upon the poles of the equinoctial.

§ 6. SOLUTION. It seems to me it must be conceded, that water above the heavens is transferred [metaphorically] according to the perspicuous retaining light.

§ 7. But to that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that to have light is spoken of in two ways, namely as to hold inseparably the nature of light, and in this way the empyrean and the ninth heaven are luminous: and as to shine, and this does not happen except in parts more condensed and compacted, as Avicenna says in the book On the Sufficiency of Heaven and Earth.

§ 8. To that which is asked, what necessity there is that that body be posited? It must be said, that although it cannot be apprehended by sight, nevertheless it is convinced to be by reason, which reason Alpetragius explains: although he also speaks of two heavens, to one of which the diurnal motion is referred, and to the other the motion of the oblique circle: and according to the commentary of Nicholas upon the same place, he does not understand this of the circle of signs, but rather of the eighth heaven, and the first of the ninth.

Articulus 3 — Whether the Crystalline Heaven Has Any Motion, and What That Motion Is; And How Right and Left Are Understood

Whether the crystalline heaven has any motion, and what is that motion? and, How are right and left accepted?

§ 1. Thirdly it is asked concerning this body by the Masters of theology, Whether it is moved or not?

§ 2. It seems moreover, that it is not moved: because 1. It itself is uniform: therefore there is not something whence motion begins: but that in which there is not whence motion begins, that is immobile: therefore it seems to be immobile. 2. If you say, that circular motion is

without beginning, and without end, just as a circle. Against this is, what the Philosopher says in II On Heaven and Earth thus: There is to an orb without doubt a diverse power, namely a right, and a left: since there are to it places of inception and standing from the work of its making. Therefore it is evident that if there is not whence motion begins from the work of its making, it will not be moved. Likewise, the Philosopher, in the same place, And again it is necessary that we estimate this in the principle of motion of an orb: for if its motion is finite in time (but its motion is infinite) it is necessarily required that of its motion

there be a place where it begins: therefore since any one circulation is finite, it is necessarily required that it begin somewhere: but what is uniform on all sides, is in one ratio: therefore either it begins everywhere, or nowhere: but it is certain, that not everywhere, since this is impossible: therefore nowhere: therefore it is not moved, just as neither is the empyrean.

§ 3. ON THE CONTRARY are the reasons previously adduced.

§ 4. SOLUTION. All say, that that heaven is moved, and that it is uniform in a certain way, and not uniform in another way: uniform as to this because everywhere it is of the nature of light, but it is not uniform as to this because in one part it is more noble than in another, and there the power of the motor abides in it abundantly, and there is the place whence motion is made, and the opposite is the place of return. But what is right and left in heaven, and whether they are accepted in position only (as the Astronomers say) or in the nature of the body, is a matter of another business. Nevertheless on account of some demanding it, it must be known briefly, that if the cause of the motion of heaven and of its mobility is considered, it is necessary to give to it a right and a left in its own nature: and then the East or right will not be called [that] under which the sun rises, because under every degree of the oblique circle the sun rises: but the more noble part of heaven will be called [so], and concerning this the Masters of the Latins have said many abusive things. But the opinion of the Arabs is twofold, namely that either according to the number of movables in one circle there will be many motors: and then the motor influxes motion into the more noble place of that movable, as to the circle of signs in the head of Aries and Libra, and to the first movable in the more noble place equally distant from both poles, and to other orbs otherwise and otherwise many. Or one motor or star influxes diverse motions into the parts of the movable: and then the right or East will be the place of the star: and according to this we find Rabbi Moses [Maimonides] saying, that in the starry sphere there are many motors, and in the others one. But if we consider the effect of the stars according to relation to us, then the right of heaven will be twofold, and in the same way the left, and it will be according to immobile position only: and again the right aspect is from the East into the middle of heaven, and the left from the middle of heaven into the angle of the West, and again the right from the angle of the West into the angle of the middle of the earth beneath: therefore because with respect to opposition that quarter relates to that which is from the East into the middle of heaven, and each is looked back upon by the other and their powers are communicated: and the second left aspect is from the angle of the middle of the earth into the Eastern sign for the same cause, because through opposition the powers of the first left quarter are communicated to it: and in this way the Philosopher seems to intend in II On Heaven and Earth, and the Commentator upon the same:

because the letter says thus: From those things which we ought to estimate, is a man having a right and a left alike in figure: then he has above himself an orb. And the Commentator says, that one ought to imagine, that his head is in the higher antarctic pole hidden to us, and his feet in the arctic pole manifest to us; and his face turned to our hemisphere. For then above the right will be the first quarter ascending, and above the left descending to the West: and if he is revolved once, then above the right will be the quarter from the East into the angle of the earth, and above the left the ultimate quarter from the angle of the earth emerging into a sign above the horizon; and in this sense all Astronomers use the right and left of heaven in the division of every aspect.

Articulus 4 — Why the Heaven Is Called Fiery; And Whether It Is of the Nature of Fire

Why is heaven called igneous? and, Whether from the nature of fire?

§ 1. Next it is asked concerning the second question of the Master in the letter which he touches upon, there, But certain people [say] the heaven which exceeds the spaces of the air, etc. For that this is false, is proved through all Philosophy in the book On Heaven and Earth: 1. For it is impossible, that the motion of a body of one nature be diverse according to nature. But it is certain, that the natural motion of heaven is circular, whereas the motion of fire is upwards and straight. Therefore fire and heaven and star are not of one ratio. 2. Likewise, A body perpetually remaining according to one mode and quantity, cannot be generable and corruptible in its parts: a star and the orbs of the heavens from the beginning persevere according to one motion: therefore they are not generable and corruptible by nature: but fire by nature is a generable and corruptible body: therefore those bodies are not of fire. 3. If you say, that God contains them: this is nothing: because, as Augustine says, in the first works it is asked, In what

natures did God constitute the parts of the world, not what He may operate from them or in them through the power of a miracle? 4. Likewise, This does not seem to concord with the sayings of Rabanus, who in his book upon Genesis, posits a division of the heavens saying, that there are seven heavens, namely empyrean, aqueous, firmament, igneous, olympum, aethereal, aerial: therefore it seems, that the aqueous and the firmament are of another nature, than the igneous.

§ 2. Furthermore concerning this same division it is asked, Whether it is given according to something common to every heaven? 1. For heaven, as Damascene says, is the continent of visible and invisible creatures. But it is certain, that this does not apply to every heaven. Therefore by this heaven cannot be divided as commonly said. 2. Furthermore, the Philosopher says, that aether is not named except as a celestial body: therefore aethereal does not express anything but a diverse matter from the firmament and the empyrean. 3. Likewise, whence is Olympum said? For it cannot be said from mount Olympus. According to what therefore is this number of heavens taken?

§ 3. Solution. It must be said to the first thing asked, that heaven is not called igneous from the nature of fire: but because it is similar to fire in the nature of light and of shining in the

stars: and in this way the Saints speak: and through this the solution of those things which are objected is evident.

§ 4. To the division of Rabanus it must be said, that he himself takes heaven commonly according as it contains and has a perspicuous [nature] susceptive of light: and he does not take it according as it contains all things, but according to containing alone: and therefore the division of Rabanus is accepted thus, that heaven either contains having light inseparably, or separably. But if it contains and has light inseparably: either therefore it has it from itself as the first cause of light, or it has it from another. If from itself: either moved, or not moved. And according to these combinations of dividing parts the whole number of the heavens is accepted. For if it contains unmoving having from itself a luminous nature inseparably, then it is the empyrean heaven. But if it contains moving having light or a luminous nature inseparably: either it has it everywhere and equally, or in some part more and in some less, because in some part according to the act of shining, in some not. If in the first way it is the crystalline or aqueous heaven. If in the second way, it is the heaven of stars, under which are comprehended the orbs of the seven planets according to Rabanus. But if it has a luminous nature from another inseparably, then this can be in two ways, namely according to the convex, or according to the concave. If according to the convex, then according to Rabanus it is called the igneous heaven. But if according to the concave, it is called Olympum: because Olympum is said here not from Olympus, but from this that Olympus is said to approach to it. But if it contains having the nature of the luminous separably: this again is according to the convex, or according to the concave, that is, according to the exterior or interior surface. If in the first way it is aethereal: because aether is taken otherwise by Rabanus, than by Aristotle, namely for the higher part of the air, which by certain Philosophers is called the region of heat: and through this the solution of the objection made to the contrary is evident. But if it is according to the concave, it is the aerial here among us.

§ 5. And if it is objected that it was proved above, that fire does not shine in its own sphere. It must be said, that nevertheless it has the nature of the luminous: because if its parts are compacted in something and thickened, they themselves will shine in it: and this air does not do, and water: but nevertheless they make the nature of the perspicuous without light, as is evident in glass, crystal, beryl.

§ 6. And from this the solution of all the objections is evident.

Articulus 5 — Why a Spherical Figure Is Attributed to the Heaven; And Whether It Is the Figure of the Heaven

Why is a spherical shape attributed to heaven? and, Whether it is the shape of heaven?

§ 1. Next it is asked concerning the third thing which is said, there, It is also customarily asked, Of what shape is heaven?

§ 2. This seems false what the Master says, and Augustine, and Damascene, and many other Saints, who say that heaven is of a spherical form.

§ 3. It is also asked further, Why is a spherical shape attributed to heaven?

§ 4. Solution. It must be said, that Scripture did not narrate this in the Canon, although the holy Fathers wrote this.

§ 5. To the other it must be said, that a spherical figure is in a body, just as circular in a surface. But the circular and the spherical have two properties: because they are the simplest of all figures, and because they are the most capacious: and on account of the first they are given to the body surrounding the whole.

§ 6. But this is proved thus: Every figure in every division of which there never results another figure, and never the ratio of the whole of the same figure, but always the ratio of a part of that figure, is simpler than every other figure in some division of which there results another and another figure, and another ratio of the whole of the same figure which is divided. But thus is the circle related to every figure: therefore the circle is the simplest of figures. The proof of the first is: because if any of the figures is simpler than a circle, that is a triangle: because every other figure is composed of as many triangles, as it has angles. But a triangle can be divided in two ways, namely by a line drawn from side to side, and then there comes forth a quadrangle and a triangle: and by a line drawn from an angle upon the base or upon either side, and then there come forth two triangles. But in whatever way a circle is divided, either into semicircles, or into proportions, there never comes forth a circle or another figure, but always a part of a circle: therefore the circle is the simplest of figures: therefore it is to be attributed to the first body.

But that it is most capacious is thus proved: For it is not understood concerning every angular figure, because a circle of such capacity can never be given, without a mathematical figure of greater capacity being able to be inscribed in it, if it is given conversely: but it is understood concerning an angular figure inscribed in a circle, whose all angles extend to the circumference. Therefore, with this noted, if it is possible that an angular figure is of the capacity of a circle, this cannot be except due to the multiplication of angles more distant from the center than the sides make: therefore the angles grow infinitely: therefore if polygonal figures reach the capacity of the circle, then they will reach it. On the contrary: Even with infinite angles existing, it is always angular: but an angle is the alternate contact of two lines: therefore that line which touches another at an angle is the chord of some portion of the circle: therefore it does not recede from the center as much as the portion of the circumference to which it is subtended: therefore it does not reach the capacity of the circle: therefore the circle is the most capacious of figures: therefore it most fittingly pertains to the first body surrounding all.

Articulus 6 — Whether the Heaven Is Moved; And Whether the Principle of the Motion of the Heaven Is the Same According to the Philosophers and the Theologians

Whether the heaven is moved? and, Whether the principle of the motion of heaven is the same according to Philosophers and Theologians?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, § 2: It is also accustomed to be asked, If it stands, whether the heaven is moved? etc.

Concerning this which he says here, it is not necessary to dispute here. But it is to be noted, that according to Aristotle, no body is moved in its place, whose mover is not a spiritual substance: for fire is moved to a place, and other elements by those generating them per se, and they rest in their places: but heaven is moved in its place: therefore its mover is a spiritual substance.

Likewise, Avicenna objects, that nothing is moved according to nature unless to some position, and from that one motion in number; and the truth is obtained through induction: but stars are moved to any position, and from that one motion in number: therefore they are not moved by a mover who is nature alone: but by a mover who is a spiritual substance. And this seems to be what Jerome wants in the Gloss on the beginning of Ecclesiastes, on that, "The spirit goes around surveying all things." He called the sun itself a spirit, which animates, and breathes, and sees, and completes the annual orbits by its course.

Likewise, the objection of Aristotle is to this: because every mover moving a body diversified through virtues ordered to the inception of local motion in one place rather than in another, is a spiritual substance: but the mover of heaven moves a body disposed right and left, which are the virtues disposing to the inception of motion and return. And therefore all the Arab Philosophers said and proved in many ways, that heaven is moved by a soul joined to it: and this Aristotle says, and Avicenna, and Averroes, and Al, and gazelAlpharabius, and Maurus Albu, and masarRabbi Moses, and that it has a triple mover, namely the first cause which is the desired of the first intelligence which is full of forms explicable through the motion of its orb: but because intelligence is simple, therefore it cannot intend particular motion in this and that position, and therefore the third mover joined to heaven is the soul according to them, and the nature of heaven is a disposition to motion: because it is naturally carried circularly, and in the circuit the spirit goes,

in composition there is no contrariety: and therefore that motion is without labor and pain, as they say, and does not induce weariness as the motion of the soul by which it moves our body. Therefore in this all agree, and that the virtue of the first mover is in all lower things, and of the second in the lower things to it, and thus the descent. But that this whole thing is a cursed error, is clear through Damascene saying thus: No one therefore truly thinks to say, however many heavens or luminaries exist: for they are inanimate and insensible. that they are not moved except by divine command, and will: and that the reasons above mentioned do not prove, except that they are not moved by a nature which is the form of a moving body: and this also other Philosophers say like Astronomers, and Ptolemy, and Albategni, and Albumasar, and Geber, and many others.

Therefore concerning the opinion of Jerome, it is to be said, that he takes this from the opinions of Philosophers. Augustine, however, touches upon this question on Genesis, and leaves it discussed. Elsewhere also it is much disputed concerning this Matter and prolixly: and there we followed the sayings of certain Masters of theology, who wished to reduce the opinions of natural things to theology by saying that Angels serve God in the motions of the

heavens, which they are called souls by them: but nothing is said so securely, as that they are moved by the will of God alone, and their own nature not opposing the motion.

Concerning the manner also of the motion by which they are moved, there is a dispute among the wise: but this will be determined below in the adornment of the fourth day.

Articulus 7 — Why In The Work Of This Day It Is Not Said, God Saw That It Was Good

Why in the work of this day is it not said, "God saw that it was good"?

Then it is asked fifthly, there, After this it is usually asked, Why is it not said here, "God saw that it was good," as in the works of the other days?

And the Master assigns an allegorical cause for this. However, in the histories, the literal and true cause is touched upon, namely that the work of distinction of the middle nature is not completed unless the middle is distinguished from both extremes: and therefore this distinction is not completed except on the third day: and then it is blessed when the waters are distinguished, and the other two elements from the earth, as the Master will say below. Because in the distinction of the water is understood the distinction of fire and air when they are freed from the waters and are cleared: then, therefore, with the distinction perfected, they receive a blessing just as the other works.

Articulus 8 — What the Sufficiency of the Works of Distinction Is, and With Respect to What It Is Taken

What is the sufficiency of the works of distinction, and according to what is it taken?

Concerning the first, thus it is proceeded: 1. Fire and air are elements: therefore they require distinction just as water and earth: therefore the work of distinction is not sufficiently determined in three days.

1. Likewise, just as the firmament and the aqueous heaven are heavens: so also the sphere of Saturn, and Jupiter, and Mars, the Sun, and Venus, Mercury, and the Moon: therefore they require distinction just as the firmament and the aqueous: therefore the work of distinction is insufficiently posited.

Solution. The work of distinction, as was said before, is nothing other than the determination of the general principles of the world to form and to place, from which are the moving, or moved, or both in those things which are generated and corrupted: but this can be, either that they are moving to generation and to the mixable, or that they are moving entering into the constitution of the generated through substance. If in the first way: then the nature of the heaven is universally in all spheres and stars, and these are distinguished in two ways, from the extreme, and from the middle, as was evident above. But if the moving to generation and commixture is entering into the substance of the generated: this is in two ways: because either active spiritually moist and dry: just as with the active simply which is hot, it is spiritually dry in fire, and spiritually moist in air: or active in a certain respect, which is: cold which is said to be active in a certain respect, and it stops motion by its action, and induces immobility: and

with that is corporeal moist in water, and corporeal dry in earth: and therefore the Philosopher says, that the matter of all generated things is more from water and earth[187].

Therefore it must be said to the first, that fire and air are understood as distinct, when they are serene, free from others.

To the second it must be said, that the spiritual spheres of the planets and stars are of the adornment: because they are ordered per se to the diversity of figures according to the species of the generated with respect to the mixture of complexion which is common to all.

Articulus 9 — Whether Plants Pertain to Ornament or to Distinction

Whether plants pertain to adornment or to distinction?

Secondly, it is asked concerning plants, about which it is treated here, whether they pertain to adornment.

And it seems that they do:

1. For it does not seem that the cause commonly touched upon, that they pertain to disposition because they adhere to the earth by their roots, is valid: because according to this, since stars are not moved except by the motion of their sphere, because they adhere to the spheres as parts to a whole, even stars would not pertain to adornment, which is false.
2. Likewise, stars are inanimate, as the Saints say: but plants at least have a part of the soul's part: therefore, they pertain much more to adornment than stars, as it seems.

Solution. It must be said according to Augustine, that plants are produced here not by the seminal power: and therefore he explains in the third book on Genesis, "Let the earth bring forth grass," etc., that is, let it receive the power of producing: and this is hinted at in the second chapter, where it is said that he made the shrub of the field before it arose on the earth.

The reason for this according to Augustine can be that for the production of plants the motion of the stars with the seminal power suffices, and a generating cause equivocally suffices for them because of the similarity of the matter of their bodies in their parts: and therefore they do not pertain to adornment, since adornment is properly the form given to the world at its beginning for univocal generation which otherwise could not occur: for man and horse could not be generated by the power of the stars through any mixture, unless there were a seed cut off from something of the same species, although some philosophers have said the contrary: yet the better ones say that complete animals having great diversity in organs, like man, horse, and donkey, and the like, could not be made except from something of their species: and therefore plants do not pertain to the adornment of the world: and this reason holds, even if it is said according to other Saints that plants were produced on the third day.

To the objection, it must be said that it is true that planets and stars are not moved except by the motion of some sphere: but it is not proven whether they always stand in the same part

of the sphere. For many contradict this opinion: but this is not the present intention: but whatever it may be, they are movers towards the special forms and figures in which the world is ordered: and therefore they pertain to adornment.

To the other, it must be said that according to Gregory, it is rather greenness than soul by which plants live: and therefore the Philosopher says that they have a part of the soul's part: because although they have the works of the vegetative, they have them more by the mode of nature than of soul: and therefore a certain Philosopher said that the generation of plants was for an imperfect world, but animals for a world already perfected.

Articulus 10 — Whether Harmful Plants Were Then Made Like the Others

Whether harmful plants were then made like others?

Whether harmful plants were then made like others?

Thirdly, it is asked concerning harmful plants, whether they were then made?

And it seems that they were not: because
1. Punishment is not prepared before sin: but the harmfulness of plants is for punishment: therefore they were not made harmful before sin.

1. Likewise, all things obeyed Adam in the first state at his command: therefore then nothing was harmful to him.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
Poisonous moisture is natural to certain plants, and the shape of sharp angles is natural: since therefore each thing was made then in its nature, it seems that the poisonous moisture with the shape of the sharp angle of thorns was then made: therefore harmful things were then made.

Solution. The common opinion is that they were then made: but they could not harm except through sin: for Isidore says that if Adam had not sinned, neither would fire burn, nor thorn prick, nor sword cut, nor could any other harm be inflicted upon him.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 11 — Whether the Waters Were Gathered into One Place

Whether the waters are gathered into one place?

Next, it is asked concerning the second point that the Master touches upon, there E, § 2: If, however, it is asked, Where are they gathered, etc.

For what the Master says does not seem to be fitting: because it is determined that the more an element is of a rarer substance, the more space it occupies: since therefore water is of a rarer substance than earth, it could not be that the earth, subsiding, received it.

187. Aristotle, Meteorology 4.12.

Solution. It must be said that water is considered in two ways, namely according to the nature of the unbounded gross moist, it is not terminated everywhere by the earth through a circle: for because it is a gross element, it does not complete a spherical figure, but a circular one: because it does not occupy as much space as air and fire: and therefore the earth also has a smaller place: because it is located in the middle around the center. Insofar as it is an unbounded moist with its own boundary, it flows to the earth through a circle from the North to the South: because in the North there is more cold than even in the South in the uninhabitable part of the earth towards the pole: and this happens because of the shortness of the sun's diameter in the southern signs. Since therefore cold induces aqueous moisture, it is clear that water abounds more towards the North than towards the South. And this is the cause: because the Philosopher says in the book of Meteorology that the sea flows from the North to the South. Insofar as it has a commiscible incorporable moist, it flows through the mouth of the earth and mixes with the earth for the generation of elements.

To that which is objected, it must be said that the Master calls the subsidence of the earth, when first expanded by vapors and the mixture of moisture, dried, it is contracted to the center: because then it freely left the circle to the Ocean which is called Amphitrite, because it flows circularly around the earth, as has been said.

Articulus 12 — It Is Asked With Respect to What the Division of the Earth into Asia, Africa, and Europe Is Taken

It is asked, By what is the division of the earth into Asia, Africa, and Europe taken?

Then it is asked concerning the third thing which it touches upon, there, E, towards the end: Since many things are agreed to be seas, etc.

For that place, as it is held in the beginning of Ecclesiastes, is the Ocean Sea. Whence it is said there: All rivers run into the sea, and the sea does not overflow: to the place from which the rivers come, they return, etc.

According to this, the reason for the division of the lands into Asia, Africa, and Europe is asked. For that division is not from rivers, but from seas, as it seems: therefore it seems that the seas are not contained.

To this it must be said that the division of the earth is twofold: one of which is according to the great circles of the heavens by which the surfaces are understood to extend from semicircle to semicircle: and thus Boethius divides in the book of the Consolation of Philosophy into four quarters. One semicircle makes the surface of the horizon of the world, and the other cutting it in the surface of the center of the earth makes the equinoctial. But our habitable quarter is divided into Asia, Africa, and Europe.

And Augustine places the reason for the division and the solution of the objection in book XVI of the City of God, saying thus: Those which seem to call half the world Asia, from the South through the East to the North it reaches, but Europe from the North to the West, and Africa from the West to the South. Two hold, Europe and Africa: but the other half Asia alone. But therefore those two parts are made, because between each the Ocean enters whatever

waters wash the lands, and this makes the great sea for us. Wherefore if you divide the world into two parts, of the East and of the West, Asia will be in one, but in the other Europe.

From these things the solution to the questions is clear.

But if it is objected that the sea does not seem to be the proper place of waters, because the proper place of water is the place of the element: but the element of water is simple and tasteless: the sea, however, is salty and composite: therefore it is not the proper place of waters,

It must be said that the sea is mixed with burnt earth by accident, where it touches the land, but in retreat from the land it is tasteless: and this is taken from the saying of the Philosopher in I of the Animals where he says thus: Some marine animal is greater than a blooded animal: although it lacks blood, and this is rare, like certain fishes called malachie. For this kind increases in hot places, and is more in the open sea than near the shores, and especially in places where tasteless waters multiply. And this is clear, that tasteless water is in the open sea far from the shores or coasts, for

The sea has shores, but the other rivers have banks.

DISTINCTIO XV

Divisio Textus

It follows, God said: Let there be great lights, etc. In this distinction, two things are said, namely the origin of three days: and at the end, the opinions of the Saints are explained, whether all things were made simultaneously, or not. There, G, § 2: for in this matter, etc.

In the first, there are three parts according to the threefold adornment of the three days: and the division is evident in the Letter.

Articulus 1 — Whether the Stars Pertain to Ornament

Whether the stars pertain to adornment?

Whether the stars pertain to adornment?

A doubt arises concerning the adornment of the fourth day from what is said on the fourth day, "Let there be lights."

And five questions are asked concerning the stars:
The first of which is, Whether they pertain to adornment?
The second, Why are the sun and moon called great lights?
The third, What is here called the firmament?
The fourth, How are they for times and signs?
The fifth, Whether they have any causality over free will?

To the first, it is objected thus:
Of whatever body the whole does not pertain to adornment, neither is a part of it appointed for adornment: but the circles of the spheres according to themselves do not pertain to adornment: therefore neither do the parts. The first is evident from the foregoing in which the whole and the parts are disposed by one disposition of any body. The second is evident from this, that a star is said by all Philosophers to be a part of the orb.

If you say that some things pertain to adornment, insofar as adornment signifies beauty, but some to the determination of species: and because the stars are luminous and the lights of the world, therefore they pertain to adornment, as the Master seems to say: because in their light other things are seen. That is very doubtful which is supposed: because many Philosophers say that none of the stars has light except from the sun: and to name some, Aristotle says this at the beginning of book III on the Properties of planets and elements. And Avicenna says that all have color, but not light except from the sun. And Messehalach in the book on the Moz of the orb, and he presents several figures for this: Therefore this statement is nothing.

If you say that they lie, because Scripture says, "lights." Against this—Even the moon is called a light, and yet we clearly see in a solar eclipse that it is black and not luminous: therefore it is doubtful what is supposed as certain, and the better Philosophers say the contrary.

Solution. It must be said, as pertains to this passage, that the stars therefore pertain to adornment, as we said above, because their formation is such that they move to determinate species. However, how they are moved in their orbs is another matter: since this cannot be proven without demonstration. Hence I well concede that there is no cause which is posited as a cause: but this is true, that whether under their own light or under another's, they contribute to the appearance of the beauty of the lower things.

Articulus 2 — Why the Sun and the Moon Are Called the Great Luminaries; And Whether the Moon Was Made Full, or First, Namely at Its Kindling

Why are the Sun and Moon called great luminaries? And, whether the Moon was made full, or first, namely in its ignition.

Secondly, it is asked, Why are the Sun and Moon called great luminaries?

For that the Sun is called great, this does not have a question: because the Sun is great in quantity and light: but the Moon is small in quantity, although it is near, and therefore seems greater than some other stars, and it is small in light: therefore it seems that it is wrongly called great.

Again, it is asked about the Moon, Whether it was made full or first, namely in its ignition.

But if first: then it is imperfect: therefore God made something imperfect. If full: then another translation seems to deceive, which says that He made the moon in the beginning of the night: for it does not first appear in the beginning of the night, since it is new.

Solution. Concerning the quantities of the luminaries, different things are written by the Philosophers: but in this they agree, that the sun is much greater than the earth: which is proven by the shadow of the earth which extends into a point or cone, which would not be if the earth were equal to or greater than the sun. That the shadow of the earth extends into a cone is evident from this: because otherwise it would eclipse many fixed stars every night: for if it were equal to or greater than the sun, the shadow would never end, but would be projected infinitely, or up to the fixed stars. However, the Moon is called great in effect, although it is not great in quantity, and therefore it is called the second sun by the Philosopher: it has especially the power to move earthly things, and especially human things, because it is nearer.

To the other, it must be said that some have said both. But if it is said to be made new: then what is objected does not follow: because its natural perfection is to receive increments of light according to its distance from the sun: hence it is not called imperfect when it has that which it ought to have by substance.

Articulus 3 — What Is Here Called the Firmament

What is here called the firmament?

Thirdly, it is asked what is here called the firmament?

For if the firmament is called the heaven of the fixed stars, this is not fitting: because the sun, and the moon, and certain other stars, namely the five planets, are not placed in the heaven of the fixed stars.

But it must be said that if we were to follow Ptolemy and Nicholas in the commentary on the Almagest, and Messehalach, we would posit, besides the empyrean heaven which the Philosophers did not know, ten heavens: of which the first is that which revolves over the equinoctial poles, and revolves every star with a diurnal motion. The second, however, is the non-starry heaven which revolves over the poles of the oblique circle, that is, the ecliptic, and revolves every star from the West to the East according to the quantity of its circle: because it moves with equal speed according to the said Philosophers, and also according to Thebit, the Moon, Saturn, and the fixed star: but that the Moon completes its circle in twenty-eight days, Saturn in almost thirty years, and the fixed star in thirty-six thousand years, this happens because in such a proportion of quantity, the quantity of one circle surpasses the circle of another, although the spaces they traverse every natural day are equal. The third orbit is of the fixed stars existing on one surface: not fixed because they do not move, but fixed because they do not change the images and distances of their positions relative to each other, as is proven in the Almagest. The fourth is the orbit of Saturn. The fifth is the orbit of Jupiter. The sixth of Mars. The seventh of the Sun according to the said Philosophers. The eighth of Venus. The ninth of Mercury. The tenth of the Moon. However, Geber in a certain commentary on the Almagest holds a singular way concerning Mercury and Venus: because he places them above the Sun: and then according to him, the order is changed concerning those two, but not the number: and therefore it must be said that according to sacred Scripture, the whole nature of the fifth body is called the firmament: but among the Philosophers, the firmament is called the eighth sphere ascending upwards.

Whether, however, the whole is a continuous body and one, or diverse, and of longer length and more proper, requires a long discourse and many demonstrations: and this pertains to another business.

Articulus 4 — How the Sun and the Moon Are for Signs and for Times

How are the Sun and Moon signs and times?

Fourthly, it is asked, How are they signs and times?

1. For either as a sign which is a cause, or not. If so: therefore since motion is necessary, it seems that sign is necessarily the cause of things, which is not said by any of the Catholics. But if it is a sign, not a cause: therefore that which is signified will be reduced to another which is the cause of that signified: but this cannot be unless it is immortal and perpetual and the first body: therefore some such body is before the heaven, which is false: therefore it seems that it is a sign and a cause.
2. Likewise, even Augustine seems to say that they are causes. For he says thus in Book V of the City of God: It cannot be said altogether absurdly that certain sidereal influences avail for the differences of bodies alone, just as in the solar accesses and recesses we see even the times of the year vary, and in the lunar increases and decreases certain kinds of things are increased and diminished, such as sea urchins, shells, and the wondrous tides of the Ocean.
3. Likewise, among the causes of the restless generation and corruption in II of Generation and Corruption, the continuous carrying of the sun in the oblique circle is posited: therefore it seems that they are signs and causes.
4. Likewise, of a body having one mode in motion and being, it is to rule a body having a different mode in motion and being; but the heaven and stars have one mode in motion and being, and they are not elemented elements: therefore it seems that these lower things are ruled by those.
5. Likewise, the Philosopher in the book On Animals says that the impregnation and birth of all things occur according to the carrying of the stars: therefore it seems that they rule and signify as causes.
6. Likewise, in the Letter here we have that they are signs of rains and fair weather: and the same says Damascene: but by the elevation of vapors rains are made: therefore they are also causes of the elevation of vapor: but the elevation of the lower is the cause of the mixture of elements: therefore they are also causes of mixtures: therefore also of their generation consequently.

I help. I think that it must be conceded that they are signs and moving causes of corruptible lower things.

To this, however, which is objected, that they are necessary causes, it must be said that it is of no value: because although the stars are moved in one way, they do not regard the lower

things in one way: but also the lower things are not moved in one way: and therefore the effects of the stars can be impeded by contrary dispositions. And this is what Ptolemy says in the Centiloquium, that a wise man rules the stars, namely by disposing bodies with contrary dispositions to which the star moves.

And by this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 5 — Whether the Stars Have Dominion over Free Will

Whether the stars have dominion over free will?

Whether the stars have dominion over free will?

Fifthly, it is asked whether the stars have power over the free will of man?

It seems that they do not: because
1. Damascene says that they are in no way causes of our actions.

1. Likewise, Augustine in Book V of The City of God labors in many ways against this, saying that the wills of souls are not subjected to the positions of the stars.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
1. The will greatly depends on the complexions of bodies: therefore, if they have powers over the complexions of bodies, they also seem to have power over the intellect of the soul and free will.

1. Likewise, we see astronomers respond concerning those things which are subject to free will, such as peace and war, the depopulation of lands and construction, and the like, and this according to the considerations of the stars. Therefore, since they frequently pronounce the truth, it seems that they are causes of those things.
2. Likewise, Aristotle in the book On Causes says that the properties of the elements are empty and lands are depopulated at the conjunction of two stars, namely Jupiter and Saturn: therefore, it seems that they have causality over free will.

Solution. It must be said that they have no causality over free will according to the sayings of the Saints: and even the Philosophers do not say that they have causality over free will except as was proven first, namely by consequence, insofar as free will is drawn by complexion to the inclination of certain acts. To all other things Augustine says that such revelations are made rather by demons than by the motion of the superiors. However, we can say that nothing prohibits the weakness of the process of the whole life according to strength from being signified, aided, and impeded by the stars, but not free will: yet in such a way that it is understood only in bodily acts, and that causality begins from the body, and is in the soul only by inclination.

Articulus 6 — Why the Ornament of the Air and of the Water Is Made in One Day; And Why Creeping Thing Is Said; And Why Fire Does Not Pertain to Ornament

Why is the adornment of air and water made in one day? and, Why is it called reptile? and, Why does fire not pertain to adornment?

Why is the adornment of the air and the water done on one day? And, Why is it called a creeping thing (reptile)? And, Why does fire not pertain to the adornment?

§ 1. Next, it is inquired concerning this which he says there, Then God also said: Let the waters produce the creeping thing, etc.

§ 2. And two things are inquired here, namely, why is the adornment of the air and water done on one day? And, Why is it called a creeping thing?

§ 3. As to the first, one proceeds thus: 1. Two divided elements ought to have distinct days in the adornment: air and water are divided elements: therefore they ought to be adorned on two days.

§ 4. 2. Also, birds and fishes rest on the earth: therefore it seems that they pertain to the adornment of the earth.

§ 5. Also, Why does fire not have a special adornment?

§ 6. Solution. It must be said that water and air agree in a passive quality which is moisture, and similarly in the property of transparency: and birds and fishes are also near to one another in matter: for birds are, as they say, from vaporizable moisture, which approaches the nature of air: while fishes are from waters growing fat underneath, and subsisting by coagulation: and for this reason they have their adornment on a single day.

§ 7. To the other argument it must be said that the place of immobility is never assigned for the adornment, but rather the place of motion: but the places of motion of fishes and birds are the air and the water.

§ 8. To that which is inquired secondly concerning creeping things, it is said that creeping thing (reptile) is spoken of in many ways, as is gathered from the book On Animals, namely because it snatches itself by the force of fins, as fishes: or because by the force of the mouth, as certain worms: or because by the force of ribs, as certain serpents: or because by the force of rings which it contracts and extends, as those having ringed bodies: but in the first way a creeping thing is taken here.

§ 9. To the other argument it must be said that fire has a consumptive quality: and therefore nothing animated lives in it: for it is false what some say concerning the salamander.

Articulus 7 — What Difference There Is Between Beasts And Cattle And Animals

What is the difference between beasts (bestiae), beasts of burden (jumenta), and animals (animalia)? And, Why does he not make mention of amphibious animals, that is, of doubtful life, namely partly terrestrial and partly aquatic, and why does he also not make mention of minerals?

§ 10. Thirdly, Why is there no mention of minerals among the adornment of the elements?

§ 11. Next it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, D, It follows: God said: Let the earth produce, etc.

§ 12. Concerning the adornment of the earth three things are inquired here: and the first is, What is the difference between beasts of burden, beasts, and animals?

§ 13. Second, Since there are many genera of animals, because Aristotle says that nature does not proceed from the marine to the terrestrial except through a mean, why does he himself not make mention of the intermediate animals between the aquatic and the terrestrial?

§ 14. TO THE FIRST therefore it must be said that beasts of burden (jumenta) are called in histories as it were helps (juva-menta), which were created for the help of labor: for it is a genus of animals. But beast (bestia) is called as it were vast (vastia), which harms with teeth or claws. But cattle (pecora) are called, as Augustine says in the book On the Good of Marriage, because by such things the ancients acquired money (pecunia).

§ 15. TO THE SECOND it must be said that Moses does not intend to speak here except of the general differences of animals, which are the aquatic, the flying, and the walking.

§ 16. TO THE THIRD it must be said that minerals do not have any form except one following upon the commingling of the elements: and therefore they do not pertain to the adornment, but to the disposition: nor yet is mention made of them there, because they are hidden in the earth, and only manifest things were expounded to an uninstructed people.

§ 17. But concerning harmful animals, and those which can be born by equivocal generation by the power of the stars or by putrefaction, he determines suitably enough in the Letter of the text.

§ 18. But concerning this which follows about the opinion of Augustine, it has been disputed above.

§ 19. Also concerning the rest of the Sabbath, as much as pertains to this place, what is said in the Letter of the text is sufficient, and the remainder is had upon the third precept in the third book of the Sentences.

§ 20. But concerning all these things there exist other questions compiled by us more prolixly, in which there are certain things which are not contained here.

DISTINCTIO XVI

Divisio Textus

DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

§ 21. Having traversed these things which above concerning the creation of man, etc. Here begins the third part of this tractate on creatures: in which the Master treats of the creature which is composed of the spiritual and the corporeal.

§ 22. And it is divided into two parts: in the first of which he sets forth his state before sin. But in the second his fall into sin, and his state in sin, which begins below, Distinction XXII, there, A, Seeing therefore the devil, etc.

§ 23. The first of these is divided into three: in the first of which the formation of the man is treated. In the second, concerning the formation of the woman, Distinction XVIII, there, A, In the same paradise also, etc. In the third, concerning the generation which would have been from both, if they had not sinned, Distinction XX, there, A, After this it must be seen, etc.

§ 24. The first of these has two distinctions, in the first of which he treats of the formation of man as to the conformity of the image, which a work receives from the worker. In the second, concerning the material origin according to the soul and the body, there, Distinction XVII, A, Here concerning the origin of the soul, etc.

§ 25. In this distinction four things are contained: in the first of which he says that man was made to the image. In the second chapter, what is called and in how many ways image and likeness? there, B, But the image, etc. In the third, he excludes certain false expositions concerning the conformity of the image, and posits the true one, there, C, around the beginning: Whence there were some, etc. In the fourth and last, he states the difference between the image which is the Son, and the image which is man, there, H, Wherefore man is also called an image, etc.

§ 26. And through this the sentence concerning this matter is evident as to the created image, concerning which very many things have been said in the first book of the Sentences, Distinction III: and concerning the uncreated image in the same book, Distinction XXXI: and,

§ 27. Whether an Angel is to the image? above, in this second book of the Sentences, Distinction VI, and I do not wish to repeat this.

Articulus 1 — Whether Any Creature Is Conformed to God According to the Image

Whether any creature is conformed to God according to the image?

§ 28. But four things are inquired here around this first point, namely, Whether any creature is or can be conformed to God according to the image? Second, Whether every creature is conformed to God according to the image? Third, Whether every rational creature is equally to the image? Fourth, Whether man and woman equally?

§ 29. As to the first, one proceeds thus: 1. Hilary says, An image is an indifferent species of that which is imitated. But man is not an indifferent species of the same thing which he imitates. Therefore he is not the image of God, nor can he be.

§ 30. 2. Still further, Hilary says that an image is an imaged and indiscernible likeness of one thing to a thing to be equaled. But man or any creature does not equal God. Therefore it cannot be an image.

§ 31. 3. Also, There is no creature but that it is infinitely distant: therefore there is no creature which can be an indiscernible likeness.

§ 32. 4. Also, Augustine in a sermon On the Image, makes a distinction between equality, and image, and likeness, saying that where there is a likeness, there is not continuously an equality: but conversely where there is an equality, there is continuously a likeness. Also, Where there is a likeness and equality, there is not continuously an image: but conversely where there is an image, there is an equality and likeness: therefore an image presupposes equality to itself. But no creature is equal to God: therefore no creature can be an image of God.

§ 33. 5. Also, Isaiah 40:18: What image will you set up for Him, namely for God? Therefore He can have no image.

§ 34. 6. Also, Of those distant to infinity, one is not the image of another. God and the creature are distant to infinity: therefore no creature can be the image of God.

§ 35. ON THE CONTRARY: Let us make man to our image, etc. And very many other authorities concerning this are found.

§ 36. Solution. To this it must be said that there is an image of equiparance (absolute equality), and an image of likeness through imitation. It must be said therefore that the creature cannot be an image of equiparance, but an image of likeness through imitation in this way which was said above, that a hierarchy is in the likeness of God ascending proportionally, and to God there is likeness and unity. And through this the solution to almost the whole is evident.

§ 37. But to the first it must be said that an indifferent species is spoken of in two ways, namely indifferent in the contact of the imitator to that which it imitates: and thus man is an indifferent species: because by leading into the exemplar, he attains it by imitating proportionally to himself. A species is also called indifferent through substance and essence: and thus only the Son is an indifferent species with the Father.

§ 38. To another argument it must be said that there is a co-equation of sufficiency for leading into another: and there is a co-equation of the fulfillment of equiparance. The co-equation of the sufficiency of leading into another is in a thing, when it has those things by which it sufficiently leads into the other. Thus an image of likeness is co-equated to the exemplar: because there is in it something responding to the distinction of the persons, and something to the order of nature, and something to equality, and something to the identity of essence, as was held in the first book of the Sentences: but the co-equation of equiparance no image has except the one which is the Son.

§ 39. To another argument it must be said that an indiscernible likeness is that which by representing proportionally shows the exemplar: and this is the created image; or indiscernible through substance: and thus only the Son. Whence some say that the definitions of Hilary are not understood of the created image, but only of the uncreated. And this is true if they are

taken strictly and properly. But if the words are taken broadly, nothing prohibits them from being understood even of the created.

§ 40. To another argument it must be said that there is an equality of configuration, and an equality of nature. The equality of configuration outwardly suffices for the notion of an image. For that a statue be the image of Hercules, it is not necessary that it be of the same nature and that it live: but that, existing smaller and of an inferior nature, it be similarly figured to him. And thus man is said to have an equality which is imitated in the spiritual configuration of the powers of the soul. But the Son has the figure and nature of the substance.

§ 41. To another argument it must be said that Isaiah is speaking of a corporeal image.

§ 42. To another argument it must be said that God and the creature, as Creator and creature, are distant to infinity: but in the ratio of an exemplar he says approaching to us, and drawing near to us.

Articulus 2 — Whether Every Creature Is Conformed to God According to the Image, or Is to the Image of God

Whether every creature is conformed to God according to the image, or is to the image of God?

§ 43. Secondly it is inquired, Whether every creature is to the image of God?

§ 44. And it seems that it is: 1. For to an image of likeness (as was held) only four things are required, namely the distinction of some three things, and their unity according to substance, and order, and equality: but in every thing it is possible to find the one, the true, and the good: and these three are distinct, and the same in the substance of the suppositum: and they are ordered, because according to the ratio of intention the one is prior to the true, and prior to the good: and they are equal, because they are converted upon each other according to supposita: therefore it seems, since these are in every thing, that every thing was made to the image of God.

§ 45. 2. Also, Boethius seems to say this in the book On the Consolation of Philosophy, in those words: O Thou who governest the world by perpetual reason. And below: Thou bringest forth all things from a supernal Exemplar. Thyself most beautiful, bearing the beautiful World in mind, and forming it in a similar image, And commanding the perfect parts to complete a perfect whole.

§ 46. 3. Also, A confused likeness does not lead into a thing except confusedly: but by the mediation of creatures the Philosophers came to God not confusedly: therefore in all creatures there is also not a confused likeness, but a distinct one. If it be said that the Philosophers did not know the Trinity, but the divinity: this seems to be against Augustine, who said that they knew the Father and the Son.

§ 47. Solution. In the first book of the Sentences it was shown what is called a vestige, and in what it differs from an image. Whence I say that in the irrational creature there is nothing but a confused likeness of the persons, but an express notion of the divinity.

§ 48. To the first therefore it must be said that the one, the true, and the good, insofar as they are among the first things (just as was noted at the end of the first book of the Sentences), do not differ except by relation to the efficient, or formal exemplar, or final, disposing, efficient causes: and therefore the one does not add upon the other except the notion of respect, and therefore they are not truly those three: as are memory, intelligence, and will.

§ 49. Also, The one does not add upon being except in division, and not any form: but memory adds upon the mind a certain property, by which it is made a determinate power: and therefore it is evident that there is confusion in the distinction of these three.

§ 50. Furthermore, The soul is called an image, because it is capable of God through beatitude, and can be united in the acts of grace: and these things are not found in the irrational creature.

§ 51. Also, Augustine says that the image is in the soul insofar as it is immortal: and if it were not immortal, it would not be an image: and this again is not found in those three. It is evident therefore that they express a confused likeness.

§ 52. Also, The one in order does not proceed from another, but rather adds to another: and the one relates to another as a subject, and the one is in the true and the good, and the true in the good, as a subject: and such an order is not in the divine persons according to the order of nature which is there. Whence it is evident also that there is confusion in the order of these three.

§ 53. To another argument it must be said that Boethius, by an extension of the name, takes the image for the ideated thing brought over from the idea.

§ 54. To another argument it must be said (as was first proved) that the Philosophers never knew the persons except confusedly, and not under their proper notion.

Articulus 3 — Whether Every Rational Creature Is Equally to the Image of God

Whether every rational creature is equally to the image of God?

§ 55. Thirdly it is inquired, Whether every rational creature is equally to the image?

§ 56. But it seems that it is not: because 1. Gregory said above: By as much as the nature is more subtle in an Angel, by so much more is the image of God at the same time insinuated as impressed in him: therefore it seems that an Angel is more to the image of God, than man.

§ 57. 2. Also, To hold the knowledge of God and of oneself in oneself belongs to memory according to Augustine, and to intuit oneself in God belongs to intelligence, and never to not love God in oneself through a natural love belongs to the will: but all these things the Angel has deiformly, and this without inquiry and study: therefore it seems the Angel is more to the image, than man.

§ 58. ON THE CONTRARY is what is held below, where the Master says, that he formed the woman from the side of the man for this reason, so that the image of God might appear in this in man, that just as God is the principle from which are all things, so man would be the

principle from which are all things of his genus: but this is found in no Angel: therefore it seems that the Angel is not so to the image as man.

§ 59. Solution. It must be said that this whole question is determined from the things said above in Distinction VI: because if the image of likeness alone is considered, then the Angel, according to the saying of Gregory, is an image even more express than man: and it is false what some say, that the Angel is a seal instead of a more express image. But if it is considered not only in the natural powers, in which the spiritual substance is capable of God, but in conformity to the ratio of a principle which is God according as He is and is one, then man is more an image than an Angel: because man is that from which are all things of his genus, and through whom are all things according to a certain mode: and thus the objections proceed: whence the solution is already given for the whole.

Articulus 4 — Whether Man and Woman Are Equally to the Image of God

Whether man and woman are equally to the image of God?

§ 60. Fourthly it is inquired, Whether man and woman are equally to the image of God?

§ 61. And it seems that they are not: because 1. In 1 Corinthians 11:7, it is said that the man is the image and glory of God, but the woman is the glory of the man: therefore it seems that they are not distant by one degree from the notion of the image.

§ 62. 2. Also, The woman does not rule the man, but is ruled by him: since therefore it belongs to the image to rule, it seems the woman is not so to the image as the man.

§ 63. 3. Also, Below she herself is not posited as the principle of the whole human nature, but the man: since therefore conformity in the ratio of a principle with God is of the ratio of the image (as will be held below), it seems she is not equally to the image as the man.

§ 64. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. The woman is capable of God just as the man: since therefore the image is present according to the mind which is capable of God, it seems the woman is to the image just as the man.

§ 65. 2. Also, In Genesis 1:27, it is said that God created man to His own image and likeness: and it is subjoined, Male and female He created them. Therefore it is understood of the woman just as of the man.

§ 66. Solution. This question is light. It must be said that the image is considered in two ways: namely in the interior powers of the mind, or in the agreement in the ratio of a principle of nature. In the interior powers again in two ways, namely in the distinction, and order, and equality, and consubstantiality of the powers: and thus the woman is equally an image as is the man. Or in the vigor and nobility of the powers compared to act according to the nature of the sex: and thus the man is more to the image than the woman. But if it is considered in the ratio of a principle with respect to the universal nature: this happens in four ways, namely universally and effectively and materially: and thus only Adam is to the image. Or effectively and materially only: and thus all men are to the image only. Or materially and universally with respect to all propagated things, and not effectively: and thus Eve alone is to the image.

Or materially and not universally with respect to propagated things: and thus every woman is to the image.

§ 67. To the first therefore it must be said that this is said on account of the subjection of the sex, and the vigor of natural endowments.

§ 68. To another argument it must be said that rule is considered according to the facility of turning aside into vice from the weakness of natural endowments.

§ 69. To another argument the solution is evident through the distinction posited.

Articulus 5 — Whether Those Things in Which Image and Likeness Are Said to Be Are Well Assigned

Whether those things in which the image and likeness are said to be, are well assigned?

§ 70. Next it is inquired concerning this which he says: Nevertheless this distinction, although probable, etc.

§ 71. For in that place he expounds image and likeness in three ways, namely that the image is according to the three powers of the mind, and the likeness according to innocence and justice. In the second way, that the image is in the cognition of truth, and the likeness in the love of goodness or virtue. The third is, that the image is in all other things besides the essence, by which the soul is immortal and indissoluble or indivisible, and in these is the likeness.

§ 72. For it seems that those expositions are not fitting: because according to the Master below and many Doctors, man was not made in grace: therefore he did not have justice: therefore he did not have the likeness in innocence and grace.

§ 73. AGAINST THE SECOND it is similarly objected: 1. For if the image is in the cognition of truth, since the cognition of truth is a certain quality just as is the love of virtue, it seems both pertain to the ratio of likeness: because likeness, as Boethius says, is the same quality of differing things.

§ 74. 2. Furthermore, Since the ratio of the image is in the configuration of some things, it seems that it is necessary to posit many things in which it is: but the cognition of truth does not express but one thing.

§ 75. 3. Also, Since the image is in some quantity, it is necessary to posit the ratio of a spiritual quantity in which the image is: and since Bernard says that love is the quantity of the soul, it seems rather that the image is in the love of virtue than in the cognition of truth.

§ 76. Furthermore, It is objected concerning the third exposition. For the image seems to be closer to the essence than the likeness: therefore it says nothing, that the image is in the things other than the essence, and the likeness in the essential things.

§ 77. Furthermore, With respect to what are those three expositions taken?

§ 78. Solution. It must be said to the first that the Master expounds well: because either it is understood of natural innocence and justice, if man is posited not to have been made in

gratuitous gifts: and then natural innocence is nothing else than the state which did not harm from this, that through sin he did not merit that God should harm him through punishment: but punishment, as Augustine says, is not an evil, except because it harms. But natural justice is called the right order of the lower powers to the higher, and of the higher into God, and of the body to the soul, and of the world to the body: and in this order man was created: and then the first objection avails nothing. But if justice and innocence are taken for gratuitous gifts: then according to that opinion, that he was created in grace, the objection concludes nothing inconvenient: however below there will be a disputation concerning this. But according to the other opinion we will say that the likeness is in innocence and justice in gratuitous gifts: not which he would have, but which he would have had, if he had stood firm: and then there is a likeness in potency and in the order of the potency to the habit.

§ 79. To another argument it must be said that the cognition of truth is not completed by one power: for there must be one holding the notion, and this is memory: and another intuiting, and this is intelligence: and a natural love of the known thing accompanies these, which continues the intuition lest it be turned away: and as to that distinction which the cognition of truth supposes, a discrete spiritual quantity is hinted at, which is required for those things which are of the image. And thus it does not consist in the sole quality of cognition. And through this the solution to the following is also evident: because love is not the quantity which the image requires, but is the quantity of the value of the soul when it is gratuitous: and concerning that quantity Bernard speaks.

§ 80. To that which is further inquired, it must be said that the image expresses agreement in exterior things: and therefore intrinsic substantial things are not competent to it: but the likeness is in quality, and quantity: but every form whether substantial or accidental predicates what sort: and as to this Boethius says that a species is the essential likeness of individuals: and therefore nothing prohibits the likeness from being in the essence and the image from being in the consequent properties, as are memory, intelligence, and will.

Articulus 6 — Whether Image Is Said of Man and of the Son of God Univocally, Equivocally, or Analogically

Whether the image is said of man and of the Son of God univocally, equivocally, or analogically?

§ 81. Next it is inquired concerning the last chapter, there, Wherefore man is also called an image, etc.

§ 82. For from this the question arises, Whether the image is said of man and of the Son of God univocally, or equivocally?

§ 83. It seems that it is equivocally: because 1. Nothing is univocal to the creature and the Creator: therefore neither is the image.

§ 84. 2. Also, The natural and the artificial are not univocal, as an ass which is a vessel, and an ass which is an animal, and the animal which is man, and that which is painted: since therefore the image of God, as Augustine says in the book On the Ten Strings, is in man as the

image of Caesar in a gold solidus (coin): but in the Son as the image of Caesar in his natural son: it seems to differ in man and in the Son, just as the artificial and the natural: therefore it is surely present equivocally.

§ 85. 3. Also, Artificial things are those whose principle is the will, as the Philosopher says: but the principle of the created image is the will of God, and of the Son it is not the will, as was held in the first book of the Sentences: therefore in man it is as in art, and in the Son as in a natural thing: therefore equivocally.

§ 86. ON THE CONTRARY: Equivocals are neither of one ratio, nor do they attain unity in ratio: the image in man attains the unity of essence in three (persons), and the ratio of a principle in the Father: because just as the Father is the principle of the whole deity, so man is the principle of the whole humanity: and the Son imitating the same is one in essence with the Father: therefore man and the Son of God are not called an image equivocally.

§ 87. Solution. It must be said that it is said by analogy, neither properly equivocally, nor properly univocally: such an analogy, I say, which posits nothing as one in both, but rather posits the whole in one, and in the other posits being from that and to that: and thus man is an image.

§ 88. It must be said therefore to the first, that nothing is common in genus or species: but through such an analogy there is something in man from God, which by priority is found in God.

§ 89. To another argument it must be said that that argumentation is deceptive: because Augustine does not mean to say that man is a work of art, but that the ratio of imitation is in him in a diversity of essence: but not in the Son.

§ 90. To another argument it must be said that there is a will transmuting matter and inducing form through natural principles, and such a will does not induce a work of art, but of nature, as the divine will. But there is a will not transmuting matter, but making a figure of incision by the taking away or transposition of parts: and such is a principle of art, as the will of man. However I well concede that it is not said univocally, but not just as the artificial and the natural.

§ 91. And if it is objected, that all natural things are works of the first art. I say the same concerning that art as concerning that will: for that art does not remove the ratio of a work of nature, but posits a diversity of substance in the created and creating nature.

DISTINCTIO XVII

Divisio Textus

DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

§ 92. Here concerning the origin of the soul, etc. Here the formation of man according to relation to a material principle is treated: and this in two ways, namely according to the soul, and according to the body: and therefore there are two parts here, in the first of which he touches upon it according to the soul. In the second, according to the body, there, D, It is also customarily inquired, Whether God, etc.

§ 93. Around the first the Master touches upon two questions, of which one is, Whether the soul was created from the substance of God? The second, Whether in the body or outside the body? there, C, But whether in the body, etc.

§ 94. In this part I pass over briefly by objecting: since this question, Whether the soul was made from the substance of God, or from some matter preceding it: or whether before bodies souls were created in comparable stars, or simply, just as Pythagoras and certain others said, have been diligently investigated elsewhere.

Articulus 1 — Whether God Breathed into Man the Breath of Life, Such That the Soul Is a Part of God or of the Divine Substance

Whether God inspired into man the breath of life, so that the soul is a part of God or of the divine substance?

Whether God inspired into man the breath of life, such that the soul is a part of God or of the divine substance?

Concerning the first part, however, we can present the arguments of the heretics as follows: 1. God is not a breathing of another substance than His own: therefore, if He inspired into man the breath of life, He also breathes this to him from His own proper substance: therefore the soul is a part of God.

1. Likewise, inspiration or breathing into another is a movement of the spirit from the interior: therefore, since God inspires, there was a movement of the spirit of God's substance: but the interior things are substance: therefore the soul is taken from His substance.
2. Likewise, John 20:22: "He breathed on them, and said to them: Receive the Holy Spirit." And Augustine says that the breathing shows the Holy Spirit proceeds from His substance. Therefore, similarly here by breathing, He shows that the breath of man's life proceeds from His substance.
3. Likewise, the form of the exemplar and the image is the same: therefore it is necessary that the receptacle of that form be the same according to nature, and according to the diversity of form, the matter and subject are diversified: since therefore man is the image of God, it is necessary that in him there is a substance in which that form is impressed: and this will not be receptive of that form unless it is divine: therefore the soul is of the divine substance, as it seems.

However, there are other arguments of the Philosophers which seem stronger, but they are collected and solved elsewhere.

On the contrary, it can be objected thus:
1. Everything that is made from something is more perfect than that: the soul is made from the divine substance: therefore it is more perfect than it, which is absurd.

1. Likewise, whatever is potentially material to many things which are made from it, is imperfect with respect to any of them: the divine substance is material according to the heretic to every soul: therefore it is more imperfect.
2. Likewise, the divine substance is indivisible: but what is indivisible cannot be the matter of diverse things unless it is through its diverse parts in them: therefore the divine substance cannot be that from which all souls are made.
3. Likewise, the divine substance is not changeable by the choice of will: but the soul is changeable: therefore the soul is not from the divine substance.

And many other things can be objected to this.

Solution. It must be said that Pythagoras was the first author of this heresy, as Chrysostom says on Job. Then some others increased it, saying that God, matter, and the soul are the same: and they added some fantastical arguments which are solved elsewhere. Josephus seems to have agreed with this; because he says the soul is a particle of divinity placed in the body.

To the arguments, however, which are introduced here, it must be said that when it is said, "He inspired," effectively, that is, He made the spirit: and that it must necessarily be understood thus is proven by the arguments introduced on the contrary.

To the other, it must be said that this is not true if it speaks of the effect of the efficient cause: for then it operates upon foreign matter and induces the form of a created spirit, not from the interior of His own substance or essential: because the term of God is the same as consubstantial.

To the other, it must be said that the form of the exemplar and the image is not one except according to the reason of leading into another: for the image leads into the exemplar, and is not equal: but changing, as was previously held: and therefore that reasoning is not valid.

Articulus 2 — Whether the Soul Is Created in the Body or Outside the Body

Whether the soul is created in the body, or outside the body?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, there,
But whether in the body, or outside the body, etc.

For it seems that the soul is created outside the body: because Plato, Macrobius, and Gregory of Nyssa also seem to prove this: because he says that otherwise it would be mortal: and their words and reasons are sought elsewhere.

However, by reason it seems the same thus:

1. For a spiritual substance not depending on the body according to being, ought to be made before the body according to the order of dignity: the rational soul is such a substance: therefore it ought to be made before.
2. Likewise, everything that is this something, and a perfect being, is first in itself before it is in another: the soul is this something, and a perfect being according to itself: therefore it is first in itself than in the body. That the soul is this something is evident by this because it is a composite substance, and a composite substance is this something, as the Philosopher says.
3. Likewise, it is evident that according to being it does not depend on the body: therefore it is united to it by accident: therefore it has being substantially in itself: but the substantial is prior to the accidental: therefore it is prior in itself than in the body.
4. Likewise, just as the eternal is related to time, so the everlasting to the temporal: but the eternal is before time: therefore also the everlasting: since therefore the soul has a beginning and not an end, and is everlasting, but the body is generable and corruptible, it seems that it is created before the body.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
1. The soul is the substance of a physical body according to reason, as the Philosopher says in II De Anima, giving substance and reason to the physical body: none of such precedes that of which it is the substance: therefore neither does the soul.

1. Likewise, where was the incorporation before? For it cannot be placed in the star: because this is disproved and heretical: therefore it must have been among the Angels: therefore either it was compelled to be incarnated, or it chose by will. If it was compelled, since every compulsion has a punishment, the soul is punished before fault. Likewise, if it were compelled: then it would seek the dissolution of the body to be freed: and this we all clearly experience to be false. But if it chose: this was foolish, since it comes from a God-like intellect into that which shadows and obscures and infects it.

If you say that it was not thus in the body of Adam: because this was not infected. ON THE CONTRARY: The body of Adam did not have the vision of God with a God-like intellect: therefore the body of Adam also obscured the intellect, although less than our body.

Likewise, no form according to nature precedes its subject, but is the end of the generation of the composite: the rational soul is the ultimate form according to nature: therefore it does not precede its subject, but is the end of the generation of man.

Solution. It must be said that the souls of men are created by infusion, and by creating they are infused. Concerning the soul of Adam, Augustine and Gregory of Nyssa doubted, because of the work of creation from which God rested on the seventh day: and to their doubt it must be responded that there is creation for the restoration of nature, and from this God rested on the seventh day: and there is creation for the propagation of nature, and from this He never

rested, to such an extent that some even say He gives every substantial form by creation, as was shown above. Hence I think that even the soul of Adam was created in the body: and what Genesis says at the end of the first chapter, that God created man in His image: and afterwards in the second chapter it adds concerning the formation of him according to the body, I say that it is said by anticipation, as often happens in Scripture.

To what is objected against, it must be said to the first that this is false, that a spiritual substance, according to being not depending on the body, ought to be made before the body, if it is proposed generally. For there is a certain spiritual substance, according to being not depending on the body, which is the form and perfection of the body: and that ought not to be made according to the order of nature except with an organized body.

To the other it must be said, that the soul is this something, this is said by the Masters, not by the Philosophers, nor by the Saints: and I think that it is said falsely: because in the beginning of the book II De Anima it is held that matter is not this something, nor even form, and that the soul is not this something: but I well concede that the soul is a composite substance: but it is not composite as this something: because according to nature it has dependence on the body, although it could be without it. But I well concede that its perfection is not entirely complete without it.

To the other it must be said, that according to being not to depend on the body is said in two ways, namely that it is a form and corporeal power: as is heat, and cold, or the harmony of composition, or stoniness. Thus it is true that according to being it does not depend on the body: because it can be without it, although it is not in ultimate perfection without it. Or, it can be understood that dependence on the body is not of its being and definition. Thus it is false: because it is substantially determined to the body.

To the other it must be said, that the eternal does not precede time except in the order of dignity, nor does the soul as it is the form of the body, nor is it entirely outside of time, but rather on the horizon of time and eternity, as the Philosophers say: because according to substance it is outside; and according to the act of animation and works it is under time.

Articulus 3 — Whether a Body of Such a Kind Is Owed to the Soul, One That Is Composed of Contraries, or It Ought to Have Had a Celestial Body

Whether a body composed of contraries is owed to the soul, or whether it ought to have a celestial body?

Whether a body composed of contraries is owed to the soul, or whether it ought to have a celestial body?

Then it is asked concerning what is said there, "It is also customary to ask, Whether God made man, etc."

For some here ask, Whether a body composed of contraries is owed to the soul?

It seems that it ought to have a celestial body, because

1. Just as the form of a body relates to form, so a body ought to relate to a body: but the rational soul is proximate to intelligence, which according to some Philosophers is the form of the heavens: therefore its body ought to be proximate to the nature of the heavens: therefore it ought to be made from some star, as it seems.
2. Likewise, to the most noble forms in the genus of forms is owed the most noble matter in the genus of bodies: but the soul is rational and the most noble form, as the Philosopher says in I De Anima. For he says that the soul has a rational and most noble being according to nature: therefore the most noble matter in the genus of bodies is owed to it: therefore it seems that a celestial body is owed to it.
3. Likewise, the mover and the mobile, as the Philosopher suggests in the book De Caelo et Mundo, are proportional: but the soul is a perpetual mover: therefore a perpetual mobile is owed to it: but this is only a celestial body: therefore, etc.
4. Likewise, it seems that it ought to have a simple body: for to a simple mover is owed a simple mobile: but the soul is a simple mover: therefore a simple mobile is owed to it.
5. Likewise, the union of those having a symbol is easier: but the spiritual has a greater symbol to the simple than to the composite: therefore the soul will be more easily and better united to a simple body than to a composite one, as it seems.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
1. To a mover having diversity in powers, a mobile diversified in parts is owed: such a mover is the soul: therefore a mobile diverse in parts is owed to it: but this is not simple: therefore a composite is owed to it.

1. Likewise, every mover which is the form of a body according to itself and according to parts, ought to have a body diversely capable of receiving and preserving its powers: the soul is such a mover: therefore such a body is owed to it: but a homogeneous body is not naturally capable of receiving diverse powers: therefore a homogeneous body is not owed to it.
2. Likewise, a rare spiritual body like air does not retain what it receives: therefore it is not owed to it, but a dense, mixed, and complexioned body for receiving and retaining diverse powers.
3. Likewise, just as there is a distinction of forms and movers, so there is a distinction of mobiles and matters: but a homogeneous rare spiritual body does not retain a distinguishing figure: therefore such a body is owed to the soul that has a member distinct from a member, and is distinguished by figure from the body of another animal.

Solution. It must be said that the latter reasons are proper and proceed from proper physical principles, and the former are vain.

Therefore, it must be said to the first, that that comparison is none: because no one ever said that intelligence was the form of any body, either celestial or otherwise. But some Philosophers are found to have posited the souls of the heavens, that the heaven is composed of a mover and a mobile, and a soul and a body: but they say that the soul there is of a different nature than the soul of lower animals and humans. Hence there is no comparison, if it is according to the proportion to move, because intelligence moves through the forms it has, just as the desired moves desire, and the soul moves as a mover joined to a substantial mobile. But if a comparison is made by the nature of the intellectual operation which is in the soul and intelligence, then the reason is of no value: because neither is determined by a mobile body with respect to that operation. However, I say this, not asserting that intelligences are in such an order as the Philosophers say, but rather to show that the argument would be vain even according to the position of the Philosophers, that no soul is assigned a body insofar as it is a spiritual substance, whether intellectual or incorruptible, but rather insofar as there are moving powers in it: and since these are in the rational soul, nutritive, generative, and sensitive, and the like, it is necessary that the moved body has diversity according to those.

From this it must be said that the rational soul is the most noble form because it completes all the operations of the soul, namely natural, intellectual, and divine, as the Philosopher says. And therefore it does not follow that the most noble body is simply owed to it, but that the most noble in which it could fulfill such operations: and this is true, because this is complexioned and composed by the composition and complexions of man.

To the other it must be said that they are most proportionate: because as many moving powers as the soul has, so many diverse organs does the body have receiving those powers: nor is it valid that therefore a perpetual body is owed to it, because it itself is perpetual, unless it needs a perpetual mover: and this is not true: because it is perpetual in substance, and not in the reason of moving.

To the other it must be said that it is false that the soul is a simple mover. For I well concede that it is a simple substance, but the mover itself is composed by the universality of its moving and perfecting powers of the body: because (as the Philosopher says) the same must be taken in the parts as in the whole soul: so that just as it is in itself the perfection of the whole, so the parts are perfections and acts of the parts.

To the other it must be said that the symbol can be considered with respect to the substance of the soul insofar as it is a spiritual substance, and thus a body is not owed to it: because thus a body would be owed to every spiritual substance, which is clearly false. Or, the symbol can be considered according to the suitability of mobiles to movers, and thus the first is true: but what is further induced does not follow: because since the soul is a multiform mover in powers, it is not proportioned to a simple or uniform, but to a multiform complexioned and composed.

And thus it is clear that such reasons are vain, and cause error in natural science.

Articulus 4 — Whether Paradise Reaches to the Lunar Globe; And in What Place It Is Situated, Whether under the Equinoctial; And Why It Is Hidden

Whether paradise extends to the lunar globe? And, in what place is it situated, whether under the equinoctial? And, why is it hidden?

Then it is inquired about what is said there, "For the general airs from paradise," etc.

It is asked, if it is true what is said, that paradise reaches up to the lunar globe?

It seems false: because

1. Avicenna says and it is necessarily proven, that fire touches the orb of the moon from all sides: since the moon is the lowest body among the celestial, and its orb is the lowest orb: therefore, either fire is located in it or another body, or there is something empty between the last celestial body and the first body of the element. It is clear that there is no vacuum, nor anything from the five bodies, namely the celestial body, and the four elements: therefore it remains that fire is there: therefore trees and the pleasantness of water from a great fountain cannot be there, etc.

1. Likewise, Damascenus says that that fountain is the Ocean: therefore it seems that paradise was the world, and not a special place.
2. Furthermore, if it were a special place, why is there no habitation of men there? For a place is in vain where no one dwells. If you say that the first man deserved this because of sin: then it is asked, why do not men dwell nearby?

Furthermore, the rivers which flow from there are known: therefore it seems to be in our habitable world. However, these do not vary except by the latitude of the seven climates, and not by more: therefore since many cities are known in those, the place ought to be known, especially to the Philosophers who have written much about wonders.

Solution. It must be said without prejudice, that to reach the lunar globe is said in two ways. In one way, according to the dimension of the place: and thus it is not true what Bede says in the Letter. In another way, according to property, and thus it is true: because in the lunar circle the state and nature of incorruption begins: and paradise was the place of immortality and incorruption of men in the first state.

To the other, it must be said, namely to the saying of Damascenus, that that fountain is the Ocean according to origin, and not according to substance: because it is infused from the Ocean, and more noble, and more inexhaustible than other waters.

To the other, it must be said that that place is more secret from our habitable world: not that it is not in our habitable world, but that the Lord has closed it from us. And speaking without prejudice, it seems to me that it is on the equinoctial line towards the East in comparison to our habitation: however, there are opinions about the equinoctial line. For Avicenna and Nicholas in the commentary on the Almagest, and some others seem to want that place to be the best and most prepared. But some others say that it is an intemperate place. And it is proven by demonstration to be temperate thus:

The declination of the sun from the equinoctial is to each latitude almost to twenty-four degrees: however, it is clear that whatever is outside the latitude is regarded by the sun with an oblique ray only: however, an oblique ray is never perfect in the tempering of heat, but inclines to cold.

Likewise, a perpendicular ray is twofold according to the division of the sphere, namely staying and near one to another, and quickly passing and remote one from another: a perpendicular is reflected into itself: therefore it is very hot. If therefore it is staying and near one to another, there is an excess in heat: therefore by the opposite, if it is perpendicular not staying nor near one to another, it will be temperate.

Having this, it is inevitably proven that the place under the equinoctial line is most temperate. The equinoctial circle is one of the great circles of the sphere: therefore it divides the sphere into two halves: therefore the equidistant circles in which the sun revolves between the equinoctial line and the summer tropic will all be smaller than it: and the smaller, the more they approach the tropic of Cancer: therefore near the equinoctial the latitude between circle and circle will be greater, the more ample the sphere is: and near Cancer, the greater the proximity, the more narrow the sphere is: therefore the sun going from the equinoctial passes through circles more distant than near Cancer: therefore it passes more quickly through the latitude of the place.

However, that it does not stay so long over the earth is proven: because with the sun coming from the equinoctial, the greater the latitude, the longer the day: therefore the longer the stay of the sun's ray on the earth. And this is the cause that the land of Ethiopia which is under Cancer is very hot and intemperate: and temperate, that which is under the equinoctial: and that which is under the winter tropic, that is, under Capricorn, has these causes of heat: and besides these, one other beyond these, that is, the brevity of the sun's diameter: and therefore that is uninhabitable.

And by these reasons it seems to me to be acquiesced that that place is paradise.

However, there are reasons of others to the contrary not having the firmness of demonstration, namely that a place thrice regarded by the sun ought to be hotter than that which is regarded in two ways only: the equinoctial line is regarded thrice by the sun, and the place under the tropic in two ways: therefore it ought to be hotter. The proof of the middle is that twice in the year it is moved by a perpendicular ray over the heads of those dwelling under the equinoctial, namely in the head of Aries and Libra: and it regards it also with an oblique ray from each tropic, and the intermediate places: but the tropic is not touched except by the sun with a perpendicular ray, and it is elongated by an oblique ray from it by a latitude of forty-seven degrees and more: therefore if that is hot, so that men become black there, the place from which it is not so much elongated, but is immediately and twice touched by a perpendicular ray, will seem to be intemperate.

Likewise, we see that even cities which are of greater latitude than the tropic of Cancer are of excellent heat: how much more a place of no latitude.

But in my judgment these reasons do not have force as the first, and are sophistical. Because the cause of intemperate heat is not that it is touched twice by a perpendicular ray, or is less elongated: but rather the unequal stay of the ray over the earth, and the constriction of the equidistant circles in which the sun revolves, which makes the ray fall as if in the same place more often, is the cause of intemperate heat.

However, that paradise is there, we can estimate by another reason: because the Nile according to the sayings of the Saints exits from paradise: however, it is clear that it comes from Ethiopia into Egypt: however, Ethiopia is towards the equinoctial, since it is under Cancer: therefore it comes from the equinoctial or near.

Likewise, a sign of this is that it is said to flood twice in the year, and those who have come from that land report that with the sun being in Cancer and Capricorn it floods: however, with the sun being in those tropics, it is winter for those dwelling under the equinoctial, and it is their winter according to the elongation of the sun by only three signs: therefore the sun raises vapors, and does not consume them in that line: therefore rains fall there then. Therefore, since the Nile always floods then, it receives an increase of water from the rains falling under the equinoctial line: and this could not be unless it passed through that line: therefore it comes from under the equinoctial, and from paradise, as Scripture says: therefore it seems that paradise is there.

Therefore, this having been said by opinion, not by assertion, about the place of paradise.

However, what is objected, why is it hidden? It must be said that it is so that man might not grieve too much over the deprivation of such pleasantness, it was regenerated as a testimony of the first innocence.

Articulus 5 — Why One Tree In Paradise Was Called The Tree Of Life, And Another The Tree Of The Knowledge Of Good And Evil

Why is one tree in paradise called the tree of life, and another the tree of the knowledge of good and evil?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said, there, F, In this paradise, however, there were trees, etc.

For either these trees are named from their effect, or not. Thus: then the tree of the knowledge of good and evil causes the knowledge of good and evil, just as the tree of life, which is false,

because the contrary of this is said in the Text. If not: therefore, since there is one reason for the imposition of names, neither does the tree of life cause immortality: the contrary of which is held below.

Solution. The Master determines this quite suitably: because the tree of life is thus called from its effect and this is to be understood from the effect of the disposition of matter towards immortality but it did not cause the habit of immortality, as is proven below; but the other is called the tree of the knowledge of good and evil from the event which God foresaw.

To this, however, which is objected, it must be said that this is false, that there is one reason for the imposition of names.

DISTINCTIO XVIII

Divisio Textus

In the same paradise also he formed the woman, etc. Here it is treated concerning the formation of the woman. And there are here two things, namely concerning her formation, and concerning the questions following the formation and location and life of the first state in both: and concerning this is the following distinction, XIX, there, A, "Many things are accustomed to be asked," etc.

However, four things are determined here concerning the formation of the woman, namely in comparison to Adam from whom she was formed, and in comparison to the efficient cause of the formation, there, E, "It is also accustomed to be asked," Thirdly, concerning the formation in comparison to the causal reason of the works of the six days, there, F, "But it is asked, Whether," In the fourth, it treats of the formation of her according to the soul, there, H,

"Just as the body of the woman," etc.

Through this division the sentence is clear.

Articulus 1 — Whether the Rib from Which the Woman Was Formed Was of the Reality of Human Nature in Adam Himself or Not

Whether the rib from which the woman was formed was of the truth of human nature in Adam himself, or not?

Concerning the first part, it is asked whether the rib from which the woman was formed was of the truth of human nature, or not?

If not: then God created something superfluous in Adam, which is inconvenient to say: because if nature does not lack in necessities, and does not abound in superfluities, much less do these works of God have. But if it was of the truth of human nature in Adam: then it will rise again in Adam: since therefore the whole woman was made from that rib, nothing of the first woman will rise again.

If you say that the soul still remains which was not made from the rib. On the contrary: this is nothing, because the soul does not rise again. For Damascene says that resurrection is the second rising of that which fell; but the soul never fell through death: therefore it will never rise again.

Solution. It must be said that just as the superfluity of the nutritive moisture from which there is a decision in generation is called superfluous with respect to the need of the individual, yet it is necessary for the conservation of the species, and nature prepares both

because it intends to save both: so God, the author of nature, did not make in Adam only what was necessary for this man, but what was necessary for the beginning of universal nature: for Adam was indeed a man; and the beginning of men: and that rib was superfluous for this man, and necessary for the beginning of nature: because it was necessary that a helper similar to him be formed from that rib: and from this it is clear that it will rise again in Eve in whom it was necessary for this man, and not only for the species: just as also the seed rises again in the son or offspring, and not in the parent from whom it is descended: and through this the solution of the objections is clear.

Articulus 2 — Whether the Angels Ought to Have Formed the Body of Man, or God; And Whether It Belongs to God or to the Angels or to Good Men or Even to Evil Men to Work Miracles

Whether Angels ought to have formed the body of man, or God? And, whether it is of God or of Angels or of good men or even of evil men to perform miracles?

Then it is asked concerning the second part, there, "It is also accustomed to be asked," etc.

For it seems that Angels ought to have formed the body of man: because

1. There are two parts of man, body and soul. Similarly, there are two spiritual natures superior to man, God and Angel. If therefore the more dignified part is created by God, it remains that the less dignified part is formed by an Angel.
2. Likewise, among miracles Augustine assigns, as it is held in the Letter, that the woman was formed from a rib: but it is of the Angels who are called Virtues to perform miracles: therefore this ought to have been done by Angels.

For the sake of this, it is asked, whether it is of God, or of Angels, or of good men or of evil men to perform miracles?

For it seems that it is of God alone:
1. For in miracles, nothing is subjected in the elements of the world except the obedient power of matter: this is only with respect to divine power: therefore it seems that miracles are only with respect to divine power, and not of Angels, or of any men.

1. Likewise, in the natural course, the work of nature cannot be perfect unless God is operating in nature, as the Saints say: therefore much less in the course which is above nature: therefore it seems that miracles are not performed except by divine power operating.

But on the contrary, it seems that
1. It is attributed to Angels by the Saints.

1. Also, from this a special order is denominated.
2. Likewise, it is attributed to men. Whence, 1 Corinthians 12:10: "To another the working of miracles," that is, the operation of miracles.

3. Likewise, it seems that not only the good perform miracles, but also the evil: because it is said, Matthew 7:22: "Lord, Lord, have we not prophesied in thy name, and in thy name cast out devils?"

4. Likewise, the disciples said to the Lord: "Master, we saw someone casting out devils in your name, who does not..."

follows us, and we forbade him. Therefore it seems that both the good and the wicked perform miracles.

§ 2. By reason of this, it is asked: By reason of which virtue are miracles performed?

§ 3. It seems that they are by reason of hope: because 1. It [hope] is of the arduous: and a miracle, as Augustine says, is an arduous and unusual thing. 2. Also, hope is the expectation of future beatitude: miracles are performed for the sake of beatitude: therefore it seems that they are performed by the merit of hope.

§ 4. BUT against this it seems that they are by the merit of charity: because 1. Charity is the most perfect virtue: therefore the most perfect works are owed to it: but such is this operation of miracles: therefore the operation of miracles is owed to charity. 2. Also, the Angels who perform miracles do not have faith, nor hope, but charity: since therefore there is one habit for one operation, it seems that in men too the operation of miracles should not be owed to hope, or faith, but to charity.

§ 5. BUT against this it seems that it should be attributed to faith: because 1. The Lord says so: If you had faith like a mustard seed, you would say to this mulberry tree: Be uprooted, and transplanted into the sea: and it would obey you. Therefore it is owed to faith. 2. Also, If you can believe, all things are possible to the believer. 3. Also, 1 Corinthians 13:2 If I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, etc.: therefore as above.

§ 6. But if this is granted, it is further asked: By reason of which article [of faith]?

§ 7. And it seems that it is by reason of the Incarnation. Because Augustine says that every miracle is to show that [Incarnation]: therefore it seems that every miracle is by virtue of that; and this is the article of the Incarnation: therefore by virtue of this article. This also seems to be drawn from the Letter, where he says: Therefore of all things which were done not by the natural motion of things, but miraculously, to signify grace, the hidden causes were in God. And it is established that it notes the grace of the Incarnation: therefore all miracles are done by virtue of the article of the Incarnation; and yet more could be adduced from the third and fourth book of Augustine's On the Trinity.

§ 8. But against this it seems that they are done by reason of wisdom: because miracles show the reason of divine wisdom. For an artisan displays wisdom by acting in such a way that all are cured: but such are the works of miracles: therefore it seems that they show wisdom.

§ 9. But it seems again that they are done by reason of omnipotence: because 1. Also, the Angels to Sarah, Genesis 18:14 Is anything difficult for God? Therefore it seems that it is by reas-

on of omnipotence. 2. Also, omnipotence means to oppose the laws of natural power: but this occurs in a miracle: therefore they are done by reason of omnipotence.

§ 10. Solution. It should be said to the first that God, an Angel, and a man perform a miracle in different ways. For God does it by authority and by His primary operative power: while an Angel does it through ministry and by preparing the matter: and man through invocation. Hence it is well conceded that the Angels did something in the rib of Adam, namely by separating it from Adam, and preparing it through dispositions: but they could not form it, because to form the rib is to animate the woman, and this could not be except by creating for her a rational soul: and this is implied in the text, where it is said that only God could form the rib, but Angels act like farmers toward the crops: and by this the solution to the first two arguments, and to the following question, is clear.

§ 11. To the next it should be said that wicked men perform miracles in the holiness of the Church, although not in the holiness of the person: because God performs them at their invocation to comfort the faith of the Church: and sometimes to test the faith of the Church, as will happen in the times of the Antichrist.

§ 12. But if it is objected that his operation will be according to the working of Satan, as the Apostle says, in all power, and lying signs, and wonders. It should be said that they can be lies with respect to intention, because through them he intends to subvert: although they are true with respect to operation: and perhaps some will be illusory, concerning which it was treated above.

§ 13. To the next it should be said that those two reasons which are induced to show that it belongs to God alone to perform miracles, only prove that it is His to do so by authority and by a power perfect for the work from itself: and this is well conceded: but an Angel operates under Him by disposing through ministry, and man through invocation.

§ 14. TO THIS which is further asked: To which virtue does it belong to perform miracles? It should be said that it properly belongs to faith, although it belongs to the others by way of merit in common: and the reason for this is: because faith is primarily about those things that are above reason, and therefore it confirms in others through those things that are according to reason.

§ 15. Also, just as faith causes one to deny the proper power of reason, so it is fitting that the divine power should operate in it: and therefore even the Philosophers said that a Prophet rising up has no way to prove the truth of his words except through miracles: and therefore even the Prophets gave signs, as in Isaiah 7:11 Ask a sign for yourself.

§ 16. TO THIS therefore which is objected concerning hope, it should be said that the arduousness of hope is not an arduousness of operation, but rather that it should be comprehended in beatitude: but miracles are rather done to show the way of beatitude.

§ 17. TO THE NEXT it should be said that all things are done for the sake of beatitude, as for an ultimate end: but the proximate end is the confirmation of faith, as is held in Hebrews

2:4 God bearing witness by signs, and wonders: and Mark 16:17 And these signs will follow those who believe: In my name, etc.

§ 18. To that which is objected concerning charity, it should be said that according to the perfection of the informing of merit, charity is the perfection of the virtues: but not according to the fittingness of the operation of miracles.

§ 19. To the next it should be said that Angels operate in ministry: but we are asking about the merit of fittingness on the part of the one invoking: and therefore that objection proves nothing.

§ 20. To that which is further asked: By reason of which article? I say that it is primarily by reason of omnipotence: because a miracle primarily bespeaks an elevation above all power except the divine.

§ 21. TO THAT which is objected to the contrary, it should be said that miracles show the work of the Incarnation, or the grace of faith of the Incarnation as an end, but not as the operating power, but rather the omnipotence of God which does these things and faith: for he who believes in the power, merits that miracles be done at the invocation of the believer: through this the solution to the following is also clear.

§ 22. To that which is objected concerning wisdom, it should be said that they are not done by wisdom, nor do they primarily show wisdom, nor do men marvel at wisdom, but rather at power. For admiration of wisdom arouses one to inquire into the work and the mode of the work: as the Philosopher says in the first book of the Metaphysics: From wondering both then and now they began to philosophize. But admiration of power ceases from inquiry, and is astounded in itself: and that is the admiration of divine miracles, as was said of the Lord: What kind of man is this, that the winds and the sea obey him?

Articulus 3 — What a Miracle Is by Definition; Then It Is Asked about What He Says There

What is a miracle by definition? Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there,

What is a miracle by definition? Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, F, But it is asked, whether the reason which God, etc.

§ 25. And four things are asked, namely, what is a miracle? because without knowledge of that, the things handed down here cannot be well determined. Secondly, what things are called miracles? Thirdly, what is the difference between a miracle, and a marvel, a sign, a prodigy, a portent, and a monster? Fourthly, whether every miracle is against nature, or above nature, or outside nature?

§ 26. To the first, one proceeds by two definitions, the first of which is Augustine's in the book On the Advantage of Believing, namely this: A miracle is something arduous and unusual appearing beyond the expectation and faculty of the one admiring. The other is that of the Masters, namely this: A miracle is a manifestation of divine power.

§ 27. Against the first definition, namely Augustine's, it is objected as follows: 1. Those things that are called miracles are not always arduous, but sometimes concern small things, as that the blessed Benedict returned a sieve whole to his nurse, that when Elisha threw wood upon the water, the iron swam, and the like: therefore a miracle is badly defined by "arduous." 2. Also, it is not always "unusual": because apparitions of Angels frequently occurred to the Fathers: and yet they were wonderful. 3. Also, let us posit that they occur frequently, then they will not be unusual: and yet they will be no less miracles than if they occurred rarely: therefore a miracle is not unusual, or to be unusual will not be substantial to a miracle. 4. Also, it does not seem to be "beyond expectation": because the greatest of all miracles, namely that a Virgin would conceive and give birth, and God would become man, all the ancients expected: and yet it was a miracle. 5. Also, we all expect the resurrection: and yet it will be miraculous: therefore it is not beyond expectation. 6. Also, against what he says, And faculty: it is either understood of the faculty of cognition, or of operation. If of cognition: then all works of nature will be miraculous in this respect: because Solomon says that a man cannot find the reason for those things that are done under the sun. But if of the faculty of operation: then they are much more miracles: because although art imitates nature, yet it cannot follow it in operating: and therefore the Philosopher says that art does not induce a specific form by itself as nature does: therefore it seems that a miracle is badly defined by Augustine.

§ 28. Against the second it is objected as follows: Every work of divine power is declarative: therefore every work is miraculous, which is to say nothing.

§ 29. SOLUTION. It should be said that Augustine's definition is good, and the Masters' is not as good, but nevertheless it can be sustained.

§ 30. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the first two differences posited in the definition of a miracle define it in comparison to other things which are not done miraculously, such as those that are done by nature, and by human will. But the first, which is "arduous," is said in comparison to the efficient cause, which is elevated above the causes of natural and voluntary things: and therefore the solution to the first is already clear: because although the thing in which the miracle is done is small, yet the power doing it is elevated and arduous.

§ 31. To the next it should be said similarly, that even if a miracle occurred all day long, it would still be unusual: because it does not happen in the usual course according to inferior causes, but rather according to a reason hidden in God from the ages, as is said in the Letter. Yet there are those who solve these and the following otherwise: but this is not much to be cared about: because the question is not very laborious.

§ 32. To the next it should be said that according to the intention of Augustine, "expectation of nature" is meant there: as is held in Romans 4:18 , upon that, Who against hope believed in hope, the Gloss says: Against the hope of nature in the hope of grace: and this is true: because although there was a hope of grace concerning such things, there was never a hope of nature: and this solution is according to the intention of Augustine. But others concede the objection, and say that such things are marvels and not miracles: and I think that they do not speak well.

§ 33. To the next it should be said that "faculty" is called there the power of knowing and operating: because neither by knowing nor by operating can we attain to a miracle.

§ 34. To that which is objected to the contrary, it should be said that we have the power of knowing the works of nature through causes, although not sufficient ones: but in miracles we do not attain the mode of the cause. Similarly, we imitate natural things, and operate some things in the work: but we can admire marvels, but cannot imitate them.

§ 35. Through this it is clear that the last two differences are posited in the definition of a miracle in comparison to the one admiring.

§ 36. TO THAT which is objected concerning the definition of the Masters, it should be said that it must be understood with precision, so that a miracle is only a manifestation of divine power: just as the magicians said to Pharaoh: This is the finger of God, that is, a demonstration of divine virtue and power. But other works show other proximate powers, although they show divine power as the primary one.

Articulus 4 — What Are Called Miraculous: Whether the Work of Creation, Distinction, Ornament, Justification, Incarnation, Resurrection, and Also the Work of Nature

What things are called miraculous: Whether the work of creation, distinction, adornment, justification, incarnation, resurrection, and even the work of nature?

§ 39. Secondly it is asked, What things are miracles? And it is asked concerning the work of creation, whether it is miraculous? And it seems that it is: because 1. Anselm and Chrysostom distinguish a threefold course of things, namely that which happens by divine will alone, and that which by divine will and nature, and that which happens by the will of a rational creature: and the first they call a marvel, the second natural, the third voluntary: but the work of creation is done by divine will alone: therefore it is miraculous. 2. Also, it cannot be the work of a man, or of an Angel. Also, neither of nature: because then nature did not exist. Therefore it is left that it is miraculous, or natural, or voluntary.

§ 40. If it is asked concerning the work of recreation through justification. It seems that it is a work of miracle: because 1. Augustine says: It is a greater thing to make a pious man out of an impious one, than to create heaven and earth: therefore it is the work most manifesting power: but this is a miracle: therefore it is a miracle. 2. Also, Gregory in the book of Dialogues says that it is a greater thing to raise a man in mind, than in body: and he proves this by Paul raised in mind, and Lazarus raised in body: of one of whom wondrous things are read after his raising in mind, but of the other nothing great is read after his raising in body.

§ 41. Also, in the same place he implies another reason for this: because it is a greater thing to give life to souls that will live forever, than to bodies that will die again: therefore it is a work of miracle.

§ 42. BUT IF this is conceded, it seems to the contrary, because 1. A miraculous work is by divine power alone operating, and man not cooperating, but perhaps an Angel cooperating, as was held before: but Augustine says: He who created you without you, will not justify you

without you: therefore it seems that man cooperates with God here: therefore it is not miraculous. 2. Also, it is not beyond expectation, nor unusual: therefore it is not a miracle.

§ 43. FURTHER it is asked concerning the works of nature, whether they are marvels? It seems that they are: because Augustine says that it is a greater thing to multiply the harvest of the whole world from a few grains, than to multiply five loaves to the satiety of five thousand men: therefore it seems that while the latter is a miracle, the former is much more a miracle. And many Glosses upon John 6:1 and seq. , can be adduced for this, and upon John 2:1 and seq. , where it is read concerning the changing of water into wine.

§ 44. BUT AGAINST THIS: Augustine upon Genesis, and this part is posited in the Letter, distinguishes between those things which were in the account of causes of the first works, as whence they should be made: and those which were in them, so that from thence they could nevertheless be made: and among the former he enumerates the works of nature, as that moisture is drawn into the vine, and digested there is turned into wine. But among the latter he enumerates the changing of water into wine: which nature cannot do.

§ 45. Since therefore the latter are miraculous, the former are not miracles.

§ 46. FURTHER, some object concerning the Incarnation and Resurrection, wishing to prove that they are not miracles, because they do not occur beyond expectation: but this objection is worth nothing to me.

§ 47. Solution. It should be said that every work, and only that, is called miraculous which does not happen according to the law of nature, nor according to the law of a created purpose or created will: and therefore the work of creation, and of disposition, and of adornment I repute among miracles: although some say that it is a marvel, and not a miracle: the reason for which distinction will be clear below. But the work of justification, although it is above us, yet does not happen except according to the law of the will: because not unless we consent: and therefore I do not call it miraculous or a marvel: but the work of nature is in no way miraculous or a marvel, since it is entirely subject to the laws of nature. But the work of incarnation and resurrection I think must be entirely placed under the number of miracles.

§ 48. TO THAT which is objected to the contrary, it should be said that the work of justification is in a certain respect a manifestation of greater power, and not simply: because in the creation of heaven and earth there was no contrary disposition inclining to the opposite: but in the justification of man there is the contrary disposition of sin:

§ 49. Also, creating heaven and earth, He only spoke, and they were made: in justification He did many things, said infinite things, endured very many things. In this respect, therefore, it shows greater power, but simply it shows greater goodness. Nor does it follow, "this work shows greater power: therefore it is a greater miracle than that": because a miracle is not enunciated from that alone, but from that and also other differences, defining it.

§ 50. TO THE REASONING of Gregory in the book of Dialogues, it should be said that he does not intend to prove that it is a miracle, but that it is a more useful and better thing: and therefore more marvelous in goodness, and not more miraculous.

§ 51. To the next it should be said that the work of nature is not miraculous: and I well concede that carrying nature shows a greater power than multiplying loaves: and the solution to those things which are induced is clear from what has been said.

§ 52. To the next it should be said that, in my judgment, those are miracles: but that it is said in the definition "beyond expectation," is understood of the expectation of nature, and not the expectation of grace which is a virtue.

Articulus 5 — How Miracle, Marvel, Sign, Portent, Prodigy, Monster, And Power Differ

How do a miracle, a marvel, a sign, a portent, a prodigy, and a monster, and a virtue differ?

§ 54. Thirdly it is asked, what is the difference between a miracle, a marvel, a sign, a portent, a prodigy, and a monster?

§ 55. The Gloss upon 1 Corinthians 12:10 seems to say that signs are lesser, and prodigies are greater.

§ 56. Also, a marvel and a miracle do not seem to differ except as potency and act: therefore they are of the same kind.

§ 57. Solution. It should be said that according to the Masters a marvel and a miracle differ as genus and species: because every miracle is a marvel, but it is not converted: hence they say that the works of creation, and justification, and glorification are marvels, which are not beyond expectation, and therefore with respect to some difference fall away from the definition of a miracle: but they say miracles are like the illumination of the blind, the making straight of the lame, and the raising of the dead, and the like, concerning which there is no expectation. But according to the name they do not differ except as potency and act: and through this the solution to the object is clear.

§ 58. Some also distinguish between a wonder [mirum] and a marvel [mirabile]: because a wonder is having an unknown cause, and a marvel, and a miracle, are dependent on divine power alone, as has been said. But I have not found these definitions, nor do I remember finding them proven. But if we wished to speak according to the Philosophers, then a marvel is called that which has a high cause which is beautiful to investigate, but difficult to find, like the eclipse of the moon or the sun, and like the knowledge of the passions of the soul and of nature and of spiritual substances: but this usage is not found among the Saints.

§ 59. But a sign, and a prodigy, and a virtue differ. For a sign is said insofar as it is an indication of divine power, but a prodigy insofar as it provokes the gaze of men unto itself since it is far from the indication of human knowledge: and therefore it is called a prodigy [prodigium] as if far from the finger [procul a digito], that is, the power of indicating the cause: and therefore the Gloss says that a sign is in lesser things, and a prodigy in greater things. Some also say that because the future is far off, a prodigy is a sign promised for the future, which is indicated far in advance by the finger of pre-announcement: but I do not believe that this can be proven by example or authority. But a virtue is said in comparison to the operating power: because that is ultimate above nature and the faculty of nature: but virtue is called the ultimate of power concerning a thing.

§ 60. But a monster is that which exceeds the measure of nature: and this happens in multiple ways, namely from a defect, as a hand at the shoulder: or from an abundance: and this in three ways, namely of power to the form of one member, like many mouths, or noses, or ears on one head: or from an abundance of matter in one member, like six or more fingers: or with respect to quantity only, as the sons of Anakim are called monsters, because others compared to them seemed like locusts: and sometimes it happens from the motion of the womb dividing the seed in part and leaving it continuous in part, as when it diffuses through the length of the womb, and spreads apart in one part, for then two bodies divided for a part are generated continuous with each other in the undivided part: but sometimes this happens from the rupture of the afterbirth when the humor is still liquid, as Aristotle seems to say. But to inquire about these is the business of another discipline.

Articulus 6 — Whether Miracles or Marvels Are Against Nature; And What the Difference Is between Being Able to Be Done and Being Done of Necessity

Whether miracles or marvels are against nature? and, What is the difference between being able to happen, and happening from necessity?

§ 63. Fourthly it is asked, whether those things which are called miracles and marvels, are against nature, or not?

§ 64. But it seems that they are not: because 1. Augustine says: Who does not know that water co-created with the earth, when it comes to the roots of the vine, is drawn into the nourishment of that wood: and in it assumes a quality by which it proceeds little by little erupting into the grape, and as it grows larger, becomes wine and sweetens as it matures, which while still fermenting is pressed, and strengthened by some aging, arrives more useful and pleasant for the use of drinking? Did God therefore seek wood or earth, or these delays of time, when by a wondrous shortcut He converted water into wine, and such wine that even a drunk guest would praise? Did the founder of time need the help of time? Does not the whole nature of serpents coalesce, take form, get born, and grow strong by certain numbers of days accommodated to each of its kind? Were these days awaited, so that the rod would be converted into a serpent from the hand of Moses and Aaron? Nor when these things happen, do they happen against nature, except to us to whom the course of nature has become known otherwise, but not to God, to whom whatever He has made is nature. Therefore it seems that none of these things is against nature.

§ 65. 2. If you say that there is natura naturans which is God, and against this nothing is: and natura naturata which is created nature in the contexture of causal reasons of nature, and against this miracles are done: and by this distinction you wish to solve the statement of Augustine. To the contrary: Augustine, in the same place: But it can rightly be asked, those causal reasons which He implanted in the world when He first created all things together, how were they instituted? And below: It remains that they were created apt for both modes, whether for that by which temporal things most usually run their course, or for that by which rare and marvelous things happen, just as it pleased God to do. Therefore miracles are according to the causal reasons implanted in created nature: therefore they do not happen against it.

§ 66. This is also openly said in the Letter.

§ 67. BUT AGAINST THIS: 1. 1 Corinthians 12:10, upon that, The operation of miracles [virtutum], the Gloss says thus: Signs and prodigies are in those things which happen against nature. 2. Also, Romans 11:24 You were grafted against nature into a good olive tree.

§ 68. FURTHER it is asked here, what difference is noted in these ways of speaking which are had here and are drawn from Book IX on Genesis, that God implanted some things in the first works so that they could happen, and some so that it was necessary for them to happen? 1. For none of the inferior generable things is generated of necessity, as the Philosophers prove: therefore it seems that it is not necessary to happen. 2. Also, whatever can happen, if it is posited to happen, is nothing marvelous. 3. Also, whatever is necessary to happen, can happen: therefore it seems that these are related as superior and inferior: therefore they are wrongly divided against each other: for if He implanted those things which usually happen into that first condition of things, so that thus it would be necessary for them to happen, it would behoove that He also implanted that they could thus happen.

§ 69. Solution. It should be said according to Augustine, that if we consider the primordial causes of the first condition and the causal reasons only, nothing seems to happen against the nature first implanted in things: because God implanted in them even the causal and primordial reasons of miracles: and Augustine says that just as He cannot act against Himself: so He cannot act against those reasons, and against His work wisely disposed.

§ 70. Hence upon that of the Apostle to Romans 11:24, which was adduced, the Gloss of Augustine says: God the creator and founder of all natures does nothing against nature: but by human custom it is said to be against nature, which is against the use of nature known to mortals.

§ 71. Also, Augustine, City of God: Those which are portents, we say are against nature, but they are not: for how is it against nature, that which happens by the will of God?

§ 72. To the other Gloss which says that they happen against nature, it should be said that this is true with respect to the other two genera of causes, namely natural and seminal: because they were not according to natural or seminal causes.

§ 73. TO THAT which is further asked, it should be said that as the Commentator says upon Book XI of the Metaphysics, nothing is in potency in anything unless it is drawn out of it by one mover according to nature: and this the Philosopher also implies, saying that white is made from non-white: and not from just any non-white, because not from the non-white which is a line: but from the non-white which is black, or a medium, that is, which is a principle in the proper matter of white: and therefore when Augustine says that some things were implanted in the first condition so that it is necessary for them to happen, he does not mean of the necessity of existing, but of the necessity which is in the sufficiency of natural principles, namely that they have in natural causes a mover and a moved and dispositions, and all things which are required for their happening: and therefore that which is objected to the contrary is not valid: because this is true of the necessity of existing in being: but when he says that He implanted some things so that they can happen, he means that the word can denotes a potency of obedience on the part of nature only, which has no mover in all the principles of nature, but outside, because they happen by the working of God's will alone.

§ 74. TO THE OBJECTION to the contrary, it should be said that there is an equivocation of potency: because there it is understood of a potency having a mover in nature: but here of a potency of obedience only: just as we say that in a tree trunk there is a potency, that from it a calf could be made by God: yet it is not in it so that it is made from it [naturally]: because for it to happen in act an acting principle is also required: and this is not in the tree trunk.

§ 75. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 7 — What Are Called, and How They Differ, Primordial Causes, Causal Reasons, Natural Causes, and Seminal Causes

What are they called, and how do primordial causes, causal reasons, natural causes, and seminal causes differ?

What are they called, and how do primordial causes, causal reasons, natural causes, and seminal causes differ?

§ 78. Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, F, These are primordial causes, etc. For here he names four genera of causes, namely primordial causes, causal reasons, and natural causes, and seminal causes: and these names are found here in the two following chapters, and are drawn from book IX of Augustine upon Genesis.

§ 79. But it seems that primordial causes are natural: because 1. He says below, that even seminal causes are primordial with respect to those things which are made from them. 2. Also, causal reasons seem to be the same as natural ones: because nothing of natural things happens which does not have the reason of an end: since therefore a reason primarily bespeaks an end, it seems that a natural cause and a rational one are the same. 3. Also, seminal causes and natural causes seem to be the same: because a seed is the appropriated nature of a species: therefore it has a natural cause, and a natural cause is that from which a species is made and conserved.

§ 80. SOLUTION. It should be said that Augustine posits all these names without distinction, and many have made a manifold distinction here, nor does the distinction of one agree with another: and therefore I will not posit their sentences, but according to the accounts of the names I will posit one. A primordial cause, therefore, is so called in two ways, namely simply first, and first in a certain respect. The simply first is the idea in the divine mind, which is related to all ideated things whether they be marvels or natural things: and this is called hidden in God from eternity. But it is called primordial in a certain respect in two ways, namely universally, and particularly. Universally, like the causes of essence or natural causes, which are implanted in the first condition of things with respect to all things which are in it, whether so that it is necessary for them to happen, or so that they can happen. And thus primordial causes have under them causal reasons, and natural causes, and seminal causes. But particularly, any causes which precede the origin of that which is made from them are called primordial: and this sense the Master touches upon in the Letter: and thus sometimes natural and seminal causes are primordial, and they differ according to the accounts of the name.

§ 81. But causes which are called causal reasons, are properly with respect to those things which are so implanted that the first condition of things has nothing but a potency of obedience to them, namely by which they can be made from it: but they do not have the necessity of principles in nature: and I say this by this reason, because a reason looks to the end: and such things are always done to indicate that which is simply the end, namely the state of grace and glory.

§ 82. Also, a reason bespeaks something simpler than the thing, because it is drawn from the thing: a cause also does not always bespeak an intrinsic principle: and therefore causal reasons according to the name denote a potency implanted in the first condition with respect to works which are drawn out from it miraculously and not naturally.

§ 83. But when he says natural causes, he means an intrinsic principle, but not necessarily a proper one: because the Philosopher says that nature is the cause of the order of the universe: and therefore natural causes are properly the universal contexture of causes in created things disposed and ordered, as was said above. Yet there are those who say, because nature is principally form, that the formal cause is called here the natural cause: but this is not true...

according to the usage of Augustine, as is easily evident to one examining the intention of Litzere.

However, seminal causes add a property over natural ones to this or that species.

From this, therefore, the reason is evident for what was said in the preceding question, that miracles occur against natural and seminal causes, but not against causal reasons and primordial causes.

It must be noted here that some miracles seem to be against natural causes, some above, some beyond these: the reason for which is this: because some miracles have something in which nature can also act, but not in that manner: as a blind man seeing, after he had eyes: and a dead man living after the return of the soul, and the like: for living, seeing, walking, are natural acts: but the return to such things through a miracle is beyond nature. However, it seems to be against natural causes when an act indeed exists while the contrary disposition remains through nature: as if someone remaining blind were to see: and thus is the singular miracle of the glorious Virgin in childbirth: because while virginity, which is a contrary property to childbirth, remained, she gave birth. However, it is above nature when it is terminated in an act into which nature cannot: such as the glory of bodies, and the miracle of the incarnation in the unity of deity and humanity.

And let these things said about the miracle suffice.

Articulus 8 — Whether the Soul Is from Propagation, namely the Vegetative, the Sensitive, and the Rational

Whether the soul is from transmission, namely vegetative, sensitive, rational?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, "Just as the body of a woman," etc.

For here the question arises, Whether the soul is from transmission? and, because it is treated elsewhere at length, therefore here I briefly pass over it by objecting theologically thus:

1. Genesis 46:26 says: "All the souls that went with Jacob into Egypt, and came out of his thigh": therefore the soul is sown with the body, therefore it is from transmission like the body.
2. Likewise, the soul contracts original sin: but in the body there is no original sin, as will be clear below, because the body is not susceptible to sin and guilt: therefore it does not contract from the body: therefore it is necessary that it is from the soul of the parent: therefore it is from transmission from the soul of the parent.
3. Likewise, the Philosopher says that the soul is in the seed like an artisan in the artifact: therefore it seems that it is sown there: therefore from transmission.
4. Likewise, he says that embryos live the life of a plant: but they do not live except through the soul: therefore they have a soul: and not unless it is sown: therefore the soul is from transmission.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
The soul is the act of a physical body having the potential for life: and this does not pertain only to the rational soul, but also to the vegetative, as the Philosopher says, and the sensitive: therefore it is not in the seed, nor can it be.

Solution. It must be said that according to Catholic faith, and according to the Philosophers, no soul is from transmission, neither of a plant, nor of a brute, nor of a human: and through the error of natural science contrary opinions have been induced: for some say that spiritual matter is divided with the seed, from which the soul of a brute and a vegetative is made: and no Philosopher ever felt this, as is evident in their books, Aristotle in books XV and XVI of the Animals, and Avicenna who explains Aristotle's words entirely in another way. And similarly Averroes in a certain book on the Virtue of the formative power.

Therefore, it must be said to the first, that the whole is put for the part: because the body exists from the thigh.

To the other, it must be said that the soul contracts original sin from the flesh: and therefore it is not valid, it is not in the flesh: therefore it is not contracted from the flesh: just as if it were said, liquefaction and heating are not in the sun: therefore they are not contracted from it: for this reasoning does not hold except in univocal agents, and not in equivocal agents. However, it could be said that it is in the flesh as in a cause, and not as in a subject.

To the other, it must be said that Aristotle explains himself in book XVII of the Animals, and Avicenna and Averroes expound that the power of the soul is called there the soul: and this is the formative power, which is given to the seed by the power of the genitals completely, also dispositively by the heart, and liver, and brain, and materially by the whole body: and this is called the soul because of the act of the soul.

If you say that power is not without a subject: and therefore if there is power there, there is a subject: I say that the argument arises from a bad understanding of natural things: because the power of the soul is twofold, namely effective or efflux from the soul into the body: and its subject in the seed is the corporeal spirit of the seed, which relies on heat, as Aristotle says, namely the first, of the element which is directing, and the second, of the heaven which is moving towards substance and species, and the third, of the soul which is forming and shaping the organs.

And this power is indeed without a subject. However, there is another part of the power of the soul, and this cannot be without a subject.

To the other, it must be said that the seed is said to live, just as the egg of the wind is said to live by the Philosopher in the same book: and this is from the act of nourishment and potential: because the seed is likened to a son going out of the father's house, who carries a part of the substance with him, and multiplies it by trading: thus the seed brings with it a part of the substance from which the roots are made, and attracts a part from elsewhere from the seed of the mother or menstrual blood: and that nourishment is for the formation of the organs: and therefore it is equivocal to the nourishment of the vegetative soul.

However, how no soul is from transmission and none in the seed, is shown elsewhere diligently: through these, however, the solution of the objections is sufficiently clear.

DISTINCTIO XIX

Divisio Textus

Here, several questions are usually asked about the state of the first man, etc.

Here, he determines certain consequent questions concerning the state of both, namely Adam and Eve.

And there are three questions. The first is about their immortality according to the difference from that which we will have in the homeland after the resurrection. The second, Whether that immortality was from nature or from grace? there, B, It is usually asked here, When The third, Whether the first man, etc., had immortality from the tree of life? there, C,

But it is still asked, If not, etc.

From these, in the following disputation, the opinion is clear.

Articulus 1 — Whether Man Is Immortal According to the Soul

Whether man according to the soul is immortal?

Whether man according to the soul is immortal?

Concerning the first, two questions arise which are both diligently treated elsewhere. The first is, Whether man according to the soul is immortal? The second, Whether the first man in the body could be immortal?

To the first, it proceeds thus: It seems that the soul dies with the body, because

1. Solomon says, "The fate of humans and animals is the same."
2. Also, Wisdom 2:1: "There is no one who has been recognized to have returned from the dead."
3. Also, by physical reasons thus: Whatever things are defined to each other by essential definition, neither of them can exist without the other: body and soul are defined to each other by essential definition: therefore neither of them can exist without the other. This is evident in itself. The second is proved by the definition that the soul is the act of a physical body having the potential for life. And that it is essential is evident because otherwise the soul would be united to the body accidentally: and thus there would not be one substance from body and soul, which is false.
4. Also, no form has existence except in a subject and in matter: the soul is a form, as the Philosopher says: therefore it does not have existence except in a subject and matter: therefore, with the body not existing, the soul does not exist.
5. Also, according to the Philosopher, something is corporeal in two ways, namely because it is from contraries, or because it is carried over by being upon a composite from contraries, or essentially joined to it. And those are corrupted accidentally: the soul, however, thus carried or joined, is upon a composite from contraries: therefore it is corporeal.

But on the contrary, the Masters object with probable reasons, taking entirely proven authorities from the Philosopher, namely,

1. The intellect is the act of no body: therefore it is not corrupted by the corruption of any body.
2. Also, the soul relates to the body as a sailor to a ship: but the sailor is separable: therefore the intellect and soul.
3. Also, they object from certain conveniences thus: Since where there is to find extremes, there must be a medium: but we find an incorruptible spiritual substance not joined to a body, like Angels: and a corruptible spiritual substance joined to a body, like the sensitive and vegetative soul: therefore there will be a middle substance, namely an incorruptible spiritual substance joined to a body: and this cannot be corruptible: because if it is corruptible, it is either corruptible per se, or per accidens: not per se: because nothing is corruptible per se except what is composed of contraries, which cannot pertain to a spiritual substance: per accidens, however, it cannot be corruptible, since it is joined to what is corruptible per se: therefore one medium remains, namely an

incorruptible spiritual substance joined to a body. And many other similar things I have placed elsewhere.

One is the reasoning of Avicenna, which is better than all others: for it is doubtful what others who follow Philosophy would respond to such propositions if they were proposed to them. The reasoning of Avicenna is physical, and it is this: If the soul is corrupted with the corrupted body, it is either corrupted per se, or per accidens. If per se, since according to Philosophy nothing is corrupted per se, except what has potential from the composition of contraries to non-being, it is necessary for the soul to have simultaneously the act of existing as now, and the potential of not existing: either according to the same, or according to different things. Not according to the same: because the same is never the principle of existence: because existence is from form, and the principle of corruption is the composition from contraries: therefore it will have this from different things: therefore it has in itself a composite from contraries, namely hot, cold, moist, dry, and form: therefore it is a body, or the harmony of a body: and both of these are disproved by the Philosopher in the first book of On the Soul. If, however, it is corrupted per accidens: this cannot be, unless because according to being it depends on the body. Either therefore it depends on it as on what is simultaneous according to nature and being, or as on a prior, or as on a posterior. If as on what is simultaneous, then it would be necessary that they are relative to each other: because only those are simultaneous by intellect: but all correlatives are opposites, from which one is never made: therefore from body and soul one is never made. If as from a prior: either as from a prior in time, or as from a prior cause. If the first: therefore now the rational soul will be in matter as in potential: but every such form is drawn out from matter and is its act, and does not have operation except in matter: therefore the rational soul is the act of the body, and does not have operation except in the body, which was disproved above, since its principal operation is not perfected except by abstracting from the body and the appendages of matter, as is understanding. If, however, it depends as from a prior cause: this cannot be as from matter, since this has already been disproved: therefore as from an efficient, or final cause: and each of those is evidently false: because in the causality of the efficient, and form, and end, the soul relates more to the body, than conversely. Moreover, the efficient and matter do not coincide in the same, and the body, as proved by all Philosophers, is the matter of the soul: therefore it is not the efficient cause, or end. If, however, it depends on it as from a posterior. On the contrary: the prior can exist without the posterior: therefore the soul can exist without the body.

You should know, however, that this disposition depends on two others: one of which is, that the soul is a substance: and the other, that it is not a corporeal power which is divided when the body is divided: and all these reasons with the preambular questions according to the physical order are placed elsewhere.

Solution. There is no doubt that the soul is immortal, nor is there anyone who doubts, except one who diligently seeks the life of beasts.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that Solomon speaks there in the manner of a preacher, but not in the manner of one asserting: whence he also says many other foolish things there by collecting.

To the other, it must be said that the impious erring ones said that, who do not judge the honor of the souls of the saints.

To the other, it must be said that the soul is the entelechy of a physical body: but from this it does not follow that it is not separable: but rather that it has substantial dependence, because it is not perfect, as exercising all operations in the body, but some: and therefore it is proved to be separable.

To the other, it must be said that if it were joined to the body as a form drawn out from it, which fulfills all its operations in it, then the argument would proceed: but it is not so, and therefore even the sensitive and vegetative soul, in brutes and plants, are corruptible: and they are not in the image of God: but the rational soul is immortal in the image of God. Whence upon that, "In the image man passes," the Gloss says: The soul is made immortal, and Gregory in the book of Dialogues: Man, as he is created in the middle, so he communicates with the higher and lower nature, immortal in spirit with the Angel, mortal and corruptible in body with the beast.

Articulus 2 — Whether the First Man Could Have Been Immortal in Body; And Whether Adam in the First State Received a Passible Soul or a Passible Body

Whether the first man could have been immortal in body? And, whether Adam in the first state received a passible soul or a passible body?

ARTICULUS HW.

Whether the first man could have been immortal in body? And, whether Adam in the first state received a passible soul or a passible body?

Secondly, it is asked, whether man could have been immortal according to the body in the first state.

And it seems that he could: because

1. Punishment does not precede guilt: but death is the greatest of punishments: therefore, before the sin of man, it could not have occurred: therefore, before sin, man was immortal.

1. Likewise, Wisdom 1:13-16: God did not make death... But the impious by hands and words summoned it. Therefore, it seems that death would never have been acquired, except by the words and hands of the impious, namely the speaking serpent, and the extending hand of Eve: therefore, before that impiety, man was immortal.
2. Likewise, according to the justice of God, it would be for the soul to always remain under the one governing it through obedience, and for the body to remain under its governance at its command: therefore, the body would never have been separated from the soul: but it would have always remained under the obedience of God, if it had not sinned: therefore, the body would never have been dissolved by death.
3. Likewise, Isidore says that if man had not sinned, neither fire would burn, nor thorn prick, nor sword cut: therefore, it seems that he would have truly been immortal. And this same is said in the Book, and is held by Augustine, as is evident.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
1. Man had in the first state a body composed of contraries: therefore, there was conflict in his body: therefore, the body could become infirm and dissolve when composed.

1. Likewise, everything composed of heavy and light elements is composed of those whose motions according to place are contrary: but these will sometimes separate and stand apart, as the Philosopher says in IV De Caelo et Mundo: therefore, it seems that man, since he was composed in the first state, was corruptible.
2. Likewise, he had a soft body: therefore, it was cuttable and divisible.
3. Likewise, the Philosopher says that everything generated will be corrupted in a determined time: Adam's body was something similar to what was generated: therefore, it would have been corrupted in a determined time.

But because these reasons are worth nothing, since the Philosophers never knew anything about this state of nature,

It is further asked, whether he received a passible soul in the first state, or a passible body?

It seems not: because the soul does not properly suffer except from the passion of the body: therefore, it seems if then the body could not suffer, neither could the soul suffer with it.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
1. He could know: but he does not know except through the reception of the known, and to receive is a kind of suffering: therefore, he had a passible soul.

1. Likewise, he could desire: and desire does not occur except something suffering in the appetitive power: therefore, he could suffer.
2. Likewise, contraries are naturally made around the same: and he could rejoice: therefore, also be sad: therefore, feel pain: because sadness is from the sense of pain.

Therefore, this disputation through these reasons is worth nothing. It seems to me that when it is asked, whether man was mortal or immortal in the first state? it must be distinguished. Therefore, when it is said immortal, it can be the privation of the act of death: and thus it is conceded by all that he was immortal, remaining in the first state. However, it can be the privation of the power of dying: and this in two ways, namely, the power disposed to dying through the habit of immortality: and it is still conceded that he was immortal, because he did not have such a power for dying, but rather a disposition contrary to death: or it can deprive the power alone which is called material, and is only in material and natural principles: and in this way, he does not seem to have been immortal, but rather mortal: because he had the material and natural power of dying, although it was bound by the contrary habit: and it is like the power of opening in a door indeed revolving on a hinge, but closed by a very firm bolt so that it may not be opened. On this, infinite authorities can be adduced.

TO THE REASONS, therefore, which seem to prove that he was corruptible and mortal: it must be said first, that the Philosophers knew nothing about this immortality, nor did they

speak anything: then it can be said that those reasons hold concerning the natural principles of Adam: but they could not go into the act of dying, because they were bound by the habit of immortality through grace, as will be evident below.

As for what is further asked, whether he was passible? It must be said that the passibility of the soul was disputed in III Sentences, in the treatise on the Passion of the soul of Christ only: however, it can be said here that to suffer is said from the Greek πάσχειν, which is to receive in Latin: and thus he was passible both in body and in soul: because in the soul he received species, and in the body food. It is also said to suffer from a contrary affecting the sufferer and transmuting: and thus he could not suffer either in soul because of the habit of grace of the first state, which was contrary to this passion, nor did it allow it to fall into it. It is also said to suffer from a contrary altering and casting out from substance: and thus in no way was he passible, neither in body nor in soul.

To what is objected, that contraries are naturally made around the same, it must be said that it is not valid: for if one is present by nature as heat to fire, then it does not hold. Likewise, if one is present by confirmation, again it does not hold: because joy is present to the blessed, and sadness cannot be present: and sadness to the damned, and joy cannot be present to them. Thus to Adam through experience good and joy were present: and evil and saddening could not be present, unless he first sinned, because of the habit of innocence preserving him from all saddening and harmful.

However, concerning impassibility, such a distinction can be made as was held in immortality.

Articulus 3 — Whether the Immortality of the Resurrection Will Be One and the Same with That Which Was in the First State

Whether the immortality of the resurrection will be one and the same with that which was in the first state?

Then it is asked concerning what is said there, A, around the beginning: In the third state, it will have the ability not to die, and not the ability to die, etc.

And it is asked here, Whether the immortality of the resurrection and the first state is one and the same?

And it seems that it is so: because
1. Of one power, there is one act and complement: but the power of immortality is one in man and not two: therefore it seems that the act is one: since therefore that and this immortality are acts of that power, it seems that those immortalities are one.

1. Likewise, Augustine in the book On True Religion says that through Christ we have recovered what we lost in Adam: but in Adam we lost the immortality of the first state, and through Christ we have recovered the immortality of the third state: therefore the immortality of the first state and the third are one.

2. Likewise, Immortality signifies a natural power of resisting death, just as mortality signifies a natural impotence: but every natural power is from the victory of form over matter: since therefore there is one form, it seems there is one immortality.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
1. That of the first state was to be sustained by food: that which is of the resurrection does not need food: therefore it is not one immortality.

1. Likewise, They do not have one reason for the ability not to run, and the inability to run: therefore they do not have one reason for the ability not to die, and the inability to die: the immortality of the first state was according to the ability not to die, but the immortality of the third state will be the inability to die: therefore they are not of the same reason.

Solution. It must be said that immortality in man follows the state of free will just as every disposition of the human body according to the order of divine justice proceeds from free will: and therefore when the free will of man was able to sin and able not to sin, then the state of the body was able to die and able not to die: and just as one indisposed power of the soul is that which can sin, and that which can not sin: so one indisposed power of the body was that which could die, and not die: but in the first state free will was not disposed to sin, but was disposed by the grace of innocence and the will of the first condition not to sin, but it was not confirmed.

Likewise, In the first state there was not a disposition of the power to die: but there was a disposition not to die, but not confirmation. In the second state, however, the same power of free will was made under the necessity to sin, and the disposition not to sin was taken away: and therefore that power which was disposed not to die, was made under the necessity of death. In the third state, however, free will will be confirmed in the good in the blessed, and confirmation of immortality follows on the part of the body: and in the damned, it is confirmed or rather obstinate in evil, and the obstinacy of death follows, so that according to the saying of Bernard, they always die, and never completely die.

From this, therefore, it is clear that if it is asked about the power of dying and not dying, and the necessity of dying, and the impossibility of dying, one indisposed power is. If, however, it is asked about the disposed, it must be said that the disposed and disposition and habit is not one.

To that which is objected, it must be said that of one power there can be many acts ordered, complete and less complete, according to which the power progresses to perfection: but of one power according to true substantial being, it is true that there is only one substantial act: because of one matter there is one substantial form, but in well-being it is not so.

To the other, it must be said that this argument is made by Augustine, and he says that immortality habitually renders little, but a better recompense is given to us.

To the other, it must be said that although natural power is from form, nevertheless it is not entirely natural power from form in the same way: and therefore diverse natural powers are not made: when they are considered habitually or formally, although in the root of the indisposed power it was one.

Articulus 4 — Whether Immortality in the First State Was from Nature or from Grace

Whether immortality in the first state was from nature, or from grace?

Then it is inquired concerning the third part, there,

It is usually asked here, Since the first man, etc.

For it seems that that immortality was through nature:

1. For especially those things are called natural in which we are born: therefore it was especially natural for Adam that in which he was established.
2. Likewise, the same is the principle of life and the continuation of life. But the soul by nature is the principle of life: therefore of continuation: therefore it can continue life by nature: but immortality is nothing other than the continuation of life: therefore Adam was immortal by nature.
3. Likewise, if it were given to us having the effect of the continuation of life, and we by natural power could eat, and thus continue life, we would be said to live from natural things alone, and not from grace, since we would have in natural power to continue life for ourselves: therefore if the tree of life had the power of continuing life, and man the natural power of eating it, he continued life by nature, and not by grace: but it is said in Scripture, that he was immortal from the eating of the tree of life: therefore he was immortal by nature.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. A nature composed of contraries does not have in itself the principle of incorruption: but Adam had a nature composed of contraries: therefore from nature he did not have the principle of his immortality.

1. Likewise, in Scripture it is said, that he was immortal from the benefit of grace: and all the authorities of Augustine say this, that he says, that just as it was ordained for the children of Israel that in forty years their garments would not grow old, so it was ordained for Adam that he would not die. But it is evident, that by nature there was no preservation of garments from aging: therefore neither was the immortality of Adam by nature.

Solution. It must be said, that immortality was by grace, and not by nature. And note, that just as in us, so for the immortality of Adam five things were required: of which the first is the continuation of order to the perpetual cause of life: and this was in that the soul was subjected to God, and the body to the soul, and the world to the body. For thus it was here: for it drew from the perpetual fountain of life, and thus poured perpetual life into the body. The second is a certain created habit which preserved the proportion of the body in the first composition

and complexion, so that remaining in the same habit it would always live: and this habit was the created grace which he lost when the first order was interrupted. The third was the tree of life which disposed from the part of matter, removing from the body the causes of old age, and the hardening of the members, and the putrefaction of the humors: and therefore Augustine says, that the tree of life strengthened his body with stable health, because it always renewed the tenderness of the best complexion. The fourth was the food of other trees, which preserved that nothing would perish in the matter of the body, or of the radical moisture. The fifth was God protecting externally by this that all harmful things were subjected to him, and could not be against him, but for him. And therefore it is clear, that since immortality properly regards the first and second for a cause: the first as the efficient cause, and the second as the habitual and formal cause, that it was from grace, and not from nature: but the other three did not make immortality except as natural dispositions.

Therefore it must be said to the first, that those things in which we are born as in the principles constituting nature, are natural: but if we were born in grace, or in glory, it would be otherwise: and so it was also with the first man.

To the other it must be said, that this is doubtful and not proven, that by the same nature something constitutes life, and influences it: and perhaps the proposition is false, because no power of the soul nor of the plant nor of the brute ages and weakens, except accidentally. And the Philosopher says, If it is so and it is true of the eye, if it took the eye of a young person, it would see like a young person: of a donkey, like of the eye of a human: whence I think it must be said, that it is substantial to the soul to influence life to such a body, as composed and complexioned: but it is not natural to continue: because if this were natural, its perfection would not be complete, unless it had such a body; and this is not true according to natural Philosophy.

To the other it must be said, that the food of the tree...

§ 1. ...is nothing but a material disposition, and not the habit by which he was formally called immortal. And this is evident, because Elijah and Enoch are mortal, in that such a habit of immortality is deprived in them; although through the eating of the tree of life the disposition to death is removed in them from the body up to the time that God shall will.

§ 2.

Articulus 5 — Whether Adam Could Die without Sin

Whether Adam could have died without sin?

§ 5. Next, it is asked concerning what he says, there, C, But it is still asked, if there had not been a precept that he should eat of the tree of life, etc.

§ 6. And two things are asked here, namely: whether Adam could have died without sin? and, Whether, having become mortal through the necessity of dying, he could have recovered immortality if he had had these two things, namely, penance and the eating of the tree of life?

§ 7. TO THE FIRST, one proceeds thus: It seems that he could have died without sin. Let us posit, as is posited in the Letter, that he had no precept to eat: then he would not have sinned if he had not eaten, and yet he would have had an animal body needing the nourishment of food: therefore, if he had not eaten, he would have been dissolved: therefore he would have died without sin.

§ 8. If you then say that he would have sinned by laying hands upon himself [i.e., starving himself]. On the contrary: Hunger is a penalty: therefore he would not have incurred hunger without fault: but he was not bound [to eat] unless he hungered: therefore, if he never hungered, he would never have laid hands upon himself: but if he had not sinned, he would never have hungered: therefore he was never bound to eat: therefore he would have died without sin.

§ 9. Item, let us separate sin from this: for let us posit that he was not bound to provide for himself by eating: then he would not have sinned in not eating, and yet he would have been dissolved by not eating, since he had an animal body: therefore he would have died without sin.

§ 10. ON THE CONTRARY: To everything that lives naturally, nothing is so contrary and penal as death: but Adam lived most naturally: therefore he would have died most penally: therefore the penalty of matter would have been without fault.

§ 11. Solution. To this some say that Adam, if that posit were made, would have been naturally dissolved without penalty. But this solution does not seem to be true: because death is at least a defect: and it is not to be thought that man would be subject even to a defect if he had not sinned.

§ 12. Moreover, it seems to be a fable that he would die in the best disposition of the body without lesion: since the soul naturally desires conjunction.

§ 13. Therefore others say, and I think more truly, that just as in us there is natural and violent death, and preservation from violent death is the prohibition of extrinsically harming things, while preservation from natural death is preservation from those things which corrupt intrinsically: for thus was the preservation of all interior things in the first man by the custody of free choice from sin: hence if there were no precept, I think that he would have sinned by not eating: because it was natural for him that he ought to eat: and reason dictated this.

§ 14. TO THIS, however, which he says, Let sin be circumscribed from him: then I say that, at the same time, it is circumscribed with it that he not be an ani-

-mal and in need of food, since with that posited, it would follow that he is bound to eat in a time of necessity. But if both of those are circumscribed: then it is true that he does not need eating, and he will not sin by not eating. But if he should say that he posits through an impossibility that he is an animal and does not need food: then nothing prevents an impossibility from following, namely, that he is immortal and not needing food: just as if I posit you to be an ass, it is not absurd for you to have four feet.

§ 2. TO THIS, however, which is objected concerning the sensation of hunger, it must be said that the first man had his entire body under the dominion of reason: and therefore he foreknew the hour of eating without hunger: and since he was bound to eat, if he sinned by not eating, it was not absurd for him to afterward feel hunger.

§ 3.

Articulus 6 — Whether Adam, Made Mortal by the Necessity of Dying, Could Have Recovered Immortality through Penance and the Eating of the Tree of Life

Whether Adam, having become mortal through the necessity of dying, could have recovered immortality through penance and the eating of the tree of life?

§ 6. Secondly it is asked, Whether through penance, and through the tree of life, he could have recovered the state of immortality?

§ 7. It seems that he could: because 1. Penance continues him to the fount of life from which unfailing life flows, and the tree removes the contrary disposition: therefore it seems that immortality would have been recovered.

§ 8. 2. Item, This seems from the letter of Genesis, where it is said: Now therefore lest perhaps he put forth his hand, and take of the tree of life, and eat, and live forever.

§ 9. Item, Enoch and Elijah continue life through the eating of the tree of life: therefore Adam too could have done this.

§ 10. ON THE CONTRARY: The prohibition and threat of the Lord was: In whatever day you eat of it, you shall die the death: therefore he incurred the necessity of death.

§ 11. Item, In the Letter is adduced what the Apostle says to the Romans 8:10: The body indeed is dead because of sin, that is, addicted to the necessity of death: therefore he could no longer become capable of not dying.

§ 12. Solution. It must be said that immortality could not be recovered through those two things.

§ 13. To that which is objected, it must be said that it does not belong to just any grace conjoining to God to bestow immortality: but rather to pure, uninterrupted grace: and this is not the grace of penance, but of first innocence.

§ 14. To the other it must be said that, as was previously held, from the tree of life there is nothing but a material disposition towards not dying: and if he had continued life from such eating, like Elijah and Enoch, he would nevertheless have had the habit of the necessity of dying at some point: and the tree of life does not remove that habit, just as it did not confer the first habit of the immortality of innocence, but it only impedes the act of death as long as it is consumed: and therefore he would not die: yet, eating of the tree of life after sin, he would have had the necessity of dying: and this would be rather a prolongation of misery than of grace: and therefore he was forbidden.

§ 15.

DISTINCTIO XX

Divisio Textus

§ 16. Division of the Text

§ 17. DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

§ 18. After these things it must be seen, how the first parents, etc. Here he treats of the generation of the first parents which would have been if they had not sinned. And it is divided into two parts: in the first of which he determines the mode of generation on the part of the act: in the second, on the part of the offspring born, there, D, But if it is asked, What kind, etc.

§ 19. In the first part there are two things, namely, how they would have united through sexual intercourse, and how long they would have remained in such a state, there, C, But concerning the term of time, etc.

§ 20. And through this the sentence is evident.

§ 21.

Articulus 1 — Whether the First Parents Would Also Have Begotten by Intercourse in the State of Innocence

Whether the first parents would have generated even through sexual union in the state of innocence?

§ 24. Concerning the first there are five doubts, namely, Whether they would have generated through sexual union? Secondly, Whether in the union there would have been any shameful concupiscence? Thirdly, Whether they would have generated with virginity remaining or corrupted? Fourthly, Whether they would have united for a cause other than the hope of offspring? Fifthly, Whether there would have been any resolution of foul superfluities in them?

§ 25. And concerning all these there is little doubt.

§ 26. To the first one objects thus: 1. Augustine says in the book On the Good of Marriage, that nuptials are the good of mortals: therefore it seems that, with first immortality remaining, they would not have been carnally united.

§ 27. 2. Item, Damascene says, If they had not sinned, God would have multiplied the human race in another way than through coitus: therefore they would not have united.

§ 28. 3. Item, Generation is respectively opposed to corruption in the same nature: therefore if there had been no corruption, there would not have been such generation.

§ 29. 4. Item, Generation is for saving the same thing in species which cannot remain in the individual: but given that they had not sinned, they would have remained in the individual forever: therefore there would have been no generation for them through union.

§ 30. 5. Item, Generation is from the superfluity of nourishment: but if they had not sinned, there would have been nothing superfluous in them: therefore they would not have generated.

§ 31. 6. Item, Severance only occurs from a body: but that which can lose something is corruptible: therefore, gene-

-ration cannot occur except from a mortal body: therefore if they were not mortal, they would not have generated through a severance made from the body of the generator: therefore neither through natural carnal union.

§ 2. But against this: 1. Is what is said in the Letter.

§ 3. 2. Item, God formed sex in them: but sex is defined such that the male is generating in another of his own kind from his seed, while the female is generating in herself from another of her own kind: therefore either sex would be superfluous, or they would have generated in paradise.

§ 4. Solution. Without a doubt it is true to say that they would not have generated unless they had been united: however, some say that if they had not sinned, the multiplication of the human race would have been just as Eve was formed from the rib; and that God, foreknowing the fall, formed sex in them: and therefore He did not form in them only what was fitting for the first state, but also what was fitting for the second. But this is a fable, since Scripture says, Let us make him a helper like unto himself; and a woman could not be called a helper of man except for generation.

§ 5. Therefore it must be said to the first, that the first man was mortal through the nature of the principles from which he was composed, but immortal through the grace of innocence, as has been held: and therefore, since coitus is an act of nature, he would have generated through coitus.

§ 6. To the other it must be said that "another mode" can refer to concupiscence conjoined to the act and the foulness of infirmity: and thus the saying of Damascene is true. It can also refer to the act of union: and thus it is false.

§ 7. To the other it must be said that indeed the generated and the corrupted, or the generable and the corruptible, are not relatively opposed: but they accompany one another, namely in this way, that if one is present, the other is present: because what is generable by nature is corruptible by nature: and this is well conceded concerning the first man, as was held.

§ 8. To the other it must be said that this must be referred to nature, and not to the state of grace.

§ 9. To the other it must be said that there would have been a severance and a superfluity: but such a severance and superfluity would not have induced corruption, with grace and the eating of the tree of life prohibiting it: and physically speaking, this would be per accidens: hence those arguments are not compelling.

§ 10.

Articulus 2 — Whether in the State of Innocence, in Intercourse, There Would Have Been Any Shameful Concupiscence or Titillation

Whether in the state of innocence there would have been any shameful concupiscence, or titillation, in the union?

§ 13. Secondly it is asked, Whether there would have been any titillation in the union?

§ 14. It seems that there would: 1. For divine being is maximally desired by nature: but divine being is permanence: therefore permanence is maximally desired: but by coitus nature acts toward divine being: therefore it will maximally desire coitus: therefore in the act of coitus it will maximally delight: because then it is conjoined to the desired thing according to act: therefore there would have been maximal delight in coitus in paradise.

§ 15. 2. Item, Adam was sensible: but sensation is in the nerves, especially according to nature: therefore touching the nerves lightly and fittingly would maximally induce delight: but this is the seed in coitus: therefore in the descent of the seed he would have had maximal delight.

§ 16. 3. Item, Heat subserves generation, making the seed run, and distending the genital members: but with such a disposition existing in the body, delight arises: therefore it seems that it would have been necessary to have delight.

§ 1. 4. If you say that there would not have been pleasure binding reason. On the contrary: It is connatural to man that when one potency is fortified in act, another is abstracted: therefore, with the delight of touch being fortified inasmuch as it can be, reason will be abstracted: therefore since this is in coitus, reason would also have been absorbed in the first state.

§ 2. But against this is [what is found] in the Letter: because 1. Such a bed would not be with lethal concupiscence which binds reason, but immaculate.

§ 3. 2. Item, In the Letter it is said that they would have used those members solely at the command of reason: therefore they would not have grown into concupiscence beyond the command of reason.

§ 4. Solution. It must be said that they would have had delight in coitus in the first state, but subjected to reason, just as in eating and drinking, and not commotioning the body nor binding reason: nor would the members have been excited, except as much, and as long, and when reason would have willed.

§ 5. To the first, therefore, it must be said that that desire and the desired thing would not have exceeded the bounds prefixed to it by reason.

§ 6. To the other it must be said that the touch of the nerves in the genital places could not have occurred except by the command of reason, and the effect not except under reason.

§ 7. To the other it must be said that that heat would then have been the servant of reason, and therefore would not have extended itself above reason, which would have been the cause of the first motion, and ordering all the acts of the human body to the decency of the state of first justice.

§ 8. To the other it must be said that binding concupiscence does not exist without preceding or concomitant sin: hence the fact that reason suffers this violence that it is abstracted, is an effect of sin: and the Philosophers who said this knew only the state of corrupted nature, and not of first innocence.

§ 9.

Articulus 3 — Whether the First Parents Would Have Come Together with Virginity Remaining or Corrupted

Whether the first parents would have united with virginity remaining or corrupted?

§ 12. Thirdly it is asked, Whether they would have united with virginity remaining or corrupted?

§ 13. It seems that it would be corrupted: because 1. Generation does not occur unless there is a mixture of seeds: but such an act in the man, and such a reception in the woman do not occur unless the pathways of the man are opened for inseminating, and of the woman for receiving, and also for inseminating: but this opening is the corruption of virginity: therefore the corruption of virginity would have been in the first state.

§ 14. 2. Item, If they had united with virginity remaining in the first state: then giving birth in virginity would not have been miraculous in the Blessed Virgin, which is absurd: therefore virginity would have been lost.

§ 15. 3. Item, Natural things are not removed by sin, but wounded: if therefore this were natural to them then, they would still have it now, albeit with greater difficulty.

§ 16. ON THE CONTRARY: A virtue or a state of virtue is not corrupted except through vice, or that which is from vice: but then there would have been no vice, or libidinous act from vice: therefore there would have been no corruption of virtue or of the state of virtue: virginity is a virtue, or a state of virtue: therefore then it would not have been corrupted.

§ 17. Solution. Such questions are rather foolish than that one should labor long in them: nevertheless they are introduced here by some.

§ 18. Therefore it must be said that the corruption of virginity can mean violence or the interruption of the meditation of perpetual integrity: and thus it would not have been in the first state: because neither could violence be there, nor could suffocating pleasure interrupt the habitual meditation of perpetual vir-

-ginity: but if corruption means the simple opening of the gates of propagation, then in the first state virginity would have been corrupted: and therefore in the first state marriage was of greater glory than virginity: because coitus brought no ignominy, and it brought the utility of

offspring; and therefore also because they had it as a precept to unite, when it was said to them: Increase and multiply.

§ 2. And if it is asked: When was this precept relaxed? It must be said that it was given from a cause: and therefore while that cause existed it held, and would still hold, and it held before sin: now this cause was the paucity of humans: but once a multitude was made, and with many hastening to marriage, they are absolved, flying to the fruit of a better life for the sake of a better good which is against the foulness that is conjoined to coitus from sin.

§ 3. And through this the solution to the whole is evident.

§ 4.

Articulus 4 — Whether in the First State They Would Have Come Together for a Cause Other Than the Hope of Offspring

Whether in the first state they would have united for a cause other than the hope of offspring?

§ 7. Fourthly it is asked, Whether they would have united for a cause other than the hope of offspring?

§ 8. And it seems that they would: because 1. Coitus in itself was delectable: therefore it provoked appetite in itself, even when no other cause existed.

§ 9. 2. Item, Marriage is not only for the hope of offspring, but also for the good of faith, and for the good of the sacrament: therefore, invited by these goods, the man could be moved to coitus beyond the hope of offspring.

§ 10. But against this is that in the first state (as the Saints say) marriage was only for the office of nature: but according to what is for the office of nature, it is only in the hope of offspring: therefore they would not have united except in the hope of offspring.

§ 11. FURTHERMORE it is asked, Whether each would have had his own [wife], or one would have indifferently known any one or many?

§ 12. It seems that many: because many can be fecundated by one: therefore since no libido prohibited it, he could have had many.

§ 13. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Bigamy is vituperated in the first bigamist: therefore it would be much more vituperable in the first state.

§ 14. 2. Item, Adam said: They shall be two in one flesh: and he did not say, three or four, or one in the flesh of two or three.

§ 15. Solution. It must be said that they would never have known one another without the hope and certainty of offspring: because every coitus would have fecundated the woman.

§ 16. To the other it must be said that those goods do not cause marriage through the act: but it causes the good of faith through consent, and through conjunction with God and through an undivided life: and therefore those would not have invited to coitus then, as they do now.

§ 17. To the other it must be said that one would have had only one.

§ 18. To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that this was not necessary then, since there was nothing inciting and drawing back from the worship of God: but all the seed, just as it would have received the propagation of the flesh, so it would have received original justice: and then the fulfillment of the number of the elect could be awaited gradually, especially since there was not even a dwelling in misery causing tedium in life. But after sin, since the senses were prone to evil, and the devil was everywhere instigating to idolatry, it was permitted to some to have many, so that the multiplication of the number of the elect might be retained in them up to the time when the fullness of the Gentiles should en-

-ter through spiritual fecundity in Christ: when again spiritual generation would have place through the word of preaching.

§ 2.

Articulus 5 — Whether There Would Have Been in Them the Dissolutions of Superfluities, Such as Pollutions, Menses, Evacuations, and Urine

Whether there would have been in them resolutions of superfluities, such as pollutions, menses, egestions, and urine?

§ 5. Fifthly it is asked, Whether there would have been in them resolutions of superfluities, such as pollutions, menses, and egestions, and urine, and sweats, and the like?

§ 6. And it seems that there would not: because these imply a certain foulness, which foulness signifies a penalty: but a penalty could not exist before sin.

§ 7. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. It is certain that God made in them members receptive of humid superfluity, like the bladder: and receptive of dry superfluity, like the stomach, and intestines.

§ 8. 2. Item, He made open pores in them through which sweats might be emitted. Now these would have been idle if there were no superfluity.

§ 9. 3. If you say that nourishment which is not very suitable is emitted: but then it would have been entirely suitable, and thus nothing would be emitted: this is impossible: because then digestion would not have been necessary, but it would have been consumed before it was eaten.

§ 10. Moreover, it is fabulous to say such things.

§ 11. Solution. It must be said that certain resolutions attest to a corrupting superfluity or to a debilitating of the retentive virtue: and those would not have been in the first parents, such as pollution, menses, and sweats, and the like. But some are natural, like feces, and urine, and spit, and the like: and those would have been, as I think, yet without shame and the stench of foulness.

§ 12. And through this the solution is evident, because to have resolutions in this way is not a penalty.

§ 13.

Articulus 6 — Whether the Marital Act Is and Ought to Be Called a Sin

Whether the matrimonial act is and ought to be called a sin?

§ 16. Next it is asked concerning this which he says, there, A, towards the end: For infirmity prone to ruin, etc.

§ 17. For from this it seems that the matrimonial act is a sin: because nothing is ordained unless it is inordinate: but nothing is inordinate unless it is with fault.

§ 18. Solution. The matrimonial act sometimes proceeds from reason as the first mover, as when it is in the hope of offspring, and with a view to the justice of rendering the debt: and then it is not a sin, neither venial nor mortal, but a merit. Or, as the annexed concupiscence is ordained not so that one may fall, but because one would fall if there were no marriage: and then some say that it is a venial sin, but a small one: and there is a place to inquire about this in the treatise on marriage.

§ 19.

Articulus 7 — Whether the First Parents Would Have Begotten Offspring Strong, Perfect in Due Quantity, and Knowing

Whether the first parents would have generated offspring that were strong, perfect in proper quantity, and possessing knowledge?

§ 22. Next, it is asked concerning what he says, there, D, But if it is asked, What kind, etc.

§ 23. For the opinion of the Master seems to be false: because 1. The nature of man is more worthy than that of a brute: therefore it is irrational that this would have been granted to a brute, that it should walk and eat, and not to man.

§ 24. 2. Item, in the last part, H, the Master says the same thing even on the part of the soul: therefore the children would have been ignorant: but ignorance is a penalty of sin? Therefore they would have felt a penalty before fault.

§ 25. Solution. Concerning all these things many inquiries have been made elsewhere. Hence here it must be said briefly concerning this, that the softness of the limbs is contrary to walking, and the softness of the limbs attests to the most noble complexion according to the qualities of touch, which constitute the subject and the body, and therefore they are of nobility rather than ignobility: and therefore it was not a defect. But other terrestrial animals have an earthy complexion, and therefore hard and rigid limbs, and hairy skin: and all this belongs to ignobility: and this moved the Master.

§ 26. To that which is objected concerning perfection according to the soul, it must be said that it is not natural that, with the complexion of the brain being soft and fluid, there should be a strong impression of species and a strong conversion upon them: but such a flux is in children: and therefore the Philosopher says in Physics VII, that by sitting and resting the soul becomes knowing and prudent: and he refers rest and sitting to the motion of a fluid com-

plexion in diverse directions. Hence I think that just as the Master says, that children in infantile age would not have had knowledge according to act because of the humidity of the organ, but nevertheless they would have had the habit of all knowable things by nature innate to them in the soul: just as we now say concerning baptized infants, that they have virtues as a gift, and not in use: and this would not have been a penalty, but nature.

§ 27.

Articulus 8 — What and How Many Precepts God Gave to the First Parents; And Why He Expressed Two of Nature and One of Discipline

What and how many precepts did God give to the first parents? and, Why did He express two of nature, and one of discipline?

§ 30. Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, K, at the end: He added a precept of obedience, etc.

§ 31. For here the Master intimates that He imparted some precept through natural reason, and outwardly impressed another. And it is asked, How many and what are they?

§ 32. Item, it is asked, Why did He express two of nature, namely eat, and increase, etc., and gave only one of discipline, namely of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil do not eat?

§ 33. But why He gave such a precept of discipline, the Master resolved above.

§ 34. Solution. It must be said that there are two things in man: reason, and body; or soul, and body: now according to the soul He impressed the law of nature which is universally in these: What you do not wish to be done to you, do not do to another; and what you wish to be done to you, do to others: and these precepts regard the conversation of life in human society. But on the part of the body, he was an animal, and multipliable through the severance of seed:

and therefore for the custody of the individual he received one, namely, Of every tree of paradise eat: but another for multiplication in species, such as, Increase and multiply. Now there were only these three things in the life of man: two within himself, and one toward another: and therefore he did not receive more precepts of nature. But he received one of discipline so that obedience might be easier, and the transgressor more accusable: but they are called precepts of nature because nature inclined toward them according to the first state of animality.

§ 2.

DISTINCTIO XXI

Divisio Textus

§ 3. Division of the Text

§ 4. DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

§ 5. The devil also seeing, etc. Here therefore concerning the fall of man. And it is divided according to those things which are in every fall, namely the cause of the fall, and from what he falls. And this is treated in distinction 24, there, A, Now to be diligently investigated, etc. But in distinction 30 he determines into what he fell, there, A, In the superior things it was insinuated, etc.

§ 6. The first part is subdivided into three: in the first of which the cause of the fall is asked on the part of the tempter and the temptation: and this distinction is about this. In the second, the cause is asked on the part of the first sin in man: and the following distinction [25] is about this, there, A, Here it seems to be diligently investigated, etc. In the third, he inquires into the cause on the part of God permitting the fall and concerning this in distinction 23, there, A, Furthermore, it is usually asked, etc.

§ 1. This distinction has four parts: in the first of which he describes the advent and species of the tempter; in the second, the mode and progress of the temptation, there, C, But the temptation, etc. In the third, he touches upon the cause why the sin of man is remediable, and not that of the angel, there, F, Furthermore the angelic nature, etc. In the fourth, he touches incidentally that by the saying of the woman it is proved that the mandate was given not to the man alone, but also to the woman, there, G, That also is to be noted, etc.

§ 2. And through these things the sentence is evident.

§ 3.

Articulus 1 — What Temptation Is By Definition

What is temptation by definition?

§ 6. Five doubts occur concerning the first: of which the first is, What is temptation? Second, Who is the tempter? Third, Whether temptation is to be desired? Fourth, Whether every temptation is a sin, or necessarily with sin? Fifth, Whether every temptation is from the devil?

§ 7. TO THE FIRST, one proceeds thus: Cassiodorus in his Commentary on the Psalms says, "Temptation is the assimilation of good for the sake of deceiving."

§ 8. Master Hugh of St. Victor defines it thus: "To tempt is to experience craftily, and before a violent impulsion, to test as it were by certain flattering attempts."

§ 9. But an objection is raised against the first definition: because 1. Genesis 22:1: God tempted Abraham:[188] but it is certain that it was not for the sake of deceiving: therefore that definition does not apply to every temptation.

§ 10. 2. Item, the Gloss, in the same place: "We say to tempt for that which is to prove": hence it is written, The Lord your God tempts you, that it may be made manifest whether you love

Him or not.[189] For man ignores the strengths of his own love unless he knows it by experience: therefore it seems that temptation is not always for deceiving.

§ 11. 3. If you say that Cassiodorus understands this of the temptation of the devil. On the contrary: The devil does not always tempt in the assimilation of good, but rather sometimes concerning open evil: therefore that definition still does not apply, as it seems.

§ 12. 4. Item, temptation is for the acquisition of an experiment, as the Gloss seems to say on Genesis. But the tempter (as the Philosopher says) never takes the experiment of knowledge, but always of ignorance: therefore it seems that the devil in tempting never takes the experiment of our sin, but will remain ignorant of the sin.

§ 13. If you say that this is not to be understood of the temptation of the devil, concerning which the Master treats here, but of the temptation of a tempter in knowable things, because the tempter imitates the dialectician. On the contrary: Augustine says in the book of Questions of the Old and New Testament, on that question, Let not temptation apprehend you, etc.: "Everything which is not proved, is tempted, and comes into doubt." Therefore this is the same thing that the Philosopher says: therefore the tempter never acquires the experiment of knowledge.

§ 14. AGAINST THE SECOND DEFINITION, one proceeds thus: For what he says seems false, To tempt is to experience craftily: because 1. Augustine says in the memorated book: "In temptation we ought to be altogether robust, knowing not to the diminu-

...[profit] for our probation, but rather for an increase [in merit], provided we endure it with an even mind on account of Christ. [To the other argument it must be said regarding that] part, that this is not a cunning interrogation, nor a cunning way of testing.

§ 2. It also seems that the subsequent part does not fit, because there is never a violent impulse in temptation. For Gregory and Bernard say that the enemy is weak, who cannot conquer unless someone is willing: therefore, he can cause a violent impulse to no one.

§ 3. Also, what follows does not always fit, namely, to test by flattering efforts: because, as will be maintained below in the question, sometimes in tempting he terrifies by threatening, while at other times he breaks by despairing, and at other times he snatches by oppressing: and then he does not test by flattering efforts, as it seems.

Solution. It seems it must be said that these definitions are not understood of the temptation by which God and man tempt: but of that which is a motion and instinct toward the illicit, proceeding from the devil, or from the flesh, or from the world.

And to understand this, it must be known that temptation is spoken of in many ways: for sometimes it is an interrogation of testing in knowable things according to the speculative intellect: and this can occur in two ways, namely, regarding the universal principles of an art, which being known the art is not necessarily known, yet being ignored it is necessarily ignored: and in this way the tempter imitates the dialectician who proceeds from common

188. Genesis 22:1.

things which are found in particulars, and he never acquires the experience of knowledge, but of ignorance. But sometimes he tempts regarding proper principles, which being known the conclusions proper to the art are necessarily known, and that tempter acquires the experience both of ignorance and of knowledge: and in this way temptation is not dealt with here.

Also, temptation is a proving through an experience of work, so that there may be certainty about the quantity of virtue which is present within, the experience of which is useful, either for humiliation if it is small and is believed to be great: or for presuming upon God if it is great and is believed to be small: or for exercise in the quantity of merit: and in this way God tempts the Saints, as Augustine says in the book of Questions of the Old and New Testament. There is also another temptation by which Abraham, and Tobias, and Job, the servants of God, were tempted: as Abraham through the tribulation of offering his only and most beloved son, so that he might have a more abundant fruit of justice for eternal glory. And Job by the loss of his entire substance, so that enriched in wealth he might be increased in heaven and on earth. And Tobias indeed, having suffered blindness of his eyes, became so advanced that in the present he was made glorious by receiving his eyes back, and perpetual clarity would be preserved for him in the future: because the just are proven for this, that they may advance: and in this way God tempts.

Also, in a third way, temptation is an interrogation through scourges: and this occurs in two ways, namely, whether one is faithful, so that man, not God, might know this: and in this way it is said: God tempted them, and found them worthy of Himself. The interrogation of the wicked is that they may recognize themselves: because, as Gregory says, "The eyes which guilt closed, punishment opens": and concerning this Augustine says in the aforementioned book: "The Jews are tempted on account of their lack of faith, so that, anguished, they may return to the way as penitents: for when they lacked faith in God's providence, they were tempted by serpents, so that, seized by pain, they might be amended." For God tempts in this way, so that He may correct such men.

In a fourth way, temptation is said to be a proving of divine providence or of the divine word, whether it is as Scripture says: and this happens in two ways, namely, by a contrary act provoking God: and this occurs when there is a lack of trust in God's power, and it is believed that the power is absent, as the Jews did, as it is said in the Psalm They tempted God in the desert. And elsewhere, Your fathers tempted me, and proved me, and saw my works and Augustine calls this temptation "divine," for the reason that it is to tempt God, and that is the most grave. In another way, it is to seek an experiment from God, regarding how much estimation the one who tempts holds, whether He wishes to perform a miracle for him rather than let him perish: and in this way God said to the devil You shall not tempt the Lord your God. Concerning the first, Augustine says in the same book that was mentioned: "Not without providence, as I judge, does the Apostle, the teacher of the Gentiles, wish not that temptation should not overtake us, but that it be only human: because a divine temptation produces destruction. For the Jews, overtaken by this, perished by the serpents: for acting under the law of God, they doubted His providence: and on this account he exhorts that not a divine, but a human temptation should

189. Deuteronomy 13:3.

overtake us. For he is said to be tempted by God, who acting under His name, hopes for salvation from idols: because he does not have a proven God." And Augustine understands that such a one is said to tempt God. But concerning the second mode of divine temptation, it is said in the Gloss on Deuteronomy[190], that he tempts God who, having something he can do, without reason commits himself to dangers, testing whether he can be delivered by God.

In a fifth way, temptation is called an interrogation through pondering about the help that a human can provide: and when man is found weak, to despair of human help: and the Apostle wishes this temptation for us (as Augustine says)[191], when he says: Let no temptation overtake you but such as is human. And these are Augustine's words: "But human temptation is salutary: because just as to tempt concerning God is destructive, so to despair of man on account of God's law is most salutary." Moreover, a human temptation is also spoken of by the same Augustine in the same place: by which we are tempted by man according to human sense: and there is despair concerning us acting under the law of God: and therefore we are tribulated by man: and these are his words: "Let no temptation," he says, "overtake you except human: so that, tempted by men on account of the law of God, we may be found strong by carnal men who doubt concerning us: but let us be proven to God, because those who are not proven are tempted so that they may be amended."

Temptation as it is defined in the previous definitions is taken in none of these ways. But it is spoken of in a fifth way [i.e., a further distinct way], when under the simulation of an apparent good the tempter devises evil, in order that he may incline the consent of the will to the illicit: and this temptation is sometimes from the enemy, sometimes from the flesh, and sometimes from the world, as will be clear below.

According to this, therefore, it must be answered to the objections, saying to the first and second, that they are not understood of those temptations by which God or man tempts.

To the next it must be said, that evil as evil does not move the appetite: but it must be that it is under the rationale of a good for the present time: and this is called the assimilation of the good: and it may well be that he tempts concerning that which is openly a sin, and then it is under the rationale of a good not simply, but for the present time: just as fornication is openly an evil, yet it has a delight for the present time, from the species of which it moves temptation.

To the next it must be said, that the devil does not tempt in order to test, but rather to incline consent: hence those arguments do not hold. And what Augustine says is understood of the temptation of man by which he tempts God: for the divine temptation is called by him that by which God is tempted, as was maintained earlier.

To that which is objected concerning the second definition , it must be said that the devil does not cunningly test the knowledge of sin: but rather he cunningly considers the inclinability of consent, and to what vice one is more easily inclined, so that he may prepare a snare for him.

To the next it must be said, that a violent impulse is spoken of in two ways, namely from violence inflicting force, or from violence drawing and instigating: and it is taken in this latter way in the definition.

To the next it must be said, that those temptations by which he terrifies by threatening, and the like, also proceed from the flattering of a proper good: for nothing is feared except on account of an excessive love of a proper good, as Augustine says. As to what is said, he snatches by oppressing, and breaks by despairing, those two do not state the first movement of temptation, but rather the effect following consent and the work of sin: and therefore they are not properly the machinations of temptation, but the effects which he causes in the sinner who has given the demon a place in himself through the merit of sin.

Articulus 2 — Who The Tempter Is

Who is the tempter?

Secondly it is asked, Who is the tempter? Now it seems that it is the devil: because

§ 1. The Apostle says Lest perhaps he who tempts has tempted you. And there the Gloss says: "Only the devil, whose office is to tempt."

§ 2. Also, Jerome on Jeremiah in the Original: "Whatever we sin, whatever we do day and night, and perpetrate of evil works, is the dominion of demons, who never give us rest, and always impel us to increase our offenses by our faults, and to make a heap of sins." And there are many other authorities on this.

ON THE CONTRARY: God tempted Abraham, etc., and God tempted them.

Furthermore it seems that neither the devil tempts, nor God, but concupiscence.

§ 1. Let no one when he is tempted, say that he is tempted by God: for God is not a tempter of evils, and He Himself tempts no man. But each one is tempted by his own concupiscence, etc.

§ 2. Also, it is said that the world, the flesh, and demons stir up diverse battles: therefore it seems that there are three tempters.

Solution. It must be said that if temptation is taken generally, then there are multiple tempters, but in different ways, as Augustine says: because God tempts to prove, that is, so that He may render one proven or amended, or may instruct. Man tempts, so that he may test. The devil tempts, so that he may seduce. And according to this distinction the adduced arguments are to be conceded.

To the first, however, it must be said that it is not the intention of the Apostle that every temptation is from the devil as the immediate mover, but that it is originally so: because he was the first to tempt, and made us temptable in evil.

To the next it must be said, that it is understood in the same way: for because the devil introduced sin, therefore from whatever proximate mover it may be, sin is always from him, as from the first mover.

190. Genesis 1:28.

To the next the solution is already clear, regarding how God tempts.

To the next it must be said, that concupiscence tempts as inclining from within, while the devil does so as suggesting from without.

To the next it must be said, that the division of those tempters is taken according to the things which can move the powers of the soul to evil. For this is either conjoined, or separated. If conjoined: then it is the flesh, that is, carnal concupiscence dispersed in the interior powers of the soul. If however it is separated, it is either by way of one suggesting from without, or by way of a mover and object. And in the first way the demons tempt: but in the second way the world, through the three things which are in it, namely riches, delights, and honors.

Articulus 3 — Whether Temptation Which Is Toward The Illicit Is To Be Desired

Whether temptation which is an inclination toward the illicit is to be desired?

Thirdly it is asked, Whether temptation which is an inclination toward the illicit, is to be desired?

It seems that it is: § 1. Prove me, O Lord, and tempt me, etc. Therefore, since the Prophet asks to be tempted, he also gives us an example of asking.

§ 2. Also, Count it all joy, my brothers, when you fall into various temptations. Now everything concerning which one must rejoice, is to be desired on account of merit. Therefore temptation is to be desired.

§ 3. Also, upon that text, There was given to me a thorn, the Gloss says: "He was not heard, because that temptation is the repression of pride." But this is good: therefore it is to be desired.

§ 4. Also, Gregory: "The holy man desires himself to be tempted after his virtues, lest by confidence in his virtues he rush into sin." But this is supremely to be desired: therefore it is also to be asked for.

§ 5. Also, by reason: for whatever is not a sin, but the material for exercising virtue, this is to be desired: a temptation to which consent is not given by sin (as the authority says) is not a sin, but the material for exercising virtue: therefore it is to be desired.

§ 6. Also, whatever is ordered to the advancement of merit without the fear of falling through sin, that is to be desired: such is temptation: therefore it is to be desired. The proof of the minor premise is through the preceding points regarding the fact that it is ordered to the increase of merit: but that there is no fear of falling is proven where the Apostle says God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able: but will make, etc.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. And lead us not into temptation.

§ 2. Also, Watch and pray, that you enter not into temptation. The spirit indeed is willing, etc.

191. Genesis 2:24.

§ 3. Also, the same thing is not to be desired by man which is sought by a demon: but the demon seeks us to tempt us: therefore this is not to be desired by man. Proof of the minor premise Simon, Simon, behold Satan has desired to have you, etc.

Solution. It must be said that temptation is not to be desired: because on the intention of the tempter, it is so that the act is ordered to the illicit, and on the part of the one tempted there is a weakness of standing firm, although on the part of God permitting it, it is ordered to advancement: hence it does not regard advancement in itself, but accidentally.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that David asked to be tempted by scourges, so that thus he might be freed from hidden sins: concerning which Ambrose says, that even if faith is lacking, that is, the conscience of sin, yet the punishment of the scourge satisfies: and this is not a temptation verging on the illicit, like that which stimulates toward the consent of sin.

To the next it must be said, that one must not rejoice concerning temptation in itself, but accidentally, when through victory one arrives at being proven purer than gold.

To the next it must be said, that it is medicine accidentally, namely through the recognition of fragility: but in itself it is toward the illicit.

To the next it must be said, that that desire is accidental, namely concerning the effect of temptation, and not concerning the temptation itself.

To the next it must be said, that if it were the material for exercising virtue in itself, like a meritorious act, it would be desirable: but because it is the material for exercising virtue accidentally, such as by drawing virtue to the illicit, it does not have to be desired. Through the same thing the response to the first proposition of the objection is clear.

To that by which the minor premise is proven, it must be said that God, as far as is on His part, does not suffer it: but we, out of excessive weakness, sometimes cast away grace, and fail away from God: and therefore, conscious of our weakness, we ought not to desire it.

Moreover, as for that which is objected to the contrary, although we concede it, yet it must be noted that it is not the same thing to be tempted and to be led into temptation according to a certain Gloss on Matthew, because to be tempted is to be tested: but to be led into temptation is to be abandoned in temptation, and to fall, as the Gloss says.

Articulus 4 — Whether Every Temptation Is Sin, Or Necessarily Accompanied By Sin

Whether every temptation is a sin, or necessarily accompanied by sin?

Fourthly it is asked, Whether every temptation is a sin, or necessarily accompanied by sin?

Now it seems that it is always a sin: § 1. For every motion toward the illicit is a sin: but temptation is a motion toward the illicit: therefore it is a sin.

§ 2. If you say that this is true of interior temptation, and not of exterior. On the contrary: let us speak only of the interior: therefore that is always toward the illicit: therefore it is always a sin.

§ 3. Also, Augustine in Book XIX of The City of God: "It is no small vice when the flesh lusts against the spirit": therefore it seems that it is also essentially a sin.

§ 4. Also, upon that text, There was given to me a thorn, etc., the Gloss says: "Temptation to which consent is not given by sin, is not a sin, but the material for exercising virtue." And it subjoins, "Understand this of temptation aside from that which is from the flesh." Therefore all that which is interior seems to be essentially a sin.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. Upon that text, And lead us not, etc., the Gloss says: "Temptation orders toward the crown": but this is not to be essentially a sin: therefore interior temptation is not essentially a sin.

§ 2. Also, motion is one thing, and the terminus of motion is another according to essence: but the terminus of temptation is sin: therefore temptation, which denotes the preceding motion, is not a sin.

Furthermore it is asked next to this, Whether it is always accompanied by sin?

It seems that it is not: because § 1. Since the devil can agitate the flesh whenever he wishes, he would make us sin incessantly: because Job says The earth is given into the hand of the wicked.

§ 2. Also, every sin (as Augustine says) is so voluntary that if it is not voluntary, it is not a sin: therefore since those temptations are not voluntary, it seems that they are not a sin.

§ 3. Also, no one sins in that which he cannot avoid: therefore since we cannot avoid the devil tempting the flesh, there will be no fault there.

§ 4. Also, suppose that reason does not consent: therefore it happens in sensuality alone: therefore either it is a sin, or not. If so, since that is common to us with brute animals, there could also be sin in brute animals. If not, then the proposition will be had, that it is not always a sin.

Solution. It must be said, in my judgment, that there is an interior temptation, an exterior one, and a mixed temptation from both. Exterior temptation, as in the first parents, and in Christ: and that was no sin, nor was it accompanied by sin: interior temptation is that which has its origin in the concupiscence of the flesh: nor is the flesh said to lust (as Augustine says) except because the soul lusts in the flesh: and I think this is always a sin, but a very light one, and also accompanied by sin, because it proceeds from the evil which dwells in the flesh, as the Apostle says. The third temptation which is mixed, is sometimes a sin, and sometimes not. For if the flesh is contained so that it does not lust, it is not a sin, because then it is more exterior than interior; nevertheless it is interior to the extent that the flesh is moved. But if the flesh lusts, then it is a sin, because it has been made interior: but such a sin is the first movement which is very light, as will be said below.

To that which is objected on the contrary, it must be said that temptation does not lead to the crown except accidentally, namely by the resistance of the battle, and victory.

To the next it must be said, that essentially speaking, a motion according to the Philosopher is in the same genus as the terminus of the motion: because it does not differ from it except

as the way and the terminus, and as an act mixed with potency [differs] from a pure act: and therefore it is clear, that temptation has something of the rationale of sin.

To that which is further asked, it must be said that it is a sin, and accompanied by sin, as has been said.

To that which is objected on the contrary, it must be said that he cannot agitate whenever he wishes, although he can bring about occasions: because by the will preceding we can hold the flesh back so that it does not lust.

To the next it must be said, that that authority takes "voluntary" broadly, for antecedent, or consequent, or conjoined: just as original sin is antecedently voluntary: and something previously unknown, and later known, if it pleases and does not bring repentance, is consequently voluntary: while a conjoined [voluntary act] is a willed work. But those movements are voluntary, for the reason that the will can prevent them, and does not do so.

To the next it must be said, that with the will preceding we can avoid any given movement, although speaking universally, it is necessary to fall into some.

To the next it must be said, that the first movement is in sensuality on account of its colligation to reason: and this colligation is not in the brute animal: and therefore the objection does not hold.

Articulus 5 — Whether Every Temptation Is From The Devil

Whether every temptation is from the devil?

Fifthly it is asked, Whether every temptation is from the devil?

And it seems that it is, through the Gloss on the text introduced above which Gloss seems to say that only the devil has the office of tempting.

Also, in the Apocalypse The accuser of our brothers has been cast out, who accused them before the sight of our God day and night. And this speaks of the devil: therefore he alone renders the Saints accusable by his temptations.

Also, in Hosea it is said: All night he slept baking them, in the morning, etc.: where Gregory says that the devil is the baker.

Also, upon that text, Set on fire by hell, Bede says: "The devil, agitated by hell, always burns, and suggests the flame of vices to everyone."

Also, upon that text of the Psalm Turn away from evil, and do good: the Gloss of Jerome says: "All evils proceed from the instinct of the devil, just as good things from the instinct of God." The authority of Jerome introduced above also contributes much to this.

Also, upon that text, Let everyone fear his mother, Gregory says: "Concupiscence is the mother of all sin, and the devil the father."

ON THE CONTRARY: Upon that text, With the flesh I serve the law of sin, the Gloss says: "By the name of sin he calls concupiscence, from which all vices arise": therefore they are not from a demon.

Also, to the Galatians Manifest are the works of the flesh, which are fornication, etc. And it also enumerates there certain spiritual vices. If therefore all proceed from the flesh, then it seems that none proceeds from a demon.

But against this again is the Gloss on the same passage saying, "To believe that all things happen from the flesh, is an error: for not all the vices of life are to be attributed to the flesh."

Solution. To this it is light to respond according to what has been said: because to say that all things are from the devil is true, as from the first mover and tempter, but not always the proximate one: and through this the solution is clear to all those things which were introduced for that side.

Now the corruption of the flesh is twofold, namely that of which the flesh is the subject, or that which is from the flesh as from a cause, and that is subjectively in the soul: and taking flesh commonly in this way, every sin proceeds from the corruption of the flesh, as from a habit inclining the power from within: and through this again the solution is clear to those things which are introduced for that side.

Also, in the second way, certain things are from the world, as was said above. Taking the corruption of the flesh also in this way, nothing prohibits all spiritual things from also being from the corruption of the flesh. But if it is taken strictly for that which is subjectively in the flesh, then it will not be from the corruption of the flesh, except that it has a proper delight in the flesh: and the Gloss intends it in this way, which says that it is an error that all sins are from the corruption of the flesh.

Articulus 6 — Whether The Serpent Who Tempted Eve Was A True Serpent, And How The Intentions Of Expressed Voices Could Reach The Words Formed In The Air

Whether the serpent which tempted Eve was a true serpent? And, how could the intentions of expressed voices arrive at words formed in the air?

Then it is asked concerning what he says there, at B, around the middle: And therefore the serpent was said to be more cunning, etc.

For the Master determines well that it was not a rational serpent: and it was not moved by the intrinsic power of its substance, that is, which was a part of its substance, although the power of the demon was intrinsic as to place.

But it is still asked: How could the intentions of expressed voices arrive at words formed and figured in the air?

For in us the way is: because species which are simple in the intellect, are clothed with corporeal images in the imagination, and through the motive nerves they are carried to the breath which the tongue strikes, and they are imprinted on it. But the imagination of the serpent was not susceptible to such conceptions, as You shall be as gods, knowing good and evil:

therefore through its imagination it could not continue the species to a voice: for what purpose therefore did he move the tongue of the serpent?

Solution. It must be said that, just as was determined above concerning magical works, because demons are spiritual substances, inferior matter obeys them by divine command and order: and therefore I say that they were imprinted immediately by the intellect of the Angel in the aerial breath: and there they received corporeal images: and the tongue of the serpent by its motion made nothing other than shapes.

Articulus 7 — Whether Eve Sinned By One Sin Or By Several Sins

Whether Eve sinned by one sin, or by several sins?

Then it is asked concerning what he says there: Where he tempted man in three ways, etc.

For it seems from this that Eve sinned by three sins: and this is not said.

Solution. In the following question it will be determined whether she sinned by one sin or several: but here it must be said that the Master speaks materially: because formally there was only one sin there: because all things were ordered in a composite work to obtain one appetite, namely that she might be like God in the knowledge of good and evil: and on account of that she ate, and did all the other things, and therefore formally she sinned only by that one.

Articulus 8 — Which And How Many Are The Modes Of Tempting, And How They Are To Be Understood

What and how many are the modes of tempting, and according to what are they taken?

Then it is asked concerning what he says there, at E: Furthermore it must be known that there are two species of temptation, namely interior, and exterior, etc.

For on account of this it is asked concerning the modes of tempting. And the Master says that

§ 1. There is an interior and exterior mode.

§ 2. But John says, that all that is in the world, is the concupiscence of the flesh, and the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life.

§ 3. The Gloss on the Psalm He who dwells, says that one temptation is light and hidden; another is grave and hidden; and another is grave and manifest.

§ 4. Also, Upon that text of the Psalm Their soul abhorred all meat, etc., the Gloss says: Temptation is multiplex: first, ignorance of the way and truth; second, difficulty of conquering temptations; third, weariness of the good; fourth, the storm of the world.

§ 5. Also, Augustine in On Christian Doctrine: "He tempts by vexing the flesh, wounding natural goods, despoiling gratuitous goods."

§ 6. Also, Gregory, and it is placed below: "by suggestion, delight, consent."

§ 7. Also, upon that text[192], Let no temptation overtake you, etc., the Gloss distinguishes between angelic perfection, diabolical presumption, and human temptation. For to savor [or think] in no way otherwise than the thing is, is angelic perfection. But diabolical presumption is by excessively loving one's own opinion, or by envying those who are better, to arrive even at the sacrilege of cutting off communion and founding a schism or heresy. But human temptation is in five ways, as the Gloss says, namely in those things without which this life is not conducted. Or, that in necessity or pressure a man does not lose faith, by seeking human help from God. Or, human temptation is that through which one advances before God, to suffer dangers on account of Christ. Or, to savor otherwise than the thing is and with a good mind, is human temptation. Or, human temptation is when one is irritated at a brother out of a zeal for correcting him, yet more than Christian tranquility demands. It was also maintained above by Augustine in the first article of the question, what is human temptation, and divine temptation.

§ 8. Also, divine temptation is threefold: by which God is tempted: and this in two ways, namely either from a lack of faith in providence, as He is tempted through idolatry: and from the presumption of a miracle, as by those who placed in necessity commit themselves or their faith to hazard by demanding a miracle, when there is no lack of human counsel for them to escape otherwise. Also, secondly the divine temptation by which God tempts: and this in two ways, namely those whom He does not have as proven, like the wicked, by scourging or killing them: and those whom He has proven, but He shows them His probation, as He tempts the good. But human temptation is twofold, namely that by which men proving, we despair of placing our hope in man, which is most salutary: and that by which men prove us lacking faith in us, because we act under the law of God: and this is also good.

§ 9. Also, on Job[193], and in Book XXXIII of the Morals, Gregory says: "To His faithful servant the Lord insinuates all the machinations of the cunning enemy: everything that he snatches by oppressing, everything that he flies around by insinuating, everything that he terrifies by threatening, everything that he flatters by persuading, everything that he breaks by despairing, everything that he deceives by promising."

§ 1. Concerning all these modes it is asked: According to what are they taken? § 2. Solution. It must be said that here nine genera of temptations are touched upon. The first of these is taken on the part of the one tempted: for the temptation either has something dragging from within, such as corruption, as in us; or not, as in the uncorrupted, as in the first parents, and in Christ. § 3. The second is taken on the part of the object moving from without, according to the three things that are in the world, namely riches, delights, and honors, as was said above. § 4. The third is taken on the part of the mode in comparison to the trial through the dispositions of the rational and the irascible power rising up: for what is called hidden and open is in comparison to reason; what is called light or heavy is in comparison to the irascible attacking and expelling. § 5. The fourth is taken from the dispositions of the tempted, which make for his ease of being conquered: and this in comparison to the three powers divisively, or conjunctively to all. For to the rational power, ignorance, etc. To the irascible, difficulty, etc. To the

concupiscible, weariness of the good. To all however, according as they are in a work, the storm of the world [tempestas saeculi]. § 6. The fifth is taken according to the harm it intends to inflict on the part of the body, and the soul, and grace: and the division is clear. § 7. The sixth is taken according to the degrees by which it coalesces in us: in which first there is a messaging by suggesting; second, the soul applies itself to it by experiencing delight; and third, it hands itself over to it through consent. § 8. The seventh is taken according to the quantity taken in the degrees of sin: and the division is sufficiently clear: because it is either in morals, and then it is diabolical, and especially in those things that separate from the Church. Or in human affairs which pertain to the infirmity of this life: and then in suffering, or in acting. In suffering in two ways: for either with hope of evasion, and then it is the second, when in necessity one hopes in God, and human counsel is not neglected; or without hope of evasion, and then one ought to commit oneself to God, and suffer for the sake of Christ, and this is the third mode. Or in acting, and this according to the concupiscible by loving more than is fitting those things without which this life is not lived, and this is the first mode; or according to the act of the rational, and this is to savor otherwise [aliter sapere], etc., and this is the fourth mode; or according to the act of the irascible, by the zeal of correcting another, and this is the fifth mode. § 9. Concerning the eighth mode enough was said in the first article: and the whole reason of the division is laid out in the solution. § 10. Here concerning the last mode it must be said, that it is taken on the part of the modes of the devil's machination: for it is either through adverse things, or through prosperous things. If through adverse things, either in the future, or according to the present: if from a future evil, then it is everything that terrifies by threatening; but if from a present evil, either this is the evil of punishment, and then it is everything that seizes by oppressing; or according to the evil of fault, and then it is everything that breaks by despairing. But if it is according to prosperous things, again it is either from a future good, or from a present one. If it is from the future, then it is everything that deceives by promising; but if from the present, either he exhibits universally now this, now that, so as to find something through which to attract, and then it is "he flies around ambushing"; or particularly, and then he flatters by persuading, because then he persuades by the blandishments of the fruit of mutable things, so as thus to turn away from the Creator. § 11. Other modes also are found very many in the sayings of the Saints: but let these suffice here, because elsewhere very many things have been asked concerning this question. § 12.

Articulus 9 — Whether The Temptation Of The Flesh Is More Difficult Than Any Temptation Of The Demon

§ 13. Article 9 § 14. Whether the temptation of the flesh is more difficult than any temptation of a demon?

§ 1. ARTICLE IX. Whether the temptation of the flesh is more difficult than any temptation of a demon? § 2. Next it is asked about what he says, there, E, around the middle: But the temptation of the flesh, etc. § 3. For this seems false: because § 4. 1. Job says There is no power on earth that can be compared to him, who was made to fear no one: therefore the temptation of a de-

192. 1 Cor. 10:13.

mon is more difficult than that of the flesh. § 5. 2. Besides, the demon has power in the flesh, and not conversely: therefore it seems that his attack is more difficult, because it is in two [powers], than that of the flesh which is in one only. § 6. Solution. To this it is easy to respond: because the temptation of the flesh is more difficult on account of three causes, namely because it is through things connatural to us, and this is more deeply rooted; and because it is in our part of substance, and this draws more; and because it is continuous. § 7. It must be said therefore to the first, that the demon is strong in himself, but not in man: because Gregory and Bernard say, that the enemy is weak who cannot conquer except the willing: and although he can tempt, yet he cannot harm, as the Gloss hints upon that, Send us into the herd of swine, which says: Unless one lives in the manner of a swine, the devil does not receive power over him. And this is understood as to the harming of the good of grace, or the natural good which is diminishable through sin: because although he tempts, this very thing is ordered to the profit of man. § 8. To the other it must be said, that in many ways and in many things the devil has power, as is clear in the preceding distinction: but this whole is little, since it is posited to be conquered in our power, and not in his. § 9.

Articulus 10 — Whether Man In The First State Could Sin Venially

§ 10. Article 10. Whether man in the first state could have sinned venially? § 11. ARTICLE X. Whether man in the first state could have sinned venially? § 12. Next it is asked about what he says, there, F, around the middle: So much the more grievously was he to be punished, etc. § 13. And it is asked here, Whether man in the first state could have sinned venially? § 14. But it seems that he could: because § 15. 1. He could love his wife more than he ought, short of God [citra Deum]: therefore he would have sinned venially. § 16. 2. If you say that this could not be. Against: He loved his wife, and that love could grow: let it grow therefore, and be intensified up to this that it is before it ought to be and short of God: therefore the proposition will be had. § 17. 3. Item, There is a state in which sin cannot be committed, neither mortal nor venial: and there is a state in which they are always in mortal sin, as those who are in the state of the damned. § 18. Item, There is a state in which one sins venially and mortally, as is the state of the militant Church. Therefore in order that the division be completed, it is required that there be some state in which one sins venially and not mortally: and that cannot be except the state of first innocence: therefore Adam could have sinned venially. § 19. 4. Item, Everything that is made curved from the straight, is first in a small obliquity rather than in a great one: but free choice in the first state was straight, in the second however curved in a great curvature, namely in

§ 1. mortal [sin]: therefore in the middle state it ought to have been deflectable into venial [sin], and not into mortal: therefore it seems that he could have sinned venially. § 2. ON THE CONTRARY: § 3. 1. The first man in the first state had all inferior things subjected to reason: therefore inordination could not happen except on the part of reason going off track: but in reason, as will be held below, there is mortal sin: therefore he could not sin venially, but only mortally. § 4. 2. Item, In venial sin the delectable thing which moves is small: but a small

193. Job 40:25 (Vulgate).

delectable thing cannot turn away the powers conjoined under the order of reason: therefore what turns away from the first order must have been great: therefore it had to be a mortal sin: because in that a mutable good moves to fruition. § 5. 3. Item, It is hinted in the cunning of the serpent, who promised not a small thing, but a great thing, namely, You shall be like gods, knowing, etc. § 6. Solution. It must be said, that in my judgment one must consent to the last reasons, that he could not sin venially, and two causes were touched upon in objecting. The third however is touched upon in the Text: namely because he had no inciter: and so the sin had to be imputed to him unto death. § 7. It must be said therefore to the first, that against this it is objected, that he would not love outside reason: because reason was subjected to God containing it: and therefore nothing inordinate, neither small nor great, could exist, unless it began from it. § 8. To the other it must be said, that love could not grow outside the order of reason, such a state remaining. Whence its increase was impeded by accident. And this would well happen in many things which would grow as much as is in them, except that they are impeded by accident. § 9. To the other it must be said, that such argumentations have no necessity, and especially in that division: because here the ability to sin venially is caused from the ability to sin mortally, and therefore follows it. Whence there can be no state in which one sins venially, and not mortally. § 10. To the other it must be said, that in the curvature of wood or another body that objection proceeds, but not in the curvature of the will: because that is not curved except by a great curvature first: because it does not come into a great curvature through a small one, but conversely into a small through a great one, as was said. § 11.

Articulus 11 — Why The Sin Of The Angel Is Not Remediable, And Why Human Nature Could Be Assumed And Not Angelic Nature

§ 12. Article 11. Why the sin of the Angel is not remediable? and, Why human nature could be assumed, and not angelic? § 13. ARTICLE XI. Why the sin of the Angel is not remediable? and, Why human nature could be assumed, and not angelic? § 14. Next it is asked about what he says, there, E, towards the end: And therefore his sin stood as irremediable, etc. § 15. For it is asked, Why is the sin of the Angel not remediable? § 16. And because this was disputed much above, therefore here I will posit only three reasons which seem to be better: of which one is to this that he is not unifiable. The second however, that he is not redeemable. The third, that his fall is not according to the state of a penitent, but of a damned one. § 17. The first is founded upon three propositions, of which one is proved in the third book of the Sentences, that nothing singularly one discrete in personality is unifiable to another, for the reason that it is not transmissible into the singularity of another which would unite this to itself. § 18. The second, that personal discretion and

§ 1. singularity is inseparable from the angelic nature: and this is proved through this that in the angelic nature potency never precedes being: but from the moment it is a "this something", it is distinct by its singularity and personality. § 2. The third is, that divine personality is not consumed nor consumes anything of the nature and dignity of that which it assumes. § 3. From these therefore it is necessarily concluded, that an Angel cannot be assumed to a union thus: For let it be given, that it is united, if it is possible: therefore either it is united with its singularity remaining, and the singularity of the divine person [remaining]; or with

one of them passing away, or with both. If with both singularities remaining: therefore two personal singularities are in that single one: therefore necessarily two singulars, and two persons, and two natures, because natures are never united: therefore there are two in every part: therefore united in no part: and this is against the hypothesis, that they are united. If with one passing away: either that one passes away in such a way that when it was in potency, before the act it was assumed into the singularity of a higher one: and therefore it was not susceptible properly: as was done in the assumed nature of man: and then it follows, that in the nature of the Angel potency precedes act: and this is against the first proposition. Or it is thus, that the divine personality consumes the found angelic [personality]: and this is against the third. Or both are confounded into a third: and this again is against the third. § 4. The second reason is taken from the nature of the assumed: because that which does not have a nature ordered to one in number is not assumable to make a cure in one in number: just as human nature originally and naturally is one species handed down from one through one act of nature which is generation: but the nature of an Angel is not one in number, nor in species, nor in origin: therefore it cannot be cured in one assumed number: but it would be necessary, that each one individually be assumed. And Augustine seems to hint at this reason in the Text, when he says, that the whole nature of man perished, but not the whole angelic [nature]. But the cause why the whole perished, is because it had one order of nature and origin, and the angelic did not: because otherwise the angelic would have wholly perished in the first Angel, just as the human in the first man. § 5. The third reason is taken from the fall: because he sinned against a deiform intellect: and man against reason, as Dionysius says: and this was expounded above in the question about the cause of the confirmation of the Angels, and also in III Sentences: and therefore it suffices here.

§ 1.

DISTINCTIO XXII

Divisio Textus

§ 2. Division of the Text § 3. DIVISION OF THE TEXT. § 4. Here it seems it must be diligently investigated, etc. Here the Master treats of the cause of the fall of man, which is sin. And it has three parts: in the first of which the Master inquires, what was the first sin of Eve? In the second however, What was the first sin of Adam? there, D, It is usually asked, Whether that, etc. In the third, he makes a comparison of both, there, E, From which it can manifestly be, etc. § 5. From this and the disputation the meaning is sufficiently clear. § 6.

Articulus 1 — What The First Sin Of Eve Was

§ 7. Article 1. What was the first sin of Eve? § 8. ARTICLE I. What was the first sin of Eve? § 9. First it is asked here, What was the first sin of Eve? § 10. Second, Whether she sinned by one or many sins, as some have said? § 11. Third, Whether this sin was against the Spirit, or against the Father, or against the Son? § 12. To the first it is objected thus: § 13. 1. Augustine

says in the Text, that a pride [elatio] to be repressed or destroyed preceded the tasting of the forbidden: therefore that pride by which they want to be like God, was the first sin. § 14. 2. Item, Augustine in the book On Virginity: The devil who in heaven wanted to be like God, falling persuaded man to the likeness of his own will. But it is agreed, that the first sin of the Angel was pride. Since therefore things are not similar unless having one quality, the first sin of Eve also was pride. § 15. 3. Item, The beginning of all sin is pride. And elsewhere, The beginning of all pride is to apostatize from God. Therefore pride was the first sin. § 16. But against it seems, that it was infidelity: because § 17. 1. She did not believe the words of God: whence she said, Lest perhaps we die, even before the serpent named the likeness of God: but to doubt the words of God is infidelity: therefore her first sin was infidelity. § 18. 2. Item, Above the Master said, that she doubted, receded from the affirmer, and approached the denier: therefore she was an infidel. § 19. 3. Item, The order of recreation was according to the order of the first perdition: but in the recreation in the glorious Virgin the first way of life was faith: therefore in the perdition in Eve the first door of death was infidelity. § 20. 4. Item, In the justification of the ungodly the first is faith, as Augustine says: therefore in the first ungodliness the first was infidelity, from opposites, as it seems. § 21. BUT AGAIN it seems, that the first sin was gluttony: § 22. 1. For this was the first act of sin: and a sin is specified and numbered by the act: therefore it was the first. § 23. 2. Item, The order of temptation of the second Adam was by the mode of temptation of the first, as the Saints say: but Christ was tempted first concerning food therefore also Eve. Therefore also her first sin was the taste of the forbidden. § 24. 3. Item, He seems to say this in the hymn, He himself then marked the wood, etc. § 25. BUT IT SEEMS again, that disobedience is the first sin: because

§ 1. 1. The Apostle says this As by the disobedience of one, etc.: therefore, etc. § 2. 2. Item, Because Augustine says this, that Adam was cast out of paradise on account of disobedience. § 3. Item, Ambrose says, that every sin is a prevarication of the divine law, and a disobedience of the heavenly commandments. § 4. 3. Item, The Lord himself seems to say this: For who told you that you were naked, except that you ate of the tree of which I had commanded you that you should not eat? § 5. 4. Item, This seems from the words of the serpent, who made mention of the precept saying: Why did God command you? § 6. BUT IT SEEMS again, that the first sin was not of commission, but of omission only: because the woman hearing the words of the serpent ought to have conferred, whether they were likely true [viri similia (verisimilia)], and she did not confer: therefore she omitted. § 7. Solution. It must be said that it is easiest here to object infinite things. § 8. To the first it must be said, that "first" is taken in two ways as far as pertains to the present intention, namely in time, and in cause: and in both ways pride was the first sin in Eve. For first from free choice she consented to this that she would be like God in the perfection of the knowledge of good and evil: and the cause of this made whatever she did: and therefore she ate, as she saw the wood, and believed the serpent: and therefore the object of pride was the final cause of all the other acts, as Augustine says in the Text, and all the Doctors have always concordantly conceded: although some recently want to make opinions about this. § 9. To that therefore which is objected against this, it must be said that that doubt does not make infidelity, nor any sin, but a certain facility on the part of the ruling reason: because without sin she could believe, that God had brought forth those words in another sig-

nification, as the Master says in the Text: yet because it was not hers to discuss this, when she hesitated, she approached the denier: nor was this an imperfection: because it was not of the nature of the first state to know all things, and immediately understand every signification of the Lord's speech, unless inquiry and merit preceded. And through this also the solution to the following is clear. § 10. To the other and to the fourth it must be said, that it is not valid: because it is not necessary, that the order correspond to the order in all things. Besides, Humility in the Blessed Virgin was found before the consent of faith. In the justification of the ungodly the virtues have a colligation and order: but the vices none, because from any particle and corruption one vice is born: and therefore that objection is worth nothing. § 11. To that however which is further objected about gluttony, it must be said that the act of gluttony was here material in this sin: because she did not act proudly so that she might eat, but she ate so that she might act proudly in the likeness of God. And therefore it does not specify the sin: because matter does not specify, but form and end. § 12. To the other it must be said, that that order corresponds to the whole transgression: because that was in pride and the taste of the forbidden. And therefore redemption was made in the humility of him hanging on the wood. § 13. But that which is objected about the temptation of the second Adam, it is clear that it is not valid: because the first man was tempted only by one temptation, and in one place, and in one act: and Christ by three, and in three places, and concerning three formally distinct things: and when the Saints adapt, a material multiplication of acts in the sin of Adam suffices for them. § 14. To this that is objected about disobedience; it must be said that disobedience is spoken of in two ways, namely contempt of the precept insofar as it is a precept: and thus it is a special sin: and in this way it was not

§ 1. in the sin of Adam and Eve. It is also called the non-observance of a precept, and thus it accompanies every sin, and in this way it is not a special sin of Adam. § 2. And through this distinction the solution to the whole is clear. § 3.

Articulus 2 — Whether Eve Sinned By One Sin Or By Several

§ 4. Article 2. Whether Eve sinned by one sin or by many? § 5. ARTICLE II. Whether Eve sinned by one sin or by many? § 6. Secondly it is asked, Whether she sinned by one sin or by many? § 7. But it seems that by many: because § 8. 1. Above, in the preceding distinction it was held, that there were three sins in the sin of the first man, namely vainglory, avarice, and gluttony. § 9. 2. Item, It is agreed, that she ate the forbidden, and again acted proudly: therefore she sinned by many. § 10. Solution. It must be said, that she did not sin by many sins: but if one wants to speak properly, one will say that she sinned by one multiple sin, namely that it was one according to the form and end of the will, but multiple in the material acts: and the reason for this has already been expounded often: and therefore it is not necessary to respond to the objects. § 11.

Articulus 3 — Whether The Sin Of Eve Was Sin In

§ 12. Article 3. Whether the sin of Eve was a sin against the Holy Spirit, or against the Father, or against the Son? § 13. ARTICLE III. Whether the sin of Eve was a sin against the Holy

Spirit, or against the Father, or against the Son? § 14. Thirdly it is asked, Whether this sin is a sin against the Holy Spirit? § 15. For it seems, that it is: because she did not then have infirmity, nor ignorance, which are punishments of sin: therefore she must have sinned from malice: but this is a sin against the Holy Spirit: therefore she sinned against the Holy Spirit. § 16. ON THE CONTRARY: § 17. 1. Below the woman will allege, The serpent deceived me: therefore it proceeded from ignorance: therefore it is a sin against the Son. § 18. 2. Item, The Apostle says Adam was not seduced, but the woman was seduced in the prevarication. Therefore she was seduced: therefore she sinned from ignorance: therefore against the Son, and not against the Holy Spirit. § 19. Solution. This is not worthy of great doubt. For it must be said, that she sinned against the Son, just as the Master below by objecting from the words of Isidore says the woman sinned from ignorance: but ignorance is twofold, namely the punishment of sin, and from that she did not sin: and there is ignorance, the nescience of things to be done, as in what sense the words of the Lord were said: and from such proceeded her sin, and therefore it was against the Son. § 20. For she was not ignorant only according as every evil person is called ignorant, but also she was ignorant of the sense of the Lord's word: which ignorance was the occasion of the sin: and Adam also was ignorant that it was mortal, which he thought to be venial: and therefore he also sinned against the Son: and through this the solution to the object is clear. § 21.

Articulus 4 — Whether Pride Was The First Sin Of Adam, And What He Desired, And Whether He Believed The Serpent

§ 22. Article 4. Whether pride was the first sin of Adam? and, What did he desire? and, Whether he believed the serpent?

§ 1. ARTICLE IV. Whether pride was the first sin of Adam? and, What did he desire? and, Whether he believed the serpent? § 2. Next it is asked about what he says, there, It is usually asked, Whether such a pride, etc. § 3. For it seems, that pride was not the first sin of Adam: because § 4. 1. He did not believe the serpent: therefore he did not believe that he could become like God: therefore he did not desire this. § 5. 2. Besides, He was not seduced in what the woman was, but thought to be venial what was mortal: but whoever thinks this, is an infidel: therefore infidelity was his first sin. § 6. Solution. It must be said, that the sin of the woman and of the man with respect to the likeness of God in the knowledge of good and evil differ according to the Master, just as a sin of deed and of concupiscence alone, insofar however as it is a consent of reason: because the woman who believed this could be done, exhibited her members to iniquity for the deed, through which she would obtain this: but the man consented to the robbery of divine likeness: but he did not eat on account of this, but he ate so as to humor [morem gereret] his wife, which he did not believe to be a great evil. § 7. To the first therefore it must be said, that this argument does not proceed. He believed it could not be done: therefore he did not desire. For many covet the goods of a king, and would unjustly want to have them, and by consenting they covet: and yet they know they cannot have them, because the will covets more than it can acquire. § 8. To the other it must be said, that he well knew that it was worthy of death: but he also knew that God is merciful, and could punish not by death, what nevertheless was worthy of death: whence on the part of divine mercy and

his excusability given through the love of his wife, he thought it to be pardonable. § 9. Whence the Masters distinguish here, that a sin is called venial in multiple ways: namely from its genus, as an idle word: or from a subsequent event, as a mortal sin deleted through contrition: or from a certain cause of pardon which is on the part of the sinner and of him against whom he sins, as here, because the occasion of the sin was the love of his wife, and the presumption of God's mercy: and therefore it is clear, that he was not an infidel. § 10.

Articulus 5 — Whether Adam Sinned More Than Eve

§ 11. Article 5. Whether Adam sinned more than Eve? § 12. ARTICLE V. Whether Adam sinned more than Eve? § 13. Next it is asked about what he says, there, E, From which it can manifestly be observed, etc. § 14. For it seems, that Adam sinned more: because he was the head of the woman: therefore he sinned more. § 15. Item, Because he had more vigorous natural endowments. § 16. Item, Because he received the precept immediately. § 17. Item, Because it was more harmful: because from him the whole offspring was infected, and not from Eve, as will be said below: therefore it seems, that Adam sinned more. § 18. But contrary are the reasons in the Text, which need not be repeated here. § 19. Solution. In the substantials of the sin Eve was more guilty, but as to certain circumstances Adam more: for arrogance [fastus] and concupiscence are a greater cause of the act of sin, and as to those Eve sinned more: but the circumstances of the one sinning and of the harmfulness of the sin were greater in Adam, as the objections prove. § 20.

Articulus 6 — Whether, If One Had Not Sinned, The Human Race Would In No Way Have Been Corrupted By Sins

§ 21. Article 6. Whether if the man had not sinned, the human race would have been not at all corrupted by sins?

§ 1. ARTICLE VI. Whether if the man had not sinned, the human race would have been not at all corrupted by sins? § 2. Next it is asked about what he says, there, G, towards the end: If the man had not sinned, the human race, etc. § 3. Against: The woman would give the matter of the flesh: and from the flesh, as is held below, original sin is contracted: therefore the human race would still perish. § 4. Item, If the man had not sinned, it is asked, what would God have done with the woman? § 5. Solution. It must be said according to the Masters, that corruption is twofold, namely of passibility and of hunger, thirst, death, and men would have had this from Eve if she alone had sinned. And there is the corruption of vice through an efficient cause, according to which the flesh sown through coitus from the man can infect souls: and this corruption would not be had, as they say. § 6. TO THE ARGUMENT therefore it must be said, that this second corruption is not had from matter, except insofar as it is cut off from the man, in whom the whole nature is materially and effectively. § 7. To the other it must be said, that God would have permitted her to die in herself, or would have made another woman for the man. Which of these is true, is unknown. § 8.

Articulus 7 — Whether Ignorance Is Sin, And Whether Some Ignorance Is Affected And Voluntary

§ 9. Article 7. Whether ignorance is a sin? and, Whether some ignorance is affected and voluntary? § 10. ARTICLE VII. Whether ignorance is a sin? and, Whether some ignorance is affected and voluntary? § 11. Next it is asked about what he says, there, For there is an ignorance which excuses, etc. § 12. And three things are asked about ignorance, namely whether it is a sin? § 13. And secondly, What kind of sin? § 14. And thirdly, According to what mode, and what ignorance excuses, and what does not? § 15. But that it is not a sin, some strive to prove thus: § 16. 1. Ignorance is a pure privation: no sin is a pure privation: therefore ignorance according to itself is not a sin. § 17. 2. Item, Ignorance bespeaks a privation of knowledge: but no knowledge is a virtue: therefore its privation is not a vice.

§ 1. 3. Item, There is no vice that is not deleted through penance: but ignorance remains after penance just as before: therefore ignorance is not a sin. § 2. 4. Item, Ignorance is in the intellect: but no vice or virtue is in the intellect: therefore, etc. § 3. 5. Item, No vice is born in us except original sin: ignorance is born in us: therefore it is not a vice unless it be original, which is clearly not true. § 4. 6. Item, No punishment into which we fall from sin, is a sin: ignorance is a punishment into which we fall from sin: therefore it is not a sin. § 5. By these and very many other reasons some prove, that no ignorance is a sin. § 6. BUT ON THE CONTRARY are the authorities which are posited in the Text. § 7. Item, The Apostle, If anyone is ignorant, he shall be ignored. § 8. Item, Ambrose upon that of the Apostle You treasure up for yourself wrath in the day of wrath: You sin grievously, because you treasure up the wrath of God for yourself; more grievously, because you despise the goodness of God; most grievously, because you are ignorant. Therefore it seems, that it is a sin. § 9. 2. Item, A debt of doing something in a determinate time, if it not be done, a sin of omission is committed: therefore also a debt of knowing something in a determinate time, if it not be known, leaves a sin of omission: and since ignorance holds itself thus, it seems to be a sin of omission. § 10. But because it is said in the Text that affected ignorance is a sin, it is asked, Whether some ignorance is affected? § 11. But it seems that it is not: because § 12. 1. Ignorance bespeaks a privation: but a privation is nothing: therefore it does not have from whence it may move the appetite of the will: therefore no ignorance is affected or voluntary. § 13. 2. Item, The Philosopher says, that all men desire to know: therefore no man desires to be ignorant: therefore, etc. § 14. But if this be conceded, Against it the words of the Saints expressly speak, which are in the Text. § 15. Solution. It must be said, that concerning this question the opinions of diverse men are diverse. For some have said, that no ignorance of itself is a sin, but by reason of an annex some is said to be a sin, namely by reason of negligence of knowing that which one is bound to know, or by reason of contempt, or by reason of the will, which is the same: and therefore these men in this way solve the sayings of the Saints, that the Saints on account of these causes call some ignorance a sin, and not for its own sake, and they concede the induced reasons. § 16. And they say further to the second question, that by reason of an annex it is also called voluntary: because voluntary is that which makes one ignorant, such as not learning, and resting from the labor of study, or even the will for impunity if it not be known, because if he knew, he would be bound from knowledge to do it. § 17. But because this solution seems according to

the surface to contradict the Saints: therefore others say otherwise, and I think better, distinguishing that ignorance is manifold. For there is an ignorance that is a privation of a habit in the speculative intellect, and this is not a sin: and there is an ignorance of things to be done by us, which is a privation of a ruling habit in morals necessary for salvation: and this is twofold, namely a certain one is the privation of a habit instructing toward those things which are necessary for life in common, such as ignorance of divine right ordaining morals in precepts, as that fornication is a mortal sin, and murder, and the like: and this is a sin in those having the use of reason. Another is the privation of a practical habit of the intellect ruling in those things pertaining to an office, as a Pontiff.

[one] is bound to know the established letters instructing toward faith and morals, and a priest those things without which a sacerdotal act cannot validly be exercised, and the like. And this ignorance, when the office is held, is also a sin, but when it is not held, it is not a sin. And because this is easier to maintain, let us answer the objections according to this.

§ 1. By saying to the first, that such ignorance is not absolutely nothing, just as evil is not when it is a sin: for it leaves the subject, and the debt toward the act to the one knowing, and this debt introduces guilt, when it is the time for paying it.

§ 2. And if it is asked, When is the debt due? I say, in any work necessary for salvation, when one does perversely what, from the knowledge of divine law, ought to be done otherwise. And similarly in other ignorance, as often as one perversely proceeds into an act of his office out of a defect of knowledge; for then the act of the knower owes the governing knowledge.

§ 3. And through this is solved that which is customarily objected, namely that if ignorance is a sin, the ignorant person sins continuously, because the ignorance remains continuously: it must be said that he does not, but he sins as often as he proceeds into a perverse act out of a defect of knowledge. And I readily concede that then he sins doubly, namely by the omission of knowing, and by the illicit act: because, since "to be obliged to know" is an affirmative precept, it does not oblige for always, although it always obliges: but it is exacted at that time when, without the act of knowledge, he cannot avoid sin.

§ 4. To the next it must be said that this is false: "No knowledge is a virtue." For the knowledge of things to be done, taken practically, is a virtue, such as prudence, the gift of understanding, wisdom, and knowledge, as is much disputed in the III Sentences[194].

§ 5. To the next it must be said that if penance is perfect, the guilt of the ignorance passes away, and there remains the act according to which it obliges: because if it is a privation of knowledge pertaining to an office, then if he dismisses the office, he is discharged of the obligation, and then there will not be in him an obliging ignorance. If, however, it is an ignorance of those things which are required for life, he does not do penance unless he inquires and learns, and then the ignorance passes away.

§ 6. To the next it must be said that there is an intellect antecedently ordered to the will to operate, and in that there is no virtue: and there is a voluntary intellect consequently ordered

to the will, and in that there is virtue. And all these things have been discussed in the third of the Sentences.

§ 7. To the next it must be said that according as we are born in ignorance, it is not a sin, but a penalty, just like concupiscence, which is concupiscibility in a child: but when we are bound to know, ignorance is a sin: just like concupiscence, when we are bound not to concupisce. Because what in concupiscence is a sin of commission of a prohibited act, this in ignorance is a sin of omission of a due act.

§ 8. To the next it must be said that ignorance, insofar as it is a penalty, is not a sin, but insofar as it becomes the omission of an act to which someone is bound, and then he is bound.

§ 9. To that which is further asked, "In what way is ignorance voluntary?" Those who are of that opinion distinguish, saying that sin is not said to be voluntary in only one way. For if force is applied to the word, they say that no evil and no sin is voluntary, just as Dionysius[195] says that sin is uncaused, and involuntary, and outside intention, and barren, and sluggish. But some sin, like that of commission, is said to be voluntary because its act and pleasurable object are voluntary, when they ought not to be voluntary. Some [sin] is voluntary by a remote and antecedent will, although not by a proximate and consequent one, as original [sin] is voluntary by the will of Adam, and not by our will.

Some [sin] is voluntary, as that which the will ought to prevent, like the movement of concupiscence. Again, some is voluntary, as that into whose opposite act the will is bound to tend, and in this way the sin of omission and of ignorance is voluntary. And through this the solution to the first objection made concerning this is clear.

§ 10. To the next it must be said that all men desire to know, yet not all men desire to know this or that, but in itself they desire to know. Ignorance, moreover, is not said to be universally affected, but particularly, namely this or that: and this is not contrary to the Philosopher[196]; and therefore in the argument there is a figure of speech passing from simple supposition to determinate and mobile supposition, since the term to know stands immobily and simply in the Philosopher's proposition.

Articulus 8 — What Kind Of Sin Ignorance Is

What sort of sin is ignorance?

§ 11. Secondly it is asked, What sort of sin is ignorance?

§ 12. And it seems that it is original [sin]: because 1. It is born in us. 2. Again, Because through penance it passes away in guilt, and remains in act, just as the Master says below concerning original [sin].

§ 13. BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Because original [sin] is only one: and this is not ignorance. 2. Again, Because original [sin] regards all men: but a certain ignorance is not a sin

194. Job 41:24.

except in those holding an office. 3. Again, Original sin is before the time of discretion, but not ignorance: therefore it is not original.

§ 14. Solution. It must be said that on account of these and similar things, almost the whole multitude follows that opinion, because ignorance of itself and in itself is not a sin. But nevertheless, saving the other [opinion], we can say that ignorance is not a sin according as it is born in us, but according as at the time of discretion and of office it becomes an obligation to the act of knowing.

§ 15. To the next it must be said that ignorance, just like the sin of omission, does not have an act, but its act is a present privation: just as we say of someone that he is actually blind, signifying that at the present time he does not have the habit of sight, and thus privations are in act. And since the sin of ignorance is a sin of omission, it has no other act: and because privations remain unless the habit arrives, therefore ignorance is said to remain in act. Nevertheless, that act is equivocal to the act of original [sin]: because the act of that is the proneness of concupiscence, which is a habit inclining to act; but here it is the actual privation of the governing habit in an office, or in life, regarding those things which are necessary for salvation.

§ 16. And according to this solution one must suppose that the sin of omission does not speak of any act, neither exterior nor interior, but only the omission of a due act and in the time when it is due. And the other opinion does not say this, but rather that every sin of omission is a sin as regards the interior act, as one not restoring a poor person in a time of ultimate necessity, willing not to restore him, or avariciously reserving one's own things for oneself: but this will be treated below.

Articulus 9 — It Is Asked, According To What Mode, And Which Ignorance Excuses

It is asked, according to what mode, and what sort of ignorance excuses?

§ 1. Thirdly it is asked, According to what mode, and what sort of ignorance excuses?

§ 2. And it is objected thus: 1. An evil added to an evil makes the whole more evil: therefore if ignorance is a sin, whether of itself or through something else, if it is added to a sin, it makes the whole more of a sin. 2. Again, This seems evident from the Letter: because it says that affected ignorance excuses no one. 3. Again, From Ambrose above, who says that you sin most gravely because you are ignorant.

§ 3. But perhaps you will say that invincible [ignorance] excuses. On the contrary: The ignorance of a drunkard is invincible: and if he kills [someone], Damascene and Aristotle say that he deserves double curses: both because he kills, and because he gets drunk.

§ 4. Furthermore, according to the Philosopher, ignorance does not excuse except that which is called [ignorance] of fact, which makes an act involuntary: and this is recognized because one is ignorant of the circumstances, and has repentance in the act; but not all ignorance is of this kind: therefore not all ignorance excuses.

195. Matt. 4:3.

§ 5. Solution. It must be said that ignorance, according as it is a sin, whether of itself or from what is annexed to it, has something in the affection, according to which it is called affected: and it has something in the intellect, namely the privation of the governing habit in workable matters pertaining to life or office.

§ 6. It must be said, therefore, that as to the first, it is a sin. But as to the second, it is not a sin, and it excuses either from the whole, if it is particular and of fact; or from a part [i.e., a tanto], if it is of law or universal, which is the same thing: because from that part it causes one to be ignorant of the circumstances in which the act takes place, and so it is a cause of the involuntary which merits pardon and some mercy. And through this the solution to the first objection is clear.

§ 7. To the next it must be said that Augustine speaks of ignorance according to that which is affected, and as to this what he says is true.

§ 8. To the next it must be said that Ambrose does not take "most gravely" according to the quantity of the sin, but rather according to the aspect of danger. Hence "most gravely," that is, most dangerously: because the ignorant person does not see the way by which he might return, and does not recognize the medicine.

§ 9. To the next it must be said that the division of ignorance will be clear below: but nevertheless some is vincible in itself: some vincible in its cause, and such is the case concerning the ignorance of a drunkard: for we are masters of drunkenness, as Damascene says: and therefore that ignorance is not entirely invincible: and therefore it does not excuse from the whole.

§ 10. And if it is objected concerning Lot, that he is excused from a part, and not from the whole: It must be said that it is well conceded that he is excused from a part, but not from the whole. Yet even this does not follow, that if he merits double curses, or if he sinned twice, that on account of this he sinned more [in magnitude]: because there is a progression there from the discrete, as it were, to the continuous, that is, from that which has the quantity of multiplicity, to that which is quantitative intensively: nor is it the same to be cursed and to sin: because some sins are of greater curse or infamy, and yet of lesser weight, as (Gregory says) carnal sins [compared] to spiritual ones.

Articulus 10 — How Manyfold Ignorance Is, And How It Is Divided

How manifold is ignorance, and how is it divided?

§ 11. Next it is asked concerning what he says there, K, Now ignorance is threefold, etc.

§ 12. For the understanding of this passage, note that the division of ignorance is manifold and very useful. For sometimes it is divided according to the efficient cause: as when it is divided into vincible and invincible: and this division is manifold.

§ 13. For there is invincible [ignorance] from nature, and this excuses in whole, such as it is in the naturally foolish, idiots, and melancholics. And there is invincible [ignorance] from an

196. Rom. 5:19.

accident, which is twofold: since that accident is either separable, or inseparable. If separable: it is either from something obstructing the pathways of the animal spirit in the brain, and disturbing the organ from which reason receives species: or from an inseparable and incurable accident of infirmity. And in the first way it is in a drunkard, or one who drinks henbane, or opium, or something else. In the second way it is in the infirm: and thus it is distinguished in its cause: because either he himself applied effort [to bring it about], or not. If not, as if he was ignorant of the quality of the wine, or of what he consumed, then it excuses him in whole. But if he himself applied effort: either through a licit thing, or an illicit one. If in the first way, again he is excused in whole even if he acts badly afterward. But if through an illicit thing: either that was a venial sin, or a mortal one. If in the first way, it still excuses in whole. If in the second way, it does not excuse in whole, in my judgment, but in part: because then he deserves double curses.

§ 14. But if it is vincible: then it is further divided according to matter, into ignorance of law, and of fact: and this is the same as what Theologians call universal, and particular: because "law" is called here the universal rules governing life, or office. "Fact", however, is this or that particular thing, which it happens even a wise man to be ignorant of: just as Jacob was ignorant of Leah being substituted for Rachel and therefore he is excused in whole. But [ignorance] of law is twofold: because some is universal law, which is imposed on all to be known: and

some is particular, which is not known except through study: and I think that the first is crass and supine, not excusing. The second, however, excuses, either from a part, or from the whole, if the case is very difficult.

§ 1. By this same division ignorance is called affected, or simply ignorance, according as it is conjoined with the form of the will, or separated from it: and when it is affected, then it is a sin on the part of the affection: but when it is simply ignorance, then it is excusing from a part, and not from the whole. These differences, however: excusing, and not excusing, are taken according to the final cause.

Articulus 11 — Whether A Sin From Ignorance Is More Grave Than From Weakness

Whether a sin out of ignorance is graver than one out of infirmity?

§ 2. Next it is asked concerning this which is said in the Letter, that one sins more gravely out of infirmity than out of ignorance.

§ 3. But this does not seem so: because infirmity denotes a weakness in standing firm: and the greater the weakness is, the less the sin is imputed.

§ 4. Solution. It must be said that Isidore makes the comparison according to that which the sin has of voluntariness. For since through ignorance the circumstances of the business, and the place, and the time, and the person, and the subsequent harm are not known, nothing of the voluntary remains with respect to the circumstances. But in infirmity it does remain: and therefore it has more of the voluntary, and consequently more of sin and contempt.

§ 5. And let these things said concerning ignorance suffice.

DISTINCTIO XXIII

Divisio Textus

§ 1. Moreover it is customarily asked, Why God [permitted] man, etc. Here, thirdly, he subjoins a question concerning the cause on the part of God permitting that man should fall.

§ 2. And it has two parts. In the first he raises a question about the permission of the fall. In the second he touches upon in what sort of knowledge man was created according to the soul, there, B, And indeed according to the soul, etc.

§ 3. Here two things are asked: Namely, whether man was made in natural or in gratuitous gifts? And, Whether God could have made man better than He made him? And the first of these has been determined above concerning the Angels: because it is the same thing to ask, Whether man and Angel were made in natural or gratuitous gifts? The other, however, is found widely disputed in the first book of the Sentences: and therefore here we must pass on to the second part of this lesson.

Articulus 1 — Whether Man In The First State Received All Knowledge Through Nature Or Through Grace

Whether man in the first state received the knowledge of all things through nature, or through grace?

§ 4. Therefore it is asked, Whether man in the first state naturally had the knowledge of all things?

§ 5. And it seems that he did: because 1. It was fitting that God's works be perfect: but man was the work of God: therefore he ought to have been left lacking in no perfection: therefore he was perfected according to the knowledge which can naturally be had by someone. 2. Again, He made him perfect in body: but the perfection of the soul is worthier than that of the body: therefore He also made him perfect in soul. 3. Again, Since it is very difficult to discover sciences, but easy to increase them through hearing from another: just as we find in the first philosophizers, that they said very foolish things, and the later ones understood better. It seems according to this, however, that Adam would have been most foolish, unless he himself had the knowledge of all things given to him from creation.

§ 6. BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. There is a difference between the soul and an Angel: because the soul is placed in a body so that it may receive sciences and virtues: whereas an Angel has sciences from creation. Since therefore Adam was one having a human soul, it seems he ought not to have had knowledge except through discipline in the body. 2. Again, This is seen from what was held above, where the Master says that children would have been

born in the imperfection of knowledge, just as also in the imperfection of stature: therefore it seems that it is not of the nature of man to immediately receive the habits of the sciences.

§ 7. Solution. It must be said that Adam had the sciences of all things, and this through gratuitously given grace, and not through nature. An Angel, however, has this through nature: and therefore the difference between the soul and an Angel still remains: yet this is not a substantial difference, but another which was touched upon in part above.

§ 8. TO THE OTHER it was answered above, that infants would not have been born, in my judgment, imperfect in the habit of knowledge, but rather in the act of consideration, on account of the fluidity of the complexion of infants toward diverse things, which does not suffer a strong conversion upon one and the same thing.

Articulus 2 — Whether The First Man Had Knowledge Of The Creator, And Saw God Without A Medium, Or Through A Mirror And Enigma

Whether the first man had knowledge of the Creator, and saw God without a medium: or through a mirror and an enigma?

§ 9. Next it is asked concerning this which he says, there, D, The first man is also believed to have had knowledge of the Creator.

§ 10. For the Master seems to speak falsely: because 1. In the beginning of the fourth of the Sentences it is held that the first man saw God without a medium: therefore he did not see through a medium, as is said here. 2. Furthermore, If he saw through a medium: then his vision did not differ from ours: because even among us one sees more clearly than another: and this does not seem likely. 3. Furthermore, Augustine says on Genesis that he worked in order to receive experience: but by experience art and science are left behind: therefore it seems that he did not have the knowledge of all things, as was previously supposed to be assumed.

§ 11. Solution. It must be said that the vision of faith is through a mirror in an enigma but an enigma is manifold.

§ 12. For one enigma is from this very fact, that the intellect is created, from which it happens to it that, even if it is concerning the same knowable things which the intellect of God is about, nevertheless it cannot [penetrate] into them as limpidly as the divine intellect: and under such an enigma every rational creature is, even the soul of Christ.

§ 13. Another enigma, again, is from the fact that the intellect of man is inquisitive, whereas the angelic [intellect] is without inquiry, as we said above: and this enigma again man has inseparably on the way, although in the homeland he is made similar to the Angels.

§ 14. A third enigma is from the fact that the intellect is veiled by flesh: and this again is inseparable from man as long as he bears animal flesh. And under all of these Adam knew God.

§ 15. A fourth enigma is of the obscurity of the intellect, which occurs from the sin of the soul: and under this we see, for the reason that we can never be so recalled through penance in this life that nothing remains of the corruption of the sincerity of the powers.

§ 16. A fifth enigma is that proceeding not from the flesh, but from the corruption of the flesh: because the corruptible body is a load upon the soul, etc.. And in these last two ways Adam saw more limpidly than we do.

§ 17. Again, the mirror of creatures does not represent God except in some light. That light, therefore, is either divine alone and resting in the divine which is the light penetrating all things, and thus God knows creatures, and Himself to shine forth in creatures through the light which He Himself is, and He remains un-egressively in Himself.

§ 18. In a second way He is known in the creature through a light beginning from God and terminating in the creature: just as the Angels and the blessed from the morning vision come into the evening vision. And in neither of these ways did Adam know God in a mirror.

§ 1. In a third way He is known in a mirror through the vestige of uncreated light, which nevertheless is a created light, obscured in no part by the infection of sin: and thus Adam saw God in the mirror of the creature.

§ 2. In a fourth way God is known in the mirror of the creature through a created and obscured vestige: because when Adam sinned, all things which were made on account of him flowed down into a worse state, as the Gloss says on that of the Epistle to the Romans, 8:20: To vanity, etc.. And thus Adam did not see, but we do.

§ 3. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

§ 4. For to what is first objected, it must be said that the Master in the fourth of the Sentences does not intend to remove every medium, but on the part of the interior enigma, the fourth and fifth; and on the part of the mirror, only the fourth.

§ 5. To the next it must be said that none of us can reach that clarity which has no obscurity from sin.

§ 6. To the next it must be said that Adam experienced for the sake of delight in the act of contemplation of the wisdom governing nature, and not for the acquisition of a habit: just as one who knows how to play the fiddle, fiddles, so that he may be delighted in the hearing.

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§ 7. Now it must be diligently investigated, etc. Here begins that part in which it is treated from what Adam fell through sin.

§ 8. And it has two parts: in the first of which he treats how he fell from the natural [gifts] in which he was wounded: and in the second, how he fell from gratuitous [gifts]: and this begins in distinction XXVI, there, A, This is operating grace, etc.

§ 9. The first of these is subdivided into two: in the first of which he treats of free choice. In the second, of its liberty and states, which begins in distinction XXV, there, A, But now to the proposition, etc.

§ 10. This lesson, however, is subdivided into three: in the first of which he inquires, Whether man received any gratuitously given grace in the first state? Secondly he determines what that grace was, because it was of free choice, there, D, Here it is to be considered, etc. Thirdly, he determines the order of temptation in the powers of the soul, there, G, That also must not be passed over, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether Adam Was Able To Stand By That Which He Received In Creation

Whether Adam could have stood firm through what he received in creation?

§ 11. Concerning the first, three doubts arise: namely, Whether Adam could have stood firm through what he received in creation? Secondly, Whether he could have progressed?

Thirdly, Whether his not progressing could then have been imputed to him?

§ 1. TO THE FIRST one proceeds thus: 1. Damascene says that every creatable thing is vertible [i.e., changeable]: but it is certain, not for the better: therefore it will be turned for the worse. But the first man was created: therefore without the help of God he would be turned for the worse: therefore it was necessary that he would not stand firm unless he received some grace for standing. 2. Again, Augustine in the book On True Innocence "Human nature, even if it had remained in that integrity in which it was founded, could yet in no way preserve itself without the Creator aiding it." If therefore then, without the grace of God, he could not preserve his salvation which he had, how after the fall could he recover the grace which he lost? Therefore it seems that of himself he could not stand firm.

§ 2. BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. That which is not in our power is not imputed to us: if therefore Adam could not stand firm in what he received without a new grace, if he did not receive that, it was not to be imputed to him that he fell: but he did not receive it: therefore the fall was not to be imputed to him. 2. Again, Nature gives being to no one without also giving to it virtues preserving the being which it gave, unless it be that its being is a continuous becoming: since therefore God is not more imperfect in operating than nature, when He gave natural being to man, He gave him the power of standing in it. 3. Again, God gave being to an ass, and the power of standing in it: therefore if He did not do this for man, he would be of a worse condition with Him than an ass. 4. Again, the Master says in the Letter that the grace by which he could stand in what he received was the faculty of free choice and of discerning good and evil: but it is certain that the first man received these powers or faculties in creation, from which he could stand.

§ 3. Solution. It must be said that man can be nothing, or do nothing without grace: but this is not always gratum faciens [i.e., grace making pleasing], but rather the preservation and influence of divine goodness for being and operating, just as He Himself says: Without me you can do nothing. And by this grace the first man could stand firm in what he had received: but he was not created in gratuitous gifts: which nevertheless I do not believe, although I maintain it on account of the Master.

§ 4. It must be said therefore to the first, that I well concede that man needs containing just like any other creature: but he would not need gratum faciens grace for this. And in this way the following authority of Augustine is also understood.

§ 5. To the other things, however, which are objected to the contrary, the solution is clear: because those do not remove the grace of divine influence and of things superadded in natural powers which God gives to each nature according to the proportion of its capacity: and such was also the grace which Adam received. But in man it is properly called grace, because it orders toward gratum faciens grace: whereas in other things it is not properly called by the name of grace, but of a given [gift], or of nature.

Articulus 2 — Whether Man Was Able To Make Progress In The First State From The Things Which He Received

Whether man could progress in the first state from those things which he received?

§ 6. Secondly it is asked, Whether man could progress in the first state from those things which he received?

§ 7. And it seems that he could: because 1. In Luke 10:30, it is said in the Gloss that he was wounded in natural [gifts], and despoiled of gratuitous ones: but no man is despoiled of that which he does not have: therefore he had gratuitous [gifts]: but one having gratuitous [gifts] can progress: therefore Adam could progress to merit.

1. Again, In natures we see thus, that everything which nature perfects in being, it also gives to it natural powers, by which it can progress into well-being and operating: since therefore God is not more imperfect than nature, He also gave to His work powers by which he could progress in well-being: therefore Adam also could progress.

§ 1. If it is conceded, Against this is what Augustine says in the Letter.

§ 2. FURTHERMORE it is asked here according to the other opinion, which says that Adam was created in gratuitous gifts, how is what Augustine says here understood, that he could not progress?

§ 3. Solution. It must be said to this, that Adam according to that opinion that he was not created in gratum faciens grace, could not progress to merit: because the progress of merit is not established within the power of natural forces or capacities, but it is necessary to have higher ones, like faith, charity, and the like: but he could progress in the well-being of nature,

as in the advantages of life, and in works established within the power of natural capacities: and the second objection proves this and no more.

§ 4. To the first it must be said according to this opinion, that he was not despoiled of gratuitous gifts which he possessed, but which he was going to possess if he had stood firm.

§ 5. To that which is asked, How is it answered according to the other opinion to the words of Augustine in the Letter?

§ 6. It must be said that there is a progress to merit, and in this way Adam could progress: and there is a progress to confirmation according to the state of beatitude, and in this way he could not progress, unless God completed him.

Articulus 3 — Whether, Supposing That Man Did Not Have Grace, It Was Nevertheless To Be Imputed That He Fell

Whether assuming that man did not have grace, it was to be imputed to him that he fell?

§ 7. Thirdly it is asked, Since he did not have grace, whether it was to be imputed to him that he fell?

§ 8. And it seems that it was not: because 1. He had more things depressing into evil than elevating into good, because of the vertibility [changeability] of nature, and an Angel exhorting: therefore he could not resist. 2. Again, The devil is stronger than man; therefore man cannot resist him of himself: therefore that he succumbed was not to be imputed to him, as it seems.

§ 9. BUT ON THE CONTRARY: He had discretion of good and evil, and the faculty of choice, because he could dissent: therefore he fell by his own fault, since he could have stood firm, as it seems.

§ 10. Solution. From what was previously had in the question concerning temptation, this is easy to solve: because although nature is vertible, yet the influence of divine will holds itself more to standing firm, than that it should be turned.

§ 11. Again, although he has an Angel tempting from without, he also has a good Angel comforting him: and therefore he had more efficacious remedies elevating than depressing, and therefore it is to be imputed to him.

§ 12. To the next it must be said, as above, that although the devil is strong in himself, yet the temptation is not stronger than man himself wills: because he himself does not receive forces against us except from our permission or will: and therefore that objection does not compel.

Articulus 4 — Whether Man In The First State, By Resisting Evil And Not Consenting To Temptation, Would Have Merited For Himself

Whether man in the first state, by resisting evil and not consenting to temptation, would have made merit for himself?

Whether man in the first state, by resisting evil and not consenting to temptation, would have made merit for himself?

§ 1. Next it is asked concerning this which he says, there, C, around the middle: To which we say, that to resist evil, etc.

§ 2. For the reason of the Master seems to be none: because 1. It is a meritorious work from the fact that it proceeds from the root of charity. 2. Again, That he says, To decline from evil ... does not always merit the palm, seems false: because it is a part of justice, and justice according to its whole self merits the palm: therefore to decline from evil also.

§ 3. Solution. It must be said that the Master rather attends to the aspect of the act of virtue than of grace. And it is true: because virtue is about the difficult and the good: and the resistance of the first man would not have had this aspect, although otherwise it would have had the aspect of merit. Others say differently, namely that the merit of the remission of punishment consists in the difficulty of the work, and Adam would not have had this: but the merit of glory consists in the quantity of charity, and he would have had this if he had had grace. But this is not pleasing on this account, because he himself would not have needed that merit, since he was a debtor to no punishment: and therefore that distinction would be made in vain concerning his work.

§ 4. To the next it must be said that there is "to decline" which denotes nothing but a simple privation, just as one declines from an evil of which there was never a thought: and of this the Master speaks. There is also "to decline from evil" of which there was a thought, and there is an actual will tending to the contrary of that evil: and this is a part of justice, and merits the palm: and of this he does not speak.

Articulus 5 — What Free Choice Is: Whether A Habit, Or A Power, Or A Passion

What is free choice? Whether a habit, or a power, or a passion?

What is free decision? Is it a habit, or a power, or a passion?

§ 1. Thereafter, an inquiry is made concerning what is said there, at E, But free decision, etc. And three things are inquired here concerning free decision, of which the first is: What is it? The second: Whether its freedom can be lost or removed through anything? The third: concerning its act, of which mention is made in the Letter [Text of the Sentences].

§ 2. TO THE FIRST one proceeds thus: 1. Everything that is capable of intensification and remission, out of those things that are in the soul, is a habit or a passion, and not a power. Free decision is capable of intensification and remission: therefore it is a habit, or a passion. The first premise is evident through what the Philosopher says, that there are three things in the soul: powers, passions, and habits; and powers do not receive more and less, since they are consequent upon the substance of the soul, but the other two are capable of more and less. The second premise is proved by Augustine, Bernard, and Anselm, who say that it is freer in the blessed than in wayfarers, and freer in wayfarers than in the damned.

§ 3. Likewise, freedom is divided into freedom from coercion, from sin, and from misery; and these bespeak a habit. Therefore, free decision bespeaks a habit, and not a power.

§ 4. 2. Likewise, this is seen through the fact that it is called the faculty of reason. For a faculty of a power is a habit, and not a power. Therefore, free decision is a habit.

§ 5. Further, it is inquired in what way it is called the faculty of reason and of will. For it is either because it is in both, or because it is from both. If because it is in both: then free decision is a part of reason and of will. And since it is numerically one, one and the numerically same thing will be an essential part of two things, which is impossible. If, however, because it is from both: then free decision is a power composed from two powers, which is impossible. And according to this, reason and will would not remain in their proper act in the soul, but in that which they compose.

§ 6. Besides, two simple things do not compose a third, unless one is material relative to the other, and the other is formal. But reason and will are not disposed in this way. Therefore it seems that it is wrongly called the faculty of reason and of will.

§ 7. Further, it is inquired, how is reason taken in the definition of free decision? For it is clear that it is not taken for speculative reason. Therefore, for practical reason. Therefore, either for the higher, or the lower, or for both simultaneously. If for the higher: then lower things would not be disposed through free decision, as it seems. If, however, for the lower alone: then it would not happen that one inheres to higher things through free decision, which is also false. If, however, for both: this does not seem right, because according to this, free decision would not be a special power, but one encompassing many. In the same way, an objection can be made concerning the will.

§ 8. SOLUTION. It must be said, in my judgment, that free decision is a special power completed through a natural habit, which is its freedom: hence it has something of reason, and something of will, as its name shows. For its proper act is to will a decision for itself, and this means to choose, when two things are proposed, that is, to prefer and pre-elect. And to propose two things belongs to reason, but to prefer the one belongs to the will: but he names the freedom from the will.

§ 9. And that this may be understood, it must be known that, as the Philosopher says, "Free is he who is the cause of himself, and not the cause of another:" and that which is bound to another is not free. Hence powers affixed to organs are bound to them, not being able to act beyond the nature of the organ's receptivity: just as the visual power bound to the pupil cannot [act] beyond what the pupil is naturally apt to receive, and so it is also for the others. But from such an obligation all the powers of the rational soul are absolved, none of which is affixed to an organ. Another obligation to another is from the object, when it compels the power concerning consent to it, just as all the apprehensive powers of the rational soul, such as the intellect, reason, and the like, are compelled by arguments to consent to the true: and therefore they are not the cause of themselves, but of another. But the will is bound in neither way: because it is not a power affixed to an organ, nor does it even necessarily consent: because, while reason dictates that this must be done or not, it still holds itself toward

whatever it wills, and can will the contrary of what has been judged by reason. And therefore the will is free, and the choice of free decision from that part has the same freedom. Hence it must be known that free decision is a power of the rational soul situated in the soul in the contact of the judging reason and the completely willing will: because to choose (which according to Augustine belongs to free decision) is after judgment, and before complete willing.

§ 10. Therefore, to the first, it must be said that freedom is threefold, namely, from coercion, from sin, and from misery. And only that which is from coercion is of the substance of free decision. And that, in turn, is considered in two ways, namely, in itself, and thus it cannot be intensified or remitted: or in comparison to an act, and thus it admits of more and less, just as the natural power itself does. And therefore, through this, it cannot be proved that it is not a power, but with respect to the other two freedoms, it designates a habit receiving intensification and remission.

§ 11. To the other, it must be said that although "faculty" is spoken of abstractly, it nevertheless names a power completed through the nature which is freedom from coercion, which it receives according as it attains the will.

§ 12. To the other, it must be said that it is called the faculty of reason and of will, as if from both, not materially, but according to order, because one in act puts itself before it, and the other follows from it.

§ 13. And this is clear from Damascene, who says that first one inquires, then disposes, thirdly orders, then judges and sentences, then chooses, then wills, then makes an impulse toward the work. And it is clear that to inquire, dispose and order, judge and sentence, are acts of reason: but to will and to make an impulse toward the work are acts of the will. But to choose (as we have it in the Letter) is an act of free decision. Therefore, free decision is a power situated in the contact of reason and will, having something from the fact that it is ordered to both, to one consequently, and to the other antecedently. And therefore both are posited in its definition: and it is not compacted, as some have said, from both, but by order it looks to both.

§ 14. To that which is further inquired, how reason is taken there? It must be said, for practical reason, which commonly holds itself toward both portions, because decision is in the service of both.

§ 15. Nor does the objection to the contrary follow: because reason and will do not enter into its composition, but are required for the order of the act which is to choose.

§ 16. Concerning all these and the following matters, many exceedingly exquisite disputed questions are found in our treatise On the Soul, in the question on the motive powers and on free decision.

Articulus 6 — Whether Free Choice Could Be Lost, And Its Freedom Taken Away By Something

Could free decision be lost, and its freedom removed through anything?

Could free decision be lost, and its freedom removed through anything?

§ 17. Secondly, it is inquired, whether it can be lost? For how it is preserved alongside foreknowledge was noted in the first book of the Sentences, in the treatise on foreknowledge.

§ 18. But it seems that it is lost through sin: because 1. Augustine says in the Enchiridion (and it will be held in the following distinction), "man, by using free decision badly, both loses himself and it." But what is lost is not possessed: therefore it seems that afterward it is not possessed by man.

§ 19. 2. Likewise, below he will say that after sin it is dragged and conquered: but what is dragged and conquered is coerced: therefore it is coerced after sin: therefore it is not free.

§ 20. 3. Likewise, Augustine in the book On Free Decision: "Man enjoys nothing with freedom, except what he enjoys with security." But man will never have security in this life: therefore neither freedom: therefore it seems that he has lost freedom.

§ 21. But against this is what Origen says on that verse of Deuteronomy 11:26: Behold, I set forth in your sight today, etc., as follows: "Those things that happen externally are not in our power. But to use well or badly those things that occur, by the reason within discerning and judging how one ought to use them, is in our power, as Moses says: Behold I set forth in your sight today, etc."

§ 22. Further, it is inquired, whether the ability to [do] evil is freedom or a part of freedom? And it seems that it is: because 1. It is posited in the previously held definition of Augustine.

§ 23. 2. Likewise, the Philosopher says that the power of the wicked is to be chosen: therefore it is good, and belongs to the power of free decision.

§ 24. But against this is what Anselm says, that to be able to sin is neither freedom, nor a part of freedom: therefore it is not of the essence of free decision.

§ 25. SOLUTION. It must be said that freedom, as the Master says in the following distinction, is threefold, namely, from necessity, and from sin, and from misery. And the first cannot be lost, but the second and third can.

§ 26. Likewise, the first is still considered in two ways, namely according to the terminus from which, that is, according as it is free or absolved from necessity: and thus it is never lost, or diminished: because a privation does not receive intensification or remission. Hence, according to this, it is equally in God and in the creature, and equally in the blessed and the miserable, and equally in the good and the bad. It can also be considered in comparison to the act of choosing: and in this way it is not lost, but is diminished from the defect of the habit of grace or [of another good].

§ 27. To that therefore which is objected first and third, it must be said that it is understood concerning the freedom of grace and of glory or beatitude, and not of nature which is from necessity.

§ 28. To the other, it must be said that it is dragged and conquered so as to be subject to sin: because by itself it cannot exit from sin, unless it has freedom from sin, which is through

grace. But it is not dragged nor conquered such that it is coerced to a subsequent sin, because in that way it would have lost freedom from necessity.

§ 29. To that which is further inquired, it must be said that the power of sinning is not a part of freedom except accidentally, namely insofar as it is numerically and substantially one with the power of not sinning, and this is materially. But insofar as it is of sinning, it is a defect and an infirmity, and not a power: and in the first way Augustine takes it; in the second way Anselm.

§ 30. Through this also the solution to what the Philosopher says can be evident.

Articulus 7 — What The Act Of Free Choice Is, And Whether It Is Choosing

What is the act of free decision? and, Whether it is to choose?

§ 31. Thirdly, it is inquired concerning the act of free decision which is to choose, as is held from the definition which Augustine posits.

§ 32. But to the contrary, it seems to be the act of electiveness (eligentia): 1. Electiveness is not free decision: therefore to choose is not the act of free decision. But that electiveness is not of free decision is clear: because the Philosopher says that electiveness is always right, while free decision is right and not right.

§ 33. 2. Likewise, of one simple power there is one simple act: but free decision is one simple power: therefore it has a simple act. The first premise is evident per se. The second is taken from the premises. Hence thus: To choose is not a simple act: therefore to choose is not an act of free decision.

§ 34. The proof of the first is that Damascene, defining "to choose", posits many things in the definition, saying that to choose is, when two things are proposed, to prefer this one to that.

§ 35. SOLUTION. It must be said that "to choose" is twofold, namely, from spontaneous consent, as the Master says in the following distinction: and thus it is the choice of whatever the chooser wills, and consists in the freedom of decision. There is also choice which is the determination of the better eligible thing according to right reason, and thus it belongs to electiveness: and thus it is clear that the choice of free decision follows spontaneous consent without any governing rule: and therefore it is free. But the choice of electiveness follows the rules of reason taken from the nature of the eligible thing: and therefore that is not free, but is compelled by right reason, and falls into the considerations of the topical art, as is clear in Book II of the Topics: and it is made the efficient cause of virtue, as is clear in Book III of the Ethics.

§ 36. Through this the solution to the first is clear.

§ 37. To the other, it must be said that although free decision is one power, nevertheless its rooting is not immediately upon the substance of the soul, as was said before, but rather it is upon it as already determined through other powers which it puts before itself: and therefore in act it also has something from the others, yet that is material, namely, to propose two

things: but the complement of the act rests in preferring. And thus it is found in all acts which are not of one power according as it is alone, but in comparison of order to others, such as to enjoy, to use, to know, and many such things, concerning which it was noted in the first book of the Sentences: and in another work distinct from this, in the question concerning eternal life.

Articulus 8 — What Sensuality Is, And Whether It Names One Force Or One Power, Or Several

What is sensuality? and, Whether it names one force or power, or many?

What is sensuality? and, Whether it names one force or power, or many?

§ 38. Thereafter it is inquired concerning what he says, there, For sensuality is a certain power, etc. And two things are inquired concerning sensuality, namely, what is it? and, whether there can be sin in it?

§ 39. To the first one proceeds thus, having supposed the definition of Augustine which is posited here, namely that sensuality is a certain lower power of the soul, from which there is a movement that is directed into the bodily senses. And he posits another, that it is the appetite for things pertaining to the body.

§ 40. But against this: 1. The lower power of the soul from which there is such a movement, is not one power: because the phantasy, according to the Philosopher, moves in this way, and also the concupiscible, and the irascible: therefore he wrongly calls it a "power".

§ 41. Likewise, at the end of this distinction he says that sometimes sensuality is called the lower portion of reason which intends to the disposition of temporal things, namely lower things which are also sensible: therefore the movement intending into the senses is from the lower portion: and so it will be sensuality.

§ 42. 2. Likewise, those things of which there is appetite or flight by the sensible soul, are not always received from sense, as Avicenna says: but they are intentions of good or evil, of harmful or convenient, which the estimative power elicits, and does not receive them from sense: therefore it is wrongly said that it is directed into the senses.

§ 43. Likewise, against the second: For the appetite for things pertaining to the body is not of one power, but rather of the irascible and concupiscible: therefore he wrongly posits it in sensuality as in one power.

§ 44. SOLUTION. Without prejudice it seems to me that sensuality does not name one power and potency, but many, namely all those in which a movement is completed from a sensual apprehension. But that is completed in two ways: for it can begin from the receiving sense, and the common sense composing one sensible with another, just as it began in the woman, as is said: Therefore the woman saw that the tree was good for eating, and beautiful to the eyes, and delightful to look at. Namely, there was the common sense composing the visible with the gustable. Then follows the act of the practical phantasy composing and dividing what is received from the sense, according to a composition from which the intentions of good and evil, of convenient and non-convenient, or of harmful or friendly, can be elicited. And then the

estimative power informed by those intentions, and instigating to movement or flight. And then follows the affluence of desire which is a common power: and it has two parts, namely the concupiscible and irascible, and it flows abundantly through concupiscence into the delightful, but through anger it rises up against the harmful. And then there is a delightful touch in the soul through delectation: and there the movement of sensuality is completed: whence also it is denominated from it, because it feels the conjunction of the delightful sensible thing.

§ 45. Another mode of beginning is from the memory which (as the Commentator says on the book On the Soul) makes the singular stand through reflection before the sense: and in the progress there is no variation.

§ 46. And it seems to me that sensuality names the sensible soul in all these motive powers. For it is necessary that in every movement a report be made through apprehension, which begins from sense, or from memory: and afterward it runs down that path which we have spoken of: but nevertheless principally the ultimate completion is the touch, or the conjunction of the sensible thing delightfully in the sense of interior delectation.

§ 47. To that therefore which is objected first, it must be said that Augustine in book XII of On the Trinity, whence those things are drawn, does not treat of the powers of the soul intentionally: and therefore he commonly calls a "power" that in which the whole force of that movement which is on the part of the beastly nature is completed: and from that nature it is called one power, and not from the ratio of one power.

§ 48. To the other, it must be said that "to be received from sense" is said in two ways, namely from the proper object: and thus intentions are not received from sense, as Avicenna says: because the intention of good or evil here and now is not the proper sensible of any sense. It can also be said to be received from sense, what is elicited from the composition or division of sensibles, and is not separated from the appendages of matter which makes a particular thing: and thus the intentions of good or evil here and now, are received from sense: and thus according to Augustine, sensuality is directed into the five bodily senses.

§ 49. To the other, the solution is clear through what has been said before.

§ 50. Moreover, you will find many things concerning this matter and the following article in the other Summa, in the question on temptations, and on the motive powers of the soul.

Articulus 9 — Whether There Can Be Sin In Sensuality

Whether there can be sin in sensuality?

§ 51. Secondly, it is inquired, Whether there can be sin in sensuality? And it seems that there cannot: because 1. Sin is not present in beasts: but sensuality is common to us with the beast: therefore sin cannot be in sensuality.

§ 52. 2. Likewise, Augustine says that every sin is in reason.

§ 53. Likewise, he says in the Letter, and it will be held below, that sensuality is secluded from the nature of reason: therefore sin is not in sensuality.

§ 54. 3. Likewise, of opposites there is one power: virtue and sin are opposites: therefore the power of them in which they have being, is one. But virtue never has being in sensuality: therefore neither does sin, as it seems.

§ 55. BUT AGAINST THIS: 1. First movements are sins, as Augustine says there. And first movements are in sensuality: therefore sin is in sensuality.

§ 56. 2. Likewise, the first movement is called in the genus of sin with respect to the second: but the second in the woman is a sin: therefore also the first in the serpent: because what is not a sin is not first in the genus of sin.

§ 57. SOLUTION. Without prejudice it must be said that in sensuality there is a sin which is called the first movement, which according to Augustine, is the lightest sin.

§ 58. To the first therefore it must be said that although according to substance sensuality is common to us with the beast, nevertheless it has in man an order and composition to reason, which it does not have in the beast, and from that order it has the fact that it can be the subject of venial sin insofar as it is corrupted.

§ 59. To the other, it must be said that every sin is in reason, not as in a subject, but as in a cause: because what is even venial in sensuality, this itself is caused from the fact that it is ordered and united to reason.

§ 60. To the other, it must be said that the lightest venial sin does not have opposition to virtue, but rather mortal sin [does]: and therefore it remains with virtue, because it does not attain the same part. And therefore it is not necessary that sensuality be the subject of virtue, if it is the subject of this sin. Note, however, that in the sensible soul there are certain parts, according to the Philosopher at the end of the first book of the Ethics, which somehow participate in reason, [namely] the concupiscible, and the irascible: and these, according as they participate somehow in reason, are elevated above the capability of sensuality, and are made subjects of virtue and vice.

§ 61. Concerning this, again, seek elsewhere in the assigned places.

Articulus 10 — What Reason Divided Into Two Parts Is, Namely Whether It Is One Power Or Several

What is reason divided into two parts, namely whether it is one power, or many?

§ 62. Thereafter it is inquired concerning what he says, there, E, But reason is the higher power of the soul, etc. And five things are inquired. First, what is reason divided into two parts, namely whether it is one power, or many? Second, by what are the higher and lower distinguished? Third, concerning the lower. Fourth, concerning the higher. And fifth, how ought the higher to rule the lower?

§ 63. To the FIRST one proceeds thus: 1. Augustine says that there is a higher power of the soul: therefore it is one power, and not many.

§ 64. 2. Likewise, reason is posited in the definition of free decision along with the will: therefore, just as the will is one power, so also is reason, as it seems.

§ 65. AGAINST THIS: 1. That power, whatever it is, is called by Augustine by many names, namely intellect, and higher reason, and appetite. Likewise, the reason of wisdom. And he calls the lower by many names, namely action, the reason of science, the woman. But it is clear that not all these denote the act of one force or power: therefore it seems that it does not suppose one power.

§ 66. 2. Likewise, he himself says that the higher [portion] inheres in contemplating eternal things: but to contemplate belongs to practical speculation, and to inhere belongs to the will and to what is pleasing: therefore he names the higher not only reason, but also will.

§ 67. 3. Likewise it is held concerning the lower: because the lower reasons concerning lower things, and acts, as he says in the Letter: and these belong to reason, and to will.

§ 68. 4. Likewise, the woman and the man ate: therefore they tasted the illicit: but this is done through the consent of the will: therefore neither of those parts is separated from the will.

§ 69. SOLUTION. Without prejudice it seems to me it must be conceded that the reason which is here divided by Augustine denotes the whole by which movement is completed on the part of the rational soul according to practical reason and the appetite of the will, but nevertheless principally with respect to practical reason: just as was also said concerning sensuality.

§ 70. Nor does the first objection compel: because in that place Augustine does not intend to treat of the distinction of the powers of the soul: and therefore he commonly calls a "power" that in which there is the force for good or bad movement: and this is not one.

§ 71. To the other, it must be said that when it is posited in the definition of free decision, then it is posited with the will: and then it is divided from a different perspective: yet it is understood commonly regarding the higher and lower. But Augustine here does not seem to attend to this, unless perhaps principally: because the office of this twofold conversion is first in reason, and is in the will as following the decree of reason.

Articulus 11 — In Respect Of What The Two Portions, The Higher And The Lower, Differ

According to what are those two portions distinguished, the higher and lower?

§ 72. Secondly, it is inquired, according to what are those portions distinguished? And it seems that it is according to objects: because 1. The higher and the lower, the eternal and the temporal, do not have one ratio: therefore they do not move according to one ratio, but the higher is moved by eternal things, and the lower by temporal things; therefore they are not one power, but distinct through objects.

§ 73. 2. Likewise, temporal and temporal differ less than temporal and eternal: but temporal and temporal sometimes constitute many powers: therefore much more so temporal and eternal.

§ 74. BUT AGAINST THIS: 1. The ruler and the executor must necessarily look to the same thing: because the ruler rules in nothing, except in the same thing that the executor executes: but the higher is the ruler, and the lower the executor: therefore it is necessary that both look to the same thing, namely the temporal act in which the higher rules, and the lower operates or disposes.

§ 75. 2. Likewise, in the Letter he says that when we discourse concerning both parts of the human mind, we discourse concerning one certain thing, nor do we double it except through its offices. Therefore they do not discourse according to a reality which is a power: therefore they are one power.

§ 76. SOLUTION. I think it must be said that they are one power, as is ultimately proved, and they are not distinguished except through habits and offices. For the habit of the higher is the rule of divine justice, which is attended to in operable things with respect to what is licit from the precept of God, or not licit, or expedient for the edification of morals or faith, or not expedient, or according as it makes a sincere conscience or not: because such reasons are divine. But the habit of the lower is attended to with respect to the base or beautiful, or what is honorable for citizens or not honorable, approaching the mean of virtue or not approaching: because such reasons are human. And both reasons, namely human and divine, are looking to the same operable things: and therefore they are disparted in the office of ruling and of the ruled through these habits: but they have the same work and object, although they do not attend to the same ratio of the work: because it happens that one and the same work has different rules, of which one is under another, and imitating another: just as even the Jurists say that the laws of the Emperors do not disdain to imitate the sacred canons.

§ 77. To the first therefore it must be said that the higher as higher in the ratio of the uncreated does not move the power, but rather in the ratio of the rule of the lower: and therefore the objection is not valid.

§ 78. To the other, it must be said that they differ less according to nature, but sometimes differ much more in the ratio of moving: because the eternal and the temporal can move to the same thing: and then they attain each other as ruler and ruled.

Articulus 12 — Whether It Happens That The Superior Portion Sins Venially Only, Or Venially And Mortally Together

Whether it happens that the higher portion sins venially only, or venially and mortally simultaneously?

§ 79. Thirdly it is inquired concerning the higher partition, whether it happens that it errs? And it seems that it does not: because 1. That whose proper office is always to inhere in eternal things, does not happen to err: but this is the office of the higher portion: therefore the higher portion does not happen to err.

§ 80. 2. Likewise, in the soul there is a part of perpetual perversity, such as sensuality, which is never so healed in this life that it does not desire the illicit: because it is the flesh which lusts against the spirit.

§ 81. 3. Likewise, there is a part in the soul which can err and be directed, such as the woman, or lower portion: therefore for the complement of the division it seems that there should be a higher part, which can never err.

§ 82. 4. Likewise, a rule does not happen to be curved, while the species of regimen remains: but the higher portion is the primary rule of the regimen of the woman: therefore if it is incurvated, no species of regimen remains. The proof of the first is, because there is no species of regimen except to the norm of the rule. But the second is supposed from the Letter, where it says that it belongs to the man to rule the woman.

§ 83. But against this is what is said in the Letter, that the man sometimes eats with the woman.

§ 84. But then it is further inquired: If this is granted, that the man sins, whether it happens that he sins venially and mortally, or mortally alone?

§ 85. It seems that mortally alone: because 1. In the serpent there is only venial sin, but in the woman venial and mortal: therefore since only the third member remains, in the man it will be mortal alone: for there cannot be a fourth, which is a sin, and which is neither venial, nor mortal.

§ 86. 2. Likewise, nothing is averting from eternal and immutable reasons, except mortal sin: but the man does not sin, except through aversion from them: therefore he does not sin except mortally.

§ 87. BUT AGAINST THIS: Let it be posited that someone is moved by a light movement of surreption of vainglory concerning science or sanctity: it is clear that this movement is not a mortal sin. But since it has no object in sense, nor is it conjoined to anything sensible, it cannot belong to sensuality: nor is it of the lower portion of reason, because its [office] is to dispose temporal things: therefore it is in the higher: therefore the higher portion can sin venially.

§ 88. SOLUTION. It must be said that the higher portion can sin venially, and mortally.

§ 89. To the first therefore it must be said that of opposites there is always one power: and therefore a power whose act and office is to be converted to eternal reasons in the above-mentioned mode, its [act] also is to be converted to the reasons contrary to them, such as sin, and demerit, and the illicit, and the like. But it is true that there is no sinning except against the optimum: because that is the end, and the denomination is given from the end, and the definition respects the name: and therefore the office also respects the end, because the definition is through the office and act. Hence although it is always for the higher portion to be converted to eternal reasons: nevertheless it is not always converted, but sometimes it is averted from them.

§ 90. To the other, it must be said that in the state of the way and of merit there cannot be such a corruption: because that would be contrary to the possibility of conversion to God: but corruption to venial sin is not contrary, and therefore that is in the soul. And through this the solution to the following is clear.

§ 91. To the other, it must be said that the higher portion is the ruler and not the rule: for the rule is the divine reason of justice: and that is not corrupted. And even when an aversion is made through reason, the possibility for grace and of conversion to the rule remains: and therefore with the higher part corrupted, the species of regimen still remains.

§ 92. To that which is further inquired, in my judgment it must be said that it can sin venially: and yet I well concede that the power of sinning venially is from corruption.

§ 1. ...of sensuality: but this corruption is twofold, namely that which belongs to sensuality as a subject and cause, such as that which is in the lower powers conjoined to the flesh; and that which belongs to sensuality as a cause and not as a subject, and this is diffused in all the powers of the rational soul on account of the corruption regarding its binding to the flesh. From that corruption proceeds an instinct in the higher portion, and in certain other parts of the soul, for spiritual sins, such as for a certain vainglory, pride, and infidelity, which do not proceed from habit nor from deliberation.

§ 2. And BY THIS the solution to the first objection is evident: because that sin is from the serpent as from a cause, yet it is not in it as in a subject.

§ 3. To the next objection it must be said that this is true, that nothing turns one away except mortal sin by an actual or habitual turning away: but something can dispose one toward a turning away, such as venial sin.

§ 4. To the next objection it must be said that the mortal sin of the man corrupts the entire order according to act, but venial sin does not.

Articulus 13 — Whether The Woman Can Eat Without The Man, And What Is Understood By The Man And What By The Woman, And Whether The Woman Has Any Consent Or Only The Man, And What Morose Delight Is

Whether the woman can eat without the man? and, What is understood by the man, and what by the woman? and, Whether the woman has any consent, or only the man? and, What is morose delectation?

§ 5. Fourthly, it is asked concerning the woman, or the lower part of reason. And it is asked, Whether she can eat without the man?

§ 6. And it seems that she can: because thought can take pleasure without consent: but consent belongs to the man: therefore the eating can be in the woman without the man.

§ 7. Also, the serpent takes pleasure in the illicit aspects of the flesh, and the woman in the same: what is the difference, or how is it known that the woman has eaten?

§ 8. It seems that there is none: because the pleasurable object is the same, and ordained to the same end, namely to the concupiscence of the flesh according to consent: therefore there is no difference in anything. If you say that the woman by reason composes and divides forms, which the sensuality common to us and the beasts does not do. On the contrary: Sensuality composes and divides, and elicits intentions of the friendly or the harmful even in beasts: because otherwise a sheep would never flee a wolf, and follow a shepherd or a dog.

§ 9. But if it is said that the woman sees under the aspect of the honorable or the shameful, and thus takes pleasure in it. On the contrary: That pleasure is after deliberation: therefore it would always be a mortal sin, which is false.

§ 10. Also, if you say that consent causes it to be in the woman: this is nothing, because according to the Master [Peter Lombard] consent pertains to the man. Moreover, consent makes a mortal sin: but it is not always mortal in the woman.

§ 11. It is further asked, Whether the woman has any consent?

§ 12. And it seems that she does not: because consent is the ultimate thing that occurs before the completion of the work: but the ultimate pertains to the ultimate part: and this is the man: therefore consent belongs only to the man.

§ 13. BUT AGAINST THIS is what is held in the Letter of the text in two places of this distinction, that the woman consented to the pleasure, and the man to the deed.

§ 14. Further it is asked here, When does it become morose delectation [i.e., a lingering pleasure]?

§ 15. For "morose" refers to time, and is named from time: therefore, he in whom pleasure lingers for a long time seems to take pleasure morosely, and thus sins mortally.

§ 16. BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. In the Lives of the Fathers it is read that the sting grew in a certain man for thirty years:

and yet he did not sin, as the Fathers say.

§ 17. 2. Also, Paul asked three times that the sting of the flesh might depart from him , according to one Gloss: and he did not obtain it: therefore it is not morose by reason of time.

§ 18. Solution. It seems it must be said that the woman can eat without the man, when she takes pleasure in something illicit without consent to the deed.

§ 19. Now to that which is asked, What is the difference between the pleasure of sensuality and that of the woman?

§ 20. It seems it must be said that, as was clear in the question concerning sensuality, as long as the pleasurable object is not actually or habitually apprehended separately from the apprehended sensible thing and its appendages, the pleasure is always in the serpent. But sometimes it is apprehended actually or habitually under the aspect of the shameful, according as those concerned with civil affairs determine what is shameful, such as under the aspect of what is shameful or of that which one wishes to be hidden: and because a brute animal does not notice such aspects, therefore then it is in the woman. And there can well be such a thought either by habit or by act before consent to the pleasure and to the deed: and then the woman eats venially.

§ 21. Now to that which is asked concerning consent, I say that consent is twofold, namely to interior pleasure, and to the exterior deed: and that which is to the exterior deed properly belongs to the man, because by it the members are presented as weapons of iniquity to sin .

But that which is to interior pleasure belongs indeed principally to the woman, yet through the sluggishness of dissimulation it is imputed also to the man, as is held in the Letter.

§ 22. To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that the ultimate thing which is before the completion of the deed is consent to the deed, and not consent to the interior pleasure, and that consent belongs to the man.

§ 23. To that which is further asked, it must be said without prejudice that morose delectation is not so called from the brevity or length of time, but rather from the sluggishness or vigilance of reason. Hence, to specify it more precisely, I think that even if pleasurable concupiscence should linger for many days with the resistance of reason, that is a merit of the battle, and not a sin, as is proven by objecting. But if reason does not resist, after it has seen it under the intention of the shameful, and the dishonorable, and the sinful, and the illicit, then I think that even in a short hour it is called morose: because reason is not turned away from the shameful and sinful thing seen, on account of an actual or habitual consent.

Articulus 14 — Whether The Higher Reason Ought To Rule The Lower, And Whether The Serpent Is Exempt From The Rule Of Reason

Whether the higher reason has to rule the lower? and, Whether the serpent is absolved from the rule of reason?

§ 24. Fifthly, it is asked concerning the rule of the lower by the higher.

§ 25. And it proceeds thus: 1. Whatever two things are related in such a way that one is the ruler and the other is the ruled, it is necessary that the ruler looks through certain rules to the acts of the ruled: the lower and higher portions are related in this way: therefore it is necessary that the higher looks to the acts of the lower through certain rules: therefore the man and the woman are diversely related to acts.

§ 26. Also, in bodies we see it thus, that a body which is sometimes moved and sometimes not, and sometimes generated and sometimes not, is ruled by a body always remaining in being, and which is of perpetual motion, just as generable and corruptible things are regulated by the heaven in motion: therefore it seems that since the serpent is more mutable than the woman, the serpent ought to be ruled more by the man than the woman is.

§ 27. 3. Also, between the ruler and the ruled in nature there is such a relationship that the ruler is the mover and the ruled is the moved: therefore it seems that no motion can arise in sensuality and the lower portion which does not proceed from the higher as from a prime mover: and this is false: therefore they are not related as ruler and ruled, as it seems.

§ 28. 4. Also, naturally it is thus, that everything which can behave formlessly in being is subordinated to another regulating it, which can in no way behave formlessly in being: but the higher portion can behave formlessly by sinning and not sinning: therefore it ought to be subordinated to another by which it may be regulated, and it ought not to regulate others, as it seems.

§ 29. Solution. I think the first argument to be necessary, although some say that the higher portion is synderesis, concerning whose opinion there is no place to dispute now, because this view has been disputed elsewhere.

§ 30. To the next objection it must be said that the serpent is not absolved from the rule of reason: but this is in the dissent forestalling it in its motions, in the same way in which we say the first motions are voluntary, because this and that can be forestalled by a contrary will, and thus sensuality is contained. But it is not subordinated to rule in such a way that the rectitude of the rule according to the principle of virtue could be imprinted upon it: nor is this necessary, because the things regulated do not relate in only one way to the norm of the rule.

§ 31. To the next objection it must be said that there is a regulating principle in nature universally, and there is a regulating principle particularly: universally like the motion of the prime movable [heaven], whose diversity responds to the diversity of the things regulated: a diversity, I say, proceeding from the diversity of the movable things, and the diverse situation of the stars; and to this in humanity corresponds the rectitude of divine justice described in synderesis which rules universally, not looking so much at particulars: because many things happen in particulars contrary to it. There is also a regulating principle particularly, like the directive power in the body of a generated thing: and this ruler is mutable, and is subordinated to another universal and immutable one, and to this in us corresponds the higher portion which is also subordinated in us to the rule of synderesis.

§ 32. Now to that which is objected, that there is no motion in the ruled except from the ruler. It must be said that it is false: because in nature there are active and passive qualities in matter, on account of which even when a motion is made by the higher, sometimes generation and corruption do not happen, because the bodies are disposed to the contrary, as Ptolemy says. And so it is in these spiritual matters; the disposition of corruption is abundant in the serpent and in the woman, after this it is less in the man, but nevertheless there is some: and therefore from such a corruption frequently arise inordinate motions, and even when a motion is made by the ruler according to the rectitude of the rule, sometimes the impetus of the corruption is so great that the motion of the regulating principle is excluded and conquered.

§ 33. And through this the solution to the whole is evident.

§ 34. Now for the easier understanding of the following and preceding points, the division of the motive powers of the rational soul must be noted, just as the division of the sensible soul was also presupposed.

§ 35. Therefore it must be said that the good moves, according to the Philosopher: therefore according to the division of the good there will be a division of the motive powers. Therefore the good can be taken as known, which makes an announcement concerning motion, or as touching the appetite: and in both ways it is motive, and first it moves practical cognition, which by the Philosopher is called the practical intellect, and secondly, by a proximate motion it touches the affection or will. These therefore taken jointly: are either with respect to the uncreated good alone, or the uncreated insofar as it regulates the created good, or with respect

to the created alone, because a fourth member is null, for the reason that the created does not regulate the uncreated, but conversely, as we said above. If of the uncreated alone: then they are the powers of the image, concerning which it has been stated elsewhere how they are assumed, both in

this work, and in another. But if it is objected that the image is also when the soul remembers itself, understands itself, loves itself: and thus it is not with respect to God alone: it has been solved above entirely: because there is no image in this except insofar as the power itself is an image: and thus the intellect and affection then begin from it, and are terminated in the uncreated good. But if it is with respect to the uncreated good insofar as it is the rule of the created good, it is not except according to the principles of the most upright divine law. This therefore is twofold, namely in universal principles in which there is no error, as that fornication is a mortal sin: and thus it is synderesis which does not err, as the Saints say. Or it is according to principles applicable to particulars in an action: and thus it is the higher portion which looks to the particular acts of the lower, and yet according to higher principles. Or it is from both, namely with synderesis proposing, and reason assuming: and then it is conscience, because conscience is properly of a conclusion which follows from the major premise of synderesis, and the minor premise of reason: as when the conscience of a heretic dictates that one must die before swearing an oath: conscience dictates this for this reason, because synderesis had proposed that one must die rather than that a precept be transgressed: and reason assumed that the precept of the Lord is not to swear: from which it follows that one must die before swearing. And concerning synderesis there will be no error, since that is in universal principles known through themselves, and in which there is no exception. But reason looking at particular actions in which very much error occurs, is deceived and errs: and therefore the error of conscience in the conclusion arises. But if it is of the created good: either it is by way of announcing motion: and then it is practical reason, and practical intellect: or by way of choosing, and thus issues free choice [liberum arbitrium]: or by way of completing and eliciting through command, and thus it is the will: and under these are the motive powers of the sensible soul, concerning which it was treated before.

§ 36. There are also many acts of reason, as also singular ones, concerning which enough has been treated in the question on free choice: but all these things have been expounded with study and diligent proof in another work from this one.

Articulus 15 — Whether Now In A Single Man There Is An Order Of Temptation And Progression Such As Preceded In The First Parents

Whether now in one human being there is an order and progression of temptation, such as preceded in the first parents?

§ 37. Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, G, It also must not be passed over, etc.

§ 38. For it still remains to be asked, Whether this progression is according to every sin?

§ 39. And it seems that it is not: because in an idle word morose delectation is not a mortal sin: and even if the man should eat, the whole soul is not damned on account of this.

§ 40. If this is granted, 1. It seems to be against the Letter where the Master says that it can be mortal if it is very often decided that it is to be done.

§ 41. 2. Also, in the Gospel it is held that an account will be rendered of it in judgment since therefore an account is not demanded of a small thing there, it seems that it could become mortal.

§ 42. BUT AGAINST THIS the Doctors object that: 1. Species are not changed: but venial and mortal are diverse species of sins: therefore they are not changed into each other: therefore a venial sin does not become a mortal one.

§ 43. 2. Also, whatever things are distant without proportion, of them there is no changing into each other: but venial and mortal are distant in this way: which is proven by the punishments due to them: therefore there is no changing of them into each other.

§ 44. 3. Also, no circumstance aggravates infinitely: but iteration or act or custom is a circumstance: therefore it does not aggravate infinitely: but it would aggravate infinitely if it effected a mortal sin: which is proven by the punishment: therefore it does not make it mortal.

§ 45. Further it is asked, Whether this process is in every mortal sin?

§ 46. And it seems that it is not: because there are certain mortal sins which have no aspect of reason in sensuality, such as many kinds of pride, infidelity, and vainglory, and the like: therefore in these those degrees cannot be preserved.

§ 47. Solution. It must be said that in all sins there are these degrees as to the first motion, and the second, and the third: but those motions are not of the same weight: because I do not think this, that in a venial sin, which from its genus is venial, even in the consent of the higher portion is it mortal, unless something else is added.

§ 48. To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said according to the Doctors that the conversion to the mutable good in a venial sin is proportioned to the conversion to the same in a mortal sin: but the turning away is not proportioned to the turning away: and therefore on the part of the conversion pleasure can grow to such an extent that sometimes it is done in contempt of God, which previously was done out of weakness or levity: and then it is mortal not from iteration, but from the added contempt.

§ 49. To the next objection it must be said that an account will be rendered on the day of judgment of small and great, which has not been deleted through penance: and therefore the Saints then will render an account of nothing, because the combustible things are to be purged then by the fire by which the face of the world and of purgatory will be burned out. But for the wicked both venial and mortal sins are reserved: because in the damned they have not been deleted through penance: and therefore they will render an account of both: but nevertheless one account is held for a farthing, and another for a hundred marks, and for the account of a farthing the bailiff would not be thrust into prison if he had not carried off a

hundred marks along with the farthing: and this is the meaning of the Gospel according to the letter.

§ 50. To that which is further asked, it must be said that in every mortal sin there can be these degrees: but, as we have said above, the first motion will be of the serpent not as a subject, but as originating the corruption from which that corruption exhales, as it were. And this I say in the present life [in via] in which the state of temptation has a place: because in the damned it is not so: because in them the motions proceed from a rooted and confirmed malice.

Articulus 16 — Why The Lower Portion Is Called Sensuality

Why is the lower portion called sensuality?

Why is the lower portion called sensuality?

§ 51. Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, Now it must not be passed over in silence, etc.

§ 52. 1. For there seems to be no reason why the lower portion should be called sensuality, since the Master from the words of Augustine says that it is not of a bestial [sheep-like] nature, for the reason that otherwise it could not be taken into the marriage of the man.

§ 53. 2. Also, he himself said that it was derived from him, like the lower from the higher, with which it is of the same nature.

§ 54. Solution. It must be said that sensuality can be named from the sensuality of nature, or from the sensuality of the object, or in both ways simultaneously. In the first way it does not apply to the lower portion of reason: because it itself is not of a sensible nature, but spiritual and rational. In the second way it does apply to it: because it operates around particular sensible things, in which is the life of nature, although it disposes them according to reasons that are not sensible, but abstract, which are the reasons of the honorable, and of the civil good, as was treated before. In the third way, again, it does not apply to it, but only to sensuality: and by this the solution to the whole is evident.

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§ 55. Now indeed let us return to the proposition, etc. Here the Master treats of the freedom of choice [libertas arbitrii]. And it has three parts: in the first of which he touches upon what it is according to the Philosophers. In the second, what things are subject to it, there, B, Now this must be known, etc.

§ 56. In the third, he touches upon to whom it belongs as subjects, there, C, And indeed according to the aforesaid assignment, etc.

Articulus 1 — Why Free Choice Is Said By A Double Name, And Why Substantively And Adjectively, And Whether It Is Well Defined, And Whether It Is One Particular Power Or A Universal One Diffused In All Motive Powers

Why is free choice called by a double name? and, Why as a substantive and an adjective? and, Is it defined well? and, Is it one particular power, or a universal one diffused in all motive powers?

§ 57. A question arises concerning the first part on the name of free choice, why it is called by a double name?

§ 58. Also it is asked, What belongs to reason that choice falls into its name as a substantive , and that which is from the will falls there as an adjective, namely "free."

§ 59. Further it is asked concerning the definition which is given here, and is said to be physical, that it is "a free judgment concerning [or from] the will": for either it denotes the efficient cause, or it notes the matter. If the efficient cause: then the freedom of choice is from the will, as from a cause: therefore freedom is not primarily found in free choice.

§ 60. But if this is granted, on the contrary it seems to be that the powers of the soul ought to be denominated from that which is primarily and per se found in it. If therefore freedom is primarily found in the will, the will ought rather to be denominated from it, than free choice: and this is not done: therefore it is primarily in free choice, as it seems. But if it notes the matter: it cannot note the matter, except that which it is about: and this also seems to be false: because John Damascene says: With free power he desires, and freely he wills, and freely he inquires and considers, and freely he consults, freely he judges, freely he loves, freely he chooses, and freely he is moved, and freely he acts in those things which are according to nature. Therefore it is not only about the will.

§ 61. FROM THIS FURTHER it seems again that free choice is not one particular power, but one universal power diffused as it were in all the motive powers. Which also seems to be the case through Augustine, who in book V of Responses says thus: When we speak of free choice, we do not speak of a part of the soul, but of the whole: because the first man did not sin in a part of the soul, but failed in the whole nature in which he was established. If this is granted, entirely by the same reason the will will not be one particular power: because by willing we understand, and by willing we inquire, and we do all those things which Damascene said.

§ 62. Moreover, Damascene himself explains that it is not his intention that free choice should be a universal power, but that it moves the others in humans, while in beasts others are moved by natural instinct. Hence also immediately before he says thus, Irrational appetite belongs to irrational beings, and they are driven by natural appetite. Therefore neither is will called irrational appetite, nor is counsel. For the will is rational, and free choice is an appetite. But in human beings endowed with reason, the natural appetite is led rather than leading: for by free choice, and with reason, it is moved. But because cognitive and appetitive virtues are conjoined in the same: therefore he desires by free choice, they are led. Therefore he does not intend this, that it is universal, but that it is the motor of the others to act, just as also the will is.

§ 63. Solution. It must be said according to what has been previously established, that free choice is denominated from reason and will: because it itself is rooted in the essence of the soul according to an order to reason as preceding, and to the will as following, according as the will is in reason: because otherwise properly speaking it is not the will, as Damascene says: and by this the solution to that which was asked first is evident, namely why it is called by a double name?

§ 64. To the next objection it must be said that that which is of reason in free choice with respect to the act which is to choose, is material and in potency: therefore it is signified substantially. But that which is of the will, is formal and completing: and therefore it is signified formally, that is, adjectivally.

§ 65. Now to that which is objected concerning the definition, it must be said that it is rather a certain interpretation or assignment: but yet we do not make an issue here, whether it is a definition, or not: and in whatever way it may be, it must be said that "free" names the cause according to Augustine and Bernard : because all freedom is from the will, as was shown above: because no power in act is entirely the cause of itself except the will: and from the will whatever things exist are free. For that which is the cause of itself, is free, as the Philosopher says: and therefore it is commonly said that no cause of the will is to be sought; and therefore it is defined below in the following distinction, that the will is the movement of the mind, with no one compelling, to obtain something, or not to admit something. And Bernard defining free choice, says: A rational consent, on account of the inamissible freedom of the will and of reason, which always and everywhere carries or participates in indeclinable judgment, I think is called free choice. Whence it is clear that the will is the first cause of freedom: and free choice participates in freedom according as by nature, not by time, the appetite presupposes and subordinates the will to itself: because the extremes are before the means by nature, though not necessarily by time. However, it has often already been shown that free choice is the medium between reason and will.

§ 66. To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that the naming is not from just any first thing that is found in the thing, but rather from the more substantial: and the will or volition [velleitas] is more substantial to the will than freedom: and therefore it is not named from freedom, but from volition.

§ 67. Moreover, although it is primarily in the will as in a cause, nevertheless in free choice it is prior in time: because the act of free choice precedes the act of the will in acting, just as choosing precedes the willing of completion to consent.

§ 68. To that which is asked, Whether it is a universal power?

§ 69. It must be said that the question is absurd: because none of the authors ever intended this: but it is a fiction of certain people.

§ 70. To the authorities it must be said that they speak thus for this reason, because every power participating in the freedom of the will is universal in moving the others to act: for by this that it is compelled by nothing interior or exterior, it is made universally powerful to turn itself over all things: and this is what the authorities intend to say.

§ 71. And note that some opine here that free choice is a universal power, and indeed composed of will and reason. Certain others that reason and will are the same, and free choice is the same with both, and has a difference in name only. Hence they say that those three are one power having the force of performing three acts: and they distinguish between force and power, saying that power does not indicate a difference in act only, but also in rooting, namely that it is another property of the soul by which it is completed for this power and for that: but forces differ only in acts, and not in rooting. And all these I consider absurd, and they are disproven elsewhere, as it seems, by necessary and compelling reasons: and there also the art is posited through which the principle of the distinction of powers is found.

Articulus 2 — Whether Free Choice, As To The Act Of Choosing Or Deliberating, Is Only Of Future Contingents Operable By Us, Of Which We Are Masters

Whether free choice with respect to the act of choosing or deliberating, is only of future contingent things operable by us, of which we are masters?

§ 72. Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, Now this must be known, that free choice, etc.

§ 73. For it seems to be false: because 1. Those things which were done in the past by the will of a human being, and those in the present, must necessarily be reduced to some cause: but they cannot be reduced to nature, or chance, or to fortune: therefore they will be reduced to free choice, as the caused to the cause.

§ 74. 2. Also, not all things which will happen in the future are referred to free choice as to a cause: therefore it seems to be false what he says.

§ 75. Solution. It must be said that free choice as to the act of deliberating or choosing, is only of future contingent things operable by us, of which we are masters, as Damascene says.

§ 76. To the first it must be said that the past as past does not depend on free choice, as on a cause, but as an act it is reduced to the cause which caused it: and therefore it does not look even as to its act to deliberation and choice: because those are only of a future operable thing: but the present in that it is present, does not depend on us, nor is it under deliberation or choice, but under necessity while it is: and thus the Master understands it.

§ 77. To the next objection it must be said that he does not understand it of all future things, but of those which have been stated.

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§ 78. Then the third part of this distinction is to be taken up, which begins, there, C, And indeed according to the aforesaid assignment, etc.

§ 79. And it is divided into three parts. In the first it is shown how it is differently in rational nature. But in the second he distinguishes a threefold freedom, there, I, For there is a freedom, etc. In the third he posits two objections to the contrary, there, L, Here it can be asked, whether freedom, etc.

Articulus 3 — What Liberty Is According To The Definition

What is freedom according to definition?

§ 80. Around the first there occur three questions, namely, What is freedom? Second, Whether free choice is in the confirmed [i.e., the blessed/angels]? Third, Whether it is in all rational nature according to one or a diverse principle?

§ 81. To the first various definitions are posited.

§ 82. Anselm posits this one: Free choice is the power of preserving the rectitude of the will for its own sake.

§ 83. And Bernard seems to give this one: Freedom is the power of doing what one wills.

§ 84. Peter in the Itinerarium seems to give this one: The faculty of turning oneself to whatever acts one wishes, is the freedom of choice.

§ 85. The Master seems to intimate this one: Freedom is the flexibility into opposite acts.

§ 86. But IT IS OBJECTED against the first: because 1. Rectitude is created: therefore it ought not to be preserved for its own sake: because otherwise an end would be posited where it ought not to be.

§ 87. 2. Also, a power for an impossible act is in vain, and idle: but the damned are impossible toward rectitude: therefore the power is not in them: because nothing is in vain in the works of God or nature.

§ 88. Also, it is objected concerning the second; The power of doing what one wills belongs to the omnipotence of God alone. PROOF. For the Philosopher says that the will is of impossible things. Therefore the will is of all things possible and impossible: and if freedom is the power of doing what one wills, freedom will be omnipotence, which is false.

§ 89. Also, of the third: 1. The power of turning oneself to whatever acts one wishes extends itself also to the acts of sins, and the power of sinning, as Anselm says, is neither freedom, nor a part of freedom.

§ 90. 2. Also, Anselm: He who can do what does not profit him, nor is expedient, the more he can do that, the more adversity and perversity can do against him.

§ 91. And the same objection is against the fourth definition.

§ 92. Moreover, Flexibility to opposite acts is not in God and the confirmed and the obstinate, in whom nevertheless the Master says there is free choice.

§ 93. It is also asked, According to what are these assignments of freedom taken?

§ 94. Solution. It must be said to this last point, that the first is given in comparison to the end for the sake of which freedom was given, or for the sake of which it is: because it is for preserving the rectitude of the will, not for acquiring it: because not in every rational creature can it acquire it from itself...

it, but given from itself it can preserve. Other definitions, however, are given in comparison to acts: but they are considered in three ways. According to the first commanding: and thus the second and third are given, which are the same in this: for the first commanding is the will: and those two do not differ, except that the first states the immediate relation of power to act, but the second states that same as it is the general mover of other powers to act, and as it is the principle of its own proper acts. But when it is said the power of preserving itself, etc., the faculty of turning itself upon others and moving them is implied, as was previously held. The third, however, is said by comparison of the act to the object, which is good, or evil: and evil not as it is in the nature of evil, but of changeable good, which is good as now.

To that, therefore, which is first objected, it must be said that rectitude is placed here principally for the uncreated, because by the grace of that it is fitting to the freedom of divine will: and if in others there is created rectitude, that nevertheless touches the uncreated, as the exemplified touches the exemplar: and therefore it is the terminus of the act, and the uncreated the end of intention: just as it is also said of created and uncreated beatitude.

To the other it must be said, that such power even in the damned is not in vain: because if such power were not present, they would be unjustly punished for the lack of rectitude, just as a stone would be unjustly punished, and therefore that the justice of God may shine in punishments, the power remains and when it is said to be impossible to act, this is not from nature, but from malice of confirmation.

To what is objected concerning the second, it must be said that it is understood of those things of which we are masters: for in these we are not bound to one work, and not to another, as natural powers.

To the other it must be said, that the power of committing sin, insofar as sin is the terminus of the act, is not liberty, nor part of liberty: but insofar as the act proceeds from a power not bound to this or that, but freely, thus it indicates liberty: because the act of sin itself can be considered from the terminus, and thus Anselm considers it: or it can be considered from the eliciting principle, and thus it indicates liberty, because of spontaneous will: and thus other Saints speak.

By this the solution to the following is clear.

To the other it must be said, that flexibility as flexibility is not liberty, but indicates liberty in a certain nature: and that which it indicates is in every rational nature: for nothing prohibits the same from being indicated by many and diverse signs: which nevertheless are all found in all those in which the faculty indicated by the sign is found, because it is not entirely univocally nor in one way in them.

Articulus 4 — Whether Free Choice Is In The Damned Angels, And In The Confirmed, And In God

Whether free will is in the damned Angels, and in the confirmed, and in God?

Secondly, it is asked, whether free will is in the confirmed Angels, and the damned, and in God?

And this indeed has been determined above.

But still it is objected, because some wish one reason for confirmation to be noted by them. Therefore, it seems not to be free: because it is not towards opposite acts.

It must be said, that free by nature is not bound nor by habit to this or to that: and this is the inseparable freedom in God, and Angel, and man, for they do nothing without being able not to do it, and without being able to do otherwise: and this has been noted above, and it has been proven in the Third of the Sentences.

However, the cause of confirmation in God and in Angels has been said often to be manifold: and therefore here one suffices, namely that God in Himself is full light, and to Himself the reason of knowing whatever He knows: and just as that light is not deceived, so it is impossible for Him to be deflected into falsehood.

Likewise, His goodness is to Himself the reason for willing whatever He wills: and just as His goodness is impossible to malice, so also is His will. In the blessed indeed the reason was of true and false, and the will of good and evil: and this on account of the other of those: for the ultimate end of reason is the first truth, and the ultimate end of the will is the first goodness: and therefore when the first truth and the first goodness are joined to the blessed through intellect and will, then the will is fulfilled with the first goodness, and reason with the first light: and therefore the first light then becomes to the intellect the reason of knowledge of all things, and illuminating above all things: and therefore it is indeflectible from itself: just as now if this principle were given, Every whole is greater than its part, to be the sufficient light of all knowables universally and particularly, it would be impossible to fall into error in any of the known things. So also I say on the part of the will, that the first goodness penetrating the will, becomes the reason for willing and desiring whatever anyone wills and desires: and therefore it is impossible to desire anything not joined to it. Just as now if we were to grant, that the honest were the reason for the inclination of the will in every willed thing, and the will were never inclined except in it to willing, it would be impossible to will anything base. And through this the solution of the question is clear throughout, because it has been disputed often in this book and in the third of the Sentences.

Articulus 5 — Whether Free Choice, According To One Notion Or Diverse, Is In Every Rational Nature

Whether free will according to one reason or diverse is in every rational nature?

Thirdly, it is asked, Whether it is according to one reason in all?

It seems that it is not: because there is nothing common to the Creator and creature by which a common reason can be taken; therefore, neither is the freedom of will common to the Creator and creature.

But on the contrary is what Anselm says, because this definition, "Liberty is," is suitable to God and creature: therefore, the faculty of preserving rectitude for its own sake seems to be said commonly according to that reason.

Solution. It must be said that according to analogy this commonality is in the creature and Creator: because rectitude in the Creator does not differ from the power preserving it, except according to reason: nor does the power preserving differ from the powerful, except according to reason: but in the creature there is a difference between these according to the thing: and in God it is, as in the first exemplar: and in the creature, as in the exemplified: but in the Angel and in man it is not according to a common species, but by genus, as the sensible in brute and man: and what is more, it is not according to a proximate genus, but remote: because it is not my opinion that the Angel and soul are the same in species, or in proximate genus: nor are Angels the same in species, as I think: therefore, the powers also according to these have a difference among themselves. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 6 — Whether There Is A Threefold Freedom Of Choice

Is there a threefold Freedom of choice? and,
Whether that middle one is in which man can sin, and cannot not sin before reparation, etc.?

Then it is asked about this which he says, there, F, at the end: The middle one, in which he can sin, etc.

For according to this, it seems not to be imputed to man: because
1. Concerning actual sin, it is true, as Augustine and Jerome say, that it is so voluntary, that if it were not voluntary, it would not be sin: and if it is voluntary, it is not necessary, as Augustine says against Tullius. Therefore, it seems that it is not necessary for him to sin: therefore he can not sin: therefore it is true that he can not sin mortally: therefore its contradictory is false, namely, he cannot not sin mortally.

1. If you say that this is through grace freely given, which no man lacks. Against this seems to be what is said in the Letter: because he says before reparation: it is clear, however, that it is not repaired except by grace making pleasing, and not freely given.
2. Likewise, let man be understood in only free choice and one or two mortal sins, and let him be tempted concerning a third: either he can resist, or not. If not: therefore he sins necessarily: therefore involuntarily: because when we cannot resist, the cause of this is not in us: and what we do voluntarily, we are the cause of this, and the cause of it is in us: therefore that work is excused entirely: because involuntary through violence is, whose principle is in another, contributing nothing to the one suffering force, as Damascene says. Since therefore this is false, he can resist, and he does not have to sin mortally before the reparation of grace freely given, or making pleasing.

If, however, this is conceded, the sayings of the Saints seem to be contrary, as it seems:

1. For thus Christ says, John 15:5: Without me you can do nothing. Therefore much less resist the temptation of following sin.

Likewise, Isaiah 26:12: All our works you have worked for us, Lord. Therefore without him we can do nothing of works.

Likewise, Exodus 14:14: The Lord will fight for you, and you will be silent. Therefore there is no fight of ours without the Lord, as it seems. And, Psalm 18:35: Who teaches my hands to battle, etc.

Likewise, Psalm 68:3: I am stuck in the mire of the deep, etc. Therefore man after the first sin always tends downward: therefore he cannot stand by himself.

1. Likewise, Gregory: Sin which is not erased by penance, immediately by its weight draws to another. It is necessary to fall.
2. Likewise, He who is in sin has nothing lifting up, but has sin pressing down: therefore the power of the pressing down is stronger: but the stronger power, by outweighing, conquers: therefore it is necessary for such a one to sin whenever he is tempted.

Solution. Without prejudice I say, that no man as long as he is on the way, is destitute of all grace aiding against sin: for he always has some influence of divine goodness, either in fear, or unformed hope, or faith, or something such lifting himself up: and he also has externally, the instigation of a good Angel: by which he can resist sin. If, however, it is supposed that he has only free choice, it seems to me, that he can still resist temptation.

To this, however, which is objected from the Letter, it is solved in two ways. In one way according to Augustine against Celestius concerning the defense of grace saying thus: From this it is taken, that the sense is, he says, If the Son shall make you free, you shall be truly free. For the will, conquered by the vice into which it fell, lacked natural freedom. Hence another Scripture says, For by whom a man is overcome, by the same he is brought into bondage. Therefore, just as a physician is not needed for the healthy, but for those who are ill: so a liberator is not needed for the free, but for the slaves, so that to him the gratitude of freedom may say: You have saved my soul from necessities. For health itself is true freedom: which would not have perished, if the good will had remained. But because the will sinned, a hard necessity of having sin followed the sinning will, until the whole infirmity is healed: and the whole freedom is received, in which as it is necessary, the will of living blessedly remains, so that there is also a voluntary and happy necessity of living well and never sinning. It is: He cannot not sin, that is, not be in sin: and this is plainly true: because he is not freed from sin except by repairing grace, which is grace making pleasing: because man is a spirit going, and not returning. According to Anselm, however, we are said not to be able what we cannot do without difficulty and labor: and therefore it is said here not to be able to resist sin, or not to be able not to sin, because it is difficult for the infirm when tempted to stand.

To those things which are objected in the contrary, it is easy to respond: because the authorities do not prove nor say, that without grace one cannot resist, but that one cannot without God: and this is plainly true: because in God we live, and move, and are: and unless he continually contains, and saves, and moves, we can be and operate nothing: but this does not posit special grace.

To that which is objected from the saying of Gregory, it must be said, that weight means inclination, and not necessity: and this is true. Because inclination cannot grow beyond the

freedom of the will which is from coercion, therefore it does not induce the necessity of sinning.

To what is objected by reason, it must be said that it does not follow: because the temptation of the will can never grow beyond the willed, because otherwise the will would not be free from coercion: and therefore the will always wills to turn away from it, and not consent to it: and therefore it is not similar, the good nature which God gave is much more powerful in lifting up, than sin in pressing down.

If, however, it is objected, that the power of the will is finite: therefore temptations can be so intensified that it is conquered: it must be said, that this is impossible, that temptation remaining only temptation is so intensified: because then it would be coercion and not temptation.

Likewise, the will is infinite to act, although in itself it is finite: and therefore its act is always under itself however much it is intensified.

Articulus 7 — How There Is A Threefold Liberty, And How The Divisions Of Liberty Are Taken, And Whether There Is Equally In All Freedom From Coaction

How is there a threefold liberty? and,
How are the divisions of liberty understood? and, Whether equally in all there is liberty from coercion?

How is there a threefold liberty? and,
How are the divisions of liberty understood? and, Whether equally in all there is liberty from coercion?

Then it is asked concerning what he says, there, I, For there is a threefold liberty, etc.

However, other divisions of liberty are found, as Bernard posits this, that there is liberty of choice, counsel, and complacency. And Anselm posits this,

that there is liberty having rectitude, and liberty not having it. However, that which has it: one indeed has it in a manner that can be lost, another has it in a manner that cannot be lost. That which has it in a manner that cannot be lost: one is given or accepted, another is not given or accepted, but gives to others having it. The one not given is divine: the one given is of the creature: and having indeed rectitude given in a manner that cannot be lost, is the blessed rational creature, like an Angel, or man, and soul: however, having it given in a manner that can be lost, is man constituted in grace on the way. However, not having it: either lacks it recoverably, and thus man living in mortal sin: or lacks it irrecoverably, and thus the damned souls and Angels have it.

Therefore, it is asked, By what are these divisions understood?

Likewise, the Master says in the text, that liberty from coercion is equally in all: and this does not seem true: because

1. God is freer in acting and in the absolution of coercion, than man: and a holy man, than a sinner: whose proof is: because it is freer from coercion, that which is not drawn nor conquered, than that which is drawn and not conquered: and it is freer that which is drawn and not conquered, than that which is drawn and conquered: therefore, since according to these degrees it is in the blessed, and the good, and the evil, it seems that it is not equally free from coercion.
2. Likewise, Every creatable thing is changeable: therefore the liberty of a changeable creature is towards evil and non-being: however, divine liberty is neither changeable, nor drawn, nor conquered: therefore it is most free.

Solution. It must be said, that liberty is a power ordered to act and to an end, removed universally or particularly from contrary habits. Whence a division can be given either by the contrary habit to liberty, separated from it: and this the Masters call by the term from which: and then there is the division given in the text, namely, liberty from coercion, from guilt, and from misery.

And the division is understood thus, that the habit inducing servitude: is either from nature, or from the act of merit. If from nature: then there is obligation with matter, so that it is acted upon rather than acts: and against this is liberty from coercion. However, if it is from the act of will, and merit: either it is a habit to which the will subjects itself, and this is guilt, and against it is liberty from sin: or to which it is subjected by the order of avenging justice, and thus is the misery of penalties: and against this is liberty from misery. Therefore, the first is through the liberty of rational nature, the second through grace, and the third through glory.

However, the second which is Bernard's, is given by those disposing to the proper act of liberty: however, this is either according to the power of free nature, and thus is the liberty of choice: or in those things which are above nature: and this in two ways, namely in the best according to the state of the way, and concerning these is the liberty of counsel: or in the best according to the state of the homeland, and concerning these is the liberty of complacency: and all these must be understood according to the relation of each of these to the best act. Whence Bernard says, that the liberty of choice has to discern what is lawful, but the liberty of counsel to approve what is expedient, but the liberty of complacency to experience what is pleasing.

However, the division of Anselm is given through the efficient cause and the end together: because given and not given speak of the reason of the efficient cause: and rectitude is the end of the power of preserving it.

However, another division is reduced to art in objecting.

To what is further asked concerning liberty from coercion, it must be said that it is considered in two ways, namely first according to that from which it liberates, and second in

comparison to the natural faculty perfected by habit to act. If in the first way: then it is only privation, and it is the same as not having coercion: and privation is not more something in one, than in another: nor more something in God, than in a rational creature: nor more something in the damned, than in the just: because negation and privation are neither intensified, nor diminished: and none of these have obligation with matter. Whence Bernard: Liberty from necessity equally and indifferently belongs to God, and universally, both to good and evil, to the rational creature: nor is it lost or diminished by sin, or misery: nor is it greater in the just, than in the sinner: nor fuller in the Angel, than in man. For just as the consent of the human will turned to good by grace makes a man freely good, and in good free, by which he is made voluntary, and not drawn unwillingly: so having spontaneously fallen into evil, in evil nonetheless as free as spontaneous it constitutes him indeed led by his own will, not compelled by another to be evil. And just as the heavenly Angel, or even God himself remains freely good by his own will, not by any extrinsic necessity: so indeed the devil equally freely fell into evil, and persists, indeed by his own voluntary will, not by another's impulse. Therefore, the liberty of the will remains, where even the capacity of the mind is made, as full indeed in the evil as in the good, but in the good more ordered: as whole also according to its mode in the creature as in the Creator, but in the latter more powerful. It is considered to act, then it is not equally present: because where there is a nobler nature, there the act is more expedient.

However, to all other things there is one solution, except the last: because they proceed from liberty from sin, and from misery: and these are the habit of grace, and of glory: and they well receive intensification and remission.

To the last it must be said, that this changeability speaks of the order to act, and not of the consideration of that from which it liberates only: and it is well conceded, that thus it is more powerful in the Creator, as Bernard says, and more ordered in good than in evil.

In another work, more things concerning these liberties are found.

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This is operating grace, etc. Here the Master touches upon that from which man fell with respect to the good of grace, or what he had if he was created in grace, or what he would have had if he was not created in grace, according to another opinion.

It is divided, however, into three parts: in the first of which the Master touches upon what grace is. In the second, however, what virtue is, and how free will is related to grace and virtue: and this begins in the following distinction XXVII, there, A, Here it must be seen what virtue is, etc. The third touches upon the comparison of grace and virtue to the first state of man, inquiring, Whether then he needed grace and virtue, or not? and this begins below, in distinction XIX, there, A, After these things it must be considered, etc.

However, this distinction which contains the first part, has three parts: in the first of which it deals with operating and cooperating grace according to itself. In the second, however, it determines the first supposition in the justification of the impious, there, D, And if dili In the third it touches upon the comparison of grace to virtue, whether it is the same to it, or not? there, H, Here it must be considered, when the aforementioned is, etc.

However, the division further is evident to each one from the consideration of the chapters.

Articulus 1 — Whether Grace Is Necessary

Whether grace is necessary?

Concerning the first, four questions arise, namely, Whether there is grace? and, Whether it is a substance or an accident? and, How and to whom does it belong? and, What is it in reality and definition?

To the first, objections arise in many ways, but we will proceed with five, namely from the consideration of similars, from the consideration of the first agent, from the consideration of the dignity of the human mind, from the consideration of the gratification of men, and from the consideration of grace itself.

The first way is objected thus:
1. God works the work of creation without a medium: therefore also the work of beatification without a medium: because thus says Master Hugh of Saint Victor: Just as we are not created except through Him in goodness, so nothing stops us until Him. Let it be granted that the work of recreation is also immediately through Him: and since this is gratification, it seems that grace besides Him places nothing in us, or in another rational nature.

1. Likewise, Grace is a certain spiritual light that illuminates the mind: but from the corporeal sun, as they say, day is made without a medium: therefore grace is nothing created as a medium between God and us in us.

SECOND WAY is proceeded thus:
1. It is of the most perfect agent to act without a medium: God recreating and gratifying is the most perfect agent: therefore God acts our gratification without a medium.

1. Likewise, No wise and powerful agent acts in a less worthy manner for a more noble thing than for a less noble thing: but God is the most wisely acting agent: therefore He does not act in a less worthy manner for a more noble thing than for a less noble thing: but He acts upon prime matter, which is the most ignoble of beings, without a medium and perfects it: therefore He will not perfect the human mind through a medium, since this is a less noble mode of action.
2. Likewise, God is not less wise in acting than nature: but nature, as the Philosopher says, is ingenious to this extent, that it never does with many what it can do with one: therefore neither does God: but He can perfect the mind by Himself alone: therefore He does not perfect it using a medium.

THIRD WAY is proceeded thus:
1. The less worthy does not intervene between the most worthy and that which is proximate to it in dignity: but an irrational creature is less worthy than a rational one: and the most worthy nature is God, and the nature proximate to Him is rational: therefore no grace, which would not be a rational creature if it were, can intervene as a medium: and grace is posited to be something in us only to be a medium joining us to God: therefore grace is nothing, because if it were, it would be in vain.

1. Likewise, Augustine says that between the human mind and God there is nothing medium: therefore neither grace, which is a creature, if there is any, will be posited as a medium.
2. Likewise, it has been held in the first book of the Sentences, that the human mind by itself is capable of God: therefore it is in vain to posit a medium by which it is made capable of Him: therefore since grace is posited to be for this, it will be in vain if it exists. Let us suppose, however, that in the works of God nothing is in vain: therefore grace is not.

The fourth way is proceeded thus:

If a soldier is pleasing to the king, by this nothing is placed in the soldier, but in the king the acceptance of the soldier according to good will: for a soldier can, with no change made in himself, both be pleasing and not be pleasing to the king, by the sole change of the king's will: therefore similarly if a man is pleasing, nothing is placed in the man, but in God, as it seems.

1. Likewise, When we say, This one has the grace of the king, the sense is that the king wills good for him, and has good will towards him: but by none of these is anything placed in the one gratified, but only in the one gratifying: therefore it seems that also when it is said someone has the grace of God, nothing is placed in him, but only in the one gratifying.

The fifth way is proceeded thus:
1. Every creature is vanity, and an accident is more vain than a substance: but the more vain of vanities does not join the less vain with the first truth: therefore since grace is an accident, if it is, as will be proven below, it does not join the rational substance less vain than itself with the truth: and it is posited for this alone: therefore it will be in vain if it is: therefore it is not: because nothing is in vain in the works of God.

1. Likewise, If a creature is not joined to the highest good except through a medium, because a creature is infinitely distant from the Creator: that medium which is called grace, is either created or uncreated. If created: therefore it is infinitely distant: therefore it needs another medium joining it: and that again is created, or uncreated, and the reasoning proceeds to infinity. But if it is uncreated: then it is not a medium, but an extreme, to which we are joined: and thus the proposition will be held, that grace places nothing created in the one who has grace.

2. Likewise, Everything perfecting something according to the best mode of perfection, is more worthy, and better, and nobler than that: if grace is, it perfects the mind of man and angel according to the best mode of perfection: therefore grace is better, and more worthy, and more perfect than the human mind, which is absurd, since it is an accident, and the mind of man and angel is a creature made in the image of God.

But it is objected on the contrary by infinite authorities, which we will omit, because many are placed in the Letter.

And by reason the same is held thus:
1. Whatever is an agent receiving nothing from its work, and infinitely distant from it, if its work is to be worth anything in its reputation, it is necessary that it receives this from the agent: but the rational creature is the work of God, from which God receives nothing, and is infinitely distant from Him: therefore if it is to be worth anything in the reputation of God, it must receive that in which it is reputed from God. The first is proven by this, that if the work by itself is nothing, nothing can be made from the work by which it is reputed, except by a superior power. The second, however, is evident by itself. But that by which we are something in the reputation of God, we call grace by which He deems us worthy of eternal life: therefore grace is something created in us by God.

1. Likewise, God is present, essential, and potential in all things: therefore either He is in the Saints in some different way than in all, or in none. If in some different way: since the cause of this difference is not on His part, nor on the part of the created rational nature, it is necessary that it is through the habit of grace received and infused by Him: and thus the proposition is held. But if in none is there a difference: therefore what corresponds to the existence of God in one, will correspond in all: but it does not correspond in a stone except as containing, in being for a time: therefore now the honor of holy souls would not have more than a stone, and it would not correspond to it reward and merit, which is absurd - therefore the indwelling grace which is in the Saints, is something created.
2. Likewise, In bodies we see that the noblest of bodies, like the heavens, is not joined to the lower without a quality infused by it as a medium: therefore the noblest spirit, namely God, will not be joined to the spiritual mind without a quality infused by Him as a medium: and this we call grace: therefore grace is something in the souls of the Saints.

Solution. It must be said that grace is something created in us, as the last reasons sufficiently persuasively show:

To that which is first objected by the first way, it must be said that it is not similar: because the work of creation supposes nothing, and therefore nothing cooperates with it, neither antecedently, nor concomitantly, nor consequently. But the work of glorification is the elevation of the whole nature to the highest: and therefore also in that nature nothing can cooperate. But the work of gratification is for this that we may be able to operate meritori-

ously: and therefore it necessarily places in us a form and habit perfecting that work. Or it may be said that the proportion of similarity supposes a falsehood in the work of glorification: because although God on His part does not use a medium, yet on our part there is a medium elevating, as the endowments of body and soul in created beatitude. But nevertheless the first solution is truer: because it supposes the true cause.

To the other it must be said that a falsehood is supposed in the similar: because the material sun does not illuminate the world immediately by itself, but by its light flowing from it: and therefore.

nor does the spiritual sun do this in the lesser world.

To what is first objected in the second way, it must be said that we do not need a mediator because of God's indigence, but because of our own: for grace is for this purpose, that what is ours may become pleasing: but we cannot have this from ourselves: and therefore it is necessary that we have the form perfecting for this from Him. However, the objection to the argument is that according to this, no matter should have a form, but God should be the immediate perfection of every perfect thing: and this is absurd.

To another it must be said that God immediately as an efficient cause made the mind, just as He made matter: but just as He did not perfect matter formally by Himself, but through a created form, so neither the mind: for everything perfectible for some act requires that a form ordering to that act be given to it, because God is not mixable with a subject as a form, nor unifiable: and this shows the indigence of the created subject, not of God.

To another the solution is evident by the same: because although God can do this by Himself, yet on our part it cannot be done fittingly: and thus every creature also always operates according to the fittingness of that which is made, and not according to the fittingness of the agent.

To what is first objected in the third way, it must be said that the dignity of grace and the dignity of the mind are equivocal and incomparable: because one is according to the proportion of the capacity of God through cognition and affection, but the other is according to the perfection to the act of meritorious good: and therefore the soul in this way is less worthy: and this is according to what is less worthy than grace: and therefore a middle intervenes: for by formal goodness in the goodness of likeness through the imitation of the image, the soul is good: and these goodnesses are not comparable.

To what is said, it must be said that Augustine's statement is understood, that no substance and creature standing the soul short of God falls in the middle: but the form which elevates so that it can be joined without a standing middle, that indeed falls in the middle, like grace and glory.

To another it must be said that in this way the soul is capable of God by itself, namely materially: but for it to actually receive, it is necessary to have grace not standing the soul short of God, but elevating it up to God.

To what is objected in the fourth way, it must be said that nothing is similar between a king, a man, and God: because a soldier indeed has in himself something by which he may please, or ought to please the king, because his goods are proportionate to the king's good pleasure, and can move his good pleasure: but it is not so with God: because nothing on the part of his work is by which he can or ought to please, unless the reason for pleasing is taken from Him.

To another it must be said that what has already been said varies the sense of the expression, when it is said, this one has the grace of the king: and when it is said, this one has the grace of God.

To what is first objected in the fifth way, it must be said that although every creature is vanity insofar as it is a creature, yet insofar as it proceeds from God, some are perfecting towards truth, and some are perfected, and some are given only for the way: for what is said, that every creature is vanity, is understood by the nature of convertibility: and this is in the creature, insofar as it is from nothing: but it is also from God, and therefore from that part it can approach truth. Therefore, some approach as a form perfecting towards truth, by this that it proceeds from God as a likeness of His goodness, and assimilating to Him, and this is grace: some, however, as attaining truth, by this that it is perfected by such grace, as the rational mind, and the body joined to the soul on the way, because it serves man. Hence, in Romans 7:22, it is said, that every creature groans and labors until now, because it desires to be freed from the servitude of the body, and to attain truth in order to man attaining truth: and therefore it is evident, that that reasoning proves nothing, rather if grace were not given, all things would remain vain and corrupt.

To another it must be said that the created thing insofar as it is from nothing, is distanced from God by infinity: but insofar as it is from God, it approaches Him by certain degrees of fittingness, as Dionysius suggests. Hence, the living thing approaches God more than the merely existing thing: and the sensing thing more than the living thing: and again the rational and intellectual nature more than that: according to what Augustine also says, that God created two things: one near to Himself, and the other near to nothing. And thus grace also approaches from that part, which has the act of assimilation to the goodness of God: and this it does not have insofar as it is distant, but insofar as it imitates the effect of the goodness from which it is: and from the same it has, that grace making pleasing is never without God, because through it He inhabits the Saints.

To the last it must be said that just as there is being simply, and being in a certain respect: so there is perfect and noble and good simply, and good in a certain respect. For being simply is substantial, and first, and good simply, and perfect: but in comparison to act or end, it is being in a certain respect, and good and noble in a certain respect: and in this way nothing prohibits the habit of grace from being even more perfect than the nature of the rational mind: but according to being simply, the spiritual substance is more perfect.

4 The Vulgate has, Numbers 27:18: and following. The Lord said to Moses: Take Joshua, the son of Nun, a man in whom is the spirit, ... and you shall give him a part of your glory, etc.

Articulus 2 — Whether Grace Is A Substance Or An Accident

Whether grace is a substance or an accident?

Secondly, it is asked, whether it is a substance or an accident?

And this is light:
It is objected thus:
1. Whatever remains the same in act and substance, is transformed from one into another, that is a perfect substance in itself or its matter: one grace remaining, is transformed from one into another: therefore it is a composite substance, or matter. The first is proved from this, that both accidental and substantial form do not change the subject while remaining the same: but matter does this, and a composite substance remains the same in different places. The second is proved in Numbers 11:17, where it is said: "I will take of your spirit and will give to them," namely the elders. And similarly: "I will give to Joshua of your spirit." And, in the book of 1 Kings: "The Spirit of the Lord departed from Saul." And, "The Spirit of Elijah rested upon Elisha." And in the New Testament, "Of his fullness we have all received, and grace for grace." Some things also in the preceding chapter are relevant to that problem.

1. Likewise, every accident depends according to being on the principles of the subject: therefore if grace is an accident, it depends according to being on the principles of the subject: but whatever depends on the principles of some subject, has no power except from them: therefore grace would not have power except from the subject in which it is: which is false: because from the power of the subject it never performs a meritorious work and pleasing to God. With this objection, Pelagius seems to have been deceived, who believed that by one's own powers one becomes a Son of God: therefore it seems that grace is not an accident.

FURTHERMORE, if grace is an accident, what kind of accident is it? It can only be a habit.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
1. Augustine says that a habit is that by which someone acts when the time is right: therefore grace is ordered to some act: and it is asked, what is that, and to whatever it is ordered, then it is not ordered to another: just as neither does a virtue ordering to one act, order to another.

1. Furthermore, no habit is continuously in act, because a habit acts when the time is right: but grace, if it is a habit, acts continuously, because it continuously makes one pleasing: since therefore this is against the nature of a habit, it seems grace is not a habit: nor is it another accident: therefore it is not an accident.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
1. No substance is unifiable to another unless it is matter, or a substantial form: grace is not matter, or a substantial form: therefore it is not unifiable to another substance: but it is united formally: therefore it is not a substance, but an accident.

1. Likewise, Boethius says that whatever is consequent to substantial being, is an accident: grace is consequent to substantial being: therefore it is an accident.

2. Likewise, an accident is that which can be present or absent from the same thing: grace can be present or absent from the same thing: therefore grace is an accident.

3. Likewise, an accident is that which is present or absent from a subject without the corruption of the subject: grace is present or absent without the corruption of the subject: therefore it is an accident.

Solution. It must be said that grace is an accident.

TO THE FIRST, therefore, it must be said that grace according to essence does not change the subject: but by similarity to act it is said that grace is given to one from another, and of the grace of another.

To the other it must be said that this is false, "Every accident depends on the principles of the subject as to cause": but if it is understood to depend on the subject as to being, because with the subject not existing, there is no accident in it, then it is true: but then it does not follow that its being depends on the principles of the subject: and there is an instance of light, which depends according to its being and cause on the direct opposition of the illuminator: and similarly it is with grace. But if according to this it is opposed, that the being of grace is to be made, like light: it must be said that this does not hold: because the first agent is more perfect than the luminous body: but as to this it is well concluded, that there is no grace except by conversion made to God, just as there is no light except in the direct opposition of the diaphanous to the luminous body.

To the other it must be said that grace is a habit universally making pleasing, both essence and power: and therefore it does not have a special act like virtue: but just as the soul is an act giving being according to itself, and according to power is the principle of operations: so grace is a habit making being good, and according to infused virtues it perfects to act: and therefore I well concede that just as the act of form which is being, is continuous, or rather one indivisible remaining: so the act of grace which is being good, is one continuously remaining. But what I say of the act of form, not properly continuous, but indivisible, I do so because the Philosopher wishes that the reception of being is in the indivisible: but continuous motion is not in the indivisible, and there is no giving of the indivisible in which it is: and therefore the corruption of being is in time, and the reception in the indivisible.

But the objections made about habit do not hold, except about a habit respecting a particular act: and about this Augustine and the Philosophers also speak: because they did not consider habits, except those which are generated from acts: and those are similar to acts, and particular like the acts from which they are generated. But infused habits are not so: because God infuses the whole perfection according to being good and according to acting at once: and according to being good which is universally in all, it is a habit universally respecting essence and power: according to particular acts, however, habits perfect the powers.

And by this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 3 — Whether Grace Is Immediately Inherent In The Essence Of The Soul, Or By Means Of The Powers

Whether grace is immediately present in the essence of the soul, or through the mediation of the powers?

Thirdly, it is asked, How, and to whom is it present?

It seems, however, that it is not immediately present in the essence of the soul, but through the mediation of the powers.

1. For every habit perfecting towards action is present in the first through the mediation of that to which that action is immediately present: grace is such a habit: therefore it is present through the mediation of that to which such an action belongs. The first is clear from the fact that otherwise a perfecting habit would not perfect as required by that which is perfected. The second is clear from the fact that there is operating grace and cooperating grace: and they are said in the Text to be one grace: hence, since the operating is perfecting towards action, the cooperating also perfects towards the same. Thus: Grace is in the soul first according to its ordination towards action: but this according to its ordination towards action, the powers are: therefore grace is in the soul through the mediation of the powers.
2. Likewise, in the Text it is held that the operating is said to be that which causes willing, and also that which causes running: which of these regards the power: therefore grace is present through the mediation of the power.
3. Likewise, from the Text it is held that: grace is prevenient and subsequent: and both of these are said in comparison to the will, as it is held in the Text: therefore grace is immediately in the powers, and not in the essence of the soul.

ON THE CONTRARY:
1. Perfection ought to be proportionate to the perfected: but grace is the perfection of the soul: therefore it is proportionate to the soul perfectly: but the soul in its substance is prior to the powers through which it acts: therefore also its perfection regards the essence before the power.

1. Likewise, the soul is perfected in virtue according to the powers: if therefore it is perfected by grace also in the powers, then there are two perfections towards the same equally primary: and this cannot be.
2. Furthermore, grace is defined by the Doctors as a form making the possessor and his work pleasing: but the possessor is the very substance of the soul: therefore it informs the substance of the soul first, then the powers.

Solution. I think it must be said that grace is a habit more perfecting in comparison to God than to action. For a habit perfecting towards action must be perfecting towards this and that: because every act is singular: hence grace, which does not regard work under a determined reason, cannot be the perfection of grace by act. This is thus proved: By the determined reason

of act, it is evident that it is not taken from the part of the agent: because the agent is related to every act it performs: because one and the same agent can be of diverse arts, namely, sculptor, lyre-player, and so on. Therefore, since it is between the agent and the object concerning which it operates, it must be that the determined reason is taken from the part of the object, as of the lyre-player with respect to the lyre, of the sculptor with respect to the statue, and so on. It is evident, however, that grace regards no determined object: because if it regarded one, then it could not regard another, just as this or that virtue is only of its own object: therefore it is clear that grace is not the first perfection of the power which operates, but the first perfection of the essence of the soul, and through it is referred to the powers.

To what is first objected, it must be said that the middle is false, that grace is a habit ordered per se to this or that act: because it is more perfecting in comparison to God than to act.

To the other by which it is proved, it must be said that the operating is grace per se, and its work is to be good, as was previously held: the cooperating, however, is consequent: and therefore since being good operates in the essence of the soul first, the essence itself will be its proper subject.

To the other it must be said that grace makes being good according to the state of gratification of the one having it: but this is first known in the will: and therefore it is said to be the principle of operating grace.

To the objections it must be said in the same way, that grace prevents the actual good will: not that the will is its first subject, but rather the essence: but to note, that being grace in us is not caused by our will.

Articulus 4 — What Grace Is

What is grace?

Then it is asked, What is grace in definition and in reality?

And therefore two things are asked, namely about its definitions, and whether it is the life of the soul, as some say?

To the first, it proceeds thus:

1. Chrysostom says: Grace is the health of the mind, and the delight of the heart.

1. Likewise, Isidore: Grace is the gift of divine mercy, through which the outcome of good will is made.

2. Likewise, Augustine, as some say,
   Grace is the habit universally ordering the whole life.

3. Likewise, the Gloss on that, says: As it exhilarates, etc., grace is a certain brightness of the soul, conciliating holy love.

However, it is objected against the first definition thus:
1. The health of the mind is only when infirmity is universally removed: infirmity is not only in guilt, but also in punishment: but this is not universally removed except through glory: therefore it is wrongly attributed to grace.

If perhaps it is said that the health of the mind is in comparison to the wound of sin. Against this: To heal the wound of sin is properly of the sacrament: but grace is not a sacrament, nor only in the sacrament, but also in the habits of virtues and gifts: therefore it seems that it is still wrongly defined by the health of the mind.

1. Likewise, it is objected concerning what he says, Delight of the heart: because this is rather a fruit than grace: because fruit seems to denote refreshment in the heart.

Further, it is objected concerning the second definition which is of Isidore:

1. For the virtue of divine mercy is a gift, through which is the outcome of good will: therefore virtue is grace: and this is not conceded by many, as will be had below.
2. Likewise, it was previously held that grace is in the soul proximally, and consequently in the power: therefore it is wrongly said that the outcome of good will is grace.
3. Likewise, just as through grace the outcome of good will is made, so the good of the intellect in faith, and the good of the concupiscible in temperance, and the good of the irascible in fortitude:

therefore it should not be defined more by the outcome of good will than by the other virtues, which through cooperating grace proceed into action.

Further, it is asked about the third definition which is said to be of Augustine, although it seems more to be of the Master:

1. For the habit universally ordering the whole life, it is necessary that it regards every order to God, to oneself, and to one's neighbor: but this is the universality of virtues, or general justice: therefore grace is the same as the universality of virtues, or general justice: and neither of these is conceded by many.
2. Likewise, grace only denotes making pleasing: but this does not universally determine the order of life, but only denotes respect to divine acceptance: therefore it is wrongly defined by the habit universally ordering life.

Further, it is objected concerning the last:
1. For the brightness of the soul does not seem to be except according to the intellect, because it is proper for it to shine: therefore if grace is the brightness of the soul, it will only be in the intellect,

1. Likewise, conciliating holy love is charity: therefore if grace conciliates holy love, it seems to be the same as charity: and this is denied by many.

Solution. It must be said that by some ancient Masters this definition was given, which I consider more proper, that grace is the gift of God's good will, making the possessor pleasing, and rendering his work pleasing. For by what is said to be the gift of God, grace is placed in the genus. By what is said, of good will, it is placed as different from other natural gifts which do not have the exemplary likeness of divine goodness. By what is said, making pleasing, grace making pleasing is distinguished from grace freely given.

Wherefore the other definitions mentioned above are certain notifications, and not proper definitions: and the first of them is given by the effect which it follows in the subject according to comparison to the opposite habit, which it removes, which is the habit of infirmity, which is said by effect to be health, and by comparison to the end it is said to be the delight of the heart: because it delights the heart from the taste of goodness which is the end.

The second is given by comparison to a double act in general, namely of operating and cooperating: because as it is the gift of mercy, so it is given to be: and as it is the outcome of the will, so it is given to act.

The third is given by its proper act which is to make pleasing for meriting, and for the state of merit: because in this and for this it orders the whole life.

The fourth is given by what it executes in the two principal parts of the soul: because it shines in the intellect, and burns in the affection.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that infirmity in cause is removed by grace, according to what makes pleasing: because thus it removes that from which there was ingratitude: but infirmity as to the remnants and consequent weaknesses is indeed universally cured in glory, but particularly in the reception of the sacraments.

To the other which is objected concerning the second part, it must be said that delight is in the work, and delight is in the goodness of divine gratitude: and the delight which is after the labor of work is called fruit: but in the example of goodness which is grace, grace gives delight.

To what is objected concerning the second definition, it must be said that virtue according to the reason of virtue does not denote the first gift according to the reason of its name, but rather perfection for action: but grace according to the reason of the name is a gift: whence the Apostle, Otherwise grace is no longer grace[197], namely if it is rendered, and not given freely.

To the other it must be said that the will is the universal mover of all powers, as will be had below: and therefore it is rather said the outcome of the will, than of others: and this as to the cooperation of grace: because although grace primarily regards the essence of the soul, yet secondarily it refers to the powers, as will be proved at the end of this distinction.

Through this also the solution to the following is clear: because the will moves all others in gratuitous acts which are informed by grace.

To what is objected concerning the third definition, it must be said that this order is determined according to the reason of good and end: and therefore it is disordered which

does not reach the end: and because grace makes to reach the end which is God and eternal life, therefore it is said to be the habit universally ordering the whole life: and this order is not taken here which is according to the degrees of the ordered, but rather it is said the relation of the whole life to the attainment of the end. But this justice or virtue does not do: because justice in that it is justice or virtue does not necessarily make worthy of eternal life.

Through this the solution to the following is also clear: for universally does not determine ordering, but life, that is, which orders the whole life in itself and to others universally as to all voluntary acts to the merit of life.

To the other it must be said that brightness is properly in the intellect: but yet the brightness of honesty is in all parts of the honest, and especially in grace: and therefore we can say that in the whole soul grace makes beauty, and the adornment of the divine image.

To the other it must be said that it is not said to conciliate holy love, because it only conciliates it, but because it principally conciliates it: whence also it cannot be without form, just as neither grace.

Articulus 5 — Whether Grace Is The Life Of The Soul

Whether grace is the life of the soul?

Secondly, it is asked concerning this part, whether grace is the life of the soul?

It seems, however, that it is so: because

1. The first death of the soul is sin: therefore, by opposition, grace is its life.

1. Likewise, the first by which the soul lives in the body is life: therefore also the first by which it lives in God is its life. For in Him we live, move, and have our being. But that by which we first live in God is grace: therefore grace is the life of the soul.

But against this it seems to be, that life is the continuous act of the soul in the body: however, grace does not act continuously in the soul: therefore grace is not called life. The first is supposed from what the Philosopher is said to be the word. The second, however, is proved thus: because if grace acts continuously, then it continuously merits: therefore it is continuously intensified and increased: and this is not said to be true.

Solution. It must be said that in truth grace is the life of the soul, according to which life formally adheres to the living, as a form flowing from the cause and source of life. And to understand this, it must be known that the body lives in two ways by the act of the soul: for it has one act, according to which the soul is the form of such a body, namely, the potentiality of having life: and this act is to live, according to which to live (as the Philosopher says) is to be for living beings: and this is simple, and not continuous, nor is its being continuously becoming: but rather this act is the terminus of the generation of the animate.

According to this mode, the life of the soul, metaphysically speaking, is God giving being to the soul, not as a form, but as bearing its being and conserving and making by the word of

197. Romans 11:6.

His power. In another way, the body lives, according to which we say that the vital spirit is the vehicle of life, which is continuously infused into the body from a special organ of the animal, like the heart: and its being is continuously becoming, and of that the true definition is, that life is the continuous act of the soul in the body. And to this metaphysically corresponds the life of grace, which is infused into the soul by God, and is continuously infused, as some say. However, it is not probable that the being of grace is continuously becoming, as was held above.

To what is objected, it must be said that the continuity of that act which is being does not intend the form, but rather by the act which is work, the habit and form which is the principle of that work is intended: because, as the Philosopher says, from similar acts similar habits are generated: and therefore that objection does not proceed. However, some concede that it acts continuously, although it is not perceived: just as the agent intellect acts continuously, and is not perceived because of the tumult which is in the phantasms, as they say. But this is nothing: because it does not follow, if the intellect is always in act, that it acts continuously, because the species are lacking: just as light is continuously in act, and does not always make colors in act: and this is the opinion of the Philosopher according to three Commentators, namely Averroes, Maurit, and Rabbi Moses.

Hence, to the first solution it must be returned, which is true: and therefore even though life is continuously infused into the body, yet it is not intensified from this, because from such acts it is not born to be generated.

Articulus 6 — On The Various Divisions Of Grace

On the various divisions of grace.

Then we must come to the Letter uh; it says, A, This is operating grace and so. operating.

Concerning which part two questions are asked namely about the divisions of grace, and about the meaning of the names which it sets forth, when it says, operating grace, and cooperating, and preventing, and subsequent.

From the FIRST it proceeds thus: 1. Augustine says in the book On Nature and Grace: It prevents that we may live piously, therefore it subsequently follows that we may always live with it: now it prevents that we may be called, then it follows that we may be glorified: it is granted, that preventing grace is referred to this whole life of merit, and subsequent to the reward of glory.

1. Likewise, Augustine, in the same place, It prevents Health, however, does not happen without exercise of work, that we may be healed, it follows that being healed we may thrive. Therefore it seems, that preventing grace includes both operating, and cooperating: and the contrary of this is held in the letter.
2. Likewise, Augustine, in the same place, Therefore it prevents the will that it may will the good, it follows that it may complete or cease. It seems, that preventing makes the work interior, and subsequent makes the work exterior and perseverance: but both of

them are attributed to cooperating grace: for every work is given by free will, either in whole, or in part, as the Master will prove in the following distinction.

Many other differences of graces are also found, which are not to the purpose: because the Apostle, I to the Corinthians xii, 4 and following, divides grace.

freely given through twelve differences. And others divide it differently through diverse effects. But here the intention is only concerning operative grace and cooperative grace.

Similarly, in Romans 8:29 and 30, it divides it into the grace of predestination, calling, justification, magnification.

Similarly, in Isaiah 31:5, it gives a fourfold saying, that the Lord will pass through Judah, protecting and delivering, passing and saving.

In the same way, Genesis 16:38, upon that, "If I have found grace in your eyes," the Gloss says that not one grace suffices for the Saints. For one commands that they love and know God; another follows that they keep themselves pure.

In the same way, Chrysostom says upon John in Homily XIV on that, "Grace for grace": From this, which were of the law, were also graces, even the very formation of man from nothing. For we do not receive this reward by our preceding merits. For how, when we were nothing? but by the grace of God, which always claims the first parts in benefits for itself. Not only that we were made from nothing: but that, being made, we learned what is to be done and avoided, and from these, we received the law of nature, and an incorrupt judgment of conscience was granted to us by the Creator God. This, I say, was especially of grace, after which another followed, that we might recover this corrupted law through the written one. It is accepted by authority, that there are as many graces as there are benefits of God appearing around us, whether in natural things or in superadded ones: and according to this, Anselm defines grace: Grace is what descends from grace, that is, from gratuitous will.

Solution: It must be said that for the purpose of this reading, only the divisions of Augustine, which we first set forth, are relevant. And I well concede that prevenient and subsequent grace have multiple expositions, as the objections suggest: and therefore those must be solved: but in those graces, the reason of prevenient or operative, and the reason of subsequent and cooperative, is not first found: and therefore Augustine in the same book places the words which the Master places here: and they properly divide grace: because prevenient grace is that which precedes all our merit, and this is what works to be good in the will through the informing of the will: for the habitual will must be informed by grace before a good meritorious act is elicited from it. Subsequent, however, is first found in that which merits: because the act immediately follows the habit: and therefore it is called cooperative, because it provides the matter of the act to free will in merit: but the form through which the efficacy of merit is, grace gives, which is in the soul and free will: and therefore the Master says in the following distinction, that the use of virtue and grace is partly from free will as from a cause.

But although other divisions of grace are not to the purpose, it can be said that the first is given according to the acts in which the Spirit is manifested for the utility of the Church. But further multiplication and differences have been sought elsewhere.

The second, however, is given according to absolute order: for to this order is first required preparation in God, which is predestination, and on the part of the one graced is the terminus from which: and according to this is required calling through the grace of separation from the mass of perdition: and it is the terminus to which: and it is twofold, namely proximate, and this is justification: or remote, and that is

magnification, whether magnification says exaltation in the increase of grace through the exercise of virtues, as one Gloss suggests, or says exaltation in glory through merit, as another suggests.

But that which is from Isaiah is given according to those things which perfectly contribute to the redemption of the captive: because first it is required that he be protected from the enemy, and afterwards delivered from inflicted danger, such as wounds, and the like, and afterwards there is the passage of frequent visitation in the progress of good work, to which the salvation of the perfect in the return of health follows.

But that which is from the Gloss on Genesis is given through those things which contribute to the acquisition and conservation of grace: for regard to God in knowledge and affection acquires grace, but self-guarding conserves it.

However, the division of Chrysostom is sufficiently clear from the pre-established, according to which it is accepted.

Articulus 7 — What Operating And Prevenient Grace Is, And How It Moves Free Choice

What is operating and prevenient grace?
and, How does it move free will?

What is operating and prevenient grace?
and, How does it move free will?

Then it is asked about the second, namely,
about the nature of the names of these graces.

For when it is said operating grace:
either it is understood to operate itself, or
the will, or itself in the will. If itself: this
cannot be: because nothing operates itself
or makes. But if it is understood to make the will:
this again is nothing: because
the will was before this. But if itself in
the will: this again is nothing: because
nothing makes itself neither in itself, nor in
another: therefore operating grace is poorly understood.

If you say, that it makes a good will: it is asked, what does the term good supply? It is evident, however, that it is not the will according to itself, but grace informed: therefore it is the same to make a good will, as to make itself in the will. and thus it returns to the first.

In the same way it is asked about prevenient grace, what does it prevent?

It is evident, that it does not prevent the will: because the will was before, even before grace: nor does it prevent itself, because nothing can prevent itself. But if you say, that it prevents the subsequent: this again cannot be: because the Master below says, that prevenient and subsequent grace are one grace in number: therefore if it prevents the subsequent, it prevents itself: and this cannot be.

In the same way it is asked about cooperating grace.

For it seems, that it is secondary in a meritorious act: because when two operate, and one gives the substance, the other gives the property — the substance following, will be more principal in the work which gives the substance, than that which gives the property: thus free will and grace operate, such that free will gives the substance of the act, and grace the property by which the act is pleasing: therefore free will is more principal in the work.

If you say, that grace moves and excites free will to act: and therefore it is more principal. Then it is asked, Whether it moves naturally or violently?

It seems, that violently: because 1. Augustine likens grace to a rider, and free will to a horse. It is evident however, that the motion by which the rider moves the horse, is violent, since its principle

is outside the horse: therefore grace moves
free will violently.

1. Likewise, Natural motion is to that which
   is in the nature of the moved thing: but the motion
   by which free will is moved is to that
   which is above the capacity of its nature:

therefore it seems, that it is violent, and not
natural.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
Violent motion if repeated, induces
corruption, and labor of the movable: but the motion
of grace is the perfection of free will:
therefore it is not violent.

In the same way it is asked about the subsequent,
about which the Master says in the Text, that
it follows free will lest it will in vain:
but this seems to be nothing: because if
grace perfecting the will is first given,
the subsequent work cannot be in vain,
since it is always worthy of eternal life.
For in vain, as the Philosopher says, is that which
is for some end which it does not include.

Solution. It must be said to the first, that
it is called operating, because it operates to be good
in the will: and it is said to operate as
a form makes to be, not as an efficient. But
this making which is of the form, is nothing but
the diffusion of itself in the formed. And therefore I well
concede, that a form absolutely accepted in the act
of a non-efficient form makes itself in the formed:
but it makes nothing of itself according to the same
consideration accepted: and the efficient does not
make itself even in different
considerations accepted: but because a form does not
properly make, but gives, and its giving is
the diffusion of itself and information, therefore a form gives to be
which is the act of that form, and operates,
and this is its being in the formed. The first
objections proceeded as if

grace were operating in the manner of an efficient,
and not of a form.

To what is objected about the prevenient,
it must be said that it prevents the act of merit, which
is the grace of the subsequent and cooperating:
and grace is called cooperating inasmuch as
it operates with free will: and
I well concede, that free will
is secondary in that work for three
reasons; one of which is, because grace is
the first mover, as a habit moves in
the manner of inclining nature to the impulse
of some act, as a heavy thing inclines downward.
The second is: because it does not give the property
or accidental form, but the
substantial form of merit, from which is all
the efficacy of merit: so that an act without that form,
is not meritorious, nor would it be worth eternal
life. The third reason is which Augustine touches,
because it governs free will: and free will is as
an obedient beast. Hence, Psalm 32:9:
I became as a beast before you.

To what is objected, it must be said
that it prevents the subsequent: although it is
one and the same in substance
prevenient and subsequent, yet it is not one in reason:
and therefore in different reason it can
prevent itself, as a habit informing
a power prevents a habit operating in
act.

To what follows, namely about cooperating grace,
the solution is clear from the above.

To the other question, Whether
it moves violently or naturally? It must be said,
that there is no division: because voluntary
motion is neither natural, nor violent:
and it moves as the perfection of the will. But
it is true, that it moves in the manner of
nature, as Cicero also says about virtue.
However, it is a voluntary habit: and therefore
we are born to receive in such things, and

perfection is from habit in civil virtue:
but in grace perfection is from the infuser
of grace: and therefore those questions are ridiculous.

To what is objected about
Augustine, it must be said, that grace is compared
to a rider as to governance, and not as to this
that grace is extrinsic, as a rider
is extrinsic to a horse.

To the other it must be said, that it is true
that the natural motion of a body has
a moving principle within; but the voluntary
which we are born to have, does not have
a sufficient principle within, but receives
from elsewhere, as has been said: and thus it is the proper
solution according to this matter, and not
that which some solvers posit, that
it is natural, and because it is not done against the will:
and they give an example, as if a bird

striving upwards by itself, is thrown upwards,
it will not be entirely a violent motion, as if
a stone is thrown upwards: and these are improper words
according to this science of voluntary habits.

And by this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 8 — Whether The Will Is Well Defined By Motion, Although It Is A Power

Whether the will is well defined by motion, although it is a power?

Then it is inquired concerning what is said there, B, Augustine in the book on the two souls, etc.

For the will does not seem to be motion, but a power: and therefore it is poorly defined by motion.

If you say that it defines the will which is an act, and not a power. ON THE CONTRARY:
1. According to this, it ought to say, the will is the motion of the will, and not the motion of the mind.

1. Furthermore, the motion by which it is moved to acquire something seems to belong to the concupiscible.
2. Furthermore, that which is moved to not admit something is irascible: the irascible and concupiscible are not the will, since the will is a part of the rational soul, the irascible and concupiscible are parts of the sensitive soul.

Solution. It must be said that according to Anselm, the will is threefold, namely instrument, motion, and affection: and here motion is defined, and not instrument or affection.

To the objection, it must be said that the mind is placed there for the superior part which is rational: but it is referred to the will by what is said, with no one compelling: because, as was held above, freedom from coercion is primarily and per se of the will.

To the other, it must be said that to acquire something with the reason of delight ordered to sense is of the concupiscible: but to acquire something according to the reason of good simply is of the will which is in reason which considers good simply.

As for what is objected concerning what is said, not to be admitted, etc., it is not true what is objected: because it is of any power not to admit what is repugnant to its object: but the irascible is to detest and rise against what is harmful in sense, or to overcome arduous things with its own strength.

Articulus 9 — Whether The Grace Of Justification, By Which The Ungodly Becomes Godly, Is Faith Or Operating Grace Or Cooperating Grace

Whether the grace of Justification through which the impious becomes pious is faith, or operating grace, or cooperating grace?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, D, "And if you diligently attend," etc.

For here he seems to say that the grace of justification is faith through which the impious becomes pious. However, below, according to the opinion of many, it will be proven that grace is not faith, except as a potential whole is its part: therefore, it seems that he speaks wrongly here.

Concerning this question which is asked about the justification of the impious, many things are noted in another summa in the fourth book of the Sentences, in the treatise on contrition, and in this below, on the third book of the Sentences: and there they should be sought.

But as far as pertains to the present, it must be said that faith is not called operating and cooperating grace, except as the whole is predicated of the suppositum: nor does the Master intend otherwise: and grace is rather manifested in this suppositum which is faith, than in another virtue: because faith has the first act in the justification of the impious, although all habits are infused simultaneously: but nevertheless, this is responded to in the aforementioned places.

Articulus 10 — Whether Operating Grace And Cooperating Grace Are One Or Diverse

Whether operative grace and cooperative grace are one or diverse? And, why do they have different names?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said, there, I, Here it must be considered, why it has been said, etc.

And four questions are asked: of which the first is, Whether operative and cooperative are one grace, or diverse?

Second, Whether it is a virtue, or not? Third, How grace is in virtue and in certain other things, whether distinct or indistinct, or multipliable or multiplied?

Fourth, concerning the act of grace and virtue; how they are united, and how they are distinguished?

TO THE FIRST, it is objected thus:
1. Operative and cooperative have diverse acts: however, habits as well as powers are distinguished by acts: therefore, operative and cooperative are diverse?

1. Likewise, Operative is that which works good, as was held above: however, to work good is to make good through the informing of the good which is grace making pleasing: however, this commonly regards power and essence, cooperative only power: therefore, operative and cooperative are not the same: by the same reason neither are prevenient and subsequent.

But ON THE CONTRARY:
In natures it is thus, that the same form which makes and gives being, becomes the efficient principle of operations, as the Philosopher says in II De Anima. Therefore, it is also thus in habits: however, operative grace is that which makes being, cooperative however the principle of operations, and they do not differ in another. Therefore, they are one in number: and this also the Master says in the Text.

Solution. It must be said, that they are one in number, and on account of the diverse reasons which were held above, it takes diverse names.

To the first, however, it must be said, that not every difference of acts makes a difference of habits and powers, but only of those acts which are upon objects of diverse reasons: but here it is not so, but rather those acts are ordered, just as being which is prior, and acting which is posterior.

To the other it must be said, that grace which is the perfection of the soul, is proportioned to the soul itself. Whence just as the essence of the soul is in the powers, and not outside them: so also grace reaches the powers of the soul, and operates with them: and therefore it is called cooperative. And this does not divide grace as to substance: just as neither is the essence of the soul divided in itself and in the powers taken, but remains one and the same undivided.

Articulus 11 — Whether Grace Is A Virtue, And Virtue Grace; Secondly, Whether Grace Is A Virtue

Whether grace is a virtue, and virtue grace? Secondly, it is asked, Whether grace is a virtue?

Whether grace is a virtue, and virtue grace? Secondly, it is asked, Whether grace is a virtue?

It seems, however, that it is so: because 1. This seems to be said in the Letter, that faith is grace: and the same reason applies to other virtues: therefore virtue is the same as grace.

1. Likewise, Virtue is defined in the following distinction thus: Virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which one lives rightly, which no one uses badly, which God works in us without us. All these agree with grace: therefore, etc.
2. Likewise, Perfection for merit is grace: but virtue is perfection for merit: therefore virtue is grace.

ON THE CONTRARY: If virtue is grace: it is either grace freely given, or grace making one pleasing. If it is grace freely given, this is not questioned: because both the powers of the soul and virtues and all other things which are had from God are grace freely given. But if it is grace making one pleasing. On the contrary: Virtue can exist without grace, infused, and acquired apart from charity: therefore if grace is virtue, it will be only charity: therefore at least it is held of necessity, that grace is not every virtue, but either some or none.

If you say, that it does not follow, if grace can be lost while virtue is retained, that grace is not virtue. On the contrary: Whatever things are essentially separated, so that one is without the other, those are not the same either in essence or in substance: but virtue and grace are separated thus, that one of them can be without the other: therefore grace is not the same as virtue.

If you say, that the form of virtue is grace, and thus it is virtue making one pleasing then: at least it is held, that grace and virtue as virtue are not the same. But if it is the form of virtue: it is either the form giving being, or the form following the being of virtue, that is, the essential form, or accidental which is for well-being. If you say, that it is the form for well-being: then it is necessarily held, that it essentially differs from the substance of virtue: because every form which is for the well-being of something, essentially differs from that: therefore grace according to this essentially differs from virtue. But if it is the form giving being to virtue. On the contrary: The form giving being is multiplied and contracted in different things to different things: and as those differ in species or number, so it differs in species or number. If therefore grace is the form giving being to virtue, it will be in different virtues different in species, and thus it is not one grace operating, but many species according to the number of species of virtue: and this I do not think anyone concedes.

If however it seems to someone not to be inconvenient. It is argued against thus: The form giving being has a name applicable by concretion to the species which it constitutes, just as humanity makes a human: and let us take the natural form, and thus it is found in all: therefore faith is constituted by the form of another reason and human, than hope, and charity, and prudence, and so of others: but grace says only the form of one reason: therefore grace is not the form constituting virtue according to essence.

If you say, that this would be true, if all virtues did not agree in one act, which is to make pleasing and to merit in work: and because they do agree thus, therefore they have one form: then it will necessarily be proved, that grace essentially differs from virtue thus: Every virtue

is essentially determined to a special object, and to the act of that object: just as faith to the first truth and the act of assenting to the first truth, and charity to the first goodness and the act of loving: and concerning carnal things there is no question but that it is so: therefore what does not regard an object in one reason, nor an act in a special reason, that will not be of the essence of this or that virtue: but either it is not a virtue, or it is not one kind of virtue: but grace does not regard any object in species, nor an act in a determined reason: which is proved from this that whatever it would regard, already by this very thing it would be opposed to another: and this is not true, because any virtue has grace in itself: therefore grace is either not specifically a virtue, or it is not a species of virtue: because a genus according to being is in a species, and a species in individuals, and they are ordered to the same act to which the form of the individual is: therefore it remains, that grace is not essentially a virtue.

Likewise, It is impossible that that in which different species agree, and in which they are distinguished, is from one principle: but in the reason of meriting different species of virtues agree, and in the reason of the act by the object different species of them are distinguished: therefore the reason of meriting and the reason of acting the act of this or that virtue, are not of one principle according to essence. But virtue is the principle of acting in the reason of a determined object, because every act of virtue of a determined reason has an object: and grace is the principle of good merit, as it is said in the Letter: therefore grace and virtue are not the same.

If you say, that one form in number is giving being, and the principle of actions following being: and thus in one number it is the form giving being good, and which acts actions following virtue. This is ridiculous, and said from great ignorance of natural Philosophy. For when the form is the principle of actions following being: either it in itself remaining one is the principle of all those actions, or by different principles which are caused by it in the composite or in the substance.

If you say, that in one way in itself remaining: this will be against every known principle: because the same in the same way disposed, always does the same. But if it does this by different principles by which it acts, and by which it causes in the substance: just as the soul by intellect and will and memory is made the principle of different things: then nothing is worth what is induced because then neither will grace be made the principle of acts different in species, unless different in species are joined to it: and those are virtues which are infused in it: therefore grace and the virtue of the soul differ, just as the substance of the soul and the powers: and this we intend to prove, because they differ essentially thus.

Solution. Without prejudice perhaps to those understanding more subtly here, it seems to me impossible, that grace and virtue are the same in essence: but in substance they can be the same in some way as the soul with its powers: because the nature of the soul subsists in all powers, and its power is completed in them, although according to itself it has the act of giving life, according to which act it is the first perfection of the body: because, as the Philosopher says, to living things being is, just as to sensing things is to sense, and to understanding things is to understand: and, to speak briefly, just as the first act of any substantial form in that of which it is the form, is the being of that formed: so it seems to me,

that grace subsists in all virtues making pleasing, and its act is the spiritual life of the soul: and virtues receive essence from added properties, just as natural properties added to the soul make powers: and those properties are not essentially grace, although grace subsists in them: and those properties because they are diverse, therefore they are different habits regarding different acts and objects. And this opinion seems necessarily proved by the reasons induced.

To the first therefore which is objected against, it must be said that it is said, that the soul is a power: because the nature of the whole potential does not fail the part added to it by the property of a special act: but the whole substantial nature subsists, and therefore it is predicated of that.

To the other it must be said, that grace is not properly lived rightly: because the right is taken from the mean according to the dimension proportioned to the extremes: but the mean is the act, and the extremes, the power and the determined object; and then this rectitude agrees only to virtue, and not to grace, because that by itself neither regards power, nor any object.

To the other it must be said, that in that argument there is a sophistical place of the accident: for perfection for merit is grace by itself: but virtue is not substantially determined to merit, but to the object of a determined reason, and to merit insofar as it is in grace: and it contributes to merit, just as the act of the power of the soul, as to understand, or to nourish, or to generate, operates life: and it is evident, that the proper act of powers is not life, but as it is reduced to the soul in which it is rooted.

Articulus 12 — How Grace Is In Virtue, And In Certain Other Things, Such As Gifts, Beatitudes, Fruits, Etc

How grace is in virtue, and in certain other things, such as gifts, beatitudes, fruits, etc.?

Thirdly, it is asked, How grace is in virtue and other gifts, namely beatitudes, and fruits, and sacraments, in which not all have virtue: whether it is divided in them, or remains undivided?

It seems, however, that it is divided. 4. For that which is in many things specifically and numerically different, it is necessary to be multiplied in them at least according to being: grace is in all formed virtues, and other gifts: therefore it is multiplied and divided in them according to being, as it seems.

1. Likewise, According to the number of formed things, forms differ according to being, although not according to reason: but virtues are informed by grace at least according to well-being: therefore they differ according to the difference of virtues: therefore according to being.
2. Likewise, In acts there is a number of merits: because what has more meritorious acts, has more merits: therefore it seems to be similar in habits.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: The substance of the soul is not multiplied by the multiplication of powers, since perfection proportionally corresponds to the perfect: but grace and virtue are perfections of the soul: therefore since grace refers to substance, and virtue to power, it seems that with the multiplication of virtue grace is not multiplied.

Solution. It must be said that here there are two opinions. One is which I believe to be truer, which is concluded in the last objection, that grace is not multiplied in virtue, and it underlies all, as one nature of the whole potential, which universally makes the possessor and work pleasing. And according to this, because it is more subtle, the objections must be answered.

To the first it must be said, that this is true, that that is multiplied which is in many things which are simply many and are not reduced to one, or which is in those reduced to one, not according to that they are reduced to one, but according to that they are many. But thus grace is not in those which are introduced: because virtues are reduced to powers, and powers to the nature and substance of the soul which grace regards first. They are also reduced to grace which underlies all, as they are formed in the virtue of meriting. And therefore it is not necessary that grace be multiplied in them.

To all the following there is one solution, that this is true of the perfection of the formal, which is multiplied as the object concludes: but virtue is perfected by grace as a potential part in meriting is perfected by the whole: and as power is perfected by the nature of the soul by this that it is caused by it and contained by it, as it is held in the first book of the Sentences, that powers flow from the nature of the soul: and this is also diligently proven in our treatise which we have disputed concerning the soul.

Articulus 13 — Whether And How The Acts Of Grace And Of Virtue Are Distinguished

Whether and how are the acts of grace and virtue distinguished?

Fourthly, it is asked concerning the act of grace and virtue, how are they distinguished?

It seems, however, that in no way:
§1. Of one power there is one act: but one power is the subject of grace and virtue: therefore, there is one act of both.

§2. Likewise, we do not say that in any act someone merits, and in that acts according to virtue: therefore, by one act he does both: therefore, to merit is an act of grace and virtue, as it seems.

§3. Likewise, the soul is not an active principle except through power: but virtue is the perfection of power for act: therefore, the soul does not have good acts except of virtues: either, therefore, the same acts are of grace and virtues, or none are of grace, but all of virtues, as it seems.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
§1. The act of grace is to make pleasing: but the act of virtue is not necessarily this act because

it can be without it, as political or cardinal, and all theological except for charity alone which cannot be without form.

§2. Likewise, the act of virtue is defined by the object, as to believe, to love, to hope.

and so concerning others: however, the act of grace is not defined to any object, but to the acceptance of good pleasure: therefore they are not the same.

Solution. It must be said that the act of virtue and grace is the same by supposit, and by reason not vain, but founded in the property informing the act differently. And the first reasons proceed only concerning the identity of the supposit: and this is well conceded. However, the property informing the act and difference is that which makes worthy of eternal life, and this is from grace: and that which specifies to this and to that object, and this is from virtue.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Note, however, that concerning these last four articles of the question, there are still two opinions of others. For some say that grace and virtues are entirely the same by substance and essence, but different by reason: and this is the reason why they say thus: because in comparison to acts which are to make pleasing, and to operate rightly, they are the same. But I do not see how those different acts can proceed from a principle by essence in every way one: nevertheless, this is the common opinion of many, because the multitude does not attend to subtlety.

Another is the opinion of certain great ones, that grace indeed and virtue differ in the manner spoken, but that grace is multiplied in virtue: and they give an example of this, that just as light is in the star in the center one, in which all rays are gathered to one, but distant from it is multiplied in rays: so in the soul they place grace in itself one and spiritual light, whose spiritual rays are diffused in the diversity of powers and virtues.

DISTINCTIO XXVII

Divisio Textus

Here it must be seen what virtue is, etc. In this part, the Master deals with virtue in two ways: and therefore it has two distinctions: because in this he determines what virtue is, and that virtue is not a motion or use of virtue, unless speaking through cause. However, in the following, he touches upon how the power of free will relates to grace and virtue, namely there in distinction XXIII, A, "Id vero inconcusse," etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether The Definition Of Virtue Is Good Which Says, It Is A Good Quality Of The Mind

Whether the definition of virtue is good which is said, "It is a good quality of the mind"?

SOLE ARTICLE.

Whether the definition of virtue is good which is said, "It is a good quality of the mind"?

Concerning the first distinction, there is nothing doubtful, except about the definition of virtue, which the Master posits: and about this, even in other definitions and virtues in common, it has been disputed in another summa very extensively and diligently. But here, in this place, we consider the definition which is posited here, namely that

Virtue is a good quality of the mind, etc.

1. For when it is said, "good": Either it is a predication of the denominative, or of the substantial. If of the denominative: then the notion of goodness does not belong to virtue, which is false: since virtue is a certain goodness, because the good is the end of appetite, because it is what is wished and desired: but virtue, since it is among the parts of the honorable, falls under the division of the good: and thus the good is predicated substantially of virtue itself. But if this is conceded, that it is predicated substantially: since therefore virtue is something simple and abstract, goodness ought to be predicated abstractly of it: for whiteness is not said to color, but color: therefore neither is virtue good, but goodness, as it seems.
2. Furthermore, it is questioned about what is said, "Quality of the mind." For virtue is not always in the mind, since the mind is the superior part of the soul, and virtues are as if in the irrational parts participating somewhat in reason, such as the concupiscible and irascible.
3. Likewise, it is objected about what is said, "By which one lives rightly": for rectitude seems to belong only to justice: for which reason it is also said by Anselm that justice is the rectitude of the will: therefore it seems that it is wrongly posited in the definition of virtue in common.
4. Furthermore, this seems false which says, "By which no one uses badly." Because many have abused virtue, considering it to be the highest good in life, as certain Stoics.
5. Likewise, this seems false which says, "Which God alone works in man." For if it is understood of habitual virtue, it is plainly false: because the efficient causes of it are knowing, willing, and persevering in action. But if we speak of infused virtue, it is still false in adults to whom nothing is infused unless they are willing.
6. Likewise, this definition seems to agree with grace: therefore virtue is grace.

Solution. It must be said that the good is substantial to virtue: and yet it is of greater simplicity than virtue: because the good, insofar as it is good, regards being, but virtue regards action: and therefore nothing prohibits it from being predicated concretely of virtue in name, although according to the thing it is substantial to it: just as also rational of man, and not rationality. However, how this is, requires long words which are found elsewhere in the question about virtues in common.

To the other, it must be said that Augustine defines infused virtue with grace making one pleasing. Such a thing, however, as in the first subject, is received in that which is nearest to God: but this is the mind by descent: afterwards, the parts of virtues are in other powers.

To the other, it must be said that rectitude is the preparation of the due, and of the debtor, and of that which God alone works in man. to whom it is due: and this is of justice. It is also rectitude as the extension of an act to the end, or to the reason of the mean without deflection from the end, or to the superfluous, or diminished: and this is the rectitude of virtue in general: for theological virtue has a direct extension to the end without obliquity from it, and political virtue attains the mean without bending to the malice of superfluity and defect.

To the other, it must be said that no one ever used virtue badly: because by the very fact that some did not refer it to the due end, they did not have true virtue, but only the image of apparent virtue.

To the other, it must be said that consent is not excluded. But that consent is only disposing on the part of the subject in which virtue is.

To the last, it must be said that grace is not lived rightly, if force is made in rectitude, as has been said: but one lives meritoriously by grace, as is clear from what has been previously held.

But other things of this distinction are evident by themselves, and by our position elsewhere treated about virtue.

DISTINCTIO XXVIII

Articulus 1 — What Good Free Choice Can Do By Itself Without Grace

What good can free will achieve by itself without grace?

What good can free will achieve by itself without grace?

Let us indeed firmly and unhesitatingly hold, etc.

Concerning this distinction, there is a small difficulty. We will inquire about two things only, namely, what good free will can achieve by itself without grace, and whether in any state it is possible to merit the first grace.

It seems, however, that free will can achieve good by itself thus:

1. Just as grace relates to glory, so that it precedes it, so does the nature of free will relate to grace: but grace can acquire glory by itself without the addition of another: therefore, it seems, free will can acquire grace by itself.
2. Likewise, the will without grace making it pleasing can will the good: but the will is denominated good or evil from what is willed: therefore, the will willing the good is good: therefore, willing the good by grace, it is good by the good of grace, as it seems.

3. Furthermore, for the good, nothing is required except to think, assent, will, and act: and we have the power of all these from our side: therefore, it seems that we are perfected for the good of grace.

4. Likewise, the commandments of God are imposed on all: therefore, either it is possible for all to keep them, or not. If not: then impossibilities are commanded: which is against Ambrose saying that it is anathema to think that God commanded impossibilities. But if it is possible to be kept by all: therefore, it is in our power to fulfill the commandments: but in the fulfillment of the commandments, we merit: therefore, a meritorious work is in our power.

5. Likewise, services are more pleasing the less they are owed, as Augustine says: but he owes less who serves from his own, than he who serves from another's: therefore, it seems more pleasing what we do from our own strength, than what we do from the gifts of others: more merit consists in our ability before grace, than after.

6. Likewise, it is taken from certain authorities found in the Scripture: such as that, "He gave them the power to become sons of God": and that, "to be able to believe and such things is the nature of all, but to believe is the grace of the faithful," the Master sufficiently explains in the Scripture.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY, this is all that is held in distinction XXVI, where it was shown that nothing is pleasing to God from us, unless we receive the reason for gratitude from Him: therefore, we cannot achieve meritorious good from our own ability.

But FURTHER, it is asked, since there is the good of nature, like eating, drinking, and providing for the family, and such things: and good in general, like a voluntary act upon due matter, like feeding the hungry: and there is the good which is generative of political virtue, which is an act clothed with circumstances: because from similar acts, according to the Philosopher, similar habits are left: and there is the good of customary virtue: whether in all these free will can act and in what manner?

Whether, however, it can resist temptation, has been explained above.

Solution. It must be said without any ambiguity, that free will by itself cannot achieve grace, nor meritorious good: because (as was proven above) it is necessary that we receive this from God.

Therefore, it must be said to the first that although there is similarity in the order of precedence according to time, there is not similarity in the mode of causality: because grace cannot be caused by nature, for then it would not be grace, and it would be something vain and not worthy of reward.

To the other, it must be said that the will is denominated from that in which it is in this way: and therefore, because it is only imperfectly, and by way of preparation, in the good of grace, but in perfect ordination and preparation in it, and this is from material disposition: therefore, such a will is semi-perfectly good.

To the other, it must be said that those are not sufficient for the good of grace, but for the good subject to our power, like the good of nature, and good in general.

To the other, it must be said that if the form is in the precept, which form is said by the Doctors to be charity, then it is not in our power to fulfill the divine commandments: and yet they are commanded to us, because it is possible for us to do something, by doing which we have power from grace: this, however, is to do what is in us: because if we do this, God inevitably gives grace: because He always relates to us in one way, namely by offering grace: but we do not relate to Him in one way, when we turn away: but if we turn by doing what is in us, we immediately receive. Therefore, because the antecedent is in our power, the consequent is also commanded to us. But if according to another opinion the form is not in the precept, then we can fulfill the commandments of God: but we will not have the merit of eternal life, but we will avoid punishment: but the commandments of the love of God and neighbor to which the commandments of the Decalogue are referred as to the form by which they are fulfilled, we cannot fulfill: because they are of the form of the command rather than of the command itself. And thus the solution is clear according to both opinions.

To the other, it must be said that this is understood of the freedom of the will in the work, and not of the ability from which the work proceeds. For there are those who serve only out of fear or obedience compelled by necessity: and their services are less pleasing. There are also those who serve out of charity, and they serve liberally: but no one serves meritoriously without grace.

To the authorities, it must be said that they speak of the power of receptivity, and not of the complete power for action, which completion is only through the habit of grace, of which, however, we are receptive by nature.

To the last, it must be said in my judgment, that free will without grace making it pleasing superadded, not without freely given grace, with nature can achieve a threefold good, namely of nature, in general, and clothed with circumstances which is generative of virtue. For it can be considered as it is the nature of man, and thus it can achieve the good of nature. It can also be considered as it is deliberative, and thus it is collative to another, and composes proportionate things to due action upon matter, and divides disproportionate things, and thus it can achieve good in general. It can again be considered according to the order to the perfection which it is innate to receive, although to perfect is from custom, and if it joins to the natural good which has an order to the honest good, and thus it can achieve an act generative of political virtue: but with freely given grace which is political virtue, it can achieve the good of political virtue, and with grace making it pleasing it can achieve meritorious good.

Articulus 2 — Whether In Any State It Happens To Merit The First Grace, And Whether Someone Can Merit For Himself Or Another The First Grace

Whether in any state it is possible to merit the first grace? And, whether anyone can merit the first grace for himself or another?

Whether in any state it is possible to merit the first grace? And, whether anyone can merit the first grace for himself or another?

Secondly, it is asked, whether anyone can merit the first grace for himself or another?

And let us posit two states, according to which someone is now in a state of justice, and fears falling, and prays that if it happens that he falls, he may rise again. And it is asked, whether he in the first state can merit that he rises again when he has fallen?

However, it seems that he can: because 1. This prayer is for himself, piously, and perseveringly, because with the intention of persevering, and for salvation: therefore it is heard: therefore afterwards he will rise again by the merit of the first prayer.

1. Likewise, someone merits the first grace for another, as the Saints say, as Stephen merited for Paul, and others for others: therefore much more quickly for himself.
2. Likewise, he is already in a state of meriting: therefore he can merit eternal life, and everything that is substantially ordered to it: but to rise again if he falls is substantially ordered to salvation: therefore he can merit this.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. By subsequent sin all preceding goods are mortified: and that which he prayed for, that he might rise again: therefore he did not merit that he might rise again.

1. Likewise, in Ezekiel 18:24, it is said, that the just man turning away from his justice, therefore it seems that in his iniquities he shall die: and of all his justices God will not remember anymore, he merits nothing by that.

Solution. It must be said that no one merits the first grace for another de condigno, but only de congruo: for himself, however, neither de condigno nor de congruo can he merit: because before he has grace, he is not worthy of the bread by which he is fed, as Augustine says: and then he can merit nothing. However, when he is in a state of grace, and does not persevere in the same, he does what is directly an impediment to prayer: and therefore he does not merit the subsequent resurrection: because subsequent sin is against grace in the one meriting through it.

To the first objection, it must be said that he does not ask perseveringly: because he can fall, and the fall is ordered against the effect of prayer in the one praying: and therefore he is frustrated from being heard.

To the other, it must be said that the fall or sin of another does not contradict the prayer in the one praying: and therefore he can obtain the effect de congruo, because it remains alive, always: but the fall of the one praying contradicts the effect of prayer in the one praying: and therefore it does not remain alive to be heard: and therefore there is no place for affirming from the lesser, but rather for denying from the lesser: and therefore the process is not valid.

To the third, it must be said that he is heard in those things which are per se ordered to salvation: but to rise again if he falls is not among the substantial things of the one praying: and therefore it can be frustrated by subsequent sin: as also other goods which he does.

And through this all the doubts of this distinction are made clear.

DISTINCTIO XXIX

Divisio Textus

After this, it must be considered whether man was before sin, etc. In this distinction, two things are said, namely, whether Adam was in grace and virtue before sin, or not? And secondly, concerning the place from which he was ejected. Certain things are also said about the tree of life: and in that also the punishment of sin.

Articulus 1 — Whether Adam Before Sin Was In Grace And Virtue

Whether Adam before sin was in grace and virtue?

ARTICULUS UNICUS.
Whether Adam before sin was in grace and virtue?

Concerning the first, it is objected:
For it seems that Adam did not need operative grace, because

1. That makes the impious pious; however, he was not impious; therefore, he did not need that grace.
2. Likewise, every motion is between contraries, or between privation and habit. But if Adam received operative grace, he was made good; therefore, from not good or from evil, both of which are false, since Scripture says thus, God saw all that He had made, and it was very good; and specifically about man, that God created man upright; and elsewhere, that He clothed him with virtue.

The same objection applies to the Angel.

Here also some reiterate the question, Whether man was made in grace or not? But because it is disputed by the same reasons, as was inquired above concerning the state of the Angel, I therefore pass over it.

Solution. It must be said that the Master supposes in the text that Adam had virtues and charity; and consequently supposes that he had grace: which some denying say that charity is here placed for natural love, and other virtues for natural inclinations to the acts of those virtues: as Job says, Mercy grew with me from my infancy, etc.; and as gentleness is said to have been innate to Moses, and to some others other virtues.

This also seems according to the Master to need to be said: because above he conceded that by resisting temptation he would not have merited. But yet the opinion of others is that he had grace by which he could progress in merit, but not for the confirmation of beatitude. All this was disputed above, and in another Summa.

To what is first objected, it must be said that grace deletes sin where it finds it; but this is not substantial to it, but happens from the part of the subject: and therefore before sin man needed operative grace so that he might be formally good according to grace.

To the other, it must be said that he was good before the privation of that habit which he received: hence before this he was not good by gratuitous goodness, although good by natural goodness, about which the authorities introduced speak.

But the rest of this distinction is evident from what has been said above.

DISTINCTIO XXX

Divisio Textus

In the preceding, it was insinuated, etc. Here begins the part in which the Master determines into what Adam and his posterity fell, according to the state of guilt. However, there is a twofold guilt into which they fell, namely original, which he treats first, and actual, which he treats second, where distinction XXXIV begins, there, A, After the aforementioned concerning actual sin, etc.

The first of these is divided into four distinctions, which are placed here concerning original sin: in the first of which he inquires, What is original? In the second, How is it transferred to posterity? which begins in the following distinction, there, A, Nene supe In the third, it is touched upon, How is it remitted in baptism? which begins in distinction XXXII, there, A, Quo In the fourth, since it was said above, etc. he inquires, Whether the sins of all preceding fathers are transferred into their sons, or not? which begins in distinction XXXIII, there, A, To the aforementioned should be added, etc.

This distinction is divided into four parts: in the first of which the Master investigates, what is original sin in general: Whether act, or guilt, or fault? In the second, however, he investigates, What is it in its own species? there, G, Nune su In the third, he resolves certain objections which seem to persuade that original sin is actual, there, K, What therefore he says, Through disobedience, etc. In the fourth, he touches upon, how all men were in Adam sinning? there, M, To this, however, which we have said, etc.

The subdivision of these parts is evident by itself.

Articulus 1 — Whether Original Sin Is In All Those Begotten By Adam Under The Law Of Concupiscence

Whether original sin is in all begotten by the law of concupiscence from Adam?

Concerning the first, here arises a most difficult question, Whether original sin exists?

To which the Masters have given reasons in four ways. For some have proven it not to be from the consideration of divine and human justice: and this is the first way. Some, however, from the consideration of the human body: and this is the second. Some from the consideration of the human soul: and this is the third. Some from the consideration of God creating the soul and informing man: and this is the fourth way.

ACCORDING TO THE FIRST WAY, it proceeds thus:

1. Ezekiel 18:20: "The soul that sins, it shall die: the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father," etc. Therefore, it seems unjust that infants be condemned for the sin of the first man.
2. Likewise, the Lord commanded that fathers should not be put to death for their children: therefore, much less should He punish infants for the sins of their parents.
3. Likewise, in human laws, children are not punished for their fathers, except in what they receive from their fathers, namely in inheritance: therefore, infants should not be punished except in what they receive from their earthly father; this, however, is the body, and not the soul: therefore, they should not be punished in the soul concerning original guilt. That the soul is not received from the fathers is proven from the fact that the soul is not from transmission as the body is. Hence, Hebrews 12:9: "We have had fathers of our flesh who corrected us, and we gave them reverence: shall we not much rather be in subjection unto the Father of spirits, and live?"
4. If you say that the son is punished for the father temporally, not eternally: and thus the Lord punishes infants for the sin of Adam. On the contrary: Original guilt binds eternally to the deprivation of the vision of God, unless it is cured by the grace of the Mediator: therefore, God punishes children eternally for the father, and not only temporally; and this seems unjust.

ACCORDING TO THE SECOND WAY, it proceeds thus:

1. Augustine says that in all things the agent is more excellent than the patient: and the Philosopher, that the agent is always more honorable than the patient, and the efficient than the matter: but the body is not more excellent than the soul: therefore, since original sin is not caused in the soul from elsewhere except from the body, it seems that it cannot be caused in it.
2. Likewise, the agent impresses its form on the patient: if therefore the body acts on the soul, it impresses a form according to which it acts on the soul: this, however, is not guilt, because the body is not susceptible of virtue or vice: therefore, it impresses on the soul only punishment, and not guilt: therefore, no guilt is born in the soul from the body.
3. Likewise, nothing gives what it does not have: but the body does not have guilt: therefore, it does not give guilt to the soul.

Likewise, Anselm says that original sin is not more in the seed than in the spittle: therefore, it is not in what is formed from the seed: but the infant is formed from the seed: therefore, original sin is not in the infant.

ACCORDING TO THE THIRD WAY, it is objected thus: 1. The soul that receives the guilt of another must have a connection with it: but the soul of the infant cannot have a connection with the soul of Adam, unless it were in it: therefore, it seems that the soul of infants is transmitted from the soul of Adam, which is heresy: therefore, it does not have original sin, as it seems.

1. If, however, it is said to have it from the body. On the contrary: The rational soul is not a form drawn from matter like other forms, but is given from without: therefore, it will not participate in any of the properties of matter, nor the corruption of sin.
2. Likewise, the rational soul according to its powers, which are intellect, reason, and will, and the like, is not bound to bodily organs: therefore, it receives no infection from them.
3. Likewise, every sin is so voluntary that if it is not voluntary, it is not sin. If therefore the soul is corrupted in the body, it is either willing or unwillingly incorporated. If willing, it already sins actually choosing its corruption. If unwilling, then it is compelled to be incorporated: and thus the corruption should not be imputed to it. If, however, you say that the whole man has sin because he was in Adam sinning: then it seems that he also satisfied because he was in Adam satisfying.

ACCORDING TO THE FOURTH WAY, it is objected thus:

1. God created the soul, and it does not have malice from the matter from which it is caused, because it is not from matter: therefore, if it has a stain, it will be from the efficient cause: but it cannot have it from the efficient cause: therefore, it does not have the stain of guilt, as it seems.
2. Likewise, either at the same moment in which it is created, it is evil, or after. If at the same: then it must be that it is evil and exists at the same time: therefore, it has being and malice from the same, since according to malice it cannot be reduced to another cause existing before it.
3. Furthermore, this seems impossible: because Augustine says that it is not evil except because it harms, that is, because it takes away the good of nature: therefore, it seems that that good of nature was prior - and it cannot have been unless the soul itself was first: therefore, the soul itself was first good. If, however, this is granted, then the soul is prior to being in the body: because as soon as it is in the body, it is evil, as the Saints say.
4. Furthermore, Julian the Pelagian objects: Since sex is good because it is created by God: and the act of marriage is good because it is blessed by God, when He said: "Be fruitful and multiply," etc., parents are often holy and good: marriage is good because it is instituted by God: among so many defenses of innocence, through which cracks will original guilt enter?

5. Likewise, when parents are infected with bodily leprosy, they are advised to abstain from procreating children because of the defect of the body, if they can otherwise abstain: therefore, since the defect of the soul is greater, it seems that marriage should be prohibited, lest children be born in original evil.
6. Likewise, the good of offspring is that it is received for the worship of God and is religiously nurtured: therefore, it is not the good of offspring that it is born infected with sin: but all are born thus: therefore, it seems that marriage no longer has the good of offspring: and for this it is principally instituted: therefore, it seems that it should cease.

Solution. It must be said that original sin is in all begotten by the law of concupiscence from Adam: and how this is, it must be understood that there is a twofold corruption in the body from sin: one is that which has an active principle and cause.

in the body, but it has an act from the fault of the first parent: and this is hunger, thirst, weakness, death, and the like: and these are called natural defects: because although their act is from fault, yet the potency is from nature, and it is called by the Masters the corruption of passibility. Another is the corruption which according to act and potency is caused by the fault of the first parents: and it is not in the body insofar as it is from contraries, nor insofar as it is the body of man, but insofar as the grace of innocence has flowed away through fault. However, this defect is habitual concupiscence spread in the organs, as they are movable by the rational soul according to the law of nature inserted in it: for this law is contrary to that law of the members making the movable difficult in good, and easy in evil from the desire of good, as now habitually spread in the body. This corruption is called by Augustine the daughter of sin in the book on Marriage and Concupiscence, because of its similarity with sin, because it is immediately caused by sin: which can be shown thus: The first sin turned away from God, converting to a changeable good, and perverted the order by which reason was under God, and the body was under reason: and all these are found in this corruption: because habitual desire diffused through the body joined to the soul inclines to a changeable good, turning away as much as it can from the unchangeable, and does not subject itself to the order of reason: for which the Apostle says: I delight in the law of God according to the inner man: but I see another law in my members, etc. Therefore, this penalty is only in the body, because the body is not the substance of reason, and therefore not susceptible to fault: and therefore when that subject which is susceptible to the fault of man is infected, it is at the same time with that: and thus the soul is infected with the infection of fault and penalty. This corruption of disordered habitual fervor in the body our more learned contemporaries have called the corruption of vice: because it is the image of the first vice, and is an instrument to vice. This is drawn from the words of the Apostle, where it is said that we have borne the image of the earthly Adam. And because this mode relies on the words of Augustine, and Anselm, and other Saints, according to that we respond to all objections: and in the end, we will place two other solutions of others, returning to the same through other words.

Therefore, it must be said to the first, that the saying of Ezekiel is understood of sin whose cause is not taken from the father, as it is actual, as has already been shown, that the original cause in the soul is taken from the father in the corruption of vice, or in the penalty, which is called the daughter of vice: and it is called concupiscence by Anselm.

By the same, the solution to the following.

To another, it must be said, that although the soul does not receive from the father, yet it receives the cause of the infection of the soul from him in the pre-existing corruption, which is transfused with the seed, and is called the law of concupiscence: and therefore this is born with the law of corrupted nature over him. But in the case of men, the son does not participate with the father in the cause of sin: and therefore the father is punished in the son by temporal law through exile or through disinheritance of the son.

To another, it must be said, that the penalty corresponds to the original, because it is born from the aforementioned cause: and this is because the whole nature was corrupted in Adam, as will be shown below: and from the corrupted nothing proceeds except the corrupted: and nothing can be united to the corrupted, which does not contract some corruption.

To what is objected in the second way, it must be said that the word of Augustine and the Philosopher is true of the universally acting, because it in no way suffers from that in which it acts: whence the Philosopher speaks of the universally acting intellect, and Augustine of God. But in agents through corporeal or spiritual contact, the patient also acts on the agent: whence the Philosopher says that the physical agent suffers; and the Commentator on the books on the Soul says that the body acts on the soul, and inflicts certain passions on it, just as conversely: as is evident in sleep, and wakefulness, and certain others: and in this way, I can say that although the soul is nobler, it nevertheless suffers from the body to which it is united.

To another, it must be said, that it is false that the agent impresses its species on the patient, unless of the univocal agent: but they do not act univocally, unless when the matter of the agent and the patient is one, which is not in the body and soul: and therefore that objection does not proceed: and it is similar, that the sun heats and dries, but it is neither dry nor hot. If, however, we wished, we could say otherwise, that the species of that penalty is impressed on the soul: because what is not fault in the body, does not impede anything except the nature of the subject, because it cannot be the subject of fault: therefore, when it has its proper subject, it takes on the reason of fault.

To another, it must be said, that if it is understood thus, Nothing gives what it does not have contained by substance, to that whose substance it contains in itself, the proposition is false in all causes which have the caused by virtue, and not by substance, yet they give it: and thus flesh has fault. If, however, it is understood that nothing gives what it in no way has, then the proposition is true: and it does not avail for the purpose, because flesh in some way has fault.

To what is objected according to the third way, it must be said that the soul does not receive sin from the soul, except as from the first cause infecting the flesh: but it receives from

the flesh, as from the proximate agent: not because it is from propagation: but because it is caused in the flesh, and united to the flesh.

To another, it must be said, that the soul is spiritually united to the body first: because it is through substance the perfection of the body, and certain powers consequently are the perfections of parts, and certain not all, flow from the soul substantially united to the flesh: and therefore they all contract the infection of substance.

To another, it must be said, that in the Book it is held, that this sin is voluntary in its first cause: that is, Adam, which is called the separated will by the Masters: but it is not voluntary by the will joined. And it must not be said, that the soul wills to be incorporated by the will of nature: because it is false, because the soul must first exist before it wills, and it is never except incorporated. If, however, it is said to be the will, the natural appetite of matter, which, as is said by some, is in all forms: that is nothing: because according to the Philosopher, it is not true: although matter desires form, as the female desires the male, and the base desires the good, yet it is not conceded by the Philosophers, that form desires matter, since it is divine and the best not desiring, but desired, and in matter it is subject to variation and corruption, which can desire nothing. Moreover, given such an appetite, then the soul of man does not otherwise will to be incorporated, than the form of a stone to be in the earth mixed with mineral: and this is absurd, that it should be disputed in this matter about such a will, when it is asked about the will of sin.

To another, it must be said, that Adam as the material principle of men sinned but could not thus satisfy, as has been proven above the third, and therefore we did not satisfy by him satisfying.

To what is objected according to the fourth way, it must be said that God creates the soul pure, that is, that from creation it does not have impurity: but rather in infusion it receives, not from creation but from union to that to which it is infused: as wine in contact with an unclean vessel which in the hands of the giver is clean, as the Master says in the following distinction: and therefore it would not follow, if by creating he made it clean, that it is clean: because from another in the same moment it is made unclean.

To another, it must be said, that malice is reduced to the foulness of the flesh in which it is created, as to an antecedent cause.

To another, it must be said, that evil takes away the good which precedes by nature or time, or in both ways: by time and nature in actual sin, but by nature only in original sin.

The solution to Julian's objection is now clear: because the channel through which concupiscence descends is habitually drawn in the seed. Whence Augustine arguing against him says, that he himself, the impudent preacher of concupiscence, makes no mention of concupiscence, which if it could be removed by generation, there would be no original: and this is to be understood of concupiscence which is the material substance of original sin, as will be shown in another question when it is asked, What is original sin according to matter and form?

To another, it must be said, that if sin were irremediable, then the objection would hold: but it is remediable by the grace of the Mediator. Or it may be said, that because of the defect into which it falls on the part of man, marriage was instituted and the course of nature in conception should not be impeded. However, the first solution is truer.

To the last, it must be said, that the good of offspring is not impeded, because sin has a remedy: and moreover, by nature, the intention of God is the multiplication of nature, and the impediment is sometimes from the act of man: and he cannot impede the divine.

Articulus 2 — Whether Original Sin Is A Fault

Whether original sin is guilt?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, "But that original sin is guilt," etc.

For it seems that original sin is not in the genus of guilt: because

1. The involuntary, even in act, does not have guilt, but pardon and mercy, as the Philosopher says: therefore much less the involuntary, in which he who is subject to it does nothing: but such is original sin: therefore it seems that it is not in guilt.
2. Likewise, Augustine says that no one sins in that which can in no way be avoided: but infants can in no way avoid the original fault: therefore they do not sin.

Solution. It must be said that original sin is the sin of nature, as has been held: and because that justice obliges, as Anselm says: because if it had stood, it would have poured forth original justice into the children, just as it later poured forth injustice.

How this happens must be understood by other two ways besides that which was held in the preceding question: one of which is the masterly way, namely that corrupted nature generates, and does not intend to generate only the body, but the composite: and therefore although the soul is not drawn from matter, nevertheless the work of nature reaches the soul by intention, inasmuch as even in the seed the soul operates: But that which is reached by a corrupted work, that is stained: and therefore the soul, inasmuch as it is the form, which is the end of the act of generation of corrupted nature, in which the act of generating rests, is necessarily corrupted: and therefore in all others they have the same order of response to objects, which was previously held.

Another way of solving is of a certain Lord Ebdoms, Bishop of Cambrai, who posits that common nature participates in the person in acting in the body: for it follows if this man sins, that man sins: and if this man is corrupted by sin, that man is corrupted by sin: because common nature according to being is only in this one, especially in Adam before it was derived into others. Therefore in him the whole and all nature was corrupted. But the particular responds to the universal: therefore to corrupted nature in common must respond every particular corrupted by the act of generation from that in which it itself is corrupted. And this returns to the same with the previously held way, although they are other words: and afterwards it is again the same mode of solving.

To that which is first objected here, it must be said that the involuntary is that guilt, and the saying of the Philosopher holds in the act of the person, and not in the guilt of nature.

To the other it must be said that nature could have avoided in Adam, although not in this one: and another reason is, because Augustine does not understand concerning the natural, but concerning that of which we are the cause.

Articulus 3 — Whether Original Sin Is Concupiscence Or The Fomes

Whether original sin is concupiscence, or the tinder?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, G, Now it remains to see, etc.

For there it seems to be implied from the words of Augustine, that original sin is concupiscence: and because it would be long and burdensome to introduce here the multitude of authorities which are in the Gloss on chapter v, vi, and vii of the Epistle to the Romans, it must be known that we speak in three ways: for some say that the tinder is original; some, however, that the intense tinder; some, however, that concupiscence.

And it seems all this is false: because
1. The tinder remains after baptism: but original does not remain after baptism: therefore original is not the tinder.

1. Likewise, Intense and remiss do not vary the species: but the intense tinder is before baptism, and remiss after baptism: therefore they are of the same species: but the remiss after baptism is not sin nor fault: therefore neither is the intense before baptism.
2. Likewise, Concupiscence, which is concupiscibility in the infant, and in the adult concupiscence, also remains in the Saints: but original does not remain in the Saints: therefore original is not concupiscence: therefore all seems false which is said here.
3. Furthermore, Since we have fallen from sin into ignorance, just as into concupiscence, and infirmity: it seems that ignorance and infirmity ought to be original sin just as concupiscence.
4. Likewise, Hugh of Saint Victor:
   Original sin is that which by being born: Therefore we contract through ignorance in the mind, through concupiscence in the flesh. It is granted, that ignorance is as much original sin as concupiscence.

Solution. It must be said, that here many have spoken in many ways, so that none agrees with another: but the easier way by which we can exit, is this, that we say certain things are in original sin, as material, and certain as formal. The material in the original is the foulness of concupiscence or the corruption of vice, of which it was said above. The formal, however, in it is the lack of due justice: for nature had lost the justice in which it was created and which it had from itself, in all those in whom it is required, as Anselm says: and therefore according to what can be gathered from the words of Anselm in the book on the Virginal Conception, it can be defined thus: Original sin is the proneness to all evil with the lack of due justice. And this

definition is of certain ancient Doctors, but it is extracted from the words of Anselm. And what is said, proneness to all evil, is the inclination to conversion in a changeable good, and not conversion, because original does not have conversion except in potency. I say, however, in potency completed through the habit of the corruption of vice, of which it was said above. But it has aversion in act: and this is touched upon by what is said, lack of due justice. For if it were said lack of justice only, it would be said only as the reason of the penalty of loss: but when due is added, then the reason of fault is posited: whose cause is justice deserted by nature. According to this, therefore, we can say, that the authorities speak of the original from the part of that which is material in it: or they speak of the material, according to what underlies the formal: because thus it is original fault or sin.

To the first objection, therefore, it must be said that the tinder in this formal reason does not remain after baptism, but in the remote matter without form: and in this way the Saints do not speak, when they say that the tinder is original.

To the other it must be said, that there is intensity in the same act according to reason, and this is in the same quality according to habit, and does not vary the species, as in whiteness to the act of separating: and in this way the Saints do not speak. In another way there is intensity with respect to some act varied according to species: just as we say the Angel understands better than we, because he understands in a godlike manner, but we inquisitively and with study: and that is caused by nature according to another species, and more noble than ours: and that varies the species: because it is not properly intensity, but by analogy participation of the same. So it is in the tinder before baptism, and after: because before baptism it has the form of aversion through which it can harm damnably and concupiscentially: but after baptism it agrees only through the natural habit, through which it inclines concupiscentially: but it does not harm to damnation, as Augustine says: and this the Gloss understands which says this.

To the other it must be said, that concupiscence is suffocating and promoting. Suffocating, however, is only according to what extinguishes the fire of good, and precludes the vital spirit of grace: and this is only from what is formal in concupiscence, namely from the lack of due justice. Promoting, however, is that which is the cause of exercise in fighting in temptation: and this remains after baptism: and this is materially the sequel of the original, and not original sin.

To the other objection concerning ignorance and infirmity, it must be said that they are not the matter underlying the original, but rather the penalties following: and this is clear from this that they relate to evil in the reason of diminishing and excusing: but concupiscence relates to it as inclining into it.

To the dictum of Hugh it must be said, that he does not manifest nor define the original through its substantial things, but through the signs of sins following it and remaining in the subject, even after it has passed and is remitted.

Articulus 4 — With Respect To What The Names That Are Attributed To Original Sin Are Distinguished

Upon what are the names, which are attributed to the original, diversified?

Upon what are the names, which are attributed to the original, diversified?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, G, around the end: Which come from the languor of nature,

Here many names of the original are posited, namely original sin, fomes, concupiscence, languor of nature, law of the members, and tyrant. And it is asked, Upon what are they diversified?

To this it must be said that original sin is named in comparison to the good which it loses, and in comparison to the illicit act, and in comparison to that in which it is. In the first way, it is called original sin. In the second way, it is called in two ways, namely according to that which is the nourishment of the libido of sin, or according to the comparison to the object delighting as now: and in the first way, it is called fomes, because it is the foment of libido. In the second way, concupiscence. In the third way, it is named in two ways, namely according to the force which it inflicts on the intact nature which delights in the law of God, and thus it is called tyrant: and according to that which binds and captivates sensuality to the illicit, and thus it is called law of the members.

M. Objection of some against that which was said above, that all men were in Adam.

To this, however, which we have said, that all men were in Adam, some followers of words object thus, saying: Not all flesh which is propagated from Adam could exist in him at once: because it is of much greater quantity than the body of Adam was. In which neither were there so many atoms as there have descended men from him. Wherefore they assert it is not true that the substance of each one was in the first parent.

N. Response, where it is opened how they were in Adam according to the seminal reason, and how they descended from him, namely by the law of propagation.

To which it can be responded that materially and causally, not formally, it is said that everything which is naturally in human bodies was in the first man, and descended from the first parent by the law of propagation, and in itself was increased and multiplied, with no external substance passing into it, and it will rise again in the future. Indeed, it has nourishment from food: but foods are not converted into human substance, which indeed descends by propagation from Adam. For Adam transmits a small amount of his substance into the bodies of his sons, when he begets them, that is, a small part of the mass of his substance is divided, and from there the body of his son is formed, and by its multiplication without the addition of an external thing it is increased: and from that so augmented something is separated, from which the bodies of posterity are formed: and thus the order of procreation progresses by the law of propagation, up to the end of the human race. Therefore, it is clear to those who understand diligently and clearly, that all were in Adam according to bodies by seminal reason, and descended from him by the law of propagation.

O. By authority and reason it is proven that nothing external is converted into the human substance which is from Adam.

But that nothing external passes into the nature of the human body, the truth signifies in the Gospel saying: "Everything that enters the mouth goes into the stomach, and is cast out into the sewer"[198]. Which also can be shown by reason in this way: A child who dies immediately after birth will rise in that stature which he would have had if he lived up to the age of thirty years, impeded by no defect of the body. Whence, therefore, will that substance which was so small when dead be so great in the resurrection, unless by multiplication in itself? Whence it appears that even if he lived, that substance would be increased not from elsewhere, but in itself: just as the rib from which the woman was made, and just as the Evangelical loaves. We do not deny, however, that foods and humors pass into flesh and blood: but not into the truth of human nature which descends from the first parents, which alone will be in the resurrection: but the remaining flesh into which foods pass will be cast off as superfluous in the resurrection: which, however, coheres by the nourishment of foods and other things.

Expositio Textus

Exposition of the Text

Exposition of the Text.

Then it is asked concerning what is said there, "M, To this, however, which we have said, in Adam there was," etc.

But concerning this, it has been disputed in the third book of the Sentences, distinction 3; and in another Summa, in the question concerning the truth of human nature: and therefore let those be examined, and let them suffice, because it is not necessary to repeat.

DISTINCTIO XXXI

Divisio Textus

Now it remains to investigate, etc. In this part, the Master determines how that sin is propagated from Adam into all men. And he touches upon four things concerning it: the first of which is that he refutes the error of those who said the soul is from transmission, because they did not see how otherwise it would contract original sin. The second is that he determines how sin dwells in the flesh, there, "For the flesh, on account of sin," etc. In the third, it is asked whether that which is in the flesh is guilt or punishment, there, "Here it is usually asked, whether," etc. In the fourth, the cause of original sin, etc., he objects how the soul is infected in conception, when it is not yet infused, there, "But to this it is opposed," etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether A Person Could Infect Nature, Namely, That Adam Corrupted The Whole Nature

Whether the person could infect the nature, namely, that Adam corrupted the whole nature?

A question arises, whether the person can infect the nature, as is suggested here—nature and the powers of nature:

as is suggested here, it is broken:

Master, saying that Adam corrupted the whole nature?

1. For that which is perpetual and existing in one way does not receive transmutation—however, the common nature of men, existing in one way in the past, present, and future, seems to be perpetual and intransmutable: therefore, it seems it cannot receive alteration or corruption from another person.
2. Likewise, the less noble does not act upon the more noble: but the person is ignoble, because corruptible: therefore, it does not act upon the nature by corrupting it.
3. Likewise, if nature is corrupted in something, this is per accidens, and in a certain respect: per accidens, because not per se, but through this or that person: in a certain respect, because only as it is in itself: therefore, when it is separated from that, it will have neither corruption per accidens, nor according to what it had in that: but as it is in another, it is separated from the principle in which it was corrupted: therefore, in another, it is not corrupted, as it seems.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
The whole nature is there by being, where nothing is outside by being: but nothing by being of human nature was outside the first parents: therefore, the whole was in them: however, it is evident that it communicated singularly in act, because the singular acts only according to nature and the powers of nature: therefore, from the sin, the whole nature was simultaneously corrupted, but whatever is taken from the corrupted is corrupted: therefore, everything that descends by propagation is corrupted, because everything is taken from the corrupted.

Solution. It must be said that, as Anselm says, and the Master suggests here, in the first sin the person corrupted the nature: and then the corrupted nature of the father corrupts the nature of the offspring: and the corrupted nature of the offspring corrupts the person of the offspring and the soul: and thus corruption returns from person to person in a circle, although not according to the thing.

To what is first objected, it must be said that nature does not entirely name the same as perpetual and incorruptible: because nature names the principle of acting and the power, which is to procreate similar from similar: and this is not done by the universal, but rather by the nature of man accepted by being: and since it is the substantial being of the individual, according to this it is corrupted by it: and this is to accept it according to nature and thing: however, according to the abstracting reason, it is perpetual and incorruptible, according to

198. Matthew 15:17.

what is universal: and it is well conceded that the reason of the universal accepted does not act, nor suffer, nor generate, nor is generated: but is a simple power of communicability only. Whence the first transcendent reasons are, and concluding nothing of the purpose.

To the other, it must be said that this is true according to what is more noble: but it acts upon it, according to what it communicates to it in being: and the corruption of the less noble in this way redounds in the more noble.

To the other, it must be said that there is a double per accidens, namely, that which is opposed to what is per se in denomination, and thus per accidens it is corrupted in this, because it is corrupted by another. Another is per accidens by the nature of the accident: and thus nature is not per accidens in this, but substantially, and it has substantial being in this: and the corruption of the person substantially in this redounds in the substantial being of nature.

Articulus 2 — Whether Original Sin Is Transmitted To Descendants Not By Propagation But By Lust

Whether original sin is transmitted to descendants, not by propagation, but by lust?

Whether original sin is transmitted to descendants, not by propagation, but by lust?

Then it is inquired concerning what is said there, C, around the beginning: Now after sin, carnal copulation is not valid, etc.

For from this is implied that word which he will later say, that original sin is transmitted to descendants: not by propagation, but by lust.

However, it seems that this is false:
1. For lust is an improper will: but an improper will is the sin of the parent and not of the offspring: therefore, if from that original sin is caused, original sin is caused by the act of the proximate father, and not by the sole transgression of Adam, which will be disproved below.

1. Likewise, it frequently happens that parents do not have an improper will, but come together with pious intention in hope of offspring: therefore, according to this, then original sin would not be caused in infants.
2. Likewise, if it is said that original sin is caused by lust which is called the itch of concupiscence in intercourse: this does not seem so: because this is only in the parent: but original sin occurs in the offspring: therefore it seems that it is not substantial to the original sin: because what is substantial is not divided from the thing to which it is substantial. But if it is said that it is not substantial, but nevertheless is a cause: then it follows that original sin is caused by the proximate parents, and not by the first: and again it is said by trustworthy sources that by the merit of the devotion of the parents, the itch is separated from the act of marriage: and yet they conceived and begot: therefore according to this, the children did not have original sin.

3. Likewise, the Doctors have said thus far: that if the body of a man were formed by hand or from the foot without intercourse, and the soul were infused, that it would still contract original sin: therefore it seems false that original sin is transmitted by lust and not by propagation.

Solution. In my judgment, there is a threefold lust, namely, actual in the soul, which is an improper will actually or habitually preceding sin. There is also lust, concupiscence suffocating reason in the itch of the flesh in intercourse: and I do not think that any of these causes original sin, as the objections prove. But there is a third, of which it was said above, habitual concupiscence residing in the seed, which corrupts the order of the organs of the body to the soul according to mobility towards good: and this is the cause of original sin according to which original sin is drawn from the flesh, and this is what transmits original sin, and it is not caused except by the first parent and not by others, and it is called the daughter of vice or the corruption of passibility, as we have said.

And through this the solution of all objections is clear: for I indeed concede what is objected: because the flesh corrupted by its corruption does not cause original sin, except when it is in the act of nature, which is the multiplication of individuals under the common species; and if that were done otherwise than by intercourse, unless that actual lust or concupiscence were removed, the soul would always be infected just as now.

However, there are others saying otherwise, namely that there is a pollution of the seed by the lust of intercourse, which lust is said to be of Adam, because it was caused by him: and the seed polluted by that disordered fervor pollutes the soul: and they concede that if man were formed otherwise, he would contract only the corruption of passibility and not of vice.

Articulus 3 — Whether There Is One Original Sin Or Many

Whether there is one original sin, or several?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, H, towards the end: Behold, in iniquities I was conceived, etc.

For from this it seems that there are several original sins, not one: because

1. The Gloss explains this concerning the original. Likewise, on that of Psalm 31:1: Blessed are those whose iniquities are forgiven: the Gloss says, Original sins.

Likewise, Matthew 18:23 and following, concerning the wicked servant, the Gloss of Rabanus says that even the original sin returns upon him.

1. By reason it also seems the same: because the proneness to all evil, multi...

It is divided according to the division of evil: but evil is of many kinds: therefore, since original sin is a proneness to all evil, it seems that it is in a multiple division.

1. Likewise, it is contrary to all virtues: but one and the same thing is not opposed to many: therefore original sin is not one.
2. Likewise, this seems from the fact that it does not exist in one way in the powers of the soul: because the concupiscible part is said to be corrupted and infected by original sin according to the generative part, but the others are only corrupted.

There is also a question about the meaning of these words, what is meant by saying that one is infected and corrupted, and the other only corrupted?

Solution. It must be said that original sin is only one: and the reason for this is that the soul contracts it, insofar as it is the perfection of the body: but the perfection of the body is according to substance: and therefore it contracts it according to substance: and just as substance is one, so original sin is one: but it is said to be multiple, insofar as it is multiplied to acts, in that it extends itself by spreading in the corruption of the powers: and in this way the authorities are understood to be led: but this is not to be many, except in a certain respect.

To the other, it must be said that original sin has aversion simply: but it has conversion only in potency: and this is the proneness which is not converted, but convertible into good changeably: and therefore from that part it touches the powers, and is multiplied in a certain respect in them.

To the other, it must be said that original sin is not directly opposed to virtues, but actual sin is: but original sin is per se opposed to grace, which regards the essence of the soul, as was previously held, and consequently it is opposed to virtues, and is not multiplied per se, but per accidens.

To the other, it must be said that the reason for that saying can be twofold: one, that it is said to be infected actively, that is, infecting: and then it is plainly true that this is infected, because through it the whole posterity is infected. Another reason is: because none of the powers resists reason so violently as that one, and the delightful movement of it is poured into the soul, so that the whole becomes flesh: and this is a sign that concupiscence is more withered according to that power than according to others: and therefore because of that abundance of corruption it is said to be infected.

I. Objection of some striving to prove that sin is not transmitted from the law of coitus.

But to this it is opposed in this way, In the very conception where it is said that sin is transmitted, flesh is propagated: yet then the soul is not infused according to the physicists, but when the body is already formed. Which Moses also clearly signifies in Exodus, where he speaks of the striking of a pregnant woman: "If," he says, "someone strikes a pregnant woman, and causes a miscarriage, if the offspring is still unformed, he shall be fined with money: but if it is formed, he shall give life for life." But formed is understood as animated with its own soul: and unformed, as not yet having a soul. Therefore, in the very conception when flesh is

propagated, the soul is not yet infused. How then is sin transmitted there, since sin cannot be where the soul is not? To which it can be said, because in that conception sin is said to be transmitted: not because original sin is there, but because the flesh there contracts that from which sin arises in the soul when it is infused. And both are called conception, namely when flesh is propagated and receives the form of the human body, and when the soul is infused, which is sometimes also called birth. Hence it is said, "What is born in her." But properly birth is called the bringing forth into the light.

Expositio Textus

Exposition of the Text

Then, it is asked concerning what is said there, "But to this it is opposed in this way," etc.

For it seems that this disobedience ought to have been more in reason than in the generative organs, because reason first sinned by willing to be like God.

Likewise, it seems that it should have been in the nutritive part, because it tasted the illicit.

Likewise, in the ear, because it first heard the serpent.

The solution to all such things is that it is not considered whether the sin was first in this member or that, but rather the corruption of nature in the original is considered: and therefore disobedience and lust dominated in the act of propagation, so that disobedience itself is an argument that conception is corrupted by original vice.

DISTINCTIO XXXII

Divisio Textus

Since it was said above that original sin is a vice, etc. In this distinction, the remission of original sin is treated.

And the distinction is divided into two parts: in the first of which, it treats the remission of original sin. In the second, however, it presents certain consequent questions, which begins there, "Moreover, it is usually asked, Whether concupiscence which follows, etc." And there are five, as is clear in the Letter there in the order of the chapters.

The first still has two: because first it inquires about remission in the soul; second, about remission in the body, there, "It is usually asked here, Whether even itself, etc."

Articulus 1 — Whether Original Sin Is Blotted Out Totally Or In Part, And In What Sense It Is Said To Pass As To Guilt And To Remain As To Act, And Whether It Returns In The Baptized

Whether original sin is entirely or partially removed? And, in what sense is it said to pass in guilt and remain in act? And: Does it return in the baptized?

There arise, however, four questions concerning the first: of which the first is, Whether original sin is entirely or partially removed by baptism?

The second, Whether the remaining original concupiscence after baptism can be increased or diminished?

The third, How the remaining punishment is said to promote and not suffocate?

The fourth is, Whether it remains equally in all, just as it is equally contracted by all?

To the first, it is objected thus: 1. The merit of Christ's obedience was not of lesser efficacy than the demerit of Adam's disobedience: but through Adam's disobedience, the whole original sin entered concerning guilt and punishment, etc.

1. Likewise, satisfaction ought to correspond to the guilt of sin, but original sin was contracted entirely through an alien act: therefore, it seems that it ought to be entirely resolved through an alien act.
2. Furthermore, the merit of that which could not avail us should not have harmed us, or at least through Christ, we ought to have been entirely liberated.
3. Furthermore, it seems that this is not substantial to baptism: because before baptism, they were cured by various sacrifices, and circumcision, and sometimes by faith alone.

Further inquiry is made about this, What is this statement that the Master says in the Text, that through baptism guilt passes, and remains in act?

1. For original sin does not have an act: because if it had an act, it would not be original but actual: therefore, it seems it cannot remain in act.
2. Furthermore, there is no guilt unless there is some fault: therefore, since that passes before guilt passes, it seems that it ought to be said that guilt passes, and concupiscence remains.
3. Furthermore, it seems false what he says. For above he said that original sin is concupiscence which renders the infant concupiscible, the adult concupiscent; but this in no way passes through baptism: therefore, original sin does not pass in baptism.
4. Likewise, since concupiscence remains after baptism, the cause of the original is still in the body: therefore, it ought to infect the soul again: and thus original sin returns upon him who is baptized.

If you say that grace received in baptism prevents it, Against: Suppose that one falls from grace: then, since concupiscence remains, original sin returns.

If you say that the character prevents it: therefore, since circumcision and sacrifices did not impress a character, then original sin returned, which is false.

Solution. It must be said, as stated above, that there is something material in original sin, and something formal: the material remains in the baptized, but not the formal, namely the lack of due justice: because the justice lost in Adam is not required from the baptized, because

he recovered it through the justice of Christ, either through baptism, from which it was instituted, or through sacrifices and faith and circumcision, before baptism was instituted, as was explained at the beginning of the fourth Sentences.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that although original sin is caused by the first injustice according to both parts, it is not ordered against the grace of redemption according to both parts, but only according to the formal part: and therefore in that part, the whole is remitted: but in the other part, in which it cooperates with grace for humility and exercise, there the damage would have been removed by baptism. Hence, this is not due to the imperfection of Christ's satisfaction, but rather for our utility, so that we may be cautious and circumspect, lest we fall again.

To the other, it must be said that the whole guilt is removed, but not the punishment. For it is necessary that the punishment of Christ be mixed with our punishments: because just as the evil of the first Adam is continued to us through matter, so it is necessary that the benefit of Christ be continued to us through faith and compassion: and therefore satisfaction cannot be entirely alien, because it is owed by the spirit, and therefore it must be voluntary: but that which depended, did not have to be voluntary. And much has been said about this elsewhere.

To the other, it must be said that it is false concerning merit or justice before sin: because original justice (as Anselm says) would have transfused into us from Adam, just as he transfused original injustice. But concerning justice after sin, it is true: and then it is not to the point: because that did not have to be had except through the faith of the Mediator: and thus it is referred back to the second Adam, not to the first: and therefore he did not have it as origin and fomes, but as infused and originated from him from whose fullness we have all received.

To the other, it must be said that the faith of the Mediator is substantial according to all time, but baptism according to the state in which it is instituted.

To what is further inquired, it must be said that to remain in act is explained in two ways, namely potentially concerning the material part: as we say that this one is actually blind: or in act, that is, by inclination to act, namely by the proneness of concupiscence: and both can be understood, and are understood by different people.

To the other, it must be said that guilt properly regards the act of one's own will: and therefore, although original sin is in the genus of guilt, as was held above, yet it has the notion of guilt more completely than the notion of guilt: and therefore it is said that guilt passes: for guilt is more properly from another than guilt: yet what the objection concludes is true according to the truth of the matter.

To the other, the solution is clear from what was said before: because concupiscence can be considered standing under deformity: and thus he said above that it is original sin. It can also be considered as the material remnant of the original, and thus it remains after baptism: and thus he speaks here.

To the other, it must be said that after baptism it does not remain to harm according to what Augustine says, namely to infect one's own soul: because, as was said above, it never infects unless when it is in the act of nature, because thus it regards the common nature, which is corrupted in Adam: but this act is not propagation, and therefore it does not infect except in that. Hence, there is no question about the body of the baptized: because it is only the material disposition of the body of the person, and does not regard the common nature.

Articulus 2 — Whether The Original Concupiscence Remaining After Baptism Can Be Increased Or Diminished

Whether original concupiscence remaining after baptism can be increased or diminished?

Secondly, it is asked, whether it can be increased or diminished?

1. It seems, however, from many things said in the Text, that it can be increased and diminished according to that which remains after baptism.
2. To these are reasons: For every habit directed to some act is intensified by the frequency of those acts to which it is directed; but concupiscence which remains is a habitual inclination to an illicit act; therefore, it is intensified by the frequency of illicit acts, as it seems.
3. Likewise, a habit is generated and increased from the same source, just as it happens in natural growth and generation; but habitual concupiscence is generated from illicit acts; therefore, if concupiscence is present by corrupted nature, it is increased from the same.

ON THE CONTRARY:
1. Suppose it is increased: then since it can be increased more, and its state was finite before baptism, concupiscence after baptism will eventually become as intense as it was before baptism; therefore, it will then operate identically; therefore, original guilt returns: and this is false; therefore, it cannot be intensified by subsequent sin.

1. Likewise, a habit left from illicit operations immediately regards the power from which the act proceeds; above, it is said that the material of the original is immediately in the substance of the soul ; therefore, it seems that from the works left, it is not united to that innate habit; therefore, it does not intensify it.
2. Likewise, the innate and that left from operations are not of the same nature; but original concupiscence is innate, while the habit left from operations is actual; therefore, they are not of one nature; therefore, one does not intensify the other, as it seems.

It is further asked, whether it can be diminished?

It seems so: because
1. This is often said in the Text.
2. Likewise, to satisfy, as Ambrose says, is to cut off the roots of sins; but the roots of sins are

in the fomes; therefore, the fomes can be cut off; but it is cut off by diminution; therefore, it seems that it can be diminished.

1. Likewise, every habit directed to some act is diminished and weakened by the contrary act; but the fomes is directed to an illicit act; therefore, it is diminished and weakened by contrary operations; but every diminution is according to some alleviation of parts; therefore, by multiplying the diminishing factors, since it is finite, it could be entirely removed, which is denied to be possible in the Text. Nor is there an instance concerning the Blessed Virgin: because this was by miracle, as is disputed below.

Solution. To solve this, it is necessary to distinguish original concupiscence, or fomes, or original inclination, or by whatever other name it is called. For original concupiscence can be considered inasmuch as it is original, namely, according to what is contracted by the law of concupiscence at birth, and thus it is never increased; but it can be diminished by the operation of the sacrament, although not by the operation of the person: because whatever is left from the operation of man is not original, and therefore does not reach the original as original, as the induced reasons prove: and in this way the Saints do not speak of original concupiscence. Or, it can be taken according to what is original concupiscence materially, and not under the notion of original form: and thus it can be taken in two ways: because it either happens universally, and thus it is properly taken according to what is an inclination to all evil: and because beyond all there is nothing, therefore it cannot be intensified as to the object. However, as to illicit fervor, it is also not intensified when considered thus: because habits left from works are particularly directed to this evil or that, and not to all. But in this way, it can be remitted by the operation of the sacrament, and the intensity of the motion becomes less, and not as to the number of those in which it moves: because after baptism it moves towards all illicit things, although not as intensely as before, as will be evident below. It can also be considered particularly diffused concupiscence in the powers of the soul, according to what is determinately moving to this illicit thing or that: and thus nothing prohibits concupiscence from being intensified in my judgment: and thus the Saints speak in the Text: and in every such way, I think it should be said concerning diminution: and in this last way, the first three reasons proceed.

To what is objected against, it is immediately clear that all those reasons proceed, with original concupiscence formally accepted as original in the first way: and therefore the solution is now clear.

To what is objected, whether it can be intensified so much that it causes the original to return, it must be said that never: the reason for which is that there is a twofold cause of the intensity of an act, one of which is founded through all the formal principles ordered to that act: as we say an Angel understands better than a man: and that better and lesser understanding is founded upon different forms by species. In another way, an act is said to be intensified by the approximation of the same form to a greater or lesser term, as white unmixed with black, and whiter more unmixed. I say, therefore, that before baptism concupiscence had the power of infecting from that form which is the lack of due justice in the act of propagation:

but because after baptism that form does not return, therefore concupiscence will never have that act of infecting in one who is baptized: and this is what Augustine says in the Text, that it is not about the intensity by which concupiscence would be intensified so as not to be, but so as not to harm the one dead through baptism, which was inherent in the one born. It is said in the third way, it is upon the same form more and less receding from the good.

By the same reason, the solution to what is objected in the contrary.

To the small question, it must be said that it is diminished, as the Saints seem to say: but it is considered in two ways, namely, in comparison to the subject in which it is or is induced, and it is natural from corrupted nature: and in this way, it cannot be removed, because it always sprouts again: but in comparison to the act, it is infinite, because it is infinitely related to the act of evil: and therefore, however much it is diminished, it is not removed from the whole.

Articulus 3 — How The Remaining Punishment Is Said To Be Promotive

How is the remaining penalty said to be promoting?

Thirdly, it is asked, How is the remaining penalty said to be promoting, when it rather seems to be suffocating?

It is argued thus: 1. Whatever penalty is per se ordered to the illicit is more a cause of evil than of good: but concupiscence is per se inclined to the illicit: therefore it is more a cause of evil than of good. The first is evident per se. The second is proved by this, that it is signified by the Gentiles whom the Lord did not destroy from the face of the children of Israel, who without doubt worshipped the devil.

1. Likewise, whatever motion is prohibited by the Lord is a penalty more suffocating than promoting: but the motion of concupiscence is prohibited by the Lord, when it is said, Thou shalt not covet: therefore concupiscence is a penalty suffocating reason: but this is done by the act of concupiscence, especially in intercourse: therefore it is a suffocating penalty: therefore it seems that it ought to have been entirely removed in baptism, and not left in part.

But on the contrary, although those Gentiles whom the Lord did not wish to exterminate were evil, yet He wished them to remain, that in them He might instruct the children of Israel: therefore neither should concupiscence be entirely exterminated, but in part, that the spirit may be instructed in the fight against it.

Solution. It must be said that it was not useful for the good remaining in the state of this life and mortality not to have concupiscence, with which to fight: and indeed there are many causes of this, but three suffice for the present: namely, the memory of the ancient transgression which aids faith and the knowledge of sin. Second, the exercise of the fight, which aids the increase of merit. Third, the recognition of one's own fragility and humility, which makes one desire eternal life and liberating grace.

To the first objection, it must be said that it is not suffocating which remains after baptism, because it does not suffocate the habit of the life of the spirit, and although it is ordered to the illicit, yet its appetite is under us, and we can dominate it.

To the other, it must be said that the mortal motion of concupiscence is directly prohibited by the Lord: but the venial indirectly falls under the prohibition of sin, and it aids the exercise of the fight.

To the other, it must be said that reason is bound in two ways, namely, so that it is abstracted from the act of contemplation: and this binding does not suffocate, because this is done by delight even in the marriage of the Saints: and again it is bound so that it is abstracted from the habit, and that is suffocating and mortal, and in such power concupiscence does not remain after baptism.

Articulus 4 — Whether Original Sin Affects All Equally

Whether original sin affects all equally?

Fourthly, it is asked whether original sin remains equally in all?

It seems that it does not: because 1. We see one person more incited to illicit acts than another: since therefore the impulse is towards the illicit from the fomes, it seems that original sin does not remain equally in all after baptism with respect to concupiscence.

1. Likewise, natural virtues are not equally in all, about which Job 21:18 says that compassion grew with him from infancy, etc.: therefore, by opposites, neither does the fomes remain equally in all.
2. Likewise, it is held in the text that in the same person it can be intensified and diminished: therefore, it is unequally in the same person; therefore, much more in different persons.

ON THE CONTRARY: 1. If they die after baptism, they have equal beatitude, as the Master says in the following distinction: and those dying before baptism equally suffer darkness: but equal beatitude and equal punishment presuppose equal original sin: therefore, it seems that original sin is equal in all, and also concupiscence remaining after baptism.

1. Likewise, in each person it remains with respect to the proneness to all evil: but nothing can be added to all: therefore, it seems that on that part there cannot be inequality. On the part of the lack of due justice, there is privation, which also does not admit more and less: therefore, neither on that part can there be inequality: therefore, it is equal in all.
2. Likewise, in one way all are in Adam materially, and through the law of concupiscence: since therefore this is the cause of original sin before baptism, and of concupiscence remaining after baptism, in one way original sin is in all, and in one way concupiscence will remain in all, as it seems.

Solution. It must be said that the first distinction was made in the first problem of this reading: and to respond to this is not difficult. For it must be said that if original sin is considered as original, it is equally in all.

Likewise, if concupiscence is considered as it is towards all evil discretively, it is equally in all.

But if it is considered as it is determined to this or that, intensively it is not equally in all, nor always equally and in one way in the same person, but more remiss and more intense: and in this last way considering concupiscence, the first three arguments proceed: but considering original sin and concupiscence in the first way, the arguments proceed in the opposite: and therefore the solution to the whole is clear through this distinction.

Articulus 5 — Whether The Sacrament Of Baptism Works Anything In The Flesh Against Bodily Stench

Whether the sacrament of baptism effects anything in the flesh against bodily corruption?

Then it is asked concerning what is said there, C, "It is customary to ask, Whether even the flesh, etc."

However, it seems that the sacrament does not effect anything in the flesh.

1. For a sacrament does not operate except through grace: but grace is not in the flesh as in a subject, but in the soul: therefore it removes nothing of corruption in the flesh.
2. Furthermore, we see that the flesh of the baptized, when generating, transmits original sin: therefore it seems that since it could not transmit except through that corruption, that it itself is not cleansed from corruption.

But on the contrary:

1. Infants are saved in the sacrament of baptism: but it is evident that this is only against the corruption in the concupiscence. Therefore, since the sacrament is the cause of everything of which it is a sign, it is necessary that the corruption on the part of the body be removed.
2. To the same, it is commonly objected: because we see the unbaptized to be bodily corrupt: because bodily corruption is a demonstrative of spiritual impurity: therefore it seems that the corruption of the flesh is removed in baptism.

Solution. It must be said, as I think, that the corruption of the flesh is indeed removed, insofar as it is in the flesh in comparison to the spirit, and it is demonstrative of the impurity of the spirit.

To what is first objected, it must be said that although grace is in the soul, nevertheless through the acts which the soul exercises in the flesh, the flesh contracts a certain sanctity and

purity, of which the Apostle says that our bodies are the temple of the Holy Spirit: and thus by participation in sanctity, that carnal corruption is removed.

To the other, it must be said, as Augustine bears through many similar things in the letter: because when the grain is cleansed from the chaff, nevertheless when it is sown, it is born in the chaff: and when the circumcised is freed from the foreskin, nevertheless he begets with foreskin: and this is because the flesh is cleansed in act as it is in this one: but as the seed is cut off in the act of nature, it reverts to the corruption of common nature: and therefore then the potentiality of the first corruption is reduced to act, as has often been proven above.

Articulus 6 — Whether All Souls Are Equal From Creation, And Whether Some Are More Excellent Than Others

Whether all souls are equal from creation, and whether some are more excellent than others?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, "That also is not incongruous," etc.

For it seems that there can be no cause of this equality of souls: because God is disposed in one way in creating.

Again, the diversity of corruption is not the cause of the diversity of souls, but rather conversely.

Likewise, they are not diverse from this, because they are from nothing: therefore it seems, since no cause of this diversity is found, that souls are equal from creation.

As was said above concerning Angels, and in another Summa concerning this question, the cause of diversity is the wisdom ordering the created: and although this is disposed in one way to the wise God, nevertheless it does not explain in one reason those things about which it is: and therefore diversity arises. Why, however, it is united to the body, and whether voluntarily or not, has been explained above.

DISTINCTIO XXXIII

Divisio Textus

To the aforementioned, it seems necessary to add, etc. In this last part of this treatise, five things are determined. First, indeed, he objects sophistically by proving that the sins of all preceding are transferred into infants. Second, he shows that this is said by opinion, and that infants contract only the sin of Adam alone, there, D, "But truly in actual sin," In the third, he inquires whether that sin, etc., is the most grievous, which harmed all? there, F, "Here it is usually asked," etc. In the fourth, he inquires whether it was remitted to the first parents, or not? there, H, "If" In the fifth and last, indeed, it is asked, etc., he resolves the authorities first introduced, by which it seemed to be proven that the sins of all preceding are contracted in origin, there, I,

"And although by sins," etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether The Sins Of All Ancestors Are Transmitted To Descendants, Or Only Those Of Antiquity

Whether the sins of all preceding are transmitted to descendants, or only of antiquity?

A doubt arises concerning the first: because it seems that the sins of all preceding are transmitted to infants:

1. For every matter disposed by some disposition is more disposed by a proximate agent than by a remote one which touches only through a medium: but a body severed from the generator is disposed by the disposition of corruption: therefore it is more disposed by the proximate touching than by that which touches only through a medium: but the first parent touches only through a medium, and the proximate by itself: therefore there is more corruption of the proximate parent in the severed body than of the first.

1. Likewise, the generated does not have a relation to the body of Adam, except through the body of the nearest parent: therefore it more properly contracts from the nearest than from the first.
2. Likewise, if the first sin corrupts nature: therefore also the second, and the third: therefore since nature is corrupted by sins, either each corrupts the whole, or not. If so: therefore the later someone is born, the more they contract greater corruption: and thus the proposition is held, that corruption is contracted from the nearest parents. If it does not corrupt the whole: therefore it is necessary to say how much part it corrupts, and what is that to which it does not extend: and this is difficult even for those wishing to imagine.
3. Likewise, when Abraham gave tithes, those who were in his loins were tithed: but they were tithed before they were in his loins by the law of concupiscence, as Augustine says: therefore in his loins they received the original: therefore by the same reason the sons of others: therefore the original is contracted from the nearest.
4. Likewise, concupiscence (as Augustine says) is the cause of original sin: but concupiscence joined to the seed is the concupiscence of the nearest father: therefore it seems that sins are contracted from the nearest parents.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: If the sins of the nearest parents corrupt nature, this is either by the corruption of vice, or by the corruption of passibility. If by vice: therefore the body of the later born ought to burn more in lust than the body of the anciently born: and we frequently see the opposite.

Likewise, the body of the son of saints ought to resist the spirit less than the body of the son of fornicators: and we frequently see the opposite of this too.

But if it contracts greater passibility, this again we see to be false: for we are not more mortal than the first who were subjected to the necessity of death. If it is said that now we live a shorter time than then: this is nothing: because

in the time of Moses the days of man were a hundred and twenty years: and we still see some living so long: and according to this men would not live for ten years, and thus the son ought always to live less than the father: and this we do not see: therefore it seems that from the sin of the nearest parents our nature contracts no corruption.

Solution. It must be said that the original is contracted only from the first parent, and through the nearest parents only: and this is because every man who generates, generates only in the oldness of Adam, as is said in the Letter of the preceding distinction, and not in his own sin, because this does not corrupt the nature of human misery, although it corrupts the natural good in the sinner: but the sin of Adam corrupted human nature by the corruption of passibility and vice, and no other sins corrupt nature in this way, but the natural good in the person sinning: and that natural good does nothing for generation: and therefore only the sin of oldness is transmitted.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that that reasoning holds in those cases where the nearest mover and disposer moves by its own disposition, and not by the disposition by which it was moved by another anterior. But when it is so, that the nearest moves by the disposition by which it is moved by another only, then it does not hold: because then the first moves more than the nearest: as the Philosopher says about the first mover in the Physics, that without the first mover moving, none of the secondaries move, and not conversely. That it is so is clear from what Augustine says, that all generate in the first oldness.

To the other it must be said that it is true, that the relation of this is not to the body of Adam, except through the nearest parents: but nevertheless it is not contracted through them as through the first source, but through them, as the carnal corruptions of the first.

To the other it must be said that the second and third do not corrupt all this nature which the first corrupts: because it corrupts the matter of the body and the good of nature: but the subsequent sins corrupt only the natural good: the cause of this is because the equality of humor and composition was maintained by the grace of natural innocence, which was taken away by the first sin: and since it cannot be recovered, like lost virginity, therefore no subsequent sin does anything, in my judgment, in that corruption, but only corrupts the good of nature to which it is contrary: and this is the true cause, and they give the example of a wet cloth, which is not wetted more inside, because it is not susceptible of greater infusion: and of a mirror infected by a bloody cloud of menstruation, which is not infected more.

But the reason for this is what was said: because namely sin found the grace of innocence in the subject, which made impassibility and incorruption, which because another sin does not find, it does not act against it, but only against the good of grace and nature, and what it finds in the subject.

To the other it must be said that it is well conceded that in the loins of Abraham the sons descending through intercourse contracted the original: but nevertheless not from the loins of Abraham, as the proper and first source of that corruption.

Through this the solution to the whole is clear. For what is objected, above it is solved, namely how the original is one and many.

Articulus 2 — Whether In Adam's Actual Sin Several Sins Can Be Noted, And For What Reason Original Sin Was Transfused, And Whether, If He Had Sinned By Consent Only, His Body Would Have Been Vitiated

Whether in the actual sin of Adam several sins can be noted? And, by the grace of whom is original sin transmitted? And, whether if he had sinned by consent alone, his body would have been corrupted?

Whether in the actual sin of Adam several sins can be noted? And, by the grace of whom is original sin transmitted? And, whether if he had sinned by consent alone, his body would have been corrupted?

Then it is objected concerning what is said there, D, "But truly in the actual sin of Adam," etc.

For it seems this is false: because 4. Adam sinned only by one sin: therefore in his sin several sins are not noted.

1. Furthermore, according to what Augustine says here, anyone who sins in one way, sins in many: because sin is the death of the soul, and it kills itself.
2. Furthermore, sin is the transgression of divine law and disobedience to heavenly commandments: therefore it is disobedient: and so concerning many other things which can be similarly held.

Furthermore, since many things are enumerated here, it is asked, by the grace of whom is original sin transmitted?

For it seems, by the grace of gluttony: because it infects the body: and in the sin of Adam there was no bodily act except of gluttony alone.

But against this is what the Apostle says to the Romans 5:12, that through disobedience sin entered into the world, and through sin death.

Furthermore, in this commandment it seems the special sin is disobedience: because what was prohibited was only the evil of disobedience: therefore the special sin of Adam was disobedience, as it seems.

But if this is conceded, it is against what was determined above, in which it was proven that pride was the first sin of man, from which all evils of man arose.

Furthermore, it is asked, if Adam had sinned by consent alone, whether his body would have been corrupted, and original sin transmitted to us?

However, it seems not: because 1. In the act of sin the body would not have communicated with the soul: therefore it would have been unjustly acted with the body, if the body had been punished.

1. Furthermore, penance restores the losses of the mind in full, but not of the body: therefore it seems, that if he had sinned mentally in consent, he would have risen again

in whole through penance: but this cannot be unless the body remains uncorrupted: therefore through mental consent the body would not have been corrupted.

BUT on the contrary:
Every sin is to adhere to mutable things with the immutable good despised (as Augustine says): therefore it is a perversion from the highest making the lowest, and from the way the end: therefore for punishment the perversion will respond to it: this is, however, that what was subjected to the soul is not subjected to it, just as reason itself is not subjected to God. Since therefore the body ought to be subjected to the soul, the body will not be subjected: but this disobedience is not caused except by the corruption of concupiscence: therefore the body would have been corrupted by every sin whether spiritual or bodily.

Solution. It seems to be said, as above, that in the sin of Adam there are not several sins except materially speaking and by metaphorical adaptation, and how this is, was explained above. Simply, however, it was the appetite for excellence in the perfection of the knowledge of good and evil: and all other things were done to achieve that: and therefore that was the end of the appetite and substance: but other sins were done and intended and joined to it in the perfection of sin, and therefore they are materially.

And through this the solution to the first three is clear.

To the other which is asked, by the grace of whom is the transmission of original sin made?

It must be said, that formally it is transmitted because of pride, but materially because of gluttony: according to some, however, formally because of disobedience, although disobedience was not intended in the sin: because disobedience gave the form of sin to the eating, which otherwise would not have been sin, although it did not give the form of pride, which alone there fulfilled the reason of sin and was the cause of all others.

And through this again the solution to the following three, which proceed above the members of this distinction, is clear.

To the first which is further asked, whether he would have transmitted original sin if he had sinned mortally by consent alone? I think so, as the last objection proves.

But to what is objected, it must be said that immortality and incorruption of the body, whether contracted by the corruption of passibility or by the corruption of vice, falls from the grace of innocence, as we said above, when it was disputed about the mortality of Adam; but to this grace insofar as it was original innocence, the first mortal sin, whatever it was, was contrary, by this that it interrupts the adhesion of the soul with the perpetual source of incorruption, and consequently corruption is caused in the body. But the objection would proceed, if the cause of the incorruption of the body had been in the body alone, or in the body and in the soul separately: now, however, it was in the soul, and the soul itself could contain the body, and with it lost it could not do this: and therefore any sin could corrupt the first state.

To the other it must be said, that penance restores the damages of the mind which are only of the mind: but the grace of innocence, although it was in the mind, yet it was in it as a ruling

reason, and it was compared to the body: and therefore the damage incurred by its loss affects the body, which was not reparable by penance. However, there are those who concede, as the objections prove, to say that it would have been erased by penance, or that it would not transmit to us except the corruption of passibility and not of vice: although their saying is very improbable.

Articulus 3 — Whether Adam's Sin Is The Greatest And The Most Punished

Whether the sin of Adam is the greatest,
and most punished?

Whether the sin of Adam is the greatest,
and most punished?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said,
there, F, Here it is usually asked, Whether
the sin of Adam, etc.

For it seems that the sin was the greatest: because it is most punished.

Likewise, because it was committed without temptation.

But if it is conceded, on the contrary,
it is objected by what is said in the Text,
because the greatness of sin is especially
considered in the deformity of the act: but many
acts were more deformed than
the actual sin of Adam.

Solution, There is a manifold comparison
of sin, namely in the substance of sin,
or in the circumstances. But according to
substance, there is a simple comparison, as
we say that homicide is a greater sin
than theft, and the like.
However, comparison in circumstances is
a comparison in a certain respect.

Hence the Doctors have noted here
eleven modes, by which one sin
can be lighter or graver than another in a certain respect: the first of which is causality:
because it is the cause of many or all
sins: and thus the sins of the Angels and the first
man surpass others.

The second is generality: because it
contains more in itself through material adaptation:
and thus again the sin of Adam

surpasses, because Augustine noted more
in it.

The third is the multitude of punishments: and
thus the sin of the woman surpasses over
the sin of the man.

The fourth is greater ingratitude: and thus
a saint falling in the same kind of sin
sins more than another.

The fifth is danger: and thus ignorance
is a graver sin than others, as
was held above.

The sixth is inseparability: and then avarice
is said to be a graver sin: because
as things and age increase,
cupidity becomes inseparable.

The seventh is proneness: and thus the sin of
incontinence is graver, because it is in
the delight contemporaneous with life.

The eighth is persecution or tyranny:
and thus pride is said to be graver: because
it arises from its opposite, and after all
virtues it rages: as Augustine says,
that pride even lies in wait for good works,
so that they perish.

The ninth is the attack on greater grace:
as the sin against the Holy Spirit
is said to be great.

The tenth is said by reason of offense: and thus
the sin of idolatry is the greatest.

The eleventh is drawn from the Text, and is
the ability to resist: and thus one less
tempted in the same kind of sin is said
to have sinned more, than one more
tempted.

And thus through this the solution to the whole is clear:

Articulus 4 — Whether Original Sin Was Remitted In The First Parents

Whether original sin in the first parents was remitted?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said, there, H, If indeed it is inquired, Whether that sin; etc.

And it is inquired here concerning the punishment of the original in the body and in the soul. For if it was remitted, then it seems that every punishment ought to be remitted: because Jerome says, and it was disputed above, that all things which we suffer, our sins have deserved: but this was not done: therefore it was never remitted.

Likewise, In limbo they lacked the vision of God - therefore neither in the soul was it remitted.

Solution. It is not to be disputed here concerning the punishments of the original: because they were touched upon above, and what is its proper punishment, and what is not. But also this which is objected here, was solved in the preceding distinction, where it was shown that the punishment promoting in the body remains: but the punishment of privation with respect to the satisfaction of the person was remitted: but the guilt of nature could not be solved, except through the mediator of God and men, our Lord Jesus Christ, as was proven in the III Sentences, and therefore it was necessary to await the offering of the price in limbo: because all merit has efficacy, and always had from the merit of Christ: and that, held in faith only, cures the person, but in faith and act it cures nature and person, and opens the gate.

DISTINCTIO XXXIV

Divisio Textus

After the aforementioned, concerning actual sin, etc. Here the Master discusses the actual evil into which man has fallen. It is considered in three ways, namely according to substance, and thus he discusses it in the first part. And it is considered according to quantity, and thus he discusses it in the second part, below, in distinction XXXVII, there, A, After the aforementioned. It is also considered concerning the will, etc., according to differences of species and number: and thus he discusses it in the third part, where distinction XLU begins, there, A, When, however, the will is evil, etc.

The first of these is further subdivided into two: because in this distinction he discusses sin in the notion of evil, and in the following he begins to discuss the same according to how it consists in act, and has something of being, namely there, Distinction XXXV, A, After these things it must be seen what it is, etc.

However, the present distinction has three parts: in the first of which it is determined whence evil comes: and in the second, in what evil is, there, D, The origin of evil having been shown, etc. In the third, he objects to certain things, and resolves them, there, H, To this, however, which has been said, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether Evil Is

Whether evil exists?

Concerning the first, three doubts arise: the first of which is, Whether evil exists? The second, Whether it has an efficient or deficient cause? The third, How it proceeds from an efficient or deficient cause?

To the first, objections can be made through authorities: but since they are copiously introduced by the Master in the following part of this distinction, and in the following distinction, I refrain.

By reason, evil seems to be nothing thus:
1. Good is defined by its end: since therefore evil is opposed to the end, either evil is defined by a contrary end, or by the privation of the good end: however, it cannot be defined by a contrary end, because nothing is contrary to the highest good, since there is nothing supremely evil: therefore it will be defined by the privation of the good end: but privation does not posit or signify being: therefore evil is nothing of beings.

1. Likewise, Dionysius: Evil is nothing. Therefore, since it cannot vary in many ways among beings, neither in an angel, nor in the soul, nor in the whole of nature, evil will not be a being.
2. Likewise, Either evil is said to be per se and substantially evil, or by participation substantially evil, or by privation of good. If in the first way: then something is substantially evil: but what is substantially evil, has nothing of good: therefore that evil has nothing of good: but being is some good, and the good of which the Philosopher says that all desire to be good, and act for its sake, whatever they do: therefore that substantially evil does not have being: therefore it is not evil. But if it is said to be evil by participation. On the contrary: Nothing becomes evil by participation, unless something is per se evil which is participated: therefore nothing is participatively evil. It remains therefore, that evil is said by privation of good: therefore evil is nothing but privation: but privation is nothing: therefore evil is nothing.
3. Likewise, Damascene says that evil is spiritual darkness: but darkness signifies only the absence of light, where light ought to be: therefore neither does evil signify anything but the absence of good, where good ought to be: this however is nothing.
4. Likewise, As it is in the external powers compacted to act and perfection, so it is also in the internal powers: but external powers are not removed from act and end except by privation, as blind, and deaf, and the like: therefore neither are internal powers: but evil signifies the removal of act in the perfection of the end: therefore evil signifies nothing but privation: but privation is nothing: therefore evil is nothing. If you say that an external power is sometimes removed by something that is, like the power of the eyes by skin covering the sight: this is nothing: because there the disposition and perfection of the eye to act is not removed, but is covered and impeded, just as it is not removed by the hand if it is placed over it.

But because all confess this, it is objected to the contrary thus:

1. Evil is nothing: but what is nothing, opposes nothing: therefore evil opposes nothing: but it fights against good, as Dionysius says: therefore evil is actually a being.
2. Likewise, Nothing corrupts something, unless it is actually a being: evil corrupts good: therefore evil is actually a being.
3. Likewise, Evil is first in act, as is said here in the text: but act leaves a habit such as it is: therefore evil is in habit: but act and habit are actually beings: therefore evil is actually a being.
4. Likewise, A stain either signifies something in the soul, or nothing. If nothing: then it is not erased by grace, because nothing is not erased. But if it signifies something, since it itself is evil, evil will be some being.
5. Likewise, The soul is said to be good by participation in good: therefore if evil is the privation of good, from the same it is evil and indifferent, which is false: therefore it must be that it is evil by participation in some being: therefore evil similarly is actually a being.

1. Likewise, If evil is nothing, and men become nothing when they sin, as Augustine says, and it is held in the following distinction: therefore it seems that when God punishes men, He punishes them for nothing: and this is ridiculous: because what is punished for nothing is punished without cause.

According to this, the solution is sought of some saying that there is a twofold being, namely primary and secondary. Primary being is true being. And secondary being is the being of perfection perfecting according to good, of which Boethius says that being is what retains order and preserves nature. They say therefore that evil is non-being according to secondary being, because it deprives of well-being: but it is being according to primary being, because it is preserved in that. But that this is nothing to say, is easily proven thus:

1. Given that evil is the privation of good, evil will not have being except of privation concretely taken: but this neither signifies the being of the subject, nor the being that it deprives: therefore it signifies neither primary being, nor secondary being: therefore it is simply nothing.
2. Likewise, This seems to be proven by similarity: because blindness (as Anselm says) signifies nothing more in the eye than in the stone: but it signifies neither primary being, nor secondary being in the stone: therefore neither in the eye.
3. Likewise, Negation is not said to have being because it does not negate whatever is: but it is said to be nothing because it is nothing of composition or affirmation opposed to it: therefore neither will privation be said to have being according to primary being, because it does not deprive primary being, since that privation which deprives second-

ary being is not opposed to it: but rather it is said to be nothing at all, because it signifies neither primary nor secondary being.

Solution. To this it seems to be said that evil, in that it is evil, is altogether nothing, neither according to primary being, nor according to secondary being. But that which is materially evil, is something: just as blindness is altogether nothing, although that which is blind is an animal lacking sight. And this is what is said in other words, that the subject of evil, materially speaking, is something: but the form of evil consists in pure privation. And this is because every privation leaves the subject and aptitude or due to the habit, and deprives the habit itself: and evil does not take the intention and reason of evil from the part of the subject which it leaves, but rather from the habit which it deprives: for as the Philosopher says, From the potency of the subject we are not said to be good or evil: According to this, therefore, I concede that evil, in that it is evil, is altogether nothing: just as neither is any privation, in that it is privation, something.

To the first it must be said that to fight is said properly and improperly. If to fight is said properly: then to fight is the same as to act with contrary virtue against the contrary: and then evil does not fight against good except by the virtue of good, as Dionysius says: and this is to be understood thus, that there is particular good, and universal good which is the end of all goods. But universal good which is the end, that has no contrary evil: and therefore nothing opposes it. But there is particular good, which is the form of good in act or habit. But the habit of special virtue is not good substantially, but rather insofar as it joins to the end. So also the habit of vice is not substantially evil, but insofar as it deprives of the end, which is universal good. Therefore privation sustained in act or habit fights against particular good: not as privation, but rather as contrary act or habit: and therefore it fights only by the forces of good: because that insofar as it is, is good: and insofar as it is, is contrary, although privation follows passively: and then to fight against good is to fail good: and this happens by depriving it: and thus every privation fights against habit. But from this it does not follow that thus fighting is actually a being: but that which fights in the first way is actually a being: because thus it is not only privative, but also contrary, having a contrary form to the habit and act of particular good.

To the other it must be said in the same way, that if to corrupt sounds like acting with contrary forces to destitution, then evil and good are improperly taken for their subjects in acts and habits: and thus each is actually a being. But if to corrupt is taken for failing from the destitution of the end, then it is not necessary that the corrupting is actually a being: just as neither is death actually a being, although it corrupts and deprives life.

To the other it must be said that evil is first in act: but act is not the reason of evil, but rather the subject: because insofar as it is, it is good, as will be evident in the following distinction.

To the other it must be said that a stain is said in two ways, namely for the habit of vice, and for the defect of that which ought to be present. In the first way, the stain is not evil as per se, but as the subject of evil: because that habit insofar as it is, is not evil, but insofar as it

deprives of good from the lack of the end. In the second way, it is a defect absolutely positing nothing of being, but the disgrace is from the defect of that which ought to be present: as the blind is said to have a stain, not because of the privation of something, but because of the privation of that which ought to be present.

To the other it must be said that the soul is not said to be indifferent from the same from which it is said to be evil: because indifference does not signify the privation of the end, but rather signifies non-conjunction with the end: but evil signifies the corruption and privation of the end.

To the other it must be said that that is a vile objection having little reason. For when it is said, evil is nothing, it is understood not to posit any being, which nevertheless ought to be present. But when it is said, men are punished for evil, it is understood for the privation of the habit of good, which ought to be present. And from this it does not follow that they are punished for nothing, but for something, that is, for the good which ought to be present, and is not present. And therefore for the same men are punished and rewarded, but for the good which they have done and have, they are rewarded: and for the good which they have not done nor have, they are punished. And to speak more openly, when it is said, evil, two things are said - one namely which is the reason of evil, and the other which it leaves in the subject: and when it is said, evil is nothing, the being of evil is denied according to the reason of evil. But when it is said, men are punished for evil, evil signifies the cause of penalty or punishment according to that which it leaves in the subject which is the lack of habit. And from this it does not follow that they are punished for nothing, since it is taken in different ways in the premises, for the sake of the different things it signifies. But it follows: therefore they are punished for the habit which they ought to have, since they have nothing.

Articulus 2 — Whether Evil Has An Efficient Cause Or A Deficient Cause

Whether evil has an efficient or deficient cause?

Secondly, it is asked, whether it has an efficient or deficient cause?

However, it seems that it has a deficient cause: because
1. As Augustine says, efficient causes of evil ought not to be sought, but deficient ones.

1. Likewise, evil (as has already been held) is privation. However, privation does not have an efficient cause, but a deficient one; therefore, evil similarly.
2. Likewise, an efficient cause does not effect except in two ways, namely by influencing the form.

its own, or by eliciting its form from that in which it acts. For example, fire influences its own form in the combustible, and the sun elicits the form of liquefaction in the earth, which is not proper to the sun: therefore, if evil has an efficient cause, it must have a form in one of those ways. However, whatever has a form, is itself absolutely: therefore evil is absolutely. But this is false, as has been proven: therefore evil does not have an efficient cause, as it seems.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY 1. Everything that is, is either the first cause or caused by the first cause: evil is in act and habit: therefore it is either the first cause or caused by the first cause. However, it is not the first cause: therefore it is caused by some efficient cause.

1. Likewise, a whitener is the efficient cause of white: therefore also an evildoer is the efficient cause of evil: therefore evil has an efficient cause.
2. Likewise, whatever is in the potentiality of something, before it exists, it is necessary that it is in it, as in the potentiality of an efficient or material cause: however, evil is in the potentiality of free will before it comes to be: therefore it is in it as in matter, or in the efficient cause: however, not as in matter: therefore as in the efficient cause: therefore it has an efficient cause.

Solution. To all these it is easy to solve, if what has been previously considered in the preceding problem is held. For if evil is taken materially, that is, what is evil, then evil will be in act and habit. However, that act is considered in two ways, namely in comparison to the object, which is a changeable good: and in the same way, the habit can be considered inasmuch as it inclines towards it: and thus evil is voluntary and intended and caused, and has an efficient cause, as will be proven in the following distinction. However, if evil is considered in that which is evil, or the act or habit inasmuch as it is compared to the formal privation of good: thus evil is not voluntary, and not intended, and not productive, but sluggish, as Dionysius says, and not caused by any efficient cause: but it is a defect arising from the will deflected from changeable good, and thus proceeding into act.

And all this is to be proven in the following distinction, in which it will be asked, Whether every act is from God? According to the first intention of evil, the reasons proceed secondly induced: and according to the second intention of the same, the reasons proceed firstly induced.

Whence the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 3 — How Evil Proceeds From An Efficient Or Deficient Cause

How does evil proceed from an efficient or deficient cause?

Thirdly, it is asked, How does evil proceed from an efficient or deficient cause?

It seems, however, that it is not caused by a deficient cause: because 1. The deficient rather falls from the power of causality than itself is a cause: if therefore the will in that which is deficient is a cause, it rather falls from the power of causing than that it causes something.

1. Likewise, Evil (as has been held) is not in a subject except in the soul, or habit, or act: but as it is in the soul, thus it is caused by an evil act: therefore an evil act is caused by the soul: but nothing deficient acts; therefore an evil act is not caused by a deficient will, but rather by an acting and potent one.
2. Likewise, There is no evil unless there is a conversion to a changeable good by way of enjoying: but to be able to convert, to be able is, and similarly to be able to enjoy a

changeable good, to be able is: therefore the cause of sin consists in the potent and acting, and not in the deficient.

Defect (as has been held above) is never from the efficient, because the efficient effects being according to some species, and this is not defect or privation, but Augustine says, and it is placed in the following distinction, that the whole nature of evil is taken from privation of species: therefore it is not caused by free will or will, according to which it is efficient, but according to which it is deficient.

Solution. It must be said to this, that evil is from a deficient will, whether it is taken materially or formally. For if it is taken materially: then it is an act upon an object lacking the form of good from the privation of the end. But if it is taken formally: then it denotes the privation of the reason of good. But if evil were to denote an act in comparison to the object only, then it would be true that it would be from an efficient cause: but this it does not denote according to any sense. And so that it may be more fully understood, let us set forth two examples, one of which is from Augustine, the other is taken from the Philosophers. Augustine's example indeed is, that the walking power is considered perfect and whole, situated in a member in which the leg is turned, and it is considered in the leg itself joined to the thigh or to the knee a bent shin, and the act of walking is considered: for the act of walking is reduced to the walking power as moving and not deficient, but to the shin as deficient in the reception of straight motion from the walking power: and therefore that which is of walking, the whole flows from the walking power, but the reason of limping and defect from the straight falls beyond the intention of the walking power from the curvature of the shin, which curvature is also nothing other than weakness and defect of straightness in the instrument of walking. Let us say therefore, that the walking power in moving is like the divine power generally moving the will and nature: but the will in itself is like an instrument able to fail from the convertibility of nature: the will however turned to a changeable good by consent, is like a deficient and bent instrument, because the direct intention tends upwards, as it is said in the Canticles, 1, 3: The upright love you, where Ambrose says, that to love earthly things is the curvature of the soul. Therefore when the cause of evil is asked, either the cause of evil in potency is asked, or the cause of evil in act. If the cause of evil in potency: then I say, that it is the will able to fail from the convertibility of nature and choice. If the cause of evil in act: I say that it is the will deficient from the first good by deficient conversion to a changeable good so that whatever is the motion of the interior or exterior, proceeds from the moving power of God: but the defect of good falls from the moved will, which is deflected from the order of the first moving power to the end of good, by this that it is converted to that which is under itself or ought to be. Another example is of the informative power in the seed, to which the substance of the seed does not obey: for there a monster is generated, not from the defect of the informative power, but because the substance of the seed fails from the mobility which it receives from the informing power: but the defect from the perfection of form is the defect of the mobility of the seed, from this that it is joined to contrary dispositions. And these two examples almost solve the whole difficulty of this and the following distinction.

Therefore it must be said to the first, that evil has a deficient cause, so that causality is turned back to that evil which is material and being, but defect to the privation of good which causes the reason of evil.

To the other it must be said, that the act is being, and is caused by the will as it is moved by the power of the first mover: but the defect falling around the act is caused by the actual defect of the will, which defect is a deflection from the order of the divine power's motion to the end of good. For from this is caused the privation of the end and good: because if it were moved as God moves, then it would attain the end. What that egress and defect is, will be clear below in the same problem.

To the other it must be said, that conversion to a changeable good is not evil, as Augustine says in the book On Free Will, just as neither is the changeable good itself evil, nor is the fruit of the changeable good evil: but conversion turning away has the reason of evil, and the fruit excluding that which is to be enjoyed is evil: and therefore it is clear, that evil falls by the exclusion of the highest good, because it is impossible for there to be two ends not ordered to each other of one will: and therefore if it is converted to a changeable good as to an end, the incommutable good is necessarily excluded: and this exclusion of the changeable good's defect is in the will, and is the whole reason of evil. And therefore this is of impotence and of the second cause deficient from the order of that motion, by which they are moved by the first cause.

And by this the solution to the whole is clear: because to that which is contrary, we well concede.

Articulus 4 — Whether The Cause And Origin Of The First Sin Was A Good Thing

Whether the cause and origin of the first sin was a good thing?

Then it is inquired concerning what is said in the Text, chapter B: The cause and origin of the first sin is a good thing, etc.

For this seems false: because
1. Matthew 7:18 says: A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruits, etc. Therefore, the root of the first evil is evil and not good, as it seems.

1. Likewise, it has been held that evil is from a deficient cause: but a deficient cause is only from a good: therefore, it is from a deficiency of good: but a deficiency of good is evil: therefore, the first evil is from an evil, as it seems.
2. Likewise, that defect from which evil arises is either punishment or fault: not punishment, as it seems: therefore, fault: therefore, fault precedes the first fault: for it cannot be said that it is punishment, because punishment is not before the first fault, but after it according to the order of divine justice.
3. Likewise, when it is said, the first evil, it is understood concerning the interior will, which is the act of the instrumental will: but this evil proceeds from the will, which is

the instrument: either therefore insofar as the will is moved by God, or insofar as the will is changeable. And in whatever way it is said, it follows that evil is always from the will: because it is never without any of those, which is false: therefore, it seems that it is not from it except insofar as it is evil.

1. Likewise, it has been held that the will actually deficient from good is the first cause of evil: therefore, either that defect is the same as the caused evil, or different. If the same: then the same is the cause and the caused, which cannot be. If different: then it inevitably follows that the first evil is from another evil: because the defect of the will from the first good is evil. But if this is conceded, it is necessary that this goes on to infinity, or there is something supremely evil, which causes all evils, as the Manicheans say. For if before the first evil in act there is evil, it is asked concerning that evil, whether it is the cause or the caused? If the cause: then it will be evil per se: and thus the Manichean speaks truly. If the caused: then it is asked concerning its cause, whether it is good or evil? And it seems that it is evil: because contrary things have contrary causes. Therefore, if the cause of good is good, the cause of evil will be evil: and then it is asked concerning that evil: and it goes on to infinity: or it is necessary that the cause of evil is good: and this seems impossible.

Solution. It must be said that the cause of the first evil of the interior act is a good thing by the goodness of nature, but not by the goodness of an end ordered to grace and virtue: and this thing is the will created from nothing, changeable according to choice to diverse willed things, which are changeable good and unchangeable good, according to what it has chosen.

To the first, therefore, it must be said (as the Master says in the Text) that the Lord speaks there of the actual evil interior will, and calls the fruit the exterior work.

To the other, it must be said that a deficient cause in potentiality is evil, but good by the goodness of nature: but a deficient cause in act is evil: but the defect in act is the same defect which is of the interior will according to act: and therefore one evil does not precede another, because both are one.

To the other, it must be said that that defect is fault, and it is in the act of the interior will: because the substance of that act consists in illicit conversion to a changeable good: and this conversion under such a notion indicates such a defect: but the changeability of the power itself is neither punishment nor fault, but nature which follows it insofar as it is from nothing.

To the other, it must be said that none of those modes is necessary: because evil does not have a necessary cause, but is from the will having the freedom of converting itself and averting: and therefore sometimes it sins, and sometimes it does not sin. And what is objected, that contrary things have contrary causes, does not hold in rational causes, but only in agents acting by necessity of nature.

To the other, it must be said that that defect is the same, because the will actually does not fail except in the act of willing and undue conversion. Nor does it follow, however, that it is

not the cause of evil: because it is the deficient cause of evil, that is, from which evil has its notion: and that is conjoined with evil, but it is not efficient, but rather the will is efficient according to itself, and the whole effect is evil according to nature and notion, although not in the same way, as has been said. Hence that defect does not precede evil except by nature, as the notion of something precedes that of which it is the notion, although according to being it is the same.

Articulus 5 — Whether Evil Is In A Good Thing Or A Bad Thing

Whether evil is in a good thing, or a bad thing?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, D, Having shown the origin of evil, etc.

For it seems impossible to say this in three ways.

For in this which he says, that good is the subject of evil: because according to this, the opposite is the subject of the opposite, which can in no way be: because

1. The Philosopher says that the subject of neither of the opposites is the opposite. If you say that good and evil are not contraries, but opposites, like privation and habit: then it is even more impossible: for a deprived habit is in no way the substrate of the privation which deprives it: therefore good is not the subject of evil.
2. Likewise, Good and evil are opposed: therefore either the whole evil is opposed to the whole good, or to a part of the good. If to the whole good: therefore nothing of the good remains with that which is subjected to evil. If to a part of the good: therefore since nothing is good unless it is opposed to evil, not the whole good is good, but only that part which is opposed to evil, which is false: therefore nothing remains of the good which is subjected to evil, as it seems.
3. Likewise, Nothing is the subject of something unless it is naturally disposed to receive it: good is the subject of evil: therefore it is naturally disposed to receive it. Let it receive, therefore: then good will be evil, and the opposite will be proved from the opposite, which according to every kind of opposites is impossible, although it is said in the Letter Z, and conceded.

According to what he says, it is that evil takes away good: and this also seems impossible: because since good is finite, there can be so many evils that they would consume the whole good: and what has nothing of good is non-being: therefore evils can be multiplied in something so that it would become non-being. If you say that good has the property of the continuous which is divisible into infinity: and the first evil takes away some part of the good, and the second does not take away as much, but some part of the remainder, and so on to infinity. And then the question is, What is the reason, since the second evil finds the good weaker than the first, yet the second takes away less from the quantity than the first? And no reason can be found, even by one willing to feign.

Moreover, In the Letter it is not solved thus by Augustine: but that this happens because the good itself is natural. And then the question is the reason for this, How is it that good is not finished because it is natural?

The third thing he says is that in these contraries the rule of the Dialecticians fails: and it seems Augustine read the rules of the Dialecticians poorly: because good and evil are not contraries according to him, but opposites, like privation and habit.

Moreover, Even if it is granted that they are opposed as privation and habit, still it can in no way be held that evil is in the same good which it deprives: because no intellect grasps this: because the deprived is not: but the subject of privation and evil is simply. Therefore Augustine seems to say this poorly.

Solution. It must be said to this that there is a threefold evil, and a threefold good: and because good is said as a habit from which privation is known, good must first be distinguished: and from that the distinction of evil is obtained. Therefore, good is said to be grace, and good which is substantially converted with being, and the middle good which is the ordainability of rational nature to grace. The first good is in grace and the virtue making pleasing. The second follows every nature insofar as it is nature. The third, however, is especially of the nature which is capable of grace: because that capacity has a natural relation by which it is ordered to grace: and this is called by the Doctors and Saints the natural good divisible by sin. Hence that middle good between grace and nature is considered in two ways, as every middle, namely on the part of the substance in which it is rooted, and on the part of the end which it attains, namely grace. I say therefore that evil is also said in three ways according to Dionysius: because the evil of nature is against the nature of that thing of which it is the nature: and the evil of fault is against grace: and the evil of reason or soul is against the natural good, which is the natural ordainability to grace.

I say therefore to the first of those three objections, that the evil of fault of which he speaks here is opposed to the whole good of grace, and therefore it wholly deprives it, so that nothing remains of it with evil: but the same evil of fault is in no way opposed to the substantial good which is converted with any being insofar as it is, and therefore in no way deprives or takes it away: but it is opposed to the middle good in that part in which it relates to grace, and not in that in which it relates to the substance in which it is rooted: and therefore in that part in which it is opposed to it, it deprives it, and is not preserved with it: but in the other part in which it is not opposed to it, it becomes its subject, as a subject can have privation, because from that part it is left by privation: and therefore it happens that the middle follows the nature of the extremes: and therefore in that part in which it attains grace to which the evil of fault is opposed, evil is opposed to it, and in that part in which it is rooted in the substance to which it is not opposed, it is left by evil, as a subject by privation. Therefore it must be said to the first that it is not according to the same reason that it is subject and opposite, as is clear from what has been said.

To the other it must be said that evil is opposed to the whole good of grace, and therefore it deprives it, but to no part of the substantial good, and therefore it deprives nothing of this:

but it is opposed to the middle good according to something, and in this respect it deprives: and according to something it is not opposed, and therefore in this respect it does not deprive.

To the other it must be said that in the Letter it is conceded that evil is good: but it is not the same predicate and opposite: because the good which is opposed to evil is the good of grace or nature, which is the middle from that part in which it attains the good of grace. But what is predicated of evil is the good which is converted with being, or the middle good according to that which is rooted in the rational substance: and therefore there is no opposition according to the thing, but according to the name alone.

To what is objected secondly, it must be said that that solution is feigned, and well disproved: but the cause is what Augustine posits in the Letter: namely that from that part from which it is rooted in the substance, it is natural as the substance: and therefore since evil is not opposed nor deprives from that part, it is infinitely related to good: and therefore although it is always removed, yet it is not taken away that the potency of good remains through the help of grace: but if it were infinitely related to the good of grace, then the objection would proceed.

To what is objected thirdly, it must be said that contraries are said in two ways, namely properly, and broadly. Properly taking contraries, thus they are forms contrary ordered to one subject: and thus each of the contraries is a being in a perfect species: and in this way evil and good are not contraries. Broadly, however, they are contraries which are principles of contrary acts and habits: and in this way complete good and evil are contraries: because a complete will is the cause of a good act through the form of grace and virtue, and a diminished will which is subject to sin cannot of itself, but can in the act of vice and habit of virtue. And in this way Augustine takes contraries here, and in this respect he speaks truly: and therefore the rule of the Dialecticians does not simply fail here: and therefore some gloss that it does not fail, but seems to fail: and it is not Augustine's opinion according to the thing, but which makes one seek the true understanding of the rule.

DISTINCTIO XXXV

Divisio Textus

After these things, it must be seen what sin is, etc. Here he begins to discuss sin. And it is divided into three parts: in the first of which he touches on what sin is definitively and really. In the second, however, he determines whether sin has the nature of punishment or not, in distinction XXXVI, there, A, It must be known, etc. In the third, he inquires whether the acts of sins are from God or not, in distinction XXXVII, there, A, There are also many others, etc.

The present reading, however, contains four arts: in the first of which the Master gives three definitions of sin. In the second, he presents the reasons for different opinions on what sin is according to reality and substance, there, B, Therefore of diversity. In the third, he

touches on the reasons of those who say every sin, insofar as it is, is from God, and he objects against them and resolves, there, D, Some. In the fourth, however, he diligently inquires, Since sin is the corruption of good, whether it corrupts good insofar as it is, or insofar as it is an act, or insofar as it is sin, there, K, It can also be asked by the same, Since sin, etc.

And through this the sentence is clear.

Articulus 1 — Whether Sin Is Definable, And Whether Mortal And Actual Sin Can Be Defined By One Definition

Whether sin is definable? and,
Whether mortal and actual can be defined by one definition?

Whether sin is definable? and,
Whether mortal and actual can be defined by one definition?

A threefold doubt arises according to the Letter, namely, whether sin is definable?

And, whether the reasons which the Master touches upon are applicable to every sin?

And thirdly, concerning the definitions which he posits.

To the FIRST, it is proceeded thus:
For it seems that sin is not definable.

1. For whatever, according to the common name assigned to it, is not reducible to any one proximate genus of cause, cannot be defined by any cause: sin is of this sort: therefore, it cannot be defined by any genus of cause. The first is evident from this, that every definition is given through some cause. The second is proven by this, that sins have no form, but rather a privation of form, just as species.
2. Similarly, since it has no matter except that around which, and that is not of one reason in sins, they cannot be defined by it: nor by the efficient cause, because there is no efficient cause of sin, but a deficient one: nor by the end, because every sin is sin because it deprives of the end: therefore, in no way does sin seem definable.
3. Likewise, whatever is definable, with this definition posited, constitutes something and is perfect in the order of the universe: but sin is none of these: therefore, sin is not definable at least by a positive definition. The first is proven by this, that all parts of a positive definition constitute something in the defined. The second by this, that although sin is ordered, yet that order is in another, and not in sin, and it is an extrinsic order by which someone uses evil well for another: because sin deprives of the substantial and intrinsic order of a thing, as was said before the end of the first book of the Sentences, in the question concerning the order of evil.
4. If you say that sin, like evil, is a privation, and can be defined as a privation. Against this is that at least it is not definable by a positive and affirmative definition, as the Master here defines.

On the contrary, however, is what is held in the Letter.

Furthermore, every sin, as the Master will say below, has an act concerning a determined object: such an act is definable by the object: therefore, sin is definable.

Solution. It must be said that mortal and actual sin, as the Master says, can be defined by one common definition. Whether every sin can be defined by one definition will be clear in the following problem.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that by the efficient cause and matter, actual and mortal sin can be positively defined: for although it has a deficient cause in comparison to the form of circumstances and the end of good, inasmuch as it is sin, yet it has a cause operating from intention, inasmuch as the act is compared to the object: and how this is, was explained above in the preceding distinction.

To what is objected concerning matter, that it is not of one reason, it must be said that matter is considered in two ways, namely in itself as it is a certain thing, and thus it is true that it is not of one reason. It is also considered as it is bent to the will, and thus it takes on the reason of the end of the will and of the willed or desired. Through these two causes, although the act of sin is defined, yet sin is not sufficiently defined unless something is posited in the definition that implies the privation of the end and the corruption of circumstances, as is evident in the definitions posited in the Letter.

To the other, it must be said that in sin it is necessary to posit something implying defect, such as disobedience to commands, or being against the law of God, or what justice forbids, or the like: and for this reason it falls into the reason of the perfect and good order of that which is substantial to the thing: but by reason of the act it can be defined, as has been held.

To the other, it must be said that although these words, against the law, or what justice forbids, are said positively, yet they signify privations, as has been held: and therefore the definitions given in the Letter have privations in them, in which the reason of sin is completed, although not the reason of the act.

Articulus 2 — Whether The Reasons Which The Master Touches Upon Agree To Every Sin, So That By Those Reasons Every Sin Is Defined

Whether the reasons which the Master touches upon are suitable to every sin, such that by those reasons every sin is defined?

Secondly, it is asked, Whether every sin is defined by those reasons which he sets forth in the Text?

However, it seems that it is so:

4. Whatever things divide something common are defined by one given reason according to

that common name which they divide: original, venial, and actual divide sin taken in common; therefore, the definition given in common concerning sin is suitable to them.

1. Likewise, the definition of the genus is applicable to the species: but the species of sin are original, venial, and mortal: therefore, the definition given concerning the genus is suitable to them.

2. Furthermore, every sin takes away good, as it is said in the Text: and similarly every sin is voluntary, even original, as Augustine says, and it has been held above in the Text: therefore, every sin agrees in the efficient and deficient cause: since therefore by those two causes it is chiefly defined, it seems that every sin can be defined in one common definition.

But against this is that
1. That which is the privation of good takes away in good the good of grace, and diminishes the good of nature: but venial does not take away the good of grace, nor does it even interrupt the good of nature, because as it has been held above, the good of nature is not diminished except according to the order in good: therefore, the corruption of good does not agree with venial.

1. Likewise, original is a necessary sin, as it has been held above: but that which is voluntary is not necessary: therefore, original does not agree with...

venial and mortal in the efficient cause: therefore it cannot be defined together with them by that.

Solution. It must be said that there is not one definition by which in common those kinds of sins, namely original, venial, and mortal, can be defined, as the last two arguments prove.

Therefore, it must be said to the first that this is true of those dividing a common genus: but original, venial, and mortal do not divide sin as species divide a genus, but as prior and posterior participants of it: just as potency and act divide being, for potency adds no positive difference to being, but adds to it a mode by which it is divided against act, against which being is not divided: but act divides by a constitutive difference, and therefore participates according to perfection. And so also when sin is divided by venial, mortal, and original, venial does not add anything over sin that is of the essence of sin, because the minimum in which the notion of sin is preserved is venial: but original adds something: but what it adds is not of the essence of sin, but rather contributes to the diminution of sin, for it adds a trait from nature and from necessity, and diminishes sin. Mortal, however, adds that which perfects the essence of sin, in the way that sin can be said to be perfected: and therefore it is clear that although these three divide sin, they do not participate in its essence in the same way.

To the other it must be said that they are not species of sin: because venial cannot be sin or evil unless because it disposes to sin by taking away not the good of grace or nature, but rather the good of fervor in the act of devotion or good work, or the good of rooting in the subject: and so it is clear that that argument does not proceed.

Articulus 3 — Whether The Definitions Of Sin Which The Master Posits In The Text Are Well Assigned

Whether the definitions of sin which the Master places in the Text are well assigned?

Thirdly, it is asked concerning the definitions placed in the Text, and first concerning this, that sin is a word, or deed, or desire against the law of God.

1. However, original sin is not a word or deed or desire against the law of God: therefore it is not sin, which is false.
2. Likewise, the sin of omission is not a deed: therefore it is not sin. And these two objections lie in the Text.
3. Likewise, venial sin is not against the law of God: because whatever is against the law of God is mortal sin: therefore venial sin is not sin, which is false.
4. Likewise, if there were no law of God, there would still be sin: therefore it is badly defined by being against the law of God.
5. Likewise, some things are evil because they are prohibited, like the eating from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil: but some things are prohibited because they are evil, and those are truly evil: therefore it is not the reason of sin that it is against the law of God, and rather the law prohibits it because it is sin: therefore sin is badly defined by being against the law of God.

It is objected, however, against the second definition of sin; because

1. There are some sins in which one does not wish to obtain or retain anything, but rather to destroy, such as hatred, anger, and envy: therefore sin is badly defined by those.
2. Likewise, particular sins are contrary to particular virtues: therefore not every sin is prohibited by justice, but also by other virtues.

It is objected, however, concerning the third which is of Ambrose, namely, Sin is the transgression of the divine law, and disobedience to heavenly commandments.

1. For sin is not a transgression unless a law is set, as the Apostle seems to want: but before the law was set, there was sin: therefore it is accidental to it that it is a transgression: and thus it is badly defined by transgression.
2. Likewise, not every virtue is obedience: therefore not every vice or sin is disobedience: therefore it is badly said to be disobedience to heavenly commandments.

There are moreover other definitions of sin, such as that of Augustine: Sin is an act arising from the defect of good.

And against this it is also objected:

For every sin is from a determined purpose: but a determined purpose is a determined cause: and what is from a determined cause does not arise: therefore sin does not arise: therefore sin is not an arising act.

Likewise, if it is said to arise from the defect of good, it is asked, From the defect of which good does it arise? If you say from the defect of uncreated good: then it seems that every act of nature is sin. The same follows if it arises from the defect of the good of grace. But if it is said to arise from the defect of the good end, it seems that every sin is indifferent, since it does not have an end, and yet it is done.

There are also other definitions of sin, such as that which Augustine places, that sin is to adhere to mutable things, with the immutable good despised.

Likewise, Augustine: Sin is to desire what Christ despised, or to flee what Christ endured.

Likewise, Augustine: Sin is the corruption of mode, species, and order. Likewise, Sin is the merit of punishment.

Therefore it is asked, By what is the difference of these definitions taken?

Likewise, since there is evil, fault, sin, stain, vice, and guilt, by what do these differ?

Solution. It must be said that, as the Master says in the Text, in these definitions only mortal sin is defined, which alone is simply sin.

However, those three definitions which are in the Text are taken according to a threefold consideration of sin, so that the first is taken according to the substance of sin by comparison to deformity, which, I say, the substance is subject to deformity: for it is a word or deed, etc. And deformity is implied by what is said, against the law of God.

The second, however, is taken by the efficient cause of sin by comparison to the reason of deformity: for the will is the cause of retaining or obtaining, etc., is of every sin. The prohibition of justice is the reason of deformity.

The third is taken according to the contrariety to the law regulating us in good life: for this is the divine law, and heavenly commandments.

The fourth definition of Augustine is given concerning sin, according to which it has the reason of evil, because thus it is not intention, but it arises, as was held above from the defect of good.

The fifth, however, is taken by the aversion from the highest good, and undue conversion to a changeable good. This namely, With the immutable good despised, etc., so that to despise is said generally for what is to not wish to adhere, and to adhere says the adhesion of fruition.

The sixth, however, is taken by the defect of the exemplar regulating us in life: for Christ gave us an example, that as he did, so also we should do.

The seventh is taken according to the effect of sin in the good of nature.

The eighth is taken by comparison of sin to guilt.

To that which is objected against the first, it must be said that here original is not defined according to the Master. Or otherwise it must be said that there is original originating, and this is actual sin: Adam, and of that the said definitions hold: and there is original originated, and this is considered in two ways, namely in itself, and thus the said definitions do not hold: and in its first cause, and thus it is a word or deed, not what is proper, but what is alien, because of the first parent. Thus also it was held above, that it is voluntary by a remote will, and not proximate.

To the other it must be said that according to the more probable opinion of the Doctors, there is no sin of omission which does not have some act, as is also said in the Text. For to omit that about which there is never thought, nor will, is pure privation, and does not say something which is from us. Hence omission is done in two ways, namely when in the time of omission the will is of the contrary, as in the time of necessity not helping the miserable, one does not wish to help, and to will not to help says an act of will, and for the sake of this it is made a desired sin against the law of God. Although this opinion is more celebrated, yet there are others who say that word is taken commonly and deed, etc., to word and not word according to the law, and to deed and not deed according to the law. The second way is when before the time of fulfilling the command one wills something, which cannot stand with the fulfillment of the command: as he who is bound to rise for Matins, before the time of rising wills to intoxicate himself or to watch excessively disorderly, with which will the fulfillment of the duty, namely that he rises for Matins, cannot be.

If, however, it is asked about this, Why is it called omission, since every sin according to this is some omission? It must be said that it is therefore called omission, because it omits the act which is in the precept, although by another act it commits.

To the other it must be said that venial is not sin simply: because sin is predicated by prior and posterior of venial and mortal, as was held before: but venial is properly beside the law, and a disposition to that which is contrary to the law, and thus indirectly against the law of God.

To the other it must be said that the law of God is taken commonly to the interior and exterior law: and just as the straight is before the curved, because it is the judge of itself and the oblique, because by the straight we know it, as the Philosopher says, and the oblique: so the law of God thus commonly taken, is according to reason before the judgment of every curved act, and thus according to reason before sin: and every sin is sin by this that it disagrees from it, and in this way it is understood what is placed in the three definitions: and thus it is plain that every evil is evil by this that it is against the law of God thus taken, since the reason of malice is discordance to the rectitude of the law.

And in this way those objections cease which are made about this, that some things are prohibited because they are evil: and some are evil because they are prohibited.

To that which is objected about the second definition, it must be said that all those placed, as will be clear in the following definition, proceed from the will of obtaining something: and

thus they destroy the alien, so that they may obtain or retain their own: and thus of those also the definition holds.

To the other it must be said that justice is said here generally for the whole order of rectitude which is contained in the natural and written law, and it is not placed for a special virtue, nor even is it placed for the general virtue which is called general justice, but rather for the rule of life contained in the natural and written law.

To that which is objected about the third, it must be said that law is taken commonly, as was held, and thus to be a transgression is not sin, but is rather the reason of sin: and therefore it is well defined by transgression.

To the other it must be said that obedience is taken in two ways, namely for a special virtue, and this is the will of fulfilling the command, because it is a command, and of that obedience and disobedience the objection holds. Otherwise obedience is said generally the fulfillment of that which is commanded, not because it is commanded, and thus every virtue fulfills the command and falls under obedience in the general sense, and to this is opposed disobedience generally taken which is every sin: and this is nothing other than the non-fulfillment of the command which is done in every sin, and thus it is taken in the definition of Ambrose.

To that which is objected about the fourth, it must be said that that definition is given of sin according to the reason of evil, and of that it was proved above, that it is not by will or purpose, nor does it have a cause, but rather it arises from the defect of the first good, from which it is deflected in the act of sin, according to which sin has a deficient cause, as was shown above.

And that which is objected is of no value: because nature is not deflected deflectibly from the first good, although by the act of will it is not always converted: for to be deflected is to go out from the order which is the principle of the first mover continuously to the end, which is the same as the first, as was said above.

By this the solution concerning the arising is clear.

The remaining definitions are explained at the beginning of the reading of this problem.

To the last it must be said that sin more regards the act, evil however the deformity, and fault the contrariety to grace, stain however the infection of the image, vice however the depravity of the natural, and guilt says the obligation to punishment.

Articulus 4 — Whether Only An Evil Will Is Sin And Not Exterior Acts, Or Will And Exterior Acts Together, And Whether It Should Be Said That All Acts Are Good And Have God As Author

Whether an evil will alone is sin and not external acts, or will and external acts together? And, whether it should be said that all acts are good and from God as author?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, B, "Wherefore of this diversity," etc.

For it is asked, What is the reason for the diversity of these opinions?

And to this it must be said that the first opinion determines concerning sin according to the cause of sin: and because this is the first actual interior will, therefore it said that will alone is sin.

But the second considered sin or evil according to the nature of the subject, and on the part of the act: and because malice is founded both in the interior act and the exterior, therefore they said that both interior acts and exterior acts are sin.

But the third opinion considered evil according to the nature of evil or sin: and because that entirely consists in privation, therefore they say that sin is altogether nothing.

Articulus 5 — Whether Evil Altogether Can Consume Natural Good

Can an evil man entirely consume natural good?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said, there, B, around the beginning: "But nothing is evil," as Augustine says on John, etc.

For the sake of this, two things remain to be inquired about evil, namely,

Whether it can entirely consume natural good?

And, Whether evil is diminishable in that which is evil?

TO THE FIRST, the procedure is as follows:

1. Everything that is consumed according to a part proportionate to the whole, if the consuming thing is multiplied, will be consumed in whole: natural good is consumed by evil: if therefore evil is multiplied, natural good will be consumed in whole.
2. Likewise, in Jeremiah 2:16, it is read: "The children of Memphis and Tahpanhes have broken your crown": but the crown is the highest point: therefore they have led to the height of evil: but the height of evil has nothing of good: therefore natural good can be consumed in whole.

To this, some of the ancients wished to say that natural good is diminished, just as a continuum is divided: for if a continuum is divided according to parts proportionate to the whole, the division stands and the continuum is finished, as the Philosopher says. But if it is divided according to parts having the nature of the whole, since the continuum is always divisible, the division will never stand, because none of the divisions divides the form of the continuum from the matter of the continuum. Thus they say that the first sin takes away some part of natural good, and the second not as much by equality, but divides from the remainder some part, as the first, and divides the remainder in the nature of the whole. Hence if the first diminishes by a hundredth, the second diminishes by a hundredth of the remainder, and so on.

But against this it is objected:

1. Since in the second sin natural good is perhaps less strong to resist than in the first, and the second sin is equal to the first, then an agent acting equally on a less strong thing acts less, and on a more strong thing acts more, which is against reason.
2. Likewise, let us suppose that the second, and third, and so on sins are greater than the first: either therefore they take away more in quantity from natural good, or less. If more: then necessarily natural good would be finished, which Augustine denies can happen. If less: then a stronger agent in a weaker resistant does less than a weaker agent in a stronger resistant, which again is against reason.

Solution. According to what has been said above, it must be said that natural good is never finished: and yet I well concede that a greater sin takes away more, and a lesser takes away less: and the cause of this was touched upon above, because on that part where it is the subject, it is not contrary. But on the other part where it relates to act and to good, it is corrupted by evil, and is contrary to it: but on that part, the potentiality is infinite, although it is finite according to being, as was said above: and I well concede that no solution is posited in opposing. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 6 — Whether Malice Is Diminishable And Intensifiable

Whether malice is diminishable and intensifiable?

Whether malice is diminishable and intensifiable?

Secondly, it is asked, Whether malice is diminishable?

It seems that it is so: because one is said to be less good than another: therefore, by similarity, one is said to be less evil than another: therefore malice is diminishable.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
1. The opposite of malice is grace: and this is not diminishable: therefore neither is malice.

1. Likewise, Malice has no contrary except grace: and this does not diminish it, but removes it entirely: therefore it is not diminishable.
2. Likewise, Malice is a privation: and privations are neither increased nor diminished: therefore neither is malice.

Solution. Malice is taken in two ways, namely according to the subject in which it is substantiated: and this is an act, or habit, or disposition left from a habit: and from that part it can be intensified, and not diminished: and this is because it is in us to commit sin, and to induce an evil habit, but it is not in us to remove it from the soul, or to diminish it when it is induced, but it is removed by grace and not diminished: however, the remnants can grow and decrease. It can also be considered from the part of deformity which is a privation, and thus it is neither diminished nor increased: and as to the first, the first objection proceeds, and the two

objections secondly made proceed. The last, however, proceeds according to the second consideration of malice.

And therefore the solution to the whole is clear through this.

Articulus 7 — Whether Every Act Is From God, Both Good And Evil

Whether every act is from God, both good and evil?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, D, Some, however, diligently attending, etc.

And this is a famous question, Whether every act is from God? And although the other part pertains to distinction XXXVII, yet so that it may be better elucidated, both parts will be disputed here.

It is proposed for this opinion thus:
1. Giving alms can be done well or badly in itself: therefore it is indifferent, or good in kind. But everything that is good, whether in kind or otherwise, is from God. Therefore, let this circumstance be added which is giving alms for vain glory: then it is a sin: therefore if then the act is not from God, the same act in number can be from God, and can not be from God, which is impossible.

1. Likewise, Matter is one in number under privation and form: therefore that which is the cause of it according to the substance by which it underlies the form, is also the cause of it according to the same substance by which it underlies privation: but the act to the form of good and privation, relates as the substance of matter to form and privation: therefore that which is the cause of the act when it underlies the form of good, is also the cause of the act when it underlies privation and malice: therefore every act is from one cause which is God.
2. Likewise, The same act can be done well and badly: if therefore when it is done badly, it is substantially acted by another principle than God: and when it is done well, it is substantially acted by God: therefore the same by substance is substantially acted by God, and is not acted by God, which is impossible.
3. Likewise, Good and evil action agree in the kind of action: therefore it is necessary that they agree in some one thing which causes that action: but this is none other than God: therefore every good and evil action is from God.
4. Likewise, Dionysius wishes that evil is only in good: if therefore there is evil in action, the action will necessarily be good: but every good is from God: therefore the action which underlies malice in sin, is from God.
5. Likewise, Whatever is the cause of the cause, is the cause of the caused: but God is the cause of free will or the will: but the will is the cause of evil action: therefore God is the cause of the action which is evil.

6. Likewise, Every one effect which is commonly found in diverse things, is necessarily reduced to one kind of cause of those diverse things, because one is not caused except by one: but entity is an effect found in good and evil action and many others, and is one effect; therefore it is necessary that it be reduced to one cause with respect to all those in which it is found. But it is evident that in others it is reduced to the first being, as to a cause: therefore also in these it is reduced to the same cause.

7. Likewise, It is evident that the will is the cause of evil action: therefore let the action itself be considered according to substance, namely the conversion of the will to a changeable good: this action thus considered, either proceeds from the will according to which it is a deficient cause, or according to which it is an efficient cause. But it is evident that not according to which it is a deficient cause, because thus nothing except deficient proceeds. Therefore either the will itself is the first cause of this act which has being through the substance of the act terminated to the matter of changeable good: or it is the substantial cause of sin, with the first moving it. If in the first way: therefore the will would be the first cause of some being: because the first is, before which there is nothing else, and this is heretical. But if in the second way: since before the will in the order of cause there is nothing except the first cause, that act according to substance proceeds from the first cause, and thus again it returns, that every action is from God.

8. Likewise, Let it be granted that that will is the cause of the act. Therefore since it does not make it from matter, it is necessary that it brings it forth from nothing: therefore the will is able to create something, which is absurd.

9. Likewise, By examples previously introduced concerning evil, the same is proven: for although sin sometimes falls on the part from the iniquity of matter, yet whatever form is induced in a monster, the whole flows from the informative power: therefore similarly although the defect of malice falls in the act of the will, yet whatever entity it has, the whole is from the first cause moving all. The same is proven by the motion of the sun, which moves natural powers, around whose works multiple defects occur: and yet whatever is there of information, the whole is from the power of the sun not erring.

10. Likewise, Concerning limping: for whatever is there of walking, the whole is from the power moving the shin without error: but the deviation from the straight, is caused by the curvature of the shin, which is nothing, just as the curvature of the shin is not something: therefore similarly thus it is in God moving free will in the act of evil.

11. Likewise, This is taken from the words of Anselm. For he says that it is audacity to say something is a being which is not from the first being. Therefore it seems that the other opinion is presumption, or heresy.

12. Likewise, Anselm in the book on Foreknowledge and Free Will: Every quality and every action and whatever has essence, is from God, from whom is all justice, and no injustice. Therefore he makes all things which are done by just or unjust will, that is, good works and evil. Indeed in good things he makes that they are, and that they are good: but in

evil things he makes that they are, but not that they are evil. Therefore evil action in what it has of being, is from God.

13. Likewise, Anselm, in the same place, Also the willing itself which is sometimes just, sometimes unjust, is nothing other than using the power of willing and the will, which God gives, inasmuch as it is, it is good, and is from God: which then indeed, when rightly it is good and just: but when not rightly, this alone because it is not rightly, it is evil and unjust. This is taken, that evil is nothing but privation: and the substance of the act in what it is, is good and from God. It is also taken from the act of Caiaphas who in truth with evil intention was exercised, and yet is said to have prophesied by the Holy Spirit: and this could not be, unless the action were from God.

But it is objected against for the other part: because
1. On that of the Apostle to the Romans, iii, 5: But if our iniquity commends the justice of God, Fulgentius says, God is the avenger of that thing of which he is not the author. But this thing is nothing other than evil action: therefore evil action is not from God.

1. Likewise, On that of Paul, I to the Corinthians, viii, 4: An idol is nothing in the world, the Gloss says that God created the matter, but the foolishness of men gave the form. If therefore the form of the idol can be from man without God, also evil action can be from man without God.
2. Likewise, Whatever God does, he wills to be done: but God makes the act of fornication: therefore he wills the act of fornication to be done: which is absurd, because he does not punish anyone for doing what he wills, but rather rewards him.
3. Likewise, Whatever God does, is good: but he makes the act of fornication: therefore it is good: which is absurd and heretical, as it seems: since Augustine says, that the act of fornication cannot be done well.
4. Likewise, He does good who moves the power to good: if therefore he also moves the power in evil act, he equally operates good and evil: therefore one will not be rewarded, and the other condemned.
5. Likewise, The one aiding in theft and supplying strength, and he who steals, are blameworthy: but cooperating and containing powers and moving them, is aiding in evil since it is evil. Therefore since God thus operates, it will seem to someone that he is equally made blameworthy as the one doing evil, which is absurd.
6. Likewise, An act is not caused except as it is in act, and not as it is in kind or in intellect: but in act it is only as it is subjected to malice therefore it is not caused by anything except as it is subjected to malice. If therefore it is caused by God, it will be caused as it is subjected to malice: but this is false: therefore evil act is not from God.

Sorvutio. The ancients concerning this question, as is clear in the Letter, opined in two ways. For some said that the will by itself suffices for an evil act, but not for a good or indifferent act. And they said that from this it does not follow that there are two principles:

because the will by itself performs an evil act, yet it is not from itself. However, in that which is the first principle, it is required that it be from itself, and act from itself. Their stronger reasoning was that an evil act is not performed except according to what it is: but existing in kind or without malice, it is only in potency and according to the intellect: therefore it is not performed in this way. However, an evil act is actually conjoined with malice: therefore it is performed according to what it is conjoined with malice: but in this way it is not performed by God: therefore an evil act is not from God. And this opinion prevailed among many of the ancients.

But because the moderns saw that it is more perfect to act than to be, they saw that what is not from itself, nor can remain in being from itself, much less can act from itself: and since an evil act according to conversion to matter is simply an act proceeding from a perfect active potency according to nature, therefore they concluded that it does not proceed from it except according to what it is moved by the first cause: otherwise it would follow that there are two principles: and this is the reason why the other opinion almost withdrew from the court, and by many of the moderns is considered heretical. Therefore, sustaining this opinion, it must be resolved to the objections in order.

To the first, it must be said that an evil act is referred to an efficient principle in two ways, namely concretely with malice, and thus it is referred only to the will which is the efficient and deficient principle, but further it is not referred to God: and thus it is not a thing, and in this way Fulgentius speaks. In another way, it is referred to the efficient principle according to what it has of being, and in this way it is referred to God as the efficient principle.

To another, it must be said that there is the form of art in an idol, and there is the form of opinion, which is only in the foolishness of men, like the form of the deity believed in Asclepius, and this is not in reality, like a chimera or tragelaphus: and this is not a thing, and of this the Gloss speaks: and therefore it does not follow that there is any thing which is not from God.

To another, it must be said that there is the will of the sign which is operation: and in this way God wills the act to be done, but not an evil act, as is clear from the aforesaid. There is also the will of good pleasure: and in this way God does not will an evil act to be done, nor does He will it not to be done, as is clear from the disputes on the end of the first.

To another, it must be said that whatever is actually good, is by the nature of the act, but it is not good by the goodness of morals, which is from the relation to the end.

But if it is objected that it is of the will to refer the act to an evil end, and to refer is to do something: and since that relation is not from God: therefore some act is not from God. It must be said that this relation is only in the habit of relatives, and on the part of the act it is being and from God: but on the part of the end it is privation, just as the evil end: and therefore because it does not have a good end, on that part it is privation, and according to this it is evil.

To the next, it must be said that as is clear from the words of Anselm introduced above, God operates differently in good and in evil: because in good things there is the perfection of

the substance of the act and the moral form, and therefore He makes both there: but in evil things only one, because the moral form is lacking in them.

To another, it must be said that that reasoning holds in those things which cooperate with each other by way of counsel and consent of the will: but God cooperates with the will in this way: but rather the nature of the will depends on Him, just as the second depends on the first causing and containing, and moving: and in such an order the defect arises from the second, and is not reduced to the first, as is clear from the three examples introduced above in objecting, which need not be repeated except universally, that one is about the sun and complexional heat, and another about the informative power in the seed, and the third about the moving power of the bent leg in walking.

To another, it must be said that matter is considered in two ways, namely as it is, and thus it is matter in act. In another way, matter is considered without any form, and thus it is only in potency. So also the act subsisting in privation, is in act, and is caused according to its being by which it subsists, by God: but considered under privation, it is only in potency, and in this way it is not caused.

Articulus 8 — On The Various Definitions Of Evil

On the various definitions of evil.

On the various definitions of evil.

Then it is inquired about what he says there, K, It can also be asked by the same, Since sin is, etc.

For here the question arises, what is evil?

And the Master says here, that it is the privation of mode, species, and order, and in solving the objection he says, that it is an active privation: from this, however, it is taken that evil acts.

But against this is the fact that evil is privation: but privation does nothing, therefore evil does not act.

But because Dionysius says that evil acts by the power of good, and fights against good by the power of good, and this was treated above in the preceding distinction, therefore we will present other definitions of evil, and we will assign according to what they are taken. The response to the objection about this definition is above.

Augustine says in the book On Free Will, that evil is aversion from the immutable good.

The same, in the book On the City of God, Evil is to use good badly.

The same, in the book of Eighty-Three Questions, Evil is the privation of good.

The same, in the book On the Nature of Good, Evil is the corruption of species, mode, and order.

The same, in the book On the Trinity, Evil is to use what should be enjoyed, and to enjoy what should be used.

The same, in the book On True Religion, Evil is the lack of immutable goods, which should be enjoyed.

Damascene also says that evil is from that which is according to nature, into that which is beyond nature, a voluntary conversion.

The same, Evil is the darkness of the intelligible.

Basil, however, says that evil is a disposition of the soul contrary to virtue.

It is asked, According to what are these definitions of evil taken?

And it must be said, that the first speaks of the defect of the first mover towards good, and this is God.

The second, however, speaks of the defect of the form which is grace, in the act of conversion to a changeable good.

The third indeed speaks of the defect of the end informing the act.

The fourth, however, speaks of the privation consequent in the good of nature.

The fifth indeed speaks of the perversity of the work compared to the end, and to that which is for the end.

The sixth, however, speaks of the defect of the end which ought to be intended in every work.

The seventh, which is of Damascene, speaks of the defect of the conjoined mover, who moves to good by nature.

The eighth, however, speaks of the defect of the light governing the intellect.

The ninth, which is of Basil, speaks of evil as it is left from an evil act in disposing the soul through the habit of vice.

Moreover, Anselm gives one, which is, Evil is the absence of good, where it ought to be, and this touches the relation under the being: of the subject in which evil can be, in that privations seek around the subjects in which they are.

And let these suffice for the reading.

DISTINCTIO XXXVI

Articulus 4 — Whether The First Motions Proceed From The Necessity Of The Fomes

Whether the first motions proceed from the necessity of the fomes?

Fourthly, it is asked concerning the first motions, which Augustine says proceed from the necessity of the fomes.

And it seems the contrary: because
1. What is not voluntary is not an actual and personal sin: but what is necessary is not voluntary: therefore it seems that such are not sins.

1. Likewise, Jerome says that anathema be upon him who says that man cannot avoid sin.

Solution. To this it has been solved above, in Distinction XXXII, the question concerning the first motions.

And here Augustine takes "necessary" in two ways: namely, for the necessity of difficulty, and for the necessity of inevitability. And in the first way, it refers to mortal sins: because after sin, it is difficult to resist mortal sins. It also refers to singular venial motions, which are also difficult to resist through grace. But if it is taken for the necessity of inevitability, then it refers to the first motions universally taken together: because it is impossible to prevent all at once by a will contrary to all, so that none arise. And a similar example is given by the Masters of someone who is attacked by many from the front and back, right and left, above and below: for he can receive each singular blow on the shield, but cannot guard against all at once. And in this respect indeed, it is remitted, and cannot be over penalty. Insofar as the appetite follows the concupiscence of the fomes, they are not penalties, but sins.

Articulus 5 — Whether Anger, Envy, And The Like, Are Punishments Of The Sinner

Whether anger, envy, and the like, are the penalties of the sinner?

Whether anger, envy, and the like, are the penalties of sins?

Fifthly, it is asked concerning the fifth chapter, whether anger, and envy, and the like, are the penalties of sins?

It seems, however, that they are: because they are defined by penalty. For anger is the fervor of blood around the heart from the evaporation of bile. Envy, however, is pain in the prosperity of goods or neighbors. Therefore, it seems that they are passions, and not sins.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
By passions as they are passions, we neither merit nor demerit. If therefore such sins are essentially passions, we neither merit nor demerit by them, which is absurd.

Solution. It must be said that passions are considered in two ways, namely as inflicted: and thus they are not the principle of meriting. They are also considered as received by the will, or caused by the will loving something inordinately or ordinately: and thus they are merits and demerits: and thus it is in those sins which cause penalties which are in them by inordinate love of one's own good: and therefore they are not penalties, insofar as they are sins, except materially: but rather they are perverse wills, which because they do not achieve their effect, therefore they are punished and waste away by themselves: as envy is a will impeding anoth-

er's good from inordinate love of one's own: and because it does not impede, it wastes away, and so with others.

Articulus 6 — What Is The Good In Genus, And Whether The Good In Genus Can Become Evil In Genus

What is the good in general? and, Can a good man in general become evil in general?

Then it is inquired concerning what is said at the end of the distinction, there, K, They also add that some are good not only in essence, but also in kind, etc.

And two things are inquired here, namely, what is the good in general? And, Whether to the good in general, there always corresponds the good in species.

To the FIRST, it proceeds thus: 1. In the text, the Master says that the good in general is, as to refresh the hungry: but to refresh the hungry is to refresh what ought to be refreshed: therefore, the good in general is said to be an act proportioned to the due matter: and therefore some define the good in general as an act upon due matter. But against this is what the Master here says, that this is of the kind of works of mercy: but a work of mercy is a work of virtue in species: therefore, the same is the good in general as the work of virtue in species: and this is said by no one.

1. Likewise, other ancients said that the good in general is what can be done well and badly: but this again does not seem fitting: because to preach, to pray, to teach, to give alms, to know oneself, can be done well and badly: yet each of these signifies an act clothed with circumstances, which does not make the good in general. For a genus is what is predicated of many differing in species: and this way the genus is not taken here: because it is not predicated of many.
2. Likewise, a genus is said to be the principle of generation: which way again it is not taken, because the good in general does not generate the good clothed with circumstances or specified.

Likewise, a genus is also said to be the first subject: which way again it does not seem to be taken here: because an act upon due matter is not first, but rather the act in itself seems to be first.

1. Likewise, a special due is considered by justice: if therefore an act upon due matter is the good in general, it seems that every good in general should be referred to justice, which is false.
2. Likewise, it seems that the good in general is the good of virtue: because comparing virtue to virtue, we say charity in general is better than temperance in general: therefore, it seems that such virtues and vices are good and evil in general: which yet no one says.

3. Likewise, it is inquired, By what goodness in general is it good? since it (as the Masters say) can be done well and badly, it seems that it ought to be called evil in general as much as good in general.

Likewise, it is inquired, Whether the good in general can become evil in general?

It seems that it can: because contraries are naturally made around the same: therefore, the good in general can become evil in general.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: An act proportioned to due matter cannot be unless proportionally: since therefore this is the goodness of the good in general, it cannot become evil in general.

But it is inquired, Why this which is good...

whether in the genus, it cannot become evil in the genus, and yet in the species? For since the species is more perfect than its genus, its goodness ought to be more inseparable from itself than the goodness of the genus from itself.

Solution. It must be said without prejudice, that good in the genus is said metaphorically with respect to the genus which is the first subject and first potentiality: but this in morals is the act of the will compared to the matter about which it ought to be according to its nature, as to refresh concerning the hungry, and to give concerning the needy, and so with others. And the ancients intend to say the same when they define good in the genus, saying that it can be done well and badly: because the first potentiality in some genus is determinable to either of the contrary outcomes through differences ordered to the potentiality of the subject.

To what is first objected, it must be said that the Master intends to say that it is specified concerning works of mercy by circumstances, but considered according to itself and without circumstances.

To another it must be said, that when the ancients say that it can be done well and badly, the term "can" couples the potentiality of the subject: but the objection proceeds as if it coupled the second potentiality, which is in circumstances other than the end; and therefore the coupling is predicated of the term "can," and a fallacy of figure of speech occurs.

To another it must be said, that the genus is taken for the subject of the first potentiality ordered to the complete form in morals.

And to the objection against this it must be said, that the act according to itself does not place potentiality in morals, but is effected outside morals: and therefore it is not first in the genus, but outside the genus: and this is not inquired here. However, it has a similarity with the predicable genus in some respect. For in the predicable genus there are two things, namely that which is said of many differing in species, and this is power: and in this respect it does not agree. There is also that which is the subject or substance around which the difference is placed, and thus it is substantially in the species: and in this respect it has similarity: because good in the genus is substantially in good in the species, as will be shown below. However, the genus which is the principle of generation also has two things. One is that it acts the

species: and in this it does not agree with good in the genus. The other is that it remains in the species through division: and in this respect it agrees in some way.

To another it must be said, that there is a debt of law, and this is of justice: and there is a debt of the proportion of the nature of the act to the matter in morals, taken, and this is of good in the genus.

To the objection it must be said, that that objection proceeds as if the genus is said here to be a general form: and this is not true. And that objection equivocates in the genus.

To another it must be said, that good in the genus is said to be good by the goodness of proportion, which further is potential to the good of circumstance: just as matter inclined to form, not having it, is said to be good by analogy to the form to which it is proportioned: and this is incomplete goodness, because it is founded in privation, yet with order to good.

To another it must be said, that good in the genus cannot become evil in the genus, just as matter cannot become evil, although the composite can become evil: and this is because the proportion of matter is substantial, but the form is not substantial to it, but separable: and therefore the first goodness is inseparable, and the second is not: and this is not because matter is more perfect than the composite (whence the objection does not place the cause for the cause) but from the reason already stated.

Concerning this and the following article, more things have been diligently sought in another summa in the question of good in the genus, in the treatise on virtues and good.

Divisio Textus

It must be known, however, that certain sins are such, etc. Moreover, a division is introduced under the opinion previously held by way of disputation. For it is asked from this opinion, Whether sin, insofar as it is a punishment, is from God, or whether the act of sin is from God? and, If by way of punishment it is from God? and, Whether every sin is a punishment insofar as it is sin?

This distinction, however, is divided into two parts: in the first of which he shows how sin takes on the nature of punishment. In the second, however, he presents the summary of this opinion, there, K, Satés diligently, etc.

The first is further subdivided into two: in the first of which he shows that sin is a punishment. In the second, however, he resolves a certain contradiction which seems to be between Augustine and Jerome, there, H, However, diligently, etc.

In the first he does four things. First, he proves that every sin is a punishment. In the second chapter he asks, Whether insofar as it is sin, or not? and determines that it is not, there, B, And therefore rightly it is asked, etc. In the third chapter he asks, Whether one sin is the punishment of another? there, C, #¢ In the fourth, from this sense, etc., he tends specifically in certain sins, that they are punishment: and this in two ways: because first concerning original sin in the concupiscence, there, F, That however certain sins. Secondly in certain acts which

are defined by punishment, such as anger, envy, and the like, there, G, Furthermore, by no means doubting, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether Sin Is Essentially Punishment

Whether sin is essentially punishment?

Whether sin is essentially punishment?

According to the order of these, we will also inquire five things. First, concerning the first chapter, Whether sin is essentially punishment?

Second, on account of the second, Whether punishment is essentially joined to every sin, and in how many ways?

Third, on account of the third, Whether one sin is the punishment of another, and in how many ways?

Fourth, we will inquire, Whether first movements are punishments? And it seems Augustine says that they are the punishment of original sin.

Fifth, on account of the fifth, we will inquire, Whether envy, wrath, sloth, and the like, are substantially punishments.

And we will briefly touch upon this: because one solution in any of these solves the whole.

To the first, it is objected thus:
1. Punishment is essentially caused by sin: but cause and effect are never the same: therefore sin is never potentially punishment.

1. Likewise, Whatever things are such that one is prior to the other in time, one of them is not essentially the other: but sin is the merit of punishment, and merit precedes that of which it is the merit: therefore it precedes punishment: therefore sin is not punishment.
2. Likewise, Every punishment is just and good: but no sin is just and good and from God: therefore no punishment is essentially sin: therefore conversely it is simply true, no sin is essentially punishment.

BUT on the contrary is what
1. Augustine says in the book of Confessions: You have commanded, Lord, and it is so, that every disordered movement is sin and is punishment to itself: therefore it is punishment to itself: but nothing is punishment to itself unless it is substantially punishment: therefore sin is substantially punishment.

1. Likewise, Sin is substantially evil: and evil is substantially the privation of species, mode, and order: therefore, sin is substantially punishment.
2. Likewise, Sin is substantially aversion from the immutable good: but this is the punishment of loss: therefore sin is substantially the punishment of loss. This is also supported by what is in the text.

Solution. Without prejudice, speaking it seems to me, that sin is not substantially the punishment of sin, as the Master also says in the text.

To the first objection, it must be said that sin, as sin, is not punishment: because as sin, it is an act proceeding from free will: but punishment substantially accompanies it, that is, disorder in the kingdom of the soul, where the ruler becomes ruled, and the mistress becomes a servant: and thus Augustine speaks.

To the other, it must be said that sin is formally evil, and evil is the privation of active good, as the Master said above: and therefore in the construction, the equivocation of sin occurs, because the privation of passive good is taken, whereas in the premises it was taken actively.

To the other, it must be said that it is passive aversion: and this follows sin as an effect follows a cause, not indeed in time, but in nature and cause: because it is not true that sin always precedes punishment in time. There is also active aversion, when the will turns away in action: and this is essentially sin, and not punishment.

Articulus 2 — Whether To Every Sin Punishment Is Essentially Conjoined

Whether to every sin punishment is essentially conjoined?

Secondly, it is asked, whether to every sin punishment is essentially conjoined?

And it seems that it is so: because
1. Given the cause, the effect is posited: but the cause of punishment is sin, therefore with sin posited, punishment would necessarily be induced.

1. Likewise, Gregory: No adversity will harm, therefore it seems by contrary sense, if no iniquity dominates, that all adversity is from the dominion of iniquity.
2. Likewise, Psalm 103:3: Who forgives all your iniquities, who heals all your infirmities. For from this, as Augustine says, it is understood that there is no infirmity except from iniquity.
3. Likewise, Jerome: Whatever we suffer, our sins have deserved.

But on the contrary: Punishment is found without sin: therefore sin can also be found without punishment. The first is proven in Christ, and in Job who says, I have not sinned, and in bitterness, etc., and in the man born blind, of whom the Lord says: Neither has this man sinned, nor his parents.

Solution. It must be said that punishment is essentially conjoined to sin as a cause, as the first objections prove: and punishment is at least fourfold, of which two are punishments of loss, one namely in the loss of the immutable good which inhabits the Saints. Another is in the deprivation of gratuitous gifts, through which God inhabits the Saints. The third is the corruption of natural good, about which much has been discussed above. The fourth is the disorder of powers in the kingdom of the soul: because the higher serve, and the lower dominate. Besides these, there are others not so perceived, such as greater power of the

demon, and impotence of rising from evil, and defect towards good, and inclination to evil, and darkening of the light in the intellect towards good, and infinite others, so that it is true what is said, that he who offends in one loses many goods.

Therefore, to what is objected on the contrary, it must be said that it is of no value: because punishment is not bound to sin, as conversely, and that punishment is satisfactory for sin both in the members and in the head: and therefore inflicted upon us sometimes by the mercy of God, and upon the head, so that through it satisfaction may be made.

Articulus 3 — Whether One Sin Is The Punishment Of Another

Whether one sin is the punishment of another?

Thirdly, it is asked whether one sin is the punishment of another?

It seems, however, that it is so.

1. By many things which are introduced in the text of the first and third chapters, which it is not expedient to bring back here again.
2. The same is proved by reason: for the subsequent act is caused by the preceding habit: since therefore the preceding sin leaves a habit in the soul, it seems that every subsequent sin is caused by the preceding: but it is the same for a sin to be caused by a sin as for a sin to be the punishment of a sin, as it is said in the text.
3. Likewise, it seems that any subsequent sin is the punishment of any preceding sin: because the preceding universally deprives one of the goods that help to stand: but that which deprives one of the goods that help to stand universally disposes one to fall: therefore any sin disposes and inclines one to the fall of any sin.

But on the contrary, it seems that

1. Disposition and habit do not incline except to an act similar to that from which that disposition or habit was left: therefore they do not incline to any sin, but to a similar sin.
2. Furthermore, it seems that no sin is the cause of another. For since God is a just judge, He punishes equal sins equally. Let it be supposed, therefore, that the first sin and the hundredth are equal sins: therefore they are punished equally: but the hundredth is not punished except by the punishment of eternal fire, assuming that it is the last: therefore neither is the first sin: therefore it is not punished by subsequent sins: therefore the subsequent sins are not its punishment.
3. Likewise, a just judge among humans does not punish one theft so that another is committed: therefore much less does the heavenly judge, who hates iniquity, do this: therefore one sin is not punished by another sin.

Solution. It must be said that one sin is the punishment of another sin in three ways: the first of which is taken from the part of the deprivation of gratuitous gifts and the uncreated good and the corruption of the good of nature, which contain in good and give virtue from the part

of conversion to a changeable good: because from that part the act of sin leaves a disposition to another sin in the soul; and this in two ways, namely to a similar sin in species, as gluttony to gluttony, and lust to lust, and so on for others: or another in species, to the act of which the first causes a proneness, as gluttony to lust, because the belly heated with wine, as Jerome says, easily foams into lust. The third way is when someone deprives himself of the governance of reason through one sin, and afterwards falls into another, as if a drunkard kills. And through this the solution to the first objection is clear.

To the penultimate and last, it must be said that the first punishment of mortal sin is eternal fire: and with this God punishes: but other punishments are accidental, and not per se: and they can also happen to one sin because it is prior, and not to another because it is posterior.

How all these punishments are from God will be determined at the end of the following distinction, where the Master makes a special chapter about this.

Articulus 7 — Whether To The Good In Genus There Corresponds The Good In Species

Whether to the good in general corresponds the good in species?

Whether to the good in general corresponds the good in species?

Secondly, it is asked whether to the good in general corresponds the good in species always?

It seems that it does: because
1. Genus and species are correlatives: and where one is, the other is necessarily presupposed.

On the contrary: The good in general can be done well and badly: therefore, the good in general can be the substrate of evil in species.

1. Further, it seems for the sake of what is said in the Text: because a good act is essentially and generically good as matter proportioned to form through inclination, but not sufficiently adapted through dispositions: and therefore, just as such matter, with contraries overcoming the disposition, can be under another form than that to which it was first proportioned, so also the good in general can be subjected to evil in species.

There are, however, those who say that the good in general is always subjected to the good in species, and evil to evil, and that it is adapted through circumstances. And this is not well said: because in certain acts it is never possible to take the due matter without circumstances, just as in those in which there is nothing to direct without circumstances, such as to copulate, to kill, and the like: and in which the due circumstance is implied in the act and matter, as to love God. However, in some it can be separated, and clothed with both good and bad circumstances, as to give to the needy, and to refresh the hungry, and in similar cases.

Therefore, it must be said to the first, that to the good in general corresponds a species necessarily supposed to it, but some which is referred to it.

To the same it must be said, that species is said here metaphorically in relation to the property of species which is abundant in genus: thus indeed: the specified and determined good in morals abounds in circumstances from the good in general.

To the last it must be said, that the good by essence is the same good which is convertible with being insofar as it is, and adds nothing over being except relation to the end.

However, the good in general is said in two ways, namely by the proportion of act to due matter, or from the general form, as is clear from the aforesaid. But the absolute good simply is the good which is perfect according to the form of good from circumstances and end.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

DISTINCTIO XXXVII

Divisio Textus

There are, however, also many others, etc. Here he touches upon the opinion of others concerning the acts of sins, saying that they are not caused by God, but by free will. And it has two parts: in the first of which he pursues this opinion in four chapters. In the second, however, he says that it is the concordant opinion of all that every punishment is from God, there, "E, Since therefore all agree in this," etc:

In the first part, he proceeds thus. In the first chapter, he explains the opinion. In the second, he responds to the words of Augustine introduced for the first opinion. In the third, he shows that there is something which is not from God. In the fourth, he presents an objection against punishment.

Articulus 1 — Whether Sin, Insofar As It Is Sin, Is From God

Whether sin, insofar as it is sin, is from God?

Regarding this part, two questions remain to be asked, namely, Whether sin, insofar as it is sin, is from God? and, Whether sin is some thing, on account of those things which are determined in the third and fourth chapter.

To the first, it is objected thus:
1. In natural causes it is thus, that absence and presence cause opposites, as the sun by its presence illuminates, and by its absence darkens: therefore the same can be said of the spiritual sun: but sin is spiritual darkness: therefore sin, insofar as it is sin, can be said to be from God.

1. Likewise, it is proven by what the Philosopher says, that the presence of the governor is the cause of the safety of the ship, but his absence is the cause of its peril.
2. Likewise, what is the cause of the cause, is the cause of the caused: but God is the cause of the will from which sin is, insofar as it is sin: therefore He is the cause of sin.

3. Likewise, this is held from certain authorities. On Romans 5:19, on that, "By the disobedience of one," etc., the Gloss says: The work of the work of God passes through sin is the work of the work of God: the work of God: therefore it passes through the work of God: and nothing is in the work that is not in the cause of the work in some way, therefore sin is in God as in the cause.

4. Likewise, on Romans 1:26, it is said: "God gave them up to vile passions": but these are sins: therefore He was the cause of sin.

5. Likewise, 1 Kings 22:20 and 22: "Who will deceive Ahab?" And He responded to the lying spirit: "You will deceive, and you will prevail." Therefore He made the lying spirit lie: therefore He was the cause of the lie, as it seems: and by the same reason He was the cause of other sins.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
1. Augustine: Far be it that God is the cause of evil, either per se or per accidens.

1. Likewise, sin has no cause except a deficient one, as is clear from the above: but God cannot fail in any good: therefore He cannot be a deficient cause of anything: and sin, insofar as it is sin, has only a deficient cause: therefore God cannot be the cause of sin.

2. To this also the Masters commonly object: because it is better that from which evil cannot be, than that from which it can be: but God is better than can be thought: therefore iniquity or evil cannot be from Him.

3. Likewise, 1 Corinthians 5:3, on that, "Absent in body, but present in spirit": the Gloss says, Every carnal will is from the devil: therefore not from God.

4. Likewise, on Romans 1:27, on that, "They burned in their desires," the Gloss says, These are not from God.

Solution. It is easy to solve this, if the things previously discussed are recalled to memory: because an act under deformity conjointly cannot be referred to God as to a cause, nor even deformity according to itself: but the act in itself can be from Him, as was proven above by reason, and shown by examples.

To the first and second, therefore, it must be said that it is not similar concerning natural causes: because they are present and absent, but God is always able and prepared to give grace: and therefore nothing evil happens by His absence: and this is also noted above at the end of the first book.

To the other, it must be said that sin, which is the work of the work of God, passes through the work of God: yet it cannot be referred to God, just as limping cannot be referred to the moving power of the leg. But what is objected, that nothing is in the work that is not in the cause of the work, it must be said that this is true of those things which are simply so: but defect and failing are well in the second, so that they do not return to the first, and thus sin occurs insofar as it is sin.

To the other, it must be said that God gave them up not by imparting malice, but by not infusing grace to the opposite: and of this non-infusion of grace He is not the cause, but the sinner turning away from the influx of grace, as has been often said above.

To the other, it must be said that that is understood concerning the permission of power, and not concerning the work or command of lying: and it was just and good.

Articulus 2 — Whether Sin Is A Thing, Or A Nature, Or A Substance

Whether sin is a thing, or nature, or substance?

Secondly, it is asked whether sin is a thing, or nature, or substance, because the whole intention of the third and fourth chapter revolves around this.

However, it seems that it is not: because
1. "Without it nothing was made," says Augustine, that is, sin.

1. Likewise, it is held in the Letter that it is not a foundation.
2. Likewise, in 1 Corinthians 8:4, it is said that an idol is.
3. Likewise, in the Gloss there, that the form of an idol is nothing: but an idol is the apparent sweetness of sin: therefore sin is nothing, as it seems.

But on the contrary: Fulgentius says, God is not the author of that thing of which He is the avenger.

Likewise, Wisdom 12:11, "The seed was cursed from the beginning": the Gloss says, from which they were in foreknowledge, there was in them some quality: and this is a thing: therefore sin is a thing.

To this also the Master objects at the beginning of the fourth chapter.

Solution. All this is solved by the distinction of thing, nature, and substance.

For a thing can be said to be as if an entity established by form: and thus what lacks form is not a thing, like privation, and sin insofar as it is sin. A thing is also said from "reor, reris," not that it is in opinion alone, but from the thing itself which is nevertheless deprived, and thus sin is a deficient thing: and in this way, a thing is taken in the authority of Fulgentius, and other authorities introduced.

However, substance is said from the nature of substance: and then a thing is per se existing: and in this way, no act is a substance: it is also said as if from effect, because it makes to subsist: and in this way, a good work is called a substance, but not an evil one: because evil makes to fail, and good makes to subsist in the order of natural good, and contributes to it: and this is said to be evil not being, and not having a foundation. Sometimes also substance is said effectively by negation explaining, namely that it does not make to fail from subsistence: and thus indifferent is called substance, but evil is not substance. In the fourth way, substance is said to be what has in any way a quiddity in being: and in this way, evil is substance.

In these ways also nature is said in two ways, namely that which is the cause of order: and thus evil and sin are not nature, and thus it is taken from the Philosopher in VIII Physics, where he says that nature is the cause of order in all things. In another way, nature is said to be that which is understood in any way: and thus privation is nature and sin.

And in this way, by distinction, the solution is clear to the whole.

Articulus 3 — Whether Every Punishment Is From God

Is every punishment from God?

Is every punishment from God?

Then it is inquired concerning what is said in the last chapter E, there, "Since therefore all agree in this," etc.

Here the Master seems to say that every punishment is from God: and this does not seem [correct]: because it is read that God did not make death.

Likewise, God does not make His work worse: but by corruption the work is worsened: therefore, He neither makes the corruption of the body nor of the soul.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY is what the Master says in the Text. And thus it is read in the Gloss on Romans 1:26: "He delivered them," etc. God works in the hearts of men to incline their wills to what He wills, whether to good or to evil.

Solution. The Masters here found a distinction, that there is punishment enacted, and punishment contracted, and punishment inflicted. Punishment enacted or which we do is sin: and this is not from God, as they say. Punishment contracted is the fomes, which insofar as it resists the will, is a punishment justly inflicted by God: but insofar as it inclines to evil, it is not from God, but from man, as they say. However, inflicted punishment is simply from God, like the infliction of fire.

But because the Master says absolutely that every punishment is from God, therefore it must be said otherwise, that sin (as was shown above) is sin from one and punishment from another. Punishment is either of loss or inflicting. If of loss: then it is indirectly from God, because He does not infuse the form of grace or the good supplying the loss: and He is not the cause of this influence, but turns away from it. Hence, although this punishment does not make His work worse in body and soul, yet He does not do this, except in the manner stated. And thus it is also understood that God corrupts nothing of existing things, namely by acting, but rather from the fact that He does not infuse being as He did: and this is not because God is otherwise disposed to the thing which is corrupted than before, but rather because the corrupted thing is otherwise disposed to Him. However, God inflicts the punishing punishment, by this that He infuses a form of some affliction, which is contrary to the good nature, due to the order of justice.

Through this the solution to the first is clear, how God makes the death of the body and soul, and how He does not make it.

To the other it must be said that that Gloss on Romans is good and subtle: and the first part of it touches on what God works, namely the substance of the act: and the second part touches on the work of order, because He does not make malice, as it is nothing, but inclines evil to what He wills, ordering that from it He may elicit good for which He permits malice to occur.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

DISTINCTIO XXXVIII

Divisio Textus

After the aforementioned concerning the will and its end, etc., here begins the part in which the Master discusses the quantity of action in general in good and evil action. And he does this so that the quantity of sin, about which he intends here, may be better seen.

It is divided into three parts: in the first of which he discusses the quantity of the interior action, which is the will. In the second, the quantity of the exterior action, which is the work. And this begins below, distinction XL, there, A, After these concerning the acts, etc. In the third, for the sake of a certain thing that was said, namely that faith directs intention, he inquires about the acts of the unbeliever, distinction XLE, there, A, And when in intention, as above, etc. follows the part which is about the modes of sins, as is clear from the division assigned above.

The first of these is divided into two: in the first of which the Master inquires about the quantity of the will. In the second, however, why the will itself is a determined sin: and this begins in the following distinction XX AIX, there, A, Here, however, arises the question, etc.

The present distinction is divided into two parts: in the first of which he touches upon those things which contribute to demonstrating the quantity of the will. And in the second he inquires, What is the difference between will and intention which measures the will? there, F, It is also usually asked, etc.

In the first of these, the Master does three things. First, indeed, he shows the measure of the will from the end. Second, he inquires whether all good wills have one end, and all evil ones one or diverse? there, C, But it is asked, Whether all good, etc. In the third, he determines a certain objection of Augustine against the determined, there, D, Nevertheless to this opinion, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether The Quantity Of The Will Is Weighed By The End

Whether the quantity of the will is measured by the end?

A doubt arises concerning the first, whether the quantity of the will is measured by the end? And, if it is measured by the end, by which end is it measured?

To the first, it is proceeded thus: 1. Every agent by intention and intellect, unless it acts in vain, sets for itself an end to which it measures the whole work: the will is such an agent: therefore, it sets for itself an end to which it measures the whole work. The first is proved by this, that whatever of the work is not proportioned to the end, that is vain. This is evident from what Damascene says, that every will is in reason. Hence thus: Every work receives the quantity of value from that to which it is measured: but the whole work of the will is measured by the end: therefore, the whole receives the quantity of value from the end.

1. Likewise, in agents according to nature, in which the form of the end is, the goodness of generation and act is considered from the form which is the end: therefore, similarly it will be in agents from deliberation: therefore, again it follows that the actual quantity of the will is considered from the end.
2. Likewise, the reason of good in all things is from the end: therefore, much more in moral work, in which there is simply the good which is honest: therefore, since the work of the will is solely moral, the quantity of goodness or malice will be taken from the end.

Likewise, Boethius in the Topics gives this maxim, "Whose end is good, if it itself is also good: and whose end is evil, it itself is also evil."

Therefore, a good end makes good: and the quantity of good makes the quantity of good from the will: therefore, the quantity of the will is considered from the quantity of the end.

Likewise, this is taken from the Letter through many authorities.

But against this, it seems to be an instance through many acts: as

1. Someone fornicates with someone, so that from that familiarity he may recall her from heresy, here is a good end, and yet the work is evil.
2. Likewise, someone steals to feed the poor: whose end again is good, and the work is evil.

The solution of the ancient Doctors tends to this, which a certain Gloss says on that, "The lamp of your body is your eye": that as much as you intend, so much you do: this is understood in evils generally because of contempt: because if you intend by lifting a pen to sin mortally and provoke God, you sin as much towards God, although not as much towards your neighbor. Similarly, they say that generally it is understood in indifferent things: because in those it is true that your intention imposes the name and form on your work: because it does not have indifference by reason of merit or demerit, except from intention. But in goods, they said that rule is particular: because in goods you do not always do as much as you intend. For if you give a penny and can give more, and intend to merit as much by a penny as by a hundred thousand, you will not merit as much for this. And so they said also about evils done for good: although the intention of good diminishes the fault in such things, it does not, however, remove it entirely, nor make the work meritorious. And in this solution stood Prepositivus Cantua and William of Auxerre.

However, it can be said otherwise without prejudice, by distinguishing in that which is referred to the end, and in the end to which it is referred, that which is referred to the end. For of those things which are referred to the end, some are akin to the end by their nature, that is, which are naturally ordered to it: some, however, are by nature oblique from it: and some neither in this way nor that way, which are imposed to the end, and imposed in obliquation from it. Similarly, the end is threefold, namely, in the first way which disposes the thing related to it, as the terminus of motion disposes and defines motion, just as the form of the end is in generation: and this end is a part completing the thing, either in being or in well-being. There is also the ultimate end intended in which the agent rests, although not moved first reaches it, just as the end in natures is the conservation of the species. And in the third way, the end in which the whole intention of motion rests: and this is in nature by assimilating in some first author, according to which this is possible for each of the secondary movers. In morals, these are adapted, namely, that a good action is akin to a good end: but an evil one is oblique: and indifferent, potential to either. The end, however, which is completing in act in well-being, is the form of charity in merit: and the end in which the agent rests, is beatitude: and the end in which the whole intention rests, is God.

Let us say, therefore, that intention imposes the name on the work through the proximate or first end, in those things which are akin to it, and in those things which are not oblique to the contrary. And then it never has an instance: because just as in natures the moving form induces its species in the end of motion, so the quantity of charity induces the quantity of merit in the work akin and indifferent to it.

And in this way, the reasons previously introduced proceed.

But to those things which are objected, it must be said that they are not valid: because there is not in such things a relation by the nature of the work, but only by the thought of the agent: and of such a relation, the Master does not speak here: because that is foolish, if it applies to an end which is not applicable to it.

And through this, the solution to the whole is clear,

Articulus 2 — What Is The End By Which The Quantity Of The Will Is Weighed

What is the end from which the quantity of the will is measured?

Secondly, it is asked, What is that end? And it is said in the Text, that it is charity which is the end of the commandment.

However, it seems that it is not.

1. By that Ecclesiastes 12:13: Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter. Fear God, and keep his commandments: for this is the whole duty of man. The Gloss there, that is, to this is the whole man: therefore all things are to be referred to fear.
2. Likewise, that charity is not the end, it seems from this which is said, Ecclesiastes 9:1: Man does not know whether he is worthy of love or hatred. However, it is certain that everyone who acts knows the end of his work: therefore the end is not charity.

3. Likewise, in the First Book of Sentences, distinction I, it was held that the end of love and the use of every work is that which is to be enjoyed: however, this is God the Trinity, as it is said there: however, God the Trinity is not created charity: therefore charity is not the end of the work.

Likewise, Beatitude is said to be the end of every appetite by Augustine, and the Philosopher, and Boethius: however, this is not charity: therefore it is not the end.

1. Likewise, just as we are moved by charity to the goodness of God, so by faith to truth, so by hope to eternity.

Therefore, it seems, since uncreated truth and eternity are the end, that faith can be called the end just as charity.

1. Likewise, nothing is moved to an end which it already has: however, having charity, one is still moved in meritorious work: therefore, one is not moved to charity: but that which is the end, is that to which there is movement: therefore, charity is not the end.
2. Likewise, furthermore, obedience seems to be more the end of the precept than charity: because obedience regards every precept insofar as it is a precept, but charity does not: therefore, it seems wrong to say in the Letter.

Solution. It must be said, as the Gloss says on that of the Apostle, 1 Timothy 1:5: The end of the precept is charity: the end is threefold, namely of determination, as of a field in its last part, when the whole continuous to that term is finished: and the end of consumption, as bread is finished in the last part, insofar as there is no more of the bread: and of consummation, as the perfection of the end is.

It must be said, therefore, that charity is the end of the works of the precept consummating the works: because to it, as they are meritorious, they are referred. However, how charity is the end and form and root and mother, has been said in the First Book of Sentences: here, however, it is only said that it is the end induced by the species of merit in the work from itself, as it is moving the meritorious in the work: just as in natures according to reason the same is the mover and the end: but the end in which the agent rests is beatitude: and in which the whole intention rests, is God the Trinity: and the first indeed is the form of the act, the second is the rest of the appetite, and the third is the complete attainment of the intention. Hence the first is referred to the second, and the second to the third: and concerning all these many things have been said in the third Sentences in the aforementioned places.

To the first, therefore, it is said that fear is the end in a certain respect, namely by withdrawal from evil: but charity is always the proximate end to the meritorious act insofar as it is meritorious: and also because other virtues have as their end the object of charity.

To the other, it must be said that nothing prohibits charity from being known and intended as the end: and as informing the soul, from being unknown. Hence in the argument there is a fallacy of the accident.

To the other, it must be said that it is understood concerning the end in which the appetite rests, not which informs the act, or in which as in the last the intention rests.

To the other, it must be said that the fulfillment of joy in good is, to which truth relates as showing, and eternity as unfailing: and therefore others are not the end as charity is. And another reason is: because they can be without form: and therefore they do not inform the act of merit: hence since form is the end of the act, at least they cannot be ends in this way.

To the other, it must be said that this is true: but something moves to induce its species in another: so it is here that charity moves in the meritorious work, as in the end of the work, as it itself makes the force of merit: hence the movement is so that it is held otherwise than it is held.

To the other, it must be said that obedience regards the precept insofar as it is a precept, but not that which is the precept, nor that which is the work of the precept, and therefore it cannot be the end of every meritorious work: but charity regards that which is the precept, and that which is the work, as the form of the act, and therefore it takes the nature of the end.

Articulus 3 — Whether There Is One End Of Good Wills, And Whether We Can Set Two Ends For Ourselves, And Whether Good Hirelings Merit

Whether there is one end of good wills? and, Whether we can set two ends for ourselves? and, Whether good hirelings merit?

Then it is asked, concerning what is said in the second part, there, C, But it is asked, Whether all good wills, etc.

And two things are asked, of which the first is, Whether there is one end of good wills?

Secondly, Whether there is one end of evils, as it seems to say in the Letter?

To the FIRST it is proceeded thus: For it seems that there is not one end of good wills: because

1. If the end is the perfection of a thing, as perfect things differ, so do perfections differ: But meritorious works differ even in the same man: therefore also perfection according to the end.
2. Furthermore, It is held that charity is the end, and beatitude is the end, and God is the end: therefore it seems that there are many ends even of the same man and the same work.

If you say that one of these ends is referred to another, and thus the ultimate end is one: but short of the ultimate there are not many ends. This still seems to be false: because it says in the Letter at the end of the preceding distinction, that the ends are the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit: and it is evident that they are equal: therefore one is not referred to another: therefore they are ends.

If you say that they are one end inasmuch as they are one supreme good. On the contrary: Faith posits them three to be enjoyed, as it is held in the first distinction of the book of Sentences: therefore it posits them three to whom we adhere by love for their own sake: therefore three ends, because nothing is loved for its own sake unless it is an end.

1. Likewise, Since the end of the intellect is truth: and this distinguishes articles by faith, there seem to be many ends.
2. Furthermore, Since there is divine wisdom and power and goodness and virtue and many other things which are God, He seems to be a multiple end according to the reason of the multiplicity of all attributes: therefore there is not one sole end.

According to this, it is further asked, Whether we can set two ends for ourselves?

But it seems that we can: because
1. In many Churches it is customary to give a penny to those coming to Matins, so that they may come more willingly: and it is evident that we do not condemn either the givers or the receivers.

1. Likewise, the Apostle: He ought to labor in hope, therefore he who plows should plow in hope: he can hope for the temporal: but whatever is hoped for is intended: therefore he can intend that end in labor.
2. Likewise, The laboring farmer ought first to partake of the fruits.
3. Likewise, elsewhere, the Lord ordains that he who serves the altar should live from the altar.
4. Likewise, elsewhere, You shall not muzzle the ox that treads out the grain.
5. Likewise, elsewhere, If we have sown spiritual things for you, is it a great thing if we reap your carnal things? As if he would say: No.
6. Likewise, in the Letter it is also held, His left hand is under my head, that is, temporals in sustenance.

But on the contrary is what
1. Augustine says in the book of Confessions: He loves you less, who holds with you, that is, less than he loves something else.

1. Likewise, On that Deuteronomy vi, 5: You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, etc., the Gloss says that God does not want His love to be divided: therefore nothing is to be loved with God.
2. Likewise, Isaiah xxv, 20: It is narrowed. It is explained concerning charity: therefore the bed is so narrow that another falls out: and the short covering cannot cover both: therefore nothing covers with God: therefore we cannot make two ends.

It is also further asked concerning good hirelings who seem to make two ends because
1. Some serve for the sake of the kingdom of heaven, and not for the sake of God: for they seem to sin according to this.

1. Likewise, Psalm cxvii, 1: Give thanks to the Lord, for He is good. It does not say, For He is good to me or to you: therefore He ought to be loved for His own sake, and not for any temporal or eternal utility: therefore it seems that those serving for eternal reward sin.

But on the contrary: In Luke, How many hired servants in my father's house have bread in abundance. Therefore those hirelings do not perish: therefore someone can set for himself the ends of created beatitude in the service of God.

Solution. It is easy here to respond to the objections according to what has been determined above.

Therefore it must be said to the first part of the objections, that there is only one ultimate end, and one object of fruition, as it has been determined in the second book of Sentences, first distinction: and although faith distinguishes, yet the complement of joy is neither in the intellect nor in truth, but in effect and goodness: and therefore one end.

To the other it must be said, that none of the attributes says two things at once, namely, lovable for its own sake, and the reason of lovable for its own sake, except only goodness: and therefore it alone is the end, and in the reason of the end: but other attributes are indeed ends, but not in the reason of the end.

To the SECOND part it must be responded by distinction, that we cannot set more than one ultimate end: but short of the ultimate we can have other ends, as it says in the Letter: and this in two ways: for what is sought short of God is sought in two ways, namely, to God alone: as those who seek nothing but from which they may make for themselves an instrument of meriting, as those who give all in alms. It is also sought for love short of God alone: and they build wood, hay, stubble: but yet by the merit of the foundation and charity by which they loved nothing as much as God, they will be saved.

To what is objected on the contrary, it must be said that when Augustine says, He loves you less, it is understood according to which the "you" says association of equality or contrariety: because then such love is mortal sin, and is lustful, which does not prefer God to all creatures.

To all others it must be said, that they are understood concerning the end short of the end, and there is no sin in such things.

To the THIRD part of the objections, it is disputed also on the third Sentences, question concerning the number of things to be loved.

And it must be said, that a good hireling not only does not sin, but merits much: because the same is the eternal reward which is God Himself according to cause, although created beatitude formally is not God: but he refers it further to God as the best for himself.

To what is objected, it must be said that the same good simply good, is good for us in glory, although in the state of sensuality it is not always the same: and the good hireling attends to his own good according to the state of glory: and therefore he confesses because He is good.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Divisio Textus

It is also customary to inquire, What is the difference between will, etc. And it has two chapters: in the first of which it distinguishes between end, will, and intention. In the second, it touches on how in one work there are multiple material wills and material ends: and yet there is one ultimate will, and one ultimate end. And this is clearly evident in the Letter of that chapter, there, G, But it is asked whether intention, etc.

Articulus 4 — Whether There Is One End Of Evil Actions, Namely Of The Avaricious Man And The Lustful Man

Whether there is one end of evil actions, namely of the miser and the lustful?

Secondly, it is asked, Whether there is one end of evil actions?

And it seems that there is:
1. By what is in the Text in three places, namely in this chapter once, there, CG, But it is asked, etc.: and in that chapter, F, It is usually asked, etc.: and twice by the words of Augustine on those verses of the Psalms: Searching hearts, etc., and, In this snare which they have hidden, etc.

1. Likewise, By reason: All (as Augustine and Boethius say) wish to live happily, and for that they do whatever they do: therefore there is not only one end of evil actions, but also of all actions, good and evil, namely happiness.

ON THE CONTRARY:
1. We see that there is not one love according to the reason of the species which moves the miser or the lustful: and this is evident in the works: therefore there is not one end of all evil actions.

1. Likewise, It is impossible for the prodigal and the miser to take pleasure in one thing according to reason: therefore there is not one end of all evil actions in the species of pleasure. And if you say that this is desire. On the contrary: This desire is diversified according to the matter: but the matter differs in species in evil acts: therefore also desire: therefore desire is not one in number, nor one in species.
2. Likewise, It seems false that all seek happiness: because we see that many times some seek unhappiness: but they seek in action what is sought through it: therefore the end of all is not happiness.

Solution. It must be said, as it seems to me, that the ultimate end of all good actions is one in number and reason and substance, which is God Himself or the highest good: but the ends

which are around Him are not one, but many ordered to Him. However, it does not seem to me that there is one end of evil actions, neither in number nor in species, as the objections prove, but in cause: Because every evil love of any species is caused by disordered self-love, as Augustine says on that, Set on fire and undermined: because although there are two roots of evil, namely fear badly humbling, and love badly inflaming, yet also as he says, fear is born from love. But there is not one end of both good and evil actions, except according to analogy, and not in species or number: and this is to live happily: which happiness is considered in two ways, namely according to what it truly is either by substance or by supposition: and thus it is not sought except by those directly seeking and finding it.

It is also considered according to reason: and this in two ways, namely according to the true reason which is according to its nature, and in this way again it is not sought by all: and it is considered according to the common reason from those things of which it consists, and this by the commonality of analogy not of species: as Anselm says, that it consists of advantages: and it is true that all seek to live comfortably and according to their will: and this is sought in every action: and in this way all seek to live happily: but this is not to have happiness as the end of the act, except in a certain respect, and not simply.

And by this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 5 — What Intention Is

What is intention?

A certain doubt arises here concerning intention, What is it?

For it seems that it is not a habit or a power, because we say that a sleeping person intends nothing, although we say that powers and habits are in the sleeper. By the same reasoning, it seems that it is not a passion: therefore, it seems that it is none of those things which are in the soul, because the Philosopher posits three things in the soul: passions, powers, and habits.

And on the contrary, it seems that it is a habit, because in the Gospel it is compared to light, where it says: "See that the light which is in you is not darkness?" Light, however, is a habit: therefore, it seems that intention is a habit.

Further, it is asked whether it is in the soul on the part of the affect or on the part of the intellect?

However, it seems that it is on the part of the affect, because
1. Augustine says here in the Text that it is the will with an end: but the will is present in man according to the affect.

1. Also, the Philosopher says that the will is the end. Since therefore intention is a relation to the end, as it is said in the Text, it seems that intention is present according to the will.

2. Also, merit or demerit, and the quantity of good and evil, depend on intention, as was held above: however, none of these depend on the intellect or the affect of reason: therefore, intention is present according to the affect.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
1. In the Gospel it is compared to the eye, when the Lord says: "The lamp of your body is your eye." And again, "If your eye is simple, your whole body will be full of light," that is, the whole mass of works: however, the eye is not the affect, but sight: therefore, intention is present according to the intellect, and not according to the affect.

1. Also, when it is said, "I intend this," the sense is, "I assign this end to my work": however, to assign an end to oneself is of the power of conferring: since therefore the will confers nothing, it seems that intention is not present according to the will, but according to reason.
2. Also, the will never wills anything willed unless it is announced by reason, because it does not have the eye of seeing the willed.
3. Also, it cannot see the end unless it is assigned by reason. Since therefore intention foresees the end, it seems that intention is present according to reason, and not according to the will.

Further, it is asked about what is said above in the Text, chapter B, that intention is the end: for this seems false because intention is related to the end: however, the end is not related to the end: therefore, intention is not the end.

Solution. It must be said without prejudice to the first, that intention is an act.

However, when it is objected that the Philosopher says that there are three things in the soul: it must be said that this is understood concerning those things around which virtue consists according to substance: because according to the subject it is around power, and according to essence it is a habit, and according to matter it is around passions: however, there are many other things in the soul, such as acts, species, and the like.

To the other, I think it must be distinguished that intention can intend the end by operation, or by judging the end only, or in both ways. And in the first way, as a traveler tends to the end of the journey: and thus intention is the will tending to the end: or, as it is better said, the tension of the will to the end. In the second way, it is similar to one who, standing on the road, points with a finger. And in the first way, intention is in the will: and in this way Augustine speaks, and other reasons are induced for this. In the second way, it is in reason: and in this way the Gospel speaks. And in the third way, it is of the will rightly or regulated by reason: and this is the intention taken in the proper manner of the matter.

And by this, the solution to almost everything is clear except for two.

To what is objected, that merit is only in the will, it must be said that this is false, because it is also in practical reason: but as we said above, in reason all merit is as in determining, and in

free choice as in choosing, and in the will as in completing merit perfectly by willing and acting.

To the last, it must be said that intention is not called the end except speaking materially, so that intention is put for the intended: and in this way, what is said in the Text is understood.

DISTINCTIO XXXIX

Divisio Textus

Here arises a quite necessary question, etc. This distinction contains three chapters: in the first of which the Master touches upon why the will is sometimes good, sometimes evil. In the second, why the act of this natural power is rather susceptible to malice and goodness than the act of another, there, C, But still it is asked, etc. In the third, he touches upon the natural will imperfect towards good, there, C, Furthermore it is usually asked, etc.

Through this the meaning is clear.

Articulus 1 — Why The Act Of The Will Is More A Sin Than An Act Of The Other Powers

Why is the act of the will more a sin than the act of other powers?

Why is the act of the will more a sin than the act of other powers?

Concerning the first part, a doubt arises: Why is the act of the will more a sin than the act of other powers?

For it seems that the acts of others are sins, just as those of the will:

1. For opposites are naturally made concerning the same thing: but virtues are in reason: therefore, sins are also. The first is evident in itself. The second is evident through a certain Gloss on what is said in Matthew 13:33: "The kingdom of heaven is like leaven, which a woman took and hid in three measures of flour." For the Gloss says that by the three measures, the three powers of the soul are understood, so that in reason we possess prudence, in the concupiscible the desire for virtues, in the irascible the hatred of vices.
2. Likewise, it has been held above that sin is in reason concerning both the lower and higher part, and it is also in sensuality: therefore, the act of the will alone is not sin.
3. Likewise, it has been held that sin is in free will, where it was said that free will is flexible towards good and evil: but free will is the faculty of reason and will: therefore, sin is also present according to the act of other powers.
4. Likewise, sin stains the image: but the image encompasses memory, understanding, and will: therefore, sin is present according to the cognitive part of the soul.

5. If you say that it is present cognitively insofar as it extends itself into practice or operation. On the contrary: For it seems that even in cognitive things which are purely cognitive, there is sin: for knowing, whose end is truth, is in some things prohibited, as in the sciences of divination and necromancy: but there would not be a reasonable prohibition unless knowing that were evil. Therefore, since this is in speculation alone, in speculative matters insofar as they are speculative, sin occurs in act.

6. Furthermore, it seems that sin is more according to reason than according to will. For the Philosopher at the end of the first book of the Ethics says that other powers are susceptible to virtue, insofar as they participate somewhat in reason. Therefore, according to the same, they will also be susceptible to sin: therefore, reason much more: but from the participation of the will, no susceptibility to virtue or sin is posited in others: therefore, sin is more according to reason than according to will.

7. Likewise, it seems that it is present according to every power: because for sin the whole man is damned: but he is not punished except in that in which he sinned: therefore, the whole sinned, therefore he sinned concerning every power of the soul.

ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Sin is voluntary, so much so that if it is not voluntary, it is not sin, as Augustine says: therefore, it is not sin unless it is under the act of the will.

1. Likewise, it has been shown above that man is not the entire cause of his act, except in that part where he is entirely free: but he is not entirely free except according to the will: but sin is where man is the cause of the act: therefore, sin is according to the will alone.

Solution. It must be said that, as was distinguished above, sin is in the soul in three ways: for it is either as in the first discerning and willing and choosing, or as in obeying, or as in not obeying indeed, but in being ordered to reason and will. In the first way, it is in the soul concerning reason and free will and will, in the second way concerning the irascible and concupiscible, in the third way concerning sensuality which is subject to mortal and venial sin. However, the first mode is subdivided into three, as is evident: because three things are required for voluntary acts, namely, the decree that they be done, and choice which is mixed with will, and thirdly complete consent in the work. Concerning the first of these, every sin is in reason, and concerning the second it is in free will, and concerning the third it is in the will: and therefore the completion is in the will and reason, and also free will is a power ordered to completion. And similarly, it is concerning good: and through this, the solution to the first three is evident.

To the other, it must be said that the image is taken in two ways, namely, per se: and thus it is in the simplest powers of the soul, which are only naturally inclined to be directed towards God through habits connatural to them: and in this way, there is no sin in the image. In the second way, it is taken for that part which imitates concerning acts, that is, which knows and can and wills to act freely: and in this way, sin is in the image: and this image is present according to reason and free will: and then it returns to the same distinction: because it is the same for sin to be in the image as it is to be in reason, free will, and will.

To the other, it must be said that in speculative matters there is no sin.

To the objection against, it must be said that such things are not prohibited because of knowing, because knowing is good, but because of the promptness to act from experience in the work in the knower himself: which act is evil, and is ordered to the perversion of the worship of faith.

To the other, it must be said that there the Philosopher speaks of practical reason, which has something of the will: and through this very thing, that they are orderable by reason, they become more free in the work of the will. Hence, whatever receives order, also receives free command from the will: and therefore it is not proven through this that sin is more in reason than in will: because the Philosopher supposes one in the other.

To the other, it must be said that the whole man is damned: because the act is of the whole man, although not according to the whole man: as Augustine said above about the man and woman, when only the lower portion ate: for damnation is due to the agent, just as the work is: but the powers according to which he does not sin, although the whole sins, are damned in him because of the conjunction and union to the damned agent.

To what is objected against, it must be said that the will communicates the freedom of acting even to other powers, insofar as it is the mover of other powers, as was noted above: and through this, they become susceptible to sin like the will, although in a different way, as was evident through the distinction introduced above.

Articulus 2 — Whether The Natural Will By Which We Will The Good Naturally Is An Actual Willing

Whether the natural will by which we will the good naturally is something to will in act?

Whether the natural will by which we will the good naturally is something to will in act?

Then it is asked concerning what he says in chapter 3, there, C, "Moreover, it is usually asked," etc.

For it seems that the Master says that the natural will by which we will the good naturally is something to will in act, and is a movement of the will.

However, it seems that this is not true: because opposite acts cannot exist in the same thing at the same time: however, it is evident that the sinner, when he wills evil, wills evil according to the whole power of the will: therefore, according to that, he cannot will good: therefore, he is not moved by a movement towards good and evil at the same time, according to one power which is the will.

If you say that it is not one will, but two: then I ask, whether they are two powers? If you say yes: therefore, there are two powers of the will in man: and this is superfluous, since according to one he could will good and evil, because all rational powers are towards opposites.

Likewise, to will naturally, as it is said in the text, is imperfect towards the good: but every imperfect thing can be perfected remaining the same in number according to substance: therefore, when liberating grace comes, it is the same will by which he wills the good effectively: but this is deliberative: therefore, it is the same will according to the essence of the power which naturally wills the good, and the deliberative will: but the deliberative is that which wills evil: therefore, it is the same according to the essence of the power that is the natural will, and effective towards good, and effective towards evil.

If you say that it is not inconvenient that one power according to essence is in opposite acts: because in truth they are not opposites, namely to will good naturally, and to will evil deliberatively. On the contrary: the will is towards act: either therefore towards one only, or towards many at the same time. If towards one, I have the proposition: because then when it is moved towards good either naturally or in any other way it is moved, it will not be moved by another act. But if towards many: therefore, from one simple immediate mover, many immediate acts proceed, so that one is not through another: and this is inconvenient, because it is supposed by the Philosopher that from one there is only one immediately.

If you say that that one mover which is the will is disposed by different habits, namely natural and deliberative: and therefore it can be in different acts at the same time. On the contrary: we speak of the conversion of the will by habit to act: either it can be converted to two acts at the same time, or not. If at the same time: therefore, one by essence and indivisible at the same time makes two, which the intellect does not grasp. But if it does not convert itself at the same time: then the proposition is held, namely that it is not moved by different movements at the same time.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
1. Damascene says that no substance is deprived of its proper operation: therefore, neither is the natural will: therefore, it always wills something.

1. Likewise, it is natural always to be in act: the natural will is natural: therefore, it is always in act.

Solution. It must be said without prejudice that the natural will is not always in act, and that it wills the good in act at the same time when the deliberative wills evil: but it wills it according to nature: and this is to will in a certain respect, and not simply: and this is to say that returning to the order of nature it wills good, but deliberation frequently neglects or despises that order: hence I concede the first part of the objections.

To that which is objected against, it must be said that there is an operation of the substantial form by which there is being: and this is a continuous operation. And there is an operation of the power following the form in that which is: and this does not have to be continuous, especially when it does not operate by necessity of nature, but rather by the freedom of will or reason.

Here also incidentally can be introduced the whole disposition concerning synderesis, and the whole disposition concerning conscience, which elsewhere among the questions concern-

ing the motive powers of the soul in our treatise on the Soul as we were able, we noted: and therefore it would be superfluous here to fill the pages with the same.

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DISTINCTIO XL

Divisio Textus

After these concerning acts, it is to be added whether it is granted, etc. In this distinction, the Master discusses the quantity of external acts by inquiring, Whether they also ought to be considered according to intention?

And it is divided into three parts: in the first of which he proposes the question with the authority of Ambrose, who seems to say that in all things the affection gives the name to the work. In the second, he introduces two opinions variously solving that question, the first of which begins there, B. But which is sown, Whether all works, etc. The second begins there, B, § 2: Others, etc. And for that opinion, he introduces a long chapter from the words of Augustine. In the last part of the distinction, he determines how those who are of the first opinion respond to the words of Augustine, and this begins there, D, Which nevertheless some contend never to have, etc.

And this is the sentence of the whole reading.

Articulus 1 — Whether Good And Evil Are Constitutive Differences Of Voluntary Action In Morals

Whether good and evil are constitutive differences of voluntary action in morals?

Here arises a doubt concerning the first part of the distinction, whether good and evil are constitutive differences of voluntary action in morals: so that a good action differs from a bad one, or not?

It seems that they are, 1. Whatever forms are intransmutable concerning a subject, seem to be substantial to that subject: but good and evil in action are forms; intransmutable concerning voluntary action - therefore they are substantial forms. The first is proved by the definition of an accident, which can both be present and not present in the same thing. The second is proved by this, because whatever action is good, it can never become bad, so that it remains the same in number: and thus the proposition is held.

1. Likewise, action in morals is not specified except by the reason of good and evil: therefore it seems that good and evil are substantial forms to action.
2. Likewise, action upon due matter signifies good in general, to which as a species responds good from circumstance: but circumstances make an act good or bad: there-

fore it seems that goodness and malice are forms specifying the act or voluntary operation.

ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Evil is a privation: but no privation specifies anything: therefore evil does not place action in a species.

1. Likewise, whatever things are differently present in individuals of the same species, those cannot be substantial forms: good and evil are differently and contrarily present in individual actions of the same species: therefore they cannot be substantial forms specifying action. The proof of the first is that whatever is after the species, is of the accidents, as Boethius says. The second is proved by example: because every coitus is one action in species: and yet one is good, and another bad. Similarly, the giving of alms by anyone is one action in species: and yet one is good, and another bad: and thus it is found in many others.
2. Likewise, all differences and specific forms are caused by the same principles from which the substance they inform and specify is caused: but good and evil are not caused by the same principles from which action is caused: therefore they are not differences or specific forms.

This is proved first by the fact that difference is potentially in the genus, and form in matter: and the operation of the agent brings it forth when it operates upon that matter. The second is proved by this, that it has been proved in many ways above that evil is not from God, and yet every action is from God.

Solution. It must be said that goodness and malice befall action. But there is a double accident. One is that which flows from the principles constituting being, but is after it, and this is an accident of the species, like even and odd befall number, and straight and curved line, and risible man: for since it is not of being, as Boethius says, it is necessarily of the number of accidents: but yet it is an accident per se not transmutable concerning the subject.

Hence it is clear that the first argument which seems to prove good and evil to be specific forms of acts, from the fact that they are not transmuted concerning the subject of one action, does not proceed: because it has an instance in such an action. Yet this solution solves nothing except concerning man: because good and evil are not properly passions of action,

For it is an accident of the individual which is caused by a cause per accidens: as white and black befall man: and this can be compared to the subject in two ways, namely to the subject only, or to the subject and cause. In the first way it is still compared in two ways, namely that there is a double subject, namely permanent, and that which is successive, like motion. If in the first way: then without doubt the accident is transmutable concerning the subject remaining the same in number, like white and black concerning man. But in the second way compared it is not transmutable: and this is not from the power of the accident, but from the fact that the subject passes, and cannot even be resumed the same in number: but if it could be resumed, it could also be under another accident, as we say swift and slow befall motion:

although the same motion in number can never be swift first, and afterwards slow, or conversely: and in this way also good and evil befall action. Hence that they are not transmuted, this itself is per accidens, and not of the nature of those forms. But if the accident is compared to the subject as to the subject and cause: and this happens in two ways, namely that the name of the subject names per se the cause of the accident: as an Ethiopian the cause of blackness in the subject, and snow of whiteness: and then the accident is not transmutable concerning the proximate subject, but concerning the common, as concerning man or frozen water. Or it is compared to the subject in such a way that it flows to some causes of the subject, as being Gallic or Teutonic, which is caused by place, which place of generation is a principle concerning something: and thus the solution to the first is clear.

To the other it must be said that action in morals is specified in its end, as every motion: because it is for that end, and it is its end: but good and evil, as will be clear below, are not thus caused from the end, but also from others.

To the other it must be said that good in general, as determined above, is not said in general from a general form including under the scope of predication its many species, but rather from the first potency in morals: and good from circumstance does not respond to it as a species of which it is substantially predicated without conversion in what it is, but responds to it as determining the potency of the subject, which could be done both well and badly: and good in action is not always caused from circumstances, but rather from the root of charity: and evil which proceeds from the evil root of the will: and frequently evil is that which does not have circumstances, as the interior act: for circumstances are properly concerning exterior acts.

Articulus 2 — Whether All Acts Can Be Called Indifferent

Whether all acts can be said to be indifferent?

Whether all acts can be said to be indifferent?

Then it is inquired concerning what is said in the first opinion, there, B, around the beginning:

To some it seems to be so, who say that all acts are indifferent, etc.

For it seems that this is impossible:
1. For it can never be indifferent, that which cannot be done except badly: to hate God, to persecute the innocent, to blaspheme the Creator cannot be done except badly: therefore an act can never be indifferent.

1. Likewise, Augustine says in the Letter, that some things can never be done well no matter how good a cause they have: therefore they can never be done except badly: therefore never indifferently: because indifferent is that which is neither good nor bad: therefore it seems this opinion speaks falsely.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
A common action is from God: no evil is from God: therefore no act is per se evil, nor per se good: therefore every act per se is indifferent, as this opinion says.

According to this, it is further inquired, Whether good in general signifies an indifferent act?

However, it seems that it does: because good in general is that which can be done well and badly: indifferent, however, is the same: therefore good in general signifies an indifferent act.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
Good in general signifies an act upon due matter: however, it is evident that the bare substance of matter is not due: therefore through some disposition it is made due: however, that makes good in general, or evil in general: therefore it is in the nature of good or evil: therefore acts are not in the nature of indifferent in good in general, or good in general does not signify an indifferent action.

Solution. It must be said that an indifferent action is said in many ways. In one way, an action is said to be indifferent, which can be done well and badly and be well informed, since it is an action of deliberative will, and of itself or of its species is not ordered more to one than to the other: and in this way indifferent is taken, as will be clear below, when it is inquired about the indifferent: and in this way indifferent is properly taken. In the second way, however, it is said to be indifferent, which through the substance of the subject does not determine the good or evil by which it is informed or deformed.

Therefore, it must be distinguished to the first, that when it is said, This action of this agent, the action is already demonstrated under the accidents of circumstances forming or deforming it: and similarly when it is said, This agent under the circumstances of the person: and it is true that thus accepted it cannot be done well: but when this opinion says that the action of itself is indifferent, it understands of itself for what it is of its simple substance understood without circumstances, as has often been explained above.

There are, however, those who say this is twofold, this action cannot be done well, and the action of this man cannot be done well: from which a demonstration can be made to the eye, and then the substance of the agent and action is demonstrated under the forms forming or deforming it: and thus they say it is true. It can also be a demonstration to the intellect concerning the bare substance of the action and agent, and thus they say it is false.

Thus this distinction seems to be without art through the said, and the solution to the second is clear: because Augustine speaks of action with circumstances.

To what is further inquired, it must be said that good in general or evil does not signify indifferent, as the objection says and proves.

To what seems to prove this, it must be said that when it is said, that good in general can be done well and badly, the "can" couples the power disposed to the other: just as when it is said, Indifferent can be done well and badly, the power is removed only: and that is not the proper nature of indifferent: but rather in this indifferent is, that it is neither good nor bad.

Articulus 3 — What The Indifferent Is

What is indifferent?

Then it is inquired about what is said there, C, But Augustine most evidently teaches, etc,

And two things are inquired. First, What is indifferent?

Second, Whether anything according to the Theologian is indifferent in the works of deliberative will?

TO THE FIRST THUS: Indifferent, which is placed between good and evil, is that which is neither good nor evil: however, many such things exist in the works of men, whether they are good, or

evil, such as eating, drinking, moving the hand, and the like: therefore, indifferent seems to be a human work proceeding from the will, which is neither good nor evil.

But against this seems to be, that 1. Good and evil have a medium between them which are in the same genus: therefore it is necessary that they have the same cause: but the proximate cause of good, and similarly of evil, is deliberative will: therefore, it will not be indifferent unless it proceeds from deliberation, and is neither good nor evil.

1. Furthermore, There is the good of nature, and the good of morals: however, the medium between certain extremes ought to be of the same order according to nature with them: therefore, that which is the good of nature, ought not to be indifferent which is placed as a medium between good and evil in morals. And this is said against some who place indifferent in the good of nature, or in the good in general.

2. Furthermore, If anything which is not
good nor evil in morals,
were indifferent, then hands and feet and
the like would be indifferent, which
is false: therefore, it is necessary that indifferent
be reduced to the same genus of cause with
good and evil: but those have a deliberative
cause: therefore, an indifferent act
would proceed from deliberative will, which
is neither good nor evil.

But on the contrary: Since every good is good
from the end, and evil is evil from
the privation of the end, that which is neither good
nor evil, is that which lacks the reason
of just necessity and pious utility: therefore
it is idle, because Gregory says, that

idle is that which lacks the reason of just
necessity and pious utility: however, in Scripture it is considered a sin!:
therefore indifferent is a sin: and
sin is evil: therefore indifferent is
evil, which is false.

Likewise, Indifferent seems to be the same as

vain or in vain: because, as the
Philosopher says, Vain or in vain is,
indifferent however by the very fact
that it is for some end, and does not
include it: what can be done well, is for some
end, and does not include it when it is not done
well: therefore it is the same as vain, as
it seems.

Solution. It must be said that indifferent
is taken in two ways, namely broadly, and
properly: and this speaking only in morals.
Broadly, indifferent is said of every
act which of itself determines neither the good of virtue nor
the evil of vice: and this
in two ways: for of itself it does not determine as to
the substance of the act considered in itself:
and thus every act is indifferent, as the first opinion says:
and in this way it is not spoken of here concerning indifferent.

In the second way, still broadly, indifferent is said of an act of will
which of its form determines neither good nor evil,
but is ordainable to either by intention: and that act proceeds
sometimes from the will of justice: as is
eating, going, moving, and the like: and
in this way again it is not spoken of
indifferent. Properly, however, indifferent is said
of that which proceeds from deliberative will,
and is neither good nor evil, but
ordainable to either: and in this way
it is inquired about indifferent, because this has
the same cause, and is ordered in the same
genus with good and evil in morals: and
this nothing prohibits to place according to
the ethical Philosopher: but whether also
according to the Theologian it can be placed, will be the question
in the following problem.

To what is first objected, it must be said
that that is indifferent broadly accepted:
but those things which are objected against,
proceed from indifferent most properly taken,

But what is further objected,
that indifferent is the same as idle, without
prejudice it seems to me properly taken
indifferent is the same as idle: but
nevertheless I do not always consider idle an act

of deliberative will, when it is not
immediately referred to God: because idle
is, that which lacks the reason of just necessity
or pious utility. Just necessity
of nature, as that which requires eating, and
drinking: and pious utility is any
utility concerning oneself or concerning one's neighbor, as
there are certain things concerning oneself from love to
remove tedium or sadness, as
lawful games, and symphonies, exercises,
and conversations, and songs, and the like:
for which reason also the Philosopher says in
the Ethics, that concerning the pleasurable
which is in play, the mean indeed is Eu-
trapeles, that is, well moderated, and

the disposition Eutrapelia. Superfluity however
is Buffoonery: and he who has it, is called
Buffoon. But he who lacks, is called

boorish or rustic: and the disposition rusticity.
Whatever things however are done for such ends
either in oneself, or in one's neighbor, I do not consider
indifferent nor idle. Whatever things
however proceed otherwise from deliberating will,
I consider idle and sins,
according to which vain is considered a sin by the Theologian.

To what is objected about vain,
it must be said that vain properly taken
differs from idle indifferent: because vain is
related to the end, but does not achieve
it: but idle and indifferent lack
that relation.

Note however, that there are some concerning
this thinking in diverse ways: for some
say, that indifferent is properly an act
of will whether deliberating, or not, not
related to the end of good or evil, nor of itself
determining either of them, as going,
exercising, eating, and the like. For
there are some acts of themselves having a good
end, as believing, loving, hoping and
the like. And these say indifferent
is something both according to the Ethicist and
according to the Theologian. Others say, that
indifferent is not an act proceeding from will
in whatever way it is, but from
deliberative will, having neither of itself, that is, neither good nor evil, nor
related to any of these: and this they say
in word is a sin, because word
is to another: but not in deed, because
this is not ordered to another.
And these, with all due respect, do not know what
they say: because when a word is said to
another, it is not said to another as to
the end of good, but it is said to another as
manifesting to another the intention of the speaker: and

then in the same way is determined the deed and word of deliberative will.
Hence also Gregory well says:

What the word condemned, it is not
to be believed that the word permitted, since
the deed is greater than the word. They hold the opinion above determined,
that indifferent is the same as idle, according
to which indifferent is strictly taken: and
therefore there is not much diversity between
the first opinion and the third.

Concerning this however in the following problem,
and concerning many other things more are found in
another treatise of ours on Virtues,
the question of good in general.

Articulus 4 — Whether, According To The Theologian, There Is Something Indifferent In The Works Of The Deliberative Will

Whether according to the Theologian there is anything indifferent in the works of deliberative will?

Secondly, it is asked, whether according to the Theologian there is anything indifferent in the works of deliberative will?

And it seems that there is nothing at all: because 1. The Apostle says to the Colossians 3:17: "Whatever you do in word or deed, do all in the name of the Lord Jesus, giving thanks to God the Father through Him."

Therefore, either the Apostle's precept is fulfilled, and then it is done well: or it is not fulfilled, and then it is done badly, because it is omitted: therefore it seems that nothing is done indifferently.

1. The same is concluded by what he says in 1 Corinthians 10:31: "Whether you eat or drink, or whatever you do, do all to the glory of God." And in the same book, 14:40: "Let all things be done decently and in order," namely among you.
2. Likewise, Bernard says that to stand in the way of God is to go backward: but if someone acts indifferently, he stands: therefore he goes backward: therefore to act indifferently is to go backward: and this is evil: therefore indifferent is evil.
3. Likewise, the Lord says: "I tell you that every idle word that men shall speak, they shall give account thereof in the day of judgment." And Gregory says, much more about deeds. Since therefore this is the same as indifferent properly taken, as was previously evident, it seems that nothing is indifferent to the Theologian: but many things are evil or good.

4. Likewise, this seems by that: "Either make the tree good, and its fruit good; or make the tree bad, and its fruit bad." Therefore it seems that a bad man produces all bad acts, and a good man produces good acts. Since therefore without a middle every man is good or bad, it seems every act is good or bad.
5. Likewise, no one can serve two masters: therefore it is necessary in every work to serve one or the other without a middle: if therefore the work is not of the service of God, that is, good, without a middle it seems to be of the service of the devil.
6. Likewise, there is nothing between rewards and punishments: therefore there should be nothing between the merits of punishments and rewards: but good works are causes of rewards, and evil works of punishments: therefore

there is nothing between a good and evil work: therefore nothing is indifferent, as it seems.

1. Likewise, if Adam had persisted in the first state, he would have referred all his works to God: therefore what is not referred, this is from sin: but what is from sin is evil: therefore not referring is evil: and thus not referred is evil: therefore indifferent is evil.
2. Likewise, Augustine says that to use what comes into one's power without referring it to something else to be enjoyed is to abuse and not to use: but indifferent when it proceeds from deliberative will, as has been said, is assumed into the power of the will: therefore it must either be referred to something else, or its use is abuse: and if it is referred to something else, it induces the reason of good: if however it is abuse, it becomes evil: therefore it never remains indifferent.
3. Likewise, Augustine: What we call sin is not the desire of evil things, but the desertion of the better: but indifferent deserts the better: therefore indifferent is sin, as it seems.
4. Likewise, reason is king in the kingdom of the soul: therefore it ought to refer all things to God, or it omits in governing: but things referred to God are good, and things omitted are evil: therefore all things under its governance are good or evil.

Likewise, God is the Alpha and Omega, the beginning and end of all things: therefore whatever is from Him as the beginning, if it does not intend in Him as the end, that remains imperfect: but an indifferent act is from Him, as from the beginning: therefore if it is not referred in Him as the end, it remains imperfect in morals: but what is deprived of the perfecting end is evil: therefore indifferent is evil.

But if this is conceded, 1. It seems that the Saints sin much: for there is no one who refers all his voluntary motions to God: therefore the Saints sin all day, as it seems.

If you say that the word of the Apostle is not a precept, but a counsel. Against this is that he speaks not to certain men, but to all: nor about certain works, but about all, such as eating and drinking, without which no man lives. Moreover, from the manner of speaking it seems

that we ought to refer even the works of nature to God: because eating and drinking are works of nature, although it is conceded that in them something can be indifferent.

1. Likewise, if it were a counsel, at least it would be necessary that some fulfill it as the perfect: and we see that no one fulfills it.
2. If you say according to some, that there is a certain precept that obliges habitually, but not actually, that is, that it is habitually referred, not in act, that is, that nothing is done against the glory of God: but such are works referable to the glory of God. Against: For according to this, one sleeping would fulfill that precept, because he does nothing against the precept of God: but all his works are referable to the glory of God: but whatever fulfills the precept of God, merits: therefore one sleeping merits in act, which is false.
3. Likewise, a precept regards of itself a work that is in our power, and not a habit: therefore it is not to be said that it obliges habitually and not actually.

From this disputation it seems further to follow that

1. Religious and any others are bound to refer all singular works to God, or they will not be meritorious, but demeritorious: which is very difficult to sustain, because no such person is found.
2. Moreover, if we are bound to refer all to God: therefore also venial sins.

Conclusion. Speaking without prejudice, I do not see how according to the sayings of the Saints it can be sustained that there is anything indifferent in the works of deliberative will: because it will either be idle, and then it is considered evil in the Gospel: or it will be referred, and then it will be meritorious: and therefore I concede the first four arguments.

To the fifth, however, it must be said that it is not valid: for it can well be that a bad man does a work not bad: as if he gives alms for the sake of God, because good is not the same as meritorious: but it can be good of the genus of goods, as the Masters say. But what is said, "Either make, etc." It must be said that the tree is not said here to be the acting man or the will which is the instrument, but the tree is said to be the fruit of the will: and this is true: because from such an interior act by itself proceeds only according to the likeness of the fruit, but from the man himself it can proceed as evil and good.

To the other it must be said that that objection is not valid: because it is understood that by one work one cannot intend contrary things: whence the Gloss says that it is understood of masters commanding contrary things: but yet by one work one could tend to one thing according to what is of the genus of goods, and by another tend to another which by itself is evil.

To the other it must be said that there is nothing intermediate in my judgment regarding the acts of deliberative will: because that which seemed to be intermediate takes the condemnation of evil, but not regarding all acts of will, as is evident from what was previously held.

To the other it must be said that we are not bound to all those things which we would have had in the state of the first man, if he had stood. And although some things are caused by sin, such as the necessity of dying, and such penalties, yet by occupation we are not bound to refer all to God, unless they are done by deliberating will: but sudden or not thinking we are not bound, and that is not the cause of indifferent properly speaking, but deliberative will, as was previously said.

To the other it must be said that it is an act of deliberative will: yet I do not say that it is abused if it is not referred: but if it is referred to the opposite, then it is abused: and the reason for this will be evident in the following of this same problem.

To the other it must be said that the desertion of better things is only through actual aversion: and this aversion is only through conversion to the opposite.

To the other it must be said that an indifferent act is from God, as every act: yet it is not necessary that it be actually referred to God: because it has perfection according to nature: and that relation would not give it perfection according to nature, but only according to well-being: and that is said to be perfect which is complete according to being; yet it is true that it remains vain not referred, as will be evident below.

To what is objected in the contrary, without prejudice I say that it is the precept of the word of the Apostle: but since it is affirmative, it does not oblige always, although it obliges always. I say, however, that it obliges for place and time: and place and time are when he actually thinks that such an act is referable, and can be meritorious if it is referred. But still the precept is violated in two ways, namely by the will tending to the opposite relation: and this is the will despising the honor of God by that relation, and then it transgresses mortally and violates the precept. It is also omitted by the will simply: and then I think that work remains vain, and it becomes venial, and it is not done against the precept, but we do it beyond the glory of God. And thus it is evident that the commandment is fulfilled by many: and by those who do not fulfill it, they do not always sin mortally.

To what is further objected, it must be said that such works, although they are of nature, yet they are ordainable by deliberating will: and in such a case the Apostle speaks.

To the other it must be said that the one ordaining does not have actual will: but this sin has will actually deliberating, as has been said: and therefore against the will of God: as to do is in the sleeping pure privation: in the waking, however, if it is referred, then it places actual merit. If however it is not referred, then it places something to be done against the commandment or beyond the commandment, as has been said: and therefore in one case it can be a grave sin, in another however idle, which is also considered evil by the Saints.

By this also the solution to the following is evident,

To what is further asked, it must be said that a universal relation suffices: as for example, if he devoted himself entirely, all works are related in that relation, unless actually in some evil work the relation is revoked: as if we say, he devoted a hundred marks to God, and every day he gives single pennies, it is not necessary that he refers every day: because the relation

suffices unless it is revoked: and it is similar in those things which are carried by violent motion, in which the first motivating force is not always joined, but is multiplied in the middle, and remains.

To the other it must be said that it is not valid: because venial sin is a disposition to evil: and therefore it is not referable: but the saying of the Apostle is understood of those things which by nature are ordered to the glory of God.

Articulus 5 — Whether One And The Same Act Numerically Can Be Good And Evil

Whether one and the same act in number can be good and evil?

Whether one and the same act in number can be good and evil?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, C, towards the end: In which some place the act of the Jews, who crucifying, etc.

For it seems to follow from this that one act in number can be good and evil.

1. For the crucifixion of the Jews was one act in number: and therefore the passion of Christ pleased the Jews, and the act of the Jews displeased God; therefore the same pleased and displeased: but nothing pleases God unless it is good, nothing displeases unless it is evil.
2. Likewise, This also seems in many examples, as in all the temptations of the Saints which on the part of the tempters displease, and on the part of the sufferers please, although it is one and the same act in number.
3. Likewise, The good lord commands the evil servant to give alms, and he gives it with an evil will: that giving is one in number, and meritorious for the lord, and demeritorious for the servant: therefore the same action is good and evil.
4. Likewise, This objection is concerning the suffrages which are made for the good dead by the evil living, in which one act in number seems to be meritorious of the diminution of punishment, and not meritorious. If you say, that this is not inconvenient with respect to different things. This is nothing: because good and evil are absolute forms inhering, and not in comparison to another: therefore it seems, that an action which is good for someone, is good in itself: and which is evil for someone, is evil in itself: therefore the same act in number is in itself evil, and in itself good, which is impossible.
5. Furthermore, It seems this is verified concerning some continuous act, which someone first does for God, and afterwards before he finishes, he turns the intention to vain glory: for then the act is one, because the agent is one, and the time is one, and the terminus of the motion is one: and yet it is first good, and afterwards evil: therefore one act in number can be good and evil, which seems to be impossible, since good and evil are opposites, either as contraries, or as privation and habit, as was determined above.

Solution. It must be said, that in my judgment one and the same act thus posited as the same taken in essence, cannot be simultaneously good and evil.

To the first and second, therefore, it must be said, that action and passion are not the same: because action is in the agent as an accident in a subject, although it is from it as from a cause: and therefore although the passion pleases, it is not necessary that the action pleases: because they are not the same essentially, although they are simultaneous, and one is effected by the other.

To the other it must be said, that there are two actions there really, namely the will to give in the lord, and the will not to give in the servant: and therefore the action of the lord is simply good: but the action of the servant has two things, namely the essence of the action according to which it is in the agent and from it, and this is absolutely evil: and the act itself, and this by the authority of the lord, although the ministry is of the servant: and this is good according to which the authority is, and that ministry is right, although absolutely it is evil.

To the other it must be said, that the work of suffrage done by the evil, has the first motive that which is in purgatory, and the grace of that informs the act itself: but the action itself is substantially evil and demeritorious for the doer, or at least not good.

To the other it must be said, that in such an action there are two moral actions, although one is naturally: and with respect to its diverse parts it is informed diversely by intention: for in morals intention is principally moving: and since there are two intentions there, there are two movers, and to two movers follow two actions, and not one.

DISTINCTIO XLI

Divisio Textus

Since the intention, as was said above, etc. In this distinction, the Master determines a certain question which follows from what has been established, namely, whether every act of unbelievers is a sin, whose intention is not directed by faith?

It is divided into two parts: in the first of which he determines whether every work is a sin that is not done from faith directing and charity informing the intention. In the second, a question arises incidentally, because intention in one way is the will related to the end, he inquires whether every sin is voluntary. And this begins there, D, "After this it must be investigated," etc.

In the first part, there are four chapters, in the first of which from the words of Augustine it seems to be proven that there is no good work where there is no charity. In the second, the contrary is objected again through the words of Augustine. In the third, a response is given according to those who say that there is no good work where there is no faith. In the fourth, another response is given according to those who make a threefold division of acts.

And through this, the meaning of the first part is clear.

Articulus 1 — Whether The Will Alone Or Intention Suffices For Merit Or Demerit, Or The Act Adds Something In Both

Whether the will alone or intention suffices for merit or demerit, or does the act add something in both?

Before the Letter, however, due to the diverse disputations of the Masters, four questions are asked: the first of which is, Whether the will alone or intention suffices for merit or demerit, or does the act add something in both or not? Secondly, Whether intention makes a work good or evil? Thirdly, Whether it is true that intention gives quantity to a good or evil work? Fourthly, Whether intention is directed by faith and charity, or not?

To the first, it is said thus:

1. Bernard in the book on Free Will and Grace: A good intention suffices for merit, but a good action is required for example. Therefore, it seems that action does nothing with respect to merit, but intention alone.

1. Likewise, on that place of Psalm 31:5: "I said: I will confess," etc., the Gloss says: The will is counted for the work. Therefore, it seems that the work is superfluous, since God does not regard anything unless it is truly sufficient.
2. Likewise, Psalm 125:3: "Those who sow in tears," etc., the Gloss says: To which it suffices if the ability is lacking. Therefore, it seems that in every good the will suffices.
3. Likewise, the same seems by reason: For merit is to be considered according to that which is most ours: but nothing is so much ours as that which is most in our power: and this is the will, as Augustine says in the last chapter of this distinction: therefore, it seems that merit is considered according to the will of man.
4. Likewise, God created us all equally for the kingdom: therefore, He also placed the power of meriting in something that all equally have: but this cannot be an external work, but an internal will: therefore, the power of merit consists in the will, and not in the external work.
5. The same seems by authority, that the external work adds nothing to merit: because on that of Mark 12:43: "This poor widow has put in more than all those who have given to the treasury," the Gloss says: The merit is of pious intention. Therefore, intention is more accepted than the work, or rather without the work, because the widow did no or little work compared to others.
6. Likewise, the Gloss of Jerome, there: "Not how much, but from how much you give," and from this follows the same.
7. Likewise, on that which merit did not abound: the Gloss says: Where the will is equal, it will have equal reward.
8. Likewise, all that we work is by grace: but grace is not given according to works, but gifts: therefore, it seems that neither is merit, which is from grace, in external operations, but in the internal act of grace.

If it is said that it is so in good things, but not in evil: because evil in work is worse than in will alone. Against this, it is objected thus: On that place of Psalm 7:3: "They work iniquities in their heart," etc., the Gloss says: If you will and cannot, the Lord counts it as done.

1. Likewise, on that of Leviticus 15:19: "A woman who suffers the flow of blood at the return of the month," the Gloss: The will is counted for the deed: and so it seems that in evils, it is the same, and also in goods: and thus it seems that the work adds nothing on either side.

But against this, it is objected thus:
4. James says in the canonical, 2:20: "Faith without works is dead": but faith directs intention: therefore, intention without works is worth nothing.

1. Likewise, Gregory: Charity works great things, if it is: but if it ceases to work, it is not charity. Therefore, it seems that in charity, which is the end of works, as was said above, works are required.
2. Likewise, Gregory: The proof of love is the exhibition of work.
3. Likewise, 2 Corinthians 8:10-11: "You began to will from the previous year: now also complete it in deed, so that as the readiness of the will is, so also may be the completion from what you have."
4. Likewise, there, 8:12: "If the will is ready, according to what one has," etc.
5. Likewise, there, 9:6: "He who sows sparingly," etc., and he speaks of works. From these and many others, it is clear that good works done in charity are worth for reward and merit.
6. Furthermore, it would be absurd to say that they are not worth anything: because thus men would be withdrawn from works.
7. Likewise, in human judgment, one who serves with will alone is not equally rewarded as one who serves with will and work: therefore, it is the same in divine justice. Similarly, it seems that in evil they also bring: because in human judgment, a thief is condemned, not one who wishes to steal, although incomparable: therefore, in the judgment of God, it should be so, that the deed is more condemned than the will alone.
8. Likewise, Matthew 25:35 and following, the king, namely God, reproaches both the good and the evil with deeds as the cause of salvation or condemnation, saying: "I was hungry," etc.: therefore, works are added to the will.

Solution. It must be said that in good things, the will and intention suffice in adults, in all those cases in which the ability of the work is lacking. But in all those cases in which the ability is present, the intention and will deceive themselves unless they proceed in work: and then the will and deed are rewarded together.

By this, the solution to all those objections concerning good things is clear.

Likewise, merit must be distinguished. For there is the merit of actual reward here, and in the future: in the future, to glory in the multitude of good operations: here, however, to be rooted in good by the confirmation of habit and the increase of grace, from the knowable because one uses well what is received, and suchlike: and for this, works are worth, and they add upon this a complete will. And there is merit with respect to substantial reward only, that one may glory in the participation of God: and this is considered only according to the root of charity.

By this, the solution to all objections concerning good things is clear.

To what is objected concerning evils, there is also one solution, that a complete will is counted as a deed in those things which are sins against God, such as contempt, aversion, ingratitude, and suchlike. But in those things which are against one's neighbor, a complete will alone is not as harmful as the work: and consequently, the punishment of loss and sense is equal, but the punishment of remorse is not so. Yet it must be noted that in some sins, the will is scarcely so complete in itself as in the work of the flesh, as in fornication: because the bodily act adds delight there.

To what is objected concerning human judgment, which condemns the work, not the will, it is not similar: because man does this, because he does not see the heart: but God, who looks at the heart, condemns both, and more the heart than the work.

By this, the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 2 — Whether Intention Makes A Work Good Or Evil; Secondly It Is Asked, Whether Intention Makes The Good And The Evil Work

Whether intention makes a work good or evil?

Secondly, it is asked, whether intention makes a work good and evil?

Whether intention makes a work good or evil?

Secondly, it is asked, whether intention makes a work good and evil?

It seems that it does:

1. By that of Luke 6:45: "A good man out of the good treasure of his heart brings forth good, and an evil man out of evil, etc.": there the Gloss says: The treasure of the heart is intention, from which the Lord judges works. Therefore, it seems that works are good and evil through good or evil intention.
2. Likewise, a good which is perfect in being and well-being can become evil through intention, as is believing in God or giving alms with an evil intention: therefore, much more can an evil which is imperfect and a defect become good through intention: therefore, good becomes evil through intention, and evil becomes good, and thus the quality of the work generally depends on the quality of the intention.
3. Likewise, since the work is not the cause of the intention, but rather the intention is the cause of the work, and the cause influences its quality upon the caused, it seems that the

goodness or malice of the intention flows into the work: and thus the work is good or evil by a good or evil intention.

4. Likewise, theft is evil in itself: and yet done with a good intention, it is good in those who took the goods of the Egyptians by the command of the Lord.

5. Likewise, someone simple steals from a rich man without any remorse of conscience, to give to the poor: in that case, only the good intention moves to the work: therefore, it seems that it becomes good.

6. Likewise, this one intends to sin mortally, and the act in itself is a venial sin: the Masters concede that he sins mortally because of the intention: therefore, similarly it should be conversely, that one sinning mortally from the act, will sin venially from the intention, since the Lord is more inclined to have mercy than to condemn.

But if this is conceded, those things which were held by Augustine in the preceding distinction will be contrary.

Solution. It must be said that good and evil in a work are not caused in one way: but good, as Dionysius says, is from one whole cause, that is, for the constitution of good, all circumstances and the end and form in the will of the agent must agree: and it is not constituted except by all these together in the manner of an integral whole, which is constituted by all its parts taken together. Evil, however, as Dionysius says, happens in every way, that is, from any particular defect: just as an integral whole is destroyed by any part being destroyed separately. And therefore it is, that good is not without a good intention, although it is not good from intention alone: just as a house is not without a wall, although it is not from the wall alone.

And by this the solution to the first is clear: because for evil, the intention of corruption suffices, although it is also caused by other corruptions. But for good, the integrity of intention does not suffice: because many other corruptions can be around the work.

To the other, it must be said that it is not similar, as is clear from what has been said.

To the other, it must be said that intention is the cause of the work, but it is not the sole cause: and therefore that objection does not proceed.

To the other, it must be said that it was not theft, but rather a transfer of dominion from him who could, into the power or dominion of the people: and therefore that argument does not prove.

To the other, it must be said that in that work there is ignorance of the law, which excuses no one entirely: and therefore that intention is perverse.

To the other, it must be said that as it is in good and evil, so it is in evil and worse: because for worse, a particular corruption in act or intention suffices. However, for evil to become less evil in kind, it does not suffice in the same way. I say in kind, so that from mortal in itself it becomes venial: because the goodness of intention diminishes in the same kind, but not by changing the kind of sin.

Articulus 3 — Whether Intention Gives Quantity To The Good Or Evil Work, And Makes The Work Good Or Evil

Whether intention gives quantity to a work, good or evil, and makes a work good or evil?

Thirdly, it is asked whether intention gives quantity to a work, good or evil?

It seems that it does: for the Gloss on that passage of Luke 6:45: "A good man," etc., says: "From the good treasure, as much good as you intend, so much good you do." And another on that, "An evil man from the evil treasure," etc.: "As much evil as you intend, so much evil you do." Therefore, it seems that both good and evil work receive quantity from good or evil intention: but this one, by giving alms or by the mere will of martyrdom, intends to be a martyr: therefore he is a martyr. And similarly in evil, this one by fornicating intends to sin venially: therefore he sins venially: both of which are false: therefore, not as much as you intend, so much you do.

Solution. To this, it can be said, as was answered above: and I consider that solution better. But nevertheless, the Antisiodorensis distinguishes here by saying that when it is said, "As much as you intend, so much you do," "as much" and "so much" can be taken nominally and adverbially. If nominally: they are in the accusative case, and the sense is: "As much a thing as you intend, so much you do": and then in good things it does not hold for the reasons stated above: because good is caused by one whole and sole cause, and not by intention alone. However, in evils, having comparison to worse, it holds on the part of guilt, although it does not hold on the part of conversion to a changeable good, as was said before: but descending with respect to lesser evil, it does not hold: because it does not follow, if you intend by fornicating to sin venially, that you sin venially. If, however, they are taken adverbially: then they can denote intention in general and similarity, or in species in equality. In the first way, it is true, "As much as you intend, so much you do," that is, if much, much. If in the second way, it is false: because the work is not always measured to the equality of intention.

And by this, the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 4 — Whether Intention Is Directed By Faith Or By Charity

Whether intention is directed by faith or charity?

Fourthly, it is asked whether intention is directed by faith or charity, or not?

And it seems that it is not:

1. For reason by itself suffices to see the end of its work: therefore, by itself without the end, it suffices for directing.

1. Furthermore, charity in no way seems to direct: because to direct is an act of sight, but charity is according to simple affection.
2. Likewise, why is looking attributed to faith and charity, and not to hope, since it is a theological virtue and regards the end like the other two?

Solution. It must be said that faith alone properly directs by this, that it shows the end of good and the reward.

To the first objection, it must be said that although reason by itself suffices to know the end as it is, it does not suffice to know what is the reward of the work in the participation of God through glory: and therefore the light of faith must be present in that direction.

To the second, it must be said that charity directs in the manner of tending towards the end, not in the manner of indicating, as was explained above.

To the third, it must be said that the end is present in that which intends towards the end through intention: but hope and that which it expects is in the manner of the future, not the present: and it does not properly direct, but raises up the one working.

Articulus 5 — Whether The Works Of All Unbelievers Are Necessarily Evil Or Not

Whether the works of all unbelievers are necessarily evil or not?

Then inquiry is made concerning those things which are said in the Text: and first concerning this which it says, there, A, Whether every intention and every work of theirs is evil, etc.

For it seems that this is true: because
1. A good tree cannot produce bad fruits, nor a bad tree, etc. It is evident, however, that the unbeliever is a bad tree: therefore, he does not produce good fruits: thus he cannot perform good works.

1. Likewise, Unbelief is a habit contrary to faith: therefore, it directs towards the contrary of faith: however, a right intention towards the contrary of faith makes a work evil: therefore, every work of an unbeliever is evil.

ON THE CONTRARY:
1. Unbelievers had the work of civil virtues: but those works are not evil, but rather good: therefore, an unbeliever can perform good works.

1. Likewise, a certain Gloss on Matthew says that many come to Christ with natural virtues. Therefore, before they come, they have natural virtues: however, the works of those virtues are not evil: therefore, not all their works before faith are evil.

Solution. It must be said that not all the works of unbelievers are necessarily evil: but all their works are necessarily without grace making one pleasing, and not meritorious, although they can be of the genus of good things, as the second opinion introduced here says: because the prior opinion which responds to this question in the Text is false.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that a tree is not called a working man, nor is the will an instrument, but the will is an interior act: and that which proceeds from it per se, not per accidens, is informed according to it: and therefore, if it is evil, it itself is evil: and if it is good, it itself is good. And this has also been noted above. However, a bad man in himself can well

do good, not insofar as he is bad, but insofar as he is moved by natural piety or the goodness of political virtue.

To the other, it must be said that unbelief, insofar as it does not denote the privation of faith, but the habit contrary to faith which is called error, does not always direct the unbeliever: but it is true that whenever it directs him, it perverts the work. However, the unbeliever is directed, just as the believer, sometimes by the light of natural reason: and then he can perform works which are of the genus of good things. However, what Augustine says in the Text, that false virtue is in such, even in the best morals, the second opinion which is called false solves well enough: because what it promises as far as the nature of the act which is ordered to beatitude, it does not solve due to the contrary disposition found in the subject of the acting.

Articulus 6 — Whether Every Sin, Even Original, Is Voluntary

Whether every sin, even original, is voluntary?

Whether every sin, even original, is voluntary?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, D, After these things it must be investigated, how it is to be understood, etc.

For it seems that every sin is voluntary: because

1. Original sin is innate from the necessity of corrupt nature: and what is from necessity, as Augustine says, is not under the will: therefore the first motions are not under the will: therefore they are not voluntary: and yet they are sins: therefore not every sin, even actual, is voluntary.
2. Likewise, some sin is from ignorance, as was held above. However, it is evident that what is involuntary is through ignorance, as Damascene says, whose principle is within the one not knowing singulars: therefore what is unknown is not voluntary: but ignorance is sin: therefore not every sin is voluntary.
3. Likewise, someone is bound to rise for Matins, and while sleeping does not hear the signal: therefore he omits by not rising: but it is evident that he does not have will while sleeping: therefore he sins by omitting without will: therefore not every sin is voluntary.

Solution. It must be said that every sin is voluntary, as it says in Zitfera: but it is not voluntary in one way, but in multiple ways. For some is voluntary which is caused by will alone with nothing else inclining to sin, neither interior nor exterior: and thus the first sin of the demon was voluntary.

In another way, it is called voluntary, which is caused by will alone inclining internally, although it has an external inclining: and thus the sin of the first parents is called voluntary, whom nothing inclined internally to sin except will, and the demon externally: and this mode is held in Litlera.

Sometimes a sin is called voluntary, whose act is voluntary: but with will inclining to the same thing both internally and externally: and thus actual mortal sins in us corrupted are called voluntary.

Sometimes a sin is called voluntary by the will causing the cause of the first sin, although not the sin itself: and this in two ways, namely in different persons, or in the same: in different as original is called voluntary, because its cause in Adam was voluntary: in the same, however, as when someone voluntarily first intoxicates himself, or does something else, whereby he loses the governance of reason by his fault, and afterwards falls into another sin.

Otherwise, a sin is called voluntary, which in singular can be prevented by will, although it cannot in universal: and thus the first motion is called voluntary, as we said above.

Sometimes a sin is called voluntary, because the will tends to its contrary: and this in two ways, namely in itself, and in cause: and thus the sin of omission is called voluntary in itself, as when he does not honor when he ought and can his parents, or does not rise when he can and ought and notices, for Matins: then indeed the will ought to tend to rising and honor. In cause, however, when someone directly intoxicates himself or stays awake too much, so that nature cannot sustain rising at the due time: or when someone promises at a term in which he thinks himself insufficient to pay: but if he does whatever he can, and cannot, then he does not omit. And thus also in the sin of ignorance it is voluntary, because the will is bound to tend to knowing.

Sometimes it is called voluntary whose act is voluntary, and the circumstance involuntary: just as ignorance of fact excusing from the whole is voluntary, because he wills the act, although he does not will the circumstance which he ignores: and if he could know, he would not will the act, just as knowing Leah in Jacob was voluntary before he consented to her as his.

In the last way, it is called voluntary what is not chosen in itself, but for the sake of something more difficult into which it is necessary to fall, if that is not voluntary, just as in time of storm the casting of goods is voluntary, because unless they are cast, it is necessary to sink from the weight of the ship.

And through this the solution to all objections is clear, except concerning invincible ignorance: and concerning that it must be said, that it is reduced to voluntary whose act is voluntary, but not the circumstances: yet in such a way that will is taken broadly.

DISTINCTIO XLII

Articulus 7 — What Tumor Is; And How The Species Of Tumor Are Taken

What is swelling? and, How are the species of swelling received?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, 1, around the beginning: Of which there are four species, etc.

These according to Gregory are species of swelling rather than of pride.

Therefore, two things are inquired, namely, what is called swelling? and, By what are these species received?

And it must be said that (as Gregory says) swelling of the mind is an obstacle to truth: and swelling is called the inflation of presumption from the power which someone believes they have. And in this it differs from pride: because pride is the appetite for excellence or dignity: but swelling is arrogance, and is caused by power and dignity obtained.

But secondly, it must be said that one's own power is caused in three ways, namely from innate things, acquired things, and the manner of having. If from innate things: then it is the first species, when one believes they have by their own strengths. If it is from acquired things: then it is the second, when one indeed believes they have from another, but not freely, but through the acquisition of merit which was proper. If from the manner of having: either which seems, and is not: and then it is the third species, when one falsely boasts to have what they do not have. Or it seems and is, but is singular: and then it is the fourth species which is, when one believes they have more excellently than all others what they have. And concerning these there is a verse:

From oneself, for merits; falsely, more than all, they inflate.

Divisio Textus

Since, however, a bad will and operation are sin, etc. Here he begins to discuss the modes of sins. And it has two parts: in the first, he touches on the general definitions of the roots of sin. In the second, he specifically touches on the diversity of the greatest sin, which is the sin against the Holy Spirit, which begins below, distinction XLII, there, A, There is moreover a certain sin, etc.

This distinction, however, has five parts: in the first of which he inquires, Whether the actual interior will and the exterior work are one sin, or not?

In the second, how sin passes in act and remains in guilt? there, D, Moreover it is usually asked, When by someone, etc. In the third, he touches on the diversity of the roots of sin, there, F, The modes of sins, In the fourth, he discusses the seven capital vices, there, H, Moreover it should be known In the fifth, he shows how from pride and greed all vices arise, there, I, However pride all evils, etc.

And through these and the following disputation, the sentence will be made clear.

Articulus 1 — Whether The Interior Will Together With The Exterior Act Is The Same Sin Or A Different One

Whether the interior will with the exterior act is the same sin or different?

The question arises concerning the first part, whether the interior will with the exterior act is the same sin or different?

It seems, however, that they are different:

1. By three reasons, which the Master sets forth in the Text, and solves: of which the first is this, Will and act are either multiple sins, or they are not multiple sins. If they are multiple sins, I have the proposition: but multiple sins are not one sin: therefore will and exterior act are not one sin. But if they are not multiple sins: either therefore neither is a sin, or one is not a sin: both of which are false: therefore it remains, that they are multiple sins.

1. The second is this: By multiple things of which one is not a sin, one is not made more guilty than by one which is a sin: therefore if will and act are multiple non-sins, by them one is not made more guilty than by will alone: but this is false: therefore the act is a sin added to the will: therefore will and act are two sins.
2. The third is this: One sin is not prohibited except by one command, and multiple by multiple: but will and act are prohibited by multiple commands: therefore they are multiple sins.
3. To the same can be objected in this way: As was held above, the interior will and the exterior work differ as tree and fruit: but tree and fruit are different evils in evils, and different goods in goods: therefore the interior will and the exterior work are different sins.
4. Likewise, on that of the Psalm xcviii, 28: "Add iniquity upon iniquity," etc., the Gloss says, that he who adds work to will, adds iniquity to iniquity: but iniquity is not added to iniquity, unless different to different: therefore will and work, etc.
5. Likewise, on that of the Apostle to the Romans 1, 29, "murders," the Gloss says:
   He says in the plural, "murders": because one is the murder of will, and another simply of work. Therefore similarly it is in other sins: therefore will, etc.
6. Likewise, the interior will and the exterior work differ as cause and effect: but these are always different: therefore they are different sins.
7. Likewise, a universal is predicated of its multiple inferiors separately, and afterwards separately falls into plurality, when it is predicated of multiple together conjunctively, as if Socrates is a man, and Plato is a man: therefore Socrates and Plato are men. But it is evident, that the will of fornicating is a sin, and fornication is a sin: therefore the will of fornicating and fornication are two sins: and the same is in others: therefore in all the interior will, etc.
8. Likewise, in two things differing in substance by number, there is not one accident by number: but the interior will and act differ by substance: therefore one accident by number is not in them: but malice and deformity is an accident or by the mode of an accident: therefore there is not one deformity in the interior will and the exterior act.
9. Likewise, sometimes the interior will and the exterior act are not simultaneous in time: and it is evident, that each is a sin: therefore they are not one sin by number: because the same by number does not precede itself in time.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
1. It was held above, that the first evil and cause of evil is will: therefore the act is not evil per se, but per aliud or per accidens: but evil per se and evil per accidens do not diversify substance according to number: therefore the interior will and the exterior act do not make different sins according to number.

1. Likewise, one sin by number is for which one penance by number is enjoined: but for will and act when they are conjoined, one penance by number is enjoined: therefore one sin by number.
2. Likewise, in good works the interior will and the exterior work, when conjoined, constitute one merit only according to number: therefore since God does not count our evils as much as our goods, there will be in evil one sin by number, the interior will, etc.
3. Likewise, there is one conversion and aversion in both: because when will and work are conjoined, the will is not converted to a changeable good, except through the work: therefore since the unity of sin is from one conversion, and by one conversion the interior will and the exterior act are one sin,
4. Likewise, one sin is from one privation of grace and corruption of natural good: but the work does not deprive otherwise than the will, when they are conjoined: therefore one sin is the will with the exterior work.
5. Likewise, there is one punishment for both: but of multiple sins there is not one punishment; therefore they are one sin.

Solution. It must be said, that when will and act are conjoined, they are one double sin: because that which is natural in sin is duplicated in sin, namely the substance of the act: because the interior and exterior acts are two. But that which is formal, namely deformity, is the same. For in the notion of form and end, it is one sin, because one is the end for both, and one aversion.

And by this the solution to almost everything is clear.

To the first it must be said, that these are multiple non-sins but one sin, that is, united in one deformity. And thus

it is clear, that each is a sin: and yet not multiple sins: because one is there on account of the other, as act through will: and one from the other, as from cause and from will: and one in the other conjoined to the end, as will in the exterior act.

To the other it must be said, that one is not made more guilty intensively, when will and act are conjoined: but one is made guilty of more materially, because of a double act. But if will preceded act in time, then the argument would follow: because then not only the exterior act follows the interior will, but the intermediate will with the exterior act follows the will which preceded, and this makes two sins.

To the other it must be said, that it is false, that it is prohibited by a double prohibition, when they are conjoined: because when it is said, "You shall not commit adultery," there the

will progressing into work is prohibited. But when it is said, "You shall not covet," etc., there the will resting only in the delightful thought is prohibited. But yet the Master solves this thirdly otherwise in the Text: but it is not to be cared for: because this solution is more to the point, his however more to the man.

To the other it must be said, that they differ materially, and in this they have similarity with tree and fruit: but they are not similar in the multiplication of form, because it is multiplied in tree and fruit.

To the two following it must be said, that this is either understood of material diversity: or if it is understood of formal diversity, then it must be taken of will divided from work according to time.

To the other it must be said, that although the exterior work proceeds from the interior will as from an efficient cause, yet it is united to it in the end, and consequently in the aversion following that end because it is not averted except through this, because it places a changeable good as its end: and therefore formally they are one sin.

To the other it must be said, that this is true, when the common is predicated of multiple differing in form according to being, although not according to reason, as Socrates and Plato have two humanities: but as we said before, the interior will and the exterior act have only one deformity according to the being of sin, inasmuch as it is sin: and therefore it is not similar.

To the other it must be said, that in two things which are entirely different, it is true what is objected: but will and act are not entirely diversified: because they are united in the end, and from that end is all the deformity: because (as Augustine says) all human perversity is to enjoy what should be used, and to use what should be enjoyed.

To the other it must be said, that when they are divided, and will is limited in itself, nor does it progress into work, nor does it continue to work: then it is well conceded, that they are different sins, as is evident from the prehabited.

Articulus 2 — On What Liability To Punishment Is Founded

On what is guilt founded?

On what is guilt founded?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, "Moreover, it is usually asked," etc.

For guilt, since it signifies an obligation to punishment, must be founded on something as on a cause: therefore, it is either founded on the act, or on something left from the act. Not on the interior or exterior act: because each passes away, as is proven in the Text: and with the cause ceasing, the effect ceases: hence, if it were founded on the act, it would be necessary that there would be no guilt unless the act existed: and this is false: therefore, it is founded on something left from the act. It is asked, therefore, what is that?

However, it seems that it is a habit or disposition: because

1. From similar acts, similar habits are left (as the Philosopher says) in good and in evil: therefore, from evil acts, a habit or disposition is left in the soul towards a similar act in species.
2. Likewise, a man does not become more prone to acts of one species than another, except from some disposition or habit left: but from frequently acting badly, a man becomes more prone to acts of the same genus or species: therefore, they leave a habit.
3. Likewise, a determined punishment of sense does not follow the substance of the soul, but something placed in it which is a being. Since, therefore, nothing positive is caused in it except a habit from the operation of sin, it seems that nothing remains of sin in the soul, except a disposition or habit inclining to sin: therefore, it seems that guilt is founded on that disposition or habit.
4. Likewise, from that part from which sin is nothing, it cannot remain in act: but from the part of aversion, it is nothing: therefore, from that part, nothing is left to remain in the soul: therefore, it must remain from the part of conversion to a changeable good: but from that part, nothing remains except through the disposition or habit which it leaves: therefore, guilt either does not remain in the soul, or if it remains, it is founded on that disposition or habit, as it seems.

But it is objected against this insolubly, that

1. Someone commits the sin of avarice, and before he repents, he becomes prodigal; it is evident that the guilt of avarice remains. Therefore, either the habit of avarice remains in which that guilt is founded, or not. If it remains: therefore, contrary acts are in the same according to the same, namely of prodigality and avarice, which is impossible. But if the habit of avarice does not remain, and yet the guilt remains: therefore, guilt is not founded on the habit or disposition left from sin.
2. Likewise, the proneness to the act of sin remains after penance and grace, because it is not purged except through the habit of good: however, guilt does not remain after penance and grace: therefore, it is not founded on the proneness of disposition or habit: because proneness to some determined act in species is not in the soul except according to dispositions or habits.
3. Likewise, every disposition and habit are qualities of being: therefore, they are from the first being: but that which stains the image and defaces it cannot be from the first being: therefore, the stain is not a disposition or habit: therefore, guilt is not founded on that.

Solution. To this, without prejudice, it must be said that guilt is founded on a culpable stain. This stain, however, is the corruption of the beauty of natural good, as if we were to say stained in the face mutilated. This stain, however, is left from the sin of the soul, as the Master said above, not dispositively: and in that it is founded.

The guilt, according to which it is substantiated in the natural good.

If, however, it is objected that according to this there is one stain in all sins: because one is deprived, namely grace, and one is corrupted, namely the natural good: therefore also the guilt of all sins is one in number: therefore also the punishment is the same and one. It must be said that none of these follow: because the deprived good, namely grace and the integrity of nature, is considered in two ways, and also the corrupted good, namely in itself, and thus the objection proceeds: but thus it is not corrupted nor deprived except by evil according to which it is evil, not according to which it is this evil.

Both are also considered according to which it is towards the act, and thus the good of nature is more deprived with respect to chastity by the stain which is from lust, than with respect to liberality: and the good of grace is more distanced inasmuch as it is in chastity, than inasmuch as it is in liberality. However, on the part by which the privation regards the act by which it deprives, nothing prohibits privations from being numbered, and the following guilts from being numbered, and also from being diversified according to this.

To what is first objected, it must be said that guilt, in my judgment, is founded in the stain, which is privation and corruption considered in this way.

To what is proven, that this is a disposition or habit by two arguments: it must be said that indeed disposition and habit can be left from bad operation: but guilt is not founded in that, as was proven by objections made to the contrary.

To another objection about sensible punishment, it must be said that punishment is diversified according to the diversity of the stain, and it has already been said how the stain is diversified.

If, however, it is asked, whether it follows the soul, or the substance of the soul, or something else posited? It must be said that nothing prohibits it from being posited to follow the substance under such a defect, although it could not be in it according to which it is taken without that defect: just as also many agents according to nature are brought to the composite body by some of the principles composing the harmony of the body, which, with the harmony remaining, could not bring any passion.

To another it must be said, that although sin considered according to aversion alone is nothing, yet it is not entirely nothing according to which aversion is substantiated in conversion: because (as we said above) evil acts by the power of good, and thus causes evil in the soul which is rooted in the natural good: and it is not entirely nothing, but its stain deforms the image by its spiritual mutilation.

There are, however, those who solve this question otherwise, that the stain is something positively existing: but because what they say cannot be well sustained, therefore I pass over their sayings.

Articulus 3 — Whether Sin Is Said Of Venial And Mortal Sin By One Notion, Or According To Prior And Posterior; And How Venial Sin Is Sin

Whether sin is said of venial and mortal sin by one reason, or by prior and posterior? And, How is venial sin a sin?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, E, around the middle: For there are two kinds of sins, namely mortal and venial.

And there are two things to be asked here, namely whether sin is said of mortal and venial by one reason, or by prior and posterior? And, How is venial a sin?

But the first of these has been determined above in the same work.

TO THE SECOND, it proceeds thus:
1. In every actual sin which is sin, it is necessary that there be those things which constitute sin: venial sin is actual sin: therefore, necessarily there are in it those things which constitute sin: these, however, are aversion and conversion: therefore, in venial there is aversion and conversion.

1. Likewise, Everything that is not turned away from the order by which it exits from the first principle, is ordainable to the same principle as it is the end: but venial is not ordainable to it as it is the end: therefore, it is turned away from the order by which a thing exited from the first principle: therefore, it is turned away from the immutable good: however, it is evident that venial has conversion to a mutable good: therefore, in venial there is aversion from the immutable good and conversion to a mutable good.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
1. Aversion from the immutable good does not have it through inhabiting grace: therefore, if one sinning venially is turned away from the immutable good, he does not have the immutable good through inhabiting grace: which is false, because then no one would be saved.

1. Likewise, One sinning venially loves the creature below God, therefore more than God: therefore, he is not turned away, because the weaker does not turn away the stronger, but the contrary.

Further, it is asked, Why is venial sin said to be evil? For evil is said from the privation of gratuitous good and the corruption of the natural: and venial sin neither deprives grace, nor corrupts natural good: therefore, it ought not to be called evil.

Solution. It must be said according to the Doctors, that venial sin has conversion to a mutable good only as to a lingering way, not however as to an end; and since according to the intention and will of the sinner only conversion is intended in sin, and aversion follows without will and without intention, venial will have only a disposition to aversion, and not aversion from the end: and therefore it does not have the full reason of sin, neither in conversion nor in aversion as mortal: and therefore venial sin is not rightly divided against mortal: whence neither conversion nor aversion has it in the same reason with mortal sin.

And through this the solution to the first is clear: because these two do not constitute venial and mortal sin in one reason, but they are in them by prior and posterior, just as sin is predicated of them by prior and posterior.

To the other it must be said, that what is directly turned away from the order of exit from the first, which exit is continuable into it as into an end, is mortal sin: because this corrupts the order even according to the habit in the turned away: but venial properly speaking is beside the order, and not against: because although with it there is not conversion to the immutable good according to act, since one cannot at the same time and once sin venially and merit according to act, it is not contrary to the order according to habit: because one sinning venially is converted according to habit, although not according to act.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 4 — Whether Through Mortal Sin Man Merits Eternal Death, And Not For Venial Sin

Whether through mortal sin a man merits eternal death, and not for venial sin?

Then it is inquired concerning what is said there, D, around the middle: Mortal is that by which a man merits eternal death. For it seems that mortal and venial are proportionate on the part of conversion: because

1. Someone well loves temporal goods around God, and another loves beyond God: and it is evident that neither loves with infinite love: but the finite has every proportion to the finite: therefore venial is not exceeded by mortal infinitely. Therefore, since bitterness is due to sin on the part of conversion, it seems that it is an unjust judgment to punish one infinitely and the other finitely in fire.

If you say with Gregory, that this is because a man sins in his eternal, and therefore he will be punished in the eternal of God. On the contrary: Suppose that someone remains until death in venial sin, he sinned venially in his eternal: and yet he is not punished eternally: therefore neither does it seem that one sinning mortally in his eternal ought to be punished eternally.

1. Furthermore, it seems false that venial is punished temporally because when someone departs in mortal and venial: either venial is remitted to him after death, or not. If not: therefore he is punished eternally, and then it is false what is said in the Letter, that venial sin is punished temporally. Or it is remitted then after death: and then it is false what is said by the Church in song, that in hell there is no redemption.

2. If you say that venial sin is not punished eternally by itself, but insofar as it is joined to mortal, and this happens to it. On the contrary: Let us suppose that someone departs in original and venial, he is due sensible punishment from venial: but since he is not susceptible to grace after death, it is evident that venial is never remitted to him, because no sin is remitted without grace: therefore he will be in venial sin eternally: therefore the guilt of punishment remains eternally: therefore also the punishment: and thus venial sin not joined to mortal is punished eternally: therefore it is false what is said in the Letter.

Solution. Without prejudice, it must be said that although many reasons have been assigned by the Saints and Masters why mortal sin is punished eternally, yet one is above the others, which seems to me to be more compelling, namely this: because a man by himself subjects himself to perpetual impotence to exit from sin: but he has no power of himself to exit, and also in himself he does not have that from which there is the power to exit, which is grace: and therefore it is just that he who dies thus should be punished perpetually, and this Gregory calls (in my judgment) sinning in the eternal of man. But it is not so in venial sin: because in it the power to exit from sin is not taken away, nor does a man subject himself to perpetual impotence by will, since habitual will remains towards God. And therefore it is fitting that it be expiated temporally, just as it is turned away temporally according to act and not according to habit, and with the power of returning.

Therefore, it must be said to the first, that the conversion of mortal and venial is considered in two ways, namely according to the quantity of love which is in both: and thus both are finite, and neither is due the eternity of punishment, but bitterness: and these punishments are proportionate in this respect, just as the loves are, and the punishment of the fire of hell is not infinite in bitterness. They can also be considered according to the mode of conversion in comparison to aversion: and thus they differ as affirmation and negation, and as being and non-being, which differ infinitely: because mortal turns away, and venial does not turn away, but only disposes towards aversion: and thus punishments not proportionate respond to them.

To what is objected concerning venial existing with mortal in the same subject, I concede well.

But to what is objected, that one departing with venial and original is punished eternally: I say without prejudice, that the position is impossible.

There are, however, those who prove it thus, that before the years of adolescence one is not held to confer about his state, when he is born of unbelieving parents. Let us be in the first instant in which he is an adolescent, and in that instant the adolescent cannot be and confer: because it is prior to be an adolescent than to confer as an adolescent: therefore he can be an adolescent before he is held to confer. Let him sin venially, and depart, then he departs only in venial and original: and thus the position seems possible. To this, however, in my judgment it must be said that this proof errs in many ways: first, because to be an adolescent is to be in becoming and not in permanence, just as also youth and old age. And when it is said, Let us be in the first instant in which he is an adolescent, it is a foolish statement: because in such things which are in succession, there is no taking an instant in which they are, but time, and in the time in which he is an adolescent, he can and is held to confer: and if he omits, he sins mortally. Secondly, it errs: because given that the adolescent could be in the first instant, then in the same he can also confer or begin to confer, because someone can first be an adolescent and confer as an adolescent, because to be an adolescent does not precede to confer as an adolescent in time, but in nature: and in this way (in my judgment) the position is impossible. Even given that it is posited for the sake of disputation, then I say that he is punished with sensible punishment eternally: and this per accidens, and not per se.

And if it is objected, that according to this he is in purgatory or in hell and in limbo: therefore at the same time he is in different places, I say that he is locally in hell: and yet he only feels the bitterness due to venial: but he is not locally in limbo, but as to the punishment of limbo which is the lack of the vision of God.

Articulus 5 — According To What The Saints And The Masters Distinguish The Modes Of Sins

In what do the Saints and Masters distinguish the modes of sins?

In what do the Saints and Masters distinguish the modes of sins?

Then it is inquired concerning what is said, there, F, "The modes of sins have various distinctions in the Scriptures." For indeed, the modes determined here are found in many ways by the Saints to place differences of sins. Hence, 1 John 2:16: "All that is in the world is the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life."

Likewise, on Psalm 37:6: "From the face of my ignorance," Gregory and Chrysostom say that every sin is from ignorance. Ambrose, however, says that every sin is from contempt. And Augustine, that every sin is from lust. And Bernard, that every sin is either from love of the world, or from excessive love of self.

And it is asked, In what are these taken?

The Philosopher also says, "that every evil person is ignorant." And Augustine, that every sin is from error. To dispute about all these would be long and burdensome. But the things that can be inquired are two, namely, how each of those is taken, according to which sin arises from it, and in what is the diversity of them taken?

Solution. It must be said that the diversity is threefold which the Master places in the text: and it is taken indeed generally, and first according to those inclining to sin from the part of the affection only. This, however, is either according to the order in good, and thus it is love badly inflaming: or according to the disordered flight from evil, and thus it is fear badly humbling. If, however, the cause of this inclination is considered first: then it is fear only, because as Augustine says, even fear arises from love: and this generally, either with respect to one's own good, or ordered to one's own: and first it is love of self, and in the second way love of the world: and according to those two is taken the saying of Bernard. If, however, it is taken inclining from the part of the affection generally according to comparison to the sweetness of the moving object: then it is lust, which is in every sin moving from the part of the affection. If, however, it is inclining from the part of the irascible in particular: then it is contempt. If indeed from the part of reason only: this can be in three ways, namely according to the privation of the governing habit, or according to the contrary habit to the governing, or according to the privation of knowledge not speculative but of the approval of good. And in the first way sin is from ignorance, in the second way from error, and in the third way from ignorance, about which the Philosopher says, that every evil person is ignorant. The division, however, brought from the epistle of John is taken according to the general objects moving the powers to sin: because that is either within, or outside. If within: then it is the lust of the flesh.

If outside: either according to the concupiscible, or according to the irascible. And in the first way it is the lust of the eyes. In the second way it is the pride of life.

The second diversity of concupiscence which Matthew places is taken according to the general instruments of sinning, which are the heart, mouth, and hands or work.

The third diversity is taken according to those against which the offense or harm of sinning is ordered, which are God, neighbor, and the sinner himself.

To that which is asked, What is ignorance? It must be said that ignorance is said in two ways, namely from the privation of that which is to be wise: and then it is the same as ignorance, and thus it is not the root of every sin. It is also said from the privation of wisdom and good: and thus every sin proceeds from it, because in every sin the good which is deserted by it is foolish.

Error, however, is said in two ways, namely in the knowledge of choosing, and thus it is not the root: and in choosing, and thus it is the root, because every sinner chooses erroneously, although he knows to choose otherwise.

Lust also is taken in two ways, namely actual inordinate pleasure of good, and thus it is a special actual sin. It is also said habitual concupiscence of changeable good, and thus it is the root of every sin: because otherwise changeable good pleases in every sin, since it is a conversion to it.

Love is also taken for the will inclined to good according to act, and thus it is a special affection. It is also taken for the habitual inordinate inclination of the will to one's own good, and thus it becomes the root: because thus it is in every sin.

In the same way it must be understood concerning fear with respect to the evil which fear flees.

And thus the solution to each of the questions is clear.

Articulus 6 — Whether The Capital Vices Are Seven Or More

Whether there are seven capital vices or more? And, by what is the number of vices taken?

Then it is inquired about what is said there, "Furthermore, it must be known that there are seven vices," etc.

For it seems that there are more than seven: because:

1. The Gloss on Proverbs vi, 16, on that passage: "There are six things which the Lord hates," etc., states that it enumerates seven capital crimes there, and by comparison, it dismisses those sowing discord as lesser. But it does not enumerate any of those there. Therefore, those with these make at least fourteen.

Furthermore, vice is of a broader multiplication than virtue, since around one virtue there are at least two vices, one according to defect, and another according to excess: since there are seven virtues, it seems that there should be fourteen principal vices.

If you say that vices are taken by opposition to the cardinal virtues, and not by opposition to the theological virtues, then it seems that there are at least eight vices: because there are four cardinal virtues.

1. Likewise, Augustine in the book of Confessions enumerates these vices and adds foolishness and certain others. Therefore, there seem to be more than are enumerated here.
2. Furthermore, lust and gluttony are opposed to temperance: why then are not other vices taken by opposition to other cardinal virtues? For none is opposed to fortitude or prudence, except insofar as justice is a general virtue.
3. Likewise, since there are seven gifts, eight beatitudes, and twelve fruits, why are not other vices determined by opposition to these? For it seems that it should be done so: because the opposites of these are vices: therefore, just as these are principal in goods, so their opposites are principal in evils: therefore, now there will be many capital vices.
4. Likewise, it seems that there is some contradiction between Gregory and Isidore concerning these vices: because Isidore, on Deuteronomy vii, 1, enumerates thus: gluttony, avarice, fornication, wrath, sadness, sloth, vainglory. But Gregory enumerates on Job xxxv, as recited here in the text. However, it is clear that Isidore makes no mention of envy, nor even of pride: for vainglory and pride are not the same, since vainglory is the same as unclean glory from "kenos" which is empty, and "doxa" which is glory, or vain glory: but vain glory is not the same as pride: therefore, there seems to be a contradiction.

Solution. To these and other things which could easily be objected against the division, it must be said that a capital vice is said in two ways. In one way, that which is to be punished by death: and thus it is taken in the Gloss on Proverbs vi, 16. In another way, that which is the head in the number of vices, to which the others are reduced as members: and thus a capital vice is taken here as a fountain-like vice, from which the others arise; and therefore, according to both Isidore and Gregory, many daughters are assigned to each of these which are born from it.

To the other, it must be said that although vice is opposed to virtue, it is not necessary that the first vice is opposed to the principal virtue: and therefore capital vices are not taken by opposition to the cardinal virtues, or theological virtues, or gifts, or beatitudes, but by general things moving the appetite, to which as to a cause other vices can be reduced, as will be clear below.

By this, however, the solution to all except the last is now clear.

And to that it must be said that pride is taken in two ways. In one way generally, according to which pride is said to be as if it is a way to any higher things: and thus the appetite for excellence to any higher things is called pride: and thus it is not a special and capital vice, but rather the cause of all vices: and thus it is taken by Isidore: and thus Gregory also calls pride the queen of vices. And thus vainglory or empty glory is taken under it, and thus it is glory from unworthy dignity, and that is special and capital.

In the second way, pride is said specifically as the appetite for dignity or preeminence: and thus it is the same as vainglory in the aforementioned way, and thus it is said by Gregory to be one of the capital vices: and vainglory is the same as the appetite for glory in praise which is empty: and since praise is not the principal mover to which others are reduced, it will not be a capital vice in this way, but a daughter of the capital.

If, however, it is inquired, by what is the number of these vices taken?

It must be said that the principal movers are either on the part of the spirit or on the part of the flesh. If on the part of the spirit: either they move by the reason of apparent good, or of apparent evil. If according to the reason of apparent good: either of good which is in itself, or of that which is in another. If in itself: then there is a perverse order in that: and thus it is pride, which is exalted above the good received generally. If, however, it is in another: then the perverse order in that is to desire that good through envy, and this again in kind. If, however, it is moving according to the reason of apparent evil: either that which is punishment, or that which is guilt. If it is the appetite against the evil of guilt to be destroyed, it cannot be perverse: and therefore on that part there cannot be any vice. If, however, it is against the evil of punishment: either in itself, or in another. If it is against the evil of punishment in itself and in a perverse way: then it is sloth, which flees the punishment which is from spiritual labor: and therefore it seeks to wander, because in spiritual things it does not find whence it may rejoice, because it considers them laborious. If, however, it is the evil of apparent punishment in another and in a perverse way: then it is wrath which is the appetite for vengeance, because it seems to have inflicted punishment on the one to whom it is angry.

If, however, it is objected that apparent good is multiplied by the good of any virtue, as there is apparent truth, and apparent height, and apparent delight: therefore, it is necessary to multiply vices by the appetite in those.

Likewise, just as there is the delight of the sense of taste, and the sense of touch: so there are delights of other senses: therefore, just as two vices are taken by the delight of taste and touch, so vices should be taken by the delights of others. It must be said that it is not true: because since truth in morals is ordered to good, there is not a complete appetite in apparent truth: and therefore by truth a capital vice cannot be taken: thus infidelity and error are not capital vices, although they are criminal and mortal. And the cause of this is because it is not by a complete appetite, but there is error there from deception which, insofar as it is deception, is not voluntary: and therefore if infidelity were a capital vice, there would not be leaders with the queen, as Gregory says: because it could be that the queen pride was present, and the other six vices, but not infidelity: and therefore infidelity cannot be a capital vice.

To the other it must be said that the delights especially of the concupiscible and irascible, since they are parts of the sensitive soul, as Damascene and Aristotle and Avicenna and Jerome say on the beginning of Ezekiel in the Gloss, are not outside the flesh: and since the principal act of the irascible is to rise up fighting against the harmful, this has a place in sloth and wrath. But the concupiscible especially is to desire the delight of the flesh: and this has in

the delight of taste and touch in the highest; and therefore by this no special is taken except gluttony and lust.

To the other it must be said that as it is proven in the questions about the Soul, no sense simply has delight except touch alone, and taste insofar as it is a certain touch: and therefore by the delights of other senses capital vices are not taken, as by the delight of taste and touch.

Articulus 8 — What Difference There Is Between The Beginning And The Root; And Which Is More Essential To Sin, Namely, Pride Or Avarice

What is the difference between the beginning and the root? And, which is more essential to sin, namely, pride or avarice?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, I, near the end: To this, however, it seems rightly to oppose, etc.

And briefly three things are asked under one article. First, what is the difference between the root and the beginning? Second, which is more essential to sin, namely pride or avarice? Third, whether it is a special sin, or two sins, or two evils, or one?

To the first, it proceeds thus: One motion has only one principle: and the beginning is a principle: therefore the beginning and the root are the same.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: But on the contrary, in sin there are two things, namely aversion and conversion: and in aversion, sin begins insofar as it is sin: therefore from that part it has a beginning: but conversion, because of delight, provides nourishment and juice: therefore from that part it has a root: therefore the beginning and the root are not the same.

TO THE SECOND thus:
1. If we consider sin according to the intention and will of the sinner, it is not intended and willed from the part of aversion, but intended and willed from the part of conversion: therefore from that part it is more effectively initiated than from the other part: therefore covetousness is more the root and more effective than pride is the beginning.

1. Likewise, sin from the part of conversion has a term and end to which the will is moved, and the species by which it is distinguished: therefore what inclines to that, more substantially regards sin than that which is in sin according to aversion in which neither the end nor the term of the will is, nor is the species of sin distinguished: therefore from that part again it follows that covetousness more substantially regards sin than pride.

But on the contrary, this is what Augustine says in the book on Free Will, that sin is not from this that it is conversion to a changeable good, because to be converted to a good is not evil: but it is sin through aversion. Therefore what initiates from the part of aversion regards more substantially than that which initiates it from the part of conversion: but in the former way

pride initiates, in the second way avarice: therefore pride regards more essentially than avarice.

1. Likewise, Augustine says that sin is not the appetite of evil things, but the desertion of better things: but there is no appetite of evil things insofar as they are evil: but pride initiates according to that which is the desertion of better things, therefore pride is essentially in sin.
2. Likewise, sin is death: but death is more separation from the cause of life than pain: therefore since pride initiates sin according to that which separates from God, it initiates it more essentially than avarice.

To the THIRD, Augustine thus says:
The beginning of all sin is pride, and the root of all evils is covetousness. Let us beware therefore of pride and avarice, not two evils, but one evil. This is the Gloss on Exodus, last chapter. Therefore it seems that pride and avarice are the same vice.

But on the contrary, this is what the Master says in the Letter, last chapter, where he wishes that they initiate sin separately and not together: and therefore he wishes that it be understood concerning the genera of each, that each is said to be the beginning of all sin, and not of the individuals of the genera.

Solution. It must be said that the beginning and the root differ in reason, although they are the same in subject. For the root, as was touched upon in objecting, begins sin from the part of conversion which is material in it. But the beginning is the first from the part of aversion, as the first objection proves. Hence pride, when taken generally for habitual pride which makes a way over the will of the superior, is the beginning in sin, and not properly the root. But covetousness, also generally accepted for habitual lust for a changeable good, is the root providing nourishment to illicit appetite.

And through this the solution to what is first asked is clear, that from the part of sin insofar as it is sin, pride is the beginning: but from the part of sin in us or the sinner, covetousness is the beginning.

To what is second asked, it must be said that the solution is now clear, that pride is more the beginning: but avarice is more the root, because that begins from the part of being sin according to which it is sin, but covetousness begins more from the part where there is conversion.

From this the solution to all the objections concerning this is clear: because by that to which the conversion is made, the sin is also distinguished into species, even if it does not receive the formal character of sin from it.

§ To the third it must be said that pride is taken generally, and specifically. Generally, it is an habitual overstepping of the height of the divine will, to which the sinner does not submit: and thus it is the beginning of all evil, and thus it is not a specific and capital vice. In a second way, it is taken according as it has its end as excellence in a specific matter which is the

dignity of prelacy and honor: and thus it is not a root, but nevertheless thus it can be the cause of all vices in number.

§ Avarice is also spoken of in two ways, namely as an habitual lust for mutable good: and thus it is the root of every sin, and thus it is the same in subject with pride spoken of in the first way, although it differs in formal character (ratione), just as aversion and conversion differ which are in the same sin, and thus Augustine takes it. In another way avarice is spoken of, which has its end as possessing unto sufficiency in a specific matter which is the good of fortune: and this is a specific capital vice, and is not a root: yet it is taken in this way by the Master in the Text, when he says that all sins can be caused from it as regards the genera of single sins, and not as regards the single sins of the genera: but thus it is not a root, since a root is an essential inner part of a thing: but a cause is not a part, nor conjoined to the thing as a part. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

DISTINCTIO XLIII

Divisio Textus

Furthermore there is a certain kind of sin more grave than the rest, etc. Here the Master treats of the differences of the more grave sin, which is the sin against the Holy Spirit.

And it is divided into four parts: in the first of which he compares this sin to others, and shows that it is more grave. In the second, he posits the assignment of this sin according to Augustine, from which four species of it are drawn, there, A, § 2: But it is asked, What is that sin, etc.? Now the four species which are gathered there, are obstinacy or induration, final impenitence, despair, and presumption.

In the third part, he posits another assignment according to Augustine, from which two other species are drawn, namely envy of fraternal grace, and the attacking of recognized truth, there, C: There is also another. In the fourth, he posits the assignment of this sin according to Ambrose, from which the same two others, yet by another rationale, are extracted, namely there, D: Concerning this sin also, etc.

Articulus 1 — What It Is To Be A Sin Against The Holy Spirit

What is it to be a sin against the Holy Spirit?

Now there occur concerning the first part here three things to be inquired into, the first of which is, What is it to be a sin against the Holy Spirit? Second, Why is the sin against the Holy Spirit called unto death? Third, Whether it is a special sin separated from others, or is conjoined to other sins as a circumstance of the sin or an accident of it?

To the first one proceeds thus: § 1. Every sin is against grace which is the effect of the Holy Spirit: since therefore this is to be a sin against the Holy Spirit, that it is against the attribute of the Holy Spirit, it seems that every sin is against the Holy Spirit.

§ 2. Also, every evil is opposed to goodness: but malice is in every mortal sin: therefore every mortal sin is opposed to goodness: but the sin against the Holy Spirit is so called, because it is opposed to the goodness of the Holy Spirit: therefore every mortal sin is a sin against the Holy Spirit.

§ 3. Moreover, it seems rather to be a sin against the Holy Spirit, in which one thinks badly concerning the Holy Spirit, like Eutyches who said that the Holy Spirit is a servant: therefore it seems that the sin against the Holy Spirit is a sin proceeding from error against the Holy Spirit. But if this is conceded. On the contrary: A sin proceeding from ignorance is a sin against the Son: but a sin concerning which one thinks badly of the Holy Spirit, is a sin proceeding from ignorance: therefore it is a sin against the Son: therefore it is not against the Holy Spirit.

§ 4. Also, it seems that no sin is against the Holy Spirit: because every sin is born from the infirmity and corruption of nature: therefore every sin is from infirmity: but this is to sin against the Father: therefore every sin is against the Father: therefore it seems that no sin is against the Holy Spirit.

§ 5. Also, it seems that every sin is against the Son: because the Philosopher says that every evil person is ignorant therefore sin is from ignorance: but this is to sin against the Son: therefore every sin is against the Son: therefore no sin is against the Holy Spirit.

§ 6. Also, it seems that he who sins against one, sins against another: because just as the one substance belongs to the three, so the one offense belongs to the three: therefore he who sins against one, also sins against another.

§ 7. Also, there is one goodness of the three: therefore he who sins against one, sins against another: therefore to sin against goodness, is to sin against the three persons equally: therefore to sin against goodness, is to sin against the three persons.

§ 8. Also, the three persons have a greater union than the virtues have with charity: but on account of the union of virtue with charity, he who offends in one, is made guilty of all ; therefore much more on account of the union of the persons to one another, one sinning against one, sins against all.

But if this is conceded, to the contrary will be what is said in the Text.

Solution. It must be said that a certain sin by its name expresses only the sin: and a certain sin by its name expresses the sin, and the cause of the sin. An example of the first is fornication, which names only the illicit act or the intercourse of an unmarried man with an unmarried woman. But a certain sin names at the same time the moving cause on the part of the sinner, as a sin against the Father, and a sin against the Son, and a sin against the Holy Spirit: for that expresses the sin, and the moving cause, which is infirmity, or ignorance, or malice. Now there is a third mode of naming, when the name of the sin expresses both the act of the sin, and the circumstance, as incest, or defloration, or sacrilege, or things of this kind: but this mode does not serve the present purpose.

§ To the first therefore it must be said that a sin against the Holy Spirit is spoken of in two ways, namely from the object concerning which the sin is, and from the moving cause to the sin. From the object, when namely it is against the person of the Holy Spirit, just as also many sin against the person of the Son, and fewer against the person of the Father. But the sin against the Holy Spirit is not taken in this way here: but rather in the moving cause to the sin, it has contrariety to the goodness of the Spirit, just as a sin from malice is contrary to the goodness of the Holy Spirit, in which sins are remitted in the Church. And through this it is clear, that not every sin is against the Holy Spirit, because it does not have such a moving cause: but every sin deprives of grace through the contrariety which it has to grace: yet the moving cause to the sin is not contrary to the goodness of the Holy Spirit in which He remits sins.

Through this the solution to the second is clear.

§ To the third it must be said that this is a sin against the Holy Spirit spoken of in the first way: and thus the sin against the Holy Spirit is not treated here: for in this way a sin against the Holy Spirit is spoken of, just as a sin against man, or against oneself, or against God.

§ To the next it must be said that it is one thing for a sin to be from infirmity, and another to be with the infirmity of corruption from whence it draws its origin. For when it is said to be from infirmity: then infirmity is understood to be the moving cause: just as when someone blasphemes from fear of punishments, or sins from fear of poverty: and this is properly called a sin against the Father. But not every sin proceeds from such a motive, but sometimes nothing moves except malice and the industry of sin. Sin is also said to be with the infirmity of corruption from which the temptation to sin arises, and thus after the state of corruption every sin is from infirmity: but then the preposition from (ex) does not denote the cause moving proximately to the act, but remotely: because namely the infirmity of corruption is the origin from which every temptation to sin is constituted and arises: and this infirmity admits another proximately moving cause, which is malice on account of which it will be called against the Holy Spirit.

§ To the next it must be said that the Philosopher speaks of the ignorance which is the privation of knowledge, not of just any knowledge, but of that which is called the knowledge of approbation, namely when in works the good is not approved: and every evil person is deprived of that knowledge in act. But that ignorance does not make a sin against the Son, but rather that which expresses an absolute or relative privation of the knowledge governing in works, on account of which the committed fault becomes excusable either in whole or in part.

§ To the next it must be said that although the three persons agree and are one in subject, yet they do not agree and are not one in their proper characteristics (propriis): and as regards the proper characteristics something can be contrary to one, which will not be against another.

§ Also, the middle term as regards the mode of understanding between the substantial and notional properties are the appropriated properties: and these are considered in two ways, namely according to what they are, and thus they express the substance: and according to the appropriated properties, and thus they are not known except from the rationale of the proper

characteristics: and as regards this something can be against the appropriated property of one person, which does not happen against the appropriated property of another person: and in this way we speak here. Whence although there is one offense, yet the cause of the offense does not have one opposition to the appropriated properties of the persons, insofar as they are appropriated.

§ To the next it must be said that there is one goodness of the three, insofar as goodness is considered in itself and substantially: but if it is considered under the rationale of an appropriated property, then it receives a specific rationale which is attributed to the Holy Spirit: and in this way it is a sin against the Holy Spirit as regards the moving cause which is contrary to it.

§ To the next it must be said that through the offense it is against all: but just as it is in sin, that through the rationale of malice it deprives of all virtue, and yet through the rationale of the act it is not contrary except to one: so it is concerning the sin against the Holy Spirit, namely that through the offense it is against the three persons, yet through the moving cause it is not contrary except to the attribute of the Holy Spirit.

Articulus 2 — Why Sin Against The Holy Spirit Is Said To Be Unto Death

Why is the sin against the Holy Spirit called unto death?

Secondly it is asked, Why is it said, There is a sin unto death [199]?

§ 1. And this through the rationale of the name: because mortal is that which makes one die here by the death of fault, and in the future by the death of punishment, unless it is deleted by penance: but such is any mortal sin: therefore every sin is a sin unto death.

§ 2. Also, 1 John 5:16, upon that: There is a sin unto death, not for that, etc., the Gloss says: "A sin unto death is that which separates from God, just as death separates the soul from the body" but every mortal sin does this: therefore, etc.

§ 3. Also, in the same place, in another Gloss: "A sin unto death is that which endures unto the end" but such is a venial and mortal sin in which someone finishes life without penance: therefore any mortal and venial sin can be against the Holy Spirit: which is false, since it is said in the Text that it itself is more grave than the rest and the greatest.

§ 4. But if a sin unto death is said to be that in which the potency of revivifying or returning to life is deprived: then it seems that every sin is a sin unto death: because in every mortal sin the life of grace and the potency of returning to grace is deprived: since man is a spirit going by itself into sin, and not returning by itself from sin, it seems that there is no reason why this sin specially should be called a sin [unto death].

Alongside this it is also further asked, Why does John say, 5:16: I do not say that anyone should ask for that?

§ 1. For thus it is held in the second assignment of Augustine, that one should despair of no one while he is in life, as long as the kindness of God leads to penance: and for him one

does not pray imprudently, concerning whose salvation one does not despair: therefore for him who sins against the Holy Spirit, we ought to pray: therefore he does badly by prohibiting prayer.

§ 2. Also, prayer is for impetrating pardon: where therefore there is a greater necessity of pardon, there the prayer is greater and more frequent: but there is never so great a necessity as in the greatest sins, as in sins against the Holy Spirit: therefore for it one must maximally pray: therefore he ought not to say, I do not say that anyone should ask for that, but rather, I say that every man should pray for that.

Solution. It must be said that a sin unto death expresses more than a mortal sin. And so that this may be better understood, it must be noted that there are three things in corporeal death, and three responding to them in spiritual death. The first is the separation of the soul from the body: because the soul is the cause of the life of the body. The second is the impotence to return to habit from privation. And the third is the cause of disease or death in the dead subject being repugnant to life. And to these correspond three in spiritual death. And the first is done through the act of sin which separates God and grace from the soul. But the second is from the defect of free choice, which by itself cannot recover grace: and every mortal sin has these two, and for so much is it called a mortal sin. The third is from the cause of death, which is contrary to the disposing to the influx of life on the part of God: and thus the sin against the Holy Spirit is unto death: because the moving cause to that kind of sin is contrary to the goodness by which He moves the Spirit vivifying all things, to this that it may inflow life: and through this the solution is almost clear to all the things which were objected as regards the first part: because mortal and unto death are not the same: because when it is said unto death, by virtue of the preposition an order to the impediment of the inflowing life, and the cause of the sin, is denoted.

§ To the next it must be said that those Glosses call a mortal sin unto death: and speak concerning the separation of life, in the cause of which is an order contrary to that which inclines to the influx of spiritual life.

§ To the next it must be said that to finish life in mortal sin happens in two ways, namely as regards the proposal, and thus it is a sin...

against the Holy Spirit: and as to the continuation in sin, and thus it is not against the Holy Spirit: but this is special, which was proposed not to repent of the sin committed.

To the other, the solution is clear from the aforementioned.

As to what is further asked, How is it understood, I do not say that anyone should pray for him, that is, whoever?

It must be said that he does not forbid every prayer, but signifies the magnitude of the crime, that is, that he does not command anyone from the people to pray: but someone of

199. 1 John 5:16.

special sanctity and perfection ought to pray for such, because it is for the great to pray for the great.

But if it is objected concerning what was said to Samuel, How long will you mourn for Saul, since the Lord has rejected him? and to Jeremiah, that he should not pray for the people? it seems to be understood in this way, that no one should pray, because it is altogether of no avail. It must be said that this is not to the purpose: because neither Saul nor the people had sinned against the Holy Spirit: but God had confirmed the sentence of rejection of Saul, and of the captivity of the Jews, and in this He did not wish to hear the Prophets.

Articulus 3 — Whether Sin Against The Holy Spirit Is A Special Sin Separated From All Others

Whether sin against the Holy Spirit is a special sin separate from all others?

Thirdly, it is asked whether it is a special sin separate from other sins?

And it seems that it is: because 1. Remissible and irremissible are passions that pertain to sin according to which it is considered in species: therefore, since sin against the Holy Spirit is said to be irremissible, it will be a species of sin according to itself.

1. Likewise, that sin, as the Masters are accustomed to say, is opposed to the special grace in which the remission of sin is made with grace informing free will to act: but that which is opposed to special grace is a special sin: therefore, sin against the Holy Spirit is a special sin.
2. Likewise, in the text it is said that it is a certain sin graver than others: but it is not compared to other special sins unless it is a special sin: therefore, it is a special sin.
3. Likewise, sin is not divided into species unless it is taken in a determined genus: but sin against the Holy Spirit, here in the text and by the Masters, is divided into species: therefore, it is a genus of sin according to itself.
4. Likewise, to oppose known grace or to envy fraternal grace are said to be special acts: but these acts are sin against the Holy Spirit: therefore, the sins moving towards them are special sins: therefore, also other special sins are another species of sin against the Holy Spirit.

ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Sin against the Father is sin from infirmity: and sin against the Son is sin from ignorance: but such are not special sin, but many diverse sins according to the species of the act can be from infirmity, and also from ignorance: therefore, since sin against the Holy Spirit divides sin differently with those, it rather seems to denote a circumstance of sin than a special sin.

1. Likewise, to sin from certain malice denotes a circumstance accusing from the part of the sinner: but this is sin against the Holy Spirit: therefore, it seems that sin against the Holy Spirit is not a species of sin, but a circumstance of sin.

2. Likewise, that which can circumstantiate the same act in species is a circumstance: but to sin from coercion through malice, as Richard of Saint Victor says in the epistle on the spirit of blasphemy, and to sin from ignorance, and to sin from malice, can be around the same act in species, as around denying or blaspheming Christ: therefore, they are circumstances, and not species of sins.

3. Likewise, a special sin seeks a determined nature: but sin against the Holy Spirit does not have a determined nature, but rather is founded upon other sins, as is evident in obstinacy, and despair, and presumption, and final impenitence: therefore, sin against the Holy Spirit is not a special sin separate from others.

Solution. It must be said that sin against the Holy Spirit, according to the reason by which it is drawn into species, is separate from other sins. However, from the part of the matter around which it is, sometimes it is conjoined with other sins, sometimes separate. For according to the two species which are envy of fraternal grace and opposition to recognized truth, it does not suppose other sins for matter: but in the four other species, it supposes other sins in the subject: but it does not suppose them as a circumstance of their act, because it always has an act separate from the acts of other sins, although it does not have an act separate, so that other sins are the matter around which the act of this sin is made.

Therefore, it must be said to the first objection, that sin against the Holy Spirit is divided against sin against the Father and against the Son, by reason of the cause which it says with the act, and not by reason of the act: and therefore it does not follow that it is only a circumstance of sin like sin against the Father, but because it says a circumstance, by reason of which it is opposed to sin against the Father and sin against the Son. However, as was said above, sin against the Father is said in two ways, namely according to which it is against the Father, so that the Father is the matter of the act and object: and according to which it is from a cause which is against the attribute of the Father: and in this last way it is taken here by the Master. But if it were taken in the first way, it would have a special act, and it would be a special sin separate from others.

To the other objection, it must be said that although certain malice denotes a remaining cause which sounds a circumstance from the part of the sinner, nevertheless it also supposes an interior act of will: because one does not sin from certain malice unless one wills evil, and it pleases him for its own sake, as it is said in the text: and this is to be moved by a special act around sin. But it is not so in sin from infirmity, nor from ignorance: because such a one does not will infirmity or ignorance or even evil: and therefore those are only circumstances: but sin against the Holy Spirit is both a circumstance and an act.

To the other objection, it must be said that that which is a circumstance in sin against the Holy Spirit can be around a similar act in species around which infirmity moving and ignorance are: but from this it is not called a special sin, but rather from this that with such a circumstance posited, the act of the will of evil is also posited, namely of the interior for which it is made a special sin.

To the last, the solution is evident through the principle of this solution: because a special sin does not always seek special matter, but the act suffices for it, and its matter is sometimes other sins.

And through this the solution to all that was asked is evident.

Articulus 4 — Whether The Species Of Sin Against The Holy Spirit Are Well Assigned

Whether the species of sin against the Holy Spirit are well assigned?

Whether the species of sin against the Holy Spirit are well assigned?

Then it is inquired about what is said there, A, §2: But it is asked, What is that sin?

For there it seems to touch upon the species of sin against the Holy Spirit: and it is objected concerning those species, and it seems.

1. That hardness is not a species of sin, but an accident of the sinner. For it says in the Letter thus, that obstinacy is in the constancy of a hardened mind in malice, through which a man becomes impenitent: however, that obstinacy does not regard one or two sins, but all, and similarly impenitence: therefore it will not be a defined sin, but rather a property of the sinner with all sins.
2. Furthermore, from the second part of this definition it seems that obstinacy is not a species distinct from final impenitence, but is its cause: and this is against many who say there are six species of this sin.
3. Further, it is inquired about impenitence: because that seems to be nothing other than the continuation of sin until death without penance: however, many die in such a state even in small sins: therefore all those sin against the Holy Spirit: and this is false, because thus all the damned would have sinned against the Holy Spirit.
4. Further, it is also objected concerning despair. For since despair is against hope, and similarly presumption, there should be something against faith and charity: and this does not seem to be the case: therefore sins against the Holy Spirit are insufficiently assigned.
5. Likewise, charity is attributed to the Holy Spirit: therefore its species should especially be taken according to the contrary of charity, and we have none such.
6. Likewise, Augustine says that infidelity is a sin by which all are retained: therefore it is the greatest sin: but in the Letter it is said that sin against the Holy Spirit is the greatest sin: therefore it seems that infidelity is a sin against the Holy Spirit.

Further, it is inquired about the species which he touches upon in the second assignment, which are the impugnation of recognized truth, and envy of fraternal grace.

1. For since truth is attributed to the Son, the impugnation of recognized truth is rather a sin against the Son than against the Holy Spirit.

2. Similarly, it is objected concerning the second, that if envy is a sin against the Holy Spirit, then the envious sin against the Holy Spirit: which is grave to say.

Solution. It must be said that according to the more approved Doctors, there are two opinions concerning the number of species of sin against the Holy Spirit: one of which is held by many moderns, and posits there to be six, which are thus taken. Let those things which are above be supposed, namely that sin against the Holy Spirit according to its complete notion signifies that genus of sin which is opposed to the attribute of the Holy Spirit in the cause moving to sin, and to that attribute which according to the notion of understanding inclines one to retain sin, because this is its goodness: and that it opposes the Holy Spirit not in itself, but in those things which are required for the remission of sin, which are its gifts. However, since three things concur for remission, namely the one remitting, and the one to whom it is remitted, and the good of the Church which is communicated to the one to whom it is remitted, because sin is not remitted except in the Church in the sacraments. Since, I say, it is so, from the part of each of these two things are required for the remission of sin. From the part of the one remitting, mercy is required in remitting the whole guilt, and in changing eternal punishment into temporal. From the part of the penance imposed by the power of the keys, justice is required willing satisfaction through the imposed punishment. But despair opposes this mercy, and presumption opposes this justice. From the part of the one to whom remission is made, they say there are two things, namely sorrow for the committed sin, and the purpose of not committing it in the future. And obstinacy opposes the first, which is pleased with sin through act: and final impenitence opposes the second, which is the purpose of never repenting of sin. From the part of the Church also there are two things, namely the efficacy of the sacraments and faith, which are in the Church: and that is opposed by what is called the impugnation of recognized truth, as if you knew an article of faith to be true, and said it was false out of malice: or if you knew sins to be remitted in baptism, and said it was false out of malice: or if you knew through works that miracles and divine things were true, and said out of malice they were done by Beelzebub. As is clear below in the words of Ambrose, the common good which is in the members of the Church is also required, which is communicated to each through fraternal charity: and this is opposed by envy of fraternal grace.

Another opinion, which has fewer followers, says there are five species of sin against the Holy Spirit: and it does not differ from this one except in this alone: for it reduces obstinacy and final impenitence into one species: because the purpose of never repenting always arises from the obstinacy of sin: and this seems to have been the opinion of the Master in the Letter: and some great ones follow him in this.

But according to this assignment it seems that despair is a sin of infidelity: because he who says his iniquity is greater than God's mercy is moved by infidelity against the greatness of God: because God in any of His attributes is greater than can be thought: therefore infidelity is to despair, and not a sin against the Holy Spirit. A similar objection is about the sin of presumption: for the one presuming says God is not just: but this is infidelity: therefore the one presuming is an infidel, and not sinning against the Holy Spirit.

But it is objected on the contrary: because 1. Sin is against God, and to be punished in sins shows only faith: therefore since the one despairing is moved by these motions, namely the knowledge of the greatness of sin, and the rigor of justice in punishing, he is moved by the motion of faith: but he cannot be moved by the motion of faith and infidelity at the same time: therefore the one despairing is not an infidel. The same objection is about the one presuming: because he knows God's mercy forgiving through faith.

1. It also seems that the aforementioned assignment is insufficient for another reason: because Bede says: We fall into four things from sin, namely we have weakness, ignorance, malice, and concupiscence: but sin against the Father is according to weakness, and sin against the Son is according to ignorance, and sin against the Holy Spirit is according to malice: therefore we should also have some genus of sin according to concupiscence: and we do not have it: therefore the Master in the Letter seems insufficient in assigning the genera of sins.

Further, it is also inquired, since weakness is a punishment and also ignorance and concupiscence, why the fourth was not a punishment, namely malice: or if it is a punishment, why it does not excuse the sin itself as the others do.

To the last objections, it must be responded, and it must be said to the first, that the one despairing is not an infidel, and the objection supposes something false: for the one despairing does not think his iniquity is greater than the mercy of God, but his iniquity is greater than God ought or wills to have mercy: and this sounds like the word of Cain, who did not say, My iniquity is greater than your mercy: but, than that I may deserve pardon, that is, that I can merit it: and in this he spoke truly, but not that you never will to have mercy: because God does not demand satisfaction of condignity, but satisfaction of congruity which we can offer. In the same way it must be said about the one presuming, that he well considers God to be just: but because mercy exalts over judgment, he says God does not use justice in punishing sins.

To the other it must be said, that concupiscence does not signify any special moving of any power determinately like ignorance which is present according to reason, and infidelity which overflows into the Holy Spirit from the flesh, and like malice which is in the will: but, as the Gloss says, on Romans vii, 7: Concupiscence is conflated from all, and is a defect spread

In all powers according to natural appetite: because each power desires its object, and therefore it sometimes moves with ignorance, sometimes with weakness, sometimes with malice, and it is not a distinct motive: and therefore no special genus of sin is taken according to it.

To the other it must be said, that without doubt according to which malice is a consequence of sin, it is a punishment: and it sounds the same as malignability, because man through sin has become malignable: but nevertheless because this punishment is subject to liberty and will, and not weakness or ignorance, therefore this does not excuse the whole or part.

To what is objected at the beginning, it must be said that obstinacy is said in two ways, namely the habitual hardness itself, and this is not a sin, but a punishment left from the custom of sinning. It is also said the actual affection of past sin,

when namely one delights when he has done evil, and exults in the worst things: then it is a sin against the Holy Spirit.

To the other it must be said, that also impenitence is said in two ways, namely impenitence in sins, and from that the objection proceeds: and the actual purpose of never repenting, and this is a sin against the Holy Spirit: because it proceeds neither from weakness nor from ignorance, but from malice and the pleasure of evil.

To what is objected, that obstinacy does not differ from final impenitence, the solution is clear from what has been said in the assignment of species according to different opinions.

To the other it must be said, that despair is not said to be a sin against the Holy Spirit because it is against hope, but rather because it is against the grace in which sins are remitted: and therefore those objections are of no value: But because this solution seems to be an evasion, it must be said that hope is not only of the uncreated, but also of pardon and grace: but faith is not, but relies on the first truth, and charity on goodness: and because pardon and grace and other things of which there is hope, work for the remission of sin, for this reason it is more a sin against the Holy Spirit against hope, than against faith and charity.

To what is objected concerning the second assignment, it must be said that the truth which is impugned in this sin is that which is according to impiety, and for this reason it is attributed to the Spirit of truth. Or it is said, that it does not say against the Holy Spirit only, because it is against the person of the Holy Spirit or the attribute of that person or another, but because the moving cause is contrary to the attribute: and although truth is impugned, nevertheless because it is impugned out of malice, therefore it is a sin not against the Son, but against the Holy Spirit.

To the last it must be said, that it is not

the same envy, and envy of fraternal grace: because envy is with sadness in the good of the neighbor, insofar as it is an impediment to one's own good: and therefore Job, v, 2, says that envy kills the little one: because unless he considered himself little, that is, impedible in his own good, he would not envy another. But goods which impede each other are those which are diminished from community, such as riches, honors, praises, and such worldly things. But envy of fraternal grace is properly with respect to a good which is not diminished from the participation of many, but rather grows, as is spiritual good: and this cannot be impugned from ignorance or weakness in the neighbor, because it is not impugned unless it is known. And therefore that envy proceeds from malice against the gift of the Holy Spirit.

Through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 5 — Whether Sin Against The Holy Spirit Ought To Be Called Irremissible

Should the sin against the Holy Spirit be called irremissible?

Should the sin against the Holy Spirit be called irremissible?

Next it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, B, But it is asked, Whether every obstinacy, etc.

For here the Master treats of how it is irremissible: and concerning this it is asked thus:

If that sin is called irremissible, this will only be on account of the magnitude of the sin, or on account of the impotence of remission. But not on account of the magnitude, as is proved in the Text by the words of Augustine. If, however, it is called irremissible on account of the impotence towards remission: this impotence will either be on the part of the one remitting, or on the part of the one to whom it is remitted. Not in the first way: because thus no sin is irremissible to the omnipotent physician who is equally potent to save in many things and in few, and in great things and in small. If, however, it is called irremissible on the part of the one to whom it is remitted: thus every mortal sin would be called irremissible: and thus every mortal sin will be a sin against the Holy Spirit. If, however, it is called irremissible, because it is not remitted neither in this world nor in the future: thus every sin in which someone departs without grace, will be a sin against the Holy Spirit, which again is false.

SOLUTION. It must be said that that sin is called irremissible not on the part of the guilt, nor on the part of the one remitting, nor on the part of the one to whom it is remitted, but on the part of the cause moving to remit, and it is the same cause which moves to sin: for this is malice: and this accuses, and it does not have the congruity of remission, because it does not have a cloak of excuse: hence that it is sometimes remitted, this is out of the mere piety of the physician.

But Richard of St. Victor touches upon another cause in his epistle On the Spirit of Blasphemy, saying that just as charity does not fall away, but is perfected, because it has an object and an act of remaining in the future, and here, but there more perfectly: so that sin as to its cause and act is not remitted, because it has a more abundant cause in the future world than here: for its cause is the love of sin, and the hatred of God: and this abounds more in the damned, than in the evil here. It is similar in the other species besides presumption alone.

Others assign other causes up to six, which with these will be eight. And of these six, the first is: because it is opposed to the font of mercy. Hence Augustine says on Matthew 12:32: The sin against the Holy Spirit is, when someone is agitated by the torches of envy against the grace of God. The second is, because such a one scarcely humbles himself to seek pardon: and this is held in the Text. The third is, because it is rarely and to few forgiven: and of this can be expounded that of the Apostle to the Romans 2:5: But according to your hardness, etc. The fourth is, because it is not read to have been forgiven. Hence, Luke 12:10, on that, He who shall blaspheme against the Holy Spirit, the Gloss says: This blasphemer, his merits demanding it, just as he is never to arrive at remission, so he is never to arrive at penance. The fifth is also the one which Richard assigns, because in such [sins] nothing is diminished of the due punishment, that is, less than in others: because they do not have an excuse in the cause moving to that sin. Hence Richard says thus: The sin of the devil is inexpiable, because it can in no way be expiated: and through this is evident the difference between the irremissible sin against the Holy Spirit, for which no

relaxation of punishment is accustomed to be made: inexpiable, and irremissible. The sixth is, because such a one never merits to obtain the grace of penance. Hence, Matt 12: 32, on that, He who shall speak against the Holy Spirit, the Gloss says: He who sins against the Holy Spirit, it shall not be remitted to him, because he does not merit to do penance so that it may be remitted.

And through this the solution to the whole is evident.

D. Another assignment of the sin against the Holy Spirit.

Discussing this sin against the Holy Spirit, Ambrose in the book On the Holy Spirit hands down a defined assignment, saying: Why the Lord said, 'He who shall blaspheme against the Son of Man it shall be remitted him: but he who shall blaspheme against the Holy Spirit it shall not be remitted him, neither here, nor in the future', advert diligently. Is the offense of the Son one thing, and that of the Holy Spirit another? Just as the dignity is one, so the injury is one. But if anyone, deceived by the visible species of the human body, thinks something more remissly of the flesh of Christ than is worthy, he has fault, yet he is not excluded from pardon. But if anyone denies the eternal dignity, majesty, and power of the Holy Spirit, and thinks that demons are not cast out in the Spirit of God, but in Beelzebub, there cannot be the exhortation to pardon where there is the fullness of sacrilege. Here it is explained clearly enough what the sin against the Holy Spirit is. Which seems to agree with that description of Augustine, by which that sin is said to be envy of grace attacking fraternal charity. For he who after the cognition of the truth denies the truth of the Holy Spirit, and says his works belong to Beelzebub, is not doubted to envy the power, goodness, and grace of God. Therefore that distinction of words is not to be accepted thus, as if the offenses of the three persons were divided: but there the genera of sins are distinguished. For the sin against the Father is understood as that which is done through infirmity, because Scripture frequently attributes power to the Father. The sin against the Son, [that] which is done through ignorance, because wisdom is attributed to the Son. The third is expounded. Therefore he who sins through infirmity or ignorance easily obtains pardon: but not he who sins against the Holy Spirit. But since the power, wisdom, and goodness of the three is one: why power is more often assigned to the Father, wisdom to the Son, and goodness to the Holy Spirit, was said above.

Articulus 6 — How Blasphemy Against The Holy Spirit, Sin Against The Holy Spirit, And The Spirit Of Blasphemy Against The Holy Spirit Differ

How do blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, sin against the Holy Spirit, and the spirit of blasphemy against the Holy Spirit differ?

How do blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, sin against the Holy Spirit, and the spirit of blasphemy against the Holy Spirit differ?

Next it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, But he who shall blaspheme against the Holy Spirit, etc.

And here is asked the difference between blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, and the sin against the Holy Spirit, and the spirit of blasphemy against the Holy Spirit. For he touches upon these three differently in the Text.

And it must be said that the sin against the Holy Spirit is the more general among these, and does not posit a sin except as to the moving cause, which attacks the grace in which the remission of sins is made, as was said before. But blasphemy against the Holy Spirit posits an act of dishonoring the Holy Spirit acknowledged in a work showing him, just as was the work of miracle in the cast-out demons, because as the finger of the Holy Spirit demonstrated, and yet they attributed it to the contrary spirit, namely Beelzebub. For blasphemy is the imposition of a false crime upon God. But the spirit of blasphemy is the love of blaspheming through hatred of God, spirating against the power and grace of the Holy Spirit.

Moreover, Richard says: If anyone blasphemes compelled by torments or deceived by ignorance, who would deny that it is more tolerable than if anyone blasphemes led by malice alone? Therefore the malignity of blasphemy is the worst before all others. But it is most wicked in this genus, and in which malice grows to the highest [degree], when anyone delights and glories in the vituperations of God: for what is blasphemy, except divine vituperation? But everyone aspires to this which he strongly affects and desires much: what else therefore does the spirit of blasphemy seem to be, than the affection and desire of divine vituperation?

Articulus 7 — Whether The Sin Of The Jews Who Crucified Christ Was Sin Against The Holy Spirit; And Whether The Sin Of The Angel And Of The First Man Was Against The Holy Spirit

Whether the sin of the Jews who crucified Christ was a sin against the Holy Spirit? And, Whether the sin of the Angel and of the first man was against the Holy Spirit?

§ 10. Then it is asked about what he says, there, D, near the end: For the sin against the Father is understood as that, etc. It is asked, Whether the sin of the Jews was against the Holy Spirit?

§ 11. And it seems that it was: because in Matthew 12:32 and Luke 12:10, where it treats of the sin against the Holy Spirit, it speaks of the sin of the Jews who contradicted the operations of Christ done through the Spirit.

§ 12. But against this seems to be what is said in Acts 3:17 I know, brethren, that you did it through ignorance, as did also your rulers. Therefore it seems to be a sin against the Son. And many things could be adduced for this: but let these suffice, because they all have one solution.

§ 13. Further it is asked concerning the sin of the Angel, and of the first man. For since infirmity and ignorance are penalties consequent upon sin, it does not seem that they were in the Angel or in man before the first sin: therefore it seems that their sin was neither against the Father, nor against the Son: therefore it remains that it was against the Holy Spirit.

§ 14. But against this is what the Apostle says of the woman Adam was not seduced, but the woman being seduced was in the transgression But seduction falls under ignorance: therefore she sinned against the Son, and [not] against the Holy Spirit.

§ 15. Also, concerning the man Augustine says that he believed to be venial what was mortal: and he himself was ignorant of something.

§ 16. Also, the first Angel believed that he could receive beatitude according to perfect power without merits, and from himself, because otherwise he would not have desired it: therefore he too was deceived: and thus the sin of all was against the Son, and not against the Holy Spirit.

§ 17. Solution. To this it must be said that the sin of the Jews as regards the works which were an argument of the power of the Holy Spirit, was against the Holy Spirit: but the infidelity by which they crucified Christ, was from a crass ignorance by which they were deceived concerning the flesh of the Savior: and as regards this it was a sin against the Son. And thus the solution to the contrariety is clear.

§ 18. To the other it must be said that ignorance is twofold, namely nescience accompanying a created nature, and from this both the first Angel and the first man sinned: and ignorance which is a sequel to sin, which signifies a privation of the light of grace directing in things to be done, and from this they did not sin: and in the first way it was a sin against the Son. And through this the solution to all that is usually asked in this distinction is clear.

DISTINCTIO XLIV

Articulus 3 — Whether The Potency Of Sinning Is One Or Many

Whether the power of sinning is one, or many?

§ 34. Thirdly it is asked, Whether it is one, or many?

§ 35. But it seems that it is many: because evil is done by speaking, and walking, thinking, willing, and choosing, and many other actions, which it is impossible to reduce to one power: therefore the power of doing evil is many powers, and not one.

§ 36. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Augustine says that in every evil only the will is blamed: therefore only the will is the power of evil, or of sinning. 2. Also, we had above, that the act of this natural power which is the will, is called evil, and not of the others: therefore only the will is the power of sinning.

§ 37. Solution. It must be said that the power of sinning, namely executing sin, is multiplex in man: but the power commanding sin is only one alone, which is the will. And through this the solution to the whole is clear. However, a distinction was noted above how sin is differently in reason, and free choice, and will, and the other powers: and those also are valid here.

Divisio Textus

§ 19. After the aforesaid things it seems worthy of consideration, etc. This last distinction is divided against the whole treatise on sin: because in this one it is treated of the power of sinning.

§ 20. And the Master asks two things here, namely whether the power of sinning is from God? and, Whether we ought to resist the sin of the wicked? there, C, Here arises a question, etc. And through this the meaning is clear.

Articulus 1 — Whether The Potency Of Sinning Is A Potency Or An Impotence

Whether the power of sinning is a power or an impotence?

§ 21. Around the first part three things are asked: of which the first is, Whether the power of sinning is a power or an impotence? Second, Whether it is from God? Third, Whether it is one, or many?

§ 22. To the first one proceeds thus: 1. The Philosopher says that rational powers are for opposites: but opposites are good and evil: therefore there is one power for these in the rational soul: but the power for good is a power: therefore also the power for evil is a power. 2. Also, the power of evil is a power able to do evil: therefore it is an active power: but every active power is a power and not an impotence: therefore the power of evil is a power, and not an impotence. 3. Also, it was held above that free choice is a faculty of reason and will, by which good is chosen when grace assists, and evil when it deserts: therefore free choice is the power of evil by which evil is done: but the will is a power simply: therefore the power by which evil is done is a power and not an impotence.

§ 23. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Anselm says in the book On Free Choice: Do you think that what being added diminishes, and being subtracted increases liberty, is liberty, or a part of liberty? as if to say: No: but the power of evil added to power and faculty and liberty, diminishes each one of them: therefore it is neither a power, nor a part of a power. 2. Also, if it were a power absolutely, since no power which is of the genus of praiseworthy things is lacking to God and to the confirmed Angels, this would be in the Angels and in God, which is false: therefore it is not a power. 3. Also, if it were a natural power of man, since grace is the perfection of nature, and glory the perfection of grace, that power would remain in grace and glory: but it is established that this is not true: therefore it is not a power, as it seems, but a defect and an impotence.

§ 24. Solution. It must be said that the power to evil can be in two ways, namely to the evil of pure privation, and this power is material, and is a defect in all corporeal and spiritual things: and we are not speaking of this here: because its ultimate (as the Philosopher says, and moreover the Commentator in the book On the Heavens and the Earth) is in the minimum: as if it can be overcome by one, it can be overcome by two, and three, and so successively. The power of evil is also called the power of doing evil: and then it is necessary that evil be taken in a bad action, according to what we said above, that evil has a deficient and efficient cause: and thus that power can be considered in three ways, namely according to the root in which it is rooted in the subject of the power, and according to the essence of the power, and according to the conjunction to the act. In the first way it is a power, and in the second way: and thus is understood that saying of the Philosopher, that the power of acting wickedly is good. But in the third way it is still considered in two ways, namely by comparison to the substance of the act, or by comparison to the act under the deformity. And in the first way it is still a power.

But in the second way it is a power mixed with impotence. But if it be compared to the deformity alone: then it is not an active power, but a material defect and weakness succumbing to malice: just as we say that this one can die, and that one can become sick, and that one can be overcome, always with the material power failing.

§ 25. And through this the solution to the whole is clear: because the first reasons proceed concerning the power in the first, and second consideration, and third according to what refers to the act only. But the other reasons proceed in the consideration by which it is referred to the defect and deformity. Also in the first and second way these powers are in the Angels, although not in the third way.

Articulus 2 — Whether The Potency Of Sinning Is From God

Whether the power of sinning is from God?

§ 26. Then it is asked concerning the second, namely whether it is from God? because this is asked about in the Letter.

§ 27. It seems that it is: because 1. All power is from God: therefore also this one. 2. Also, Sirach 31:10, the holy man is praised, who could transgress, and did not transgress, do evil, and did not do it: but he is not praised except through what he has from God: therefore he has this power from God. 3. Also, whatever is the cause of a cause, is the cause of the caused: but every act is from God, as was proved above: therefore every power of acting is from God. 4. Also, whatever power is by analogy in God and in the creature, that is from God according to what it is in the creature: therefore according to what it is in the creature, it is from God.

§ 28. ON THE CONTRARY: A wise man does not make something by which his work becomes worse: from the power of evil is all that by which the work of God becomes worse: therefore the power of evil is not from God. The first is clear through Augustine. The second is clear through this, that evil is that by which the work of God becomes worse: and if there were no power of evil, evil would not be done.

§ 29. Solution. It must be said according to the distinction previously had, that the power of evil according as it is prior to the evil, and considered in the subject, or in itself, is a perfect being and from God: but it has an order to evil from the fact that it is from nothing, and not from God, and thus it is not from God. And as regards the first consideration the first four reasons proceed: because also it cannot elicit an act from itself, except according to what is from God. But according to the other consideration the reason to the opposite proceeds: and it is not difficult to assign this solution to the induced reasons.

Articulus 4 — Whether In All Things Obedience Ought To Be Given To Authority

Whether power should be obeyed in all things?

§ 40. Then it is asked concerning the second part which begins there, C, Here arises a question not to be passed over in silence. Around which two things occur to be asked, namely, Whether power should be obeyed in all things? And, Whether the power of the devil should be resisted?

§ 41. TO THE FIRST it is objected thus: 1. Bernard says in the book On Precept and Dispensation: Let the Prelate exact nothing of those things which I have not promised. Therefore the power of a prelate is not to be obeyed in all things. 2. The same, Ibid.: A subject is neither to be inhibited short of his promise, nor to be compelled beyond it by the law of observance. From this the same follows.

§ 42. But against this seems to be that 1. Ibidem he says, that perfect obedience knows no law, is not straitened by limits. Therefore it obeys in all things. 2. Also, Hugh of St. Victor: Obedience is a virtue, which embraces all enjoined things to be necessarily fulfilled, unless the authority of the commander withstands. 3. Also, Sirach 4:32: Do not resist against the face of the mighty. Therefore in nothing is one to resist. 4. Also, Coloss. 3:20: Children, obey your parents in all things. Therefore much more spiritual parents: therefore power is to be obeyed in all things. 5. Also, Jerome to Rusticus the provost of the monastery: That you may fear God, that you may love God, believe whatever salutary thing he shall have commanded: nor judge lesser the sentence of the greater, whose duty it is to obey and fulfill commands, Moses saying, Hear, O Israel. 6. Also, Gregory: Consider not the quantity of the command, but the dignity of the commander. 7. Also, in the Gospel: He who hears you, hears me: and he who despises you, despises me. But it is established that God is to be heard in all things: therefore also the Prelate. 8. Also, Benedict in the Rule: If perhaps the Prelate commands impossible things, one must attempt to do them. Therefore in possible things it is much more to be obeyed.

§ 43. Solution. To this, according to Bernard, it must be solved under a distinction: because either we are speaking of perfect obedience, which is of charity and liberty: and this knows no end, just as charity does not. Or we are speaking of the obedience of justice: and this has the limits of its vow, and is not to be compelled beyond it except from charity. However further according to the Masters it is necessary to distinguish: because there is full power, and limited power. Full power is to be obeyed in all things: but in nothing which is not of power, but of impotence. Whence if he commands sin, this is not of power, but of impotence: and therefore in this he is not to be obeyed. But if he commands those things which are of power, as the Apostle says, According to the power which the Lord has given me unto edification, and not unto destruction, namely yours: then what Bernard says has place, namely that either it is the obedience of perfection, and this obeys in all good things, because for those alone is power given: or of justice, and this one need not obey, except in those things to which he is obligated from a vow or from the chair. For thus is understood that of Matt. 23:2: The Scribes and Pharisees have sat on the chair of Moses. All things therefore whatsoever they shall say to you, namely pertaining to the chair, observe and do, etc. But if it is limited power: then from justice I ought not, except insofar as a subject, whether from the command of a greater, or from a vow: but from charity and perfection I can obey further, never however against the vow or against the mandate of a superior. And thus it is clear to the whole: because the first authorities speak of the obedience owed from justice: but the second of the perfection of charity in obeying.

Articulus 5 — Whether We Ought to Resist the Power of the Devil, and Whether We Ought to Will to Be Tempted

Whether one must resist the power of the devil, and whether we ought to wish to be tempted?

Secondly, it is asked whether one must resist the power of the devil?

It seems that one should not: because he who resists power, resists the ordination of God: therefore the power of the devil is not to be resisted.

1. Also, this seems so through the fact that Jeremiah urged that Nebuchadnezzar should be served, by whom the power of the devil is signified: therefore the power of the devil is not to be resisted.
2. Also, a man ought to endure what he has deserved to endure from his sins: but he has deserved the exercise of the devil from his sins: therefore he ought to endure this, and not resist. PROOF of the minor: because on that of the Psalm He often delivered them, namely the Lord his people, etc., the Gloss says: Not his own virtue, but the sins of men made him powerful.

Also, the Psalm Prove me, O Lord, and tempt me, etc. But temptation happens through the power of the devil: therefore we ought even to desire that we be subjected to the power of the devil.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY is what we note in Matthew And lead us not, etc.

Also, 1 Peter Whom resist, steadfast in the faith.

Solution. Whether we ought to will not to be tempted, has been disputed above. But here it must be said that the devil is to be resisted with all our might: because "devil" names a substance depraved in will: and therefore he does not use the power conceded to him, except to an evil end: and therefore he and his power must be resisted.

TO THAT therefore which is first objected, it must be said that all power is ordained by God: but with this ordination is sometimes conjoined the iniquitous will of the one having power, and in this respect the power is to be resisted: but if he were to remain in the divine order only, which would be for the punishment of evildoers and the praise of the good, then in no way would it be to be resisted.

To the other it must be said that Jeremiah urged this with respect to the affliction of bodily captivity, but not with respect to spiritual captivity which occurs through fault: because that does not proceed from the order of power, but from the intention of an iniquitous will.

To the other it must be said that this is true with respect to bodily afflictions: just as Job was afflicted. But in no way must one consent to the fault which he intends: just as neither did Job sin with his lips in all his temptations, nor did he speak foolishly, etc.

TO THAT which is asked, Whether we ought to wish to be tempted? It must be said that no, on account of two things: of which the first is, because temptation does not only state that which is of ordained power, but also that which is of perverse will, which must be resisted.

The second is weakness: for we are weak, and we ought to beware of occasions of falling. To that however which

is objected to the contrary from the Psalm, it must be said that David desired the effect of temptation which is purity, and not the probation in itself. And if it is objected that this is impossible, that one be had without the other: it must be said that by the virtue of the Lord he willed to be confirmed in the act of temptation, so that he could not be tempted except unto purity: and this was well possible, just as Augustine said in the book of Confessions: Grant to fulfill what thou commandest, and command what thou wilt. And a certain holy Father in Egypt: I do not pray that I may not have temptations, but that the Lord may give me the virtues to bear them.

Articulus 6 — Whether One Must Always Obey a Superior

Whether a superior must always be obeyed?

Then it is asked about what he says, there, C, around the middle: Attend to the grades themselves of human things, etc.

And two things are asked, of which the first is, Whether this is always true what Augustine says, that a superior must be obeyed, when a superior and an inferior command contraries?

Second, Whether the power of tyrants must be obeyed?

TO THE FIRST it is proceeded thus: 1. On that of the Apocalypse And to the Angel of the Church of Pergamum write, the Gloss says, Let not an Archbishop dare to lay a hand upon the subjects of a Bishop without him. Therefore an Archbishop cannot command contraries to the subjects of Bishops, as it seems: therefore it is not generally true what is said here.

1. Also, a more immediate power influences more than a mediate one: but an inferior power is more immediate: therefore it is stronger over subjects, than a superior one: therefore if they are contrary, one must stand by the inferior, and not the superior.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: Boethius says, that whatever an inferior power can do, a superior can do, and more: therefore if they are contrary, it is necessary for the inferior to yield.

Solution. It must be said that superior and inferior hold themselves in two ways, namely as in order to each other, so that the whole inferior goes out from the superior, as the power of a Proconsul from the power of the Emperor, and of Bishops from the Pope: and then the superior power remains ordinary and immediate to all inferior subjects: and in such a case Augustine speaks here, and it has no instance [i.e., exception]. But sometimes they hold themselves thus, that both go out from one universal power which subjects the inferior to the superior in those things which it wills, and in those things which it wills it does not subject: and then the inferior can command something which the superior cannot retract: and thus the power of a Bishop and an Archbishop hold themselves in comparison to the Pope.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 7 — Whether the Power of Tyrants Ought to Be Obeyed

Whether the power of tyrants must be obeyed?

Lastly it is asked concerning the power of tyrants, of whom Boethius says, that they are invaders, and do not have power unless usurped, whether they must be obeyed or not?

But it seems that they must be obeyed: because there is no power but from God: and he who resists power, resists the ordination of God.

Also, concerning Nebuchadnezzar it is certain, that he did not have power over the Jews except usurped: and yet Jeremiah urged, that he be obeyed.

Also, Pilate did not have power over the Lord except usurped: yet the Lord said: Thou wouldst not have any power against me, unless it were given thee from above: and he obeyed him with respect to this that he did not resist.

BUT AGAINST this seems to be that what is usurped is that which is invaded contrary to the order of right: and to those we are not bound to obey, but rather to resist, lest he lose his soul by invading what is not his.

Similarly, the cross is borne against barbarians invading the rights and peace of the Church: therefore the power of such is to be resisted.

Solution. Power is twofold, namely ordained according to the grades of the power of the Church or civil law: and to this power one must not resist with respect to obedience. There is also usurped power which is the power of a minister by which the Lord scourges us... and to this one must not resist with respect to this, that we should not endure if the Lord wills; but we can well resist with respect to obedience, if we can: for the power of such is iniquitous, and iniquity must always be resisted. If however the Lord wills, the scourge is to be endured: and with respect to this the first authorities speak: because the Lord willed the Jews to be scourged: and this was revealed to Jeremiah. And the Lord of peace placed the discipline of our peace immediately upon our Lord Jesus Christ: and with respect to this he said that it was given to him from above: and not with respect to this that he would justly command the Jews or the Lord Jesus Christ, who was the Lord of ages, to whom is honor and glory unto the perpetual ages of ages. Amen.

LIBER III

PROLOGUS

Prologue

D. ALBERT THE GREAT, BISHOP OF REGENSBURG, COMMENTARIES

ON THE THIRD BOOK OF SENTENCES. ON THE INCARNATION OF THE WORD AND OTHER THINGS PERTAINING TO THIS. PROLOGUE. The contents of this volume are briefly outlined.

For here the order of reason demands that, having in the first book discussed something about the inexplicable mystery of the most high Trinity with the irrefutable testimony of the Saints, and then in the second book having suggested the order of the condition of things and the fall of man under certain rules of authority - concerning his restoration through the grace of the mediator of God and men, and the sacraments of human redemption, by which the contritions of man are bound and the wounds of sins are healed, we consequently discuss in the third and fourth book: as the Samaritan approaches the wounded, the physician the sick, grace the wretched.

DISTINCTIO I

Divisio Textus

When therefore the fullness of time came, God sent His Son, made of a woman, made under the law, to redeem those who were under the law. This is the third book concerning the restoration of the human race, or of fallen man, in those things restoring which are by way of things and signs. And therefore it is divided into two parts: in the first of which it is treated of the restorer and those things fitting to him in that he is a restorer: because the restorer himself restores effectively. In the second, however, it is treated of the dispositions which restore formally, as of virtues, and gifts, and precepts: because those dispositions are supposed in this doctrine, as things, and not as signs. And this second part begins in distinction XXXIII, where it says: When indeed, etc.

The first of these is divided into two: in the first of which it treats of those things which perfect the union of the Son of God to human nature, and conversely. In the second, however, it touches upon the very properties which are fitting to Christ the Son of God and son of man

according to that he is united, and by the grace of his union. And this begins in distinction VI, where it says: From the aforesaid, however, a question emerges, etc.

And the first of these containing five distinctions, is further divided into three parts, according to that three perfect the union, namely, the uniting, the united, and both together associated. Hence in the first it treats of the uniting. In the second, of the united or assumed. And this begins in the second distinction, there, A, And because in man. In the third, lest the whole human nature, etc., it treats of both together: and this begins in the third distinction, there, A, It is also asked concerning the flesh of the Word, etc.

The first distinction is divided into two parts: in the first of which it treats of the time of the incarnation, or union to the flesh. In the second, of the uniting another in person: and this begins in the second chapter, there, B, It must indeed be diligently noted, etc.

And this is further divided into two parts: in the first of which it determines why the Son, not the Father, nor the Holy Spirit united flesh to Himself. In the second, it touches upon a doubt concerning this, there, D, But perhaps some will say, etc.

Still the prior has two parts, so that in the first it proves what was said: in the second, it solves the question incident to this, there, C, But if it is asked.

In the first chapter it does three things. First, it is said, that when the fullness of time came, God sent His Son. Second, it explains what the fullness of time is. Third, it explains what it is for the Son to be sent, as is clear in the Letter.

Expositio Textus

Exposition of the Text

The letter is thus expounded:

"When the fullness of time had come," etc. The Apostle to the Galatians 4:4-5.

"Sent," by this is meant that He appeared in the flesh.

"Made under the law."

Note that the law is not established for the just. Hence, to be under the law is said in three ways, namely, by cause, or by the observance of certain commandments of the law, or by the motive of the law. By cause, thus all born in sin were under the law. According to observance, however, it happens to be under the law in two ways, namely, by obedience, or by consummation: by obedience, as the just are under the law; by consummation, however, as Christ who fulfilled the law. Under the motive of the law, which was fear, were those who observed it out of servile fear.

"Therefore, the Son sent," etc. Objection: In the law, in the time of the fathers, He was often sent through the gift of wisdom: therefore, He was incarnate from then.

Solution: It is understood concerning the mission into the world, not only into the heart.

Articulus 1 — Whether It Was Fitting For God To Be Incarnate

Whether it was fitting for God to become incarnate?

The first doubt arises, whether it was fitting for God to become incarnate? And I will present reasons for this, first on the part of God, second on the part of the creature. On the part of God, I will present reasons first taken from the power of God, second from wisdom, third from goodness.

On the part of the power of God, first four things are supposed which are approved among the wise. The first supposition is that the first cause is of infinite power in acting. The second is that it is of infinite power to demonstrate itself at some time in work. The third is that infinite power cannot demonstrate itself except in a work in some way infinite. The fourth is that the power of God in acting needs nothing.

From this, thus: 1. Whatever is purely created is finite and of finite power: therefore it is of finite essence: therefore infinite power will not be sufficiently demonstrative; therefore it is necessary for the operation of God to be in some way above created being. This, therefore, will be either that it be made by Him, or that He unite with another: not in the first way, because if it is a non-created being, it cannot be made, otherwise contradictory things would be verified of the same: therefore it will be thus, that He unite with another created being which is without proportionate comparison distant from Him: therefore it is necessary or fitting that God unite with a creature: and below it will be proven that only man is unifiable with Him: therefore it was necessary for God to unite with man: because otherwise infinite power would not be demonstrated through an infinite effect, which is against the second.

1. Likewise, Infinite power is to lead the created to the highest act of which it is susceptible: but (as will be shown later) the created will be susceptible of deity in one person: therefore it will be of infinite power to join deity in some effect in one person; not unless with man: therefore it was fitting for God to become incarnate.
2. Likewise, It is proven through wisdom, and three propositions are supposed, namely, that it is of wisdom to order. The second is that supreme wisdom is to fulfill every possible order. The third is that supreme wisdom demonstrates itself in every possible beauty.

From this, thus: Order is in created things to each other, according to which they touch each other through union and composition. Similarly, order is of the creature to the Creator: therefore it is necessary to complete this order in the ordered: but it will not be completed unless the first is joined with the last: therefore it is necessary for the first and last to be joined, as it is held, Wisdom 8:1: "She reaches from end to end."

1. Likewise, All beauty is of wisdom: but I see that beauty from species is such that mixed things are more beautiful than elements, and complexioned things than mixed, and animated things than complexioned, and the most beautiful composed of a rational soul and corporeal substance having the potential for life: therefore since supreme wisdom does not stop there unless it comes to the beauty of infinite beauty, it will join with this

creature animated by a rational soul which is the last in the beauty of nature, the most beautiful uncreated spiritual substance: and this is what is held, Proverbs 31:10: "Far and from the ends of the earth is her price." For far is the uncreated spiritual substance: but the last lines are the last end of nature, and the last end of the universe: but the last end of nature is man through the enumeration of compositions, but the last end of the universe is God, from which ends the price of redemption is made.

2. Likewise, From power and wisdom together it is argued thus: Great is the power in the bringing forth of simples from nothing: but greater shines forth in the grades of nature which are to be mixed being, living, sensing, understanding; yet neither is infinite in these. Therefore, since both are finite, they will still bring forth a further grade from the conjunction of a nature which is above intellectual with intellectual or rational.

If perhaps it is said that according to this reasoning man ought first to be joined to the angelic nature, and afterwards the divine nature to him: as we see that after the simple is the mixed mineral, and after that living, and so on with others, and always the prior is preserved in the subsequent. To this, the response is deferred until later, where it will be shown that the Angel is neither unifiable with God nor with man.

[uni]ble: hence this does not impede the process.

§ 6. Next, this is shown from goodness: and let three things be supposed, namely, that the good is diffusive and communicative of itself. Second, that it belongs to an infinite good to communicate itself in an infinite mode. Third, that the created thing is capable through union of the infinite good, as has appeared in effect.

Hence thus: The infinite good communicates itself in an infinite mode, and it is not infinite unless it is so substantially: therefore it will communicate itself to the created.

If perhaps it is said that, according to this, it communicates itself to every capable created thing. On the contrary: The Good regards the nature to which it communicates itself, and not the person: nature, however, is indifferent: therefore it will not be communicated except through a nature: in a person, however, it cannot be, because then the order of that nature to another according to other gifts would already be destroyed, if every person were united to it, and the plurality of individuals [would be destroyed], which is proved thus: If a union were made to Socrates, or to Plato, it would be such as would make God man, and man God. Therefore Socrates is the Son of God, and the Son of God is Socrates: and the Son of God is Plato, and conversely. But whatever things are the same as one and the same thing, are the same as each other: but Socrates and Plato are the same as the Son of God and according to the same thing, because according to one union: therefore Socrates and Plato are the same. And the same reasoning holds concerning others: therefore the number of persons of that nature would be destroyed: therefore it was not fitting for Him to be united except to one of that nature.

§ 7. Also, from power and goodness together I argue thus: Great is the power and goodness that makes the universe: but yet a greater can be thought, namely one that makes infinite

worlds: but a still greater can be excogitated, namely one that conjoins God to some creature in one person: because that is incomparable to it. Since therefore God has a power than which a greater cannot be thought, and indeed even greater than can be thought, He Himself can, and wills (since His goodness is as great as His power) to produce such a conjunction: but it cannot be done to all created things, because the number of individuals would be destroyed, as was held: therefore He will do it to one: but no creature is unible except man: therefore He will do it to man. And because it is easy to multiply reasons of this kind, therefore let these suffice: provided that caution is taken not to say that any of these is necessary; because all are certain fitting reasons to the end that the incarnation should occur, even supposing that there had been no sin.

§ 8. From the condition of the state of man, which is under sin, the same is argued: and first let it be supposed that it is necessary that God's preordination made concerning man be fulfilled. Second, that every rational creature was made for beatitude. Third, that every rational creature, through some number of its individuals, should participate in it. Fourth, that God has not punished a rational creature without sin. Fifth, that every simple creature owes to the Creator, for itself, all that it is and is capable of, and cannot respond to Him in thanksgiving. Sixth, that a sinner can make satisfaction for nothing, since he has not made satisfaction for himself.

Hence thus: Man is subject to many penalties, and is a rational creature: therefore he sinned: therefore both because he is a creature, and because he is a sinner, he cannot make satisfaction, nor can any simple creature: therefore it is necessary, if satisfaction is to be made, that the one satisfying be the Creator so that he can, and man so that he ought [to do so], if satisfaction must be made, otherwise the preordination concerning man would be frustrated: therefore it is necessary for God to become incarnate.

We have also placed many such arguments elsewhere, and therefore let these suffice here.

To the contrary it is objected thus: § 1. That which is of infirmity does not befit God; to be joined to the infirm is of infirmity; therefore it does not befit God. But to be joined with a nature subject to penalties is to be joined with the infirm: therefore, etc. The proof of the first is because everything that is joined, is joined for the sake of something better. The proof of the second is because

a junction is desired so that the conjoined may be elevated.

§ 2. Also, that which is imperfect with respect to nothing, is in potency with respect to nothing. Hence thus: That which is not in potency in some way, is not unible, since unible expresses potency. God is not in potency to anything: therefore He is not unible to anyone.

§ 3. Also, everything that becomes something has something making it outside itself: God becomes man, and becomes united, since He was not always united: therefore He has something making Him outside Himself: but this is false: therefore God is not united.

§ 4. Also, God is united to human nature: therefore something unites Him: either the same thing, or another: if the same thing, then the same thing is the maker and the made, which is

not intelligible: if another, since the agent and maker is more noble than the made and acted upon, something will be more noble than God united, which is a heresy, because God is not more noble than God with flesh.

§ 5. Also, every union of two things seems to be with respect to some third thing constituted from both: but the deity is not capable of being subjected with respect to any third thing: therefore it is not unible.

§ 6. Also, no substance perfect in being and nature is unible or componible with anything: God is the most perfect substance: therefore in no way is He unible to anyone. The first is proved: because every composition and union is for the sake of acquiring some perfection: either in act, as matter is united to form: or in being, as form is united to matter.

§ 7. And because it takes long to object many things concerning this, since it is very easy to adduce reasons concerning this, let all conceptions of the mind existing against this union be posited: of which one is, that a substance perfect in act and being is unible to nothing. The second is, that every union terminates in a substantial or accidental composition. The third, that of diverse natures differing in species there is not one hypostasis and person. The fourth, that diverse differences in nature and species and genus constitute nothing that is one in genus, species, or individual. The fifth, that those at an infinite distance have no proportion of union. The sixth, that the first cause uniting and composing all things is possible toward no union or composition, and infinite other things which it is easy to find. Since therefore the intellect holds and supposes these things within itself, it will not receive the union of God with human nature.

Solution It must be said that the reasons which have been adduced to prove that God is unible with human nature are fitting, and they will not be of necessity: for if they were of necessity, it would not be a work of His good will, nor would we be bound to so many and such great acts of thanksgiving, nor would we accept it through the revelation of faith. This, moreover, easily appears to one paying attention to those reasons posited here and elsewhere, and this I leave to the judgment of the readers. But all the reasons posited to the contrary do not impede the union. And I say this for this reason: because although faith cannot be sufficiently proved, nevertheless it also cannot be disproved.

It must therefore be said to the first, that it is not of infirmity to be united to an infirm nature, except where the united nature would be submerged into those infirmities, and would begin to distance itself within itself. But the divinity is not thus united to humanity, and there is Augustine's example of the light of the sun, which is not infected by those things upon which it places its rays.

To the other it must be said, that this reason holds in those things which are united with respect to some third thing. But the divinity is not thus united to humanity: because it will be proved below that in the Lord Jesus Christ a common species is not to be found.

To the other it must be said, that the unible which is in potency with respect to composition has another uniting it outside itself, and this is the unible which becomes in some way in the composite . But the deity is not such: because it neither becomes in itself, nor in the composite.

Nor is this to be accepted simply, 'God becomes man': because becoming is noted to be posited concerning God. And if it is found posited in an authority, it is to be glossed thus: This comes to be, that God is man, but this 'becoming' is then posited concerning the nature of humanity, not of deity, and therefore it unites itself. Nor is this true, that the deity is better united than not united: on the ground that united it is as if conjoined to a created good, and by itself it is only an uncreated good. And this is so because nothing can be added to the uncreated goodness that would augment it, since it is infinite: and if something is added to it through union, it has neither the notion nor the essence of good except from it: hence it does not add anything to it, but rather receives this very good that it has, from the fact that it is united to it: because the more closely something is ordered to it, the more it receives of its goodness.

To the other it must be said, that the union of two things which are both imperfect in some way, is with respect to some third thing: just as matter is imperfect regarding act, while form is imperfect regarding being. But it is not thus concerning deity and humanity.

To the other it must be said, that all those common conceptions of the mind prohibit that the deity even as a part be unible. And this we readily concede: because the definition of a part is the definition of something imperfect, and this does not befit the deity.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 3 — What The Fullness Of Time Is, And In How Many Ways It Is Said

What is, and in how many ways is "fullness of time" spoken of?

§ 14. Then it is objected concerning what He says, there, at A, The fullness of time.

§ 15. For a manifold fullness is found in Sacred Scripture, which does not apply to the time in which the Son of God came into the flesh: therefore it seems that the fullness of time is not spoken of specially.

§ 1. But that a manifold fullness is found is evident thus:

§ 2. 1. Deuteronomy 32:3-4: Give magnificence to our God. The works of God are perfect: therefore, full. Whence, Psalm 23:1: The earth is the Lord's, and the fullness thereof: therefore it seems that in the universality of creatures there was a perfect fullness of time.

§ 3. 2. Item, Matthew 13:48, upon that: Which, when it was filled, they drew out: the Gloss intends that this be applied to the end of the world. Therefore, it seems the fullness of time is at the end of the world.

§ 4. 3. Item, Ephesians 4:13: Until we all meet into the unity of faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the age of the fullness of Christ: but this was in the time of the Resurrection, because this was the fullness of Christ, or in the time of the resurrection of the blessed.

§ 5. 4. Item, In the Prologue of Luke, Jerome says: That God into a full God, he refers this to the Ascension of the Lord Jesus. Therefore, it seems that there was also a certain fullness in the Ascension.

§ 6. 5. Item, John 19:30, Jesus on the cross said: It is consummated: but this happens when through the fulfillment of the number of the elect the ruin of the Angels is filled up. Therefore, then was the fullness, as it seems. Whence, Apocalypse 6:11: It was said to them that they should rest for a little time, until their fellow servants and their brethren should be filled up, etc.

§ 7. Solution: It must be said that fullness is manifold. Namely, of nature according to the sufficiency of principles, so that it might be propagated: and this was when He rested on the seventh day from the perfect works of God. Whence, Genesis 2:2: And on the seventh day God ended His work which He had made: and He rested on the seventh day from all His work which He had done.

§ 8. Item, Fullness of propagated nature, of which it is said, Psalm 23:1: The earth is the Lord's, etc.

§ 9. There is also the fullness of grace, and the fullness of glory. Now the fullness of grace is twofold: in the head, and in the members. In the head, however, it thus began in the Incarnation: because that fullness is the cause and beginning of the other fullnesses on account of three things. Namely, because then was the fullness of the preordination of the time that He should become incarnate; whence, Colossians 2:9: For in Him dwelleth all the fullness of the Godhead corporeally. Secondly, because then was the fullness of generation. For the first was of a man from the earth; the second, of a woman from a virgin man [i.e., Adam's rib]; the third, of children from the commingling of parents; but the fourth, of a virgin man from a virgin woman, which completed the order of generation. Whence, Genesis 15:16: In the fourth generation they shall return hither. And therefore it was said to the one generating: Hail, full of grace. Thirdly, because then grace overflowed for fulfilling the law, and for paying the promises. John 1:14: We saw His glory, the glory as it were of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace, with respect to the fulfillment of commandments, and truth, with respect to the fulfillment of promises. Whence, below, v. 16 and 17: And of His fullness we all have received, and grace for grace. For the law was given by Moses; grace and truth came by Jesus Christ. But in the members there was a fullness of grace at Pentecost: of which it is said, Acts 2:4: And they were all filled with the Holy Ghost. Item in the same place, 6:8: Stephen, full of grace and fortitude, etc. Psalm 89:14: We are filled in the morning with Thy mercy, O Lord.

§ 10. There is also the fullness of glory in the head with respect to the glory of the body in the Resurrection, of which the Apostle speaks in the authority brought in above; or with respect to the place corresponding by way of fittingness, and this in the Ascension, of which Jerome speaks in the Prologue. But in the members there can be a fullness of glory with respect to number, and thus speaks the Gloss upon

§ 1. Matthew concerning the net; or with respect to the perfection of sanctity in both schools [i.e., Jews and Gentiles], concerning which, Ecclesiasticus 24:16: In the fullness of the

saints is my detention; or with respect to the outcome which is the restoration of the ruin of the Angels, of which Psalm 1:7 and following speaks. Thus the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 4 — Whether The Son Of God Can Be Said To Have Been Made Of A Woman

Whether the Son of God can be said to be made of a woman?

§ 2. Next it is asked concerning what He says, there, at A, near the beginning: Made of a woman.

§ 3. 1. For a making (factura) does not fall upon the Son of God, but upon the Son of man. Therefore, he speaks badly calling the Son made.

§ 4. 2. Item, Why does he not say born of a woman: since nevertheless this is true?

§ 5. 3. Item, The Gloss: The Virgin was not a woman (mulier), but a virgin. Therefore, the Apostle seems by this to inflict an injury on the Mother of the Lord.

§ 6. Solution: Without doubt, making is not posited concerning the Son of God inasmuch as He is such, but concerning the Son of man. Whence Augustine: Inasmuch as He is made, it is inasmuch as He is of a woman. Whence the sense is: His Son made, not inasmuch as He is the Son of God, but made in human nature, so that namely human nature might be the subject about which the making itself is.

§ 7. To the other it must be said that creation is the work of the divine will bringing forth a creature from nothing; but birth is the work of nature on both parts, namely, on the part of the patient as is the mother, and on the part of the agent as is the father. But to make is the work of the will upon pre-existing matter, just as God the Trinity made human nature, which is united to Christ or the Son of God; and to signify this, he says, made. But when He is said to be born, this is according to nativity, which is from the mother alone.

§ 8. To the last it must be said that "woman" (mulier) is said in two ways. Namely, according to the signification of the name, and thus the Gloss says: The Virgin was not a woman (mulier) [i.e., not a deflowered female]. Or according to the interpretation [etymology] of the name, and thus she was especially a woman (mulier) [i.e., molliens heroum, softening a hero]: because she softened the hero of all heroes. Whence when, dissolved out of softness entirely on the cross, He poured forth sweetness, He referred this softening to her, saying: Woman, behold thy son.

Divisio Textus

§ 9. But it must be diligently noted, etc.

§ 10. The Master [Lombard] touches here upon three causes why the Father was not sent into the flesh, of which two are specially why the Father was not incarnate. But the third generally why neither the Father nor the Holy Spirit. The first is in the beginning. The second, there, at B, § 2: Therefore also the Son, etc. But the third, there, at B, § 3: Whence Augustine in Ecclesiastical Dogmas: The Father did not assume flesh, etc.

Articulus 5 — Whether The Time Predetermined By The Father Is And Ought To Be Called The Time Of Fullness, In Which God Sent His Son

Whether the time was preordained by the Father, and ought to be called the time of fullness, in which God sent His Son?

§ 9. Next it is asked concerning what He says, there, at A, near the beginning: The time of fullness is called the time of grace, etc.

§ 10. For this seems to be against the Gloss of the Epistle to the Galatians 4:4-5, which upon the same says that it is called the time of fullness because it was preordained by the Father that He would send the Son then.

§ 11. ON THE CONTRARY: It was preordained from eternity. Therefore, He ought to have sent Him from eternity.

§ 12. If it is said that the will is a dilatory cause. On the contrary: A will which receives dispositions from things conceived by reason wills this and that. Therefore, a will which always holds itself in one way does not will this and that. But such is the will of God. Therefore, He always wills the same. Therefore, if He willed it then, He willed it from eternity. Since therefore He is omnipotent, He fulfilled it from eternity, which is false.

§ 1. Solution: The time of preordination that He would send is called the time of fullness, as was said, for those reasons which were assigned. And it is true that from eternity He preordained that He would send then; and therefore the will was not changed according to the diverse things willed: because from eternity He willed that He would come then. Just as if I should will to build tomorrow, and I persevered in that will, if I were to build not now but tomorrow, I would not be said to have changed according to my will. Whence the argument does not follow: because He did not preordain from eternity absolutely, but He preordained that He would send, and also with this He preordained when He would send. But by what cause He deferred it, some causes are assigned by way of fittingness. But the sufficient ones are hidden in the wisdom of God, over which the Apostle exclaims, in Romans 11:33: O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God! How incomprehensible are His judgments!

Articulus 6 — Why The Time In Which God Sent His Son Is Called The Time Of Fullness, The Time Of Mercy, The Year Of Kindness, The Time Of Grace, Etc

Why the time in which God sent His Son is called the time of fullness, the time of having mercy, the year of benignity, the time of grace, etc.

§ 2. Next it is asked concerning what He says, there, at A, near the middle: The year of benignity.

§ 3. For what is the reason for the four or three names of this time, namely, that it is called the time of fullness, the time of having mercy, the time of benignity, and the time of grace?

§ 4. To this it must be said that the reason why it is called the time of fullness has been stated. But because from the fullness followed the redemption of the miserable, therefore it is called the time of having mercy, Hosea 11:8: My repentance is stirred up. And, Jeremiah 31:3: I have loved thee with an everlasting love: therefore have I drawn thee, taking pity on thee. But for such a great help an ignited goodness was required, which melting the good within would make it flow out into all; and therefore it is called the year of benignity. Canticles 1:3: Thy name is as oil poured out: therefore young maidens have loved thee exceedingly. And the time of grace because of the abundance of grace for fulfilling the commandments.

Articulus 7 — Whether The Law Of The Decalogue Can Be Fulfilled Without Grace

Can the law of the decalogue be fulfilled without grace?

§ 5. Next it is asked concerning what He says, at A, near the end: Because through charity, etc.

§ 6. On the contrary: Because no wise legislator obliges to the impossible. But to have grace is not in our power. Therefore we are not obliged to have grace. And yet we are obliged to the decalogue. Therefore the law of the decalogue can be fulfilled without grace.

§ 7. Solution: If we wish to sustain that opinion, that the mode [of acting from charity] is in the precept, then we say that although the decalogue can be fulfilled without grace with respect to the works themselves which are commanded, nevertheless it cannot be fulfilled according to the intention of the legislator: because he intends that the observance should obtain life, and thus it cannot be kept without grace.

§ 8. As to that which is objected, that to have grace is not in our power, it must be said that this is true; but nevertheless it is not impossible to have: because doing what is in us, we will of necessity have it, because God gives to all abundantly, and upbraideth not.

Articulus 8 — Whether The Father Could Have Been Incarnate And Redeemed The Human Race

Could the Father have become incarnate, and redeemed the human race?

§ 11. But here a doubt arises: because it seems that the Father ought to have become incarnate rather than the Son.

§ 12. 1. For power is attributed to the Father. But it belongs to the powerful to conquer the strong. Therefore, it belongs to the Father to become incarnate for the work of redemption. Proof of the minor: Job 41:24: There is no power upon earth that can be compared with him.

§ 13. 2. Item, Isaiah 49:24: Shall the prey be taken from the strong? or can that which was taken by the mighty be safe? Therefore it seems that to redeem belongs to power.

§ 14. 3. Furthermore, the Incarnation is a work in which infinitely distant things are conjoined, as God and man. Therefore this will belong to the infinitely powerful, and this is appropriated to the Father. Therefore, it belongs to the Father to redeem, and not to the Son.

§ 15. 4. Item, the affection of a Father is greater toward sons, than of a brother toward brothers. Since therefore the Father is read as our Father, and the Son as brother, it seems that there would be more solicitude for redemption from the Father than from the Son.

§ 16. 5. Furthermore, to adopt belongs to a father and not to a son. Since therefore through the Incarnation we are made sons, it seems that the Father ought to have become incarnate.

§ 17. FURTHERMORE, it is asked, what unfitting thing would there be if the Father were incarnate?

§ 18. It seems that there would be none: because the whole world would still experience an amelioration, just as it experiences in the Incarnation of the Son. Since therefore the Father is not envious, this good

§ 1. [Thus] He wished to communicate to the world, and thus the incarnation of the Father is still to be hoped for, which is a heresy.

§ 2. Solution: It must be said: If we consider congruence [i.e., fittingness], it does not belong to the Father to be incarnate; but if we consider power absolutely, the Father can be incarnate, as will be said below.

§ 3. Therefore, to the first objection it must be said, that the work of redemption, as to that which belongs to action, belongs indivisibly to the three persons. And therefore there is something in it which belongs to power, something which belongs to wisdom, and something which belongs to goodness. For as to the effect, which is to redeem from the strong armed man, it is of power; but as to the mode through humility and justice, it is of wisdom; and as to the end in which the highest goodness shines forth, it is of goodness. But because it principally consists in the mode, therefore it is principally of wisdom, especially because there, in 'being sent', 'being from another' is enclosed, which does not belong to the Father, as Augustine says. Through this the solution to the second objection is also clear.

§ 4. To the next it must be said, that our Father is God the Trinity, and the Son is our brother according to the flesh: and if the Father were incarnate, He would be our brother, and therefore that objection does not proceed.

§ 5. To the next it must be said, that we are adopted by the whole Trinity, and not by the Father alone, and therefore it was fitting for the Son to be sent, who might confirm us in the inheritance into which we are adopted, lest a doubt should be generated for man that the Son might contradict those things which the Father had established.

§ 6. To the other objection which is subsequently asked, it must be said that many absurdities would follow: yet for the sake of brevity let these suffice: one of which is that there would be confusion in the Trinity, on the grounds that there would be two sons, one according to divinity, the other according to humanity. A second is that He who is the Son according to deity would be the grandson of the Virgin: for the Father would be the son of the Virgin, whose son would be He who is the Son according to eternal generation; and thus He would be the grandson of the Virgin, because He is the son of her son. A third is because the opposite to the innascibility of the Father would be signified in two ways, namely, in the fact that He

would be sent, and in the fact that He would be born. For as Saint Augustine says, the mission of the Son is His incarnation. For Augustine says in book IV On the Trinity, that to be sent is to be known to be from another. Hence in the mission itself it is given to be understood that the Father is from another, and thus it would be necessary that there be someone from whom He is: therefore He would not be innascible, and there would be a quaternity in the Trinity, since He could not be from the Son who is from Him by generation, nor from the Holy Spirit who is from Him by procession. And similarly, through nativity He would be nascible [i.e., capable of being born], at least according to humanity, and this nascibility would not be congruent with the property of innascibility.

§ 7. And because of these and similar things, it is not fitting for the Father to be incarnate.

Articulus 9 — Why The Holy Spirit Did Not Assume Flesh

§ 9. Next it is inquired concerning that which he says, there, B, § 3: Neither the Father assumed flesh, nor the Holy Spirit, etc.

§ 10. For it seems that the Holy Spirit ought to have assumed it, because:

§ 11. 1. Augustine says in the book On the Spirit and the Soul, that the Holy Spirit is the person in the Trinity closer to us: therefore, since things that are closer are more quickly united, it seems that He ought to have assumed flesh.

§ 12. 2. Furthermore, the incarnation was a work of the highest goodness and love: but goodness and love are attributed to the Holy Spirit: therefore the Holy Spirit ought to have been incarnate.

§ 13. 3. Also, if to be sent belongs to him who is from another, as Augustine says, then it is more fitting for the Holy Spirit than for the Son: because the Holy Spirit is from two, but the Son is from one only: therefore it is more fitting for the Holy Spirit to be sent into flesh than for the Son.

§ 14. 4. Also, the incarnation is for the sake of acquiring grace, which was lost through the sin of the first man: but grace is attributed to the Holy Spirit: therefore the Holy Spirit ought to have been sent into flesh.

§ 15. 5. Also, the Master will say below that, on account of the charity which appeared in it, this work is attributed to the Holy Spirit: therefore He ought much more to have been incarnate, because in this a greater charity would have appeared.

§ 16. Solution: It must be said that it was not fitting nor is it fitting for the Holy Spirit to be incarnate, but for the Son alone, for the reasons stated above.

§ 17. Therefore, to the first it must be said that the Holy Spirit is not called closer to us for the reason that He is more unible to flesh than the Son, but because He proceeds from eternity as capable of being given in time; and therefore, according to His name, He speaks a relation to the mission which occurs into the hearts of the faithful to sanctify the rational creature. For He proceeds as the gift of the Father and of the Son, capable of being given even to a rational

creature: but the name of the Son, according to which He is from the Father, does not import such a relation to us.

§ 18. To the next it must be said, that goodness and love are appropriated to the Holy Spirit with respect to the distribution of gifts, and not with respect to the incarnation. For the incarnation encloses within itself nativity, which chiefly belongs to the one born according to eternal generation.

§ 19. To the next it must be said, that the concept of mission is enclosed in the concept of incarnation, but this is not sufficient; rather it is necessary that from His own property He has a congruence toward such a mode of mission which is to be born in flesh, and no one has this except the Son. Hence Augustine says that He was incarnate lest the name of Son should pass to another: hence it was fitting for Him alone to be incarnate.

§ 20. To the next it must be said, that the work of the incarnation was for the sake of grace, not just any grace, but that which is of reconciliation and of the adoption of sons. Hence the Apostle, to Galatians 4:4 and 5: God sent His Son, made of a woman, made under the law, that He might redeem them who were under the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons. Therefore, since adoption occurs with the consent of the true heir, it was necessary for us to be adopted through the true son. And therefore the Apostle says, to Colossians 1:13: He has translated us into the kingdom of the Son of His love. The gloss of Augustine says, that is, of His beloved Son: and therefore this grace is more appropriated to the Son than to the Holy Spirit.

§ 21. To the next it must be said, that the incarnation itself is the action by which the three persons worked flesh, not for themselves, but for the Son: and this is more fittingly attributed to the Holy Spirit because of the love which appeared supremely in it, as the Master says. But the incarnation is the assumption of flesh, and that is more fittingly attributed to the Son for the reasons stated above.

§ 22. The text of this chapter is self-evident.

Articulus 10 — Whether The Father And The Holy Spirit Could Have Become Incarnate, And Whether They Can Assume The Same Man, And Whether They Can Assume Several Men

§ 24. Next it is inquired concerning that which the Master says: But if it is asked whether the Father, or the Holy Spirit, etc.

§ 25. For there it is said, that the Father and the Holy Spirit could and can be incarnate. And this seems to be false:

§ 26. 1. By the reasons stated above.

§ 27. 2. Also, the power of God is as great as His wisdom: and His wisdom is as great as His knowledge: but He never knew that the Father or the Holy Spirit was to be incarnate: therefore He never could.

§ 28. 3. Also, nothing can or could ever be done, the reason for which did not precede it in the divine mind: but there was never any reason for this: therefore it never could be done.

§ 29. Furthermore it is asked, whether the Father and the Holy Spirit could assume the same man, or the same human nature which the Son assumed.

§ 30. And it seems that they could: Luke 1:37: No word shall be impossible with God: therefore they could assume the same nature.

§ 31. BUT ON THE CONTRARY: Let it be posited that they assumed it: such a union is one which makes God man, and man God in person: therefore the Father is this man, and the Son is this man, and the Holy Spirit is this man. But whatever things are the same as one and the same thing, are the same as each other: therefore the Father is the Son and the Holy Spirit, and conversely, which is false: therefore they could not assume the same man.

§ 32. Again it is asked further, if they could assume multiple men, or even every man?

§ 33. And it seems that they could: For the assumption of one would have conferred as much benefit as the assumption of another. Therefore, since God is not envious, and this benefit was communicable, it seems that it ought to have been bestowed upon every man.

§ 34. Solution: It must be said with the Master and Augustine, that the Father and the Holy Spirit could and can be incarnate: but it is not fitting, nor was it necessary. Hence, since God does nothing unless it is fitting and decent, He did not do this: yet if He were to do it and had done it, it would be most fitting.

§ 35. To the other point which is objected first, it must be said that the reasons previously had are reasons of greater fittingness according to human investigation: they do not, however, remove divine power, nor do they limit it in anything. Because God, as Dionysius says, is above mind and above reason, from which He is neither worthily thought of, nor worthily spoken of.

§ 36. To the next it must be said, that His power is as great as His knowledge, according as each is essentially considered in Him. But if each is referred to external objects, the power will be wider than the knowledge: for He can do certain things which He does not know [i.e., with the knowledge of vision], because He will not do them, that is, for which He does not have a reason within Himself: which, if He were to do them, He would without doubt fore-have the reason for them. And this is also the case with the will, which, although it is as great as power and knowledge, is nevertheless lesser with respect to objects. Hence Augustine says that certain things are subjected to power and not to knowledge, and certain things to knowledge and not to will.

§ 37. To the other point which is further asked, I say without prejudice, by the reason introduced, that it could not have happened that the Father and the Holy Spirit should assume the same man on account of the confusion in the persons: because, since the union is in person, it would seem to follow that they would all be one person. I say moreover that it cannot be done: because, although God could have done this, nevertheless on the part of the assumed nature it could not be done, and this is not a divine impotence, but rather of the creature, on account of the absurdity which seems to follow.

§ 38. To the other point which is further asked, whether they could have assumed every man, it has been answered above that this again would not be fitting on the part of the individuals: because all men would be united into three men, as was proved above, and thus the beauty of the universe would perish, as well as the potential for the multiplication of the human race, and also (which is more absurd than these) the number of the elect, and the restoration of the ruin of the Angels would not occur. But if the nature of three men were assumed, it would be superfluous: since redemption is the end of the assumption of human nature, and through the assumption of one man the redemption of infinite worlds could be accomplished, if they existed. I do not say it is superfluous, however, for the reason that if it were done or had been done it would be unseemly: on the contrary, whatever God does is most fitting. Rather, I assign the reason of fittingness on the part of the creature. For most fittingly God arranged the nose below the forehead: but if He had placed it under the back, it would nevertheless be most fitting, although we might not see the beauty on the part of the disposition of the human body.

§ 39. The text of that chapter is self-evident.

Articulus 11 — Whether, For The Assumption By One Person, When It Is Said, The Son Assumed Human Nature, All Three Persons Assume

§ 41. Next it is inquired concerning that which he says: But perhaps some will say: Since they are undivided, etc.

§ 42. For it seems that for the assumption of one, all three assume.

§ 43. 1. For when He is said to be incarnate, an effect in the creature is noted: but every such effect is indivisibly of the three persons: therefore if one assumed, all assumed.

§ 44. 2. Also, Damascene says that the three are the same in all things except ingeneration, and generation, and procession. The incarnation is not any of these: therefore it seems that in the incarnation they are the same.

§ 45. 3. Also, the Son is not united to flesh only in that which relates to another: because Damascene says that the whole divine nature is incarnate in one of its hypostases; but in nature He is the same as the Father and the Holy Spirit: therefore it seems that whatever belongs to Him according to nature, belongs also to the Father and the Holy Spirit. But this is the assumption of flesh: therefore this belongs to the Father and the Holy Spirit, which is false. Because thus Dionysius says in the book On the Divine Names, where he discretely posits what is fitting to the divine persons: But it is discrete [or proper] by the benign divine operation toward us, that the substantial Word truly and totally was made a substance according to us [and] from us, and to do and to suffer, and whatever things belong to His human contemplation, are selected and set apart. For in these things the Father and the Spirit communicated according to no reason, unless someone says according to a good, fitting, and benign will, and according to every superposed and ineffable divine operation which He did, and being made according to us, invariable according to [the fact] that He is God and the Word of God.

§ 46. Solution: It must be said that in the incarnation there are three things, namely the operation or action, and the thing worked itself, and that to which there is union. The operation or action is indivisibly of the three persons. But the thing worked itself is the body and soul joined by a natural conjunction. And He to whom it is united is the Son alone. And this is taken from Damascene, where he says thus: The wisdom and power of the most high God, subsisting in His own hypostasis, the Son of God, consubstantial with the Father, overshadowed the Virgin as a divine seed. And He constructed for Himself from pure and unspotted bloods a flesh animated by a rational and intellectual soul, the firstfruits of our mass, not with seed, but by a forming work through the Holy Spirit.

§ 47. Therefore it must be said to the first objection, that the effect is indivisibly of the three, that is, from the three: but it is not of the three in the sense that it is united to the three: and in this sense the objection infers.

§ 48. To the next it must be said, that what Damascene says is true: but it is to be understood thus, that those properties are considered in two ways, namely, in themselves, or in the concept of others. And just as they distinctly belong to the persons in themselves, so also those things in whose concept they are inseparably enclosed cause distinct things to belong to the persons. Hence "incarnate", in the concept of that which is called "incarnate", encloses the property of the Son, on account of which it belongs to the Son alone: because it encloses within itself a mission and a 'being from another'. How this is the case is clear from the aforesaid, where it was proved that the Son alone is unible to flesh. Hence, on account of the concept of relation, this cannot belong to the other persons.

§ 49. To the next it must be said, that to be incarnate, or to be united to flesh, does not belong to the divine essence according as it is considered absolutely without the concept of the persons: and this will be proved below. Hence to be incarnate, according to the reason of understanding, priorly belongs to the person of the Son, and posteriorly to the essence, namely, because the essence is the Son of God, and conversely. And therefore it cannot be argued that it belongs to the Father and to the Holy Spirit: just as the Son is His own property, and His property is the divine essence, and the divine essence is the Father: and yet the Father is not the property of the Son, nor is the property of the Son the Father.

Articulus 12 — Whether The Whole Trinity Descended Upon Christ Baptized In The Appearance Of A Dove

§ 51. Next an objection is raised concerning that which he says, there, D, near the end: Nor that the same Trinity descended in the species of a dove, etc.

§ 52. For in the dove and the voice there seems to be nothing whereby it is not commonly of the three persons: for the operation of the dove and of the voice is indivisibly of the three, and the thing worked itself. But the union, which is a third thing there, was not present: for the Holy Spirit was not united to the dove, as the Son to the flesh; nor the Father to the voice, but the Son to the flesh: therefore nothing seems to stand in the way why those two should not commonly belong to the three persons.

§ 53. Solution: There is not only a dove there: but the descent of the dove, in which descent the mission of the Holy Spirit is understood. And the mission encloses within itself the concept of the personal property of the Holy Spirit according to how He is in the dove: namely, in such a way that the species of the dove is an appropriated [sign] of the Holy Spirit, in which the proper is enclosed. So that the sense is, that a dove appropriable to the Holy Spirit descended, in which descent the Holy Spirit proceeded by a temporal procession which contains within itself through its concept the eternal procession. And thus it is clear how this does not belong to the Father and the Son except with respect to cause, not by reason of a relation or property enclosed in the concept of that descent.

§ 54. Similarly I say concerning the voice, that it is not only taken as a created voice sounding in the air: but also according to the articulated words which sounded there. And these are: This is my Son, etc. In the utterance of this, therefore, the Father is understood sounding according to His personal property, although the Son and the Holy Spirit produced that sound with Him.

§ 55. And the text is self-evident in the chapter.

Articulus 2 — Why The Son Of God Did Not Assume Human Nature From The Beginning

Why did the Son of God not assume human nature from the beginning?

§ 9. But a doubt still remains: Why did He not assume human nature from the beginning?

§ 10. And it is objected thus: 1. When there was a disease, it was the time for medicine. But from the beginning there was a disease. Therefore, the physician ought to have been incarnate from the beginning.

§ 11. 2. Furthermore, this is seen by similarity to a bodily disease, which the longer it grows strong, the more difficultly it is cured. Therefore, it seems that from the beginning of the disease it was fitting for the Son to be incarnate.

§ 12. Solution: It must be said that it is otherwise in the medicine of the spirit and in the medicine of the body. Because bodily medicine acts with nature and helps it, and this through the actions of the primary qualities, which do not act voluntarily nor through the intellect; and therefore it is better to meet that disease in the beginning, as long as nature is strong, before it succumbs. But spiritual medicine does not act except with our will at least consenting. But for a consent of this kind, a foreknowledge of the disease, and of the medicine, and of the need is required: because otherwise the physician and the medicine would not be sufficiently embraced, and it is of no avail unless it is fervently desired. And therefore it was consequential (as the Saints say) first to make the disease known, and that there was no help through nature, or the obedience of the law without grace, and afterwards the physician would come with the medicine.

§ 13. And through this the solution to both objections is manifest.

DISTINCTIO II

Divisio Textus

§ 56. DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

§ 57. And because in man the whole human nature, etc. Here begins the second part in which what was assumed is treated.

§ 58. And it is divided into three parts: in the first of which it is touched upon what is assumed. In the second it is determined whether the soul was assumed mediating the intellect, and the body mediating the soul: and this begins there, B, Therefore the Son of God assumed, etc. And in the third it is determined whether He simultaneously in time assumed, and made, both the soul and the body, there, C, But if it is asked, etc.

§ 59. In the first part he does three things. First he proves that when it is said, "The Son assumed human nature," by human nature is understood the body and the soul. Secondly, he introduces the error of some saying that by human nature is understood a property following the conjoined body and soul: and he destroys this through John of Damascus who says that in the Lord Jesus it is not possible to accept a common species. Thirdly, he introduces John of Damascus also saying of what sort was that which He assumed: because it was of the same sort as that which He planted in our nature.

§ 60. The sentence in the Text will already be clear through the disputation.

Articulus 1 — Whether Only The Rational Nature Is Assumptible

§ 62. First therefore five things occur to be inquired into, of which the first is, Whether only rational nature is assumable, or conversely irrational nature? Secondly, Whether only the nature of man, or also of an Angel? Thirdly, Whether the nature of man, or also a man? Fourthly, How this is true that in the Lord Jesus one may not accept a common species? Fifthly, Whether He assumed nothing except what He planted in our nature?

§ 63. First therefore it seems that irrational creature is also assumable.

§ 64. 1. There is a congruence [or sharing] of those things, and of congruent things a transition to one another into one is possible: therefore the possibility and aptitude of union belongs to the irrational creature.

§ 65. 2. If perhaps it is said that a trace [or vestige] is not a sufficient likeness, but only an image. On the contrary: Between the Creator and any creature there is an infinite distance: but of things infinitely distant, one is not nearer than the rest: therefore it seems that an irrational creature is just as unible as a rational one.

§ 66. 3. Furthermore, union is for the complement [or completion] of the universe: therefore it seems that irrational nature ought to be elevated through union just as rational nature.

§ 67. 4. Furthermore, in some things irrational creatures are more assimilated to divine nature than human nature is: such as the sun, and the moon, and things of this kind, which Boethius calls immortal and spiritual bodies: therefore, since a transition is easier for things having a symbol [or common ground], it seems that these are more unible than rational things.

§ 68. BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. That which is unible to the deity through union is glorifiable, and partakes of beatitude: but the irrational does not partake of beatitude: therefore it is not unible. Proof of the first premise: The conjunction of sanctifying grace is lesser than the union to the deity: but the conjunction of sanctifying grace orders towards the partaking of beatitude: therefore that which is to the deity does so.

§ 69. 2. Also, the end of the assumption of a creature is redemption: but the irrational is not in this way unible to God: therefore it is not unible.

§ 70. 3. Also, nobler gifts belong to nobler creatures: but the rational creature is nobler than the irrational: therefore it is capable of nobler gifts. But above all things the communication of the deity with a creature is most noble: therefore none but the rational was susceptible of a gift of this kind.

§ 71. And because it is easy to adduce many such arguments, let these suffice.

§ 72. Solution: It must be said that an irrational creature is not unible: for when it is asked what is unible, it is not asked what God can unite to Himself, but rather what has an aptitude from some fittingness for union. And therefore, since the irrational creature has no fittingness for union, I say that it is not unible.

§ 73. To the first thing therefore which is objected, it must be said that a vestige does not make for unibility, but is rather an indication that it is from another as from an acting cause. For unibility posits the perfection of the same union as to joy and fruition, which is born from such a conjunction, and also some cause of the union, as Anselm says, none of which is present according to possibility in the irrational creature: and therefore it is not unible.

§ 74. To the next it must be said, that although the Creator is equally distant from all created things, nevertheless not all things are equally distant from Him, as Dionysius says in the book On the Celestial Hierarchy, and Aristotle in the book On Causes. And therefore, through degrees of dignity which are distinguished by the participation in the goodnesses which are in God, one thing approaches more than another: just as the living approaches more than mere being, and the sensing more than the living merely, and the reasoning more than the sensing. And therefore the rational creature is more unible than the irrational.

§ 75. To the next it must be said, that the irrational creature did not fall except through the fall of man: and therefore it is not elevated except in him for two reasons: one of which is because every creature is in some way in man. Because the elements are in those things which complexion the body, but the vegetative and sensitive potential is in the soul, and also a likeness to the Angel in reason and intellect. And therefore he is also called a microcosm, because he collects all the parts of the macrocosm. And therefore in the microcosm the

macrocosm is elevated to a higher dignity. But the other reason is because man is the end of every creature: therefore, just as that which is towards the end has dignity only in the end, so every creature will have dignity in man. And thus the Apostle says: All things are yours, but you are Christ's, and Christ is God's.

Articulus 2 — Whether An Angel Is Assumptible

§ 77. Secondly it is asked, whether an Angel is also assumable?

§ 78. And it seems that it is. 1. For an Angel (as Gregory says) has the image of God more expressly than man: and therefore by Ezekiel 28:12 he is called the seal of resemblance. Since therefore man is unible because of the image, it seems that an Angel is more unible than man.

§ 79. 2. Furthermore, an Angel is capable through the intellect of the union itself, and is beatificable: therefore he is unible.

§ 80. 3. Also, it belongs to the highest mercy to reduce all things from a state of misery: but the Angel is in a state of misery: therefore since God is supremely merciful, it seems that He ought to unite the Angel to Himself so that He might redeem him.

§ 81. BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. From whatever thing personal distinction is inseparable, that thing is not assumable: but personal distinction is inseparable from the angelic nature: therefore it is not assumable. Proof of the major premise: Assumption destroys nothing in what is assumed, because one of the assumers does not transition into the other. If therefore He were to assume that which is in a personal distinction, the personal distinction in it would not be destroyed, and thus union in person would not occur, nor even in nature, because the nature of the assumer and the nature of the assumed would always remain distinct, and thus no union would occur. Proof of the minor premise is taken from the second book of the Sentences, where the Master says through the word of Augustine, that personal distinction is one of the attributes of angelic nature, which does not forsake the nature itself.

§ 82. 2. Also, in those things in which potentiality is never towards an act, in those things nature does not precede the person if there are persons—that is, if they are individual substances of a rational nature: therefore in them nature exists with the person: therefore the nature or person is not assumable.

§ 83. 3. Also, assumption is for redemption, which occurs through someone other than him who sinned: but he who sinned by himself does not have a congruity to satisfy through another: since therefore the Angel sinned by himself, he could not satisfy through another: and thus assumption would be empty.

§ 84. 4. Also, union is not accomplished through all hypostases of a unible nature, but rather towards one; and because all sinned from one from whom they descended, they can also satisfy through one. But not all Angels descended from one Angel; therefore even with one assumed, he could not satisfy for the others: therefore the Angel is not assumable.

§ 85. 5. Also, the Apostle says this, to Hebrews 2:16: For nowhere does He apprehend Angels, but He apprehends the seed of Abraham.

§ 86. Solution: It must be said that an Angel is not unible for the reasons lastly introduced.

§ 87. Therefore to the first it must be said, that a likeness is not a sufficient cause. For some say that an Angel is not the image of God, and they assign the reasons they wish: but because they contradict the Saints, namely Gregory, Augustine, and Anselm, it does not seem to me that one should say this: but rather, that the rationale of an image is not a sufficient cause for the assumption of a rational nature. Rather, something is required on the part of the nature, and something on the part of the state. On the part of the nature, namely, that the nature is distinguishable in time and act from personal perfection, and that it has an origin from one: because otherwise if one nature of man were assumed, God would not be united in nature, because one nature and another is according to its coming from another principle of origin. But on the part of the state, namely that he sinned through another, that he could rise again, and the like. And neither such things on the part of nature, nor on the part of the state of sin, are found in the Angel: and therefore the Angel will not be assumable.

§ 88. And through this the solution to all the objections is clear.

Articulus 3 — Whether The Nature Of Man Is Assumptible, Or Also A Perfect Man

§ 90. Thirdly it is asked, whether only the nature of man is assumable, or also the perfect man?

§ 91. And it seems that the man is: because 1. It is said thus, Psalm 64:5: Blessed is he whom You have chosen and assumed:[200] but it speaks of a person: therefore He assumed a man.

§ 92. 2. Also, Augustine: He who says that the man Christ, once assumed by God, is laid aside, let him be anathema: therefore He assumed a man.

§ 93. 3. And because many authorities say this, let the same be proved by reasons thus: Christ assumed the conjoined body and soul: but the conjoined body and soul are a man: therefore Christ assumed a man.

§ 94. 4. Also, Christ is most truly a man: either therefore a man whom He assumed, or a man whom He did not assume. If a man whom He did not assume: therefore He Himself is some man whom He did not assume: but a man whom He did not assume is Peter, or John, and so of all the others whom He did not assume: therefore He Himself is some one of them, which is false.

§ 95. 5. Furthermore, "to assume" either says the grace of union, or another [grace]. If another, let it be asked what that is, and it will not be possible to assign it. If it says the grace of union, thus: The grace of union unites: therefore the uniter unites the one thus assumed: but to every union there corresponds a one: therefore He Himself is one with the assumed. But the Son of God is not one with human nature; because He Himself is not human nature; therefore He did not assume human nature, but a man, since He is one with this man.

§ 1. Solution: It must be said that Christ did not assume a man. For the rule of the ancients is good, that the assuming [principle] is not the assumed [nature], but the uniting [principle] is the united [nature]; this is evident from our manner of speaking. For we do not say: "I

assume to myself the clothed or dressed thing," but rather it is well said: "I assume a garment or clothing." But it is well said: "I unite the clothed thing to myself," or "I am one with the clothed thing." And it is not said thus: "I am one with the garment." Whence it must be noted that to assume expresses a violent motion which is a drawing toward the one drawing; and therefore, according to the conceptual order [ratio intelligendi], assumption is prior to union. For first there was the drawing of the nature to Himself, and afterwards, according to the conceptual order, union in a hypostasis followed. Therefore, union is, as it were, the terminus of assumption. Hence, He could not assume a man. For if He had assumed a man, then He would have assumed some man: and thus there would have been some man whom He had assumed, which is false. Therefore, since that union destroys nothing in the assumed reality, if He had assumed some man, and that man had been an individual person, his personality would not have been destroyed: and thus distinct persons and distinct natures would have remained, because those are always distinct: and then there would have been no union. However, this will be inquired into more fully below.

§ 2. Therefore, to the first, it must be said that it is commonly glossed thus: "Blessed is he whom," that is, whose nature, "You have assumed."

§ 3. To the next, it must be said that man is posited by Augustine for human nature: because otherwise he would be saying nothing. For it is certain that Christ was not a man during the three days [in the tomb], but He had human nature united to Himself: and therefore, during the three days He would have laid aside the man, if man were taken strictly there.

§ 4. To the next, it must be said that a body and a soul conjoined are not a man. For not just any conjunction of body and soul makes a perfect man in person, but rather a conjunction which is complete according to nature: and this is with organs formed and perfected, and with their powers strengthened in them. Although in Christ these were present after the union, and the assumption and the union were simultaneous in time, nevertheless (as has been said) according to the conceptual order, assumption is prior to union, and is like the becoming [in fieri] of that union itself, and union is like the completed state [in factum esse] of that assumption itself. And therefore, to assume is with respect to the nature, and not with respect to the hypostasis. However, some have sometimes said that this can be conceded in some way: "He assumed a man"; distinguishing that "He assumed" can signify assumption according to the conceptual order either as in becoming, or as in the terminus. If it is as in becoming or something like in becoming, then He did not assume a man, but human nature. But if it is as in the terminus, then He assumed a man: because the terminus, or quasi-terminus, of the assumption is a man.

§ 5. To the next, it must be said that Christ is indeed most truly a man: but He is not a man whom He assumed under the formality of a man; rather, He is the one whose nature He assumed.

§ 6. Therefore, to what is asked, "Is He the man whom He assumed?", it must be said that this is not a division opposed by contradiction: "He is the man whom He assumed," "He is the

200. Psalm 64:5.

man whom He did not assume," in such a way that the implication falls under the negation, because otherwise it would not contradict. Rather, He Himself is the man whose nature He assumed, which nature is neither the Son of God, nor is it this man, because no man is his own nature.

§ 7. To the next, it must be said that union is through the grace of union: but this union is both as in becoming [in fieri] and as in completed state [in factum esse]. When it is as in becoming, then it is strictly assumption; and when it is as in completed state, then it is as union. And it still remains clear that He assumed human nature.

Articulus 4 — Whether It Is Lawful To Say That Christ United To Himself This Man Per Se, And Man Consequently, And The Son Of The Virgin Per Accidens

Whether it is permissible to say: Christ united to Himself this man per se, and man by consequence, and the son of the Virgin by accident?

Whether it is permissible to say: Christ united to Himself this man per se, and man by consequence, and the son of the Virgin by accident?

§ 1. Fourthly, it is asked whether it happens to be said that Christ united to Himself this man per se, and man by consequence, and the son of the Virgin by accident?

§ 2. And it seems that it is so. 1. For union is in a hypostasis: but Christ is only one hypostasis, namely eternal: therefore, this man is that hypostasis. But this hypostasis is a man, and an animal, and a body, and a substance, just as the essential predicates that follow it: therefore, by consequence, the union is of those things.

§ 3. 2. Also, it happens accidentally to this man that he is the son of the Virgin; therefore, it seems that He united that to Himself by accident.

§ 4. But against this, it seems that He did not unite to Himself this man: for nothing is united with something unless according to reason it preexists prior to the union with the other: but this man, according to reason, was not prior to being united. Therefore, this man was not united: therefore, neither by consequence was man or animal, nor by accident the son of the Virgin.

§ 5. Solution: It must be said with Augustine that such was that union which would make God man and man God. Hence it must be conceded that He united a man to Himself: because the union is the terminus of the assumption, and man is, in a certain way, of the assumed nature, because it is consequent upon the conjoined body and soul which are assumed here. And it is rightly conceded that by consequence it is of man, or animal, and of the other enunciable predicates of men; and by accident of the others which are accidental, such as the son of the Virgin, and the like.

§ 6. To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that if He unites a man to Himself, it is not necessary that He unite to Himself some preexisting man: because by making a man He united, and by uniting He made. For the uniter in this union is of infinite power, which is not the case in other unions. If, however, it is objected that a similar thing

could be said concerning assumption, it must be said that it is not similar: because to assume, by its very notion, implies a diversity between the assuming and the assumed; but union does not imply a diversity between the uniting and the united.

Articulus 5 — Whether In The Lord Jesus A Common Species Is To Be Admitted

Whether in the Lord Jesus it is possible to take a common species?

§ 7. Fifthly, it is asked concerning what he says there, A, toward the end: In the Lord Jesus Christ, however, it is not possible to take a common species, etc.

§ 8. For this seems to be false, because: 1. The Lord Jesus is a man, and man is a common species: therefore, in Him it is possible to take a common species.

§ 9. 2. Also, this man who is Jesus is either in some species, or not. If not: then He does not have communication in the species of man, and thus His redemption would not avail for man, which is false: therefore, He is in the species of man, and thus a common species is taken in Him.

§ 10. 3. Furthermore, the reasoning of John Damascene does not seem valid when he says: For He was neither made, nor was He ever another. For this does not seem to be a cause: because the sun is neither made, nor will it ever become another: and yet it has a common species, as far as the communicability of its form is concerned: and if it is not communicated,

this is because the entire matter is determined within the form, and therefore the form remains undivided in all its matter.

§ 1. 4. But to this some say that (as Boethius says) a species is the whole being of individuals, at least formally: because what is subsequent to the species belongs to the individuating principles. In the Lord Jesus, however, this species is not the whole being: because He has a certain being from the Deity. And therefore Damascene says that in the Lord Jesus Himself a common species is not to be found.

§ 2. But against this: Avicenna says that just as light, shining, and the shining thing differ: so do essence, being [esse], and a being [ens] differ. Therefore, just as light is referred to nature, so is essence; and just as shining is referred to act, so is being [esse]. But in Christ there is only one hypostasis and person. Since therefore being [esse], which is strictly an act, belongs to a person, Christ will not have except one being [esse], as it seems: but one being [esse] is what is in one species: therefore it seems that Christ is in some one species.

§ 3. Furthermore, according to this, His reasoning which He introduces would be no reasoning at all: as if there were not one species for the reason that the form in Christ according to which Christ could exist is not communicable.

§ 4. Solution: It must be said that according to the understanding of Damascene, it is to be understood thus: In the Lord Jesus, etc., namely, that there are understood to be two compositions in Christ, one of which is natural, the other by the grace of union. One is proper, the other indeed improper. The proper composition is called the first one, which is of soul and body: the soul (I say) which is the act of a physical organic body having life in potency: and

this composition is followed by the form of the whole which is man, or humanity if it is permissible to speak abstractly of it, and this itself is the species in this particular individual. For form is twofold, namely the form of the matter, or of the part, or of potency: and this form is the end of generation in nature, and is a part of the thing not predicable of the thing itself, and such a form is the soul in man.

§ 5. But the other form is that which is the formal definition [ratio] of the thing, and the whole being according to definition: and this is consequent upon the composition of the natural form and the natural potency, which is matter. And the Lord Jesus had such a consequent form on account of the natural composition, on account of which He is a true man, and one supposit in the species of man. But there is another composition in Christ, which is not truly a composition unless composition is expounded to mean the placing of one with another: and this is of the whole human nature with the Deity, not for constituting some third thing, but rather in the reception of personality which had been from eternity in the supposit of the divine nature. And this must be posited for this reason: because every composing element has the character of a part and of something imperfect with respect to the form of the composition: but divinity neither in itself, nor posited with another, can fall into the character of a part and of something imperfect. Whence it is not strictly any composing element, but, posited with itself, draws [the other] into some act of its own supposit: and therefore human nature posited with it in the supposit came to be through the association of the supposit of the divine nature. And with respect to this composition Damascene says that there is not a common species in the Lord Jesus, a species (I say) which would be the form of the composition, and the formal definition consequent upon the composition of the whole human nature with the divine.

§ 6. Therefore, to what is objected concerning Damascene's proof, it must be said that he does not intend this to be the reason, that He Himself cannot be predicated of many: but rather he proves the antecedent from the consequent. For what is impossible to have a form which follows a composition, is impossible to have a communicable form. Since therefore every species, as far as it is in itself, is communicable (as has been said elsewhere), that which is impossible to be communicated of itself does not have a species of composition, or a form of the whole, which is the same thing; and thus since it is impossible for Christ to have a communicable form, it is impossible for Him to have

a form which would follow upon the composition of the Deity with humanity.

Articulus 6 — Whether Christ Assumed Only What He Planted, Such That He Assumed Of The Same Number

Did Christ assume only what He planted, such that He assumed of the same number?

§ 1. In the sixth place, a doubt arises concerning what he says there, A, at the end: All the things which God planted in our nature, the Word assumed, etc.

§ 2. For the sake of this, three things are asked in order to exclude heresies. One of them is, whether He assumed only what He planted, such that He assumed of the same number.

Secondly, if He assumed not the same in number, but in origin, whether He assumed such as He planted? Thirdly, how did He assume?

§ 3. Regarding the first, there was a certain heresy which said that the substance of Christ's body descended through all the parts like a certain light, unmixed with the parts of nature corrupted by the corruption of vice, nor infected by the lust of copulation: and it could have, or did have, this sort of support for its error:

§ 4. 1. Medicine and a wound are of diverse qualities: since therefore the substance of Christ was medicine, it must not be of the same quality as the wound: but the wound was the corruption of vice: therefore the quality of Christ's substance always remained without this sort of corruption.

§ 5. 2. Also, it is found in the book of Wisdom (7:30): Malice does not overcome wisdom. And in the same place, v. 25: No defiled thing incurs into her. Since therefore Christ is the wisdom of the Father, it seems that nothing defiled ever incurred into the substance of His body.

§ 6. 3. Also, the greater purity that could be under God is owed to Christ: but it is a greater purity for the substance of His body never to have been subjected to sin, than to have sometimes been subjected even in another: therefore it was never subjected. Therefore, like light unmixed with darkness, it descended through all.

§ 7. 4. Also, Augustine says that Christ was in the loins of Abraham in one way, and Levi in another. For Levi, who was to come into his mother through copulation, was there through the law of concupiscence, and through corpulent substance; whereas Christ, who was not to come into His mother through copulation, was there through corpulent substance only. Therefore it seems that He was similarly so in the others: therefore this corpulent substance descended without the admixture of the other infected substance: therefore it descended like light from the first parent.

§ 8. 5. Also, the first man was not totally corrupted, for otherwise he would not have been capable of medicine: but it was more fitting that the substance of Christ should be formed from an integral part than from a corrupted one: therefore the entire substance of Christ always descended integrally, unmixed with corruption.

§ 9. BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. All the parts of the first man ought to have been subjected to reason equally, with none excepted, and all the powers of the mind ought to have been subjected to God. Therefore, since he was punished in this that his body was not subjected to him because his reason was not subjected to God, he ought to have been punished in all parts of his body, and the whole body corrupted: therefore no part remained uncorrupted.

§ 10. 2. Also, in the generation of Seth there was only the use of the act of generation: therefore whatever of the substance of Adam came into Seth, descended through that act. But the substance from which the body of Christ was afterward originally formed came from Adam into Seth: therefore it descended through that act: therefore through copulation. And whatever descends through copulation is corrupted by the law of concupiscence, as Au-

gustine says: therefore the substance of Christ's body existing there, not mixed as in Christ, was corrupted.

§ 1. 3. Also, in the succession of the fathers there was either a similitude of parts, or a dissimilitude. If in the first way, I have my point: because since Christ descended in their succession, the substance of Christ's body was not unmixed with the substance of the bodies of the others. But if there was a dissimilitude in the parts, a dissimilar substance means a dissimilar act of transfusion, and a dissimilar receptacle in which it is kept and guarded: but it is impossible to find such a diverse act of transfusion and dissimilar receptacle, even for those wishing to feign it: therefore the substance of Christ's body was not distinct from the substance of the bodies of the others.

§ 2. 4. Furthermore, according to this, Christ would have descended only from Adam, and from none of the others, if this substance was preserved distinct in the others only: which is contrary to the Psalm saying: Today I have begotten you. Which a Gloss also expounds concerning His temporal nativity.

§ 3. Solution: It must be said that the substance of Christ's body was transfused indistinctly all the way down to the substance of the body of the glorious Virgin: which was also for this reason sanctified in the womb, and afterward purged by the Holy Spirit: so that the vice of propagation might be entirely deleted from that which Christ deigned to associate with Himself.

§ 4. To the first, therefore, it must be said that the medicine was the body assumed as assumed, and it was not in many [ancestors] in the quality of medicine, but only according to original matter: and this sufficed.

§ 5. To the next it must be said that no defiled thing ever ran into Wisdom: but the matter of propagation had no relation to Christ except according to matter, and not according to the corruption to be purged from it by sanctification in the womb and the coming of the Holy Spirit. And therefore it could not even incur; but it ran only as far as the mother: but into Christ it could not incur.

§ 6. To the next it must be said that the greater purity that can be understood under God is owed to Christ, in such a way that the end of the redemption which was accomplished through Him is preserved. But it creates no impurity if Christ accepted the pure matter of His body from matter that was vitiated in origin. For because of this Christ was never subjected to sin: although the others with whom He agrees in matter were subjected to sin.

§ 7. To the next it must be said that Augustine understands the matter which is in the loins not absolutely, but in comparison to those whose matter it is: and thus it receives conjungibility with lust necessarily in some, and in some it is impossible for such a conjunction. For the matter as related to Christ cannot be subjected to the law of concupiscence, as related to Levi it cannot fail to be subjected. If, however, the matter of the loins is considered absolutely, it entirely is subject to the law of concupiscence: and in this way Augustine is speaking, as will become clear below, when the tithing of Christ is inquired into.

§ 8. To the next it must be said that the first man was materially totally corrupted: whence the medicine was in him only according to potency, namely that in assumption it could be purified: and therefore that objection is founded upon a frivolity. But as to what it says, that if he was totally corrupted, then it was impossible for healing, it must be said that this too is false: because he was not corrupted in such a way that the corruption would be inseparable from him, unlike in a demon, from whom corruption cannot be separated.

Articulus 7 — Whether Christ Assumed Such A Body As He Planted

Did Christ assume such a body as He planted?

Did Christ assume such a body as He planted?

§ 1. Next it is asked: What kind of body did He assume?

§ 2. And it seems that it was such as He planted: 1. But He planted it in a certain immortality: therefore (as it seems) He assumed such a body.

§ 3. 2. Furthermore, Christ's incarnation was for this end, that what we lost in Adam, He might recover for us: therefore He ought to have assumed our body in that state.

§ 4. 3. Furthermore, an effect does not seem to exist without a cause: because the Philosopher seems to say that when the cause ceases, the effect ceases. But penalty is the effect of fault. Since therefore Christ was immune from fault, it seems He also ought to have been immune from penalty: and thus He assumed a subject not subject to penalties.

§ 5. 4. Also, He assumed nothing except what He planted in our nature: but He did not plant penalty in our nature: therefore He did not assume penalty. The first premise is written in the Letter. The second is written, Wisdom 1:13, 16: God did not make death. But the wicked with hands and words have called it to them.

§ 6. BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Christ came to redeem: but redemption could not congruously happen except through satisfaction. But he who could not suffer penalty could not satisfy: therefore He ought to have assumed our penalties.

§ 7. 2. Also, Hebrews 2:14: Because the children have communicated in flesh and blood, He Himself likewise partook of the same, that through death He might destroy him who had the empire of death.

§ 8. Solution: It must be said that Christ assumed a body with its penalties. And concerning this there will be a more proper treatise below, where it will be determined what penalties Christ assumed, and what He accepted from each state.

§ 9. To the first therefore it must be said that penalty is in the body in three ways: namely, with respect to merit, and thus it is induced by sin, and not planted by God; and with respect to vindicative justice, and thus it is inflicted by God as a just judge; and with respect to contrary principles repugnant to one another and inducing dissolution, and thus it is planted by God in this very fact that He made the body from contraries. For the fact that contraries did not fight before sin is owed to grace, not to nature—the grace (I say) which is the grace of

innocence, as is determined in Book II of the Sentences, concerning the state of Adam before sin.

§ 10. To the next it must be said, as Augustine says on Genesis, that we do not recover in Christ the same immortality in species which we lost in Adam, but that to which Adam was to be transferred if he had stood firm. And even if we were to recover the same, nevertheless Christ ought not to have assumed the same: because through the merit of Christ we recover what we lost; but this merit consists in the laying down of His soul for His friends: and therefore it was necessary that He be mortal.

§ 11. To the next it must be said that without doubt penalty is the effect of fault: but it is not necessary that the fault be in the same subject in which the penalty is; rather, it suffices that it be originally in the same nature. But I say "originally," that is, it had preceded in him in whom the whole nature was according to origin.

§ 12. To the last, the solution is clear through what has been said before.

Articulus 8 — How The Word Of God Assumed The Body That It Planted In Our Nature, That Is, Whether In A Perfect Man Or In Seed

How did the Word of God assume the body which He planted in our nature, that is, in a perfect man, or in a seed?

How did the Word of God assume the body which He planted in our nature, that is, in a perfect man, or in a seed?

§ 1. Thirdly it is asked, How did He assume it?

§ 2. And Jeremiah seems to say that it was a whole perfect man in the lineaments of the body, and the perfection of the soul according to wisdom and grace: because, as he says, the Lord will create a new thing upon the earth: A woman shall compass a man. And the faith holds this.

§ 3. But this seems to be contrary to sacred Scripture: 1. Hebrews 2:16: For nowhere does He apprehend the Angels, but He apprehends the seed of Abraham; therefore it seems He received it in a seed, and not in perfect lineaments.

§ 4. 2. Furthermore, two heresies which were sometimes spoken seem to follow from this, namely, that Christ did not grow in His mother's womb: for if at the instant of conception He had the lineaments and organs for the having of which other little ones grow, it seems He Himself did not grow. The other heresy is that Christ was not in the womb as long as another little one: because in others, forty days, as Augustine says, are owed to the formation of the lineaments; but that was perfected in Christ in one moment: therefore it seems that He would have exited the womb forty days sooner than another little one, which is contrary to the book of Wisdom, where it is said that He was in the womb for a time of nine months just like another.

§ 5. Solution: It must be said to this that, just as the faith says, Christ in receiving the body formed it into lineaments, and by forming it received and united it simultaneously in time: as will be determined in the last part of this distinction.

§ 6. To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that the seed is posited for the human nature to be redeemed: for the seed of Abraham are the sons of Abraham. But the seed of Abraham is posited, so that it may be understood to pertain to the blessing of Abraham.

§ 7. To the reasoning of the first heresy it must be said that it is not valid: because although Christ received a lineamented body, nevertheless the lineaments were not in that quantity to which the lineaments of other little ones grow when they are born from the womb. Whence what is owed to two things in other little ones, was owed to one thing in Christ. For the time of pregnancy in others is for the formation of the lineaments, and for their due increase; but in Christ it was only for the due increase.

§ 8. Through this the solution to the reasoning of the other heresy is also clear: because although Christ's body immediately had the lineaments of its members, nevertheless He did not have them in the quantity in which they were after forty days: and therefore He had days in the womb along with others in order to acquire the due increase.

Divisio Textus

§ 1. Next the second part of this distinction must be treated, which begins there, B: Therefore the Son of God assumed, etc.

§ 2. In which the Master does three things. For first he shows the medium of congruity and reason through which the Deity is united to the flesh. Secondly, he shows that the mode of this union is inexplicable, there, B, § 2: But that union is inexplicable, etc. Thirdly, he excludes the error of the Manichaean who said that Christ assumed a phantasmic and not a true body, there, B, § 3: Therefore they are not to be heard, etc.

Articulus 9 — Whether In The Union To The Flesh A Medium Was Needed

Did He need a medium in the union to the flesh?

§ 3. Concerning the first of these, however, there are two doubts: the first of which is, whether the Deity needed a medium in the union to the flesh?

§ 4. The second is, what sort of medium is that?

§ 5. Concerning the first it is objected thus: 1. Extremes that are very distant are not united except through some medium: but a created corruptible corporeal thing and an uncreated incorruptible incorporeal thing are very distant: therefore they are not united except by some medium. But the body and the Deity are such things: therefore it seems that such a conjunction needs a medium.

§ 6. 2. Also, a corporeal corruptible created thing and an incorporeal incorruptible created thing are less distant than the Deity and a body: and yet those two are united through a medium, namely through a corporeal spirit which is moved in the body in the manner of the

luminaries in the world: therefore it seems that much more should the Deity and flesh have a medium.

§ 7. BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Whatever can do something per se without a medium, if it uses that medium, the medium will be superfluous in that case: but the Deity can unite itself to the flesh without a medium: therefore a medium will be superfluous.

§ 8. 2. Furthermore, it seems that Christ would not have had a soul. For nothing is required for life except what is the cause of life, and what is the recipient of life. But the Deity is especially the cause of all life, and the body the recipient: therefore He would have had a soul superfluously.

§ 9. 3. Furthermore, the Gospel seems to say this when it says: The Word became flesh, It does not say anything about a soul.

§ 10. 4. Furthermore, a redeeming union sufficed at the origin of sin: but the origin of sin is in the flesh: therefore it seems that the union of the Deity to the flesh sufficed.

§ 11. 5. Also, Christ came to redeem the propagation: but we are propagated only according to the flesh: therefore the union is only according to the flesh, and not according to the spirit: because God creates all souls anew.

§ 12. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. The whole [Christ] assumed the whole of me, so that He might gratuitously bestow salvation on the whole of me; but the principal part of us is the soul: therefore He assumed that principally.

§ 13. 2. Also, the principal death was in the soul: therefore since He came to destroy death, He ought principally to have assumed a soul.

§ 14. Solution: It must be said that Christ assumed a soul, and a body, and all the parts of both.

§ 15. To that which is asked concerning a medium, it must be

said that there the medium in a certain way is one to the other, as the Saints say.

§ 1. But to that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that the Deity on its own part does not need a medium: but a medium was congruous on the part of the flesh, and what kind of medium this is will be determined in the following article of the question.

§ 2. To that which is objected, that Christ did not have a soul, it must be said that although the Deity is per se the cause of life, nevertheless it is not the cause of life as the act of a physical body: because thus it would be a form united to the body, and making a composition: which is absurd. And such a cause of life is demanded in natural life. Whence He would not be a true man if He had assumed only a body, nor would His life be as from a natural form and cause, but rather it would be by the effect of a miracle; and it would not avail us, because such a one would not have convenience with us in the nature of the species, and therefore could not have paid our debt.

§ 3. To the next it must be said that flesh in the Gospel is posited for the whole man: but the more defective part is named, for this reason, to show that Christ despised no part of our nature, and accepted our weaker things.

§ 4. To the next it must be said that although sin in posterity is in origin in the body, nevertheless it is primarily only from the soul, and even in posterity it infects the soul.

§ 5. Also, in posterity He does not redeem only from original sin, but also from actual sin: because our penance would be worth nothing if His satisfaction had not killed the sin before the actual sin, which is from the soul as from a first cause.

Articulus 10 — Whether It Is A Medium Of The Thing Or Of Congruity

Is it a medium of reality or of congruity?

§ 6. Secondly it is asked, What kind of medium is it, whether of reality, or of congruity?

§ 7. That it is not a medium of reality is proved in this way: With a medium of reality removed, the conjunction which was held by that medium is removed: but during the three days [in the tomb] the soul was not conjoined to the body. Therefore if it was a medium of reality, the Deity ought not to have been conjoined to the body then, which is false: because the Deity was united to the flesh in the sepulcher, and to the soul in hell.

§ 8. If on account of this it is said, as almost all say, that it is a medium of congruity only:

§ 9. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. With a medium of congruity not posited in being, the extremes are still unible: but with the soul not posited, the extremes are not unible unto the end of redemption: therefore the soul is not merely a medium of congruity. The first premise is self-evident: Because the congruous is indeed fitting and convenient, but not necessary. The second is proved by a supposition thus: Let us suppose Christ assumed a body without a soul; then Christ would not be a true man, and could not pay the debt.

§ 10. 2. Furthermore, a body without a soul is inassumable, like a creature which only has a vestige.

§ 11. Further it is asked concerning this that is said, that He assumed the soul through the spirit: for the soul and the spirit, that is, the inferior and superior part in the soul, are one substance, as Augustine says: therefore one through another is not assumable by God.

§ 12. Solution: It must be said to the first that the soul has something of a medium of reality. For in holding the extremes it has the character of a medium of congruity: but in causing unibility in the other of the extremes, namely in the flesh, as the objection proves, it thus has the character of a medium of reality. And this is drawn from the Letter, where it says that it was not congruous for the Deity to be united to a body formed from the slime of the earth: and this is true, unless according as the body participates in a soul. And thus the solution to the first question is clear.

To that which is asked further, it must be said that the soul, as the Philosopher says, is named from animating [animando], and it animates through powers affixed to organs, and

those are the vegetative and sensitive power; and those powers, unless they are conjoined to the rational, are not unible of themselves, namely, to the deity. And therefore, insofar as the rational makes them unible, it is made a medium of the thing for them, but in holding together it is a medium of congruence: because, positing by impossibility that the rational were separated from the sensitive, it would not on this account be necessary for the deity to be separated from the same, just as when the soul was separated from the body, the deity was not on this account separated from the same.

Articulus 11 — How The Union Of God Or Of The Divine Essence Relates To The Other Unions In The Incarnation Of Christ

How does the union of God or of the divine essence relate to the other unions in Christ's incarnation?

Next, it is asked concerning what he says there, at B, §2.: But that union is inexplicable, etc.

And three things are asked, namely, concerning the mode of the union relative to the natural union of soul with body. Secondly, it is asked, what sort of one is that one? Thirdly, whether that union excludes the reasoning of the Manichean, or not?

Concerning the first, one proceeds thus: § 1. We commonly say that God is united to the flesh. Therefore, let it be asked, what does the word "united" signify? And it seems that it signifies the divine essence, connoting an effect in the creature, by this rule: Every statement made of God from a point in time in comparison to a creature signifies the divine essence while connoting an effect in the creature. Such is the case when we say, "He is united to the flesh or to the man"; therefore, it seems to signify the divine essence.

But on the contrary: Through this word "united," it would not relate to God except as to a cause. Therefore, just as when I say "God is the creator," it is sufficiently expounded when it is said, "that is, God, from whom this creature is," so it would be sufficiently expounded, "God is united to the flesh, that is, God is He from whom this union or flesh is." But this is false, since this union, according to Augustine, makes God man, and man God. Therefore, it is necessary that it state something more. And I ask concerning that "more," whether it is posited in regard to the divine essence or not? If not, then that union does not make God man, which is false, because it makes nothing in regard to that around which it is not posited. But if it is posited in regard to God: either it is posited in regard to God from eternity—and therefore from eternity it made Him man, since that is its effect, as Augustine says—or it is from a point in time, and therefore something began to be in regard to God which was not in regard to Him from eternity, and thus He is variable, as it seems, which is absurd.

§ 2. If perhaps it should be said, as some say, that this union according to reality is posited in regard to human nature, and according to the intellect is posited in regard to God; just as when "creator" is said, the dependency which is the cause of the relation is really posited in regard to the creature, but because a relation of the creature cannot be understood unless its correlative is understood, therefore our reason posits a relation in regard to the creator, which, however, is not according to reality. If, I say, it is said thus. On the contrary: The relative

"father" is one thing, and "son" is another, because the father is the cause of the son. But "similar" posits similarity in both of the similar things, and does not express the dependence of one upon the other more than the reverse. Similarly, "union" expresses a relation which is not signified to be more in one of the united things than in the rest. Hence, it is not similar for "union" and "creator."

§ 3. Besides, Since it belongs to this union to make one, concerning that in regard to which it is not posited according to reality, its effect will not be concerning that. If, therefore, it is not really posited in regard to God... ...its effect will not be in God, and thus really this would not be true: "God is man," which is false.

Further, it is asked whether this union is creator or creature? If creator, then it seems that it was from eternity. If creature, then it is asked, according to what was it in the works of the six days? If it is said that it was in a causal or substantial principle, then the conjunction still seems to be natural, which is false.

Solution. Without prejudice, it must be said that it is one thing when "union" is said, and another thing when "united" is said; just as "creation" is one thing, and "creator" another. For creation expresses a relation insofar as it is a mediating condition between creator and creature, which according to reality holds itself in the creature, and therefore does not signify the divine essence, nor is it the divine essence. Similarly, union expresses a relation which is a mediating condition between God and man, and is not the divine essence, but according to reality is rooted in human nature. But if I say "God is united," the word "united" signifies the condition of God and of the divine essence in the person of the Son to human nature, which is consequently according to reason in God, and not as primarily; which is evident as follows. Union, which is a relation, is a mediating condition between God and man: therefore, it is caused by some mutation or immutation. But here nothing is mutated except the nature of man which is assumed; therefore, the cause of the relation, which is a mutation, is not found except on the part of human nature, and therefore that relation is rooted in human nature. But because man cannot be one with God unless consequently God is one with man, therefore, conversely, the union attains God according to reason in this way, although He is not mutated according to reality, but relates to Himself in one and the same way. And this happens because something is mutated toward Him by this mode of mutation which is union.

Therefore, it must be said to the first that when it is said "God is united," it is understood as a union according to reason attaining God consequently: because although it is from Him, since God makes it, nevertheless it is not signified as from Him, and therefore I well concede that it is not similar for creator and creature.

To the other, it must be said that it was not in God from eternity, because the union of the creature is also a creature. Nor is it signified as really in Him, because the cause of that relation, which is a mutation, is not concerning Him; but rather it is as in Him according to reason consequently, from the fact that something else began to relate to Him according to that relation.

To that which is objected, that it does not make one except in that in regard to which it is posited according to reality, it must be said that it does not make one for the reason that it is equally posited according to reality in both of the united things, but rather consequently it regards the other of the united things, as was said. Namely, because a man cannot be one with the Son of God, unless it is also not only understood, but also is conversely so; yet in such a way that this is caused from the fact that the created thing thus relates itself to the creator, and not that the creator relates Himself in any way (as far as He is of Himself) otherwise than He had from eternity. And according to this mode, the union is ineffable and unintelligible, as John Damascene says.

To that which is further asked, "According to what was it in the works of the six days?", it must be said that, according as it is radically founded in the creature, it was there in the causal principle of matter; which causal principle, however, is nothing else than the principle of obedience, by which it could be made of the creature what the Creator willed by His power, not what can be produced by nature or an Angel, and thus it still remains miraculous.

Articulus 12 — To The Likeness Of Which Unity This Union Or Unity Is Said

To the likeness of what unity is this union or unity said to be?

To the likeness of what unity is this union or unity said to be?

Secondly, it is asked: What sort of one is that one?

For we see that out of matter and form there is made one in nature; similarly, out of accident and subject there is made one; similarly, the three persons are one in one essence. And it is asked, to the likeness of which unity is this one?

§ 1. Now it is clear that it is not to the likeness of the first unity, because those are one by the unity of a form perfecting a potency; but Christ is not one in this way, because He is one by the unity of person and has two natures.

Similarly, it does not seem to be the unity of an accident with a subject, because neither of the natures in Christ is the accident of the other.

§ 2. Again, the more distant the united things are, the less they are one when they are united; because the Philosopher says that for those having a symbol [i.e., a common feature], transmutation into one another is easier. But natures, of which one is created and the other uncreated, are more distant than those of which one is an accident and the other a substance. Therefore, it seems that the union of natures in Christ has less of "one" than the union of subject and accident.

§ 3. Again, when "one" is said of many things, those very "ones" are ordered among themselves; for one from matter and form is more one than one from subject and accident, just as we call an individual one. Since therefore a person also adds a property pertaining to the dignity either of nature (as any individual of a rational nature is a person) or even civil dignity (as we call prelates persons), the "one" of a person seems to be after the "one" from subject and

accident; therefore, it is less one. But Christ is one by the unity of person: therefore, He has less of "one" than a one from subject and accident.

Besides, it is asked whether natures are more united in the person of Christ, or the three persons in the one divine nature?

And it seems that it is the former: because the union in the person is so great that it makes God man, and man God; and whatever belongs to this man, belongs to the Son of God, and conversely. But this is not so in divine things: for one person does not become another on account of the union of nature with them; nor does whatever belongs to one person necessarily belong to the others.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. Bernard says in Book V of De Consideratione that among all unions, the unity of the Trinity holds the summit. [201]

§ 2. Besides, the more simple something is, the more it is one. But the three persons have the most simple being in the divine nature; therefore, they are maximally one in it.

Solution. It must be said that Christ is one by the unity of an eternal person, and therefore He is more one than any natural one; and therefore His union is similar to none of those ones. And the reason for this is this: because a "one" in nature is according to those things that order toward the end of that which is united and composed. Hence, as many things are required for one man as are required for his perfection according to the end of nature, which is to reason; and therefore it is required to be, to live, to sense, to understand. Similarly, those things are required for the one that is Christ which suffice for the end of redemption. But for that end (as was held above), it is required that He ought, and thus it is required that He be man; it is also required that He can, and as to this it is required that He be perfect God; and therefore Christ is one God and man.

To the other, it must be said that the power of a one is not taken according to the distance of the united things alone, but also according to the power of the one uniting. And therefore, although the created and uncreated natures are more distant than some created natures, yet they are more united on account of the infinite power of the one uniting.

To the other, it must be said that it is true that the unity of person is minimal in those things in which there is a union in a personal property following (according to nature or time) the unity of a supposit from matter and form, and the unity of a subject from subject and accident. But here it is not so; rather, the union is made into an existing person, because into an eternal person; and therefore this is greater than the other unions existing according to nature.

To the last, it must be said that the maximal union is of the three persons in one essence. But after this is the union of three natures, namely, of body, and of soul, and of deity, in one person. Because persons have a simpler being in the divine nature, whereas the natures are composed, and remain substantially diverse in the person.

But to that which is objected on the contrary, it must be said that it does not impede the simplicity of nature that those things which belong to one person do not belong to another, because this is on account of the opposition of relation, and not on account of a division of nature. But in the person, the natures do not merely remain distinct, but also substantially differing. Yet the union in the person again surpasses the other natural unions of creatures, because in those, diverse things are united into a consequent act which belongs to none of the preceding, nor to any of them. But when natures are united in the person of Christ, the assumed nature is united into the uniting one, not into some third thing consequent upon their union.

Articulus 13 — What Sort Of United Thing Christ Is, Or By What Unity Christ Is Said To Be One

What sort of united thing is Christ, or by what unity is Christ said to be one?

Next, it is asked concerning this which he says in the third place, there, at B, § 3: They are therefore not to be heard, etc.

For it seems that the reasoning of the Manichean holds, because: § 1. If some two things are entirely the same in reality, whatever belongs to one according to reality, belongs also to the other. But the Son of God is according to reality entirely the same as the divine nature, and conversely. Therefore, whatever belongs to the Son of God according to reality, also belongs to the divine nature. But if He assumed true flesh, it belongs to the Son of God to be born, to suffer, to be wearied, to hunger, and the like. Therefore, this belongs to the divine nature; and thus it is defiled by human flesh, as it seems.

§ 2. Besides, the example he posits about the rays of the sun does not seem fitting, because they are not united to dung.

§ 3. Besides, we see that even a spiritual substance, which is simpler than the rays of the sun, contracts passibility or compassibility from the body to which it is united, such as the rational soul. Therefore, it seems that it would happen similarly in the union of the divine and human nature.

Solution. It must be said to the first that the divine essence and the person are the same in reality, yet they are not the same in the mode of understanding and attributing. For not to be distinguished is attributed to the essence, but to be distinguished to the person; and to generate and to be generated is attributed to the person, but not to the essence. And therefore, things which are related to another belong to the person, and not to the essence; but to be born, to suffer, and the like, have the force of distinguishing features, as was held above; and therefore these do not belong to the divine essence. And for the theologian, it is a mutation of predicament [i.e., category], because "who" is mutated into "what."

If perhaps it should be said that, according to this, it does not even belong to the divine essence to be incarnated: it must be said, according to the aforesaid, that it does not belong to

201. Bernard of Clairvaux, De Consideratione, Book V.

it primarily, but rather belongs to the person primarily, and to the essence as it is the same as the person. But it is not similar concerning being incarnated, and suffering, and being born, and the like; because to be incarnated expresses nothing but to be associated with flesh, which is to be per se in another, that is, in that which is another in the mode of attributing. But to be born, to suffer, and the like, express acts or passions consequent from the flesh, and therefore they immediately belong to the person by grace of the human nature, and not per se. But since the natures remain distinct in Christ, and their properties too, it follows that these do not belong to the divine nature. The proof of this is as follows: When an essential predicable is predicated of something, by the very fact that it is posited to be of that thing, the opposite of that predicate is removed from the same subject. As when it is said, "Man is an animal," I can by that very fact infer: "therefore he is neither a stone, nor wood, nor the like." Therefore, similarly, when it is said, "Christ is born, suffered," these are predicates that do not belong per se to the Son of God, but rather by grace of the human nature. Since, therefore, the human nature has an opposition and distinction in Christ from the divine nature, by the very fact that they belong by grace of the human, they do not belong by grace of the divine: therefore, neither to the divine. And thus it follows: "Christ suffered: therefore the divine nature did not suffer."

To that which is objected concerning the example, it must be said that the example is fitting. For it is precisely because celestial and inferior bodies do not have a single matter, that one does not act upon the other by immutating it according to species. Therefore, much less do those things of which there is no agreement either in matter or in anything univocal—such as the divine nature relates to all created things. And thus no defilement incurs upon it.

To that which is objected concerning the rational soul, it must be said that it is otherwise. Because, although it does not have matter out of which it is, nevertheless it has matter in which it is, as a mover and form; and therefore it is united to it, and is affected by it. But the deity is not in matter in this way, but rather is associated while remaining distinct, for the perfecting of the union in the person, to whom, on account of the union, these things belong: to be born, to suffer, etc.

Articulus 14 — Whether Christ At The Same Time Formed, Consolidated, And United The Body To Himself

Did Christ simultaneously form, consolidate, and unite a body to Himself?

Next we must come to the third part, in which the Master determines whether He assumed body and soul simultaneously in time? And it begins there, But if it is asked, whether the Word, etc.

Now in this chapter it is determined that Christ simultaneously formed and united a body to Himself: and the Letter is evident in itself.

But a doubt arises concerning this which he says, that He simultaneously formed and united a body to Himself.

§ 1. For the Apostle says that in all things He had to be assimilated to His brothers. Therefore, it seems that in the mode of assuming a body, He ought thus to have first formed it, and afterwards united it.

§ 2. Again, Augustine in Book IV of De Trinitate says: "Not without reason in the building of the Lord's body, in the figure of which He used to say that the temple destroyed by the Jews would be resuscitated by Him in three days, the number six itself is understood to be posited for a year. For they said, Forty-six years was the temple in building, and forty-six times six becomes two hundred and seventy-six, which number of days completes nine months and six days; which are imputed as ten months for childbearing women: not because all arrive at the sixth day after the ninth month, but because the very perfection of the Lord's body is found to be brought to birth in that many days, just as the authority of the Church guards, having received it handed down from the elders. For He is believed to have been conceived on the eighth of the Kalends of April, on which He also suffered." [202] Therefore, it seems that the succession of days in the formation of the body was so great, that the whole was not made once and simultaneously.

§ 3. Again, since in others there is conversion, formation, consolidation, distinction of lineaments, and the ordering of the same in composing the body, how could all these things happen simultaneously with the union? For the union seems to put animation beforehand, but animation presupposes the other things.

Solution. It must be said that all these things were made simultaneously. Hence, by comforting and forming, consolidating and distinguishing the members, and composing the body and animating it, He united it to Himself, and conversely by uniting it He made all those things.

Therefore, it must be said to the first, that He was similar to His brothers in all things which were expedient for us, but not in those which imply a defect. For if His body had been formed successively in this way, then it would have been made by the operation of nature, and not by the work of the Holy Spirit. But whatever is made by nature is not elevated above nature, and thus He would not be God. Hence, this was not expedient for us.

To the other it must be said, that the authority of Augustine speaks of the time in which the Lord's body was drawn out to its due quantity, and he does not intend that it had a successive formation like other bodies.

To the last it must be said, that all things were made simultaneously, on account of the infinite power of the Holy Spirit operating, who can do those things simultaneously which nature cannot do even successively.

DISTINCTIO III

Divisio Textus

It is also asked concerning the flesh of Christ, whether before it was conceived, etc. Here begins the third part, which is about the conjunction of the one assuming and the assumed, and it lasts up to the sixth distinction.

It therefore contains three distinctions, according to which it is distinguished into three parts, according as three things are required for conjunction. The first of which is the due disposition in the assumed: and this is treated in this third distinction. Secondly, that there be something operating and conjoining the conjoinables: and this in distinction IV, which begins there, A, But when the incarnation, etc. Thirdly, a union in hypostasis and person is required: and this is treated in the fifth distinction, there, A, Besides it must be inquired, etc.

The first of these parts, which is entirely terminated in this third distinction, is divided into three parts: in the first of which is explained the sanctification of the Blessed Virgin, and the mode of conception, because her sanctification disposed toward the conception. But in the second, because the Blessed Virgin according to her whole flesh was obnoxious to sin in her parents, it is asked whether Christ, or the flesh of Christ, according to the obnoxiousness of sin and the sign of obnoxiousness which is tithing, was in the loins of the Fathers, just as of Abraham, and of others? There, C, But since that flesh, the excellence of which, etc. But because it was said in the first part, that Christ united to Himself the flesh once made, therefore in the third part he objects against it, and solves it, where, E, But to that sentence which we said above, etc.

The first of these is yet subdivided into three: in the first of which he shows that the assumed flesh, before it was assumed, was the flesh of the Virgin, and obnoxious to sin. In the second, he shows the mode of the sanctification and conception of Christ in the glorious Virgin, there, A, § 2: Mary also entirely the Holy Spirit, etc. In the third, he proves that the Blessed Virgin from then on lacked all sin, there, B, But that the sacred Virgin from then on, etc.

The Letter of the first part is evident in itself.

Articulus 1 — Whether The Flesh Of Christ, Before It Was Assumed, Was Liable To Sin

Was the flesh of Christ, before it was assumed, obnoxious to sin?

Was the flesh of Christ, before it was assumed, obnoxious to sin?

But here a doubt arises concerning what he concedes, that the flesh of Christ, before it was assumed, was obnoxious to sin.

202. Augustine, De Trinitate, IV, 5.

§ 1. For before it was assumed, it was in the loins of the Fathers, and it was not there except as the medicine of the wound, as Augustine says. Therefore, it was not obnoxious to sin, because what is obnoxious to sin is not medicine.

§ 2. Again, it is not conceded that Christ was in the loins of the Fathers according to the law of concupiscence. But the law of concupiscence is the cause of the obnoxiousness to sin. Therefore, it ought not to be conceded that it was obnoxious to sin even beforehand.

§ 3. Again, it is not conceded that the flesh of Christ was tithed in the flesh of the Virgin or of the Fathers. Therefore, much less ought it to be conceded that in them it was obnoxious to sin.

Solution. It must be said that the flesh of Christ can be taken in a twofold way. Namely, materially only, according to a potency indisposed to union: and thus it was indistinct from the rest of the flesh of the Virgin in the Virgin, and from the rest of the flesh of the Fathers in the Fathers; and thus it was obnoxious to sin. And this is how the Master understands it.

The flesh of Christ can also be understood insofar as it is of Christ, or with relation to Christ. And thus it was never obnoxious to sin, but always the medicine of the wound, nor was it ever tithed, as will be clear below.

And through this, the solution to the reasons which are brought forward to the proposition is evident. Because they take the flesh of Christ as determined for Christ by the form of Christ, or by faith. And when it was under the form of Christ, it was not obnoxious. But faith, determining it for itself, did not determine it as obnoxious, as it was in the tithes, and by reason of medicine, and the like which faith promulgated concerning the flesh of Christ.

Articulus 2 — Whether Christ Suffered Not Naturally, But Voluntarily

Did Christ suffer not naturally, but voluntarily?

Next, it is asked concerning what he says there, at A, near the beginning: Penalty only, not by necessity, etc.

For from this it seems to follow that Christ suffered not naturally, but voluntarily, which some also wished to draw from that word of Isaiah, 53:7: He was offered, because He Himself willed it.

But because there will be a proper treatise on this below, it must be said that "penalty" means a penality in a passible body, which Christ indeed assumed at first by will and not by necessity. Because He could have so separated the nature of the body from compassibility, just as He separated it from sin, if He had willed it. But after He first voluntarily assumed this penality, afterwards He had it naturally and by the necessity of nature, or naturally according to existence He suffered inconveniences. Just as one approaching a fire, approaches voluntarily indeed; but after he has approached, he becomes hot from the fire not voluntarily, but naturally.

Articulus 3 — Whether The Blessed Virgin Was Sanctified In The Womb, Or Before The Womb

Was the Blessed Virgin sanctified in the womb, or before the womb?

Mary also entirely the Holy Spirit, etc.

In this chapter four things are said. The first is about the sanctification of the glorious Virgin. The second is about the mode of her conception, there, The power also of generating, etc. The third is, out of what, as it seems, the body of Christ was formed, there, Then overshadowed her the power of the Most High, etc. The fourth is, what she conceived, because it was a true body and soul: and therefore the error of the Manichean is convicted, there, Flesh animated and rational with intellect, etc.

Regarding the first of these, the question arises concerning the sanctification of the Blessed Virgin. And eight things are asked briefly, namely: First, whether she was sanctified in the womb, or before the womb? Second, whether in the womb before animation, or after? Third, whether after animation, or before birth, or after? Fourth, how great was her sanctification in the womb? Fifth, what did the sanctification add from the prevention of the Holy Spirit upon her, and from the indwelling of the Son? Sixth, concerning the teaching on the sanctification of her, and of Jeremiah and John, who were also sanctified in the womb. Seventh, whether the grace of sanctification in the womb confirms the sanctified, and especially whether it confirmed her, such that afterwards she could not sin? Eighth and lastly, in what does the grace of sanctification in the womb differ from the grace of sanctification which is in the sacraments? And, whether those sanctified in the womb are bound to the sacraments?

To the first, one proceeds thus: § 1. The Apostle says that all sinned in Adam, who was the form of the prevarication of all. Since therefore God is more prone to have mercy than to condemn, all in Adam or some could have satisfied, and whatever could be conceded, was conceded to the mother who was full of grace. Therefore, Christ conceded this to her.

§ 2. Again, Anselm: "It was fitting that the Virgin, to whom God prepared a mother for the Son whom, begotten in His heart, He loves as Himself, should shine with that purity than which a greater under God cannot be understood." [203] But to have had original sin and to have lost it, is not the greatest purity which can be understood under God, because a greater is understood in never having had it. Therefore, this was conceded to the mother, to whom whatever can be conceded was conceded. Which is accepted from the word that in 3 Kings 2:20, Solomon said to his mother: Ask, my mother: for it is not right that I turn away your face, namely, for me to deny you anything.

§ 3. Again, the Church sings that Eve was the way of death, and the Blessed Virgin the way of life. Therefore, just as that one was of death, so this one of life. But that one was of death for those existing in the loins; therefore, this one is the way of life existing and for those existing in the loins.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. Augustine: "He cannot be well who is not." But to be sanctified is to be well. Therefore, it does not belong to a non-existent thing.

§ 2. Besides, whatever was in the loins as not obnoxious to sin, was the medicine of the wound, as Augustine says. Therefore, if the Virgin had been in the loins as not obnoxious to sin, she would have been the medicine of the wound. But once one efficacious medicine is had, another is superfluous; therefore, the incarnation of Christ would be superfluous.

§ 3. Besides, in the Church there is only head and members. It belongs to the head only to redeem; therefore, it belongs to the members to be redeemed. Since therefore the Blessed Virgin was a member, thus it belongs to her to be redeemed. But Augustine says that it belongs to whoever is to be redeemed to be in the loins of the Fathers as obnoxious to sin; therefore, the Blessed Virgin in the loins of the Fathers could not be sanctified.

Solution: We say that for three reasons the Blessed Virgin, and anyone else, cannot be sanctified in their parents. One of which is that the grace of sanctification does not have its origin from the parents, and therefore cannot be transferred in them; but sin has its origin, and therefore is transferred by the propagation of nature.

And through this, the solution to the first and third is clear.

The second reason: As Augustine says, from lust in propagation, as if a daughter of sin, the cause of sin is born in the flesh: and Augustine says the same. However, this lust is not separable from the concupiscence of the mixing of seeds, and therefore sin is born: and therefore, because the Blessed Virgin was under this law of concupiscence in the loins of the Fathers, because she was to come into the womb of her mother, she did not have in them the possibility for grace.

The third reason is that the flesh is not a participant in the grace that makes one pleasing except through the distinct soul: and therefore in the loins of the Fathers no one was according to the soul susceptible to grace.

To what is objected concerning Anselm, it must be said that that purity is not understood in comparison to before, but to after. For original sin is had in comparison to before, whence it is contracted, and in comparison to after, because it inclines to evil. However, Christ, God and man, did not have it in comparison to before, nor to after: whence under that there is purity which has original sin in comparison to before, because it was contracted: but not to after, because after the law of concupiscence it could not incline to evil.

Articulus 4 — Whether The Flesh Of The Blessed Virgin Was Sanctified Before Animation, Or After

Whether the flesh of the Blessed Virgin was sanctified before animation, or after?

Secondly, it is asked, Whether her flesh was sanctified before animation, or after?

1. For some have presumed to say this, namely, that she indeed contracted original sin in the cause and matter of the body: but because the Holy Spirit and the soul came simultaneously to the body, and the Holy Spirit is more mobile than all mobile things,

203. Anselm, De Conceptu Virginali et de Originali Peccato, cap. 18.

therefore it preceded the soul in entering the body, and cleansed it so that it could not infect the soul with original guilt.

2. And they strive to prove this thus: The Blessed Virgin is signified by the ark, and her soul by the golden urn, and her grace by the manna: therefore, since the ark was covered with gold on every side before the urn was placed in it, the flesh was prevented by the purity of the Spirit before the soul came to it.

3. Furthermore, as has been held, her purity is greater than that which can be under God: but this is so that she has it in cause and not in guilt, since the Son, true man and God, has it neither in cause nor in guilt.

4. Furthermore, what would be the cause that God would wait for that sanctification until the body would infect the soul, when He could bestow it before? It is evident that there is none. Since therefore whatever can be conceded, He conceded to the mother, it seems that He granted this.

5. Furthermore, concerning the Antichrist who will be the instrument of the devil, it is read in a certain Gloss on Daniel, that even in the mother the devil procures growth for himself: therefore by the opposite concerning her who is as it were the instrument of God, it seems that God ought to procure the body itself so that it does not infect the soul.

6. Furthermore, it is read concerning Jeremiah: Before I formed you in the womb, I knew you. But formation (as Augustine says) is in the infusion of the soul: therefore He knew Jeremiah before He infused the soul: but it is evident that He speaks of the knowledge of approval through grace; therefore He approved Jeremiah through grace before He animated him: therefore much more strongly the mother.

7. Likewise, Luke 1:15, on that: He will be filled with the Holy Spirit even from the womb, Gloss: The spirit of life was not yet in him, and already the spirit of grace was in him: therefore much more strongly it was so in the mother, and thus she was sanctified before the spirit of life: since therefore the spirit of life is the soul, she was sanctified before animation.

ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Sanctification in the womb is against the guilt of original sin, and not against the penalty, or concupiscence of it. Proof: Because contraries do not remain with grace: therefore guilt has contrariety to grace: but the flesh is not susceptible to guilt: therefore neither to grace.

1. Likewise, there is order in the parts of man to God, so that the body is under the soul, and the soul under God: therefore in the descent of graces God, by giving grace, is more closely related to the soul than to the body: therefore the effect of grace ought to pass into the body through the soul.

2. Likewise, Dionysius says that the law of divinity is to lead through the first to the middle, and through the middle to the last: therefore since the soul is the middle, the body ought to be led back to the state of grace through the soul.

Solution: We say that the Blessed Virgin was not sanctified before animation: and those who say the opposite, it is a heresy condemned by Blessed Bernard in the letter to the people of Lyons, and by all the Masters of Paris.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that the Holy Spirit is moved when He transfers Himself into holy souls through motions: not indeed in Himself, but in the gifts of graces: and therefore He first comes into the soul, and through it sanctifies the body. Hence it is false that He would precede the soul into the body through the indwelling grace making one pleasing.

To the other, it must be said that that allegorical exposition is: and it is not similar: because what was in the ark was said materially, and this was ordered otherwise in nature: and grace did not have itself so, because the grace of the body was only from the soul: and it is similar if the gold of the urn were the soul, and the gold of the ark proceeded from the urn: but art could not do this, and therefore it divided the works.

To the other, it must be said that that purity is to be taken according to the soul: because Christ could well take the body without penalty, and yet did not: hence the penalty of the flesh is not impurity: hence pure and impure are referred to the soul: and she had that greater which could be under the Son, as was said before.

To the other, it must be said that there are many causes why God willed her to be animated first: of which one is, that otherwise she would not have been susceptible to graces. The second is, because otherwise she would not have needed liberation as to the soul, and would have performed lesser graces. The third cause was the firmness of the sentence: because He said: You shall die the death. Which is understood of both deaths in propagation. And many others can be assigned.

To the other, it must be said that the devil does not so prepare nourishment for the Antichrist, that he nourishes him with sin, or infuses more sin into him than original: but it is said to nourish, because he inflames the complexion of the mother's blood, so that the flesh generated in the offspring is more inclined to sin than in another. And on the opposite, nothing prohibits, rather it is pious to believe concerning the Blessed Virgin, that her flesh even from the first complexions in the mother, was not so fervid to lust as the flesh of another: yet this cannot be proved otherwise, except because it is pious to believe. But from greater concupiscibility (so to speak) the flesh does not have that it infects the soul more or less with original sin: but rather from this that it is wholly corrupted in the first parent sinning, in whom it wholly was: and therefore also it transfused only one sin: and therefore Augustine says that every man was Adam in nature except Christ.

To the other, it must be said that it is understood of the knowledge of predestination: and therefore it follows also: Before you came forth from the womb, I sanctified you: so that it

might also notify the grace of predestination with the grace of sanctification which is given in the womb after the formation of the offspring.

To the other, it must be said that the spirit of life is not called the soul there, but the attraction of the vital spirit from the free womb, that is, before you freely took the vital spirit, you were separated from the mother.

Articulus 5 — Whether After Animation And Before Birth From The Womb She Was Sanctified

Whether she was sanctified after animation and before birth from the womb?

Thirdly, it is asked, Whether grace was given to her after animation and before birth?

And it seems that it was not.
1. Augustine: What is not born, but by the grace of the saint cannot be reborn: regeneration of the fig tree: therefore it is not given except to those born.

1. Likewise, in maternal wombs, as Augustine says, you know that infants cannot be reborn, and from this it is concluded as before.

On the contrary, there are authorities above introduced concerning John and Jeremiah.

Solution: It must be said that she was sanctified before birth from the womb: but on what day, or at what hour, no man knows, except by revelation: except that it is more probable that it is conferred soon after animation, rather than long awaited.

To the objections, therefore, it must be said that Augustine speaks of the grace of the sacraments which are conferred by the minister: because in those grace is conferred. Hence, since the operation of the minister is only upon distinct persons, this grace cannot be given except to those distinct outside the womb. Or it must be said that birth is twofold: in the womb when the child is animated, and out of the womb when the child comes forth to the light: and what Augustine says is understood of the first birth if it is taken generally.

Articulus 6 — How Great Was The Sanctification Of The Virgin In The Womb

How great was the sanctification of the Virgin in the womb?

Fourthly, it is asked, How great was her sanctification in the womb?

And it seems that it removed the guilt of original sin and the act which is the fomes, thus:
1. In Jeremiah and John, it removed the guilt: therefore, since it conferred more upon the Blessed Virgin than upon them, in her it ought to have removed both.

1. Likewise, Augustine says that due to the inclination of concupiscence, we cannot now say, "We have no sin": therefore, since she could have said this (as he also says), it seems that she did not have that inclination: and this is the fomes: therefore, she did not have the fomes.

1. Furthermore, there is nothing in what some say, that she had it according to habit, but not according to the act of evil inclination: for a quality that is active by itself always acts, as long as it finds a subject in which to act, like heat, cold, and the like: but the fomes is a quality that inclines to evil by itself: therefore, it will always incline, because it always finds a subject, that is, sensuality and free will.

2. Furthermore, there is nothing in what others say, that the fomes does two things, namely, it inclines to evil, and in this respect it was removed in the Blessed Virgin: and it causes difficulty towards good, and in this respect it remained: because it causes difficulty towards good from the same and not another source that inclines to evil: and consequently, if the inclination to evil were removed, the difficulty towards good would be removed.

3. However, there are others who wished to say that the whole fomes was removed with respect to the person, but remained with respect to nature, that is, that in her there was no habit of the fomes: but if she had conceived, still due to corrupted nature, she would have transmitted original sin to the child. However, this solution is false in two ways. In one way: because it is against the Letter which says here, that the Holy Spirit, preventing in her, purged her from sin and freed her from the fomes: therefore, it found the fomes in her, which it either weakened (as the Master says) or completely removed. In another way: because let us suppose, by impossibility, because it is impossible for the mother of God (as Ambrose says) that after Christ she would have borne a son, it is certain that he would have had original sin: therefore, this operation of the fomes was never removed, which is the matter of another.

Solution: It must be said without prejudice, that the habit of the fomes is considered in two ways: in its vigor, namely inclining as it is in itself to mortal and venial sin: and in habit only, and in disposition only. For there is a habit ready for action, and there is a habit not ready for action due to contrary habits impeding, although they are not in the same proximate subject, yet in the same common subject. And there is a certain disposition remaining after the habit, which is weak and easily purged: yet sometimes it is not quickly purged due to its coherence with the subject: because it infects deeply, although it infects slightly.

Hence we say without prejudice, that the sanctification of the Blessed Virgin removed the power of inclining to venial and mortal sin as it is in itself, the habit of original sin and the guilt: and according to the sayings of the Master here, and of Damascene, it remained in habit and disposition not inclining. However, in Jeremiah and John, it remained inclining to venial sin, but not as it is in itself to mortal sin.

To the word of Augustine, it must be said that she could have said this, because even if she had the habit, it did not incline her to evil, nor did it draw her away from good.

To what is objected against this solution, it must be said that it found a disposed subject, indeed with a contrary disposition, like free will and reason: and that contrary habit represses the act of the fomes so that it cannot manifest in any way.

Regarding other solutions, it seems that it must be said, as the objections proceed: because they do not have the foundation of their saying from the elders.

Articulus 7 — What The Sanctification From The Prevenience Of The Holy Spirit Added In The Blessed Virgin

What did sanctification add from the prevenience of the Holy Spirit in the Blessed Virgin?

Fifthly, it is asked, What did sanctification add from the prevenience of the Holy Spirit in her?

For if it was fitting that she should shine with that purity, which is greater under God, then it seems also that the habit of concupiscence did not remain in her: and it could add nothing, if it is said, that it added with respect to the state of greater purity, not that she was impure before: against this is the Scripture which says, that it diminished concupiscence.

Solution: This is now easy to determine, because it added by extinguishing the habit of concupiscence.

And if it is asked, What does the indwelling of the deity still add?

It must be said, that by removing the disposition: for just as before the habit there is a disposition, so also after the habit there is some disposition frequently remaining: but then it could not remain, because the whole body shone with the light of the indwelling deity in itself: and this is signified, Ezekiel 43:2, where it is said, that the glory of the Lord entered the temple by the way of the eastern gate, and the earth shone with His majesty.

Articulus 8 — How The Sanctification Of The Blessed Mary The Virgin Differs From The Sanctification Of John And Jeremiah

How does the sanctification of the Blessed Virgin Mary differ from the sanctification of John and Jeremiah?

Sixth, it is asked about the difference of her sanctification compared to the sanctification of John and Jeremiah? And, why are these read as sanctified more than others?

And it seems that there is no difference: because

1. Augustine says that to live in the flesh without sin is only of the Redeemer: therefore it seems that the glorious Virgin did not live without sin.
2. Furthermore, Jeremiah and John also sinned. It is evident about Jeremiah, where it is said: "Behold, I have touched your lips." For the touching of the lips (as Gregory wishes) is the purification of sins. Similarly about John, when Christ came to him to be baptized by him, Matthew 3:14, John said: "I ought to be baptized by you," there the Gloss says, that is, to be cleansed from sin: therefore all sanctified were similar in venial sin.

Furthermore, it is asked, why was this grace given to no Patriarchs, but to one Prophet? and to John who is the end of the Law and the Prophets, and to the Blessed Virgin?

1. Furthermore, it seems that Job was sanctified in the womb, and yet he was not a virgin: because it is said: "From my infancy mercy grew with me, and from my mother's womb it came forth with me." Whoever has one virtue, has all: therefore he had all, and thus was sanctified in the womb.
2. Furthermore, Malachi 1:2: "I have loved Jacob": therefore Jacob also seems to be sanctified.
3. Furthermore, it is similarly said of Jeremiah: "Before you came forth from the womb, I sanctified you." Of John: "He will be filled with the Holy Spirit even from his mother's womb"; therefore something more should be understood about the mother of the Lord, even if it is not said.
4. Furthermore, Augustine says that all apparitions made to the Fathers were ordered to the one in which Christ appeared in the flesh, and all miracles to the one in which divinity was united to human nature: therefore it seems that all sanctification made in the womb should be ordered to the sanctity in the womb of which it was said: "That which will be born of you is holy," not sanctified. Since therefore Isaiah predicted this most clearly, he also should have been sanctified in the womb.

Solution: It must be said that the Blessed Virgin never sinned: and this is expressly held here in the Text.

To the objection against, it must be said that to live in the flesh without contracted and actual sin is only of the Son of God: but the Blessed Virgin contracted sin first, and afterwards was sanctified.

To the other, it must be said that I well concede that Jeremiah and John sinned venially, but not the glorious Virgin for the honor of the Lord.

To what is further asked, without prejudice I say that this grace is ordered to works of perfection, especially in continence: and since coitus cannot be without lust, it was not fitting to give them this grace: because they were engaged in generation for the promised seed, which was mixed with concupiscence. But what was given to Jeremiah was because he had an order to sanctity in the womb in the most open expression more than all the Prophets: which is thus proved: Among all, Isaiah and Jeremiah prophesied more expressly about the manner of the Lord's nativity, Isaiah 7:14 and following, and Jeremiah 30:22. Isaiah, however, says thus: "Behold, a virgin shall conceive and bear a son": where he only expresses the disposition of the mother, namely that she would conceive and bear. But Jeremiah says thus: "The Lord has created a new thing on the earth: A woman shall encompass a man." And before this, in the same place: "How long will you wander, O unfaithful daughter?" But it would not be new if a woman conceived: therefore in this alone is understood what Isaiah had said.

Furthermore, it would not be new for a pure man to be made from one man alone: because this was done when Eve was taken from Adam: therefore in this he wishes the conjunction of humanity with deity. But when he says, "shall encompass," he speaks of the contraction of the infinite to the narrowness of the womb. But when it is said, "a man," it is understood the perfection of him in soul and habits of the soul, which are wisdom and grace. But by what preceded: "How long will you wander, O unfaithful daughter?" he notes the preaching of chastity henceforth in all time, in which daughters do not seek to be dissolved in delightful embraces, but to adhere to God with chaste embraces. John, however, demonstrated this sanctity in the womb by exulting in his mother's womb, and afterwards also pointed it out with a pure finger: and therefore he was more closely ordered and lived more saintly. But above all, she receives sanctity who thus approached sanctity, that from her was taken what was united to God.

To the other, it must be said that Job was not sanctified in the womb: but he touches on the grace freely given to him in the complexion of the body, from which he had that he was more easily inclined to mercy than another man: just as any man is closer to one virtue according to his complexion than another.

To the other, it must be said that it is understood of the love of predestination.

Articulus 10 — Whether This Grace Abounds Or Falls Short Of The Grace That Is In The Sacraments

Whether this grace abounds or is deficient compared to the grace which is in the sacraments?

Eighthly and lastly, it is asked, Whether this grace abounds or is deficient compared to the grace which is in the sacraments?

And it seems that it is deficient: because
1. It does not imprint a character, as baptism does.

1. Likewise, it does not open the gate which baptism opens: therefore it seems that it is deficient.

ON THE CONTRARY:
1. Baptism does not so weaken the fomes that it does not incite to mortal or venial sin: the grace of sanctification in the womb so weakens it that it does not incite as far as it is of itself: therefore it seems that it abounds.

1. Likewise, abundant and undiminished grace is given to those who are of special privilege and prerogative: but those sanctified in the womb are of special privilege and prerogative: therefore greater grace is given to them.

Further, it is asked, Whether they are bound to receive the sacraments?

And it seems that they are not: because God has supplied in them the place of the sacrament more abundantly: therefore, since the operation of God is greater than that of the minister, it is not necessary to receive the sacraments.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
Jeremiah and John were circumcised, therefore they are bound to the reception of the sacraments.

Solution: It must be said that in some, sacramental grace abounds more, and in some, it is deficient compared to the grace or sanctification in the womb. As to those things which are substantial to salvation and grace, such as the order towards good and the removal from evil, the grace of sanctification in the womb abounds more than the sacramental grace: but as to other things, it abounds less, such as the impression of character and the opening of the gate which is done in the sacraments, insofar as in them the Passion operates which pays the price.

As to what is further asked, it must be said that they are bound to receive the sacraments because of the precept: for circumcision was not only given as a remedy, but also as a sign: and therefore because of the work operating it was necessary to receive, and not because of the work operated, unless perhaps the Blessed Virgin and John were baptized for the impression of character.

Articulus 11 — Whether The Glorious Virgin, By Her Generative Power, Did Anything In The Conception Of The Son

Whether the glorious Virgin by her generative power did anything in the conception of the Son?

Whether the glorious Virgin by her generative power did anything in the conception of the Son?

Then a doubt arises concerning the second part of this chapter, where it says, there, A, near the beginning: He also prepared the power of generating without the seed of a man for the Virgin.

Where two things are asked, Whether the Blessed Virgin by her generative power did anything actively in the conception of the Son?

Secondly, What is meant by saying that the Holy Spirit prepared the generative power?

Concerning the FIRST, it proceeds thus: 1. Among all natural Philosophers it is supposed that the informative power is in the seed of the male, and not of the female: and this is proven by the eggs of the wind, from which a chick is not formed due to the lack of informative power. Therefore, since it is the role of the formative power to form and convert into similar and dissimilar members, none of these belong to the power of the mother: therefore neither to the generative power of the Virgin: therefore, concerning the form of the members and body, the generative power of the Virgin did nothing.

1. Likewise, the Philosopher in the book XVI of Animals says that the soul is in the seed, as an artisan in the artifact: it is clear, however, that he does not mean the soul as it is the act of a physical organic body having life in potentiality, because the seed is not

such a body: therefore he means the formative power: therefore again it is not from the mother.

2. Likewise, in the same place he says that the power of the seed operates formation, conversion, and animation with a threefold heat joined to it: for by the heat of fire it converts, and by the heat of the sky it forms, and by the heat of the soul it prepares for life: but nothing of this sort is in the mother: therefore she does not operate in these.

3. Likewise, in the book on Vegetables the properties of the male and female are set forth. And the properties of the female are moist and cold: because these are suitable for the sealing of forms and reception, since the moist conveniently receives, and the cold conveniently retains. But the properties of the male are hot and dry, which seal well: because the hot opens for sealing, and the dry penetrates through sharp angles. Therefore, since it is the role of the sealer to form, convert, and the like: this will be of the male, and not of the female: therefore neither did the Blessed Virgin have this for Christ.

4. Likewise, whatever else may be said in the conception of Christ, conversion, formation, vivification, union were done simultaneously: therefore they could not be done by a created power, but by an uncreated one: therefore not by the Blessed Virgin.

5. Likewise, Damascene says that the wisdom of God itself preceded her, as a divine seed: it is clear, however, that it was not seed as to matter, because this would be heresy, since he is the father from whose seed the child is materially formed, and thus Christ would have a father according to temporal generation: therefore it remains that it was seed as to the power of the seed, namely forming, strengthening, converting, shaping, composing, and the like: therefore this was not by the power of the glorious Virgin, as some have said.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. One is not called a mother solely because of the matter: for by this gold would be the mother of a ring: therefore it seems that she did something prior to the matter being received in her.

1. Likewise, some Philosophers say that the child hangs on the womb, having veins to the veins of the womb, and nerves to the nerves of the womb, and arteries to the arteries: so that it may draw sense and motion in the nerves, and nourishment in the veins, and life and vital spirit in the arteries: therefore it seems that the operation of the mother is more than giving matter.

Solution Without prejudice it must be said, that all that is a simple operation towards the form, and towards the species of man, and union, was done by the Holy Spirit: but as to the matter, and the fostering of a suitable place warming with external heat, the generative power of the Blessed Virgin operated, as it happens in other women: hence the first reasons, although indecent for such sanctity, were brought forth because some presumed to say that Christ was formed by the generative power of the Virgin, and wrote and said many other abominable things about this.

To the item that is said on the contrary, it must be objected that not only matter is received in the mother, but also work by way of fostering aiding externally: as the nature of the womb operates, namely cold and dry: and coagulating the form by cold, and retaining the form by dry. And as natural heat operates towards being by fostering, and towards inducing better qualities to the complexion: but these do not operate as an intrinsic nature conversion, formation, and shaping.

To the other it must be said, that this is done only as fostering, which is clear: for sense and motion are not derived from the mother, but from the brain which is formed in the child: and nourishment from the liver, not of the mother, but which is formed in the child: and vital spirit from the heart formed in the child: and therefore such things are fostering, and not operating. Especially is this true in the glorious Virgin, in whom all these things were simultaneously perfected.

However, some say that she did something towards the conception by the consent of faith, when she said: Let it be done to me according to your word: but this is not to be said - because this consent does not operate towards this, but removes the obstacle so that the conception might occur in her. For the obstacle to this was her dissent, and when she consented, the obstacle was removed.

Articulus 12 — What It Is To Give To The Blessed Virgin The Generative Power Of The Word Of God; And Whether This Is From The Holy Spirit

What it is to attribute to the Blessed Virgin the generative power of the Word of God? And, whether this is from the Holy Spirit?

Secondly, it is asked, What it is to attribute to her the generative power of the Word of God?

1. For John of Damascus says:

I say thus: The power of the deity of the Word. For either it is the same to prepare the receptive as preparing at the same time the generative for reception, and to give the generative, or another. If the same, then the Virgin does not seem to be a mother, except because she received through the ministry of matter and womb: and this seems to be little. But if another, then the generative seems to act something in conception.

1. Furthermore, this is well conceded, the Virgin generates the Son: therefore, when it is said "generates," or "generated," it speaks in the manner of action of generation, it seems to have acted in conception.
2. Furthermore, some have said that the Holy Spirit aroused the generative power in the Blessed Virgin, so that it could proceed into the act of generation. But this seems false: because the one arousing the power is the father in generation: but the Holy Spirit is not the father of Christ, even according to human generation, as will be proven below.

3. Furthermore, according to this, the words of Damascus do not seem: which John of Damascus, explaining, says: After consent, etc., the generation of Christ from the Virgin is miraculous: because if a blind man is illuminated, afterwards it is not a miracle itself to see: therefore similarly if the generative power of the Virgin is aroused to act, it will not be a miracle afterwards for her to generate.

Solution: It must be said without prejudice, that to give the generative power is nothing other than to prepare the generative power of the Virgin for the act which is due to the mother according to the nature of the mother: this act, however, as has been held, is not to form, and convert, and shape, except as assisting externally, and to minister the matter in which conversion, and formation, and other such things are done: to minister, I say, the matter, and the convenient place. However, to prepare for receiving, is to sanctify her so that her womb may befit the deity to be received: and therefore it is said, that it gave her the receptive power of the Word of God, and at the same time the generative: because first according to reason it was to receive, and afterwards to generate.

To the other it must be said, that the Virgin most truly begot Christ, as a mother: but the mother does not have the principal act of formation, but rather that which is in generation is in the manner of an efficient cause.

To the other it must be said, that this word that aroused her generative power does not seem to be truly received: but rather it gave it to her, not indeed in itself, because she had it from nature, but so that she might be ready for such an act which befits a mother.

To the other it must be said, that the conception of the son was the miracle of all miracles: and it is not similar to the illuminated blind man: but it would be similar if the blind man saw: for then both the power and the act would be miraculous: just as here the Virgin herself conceived and gave birth.

Articulus 13 — Whether It Was Fitting That The Annunciation Be Made To The Blessed Virgin Concerning The Conception Of The Son

Whether it was fitting that the annunciation be made to the Blessed Virgin concerning the conception of the Son?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said, there, A, towards the middle: The Angel addressing the virgin said, etc.

And for the sake of this, it is inquired concerning the annunciation made by the Angel to the Blessed Virgin: and five things are inquired: of which the first is, Whether it was fitting that the annunciation be made? Second, Whether it was fitting that it be made by an Angel? Third, Of what order was the announcing Angel? Fourth, concerning the mode of the annunciation. Fifth and last, concerning the end of the annunciation.

Concerning the FIRST, it is objected thus:
1. A Gloss on Matthew 1:20 and following says that the prophecy of predestination is fulfilled without our will, as the Virgin giving birth. Therefore, since, as the Gloss says on Luke 1:26

and following, the annunciation is to obtain the consent of the Virgin's will, it seems the annunciation is superfluous. For on that passage of Luke 1:38: The Angel departed from her, the Gloss says: The Angel seeks heavenly things with the consent of the Virgin.

1. Likewise, Gregory says, Faith does not have merit, but the annunciation was through merit, to which human reason offers experience: persuasion to believe: therefore it was more to nullify the fruit of faith than to aid it. Therefore, since the annunciation was to make faith for the Virgin, it seems that it ought not to have been made. But that the annunciation constructed faith through reason is clear from the words of the Angel: The Holy Spirit will come upon you, etc., and, Nothing will be impossible with God. And from what Elizabeth said: Blessed is she who believed.
2. Furthermore, Without the operation of an intervening Angel, God works grace: therefore, since the incarnation was something greater than the grace given to the Saints, God ought to have perfected this by Himself: but the annunciation is towards the incarnation: therefore God ought to have made it by Himself.
3. Furthermore, Augustine in the fourth book on the Trinity says that the apparitions made to the Fathers were made through Angels and were ordered towards the incarnation of the Son as to an end: therefore, since the end is more worthy than that which is towards the end, and those were made through Angels, the annunciation ought not to have been made through an Angel, but through interior illumination by God.

Solution: It must be said that it was fitting for the annunciation to be made through an Angel to obtain the consent of the Virgin.

To the first objection, it must be said that the prophecy of predestination is not fulfilled without us consenting, but without us acting.

To the second, it must be said that the Angel did not intend to build the virtue of faith in the Virgin through the annunciation, because she was most full of faith: but because she was most humble, not presuming high things of herself; and since it is most high to be the Mother of God, she ought not to have presumed this of herself from her own estimation, unless instructed by the Angel: and therefore the faith which the annunciation constructed is the faith of knowledge and opinion: so that she could think, know, and believe this, that it would be done concerning her. But that it would be done through another, whoever might be chosen for this, she believed would happen. And such faith rightly seeks reason and revelation laudably, and without these, to believe such great things of oneself would be blameworthy.

To the third, it must be said that the incarnation is something greater than grace, but not the annunciation: and therefore, although God made the incarnation by Himself, yet not the annunciation.

To the fourth, it must be said that those apparitions were ordered towards the apparition of the Son in the flesh, but not towards the annunciation: and therefore the objection does not proceed.

Articulus 14 — Whether It Was Fitting That This Annunciation Be Made Through An Angel

Whether it was fitting for this annunciation to be made by an Angel?

Secondly, it is asked, Whether it was fitting to be made by an Angel?

And it seems that it was not. For Angels are superior illuminators to those whom they illuminate, as Dionysius says: but no Angel was superior to the Blessed Virgin: therefore no one ought to have illuminated her. But the annunciation was an illumination concerning the conception of Christ: therefore no Angel ought to have announced this to her. But that the Blessed Virgin was superior, Jerome says in a sermon, that she was exalted above all the choirs of Angels to the heavenly kingdoms.

1. Likewise, God was nearer by grace to the heart of the Blessed Virgin than an Angel: therefore it was more fitting for the illumination to pass through her to the Angel, than conversely.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
1. Dionysius says that the whole dispensation of the incarnation of Christ was announced by Angels. They announced, they made the Magi cautious, they preached to the shepherds: therefore it was fitting to be made by an Angel.

1. Likewise, to the Ecclesiastical hierarchy according to order descend illuminations from the celestial hierarchy: but the Blessed Virgin was of the Ecclesiastical hierarchy: therefore illuminations ought to have descended to her from the Angels.

Solution: It must be said that, as the last reasons prove, it was fitting for the annunciation to be made by an Angel.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that the Blessed Virgin was more excellent by the merit of life, but she was inferior as to state: and the descent of illuminations is chiefly according to the state of sacred order and hierarchies.

To the other, it must be said that God was nearer to the heart of the Virgin by indwelling grace, but not by the mode of contemplation: for Angels saw face to face, but the Blessed Virgin in a mirror and in an enigma: and therefore according to the order of revelation the Angel was nearer: and therefore the illumination descended from him to the Virgin.

Articulus 15 — Of Which Order Was The Angel Who Announced The Incarnation Of Christ

Of which order was the Angel announcing the incarnation of Christ?

Thirdly, it is asked, Of which order was the Angel announcing?

It seems that he was from the higher orders. 1. For Gregory says: Therefore it was fitting that the highest Angel be sent, who announced the highest of all: not only was he from the higher order, but also the highest in it.

1. Likewise, on that of Isaiah, "Who is this that comes from Edom?" the Gloss of Jerome says that it is the voice of the lower Angels ignorant of the mystery of Christ's incarnation: but the announcer was not ignorant: therefore he was not from the lower orders.
2. And this also seems to be suggested by the name of the Angel: because Gabriel is interpreted as the strength of God.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Dionysius and Gregory say that the higher ranks do not have the use of external office: therefore none from the higher orders was sent. If it is perhaps said that this has an instance, Isaiah 6:6: "One of the Seraphim flew to me, having a coal in his hand, which he had taken with tongs from the altar." On the contrary: Dionysius says that he was not one of the higher ones, but delegated by a superior, and named from his office, which is to go forth.

If, however, it is said, as some say, that the mystery of the incarnation was beyond the order of nature, and therefore ought to be announced beyond the law of order. This is nothing: because the incarnation, although it is beyond the order of nature, is not beyond the order of grace, and the orders of Angels are distinguished according to the gifts of graces.

1. Furthermore, whatever has an office, the highest in that office is of the same: it is the office of Archangels to announce secrets: therefore the highest in that office: but the highest is the incarnation of Christ: therefore this ought to be announced by an Archangel.

Solution Without prejudice, it must be said that that Angel was from the order of Archangels, as the Church sings, saying:

We know Gabriel the Archangel to be divinely inspired: and so the Saints say.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that Gregory understands not of the highest simply, but of the highest order of Archangels. Hence he says these words: Angels. And it follows: for the messengers, Archangels are called the highest messengers. For as above, the highest messenger, etc., was introduced.

To the other, it must be said that the Angels, as Augustine says, knew the mystery of the incarnation: but the depth of the divine counsel concerning the incarnation they did not fully know: and therefore they wished to be instructed about this: nor do they ask, Who is this, from the fact that they are ignorant of the person: which is evident: because they are not answered about the person, but about the time: "I, who speak justice," he says. Hence they wished to learn the height of the counsel concerning this. And this solution agrees with the words of Augustine and Dionysius.

To the other, it must be said that the Angel was named from his office: because, namely, he announced the strong one, who had come to overthrow the powers of the air, as Gregory says.

Articulus 18 — What Is Understood By "The Most High" When It Is Said "The Power Of The Most High"

ARTICULUS XVHI.

What is understood by the Most High, when it is said, the power of the Most High?

Then it is asked concerning what is said there, A, towards the middle: Why does it call him the Most High, and what is it for the Holy Spirit to overshadow?

And to this it must be said, that according to Cassian in the book against Nestorius and Eutyches, by the Most High is understood the Father, and by appropriation in the Father is authority: but by wisdom and power is understood the Son, and the Holy Spirit is expressed by his own proper name: so that thus the three great craftsmen of the world are understood in the indivisible work of incarnation to have also repaired the world in the making of the virginal womb.

For another reason also it says, Most High, because he made the most high: for he elevated the lowly to the high, by uniting our nature to the Word, and joined the high to the lowly. But wisdom appeared in the manner of conjunction, so that the natures are distinct and united hypostatically: but power in the conjunction of such distant things, as deity and humanity. But a shadow cools, unites vision, and shades or darkens. To cool is fitting to the sanctification of the Virgin, and to the extinction of concupiscence, to unite vision to the contemplation of the incarnate Word: but to be darkened to the Word which emptied itself taking the form of a servant.

But Damascene says to be born from it not sanctified: because it was never not holy.

Articulus 19 — Whether The Flesh Of Christ Was From The Purest Blood

Whether the flesh of Christ was from the purest blood?

Then, it is asked concerning what is said there, A, towards the middle, that He united to Himself from the most holy and purest blood, etc.

For from this it seems that, as to matter, Christ is from blood.

ON THE CONTRARY:

1. Augustine says below, that [He is] from flesh.

1. Furthermore, flesh is nearer to flesh than flesh to blood, or conversely; but the union of those having a symbol is easier: therefore it was more fitting to assume from flesh than from blood. But if this is said, then it was also necessary to take bones from bones, nerves from nerves, and so on with others.

Solution: It must be said that He took from the purest blood: because blood is potentially the whole body, but not flesh.

To the first of Augustine, it must be said that he understands flesh for that which is the matter of flesh: and this is blood.

To the other, it must be said that flesh is nearer to flesh in the form of the species: but not in the way of generation: because flesh is not made from flesh unless it is corrupted in food, and through digestion is converted into blood, and then finally flesh is generated from it. However, from blood, flesh is immediately made through the conversion and formation of generative power, or even nutritive in some.

Articulus 20 — What Is Meant By 'The Ancient Conspersio'

What is said, Ancient sprinkling 2

What is said, Ancient sprinkling 2

Then, it is asked concerning what is said there, A, towards the end: Of the ancient sprinkling, etc.

For this does not seem true: because ancient sprinkling is ancient from the infection of vice, as the Apostle suggests, 1 Corinthians 5:7, where he says: Purge out the old leaven, that you may be a new sprinkling.

Response. It must be said that it is called ancient on account of the wrinkles of punishments, and not of guilt: because guilt does not receive from our antiquity, but punishment, as the Master will say below.

Articulus 21 — How What Is Said Is Understood, 'Not Sowing, But Creating Through The Holy Spirit'

How is it understood what is said, Not sowing, but creating through the Holy Spirit?

Then it is asked about this which he says, there, A, towards the end: Not sowing, but creating through the Holy Spirit, etc.

For since to create is to make something from nothing, it does not seem to befit Christ, who was made not from nothing, but from some material, because from the blood of the glorious Virgin.

Solution: It must be said that to create implies two things, namely that it is the immediate work of God, and therefore it says creating: but it does not have the other, and therefore another Letter in the original has. But through the Holy Spirit conditionally.

Articulus 22 — Whether The Blessed Virgin Had The Power Of Generating The Son

Whether the Blessed Virgin had the power of generating the Son?

Then, it is asked concerning the word of the Master which says, there, A, towards the end: To whom was conferred the power of generating in a new manner, etc.

For from this it seems to be understood that the Virgin did not generate Christ actively in any way: because it is explained thus, that without the intercourse of man, without the lust of the conceiving one, the conception of God and man was celebrated in the womb of the Virgin.

And to this it must be said, as was said above, that she acted only by disposing, and assisting externally, and ministering the material for the substance of the members and for the growth. But the power converting, forming, and shaping, and composing the members, and uniting the soul with the deity, was entirely in the work of the Holy Spirit.

Articulus 24 — Whether The Glorious Virgin Could Sin

Whether the glorious Virgin could sin?

ARTICULUS XXIV,
Whether the glorious Virgin could sin?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said,
there, B, around the beginning, For from this we know,
that more grace was bestowed upon her, etc.

For if she conquered sin in every respect,
then it seems that she also conquered in respect
of the power to sin, and thus could not
sin.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY
There are four states of free will, as
is held in the book II of the Sentences: To be able
to sin and not to sin, which is
the state of innocence: and not to be able not to sin mortally,
which is the state of condemned man: not to be able
not to sin venially, which is the state of

redeemed man: not to be able to sin, which is
the state of the glorified: therefore it seems that the Blessed
Virgin then was in the state of the glorified, and
beyond the state of innocence by itself, which
is false.

Solution It must be said, that there is a power from
an inclining habit, and there is a power from
the freedom of choice: and the Blessed Virgin had conquered
the power from an inclining habit
to sin, but she had it from the freedom of choice.

But on the contrary, it is objected, that according
to this she had the state of Adam before he
sinned.

Solution It must be said, In this respect she had that she did not have an inclination to evil from the part of the body, but as to mortality and internal troubles she did not have: for in her death was not joined to the ability not to sin, as it was in Adam.

Articulus 25 — How 'We Have No Sin' Ought To Be Understood

How should it be understood, "We do not have sin"?

Then it is asked concerning what is said there, B, around the middle: If all the saints and holy ones were to convene, etc.

For infants recently baptized do not seem to have sin. Similarly, let us suppose someone with contrition for all venial and mortal sins has confessed, according to the faith of the Church, he does not have sin.

Solution: If it is generally understood even of infants, then I think it should be glossed, "we do not have sin," that is, the fomes and cause of sin, in the manner the Apostle takes sin in the Epistle to the Romans 7:16-17: "If then I do what I do not want, I consent to the law, that it is good. Now then it is no longer I who do it, but sin that dwells in me." But if it is understood of adults, then it scarcely happens to be without sin: because some things adhere so greatly, that a man scarcely confesses without the intention of dismissing all even venial sins.

C. Why was Christ not tithed in Abraham, as Levi was, since the flesh which he took in him was subject to sin?

However, since that flesh, whose singular excellence cannot be explained in words, before it was united to the Word, was subject to sin in Mary and in others from whom it was transmitted by propagation: it can not undeservedly seem to have been subject to sin in Abraham, whose entire flesh is subject to sin.

Hence it is usually asked, Why is Levi said to be tithed in Abraham and not Christ, since both were in the loins of Abraham according to the material reason, when Abraham was tithed, and gave tithes to Melchizedek? For then the Apostle says Levi was tithed in Abraham, as in the material cause: because by that tithing, just as Abraham is shown to be lesser than Melchizedek, to whom he personally paid tithes, so also the Levitical order, which was in Abraham according to the seminal reason, and descended from him through the concupiscence of the flesh. But Christ was not tithed: because although he was there according to the flesh, he did not descend from there according to the common law, namely through the lust of the flesh: just as in Adam all sinned, but not Christ.

Hence Augustine on Genesis: Just as in Adam sinning, those who were in his loins sinned: so in Abraham giving tithes, those who were in his loins were tithed. But this does not follow in Christ, although he was in the loins of Adam and Abraham: because he did not descend

from there according to the concupiscence of the flesh. Therefore, since Levi and Christ were according to the flesh in the loins of Abraham, when he was tithed, they were not equally tithed, because in some manner Christ was not there as Levi was there. For according to that seminal reason Levi was there, by which reason he was to come into the mother through intercourse: according to which reason the flesh of Christ was not there, although according to it the flesh of Mary was there. Therefore, he was tithed in Abraham, who was thus in the loins of Abraham as he was in the loins of his father, that is, who was thus born of father Abraham, as he was born of his father, namely through the law of the flesh, and invisible concupiscence.

It follows concerning the second part of the distinction, in which it is asked, Whether Christ was tithed? And it arises from the preceding in which it is asked, Whether the flesh of Christ was subject to sin? because he who has flesh subject to sin, he was tithed in the Fathers: but this part begins there,

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Having established these things, we must come to the Letter of this part, and take that which it says, there, C, "Because by that tithing thus and by what inferiority? so Abraham is shown to be inferior to Melchizedek," etc.:

And it is said, that the imperfection of blessing and of neediness, which imperfection he signified by the offering of the tithe and the retention of the nine: for when Melchizedek received the tenth, the denarius did not remain with Abraham: and therefore the reading was with Melchizedek and not with Abraham, which he signified by removing the tithe: and therefore by the priesthood of Melchizedek, and not of the sons of Abraham, the perfection of blessing and redemption was signified. But when Melchizedek exhibited the type of the priesthood of Christ in the offering of bread and wine, the priesthood of Christ is perfect and liberating: and Abraham's is imperfect and needing a liberator.

Then take that before the end of the chapter: "According to the seminal reason," etc., is the reason by which posterity is sown: and that reason is the force of concupiscence, and the commingling of the sexes, as is evident in all.

After these things take that, at the end of the chapter:

"Invisible concupiscence." This concupiscence is called invisible, because in the properties of the visible body sown it does not appear, but through the reason of the flesh it almost appears against the spirit.

Articulus 26 — Whether Christ Was In The Limbo Of Adam Or Of Abraham According To A Different Mode From Others

Whether Christ was in the loins of Adam or Abraham in a different mode from others?

Here three difficult questions arise. The first is, Whether Christ was in the loins of Adam or Abraham in a different mode from other men? The second, What it means to be tithed in the

loins of Abraham, or not to be tithed? The third is, What it means to sin in Adam, or not to sin?

Concerning the first, the procedure is as follows:

1. Augustine says in Book VIII on Genesis, that we were all in Adam through corporeal substance. Therefore, either corporeal substance is understood as that which is according to the form and matter of our body, or corporeal substance, which is the matter of our body. It is clear that it is not in the first way: because thus our organized bodies would have been there, which cannot be. But if corporeal substance is the matter of our body. On the contrary: That matter was something designated in Adam, or the matter of another: therefore, the matter of all bodies made and to be made was there by some designation, which is very unreasonable: because if it had been as a great mountain, it could not be divided into so many: especially if the world were infinite, it would always be possible for men to be propagated from men. Yet there are and were before us those who said this, like the Master who wrote this book, and he solves the objection made, that indeed something of all was in him: and this was multiplied by the operation of the Lord into as many as would be born, just as the matter of five loaves was multiplied into so many thousands of men who are said to have been satisfied from it.

But against this is that the work of nature would be entirely miraculous, and men would not be naturally generated from men.

1. Furthermore, the same reasoning applies to horses, donkeys, and other animals, how they were derived from the first ones created in the works of the six days.

2. Furthermore, this is reduced to an impossibility thus: God multiplies what is taken from Adam: either therefore by adding something from the elements of the world to that matter: or by newly creating matter and adding it to it. If He adds something from the elements of the world: then not everything was in Adam, as they say: because their opinion is that nothing is converted into the truth of human nature which is taken from the first parents. If in the second way, the same question arises. But if it is said that He multiplies that matter in itself, neither by creating something to be added, nor by converting something else into it: this is not intelligible: because the Saints say that He multiplied the five loaves, just as He multiplies crops from one grain. But this multiplication is done by converting other grains into crops: hence then it is not similar to what they add: because He multiplied the loaves by converting foreign matter into them.

For this reason, others found a more subtle imagination, and said that matter is divisible into infinity by the act of nature: and thus that everyone has something from the first. But against: Either matter as it is substance existing only in potentiality is divisible: or quantified matter. If in the first way, this is not understood by the intellect, that something is actually divided by the division of matter and not of form, which has no quantity: and this is against the Philosopher in Physics I, saying that if there is only one thing that is substance, that it is indivisible, because it is not divided by the division of matter except quantitatively. However, by the division of form, something can be added that is not quantitative, like being, and substance, and other such genera which are divided by their differences: but such a division does not

have a place here. But if they say quantified matter is, On the contrary: The Philosopher in On the Soul II says that the nature of all things that stand is the limit and reason of magnitude and increase: but this limit and reason is taken from two things: from the quantity of radical moisture, which is the first matter of generation, and from the vigor of formative power, and information, as Galen suggests, who says that the defect of some members is caused by the defect of matter, but of others by the defect of power: therefore that matter is proportionate to such a body in such a quantity, which if it is less, it will not be as much: therefore if it is divided, I do not say now, into infinity, but even to a small extent, as into two, the whole quantity of the human body will not be generated from it: and thus there is nothing of what they say about division into infinity.

If perhaps it is said that this is true: and therefore now men are born of lesser quantity than anciently: because the divided matter has become less.

Against:
1. According to this, the son should continually be lesser than the father by as much quantity as the matter is divided into the number of sons and daughters. And since someone is read to have had thirty sons, and more daughters, he should have been greater by thirty parts than any of those sons, which is ridiculous.

1. Furthermore, we often see a son generated greater than the father.
2. Furthermore, the succession of men has lasted so long that it is a wonder that we are not now atom-sized.
3. Furthermore, perhaps this opinion is refuted by another reason, namely that what was divided from Adam, either was entirely formed into the body of Seth, or not entirely, but a part was reserved in Seth so that the son of Seth would be born from it. If in the first way, since that which has the human form in one is not susceptible to the human form in another, nor will it rise with it, as Augustine says, it cannot be made into the body of another by succession: for it is very contrary to reason that a thing is in potentiality to a form which it already has. But if it is said that it does not oppose what Augustine said about the resurrection: because it has a nobler being in the second than in the first. On the contrary! In the first it is like a radical member of man, and not like a nutritive one: because it was given that it is entirely formed into the body of a man: therefore in the first it has a nobler being. If for this reason another part is given, that not all is formed into the body, but a part is reserved, then it follows that either it is divided into parts numbering the whole, like halves, thirds, fourths, fifths, or into numbering parts, each of which is smaller than the preceding divided. If in the first way, then the propagation of the human race will necessarily stand, with as many born as the seed is divided into parts. If in the second way, then the latter is always smaller than its father by some quantity, and this is not true, because sight frequently proves the contrary.

4. Furthermore, all philosophers commonly say that generation is from the superfluity of nourishment, to which formative power is conferred through the organs of generation; therefore it is not in this way as they say.

5. Also, Aristotle in Book XVI of Animals says that the seed of generation is likened to a son going out from the house of the father: because just as he carries a part of substance with him, and multiplies it through negotiations and profits: so the seed carries with it a part of the radical moisture in which the organs are formed, and multiplies it through the part of the mother.

Solution Without prejudice, we say that we were not in Adam by any designation: but we say that there is a twofold matter of the human race, namely designated in the form of a man, or in the form of a part of a man: as there is the matter of Peter, or the foot of Peter: and there is original matter. But original matter is that which was cut off from the body of Adam, that is, from what was potentially the body of Adam, for this was the superfluity of nourishment - cut off, I say, by the act of generative power, and it received formative power in a place determined by the soul of Adam, so that from it the body of a son would be formed, and it would be entirely converted into it. Nor is it called superfluous, which is not assigned for the sustenance of individual substance by the act of nutritive power; but from what is superfluous to it, it ministered to the generative for the sustenance and multiplication of the species. But the same is not converted into the body of the son of Seth, nor a part of it, as has been proven, but rather it receives the moisture of nourishment in the body of Seth: and again the superfluity of that moisture is sent to the generative, so that it receives formative power from that which originated from Adam: and thus succession is made through all. And this I call the matter which is originally converted to one man Adam: thus we were all in Adam. And this Augustine suggests when he says that if a man is fed with the flesh of another man, and generates, that flesh will rise in that in which it was from the radical moisture, not in that in which it was only nourishment.

Hence it seems to me that the superior opinions are either false, or cannot be understood how they are true. And I concede the reasons brought against them.

And concerning this I say that when it is said, Christ was in the loins of Adam, it was through matter in this original way, but not like other men. For the corporeal in which formation was made was thus originally there: but the forming power did not originate from there, but rather from the Holy Spirit, as was said above. And therefore when it is said, Christ was in the loins of Abraham like others, I think it should not be conceded: but when it is said, Christ was in the loins of Abraham or Adam through that by which others were, it should be conceded: because one says the substance of matter or origin, the other says the mode of propagation or generation.

Articulus 27 — What It Is To Be Tithed In The Loins Of Abraham

What is it to be tithed in the loins of Abraham?

Secondly it is asked, What is it to be tithed in the loins of Abraham?

§ 1. For either to be tithed is to give tithes, or to be obligated to tithes, or to prefigure the sign of the tithing of those who were to be in the future. If it is to give tithes: then those who were to be in the future, then gave tithes: and with the tithes given, he who gave is freed from the obligation to give: therefore afterward he was not bound to give tithes, which is false.

§ 2. Moreover, it seems that a thing existing in the material potency of its origin cannot be tithed in this way: because someone tithes his wheat, and from the tithed wheat he sows, and the fruit which grew, he is again bound to tithe, even though it was in the tithed seeds according to the matter of origin: therefore by a similar reasoning, although Abraham gave tithes, yet he could not tithe his sons in himself.

§ 3. But if it is said that to be tithed is to be obligated to tithes. On the contrary: The Levites are not obligated to tithes: rather they received tithes from the people according to the law: and so they were more tithed, if this were to be tithed, in Melchizedek who received tithes, than in Abraham who gave. But if this is to prefigure the sign of the tithing of others. On the contrary: They were then only according to the matter of origin: but Christ was there in entirely the same way: therefore Christ was tithed, just as they were.

§ 4. Moreover, it seems to apply more to Christ than to others: because he himself is signified by the tithe, as Augustine and the Master say ; therefore he seems more to be tithed.

§ 5. Moreover, after the victory Abraham offered tithes to Melchizedek: so Christ after the triumph offered the price of redemption to the Father: therefore it is more fitting for Christ to be tithed in such a sign, than for others.

Further it is asked, What is this that Augustine says as the reason why Christ was not tithed in the loins of Abraham: namely because he was there otherwise than the others? For this seems to be false: for the law of concupiscence is not in anyone unless when he exists: but then his descendants did not exist: therefore they were not there then by the law of concupiscence: therefore by corporeal substance only: and thus Christ was there: therefore the others were there just as Christ.

Solution. It must be said that to be tithed is different from to tithe. For to tithe is the same as to give tithes: and this is done for two causes, one of which is moral: and as regards that, tithes have remained in the new law, namely so that there may be food in the house of God, as Malachi says , namely so that the ministers serving in the temple may have whence they may be sustained. The other cause is so that an offering of perfection may be shown to be made for oneself before God: for he who gives a tenth, offers the tenth which occurs to the number and to his superior, and retains nine for himself. Now the number ten (denarius) is the first boundary, and signifies perfection: whence it signifies the price of our redemption which is removed from us, as the price from the redeemed: because on our part we could not have this price. But the retention of the nine, which number signifies imperfection, through the fact that it falls short and is lacking from the number ten, signifies our imperfection: and thus the offering of the tenth is to signify that one is imperfect and in need of redemption. But the tenth which

he offers from himself signifies the price of that redemption. And thus Master Hugh of St. Victor expounds it. Now, to be tithed is to signify this need for liberation.

§ To the first therefore it must be said that the Apostle in Hebrews 7:4 et seq., from whence all this is drawn, intends to prove that Christ's priesthood excels the Levitical priesthood, in this that Christ's priesthood is signified by the priesthood of Melchizedek, who as greater received tithes from Abraham, in whom the ministers of the priesthood of the old law were signified to be in need of redemption, and this is signified by the tithes offered by Abraham to Melchizedek himself, of which redemption Christ had no need: rather his flesh is signified by the tenth which Melchizedek received, so that he might bless Abraham: just as the Father received the immolation of Christ's body, so that he might bless the human race. And thus it is clear why Christ was not tithed in the loins of Abraham, namely signified as needing liberation. But others were tithed in his loins, who by the retained nine were signified to need liberation, which is signified by the priesthood of Melchizedek and the blessing. Therefore let it be said to the first, that to have been tithed is to signify the need for liberation by the nine retained in the offering of the tenth part to him who blesses and redeems: and to this tithing it is clear, that all who are signified by the nine, are obligated through Abraham.

§ To that which is objected, that a thing existing in potency cannot be tithed, it must be resolved that it cannot be tithed by a number actually casting out a tenth: because it is not in act, but in potency: but it can be tithed, that is, determined to tithing: and obligated in this way in which it is. And as to what is objected concerning the grain, it must be said that this grain is twofold, namely as being in act, and thus it is tithed: and as another being in potency in it, and thus what is in it, is not tithed, and ought to be tithed when it comes forth from it.

§ To the next it must be said that the Levites received tithes, as they are for the sustenance of the ministers, but not as tithing signifies the need of liberation: because thus they were tithed, and did not receive tithes.

§ To the next it must be said that to be in the loins is attributed to all as regards the matter of origin: but that matter has a twofold relation, namely to the origin, and to the originated. To the origin again it has a twofold relation: one according to corporeal substance, another according to the law by which it is severed and transferred into another. But to the originated it again has a twofold relation, namely as being a possible substance in him, and according to the mode by which it is to be taken for constituting the originated itself.

§ If however matter is taken here in respect to the origin only materially: but to the originated as being only its matter. It must be said that Christ was in this way in the loins, as others: and this Augustine calls being in the loins according to corporeal substance: for the reason that in both respects, namely to the origin and to the originated, it is not considered except materially according as matter is a corporeal substance in which the form of the body is made. If however it is taken in the two secondary respects, namely according to the law of concupiscence by which it is transferred from the origin, and according to the commingling of sexes how it is taken in the conceived, Christ was not there just as others. And this Augustine intimates, when he says that those were tithed in the loins of Abraham, who were in his loins in such a way, just as Abraham himself was in the loins of his father: and who were to be in the mother through sexual union.

§ If however it is still objected, that Christ's flesh before it was under Christ's form, was entirely the Virgin's flesh: and that whole was there according to both respects: therefore also Christ's flesh. Just as it was determined above, it must be said that it is not true: because the Virgin's flesh is of another formal character (rationis) than Christ's flesh. For flesh is called

Christ's in two ways, namely that which is actually Christ's flesh, and that was never as Christ's in another than in himself. In another way it is called Christ's flesh, which through faith from our mass was determined to be assumed by Christ: and that was descending in all, and always indeed through the act of sexual union according to substance: but as faith conjoins it with respect to Christ, thus it was impassible to the law of concupiscence: and this is to take the flesh of Christ according to formal character: because in this formal character by which it was to be Christ's, it never was subjected to the law of concupiscence, just as we said above.

§ To the next it must be said that in the offered tenth Christ is signified: but the offered thing itself is not tithed thus, just as we said above: but rather his very act who retains nine, obligates to tithing through the fact that he professes himself to need to be redeemed by such a tenth.

§ To the next it must be said, as is clear from the aforesaid, that that flesh as determined for Christ through faith was not except through corporeal substance in the loins of the fathers: but others in two ways.

Articulus 28 — What It Is To Sin In Adam, Or Not To Sin

What is it to sin in Adam, or not to sin?

Thirdly it is asked, What is it to sin in Adam, or not to sin?

§ 1. For to sin is to act: but nothing acts except what is in act: we were not in act in Adam: therefore we did not sin in Adam, as it seems.

§ 2. If you say, that this is to be obligated to sin in a material principle. On the contrary: Christ was there according to a material principle: and yet he did not sin in Adam.

§ 3. If you say: This is to contract guilt from the vice of that matter. Against this is what Anselm says, that sin or vice is no more in the seed, than in spittle: therefore it is not contracted from seminal origin.

§ 4. Moreover, it seems the greatest injustice, that sons beyond the third and fourth generation, and up to infinite generations are punished for the sins of the parents.

Solution. It must be noted beforehand, that a treatise concerning original sin and its infliction is had in the II book of the Sentences. But passing by briefly here I say, that to sin in Adam is to contract the guilt of original sin through the mode of the reception of matter from Adam: and in this way Christ did not sin in Adam: rather as the medicine of the wound he was in him. For although the whole flesh of Adam was corrupted by the corruption of passibility and vice, yet not according as it is determined by faith to Christ: because thus tithed it has

in itself a part of itself which is the medicine of the wound, as Augustine says, and this is easily clear through what was said before.

§ To the first therefore it must be said that we all sinned in Adam, as in a vitiated origin, who were so in him that neither the reception of our flesh from his propagation is repugnant to corporeal substance, nor to the law of concupiscence. But Christ was not there thus. And thus to sin is to sin in a certain respect, that is, according to the origin of nature: and in this way also we were in him, who have been propagated from him.

§ To the next the solution is clear through what was said before.

§ To the next it must be said that vice is spoken of in two ways, namely for the habit of vice, and for the cause of vice. In the first way it is not in the seed: but in the second way it is in the seed: because from its foulness which in it is a punishment, foulness is caused in the soul which is a fault and a punishment, and the rationale of this, the Lord granting, is explained in the second book of the Sentences.

D. For what reason the flesh of Christ is said in Scripture not to have been sinful, but similar: by which it is opened, why it was not obligated to sin in Christ.

Wherefore Christ is rightly said to have assumed the first fruits of our mass: because he did not take the flesh of sin, but the likeness of the flesh of sin. For God sent His Son, as the Apostle says, in the likeness of the flesh of sin . For the Word assumed flesh similar to sinful flesh in punishment, and not in fault, and therefore not sinful flesh. But all the rest of the flesh of men is flesh of sin. His alone is not flesh of sin: because a mother did not conceive him by concupiscence, but by grace: yet it has the likeness of the flesh of sin through passibility and mortality, because he hungered, thirsted, and things of this kind. Although therefore his flesh is the same as ours, yet it was not so made in the womb as ours. For it was sanctified in the womb, and born without sin, and neither did he himself ever sin in it. In punishment therefore it is similar to ours, not in the quality of sin: because the pollution which is conceived from the motion of concupiscence, it entirely did not have, nor was it born from carnal delight. Therefore he came to an immaculate body, which was conceived apart from the concupiscence of lust: nor did it have in itself the vice, which in others is the cause of sin, nor did he sin in it. And therefore it is truly said that the flesh of the Word was not in Christ obligated to sin.

Expositio Textus

Exposition of the Text.

Wherefore the first fruits of our mass, etc. This is the second part, and it is a certain conclusion which follows from the preceding.

And note, that first fruits are spoken of in two ways, namely that which on account of greater vigor of nature more quickly reaches maturity, this is called first fruits: and this was offered to the Lord according to the law. First fruits are also called the first in nobility. And in both ways the flesh of Christ is called first fruits: because that first attaining purity, led all to the maturity of purity: and because it was most worthy on account of the union of the deity.

Then take that: A mother did not conceive him by concupiscence, but by grace, etc., because it is in the act of a concupiscent mother. Or more truly,

this is what always fornicates with the demon, so as to establish sinful sons from adultery. But the grace of Christ is spoken of which is the grace of union, not of habit, as in us: but she conceived man as God in hypostasis. But I do not say this for the reason that Christ did not have the grace of habit, but he had it in the virtues and gifts: but the grace of union was not habitual, as some erring men have said, because according to this he would not be a son except by the reception of that grace; but the grace of union is given to be naturally the Son of God in one person of both natures.

All the other things of that part are clear through the disputation.

Divisio Textus

But to that sentence which we said above, etc. This is the third and last part of this distinction, and it has three parts: in the first of which he posits an objection against the things determined above, which is clear in the Text. In the second, he posits the solution, there, § 2: But another reason of that saying existed, etc.: and that also is clear through the things said before. In the third, from all the prehabits he concludes that through the union of the Word and man the properties of both natures are not confounded: but remain different and distinct: and this he proves through the authority of John Damascene which begins, there, § 3: The Word therefore was incarnate, etc.

Articulus 30 — Whether The Word Is Everywhere Man

Whether the Word is everywhere man?

Then it is objected concerning this which he says, there,
§ 3: Not coextensive with the flesh, etc.

For either the Word is everywhere incarnate, or not everywhere. If everywhere, then Christ is everywhere man: and thus the flesh is coextensive with the uncircumscribed deity. But if not everywhere: therefore the Word is somewhere where man is not, and somewhere man, which is false, since it is simple: and it is either wholly incarnate, or nothing of it is incarnate.

Solution It must be said that the Word is everywhere man, but is not man everywhere: because when it is said, the Word is everywhere man, there is a double expression, from the fact that the adverb, everywhere, can determine the verb is in comparison to the suppositum, and thus the expression is true: or in comparison to the appositum, and then the expression is false. And in the first way the sense is: the Word being everywhere, is man: and this is true. In the second way the sense is: the Word is man everywhere, such that in human form it is everywhere. And thus when it is said, the Word is everywhere on this altar: therefore the Word is on this altar everywhere, it does not follow, and a fallacy of diction occurs. For Pope Innocent says that the Word in triple consideration is related to place in three ways: according to the deity it is everywhere essentially, by presence, and potentially: but according to the human form it is openly and distinctly in a determined place at the right hand of the Father in

the empyrean heaven, that is, in the highest goods; but according to the species of bread it is on the altar on which it is consecrated.

Articulus 9 — Whether Sanctification Confirms The Sanctified, And Especially The Blessed Virgin

Whether sanctification confirms the sanctified, and especially the Blessed Virgin?

Whether sanctification confirms the sanctified, and especially the Blessed Virgin?

Seventhly, it is asked, Whether this grace which is called sanctification in the womb, confirms the sanctified, and especially the Blessed Virgin, by which afterwards she could not sin?

1. For this seems through Ambrose in the book on the Virginity of the glorious Virgin, where he says that it was impossible for the womb of the Virgin, which the Son had consecrated by inhabiting, to be defiled by the intercourse of another union: since therefore a similar reason applies to other acts of imperfection and sin, it seems she could not have sinned.
2. Likewise, indecency does not befit Christ: but the reproach of the mother if she sinned would result in some blame, which would seem indecent to have bad parents: therefore it seems that she could not sin.

Solution: It must be said that this grace does not confirm those to whom it is given: but it is indeed true that in the Blessed Virgin it removes the habit towards evil, so that, namely, on the part of habit she did not have an inclination.

But what Ambrose says is understood of the impossibility which is from incongruity: because it would have been incongruous for the womb which had been the temple of the Son of God to be offered to be corrupted by a man: and this impossibility is the immobility of honesty from free will.

And in this way proceeds the following objection, which proves this by way of indecency.

Articulus 16 — What The Mode Of The Annunciation Is, Whether Intellectual, Or Some Other Leading To Assent

What is the mode of annunciation, whether intellectual, or some other leading to assent?

Fourthly, it is asked about the mode of annunciation.

For it seems that it ought to have been done by intellectual vision: because
1. This kind of illumination is the highest, as Augustine says in book XII on Genesis.

1. Likewise, Daniel 10:1: Understanding is the work in vision.
2. Likewise, Augustine says that prophecy is only from intellectual vision, because in others there is error: therefore it ought to have been done in that way, as it seems.

If perhaps it is said that Angels cannot illuminate our intellect, because according to intellect we are equal to them: for an equal does not have power over an equal. This is against Augustine in book XII on Genesis, where he says this is done in wondrous ways, that Angels imprint intelligible species on our intellect.

Solution: It must be said that annunciation is by the mode of inducing into consent, so that to consent is from free choice: because otherwise it would not be praiseworthy: because illumination in the intellect convinces reason of consent. And therefore, although the mode of intellectual illumination is more noble in its kind than through vision or imagination, nevertheless it would not be as useful for annunciation which inclines to free consent.
And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 17 — What The End Of The Annunciation Is

What is the end of the annunciation?

Fifthly, it is asked, What is the end of the annunciation?

And it seems that it is faith: because
1. Thus says Elizabeth, Luke 1:45:
Blessed is she who believed.

1. Likewise, the faith of the Blessed Virgin is said to have been the way: therefore it was the end of the annunciation.

2. Likewise, this seems to be in the words of the persuading Angel.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
The Blessed Virgin had faith before the annunciation: therefore it was not the end of the annunciation, because it was not acquired by her.

Solution: It must be said that there was a twofold end: one in the Virgin, and this is the consent, or faith in the words of the Angel, not the simple faith by which one believes in God, because she had that before: and through this the solution to the first is clear.

Another end was consequent, namely the conception and incarnation of Christ, not operating through the annunciation, but disposing the Virgin for this, so that it might be done in her by the operation of the Holy Spirit: and through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 23 — Why It Is Said, 'Do Not Think This Flesh To Be Of A Heavenly, Nor Airy, Nor Of Any Other Nature'

Why is it said, "This flesh is not celestial,
not airy, not of any other nature"?

Why is it said, "This flesh is not celestial,
not airy, not of any other nature"?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said, there,
A, at the end: "This flesh is not celestial,
not airy," etc.

Against this is what is held, John 3:31: "He who is of the earth, is of the earth, and
speaks of the earth. He who comes from heaven,
is above all." And John says this of himself,
comparing himself to Christ according to
inferiority. However, it is evident, that from the anibut he does not speak, but of the body: therefore the body of Christ came from heaven: therefore it is of heavenly nature.

Solution: It must be said that John says this about the person of Christ, not about the nature of man: for Christ in person came from heaven: but John had the person of earthly nativity: as Christ also says elsewhere about himself: No one ascends into heaven, except he who descended from heaven, the Son of Man, who is in heaven.

Articulus 29 — In What Sense It Is Said, 'The Whole Word Was Incarnate'

In what sense is it said, the Whole Word is incarnate?

But it is asked concerning this which is said there, § 3: The whole is incarnate, etc.

For either the whole is referred to nature, or to person, or to both. If to nature, it seems false: because although the whole divine nature is incarnate in one of its hypostases, yet the whole nature of the Word is not uncircumscribed, but circumscribed.

Solution: It must be said that the term "whole" regards both nature and person: but the nature of man is not incarnate, but rather united to the deity. Hence it speaks of the Word according to that which is incarnate: and because to be incarnate does not pertain to human nature, therefore the distribution does not regard parts of human nature.

DISTINCTIO IV

Divisio Textus

Since indeed the incarnation of the Word, as has been treated in the above, etc.

Here begins the second part of that part, in which it is discussed concerning the conjunction of the assuming and the assumed, and in which it is determined concerning the one operating the conjunction and joining the unibles themselves: and the whole is contained in this distinction.

It is divided into two parts: in the first of which the Master adduces the reason for and against, Why is the incarnation attributed to the Holy Spirit? In the second, however, it is further inquired, Why does the Apostle say he was made from the seed of David according to the flesh: when he was made according to the flesh from the power of the Holy Spirit, not

from the male seed? and this begins in the last chapter of this distinction, namely there, D, But it can be asked, Since we the Savior, etc.

The first part is subdivided into two: in the first of which the reason is taken, why Christ is said to be conceived of the Holy Spirit, according to the attribute of the Holy Spirit which is charity. In the second, however, another reason is taken according to the work of the Holy Spirit, there, C, It can also be said that Christ according to man was therefore born, etc.

The former of these is further subdivided into three: in the first of which he raises the question, and applies the solution. In the second, he confirms the solution through the authority of Augustine, there, A, § 2: When that creature which the Virgin conceived, etc.

In the third, he touches upon the contrary objection from this that it seems the Holy Spirit is the father of the Son according to man, and solves it, there, B, But it is not to be dwelt upon longer in this.

Articulus 1 — To Which Person's Attribute The Incarnation Is Chiefly Attributed

To which person is the attribute of Incarnation most especially attributed?

The question arises concerning the first chapter, to which person the attribute of incarnation is most especially attributed.

It seems, however, that it is to the Father. 1. John 3:16: "For God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son." It is evident, however, that the term "God" there supposes the Father: because the only begotten Son is not Christ except of the Father, not of himself, nor of the Holy Spirit, nor of the whole Trinity. Therefore, it seems that this giving is a mission into flesh: therefore, it seems that it especially belongs to the Father.

1. Likewise, this is shown by the name of the Angel sent: because Gabriel is interpreted as the strength of God. Since, therefore, the names of messengers declare attributes, and mission and strength are power, it seems that it ought to be attributed to the Father.
2. Likewise, by human generation he is not the son by another filiation than that by which he is the Son of the Father: since, therefore, by this relation he posits something other than the Father, the work of human generation ought to be attributed to the Father, and not to the Son, or the Holy Spirit.
3. Likewise, it was held above, that he is sent who is from another: but the Son is from the Father: therefore, he is most fittingly sent by him; but the principal of all missions was that which is into flesh: therefore, that is most fittingly attributed to the Father. But that mission was incarnation: therefore, incarnation is attributed to the Father.

However, it seems that it ought to be attributed to the Son.

1. For it was held above, that because he made all things in wisdom, they ought also to be recreated in wisdom: therefore, the work of incarnation is attributed to the Son, to whom wisdom is also attributed.

2. Likewise, it is the work of him who especially assumes the flesh, to operate the incarnation. But this is the Son: therefore, the work of incarnation is of the Son as the operator.
3. Likewise, Bernard in the fifth book of "Consideration" says: "Wisdom, with the garment of the faith of the glorious Virgin, joined three measures in the incarnation, namely new, ancient, eternal: new in the creation of the soul from nothing, ancient in the assumption of the body from the nature of Adam's body, eternal in the union of the deity." Therefore, since wisdom is attributed to the Son, incarnation is most especially attributed to the Son.

But it seems that it is especially to the Holy Spirit: because 1. The Creed says, "Who was conceived by the Holy Spirit."

1. Likewise, Matthew 1:20: "For that which is conceived in her is of the Holy Spirit."
2. Likewise, Luke 1:35: "The Holy Spirit shall come upon thee, and the power of the Highest shall overshadow thee."
3. Furthermore, this is proven here by many authorities in the Scripture.

Solution: It must be said that according to something of each person, attributes are found in the incarnation: for as to the conjunction of the distant human nature and divine, power appeared, but as to the moving to the assumption of flesh, goodness appeared, but as to the mode of the indissoluble union, wisdom appeared.

Similarly, in the consequences of the incarnation on the part of the end which is redemption, goodness appeared: but in the payment of the due price by the mode of the debtor and the powerful to pay, wisdom appeared, which joined those things in the price, by which the price itself could not be refused: so that (as Augustine says) it might have one in itself from which it ought, and from which it could pay the price, and by the deity itself offered it might be one with him to whom it was offered, and with the priest offering it in sacrifice one, and with those for whom it was offered one in the nature of humanity. And this is what Augustine says in the fourth book of "On the Trinity," thus saying: "What could be offered and received more graciously than the flesh of our sacrifice, the body made of our priest? So that since four things are considered in every sacrifice, to whom it is offered, by whom it is offered, what is offered, for whom it is offered. The same one true mediator, by the sacrifice of peace reconciling us to God, might remain one with him to whom he offered, might make one in himself for whom he offered, might be himself one who offered, and what he offered." It appeared in the end, also in the victory over death, hell, and the devil: because, however, the intended end is goodness, and the first mover is goodness: therefore, it is attributed to the Holy Spirit.

But that it is so, four authorities say. For John Damascene says thus: "In the incarnation, the goodness, and wisdom, and justice, and power of God are shown together: goodness indeed because he did not despise the infirmity of his own creation, but his bowels were moved by it falling, and he extended his hand. Justice indeed because, with man conquered, he made the tyrant to be conquered by no other than man. Wisdom indeed; because he found a solution of

the most difficult, that is, the most fitting solution." Likewise, Cassian in the first book against Nestorius says thus: "The Word descended." Likewise, Bernard in the fifth book of "Consideration" says that the three persons worked the incarnation of Christ. The same Augustine says in the fourth book of "On the Trinity."

And through these things, the solution to all that was objected is clear.

Divisio Textus

But one must not dwell longer on this, etc.

Here the Master objects against the things previously determined: because if the work of the Incarnation is attributed to the Holy Spirit, and whatever works the form of the body in generation seems to be a father: it will seem that the Holy Spirit is the father of Christ according to human generation.

And this part has three chapters: in the first of which he touches upon the said objection, and solves it. In the second, he gives an instance against this proposition, Whatever is reborn of water, is the son of that [water], there, § 2: However it is not to be conceded, etc. In the third, he gives an instance against this, Everything that is the son of someone, is born of him, there, § 3: Thus therefore he is born of the Holy Spirit, etc.

Articulus 4 — Whether The Trinity Could Be Called The Father Of Christ; And Whether The Holy Spirit Could Be Called His Father; And Whether Christ Can Be Called The Son Of The Holy Spirit According To Grace; And Whether He Is An Adoptive Son

Could the Trinity be called the father of Christ? And, could the Holy Spirit be called his father? And, could Christ be called the son of the Holy Spirit according to grace? And, is he an adopted son?

However, a doubt arises here: Whether the Trinity could be called the father of Christ?

It seems that it could, because: § 1. Augustine says below, Since that man had it by no preceding merits, but by grace, that he be assumed into the unity of the person of the Son of God: but from this grace the Trinity is called our Father, when we pray, Our Father, who art in heaven therefore it seems that the Trinity is the Father of Christ.

§ 2. Moreover, the active power of conception is from the father: but the active power of the conception of the Son, as is proved before, was communally from the whole Trinity: therefore it seems that the Trinity is the Father of Christ.

§ 3. Moreover, I confess to you, Father, Lord of heaven and earth. The Saints expound this, that he is the father of all by creation: therefore much more will he be the father of Christ by the formation of the divine body, as it seems.

§ 4. Moreover, we see according to nature that the operation of the father is the detaching of matter, its conversion into the body of the one born, formative into the figure of the members, distinctive and positing of the organs: but the Trinity did all these things, by separating the purest bloods of the Virgin, by forming the species of the body, by distinguish-

ing and composing the members: therefore the Trinity even more truly seems to be the father of Christ, because it did these things in a moment, than a man is the father of a man whose power does this successively.

§ 5. Moreover, a human is called the father of another because of the power forming the body: therefore much more will the Trinity be called the father of Christ on account of the power forming the body and soul; because the Trinity formed both.

BUT AGAINST THIS: § 1. He cannot be called the son of the Trinity except by the grace of the persons: therefore Christ is his own son: therefore some thing begets itself as such.

§ 2. If it is said that this does not follow: because Christ according to human nature is his own son, but according to divine nature he is not. Against this: No thing is called the son of another by grace of nature, because nature is not the son of anyone, but rather the person is: for we do not say that the body and soul of Socrates is the son of Plato, but rather Socrates himself; therefore Christ in person is his own son according to person: therefore some thing in every way the same as that which begets, begets itself as such.

§ 3. Furthermore, Christ is his own son. Let this be granted. Also it is true that Christ is not his own son: therefore Christ is two sons, namely of the Father, and his own along with the others: but this is false: therefore Christ cannot be called the son of the Trinity.

§ 4. Moreover, Cassian in book V On the Incarnation, treating that text of the Apostle John, Every spirit that dissolves Jesus is not of God says thus, To dissolve, this is to want to break what is united in Jesus, and to separate what is undivided. But what is united and undivided in Jesus? Certainly man and God: therefore he separates Jesus who separates and breaks this: therefore whoever says that one thing belongs to the man insofar as he is man, and another to the Son of God insofar as he is person, dissolves Jesus: but filiation belongs to him insofar as he is person: therefore he who says that one filiation belongs to him insofar as he is God, and another insofar as he is man, dissolves Jesus: therefore to say this is not only unfitting, but even heretical.

§ 5. If perchance it is said that filiation does not belong to him by grace of the hypostasis, but by grace of the nature: this is ridiculous: because paternity or filiation does not belong to anyone, neither to God nor to man, except by grace of the hypostasis, and not of the nature.

§ 6. Moreover, the union in Christ is by grace of the hypostasis, and not by grace of the nature, because the natures remain distinct: but the union is unto being, not merely unto the consent of the will: therefore this hypostasis is that [hypostasis]: and whatever is said of the one insofar as it is a hypostasis, will also be said of the other: but the eternal hypostasis is not the Son except of the Father alone. The first premise is written by Augustine who says that the union was so great that it made the man God, and God man. The second is written by Cassian in book VII On the Incarnation, and by Pope Leo against Nestorius, where he says thus: Such an unity of man and God is read, that both the man seems always previously coeternal with God, and afterwards God seems to have suffered with the man.

But these things are introduced because of the erroneous solution of certain ones, who say that he could be called the son of the Trinity, unless a confusion of relations were implied: yet it would not be distinguished whether he was son according to the divine nature or according to the human [nature]. For this was the heresy of a certain monk Leporius, who introduced a quaternity of relations, so that he called Christ two sons.

§ 7. Moreover, Christ is an eternal person and hypostasis by no other personality: but he is a person and hypostasis by eternal filiation: therefore even the man himself existing because of the union will not be called son except by the eternal filiation through relation to God.

But further it is asked, Whether he could be called the son of the Holy Spirit?

And it seems that he could: because § 1. That which is conceived and born out of someone and from someone existing with him in likeness of substance, is his son: because by saying "is conceived and born in likeness of substance," I exclude all of Augustine's counter-examples: but the son is conceived and born from the Holy Spirit existing with him in likeness of substance: therefore he is the son of the Holy Spirit. The first premise is proved. The entire second premise is written in the Creed and the Gospel: because the Creed says that he was conceived by the Holy Spirit: the Gospel says he was born of the Holy Spirit and consubstantial with him: because he is also homoousios with the Father and the Holy Spirit.

§ 2. Moreover, Damascene says that the Word descended into the Virgin as a divine seed: therefore it seems that the Holy Spirit operated from seed: and he who operates from seed is a father: therefore it seems that the Holy Spirit is the father of Christ.

§ 3. Moreover, the operation of a more perfect agent is more perfect: but the operation which operates from matter is more imperfect than that which produces matter and form simultaneously: therefore the first belongs to a more imperfect agent, the second to a more perfect one. But if on account of his operation it is attributed to a human father that he is a father, much more ought it to be attributed to the Holy Spirit to be a father on account of a more perfect mode of operation.

To this, again, men are marvelous at solving, [saying] that even this could be said unless a confusion were noted in the voice, namely a confusion of filiation.

But against this are: § 1. The authorities of Augustine and Ambrose saying that in no way can he be called the son of the Holy Spirit: since he himself is not a son except according to hypostasis, and the hypostasis in Christ is but one, he will not be a son except by one filiation.

§ 2. Moreover, the Saints say that Christ is a Son only by nature: but he is not a Son by nature except of the Father: therefore he is not a Son except of the Father: therefore he is not a Son of the Holy Spirit.

But still further it is asked, Whether with this determination, Son by grace, it should be said that Christ is a son of the Holy Spirit by grace or according to grace?

It seems so: because here in the Text we have, that that man was assumed into the unity of the Son of God, which he had by grace not by merits: but all grace is of the Holy Spirit by appropriation: therefore it seems that he himself is a son of the Holy Spirit by grace.

Against this is: § 1. The text of the Gospel which says: We have seen his glory, glory as of the Only Begotten from the Father, full of grace and truth therefore the fullness of grace is to him from the Father: therefore it is not attributed to him from filiation of the Holy Spirit.

§ 2. Furthermore, when I say, This man is a son by grace: either grace is taken there for a grace-making habit, or it is the grace making the union of the hypostasis and person. If in the first way, then this man is not the son of God except through the reception of grace, and not through the hypostasis: and this is the heresy of Nestorius and Eutyches. If in the second way, then the hypostasis of this man and of the Son of God is the same: but this hypostasis is a hypostasis by eternal filiation alone: therefore this hypostasis will not be by the grace of the Holy Spirit.

But further it is asked, Whether Christ is an adopted son?

But the Master will determine this below: therefore it must be deferred until then.

Solution: Without a doubt it must be said that in no way, neither by grace nor by nature, is Christ the son of the Trinity, nor even of the Holy Spirit, on account of the reasons to the contrary, which are almost all extracted from the sayings of the Fathers. For that grace is the grace of union according to being, and not of acceptation: and therefore [being] a son by grace in this way is [being] a son by nature: because he is not a son by nature except of the Father: and also by this grace he is not a son except of the Father. But why he is the son of a mother will be inquired below.

Therefore to the first it must be said that this is false, that from such grace the Trinity is called our Father: on the contrary, that grace is of acceptation, which makes a consent of the will: and it does not unite us to God into a unity of person, but into a unity of the Holy Spirit, as the Apostle says: He who adheres to the Lord is one spirit, namely with him. Which unity of spirit is in the consent of the will, not in the unity of person or nature.

To the other it must be said that the operative power of conception which is intrinsic in the seed, because the begotten is from the substance of the begetter, makes the human father to be a father: but a power which operates extrinsically upon matter not brought from the substance of the operation, but upon foreign [matter], and assumed from elsewhere, makes the operator to be an artisan or maker, but not a father: and such was the power operating in the conception of Christ. Hence Praepositivus says in a certain sermon on the Lord, treating that of the Gospel: Is not this the son of the carpenter? For he says that he is the Son of the heavenly Father: for in the Incarnation those three great artisans, the makers of the world, descended into the workshop of the virginal womb, and fabricated a body for Christ. But the operation of a carpenter is the operation of an artisan, and not of the nature of a father.

To the other it must be said that we are called adopted sons, in which filiation Christ cannot be called a son, as the Master will show below: therefore it is not similar, because his grace is uniting to one being in person, but ours is to one being in consent of the will alone.

To the other it must be said that the detaching which belongs to fathers is from their own substance, and not from an alien one: just as the Trinity detached from the body of the Virgin,

and the formative power is originated in the seed from the generative [power] of the father: and such was not the power operating the conception of Christ: and therefore that objection does not proceed.

To the other it must be said that although God forms the body and the soul, nevertheless God the Trinity is not called the father of Christ, on account of the dissimilar mode of formation, as was said.

To the other which is asked further: Whether Christ is called the son of the Holy Spirit?

It must be said that in no way can he be catholically called the son of the Holy Spirit.

To that which is objected first, however, it must be said that Christ was not conceived and born of the Holy Spirit as from a father: because [he was] not [conceived] from a substance detached from the Holy Spirit, or by a formative power originally received from him: but he was born and conceived from him as from the power of an extrinsic operator: and therefore he is not his father, nor does the son have an identity of substance with the Holy Spirit according to which a nature operates according to the substance of the Holy Spirit: because that nature is human, in which the Holy Spirit does not communicate with Christ.

To the other it must be said that John Damascene does not say that a true seed descended into the Virgin, but as a divine seed: so that through the two words as divine seed it may be drawn outside the ratio of a seed: for a divine seed cannot be a part of the substance of God: because the substance of God is indivisible: but it has something of the power of God.

Moreover, As a divine seed still says less than divine seed: hence divine seed removes the ratio of the substance of seed: but as a power removes the operator of the seed, which is intrinsic and natural, what kind of power for the formation of Christ's body was not in the separated flesh. Hence nothing remains of the properties of seed, from which the intrinsic formative power and substance is removed, except the operation itself, and that was there, because the concept was being converted, formed, and figured to the conversion of the species, and the form of the body, and the figure of the lineaments of the body of other humans, and this by the operation and power of the Holy Spirit. Hence from this it does not follow that he operated from seed.

To the other it must be said that to a more perfect agent is due a more perfect operation: but it does not follow that that operation causes the ratio of a father in the operator. For I well concede that the operation of the Holy Spirit is more perfect than that of a carnal father: nevertheless that operation was not by the mode of a father.

To that which is asked further: Whether with this determination according to grace the Holy Spirit could be called the father of Christ?

It must be said that in no way is it to be said: because the grace is unto one being in person, and no one is called a son of a father except in person and by grace of the person: hence that objection does not proceed. And I well concede that that solution is erroneous and contrary to the sayings of the Saints, [namely] that it could be conceded in reality, if confusion in the signification of the relations did not accede, as was expressly proved. And the Saints say that our concession through speech, or negation, does not make a thing to be so, or not to be:

hence it would be so, that Christ would be the son of the Holy Spirit by grace, which the Saints deny by the induced reasons.

Articulus 5 — Whether The Glorious Virgin Truly Was The Mother Of Christ; And Whether She Ought To Be Called Theotokos Or Christotokos

Was the glorious Virgin truly the mother of Christ? And, should she be called Theotokos, or Christotokos?

Next it is inquired concerning this which he says in B, at the end of § 1: But he was born of her thus, as of a mother.

For this seems false: § 1. For a mother is one who, by the power of the act of her own generative [faculty], detaches the matter of the concept from the substance of her body, as some say: but the detaching of the purest blood was done by the Holy Spirit, as was held above in the authority of Damascene: therefore the Blessed Virgin was not the mother of Christ.

§ 2. If perchance it is said that she is called mother by grace of the matter which was accepted from her, and by grace of the nutrition of the concept which was made in her: according to this, bronze would be the mother of a statue, which is false: therefore it seems that she was not his true mother.

§ 3. Furthermore, some say that the vegetation of embryos is in the mother after the manner of a plant, because it is bound to the matrix through the cotyledons, and receives sense and motion from the mother's nerves, vital and pulsatile spirit from the arteries, and its nourishment and natural spirit from the veins: and thus they wish that all movements of formation and nutrition and vegetation be from the mother's soul. BUT AGAINST THIS: The seed projected to the matrix either has a natural movement toward conversion and vegetation, or not. If it has a natural [movement]: therefore from a principle intrinsic to itself: but the mother's soul is not a principle intrinsic to it: therefore it is not moved by the mother's soul. If it does not have a natural movement: then all human generation would be unnatural.

§ 4. Furthermore, let this be granted, that it is moved after the manner of a plant in the earth. But a plant in the earth receives only matter, and not the formative power: rather it has that either from the stars, or it is in the seed of the plant: therefore the concept in the mother also does not receive the formative [power] from the mother.

§ 5. Moreover, the Philosopher says that in plants alone the power of female and male is in one: because plants everywhere impregnate and are impregnated. But in all sensible beings the formative power is not from the mother, but from the male: therefore this is not proper to the mother, that she moves to form and vegetation: and because this is believed among those who know the opinion of Aristotle, but such a disputation is not congruent for such a great matter, it is dismissed.

And let it be asked, Whether the Blessed Virgin ought to be called Theotokos, or only Christotokos, as certain heretics said?

But it seems that she ought to be called Theotokos, because: § 1. Thus Damascene says: We preach the Virgin Mary principally and truly Theotokon, that is, the Mother of God: for just as he who was born of her is truly God: so she is truly Theotokos, that is, the Mother of God, who bore the true God incarnate from her.

§ 2. Moreover, Damascene, in the same place: The Holy Virgin did not bear a mere man, but true God: not mere, but incarnate: not bringing down a heavenly body, and passing through her as through a pipe, that is, a channel, but assuming from her flesh homoousion, that is, consubstantial with us, and subsisting in himself.

§ 3. Moreover, in the same place: Justly and truly we name holy Mary Theotokon, that is, the Mother of God. For this name constitutes the universal mystery of the Incarnation. For if she is Theotokos, that is, the Mother of God, who bore God, he who is born of her is altogether God, and also altogether man.

§ 4. Moreover, in the same place: We do not call the Virgin Christotokon, that is, the Mother of Christ: because unto the destruction of the word Theotokos, that is, the Mother of God, the wicked and defiled Nestorius, similar to a Jew, invented it, as a vessel of dishonor unto the dishonor of the only one truly honored above all creation: even if he himself is cut off with his father the devil. In that authority, Nestorius is not dissimilar to a Jew, that is, the heretic, who is a vessel of dishonor, and frantic, similar to a Jew, that is, having the frenzy of a Jew or of the Jews, saying that Christ is a pure man, invented this name from the lies of his father the devil.

BUT AGAINST THIS: § 1. According to this she is mother, according to what she gave: but she gave no nature except that of a man: therefore she herself ought not to be called, as it seems, Theotokos.

§ 2. Moreover, according to this she is mother, according to which she is consubstantial: but she is not consubstantial except according to human nature: therefore she ought not to be called mother except as to this, that she is of human nature. And thus again it follows that she ought not to be called Theotokos.

§ 3. Moreover, what is the obstacle if she is called Christotokos? For as Ambrose says, in the name of Christ not only, I say, divinity, but the Trinity is understood: since therefore Christ is understood as the anointed according to human nature, and the unction according to divine nature: it seems that there is no dishonor to her, if she is called Christotokos.

§ 4. Moreover, it was held above that Christ is a son by one filiation: and that filiation is eternal: therefore according to this filiation he is not the son of the Virgin: and he has no other, as was proved: therefore in no way is he the son of the Virgin: therefore she herself ought to be called neither Theotokos nor Christotokos.

SOLUTION. We say without a doubt that the glorious Virgin is most truly the mother of Christ: and because this was conferred on her, that she could become the virgin mother of Christ by grace: but...

§ 1. ...when a comparison is made, she is naturally the mother of Christ. However, as was held in the preceding distinction, it does not belong to the mother to be convertible to the

species, and formative of the members of the conceptus: but her operations are toward the improvement of the complexion from the matter, and disposing powers from the complexion of the matrix and nourishment. Nor do I presume to say this, that she herself severed the blood to be formed into the body of Christ: because the authority of Damascene had above says that the Holy Spirit made that separation. But this is true, that the merit of her faith disposed in her to this, that this should be done in her: and this is what Blessed Bernard says in Book V On Consideration in these words: "Whether the two (namely soul, and flesh) are conjoined or separated, nevertheless the personal unity persevered in the three. Just as one Christ, and one person, Word, soul and flesh, endured even when the man was dead. In the womb of the Virgin (as I perceive it) this commingling and fermentation was made: and it was the woman herself who mingled, and fermented. For I might not undeservedly call the faith of Mary the ferment. Plainly blessed is she who believed, since the things spoken to her by the Lord were perfected in her. But they would not be perfected if the whole had not been fermented according to the word of God, and perpetually fermented, preserving for us as much in death as in life equally one and integral mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus with his deity." According to this authority it is necessary that the Blessed Virgin mingled and fermented, that is, she operated by the merit of faith toward the mingling, that is, toward the union and fermentation and congruity of the matter: because that commingling here is nothing other than the union of three sown elements, that is, of the body, and soul, and deity: and the fermentation of the virginal mass is nothing other than the maturity of congruity.

§ 2. To what is objected concerning the bronze in the statue, it must be said that it is not similar: because the bronze is the whole matter of the statue according to its whole self, and moreover it does not operate by secondary acts toward the figure and vegetation and nourishment of the statue through a power internal to the bronze itself.

§ 3. To that which is objected concerning the solution of certain ones, it must be said that that suspension does not show that anything is from the mother except secondary operations: because the principal one is in the seed of the man: but in the virginal conception it was from the work of the Holy Spirit.

§ 4. To that which is further asked, Whether the Blessed Virgin could be called Christotokos? It must be said, that not absolutely: because, as Damascene and Ambrose say, the fronestarii [i.e., those holding the mindset] of the Jews, like Paul of Samosata, and Nestorius, and Eutyches, and Pelagius invented this to the diminution of the honor of the Blessed Virgin, so that namely only Christ, and not God, was born of the Blessed Virgin: and therefore since (as Jerome says) we ought not to have words and names in common with heretics, this is not to be received absolutely.

§ 5. To what is objected against this, it must be said that to be born does not properly belong to the nature, but to the person or hypostasis per se: therefore the hypostasis God and one perfect man was born, who is the son of the mother and of the heavenly Father according to his two nativities. But that argumentation proceeds as if by the grace of the nature born the mother and the born were so called: and this is not true.

§ 6. To the other it must be said that the consubstantiality of the parent to the born is consequently according to the intellect, and not primarily. For primarily and principally this one generated this one: but because he generated from his own substance, therefore he is consubstantial. Whence since nativity regards the being of the hypostasis and person primarily and principally, but the nature secondarily, she is called the mother of Christ according to the hypostasis, which hypostasis is God and man, and therefore she is the mother of God and man: although she is not consubstantial except as regards the human nature only, because consubstantiality from its own concept only signifies agreement in substance: but nativity is of the person primarily and per se, and of the nature consequently and secondarily.

§ 7. To the other it must be said that she is not to be called Christotokos: because although unction is understood in Christ, nevertheless it does not necessarily posit the unction of deity, but of grace, as when it is said: Touch not my christs[204].

§ 8. To what is further objected, without prejudice it must be said that Christ is son by only one filiation: but he has two nativities: but from the other nativity, namely the earthly one, there is not born in him a new filiation, which determines his hypostasis: however in the parent there is born a new respect [relation] toward him, as can be seen in a similar case: for we do not say that by one filiation Socrates is the son of his father, and by another filiation the son of his mother, but by the same: but nevertheless the respect of the father to the son is one, and the respect of the mother is another. And therefore Christ from the human nativity which he truly has, most truly makes the mother have a respect of relation to him in conformity of earthly substance: but nevertheless he does not have another filiation by which he is son, than that which he has from eternity: for filiation determines the hypostasis, which is only one in Christ: and in one insofar as it is one and according to one, it does not befit there to be two qualities of the same species according to two relations: and therefore by one filiation he is the Son of the Father according to the eternal generation, and by the same filiation he is the Son of the mother according to the temporal generation.

§ 9. But there are found some saying otherwise, against whose opinion it is long to dispute. But what has been said here agrees with the sayings of the Saints.

Articulus 6 — Why Something Born Of Another Is Called A Son, And Something Not; And Why Those Reborn Of Water And The Holy Spirit Are Not Called Sons Of The Water And Of The Holy Spirit

Why is something born of another called a son, and something not? and, Why are those reborn of water and the Holy Spirit not called sons of water and the Holy Spirit?

§ 30. Then it is asked concerning what he says, there, B, § 2: Otherwise is a son born from a man, otherwise a hair, etc. For it is doubted, why it is that something born of something is called a son, and something is not called a son?

§ 31. Also, concerning this it is asked, How is it that some reborn of water and the Holy Spirit are not called sons of water and the Holy Spirit, but rather of God the Father and of his

mother the Church? Mother Church is the congregation of the faithful: and because a mother ministers matter to the fetus, mother Church ought to minister matter in this birth: and this is not true, because neither is grace from her, nor the matter of the body, according to which matter a man is generated.

§ 32. To the first it must be said that it is not called a son unless three things come together in the born, namely matter which is in potency the whole body, and a formative power in that matter, according to which this ought to be severed by an act of the generative power in the parents: and third, that the born is terminated through nature and is reduced to a similar according to species and form to the generator itself. But hairs are not generated thus: but rather from a gross terrestrial smoky nourishment reaching to the skin, hairs are generated: but earthworms from putrefied nourishment in the lower belly, as the Philosopher says: for when the nourishment putrefies, a natural heat exhales which draws with it the natural humidity: which because it is viscous, is outwardly surrounded in the manner of skin, which skin contains the exhaled hot in itself in the extracted humid: which heat since it cannot evaporate, is converted into a spirit, and draws out a sensible soul, and a worm is generated, long or short according to the complexion of the matter: but perhaps the sensible soul is given by the power of the stars: this however is plain, that it has neither the matter nor the formative power of the generation of a man, nor is it terminated in the similar of species and form.

§ 33. To what is further asked, it must be said that the water is not there except as the matter in which a sensible similitude is taken for the signification of the sacrament: through which similitude it causes not from the water, but from the sanctification: and therefore since a mother causes in some way, water cannot be called mother. But the Spirit is well called spiritual father. For a spiritual father is not a father absolutely, but is so called metaphorically, because by his power he gives being according to the spirit, and this is well-being. But the Church is called mother not properly, but by metaphor, because in the womb of her affection she gives birth to us, until Christ be formed in us.

Articulus 7 — Whether Some Can Be Called Sons Of Gehenna

Whether some can be called sons of Gehenna?

§ 38. Then it is asked concerning what he says, there, B, § 3: Sons of Gehenna, not born of it, but prepared for it. For from the fact that something is compared to something after its being, it cannot have the rationale of filiation to it: since therefore no one is compared to Gehenna except ex post facto, which follows being: it seems that they ought not to be called sons of Gehenna.

§ 39. Solution. Son includes in itself three things, namely to be born of the substance of the parent, and to have the discipline of the parents, as the Apostle says, Heb. 12:8: But if you be without discipline, whereof all are made partakers, then are you bastards, and not sons. The third is the right of paternal inheritance. And indeed the sons of Gehenna do not have the first from Gehenna: and this is because nativity follows this alone: therefore they are not born of

204. Mt 6:9.

Gehenna: but in the middle they are prepared for it by Gehennal acts: and the third when they will possess Gehenna, because through acts they will have it by hereditary right.

Articulus 8 — Whether Any Merits Preceded the Incarnation

Whether any merits preceded the Incarnation?

§ 44. Then it is asked concerning what he says, there, B, § 3: It insinuates to us the grace of God, by which man with no preceding merits, etc. For it seems that many merits preceded the Incarnation: because 1. So God says to Abraham, Gen. 15:1: I am thy protector, and thy reward exceeding great: where he promises himself to be incarnated, as the Saints say: but a reward is owed to merit. 2. Moreover, the Saints believed this, and faith is merit: therefore merits preceded. 3. Also, Isa. 26:8: In the way of thy judgments, O Lord, we have patiently waited for thee: but to patiently wait in the way of judgments is a merit of the just: therefore from the merits of the Fathers this is given. 4. Also, Heb. 11:39: And all these being approved by the testimony of faith, received not the promise: God providing some better thing for us: therefore to those approved by the merit of faith this was given from debt, and not from grace. 5. If perhaps it be said that it is not such a good that is owed to merit. On the contrary: Glory is greater than any grace: but someone can merit glory: therefore much more grace: but among the graces ordained to glory, is the grace of redemption accomplished through Christ: therefore it seems that it falls under merit.

§ 45. Solution. The induced reasons are in no way against what is said in the Letter: because in the Letter it is said that that man does not have it from preceding merits, because he was not before he was united to the deity: and before he was, he could not merit.

§ 46. To that which is asked, Whether there was any merit of the Church? It must be said that there is merit of congruity, and there is merit of condignity or of debt: and merit of congruity could precede, by which namely it would be given more congruously than if there were no such merit: but it was not given by the merit of condignity or debt. Whence, Titus 2:11: The grace of God our Savior has appeared to all men. And, below, 3:4-5: When the goodness and humanity of God our Savior appeared, not by the works of justice which we have done, but according to his mercy he saved us. Therefore I well concede that it does not fall under the merit of condignity.

§ 47. And to what is objected against this, it must be said that glory falls under merit, also that which is ordained to glory, although no one can merit the first grace, because otherwise grace would be before the first grace. But the Incarnation is not substantially ordained to glory: because Augustine says that another mode was possible, although none more congruous for healing our misery. Or it can be said that although glory falls under the merit of condignity or debt, it does not however follow that all that falls under the merit of condignity which is ordained to glory: because the first grace, even when another merits the first grace, does not fall under the merit of condignity or debt, but under the merit of congruity. Whence it is clear that that argument does not follow: from which the solution of all the arguments which are induced is clear.

Articulus 9 — Whether Grace Is Natural to Christ

Whether grace is natural to Christ?

§ 48. Then it is asked concerning what he says, there, B, § 3: That grace itself should become in a way natural to that man, etc. On the contrary: No grace is natural, but a gift of God consequent upon nature, and perfecting it in well-being: therefore it is not natural.

§ 49. Solution. Natural is spoken of in three ways, namely what is of natural being in some way, and what cannot relinquish nature, and what is caused by some part of nature per se. And in these three ways grace is said to be natural to Christ. For the grace of union is not a habit of acceptation and gratification in Christ: but it is making one being of the person of the Son of God and of the Son of man: and thus that grace is of being. But the habit of grace in virtues and other graces could not relinquish the subject: and thus it again had the property and similitude of a natural thing, which never relinquishes that in which it is. In the third way grace is also said to be natural: because per se grace is caused by the deity which is, and was the other of the natures in Christ: and in this way the Author understands what he says here.

§ 50. To that therefore which is objected, that grace is of the things consequent upon being, it can be said that this is true in other rational creatures, which are not united to the deity in the principle of their being. Or let it be said, that this is true as to the order of rea-

tion, which is between being and well-being: but it is not necessary that this be according to time.

Articulus 11 — Whether Both Can Be Said, That He Was Conceived Of The Holy Spirit, Born Of The Virgin Mary

Since it is said in the symbol, Who was conceived of the Holy Spirit, born of the Virgin Mary, can both be said [of either]?

Then it is objected concerning what he says: Conceived therefore and born of the Holy Spirit, etc.

For the symbol does not seem to have it so, but thus: Who was conceived of the Holy Spirit, born of the Virgin Mary.

It is asked therefore, Whether both can suitably be attributed to the Holy Spirit?

And it seems that they cannot: because 1. By reason of nativity he is called Son: whence if he is said to be born of the Holy Spirit, he will seem to be the Son of the Holy Spirit.

1. Furthermore, the Holy Spirit did not operate toward nativity just as toward conception: because in conception he converted, separated, formed, distinguished, and united: therefore it ought not to be attributed to him.

Solution. It must be said, that conception is more congruously attributed to him than nativity: yet one can be attributed to him on account of the other. Nor from this does it follow, that he is a son: because to be born of someone operating does not posit filiation to him, but

rather to be born of him substantially. Or, it can be said, that there is a nativity in the womb which is through the information and infusion of the soul, which the Holy Spirit made in conception: of which it is said in Matthew That which is born in her, is of the Holy Spirit: and this is the nativity which is here attributed to the Holy Spirit.

Articulus 2 — Whether The Incarnation Can Be Called A Work Of Charity, And A Work Of Gift, As It Is Called A Work Of The Holy Spirit

Can the Incarnation be called a work of charity, and a work of the gift, just as it is called a work of the Holy Spirit?

Then it is asked concerning what is said there, A, around the middle: the Holy Spirit is charity and the gift of the Father, etc.

Whether it can namely be called a work of charity, and a work of the gift, just as it is called a work of the Holy Spirit?

And it seems that it can: because that on account of which each thing is such, and that more so is such: but the work of the Holy Spirit is called on account of charity, and because it is a gift: therefore it ought more to be called a work of charity and of the gift.

Solution: Nothing prohibits that it be called a work of charity as disposing towards the work: but it is otherwise called a work of the Holy Spirit, namely as of the substance operating, but the work of the Gift is not fittingly said: because the gift does not imply a comparison to the work, but to the giver, and to him to whom it is given. Charity, however, regards the act, as a habit ordering towards the act and inclining: and therefore it is properly called a work of the Holy Spirit, less properly of charity, but it cannot fittingly be called a work of the gift.

Articulus 3 — Whether, When One Is Named, Three Are Necessarily Understood

Whether when one is named, necessarily three are understood?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said: But rather when one is named, three are understood, etc.

For it seems that not: because with the essence understood, the person is not necessarily understood: because many understand the essence, who deny the person: and with one person named, the others are not necessarily understood: for with the Father named, the Holy Spirit is not understood.

Furthermore, it is asked, Whether it is always so, that when one is named, the others are understood? It seems that not: because above it was held, that some knew the Father and the Son, and not the Holy Spirit; therefore it seems that it is not necessarily true, that when one is named, the other three are understood.

Solution: It must be said that when one is named in the act of work, without doubt three are understood: because in the indivisible essence, three are referred to the work.

Furthermore, the properties which are attributed to the persons result in the work: and therefore all are understood together.

To that which is objected against, that with the essence understood by someone, the persons are not necessarily understood, it must be said that the Author does not speak thus, but according to the manner of Scripture which is accustomed to name one thing on account of a special attribute; and yet it implies others: as in John 17:3: That they may know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent. For here the Holy Spirit is not excluded.

To the other [objection], it must be said that it is always thus, when they are referred to some work in themselves: and it is not necessary that it be through the intention of their relations.

Articulus 10 — Whether Human Nature Can Be Said Concretely of the Word, and Whether the Word Was Bodily Filled with Divine Grace

Whether human nature can be said to be concrete with the Word? and, Whether the Word was corporally filled with divine grace?

Then it is asked about what he says, there, B, § 3 at the end: Man... in an ineffable mode is adjoined and connected to the Word of God, etc.

But it seems that it is not concrete: because 1. "Concrete" denominates a subject as an accident: whence it seems, that one of these natures verges into an accident.

1. Furthermore, it is asked about what is said, "corporally filled": because the body is not the proper subject of divine grace: therefore Christ is not corporally filled with divine grace.

Solution. Some have said, that the human nature in Christ verges into an accident: and therefore it does not make a personality in him, nor a person. But I do not dare to say this: nevertheless it will be treated below. But here it must be said, that "concrete" is taken improperly for "united": and thus the objection ceases.

TO THE OTHER it must be said that he is said to be "corporally filled" with respect to the grace of union: for the union is to the body and to the soul. Although therefore the body is not the subject of grace in which there are the habits of virtues, nevertheless the body of Christ united to the deity can be said to be the subject of divine grace: because in him, as the Apostle says, the fullness of deity dwelt corporally.

Others however wished to speak more subtly, and less to the point, saying that there are three dimensions of divine grace: of which one is of the simplicity of God, the grace of which God is in all things, reaching from end to end mightily, and disposing all things sweetly, as if by a protension from the point of the first principle up to the ultimate point of the newest creature, according as God is in all things essentially, presentially, and potentially: and this is the dimension of length by the mode of length through all the grades of beings. But there is a dimension by the mode of width, but more contracted in length, according to which God inhabits the Saints through charity and grace, of which inhabitation it is said: Thy commandment is exceedingly broad. In the third mode he conjoins the prior two in Christ, and adjoins the depth of the solidity of the grace of union in the being of the person: and thus as if by a

threefold dimension he inhabits in Christ, by a twofold in the Saints, and by a single dimension in all things.

Others expound, that "corporally" is said here figuratively: because a shadow is only from the object of some body which stands before the light: whence the Fathers were in the shadow of this grace: but the body of the truth of grace is Christ: but the subsequent redemption is the light.

Articulus 12 — Whether It Can Be Granted That the Holy Spirit Begot a Son from the Virgin Mary by Grace

Whether it can be conceded that the Holy Spirit begot a son from the Virgin Mary through grace?

Then it is asked about what he says, there, C, Because through the grace of God and the operation of the Holy Spirit from the flesh of the Virgin, etc.

It is asked, Whether by reason of this grace it could be conceded that the Holy Spirit begot a son from the Virgin Mary?

It seems that it can: because, on that of Matthew God is able of these stones to raise up children to Abraham, the Gloss says: In testimony of this thing God begot a son from Sarah. Since therefore God did not beget from Sarah materially or seminally, but through the effect of grace, it seems that here much more this could be said, where the effect of grace is greater.

Solution. In no way ought it to be conceded that the Holy Spirit begot a son from the Virgin Mary. And that Gloss which is adduced, is improper: and the sense is, begot, that is, caused to be born.

THEN, On that chapter C, at the end: If as if from his operation and power the Virgin conceived, etc.

Take the authority of Hugh of St. Victor, who gives the reason for this in these words: Mary conceived of the Holy Spirit: not that she received the seed of offspring from the substance of the Holy Spirit, but because through the love and operation of the Holy Spirit substance was ministered to the divine offspring from the flesh of the Virgin: for because in her heart the love of the Holy Spirit burned singularly, therefore in her flesh he did miraculously: whose love because it received no companion in the heart, his operation in her flesh had no example.

Articulus 13 — How Generating and Making Differ

How do to beget and to make differ?

But it can be asked, Since we the Savior, etc.

Here begins the part which is divided against all the preceding, where the Master further asks why the Apostle says he was made of the seed of David. And the reason which the Master assigns lies plainly in the Letter, and is good, and solves the question.

But it is asked here, What is the distance between to make and to beget?

TO THIS it must be said that "to make" is taken broadly, and strictly. Broadly, then any work is said to make, and to create, and to form, and all such. Strictly however something is not said to make unless what operates by extrinsic virtue concerning pre-existing matter, as an artisan, and so it is taken here. But to beget is to produce from substance something similar to the begetter in species and form.

Articulus 14 — Whether the Blood of the Blessed Virgin Is Also Coagulated

Whether the blood of the Blessed Virgin was also coagulated?

Then it is asked about that which he says, there, D, For it is one thing to beget by mixed seed and coagulated blood, etc.

For it is doubted, Whether it was thus in the Blessed Virgin?

It must be said, that in the generation of another little child (as some say) three things concur, namely the seed of the father which is a coagulant in milk, the seed of the mother which is more obedient, and the more unible blood of the mother into nourishment and augmentation: but in the Blessed Virgin there was only one, which is the blood separated and purified by the virtue of the Holy Spirit, as was had above in the authority of Damascene.

DISTINCTIO V

Divisio Textus

Furthermore it is necessary to inquire, etc.

Here begins the third and ultimate part of this question in which it is treated of the union of the assuming and the assumed in hypostasis and person.

But it is divided into two parts: in the first of which it is treated of the union made in hypostasis. But in the second objections are made against what was determined, there, E, Here by some it is objected, that the person, etc.

Yet the prior is divided into two parts: in the first of which it is determined, that a person assumed a nature, and that a nature assumed a nature. But in the second it is further asked, Whether this ought to be conceded, the nature was made flesh?, there C, But it is asked, Whether the same divine nature ought, etc.

The first of these is yet subdivided into two: in the first of which he proves, that a nature did not assume a person, nor a person a person, but a person assumed a nature. In the second, he moves the question, Whether a nature assumed a nature? there, A, § 2: By these and many other authorities, etc.

In the first paragraph of the first chapter he first touches the question of four problems, namely whether a nature assumed a person, or a person a person, or a person a nature, or a

nature a nature? and he determines three of those problems, namely that a nature did not assume a person, nor a person a person, but a person assumed a nature.

Articulus 1 — Whether to Assume Is the Same as to Unite in the Incarnation of the Son of God

Whether to assume is the same as to unite in the incarnation of the Son of God?

Here a question falls before the Letter of a fourfold member: of which the first is, Whether to assume is the same as to unite in the incarnation of the Son of God? Second, Whether the divine nature, with personality abstracted, is assuming or uniting to itself, or can be. Third, Whether a divine person can assume or unite anything to itself? Fourth, Whether assumption primarily belongs to the nature or to the person?

To the first of these it is proceeded thus: Something is assumed in manifold ways: for assistance, as a wife in the generation of a son: for nature, as a seed assumes to itself by attracting whence it takes increase, and unites that to itself: and also assumption into friendship and society. And in all those modes there is always diversity of the assumed and the assuming. Therefore it seems, that since the uniting is the united, that this is the difference which almost all make, that the united is the uniting, but the assumed is not the assuming: and this difference between to assume and to unite is attributed to Boethius, although in his books it is not found, as far as I know.

If perchance it be said, that it is not true, that the uniting is the united. ON THE CONTRARY: The united makes one with that to which it is united, because otherwise it would not be united: therefore the united after union is one with that to which it is united: but the united is unible: therefore this is true, The uniting is the united.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Assumption is the same as a taking to oneself. But when I say "to oneself": either it is understood that it is united, or it is understood

that it is next to something else rather than that it constitutes one. If in the first mode, then the assumption will be of the same thing of which the union is in the incarnation. If in the second mode, then the nature seems to be assumed to something else than to union, which again is false.

1. If perchance it be said, that these two, namely to assume and to unite follow each other according to nature: for something is first assumed before it is united: and this is clear: because nothing is united, unless first assumed that on account of this it may be united. ON THE CONTRARY: In the incarnation all things were made at once, namely separation, conversion, union in person: therefore one cannot posit one before another, and thus what is said is nothing.

Solution. It must be said that to assume and to unite, and assumption and union, differ in reality and in reason in the incarnation.

And their difference is in four things, of which the first is according to name: because assumption is only of what is diverse in substance, and reason, or in number: for it is not said, "I assume me wearing a cope": but, "I assume a cope, or a garment, or I assume a companion, or a friend." But union according to its name states one either in subject or in identity, just as we say white is one or united to Socrates, if Socrates is white, and we say it to be the same to him.

The second difference is in the act of assumption, or union: since not everything which is assumed, is made near or next to: but everything which is united, is made one.

The third difference is in the assumed and the united: since the nature was properly assumed: and since the human nature always remains under properties which belong to no other nature, distinct, it is not properly united except perhaps in another which is the hypostasis: but the hypostasis is the united in itself: and thus union immediately respects the hypostasis, but assumption per se respects the nature.

The fourth difference is taken by reason of order between the two acts, namely to assume, and to unite: because according to reason it is prior to assume, than to unite the assumed. Thus therefore we concede the difference which is commonly assigned, that what is diverse is assumed, and what is the same in person is united.

TO THAT however which is objected to the contrary, that the nature is not assumed here except unto union, it must be said that if force is placed in this that he says "unto union," so that it be understood to be united in itself and per se, it is false, because the assumed remains in itself and per se distinct: because human nature is not divine nature, nor a divine person, nor is it a man. But if it is understood broadly "unto union," that is, to union as to an end, and it is united in another although not in itself, then it is true that the assumption of the nature is unto the union of the hypostasis whose that nature is.

To the other it must be said that although there is not a consequence according to time between to assume and to unite, nevertheless they follow each other by a necessary order of the assumed and united reality: and that consequence suffices to demonstrate the difference of assumption, and union. For assumption states an attraction from another to oneself: whence assumption according to its perfect reason or terminus a quo, is saved in that act by which the Holy Spirit separated from the rest of the blood of the glorious Virgin what would yield into matter for the body of Christ: nevertheless in that act the reason of union is in no way saved.

Articulus 2 — Whether, with Personality Abstracted, the Divine Nature Can Unite Something to Itself

Whether with personality abstracted, the divine nature could unite anything to itself?

Secondly it is asked, Whether with personality abstracted, the divine nature could unite, or assume anything to itself?

But it seems that it could. 1. Nature states something unible to another, in that every nature of something is a nature in that in which it is: but a person does not state what is unible to

another, but rather a perfect being in itself: therefore nature seems more to agree to another, and to unite another to itself than person.

1. Also, it belongs to nature to work the incarnation, as the Saints say: therefore it also belongs to it to unite itself to the worked and made.
2. Furthermore, let it be understood through an impossibility that persons do not exist, just as Jews and Pagans understand God, God will still be omnipotent: therefore by reason of omnipotence it will still befit him to unite himself. If perchance it be said that union is not a work of omnipotence. ON THE CONTRARY: the Angel proves that what he says to the Blessed Virgin can be done, because no word shall be impossible with God: therefore this will be proper to omnipotence: and thus it follows since omnipotence is not abstracted from nature, even with the persons posited not to exist, that it still befits him to be incarnated.
3. Furthermore, it still befits him to love his workmanship: therefore he will still be moved by love to the redemption of man: therefore he will still be incarnated. He will still predetermine the number of the elect, and still understand that it is fitting that that number ought to be fulfilled: and that he who sinned through another, will be able to satisfy through another, and suchlike. Since therefore these causes are assigned by the Saints, why the Son was incarnated, and all are saved even when persons are not understood, it seems that with persons circumscribed, it still befits the nature to be incarnated.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Nature is considered triply, as Damascene says, either in bare contemplation, and thus it is in the soul only, or in potency, or in species, or in an atom. But in a universal species it is in all its atoms. If therefore separation from the atom is separation from the person, and conversely, it seems that nature according to reality is not outside the person: but it never befits it to assume unless where it is according to reality: therefore it never befits it to assume except in a person: therefore it will assume nothing with personality circumscribed.

1. Also, nature as considered in itself, does not act, nor suffer: because actions and passions belong to perfect singulars: but to assume requires to act: therefore it will not assume according as it is abstracted from persons.
2. Also, to assume is after the perfect being of the assuming: because no one assumes anything to himself, unless after he is completed: since therefore nature states something incomplete which is completed in a suppositum or reality of nature, nature cannot assume.
3. Furthermore, nothing assumes anything to itself except through the mode through which it is: but nature is never except in a reality of nature: but this in divine things is a person: therefore then it does not assume except in a person.

Solution. It must be said that it is one thing to circumscribe every personality from the nature, and another to circumscribe this personality which faith determines, namely of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. For if in the first mode a circumscription of personality is made in the divine nature, it will be in the intellect only, and will act or assume nothing, and will be understood by the mode of something ordinable into another in which it may be according to being, because it will be understood as ordinable to a person: and thus proceed all the objections adduced to this, that a nature abstracted from persons cannot assume. But if an abstraction is made from the personality which faith determines in divine things, then there still remains according to the intellect God, a being one in himself of rational nature, and discrete by his attributes from all others: and thus he will remain in the reason of a person, although he will not remain in the reason of this person or

of that one: and to him it belongs to assume, or to operate, and to unite to himself from his omnipotence whatever he wills. But it is true, that thus the order of redemption will not be fitting. And the reason for this is: because with the personality which faith distinguishes in divine things abstracted, the distinction of persons would not remain, although one person would remain according to a perfect and one substance, and there cannot be many such persons in divine things: because with many such persons posited, it would follow that there are many gods, which is not true. And therefore since to redemption a personal distinction between the sender and the sent is required, and between the one satisfying and the one to whom satisfaction is made, such fitnesses cannot then be saved: because the sender and the sent would be personally the same, and the one satisfying and the one to whom satisfaction is exhibited. Whence it must be said, that with the personality of faith circumscribed, the potency of incarnating is still saved in God, but not the fitness.

TO THE FIRST therefore it must be said, that nature is said as something unible to another which is its own reality just as the individual of its own nature: but it does not state what is unible to another nature or person of another nature.

To the other it must be said, that it does not belong to nature to operate unless a person is assumed, although it does not behoove to suppose it in this or that distinct person, as faith supposes.

To the other it must be said, that with these persons not understood, the reason of personality still remains in God: but it is true that it is not the same reason of personality: because it would not be distinguished by relations from a reality of the same nature, but it would be distinguished by attributes from realities of other natures: and therefore it is no wonder if he remains omnipotent.

To the other it must be said, that he will love and command: because he is supposed as a person subsisting in himself perfect, and indistinct from others: but nevertheless because only one is then posited, the fitness of incarnation and redemption will perish.

Articulus 3 — Whether to Assume Befits a Divine Person

Whether to assume belongs to a divine person?

Thirdly it is asked, Whether to assume belongs to a divine person?

It seems that not: because 1. Person states something distinct and incommunicable: but in assumption union to another and communication is stated: therefore the intellect of person is contrary to assumption and union.

1. Also, every union which nature makes is to this that the united may stand in one, so that it is not further united to another, just as it unites elements in humours, and humours in complexion, and complexion in similar members, similar ones in dissimilar ones, and dissimilar ones in the composition of a physical organic body, and the organic body with the soul having a diversity of powers, and there it stands: therefore this is the ultimate which is repugnant to unibility: since therefore this is the individual of nature or person: person according to the reason of person is not unible to another: since therefore in divine persons the reason of person is truest, it seems that it is not unible according to the intellect of person.
2. Also, Boethius says, that person is an individual substance of a rational nature: therefore since an individual is divided from others, it follows that by its intellect it posits separation from others: since therefore separation is contrary to union, which is to another, person according to its intellect is repugnant to unibility. And this is against all Saints and Doctors, saying that a person can assume more than a nature.
3. If perchance it should be said, that these reasons prove, that congruently the union of a person ought not to be made as far as it is on the part of the assuming, but nevertheless God can...

to do this out of His omnipotence: this is saying nothing, because many Saints assign reasons why it is more fitting that the assuming subject be a person rather than a nature.

§ 2. 5. Furthermore, according to this, God could do something contrary to the formal character of His person: and this would not be expedient for Him, because in this way He could do something against Himself. For Anselm says that he who is able to do what does not profit him and is not expedient for him, the more he is able to do it, the more adversity and perversity have power over him.

§ 3. 6. If on account of this it is said that these arguments would proceed well if the person, on the part of its personality, were to lose its incommunicability through the union: but this is not the case, and therefore they remain incommunicable just as before. On the contrary: Every union or unibility implies a communication or communicability: but the union is only in the person, as the Saints say: therefore communion and communicability are in the person, and thus what is said amounts to nothing.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 4. 1. The union is for the sake of redemption: therefore the union will be through that mode which is most fitting for redemption: but it is fitting for redemption that the one making satisfaction be the same in person as the one owing the debt, and not [the same] in nature: therefore the union ought most fittingly to be made in the person.

§ 5. 2. Also, Augustine says: He who is sent is from another: therefore he who is sent into the flesh is from another: but nothing is from another except a person: therefore the incarnation properly belongs to the person.

§ 6. Solution: We say with the holy Fathers that the person is unible on the part of the one assuming.

§ 7. To the objection raised to the contrary, it must be said that this is true, because singularity and incommunicability belong to the concept of a person: but not every singularity nor every incommunicability, but the singularity that is contrary to being in many things, and the incommunicability that is contrary to a unibility for the sake of constituting a third thing. And in this way the divine person did not lose its singularity: because it still remained one singular person, not predicable of many things in which it might be, nor changed into any third thing; but rather, it assumed the assumed [nature] into its own incommunicability and eternal personality, so that the same subject would be God and man in person, and a quaternity in the divine [persons] would not be constituted in the number of hypostases (which would happen if the hypostasis of each nature had its own proper personality, or if a new one were made in the Trinity when the eternal hypostasis together with the hypostasis of man constituted a third person).

§ 8. To the next it must be said that this is true, that a nature in all united things intends one ultimate thing, not unible to another to constitute a third thing, just as was done in all things which it unites to the person: but it does not intend that nothing be united to it into its own singularity and personality: for otherwise He would not assume drink, and food, and the like. Hence it is clear that it is not contrary to personality that something be united to it into its own personality.

§ 9. To the next it must be said that when one says "individual substance," the word individual signifies a separation from others which is contrary to union and to the communicability of potency to act, and vice versa: because such communicability is for the sake of constituting a third thing. But it is not contrary to the union of something into the same singularity of the person, as was established earlier.

§ 10. To the next it must be said that the union is posited by the Saints to have been made in the person: but not such a union as would be contrary to singularity, or would induce a new personality.

§ 11. To the next it must be said that God could do something contrary to the formal character of His person if the union were made in such a way that personality was destroyed: but it is not done in this way, as is clear from what has been said.

§ 12. To the objection that every union implies communicability, it must be said that this is false if one insists on the strict sense of communicability. For something is said to be communicable properly in two ways, but improperly in a third way. For it is called communicable when communicated by way of matter to constitute another thing, just as the body is communicable to the soul: and this communicable thing is communicable as a part. In a second way, it is called communicable of many things as far as it is in itself, in which it is or

can be, such as a common nature. And those two are contrary to personality or singularity. In a third way, it is called communicable as unible, by grace of which a communion is made to the properties of another: and in this way the hypostasis of God and of man are united and communicate: and this hypostasis is that one: and whatever belongs to the one by grace of the hypostasis, belongs also to the other. Hence we say that this God is this man, and this man created the stars and was from eternity, and this God was born of the Virgin and suffered under Pontius Pilate.

Articulus 4 — Whether Assumption Primarily Befits the Person or the Nature

Does the assumption belong first to the person or to the nature?

§ 14. Fourthly, it is asked to what it belongs first: namely, to the person or to the nature?

§ 15. It seems, however, that it belongs to the nature: because 1. To whatever creation belongs by grace [of it], recreation belongs by grace of the same: but creation belongs by grace of the nature; therefore recreation does too. If it is said that the first proposition is false, it is proved by a similarity from earlier points, where Augustine said that because He had created in wisdom, it was fitting that redemption be made in wisdom.

§ 16. 2. Also, the Incarnation is a work of the three persons in common, as was established in the previous distinction: therefore it seems that the assumption also belongs to the nature first: because whatever is common to the three belongs to them by grace of the nature.

§ 17. 3. Also, Damascene says that the whole divine nature assumed human nature in one of its hypostases: therefore this belongs first to the nature.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 18. 1. Whatever belongs to any person by grace of the nature, belongs in common to all the persons: therefore if the Incarnation belongs to a person by grace of the nature, it belongs to all the persons, which is false: therefore it does not belong by grace of the nature.

§ 19. 2. Furthermore, all the fitting reasons of the Saints are assigned according to the proper or appropriated attributes of the person: therefore it seems that the work of the Incarnation belongs first to the person rather than to the nature.

§ 20. 3. Also, something belongs first to that to which it belongs in itself and per se: but the Incarnation does not belong to the nature in itself and per se, but to the person, as was proved from earlier points: therefore it belongs to the nature secondarily, and to the person first.

§ 21. 4. Also, a union more properly touches that which is effected than that which is not effected: but nature is not effected as one with nature, but rather hypostasis with hypostasis: therefore it seems that the union, according to the order of understanding, belongs first to the person rather than to the nature.

§ 22. But on the contrary: In whatever things there is absolute real indifference, whatever belongs to one belongs to the other, and equally first if they are absolutely indifferent and identical in reality: but the divine nature and the person are absolutely indifferent in reality: therefore if it belongs to one to be incarnate, it equally belongs first to the other.

§ 23. Solution: It must be said that, according to the order of understanding, to be incarnated belongs first to the person rather than to the nature. Nor does it belong to the nature in that it is a nature, but rather to the nature according as it is in this person, which posits a fittingness—from His relation by which He is the Son—for the mission into the flesh. For otherwise it would be either impossible or difficult to resolve why the Father and the Holy Spirit did not assume flesh. And therefore we said above that the Incarnation, by the fact that it is a mission into the flesh, includes within itself the relation of the Son, through which the Father and the Holy Spirit are excluded from the Incarnation. Nor do we mean "first" in time here, or from the fact that the nature in reality is prior to the person or simpler; but because it is so in the mode of attributing: and the order of understanding is informed by that mode of attributing. For the attributes of nature are in the divine [persons], although they do not differ in reality: and therefore the order of understanding, thus informed, says that it belongs first to the person rather than to the essence or nature.

§ 24. To the first, therefore, it must be said that to create does not imply a mission in the way that to recreate implies a mission: and therefore what is here of the work is common, because this does not import a mission: but the union includes a relation within itself, and therefore it cannot be common. But when Augustine says that He created in wisdom, the proper [attribute] of the Son is attended to in both cases in His appropriated [attribute], which is wisdom: but creation does not import this appropriated [attribute] according to the meaning of the name.

§ 25. To the next it must be said that the operating work, which is the action itself, and the operated work, which is the composite of body and soul, are common: but the Incarnation does not signify this, but rather the assumption of flesh into Himself, and that is not common on account of the included relation of the Son Himself.

§ 26. To the next it must be said that the authority of Damascene rather supports the opposite: because he says that He assumed in the person, as if to signify from the mode of speaking that this belongs to Him by grace of this person, not by grace of Himself.

§ 27. To the last it must be said that although there is no real difference between the essence and the person, nevertheless they differ in the mode of attributing to them those things which belong to nature in the divine [persons]: because the essence is communicable, the person incommunicable: the essence is not generated, the person is most truly generated: for the essence is not distinguished, whereas the persons of the nature are most truly distinguished, and the essence is not generated in such things: therefore something can belong first to the person, such as the Incarnation on account of the included relation, and secondarily to the essence, both on account of the fact that it is not separated from the person, nor is it distinguished from it.

Articulus 5 — Whether the Assumed Nature Is According to Every Mode of Nature, Which Is Fourfold

Is the assumed nature according to every mode of nature, which is fourfold?

§ 29. Next, it is asked concerning those things which are said in the text, and first concerning what he says there, A, § 1: "Therefore He, God, received the form of a servant, that is, the nature of a servant, into His person."

§ 30. For it is asked here: According to which formal character of nature is the nature said to be assumed?

§ 31. For Boethius posits four definitions of nature, of which the first is this: "Nature is of those things which are, since in whatever way they can be grasped by the intellect." He says "in whatever way" on account of God, who by His excellence is not perfectly grasped by the intellect, and on account of the mixed privation in matter, which he also posits as an example, and of these there are also time and motion according to Avicenna. According to this mode, nature is indeed whatever exists: but nature is not taken in this mode when "assumed nature" is spoken of: because if He had assumed only a body in this mode, He would have assumed a nature.

§ 32. The second definition: "Nature is either what can act or indeed be acted upon:" and this belongs to all substances to which it is proper to act and to be acted upon, and such are both corporal and spiritual substances: and if He had assumed a nature in this sense, again the assumption of a body alone or of a soul alone would suffice for the assumption of our nature.

§ 33. The third definition is: "Nature is the principle of motion per se and not per accidens:" for this belongs only to corporal substances. But Christ had not taken merely a body: therefore He did not receive it in this sense of nature.

§ 34. The fourth is: "Nature is the specific difference informing each thing, or the common difference:" if therefore He had taken human nature according to this acceptation, it seems that He would have taken it in all men, which is contrary to Damascene, who says that He did not take the nature considered as a species, but in an atom [i.e., an individual].

§ 35. If you say that He took the difference according as it is in this [individual] constituting its being. Against this is still: because although the difference makes the formal being, it nevertheless does not make the whole natural being. But Christ also took our matter: therefore it seems that He took our nature understood in no mode at all.

§ 36. If perhaps it is said that our nature is a form, then it follows that He would not have assumed a body: because the same Philosopher says that the body is not a form, but matter: therefore He did not take it in this mode either.

§ 37. If perhaps it is said that nature is taken for the conjunction of the two significations of nature, namely of form and of matter, just as the Master [Lombard] said above, that by the name of nature the body and soul are understood, and these conjoined, as the Master said. Against this is that the composite is rather called a thing of nature by the Saints and Philosophers according to nature or the natural.

§ 38. Furthermore, it is asked concerning this: Whether it must be conceded that He assumed our natural, or what is according to nature. Now the natural is that which follows

upon nature in the composite. If therefore He did not assume the antecedent according to the intellect, it seems that neither did He assume the consequent.

§ 39. Further it is asked: Whether it must be conceded that the Son assumed our essence?

§ 40. It seems that He did: because our essence is body and soul: and He assumed those: therefore He assumed our essence. But on the contrary: Essence is that from which being comes: but every composite exists: therefore, since the composite is this or that singular thing, and He did not assume a singular thing, as will be proved below: it seems that He did not assume our being: therefore neither our essence, as it seems.

§ 41. Furthermore it was asked: Whether He assumed our humanity?

§ 42. It seems that He did: because humanity is what makes a true man: therefore, since Christ is a true man, and this is from the assumption of human nature: it seems that He Himself assumed our humanity. But on the contrary: Humanity is only in this man or that man: but He assumed neither this man nor that man: therefore He did not assume humanity.

§ 43. Solution: It must be said without prejudice that Christ received our nature according to every definition which Boethius posits.

§ 44. For if nature is said to be of those things which in whatever way can be grasped by the intellect, then just as He assumed every reality of our nature: because [He assumed] both substance and natural accidents, such as sleep and penal liability. Nor is the argument valid which is objected to the contrary: because Christ is not merely said to have assumed our nature, but also the whole of it.

§ 45. If however nature is said to be what can act and suffer, again He received it: and although He might have received something of our nature, namely flesh only, or soul only: yet when one says the nature of man, it is something else than nature said absolutely: because the nature of man is the whole nature of man. And through this the solution to what is objected to the contrary is clear.

§ 46. Similarly if nature is taken in the third way insofar as it is the principle of motion and rest per se and not per accidens, in this mode again He received it: because it is as the principle of natural motions and operations.

§ 47. If it is taken in the fourth way, Boethius says that both Catholics and Nestorius say there are two natures in Christ.

§ 48. But difference is taken badly and contrary to intention for the universal and specific difference in common: rather it must be taken for the difference in this particular, and then a distinction must be made: since just as it is in generation that a certain thing is generated per se, and a certain thing as a consequent, and as a consequent it follows from the generation, just as "this" is generated by "this" per se: but because "this" is a supposit of man, it follows from the generation of this that this is a man, and further that this has humanity, and that it is an animal capable of discipline, and the like. So I say concerning the assumption, that what is assumed properly and per se is human nature accepted materially, that is, in the parts which are material to the form of the whole, that is, to the being of a man in Him. But because that

assumed thing is united by assuming, it follows the assumption as a consequent that there is a specific difference in that assumed thing, that is, had through the assumption; and in this way it can be conceded that nature in that mode is not only in Christ, but also assumed: just as I say that not only "this" but also "man" is generated, when "this" is generated: because it stands as a necessary consequent to the generation of this, and is in this.

§ 49. To the question concerning the division of the Philosopher, it must be said that although matter is a nature, and form is a nature: nevertheless neither of them is the whole nature of man. Nor can it be said that the body, which is the matter of man, is the human nature: nor can it even be said that the soul, which is the form of the body, is the human nature: because when one says "human nature," the whole is understood: and therefore body and soul, as the Master said above, are understood by human nature: and therefore both significations are conjoined in the concept of human nature which Christ assumed, which is proved thus: Christ is true man in the nature which He assumed: but He is not true man only in body, or only in soul: therefore both are comprehended by the concept of human nature.

§ 50. To the question concerning nature and natural, it must be said that "according to nature" is said in many ways, and similarly "natural."

§ 51. For it is said to be according to nature what belongs according to some principle of nature, and what belongs through a natural potency: and thus according to the nature of man is to be rational, and according to the nature of man is to understand. And it is also said to be according to nature what is according to the way which leads into nature, just as what is through generation or according to generation. And Christ assumed all these things, which are thus according to nature, in the mode which we stated above, that to assume, taken broadly, is said of the assumed thing and of that which follows the assumed thing insofar as it is in human nature.

§ 52. Now, natural is said either from the first nature, or from corrupted nature. And if natural is said from the first nature, that is, according to the first institution, then He assumed all natural things: because immortality was not among the natural things, but among the gratuitous things, as Augustine says. But if natural is said from corrupted nature, then He did not assume all things natural to us: because it is natural to us that we are born children of wrath: and He Himself did not assume this, but only assumed the penalty following from the fault, although it was not a consequent in Him from fault: which nevertheless would not have been either in Him or in another unless a fault had preceded. In this way the penal liability natural to us is said to be assumed by Him, and not contracted.

§ 53. 2. To what is further asked: Did He assume our essence?

§ 54. It must be said that essence can be taken from that which is in our nature, or [it can be taken as] our nature: and thus by taking our nature, He took the essence. But if essence is taken for that by which formally the being of a man is insofar as he is a man: then it seems it must be said that the essence is a consequent of the assumption just as the man is, and it will not be called assumed as pre-existing before the assumption, but as a consequent assumed thing, as we said earlier.

§ 55. 3. To what is asked concerning humanity, it must be said that the Master said above that by the name of humanity the body and soul are taken, and it is well conceded that this humanity is assumed principally and first. But if by the name of humanity the form of man insofar as he is man is understood, it will not be assumed except in the mode by which the whole is said to be assumed, which is had in the assumed thing. For because by assuming He united the body and soul, it follows that that which is assumed is as a consequent a man, and the man is having humanity; humanity follows as a consequent in the assumed thing: and otherwise I do not see that it should be conceded.

Articulus 6 — Whether the Whole Trinity Effected the Assumption of Human Nature

Did the whole Trinity operate the taking up of human nature?

§ 57. Next it is asked concerning what he says there, A, § 2: "Since the whole Trinity operated the formation of the taken up man," etc.

§ 58. The Master will deny this below.

§ 59. Solution: It must be said following those commonly glossing this phrase, "of the taken up man," that is, of human nature. Or it can be said following the aforementioned points, that although a man was not taken up, nevertheless that which is taken up attains the being of a man because by taking it up He unites the body and soul and forms and perfects them: and thus although not first, nevertheless consequently a man is had through the taking up by the Son of God, and He Himself is that man, because the union was made in the hypostasis.

Articulus 7 — What Is Understood by the Form of God

What is understood by the form of God?

§ 61. Next it is asked concerning what Augustine says there, A, § 2: "When," he says, "you hear concerning Christ in what form of God He was," etc.

§ 62. For he calls both the human nature and the divine nature a form. And the reason for this is asked.

§ 63. 1. For Boethius says in the book De Trinitate: "A form which is without matter cannot be a subject, nor truly be in matter: for then it would not be a form, but an image. For from those forms which are outside matter, those forms came which are in matter and affect the body: for the rest which are in bodies we abuse by calling them forms while they are images: for they are likened to those forms which are not constituted in matter." From this it is gathered that the divine nature which is not in matter, nor is the subject of anything, can be called a form: but the human nature only abusively.

§ 64. 2. Furthermore, human nature is said in this book by the Master to be the body and soul: but the body and soul are neither a form in matter, nor outside matter: therefore it seems that it ought not to be called a form.

§ 65. Solution: Some have said that human nature in Christ is called a form, as it were foris manens [remaining outside]. But whatever the case may be regarding this, the divine nature

cannot be called a form in this way. Hence, since Augustine seems to accept the name of form in one way in both instances, it must be said that the acts of form are many, but the principal one is to make the proper being of that form. Hence since Christ most truly possesses the being of God, He is said to remain in the form of God: and since He most truly possesses the being of man, He is said to remain in the form of man.

§ 66. To the objection concerning Boethius, it must be said that he speaks there of forms according as they descend from the givers of forms, which are the Intelligences according to the Philosophers, and especially from the First Intelligence. Hence those forms, speaking theologically, are Ideas, the images of which are the forms that are in matter. Human nature in Christ, however, is not called a form in this way, but from the act of form, which is to give true being according to nature: and this being each nature gave in Christ: hence we truly say that He Himself is man, and that He Himself is God.

Articulus 8 — Why He Says, the Trinity Made Only the Word Flesh

Why does he say, "The Trinity made the Word alone flesh"?

§ 68. Next it is asked concerning what Augustine says there, A, § 2, towards the end: "By the fact that the Trinity made the Word alone flesh."

§ 69. For flesh means a part of man, or even a part of a part: since therefore that man is not his flesh, nor together with the Word can he truly be called his flesh.

§ 70. If, however, it is said that the part is put for the whole: then I ask, Why is flesh put there for the whole rather than the soul, or something else?

§ 71. Solution: It must be said that the part is put for the whole: but he specifically posited this part for two reasons, one of which is to exclude an error. For certain heretics said that God was not unible to flesh on account of the passibility of the flesh. Therefore, so that the Evangelist might show this to be erroneous, he did not posit the more noble part, but the more defectible one. Another reason is so that we might know that He assumed the defects of our penalties which were fitting for Him: because our greatest defect with respect to mortality, and penalty, and pain, is in the flesh.

Articulus 9 — What the Truth of Human Nature Is

What is the truth of human nature?

§ 73. Next it is asked concerning what he says there, A, § 2, near the end: "In whom thus the immutable truth of the divine and human remains," etc.

§ 74. For there can be a doubt as to what that truth is.

§ 75. Solution: It must be said briefly to this that the truth of human nature is that of which it can truly be said, "This is the nature of man," or an essential part of the nature: and similarly the truth of the divine nature is that of which it can be said that "this is the divine nature." Hence it is clear that sin is not of the truth of human nature. Since this is neither a nature, nor a part of a nature, but beside nature and against nature and corrupting the good of nature,

which is mode, species, and order; and therefore Christ did not assume this. Similarly, penal liability is not of the truth of human nature: because without it human nature is true, just as it was in the first state, and just as it will be in glory: and therefore the penalty was assumed with the nature of the second state, not the first, as something conjoined to the nature: and this was fitting on account of the mode of redemption. Penalty is not, however, contrary to truth like sin is: because it is caused from something natural, which is the admixture of fighting and dissoluble contraries.

Articulus 10 — Whether What Was Assumed Was Necessarily a Nature or a Person

Was the assumed thing necessarily a nature, or a person? § 77. "But we [avoiding] the mark of all falsehood and contradiction," etc.[205]

§ 78. Here the question arises concerning this assumed thing: Whether this was necessarily a nature, or a person? And if a nature, whether in some way a man was assumed, and thus this man is assumed or not? And, what inconvenience follows if it is said, "A person is assumed"?

§ 79. To the first we proceed thus: For it seems that a nature was not assumed:

§ 80. 1. For nothing is assumed unless it exists prior to the assumption: but the nature of Christ did not exist prior to the assumption: therefore it is not assumed. The first premise is self-evident. The second is proved from the fact that the Holy Spirit, by separating the nature and making it, formed and animated and united it to the Son, as was held earlier: therefore the nature never existed prior to the assumption.

§ 81. 2. Also, an assumption is made for the sake of uniting to oneself: but the nature was neither united to the Son, nor to the divine nature: therefore it was not assumed. The first premise is clear from what is written in the text: because by the assumption Christ was made one: and therefore assumption is often put in translation in place of union. The second, however, is proved by the fact that everything united is one with that to which it is united: but human nature is neither the son of man, nor the Son of God, nor the divine nature: therefore there is no union in it. Since therefore the assumption is for the sake of union, the nature does not seem to be assumed.

§ 82. 3. Also, whatever things remain in the same separation are at one time no more united than at another: but the divine and human nature always remain in the same separation: therefore at one time they are no more united than at another. Proof of the middle premise: because the first is self-evident. Because from the beginning the divine nature was never the human, nor was the divine person the human nature, nor is it now any more than then; therefore it is certain that there is always the same separation between them: therefore human nature is never assumed or united either to the divine nature or to the divine person.

§ 83. 4. Also, everything united to another or assumed into union acquires the properties of that to which it is united and by which it is assumed: human nature never acquires any property of the divine nature nor of the divine person: therefore it is never united to either,

and is never assumed by either. Proof of the middle premise: For the first is certain. For the properties of the divine nature and of the divine person are to be uncreated, immortal, impassible, and the like: and none of these is participated by human nature.

§ 84. If this is conceded, against this there are very many authorities which the text adduces.

§ 85. 1. The first reason to the contrary is thus: What is neither by assumption nor by union in the Son of God, is in no way in Him: therefore if a single human nature is neither by union nor by assumption in the Son of God: therefore it is in no way in Him: but it is in Him: therefore that which is, by reason of the consequent, will be in Him by union or assumption: but not by union properly speaking, as is clear from what was disputed earlier at the beginning of this distinction: therefore it will be in Him by assumption: therefore human nature is assumed.

§ 86. 2. Also, the assumed [thing] is a thing taken to oneself: now it is certain that human nature is taken to the person, because it is in the person: therefore human nature is assumed.

§ 87. And because everyone says this, the adduced reasons suffice.

§ 88. Solution: It must be said that human nature is the assumed thing properly and per se, and

also united in some way: but it was assumed first and per se, however united in its hypostasis to the divine hypostasis.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that we needed the human nature in natural potentiality even before it was assumed by Christ: but the nature of Christ was not before it was assumed by the Word. Nor is this argument valid, "It was not before it was assumed: therefore it could not be assumed," because although by assuming it made, nevertheless the assumption does not deprive the nature made; just as if I were to draw a garment to myself by making it, I would nonetheless draw it made: for by the fact that both are with the other, namely to make and to assume, one is not destroyed by the other.

By this, the solution to the second is also clear.

To the other, it must be said that this is false, that human nature with God or the Will of God is always of the same separation: because although it was never one in itself with the hypostasis or nature, nevertheless as soon as it was assumed, it was consecrated and joined in a new way to the Son of God, and to the divine nature in one person: and this is the conjunction which can be in the assumption of nature.

To the other, it must be said that it is true that the divine nature does not communicate its properties to the human nature in itself: but this does not suffice for there not to be assumption: for it suffices for the assumption, that the hypostasis of human nature participates in the properties of the Son of God and the divine nature, and conversely the divine hypostasis receives the properties of the human hypostasis, as was said before.

205. Peter Lombard, Sententiae, III, d. 5.

Articulus 11 — Whether Man, or This Man, or Some Man, Was Assumed

Whether man, or this man, or some man, is assumed?

Secondly, it is asked, Whether man, or this man, or some man, is assumed?

It seems, however, that this man is assumed. 1. For it is conceded that Christ assumed body and soul: therefore, either he assumed them united, or not united. If not united: then there will be two assumptions, one of the body, the other of the soul.

1. Furthermore, it is written above in the Letter, that he assumed these united: but the mode of union of nature is like potency and act: therefore they make one complete in the genus of men; but nothing is complete in the genus of men, unless it is this something, and this man: therefore the Son of God assumed this man or some man.
2. Furthermore, why is this not conceded, He assumed this man? If because it would be necessary for this man to have pre-existed before the assumption, which is not true: therefore it should not be conceded that he assumed human nature either: because the human nature which was assumed by the Word did not pre-exist before the assumption. But this is conceded. Therefore that should also be conceded.
3. Likewise, the conjunction of all things conjoinable by nature constitutes some one thing: but body and soul are conjoinable: therefore the conjunction of these will constitute some one thing which is from both: but Christ assumed them conjoined: therefore the conjunc-
   tion of these had already constituted some one thing before the assumption by the intellect. Therefore it is asked, What is that one thing constituted from body and soul? and it cannot be found except this man: therefore he assumed this man, as it seems.

But if this is conceded, it is proven contrary to many authorities of the Saints in the Letter: and the Master also says, that it is undoubtedly certain, that the person is not assumed: since therefore this man is nothing but a person, this man will not be assumed.

Solution: It must be said that the Son of God neither assumed man, nor this man, as the Master says. But Jesus was never this man except after he assumed the human nature which is in him. Hence he was never this man, nor will he be, nor is he by the proper singularity of man: rather, the assumption is terminated in the singularity not of man, but in the divine person.

To the first, it must be said that this is conceded, Christ assumed body and soul united, in such a way that by assuming he made the body and united it, not that they were before the assumption, or were united: but this union did not make a singular of man as man. For since one is said to be undivided in itself, and divided from others: and this assumption did not first conjoin body and soul into some one thing of the nature of man, which united to the divine nature and divine person in divine personality, it is clear that it never made one from body and soul, as one of human nature in this mode: rather it made simultaneously the conjunction and one of the divine person. Hence since one from body and soul makes this man as

this man, it is clear that such a one was never assumed in Christ: therefore he did not assume this man.

And this solution is notable: because it solves almost all that can be asked about this matter on the part of the assumed.

To the other, it must be said that the reason why it is not conceded has already been stated: namely because the union of body and soul does not make one divided from another before it was assumed or in the assumption itself in which the assumption is terminated: but the assumption indeed makes one nature preserved as human: because it did not lose its properties from the assumption, as it loses that one which is constituted from body and soul.

Moreover, it must be said that this is true in things conjoinable only by nature: but in Christ the conjunction of soul and body by the conjoining was not alone: rather with this there was another union in another, in which the union of the assuming and the assumed was completed: and this is one of the person in whose singularity the assumption was made: nor did any one thing ever pre-exist, nor was it in the assumption itself, nor after from body and soul according to which one is said to be singular divided from another and undivided in itself: and therefore this is simply false, that the Son of God assumed one, or some man, or this: for the reason of man and of one man is the same: hence if he did not assume one man, he also did not assume man.

Articulus 12 — What Inconvenience Would Follow from Christ's Having Assumed a Person

What inconvenience would follow if Christ had assumed a person?

Thirdly, it is asked, What inconvenience follows if Christ had assumed a person?

It seems that none: because 1. Immediately in the conjunction of the human person to the divine, the human personality would be destroyed, and thus there would not be two persons, but one: just as some ancients also said that a person did not assume a person, but consumed it. If therefore it is so, it is not necessary to hold this inconvenience, that it follows there are two persons.

1. Furthermore, a person is an individual substance of a rational nature, as Boethius says: but Christ as man, insofar as he is man, is an individual substance of a rational nature: therefore Christ as man, insofar as he is man, is a person. Similarly, he is a divine person: therefore either a person consumes a person, or there are two persons.
2. Furthermore, let us suppose that Christ lays aside our humanity: that which he lays aside will be composed of a rational soul and a body: therefore it will be a man: and it will also be this man: therefore it will be an individual substance of a rational nature: therefore it will be a person.

Therefore, it is asked, What did confer upon him that personality which God did not have? It seems that nothing: because nothing happened to him except division: but division gave him

nothing, rather it took away: therefore since nothing made personality in him, it seems that he had it, and thus Christ seems to have assumed the personality and person of man.

1. Likewise, let us further suppose that he resumes the man laid aside, either this resumption destroys something of dignity in him, or it does not. If it destroys, then it seems that the union of deity to man harms according to some dignity, which is absurd. If it does not destroy, then it seems that afterwards he is a person as before: and thus there will be two persons: therefore it is not an inconvenience for the Son of God to assume a person.

CONTRA: 1. Whatever two things are, in that they are two, they are not one. Proof. Damascene says that difference is the cause of number: therefore since in that in which things differ, they do not agree, it is clear therefore that whatever two things are, in that they are two, they do not agree, nor are they united. Therefore it is given that Christ is two persons: therefore a person is not united to a person, nor is nature united to nature, because natures remain distinct, as was previously held: therefore there is no union in Christ, which is false: therefore in Christ there are not two persons, but one.

1. Likewise, it was previously held that by forming and joining he united to himself: therefore never did the body and soul have or could have their own singularity. And proper singularity makes a person in a rational nature: therefore he never assumed a person, nor had, nor will have.

Solution: It must be said that in truth many absurdities would follow if Christ had assumed a person, namely that by its own singularity it would have been at some time distinct, and would have consumed some dignity of human nature by its assumption, or that there would be no union in Christ: and therefore it is denied by all, because this was the error of Eutyches. For Nestorius and Eutyches found two errors concerning the incarnation. One, seeing that always to the number of natures follows the number of persons, and seeing that Christ is only one person, said that Christ is also of one nature: and this was Nestorius. The other, however, considering that in Christ there are two natures, and supposing the same with him, said that there are also two persons there. And the error of both arose from the fact that they did not know how to distinguish between person and nature: the distinction, however, will be made clear below.

Therefore it must be said to the first, that this is a great absurdity, that it is posited that Christ destroys something in us that pertains to dignity. Likewise, it is against understanding that, with the singular remaining, singularity is taken away from it: because this cannot be understood: and therefore he did not assume a person. And therefore we say that it is not an opinion, but an error, that Christ assumed or consumed a person. For nothing is consumed except what is: but it has already been proven that that man was never one by his own singularity, nor will he be.

To the other it must be said that Christ as man, insofar as he is man, is not an individual substance of a rational nature, nor is Socrates insofar as he is man, but insofar as he is a

rational mortal animal: but insofar as this man is himself a person. And Christ insofar as this man is a person: but that he is this man, he has from the singularity of the divine person, into whose singularity, as it is held in the Letter, he is assumed.

To the other it must be said that if that position is posited, I well concede that the laid aside will be this man, and a person.

To what is asked, What confers upon him the personality which he did not have before? It must be said, that the singularity which he did not have before or incommunicability, as others say.

But if it is asked again, What confers upon him that singularity? It must be said, that division by accident confers it upon him. And if it is said that division rather takes away than confers. It must be said that it takes away per se, and by accident confers being one and divided from another: and this is singularity. And an example of this is in animals with annulated bodies, in which there is a similar or nearly similar composition of parts in the whole body. For in them there is one sensitive soul, as the Philosopher says: and if it is divided, there will be a soul in each of the parts by sense and motion, and each part will have a singular soul, and this division confers by accident upon the parts, just as something confers by consequence from another through another. Yet in that example I do not define whether they are one or two, because of the word of Augustine: but according to the intention of the Philosopher the example is given, who wishes that there are two souls. And if each part does not recover, he says this is due to the defect of organs necessary for life, such as the organ by which food is taken, and by which it is digested, and from which spirit arises, and the like.

To what is further posited, that he resumes again, not except by uniting to himself, whence since union destroys nothing, etc. I say, that that man will not be assumed, but yet by infinite power he could be assumed, and then by accident personality would be destroyed, just as division was made by accident.

And these positions are vain and according to a merely phantastic understanding.

Articulus 13 — Whether This Should Be Conceded, the Divine Nature Is Incarnate

Whether this is to be conceded, the Divine nature is incarnate?

Then, it is asked concerning this which is said, there, B, around the middle: For we affirm the whole nature or substance of the deity to be united to human nature.

For what is simple does not seem to have parts. What then does it mean when it says, the whole nature of the deity?

Solution: It says, whole, on account of the modes of signifying through attributes, such as wisdom, power, and the like.

Articulus 14 — Whether the Divine Nature Ought to Be Said to Be Made Flesh

Whether the divine nature ought to be said to be made flesh?

It is asked whether the same divine nature ought to be said to be made flesh?

It seems, however, that it should be: because
1. It is conceded by almost all moderns that the divine nature is incarnate: because it assumed in such a way that it was in the flesh itself: therefore it is incarnate. And similarly also the Son of God assumed flesh to be in flesh: therefore he is incarnate.

Further, it follows from this that the Son of God is made flesh, because the Word was made flesh: therefore it seems similarly to follow from the other side, the divine nature is incarnate: therefore it is made flesh.

1. Furthermore, if this is admitted by some, why is this not similarly admitted, the divine nature is born, suffered, and died: just as the Son of God is born, suffered, and died?

For it seems that it follows. For the divine nature is really and not accidentally the Son of God: and the Son of God is not accidentally, but truly and really born, suffered, and died: therefore the divine nature is born, suffered, and died, as it seems; for in the process nowhere does it seem that the assumption of something extraneous or accidental in the predicament intervenes.

Solution I say without prejudice, that I think this should be conceded, the divine nature is incarnate, because this is written by Damascene, and the authority is placed here in the Letter; for it has two senses, and in one it is true, and this suffices for the truth of the proposition. For incarnate says nothing other than the assumption of flesh, in which flesh the one assuming is, whether he assumes to himself in himself, or assumes to himself not by himself, but in his hypostasis in which the nature is full and perfect: and for the other part it is verified of the nature: because he united flesh to himself not in himself, but in the hypostasis and assumed it.

But this seems to me to be denied, the divine nature is made flesh. For since this can have only two senses, in both it is false concerning the nature and the person. These are the two senses. The first, that the making is noted, whose according to the intellect is made, to be placed around the divine, as around its subject: and thus it is false concerning the nature and person: for thus neither is the divine nature made flesh, nor is the Son of God made flesh. The second sense is, that made places its making around another nature which is assumed, so that the sense is, the divine nature is made flesh, that is, flesh is made the divine nature, or it is made that the divine nature is flesh: then it is false concerning the divine nature because of excessive expression, as the Master says, but it is true concerning the person: for the Son is made man, and it is made that the Son of God is flesh or man. There are indeed those who concede it in the second sense: because the divine nature is man who is made: although it should rather be denied because of the expression and because of the simple who would take it in that sense, that the making is placed around it.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that it is not similar concerning the Word and nature: because the Word united the nature to himself and in himself: but the nature united to himself, not in himself, but in the person. But if it is objected that nature is the same as person, it is ridiculous: since this has often been solved in the first book of the Sentences, that they differ greatly in the mode of attributing, although they are the same in reality.

To the other it must be said that although this is conceded by some, the divine nature is made flesh, under one sense: yet it is not conceded that it is born: because nativity is a property of this man according to human nature, and similarly suffered, and died: whence since the natures are discrete and disparate, the divine nature is excluded from such predicates.

To the first objection, it must be said that the extraneous is taken in two ways, namely for the sake of the person, and for the sake of the nature which is in the person. Therefore, when it is said, the divine nature is the Son of God, here it is predicated for the sake of the thing of nature: and when it is said, the Son of God is born, here the predicate, although it is not extraneous to the Son from the side of the person, yet it is contrary for the sake of the nature in which the person in the prior proposition was predicated of the divine nature: and therefore an accident falls in the process of that argumentation.

Articulus 15 — Why the Person Is Repugnant to Unibility

Why does personhood oppose unibility?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says:

Therefore, indeed, he did not assume the person of a man, etc.

The reasoning of the Master is the same as ours above, that never did body and soul make one by their own singularity.

If it is asked, Why does personhood thus oppose unibility?

To this it must be said that personhood, by its own understanding, posits itself as one per se; it also posits per se incommunicability to another: because it is not in the potentiality of another, nor of another as a predicate, as was said above. Similarly, it posits singularity of itself. And these are three things, namely unity, singularity, and incommunicability. And unity is from matter: because the same is one in number and matter, as the Philosopher says. Singularity, however, is from individuating factors. Incommunicability, however, is from the distinction ultimately completing and perfecting. Hence, since that conjunction from body and soul is not one nor was it one per se, nor distinct per se, but united to another in the singularity of another and personal distinction, it is clear that personhood could not be assumed, and that the intellect of personhood expressly opposes assumption.

Articulus 16 — Whether A Soul Separated From The Body Is A Person

Whether the soul separated from the body is a person?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says:

For separated from the body, it is a person, just as an Angel.

For the soul, even when separated, according to its definitive substance is the actuality of an organic physical body having life in potentiality: therefore it seems

that there is an essential dependence of it on the body: therefore it cannot be incommunicable to another incommunicability: therefore the soul is not a person: and this all concede.

However, if we wish to sustain the Master, then it must be said that the soul is said to be separated from the body in two ways, namely separated, that is, divided from the body: and thus it is not true. Or, separated from the body, that is, from the order to the body: and then the Master speaks hypothetically, namely if it is posited to be separated from the dependence which it has on the body: because then it will be a certain intelligence of a nature similar to Angels.

DISTINCTIO VI

Divisio Textus

DIVISION OF THE TEXT,

From the premises, however, emerges the question, etc. Here begins the part in which the Master begins to treat of the things consequent to the union.

Now, the consequents that follow the union are, as the terms of the union itself, such as God being man, and conversely: and man and God being two, or one: and the union having been made in nature, or in supposit, or in person. And the Master treats of these consequents first.

There are also consequents not as terms, but as properties of such a union, such as omniscience, and being the head of the Church, and being fearful with natural fear, and concerning merit, and the like, about which the Master treats later.

It is therefore divided into two parts, of which the first treats of the consequents of the union in the first way: and this contains two distinctions. In the second, it treats of the consequents of the union in the second way: and this begins in distinction VII, there, A, After the aforesaid, it ought to be inquired, etc.

In the first of these, there are two parts: in the first of which it contains this question, Whether it ought to be conceded, Man or this man has been made God, just as conversely it is conceded? and, What is predicated, when it is said, God is man, or made man? And moreover, in the second part, it contains the distinction of three opinions on this question, there, B, For others say in the incarnation of the Word itself, etc.

And this is further divided into three distinct opinions, which are easy to distinguish in the text.

In the second, however, the Master sets forth the responses of these opinions to the question made: and this begins in distinction VII, there, A, According to the first it is said, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether This Should Be Conceded, the Son of God Was Made Man

Is this to be conceded, the Son of God was made man?

However, a doubt arises here concerning the first part of the first distinction regarding that proposition which the Master says is conceded by all, namely, God was made man, or the Son of God was made man, or God is man, or the Son of God is man: because in all of these there is the same reason for doubt.

However, it seems that this is false, God was made man, or the Son of God was made man: which nevertheless the Master says is conceded by all.

1. For everything made is the terminus of some becoming which is posited concerning that which is made, or concerning some part of its nature. Therefore, when it is said, the Son of God was made man, "made" indicates the terminus of some becoming which by the power of the expression is posited concerning the Son of God or God: but no becoming can be posited concerning God or the Son of God: therefore the expression is false.

If it is said that it is not inconvenient that some becoming is noted to be posited concerning the Son of God. On the contrary: Everything that becomes is changed and is imperfect: but God is not changed, nor is He imperfect in any respect: therefore no becoming can be posited concerning Him. Likewise, What becomes is not among the permanent things: therefore if the Son of God becomes, He is not, which is false.

1. Likewise, when it is said, Iron was made a knife, it is noted that iron was the subject of the becoming of the knife, as matter: therefore similarly when I say, the Son of God was made man, it is noted by the power of the expression that the Son of God is subjected to the becoming itself, as matter: and thus it would follow that the Son of God in the man Christ would be material, and man formal, which is absurd: therefore that proposition is false.
2. Likewise, Everything made is the complement of that which is made, and of no other: therefore if the Son of God was made man, "man" will be called by the power of the expression the complement with respect to the Son of God becoming, which is false: therefore that proposition is not to be conceded, as it seems.

Further inquiry is made about this, God is man, which he says is conceded by all opinion.

For it seems to be false: 1. For nothing is predicated univocally of God and creature: but when it is said, Peter is man, John is man, "man" is predicated univocally. Therefore, by this reason, it ought not to be predicated of God: therefore this is false, God is man.

1. Likewise, If something inheres in something, or is predicated of something, and it did not always inhere, it indicates that a change has been made concerning it: God is man, and He was not always man: therefore He has been changed from this that He is man: but this is false, because God is immutable: therefore God is not man.

2. Likewise, When it is said, God is man: either "man" is predicated essentially of "God," or accidentally. If accidentally. On the contrary: Avicenna says, What is in itself a substance, with respect to nothing can it be an accident: therefore from the destruction of the consequent, if it is predicated with respect to something as an accident, in itself it is not a substance, which is false: because man is a substance: therefore it cannot be predicated accidentally. But if it is predicated essentially of God, it necessarily agrees essentially with every suppositum of the subject, just as when it is said, man is animal: because animal is predicated essentially of every suppositum of man: therefore every suppositum of God would be man: but the Father is a suppositum of God: therefore the Father is man. Likewise, the Holy Spirit is a suppositum of God: therefore the Holy Spirit is man, which is false: therefore this is false, God is man, from which that follows, as it seems.
3. Likewise, In Topics four kinds of predicates are distinguished, namely accidental converted, and accidental not converted, substantial converted, and substantial not converted. However, the predication of species and difference are reduced to substantial not converted.

Therefore, it is asked, in which of these predicates is the predicate of this proposition, God is man? If it is said, that in accidental, either in not converted, or in converted. If in the first way, then man ought not to be predicated of God except denominatively or by inherence. But if denomination could be made, then either it could be said that God is not man, but humanized, which is false: or it ought to be said that it inheres in God as an accident, and it ought not to be said man, which again is false. But if it is an accidental converted predicate. On the contrary: That is converted with the subject with a distributive sign: just as man is risible, I can say, every man is risible, and everything risible is man. Therefore, if we say thus, God is man, it will be, Every man is God, which is false: therefore it will not be such a predicate. Furthermore, Boethius says about such a predicate, that it flows from the essential principles of the subject: therefore according to this man flows from the principles as a passion of God, which is most absurd. But if it is substantial: either converted, or not converted. If converted: therefore man will be the definition of God, which is absurd. But if it is not converted, then it will be genus, or difference, or species. But on the contrary: In all such predicates the form of the subject and the form of the predicate posit and say necessary and natural coherence both of inferiors and superiors: but deity which is the form of the subject does not posit such coherence with the form of the predicate, but rather disparity: therefore it is not such a predicate: therefore this expression, God is man, and God was made man, is false, as it seems.

1. Likewise, When it is said, God is man, and when it is said, Peter is man, whatever universally by the grace of the supposita of man is predicated of man, all can be said of the subject, as man is risible, and substance, and suchlike, all are said of Peter: therefore similarly when it is said, God is man, everything that is universally predicated of the predicate can be said of the subject: but man is created: therefore God is created. Likewise, man is creature: therefore God is creature. Nor can it be said that here falls the fallacy of the accident: because creature and created, although they say accident,

nevertheless they say inseparable accident and proper passion universally consequent to man: and in such things neither extraneous nor fallacy occurs. If it is said, that pas-

§ 1. ...[proces]sion indeed is of that which comes forth from nothing, but not of man insofar as he is man: this does not hinder the argument: because when I say, "Peter is a man," I can further infer, "and man is living, therefore Peter [is living]," and "man is corporeal, therefore Peter [is corporeal]"; and yet these things do not follow upon man insofar as he is man, although they follow upon man universally, although they do not follow upon man alone.

§ 2. If perhaps it is said that this is true: "God is created," and "God is a creature," this is nothing [i.e., invalid]: for the Master denies it below, and says it is the perfidy of Arius.

§ 3. Furthermore, if he were created: he would be created either by himself or by another. If by himself. Against this: Everything creating is; everything that is created is not: therefore the same thing is and is not, which is false. But if he is created by another: therefore there is another creating God than himself, which was disproved in the first book of the Sentences.

§ 4. Also, when it is said, "God is man," of what quantity is that proposition?

§ 5. If it is said that it is indefinite: then it will receive a universal or a particular sign. If universal, then it follows that "every God is incarnate," which is false, because the Father is not incarnate. But if it is not verified with a universal sign, then it will be verified with a particular sign, and its subcontrary will be true along with it: for then it will be in contingent matter; therefore these two will be true at the same time: "some God is man," "some God is not man"; therefore also these: "God is man" and "God is not man," by the topic from particular equipollence to the indefinite.

§ 6. If perhaps it is said that the subject is restricted by the predicate to supposit [stand] for the Son alone: this will be against the art of restrictions, where it is proved that predicates do not restrict their subjects: for otherwise, if only one, or two, or three were running, this would be true: "every man runs," because the sense would be: "every running man runs," which is false: therefore it is saying nothing to claim that the predicate restricts the subject.

§ 7. Also, when it is said, "God is man," in what matter is this proposition?

§ 8. For it will be either in natural, or impossible or remote, or contingent [matter]. If in natural: therefore the predicate always belongs to the subject, while the subject exists: therefore this was true from eternity, "God is man," because God existed from eternity, which is false. But if in remote matter: therefore the predicate cannot cohere to the subject: and it is signified to cohere; therefore the statement is false. But if in contingent, then the predicate can be separated from the subject, and the same God in person who is man can be non-man: just as the same Peter in person can be white and can be non-white, which is false: therefore that statement ought to be simply denied.

§ 9. Also, there are two modes of predicating, namely by cause, and by the coherence of the predicate with the subject. By cause, as when it is said: "the sun is hot." By coherence, as it is said: "man is white."

§ 10. And let it be asked which of these modes is in this [proposition], when it is said, "God is man"? If by cause, then the sense is: "God is man," that is, the cause of man: therefore according to this he could be called a lion and an Angel, because he is the cause of the Angel. If in the second mode, then humanity coheres to God: but humanity is not deity: therefore a form extraneous to deity is in God: which cannot be, because thus he would be composed of disparate forms, which is against Hilary saying: "God, who is spirit, is not out of disparate things."

§ 11. FURTHERMORE it is asked concerning the converses of these propositions, namely, "man was made God," and "man is God": for even those opinions concede these converses; and therefore it is necessary to inquire about them before we descend to distinguishing the opinions.

§ 12. For it is asked first concerning this: "Man was made God." For it seems that it is false: for when something is being made (in fieri), it is not under the same form in its being made and in its having been made (facto esse): therefore since it is in being made, that is, in union with the form of man, by a perfect union it is not under that [form]: and thus Christ was not man when he was united, which is heresy, because today he is true man, and always was from the moment he assumed human nature.

§ 13. Also, when it is said, "Man was made God," man is noted as pre-existing before the making itself, the terminus of which is "to have been made": just as I say, "iron was made a knife"; but he was not man before the union: therefore since this is noted, by virtue of that statement, that statement will be false.

§ 14. It is also asked concerning this: "Man is God." Either this is by virtue of the union, or by virtue of the coherence of the union. If in the first mode. Against this: God and man are more distant than affirmation and negation concerning the same thing. If therefore by no power are affirmation and negation conjoinable concerning the same thing, and according to the same thing, by no power will God and man be in the same thing, and according to the same hypostasis.

§ 15. But if it is said that the proposition is verified on account of the coherence of the terms, it is ridiculous: because deity and humanity are disparate.

§ 16. Solution. Without prejudice, on account of the errors intruding themselves here, it is necessary to respond to the aforesaid arguments cautiously, so that the truth of faith is entirely held rather than Aristotle, the prince of the Philosophers: because it is no wonder if the incarnation holds within itself something contrary to the art [of logic], which could not be investigated even by a genius supported by grace: whence John the Baptist says: "There comes after me one stronger than I, the strap of whose sandals I am not worthy to stoop down and loose." We will, however, save the art as much as is possible.

§ 17. I say therefore, that without doubt this is to be conceded, as the Master says: "God was made man," and "the Son of God was made man"; for the reason that it has two senses of truth. For if the word factus determines the word homo, it is true under this sense: "God was made man," that is, "God was made the man who was made"; and this immediately appears

true to everyone. If therefore the word factus is referred outside the proposition to the making (fieri) whose terminus is factus, so that the sense is: "God was made man," that is, "something was made by which God is man, because a union was made by which God is man": then again it is true, and "having been made" (factum) places its making (fieri) around that which in the union was subjected to the Holy Spirit, and this was human nature. But if the word factus were to place its making (fieri) around God, or the Son of God, it would not be conceded in that way, and the objection proceeds in that sense. Now, in the middle sense it seems to be explained in the Text thus: "God was made man, or began to be man, and he did not begin to be man, except through the fact that something was made by which he then was man, and before this he was not man." Whence that statement, since it is verified in a twofold sense, is conceded by every opinion.

§ 18. To the next, it must be said that it is not similar concerning this: "iron becomes a knife": because iron is the matter of the knife; because matter of its own nature is subjected to the making itself; therefore it seems from its nature that the making is placed around it: but this is not so in this [proposition], "God was made man," or "the Son of God."

§ 19. To the next, it must be said in the same way, that "having been made" is the complement of that which is being made, when the making is noted to be placed around it, as in natural generation, or motion: but here it is not so.

§ 20. To that which is further asked concerning this: "God is man," it must be said that nothing is predicated univocally of God as he is God, and of a creature as it is a creature: because I readily concede this, that man in the same ratio [concept/definition] is predicated of Christ as of others. And if it is objected through John Damascene, that in the Lord Jesus a common species is not to be found, it was solved above, where that authority was explained.

§ 21. To the next, it must be said that that argument does not proceed: because it does not follow that if something is predicated of God which was not always predicated, that he himself has been changed. For this proposition, "Something belongs to God which does not always belong," has two causes of truth: one of which is, if God has been changed, the proposition is true. The second is, if something has been changed towards him, again it is true: and then it does not follow that he himself has been changed, but that something has been changed towards him. Whence in that argumentation there is the fallacy of the consequent, and there is an instance [counter-example]: "God is in this created soul now essentially, by presence, and by power: and he was not always in it: therefore he has been changed"; so it is also here. Beyond this it follows that he is with the man Christ through union.

§ 22. TO THE NEXT it must be said that when it is said, "God is man," the word homo is predicated essentially. And for this, something must be understood: that when it is said, "God is man," or "the Son of God is man," this term, "God," is subjected for the sake of the suppositum, and not for the sake of what is signified by the term: and this is compelled by the predicate, as is proved below. Just as when it is said, "man runs," by virtue of the predicate this term, "man," stands for the suppositum to which running belongs; so when it is said, "God is man," by virtue of the predicate this term, "man," stands for the suppositum.

§ 23. And if it is objected that it is against the art [of logic] that an essential predicate should compel a term to stand for the suppositum: because an essential predicate notes coherence to the signified primarily, and to the suppositum as a consequence: for when I say, "Socrates is an animal," it is not said, "Socrates is an animal," except through the fact that he is a man. If, I say, it is objected in this way, I respond that this is true in those predicates which are taken from the form of the whole, which is a genus, or species, or difference with respect to the subject: but this predicate "man," when it is said, "God is man," is not such a predicate that it is essential to the subject by reason of being a genus, species, or difference: but it is essential as having been made essential through another; and therefore it compels the subject to stand for that in which the union was made, which makes the predicate itself essential.

§ 24. And thus it is evident that it does not follow that it can stand for just any suppositum: rather, it will not appellate [refer to] any except that suppositum in which the essential union was made: and then it does not follow: "therefore the Father is man," or "the Holy Spirit is man."

§ 25. To the next, it must be said that it is reduced to an essential predicate, not converted, but by the reason already stated it cannot be inferred, "Every God is man," even if grammar were to admit this [expression], "every God": because in the second distinction of the first book of the Sentences it was proved that the word "God" does not receive a distributive sign, or a particular or plural number.

§ 26. To the next, it must be said that this is to be simply called false: "God is created," and "God is a creature," unless a determination is added, as the Master will teach below. Nor is it similar when it is said: "God is man," and "Man is a creature, therefore God is a creature." For although man is a creature, nevertheless "man" from its own concept does not import anything contrary to the signified of this term, "God": but rather it imports from its own concept something unitable to the divine nature and deity, and through this it compels this term, "God," to appellate the suppositum of the Son, as was said before. But this term, "created," or "made," or "creature," from its own concept imports this which is common to the Trinity: because to make and to create are works of the essence: and therefore they respect this term, "God," for the sake of the signified: whence opposites are posited concerning the same thing: therefore the statement is false. Nor is it valid that if "being a creature" follows universally upon "being a man," that on account of this, of whatever in any case "man" is predicated, "creature" (for a sheer making) should also be predicated. And this is so because "man" is not predicated for its own sake, but for the sake of the union that was made: for this term, "man," does not have it from its own signified that it is God, but rather from the union made in the hypostasis.

§ 27. To the next, it must be said that when it is said, "God is man," it is not a proposition of any quantity: and this happens on account of the nature of this term, "God," which says neither a universal nor a singular. Now, that it does not say a universal is evident: because a universal is in many by intention, and divided from them by being; but God has a signified communicable indeed to many, but singular in being: because the three persons according to deity have the same being. That it is not a singular is evident: because no singular is commu-

nicable to many, neither in reality nor in reason: therefore it cannot be said that it is a proposition of any quantity. Nor is it indefinite, and therefore the arguments from the particular to the indefinite do not proceed. Yet, lest we seem to flee the argument, it must be said that this is true, "God is man," and this is false, "God is not man." For as Boethius says: "Subjects are such as predicates have permitted them to be"; and this always holds as to this: that the subject is compelled by the predicate to stand either for the subject, or for the suppositum, or for both. For when it is said, "man runs," the predicate always compels the subject to stand for the suppositum. And similarly in the negative, when it is said, "man does not run." Therefore similarly when it is said, "God is man": since the predicate is not essential to the subject by nature, but by the union which was made in the hypostasis, it compels the subject to stand for the suppositum in which that union was made. Therefore, if it is denied, it will be denied by reason of the same hypostasis: because it does not respect any other except that in which the union was made. Therefore these two, "God is man," and "God is not man," are not opposed except as affirmation and negation concerning the same thing: since therefore this is true, "God is man," this will be false, "God is not man."

§ 28. But to that which is objected, that predicates do not restrict subjects, it must be said that although they do not restrict in the number of supposita, they nonetheless restrict for the sake of the signified or the suppositum, and compel [them] to stand for the signified or the suppositum, as is evident in these: "man is the most worthy of creatures," and "man is an animal," and "man runs"; in all of which the subject is respected by the predicate, and on account of a respect of this kind it is compelled to have personal or non-personal supposition. And so it is in this statement, "God is man," except only for this, that the predicate of this statement does not have this from the nature of the signified, but from the union which was made in one hypostasis alone: and therefore it does not respect the subject except only for the sake of that, and in the negative similarly. And it is similar if we posit only one to be snub-nosed: as when it is said, "man is snub-nosed," the statement is true, and the subject is respected for the sake of that one, and it appellates him, and for him renders the statement true. That this is verified, "man is not snub-nosed," this happens because "man" is not restricted, and in another he is according to another being: which is not the case in God, or in the signified of this term, "God."

§ 29. To the next, it must be said that when it is said, "God is man," the proposition is in natural matter: but something is in natural matter in a twofold way, namely, from the natural coherence of the terms which they have from the order of their signifieds to one another, and from another [agent] making to cohere substantially those things which by nature are separated from one another, and so it is here: whence also a likeness of this cannot be found in nature. § 30. To the next, it must be said that it is not predication by cause, but by essence, as was said.

§ 31. To that which is further asked concerning the converses, namely this: "Man was made God": it seems to some that it is not to be conceded, for the reason that it seems to follow: "man was made God, therefore some man was made God," or "therefore one was made God," and thus both were disproved in the preceding distinction.

§ 32. But it seems to me, speaking without prejudice, that the Master concedes them, and even Augustine posits them: and therefore they can be received under a distinction: "man was made God," such that the word factus determines the word homo, so that the sense is: "man was made God," that is, "the man who was made [is God]"; and in this sense it is not necessary that the man pre-existed, because his having been made (factum esse) was simultaneous with his having been united, and his being made (fieri) was simultaneous with his being united. Similarly, if the word factus is referred to something understood outside the proposition, so that the sense is: "it was made that man is God," that is, "something was made, that is, the union by which man is God," it will be true.

§ 33. To the first therefore which is objected against this, it must be said that this is true when the making (fieri) is successive: because then the having been made (factum esse) is a mutation in the terminus: but it was not so in Christ; rather the whole was made simultaneously by the infinite power of the Holy Spirit. Or let it be said that if the making is distinguished by the intellect from the having been made, then the making does not posit man to be, but only the potency of man which is mutated to the form of man, but simultaneously the union and the man to God are had, and therefore both remain: because the union is not into a terminus, but rather into the singularity of a pre-existing person.

§ 34. To the next, it must be said that this is not true: because the word "man" is not said to have been made like matter, but rather like the terminus of that making which is imported by the term of the union: and to this, on the part of the assumption, the nature was subjected, and the union was terminated in a perfect united man: not such that it was successively made there in time, but on the part of the natural order it is prior to assume a body and a soul, than to have a perfect united man.

§ 35. To that which is further asked concerning this: "Man is God," it must be said that this is absolutely true.

§ 36. But to the objection against this, it must be said that in one respect affirmation and negation are more distant, in another respect God and man are more distant. For if the nature of opposition between being and non-being is considered, affirmation and negation are simply more opposed than God and man, and therefore they are not verified simultaneously, nor can they be conjoined; but God and man can well be conjoined. But if the proportion of dignity between the extremes is considered, then God is more distant from any created thing than affirmation and negation [are from each other].

Expositio Textus

Exposition of the Text

§ 37. For some say in the very incarnation of the Word, etc. Here the Master approaches the first opinion: and as it seems to me, this opinion is divided into two parts: in the first of which its positions are posited, in the second the confirmations of its positions, namely there: And lest they be thought to have spoken only from their own sense, etc.

§ 38. Note that four positions of this opinion can be extracted from the Text from the prior chapter, in which the positions are posited : the first of which is that man is assumed: and this is extracted from what the Master says, there: They concede also that man assumed by the Word, etc. The second is there, that both of these propositions are true: "God was made man," and conversely: and this is extracted, there: And for that reason they hand down that it was said, God was made man, etc. The third, that Christ is two supposita, and not only two persons: and this is extracted from what he says at the beginning of the chapter: A certain man from a rational soul, etc. And it is confirmed by the authority of Augustine: Both are one: but one thing on account of the Word, namely God assuming, and another thing on account of the assumed man. The fourth is that when it is said, "God is man" or "this man," that suppositum has only two substances in itself, namely of body and soul, and is not subsisting from three: and that is extracted at the end of the chapter, there: And when they say that man, etc. For this fourth position is the cause of the third, why they say Christ to be two supposita: and therefore I have joined them here, although the third is taken from the beginning of the first chapter. Moreover, from these follows the fifth position, by which they respond to the question posed to those who are of this opinion, namely that when it is said, "The Son of God is man," that something is predicated there, because the suppositum of man is united to the Word or Son of God: because the suppositum is in two substances, namely of soul and body.

§ 39. This therefore is the sentence of the two chapters, which are posited in the first part of the distinction.

Articulus 2 — How the Thing of Nature, Supposit, Substance, Hypostasis, Individual, and Person Differ

Thing of nature, suppositum, substance, hypostasis, individual, and person: how do they differ?

§ 40. But here a question occurs concerning three things: the first of which is, what difference is there between thing of nature (res naturae), suppositum, hypostasis, substance, individual, and person? The second is, in which of them was the union made, and in which not? The third is, whether this is true, that Christ is two or one? and, which two is Christ himself, if he is two?

§ 41. To the FIRST it is proceeded thus: When "thing of nature" is said, it is understood in two ways, that is, a thing intended by nature, and [a thing] constituted by an act of nature: therefore a thing of nature is that which is closer and more immediate to generation: since therefore it generates per se here and now, a thing of nature is nothing other than something constituted through the act of generation in that nature, namely this something (hoc aliquid), and this is to be conceded.

§ 42. FURTHERMORE, when it is said, "Peter is a man," "John is a man," and "Thomas is a man": what "man" is is common to them, and by one ratio it is common to them: therefore each one of them has a similar respect to the other towards the common nature which is signified in "man." Therefore from this similarity of respect another community of proportion to one is caused, namely that just as one is supposited to the common nature, so also is the other: and

from this they receive the community of the suppositum: such that each one is a suppositum of man: therefore the suppositum is said to be standing under a common nature: and this is also to be conceded. § 43. Also, that which stands under a common nature is indeed distinct through matter: but since it is a suppositum, it is distinguishable through individuating accidents. Since therefore substance is properly that which substands the person and accidents, substance will be distinct through this matter, but distinguishable through accidents and not distinct through them: and this is also to be conceded.

§ 44. Hypostasis is the same in Greek as such a substance is among us.

§ 45. FURTHERMORE, an individual, according to the Philosopher, is distinct by a collection of accidents which cannot be found in another: yet it is not necessarily a person: because an individual, although it is distinct, is not necessarily of a rational nature.

§ 46. And therefore a person is still of greater concretion, namely that it is in a natural dignity which is of a rational nature, distinct by a property making it incommunicable in three modes, namely that it is not communicable as a part, as the soul and body are: and that it is not communicable as a universal, like what is predicated of many: and that it is not communicable through union into the singularity of another, as we said in the preceding distinction: and this is to be conceded.

§ 47. Therefore from this it is evident that these are ordered: that first is the constituted thing of nature, second the suppositum, third indeed the hypostasis, fourth the individual, fifth the person.

§ 48. And through these things the solution of the first is evident.

Articulus 3 — In Which of the Aforementioned the Union Was Effected

In which of the aforesaid was the union made?

§ 49. To the SECOND doubt, namely in which of them the union was made, it is proceeded thus:

§ 50. 1. A thing of nature is not repugnant to any communicability: therefore it seems that the union is not necessarily in it. PROOF. For in a nature, for the reason that it is not repugnant to communicability, therefore the union is not made in it: therefore neither in a thing of nature, as it seems.

§ 51. But that a thing of nature is not repugnant to communicability is evident. A thing of nature seems to be a composite: but a composite is united and assumed. PROOF. Above we frequently had that he assumed a body and a soul, and these conjoined. Since therefore those composites are things of nature, as it seems, it seems that the union was not made in the thing of nature just as neither in the nature.

§ 52. 2. In the same way it seems that neither is it in the suppositum: because a suppositum means something posited under a common nature: but something is posited under a common nature, which is the nature of man in Christ: and that is not in the same order posited under the divine nature. For as the natures to which the supposita substand are related, so are the

supposita which are posited under them related: but the natures are diverse: therefore the supposita will also be diverse, as it seems.

§ 53. 3. Also, of diverse natures and those not posited subalternately there are necessarily diverse supposita: therefore although the natures are united in Christ, nevertheless because they retain their diversity, they will have diverse supposita: and thus the union will not be in the suppositum.

§ 54. 4. Also, whatever things are one in suppositum, of those things there is necessarily one respect to the nature to which that suppositum substands: therefore by the destruction of the consequent, those to which there is no one respect to the superior nature, of those there is not one suppositum: but of this man and this God there is no one respect to the nature, just as there is not one nature: therefore of those there is not one suppositum: therefore the union is not in the suppositum.

§ 55. 6. Furthermore, the nature and ratio of a suppositum is not repugnant to communicability by mode of a part: for if I say, "this hand," the pronoun, namely "this," tells me the suppositum of the hand: and yet it is a part of man: therefore the ratio of a suppositum is not an incommunicable ratio: therefore it seems that it holds itself on the part of the nature, and not on the part of the person. Since therefore the union was made in the person, it seems Christ is two supposita.

§ 56. Furthermore it is asked concerning the individual. For an individual seems to be distinguished by a collection of accidents which cannot be found in another: but those accidents are either of nature, or adventitious by accident. If they are of nature or natural, it follows (as it seems) that Christ is not one individual. For the natural properties of that which is man are not the properties of that which is the Son of God: therefore they do not communicate [share] in individuating features: therefore they are not one individual.

§ 57. But concerning the union in the person, it was held in the preceding distinction.

§ 58. Solution. Modern doctors almost all belong to the second opinion, and not to the first: because without a doubt it cannot be reasonably sustained. Yet he uses the arguments already induced, supposing that this man, not insofar as he is man, but demonstrating Christ, is not constituted from two natures and three substances, but only from two substances and one nature of man, such that no force is placed on the word "from" (ex): because no opinion says that there a composition is made with respect to some third thing: but this second opinion posits an exigitive [demanded] composition in the man Christ: because the exigitive has as many substances in itself as the redeemer demands: for the redeemer both owes and is able [to pay]: whence it is demanded that he have a nature by which he owes, and this is human; and a nature by which he is able, and this is divine: and to posit such a composition in the Son of God is not unfitting. And therefore I do not wish to solve for the first opinion, because I think that it is false.

§ 59. I respond to the first, that the union is in the thing of the nature of man, and of the suppositum, and of the hypostasis, and of the individual, and of the person. For if it were only in the person and not in the others, it would be necessary that this man and this God would

not be one, except only in a personal property: and this is ridiculous, namely that they would not agree except in a certain accident. In the same way, if they were united only in the ratio of an individual, they would not be one by nature, but only in a collection of accidents. In the same way, if they agree in hypostasis, and not in the thing of nature, the agreement will be in the act of substanding to the nature: and this is not intelligible, that that which is something would not be the same and one with that "this something" (hoc aliquid), since the supposita are not diverse. Similarly, it is not intelligible how the supposita could be diverse, and yet the hypostasis one. And furthermore it cannot be understood how the hypostasis could be diverse, and not the individuals. And if the individuals are posited as diverse, it is not understood how the person could be one.

§ 60. And therefore I say that Christ did not assume a man, nor a suppositum, etc., but all these he united to himself into the singularity of the person. And I say that the thing of nature is not distinct by being from the Son of God, and it is incommunicable by the incommunicability of the Son of God, and not by another in Christ. But in others, a thing of nature is incommunicable through this matter, just as the suppositum, and the individual, and the person.

§ 61. To the next, it must be said that the supposita are united: for although the respect of this man insofar as he is this man, and of this God insofar as he is this God, to the nature of man and to the nature of God, is not one, not on account of this is this suppositum any less that [same] suppositum: and from this it follows that by reason of the twofold nature it substands to both natures: for the respect is in the suppositum not from whence it is "this something" (hoc aliquid), but also from the fact that it is "this something" of this nature. And therefore the terminus to the nature is varied on account of the diversity of the natures in Christ: whence since that respect of supposition is a consequence of the suppositum, from the nature a diversity remains in the respect, just as in other accidents of the natures: but yet the union will be in that which is the suppositum.

§ 62. To the next, it must be said that this is false, in Christ, that just as the na-

natures, etc. Because in Christ there are diverse and distinct natures, yet not [diverse and distinct] supposits: and this is caused by something else, namely by the union. But the proposition is true in those things in which the being of the supposit is entirely one nature. But this is not the case in Christ: rather, it is in this that that opinion errs, because the being of this or that supposit is not from one nature, but from two, because this man has the being of a man unitively, and not confusedly or mixedly.

§ 1. To the next it must be said that it is not true, unless those natures remain separate from each other, such that they are not united into one hypostasis or supposit: this is not true in Christ, as has already been said.

§ 2. To the next it must be said that it is not necessary that things whose supposit is one must have one relationship to the common nature: because if one supposit is, through its proper being, in two natures, then it is subjected [to them] by a twofold relationship, and yet remains one.

§ 3. To the next it must be said that the rationale of a supposit is repugnant to communicability: because that is a supposit which has the form of a nature particularized over this matter: and this is one thing constituted in itself and divided from others. Since, therefore, there are not two such things in Christ, it must be that that [supposit] is one through the being of the Son of God: because it is not of the nature, but rather stands under it. For otherwise something would be truly predicated of this man which would not be predicated of the Son of God, which is contrary to Augustine. For this is true: "this man is a supposit of human nature and a thing of nature"; hence it is necessary that this be true: "the Son of God is a supposit of human nature and a thing of human nature."

§ 4. To what is further asked about the individual, I say in the same way that there are not two individuals in Christ: for although the properties are not the same, just as the natures are not, nevertheless the properties of both are denominatively predicated of this man, and of the Son of God. For such is that union (as Augustine says) that would make God man, and man God: and the properties of one are said of the other, and conversely: hence it is said, "God was born, suffered, was weary, sorrowing," and the like; and "man is the creator, the governor of the world," and all such things. And therefore it must not be said that Christ was ever a "this something" (hoc aliquid) or one supposit, or an individual by a proper unity and singularity that belonged to human nature: but he was always a "this something" by both the unity and singularity of the divine person.

Articulus 4 — Whether Christ Is in Some Way Two, and Whether He Had Only One Being

Whether Christ is in some way two? And, whether he had only one being (esse)?

Whether Christ is in some way two? And, whether he had only one being?

§ 5. Thirdly, it is asked whether Christ is in some way two, as this opinion says?

§ 6. And it seems that he is: 1. For Damascene says that difference is the cause of number. Therefore, a multitude of number follows from a multitude of differences. But in Christ there are two differentiating things according to being (esse) and making being; therefore they make two beings. But from a plurality of being a thing is two or more; therefore Christ is two.

§ 7. 2. Also, Cassian in the sixth book against Nestorius says thus: "Because you say that the nativity ought to be consubstantial (homoousion) with the parent: I say that by the diversity of persons our Lord Jesus Christ was consubstantial (homoousion) with both the Father and the mother equally: he renders to each parent his own likeness." From this it also seems that not only are there two, but even diverse persons.

§ 8. Further, it is asked whether Christ had only one being (esse)?

§ 9. And it seems that he did: because being belongs to the hypostasis: and there is only one hypostasis; therefore there is only one being.

§ 10. Also, being belongs to what is complete and distinct: but there is only one complete and distinct thing there; therefore there is only one being.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 11. 1. It is unintelligible how there are two essences making being, and yet only one being.

§ 12. 2. Furthermore, essence is not in the hypostasis except through being: if therefore there is one being, it seems there is only one essence according to nature, which is false.

§ 13. Solution: To this it must be said without prejudice that Christ's being in the hypostasis is only one, which is made from two natures unconfusedly united in that hypostasis: because we posit according to the second opinion that this demonstrated [individual] is constituted from three substances and two natures; and this is confirmed by the authority of Boethius and Cassian.

§ 14. For Boethius says thus in the book On the Two Natures in the One Person of Christ: "The nature of Him who alone is God came together with human nature, which was dissimilar from it: and thus from distant natures the one person of Christ was made by the coupling of divinity and humanity." From this it is accepted that the supposit of the person of Christ is posited as supposit in two natures existing essentially in Christ.

§ 15. Moreover, Cassian in the sixth book against Nestorius says thus: "The same our Lord Jesus Christ, born man and God, had in Himself the property of each parent, while in that He is man, He rendered a likeness to His human mother: and in that He is God, He had the truth of God the Father."

§ 16. Thus, therefore, according to the aforesaid, I say that there is one being in Christ according to the comparison to the hypostasis to which the being belongs, although this being is of two essences which remain distinct, because this being of the one is this being of the other: and it is marvelous that the union is made in being, and not in the essences.

§ 17. Therefore, it must be said to the first that difference is the cause of number: but in being, insofar as being belongs to the hypostasis, there is no difference except through the nature, because one is united to the other, or rather one is united into the other.

§ 18. To the statement of Cassian it must be said that he does not intend that Christ is two persons, but that through two natures He is referred to two persons, which are the father and the mother. Hence Christ is not two, but one: because He is neither two persons, nor two hypostases, as is already clear from the aforesaid.

§ 19. To the objection that it is unintelligible how there is one being of the hypostasis belonging to two essences, it must be said that this is unintelligible, unless those essences are understood to be united, such that the being of one is terminated in the being which the other makes, as is the case in Christ. Hence in nature no similar thing is found to this.

§ 20. To the next it must be said that in the hypostasis there is an essence, and the being of that essence itself, that is, the being which gives the essence to the hypostasis, and they differ as effect and cause; hence that is not the nature. However, some say that the being is one, and two. Two by the number of the essences from which it is, and one by the number of the hypostasis in which it is. But the first is truer: because being is singular; but nothing befitting the person is singular, except by the singularity of the divine person.

Articulus 5 — Whether in Christ There Is One Being Simply

Whether there is simply one being in Christ?

§ 21. But it is still objected against this: because 1. Peter is not the being of Peter; therefore Christ is also not the being of Christ. Therefore it seems that being belongs to the nature; therefore being is not that which the hypostasis is, and the union is only in the hypostasis; therefore there is not one being.

§ 22. 2. Also, the Son of God is His own being; this man is not his own being. Therefore the being of this man, insofar as he is this man, is one thing, and the being of the Son of God, insofar as He is such, is another. Therefore there is not one being, but two; therefore He did not become one in being.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 23. Whatever are two in being simply, they are two simply: and whatever are two simply, they are not only one. Therefore the Son of God is not only one, which is false; and this was disproved in the preceding distinction.

§ 24. Solution: Holding the truth that the union is made in the hypostasis, as is the truth, and the second opinion says there is only one being, there is simply one being of Christ. But the being of this simply is one thing, and the being of this according to this or that nature is another, and the being of this or that nature is another. For the being of this simply is the being of the person or hypostasis, according as it is a hypostasis: and this is only one in Christ. And this can be clear from the fact that the Catholic faith says that that union was made in being. For if it was made in being, it will be made in some being, and not except in the being of the hypostasis. Therefore the being of this hypostasis resulting from that union is one: for whatever things are united, are one.

§ 25. Also, of one hypostasis there is only one being. But Christ is only one hypostasis; therefore Christ has only one being simply: because the being of a thing of nature or of a hypostasis is the being of the whole: and this is being simply.

§ 26. But being according to this or that nature is being taken in comparison to the nature making being in the hypostasis, and on that side being is doubled in Christ. For there is in Him the being of the nature of humanity, and the being of the nature of deity. And if we wished to speak properly, then we would say that He would have in such a consideration not two beings, but a single twofold being in that which constitutes being.

§ 27. The being of the nature is the being which the nature has in itself: for every thing has its own being. The being of human nature in Christ is not the being of the nature of God, nor are those beings two just as the natures [are two].

§ 28. Therefore, to what is objected to the contrary, it must be said that Christ is not His own being: this happens, not according as He is a hypostasis of divine nature, but because there is absolute simplicity there: but this is not [the case] in the hypostasis of man, because that hypostasis is posited to be in two natures and three substances.

§ 29. However, it must be known that, saving that [first] opinion, there would be a twofold being there: because it says that when this man is posited as a supposit, there is posited in Him only a twofold substance, namely of flesh and soul, and one nature.

Divisio Textus

But there are also others who partly consent to these, etc.

§ 30. Here begins the second opinion which almost all moderns defend: because in it the sacrament of the union is more expressed. And it has two parts: in the first of which its positions are posited; and in the second, the proofs of its positions, there, E, Concerning this Augustine in the book of the Sentences of Prosper, etc.

§ 31. But as can be gathered from the letter of the prior chapter, there are four positions of this [opinion], namely that when it is said, "this man," Christ is set as supposit in two natures, composed of three substances, namely flesh, soul, and deity: and it is extracted at the beginning of the chapter, where he says: They say that that man not from the soul, etc. The second is that Christ is only one, and not two; and it is taken there, Not as if there were two persons, etc., because in truth, as was clear above, from there being two supposits, it follows that there are two persons, since nothing is said that the union was made in personal property alone, and not in that which is a person. The third is that man is not assumed, neither this man, nor the person: and this is taken there, Therefore the person who previously was simple, etc., because they do not say that the assumed [thing], that is, the composite, to Him is anything except a nature. But the fourth is that that person is not said to be "made" absolutely unless "according to human nature" is added, or "was made composite," or the like: and this is extracted from there: And yet that person ought not to be said to have been made a person, etc.

Articulus 6 — Whether Christ Can Be Said to Be Composite

Whether Christ can be said to be composite?

§ 32. Now there are few doubts against this opinion, because it clearly contains the truth. But yet there can be a doubt about its first position, which says that Christ is composite.

§ 33. 1. For every composite unites its components into a third: but this union is made into the eternal person; therefore Christ is not composite.

§ 34. 2. Also, in every composite each of the components is a part. But deity cannot be called a part: because since every part is something less than its whole, deity would then have something greater and better, which is most inconvenient.

§ 35. Also, since every part is imperfect with respect to the whole, deity would then be imperfect, which again is false.

§ 36. To this it must be said that this opinion does not take composition according to nature, but according to the name alone, so that "composite" (compositum) is the same as "posited with another" (cum alio positum) in the same thing that was before: although in this way He was not entirely as He is now; and thus the person of Christ is composite, because He is

now in two natures and three substances. Hence this opinion says that neither of the natures is a part: because deity cannot be a part, as the objections prove; and humanity, although it has parts, is nevertheless not a part: because every part has a co-part, for the reason that no one part makes a whole; hence humanity cannot be a part.

§ 37. And thus the solution is clear to the objections which proceed as if composition were properly taken according to the nature of a composite. But some call this composition "exegitive" (exegitiva), as we said in the exposition of the preceding opinion.

Articulus 7 — What the Pronoun "This" Demonstrates When "This Man" Is Said of Christ

What the pronoun "this" demonstrates when it is said, "This man," of Christ.

§ 38. There is also a doubt concerning this which this opinion posits, that when it is said, "This man," demonstrating Christ, His supposit is set in three substances and two natures, and not in human nature alone. For this seems false: for this is not held from the understanding of that which is said, "this man." For if we consider the substance of the pronoun, that is, what the pronoun supposits for, it speaks only of the supposit; but the [word] man (homo) which follows speaks of the nature for which it is supposited. Therefore it seems that by the power of the term thus complexly composed of supposit and nature, Christ is not supposited except in one nature, as the preceding opinion said, and in a twofold substance, namely in flesh and soul.

§ 39. Solution: It must be said that it is one thing in Christ, and another in other men. For when "this" is said in Christ, the supposit cannot be demonstrated except as united, or rather as one: and therefore the demonstration imports a twofold nature or relationship, of which we determine only one through the [word] man that follows, and the other is signified to be determined by the name signifying that nature which is also in Him. And therefore both are imported when it is said, "This man is this God": for in that phrase, twice in the pronouns "this" and "this," one supposit is signified, and through the following terms signifying the common nature for which it supposits, a twofold relationship of that supposit to those natures is signified: but through the middle composition [the verb "is"], the identity of the supposit in both natures is signified. And from this it is clear that this opinion alone has touched the truth.

§ 40. From these things which have been said, it is easy to understand the authorities which are introduced by this opinion.

F. The third opinion of others.

§ 41. There are also others, who in the incarnation of the Word not only deny that the person is composed of natures, but even deny that any man or even any substance is there composed or made from soul and flesh. But they say that those two, namely the soul and the flesh, are united to the person or nature of the Word in such a way that neither from those two nor from these three was any nature or person made or composed, but the Word of God was clothed with those two as with a garment, so that He might appear congruously to the eyes of mortals. And for this reason He is said to have been made a true man, because He accepted

the truth of flesh and soul. Which two He is also read to have accepted into the singularity or unity of His person: not because those two, or some thing composed of them, is one person with the Word, or is the Word; but because, with those two acceding to the Word, the number of persons is not increased, so as to make a quaternity in the Trinity: and because the person of the Word itself, which was previously without a garment, is not divided or changed by the assumption of the garment, but remained one and the same immutable [person]. They say that God was made man according to habit [clothing]: for by accepting man, God is called, and was made, man: and on account of the accepted man, God is truly said to be man: and on account of the assuming God, man is said to be God. For if it were understood that God is essentially man, or man is essentially God, they say, then if God had assumed man in the female sex, the woman would also be essentially God, and conversely. But God could have assumed man in the female sex; therefore a woman could be God, and conversely.

G. He introduces authorities by which this sentence is strengthened.

§ 42. But lest these men also seem to assert merely from their own sense, they confirm what they say by bringing forth testimonies into the midst. For Augustine says in the book On the Grace of the New Testament "Just as the number of persons is not increased when flesh accedes to the soul so that there is one man, so the number of persons is not increased when man accedes to the Word so that Christ is one man. And thus God is read to be man, so that we may understand the singularity of this person, not so that we may suspect the divinity to be changed into flesh." The same author, also treating that word of the Apostle, found in habit as a man [206], manifestly shows that God is said to have been made man, or to be man according to habit, saying thus in the book of Eighty-Three Questions "We speak of habit in many ways: either a habit of the mind, as the perception of a discipline firmed by use; or a habit of the body, as when we say one is stronger than another; or a habit of those things which are accommodated to the members from the outside, as when we say someone is clothed, or shod, and the like. In all these genera it is manifest that 'habit' is said in that thing which happens or accedes to someone, in such a way that he can also not have it. But this name is derived from that verb which is habere (to have). Therefore, habit is said in that thing which either happens or accedes to us in order to be had. Nevertheless, there is this difference, because some of those things which happen or accede to make a habit are not changed, but they themselves change [the subject], remaining whole and unshaken in themselves: just as wisdom acceding to a man is not itself changed, but it changes the man, whom it makes wise from a fool. But some accede or happen in such a way that they change, and are changed: as food, which losing its species is turned into the body, and we, refreshed by the food, are changed from thinness and languor into strength and vigor. A third genus is when those things which happen or accede neither change those to which they accede, nor are they changed by them: such as a ring placed on a finger; which genus is very rarely found. A fourth genus is when those things which happen or accede are not changed in their nature, but receive another species and form: as a garment which when cast off and laid aside, does not have the form which it assumes when put on. For when put on the members it receives a form which it did not have when stripped off: which genus is congruous with this comparison. For God the Son

emptied Himself, not changing His form, but receiving the form of a servant: nor was He converted or transmuted into man, having lost His immutable stability, but the Susceptor Himself was made in the likeness of men; by taking up a true man, He was found in habit as a man, that is, by having man He was found as man, not to Himself, but to those to whom He appeared in man. But that he says, as a man, expresses the truth. By the name of habit, therefore, the Apostle sufficiently signified how he said, made in the likeness of men: because He was made not by transfiguration into man, but by habit, since He put on man, whom uniting and conforming to Himself in a certain manner He might associate with immortality and eternity." By these words Augustine seems openly to intimate that God is said to have been made man according to habit. He also, wishing to express the mode of the incarnation itself to those inquiring, says in the fourth book On the Trinity "If it is asked how the incarnation was made, [I say] it itself; for these things are difficult." The same, in the book On Faith to Peter "I say the Word of God was made flesh, that is, made man: yet not converted and changed into that which He was made, but clothed with flesh so that He might appear congruously to flesh. Indeed so made, that there is not only the Word of God and the flesh of man, but also the rational soul of man. And this whole is called both God on account of God, and man on account of man. But if this is difficult to understand, let the mind be purged by faith, by abstaining from sins, and doing good works. The Son of God, though He is the eternal and true God, was made a true and full man for us. True in this, because that God has true human nature: full indeed in this, because He assumed both human flesh and a rational soul." Also, "That taking up or emptying of the highest God was nothing else than the taking up of the servile form, that is, of human nature: therefore both forms are in Christ, because both substances are true and full in Christ, namely the divine and the human nature." Also, in the book Against Maximinus "Since He was invisible through Himself, He appeared visible in man, whom He deigned to assume from a woman." Also, in the same: "We believe that Christ the Lord assumed a true man, and in him, invisible, appeared visibly to men: in him He conversed among men, in him He endured human things from men, in him He taught men." Hilary also in the book On the Trinity [207] says: "How was the Son of God born of Mary, except that the Word was made flesh, namely that the Son of God, since He was in the form of God, received the form of a servant. Yet we profess one and the same, not by the defection of God, but by the assumption of man: and that He was found in the form of God on account of the divine nature, and in the form of a servant from the conception of the Holy Spirit according to the habit of man. That habit was not only of man, but as of man: nor was that flesh the flesh of sin, but in the likeness of the flesh of sin."

§ 43. You have heard the three opinions posited according to diverse authors, and the testimonies introduced for each.

Expositio Textus

Exposition of the Text

There are also others, who in the incarnation, etc.

206. Phil 2:7.

§ 44. This is the third opinion, which is now not an opinion, but a manifest error condemned by Pope Alexander [III].

§ 45. And the treatise on this error is divided into two parts, just like those of the preceding opinions. For first he posits the chapter in which there are two positions. Secondly, authorities are introduced which seem to say this, although they do not say it.

§ 46. From the first chapter they draw seven positions of this error, which are all false. The first is that, since the natural union is twofold, namely of the soul to the flesh, and of the flesh and soul with the deity, that in Christ neither of those made any one thing: for neither did the soul and flesh when united make one man, nor did the nature of man and the Son of God when united make one person: and this is at the beginning of the chapter, there, F, There are also others, who in the incarnation of the Word, etc.

§ 47. The second position is that, with these two things accepted according to truth, Christ did not use them to make them one with Himself, but rather as a garment, so that He might appear visible in them to the eyes of mortals: and this is taken there, They say that those two, namely the soul and the flesh, are united to the person or nature of the Word.

§ 48. The third is that He was not made one with man in truth: but for this reason He is said to have been truly made, although He is not truly a man: because He accepted true flesh and soul for a garment: and this is extracted from there: And for this reason He is said to have been made a true man, etc.

§ 49. The fourth is that He did not accept these into singularity or [into] something constituted from them: but He is said to have accepted them, because with those two accepted for a garment, the number of persons is not increased: and this is drawn from there: Which two also into singularity, etc.

§ 50. The fifth is that the person was not made composite by any composition: for He did not unite these to Himself: but He is said to be made composite because He accepted the use of this garment: and this is taken there, and because the person of the Word itself, which was previously without a garment, etc.

§ 51. The sixth is that God was not essentially, that is, according to being, made man, or the Son of God is not called man [essentially], but according to the habit of man: and this is elicited from there: For by accepting man, God is called, etc., and they call "being a man" having human nature, not that by the union of soul and flesh a man was made from that nature, as is clear in the second opinion.

§ 52. The seventh and last is the cause of their statement: because it seems inconvenient to them that God could be united according to being to a creature: because if He were united to a weaker creature, then it would follow that He Himself, according to being, would be that creature; and they give the example of the female sex: and this is taken at the end of the chapter, there, For if essentially, they say, God is man, etc.

207. Hilary of Poitiers, De Trinitate, X.

§ 53. From these statements two other positions further follow: of which the first is that to say Christ is man is this, which is to have an ununited human nature. For grant that it is united: this will be against the first position. Similarly grant that it is essentially: this will be against the seventh position. Therefore it is left that He is called man for the reason that He had true human nature not united by a natural union. The second is that, because in the three days [of death] He had these ununited, He was a man in the three days: and on account of this last point, because the Master [Peter Lombard] grants this below, the Master is blamed for having been of this opinion.

§ 54. But because this error is novel, and no one has disputed against it: we will posit some reasons against these positions.

§ 55. There are three against the first [position]: because the body of a man neither senses nor lives the life of nature through the fact that it is conjoined to the soul by just any conjunction, but through the fact that it is conjoined to it as to a perfection and act. Either, therefore, Christ's body neither sensed nor lived with natural life and natural sense, or it was necessary that the soul was united to the body as the act of a proper potency or matter.

§ 56. Then one proceeds thus: Whatever two things are conjoined by a natural conjunction as matter and form, constitute a third which is neither of them. Christ's soul and body, as has been proved, are so conjoined; therefore they constitute a third which is neither of them. But this is nothing other than a man; therefore they constitute this man, which the first position denies.

§ 57. Also, this position is expressly the heresy of Pelagius. Hence Cassian in the sixth book against Nestorius "The wickedness of the Pelagian heresy, asserting a solitary man born of the Virgin, yet said he was an instructor of the human race rather than a redeemer: because he did not give redemption to men, but an example of living." If therefore no union was made to the Word, but He only thus appeared to the eyes, it is necessary that the Virgin begot only a man, or less than a man, if she begot only a part of a man, which is the body.

§ 58. Also, thirdly: because from this it follows that Christ was never a man, just as the human nature which is the body never was, nor is, nor will be a man. The Son of God never had anything except the nature without the twofold union of which it has been spoken: therefore Christ was never truly a man. It is clear, therefore, that the first position is false.

§ 59. The second [position] is proved false in this way: If He only used these two accepted according to truth so that He might appear to the eyes of mortals: then He superfluously used that which would not appear to the eyes of mortals. But the soul does not appear to the eyes of mortals; therefore He assumed it superfluously.

§ 60. Also, whatever is assumed without union to the one assuming, once the office for which it is assumed is accomplished, is laid aside: and this is proved both of the dove in which the Holy Spirit appeared, and of the voice in which the Father appeared, and of all creatures assumed in the apparitions of the Old Testament. Therefore, if the Son of God remaining [un-united] assumed such a nature only...

for the apparition, and when the apparition was enacted he laid it aside: therefore he did not rise in the same nature which he assumed. But whoever says and feels this, is anathematized by Augustine in his exposition of the council: therefore this is also a heresy.

AGAINST THE THIRD OPINION THUS: Christ was neither born nor suffered except from the union. Either from the union with the nature, or with the hypostasis of human nature. Not from the union with the nature: because the nature remains distinct, and the divine nature is neither born nor suffered. If therefore he is not essentially united in hypostasis, he himself in no way essentially truly suffered, nor was born, nor any of the other things.

AGAINST THE FOURTH OPINION: The Son of God did not take this nature into a singularity of nature nor of person, as this position says: therefore the assumed had no singularity with the assuming: therefore in no way was it one with him: therefore what is said of one is not said of the other: and this is contrary to Augustine. And in the same way it is easy to argue against others who agree with them.

Moreover, the authorities adduced for this opinion also do not seem to do anything except in two places, namely where Augustine adapts the fourth kind of habit, and says that it happens or accrues that he was found as a man, not to himself, but by men. But Augustine explains this, because he places force on the fact that he was "found": for he did not find himself, although he was truly man, because he was always known to himself: rather, others knowing him found him conversing among human affairs. And Augustine says that this happens in the similitude adduced: yet human nature does not happen to Christ as an accident, although some say it is turned into an accident: but I do not presume to say this concerning the truth of the incarnation. The second place is in the middle of the same chapter G, where he says: Therefore it is not necessary to understand the Word to be changed, etc. But indeed every man confesses that the Word is not changed, as was said above: but what he says, "as if he had assumed a habit," Augustine corrects that wherein the simile is insufficient, when he says: Although that taking up would ineffably couple—that is, unite—the taken up to the one taking.

From these, the other texts can also plainly be glossed.

DISTINCTIO VII

Divisio Textus

§ 1. But according to the first [opinion] it is said, God became man, etc. This seventh distinction corresponds to the preceding one. For here it is shown how, according to these three opinions, the above-mentioned question is answered—namely, when it is said "God became man" or "God is man," what is predicated in those locutions. And therefore it has three parts: in the first of which he touches upon the response of the first opinion. In the second, the response of the second, there at B: But in the second opinion of this distinction, etc.

§ 2. The first part is divided into two chapters, in the first of which he posits the response according to the first opinion. In the second, however, he posits an objection and solves it, there at A, §2: But to this opinion it is objected, etc.

And through this the meaning of the first part is evident.

Articulus 1 — Whether This Should Be Conceded, Man Began to Be God

Whether this must be conceded: Man began to be God?

But an objection is raised concerning what he says in the first chapter A, §1: That substance began to be God: and concerning that, God began to be a certain substance.

1. For he wishes to say by this that God began to be man, and man began to be God: but what begins, is new: therefore if man begins to be God, he begins to be new: therefore the man then was a new God: but what is new is recent: therefore he begins to be a recent God, which will be against the Psalm saying: There shall be no recent God in thee.
2. Again, what begins to be, now first is, and before this was not (in things that are permanent): because in successive things, "begins" and "ceases" must be expounded otherwise. If therefore man begins to be God, now first he is God, and before this he was not, which is against Augustine and Cassian who say that that man from eternity is God, and that he created the stars.

Solution. It must be said that the first argument does not suit this [first] opinion, but necessarily suits the second, as will be said below.

Hence it must be said to the first, that "man begins to be God" must be conceded according to this opinion which posits that when "man" is said, nothing is supposited except one nature and two substances, as was explained above. And it well follows further: therefore now first he is God, and before this he was not, if we are in the instant of the union: but it does not follow further: therefore he begins to be a new God, or something new, or something recent. Because when this was conceded, "Man begins to be God," the word "begins" posited its inception concerning the nature of the subject in comparison to the predicate: and therefore the inception was posited concerning the form of man and his union. But in the conclusion, it is noted to posit inception concerning the form of the predicate in comparison to the subject: and therefore then it is denoted that God began, and now first is, which is false. Thus one must respond according to this opinion. But it will have to be answered otherwise according to the second opinion, which alone is true among the opinions, as will be clear below.

To the other it must be said that the argument suits this [first] opinion, inasmuch as it posits that nothing is supposited when it is said, "this man", except the supposit of man insofar as it is from human nature and the double substance which is flesh and soul: and thus he was not from eternity. And therefore this opinion is contrary to the Saints, namely Augustine and Cassian. But according to the true opinion, which is the second, it supposits the divine person in human nature and a triple substance. And then one must respond otherwise to both arguments thus: that when it is said, "Man began to be God," that the word "God

began" or "commenced" can note an inception concerning the reality of the subject, or of the predicate. If of the predicate, it is false. If of the subject, it is still twofold, namely that the inception can be posited concerning the supposit in comparison to the form which is signified by the name of the subject; and thus it is true under this sense: this one who is man, insofar as he is man, begins to be God. For although the supposit of the man is the divine person, as proved above, yet the form signified by "man" is nothing but humanity: and in this sense an inception is posited concerning the person by grace of humanity: and therefore it is true. But if the word "begins" posits an inception concerning the supposit absolutely, the locution is false: because then the sense is, "that one who is man begins to be God": and this is false, since he was God from eternity.

Articulus 2 — Whether Christ Insofar as Man Is Predestined

Whether Christ insofar as he is man is predestined?

Next, it is asked concerning what is held in the same chapter A, below, §1: It is rightly said that Christ, insofar as he is man, is predestined, etc.

It seems that being predestined does not belong to Christ: because

1. It does not belong to the same [subject], namely Christ, to predestine and to be predestined. The first is proved from the fact that being active belongs to God alone: but the other only belongs to a creature who is to be in grace and glory. The second is proved from the fact that the works of the Trinity are indivisible.
2. Again, Christ is the art of the Father full of the reasons of all living things, as Augustine says: therefore in Christ are all the predestined and their graces: therefore if Christ is predestined, Christ is in Christ, and the art in the art, which seems absurd.
3. Again, the Apostle says: He chose us in him, namely in Christ, before the constitution of the world. Therefore we are chosen in Christ: therefore predestined. If therefore he himself is predestined, he is not predestined except in himself: and this again is to say nothing, that the same one should be chosen and predestined in himself.

But on the contrary: To the Romans 1:4: Who was predestined the Son of God in power, according to the spirit of sanctification.

Solution. According to this [first] opinion it is easy to respond to the objections: because the objections do not touch it, but rather the second opinion: because this opinion says that "man" supposits nothing but the supposit of man in one nature and two substances.

And therefore they say to the first, that Christ in the divine supposit and nature predestines: and that man in the human supposit and nature is predestined: and thus it is not absurd that to one in person according to diverse supposits and natures it belongs to predestine and to be predestined, and to be eternal and temporal.

To the other they say similarly, that Christ in the eternal supposit and nature is the art of the Father: but in the supposit of man he is an artifact which is contained by an ideal cause in the art, and yet the person is one.

To the other they say in this way, that it is not absurd to choose something in himself: for the very same person according to the divine supposit was choosing in whom the Father chose: and he himself according to the human supposit and nature was chosen, because there were two supposits, not one.

But since this opinion is false, therefore it is necessary to respond.

Therefore it must be said to the first, that although Christ the Son of God insofar as he is such is the same as Christ in both natures and triple substance, yet according to consideration he differs: because first the simple person is supposited, but second the composite person. Now to the person as he is simple, it belongs to predestine: but to the person as he is composite, it belongs to be predestined: yet not that the person is either in the divine nature, but as the composite person in human nature and the substance of flesh and soul. And let no force be placed on the [term] composition: just as the second opinion in the letter explains through what mode he is composite. And thus it is clear that although to predestine and to be predestined belong to the same, yet it is not in respect of the same thing.

To the other it must be said in the same way, that the person as simple is the art of the Father by appropriation, and nothing prohibits the same from being contained in itself as regards the fact that it was going to be in human nature.

To the third it must be said that there is nothing absurd in this way for him to be chosen in himself considered diversely.

Exposition of the text.

Next it is asked concerning this proposition of Origen which they adduce in the same chapter, A, §2: He was made without doubt that which he was not before.

For either this is the hypostasis, or the human nature. If the hypostasis: therefore Christ was made some hypostasis which was not always: but some hypostasis is some man: therefore he himself was made some man: and this was disproved above.

And it must be said that Origen adds according to the flesh: and this determination verifies the locution. Because it must not be conceded according to the truth, although this opinion says so, that Christ is some substance which was not always: because the hypostasis of this man and of the Son of God is one. But if the nature is understood: he himself on this day is not his nature: just as he never was, nor will be: and therefore it can be verified neither of the hypostasis nor of the nature: and therefore it is excluded, because this opinion is absolutely false.

§ 3. But in the second opinion, etc.

Here is posited the response of the second opinion which, as is commonly held, is contained in six chapters, in the first of which the response is posited. In the second, the

determination of the authorities adduced for the first opinion, there at D: The authorities also determine, etc. In the third, certain objections to the contrary, there at E: But to these it seems to be opposed, etc. In the fourth, the solution of those, there at F: But these in this manner, etc. In the fifth, it is determined how Christ is said to be both, there at H: What was also said, Christ is both. In the sixth and last, he objects a certain thing which seems more contrary, and solves it, there at I: But there is also another thing which [seems opposed] to this opinion, etc.

Articulus 3 — Whether Christ Is One or Two Supposits

Whether Christ is one or two supposits?

Concerning the authorities adduced in the fifth chapter E, a doubt arises: because they seem to prove that Christ is two: and this is against the position of that opinion stated above, which is that Christ is nothing but one: since he himself is neither two supposits, nor two natures.

BUT IT IS OBJECTED: 1. As Augustine says: The Word of God is one thing, the man is another. Again, in the same place: The Son of man is one thing, the Son of God is another: and the other authorities adduced there.

1. To the same by reason: Christ is one by a created unity, and he is one by an uncreated unity: and the created unity is not the uncreated unity: therefore Christ is two. Proof of the first. Every thing is one by the unity of a form: but Christ is in an uncreated form: therefore he himself is not one. Proof of the second: because created and uncreated are opposed: therefore the one is not the other.
2. Again, Christ is something in which he agrees with the mother, and Christ is something in which he agrees with the Father: and that in which he agrees with the mother is not that in which he agrees with the Father: therefore Christ is two. And the propositions are proved in the same way.
3. Again, Christ is something passible and mortal, because [he is] a man who is passible and mortal: and he is something which is impassible and immortal, because of the divine nature of Christ: therefore Christ is two. If it is said that it does not follow: He is passible and mortal: therefore he is not impassible and immortal. On the contrary: Impassible and immortal is what is neither mortal nor passible: passible and mortal is what is passible and mortal. Therefore if they are the same, that which is not mortal and passible is mortal and passible: these are contradictorily opposed: therefore contradictories are simultaneously verified of the same thing, which cannot be.

Solution. To these and all sophisms of this kind it must be said that Christ is truly one supposit subsisting in two natures, and out of three substances: because this is the confession of the Catholic faith. Now it is notably said that Christ is a supposit in two natures . Hence the supposit is predicated of Christ in the nominative [recto], but the nature in the oblique. Thus the Son of God is man, and the Son of God is of human nature. And on the part of the other nature it is similarly thus: this man is the Son of God, and this man is of the divine nature.

And if it is said that this is not the divine nature, but it accrues to him, and not essentially (per se): for this is not from the nature insofar as it is a nature, but from the fact that in divine things person and nature do not differ. And this is clear from the fact that although in divine things the nature is the supposit, and conversely, yet not whatever belongs to the supposit belongs to the nature. And this is so because the nature, in that it is a nature, is not the supposit in that it is a supposit: but this happens on account of the simplicity which is between the nature and the supposit. And although in divine things no predicate falls by accident, nevertheless the proposition is not immediate when it is said, "The supposit is the nature": and still less immediate is the proposition when it is said, "This man is the divine nature," demonstrating Christ. Because there are two middle terms there, namely that this man is the Son of God, and the Son of God has no difference from the eternal nature.

Having seen these things, one must respond to the objections.

To the first therefore it must be said that when Augustine says that the Word is another thing, he rightly understands another according as the predicate is taken in conjunction to the oblique predicate signified in the form of that nominative: hence it is another Word, that is, the Word in the divine nature insofar as he is such. And from this it does not follow that Christ is simply two: but it follows that he is one thing and another according to something that is in him: and this is true, and it is not against this opinion.

In the same way the solution to all the authorities adduced in that chapter is clear.

To what is objected by reason, it must be said that this is true, that Christ is one by a created unity: and it is true that this unity is not that unity if it is taken in the abstract, as the objection proceeds: because the unity will be the nature which makes the one a unit, or a form. But it does not follow further: therefore Christ is two. Because although this unity or form is not that one, nevertheless the "one" of the one is the same as the "one" of the other: because "one" speaks of the hypostasis, while "unity" speaks of the natural form: and those forms in Christ were two, and yet the "one" was only one.

To the other it must be said that "Christ is something in which he agrees with the mother"—this is true, if it is duly understood. Now the sense is that Christ is one in which the grace of the nature agrees with the mother, and not the grace of the supposit: because the supposit of the Son is not the supposit of the mother. Similarly this is true: "Christ is something in which he agrees with the Father": and in the same sense, because the hypostasis of the Son is not the hypostasis of the Father: but the nature of the Son is the nature of the Father. But from this it does not follow that Christ is two hypostases, but that one hypostasis existing in two natures, in one of which he agrees with the mother, and in the other he agrees with the Father.

To the last it must be said that when it is said, "Christ is something passible and something impassible," something is not taken in the same way in both. For when "something passible" is said, the word something signifies the supposit, and not the nature except obliquely. But when "something impassible" is said, it signifies the nature in the nominative: and it does not signify the supposit, neither obliquely nor directly. And therefore it does not follow that he is two, but that he is one in two natures. From this it is clear that they are not contradictories, to be

something passible, and to be something impassible. Yet although this is denied, "the divine nature is passible" is false because of simple things and because it is composite: however, it is distinguishable from the fact that "passible" can be an adjective, and posit its reality concerning the divine nature, and then it is false and composite. But if it is a substantive and does not posit its reality concerning the divine nature, but concerning the word something which is understood implicitly: then it is true, "the divine nature is a passible thing," that is, something which is passible: because it itself is the supposit of the Son of God, which supposit is passible. But then it is invalid if from this it is inferred thus: "The divine nature is a passible thing (neuter): therefore the divine nature is passible (feminine)": because "passible" (in gendered form) signifies a formed gender, namely masculine or feminine, and that does not enclose within itself a finite subject like the neuter does, which encloses in itself the finite essence of a thing, because a general subjected thing suffices for the finitude of nothing: which is not the case in a formed gender which seeks to posit its reality concerning a special entity. And therefore passibilis (passible, m./f.) is an adjective according to the Grammarians: and cannot be substantivized in the same way as passibile (a passible thing, n.).

Articulus 4 — What Kind of One Christ Is

What sort of one is Christ?

Next it is asked concerning what he says around the end of the following chapter F: Not that the Son of God himself and the Son of man are those two diverse things, etc.

For from this it is supposited that Christ is only one.

But it must be asked, what sort of one: and having established what sort of one he is, it is asked whether he is more one than other natural unities?

To the first one proceeds thus: Blessed Bernard in book V of De Consideratione distinguishes nine modes of unity, saying thus: There is a unity which can be called collective, for example, many stones make one heap. And there is a constitutive unity when many members constitute one body or many parts constitute any whole. There is also a conjugative unity by which it comes about that two are not two, but one flesh. There is also a natural one by which a soul and flesh are born a man. There is again a potestative unity, by which a man of virtue is not unstable, not divisible: but strives to be found one with himself. There is a consentaneous unity when through charity there is one heart and one soul of many men. There is also a volitive unity when the soul adheres to God in all its vows, and is one spirit. And there is a dignative unity by which our clay is assumed into one person with the Word of God. (The ninth he had called the union of the three persons in one nature of the deity). From this it is clear that Bernard reduces that "one" which is Christ to the dignative unity.

But it seems that it ought to be reduced to the conjugative unity: because

1. So says the Apostle to the Ephesians 5:32: This is a great sacrament: but I speak in Christ and in the Church. Now the Church is espoused by immediate espousal in the head: therefore it seems that it is reduced to the conjugative.

2. Again, This is now bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh, the Saints expound concerning the flesh assumed by the Son of God.

3. Again, the Apostle, I Corinthians 11:3: I would have you know that the head of every man is Christ: but the head of the woman is the man: but the head of Christ is God: he seems to intimate the same union.

Solution. It must be said in truth that it is a dignative unity, and it is called dignative because through the grace of God's condescension (dignationis) to our nature this unity was made, as was held above and is held here, that that man, in order to be assumed into such a singularity of the Son of God, had it by grace, and not by nature, nor by merits.

But from the objections to the contrary, nothing is proved except that it has something similar with the matrimonial or conjugative unity: because namely the two natures in Christ have the custom of an undivided life, and the one is ruling and the other is ruled.

Articulus 5 — Whether Christ Is More One than Other Things That Are One Naturally

Whether Christ is more one than other natural unities?

Secondly, it is asked concerning the comparison of that union to those things which are united by nature, which are distinguished in manifold ways by the Philosophers: but let us briefly touch upon the summary, reducing them to an order.

Now the Philosopher distinguishes between one essentially (unum per se) and one accidentally (unum per accidens).[208] Accidentally is said in four ways, namely: two accidents, of which one accrues to the rest, as "a navigator" and "a musician" are one; two substances under one accident, as Socrates and Plato are one in being musical; one accident in two substances, and this in two ways: either as a subject is contained under another subject, and then the accident can be compared to both, although to one more properly, as "a man" and "a musical man" are one; or the accident can be attributed to the subject without comparison to a superior, as "this man is musical." The first and third and fourth modes the Philosopher posits in the fourth book of the Metaphysics.[209] But the second, although he does not posit it, nevertheless he intimates by examples, by similitude, by the whole from the lesser, when he says that "musical" is an accident to both men, and because among one essentially he posits one in genus, as an isosceles and an equilateral are one figure, although they are not one triangle.

But one essentially has nine modes, namely: indivisible, as a point or a unit.

Continuation, and this in three ways, namely: whose parts are coupled to the same boundary; or whose diverse parts are glued together by artifice; or whose parts are collected to one thing which is their origin by nature, just as an organic body is one by the colligation of its parts to a principle, namely to the heart, which (as Basil says) is the foundation of the whole body. Now the sign of being one is that its motion is one. Because Boethius says that the sign of a continuum is that when one part is moved, the whole is moved: and this is understood of local motion. And in this way the parts of the body are also called one, as one hand, or one

foot, which is easily seen, because the motion of the hand is one even if the arm is unmoved, and so of the others.

The third mode of one is that whose subject is not divided according to form. Now those things are not divided according to form whose forms are not divided according to position and subject, either first or ultimate: just as it is said "one wine" and "one water." Also, homogeneous things which if divided, the same form remains in the whole and in the part: and therefore they are not divided according to form. But simple things, like water, are not divided according to the form of the first subject which is simple matter: because elements are not mixed, nor do they have a mixed nature; and therefore they are homogeneous in whole and in parts in the first subject in the order of nature. But wine and lead and oil are one according to the form of the ultimate subject, which is proximate to the form of the species, just as a mixture which is one in the whole and in the parts: although they are not one in the form of the first subject which is the intermediate miscible things of wine or oil, because a certain part of that first subject is water, a certain part air, a certain part earth, and a certain part fire.

In the fourth mode it is one in the form of a genus only, which is not the whole being: although it is part of their being, and, although it has diverse differences by which their species are constituted, such as man, horse, dog. And according to this mode, things are called materially one whose species are diverse in nature: but they are mutually transmutable, just as generable and corruptible things are one, as Boethius says, because their matter is one, and species diverse.

In the fifth mode, what is one by definition is one: and this in respect to a superior, just as augmentation and diminution are one, because both of them are motion in quantity: or in respect to an inferior, just as the definition and the defined are one.

In the sixth mode it is one: because it is divided neither by time nor place nor definition: and such a one is chiefly a substance which is one in the division of its substantials.

In the seventh mode it is one, which is not divided according to form, although it has material parts: as one man is one animal, and one entity is one; although both are divided through matter.

Eighthly it is called one, as diverse things in acting and suffering are united in order to one form: as the members of an organic body are called one in respect to the act of life, which is the soul.

Ninthly they are called one, whose substance is one: and because substance is said in three ways, namely matter and form and composite, therefore it is said in those three ways.

Let it be asked therefore, whether Christ is more one than any of those ones, so to speak?

It seems that he is: because chiefly one among those is one indivisible, and one by natural form just as a composite is one: and yet in those, what belongs to one does not belong to the

208. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book V.

other: because what belongs to a point does not belong to a unit: or what belongs to a form does not belong to matter: therefore since whatever belongs to the man belongs to the Son of God, and conversely, it seems that Christ is more one than those.

But on the contrary it seems that he is less one: because

1. In nature there is the unity of a composite in united matter and form. And there is the unity of an individual in individuating principles, which are more distant than matter and form: for substance and accident are more distant than substance and substance: therefore the union of the individual is lesser than the union of matter and form.
2. Again, an accident and an accident pertaining to dignity are more distant than an accident and an accident absolutely: therefore the union of the person is lesser than that of the individual: because the individual is made by a collection of accidents, but the person by a property pertaining to dignity: therefore it seems that the union of the person is the least.

But this is against Blessed Bernard, who in book V of De Consideratione says thus: Among all things which are rightly called one, the unity of the Trinity holds the peak: because three persons are one substance. In second place excels that unity by which, conversely, three substances are one person in Christ.[210]

Again, in the same place, I say that in Christ the Word, soul, and flesh are one person without confusion of essences, and likewise remain in their numerousness without prejudice to the personal unity.[211]

But it seems that this unity collects two simultaneously, namely the union of soul and body, and the union of the three persons in the divine nature: because so says Bernard: Nor would I deny that this also pertains to that kind of unity by which soul and flesh are one man. For it was fitting that the sacrament constituted for man should agree more familiarly and similarly with the constitution of man. It was also fitting to agree with the highest unity which is in God: so that just as there three persons are one essence, so here by a certain most fitting contrariety three essences are one person.[212]

Solution. It must be said that the "one" by which Christ is one is reduced to no unity of natural things, neither to essentially one nor to accidentally one. And it is no wonder if the Philosophers did not know of this unity, which was made not except through grace and not through nature.

And therefore I say that unity can be considered in three ways. In one way, namely in the proportion of the conjoined things: and thus the unity of the Trinity is the greatest, and after this the unity of an indivisible nature, and afterwards the unity of a nature through form, and it is more in homogeneous things, and less in heterogeneous things, and still less in things conjoined out of a spiritual and a corporeal nature. And especially it must be considered that according to the distance of the united things, the union is lesser. Uniting power can also be

209. Albert refers here to Metaphysics IV, though the discussion of "unum" belongs primarily to Metaphysics V (Delta), Chapter 6.

considered: and thus the unity of the Trinity is the greatest, and after this the unity of the three substances in Christ, and the natural union is lesser: because form in natural things...

uniting is weaker than the nature uniting persons, or the person uniting natures. § 2. In the third way, union can be considered according to the things that follow upon the united: and thus the maximum unity is still that of the Trinity, because from it whatever substantially belongs to one, belongs also to the other, and conversely. Still less is the natural unity which is of form and matter: for not from the union of those does whatever belongs to the form belong to the matter, and conversely. § 3. To that which is objected, therefore, that the personal union is minimal, I say that this would follow if there were no union except in a personal property: but just as was determined in the fifth distinction, this union is according to the being of the hypostasis, which is to be this, or which is here: and therefore the union is in a thing of nature, although the natures remain distinct. But the objection proceeds as if the union of the individual and the person were only in the accidents, or properties of the individual and the person. § 4. But to this which is objected concerning Bernard, that it seems to be intermediate between the unity of the Trinity and the union of the soul with the body, it must be said that this is true with respect to the last two considerations, and not with respect to the first. And that he intends this is clear: because he adds thus in the original: Thus this unity of the two, subsisting in the middle of the unities, is known to succumb to one and to pre-eminent the other, by as much as it is inferior to the superior, so much it is superior to the inferior. Finally, the person in whom God and man is one Christ exhibits in Himself so great and so express a force of union, that if you predicate those two of one another, you would err, namely pronouncing God to be man, and not man to be God truly and catholically. But you do not similarly predicate flesh of soul, or soul of flesh, unless most absurdly, although similarly soul and flesh are one man. Moreover, that it is not through the power of the uniting, is clear in the same place, where he says thus: Nor is it surprising if the soul by its vital though valid intention is not equally powerful to connect and by its effects bind flesh to itself, as the deity connects to itself that man who is predestinated to be the Son of God in power. And by this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 6 — Whether It Is True That Human Nature in Christ Degenerates into an Accident

§ 6. Whether it is true that the human nature in Christ degenerates into an accident? § 8. Whether it is true that the human nature in Christ degenerates into an accident?

§ 9. Next, it is asked concerning the third opinion which is an error, which is touched upon there, K, In this sentence therefore, etc. § 10. For certain people, who wish to be of this opinion, do not indeed say that He took human nature as a habit: but nevertheless they say that in Christ it degenerates into an accident: and this is proved thus: § 11. 1. An accident is that which is present and absent besides the corruption of the subject: but human nature is present and absent to the Son of God, who is no less the Son of God: therefore human nature is an accident to the Son of God. § 12. 2. Also, An accident is what comes to

210. Bernard of Clairvaux, De Consideratione, Book V.

a nature already complete: but human nature comes to the Son of God already complete in nature and person: therefore human nature in Him is an accident. § 14. 3. Also, An accident is what is predicated denominatively, and not as a substance: for Socrates is not said to be humanized, but is called a man: but he is called whitened, if whiteness is signified to be in him as at the term of motion to whiteness: since therefore Christ here is called humanized, it seems that human nature is present by accident. § 15. 4. Also, An accident united to something does not vary it from its proper nature: the human nature coming to the Son of God did not vary Him: therefore it is an accident, or it degenerates into an accident.

§ 16. BUT AGAINST: § 17. 1. The Philosopher says, What is a substance in itself, is an accident to no one: but human nature in itself is a substance: therefore it is an accident to no one. § 18. 2. Also, An accident is either of the species or of the individual: of the species, as a proper passion: but of the individual it is compared to the subject either as to a subject only, or to a subject as to a cause. If therefore human nature degenerates into an accident, it will be an accident in one of these ways. Not in the first way: because thus human nature would be converted with the Son of God always and everywhere, which is false. Nor in the second way: because the Son is not the subject of human nature. Hence if human nature were in a divine person, then the divine person would be human nature, which is false. Nor in the third way: because the Son of God does not express the cause of human nature.

§ 19. Solution § 20. It must be consented to the last reasons, that human nature in no way is an accident, nor does it degenerate into an accident: nor did the ancients say that it degenerates into an accident, but that it converges (vergit) into an accident: and the moderns changed vergit into degenerat, although those are very different. For it seems to verge upon an accident because of its agreement with a certain property of an accident, not because of the nature of an accident, namely that it can be absent from the Son of God without the diminution of the person, and comes to Him without augmentation: because the goodness of human nature adds nothing to the divine person, just as neither does a point to a line or a quantity: but far be it that it degenerates, because rather it becomes generous (ennobled). § 21. To the first, therefore, it must be said that this makes it communicate in a certain property of an accident, and not to be an accident according to nature. In this way it must be answered to the next. § 22. To the other it must be said, when God is called humanized, that in the mode of predication it is not understood that it is an accidental habit according to nature, but according to the property which was mentioned. Through these also the solution to the last is clear.

Articulus 7 — Whether Christ Is Fittingly Called the Lordly Man

§ 24. Whether Christ is congruously called a dominical man? § 26. Whether Christ is congruously called a dominical man?

§ 27. Next it is asked concerning this which he says, there, M, Yet he is not congruously called a dominical man. § 28. For the contrary seems because § 29. 1. 1 Kings 1:19, upon that: Elkanah

211. Ibid.

knew, the Gloss says: Who is here except the dominical man, namely the Lord Jesus Christ. § 30. 2. Also. Augustine in the Sermon on the Mount: It is permitted to no one to be ignorant of the kingdom of God, since His only-begotten came down from heaven not only intelligibly, but also sensibly and visibly in the dominical man. § 31. 3. Also, Cassian in the sixth book against Nestorius: *Although therefore with our confession itself before the birth and conception of the Virgin Christ was not the dominical man: nevertheless because in you He is called solitary, the God-man is preached in the Sacred Scriptures without beginning: and so great a unity of man and God is read, that both the man

seems always coeternal to God before, and God to have suffered for the man afterwards.* § 33. 4. Furthermore, Damascene often calls the man deified: therefore he can also be called a dominical man.

§ 34. If perchance it is said, that dominical is a possessive noun, and thus signifies the thing of the noun to which it is adjoined to be possessed. § 35. Against: Christ took the form of a servant, and is called the servant of the Lord, Isa. 52:13: Behold my servant shall understand.

§ 36. Solution § 37. He ought not to be called a dominical man: but it ought to be said, that Christ the man expresses a person: and that was never a servant, although He took a servile nature. § 38. But that He himself is called a servant does not belong to Him by the grace of the person simply, but by the grace of the nature which is in the person: and therefore because dominical sounds as if the person of Christ is servile, therefore Augustine retracts himself. § 39. Nevertheless, dominical is sometimes said not as a possessive, but for one having dominion, as a logician who has logic: and thus some call him dominical, but it ought not to be extended, because it more properly sounds of a servile person.

DISTINCTIO VIII

Divisio Textus

§ 40. Division of the Text § 41. DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

§ 42. After these things it ought to be inquired, etc. § 43. Here begins that part which is about the things convenient to the conjunct from the unity and the unible. § 44. There are moreover three things according to Dionysius to be considered in every perfect unity, namely substance, power, and operation: and substance is called the composite or person, power however is the natural potency for action or passion, operation however is the work which belongs to the hypostasis constituted and perfected according to the power which is in it. And therefore also the properties of the united Christ are threefold. For either they are of the united according as it is united: and these are treated in the first part. Or they are of Christ according to the potency or power taken on the part of the soul or the body: and these are treated in the second part, which begins, distinction XIII, there, A, Furthermore it must be known, that Christ according

212. Ibid.

to the man from the very conception, etc. And that this is true is clear: because there he treats of the wisdom and grace of Christ, which are in Him according to the potency taken in the soul: and in distinction XV he treats of our assumed defects, which are in Him according to the impotency taken on the part of the body. Or there are also properties taken according to works: and these he treats in distinction XVIII which begins there, A, Concerning the merit also of Christ it is not to be passed over, etc. And that this also is true is clear: because all the things which are posited there are about merit, mediation, and redemption, and about death which was the work of most excellent fortitude: and therefore in that the tractate on the incarnation is finished.

§ 45. Therefore concerning the properties of Christ the man in so far as He is God and man, it is treated in the first part: and it is divided into two parts. For certain properties are in Him in being: but certain ones are not in Him, except according to power through the intellect, just as is the power to assume another, the power to assume in the female sex. Therefore concerning those which are in Him in the first way, he treats in the first four distinctions, and also in the first chapter of the fifth distinction which is the twelfth. But concerning those which are in Him in the second way, he treats in another part of the twelfth distinction, there, B, But it is usually asked, Whether another man, etc.

§ 46. The properties which are in Him in being are caused by the essential principles of Christ. But those are either extrinsic, like father and mother: or intrinsic, like both natures. And therefore the former is divided into three parts: in the first of which it is treated of the properties following the united Christ according to the comparison to the principle from which as through generation, such as to be born, or to be born twice: and these are treated in this eighth distinction. Or they are caused by the divine nature, such as honor, and adoration, and the like: and these he treats in distinction IX, there, A, Furthermore it is necessary to investigate, etc. Or they follow Him from the human nature: and of those it must be spoken in the tenth and eleventh distinction, and in the first chapter of the twelfth. But this part begins there, dist. X, A, It is also usually inquired by some, etc.

§ 47. But in this distinction which is of the present reading, there are two chapters, namely whether the divinity ought to be said to be born and conceived? And, Whether Christ ought to be said to be twice born, there, B, It is also usually asked, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether the Divine Nature Is Born and Conceived, and Whether the Human Nature Is Born, and Whether It Can Be Said That the Divine Nature or the Human Nature Is Born by Consequence

§ 49. Whether the divine nature is born and conceived? and, Whether the human nature is born? and, Whether it can be said that the divine or human nature is born consequently? § 51. Whether the divine nature is born and conceived? and, Whether the human nature is born? and, Whether it can be said that the divine or human nature is born consequently?

§ 52. But a doubt arises here concerning the beginning of the first chapter, where he says: It seems indeed that it ought not to be said, namely of the divine nature, that it is born of the Virgin. § 53. And the question is multiplied, so that first it is asked, If the divine nature is born and

conceived? § 54. Secondly, If the human nature is born in Him? § 55. Thirdly, If the divine or human, although not primarily, yet consequently ought to be said to be born or conceived?

§ 56. To the first of these it is proceeded thus: § 57. 1. This is conceded, The divine nature is incarnate: but nothing is incarnate, except what was first conceived in the flesh in the womb of the Virgin: therefore it ought to be conceded that the divine nature is conceived: but nothing is conceived except what is born, if the nature does not suffer an impediment: therefore it ought to be conceded that the divine nature is born. § 58. 2. Also, Hilary in the book On the Trinity: The Son has nothing except what is born: since therefore this is true of eternal generation, it can also be said of the temporal; because He is not born of the Virgin in part, and not in part, but wholly. § 59. 3. Also, for otherwise His mother would not be called Theotokos: therefore it ought to be conceded that the divine essence is born in Him. § 60. 4. Also, In the Son of God according to the intellect there are only two, namely the essence, and the property, although those two are one in Him. Therefore He is incarnate either by reason of the essence, or by reason of the property, or by reason of both. Not by reason of the property only: because this would be ridiculous, that that property would be born. Similarly not by reason of the essence only: because thus the Father would be born. Therefore He is born by reason of both: therefore the divine essence is born. § 61. 5. Also, In lower things we see that when someone is born, everything which is in him is born with him: therefore much more will this be in higher things, in which there is greater simplicity: since therefore the essence is in Him, the essence seems to be born. § 62. 6. Also, In lower things whatever is predicated directly of the born, is said to be born, just like the born one: as, this is born, and this is Peter, and Peter is said to be born. Therefore also in higher things whatever is predicated directly of the Son of God, if the Son of God is said to be born, they also will be said to be born: but the Son of God is the divine essence: therefore it itself is said to be born.

§ 63. Furthermore it is asked concerning the second article of the question, Whether the human nature ought to be said to be born? § 64. It seems that it should: because § 65. 1. Human nature began: and everything which began, either began through creation, or generation: but human nature did not begin through creation: therefore through generation: therefore it itself is born or generated. § 66. 2. Furthermore, Nothing is generated by temporal generation, except what began in time: the person of Christ did not begin in time, as has already been often proved: therefore the person of Christ is not born in time: since therefore something is born of the Blessed Virgin, it seems that it is necessary for the human nature to be born. § 67. 3. Also, This is born of the Virgin, which is made by the operation of the Holy Spirit: but this is human nature, for the Holy Spirit did not make the person of Christ: therefore human nature is born.

§ 68. BUT AGAINST both parts of the question it is objected thus: § 69. 1. Nothing is generated except a complete being in that nature: but a complete being is

the supposit: therefore what is generated is the supposit. § 71. 2. Also, The Philosopher in the VII of First Philosophy proves that neither matter nor form is generated, but the whole composite: since therefore both matter and form are the composite of nature, it does not belong to nature to be generated, nor to be born. § 72. 3. Also, That is not generated except in

which generation is terminated: but generation is not terminated except at the supposit: therefore it does not properly belong to nature to be generated, or to be born.

§ 73. Furthermore it is asked concerning the third article of the question, namely, Whether it can be conceded of the divine nature, that it itself is born consequently? § 74. It seems, that it can: because § 75. 1. If I say, This generates this one per se, and this one is a man: I can further infer, therefore consequently he generates a man: and man is an animal, and consequently he generates an animal, and so of others. Since therefore man and animal express the nature of man, it seems that nature has to be generated and born consequently: therefore similarly of the Son of God, this generates this: and this is the divine nature: therefore it seems, that consequently He generates the divine nature. § 76. 2. Furthermore, Although a foot and a hand and a body are not born per se, yet we can congruously say that they are born in this born one, and thus there is some nativity of them; therefore by a similar reason, although the divine nature is not born, yet it seems that we can say that it is born in Christ.

§ 77. Solution § 78. It must be said, that the divine essence ought in no way to be called born. For as is said in the Letter, nothing ought to be called born in time, which is not born in eternity, lest the name of filiation pass to another, as was held above in the first and fourth distinction. And also therefore because in no nature is it the case that the nature is born: but the hypostasis is born, or the composite substance, as was well proved in the objections. § 79. To the first therefore it must be said, that it is indeed true that this is conceded, that the divine nature is incarnate, under this sense, that the divine nature is associated with flesh in the same person, namely not to itself and in itself according as the nature assumed flesh, but it assumed to itself in the person: whence since nativity belongs to that which in itself and per se is incarnate, the divine nature will not be born on account of this. § 80. To the same it must be said, that nothing is incarnate except what was first conceived, as is already clear: because nothing is conceived, except what is per se united to flesh according to the reason of understanding: and thus the divine nature is not incarnate. § 81. To the other it must be said, that Hilary speaks of the eternal generation: and the sense is, Nothing except what is born, namely what it received by being born. But this cannot be said of the temporal: because by being born temporally, He did not receive the divine nature: and therefore also this is not true, that it is born, so as to be temporally received. § 82. To this which is objected, that according to this the Holy Virgin would not be called Theotokos: it must be said that it does not follow: because although the divine nature is not born, yet the Son of God and God is born of her. § 83. And if it is objected, that God is the name of substance and nature: and if God is born, the divine nature is born. The response is that although the word 'God' is the name of substance, yet through a notional act as is to be born temporally and eternally, because both belong to the supposit, it is drawn to supposit for the person: and therefore then it does not follow that the divine nature is born. If however the proof is asked, that to be born temporally is notional, let it be recalled to memory what was said above about the incarnation, where it was shown that the eternal generation according to the intellect is enclosed in the temporal. § 84. To the other it must be said, that in the Son of God is the essence, and is the property, and is

the person: and these do not have number: because the essence is the person, and the property: whence just as we say that it does not belong to the essence to be born, so also we say that it does not belong to the property to be born, but to the person which according to the intellect is intermediate between the essence and the property, and signifies the hypostasis perfect and subsisting in itself: for although in divine things because of omnifarious simplicity the essence does not differ from the person and the property, yet when one is supposited the other is not supposited, nor is whatever attributed to one attributed to the other. § 86. To the other it must be said, that in lower things it cannot be said that everything which is in someone is born: for properly it is also not said that the whole is born in him: but properly it is said that he is born in that whole which is in him. Hence that reason proceeds either from false premises or from improper ones. § 87. To the other it must be said, that in lower things although all things are said to be born which are predicated directly, yet not all are said to be born per se, but some by accident, and some consequently: but of some it is said that he himself is born in them, for example, the hypostasis of this one per se: that which is one with the subject, by accident, as white, long, and the like: but that which is the second substance to which the supposit or property or of the species or genus substands, will be said to be born consequently: because the Philosopher says that a universal animal is either nothing, or is posterior. Hence this one is born, and this one is a man, consequently the man is born: and man is an animal, consequently the animal is born, and consequently susceptible to discipline because of the property of the species, consequently alive or vital because of the property of the genus: and so of others. But it is not so in Christ for two reasons. One is, because although the divine nature is predicated of the Son of God, this does not happen from the reason of the person, because He is a person: nor from the reason of the nature because it is a nature: but from elsewhere, namely from omnifarious simplicity. Hence the nature is not posterior to the person, but the same under another mode of signifying. The second is more to the proposition: because namely in those things the whole is received through generation in some way, but it is not so in Christ: for He did not receive the divine nature through temporal generation, as we said before. § 88. To that which is further asked, Whether the human nature ought to be said to be born? It must be said, that according to the understanding of nature which is posited above in the Letter, namely that human nature is the body and the soul, it ought not to be conceded: because in no nature is this true, as the objections well prove. But if human nature were called the universal of the species or genus, it could be said that nature occultly operates in these, and would be born consequently, or a posteriori. § 89. But to that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that this is false, This is born of the Virgin which is made by the operation of the Holy Spirit: because the person is born of the Virgin, and yet the person was not made by the operation of the Holy Spirit. Hence that reason proceeds from false propositions. § 90. 3. To that which is further asked, Whether it can be said, that the divine nature is born consequently? It must be said, that not by those two reasons which are posited above: and it is not similar in lower generation, as is clear from what has been said. And through this the solution to the first is clear. § 91. To the other it must be said, that it is not true, This foot is born in this one, unless very improperly: but it must be said thus, This one is born having a foot

and a hand: if however it is conceded improperly, it will not be similar concerning the divine nature: because it is not received through temporal generation, like a foot, or a hand.

Articulus 2 — Whether in Christ There Is Only One Filiation

§ 93. Whether in Christ there is only one filiation? § 95. Whether in Christ there is only one filiation?

§ 96. Next it is asked concerning this which he says. there, A, around the beginning: Lest any thing have the name of filiation in the humanity, which does not hold it in the divinity. § 97. For from this it seems to be taken, that there is only one filiation, which also is proved by many reasons thus: § 98. 1. In divine hypostases there is no distinguishing property except the relation of origin: therefore there is no personal property except that: but from one personal property one person is called: since therefore this property in the person of the Son is the filiation of the Son, then one person will have only one filiation. § 99. 2. Also, Let us suppose someone is generated actively by a father, as mules do, and the same is generated passively by a mother: from the fact that this one is otherwise generated by the father, and otherwise by the mother, there do not become in him diverse filiations: but by one filiation he posits a respect to the father as to the generating actively, and he posits a respect for the same to the mother according to passive generation: therefore by a similar reason the Son begotten in a diverse way by the Father eternally, and by the mother temporally will not have diverse filiations. § 100. 3. Also, Let us suppose one has ten sons: by one paternity he is referred to all according to diverse respects compared to this one: therefore a diverse act of generation does not cause a diversity of origin. § 101. 4. Furthermore, In every nature a similar thing cannot be found, that something according to the same part even from diverse causes has two properties of the same species: for two whitenesses are not in the same thing according to the same, nor two blacknesses even induced from diverse causes, and similarly in the soul there are not two sciences of the same reason in the same, nor two species of man for understanding man, and thus it is in all things: therefore also it is impossible to understand how this can be true. § 102. 5. If perchance it is said, that human filiation is of another reason, and divine filiation is of another reason: and therefore there are two filiations in the same. Against: Filiation is that which constitutes a son: and whatever is of another reason in the abstract, is also of another in the concrete. This proposition has no instance. Therefore if the filiation is of another reason, the son is of another reason: but a son of one reason, and a son of another reason are two sons: therefore Christ is two sons, which is a heresy. § 103. 6. Also, Either it is of another reason thus, that it is equivocal to it, or that it is said according to prior and posterior. If equivocal: it follows necessarily, that Christ is a son by another and another reason. But if it is said according to prior and posterior: since prior and posterior cannot be equally something common, and because nothing is common to the Creator and the creature, the filiation will be in this mode that this is a filiation by imitating that: therefore it does not recede entirely from its reason: therefore two properties in this way are similar in the same according to the same, although from diverse causes: but because it does not happen to be understood or imagined (for let us suppose uncreated wisdom and created wisdom to be in the same) adjectivally: it will not be intelligible, since they do not recede from one reason of community according to

the proportion to one act. § 104. 7. Furthermore, Let us suppose one master today to have one disciple and tomorrow another and so successively up to a thousand, it would be necessary according to this, that a thousand masterships would be generated in him, which is absurd. § 105. 8. Also, Filiation is the property of a person according to what a person is: but the person is only one, and of one person as a person, there is only one constitutive property: therefore since the son is one person,

the son will not have except one filiation.

§ 107. BUT AGAINST: § 108. 1. Generation is the cause of relation: but in Christ there is not one generation: therefore neither one filiation. § 109. 2. Furthermore, Filiation is that by which the Son is referred to another: but by eternal filiation He is referred to the Father, and not to the mother: therefore there will be another relation to the mother: therefore another filiation.

§ 110. Solution § 111. Without prejudice I say, that there is only one filiation of Christ the Son of God: because it is not intelligible, how those two properties of the same reason would determine one hypostasis: hence I concede the former reasons. § 112. To that which is objected against, that generation is the cause of relation: it must be said, that this is true, unless it is a relation of the same reason which it has to cause: for if that is in it, another cannot be induced upon it, but it induces diverse respects of the same, namely that a father or son with respect to someone is a father, with respect to whom he was not. Just as if we posit someone to be white: and causes inducing whiteness come to him, they will not induce in him another whiteness, but they will make that the same whiteness from another cause is also had than he previously had. § 113. To the other it must be said, that filiation is a property causing a respect in the relative, and in that which is a property it does not look back except to that in which it is, and it is one: but according to that which causes the respect, it does not look back to that in which it is as in a subject, but it seeks to be determined outside: and therefore in one property as many respects are multiplied, as it has outside to which it is referred: and therefore it does not follow, that if in some respect it is referred to the father, and in another to the mother, that there are diverse properties of filiations in Him. Nor is this opinion new, but also written in the writings of other Masters.

Divisio Textus

§ 114. Division of the Text § 115. B. Concerning the twin nativity of Christ, by which He was twice born. § 116. It is also usually asked, Whether Christ ought to be called twice begotten, as He is called the Son of God and of man? To which it can be said that Christ was twice born, and had two nativities. Whence Augustine in the book On Faith to Peter: God the Father from His own nature begot God the Son coequal and coeternal to Himself. The same also only-begotten God was secondly born from the Father once, from the mother once. For the Word of God was born from the Father: the Word made flesh was born from the mother. Therefore one and and same Son of God was born before the ages, and born in the age: and each nativity belongs to one Son of God: namely the divine, and the human. [213] Concerning this also John Damascene says: We therefore venerate two nativities of Christ: one from the

Father before the ages, which is above cause and reason and time and nature: and one, which in the last times... [214]

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§ 1. ...in times past for our sake, and according to us, and above us. For our sake, because it was for our salvation; according to us, because He was born a man from a woman, and in a time of conception, namely of nine months; above us, because [He was born] not from seed, but from the Holy Spirit and the Holy Virgin, above the law of conception. From these things it manifestly appears that there are two nativities of Christ, and that the same [Christ] was born twice.

## Articulus 3 — Whether Christ Can Be Said to Be Twice Begotten, and How He Ought to Be

Whether Christ can be said to be twice begotten, and how He ought to be?

§ 2. Next, it is asked concerning that which is said in chapter B: It is also customarily asked, whether Christ ought to be called twice begotten, etc.

§ 3. It seems that He should not be. 1. For nothing thus existing in act, which itself is never interrupted, makes a number with another act of the same account (ejusdem rationis). For example, if I run eternally with one run, I will never be said to have run twice, even if I am able to run with another run alongside it. For "twice" implies an interruption. But the one generation of the Son is eternal, and therefore not interrupted; therefore, it does not make a number with another generation.

§ 4. 2. Also, whichever acts are not of the same account, "twice" cannot be said of them. For instance, if I run once and write once, it cannot be said, "I ran twice" or "I wrote twice." Therefore, since likewise eternal and temporal generation are not of the same account, He cannot be said to be twice begotten.

§ 5. Solution. Isidore expressly says that Christ is twice born, and the Master says this too; hence this is conceded improperly, so that the sense is "twice born," that is, He has two nativities.

§ 6. Therefore, it must be said to the first objection that when the generation of the Son is called eternal, it is not called eternal because it never reaches an end, but because it stands wholly at once and is perfect—never in becoming (in fieri), never in having-been-made (in factum esse). Rather, it is always complete and perfect, and not interrupted, because nothing is interrupted except time and the temporal. And although eternal generation is not entirely of the same account as temporal generation, it is nevertheless not in no way common to it, because there is a community of proportion there. And thus, insofar as it is complete and perfect, it is improperly numbered together with the temporal generation perfected by the perfection of time. For although eternity and time are not univocal in one [genus], yet they are so ordered that one is under the other, and time imitates eternity insofar as it can.

213. Augustine (Fulgentius of Ruspe), De fide ad Petrum.
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§ 7. To the other objection, it must be said that eternal and temporal generation are of the same account by prior and posterior through analogy, as has often been said.

Articulus 4 — Whether Christ Is One Son

Whether Christ is one Son?

§ 8. Next, it is asked concerning that which is said there, at B, around the middle: Therefore one and the same Son of God was born, etc.

§ 9. For this seems to be false, because: 1. Individuals of diverse natures in genus and species are diverse. But the divine nature and the human nature are diverse natures in species and genus; therefore, their individuals are diverse, as it seems.

§ 10. 2. Also, the termini of diverse acts in nature and being are diverse. Divine and human generation are diverse acts, and each is in nature and being (because generation, according to the Philosopher, is the way into nature). Therefore, they have diverse termini. But the terminus is he who is born; therefore, those who are born are diverse. But those who are born are sons; therefore, the sons are diverse.

§ 11. 3. Also, individuals of diverse species and genera are diverse; therefore, also persons of diverse rational natures in species and genus are diverse, because a person is an individual hypostasis of a rational nature.

§ 12. Solution. From the foregoing it is easy to solve this: because it has been proven above that Christ is only one; and therefore, there is only one son.

§ 13. Therefore, it must be said to the first and the last objections, which are almost the same, that this is true of natures neither of which is communicable to the other, or communicates. But if one communicates, and the other does not, the one that communicates will not have an individual, because it is not undivided in itself and divided from another. For example, the soul is a spiritual rational substance, and the body is a corporeal substance; and yet neither does the body have an individual, nor the soul a person, because they communicate with each other. For to communicate to another through union removes the potency of having personality or a person.

§ 14. To the other objection, it must be said that generation in divine things does not signify some act which is terminated as a becoming at the produced son. For according to this, it would be successive, and the son would first have been in potency and afterwards in act, and he would not be eternal. And therefore, this holds only in human things. But if force is not put on this, it must be said that then human generation is of the same [subject] as the divine is, as is clear through the things said above; but not according to the same [nature]. For His eternal generation is according to the divine nature, but the temporal is according to the human nature.

§ 15. But if it is objected that from this, human nature seems to lose much because it is communicable, since it loses the potency of constituting a person, it must be said that it loses

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nothing. Nay rather, it is ennobled from this, because it has the supposit and person of the Son of God in a more noble way.

DISTINCTIO IX

Divisio Textus

§ 16. Furthermore it ought to be investigated, etc. Here he treats of the properties of the united [nature] caused by the divine nature, which are honor, and the debt of adoration, and things of this kind.

§ 17. It is divided into two parts. In the first of these he touches upon the opinion of certain men saying that the flesh of Christ is to be adored with dulia, and not with latria. In the second, he touches upon the opinion of those who conversely say it is with latria, not dulia, there at B, But it pleases others that the humanity of Christ, etc.

Articulus 1 — What Latria Is

What is latria?

§ 18. Now four doubts occur here before the Text, namely: What is latria? Is it a virtue? And if it is a virtue, of which of the principal virtues is it a species? And fourth, to whom is it owed?

§ 19. Here in the Text, the definition of latria is had as follows: Latria is the service or worship exhibited to God the Creator alone. And this definition is drawn from Augustine in Book I On the Trinity, chapter 6. In that place it is especially clear enough that the Holy Spirit is not a creature, where we are commanded to serve not the creature but the Creator: Not in the mode by which we are commanded through charity to serve one another, which is in Greek δουλεύειν (douleuein), but in the mode by which God alone is served, which is in Greek λατρεύειν (latreuein). Hence they are called idolaters who exhibit that service to images, which is owed to God alone. From this word of Augustine, the aforesaid definition is proven.

§ 20. But it is objected against the definition thus: 1. Service or worship does not name a habit of the soul. Since therefore latria is a habit of the soul (and let this be supposed, because it will be proven below to be a virtue), it seems that the definition is bad, inasmuch as a habit is posited in the genus of act.

§ 21. 2. Also, service regards a lord (dominus); but obedience is owed to a lord as to one commanding. Therefore it seems that service is not properly the act of latria.

§ 22. 3. Furthermore, worship is in many things exterior, such as in prostration, genuflection, and the like, which are corporeal acts. Therefore it seems that it does not properly denote the act of a virtue, because the act of a virtue is in the will.

§ 23. 4. Also, "Creator" does not declare the account of the end in worship: because He is also worshiped as God, and as Lord, and as Creator, and as Glorifier. Why therefore is "Creator" specifically posited in the definition of latria?

§ 24. 5. Also, to believe is a service owed to God alone, and similarly to love Him for His own sake and above all things. Therefore it seems that faith is latria, and charity; and the same can be argued concerning the act of hope. Since therefore this definition applies to so many things, it is not convertible with the defined thing; therefore it is not a good definition.

§ 25. 6. Also, the Apostle, 1 Cor. 10:31: Whether you eat, or drink, or whatever else you do, do all to the glory of God. Therefore it seems that in all works we exhibit the service owed to God alone, and thus that any work whatever will be a work of latria.

§ 26. Solution. We say that latria is defined here through a general act, which nevertheless can be appropriated through an account sub-understood from the object, namely, so that it is service or worship owed to the Creator insofar as He is God, out of the reverence or honor proper to Him. For properly, reverence or honor are owed to the Creator, which are not owed to anything created.

§ 27. Therefore it must be said to the first objection that it is not unfitting for a virtue to be defined through its act; because just as we know powers from acts, so also we know habits from acts. And that definition does not then posit latria in the genus of act, because it is not an essential or formal definition, but rather it makes the habit manifest through its act and object.

§ 28. To the other objection, it must be said that service is called here compliance (obsequium), not subjection, as is the service taken from the condition of a slave. Just as was also evident in the authority of Augustine, that we are commanded out of charity to serve one another, that is, to comply.

§ 29. To the other objection, it must be said that worship is material in many acts, but there is one formal act, namely the exhibition of worship in testimony of the honor owed to the Creator because He Himself is God, or the Creator. For that account is one in all the material acts, and unites them all.

§ 30. To the other objection, it must be said that "Creator" expresses in its name a distinction toward the creature, which "God" or "Lord" does not do, because creatures are in some way called gods or lords. And because this worship is given to God according as He is distinguished from everything created, therefore the object of latria is expressed more properly through "Creator" than through another name. And I well concede that it is not owed to the Creator by reason of this name; but rather to Him who is Creator in this, that the Creator is distinct in honor and reverence from everything created.

§ 31. To the other objection, it must be said that believing, loving, and hoping name acts which can be material in the act of this virtue, namely if one believes or loves with the intention of professing oneself in this to worship God in testimony of the honor owed to Him. But nevertheless, to believe, to love, and to hope name the acts of faith and charity and hope, and so on for the others. Hence, to believe, according to its own account, does not regard the

compliance of worship, but rather consent to the First Truth. Similarly, charity regards the account of the First Goodness, and so on for the others. And then they are distant from the act of latria. For it is not unfitting that one act that is not proper, but common, when informed by diverse differences, is of diverse virtues.

§ 32. To the other objection, it must be said that it is one thing to do something for the glory of the Lord, and another to refer it to the worship of God: because the first regards the rectitude of intention only, but the second regards the rectitude of worship and of the owed honor exhibited.

Articulus 2 — Whether Latria Is a Virtue

Whether latria is a virtue?

§ 33. Secondly it is asked, whether it is a virtue? And it seems that it is not. For a virtue is a voluntary habit consisting in a mean, determined for us by reason, and as the wise man will determine. But latria does not have a mean of this kind, because God cannot be worshiped too much. Therefore latria is not a virtue.

§ 34. If you say that it is a theological virtue, which does not have a mean of this kind. ON THE CONTRARY: The theological virtues are only three, and therefore species are assigned to them, just as to the others. Therefore if it were a theological virtue, it would be faith, hope, or charity; but it is none of these; therefore it is not a virtue.

§ 35. BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. No act is meritorious unless it is an act of virtue. But the act of latria is a meritorious act, if the one exhibiting latria is in grace. Therefore latria is a virtue.

§ 36. 2. Also, nothing is commanded except a work of virtue. But the act of latria is commanded, Deut. 6:13: You shall fear the Lord your God, and Him alone shall you serve. Therefore latria is a virtue.

§ 37. 3. Also, concerning every difficult and good thing consisting in the will, there is had a virtue and an art. But the exhibition of worship, insofar as it is such, is a certain difficult and good thing. Therefore concerning this there is a virtue; and concerning this is latria; therefore latria is a virtue.

§ 38. Solution. It must be conceded that latria is a virtue, and the first reason which is against this must be solved, namely that this habit consists in a mean. But according to the Philosopher, not all virtues have a mean of one account. For not all have the mean of the matter of the virtue between too much and too little, as Aristotle says in the V book of the Ethics; but they have a certain mean, which is right reason. Such are those that are in reason, like prudence, and justice with its parts. And this is the mean to which the work is directed, and this virtue has such a mean. For I well concede that God cannot be worshiped too much. Nevertheless, there are some who say that every political virtue has a mean between too much and too little; and they say that God can be worshiped too much, and too little. But this is not according to the Philosopher in the New Ethics.

§ 39. To the other objection, it must be said that I well concede that it is not a theological virtue, nor any part of any theological virtue.

§ 40. Nevertheless, even the arguments brought to the contrary, although they conclude to what is true, and belong to the Masters, they are not however drawn from the proper principles of Ethics. Because in my judgment, it is not true that no act is meritorious unless it is an act of virtue. For properly speaking, an act of virtue is called that which is similar to the virtue, and from which it would be generated and perfected by habituation; just as to attack arduous things and to undergo terrible things voluntarily belong to fortitude, and to restrain from innate delectable things, and sexual matters, and matters of taste belongs to temperance, and so on. And beyond this, to go to Church, or to sit, or to stand, are not acts of any particular virtue, yet they can be done meritoriously. But the Masters who introduce that proposition take the act of virtue generally, because namely it is elicited by some virtue in whatever mode, and especially by charity, which is as it were the universal mover in all good works.

§ 41. I say the same concerning the other, that "nothing is commanded except a work of virtue" is not true, unless it is understood of an act reducible to a virtue in whatever mode. For it was commanded to Adam that he should not eat of the tree which was in paradise, and it was not according to itself a work of any virtue.

Articulus 3 — Of Which of the Principal Virtues Latria Is a Species

Of which of the principal virtues is latria a species?

§ 42. Thirdly it is asked, of which of the principal virtues is it a species? And it seems that it is of faith, because: 1. Faith determines God and the rewarder who is to be worshiped. For the Apostle says, Heb. 11:6: He who comes to God must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder to those who seek Him.

§ 43. 2. Also, it seems that it is of prudence, because prudence discovers what is to be worshiped.

§ 44. BUT IT SEEMS, as all say, that it is justice. 1. For when it is called worship owed to God, in the name of the debt the account of justice is determined. Therefore latria is a species of justice.

§ 45. 2. Also, justice orders toward a superior. But latria is exhibited to God the superior, insofar as He is superior. Therefore it pertains to justice.

§ 46. BUT ON THE CONTRARY: Justice renders a debt, because it is a debt; but worship is expended out of liberality, because otherwise it would not be meritorious. Therefore it seems that it is not a debt; therefore it is not ordered under justice.

§ 47. Solution. It must be said with Cicero that it is a part of justice, and falls into that part of justice which is religion. For thus Cicero says at the end of the first Rhetoric, where he posits religion as a part of justice, because religion is that which brings care and ceremony to a certain superior nature which they call divine. Now it is clear that he calls "care" the due

account, and "ceremony" the worship; because ceremony or piety denotes the duties of Ceres, and it is transferred to the other services of the gods, in which they were worshiped. But here it is taken for the worship of the superior nature which is divine. Hence latria is located under it; and if it is exhibited to an idol, it will be idolatry.

§ 48. Therefore it must be said to the first objection that although faith shows what is to be worshiped, nevertheless it does not move one to worship, as the proper habit of this act; but rather it moves one to believe.

§ 49. To the other objection, it must be said that prudence does not attend to the debt, but rather to the account of what is eligible for the work. For Augustine says in the book On the Morals of the Catholic Church, that prudence is a love wisely choosing those things by which it is helped, away from those things by which it is hindered. And although sometimes the eligible thing, the work, and the debt are the same, yet the account of what is eligible insofar as it is such is one thing, and the account of the debt even in that it is such is another; and they are distinguished by those accounts.

Articulus 4 — To Whom Is Latria Properly Owed, and Whether Through Any Creature We Can Adore God with Latria

To whom is latria properly owed? And, can we adore God with latria in any creature?

§ 50. Fourthly it is asked, to whom is latria properly owed?

§ 51. As the Text says here, to the Creator alone. BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Concerning Abraham, Gen. 18:2, it is read that he saw three, and adored one. And yet Augustine says that they were Angels. Therefore it seems, since Abraham is not reprehended, that worship of this kind can be transferred to a creature.

§ 52. 2. Also, Rev. 22:8–9, John fell before the feet of the Angel, and wished to adore him; and he forbade him, saying: See that you do not do it; for I am your fellow servant. Therefore he wished to adore him either with dulia, or with latria. If with dulia: this does not seem right, because the Angel would not have forbidden it, since that can be expended to a creature, even one that is lower than an Angel. Therefore it seems that he wished to adore him with latria; and John is not reprehended for this, nor is he said to have sinned. Therefore it seems that latria can be exhibited to a creature without sin.

§ 53. 3. Furthermore, we adore images of Christ, and of the crucifix, and of the Saints. Therefore, either with dulia, or with latria. If with dulia: then since adoration, as Damascene says, is referred to the prototype, we adore Christ with dulia, not with latria, which is against Damascene and Augustine. But if with latria: I have my proposition, that some creature can be worshiped with latria.

§ 54. 4. Also, in honor and reverence we see God communicate His gifts and attributes to men and Angels, because some are established from the opposite in dignity. Therefore, if He communicated to them that which is worshiped in Him, He Himself also communicates worship to the same; therefore they are to be worshiped with latria; therefore not God alone.

§ 55. Solution. It must be said that God alone is to be worshiped with latria, as Augustine says here.

§ 56. As to that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that Abraham recognized the mystery of the Trinity and unity in the Angels, and therefore he adored the Trinity in them. And it well happens that the Trinity is adored in itself or in a sign.

§ 57. To the other objection, it must be said that John adored the Angel with dulia. But there are three reasons why the Angel forbade him. One is: because human nature was already exalted in Christ; hence what the Angels allowed to be done to themselves in the Old Testament, they did not allow in the New. The second is the evil appearance: lest perhaps it might seem to some simple person reading later that John had adored with latria, and he might do likewise. The third reason is more efficacious, as I think, that in this the Angel showed the dignity of John, who was of no lesser dignity than many Angels.

§ 58. But from this determination a question results: 1. For it was said that Abraham adored God in a sign, and we in images.

§ 59. Therefore let it be asked: Whether I can adore God in any rational creature? It seems that I can, because:

§ 60. 2. No image is so similar to God as that which is in the mind of a rational creature. Therefore, God ought especially to be adored with latria in it.

§ 61. 3. Also, 1 Cor. 3:17: The temple of God is holy, which you are. But in a temple we adore God, which we made with our own hands. Therefore much more can we adore in the temple which He Himself made.

§ 62. 4. Also, the soul of the just man is the seat of wisdom. And again: I will dwell in them, and walk among them. Therefore it seems that we can adore Him, especially in the Saints.

§ 63. BUT ON THE CONTRARY: The Angel forbade that he be adored by John; therefore neither ought other Saints to be adored.

§ 64. Solution. It must be said that God ought not to be adored except in an image established in memory of His figure, which He assumed for us, that is in the figure of the cross and passion, and of the other sacraments which He undertook for us, such as of the nativity, baptism, and resurrection, and the like. For adoration of this kind in a dead image is referred to the prototype, as Damascene says. And this is conceded in the New Testament, and not in the Old, because God had not yet assumed an image which could be made for Him.

§ 65. Similarly, the state of idolatry was still strong [in the Old Testament]. Hence, now latria can be adored in such images.

§ 66. But note that it differs to speak of an image as an image, and an image as an absolute thing, made of stone, or wood, or another matter. To adore an image as an image is to be led through the intellect and the intention of adoration into Him whose image it is; and this is what John of Damascus calls referring the honor of adoration to the prototype. For it is called a prototype from πρῶτος (protos), which is first, and τύπος (typos), which is figure, and it is

the principal figure of the man Christ. But an image as it is a thing out of this matter, we ought in no way to adore. And by this the third and fourth arguments of the principal question are solved. Hence, if a cross is taken apart, so that it does not represent the figure of the passion, I ought not to adore it with the adoration of latria.

§ 67. Therefore it must be said to the first objection that in the three men whom Abraham adored, personal distinction was represented with respect to number, and unity of essence with respect to consent. But this was not yet sufficient; rather, because their apparition was for this end, that such a distinction of Trinity and unity might become known to Abraham in them. And therefore, if three men appeared to us not sent for this end, we ought not to adore them with the adoration of latria.

§ 68. But if you ask, whence would Abraham know this? I say that it was through revelation, and that gift of grace which is called the discernment of spirits.

§ 69. To the other objection, it must be said that we cannot adore God with latria in an image which is a man, because of the conjoined danger. Because vainglory is near to us, and therefore that man would quickly believe that he is being adored on account of his own dignity. But from the contemplation of the image in him, and especially from the grace which appears in him, we can well be excited to adore God, just as we praise God in His saints.

§ 70. To the other objection, it must be said that in a material temple there is not a conjoined danger as there is in a spiritual temple. And if you say, "I will adore secretly, so that he does not know." The response is that still it is not to be done, because his image is not established for this, that it be referred to the prototype. But as I said before, you can be excited to adore from his similitude which he has to God in natural things and in grace.

Articulus 5 — What Dulia Is

What is dulia?

§ 71. Next it is asked concerning that which he says, there, at A, around the middle: For there is a certain mode of dulia, etc.

§ 72. For here it is asked, What is dulia, and whether it is one and the same virtue with latria, and to whom is it owed?

§ 73. Now from the authority introduced above from the first book On the Trinity and from the Text here, a definition is drawn which the Masters give, that dulia is the honor or service or worship owed to a creature.

§ 74. But it seems that no honor is owed to a creature from the time that man fell, except perhaps to Angels and Saints, because:

1. Thus says Psalm 48:13, 21 [Vulgate]: Man, when he was in honor, did not understand; he is compared to senseless beasts, etc. Therefore it seems that no worship is owed to man; therefore much less to a creature lower than man is; and thus the definition seems false.

§ 75. 2. Also, if I ought not to adore a man (in such a way that I adore God in him) because of the conjoined danger, since there is also danger in the honor of dulia, I ought not to adore with dulia.

§ 76. BUT ON THE CONTRARY: Gen. 23:7, Abraham adored the people of the land, and he was not reprehended, even though they were sinners.

§ 77. Solution. I say that worship and honor are owed to a creature which is the image of God, unless it is depraved by the vice of confirmation in evil. And this is what the Apostle says, Rom. 13:7: To whom honor, honor. And elsewhere: Outdoing one another in showing honor. And it is the custom of certain religious to bow to every brother when meeting them.

§ 78. Therefore to that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that fallen man (in a recoverable way) is not compared to beasts in the loss of the image, but in the loss of the honor of grace which he had upon the image. And therefore through the necessity of dying and penalties he is compared to beasts, not through this, that no worship is owed to him, since he himself still, according to possibility and the order of the way, can attain to the highest honor of eternal beatitude.

§ 79. To the other objection, it must be said that it is not similar: because latria has divine honor in itself, which is the greatest; but not dulia. And therefore the honor of dulia does not elevate a man above himself, so that his heart is lifted up in pride like that of latria. For it is no pride if a man receives that which is owed to him; but if he attributes it to himself on account of himself, this is pride.

Articulus 6 — Whether Dulia Is the Same Virtue as Latria, and Whether Dulia and Hyperdulia Are of One Common Species

Whether dulia is the same virtue with latria? And, whether dulia and hyperdulia are one common species?

§ 80. Secondly it is asked, whether it is the same virtue with latria?

§ 81. It seems that it is, because: 1. We love God and neighbor by one species of virtue which is love (dilectio).

§ 82. 2. And again, we believe certain things about God, and about the punishments of hell, and about certain other things, by one species of virtue which is faith.

§ 83. 3. Also, by one species of dulia we adore a king, and a simple man. Therefore it seems that it is one habit moving to adore God and man. Therefore dulia and latria are one species of virtue.

§ 84. 4. Also, species of virtue do not differ by matter alone, but by form. But if worship is attributed to God, and if it is attributed to man, there seems to be no difference except a material one. Therefore it seems that the species of virtue is not varied on account of this. Therefore dulia and latria are one species of virtue.

§ 85. BUT ON THE CONTRARY:

There is an infinite distance between the honor...

§ 1. [Conclusion of a preceding argument:] ...owed to God, and among the honor owed to a creature: but between those things that are of one species there is not an infinite distance: therefore the virtue moving to render cult to God, and the virtue moving to render cult to man, will not be of one species.

§ 2. Next to this it is further asked, Whether hyperdulia and dulia are one common species of virtue?

§ 3. It seems that they are not: because 1. The Master here says that these two species of dulia differ.

§ 4. 2. Also, justice, according to the degrees investigating what is due, is distributed into species: as obedience is due to superiors: hence, Heb. 13:17: Obey your prelates, and be subject to them: for they watch, as if to render an account for your souls. To inferiors, however, mercy is due: because mercy is due to misery. And to parents, piety: because Tully says that: Piety is benevolence toward parents. Therefore, by a similar reasoning it seems also that dulia is distinguished into species according to the degrees of men.

§ 5. 3. Also, not one cult and honor and reverence is due to all: for princes are honored and worshipped in one way, and inferior prelates in another, and subjects in another: therefore it seems that they are diverse species.

§ 6. Solution. To the first, it must be said that latria and dulia are diverse species of virtue: agreeing nevertheless in a proximate genus, which however is unnamed, just as we do not have names for many virtues.

§ 7. To that which is objected concerning love: it must be said that it is not similar: because in love the end and the material are the same: and the end serves as its formal difference. Hence, since charity does not differ regarding God and neighbor except according to the material, and not according to the end which is the rationale of the act and the difference drawing it into a species: the love of neighbor does not differ from the love of God except through the material and the act, and not through the habit. For when I love my neighbor, for God's sake I love him as myself, that is, for that for which [I love] myself, that is, for God: and thus love rests in God, although it takes its material in the neighbor. But it is not so here: because the cult due to a creature does not rest in divine cult.

§ 8. And if you object that all things are referred to one end, namely that they be for the sake of God. The response is that this is true concerning the end of a universal intention, but it is not true concerning the end of this or that act: for just as we see in nature, that it intends a double end: one through generation, and that end is the form acquired in the generation of this thing: and another which it does not intend through this generation, but through the whole succession of generation, which is the perpetuity of being in generable and corruptible things: so also it is in moral works. For the intention of the work is that in which the act of the efficient cause terminates, and that is to render what is due in a work of justice, and to endure for the sake of the good in a work of fortitude, and the love of the highest good in a work of

charity, and not of just any good, and divine ceremony in a work of latria, and reverence due to a creature in a work of dulia. There is another intention which is the universal act to the effect that through all these things [something] ought to be acquired, namely eternal beatitude and happiness. Hence it is clear that charity in loving God and neighbor has one end of the work, but not dulia and latria. Moreover, this end is that by which the virtue is drawn into a species.

§ 9. To that which is objected concerning faith, it must be said that there is no similarity: because in every article of faith one divine truth is subjected, which nevertheless receives determination through special articles: and therefore there is one rationale of believing in all of them, namely on account of the highest truth: and therefore faith is one species of virtue: yet we do not believe in eternal punishments, nor in one Church [in the same way as God]: but in God judging through punishments, and in God uniting the Church: and so concerning the others. But here, divine and human honor are not reduced to the same thing.

§ 10. To the other it must be said that human honor is reduced to the same thing, namely to the sign of the image of God, not depraved through the confirmation of sin. But that which is added in the other likenesses only varies according to quantity: as a king who has the likeness of God in an image, and the place of God and of a judge in degree, and so concerning others: and therefore a greater cult is due to him, but not one that is other according to species. But in divine honor and human honor there is no such agreement: because we are nothing compared to God: and through Him we are whatever we are: and therefore in adoring God we profess this: but we do not profess this in honoring a king or a simple man, but rather a remote likeness to Him in an image, or His place in the governance of justice and prelacy.

§ 11. To the other the solution is already clear through what was said before: because it has been shown that they do not differ through material alone, but also through the proximate end of the act which is the form in moral matters.

§ 12. To that which is further asked, I respond that every dulia is of the same species as every [other] dulia, as was explained before: and what the Master says here, he says on account of the speciality of the material, and of an inseparable accident. Hence they are accidental species, just as sulfurous water, and sweet, and salty, are diverse species of water.

§ 13. To the other it must be said that in justice the rationale of the debt is varied, not only the material. For the rationale of the debt which is due to an inferior is one thing, and that which is due to a superior is another: but this is not posited over common honor except as an accidental difference.

§ 14. To the other it must be said that such a difference, causing only a greater and a lesser, does not vary the species: but it attends to an accident, and to some property of those things which are in the species.

Articulus 7 — To Whom Dulia Is Owed

To whom is dulia due?

§ 17. Thirdly it is asked, To whom is dulia due?

§ 18. Here it seems according to what was determined, that it is due to every creature. From this it follows that it is due even to sinners, especially since Abraham adored sinners when he wished to buy the double cave for the right of a sepulcher.

§ 19. But then it is asked, Whether it is due to the devil and to the souls of the damned?

§ 20. And it seems that it is: because the image is in them, as Dionysius says in the book On the Divine Names: The natural gifts given to them we say are by no means changed: but they are intact and most splendid.

§ 21. NEXT TO THIS it is further asked, Whether it is due to those whom we see in the act of sin, while they are in the sin itself and the act: as if I were to see a prelate fornicating, whether in that act when I passed by, I ought to recognize the honor of his degree to him through dulia?

§ 22. And it seems that I ought not: because Gregory says in the Pastoral Care, that fault is vehemently extended as an example, when a sinner is honored through reverence for his degree.

§ 23. Also it is further asked, Whether such honor is due to an irrational creature?

§ 24. And it seems that it is not, on account of the appearance of idolatry: for not only must evil be fled, but also the appearance of evil.

§ 25. Also, such creatures are inferior to us: and what is inferior ought not to be honored by a superior.

§ 26. Solution. I say that dulia is due to a rational creature not irremediably depraved by sin, in whom an act of unworthiness does not appear: and thus it is not due to those who are in the act of sin, because an act contrary to honor and reverence appears in them: because honor is the exhibition of reverence in testimony of virtue, and an act of iniquity appears in him. But afterwards we do not know, nor can we know, in what state he is: and therefore he is to be honored then.

§ 27. And from this the solution to the whole is clear: because it is not due to a rational creature irremediably depraved on account of a contrary disposition inseparably conjoined to it: and it is not due to an irrational creature, because it is a trace and an obscure likeness, not expressly showing the honor of the likeness of God.

Articulus 8 — Whether Piety Belongs Univocally to God and to Creatures

Whether piety belongs univocally to God and to creatures?

§ 30. Next it is asked concerning this which he says, there, A, towards the end: Which in Latin is called piety, etc.

§ 31. For piety is a gift of the Holy Spirit. Piety also, according to Tully, is a species of the virtue of justice through which duty and worthy cult are attributed to blood relatives and well-wishers of the fatherland. Piety is also called the cult of God.

§ 32. And it is asked, Whether it is said univocally or equivocally?

§ 33. It seems that it is equivocal: because 1. There is not one rationale in all these, especially in God and a creature.

§ 34. 2. Moreover, Augustine posits another signification: for he says that prayer is the pious affection of the mind towards God: and that signification does not fall directly into any determinate signification.

§ 35. 3. Moreover, it seems to be false what he says, that this cult is of piety: because it is rather of religion. Hence Augustine in book X of The City of God: Which therefore is called 'latria' in Greek, and in Latin is interpreted as service. But that by which we worship God, or which is 'threskeia' in Greek, in Latin however is called religion: but that which is in us toward God, or which they call 'eusebeia', we indeed cannot express in one word, but can call it the cult of God: for this we say we owe only to God, who is the true God, and makes his worshippers gods: therefore it seems that it is not called piety.

§ 36. 4. Also, Augustine, in the same place a little further down: He (God) is the fount of our beatitude, He is the end of all appetite. Choosing Him or rather re-choosing (religentes) Him, for by neglecting Him we had lost Him: therefore re-choosing Him, whence also religion is said to be named, we tend to Him by love, so that by arriving we may rest. Therefore it seems that it should be called religion, and not piety.

§ 37. Moreover it is asked, How are love and sacrifice part of divine cult? For love is an act of a special virtue which is charity: and therefore it does not seem to pertain to latria. Similarly sacrifice is an act of exterior oblation: why then does the cult of God consist more in it, than in censing, prostration, and genuflection?

§ 38. Solution. We say to the first, that piety according to Augustine is said in multiple ways, and not equivocally, nor univocally, but according to prior and posterior [i.e., analogically]. For it is called the cult of God, and of the image of God: but there is a certain image of God in blood relatives and well-wishers of the fatherland, from the fact that we somehow are through them, just as we simply are through God. And the rationale of the image is also found in all men: and thus cult and service are found in the gift of piety towards all. Moreover, piety which is an affection in prayer, expresses the disposition of one tending through service and cult to God, in an affection melting through the love of Him who is worshipped. And through this the solution to the first two is clear.

§ 39. To the other it must be said that religion and the cult of God are not the same: but religion is the observance of those worshipping derived from cult, and observed on account of cult. Hence religion is named as if a binding back (religatio): and it binds the worshipper to a life which harmonizes with the cult. And Augustine notes this distinctly saying, that latria is the cult by which God is worshipped: while religion is that which is in us toward God. And if it is objected that Augustine says that it is named from re-choosing (religendo): it must be said that Augustine says both, because one is the cause of the other: for when we re-choose God to be worshipped by us, we bind ourselves back to the observances in which we harmonize with His cult.

§ 40. To the other it must be said that love is of the cult materially, and as moving [it]. But sacrifice [is of it] essentially as an act of cult. Hence Augustine says that sacrifice is offered to none but God: and the appearing Angels, if they were good, did not ask that sacrifice be offered to them: because they did not usurp the honor of God.

§ 41. TO THAT which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that that act professes divine honor more than any other, because it is due to Him alone from whom we have all things that we offer, and who offered a sacrifice for us: but we exhibit other operations even to men.

§ 42. And note that sacrifice is one thing, oblation another: because an oblation is made for the use of the ministers, so that they may have food in the house of God. But a sacrifice is offered to God alone: although from its determination afterwards, it may be converted either to use, or to something else.

§ 43. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 9 — Whether the Humanity of Christ Is to Be Adored with Latria

Whether the humanity of Christ is to be adored with latria?

§ 46. Next it is asked concerning this which he says: But it pleases others, etc.

§ 47. For it seems that Christ's humanity ought not to be adored with latria: because

§ 48. 1. Humanity (as exposed above) is human nature, and always remained created, and a creature in all its properties: therefore service is not due to it except as to a creature.

§ 49. 2. Also, Christ is true God, and true man: therefore if from the truth of God the cult of God is due to Him, from the truth of man the cult of man is due to Him. But this is dulia: therefore He ought not to be adored with latria.

§ 50. BUT ON THE CONTRARY: Rabanus says: The flesh of Christ is to be adored with latria: therefore it seems that it is to be adored with latria just like the Word of God: but not with every species of latria: because we do not adore it prostrated on the earth: just as we neither believe that it created us: nor do we sacrifice to it as to God: but we adore it, because through it we were redeemed, just as through God.

§ 51. To the same effect avail the similarities introduced by Damascene and Augustine, which lie in the letter [of the text].

§ 52. But here a doubt occurs concerning the saying of Rabanus: because he seems to posit diverse species of latria, and he seems to say that we do not adore prostrated: yet we frequently adore even men while prostrated: as Jacob said to his sons going into Egypt: Go to the lord of the land, and when you find him, adore him upon the earth.

§ 53. Moreover concerning this it is asked, With what adoration is the glorious mother of the Word who assumed flesh to be adored?

§ 54. And it seems that with latria: because the honor of the mother is referred to the king.

§ 55. BUT ON THE CONTRARY: Because she is a simple creature: therefore divine honor is not due to her: nor will she, since she is most excellent and most just, seek it as if by usurping what belongs to another.

§ 56. Solution. It must be said that the flesh of Christ is considered in two ways, namely as it is the supposit which is this man and Christ: and since He is God, He is adored with nothing but latria as God, because He is truly God according to the second opinion touched upon above, which alone is truly Catholic. And through this "flesh" is understood when it is said, The Word became flesh: because through synecdoche a part is posited for the whole.

§ 57. In another way it is considered as a part of this man: and then because it is actually united to the deity, and nothing of it is separated from the deity, just as no part of a coal is separated from the fire: therefore it is still to be adored with latria.

§ 58. Thirdly, it is considered vaguely according to the intellect alone, denuded of the deity: and thus it is to be adored with hyperdulia, as the previously introduced opinion stated.

§ 59. To that which is first objected, it must be said that although humanity is distinct from the [divine] nature by its properties, it is nevertheless not separated from fellowship and union.

§ 60. To the other it must be said that although He is true man, He is not, however, a mere man. Yet I do not deny that hyperdulia may be exhibited both to Christ and to God: because He is worthy not only of one honor, but of every honor: but He ought not to be adored with dulia alone. Hence the Gloss on that Psalm 97:5 [Vulgate]: In the churches bless the Lord God: says God, because He is adored with latria: and Lord, because He is adored with dulia.

§ 61. To the other it must be said that there are material and accidental species, as was said before concerning dulia, because God is adored in Himself and in the assumed humanity.

§ 62. To the other it must be said that prostration is done in two ways, namely in testimony of honor, or as a sign of an attribute which is to us the cause of veneration in that mode of adoration. In the first way, we adore prostrated everyone whom we worship. In the second way, we adore prostrated the Creator who raised us from nothing into something, and genuflection is as if a falling toward the Redeemer who raised the sinner up from his fall.

§ 63. To the other it must be said that the Blessed Virgin is to be adored with hyperdulia: for although the honor of the mother is the honor of the king, yet because through the deity the Son had another generation, divine honor is not due to her, just as the Son did not receive the deity from her.

Articulus 10 — By What Species of Worship Christ Ought to Be Worshiped

With what species of cult ought Christ to be worshipped?

§ 66. Next it is asked concerning this which he says, there, B, around the middle: If the Son is not God by nature, but a creature: neither is He to be worshipped, etc.

§ 67. On the contrary: It does not belong to the same being to worship, and to be worshipped. But the Son worshipped the Father, by praying, offering, subjecting Himself: therefore it seems that He ought not to be worshipped with latria.

§ 68. TO THIS it must be said that Christ ought to be worshipped with latria: for although He worshipped, He did this insofar as He was man, and the mediator of God and men. Hence both belong to Him, and one does not exclude the other: just as according to humanity He is less than the Father, and according to divinity equal.

Articulus 11 — How The Consecrated Host Is To Be Adored

§ 71. How is the consecrated host to be adored?

§ 72. Next it is asked concerning this which he says, there, B, around the middle: They worshipped and served the creature rather, etc.

§ 73. 1. For let us suppose that Satan transfigures himself into an Angel of light, and some simple person adores him with latria: he seems to worship a creature: and yet not to sin, because ignorance of fact excuses entirely.

§ 74. 2. Moreover, let us suppose that he applies whatever diligence he can, and it always seems to him to be God: then he seems not to sin by adoring him as Christ: for this man is not bound to have the discernment of spirits, because he cannot acquire it: therefore if he does what he can, he does not seem to sin.

§ 75. Further, it is asked concerning the adoration of the host in the Mass:

§ 76. 1. For it is not certain to me that it is consecrated: therefore I ought never to adore it, except under a condition, namely, if he omitted nothing of the contingents: but this seems absurd if every simple person ought to have a condition of this sort in his consideration.

§ 77. 2. Moreover, good is to be presumed of anyone, unless the contrary is proved: therefore I ought to presume good of the celebrating priest: therefore I ought to presume that the host is consecrated, since the contrary has not been proved to me.

§ 78. Solution. To the first I say that by him who does not have the discernment of spirits, everything that appears to the senses is to be feared, and is never to be adored absolutely for three reasons: one of which is on account of the frequent illusion of the senses.

§ 79. The second is the conscience of one's own humility: because he ought to repute himself not worthy that a good Angel should appear to him: and therefore to fear an evil one. The third is that an appended condition does no harm, but can be beneficial. For if it is God who appears, He will love that we are safe on account of the fear of Him. We have an example of this according to the exposition of Chrysostom on John 1:45 and following, in Nathanael, to whom when Philip called saying: We have found Jesus, the son of Joseph, from Nazareth, he responded: Can anything good be from Nazareth? as if slow to believe: and therefore because he did not believe immediately, but examined the fact, not believing every spirit, but testing the appearance if it was from God, he was praised by Christ when He says: Behold a true Israelite, in whom there is no guile. There is also an example in Zechariah, Luke 1:12 and 29, and in the

Blessed Virgin, who were troubled at the visitation of a good Angel: and therefore I say that he who adores absolutely can never do what is in his power [to avoid error]: because it was within his power that, fearing for these reasons, he should append a condition.

§ 80. And to that which is asked concerning the host of the priest, it is to be solved by distinguishing, that namely the priest is either known or unknown. If he is known: it is either known that he is accustomed to be negligent in divine matters, or not: because many, although they are of bad life, are nevertheless not negligent in divine matters, so as to omit anything. If it is known that he is not accustomed to omit anything, then by that very fact the condition is probably presupposed by the adorer, namely that the host is consecrated. But if he is unknown, or his customary negligence in divine matters is known: then I consider it well that the condition ought to be appended actually or habitually.

§ 81. To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that I do not thereby judge the priest to be evil: but as a wise man I guard myself from the danger of idolatry, or from the appearance of idolatry.

Articulus 12 — Whether Christ Is More Adored than Any One of the Three Persons

Whether Christ is adored more than any of the three persons?

§ 84. Next it is asked concerning this which he says, there, B, near the end: In Christ the Lord humanity not alone, or bare, etc.

§ 85. 1. For it seems to follow from this that the Son is more to be adored after the incarnation than before: because after the incarnation we adore both natures in Him, before the incarnation only one.

§ 86. 2. Also, from this it seems that the Son is more to be adored than the Father or the Holy Spirit; because in them we adore only one nature, but in Christ two.

§ 87. But TO THIS it is easy to respond: because it does not follow if more things are adored in Him, that on account of this He is adored more: and the discrete is changed there as if into the continuous. Or it may be said that the adoration of the human nature does not add a new adoration, but a new material, in which the deity is adored: because the adoration does not rest in the human nature in itself, but is referred to the divine nature united to it: and thus the adoration of the three is one, just as the divinity of the three is one.

Articulus 13 — Whether There Is One Adoration of the Three Persons

Whether there is one adoration of the three persons?

§ 90. But then it is asked by reason of this, Whether the three persons are adored with one adoration?

§ 91. And it seems that they are not: because faith distinguishes among them: and adoration follows faith: therefore the adoration will be distinct.

§ 92. BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Adoration is the profession of majesty to be worshipped: since therefore the majesty of the three is one, the adoration will be one.

§ 93. 2. Also, let us suppose the persons did not exist, there will still be the same rationale of adoration as now, namely because the Creator and the highest majesty is worthy of the highest cult and honor: therefore it seems that adoration is not due to the persons insofar as they are distinct, but insofar as they are one: and thus it follows that their adoration is one.

§ 94. Solution. I readily concede that the adoration of the three is one as to the rationale of adoration: because that which and on account of which we adore, is one in the three.

§ 95. To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that although faith distinguishes, nevertheless it also unites the persons, and says that there is one thing in the three insofar as they are to be adored. But if faith were to posit the rationale of adoration in distinguishing properties, the argument would follow, which faith does not do: but rather it posits [the rationale of adoration] in that which unites the persons, which is the nature of the divinity one in the three.

DISTINCTIO X

Divisio Textus

§ 96. Division of the Text

§ 97. DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

§ 98. It is also customary to be inquired by some, etc. Here begins that part in which the Master treats of the properties consequent upon Christ united from human nature: and it contains this and the following distinction, and the first chapter of the twelfth distinction.

§ 99. And it is divided into two parts: in the first of which it is determined concerning the properties consequent upon Christ according as He is man: and this begins at the beginning of distinction XI, there, It is also customary to be asked, Whether it ought to be said simply, etc.

§ 100. And this distinction which contains the first part, is divided into three parts. In the first it is shown that being a person does not follow upon Christ in that He is man. In the second it is shown that being an adoptive son does not follow Him in that He is man, namely there, D, But if it is asked, Whether Christ is an adoptive son, etc.? In the third it is asked, To what is His predestination referred, whether to nature, or to person? and this in that He is man, because thus He is predestined: in the last chapter, namely there, F, Next if it is asked, Whether predestination, etc.

§ 101. In the first of these there are three chapters, whose division is evident in itself.

Articulus 1 — Whether Christ, Insofar as He Is Man, Is a Person, and Whether Christ, Insofar as He Is Man, Is an Individual, and Whether Insofar as He Is Man He Is Also a Supposit, and Whether Insofar as He Is Man He Is a Thing of Nature

Whether Christ according as He is man, is a person? and, Whether Christ according as He is man, is an individual? and, Whether in that He is man, He is also a supposit? and, Whether according as He is man, He is a thing of nature?

§ 104. Here there is a doubt first concerning that question which he posits in the first chapter, Whether Christ according as He is man, is a person?

§ 105. Now it seems that He is: because 1. Christ according as He is man, is either man in species, or in the individual. Not in species: because thus He would either be very simple, because He would be in every man: or He would be every man: both of which are false. Just as Damascene also says, that He assumed our nature not in species, but in an atom: therefore Christ is one man: but the one is that which is undivided in itself, and divided from any other: therefore Christ is a singular man in the nature of man: but every singular man in the nature of man is a person: therefore Christ insofar as He is man, is a person.

§ 106. 2. Also, Christ insofar as He is man, is a rational mortal animal, and a 'this': therefore He is this rational mortal animal: but of whatsoever it is true to say that it is this rational mortal animal, it is a person: therefore Christ insofar as He is man, is a person.

§ 107. 3. Also, a person is called as if one through itself: but Christ insofar as He is man is one through Himself: which was proved above, because Christ is not two: therefore Christ insofar as He is man, is a person.

§ 108. 4. Moreover, what inconvenience would there be, when it is said that Christ insofar as He is man, is a person? It seems that none: because from this it does not follow that Christ is two persons: just as I see that insofar as He is man He slept, and insofar as He is God He created the stars: and yet it does not follow that He is two.

§ 109. 5. Moreover, Insofar as He is man: He is either something, or nothing. It is certain that He is something: therefore that which He is insofar as He is man, is predicated directly of Him, and He cannot not be this something in the species of man: but this perfect something in the nature of man is nothing other than a person.

§ 110. FURTHER it is asked, Since being an individual is less than being a person, whether according as He is man, He is an individual?

§ 111. Now it seems that He is: because 1. An individual is that which consists of a collection of accidents, which is impossible to be found in another: but many such accidents are found in the man Christ: therefore it seems that in that He is man He is an individual.

§ 112. 2. Also, Boethius: Species is the whole being of individuals. And he says this for this reason, because whatever is after the species, has individuating characteristics befitting it alone: therefore He according as He is man, is an individual.

§ 113. FURTHER it is asked, Whether He in that He is man is a supposit?

§ 114. And it seems that He is: 1. For everything which is a this something under some common nature, is a supposit of that nature: but Christ in that He is man, is a this something in this common nature which is man: therefore He is a supposit of man.

§ 115. 2. Also, the community which is in the rationale of a supposit when it is said, Peter is a supposit of man, and Paul is a supposit of man, and so concerning others, proceeds from the proportion of the singulars to the community of the species: but man is truly predicated of Christ: therefore He has that proportion to the species which others have: therefore He according as He is man, is a supposit of man.

§ 116. BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Damascene says that in the Lord Jesus one cannot receive a common species: therefore nor a supposit of any species: therefore Christ according as He is man, is not a supposit of any species.

§ 117. 2. Also, Boethius: Species is the whole being of individuals: but the species of man is not the whole being of Christ: therefore He is not a supposit of man. THE PROOF of the minor is: because Christ is in divinity and humanity: therefore humanity is not His whole being.

§ 118. 3. Also, it was held above in the exposition of the second opinion, that this man is supposited by three substances, and two natures: but no supposit is except in one nature: therefore Christ in that He is man, or according as He is man, is not a supposit of man.

§ 119. 4. Also, the Philosopher says that the rationale of a proposition, and of only one proposition, is the same: therefore by a similar reasoning the rationale of a supposit, and of only one supposit, is the same. Thence it is further objected: One supposit is the supposit of one nature: but Christ is not subjected to one nature: therefore He is not one supposit: because what is not one, is not anything, as Boethius says.

§ 120. FURTHER it is asked, If Christ according as He is man, is a thing of human nature (res naturae humanae)?

§ 121. It seems that He is: because 1. A thing of nature is that which is made by the act of that nature which is generation: but Christ was made by human generation and nativity from a mother: therefore He is a thing of human nature, as it seems.

§ 122. 2. Also, it was held above from Damascene that He is homoousios, in the explanation of the second opinion: but this cannot be unless He is a thing of the same nature as that thing is: and that thing is of human nature: therefore Christ also is a thing of the same nature.

§ 123. 1. A thing of any nature is a hypostasis...

incommunicable under that nature. But Christ, according to what he is as man, is not an incommunicable hypostasis under human nature. Therefore, he is not a thing of human nature. Proof of the minor premise: Christ, in that he is man, is assumed into the singularity of the divine person; therefore, he is not incommunicable under human nature, because it was held above that what is incommunicable does not communicate assumption to another.

§ 2. If you say that in that he is man, he is not assumed into the singularity of the divine person. On the contrary: Christ is one singular person: either in that he is man, or in that he is

God. It is clear that it is not in that he is man, because he is a person by an eternal personality, as the Saints say. Therefore, he is a person insofar as he is God. If, therefore, this man is in the same singularity of person, this will be through assumption; therefore, he himself, in that he is man, communicated in the singularity of the divine person.

§ 3. To these and all sophisms of this kind the Master posited a distinction regarding the consignifications of "according to what" or "in that", as is clear in the text. But because below we will give the rationale for that distinction, we therefore answer these plainly according to what was held above in distinction 5. And we say to the first question, that if the word "according to what" notes a cause or a condition of the nature—that is, that humanity is the cause why he is a person, or the human condition or property in him is the cause that he is a person—then, I say, we state that he in that he is man, or according to what he is as man, is not a person; because the personality by which he is a person is an eternal personality, and this follows divinity in him. But if, when it is said, "Christ according to what he is as man is a person," the word "according to what" notes the unity or identity of the human supposit to the divine supposit, then he in that he is, or according to what he is as man, is a person.

§ 4. In this sense all the subsequent questions concerning the individual, and the supposit, and the thing of nature, must also be distinguished, especially according to the second opinion, which alone we hold: because it posits that when I say "this," pointing to Christ, he is pointed to in two natures, and in three substances because of the union. However, the last two are more easily granted—namely, that Christ according to what he is as man is a supposit and a thing of nature—than the first two—namely, that according to what he is as man he is a person or an individual of man.

§ 5. It must be said, therefore, to the first, that Christ according to what he is as man, is a man in the individual. But if we wished to force the intention of what is "one," as the objection does, then it does not follow from this that he is one man, because he is not divided from the person of the Son of God, into whose singularity he is united.

§ 6. And if you object: Christ according to what he is as man is either one man or several men; but he is not several; therefore, one. I say that this does not hold, because "one" is taken in different ways. For in the first way, being is taken as it is opposed to existing in conjunction with another; and in the second way, it is taken as it is opposed to several. And there is a counter-instance: the foot of Paul is not one. Proof: the foot of Paul is not divided from others; therefore, the foot of Paul is not one in itself. On the contrary: the foot of Paul is not one in itself; therefore, it is several. Whence it is clear that in the present case, in which there is the union of this man into the Son of God, a process of this kind is invalid. Moreover, even if it were granted that Christ were one man, insofar as one is opposed to several, it would not further follow that he would be a singular man, because he communicated in the divine person, and he is not singular by human singularity, but rather he is singular by divine personality.

§ 7. To the next it must be said that this is false: "Christ, insofar as he is man, is in himself one," as has already been shown, because person is interpreted through my saying "one in itself." But "one" as opposed

to communicability and to plurality. But the objection proceeds as if it were opposed only to plurality; for thus, as it is opposed to plurality, it was proved above that he is one, and not two; but not as existing, because thus he subsists in the divine person.

§ 2. To the next it must be said that if it were granted that Christ according to what he is as man were a person, and the word "according to what" noted a cause or condition of the nature, it would follow that he would be two persons. Proof: for Christ according to what he is as God is a person, and according to what he is as man would be a person; and what he is according to what he is as God, he is not according to what he is as man. Proof: "According to what he is as man he created the stars, and is eternal," is false. "According to what he is as God he slept and ate," is false. Therefore, what he is according to what he is as God, he is not according to what he is as man; therefore, it would follow that he would be two persons. Thus I say, if the word "according to what" noted a cause or condition of the nature. And this is a great absurdity, because it is a heresy. Proof: if Christ is two persons, it is written [215] that the Father gave to that man a name which is above every name, and Augustine says, namely, that he be called and be God: that every tongue should confess it, because Christ is in the glory of God the Father. Therefore, there would be four persons in the glory of God; and thus a quaternity in the divine things would follow, which is the heresy of a certain Leporius, a Gallic monk, reprobated in the time of Pope Leo. Another heresy follows according to Boethius, namely, that if he is two persons, the union is not made in a person; nor again is the union made in a nature; therefore, no union is made in Christ; and thus that man is a mere man. And this was the heresy of Nestorius and Eutyches, refuted by Ambrose and Cassian, and reprobated by the same Pope Leo III, and condemned in the Council of Nicaea. Therefore, it is clear how great an absurdity it is to grant that Christ, in that he is man, is a person, such that the word "according to what" expresses a cause or property or condition of the nature.

§ 3. To the next it must be said that Christ in that he is man is a "something" [aliquid], because he is this man; but it does not follow that he is a person, because this "something"—that is, the man—does not have the threefold incommunicability of a person, which we noted above at the end of distinction 5.

§ 4. To what is further asked: Whether Christ according to what he is as man is an individual? It must be said in the same sense that he is not, because an individual is said to signify what is one in itself, and by its singularity is divided from others. And so all individuals include the incommunicability of a person in their understanding, although they may not have in themselves that they are supposits of a rational nature.

§ 5. To what is objected to the contrary, it must be said that if force is applied regarding the individuating principles, he does not have the individuating principles in that he is man. For the principle of the individuating principles is the singularity of the person, that is, the

personal property, by which a person is a person; and this he does not have in that he is man, but in that he is the Son of God. But this is true, that he, being man, has that collection of individuating principles; and in that he is man he has some things which are not found in another, but those do not complete the singularity of his individuation.

§ 6. To the next it must be said that Christ in that he is man is something after the species and under the species of man; but he is not only this, rather he is also the Son of God. And therefore it does not follow that whatever is after the species in him belongs to the individuating principles in that species.

§ 7. Furthermore, this proposition of Boethius, that "The species is the whole being of the individuals," is not true except of those individuals which

are subordinated to a species in one nature alone. But Christ is subordinated in two natures and three substances, as was said above.

§ 2. To what is further asked, whether Christ in that he is man or according to what he is as man is a supposit, this can be granted: even if "according to what" designates a cause or condition of the nature. However, the Master seems to wish that it not be granted absolutely, because his question is as follows: "Whether Christ according to what he is as man is a person, or even is a 'something'?" And he seems to direct his distinction back to both parts of the question. If, therefore, it is granted, it is without a doubt because supposit, individual, and person are not convertible according to the intentions of the names, even though supposit and individual are convertible according to the supposits.

§ 3. If, I say, it is granted, it must be answered to what is objected to the contrary that the understanding of the authority of Damascene is not the one which is posited, but rather that there is no common species, insofar as a species designates a form of the whole predicable of the whole: because thus in the Lord Jesus there does not result any form of a whole in which divinity and humanity are united, as the body and soul are in a man. For it was held above that the rationale of this composition, which is not a union of parts, is inexplicable. But Damascene does not mean that Christ, in that he is man, is not truly a man in species, because this was held above in his words, that he is homoousios [consubstantial] with his mother, precisely because those two natures are not compounded with respect to a third: because if they were compounded with respect to a third, then Christ would be neither man nor God, just as a man is neither a body nor a soul.

§ 4. To the next it must be said that that proposition does not hold in Christ, nor was it posited by Boethius except concerning those things which are in only one nature.

§ 5. To the next it must be said that when Christ is said to be a supposit of man, the divine nature is not excluded, nor is the supposit of the divine nature excluded; because Christ is one supposit which is truly subjected to both natures.

§ 6. To the next it must be said that I well grant that Christ is one supposit, but it is invalid if it is further inferred: "Therefore he is a supposit of one nature"; and it proceeds from an

insufficiency, because either one supposit is of one nature, or it is a supposit of several natures.

§ 7. To what is further asked concerning a thing of human nature, I grant this as well in every sense.

§ 8. Now to what is objected to the contrary, that a thing of any nature is an incommunicable hypostasis, etc., I well grant it: because a thing of this nature is incommunicable, but not by its proper singularity, but by the singularity of the divine person. And this does not prevent him from truly being a thing of that nature: for the union takes nothing away from the things found there, but confers many goods.

§ 9. To what is further proposed, whether according to what he is as man he is communicable and communicates? It must be said that if the word "according to what" notes a cause or condition of the assumable and unible nature, that phrase is true. But if it expresses the unity of the person, it is false. Moreover, if it is granted in the truest sense, the further inference does not hold: "Therefore he is not a thing of nature," because a thing of nature does not have incommunicability from its own understanding. And there is a fallacy of the consequent in the argument. For it holds conversely: "It is not a thing of nature, therefore it is not incommunicable," because a thing of nature follows upon the incommunicable, and not conversely.

Articulus 2 — What Belongs to the Distinction of "Insofar As"

On the things that concern the distinction of what "according to what" is.

On the things that concern the distinction of what "according to what" is.

§ 1. Next it is asked about what the Master says, there, at A, towards the end: "For according to has a multiple rationale."

§ 2. Here the Master posits four things which the word "according to what" posits, namely, condition or property, unity of person, habit, and cause. And it is asked: What are the examples of this division?

§ 3. And it must be said that it notes condition for property, when it is posited with a word signifying one of the natures in him, and there follows something which is proper to that nature: as when it is said, "Christ according to what he is as God is good," or "according to what he is as God is uncreated," and things of this kind which denote properties belonging to God alone. And on the other part, when posited with the human nature, it infers properties following upon it: as, "Christ according to what he is as man is capable of laughing, and an animal capable of discipline, and rational, and corporeal, and mortal," and the like. According to this, note the rule, that whatever is predicated of any subject to which this phrase "according to what" or "in that" is joined, taken in this sense, is either the definition of the subject, or a part of the definition, or a proper passion which is called an accident adhering per se, or an immediate effect, or its immediate cause. And examples of this are these, in the order of enumeration: "Christ according to what he is as man is a rational, mortal animal," and "is an

215. Hebrews 13:17.

animal," and "is capable of laughing"; and "Christ according to what he is as slain, died"; and "Christ according to what he is as man, was generated by a temporal generation."

§ 4. But sometimes it notes the unity or union of the nature, and this especially in Christ, as when it is said, "Christ according to what he is as man created the stars," "Christ according to what he is as God died on the cross." For there "according to what" does not note that that predicate can be inferred from the form of that to which it is joined, but rather that by virtue of the union made in the hypostasis such predicates are attributed to the subject.

§ 5. The third signification or consignification of what "according to what" is, is that it notes habit: and an example of this is in Philippians 2:8: Found in habit as a man. And the sense is that Christ as man, that is, according to what he is as man, is found in habit, that is, that the human nature has a certain likeness in him, as was expounded above in distinction 6. But a plainer example is that as man he was shod, and according to what he is as man he was clothed: because a habit of this kind belongs to him on account of the man, and not on account of God. And in that signification of habit, Christ according to what he is as man is holy, beautiful, fair before the sons of men, grace is poured forth on his lips , and so for the rest, because "to have" is spoken of in many ways according to all those things which come to us, so that we have them, as Augustine said above in distinction 6.

§ 6. In the fourth signification it denotes a cause; and since there are four causes, it can note all of them. Thus, it notes the efficient cause, when it is said, "Christ according to what he is as man merited for himself and for us." The formal cause, as "Christ according to what he is as man is rational." The material cause, as "Christ according to what he is as man is from body and soul." The final cause, as "Christ according to what he is as man is the end of all creatures, or the most worthy of creatures," or "according to what he is as man he came for our sake."

§ 1. But on the part of God it can note the efficient cause, as "Christ according to what he is as God has the power to lay down his life, and to take it up again"; and as it were the formal cause, as "Christ according to what he is as God is a supposit of the divine nature." But it never notes the material cause, nor as it were the material cause, because divinity is not to be called matter, and what is similar to matter is also imperfect. And it notes the final cause, as when it is said, "Christ according to what he is as God is he to whom all things are directed, and for whose sake all things are and come to be."

§ 2. From this distinction it is easy to solve those things which some ask here, namely, whether Christ according to what he is as man is God; and if according to what he is as God he is this man; or according to what he is this man, he is God, or Creator, or anything of this kind; which, because they are easy to solve, we pass over.

Articulus 3 — Whether the Master's Objection Avails in the Definition of Person

Whether the Master's counter-instance is valid against the definition of person?

§ 1. Next it is asked concerning the counter-instance which the Master gave in the text, there, B: "For even now the soul of Christ is a rational substance," etc.

§ 2. For it does not seem to be valid, because: First, "substance" is taken equivocally on either side, because the soul of Christ is a substance as a form; when it is said, "a person is a substance of a rational nature," "substance" is taken for the first composite substance, which is properly and principally, and maximally so called, as "some man," or "some substance of a rational nature"; therefore it is a person; from which the counter-instance is invalid.

§ 3. Second, the Master seems not to have interpreted "person" grammatically: because if it were said to be as it were "sounding by itself" [per se sonans], the middle syllable in the noun "persona" ought to be shortened or abbreviated: because in the verb "sonans" the first syllable is short. The proof of this is in the composition "consonum" [consonant] and "absonum" [dissonant].

§ 4. Solution. It must be said that in truth the Master's counter-instance does not stand with respect to the understanding of "substance." But he intends to show that the elements posited are not sufficient for the definition of person, because "person" is not sufficiently defined when it is said that it is a "substance of a rational

nature," unless "individual" is added; and then it does not belong to this man, according to what he is as man, in that sense in which the word "according to what" notes a cause or condition of the nature: because then "individual" posits a threefold incommunicability, because it means incommunicable to several, and incommunicable by opposition to the communicability of a part in a composition, and incommunicable by opposition to communicability through assumption into the singularity of another, as was expounded above.

§ 2. To the next it must be said that the interpretation of a name is twofold. One which follows the sound of the syllables posited in the word, or even the correspondence of the letters: as when "lapis" [stone] is said to be "laedens pedem" [injuring the foot], "petra" [rock] as "pede trita" [rubbed by the foot]; and it is not necessary that in such interpretations the interpreted thing follows the nature of the interpreting elements; and thus the Master speaks here. The other is an interpretation according to the signification of the name: just as we say that a composite draws its signification from its components: and thus "persona" [person] is composed from "per se" and "unum," as it were "one by itself" [per se una]. Whence it is clear that Christ insofar as he is man is not one by himself; and therefore he is not a person insofar as he is man.

Articulus 4 — Whether the Son of God Is Predestined

Whether the Son of God is predestined?

Whether the Son of God is predestined?

§ 1. Next it is asked concerning what he says: "Christ according to what he is as man is predestined to be the Son of God," etc.

§ 2. On account of this there arises here a question concerning predestination as the Son of God; concerning which let us briefly ask three things, namely: Whether the Son of God is

predestined? Secondly, Whether the Son of God is predestined to be the Son of God? Thirdly, Whether the Son of God is predestined to be man?

§ 3. To the first it is objected thus: First, Augustine says, and the authority was held above, that such was that union which would make God man, and man God, that all things which are truly said of the man, are said of God, and conversely. Therefore, since this is true, "The Son of God is man," and "The man is predestined," it seems to follow because of Augustine's ante-predicamental rule that the Son of God is predestined.

§ 4. Second, according to the second opinion, Christ is nothing but one single supposit; but of this supposit it is true to say that it is predestined; therefore the Son of God is predestined.

§ 5. Third, if it should be said that this is invalid, because "Son of God" names nothing but what is eternal; but passive predestination is only of temporal things. On the contrary: I see that this is granted: "The Son of God is sent," "The Son of God is given," as is proved in Book I of the Sentences; but "is sent" and "is given" connote time according to act, because they do not belong to God from eternity. But "to be predestined" does not connote time. Therefore it seems that much more ought it to be granted, "The Son of God is predestined," than "The Son of God is sent."

§ 6. Fourth, in other predestined persons I see that it is not necessary to add "according to what"; for we say simply that Peter is predestined, and Paul; therefore it seems that neither in Christ is it necessary to add it; therefore it can simply be said, "The Son of God is predestined."

§ 7. Fifth, predestination is properly of a person, and not of a nature; for we do not say that Peter's body is predestined, nor his soul, but Peter himself. Therefore, since according to the sayings of the Saints Christ is predestined, predestination belongs to him insofar as he is a person; but insofar as he is a person, he is the Son of God; therefore it seems that the Son of God is predestined.

§ 8. Sixth, when a subject is posited, it is not necessary that a predicate be rendered to it per se, unless a reduplication is made about that subject: as when I say "man," I can predicate of him that which belongs per se, and that which belongs through another, and that which belongs by accident. For man is a rational, mortal animal; and man is an animate body, which does not belong per se, but insofar as he is an animal; and man is white, which belongs by accident. Therefore it seems similarly that since the Son of God is a certain subject, it can be truly predicated of him what belongs to him through another: but through the fact that he is man, it belongs to him to be predestined; therefore I can simply grant, "The Son of God is predestined."

§ 9. Seventh, other predicates which belong to him insofar as he is man I can predicate simply of him, such as "born," and "suffered," and "dead"; therefore it seems that this is simply to be granted, that the Son of God is predestined.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. The Son of God is eternal; nothing eternal can be predestined; therefore the Son of God cannot be predestined.

§ 2. Second, the Son of God is the one predestining; but the one predestining can never be the one predestined; therefore the Son of God cannot be predestined.

§ 3. WHICH we grant, saying to the first, that "such is the union," etc., is understood of those things which do not have in their understanding a rationale of opposition to the Son of God: such as "made," "created," "creature," "predestined," "recent," and the like. For all these things are not said even of that man on account of the person or supposit, but on account of the human nature, as was evident above in the explanation of the second opinion, where Christ is said to be predestined according to what he is in human nature.

§ 4. To the next it must be said that that supposit, just like the person, is not predestined except on account of the human nature.

§ 5. To what is objected to the contrary concerning mission, it must be said that it is not similar: because mission has in itself the eternal and the temporal; and yet it is determined by the temporal, as Augustine says, that to be sent is to be known that he is from another. But predestination does not enclose in itself the eternal insofar as it is passive, but only the temporal; whence the mission of the Son does not precede "to be sent," as predestination precedes the predestined.

§ 6. To the next it must be said that in others it is not necessary to add it: because their form signifies nothing opposed to predestination, because their form denotes that which is not from eternity; and therefore the determination is enclosed in their understanding. But in the Son of God the total opposite is true, because the contrary of predestination is enclosed in the understanding of the Son of God.

§ 7. To the next it must be said that predestination is of the person, but not on account of the person, rather it is on account of the nature in the person: because on account of it [the nature] the person is temporal, or eternal. Whence in others in which both are temporal, namely nature and person, there is no opposition of the form of the subject to the predicate. But in Christ it does not belong on account of the person, but on account of the temporal nature; and therefore it is necessary to add a determination.

§ 8. To the next it must be said that although a predicate is not always rendered to a subject per se, nevertheless a predicate which is opposed to it is never fitted to it, unless some determination is added on account of which it belongs to it. Now it is so in the present case, that the predicate has an opposition to the subject; and therefore it is necessary to append the determination of the other nature, on account of which those things which are opposed in themselves, belong in Christ because of the union of the two natures made in the eternal person.

§ 9. To the next it must be said that it is not similar concerning certain other predicates, which do not have an opposition to the subject, as has been said. And concerning those which express opposition from themselves, for instance, "to be born," "to suffer," "to die," they do not belong to the supposit except on account of the nature, and therefore belong to the nature per se and immediately, and to the person consequently. But "to be created," and "to be recent,"

and "to be predestined," belong to the person by reason of the supposit; and therefore it is not similar.

Articulus 5 — Whether the Son of God Is Predestined to Be the Son of God; Secondly, Whether the Son of God Is Predestined to Be the Son of God

Whether the Son of God is predestined to be the Son of God? Secondly it is asked, Whether the Son of God is predestined to be the Son of God?

Whether the Son of God is predestined to be the Son of God? Secondly it is asked, Whether the Son of God is predestined to be the Son of God?

§ 1. It seems that he is, because: First, this man is predestined to be the Son of God; and this man is the Son of God; therefore this man is predestined to be the Son of God; therefore the Son of God is predestined to be the Son of God.

§ 2. Second, Damascene says that the natures

of Christ communicate their idioms to one another, that is, their properties; but one of the properties is predestination to be the Son of God; therefore this is communicated to the Son of God; therefore the Son of God is predestined to be the Son of God.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 2. First, the composition imported by the word "is," when it is said, "The Son of God is predestined to be the Son of God," has opposition on both sides, namely on the part of the subject, and on the part of the determination of the predicate; therefore that is falser than the first, namely this: "The Son of God is predestined."

§ 3. Second, nothing is predestined to that which is eternal; therefore nothing is predestined to this. Proof of the first premise (for the second is evident of itself): because Augustine says that predestination is the preparation of grace in the present, and of glory in the future. But neither grace as present, nor glory in the future is eternal for us; therefore since all predestination is to this, nothing is predestined to the eternal; therefore the first premise stands, and thus the conclusion follows.

§ 4. Solution. It must be said that this is false, in my judgment, "The Son of God is predestined to be the Son of God," and falser than the former.

§ 5. TO THE FIRST ARGUMENT it must be said (as above) that although this man is predestined, this does not follow concerning the Son of God: because in the signified meaning of the name, when "this man" is said, there is enclosed that on account of which predestination belongs to the Son of God; but not when "Son of God" is said, etc.

§ 6. To the next it must be said, as before, that those idioms which do not belong per se to the hypostasis, but primarily belong to the nature, and have in themselves a rationale of opposition to the subject, are not communicated without a determination. However, note that in the argument which is last introduced for the opposite, there is also an error: because it does not hold except for those predestined in whom the grace prepared is a habit rendering them good, and making their works good and meritorious. But in Christ there is the grace of

union to being, and it is prepared for him that this man himself be the eternal Son of God: but yet this is not prepared for the Son of God, because he was this from eternity.

Articulus 6 — Whether It Should Be Conceded That the Son of God Was Predestined to Be Man

Whether it should be granted that the Son of God is predestined to be man?

§ 1. Thirdly it is asked, Whether it should be granted that the Son of God is predestined to be man?

§ 2. It seems not, because: First, predestination, by virtue of the preposition prae- (pre-), notes an order of antecedence with respect to the one predestined. If therefore the Son of God is predestined, it would be necessary that something be prior to the Son of God, which is false.

§ 3. Second, nothing is predestined except to grace, or to glory, or to one of those. But no grace is prepared for the Son of God; for grace does not come to him through union to the man, but rather conversely. Therefore it seems that the Son of God is not predestined to be man in time.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 4. First, in the text above it was held that it is predestined that the Son of God should be man in time; therefore it seems that the Son of God is predestined to be man.

§ 5. Furthermore, the Son of God is man: either therefore this is true from eternity, or not. If so: then it is true from eternity that the Son of God is man, which is false. If it is verified in time: then beforehand it was foreseen that it would happen. Either therefore that it would happen through grace, or through nature. Not through nature; therefore through grace. But no grace is given in time which is not prepared beforehand; therefore it was foreseen and prepared through grace that the Son of God be this predestined man; therefore before the incarnation the Son of God was predestined to be man.

Solution: It must be said that this is twofold. The Son of God is predestined to be man, from the fact that the term "predestined" can determine the composition on the part of the subject or on the part of the predicate. If it determines it on the part of the predicate, it is true: because the Son of God being man is predestined. But if it determines on the part of the subject, thus it will denote precedence to the subject, and thus it is false. However, some say that for another reason it is twofold, namely from the fact that the term "predestined" can be a noun or a participle: and if it is a noun, they say that it is an adjective of what I say, man: and if it is a participle, then they say it is false. But this is nothing: because if it is a noun, then nothing is said, that the Son of God is predestined to be man: just as nothing is said, the Son of God is to be man, which is an incongruous expression: hence the first distinction is better.

To that which is objected against, it must be said that if the term "predestined" determines the composition before and after, then it will denote precedence not with respect to the Son of God according to himself, but rather with respect to being man.

And through this, the solution to the second is also clear.

Articulus 7 — Whether Christ Was Predestined to Be This Man

Whether Christ is predestined to be this man?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said:

Christ, insofar as He is man, is predestined to be the Son of God, etc.

For by this, this seems to be conceded by the Master, that this man or Christ being man is predestined to be the Son of God: and this seems to be false, that this man or man is predestined to be the Son of God: for nothing is predestined which is not predestined from eternity: if therefore this is true, Christ according to man or human nature is predestined, it seems that before the incarnation it was true: just as also this is said to be true, Peter is predestined from eternity or was predestined.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
When it is said, This man before the incarnation is predestined, this man supposes because it supplies the place of a verb of past tense, just as when it is said, This man is loved. But the rule is, that a term supposing for a verb of past tense, supposes for the present or for the past if the speech is to be true. For it follows, This is loved, or man is loved: therefore the man who is or was, is loved: therefore similarly, if Christ is predestined, it seems that either the man who is, or who was: and since for both it is false, the speech seems to be simply false. And this is a general objection concerning all predestined.

Solution: It must be said that this does not follow with words pertaining to the act of the soul, or noting form: because they have the power of extending: for it does not follow, it is thought about man: therefore about the man who is, or who was: nor does it follow, man can or could be: therefore the man who is, or who was. Similarly, this which I say, that predestined pertains to the act of the divine intellect and will: because to be predestined is to be foreseen for grace and glory: and therefore it does not follow, that it is about him who is or was: but it suffices for him, that he will be.

Articulus 8 — Whether Christ Was Predestined to Infinite Grace

Whether Christ is predestined to infinite grace?

Whether Christ is predestined to infinite grace?

Then it is asked concerning what is said there, G, towards the end: "That he himself, being man, is the Son of God, he has through grace."

For from this it seems that he is predestined to grace, and it seems that he is predestined to infinite grace.

1. John 3:34: "For God does not give the Spirit by measure." But what is not by measure is infinite: therefore it seems that he is predestined to infinite grace.
2. Likewise, "We saw his glory, the glory as of the Only Begotten from the Father, full of grace and truth." But since no grace is in him unless prepared from eternity, it seems he

is predestined to the fullness of grace, from whose fullness we have all received, and grace for grace.

3. Likewise, the Gloss on that of the Apostle, to the Romans 8:23: "Waiting for the adoption of the sons of God," etc. No greater gift could God predestine for man than to make his Word, through which he created all things, their head, and them as members of the head. This is for this, that he be the head of the Church: but the head imparts sense and motion: therefore Christ gives the fullness of grace: but this he cannot do except from divine fullness, because faith and grace cannot be from any creature: therefore this man is predestined to infinite grace.

ON THE CONTRARY:
1. Infinite grace is uncreated grace, because nothing is infinite unless uncreated: but what is uncreated is eternal: but what is eternal, nothing precedes: therefore nothing precedes that grace. But everything that is prepared by predestination, predestination precedes: therefore predestination does not prepare infinite or uncreated grace for this man.

1. Likewise, predestination is the preparation of grace in the present, and of glory in the future: therefore both grace and glory prepared have a condition from predestination marked by the difference of time: but the eternal and infinite have no such condition of time: therefore predestination does not prepare eternal or infinite grace.

Solution: It must be said that all grace which is had by Christ as man according to which he is predestined, is predestined with him and prepared for him, and is created in time: because he is not predestined except insofar as he is man, as was previously proven: and this grace is twofold, namely of union, and of habit. But the union is again twofold, namely the first, and the consequent. The first is that he truly be the Son of God, and the created union which is the medium between man and the Son of God, and the human nature and the divine nature, as was proven above: because it is a relation holding according to the thing on the part of the united which is created. And to this grace follows multiple other grace, namely that he be the head, that he be God, that he be imparting sense and motion to the Church: because although the infinite and eternal are in themselves, yet the relation of man to those is only through union made in time: and thus insofar as these are of man, they are prepared and predestined, and not simply: and this is what the Master intends to say from the words of Augustine: and through this the solution of those things which are first objected in the contrary is clear.

But habitual grace is the charity of Christ, and other virtues: and to these consequent grace is the merit of Christ, and suchlike.

And through this distinction the solution to all the questions is clear.

However, there are those who say this, that no infinite grace is predestined in Christ, and they say that Christ is the head of the Church in two ways, namely in the conformity of nature: and thus he does not impart except through merit, namely because he merited grace

for the Church: and he is one head with the Father and the Holy Spirit, and thus he imparts: and they say this is not predestined for Christ.

But on the contrary: This man has to impart sense and motion, and not from eternity: therefore in time; and he has nothing in time except what is prepared for him from eternity: therefore from eternity this is predestined for him.

Furthermore, in the text it is often held that it is predestined that he would be God naturally and truly, and that he would be the Son of God: whence it is clear that opinion is false. For although the eternal does not begin in itself, yet he began to be eternal, that is, that which is eternal and infinite: whence also this is conceded, that this child created the stars: and this (because he had grace) was without doubt predestined before he had grace.

Articulus 9 — Whether Christ Is an Adoptive Son

Whether Christ is an adoptive son?

Whether Christ is an adoptive son?

If indeed it is asked, Whether Christ is an adoptive son, etc.

Here begins that part which is about the question, Whether Christ is an adoptive son.

And it is divided into two parts: in the first of which he shows that Christ is not adoptive, but a natural son. In the second, he objects to the contrary and solves it, there, But to this it is opposed, etc.

Before the Letter, it is necessary here to inquire two things, namely, what is adoption in divine matters?

And, Whether it is fitting for God to adopt anything?

To the first, it proceeds thus: Adoption by men is perfectly described thus: It is the legitimate assumption of an external person into a son, or grandson, or thereafter.

But according to this definition, it seems there is no adoption in divine matters: because

1. According to God, no one is external to God: therefore it seems that no one is adopted.
2. Likewise, an adoptive father does not bring forth an adoptive son into being: but God brings us all into being: therefore He cannot be an adoptive father.

Furthermore, since adoption is done in two ways by laws, namely when someone who is of his own right is adopted into a son, and passes into the tutelage and dominion of the adopter, and similarly the sons if he has any: which adoption is called arrogation. Another adoption is of one who is not of his own right, but still under the governance of the natural father: and he does not pass into the dominion of the adopter.

It is asked, Whether in both ways it can be in divine matters?

It seems so: because we are all adopted, whether we are of our own right or not: therefore it seems that in both ways it is in divine matters.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: An adopted person by simple adoption does not pass into the governance of the adoptive father: but all adopted by God pass into the discipline and governance of God: therefore there is no adoption in divine matters. For the middle proposition. To the Hebrews xii, 7 and 8: What son is there whom the father does not correct? But if you are without discipline, of which all have become partakers, then you are bastards and not sons.

Likewise, To the Romans viii, 15: For you have not received the spirit of bondage again to fear, but you have received the spirit of adoption of sons, in which we cry: Abba (Father). Therefore it seems that since we all pass into the dominion of God through adoption, that there is not simple adoption there: but only arrogation.

Furthermore, It is asked about what he says,

Legitimate assumption.

For it seems that by the very fact of creating us, He assumes us: because 1. He creates in us the light of His countenance, which is the image in our soul: therefore it seems that from creation He takes us into sons.

1. Furthermore, the Saints say that we are sons of God from creation, and not natural sons: therefore we are adoptive sons.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Adoption is not done except by the consent of free will, for it does not compel the unwilling, as Damascene says. But from creation we do not have the use of free will: therefore it seems that we are not adoptive sons from creation.

1. Furthermore, the Spirit of adoption is distinguished from the Spirit of servitude, as previously appeared in the authority introduced: but the Spirit of adoption is in the grace that makes one pleasing, which we do not have from nature: therefore it seems that we are not sons of adoption from nature.
2. Likewise, the Apostle, to the Romans viii, 17, infers after he has spoken of the Spirit of adoption which makes sons: If sons, then heirs: heirs indeed of God, co-heirs however of Christ. But it is evident that we are not heirs from creation: therefore it seems that we are not adopted from creation.

Furthermore, What is legitimate assumption?

If it is that which is done according to laws: it is done by the consent of the prince, if it is arrogation: or by the consent of the senate, when it is simple adoption: but nothing similar is in divine matters: therefore it seems that in this regard the definition does not hold.

Likewise, Augustine says that through the natural son, sons of grace are adopted: and in this way, legitimate adoption is not done: rather the father adopts without the son: therefore it seems that adoption in divine matters is not done in the likeness of legal adoption.

Solution It must be said that in part divine adoption is similar to legal, and in part dissimilar. For in this respect, that adoption is done by the special favor of the adopter towards the adopted, and that the adopted by arrogation passes into the power of the adopt-

ive father, and concerning some right in the inheritance to be received according to the portion of the adoptive son, it is similar. But in this respect, that the adoptive father is not bound to give the adoptive son except a fourth part of the goods: and in this respect, that he is external to him, so that he did not bring him into being, it is somewhat dissimilar.

Therefore, it must be said to the first, that we are all adopted into sons for the inheritance of the beatitude of our adoptive father. Hence in Psalm xci, 6: I cried to you, Lord: you are my hope, my portion in the land of the living. Psalm xvi, 6: The lines have fallen to me in pleasant places. And, Baruch: O Israel, how great is the house of God, and the vast place of His possession.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that no one is external to God: because external in sacred Scripture denotes alienation by vice, as it is said in Psalm xvii, 46: The sons of strangers have lied to me, the sons of strangers have grown old, etc. Hence, Acts xvii, 28, Paul said: For we are also His offspring. But yet we are not sons by nature: therefore we can be adopted.

To the other, it must be said that although God brings us into being, yet He does not bring us into being by generating: and therefore we are not of His substance, and therefore we can be adopted.

To the other, it must be said that something similar is found in both adoptions in this respect, that some pass into the more special power of the adopting God by the grace of adoption, like religious who are as if arrogated, because they make themselves first devoted by what is held, Deuteronomy xxx, 9, concerning Levi: Who said to his father and to his mother: I do not know you: and to his brothers: I ignore you. Others, however, remaining in the world, in the care and solicitude of this life, have something more similar to simple adoption.

To the other, it must be said that I well concede that all those are adopted who by the testimony of the grace of the adopting and the Holy Spirit can say in conscience, Abba: because that testimony is required, as the Apostle says, to the Romans viii, 16 and 17: For the Spirit itself bears witness with our spirit, that we are the children of God. If children, then heirs: heirs indeed of God, co-heirs however of Christ.

To what is asked, Whether by the fact that we are created we are adopted? It must be said,

that we are not: because the mere likeness of the image does not make us adoptive sons, nor does any creature have from creation whereby it could justly pass into the dominion of the father: but from adoption we receive the pledge of the spirit, by which we acquire the right to the inheritance and dominion of the father. Nor do I say, however, that the use of free will is required: because thus infants would not have the grace of adoption.

To what is objected, that it does not compel the unwilling or resisting, it must be said that to compel is to inflict force: and force is inflicted where there is a resisting obstacle; but in these infants, although there is the obstacle of original sin, yet there is not a resisting with a contrary effort of will; and therefore there is no compulsion there.

Furthermore, To this that they are adopted, the passion of Christ and the faith of the mother Church operate: and such adoption is done from the excessive liberality of the adopting prince.

To what is further asked, Whether it is by the consent of the prince? It must be said, that it is not: because this adoption is of the prince: for it is not necessary that the prince seeks the consent of another or the senate: hence also this adoption is done with a more generous hand than human: because it is done for the whole inheritance: not by one who lacks a son, but by one who has the Only Begotten, and who brings many sons into the glory of His house: nor is it done by one who has not adopted others, but by one who has adopted all: for in human laws one who has natural children cannot adopt because of the scarcity that occurs from the division of the inheritance. Similarly, one cannot adopt many for the same reason: and this obstacle is not in divine matters: and therefore we can all be adopted individually into the whole inheritance.

To what is asked, Whether it is done through the son by nature? It must be said that it is: For the Father adopts from His own property; but the Son communicates to us the name of sonship, and transfers us into the kingdom of His inheritance by the right of adoption. The Holy Spirit is by whom, as by a pledge, we are adopted through charity which makes sons.

But what is objected, that according to this it does not seem to be legitimate. It must be said that it is still legitimate: because in human adoption another thing reforms the pact, as was said, namely the scarcity that occurs by the division of the inheritance: but here the more are adopted, the greater the inheritance of each becomes.

Articulus 10 — Whether It Is Fitting for God to Adopt

Whether it is fitting for God to adopt?

Secondly, it is asked, Whether it is fitting for God to adopt?

It seems, however, that it is not: because
1. One who has many sons cannot adopt.

1. Furthermore, adoption is granted for the consolation of lost sons: whence it is also granted to a woman as solace for deceased sons: therefore it seems that it is not fitting for God.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
One who cannot generate cannot adopt: but God regenerates us: therefore He can adopt all, by the place from the contrary sense which jurists use in their arguments. Whence, Isaiah 66:9: "Shall I who cause others to bring forth,
shall I not bring forth myself?" says the Lord: "if I who grant generation to others,
shall I be barren?" says the Lord your God.

Solution
That question has already been determined above: because God can adopt all with a generous hand, on account of the riches of His patrimony.

To that which is objected, it must be said that this adoption is not made for the distinction of sons, unless we say that it is to restore the kingdom made in heaven and in paradise: but this will not be fitting except concerning that adoption by which sons are adopted in reality, about which it will be determined below: because the grace of adoption to inheritance is fitting for every rational creature: nor is this grace properly for the solace of sons lost through sin: because it would be, even if sin were not, unless it is taken according to the accident of this state of sin in which we are: but rather from the magnificence of the supreme Emperor, and from the greatness of the inheritance: and this seems to be signified in the Gospel, where it is said: "Go quickly into the streets and lanes of the city; and bring in here the poor, and the weak, and the blind, and the lame... that my house may be filled."

Articulus 11 — Whether Christ Is Called Son by Nature, as God

Whether Christ is called Son by nature, as God?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, D, "However, He is not called Son by nature, as He is called God by nature."

For this seems false: because God is called by nature according to deity: therefore, thus He is called Son by nature, as God by nature.

To this it must be said that the Master emphasizes the mode: because when God is called by nature, the ablative is constructed in the relation of formal cause. However, when Son is called by nature, it is constructed in a double relation. If indeed the Son is called a simple person without assumed humanity, then "by nature" is constructed as if in the relation of efficient cause, according to what the Philosopher says in the fifth book of the Metaphysics, that nature is that from which the sprouting sprouts first. However, if the Son is a person in two natures and three substances, as the second opinion states, then Son by nature: because He is Son by eternal filiation which is according to the divine nature: for He is a person by eternal personality: and the Master indicates this when he says: "And yet He is called Son by nature or of nature, because He is naturally Son, having namely the same nature as He who begot." In this is the difference, that Christ as man had that nature by grace not of adoption, but of union in the being of hypostasis and person which by nature is Son: and therefore natural filiation as it were passes to this man, who is per se in the Son of God: but it passes through the union made in hypostasis.

Articulus 12 — Who Are Those Who Are Adopted, and Whether They Are Existing in Sin

Who are those who are adopted, and are they existing in sin?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, D, towards the end: Because when we were born we were sons of wrath, through grace we have been made sons of God.

For from this it seems that only those who are existing in sin are adopted.

This also seems so, because 1. They are not adopted unless they are called: but they are not called unless they are removed from sins, as the Gloss says on that of the Apostle, to the Romans 8:30: Whom he predestined, those he also called: and whom he called, those he also

justified. On the contrary: Sin seems rather to be the cause of wrath than of adoption: for in human adoptions, if someone offended someone, he would not adopt him, but rather him who obeyed him.

1. Furthermore, according to this it seems that the grace of adoption does not pertain to an Angel in the first state, nor even to man in the state of innocence. For it seems that it does not pertain to an Angel: because he is not adopted who is already in the house: but the Angel was always in heaven, both before confirmation and after: therefore it seems that he does not need to be introduced through adoption.
2. Furthermore, concerning man also: in the state of innocence it seems that he did not need the grace of adoption: because the sin which distanced him from the inheritance had not yet been committed. But on the contrary: From our own we cannot have a right to the inheritance of God, but it is necessary that we acquire it freely from his gift: but this is to adopt, to acquire a right in the inheritance of God from grace bestowed upon us: therefore adoption pertains both to the Angel before confirmation, and similarly to man in the state of innocence.

Solution We say that the grace of adoption has something per se, something per accidens. Per se it has three things, namely the state of not being a son by nature which it finds in the adopted: the habit of grace making pleasing, which habit is the substance of this grace through which adoption is made: and the third which is its effect, and this is the conferral or acquisition of a right in the inheritance of the adopting Father: and according to these three substantial things adoption is preserved, both in the Angel and in man first before the state of sin: it has a fourth per accidens, namely the state of sin, in which those who are adopted after sin are born.

Therefore it must be said to the first, that it is not similar concerning God and man adopting: for we can anticipate the affection and favor or love and grace of a man adopting us by services: because we do not serve him from his own, but from our own: but in God it is not so: because we cannot serve him except from his own: and therefore he anticipates us with grace so that we may will; hence he first adopts, and we being adopted begin to serve.

To that which is objected concerning the Angel and the first man, the solution is already clear,

To that which is objected on the contrary, it must be said that it is not the same to be in heaven, as in a habitation more fitting according to nature, and to have a right in the inheritance of the kingdom. For the first was granted to the Angel by creation: because Bede says on that Genesis 1:1: In the beginning, that by created God heaven and earth heaven is understood as angelic nature, or the empyrean heaven which as soon as it was made, was filled with holy Angels. But the second is not given except through the grace of adoption.

And if it is objected that natural things are not deserved: therefore if the empyrean heaven is a natural place and given from creation to the Angels themselves, the devil ought to have remained there. It must be said that natural things which are parts of substance we do not

lose, like parts of the soul and body: for concerning those Dionysius says in the book On the Divine Names: We do not say that the natural gifts given to demons have been changed: but they are whole and most splendid! There are other natural things fitting according to the state of innocence, or grace, or fault: and those are changed for the better, and for the worse: as the world is given to man existing in fault for the dwelling of misery, yet in which he can merit: paradise however to the state of innocence as a place of delights: and hell to the damned: but the empyrean heaven to creatures exalted through glory.

Articulus 13 — Whether Christ Was an Adoptive Son

Whether Christ was an adoptive son?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said, there, E, shortly after: The Son of the Virgin is said, because in the Virgin He assumed man into the unity of person: and this was of grace and not of nature.

From this it seems to follow, that Christ was an adoptive son:

1. For the grace which makes a son from one who is not a son, is the grace of adoption: but the grace of assumption makes a son from one who is not a son: therefore it is the grace of adoption.
2. Furthermore, why is it not conceded, that Christ is an adoptive son? For from this, as has been held, it does not follow, that He was a son of wrath: because this happens by the grace of adoption. If you say, that it would be necessary that He was not a son before, and afterwards be adopted to become a son: however, He was made the Son of God: this again does not seem to impede: because let us suppose this opinion to be true, that Angels were created in grace, and not confirmed: just as also some say about man, it is still true, that by the grace of adoption both Angels and men are sons: therefore it seems, that this also happens by the grace of adoption, that it finds not a son whom it makes a son: therefore it seems, that it does not prevent Him from being able to be called an adoptive son.

Solution It must be said, that in truth, as it was objected, those things happen by the grace of adoption: but because there is also in Christ, the man existing, the reason of sonship, and therefore He is not to be called adoptive.

To understand this, note that it is one thing to have sonship per se, and another to have it by gift. He who has the sonship of God by gift, since that gift is not his being, has it only by the grace of adoption which God gave him. But by being it happens to have in two ways, namely by the act of nature which is towards being: just as we have natural things in us by receiving from parents their natural things: and therefore we are their sons by nature, and not by the grace of their good pleasure: and in this way the Son of God, insofar as He is the Son of God, is the Son of God the Father by nature. In another way it is had by being through identity and through union to Him who has it by nature. For if I am one with you by the being of your person, whatever you have by nature, this is also natural to me: although we have

received it by union, and not by the act of nature which is generation. Thus this man insofar as this man: so that "insofar as" indicates union, has that he is a son by nature: and yet this man is not begotten of the Father: and this is what Augustine says, that this man has this by grace; but this grace is not a habit of the soul, as the grace of adoption, but rather is a union to be one with the person, who naturally has the sonship of God the Father: and by this the solution to the question is sufficiently clear.

Articulus 14 — For What Did God Adopt Us

To what end did God adopt us?

Then it is asked concerning what is said there, K, around the middle: "He indeed by nature is Son, but we by adoption." And it is asked, To what end did He adopt?

For it seems that 1. We are more espoused, as is evident throughout the Song of Songs. However, a father adopting a daughter whom he has adopted cannot espouse her.

1. Furthermore, He does not give a part of the inheritance, but the whole: therefore, it is not adoption.

Solution: This is easy to determine from the preceding: because in truth we are adopted, and even more truly than adoption according to the laws. Although legal affinity excludes carnal marriage, no proximity excludes spiritual marriage: but rather, the more reasons there are for joining, the firmer it is.

To the other, the solution is already clear: because what according to the laws gives a part of the inheritance and not the whole, this happens due to the defect of temporal things, which the more they are divided, the more they are diminished. But in spiritual marriage, it is the opposite: because the more it is given to many, the greater it is: and therefore it increases for each one from the adoption of the just, because he will rejoice in God in the adoption of many. Hence the Lord says: "There will be joy before the angels of God over one sinner doing penance."

Articulus 15 — Whether the Father Alone Adopts or the Whole Trinity

Whether the Father alone adopts or the whole Trinity?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said there, FE, around the middle: He did not only by name declare Himself to be the Son of God, etc.

For there is a doubt, Whether the Father alone adopts, or the whole Trinity?

It seems, however, that the Father alone [adopts]; because the law says that he who can generate can adopt: but the Father alone can generate in divine matters: therefore the Father alone can adopt.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
1. On "Our Father, who art in heaven," the Gloss says that our Father is the God Trinity: therefore it seems that the whole Trinity adopts.

1. Likewise, Grace is equally from the whole Trinity: and through grace we are adopted: therefore it seems that the whole Trinity is the father of adoption.
2. But again, against this it seems to be that which is determined in the first Sentences, that it is not said, "Our Son": therefore it seems that it does not have relation to us: nor is it said, "Our Holy Spirit": but only "Father" is said.

our: and since through the grace of adoption He is our Father, it seems that only the Father can adopt.

Solution We say that the whole Trinity is the adopting Father: but nevertheless only the Father appropriately, not properly: and therefore it was said above, that the Father adopts through the Son, and through the Holy Spirit: because we receive the name of sons through the testimony of the Spirit of the Son.

To the other it must be said, that the whole Trinity can generate by that generation. And if you object certain things in the laws, He cannot adopt who cannot generate by nature: it must be said, that this compels nothing more than that adoption appropriately, and not properly, belongs to the Father.

To the other it must be said, that although He is not called ours under that name, nor the Holy Spirit under that name: nevertheless each of these is called ours under the name of the adopting Father: because the Son according to the name of Son, does not place a relation to us, but to the Father: and similarly the Holy Spirit under the name of the Holy Spirit, does not place a relation except to His principle, which are the Father and the Son.

Articulus 16 — Whether Son Is Said Equivocally as Son by Origin and by Adoption

Whether the son is said equivocally to be a son by origin and adoption?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said, there, EK, near the end: For this one is the true and proper Son by origin, not by adoption.

For from this it seems that the son is said equivocally by adoption and by origin: and the father is said equivocally of the true father and the adoptive father. Which is also proven by another reason: for the father is a father from generation, and the son is a son from birth: but generation is not of one reason, and birth is not of one reason in natural generation and adoption: therefore, the father or son is not of one reason in both cases.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY
The Apostle infers, "And if sons, then heirs: heirs indeed of God, and joint-heirs with

Christ"[216]. Which inference would not be valid unless it had something of the reason of his sonship.

1. Likewise, to the Romans viii, 29: "Whom he foreknew, he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son." And there, "That he might be the firstborn among many brethren." Therefore, if we are conformed to the image of the Son, we are not said to be sons equivocally: and if he is called the firstborn, his generation is counted with ours: and thus it is not equivocal. Similarly, this is taken from that word: "Go to my brethren, and say to them: I ascend to my Father and your Father, to my God and your God"[217]. For he would not say, "brethren," if the generation were entirely equivocal.

Solution
It must be said that these are not of one reason: but they are said by prior and posterior: for Christ is truly the son, to whose likeness we are sons: and likeness is not taken in the act of generation, as the first objection proceeds, but to the born, and to the right of the born. To the born because he is an example to us, to whom we are assimilated as much as we can, so that we may be conformed to him. And this the Apostle intends when he said to the Romans, viii, 17. For when he had said: "And if sons, then heirs: heirs indeed of God, and joint-heirs with Christ," he immediately added: "If so be that we suffer with him, that we may be also glorified together." As if he were saying: If in life we have been similar to the Son. To the right of the born, likeness is taken in the perception of inheritance.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 17 — Whether There Are Some Sons by Appellation Only, and Whether There Is Some Mean Between a Son by Nature and the Grace of Adoption

Whether there are some sons by nuncupation only? And, whether there is any medium between a son by nature and a son by the grace of adoption?

Whether there are some sons by nuncupation only? And, whether there is any medium between a son by nature and a son by the grace of adoption?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, E, towards the end: Truth, by nuncupation.

From this, a third kind of sons seems to be introduced: who are neither adoptive sons nor sons by nature, but by nuncupation alone.

But if it is said that these are those who are sons by creation alone, on the contrary: they are not sons by nuncupation alone, but they have the act of the Father in leading to being, and also the likeness of the Father in image.

Further, it is inquired according to this, whether there is anything medium between a son by nature and a son by the grace of adoption?

It seems that there is: because a medium participates in the nature of the extremes: but a son by nature is a son by nature only: an adoptive son is only by grace: therefore, he who has by grace only what is a son by nature, as Christ the man, he is the medium between a son purely by nature and a son purely by adoption.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
A medium is not named by the name of an extreme unless it is compared to another extreme. If therefore this man is the medium between a son by nature and a son by adoption, it seems that he ought not to be called either adoptive or naturally a son absolutely.

Solution: To the first, I say that there is a son by creation alone: and there is a son by creation and adoption: and there is a son by nuncupation, who has defaced the image of creation by the act of sin in which he is: and he is called a son by nuncupation, not because he does not have the act and image of the Father, but because he falls short of the imitation and likeness of the father: as Abraham said to the rich man: Son, remember, etc.

And through this, the solution to the first is clear.

To the other, it must be said that in no way should Christ the man be called a medium between a son by nature and a son by adoption: because he participates in only one of the extremes: and this not by the reason of a medium, but by the reason of an extreme: for the grace by which that man is a son is not the grace of adoption, as has been said, but of union to being: and therefore there is nothing there of the reason of that extreme which is the filiation of adoption. But the other extreme is there in the reason and simplicity of the extreme: because Christ is a son by the same numerical filiation by which the eternal Son of God is a son. The nature of the extreme which constitutes the medium is mixed and not remaining in its simplicity and nature.

Articulus 18 — What That Grace Is by Which We Are Adopted

What is that grace through which we are adopted?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said, there, E, towards the end: Through adoption we are called sons, etc.

For it can be doubted here, What is that grace through which we are adopted?

It seems, however, that it is love: because
1. Love moves the adopting father to adopt a son.

1. Likewise, to the Colossians 1, 13: He has transferred us into the kingdom of the Son of his love. Since therefore the grace of adoption transfers into the kingdom, it seems that that grace is charity.

216. Romans 8:17

1. Likewise, the Holy Spirit pours charity into our hearts, as it is held, to the Romans v, 5: and he himself is called the Spirit of adoption of sons in whom we cry out, Abba (Father). Therefore it seems that adoption is made through charity.

2. Likewise, Augustine says that only charity distinguishes between lambs and kids, between sons of the kingdom and of perdition: since therefore we are adopted to the kingdom, it seems that this was through charity.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
4. We are adopted through assimilation to the Son: but the Son says, Matthew xi, 29: Learn from me, for I am meek and humble of heart, And, John xiii, 13 and following: You call me: Master, and Lord: and you say well, for so I am. If therefore I have washed your feet, Lord and Master, you also ought to wash one another's feet. For I have given you an example, that just as I have done to you, so you also should do.

1. Likewise, That which chiefly gives grace, chiefly works towards adoption: but God resists the proud, however gives grace to the humble: therefore humility adopts.

Solution In adoption something is considered on the part of the adopter, and something on the part of the adopted. On the part of the adopter first is love inclining to the bestowal of grace, and consequent according to reason and not according to time is the bestowal of grace. On the part of the adopted, however, first is faith, or the movement of faith, showing the breadth of the inheritance and the kindness of the adopter: for one approaching God must first believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder to those seeking him. Secondly is the fear of punishment. Thirdly, hope of obtaining the inheritance and adoption. And fourthly, desire according to love. And consequently the adoption itself: and this according to nature, although not according to time. And therefore grace simply adopts: charity, however, as perfectly uniting on the part of the adopter and the adopted: faith, however, fear, and humility, and other virtues in a certain respect: because faith as showing, fear as impelling from the contrary to adoption, humility as preserving the grace of adoption.

Articulus 19 — Whether The Predestination Of The Son Of God Is Of The Same Kind As Ours

Whether the predestination of the Son of God is of the same nature as ours?

Then it is inquired concerning the last part of this distinction, which begins there, F, Then it is asked, Whether predestination, etc.

And two questions are asked. Whether the predestination of the Son of God is of the same nature as ours?

And, Whether it is the cause of our predestination?

TO THE FIRST, it is proceeded thus:

1. To Romans viii, 30: Whom He predestined, He also called. But calling is a separation from the mass of perdition through final grace, as is gathered from the sense of the Gloss. Since therefore the Son of God, being predestined, is not called: it seems that His predestination is not of the same nature as ours.

1. Furthermore, It seems to agree with us subsequently: because predestination agrees with us as to the whole person and the whole nature: but with Him, it does not agree absolutely as to the person, but as to the grace of the person in nature, or the grace of nature: therefore it seems that it agrees with us primarily.
2. Furthermore, Nothing is predestined (as Rabanus says) unless it is destined beforehand: but nothing is before the Son, whereas eternity is before us: therefore it agrees with us primarily, rather than with Him.

ON THE CONTRARY:

The Gloss on the Epistle to the Romans viii, 30: The predestination of God is the most splendid light of our predestination: it would not be of the same nature: because neither illuminates the other equivocally.

Solution: It must be said that predestination is spoken of as prior and posterior: and in predestination there are three things, namely, the terminus from which, the terminus to which, and the one who is predestined. The terminus from which is nature or guilt: I say pure nature: because if there had never been sin, we would still be predestined to grace and glory; and in this respect, the preparation of grace agrees with us primarily, rather than with Christ. The terminus to which is glory: and that agrees with Christ primarily: because He ascended, opening the way before us, and led us into glory: and thus the preparation of glory agrees with Him primarily. However, the one destined and predestined is the medium: and this agrees with Christ simply by the grace of nature, and by the grace of the person in a certain respect and not simply: and therefore it agrees with us primarily according to the nature of the name: and through this, the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 20 — Whether the Predestination of the Son of God Is the Cause of Our Predestination

Whether the predestination of the Son of God is the cause of our predestination?

Secondly, it is asked, if His predestination is the cause of our predestination?

217. John 20:17

And it seems that it is so: because
1. He Himself is the cause of our salvation: and His resurrection is said to be the cause of our resurrection. 1 Corinthians 15, 1 and following in the Gloss.

1. Furthermore, the mediation of the mediator is reduced to the act of an efficient cause: but He Himself was the mediator of God and man: therefore He Himself was the cause of our salvation, and consequently of our predestination.
2. Likewise, predestination, as Gregory says, is aided by the prayers of the Saints: therefore much more is it aided by Christ: therefore He is the cause.
3. Likewise, we are not to be saved except through Christ: and whatever would be done, this was foreseen: therefore that we are to be saved through Christ is prepared and foreseen: therefore it is predestined: therefore that predestination causes our predestination.
4. Likewise, just as the predestined relates to the predestined, so predestination relates to predestination, but the predestined Christ causes us: therefore His predestination seems to cause ours.

ON THE CONTRARY:
1. Nothing is the cause of the eternal: but our predestination is eternal: therefore nothing is the cause of it.

1. Furthermore, it seems that neither is the effect of our predestination grace in the present: for predestination does not pertain to Christ except by the grace of humanity: and grace is not caused by His humanity: therefore no nature can be the cause of our predestination.

Solution: It must be said that there is a cause in two ways, namely, exemplary, and causing by influence over the caused. Similarly, in our predestination there are two things, namely, the eternal which is the purpose of mercy, and the preparation of grace in the present and consequently of glory in the future. If, therefore, it is asked whether the predestination of Christ is the cause as influencing over that which is eternal in our predestination? I say, it is not: but nothing prohibits that it influences by way of merit and mediation over that which is temporal: because this is the effect of predestination, which is also aided by the prayers of the Saints. However, it can be an exemplary cause: because we are predestined to conformity with Him.

Through this, the solution to the first arguments is clear, which all prove that it is a cause influencing by way of merit and mediation.

To the objection, it must be said that that which is eternal is not caused by anything: but although the grace which is the effect of predestination is not from the man Christ insofar as He is man, nevertheless, it can influence by way of meriting and satisfying for us and mediating, as was said before.

DISTINCTIO XI

Divisio Textus

It is also customary to inquire whether it ought to be said simply, etc. In this part, the Master determines the consequences of Christ being one from human nature by relation to the efficient cause, or to the act of the efficient cause, which on the part of the efficient cause is creation. From which it is left that human nature is created and a creature. However, on the part of the effect or caused, it follows the inception of being in human nature.

And therefore there are here two questions, namely whether it should be conceded that Christ is a creature? and this is determined in this distinction. And, whether Christ began? and this is determined in the first chapter of the following distinction, there, A,

After the aforementioned, it is asked whether that man began to be, etc.

This distinction contains three things, of which the first is that it should not be conceded simply that Christ is a creature. The second is concerning the perfidy of Arius and punishment, because he said that Christ is a creature: and there it is contained in what sense creature is said, since sometimes it is said made, there, B, Arius said these things to have been. In the third and last part, a certain sophistical argumentation is solved, by which it seems to prove that Christ is a creature, namely there, B, § 3

Nor from the fact that Christ according to man is said to be a creature, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether It Can Truly Be Said, Christ, or This Man, with Christ Being Pointed Out, Is a Creature

Whether it can truly be said, Christ, or this man, with Christ being pointed out, is a creature?

It is objected, however, concerning this which is said there, A, after a few: To which it can be said, this simply and without determination is less fittingly said, etc.

For from this it seems to say, that it can truly be said, although incongruously on account of heretics.

Which also seems able to be shown by reason:
1. For this is true, This man is God, on account of the union: therefore by conversion, God is this man. Either therefore created man, or not created man. If not created man: therefore there is some not created man, which is false: therefore God is created man: but created man is a creature: therefore God or the Son of God, or Christ is a creature.

1. Likewise, On account of the union this is received, This man is Creator: therefore on account of the same union this should be received, The Son of God is a creature.
2. Likewise, When it is said, Christ as man is a creature, it is understood thus, Christ as man is a creature: either the term man signifies the suppositum, or the human nature: not the human nature: because that is not predicated in the strict sense of Christ:

therefore it signifies the suppositum: therefore the sense is, Christ as man and according to the human suppositum is a creature: but whatever is said of the human suppositum, is said of God: therefore Christ simply is a creature.

3. If you say, that this is due to the repugnance of the intellects. On the contrary: There is no greater repugnance of the intellects between this, when it is said, This man is Creator, than between this, The Son of God is a creature; and yet the first is received: therefore it seems, that also the second.

Likewise, I ask when it is said, Man is a creature, if the predicate and subject have dissonance? It seems that not: because the dissonance will either be by reason of disparate forms, or by reason of opposition: but it is clear, that this form and the form of creation, are neither disparate nor opposite: therefore it seems, that this should be conceded, This man or this man is a creature.

1. Likewise, From whatever it is denied above and below: but creature is above every form except the divine: therefore it is also above the form of man; therefore if this man is not a creature, it follows that this man is not a man, which is false: therefore this should be conceded, This man is a creature.

Solution It must be said, that all propositions are false if proposed without determination. For if man is on the part of the subject with the note of demonstration, it will necessarily stand for the suppositum and person, for a twofold reason, namely on account of the demonstration, because only a person is demonstrated: and also by reason of the subject, because it is not subjected for the sake of nature, but for the sake of the person: and therefore since the person is not created or a creature, that expression will be false when it is said, This man or this man is a creature. But if Christ or Jesus is subjected in its proper name, that name is also of the person and suppositum: and therefore again it will be false if proposed without determination. But if it is supposed with the subject naming the eternal person or personality, then again it will be false, as when it is said, The Son of God is a creature, or Jesus or Christ is a creature. But if creature is on the part of the subject, and this man according to some of the names on the part of the predicate, again it will be false: because then it will be inartificial: because on account of the demonstration or the predicate name it will stand for the person, and the subject for the form of creation: and therefore then the proposition is understood to be converted, as when it is said, Some creature or creature is this man: and therefore again then it will be false: and therefore in every contingent case it is false without determination.

Therefore it must be said, to the first that this is true, God is this man: but the term God supposes for the person of the Son of God or for the nature: because it is true, that the divine nature is this man, although according to the reason of understanding it is not as much per se this, God is this man, as this, The Son of God is this man. And what is afterwards inferred by dividing: either created man, or uncreated man: it must be said that, the term this man supposes for the composite person: and therefore that person is simply uncreated, and in a certain respect created: whence simply it must be given, not created man: but this God, is created man, is not created man, are not opposed by affirmation and negation, since both are

affirmative. But if this is given, not created man, it cannot be inferred, therefore it is not created man, so that not created is as much as uncreated: because as the Master says in the book of Sentences: When therefore God so it seems here to be said he willed God: therefore the same God or another God, which does not follow, another God, on account of the identity of nature: nor does it follow, the same, on account of the distinction of person: on account of the diversity of natures in one person, since the term man or this man supposes the composite person in two natures, on account of the uncreated nature it does not follow, that it is created and on account of the created it does not follow, that it is uncreated: whence neither does it follow, that it is created man: nor does it follow, that it is uncreated man.

To the other it must be said, that this is received, that it is creator, this is true because creator is imposed from the act which properly is of the person as person: but to be created or to be uncreated is said for the sake of nature: whence it is not similar concerning created and uncreated, and the term creator.

To the other it must be said, that when it is said, Christ as man is a creature, the term as notes the condition of nature: for it is not necessary, that when the term as is predicated in the strict sense, that this is simply predicated in the strict sense, unless the term as always noted the identity or unity of the person: and this is not true and what is fitting to Christ according to the term as, it is not necessary that it is fitting to him absolutely: as was evident in the preceding distinction.

To the other it must be said, that when it is said, This man is creator, there is no repugnance of intellects: because the term this man supposes the person, and to this it is fitting to be creator: but this is true, that it supposes the composite person in the manner of composition which the second opinion says: and therefore I would not receive this, This man is uncreated: just as neither this, This man is created, unless a determination were added, However there are some who say, that it is dissimilar: because human nature is exalted in Christ, and it has itself moreover as coming to the divine person, and thus it inclines almost as an accident: and therefore its attributes do not so fit the person, as the attributes of the divine nature which is almost substance and in the reason of substance itself the person. But this does not seem: but rather it must be considered in the attributes, because some are first and per se of the person, as those which say the act or possession of the person, or are imposed from those: as creator, creates, and the like. But some fit by reason of nature, as to be created, or to be uncreated. And those which fit the person per se, those are attributed on the part of both: but not those which by reason of nature, when they say repugnance on the part of the subject.

But if you object, that this is found from the Saints, This man was from eternity, I say that to be from eternity fits the person as nature: and therefore that is attributed.

Moreover, To be eternal does not so repugn, as to be uncreated: because eternity can be communicated by reason of immutability, as Augustine says: just as Angels participate in eternity, because eternity says by way of measuring outside: and therefore it fits man by reason of person. But to be uncreated absolutely places repugnance to nature: because nothing is created nor uncreated except by reason of its nature. However concerning this there are

opinions: and some concede simply, that this man is uncreated: but they do not wish to concede, that this man is created except with determination.

To the other it must be said, that creature is not above this man as it supposes the composite person, unless with determination: and therefore if it is denied, it is not necessary on account of this that man is denied from it.

Articulus 2 — Whether We Can Truly Say Christ Was Made

Whether we can truly say Christ was made?

Then it is inquired concerning what Augustine says there, A, around the middle: But if the Son... is a made substance, not all things were made through Him.

For this does not seem to follow: because the Son of God was made man, this was conceded above, in the sixth distinction: and man is a made substance.

Solution: The substance which is Christ is predicated of Christ directly: and therefore that cannot be anything but a person and suppositum: because a nature made from that of which it is the nature is not predicated directly: and therefore Christ cannot be a made substance: because a person and substance cannot be made. And thus Augustine understands.

To the other it must be said, that (as was said) the Son cannot be the substance which He made: but He can be the substance which He made in nature, or according to nature, or of which He made the nature.

Articulus 3 — Whether A Creature Can Be In God

Whether a creature can be in God?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said in the second part of the distinction, there, B, § 3:

How can a creature be in God?

For this seems to be against the predetermined: because
1. Above, in distinction IX, Augustine said: It must be known that in the Son of God the earth is, which is worshiped without impiety. For he took from the earth the earth: because the flesh is from the earth.

1. Likewise, it is also said by some Saints that there is a creature: as Damascene says, that he does not disdain to be called a creature. And Master Rodolphus of Saint Victor: By power, not by nature, it becomes a creature. Therefore, it seems that a creature is in the Creator himself.

Solution: It must be said that the intention of Augustine is that in God, that is, in the Trinity and in unity, a creature cannot be: because it would either be a person or a nature: and thus neither can be: and therefore Christ is not a creature: because it is the name of a person who is

not a creature nor created: but he does not intend that this person is not in a created nature, and a created nature in itself.

To the other, it must be said that authorities of this kind are to be understood with determination, not simply, although they are simply stated.

Articulus 4 — What the Master Understands by Tropic Argumentation

What does the Master understand by tropical argumentation?

What does the Master understand by tropical argumentation?

Then it is asked about the argumentation which the Master says is from tropics, there, B, §4: But from tropical expressions, etc.

For if a trope is a figurative speech, it seems to be from figurative propositions such as this, Christ insofar as man is a creature, or rational, or irrational, etc.: indeed it does not seem to be an error, except that in the conclusion the reduplication is not repeated thus, Christ insofar as man is a creature: because this is

the intended conclusion, and it ought thus to be argued, Christ insofar as man is a creature: because this is the intended conclusion, and it ought thus to be argued, Christ insofar as man is a rational creature: but a rational creature is a creature: therefore Christ is a creature. Then it is clear, that here there is no error from any trope, but only from the fact that the reduplication is not repeated in the conclusion.

The response to this is that the Master calls improper tropical: because in truth that which by nature is per se, ought not to be predicated of a person simply: and if it is done, it is done improperly.

Articulus 5 — Whether Christ Is Something Non-Divine

Whether Christ is something non-divine?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said, there, B, § 4: Christ to be something non-divine, etc.

For above it was said that Christ is not a dominical man: therefore by the same reasoning it seems that he ought not to be called something divine.

Solution: It is not similar: for although both are possessive, yet one denotes supposition, the other denotes the habit of nature as form: and it is well conceded, Christ is something divine, because having deity: however, it is not conceded to be dominical, because this implies subjection to a lord and servitude.

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DISTINCTIO XII

Articulus 1 — Whether This Is True, A Man Was Made God, And A Man Began To Be God

Whether these [propositions] are true: "Man became God", "Man began to be God", "This man began to be God"?

§ 2. After the aforesaid, it is asked, etc. In this first chapter, it is asked by the Master: Whether Christ began to be?

§ 3. And by reason of this it is asked: Whether this is true: "Man became God", and, "Man began to be God"?

§ 4. Now, it seems that the first of these is true: because 1. It was conceded above in all three opinions, which were introduced for no other reason than to show how the Son of God became man, and man became God, and what is predicated by the term "man".

§ 5. 2. Also, Man is God: therefore he became God, and began to be God.

§ 6. 3. Also, God became man: and whatever is made, began to be: therefore God began to be man: therefore converted simply: therefore man began to be God.

§ 7. 4. Also, in the Text this is found: "Our Christ is a recent man": therefore the man who began is God, as it seems: and this seems much more false than this: "Man began to be God."

§ 8. Further it is asked whether this is in any way conceded: "This man began to be God?"

§ 9. And it seems that it ought to be conceded because:

1. It is the same to begin simply, and to begin to be in a substantial species: just as it is the same for Socrates to begin to be simply, and to begin to be a man: therefore by similarity it is the same for this man to begin to be, as to begin to be a man: but he begins to be a man: therefore he begins to be. And if you wish to object by means of this: "He begins to be white: therefore he begins to be": the objection is excluded: because to be white is to be according to an accident, and therefore it does not infer being simply: but to be a man is to be substantially: therefore it seems that it follows that he begins to be.

§ 10. 2. Also, it was held above that He made man, and in making united [him]: therefore in the same instant there was being for this [man], and being man: therefore it seems that just as this is conceded: "He began to be a man", so this ought to be conceded: "This [man] began to be."

§ 11. 3. Furthermore, it is commonly said, and has been held above rather often, that this is true: "God began to be man", "God became man": although the making of him who was made seems to be posited concerning the word "God" or concerning the Son of God, and belongs to neither: therefore much more ought this to be conceded: "Man began to be God", or "became God": since making and beginning are not repugnant to the nature signified by this term, "God".

§ 12. 4. If perhaps you say, that this [man] from eternity was God, and this man from eternity is God: therefore it seems that this man from eternity is: but in every statement I can predicate the same of itself: and Boethius says that no proposition is truer than that in which the same is predicated of itself: therefore it seems that if this man from eternity is, that it can be inferred: therefore this man from eternity is man, which is against Augustine in the Text, where he says that before the world was, neither were we, nor the mediator of God and men, the man Jesus Christ.

§ 13. 5. Furthermore, from the same authority it seems to be taken directly that the mediator of God and men, the man Jesus Christ, was not from eternity: which is against this which all say, that this man was from eternity, and this boy who created the stars. And against this is what He Himself says in the Gospel of John, 8:25: "I am the beginning, who also speak to you": for there "I" supposes for its utterer, that is, for that man. And it is against what He says in the same place: "Amen, amen I say to you, before Abraham was made, I am." For just as He says, "Before Abraham was made," so for the same reason, namely on account of the unity of the person, He can say: "Before the world was made, I am."

§ 14. Solution. It must be said, in my judgment, that no solution of the moderns avails as much here as the Author's solution which he posits here: because it is most cautious, that without a distinction understood or posited in speech no answer should be rendered: because to be made and not to be made, to have begun or not to have begun, to be a creature or not to be, are concerning the person of Christ, on account of the union of two natures in Him: just as [to be] another or the same God is concerning God generating, as was said above.

§ 15. There are some, however, who have investigated subtleties here, less cautious for the simple, although they speak the truth. And the author of these solutions is Master William of Auxerre. And according to them it must be said that when it is said, "God became man", or "The Son of God became man," or "began to be man": because in all those in which a simple person stands for an essential noun or for a noun of a person in the subject, and "became" or "began" is subjoined on the part of the predicate with this term "man", the statement is twofold with that twofoldness which we posited above in the fifth distinction, namely that the word "became" or "began" can posit its thing concerning the thing of the subject, and thus the statement is false, and is called a proposition de re among the Sophists: or it can be bent back to the whole, so that the making is not posited concerning the thing of the subject, but the beginning or making is of the whole under this sense: "This began: that God is man": and then it is called a proposition de dicto among the Sophists, and thus it is true. If, however, those propositions are converted thus: "Man became God," or, "Man began to be God": they say that if it is de re, it is false, just as the other is; but if it is de dicto, it is necessary that it be said to be true and is true: because this is true: "It was made that man is God": and, "This began: that man is God"; because not from eternity is this true: "Man is God": but it is otherwise when it is said, "This man became God": because that is de re, and is false.

§ 16. Now the reason of William of Auxerre is, that he wishes that terms suppose in one way on the part of the subject, and in another way on the part of the predicate: for when this term, "man", is in the predicate, it stands for the nature and not for the person: and since being

made and beginning apply to the nature, therefore they concede that the Son of God became man, and God became man, and this man became man. But when it is in the subject, it stands for the person: because subjects are subjected by reason of supposits: and therefore since the human nature in Christ is adventitious and tends toward something similar to an accident, when it is said, "Man became God," it is understood of the person: and it can be descended from it to the supposit thus: "Man became God; therefore some man, either this one or another: not another: therefore this one: therefore this person became God," and this is false: therefore this is false: "This man began to be God": and that from which it follows.

§ 17. And he posits an instance thus: that if that shield were just now made white, this is true: "This shield began to be white": but this is false: "This white thing or white thing began to be a shield": because when the word "white" is on the part of the predicate, it states nothing but whiteness in this, but yet on the part of the subject it stands for another subject: and therefore when it is said, "The white thing began to be a shield", it follows: "therefore this white thing or another began to be a shield: not another: therefore this one: but this white thing is a shield: therefore a shield began to be a shield," which is false: therefore this also is false, "The white thing began to be a shield": because the word "white" in the subject supposes for the supposit which is before the form of whiteness. By similarity they say here, when it is said, "Man began to be God," that the word "man" stands for the person who is before the humanity which in him has the likeness of an accidental nature: because it came later: and therefore it follows from that, that this person began to be God: but this is false: therefore this also, "He did not begin to be God, or the Word, or a divine person." But it is not the same concerning this: "God or the Son of God began to be man": because the word "man" in the predicate stands formally: and therefore then it is not permitted to descend to the person: and it does not follow that God or the Son begins to be a person. Through this therefore the solution to all those things about which it was first asked is evident.

§ 18. To the authority of Augustine, which is had in the Text, that "Christ our God is a recent man," it must be said with the Master, that it is to be received with a subintellected determination, and not otherwise.

§ 19. To that which is asked further, Whether this man begins to be? It must be said that in no way is it to be conceded.

§ 20. To the proof, however, it must be said that in Christ it is not similar: because the being of man is not the whole substantial being of this [thing], or of this man, or of Christ: and therefore although with a determination it is conceded according as it is de dicto, yet it cannot be inferred, "therefore he began to be." And the instance is good in Christ: because in Him "man" predicates an adventitious nature, although not an accidental one, from which nature this man does not have that he is "this" or a "person": because he was "this" and a "person" beforehand.

§ 21. To the other it must be said, that although by making man he united [him], yet not by making this [person] or that person: but the word "man" on the part of the subject supposes this person.

§ 22. To the other it must be said, that those were conceded above, according as they are de dicto, and not de re: just as also was said in the sixth distinction: and it is not similar concerning their converses according to William of Auxerre, on account of the cause which was stated.

§ 23. To the other it must be said, that in truth this man was from eternity: but it does not follow from this, that from eternity he was man, or from eternity is man: because the word "man" on the part of the predicate stands formally, and formally according to the form signified by the term he was not from eternity: but in the subject supposit it stands personally, and the person was from eternity. Whence this man from eternity was God, and the man from eternity was God: yet it does not follow that God is from eternity or was man, as was said.

§ 24. To the authority of Augustine it must be said, that in my judgment it is understood thus, that the word "man" is on the part of the predicate, thus: "Before the world was," etc., that is, the very mediator of God and men, Christ Jesus, was not man before the world was: and then according to the aforesaid reason of supposition in the predicate and subject, it is true.

§ 25. Behold, in so far as I was able to investigate, this is the opinion of William of Auxerre. There are others, however, who do not speak thus: for they do not wish to say, that when they say "Man" or "this man" in the subject, that it supposes like an accidental term for the supposit or form: but they say, that in such a noun a composite person is supposed, or a composite supposit in three substances and two natures, as the second opinion says: and therefore to that supposit belongs beginning and making, not simply, but by reason of the human nature which is signified in him: and therefore they say, that this can be received: "Man became God", according as it is determined according to the intellect: and then it does not follow, that that man was from eternity: but it follows, that insofar as [he is] man he was not from eternity: and this almost returns to the same according to sense, although not according to words.

Divisio Textus

§ 26. DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

"It is also wont to be asked, Whether another man," etc. In this place the Master touches upon Christ conjoined from the union of divinity and humanity from the conditions of human nature, according to those things which are in it, such as matter, the power of sinning, the distinction of sex. And concerning these three he moves three questions here. First, Whether from elsewhere He could have assumed materially that matter, than from Adam? Second it is asked, Whether that man could sin? there, C, "Therefore not undeservedly is it asked", etc. Third it is asked, Whether He could have assumed in the female sex? there, D, "It is also wont to be asked, although curiously," etc.

Articulus 2 — Whether Christ Could Materially Assume That Matter from Elsewhere than from Adam

Whether from elsewhere He could have assumed materially that matter, than from Adam?

Whether from elsewhere He could have assumed materially that matter, than from Adam?

Now a question occurs concerning the first, Whether from elsewhere than from Adam He could have assumed?

§ 29. Second, Whether He ought to have assumed someone who was similar to Adam in beginning the whole human race naturally and materially, like Adam?

§ 30. Now it seems from elsewhere: because 1. Thus Augustine says: "God could therefore take up a man from elsewhere, in whom He would be the mediator of God and men, not of the lineage of that Adam, who bound the human race by his sin."

§ 31. 2. Also, one extracting from penalty and from fault ought to be far from both: just as one extracting from a pit is not in the pit: but Christ is extracting us from penalty and fault: therefore He ought to be far from both.

§ 32. 3. Also, everything that was in Adam was subject to the debt of penalty: but that which owes a penalty through itself cannot satisfy for another by suffering the penalty. Since therefore Christ came to satisfy, He ought not to have assumed the matter of nature from Adam, as it seems.

§ 33. 4. Also, the medicine of a twofold disease is not prepared for the body through contrariety to one disease only: but Christ is our medicine: therefore He ought to have had contrary forms to both diseases: but the disease is twofold, of penalty and of fault: therefore it seems that He Himself ought to have had neither in Himself: and thus He ought not to have taken nature from the nature of Adam which was wholly subject to penalty, as it seems.

§ 34. BUT AGAINST THIS: 1. Anselm in the book, Cur Deus homo, says, that the one satisfying, and he for whom satisfaction is made, either ought to be the same, or of the same nature: but they cannot be the same, because Adam by sinning had taken away an infinite good from God: therefore it was necessary that they be of the same genus: but they would not be of the same genus if He had assumed a man from elsewhere: therefore it seems that He ought to have assumed a man from the lineage of Adam.

§ 35. 2. Also, God had foreseen many to be born of Adam who were to be saved: but the Apostle says, Hebrews 2:11, that "He who sanctifies, and they who are sanctified, are all of one," supply, "origin": therefore it was necessary, insofar as it is of the necessity of congruity, that Christ sanctifying and those who are sanctified should be through the matter of nature from one.

§ 36. 3. Also, no one thing in nature is referred to two principles of its own genus, which are principles according to one character: for donkeys are not referred to two donkeys actively first generating, nor lions to two lions: therefore neither can men be referred to two men. But if He had assumed a man from elsewhere, either human nature would truly be in him, or not. If not: then the redemption avails us nothing: because he who was not man ought not to have satisfied for us, as was proved above. But if human nature were truly in Him: then human nature in one species would not be referred to one first principle, which is against all order of nature. Therefore the Creator of nature who instilled this order of nature would also be the perverter of nature, which cannot be.

§ 37. 4. Also, in material nature there is recourse to one material principle in that genus: therefore this will also be in human nature. Therefore this material thing will either be in the first man, or outside him. If in the first man, then every man materially will be from him, as is the truth: and the man Christ could not congruently take matter except from him. But if outside him: therefore something of possible matter disposed for the form of man (because we are speaking of that) was outside the principle of propagation of human nature. But whatever is outside the principle of propagation is not propagated: therefore some matter disposed for the form of man is not propagated, which is not intelligible: therefore it was necessary that all of it was within. If therefore Christ ought to have been man, it behooved Him to assume nature from the matter of Adam.

§ 38. Solution. Consenting to the last reasons, we say that nothing is impossible for God: but insofar as it is of the congruity of nature and of satisfaction, Christ ought not to have taken a man from elsewhere than from Adam.

§ 39. To the first therefore it must be said, that Augustine is speaking of the absolute power of God, to which nothing is impossible nor incongruous: because by the very fact that He would do it, this would be congruous.

§ 40. To the other it must be said, that it is one thing concerning one extracting from place to place, and another concerning one extracting through the merit of satisfaction: because the former must be distant from the place of the fall, but it is permitted for the latter to communicate in something with him who fell, not in the debt of satisfaction, unless as he himself willingly makes himself a debtor: whence he will communicate in penalty and nature.

§ 41. To the other it must be said, that everything that was in act in Adam, this was subject to penalty and the debt of penalty: and also whatever was in him by this mode of origin: but He Himself could be an origin: but not whatever was in him materially, that is, through corporeal substance, was subject to debt, although it was subject to penalty: because Christ was in his loins through corporeal substance. Whence Augustine says, that in him was the wound, and the medicine of the wound: yet this was purged before it was assumed. Whence we could say, that the whole in him was subject to the debt of penalty: but as assumed from him, it was not subject to the debt of penalty: but He voluntarily assumed the penalty, who if He had wished to separate it, could have. The first solution, however, agrees more with the words of Augustine posited above concerning the tithing of Christ.

§ 42. To the other it must be said, that it is one thing concerning spiritual medicine and corporeal: because spiritual is through the mode of justice, and of one satisfying: and therefore as justice demands seeking restitution, the guilt of penalty is not remitted in that matter except through the sustaining of penalty: therefore it was fitting for Christ to assume the nature of man from Adam.

Articulus 3 — Whether Christ Ought to Assume a Nature That Would Be the Principle of All

Whether Christ ought to have assumed a nature which was the principle of all?

§ 44. Secondly it is asked, Whether Christ ought to have assumed the nature of someone who was the principle of all, like Adam?

§ 45. Now it seems that He should: because 1. The Apostle says to the Romans 5:19, that "as by the disobedience of one man many were made sinners, so also by the obedience of one many shall be made just": therefore justice ought to be propagable in one, like sin: but this cannot be, unless he be the principle of all: therefore it seems that the nature which is in Christ ought to have the relation of a principle to the whole human nature.

§ 46. 2. Also, this is the cause why the sins of parents are not inborn in children: because although they are propagated from them, yet they are not found in them as in the principle of the whole human origin: therefore by the contrary, that they are justified from one, the cause ought to be because originally they are repaired in one.

§ 47. 3. Also, no one ought to satisfy more for all, than he who is the origin of all, and in whom all sinned: therefore it seems that since Christ came to satisfy for all, that He ought to have assumed him who was the origin of all, namely the protoplast.

§ 48. BUT AGAINST THIS: 1. As was proved before, it is against the character and order of the whole nature that there be two principles of principating in the same way: therefore Christ could not be the principle of all men in the conformity of nature, unless He assumed Adam himself.

§ 49. 2. Moreover five very great inconveniences would follow: the first of which is, because the assumed and the assuming would be one person: and since the assumed sinned damnably, it would follow that the Son of God sinned damnably: because whatever this man does or did, the assuming Son of God would do the whole. The second is, that since the whole nature of Adam actually was subject to sin, it would follow that Christ's nature had been subject to sin, which again is false. The third is, that it would behoove that grace originally be from the flesh, just as sin also: because multiplication could not be done except according to the generation by which Christ would generate: and this itself is absurd and horrendous even to think about Christ. The fourth is, that according to this the man Christ would not then be by human generation: because he who has been born will not be able to be born. The fifth and last is, that according to this Christ would assume a person from the person of Adam, and a person would consume a person. Because these things are absurd, it must be said that Christ ought not to have assumed one who would be the material principle or original principle of all according to propagation, that is, it was not congruous.

§ 50. To the first therefore it must be said, that the Apostle is speaking by way of satisfaction and merit, and not of the propagation of nature materially or originally.

§ 51. To the other it must be said, that it is not similar: because although sin through essence and form is not in the flesh as in a subject, yet causally it is in the flesh: because it is born into the soul from the flesh: but grace neither essentially nor originally can be except from God, and not except in a spiritual subject which is the rational soul or an Angel.

§ 52. To the other it must be said, that although no one ought more, yet no one can less than he. For a satisfier, however, (as was proved above) it is required that he can and ought: he ought from nature, but can from the deity conjoined to him.

Articulus 4 — Whether God Could Assume a Sinful Man

Whether God could have assumed a sinful man?

§ 54. Then it is asked about this which he says in the second question, there, "Therefore not undeservedly is it asked, Whether he," etc.

§ 55. Now it seems that He could have assumed a sinful man: because 1. He is omnipotent: therefore since it is of His power to assume him, He could.

§ 56. 2. Furthermore, it was mercy that He assumed our misery: therefore to assume a greater misery was of greater mercy: but a sinner is more miserable than an innocent: therefore it would have been of greater mercy to assume a sinner than an innocent.

§ 57. 3. Also, nature operates in the shortest way it can: therefore grace also, since there is less superfluity in grace than in nature, because grace dispatches itself with much fewer things: but by assuming a sinner he would immediately have been cured from sin, and it would not have been necessary afterwards to preach, and to suffer, and to do many other things which He did: therefore it seems that He ought to have assumed a sinner.

§ 58. BUT AGAINST THIS: If He had assumed a sinner, from sin He would have had the debt of death: therefore through death He would have satisfied for no one: because Anselm says, that that which one owes through himself, by paying that, he does not satisfy for another.

§ 59. Solution. It must be said, that in truth He could not nor ought He to have assumed a sinner: because this was fitting neither to the nature of God, nor to the office of mediator, and He would have brought an impediment of redemption upon those to be redeemed rather than redemption.

§ 60. To the first therefore it must be said, that it is of impotence to assume a sinner, in such a way that the assuming one be subject to his sin.

§ 61. To the other it must be said, that the mercy is cruel, nor is it mercy, which increases misery and does not abolish it. But if Christ had been a sinner, we would have been so much the more miserable: because then He in whom was the hope of all, that He might liberate from sin, could not even liberate Himself from sin.

§ 62. To the other it must be said, that this was not a short way. For if He had first purged the sinner, and then assumed him: although He would have liberated him, yet He still would not have liberated us: and therefore it still would have been necessary to do all the things which He did, also by assuming our innocent nature in the womb of the Virgin.

Articulus 5 — Whether Christ Could Will Evil or Iniquity

Whether Christ could have willed evil or iniquity?

Whether Christ could have willed evil or iniquity?

Then it is asked about this which he says, there, C, "To be God, and to be able to will iniquity, cannot be at the same time."

§ 65. For it seems that this is false: 1. For either Christ was able to sin, or not to sin. If He was not able to sin: therefore He was necessarily good: therefore His goodness was not praiseworthy. If He was able to sin, I have my proposition: because if He was able to sin, He was able to will iniquity, and yet He is God: therefore He was able at the same time to sin, and to be God.

§ 66. 2. Furthermore, some object thus: Christ either was able to lie, or not. If He was not able: therefore He was not able to utter a falsehood: therefore He was not able to do all things that you can do: because you will be able to utter a falsehood. But if He was able to lie: therefore He was able to sin: and every sin, especially actual, is voluntary: therefore He was able to will sin.

§ 67. 3. Also, He seems to have willed sin sometimes: because He willed this which God the Father did not will: because He willed the chalice to be transferred from Him.

§ 68. 4. If you say that it is not a sin to will what God does not will. Against this: Upon that of Canticles 1:3: "The righteous love thee," the Gloss says, that the crookedness of the soul is to will that which God does not will: therefore it is a sin, because the crookedness of the soul is nothing but sin.

§ 69. 5. Also, either He willed that the chalice would pass from Him, or not. If so: then He willed what the Father did not will, and thus He willed sin, as it seems. If not, and He asked [for it]: therefore He asked for what He did not will: and so He seems to have been double [i.e., deceitful/duplicitous], which again is a sin: and so it seems that these are not repugnant: to be able to will iniquity, and to be God.

§ 70. Solution. It must be said, that Christ was not able to will iniquity: and this was not coercion, but the immobility of His uprightness from the union to the deity.

§ 71. To the first therefore it must be said, that the goodness of Christ was most praiseworthy from this, that He was not able to sin: because this "not being able", is the most noble "being able": whence it does not sound like coercion, but rather the immobility of the will from perfect affection concerning the highest good which Christ has from the union.

§ 72. To the other it must be said, that Christ was never able to lie: and I posit that [if] He were to utter a falsehood, His utterance (suppositum) will be materially false, and not with the intention of deceiving, or of signifying a falsehood to be thus as it is pronounced: for falsity cannot be mixed with truth.

§ 73. To the other it must be said, that Christ never willed what the Father did not will Him to will. For the Father, when He made man, willed him to will and to show that he wills all things natural to man: and therefore He willed Him to will what followed from the fear of natural things. What He said: "If it is possible," etc., was indicative of natural fear: and this

willing, provided that fear did not lead reason [astray], was not contrary to the will of the Father, but rather the Father willed Him to will this.

§ 74. To that which is objected concerning Canticles, it must be said, that it is understood of the conformity of the will of God and the form of willing, namely that we should will from the same charity from which God wills: for to conform the will to the will in the object willed alone is sometimes a mortal sin, as is clear at the end of the first book of the Sentences, in the authority of Augustine, concerning two sons, one of whom out of avarice wills his dying father to die: the other out of piety wills him to live, which God does not will. But concerning this matter more things are noted there.

To the other it must be said, that He asked what the Father willed Him to ask, when He gave Him a passible nature: and therefore it is shown to be neither double, nor difform from the will of the Father.

Articulus 6 — Whether This Statement Is True, with Christ Being Pointed Out: This Man Can Sin

Is this true, demonstrating Christ: This man was able to sin?

Next, it is asked concerning this which he says, there, C, Here there is need of a distinction, etc.

For it seems that this is simply false: This man was able to sin.

§ 1. For as was shown at the beginning of this distinction, the word this (iste) demonstrates and supposits for the person: and that person cannot sin whether understood in humanity or not: therefore, there is no need for a distinction, but it must be denied absolutely.

§ 2. Also, let it be granted that it demonstrates the nature; the union is still not excluded: and a united nature cannot sin: therefore, it still must be denied simply.

§ 3. Also, let us even grant that it is not united, since Christ had two things in Himself, namely the union and the state of a comprehensor on the way, because He was a true comprehensor on the way: if the union ceased, the rationale of a comprehensor does not fail on account of this: and then again He was not able to sin: therefore it seems that in every sense this should simply be denied.

Solution. It seems to me that it must be denied simply and absolutely: and yet the Master understands that a distinction is needed, not because the proposition is multiple [i.e., equivocal], because in truth it is absolutely false; but rather he intends that if the question is framed concerning the nature, it can then be understood as united, or not united: and if it is understood as not united, then it will have the potency of sinning: not from anything inclining it to sin, as in us from the fomes [tinder of sin], but rather from the sole flexibility of free choice.

And then, to the argument fashioned to the contrary concerning comprehension, it must be said that Christ's comprehension is founded upon the union, and if the union ceases the comprehension will cease (because in the state of the way it is not thus): but the human nature is

not taken here except by a sole and naked contemplation of the intellect, as it never actually was: because in making it He united it, and by uniting He made it to be.

Articulus 7 — Whether Christ Could Sin in Act

Was Christ able to sin in act?

Next, it is asked concerning this which he says: However, some strive to prove, etc.

For although Christ could not sin in act, He nonetheless seems to have had the potency of sinning, by several reasons.

§ 1. The first of these is taken from the authority of Bernard who says that He descended as much as He could descend: but the lowest degree apart from fault is the potency of sinning, and not sinning: therefore it seems that He descended to that degree.

§ 2. Also, Aristotle in the III book of the Topics: The powers of evils are to be chosen, such as to steal, etc.: for God can do depraved things. Therefore it seems that Christ chose these powers for Himself.

§ 3. Also, every rational potency is to opposites: Christ had a rational form: therefore He had a potency to evil or of evil: therefore He had the potency of sinning.

ON THE CONTRARY: Do you think that what is added diminishes, and what is subtracted increases, liberty and a part of liberty? So says Anselm, and he is speaking about flexibility to opposites: therefore flexibility diminishes freedom of choice if it is added to it: therefore it seems that it was not in Christ, because nothing diminishing His liberty would have profited us.

Solution. It must be said that Christ did not have the power of sinning.

To the other it must be said that the powers of evils are not powers to evils: and therefore they are not chosen insofar as they are of evils, but they are chosen insofar as they are powers to goods: because the power of good and evil is the same, although it is not except to good: and therefore the grace of that to which it is finally ordered says that it is to be chosen, and not the grace of evil, which when it is present, indicates its defect. But as for what he says, that God can do depraved things, it is understood thus, as some say, that God can do certain things which are now depraved: but if He did them, they would not be depraved. Or it can be said that he is speaking according to the opinion of the Gentiles concerning those things which are idols.

To the other it must be said that a rational potency, as it is a potency, is to opposites, and thus it always was in Christ: hence in Him it was never as a potency holding itself indifferently to either of the contraries.

Articulus 8 — Whether the Spirit and Grace Were Given to Christ without Measure

Was the Spirit and grace given to Christ without measure?

Next, it is asked concerning this which he says, there, D, That man to whom the Spirit was given without measure, etc.

For this seems false; because § 1. The Spirit here is either created, or uncreated. If uncreated, this would be saying little: because to every man to whom He is given, He is given without measure: because He has no measure. But if we are speaking of the created [Spirit] which is grace, this seems false: the essence of Christ's soul is finite: therefore His habit is not without measure.

§ 2. If you say that the habit of grace of Christ's soul is essentially finite, but is infinite in power. To the contrary: Infinite power is not in a finite subject, if infinity is considered according to the vigor of power, and not according to the iteration of acts: because the motors of the spheres, if indeed they have motors, as some Philosophers say, even if they were said to always be able to move, it would not follow from this that they are of infinite power; therefore since the power is finite in essence, it will be finite in the potency of meriting: and thus the Spirit is given to Him according to measure both in the essence of the Spirit of grace, and in the vigor of grace.

ON THE CONTRARY: Let it be posited that Christ has a finite grace; another Saint, whoever he may be, will have somewhat less: and since both are finite, they would be proportionable: for there is always some proportion of finite to finite. Let that Saint then progress: therefore he can progress so much that his grace will be like the grace of Christ in quantity, which is false. Therefore the grace of Christ is indeed created and finite, as it seems.

Also, Anselm proves that what Adam took away from God is infinite, and it cannot be recompensed except by an infinite good: but it is recompensed by the merit of Christ: therefore the merit of Christ is an infinite good, as it seems.

Solution. It must be said that the grace of Christ is twofold, namely created, which is a habit of the soul; and of union, which attains to an infinite grace: because the union makes the man to be God, and to be able to do what God can do. However, the act of Christ's merit is considered according to both graces: because otherwise what Anselm says would not be true, that none could redeem that except God. Hence I say that the habit of Christ's soul is the habit of a soul united to the deity, and it acts in the virtue of that union.

I say therefore to the first, that it is a finite habit in its substance: and yet it can act infinitely, not of itself, but because it is the habit of a potency united to the deity. Hence it is not similar to just any simple created power, which is not united: because that one cannot do what Christ can, on account of the union. And through this the solution to the last point is evident, that no one, no matter how much he progresses, can equal that habit, on account of the union.

To that which was previously objected to the effect that it is simply infinite, it must be said that it is finite in essence: yet its ability [posse] is not taken only from itself, but also from the union of the potency in which it is: and from that part it attains the infinite, and contracts an infinite ability in act, as Anselm proves.

And through this the solution to the whole is evident.

Articulus 9 — Whether Christ Had the Power of Transgressing

Did Christ have the power to transgress?

Next, it is asked concerning this which he says, there, D, near the end: Who was able to transgress, and has not transgressed, etc.

For this seems to be for an increase of praise: and thus, since nothing praiseworthy was lacking to Christ, it seems that He had this: therefore He was able to transgress. Nor does the Master's solution seem valid: because

§ 1. Nothing praiseworthy was lacking to Christ: therefore the potency to transgress was in Christ.

§ 2. Moreover, Damascene says that He assumed all things which He planted in our nature: but He planted this in our nature: therefore He was able to transgress.

§ 3. Also, Damascene says, For the Whole totally assumed me, that He might grant salvation to the whole of me: therefore it seems, since the potency to transgress is something of us and natural to us, that Christ assumed it.

Solution. It must be said that Christ did not have the potency to transgress: because transgression is not a potency as such, but is a defect.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that in man it denotes praise, not essentially, but accidentally, namely insofar as from it is inferred the voluntary preservation of justice; but in those in whom there is greater liberty, the rationale is taken not from the potency of this, but rather from the immobility of the free will preserving justice, as in Christ, and in the confirmed. The Master gives another solution in the Letter.

To the other it must be said that the potency of sinning, as such, is not planted as a part in our nature, but rather is a defect consequent upon the fact that we were created from nothing: and therefore it denotes neither liberty (as Anselm says) nor the perfection of liberty.

To the other it must be said in the same way, that it is understood of integral parts, and powers: but the potency of sinning is a defect and an impotence consequent upon the rational nature's emergence from nothing: and therefore it did not behoove Him to assume it: because it was not expedient for us.

Articulus 10 — Whether Christ Ought to Have Assumed a Human in the Female Sex

Ought Christ to have assumed humanity in the female sex?

Ought Christ to have assumed humanity in the female sex?

Next, it is asked concerning this which he says in the last question, there, It is also customarily asked, etc.

For it seems that the Son of God ought to have assumed humanity in the female sex: because

§ 1. The first death began through a female: therefore life ought to have begun also through a female.

§ 2. Also, Wisdom, which is the Son, played as it were the role of a female, who conceived us in the bowels of charity, and formed us, and gave birth to us: hence also in Proverbs 31:10, a strong woman is spoken of: therefore it seems that it was more apt for Him to receive humanity in the female sex than in the masculine.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. Preaching ought not to have been done by a female: since therefore He was sent to announce, He ought not to have assumed our nature in the female sex.

§ 2. Also, He had to be the Head of the Church, but a woman could not be the head of the Church: therefore He ought not to have been a female.

§ 3. Also, in no genus is the son and daughter the same: but Christ would have been a son by eternal generation, yet a daughter in time: therefore He would have been son and daughter, because the hypostases would communicate their properties to each other.

§ 4. Also, Aristotle in book XVI of On Animals says that the female is a misbegotten [occasionatus] male: therefore it seems that the female is from an imperfection of nature: but Christ ought to have been most perfect: therefore He ought to have been a son, and not a daughter.

§ 5. Moreover, God could make man in four ways, as Anselm says, namely without male and female, as Adam; from a male without a female, as Eve. From a male and female, as Abel, which course has become known to us: therefore there remained yet one way, namely from a female without a male: and since at first He had produced a female from a male, it remained that now He should produce a virgin male from a virgin female.

Solution. The last reasons are to be conceded.

It must be said to the first, that although death entered from here through a female, yet the propagation of death is more principally through the male: because he is more principal in generation: and from him it is more principally transfused in original generation.

To the other it must be said that this is understood spiritually, and in spiritual fecundity regarding preaching, he who is male in body is more apt than a female.

To the OTHERS the Master resolves sufficiently in the Letter, as is evident in itself to one looking into it.

DISTINCTIO XIII

Divisio Textus

Moreover it must be known, that Christ as man, etc. Here begins that part which is about the things fitting for Christ according to the natural potencies or powers which He received in

human nature. And according as the substance of human nature is twofold, so the potencies are twofold, namely of the soul and of the body: and He acts first concerning the things fitting for Christ according to the potencies of the soul. But in the second part concerning the things fitting for Him according to the potencies of the body: and this begins in distinction XV, there, A, That also must not be passed over, etc.

The first part has two questions about the progress of the grace and wisdom of Christ, which are present through the potencies of the soul: one of which is determined in this distinction, namely in what way He progressed in grace and wisdom. The second is about the number of things known, whether He knew as many things as the Father, and equally limpidly, or not? and this is determined in the following distinction, there, A, Here it is necessary to ask, When the soul of Christ, etc.

Now this distinction has two parts: in the first of which he moves and solves the question. In the second, he objects to the contrary, there, E, To this sentence, however, seems to be opposed, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether the Grace of Christ Was Created Grace or Uncreated Grace

Was the grace of Christ a created, or uncreated grace?

First falls the question on the part of the grace and wisdom which Christ is here said to have received: Was it created or uncreated grace?

But it seems that it was uncreated.

§ 1. For every created thing is in number, weight, and measure: the Spirit is given to this man not by measure: therefore the uncreated Spirit is given to Him.

§ 2. Also, in the lower nature, namely the flesh, divinity was conjoined without a medium habit: therefore much more to the higher, namely the soul, was it conjoined without any created habit. And thus this man did not have wisdom, or grace, which was a created habit.

§ 3. Also, between like things it is not necessary to posit a conjoining medium: but the soul of Christ had nothing of that which makes unlikeness: because this (as Augustine says) is solely sin: therefore it is not necessary to posit a medium habit of grace, by which the divinity is conjoined to the soul.

§ 4. Also, in God we do not posit a habit disposing His power to a work: therefore neither even in that which is united to God: but the whole soul according to all its potencies is united to God: therefore it is not necessary to posit another aid besides it: and thus there is no created habit for it.

§ 5. Also, nature expedites itself with as few things as it can: therefore much more do grace and God: but the united divinity can do this by itself without a created habit of grace and wisdom: therefore it is superfluous to posit a created habit of grace and wisdom in Christ.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. To the best thing nothing is lacking of all the goodness which it can receive: but Christ is best: therefore no goodness was lacking to Him, which He could receive: but He is susceptible to created grace: therefore He had it.

§ 2. Also, He ought to have had all human things which belong to perfection, so that He might be shown conformed to us: but grace is among the principal things fitting for man, and wisdom: therefore He ought to have had them.

§ 3. Also, nothing overflows from someone unless it is in him: but grace overflowed in mer-
it from Christ into us, because He merited for us: therefore the grace by which He merited was in Him: but this is created: therefore He had created grace, and by the same reason wisdom, because that overflowed from Him through doctrine.

§ 4. Also, Christ was most truly in the state of a wayfarer: therefore the grace of a wayfarer was not lacking to Him: but this is created grace: therefore He had created grace.

§ 5. Also, Isaiah 11:2: The Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him, the spirit of wisdom, etc.

Also, Sirach 24:25: In me is all hope of life and of virtue. All of which indicate created graces.

§ 6. Also, Matthew 11:29: Learn from me, for I am meek and humble of heart. Psalm 44:3: Grace is poured abroad in thy lips.

Solution. It must be said that if emphasis is placed on the word when it is said that Christ from the instant of conception received the Spirit, it is understood (as the Saints say) of the Spirit in created gifts, both sanctifying [gratum facientibus] and freely given [gratis datis]: but by the uncreated Spirit, who is the Son, human nature was rather received in Him, than that it received Him: because we are said to receive and to have that which comes to us, as Augustine said above, not that to which we come. However, I do not say this because Christ was a man in time before His grace: but because nature precedes habit as a subject, and has the habit, and is not had by it. According to this, therefore, it must be said that according to the intention of the Saints this is understood of created grace.

But to the FIRST which is objected to the contrary, it must be said as above, that the Spirit is given to Christ not by measure through the virtue of the union by which God concurs in every act of Christ: and therefore there is an infinity of virtue, as was said above.

To the other it must be said that we do not posit a habit of grace and wisdom in Christ so that it may be a medium of union of the deity to the soul or to the flesh: but rather as a perfection informing works, on the part of the created potency: because the divinity was not conjoined to Him mediating charity or chastity, but rather immediately.

To the other it must be said in the same way, that the solution to both is one.

To the other it must be said that a habit is not posited in God on account of His simplicity: but nevertheless He truly has wisdom and goodness: but the human nature in Christ is not simple, and therefore the habit of the soul is not the soul itself, as the Master says in the Letter in the penultimate chapter of this distinction.

To the SAME it must be said that two aids are not posited for the created potency on account of the weakness of the deity, but rather on account of the demonstration of both natures. Hence, since the potency of human nature in Him is in the best of grace, and in the best which is the divinity, then the truth of both is known.

To the SAME it must yet be said that God in operating does not only consider what He can do from His power, but also what is congruous to be done according to the state of the nature in which He operates: and since it is congruous for the human soul to merit, He operates in it through a habit, and with a meritorious habit.

To the other it must be said that nature expedites itself with as few things as it can: yet in such a way that it does not fail in what is necessary, and thus does the divinity united to Christ; because it was necessary for human nature, not for the deity, that it be perfected by the best of grace and wisdom.

Articulus 2 — In What Way Christ Is Called Our Head

In what way is Christ called our head?

In what way is Christ called our head?

Next, it is asked concerning this which he says, there, A, As in our body sense is present in individual members, but not as much as in the head, etc.

For from this he wants to prove that Christ received the Spirit as head, but we as members.

Here, however, a twofold question falls, namely in what way is Christ called head? And, what is the grace of the head?

To the first one proceeds thus: § 1. At Ephesians 2 , the Gloss says that Christ is head according to the deity.

§ 2. Also, Hilary says that the head of all is Christ, but the head of Christ is God: but He cannot be the head of all according to conformity of nature: therefore He is the head of all according to the deity.

§ 3. Also, from the head flows sense and motion into all the members: but the sense and motion of the Church are not from Christ except according to the divine nature: therefore He is head according to the divine nature.

ON THE CONTRARY: A head which is not of one nature with the other members makes a monstrous body: therefore the head of the Church is in conformity of nature with the other members.

Solution. We say that a head has three things in itself in comparison to the body: one of which is virtue, which is the principle effectively flowing the virtue of sense and motion: because sense flows from the anterior part of the head, and motion from the posterior through sensible and motive nerves. The second is that which the soul formally flows into the members by assimilating them to itself in the sensitive virtue flowed in, which adheres to the members quasi-formally. The third is the conformity of nature with the members. And thus

the spiritual head which is Christ can be considered in three ways. If He is considered as an effectively flowing principle only, then He is head entirely according to the deity. If, however, as He is an effective and assimilating principle to Himself through something which He flows which is as a form: thus He is the head of the blessed and of those existing in grace, to whom He flows a quasi-similitude of His life, and His motion, and His sense, in gifts perfecting the intellect and the affection. But if He is considered in the third way, then He is head of men only.

And through this the solution to all the objections except the last is evident.

To which it must be said that that which is of diverse nature and grace does not make a monstrosity, as long as it has an order to the body, as flowing from without: because otherwise the conjunction of the soul with the body would be monstrous: but that which is of a diverse nature, and does not have the virtue of flowing into the body, such as a lion's head, or the like, that makes a monster in its composition to the body.

Articulus 3 — What the Grace of the Head Is

What is the grace of the head?

Secondly it is asked, What is the grace of the head?

But it seems that it is the union: because § 1. That is the grace of the head which causes the virtue of flowing both sense and motion: but He does not have the virtue of flowing sense and motion except from the deity: therefore it seems that the union to the deity confers upon Him the grace of the head.

§ 2. Also, the head is the governing principle of the members: therefore that which constitutes in another the governance of the members, that gives the grace of the head: but the union does this: therefore the union is the grace of the head.

ON THE CONTRARY: The grace of the head is what it flows into the members: but Christ does not flow the union into the members: therefore the union is not the grace of the head.

Solution. It must be said that the grace of Christ is threefold, namely as united, and as head, and as a singular man. That which is of Him as united, is not by measure, as was held in the preceding. But that which is of Him as head, is flowing upon the members simply, according to the threefold consideration of a head: but it effectively flows according to the first two considerations. In the third consideration, however, He who is head indeed still effectively flows, but not insofar as He is man: but He flows thus in three ways, namely meritoriously, because He merits for us the influx of grace: and in the manner of a mediator or redeemer, because He removes the obstacle of the influx into us, which obstacle is the debt of Adam which He paid. In the third way exemplarily. The grace as a singular man was also privileged in Him in the works of freely given grace [gratiae gratis datae]: as in words of wisdom and science, and in miracles: and in the works of sanctifying grace [gratiae gratum facientis], because the work of no man can ever be as pleasing as His was.

Therefore it must be said to the first, that the union is the grace for this man to be God, and not for flowing: and it well constitutes Him in the place and rationale of a head: but nevertheless it is not what the head communicates to the members.

And through this the solution to the whole is evident.

Articulus 4 — Which Senses the Spiritual Head Infuses into the Spiritual Members

What senses does the spiritual head flow into the spiritual members?

Next, it is asked concerning this which he says, there, A, For there is sight, and hearing, and smell, and taste, and touch, etc.

For although Augustine speaks here by similitude, nevertheless those senses are spiritually in us.

But it seems that only touch was in Christ: because the head does not flow anything into the members except touch, and not the other senses: therefore it seems that this is the same way in spiritual matters.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. Psalm 33:9: Taste, and see that the Lord is sweet. Therefore we have taste and sight.

§ 2. Also, it is said reprehensively of the wicked: They have eyes, and will not see. They have ears, and will not hear: they have noses, and will not smell. They have hands, and will not feel [218]. Therefore it seems that our head flows every sense into us through the Holy Spirit.

§ 3. Also, Origen on Leviticus: There are five spiritual senses, namely that with a clean heart we may see God, and hear what He speaks, smell the good odor of Christ, taste the sweetness, of which it is said: If yet you have tasted that the Lord is sweet [219]: we may handle with John the word of life [220]. Therefore it seems that He flows every sense into us just as He has them in Himself.

Further it is asked, According to what are these five spiritual senses taken? For Augustine says that by one intellect is discerned whatever is received by all the senses. Therefore it seems that such a quinary difference of senses cannot be referred to species.

This also seems, because there are two differences of intellect in us, namely the intellect by which we make all things intelligible in us: and the intellect by which all things become intelligible, that is, the agent and possible: therefore it seems that one should not make such a quinary division.

Solution. It must be said that in truth Augustine is speaking by a certain similitude of the material head to the spiritual head: for the material head flows some sense which it has to the whole body: and some also it does not flow [to all], but one to one member, and another to another: as sight to the eye, taste to the tongue and palate, and hearing to the eardrum, and smell to the olfactory organ, which are two cones of the brain in the anterior part of the head in the manner of cones of a breast, as the Philosopher says. But to all the members it flows touch: because (as the Philosopher says) that is the sense on account of which the animal is, and it is not so much a sense, as a general difference constituting the nature of the animal and

the necessity of sense. And thus Christ has certain gifts excellently, and flows them to none: but certain others He flows to some, not all, namely the freely given graces: but to all He flows what is necessary for spiritual being, and this is by way of touch without which an animal cannot be: and He flows to all the motion of merit. And this gift is charity. Yet Augustine does not deny but that in us there are all the spiritual senses.

And through this the solution to the first is evident.

To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that in us there are all the spiritual senses, as Origen says. And the Psalm implies it. And they can be distinguished in this way. Because those things which are received from God are twofold, namely goodness, and truth: goodness in the affection, and truth in the intellect. But goodness is received in two ways, namely through its proper features: and thus it is received by way of touch, in this way that touch is altered according to the conjunction of the extremes: and this happens when by experience we attain God, and His goodness. Goodness is also received according to those things which show His complexion, and savor. For savor is a consequence of the complexion of a commingled tangible thing: and thus spiritually we prove the sweetness of God in His effects, in which on the way His charity is shown, as in the complexion of His body and blood: of which it is said, Wisdom 16:21: For thy substance showed thy sweetness, which thou hast toward thy children: and serving every man's will, it was turned to what every man liked.

But if it is objected against these two senses, that sense is a cognitive power: but this is not ordered to apprehend, but rather to be affected: it must be said that it is a cognition by way of reception as if from without: and it is an experimental cognition, as Dionysius says that Hierotheus by suffering divine things, learned divine things: and this cognition is through spiritual taste and touch.

But if it is a perception of truth, this is in two ways, namely as it is truth, or as it is ordered to the good, that is, the true in the rationale of the true, or the true in the rationale of the good. If it is in the rationale of the good, then it is spiritual smell: for smell is produced from a fumal evaporation showing the savor of a thing: and the true in its rationale as it were evaporates the savor of the good, and shows it as it were through a distance, which is the true. But if it is the true as true: either in a sign, or in itself. If in itself: then it is sight which is directed into the form of the thing intrinsically. If in the second way, namely as in a sign, then it is as hearing is perceptive of the form of a thing in a sign: and therefore these two are disciplinal, one by discovering, the other by receiving through doctrine.

To that which is lastly objected, it must be said that the possible intellect is one, but speculative, or that which is in it, can have rationales of difference according to...

the act, according to the reasons which have been stated.

And through this the solution to the whole is evident.

218. Cf. Ps. 113:5-7 (Vulgate) or Ps. 115:5-7.

Articulus 5 — Whether We Receive from the Fullness of the Grace of Christ the Same and as Great a Grace as He Himself Received

Whether we receive from the fullness of the grace of Christ the same and as much grace as he received?

Then it is asked concerning what is said there, A, around the middle: But they received from his fullness not according to essence, etc.

It seems that this is false: because
1. There is in him the fullness of redundancy: therefore it seems that the same thing overflows into us that was in him: and thus we receive from the same in essence.

1. Likewise, we had only one Redemption: and this was accomplished through Christ: therefore it seems that at least we all received that essentially.

Solution
It must be said that the Master here speaks of habitual grace by which we are formally just: however, when he says that we received according to likeness, it must be understood that this does not suffice, that we have only the likeness of that: because thus we could receive from the grace of Paul or Peter; but the influence of the head is required which was said above, namely, for this that efficiently according to God, and meritoriously according to the noble man, he influences a similar grace to his grace, although not as much.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that it is redundant not materially, but causally, as was said.

To the other, it must be said that the reception is common grace in some respect, and in some respect special: for as to the solution of Adam's debt, it is common, and thus it is not in us: but as to its own efficiency, namely, that in me the debt of Adam, which is original guilt, be removed, it is necessary to receive habitual grace which formally blots out sin: and this was not essentially in Christ, but was first accomplished through his own work.

Articulus 6 — Whether Christ Was Full of Wisdom and Grace from His Very Conception

Whether Christ was full of wisdom and grace from the very conception?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said, there, A, towards the end: He was full of wisdom and grace from the very conception, etc.

For this seems false: because, in Luke, iv, 21, on that: Today this scripture is fulfilled in your ears, etc., the Gloss says: For all the saints he was anointed with spiritual anointing, when the Holy Spirit descended upon him in the form of a dove. This happened when he was beginning to be about thirty years old. Therefore, he was not full from the instant of conception.

Solution: It must be said that there is a fullness for the act of perfecting the one who is full, and there is a fullness itself overflowing from the full one, and infusing others. And the first

219. 1 Pet. 2:3.

was in Christ from the instant of conception. But the second was from when the Spirit was sent in bodily form like a dove into him: because then the regenerative power flowed into the waters, and also into others through the grace of preaching and miracles. And concerning this fullness the Gloss speaks.

Articulus 7 — Whether God Could Confer Greater Grace than He Conferred

Whether God could have conferred greater grace than He conferred?

Whether God could have conferred greater grace than He conferred?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says:

To this sentence, however, it seems to be opposed, etc.

This is the second part in which he objects and solves through the words of the Gospel, and secondly through the words of Ambrose, and he solves, there, C,

Elsewhere, however, it is found written, etc.

Concerning the first part, it is inquired concerning this which he says: To which indeed it can be said according to man, etc.

For this indeed seems plainly done, that according to man he has finite grace: therefore greater can be thought. Either therefore God is able to confer that which can be greater, or not. If not, His power will be limited: which is inconvenient. Thus: therefore it is false what he says here, that God could not have conferred greater.

Solution It must be said that this is true which the Master says here: but it must be understood that every perfect thing of nature and grace necessarily has a determined capacity in species and nature proportionate to itself, of which it will not receive greater, unless the species is changed. However, in the species of man, the greatest of all capacities which can be, preserving the species and nature of man, was in Christ: and therefore God could not have conferred greater grace upon Him, because no man can receive greater, nor any creature.

To that which is objected against, it must be said that God can make greater and confer: but nothing created will be receptive of it. Hence the Master does not attend to what God can do, whose power is limited in nothing, but what can be done in the creature.

But if you object, that God can make a new species, and from that make Christ, and then confer greater grace upon Him: it must be said that this is nothing: because God can make what He wills, but yet on the part of the creature it could not be orderly done any species, which is higher than the intellectual nature in man and Angel: for the intellectual nature by its nobility through the intellect is capable of God, and of His gifts: and whatever else God would make, it could not be more capable than the intellectual nature, and in that Christ was most capable: hence since the measure of His grace was according to that capacity, it cannot be greater on the part of the receiving creature: and through this the power of God the maker is not limited, but rather the capacity of the receiving creature. And it is similar in the matter of

220. 1 John 1:1.

the element which can be refined from the grossness of earth, and it can be refined so much that it will not be earth, but water: and similarly from water is made air, and fire from air: but it is not capable of greater subtlety than in fire: because all natural things have the limits of their capacities, which they do not exceed while the nature and species remain.

Articulus 8 — Whether Those Who Did Not Progress in the Grace and Wisdom of Christ Had Him as Head, Influencing Sense and Motion to Them

Whether those who were not advancing in the grace and wisdom of Christ had Him as a head influencing them with sense and motion?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said, there, B, But in others, who were advancing in His wisdom and grace, etc.

For from this it seems that those who were not advancing in His grace and wisdom did not have Him as a head influencing them with the sense of grace and motion:

1. But those who were before the advent neither saw Him nor heard Him: therefore they did not receive sense and motion from Him.

1. Likewise, a head is properly said in conformity of nature: but before the incarnation, it was not in conformity of nature: therefore it was not a head.

ON THE CONTRARY:

1. Anselm says in the book "Cur Deus Homo" that never from the times of the creation of man on earth was the Church acephalous, that is, without a head: therefore there was always a head.
2. Likewise, Matthew 21:9: The crowds that went before and that followed cried out, saying: Hosanna to the Son of David! But those who went before signify those preceding the advent: those who followed signify those following: therefore all drew sense and motion of grace from Him: therefore all had Him as head.
3. Likewise, Augustine says, and it is placed below in the Letter, that the faith of the ancients and the moderns is the same: and the times are varied, but the faith remained unchanged. Therefore they believed in the incarnation of Christ just as these do, and thus through faith He was their head in conformity of nature. Which must be conceded.

To the first, it must be said that there is an influx through inspiration, and through presence, and word. The first was had by those preceding and following His ascension. However, the second was had by those present who followed Him: concerning whom He said: Blessed are the eyes that see what you see. For I say to you, etc. Concerning the second, however, He said, John 8:56: Abraham, your father, rejoiced to see my day: he saw it, and was glad.

To the other, it must be said that the head was thus in conformity of nature, as the last objection proves.

Articulus 9 — Whether Christ as Man Was the Head of the Angels

Whether Christ as man was the head of the Angels?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said, there, B, towards the end: That boy is full of wisdom and grace is testified. according to humanity.

Therefore it is asked, Whether Christ as man influences the Angels?

It seems that he does not: because the Psalmist says thus: You have made him a little lower than the Angels. But the superior does not receive illumination from the inferior: therefore the Angels do not receive from Christ.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
1. Revelation 21:23: The Lamb is the lamp. Therefore the slain Lamb illuminates all in the kingdom of heaven: therefore also the Angels.

1. Likewise, the Body of Christ is one in all the saints and blessed: because it is said, Song of Songs 6:8: My dove is one. Therefore the Angels are of the unity of the body: therefore they receive through the influence of the head, just as the other members.
2. Furthermore, Dionysius expressly says this, that from Jesus himself they receive illuminations.
3. Likewise, it is of the superior to illuminate the inferior: but Christ is in the greater goods of the Father, even according to man: therefore it is his to illuminate all.

Further it is asked according to this, What it is to receive sense and motion?

1. However, it seems that sense is of thought, but motion is of work: and so it seems that we do not receive the grace perfecting the intellect and its work.
2. Likewise, every animal has a head or another member in place of a head, as the Philosopher says in the book on Animals: yet not every animal has motion: therefore it seems that it is not of the nature of the head to give motion, but only sense.
3. Furthermore, here in the Letter there is no mention of motion, but only of sense: therefore motion is not ministered to us by the spiritual head, but only sense.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
1. In all perfect animals, motion flows from the head: but Christ is the most perfect head: therefore he flows motion.

1. Likewise, it will profit nothing to know divine things through spiritual sense unless we had the motivating power by which we are moved in the divine things known: therefore for sense to profit us, the influx of motion is necessary.

Solution
It must be said to the first, that the Angels are of the unity of our body: for it does not have

only bodily parts, but also spiritual ones: and Christ is the head of the Angels in the first and second acceptance of head, although not in the third.

To that which is objected against, it must be said that he was made lower in the assumption of our penalty only: but not in the power of illumination.

To the other which is further asked, it must be said that we receive motion from the head, which is the motion of merit by which we are moved in the divine things known.

To the first objection, it must be said that there is a twofold motion: namely, progressive, and not every animal has it except from its head, or from a member which is in place of the head. There is also the motion of dilation and constriction, and every animal has it.

To the last, it must be said that in the Letter there is no mention of motion: because it is supposed in the cause. For charity, which is here as the touch of goodness flowing into all, is the cause of the greatest motion. For it is a mobile, sharp, superheated fire, as Augustine suggests: and Dionysius says that charity always progresses or regresses. And Gregory: Charity works great things if it exists: for if it ceases to work, it is not charity.

Articulus 10 — On the Intention of the Words of Ambrose; and Whether in Christ the Agent Intellect Could Abstract Universal Notions from Other Forms

On the intention of the words of Ambrose: and, Whether in Christ the agent intellect could abstract universal concepts from higher forms?

On the intention of the words of Ambrose: and, Whether in Christ the agent intellect could abstract universal concepts from higher forms?

Elsewhere, however, it is found written, etc.

Here he objects through the words of Ambrose. And it has three parts, namely the objection, and the explanation of the intention, with an objection to the contrary, there, EH, But from what cause of that saying's understanding, etc.

However, a doubt arises here concerning the intention of Ambrose. For if he wishes to say what the Master imposes on him: then he proves nothing against the heretic.

§1. For the Master says that he wishes to say that the human sense was advancing, while it showed progress to others: but this also pertains to the divine sense: therefore through that mutability in progress which is in others, he cannot prove that in Christ the human sense was, as Ambrose intends: for he speaks against heretics who said Christ was a simple creature.

§2. Furthermore, it seemed that Ambrose spoke the truth. For Christ assumed all that he planted in our nature: but in our nature even in the first state he planted experiential knowledge which is taken from singulars: therefore he assumed that. It is written by Damascene. The second is proved by Augustine in the book on Genesis according to the letter on that: The Lord God formed man, and placed him in the paradise of pleasure, to work and keep it.

For on that place in the book VIET on Genesis according to the letter Augustine says showing that not before sin did he condemn man to the need of labor: but that, aroused by experience, he might more know the Creator working in nature. And these are the words: For what is more wonderful than this spectacle, or where more can human reason in some way speak with the nature of things, than when seeds are planted, shoots are set, saplings are transplanted, grafts are inserted, as if each root and germ's power is questioned, what it can, or cannot do: whence it can, whence it cannot: what in it the invisible and interior power of numbers can achieve, what external diligence can apply: in the very consideration to perceive, because he who plants is something, neither who waters, but who gives the increase, God*. Although Adam had the knowledge of all natures, yet he advanced in the knowledge of experience. Therefore from the similar, let Christ have had the knowledge of all, he could also advance in experiential knowledge: and in this knowledge the divine intellect does not advance, because it receives nothing from things.

§3. Furthermore, the sense of Christ was receptive of the species of sensibles in present matter. Either therefore the common sense in Christ could make a composition of sensed things in him, as to say, this yellow is sweet, and this yellow is bitter: or not. If not: therefore it was more imperfect than in us: because the common sense could do this in us. If it could: therefore the common sense could in Christ make new compositions every day. Either therefore the forms of those compositions could be preserved by the imaginative power, or not. If not: again it follows, that it was less potent than in us. If so: therefore he had many new things in imagination.

Further I ask, Whether the agent intellect in Christ could abstract further concepts from other forms, or not? If not: therefore impotent. If so: therefore it abstracted. But whatever the agent intellect abstracts, it impresses on the possible: therefore the possible intellect in Christ received a new species, and many new species: therefore it seems, that a new knowledge: and thus the human sense advanced in him, as Ambrose says.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: §1. Two forms of the same species cannot be in the same subject: but the habit of knowledge of all was in Christ from the instant of his conception: therefore he was not susceptible of any habit through experiential knowledge.

§2. Likewise, Matter is not in potency to the form it has, and receives nothing except that to which it is in potency: therefore it never receives the form it has: but the agent intellect relates to the possible, as form to matter, as the Philosopher says, or art to matter: therefore the possible does not receive from the agent the form it has: therefore the intellect in Christ did not advance: and thus again it seems false what Ambrose says. If you say, that the possible is not like the matter of nature, but like the matter of art, because the Philosopher says that the agent relates to the possible as art to matter: still it is concluded proposed + for although the matter of art does not lose the form of nature by receiving the form of art, as Empedocles said, yet it does not receive at the same time two forms of art of the same species, nor two forms of nature of the same species. Since therefore the agent is like art, because it is the species of

intelligible species, the possible does not at the same time receive from it two species of the same concept.

Solution It must be said without prejudice, that there is more truth in the words of Ambrose than the Master elicits from them, because without doubt otherwise he would prove nothing against the heretic. For I posit in Christ four

knowledges, of which one in the highest was the knowledge of the Son of God which is the knowledge which he has one in number from eternity uncreated with the Father and the Holy Spirit.

Another he has from the conjunction to divinity: and this is the knowledge through the species which is of the homeland, and beyond that of the homeland: because others know through the species of divine presence, but he knew through the species: united to him: because the deity which is the species, is united to him, and in this knowledge he was a comprehensor and most truly.

Another is the knowledge which he received from the truth of the state of innocence: and this is the concrete knowledge of all natural things which Adam also had before sin.

The fourth knowledge is that which is of the wayfarer which is the knowledge of experience: but the origin of experience is twofold: one which makes knowledge, and thus is in the ignorant in whom through experience memory is acquired, and from memory and experience a universal concept which generates knowledge in the intellect not having it. Another is experience not making a habit indeed, but exciting, as Adam had experience, as was proved in the authority of Augustine: and this Christ had, and advanced in it: and this Ambrose intends: and therefore he says, The human sense was advancing: and he did not say, The human intellect was advancing, as Basil says in a certain homily on the beginning of Proverbs. Sense is intellect of the present, that is to say, intellect reflected to sense: and that is changed to act through experience, although not to a new habit, as was proved by objecting. For I well concede that the particular sense of Christ was apprehensive of sensibles, and the common sense was composed, and imagination— receptive of imaginations: but the intellect according to act made in some habit does not receive further a habit of the same concept: because two species of the same concept are not in one and the same.

But if it is objected, that it is similar with imagination and sense, I well concede as long as the imagination of the same remains: but imaginations frequently pass in the sensible powers, and new ones are received more than in the intellect.

But to what is objected against, it must be said, that he did not receive a new habit, but a new conversion of the habit to this or that from the intellect to the sense reflected.

But if you object, that Christ by the same reason should not have had except one knowledge: because two knowledges are not ordered to the same. It must be said, that those three are not of the same concept: because one is the divine essence: but another contemplation in the united Word: the third indeed habitual human, but flexible to this or that, is of the perfection of the wayfarer.

Articulus 11 — Whether Jesus Advanced in Age and Human Wisdom

Whether Jesus advanced in age and wisdom of man?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said, there, C, around the beginning: Therefore, if He advanced in the age of man, He advanced in the wisdom of man, etc.

For it seems that He did not have the wisdom of man: because
1. Nature does not abound in superfluities, as the Philosopher says: since therefore He had a more noble cognition than even future things are not hidden, as it says below in the Letter, it seems He did not have human wisdom, because it would be superfluous.

1. Likewise, in lower things we see that a greater light obscures a lesser, as the light of a candle does not appear in the sun: therefore it was also thus in the soul of Christ: therefore He had only divine knowledge and thus it is false, as it seems, what is said.
2. Likewise, it is more perfect to know without receiving from another, than by receiving: and it is more perfect to know through the cause, than through the effect: and it is more perfect to know through knowledge which is the cause, than which is not the cause, but only a likeness. Therefore, since God denied none of the perfections to His Son, and removed all imperfection from Him except this alone which had order to our redemption, it seems that He removed every mode of imperfect cognition from Him: because imperfect cognition is more contrary to salvation, than promotive. Since therefore man knows by knowledge caused by things, an Angel by knowledge which is a likeness of things and not a cause, but God by knowledge which is the cause of things, it seems that He had only that and not another.

To this it must be said, that Christ had multiple cognition, — namely uncreated, and from union to the Word of the comprehensor in the homeland, because the Word was always present and united to Him as to the soul: and also the cognition of Adam: and also in some way experiential cognition.

To that which is objected against, it must be said that it was not superfluous in Christ what was of nature or of the state as demonstrative: because this greatly avails us to believe in Him both natures: and also such cognitions are of the nature of states.

To the other it must be said, that this is false, unless the lights are of the same nature at least as to light, and unless they project rays to the same part. But neither of these modes is here: because these knowledges are not of the same nature, nor do they illuminate in the same way over the known.

But if you say, that in lower things also the lights are not of the same nature, and yet they mutually absorb each other. It must be said, that this is false: because as to light at least they have the same nature of proportion to act: for light is not in a lower body except according to the nature by which it communicates with a higher body, as the Philosopher says: and therefore although they have diverse powers in moving, yet to shine is common to them according to proportion. But thus it is not in knowledges: because knowledge is equivocal, as the mode

of objection shows: because one is the cause of the thing, and another a likeness, and a third caused by the thing.

To the other it must be said, that to have every mode of knowing is not of the nature of imperfection of human nature: for what would be imperfect for God, this would be perfect for an Angel or man: whence since Christ was God and man, He had all modes of perfection useful to us according to the state of each nature.

Articulus 12 — Whether in Christ from Infancy There Was Any Ignorance, or He Had All Knowledge

Whether in Christ from infancy there was any ignorance, or he had all knowledge?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said, there, C, around the middle: "But the infancy of recognition," etc.

This also seems so.
1. By the authority of Pope Leo in the sermon on the Epiphany saying thus: "They adored the infant in no way distinct from the generality of others."

1. Likewise, Christ descended in humility below all: therefore it seems since the ignorant is more humble than one having all knowledge, that he ought to have assumed this defect for us.
2. Likewise, Chrysostom on John reproves the book on the infancy of the Savior, saying that in infancy he did not differ from other infants.
3. Likewise, it seems to be ignorance or nescience from the nature of the infant: therefore it seems since Christ assumed all things natural to us, that he assumed that. The first is proved by what the Philosopher says at the beginning of the natural things, that children at first consider all men fathers, and women mothers, and afterwards discern: therefore it seems that this is natural to them.

Solution: It must be said that ignorance or nescience never befits Christ, but all knowledge from the instant of his conception, as the Master proves in the Text, fourfold, or threefold, as was said, namely uncreated, united to the Word, and of the comprehensor: and according to the first state, it was similar to the knowledge which the Angels received from the beginning of their creation. However, the knowledge of the comprehensor is the knowledge of the present united, and therefore it is reduced to the knowledge of the union, that is, which the union makes: and thus there will be three knowledges of Christ. However, the fourth was experimental in him as an act not making a habit, as was said by the Apostle to the Hebrews, that he learned obedience from the things which he suffered.

To the authority of Leo, it must be said that he speaks according to what appeared outwardly in him: and in the same way, the saying of Chrysostom must be solved.

To the other, it must be said that to descend into that which is contrary to merit and beatitude is not of humility, but of foolishness: and this is ignorance and nescience, because a good intellect is for all making it.

To the other, it must be said that this is not of the nature of the infant except according to the state of corrupted nature, which was known to the Philosophers. For if Adam had not sinned, it would have been determined how much we would be born perfect in knowledge and grace according to the state of animal life, although not perfect in quantity due to the necessity of the maternal womb.

Articulus 13 — Whether Christ from the Instant of Conception Was Full of Grace and Wisdom

Whether Christ from the instant of conception was full of grace and wisdom?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says:

But from what cause, etc.

Here the Master seems to suppose what was determined above, namely that Christ from the instant of conception was full of grace and wisdom.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
He did not have faith, he did not have hope, he did not have penitence: all of which are graces: therefore not the fullness of divine grace.

Solution: Faith as to vision was in Christ, but as to the mirror and enigma in which faith sees, it was not in him, because those are of imperfection. However, hope is a certain expectation of future beatitude arising from merits and grace, and in every way it was not in him, but insofar as it is certain from merits and union, and of the glory or beatitude of the body, not of the soul, there was in him an act of hope: because he certainly expected the glory of the body. However, he did not have penitence: because it regards preceding sin, but for us only he exhibited an act of penitence: because he paid the penalties due for our sin, and because he was a sacrifice for our sin: for which reason he is also called a sinner by the Apostle saying: Him who knew not sin, for us God made sin, and again concerning sin he condemned sin in the flesh: and it is called sin there because he was a sacrifice for sin.

DISTINCTIO XIV

Divisio Textus

Here it is necessary to inquire, With the soul of Christ, etc. Here begins the fourteenth distinction, in which the second question of this part is asked, namely whether Christ had all knowledge as God, or not?

And it has three parts: in the first of which he objects for and against, and resolves that he had all knowledge. In the second, he assigns the reason why he did not have similarly all power or omnipotence, there, C, But if it is asked, Why God did not. In the third, it is objected against this second part, and he resolves, there namely, D, But if that soul does not have so much power, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether Christ Had Knowledge of All Secrets from God

Whether Christ had the knowledge of all things known from God?

Concerning the first, a question arises about three articles, namely whether Christ had the knowledge of all things known from God?

Secondly, whether He had that knowledge in created species, or in habit, or only in the Word?

Thirdly, whether that knowledge was or is the knowledge of comprehension, or only of simple understanding?

To prove, however, that He did not have the knowledge of all things, reasons are brought forward in the Letter, and these are subject.

To the same, however, another reason can be objected thus:

1. Nothing created is infinite, nor of infinite capacity: the soul of Christ is created: therefore it is neither infinite, nor of infinite capacity. However, the number of things known by God is infinite, which I prove thus: Augustine says in book XXII of the City of God, that although the species of numbers are infinite, yet in the manner of that knowledge they are finite, whose knowledge is not a number: therefore it is evident that divine knowledge is of infinite things.

Likewise, the Goodness of God is infinite, and similarly power, and whatever is in God is entirely infinite, and God is the most perfect contemplator of Himself: therefore if the soul of Christ knows what God knows, it knows and comprehends infinite things, which does not seem to be, since it is created.

1. Likewise, God knows whatever He can do: however, He can do things which never are, were, or will be: therefore the soul of Christ knows things which never are, were, or will be: and this is false, because what never was, is, or will be, is not known.
2. If perhaps you say that the soul of Christ knows infinite things as infinite, but not by comprehending infinite things: this is nothing, because we also know in that way the infinite: whence in this the knowledge of the soul of Christ does not differ from our knowledge.

If for this reason someone says, the soul of Christ comprehends in itself the infinity of God, namely infinite goodness, and truth, and so on. Against:

1. Whatever is comprehended is circumscribed by the intellect of the comprehender, as Augustine says in the book On Seeing God to Proba: Whatever, therefore, is circumscribed by a created intellect, this is limited by the intellect, because it is so contained by the intellect that nothing of it is outside: whatever is comprehended, is limited: nothing, however, is limited unless it is finite: therefore what is thus comprehended by the soul of Christ, is limited: but the infinite goodness, truth, etc., of God is comprehended, therefore God is finite, which is heresy.
2. Likewise, although the capacity of the soul of Christ is greater than that of any simple creature, yet it is not infinite: therefore it is not commensurate with the infinite.

§ 1. [infi]nite. But nothing comprehends anything else unless the measure of its capacity can encompass it: therefore, since the capacity of the soul of Christ cannot be made commensurate with the infinite, it does not comprehend anything infinite in God: and thus it is evident that in the number of things known it does not possess knowledge equal to God.

§ 2. ON THE CONTRARY: In the text [of the Sentences] there are again certain arguments which are assumed.

§ 3. Furthermore, it is objected as follows: 1. Augustine says that the union is such that it makes God man, and man God: and all things that are true of God are true of man, and conversely. But the Son of God knows infinite things: therefore this man knows infinite things. And this man knows nothing except what he knows in his soul: therefore he himself comprehends infinite things.

§ 4. 2. Also, Philippians 2:11: Every tongue should confess that the Lord Jesus Christ is in the glory of God the Father therefore he merited this through his passion, as is said in the same place, and this is understood according to his manhood. Therefore, according to his manhood, he is in the glory of God the Father, as it seems: but he is not in His glory unless he knows those things which He knows: therefore he is equipollent to Him in things known and in the number of things known, as it seems.

§ 5. 3. Also, from the union that soul has something over us. Since, therefore, we attain that which is infinite and do not comprehend it, he will be attaining it through the intellect and comprehending it.

§ 6. Solution. It must be said without prejudice that the soul of Christ knows all things that God knows, but not all things in the same way. For the infinity of God, which is not measured by anything extrinsic enclosing it (as has often been said in the first book of the Sentences on the second and third distinctions), the soul of Christ itself does not enclose by comprehending: rather, God alone comprehends Himself, because to Himself alone He is finite, inasmuch as nothing of Him is outside of Himself. For if we were to say that He is enclosed by the comprehension of the capacity of the soul of Christ, it seems to me that this would redound to a blasphemy against the deity of Christ: and we would then be attributing so much to His

humanity that we would be derogating from His divinity, which must not be done. Thus, therefore, it must be said that it knows all things that God knows, but not all things in the same way: because it does not comprehend whatever God knows, but only comprehends all things known by God which are not God: but this known by God which is God, it does not comprehend.

§ 7. Therefore, to the first objection it must be said: when it is said that God knows infinite things, this can be understood in two ways: namely, that He knows things infinite in number, or things infinite, as it were, in the measure which He Himself is. In the second way, it is true that He knows certain things which are infinite, as it were, in the measure which He Himself is: and the soul of Christ knows these, but does not comprehend them. However, things infinite by number are only so in a qualified sense, namely, in the potency of infinite addition, as the Philosopher says and in the potency of an efficient cause, namely because He can make infinite things, and He knows that He can do this. And yet it does not follow through this that the species of infinite things are in Him in act; and from this it does not follow that God knows infinite things, unless "to know" were the same as "to have knowledge of the infinite." Therefore, although the soul of Christ knows all things that God knows, it does not follow that it knows infinite things.

§ 8. But some speak otherwise here, distinguishing a threefold knowledge in God: namely, that of approbation, which is only of good things; that of vision, which is of those things whose intelligible principles are present to Him; and that of simple intelligence, which they say is of all things that exist in any way, such as privations, and of those things which are in potency only. And they say that the soul of Christ knows all things known by God in the first and second ways, but not in the third way. But from this a twofold absurdity follows: first, that the soul of Christ would not be equaled to God in the number of things known, which is contrary to what is said here without exception. The other is that, by the same reasoning, it would also be ignorant of evil things, because those are known by simple intelligence.

§ 9. But as to what Augustine says,

that the infinite species of numbers are finite in His knowledge, of whose knowledge there is no number. It must be said that this is true; yet it is not necessary that He knows infinite things. For since His knowledge is the cause of every real thing that is not predicated through privation, if the infinite species of numbers were in His knowledge, He would produce infinite species of numbers, which is false. Whence the understanding of Augustine is that His knowledge, which is the cause of being and is not limited by created being, comprehends that which is infinite in the potency of division and multitude (that is, insofar as something can always be taken outside it); yet it does not comprehend it in such a way that it causes it through a species, because then the infinite would already be finite, which cannot be.

§ 2. To that which he objects, that God knows what never will be, or is, or was. It must be said that He knows this in the way that it is in the cause: but it is not in the cause except through an exemplar. Whence also God does not know it except by knowing Himself to be capable of that of which there is an exemplar in Him. Whence, by knowing Himself to be in

such potency to cause, He knows it. Yet it does not follow that He knows it simply; and the same is the solution concerning the infinite: for it does not follow that if He knows infinite things through the power of producing infinite things, He therefore knows infinite things simply.

§ 3. To that which is objected, that if the soul of Christ knows by not comprehending, it does not differ from our souls: it must be said that this is not true. For it still differs in two respects. First, in number: because no pure creature has the notice of all things that God knows, just as Isidore says that the Trinity is known to Himself alone and to the assumed man. And thus Augustine says that the soul of Christ loves every good, and nothing is loved unless it is known: therefore it knows every good. But each one of the other Saints knows only as much as God wishes to reveal to him. Second, it differs in mode: because His capacity receives, as it were, excessively, and more of any knowable thing than anyone else does.

§ 4. To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that this is rightly conceded: that this man comprehends all things that God comprehends. For this man supposits the person in three substances and two natures. But it does not follow further that, if this man comprehends, he comprehends according as he is man, if the term according as denotes the condition of the nature.

§ 5. To the next objection it must be said that Christ, in His person, is in equality of the glory of God the Father: but according as He is man, He is in a lower glory, yet higher than any creature.

§ 6. To the next objection it must be said that we neither entirely know the things that God knows, nor do we comprehend the infinite ocean of the divine substance, but we attain it. God, however, comprehends all things and knows all things. Whence Christ, according as He is man united [to the Word], is conformed to Him in the number of things known (in which He exceeds us), and is below Him in the mode of comprehension.

Articulus 2 — Whether That Knowledge Which Christ Has of All Things Is in the Contemplation of the Word United to Him, or in Some Formal Habit

Whether that knowledge which Christ has of all things consists in the contemplation of the Word united to Him, or in some formal habit?

§ 8. Secondly, it is asked: Whether that knowledge which Christ has of all things consists in the contemplation of the Word united to Him, or in some formal habit in which He knows all things, just as the Angels at the beginning of their creation received a habit in which they know all things?

§ 9. And it seems that Christ knows by a habit: because 1. The soul of Christ is not more imperfect, but higher than the Angels: therefore the gifts given to the Angels were given to it. But a habit was given to the Angels from the beginning of creation: therefore also to the soul of Christ.

§ 1. 2. Also, intellect does not occur except through the assimilation of the knower and that which is known. But the soul of Christ understood all things: therefore it was assimilated to all things. But this cannot be except through a habit and the species of all things: therefore it had a habit of cognition and the species of all things within itself.

§ 2. 3. Also, as matter is related to the forms of art or nature, so the rational intellect is related to the species of knowable things. But matter is not in act except through a received species and form. Therefore the possible intellect does not become in act except through species received either by creation or by abstraction from things. But He did not have them from the instant of conception by abstraction from things: therefore He had them given by creation, as it seems.

§ 3. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. The knowledge of the Angels is threefold, as is elicited from the words of Augustine namely, evening knowledge, by which they know things in the proper genus of things, in which they are overshadowed by the shadow of privation always drawing toward sunset; and second, by which they know things in themselves [i.e., morning knowledge]; and third, which is nobler than the others, which is in the Word. Since therefore that knowledge, namely which is in the Word, does not require habitual forms (because the Word is more present to the contemplator than any species could be), much more does the soul of Christ united to the Word not require species of this kind.

§ 4. 2. Also, intellect would not occur without the presence of the thing understood. But that which is in the soul by essence is more present than that which is there only by similitude; and that which penetrates the intellect by its simplicity is more present than that which touches it only extrinsically, as it were. But the Word penetrates through Himself the intellect of the contemplator. Moreover, those things which are essentially in the soul, such as justice, temperance, faith, and the like, do not touch or inform the soul extrinsically. Therefore the Word is rendered more present than any habit could make present. But He is rendered still more present to the soul which He unites to Himself and which He penetrates. Therefore, since this is the soul of Christ, the soul of Christ knows all things in the Word and not in anything else.

§ 5. 3. Also, all things cannot be known except in that in which all things are in a certain way. But in no habit of the Angels or of nature are all things present: because those things which are subject to free choice are not ordered, nor can anything attain to comprehending them by knowing them as they depend upon the future, except God alone. Therefore these cannot be known except by God alone: therefore the soul of Christ could not know these except in God: therefore He did not know them in any received habit.

§ 6. Solution. Without prejudice, we say that the soul of Christ does not have knowledge of all things as all things except in the Word: because only to that soul which He united to Himself does He show Himself regarding all knowable things, while to the other Angels and blessed souls He shows Himself as much as He wills and as much as they have merited.

§ 7. To that which is objected first, it must be said that the soul of Christ does not have habits which are the similitudes of all things; rather, this is a sign that more was conferred

upon Him than upon the other Angels. For in the preceding distinction it was determined that He has a habit in which He knows the order and process of all natural things, just as the Angels do. But this habit is not of all things knowable by God, because the Angels do not know all things. Whence, above this, He has the union to the Word, in whom He always contemplates and knows all things.

§ 8. To the next objection it must be said that assimilation is twofold. In one way, through abstraction; and in another way, through conversion to that which is the cause and first art of all things. And in this second way, through conversion and union to the Word, the soul of Christ had the assimilation of His intellect with all things.

§ 9. To the next objection it must be said that that similitude is true concerning an intellect acquiring the knowledge of things: and this does not befit a soul united to supreme perfection, because that soul could not be subject to ignorance.

Articulus 3 — How the Knowledge of the Soul of Christ Knew All Things

By what mode of knowledge did the soul of Christ know all things?

By what mode of knowledge did the soul of Christ know all things?

§ 2. Thirdly it is asked: By what mode of knowledge did the soul of Christ know all things that God knows?

§ 3. It seems that it was by one intuition, because: 1. Whatever is in the Word is in Him through the mode of one, and not through the mode of many, since He Himself is simple. But the soul of Christ always contemplates in the Word. Therefore it knew all things through the mode of one. But a simple intuition is of one according as it is one; therefore it knew all things by a single intuition.

§ 4. 2. Also, it further seems that He knew all things by comprehending them: because the whole Word is united to that soul. Therefore nothing of the Word is outside the soul of Christ. Therefore whatever is in the Word is also within the soul of Christ: because that which contains the container also contains what is contained in it. Therefore, since it grasps the Word, it therefore grasps everything that is in Him, and thus comprehends.

§ 5. 3. Also, God does not know all things by one mode of knowledge: because He knows in one way the things He Himself is going to make, and in another way He knows the things He can make but will never make, which, if He were to make them, would be good. If therefore the soul of Christ knew all things that God knows, it seems that it too knows in this diverse mode. And it is asked: How do these modes differ in it?

§ 6. 4. Moreover, it seems to be expressly said in the Gospel that neither did the Son know all things, Matthew 24:36: But of that day and hour no one knows, neither the Angels of heaven, but the Father alone, nor even the Son. And Acts 1:7: It is not for you to know the times or moments, which the Father has placed in His own power.

§ 7. Solution. It must be said that God knows things in a threefold way: not that things are merely threefold, because they are manifold; but because they are in Him in a threefold way.

Namely, as in a powerful cause only; and they are in Him as in a cause knowing the rationale of the work and operating; and they are in Him as in one knowing only. Now, they cannot be in Him as in an operator only, without knowledge; because one possessing intellect operates by knowing the rationale of the work, or else he does not know what he is doing and operates vainly, which must not be said of God. Now, those things are in Him as in a powerful cause only which are related to Him in two ways: namely, that they are in the efficient potency of His power only, and will never be made. And these God does not know except by knowing Himself to be powerful toward things other than those He has produced. Whence this notice is nothing but the conversion of the divine intellect upon itself as it is of infinite power toward infinite effects: whence this notice posits no exemplar or idea in God. But certain things are in Him who is powerful in such a way that He Himself is giving the posse [potency] of the infinite, though not the act: and these, as to that given posse, have an exemplar, but not as to act. Just as the infinite exists only in potency: and therefore the infinite, through what it is, is only in that which is finite, and the rationale of the finite is made by God, and has an exemplar in Him. In the second way, all creatures are in the knowledge of God. In the third way, evils. I say, therefore, that the soul of Christ, by knowing the Word, knows in this threefold rationale as many things as God does.

§ 8. Therefore, to the first objection it must be said that "by one intuition" is said in two ways: namely, concerning the object, or concerning the discerner. And I well concede that concerning the object, it is one intuition by which all things are; but concerning the discerning intellect, there cannot be a single act: because there is one conversion according to the act toward this thing, and another toward that thing.

§ 9. And if it is objected that Augustine says that in the fatherland there will be no revolving thoughts, and therefore much less in the soul

of Christ: It must be said that this too is understood concerning the object, and as regards the fact that we will not be involved in inquiring and pondering, but not as regards the idea that we would always be in the exact same act of conversion.

§ 2. To the next objection it must be said, as was stated earlier, that although the soul of Christ is united to the Word, it is nevertheless not said to enclose the Word: because thus God would be enclosed, which is false. Rather, it is united to the whole Word, and this is not to close Him within, such that He is not elsewhere, since He is everywhere essentially, potentially, and by His presence.

§ 3. To the next objection the solution is already clear through the distinction: for I well concede that the soul of Christ in those three ways is made equal to God in the number of knowable things. For the Saints except nothing: and therefore nothing seems to me needing to be excepted either.

§ 4. To the next objection it must be said that the Son is not excluded from the knowledge of the Father, nor is the Holy Spirit, nor even the soul of Christ which, united to the Word, knew all future things. But He intends that the Son "does not know," because He did not make

us to know, and He held Himself after the manner of one not knowing because the knowledge of that day would not have profited us, but would have harmed us.

Articulus 4 — Whether Christ Was Ever Withdrawn from the Purity of All-Complete Contemplation; and Whether He Contemplated as Purely as God

Was Christ ever drawn back from the purity of omnifarious contemplation? And did He contemplate as purely as God?

§ 7. Next, it is asked concerning what He says in the text, there at B, near the beginning: Neither does it grasp all things as clearly and perspicuously as God.

§ 8. 1. For from this word the Masters derive what they say, that the soul of Christ does not see as limpidly as God.

§ 9. 2. Also, if it does not see as limpidly, this proceeds from some obscuration. But the cause of obscuration is sin. Therefore it seems that in it there is no obscurity, since He committed no sin, nor was deceit found in His mouth.

§ 10. 3. Also, the soul of Christ is a most clear mirror. Therefore that which results in it results most clearly. Therefore it contemplates as limpidly as God.

§ 11. Furthermore, it is asked: Was Christ ever drawn back from the purity of that contemplation?

§ 12. It seems that He was: because we see, and the Philosopher also says, that one power existing in act vehemently draws back another. Therefore, since He was sometimes very intent upon His disciples and the passions of the body, it seems that He was drawn back from this kind of contemplation.

§ 13. Solution. It must be said that the soul of Christ did not contemplate as limpidly and purely as God, and that lesser limpidity or perspicuity is caused by the privation of nothingness which is in every creature; and that obscurity which belongs to the intellect from the fact that it is created is an inseparable defect, because it is conjoined to the rationale of creation, or the exodus from non-being to being.

§ 14. Through this the solution is clear to those things which are objected against the first point.

§ 15. To that which is asked further, it must be said that Christ was a true wayfarer (viator) and a true comprehensor, and neither drew back

the other: for the retraction of powers, by which one power in vehement act draws back another, is only in those things which are purely creatures.

§ 2. However, this will be inquired into more below in the question concerning the passion of Christ.

Articulus 5 — Whether Christ Had Omnipotence as He Had Knowledge

Did Christ have omnipotence just as He had omniscience?

§ 5. Next, it is asked concerning what he says in the text, there at C: But if it is asked, Why God did not give Him power, etc.

§ 6. For it seems that He had omnipotence just as [He had] omniscience: because 1. If because of the union the knowledge of all things was caused in Him, therefore by a similar reason the power over all things was caused in Him.

§ 7. 2. Also, He knew all things as God does: therefore He knew how to create. But no one knows the exercise of any act unless he knows how to exercise that act. Therefore He knew how to exercise it. But no one knows how to exercise what he cannot exercise. Therefore the Son of God can create.

§ 8. 3. Also, the power to understand all things is a certain power, and the power to operate all things is a certain power. Since therefore in God the one power is not less than the other, it seems He ought to have given the other.

§ 9. 4. Also, a wise architect not only teaches his son, nor just gives him the art of how things are fabricated, but also by instruction induces in him the power to operate from use. Therefore it seems that God, who loves the soul of Christ much more than any man loves his son, induces in it the power of operation.

§ 10. Next to this it is further asked: Could He have given Him the power of creating something?

§ 11. It seems so, because: 1. He says in the text that He could give Him the power to do certain things which He is not able to do.

§ 12. 2. Also, in knowledge there is nothing but to receive, but in power there is nothing but to operate actively.

§ 13. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. No power exceeds its proper subject. The subject of the soul of Christ is finite: therefore it cannot have infinite power. But God's power is infinite: therefore the soul of Christ cannot receive it.

§ 14. 2. Also, nothing is created except what is reduced from nothing into being. But "nothing" and "being" are distant infinitely and without proportion. Therefore, to educe something from nothing into being requires infinite power. The soul of Christ cannot have infinite power; therefore the soul of Christ cannot receive from God

the power to create anything, however slight.

§ 2. Also, infinite power exists only in an infinite essence: therefore when infinite power is communicated, an infinite essence is communicated. But this is not communicated to anyone, unless he is essentially God: but this cannot be anything created. Therefore infinite power is not communicable to anything created.

§ 3. And this must be conceded; and it must be said that it is not similar concerning knowledge and power: because knowledge occurs through another, just as through the presence of the Word; but power goes forth from the proper essence.

§ 4. To the first objection it must be said that there is practical or operative knowledge (which is the same thing) and there is speculative knowledge. But Christ did not have anything but speculative knowledge [concerning creation], and not operative.

§ 5. To the next objection it must be said that He knew how to create, that is, how things are created; but He did not know how to create with an operative knowledge, in the way a practitioner operates.

§ 6. To the next objection it must be said that the power of understanding is a passive and receiving power, and therefore can be perfected by something higher than itself. But the power of operating into act is one going forth from the root of its own essence, and its perfection is in the agent, and this cannot be anything created.

§ 7. To the next objection it must be said that the wise architect, the glorious God, taught the soul of Christ contemplative knowledge, but did not teach the exercise: because it was not capable, nor could it be. And therefore that which is adduced for a similarity is not similar.

§ 8. To the next objection I well concede that no creature is capable of the power of creating even anything at all.

§ 9. But to that which is objected on the contrary side [i.e., regarding what God could have given], it must be said that He could have given Him the power to operate something out of pre-existing matter, which He gave to nature, but not the power of creating.

DISTINCTIO XV

Divisio Textus

§ 10. Division of the Text

§ 1. DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

§ 2. That also must not be passed over, etc.

§ 3. Here begins that part which is about the things befitting Christ according to the potency of the body.

§ 4. And it is divided into three parts, according to the three distinctions posited here: in the first of which the Master shows what defects Christ assumed in body and soul, according as the capacity to suffer was in Him. In the second he determines a question following from this, whether He suffered by the necessity of these defects, or by will alone? There, Dist. XVI, A, Here arises a question taking its origin from the aforesaid, etc. But in the third, because His pray-

er indicated a defect of natural fear and sadness, it is asked concerning His prayer, whether it was heard or not? There, Dist. XVII, A, After the aforesaid, it is necessary to consider, etc.

§ 5. The first of these distinctions is divided into three parts: in the first of which he touches upon the defects which Christ assumed. In the second, he posits the objection of certain persons from the words of Augustine and others, and resolves it, there at D, But because some concerning the sense in the passion, etc. In the third, he posits a special difficulty from the words of Hilary, and resolves it, there at G, Nevertheless they move more, etc.

§ 6. Further, the first of these is subdivided into four parts: in the first of which he shows that He did not take up certain defects on the part of the body; in the second, he shows that He did not take up certain defects on the part of the soul, such as ignorance and difficulty in acting well, there at B, Authority hands down, etc. In the third, he shows that if ignorance had not approached from sin, it would not be a defect, but a natural consequent of nature, there at C, But perhaps someone will say, etc. In the fourth, he shows that in this God should not be blamed, there at C, § 2: But these defects, etc. In these the sentence is clear.

Articulus 1 — Whether Christ Received Our Defects

Did Christ take on our defects?

§ 9. Here falls a question concerning the defects which Christ assumed. And three things are asked here regarding the first chapter, namely: Whether Christ took on our defects? Secondly, Whether He took on the defects of the soul? And thirdly, Whether He took on all of them, or certain ones?

§ 10. Regarding the first, it seems that Christ did not take on our defects. 1. For it belongs to one who is failing to fail and not to conquer: therefore the reception of a defect is contrary to fighting. But He came to bind the strong man. Therefore He ought rather to have come in fortitude, than in the assumption of defects.

§ 11. 2. Also, contraries are cured by contraries. But Christ came to cure defects. Therefore He came in that which cures our defects. But nothing cures except virtue and fortitude. Therefore He ought to have come in virtue and fortitude.

§ 12. 3. Also, a sick man, seeing a sick helper, despairs more concerning the helper, rather than being elevated into the hope of liberation. Since therefore He came to erect us to the hope of liberation, it seems that He Himself ought to have come in strength and not in defects: and thus it seems that He ought not to have assumed any defects.

§ 13. 4. This same thing seems [proven] through the Prophet Isaiah, Isaiah 51:9: Awake, awake, put on strength, O arm of the Lord! awake as in the ancient days, in the generations of old. Hast thou not

§ 1. struck the proud one, and wounded the dragon? Since therefore in ancient days He did not come except in the showing of virtue and fortitude, now also He ought not to have come in defect, but in strength, as it seems.

§ 2. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. God can do nothing unjust. To dismiss a sin unpunished without the penalty of satisfaction is unjust: therefore God cannot do this. And this is the argument of Anselm. And he concedes the premises and the conclusion. Then thus: A pure man could not render the honor due to God for sin, nor ought anyone to have done so except man: therefore, in order that this compensation might be made, it was necessary that there be a God-man. Now I resume the first conclusion. Recompense is not made except by resuming the penalty: therefore it is necessary for the satisfier to suffer the penalty. But one who does not have defects ordered to penalty does not suffer penalty. Therefore Christ had to assume defects ordered to passion.

§ 3. 2. Also, the Apostle, Hebrews 2:18: For in that wherein He Himself hath suffered and been tempted, He is able to succour them also that are tempted. Therefore, in order that He might heal and succour, it was necessary to have the defects of penal inflictions.

§ 4. 3. Also, Isaiah 53:3 and 4: We have seen Him... despised, and the most abject of men, a man of sorrows, and knowing infirmity. But it does not speak of the knowledge of pure notice, because He had this even as God, but of the knowledge of experience: therefore it was also necessary to have the defects through which He could experience it.

§ 5. 4. Also, Hebrews 2:17: Wherefore it behoved Him in all things to be made like unto His brethren, that He might become merciful. Since therefore the brethren were all in penal conditions, He Himself also ought to be in them.

§ 6. 5. Also, ibid., v. 14: Therefore because the children are partakers of flesh and blood, He also Himself in like manner hath been partaker of the same, that through death He might destroy him who had the empire of death, that is to say, the devil. But He could not die unless He assumed the defects ordered to death.

§ 7. Solution. It must be said that it was fitting for Christ to assume our defects, as the latter arguments prove: for the former are sophistic.

§ 8. Therefore, to the first it must be said that there is conquering through justice, and conquering through the use of power: and Christ came to conquer in the first way, and this could not be except through satisfaction by sustaining penalty, and to assume the penalty was more fitting for our redemption.

§ 9. To the next objection it must be said that this is true concerning the primary curing things, which are sin and grace; but not concerning proximate curing things, because often pain cures pain, as an incision cures an abscess, and cauterization a swelling, and things of this kind which are in Christ. For He Himself came full of grace against fault. But the mode of medicating so that we might be able to receive grace was fittingly through the sustaining of penalty, so that the disease due to us might thereby be expelled from us.

§ 10. To the next objection it must be said that the sick man in sin did not despair from the fact that he did not see the power of the Mighty One to redeem: because he always knew this, that He could redeem. Rather, he was cast down from the fact that he saw no one able to

exhibit a just amends for the offense. And therefore, coming in those dispositions which made for the amends of the offense, He elevated hope more than if He had come in fortitude.

§ 11. To the next objection it must be said that Isaiah seeks an arm strong through justice, and not through power, as has been said: because power alone could not liberate with a congruous liberation, as Anselm says.

Articulus 2 — Whether the Soul of Christ Was Passible

Was the soul of Christ passible?

§ 14. Secondly, it is asked: Did He take on defects according to the soul?

§ 1. And concerning this, three things are asked, namely: whether the soul is passible? And if it is passible, whether it is passible according to its entirety, or was so in Christ? And if the whole is passible, whether the bitterness of great pain and the experience of great joy could exist simultaneously in some one part of it?

§ 2. To the FIRST we proceed thus: 1. There is no pain except from a contrary agent directed toward the dissolution of a continuum or a composite; Christ's soul had nothing contrary to it: therefore, it suffered nothing in such a way that it would feel pain. The first premise is established by the words of Augustine, who says that the evil of punishment exists only because it is contrary to a good nature.[221] The second premise is evident from the fact that nothing bodily has contrariety to the soul.

§ 3. 2. Further, nothing acts upon a thing unless it is stronger than it, as Augustine says.[222] But no bodily thing was stronger than the soul of Christ: therefore, it did not act upon it to induce pain.

§ 4. 3. Further, Aristotle in book XVI of On Animals: If it does not touch, it does not act; and if it does not act, no alteration follows.[223] But nothing bodily touched the soul of Christ. Therefore, nothing acted upon it: therefore, the alteration of pain did not follow. The first premise is written by the Philosopher. The second is proven by the fact that those things touch, as the Philosopher says, which have their extremities together;[224] therefore, since the soul of Christ does not have an extremity, and even if it did have an extremity, it would not have it together with the acting agent—the nail or the scourge or anything striking it to cause pain: therefore, it seems that the soul of Christ could suffer nothing.

§ 5. 4. To the same point, an objection is raised more theologically: Dionysius says in his epistle to John the Apostle: "And as for you, I am not so insane as to think that you suffer anything; nay rather, I believe you feel the passions of the body only in this respect, that you may merely judge them."[225] From this it is gathered that the Saints do not feel passions except according to judgment, and not according to pain: therefore, much less did Christ, in whom there was greater holiness: therefore, He did not feel pain.

§ 6. 5. Further, Moses was on the mountain with the Lord for forty days and forty nights, and he did not feel the pain of hunger on account of the presence of the Angel in the person of

God: therefore, much more so Christ, who was united to God and continuously enjoyed the Deity itself.

§ 7. 6. Further, the holy martyrs continuously wore out their torturers, counting their torments as nothing because of the sweetness of charity: therefore, much less so Christ.

§ 8. 7. Further, we see that a soul most forcefully occupied with the act of one power is abstracted from the attention of another, as the Philosopher says in the book On Sleep and Waking.[226] Therefore, since Christ was continuously joined to heavenly things even by fruitive enjoyment, it seems that His soul was abstracted from the body, and thus He did not feel the passions of the body, even if passion were to rush upon the body.

§ 9. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Damascene says that when the body suffered, the soul suffered along with it;[227] therefore, the soul was passible, because to suffer along with [compati] is to suffer for another and with another; but if the soul suffered along with [the body], it suffered itself.

§ 10. 2. Further, pain is nothing but the sense of punishment; but sense belongs only to the soul, as is held in the Text [of the Sentences];[228] therefore, the soul suffered: therefore, the soul was passible.

§ 11. 3. Further, Lamentations 1:12: O all you who pass by the way, attend, and see if there be any sorrow like my sorrow! Therefore, the soul was passible.

§ 12. If it is said that the soul of Christ suffered pain by a miracle: Against this miracle we see in all men that blows and wounds cause pain; therefore, since this is present in all, it seems that it is natural for the soul to suffer along with the body, and we have this expressly in the Text. Therefore, since Christ assumed all defects, it seems also that He assumed in His soul the natural compassion and pain of the body.

§ 13. Solution: It must be said that the soul of Christ and every soul in the state of this mortality, as long as it is conjoined to the body, is passible by suffering along with the body and by suffering from the body. For (as the Philosopher says) there are certain movements coming from the body into the soul itself, and certain ones conversely coming from the soul into the body. Now, they come from the body into the soul, as in sensing and in sleep: in sensing, indeed, namely by receiving sensible species in the bodily organs, according to which the proper sense, the common sense, the phantasy, and the other apprehensive powers are said to be passive, according as to suffer [pati] is derived from the Greek pathein, which sounds like 'to receive'. And in sleep, because sleep is the binding of the senses from a cooled evaporation in the area of the brain, and descending to weigh down the organs of the senses. But other movements are from the soul into the body, such as progression, and works of art which are produced by the practical intellect: but in this manner, the passibility of the soul is not in question here.

§ 14. By another rationale, the soul is again passible according to how Damascene defines passion, which is a movement of the soul through the suspicion of good or evil. For from this

221. Philippians 2:11.

suspicion arises a passion inflicted upon the sensitive part of the soul, which is called sorrow or delight: for from the apprehension of a fitting good arises delight, and from the apprehension of an unfitting evil arises sorrow: and in this way again, passion is not in question here.

§ 15. In a third way, passion is called the sense of pain resulting from something dissolving the continuous body conjoined to the soul, whether that dissolution is from an intemperance of humors, as in fevers, or through a violent agent, as in blows and wounds, and the like: and in this way passion is in question here; and thus we say that the soul of Christ suffered along with the body.

§ 16. To the first objection raised to the contrary, it must be said that it is true that the soul in itself and according to its own nature has no contrary, neither in itself nor in its composing parts; but nevertheless, the thing conjoined to it has a contrary, namely, the body; and because it naturally desires the preservation of the conjunct—just as the Lord says to Peter, John 21:18: When you are old, you will stretch out your hands, and another will gird you, and lead you where you do not wish to go—for this reason, I say, because it desires the preservation of the conjunct, it feels pain and suffers along with things dissolving it; and this passion is from what is contrary to it, or contrary to that which is conjoined to it: for in this way, what is contrary to the conjunct is contrary to itself in this state, although not absolutely.

§ 17. To the next, it must be said according to Augustine that the nail or sword were not stronger than the soul of Christ, nor are they even stronger than the soul of another; but when a passion is produced in the body, such as a wounding, a bruise, or something of this sort, the soul punishes itself. And this is understood thus: because the soul apprehends the species of the passions produced in the body by abstracting them from the organ of touch, and apprehends them as contrary to its conjunct, and from that apprehension pain is caused as from the immediate cause of the sense of pain. Hence, although the sword does not cut it, nevertheless it feels pain by the pain caused from such apprehended species, and the immediate afflicting thing is such an apprehended species. And this solution saves the statement of Augustine. But we can solve it more easily by saying that the stronger does not act per se except upon the less strong; but per accidens it can act upon something stronger than itself: just as if it acts upon something weaker than itself which is conjoined to something stronger, from whose compassion the stronger suffers.

§ 18. To the next, it must be said that the statement of the Philosopher is true; but here there is a certain touch, for although the sword does not touch the soul immediately, it nevertheless touches it through the conjunct, so that touch is spoken of insofar as it touches the apprehended species of the dissolving agent: and thus the alteration of pain itself follows.

§ 19. To the next, it must be said that Dionysius is speaking to commend the virtue and perseverance of John in that he did not regard passions for the sake of Christ; and therefore he means to say that the passions of persecutions and exile did not affect him so as to turn him away from the rectitude of life and faith. But he does not mean that he did not feel the tribulations, which he implies by his very manner of speaking when he says: Nay rather, I be-

222. Aristotle, Physics, Book III.

lieve you feel the passions of the body only in this respect, that you may merely judge them. For if he had judgment and sense, then pain necessarily followed.

§ 20. To the next, it must be said that Moses had this by the grace of the fact that his body remained unchanged, and not by nature, since the turning away of the soul through the act of contemplation availed for this: because even this conversion to higher things draws after it the bodily spirits and lower powers, so that they operate less and direct less of the natural spirits to the natural works which are digesting, nourishing, and the like. But that he had this entirely by nature seems to me impossible: because although it is true that certain animals rest for a time, namely those of cold humors and thick skin, because they contract many superfluities at the time of nourishment, and therefore at the time when the cold begins, when the skin thickens and wrinkles more and the pores close, they do not receive food but rest: because otherwise, death would befall them due to the excessive viscosity of the humors; and so they rest then so that the heat may either consume or dissolve the contracted superfluities —nevertheless, this cannot be said of a human being: because he is not an animal of this sort, nor does this happen generally to every such creature, nor at a determinate time of every year. And therefore this miracle was greater in a man than in a woman, and greater in one moving from place to place than in one resting in one place.

§ 21. To the next, it must be said that the Martyrs suffered greatly in their passions; and if they sometimes said that the torments afforded them refreshment, as Vincent said to Domitian: "Now I am borne aloft, and I look down upon all your torments from a height above the world, O tyrant: rise up, then, and rage with all the spirit of your malice; you will see that I who am tortured can do more by the power of God than you can who torture," this must be referred to the fact that it is said as a cause, that is, that these torments are to me the cause of eternal refreshment, the hope of which already somewhat mitigates the torments, but does not remove them. And this is proven by this text in 2 Maccabees 6:30, where Eleazar says: O Lord, who have the holy knowledge, you know manifestly that although I could be delivered from death, I suffer grievous pains in body: but in soul am well content to suffer these things because I fear you.

§ 22. To the next, it must be said that a soul occupied with something can be abstracted from a light movement, but it is not withdrawn from a stronger one: for a stronger movement always draws the soul to itself. Hence, although the bond of charity binding to God through contemplation is stronger than the bond of the body, nevertheless the bond of the body in this state moves more, and is felt more; and therefore it rather draws the soul to itself than that the soul can be abstracted from it. However, I do not say this of Christ: because Christ was a wayfarer and a comprehensor; and therefore both could be in Him in actuality without one being withdrawn by the other.

Articulus 3 — Whether the Soul of Christ Was Passible According to Itself as a Whole

Whether the soul of Christ was passible according to its entirety?

223. Augustine, City of God, Book XII, ch. 18.

§ 24. Secondly, it is asked concerning this: Whether the soul was passible according to its entirety in Christ, or even in others, because for the most part it is the same question?

§ 25. For it seems that it was not: because 1. The Philosopher says that the intellect is the act of no body, that is, of no part of the body; since therefore it has no contrary in itself, nor is it conjoined to a contrary, it seems therefore that it neither suffers nor suffers along with the body.

§ 26. 2. Further, if the soul suffered according to its entirety, then it would be necessary that according to its entirety it would be occupied with the passion; therefore it would be withdrawn from all other things, and this would be a very imperfect thing to believe even of the Saints, much less of Christ; therefore it seems that the rational soul does not suffer according to its entirety.

§ 27. 3. Further, as the Philosopher maintains, it belongs to the wise man to suffer, but not to be drawn down; but he is drawn down if the passion reaches his reason: therefore it seems that it is contrary to reason to suffer according to reason: therefore He did not suffer according to reason.

§ 28. 4. Further, it was already held above that since the soul has no contrary in itself, it does not suffer per se, but suffers along with the suffering body; therefore it suffers according to that part by which it is conjoined to the body: but according to the higher powers it is not conjoined to the body: therefore according to the higher powers it does not suffer.

§ 29. 5. Further, Augustine in the book City of God says that the Philosophers found four natural passions: fear, hope, joy, and perturbation. Since therefore perturbation is the same as sorrow, and sorrow arises only from pain, in the wise man according to that part by which he is wise—that is, according to the higher part—there is neither passion nor compassion.

§ 30. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. As the body is in the composition of its members, so the soul is in the composition of its powers; but when one member suffers, as the Apostle says, all the members suffer: therefore, when one power of the soul suffers, all the others suffer with it: therefore the whole soul suffers in the passion of sense.

§ 31. 2. Further, the conjunction of the powers of the soul within the substance of the soul is greater than that of the soul and the body. If therefore from the disposition of conjunction the soul suffers along with the body, much more from the disposition of the powers among themselves does one power suffer with another; and thus when a passion takes place in one part of the soul, there will be passion in the whole soul.

§ 32. 3. Further, if the soul suffers on account of a natural passion by being thus conjoined, the whole soul will suffer. The first premise is evident from the foregoing. The second is proven by the fact that the nature which is the form of a human is different from that of a brute. Since therefore the body of a brute is perfected by the act of a sensitive soul, necessarily the body of a human will be perfected by the perfection of the rational soul: therefore the rational [soul] is conjoined to the body.

224. Isidore of Seville, Sententiae, Book I, ch. 2.

§ 33. Solution: I say that the soul according to its entirety is passible in the body. For it was once preached by a certain abbot that Christ's soul had not suffered according to the higher part, but at Paris this was condemned as heresy by the university of Masters. But it must be understood that in the soul there are two things to consider, namely, that it is the nature of a human being, and that it is the principle of human operations. As to the first, it is considered in three ways: for it has certain things insofar as it is a substantial form, and certain things insofar as it is a soul, and certain things insofar as it is the nature of a human being as human. For insofar as it is a substantial form, it is the very perfection of the human body, according as it arrives by temperament at a balance agreeing somewhat with heaven, and distant from the distemperament of the elements; and since this balance is highest in a human being, as Avicenna says, the most noble form is given to him by the Giver of Forms: and therefore the ratio of form and act in the soul is most noble. But insofar as the soul is the act of a body not only complexioned in such temperance, but also having life, and whatever is organic is of this sort, and thus the soul is able to flow forth from itself diverse powers into diverse parts of the body; this, again, the rational soul has most nobly: which is proven by the form and figure of the body and the figure of the members, which exceed every other animate body in comeliness and beauty. Third, insofar as it is the nature of a human being as human—a nature, I say, giving the human being the essence of a human being and reason, according to what the Philosopher says in II De Anima, that the soul is substance according to reason: because it gives essence and reason to the animate body: and thus the rational soul, considered as a nature, must necessarily have something more than form, and more than soul: and this is what a certain Philosopher says, that it has the property of flowing forth certain powers which are affixed to organs by the fact that it is a form giving being as a nature; and certain powers which are not affixed, having an order to those affixed by the fact that they receive species from them, and having an order to separate substances by the fact that they participate in their light; and this is what the Philosopher says, that the noble soul has three operations, namely, divine, animal, and intellectual. In this consideration, therefore, the whole conjoined soul suffers together. But there is another consideration of the soul insofar as it is the principle of human operations, and in this way it is not necessary that the whole suffers together: because a certain power of it can be about the contemplation of eternal things, and a certain one affected by the passions of bodies.

§ 34. Having established this, it is easy to reply to the objections.

§ 35. For to the first it must be said that although the intellect as intellect is the act of no body to which it is mixed as an organ, nevertheless intellectually the whole soul is the act of the body and a nature: and therefore the intellect as a nature of this [body] suffers and suffers along with it, although it is not necessary that it suffer as it is the principle of the work which is contemplation. But some say otherwise, that it receives from the body the order of a preceding power, and therefore according to that order they call it passible; but this solution, whether true or not, does little or nothing for the solution of the question.

§ 36. To the next it must be said that this is not necessary: because although the whole suffers as it is the nature of man, nevertheless not all the powers suffer in such a way that they are carried to the consideration of the passion so as to be occupied and detained concerning it: because by this consideration the powers are divided, and some are carried to higher things, but some to lower things.

§ 37. To the next it must be said that it is not drawn down: because drawing down is such that the higher powers are averted from the rectitude they have, according to which they are superior and ruling over those which are inferior; and this happens to them not as they are the nature of man, but rather as they are divided against the inferior ones.

§ 38. To the next the solution is already clear: because the whole soul is conjoined as a nature giving essence and reason to the body of man, as he is man.

§ 39. To the next it must be said that sorrow and perturbation do not fall into the wise man according to an effect that turns him away from the rectitude of governance, but they fall into him according to the experience of passion.

Articulus 4 — Whether, According to Some One Part, at the Same Time the Bitterness of Great Pain and the Experience of Great Delight Can Be Present

Whether extreme pain and the experience of great joy could simultaneously be present in some one part?

§ 41. Thirdly it is asked, whether the bitterness of great pain and the experience of great joy could simultaneously be present in some one part?

§ 42. 1. It seems that it could not: because 1. Contraries cannot simultaneously be in the same thing in the same respect: but maximum pain and maximum delight are contraries: therefore they cannot simultaneously be present.

§ 43. If perhaps you say that it was different in Christ than in other men, because Christ was united to the Deity, and therefore according to reason there could be in Him the maximum delight of fruition, and according to union with the body the maximum sense of pain in the same part of the soul. On the contrary: Whatever informs an indivisible thing informs it entirely; just as if it were possible for whiteness to be in a point, we could not say that it could be white according to its being the beginning, and black according to its being the end: because since whiteness is a being according to nature, it seeks a subject according to nature and not according to reason. But beginning and end do not diversify a point, except according to reason. Therefore similarly, since the soul is not divided such that one part is conjoined and another part is not conjoined, by the consideration of conjunction to this and to that it is not diversified except according to reason; but pain and delight are passions according to reality: therefore to whatever power of the soul it is present, it will inform it entirely: therefore the other will have no place unless it is posited that that power substantially has diverse parts,

226. Aristotle, De sensu et sensato, ch. 7.

which would be absurd: therefore it seems that supreme pain along with supreme delight could not be present in the same power.

§ 44. 2. Further, the same act cannot be understood to terminate at two things as bounds, neither in the acts of the soul nor in the acts of the body: because then one would be made two: just as one line cannot terminate at two points in one direction unless two lines were made. But if the sorrow of pain and the joy of gladness were present simultaneously, they would be present as objects about which its act would be concerned: therefore the same act would terminate at two things as bounds, which also cannot be understood: therefore they are not present simultaneously according to the same part of the soul.

§ 45. ON THE CONTRARY: Either the reason of Christ apprehended the pain of the passion or not. If it did not apprehend it: then it did not ordain it: therefore it was not meritorious, which is heretical to say. If it did apprehend it: but it is established that it also apprehended the Deity conjoined to it, because it was never withdrawn from the apprehension of it: therefore in the same power there was an apprehension of two things, one as supremely contrary, the other as supremely agreeable. Now it is established that the experience of pain follows from the apprehension of death, and supreme joy from the apprehension of the Deity: and simultaneously, as it seems, because the apprehensions were simultaneous.

§ 46. Solution: Without prejudice it can be said that it happens that contraries are present simultaneously in two ways, namely, that both are present as form and act, and that one is ordered to the other as matter, and this happens especially in the powers of the soul. That contraries cannot be present in the first way, the previously held arguments seem to prove sufficiently. But in the second way contraries can be present, and the affection can follow: for example, in every penitent there is sorrow in the reason, because otherwise it would not be praiseworthy; and yet Augustine says: Let him always grieve, and rejoice in his grief: therefore joy can be about sorrow, such that sorrow is the matter of joy, and thus both can be present. Thus I say in Christ, that death was apprehended in reason as it was the work of redemption, and thus death was apprehended as the matter of joy: and thus both could be present, and the Psalm 18:6 seems to speak thus: He hath rejoiced as a giant to run the way. And in this way there could simultaneously be present the affection of pain in the judgment of death, and joy from the end of death.

§ 47. And by this the solution to the whole is clear. Or, we could say that pain concerning the death of the flesh is not contrary to the joy of eternal fruition or human redemption: because they are not about the same thing, and thus they can be present simultaneously. But this solution is not as valid as the first one: because although they are not strictly contraries, nevertheless by their effect they draw toward contraries, such as being occupied with lower or higher things: and therefore the prior solution is better in my judgment, and the objection made to the contrary proceeds in this sense.

227. Anselm of Canterbury, Cur Deus Homo, Book I, ch. 12.

Articulus 5 — Whether Christ Received All Defects, or Some and Not Others

Whether Christ took on all defects, or some, and some not?

Whether Christ took on all defects, or some, and some not?

§ 49. Next it is asked, whether He took on all or some?

§ 50. It seems that He took on all: because 1. He came to cure all: therefore He assumed all.

§ 51. 2. Further, Damascene: The whole [Word] assumed the whole me, that He might bestow salvation upon the whole me: therefore it seems that He assumed all.

§ 52. 3. Further, Damascene: What is unassumable is incurable: therefore if He did not assume some defect, that defect was not curable, as it seems: therefore He assumed all.

§ 53. 4. Further, if from those things which He suffered, He learned obedience and mercy: then He ought to have suffered especially in all our defects: because if He had not suffered in some, according to that He would not have learned to help those who suffer.

§ 54. Moreover, what would be the reason that He should assume some, and leave some aside, since none of them is a sin? Therefore it seems that He assumed all, or none: but He did not assume none: therefore He assumed all.

§ 55. ON THE CONTRARY: He was not leprous, nor hunchbacked, nor lame: therefore He did not assume all bodily defects.

§ 56. Similarly, He was not ignorant, nor impotent to act well: therefore neither did He assume all defects of the soul.

§ 57. Solution: Here it must be considered through the rule of Damascene given above, that He assumed all the defects which He planted in our nature. Therefore it must be considered that our nature was planted in two ways, namely in natural principles, and in the grace of innocence, and God made both plantings: but God did not make the loss of grace, but the fault of man did: and therefore those things which followed fault outside of nature He did not assume, because He did not plant them, such as ignorance, and infirmity for acting well in the soul, and the tinder of lust in the body, and the fighting of the flesh against the spirit: and therefore He did not assume those. But in the natural planting, God planted our bodies by converting elements into humors, and humors into similar and dissimilar members: and from the planting of those there are some on the part of the body, and some on the part of the soul: on the part of the body, like mortality; on the part of dissolution, like hunger from primary qualities acting on substance: and therefore He assumed those. In the soul, moreover, pain and the sorrow of separation and death follow upon conjoined natural affections, and He assumed those: and these are natural defects of every human being. But leprosy, and a hunchback, etc., are personal defects of this or that individual, and therefore they do not belong per se to the nature: and since He came to repair the entire nature, therefore He ought not to have assumed those. The same judgment applies to fever, epilepsy, and the like.

§ 58. The Master gives another rule for considering between the defects assumed and not assumed in the Text, namely that He took those which it was not unbecoming for Him to take, and which were expedient for us: and this is the same: because those which He planted in the beginning of nature, it was not unbecoming for Him to take, but not the personal ones and those consequent upon fault: and these were expedient for us, because these are for the cure of the nature, and not of one man.

§ 59. Moreover, if He had assumed personal defects, such as leprosy or a hunchback, He would have been hindered from preaching the word: because He would not have been heard on account of the despicability of His person.

Articulus 6 — Whether The Three Causes Touched By The Master, Why Christ Assumed Our Defects, Are Good

Whether the three causes mentioned by the Master, why Christ assumed our defects, are good?

§ 61. Next it is asked concerning what he says in the Text in the third part of this first part, near the end, there: For the defects which He had, whether for the showing of true humanity, etc.

§ 62. For here he determines a threefold end for the assumption of defects, namely the showing of true humanity in Him, the congruity for the work of redemption, and for raising up our hope from the despair of immortality.

§ 63. But it seems that none of these causes was fitting.

§ 64. And first it is objected concerning the first thus: 1. Whatever is true in one way in the state of corruption and incorruption, passibility of corruption does not belong to the truth of it: human nature is true in one way in the state of corruption and incorruption: therefore passibility does not belong to its truth. The first premise is self-evident. The second is proven by the fact that human nature will be that which will appear in man at the time of the resurrection: because nothing corruptible will be in him.

§ 65. Moreover, the same is also written by Anselm.[229]

§ 66. Further, whatever is not from the origin of any nature, this does not belong to its truth: therefore a true human being is not shown by that.

§ 67. Further, after the resurrection He showed true humanity: and yet He did not show it as corruptible, since He entered when the doors were closed, and before the disciples He was sometimes visible, sometimes invisible: therefore if He then exhibited the truth of human nature, then penalties cannot belong to the truth of human nature: therefore He could not show Himself to be a true human being through such things.

§ 68. 2. Similarly it is objected concerning the second cause: because the work of redemption was not just any death, but of violent killing: therefore it would have sufficed to assume

225. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, Book IV, ch. 22-24.

flesh divisible by swords, and it was not necessary to assume the defect of thirst, and weariness, and the like.

§ 69. 3. Similarly it is objected concerning the third: because it seems that it depressed hope rather than raised it: since an infirm man is not consoled by an infirm helper, but is cast down into despair.

§ 70. Solution: It must be said that these causes which the Master determines here are good: and their rationale and sufficiency is taken thus: For the Redeemer assumed that which is a disposition to redemption, and that which is of avail for the work. And in the first way is the first cause: because He exhibited the truth of one owing satisfaction by taking on defects. But if it is as regards the work, it is either as regards the work itself in itself, or as regards the end of the work. If as regards the work itself, thus the second is taken. If as regards the end of the work, thus the third is taken: because this was the end of redemption, that man by the hope of the grace of reconciliation might be raised to the hope of immortality.

§ 71. To the first, therefore, it must be said that He did not intend to show the nature of man in general, because this would not have availed us, but the nature of man in the state of redemption as one owing and able to satisfy: and since this congruously could not be except through passibility, passibility belongs to the state of the truth of the nature in the one redeeming the nature, although it does not belong to the state of the nature in itself: and by this the solution to the following two is clear.

§ 72. To that which is objected against the second cause, it must be said that violent killing can inflict no injury.

with the natural defects having been assumed: because, as to the disposition of matter, the defect leading to natural and violent death is the same, although there is a difference in the efficient cause.

To the other, it must be said that from that infirmity hope is raised up: because hope is supported by the strength of merit and justice, and not by the strength of forces: and those defects accumulate for us the merit and justice of reconciliation.

Articulus 7 — Whether Christ Contracted These Defects, or Voluntarily Assumed Them

Whether Christ contracted these defects, or voluntarily undertook them?

Next, it is asked concerning what he says subsequently in chapter C of that part, there, C, § 2: But these defects not by the necessity of his condition, etc.

For it seems that Christ contracted these defects, because:

§ 1. "Contracted" is said of what is drawn simultaneously with nature: but he himself simultaneously drew both into himself from his mother's body. Therefore, it seems he contracted them.

§ 2. Also, the Holy Spirit, coming into the Blessed Virgin and cleansing her, did not cleanse that which was not unclean: but defects of this kind were not unclean. Therefore, Christ drew

both, namely the defects and the matter of the body, from his mother: therefore he contracted them.

§ 3. Furthermore, if it is said that to "contract" is to draw from lust—the lust, I mean, in which our nature is sown—what is the reason that it should be called contracted? For this does not seem to contain the meaning of the word.

Solution: It must be said that Christ does not have contracted defects, but assumed ones. For assumption is in the will of the one assuming, and thus it was in the power of Christ, before he was a man, whether he would assume the nature of a human body without defects or with them: and for this reason they were assumed. But it is not so in us: because we did not exist before we possessed these defects as a habit, and for this reason we contracted them: and I fully concede that what is contracted is drawn from nature and along with the lust that is present in the sexual union of generation.

And through this, the solution to the first two points is evident.

To that which is further asked concerning the reason for the word, it must be said that its reason is taken from a threefold inseparable simultaneity in corrupt nature: one of which is in those generating, another is in the act of generation, and the third is in the matter of generation. Now, in those generating, although the person is cleansed from original sin through baptism, nevertheless in the act of generation the person is conjoined to Adam: because every pure man (as Anselm says) is Adam in nature, whoever he might himself be in person. And this is taken from the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 15:47: The first man was from the earth, earthly: the second man from heaven, heavenly. Such as is the earthly, such also are the earthly. And below, v. 49: Therefore, as we have borne the image of the earthly, etc. For if the person were generating as a person, then the begotten would be born according to the merit or demerit of the person: and this is not true. Therefore, the person generates as Adam in nature. And thus (according to Augustine), just as a circumcised man begets an uncircumcised son, passing into him that which he himself already lacks, so the baptized man generates a son of wrath, passing into him that which he himself already lacks. And in this simultaneity of the generating person and Adam, it is called "contracted," as if drawn from both [con-tractum], namely through the one and from the other: for through the person we draw from Adam.

Moreover, the simultaneity of the act is the conjunction of a twofold law, namely of the fusion of corpulent substance, and of the law of concupiscence in vehement and suffocating lust: for although it does not suffocate some as to the habit of virtue, it nevertheless suffocates all as to the act of reason. Whence Gregory also says that in such a work the Holy Spirit did not touch the hearts of the Prophets, because of the excessive descent of reason beneath the flesh. And with respect to the conjunction of these two things, again it is called contracted, as if drawn simultaneously from both in the act of generation.

The third conjunction is in the seed, which is the matter wherein lies the corruption of vice according to its cause, and the corruption of passibility. I say the corruption of vice which is a vice, either immediately from a vice, or tending toward a vice of itself. A vice, just as original

229. Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, II, ch. 11.

sin in the soul. Immediately from a vice: because the law of the flesh sprinkled in the members is a figure of sin, as Augustine says in the book De Nuptiis et concupiscentia. For we do not have it from the things that constitute us materially, namely from the hot, the cold, the moist, and the dry: rather it is the immediate sequel to sin. And toward a vice of itself: because it is prone to sin. And I say that this corruption of vice is in the seed according to its cause, not according to its essence, because such an innate seed will cause it partly with respect to the body, partly with respect to the soul, and partly with respect to both. For as to habit, the law of the members will be sprinkled in the members of the body; as to original sin, it will be in the soul; and as to the fight of the flesh against the spirit (and conversely), it will be in both. And therefore I say that it is not in the seed according to its essence: because, as Anselm says, original sin is no more something by essence in the seed than it is in spittle. However, this has to be determined in the commentary on the second book of the Sentences.

Therefore, on account of this threefold conjunction, this passibility is said to be contracted in us. But in Christ it was present in none of these ways. For Adam was expelled in the nature of the mother; in the conception of the Son only the Holy Spirit acted, not a man; and in the assumed matter there was no corruption of vice. Therefore, he assumed these defects and did not contract them.

Articulus 8 — Whether Christ Assumed Fear and Sadness

Whether Christ assumed fear and sorrow?

Next, it is asked concerning what he says in that chapter D: But because some out of their own sense, etc.

For it seems that Christ did not assume sorrow and fear, which can be proved by a manifold reasoning. First, because such things could not fall upon him:

§ 1. For Seneca proves that they cannot fall upon the wise in this way: The wise man is not saddened by things that can be inflicted well; but bodily punishments can be inflicted well, as if they are inflicted innocently; therefore the wise man is not saddened by them.

§ 2. Also, the wise man is not saddened by things in which the act of virtue is chiefly at its peak; but in the endurance of inflicted punishments, and the peril of death, and death itself, is the act of virtue at its peak, because it is an act of fortitude: therefore he is not saddened by them: therefore neither was Christ, since he was supremely wise.

§ 3. Also, the wise man is not saddened by the assault of fortune, whether it assaults through prosperity or adversity: because fortune does not consist of praiseworthy goods, nor can it take away or give human good (and I call "human good" that for which man exists): therefore, since Christ was no less wise than the Philosophers, he was not saddened by inflicted passions. Therefore it is false that Christ had sorrow, as it seems.

§ 4. Furthermore, the authorities introduced in the following chapter E seem to support this.

228. Anselm of Canterbury, Cur Deus Homo, Book I.

Furthermore, it seems it can be shown that he did not have fear.

§ 1. For timidity is a vice opposite to fortitude; but Christ had no vice: therefore, no fear.

§ 2. Also, fear is not of that which can be taken away when someone wills it: but Christ could have transferred death from himself when he willed, because he himself said, John 10:17–18: Therefore the Father loves me, because I lay down my life, that I may take it again. No one takes it from me: but I lay it down of myself, and I have the power to lay it down, etc. Therefore it seems that he did not fear.

§ 3. Also, if man had not sinned, he would not have feared. Therefore it seems that fear followed upon sin. Therefore Christ ought not to have had it.

§ 4. Also, it was held above in the Text that if a man in the beginning of his birth or nature had ignorance or difficulty doing good, it would not be a defect in him: because there is no defect and punishment prior to sin. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, if a man by nature is saddened in dangers and fears, it is not a defect. But Christ feared, as you say. Therefore not through a defect, but through nature. And thus it did not avail us, because that which he did not freely assume did not grace us with salvation.

§ 5. Also, by the same reasoning that he did not assume ignorance and difficulty doing good (because they followed upon sin), it seems that he ought to have assumed no defect; for Augustine says in a previous chapter that that in which nature is instituted is not a defect or penalty, but rather that which follows upon sin. But all these things followed from sin. Therefore he ought to have received none of them: therefore neither sorrow, nor fear, nor hunger, nor thirst, nor any other.

Solution: It must be said that Christ had true natural sorrow, and true fear, just as the Master says in the Text.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that it is one thing for sorrow to be in a wise man, and another for perturbation to fall upon him: for although in a wise man sorrow is a trouble [turbatio], nevertheless it is not a perturbation [perturbatio]. For Christ is no less wise than the Philosophers; yet he says: I was troubled, and did not speak . Nor does Seneca intend that a troubling sorrow is not in them, but that there is not a perturbing sorrow in them: because perturbation denotes a deflection of reason away from equity. For it is one thing for reason to be touched by trouble, and not be deflected; and another to be touched and be deflected from the equality of governance by which it rules in the kingdom of the soul; and another to be touched and be deflected from the equality of virtue. For the wise man is touched and suffers by reason of the passion, but he is not led downwards, deflected from equality and equity. But the imperfect wise man suffers, and is touched, and is led downwards from equality indeed, but does not recede from equity. But the foolish man suffers, and is led downwards from both equality and equity. Therefore, although bodily punishments can be well received for the exercise of virtue, nevertheless because they act against a good nature, they induce in the wise man such a sorrow as we have stated.

To the next, it must be said that the wise man is not saddened by them insofar as the highest virtue is in them; but according to another mode he can be saddened. Whence Aristotle says in Book III of the Ethics that it suffices for the brave man not to be saddened, that is, not to be perturbedly saddened, although in other virtues this does not suffice: because in other virtues one must acquire a habit causing delight in the work, as he himself says: but the brave man cannot delight in the work of endurance, rather it suffices if he rejoices in the end, and is not perturbed in the work, even if he is saddened on account of the excessive bitterness of the passion.

To the next, it must be said that a passion, insofar as it is inflicted by fortune, is not the matter of virtue, except insofar as it is accepted by the brave and wise man: because the Philosopher says that the brave man also uses misfortunes well, and even natural dangers, such as natural death.

To the next, it must be said that those authorities do not intend to remove the passion of sorrow from Christ entirely, but they intend to posit the passion and remove the perturbing passion, just as the Master expounds those authorities below in the text.

To that which is further asked concerning fear, it must be said that timidity is not the same as fear: because timidity sounds like pusillanimity, which is a vice: but fear sounds like a certain passion which can be a virtue, a vice, and a condition of nature. A virtue, as we say that a brave man fears things that ought to be feared; a vice, as we say worldly or human fear; but a condition of nature, as we say there is a dread that falls upon a constant man. Hence fear does not always sound like a vice.

To the next, it must be said that in Christ one must consider the nature and the person: hence, although nothing was impossible for the person, nevertheless the nature in him was infirm, and its condition was the fear of the person in that nature. But that he said, No one takes it, etc., he says this of the power of the person according to the divine nature.

To the next, it must be said that sorrow and fear are planted in our nature, as we said above: because although the acts of fearing and sorrowing followed upon sin, nevertheless the potency of fearing, and the order to fear, comes from the mode constituting the nature of the body out of contraries. And this is not so for certain other defects, as will immediately be evident.

To the next, it must be said that "defect" is not properly said of that which is absent from one's natural endowments. For Diogenes is not called defective because he lacks horns; and man is not called defective because he lacks the power of flying. And for this reason these passibilities of men are called defects: because his nature is rational, and was instituted in opposite habits; but if it were not constituted with his nature, it would not be a defect, as Augustine says: just as it is not a defect in a goat that it does not reason.

To the next, it must be said that it is not similar for all defects whatsoever: because some follow nature according to the principles constituting it, and some follow fault, and some follow the person, as we said above. But Christ ought not to assume any except those which follow—

F. Determination of the authorities.

But lest there be thought to be any adverse diversity in the sacred letters, we say that the words of these authorities are to be taken in this way: that they are understood to have removed from Christ not the truth of fear and sorrow or propassion, but the necessity of fear and sorrow, and passion. For Christ had true fear and sorrow in the nature of man: but not as we do, who are his members. For we, on account of our sin, are necessarily subject to these defects, and in us these defects are according to propassion and passion: but in Christ they were only according to propassion. For just as in sins certain degrees are noted as propassion and passion, so also in these penal affects. For sometimes one is affected by fear or sorrow, in such a way that the intellect of the mind is not thereby moved from rectitude or the contemplation of God: and then it is a propassion. But sometimes it is moved and perturbed: and then it is a passion. But Christ was not so perturbed in soul by fear or sorrow, that he declined in any way from rectitude or the contemplation of God: according to which mode it is understood when he is said to have feared or been sad. Hence Jerome on Matthew, where it is read, "He began to be sorrowful and sad": "To prove the truth of the assumed man," he says, "he was truly saddened: but the passion does not dominate his soul; rather it is a propassion." Hence he says, "He began to be saddened." For it is one thing to be saddened, another to begin to be saddened: which means, one is saddened in one way by propassion, in another by passion. And therefore, according to this distinction, sometimes Christ is said not to have truly feared, sometimes to have truly feared: because he had true fear and sorrow, but not according to passion, nor from the necessity of condition. Whence Augustine, wishing an understanding of these sayings to be taken from these causes, says Christ did not truly fear or sorrow, and immediately says he had true sorrow: "Prefiguring the infirm in himself, the Lord says with these words: My Father, if it is possible, let this chalice pass from me. For the Lord did not truly fear to suffer, being about to rise on the third day, when Paul burned to be dissolved and be with Christ." That one rejoices, about to be crowned, and is the Lord sad, who is about to crown? Behold, here he seems to remove sorrow and fear from Christ. But he continuously added: "But he assumed sorrow just as he assumed flesh. For he was sad, as the Gospel says." For if he was not sad, when the Evangelist says, "My soul is sorrowful," etc., therefore also when he says, "Jesus slept," he did not sleep: or when he says he ate, he did not eat: and thus nothing sound remains, so that it might even be said that his body was not true. Whatever therefore is written of him is true, and was done. Therefore he was also sad: but by his will he undertook true sorrow, just as by his will he undertook true flesh. You clearly recognize that he contradicts himself in these words, unless he discerned the various causes of the sayings, from which the understanding of the words must be assumed. For if the cause for the understanding of the aforesaid words is discerned, no contradiction occurs.

Articulus 9 — Whether in Christ There Was Prepassion or Passion

Whether in Christ there was propassion, or passion?

Next, it is asked concerning what the Master says, solving objections against himself, there, F, near the beginning: In us these defects are according to propassion and passion.

§ 1. For those two species are posited in sins. But in Christ there was no sin: therefore neither of these degrees was in Christ.

§ 2. Also, he speaks in the Text of passion. Furthermore, the Gloss on Matthew 5:28 says that propassion is a sudden movement to which reason does not consent. But Dionysius in his third epistle to Gaius the monk says: The sudden is that which is contrary to hope, and brought forth from the unapparent into the manifest. Therefore nothing in him was sudden contrary to hope: therefore neither was there a propassion, in whose definition "sudden" falls.

BUT AGAINST THIS is, § 1. What he says in the Text.

§ 2. Furthermore, hope is not taken for the virtue of hope (which will be proven below not to have been in Christ): but propassion is that which is one of the four natural passions, which was well in Christ, just like the other natural passions: and thus there is no contrary instance.

Solution: To this it must be said that those degrees are posited in anger, not insofar as it is a sin, but insofar as it is a passion: and therefore they can be transferred also to other passions which are not a sin, such as to sorrow, or natural fear.

To the next, it must be said that there is the "sudden" on the part of the thing, and on the part of him in whom it occurs. In Christ, however, nothing was sudden on the part of him in whom it was: but it was sudden on the part of the passion. Or it may be said that propassion is not taken here according to that definition, but according to its effect: because, namely, it does not deflect reason from equality or from the equity of its governance.

Articulus 10 — Whether the Body of the Lord Had a Nature for Suffering

Whether the Lord's body had a nature for suffering?

Whether the Lord's body had a nature for suffering?

Next, it is asked concerning the words of Hilary posited in the Text in the last part, there, G: Nevertheless they move more, etc.

Now, it seems that according to Hilary the Lord's body did not have a nature for suffering: which is contrary to all the other Saints, as it seems.

But nevertheless this seems to be proved thus: § 1. Whatever is always and inseparably conjoined to a stronger repeller of every contrary, than any contrary agent is, that thing does not suffer from any contrary: but Christ's body was always and inseparably conjoined to the divinity: therefore it could not suffer from any contrary. Proof of the first premise: Let us grant that the coldness of water is infinite, and its humidity is infinite, and the heat and dryness of fire are finite: it follows that the water, before it is altered by the fire, will consume the fire: therefore it will then act without alteration of itself by the contrary. But thus it seemed to be in Christ's body on account of the infinite power of the deity.

§ 2. Also, the grace of innocence, as Isidore says, so preserved Adam's body, that fire could not burn it, nor a sword cut it, nor a thorn prick it. Therefore, since grace was much greater in Christ through the union, it seems it ought much more to have defended Christ's body from every attack.

Solution: It must be said that some say Hilary retracted these words: and this is, in my judgment, a more fitting solution. But because we have not seen his book of retractions, it is therefore necessary to examine the force of his words in three places: first where he says, there, G, § 2: What infirmity, then, of such a body do you believe dominated, whose nature had such power? For from this it is gathered that he is speaking against heretics, who said Christ was only of an infirm nature, and could not of himself, from the power of the person, have repelled such infirmity.

Second, where he says, there, G, § 4: Not having a nature for grieving. He understands this of the nature vitiated by sin, which alone is ordained to grieving from debt: but Christ did not have it from the debt of offense, but from the will of the one assuming it.

Third, there, G, § 3, where he says at the end of his words: Although the form of our body was in the Lord, nevertheless the form of our infirmity was not in the body through vice, which the Virgin brought forth from the conception of the Holy Spirit. From this also it is gathered that he intends that he did not suffer by the necessity of the corruption of vice, concerning which it was previously spoken in the preceding question. And thus it is evident how the words of Hilary are easily verified.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that it is indeed true that Christ's body was always conjoined to the deity: but the deity exposed it to tribulation, because the deity acts through freedom of will, and not by necessity of nature: and therefore it is not similar to the infinite power of water in cold and moisture with respect to fire.

To the next, it must be said that the grace of innocence preserved nature before it was turned away: and then it did not hold itself toward suffering and dying except in the potency of free will: but after it possessed the necessity of dying and suffering, it did not belong to grace to retain it. And therefore, although the grace of Christ was greater, nevertheless because not suffering and also not dying additionally regards the state, therefore in the first state a lesser grace could do this, which a greater grace could not do in the second and third.

Articulus 11 — Whether This Is True Which Hilary Says: Christ Could Suffer, but Could Not Be Passible

Whether this is true which Hilary says: Christ could suffer, but could not be passible?

Whether this is true which Hilary says: Christ could suffer, but could not be passible?

Next, it is asked concerning Hilary's note affixed at the end, where he says that he could suffer, and could not be passible.

For this seems false: because whose the act is, his is the potency. If therefore he could (in act), he was passible according to act; and so what he says seems false.

Solution: Hilary still speaks according to the first mode: because "passible" denotes a potency which he himself received that is not founded in nature according to a composition from passible contraries, but from a nature corrupt by the corruption of vice. And this potency is not necessarily his, whose the act is: but whose the act is, his is the potency according to the

nature of that act, not according to the mode of the accidents disposing the potency: and this is what he intends.

DISTINCTIO XVI

Divisio Textus

Here arises a question taking its origin from the aforesaid, etc. Here begins that part in which he determines the question left over from what was said, namely whether Christ assumed the necessity of suffering and dying?

And it is divided into two parts: in the first of which he disputes and determines the question: and the determination begins, there, A, § 2: To which it can be said, etc. In the second, to confirm the solution, he shows how Christ assumed something from every state, there, B, And here it must be noted that Christ from every state, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether Christ Suffered by Necessity or by Will Alone

Whether Christ suffered by necessity or by will alone?

Now four things occur to be asked here for the sake of the first part, of which the first is: Whether Christ suffered by necessity or by will alone? Second, whether his passion was greater than all the passions of the Saints? Third, whether it was greater than the passion of Adam in the first state, if it were granted through an impossibility that he could suffer? Fourth, whether it was greater than the passion of a soul, if it were granted through an impossibility that any of its powers could be cut off from it?

To the first we proceed thus: § 1. Anselm in the book Cur Deus homo, speaks thus: The Father did not force him, unwilling, to death, nor permitted him to be killed: but he himself spontaneously sustained death, to save men. Therefore it seems that he died by will alone and not by necessity.

§ 2. Also, in the same place: He did not force Christ to die, in whom there was no sin: but he spontaneously sustained death, not through the obedience of deserting life, but through the obedience of preserving justice, in which he persevered so bravely that he thereby incurred death.

§ 3. Isaiah 53:7 seems to say this same thing: He was offered, because he himself willed it.

§ 4. Also, He himself in the Gospel, John 10:18: No one takes it, namely my life, from me: but I lay it down of myself, and I have the power to lay it down, and I have the power to take it again.

But against this is what we have in the Text, that § 1. By the same right and the same necessity he was offered, by which we die: but we die by the necessity of dying: therefore so did he.

§ 2. Also, Augustine says that if he had not been killed, he would have been dissolved by natural death, and it would have been the same work of redemption that he accomplished

through the cross. Therefore it seems that he died and suffered by the necessity of the condition of nature.

§ 3. Also, Anselm in the book Cur Deus homo: God did not will to save the world otherwise, unless a man were to do something so great as is the death of Christ, which availed just as much for the Son willing the salvation of men: because another was not able to do this: therefore it seems that it was necessary for Christ to die.

§ 4. Also, in the same place: Nothing is less to be tolerated in the order of things, than that a creature take away due honor from the Creator, and not pay what it owes: therefore nothing more unjust is tolerated. Therefore, since recompense could not be made except through Christ's death, it seems that it was necessary for Christ to suffer and die.

To this some say that necessity is fourfold according to the four kinds of causes. For they say that there is a compelling necessity or necessity of violence according to the efficient cause, according to which Damascene says that the involuntary by violence is that whose principle is in another, with the sufferer conferring no force: and by this necessity Christ did not assume the necessity of suffering. But there is another necessity according to the material cause: just as we say that a combustible must necessarily be burned, if it is conjoined to a burning thing: and the passible must suffer, if it is conjoined to its agent toward dissolution: and this again he did not assume. Third, there is said to be a necessity according to the formal cause: just as it is necessary for a man to be rational: and this again Christ did not assume. The fourth is necessity according to the final cause, as it is necessary for a man to breathe if he is to live: and it is necessary to use food if he is to be nourished: and it is necessary to go to the market if he is to receive money there. And by this last necessity they say Christ assumed our defects.

But that this solution is entirely absurd, and nothing to the point, is proved thus: We are not asking here why or by what necessity Christ assumed our defects, but what is the necessity of suffering resulting from the disposition and condition of the body. But this distinction does not solve anything except by what necessity he assumed them: therefore it is nothing to the point. For let it be granted that he assumed our defects by this necessity of the end, I still ask: Did he assume this defect, which is the necessity of suffering and dying, or not? Therefore, after the solution, the same question still remains, and thus it is completely worthless. Furthermore, if they say that the nature of the body in its material disposition did not have the necessity of suffering, but he willed to grieve because he could not redeem otherwise, it is doubly false. First, because according to this, the words of Hilary cited earlier would be verified to the letter, which is contrary to all. Second, because Augustine says that another mode was possible, but none was more fitting: therefore what they say is false.

Solution: It must be said with the Master in the Text, that he assumed the necessity of dying, and to assume is indeed a matter of will, and not of necessity, ordained however to this mode of redemption: but the assumption having been made, it was necessary for the matter and nature to suffer and die. But not by the necessity of the person, because the person was always omnipotent, and could have repelled death if he had willed. Moreover, this necessity

of nature is distinguished from our necessity in two ways: one of which is that it is not contracted like ours: and this is what the Master said in the preceding distinction.

that He assumed our defects, not by the necessity of His condition, but by the will of His compassion. Another way is: because the matter of nature in us is doubly disposed to suffering, namely by the corruption of vice, and by passibility. But in Christ it had only one of those dispositions, namely of the passibility of nature, not of vice.

§ 2. To the first objection, it must be said that all the authorities of Anselm speak of the necessity of assuming, and not of the necessity of the thing assumed. For the Father did not compel the Son to assume a mortal nature and thus die; but He Himself willed it, and therefore assumed it. But after He assumed it, it was necessary to endure it according to the condition of the thing assumed, but not according to the condition of the assuming person.

§ 3. To the objection concerning Isaiah, it must be said that He willed it; but He was not passible by will alone. Hence, although He was offered voluntarily, He nevertheless suffered naturally, just as one approaching a fire approaches voluntarily, but is materially burned.

§ 4. To the other objection, it must be said that in the Gospel He speaks of the power of the person, and not of the assumed nature, as the other authorities of Anselm also show.

Articulus 2 — Whether His Passion Exceeded All Passions

Did the passion of Christ exceed all the passions of the Saints?

§ 5. Secondly, it is asked whether His passion exceeded all passions.

§ 6. It seems that it did not, because: 1. Many Saints endured both longer and many more, and more bitter, kinds of torments concerning the genus of the penalty, such as Lawrence and Vincent, who were afflicted with penalties for three days and nights. Therefore, it seems that His penalty did not exceed all penalties.

§ 7. 2. Further, it seems that His penalty was the least among all who have experienced death. For charity desires to be dissolved and to be with Christ. Since therefore He was of the greatest charity, He most greatly desired this. But in obtaining what is desired there is no penalty. Therefore, He was the least punished in the sense of sorrow.

§ 8. 3. Further, the recompense of a more beloved thing diminishes sorrow in the loss of what is loved less. But in the death of Christ, life was recompensed to Him through a more beloved thing, which was the redemption of the human race. Therefore, His sorrow was diminished in the loss of the lesser thing, namely life; therefore His sorrow was minimal.

§ 9. 4. Further, the hope of resurrection diminishes the sorrow of death in the Saints; therefore, much more so in Him who knew He would rise again. But Christ knew this about Himself, as Psalm 15:10–11 says: You will not give your holy one to see corruption. You have made known to me the ways of life, you will fill me, etc. Therefore, He sorrowed least.

§ 10. 5. Augustine also seems to have held this view in his commentary on Psalm 101:2, Lord, hear, saying thus: "The Lord did not truly fear, since He was to rise again on the third day."

§ 11. 6. Furthermore, it seems that even in any sinner, while he is sinning, there ought to be greater sorrow than in Him. For there is greater sorrow in separation from a better thing. But God is better than the natural life of Christ. Therefore, the soul grieves more in separation from God than Christ grieved in death, as it seems.

§ 12. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Aristotle says that the young grieve more in death than the old, on account of the nobility of their complexion. But He who was beautiful in form beyond the sons of men was of the most delicate complexion beyond all. Therefore, He was tormented by suffering beyond all.

§ 13. If you say that He was not of the most delicate complexion, on the contrary: According to the nature of the form it is necessary that the matter be disposed, as all authors say. Therefore, a soul most noble according to nature demands the most noble complexion. But Christ had the most noble soul according to nature; therefore He had the most noble complexion. From this I further conclude that the more the medium and organ of touch approaches the mean [temperament], the more efficaciously it senses excellences. But in Christ it most greatly approached the mean, as has already been proved. Therefore, He sensed excellences departing even slightly from the temperament much more than another; and pain is according to the sense of the contrary.

§ 14. 2. Further, in Book IV of the Ethics, the Philosopher says that the brave man is saddened and grieves in death in one way more than the one who is not brave, and he gives the reason, saying: insofar as he knows he is deprived of better goods. And this is insofar as he has the virtue of all goods. Therefore, the more virtuous a life is, the more it is loved by a well-disposed soul; but the more it is loved, the greater the sorrow in separation. Since therefore the life of Christ was supremely good, as one to whom the Spirit was given without measure, it was necessary that He grieved supremely in death.

§ 15. If perhaps you say that the Philosopher does not speak the truth, because he contradicts the Saints who say that perfect charity desires to be dissolved—because the Apostle said in Phil. 1:23: Having a desire to be dissolved, and to be with Christ; and Augustine says that the Saints have life in patience, and death in desire; and Job 3:22: They rejoice exceedingly when they have found the grave—what will you say to Augustine in Book IX of The City of God, where he says thus: "Aulus Gellius, in the books entitled Attic Nights, writes that when a certain philosopher grew pale in a sea storm, a certain luxurious man who was not afraid insulted him. But he brought forth the response of Aristippus in a similar situation, who said that he rightly had no cause to be anxious for the soul of a most wicked scoundrel, but that he ought to have feared for the soul of Aristippus." Therefore, Augustine confirms what Aristotle says.

§ 16. 3. Further, Augustine in Book II of The City of God says that sound reason is to be preferred even to examples. Since therefore it is sound reason that a good thing is loved, and the best thing is more loved, and the natural life of Christ was more good and better than the life

of all others, therefore it was loved beyond all others, just as He Himself said: I have given my beloved soul into the hands of its enemies—that is, my life; because the soul, which was a rational spirit, the enemies never had in their hands.

§ 17. 4. Further, since it is sound reason that in the separation of what is more beloved and joined by nature there is greater sorrow, it again follows that Christ grieved most greatly in death.

§ 18. 5. Further, the sense of a lesser intemperance in any member indicates a greater temperance of the same. Now, in the hands and feet, intemperance is immediately felt, for the hands and feet begin to grow warm even when the intemperance is so slight that it is not felt elsewhere in the body. Therefore, the hands and feet are of greater temperament. Therefore, to suffer in them will be of greater penalty than to suffer in others. But Christ suffered in them; therefore, from this also there was an aggravation of sorrow in Him. A sign of this is also that when we seek to discern by touch, we extend our hands rather than another part of the body.

§ 19. 6. Further, Lamentations 1:12: O all you who pass by the way, attend, and see if there is any sorrow like my sorrow. Further, the Psalm says of Him: My soul is filled with evils. Further, it is chanted of Him at the time of the passion, Lamentations 3:15: He has filled me

with bitterness, he has inebriated me with wormwood.

§ 20. Solution. I readily concede that Christ suffered more and indeed more bitterly than any man could ever suffer or has suffered; and this for three reasons.

§ 21. The first is so that we might be the more bound to give thanks to Him. Hence Bernard says: "He assumed much difficulty in order to make you a debtor of much love, and the difficulty of redemption might admonish to thanksgiving him whom the facility of his condition had made less devout."

§ 22. The second reason is the goodness and innocence of His life. For it is not true what some say, that one suffering for his own sins is more afflicted; for such a man is indignant from the conscience of his sins, and more greatly despises life. But an innocent man finds nothing in life for which he ought to despise it. And if you object that one dying for offenses fears eternal death and is therefore doubly tormented, this is nothing: for we are not speaking of what is accidental, but of what is per se. That torture, however, is accidental, namely insofar as through this life he is freed from the death of the soul. Hence it is clear that they speak falsely, both from the authority of Aristotle and Augustine, and also through the reason introduced above. This is also gathered from the words of the thief, when one thief said to the other: And we indeed justly, for we are receiving the due reward of our deeds; but this man has done nothing wrong.

§ 23. The third reason was from the most noble complexion of His body, both in the whole, and also in the members in which He suffered, as the objections prove.

§ 24. Therefore, to the first objection concerning the Martyrs, it must be said that it is not the same to suffer more things and for a longer time, as to feel sorrow more bitterly. And the

Saints indeed could suffer more and for a longer time, yet none of them felt the sorrow as bitterly as He did.

§ 25. To the other objection, it must be said that the charity of Christ did not diminish the sense of sorrow, but rather the reputation [estimation] of sorrow. In other Saints, however, it diminished both, both the sense and the reputation: because they were wayfarers, and when they were affected regarding higher things, the soul was drawn from the body, and felt less. But Christ was simultaneously both wayfarer and comprehensor, and one act did not withdraw Him from the act of the other.

§ 26. To the other, it must be said in the same way, that the reward caused life not to be esteemed, that is, to be less esteemed. Not that it was less valuable, as Anselm says, because it was worth infinitely more than the whole human race; otherwise sufficient recompense would not have been made through the death of Christ. But because out of love for men He chose death, not simply by casting away a life better than all men would be, but by postponing it for a time in order to recover it for all. And this evaluation belonged to charity, and was not according to value.

§ 27. To the other, it must be said that the Lord knew He would rise on the third day. For if the Lord had simply remained in death, then it would not have availed us; and He Himself also would have acted foolishly by losing His better life for us forever. But this foreknowledge of the resurrection in Christ did not take away the sense of the passion. And therefore that objection proves only concerning a lesser reputation, and not concerning the sense or experience of bitterness.

§ 28. To the objection concerning separation from God through sin, or even through eternal condemnation on the day of judgment, I say that this objection is nothing, because "penalty" is taken equivocally. For separation from God does not inflict a bodily sense, but a loss. If you say that the soul feels its loss, this is nothing, because to feel a loss is to feel a privation, like seeing darkness and hearing silence. And therefore the damage in the loss of God is infinitely greater than the loss of life, if you consider the privative damage, that is, your damnation

or his; but there is no greater physical sense.

Articulus 3 — Whether the Bitterness of the Passion of Christ Was Thus Greater than the Suffering of Adam, if It Be Granted that He Could Have Suffered

Would the bitterness of Christ's passion be greater than the passion of Adam, if it were granted that he could have suffered?

§ 29. Thirdly, it is asked whether the bitterness of Christ's passion is greater than the passion of Adam in the first state, if it were granted through an impossibility that he could have suffered or had suffered in actuality?

§ 30. It seems that it is not, because: 1. A conjunction is the more difficult to separate, the fewer dispositions to separation are present in it. Now, in Christ a penalty was assumed, but in Adam none. Therefore, there would have been greater sorrow in the separation of the soul from Adam's body than in the separation of the soul from Christ's body.

§ 31. 2. Further, the stronger the bond, the more difficult it is to break. But the bond of immortal life is in some way stronger than that of a life in which there is a necessity to die. Since therefore Adam had the first life, it seems that he would have felt a greater penalty in death if he had died, than Christ.

§ 32. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Sorrow is the sense of penalty, and the bitterness of sorrow comes from a stronger sense of a stronger penalty. Therefore, things which do not contribute to a more subtle sense do not contribute to a greater passion. However, being immortal by grace in the state of animal life, and being mortal, do not contribute to a better sense, because they are not among the things that form the complexion. Therefore, they do not contribute to a greater sorrow. Therefore, Adam would not have suffered more from this than Christ.

§ 33. 2. Further, the cause of a longer or shorter life, or even a perpetual one in the animal state, does not contribute to sensation. Because if perpetuity were a cause, then length of life would also be a cause of better sensation than the sensation of a shorter life. And this is contrary to reason, because every cause of a longer life (as the Philosopher says) is reduced to moisture difficult to dry, and heat difficult to cool. But the goodness of sensation in touch is brought about by a closer approach to the temperament in the medium, which is a complexioned mixture. Since therefore the bitterness of passion follows upon the stability of sensation, therefore length of life or perpetuity, as such, contributes nothing to a greater passion.

§ 34. If perhaps you say that Adam was of a more noble complexion than Christ, I hold this as absurd. Because in this way the Author of all nature would have acted against the law which He Himself implanted in nature, because against Himself in Himself He would have neglected His own soul. For this law is implanted, that a more noble body or matter is prepared for a more noble form. And if the soul of Christ was more noble than the soul of Adam, God, the author of nature, would have done an injury to His own soul if He had given a more noble complexion to Adam.

§ 35. Solution. In my judgment, no bodily penalty can be compared to the bitterness of Christ's passion, which anyone could suffer bodily and according to nature. Hence, if Adam had suffered, I say that he would not have grieved as bitterly as Christ.

§ 36. Moreover, the two reasons that were first adduced are solved by the objections made to the contrary. However, I well believe that Adam had a more vivid sensation before sin than after, or than we have; but I do not believe that he had a more vivid one than Christ.

Articulus 4 — Whether the Death of Christ Was More Bitter than the Death of the Soul, Per Impossible That the Soul Could Die

Would the death of Christ be more bitter than the death of the soul, if it were granted by impossibility that the soul could die?

Would the death of Christ be more bitter than the death of the soul, if it were granted by impossibility that the soul could die?

§ 37. Fourthly, it is asked whether the death of Christ was more bitter than the death of the soul, if it were granted through an impossibility that it itself could die by the separation of its parts from itself?

§ 38. It seems that it would be, because the penalty which is contrary to a better good is greater. For Augustine says that a penalty is not called an evil except because it is contrary to the nature of the good. But there was a better nature in Christ than could be in any simple creature; therefore, a greater penalty.

§ 39. ON THE CONTRARY: The more closely something is conjoined, the greater the sorrow in separation. But a part of the soul is more closely conjoined with the soul than any body could be conjoined with the soul. Therefore, there would be greater sorrow in separation.

§ 40. Solution. A "greater sorrow" is said in two ways: namely, because it is contrary to a greater good, and in this way the sorrow of Christ would still be heavier than that of the soul, if it were supposed that it could die. It is also called a greater sorrow because it is the separation of a stronger conjunction according to sensory experience; and in this way I well think that such a death of the soul would be more bitter, but nevertheless it would not be more efficacious for redeeming.

§ 41. And thus the solution is clear: because one of the objections proceeds in one sense of this distinction, and the other in the other.

Articulus 5 — How What the Master Says, that Christ Came from Above, Ought to Be Understood

How is it to be understood what the Master says, that Christ came from above?

How is it to be understood what the Master says, that Christ came from above?

§ 42. Next, it is asked concerning those things which are found in the Text in Chapter B, where it says that Christ came from above, that is, from the altitude of human nature before sin.

§ 43. For from this it seems to follow that 1. He came either materially or formally. Not formally, because He did not have the form of Adam's body. Therefore, materially, because according to nature He possessed what is impassible.

§ 44. 2. Further, Damascene seems to say this, who said that He assumed the first fruits of our mass. But the first fruits of our mass are impassible; therefore, He assumed an impassible body.

§ 45. Solution. According to what has been held, it is easy to answer this: because He came from that state regarding the likeness of the exemplar, which He exhibited in Himself in that state. And thus it is also understood concerning other states. However, this is easily conceded, that He took from Adam the matter of the body, which is one in every state, although not disposed in one way. But here it is not a question of matter, since it is said in the Text that from the first state He took innocence and immunity from sin, which is the same thing.

§ 46. To the other objection, it must be said that they are called the first fruits of our mass on account of their nobility and purgation from the oldness of sin. Just as we have also expounded above in its proper place where this saying of Damascene is introduced. And they are not called first fruits because He first assumed them materially and in the disposition of the first man.

DISTINCTIO XVII

Divisio Textus

§ 47. After the aforesaid things, it is necessary to consider, etc. In this distinction, the Master determines a certain further question derived from the preceding, namely, whether Christ sought or prayed for anything which was not granted to Him? For since He naturally feared the passion, the consequence was that He naturally fled it, and asked that it pass from Him.

§ 48. Hence this distinction is divided into four parts. In the first of which he shows principally that in Christ, on account of two natures and wills, there was no struggle of the flesh against the spirit. In the second, he proves that there was a threefold will in Christ, namely of sensuality, of reason, and of deity, there at C: Therefore by that human affection which He drew from the Virgin, etc. In the third, he objects against the words of Ambrose, there at D: But the words of Ambrose move us not a little, etc. In the fourth and last, he objects through the words of Hilary, there at E: That also is not to be ignored, etc.

§ 49. From these things the meaning is clear, because the Text is plain.

Articulus 1 — Whether Christ Willed Something Which Was Not Done

Did Christ will anything that was not done?

Did Christ will anything that was not done?

§ 50. But first it is doubted whether Christ willed anything which was not done?

§ 51. For it seems that He willed nothing [that was not done]. 1. For one whose will is always in conformity with the will of the Omnipotent: just as nothing is done against the will of the Omnipotent, so nothing is done against his will. But the will of Christ was always in conformity with the will of the Omnipotent. Therefore, just as nothing is done against the will of God, so nothing is done against the will of Christ. The first proposition is self-evident. The second is proved by the fact that it belongs to the perfection of the just to have a will conformed to the divine will. Since therefore there is no perfection which Christ did not possess, He had a will that was always conformed.

§ 52. 2. Further, He said this to His mother, Luke 2:49: Did you not know that I must be about my Father's business? And to the disciples later: My food is to do the will of Him who sent me, namely, my Father who is in heaven.

§ 53. 3. Further, the Apostle seems to mean this in Heb. 5:7: He was heard in all things for His reverence. Therefore, He never asked for anything which He did not obtain, as it seems.

§ 54. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. In Psalm 21:3: I will cry by day, and You will not hear; and by night, and it is not for folly in me.

§ 55. 2. Moreover, He prayed that the cup might pass, and it did not pass. Therefore, He was not heard in all things.

§ 56. Solution. As the Master says in the Text, there are several wills in Christ; and whatever He willed by the will of good pleasure according to the divine nature, this He obtained. Similarly, whatever He willed according to the reason of the deliberative will, He obtained entirely. But not whatever He willed according to the will of natural affection, as the Master says.

§ 57. To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that the conformity by which our will is conformed to the divine will is fourfold, namely in the object willed: and this is according to the matter, and it is the least, that I will what God wills. And this does not produce merit of itself, because sometimes someone can evilly will what God wills, such as the death of some good man.

§ 58. There is also conformity according to the form of willing, so that from the same charity we will what we will, from which God wills what He wills; because that produces merit, even if sometimes we do not will what God wills, as Augustine says, and it is posited at the end of the first book of the Sentences.

§ 59. The third conformity is in the end of willing, so that we will for the same reason for which God wills, that is, for His glory. And this again is laudable and contributes to merit, even if there is deformity in the matter of the thing willed. Because for the glory of God I could will someone to live, whom He wills to die for His glory.

§ 60. The fourth conformity is in the efficient cause of willing, namely when I will that which God wills me to will. For example, seeing a poor man, if I want him to be miserable, I am already not merciful; and yet God wills him to be miserable. Therefore He wills me to will what He Himself does not will: and these are not contraries. Similarly, when He chose the Virgin mother, He willed her own soul to be pierced by the sword of His bodily passion, so that she would sustain within in the affection of a mother what He endured without. Therefore He willed her to will that the Son should not suffer.

§ 61. In the same way I say that when Christ willed to assume true humanity, He willed him to will to flee those severe dangers of human life. And this conformity suffices for the natural will; and this conformity, disputed and proved, is found concerning the first treatise of this volume on the conformity of our will to the will of God.

§ 62. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 2 — Whether There Was Sensuality in Christ

Was sensuality in Christ?

§ 63. Next, it is asked concerning what he says there at B, near the beginning: Human will is the affection of the whole reason or the affection of sensuality.

§ 64. Four things are asked here without which this passage cannot be understood: The first of which is, whether sensuality is or was in Christ? Secondly, whether there is any will of sensuality? Thirdly, whether the will of reason was conformed to the divine will, as he says in the Text? Fourthly, concerning the division of Christ's wills, which the Text hints at.

§ 65. To the first we proceed thus: It seems that sensuality was not in Christ, because: 1. Augustine says in Book XII of On the Trinity that sensuality is in the place of the serpent, in which the first movement of sin began. Since therefore Christ had no instinct of sin, it seems that sensuality was not in Christ.

§ 66. 2. Moreover, for what purpose would it be in Him? For merit is not perfected by three degrees (sensuality, the lower part of reason, and superior reason) in the same way as demerit. Since therefore He assumed nothing except those things which are ordered to grace, and grace does not reach sensuality, it seems that He did not assume sensuality.

§ 67. 3. Moreover, this is what always fights against the spirit. Therefore, since there was no such struggle in Christ, it seems He did not have sensuality.

§ 68. ON THE CONTRARY: The devil did not create sensuality in Adam, but corrupted it having been found in him. Therefore, since Christ assumed all our natural things in body and in soul, it seems that He also assumed sensuality.

§ 69. Further, Augustine: Sensuality is a movement of the soul, which is directed towards the five bodily senses. Now, it is certain that Christ had this kind of movement; therefore, He had sensuality.

§ 70. Solution. We must agree with the final reasons, that Christ had sensuality, which is the power of the soul's sensitive desire directed towards those things which confer to the salvation of nature, and directed towards those things which confer to the senses for presentation.

§ 71. But to the first objection it must be said that Augustine speaks of sensuality not according to nature, but according to the corruption which happened from sin; and since Christ did not take sin, He also did not take that corruption.

§ 72. To the other objection, it must be said that it was in Him to demonstrate the integrity of our nature, and so that our corrupted sensuality might be cured by His assumed incorrupt sensuality; for it is not curable, as Damascene says, unless it is assumable.

§ 73. To the other objection, it must be said that it does not fight against the spirit from its nature, but insofar as it is corrupted by sin; and in this way Christ did not take it.

Articulus 3 — Whether There Is Any Will Of The Sensuality

Is there any will of sensuality?

§ 74. Secondly, it is asked whether there is any will of sensuality?

§ 75. It seems, however, that there is not: because the Philosopher says in the Topics that all will is in reason.

§ 76. Further, the Philosopher in Book III of On the Soul: In the rational part will occurs, but in the irrational part, desire and anger. Therefore it seems that it is nothing when he says that there was one will of sensuality in Christ.

§ 77. If perhaps you were to say that this is animal according to the propriety of the Greek idiom, in which "will" is only spoken of as the affection of reason. On the contrary: Augustine in the book On the Trinity says: Voluntary causes are either of God, or of Angels, or of men, or of any animals whatever, if indeed those movements of animals devoid of reason by which they do anything according to their nature, when they seek or avoid something, are to be called wills. From this it is clear that "will" is used of sensuality abusively.

§ 78. Solution. It is said that "will" is taken broadly, and strictly. Strictly, "will" is not said, as the authorities wish, except of a rational movement and appetite. Broadly, the appetite of human sensuality is also called will. But altogether abusively the appetite of brute animals is called will. Hence John Damascene says that the will is rational; and if it is not rational, it is not a will. For will denotes that which is most free in the soul; and therefore, a sensitive nature, which is driven more by the command of reason or by the instinct of nature than it acts itself, cannot properly be said to have a will in it.

§ 79. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 4 — Whether Some Will In Christ Did Not Have Its Effect

Did any will in Christ not have its effect?

§ 80. Thirdly, it is asked whether any will of reason in Christ lacked its effect?

§ 81. It seems that it did: because it was determined above that even reason, and whatever part of the soul, can be considered as nature: and thus it grieves at inconveniences and flees them. Therefore, since reason was in Christ in that consideration, it seems that He willed something by the will of reason, which He did not will by the divine will. Therefore, since it belongs to any appetite to ask for what it desires, He asked for this according to that will, which nevertheless He did not obtain.

§ 82. ON THE CONTRARY: The contrariety of appetite in the soul is not because the appetites themselves are of contrary natures in us, as the Manichaeans said, who posited one created by the prince of light, and another by the prince of darkness. Therefore it is left that this contrariety is from the opposition of the things willed. Now this opposition in us induces a struggle of the flesh or the lower part of the soul against the higher, that is, against the spirit. Therefore, there was a struggle of this kind in Christ, which is absurd to posit. Therefore, there was no such deformity of wills in Him.

§ 83. Solution. Consenting to the first objection, it must be said that nothing prohibits that according to the will of reason as it is nature, that man, insofar as he is man, desired something which he did not obtain. And He even prayed for what was not given, because He

did not pray for this willing from deliberation, but rather showing our infirmity; just as He Himself said to His disciples: The spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak.

§ 84. To that which is objected to the contrary, I say that there is no contrariety of struggle, except between those things where there is pertinacious resistance, as it is in us, in whom the will of carnal infirmity is strengthened by the fomes, and sometimes by the remnants of sins. But in Christ there was no such strengthening, and therefore the infirmity of the will did not progress beyond natural limits, showing itself in these things only for the demonstration of nature, and not to the point that it fought against reason, but rather that it followed it. And this is noted when He says: If this cup cannot pass away unless I drink it, Thy will be done. And this indeed some of the ancients, namely William of Auxerre, call a "velleity," and not a perfect will.

§ 85. There are others, however, who solve it otherwise, saying that there is no contrariety: because contraries are naturally suited to occur concerning the same thing, and sensuality and reason, or natural reason and reason, are not concerned with the same thing as the same. But it is clear that this is nothing, because according to this, even in us there would never be a contrariety of struggle. Hence the contrariety of struggle is from contrary objects willed striving to draw the whole after themselves; which willed objects (although they are not contrary in substance) are sometimes nevertheless contrary through an adjunct, namely through reason, such that one is willed as honorable, and the other truly as shameful.

Articulus 5 — Whether The Will, According To The Master, Is Well Divided In The Text

Is the will well divided according to the Master in the Text?

§ 86. Fourthly, it is asked concerning the division of the will which the Master hints at here.

§ 87. And he seems to hint at a threefold will, namely the divine, and a twofold human one, namely the affection from the infirmity of the flesh, and the affection of reason.

§ 88. 1. But since it is still one, as has been seen, namely the will of reason as it is nature, it seems that the Master is insufficient.

§ 89. 2. Further, from many forms there is not one mode of denomination of the same subject, just as whiteness denominates Socrates white, and grammar a grammarian, and so of others. Therefore, it seems by similarly, that from the many wills of Christ He Himself is willing in many ways, or many willing subjects, which Damascene denies, who says that He is nevertheless one willing subject.

§ 3. Also, those multiple, two, or three, or four wills of Christ, are all given for the act of willing: but in lower things even a single property or potency suffices for a single act: therefore it seems that all of them are superfluous except one.

§ 4. Also, it seems to follow from this that every action of Christ is composite, and not one, but multiple: for an act which is from multiple agents differing according to essence, is multiple, and not one: but those active wills in Christ differ according to essence: therefore his acts are multiple, and not one. And this also seems [true], because Dionysius speaks of a

theandric, that is, a God-manly action: but it is not God-manly, unless there is in him something of God, and something of man: therefore there are multiple actions.

§ 5. Also, we see that he wills something by one will which he does not will by another: therefore those wills do not hold themselves in a single mode toward the act of willing: and thus every act of his willing is multiple acts, as it seems.

Solution: It must be said that the Master [Peter Lombard] posits a three-membered division of the wills of Christ, which can be reduced to a two-membered one thus: The will of Christ is either divine or uncreated, or human and created. But the human [will] is either of reason, or of sensuality. The [will] of reason, indeed, is either as nature, or as deliberative. But he makes no mention of that which is of reason as it is nature, because according to the substance and being of the potency it does not differ from that which is of reason as deliberative, but rather it is a certain mode of consideration of the same potency: for that it is as nature belongs to any potency of the rational soul insofar as it is the nature of man: and therefore through the being of the potency there are only three, as the Master says. But the third is divided by a twofold respect of it into two according to reason [i.e., conceptually], and not into two according to essence.

To the next, therefore, it is clear that it is one way in forms determining the whole, and another way in natural potencies: because forms which are in a whole cannot be in it as multiple [forms] of one ratio [i.e., nature or kind]: but in natural potencies according to one common, not special ratio, it can be that multiple potencies are named by one name. But because natural potencies, although they are present according to diverse parts of nature, are nevertheless referred to one which is the subject: therefore the thing denominated by them is only one: and therefore Christ is only one willing [subject], although he could will in many modes: because "willing" signifies him who wills, [and] this is the subject, and not the root upon which that potency is founded: but the diversity of wills is known in the diversity of things willed.

To the next it must be said that in Christ there are distinct actions: not in comparison to the agent, namely that Christ is multiple agents: but as to the ratio of acting, namely because sometimes he acted as man, sometimes as God: yet always he himself acting was the God-man: whence Dionysius considers the agent as agent: and Damascene considers the actions themselves in comparison to the potencies inclining to the act, and therefore Dionysius called the action theandric, and Damascene said there are two actions of Christ, just as there are two natures: nor does the composition of potencies inclining to the act make multiple actions, but rather a plurality of agents [does so]: and even this is not always so, as is clear in those things which are by act related to diverse powers, such as the drawing of the hand, and the sound of a measure of millet grains: and thus the solution to the last is clear. And note, that this very fact that the agent was one God and man, and the things inclining to the act were two, namely created and uncreated, makes every action of Christ salvific for us: because even if he ate and slept, it was true that God did this: and so he did it for us, who for himself had no need to do such things. And the same is true of sadness, fear, and all others.

To the next it must be said that they are not superfluous : because they are not given for one thing in a single mode: because although the deliberative reason sometimes consents with the natural and sensual [will] in the same willed thing, and conversely, it is not however in the same mode.

Articulus 6 — How And Why Some Kill Themselves

How and why do some people kill themselves?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says in the Letter, there, B, toward the end: He left behind the affection of infirmity, by which no one wishes to die.

For this seems to have a counter-instance in those who kill themselves:

§ 1. Some out of a desire for immortality, as Augustine says in Book I of the City of God, thus: If this is to be thought to be done with greatness of soul: when a man inflicts death upon himself, rather Cleombrotus is found in this greatness of soul, who they say, having read Plato's book where he disputed concerning the immortality of the soul, threw himself headlong from a wall, and thus emigrated from this life to that which he believed to be better. Therefore it seems, that some do desire death.

§ 2. Also, some beyond the hope of immortality kill themselves, like Judas: and some others too, like certain melancholics: therefore it seems that what he says in the Letter is false.

To this it must be said that according to Augustine and the truth of the matter no one kills himself out of weariness of life insofar as it is life: but some have killed themselves out of something which happens to their life, according to what they believed they would find after this life: and some out of shame for the baseness of an act committed or to be committed, as Judas out of baseness committed, and Lucretia out of baseness to be committed. But melancholics out of weariness of sadness prefer not to be, than to be thus: and Cleombrotus out of the immortality which he hoped he would find. But the love of life, since life is naturally sweet, is implanted in all.

Articulus 7 — Whether Christ, In The Anguish Of Death, Asked From The Sensuality Or From Reason

Whether Christ in the anguish of death petitioned from sensuality, or from reason?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, G, §2: And from the human affection of sensuality indeed, not of reason, he willed and petitioned that, etc.

From this it follows that that petition was of sensuality, and not of reason: but how can this be?

§ 1. Since it does not belong to sensuality to order, and every petition is a certain ordered requesting.

§ 2. Also, since Damascene says that prayer is the petition of fitting things from God: and the fitting or honorable is not the object of sensuality.

§ 3. Also, prayer, as Damascene says, is the ascent of the intellect to God: therefore to pray does not befit sensuality.

§ 4. Also. Sensuality, as Augustine says, is stretched into the five senses of the body: therefore it is not affected concerning that which is not present to the senses: but that death at the time when he prayed, was not present to the senses: therefore sensuality was not affected concerning death: therefore he did not pray.

§ 5. If you say that he foreknew all things, and thus knew all things which were to come upon him: and from that foreknowledge fear and sadness were caused. On the contrary: From the instant of conception he knew all things which were to come upon him: therefore if this knowledge caused the fact that he began to fear and to be sad, he seems to have begun to dread and to be sad from the instant of conception.

Also, if he foreknew, this was not according to the affection of sensuality, but rather according to reason united to deity: and since according to that he never feared, it seems he feared nothing, nor was sad, nor prayed, nor was in agony.

Solution: It must be said to this, that the prayer was of reason as it is nature, and conjoined in the same substance with the sensual affection: and this [reason] can well order: and thus the first objection ceases.

To the next it must be said that what nature shows is not unfitting: but fittingness , however, says in that definition [that it is] proportioned to the need of the petitioner.

To the next it must be said that that definition is given concerning prayer through its effect, and concerning the prayer of a contemplator, and not concerning just any prayer.

To the next it must be said that from foresight, not from sense, sadness was caused: but from the binding together of lower things together with higher things it happens that in reason there is knowledge, [and] that this descending and putting on corporeal images by which they are determined, is made imagined through imagination, and then moves to sadness and fear: and this is nothing unfitting: since just as motions begin from sense and ascend to intellect, so it happens conversely through the reflection of the intellect to sense.

But to that which is objected, that from the instant of conception he ought to have feared: it must be said that it does not follow: because the cause of fear is not the foresight of evil, but rather the imminence of the evil of punishment. Whence although death was foreseen by him earlier, yet it was not foreseen as imminent.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 8 — Whether Christ Doubted When He Said, If It Is Possible, Etc

Whether Christ doubted when he said, If it is possible, etc.

Whether Christ doubted when he said, If it is possible, etc.

Then it is inquired concerning the words of Ambrose, there, But not a little do they move, etc.

For doubt is an undetermined motion of reason over either part of a contradiction: but Christ was certain of one part: therefore he did not doubt.

Solution: Doubt here expresses nothing but the trembling of sensuality between that which would follow reason, and the natural appetite for the opposite, namely that he might escape death: which posits nothing blameworthy in Christ, but rather a showing of the truth of our nature.

Articulus 9 — How Christ Prayed For Himself And His Own

How did Christ pray for himself and his own?

Then it must also be noted concerning the words of Hilary, there, That also is not to be ignored, etc. Note, that Hilary speaks optimally: because for the disciples and for us he prayed in three ways, and in one way for himself, namely that he might show the nature of the disciples in himself: for this was to our glory, not his; because our nature is exalted in him: and that through this he might be useful to us, not to himself; who sometimes surrounded by infirmity seek evasion of persecution, and do not despair, because we know our head did so. Thirdly, that he might give us the form and doctrine of ordering our sensual affection to reason: so that with him we might say: Not what I will be done, but what you will. Thus therefore in no way for himself, that is, for his own utility did he petition, but for us. But in another way he petitioned for himself.

And thus the things said in the Letter are plain.

DISTINCTIO XVIII

Divisio Textus

Division of the Text

Concerning the merit of Christ also it is not to be passed over, etc. Here begins that part which is about the works of Christ.

And it is divided into three parts: in the first of which he treats of the merit of Christ generally: and because his chief [work] was the passion, therefore first it is inquired about the merit of the passion. In the second, however, about the work of the passion, and of those things which were in the passion, such as the betrayal, and the like: which begins around the middle of Distinction XX, in that chapter C, Christ therefore is priest, and the same is victim, and the price of our reconciliation, etc. In the third, however, he treats questions following the death of Christ: such as if he was a man during the triduum, and the like: and by what ratio he is said to be dead: and this begins in Distinction XXI, there, A, After the aforementioned it is to be considered, Whether in death, etc.

The first of these parts is subdivided into four parts: in the first of which the Master inquires about the effect of Christ's merit in himself. In the second, however, about the effect

of merit on our part: and this begins in the last chapter of this distinction, there, E, For what therefore did he will to suffer and die, etc. In the third, however, he determines from this, how he alone is redeemer and mediator, there, Distinction XIX, E, Whence he is truly called the redeemer of the world, etc. In the fourth he inquires, If there was another possible mode? and why did he will to liberate rather by this mode than by another mode? there, Distinction XX, A, But if it is inquired, Whether by another mode, etc.: and there is the beginning of the twentieth distinction.

In the first part the Master inquires four problems and determines them: of which the first is two-membered, namely whether he merited, and what he merited? and this is in chapter A. Second, When did he begin to merit? there, B, Nor did Christ only merit this, when obedient to the Father, etc. Third, What is the giving of a name which he merited? there, C. Nor did he only merit the glory of impassibility and immortality, etc. Fourth is, If he could have this without merit? there, D, But if it is inquired, Whether Christ [could have] that immortality and passibility, etc.

The sentence of the Letter is clear by itself.

Articulus 1 — Whether Christ Was Able To Merit Anything

Whether Christ could merit anything?

Here a doubt arises. Whether Christ could merit anything?

But it seems, that he could not: § 1. For what is perfectly full, can receive nothing more. But Christ from the instant of conception had the Spirit not by measure: and we have seen not only his grace, but also his glory as of the only-begotten from the Father, who (as Basil says) did not divide the paternal glory with another. Therefore he was receptive of no good

[at all]: therefore he merited nothing: because that which someone merits, he ought to receive, or he would be dealt with unjustly.

§ 2. Also, he was not indigent of anything: but merit is that by which we are indigent either for life or for beatitude: therefore he did not merit.

§ 3. Also, the state of comprehension removes the ratio of merit: but he most truly was a comprehensor [i.e., possessing the beatific vision]: therefore he did not merit.

§ 4. Also, whoever merits, profits in the goods of the soul, namely of grace and of glory: but above it was denied that Christ profited in the soul: therefore Christ did not merit.

Also, he did not come for this that he might merit for himself, but for us, as the Apostle says: For being rich he became poor, for your sakes; that through his poverty you might be rich. Since therefore he did not act except for that for which he came, it seems that he merited nothing for himself.

§ 5. Also, to merit belongs to him who is inferior in person: but Christ was never inferior to the Father in person: therefore Christ never merited. PROOF. Merit is a work and an act: but acts of all things belong to particulars, as the Philosopher says: therefore merit regards the person, and not the nature: therefore. The first is established.

Also, to merit is to make something one's own out of what is not one's own through work and obedience: but all things were the Son's, as he himself said: All my things are thine, and thine are mine; and I am glorified in them. Therefore it seems, that he did not merit.

ON THE CONTRARY, however, is: § 1. What is said in the Letter, proved by many authorities.

§ 2. Also, Christ's works were not less efficacious than the works of the Saints: but the works of the Saints avail for themselves and others: therefore also the works of Christ: therefore he did not merit only for us, but also for himself.

Solution: The Master here (as it seems) distinguishes well enough, that "to merit" is said in multiple modes: in one way, namely, abusively, by which someone is said to merit through a good work done badly and in a bad state, that is, done in the state of mortal sin: just as it is read in the life of Saint John the Almsgiver, that a certain soldier Peter, angered by the bread which he had thrown at a poor man, merited in the judgment of the Lord to which he was raptured, a prolongation of life for penance.

In another way again improperly, but less improperly someone is said to merit through good deeds done in mortal sin: for he cannot merit from debt: but yet it is said by the Masters, that he merits grace congruously (de congruo): and it would be more truly said, that he merited it from the less incongruous (de minus incongruo): because namely he disposes himself more to grace through the works he does, than he who does not do them.

In a third way properly someone is said to merit, when someone by acts worthy of eternal life makes eternal life owed to himself: and thus he does not merit unless having grace making him pleasing and charity. And this is said in five modes. In one mode properly, namely when the cause of merits with alien merit makes a debt: as in little children who have only the cause of merits, which is grace, with alien merit, namely Christ's: and on account of this eternal life is owed to them. In a second mode most properly, when from the cause of merit and the act of proper merit out of an eternal life not owed to him he makes it owed to him, as anyone justified by his first act merits eternal life. In a third mode, when he makes what is owed to him owed to him by more reasons: and thus anyone merits by the second, and third, and so on by meritorious acts. In a fourth mode, when he merits the increase of grace and of glory previously possessed and owed: and this happens by growing charity. In a fifth and last mode, when he merits through many works something

conjoined to grace, such as the acceleration of the resurrection, or the glorification of his name, and the like: and in this mode Christ merited for himself what he did not possess before: although all honor was owed to him even through his nature, yet that which he ought to have possessed through nature, he made his own by reason of merits through works.

It must be said therefore to the first, that [though he was] rich by nature, although he possessed and could do all things: for he could accelerate the resurrection, and clarify his name; yet he did not possess all things in every ratio: for the Father of Christ willed him to

have these also in the ratio of merit, so that thus he might be shown more glorious not in multiple goods, but in multiple reasons of the just possession of goods.

To the next it must be said that although he himself did not lack anything, yet we lacked, that he should thus merit for himself, giving us a form [to imitate].

To the next it must be said that the state of a comprehensor did not take away from Christ the state of a wayfarer (viator): and therefore it befitted him to merit: but if he had been a comprehensor only, then the objection would proceed.

To the next it must be said that this profit is not contrary to perfection: because it is not posited in the number of the goods of the soul according to knowledge, or grace, or glory: but rather in the goods of the body, like the acceleration of the resurrection, and the manifestation of his name, which is posited in others receiving knowledge of him: and it is posited in the ratios of possessing, and not things possessed in the soul, but in the body, or in others, as was said.

To the next it must be said that although acts belong to singulars, and to persons if the agents are of rational nature, yet they are not always referred to the agents themselves according as they are distinct persons, but also sometimes by grace of nature: as to understand is an act of man, and yet it is referred to man by grace of the soul. So we can say, that to merit is an act of Christ who is an equal person, but according to the nature in which he is inferior: and this well befits Christ, because he acts according to the property of each nature.

Articulus 2 — Whether Christ Merited For Himself The Glory Of Impassibility And Immortality

Whether Christ merited for himself the glory of impassibility and immortality?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says in the Letter, there A, §1: But he also merited for himself the glory of impassibility and immortality, etc.

For this seems to be impossible; because § 1. If he merited, some potency merited: but this is none but free choice. But it is proved, that it was impossible that he merited through his free choice: for a confirmed free choice is not in a state of meriting.

§ 2. Also, no potency determined to one [thing] has praise in its act. This is proved in all natural potencies. But the free choice of Christ was determined to one [thing]: therefore he had no praise in it. But nothing is meritorious unless praiseworthy: therefore Christ could not merit by his free choice.

§ 3. Also, the free choice of Christ did not hold itself otherwise then than it does now: therefore if now he does not merit, neither did he merit then.

§ 4. Also, a holy man is praised, that he could transgress and did not transgress, could do evil things and did not do them therefore if this belongs to the substance of merit, if Christ never transgressed, nor could transgress, he never merited.

ON THE CONTRARY: Our free choice did not have

the potency of meriting from this that it can do evil, because this is a defect, as was proved above, but rather from this that with grace it spontaneously does good. Since therefore Christ without comparison more freely did justice than us, he can have merited more than us.

Solution: It must be said, that he himself possessed a free choice which could merit.

To the first it must be said that free choice can be called confirmed in three ways. In one way in the end according to genus, that is, in the good, yet not this or that good: and this confirmation does not take away except that defect in which it is flexible into evil: but it can still [move] into any good. Another is the confirmation of free choice in that which is simply ultimate, and it is confirmed in it by adhesion, as those confirmed in the fatherland: and this does not take away the will of doing what it wills, but posits a necessity not of coercion in it, but of immutability in that end: and since that is the reward, it is placed immutably in the reward: and therefore it now takes away the ratio of merit, because merit seeks more, and one thus adhering cannot think of more that he would possess, besides that which he has. This indeed was in Christ, but did not take away from him the ratio of meriting: because with that adhesion he was also a wayfarer (viator): and this happened in Christ on account of the two-fold conjunction of his soul, namely to the flesh, and to the deity: for the conjunction to the senses of animal flesh which precedes that which is spiritual, made the way and the wayfarer: the conjunction to that which is spiritual, which has nothing after it that is sought, made the comprehensor. The third is the confirmation of potency to this act by necessity of nature, such that it behooves him to operate this, and he could not not operate this, nor could he operate another: and this confirmation takes away the whole nature of free choice: because every rational potency is to opposites: and no one in the fatherland is confirmed, such that it always behooves him to will the same in number, and he could not not will this: and the opposite of this is posited by the nature of free choice in all, namely to be able [to will] this, and to be able to cease from this, and to be able [to will] another than this. And therefore it is clear from this that it is not the definition of freedom of choice, to be able to will good, or evil: but rather it happens to it to be able to will evil from defect: but its freedom consists in this that it can will this, and not will this, and be able to will something diverse from this. For in this the free is known, that it does not act by necessity of nature, and in this way Christ had a flexible free choice, and this suffices for merit with the state of a wayfarer: and therefore the first objection does not proceed.

To the next it must be said that a potency determined to one in number by necessity of nature, does not have praise: but it has already been shown, that this does not befit any free choice neither confirmed, nor unconfirmed.

To the next it must be said that the first [premise] is false: for it held itself otherwise then, because then it was in the state of a wayfarer: but now it is not the state of a wayfarer with the freedom which makes merit according to the state of meriting.

To the next it must be said that this concerning the praise of a just man is not *per se*, but according as it is indicative of freedom *per se*: for he who can [do] good and evil, can do what he wills, but it is not converted: and because that is *per accidens*, it does not make the state of

meriting except per accidens: and this was also determined above, where it is inquired, Whether Christ could sin?

Articulus 3 — Whether The Humility Of The Passion Of Christ Was The Merit Of Exaltation

Whether the humility of Christ's passion was the merit of his exaltation?

Whether the humility of Christ's passion was the merit of his exaltation?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says there, A, §1: Therefore the humility of the passion was the merit of his exaltation, etc.

For it seems, that by the humility of his passion Christ merited nothing.

§ 1. For passion (as the Philosopher says) is the bringing on and effect of action: therefore it is from another: but whatever is from another according as it is from another, is not meritorious: therefore in no way is passion meritorious: therefore neither the passion of Christ.

§ 2. Also, nothing is meritorious, unless it is an act elicited from some virtue: but virtue is not in the body, but in the soul: therefore what is only in the body and not in the soul, does not have the ratio of merit: but the passion was wholly in the body, not in the soul: therefore it was not meritorious.

§ 3. Also, nothing is meritorious except that which is voluntary: but no passion is voluntary: therefore it is not meritorious. The first is clear per se: because Augustine says: No one unwillingly does well, even if what he does is good. The second is clear by the definition of the voluntary which the Philosopher and the Saint posits, that the voluntary is that whose principle is in us, or in him who acts: but the principle of passion is always in another.

§ 4. If you say, that it is otherwise in Christ, and otherwise in others: because Christ was God, and therefore they could do nothing in him except what he himself willed, and therefore what they did to him, makes it voluntary. On the contrary: A verse is proposed by all,

The action displeased, the passion was pleasing.

Moreover, below it will be proved that this is not true: because according to this they would not have sinned, if their act had been pleasing and voluntary: because according to this it would have been good, since Christ willed nothing except good.

Solution: It must be said, that Christ merited by his passion: and maximum merit consists in the passion of Christ, and the passions of other Saints.

And there is a single solution to all, that although it is brought on, yet the reception and sustaining of the passion is voluntary, for the sake of the good for which the passion is: and therefore the chief of virtues which is fortitude, consists in passions brought on.

To the next it must be said that materially the passion is in the body, but the equanimous sustaining is in the soul, and that is what makes virtue.

To the next the solution is clear by what was said before.

To that which is further objected against the solution of some, I concede well, that if it is inquired, How could this be, that passion is the effect of action, and could not be without action, yet the will is of one, and not of the other?

That question is weak: because the will separates those things which according to nature are conjoined, just as the other acts of the soul: just as I will to be white, and I do not will to be a monk, and I will to be clothed upon by glory, so that what is mortal may be swallowed up by life, and I do not will to die: and, to speak briefly, the will is even of impossibles, as the Philosopher says.

Through this therefore the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 4 — Whether The Humility Of Christ Is The Merit Of Clarity

Whether the humility of Christ is the merit of his clarity?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, A, §1: Humility is the merit of clarity, clarity is the reward of humility, etc.

For from this it seems, that as by a habit he merited through humility.

§ 1. This also seems by another reason. To Philippians 2:8: He humbled himself, namely to the Father, made obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. And it follows, v. 9: For which cause God also hath exalted him, and hath given him a name which is above all names.

§ 2. Also, if exaltation is the reward of Christ, since this is properly owed to humility, because he who humbles himself, shall be exalted then humility properly seems to be the merit.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. All merit is in charity: therefore if he merited, he merited from charity.

§ 2. But it seems again, that Christ did not merit by any of his virtues thus. For he who merits by virtues, his virtues can be transferred to something better, than they themselves are: but the virtues of Christ could not grow, since they were infinite: therefore it seems, that he could not merit by virtues.

Also, charity which is in the meriter profits continually through merit, because otherwise it would be dealt with incongruously: but the charity of Christ could not profit: therefore the charity of Christ could not merit.

Solution: It must be said, that Christ merited by every virtue of his, by humility, obedience, charity, and so of others, and merited both for himself and for us. And some say, that he also merited the substantial reward of humanity in the endowments of the soul and the endowments of the body: for although he possessed them before, they say that this is not repugnant: just as the Angel [possesses] beatitude from God, and now merits it which he received: just as we also see among men, that sometimes a wage is conferred on a faithful worker, which he must afterwards serve to merit: and this sentence does not seem to me improbable. If however we wish to follow the common way, which has no calumny, then we will say that he merited for himself by multiple reasons, making his own what by fewer reasons was his

before: and he also merited in the body those things which he did not possess in the body, and he merited among men to have what he did not possess among men, such as the acceleration of the resurrection, and the endowments of the body in the body, and the manifestation of his name among men.

To the first therefore I concede well, that exaltation responds to humility as a proper reward: but this exaltation is in the body, and among men. In himself and in the soul he was exalted beforehand, [meriting] in this mode by which through multiple acts the exaltation of the soul [became] owed to him.

To the next it must be said that merit consists in charity as in a root: yet it does not so consist, that it alone merits, but rather any virtue whatever, but rather drawing the power of meriting from the quantity of love: just as it is in natures, where the sun moves to the budding and maturation of all generable things, and the special motor of this and that is not excluded: and that which is generated, in form and ratio more follows its own special motor than the general one. Also, Charity inflaming the whole affection with its heat, gives to all the power of meriting: but yet the merit is special in the special virtues, and to this responds a reward according to the ratio, as to humility exaltation, to obedience freedom, and to faith vision, and to hope comprehension, and the like.

§ 1. To that which is asked further, it is already solved through what was said at the beginning of the solution: because to merit is not spoken of in one way, but in many.

Articulus 5 — Whether The Soul Separated From The Body Is Made Impassible Immediately

Whether the soul separated from the body is immediately made impassible?

§ 2. Next it is asked about what he says, there, A, § 2: Whether the soul is made impassible, etc.

§ 3. Here the Master touches upon one of the things he merited, namely immortality and impassibility.

§ 4. 1. Now since impassibility belongs to the soul and the body, it seems that it does not happen to the soul except by grace of the body: therefore, once separation from the body is made, the soul will seem to be immediately made impassible.

§ 5. 2. Also, the soul of itself has no contrary: if therefore passion is the sense of a contrary acting against nature, of itself it has no passibility, unless perhaps from sin or the body: therefore, once separation from the body is made, unless it is subject to sin, it does not have passibility: therefore it is impassible.

§ 6. 3. Also, everything that has passibility only by accident, will not be passible unless joined to that accident: but this accident is incorporation: therefore it will be passible [when] incorporated, setting aside the sin which makes it passible: therefore the soul of Christ soon separated from the body, and the souls of the Saints, are impassible.

§ 7. ON THE CONTRARY: Let us suppose that they are again incorporated to an animal body: either they will suffer, or not. If they do: then they were not made impassible by

absolution from the body, because the impassible cannot suffer. But if they do not suffer: then they will not be united, because a soul united to a body necessarily co-suffers, since it grieves over things separating [it], as was held in the preceding distinction.

§ 8. Solution. That opinion which posits our souls as impassible after separation seems to me more probable, just as the reasons first brought forward prove.

§ 9. To that which is objected to the contrary, it can be said that souls are separated from bodies in two ways, namely as receiving the end of the life and time attributed to them by God's predefinition, as it is said: Thou hast appointed his bounds which cannot be passed ; and if those were placed again in a body, in my judgment they would not be able to suffer, unless God who is able to do all things were to again create the first affection of the flesh in them. But some are separated, not to have the end of life, but so that the glory of God might be manifested in them by a future miracle, as Christ says of Lazarus: Lazarus our friend sleepeth: but I go that I may awake him out of sleep . And of the man born blind he said: Neither hath this man sinned, nor his parents (namely, that he should be born blind): but that the works of God should be made manifest in him . And those are not separated except in a qualified sense [secundum quid], and therefore they are not made impassible.

Articulus 6 — Whether Christ Merited In The First Instant Of His Conception

Whether Christ merited in the first instant of his conception?

Whether Christ merited in the first instant of his conception?

§ 1. Next it is asked about what he says: Nor did Christ merit this only when to the Father, etc.

§ 2. For this seems to be false: because 1. To be is prior to acting. But in the instant of conception he first received being: therefore in that [instant] he could not merit.

§ 3. 2. Also, the Holy Fathers and others say that no one can be regenerated unless he is first born: therefore much less to merit, since it imports to be reborn, and afterward to act according to the grace received in regeneration: therefore it seems that it was necessary for Christ first to be born at least in the womb, before he could merit: therefore he did not merit in the instant of conception.

§ 4. 3. Also, in the bad angel it was necessary to posit being by nature prior to turning away by malice: therefore by opposites, in any good it was necessary first to have being by nature prior to being converted to God by grace: since for this much more is required than for turning away: because anyone can turn away by himself, and cannot be converted except by grace.

§ 5. If perhaps you say that it is otherwise for Christ, and otherwise for others: because Christ was a person before conception and in conception, and therefore he was able to merit: this is nothing: because then to merit would belong to the person as person, and this is false, since to merit belongs to the free choice of the lower [nature]: therefore there does not seem to be a single instant of free choice and its act in merit.

§ 6. Solution. It must be said that concerning this there are two opinions, of which that seems to me more probable which concedes the reasons brought forward, and says that Christ did not merit from the instant of conception, but continuously merited after that instant: as is also expounded that [passage] of John 8:44: He was a murderer from the beginning , that is, after the beginning. Others say that he merited in the instant of conception, and they resolve the reasons brought forward: because that instant is a certain midpoint of the past and the future: and according to how it is the end of the past, so in it Christ received being: and according to how it is the beginning of the future, so he merited in the same: hence in the same instant he began to be, and performed the work of merit, yet not according to the same notion of the instant.

§ 7. And by this the solution to everything is clear, except to what was objected concerning the bad angel: because he also, as I think, stood in the truth for a divisible span of time, and afterward fell: but it is not so concerning Christ.

Articulus 7 — Whether Christ Had, According To The Merit Of The Soul, That By Which He Was Able To Advance

Whether Christ had according to the soul's merit, by which he could advance?

§ 8. Next it is asked about what he says, there, B, Christ by no means had according to the soul's merit, by which he could advance, etc.

§ 9. For this seems false: since it was held above that to merit is spoken of in many ways, and a person can merit in multiple ways that which he already has: therefore Christ [could too].

§ 10. Also if it is asked, What is called the substantial reward?

§ 11. If this is called the vision of God which is the total wages, Christ had that in many ways from the instant of conception: but nothing prohibits that he could have acted so that it was owed to him by some reason more than it had been before.

§ 1. Also it is asked, What is called the soul's merit?

§ 2. If this is the merit by which he could merit some reward in the soul, it seems false: because he merited for the soul impassibility which he did not have before: therefore he had whereby he could advance according to the soul's merit.

§ 3. Also, Christ's action was not less pleasing than the action of other Saints: but there is no action of other Saints which is not meritorious of eternal life, which is the soul's merit and reward: therefore Christ merited for himself the soul's reward, as it seems.

§ 4. Solution. It must be said that the Master does not understand that Christ could not merit the substantial reward by some reason: but his intention is to say that through that merit nothing was added to him according to the soul which he had not had before, nor did he receive anything more fully through merit than he had before.

§ 5. To this however which is objected concerning impassibility, it must be said that the passibility of the soul is attributed to it by accident, insofar as it is in the body or in sin, as was held before: and therefore the dowry of the soul does not consist in impassibility, nor does the substantial reward.

Articulus 8 — Whether Impassibility And Immortality Are Of The Soul Or Of The Body

Whether impassibility and immortality belong to the soul or the body?

§ 6. Next it is asked about what he says, there, B, towards the middle: Therefore from conception he merited not only the glory of impassibility and immortality of the body, but also the impassibility of the soul.

§ 7. For there can be a doubt, To what do immortality and impassibility properly belong?

§ 8. It seems to belong to the soul: because 1. Life belongs to it per se. Since therefore opposites such as privation and habit have to occur concerning the same thing, it seems that mortality and immortality belong to the same thing.

§ 9. 2. And in the same way it is objected concerning passibility: for the question here is not about every passibility, but only about that which consists in pain: and since pain is the sense of a contrary, and since sense is referred per se to the soul, it seems also that passibility properly belongs to the soul.

§ 10. Moreover it is asked, How do these fall under merit?

§ 11. For it seems that they do so directly: because immortality is a dowry of the body: but dowries fall directly under merit: therefore it seems that these directly fall under merit.

§ 12. Solution. It must be said that impassibility and immortality properly belong to the composite, and not solely to the body.

§ 13. To the first therefore it must be said, that there is life as the cause of life, and this is the soul: and life as a habit of life, and this belongs to the composite, and adheres to the body as a habit.

§ 14. To the other it must be said, that passibility belongs to the soul by accident as was held before: but if it belonged to it per se, then the objection would proceed.

§ 15. To the other it must be said, that the dowries of the body do not fall as directly under merit as the dowries of the soul: because the dowries of the body are caused by the soul: for the glory of God flows into the soul, and overflows into the body in the dowries of the body: and therefore they do not fall as directly under merit as the dowries of the soul. Hence Christ merited these out of congruity and condignity, but out of condignity they are as if added to the substantial reward: whereas out of congruity, immortality and impassibility are owed to him who endured harsh pains in the body.

Divisio Textus

§ 26. Next is to be taken that part in which another division begins, there, E, For what therefore did he will to suffer and die? etc.

§ 27. In which the Master inquires into the effect of Christ's passion in us. And it is divided into two parts: in the first of which the Master touches upon four things in general, for which his passion availed us in general, not executing specifically concerning any one. But in the second he posits a specific execution concerning each: and this begins at the beginning of distinction XIX, there, A, Now therefore let us ask, How through his death from the devil, etc.

§ 28. But in the first of these there are two: in the first of which he posits four, as was said. In the second he proves the first, there, E, § 2: But how through death he redeemed us from the devil and sin, etc.

§ 29. Through these the sentence is clear.

Articulus 9 — Whether Christ Merited That The Name Which Is Above Every Name Be Given To Him

Whether Christ merited that the name which is above every name be given to him?

§ 16. Next it is asked, concerning what he says, there, But it behooved that the name which is above every name be given to him, etc.

§ 17. For he had this name from eternity: therefore this was not given to him then.

§ 18. If you say that he did not have the manifestation of the name, but the reality: but the manifestation itself was given to him through merit. On the contrary: Matthew 8:29, on that [verse], What have we to do with thee, Jesus, Son of God? The Gloss: He became known to the extent it was necessary: but not to them as life and light as to the Angels, but to terrify them through certain effects of his divinity. Therefore the demons knew him to be the Son of God even before the passion.

§ 19. Also, Luke 4:34: I know thee who thou art, the Holy One of God, etc. The Gloss in the same place: Seeing the Son of God on earth, they immediately thought they would be judged.

§ 20. Also, in the law the Son of God and God was promised: therefore since the time and works testified, it seems that God was known by them. If it is said that in the law he is not called God, this is plainly false. Isaiah 9:6: His name shall be called Wonderful, Counselor, God, the Mighty, etc.

§ 21. Also, it is commonly said that the wiser ones knew that he would come into the world for redemption.

§ 22. Also, even the boys cried this through the streets: Hosanna to the son of David! blessed is he who comes in the name of the Lord . Therefore it seems that this name was manifest even before the passion.

§ 23. ON THE CONTRARY: 1 Corinthians 2:8: If they had known, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory . And it is expounded there concerning the demons and the princes of

the Jews. Concerning the demons: because they never would have persuaded him to be crucified, since they would have known they would thus lose their power. Concerning the princes however: because they would not have done it by handing him over to the Gentiles.

§ 24. Also, Anselm in the book Cur Deus homo, says that such a great crime as is the killing of God, could never be expiated by penance, unless ignorance had excused it .

§ 25. But against this it seems again on the other hand, that every particular ignorance or ignorance of fact excuses from the whole: and concerning Christ there could be nothing but particular ignorance and ignorance of fact: therefore it seems to excuse from the whole, which is false: therefore they were not ignorant.

§ 26. Solution. It must be said that the name which is above every name, is that he truly is God and is called so by every tongue of those in heaven, on earth, and under the earth. And I well concede that the Father gave this name to him from eternity by generating him, as Ambrose says: but yet that he be called and become known as God having suffered and become incarnate, this

the Father gave to him through the merit of the passion. For it was just that he who on account of sin and us, had so hidden the knowledge of his divinity, that everyone abandoning him fled from him, should through the passion of death be so crowned with glory and honor, that every tongue should confess him to be God.

§ 2. But to all the objects there is one solution, that there is a knowledge through conjectures, and this they had of him that he was the Son of God, both demons and men. There is also a knowledge through certitude, and this they did not have: because although they saw the deeds and other things testifying, again it came into doubt for them because of the indications of weakness which appeared in him: and the first arguments proceed concerning conjectural knowledge. But the second arguments proceed concerning the ignorance of certitude. But after the resurrection, when there was no longer any indication of weakness in him, then it was congruent for the name to be manifested.

§ 3. To that which is objected last concerning the excuse of ignorance, it must be said that it did not excuse in total: because credulity was also admixed through conjectures: but if it had been total ignorance, then it would have excused.

Articulus 10 — Whether Christ, In The Same Form In Which He Was Crucified, Was Exalted

Whether Christ was exalted in the same form in which he was crucified?

§ 4. Next it is asked about what he says, there, C, For in whatever form he was crucified, in that he was exalted.

§ 5. It seems that exaltation is not owed to his humanity: because 1. Exaltation is to the seat of God to equality with the Father: but this does not belong to the form according to which he is minor to the Father: and this is the humanity: therefore exaltation is not owed to the humanity.

§ 6. 2. Also, exaltation is owed to him to whom every knee bends of those in heaven, on earth, and under the earth: but this is the deity: therefore that exaltation of which the Apostle speaks, is of the deity.

§ 7. 3. Also, in the words of the Apostle these things follow one another: He exalted him, and gave him a name which is above every name, that at the name of Jesus every knee should bend of those in heaven, on earth, and under the earth, and every tongue should confess to him: therefore it seems that they refer to the same thing in Christ: but the name refers to the deity: therefore the exaltation as well.

§ 8. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Exaltation is owed to humility: but the deity cannot be humbled: therefore it will not be exalted.

§ 9. 2. Moreover, in the Text the opposite is said in the words of the Saints, as is clear to one inspecting it.

§ 10. Solution. It must be said that exaltation is owed to the person in the human nature, and also to the human nature: but to the person in the human nature it is owed [to be exalted] to the seat of the Father to equality, which although he had from eternity, yet he did not have it existing in the lower nature: but to the nature it is owed [to be exalted] to the better goods of the Father. And by this the solution to the first and to the second is clear.

§ 11. To the third it must be said that they do not have to refer to the same thing, just because the Apostle joins those four things: but they refer to the same [subject] in person, by grace of the different things which are in him.

§ 12. And if it is asked, By grace of what are these four things attributed to him?

§ 13. I say that there is the person in Christ, and both natures, and the work of redemption, and the effects. And indeed all things are owed to the person, yet by grace of the human nature, in which and by the assumption of which he emptied himself, taking the form of a servant , exaltation is owed to him by contrast. But by grace of the divine nature the name which is above every name is owed to him: but by grace of the redemption by which he was judged and blasphemed and mocked, the proclamation of every tongue is owed to him by contrast, that every tongue should confess that the Lord Jesus Christ is in the glory of God the Father. But by grace of the effect of the liberation of those who are on earth and in limbo, and of the restoration of the heavenly ruin, in thanksgiving it is owed to him, that at the name of Jesus every knee should bend of those in heaven, on earth, and under the earth. Of those in heaven, because he restored the ruin: of those on earth, because he redeemed from the guilt of original [sin]: of those under the earth, because from there he extracted those who were there.

§ 14. If perhaps someone asks, Since this name which is owed to him from the grace of divinity is God and the manifestation of his deity, why does the Apostle say, That at the name of Jesus every knee should bend?

§ 15. It must be said that Jesus Christ are names expressing the incarnate person: and therefore they are not above every name, but they are to be venerated by us by genuflection: because they show us the nature in which the work of redemption for us was done. And Jesus

indeed names the person according to relation to the flesh: because Jesus is said to be Savior, and to save belongs to Christ through the divine nature: hence the Angel said: Thou shalt call his name Jesus: for he shall save his people from their sins . Which although according to habit it belongs to him from eternity, yet according to the act of saving, it does not belong to him, except in the assumed human nature. But Christ is said to be the anointed one, which sounds like anointing passively: and therefore it names the human nature associated into the divine: because it belongs to the human to be anointed, and to the divine to anoint.

Articulus 11 — Whether Christ Ought To Have Had The Glory Of Immortality Without Merit

Whether Christ ought to have had the glory of immortality without merit?

§ 16. Next it is asked about what he says, there, But if it is asked, whether Christ [ought to have had] that glory... of immortality, etc.

§ 17. For it seems that he ought to have had it without merit: because 1. What is granted to the less pleasing, is granted much more to the only-begotten Son: but this kind of immortality is granted to infants [who are] less pleasing: therefore without merit it ought more to be granted to the more pleasing Son of God.

§ 18. 2. Also, the condition of a servant is one thing, and the condition of a son is another: for a son is born into the inheritance of the father, whereas a servant does not participate in the goods of the father, except by meriting through service: therefore since Christ was and is the only-begotten of the Father, to be disinherited for no act of his own, he seems to be born to the reception of immortality: and therefore he ought not to have come to it through merit.

§ 19. 3. Also, according to this he is the one who merits, and he is the one who remunerates: which is not fitting, because no one merits from himself, nor remunerates from himself.

§ 20. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Every better thing is to be posited in the Son. Since therefore it is held as better and more pleasing and more proper, that by some reason [what is given] is owed to us on account of what is ours, than that which is as if given to penitents: therefore that mode is to be given: but to have through merit is to have as that in which we have a right through what is ours: therefore he ought to have merited.

§ 21. 2. Also, none of Christ's acts could be void of the Father's gratitude: therefore neither is it evacuated from merit, because every act pleasing to God, is remunerated by God.

§ 22. Solution. It must be said that Christ merited: and this was of his nobility, as the last reasons prove.

§ 23. To the first it must be said, that just as infants have another's sin, so another's merit suffices for them, which is the merit of Christ and of mother Church, as Augustine says.

§ 24. To the other it must be said, that a son merits from a father, and a servant from a master, by one reason and another. For a servant concerning what is not owed to him by nature, by making it a debt on account of service: a son concerning what is owed to him by

nature, by making it a debt by another and another reason, so that the possession might be more pleasing.

§ 25. To the other it must be said, that that objection concludes nothing inconvenient: because in Christ there are two natures: and therefore he himself in the divine nature is remunerating himself meriting in the human nature. But it is not so in others: and therefore they either only merit, or only are remunerated.

Articulus 12 — Whether The Suffering And Death Of Christ Availed Us For The Entrance To Paradise

Whether Christ's suffering and dying availed for us the entrance to paradise?

§ 30. The four things which he touches upon in the Text, are these: the entrance to paradise, redemption from the devil, from sin, and from punishment.

§ 31. Let it be asked however in order concerning each. First concerning the entrance to paradise. For the others will have their place in the following distinction.

§ 32. 1. That entrance does not seem to belong to the passion, but to the ascension. Hence in Psalm 67:19: He ascended on high, he led captivity captive, he gave gifts, etc.

§ 33. 2. Also, Micah 2:13: He shall go up opening the way before them.

§ 34. 3. Also, what impeded the entrance to paradise before the passion? It seems that nothing [did]: because the merit of the Saints was pleasing: therefore it was pleasing to God, and ought to have been remunerated in eternal life: therefore whether Christ suffered or did not suffer, the Fathers would have had the entrance to the kingdom: therefore the passion was not the cause.

§ 1. 4. Also, in baptism the heavens were opened over him therefore it seems that he did not open the heavens through the passion, but rather through baptism.

§ 2. 5. If perhaps you say that the fiery sword was not taken away except through the passion, and to open is to remove the fiery sword; it seems that this is nothing: because it was also removed at the entrance of Enoch and Elijah: therefore its removal does not pertain to the passion, as to a cause.

§ 3. 6. Also, we await the heavenly paradise through Christ's passion: but the fiery sword was before the earthly paradise.

§ 4. 7. Also, if the passion is the cause of entrance: then with the cause posited the effect is posited, and destroyed it is destroyed: but it is clear that when Christ suffered the Saints did not immediately pass from limbo to heaven, nor even did they immediately pass from hell: therefore it seems that Christ's passion is not the cause of entrance into the kingdom or into heaven.

§ 5. Solution. It must be said that Christ's passion opened the entrance to paradise by resolving the sword. But the sword is nothing else spiritually but the decree of God concern-

ing not entering without a price, which must be paid for the nature, because it was totally damned through the sin in Adam.

§ 6. To the first therefore it must be said, that the ascension did not open paradise as to the open vision of the face of God: because the Saints ascending from limbo immediately had that, but as to this, that it determines a congruent place for fruition, namely the empyrean heaven: but here the entrance of paradise or the kingdom is called the perfect habit of it in the vision of God face to face. The same must be said to the following.

§ 7. To the other it must be said, that the merit of the Fathers was personal: and therefore through them the nature was not reconciled, and the guilt of the nature impeded them so that they might not see face to face until the time of the passion, nor be introduced into the kingdom, unless the price was paid in this or another way: and because that mode was determined by God, therefore it is the cause.

§ 8. To the other it must be said, that baptism opens the heavens as a disposing cause on the part of him to whom it is opened, and it does not open simply: hence if the passion had not been, baptism would not open, because it does not have power except from Christ's passion.

§ 9. To the other it must be said, that there is no instance concerning Enoch and Elijah: because this was done in the earthly paradise: but we are speaking of the heavenly paradise, in so far as it is essentially the kingdom of God, namely the vision of God face to face: and by this the solution to the following is clear.

§ 10. To the last it must be said, that immediately upon Christ having suffered the face [of God] was opened to the Saints, the contemplation of which is eternal life, although they had not yet obtained the place congruent to that life: because it was congruent for this to be done after the sacraments of burial, resurrection, and ascension were fulfilled: but the place does not relate to the opening of the kingdom except by accident, namely by way of congruity, and not per se.

Articulus 13 — Whether All Others Were Debtors, And Scarcely Did Each One's Own Virtue And Humility Suffice

Whether all others were debtors, and his own virtue and humility scarcely sufficed for each one?

§ 11. Next it is asked about what he says, there, E, § 2: For all other men were debtors, etc.

§ 12. For from this an inconvenience seems to follow in multiple ways.

§ 13. 1. In one way, since by how much more services are owed, by so much less are they pleas-

-ing, it seems that the martyrs by dying for Christ did not do a pleasing service for Christ.

§ 2. 2. In another way: because if a person's own justice is scarcely sufficient for anyone, it seems that no one could satisfy for another, which is against the Apostle saying, Galatians 6:2:

Bear ye one another's burdens, and so you shall fulfill the law of Christ. And against James saying, James 5:16: Pray for one another, that you may be saved.

§ 3. 3. Thirdly: because if anyone is a debtor for all that he is and can do, and also a debtor of death: then it seems that whatever he does lacks remuneration, because he can never answer even for that which he has received.

§ 4. 4. Moreover, of what death is it understood that all are debtors of death? Either natural, or violent. If natural, this seems false: because then it is understood of the debt of nature which not all have paid.

§ 5. Moreover, if all are said to die, this is a condition of nature, and not a debt properly speaking.

§ 6. Moreover, according to this it is nothing to the proposition: because he is speaking here of a debt which satisfies for sin: but those dying according to nature do not necessarily pay off any sin through death. But if it is understood of violent death: this again is false: because we are not all bound to this that we be killed: therefore it seems that what he says of this debt is false.

§ 7. Solution. It must be said that in truth the text is to be understood just as it lies: and what is more, no creature even without the offense against God which he has committed, suffices with his whole being and his whole work to be able to answer for one minimum thing which he has received from God. But what we are bound to by the law of creation is one thing, and what we are bound to by the law of offense is another, and what we are bound to by the law of mercy is another. By the law of our condition we are bound to more than we know: by the law of offense every man is bound to more than he could do until the end of the world: but by the law of mercy we are bound to less than even any infirm person could do: saying, Lord, I suffer violence, answer for me ; we immediately find him remitting the whole, and demanding little, namely the will to do what we can with good moderation.

§ 8. To the first therefore it must be said, that the martyrs suffered most pleasingly for Christ: because that which they owed by condition, they offered most pleasingly: because the debt of condition does not remove the freedom of service.

§ 9. To the other it must be said, that justice is not sufficient for anyone: but yet because what he owes is not exacted from him, therefore he can do something for another: but no one for the whole nature, except God and man, as was held above.

§ 10. To the other it must be said, that it is remunerable out of God's mercy not exacting all this which we owe by strict right.

§ 11. To the other it must be said, that he understands death in general: for from the fact that they are addicted to the necessity of death by the sentence of the Lord for the guilt of sin, all shall pay it, even if they are delayed for a time, like Elijah and Enoch: and the martyrs offered that voluntarily by free will: and therefore it was more pleasing: yet it is not exacted from us except in a case, namely in the persecution of the faith or of justice, if, being held by a judge, we are forced to deny the faith, or justice.

§ 12. To the other it must be said, that those remaining according to corrupted nature die, and therefore they first pay off the debt of guilt.

Articulus 14 — Whether Our Sin Was So Great That We Could Not Pay It Off

Was our sin so great that we could not pay it off?

Was our sin so great that we could not pay it off?

Next, it is asked concerning what he says there, E, §2: "Our sin was so great, that we could not be saved," etc.

§ 1. For it seems cruel not to forgive a sin except by the death of an innocent person: but God the Father is not cruel against the Son: therefore it seems that He ought to have forgiven the sin more easily, rather than that the Son should die.

§ 2. Also, it is no less a sin of a judge if he permits the innocent to be afflicted so that the guilty might escape, than if he remits the unpunished sin for the guilty. Since therefore the Father did thus in the Son, it seems that we ought not to be redeemed by the death of the Son.

§ 3. Also, the Son of God is better than the whole world, and a thousand worlds if they existed: therefore it seems that the Father exacted the life of the Son who was better, for the sin of the world which was baser, and thus He aggravates the penalty beyond condignity, although it is His nature to punish short of condignity.

§ 4. Also, it seems that satisfaction could have been made for the world otherwise than in that manner: for if Adam and Eve, in whom the whole world was materially, had made satisfaction: then the whole world materially would have made satisfaction, just as the whole materially sinned: therefore the satisfaction would have been as great as the fault: and this ought to have sufficed.

§ 5. Also, if we posit that any person makes satisfaction for himself, it is certain that eventually satisfaction would be made for the whole world: and thus again it was not necessary for the Son to die, as it seems.

Solution. It must be said that, fittingly so that justice might be preserved, satisfaction could not have been made more fittingly except through the death of the Son of God: and this is because man does not pay for a sin by the fact that the damage is paid; for when a thief restores what was taken, he still owes his life to the judge for the lesion of justice. Therefore, much more so, even if the damage were paid, he would also owe his life if he were guilty of the crime of lese-majesty; therefore infinitely more so if he were guilty of the crime of lese-majesty against God, who infinitely exceeds all created majesty. Nor do I say this because man could pay the damage, but speaking under hypothesis: because even if he could, he still nevertheless would not have blotted out the guilt [reatum]. But above at the beginning of the book it was shown that this could not be done by any pure creature, nor by pure God: because although in the latter there is the power [posse], nevertheless in the same there is not the obligation [debitum]; but it was fitting that it be done through the God-man, and man-God,

who would owe it insofar as he is man by the obligation of charity and conformity of nature, and would be able to do it insofar as he is God.

Therefore it must be said to the first according to Anselm, that the Father did not thirst for the blood of the Son, nor was He cruel to Him: but since He could not deny His own justice, and was overcome by the mercy of human redemption, He gave the Son, voluntarily offering Himself to make satisfaction, to man, so that He might make satisfaction for him, as it is said: For God so loved the world, that He gave His only begotten Son: that whosoever believes in Him may not perish, but may have eternal life.[230] But that the Son thus offered Himself by His own will is proved from the Psalms, where it is said: Burnt offering and sin offering you did not require: then I said: Behold I come. In the head of the book it is written of me, that I should do your will. My God, I have willed it, etc.[231]

To the next it must be said, that this would be a sin of the judge, if he did it out of cruelty and perversity: but nevertheless perhaps so that

justice might stand, and the guilty one might be corrected and helped, then that judge is proved both just and merciful at the same time.

To the next it must be said, that justice exacted this: because he was not bound only to pay the damage, but also to make satisfaction for the guilt which was infinite, as was proved at the beginning of that solution.

To the next it must be said, that that argument is worth nothing at all: because immediately as they had sinned, they were ungrateful: and thus they could not do anything pleasing [gratum facere] except by the help of Him who alone could help; according to what Augustine says, that all whoever are saved, are saved in the faith of the Mediator: even if we grant this, that to make satisfaction is merely to restore what was taken away: which however was shown to be false.

Through this also the solution to the last is evident.

DISTINCTIO XIX

Divisio Textus

"Now therefore let us ask, How through his death from the devil," etc. Here begins that part in which he follows up on the other three things which he merited for us, namely concerning liberation from sin, from the devil, and from punishment.

And it is divided into three parts: in the first of which, in one long chapter, he shows at the same time how he liberated us from sin and from the devil. In the second part, so that this might be explained more, he shows why God was made man and died, there, B, "Therefore

man was made mortal," etc. In the third he shows how he liberated us from punishment, there, C, "From what punishment? temporal and eternal."

Articulus 1 — Whether Our Justification From Sin Is The Work Of The Passion Of Christ

Whether our justification from sin is the work of Christ's passion?

First therefore the question arises here, whether our justification from sin is the work of Christ's passion, or not?

For it seems that it is not: § 1. For the passion of Christ was corporeal: therefore it did not attain to our souls: but what does not touch, does not act, as the Philosopher says: therefore it did not act in justifying us.

§ 2. Also, that which justifies anyone, is conjoined to everyone: but the passion of Christ is not conjoined to everyone: therefore it is not justifying everyone.

§ 3. Also, to suffer was not fitting for Christ except according to human nature: but justifying grace is not from Him in this way: therefore the passion of Christ does not justify, as it seems.

§ 4. Furthermore, our justification seems to pertain to the resurrection, as to a cause: and so the Apostle says: He was handed over for our offenses, and rose again for our justification.

Furthermore, justice justifies the soul: therefore it has greater convenience with the resurrection than with death: therefore it is caused more by the resurrection than by death.

§ 5. Also, if the cause is the death of Christ, this will be by way of a sacrament: but a sacrament bears the likeness of that of which it is the cause: since therefore the death of Christ has no likeness with justification, but rather the resurrection, the resurrection will seem rather to be the cause of justification, than death or the passion.

But if this is granted, it is objected to the contrary:

§ 1. Zechariah: You also by the blood of your testament have sent forth your prisoners out of the pit, wherein is no water. Therefore redemption was made by blood.

§ 2. Also, in the Canon: For this is the Chalice of my blood, of the new and eternal testament: the mystery of faith: which shall be shed for you and for many unto the remission of sins. Therefore in the shedding of blood through death the payment of sin was made.

§ 3. Also, Hebrews: Almost all things are cleansed with blood according to the law, and without shedding of blood there is no remission.

§ 4. Also, ibid.: The blood of Christ... will cleanse our conscience from dead works, to serve the living God.

§ 5. Also, Bernard: "Heal me, O Lord, and I shall be healed: save me, and I shall be saved. But nevertheless I am not your saint, unless your blood intercedes for me."

230. Job 14:5

§ 6. Also, John: Behold the Lamb of God, behold him who takes away the sin of the world. But the Lamb does not take away sin except by washing in blood, as is held in Revelation: He loved us, and washed us from our sins in his own blood.

§ 7. Also, Ambrose above in the preceding chapter: "Our sin was so great that we could not be saved, unless the only-begotten Son of God died for us, debtors to death."

§ 8. Also, John: For God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son: that whosoever believes in him may not perish, but may have eternal life.

§ 9. Furthermore, his resurrection seems to do nothing for justification: because then Christ was not in a state of dying: therefore he merited neither for himself nor for us: but rather what he had merited, he received in the reward of glory or the stole of the body.

But still it seems that justification belongs to neither of these, but rather to charity and grace: as it also seems to be implied in the Text: because every change is through an opposite: if therefore in us there ought to be made a passage from sin, and from the delight of sin, it is necessary that this be done through an opposite: but these are the virtues: therefore justification is due to the virtues, and not to the passion or the resurrection.

§ 1. Furthermore, what is it that the Master seems to say, that he justifies us: because we seeing his charity towards us, are moved to love, and so we are justified by charity? For thus his death was only accidentally aiding towards justification: and if without it we had had charity, we would have been sufficiently justified: and this is false: because however much we had loved him, unless he had paid the debt for us, we would not have been redeemed.

§ 2. Furthermore, according to this even the martyrs would justify us from sins: because we, seeing them suffer for the faith, are kindled with charity towards God, who grants them to suffer so constantly: and by that charity we are justified: and thus Christ would have done little or nothing for us.

§ 3. Also, according to this the benefits conferred by God, such as to be, to live, and to understand, and giving riches, and the like, would have availed us as much, or more, as the passion of Christ: because from them also we are kindled to love God, by which charity we are afterwards justified.

§ 4. Furthermore, the Master in the Text touches further on the cause which is from faith, in that God proposed him as a propitiator through faith in his blood, so that as of old those looking at the serpent erected on a pole, etc. But it is certain that there are many articles [of faith] besides the article of the passion: therefore if we are justified through faith in the passion, since it is a greater faith to believe God to be triune and one, than to believe Christ suffered: it availed us as much for justification that God is triune and one, as that he suffered: but this is false: therefore the cause which the Master posits is null.

§ 5. Also, Christ taught us humility and meekness, without which (as Augustine says in the book On Virginity) we are not healed: as he himself says: Learn of me, because I am meek, and

231. John 11:11

humble of heart. Why are those virtues not joined to the remission of sin through the death of Christ, just as charity and faith are?

Also, the Master in the Text touches upon a third mode, saying from the words of Augustine, that by his death in one most true sacrifice, whatever there was of faults he blotted out: therefore it seems that he himself justified us by offering a sacrifice for us: and thus he does not seem to have justified us by kindling to charity, and illuminating by faith.

Solution. It must be said that justification is considered in two ways, namely in general, insofar as it is referred to the whole nature

damned in Adam: and in particular, namely insofar as it avails this or that one who is justified in particular.

Also, in relation to the cause it can be considered in four ways, namely in relation to the efficient cause, or in relation to the meritorious cause, or in relation to the sacramental cause, or in relation to the formal cause. And further, in relation to the meritorious cause, in two ways, namely meritorious of congruity, and meritorious of condignity. Similarly, as to the sacramental cause, in two ways, namely as it is a cause and sign on the part of the justifier, or as it is a cause and sign on the part of the recipient.

Having made this distinction, it is easy to determine the whole. For I say that the justification of nature, referred to the meritorious cause which is meritorious according to condignity, is referred to the passion of Christ: because He merited for us the release from sin, upon which justification follows. But referred to the meritorious cause of congruity, the particular justification—not the general one which regards the debt of nature from Adam, which Christ alone could pay—is referred to the merits of the Saints. Referred to the efficient cause, it is referred to God alone, who alone efficiently blots out sins and works justice. But referred to the formal cause, both justifications are made through grace and virtues. But referred to the sacramental cause, which is a cause and sign on the part of the recipient, according to the debt of original sin it is referred to baptism, according to the debt of actual sin it is referred to penance, if it is after baptism. But referred to the sacramental cause on the part of the justifier, it is referred to God and man, by rising again, pre-signifying in himself the life of soul and body.

Whence it is now plain to solve everything.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that the passion of Christ was corporeal and spiritual, and divine and human. Corporeal, because there were wounds in the body. Spiritual, because there was sorrow in the soul and spirit. It was human, because it was a man who suffered. But it was divine, because true God suffered. Now "to touch" is in two ways, namely through substance, and through effect: and in this second way it touched us, and acted upon us. But if it is asked, What contains this effect from Christ into justified souls, it will be clear below in this same solution.

To the next it must be said, that the passion of Christ is conjoined spiritually to anyone through something in the justified person regarding the effect and power of the passion, namely by faith and charity: and therefore the objection proceeds from false premises.

To the next it must be said, that although to suffer was fitting for Him according to human nature, yet the one suffering was not only man, but also God: and from that part sanctifying grace flows forth in the passion into all the justified.

To the next it must be said, that it pertains to the resurrection in the manner which was said, in an exemplary way, and sacramentally in a certain way.

To the next it must be said, that the death of Christ is a cause by way of the oblation of a meritorious sacrifice: and in this way it is called the sacrament of our justification, taking sacrament broadly for a sacred secret, and not for a likeness and cause. Or, it can be said (as some say) that there are two parts of justice, namely the removal of evil, and the obtaining of good. And the passion through death sets up a likeness to the taking away of sin, because just as death separates from mortal animal life, so justification separates from the mortal life of sin, in which we lived animally like brute beasts. But the resurrection sets up a likeness to justification on the part of the other term, namely the obtaining of life and justice: and this is what the Apostle seems to mean, saying: We are buried together with him by baptism into death; that as Christ is risen from the dead by the glory of the Father, so we also may walk in newness of life. And elsewhere: Reckon yourselves to be dead indeed to sin,

but alive unto God, in Christ Jesus our Lord.

To all the following things by which it is proved that the passion of Christ is the cause of our justification, the solution is already clear through the distinction had above.

But to that which is further objected concerning the causes introduced by the Master on the part of charity and faith, it must be said that the Master shows in three ways that the passion of Christ justifies: but justification is considered in two ways, namely as to sufficiency: and thus only one cause justifies, namely by the oblation of the saving sacrifice for us. It is also considered as to efficiency: and thus it is necessary that faith and charity be present: for the effect of the passion will not flow to us, unless we are of the mystical body of the sufferer. But nothing can do this except charity: and therefore the Master introduces concerning charity, so that considering his charity towards us, we might be united to the sufferer through charity, because his blood has no effect outside his mystical body. But because the sacrament of redemption flows from the head, therefore it is necessary to attend to the head by looking towards it: and to this, faith raises the eyes. And thus it is clear how reasonably the Master proceeds in the Text.

Therefore to what is objected against this, it must be said that it is not by accident: because charity does not make the sufficiency, nor does it posit the font of salvation: but it makes the efficiency, and unites us to the font of salvation: so that being in his body, we might draw from the fountains of the Savior, and confess to the Lord.

To the next it must be said, that although the martyrs kindle us to charity, nevertheless that charity, insofar as it is thus considered, does not unite us to them suffering, but rather to Christ suffering.

To the next it must be said, that benefits are supports of charity: yet by them the wave of salvation washing us is not infused into us, as happens through the passion.

To the next it must be said, that in every article [of faith] the font of justification is posited in us, although faith regarding every article purifies by disposing toward justification: and therefore that objection does not proceed.

To the next it must be said, that the other virtues are not attaining God, as these two are: and concerning the cardinal virtues it is clear, that their acts are in those things which are towards the end, and not immediately into the end. Concerning hope it is clear: because although it is with respect to the end, yet it is by expecting, not by having or uniting. But faith attains the truth of the divine article in whatever manner: and charity unites through love: and therefore the other virtues formally indeed justify, but they do not thus through their acts unite to the justifier himself, as charity and faith do.

And thus the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 2 — Whether By His Death Christ Destroyed, By One Sacrifice, Whatever There Was Of Faults

Whether by his death, with one sacrifice, Christ destroyed whatever there was of faults?

Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, A, around the middle: "For by his death, with one most true sacrifice, whatever there was of faults, from which the devil detained us to pay punishments, Christ extinguished," etc.

For this seems false: because § 1. There are still many sins, by which the devil detains us to pay punishments, both here and in the future: therefore he did not destroy whatever there was of faults.

§ 2. Also, if he himself destroyed whatever there was of faults, because fault has opposition to grace, but satisfying punishment has order against punishment: but Christ satisfied for us through the punishment of the passion: therefore this sacrifice was ordered

against punishment, and not against fault, as it seems: and so he did not blot out whatever there was of faults, but rather whatever there was of punishments.

§ 3. Furthermore, it seems that some fault could not be blotted out by that passion: because as great a good as was the life of Christ, so great an evil was his killing, or greater, on account of the offense adjoined to the damage: therefore it seems, since a lesser good cannot overcome a greater evil, that the death of Christ could not even avail to blot out that sole fault which his killers had perpetrated by killing him: therefore much less did it avail to blot out that one with all the other faults. Which however is false: because many of the killers were saved, such as Longinus, the Centurion, and others, as the Saints say.

Solution. It must be said that in sin there are four things, of which three are so conjoined that one is not loosed without another; but the fourth is severable from the other three. The first is the fault which is contrary to grace. The second is the stain defiling the image. The third is the guilt of eternal punishment: and these three are conjoined. The fourth is the guilt of temporal punishment. Well therefore I concede that the passion of Christ sufficiently blots out fault: but nevertheless the action of the passion into fault begins from the part of the guilt of eternal punishment, as the objection proves. But because the guilt is not severable, unless the stain and fault are loosed, therefore subsequently the force of the passion acts into the fault and the stain: but the passion has this insofar as in it grace flows into us from the sufferer himself: because it is to operate directly against the fault, and consequently against the stain and against the guilt. And through this the solution to the second is clear.

To the first it must be said, that the passion of Christ blots out sufficiently by itself: but efficiently it blots out with faith and charity, as was said in the preceding question.

To the next it must be said, that Anselm makes that argument, and solves it, saying that that ignorance by which they believed him to be a pure man excused from so much guilt: and therefore the sin was diminished: and it could be expiable with the others, as he himself said: Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do. But nevertheless in the argument there is a supposition of falsehood for two reasons: of which one is, because the evil is not weighed from the circumstances of the affair only, but from the circumstance of the doer: and similarly the good: but the latter always infinitely exceeds in good.

And if you say, that the deed of the man was the killing of God, and from that part it was an infinite evil. It must be said, that this is nothing: because from the part of the one suffering it was a good, and not an evil: but from the part of the doers an evil only: and therefore the act of their sin is attended to insofar as it is in the doer, and not in the sufferer: and thus the induced reason stands.

The second reason is: because even if equality be posited, the good was still more powerful in destroying evil than conversely: because good has the power of itself to impugn; but evil does not have the power of itself, but from another, as Dionysius says.

Articulus 3 — Whether, With The Blood Of Christ Poured Out Without Guilt, The Handwritings Of All Faults Have Been Blotted Out

Whether by the blood of Christ shed without fault, the handwritings of all faults were blotted out?

Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, A, after the middle: "For by the blood shed without fault, the handwritings of all faults were blotted out," etc.

For a handwriting [chirographum] is an instrument

which is held in the hand for the confirmation of the testimony of an agreement. Whence it is named from cheir, which is hand, and grapho, which is I write. But we gave no such writing

to the devil: therefore it seems that nothing is said [i.e., it is meaningless to say], that the handwritings of faults were blotted out.

To this it must be said, that it is a metaphorical locution. For we by sinning are constrained by the guilt of eternal punishment: and thus by the sentence of God we are made debtors to the torturer of the judge: just as a thief by stealing is said to give a handwriting to the torturer, by which he is bound to pay punishments to him: so we by the debt of sin oblige ourselves to the demons to pay punishments, with them torturing: and it has no firmness except in the sentence of God, and our guilt.

Articulus 4 — Whether By The Passion Of Christ We Are Freed From The Power Of The Devil

Whether by the passion of Christ we were liberated from the power of the devil?

Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, A, towards the end: "He began to possess us as native slaves," etc.

For here the mode is introduced, how we were liberated from the power of the devil.

But the passion seems to have profited us in nothing towards liberation from the devil.

§ 1. Since the Apostle says, after the passion, that our wrestling is not against flesh and blood, but against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the world of this darkness, against the spiritual forces of wickedness, in the heavenly places.[232] Therefore a fight remains for us now just as before.

§ 2. But if you say, that demons do not enter the bodies of men, besieging the senses, as they did before: again it is false, since Augustine says that they mingle themselves with the blood: and concerning many of the Saints it is read, that they expelled demons even from obsessed bodies even after the passion.

§ 3. But if you say, that before the passion he compelled to evil, but he could not do this after: this again is false: because free will can be induced or impinged upon, but it cannot be compelled: because then a sin would be made not a sin: therefore it seems, that we are taken away from sin in nothing, as it seems, and from his power.

§ 4. If perhaps you say, that this is understood regarding idolatry, which was before the passion of Christ, and not after: this again is nothing: because still today there are viler idolaters in certain nations than there ever were: heresies also are multiplied from day to day: therefore it seems that his power is rather loosed to him, than taken away.

§ 5. Also, the Apostle says that in the last days dangerous times shall come:[233] therefore it seems that after the passion his power against us will grow rather than be taken away.

§ 6. Also, Daniel: There shall come a time such as never was from the time that nations began even to that time:[234] and he speaks concerning Antichrist.

§ 7. Also, in Revelation, it is said that Satan shall be loosed out of his prison, and shall go forth, and seduce the nations which are over the four corners of the earth, Gog and Magog.[235] What is it therefore that he says, that his power over us is taken away?

§ 8. Also, it seems frivolous what he says, that "he began to possess us as native slaves." For by what right did the devil possess us? For it was not of his right to usurp us through this, that we sinned against the Lord: therefore it seems to be nothing what he says.

BUT TO THE CONTRARY: In Revelation, it is said that Christ, a strong Angel descending from the rising of the sun, bound the demon, that he should no more seduce the nations.[236]

Solution. It must be said, that multiple...

§ 1. ... is liberation from the demon. One is with respect to the power of holding [us] arising from the guilt of nature: and by this liberation we have all been liberated sufficiently through the death of Christ, although we are not efficiently liberated except through faith and charity. Before the passion, however, we were all detained at least in limbo. The other is with respect to the power of attacking: and that has not been taken away, but debilitated, principally with respect to four things. One of which is the victory by which he [the demon] was vanquished. For from this he has been made less powerful. The second is the bestowal of helps against him, such as the passion and blood of Christ, which intercede for us: and the other merits of Christ, who, in that He Himself suffered and was tempted, is able to help those who are tempted. The third is the strengthening of those fighting against the demon through the taking away of the fomes [tinder of sin], and the bestowal of greater grace. The fourth, however, which must not be neglected, is the figure of salvation in the sign of the holy cross: which is taken from Gregory in the Dialogues, where demons are read to have been unable to approach a Jew lying in the temple of an idol, because he had signed himself with the cross. Hence they said to their prince that it was an empty vessel, but a signed one. Thus, therefore, we are liberated from the strong one in infinite other ways which we do not see.

§ 2. To the first, therefore, and the second, and the third, and the fourth, it must be said that he still attacks: but his attack does not have as much efficacy as it would have if we did not have these four things from the passion of Christ.

§ 3. To the next it must be said that the Apostle says this because men render themselves unworthy of the help of the passion, and weaken themselves by a multitude of sins: but the passion of Christ operates no less because of this, even if it does not operate in them.

§ 4. To the next objection regarding the time of Antichrist, it must be said that that persecution will rage in the whole Church with unloosed power: but this is not from any weakness of the passion taking away power, but from the justice [of God] unloosing it for a time, on account of the enormous sins of men adhering to Antichrist.

§ 5. To the next it must be said that in truth the demon possessed us by no just title: but nevertheless God justly permitted it on account of our sins: and because the whole world is seated in wickedness, and we are born in a wicked world as children of wrath from a Hittite

232. Ephesians 6:12.

mother and an Amorite father, who are servants of the devil: therefore we are called his home-born slaves, as if born from his house, from a handmaid and a servant: but Christ by His passion bought us, making of the children of the handmaid children of the free woman: so that we are no longer children of the handmaid, but of the free woman: with which freedom Christ has made us free, as the Apostle says, Galatians 4:31.

Articulus 5 — Whether Christ Ought To Have Been Made A Mortal Man, So That Thus He Might Free Man From The Power Of The Devil

Whether Christ ought to have become a mortal man, so that He might thus liberate man from the power of the devil?

§ 6. Next it is inquired concerning what he [the Master] says there, "Therefore He was made a mortal man," etc.

§ 7. For it seems not to have been necessary: because 1. From the fact that the devil detained us unjustly (as will be said below), God could justly draw us back into His own power.

§ 8. 2. Also, It seems that He even ought to have drawn us back into His power: because it belongs to God as a just judge to revoke whatever is done unjustly: but the devil had unjustly claimed us for himself: therefore God ought to have revoked this.

§ 9. 3. Moreover, Why could not an Angel in man satisfy? For an Angel is more unifiable to man (although not to God) than God: because the union of those whose distance is less is easier: but the distance between man and Angel is less than between man and God: therefore man is more unifiable to an Angel, and conversely, than God is to man.

§ 10. 4. Let it therefore be posited to have been done thus: then it seems that he would not be a debtor to death, and thus he could have paid death for others: therefore it is not true what he says in the Letter, that man could not satisfy unless God were in him.

§ 11. Solution. It must be said to the first that God indeed could have justly drawn back the power of the devil whenever He wished: but man would not be justly drawn back: because man well deserved to be in the power of the devil, although the devil had no right over him: hence the justice (of which the Master speaks here) is on the part of the man who is drawn back, not on the part of the demon unjustly claiming the man for himself.

§ 12. Through this the solution to the second is also evident.

§ 13. To the third it must be said that the reason why man could not be liberated except by the God-man has been assigned above: and let these suffice.

§ 14. To the objection, however, that this is false, it must be said that if an Angel were incarnated, he would be a created good simply: therefore everything that he was, and did, and could do, he would owe to the Creator for himself: nor would he even then answer one for a thousand: therefore his justice would not suffice for himself and for all others.

233. 2 Timothy 3:1.

§ 15. Moreover, it was shown above that an offense against God, according to one circumstance, is infinite, and according to the damage inflicted it is also infinite at least in potency, because it took away all who could be born from him [Adam], although not all who would have been born from him; hence it is necessary for the one satisfying to be of infinite goodness and price in some way: and this would not befit any created being: therefore no creature could redeem: and thus what is said here in the Letter is verified.

Articulus 6 — What It Is Called

Whether the passion of Christ liberated us from eternal and temporal punishment?

§ 16. Next it is inquired concerning what he says in the Letter, there, C, "From what punishment? Temporal, and eternal."

§ 17. For here he touches upon the fourth thing from which we have been liberated through the death of Christ.

§ 18. But what he says for the first part seems false, namely that He liberated from eternal punishment, by relaxing the debt of death. For if eternal death means the fire of Gehenna, or eternal damnation: it seems that He did not then liberate those who were in the fire of Gehenna: because He only liberated those who were in limbo: and they were not in death, since they lived by charity, and awaited His coming with happy hope, as Augustine says.

§ 19. Also, Neither after nor before was the debt of eternal death relaxed for anyone through death alone: therefore what he says seems false.

§ 20. Also, Regarding the other part, what he says about liberation from temporal punishment in hope, when in the resurrection the enemy death will be destroyed: seems to be nothing, because

§ 21. 1. If Christ had not been, the saints would still have risen, and the enemy death would have been destroyed in them. Proof. The resurrection of the dead is an article of faith, under which falsity cannot lie: therefore it is necessary for it to happen: therefore whether Christ died or not, they would always have been liberated from temporal punishment.

§ 22. 2. Also, If such a liberation is caused by Christ, it seems rather to be caused by the resurrection, than by His death: because the resurrection of Christ is the cause of our resurrection, as the Gloss says on the first epistle to the Corinthians 15:1 et seq.

§ 23. Solution. It must be said that the death of Christ, by loosing the bond by which we were detained, liberates from both deaths, namely temporal and eternal: but that bond is the obligation from original sin.

§ 24. To the first thing that is asked, then, "What is it called?" I say without prejudice that it is separation from eternal life which is in the vision face to face: and this debt was relaxed in the payment of the price through the passion: and it is not unfitting that the holy Fathers were in that death.

234. Daniel 12:1.

§ 25. But if you ask, "How was that eternal death, since it passed away?" It must be said that it was eternal in its cause on our part, although it passed away by the power of the infinite price that Christ paid for us: for it would never have passed away from us except in that way, or another similar way of liberation which God might have determined.

§ 26. To what is inquired concerning the other part, it must be said in the same way, that our bodies could in no way reach the glory of the resurrection unless the price were paid, and with respect to a payment of this kind we were liberated through the death of Christ.

§ 27. To what is objected concerning the faith of the resurrection, it must be said that the articles of faith are ordered, namely in such a way that the resurrection of the dead is believed to be future by the power of God, with the price paid for us, and the bond broken by which we were detained so that we could not glory.

§ 28. To the next it must be said that now, with respect to the exemplar of the endowments of the body, it is referred to Christ's resurrection: but with respect to the payment of what impedes the glory of the body, it is referred to the passion as to a cause.

Divisio Textus

"Whence He Himself is truly called the redeemer of the world," etc.

§ 35. Here begins that part in which he treats of how Christ, by reason of His merit, is truly called the redeemer and mediator of the world.

§ 36. And therefore it is divided into two parts: in the first of which he shows how He is the redeemer. In the second, how He is called mediator, there, F, "That He alone is called mediator," etc.

§ 37. And that is further divided into two: in the first of which he shows the effect of the mediation, which is reconciliation. In the second, however, he shows in which nature He mediates, and in what ratio of a medium, there, G, "Whence He is also called mediator according to humanity, not according to divinity," etc.

§ 38. And in this the present distinction is terminated.

Articulus 7 — Whether By The Passion Of Christ Every Punishment Is Blotted Out

Whether through the passion of Christ all punishment is deleted?

§ 29. Next it is inquired concerning what he says, there, D, near the beginning: "All temporal punishment, which is owed for sin by the converted, is entirely relaxed in baptism," etc.

§ 30. For this seems false: because contrition and sorrow for sins are required: and those are punishments.

235. Revelation 20:7.

§ 31. Moreover, What is that punishment which is lessened in penance? For penance is inflicted according to the measure of the crimes: therefore it seems that it is not lessened.

§ 32. Also, Since the passion of Christ remits something, and the sorrow of the contrite person something, and the power of the keys something: it seems that no further punishment ought to be inflicted in affliction: since so many and such great helps seem to suffice.

§ 33. Solution to the first. Baptism does not require exterior groaning and weeping: and that it requires the interior in adults, this is not on account of the impotence of baptism, but lest the one approaching be feigned: because fiction places an obstacle to the Holy Spirit of discipline, as is held in Wisdom 1:5.

§ 34. To the next it must be said that the punishment owed for mortal sin is infinite and unproportionable: infinite in duration, because one has merited to be punished for eternity: unproportionable, on account of its bitterness. I say therefore that God, by relaxing the guilt, through Himself remits the eternity of the punishment and the unproportionability of the bitterness: but there still remains a great punishment of expiation, which it is necessary to compensate, but man does not suffice of himself: and therefore the passion of Christ takes away the greatest quantity, insofar as He satisfied for us: and there still remains a punishment payable in this life, if it lasts so long, but heavy for us: and therefore that which is heavy, the passion of Christ takes away in the power of the keys: and there still remains a satisfactory punishment, not very heavy, but arbitrary [discretionary] according to our powers, and the quality and quantity of the offense.

Articulus 8 — Whether Christ Is Truly Called Redeemer

Whether Christ is truly called redeemer?

§ 39. But a doubt arises concerning the first part, according to what notion Christ is called redeemer.

§ 40. 1. For if He is so called by the use of power, as he seems to say in the Letter: then He was redeemer from the beginning: and since it belongs to a redeemer to redeem, because redeemer is a verbal noun, and pertains to the act of redeeming, it seems that He redeemed from the beginning, which is false.

§ 41. 2. Also, It was held above in this same distinction that the use of power was not to be used in the redemption of man, but rather justice was to be used: since therefore that [justice] is nothing else than by undertaking the sacraments of redemption in Himself, it seems that the Son rather is the redeemer, and not the Father or the Holy Spirit.

§ 42. 3. Also, The use of power is in all divine acts, but not all divine acts are works of redemption: therefore the use of power does not suffice for someone to be called redeemer: therefore the Father and the Holy Spirit ought not to be called redeemer, but the Son alone.

§ 43. Solution. It must be said that in truth He is called redeemer in two ways, as he says in the Letter, namely by the use of power, and by the effect of humility: but the use of power

236. Revelation 20:1-3.

absolutely does not make a redeemer, but rather the use of power in that work through which there is redemption: for unless there had been divine power in the passion of Christ, He would not have overcome death by death, nor conquered hell, but would solely have been free among the dead: and in this use of power the Father and the Holy Spirit operated with Christ, although not in the sustaining of the passion, and the effect of humility. And this is what the Master intends. Hence Christ Himself says, John 14:10: "The Father abiding in Me, He doeth the works." And, Luke 11:20, He says of the Holy Spirit: "If I by the finger of God cast out demons, doubtless the kingdom of God is come upon you."

§ 44. And through this the solution to all the objections is evident.

Articulus 9 — Whether Christ Received In Himself The Sacraments Which Are The Cause Of Our Justification

Whether Christ received in Himself the sacraments which are the cause of our justification?

§ 45. Next it is inquired concerning what he says, there, E, towards the end: "In it He received and fulfilled those sacraments," etc.

§ 46. For the sacraments which are the cause of our justification are penance, extreme unction, and the like, concerning which it is not read that Christ received them.

§ 47. But to this it must be said that sacraments are twofold, namely on our part, which are as it were medicine, like vessels bringing medicine to us: and sacraments in Christ, like His nativity, passion, and resurrection, and the like, which are the cause of our redemption on the part of the one satisfying for us, from whom the sacraments which we receive have their power: and we are speaking of those here.

§ 48. Or it can be said that Christ exhibited the reality [res] of the sacraments by giving them their effect: although He did not receive the sacraments as we receive them. For He received baptism by giving the regenerative power to the waters: but the reality and act of confirmation for us: the lament of penance, by weeping and praying and fasting for us, so that our lament could have its effect: the distribution of the Eucharist, by giving His body to the disciples: order, moreover, by making them partakers of His power in binding and loosing and consecrating His body: the act of extreme unction He is not read to have received, because the unction by Mary was not done with oil: but He exhibited the perfect reality of it when He rose, anointed with the oil of the exultation of full glory.

§ 49. However, the first solution is of the intention of the Letter.

§ 50. Others say that He exhibited the sacraments when blood and water flowed forth from His side, John 19:34: "One of the soldiers with a spear opened His side, and immediately there came out blood and water," namely the water of expiation, and the blood of redemption.

Articulus 10 — Whether Christ Is Mediator Between God

Whether Christ is the mediator between God and man?

§ 51. Next it is inquired concerning the other part where it is said, there, F, "That He alone is called mediator," etc.

§ 52. 1. For if Christ is called mediator according to human nature, He seems rather to be called an extreme, than a middle: because man is an extreme.

§ 53. 2. Also, A middle never has in itself in act both of the extremes: but Christ is true God, and true man: therefore He Himself is not a middle between God and man.

§ 54. 3. Also, He seems to contradict himself in the Letter. For first he says that Christ is mediator by reason of human nature only: and afterwards near the end of the second chapter speaking of the heretics, he says: "If therefore Christ according to you, O heretics, has only one nature, whence will He be a middle? and unless He be a middle in such a way that..."

[Continuing sentence from previous page: "...He be a middle in such a way that..."] § 55. ...He is God on account of the nature of divinity, man on account of the nature of humanity, He may be a middle on account of the conjunction of both natures." And here he says that it is on account of the human only. Therefore he is contrary to himself.

§ 56. 4. If a middle is so called by participation in the extremes, then the middle will be equidistant from both extremes: therefore the act of the middle will not be to conjoin one extreme with the other: therefore the act of the mediator will not be to reconcile man to God, as it seems.

§ 57. 5. Also, Since agreement with both extremes is found in another: like the demon, who is immortal with God, and miserable with us, will he himself be a mediator between us and God? It seems so: because he agrees with both extremes.

§ 58. 6. Also, A good Angel who is a creature with us, but immortal and good with God, seems to be a middle between us and God: therefore to be a mediator does not only belong to Christ, as it seems.

§ 59. The solution to almost all these is through a certain authority of Augustine in book IX of The City of God, which is indeed long, but good: where he speaks thus: "It was necessary for the mediator between us and God to have both a passing mortality, and a permanent beatitude: so that through that which passes, He might congruously [accommodate] those about to die, and to that which is permanent, He might transfer them from the dead. Good Angels, therefore, cannot be middles between miserable mortals and the blessed and immortal: because there [with God] they are both blessed and immortal. Bad Angels, however, can be middles, because they are immortal with the former, and miserable with the latter. Contrary to these is the good mediator, who against their immortality and misery, both willed to be mortal for a time, and could persist blessed in eternity. And thus, lest by the boasting of immortality they seduce to misery, He destroyed them—immortal, proud, and miserable, noxious—by the humility of His death, and by the benignity of His beatitude in those whose hearts, cleansing by faith in Him, He liberated from their most unclean damnation."[237] From this it is evident that neither a good Angel nor a bad Angel is a mediator: because the good Angel does not agree with us, but the bad Angel, although he agrees, nevertheless does not

have the act of a mediator in conjoining to the blessed, but rather the act of a seducer. Hence in the same place below Augustine says: "For to this end the immortal and miserable middle interposes himself, so that he may not allow a passing to blessed immortality, since that which impedes persists, namely the misery itself. But to this end the mortal and blessed one interposes Himself, so that, mortality having been transacted, He might make from the dead immortals, which He showed in Himself by rising, and from the miserable, blessed, from which He Himself never departed."[238] From this it is gathered that that middle is a middle which is as a way into the extreme, and a middle of conjunction, and not by equidistance from both.

§ 60. It must be said therefore to the first, that Christ insofar as He is man, agrees with an extreme: and from the power of the union He has something in which He agrees with the other, namely justice and the fullness of grace: because without that He would not be a conjoining middle, but a distant one, and making distant, like the bad angel: but He agrees with man through mortality, which is the way through the payment of the price. And thus each is mediating, namely that in which He agrees with man, because mortality is passing into immortality, and that in which He agrees with God, which is the fullness of grace of which we have all received grace for grace. Hence He is not called a middle here by respect to nature, but rather to the two properties of the nature so united, in

[Continuing sentence from previous page: "...to the two properties of the nature so united, in..."] § 61. ...one of which He agrees with one extreme, and in the other with the remaining one, and in both He is the way for the inferior extreme into the superior extreme.

§ 62. To the next it must be said that there is a middle by negation and commingling: and such a one does not have the extremes in itself, but that which is a middle in such a way that it has the act of a mediator, which is to unite the inferior extreme to the superior: but Christ is a middle in such a way that He Himself is the mediator, and the one conjoining one with the other: and therefore it is necessary to have the extremes in Himself in act.

§ 63. To the next it must be said that he [the Master] is not contrary to himself: because "middle" sounds like inferiority: but Christ, according to the fact that He is the Word, is not inferior to the Father, but equal: nevertheless the union of the Word is exacted for being a mediator: because He has one extreme through nature, namely immortality, and the other through union to the divine nature, although nevertheless it is in the human nature according to the fullness of grace, because the Spirit was given to Him not by measure, and because, if the union were to cease, the human nature would not have that fullness of grace: and therefore Augustine speaks against the heretics, saying that He would not be a mediator unless He had both natures: not that the divine is the mediator of both: but because, in order that He could be a mediator in the one nature, which is the way in Him to the remaining one, both are exacted. That it is so, moreover, is gathered from Augustine, who speaks thus in book IX of The City of God: "Nor is He a mediator on this account, because He is the Word: for the supremely immortal and supremely blessed Word is far from mortal miseries: but He is mediator through the fact that He is man, by that very fact showing indeed that for that not only

237. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, lib. IX.

blessed but also beatific good, other mediators ought not to be sought, through whom we might judge that steps of arrival are to be constructed for us: because the blessed and beatific God, made a partaker of our humanity, offered a shortcut to partaking of His divinity."

§ 64. To the next it must be said that the middle which is a mediator and a way (so to speak) is not so called by equidistance: because this has opposition with both of the extremes.

§ 65. To the next it must be said that the demon has a certain agreement with both: but his immortality is not true immortality: and therefore he does not agree except in a qualified sense [secundum quid]. Moreover, he himself is not a way, but rather an abduction: and therefore it does not befit him to mediate.

§ 66. To the next it must be said that a good Angel does not agree: because the fact of being a creature is not a sufficient agreement. Moreover, he could not mediate between God and man by reconciling them, as was held earlier.

DISTINCTIO XX

Divisio Textus

"But if it is inquired whether God could have liberated man in another way," etc.

§ 67. Here begins the fourth part of that division which was placed at the beginning of distinction XVIII. And here it is treated whether God could have liberated otherwise than through death: and it lasts up to that place where it is said in this same distinction, there, C, "Christ therefore is the priest, and the same is the victim," etc.

§ 68. And it is divided into two parts: in the first of which he shows the reasons of congruity why He willed to redeem in this way, since another way was possible. In the second, he executes the case between God, and man, and the devil, there, B, "For if those three had come into a case," etc.

§ 69. In the first part he does three things. First he proposes the question: and second, he gives one reason for the solution from those things that assist toward the hope of immortality. Third, he gives another from the rationale of justice. And he does these three things in one chapter: and from this the sentence is evident.

Articulus 1 — Whether Another Mode Of Liberation Is Possible Besides That By Which The Human Race Has Been Liberated

Whether another mode of liberation is possible besides that by which the human race was liberated?

§ 70. But a doubt arises here first: If another mode is possible, as he says, or not?

238. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, lib. IX.

§ 71. And if this is true, that another is possible: then it is inquired secondly, by what possibility is it possible?

§ 72. It is proceeded to the first in this way: 1. Anselm says that the least inconvenience is impossible to the most decent justice of God; but the greatest inconvenience is the injustice of a judgment, and especially before that judge from whom there is no appeal to another: therefore to sustain injustice is impossible for God: but to remit sin without condign satisfaction is an unjust judgment: therefore this is impossible for God. But it was proved above, and will still be proved more fully, that no one could make condign satisfaction for sin except the God-man: for Ambrose said this in the preceding distinction: therefore it seems that another mode was not possible.

§ 73. 2. Also, Congruity and incongruity are opposed: either therefore in the genus of nature, or in the genus of morals. It is certain, insofar as he speaks of them here, that they are not opposed in the genus of nature: because he does not speak of natures, but of a work of the will, which is liberation: therefore they are opposed in the genus of morals: therefore if congruous is good, it is necessary that incongruous be evil, because good is not opposed to good: but God or the Son of God cannot do evil: therefore He cannot do what is incongruous. If therefore another mode was not congruous to healing our misery, another mode was not possible for God.

§ 74. 3. Also, When it is inquired, as Anselm says, "Whether the human race could be liberated in another way?" the mode is not inquired on the part of God who can do all things, but the mode is inquired on our part: therefore this is to inquire, "Could we ourselves exit from the guilt of sin in another way?" But it is certain that not except through God satisfying, who would also be man, as Anselm proves: therefore another mode was not possible for God.

§ 75. 4. Also, Certain authorities seem to say this expressly, one of which is, Titus 2:11, the Gloss on that, "The grace... hath appeared," etc., says thus: "We would not be partakers of His deity, unless He Himself were a partaker of our mortality."[239] Since therefore we are not partakers, except through the grace of reconciliation, we would not have been reconciled, unless He had died for us in our humanity.

§ 76. Also, Romans 5:19, on that, "For as by the disobedience of one," etc., the Gloss: "That faith is sound, by which we believe that no man, whether of infantile age, or greater, is liberated from the contagion of the ancient death, and the obligation of sin, which the first nativity contracted, except through the one mediator of God and men, the man Jesus Christ, by the most salutary faith in whom they are made safe."[240]

§ 77. Also, Anselm in the book Cur Deus homo: "He could not pass the chalice unless He drank it, not because He could not avoid death if He wished, but (as has been said) it was impossible to save the world otherwise."[241]

§ 78. Also, Hebrews 2:10, on that, "...to make the author of their salvation perfect by suffering," etc., the Gloss: "Unless Christ died, man would not be redeemed: and unredeemed he would perish, and all things would have been made in vain."[242]

§ 79. From these and many others it seems to be concluded that there was no other mode possible for liberating the human race.

§ 80. 5. Also some object thus: God had foreseen and predestined that mode, because predestination is of all salutary goods: but what is predestined, it is impossible not to be: and to be necessary, and to be possible not to be, are contradictories in the fourth and second mode of modals.

§ 81. 6. Also, The faith of the Patriarchs believed this mode: but falsity cannot underlie faith: therefore it was necessary for this mode of liberation to be: therefore it was not possible for there to be another.

§ 82. ON THE CONTRARY: Gregory in the Morals: "He who made us exist from nothing, could also have recalled us without His death and passion."[243]

§ 83. Also, Pope Leo in the reading for Palm Sunday: "The omnipotence of the Son of God, which on account of the same essence is equal to the Father, could have stripped the human race from the dominion of the devil by the sole command of His will, unless in the divine works it had most congruously befitted that the hostility of enemy wickedness should be vanquished from that which it had vanquished."[244]

§ 84. Also, Augustine in book XIII of On the Trinity: "Therefore, those who say, 'Did God thus lack another mode by which He might liberate men from the misery of this mortality, that He should will the only-begotten Son, God coeternal to Himself, to become man, by putting on a human soul and flesh, morta-...'"[245] [Sentence incomplete]

and fact, to suffer death: it is not enough to refute this by asserting that this mode is good and congruent with divine dignity; rather, we must also show not that another possible mode was lacking to God, to whose power all things are equally subject, but that there was no other mode more convenient for healing our misery."

Likewise, on that text of Psalm 21:3: And not for folly to me, the Gloss says: "So that the human race might wisely be freed by my blood: for there is no more convenient mode of our liberation than that man, who fell through pride, should rise again through humility."

To this end there are also arguments not only proving that another mode was possible, but even that another was more congruent.

§ 1. For it is not congruent for one worthy of honor to suffer punishments and exile. But the Son was worthy of all honor: therefore, he ought not to have done this injury to himself, to undergo punishments and exile.

§ 2. Again, to remit sin without satisfaction would have been of greater perfection: therefore, that mode would have been more congruent for the most perfect God. The proof of the first is that he invites us to this, that we should love our enemies, and forgive all who are in debt to us, even without exacting satisfaction. If, therefore, he persuades us to this good, he first ought to have done it in himself.

239. Glossa Ordinaria, on Titus 2:11.

If you say that he could not deny himself: but he would have denied himself if he acted against his own justice. Against this: Just as he himself is his own justice, so he himself is his own mercy which exalts itself above judgment: therefore, by exacting so heavy a reparation, he seems to go against his own mercy.

§ 3. Again, a judge is impious who exacts more in reparation than the guilty party can do: because he does not seek the amendment of the guilty party, but thirsts for his blood, since all justice seeks only to amend and save man. Therefore, if God exacts such a reparation that a mere man, or a man in the state into which he had fallen, could not provide, it seems that he did not exact it fittingly, but impiously, thirsting for the death of man. Therefore, since it is not lawful to believe this of God, it seems that a mere man could satisfy by himself: and thus another mode was possible for God.

§ 4. Or if you say that man was not in grace, and thus could do nothing pleasing. Against this is the fact that when a man does what he can, God immediately gives him grace: but there were many who did what they could, and had grace, and thus it was possible for all if they had prepared themselves. Therefore, it seems that God ought to have accepted what they were able to do.

§ 5. Again, in 1 John 5:3, it is said that his commandments are not heavy. And Jerome says that let him be anathema who says that God commanded impossibilities. Therefore, he never exacts from man such a mode of reparation that he could not fulfill unless God were man, as it seems.

Solution. Without prejudice, I say that another mode was possible, considering the power of God for whom nothing is unjust, as Anselm says, and nothing is impossible: but nevertheless on our part it was impossible for us to be redeemed except through God and man: not that I intend to say that if God had freed us we would not have been freed: but rather one must consider the power of liberation on the part of God, and on our part, and on the part of both together, namely of God and man. On the part of God, indeed, another mode was possible; on the part of man, however, another mode seems to me impossible. But if it is considered on the part of both, that is, our possibility related to God's power in which whatever he wills is done, there was indeed another possible mode, but none so convenient. For if it is asked, "Can a calf be made from a log?" we say no. But if it is asked, "Can God make a calf from a log?" we say yes.

With these things established, it is easy to answer the objections.

§ To the first, therefore, it must be said that to remit a fault unpunished is said in two ways. Namely, unpunished, that is, without any punishment: and this is impossible before the judgment of God, because, as Anselm says, the impious would be like the just before God, and sin would please God just as virtue does, which is impossible. Or, to remit sin without condign punishment: and this belongs to a judge seeking the amendment of the guilty party, and it would have been in this mode if God had pardoned man's sin without the death of the

240. Glossa Ordinaria, on Romans 5:19.

Son. For he had punished man in this life, and could punish him further in purgatory; and thus nothing unseemly on his part would follow from this.

§ To the next it must be said that "congruent" and "incongruent" are taken on our part, and not on the part of the judgment of God, to whom everything he does is congruent. Because even that which seems incongruent from contrary usage, if God were to do it, it would be most congruent. Hence, if he were to spare from condign punishment, it would be imputed to clemency, provided that justice were saved to the extent that the sin would remain punished by a penalty that amends, not suffocates, the guilty party.

§ To the next it must be said that I well concede that if possibility on our part is considered, as Anselm says, there will be no justice except one restoring what was taken away and satisfying the offense: and this could not be except through God and man, as Anselm and Ambrose say.

§ To the next it must be said that all those authorities speak of the possibility of congruence, and not of the power of God in itself.

§ To the next it must be said that predestination does not impose necessity, but causes immutability: and therefore nothing prohibits that another mode is still possible, if liberation is considered in general and in itself.

§ To the next it must be said that faith is concerning that which will not be otherwise than it is believed to be, but nevertheless it is possible to be otherwise: for faith and predestination indeed remove the act of immutability to the contrary, or to something other than what they are about, but they do not remove the potency of mutability: and therefore those arguments do not compel.

§ It is also necessary to solve the arguments for the opposite view: because according to my opinion, considering the power of satisfying on our part, no other mode was possible.

§ I say, therefore, to the first, that all those authorities speak of the power of God liberating, and not of the power of man who owes satisfaction.

§ But to what is objected through arguments, it must be said that it befitted the Son of God out of goodness to exhibit every sign of love to man which pertained to salvation, unless this were to result in an injury to justice or to the deity. But it was not an injury to the deity: because the deity neither suffered nor suffered with [humanity]; rather, the Son of God suffered in human nature: and in this it befitted the deity that there be exile and mortality.

§ To the next it must be said that God could have remitted the injury in another mode, but shame would have remained on the part of man, namely that man would have taken away what he did not restore. And if you ask, "Could God have taken away this shame?" I say without prejudice that he could indeed have taken away the reproach, but nevertheless he could not have changed the truth: because he would have acted against himself. For it was true concerning the past that man stole what he could not pay back by himself: and therefore

241. Anselm, Cur Deus homo, lib. I.

it was most congruent for the most clement judge to make such a judgment that sin would be destroyed, and man, by giving as much or more than he stole, would be freed from both reproach and sin at the same time.

§ To the next it must be said that to exact more than a man can do is said in two ways. Namely, simply, and thus it sounds like extortion; or from the expenses of the judge, so that the guilty party might recover his original dignity. And thus to exact more than a mere man can do sounds of the mercy and goodness of the judge toward us: and this is what Psalm 110:9 says: The Lord has sent redemption to his people. For what he exacted beyond our powers was to the accumulation of our glory: because otherwise conscience, the witness of truth, would always say that we had stolen, and had not paid back God's honor.

§ To the next it must be said that a man, in whatever amount of grace he may be, provided he is a mere man, cannot satisfy for the sin which has abounded unto the whole world: and this has been sufficiently proved in the premises. Nor, however, according to the sayings of the Saints, do I believe that the grace of salvation was ever given to anyone after the first sin, except in the love and faith of the Only-begotten, who reconciled all. I do not say that it could not have been given, as far as God's power is concerned. And thus it is clear that his objection amounts to nothing.

§ To the next it must be said that the commandments are not heavy to one having charity: and this is because the Son of God lightened them for us by sustaining on our behalf what we ought to have sustained: because the Lord laid on him the iniquity of us all ; and therefore it is now easy for us. Whence it can be said, as before, that he did not thus exact from us something impossible for us to our injury, but to our glory, since he himself gave his Only-begotten through whom what was previously impossible for us was made possible, although not impossible for God to whom nothing is difficult.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 2 — What That Possibility Is, Of Which It Is Said That Another Mode Was Possible To God

What is that possibility of which it is said that another mode was possible for God?

Secondly, it is asked: What is that possibility of which it is said that another mode was possible for God?

But it seems that there is none: because § 1. The power of God cannot be except according to the most fitting congruence: therefore, God can do nothing that he cannot do congruently.

§ 2. Again, the power of God is not related to a work except according to the order of pre-ordaining wisdom, because otherwise God would act precipitately. But the wisdom of God had pre-ordained this mode: therefore, another mode was not possible for God, as it seems.

§ 3. Again, let it be granted that the power of God is with respect to this, as was evident in the effect, it would be changed from work to work. Since therefore this is a kind of change,

242. Glossa Ordinaria, on Hebrews 2:10.

and God is utterly immutable: it seems that if the power of God was concerning this mode, it could not have been concerning another.

ON THE CONTRARY: God does not act by necessity of nature, as natural potency and power do, but he acts by freedom of the will. But whatever the freedom of the will does, it can do, and not do, and do in another mode. Therefore, it seems that God could liberate in this mode, and not liberate, and liberate in another mode: because otherwise he himself would be less free in acting than we are, which is absurd.

Solution. It must be said that God's power is one and simple; nevertheless it can

be considered in two ways. Namely, as executing the foresight and ordination of wisdom, and thus it seems that no other mode of our liberation was possible than what was foreseen by ordaining wisdom: but nevertheless another mode could have been foreseen, and then operating power would execute the other. It is considered otherwise according as it is antecedent to wisdom: for God can do things which he has not ordained himself to do through wisdom ordaining all things: and speaking of this power, another mode was possible: and the Saints mostly speak of this possibility.

§ To the first, therefore, it must be said that whatever God might do, by that very fact it would be most fitting with respect to the operator, because he himself would do it, as was said before. And if you object that Aristotle says that God can do evil things, it must be said that he took "evil things" there materially, that is, he can do that which is evil, which nevertheless would not be evil, but optimal by the very fact that God did it.

§ To the next it must be said that this argument proceeds concerning the power executing the order of foreseeing wisdom: and we are not speaking of this when we say that another mode of liberation was possible for God.

§ To the next it must be said that God's power is immutable: because if it were granted that it was concerning another mode, it would follow that it never was concerning this one. For although each of these is possible separately—"God's power is concerning this mode," and "God's power is concerning another mode"—nevertheless they are not compossible according to the relation to operating power: because otherwise God would change his work, which cannot be.

Articulus 3 — If Another Mode Of Liberation Was Possible, Whether Another Mode Of Redemption Was Also Possible

If another mode of liberation was possible, was another mode of redemption also possible?

Next it is asked concerning what he says there, A, around the beginning: But there was no other more convenient mode for healing our misery, etc.

For there can be a doubt, although another mode of our liberation was possible, whether nevertheless another mode by which we might be redeemed was not possible. For this is proved thus:

243. Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob.

§ 1. To redeem is to recover one's property by a just price or by war. But a just price could not be anything but equivalent to the offense and the damage. But, as was proved, the damage is the whole human nature lost, and whatever flowed down into a worse state within it, and all this that is of an inferior nature to man, as the Gloss on Romans 8:22 says upon the text: Every creature groans and travails in pain until now. The offense, moreover, was infinite, because it was against God. Therefore, the just price had to be an infinite good: and for this nothing was sufficient but God and man, who ought to pay as man, and could pay as God. Therefore, redemption could not be accomplished except through God and man.

§ 2. Again, if we speak of the redemption of war and by right: then, as is clear in the Text, it is just that the same one conquer who was conquered, and in the same thing, namely on a tree. Whence Ambrose in his hymn on the Passion: He himself then marked the wood, That he might undo the damages of the wood [246].

This, therefore, again could not be done justly,

except through God and man: and thus another mode of our redemption was not possible.

§ 3. Again, let it be granted that we are redeemed by someone other than God, whether it be a man newly made from uncorrupted nature, or an incarnate Angel. To him, therefore, we are bound as to a redeemer: therefore, we will always be inferior to him. But man is a creature in such great dignity that he was subject to none but God alone: therefore, by that redemption he will not have been restored to his original dignity. Therefore, a perfect redemption is not accomplished by him.

§ 4. Again, God foresaw man as future in dignity equal to the Angels. If, therefore, an Angel had redeemed him, he would not be in equal dignity: therefore, God would be frustrated in his pre-ordination. Because all these things are impossible, it seems that another mode of our redemption was not possible.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. From an unjust possessor one ought not to redeem a pledge, but to vindicate it into one's power. But the devil unjustly possessed us, as will be said below in this same distinction. Therefore, one ought not to have redeemed man from him with such a price.

§ 2. Again, it is impious to say that the price of the world, namely Christ's blood and soul, were offered to the devil for the redemption of man. Since, therefore, no one held us except the devil, it seems that we are not redeemed from the devil, neither in this mode, nor in another mode.

Solution. Speaking without prejudice, I concede the first arguments: there was no other possible mode of our redemption except through the payment of such a price, unless "redemption" is taken broadly for "liberation." For there is only a twofold redemption. Namely, by right of war, and thus we are redeemed from the servitude of the devil by the victory of Christ. And by payment of a price, and thus we are not redeemed from the devil: for God forbid that Christ was offered to the devil for us, but rather to the Father; and we are released

244. Leo the Great, Sermones.

from the decree of the Father obliging us not to enter paradise unless there appeared in one such a great justice of humility that it would suffice for all, as was said above.

And through this the solution to the last objection is clear.

§ To the preceding objection it must be said that although the devil unjustly possessed us, and the price was not paid to the devil, nevertheless we were justly possessed, as that just sentence of the judge's justice held us in obligation, to whom also the price was paid in our redemption.

Articulus 4 — Whether, If Man Had Not Sinned, The Son Of God Would Have Been Incarnate

If man had not sinned, would the Son of God have become incarnate?

Next it is asked concerning what he says there, A, around the beginning: For what so lifts up our minds, namely to love, etc.

§ 1. According to this, then, if man had not sinned, it seems that he would not have provoked us so much to his love. Whence in a certain sequence it is sung: O exceedingly blessed fault, by which nature is redeemed. God who created all things is born of a woman. As if to say: By the very fact that the fault was committed, God became man. Therefore, if man had not sinned, God would not have become incarnate.

§ 2. Again, in certain churches during the blessing of the Paschal candle it is sung: O happy fault, that merited to have such and so great a redeemer. Therefore it seems that if there were no fault, the Son of God would not have become incarnate.

§ 3. Again, on that text of the Apostle, Romans 8:28: We know that to them that love God, all things work together unto good, to such as, according to his purpose, are called to be saints, the Gloss says, "Even sins." Therefore, the sin of the universe ought to have worked together for the same good for the universe: but this is original sin, which all draw from Adam. Therefore, some good can be elicited from it: but this is not easily found except by Christ being incarnate. Therefore it seems that Christ would not have become incarnate if there had been no sin.

§ 4. Again, for what would he have become incarnate? For we would not then have needed a teacher, or a liberator, or a redeemer. Therefore it seems that if there had been no sin, he would not have aroused us to charity for him in the way that he did once the sin was committed.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. Good is diffusive of itself and its being: therefore, it will belong to the best to diffuse itself in the best mode it can. But it cannot be diffused in us better than by becoming incarnate. Therefore it seems that he would have become incarnate even if there were no sin.

§ 2. Again, Anselm says that there are four generations belonging to the perfection of nature, without which generation is imperfect. Namely: from virgin earth, a virgin man; from

245. Augustine, De Trinitate, lib. XIII.

a virgin man, a virgin woman; from a corrupt man and woman, an infant (not a virgin). There remained therefore the fourth mode: to produce a virgin from a virgin woman; otherwise the order of generation would not have been perfect. Therefore, since God's works are perfect, he would have fulfilled this order even if man had not sinned. But from a virgin none can be born except the Son of God, as Cassian says. Therefore the Son of God would have become incarnate, even if man had not sinned.

§ 3. Again, above it was proved through the words of the Saints that an Angel is not unifiable [to the Word], but man is. Since, therefore, no aptitude is created by God in vain, it was necessary for this aptitude to be fulfilled. Therefore it was necessary for God to become incarnate.

§ 4. Again, sin did not make our nature more similar and more unifiable with God than it was before sin. Since, therefore, it is more similar to God without sin than after sin, it seems it is also more unifiable: and thus it was more fitting for God to be united to it, as it seems.

§ 5. Again, the perfection of the universe consists in a circular dimension, as the Philosopher proves; and because nothing can be added to a circle, therefore the world is perfected with the greatest perfection of nature. Therefore, since similarly God's works are perfect, the last must be closed into the first so that a circle is made. But the first is God, and the last is man. Therefore God and man must be united. And this would happen even if man did not sin.

§ 6. Again, the greatest love communicates itself in the greatest mode. But it cannot do so more than by uniting itself. Therefore, since he has such love for man, he will unite himself to him. Therefore it seems also that he would unite himself to him, if he had not sinned.

Solution. It must be said that in this question the solution is uncertain. But as far as I am able to opine, I believe that the Son of God would have become man, even if there had never been a sin. Nor, however, would he have become an Angel, because an Angel is not unifiable by nature as man is, as we showed above. Nevertheless, I say this without asserting anything about it; but I believe that what I have said accords better with the piety of faith.

§ I say, therefore, to the first, that such expressions are extremely improper, as when a fault is called "blessed" and "happy": because it is not called blessed and happy in itself, but consequently. And although perhaps Christ's incarnation does not follow from the fault, nevertheless the great works of redemption through labor, passion, and death followed from the fault.

Through this the solution to the second is also clear.

§ To the next it must be said that sin does not work together unto good except accidentally, namely because someone sometimes rises again more fervent and more pleasing than when he fell, and is made more humble and cautious. But whether Christ's incarnation also followed [accidentally upon sin], I do not know; but this is certain, that redemption through his death followed. § To the next it must be said that he would have become incarnate for the showing of his extraordinary love, and so that he might prepare manifold delights for man,

246. Venantius Fortunatus, Pange lingua gloriosi proelium certaminis (often attributed to Ambrose in the Middle Ages).

when he would contemplate as a brother in the flesh him whom he has as the God of the universe.

§ But if we wish to maintain the contrary, which nevertheless does not seem right to me, we will say to the first objection to the contrary, that the good does not diffuse itself according to the order of nature, but according to the capacity of those who receive it. However, the union of the deity to the flesh does not fall within any capacity of nature or merit: and therefore it would not be necessary that he diffuse himself in that mode.

§ To the next it must be said that nature would have been complete without the ultimate mode in the being of nature, although not in the optimal being of grace. Nor is it necessary for God to make each thing in the optimal being in which he could make it if he wished; but it suffices that he make it as he wills, provided that he denies them nothing of their natural endowments.

§ To the next it must be said that that aptitude is not from nature, but from the grace of election, as was often held above: because that man, that he might be assumed into the unity of the Son of God, had this not by merits or by nature, but by grace.

§ To the next it must be said that although sin did not make nature deiform, nevertheless it made a redeemer necessary: and this necessity compelled the merciful God to become incarnate.

§ To the next it must be said that such an account of a circle is not necessary for perfection, but rather a circle of order: namely, that those things that issued forth from God as from a principle be ordered to God as to an end.

§ To the next it must be said that the showing of love in glorification was sufficient: because it was not necessary for God to show every mode of love, just as he does not do so now.

§ But to what is objected concerning predestination, it has a special solution, namely that predestination supposes the order of wisdom; and that wisdom foresaw the future fault, and therefore preordained a redeemer. But nevertheless the first view seems more probable to me.

Articulus 5 — What The Justice Is By Which The Devil Was Overcome, Whether Of The Redeemer Or Of The Redeemed

What is the justice by which the devil is overcome: whether that of the redeemer, or of the redeemed?

Next it is asked concerning what he says there, A, around the middle: Thus by justice the devil is overcome, etc.

For there can be a doubt here: what is the justice by which the devil is overcome? For either this is the justice of the redeemed, or the justice of the redeemer. If it is in the first mode, since they did justice even before the incarnation of Christ, it seems that they ought to have been redeemed: just as it is said of Abraham in Romans 4:11, that Abraham received the sign of circumcision, a seal of the justice of faith [247]; Noah was a just and perfect man in his generations [248]; and so on of others. But if it is the justice of the redeemer, as seems to be said in the Text, then it seems that justice is not done: because it is not equitable that one who did not do justice should be freed through the justice of another.

Further it is asked: If there were, or had been, another mode, would it be unjust?

It seems not: because God can do nothing unjust.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. The mode of power here is divided against the mode of justice. Therefore, if Christ had used the mode of power, it would not have been a just mode.

§ 2. Again, let it be posited that God had assumed our flesh, and yet had snatched us away by power. Then it seems the mode would have been more convenient: because then we would be bound to thanksgiving for the assumed nature, and yet he and we would come to the kingdom by a similar labor. Therefore, that would have been a more convenient mode, and binding us more to God.

§ 3. Again, in the judgment of man, fraud is not advantageous to anyone; therefore it ought not to acquire any right in the judgment of God. But it is clear that the devil fraudulently deceived man; therefore no right was acquired by him in man. Therefore it seems to have been a more unjust mode that he left man to him as if adjudicated to him, and wished to free him by justice, than if, by condemning the demon on account of the fraud, he had drawn man back into his own power.

Solution. It must be said that no mode can be just on the part of God [in the strict sense of owing a debt]: but on the part of man, justice is redemption in return for merits; and therefore a satisfactory punishment for the fault must be inflicted. Whence I say that the first is understood of the justice of the redeemer, which he pays for the redeemed.

§ To what is objected to the contrary, it must be said that the justice of the redeemer was exacted for this reason: so that there would be no obstacle in them. For the grace of the head does not flow out over the members unless there is a disposition in the members, as if they are receptive of grace. And thus both are exacted: one as preparing the subject, the other as liberating.

§ To the next it must be said that every mode would have been just for God, but not as convenient on the part of the redeemed man.

§ To the next it must be said that the mode of power is not divided against the mode of justice as opposed to it, but as not as congruent, not on God's part, but on our part, as was expounded earlier.

§ To the next it must be said that the fraud of the demons was not without the fault of the deceived man. And therefore, although it ought not to have been advantageous to the demons, nevertheless it ought to have been harmful to man; and therefore on that part it was necessary for the justice of the liberator to be set against the injustice of man.

Articulus 6 — Whether Only Original Or Actual Sin Is The Cause Why We Need A Redeemer, And Whether Each One Could By Himself Satisfy For Actual Sin

Whether only original sin or also actual sin is the cause why we need a redeemer? And, whether anyone could satisfy by himself for actual sin?

Next it is asked concerning what he says there, A, around the middle: By a certain justice of God the human race was handed over into the power of the devil, etc.

For from this it seems that only original sin is the cause why we need a redeemer: and thus it seems that anyone could satisfy for himself for actual sin.

But this does not seem so: because § 1. A sin committed by oneself is greater than one contracted from another: therefore greater satisfaction is exacted for it. If, therefore, it was necessary for the justice of the redeemer to intervene for the other sin [i.e., original sin], much more ought this to be done for one's own sin. Therefore, a heavier sin is that which is punished with a heavier penalty in the delinquent; but actual sin is punished in the delinquent by the lack of the vision of God and by burning fire, whereas original sin is punished only by the lack of the vision of God. Therefore, if original sin exacts a redeemer, much more does actual sin.

§ 2. Again, this seems so from the authority of the Saints posited above, who say that remission is never granted to anyone, neither infant nor adult, except in the faith of the mediator. But it is clear that the faith of the mediator conjoins the justice of Christ with the justified. Therefore, without the justice of Christ, no sin is remitted.

§ 3. Again, if it is true what all the Saints and Doctors say in common, that the passion of Christ operates in all the sacraments: then it must be said that it also operates in penance. Since thereis remitted without the sacrament of penance, no sin was ever remitted: without the justice of the mediator in the passion, no sin was ever remitted.

§ 4. Moreover, Isaiah 53:6: All we like sheep have gone astray...: and the Lord has laid on him the iniquity of us all therefore he laid on him actual iniquity as well.

§ 5. Moreover, the Gloss on Romans 3:25 says that the sins of those preceding were sustained by God, until they came to the showing of the justice of the one redeeming through Christ .

§ 6. Moreover, it is expressly written in the preceding distinction thus: In penance the punishment is diminished through Christ: for that punishment by which the Church binds penitents would not suffice, unless the merit of Christ, who paid for us, cooperated. Now, it is

247. Rom. 4:11.

established that the Church obliges no one to temporal punishment for original sin. Therefore, we would not be able to make satisfaction for actual sin, unless the justice of Christ existed.

§ 7. Moreover, Anselm's reason is that we needed a redeemer: because offending God causes an infinite offense, just as He Himself is the infinite good: therefore, since God is offended in actual mortal sin, it seems by the same reason to demand a redeemer.

But against these things some object thus: § 1. Another mode was possible: therefore the justice of a redeemer is not necessarily required.

§ 2. Moreover, the ancient fathers would have had faith, hope, and charity, even if Christ had not been incarnated: therefore, since actual sin cannot stand together with such virtues, it would have been destroyed by the merit of faith and of the other virtues, even apart from the justice of the redeemer.

§ 3. Moreover, the power of grace for conquering sin is greater than the power of sin: therefore, if sin is able to infect the soul without the help of another, the power of the grace of the virtues will be able to expel sin without the help of another: therefore, without the grace and justice of a redeemer.

Solution. It must be said that one should consent to the first arguments: because the Saints say this, relying on that word of John 1:16: And of his fullness we all have received, and grace for grace . Mark 11:9: And those who went before and those who followed cried out, saying: Hosanna in the highest , not for original sin only, but also for all actual sins.

To the first, however, which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that another mode was possible: but nevertheless, every mode that would not confer helping grace against sin from an alien justice was impossible: whether that would have been the justice of God, or of someone satisfying.

To the next it must be said that the faith of the ancients, and hope, and other goods, would have drawn their efficacy then from that other mode whatever it would have been: but because there was no other, therefore they drew efficacy from this one: just as if the sun were not the cause of day, there would be another luminary that would make the day: yet it would never be possible that the world would be illuminated from itself, but that it would have sufficient light from certain parts of itself, shining as gems do, or certain parts of fire: and in this way the justice of the merits of Christ shines in the virtues of the Saints, just as the sun in gems, which glow more brightly in the presence of the sun, but in its absence are darkened.

To the next it must be said that grace is more powerful: but it does not have any power to destroy what is in some respect infinite, unless joined to that which is in some respect infinite, as to the merit of Christ, which is the merit of God and man: and that sin is said to be able to infect without help, this is not a power [posse], but rather a failing [deficere]: for anything can fail on its own by the corruption of its conserving principles, but it cannot in this way profit out of itself.

248. Gen. 6:9.

Articulus 7 — Whether Sin Is Not Remitted Unless The God-Man Satisfies For Us

Is sin not remitted unless by the God-man satisfying for us?

Is sin not remitted unless by the God-man satisfying for us?

Next it is asked concerning that which he says, there, A, around the middle: We were by nature children of wrath: namely nature, as it is depraved, etc.

For from this it seems that if someone's nature had not been depraved, that one could have made satisfaction for us: and this has frequently been disproved above: because this would be a pure creature, either corporeal or spiritual. If corporeal: then it would be lower than man: and then man would be redeemed, and consequently subjected to, something lower than himself: therefore through redemption he would not recover the dignity he had lost.

Moreover, according to this, the foreknowledge of God, which had preordained man to be made equal to the Angels, would be frustrated.

Moreover, according to this we would not have been redeemed by a just price, but by a lower one than what was taken away: because the whole human race was taken away from God, and only one body would be offered to God.

Moreover, according to this the infinite offense against God would not have been compensated: therefore in the work of redemption justice would not be preserved.

But if it had been a purely spiritual creature, like an Angel. On the contrary: The greatest of works with respect to difficulty is to offer oneself as a price through death: but an Angel is immortal: therefore he could not redeem.

Moreover, no Angel is so high that one pure man could not be preferred to him, and several equaled: since the blessed Virgin is preferred to all, and others can be assumed according to the ranks of Angels: therefore an Angel with all his grace is not worth a single man, and others are equivalent: therefore, all the better, no Angel could be offered for all men.

Moreover, since he is of finite goodness, he himself could not compensate for an infinite offense, nor exhibit to God the due honor for sin.

There are also other reasons for this which we posited above.

But if you say that it is a composite creature made of an Angel and a corporeal man, precisely the same inconveniences follow.

But if you say that it could have been pure God. On the contrary: God cannot merit: because to merit is before another, and it belongs to an inferior to merit: therefore God cannot satisfy by meriting.

Moreover, God owes no one, neither for Himself, nor for another: therefore He will not restore a debt for another.

Moreover, God is not a mean between man and God: therefore as a mediator He is not reconciling and satisfying.

Moreover, God in the case of man is the judge: therefore He cannot be the guilty party, or exhibit satisfaction in the place of the guilty party.

From these things, therefore, it is concluded that it is necessary that it be God and a creature: therefore either man, or someone other than man. If man, I have the proposition. If someone other than man: then someone will satisfy who ought not to satisfy: but this is not just: therefore it cannot be done before a supremely just God: therefore it is necessary that it be God and man.

Moreover, it is necessary for a mediator to have the nature of both extremes, even if he mediates only in one, as was held in the preceding distinction: but the one satisfying for us is a mediator: therefore it is necessary that he have the nature of both, namely of God, and of man: and this is what we intend.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. Original sin was contracted through another: therefore satisfaction can be made through another: now it was not contracted through another who was God: therefore satisfaction can be made through another who is not God, as it seems.

§ 2. Moreover, it seems that God ought to have created another Adam, who would transfuse the justice of the redeemer into all, just as that one transfused injustice: because otherwise justice does not seem to profit all, just as guilt harmed all.

§ 3. Furthermore, what kind of justice is it that for a sin in which we never communicated either in acting or in willing, such great satisfaction is demanded that none could pay it unless he were God and man?

§ 4. Moreover, where is it proved that original sin is in man, such that it behooves him to have such a redeemer?

Solution. It must be said that one should stand by the first arguments, that sin is not remitted unless by the God-man satisfying for us, although another mode was possible.

Therefore, to that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that original sin is contracted through another who is the principle of all: and therefore it is not resolved through another, unless he too is the principle of all: but it cannot be in the same way, because a nature that has two principles of the same rationale is monstrous; but Christ is the efficient principle according to his deity, and influencing according to his humanity by way of merit: and it could not be done by another, because he could not flow into the members, since in no way would he be the head of the mystical body, as has been said elsewhere.

To the next it must be said that if He had made another Adam, there would be two principles according to one mode of material generation: and yet he would not infuse grace: because grace can only be infused by one who is God and of infinite power, and according to which the man has grace without measure, which would not belong to anyone who was a pure man.

But if you object that according to this, if Adam had not sinned, he would not have infused the grace of innocence into his posterity, which is contrary to Anselm who says that just as he

transfuses original sin, so if he had stood firm, he would have transfused original justice. To this I say that this would not have been from Adam, but from the fact that the conjunction of human nature to God would in no way have been interrupted by sin: and therefore from God there would always have been an influence of both lives, namely natural and of grace, into the soul and from the soul into the body. But after the interruption was made, the influx of grace could not be done in this way: but it was necessary that it be through the merit of satisfaction: and that merit would not flow into all by one who had the nature of a member only, and not of a head or principle.

To the next it must be said that although we did not communicate in the sin of Adam by actual will and proper action, nevertheless we communicate in his corrupt matter from the fact that we are born from him, and the corrupt matter corrupts the soul according to the infection of guilt, as is proved in Book II of the Sentences, concerning the transfusion of original sin.

To the next it must be said that express signs prove that we are in sin: now these signs are punishments unfitting for the dignity of human nature, such as irrationality in infancy, the weakness of nature, the war of the flesh against the spirit, concupiscence, ignorance, error, and the like, by which no reason says God would have punished man except for sin.

Divisio Textus

Christ therefore the priest, and the same the victim, etc. Here begins that part which is about the work of the passion, in which the principal merit of Christ consists.

And it has two parts: in the first of which the Master determines the oblation and handing over of Christ, how it was done by the Father Himself, by Judas, by the Jews, and by the Gentiles.

In the second he shows whether it was good or not, there, D, The passion of Christ therefore is also called the work of the Jews, etc.

Articulus 8 — Whether, Just As Man Deserved To Be Assailed On Account Of Consent, So The Devil On Account Of Fraud And Lying

Whether, just as man deserved to be invaded for his consent, so the devil for his fraud and lying?

Next it is asked concerning that which he says, there, A, around the middle: For when he abandoned the sinner, the author of sin immediately invaded, etc.

It seems that both ought to have been invaded by a third: for just as man deserved to be invaded for his consent, so the devil for his fraud and lying, and much more so.

To this it must be said that the sentence of the condemning judge invaded both: but nevertheless by that right man ought to have passed into the power of the devil: because he handed himself over to him willingly, permitting himself to be deceived where he could easily have avoided deception: and this is what he intends.

Articulus 9 — Whether The Mode Of Human Liberation Is Founded Upon Utility Or Necessity

Whether the mode of human liberation is founded upon utility, or necessity?

Next it is asked concerning that which he says, A, around the end. Therefore He did not want to conquer by power, etc.

For here he implies that such a mode of liberation was not necessary, but useful to man, which seems to be contrary to the sayings of Anselm, and also contrary to what was proved above.

To which it must be said that, as Cicero says in the book On Friendship, although true friendship is founded upon love, and not upon utility, nevertheless it has very many annexed utilities . So I say in the present case, that although the necessity of the liberator is not founded upon utility, but upon necessity (either in this or another mode), nevertheless it has very many annexed utilities, part of which the Master touches upon here from the words of Augustine, and certain others he does not touch upon. But it is impossible to touch upon all of them: especially since there are annexed utilities concerning four things, namely so that we might have a love of justice, not of power: so that we might receive the example of His humility, so that we might observe the doctrine of faith and the prudence of His preaching, and so that we might be strengthened in faith by miracles more than by demonstrations.

Now, the utilities of the passion the Master follows up below in the subsequent part.

Articulus 10 — Whether The Passion Of Christ Effected Salvation For The Predestined Only

Whether Christ's passion effected salvation for the predestined only?

Whether Christ's passion effected salvation for the predestined only?

A doubt arises first concerning that which he says, there, C, around the beginning: It effected salvation for the predestined only.

§ 1. For the predestined would have had salvation, even if He Himself had not suffered: therefore it seems that He suffered in vain for them.

§ 2. Moreover, it seems false: because there are many not predestined who receive present justice unto the remission of sins: and this they cannot do without the power of the sacraments, in which the power of Christ's passion operates: therefore even for the non-predestined His passion is efficiently availing, as it seems.

Solution. It must be said that it efficiently avails only the predestined, but sufficiently it avails all: such that "efficiently" designates the attainment of grace and glory, for the sake of which there was grace: for it was not only for the sake of grace, but also for the sake of glory: and therefore it does not effect the whole effect in those in whom it avails for grace in the present only: and by this the solution to the second is clear.

To the first, however, it must be said that it was also predestined that they should be liberated in no other mode than through the passion of Christ: and therefore the passion was necessary. Or it can be said that even by those things which are done in time, such as the prayers of the faithful, predestination is helped, not on the part of the one predestining, but on the part of the effect of predestination, which is the positing of grace.

Articulus 11 — Whether And How Christ Was Handed Over To Death By The Father, And By Others Who Consented To His Death

Whether and how Christ was handed over to death by the Father, and by the others who consented to His death?

Next it is asked concerning that which he says: Concerning which it is also read, that he was handed over by the Father, etc.

§ 1. For if to hand over (tradere) is to give unto death: then it seems that to hand over implies the action of killing Christ: and thus it does not apply to the Father and to Christ. But if to hand over is to pay the price to the Father through death: then it seems that it applies solely to Christ, and not to the Father: and thus what he says here seems false.

§ 2. Moreover, the Apostle, Romans 8:32: He who did not spare even His own Son, but handed Him over for us all . Therefore the Father handed the Son over to death: which seems to imply cruelty of the Father toward the Son. Therefore the question returns again, that it might be said, according to what differing mode this handing over applies to all those who in the Letter are said to hand over Christ.

To which it must be said that to hand over is to give to death as it is taken here. Now, to hand over is twofold, namely as a gift is given: and as an exhibition is given for something else which is not a gift, because it is not of the giver, but is given in another mode. In the first mode the Father handed over the Son unto death, as a gift in which man is reconciled: and Christ handed Himself over unto death. But God the Father handed the Son over to man as a price which he might offer for himself: whereas the Son for man handed Himself over to the Father by making satisfaction for man through death. But the handing over which is an exhibition for the purpose of killing, applies to Judas as betrayer, to the Jews as instigators and accusers, and to the Gentiles as the executors of the ministry of iniquity.

To the first therefore it must be said that the Father handed the Son over unto the passion, but not to the action of killing: and acts of the soul do this, because they separate those things which according to nature are not separable. Whence, although to hand over is to will the Son to die, the Father willed the passion of the Son: but He never willed the action: but He permitted the wicked who willed it: and this is not cruelty, but supreme mercy, in that death could neither take the Son away from Him, nor make the Son inglorious before Him, and He could even restore others who had been taken away.

And by this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 12 — Whether The Passion Of Christ Can Be Said To Be Good And Evil From Diverse Circumstances

Whether the passion of Christ can be called good and bad from different circumstances?

Next it is asked concerning that which he says, there, G, around the middle: For looking to the passion, they call it one work of theirs, etc.

It seems to be impossible: because § 1. In nature one matter cannot simultaneously have different and contrary forms: therefore also in motions one work cannot be informed by different and contrary circumstances.

§ 2. Moreover, according to this, one and the same thing would be the best and the worst: for the work of the Father and of Christ could only be the best, whereas the work of Judas and of the Jews could only be the worst in this deed.

Solution. It must be distinguished that there is the working work [opus operans] which is the operation itself, namely the action as it is from the agent, and in him as in a subject: and there is the worked work [opus operatum], namely the thing constituted and effected by the operation and action: and what the Master says is understood of the worked work, and not of the working work which was the worst. But concerning the same worked thing, different good and bad wills and operations can concur: for this is not unfitting, because the circumstances do not refer to the worked work, but to the working work: and therefore contrary forms are not posited in the same thing.

And by this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 13 — Whether The Passion Of Christ Is To Be Called Good

Should Christ's passion be called good?

Next it is asked concerning that which he says around the end, Whether it should be conceded that they worked something good there?

For it seems that Christ's passion should simply be called good: because every work of virtue is good: but the death of Christ was a work of Christ's fortitude and charity: therefore simply that passion should be said to be a certain good.

Moreover, what would be called simply good, if Christ's passion, from which all our good has emanated, were called good in some respect, but not simply good? Therefore it seems that one should not distinguish, as the Master says.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. Passion is inflicted by another: but everything praiseworthy is from us, not from another: therefore Christ's passion from itself is not praiseworthy, as it seems.

§ 2. Moreover, it is both the work of the Jews that is the passion, and the work of Judas, and of the Gentiles: therefore it is the worst.

§ 3. Moreover, Boethius in the Topics: That of which the generation is good, its corruption is bad: but the generation of Christ in life was the best: therefore His death was the worst: therefore it should be called bad absolutely without distinction.

Solution. It must be said that the death of Christ absolutely and without distinction should be called the best for four reasons. One of which is, because it was the summit of a principal virtue, as of fortitude, which according to the Philosopher is a principal virtue: and maximally in Christ the summit of that virtue that one can attain is death: just as He Himself also says: Greater love than this no one has, that one lay down his soul for his friends .

Another reason was, because if precious in the sight of the Lord is the death of His Saints , most precious is the death of Christ and full of price, as the Psalmist says: You will not give your holy one to see corruption. You have made known to me the paths of life: you will fill me with joy with your countenance: delights are at your right hand , that is, in your equity according to the deity, and in the more powerful goods according to the humanity, even unto the end.

The third cause is the utility of the entire redemption in the human race, as it is said, Hosea 13:14: O death, I will be your death! O hell, I will be your bite!

The fourth cause is the honorable cause of dying: for they placed above His head His cause written: Jesus of Nazareth, king of the Jews , that is, this is my cause of dying, that I am the savior flourishing with the grace and virtue of redemption, the king of those confessing and glorifying God.

To the first therefore it must be said that the Master does not order us to distinguish in this, whether the death of Christ is good or bad: but in this, whether the Jews worked anything good or bad. And in this it must be distinguished according to the aforesaid mode concerning the working work, and thus they worked nothing good: and concerning the worked good, and thus beyond their intention they worked something good.

To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that the passion insofar as it is from another is not a work of virtue, but insofar as it was undertaken with the will of sustaining it for the sake of the good: and thus to sustain is from us, and not from the one killing.

To the next it must be said that the solution is clear through what was said before concerning the working work, and the worked work.

To the next it must be said that Boethius does not intend that death in itself is bad, but insofar as it deprives the good which is acquired in generation toward being and life: and thus it refers to the intention of the Jews who desired to take away and extinguish life from Christ: yet in itself it is good which was the cause of such great goods.

DISTINCTIO XXI

Divisio Textus

After the aforesaid it must be considered, Whether in the death of Christ the soul was separated from the Word, etc. Here begins that part which is about the questions following the passion: and they are two according to the two distinctions introduced here. The first is about the mode of death: and the second is, Whether in the three days of death He was a man, or somewhere, or everywhere? and this begins there, Dist. XXII, A, Here it is asked, Whether in that three-day period of death Christ was a man?

In the first part there are three things, namely the solution to a certain objection proving that by the separation of the deity and the soul Christ was dead: and for this the first chapter is introduced. The second is the solution of the authorities of Augustine and Athanasius. And for this the two subsequent chapters are introduced, there, B, Some also rely on authority, etc. The third is, how Christ laid down His soul and took it up again: and this begins there, C, Just as Augustine teaches on John, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether The Deity Was Separated From The Body In The Three Days

Whether the deity was separated from the body during the three days [triduum]?

Now a doubt arises concerning the first objection, whether it concludes or not?

It is this: The soul is the medium by which the deity is conjoined to the flesh: but with the medium dissolved, the extremes are not conjoined, because the cause of the conjunction is lacking: therefore, with the soul separated from the flesh, the deity is also separated.

Now it seems that this argumentation holds:

§ 1. For either God is unitable to an irrational creature, or not. If not, then I have the proposition, that when the rational no longer existed it was not united, and that the rational soul is not only a medium of congruency, but a medium of cause. But if He is unitable to an irrational creature: this has been disproved above by many arguments in the question concerning the unitable. Therefore it seems that this conclusion follows.

§ 2. Moreover, below in this same distinction it is said that if the Son of God had died, the fount of life would have dried up. From this I infer two conclusions: the first of which is, that the Son of God did not die: but if He had been united to the flesh, because of the union He would be said to have died, just as He is also said to be born: therefore at that time He was not united to the flesh.

§ 3. Moreover, every union makes something one: if therefore the deity was united to the flesh, it would behoove it to make something one: but it does not make one of person, because that flesh was never the Son of God: therefore it is left that it makes one of nature: and thus the flesh and the deity would be one, which is false.

§ 4. The second conclusion is, that if the deity is the fount of life, and more efficacious than the soul, then it would have infused life: therefore the body of Christ would have lived in those three days, which is false: therefore it seems that the deity was not united to the body.

§ 5. Moreover, the union through glory to God in the blessed is lesser than the union of natures in Christ: if therefore it is impossible for the Saints on account of their union to glory to be separated from life, much more impossible was it for the body to be separated from life, if it was united to the deity: but it was separated from life: therefore it was not united to the deity.

§ 6. Moreover, by a lower union than that by which it is united to the man Christ, the deity is not conjoinable except to a rational creature, and not according to the body, but according to the soul alone: now this is the union through grace: therefore much less by a more worthy union was it conjoinable to a body without a soul.

§ 7. Moreover, God is said to be in things in three ways by Innocent, namely essentially, presentially, and potentially in all things: but by grace in rational things, not in all things: and by union in the man Christ. Since therefore the body falls into the number of irrational things, it seems the deity was not in the body except presentially, potentially, and essentially.

On the contrary, however, is what the Master says in the Letter.

Solution. It must be said that in no way was the deity separated from the body during the three days: for the bond of the grace of union was inseparably stronger than the bond of the natural conjunction of soul and body: and therefore when the natural bond was dissolved, the bond of grace remained.

Therefore it must be said to the first, that even if the soul creates assumptibility in the body, namely, as was determined above, and in this respect is the medium causing the property of assumptibility, nevertheless it is not a medium except by congruency: and therefore when it is dissolved, it is not necessary to dissolve the deity from the flesh.

To the next it must be said that the deity is the fount of life efficiently, not as a conjoined form: and although it was united, and the Son of God was united to the body, nevertheless the deity is not said to have suffered or died: because the properties of one nature are not referred to the other nature: but I well concede that the Son of God is said to have suffered and died because of the union: the reason for which has frequently been determined above.

To the next it must be said that union makes one not of nature, but of person: but the union of one [part] does not make this one, but rather the union of one with the other owed to it united. Whence the union of the body with the union of the soul to be united to it makes one of supposit and person: and during the three days the order to that one remained, even though at that time that one did not exist: because at that time Christ was not a man.

To the other conclusion it must be said that the deity is the fount of life effectively, not formally, nor was it in the body as a form in matter, nor as a soul in an animated thing, but by a dignifying union, as St. Bernard says: and the deity being in something in this way is not the necessary cause of life, not from its own defect, but from the defect of the receiver.

To the next it must be said that the union of the blessed to God is lesser than the union of this body was to God: but nevertheless that one is more contrary to death than this one is: because that one, from the rationale of beatitude, has a contrariety to misery, and consequently to death: whereas this one does not remove misery from the body, nor is it contrary to such a defect, as was shown above: and therefore that lesser one does something which this one cannot do.

To the next it must be said that the union which is through the grace of virtues and gifts, is through a habit which seeks a proper subject for itself in which to be as in matter: and because that subject can only be a rational substance, therefore God is not in this way except in a rational substance, which is man, or Angel, or rational soul: but the other union which is toward being, although it is greater, is nevertheless not a habit, nor does it seek such a proper subject: because that which is united by that union is assumed to the deity by the power of the deity which is infinite: and this can be a body having an order to a rational soul: whence all those reasons assume propositions as if this properly belonged to a nobler thing because it would be united to a nobler thing: and this is not true.

To the next it must be said that God is in three ways in those things which have no order to a rational creature: but a body, although in itself it is not rational, is nevertheless a part and the matter of a rational being: and therefore the bodies of the Saints are called the temple of the Holy Spirit: and therefore in Christ it had a special relation to union.

Articulus 2 — How What Christ Says, I Lay Down My Life, Ought To Be Understood

How should that which Christ says, "I lay down my soul," be understood?

Next it is asked concerning that which He says, there, C, I lay down my soul, that I may take it up again [249].

§ 1. For what is it to lay down? If to lay down is to depose: since this pronoun, I, signifies any given utterer of it, and the utterer of this word was Christ according as He is a person, then the person inasmuch as He is a person laid down and deposed His soul: which is false, because thus He would not have been united to the soul in the three days. But if to lay down is to place in some location, since many things can locate themselves, it will seem that the soul could place itself. But Augustine says the contrary of this.

§ 2. Moreover, to lay down implies the power to effect something: but there is no power to effect anything in the body, but only in the soul or the deity: therefore it seems that to lay down the soul belonged to one of those, and not to the flesh, as it seems to say in the Letter?

§ 3. Moreover, if to lay down is to separate: then by the same reason the flesh was laid down, by which the soul is said to be laid down: why then did He not say, No one takes my flesh from me, but I lay it down, and I take it up again?

§ 4. Moreover, it seems to be false, because since a natural union is dissolvable, and since between Christ's soul and body there was not

§ 1. ...unless the natural union itself was dissoluble. Now, every such union is dissoluble in two ways, namely, by violence and by natural separation: therefore, Christ's soul could be extorted by violence: therefore, it could be taken from him: therefore, what is said seems false: No one takes it (namely, my soul) from me.[250]

§ 2. Solution: It must be said to the first [objection] that "to lay down" (ponere) is to put off from that to which the soul is naturally united, and this is the flesh; and it is not "to lay down" simply to remove it from that to which it is united in whatever way. And I readily concede that the person lays down the soul: but because everything the person does, he does in a nature, it is necessary that he lays down the soul in a nature, or a part of a nature. Since, therefore, that which is laid down according to nature is not the same as that in which the laying down occurs or the one laying down, it is clear that neither could the soul lay down the soul in the soul, nor could the Son of God lay down the soul in the soul: therefore the Son of God laid down the soul in the body. And this is what Augustine means to say, that the body laid down the soul by the power of the divinity hidden within it: because the separation which is in death belongs to the body, not to the Son of God, or to the deity.

§ 3. To the next it must be said that, although in a dead body not united to a power of nature, there is no power of effecting anything, nevertheless, it was not so in the body of Christ, because the supremely powerful deity still lay hidden in the body.

§ 4. To the next it must be said that the Lord speaks by responding to the intention of the Jews: because the persecutor and tyrant pursues the cause of life, and therefore, even when the cause of life is separated, he rests from the persecution of the body. And to that which they desired to extort, the Lord responded that they could not alienate [it], namely the soul, from his power by their persecution: because the soul always remained in his power.

§ 5. To the next it must be said that it is one thing in Christ, and another in other men: because although Christ had a natural union of soul and body which were dissoluble, nevertheless he had a stronger [principle] able to act to the contrary, namely the deity: and therefore the tyrant's persecution would extort nothing from him if he himself did not will it. In others, however, there is nothing resisting violence, and therefore in others the soul is indeed extorted.

Articulus 3 — Whether The Deity Is Called The Fountain Of Life Efficiently Or Formally

Whether the deity is called the fount of life efficiently or formally?

§ 6. Next it is asked concerning what he says there, at C, around the middle: For if this were so, the fount of life would have dried up.

§ 7. 1. For either the deity is called the fount of life from pouring life into that to which it is conjoined sufficiently, or deficiently. If in the first way: since no fount flows unless something receives the flow, it is necessary that something then receives the flow of life: [and this is] nothing but the body: therefore the body then received the flow of life: therefore it was living.

249. John 10:17.

§ 8. 2. Also, whatever suffices for the containing [whole], it is necessary that the antecedent without which that containing [whole] does not exist does this first: now, to be a man-God follows upon being a man according to the order of nature: and to be a man according to nature follows upon being one: therefore if the union made the man-God, it was necessary first to make the man and for [him] to be one: therefore it seems that that union made life.

§ 9. If perhaps you say that the deity did not do these things without a medium, which is the rational soul. On the contrary: A power is imperfect which needs another mediating [principle] by which it acts: but since the deity is powerful in itself with respect to all things, it seems the deity flowed life in by itself.

§ 10. ON THE CONTRARY: If the deity by itself gave life, it gave either a divine life to him, or a created [life]. If divine, that [life] cannot undergo death; therefore Christ would never have been truly dead—

§ 1. —which is false and heretical. If, however, it gave a created [life]: either rational or irrational. If irrational: then the soul is superfluous, because the deity could have been in place of the soul for Christ. If rational: then the deity is less able to flow in a noble life than the rational soul which flows in a rational life, which is false.

§ 2. Solution: It must be said as before, that the deity is called the fount of life efficiently, not formally: because it effects the life of all things, itself living through itself.

§ 3. To that which is first objected, it must be said that it does not flow [life] into the body because without the soul [the body] is not receptive of life, and this expresses a natural impotence in the body, not in the deity. Nor does that impotence properly express a defect: because a defect is of those things which according to nature ought to be present and are not present: but it was never the nature of the body that it should live without the soul.

§ 4. To the next it must be said that the deity united to itself the body and the soul [already] united: and from this union it follows that God is man, and man is God. But to be a man and to be one are not ordered to this except materially on the part of the subject receiving; and therefore the deity did not do this, that it formally flowed in life or humanity, but rather effectively only, and it made life through the soul, and it made man through the form of man which is called humanity.

§ 5. To the last the solution is clear through what has been said before.

Articulus 4 — Whether It Can Be Said That Christ Suffered And Did Not Suffer, Died And Did Not Die

Whether it can be said that Christ suffered and did not suffer, died and did not die?

§ 6. Next it is asked concerning what he says there, at D, near the end: Soundly therefore it can be said that God died, and did not die, etc.

250. Isaiah 53:6.

§ 7. For this seems false: because thus contradictories are verified of the same thing, which can never be, because the Philosopher says: Of anything an affirmation or negation is true: but of nothing both at once.

§ 8. Also, Augustine: Such was that taking up, which made God man, and man God: and all things that are true of the man are true of God. Of the man it is true that he is dead:

§ 1. ...therefore of God it is true that he is dead: therefore God and man died.

§ 2. ON THE CONTRARY: That Christ died is an article of faith: therefore the opposite of that is that Christ did not die: therefore that is a heresy.

§ 3. Solution: It must be said that in truth locutions of this kind are not to be conceded without determination: for although I may concede that an Ethiopian is white with respect to his teeth, and is not white with respect to his jaw, nevertheless I do not concede absolutely that he is white, and not white. And especially in Christ: because to be dead, or to have suffered, or to be born, when they are said absolutely, are referred to the person, and do not belong to the person. And therefore although the Master posits locutions of this kind without determination, nevertheless they are not to be understood, nor taken up without determination: which determination if it is added, as he died according to humanity, and did not die according to divinity, it is clear that they are not contradictories, nor contrary to faith.

§ 4. And through this the solution to all [the objections] is clear.

DISTINCTIO XXII

Divisio Textus

DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

§ 5. Here it is asked, Whether in that three-day period, etc. Here begins the distinction concerning the questions following the death of Christ, or Christ dead.

§ 6. And there are here four questions, of which the first is, Whether he was a man during the three days [the triduum] or not? The second, Whether he, according as he is man, is everywhere or not? and this begins there, B, Here it is asked, If Christ in death, etc. In the third, it is asked concerning Christ's burial and descent into hell, there, C, And certainly he was whole at the same time in hell, etc. In the fourth, it is asked concerning his ascension into heaven, there, D, It is also usually asked, If congruently, etc.

§ 7. From these therefore the sentence is clear.

Articulus 1 — Whether Christ Was A Man In The Three Days

Whether Christ was a man during the three days?

§ 8. Now the first question occurs, Whether Christ was a man during the three days, as the Master seems to say here?

It seems, however, that he was: because § 9. 1. Christ had a rational soul during the three days: but whatever person has a rational soul, that person is rational: therefore Christ was rational during the three days: but every rational thing is a man: therefore Christ was a man during the three days.

§ 10. 2. Also, everything which has in itself, as its parts, the parts of human nature, that is a man: but Christ during the three days had the parts of human nature: therefore Christ was a man during the three days.

§ 11. 3. Also, every supposit in human nature is a man: but Christ during the three days is a supposit existing in human nature: therefore Christ was a man during the three days, as it seems.

§ 12. 4. Also, Master Hugh of St. Victor: What is more foolish to say, than that he then ceases to be a man, when he begins to be [so] more truly? And he intends that a man is more truly a man after death than before: therefore Christ was more truly a man after death than before death, as it seems.

§ 13. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Avicenna says that form does not have that it is predicated of the whole because it is form, but because it is the form consequent upon the conjoined whole: therefore where there is not a conjoined [whole], there is not a form consequent upon the conjoined [whole] which may be predicated: but in Christ there is not a conjoined [whole] during the three days, because the soul was not conjoined to the flesh: since therefore this that I say, man, is a form consequent upon a conjoined [whole], he was not a man during the three days.

§ 14. 2. Also, nothing belonging to a whole as a whole is predicated when that whole does not exist: but the ratio of man belongs to the whole as a whole: therefore it is not fitting for "man" to be predicated where there is not a whole in the ratio of a whole: but the soul and flesh were not in the ratio of constituting any whole during those three days: therefore Christ was not a man during the three days. The first premise is proved from this, that the ratio of the whole is other than the ratio of the parts, because they are opposed relatively. The second is proved from what Boethius says, that the species is the whole being of the individuals, and not of a part.

§ 1. Further it is asked concerning the solution of the Master: for one objects that

§ 2. 1. If before death he had assumed flesh and soul not united, he would not be called a man: therefore neither in death is he called a man on account of their separation. And he solves [this by saying] that it is otherwise in Christ than in other men, and otherwise than he was in himself before death and after the resurrection: because then he is called a man on account of the body and soul being conjoined, but during the three days he is called a man on account of the having of those [parts] even separated. And this does not seem to be true then:

because no ratio of a species or form belongs according to one and another ratio to one and the same hypostasis according to different times.

§ 3. 2. Also, when it is said, "dead man," there is an opposition in the adjective: therefore it deprives [the subject] of the ratio of man: therefore a dead man is not a man: but Christ during the three days was a dead man: therefore he was not a man, as it seems.

§ 4. If perhaps you should say, as some say, that the rational soul of itself gives to the man that he is a man, and to the body that it is a supposit, and to the man that he is a person: but when separated it retains that in itself which it gave to another. On the contrary: Therefore according to this if Christ had assumed only a rational soul, he would truly be called a man, which is absurd.

§ 5. 3. Also, there can never be a composite with respect to some third thing from both components, which has in itself the perfect ratio of the whole: therefore if the soul has the perfect ratio of the whole man, it is not composed with the body with respect to some third thing: therefore there is not a true and natural composition between soul and body, which is false.

§ 6. Therefore some others say that this is twofold, Christ during the three days was a man, from the fact that the word (ly) "man" can be taken materially, or formally. If materially: then Christ was a man during the three days, because he had the matter of a man. If formally: then they say that it is false.

§ 7. But against this is: because 1. Matter is predicated of nothing: therefore if "man" stands for the matter of man, it will not be predicated of Christ, nor of the Son of God during the three days.

§ 8. 2. Also, to take man materially is to take man only in a certain respect (secundum quid): therefore it should not be said that Christ was simply a man during the three days, but that he was a man in a certain respect.

§ 9. 3. Also, the matter of man is the nature of man: but the nature of man (as was proved above) is neither predicated of Christ the man, nor of the Son of God: because this is false, The Son of God is the nature of man. This also is false, Jesus Christ is the nature of man. If therefore during the three days the word "man" stands only for the human nature, this will be false, Christ during the three days is a man: just as this, Christ during the three days is a human nature.

§ 10. Solution: Almost all moderns agree in this, that it is false, and that the Master was deceived here by certain locutions which we use, saying that Christ lay in the tomb, which does not belong except by reason of the human nature: and since it is attributed to the supposit, it seems that "Christ" there stands for the supposit of the human nature, and thus stands for this man. But it must be said that those locutions are synecdochical: just as we also say, "Holy Peter, pray for us," putting the soul of Peter for the whole. Thus we say that Christ lay in the tomb on account of the part of the man which is the body, and descended into hell on account of the part of the man which is the soul.

§ 11. To the first therefore it must be said that Christ had a rational soul during the three days, but he was not rational. Nor does it follow that whatever person has a rational soul is rational: but it ought to be added, that he has it as the act of a body flowing life according to act. Nor is this true, that from rationality, which is a part of the soul, a man is denominated when he is called rational, but rather from—

§ 1. —the difference of man, which is not a part of the soul, but rather the form of the whole as it is a whole, like genus, and species.

§ 2. Similarly it is not true what some object, that if a man is denominated from the property of a less worthy part, as he is called corporeal from the corporeity of the body, that then he could also be denominated from the property of a more worthy part, so that he is called rational from the rationality of the soul: because when a man is called a body, or corporeal, or rational, or an animal, or white, or risible, and in every universal whatever is taken up, the ratio of predicating will never be found, except according as it is a form consequent upon the whole and not a part.

§ 3. To the next it must be said that this is false, "Everything which has parts, etc.," unless it be added: united by that union in which they constitute a man.

§ 4. To the next it must be said that Christ during the three days was indeed a supposit existing in human nature, but this does not suffice for this, that he was a man, but it is necessary to have some ratio of a supposit from the nature itself: and this was not there, because the nature does not give to the supposit its being a supposit, nor according as it is fitting in constituting a supposit through composition.

§ 5. To the saying of Master Hugh, it must be said that he speaks falsely in this, saving his peace, because neither is the soul a person, nor is a man more truly a man after death, or in death, than before.

Articulus 2 — Whether This Is True, Christ Is Man Everywhere

Whether this is true, Christ is a man everywhere?

Whether this is true, Christ is a man everywhere?

§ 1. Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, Here it is asked, If Christ in death, etc.

For it seems that this is true, Christ is a man everywhere.

§ 2. 1. For whatever two things are the same and one in supposit, wherever one of them is, there is the other. Now the Son of God and the man are one and the same in supposit: therefore wherever the Son of God is, there is also the man: but the Son of God is everywhere: therefore also this man is everywhere.

§ 3. 2. Also, this is true, This man is the Son of God everywhere: therefore by simple conversion, this is true, The Son of God is a man everywhere.

§ 4. 3. Also, let it be granted that this is false, The Son of God is a man everywhere: therefore its contradictory is true: therefore this is true, The Son of God is not a man everywhere: therefore the

Son of God is somewhere not a man, which is false: because it is nowhere possible to assign a place in which the Son of God is not a man, for the reason that he never and nowhere laid down the assumed man.

§ 5. 4. Also, it follows, Socrates is here, and he is not a donkey here: therefore Socrates is not a donkey: therefore by similarity, The Son of God is here, and he is not a man here: therefore he is not a man, which is false: therefore the Son of God is a man here, and by the same reason everywhere.

§ 6. Also it is asked, What prevents that it is not conceded, This man according as he is a man is everywhere?

For it seems that nothing [prevents it]: for Christ's body and blood are consecrated in many places: and in all places in which it is consecrated, it is: therefore it is in all: therefore it is possible for Christ's body to be in all places: therefore Christ can be everywhere according to human nature, as it seems.

§ 7. To the contrary is that Christ is circumscribable in place: but whatever is circumscribed is in a determinate place, not in all places: therefore Christ in human form cannot be in all places.

§ 8. But further it is asked, Since there are two things by way of extrinsic measures, namely time in lower things, and eternity in God responding to time, and place: why is eternity communicated to this man, so that it is said that this boy created the stars, and was from eternity: but the category of "where" is not communicated to him, so that he is said [to be] everywhere, just like the Son of God?

§ 9. For it seems that it ought to be communicated more: because eternity means the lack of a beginning, which is repugnant to human nature: "everywhere" means nothing but extension according to place, which is not repugnant to a creature, because universal being is everywhere: therefore what is less repugnant to the created, seems to be more communicable, than what is repugnant to every created thing: therefore it seems that to be everywhere ought to belong to this man.

§ 10. Solution: It must be said that the Son of God is not everywhere a man. That the composite may be understood. For this is twofold, The Son of God is everywhere a man, from the sense of composition, and of division. For if the adverb "everywhere" determines the verb by grace of composition with the predicate, as it properly ought: then it is false under this sense, The Son of God according to [his being] man is everywhere. If, however, it is referred to the subject with the composition of an understood participle: then it is true under this sense, The Son of God, being everywhere, is a man, and then it is divided. However, in the sense of composition the Master denies it: because without doubt the locution pretends that sense, and it is actually composite, but only potentially is it divided.

§ 11. To the first it must be said that it is not—

§ 1. —valid, that if some things are the same in supposit, that whatever belongs to one by grace of nature, that this also belongs to the other: because the natures are not one: and to be

everywhere belongs to the Son of God by grace of the nature, and not of the person except consequently. And there is an instance: for when it is said, This is a Bishop: it is not necessary that wherever he is, that he is a Bishop in that same place: because sometimes he is in another Diocese in which he is not Bishop: and yet the Bishop and he are the same in supposit.

§ 2. To the next it must be said that the conversion is not valid: because when "man" is placed in the subject, then by grace of the supposit it well belongs to him to be everywhere; but when [it is placed] by grace of the predicate, then the nature is respected by the adverb, and then the determination does not belong to it: whence since the terms are not taken uniformly, the conversion is not valid: but it ought to be converted thus, This man is everywhere the Son of God: therefore the Son of God, being everywhere, is this man: and then both are true.

§ 3. To the next it must be said that in the composite sense this is true, The Son of God is not everywhere a man: because in that sense the negation is carried to the composition, including the adverb which determines the composition in comparison to the predicate. Similarly the further conclusion, The Son of God somewhere is not a man, is twofold, just like the other: and in the composite sense it does not follow from that, because it is true under this sense, The Son of God is not somewhere a man, because [he is not] there where he is not in human form.

§ 4. To the next it must be said that it is not similar: because neither Socrates nor a donkey express natures exceeding themselves according to place: and in this way "this man" and "the Son of God" do not hold themselves: but it is similar when it is said, "this is a Bishop": for it does not follow, "this one is here, and he is not a Bishop here: therefore he is not a Bishop."

§ 5. To the next it must be said that even if this were granted that the body of Christ is consecrated everywhere (which nevertheless is impossible) still it does not follow that the body of Christ is everywhere, just as the Son of God is everywhere, such that he himself is whole in every place, and in every part of the place. But the body of Christ will not be in all places: because it will not be in the place of another glorious body, nor is the whole body in every part of its place: because it is not that where the head is, there is the whole body: therefore it is clear that that argument does not proceed.

§ 6. To the last it must be said that eternity is equally referred to the nature and to the person, and even more immediately to the person, according as it is the whole, simultaneous, and perfect possession of interminable life: and therefore it is conceded by grace of the supposit that this man is from eternity, as was held above. But "where" does not belong to God except by transference, and this according to those things which belong to the divine nature in itself: and therefore it is not referred so immediately to the supposit, and therefore does not belong to this man, according as he is such.

Articulus 3 — Whether The Whole Christ Was In The Sepulcher, In Heaven, And Whole Everywhere

Whether the whole Christ (totus) was in the tomb, in heaven, and whole (totus) everywhere?

Whether the whole Christ (totus) was in the tomb, in heaven, and whole (totus) everywhere?

§ 1. Next it is asked concerning what he says there, C, And certainly he was whole (totus) at the same time, etc.

For totus [masculine: whole] and totum [neuter: the whole] seem to be referred to the same thing: because

§ 2. 1. A doctrine is given between the whole (totum) and every (omnis): because "every" distributes for subjective parts, but "totus" for integral parts. But the integral parts of Christ were not all in hell, nor all in the tomb, nor all in heaven.

§ 3. 2. Also, it was held above that the ratio of that composition which is in Christ is inexplicable, which is not the ratio of parts, as was said there: because it is composed from three substances, and two natures: but Christ in two natures and three substances, was neither in heaven, nor was he in the tomb, nor in hell: therefore not totus.

§ 4. 3. Also, it seems to be nothing what he says, that totus is referred to the person: because the person is simple. But totus always seeks the composition of integral parts: therefore it never belongs by grace of the person, as it seems.

§ 5. 4. Also, totus and totum signify the same thing, although under a different mode: therefore they are to be referred to the same thing under a different mode: therefore if totum is referred to the nature, then totus is referred to the same.

§ 6. 5. Also, it seems that the totum was in heaven. Proof: Wherever I am, there it is necessary that what is essentially in me is: therefore wherever Christ was, there it was necessary that what was essentially in Christ was. Now human nature was and still is essentially in him: therefore wherever he was, there it was too: but he was in heaven: therefore it too: therefore the totum was in heaven, because the divine and human nature were there. By the same reason it follows that the totum was in the tomb, and the totum in hell.

§ 7. 6. Also, we find three persons in one nature, and different accidents in one supposit, and very many parts in one whole: in all these we find that by virtue of union it follows that where one of them is, in that same place is the other: therefore since the union of two natures, and three substances in one person is not less than all these, it seems also that by virtue of union it ought to follow that where totus is, there totum in nature is.

§ 8. Solution: It must be said that the Master says well, that totus [whole Christ] is everywhere, but not totum [the whole]: and this speaking of the time of the three days when there was a division between the soul and the body. And the reason is touched upon in the letter in the authority of John Damascene, that totus, since it expresses a formed being, pertains to a distinct being, and this is the perfect person. But totum, since it is of the neuter gender, expresses nothing but an unformed and indistinct being, and is attributed to the nature with its parts: therefore where the nature with its parts is not, there totum is not.

§ 9. I respond therefore to the first, totum is taken in two ways, namely for distribution and for the perfect, as the Philosopher says in Physics III: I call the whole and the perfect the same. And by distribution it is not properly said of a simple thing: but in the second way it can be said of a simple thing. And thus totus Christus is said, that is, perfect in person to be every-

where: for he does not have personality from human nature, or from man according as he is man, but rather he had it from eternity.

§ 10. To the next it must be said that it is well true that the composition is there in the way expounded above, not properly [speaking]: but by grace of the masculine mode of signifying, the word totus respects the perfection of the person, and not the integrity of the composite nature.

§ 11. To the next it must be said that although the same thing is signified, nevertheless another and different mode causes one to be referred to the integrity of the person. Whence that reason does not compel.

§ 12. To the next it must be said that that reason proceeds in those things whose essences are coextended according to place: but it is not so in all things, as was clear above, as it is said, This one is here, and this one is a Bishop, etc.

§ 13. To the next it must be said that in all those compositions, one is of as much composition according to being as the other: and even three persons one in nature are similarly related to place. But in certain accidents pertaining to jurisdiction and power or dignity it is not so, as was said before, as Bishop, King, Prince. And similarly it is not so in the natures of Christ, which are not similarly related to place.

Articulus 4 — Whether Christ Descended Into Hell

Whether Christ descended into hell?

Whether Christ descended into hell?

§ 1. Next it is asked concerning what he says: Whole... was in hell.

§ 2. And three things are asked here: namely, whether Christ descended into hell? and, Whether he illuminated those who were there with the light of divinity? and, How long did he remain there?

§ 3. For that he did not descend into hell, seems from the incongruity of the place:

1. For the best place is congruent with the best: but Christ was the best: therefore it is not congruent for him to descend into hell.

§ 4. 2. Also, Augustine says that "hell" is always taken in an evil sense: but Christ could not descend into evil: therefore neither into hell.

§ 5. 3. Also, Luke 16:26: Between us and you a great chaos is established, so that those who wish to pass from here to you cannot, nor pass from there to here. Therefore much more is this chaos between Christ and the place of the damned.

§ 6. 4. Also, if Christ descended, by virtue of whom all ascend who do ascend, how will anyone hope that he will ascend?

§ 7. But to the contrary however is what is said, at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of those in heaven, on earth, and under the earth.[251] Therefore it seems that he came to the lower regions.

§ 8. Also, Psalm 23:7, 9: Lift up your gates, O princes, and be lifted up, etc.

§ 9. Also, in the Gospel of Nicodemus it is said that David in hell hearing this voice, exulting said: I recognize this voice which I foretold.

§ 10. Also, Acts 2:24: Whom God raised up, having loosed the sorrows of hell, since it was impossible that he should be held by it.

§ 11. Also, Ecclesiasticus 24:45: I will penetrate all the lower parts of the earth, and I will behold all that sleep. But in the lower parts of the earth (as Jerome says) is hell.

§ 12. Also, the Apostles' Creed says: He descended into hell.

§ 13. But it is asked further, Whether he descended to the lower hell?

It seems that he did.

§ 14. 1. Job 17:16: All my things shall descend into the deepest hell. Thinkest thou that at least there my rest will be? Now it is certain that he did not seek rest through anything else except through Christ's descent: therefore Christ descended to the deepest part of hell.

§ 15. 2. Also, he had said thus: Who will grant me this, that thou mayest protect me in hell? And below, And that thou mayest appoint me a time in which thou wilt remember me.[252]

Also, Psalm 85:13: Thou hast delivered my soul from the lower hell.

§ 16. 3. Also, Zechariah 9:11, upon that text: Thou also by the blood of thy testament hast sent forth thy prisoners out of the pit wherein is no water: the Gloss says, that those who were held bound in prisons, where no mercy had refreshed them, which that rich man sought, thou hast freed. But in hell there is no redemption, and especially in the deepest part. Therefore in vain would Christ have descended there.

§ 17. Also, Isaiah 66:24: Their fire shall not be extinguished. Therefore again in vain would Christ have descended there.

§ 18. Solution: It must be said that without doubt Christ descended to the lower regions. But "hell" is said in multiple ways, — namely interior, as the Gloss says upon that of James 3:6: Set on fire by hell, that wherever demons go, they carry hell with themselves. And exterior: and this is multiple, such as the dark and afflictive place of punishment of the damned; and the place of punishment not entirely dark, because of the light of grace of those to be purged; and the place without the punishment of sense and without light, as the limbo of infants dying in original [sin]; and the dark place having something of light on account of the great faith and hope of those dwelling there, like the limbo of the holy fathers before Christ's descent: and to this place Christ descended, and not to another: because concerning this Jerome says, that there dwelt those who were brought out by Christ.

§ 1. To the first therefore it must be said, that Christ as man was made for the sake of man, and not for Himself: so for the sake of man and not for Himself He descended.

§ 2. To the next it must be said, that 'hell' signifies the evil of the punishment of loss or of sense: and I call the punishment of loss that which consists in the taking away of some good, just as is the lack of light: but the punishment of sense is that which consists in something existing and afflicting, like fire: but Christ did not descend to the punishment of loss or of sense, but to the place only.

§ 3. To the next it must be said, that this was not said concerning those dwelling in limbo with certain hope, but concerning those dwelling in the place of the damned, of whom there was no hope: and that certainty of liberation, and despair is called the chaos [or chasm] there: and therefore it is nothing to the proposition.

§ 4. To the next it must be said, that from this very fact we are raised to the hope of ascending, because He Himself by descending made satisfaction for us: so that He might thus gather His own in all places, and put death to flight from them in all places.

§ 5. To that which is further asked, Whether Christ descended to the deepest hell? It must be said with blessed Gregory in the Gloss in the same place on Job, that He did not. And hell is called deepest there not absolutely, but in a certain way: because it is a deep prison with respect to the pleasantness of heaven, and it is this misty air into which the demons have been thrust down: but deeper is the earthly habitation, obscure and penal: and limbo is called the deepest with respect to these, into which the soul of Job and all his goods descended, until he was liberated through Christ: and therefore He did not descend to the deepest [hell] absolutely, but in a certain way.

§ 6. To the next it must be said, that it can in the same way be called the lower [hell] if he speaks in the person of Christ. But if he speaks according to himself: then his soul was liberated, when it was liberated from the cause of descending to the lower hell, such as from mortal sin, namely adultery and murder.

§ 7. To the next it must be said, that that Gloss is very improper [or figurative]: and yet it can be expounded, that there was not a liberating mercy in limbo, but a relaxing one: because they did not have the punishment of sense and of loss. And if you say, that the rich man asked for nothing but a relaxing one, it must be said that he asked for a twofold one: first a liberating one through a return to life. For the expositors say, that he presumed that Abraham would not send Lazarus back to the evils which he had endured in life, and thus he himself would be sent: and he was not then in limbo, but arrived through Christ. Afterwards he asked for one relaxing a little of the punishment, which was not granted to him, but was granted to those dwelling in limbo on account of their merit.

§ 8. But those things which are objected to the contrary, are said concerning the simply lower hell.

§ 9. And through this the solution to all [the arguments] is evident.

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251. Phil 2:10.

Articulus 5 — Whether Christ Enlightened Those Who Were Held In Limbo

§ 10. ARTICLE V. Whether Christ illuminated those who were held in limbo?

§ 11. Secondly it is asked, Whether He illuminated those who were there?

§ 12. But it seems that He did: because

§ 13. 1. It is so held in the preceding chapter B, in the words of Ambrose: Upon those placed in hell He poured the light of eternal life. The true light of wisdom radiated there, it illuminated hell, etc.

§ 14. 2. Item, Augustine: The deified soul descended to hell: so that just as to those who are on earth, so also to those who are in hell [and] sit in darkness and in the shadow of death, it might shine upon them.

§ 15. BUT ON THE CONTRARY:

§ 16. 1. Corporeal light does not irradiate one without illuminating another: therefore it seems that, since the divine light is more powerful, it did not illuminate one unless all saw it: but not all who were in hell were worthy: therefore it seems that no one was illuminated.

§ 17. 2. Item, A place deputed to perpetual darkness ought never to have the benefit of light: but hell is such a place: therefore it ought never to have been illuminated.

§ 18. 3. Item, He Himself said to the thief, Luke 23:43: Today you will be with me in paradise. Therefore it seems that He led others also out into paradise, and did not show the light of deity in hell: because it is clear that He willed the thief to be with Him, that is, where His soul was going to be, not everywhere where the deity always was.

§ 19. Solution. It must be said without doubt according to the sayings of the Saints, that Christ showed His deity to His saints in hell, and turned the place of the horrendous prison into paradise for them, with respect to this, that they saw His deity face to face, the price of redemption having been paid.

§ 20. But to that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that the objection is foolish: because neither did they dwell in the same place: and even if they had dwelt with the others, the others would not have been able to see the light: because it is not received except by an eye glorified by grace and glory: just as those fathers then according to the soul were blessed immediately upon Christ descending to them: and this belongs rather to the potency [or weakness] of light, that corporeal light is perceived by all: because this happens to it insofar as it is a positional form proportioned to powers, and an agent acting by altering through the necessity of nature: which things, since they are all marks of ignobility, none of them belongs to the divine light.

§ 21. To the next it must be said, that limbo was not condemned to perpetual darkness, but rather to temporal [darkness] until the redemption which was accomplished through Christ.

§ 22. To the next it must be said, that paradise is spoken of in three ways, namely the interior which is the open vision of the deity, and of this Christ understands [it] speaking to

the thief: and the exterior of bodies, which is a place in Eden: and the exterior of spirits, which is the place of the empyrean heaven.

Articulus 6 — How Long Christ Was In Hell

§ 23. ARTICLE VI. How long was Christ in hell?

§ 24. Thirdly and lastly it is asked, How long was He there?

§ 25. For it seems that He departed immediately: because

§ 26. 1. It is so read in the Gospel of Nicodemus, that when the Saints had been led out into paradise, there appeared someone horrible in appearance, bearing the cross of a thief: who, when he was asked who he was, said that he was the thief to whom Christ had promised that he would be with Him today in paradise: therefore they exited immediately, as it seems.

§ 27. 2. Item, In certain Churches it is sung: You have come, desirable one, whom we were awaiting in the darkness, to lead forth this night the bound ones from the cloisters, etc. Therefore it seems that they were led out on the same night.

§ 28. 3. Item, Samson did not sleep in Gaza for three days or nights, but for one only, when he carried the gates of Gaza to the peak of the mountain. But Samson, 'the strong sun' (as Gregory says), signifies Christ sleeping in the night, and Gaza hell, and the gates of Gaza the gates of death and hell, which He carried to the peak of eternal vision and elevation.

§ 29. 4. Besides, For what purpose would He have been there so long?

§ 30. BUT ON THE CONTRARY:

§ 31. The soul ought to have been in the place of departed souls for as long as the body was in the place of departed bodies. But the body was in the sepulcher for three days: therefore the soul ought to have been in hell for that long. And Augustine renders the reason for this, because He lay for two nights, and only one perfect day: so that by His single death of the body, by which He shone as the day before the eyes of God, He might destroy our double foul and misty death, namely of body and soul, and that by His full light of truth He might signify to have wiped away the darkness of the law and of sin: so that by His light He might show Himself to illuminate two places filled with darkness by the very quality of death, namely the place of bodies, and the place of souls, in the sepulcher, and in hell.

§ 32. Therefore to the first it must be said, that Nicodemus speaks of the exit after the resurrection: and he also speaks there of Elijah and Enoch who were congratulating the liberated ones, just as they also had held a discourse beforehand concerning the departure which He fulfilled in hell by redeeming them. And as to what the thief said, that he was the one to whom Christ said: Today, etc., it is understood that the saying of Christ is materially signified.

§ 33. To the next it must be said, that the Saints there call 'night' the darkness of the infernal prison, from which they were led out when they saw the deity of the soul of Christ.

252. Job 14:13.

§ 34. To the next it must be said, that the history does not correspond to the allegory in all things: because Samson also slept with a harlot, which is not fitting for Christ: but only the sleep and the resurrection and the breaking of the gates are referred to the allegory.

§ 35. To the last the solution is evident through those things which were said at the beginning of the solution, where it is shown why it was fitting for Christ to remain so long in hell.

Articulus 7 — Whether Christ Ascended By Reason Of Both Natures, Or Of One Only

§ 36. ARTICLE VII. Whether Christ ascended by reason of both natures, or of one only?

§ 37. Next it is asked concerning this which He says, there, It is also usually asked, Whether it can be fittingly said, etc.

§ 38. And the question here is concerning the ascension of Christ.

§ 39. And it is asked first here in the Letter, whether He ascended and descended by reason of both or of one nature?

§ 40. Secondly it can be asked, Whether the ascension is to a place, or to a dignity?

§ 41. Thirdly it can also be said, Whether ascension denotes a local motion? and, Whether that [motion] is in time, or in an instant [nunc]?

§ 42. Lastly it can be asked concerning the time of the ascension.

§ 43. To the first one proceeds thus:

§ 44. 1. Damascene says, that ascension and descension are motions of bodies: therefore it seems that He ascended and descended by grace of the human nature.

§ 45. 2. Item, That which is everywhere does not change place: but the deity is everywhere: therefore it does not change place: but ascension and descension denote a change of place: therefore it seems that they do not belong to Christ by reason of the divine nature.

§ 46. BUT ON THE CONTRARY:

§ 47. Before the incarnation He did not have a human nature, and yet He previously descended into the womb of the Virgin, in which He took a human nature: therefore it seems that He descended by reason of the divine nature: because Jerome says, that it does not belong to human nature to ascend by its proper power, but by another power: and therefore the Angels marvel saying: Who is this, who comes from Edom. And below: Walking in the multitude of his strength.

§ 48. Solution. It must be said, that ascending and descending are spoken of properly, and by translation [or figuratively]. Properly they are motions of bodies, and thus they do not belong to Christ, except by reason of the human nature: and yet in that He did not descend: therefore He is said to have descended according to the divine nature, but to have ascended according to the human: because in the divine only the entity descended, and in the human it ascended: but according to person He was always in heaven, and everywhere. By translation,

however, that is then said to descend, where it was indeed before, but was not present there before, just as to the union with our substance, when He emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant: and in this way the Master speaks here.

§ 49. To the next it must be said, that the deity through itself does not change place, but through some effect it appears in some place through which it did not appear in it before, and does not appear through the same in another.

§ 50. To the last which is objected, it must be said that ascending is not attributed to the human nature as the power to which the motion belonged, but as the proper subject of that motion.

Articulus 8 — Whether The Ascension Is To A Place Or To A Dignity, And Whether To The Place Of The Crystalline Heaven

§ 51. ARTICLE VIII. Whether the ascension is to a place or to a dignity? and, Whether to the place of the crystalline heaven?

§ 52. Secondly it is asked, Whether the ascension is to a place, or to a dignity?

§ 53. But it seems that it is to a place: because

§ 54. 1. Every straight local motion is to some place: but ascension is a straight local motion: therefore it is to some place.

§ 55. 2. Item, A place congruent to his contemplation is owed to a contemplating and blessed Angel: therefore much more strongly to a glorified body: therefore it seems that the ascension is to that [place].

§ 56. BUT ON THE CONTRARY:

§ 57. 1. To Colossians 3:1 and 2, upon that: Seek the things that are above, where Christ is sitting at the right hand of God: mind the things that are above: the Gloss says, that the things above are virtues: therefore it seems that the ascension in which Christ resides is of dignity in virtue, not an exaltation of place.

§ 58. 2. Item, It is a principle among the Philosophers, that nothing is moved to that which is viler than itself: but every corporeal place is viler than the body of Christ: therefore it seems that it was not moved to any corporeal place.

§ 59. 3. Item, Place is given to a body on account of containment: therefore it seems that a body which has the necessity of existing from itself, and no flowing away in its parts, ought not to have a place: therefore that body ought not to be moved to a place.

§ 60. 4. Item, Among physical bodies, the most noble bodies do not move to a place, although they are moved in it: therefore since the body of Christ is infinitely more noble, it itself is not moved to a place.

§ 61. For the sake of this it is asked, Whether Christ's ascension was to the place of the crystalline heaven only, as some have said?

§ 62. But it seems that it was: because

§ 63. 1. A body and a spirit differ by genus: therefore the proper place of blessed spirits ought to differ from the proper place of bodies: since therefore the proximate place below that is the place of the crystalline heaven, it seems that the ascension of the body of Christ was to that.

§ 64. 2. Item, The place is different according to reason, namely of that which never was subject to the mutation which is caused by the motion of the heavens, and of that which at some time was subject: but an Angel and a spirit were never subject to motion and to the variation of time and of the heaven: but the body of Christ and of the blessed Virgin were at some time subject: therefore spirits ought to be in the place of the standing and not moving heaven: and bodies, namely of Christ and His mother, ought to be in the place of the first mobile heaven: but this is the crystalline heaven, as the opinion of almost all says: therefore it seems that the ascension of Christ was not locally except to the crystalline heaven.

§ 65. BUT ON THE CONTRARY:

§ 66. To that which is more worthy than any place, if a place is given, consequently the most worthy place is given. But the body of Christ and the sacrosanct womb of His mother are more worthy than any place: therefore if a place is given to it, the most worthy place will be given to them: but this is the empyrean heaven: therefore they are in the empyrean heaven.

§ 67. Solution. It must be said, that the ascension of Christ, is to a place, and to a dignity: to a place according to the body, and thus it is to the most worthy place of all places, namely into the highest of the empyrean heaven. But according to the divine person it is to the dignity of equality with the Father, which is called the right hand: not that it was not there before, but because sitting there in humanity through the ascension, He appeared to the faithful through faith, and to the Angels through cognition. But with respect to the soul and body it is to a dignity, which consists in the more potent goods of the Father, which are there called the right hand, if the ascension is referred to the humanity.

§ 68. But to that which is objected against this, it must be said to the first, that that Gloss by positing the ascension to be to the more potent goods which are above in dignity, does not on account of this exclude the ascension from being to a place, but rather includes it as a consequence: because the more potent goods of the Father appear more in a more worthy place.

§ 69. To the next it must be said, that it is one thing to be moved to a place, and another to be moved to a place on account of the place, namely because they need the place for their being and conservation. But glorified bodies were moved to a place which is more congruent to them, but not on account of the place, as if they needed it for their being: because if they needed that place for their being, they would be corrupted outside those places, just as fire going outside its place is corrupted.

§ 70. To the next it must be said, that in that reasoning a place is not owed to a glorified body, especially to the body of Christ, but rather by reason of congruency only, that is, because it is not congruent for it to be except in the most noble place.

§ 71. To the next it must be said, that heavenly bodies are moved in place for the generation of the elements, and they are not in place in all those ways in which generable bodies are in place, as was said in the second book of the Sentences: yet in some way they are in place. Thus also glorified bodies are not in place in every one of those ways, because their being does not depend upon a place: but they are in place by reason of congruency according to a mode which more closely approaches their nobility, since none attains to equality.

§ 72. But to that which is further asked, it must be said, that it is a foolish fantasy to say, that the body of Christ and of the blessed Virgin are in the crystalline heaven, or even that the Saints are in the crystalline: and only Christ and the blessed Virgin are in the empyrean: because the empyrean is the place of beatitude, but the crystalline heaven together with all the lower ones is ordered to generation and corruption: and therefore the Saints say, that the Philosophers did not know the empyrean heaven: and this is so, because their principles concerning the heavens are taken from motion. Whence what cannot be investigated through motion, or through a property of motion, does not belong to the Philosophers, and is unacknowledged by them.

§ 73. But to that which is objected, it must be said to the first, that this would be true, if a spirit and a glorified body by their nature were determined to the place of their generation and salvation: but this is not true: and therefore since no dignity of place according to truth suffices for glory, all glorious bodies are in one place by one account, according as they are related to that glory more distantly or more proximately.

§ 74. To the next it must be said that the body of Christ with respect to generation never was subject to the motion of the heavens, because it was effected by the Holy Spirit: but perhaps with respect to the alteration of cold, and heat, and hunger, and thirst, and the like; but from these every glorified body is liberated by glorification: and therefore it cannot be located under any mobile thing, but above every mobile thing.

Articulus 9 — Whether The Ascension Signifies Local Motion, And Whether It Was In Time Or In A Now

§ 75. ARTICLE IX. Whether ascension denotes a local motion? and, Whether it was in time or in an instant? § 76. Thirdly it is asked, Whether ascension denotes a local motion? and, Whether that motion is in time or in an instant?

§ 77. It seems that it denotes a local motion: because

§ 78. 1. Acts 1:9, it is said, that while they were watching, He was elevated, and a cloud received Him out of their sight.

§ 79. 2. Item, In the same place, v. 10: And while they were looking up into heaven as He went, etc. All these posit a local motion.

§ 80. BUT ON THE CONTRARY:

§ 81. 1. Local motion is through a space: therefore in the middle of the space through which the motion is, that which is moved is partly in the term from which, and partly in the term to which: therefore it is divisible: therefore the glorious body is divided by some division, which seems false.

§ 82. 2. Item, Every motion (as Avicenna says) is an exit from potency to act. But a glorified body is in no potency: because it cannot receive anything more than it has. Therefore it seems that it is not moved.

§ 83. 3. Besides, Either it is with the other through which it passes in the same place, or it excludes it. If it is in the same place, as the Saints seem to say: therefore the dimension of that quantity and of the body with which it is in the same place is the same: but of whatever bodies the quantity is the same, those are one body, as Avicenna says: therefore the body of Christ with that through which it is moved, is one body: which is false: therefore it is not moved.

§ 84. If perhaps you say, that it excludes that through which it is moved, from the place through which it passes. On the contrary: It passes through some things that do not give way, like wood and stones: for He entered with closed doors: therefore He was at some time in the same place with them, not excluding them.

§ 85. If perhaps you say, that what Avicenna says is not true, that if two bodies are in the same place, they are one body: the saying of Avicenna is proved to be true thus: Let there be a place of one cubit, in which there are two bodies, and let the center of that place be A, but the extremes up and down, right and left, B C D E, and let the bodies be equal: and let a line be drawn from A to B upwards of each body, measuring from the center upwards. I ask therefore, whether there is one line, or two? If you tell me that there is one: therefore the subject of that line is one: because of one form there is one subject: for otherwise an accident one in number would be in diverse subjects, which is impossible: therefore the located body is one. But if you tell me that there are two lines, two incongruities follow from this: one geometrically, the other naturally. For since AB is taken upwards in the place of both, the point B is one in number. Similarly the center is one in number. But between any two lines there is a surface. Therefore two straight lines drawn from one term to one term, enclose and contain a surface: which is against the postulate of Euclid in book I, where he says that two straight lines contain no surface. Another incongruity is: because one straight line is between two points. If therefore they are posited to be two, there will be two contiguous lines without any intermediate surface, which is against nature, and is disproved in Physics VI. Therefore two bodies cannot be in one [place] at the same time.

§ 86. But if you say, that a body insofar as it is a quantified body does not fill a place, but insofar as it is gross and material: everyone who knows anything in Philosophy knows this to be false: because the contrary is said by all the Philosophers, and is necessarily disproved by the already stated demonstration. Therefore it seems that a glorious body is not moved: since it excludes a body, nor can it be in the same place with the body through which it passes.

§ 87. Further it is asked, Whether it is moved in an instant, or in time?

§ 88. But it seems that it is in time.

§ 89. 1. For everything commensurate with a place through quantity, is moved in time, and not in an instant, as the Philosopher proves: such a mobile is the glorious body of Christ: therefore it is moved in time, and not in an instant.

§ 90. 2. Item, Created spirits are moved in an instant, as was said in the first book of the Sentences: therefore it belongs to bodies to be moved in time, and not in an instant, as it seems.

§ 91. BUT ON THE CONTRARY:

§ 92. The Philosopher says, that the motion of light in a diaphanous medium, and the motion of color to the sight is in an instant, for the reason that they are in the medium according to a spiritual being: but glorious bodies are more spiritual, and especially the body of Christ: therefore it seems that it is moved in an instant.

§ 93. Solution. It must be believed without a doubt, that Christ was locally moved by ascending, and that He can still be locally moved according to His will: and here a faithful ignorance is more pleasing to God, than a rash knowledge, or a figment of a lie. For some said that there ought not to be motion of glorified bodies. Others fashioned lies to solve the incongruities, namely that a place is due to a body, not from its quantity, but from the grossness and filling of the place: which is absurd to say.

§ 94. Whence it must be said to the first, that there is division according to reality, and this is repugnant to an incorruptible body: and there is division according to reason, namely to have the notion of a term from which, and a term to which: just as everything has which is in the medium, according as it is moved: and this is not repugnant: which can easily be proved: because thus the motion of the sun is divided by the diurnal motion, and by the declining circle: and yet it is posited by all as incorruptible.

§ 95. To the next it must be said, that there is an exit from potency to act which is received in the mobile itself, such as a form, and that is of imperfection: and there is an act not received inside, but outside: and this is not repugnant to perfection. Thus the body of Christ existing on earth, is not in act in heaven, but in potency: but when this potency comes to act, nothing is received in it, but rather it holds itself differently to place than before: and this exit, according to the Philosophers, happens constantly in incorruptible bodies: as the sun existing in the angle of the East, is in potency to the angle of the mid-heaven: and when the potency is reduced to act, the sun is in no way better than before, but holds itself differently according to position.

§ 96. To the next it must be said, that according to the sayings of the Saints, to which consent must be given without doubt, a glorious body is with any other body in the same place, and does not exclude it: but this is not insofar as it is a body, but insofar as it is glorious: and this I repute to be a miracle, and concerning those things by which the Lord gives us glory: just as He does in many other things in the body, namely that an elemented body

should be immortal and impassible, shining seven times more than the sun. Whence God who can do more than we can understand, gives it this, that it may be in the same place with another body.

§ 97. But to the adduced demonstration, it must be said that lines are not commensurate in the nature of a body: and therefore physical reasons of this kind do not hold.

§ 98. To that which is further asked concerning time: I say that He is moved as He wills: and I well think, that He has it in His power to be moved in an instant and in time.

§ 99. But to that which is objected, that the motion is divisible according to the medium: it must be said that this does not prevent it from being able to be moved in an instant: because the moving power overcomes [it]. Just as the Philosopher also proves, that every infinite power, such as magnitude or multitude, exceeds every finite thing: and thus it would move in an instant, if there were such a power, as he himself proves there. Thus it must be said, that the moving power in the body of Christ, is not proportioned to any passive potency, no matter how fast: and therefore it overcomes the space so as to make the transit in an instant if He wills, and in time if He wills. Nevertheless such things are hidden from us: and therefore I assert nothing concerning the sayings, except what the authorities of the Saints hand down, namely that those bodies are moved, and that other bodies do not obstruct them.

Articulus 10 — Whether After The Resurrection Christ Remained With The Faithful Forty Days On Earth

§ 100. ARTICLE X. Whether after the resurrection Christ remained with the faithful for forty days on earth?

§ 101. Lastly it is asked concerning the time of the ascension.

§ 102. 1. For He conversed with the disciples, as is held in the beginning of Acts, appearing to them for forty days, and speaking of the kingdom of God. Since therefore other bodies are immediately moved to the place connatural to them, it seems that He violently detained the upward flight of His body.

§ 103. 2. Besides, Since those liberated from hell went out from hell with Him, did they ascend before Him? It seems that they did not: because Micah prophesied saying, that He will ascend opening the way before them.

§ 104. But to this and to the like it must be said, that He Himself was on earth for forty days, so that by apparitions He might teach the faith to the Apostles, and might prove the glorious resurrection of the same body, which they had seen dead with their own eyes: and this is to be proved at the end of the fourth book of the Sentences, where there will be a discussion concerning the arguments for the resurrection made through the ten apparitions, which are collected from the four Gospels. And it follows concerning His body alone that He has it in His power to move where He wills, and a place is not owed to Him on account of the necessity of Himself, but from congruency only: and therefore according to the order owed and useful to redemption, the ascension had to be deferred.

§ 105. To the next it must be said, that the opinion of all says, that no one ascended before Christ: and this is true. But whether they were with Christ, wherever He appeared to the Apostles (which I believe to be more true on account of the joy which they had in the presence of that body by which they had been redeemed) or were in paradise for those forty days, which certain others say, is not to be rashly asserted, but either can be opined without danger.

Articulus 11 — What The Latchet Of The Shoe And The Bones Of The King Of Idumea Signify

§ 106. ARTICLE XI. What do the thong of the shoe and the bones of the king of Idumaea signify?

§ 107. Next it is asked concerning the last word which the Master says as if by way of epilogue, there, D, § 2: These things concerning the thong of the shoe, etc.

§ 108. For what is called the thong here? what the shoe? what the king of Idumaea? and, What are his bones? and, How are they burned even to ashes?

§ 109. Solution. It must be said, that the shoe is the humanity directing the foot of the divinity, which standing alone, sustains all things by the sack of this dead and animal skin. But the binding thong is the union of the two natures into the singularity of the person. But the king of Idumaea is Christ the king of the world through the conformity of blood: because He communicated in flesh and blood. And Idumaea is interpreted 'bloody', just as the Psalmist says: Upon Idumaea I will extend my shoe. But the bones are those things which are stronger to be understood among the sacraments of His humanity. But to be burned to ashes, is to wish to investigate even to the least things by the fire of the fervor of study through arguments. And this is not to be done, as the Master says.

§ 110. And thus distinction XXII is evident.

DISTINCTIO XXIII

Divisio Textus

§ 111. DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

§ 112. But since it has been declared above, that Christ was full of grace, etc. Here begins that part in which he treats of the formal restorers ordained to act, and not against the defect of sin: as was said in the beginning of this book.

§ 113. And it is divided into two parts: in the first of which he treats of the gratifying and restoring habits. But in the second concerning the precepts which regard works. And this begins below, in distinction XXXVII, there, A, But now the distribution of the decalogue, etc.

§ 114. Still the former of these is divided into two parts: in the first of which the Master hands down the knowledge of these habits individually. But in the second he treats of their

connection: and this begins below, dist. XXXVI, there, A, It is also usually asked, Whether the virtues are so conjoined to one another, etc.

§ 115. Still the first is divided into two, according to the twofold aspect of the habits. For there are virtues concerning which he treats first: and there are gifts concerning which he treats second: and this begins at dist. XXXIV, there, A, Now concerning the seven gifts, etc.

§ 116. Still the former is divided into two, accor—

§ 1. ...while there are two genera of virtues: the theological, which are treated first, and the cardinal, which he treats second, in distinction 32, there, A, After the aforesaid, concerning the four virtues, etc.

§ 2. The first is divided into three, according to the three theological virtues: and the first is on faith; the second on hope, which begins in distinction 26, there, A, Now there is hope, etc. And the third on charity, which begins in distinction 27, there, A, But since Christ did not have faith and hope, etc.

§ 3. The treatise on faith is divided into three parts by three distinctions: in the first of which the Master explains two definitions of faith. In the second, he raises and resolves certain doubts concerning that explanation, which begins in distinction 24, there, A, Here it is asked, if faith is only concerning things not seen, etc. In the third, he treats of faith according to the state of the believer in which he is: and this begins in distinction 25, there, A, To the aforesaid must be added, etc.

§ 4. The present distinction is divided into three parts: in the first of which the Master continues his treatment. In the second, he posits a distinction of Augustine, with its definition, there, B, Faith is a virtue, etc.

§ 5. In the third, he posits another definition with its explanation, there, H, For the Apostle says: Faith is the substance, etc.

§ 6. In the second of these parts the Master does two things. For first the Master posits the definition of faith: and this in the second chapter of this distinction. Second, he posits the explanation: and this in the five following chapters. And this begins there, C, Now faith is taken, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether It Is A Virtue Or Not

In what genus is the virtue of faith?

§ 7. Many questions arise here in the Text: but before the Text there are two, namely, in what genus is the virtue of faith?

§ 8. And, whether it is a virtue, or not?

§ 9. To the first it seems one can object thus: 1. Every speculation of the true is in the genus of science: faith is a certain speculation of the true: therefore it is in the genus of science. The PROOF of the first is that science is a habit perfecting the intellect as regards the speculation

of the true. But the SECOND is proved by the fact that faith sees the true (as the Apostle says) through a glass in a dark manner . Now to see is to speculate in a certain way.

§ 10. 2. Also, Hugh of St. Victor: Faith is the assent to the first truth established below the understanding of truth, and above opinion. Now it is established that the extremes are in the genus of science and cognition. Therefore it seems that the mean is as well. But the mean is faith: therefore faith is in the genus of science.

§ 11. 3. Also, the Philosopher says that opinion aided by reasons becomes faith: therefore faith is in the same genus with opinion: but opinion is a certain science.

§ 12. The same is accepted through Boethius, who says that an argument is a reason making faith regarding a doubtful thing. Now whatever an argument makes in the genus of science, is faith: therefore it is in the genus of science.

§ 13. 4. Also, Romans 10:17: Faith is from hearing, and hearing through the word of Christ. But Gregory says that God gives understanding when he illumines the mind from the things heard. Now that illumination which is from the things heard, is in the genus of science. Therefore also the faith which is generated from that hearing, as the Apostle says: therefore faith is in the genus of science.

§ 14. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Nothing is science which has contrariety to a vice: but faith has contrariety to a vice: therefore faith is not in the genus of science. The first is self-evident: because a virtue is in some way from us, and we are its cause, or God; but science is from a thing. And similarly science has no opposition except to ignorance: and this is the opposition of privation and habit: but faith has the contrary habit of infidelity, which is a vice.

§ 15. 2. Also, there is no science of that for which there is no reason, and which is not manifest by itself: but for the credible there is no proving reason, and it is not manifest by itself; therefore of the credible there is no science. But faith is of the credible: therefore faith is not science. PROOF of the first: Every science is either of a principle, or of a conclusion: of a principle, like that which is manifest by itself; but of a conclusion, like that concerning which there is a proving reason. The PROOF of the second is that the credible is elevated beyond our reason, nor is it manifest to us by itself, as for example that God is three and one, through the saying of Gregory, who says that faith has no merit where human reason offers experience.

§ 16. Solution. It must be said that faith is not in the genus of science, as the last reasons prove. For although it has cognition, nevertheless that rather arises from affection than from reason. Whence Augustine: Other things a human being can do unwillingly, but he can believe only willingly. Whence it must be known that the intellect is related to the will in two ways: antecedently, and consequently. Antecedently it is related with respect to certain knowable things, to which it can be forced to consent from themselves or from reason. Consequently with respect to certain others, to the consent of which it is not compelled unless it wills it from a free will, because such things are not apparent to it, and concerning such things is faith: and therefore the Masters were accustomed to say that the cognition in faith is material, and the affection formal.

§ 17. To the first it must be said that not every speculation of the true is in the genus of science: but a speculation of the true in which the things that are, are formally perfective of science, such as a proving mean, and the true considered as true, which is the principle of science, as in universals. Wherefore it does not follow that faith is in the genus of science simply speaking, unless in the way practical science is called science: and this is not to be science simply, but mixed with affection, which dominates in it and informs it.

§ 18. To the next it must be said that Master Hugh calls the "science of truth" the vision face to face, while he calls "opinion" certain credible things in Sacred Scripture concerning which one doubts without peril: such as what the Master posits below in the Text, whether formed faith becomes unformed. And it is clear that these are not simply in the genus of science: because affection dominates in that science of truth, nor does it fluctuate as opinion does: because the one knowing the truth assents to what he sees, the one opining fears contradiction, while the one believing assents, but does not see the reason of his assent.

§ 19. To the next it must be said that faith is taken in many ways, namely for the truth sometimes, which is in promises: just as it is said, a faithful God, and faithful prophets. Whence the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 10:13: God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able, etc. And, Ecclesiasticus 36:18: Give reward, O Lord, to them that wait for thee, that thy prophets may be found faithful. Sometimes it is taken for the certitude of a conclusion had from the certitude of the principles of an argument. And an argument is called a reason making faith regarding a doubtful thing, that is, for a question, which is the same in subject with the conclusion. And so it is even taken by Aristotle, that faith is opinion aided by reasons. Sometimes it is taken for legality between human beings: as human beings are called faithful, as one is called a faithful friend, or a faithful companion. Whence in Proverbs 20:6: Many human beings are called merciful: but who shall find a faithful man? Sometimes faith is taken for the confidence of a secure conscience, as the Apostle says, Romans 14:23: All that is not of faith is sin. And thus it is also taken among the common people. Sometimes in works: as Damascene says, that by faith the farmer ploughs and sows the earth: for he has the confidence of the fruit. And it is taken in other ways. But in this question faith is not taken except for the consent to the first truth in articles not apparent to reason.

§ 20. To the next it must be said that "hearing" is taken there generally for everything that induces to faith: such as the hearing of a word, and the sight of a miracle, and the like: but such things do not cause consent in faith, but only induce a thought concerning the credible thing. And because they do not sufficiently prove it, therefore they do not serve faith except on the part of the material part, which is a tenuous cognition: and it is formally perfected on the part of the affection.

Articulus 2 — Whether Faith Is A Virtue

Whether faith is a virtue?

§ 21. Secondly it is asked, whether faith is a virtue, or not?

§ 22. And it seems that it is not: 1. For Cicero says that virtue is a voluntary habit by mode of nature, agreeable to reason. But faith does not seem to be a voluntary habit, because it is not in the will: nor even by mode of nature, since nature does not incline by mode of cognition, but faith is a certain cognition: therefore it seems that faith is not a virtue.

§ 23. 2. Also, the Philosopher says that virtue is operative of the best things in passions and operations. But faith is neither in passions, nor in operations, as it seems: because operations are upon something outside, and in determinate matter: nor is it operative of the best things, but rather it leans upon the true: therefore it seems that faith is not a virtue.

§ 24. 3. Also, the Philosopher says in book VI of the First Philosophy [Metaphysics] that the end of speculative intelligence is the true, but of the practical it is the work: but as the potencies are related, so are the habits perfecting the potencies: therefore every habit whose end is the true, is in the speculative intellect. But faith is a habit whose end is the true: therefore faith is in the speculative intellect. But in the speculative intellect there is no virtue: therefore faith is not a virtue.

§ 25. 4. Also, it does not seem to be true what was said, that faith is in the intellect insofar as it is consequently ordered to the will: because affection through cognition precedes every motion of the will and affection: for first a reporting is made to the affection, and afterwards the affection rises toward what is reported. Therefore it seems that faith, since it reports divine things, and opens the eye, as Augustine says, is prior to every affection: therefore it has nothing except what belongs to cognition: therefore it is not a virtue: because no pure cognition is a virtue, from the fact that it is in no way from us: for although we consent to the known true, this is not from us, but from the truth of the thing compelling reason.

§ 26. If perhaps you say that faith is of the true by mode of the good, and thus is in the practical intellect: this cannot be true: because thus the true in faith would be material, and the good formal: therefore as regards the formal in the object it would not be distinguished from charity, whose end and object is the good: therefore faith and charity would not differ except materially, which is false.

§ 27. But if you say that they differ in this, that the true is the good of the rational potency, and as regards this faith tends into it: but this again is nothing; because no potency is so speculative that it does not have an end: and that [end], according as it is an end, is thus a good for that potency, and desired by it: and thus already every science would be made a virtue, which is false: therefore faith is not a virtue.

§ 28. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Every habit moving a potency not by mode of art and science, but by mode of nature (as Cicero intends) is a virtue: faith is such a habit: therefore faith is a virtue. The first is written by Cicero. The second is proved through the things said before: because a habit which is an art and science, has reasons, and leans upon them: but faith does not have them, nor lean upon them: therefore it moves by mode of nature, like a heavy thing downwards, and a light thing upwards, except for this, that it knows the reason.

§ 29. 2. Also, Virtue (as the Philosopher says) is the disposition of the perfect to the best: but faith orders everything that it perfects and disposes to the best, because to God: therefore faith is a virtue.

§ 30. 3. Also, everything that is a principle of justification and of the purification of the heart, is a virtue: faith is of this sort: therefore it is a virtue. PROOF of the first: because nothing justifies except what is formally contrary to the impure of sin: and this is also only virtue. The SECOND is written, Acts 15:9: Purifying their hearts by faith. And Augustine says that faith is that by which we are justified. And, Romans 4:11: He received the sign of circumcision, a seal of the justice of the faith which he had, being uncircumcised.

§ 31. 4. Also, Augustine says that faith is a virtue: and it is posited in the Text.

§ 32. 5. Also, the Apostle to the Hebrews 11:6: Without faith it is impossible to please God. And, Ecclesiasticus 45:4: In his faith and meekness he sanctified him. And, to the woman who was in a flux of blood for twelve years, Luke 8:48: Thy faith hath made thee whole. And because the whole Scripture proclaims this, therefore let these suffice.

§ 33. Solution. It must be said that faith is a theological virtue. For the theological virtues are those immediately ordering into God, just as the cardinal virtues order into the mean of passions and praiseworthy operations: and therefore these and those have their rectitudes in different ways: because the cardinal ones are called straight from the act, or from the approach to the mean, and their opposite curve is the deflection into the superfluous or the diminished: but the rectitude of the theological ones consists in the right order into the end, according as it has the nature of beatitude in the true and the good and the unfailing, the high and the arduous: and the obliqueness opposite to it, is the deflection from the end to a mutable good. Thus therefore we say that faith is one of the theological virtues.

§ 34. To the first therefore it must be said that a virtue is not called a voluntary habit on the ground that every virtue is in the will as in a subject: but rather for this reason, because in the work of virtue and of the generation of the habit the moving principle is the will; and this is soundly said in the consuetudinal [moral] virtues: but the will in theological and infused ones at least cooperates through consent. Similarly faith is inclining by mode of nature: because it does not have a reason sufficient for consent, and if it had, nevertheless it does not lean on it. Whence in science and the arts, reason is the cause of consent, and first the reason is accepted so that afterwards it may be consented to: but in faith it is the contrary: for first there is consent to the first truth for its own sake, and afterwards reason is sought so that what is believed may in some way be understood: and after it is found, faith still does not lean upon it: and therefore it is clear that the whole proceeds from the liberty of the will, which makes faith assent: and therefore it inclines as a nature.

§ 35. To the next it must be said that the Philosopher is speaking of the political and consuetudinal virtues, and not of an intellectual virtue: because even in the VI book of the Ethics, he gives another doctrine concerning intellect and prudence and phronesis than he himself gave concerning chastity and fortitude. Or it can be said that faith has an interior work,

which is to tend into the first truth, and in that potency it operates the best: but it does not have passions: because not every virtue is in passions, properly speaking.

§ 36. To the next it must be said that the end of speculation is the true, which is as the principle of the science of the thing: and this is as it were moved from the thing to the intellect, and it consists in the universal reason of the thing: and there is the true beatifying the intellect, and this is the true outside the intellect, into which it itself tends: and it is not the reason of a thing, but rather the highest thing, and the one light of eternal felicity: and that light is the end of the intelligence affected around that very true. Whence I well concede that the solution of those who say that faith is in the true by mode of the good is nothing: for this is impossible, since it leans on the first truth for its own sake: for if it tended into it under the aspect of the good, it would already not lean on it for its own sake, but for the sake of the good, which is false. And therefore the saying of the Philosopher does not impede us: because the "true" of which he himself speaks is equivocal with respect to the end of faith.

§ 37. To the next it must be said that it was said above that this is necessary as regards consent, which is the substance of the act of faith: because it is after some cognition to which the will efficaciously tends through consent: but the true which is the reception of the credible through hearing, precedes affection: but that intellect is nothing but the one receiving the what it is that is meant by the name of the credible: and therefore not through a proving reason that or why it is so: but by free will it consents. And thus it is clear that the reason does not proceed except concerning the intellect which is the what it is that is meant by the name.

§ 38. Nevertheless if someone wished to subtly distinguish, he could say that there is the intellect as intellect, and in that there is no virtue: and there is the intellect as it is through extension to a work: and this extension is done in two ways. In the first way, because affection holds the principate in that which makes operable things to be inquired into. In the other way, because the form received by it is the principle of a work and of science: and thus it is extended into affection in the first way, and the knowable true into the operable good in the second way. And this is the practical intellect in which there are certain virtues, like prudence, phronesis, and intellect, and such intellectual virtues. But there is an intellect of the true, whose principle of consent is the will: and that is the affective intellect: and in that is faith: and although it is one in subject, nevertheless its being through such forms, and its rational account, is not one.

Articulus 3 — Whether The Definition Of Faith, According To Dionysius And Master Hugh, Is Well Assigned

Whether the definition of faith according to Dionysius and Master Hugh is well assigned?

§ 39. Next it is asked concerning this which is said in the Text, that faith is a virtue by which are believed the things that are not seen.

§ 40. Other definitions are found taken alongside this one: which, because they are almost similar, therefore we will posit two.

§ 41. For Dionysius says in the book On the Divine Names, that faith is the unique foundation of believers, placing them in the truth, and the truth in them, having the simple science of the truth for those credulous in the credible truth.

§ 42. But Hugh of St. Victor thus: Faith is the certitude of absent things, established below the science of truth, and above opinion.

§ 43. Other definitions are posited below in the second part.

§ 44. 1. But it seems it is not the unique foundation: because humility also founds. If you say that it does not found believers as believers, but rather the humble: this is nothing: because already according to this every virtue would be a foundation, because charity founds the loving one, and so of others.

§ 45. 2. Also, this does not seem to be true what he says, Placing them in the truth: because it rather places them in a mirror, and in an enigma, than in the truth.

§ 46. 3. Also, faith is below the science of truth: therefore it does not place to the truth, that is, in the truth: because so another translation has it.

§ 47. 4. Also, neither does this seem true what he says, And the truth in them, for which another translation has, and the truth in themselves. If you say that it places the truth in us through faith: this is nothing: because thus faith places through faith, and the same operates through itself: and is the principle of the work, and the mean or instrument: and this cannot be.

§ 48. 5. Furthermore, what does it mean that through faith truth is placed in us? because truth is in species [vision], and not in faith, 2 Corinthians 5:7: We walk by faith, and not by sight. And therefore while we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord, as the Apostle had said immediately before . Therefore faith rather causes us to be absent from the truth, than places it in us, and locates it.

§ 49. 6. Also it is asked further, what is it that he says: In the credible truth? If this is in the believed truth, as the other translation hints, how is it true that the credulous, that is, the faithful in the believed truth have the simple science of truth, since there are so many believed articles according to both symbols [creeds]?

§ 50. Further again it is asked concerning the other definition, that faith is the certitude of absent things:

§ 51. 1. For either he understands of things absent in place, or of things absent to reason. If in the first way: this is nothing: because even things absent in place can be present to reason. But if of things absent to reason: this is even less so: because it cannot be certain to reason, what is not present to reason.

§ 52. 2. Also what he says, Below science, faith seems in this to fall short of the certitude of a moral virtue, concerning which the Philosopher says that virtue is more certain than every art: therefore it is also more certain than every science. If therefore faith falls short of the certitude of a less certain thing, such as moral virtue is: thus faith will seem less certain than moral virtue, which God forbid.

§ 53. 3. Also, why does he say, Established above opinion? For opinion is a habit of imperfect certitude: because it fears the contrary out of the weakness of the persuasion: therefore it seems that it is not a habit comparable to faith.

§ 54. 4. Also, we opine that we know when we cognize the first cause, and that it is its cause, and that it is impossible for this to be otherwise: is faith above that science, or below it? For it seems that it is above: because we see that the certitude of faith is so strong that before it is denied, death is chosen by many, as the Martyrs did: but the Philosophers, who knew many true things, did not do this: therefore he ought to have said it is established above the science of truth, and not below. BUT ON THE CONTRARY: Faith is proved by authority, as is said in this lecture. And, Hebrews 11:1 throughout, in the Gloss. But the locus from authority is weak, not making anything but opinion: therefore it seems that the certitude of faith is established even below opinion.

§ 55. Solution. It must be said that the definition of Augustine posited in the Text is also disputed by the Master in the Text: and therefore we defer that one.

§ 56. But to the first we say that the definition of Dionysius is given concerning faith according to the proper effect which it has in the believer: for thus in the fact that it itself is first by nature in the spiritual edifice, it founds and places in the truth of the believed thing or article and of the hoped-for beatitude: but in the fact that it has something of cognition, it places the truth of the believed thing in us through a most certain consent: but in the fact that it is not the truth of a complex expression, as in a proportion, which is called an axiom, or the principle of a syllogism, therefore the credulous are said to have in it a simple science of the truth, that is, a simple light, which makes one in some way know the truth of the credible article. And thus it is clear that faith does three things: namely in the fact that it is first by nature, it founds us in the truth: but in the fact that it is a certain cognition, it founds the truth in us: and in the fact that it is a simple light similar to the first truth, it gives a simple science of the truth of credible things.

§ 57. To the first it must be said that humility founds, not as being laid in the foundation, but rather as making deep trenches by emptying oneself, in which trenches the foundations are placed.

§ 58. To the next it must be said that it places the truth in us in the fact that it in some way holds it through the assent of cognition, but not through species. For the truth is in a mirror and an enigma as an object and end, although it is not in them as in its proper light.

§ 59. To the next it must be said that the "science of truth" is there called the vision through species, and the liquid and open truth: but it is not taken here thus, but rather for the truth as if veiled by a mirror and an enigma.

§ 60. To the next it must be said that faith places the truth in us through consent and a certain cognition which it makes in us: and I well concede, that it is not through faith [as an instrument separate from the habit]: but that cognition is of a mirror and an enigma.

§ 61. To the next it must be said that truth is in both, but differently: but it is not said to be in species, for the reason that there it is unmixed with similitudes.

§ 62. To the next it must be said that although there are many articles, nevertheless one thing is subject in all, which is the first truth: and therefore faith is called a simple light, which is a similitude of that truth, and is not composite from many things, like the light of intellective science.

§ 63. To that which is objected concerning the other definition, it must be said that "of absent things" is said there as regards reason: and this in two ways. For a thing is absent to reason, the cognition of which is in no way in it: neither is it as a proving reason, nor even as an object: and thus what is absent to reason is ignored: and in this way proceeds the reason adduced. In a second way that is called absent to reason which indeed is present as an object, but there is no proving and convincing reason for the sense: and thus faith is called the rectitude of absent things: and therefore the Gloss says, on Galatians 5:6, that faith is the certitude of invisible things. And invisible things are called there, what here are called absent things, namely those of which a proving reason is not had: and nevertheless the consent is most strong.

§ 64. To the next it must be said that the virtue of faith is more certain than every art and every moral virtue: because the science of truth is not understood to be the science of art, but rather contemplation through species in the Word, which overcomes all certitude through the light which proceeds from the Word. Whence that objection sins by equivocation of the "science of truth".

§ 65. To the next it must be said that faith overcomes opinion, concerning which it was spoken above: because Augustine says that there are three things by which the intellect is aided in divine things, namely opinion, intellect, and faith. And what we opine, is due to error: since we do not know how to pronounce anything certain about it, namely whether those rising with the Lord were incinerated, or not. But what we believe, is due to authority, which is supported by the revelation of the Holy Spirit: and what we understand, this is of open reason: and as regards this, faith is posited as a mean, as was said above, and not otherwise.

§ 66. To the next it must be said that faith is led by the hand by the authority of the fathers who bought it: but it does not consent because of this, nay rather it consents because of the truth itself without a reason. And as regards this it is said to be above the consent of opinion which consents because of a reason, yet fearing contradiction.

§ 67. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Divisio Textus

§ 68. Now faith is taken in three ways, etc. Here the Master explains the definition of Augustine, and introduces five chapters: in the first of which he explains how faith is a virtue. In the second, he explains this that he says, which are believed, there, D, It is one thing to believe, etc. In the third he asks, Whether faith which is not a virtue, can become a virtue? there, E, But if it is

asked, etc. In the fourth, he determines concerning the universality of faith, there, F, And since in diverse ways, etc. In the fifth, he explains the last part, which is which are not seen, namely how faith is of non-apparent things, there, G, It is also to be noted, that faith is properly of non-apparent things, etc.

Articulus 4 — Whether The Threefold Division Is Well Assigned Concerning Faith According To The Master

Whether the threefold division concerning faith is well assigned according to the Master?

§ 69. But a doubt arises concerning the first chapter concerning the division which he posits, that faith is spoken of in three ways, namely for that by which it is believed, and it is a virtue: and for that which is believed, and it is not a virtue: and for that into which it is believed, which is other than that by which it is believed.

§ 70. 1. For since there are three things, namely the habit, the act, and the object, he ought to have posited yet another by reason of the act: or if he does not attend to the act, then he ought to have posited only two, namely the habit, and the object.

§ 71. 2. Also, in the names which name the habits of other virtues, the name is not equivocated except to the habit, and the act: as love is an act, and love is a habit: and hope is a habit, and hope is an act, and so of others: therefore it ought similarly to be done here: therefore what is believed will not be called faith, as it seems.

§ 72. 3. Also, faith is spoken of in other ways which he does not posit here: therefore he seems to distinguish the multiplicity of faith diminutely.

§ 1. Solution: It must be said to the first that the Master does not intend here to distinguish the multiplicity of the name of faith, but only to explain those things that fall in some way into its definition: for into it fall the things that are not seen, and those are the articles: and into it falls virtue, and not the virtue which is unformed faith, which he calls a non-virtue, which is with respect to the same things. But the act in faith is not so properly called by the name of the habit as in the other virtues: and this is because the perfection of faith is from two things, namely from the intellect giving the act, and from the affect as informing: but "to believe" names only one of those, namely that which is from the intellect: and therefore it cannot receive the name of the whole habit, as is the case in the other virtues, which consist in only one potency as regards their material and their formal element.

§ 2. To the other it must be said that the Master does not intend concerning those, and above several modes have been posited: and besides those faith is also called the sacrament of faith, which is baptism, when infants are called faithful, because faith in a gift is given to them, just as the other virtues: and therefore the aforesaid definition is fitting to them, not that they can immediately believe according to act, but they have the habit by which they can believe when the time comes for the use of free choice.

Articulus 5 — Whether Unformed Faith Is A Virtue

Is unformed faith a virtue?

§ 3. Next, it is asked concerning this which he says: Because of that which is believed, and is not a virtue, etc.

§ 4. For from this it is held that unformed faith is not a virtue: and this seems to be proved in the Letter.

§ 5. It can also be proved by reason thus: because 1. A dead human is not a human: but unformed faith is dead: therefore it is not faith.

§ 6. 2. Likewise, Nothing unformed in a certain species is named by the name of the species or genus of that form, unless it possesses the form of another species of the same genus, by reason of which it receives the predication of the genus: but unformed faith is unformed by the form of the species of faith, and it does not possess the form of another species of virtue by which it receives the predication of the genus: therefore unformed faith cannot be called a virtue. The proof of the major is from this, that there is no order to a genus except through a species and the difference by which it proceeds from the genus. The second, however, is evident per se: because faith is not called unformed except from a lack of the form of faith.

§ 7. 3. Likewise, A virtue is a good quality by which one lives rightly, which no one uses badly, which God operates in us without us: but unformed faith is not such a quality: therefore it is not a virtue. The first premise is proved by the authority of Augustine. The second, however, is proved from this, that a formally good quality does not suffer along with itself a formally bad quality: but unformed faith suffers along with itself the stain of sin, which is a formally bad quality. Similarly, we clearly see that by it one does not live rightly: because many have it who do not live rightly.

§ 8. 4. Likewise, Augustine: Virtue is a quality by which one lives in the spiritual life: therefore it seems, since one does not live by unformed faith, that it is not called a virtue.

§ 9. 5. Likewise, If it is a virtue: either it is infused, or customary. If infused: either it is of those directing to the end, as the theological virtues do, or directing to that which is for the end. If you say that it is of those directing to the end: but all such virtues make one pleasing [grace]: therefore it seems that it makes one pleasing: which is absurd, because then the worst sinners would be pleasing. But if you say that it is a grace freely given, then I have the proposition: because a grace...

...freely given, qua such, is not a virtue, just as the word of wisdom, and the word of knowledge, and the working of miracles, and prophecy, and the like.

§ 10. BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Virtues are defined through their acts, just as potencies are: therefore if the definition of virtue applies to it, it is a virtue. But the definition of virtue is that it is a voluntary habit in the manner of nature consenting to reason. Yet it was proved earlier that faith, because it lacks sufficient reason and art, consents only in the manner of nature: but unformed faith does this: therefore it is a virtue.

§ 11. 2. Likewise, Many virtues are common to the good and the bad: for Augustine says, and it is held in the book of the Sentences, that charity alone divides between the children of the kingdom and of perdition: therefore this is not a cause for it not being a virtue, because it can exist along with sin existing in the same subject.

§ 12. 3. Likewise, To believe what is not apparent is beyond the power of our reason: but to believe what is apparent is beneath it: therefore it belongs to another virtue than reason or intellect: and I ask, to whose? and there is no other to assign than unformed faith: therefore that which is called unformed faith is a certain virtue.

§ 13. Solution: It seems to be said here that virtue is spoken of primarily and secondarily through that definition, that virtue is called the disposition of the perfect to the optimum. For according to this mode, gratuitous virtues are called virtues primarily, and unformed ones secondarily, and lastly customary ones, because they are the most remote dispositions of their perfected subjects to the optimum. I say therefore that unformed faith is a virtue, but it does not have the complete rationale of a virtue to the same extent as formed faith, or another virtue that makes one pleasing.

§ 14. To the first, therefore, which is objected, it must be said that unformed faith is not dead in such a way that the potency for life is deprived in it, but rather from the inability of its subject for the inflow of the life of faith from God: and therefore it has the cause of its death outside itself: and therefore there still remains in it a respect to the rationale of virtue, albeit secondarily. But this is not so of a dead human, or an ass, as is per se evident to anyone.

§ 15. To the other it must be said that faith is called unformed due to the lack of the form that gives to the species the perfection of virtue, and not due to the lack of the species: because otherwise unformed faith would not be faith, which is false. But what that form is will be clear below, when it is asked, Whether it becomes formed, or not? For perfection is more properly according to the potency of attaining the end, than is perfection according to the being of the species of faith. And therefore it is clear that the species is in some way in unformed faith: and consequently the predication of the genus is verified of it.

§ 16. To the other it must be said that faith is a good quality, but it does not have the complete goodness that excludes sin: but it is called good because, as much as is of itself, it is repugnant to sin. Similarly, as much as is of itself, one lives rightly by faith.

§ 17. To the other it must be said that the spiritual life is not an act of virtue, except insofar as it is conjoined to grace: because grace is the life of the soul: and therefore this saying is understood of a virtue infused with grace.

§ 18. To the other it must be said that faith is a virtue infused by God and a gift of the Holy Spirit, according as "gift" is taken broadly for whatever is given by gift for the direction of life. And it does not follow if it is freely given, and not making pleasing, that it is not a virtue: because those graces are diverse. Hence those that have to order life to God possess the rationale of a virtue, such as servile fear, and unformed faith, and the like, even if they do not possess the rationale of the most complete virtue.

Articulus 6 — Whether Demons Believe, And Whether Their Faith Is In The Practical Or The Speculative Intellect

Do demons believe? and, Is their faith in the practical or speculative intellect?

Do demons believe? and, Is their faith in the practical or speculative intellect?

§ 19. Next it is asked concerning this which he says in the same chapter C, towards the end: Another [faith] is of the demon: for the demons also believe, and tremble, etc.

§ 20. For this seems to be false: 1. For since the unformed of itself is formable, as the Master says below, it seems that it does not belong to the demons, who are in no way apt for the formation of grace.

§ 21. 2. Likewise, Unformed faith (as has also been held) is a gift of the Holy Spirit: but a gift of the Holy Spirit does not apply to demons: therefore it seems that neither does unformed faith.

§ 22. 3. Likewise, Unformed faith works in the faithful the gift of servile fear: but servile fear causes one to flee the act of sin: therefore it seems, since this does not apply to demons, that they do not have unformed faith.

§ 23. 4. Likewise, Whence would unformed faith have come to them? For before the fall they had knowledge in the Word. And this knowledge is not faith: therefore, since nothing remained of it, if they have it, it is necessary that God infused it into them after the fall: which is not probable: therefore they do not seem to have unformed faith.

§ 24. 5. Likewise, Faith is knowledge through a mirror in an enigma. But an angel, whether good or evil, knows through concreated species which it has within itself: therefore it seems that it does not have unformed faith.

§ 25. BUT ON THE CONTRARY: It is certain that they do not have knowledge in the Word: therefore they either have knowledge from reason concerning the articles of faith, or from faith. If from reason: then faith could be proved, which is absurd according to the sayings of the Saints: and this is presupposed here, because it will be proved below: therefore it remains that they have the knowledge of faith because otherwise they would know nothing of the articles to be believed, which is false.

§ 26. Likewise, Mark 1:24: What have we to do with thee, Jesus of Nazareth? Art thou come to destroy us? I know who thou art, the Holy One of God. And thus it is certain that they have faith: because that voice could not proceed from the proof of reason, nor from the contemplation of the Word: therefore it is clear that it is from faith.

§ 27. By grace of this it is further asked, due to the opinions of various people, Whether their faith is in the practical (or affective) intellect, or the speculative?

§ 28. But it seems that it is in the speculative because 1. They have no affect concerning what is believed: but every habit which is in the affective intellect is affected concerning what is believed or its object: therefore their faith is in the speculative intellect alone.

§ 29. 2. Likewise, The will of God is always good: but the will of the devil is always evil, although his power is just, as Augustine says: therefore the will of the demon is never to assent to what is believed: because this is one of the best things in life: therefore he always believes coerced. But the affective intellect is not coerced, but only the speculative: therefore it seems their faith is only in the speculative intellect.

§ 30. BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. In the Letter, and James 2:19: The demons believe, and tremble. Therefore the motion of trembling follows the believing of the demon: but no motion follows the speculative intellect (as the Philosopher says) anymore than if we were looking at terrible things in pictures: therefore the believing of the demon is not according to the speculative intellect:

therefore it is necessary that it be according to the practical.

§ 31. 2. Likewise, the Philosopher says thus in Book III of De Anima: Neither the reasoning power nor the so-called intellect is the mover: for the speculative intellect understands nothing practical [actuale]: nor does it say anything about what is to be avoided or pursued [imitabili]. From this it is gathered that the faith by which the demons tremble is not according to the speculative intellect, as some have said.

§ 32. Solution: It must be said that the Saints expressly say that demons have faith. But I well think that that faith is not the unformed faith which humans existing in life have, but a credulity arisen from natural knowledge: for although the demons lost contemplation in the Word, they nonetheless did not lose natural knowledge, by which through the species of effects and the conjectures of operations they know God as creator, and as judge, and as the rewarder of His own. And this is what Dionysius says in the book On the Divine Names: We say that the natural gifts given to the demons have by no means been changed: but they are integral and most splendid, although they themselves do not see, closing the inspectorial powers of their own good. And therefore Augustine says here, that another [faith], that is, unformed, is of the demons: because it causes the trembling of fear, and does not abstract from the act of sin, just as the credulity of the demon does not either. Hence what is said here is said by a similitude of the act of credulity, and by a similitude of the effect: namely because it causes trembling and not the flight from sin. Hence the first reasons seem to be granted, that unformed faith is not in the demons, although there is in them a credulity similar to it in certain respects.

§ 33. To the 1, however, which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that that knowledge which they have is not the remains of vision in the Word, just as faith is in a certain way the remains of formed faith, nor is it infused after the fall: but it is resulting from the knowledge which they have of God through experience and effect, and the sight of miracles and judgments, and natural knowledge.

§ 34. And through this the solution to the following is also evident.

§ 35. To the 1 which is further asked, it must be said that it is not in the speculative intellect: for this is impossible, that a speculated thing as speculated should move to trembling: but it is in the practical, which however has nothing of the will of the thing

believed, but has a spurning of the thing believed, which however through experience it is necessary to believe: for the practical does not always speak of what is desirable, but also of what is terrible: whence even then fear and flight follow.

§ 36. And to what is objected, that according to this it seems the article can be proved: it must be said that it does not follow: because for a trembling of this sort a persuasion a posteriori is sufficient: for every practical intellect (as Avicenna says) is from probabilities, namely in those things which are done by us or around us.

§ 37. And through this the solution to the whole is evident.

Articulus 7 — Whether It Is The Same To Believe God, To Believe That God Is, And To Believe In God

Is it the same to believe God, to believe that God is, and to believe in God?

§ 38. Next it is asked concerning this which he says in chapter D, there, For it is one thing to believe in God, etc.

§ 39. For it seems that these three are unfittingly posited concerning the act of faith: 1. For every single virtue relates in one way to its object: therefore one does not believe God, that God is, and in God.

§ 40. 2. Likewise, Since there could still be a greater diversity, namely to believe concerning God, and toward God, just as in God, why does the Master not posit the diversity of the object of faith according to those?

§ 41. 3. Likewise, Nothing tends into another unless that is known: therefore into whatever a certain virtue tends, it is necessary that that be first shown to it: but faith opens the eyes, as Augustine says: therefore it belongs to faith to show the object of all virtues: therefore it belongs to faith not only to believe God, that God is, and in God, but also the good and the arduous, and the just debt, and the like: therefore the Master insufficiently distinguishes the object of faith here, as it seems.

§ 42. Likewise it is asked, In what do believing God, believing that God is, and believing in God differ?

§ 43. For it seems that they do not differ except in matter: because 1. To believe God is to believe to be true those things which He says: and those manifest Him to us: therefore believing God is terminated as in an end manifested to us in believing that God is.

§ 44. 2. Likewise, It seems that he unfittingly attributes believing in God to be "by believing to love": for to love belongs to charity, and not to faith: therefore it ought not to be attributed to the act of faith.

§ 45. 3. Likewise, Every lover tends into that which he loves through affect: therefore when he said, "to believe in God is by believing to love," he superfluously added, "by believing to go into Him."

§ 46. 4. Likewise, It does not belong to faith to go, as it seems, but only to direct the eyes to the way: but to hope to be extended toward the journey, and to charity to set out, as Augustine seems to hold.

§ 47. Likewise, To adhere rather belongs to hope, than to faith: because it is commonly said that it belongs to hope to adhere, and to charity to inhere.

§ 48. 5. Likewise, Every lover and one tending into God is already incorporated: therefore to the other three sayings it was not necessary to add the fourth.

§ 49. Solution: It must be said that in truth "to believe" is defined here in relation to the object: and it is defined according to every mode by which the object can relate itself, and according to the maximum and optimal power. For faith leans upon the First Truth: and this is taken in a sign, or in itself. And I call a sign, an expressed infallible sign, such as is a word which is known to be the Word of God. If it leans upon it in a sign: then it is to believe God, that is, to believe the truthful one who speaks, whether He speaks in Scripture, or in the heart, or in revelation, or through creatures, provided it is infallibly known to be the Word of God. But if it leans upon it in itself, either it does so such that it tends into it, and thus it is to believe in God: or such that it assents without tension, and then it is to believe that God is. Hence the optimum state of believing gathers all these together: because through words it comes to God, and through God into God.

§ 50. To the first therefore it must be said that faith is one virtue, and it has one object which is the First Truth, and one rationale which is the same Truth, and it leans upon the First Truth on account of itself: and this diversification is nothing but a difference of the object according to accidental properties, as the truth is in a sign or in its being. And another difference of these two is according to the power of faith in tending, or not tending, as is clear: and this can also be in other virtues besides charity, which cannot have a lesser power in tending, or a greater: because it never becomes unformed, but nonetheless loves God in Himself, and in a sign similar to the prime goodness.

§ 51. To the other it must be said that the preposition ad [to/toward] denotes the rationale of an end, and not the rationale of an object: and this does not apply to faith: just as it is also said that the human is ad imaginem [to the image], and not the image: but it does not denote the penetration of the believed itself by the affect of the believer.

§ 52. To the other it must be said that that proposition is indeed proposed by many, and it is most false in the whole of nature, and in all moral and customary virtues, which all tend in the manner of nature, and are more direct than any art from the efficacy of the habit itself: for a heavy body does not cognitively know the medium of its descent, and yet it tends perpendicularly by the most direct way to the center more certainly than a geometer: and similarly chastity in this that the chaste works, and justice in this that the just, it is not necessary to preratiocinate concerning just and chaste things, because without deliberation they touch the mean of innate passions according to the delectable of touch: because of which the Philosopher also says, that those who are brave and just without deliberation, possess virtue more truly than those who do so from deliberation and reason: because the first follow nothing of art, but

the whole is of virtue what they do: but the second are in some way moved from art. Hence any virtue is per se certain in its object: and it is not necessary that it be shown to it.

§ 53. To the other it must be said that there is no difference of the object according to species, because thus it would diversify the virtue of faith into diverse species: but the difference is according to a property of the object, and a greater or lesser power of the virtue.

§ 54. To the other it must be said that no virtue alone can attain beatitude: hence the act of faith is defined here according as faith works through love: and then those four are so diversified, as they are the things which are required for attaining the perfection of the end: for then some are on the part of the one tending into the end, some on the part of the conjunction to the end, and some on the part of the consequent effect according to nature. On the part of the one tending there are two, of which one is the mover, such as love: and

the other is the motion itself, such as to go into Him. On the part of the consequent effect is to be incorporated into His members: and this is in a certain way to become one with the end of faith. On the part of the conjunction with the end is to adhere. And through this the solution to the first is also evident: because in that believing charity is not separated from faith.

§ 55. To the other it must be said that the following does not superabound: because it differs in the believer just as the effect from the cause, and the motion from the mover.

§ 56. To the other it must be said that faith sees in a certain way: but vision is outside the thing, and not within: and therefore to adhere is attributed to it: although it could also belong to hope through expectation, but to that it rather belongs to cohere.

§ 57. To the other it must be said that although the lover is incorporated, yet prior in nature, not in time, it is necessary that he tend from love to God, who incorporates him to Himself, and adhere to Him. Otherwise it could be said if we wished, that these belong to the act of faith in itself: and then to love does not denote for faith the act of charity conjoined with its own act, but it denotes the affection of the end which is proper to every single virtue tending into its end: and by that affect to go outside oneself into the end denotes the progress of the same: but to adhere denotes the conjunction of consent, and to be incorporated denotes union with Him. But the first exposition is of the intention of the Master in the Letter.

Articulus 8 — Whether To Believe Is To Think With Assent

Is to believe to cogitate with assent?

§ 58. Next it is asked concerning this which a certain note affixed here in the Letter says: Augustine in the book On the Predestination of the Saints: To believe is itself nothing else than to cogitate with assent.

§ 59. For here the act is defined according to the substance of the act, whereas before it was determined through comparison to the object.

§ 60. It seems that it is not true: because 1. "To cogitate" [cogitare] is said as if "to agitate together" [coagitare], as Augustine seems to hold in Book IX of On the Trinity, because to cogitate (as he himself says there) is to discern a known thing from other known things: therefore to cogitate belongs only to the cogitative power: but to believe does not proceed from the cogitative alone: therefore it seems that to believe is badly defined through to cogitate.

§ 61. 2. Likewise, Faith (as was held above) is the simple light of believers: therefore it seems that to cogitate does not apply to it: because cogitation cogitates many things simultaneously.

§ 62. Likewise, Our assent in faith does not arise from our cogitation: because then it would not be a virtue, but a science, or an art: therefore it seems that it ought not to be defined through to cogitate.

§ 63. Further it is asked concerning assent: For every virtue assents to its object and proper end: therefore it is not definitional of faith alone: therefore it ought not to be posited in its definition, since those things which are posited in a definition ought to be separated from others.

§ 64. Solution: It must be said that faith has an act which belongs to it according to itself, and it has an act which belongs to it according to what is from hearing, according to what the Apostle says, Romans 10:17: Faith is from hearing: but hearing through the word of Christ. In itself according as it is a light informing the intellect, nothing belongs to it except to assent to the invisible thing shown. But according to what is from hearing, then it assents with cogitation concerning this which it heard from a reason not proving indeed, but manually leading: so however, that hearing is taken generally: as we said above concerning the sign, when believing God was being expounded, namely that it includes within itself exterior hearing through the word, and the sight of a miracle and of the works of God, and interior hearing: for hearing causes cognition. And in this way to believe is defined in two things, that it has the thing cogitated from hearing, and the assent from itself: because I well concede that it does not assent on account of the thing cogitated.

§ 65. To the first therefore it must be said that believing is essentially in assent: yet by accident, insofar as it is nourished and fostered and manually led, it relates itself to the cogitative power inquiring concerning what is believed: not because it doubts, but because it asks of God a reason for that to which it consents: not by which it may be certified, but in which it may rejoice and admire.

§ 66. To the other it must be said in the same way, that assent does not proceed because it cogitates, but rather from this proceeds admirable rejoicing: as Augustine says of himself in the book of the Confessions: I was not satiated in those days for the wondrous sweetness to consider the altitude of the divine counsel concerning the salvation of the human race.

§ 67. To that which is objected concerning assent, it must be said that assent is of the true as true, properly speaking: and therefore the other virtues do not properly have assent, but rest in the end: because they do not consider the true as the First Truth.

Articulus 9 — Whether Unformed Faith Becomes Formed

Does unformed faith become formed?

§ 68. Next it is asked concerning this which he says in the following chapter H, there, But if it is asked, Whether that unformed quality, etc.

§ 69. For here the Master says that unformed faith becomes formed: and concerning this there are diverse opinions of the Masters: and therefore here the disputation must be more strongly insisted upon, so that we may ask three things. The first is, Whether unformed faith becomes formed, or not? The second is, Whether it is formed by a proper form, or by charity, or by grace: because all these have been said by diverse people. The third, How is it diversely formed by a proper form, and by charity, and by grace?

§ 70. To the first of these it is proceeded thus: 1. In natures if a certain potency is toward an

act in a subject, but is not expedited, nature does not evacuate it, but perfects it to the act by directing there spirits and the other things informing that potency: therefore it is similarly in grace, which is no less ingenious than nature. But it is certain that unformed faith is a virtue which can assent to all the articles: therefore advancing grace will give it nothing but to tend into what is believed, and does not evacuate it, as it seems.

§ 71. 2. Likewise, Nature always operates by the shortest way: because it neither abounds in superfluous things, nor is deficient in necessary things, as the Philosopher says. Therefore much more does grace, which in all ways is more ordered than nature: but it is shorter to inform that which already is, than to create a thing to be informed, and afterwards to inform the created thing: therefore it seems that grace proceeds in this way: therefore it informs unformed faith.

§ 72. 3. Likewise, Every unformed thing is formable: therefore unless there is an impediment from the corruption of the potency, it will of necessity be formed upon the advancing of the form: but here there is no impediment unless the human dies, for as long as he is on the way, he is possible toward grace: therefore his faith is formable by grace.

§ 73. 4. Likewise, Why would unformed faith be destroyed upon the advancing of grace? for either this would be from the contrariety of its cause: or from the contrariety of itself to grace. If it should happen in the first way, just as we see a white thing destroyed in a bright surface upon the advancing of heat, because the cold containing and causing the whiteness departs: therefore it seems that unformed and formed faith are from opposite causes, which is false, since both are caused by God and are a gift of the Holy Spirit. But if it had contrariety from itself: then the gifts of God would be contrary to each other, and virtue to virtue, which cannot be.

§ 74. 5. Likewise, A grace freely given and a grace making pleasing are less distant than a natural or customary virtue and a grace making pleasing: but an advancing grace (as many say) does not destroy a natural virtue, but perfects and orders it: therefore much less does it evacuate a grace freely given, which is faith.

§ 75. Likewise, There is lesser diversity of a grace freely given ordered to the same act with the making pleasing, than of a freely given not ordered to the same act: but an advancing grace does not evacuate freely given ones, such as wisdom, knowledge, prophecy, which are not ordered to the same act with it: therefore much more does it not evacuate unformed faith which is to the same act.

§ 76. 6. Likewise, On the part of the act and the object there is no repugnance: because believing that God is and believing God are saved, and believing in God: therefore it seems that the habit of unformed faith is saved in the habit of formed faith.

§ 77. 8. Likewise, Before the fall someone had formed faith. But it is certain that through the fall he did not merit any gift of God: therefore it seems that no other faith is infused into him than before, but only the form of that is taken away: therefore it can be restored without the restitution of unformed faith.

§ 78. Likewise, It would be ridiculous that someone should have as many new faiths as times he had fallen: and yet this would be necessary, if we were to say that the same which was unformed cannot become formed.

§ 79. If perchance you say that it is evacuated like a lesser light by a greater: this is nothing: because a lesser light conjoined to another greater one is not evacuated by it, just as one ray of the sun is not evacuated by many other rays, nor is the light of one candle evacuated by the light of another candle united to it: but unformed faith on the part of the efficient, and on the part of the object is a light of the same rationale with formed faith: therefore it is not evacuated by the light of formed faith.

§ 80. 9. Likewise, If the sun could separately infuse light, and heat: and first infuse light, afterwards by infusing heat, it would not take away the infused light, so that afterwards it would infuse both, but rather it would place heat over the light: therefore it seems that the First Truth does similarly, and first infuses light, and afterwards informs it through affect.

§ But against this it is objected as follows: 1. Sanctifying grace does the same thing in one subject as it does in another. But in someone who had nothing of faith, it confers the fullness of all virtues. Therefore, since it is not more deficient in someone who had unformed faith, it seems to confer the whole [virtue] upon him as well. Therefore, it seems that it does not form the preceding [unformed faith], but rather confers the whole.

§ 2. Also, if a soul were infused into a body that previously had some operation of the soul, the soul would nonetheless be infused into that body with all its powers, even though another power for the same act had previously been in it, because the soul could not be divided such that on account of this one power would be separated from it. Therefore, it seems that it is similar in the case of grace, which is like a certain whole with respect to all the virtues, that nothing is separable from it on the basis that it finds an unformed virtue already there. Since therefore nothing superfluous remains, it seems that unformed faith is evacuated.

§ 3. Also, servile fear does not remain when charity arrives, because perfect charity casts out fear. Therefore, similarly, its cause is also expelled, namely unformed faith.

§ 4. Also, a dead work is not vivified when charity arrives, but perishes, and a new grace for acting is given. Therefore, it seems that similarly dead faith is not vivified either.

§ 5. Also, when it is said, "Formed faith is a virtue": either this is predicated essentially [per se] or accidentally. If essentially, it seems that the whole species is supposed by formed faith, because a genus is not predicated essentially of a subject with an added form. But if it were not essentially predicated, then it seems it would only be predicated accidentally, and this is unacceptable, because everyone says the opposite.

§ 6. Also, one accident is not made from two accidents, nor can there be a composition between them unless one is like a genus and the other like a difference. Therefore, since unformed faith is a certain habit, and formed faith is also a habit, it seems that one habit is not made from them. Therefore, it is not formed by it.

§ Solution: I think it must be said here with the Master that what is unformed becomes formed through the arrival of grace and charity. And therefore, the first arguments seem to me to be conceded.

§ As to that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that sanctifying grace, insofar as it is of itself, does in one what it does in another, but it is not so on the part of the subject. For in some it perfects the natural virtues of those who have them; in some it does not, who do not have them. And in some it removes sin, and in some it does not. So it also happens to it in some to form unformed faith, while in others to infuse the whole of faith. And this is not due to its own deficiency, but due to the different disposition of the subject.

§ To the next it must be said that if a soul were infused into some body, it would be infused wholly; because the power that was previously in the body could only be rooted in the body's complexion, and thus it would not be unifiable to the soul, just as the corporeal is not made essentially one with the spiritual. But unformed and formed faith, according to their cause, are from the same efficient principle, namely God, and therefore they are unifiable. And therefore, there is no similarity between grace with its parts and the soul with its parts.

§ To the next it must be said that I say the same thing concerning servile fear: for it is not evacuated insofar as it is fear, but only insofar as it is servile. Hence it is properly the servility that is expelled, not the fear. And so I also say that the unformedness of faith is removed, but not faith itself; just as in the homeland [heaven], the substance of faith is not removed, namely the vision of truth, but rather the form of faith in act, which is to see through a glass and in a riddle.

§ To the next it must be said that there is no similarity with a dead work: because this is not from a living cause, but from free choice which lies dead in sins. But faith is from the First Truth, which cannot die, and it does not die essentially and in itself, but rather from the defect of another.

§ To the next it must be said that the predication is essential [per se] when it is said, "Formed faith is a virtue," and a perfect species of virtue is supposed. And when it is said, "Unformed faith is a virtue," the predication is by posteriority, as was explained above.

§ To the next it must be said that that proposition is false both in rational things and in nature. In rational things it is clear that a habit is made from the disposition of one act and from the disposition of another; for no reason can be assigned as to why one act should leave a disposition while another merely confirms it. In nature it is also false; because light at the extremity of the transparent becomes one with the color existing in act, according to what the Philosopher says, that color is the extremity of the transparent in a determinate body. But it is true that one is always related as potency to the other, and the other as act. And so I say here that unformed faith is as a potency, and formed faith is as its act, for the purpose that it might be able to tend toward the end and be conjoined to the end, which it could not do before.

§ But because many great thinkers maintain that opinion, one can also respond on their behalf to the opposite arguments first introduced: so that it might be said to the first, that there is not complete similarity in nature and in grace. Because in nature, natural potencies are rooted in diverse principles, especially corporeal virtues; and therefore, while those principles exist, the virtues remain, even if they are sometimes impeded. But in grace, all virtues have one thing in which they are as in their virtual whole, which is grace, and when it is removed, all are subtracted, and when it is posited, all are posited. And this is due to the perfection of grace, and the connection of virtues in grace.

§ To the next it must be said that this is the shortest way of justification, that the whole be infused at once, and that which does not cause justification be removed.

§ To the next it must be said that an unformed virtue is not called unformed because it is unformable, but rather from the privation of the form which is grace, and the privation of potency for the form. And if it is asked, "What is the impediment?" it can be said that it is its own imperfection, by reason of which it is not unifiable with perfect grace, just as a ray of fire is not united to a ray of the sun, but is evacuated by it.

§ To the next it must be said that unformed faith is destroyed as not unifiable to grace. And therefore, just as the light of the sun, being unifiable to that to which the light of fire is united, excludes it, so formed faith excludes unformed faith from the same subject. Nevertheless, there are some of that opinion who say that it remains with formed faith, and not superfluously; because it contributes to making the intellect go forth more easily into the act of believing.

§ And consequently they say similarly: because some of them say that natural things remain along with gratuitous things; and some say that by reason of imperfection they are absorbed: just as two qualities successively existing in a body according to the same thing, if they are of the same species, one is absorbed by the other.

§ To the next it must be said that although on the part of the act and the object there is no repugnance, nevertheless there is imperfection in the one. And therefore, it cannot stand with the perfect light supervening. Or, as others say, it stands with it towards the same thing, yet otherwise ordered: because unformed faith believes God [to be] and believes God [His words], whereas formed faith believes in God.

§ To the next it must be said that it is not absurd for the good habit of unformed faith to be created so many times: not that this fallen person merits it, but because God is supremely merciful, and He gives gifts even to the wicked by which they might be able to return to Him if they wish. Or, as others say, it always remains the same, and is not removed through sin, just as neither are other gratuitously given virtues, nor customary ones.

§ To the next it must be said that unformed faith does not have complete equivocation with formed faith, and therefore it can be evacuated by it. Or, as others say, both remain.

§ To the last it must be said that there is no similarity with the light and heat of the sun: because these are divided in effect, but it is not so with grace and faith. Hence, grace infuses nothing of virtue unless it gives the whole; and if it gives the whole, it does not need another. And therefore it evacuates what is imperfect. Or let it be conceded that it remains with formed faith.

§ Although it could be solved in this way, nevertheless it is apparent enough in these very solutions that the first opinion is sounder.

Articulus 10 — By Which Form Faith Is Formed

By what form is faith formed?

§ Secondly, it is asked: By what form is faith formed?

§ It seems that it is by grace: because 1. It needs nothing except that, according to a pleasing being [esse gratum], it tend toward the believed object. But grace does this. Therefore, grace forms it.

§ 2. Also, it needs nothing except that it merit, for it believes all the things that formed faith believes, but it does not merit. But grace operates toward merit. Therefore, grace forms it.

§ 3. On the contrary, it seems that charity forms it: because it seems to say so in the Text.

§ 4. Also, it was established above that charity is the mother of all virtues. Therefore, also of faith.

§ 5. Also, it belongs to that to form which never becomes unformed. But this is charity. Therefore, it belongs to charity to form.

§ BUT AGAINST THIS: 1. Form gives being and intelligible nature [rationem] to a species. Therefore, charity does not form faith; because otherwise faith would be charity, which is false.

§ 2. Also, whatever is divided disparately with another species under the same genus, that is not its form, but an opposite species. But charity and faith are divided disparately under the genus of theological virtue. Therefore, charity is not its form, but an opposite species.

§ It is similarly proven that grace, in that it is grace, does not form. For nothing that is the same in intelligible nature and is found in many species of a certain genus is the form giving being to any one of them. But grace is found according to one intelligible nature in many species of virtue. Therefore, it is not the form of any of them. The first premise is proven by

the fact that things are distinguished from one another by their forms. The second premise by the fact that it belongs to grace to make pleasing [gratum facere], and as to this it is equally in all virtues. Therefore, grace is not the form of faith.

§ Solution: In my judgment, faith is formed by its proper form, just as any other virtue. And if you ask: What is that form? I say that it is a light forming the affective intellect according to its tending toward the end, and that is formal with respect to the habit assenting to God. For as it is in the habit, so it is in the act. Now, in the act, the act of faith is to assent to the First Truth for its own sake and above all things; to which, however, when "tending into that to which it assents" is added, no material thing is added, but upon that which is the act there is placed a perfection resulting from the attainment of the end to which the act is directed. And that is the perfection of the form, insofar as the end is the form, and this form is principally in morals and virtues. Therefore, it will also be so in the habit, that to the light there is added a light conjoining the intellect of the believer to the truth which he believes.

§ Therefore, to what is first objected, it must be said that it is not sufficient for it to be pleasing in itself, but there must be something specified by reason of which it tends into the First Truth, as it is the First Truth.

§ To the next it must be said that it is not true that it only needs to merit: on the contrary, there must be something specifying the habit, which ought to elicit meritorious acts in this virtue that are not elicited by another.

§ To what is objected about charity, it must be said that charity is not the form giving being, but rather giving well-being [bene esse], as will be evident below.

§ To the next it must be said that it does not follow, if it is the mother, that it is the form giving being: because it is called mother from the fact that in the bowels of charity the virtues are formed as to a certain kind of being, and not absolutely.

§ To the next it must be said that charity is not rendered unformed; but it does not from this possess the ability to form as to being, but as to well-being; because it is impossible for multiple things differing in species not to have diverse forms.

Articulus 11 — How Diversely Faith Is Informed By Its Proper Form, And By Grace, And By Charity

How diversely is faith formed by its proper form, and by grace, and by charity?

§ Thirdly it is asked: How is faith diversely formed by its proper form, and charity, and grace?

§ For there is only a twofold being, namely substantial, and accidental, which is well-being. Therefore, it seems that there ought to be only a twofold form, and not a threefold one.

§ Solution: It must be said that in faith there are three things, namely that which is proper to faith; and the relation of its act to merit, namely that it avails for eternal life; and the relation of faith to common perfection, and the cause of all our works. And as to the first, faith needs its proper form which gives it being in its species. As to the second, it needs grace;

because grace makes the one having it pleasing, and renders his work pleasing. And as to the third, it needs charity; because charity is the bond of perfection, because all works are directed toward the supreme goodness, which is the object and end of charity. Moreover, it is called mother insofar as it is, as it were, impregnated by conceiving all things in its bowels: because the charity by which we love God is the cause of all the works and virtues by which we worship Him. And thus, in a certain way, all are born from charity.

Articulus 12 — Whether Faith Is One Or Different According To The Things To Be Believed, As Science According To The Knowable Things

Is faith one, or differentiating according to believable things, just as science differentiates according to knowable things?

§ Next it is asked concerning chapter F, there, And since faith is spoken of in diverse ways, etc.

§ For it seems that faith is not one. 1. For since a certain science is faith, or is not without science, and science differentiates according to knowable things: it seems also that faith differentiates according to believable things. But believable things are many, because the articles are the believable things, which are twelve, or fourteen according to the different divisions of the Creeds: [therefore] faith is not one.

§ 2. Also, wisdom and science are distinguished from one another, because one is concerning eternal things, the other concerning temporal things. Therefore, in the same way, faith concerning temporal things differs from that which is concerning eternal things. But it is concerning eternal and temporal things, as is said in the Text. Therefore, it is diverse.

§ 3. Also, fear, which is with respect to eternal punishments, differs from the love which is concerning eternal good, and hope which is concerning eternal goods. Therefore, faith also, which is with respect to those articles that are concerning eternal punishments, differs from that faith which is concerning [eternal goods], etc. And thus again faith is diverse, and not one.

§ 4. But if you were to say that faith is in the affection of the will more than in cognition, and is not diversified as science is: this is nothing. Because even wills differ according to the things willed. Therefore, faith tending toward one article is not faith tending toward another, as it seems.

§ BUT AGAINST THIS: In all the articles, the First Truth is supposed as the essential and final believed object. But this is one in all the articles. Therefore, faith is as well.

§ Furthermore, it is asked concerning what he says, that the faith by which one believes is one in genus, and not in species. For it seems to be one in species: because it does not differ in me and in you through a difference of species, but rather only through matter.

§ Solution: It must be said that faith, taken according to the intelligible nature and first subject of the believed object, is numerically one: because there is one reason for believing in all the articles, namely the First Truth, and this is abstracted from every article. For I do not believe that Christ suffered because He suffered, but because of the First Truth, and so with

the others. Now, the first object of faith is one, namely the believed object, namely the First Truth about which faith is concerned in every believed thing. But the subject as contracted and specified by the matter of the article is not one, but rather in this way there are twelve, or fourteen. Thus the solution to the first is evident.

§ To the next it must be said that there is no similarity: because science receives its intelligible nature from the consideration of temporal law, and wisdom from the consideration of eternal principles. And therefore wisdom and science differ, as the temporal and the eternal. But the believed object of faith is not concerning the temporal as it is temporal, but as it is the matter of the eternal and of the First Truth; and therefore it does not receive from it a difference in species.

§ To the next it must be said that fear consists in a simple fleeing affection, and hope in eternal things: because fear receives its intelligible nature from punishment insofar as it is an evil, and therefore it is opposed to hope which is concerning the eternal insofar as it is a good or unfailing. But faith is not concerning punishments as punishments are evil, but rather as they are subject to the First Truth. And therefore in this respect the articles regarding eternal punishment do not differ from the article in which eternal glory is believed, because both are the First Truth believed. And therefore what is introduced is not similar.

§ To the next it must be said that even if faith is called an affection, nevertheless it will not be said to be diversified: because it does not tend into diverse things by the intelligible nature of diverse things, but by the intelligible nature of the one thing that underlies them all, which is the First Truth.

§ To the next it must be said that he calls a "genus" here that which is predicated of multiple things differing in species, such that material species are taken on the part of the multitude of articles. Some have said that it is one in genus, that is, in generation. Or it may be said that by reason of states it is called one in genus: because a state diversifies as to species the articles taken in enunciations, even if they are not taken as one in reality, as if it is said that Christ is incarnated, and that Christ is to be incarnated, and so concerning the others.

Articulus 13 — Whether Faith Is Of Things Not Apparent

Is faith concerning non-apparent things?

§ Next it is asked concerning what he says in this chapter G, there, It is also to be noted, that faith properly, etc.

§ Here he shows that faith is concerning non-apparent things.

§ Now a question arises here around the beginning of the chapter: Whether faith is concerning non-apparent things?

§ And it seems that it is not: because 1. One article is that God is one, and another is that God is the creator of heaven and earth. And these can be proven by reason, just as we brought forward arguments for this in the first book of the Sentences. Therefore, it seems that it is concerning some things apparent to reason.

§ 2. Also, the disciples saw Christ suffer, and the same men believed. Therefore, they believed even that which was apparent to the eyes.

§ 3. Also, that which has an evident sign of its truth is said to be apparent, even if a necessary cause is not seen: because otherwise all topical [dialectical] matters would be non-apparent. Since therefore the resurrection had an evident sign, namely the apparitions that were made to the disciples, certain articles seem to be apparent to reason.

§ 4. If perhaps you were to say that it is said to be concerning non-apparent things according to the things that in reality will be apparent in the future: this is nothing. Because according to this, faith would only be concerning future things, and not concerning past and present things.

§ 5. Also, faith seems contrary to a sophism. For a sophism is concerning apparent and non-existent things, while faith is concerning non-apparent and certitudinally existent things. Since therefore a sophism has the reason for its appearance, but not for its existence, it seems that faith ought to have some reasons for its existence, but not for its appearance.

§ Solution: It must be said that faith is concerning non-apparent things to the intellect, because they cannot be proven. And the cause of this was stated in the first book of the Sentences, since we suppose among ourselves certain principles by which we receive science, which are contrary to the articles of faith. Such is the following: Everything that is entirely disposed in one way, and in which there is no variation of essence, intelligence, or will, nor cause of variation: if it moves or acts, it always acts. Yet we nevertheless believe that He began to create just now, and not before this. Also: That which is of one simple nature according to reason and being, and is not multiplied accidentally, nor distinctly by substantial form, can only be one hypostasis. Also: That of two natures differing in species and genus, preserved on both sides in being and properties, there cannot be one hypostasis. Also: That from pure nothing into some being there is no mutation. Also: That every mutation supposes and leaves behind matter as such. And therefore, in every article, the fantastical intellect must be taken captive to the obedience of Christ.

§ Therefore, to the first it must be said, as was stated in the third distinction of the first book of the Sentences, that the reason proving that God is and that He is one, does not show anything except the fact that He is, and not what He is. Moreover, although through faith we cannot entirely grasp what God is, because He alone is the perfect contemplator of Himself, nevertheless we approach more than reason leads us, saying even what sort of one God is, and what sort of substance: namely that His unity does not contradict a plurality of persons, and that His substance remaining indistinct encloses distinct hypostases within itself. And it is impossible to prove these things. And therefore, in this way faith is about God, that He is a substance, and that He is one; and not in that way by which it is concluded that He is God, and a substance, and one.

§ To the next it is solved in the Text by Gregory, that the disciples saw one thing, and believed another: because that a man suffered is not an article of faith, but that God suffered. And this could not be proven.

§ To the next it must be said that a sign is twofold: namely, that which is taken from the nature of the thing to be proven, even if it is not its immediate cause; and this sign makes for a topical opinion. The other is a persuasive sign by way of a miracle, the reason of which we cannot reach from ourselves; and this leads by the hand to faith, just as the apparition is a sign of the resurrection, and one was as hidden from reason as the other. And through such a thing faith is well proven. But on account of that proof, it is not made to be concerning apparent things: because both the proving reason and the proven conclusion are concerning non-apparent things, because we cannot reach either from reason.

§ To the next it must be said that that solution is not valid.

§ To the next it must be said that faith is well contrary to a sophism, and excludes it, but it cannot have the reason for its existence: because every reason is apparent. And if it had a reason, it would be concerning apparent things, and thus the merit of faith would be evacuated, which cannot be.

§ But if you object, saying that the Doctors of our time adduce many reasons to prove the things we believe: I say that those reasons are founded upon principles supposed by faith, and not upon sophistic (or alternatively, physical) principles, because faith by its profundity exceeds all sciences. And therefore it seeks for itself proper principles from which it may be proven. And because the principles are non-apparent, faith is not made to be concerning apparent things on account of those reasons.

Articulus 14 — Whether The Division Of The Things That Are Seen Is Good

Is the division of the things that are seen good?

§ Next it is asked concerning what Augustine says, there, Each one sees faith itself, etc.

§ For here a certain division is given of the things that are seen, which contains six members. The first of these is of things which are by their essence in the soul. The second, however, is of things which are seen in sensible species when matter is present. The third, of things which are seen through memory retaining the images of absent corporeal things. The fourth is of things which we do not see, but form them by cogitation from the things which we do see. The fifth is of things which we know from similarity, as the soul of another from nature. The sixth is of things which we learn through motion and effect.

§ But this division of the things that are seen seems to be insufficient, because:

1. Those things which are by their essence in the soul are not in it in one way. For God is in the soul by essence in one way, the soul itself or the intellect in another, and the virtues in another. Therefore, it seems that the first mode is insufficient.

§ 2. Also, since interior vision is concerning things heard, smelled, tasted, and touched through images: why is it called here by Augustine interior vision rather than interior hearing, or smelling, or touching, or tasting?

§ 3. Also, it seems not to be true what he says in the third mode: because, as Avicenna and Algazel say, the treasury of imaginable forms differs from the treasury of particular intentions. And the treasury of imaginable forms is the imagination, and not the memory; whereas the treasury of particular intentions is the memory, not the imagination. Therefore, the images by which we cogitate absent things, we do not hold in memory, but in imagination.

§ 4. Also, the fourth mode seems to be doubtful, namely, Things which we do not see, and from those which we see we form a cogitation in some way, and commend them to memory. For this can happen in three ways. Namely, things which we do not see as a whole, but we see in part, and we form a cogitation by inventing, such as a goat-stag, a buck-deer, or a chimera. And this will perhaps be of the imagination composing and dividing images. Or, things which we do not see, namely those whose species are not sensible, but are intentions elicited from sensible things, yet not separated from the appendages of matter. Just as a sheep seeing a wolf elicits that it is an enemy, and flees; and a man seeing fire elicits that it is harmful, and fears; and this belongs to the sensible estimative power. Or thus, that there are certain things we do not see in their proper and essentially sensible species, but accidentally, by separating their intelligible natures from all matter and appendages of matter through cogitation. Just as, seeing this white or curly thing, we understand 'man', and we receive the universal from the particular and sensible. Therefore, it seems that Augustine ought to have divided this.

§ 5. Also, Cicero in his Rhetoric says that we often see a contrary from its contrary. And Aristotle says the same thing in a certain chapter of On Memory and Recollection. Therefore, it seems that he ought to have posited that mode outside of this one, which says that we know the similar from the similar.

§ 6. Also, in the last he seems to say nothing: because we do not know a man by proper cogita-
tion from his motions, but rather from his proper form. Therefore, it seems that this sixth mode does not have a proper knowable object.

§ But if you were to say that Augustine's example is not 'man', but 'animal', as some books have it: then it seems that he says nothing in the fifth mode, where he supposes that the soul sees itself, and from itself knows the soul of another.

§ Solution: It must be said that these modes of vision are good. But because Augustine does not intend to distinguish visions in every way, but only to give examples of certain general modes; therefore he does not subdivide the general modes. And therefore I well concede that the first and fourth are subdivided, as the objections prove. Now the rationale of Augustine's division is this: Everything that is seen, is either seen through its proper species, or in the species of another. But if it is seen through its proper species, either its species itself is its essence, such that to be seen and to be by essence in the seer is the same thing; or its species is only an intention of the thing seen, and is not its essence. If in the first way: then it is the first mode. If in the second way: either it is with the presence of matter, as sensible vision happens, and then it is the second mode; or it is without its presence, and then it is the third mode. But if it is not seen in its proper species: either it is seen in that which results from

proper species per se, or what results from them through comparison to another. If in the first way: then it is the fourth mode in its threefold diversity, as is evident in the objections; because the objection teaches the art of receiving those modes. If in the second way: either it is a comparison of species from which the seen intention results according to the comparison of the caused to the cause, and then it is the last mode: because we receive a certain cause which cannot be known through its proper species, but through the species of its effect and work, as a mover through motion, and the like; or it is according to the collation of similar and proportionable things, and thus it is the fifth mode understood generally.

§ And through this the solution to almost the whole is evident.

§ For to the first it must be said that the things which are by their essence in the soul: either they are of the substance of the soul in a certain way, such as the soul itself and its powers; or they are gliding into it through the substance of the soul, like God; or they form it in its powers, like habits.

§ To the next it must be said that interior vision is called "vision" rather than the act of another sense for a twofold reason. One of these is touched upon by the Philosopher, namely that sight is more immaterial, and considers more differences, and is therefore more fitting to formal interior powers. And therefore it is also higher in the head of man, who has the senses completely; and it has a more lucid sensible spirit, which runs down through the optic nerves. Although in certain other animals hearing is higher, as in the horse, and the lion, and in almost all quadrupeds. But in flying animals it is like in man as to hearing and sight; but not as to smell, because that in flying animals is higher than hearing: to inquire into the cause of which belongs to another inquiry. Another cause can be that the acts of the other senses are not fulfilled without acting upon corporeal matter, and corporeally, not spiritually. As is clear in hearing according to act, because it is not fulfilled without a percussion reaching the fracturing of the air, as the Philosopher says. Odor, moreover, is not fulfilled without a fuming evaporation. And concerning taste and touch it is self-evident. And therefore the Commentator says that visible species are in the medium according to spiritual being, whereas the species of the others are through material being. And therefore again the name of sight is more fitting to interior powers than the name of another sense.

§ To the next it must be said that Augustine here calls "memory" in a general way every treasury, whether it contains the images of the common sense, or the intentions of the estimative power, or even intelligible principles. Because he himself does not intend to distinguish the powers of the soul, but only to show diverse visions through examples, so that the first might be proven to be the most certain.

To another, the solution is clear through the things said before.

To another, it must be said that seeing the contrary in the contrary does not make a proper genus of vision, which cannot be seen in another way and more properly: and Augustine intends here only such things which have some certain vision, as he proves from the very degrees of visions, that the first genus of visions is most certain.

To another, it must be said that Augustine intends a special genus of visions, namely of those in whose substance we cannot [know], except by the species of their work or effect: and therefore he does not subject man there, except as a material and common example, and he intends at the same time those things which we know through works, and not otherwise, like the virtue of sapphire through shining gold, and the virtue of the magnet through the attraction of iron, and the mover of the heavens through the motion of the stars.

Articulus 15 — Whether Someone Can Know With The Most Certain Knowledge Whether He Is Worthy Of Eternal Life, Or Not

Whether someone can know with most certain knowledge whether he is worthy of eternal life, or not?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, G, around the middle: Faith does not thus appear in the heart in which it is, from him whose it is, but he holds it with most certain knowledge, etc.

For this does not seem to be true: because it has been proven that whoever has one virtue, has all: therefore, if I see myself having all virtues, thus with most certain knowledge I know myself to be worthy of eternal life: which is against Ecclesiastes 9:1: Man does not know whether he is worthy of love or hatred. Again, the Apostle: I am not conscious to myself of anything, yet I am not hereby justified. Also, in Proverbs: There is a way that seems right to a man, but its end leads to death. Also, Job 3:23: To a man whose way is hidden, and God has surrounded him with darkness. And there the Gloss of Gregory says that the chief cause of weeping for holy men is because they do not know about their state, whether it pleases or displeases God.

To this some have said that indeed faith is seen in the heart: but it is not known whether it is given gratuitously or makes one pleasing: and therefore it is not known whether thus all are had. But this solution is remarkable: because the same objection is made concerning grace that makes one pleasing: for this is only in the soul by essence, if it is. Therefore, it is seen by itself: therefore, with most certain knowledge it knows itself to be in grace that makes one pleasing, which is evident to all to be false.

But if you say that it is understood only concerning faith: this is nothing: because in the original, namely in book VIII of On the Trinity, Augustine gives an example of faith, of justice, of charity, of temperance. Therefore, it is evident that that solution is nothing: because Augustine understands concerning all things which are in the soul by essence.

Therefore, others have said that in truth a man indeed knows according to the present state whether he is worthy of hatred or love: but he does not know whether he will persevere, or not: and thus the aforementioned authorities are understood. But this solution again cannot stand: because everyone would know with most certain knowledge whether he is in grace, or not: and it would be more certain to him about the state of grace than about the state of what he sees before the eyes of the body: and this his own conscience says to each one to be false.

Therefore, it seems to me to hold the way of some, that according to Augustine, to know is one thing which is converted with to be aware: and to know is another thing which is from discretion and thought. For Augustine says in the place from which this authority is drawn, that to be aware is nothing other than to hold the knowledge of a thing with oneself: but to think is to discern a known thing from other known things.

Therefore, it is said that there is a twofold certainty, namely the certainty of awareness: and this is stronger and better, the better and more nobly the knowledge of a thing is held with oneself: and thus nothing is so certain as those things which are in the soul by essence: but those have degrees among themselves, as has been said. Another is the certainty of discriminative knowledge of one from another: and this is done in the consideration of the proper differences of a thing according to act: and with this certainty it is more certain whose differences and properties of nature are more investigated.

But if you object by distinguishing, that if faith and other virtues are in the soul, that the soul can turn upon them when it wills, and see, and discern: because nothing is required for understanding according to act, except the assimilation of the intellect: and it is well assimilated to that which it has with itself by essence. I respond, that Augustine raises a similar question about the soul, since it is present to itself, why does it seek itself? And I say, that this is because the intellect in this life is joined to phantasms, and it does not receive except from a phantasm, and it cannot separate such from itself: and therefore if it ought to discern a thing and know discretively, it is necessary that it receives another knowledge of the same, which it essentially has with itself, from a phantasm: and thus it learns to discern faith through works, of faith, and through matter: and in this way it is true, that the soul cannot turn upon everything which it has with itself, and the cause of this has been said: but it can only turn upon that which it receives through invention, or discriminative teaching of one from another, and not upon others, except imperfectly, because it has the knowledge of those only in the universal habit of confused principles, not able to conclude the knowable, unless it is determined to particulars and specials accepted through discipline. And this is what Boethius says in book V of The Consolation of Philosophy, concerning the human intellect, placing verses which are extracted from the sentence of Augustine:

But the mind, overwhelmed by blind limbs, Cannot with the fire of oppressed light Know the subtle connections of things, And below, another:

Whether when it saw another mind, It knew equally the highest and the singular: Now hidden by the cloud of limbs, It is not entirely forgetful of itself, It holds the highest, losing the singular. Therefore, whoever seeks the truth, Is in neither state: for he neither knows, Nor yet is entirely ignorant of all things. But retaining the highest which he remembers, He consults deeply, retracting what he has seen, So that he may be able to add the forgotten parts to the preserved.

And he calls the highest deeply seen, the knowledge clouded in the confused habit of the most universal principles, which is innate to us: because otherwise, as Augustine says, he would not know that he has found what he seeks, unless he had some knowledge of it with

himself, to which he might examine the sought and found: nor would he seek, nor follow, because he cannot seek nor follow in any way the unknown: nor desire to know, because there is no desire except of that which is known in some way. And this also Aristotle wants at the end of the Posterior Analytics II.

Articulus 16 — What Conformity The Aforesaid Visions Have To The Heaven Into Which Paul Was Caught Up

What conformity do the aforementioned visions have to the heaven into which Paul was raptured?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, G, near the end: Not corporally, not imaginarily, but intellectually, etc.

For from this it seems that 1. All kinds of visions enumerated above revert to the three enumerated here.

1. Likewise, since Augustine says in book XII on Genesis literally, and it is placed in the Gloss on the words of the Apostle, II to the Corinthians, xii 1 and following, that these three kinds of visions are the triple heaven into which Paul was raptured. Therefore, it is asked, What conformity do these visions have to heaven?

Solution: It must be said to the first, that by dividing according to the modes of the visible, there are six general modes enumerated above: but by taking according to the subjects of the parts of the seeing soul, then there are only three visions enumerated here. For either it is external, and thus it is a corporeal vision through the senses: or internal, and then either corporeally, or intelligibly: and in the first way it is imaginable, but in the second way it is intellectual vision.

To the other it must be said, that I do not think that these three visions are in all ways called heaven: but they are then said to be heaven when heaven is opened in them, that is, the secrets of heaven are revealed. For this happens sometimes to the sense, as in Genesis xviii, 1 and following, where the Angels sensibly revealed to Abraham the mystery of the promised seed. And sometimes by imagination, as to Ezekiel the heavens were opened in the mystery of the animals. And intellectually, as to Daniel and Joseph, to whom the understanding of visions was revealed. And by the last alone is heaven said to be simply opened: but in the others only in a certain respect: just as in prophecy it is said simply by the last alone, and by the others not unless perhaps according to what understanding (as Damascene says) is needed in the vision.

Articulus 17 — Whether Faith Has Certitude Prior To All Cognition

Whether faith has certainty before all knowledge?

Then it is inquired concerning what Augustine says there, G, towards the end: We believe in order to know, etc.

For this seems contrary to what Augustine says in the book LXXXIII Questions, where he says that certain things are understood simultaneously and believed.

1. Likewise, if all certainty is through knowledge, then it seems that faith has no certainty before knowledge.
2. Likewise, the certainty of all knowledge is through reason; however, faith is knowledge, or not without knowledge; therefore, it seems that it does not have certainty except from reason; but it does not have reason; therefore, it does not have certainty, as it seems.

ON THE CONTRARY:
The foundation in any science is of great certainty; therefore, much more in divine science. However, faith is the foundation both of divine science and of life, as the Apostle says, 1 Corinthians 3:11: "For other foundation can no man lay than that is laid, which is Jesus Christ." Therefore, faith is most certain, because otherwise the whole would be void.

Solution: It must be said that faith is more certain than any art and demonstration, with a certain certainty. For there is a twofold certainty, namely the certainty of intellectual truth and the certainty of affective truth, or the certainty of truth which is according to piety, as the Apostle says to Titus. Certainty of intellectual truth: either it is in the first principles of that science in which that truth is, or in those demonstrated from the first principles, or from those which have received faith through the first and true principles. However, the certainty of truth which is according to piety is above reason; and therefore it does not draw certainty from the principles of reason, but rather from the light, which is similar to the first truth, which is simple, as if opening the eye to see the first truth, just as the light of the sun falling on the eye opens it to receive what is offered; and this is the certainty from the light of faith informing the conscience, and convincing through affection concerning the truth of credibility, and that one should tend towards that which is believed, even beyond the bounds of proper reason; and this is the certainty of faith: and therefore the Saint, knowing mathematical disciplines, would rather deny that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles than deny the truth of faith.

And through this, the solution to the last two is clear.

To the first, however, it must be said that to believe is said in many ways, just as faith is. And therefore Augustine takes believing there broadly, according to which believing means any assent to any truth; for thus in disciplines, believing and understanding are simultaneous, unless perhaps understanding is called the knowledge of what is said through speech. For that understanding precedes all assent, whether in intellectual sciences or in the science which is according to piety, as it is in faith.

Articulus 18 — Whether Faith Is Well Defined By The Apostle As The Substance Of Things To Be Hoped For, The Argument Of Things Not Apparent

Whether faith is well defined by the Apostle, which is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen?

Whether faith is well defined by the Apostle, which is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen?

For the Apostle says: Faith is the substance of things hoped for, etc.

Here he begins to present another definition of faith and to explain it. And therefore this part is divided into two parts: in the first of which he presents the definition of faith and explains it. In the second, however, he objects against the definition, and solves it, there, 1, If it is asked, Whether this description is fitting, etc.

Here begins the first question about the definition given by the Apostle, and a question commonly disputed by all.

And it can be objected thus: 1. Every definition ought to be from prior and more known and essential things to the defined: but things hoped for as hoped for, are neither prior, nor more known, nor essential to faith: therefore it ought not to be defined by those.

1. Likewise, Nothing one in species according to the reason of definition is placed in diverse genera not placed subordinately: but faith in this definition is placed in the genus of substance and evidence, which are diverse genera, and not placed subordinately: therefore the definition errs.
2. Likewise, No one virtue is definable by a double act: but the virtue of faith here is defined by a double act: therefore it is ill-defined. The first is proved by this that the act of one virtue is unique. The second is proved by this that to make things hoped for subsist in us, and to argue about things not seen, are diverse acts even in species, as it seems.
3. Likewise, Acts are prior to powers, and prior are objects to acts according to reason, and similarly to habits: therefore if a habit is defined as a power by object or opposite, it ought to be defined by that which is its proper object: but the proper object of faith is not the hoped for: therefore it is ill-defined by that.
4. Likewise, Substance is said in many ways, as the Philosopher says in the fifth book of Metaphysics, namely matter, form, composite, genus: how then is substance taken here in this definition? If for matter: this does not seem so: because things hoped for are not all from faith as about matter, nor are all in faith as in matter. Since therefore it is not said matter in many ways, unless from which, or in which, or about which, it seems faith is not substance as matter of things hoped for. If indeed it is said as form: this is absurd: because thus faith would be the form of all things hoped for: which is false: because many things are hoped for, not one according to the reason of form, unless in as much as they are hoped for: and this reason of form they do not have from faith, but

rather from hope. If indeed it is said substance as composite: then again it is evident by itself not to be true: because faith is not composite: nor as composite does it subsist under things hoped for: because then things hoped for would be in it as something is in a composite, and this is as an accident is in a subject or property, which is absurd. If indeed it is taken according to the intention of genus: then faith would be the genus of things hoped for: which again is absurd to all, because thus it would be predicated of all: therefore in no way is it the substance of things hoped for.

5. If indeed it is said, that it is called substance as it is a foundation. Against: because it is the foundation of all virtues: therefore it ought to be called the substance of all virtues, and not of things hoped for only.

6. Likewise, Charity is more perfect than hope in the spiritual edifice, of which that definition is

customarily expounded: therefore it ought more to be called the substance of things to be loved, than of things to be hoped for.

1. Likewise, Since faith is about eternal punishments of which there is fear, just as about eternal rewards of which there is hope: why rather is it called of things to be hoped for, than of things to be feared?

2. Likewise, Since faith is not only about future things which are to be hoped for, but also about past and good and evil things: it seems that it does not only subsist under things to be hoped for, but also others: therefore it is insufficiently said, when it is said to be the substance of things to be hoped for.

Likewise it is asked, How is it the evidence of things not seen?

For it is said evidence, the reason of a doubtful thing making faith: and it is evident, that in this way faith is not evidence: because it is neither syllogism, nor induction, nor enthymeme, nor example.

Likewise, It is sometimes called evidence a certain collection of a brief following sentence, as Jerome makes arguments in books and letters: nor in this way is faith called evidence.

Likewise, It is also called evidence according to Boethius, the greatest proposition which confirms the habit of the argument, because it argues the mind about the certainty and habit of the induced reason: and thus again faith does not seem to be called evidence, because it confirms no place or habit. Therefore it is ill-called evidence.

1. Likewise, Since every evidence, either is reasoning, or the support of reasoning: and reason evacuates the merit of faith, as Gregory says, it seems also to oppose the reason of evidence to faith.

2. Likewise, How is it called evidence of things not seen? In no way can there be evidence of things not seen: because every evidence is apparent, and through the apparent. But articles in no way appear. Therefore of them there is no evidence.

3. Likewise, Evidence makes appear that of which it is evidence: but faith does not make the article appear: therefore it is not evidence of it, as it seems.
4. Likewise, Since faith is a certain enigmatic knowledge, it seems to be more substantial that it is evidence, than that it is substance: therefore it ought first to have been placed in the definition: therefore the order of parts in the definition is perverse.

Further it is asked: because John Damascene seems to add something to this definition, thus saying: Faith is the hypostasis of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen, the unshakable and unjudgable hope of those things which are announced to us by God, and the making of our petitions.

How then is faith said to be the unshakable and unjudgable conviction: because nothing argues the mind except by judging.

Likewise, How is it called the hope of those things which are announced, and the making of our petitions? For faith is not hope.

But here further it is asked about another definition which he gives in the following chapter saying, that faith is not inquisitive consent, as some false books have, because the truth of the letter is as appeared in another translation, faith is inquisitive and this altogether does not consent: it seems to agree with faith: because it does not inquire, nor investigate. Proof: For he says a little before Damascene: For if anyone considers how from non-being to being, and for what reason God led all things: and wants to find by natural cogitations, he does not receive: for this inquiry is animal and demonic.

Solution In my judgment it must be said to the aforementioned, that faith is not defined by the Apostle in itself considered and according to its substance, but rather according to

what is considered in the subject by the effect which it produces in it. But there are two effects of it following each other; one of which is, that it shows eternal things, and thus by some consent places them in the faithful. The second, however, is, that it convinces the mind of the truth of those things: as also, the Apostle says after this definition, in Hebrews 11, 6: It is necessary for the one approaching God to believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder of those who seek Him: as also in other credible things first we know what is proposed by speech, and afterwards the mind is argued by consent: and for the sake of the first it agrees with faith, that it is the substance of things hoped for; and for the sake of the second, that it is the evidence of things not seen, because things hoped for are not seen, as the Apostle says, in Romans 8, 24 and 25: For what a man sees, why does he hope for? But if we hope for what we do not see, we wait with patience. And this is what the Doctors commonly say, that faith is defined by the Apostle, as it is the foundation in the spiritual edifice: because thus it is first according to the nature of its act, as the Master says in the Letter of the following chapter, and it subsists under all others, and places others in us, that is, it makes them to be placed.

Therefore it must be said to the first, that that reason proceeds from the essential definition, and not from that which is given by the effect in the subject consequent: because that effect is always posterior to that of which it is the effect.

To the other it must be said, that substance is not placed here as the genus of faith, but rather as a certain property found in comparison to the effect in faith. And similarly evidence is rather a certain property here, than a genus: but it is true that in comparison to the diverse mode of the subject, it is taken in this double property: for according to the affective intellect, thus to subsist in it makes things hoped for about which one is affected: but according to what it has something of cognition, thus it argues it about the consent of things not seen.

To the other it must be said, that the objection proceeds from the essential and first act: but in the definition is placed the act which is the effect, not which is the motion and substantial operation of faith. But such an act which is the effect, every virtue can have multiple, which has a subject diversified in some way, as is the affective intellect which says two things, namely that it is intellect, and that it is of affection.

To the other it must be said, that also that objection does not conclude except about the act, which is the operation of the virtue and first and proper: because to that responds the object according to reason as to vision the visible, and to faith the credible: but it does not conclude about the act which is the effect in the subject: yet the proposition that acts are prior to powers, is not generally true: but this is of another consideration.

To the other it must be said, that some say, that substance is said there as matter: but matter is said in many ways: for matter is said from the subject of matter, that is, from that which is the first subject, and thus it is said in three ways, as is evident in objecting: and matter is said the disposition which is reduced to matter, because it itself with matter is subject to form, as heat to the form of fire, and in this way they say, that faith is material substance, because according to nature it is subjected to all others in the spiritual edifice. But it can better be said, that substance is said here from the act of subsisting, and not from the nature of substance or quiddity: and then it is clear to respond: because then substance is taken from the property of the act of substance, and in no way of the four modes introduced is it called substance: but because it subsists in the spiritual edifice, in which faith founds, hope erects, piety and charity conclude the vaults.

To the other it must be said, that it founds all virtues in us: but virtues are not desired except for the sake of things hoped for, and therefore things hoped for are the end of all things which are in the spiritual edifice: and therefore rather

in comparison to things hoped for faith is called the foundation.

To the other it must be said, that in this does not consist the reason of foundation, that something is more perfect, but in this that it imports the reason of the consummation of the whole life and spiritual edifice: and this is never in loving according to what is to be loved, because this is common to the way and proper, and temporal and eternal: but what is to be hoped for is always eternal, and the whole eternal falls under what is to be hoped for: and therefore rather the assignment of faith is made according to what is to be hoped for, than according to what is to be loved.

To the other it must be said, that it is about punishments not as about the end: and therefore it is not defined according to those.

And by the same it is evident the solution to the following.

To the other it must be said, that evidence is placed in the definition of faith by similarity to evidence which is called principle. Proof. Thus says a certain John the Bishop: Faith places the faithful in truth, as the immobile principle of the highest truth. But the difference is, that the principle of science argues the mind by the light of the composition of terms, but faith by the simple light which informs the conscience or intellect: because otherwise it would not be a virtue, but an art, as was said above.

And by this it is evident the solution to that which is objected against about the evidence, which is the greatest proposition according to truth, and this is not faith.

To the other it must be said, that evidence which consists in the complexion and course of one into another, is the foundation of reason: but in this way faith is not called evidence, but in the aforementioned way: and therefore the objection holds.

To the other it must be said, that there can be no evidence of things not seen to reason, which is through the course of reasoning: but evidence which is the light of infused truth, can be of things not seen to reason, because in it they begin to appear, as articles appear in faith, although they do not appear in species.

To the other it must be said, that it is false that faith in no way makes the article appear: rather it makes to see the credible and believed in a mirror and enigmatically, and to assent to that which is thus seen.

To the other it must be said, that the parts of that definition are not ordered according to what are more substantial to faith, but rather according to what follow each other, not in time, but in nature in the subject. But first in nature on the part of the subject is to be placed in us what is to be hoped for, than to assent by the conjunction of conscience: as it is first to understand indeed what is said by speech, than to assent to it by belief.

To the last which is further asked about the definition of John Damascene, it must be said, that in truth, as Augustine says, Faith is the light leading to the first truth, and it is called unjudgable, because it cannot be discussed by the judgment of reason: and it is called unshakable light, because it does not consist in the course of reason, because every such course is in some way distant, as the more known is distant from the less by the whole. But faith is a light not distant from the truth to which it leads: because it subjects it as the subject about which it is, and the end for which it is, and the exemplar to whose likeness the soul is impressed.

To the other it must be said, that faith is not called hope essentially, but by cause because it makes some certainty of hope, and opens the eyes to that which is to be hoped for and petitioned: and therefore the predication is by cause.

To that which is further asked about another definition, it must be said that another translation has, inquisitive consent, that is, not sought, so that the preposition in comes privatively: whence the translator in another letter which he places, explains, that is, not searched: and thus the objection ceases.

Articulus 19 — Whether Those Things That Do Not Appear, Of Which Faith Is, Can Be Proved Through Faith

Whether those things which do not appear, concerning which there is faith, can be proven through faith?

Whether those things which do not appear, concerning which there is faith, can be proven through faith?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, H, If anyone doubts about them, they are proven through faith: as the future resurrection is still proven, etc.

For here almost everything that has been said is destroyed: because
1. Then it seems that it is apparent, if it can be proven.

1. Likewise, If faith draws its firmness from a place, then it does not have the nature of primary firmness.
2. Likewise, If it draws its firmness from the authority of the Fathers, then it is most uncertain: because among the places creating opinion, the weakest place is from authority.
3. Likewise, It ought to draw its firmness better from reason: because reason is prior to authority, in time and nature. Whence John the Bishop defines authority saying: Authority is nothing other than the truth of reason discovered, and committed to writing for the utility of posterity.

Further, it is asked concerning another reason which he introduces saying, that it is called an argument, because it is proof and certainty that there are some things not apparent. Because according to this, that argumentation would be necessary, Faith is: therefore some things not apparent are: which seem to have no relation. However, whether falsehood can be subject to faith, will be asked below.

Solution It must be said, that the first exposition of the Master does not serve faith, except insofar as it is from hearing, as we said above: for thus it has insufficient persuasion, and especially from the authority of the Fathers: but this is not the cause of consensus, but of easier assent to hearing. For if faith were in this way called an argument, it would rather be a conclusion than an argument.

And through this the solution to everything that is objected concerning this is clear.

To the other it must be said, that the argument is necessary by necessity of consequence: just as if it is said, divine truth is concerning this: therefore this will be, or is: and there is there the relation of cause from the supposition of the other: for with faith supposed, it is necessary that there be something not apparent, of which there is faith as cause: because things not apparent are the cause of exemplary and final faith: and therefore the process is from the supposed effect to the cause.

Articulus 20 — Whether Faith Is A Foundation

Whether faith is a foundation?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, H, at the end, "Because it is the foundation of good things, which no one can change."

For it seems that faith is not the foundation, but fortitude: because
1. Luke 12:4, on that: "I say to you," etc., he says to my friends: "Do not be afraid," Gloss: Fortitude is the foundation of faith.

1. Likewise, it seems that humility is the foundation: because Blessed Bernard says:

"Precious is the foundation of humility, in which other virtues are founded."

1. Likewise, it seems that fear is: Ecclesiasticus 25:14: "The fear of God is above all things." And, in the same place, verse 16: "The fear of God is the beginning of his love."
2. Likewise, Augustine: "Fear introduces charity, as a needle does a thread." Therefore, it seems first to establish the building.

Solution: It must be said that faith is...

simply prior and founding. But the others do not found except relatively: and this is clear, because humility is after faith, but it makes the heart concave so that what is already a foundation through faith may be founded more deeply, and therefore it, as it were, prepares the trench in which the founding takes place. Fortitude, however, founds by way of a prop against the towering storms of temptation and persecution. But fear founds by excluding things that subvert the structure of the edifice, by the fact that it turns away from sin. But faith alone [founds] by the fact that it is subjected and stands under substantially as first in the edifice.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 21 — Whether Believing, Which Is The Act Of Faith, Naturally Precedes Hoping

Whether believing, which is the act of faith, naturally precedes hoping?

Next, it is asked concerning what he says in the last chapter, there at I, around the beginning: And therefore believing, which is the act of faith, naturally precedes hoping, etc. For the contrary of this is held:

§ 1. On Psalm 36:1: Be not emulous, where the Gloss says: "Hope is the entrance to faith." [253]

§ 2. Again, it was held above that charity is the mother and form of all virtues: and this is again said by the Master here: therefore it is false that faith is first.

§ 3. Again, when one virtue is had, all are had: therefore none is prior to another.

§ 4. Again, it is prior to withdraw from evil than to do good: but fear causes one to withdraw from evil, whereas faith teaches one to approach the good, and it itself approaches the true, which is a good: therefore fear is prior.

§ 5. Again, Ecclesiasticus 1:27 seems to say this: The fear of the Lord drives out sin. For he that is without fear cannot be justified.

Solution. It must be said, in my judgment, that faith or the act of faith naturally precedes, just as the Master says here: because unless faith shows the evil, fear will not flee it. Similarly, unless faith shows the good, love will not desire it. Therefore, although they are simultaneous in time, nevertheless faith precedes in nature, as has already been said: because according to reason it is prior to the motion of a man to justice.

But if we consider justification according as it is a certain motion: then we will say that in that motion there is a terminus from which (terminus a quo) and a terminus to which (terminus ad quem); and by comparison to the terminus from which, that

is, from sin which ordains to punishment, the first mover is fear: but by comparison to the terminus to which, the first [factor] disposing the movable thing itself is hope, elevating it so that it is moved from the presupposition of obtaining pardon; but love is the first moving [factor]. And thus nothing prohibits different things from being first in justification. But nevertheless, faith will always be naturally prior to all of them: because it itself, by the ratio of understanding, is prior to the whole motion, showing from what, and to what one is moved, and how.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear, except for the Gloss on Psalm 36:1. And to that it must be said that faith is not taken there for the habit by which it is believed, but for the believed thing itself, and this is the eternal good, into which hope introduces, because it itself is the expectation of the eternal good.

DISTINCTIO XXIV

Divisio Textus

Here it is asked, If faith is only concerning things not seen, how the Truth said to the Apostles, etc. In this part, certain things are treated which can be objected against the last part of the definition of the Apostle, which was expounded in the preceding distinction.

And it is divided into two parts: in the first of which the Master asks, Whether the same thing could be seen and believed? But in the second, Whether the same thing could be known and believed? there, at C, After these things it is customarily asked, etc.

The first of these is divided into two: in the first of which he shows generally that faith is not concerning things seen, nor concerning things proven. But in the second, he specifically

253. Glossa ordinaria on Ps. 36:1.

resolves a difficulty which concerns the article of the Passion: because the Apostles saw Christ suffer, and yet they believed, there, at B, But if it is asked, Whether Peter, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether The Thing Believed Can Have The Testimony Of Reason

Whether what is believed can have the testimony of reason?

Now a doubt occurs concerning the first, Whether what is believed can have the testimony of reason?

But it seems that it can: because § 1. Peter says: Always ready to satisfy every one that asketh you a reason of that hope and faith which is in you, namely, to render it. [254] Therefore a reason must be rendered.

§ 2. Again, For we have not followed cunningly devised fables,... but having been made eyewitnesses, etc., such a voice having come down to him from the excellent glory. [255] Therefore it seems that the contemplation of that glory was for them a reason for believing.

§ 3. Again, 1 John 1:1 et seq.: That which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled, of the word of life,... this we declare unto you. Therefore sight and hearing and touch prove faith.

§ 4. Again, in the Acts, Paul to Agrippa: Whereupon, O king Agrippa, I was not incredulous to the heavenly vision: [256] therefore sight was a reason of faith for him.

§ 5. Again, Damascene says: "The Lord's disciples and Apostles, illuminated in every way by the Holy Spirit, and by His power and grace working divine signs, fishing with the net of miracles, brought back the infidels from the depth of ignorance to the light of divine knowledge." [257]

§ 6. Again, Hebrews 2:3–4: How shall we escape if we neglect so great salvation? which having begun to be declared by the Lord, was confirmed unto us by them that heard Him, God also bearing them witness with signs, and wonders, and with divers miracles, etc.

§ 7. Again, it seems that it has reason. Chrysostom on John 1:46, on that text: Can any thing of good come from Nazareth? says: "Nathanael, in not receiving that Christ was from Nazareth, showed the diligence he had concerning the Scripture." [258]

Therefore it seems that before an article is believed, the testimony of Scripture must be examined. Therefore it has reason.

§ 8. Again, Romans 10:17: Faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of Christ. Expounding which, Gregory says in the Morals: "He gives intellect, while He illuminates the mind concerning the things heard." Therefore it is necessary to be heard and for the mind to be illuminated before it is believed.

§ 9. Again, Peter, Archbishop of Ravenna: "It is not safe to believe without reason."

§ 10. Again, Augustine to Paulinus: "We believe those things which are absent: but it seems suitable that testimony is offered for them."

§ 11. Again, in the same place: "In those things which we have seen or see, we ourselves are witnesses: but in those things which we believe, we are aided by others witnessing to the faith." Therefore it seems from all these that faith will accept reason.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. Chrysostom on John 3:12, on that text: If I have spoken to you earthly things, and you believe not, etc., says thus: "For indeed, when someone is weighed down regarding things which are to be received through the intellect, and does not easily receive them, he is fittingly accused of madness. But when he does not receive things which indeed are not to be received by reasoning, but by faith alone, the accusation is one of infidelity." Therefore faith is not through reasoning, that is, through reason: because he calls this reasoning throughout the whole book.

§ 2. Again, in the same Homily, below: "You see that faith is everywhere needed: for he says the cross is the fountain of life, which reasoning indeed would by no means easily receive, and the Gentiles who deride it still testify to this: but faith, overstepping the imbecility of reasonings, indeed easily receives and retains it."

Solution. It must be said, as above, that faith has no merit for which human reason offers an experiment. However, we must distinguish here with a twofold distinction: one of which Damascene posits, namely that a certain faith is by hearing, and a certain faith is a charism of the Holy Spirit. That which is by hearing can have an inductive reason, not a probative one: not so that someone may consent, but so that he may more easily consent to that to which he is nevertheless inclined and prepared to consent through affection. But a charism is an infused light tending into the First Truth, and this does not have an inducing reason, so to speak.

And so that this may be better understood, what was held in the preceding distinction must be resumed, where believing is defined by Augustine: that to believe is to cogitate with assent. Whence on the part of cogitation it admits reason: because on that part it is by hearing: and this reason which it admits is not proving, but as it were alluding to the believed thing unto delight, not unto consent: but on the part of consent it rests upon nothing except infused light.

Peter also posits another distinction in the Itinerary of Clement, namely that faith does not demand proof, except so that the Prophet who handed it down may be proven to be true: for if he exists as true, without a doubt all things that he teaches will be true, although some of them may not be understood on account of their altitude.

According to these things, therefore, it must be said to the first that Peter is speaking of reason defending and inducing faith, not causing faith, in him who is faithful.

Through this the solution to all is clear, except for the last three authorities.

To the first of those it must be said that Peter of Ravenna is there speaking of the believing of a judge in legal cases.

254. 1 Pet. 3:15.

To the other two it must be said that believing is also not taken there as it is in faith, but rather according to how it bespeaks an improbable consent, which many testify to.

Articulus 2 — Whether It Is The Praise Of Faith To Assent To What Is Not Seen, And Whether It Is Of Things Not Present

Whether it is the praise of faith to assent to what is not seen? And, whether it is concerning things not present?

Whether it is the praise of faith to assent to what is not seen? And, whether it is concerning things not present?

Next, it is asked concerning what he says, there, at A, around the beginning: This is the praise of faith, if what is believed is not seen.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. To deny reason is to deny the light which God has placed in us. Whence, Psalm 4:7: The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us. Again, Man when he was in honor did not understand: he is compared to senseless beasts, and is become like to them. [259] Therefore it seems that by denying reason, we are more turned away from the light of God than we are converted to it.

§ 2. Again, of two things ordered to the same thing, neither is contrary to the other: but reason and faith are lights ordered to the same thing, namely, to the First Truth: therefore neither is contrary to the other: therefore it is not the praise of faith not to see through reason, but rather this would be a vituperation of faith, as it seems.

§ 3. Again, faith is an enigmatic and specular cognition: therefore according to this it is imperfect: therefore it needs assistance: therefore it ought not to be the praise of faith to believe what is not seen, but rather a vituperation of faith.

§ 4. Again, according to this we could believe any irrational things, and afterwards say that this would be the praise of faith, because they are irrational.

Again, it is asked, How could faith be the argument of things not seen, since appearance is lacking in faith, according as it is in part, because it is in an enigma and in a mirror?

For it seems that in no way: since indeed everything arguing the mind, by itself convinces the mind by its own light: and yet faith has an overshadowed light, it does not seem that it can argue the mind concerning unknowns.

If perhaps you say that faith is the argument of things not seen: and this is its praise, because it makes them be seen not now, but when in the future we will contemplate through species. On the contrary: A lesser cognition is not an argument of a greater cognition: but faith is below the understanding and vision of truth, as Hugh of St. Victor says: therefore it is not the argument of it.

To this some say that an inferior cognition can well be an argument of a superior one, just as we see that experience is a cognition accepted in singulars, and yet it argues by assisting

255. 2 Pet. 1:16–17.

toward the cognition of principles: and what is cognized in sense that it is, is perceived in the intellect why it is, because a principle is known on account of itself.

But on the contrary: This acceptation of why it is in principles: is either by the power of sense, or by the power of understanding separating the principles from the appendices of matter, in which sensible cognition solely accepts. If you say that it is by the power of sense, ON THE CONTRARY: That on account of which each thing is such, is itself more such: therefore if why it is is known in the intellect on account of sensible cognition, that [sensible cognition] will be more known why it is: and this is absurd, because the why does not shine forth in what is not fully separated from matter. But if by the power of understanding: then the similitude is false: because then the experiment of sensibles does not assist toward the cognition of why it is, except by inducing and not by manifesting the light itself.

Solution. It must be said without prejudice that the praise of faith is to assent to what is not seen: yet not against reason. For it is one thing to be above reason, and another thing to be against reason. The authori-

ty of revelation, upon which the cogitation of faith rests, according as it is by hearing, is above reason, but not against reason: and the article is according to that cogitation: and therefore we dare not say or cogitate anything (as Dionysius says) beyond those things which are expressed to us in the sacred oracles.

It must be said therefore to the first, that we do not deny reason according as it is a light: but it is not a light unless aided by revelation and authority: but we deny it according as it is blind, and overshadowed by the senses and phantasms.

To another it must be said that faith and reason are ordered to the same thing: but in all things where two are ordered to the same thing, a third corrects the error of the more uncertain one. Thus faith corrects reason: and therefore in this way reason is not denied according as it proceeds into the First Truth, because then it supposes the principles of faith, and is not deflected by the phantasms of error.

To another it must be said that faith is an enigmatic cognition: but an enigma and a mirror have in themselves two things, namely light and shadow: and on the part of the light it is an argument, but faith on the part of the shadow works towards the merit of this state: but if it were so shadowy that it did not sufficiently show the believed thing according to the state of merit, then it would be true that it needed assistance.

To another it must be said that this does not follow: for faith is not concerning irrational things, but rather concerning those things which are above reason, proven by revelation and the light of God infused within. Faith does not reject this proof: because it itself proves in that way, and is not proven, because it itself is a light infused in us, arguing the mind and convincing it concerning external things.

To another it must be said that it was answered above in the explanation of the Apostle's definition: because that appearance is not lacking to faith by which it argues from information

256. Acts 26:19.

through tension into truth: indeed thus it is more certain than any art: and therefore although the appearance of reason may be lacking, it is nevertheless not lacking in a greater certitude along with reason.

To another which is objected against the solution, it must be said that a lesser cognition can well be an argument of a greater one: not what it is, but that it is: and in this way faith argues the cognition of eternal things, as the Master expounded at the end of the preceding distinction. For what that vision is, eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man: whence through faith it is not cognized what it is except imperfectly, namely that it is inexplicable, and ineffable, and of this sort.

To that which is objected concerning the other solution, it seems to me to stand, that sensible cognition (as it seems to me) does not make the why it is appear in principles, but rather the abstracting intellect [does], not proving them, because those things which do not have priors cannot be proven.

Articulus 3 — Whether Faith Can Be Of Present Things, Since Seeing Nevertheless Takes Away Faith

Whether faith can be concerning present things, since nevertheless vision evacuates faith?

Next, it is asked concerning what he says, there, at A, towards the end: Elsewhere Augustine says that faith is concerning present things, etc.

Therefore it seems that vision will not evacuate faith: which is against the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 13:10: When that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away. But it is manifest that faith is in part, since it is a mirror in an enigma.

Solution. It must be said that he calls faith

here the genus or substance of faith, which is the vision of truth: for this is contracted to a mirror and an enigma, as to a constitutive difference, and then it makes the vision which is the whole reward, inasmuch as it is not solely a vision sprinkling itself extrinsically upon a thing, but rather the vision of what is loved and possessed.

Articulus 4 — What An Article Of Faith Is According To The Definition

What is an article of faith according to definition?

Next, it is asked concerning what he says: But if it is asked, Whether Peter had faith of the passion? etc.

For by reason of this there is here a great question concerning the articles of faith, around which for the sake of brevity we shall ask five problems, namely: What is an article by definition? Secondly, what is it in reality? Thirdly, concerning the number of articles according to each symbol [creed]. Fourthly, concerning the differences of the symbols. Fifthly and lastly,

257. John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa IV, 17.

whether we are held to believe some things which are not articles: and if so, how those things relate to the articles of faith?

To the first one proceeds thus: Richard of St. Victor says that an article is an indivisible truth concerning God constraining us to believe. [260]

But Isidore is said to define it thus:

An article is the perception of divine truth, tending into it.

Certain of the Masters also attribute this one to Hugh: An article is a nature which nevertheless as it is proposed with grace: it is not found in his book.

But IT IS OBJECTED against the first thus: § 1. Because when it is called an indivisible truth, the sense is, in which the division of the symbol stops. But there are different divisions according to different symbols: and one thing is sometimes divided in one which is not divided in another: therefore it seems that it is not simply indivisible: therefore it seems that for some cause an article could be divided into several.

§ 2. Furthermore, an article is the joining of a member with a member: therefore it seems to rather bespeak that in which credibles are connected, than that into which they are resolved through division.

§ 3. Furthermore, Augustine says that the subsequent member has the force of its motion in the joint [article]: since therefore the motion into the credible is from a habit, it seems rather that the faith by which we believe has the ratio of an article, than the faith which is that which we believe.

§ 4. Furthermore, what is said, concerning God, does not seem to be generally true. For the resurrection of the flesh is an article: and it is not concerning God, as it seems. Again, the Holy Catholic Church, and the like.

§ 5. Again, what it says, constraining us to believe, seems false. For if constraint is spoken of by way of a natural inclination, just as a virtue is constrained to its act and object: then it rather belongs to the faith by which it is believed, than the faith which is believed.

§ 6. But if constraint is spoken of by way of an open truth, which convinces the intellect, it is again false: because the more powerful articles, since they are against the principles of reason, seem more to drive away from believing, than toward believing.

In the same way it is objected concerning the second which is of Isidore. § 1. For an article is not the perception of truth, but rather the perception of the shadow of truth and of a mirror. Again, certain philosophers had a certain perception of truth tending into the truth itself: therefore it seems that they themselves had articles.

§ 2. But if you say that it is understood of the tension of love: this cannot stand: because thus one existing in mortal sin, who believes all the articles by an unformed faith, would not have faith, which is false.

258. John Chrysostom, In Ioannem, hom. 20 (al. 19), 1.

I do not wish to object concerning the definition of Master Hugh: because they are fabricated words, and falsely imposed on him, as will be clear later, when we posit his own words which he says concerning this.

Solution. It must be said that Richard defines the faith which is believed, that is, the articles, through their form, and proper matter, and act. For the form which is as a genus, is truth: but what is as a contracting difference, is indivisible: but the matter is concerning God: because unless it is an indivisible truth in such an object as God is, it is not an article: which is clear through the definition of what it is to believe, which is commonly posited, that to believe is to assent to the First Truth on account of itself, and above all things: but one does not assent to any truth absolutely on account of itself, except to the divine truth, namely so that the term on account of itself bespeaks the efficient, and final, and formal cause. Efficient: because by it effecting, and not by any reason of ours, we believe it: and on account of it, not on account of anything else, because no truth after it is more powerful than it. But he says formal: because we do not believe on account of another, nor through another: just as in metaphysical principles we believe the truth of the principles on account of the divine light in them, which makes them true effectively: but the First Truth is not made by another. But he touches upon the effective when he says, constraining us to believe.

But that which is of Isidore touches upon the form, and the act, and not so much the property of the name, because it does not posit that which is

proper to the defined name, as to constrain, and to be indivisible, which nevertheless "article" sounds like.

To the FIRST therefore it must be said that division is taken in two ways, namely according to the act of the one dividing, and according to the act of the divisible. According to the act of the one dividing, the articles are multiplied in the Apostles' Creed: and therefore certain things remain undivided, which can be divided according to the aptitude of the thing, as will be clear below: and in both ways the definition is commonly given with respect to different symbols, namely so that the privative preposition [in indivisible] deprives in some the act of division alone, and in others the act with the potency: and why this occurs will be explained below, when the differences of the symbols are treated.

To another it must be said that an article has a twofold acceptation, namely a material one, and thus an article is a bound member: and a formal one, and thus an article is the binding of members: and both are fitting, but the first with respect to the parts, and thus the article is taken by Richard. But the second is fitting with respect to the whole symbol, and thus it is not taken by him: because in the symbol the whole binding is of material articles, and the joining of one with another.

To another it must be said that the motion of faith begins from the truth of the article, and not from the habit: for the truth of the article causes to be left behind by its similitude in the soul, namely the habit to tend into the same truth: so that thus there is a motion of the movable thing beginning from the divine truth, and through the article of the First Truth

259. Ps. 48:13 (Vulgate).

tending into the same, so that the circle of the exiting ray from eternity into the temporal soul of the just is concluded, and through the truth of the article into eternal truth: just as Dionysius says in the first book of The Celestial Hierarchy: Every procession of the manifestation of lights, set in motion by the Father, proceeding optimally and abundantly to us, again, as a vivifying power fills us, and converts us to the unity of the gathering Father, and to the deific super-simplicity. [261]

To another it must be said that every article is concerning God: for we do not believe (as Damascene says) that the resurrection is future, except by divine truth and command: and therefore the promised resurrection is an effect of divine truth. And similarly the Church is not united, nor are sins remitted, nor is baptism valid, nor the other sacraments, unless by divine truth operating this through the Holy Spirit: and thus it is easy to reduce all of them to divine truth.

To another it must be said that this constraint is through the medium of the simple light, from which proceeds the reflected light which is the habit: and therefore the truth of the article, prior according to nature, constrains.

To another it must be said that this argument would proceed if it constrained according to a habitude of complexion: but it was said above that it does not, but rather in the mode of a nature convincing the intellect itself from the power of the simple light of the gift, so that it may tend into that which it believes.

To that which is objected on the contrary, it must be said according to the other definition that the philosophers did not have the perception of divine truth, except materially: but it was human, because it was through natural reasons: nor did it tend into the truth in the mode of a nature consonant with reason, but rather by way of consent from reason.

To another which is objected concerning a false Christian, it was answered above that unformed faith, as much as it is of itself, tends, but the subject does not follow it.

TO THE DEFINITION of Hugh, it must be said that he posits his words in the tenth part of the sacred books, whence certain ones signify that definition. For he says thus: "Two things are proposed to faith: the Creator, and the Savior. The Creator, and those things which pertain to the Creator: this is one part of faith. The Savior, and those things which pertain to the Savior: this is the other. In the first part faith discerns in the Creator and His works. In the second part faith discerns between the Savior and the sacramentals. To the Creator pertain the works of condition [creation], which were made in six days. To the Savior pertain the works of restoration, which are completed in six ag-

es. The first part of faith pertains to the debt of nature. The second part of faith pertains to the debt of grace. Those things we ought to believe, because we are founded through nature: these things we ought to believe, because we are repaired through grace." From this it is accepted what he intends: that in the symbol certain articles express the work restoring nature, and certain others the work restoring grace: and he does not intend to define an article: and then what was asked is plain.

260. Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate, I.

Articulus 5 — Whether An Article Is Something Complex Or Incomplex

Whether an article is something complex or incomplex?

Secondly it is asked, What is an article in reality? Namely, whether it is complex, or incomplex?

But it seems that it is incomplex, like the passion, and the resurrection, and the like: § 1. For faith is a simple light, as was proven above according to Dionysius: therefore it is of the simple, and not of the complex. § 2. Again, in God there is no complexion: since therefore an article is concerning God, it seems that it is not complex. § 3. Again, an article is defined to be an indivisible truth concerning God: therefore it cannot be complex: because nothing complex can be indivisible. § 4. Again, if an article were complex, so that enunciables were articles, then time would be of the essence of an article. Therefore let Christ have suffered in instant A: therefore another time would make another enunciable: and if He had suffered in B, it would not be the same article, namely that Christ suffered in B.

Furthermore, since time under a certain difference would be of the essence of an article, what Augustine says in the following distinction would not be true, that the times are varied, but faith has remained unchanged: and thus the moderns and the ancients would not have the same faith with respect to the articles.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. Consent is only in a complex: but in an article there is the consent of reason and of faith: therefore it itself is not incomplex, but complex. But that faith is a consent, was held above from Damascene. § 2. Again, according to this it seems that the Jews who believe the incarnation of Christ, would believe the article, although they believe it as future, while we as past. § 3. Again, according to this, if an article were simple, one should not be left as a heretic who would believe the incarnation of Christ, but not Christ incarnate: since these things are false, it seems that an article is an enunciable, and not a thing. § 4. BUT STILL it is objected against this for the first part, that if an article were an enunciable, Cornelius, who did not believe Christ incarnate, was not justified through faith: [262] because he could not have charity without faith: and his alms and prayers could not have been heard without faith, because without faith it is impossible to please God. [263] But if you say that he had faith concerning Christ already incarnate and having suffered, then Peter was sent to him in vain to evangelize.

Solution. Without prejudice I say that determinate time is not of the essence of faith with respect to the articles: nevertheless I well concede that a certain complexion is of the essence of an article: and this can be manifest in this way. For in every article divine truth is subjected, which is determined according to different things befitting the essence and the persons, and with respect to different effects pertaining to the instatement of nature and the restoration of grace. But this determi-

...the determination of divine truth cannot be signified by us except through composition, even though without a mediating composition it is determinate in itself toward those things:

261. Pseudo-Dionysius, De caelesti hierarchia 1, 1.

just as if white in a surface must be signified, it is indeed white in the surface without any medium, yet it is not signified by us as being in the surface without a note of composition. I say, therefore, that the determining of one thing in another, namely in a determinate thing, is presupposed in an article: but the note of composition which the act of the signifying soul adds, which essentially belongs to a certain difference of time, is in my judgment not of the essence of the article.

Therefore it must be said to the first, that although the light of faith is simple, nevertheless, because it is by way of inclining to consent, it therefore requires a complex in the article, but not that which makes an enuntiable in a certain difference of time.

To the next it must be said, that although in God there is no complex according to reality, there is nevertheless according to the mode of signifying of certain articles, as when it is said, "God triune and one": and also for the sake of certain things on account of diverse effects, and for the sake of some things on account of the nature united to Christ.

To the next it must be said, that an article is called an indivisible truth, because the division of credibles stops at it, not because it is entirely incomplex.

To the next it must be said, that an enuntiable in my judgment is not an article, but a complex thing ordered to all time.

To that which is objected to the contrary it must also be answered, that consent seeks only a complex thing: and about that it posits the mode of composition, which is determined by that truth to which the composing reason consents: which, although it is true in the thing itself, nevertheless, as it makes a composition, it is in the soul, as the Philosopher says at the end of the sixth book of First Philosophy .

To the next it must be said, that we are not bound only to believe the article, but those things which are determined concerning the articles from the preaching of the Apostles: and these regard faith on that side which is from hearing: for many things from the determination of time and preaching accrue and have accrued to the hearing of faith, although they are not of the substance of the articles.

Through this also the solution to the following is evident.

To that which is objected concerning Cornelius, it must be said that in that time when the time was not determined, neither according to the state of the ages of the world, nor according to the state of prophecy, nor from the preaching of the Apostles, certain people could relate to every difference of time without distinction. But now it is not so: because the time is determined according to the course of the ages and the number of the prophecy of Daniel, and "their sound hath gone forth into all the earth" .

SECTION: Article 6

262. Cf. Acts 10.

Articulus 6 — On The Number Of The Articles According To Both Symbols

Article 6: On the number of articles according to both creeds.

On the number of articles according to both creeds.

Thirdly, it is asked concerning the number of articles according to both creeds, namely the Nicene and the Apostles' creed.

It seems first that the number is diminished from the number of articles of the creed of Athanasius: because

§ 1. Just as omnipotence expresses an article, so too concerning the divine properties there is omniscience, and God's goodness, and yet they are not posited as articles.

§ 2. Item, in the creed of Athanasius it is said, "The Father almighty, the Son almighty," etc., "The Father immense," etc., and, "The Father uncreated," etc.: and none of those is expressed among the articles, except only omnipotence: therefore the number seems to be diminished.

§ 3. Item, it is said, "The Father is Lord, the Son is Lord," etc.

§ 4. Item, similarly, since properties are in the divine persons, by which the persons are distinguished, it seems that there ought to have been some article concerning them: and since none is posited in either of the creeds, the number seems to be diminished.

§ 5. Item, around the union of natures in Christ there was manifold error, some saying that the natures were confused, others commixed, others that they passed into one another: and since an article of faith is for excluding errors, we ought to have had many more articles concerning the mode of union than we have.

§ 6. Item, moreover it is asked concerning the division which almost all the Masters commonly posit, namely of the two creeds: for in one creed, namely that of the Apostles, it is posited as one article, "I believe in God the Father almighty, creator of heaven and earth." If therefore this is an indivisible truth, then it ought not to be divided: and yet it is divided in the Nicene creed, and is posited as two: for in that creed the first article is, "I believe in one God." The second is, "The Father almighty, maker of heaven and earth, of all things visible and invisible." Therefore it seems that one or the other errs.

§ 7. Item, in the Apostles' creed one undivided article is, "Who was conceived by the Holy Spirit, born of the Virgin Mary." And this again in the Nicene creed is posited as two, such that one is concerning Christ's conception, and the other concerning Christ's nativity.

§ 8. Moreover, it seems if the article concerning nativity is divided in the Nicene creed into two on account of two nativities, namely in the womb, and from the womb, that by the same reason the article of the passion ought to be divided into five, namely that he was captured, reproached, suffered, died, and was buried: and yet all these are referred to the same article in both creeds.

§ 9. Item, in the Nicene creed nothing is posited concerning the descent into hell. Whence also Anselm says that it does not entirely contain the faith. Therefore it seems that it is

diminished: especially since the descent into hell according to both divisions is posited to be one article.

§ 10. Item, in the Nicene creed the descent to hell and the resurrection from the dead are posited as two articles: in the Apostles' creed as one: therefore it seems that one or the other division is invalid.

§ 11. Item, in the Apostles' creed for two articles is posited, "The Holy Church, and the communion of Saints": and in the Nicene these two are posited as one, namely "And in one holy Catholic and Apostolic Church. I confess one baptism for the remission of sins": for all this is posited for one article in the Nicene: and it is asked, by what right did the Apostles divide it?

§ 12. Moreover, since we have one article concerning eternal life, and we also believe in eternal punishments, it seems that we ought also to have one concerning eternal punishments.

§ 13. Item, it seems that by Cassian and Leo yet a third creed is posited, in which are found certain things which are contained in neither of those: and it is of the synod of Antioch, and says thus: "I believe in one and only true God, the Father almighty, creator of visible and invisible creatures: and in our Lord Jesus Christ his only-begotten Son, and the firstborn of every creature: born of him before all ages, and not made, true God from true God, homoousion, by whom also the ages were framed and all things made: who for us came, and was born of the Virgin Mary, and was crucified under Pontius Pilate, and buried: on the third day he rose again according to the Scriptures, and ascended into the heavens, and again shall come to judge the living and the dead," etc., because the other things are not changed from the Nicene creed.

§ 14. Item, it is added in the third article, "The firstborn of every creature": and this article is found in neither of the others:

therefore there seems to be a diminution in both.

§ 15. Item, since the Apostles' creed was issued by the Apostles themselves, it seems that every preacher of the faith ought to have added his own sentence: but none is found of Paul and Barnabas, who nevertheless were chosen by the Holy Spirit himself: therefore the first creed seems to be diminished.

§ 16. Item, it is objected concerning individual articles: for the article, "I believe in one God," does not seem necessary: since this is also proved by the Philosophers by necessary reasons, as is clear in the First Philosophy of Aristotle, of Avicenna, and of other Philosophers.

§ 17. Moreover, why is it not posited there, "One simple God": since nevertheless simplicity is more proper to God than unity?

§ 18. Item, it is objected secondly concerning this which it says, "The Father almighty," etc. For omnipotence does not belong to the Father alone, but commonly to the three: therefore it seems that this article could be an occasion of error for some: therefore it is badly posited.

263. Heb. 11:6.

§ 19. Item, since in the Antiochene creed it is said, "The creator of visible things," etc., why in the Nicene is it said, "The maker": since nevertheless to create is more agreeable to omnipotence than to make?

§ 20. Item, it is objected concerning the third, "And in one Lord," etc. For he alone is not Lord, as the creed of Athanasius says, but the Father is Lord, the Son is Lord, the Holy Spirit is Lord.

§ 21. Moreover, many expositions are posited specially around this article. For it is said, "In one Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God, and born of the Father before all ages, God from God, light from light, true God from true God, begotten, not made, consubstantial with the Father, through whom all things were made": and it seems that all the subsequent things are added superfluously: because when it was said, "The Son of God," it was understood to be only-begotten and all the other things: and this was proved in the first book of the Sentences therefore there seems to be superfluity.

§ 22. Item, when it follows, "Who for us men and for our salvation descended from the heavens, and was incarnate by the Holy Spirit of the Virgin Mary, and was made man," etc., it seems to have many superfluous expressions: because when it said, "For us men," it was superfluous to add, "And for our salvation": because it seems to be the same according to the intellect.

§ 23. Item, to have descended and to have been incarnate seem to be the same: because it is certain that he did not descend being moved locally, as was proved above, because he descended in the divine nature, and to descend was to appear visible in the flesh.

§ 24. Moreover, what follows, "And was made man," does not seem to express a special article other than that one: because it is the same to be incarnate, and to be made man.

If perhaps you say, that it is not a special article. Against this is: because then in the Nicene creed the article which is concerning Christ's nativity will be lacking, which nevertheless is posited by everyone as one of the seven which are attributed to the Son.

§ 25. But concerning that which follows, "Crucified also for us," etc., it was objected previously up to there, "And was buried": where it is asked, why the Nicene creed is thus diminished in the descent into hell, and similarly the Antiochene creed, but not the Apostles' creed?

§ 26. Item, concerning that, "And he rose again," it was objected previously. But it is asked, since between the resurrection and ascension there was a multiform apparition, why is nothing

of it posited among the articles? Because the Apostle, 1 Cor. 15:4 et seq., seems to touch upon it among the credibles which he himself handed down to the faithful, saying thus: "That he rose again the third day, according to the scriptures: and that he was seen by Cephas; and after that by the eleven. Then he was seen by more than five hundred brethren at once: of whom many remain until this present, and some are fallen asleep. After that, he was seen by

James, then by all the apostles. And last of all, he was seen also by me, as by one born out of due time" [264].

§ 27. Item, concerning this which follows in the subsequent article, "And he shall come again with glory to judge the living and the dead." Because this seems to pertain neither to nature, nor to glory, but to severity, since the judgment then happens strictly: therefore according to this it ought not to be an article.

§ 28. Similarly, it is objected concerning this which follows, "And in the Holy Spirit the Lord," etc. And it is asked, why so much expression is made concerning him, that he should be called Lord, and vivifying, and the mode of procession, and the equality of his dignity, and his inspiration in the Prophets?

§ 29. Similarly, what is the cause that in the subsequent article two symbols of the Apostles, namely of Matthew who posited, "The Holy Church," and of Simon who posited, "The communion of Saints," are posited in the Nicene creed in the place of one article: and it is added there, "I confess one baptism for the remission of sins"? For this was not done by the Fathers without cause.

Solution. It seems to be said to the first, that the Apostles' creed has a division into twelve articles according to the number of those conferring the credibles: because twelve published that creed, who were signified by the twelve oxen breaking the furrows of the world, who supported the brazen sea [265], that is, the sea for the sake of the world, and brazen on account of the resonance of the confession of faith which would be in the whole globe. These are the stones concerning which it is read in Joshua 4:20, which were chosen from the Jordan, where the ark of the Lord remained, and the feet of the priests stood. The stones, I say, are the articles on account of the solidity of faith. But the ark is Christ in humanity and deity. And the Jordan is the scripture of the Old Testament, which stood then. And the priests standing upon the articles are the Lawgivers, and Prophets, and Patriarchs, who all leaned upon the articles of faith. But concerning the field of the widest preaching of the Gentiles, they were reposited in twelve: because in the Scripture of the Old Testament they are twisted back through confirmation, so that there was a wheel within a wheel, and exhibition in promise, and the blessing of the sons in the Fathers.

Now the articles are distributed according to that division by the ancients thus: that one, the first, is attributed to the Father, which Peter posited, and is this, "I believe in God the Father almighty, creator," etc.

But six are attributed to the Son.

The first according to the divine generation, which Andrew posited, and is this, "And in Jesus Christ his only Son our Lord."

But the second pertains to his two-fold human nativity, both in the womb and from the womb: and John, the guardian of the Mother bearing him, posited this: and is this, "Who was conceived by the Holy Spirit, born of the Virgin Mary."

But the third pertains to the sacrament of his passion according to all the things that circumstanced his death, just as the antecedent passion is, and the subsequent death, and the burial which is the office that is exhibited to the dead: and James, the brother of John, posited this: and is this, "Suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, died, and was buried."

But the fourth pertains to the sacrament of the redemption of those who were enclosed in the limbo of hell, according to which

Zechariah had prophesied (Zech. 9:11): "Thou also by the blood of thy testament hast sent forth thy prisoners out of the pit, wherein is no water": and Thomas posited this: and is this, "He descended into hell, on the third day he rose again from the dead." And the resurrection of the dead is conjoined here with the descent into hell: because this article states the whole that Christ merited by his death: but this was redemption in the soul which was completed by the breaking of hell in the descent into hell, and redemption in the body which was completed in the resurrection through the glory of the body. The first David had prophesied, saying: "He hath broken the gates of brass, and burst the iron bars. He took them from the way of their iniquity" [266]. But the second the Apostle says: "We look for the Saviour, our Lord Jesus Christ, who will reform the body of our lowness, made like to the body of his glory" [267]. For man is not perfectly redeemed, unless he is saved in body and soul. But Thomas appropriately posited this article, who touched the scars of the rising one, and therefore was certain of the resurrection; and he confessed the power of deity in the breaking of hell, when he said: "My Lord, and my God."

But the fifth pertains to the opening of the place of beatitude, where the precursor entered for us, Jesus ascending, and laying open the journey before us, as Micah foretold and James the less posited this, called the brother of the Lord on account of the likeness of body and religion: and is this, "He ascended into the heavens, he sitteth at the right hand of God the Father almighty." And he says three things, namely "to the heavens," to show to what the ascension is according to place: and "he sitteth at the right hand," to note that he is in the better goods according to humanity: and he adds, "of God the Father almighty," so that he is noted to be equal according to deity, just as David had foretold: "His going out is from the end of heaven" [268].

The sixth and last is about the return to judgment: since the Father judges no one, but has given all judgment to the Son: so that he who posited the law, should judge according to the law: and he who was judged for the living and the dead, should judge concerning the living and the dead: and Philip posited this: and is this, "From thence he shall come to judge the living and the dead."

But the remaining five pertain to the Holy Spirit, both in himself, and in his gifts. In himself indeed, by which his personality is expressed: and Bartholomew posited this, saying, "I believe in the Holy Spirit."

But in gifts the first is by which he sanctifies and generally unites the Church: and Matthew the Evangelist and Apostle posited this second article, who specially experienced

264. 1 Cor. 15:4-8.

this gift, when from a publican he was made a public Evangelist and Doctor: and is this, "The Holy Catholic Church": and the sense is, "I believe in the Holy Spirit, sanctifying the Catholic Church," that is, the universal Church: for Καθολικήν in Greek sounds as 'universal' in Latin. And it says 'universal' (as Boethius says in the book On the Trinity) for two reasons, namely because it is universally preached through the four quarters of the earth: and because it has universally true articles, to which nothing false can underlie.

But the third is according to the effect of grace against sin: and Simon the Canaanite posited this: and is this, "The communion of Saints, the remission of sins": for the communion of Saints in goods cannot happen, except through the Holy Spirit uniting and vivifying the whole mystical body, and making the members solicitous for one another: nor can communion happen, except by the removal of that

which is proper alone: and this is the sin of each one. Whence the sense is: I believe in the Holy Spirit communicating the goods of the Saints, so that each one has in another what is lacking to him in himself: and remitting sins. But these two are conjoined into one article: since one follows upon the other, because once the proper thing which is sin is removed, nothing is left except the communion of the Saints.

The fourth is concerning the Spirit blowing upon those infected by the poison of the first serpent, as Ezechiel also foretold: and Judas Thaddeus posited this: and is this, "The resurrection of the flesh": and the sense is, I believe in the Holy Spirit through the immission of the created Spirit to the body, making the resurrection of the flesh by his power.

The fifth and last is, "Life everlasting, amen": which was posited by Matthias, who was elected last: and the sense is: I believe in the goodness of the Holy Spirit rewarding the Saints in eternal life, for the reason that the Holy Spirit himself is the vivifier.

But there is another division of the Doctors according to the Nicene creed, which almost all follow, although some strive to say others which are of no value, and by fourteen: but two are contained in those articles only implicitly and from a cause, as will be clear below in the response to the objections, namely the article of the nativity from the womb, and the descent to hell. And according to this the sayings of the Doctors revert to this, that seven pertain to the deity, and seven pertain to the deity in humanity. For it is said, Apocalypse 1:16, that John saw seven stars in the right hand of the Angel appearing to him: and these signify the seven articles which are about the deity: and, in the same place, verse 13, he saw one like the Son of man in the midst of the seven golden candlesticks, which signify the seven others about the deity in humanity.

But the seven pertaining to the deity, are these. For the deity is known in three ways, namely, through essence, and in persons, and in effect. If in essence: then it is the first article, because thus it is not to know except one: and is this, "I believe in one God." If in persons: either the person of the Father, or of the Son, or of the Holy Spirit. If of the Father: then according as faith is from hearing, and the Father is never sent, as was proved in Book I of the Sentences [269], we cannot proceed into him except through the work appropriated to his person:

265. Cf. 3 Kings 7:23-25; 2 Paralipomenon (2 Chronicles) 4:2-4.

and this is omnipotence, and his proper act which is to create from nothing: and then the second article is introduced, which is, "The Father almighty, maker of heaven and earth, of all things visible and invisible." Or in the person of the Son who is sent, and therefore knowable through himself in effect: and therefore both are known there, "And in one Lord Jesus Christ the only-begotten Son of God, and born of the Father before all ages, God from God, light from light, true God from true God, begotten, not made, consubstantial with the Father, through whom all things were made": and this is the third. Or it is knowable in the Holy Spirit: and then is this fourth, "And in the Holy Spirit the Lord and vivifier, who proceeds from the Father and the Son, who with the Father and the Son together is adored and conglorified, who spoke through the Prophets." But if the deity is known in an effect specially pertaining to the reformation of man, because concerning the other effects it has been held with the articles of the persons: then this cannot be except in three ways, namely in the effect pertaining to recreation, or the effect pertaining to the glory of the flesh, or to eternal life, which follows both. For the first pertains to the soul, the second to the body, the third to both. If in the first way: then is the fifth posited by the Fathers, which is, "And one holy Catholic and Apostolic Church. I confess one baptism for the remission of sins."

For all these things look to the same effect, which is the recreation of the soul through sanctifying grace. But if it be in the second way: then is the sixth posited by the Fathers, which is, "I expect the resurrection of the dead." And if it is in the third way: then is the seventh, which is, "And the life of the world to come, Amen."

But the other seven look to the sacrament of the incarnation, in which the deity is known in the person of the Son united to the flesh: and those can be multiplied by this mode, that some pertain to the merit of the redemption made through Christ: but some to the effect of his redemption and merit. If they look to the merit: this cannot be except in two ways, namely according to the entry into the state of meriting, and according to the most noble act by which he satisfied for us. If it is in the first way: this is still two-fold, namely according to the union of natures in Christ: and as to this the first article is posited in these words, "Who for us men and for our salvation descended from the heavens, and was incarnate by the Holy Spirit of the Virgin Mary." Or according to the nativity from the womb, after he conversed with men, and endured human things through all of thirty and a half years: and I believe that all this is expressed by what follows, "And was made man": and it is the second article which is called by the Masters, "Born of the Virgin Mary": but these words are not had in the creed. But if according to the most noble act of our redemption: then is the third expressed in these words, "Crucified also for us under Pontius Pilate, he suffered, and was buried." But if it is expressing the effect of redemption: this is in two ways: either according to the stole of glory, or according to the judicial power, which he merited by the fact that he permitted himself to be judged. If in the first way: this is three-fold, namely according to the terminus from which he redeemed, and according to the terminus into which he led, and according to the recovery of the place which we had lost. The first two were understood by the Fathers in that they said, "And he rose again the third day according to the Scriptures": for this was to rise again through an

266. Ps. 106:16-17 (Vulgate).

effect in the members from both deaths, namely of hell into which he descended: and as to this the fourth article is introduced. And the terminus of life, into which the head raised himself: in which also the members received the security of rising again: and this is the fifth. But if it is according to the recovery of place; then is the sixth which is, "He ascended into heaven, he sitteth at the right hand of God the Father." But if it is expressing judicial power: then is the seventh and last, "And he shall come again with glory to judge the living and the dead: of whose kingdom there shall be no end": in the good by rewards, and in the bad by vindicating justice.

These things having been held, it must be responded to the objections in order.

To the first therefore it must be said, that to the Father is attributed what is appropriated to his person, and his act: because he was not knowable otherwise, for the reason that he is not sent, so that he might be known through a special effect in us, or through union: but omniscience and omnibenevolence do not thus express the divine essence (quid divinum): because omniscience was given to the soul of Christ, but not omnipotence. Similarly omnibenevolence is nothing said: because his goodness and will is not with respect to all things, as knowledge, or power. Or it can be said, that omnipotence is declared in one act, which is creation: but not omniscience, or omnibenevolence, and therefore it could not be posited for an article. But this solution is nothing: because neither is omnipotence an article except under the aspect of an attribute of the Father.

To the next it must be said, that immense, uncreated, and all such things are explanatory of the unity of persons in essence: and this also Athanasius intends to explain, namely what the Fathers said: and this explanation does not make an article, because the whole explanation is presupposed in the explained.

To the next it must be said, that Lord is not said of the Son alone, but also of the Holy Spirit in the Nicene council: and the Fathers provided this against two heresies, namely against the heresy of Arius, who willed the Son to be a creature, and therefore not to be Lord: and against the heresy of Nestorius and of a certain Theodore the Greek, who willed the Holy Spirit to be the servant of the Father and of the Son. But because concerning the person of the Father no one suspected this, therefore in the article concerning the person of the Father, they did not append this, but understood it: and Athanasius explained it.

To the next it must be said, that the properties in the divine are not distinguished from the persons, but are the persons themselves: nor is there a further real distinction, than the distinction of persons: and therefore there ought not to have been a special article about the properties: because the persons would already be signified otherwise to be composite and to differ substantially, if the subject of the property were one thing and the property another.

To the next it must be said, that around the mode of union there is only one article: because the union was not except in one mode, namely with the natures preserved in the unity of the person: and this is expressed by the fact that he is incarnate. Whence just as one virtue by the fact that it is in the mean in only one mode, excludes every multiform multitude of vices, so

267. Phil. 3:20-21.

the faith by one confession excludes every heresy: because as Boethius says in the book On the Two Natures in the One Person of Christ, faith is the mean of heresies, just as virtue is the mean of vices: and he says this himself regarding the article on the union of natures in Christ. Nevertheless Athanasius expounded this broadly in his creed.

To the next it must be said, that the Apostles conferring the creed, were proportioned to the number of the Apostles, and not to the number of credible things: and therefore sometimes they conjoined certain things, which were divisible according to reality, and sometimes they divided them: and this is the common solution. Or it can be said, that in the Father there is a two-fold ratio of principle, namely to creating, and by which he himself is the principle of the whole divinity: and therefore unity is also attributed to him, as was held in the book of the Sentences [270]; and therefore his article by Peter the Apostle is conjoined with the essential principle and essential unity.

To the next it must be said, that certain things were conjoined in the Apostles' creed which afterwards on account of heresies had to be divided. For Manichaeus said afterwards, that Christ was not truly born, nor truly made man, but appeared in a phantasm. Certain others said, he was indeed truly born, but not truly conceived, who (as they themselves said) brought a body with him from heaven, and did not receive it in the Virgin: and therefore the congregated Fathers divided it, so that one article would be about the true conception and the other about this, that he was made a true man: so that thus each heresy would be excluded: and this was not necessary in the times of the Apostles, when the heresies did not yet exist.

To the next it must be said, that it was not necessary to be done thus concerning the passion: because all those five things are ordered to the passion of death, and the time between them was continuous and short: but it was not so in the conception, and nativity: nor even (which I think the more potent cause) did a heresy press, as in that one: for concerning the death of Christ there was no heresy except one, namely of the Manichaean, who said that he neither suffered, nor died, except according to the appearance of men only: but there was none, that he indeed suffered, and did not die: or that he indeed died and suffered, but was not buried.

To the next it must be said, that Innocent renders the reason concerning this why the descent into hell was posited implicitly and not explicitly in the Nicene creed: because namely a certain error was then pullulating in the people, that Christ had descended into hell,

and would not have returned, nor would He have been free among the dead: and therefore it pleased the Fathers to blow away, as it were, that heresy, by passing this over in silence concerning Him and including it in the resurrection: for if He rose, it was necessary for His soul to return from the lower regions, just as His body from the tomb. Others say differently, that according to Gregory, it was still doubtful whether it was an article in itself: on the grounds that John had doubted whether He wished to descend in Himself, or send another who would lead out the souls of the Saints after the redemption had been accomplished: but I consider this unsafe to say.

268. Ps. 18:7 (Vulgate).

§ 1. To the saying of Anselm, however, it must be said that it is understood not to contain it sufficiently explicitly, although it contains it implicitly, as the Master says in book I of the Sentences [271].

§ 2. To the next, it must be said that both can be saved according to a twofold consideration of the resurrection: for if the resurrection is taken as a certain motion, then it has a terminus a quo and a terminus in quem, and then the descent to the lower regions and the resurrection are of the same motion: because the descent to the lower regions designates the terminus a quo by reason of place. If, however, these are considered as things done surrounding Christ: then they are two things, and Doctors consider them in this way, thereby making them two articles.

§ 3. To the next, it must be said that the Apostles, by dividing them into two articles, considered the act of grace: for one act of grace is sanctifying the Church, and another is communicating goods by remitting sins: but the Fathers, considering the unity of the grace of the Holy Spirit in substance, although it has different acts, joined them into one: and therefore both have a rationale.

§ 4. To the next, it must be said that concerning punishments it is believed by way of the opposite: because if He will give rewards, it follows by consequence that by the same justice He punishes the wicked: however, there is no special article of faith about this, because faith does not move toward this, but rather away from it.

§ 5. To the next, which is objected concerning the Antiochene [Symbol], it must be said that it is not as widely promulgated as these two: and this is because there is an occasion for doubting: for when it was said, Only true God, it could be understood such that solitude was implied concerning God, and thus the plurality of persons would be excluded: and therefore this was removed in the Nicene [Symbol].

§ 6. To the next, it must be said that what was said, Firstborn of every creature, although it is soundly understood to be true, as Basil says, because receiving is common to the Son with every creature, but having it by nature is proper to Him: nevertheless, it should not have been posited: because among the simple it insinuated the heresy of Arius, who said that He was the firstborn among creatures, and thus a creature: and therefore this too was removed in the Nicene [Symbol].

§ 7. To the next, it must be said that Paul and Barnabas were chosen after the promulgation of the symbol: and therefore they added nothing to the symbol, as is read in Acts 13:2: Separate me Paul and Barnabas, for the work whereunto I have taken them.

§ 8. To the next, it must be said that the article is posited in one God, not according as it is proved, but according as it is supposed by the faithful: and this is in a way to say in what manner He is one, namely, to which the trinity of persons is not repugnant: and no Philosopher ever understood this, but they proved His unity by the mode of science, that it is, and not what that one is.

269. Peter Lombard, Sentences, Book I.

§ 9. To the next, it must be said that simplicity is included in the "one," as Boethius says in his book On the Trinity, that this is truly one in which there is no number, because it rests upon nothing: and in this way nothing is one unless it is simple.

§ 10. To the next, the solution is clear through what has been said before: because omnipotence is appropriated to the Father, and creation is the act through which it is manifested, since otherwise He is not read to be sent. Through this, however, no error is introduced, because since the Father is substantially and He spirates the Spirit in the same substance, it is certain that He communicates the same power to Him, as the symbol supposes when it says, and consubstantial, and the Holy Spirit who is co-adored and co-glorified.

§ 11. To the next, it must be said that this was done most wisely. For certain heretical philosophers said that God first created the world in principal principles, and afterwards committed the making of it to Angels or to nature: and therefore they said, Maker of heaven and earth: because heaven cannot be made except out of nothing, since it does not have matter out of which it is made that exists before it: and therefore by the nature of that which is made, the act of creation is supposed, because according to the Philosophers heaven can in no way be made except by creating it out of nothing: and by the rationale of the word it is supposed that He not only creates, but also makes all things that are made in the matter which He Himself created.

§ 12. To the next, the answer was given above in the third argument.

§ 13. To the next, it must be said that all those expressions were made against the heresy of Arius: for because he said that He was created, and not God, therefore they said, In one Lord. But because he said He was not co-eternal, therefore they said, The Only-begotten, light from light: because that is coeval with the one generating. But because he said He was God only by acceptation, therefore they said, True God from true God. And because he said He was made, therefore they said, Begotten, not made. And because he said He was not of the same substance, therefore they said, Consubstantial with the Father. And because he said that not all things were made through Him, because He did not operate from eternity with the Father: therefore they said, Through whom all things were made. And this for the sake of the people, lest they could be deceived by the Arians in any of these matters.

§ 14. To the next, it must be said that when it is said, For us men: there the love of the conformity of nature with us is noted, against the Manichaean. But when it is said, And for our salvation, etc., the effect of our redemption accomplished through Him is noted: and it flows forth.

§ 15. To the next, it must be said that to descend does not import to be incarnated, except when understood catholically: but this does not suffice for expression against heretics. For some said that He did not descend, like Paul of Samosata, a certain heretic of the Greeks, but He was only incarnated, and was a mere man. Others, however, like the Manichaean, said that He descended, but did not assume our flesh: and therefore, so that both heresies might be excluded, it was necessary to express both.

270. Peter Lombard, Sentences, Book I.

§ 16. To the next, it must be said that He was made man was posited for the expression of the article concerning nativity from the womb: because He then begins to be a man per se, when He is separated from the mother's womb: yet it is said, He was made man, so that all things which He did up to the passion might be understood [as having been done] in man. Some, however, have said that those things which He did in life do not pertain to the article: because they cannot be expressed in a single sacrament. But this is nothing: because provided they are of the articles, they would then have to be expressed in many ways, and there would be many articles. And therefore I think that the baptism and all those things by which He founded and taught the faith, and planted the Church in the Apostles, are reduced by the Fathers through that which is said, And He was made man. For this reason also they did not speak of the nativity from the womb, because that only expresses a single sacrament.

§ 17. To the first point that follows, the response is clear through the statements of Innocent given above.

§ 18. To the next, it must be said that the apparition is the proof of the resurrection: and therefore it does not make a special credible thing, but is supposed with the resurrection of Christ as proving it.

§ 19. To the next, it must be said that it pertains to the grace of the advent for judgment: because there the just will be rewarded, which is the end of all grace: and conversely the wicked will be punished, because they neglected all grace. For just as there is the same discipline of opposites, so too one is understood in the other through the discipline of faith.

§ 20. To the next, it must be said that this was done against the most impious Nestorius and Eutyches, who said that the Holy Spirit is the servant of the Father and the Son, and obeys Him, like a certain power foreign to their essence, and does not give the life of grace nor inspiration: and therefore it was said, And in the Holy Spirit, the Lord and giver of life. And so that coessentiality might be signified, they added, Who proceeds from the Father and the Son: who with the Father and the Son is together adored and conglorified. But a certain heretic, Montanus, and later Porphyry told their disciples that the Prophets spoke with a fanatic spirit: just as energu-
mens and the possessed speak: and so that their heresy might be excluded, they added, Who spoke through the Prophets.

§ 21. To the last, it must be said that, as was said above, this is done on account of diverse considerations of grace, namely according to substance, and thus they return to one article: or according to acts, and thus they are diverse.

Articulus 7 — On The Diversity And Difference Of The Symbols

On the diversity and difference of the symbols.

Fourthly, it is inquired concerning the differences of the symbols.

1. And first it is inquired, from whence is it called a "symbol"?

271. Aristotle, Metaphysics VI.

2. And secondly it is inquired, why these two symbols are specially approved?
3. Thirdly, why the symbol of the Apostles is called the "greater," when nevertheless it contains fewer words?
4. Fourthly, why the symbol of the Apostles is said twice a day, at Prime and at Compline: and the symbol of the Fathers only on Sunday at Mass after the Gospel and before communion.
5. Fifthly, why the symbol of the Apostles is said in silence, but the symbol of the Fathers loudly?
6. Sixthly, why the symbol of Athanasius, according to the use of some, is said once a week, and this at Prime?
7. Seventhly, it is inquired whether still more symbols could be made, and articles expressed, if there were the same cause that existed previously?

§ 23. Solution: To the first, it must be said through the words of Cassian to Pope Leo , where he says as follows: "The symbol received its name from 'collation'. For what is called symbolon in Greek, is named 'collation' in Latin: and it is a collation for this reason, because the faith of the whole Catholic law having been collated into one by the Apostles of the Lord, whatever is poured forth in an immense abundance throughout the universal body of the divine volumes is wholly gathered into the symbol with perfect brevity: according to that saying of the Apostle to the Romans: For the Lord will execute a shortened word upon the earth ." This therefore is the shortened word which the Lord made, namely, gathering the faith of His double testimony into a few things, and concluding the senses of all the Scriptures in brief [statements], condensing His own things from His own things, and perfecting the force of the whole law in brevity. But the Masters of our time say that it comes back to the same thing, namely that it is said from syn which is "with," and bola, "sentence," as if they were sentences of divine truth piled together into one.

§ 24. To the next, it must be answered through the words of Ambrose in his book On the Holy Spirit , that the symbol of the Apostles is the exemplar of all of them on account of the authority of those who framed it. But with the other symbol, which is the Nicene, there harmonizes a figure in the number of the Fathers who framed it. For there were three hundred and eighteen, just like the home-born servants of Abraham when he pursued the enemies: for just as he did, so did they capture the enemies of the faith, and bring back the spoils of the faithful, and Lot, that is, the faithful people captured by the wiles of the heretics. Another reason can be: because that Nicene symbol contained fewer doubtful things than the Antiochene one.

§ 25. To the next, it must be said that the symbol of the Apostles is called "greater" on account of the authority of those who framed it: and because this is what all the other symbols interpret: and they add nothing, but they explain what was inherently there before.

§ 26. To the fourth, it must be said that the greater symbol is said twice a day, to signify that its remembrance is necessary twice in the Church, namely in the primitive Church, and at the end against Antichrist: and twice in the life of a man, at the beginning when he receives

the sacraments, and at the end when he departs from the body. And twice in the day, at the first hour of the day so that it may fortify him throughout the whole day. Whence also it is sung then:

Jam lucis orto sidere, etc. And at the first hour, as it were, of the night, at Compline: and therefore it is sung then:

Te lucis ante terminum Rerum creator poscimus, etc.

But the symbol of the Fathers, which is an explanation against heresies, is sufficient to say sometimes for understanding: and this on Sunday, when there is a cessation from servile works, and the people can assemble to listen: and therefore also in some lands that symbol is expounded in the vernacular every Sunday. It is said after the Gospel: because it is confirmed by the Gospel. And before communion: so that he who does not believe should not approach: because that is the sacrament in which faith is at its highest, inasmuch as it cannot be proved by reason.

§ 27. To the fifth, it must be said that the symbol of the Apostles is said in silence for two reasons: one of which is on the part of the believers: because since that symbol contains nothing but a simple confession of faith, and this suffices for anyone in himself, therefore it suffices to say it in silence. The second is on the part of those who promulgated it, who were then placed in fear with the doors closed, and did not dare to confess Christ openly. But the symbol of the Fathers is said in public, on account of two causes opposite to those, namely because it contains the explanation of faith by disputing against the clamor of the heretics: and therefore the Church thus echoes loudly against them: and because it was promulgated when the liberty of the Church was already prevailing, when they openly confessed Christ.

§ 28. To the sixth, it must be said that the symbol of Athanasius chiefly contains an explanation, or rather an extirpation of the Arian perfidy, and prolixly all the things which are posited in the Nicene: and therefore it is sung at Prime, so that the one following in the Mass can be understood from it.

§ 29. To the next, it must be said that if necessity urged it, the Pope could still, having convoked a council of experts, and having invoked the Holy Spirit, explain something that is implicitly contained in the symbol of the Apostles, and place it among the explicit articles: because this would not be inventing a new article, but explaining one that was always there: and Anselm says this in his book On the Procession of the Holy Spirit .

Articulus 8 — Whether We Are Bound To Believe Some Things That Are Not Articles

Are we bound to believe any things that are not articles?

Fifthly, it is inquired whether we are bound to believe any things that are not articles? And it seems that we are: because 1. He who does not believe that fornication is a mortal sin is

considered a heretic: if therefore this is infidelity: therefore its opposite is faith: therefore that fornication is a mortal sin is an article. And the same objection holds for all others.

1. Again, certain things seem to belong to the articles which are believed prior to faith, as was said: because the Apostle says that he that cometh to God, must believe that he is, and is a rewarder to them that seek him . If therefore it is necessary to believe this when coming to God: it seems that this is a credible thing prior to faith.

If on account of this it is said that "fornication is a mortal sin" is an article of faith, and "God is" is not. ON THE CONTRARY: That fornication is a mortal sin is not a truth about God: therefore it is not an article.

1. Again, that God exists is either posited in the symbol as an article, or as part of an article: therefore it seems that it is false that it is antecedent to faith, as it seems.
2. Again, it binds to believing: therefore it is an article.
3. Again, it is an indivisible truth about God: therefore it is an article.
4. Again, he who does not believe is an infidel: therefore by the opposite, faith is about it as an article.

§ 31. Solution: It must be said that just as in other sciences certain things are principal and certain things substantial, like the principal conclusions of the art: but certain things are consequent, like the secondary conclusions: from which nevertheless something further can be inferred in the work of the art, just as in geometry there are suppositions, theorems, and corollaries: so it is also in faith. And first it is necessary, in my judgment, to suppose that which is required to believe God and to believe to God: and this is that God exists, and that His words in Scripture are true: and these are suppositions and axioms. But the articles themselves are like the principal conclusions of the science: and the things which pertain to good morals are like consequent corollaries. And all these things must be believed and received through faith, according to how it is taken in a broad sense. And through this the solution to the first is clear.

§ 32. To the next, it must be said that this belongs to faith, insofar as it is to believe God and to believe to God: for that faith which believes in God first approaches through a tendency toward God: and although these are sometimes simultaneous in time, nevertheless they are prior and posterior by nature.

§ 33. To the next, it must be said that as has been said, we believe many things by faith as they follow consequentially, which are not articles, namely not principally.

§ 34. To the next, which is objected concerning believing God, it must be said that the articles are posited according as they refer to believing God and believing in God: but not to believing to God, because this pertains to the understanding of Scripture, as a thing heard.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 9 — Whether The Same Thing Can At Once Be Known And Believed

Can the same thing simultaneously be known and believed?

Then it is inquired concerning what he says in that chapter C, After this it is usually inquired: Since faith is concerning non-apparent things, etc.

For it seems that the same thing could be simultaneously known and believed.

1. For sensitive cognition is lower than intellective: and yet the intellective does not exclude it, nor conversely: rather it aids it in many things: therefore it seems, since faith and science relate to each other in this way, that one does not exclude the other.
2. Again, a lesser light does not remove a greater one, although it may be seen less than before: therefore it seems that neither does faith remove science, nor conversely.
3. Again, some Philosopher comes to the faith, like Justin, Dionysius, Apollophanes, and many others, who knew through natural reasons that there is one God: if therefore faith evacuates science, it would be necessary that they forgot those reasons, which is false: therefore science and faith can be concerning the same thing.
4. Again, we daily seek natural reasons, and those not founded upon the principles of faith, and we find many by which the faith can be defended: but it is certain that those can generate the habit of science: therefore the same thing can be known and believed.
5. Again, Job 12:7 says: Ask the beasts, and they shall teach thee. And, Psalm 18:2: The heavens shew forth the glory of God. Therefore it seems that from the creatures themselves natural reasons can be had by which something is proved about God.
6. Again, an example is usually given concerning the blessed and glorious Virgin: because she knew by experience that she had conceived without male seed by the Holy Spirit, and she believed the same thing: therefore the same thing is believed and known.

§ 36. BUT AGAINST this it is commonly objected:

1. Through that of John 14:2: I go to prepare a place for you, where the Gloss says: "Let the Lord depart, lest He be seen: let Him be hidden, so that He may be believed. For then a place is prepared, if having been believed by faith He is desired, so that being desired He may be possessed ." Therefore it seems that faith is aided by being hidden. Reason, however, does not make one believe.
2. Again, it was held above that faith is of non-apparent things: therefore it is not of known things, because known things are highly apparent.
3. Again, Master Hugh says, and it was held above, that science is above faith: therefore it evacuates it: because an imperfect habit is useless when the perfect one is had: because the Apostle says, I Corinthians 13:10: But when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away.
4. Again, in things which are under opinion, science evacuates opinion: therefore also faith.

5. Again, they object with a secular objection, that the love of God for His own sake, when it enters the heart, evacuates the love of God for the sake of temporal things: therefore similarly faith, when it comes, evacuates assent on account of reason.

6. Again, John 4:42: And they said to the woman, namely the Samaritans: We now believe, not for thy saying: for we ourselves have heard him, and know that this is indeed the saviour of the world. But the woman there holds the place of science which is through reason: therefore science accepted through reason in some credible thing, is evacuated by the arriving faith.

§ 37. Solution: It must be said that faith and science are concerning the same thing, but not in the same respect: and therefore one does not evacuate the other: and therefore I concede the reasons first adduced, understanding it in this way: but faith does not assent on account of reason, but reason is there under faith, and similarly science.

§ 38. To the first therefore which is objected, it must be said that the Gloss there wishes to say that the assent of the Apostles is more meritorious if it is hidden as to corporal sight: and this is true, because faith has the greater merit by as much as reason provides it less experience.

§ 39. To the next, it must be said that in the manner in which faith is of that article, there cannot be science or reason concerning the same: and how this is so has already been explained quite often above.

§ 40. To the next, it must be said that Hugh is speaking of the science which is intellective of the truth, which is by vision face to face, not of the science which is in the wayfarer from reason: because that is much less certain than faith is: although concerning this we also gave another rationale above.

§ 41. To the next, it must be said that I think it is false: for there can be opinion and science about this: and especially among different people, and even in the same person, although he relies more on science.

§ 42. To the next, it must be said that I do not believe him to be without mortal sin who loves God only for the sake of temporal things. But if he loves God for His own sake, and with Him temporal things only for use, not for fruition: then that love need not be evacuated.

But if you say that he loves God indeed above all things, but nevertheless loves temporal things immoderately below God: then the simile which is adduced is of no value: because this love is then a venial sin, the appetite for which is absorbed by perfect charity. Science, however, is meritorious, and not a sin at all.

§ 43. To the next, it must be said that that allegory proves nothing, except that faith does not assent merely on account of reason: and this is true, and conceded by us.

Articulus 10 — Whether The Master Sufficiently Posits The Number Of The Things To Be Believed

Does the Master sufficiently posit the number of credible things?

Does the Master sufficiently posit the number of credible things?

Then it is inquired concerning what Augustine says, there, C, around the middle: There are other things, which unless we understand, we do not believe, etc.

For here the Master seems to introduce the credible things deficiently: because

1. In the original, namely in the book of Eighty-Three Questions , one more credible thing is posited, which namely is always believed and never understood, such as the histories of all deeds: and he does not adduce this here.
2. Again, here in the Letter he intimates, and in the original he says, that in divine things one must believe first, and afterwards understand: and this is not seen in all divine things, such as that God is one.
3. Again, there is no assent to anything unless it is first understood what it is that is being said by the name at least: therefore the intellect indeed precedes every act of believing: and he denies this in the Letter.
4. Again, II Corinthians 3:5: Not that we are sufficient; where the Gloss says: "It is not believed, unless it is first thought."

§ 45. Solution: It must be said that if we speak of assent as it respects the antecedents and consequents to the articles themselves, then this credible thing is in faith: because then that which will be in the history of the canonical books is always believed, and never understood: and to believe what precedes understanding will be in the credible things into which natural reason is capable of reaching: and to believe what precedes the understanding of truth will be with respect to the credible things which are not apprehended through reason, such as that God is triune and one, and things of this sort. But the Master here does not intend except concerning the latter two: and therefore he omits the first.

And therefore the solution to the first and the second is clear.

§ 46. To the next, it must be said that it seems to me it must well be conceded that every believed thing is preceded by the understanding of what it is that is said by the discourse: but the Master is not speaking of this here, but rather of the understanding of the thing.

§ 47. To the next, it must be said that that Gloss is speaking of faith according as it is from hearing, or of the intellect which is to know what it is that is said by the discourse.

Articulus 11 — Whether To Know God Is To Behold Him With The Mind And To Perceive Him Firmly

Is knowing God to behold Him with the mind and firmly perceive Him?

Then it is inquired concerning that definition which Augustine gives, there, C, around the middle: What is it to know God, but to behold Him with the mind, and firmly perceive Him?

For how is "to behold with the mind" understood here? For either he understands it through a mirror, and in an enigma: or through a species. If in the first way: then it is not to know, but rather to believe. But if in the second way: this does not seem true: because thus He will only be seen in the fatherland: therefore it seems that God is not known.

§ 49. BUT AGAINST: Damascene: "The cognition of God's existence is naturally inserted into all ." Therefore it seems that God is known.

§ 50. Solution: Augustine is speaking of the science of approbation which is mixed with the af-
fect: for thus He is beheld by the mind, while He is tasted through experience in gifts, and this is something beyond faith and short of vision.

§ 51. To the first therefore it must be said that the mirror is not the only thing in which He is seen: for sometimes it is an exterior creature having a vestige: and sometimes with an image of grace, which is similar to beatitude: and thus he speaks here: whence also the firmness of this perception is from faith adhering through sight, and charity penetrating through affect.

Articulus 12 — Whether Faith Is Rather Through Sight Than Through Hearing

Is faith rather through sight, than through hearing?

Then it is inquired concerning what he says, there, C, toward the end: Nor are those things which are believed before they are understood utterly unknown, since faith is by hearing, etc.

For since faith is a certain thought: and thought is produced by invention and doctrine, it seems rather to be through sight, than through hearing: because

1. Sight serves invention, and hearing serves doctrine: and invention is more powerful than doctrine.
2. Again, sight is a more noble sense than hearing, and of more doctrines, and more certifying of those things which belong to every sense: therefore it seems that it ought rather to be from sight, than from hearing.

§ 53. Solution: It must be said that hearing always receives discipline from another: and because faith is from another higher light, and not from our own invention: therefore hearing is more fitting to it than sight: and through this the solution to the first is clear.

§ 54. To the next, it must be said that sight is more noble when they are referred to their proper objects: but here it is not so: but rather it is called an interior hearing, which is the acceptance of the notice of the First Truth from another: and therefore that objection does nothing to the proposition.

DISTINCTIO XXV

Divisio Textus

§ 55. Division of the Text

To the aforesaid things must be added concerning the sufficiency of faith, etc.

Here begins that part in which faith is treated according to its comparison to believers.

And it has two parts; in the first of which the state of faith is touched upon according to the diversity of time. In the second, its equality in the believer to hope and charity, which begins, there, E, That also is not to be passed over, that faith, hope, charity, etc.

But in the first there are three parts: for first he posits concerning the faith of the Fathers: secondly, he touches upon the faith of the simple ones, there, B, What therefore shall be said of those simple ones, etc. In the third, it is adjoined concerning the faith of Cornelius, there, D, It is also usually inquired concerning Cornelius, etc.

Now four doubts are incident concerning the first. First, namely: Can faith grow? Second: Was it ever sufficient to believe about God, that He is, and that He is a rewarder to them that seek Him? Third: Can falsity underlie faith? Fourth: Since an article is said to bind one to believe, does it bind one to believe explicitly, or implicitly?

Articulus 1 — Whether Faith Can Grow

Can faith grow?

To the first it is objected thus: 1. Master Hugh of St. Victor in his book On the Sacraments, part ten, says thus: "There are two things according to which faith is said to grow: thought and affect, that is, constancy, or firmness of believing, and according to cognition, when one is erudite unto science: according to affect, when one is excited to devotion, and strengthened unto constancy [272]." From this it is accepted that faith can grow.

1. If perhaps you say that it does not grow in the number of articles, but in the illumination of believers: because some understand more clearly those things which they believe, from study, than others do. Against this: Hugh, in the same place, "Faith grew over time in all, so that it might be greater: but it was not changed, so that it would be another faith before the law, when God was believed as creator, and salvation and redemption were expected from Him. But through whom and how the same salvation would be fulfilled and perfected, excepting a few to whom it was singularly given as a gift to know this, was not known by the rest even of the faithful." Therefore it seems that there was then neither an article of the incarnation, nor of the passion, nor was there then any expression of an article concerning the faith: of those articles, I say, which are concerning the humanity of Christ. Therefore faith grew according to the number of articles, as it seems.

Adonai I did not reveal to them. However, it is established that later He revealed. Therefore, faith increased.

1. Likewise, Psalm 118:100: I have understood more than the elders. Therefore, it seems that the elders did not believe as many articles as he who was after them.

Likewise, Acts 2:17: I will pour out of my spirit upon all flesh: and your sons and your daughters shall prophesy, and your young men shall see visions, and your old men shall dream dreams. Therefore, the young see something of the credibles, which the elders did not see. Therefore, faith increased.

Likewise, Gregory in a certain Homily on that of the Gospel: Blessed are the eyes that see what you see?, says thus: Therefore, it seems that according to the increments of times the knowledge of the holy spiritual Fathers increased: and the closer they were to the advent of the Savior, the more fully they perceived the mystery of salvation. Faith increased.

1. Likewise, above it was held in the division of symbols, that from twelve articles fourteen were made: and with the same cause existing, they could still be distinguished further: therefore, it seems that faith could increase in the number of articles, and still can increase, as it seems.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Faith is a simple light, illuminating to eternal truth: but eternal truth cannot increase: therefore, neither can faith.

1. Likewise, in every article divine truth is supposed and explained through those things which pertain to our salvation, or through those things which are from eternity in God: and on the part of the eternals it is established that it cannot increase: but on the part of the temporals there is a disposition ordained from eternity, which also cannot be increased: therefore, faith cannot increase in terms of articles.
2. Likewise, if faith increased in the number of articles, since articles are of the substance of faith, faith would be changed according to substance: and this is denied in the Letter: therefore, it seems that the number of articles does not increase.
3. Likewise, implicit faith is of as many as explicit: because implication or explication are on our part, and not on the part of the articles: since therefore the faith of the ancients and ours do not differ except by explicit and implicit, it does not seem that it increased in the number of articles.
4. Likewise, if it were said that faith increased because of implication and explication, since continuously through the study of Doctors the articles are more explained, it would seem to increase continuously: and this is said by no one: therefore, faith did not increase, as it seems.

Solution: It must be said with Master Hugh, that faith increases in two ways on the part of the believer: but in no way in itself, whether as to the believed. On the part of the believer it

increases as to the intellect, and as to the affection. But as to the intellect in four ways, namely by revelation illuminating from above, by doctrine explaining, by the thing believed happening, and by the study of truth opening the intellect. By revelation indeed: because he who receives more ample revelations, sees the believed more clearly, and perceives better. By doctrine explaining: because the more an article is expressed with more properties, or more articles are expressed, the better they are understood, as we said above: because concerning the article of eternal generation, and the procession of the Holy Spirit, the Fathers made more expressions in the Nicene synod: and therefore the faithful understanding better, more guarded against the heretical sense concerning the articles. Some Fathers also taught more articles, some more explicitly than others: and therefore they had better knowledge of the faith. By the thing believed also happening, the knowledge of faith increases: because as Jerome says, What is seen with the eyes is better understood than what is predicted to happen. Also, the reason for understanding the believed is opened through study, as Anselm says in the Proslogion: because faith itself sometimes seeks understanding through study. But on the part of the affection it increases in three ways, namely because it purifies the affection more and more, according to how it teaches to be more removed from sins. Secondly also, because it removes from the phantasms of natural reasons: because they do not begin to taste as before, on account of the devotion and fervor of the affection concerning the believed. Thirdly also, it gives constancy, as in certain works, such as martyrdom: and thus the faithful dares to confess the faith before kings and princes. But on the part of the articles in themselves, I well concede that it did not progress, nor does it progress: because they rely on the first truth: and the number of them is determined by that and not by man.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that Master Hugh understands concerning the progress, which is rather of the faithful in faith, than of faith in the faithful.

To the other, it must be said that the articles did not increase in themselves, but the explanation and revelation of the articles increased: and this is not for the article to increase, except per accidens: for although perhaps the passion was not then determinately known to someone, yet it was an article, and was believed implicitly by them, when any mode of liberation from future things was believed by them.

To the other, it must be said that it is not understood concerning the manifestation of the article, but rather of God, in which man increases from day to day: and the knowledge of God always becomes marvelous in the progress of man in it, nor can it be perfectly in it, on account of which the Psalm says 104:4: Seek the Lord, and be confirmed. Seek his face always.

TO THE THREE following authorities, it must be said that they prove nothing except the progress of man in the knowledge of the articles according to number.

To the other, it must be said that the division of articles is made in many ways: yet the thing remains one, which is divided in different ways by different considerations, yet the thing is not increased: just as if conception and nativity are referred to one article, or to two things, one remains, but they are considered in different ways.

272. Hugh of St. Victor, De Sacramentis, lib. I, pars 10.

Articulus 2 — Whether It Ever Sufficed To Believe Of God That He Is, And That He Is A Rewarder Of Those Who Seek Him

Whether it ever sufficed to believe about God, that He is, and that He is a rewarder of those who seek Him?

Secondly, it is asked, Whether it ever sufficed to believe about God, that He is, and that He is a rewarder of those who seek Him?

It seems, however, that it does: because

1. The Apostle says this.
2. Likewise, this suffices for tending towards God through the knowledge of the first truth: but to believe that He is, shows towards what one tends: and to believe that He is a rewarder, moves from hope and love of the reward, so that we may tend: therefore these two sufficed and suffice.
3. Likewise, for a movement to be made through appetite in us towards something, only two things are required, namely that a delightful apprehension is made, and there is an appetite for it: but to believe that He is, makes apprehension: however, to believe that He is a rewarder, makes appetite: therefore those two suffice for the movement of faith: therefore it suffices to believe those two.
4. Likewise, in the state of innocence Adam did not foresee, nor pre-believe, so to speak, his fall: but if he had not fallen, there would have been no need for a redeemer nor mediator: therefore he was not bound to believe anything about the mediator: therefore it sufficed to believe that God is, and that He is a rewarder of those who seek Him: because the same reason applies to the articles that are about the mediator and others.

1. Likewise, in the state after sin there was no open prophecy, nor revelation that we know of: therefore since the article is above reason, reason was not bound to be moved towards it without revelation: therefore it seems, that it sufficed then to believe those things which nature alone dictated, as it seems.
2. Likewise, let us suppose, that no revelation has been made to someone: and he does what natural law dictates, and we are in the time of the law of Moses or natural law: it is certain, that he will be saved: because the Apostle says, that what is by nature will judge the foreskin, fulfilling the law, you, who through the letter and circumcision are a transgressor of the law.

Since therefore nothing then dictates anything about the mediator, it is not necessary to believe, except those two things which reason dictates.

But against this is

1. What is said in the Letter through several authorities, where it is proven, that it was necessary to have faith in the mediator.

1. Likewise, for the salvation of the sick it was necessary to know beforehand the disease, and the quality of the disease: but the quality of the disease was such, as Anselm proves, that it could not be satisfied for, unless by God and man: therefore it was necessary to believe in the liberator and mediator.
2. Likewise, all who were saved from the beginning, knew that they were to be saved not by their own merits, but by the grace of God: since therefore there is no grace except through Jesus Christ, as it is said, John 1:17: Grace and truth came through Jesus Christ: it was necessary to believe that the savior was to come, and to satisfy for man.

Solution: It seems to me well necessary and true, that from the beginning of the state of sin no one was ever saved by grace, except through faith in the mediator. But the mediator is to be considered in two ways, namely in particular according to the sacraments by which he mediated, or universally according to whatever he wished to mediate: and in the first way it seems to me according to Master Hugh, who expressly says this, that the ancients were not bound to believe explicitly, but in the second way all were. However, in the first way only those to whom revelation was made, and others who were instructed by them, provided they could understand their instruction. In the state of innocence, however, it seems to me, that Adam had clearer knowledge than we, but only about the deity, and what pertains to the eternal distinction of persons: but not in those things which pertain to the reconciliation made through Christ.

Therefore it must be said to the first, that this suffices for one approaching God: but when it is said that He is, I do not believe that it is supposed, that He is only in the universal, because this is investigated by reason alone or natural knowledge, but because He is determined in certain articles determined by revelation: and when it is said that He is a rewarder of those who seek Him, this contributes to hope and love.

To the other it must be said, that because He is in the universal simply, it does not suffice to show the end in this way by which one tends towards Him through faith: but it is necessary, that in some distinctions of articles it is specified: for indeed because He is does not move towards anything, because knowledge in the universal does not move, but in the particular distinction of which the property is known.

Through this also the response to the following is clear.

To the other it was previously answered: because what sufficed for Adam, does not suffice for him who knows himself to be in sin, and cannot be cured by himself: however, I do not believe, that Adam in the first state only believed, because He is in the universal: but rather he believed certain articles, although he did not believe in act those which pertained to the mediator.

To the other it must be said, that it supposed something false: because Master Hugh says, that immediately the signs of healing through the offering of Christ began to be manifested from the beginning of the world, and consequently revelation to be made, as in the sacrifice of Abel, and thereafter in all: and the Apostle touches on this, in Hebrews 11:4, saying: By faith Abel offered to God a more excellent sacrifice than Cain:... and through it, though dead, he still speaks.

To the other they commonly say, that it is impossible, that there was anyone who did what was in him sufficiently to prepare himself, and did not receive revelation from God, or doctrine from inspired men, or a sign of the mediator: and I think, that this is true because of God's providence providing good equally to all, and offering to all, provided we are prepared to receive.

Articulus 3 — Whether Something False Could Fall Under Faith, And Whether Necessary Truth Falls Under Faith

Whether falsehood could be present in faith? and,
Whether necessary truth is present in faith?

Whether falsehood could be present in faith? and,
Whether necessary truth is present in faith?

Thirdly, it is asked, Whether falsehood could be present in faith?

It seems that it could: because
1. Faith was about the mediator: and Augustine says that another mode was possible for healing our misery, but none more fitting. However, if another had occurred, then falsehood would have been present in faith: therefore, it is not necessary that what is believed should occur.

1. Likewise, it is commonly objected concerning Abraham, who believed he would sacrifice his son, and did not: therefore, he believed something false: therefore, falsehood was present in his faith.
2. Likewise, falsehood can be present in the will: just as the Apostle wished to go to the Spaniards, and did not: therefore, falsehood can also be present in faith.

Likewise, falsehood can be present in hope: because many hope to have eternal life, and yet will never have it: therefore, falsehood could also be present in faith.

1. Likewise, let us suppose that some priest in the Mass elevates some unconsecrated host at the time and place when a consecrated one ought to be elevated: then those present believe it to be consecrated, and it is false: therefore, falsehood can be present in faith.

But on the contrary:
1. The Philosopher says that virtue is more certain than art: but falsehood is not present in art: therefore, neither in virtue: therefore, neither in faith.

1. Likewise, faith on the way is about those things of which there is vision in the homeland: and falsehood cannot be present in vision: therefore, neither in faith.
2. Likewise, faith is an assimilation to the first truth: and falsehood cannot be present in the first truth: therefore, neither in faith.
3. Likewise, divine truth is above every truth of all science: but one adhering to known truth never falls into falsehood, because falsehood is not known: therefore, much less one adhering to faith.
4. Likewise, faith is the argument and conviction of things not appearing most true: yet it is more certain to us than the divine nature which is supposed in the articles: but in secular sciences, the reason and principle of the argument is never about falsehood: therefore, much less faith: therefore, falsehood cannot be present in faith.

But then it is further asked, Whether necessary truth or contingent truth is present in faith?

It seems, however, that it is contingent: because

1. In the first book of the Sentences, in the treatise on omnipotence, it is proven that the contingent follows lower causes, and the necessary likewise, because otherwise all things would be necessary: but the remission of sins, which is believed in one article, depends on the will of him to whom they are remitted: therefore, it is not necessary: therefore, contingent truth is subject to faith.
2. Likewise, another mode was possible for our liberation: therefore, this one was not necessary, but could not be: therefore, contingent truth is present in faith.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
If contingent truth is subject to faith: and what happens contingently, contingently does not happen, as the Philosopher says: therefore, it happens otherwise than is believed: therefore, falsehood would be present in faith, which is impossible: therefore, only necessary truth is present in faith, as it seems.

Solution: It must be said that only immutably true is present in faith, yet not necessary: and this is because, as we said in the question on the necessity of predestination, there is a necessity of order, which is the immutable event of the consequent if the antecedent is supposed: and if the consequent changes, then the antecedent never was, although the consequent in itself is contingent: thus we say here, that faith is about immutably true: for if faith is about something, it will immutably occur: yet it will not be necessary in itself: and if it does not occur, then faith was never about it.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that faith was about the mediator: and given this, that faith was about this, it immutably happened that the mediator came to be. And what Au-

gustine says, he understands of this said mediator being considered in itself. Some solve it to the man, not to the reason.

For it is objected thus: Abraham believed the mediator would be: this is said of the past true: therefore, it is necessary: therefore, the contingent is necessary, namely, that the mediator would be. They say, therefore, that this saying depended on the future: and therefore it does not follow the rule and necessity of past things: and this is nothing: because it does not happen in the past, but in the order of faith: to the believed. Hence others say otherwise, that namely Abraham did not believe the mediator would be, but that the mediator would be future. For it is one thing for a thing to be future, and another for a thing to be: because when it is said that a thing is future, only the order in the disposition of the material cause to a certain outcome expected in the future is noted: and that order is, whether the thing was or not: for the Philosopher says in the book on Generation and Corruption, that one who is future to walk, does not walk. But when it is said, the Mediator will be: then the extremes of that order are noted to be placed in the future, and thus they can not occur with the order itself remaining. However, this solution holds well in contingents of the future, in which the order of the power of speech is noted only to lower causes: but in faith and predestination, the order of divine illumination to the future is noted, which illumination is certain, and in the extremes of the order the outcome of the future, and in the ordination itself: hence also Abraham did not only believe that Christ would be future, but that Christ would be incarnated and from his seed: hence it is clear that that solution does not hold. But the previously stated solution is valid and common.

By this also the solution to all similar objections is clear.

To the other it must be said that it was not that believing of faith that Abraham believed he would sacrifice his son, but rather of the opinion of obedience, and to that falsehood can well be present.

To the following it must be said that those do not pertain to the proposed: because the will and hope do not have a proper object, and truth, nor the opposite falsehood, as faith does: and therefore the will of the Apostle which was caused by human opinion, could be frustrated in the willed, because the opinion did not occur.

Similarly, hope which speaks of the expectation of future beatitude, does not have a true object, nor the opposite falsehood: but it can be frustrated from the expected beatitude, not from a defect of hope, but from a defect of the one hoping, who does not continue a good life until death, like Judas.

To the other it must be said that this was responded to above: because the condition is either supposed or added on the part of the worshiper, that it be celebrated rightly, and then it is always true: yet it is nothing to the proposed, because this believing by which I am said to believe this host is consecrated, is not an act of faith, but of opinion.

Articulus 4 — Whether An Article Constrains To Believe Explicitly Or Implicitly

Does an article bind to believe explicitly or implicitly?

Fourthly, it is asked, since an article is said to bind to believe, whether it binds to believe explicitly or implicitly?

It seems, however, that it binds to believe implicitly.
1. By authority: for a man is not bound to believe what in no way becomes known to the intellect, which is what is said by the word, concerning which it was held above, which precedes all that is credible: but what even the Angels are ignorant of, in no way becomes known to man: but, Isaiah 63:1: concerning that, "Who is this that comes from Edom?" the Gloss of Jerome says thus:

It is openly declared that certain Angels did not fully know until the mystery of the incarnation was completed.

1. Likewise, Ephesians 3:10: "That it might be made known to the principalities and powers in the heavenly places," etc. Therefore, it seems that man was not bound to know that explicitly.
2. Likewise, Chrysostom in Homily 1 on John: "We are greatly honored, that the Angels learned with us through the voice of John."
3. Likewise, on that: "Gather up the fragments that remain, that nothing be lost," the Gloss says: "The fragments are sacred mysteries, which the common people cannot grasp: therefore, it seems that not everyone is bound to believe the articles explicitly."
4. Likewise, Ephesians 3:9, on that: "What is the dispensation of the mystery hidden," the Gloss says: "hidden from the creatures of all ages, and existing in the knowledge of God alone."
5. Likewise, by reason thus: In the demonstration of knowable things, it happens that something is known implicitly in the universal, which, however, is doubtful in the particular: just as we know universally that every triangle has three angles equal to two right angles: and yet I can doubt about this wooden triangle, whether it has three angles equal to two right angles: therefore, much more can this happen in faith, which is entirely above reason.
6. Likewise, if an article were said to bind to believe because it binds explicitly, then many would have been damned and would still be damned today, who do not know the distinction of articles.
7. Furthermore, according to this, other things than articles would also bind to believe: because it is said, Hebrews 11:3: "By faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God, so that things which are seen were not made of things which do appear."
8. Likewise, Moses, when he was born, was hidden for three months, etc. And, Rahab the harlot did not perish with the unbelievers, and many such things which are not articles, and yet are accepted under faith as consequences of faith. Therefore, it seems that one is not bound to believe explicitly.

9. Furthermore, this is said in the Letter in the second part of this distinction.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY!
1. Boethius says that evil is not avoided unless it is known: but everyone is bound to avoid infidelity against any article: therefore, one is bound to know each explicitly.

1. Likewise, Galatians 5:3: "I testify again to every man that is circumcised, that he is a debtor to do the whole law." Therefore, it is necessary to believe all articles explicitly.
2. Likewise, if it sufficed to believe implicitly in the omnipotent and redeemer in whatever way one wished, then all philosophers and many heretics would have had implicit faith: but this is false: therefore, explicit faith is required.
3. Likewise, Leviticus 14:12, concerning the cleansing of the leper, it is said: "He shall offer, namely for his cleansing, a sextary of oil," and the Gloss says that the sextary of oil is the measure of faith, in which if there is more, it is poured out: if less, it fails: therefore, one is bound to offer the whole measure of the articles.
4. Likewise, Deuteronomy 27:8, it is commanded to Moses that he should write the law clearly and openly on stones: and the Gloss says that the stones are the laity: therefore, they are bound to believe the articles clearly and distinctly.
5. Likewise, faith is from hearing: but hearing is through the word of Christ, as it is said, Romans 10:17. But hearing explains all things, and similarly the word of God contains nothing implicitly: therefore, it seems that the faithful ought to believe explicitly.
6. Likewise, we see that the laity are taken and examined concerning the most hidden articles of faith: and if they are found to err or not know, they are left as heretics: therefore, it seems that they are bound to know and believe explicitly.
7. Likewise, let us suppose some simple and pious old woman having reverence for her pastor, about whom she knows nothing evil, hears heresy from her pastor, and believes it because she thinks whatever he says is to be believed: shall we say she is damned if she dies in such a state: or if she is apprehended, shall she be burned as a heretic? It seems not: because ignorance excuses from all. But if you say, yes: then she will be bound to know the articles explicitly, even if untaught by another: because if she must be taught, it will be necessary for her to be taught by her own pastor.
8. Likewise, charity is about loving God and neighbor: and it is necessary to know each distinctly: therefore, since faith similarly relates to articles, it seems that faith ought to know the articles distinctly.

Solution: Without prejudice, I say that neither before the advent nor after, without divine revelation and teaching, is one bound to know the articles explicitly, but implicitly, but this being most certainly supposed, there is no doubt that revelation is of the Church, and it has always been made to the Church: and whoever such are called the greater, because others are to be instructed by them: and this is done differently now, differently in ancient times. For in ancient times, that revelation was made for the manifestation of the articles, but now it is

made for their exposition, because all are declared which must be believed. Therefore, the simple before the advent and the simple after the advent are not bound to know explicitly, nor even implicitly, except insofar as they are taught by the greater, and can perceive with the intellect through teaching: but those who preceded were less bound because of the shadowy teaching which was then: but these are more bound because of the open teaching of truth.

Therefore, it must be said to the first objection that what Boethius says is true: but there is a twofold knowledge, namely explicit and implicit: for it is not necessary for me to know every evil in particular, but only under the counsel of the wise, namely if something uncertain occurs whether it is evil, I will recur to the wise, and by his judgment, I will avoid it. So in faith, if a new doctrine is proposed, I will recur to the priest, and by his judgment, I will believe or not believe.

To the other, it must be said that one is a debtor to the whole faith implicitly, so that he does not disbelieve any of all.

To the other, it must be said that philosophers and heretics did not believe implicitly, because they disbelieved: but the one believing implicitly disbelieves no article, although he does not know explicitly.

To the other, it must be said that the measure is fulfilled by not disbelieving any, as has been said.

To the other, it must be said that this is provided so that it may be often and clearly explained to the laity: but this can be done now in the time of grace: and yet because they have a dull sense, they are not bound to understand as explicitly as it is explained to them: because they receive the explanation according to their power of understanding, and not according to the will of the explainer. Before the advent, however, it could not be done except as the time then permitted, namely in shadow and type: and they were less bound than now.

To the other, it must be said that although faith is received distinctly in hearing, yet by the simple, what is heard is not understood, except under a veil, and not distinctly, as was said before.

To the other, it must be said that the laity are not left as heretics because they do not know how to distinguish certain articles: but because they contradict them pertinaciously when they are explained to them: for this could not happen unless they had already received infidelity from heretics against the article: for if they were burned because they do not know how to distinguish or explain articles, the inquisitors themselves would have to be burned, because they do not know much better either.

To the other, it must be said that in that case, the Doctors respond doubtfully: but all agree that they sin mortally by disbelieving an article pertinaciously. But if she doubts, ready to amend, they say it is a human temptation. Hence some say that if she insists on works of piety, whatever she can, God will illuminate her, that she should not believe that priest in such doctrine. But if she does not do whatever she can, then she should impute the cause of her

blindness to herself. But because this response is based on uncertainty, for which we can find no reason: therefore others say differently, that

if it is about an open article which is solemnized in the Church, then she ought to examine with others, whether it is commonly said so: because faith is not of one, but common: and then she can be instructed: but if it is about something hidden, like fornication not being a sin, or the body of Christ not being on the altar, but signified: she should not receive this which is beyond her strength, except under the condition, if the universal Church believes it, and she ought to remain in implicit faith, especially when it is about the body of Christ, because concerning fornication, even the baseness of the act sufficiently shows her that it is a mortal sin. However, this case often occurs in confessions because of the lust of priests, persuading certain women.

To the last, it must be said that it is not similar concerning charity: because charity does not seek reason, but only the object: and it does not distinguish, because it does not love the neighbor except materially: but faith is mixed with a certain knowledge and intellect: and not all are sufficient for that.

Articulus 5 — Whether And How Faith Can Grow

Whether and how faith can increase?

Next, inquiry is made concerning those things which are said in the Text, there, A, in the beginning: Faith indeed is said to be great by knowledge, etc.

1. For this seems to be against what was predetermined, where it was said that it does not increase by the quantity of articles.
2. Furthermore, upon what is the number of this quantity of faith considered?
3. Likewise, should it be conceded that faith is equally great in all articles, or not? It seems that it is not: because one article is about the deity, and another about humanity: and deity is greater than humanity: therefore greater...

It is an article concerning the deity, rather than concerning humanity.

Likewise, it seems that something has been handed down which is not an article, which is the greatest and most difficult to believe, such as the body of Christ being from the transubstantiation of bread and wine. Therefore, it seems that faith is not only great in the quantity of articles, but also in other things, which are not articles, but adjuncts to articles.

Further, it is asked here, if the body of Christ being on the altar is not an article, under what is it contained as an adjunct to the principal?

1. It seems that it is under the omnipotence making all things: because Ambrose says, as if giving a reason: How can it be, which is not great if the word of Christ converts the nature of bread into his body, who created all things from nothing?

Likewise, it seems that it is joined to the article of the passion: because the Apostle said, to the Corinthians 11:26: As often as you eat this bread and drink the cup, you proclaim the death of the Lord until he comes. And the Lord himself, Luke 22:19: Do this in remembrance of me.

1. But it still seems that it is reduced to that, the Holy Catholic Church, the communion of Saints: in the bread collected from many pure grains, it signifies the unity of the Church collected from the persons of the faithful, as the Apostle and Augustine say. Likewise, this seems to show the name: because in Latin it is called communion, in Greek synaxis, because it communicates in the bread of life of the faithful.

Solution: It must be said that the quantity of the article is not said here with respect to number, which increases or decreases, but rather with respect to the quantity of dignity, which each has, by this that the first truth is subjected to it: nor does the Master here enumerate, that in all these it increases: but to show in which it increases, and in which it does not increase.

To the other, it must be said that these are taken according to the four things which are in faith. For faith can be considered in itself: and thus it is said to be great in the quantity of articles: because they are great, who have nothing except the honest, true, and divine: and thus it is not of the laws of other nations which believe shameful, false, and demonic things. On the part of the believer, faith is in the heart, and in the confession of the mouth, as the Apostle says: With the heart one believes unto righteousness, and with the mouth confession is made unto salvation. On the part of the heart with respect to the intellect and affection, according to the intellect it increases in knowledge, and according to affection in devotion: with respect to confession, however, in the constancy of preaching and boldness of confessing before kings and princes.

To the other, it must be said that with respect to the subject of the articles, which is the first truth: and with respect to the mover to believing, which again is the first truth: and with respect to the end, which again is the same truth: faith is equal in all articles: but with respect to that according to which the diversity of articles is considered, which is as it were connoted in which the truth is expressed in this way and not another, in my judgment it is not equal: and this in two ways. For some are expressed by more dignified things than others, as the objection proves. Some, however, are less repugnant to reason than others, and therefore in those faith is lesser: just as faith is greater in God being triune and one, than in one God being.

To the other, it must be said that the body of Christ being on the altar, and being made from bread and wine, in my judgment is joined to the passion: because the same host is now immolated, which was then immolated: and there its memory is repeated, which was once done for all.

But concerning what is objected about omnipotence, it must be said that omnipotence is in a certain way the proof of all articles: whence also the Angel proved the article of the incarnation to the blessed Virgin thus saying: Because no word will be impossible with God: and therefore that objection does not conclude.

To the other, it must be said that the communion of Saints is the effect of that sacrament, and is not reduced to it as an adjunct to it, and therefore it is called communion, but because the sacrament is a likeness of that of which it is the cause: therefore it also has something similar with it.

Articulus 6 — Whether The Ancients Were Bound To Believe About The Mediator All That We Now Believe, Or It Sufficed For Them To Believe Only Four Things, Namely The Nativity, Death, Resurrection, And Coming To Judgment

Whether the ancients were bound to believe all things about the mediator that we now believe, or was it sufficient for them to believe only four things, namely, the nativity, death, resurrection, and coming to judgment?

Whether the ancients were bound to believe all things about the mediator that we now believe, or was it sufficient for them to believe only four things, namely, the nativity, death, resurrection, and coming to judgment?

Then it is asked concerning what is said there, C, around the beginning: To some it seems that it would suffice for them to believe the four, namely, the nativity, death, resurrection, and coming to judgment, etc.

For it seems that there is one reason for all: therefore, according to all, they could believe implicitly or according to none.

1. Likewise, it is asked whether now also these four ought to be believed more explicitly by the simple than others?
2. Likewise, it is asked why those rather than others?

To this it must be said that since there was a disease, the knowledge of the disease was required for salvation, and consequently the nativity of the liberator: and therefore the belief in the coming of the liberator was required, in my judgment, implicitly without specification of the mode, except in those to whom a revelation of the special mode was given: or who received the doctrine from them. However, the presence of the liberator could not be liberation, as was proven above, except through satisfaction for us: and therefore the belief in death was required implicitly. With satisfaction believed, it was necessarily required, as a consequent through effect, the restoration of lost beatitude which is done by implicitly believing in the resurrection, and such a penalty for those despising salvation, which is further done through the coming to judgment. Therefore, since these four are consequently related concerning redemption: therefore, it was more necessary to believe these four.

And through this, the solution to the first and third is clear.

To the second, it must be said that even now, because these are solemnized and more frequently preached, in my judgment, in one who was Christian for some time, it is required that these four be explicitly believed, and implicit faith does not suffice, except perhaps in some adult newly converted.

Articulus 7 — Whether It Is True That John Doubted About The Descent Of Christ To Hell According To The Exposition Of Gregory

Whether it is true that John doubted the descent of Christ into hell according to the exposition of Gregory.

Then it is asked concerning this which is said, there, C, around the middle: Who takes the testimony of this matter from John the Baptist, etc.

For this opinion seems to be heretical:

1. With respect to this, that it is expressed in the symbol in the part of the article which Thomas placed, "He descended into hell, on the third day he rose again from the dead."
2. Likewise, Anselm in the book on the Procession of the Holy Spirit says that it is necessary for salvation to believe in the descent into hell.
3. Likewise, all the expositors, except only Gregory, unanimously say that John did not doubt this for himself, but acted in the manner of the disciples who were envious of Christ and doubting. And this appears: because concerning this the Lord responded nothing, whether he himself or another would descend into hell: but rather he showed the disciples arguments of his divinity. And this is also taken from John, where John shows the disciples with many persuasions how he himself ought to decrease, but Christ to increase: because he who comes from heaven is above all.

Solution: I think that it is rashness to say that John doubted, and the beginning of the heresy of the Manicheans, who say that he doubted, and therefore that he is damned: wherefore I excuse Gregory saying this, that he could have doubted concerning the manner of the descent on account of the disciples, who could not doubt this on account of himself: and therefore, about to die, he sent the disciples envious of Christ, so that they might be confounded by sight, and adhere to Christ.

Articulus 8 — Whether Cornelius The Centurion Had Faith In The Incarnation Before Coming To Peter

Whether Cornelius the Centurion before the coming to Peter had faith in the incarnation?

Then it is asked about Cornelius where it says:

It is also customary to inquire about Cornelius, etc.

This especially because of the words of Augustine which are found in the Letter.

1. For it seems that faith is the first truth, as was held above: therefore he did not come to faith through mercy, but rather through faith to mercy.
2. Again, he would not pray to one in whom he in no way believed, as Augustine says there: therefore it seems false that Peter was sent to teach him faith. If perhaps you say that he had implicit faith, but Peter explained it: and this seems to be nothing, since Cornelius was among the greater, and he ought to have had explicit faith.

Solution I think that Cornelius had explicit faith: but nevertheless implicit faith would have sufficed for him: because he was not among the greater except according to the dignity of his office, not among the greater in revelation. However, the explicit faith which he had was concerning the incarnation of Christ related to any time, as we said above, and therefore Peter, the architect of the Church, was sent to determine for him the article which he explicitly believed, to a certain difference of time lest he should expect any longer the one whom Peter himself taught had come. And thus I understand Augustine, who says Peter was sent to instruct in faith, that is, to the determination of faith, not the explanation of the article: and this determination, as we said above, happens to faith in that part in which it is through hearing.

Articulus 9 — Whether Faith, Hope, And Charity Are Equal In The Present

ARTICULUS IX,

Whether faith, hope, and charity are equal in the present?

Then it is asked about what is said in the last chapter, there, "It is also not to be omitted, that faith, hope, charity, and operation, etc."

For this does not seem so: because

1. We believe much more than we love: because there is nothing we do not believe, and yet love is lacking.
2. Likewise, in natural motions it is not necessary that we always love what we know ought to be loved: therefore, neither in spiritual matters is it necessary that we love what we believe ought to be loved.
3. If perhaps you judge that what is said here is understood of the habits themselves, which are infused together and contained in grace making one pleasing: this seems to be nothing, because operation is not infused together with them, but follows them as an effect from them.
4. Likewise, in the text it is also said that the aforementioned equality is properly considered according to the intensity of the interior acts: therefore, it seems that almost none of the solutions of those saying that this is understood according to the spiritual quantity of the habits is valid.

If for this reason it were said that what is said here is not true:

1. This is against the sayings of the Saints, both here and in Apocalypse 21:16, where it says that the sides of the city are equal: and the Gloss says that the sides are faith, hope, and charity, and operation.
2. Likewise, with one virtue infused, all are infused because of the grace from which none is separated, because each is a part of that virtual whole: therefore, for the same reason, with one increased, all are increased: therefore, they are equal.

3. Likewise, if this equality happens to all, why is it posited here more about those three than about others?

4. Likewise, Gregory in the Homily of Pentecost says that charity is great, therefore it seems that if it is, if however it ceases to operate, charity is not: also operation follows the quantity of charity.

Solution: It must be said that this equality is considered in two ways, namely according to habits: and then it is among the three virtues: and according to acts, and thus it exceeds the fourth which is operation. But operation can be considered in two ways, namely according to its relation to that which informs and elicits it. If the act is considered in the first way, I do not think it is true that the operation of one virtue is equal to the operation of another, nor that the operation of the same virtue is always according to the whole power of the same virtue: for it happens that one loves more fervently than the great charity is in the heart: and it happens that one loves less fervently than the charity is in the heart. However, if the operation is considered in relation to that which informs it, since this is grace, then I say it is equal: because a lesser operation in the genus of operation informed by greater grace and charity is worth more for the substantial merit of eternal life than a greater one informed and elicited by lesser charity.

Therefore, it must be said to the first, that that objection proceeds from the operation comparable to free will, which administers the act: which because it behaves differently in devotion and sadness, just as a man never remains in the same state, therefore also the acts are different, but in comparison to the grace eliciting and informing they are equal.

To the other it must be said that it is not so in natural affections: because they are not united in one, as virtues are in grace: and from that union it is that with one increased, all are increased, and that all are equal.

To the other it must be said that I well concede that it is not understood of habits only, and that this happens to all virtues: but it is especially attributed to these: because these alone are theological: and they tend immediately to God, and direct all others as if leading to God, to whom all our work is referred.

To the other it must be said that the saying of Gregory is understood according to the comparison of the act to the informing habit, and not to the acting free will. However, it must be noted that some easily extricate themselves, saying that it is not understood as equal in species, but only in genus; as if one is great, and the other is great, and vice versa: but not that so much by equality. But the solution does not stand: because equality is expressed in the text by "as much" and "as great," as is clear to the one inspecting.

DISTINCTIO XXVI

Divisio Textus

Hope, moreover, is a virtue by which spiritual and eternal goods are hoped for, etc. Having treated of faith, he touches here in one distinction on hope, about which he determines in two ways, namely in itself, and on the part of the one hoping, there, C, After this it remains in the trace, etc.

In itself, however, he touches on three things concerning hope: first, namely, what it is? And second, in what it agrees with faith, there, B, And just as faith, Third, in what it differs from faith and hope, etc. there, B, §2: Nevertheless, faith is distinguished from hope, etc.

And from this the division is clear. The sentence is plain in the Letter.

Articulus 1 — Whether Hope Is In The Genus Of Virtue

Whether hope is in the genus of virtue?

There arise, however, before Siéferam three questions, of which the first is, whether hope is in the genus of virtue?

Secondly, supposing that it is a virtue, it is asked whether it is a virtue separate from certain other virtues, or conjoined with them?

Thirdly, it is asked, In which power of the soul is hope, and what is its act, and object, and end?

To the first, it is thus proceeded: It seems that hope is not a virtue thus:

1. From Horace and Tully and certain other Philosophers, hope is posited as one of the four natural passions: but no passion is a virtue: therefore hope is not a virtue.
2. Likewise, Every virtue has a determinate act and object: but hope does not have these determinate: therefore hope is not a virtue. The first is proved by induction in particulars. The second is proved by this, that to expect does not denote an act according to operation, but rather immobility according to place: but the object of hope is any good expected in the future: therefore the conclusion follows, that it is not a virtue.
3. Likewise, The Philosopher in the VI Physics posits remembrance of the past, just as hope is of the future: but it is evident that remembrance is not a virtue: therefore neither is hope.

Likewise, In the number of natural passions, they are not opposed according to the difference of time, but according to the object hope and fear of future evil: but it is evident that fear is not a virtue: therefore neither is hope, as it seems.

1. Likewise, Augustine says, that the mind according to the mind is the image of God having the image according to the power of understanding, and likeness in the power

of loving: there are only two powers: therefore only two virtues perfecting: but in the power of knowing God is perfected by faith, and in the power of loving by charity: therefore it seems that hope does not perfect according to the order in God: therefore it is not a theological virtue: and it is evident that it is not cardinal: therefore in no way is it a virtue.

If perhaps you say, that the affective power is bifurcated, and one part of it affects the good, and that is perfected by charity which is called concupiscible: but the other part detests evil, and that is perfected by hope. This seems to be nothing at all: because each power is appetitive of its object, and detestative of the contrary: therefore according to these are not taken two powers, nor two virtues.

1. Likewise, Every virtue is of the difficult and good: but hope is not thus: therefore it is not a virtue. The proof of the middle is: because to expect has nothing of difficulty.
2. Likewise, Virtue is a good quality of the mind by which one lives rightly, by which no one uses badly, which God works in us without us: but this which is called hope does not work in us without us: therefore it is not a virtue. The proof of the middle is, that hope is from merits, as the Master says in the Letter.
3. Likewise, If something is hope in the soul, it seems to be mercenary, and thus lacking the reason of merit, because it expects retribution: since therefore every virtue is meritorious, but hope is not, it seems not to be a virtue.
4. Further, it seems not to be a theological virtue. For a theological virtue is not a mean between excess and defect: but hope is a mean between excess and defect: therefore it is not a theological virtue. The first is proved by this that it was held above concerning faith, that faith relies on the first truth for its own sake, and above all: and above this no excess can be thought. Likewise, Bernard says of charity in the book On Loving God: The cause of loving God is God, and the mode is to love without mode: beyond which also there is no excess. The mean, however, is proved by this, that the extreme of hope in excess is presumption, and it is a vice: and the extreme in defect is despair, and it is also a vice: therefore hope is not a theological virtue, as it seems.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. 1 Corinthians XIII, 13: Now these three remain: faith, hope, and charity; but the greatest of these is charity. But what is enumerated with virtue, is virtue: but here hope is enumerated by the Apostle: therefore it is a virtue.

1. Likewise, Theological virtues consummate the spiritual edifice: but in that faith lays the foundation, as was held above: charity, however, consummates, as will be held below.

Solution.

IN THE SENTENCES, DISTINCTION XXVI, ARTICLE 1.

Therefore hope is required for building: therefore since in the edifice nothing builds except virtue, hope is a virtue.

1. Likewise, Nothing saves except virtue: hope saves: therefore hope is a virtue. The first is proved by this, that nothing saves except what is in the reason of meritorious good: and such is virtue. The second is written, to the Romans VI, 24, where it is said: We are saved by hope.

Solution It must be said that hope is a theological virtue, which perfects according to the order in God immediately. For in this the theological differ from the cardinal: because the acts of theological rectitude have their terminus in God and end, as faith tends to the first truth, but hope to the beatitude of uncreated, unfailing glory, charity to goodness. But the acts of the cardinal terminate in the mean, and place the end in God: as temperance terminates the act in innate passions between too much and too little, and places the end in God, because it does this for God.

Therefore, in order to understand the solutions to the objections, it must be known that hope is said equivocally in many ways, and from this it is placed by different people in different genera, and different things are posited as opposed to it. For sometimes it is in the genus of passion, and in this way it is considered by Philosophers: and because passion is brought upon the sensitive soul: because as the Philosopher says, Every delight is generation in the sensitive soul: then an opposite is posited to it in the genus of passion, because of the same genus of opposites: but this opposite is either taken according to the object alone, and then it will be fear according to which it is a passion of future evil: or according to the difference of time which it signifies, and thus it is opposed to delight, which is from remembrance, as the Philosopher says. But sometimes it is placed in the genus of motion or act, as in Romans VIII, 24, where the Apostle says: We are saved by hope. But sometimes it is placed for the effect of hope, which it has in the soul, for it protects the soul and certifies about future things to be had and obtained, not only being, as faith which also says that certain future things are, but hope says that they ought to be obtained: as the Apostle says, to the Hebrews VI, 18 and 19: We have fled to the hope set before us: which we have as an anchor of the soul safe and firm. Knowing that tribulation works patience, and patience experience, and experience hope. There the Gloss: That is, the certainty of hope: because, as Gregory says: The more anyone rises in God, the greater things he has endured for His name. But sometimes it is placed for the thing hoped for, as to Titus II, 13: Awaiting the blessed hope, and the coming of the glory of the great God, that is, the thing hoped for, which is the coming of glory. But sometimes it is taken for the theological virtue, perfecting the soul to hope, and thus it is inquired about here: as the Gloss says, to Titus II, 13, We await the blessedness, which is subject to the virtue of hope.

According to this, therefore, it must be said to the first, that equivocation impedes the conclusion.

To the other it must be said, that to expect does not denote the whole act of hope, as will be clear below, but to hope denotes it, just as to love the act of love, and to believe the act of faith.

To the other it must be said, that in that process also equivocation deceives, as was held before in the distinction.

To the other it must be said, that as Augustine takes the mind under the affective power or of loving, many powers are comprehended, namely free will, will, concupiscible, and irascible. And then to the object it must be said, that to detest evil is not of the irascible, according to which the irascible is, but rather it is of any power to flee its evil: but the irascible is to exclude fighting evil, which is arduous and most difficult, and is brought upon from outside, and it is its rising to the height of the end, and to the height of that which is to the end: and according to which it rises to the height of the end, thus it is perfected by hope, as will be clear below: but according to which it rises to the height of that which is to the end, thus it is perfected by fortitude. And thus the solution to the argument is clear. However, it must be known, that that reason is founded on falsehood: because when Augustine speaks of the image, he speaks of the supreme part of the soul, which is ordered to God by natural habits according to which He is three and one: and this is not perfected by habits ordered to work, unless the image is taken improperly, namely as it results in the lower powers, and free will, and reason, and will, and in such things.

To the other it must be said, that the difficult and good about which virtue is, is differently determined in theological and customary virtue: for in customary it is determined according to difficulty and the reason of the mean, which is by equidistance in passions, or by right reason taken in rational virtues, as are prudence, and justice: but in theological virtue the difficulty is according to elevating the soul outside itself, and above itself: just as faith elevates reason to deny itself, and tends above itself to the truth which it does not know how to prove: and hope elevates the soul, to hope for those things about which there is no persuasion of reason, and from those things which it sees, it is elevated to seek those which it does not see: and charity elevates, to tend to the highest good, which is sought by faith, with the love of private good set aside: and this is more difficult than the difficulty of civil virtue: and the good of theological virtue is the end, but the good of civil is the honest related to the uncreated end. Whence it is clear, that that objection supposes falsehood.

To the other it must be said, that God works in us the habit of hope without us, although not the act of hope: and it is understood of the act of hope when it is said, that it comes from merits.

To the other it must be said, that the good reward is God, and not blameworthy, and this reward hope expects: but temporal reward for spiritual, is Jezebel-like and leprous merchandise: and hope does not care for this.

To the other it must be said, that hope is a theological virtue: and those things which seem to stand around, it must be said that they do not stand around, but are corruptions of the conditions of hope: just as when hope is made from the largesse of God, the despairing neglects it: and when it is made from merits, the presumptuous neglects it. For every mediation and excess is attended according to the same matter which is not here: because it does not have matter of this kind, in which according to the reason of matter it is to abound, and to

fail, as it is in certain other customary virtues; but rather just as faith has opposed to it multiple infidelity from the corruption of various things which are required for faith, and charity similarly has opposed to it hatred and enmity, yet it is not determined to some mean: so also hope: and this is clear from the fact that on the part of the thing hoped for it is never too much: for hope relies above all on the goodness and largesse of the uncreated: and therefore the presumptuous does not exceed in hope, but rather each corrupts according to something, which is required for the substance of hope.

Again this is clear by another reason: because the mean has composition from both extremes, just as largesse from prodigality and avarice: but it is not said that one who hopes hopes for things to be hoped for and not to be hoped for, and one who despairs hopes for neither things to be hoped for nor not to be hoped for, which is false, because all those are about that which is altogether above all to be hoped for: but one hopes as he ought, others however corrupting.

Again by another reason this is clear: because if hope were a mean, now compared to the extremes it would take something of the reason of the extremes, just as the brave according to the Philosopher is timid to the audacious, and audacious to the timid: but hope is not said thus despair to presumption, and presumption to despair.

And let this be said against some, who say that hope is a mean between despair and presumption, because they think in every virtue there is a mean by one reason, which is absurd, because not even in customary (as the Philosopher says in the V Ethics) is it by one reason.

Articulus 2 — Whether Hope Is A Virtue Separate From Certain Other Virtues, Or Conjoined With Them

Whether hope is a virtue separate from certain other virtues, or conjoined with them?

Secondly, it is asked, whether it is a virtue separate from certain other virtues or conjoined with them?

It seems, however, that it is conjoined.
1. For those things which have one property, also have one subject, or at least not separate: but to endure and to expect is of longanimity and patience, which are parts of fortitude: and these are also of hope: therefore it seems that hope is a virtue conjoined with them.

1. Likewise, those things which perfect the soul against afflictions seem to be parts of fortitude, or conjoined with its parts: but hope thus perfects the soul: therefore it is either a part of fortitude, or conjoined with them. The first is proved by this, that fortitude is the perfection of the soul against rising and afflicting adversities, as the Saints say. The second, however, is written in Proverbs 13:12: Hope deferred afflicts the soul, that is, the thing hoped for: therefore it needs hope to endure.
2. Likewise, it is commonly objected that it is a virtue conjoined with fear thus: In natures, the same is the mover to retreat from the terminus from which, and to approach the terminus to which, just as from above, and in below: therefore similarly it will be in

morals: but hope is the mover to the terminus to which, fear however from the terminus from which: because hope moves to the good, and fear from the evil: therefore hope and fear are the same.

3. Likewise, aversion and conversion in sin do not make a different sin: therefore in the opposite, aversion from evil and conversion to good do not make a different virtue: but fear averts from evil, and hope converts to good: therefore they are the same virtue.
4. Likewise, the same is faith concerning punishments and rewards: therefore also the same virtue fleeing punishments as fear, and hoping for rewards as hope.
5. Likewise, of contraries the same is the discipline: but to flee and to pursue are to be held as opposites: therefore of them there will be one science and one virtue, as it seems.
6. Likewise, one virtue in number is the mean of two malices: but fear is between despair and presumption, and similarly hope: therefore hope and fear are one and the same virtue.
7. Further, it seems that hope is the continuation of all virtues: because it is of hope to expect: but this is nothing else than to remain immovably in virtue: therefore it seems that hope is nothing but a dwelling in the continuation of virtue: therefore it is not a virtue separate from all others.

ON THE CONTRARY:
1. It is enumerated singularly by the Apostle: therefore it is one singular virtue.

1. Likewise, upon that: "The light of your countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us," etc., Augustine says that the image is the recreation of Job, 1, 2, Gregory says, is grace according to faith, hope, and charity. That the three theological virtues are signified by the three daughters of Job; therefore it is a singular virtue.

Solution: It must be said that hope is a virtue separate from others, and has a singular act, as will be clear below, and an object in a special reason.

§ 1. To the first, therefore, it must be said that expectation, longanimity, and endurance equivocally express the conditions of the hoping person and of the brave person. § 2. For the conditions of the hoping person are according to the progression into the hoped-for thing which does not afflict of itself, but accidentally, namely because it is delayed: but according as they are conditions of the brave person, they express the comfort of the mind in the endurance of that which afflicts of itself, from the confidence of victory and of the end, because the passion will not always lie upon him.

§ 3. But to that which he says, that fortitude is against afflicting things, etc., it must be said that this is understood concerning things afflicting of themselves, and not accidentally from delay.

§ 4. To the next it must be said that those arguments are completely invalid: because hope is not taken in the rationale of moving from evil into good, but rather in the rationale of

eliciting an act: for fear by itself suffices to move from evil into good. For if it is servile, it moves from an evil act; but if it is initial, then it moves from an evil habit in consideration of punishment and of the love of God. § 5. For hope is not called moving in such a way that it perfects that which fear began. Whence it is clear that those arguments do absolutely nothing to the purpose.

§ 6. To the next it must be said that in sin one thing is by reason of another: for it would not avert [from God] unless it converted to illicit things. But this is not the case here: rather, hope is no less supported by fear, for it does not regard the punishment, but only the liberality of the giver.

§ 7. To the next it must be said that faith is concerning those things as they are articles of uncreated truth, and thus they agree: but they do not agree in that they are punishments, nor in that they are rewards, and therefore they are regarded by diverse habits.

§ 8. To the next it must be said that hope and fear are not contraries: for unformed [hope] is preserved with servile [fear], and formed [hope] with chaste fear. Nor are they of contraries, because hope is of achieving the glorious, while fear has an act toward punishment: and these are not opposed: for punishment and reward are not opposed, according as one is the object, and the other is as that to be achieved.

§ 9. To the next it must be said that as we said above, hope is not a virtue determining for itself a mean from the rationale of the matter. And if despair and presumption are opposed in the rationale of corruption, then fear will not be their mean, because fear fears to be separated, and despair supposes an irremediable fault: whence there is nothing to what is objected.

§ 10. To that which is further objected, it must be said that hope [spes] does not express expectation [exspectationem], but an act of hoping [sperationem], and this expresses more, since the hoping person extends himself, just as the believing and loving person, in his own way into the hoped-for thing, and he may have it in his own way, just as the believing and loving person.

Articulus 3 — In Which Power Of The Soul Hope Is

In what power of the soul is hope?

§ 13. Thirdly it is asked, In what power of the soul is hope? and, What is its act, and object, and end?

§ 14. But it seems it is not in the irascible [power]: because 1. It belongs to every virtue of the soul to expect that which it appetites, and to have when it has, and to reject the contrary: but hope expresses the expectation of that which is appetited: therefore it is not of the irascible alone, but of all the powers.

§ 15. 2. Also, hope is defined in the Letter, that it is the certainty of expectation: but certainty implies cognition: therefore hope is of the reason or intellect: therefore not of the irascible.

§ 16. 3. Also, Avicenna and Damascene (and it is also taken from Aristotle at the end of the first book of the Ethics) say that the irascible is a part of the sensible soul. Since, therefore, it does not belong to the sensible soul to be borne immediately to God, it seems that hope, which is borne immediately to God, is not in the irascible.

§ 17. FURTHERMORE it is asked concerning its act.

§ 18. 1. For the act of a power of the soul is accustomed to be denominated according to its name, as the act of the intellect is to understand, and of the will to will, and thus of others: but to hope does not name the act of the irascible: therefore it seems that it is not the act of hope, or hope is not in the irascible.

§ 19. 2. Also, what does "to hope" add beyond "to expect"? It seems that it adds nothing: because thus says the Apostle, to the Romans 4:18, concerning Abraham: Against hope he believed in hope. And he adds thus, Bearing longanimously, he obtained the promise . Therefore it seems that it expresses nothing but expectation alone.

§ 20. 3. Also, it is defined by expectation alone, when it is said, hope is the certain expectation of future beatitude, etc.

§ 21. 4. Also, what does expectation express? If it expresses only immobility in the place of virtue or of life: then it would add nothing above the other virtues except continuity: and this does not express a special act: therefore hope according to this would have no special act.

§ 22. Also it is asked concerning its object and end.

§ 23. For if it is said that its object is beatitude, as the Saints commonly seem to say, and it is supposed in the definition: then it seems that hope is every virtue: because beatitude is the end of every virtue.

§ 24. Solution: To the first it must be said that hope is a virtue separated and divided from other virtues, and it is in the irascible power of the soul. Nor is "to expect" merely its act, although it belongs more appropriately to it than to another virtue, as will be said below. But rather [its act is] to extend oneself into the hoped-for thing with a certain amplitude of mind, and this amplitude, because it is with respect to the great and the high in that which is such, belongs to the irascible according as it is human.

§ 25. To the next it must be said that certainty is twofold: one which is in the manner of an argument in cognition, and this belongs to faith. Another is that which is by way of nature, and this belongs to any virtue: for nature is more certain than art in works and in the end, as we said above: and because virtue consents to reason in the manner of nature, as Cicero says, therefore virtue is also more certain than art. § 26. But this certainty which is in the manner of nature is twofold: namely, the certainty and efficacy of a habit improving directly toward the work and toward the end, and this belongs to every virtue according as it is a virtue. § 27. Another is from the efficacy of the inclination of the habit and of the cause joined to the habit, and this is greater: just as if generated fire had joined with it the generating thing, which would give the motion that follows the form, then it would ascend more certainly, because then the motion in it would be as following its proper form, and as following the impulse of

the generator. And hope has such certainty, namely from the nature of the habit and the cause, because proceeding from merits and grace, which are the cause of certainty. And therefore also among the virtues it is specially defined through certainty: and not, as some wrongly say, because it receives certainty from faith. And the Apostle touches upon the certainty from the cause, 2 Timothy 1:12: I know whom I have believed, and I am certain that he is able to keep my deposit until that day.

§ 28. To the next it must be said that I indeed think this to be true, that the irascible is a part of the sensible soul: but, as the Philosopher says, it participates as it were in reason, and therefore it is made elevated above the nature of the sensible considered in itself, and then it is capable of that which it could not do of itself. § 29. Nevertheless, there are some moderns who say that there is a twofold concupiscible and irascible in us, namely sensible and human: and in the human they place charity and hope, but in the sensible temperance and fortitude. But this opinion has no root in any authority, neither of the Philosopher, nor of the Saints.

§ 30. To that which is further asked concerning the act, it must be said that three things concur to the act of hope which is to hope, namely a disposition on the part of the agent, and this is a fixation in the place of protension, and this is called expectation. For just as one who is moved according to place cannot be extended into something that is proper to one place, so neither can motion in life attain the hoped-for thing; but this expectation is a permanence in life, and it happens to hope from that part by which it is supported in merits, because he who expects from merits must be immobile in a meritorious life. § 31. Another thing is what is required, which is the substance of the act interiorly in the soul, although not exteriorly, namely that with a great mind it be extended into eternal things. § 32. The third is the rationale of the object: because every act has to be defined and specified through its object: and the object is the embrace of eternity and of beatitude, according as it places one in glory, because the glorious expresses the great and honored: and this properly belongs to the irascible. § 33. Therefore to hope is its act which embraces these three, namely by expecting in merits, to be extended into the amplitude and magnitude of eternal glory: because eternity also expresses the ample through this, that it sounds as unfailing.

§ 34. But to the second it must be said that this is not true in all acts, but only in those which belong to the powers themselves according to themselves, such as to understand, and the like. § 35. But there are others which belong to the powers according as they are joined to other powers, just as to enjoy belongs to the concupiscible and the will, and to know to the reason, and to believe to the intellect according as it is joined with the affect, and to hope to the irascible according as it is joined to the believing intellect, and concerning these what is objected is not true. § 36. And you will find this noted above on the first distinction of the first book of the Sentences, in the question concerning the act of enjoyment.

§ 37. To the following the solution is clear through what was said before.

§ 38. To the next it must be said that expectation is placed in the definition of hope, and the rationale of this has been stated. But protension is understood through this, that it says, of future beatitude: for if it is future, then the hoping person is not in it, but must be extended unto

it: and beatitude is taken in the rationale of the great and glorious, as will be said afterward. And thus the whole of what concerns the act of hope is understood.

§ 39. To the next it must be said that it does not express the immobility of life as it is the continuity of virtue, but rather as it is a motive in the act of hoping: and it adds this motive or the rationale of the motive above the immobility from life, or from merits.

§ 40. To the next it must be said that beatitude is defined by Boethius as a state made perfect by the gathering together of all goods: and then the term of all goods can come distributively and collectively. § 41. If distributively, then it is true what the objection concludes: because then it responds to any virtue by reason of its good. § 42. But if it comes collectively and formally, it sounds a certain ample and great thing in glory, embracing the state of every good: and that state is high in the rationale of the high, and thus it is properly regarded by hope alone. And this is the cause that the Saints always say that vision succeeds faith, and beatitude succeeds hope: and others say that comprehension succeeds it, because comprehension also expresses the conclusion of the ample and contention. § 43. And others say that eternity succeeds it: because that also, as the Commentator says upon the books of Dionysius On the Celestial Hierarchy , expresses a protension into perpetual life.

§ 44. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 4 — What Hope Is By Definition, And Whether The Definitions Of Hope Are Good

What is hope by definition? and, Are the definitions of hope good?

§ 47. Next we must come to the Letter at the beginning of chapter A, where it says: But it is hope, a virtue by which spiritual and eternal goods are hoped for, etc.

§ 48. And it must be asked, What is hope by definition? Since it is already held in what genus it is, and in what as in a proximate subject.

§ 49. Here two definitions are given by the Master: and it is objected concerning the first thus:

§ 50. 1. Spiritual and eternal goods are hoped for by any meritorious virtue: therefore it seems that it is poorly defined by them.

§ 51. 2. Also, concerning the exposition of the Master which he appends, that is, they are expected with confidence: for confidence is either called the certainty from faith; or that which Cicero says is a part of fortitude, and calls confidence. § 52. If in the first way: this seems incongruous, because then hope would draw something of its essentials from faith: which does not happen, since they are diverse species of virtue. § 53. But if in the second way: then it would be a part of fortitude: and this also seems through the fact that Cicero thus defines confidence saying, Confidence is that by which the mind itself has greatly placed trust in itself in great and honorable matters with certain confidence alongside hope .

§ 54. It is also objected concerning the second definition which the Master posits, saying that hope is the certain expectation of future beatitude coming from God's grace and preceding merits, whether charity by nature precedes hope itself, or the hoped-for thing, that is, eternal beatitude.

§ 55. And it is asked first, By what certainty is hope certain?

§ 56. But it seems [it is the certainty] of faith: because 1. Thus says Augustine in the book City of God: Hope is a virtue, by which someone presumes himself to be going to arrive at that which he believes. Therefore it seems that it receives certainty from faith, which was denied above .

§ 57. 2. Also, it seems not to be certain: because the hoped-for beatitude is often lost, as happened in Judas, who according to the state of present justice hoped for beatitude, which nevertheless he attained with no certainty.

§ 58. 3. If perhaps you say that this certainty of condition, namely of immobile hope, remained in the meritorious life, from which hope proceeds. On the contrary: A condition is of doubt: therefore it is contrary to certainty, as it seems. If therefore hope has a condition, it ought not to be defined according to certainty. Also, a condition belongs to reason which compares: but hope is in the irascible: therefore it seems that it is not its part to append a condition.

§ 59. 4. Also, let us posit someone to be foreknown [to damnation], and yet to be in the state of present justice; he has hope: and yet his expectation will be frustrated: therefore it is uncertain.

§ 60. Also let it be asked, Who has a more certain expectation between two, of whom one is foreknown, and expects by formed hope: the other predestined, and expects by unformed hope? It seems that the predestined: because he most certainly achieves beatitude.

§ 61. ON THE CONTRARY: Formed hope expects from actually existing merits: but unformed hope does not: therefore it seems if merits are the cause of certainty, as was said above, that the hope of the foreknown is more certain than that of the predestined.

§ 62. Also it is asked, What is the grace upon which hope relies?

§ 63. For this does not seem special to it, since 1. Every virtue is a certain grace: therefore it ought not to be defined specially through grace.

§ 64. 2. Also, from this it seems that it cannot be unformed, since it is always with grace: and this is false, as will be clear below. Therefore it is not always with grace.

§ 65. 3. Also, from what merits does hope proceed? For all merits proceed from virtues: but virtues are infused simultaneously: therefore hope precedes every merit: therefore it does not proceed from merits. § 66. If perhaps you say that it is understood concerning the act of hope. On the contrary: The first act of hope, whichever is that which is immediately after the infused virtue, does not proceed from merits, because it itself is among the first merits: therefore it seems that neither concerning the act is it true.

§ 67. 4. If perhaps you say that this is on account of charity, because charity (as the Master says) is the mother of all goods and by nature precedes it: and therefore the merits of charity

precede the act of hope: this is nothing: because the Master understands concerning uncreated charity, and not created: because hope by nature precedes charity, as the Gloss says upon the beginning of Matthew 1:2, upon that: Abraham begot Isaac, but Isaac begot Jacob, that is, faith [begot] hope, hope charity.

§ 68. If perhaps you say that it is necessary to be moved by the acts of other virtues before hope, and then the merits which are the good acts of other virtues, precede: this is a fiction: because Augustine says in the book On the Good of Marriage, that a habit is that by which one can act when he wills. And thus also say all the Philosophers. If therefore someone has the habit of hope, he himself can be moved by hope, when he wills, either before other acts, or after them: and thus what you say is nothing.

§ 69. Furthermore, by certain Philosophers hope is defined otherwise, namely that hope is the suspicion of a future good.

§ 70. Also, the Gloss on Romans 8:24 says that hope is the certain expectation of future glory. And in none of those definitions is it posited that it proceeds from grace and merits.

§ 71. Furthermore, since of one thing there is a single definition, On what basis are so many definitions of hope given?

§ 72. Solution: To this last point I first say that hope is in diverse genera, as was previously held: and therefore by Philosophers it is defined as it is in the genus of passion, and then it is the suspicion of a future good, and therefore the suspicion itself affects and alters the soul. § 73. But according as it is in the genus of virtue, thus it consists in the difficult and the good of a theological virtue, concerning which it was determined above, and thus it is defined by three definitions, of which two are in the Letter, and the third is posited in objecting from Augustine in the book City of God. § 74. Now the first is given through the genus and the object in general, not specified by proper differences, which object is spiritual and eternal goods. § 75. But the second is given through the act and the cause of the act in part, which is certain expectation, etc. § 76. But the third is given through the relation of hope to faith, from which it is generated according to nature: because faith is the foundation, and hope is proximately super-edified.

§ 77. But to the first that is objected against the first definition, it must be said that for any virtue spiritual things are expected, just as the essence of merit, but not as eliciting the act of hope formally: and thus it is understood when it is said, By which spiritual and eternal goods.

§ 78. To the next it must be said that confidence is received neither from faith, nor from fidence (which is a part of fortitude), but rather confidence is called there the security from the efficacy of hope and the cause of security, which is the conscience of merit, and the presumption of divine grace, as we said above. § 79. There are those, however, who say that it is received there from faith according as it generates hope: but this is not pleasing to me, that any virtue should be posited to receive something of its essentials from another: because then it would follow that it would be a part of it, or adjoined to it inseparably, just as a property to a subject.

§ 80. To that which is objected concerning Cicero's definition, it must be said that hope and confidence are taken equivocally there, namely for the presumption of victory from the magnitude of a constant mind: and therefore it does not make to the purpose.

§ 81. To that which is objected against the second definition, it must be said that certainty is proper to hope, by that rationale which has been stated.

§ 82. To that which is objected concerning Augustine, it must be said that he himself is speaking of the certainty of the hoping person rather than of hope, and therefore he says, that it is a virtue by which someone, etc.: for the hoping person has conjoined virtues, and according as in him hope is founded upon faith, it receives something from faith, just as every virtue: and this does not make to its being, but to its well-being. § 83. And thus is understood what Augustine says, that hope is a virtue, by which someone presumes himself to be going to arrive at that which he believes: and thus also charity loves that which it believes, and thus of others.

§ 84. To the next it must be said that there is a certainty of act and of order toward the end, and hope has that more than another virtue, as was previously clear: and there is a certainty of achieving the end according to effect, and no virtue has that, because that is not given except after this life: and hope is not defined by that.

§ 85. To the next it must be said that hope appends no condition: because the order to the end through the act is always certain as much as it is of itself.

§ 86. To the next it must be said that if a comparison is made according to certainty taken uniformly, which is proper to hope: then the foreknown person existing in formed hope, has a more certain hope than the predestined person. For that it is frustrated, is not from the uncertainty of hope: but rather from the flexibility of the will: whereas the other does not have the certainty of the cause of merits in act. § 87. But if a comparison is made of the eternal order to the temporal thing, the predestined person is more certain: but then that certainty will not be proper to hope, for hope orders temporally: and that it is frustrated, is not from its own defect, as was said. But predestination is an eternal order to salvation, which cannot be frustrated.

§ 88. To the next it must be said that, as I think, grace here is called the maximal and affluent liberality of the giver without reproach: and, as I think, grace here does not express a habit in the hoping person, but rather a property, upon which hope relies on the part of the giver of the hoped-for things. § 89. But if anyone wishes to say that it is a habit: then it must be said that hope specially arises from grace, according as it itself is the cause of the hoped-for thing, and the motion, as was said above: but other virtues are referred to grace, as parts to a whole only, and not to the motion of the act.

§ 90. To the next it must be said that this would follow, if hope were always conjoined to grace in the subject: but this is not true, rather sometimes it is supported by grace, which is in the purpose of conversion only, as will be clear below, and then it is unformed.

§ 91. To the next it must be said that hope is taken there for the act of hope, and merits precede this act according to the purpose of the hoping person: because he himself expects

beatitude, and is moved already to hope from the merits which he has in purpose. § 92. And this can be in five ways, namely that merit precedes the act of hope in the cause of merit only, and this is because he already has grace, but not merits, and then he hopes from the merits which are already present through the cause. § 93. In a second way it can be from preceding merits by cause and effect: and then it cannot be understood of every act of hope, but of the truly first as the objection proves. § 94. In a third way it can be, that merit precedes in cause and purpose of meriting: and thus again it will be true of every act of hope. § 95. In a fourth way it can be, that the cause precedes with an alien merit, as is that of Christ, and of the saints: and thus again it will be true of every act of hope. § 96. In a fifth way it can be, that it neither precedes in cause nor in effect, but in purpose only: and thus what he says is true only of the act of unformed hope.

§ 97. To the next it must be said that charity does not precede hope by nature, unless uncreated, or in purpose, or in cause, as was already said, if hope is taken in act: for if the habits are considered as parts of grace, they are simultaneous: but if they are considered according to the order of the spiritual edifice, then by nature hope precedes charity, as the Gloss says upon the beginning of Matthew.

§ 98. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 5 — Whether Hope Can Be Unformed Like Faith

Can hope be unformed like faith?

§ 101. Next it is asked concerning this which he says, there, A, at the end: For without merits to hope for something cannot be called hope, but presumption.

§ 102. For from this it seems that hope is never unformed: which certain ones also strive to prove in other ways thus:

§ 103. 1. That faith can be unformed, it has this from the fact that something of it is in cognition, which remains, taking away that which is of affection: therefore where that cause is not present, there is no unformedness: but hope is entirely in the affect, and has nothing in the cognitive part: therefore either the whole remains, or the whole is taken away: therefore it cannot be unformed, as it seems.

§ 104. 2. Also, hope cannot tend without love, and if it does not tend, it does not remain: therefore it seems that without charity nothing of hope remains.

§ 105. 3. Also, if it were to remain, then afterward the same thing would become formed, when grace would arrive: how therefore would that which arrives relate itself to that which remains? For it cannot be said that it is as a material, as was said concerning faith: because hope is not of a twofold essence, namely affective and intellective, as faith is.

§ 106. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Faith generates hope: therefore unformed faith will generate unformed hope, and formed faith formed hope.

§ 107. 2. Also, faith relates to fear in this way, that unformed [faith] generates unformed fear, which is servile: but formed [faith generates] formed fear, which is initial or chaste: therefore it will do similarly according to order into the good concerning hope.

§ 108. 3. Also, if hope were always formed, then the effect would be more noble than the cause: because according to nature faith is the cause of hope, and faith can be unformed and formed, as was held above.

§ 109. 4. Also, hope is in part, just as faith is: therefore it seems that the same imperfection happens to it which [happens] also to that: but this is unformedness: therefore it also can be unformed.

§ 110. 5. Also, Augustine holds that charity alone divides between the sons of the kingdom and the sons of perdition: therefore hope just as faith will not divide: therefore it will be common to the good and the bad: but it cannot be present in the bad unless unformed: therefore it can be unformed.

§ 111. But if this is granted, then it is asked, What is the difference between hope which does not have merits and is unformed, and presumption which also does not have merits and expects beatitude?

§ 112. Solution: It must be said that hope can be unformed just as faith can. And to the last point I respond first, that unformed hope is not without merits, but it does not have them except in purpose: and that was the fifth mode by which merits precede the act of hope, as we said previously: but the presumption which is called the hope of fools, is from the grace of God's liberality without all merits: for the presumptuous person expects beatitude even while continuing in sins, on the grounds that he reputes God's mercy to give beatitude without conversion, and not to attend to sins. And through this the difference is clear.

§ 113. To the first it must be said that in that argument there is a supposition of the false: because even unformed faith has something of affection, as we showed above: and therefore it is not the cause which it posits as the cause.

§ 114. To the next it must be said that every theological virtue has it of itself to tend, and not from love, except in a certain way: and that unformed hope does not tend, this is from the contrariety which it has in the subject, and not of itself.

§ 115. To the next it must be said that I readily concede this, just as above concerning faith, that with the arrival of grace that which was unformed is formed, and it is imperfect with respect to it and material, just as also in faith, just as a material disposition is with respect to the species: yet it does not differ thus, as a disposition from a species, but as the imperfect from the perfect in the same genus of quality, and as the imperfect toward the act of hoping which unformed hope well elicits, but as the imperfect toward tending.

§ 116. But to this which could be objected, that two qualities of the same species are not in the same thing according to the same respect: because the simple is not united to the simple, and the like, it was answered above in the question concerning faith.

Articulus 6 — Whether Hope Is Of Invisible Things, And Whether Faith And Hope Are Distinct From Each Other

Is hope of invisible things? and, Are faith and hope distinct from each other?

§ 119. Next it is asked concerning this which he says: And just as faith, so also hope is of invisible things, etc.

§ 120. 1. Since virtues of which the object is one, are one virtue: therefore if faith and hope have one object, then they are one virtue.

§ 121. 2. Also, hope does not seem to be only of invisible things, but also of these things which are possessed here, as the hope of grace and of pardon: for these species are found posited by the Saints.

§ 122. Solution: Hope is of invisible things, not insofar as they are invisible, but insofar as they are future absences: and therefore in the object faith and hope do not agree except materially: and therefore it is not necessary that they be one virtue.

§ 123. To the next it must be said that every definition is given from the end, and the denomination is made from the end in the same way: and therefore hope properly is of glory: and if it is of pardon and of grace, this is according to the order to glory.

Articulus 7 — Whether Hope Is Of A Future And One's Own Good

Is hope of a future and proper good?

§ 126. Next it is asked concerning this which he says, there, B, §2, at the end: But hope is not except of good things, nor except of future things, and pertaining to God, etc.

§ 127. 1. Against this seems to be what the Poet says: If I was able to hope for [foresee] such a great grief [273] From this it seems that hope is also of evil things.

§ 128. 2. Also, it seems that it is of a common good. Luke 24:21: We were hoping that he was going to redeem Israel.

§ 129. 3. Also, Augustine: Concerning no one is it to be despaired, while he is on the way. Therefore hope is of the salvation of all.

§ 130. 4. Also, faith commonly relates itself to oneself and to others, and similarly charity: therefore it seems that hope does too.

§ 131. Solution: It must be said that if hope is taken properly, then it is not of anything, unless in which these three concur, which the Master posits, namely a good, future, and proper thing. § 132. But if it is taken improperly in place of its genus which is the suspicion of any future thing whatever, then it could be of an evil: and thus the Poet takes it. And through this the solution to the first is clear.

§ 133. But if it is taken broadly, then it will also be of a common good. And through this the solution to the second and third is clear.

To the last it must be said that it is not similar concerning faith, charity, and hope. Because hope regards merits, and those are proper to an individual. But charity and faith are not founded on anything proper: and therefore they can be with respect to what is common. However, it must be known that the act by which I believe a man to be good is not an act of faith, for faith is only simply and universally directed upon the First Truth; but it can be an act of opinion.

Articulus 8 — Whether Christ, The Angels, And The Blessed Souls Have Hope

Whether Christ, the Angels, and the blessed souls have hope?

Then it is asked concerning what he says in the second part, there: After this it remains to investigate, etc.

For there the Master says that neither Christ, nor the Angels, nor the blessed souls have or had hope. And concerning these three it is objected in order.

For it seems that Christ had hope: because

§ 1. He had the fullness of graces: but faith and hope are parts of grace: therefore he had them.

§ 2. Also, In thee, O Lord, have I hoped.[274] Also, Because he hoped in me, I will deliver him.[275] And in infinitely many other places.

§ 3. Also, a certain part of beatitude was lacking to him, namely the glory of the body: therefore it seems that he could hope for that.

§ 4. Also, just as he was a comprehensor, so he was a wayfarer: therefore just as what belonged to a comprehensor was not lacking to him, so what belonged to a wayfarer ought not to have been lacking to him: but hope belongs to a wayfarer: therefore he had hope.

SED CONTRA: Christ had no imperfection according to the soul except passibility alone: but faith and hope bespeak imperfection: because faith is knowledge in an enigma, and hope is the expectation of that which is not comprehended. Since therefore Christ saw openly and comprehended perfectly, as being united to the Deity, he never had faith or hope.

Further it is asked, Whether the angels had or have hope?

It seems that they do: because § 1. They still await a reward which accrues after the day of judgment from the ministry of guardianship, by which they serve us: therefore since hope is the certain expectation of a reward, it seems that they have hope.

§ 2. Also, On whom the Angels desire to look.[276] But desire is only for what is not had in the present: therefore it seems that there could be hope in them for that absent thing.

SED CONTRA: They have in the Word and see all things pertaining to their beatitude: therefore they hope for nothing in the future which they do not see presently. But vision is not hope, as the Apostle says.[277] Therefore they do not have it.

273. Virgil, Aeneid, IV, 419.

Also, they do not have faith which precedes hope: therefore neither do they have hope.

Further it is asked, Whether the blessed souls presently existing in heaven have hope?

And it seems so: because § 1. In the Apocalypse it is said: It was said to them that they should wait yet a little time. Therefore it seems that they expect the glory of their bodies: and to expect future beatitude belongs to hope: therefore they have hope, as it seems.

§ 2. Also, even certain ancients said that by the desire for their bodies they are drawn back a little from the intensity of contemplation: therefore it seems that they have hope.

SED CONTRA: Hope that is deferred afflicts the soul: but they cannot be afflicted any further: therefore they cannot have hope.

Solution. It must be said that Christ, nor the Angels, nor the blessed souls properly speaking have hope: and this for two reasons: of which one is that hope properly is only of substantial beatitude, and this is the beatitude of the soul, not of the body: because the glory of the body is, as I opine, a certain overflowing from the soul into the conjoined body. The other reason is: because hope founds the hoped-for thing in a mirror and in an enigma: and therefore because even that which they expect, they see in the light of the Word, they are not said to have hope of it: and this reason the Master seems to touch upon in the Letter.

Therefore according to this it must be said to the first that Christ did not have hope: and hope is taken improperly in those authorities for the expectation of an accidental reward or the glory of the body, of which there is no hope except subsequently: or they speak of Christ by the grace of his members.

And through this the solution to the two following is also clear.

To the last it must be said that he was a wayfarer by reason of passibility: and therefore to have faith and hope does not pertain to a wayfarer, but rather to the imperfection of a wayfarer: because one could be a wayfarer and merit without this, just as some say concerning the Angels before confirmation. Hence also whatever of grace was in hope and faith, he had: but not whatever was in them of imperfection: for the vision of grace is in faith, and the holding or comprehension is in hope. For he who hopes (as the Master says in the first book of the Sentences, distinction 1) to some extent holds the thing, although not perfectly.

To that which is further asked concerning the Angels, it must be said that neither did they have hope, nor do they have it, for the same reasons: for that which they expect is of the accidental reward.

To the other it must be said that there is a desire for a thing not had, and this the Angels do not have: and there is a desire for a thing had, to remove satiety, and it is of this that the saying of Peter is understood.

To that which is again further asked, Whether the holy souls have hope? It must be said that they do not, for the same reasons. Nor do I think this to be true, that they are drawn back

274. Ps. 30:2 (Vulgate).

from contemplation by the desire for bodies: because a time is determined for them, and they await it with joy in a single Robe, because they have security concerning the rest.

Articulus 9 — Whether The Fathers In Limbo, And The Souls In Purgatory, And The Demons Have The Virtue Of Hope

Whether the Fathers in limbo, and the souls in purgatory, and the demons have the virtue of hope?

Then it is asked concerning what he says, there, C, towards the end: But concerning the ancient Fathers who were in hell until the passion, etc.

For it seems that they did not have hope: because

§ 1. Hope measures itself to the way: but they

were already secure: therefore they were not on the way.

§ 2. Also, hope is given for meriting: but they were not in a state of meriting: therefore they did not have hope.

SED CONTRA: Bede says, and it is posited in the fourth book of the Sentences, distinction 1, that the Fathers in limbo awaited the entrance of the heavenly door with happy hope. Therefore they had hope.

Besides, this is said here in the Letter.

Further it is asked, Whether the souls in purgatory have hope?

And it seems so: because they do not yet have open vision through species: therefore an enigmatic one: but hope accompanies this, as the Master says: therefore they have hope.

SED CONTRA: According to this the damned would also have hope: because they have an enigmatic knowledge of God: if therefore hope accompanies such knowledge, the damned have hope, as it seems: which is false, since they are utterly damned and know themselves to be damned.

Further it is asked concerning the demons, whether they have hope?

It seems so: because of Behemoth it is said: Behold his hope shall fail him.

SED CONTRA: He knows his sin to be irremediable: therefore he has despair: therefore he does not have hope of salvation.

Solution. It must be said to the first, that the Fathers had hope, just as the Master well proves in the Letter.

To the first objection it must be said that in a certain way they were on the way: for a mansion is not distinguished, as Augustine says, except into perpetually remaining places, namely in heaven, or in the hell of the damned: and therefore as to security some say they

275. Ps. 90:14 (Vulgate).

were at the term, and as to the state of meriting: but as to the transition of ulterior glory they were still on the way, not at the term.

To the other it must be said that this belongs to hope by reason of the state, that one merits or does not merit: and therefore this is not per se of hope, that it is only in a state of meriting: because it can be apart from that.

To the other that is further asked, I also well concede that those who are in purgatory have hope and faith: because they expect salvation seen in an enigmatic cognition.

To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that it is not similar: because they neither have faith by which they tend into truth, or which is a virtue, but such as the demons have, of which it was spoken above: and even if they had faith, they do not have the expectation of salvation, and therefore they do not have hope.

And through this the solution is clear to that which is further asked concerning the demons: for we concede that they have no hope.

And to that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that hope there is taken most improperly for the expectation of the delay of judgment, in which they will be punished more bitterly than now: for that [hope] will be frustrated, because they will be judged more quickly than they would wish.

And through this the solution of those things which are asked concerning hope is clear.

DISTINCTIO XXVII

Divisio Textus

But since Christ did not have faith and hope, etc.

Here lastly the Master posits the treatise on love: not that it is more unworthy than the others, but because it is born in its act from the acts of the others: and therefore those are prior by generation.

And this treatise is divided into two parts: in the first of which he treats of the love of man, by which he loves God and neighbor. In the second, of the love of God, by which He loves us: and this begins in distinction 32, there, A, To the premises it must be added concerning the love of God, by which he himself loves, etc.

The first is still subdivided into two: in the first of which he treats of love according to its substantials. In the second he treats of love in comparison to the lover, where he asks, Whether charity once had can be lost? And this begins in distinction 31, there, A, That also is not to be passed over, that some assert, etc.

The first among these is further subdivided into two: in the first of which he treats of love by comparison to the genus which is virtue, and by comparison to the act substantial to it, and

by comparison to the mode which is the form of the act. In the second, he treats of it by comparison to the object which is lovable; and this begins in the following distinction

28, there, A, Here it can be asked, Whether by that mandate of love, etc.

In this distinction which contains the first part, he treats of love in four ways. For first he treats of it according to the comparison to our Head, how it was in Christ: and this in the first chapter. Secondly, he asks about it, What it is, and whether it is one or many? and this in the second chapter, there, B, Charity is the love by which is loved, etc. Thirdly, he asks concerning the mode of the act of love, as much in loving the neighbor as in loving God, there, D, Consequently let us turn our attention to the mode of both loves. Fourthly and lastly, he determines concerning the precept which regards the act of this virtue, there, F, But that precept is not completely fulfilled by man, etc.

From the division and disputation the sentence of this reading will be clear.

There are three preambular questions here: of which the first is, Whether love is a virtue? Second, If it is a virtue, whether it is a general or special virtue? Third, If it is a special virtue, whether it is the general form of every virtue? and, Whether it can be made unformed?

Articulus 1 — Whether Love Or Charity Is A Virtue

Whether love or charity is a virtue?

To the first question it is objected thus: § 1. That for which nature suffices in itself, does not need to have an elevating virtue for this: but nature by itself suffices for loving the highest good for its own sake and above all things: therefore it does not need to have an elevating virtue for this. The first is proved from this, that grace is not less ingenious than nature: but nature does not abound in superfluities, as the Philosopher says: therefore neither does grace. The second is proved by the opinion of many, who say that nature in the first Angel and the first man sufficed for this.

§ 2. Also, by Tully in the book On Friendship, who says that friends are to be loved for themselves: and similarly Aristotle in VIII of the Topics: Friends are to be preferred to all things: therefore much more God.

§ 3. Also, the powers of the soul in man are proportionate: therefore for what reason suffices in knowing, reason suffices in loving: but reason in the first state sufficed for this, that it should know God to be supremely good, and to be loved for himself, and above all things: and it also suffices for this now, as is proved from the sayings of many Philosophers: therefore affection suffices in loving God for himself, and above all things: therefore it is not necessary to give a special virtue for this.

§ 4. Also, every virtue is given on account of the difficult and good: therefore none is given on account of the most sweet and easiest: and Augustine says in the book of Confessions, that

277. Cf. Rom. 8:24.

nothing is sweeter than to love and be loved: therefore no virtue ought to have been given for this, as it seems.

SED CONTRA: § 1. To the soul of man in the state of man in which we are, those things which are to the end are closer than the end itself: therefore their conjunction with the soul is easier, because there is greater convenience among closer things: but it needs virtues ordering it in those things which are to the end: therefore much more in those ordering it to the end itself: but the end is the good according as it is good: therefore it needs some virtue ordering it to that: but it is established that nothing regards the good as good, except charity: therefore charity is a virtue ordering to the good which is the end.

§ 2. Also, that which has contrariety to vice, is necessarily a virtue: but charity has contrariety to vice: therefore it is necessarily a virtue. The first is proved: because nothing is opposed to virtue except vice. The second is proved through this, that charity and vice mutually expel each other from the same susceptible subject.

§ 3. Also, that whose act is meritorious of eternal life, is a virtue: but the act of charity is especially meritorious of eternal life: therefore charity is a virtue.

Solution. It must be said that charity is a virtue, just as all the Saints concordantly testify, whose authorities to induce would be a waste of time.

To the first therefore it must be said, that nature never suffices, nor sufficed for the act of charity: but for the act of natural love to man, nature sufficed more potently before sin, and less potently after sin. But what that love is, the Philosopher well determines in I of the Ethics, where he proves that just as to each thing there is a proper work and act, so also to man insofar as he is man: and that this work is not sought in him according to the vegetative and sensitive, but according to the rational: but this is to choose and love above all things that which is good through itself and not in relation to another: and this he indeed proves to be happiness. And it is true, that it is uncreated happiness, which is the highest good sought for its own sake alone, and not for the sake of any other. If however it should be asked of the Philosophers, Whether this is sought because it is good, or because it is a good to him? it would be found that this would be sought, because it is a good to man. For no other good is sought by the Philosophers themselves, except the good to man according to civil life. But charity does not thus seek the good, but rather what is absolutely good, and the cause of the good: nor does it lean upon it on account of reason, because reason proves this, which is the opposite, but because that good effects such a love: whence when it is said, To love God for himself, and above all things, is an act of charity: the term for himself does not state one cause there only, but three, namely that which is as object, and that which is as efficient, and that which is as end: and in the first and last it could convene to the Angel and man in the first state according to the opinion of some, but not as to the middle: because reason effects this in them.

Through this the solution to the second is clear.

276. 1 Pet. 1:12.

To the other it must be said, that that reason is founded upon a falsehood: because although the powers are proportionate in order, they are not however equal in power: for practically they can do less, than cognitively: for we know many things, which we cannot operate: and we know many things, concerning which as we know them, we cannot be affected, unless we are elevated above our power by the gift of God given to us. And so it is in the love which is charity. For I cannot be affected through affection unto God for Himself and above all things liberally, with no one compelling at all, as long as I am invited on account of reason convincing the affection, so that it is something to be done: and therefore our natural love is not it: and even if this could be done, as some say, yet it is difficult even to believe this, that nature loves anything above itself, except insofar as it is good to itself, among some, who say that nature is curved in on itself, and by such love does not love anything above itself: and therefore they distinguish a twofold love, namely of friendship and of concupiscence, and they say that by the love of friendship something is loved for itself, but not above itself: but by the love of concupiscence which is natural, nothing [is loved for itself], but all things are loved as good to oneself. Nevertheless, because it is read in the books of the Philosophers that the love of the honest is so great, that even the brave commit themselves to dangers, who nevertheless do not have charity, it is difficult to say that no one loves anything above himself, except from charity: and therefore then we must return to the prior solution.

To the other it must be said, that the difficult in theological virtues does not consist in the act: because (as we said above) not in one way

is the difficult and the good taken in a theological, and moral, and intellectual virtue: but in the theological the good is taken which is the end, and the difficult which is to be raised above that which nature can do, and to deny nature: but in the moral the difficult is taken, which is to touch the mean or approach it: but in the intellectual the difficult which is about the mean, which is called the right reason of operable things: and the good in both according to the reason of the honest regarding happiness. But this which Augustine says is understood of the sweetness of the act to the object, and not of the denial of nature.

Articulus 2 — Whether Charity Is A General Virtue Or A Special One

Whether charity is a general or special virtue?

Secondly it is asked, Whether it is a general virtue?

And it seems that it is. § 1. For whatever is universally the effective habit of salvation, it is a general virtue: but charity is universally the effective habit of salvation: therefore it is a general virtue. The first is proved from this, that universal salvation is not had except by the expulsion of all vices: and these are not expelled except through contrary habits to them. The second is supposed by Blessed Augustine, who says that charity alone is only of the pious: but the other virtues are common to the good and the bad.

§ 2. Also, whatever has in itself the acts of all other virtues, it is universal to all virtues: charity thus holds itself to the acts of the other virtues: therefore it is universal to all virtues. The first is evident through this that virtues are distinguished and defined through acts:

therefore from a special act there is a special virtue, and from all a universal one. The second is written, 1 Cor 13:4, where the Apostle says: Charity is patient, is kind, etc.: and he enumerates there fifteen works of diverse virtues with charity.

§ 3. Also, Augustine in the book On the Morals of the Catholic Church, defines every virtue by love, as faith is love believing God, fortitude tolerating all things on account of the beloved: therefore charity is universal to all: therefore it is a universal virtue.

Also, Jerome (so that I may briefly embrace every definition of virtue) says: Virtue is charity, by which that is loved which is to be loved: therefore as before.

Also, Bernard in the book On Loving God, and Augustine in the book On the City of God: Virtue is the order of love. And in the same place: Virtue is nothing else than ordered love. Therefore it seems that charity is every virtue.

Also, it seems that charity is in the fatherland, and that it will remain from all virtues in the reward: for it is the reward of virtues: because it is defined perhaps by Augustine, that to enjoy is to inhere to any thing by love for its own sake: therefore it seems that charity is general in merit, and general in reward: and is never a special virtue.

§ 4. Also, below the Master says, that every precept is referred to the mandate of love: but there is nothing in a precept except the work of some virtue: therefore every work of virtue is reduced to the precept of love: but just as work holds itself to work, so habit to habit: therefore every habit of virtue is reduced to the habit of love: therefore charity is a general habit to every virtue, as it seems.

§ 5. Also, in natural virtues moving those things which are in matter, the reduction is to the four primary ones, and the reduction of these further to one mover in the whole of generation, which is the sun: therefore it seems that in morals it ought to be similarly. Since therefore those things which are in those ordered to the end, are reduced into the four cardinal ones, it seems that those are further reduced into one, as the sun, which is charity: because charity is the mover in all merit, and according to its quantity the whole quantity of merit is attended to.

SED CONTRA: § 1. A special act divided from the acts of other virtues, exacts a special habit: to love God for himself and above all things, is a special act separated according to reason from the acts of all other virtues: therefore it has a special habit. The first is proved through this that acts are prior to powers and habits at least spiritually, and as to us. The second is clear through this that if to love God is defined, the act of any of the other virtues is not taken in its definition.

§ 2. Also, the Apostle, 1 Cor 13:13, enumerates it singularly with other special virtues, when he says: But now remain faith, hope, charity, these three: but the greatest of these is charity.

§ 3. Also, from the special reason of the object a special virtue is taken: but the highest good is a special reason of the object, just as the highest truth, and the highest glory: therefore it has a special virtue corresponding to itself just as those do.

§ 4. Also, it is accepted by Blessed Gregory in the beginning upon Job, where he says that it is signified by one daughter specially, and not by all the sons and daughters of Job.

Solution. It must be said that charity is a special virtue, by which God is loved for Himself, and the neighbor for God and in God.

To the first therefore it must be said, that charity does not universally effect salvation, as formally opposed to all vices, but rather as conjoined to all the others, without which it never is, because they are infused with it: and therefore this is attributed to charity: and how this is, will be declared below by the Master, where he treats of the connection of virtues: because to charity in one way all the others are connected, and therefore it is called the mother of all others: and through this also the solution to all the probations of the premises of that reason is clear: because they prove as if charity had a formal opposition to all vices: and this is not true.

To the other it must be said, that charity does not have in itself the acts of the others as a habit, out of which or out of whose parts those acts are elicited: but it has them as a mover not proximate and conjoined to the mover, but rather as the mover of the mover to the act: for the love of God moves all virtues to the act. For if it is asked, Why is the patient man patient? he will answer on account of the love of God, wishing to assign the cause moving his patience to work. And if it is asked, Why does the hoping man hope? he will answer again on account of the love of God, wishing to assign the same cause. And therefore charity is well the universal mover of virtues to the act, but it is not a universal virtue: for a universal mover in one way also has a proper motion by which it is distinguished from others, and it has in another way a motion which it influences to other movers for moving, on account of which influence it is called a universal motion, as is clear in the movers of the spheres, where the first mover moves with a divine motion, and influences into all others as the desired to the desiring, motion to each one, by which also anyone moves with its proper motion, in that any inferior seeks to be assimilated to it in causing the universe to be through its proper motion as much as it can. And so it is of charity with respect to the virtues: and therefore the works of the other virtues are attributed to it: but this will be better expedited in the following article.

To the other it must be said, that the opinion of certain Masters convenes in this, that the love which is posited in the definition of other virtues, is not the love which is charity, but a certain general love, by which every power of the soul and virtue loves to be conjoined to its proper object. If however it pleases one to say, that the love is charity, as seems to be the intention of Augustine: then

it must be said that charity falls in their definition, not according to the substance of the habit, but according to the order and end of the habit to the act, which is the highest good. And so Augustine seems to will, who in every definition posits the act of virtue and the loved thing which is the end: and this is not inconvenient: because charity is the universal mover, and its object is the ultimate end of the other virtues: however it is a special virtue in relation to its proper act. But whence it happens to it that it can be a universal mover, and a certain form, and end, and yet be a special virtue, will be declared in the following article of the question.

Through this same thing the solution to the following sayings of Jerome, Bernard, and Augustine is clear.

To the other it must be said, that that objection would proceed, if the works of the precepts were reduced to the precept of love, as to a genus: but it is not so: but they are reduced as to one singular mover, which influences its virtue to others: and as to the ultimate, and not to the proximate end. And it does not follow, except that the habit is one, but universally moving and conjoining all virtues to the ultimate end.

To the last it must be said, that this is well similar. And I well concede that the other virtues are reduced to love as particular movers to the heat of the sun: because just as the heat of the sun moves in all natural virtues, so the heat of charity in all meritorious works of whatever virtues are the proper works: but it is not necessary that on account of this it should be a general virtue, just as the sun is not a genus to all particular movers in nature.

Articulus 3 — Whether Charity Is The Form Of Every Virtue, And Whether It Itself Can Become Unformed

Whether charity is the form of every virtue? and, Whether it can be made unformed?

Thirdly it is asked, Whether it is the form of every virtue, and whether it can be made unformed?

And it seems that it is a form: and this the Saints say commonly, and that it is the mother, and that it is the root, and that it is the end.

SED CONTRA: § 1. Form is said in two ways, namely exemplary, and resting in matter. If therefore charity is a form, it will be a form in one of these ways, or both. But it is established, that it is not a form as exemplary: because according to its species others are not made, just as the exemplated is made according to the species of the exemplary: therefore if it is a form, it will be an intrinsic form giving being to the virtue according to species: and this again cannot be, because just as that which is informed by humanity is a man, so that which is informed by charity is charity: therefore not faith, or hope, or other virtues: therefore it seems that charity is not a form.

§ 2. Also, form gives being and reason: but of those diverse in species there is not one being and reason: therefore of those diverse in species there is not one form: but virtues differ in the species of virtues: therefore of them there is not one form: since therefore charity is one, as has been had, it itself is not a form.

If by chance you say, that in virtue there are two things, namely that which is to the end, and that which tends into it. And that which is to the end, this gives it species, because virtues are distinguished through proximate ends, although they are not distinguished through the ultimate end; but that it tends into the ultimate end, this it has from the form which is charity in itself-

§ 1. On the contrary: The habit of virtue differs from the habit of science in this, that virtue is operative of the best things; but science is caused by a thing, and does not tend into it, but rather from it into the soul. But no virtue can be operative of the best things except by tending to and conjoining itself to its own best. Therefore, any virtue whatsoever of itself tends to its best. Therefore, it does not receive this from the informing of the virtue of charity.

§ 2. Furthermore, we see certain political virtues reach their best without charity: as is evident for example in the virtuous Philosophers, who attained the best of any virtue, and even happiness, without charity. Therefore, the virtue itself does not receive this from charity.

§ 3. Because of this, some say that in the act of any virtue there are two things, and also in the virtue itself, namely the substance of the act according to the species of the virtue, and that which makes it worthy of eternal life. And it is not informed by charity as to the first, but as to the second. They say this is present in all of them in one way, and they prove this: because the quantity of merit is evaluated according to the quantity of charity, which would not be the case unless it itself, by itself, produced merit in all the others. Moreover, that merit is from charity, the Doctors commonly say, and this is taken from the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 13:1: If I speak with the tongues of men, and of Angels, and have not charity, I am become as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal, etc.

§ 4. ON THE CONTRARY: Grace making pleasing [sanctifying grace] is that which makes the one having it pleasing, and renders his work pleasing. But to make pleasing is to make worthy of eternal life. Therefore, it is this which makes the works of the virtues, and the virtues themselves, pleasing. Therefore, it is necessary either that charity of itself does not do this, or that charity is the same thing as grace making pleasing.

§ 5. Certain ones further concede this conclusion, saying that grace making pleasing and charity are the same thing, and they do not differ except by relation: because it is called grace according as it is referred to the soul, but charity when it is referred to a power, which is the concupiscible or the will, as they say.

§ 6. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. The perfective of a whole, according as it is a whole, if it is referred to the parts, is referred by priority to the more principal parts. Grace is the perfection of the whole, as they say. Therefore, if it has a relation to the parts, it is referred by priority to the more principal part. But the intellect is more principal than the concupiscible power. Therefore, the perfection of the intellect will more have the nature of grace than the perfection of the concupiscible power. But faith is the perfection of the intellect, as was held earlier. Therefore, faith ought more to be grace than charity, which is the perfection of the concupiscible power.

§ 7. 2. Item, Does that relation of grace to a power make it to be a principal virtue co-divided with another that is received under grace, or does something else? If you say that it does: then charity does not differ from the whole which is grace, except accidentally. Therefore, it is not a principal part of it. Therefore, it ought not to be co-divided with the other parts, which are faith and hope. But if something else makes it a special virtue, then the solution relies upon a falsehood, namely that it does not differ from grace except by relation to another.

§ 8. 3. Item, Since form gives being, it gives either its own nature (ratio) or that of another. If you say that it gives its own: then every virtue informed by charity will have the being and nature of charity, which is absurd. But if it gives another: this is even more absurd, because thus it gives what it does not have.

§ 9. 4. Item, Whatever is found generally in one way in many things differing in species cannot be in any one of those things which, like species, divide the whole. That its meritorious act is pleasing is found in one way in all the parts of grace, which are the infused virtues in grace itself. Therefore, it is not from some special virtue which is co-divided with the others. Therefore, this is not from it as informing, as it seems.

§ 10. 5. Item, As perfected things are related, so are perfections related. Now, there are three

motive powers of the soul which are perfected by all the virtues, namely reason, the concupiscible, and the irascible. Therefore, as they are related to one another, so are their perfections related. But among them, reason orders and forms the others; and if the opposite happens, a perverse act goes forth in morals. Therefore, the habit of reason will similarly order the habits of the others, rather than be ordered by them. Therefore, faith rather informs charity, than is informed by it.

§ 2. 6. Item, So it is in the habits of the cardinal virtues, that those which are in reason order and in a certain manner form the others. Therefore, it will be similar in the habits of the theological virtues, as it seems.

§ 3. To this, again, some wished to say that the concupiscible is a power diffused in all the other powers, and moving them; and therefore its habit is also called a form diffused in all the other powers, and moving them. ON THE CONTRARY: This cannot be said except by reason of the appetite for its own end, which every power of the soul appetites. But if by reason of this the concupiscible is said to be diffused in the others, since every power flees the contrary of its end, by the same reason the irascible will also be diffused in all the others. Therefore, by similarity, its habit too. Therefore, hope will also be the form of the other virtues, which is absurd.

§ 4. Furthermore, appetite has parts: for the motive reason has something of appetite, and similarly the will, and similarly the concupiscible, and in the same way the irascible. Therefore, not only the concupiscible will be said to be diffused in all the others on account of appetite.

§ 5. From all these things it seems necessarily left that charity is not the form of the virtues in any mode, and that merit is not evaluated according to it.

§ 6. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Ambrose: Charity is the mother of all virtues, which informs all of them, and without which there is no true virtue.

§ 7. 2. Item, Above the Master [Lombard] said that by the approach of charity, unformed faith is formed, and becomes a virtue. Therefore, charity is a form.

§ 8. FURTHERMORE it is asked: Why cannot charity, like another virtue, become unformed (informis)?

§ 9. For it seems that it can. 1. For in a man not having charity, there is a love by which he loves God; yet he does not tend into Him through a work, just as it is in him who believes the

First Truth without tending into it. Therefore, just as faith is unformed in him who does not tend, so charity can be unformed.

§ 10. 2. Item, The others which are co-divided can be unformed and formed, like faith and hope. Therefore, itself too.

§ 11. 3. Item, Just as on the part of the intellect or reason, and on the part of the irascible, there is left to a man falling into sin something unformed, by which he might return more easily, so much more ought something to be left on the part of the concupiscible, since that one is more in need, inasmuch as it is corrupted and infected.

§ 12. ON THE CONTRARY: Form can never be unformed (informis). But charity is a form. Therefore, it cannot be unformed.

§ 13. Solution: It seems to me, without prejudice to the many who proceed by another way here, that it must be said that charity is not the form of virtue, neither according to the species of the virtue, nor even according to the being of grace making pleasing, which is found in the individual virtues that exist with grace making pleasing. But charity informs in the nature of a threefold cause which respects the caused thing as a form: namely, as an efficient cause, whose species according to something remains in the caused thing; and as a certain form; and as a final cause, which is form in optimal being. To see how this is, one must see what things are in the act of a virtue, so that from the acts we may also understand concerning the virtue itself. Now, in the act of a virtue there is the species of the act, by which it is said to be the act of this or that virtue. Similarly, in the act of that virtue is that which makes one worthy of eternal life,

and this agrees with all the acts of formed virtues. Also in the act is the reason by which it is from the agent, namely that it is similar to the disposition of the agent, in this that it is toward the ultimate end which the agent intends, and that is the first goodness which is intended. A fourth thing that is in the act is its liberality, that it is not out of the motive of utility, or private delight, but out of the liberality of the love of the highest good. Similarly, on the part of the end, I see three things, namely the matter into which the act is terminated; and the reason why rather upon this matter than upon another; and the ultimate end, which is intended by the operator. And so that this may become more manifest, let us give an example in natural and civil things.

§ 2. In natural things, we see a form-giving power in a seed of wheat, in whose act we find the species of the power, which it has from the fact that it is the power of a grain of wheat, and not of barley or another. And we find in it the act of fire, separating by digestion the pure from the impure in the humid. And we find in it a celestial power through motion to a determinate being in species and figure. And we also find an expedition toward the act, according as it is more or less impeded. And we find on the part of its end the matter in which it impresses the species it intends rather than in another, and the impressed species, and the ultimate intention, so that the common nature may be saved in such a succession. And we say that these things are from diverse sources: since the species of the power is from the form giving special being to the power, and the work of digestion is from the act of the heat of fire, and the operation toward being is from the heat of heaven, and its expedition is from the place and

heat of the sun, with the intrinsic powers which dispose the subject assisting. But on the part of the end, that such matter is sought is from the nature of the form which seeks a due matter; and the end of generation is from the agent; and the end of intention is from that which universally makes succession in generation, not in one thing, but in many.

§ 3. Item, we see also in civil things, in which one mechanical art is under another: just as the equestrian art moves the art of bridle-making to this, that a bridle competent for a horse be made. And therefore there is one form of the bridle which is from the art of bridle-making, and another art teaches how to apply that form to the horse. Similarly, charity (as it seems to me) gives proper being in the species of virtue to no virtue, nor does it give the being of grace: because, in my judgment, charity is not grace, but a part of it, just like another virtue. But it gives it the species of an efficient cause, moving generally, namely so that it may be done out of love and liberally; and it gives it the form of order, that is, ordering it not to a proximate end, but to the ultimate end, which is not intended by one act, but by all, and that is God, so that it may be done for the sake of the highest good which God is; and thirdly, it gives it conjunction with Him. For it is one thing to order to the ultimate end, and another to touch it. For it would not touch it unless there were something of love in any given virtue; because for any special virtue, if it be without love, it is sufficient to touch its own proper end. Just as also for the art of bridle-making, if it were without the equestrian art forming it, it would be sufficient to attain the form of the bridle, and it would not intend further how it would be useful for the military or equestrian art.

§ 4. To the first, therefore, it must be said that form is called here in some way intrinsic. It is extrinsic by the fact that it is universally moving: but because universally moving in merit it does not move except by influencing its species into the others, therefore a certain love is made intrinsic to any virtue whatsoever. But by that it does not lose its own species, because it is according to well-being, and not according to being absolutely. But this well-being is in the attainment of the ultimate end, which belongs to charity.

§ 5. But that charity is not a form giving being seems to be something that must be conceded.

§ 6. Similarly, it also seems to be conceded that it does not give gratuitous being, but nevertheless it gives quantity: and this is because gratuitous being is from grace; but quantity is according to something that is there of our own, because otherwise there would not be greater merit in one than in another. But that which most places there something of our own, and most liber-

ally, is charity, which makes us wholly expend ourselves, and freely; and therefore according to the quantity of that is evaluated the quantity of merit.

§ 2. But if it is objected that merit according to being and according to quantity ought to be from the same thing, it must be said that this is false. Because this is true in nothing: for never is being, and quantity in that being, from the same thing, neither in nature, nor in grace.

§ 3. As to that which is objected against the response, that charity makes all tend to their end, it must be said that there is a twofold end, namely the nature of each virtue in species, and into that it can tend without charity, just as faith into the true, and hope into the high, or the glorious, and things of this sort. But there is an ultimate end, which is the end of charity; and into that no virtue can tend unless moved by charity, and through the love of that end which charity influences into it, according as it is the universal mover of all to that end.

§ 4. As to the other thing which is further objected, that charity is not grace, nor does it make pleasing in all things, it seems to me that it must be conceded: since I cannot see how it could reasonably be said that charity and grace do not differ except by relation to the subject; nevertheless, concerning this there is more to be disputed in the Second Book of the Sentences.

§ 5. As to the simile also which is stated, that the concupiscible is diffused in all the powers, this seems to me false, just as was proven.

§ 6. As to that which is further asked, why it cannot be unformed? It must be said that this is not the cause which some say, because it itself is grace making pleasing; but of this there are four other causes. The first of these is that it itself is the first gift in which all other things are given. Now I say "first" on the part of the Giver, not on our part: because charity is after faith on our part, as was proven above; but the first on the part of the Giver is charity. And therefore, if the first were unformed, or could become so, it would be necessary that there be another prior to it by which it might be formed, which cannot be, since in no genus is there anything prior to the first. Another cause is because it itself is according to the whole capability of man, but no other [virtue] is; and therefore it is impossible that it be without grace making pleasing. And this is evident thus: for he who believes God above all things does not on account of this do whatever he can, nor does he who hopes, and thus of the others; but he who loves God for Himself and above all things retains nothing of himself which he does not expend in the love of God. The third cause is because it itself is founded in the intimate affection, just as you will find noted in Book I of the Sentences; and therefore nothing of formlessness is left in the affection in which it is. The fourth cause is because it itself is the likeness of goodness as it is divine goodness; and therefore it also tends into it as it is in the nature of goodness, and not in another nature, and it cannot not be like that best. And it is not so concerning faith, which is concerning truth, and therefore the nature of goodness which forms in the species of virtue can be lacking; and thus similarly without charity there is natural love, and therefore it does not form unless charity of another nature supervenes.

§ 7. To the other it must be said that the reason has been stated why it is not similar.

§ 8. To the last it must be said that to a man falling on that part nothing is left, because his fall is through a love contrary to truth; but he does not fall through something contrary to faith, or hope; and therefore faith and hope are not destroyed in whole. Or if you say that he falls by something contrary to faith, or hope: then it follows inevitably that that [virtue] is destroyed in whole, just like charity: because the infidel does not have faith, nor the desperate hope. But we are not speaking of this, but of one falling into bad morals through the appetite of a mutable good.

Articulus 4 — Whether The Definitions Of Charity Are Well Assigned

Are the definitions of charity well assigned?

Next it is inquired concerning the definition of charity which he states in the second part, there at B: Charity is the dilection by which God is loved for His own sake, and the neighbor for God's sake, etc.

For other definitions of charity are found.

For Augustine says: Charity is the virtue by which we desire to see and fully enjoy God.

Also, Dionysius in the book On the Divine Names, and it is drawn from the words of Hierotheus thus: Whether we call love divine, or angelic, or intellectual, or animal, or natural, we shall understand a certain unitive and concretive power, moving indeed superior things to the providence of those having less, and again coordinate things to an alternating communicative disposition in the extremes, and subject things to the turning towards what is better and placed above.

In the same place the Commentator gives two others: of which one is this: Love is the connection or bond by which the universality of all things is coupled in an ineffable friendship and indissoluble unity. The second is this: Love is the natural motion of all things that are in motion, the end and quiet resting-place, beyond which no motion of a creature proceeds.

Also, the Apostle The end of the commandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith: and the Gloss says there that the Apostle there defines charity.

It is objected however concerning the first thus: § 1. When it is said, Charity is a dilection,

it seems the same thing is defined by itself: because Dionysius says, Dilection is the same as love or charity.

§ 2. Also, when God is said to be loved for His own sake, charity does not seem to be separated from the love of the honorable in virtue: because the honorable is (as Tullius says) what is loved for its own sake.

It is ALSO OBJECTED concerning the second: because § 1. To see is rather definitive of faith, than of charity, since it succeeds faith, and not charity.

§ 2. Also, since vision is the whole reward, to enjoy is understood in to see: therefore after he said, To see God, it was superfluous to add, And to fully enjoy, etc.

§ 3. Also, to fully enjoy does not respond only to charity, but we enjoy by all virtues: therefore it is wrongly posited as definitive of charity.

§ 4. Also, to enjoy is also defined through charity: because Augustine says, that to enjoy is to inhere by love to some thing for its own sake: therefore there is a circle there, and the same thing is more known and less known than itself.

§ 5. Also, when it is said, We desire, an act of the sensible part of the soul is posited: for the Philosopher says in II On the Soul, that in the rational part there is will, but in the irrational

part desire and animus. Since therefore charity is of the rational part of the soul, it is badly defined through desire.

§ 6. Also, desire is imperfect and of what is absent: therefore since charity is most perfect, it ought to be defined by another act, namely by to will, and the like.

It is ALSO OBJECTED concerning the third: because § 1. Since love or charity is in the affection: and affection does not order anything, but rather aspect [does], it seems love does not move superiors to inferiors, and means to each other, and inferiors to superiors.

§ 2. Also, love does not move except to loving: therefore not to providing.

§ 3. Also, there does not seem to be a difference between intellectual and animal: because the intellectual is animal.

§ 4. Also, what is natural love? It seems, that there is none: because Augustine says, that nothing is loved unless it is known: but nature does not have cognition; therefore neither love.

§ 5. Also, of what love does Dionysius speak? For it is evident that not all things have charity; therefore that definition does not befit charity.

Also, it is objected concerning the other, that it is the bond and friendship of the universe.

§ 1. For contraries do not love each other, but rather hate each other, and do not suffer together in the same subject.

§ 2. Also, what is the indissoluble unity by which they are coupled? For whatever things are composed can be dissolved, both in will and in nature.

It is ALSO OBJECTED concerning the following: § 1. For love rather sounds like a passion or a habit, than a natural motion: therefore it is badly posited in the genus of motion.

§ 2. Also it is inquired, when love is said of natural, animal, intellectual, and angelic, and divine, and gratuitous love, whether it is said univocally or equivocally?

Further it is inquired concerning that which the Apostle gives about charity. Because that is more to the point, and was held last, in distinction XXV.

And it is inquired first, Of what sort of end is charity said to be?

§ 1. For the end is that to which motion is directed, and in which one rests. But charity is that from which the motion of the precept arises: because it moves to fulfill what is commanded: therefore it is rather the principle of the precept, than the end.

§ 2. Also, charity is the root of good, and from the root is the motion of increment and the principle: therefore it ought rather to be the principle, than the end.

§ 3. Also, since it is also the end of counsel, why is it rather defined as being of precept, than of counsel?

§ 4. Also, what does it mean to say, From a pure heart? If you say, from a purified intellect: this is nothing, because charity is not intellect, but rather affection. But if you say that heart is

taken there for affection: then it does not belong to charity alone, because every virtue belongs to a pure heart.

§ 5. Also, the heart is purified by faith, as is held therefore it is the same to say from a pure heart, and unfeigned faith. If you say that they differ as effect and cause: then at least the order of the parts of the definition is inverted: because unfeigned faith ought to be prepended to pure heart, just as the cause precedes the effect.

§ 6. Also, what does it mean to say, A good conscience? For a conscience does not become good except through merit, which is known to be in the conscience: and this is only from charity: therefore a good conscience is rather from charity, than conversely.

§ 7. If you say (as the Gloss expounds) that a good conscience is a firm hope: then again the order is inverted: because faith generates hope, and hope charity.

§ 8. Also, why is purity attributed to the heart, and goodness to hope, since the good is proper to love?

§ 9. Also, unfeigned faith is faith that is not simulated, or not fragile: but this is none other than that which works from dilection: therefore it is rather from dilection, than dilection from it.

§ 10. Moreover, it is otherwise defined by Augustine in the book On the Morals of the Church thus: Charity is the right affection of the mind conjoining us to God.

Also, in the book On the Spirit and the Soul: Charity is a certain life, coupling the lover with the beloved.

Since THEREFORE of one thing there is a single definition, it is inquired, According to what are so many definitions diversified?

Solution It must be said to the last, that some of these definitions are of love in general, but some of charity. The distinction, however, of charity, love, and dilection, noted according to the notions of the names, you will find in book I of the Sentences.

Concerning love, however, three are given in general, namely that of Dionysius, and the two that follow in the commentary: and the first of those indeed is given according to the order of lovers. The second according to the essence of love: because the essence of love is that it be a connection or bond. Or otherwise and better, the first is given according to things ordered by love. But the second according to the ordering itself formally. And the third according to act: and therefore, he says love is a motion. But those that are given concerning charity are five: of which the first is given through genus and act and object, and is commonly charity regarding the way and the homeland. But the second is given through the charity of the way ordered to the homeland: because desire belongs properly to the way, but to fully enjoy and inhere to the beloved belongs to the homeland. The third, however, which is of the Apostle, is given according to the things generating charity in the subject. The fourth according to the effect in species, that it ought through affection to be conjoined to God. And the fifth and last is given through the twofold effect in general: because in the lover it makes life, and it couples with the beloved.

These things being held, it must be said to the first, that although dilection is the same as charity in the usage of Sacred Scripture, which posits one for the other, nevertheless in name they differ, because love is the common affection for the good: but dilection is the affection for the good with diligent election, and thus expresses the love of reason: but charity is when the affected and elected is valued at an inestimable price: and therefore dilection according to name is the genus of charity.

To the other it must be said, that (as was a-

bove said) the word 'for its own sake' expresses there a threefold cause, namely the efficient, the formal, and the final. And this is proved thus: because charity makes us love, not we ourselves: and it does this insofar as it is a likeness of the divine goodness: and therefore the goodness of God which is God, does this. Also, by grace of its form and notion: because we do not love accidentally, but for its own sake insofar as it is itself. Also, the final: because not for the sake of another. And this is evident also through the negation of opposites: because not from another, not accidentally, not for another. But in the dilection of the honorable or of friends these three do not concur, but only the middle one, namely because we do not love accidentally. And this was shown in book I of the Sentences, where it is inquired whether virtues are to be enjoyed or used.

TO that which is objected concerning the second, it must be said that it is given through the act of the charity of the way ordered to the homeland. But that vision is of the beloved and possessed, and it is a feeding vision: and therefore it responds to faith alone, but is rather perfected in conjunction through love: and therefore charity is defined through it.

To the other it must be said, that to fully enjoy is not superfluous: because to enjoy expresses an inherence and a taste following upon the beloved, which is seen and possessed: and because it adds the taste of sweetness, therefore it does not abound [superfluously].

To the other it must be said, that although all virtues concur towards enjoying, nevertheless none concurs as its end and perfection, except charity: but rather the others are as dispositions preparing the subject: and therefore it falls maximally into the definition of charity.

To the other it must be said, that nothing prohibits the same thing from being in the definition of another for diverse reasons, and conversely. For when charity is posited in the definition of that which is to enjoy, it is posited as the cause perfecting the act of fruition on the part of fruition. But when to enjoy is posited in the definition of charity, to enjoy is posited in the notion of the ultimate affection to which charity is directed. And therefore charity is prior to enjoying simply: but enjoying is prior to charity with respect to us.

To the other it must be said, that desire is taken here commonly, and not properly, and therefore it can express the appetite of the rational soul, as there: My soul hath coveted to desire thy justifications at all times: where coveted expresses the imperfect act of gratuitous grace, and of the heart into the desire for God: while desire expresses the appetite of sanctifying grace.

To the other I think it must be conceded, that it is defined by an imperfect act: because the definition is given concerning the charity of the way ordered to the homeland.

To that which is further objected concerning the other definition, that it, as well as the two following, are given concerning love in general, which is expressed when it is said, The good is what all things desire or opt for: for this appetite is manifested in diverse ways, namely through order alone and motion, as in nature: or through motion and life, as in vegetables: or through order and sensible life with the cognition of the good, as in sensible beings: or with these it also has the cognition of the good of reason, which is simply of the good, and is intellectual. But if with a deiform intellect of the good outside itself: then it is angelic. But the divine is the appetite of the known good, which is entirely within, and is the same as the knower and the desirer.

To the first it must be said, that love of itself does not order: but its motion is twofold, namely that it diffuses the good which is within, and thus it moves the lover. But the one having the good insofar as it is such, is superior. Hence such diffusion is upon inferiors differently by God, differently by an Angel, and differently by a superior nature: for by God

through creation and recreation, by an Angel through illumination, by a nature through the motion by which superiors flow into inferiors. Another motion is to the good which is outside, according to which it is said, that all things desire the good: but the good which is outside, this is inferior: and therefore from that there follows the order of the inferior to superiors: and this Dionysius intends, and he speaks excellently. Hence a twofold order follows the order of love communicating the good, or receiving it.

To the other it must be said, that providence is said here materially for the thing in which provision is made for inferiors: for this thing is the inflowing good, and this belongs to love diffusing itself into the good.

To the other it must be said, that the intellectual expresses the appetite for the good with the notion of cognition of that which is simply good: but the animal is called sensible, which does not know the good, except as now.

TO THE OTHER the solution is clear through what was said before.

To that which is objected concerning the other definition, it must be said that although contraries flee each other, nevertheless by mutual action and passion they continue to be in generable and corruptible things: and on this part the contrariety itself returns into the bond of the love of the universe, as Boethius says

Thou bindest the elements by numbers, that colds may agree with flames, Dry things with liquid, lest the purer fire Fly away, and that they may draw down the submerged lands by weight.

TO that which is objected concerning the following, it must be said that it is given according to the act of natural love: and therefore motion is not posited in that definition. Hence that objection does not proceed.

To the other it must be said, that it is not said equivocally, but by priority and posteriority: and by priority it is said of the divine, and of those others according to their approach to it more or less: hence angelic charity, which is of the homeland, has more of the notion of love than that of the way, which is intellectual: and to this also (as Augustine says) sensible and natural love strives to assimilate itself as much as it can, although sometimes it is deflected.

To that which is further inquired concerning the definition of the Apostle, it must be said that that definition is given according to those things that generate charity in us. But charity (as was held above) is efficient and form: because something of itself and of its form flows into all meritorious works and virtues. But the end is of consummation or perfection. And therefore the Apostle says, that charity is the bond of perfection: and this happens in it in two ways. In one mode effectively: and that mode is easy, because it conjoins with the ultimate end: and thus it is called an end and a bond, because by ending it binds with the highest perfect. In another mode and more obscurely, because it itself is the end to which all tend, so that in it they may be conjoined to perfection: for all exist to this end, that the affection may be conjoined to the highest good: but the ultimate conjunction is through love, as is clear, when to enjoy is defined, which is to inhere by love for its own sake: therefore all virtues and precepts and works thus tend into it, and through it they are joined to the end: and thus it is itself the end of others, which end is as a terminus: and through it other things come to the uncreated end, which is the highest good, the object of fruition: and therefore there is nothing unfitting, that from it there is a motion, as it is efficient and form: and to it, as it is the end.

To the other it must be said, that charity is called the root in which the whole plant of life and of the other virtues takes its increment of sweetness: for nothing makes the yoke of difficulty sweet in all others, except the affection for divine goodness, which is charity: and according to this mode it is a principle

of a certain kind: but in another mode it is the end to which the virtues are ordered, as has been said. Yet the Gloss seems to expound effectively, when it says, It is an end not of consumption, but of consummation: because he who has charity fulfills the whole law. Hence also the Gloss distinguishes a multiple end, namely of consumption, just as bread is finished when it is eaten; and of dilatation, just as a cloth is finished at the extremity of the cloth, and any body at its extremities; and of consummation, as that in which a thing is consummated, that is, fully perfected: and thus charity is called an end. And it is further called an end in other ways, such as that for the sake of which there is a motion, or whatever it is: and thus God is the end. And fifthly it is called an end, as terminating the motion in which motion is into the being of motion: and thus in this mode, even by subtly understanding, charity can be called the end of every good work and virtue, because the others are referred to it, and it is united to the goodness which is the end, and the union with it is fruit and taste.

To the other it must be said, that a counsel does not regard everyone as a precept does: and therefore it is not defined by this: because it is not the end of a counsel, except in some.

To the other it must be said, that many have said many things in expounding this: but that which is in the Gloss seems better to me, that heart be posited for intellect: and its purity be

the separation of the beloved from other things, which together with it cannot be loved except impurely: and thus the Gloss expounds: But a good conscience would be hope founded in a good conscience, and unfeigned faith would be that which does not feign for itself phantasms lovable in another way: nor does it claim to love that from which it withdraws on account of adversities. And then it must be said to the first thing which is objected to the contrary, that although charity is from the affection, not from the intellect, nevertheless it has something from the intellect, namely the separation of the beloved from other things that can be loved: for this is done by the intellect discerning among lovable things.

To the other it must be said, that faith purifies the intellect, and the heart from errors and heresies: but from adulterous lovable things faith does not purify, but rather the affection of charity, which so sets one thing in value, that others become vile in comparison to it.

TO the other it must be said, that the Gloss rightly concedes that a good conscience causally expresses hope, because faith is founded on a good conscience. And as to what is objected concerning the order, it must be said that these are ordered according to the motion of generation, which is from evil into the perfect conjunction of the good. But the pure regards the term from which, because it expresses separation from the impure, and therefore it is posited first. And consequently the order into the good and the true follows: but the order into the true is twofold, namely into the true simply, or a firm or strong conjunction to the true, and to inherence: and that which is to the true simply, precedes hope, which expresses the order into the good. But hope precedes the other, which elevates by confirming a good conscience, so that it may be firmed in truth, averting at the same time from the vanity of the world and the falsity of error: and in this mode unfeigned faith is taken here: and this is noted by the Gloss which expounds it in two ways, that is, not fragile in adversities, so that it might recede from the beloved, and not feigning vain things which it might follow besides the beloved. For from these there issues forth the inmost motion of affection into God, which is charity, the end of all and conjoining to God. Others say that these three are ordered according to dignity, and not according to time or generation: and they say that the purity of the intellect is most worthy, because it is from a good conscience: and that again is better than unfeigned faith from which it is. But they suppose what is false: because unfeigned faith, in the mode in which the Gloss expounds it, has nothing better besides the sole affection of final dilection, by which all are conjoined to the highest goodness.

To the other it must be said, that every good merit is from grace and charity, so that grace makes one pleasing, and charity makes the quantity of value, as we said above: nevertheless charity as it is an end, does not proceed absolutely even from good merits in act, or existing as a cause habitually in the conscience.

§ 1. To the other it must be said that purity is attributed to the heart: because the intellect, through the discretion which it applies concerning the directable object, first separates it from impurely loved things. However, the good of hope is not attributed to it, but a good conscience, because it specifically leans upon it. The solution is clear through what has been said.

§ 2. To the other it must be said that nothing prohibits that unfeigned faith operates through love, and is finalized in it, as we said above.

§ 3. To the other definitions the solution is clear through what has been said.

Articulus 5 — Whether There Is One And The Same Habit By Which God And Neighbor Are Loved

Whether it is one and the same habit by which God and neighbor are loved?

§ 4. Next, it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, C, Here it is inquired, If by that same love God is loved, by which the neighbor is loved, etc.

§ 5. For it seems that there are two habits, and two virtues of loving God, and of loving the neighbor.

§ 6. 1. For there are in the cognitive powers diverse gifts of the Holy Spirit, wisdom, and knowledge: because one is about eternal things, namely wisdom: and the other about temporal things, namely knowledge. Therefore, since the affection is also divided here, so that in the charity of God it is about the eternal only, and in the charity of the neighbor about the temporal only, it seems that there are two virtues moving to this.

§ 7. 2. Also, nothing is common to temporal and eternal things: therefore there is not one moving formal aspect [ratio] in God and in the neighbor: therefore neither is there the same habit for loving both.

§ 8. 3. Also, the good of God is not the good of man, since there is not one formal aspect of the good in all good things, as the Philosopher proves in Book I of the Ethics therefore the habit also respecting this and that good will not be one.

§ 9. 4. Also, although faith is explicated in certain articles through temporal things, nevertheless it leans only upon the first truth: hope also is only about eternal things. Therefore it seems that charity too is one habit co-dividing the theological virtue, since that is only about God, and there is another habit about loving the neighbor.

§ 10. 5. Also, wills differ according to the things willed: since therefore charity is a certain will prepared by the ability of a habit, it will be distinguished according to the things willed. But the thing willed is not the same in the love of God and of the neighbor. Therefore charity is not the same habit.

§ 11. 6. If perhaps you say that the end is one in both loves. ON THE CONTRARY: Because the ultimate end of all virtues is one: therefore according to this all virtues would be one virtue.

§ 12. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. There are only three theological virtues: since therefore the love of neighbor is not reduced to any of the cardinal virtues, it must be of charity, which is one theological virtue.

§ 13. 2. Also, the Philosopher says in Book II of the Topics[278], that one science is of multiple things, as of both ends: of one which is the end, of the other as of that which is directed to the end. Therefore one virtue also can be in this way of multiple things, so that God is the end of the love, and the neighbor is loved as directed to that end.

§ 14. 3. Also, Augustine says in the text here, that in the neighbor nothing is loved but God: therefore by the love of God and the love of neighbor the beloved is the same: therefore it is charity.

§ 15. Solution. It must be said that it is only one habit by which God and neighbor are loved, and all things which are referred to charity as lovable out of charity: as the last arguments well show, and especially the authority of Augustine.

§ 16. But to the first it must be said that it is not similar in wisdom and knowledge: because there is not a mover of the same formal aspect in both habits: for the formal aspect of the eternal as it is eternal, and the formal aspect of the temporal as it is temporal , move in the habit of wisdom and of knowledge. And this is not so here: because in the neighbor the uncreated good moves, shining forth in him, from the fact that he is capable of that good through the act of beatitude. For no things (as the Master says below) are properly loved out of charity, unless they are ordered with us to participate in the same beatitude as we are.

§ 17. To the other it must be said that in both there is the uncreated good: but in the charity of God as in itself, while in the charity of the neighbor as it is shining forth in another. However, that argument proceeds as if in the love of the neighbor a created good moves to loving.

§ 18. To the other it must be said that this is false: rather, nothing is the total good of man except God Himself, as Augustine says.

§ 19. To the other the solution is clear through what has been said: because just as divine truth in certain articles shines forth in temporal things, so the divine good shines forth in the good of the neighbor.

§ 20. To the other it must be said that wills differ according to the things willed, not by matter only, but differing by species. And this is not so here. Whence that objection does not conclude.

§ 21. To that which is objected against the solution, it must be said that this is quite true, that virtues differ according to their proximate ends, which are the formal aspects of acts in their matters and their objects: but in charity the proximate and ultimate end of all is the same, namely the highest goodness. And therefore in it the formal aspect of the act is also the end: for goodness moves the love, and the same is the end of all operations and virtues. Because all things that we do, we do so that we may fully enjoy goodness, as Augustine says, and it is posited in Book I of the Sentences, where it is shown that man uses man differently by loving, and God uses man differently. And therefore it is not similar concerning other virtues and concerning the love of God and neighbor.

Articulus 6 — Whether The Commandment About Loving God And About The Neighbor Is One Commandment Or Two

Whether the commandment concerning loving God and concerning the neighbor is one commandment or two?

§ 22. Next, it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, C, in the middle: For which also there are two commandments, etc.

§ 23. For it seems that there ought to be only one commandment: because

§ 24. 1. Of a work of one formal aspect there is one commandment.

§ 25. 2. Also, there are two commandments concerning this: You shall not covet a wife, and, You shall not covet a thing. Because the formal aspect of covetousness in the lust of the flesh is one, and in the avarice of the eyes is another: therefore, from the opposite, where there is one moving formal aspect, there is the same commandment. But it was conceded before that there is one moving formal aspect in God and neighbor: therefore it ought to be one and the same commandment, as it seems.

§ 26. ON THE CONTRARY: Commandments are multiplied according to the formal aspects of works: which is clear, because there are many negative ones on account of the many formal aspects of corruptions. Therefore, since there is not one formal aspect of operating concerning the beloved which is God, and concerning the beloved which is the neighbor, although he is loved on account of God, it will not be one commandment.

§ 27. Solution. It must be said that we concede the last argument: and therefore we also say further, that although there are only two commandments of love, their quality is expressed according to those things concerning which we are commanded to operate. Since if one considers further the formal aspect of the work concerning God, and the diverse formal aspect of the work concerning the neighbor, that formal aspect which is concerning God will be explicated through three precepts, and that formal aspect which is concerning the neighbor will be explicated through seven. And therefore there are two in the aforesaid manner, which have to be specified through ten, as will be clear below.

§ 28. Therefore it must be said to the first, that it supposes a falsehood: because the formal aspect of a work is not taken from the universality and multiplicity of the habit, but rather from the formal aspects by which it is undertaken or sinned concerning that which we operate upon: and this is God and neighbor.

§ 29. To the other it must be said that those commandments are two: because one sins in diverse ways concerning that which is the neighbor's through covetousness. For a wife is ordered to the conservation of the species, and the goods of fortune to the continuation of the individual: and thus also there are diverse formal aspects of operating concerning the beloved which is God, and the beloved which is the neighbor.

278. Aristotle, Topics, II.

Articulus 7 — Whether It Is The Same Movement By Which God And The Neighbor Are Loved

Whether it is the same movement by which God and neighbor are loved?

§ 30. Next, it is inquired concerning this which he says in the same chapter C, there, towards the end: Or on account of two movements which are begotten in the mind, while God is loved and the neighbor, etc.

§ 31. For this seems to be false: because 1. Although there are two precepts, yet one is in the other: therefore one movement seems to be into one through the other.

§ 32. 2. Also, in natures the same movement is to the means, and to the extreme: but the neighbor is the means, and God the end of love: therefore it is the same movement by which I love the neighbor, and I love God.

§ 33. 3. Also, Augustine says here, that in the neighbor nothing is loved but God: and he says this same thing in many places concerning the Trinity: therefore it is the same movement into the neighbor, and into God, as it seems.

§ 34. 4. Also, Damascene says, that the adoration of an image is referred to the prototype: therefore the love of an image is also referred to the exemplar: but the neighbor is loved as an image: therefore the movement reaches all the way to God.

§ 35. 5. Also, the neighbor is not loved unless by the love of use: but such a beloved is referred to another, namely to that which is to be enjoyed: therefore it seems that the movement does not rest unless in God.

§ 36. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. There are three things which are required for one movement, namely unity of space, of time, and of the mobile object. But at this time in which someone loves his neighbor, he does not actually think of God. Therefore it is not necessary that it be one. If you say that it is habitually referred: this is nothing, because we are inquiring about the identity of the movement, for which a habitual relation does not suffice, but an actual one must be present.

§ 37. 2. Also, a movement is numbered from the matter concerning which it is in number: but here there are matters diverse in number: therefore also diverse movements.

§ 38. 3. Also, if on account of the end there were one movement, then there would also be one movement when I love Peter and when I love Paul, each on account of God, which is absurd.

§ 39. 4. Also, one is more intense than the other: because we love God with our whole heart, but the neighbor as ourselves. But there cannot be one movement thus more intense and more remiss: therefore it cannot be one movement in number.

§ 40. Solution. It must be said that it can be one, and there can be several. One, when the neighbor is not taken except as an image of the divine goodness, into which the love actually tends: and in this way proceed the arguments first inducted. But diverse, when one does not

actually proceed further, except by a habitual intention: and in this way the following arguments conclude.

§ 41. However, the solution to the inducted arguments is easily clear to anyone: because those which are inducted to the contrary, are the solutions of the preceding ones.

Articulus 8 — Whether The Mode Of Loving That Is Enjoined, You Shall Love Your Neighbor As Yourself, Is The Mode Of Ordered Charity

Whether the mode of loving by which it is commanded, You shall love your neighbor as yourself, is the mode of ordered charity?

Whether the mode of loving by which it is commanded, You shall love your neighbor as yourself, is the mode of ordered charity?

§ 42. Next, it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, Consequently let us turn our attention to the mode of each love, etc.

§ 43. For the mode by which I love my neighbor as myself does not seem to be of ordered charity: for if by ordered charity I love more what is more conjoined to me, it seems that I ought chiefly to love myself; therefore not as much the neighbor as myself.

§ 44. Solution. It must be said that, as he will say below, the principal status is left to the matter: nor is the similitude taken from the quantity of the affection or effect in loving, but rather from the mode which is taken from the part of the end. And therefore Augustine expounds, that is, to what end yourself, in what yourself: because in grace you love yourself, and to beatitude you love yourself; if you love yourself in charity, both in the same and to the same end you love another out of charity: or if you love otherwise, you do not love out of charity.

Articulus 9 — Whether He Who Loves Iniquity Hates His Own Soul

Whether he who loves iniquity, hates his own soul?

§ 45. Next, it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, D, in the middle: But he who loves iniquity, hates his own soul.

§ 46. 1. For this seems to be against Augustine in the book The City of God, where he says, that no one hates himself, or his own life: but those who kill themselves, hate their misery, and their own non-being, or living: and they prefer not to be, than to be in such misery.

§ 47. 2. Also, concerning the demon who seems less, it seems to be false: because Dionysius says, that they desire the good and the best, to be, to live, and to understand.

§ 48. Solution. There is a hatred of affection: and in this way no one hates himself. And there is a hatred of effect, namely when someone does something to which his own evil follows: and in this way is understood what is said here.

§ 49. To that which is objected concerning Augustine, it must be said that to be, to live, and to understand are considered in two ways, namely absolutely, and in relation to punishment. Considered in the first way, it is desired by all things which are and live and understand. In

the second way, not: because they prefer not to be, than to be thus: as the Lord says concerning Judas, Matt. 26:24: It were good for him, if that man had not been born.

Articulus 10 — Whether In Love There Is To Be Observed A Mode, And What That Mode Is

Whether a mode should be had in love? and, What is that mode?

§ 50. Next, it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, E, But the mode of the love of God is insinuated, etc.

§ 51. For that mode is, not to have a mode, as Bernard says in the book On Loving God: The cause of loving God is God, the mode is to love without mode.

§ 52. FURTHER it is inquired concerning the exposition which he makes of with your whole heart, that is, with the whole intellect without error: and with your whole soul, that is, with the whole will: and with your whole mind, that is, with the whole memory.

§ 53. 1. For either it is understood according to act, or according to habit. If according to act: then it seems impossible: because when we understand something else, then the intellect is not actually conjoined to divine things: and even Christ does this often, and other Saints.

§ 54. 2. Also, the mode of charity ought to be assumed totally from the affection, just as charity itself is totally in the affection.

§ 55. 3. Also, he posits a twofold mode of charity in the cognitive part, which seems to be inconvenient, since charity itself is totally in the affection.

§ 56. 4. Also, Bernard expounds otherwise, namely wisely, sweetly, strongly: but strongly does not pertain to the memory. Therefore it seems that mind is not put for memory.

§ 57. FURTHER it is inquired, If it is impossible for this precept to be fulfilled in this life [in via]?

§ 58. It seems that it is: For Jerome says: Cursed is he who says God commanded the impossible.

§ 59. Also, Jerome: O rashness of men! o insanity of the insane accusing God of all knowledge with double ignorance, namely that He does not know what He has done, and that He does not know what He has commanded, as if He imposed a commandment which could not be fulfilled!

§ 60. Also, Augustine in the book On the Words of the Lord: He would not damn the lazy servant, if He commanded those things which could in no way be done.

§ 61. Also, To what end would it be commanded, if it could not be fulfilled?

§ 62. Also, Matt. 19:17: If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments. And he says there, that the first commandment is what is posited here. Therefore it is necessary to be kept, if we wish to enter into life.

§ 63. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Bernard says, that it is impossible to be fulfilled in this life: and that the impossibility of the precept does not make a transgressor, but a humble person.

§ 64. 2. Also, there is one among the negative commandments which cannot be fulfilled, namely, You shall not covet: for as long as there is the battle of the flesh against the spirit, it is necessary that something of illicit movement of concupiscence fall in: and it is impossible for every thought and life and intention to always be referred to God.

§ 65. Solution. It must be said to the first, that this is the mode in love, to have no mode, as Bernard says: and thus it is in all theological virtues.

§ 66. To the other it must be said that nothing prohibits that charity should have a mode on the part of the intellect and memory: because the will is from those two, according to which love is in it, as we showed above: because love posits rational love, and that properly is charity, according as it is of the uncreated good which is of inestimable price.

§ 67. To the other it must be said that it is understood according to act, but it does not obligate continually [ad semper], as will be clear below: for I do not think that any precept is concerning a habit.

§ 68. To the other the solution is clear through the things said before in those which were said to the second little question.

§ 69. To the other it must be said that Bernard attends more to that which is said, Deut. 6:5, where it is said: You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart, and with your whole soul, and with your whole strength, than he attends to those things which are posited in the Gospel: because without a doubt the mind is nearer to the memory than the other powers, as the Master implies in the words of Augustine.

§ 70. To that which is further inquired, Whether it is fulfilled in this life [in via]?

§ 71. It seems to me it must be said that there is a totality of the way, and a totality of the homeland [patriae]: or a totality simply speaking, and a totality possible for us. The totality of the way or possible for us, is that we have nothing contrary in the intellect, or memory, or will: and in this way the inducted authorities are understood. And similarly the other precept is understood, which is, You shall not covet: for as to that which is directly prohibited in the precept, which is mortal concupiscence, it can be fulfilled in this life. But as to that which indirectly falls into the precept, it is not fulfilled: nor is it even directly commanded in this way. However, the totality of the homeland is to be totally borne actually into God and always: and in this way the saying of Bernard is understood: and this which is said in the text, that it is commanded for the showing of the future glory in us, not that we might fulfill it: for this will be our glory, that God be all things in our intellect, will, and mind.

§ 72. And the other things are clear through those which are posited in the text, namely why they are commanded.

§ 73. However, to all the objections the solution is clear through this distinction.

§ 74. It must be noted, however, that it is not similar concerning this, You shall not covet and concerning the commandment [of love]: because that is negative, and obligates always and continually [semper et ad semper]: and it is not proper to say that it does not obligate except as to those things which directly fall under the prohibition. But this, You shall love the Lord your

God, etc., is affirmative: and therefore it obligates always, but not continually [semper, sed non ad semper]: and therefore a certain totality is not in the precept: but it is not fulfilled according to totality, except sometimes.

DISTINCTIO XXVIII

Divisio Textus

§ 75. Here it can be inquired, Whether in that commandment, etc. In this part he treats of love in comparison to the lovable.

§ 76. And it is divided into three parts according to the three distinctions which are contained here: in the first of which he treats of the number of things to be loved. In the second, of the order, which begins there, Distinct. XXIX, A, After the premises it must be treated of the order of charity.

§ 77. In the third part, he treats of certain doubtful matters which follow the order of things to be loved: and this begins in distinct. XXX, there, A, Here it is accustomed to be inquired, What would rather be of more merit, etc.

§ 78. The first of these, which is of the present reading, is divided into four parts: in the first of which the Master determines the number of things to be loved out of charity. In the second he inquires, How do Angels fall into this number? In the third, How does Christ fall into that number? In the fourth, In how many ways is someone called neighbor? The second, there, B, § 1: Moreover here arises a question concerning the Angels, etc. The third, there, B, § 2: Concerning which also the Lord calls himself our neighbor, etc. The fourth, there, C, Here it must be noted that neighbor is said in diverse ways, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether More Substances Than The Master Enumerates Ought To Be Loved

Whether more substances than the Master enumerates are to be loved?

§ 79. But it is inquired here before the text concerning the number of things to be loved out of charity.

§ 80. And it is inquired first, Whether more substances are to be loved, than is determined here.

§ 81. Secondly, Whether virtues or other graces are to be loved out of charity?

§ 82. Thirdly, Whether irrational creatures are of the number of things to be loved out of charity?

§ 83. To the FIRST it is thus objected: 1. In the text it is said, that this is to be loved out of charity, which with us is referred to participating in the same beatitude: therefore the body of the neighbor is to be loved out of charity.

§ 84. 2. But if you say, that a part does not make a number with the whole: and therefore the body of the neighbor will be loved in the neighbor: this is nothing. Because by the same reason it does not make a number in yourself: yet in you the body and soul are posited in place of two lovable things.

§ 85. 3. Also, in the following distinction he posits six lovable things out of charity: therefore it seems, that there are more than the four posited here.

§ 86. 4. Also, in whatever things there is not one formal aspect of the good moving charity, in those there is not one formal aspect of the lovable: but in the body and the soul there is not one formal aspect of the good: therefore there is not there one formal aspect of lovability. Therefore it seems, that the body of the neighbor constitutes another lovable thing.

§ 87. 5. Also, it seems that one's own body is not to be loved out of charity, because the Lord says in the Gospel: He who loves his life, will lose it. And the Saints hate their own bodies, as Paul says: I chastise my body, and bring it into subjection. But what is held in hatred, is not loved. Therefore one's own body is not to be loved out of charity.

§ 88. 6. Also, the body is corruptible: but charity never fails: therefore charity and the body are not proportional. Therefore it seems, that the corruptible body is not to be loved out of charity.

§ 89. Solution. It must be said that there are only four things to be loved out of charity. And to understand this advert, that the formal aspect of the division is insinuated in the text: for the good which moves to loving, is either beatifying: and this is above us in a threefold way, namely by dignity: and by cause, because we are from it: and by end, because we are to it, and it is our total good. And therefore that has a special formal aspect of moving our love. Or it is what we are: and that has a twofold formal aspect of moving, namely according to the principal which is the soul: and according to that which is below us, yet from its conjunction to us, it specially moves to loving. Or it is that which is beside us, whether that be the soul of the neighbor, or his body, and these do not add a special formal aspect which moves us to loving, except because by a certain society it is conjoined to us as capable of beatitude. But it is not so concerning the body which is conjoined to us as inferior, not as beside us conjoined to us by society. And because there are no more diversities in the genus of the good ordered to beatitude, therefore only four things to be loved are posited.

§ 90. Therefore it must be said to the first, that the body of the neighbor is not to be loved except as conjoined by society, just as that which is beside us related to the society of beatitude: and therefore it does not have another formal aspect of lovability outside the four.

§ 91. To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that it is not similar: because our body makes a grade of lovable things in respect to our soul, namely as an inferior related through it to beatitude: but whatever is in the neighbor, has the formal aspect of a good which is beside us, whether it be taken in the body, or in the soul.

§ 92. To the other it must be said that Ambrose does not assign there the number of things to be loved, but rather the order in the enumerated things: and therefore four of those fall under one member, as will be clear below in the following distinction.

§ 93. To the other it must be said that there is one formal aspect of loving in the body and soul of the neighbor, if the formal aspect is taken in genus, namely the good which is beside us: because neither in the body, nor in the soul is the neighbor above us, nor below us: and thus it is clear, that he is not loved, except as that which is beside us.

§ 94. To the other it must be said that this is sufficiently solved in the text: because the Saints do not hate the body, but the corruptions of the body weighing down the soul.

§ 95. To the other it must be said that this has little value: because although the body is corrupted, yet it does not perish to God, but is changed for the better, as it is said, Job 19:26: Again I shall be surrounded with my skin, and in my flesh I shall see my Savior. And in the Collect for the dead: God to whom all things live, and to whom our bodies by dying do not perish, but are changed for the better.

Articulus 2 — Whether Virtues And Other Graces Ought To Be Loved From Charity, And Whether Created Beatitude Ought To Be Loved

Whether virtues and other graces are to be loved out of charity? and, Whether created beatitude is to be loved?

§ 96. Secondly it is inquired, Whether virtues and other graces are to be loved out of charity?

§ 97. But it seems, that they are: because 1. Augustine says, that he who loves his brother, loves love itself: but love is a virtue: therefore it is to be loved out of charity.

§ 98. 2. Also, that is to be loved out of charity, which is referred to beatitude: but nothing is so referred to beatitude, as that which essentially remains in beatitude. But virtues essentially remain in beatitude: therefore virtues are to be loved out of charity.

§ 99. 3. Also, someone loves virtues, for the reason that he merits by them: but it is established, that by that love he merits: therefore it is gratuitous, not natural: therefore it must be, that it is of charity: therefore it seems, that virtues are loved out of charity.

§ 100. 4. Also, he who loves sins, demerits by that love. Therefore he who loves virtues as they order to God, merits by the opposite act: and someone does not merit except out of charity: therefore it seems, that they are to be loved out of charity.

§ 101. 5. Also, the Lord says: Seek first the kingdom of God, and His justice. Therefore we ought to seek the justice leading to the kingdom: but whatever we seek ordering to the kingdom, we seek meritoriously: therefore out of charity, from which is all merit, as Augustine says.

§ 102. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. In the text it is said, that there are only four things to be loved in charity: therefore virtues are not to be loved out of charity.

§ 103. 2. Also, they do not participate in the same beatitude with us, because they are not rational substances, which alone are capable of beatitude: therefore they are not to be loved out of charity.

§ 104. Next to this it is further inquired, Whether created beatitude is to be loved above us out of charity?

§ 105. But it seems, that it is: because 1. That which beatifies, is to be loved above us: but created beatitude beatifies: therefore it is to be loved above us.

§ 106. 2. Also, Augustine defines supreme, middle, and lowest goods: and among the supreme he posits virtues, and much more beatitude. But it is established, that the good moves: therefore a greater good, moves more. But beatitude is a good above us, because it is greater than the powers of the soul, which are middle goods: therefore it is to be loved above us, as it seems.

§ 107. 3. Also, the end is to be loved more than that which is to the end: beatitude is the end, and we are to the end: therefore beatitude is to be loved above us.

§ 108. But on the contrary: 1. In the number of things to be loved beatitude is not posited: therefore it is not to be loved out of charity: therefore neither is it to be loved above us.

§ 109. 2. Also, in the text it is said, that one thing above us is to be loved, which is God: but created beatitude is not God: therefore it is not to be loved above us.

§ 110. Solution. Without prejudice I say, that virtues can be loved out of charity, and they can not be loved: and these are not repugnant. For they can be loved out of charity, as forms ordering to beatitude: but they cannot be loved out of charity, as living in beatitude beatifying us effectively, and as the object of beatitude, and as participating in beatitude with us. And only concerning these is the division given, which is had in the text, and not concerning the first: and this is because those are loved as formal aspects of lovability; for if it is inquired of someone, Why does he love another? he will answer, that on account of virtue, and to virtue: and therefore there is not one formal aspect of love in such habits and graces, and in the lovable things which are enumerated here.

§ 111. Others however say otherwise, distinguishing a twofold love, namely of friendship, and of concupiscence: and they say, that virtues and those goods which pertain to life, we love with the love of concupiscence: but the lovable things which are enumerated here, we love with the love of friendship. But this is plainly false; because no love of enjoyment, is love of friendship insofar as it is such: and yet we love God with the love of enjoyment. Similarly it is not well said, that someone loves himself with the love of friendship: because friendship is a relation, requiring diversity in the lover and the beloved: and therefore one must return to the prior solution.

§ 112. Also, certain others say, that by natural love we love virtues: and therefore they are not posited among the things to be loved out of charity: and this again is false, if it is understood generally: because we can love both the neighbor and ourselves and God and

virtues with a natural love, and we can also love each one of these with a gratuitous meritorious love, which is charity.

§ 113. Through this also the response to all the arguments first inducted is clear: for when Augustine says, He who loves his brother, loves love itself: he does not understand the same formal aspect of lovability to be in both, but one, and another.

§ 114. To the other it must be said that virtues are not referred to beatitude, as participating in it, but as formal dispositions adapting the subject to this that it may be beatified.

To the other, it must be said that one who loves virtues merits; but from this it does not follow that he loves in another respect, in which he loves other things, as has been said.

And through this, the solution to the others is clear.

To what is further asked, it must be said that created beatitude is not to be loved above us, but for our sake: because we do not seek it except for our sake, so that being disposed by it, we may enjoy uncreated beatitude.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that it does not beatify except formally: but when it is said that the beatifying is above us, it is understood of the beatifying to be loved effectively, and as it is the object of beatitude.

To the other, it must be said that the quantity of good is intensified in two ways, namely according to the order to life, or according to the dignity of nature which is referred to participating in the glorifying God. In the first way, the distinction of Augustine is understood: and therefore he calls great or supreme goods, by which one lives rightly, and without which one cannot live rightly: but the middle goods without which indeed one cannot live rightly, and by which nevertheless one does not live rightly, as the powers of the soul. But the lowest goods by which one neither lives rightly, and without which one can live rightly, as the forms of any bodies, and the goods of fortune, which make happiness pleasant, as the Philosopher says: and therefore the distinction of Augustine does not hold for the proposed matter: because all such things are loved for our sake, and we are better goods than they according to the degree of participating in uncreated beatitude: but only in that way is it to be loved above us, which is better and higher in that order.

To the other, it must be said that created beatitude is not the ultimate end, except as the terminus of a work is the end - but it is not the ultimate end in which the intention rests: and therefore it is not necessary that it be loved above us for the sake of the work, which is for its sake.

Articulus 3 — Whether All Creatures, Even Irrational Ones, Ought To Be Loved Out Of Charity

Whether all creatures, even irrational ones, are to be loved out of charity?

Thirdly, it is asked whether all creatures, even irrational ones, are to be loved out of charity?

It seems that they are: because 1. They are a vestige of God: if therefore we love our neighbor out of charity because he is the image of God, by the same reason we ought to love all things that are a vestige.

1. Likewise, we ought to conform to God in loving: but of Him it is said, Wisdom 11:25: "For you love all things that are, and hate none of the things you have made." Therefore, since He does not love anything except out of charity, we ought to love all things out of the same charity.
2. Likewise, let us suppose that someone loves temporal goods only for the reason that they are material for meriting through alms: it is clear that he merits by that love: therefore it is a love of charity: therefore temporal goods can be loved out of charity.

ON THE CONTRARY: When it is said, This is loved for the sake of another, and not loved for its own sake, the act of love is not signified to pass into that except accidentally: but that which is loved accidentally does not make a number among the lovable: therefore irrational creatures, since they are loved only for the sake of another, do not make a number among the lovable.

If you say that we love ourselves and also our neighbor for the sake of another, and yet they make a number among the lovable: and thus that reasoning does not seem to hold. On the contrary: When we love ourselves or our neighbor for the sake of another, the love is not referred to use, but rather to the enjoyment of God, so that we may enjoy God: and therefore the capacity of being enjoyed makes the reason for love per se, although not for its own sake: but when we love irrational things, the whole love is immediately referred to use, and use ends in God: therefore the reason for love per se is excluded, because there is nothing in them for which they are loved per se: therefore they are not among the number of things to be loved out of charity.

Solution: It must be said that irrational things are not loved out of charity in which there is a reason for lovability: but charity is a universal mover, as we said in the preceding distinction: and thus it is carried by its motion into everything that is, whether it is its proper object or not: but we do not speak here in this way, but rather we inquire about the proper reason for the object of charity in the number of things to be loved out of charity.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that the reason of the vestige is not a reason for loving the vestige, but rather the one of whom it is a vestige: and the same would be in the reason of the image, if there were not in it the capacity for beatitude, by which it can grasp God through beatitude and remain in eternity.

To the second, it must be said that God loves all things that are, equally and with one charity as regards Himself: yet He does not imprint on all the same reason of lovability, but there are many: and therefore some things are lovable for use, and some for participating in beatitude, and those are the proper objects of charity. But other things are loved out of charity for the sake of another, and do not have the reason of a proper object of charity.

To the third, it must be said that he merits who thus loves temporal things: but he merits because he does not love temporal things as those in which his charity is refreshed, but rather because by not loving them he disperses for the sake of the one whom he loves: and this is what some say in other words in the same sense, that many things can be loved by charity eliciting the motion of love, but only four by the reason of the good moving charity.

Articulus 4 — Whether Among The Four Things To Be Loved, No Precepts Were To Be Given About The Second And The Fourth

ARTICULUS TY.

Whether among the four things to be loved, concerning the second and fourth, no precepts were to be given?

Then it is asked concerning what is said there, A, around the beginning: Concerning the second and fourth, no precepts were to be given, etc.

For this seems false: 1. For a precept ordering the act of some virtue ought to order it universally: if therefore the precept of love orders the act of love, it ought to order it universally: therefore it ought to give a precept concerning the love of oneself and of the body.

1. Likewise, it seems to be nothing that is said in the Text, that no one hates himself or his flesh: because many hate both, as it seems: because he who loves the Trinity, hates his own soul.
2. Likewise, granted that it is true what is said, it is still not true, except concerning natural love: and that is not referred to the number of things to be loved out of charity: therefore it ought not to have been given in a precept that we should love ourselves out of charity.

Solution It is easy to respond to this through the aforementioned.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that the precept orders the act differently, when it is said, You shall love your neighbor as yourself: because in this is included the love of yourself, and primacy is given to you.

To the other, it must be said, as above in the preceding distinction.

To the last, it must be said that by this it is understood that it was not necessary for a special precept to be given distinct from the precept of love of neighbor: and this for the reason that nature assists in grace, because both incline to the same. Therefore, since a precept is a certain bond binding through obligation, it was not necessary for bonds to be multiplied there, where it is not necessary.

Articulus 5 — Whether Angels Ought To Be Loved Above Ourselves

Are Angels to be loved above us?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, B, "But here arises the question concerning Angels," etc.

For it seems that Angels are to be loved above us, because

1. Christ is to be loved above us, who was made a little lower than the Angels: therefore, much more the Angels.
2. Likewise, the Saints are above us: which is proven through their acts, because they perform illuminations, purgations, and perfections: therefore, they are to be loved above us.
3. Likewise, in loving we ought to conform to God: but God loves the greater good more: therefore, we also ought to love the good above us more than ourselves.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
It is not set forth in the Scripture except that we love as a neighbor—therefore, the primacy of love is granted to us, as Augustine says: therefore, we can love ourselves more than them.

Solution: It must be said, in my judgment, that they are not to be loved above us: because charity perfects nature: and therefore charity with nature is always more moved by loving one's own good than that of another: hence only God is to be loved above us: because He is above us as our whole good.

To the other, it must be said that they are above us: so that "above us" indicates the degree of that which is loved, and not the intensity of the act of love: but it does not follow that for this reason they are to be loved above us, for the reason which has been stated.

To the other, it must be said that we conform as much as we can, preserving the order of nature, which God has implanted in us, and wishes to be preserved: and this is that we wish more good for ourselves than for others.

Articulus 6 — Whether The Wicked Ought To Be Loved From Charity, And Whether Demons And The Damned Ought To Be Loved

Whether the evil are to be loved out of charity? And,
Whether demons and the damned?

Whether the evil are to be loved out of charity? And,
Whether demons and the damned?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said,
there, C, § 4, around the middle: Love
your enemies, etc.

Therefore, it is given that the evil are to be loved out of
charity: which also seems for another reason,
namely because

1. They are referred through the image to the capacity
   for beatitude with us: therefore
   they are to be loved just as we are.

2. Likewise, Isidore and Augustine: Therefore the evil are to be loved.
   Thus they are to be loved, so that their vices are not loved:

3. Again it is asked, Whether demons and the damned are to be loved out of charity?
   It seems that they are: because

4. Upon that Leviticus xix, 18: You shall love your neighbor, the Gloss says:
   For it is established that neighbor is not by proximity of blood, but by society of reason. And they are rational just as we are: therefore they are to be loved as we are.

5. Likewise, In them is the image of God: this however is the reason for loving us and our neighbor: therefore they are to be loved out of charity.

BUT on the contrary, they are deformed to such an extent, that they will never participate in beatitude with us: therefore they are not to be loved for that which we love ourselves: but this is to love the neighbor as ourselves: therefore they are not to be loved as a neighbor.

Solution It must be said that the evil are to be loved as neighbors: not because they are evil, but for the good to which they are possible: however, the damned and demons are not.

To the first and second reason, it must be said that the society of reason or image is not sufficient, unless it is ordered to the receiving of beatitude.

Articulus 7 — Whether Christ Insofar As Man Ought To Be Loved Above Ourselves

Whether Christ, insofar as he is man, ought to be loved above ourselves?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said, there, B, § 2: "By which also the Lord first called himself our head," etc.

And it is asked here, Whether our Lord Jesus Christ, insofar as he is man, ought to be loved above ourselves? And it seems that he should: because

1. The head ought to be loved above the member: but he, insofar as he is man, is the head: therefore he ought to be loved above us.

2. Likewise, he is our redeemer: but the redeemer is above the redeemed: therefore he ought to be loved above them. And many other things can be introduced.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:

1. Nature with grace is more affected concerning its own good: therefore it loves that more: therefore it loves nothing which is not its whole good more than itself: but Christ, insofar as he is man, is not its whole good: therefore it does not love him more than itself.
2. Likewise, in the text it is said "neighbor": therefore he ought to be loved as ourselves: therefore priority is conceded to us: therefore we love ourselves more than him.

Solution: It must be said that the first is twofold, when it is said, Christ insofar as he is man, etc. From which the phrase "insofar as" can signify the union of the person, and thus he ought to be loved above us: or the condition of nature, and this in two ways, namely of nature as not united, and then he is neither head nor redeemer: or of nature as united and thus head and redeemer. In the first way he is not to be loved above us: but in the second way he is to be loved above us.

And thus the solution to the whole is clear.

DISTINCTIO XXIX

Divisio Textus

After the aforementioned concerning the order of charity, it is necessary to treat, etc. Here begins the part in which he discusses the order of charity.

And it is divided into three parts: in the first of which the Master determines the order of charity according to the number of lovable things taken up, which Augustine sets forth. In the second, he touches upon the order taken according to the degrees of lovable things set forth by Ambrose, there, C, to which that precept is opposed. In the third, he discusses the degrees of charity concerning the love of parents, Honor, etc., there, H, It must also be known that there are different degrees of charity, etc.

In the first, two things are contained: in the first of which he touches upon the order; in the second, concerning the order, he raises a question, there, B,

Whence also upon this a question is often raised, which the words of the Saints make perplexing, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether Charity Has An Order

Whether charity has order?

A double question arises concerning the first, namely, Whether charity has order? and concerning the sufficiency of its order.

To the first, it is objected thus:
1. Charity is an affection of the simple: but affection is not the collating of thing with thing: since therefore every order is according to collation, no order seems to be according to affection: but charity is in affection: therefore there is no order according to charity.

1. Likewise, the Philosopher says that it is the wise man's to order: therefore order pertains more to wisdom than to charity.
2. Likewise, in faith there are many articles, which presuppose others, as the resurrection presupposes the passion, and the passion the incarnation: and yet on account of such order, faith is not said to be ordered in beliefs: therefore it seems that although love of neighbor in this way presupposes love of God, it is not on account of this that charity is said to be ordered in loves.
3. Likewise, on the part of the neighbor, no order seems to be in loves: because Augustine says that we love nothing in the neighbor except the reason of the image, because it is in the image of God: but this is equally in all: therefore all are to be loved equally: not therefore according to degrees of any order.
4. Likewise, it seems especially that there is not that order which Ambrose touches upon, namely, that first God, and second ourselves, third parents, and fourth children and brothers, fifth those of the household, sixth enemies. For charity is of itself the love of the good: therefore the greater good will have greater love, and the great great: therefore according to the degree of good the order of those to be loved is to be determined, and not according to the degree of affinity or consanguinity.
5. Likewise, wisdom savors the good: therefore if charity is the savor of wisdom, as Augustine says, it savors the greater good more, and the lesser good less: therefore it is not the order which Ambrose posits.
6. Likewise, Augustine: Perfected charity has or makes justice, so that greater goods are loved more: perfected justice, if any of the virtues can make perfected justice, since it is the form of virtues: therefore it loves greater goods more, not attending to the degree of carnal proximity.
7. Likewise, our charity configures us to uncreated charity: but uncreated charity loves the greater good more, and not according to the degree of carnal proximity: therefore our charity will be according to the order of good, and not according to the order of proximity.
8. Likewise, charity makes us conform our will to the divine will: but the divine will is more of the greater good, because it applies more affection to the greater good: therefore ours ought to be so.

9. Likewise, grace corrects nature in that in which it is curved: just as therefore on the part of the love of God it corrects it, so that it loves above itself that which is above itself, which before it could not: so it also corrects on the part of the love of neighbor, so that it loves more that which is more to be loved: therefore it does not attend to degrees of carnal proximity.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
4. The Apostle says, to the Galatians vi, 10: While we have time, let us do good. Therefore some are to be preferred to all, especially to those of the household of faith according to the degrees by which they are joined to us.

1. Likewise, the Saints say this in the Letter, Augustine, Jerome, and Ambrose.

Solution: It must be said that in this question there are many opinions of different people. For some concede that charity of itself does not have order, except according to the reason of good taken: and that the degrees of conjunction which Ambrose touches upon are rather of the order of the lover than of love: and they have for themselves the reasons induced, and some others, namely that such degrees will be evacuated, because in the homeland we will love the greater good, except for ourselves: and therefore since charity remains in the homeland, they say that such degrees are not of themselves of charity.

To what Ambrose and other Saints who are induced in the Letter say, they respond that this is understood with other things being equal: because then nature agrees with grace. But if there is inequality in grace, they say that charity follows more the order of grace than of nature. But because there is a threefold order, namely of nature only, and of grace only, and of grace in nature. The order of nature only is that it principally loves itself, and others more and more according to how they are more and more joined: and this order is curved and needing correction. The order of grace only is that it loves God above all, and others more and more according to how God shines in them: and this order will be in the homeland, except for this alone that one's own good will be loved more than the good of another: whence there God will be loved more, then us, and afterwards more who is better and whom God loves. The third order is of grace in nature, and this corrects nature in that in which it is curved, and sustains it in natural things. It is curved in that it does not love God more than itself: and therefore it elevates that. But that it loves itself more than another, and one joined by consanguinity more than one not joined, this God wills us to will: because He planted this in our nature: and therefore grace does not correct this, but permits the movement of nature with itself.

Therefore, sustaining this opinion, it must be said to the first, that charity is in affection according to order to the intellect, namely that it is from the intellect: and therefore it can have order on that part, although not in itself, according to which it is considered only in itself.

To the other, it must be said that it is of wisdom to order in this way in which the one ordering places the reason of order in the ordered: but charity is ordered, more than it orders:

whence it is of the ordered according to the degree of order: and this it has according to which it is in the subject which is affection, through the intellect of the ordering wisdom.

To the other, it must be said that it is not similar concerning faith: because faith is not united to the articles by reason of that in which the articles differ, but rather by reason of the first truth, which is in all of them: but charity is of greater affection and lesser according to the difference of degrees.

To the other, it must be said that finally in the neighbor nothing is loved except the reason of the image related to God above all loved, but materially not: because the differing degree is the matter of love, according to which charity is in nature, and with the nature of the lover, not evacuating it.

To the other argument, it must be said that it proceeds concerning the order of charity in itself, and not according to which it is moving joined with the nature of the lover.

To the other, it must be said that every savor which we can have here is tempered to nature: and therefore not only the good will be the reason moving love, but the good to some nature by the order of conjunction.

To the other, it must be said that that authority proceeds concerning greater goods, and other things being equal, and not simply.

To the other, it must be said that we conform our will to the divine will in this that God wills us to will this: for this is sufficient conformity on the way, as was proved in the first book of the Sentences.

Through these, however, the solution to the following is clear.

To the other, it must be said that it corrects it in that in which it is curved: and this is only in the love of God, because it is just that He is loved more than us, who is the whole good, which is the reason of the love of all things to be loved. But it is not so in others: therefore it is not necessary that in that part nature be corrected.

Articulus 2 — What Is The Sufficiency Of These Orders In Charity

What is the sufficiency of these orders in charity?

Secondly, the question is asked about the sufficiency of these orders: and to better understand, let each order be set forth.

Therefore, the order of Augustine is this, that God is to be loved first and for His own sake and above all things: secondly, ourselves: thirdly, the neighbor, who is next to us, as ourselves: fourthly, our body, which is beneath us, less than the soul of the neighbor. Ambrose, however, says that first is God, second ourselves, thirdly parents, fourthly sons and brothers, fifthly household members, sixthly enemies.

However, the first order seems insufficient; because

1. If the soul of the neighbor is postponed to our soul, then it seems that the body of the neighbor should also be postponed to our body: and this is not said by Augustine, because he places the order only among four.
2. Likewise, it seems insufficient on the part of God: because there are many benefits of God, one of which joins God to us more than another, as redemption more than creation, as blessed Bernard says: He assumed much difficulty, so that he might constitute you a debtor of much love, and the difficulty of redemption might admonish you of thanksgiving, whom the ease of creation had made less devout. Therefore, it seems there should be an order according to this mode, which are creator, redeemer, glorifier, and governor, and the like: and neither touches this order.

Likewise, Ambrose seems diminished 1. For between the household member and the enemy there are many degrees, namely relatives, fellow citizens, and godparents, and the like: and he does not place them.

Likewise, between sons and brothers and household members there are many degrees of consanguinity, which he omits: therefore it is diminished.

1. Likewise, a wife is to be loved as the Apostle commands, in Ephesians 5:25: Husbands, love your wives: and yet he does not place her.
2. Likewise, there are many societies of men, as lord and servant, master and disciple, prelate and subject, and the like: of which nothing is touched here: therefore it seems insufficient.
3. Furthermore, Ambrose himself seems to pervert the order because he says that good household members, who are in the fifth place, are to be preferred to bad sons, who are in the fourth place.
4. Likewise, it seems that what is in the fourth place should be preferred to what is in the third place: because the Apostle says, 1 Corinthians 12:14: It is not for parents to lay up treasures, but parents for children, therefore children are to be preferred to parents: although children are placed in the fourth place, and parents in the third.

In response, it seems to me that the order which Augustine places is taken according to the general differences of what is to be loved: these are, what is above us, and what is us, and what is next to us, and what is beneath us related to beatitude from the fellowship of the rational soul: nor can more connections be understood, since right and left only say what is next, and similarly before and behind: therefore only what is above, and what is ourselves, and what is next to us remains. How what is next comprehends angels and certain other things was said before. The order which Augustine touches is understood according to prior and posterior thus: because charity is one virtue, it is necessary that it has one reason of the good moving, and what has that good, or will also have it, this will be first and per se and

above all loved, this is God who is placed in the first place: and other things are loved in God and to God, as the Master says in the preceding distinction. In God, if they are in God, as friends who act friendships, that is, good works, which alone are said to make friends. To God, however, if they are not in God, as friends acting enmities, that is, sin. And among those there also intervenes order: for when it is said, You shall love your neighbor as yourself, the "as" says two things, namely order, and the reason for loving the neighbor. Order, because no one loves another as himself, unless it is first supposed that he loves himself: therefore himself first, and another consequently: behold the order. Augustine touches the reason: because he thus explains, that is, to what you yourself, namely in God, or to God. However, there is not one relation to God of the body and soul in us: and therefore there is a double grade in them: but not in the neighbor, because he is entirely next to us both in body and in soul.

And thus the solution to the first is clear, and the reason for the order which Augustine places.

On the part of God, however, there cannot be order: because every order is among diverse things: and therefore the order of love supposes the diversity of what is to be loved. Hence, although we love God for many reasons, yet it is the same thing we love, and therefore there is no order there. And through these the solution to the second is clear.

The order of Ambrose, however, is taken otherwise: because it is of charity not simply, but in our nature, and therefore it admits the inclination of nature: either therefore only according to the reason of charity, or according to the reason of nature more. If in the first way: then the first grade is, which is entirely in the reason of the highest good, as to love God per se and above all. If, however, it is according to the reason of nature: either it says only the conformity of nature, or the bond of society is superadded.

If in the first way: then it is the last grade, as to love enemies, with whom we have nothing in common except nature. If, however, it is from the bond of society: either that society is from living together, or from lineage. If from living together: then the fifth is understood, which is the household member: and it is not understood only of the material house, but of the Church, and of those who live in a conforming life: as the Psalm says, 54:14: We walked in the house of God with consent. If, however, it is from lineage: either according to the line of descent, or ascent, or according to what descends, or from whom the descent is. If according to what descends: thus it is the second grade, which is what we are: or according to the line of ascent, and thus it is the third, which is to love parents. If according to the line of descent, whether directly from us, or from what we both descend from one, it makes only one general grade, which is the fourth, as sons, and parents, brothers, and the like.

To what is objected against this, it must be said in my judgment, that all those grades are contained under the household member of the spiritual house, and they only say different modes of conversing in the house of God which is the Church.

To the objection, that the wife as wife is joined, is the same body, as it is said in Genesis 2:24: They shall be two in one flesh. And therefore it is understood as to the body in the love of ourselves as to what is beneath us, and as to the soul in the love of God.

To another objection, it must be said that those societies are special, and they say different modes of the household member. There are, however, those who concede those reasons, saying otherwise that this order is not touched here, except to which nature inclines. However, the wife is joined by the mode of sacrament, and other conjunctions are by the mode of benefit or grace. But this is nothing: because it is said in the text, that spiritual parents are understood in parents: and this is clearly false, that nature does not incline to love the wife, or the lord, but inclines to love the enemy.

To another objection, it must be said that the order is not perverted: because this order is understood with other things being equal: but with unequal circumstances, it can well happen in some case that the third or fourth is first: and this will be determined below.

To another objection, it must be said that parents fail, when it increases for children: and therefore parents are more destitute: and therefore if they are in need, they are to be preferred to children, if both cannot be helped.

To the saying of the Apostle, it must be said that to lay up treasures does not say the supplement of need, but rather of abundance: but in that we are more bound to children who are entering, than to parents who are departing.

Articulus 3 — Whether These Orders Can Be Varied, Or Are Of Necessity

Whether these orders can be varied, or are of necessity?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, A, around the beginning: For he sins who acts preposterously, etc.

For from this it seems that this order is of necessity. And this does not seem:

1. For let it be supposed that I do whatever I owe to my father: then in nothing will I be guilty against him. However, since what I do for him is not finite, I can do more for another: therefore, by loving him who is domestic more than my father, I act preposterously, yet I do not sin.
2. Likewise, someone is in religion, and sees his father in need, and cannot help unless he leaves religion to make gains: either then he is bound to apostatize, or not. If so: then since apostasy is scandal and against obedience, he is bound to sin. If not: therefore in some case he can act preposterously, namely, to prefer the love...

§ 1. [...] [leaving the associatio]n of his congregation for his carnal father, and he will not sin.

§ 2. 3. Also, let us suppose someone is in the world, and has a needy father, and lives perilously in the world with constant fear of falling: it is established that he is bound to provide for himself more than for his father: therefore he ought to leave his needy father and flee to a place of security.

§ 3. 4. Also, this is seen through the sons of Zebedee, who, called by the Lord, having left their father, followed the Lord, even though the father was poor and old: and also nothing is

read concerning their perilous way of life. Therefore it seems that those orders can be varied: therefore they are not orders of necessity.

§ 4. Solution: Without prejudice I say that, supposing the cause of a sufficient order, the order is of necessity, such that without it a sin occurs. I say the cause of the order is need on the one hand, namely of parents or others, and security on one's own part, and the possibility for assistance from the goods of fortune or a trade.

§ 5. To the first, therefore, it must be said that I never do for my father what I ought, unless I bestow upon him more affection than upon another, other things being equal: because if the father is evil, and another is good, the affection of nature indeed remains concerning the father, and the effect of grace, which is stronger, tends to the other: and in this I do not sin, and in effect if I satisfy the father, it is no fault if I do more for the other out of grace than for the father: because this does not corrupt the order, since, other things being equal, regarding affection there is always more toward the father, and regarding effect, as much as is fitting.

§ 6. To the next it must be said that he who is in religion, in my judgment, ought to remain in religion: and if he can have permission while remaining in it, he ought to assist his needy father through his trade, if otherwise he cannot have or beg [for him]: but he is not bound to go out [of religion] on account of the danger of his own way of living.

§ 7. To the next which is objected concerning him who is in the world, I well concede that if he is secure in the world, he is not bound to enter religion, but to assist his needy father: but if he probably fears a fall, or perhaps has fallen, then he is more bound to provide for himself, and can leave his father.

§ 8. To the next which is objected concerning the sons of Zebedee, James and John, it must be said that perhaps he [the father] had other means from which to live: or they knew that He who called them could provide for him better than they themselves could: but it is not so concerning others who are not God, whom we follow when calling us to religion.

Articulus 4 — Whether Charity Has An Eye To Any Remuneration

Whether charity has an eye to any remuneration?

§ 11. Next it is asked concerning this which he says, there, A, around the middle: God is to be loved for Himself, etc.

§ 12. From this it seems that charity cannot have an eye to any remuneration: and this also seems by another reason: because

§ 13. 1. Tully says that true friendship, although it has conjoined to itself very much utility and delight, nevertheless itself is founded neither upon the useful, nor upon the delightful: since therefore the charity of God denotes true friendship, it seems that it does not look upon the utility of nature: therefore neither a reward, nor a remuneration.

§ 14. 2. Also, Aristotle: Friends are to be loved, even if nothing ought to be done for us: much more God.

§ 15. 3. Also, Augustine: Although God could not be served without a reward, nevertheless He must be served without looking toward a reward: therefore since this is of charity, charity does not look upon a reward.

§ 1. 4. Also, the mercenary is disparaged, John 10:12 et seq. Since therefore the mercenary has an eye to a reward, it seems that charity is not mercenary.

§ 2. 5. Also, perfect charity casts out fear, because it is servile: therefore also the hope of reward, because this is servile and not liberally complying.

§ 3. BUT AGAINST: 1. Luke 15:17: How many hired servants in my father's house abound with bread! It is established that he speaks of the house of eternity: therefore those who serve out of charity, who alone inhabit the house, can be hired servants [mercenaries].

§ 4. 2. Also, Job 7:1: Are not his days like the days of a hired servant?

§ 5. 3. Also, to Abraham perfect in charity God said, Genesis 15:1: I am... thy reward exceeding great.

§ 6. 4. Also, the Apostle, to the Hebrews 10:36: Patience is necessary for you, that doing the will of God, you may receive the promise: therefore we can clearly expect a reward.

§ 7. 5. Also, in the same place, 10:35: Do not therefore lose your confidence, which hath a great reward.

§ 8. 6. Also, the Apostle concerning himself, 2 Timothy 1:12: I know whom I have believed, and I am certain. And in the same place, 4:8, he adds: As to the rest, there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord the just judge will render to me in that day.

§ 9. 7. Also, charity is generated from hope: and hope is always of a reward, because it is the expectation of beatitude from merits.

§ 10. Solution: To this it must be said that there is a reward which is nothing other than God and those things which conjoin God to us: and charity does not exclude the intuition of that reward, although it does not look upon it as it is a reward, but as a beloved thing to be thoroughly enjoyed. And there is a temporal reward: and charity excludes that: because although it may receive sustenance from temporal things, nevertheless it does not comply [serve] for them: and the reasons and authorities first induced speak of that [temporal reward], while the authorities and reasons consequently induced speak of the first [eternal reward].

§ 11. And through this the solution to all objections for both sides is evident.

§ 12. And because charity does not look to the eternal reward as it is a reward, but as a beloved thing to be enjoyed, therefore Bernard says that one must not confess to the Lord because He is good to you, just as he says of the wicked: He will praise thee when thou shalt do well to him [Ps 48:19]; but, Because He is good absolutely, just as the Levites did, who received no earthly portion among the sons of Israel, because the Lord was the portion of their inheritance. But concerning others who have eyes to temporal things, that is verified which was said

of the servilely serving people, Deuteronomy 32:28: The eye of Jacob in a land of corn and wine, etc.

Articulus 5 — Whether We Are Able From Charity To Love The Neighbor And Created Beatitude As Much As God, And The Neighbor More Than Ourselves

Whether we can out of charity love our neighbor and created beatitude as much as God, and our neighbor more than ourselves?

§ 15. Next it is asked concerning this which he says, there, A, around the middle: Every one ought to love God more than himself.

§ 16. For it seems possible that someone out of charity loves his neighbor as much as God: because

§ 17. 1. His grace does not destroy, but perfects nature: since therefore nature before grace loves itself more than God, it seems also that after grace it will do the same.

§ 18. 2. Also, Nature loves itself, and loves God: if therefore I add equals to unequals, the things which are left will be unequal as before: therefore with grace added, nature still loves itself more than God.

§ 1. 3. Also, the charity by which we love God is finite, and its act is finite: similarly the act by which we love ourselves and our neighbor is finite. Let therefore the act of the love of God stand [fixed], and let the act of the love of neighbor be intensified, it can be so much intensified that it will equal or grow beyond that [first act]: and yet it will always be an act of charity: therefore it is possible out of charity to love a neighbor or oneself more than God.

§ 2. 4. Also, in the neighbor nothing is loved except God: therefore God is equally in Himself and in the neighbor: since therefore this is to love the neighbor, the neighbor can be loved as much as God.

§ 3. 5. Also, Augustine: We can love things unseen, not things unknown: therefore he whose knowledge is greater, his love is greater: but we know our neighbor and ourselves better: therefore we love [them] more.

§ 4. 6. Also, a habit is equally disposed to one thing as to another, because in a sleeping man both are equal: therefore also it equally progresses into both acts.

§ 5. BUT AGAINST: 1. If he can love one equally as the other, then there is no order.

§ 6. 2. Also, charity is the estimator of goods: therefore it loves the infinite good without proportion more than the finite: but God is the infinite good: therefore without proportion it loves God more than the neighbor.

§ 7. 3. Also, God is loved above all things: therefore always both above oneself and above one's neighbor.

§ 8. Further it is asked, whether created beatitude can be loved as much as God?

§ 9. For it seems that it can: for as much as this man loves God, so much he loves to thoroughly enjoy God: and as much as he loves to thoroughly enjoy God, so much he loves the beatitude by which he enjoys: but this is created beatitude: therefore as much as he loves God, so much he loves some creature.

§ 10. Further it is asked, whether we can love our neighbor more than ourselves, or [only] as much.

§ 11. It seems that we can: because 1. The rationale of the good is the rationale of love: therefore where there is a greater good, there will be a greater love: but in the neighbor there is frequently a greater good: therefore there will be a greater love of the neighbor than of ourselves.

§ 12. 2. Also, there is one rationale of the love of ourselves and of the neighbor, namely in God, or toward God: therefore if the neighbor is more in God than we are, it seems that we should love the neighbor more than ourselves.

§ 13. 3. Also, by virtue of the expression an order between us and our neighbor does not seem to be imported: because it is said, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself: therefore it seems that we ought to love our neighbor as much as ourselves.

§ 14. But against this is what Augustine says, and it was held above, that to us is given the principality of love, when it is said, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.

§ 15. Solution: It must be said that it is impossible out of charity to love anything as much as God, as the reasons induced for this well prove. But nevertheless it is to be noted that when it is said that God is infinitely loved more than the neighbor, an actual infinite is not posited: but it is understood thus, that the neighbor is never loved so much that God ought not to be loved without comparison more: and this is for this reason, because there is no reason why we should love anything out of charity unless God alone be it: therefore He always remains loved through Himself, and more loved than anything which we love on account of Him.

§ 16. Therefore it must be said to the first, that not being able to love God above oneself (if indeed this is true, as some say) is not a potency of nature, but rather that impotence: and therefore adventitious grace amends that imperfection: but with respect to the neighbor there is no impotence, because it is not

against the right order, in which one's own good is set before the good of another.

§ 2. To the next it must be said that this is true where the addition on both sides is equal, and those things to which the addition is made are equally disposed to what is added. But this is not true here: because when it is said, Nature loves God, there is an impotence in the love. But when it is said, It loves itself, there is a potency in it: and therefore adventitious grace excludes the impotence, and does not destroy that which was a potency.

§ 3. To the next it must be said that the act of charity in itself, by which God is loved, is finite: but nevertheless it is disproportionate to that by which the neighbor is loved, because of its rationale: whence there is no reason for intensification in the act of love of oneself or of the

neighbor, except in the reason of the intensification of the love of God: and therefore it will never be compared, or if it is equaled, it will not be an act of charity, but of perverse love.

§ 4. To the next it must be said that although finally in the neighbor nothing is loved except God, nevertheless materially something else is loved in him: and those material dispositions, as created grace, and familiarity, and things of this sort, are the rationale of the act of love, although they are not of the charity of the neighbor or of ourselves.

§ 5. To the next it must be said that 'better known' is said in two ways, namely that the word 'better' can be a noun, and thus it signifies the disposition of the object of love: or an adverb, and thus it signifies the disposition of the act of knowledge: and in the first way it is true that the better known is more loved by charity, if it is the uncreated good. In the second way it is false: because Augustine says that nothing prohibits us from loving more what we are ignorant of, as long as we believe it to be better than what we know.

§ 6. To the next it must be said that it is false that a habit is equally disposed to both: because to God it is disposed as to the cause and rationale of all other lovable things, but it is not thus disposed to others.

§ 7. To that which is further asked, it must be said that there is a sophism in the process from the first to the last: because the same rationale of lovable things is not taken: for when it is said, As much as he loves God, so much he loves to enjoy, 'to enjoy' is taken for the inherence of the uncreated: and when it is said, As much as he loves to enjoy, so much he loves the beatitude by which he enjoys: if 'by which' signifies the efficient cause, then it is true, because then beatitude stands for uncreated beatitude: but if 'by which' signifies the formal cause, then it is false, because then it stands for created beatitude, and then the rationale of the lovable thing is varied.

§ 8. To that which is still further asked, it must be said that the neighbor neither ought nor can be loved more than ourselves according to the soul.

§ 9. To that which is objected against this, it must be said that this would be true if the rationale of the good alone moved in this order: but this is not true: rather, the good ordained to nature moves: and in this one's own good moves more than another's: just as the Philosopher also says that nothing prohibits certain lesser goods from being more choiceworthy for certain people than greater goods, as for a poor and needy man it is more choiceworthy to grow rich than to philosophize, although to philosophize is simply better.

§ 10. Through this also the solution to the following is evident.

§ 11. To the last it must be said, as was said above in the beginning of this reading, that when it is said, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself, there as thyself imports the order of love and the rationale: and then the objection ceases.

Articulus 6 — Whether These Orders Are To Be Considered According To Affection, Or According To Effect, Or According To Both

Whether these orders are attended to according to affection, or according to effect, or according to both?

§ 14. Next it is asked concerning this which he says, there, B: Whence also upon this a question is often moved, etc.

§ 15. For here a scrupulous question occurs: Whether these orders are attended to according to affection, or according to effect, or according to both?

§ 16. It seems, however, that according to affection: because 1. There is one rationale of love in all lovable things, namely God: but God weighs affection more than effect: therefore it seems that the order of all lovable things is to be attended to according to affection.

§ 17. 2. Also, Nature moves to this, that

he who is nearer is loved more in affection than he who is more remote: therefore it seems that the degrees of love are received according to affection.

§ 2. 3. Also, from a chance event I can bestow more of an effect upon one who is more remote, as if he is in need, and the nearer one is not: since therefore the order always remains in one mode whatever chance event occurs, it seems that the degrees of charity will be taken according to affection and not effect.

§ 3. But against this it seems to be that 1. Affection seems more to follow the rationale of the good: and the good is found more in him who is in a more remote degree, than in a nearer one: therefore it seems that the order is received not according to affection, but effect.

§ 4. 2. Also, let us suppose that I do for a brother whatever I ought: and yet I do not have as much affection for him as for another whom I believe to be more good: it is established that I do not sin: therefore it seems that the order is not attended to according to affection.

§ 5. Solution: It must be said in my judgment that the order is taken according to both, other things being equal: but there can never be a reason of nature inclining to one part, if there is vice in that one, and much of grace in another, without grace being able to preponderate in affection.

§ 6. To the first therefore it must be said that it is true that God weighs affection more, yet He weighs both: but affection ought to precede effect.

§ 7. To the next it must be said that nature moves to both, if both are necessary, as is evident in that precept: Honor thy father and thy mother.

§ 8. To the next it must be said that this does not proceed: because the order in affection is understood other things being equal: for no one is bound to assist one who is not in need: whence then the greater affection is toward the nearer one, but the greater effect toward him who is in need.

§ 9. To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that this would be true if the rationale of the good alone were moving: but this is not true, rather the good and nature move simultaneously.

§ 10. To the next it must be said that I never do for a brother whatever I ought, unless I give him more of affection and effect, if other things are equal: because then he is conjoined to me by more reasons than another: but otherwise I think it to be true what is said in the Letter, that the bond of minds is holier than that of blood.

Articulus 7 — Whether In Charity Strangers Can Be Preferred To Blood Relatives

Whether in charity strangers can be preferred to blood relatives?

Whether in charity strangers can be preferred to blood relatives?

§ 2. Next it is asked concerning this which he says, there, I: It is also customarily asked, If parents, etc.

§ 3. And two things are asked here, namely whether strangers can in any way be preferred to blood relatives?

§ 4. It seems that they can: because 1. If someone is a Prelate, and can give ecclesiastical benefices, he ought to seek the better man: therefore he ought to prefer a better stranger to a blood relative.

§ 5. 2. Also, this is seen in Ezechiel 44:6 and 7: Let all your wicked doings suffice you, O house of Israel: in that you have brought in your sons uncircumcised in heart, and uncircumcised in flesh, to be in my sanctuary.

§ 6. But TO THE CONTRARY it seems to be 1. What the Apostle says: But if any man have not care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel [1 Tim 5:8].

§ 7. 2. Also, to the contrary seems to be what is said in the Letter, that if we do not suffice for all, we ought to provide especially for those who are conjoined to us by some society.

§ 8. Further it is asked here, Whether sons can be preferred to parents?

§ 9. And it seems that they can: because Chrysostom says that juice ascends from the root into the branches, rather than conversely: therefore the love of God descends from parents into sons, and not into parents: therefore sons are to be preferred to parents.

§ 10. But to the contrary seems to be the precept of Exodus 20:12: Honor thy father and thy mother. And it is not said there: Honor thy sons.

§ 11. Solution: To the first it must be said that in spiritual goods which are not devolved as it were naturally by inheritance, the better man ought to be sought without attention to degree [of relation], if he can easily be had: but if not, it can be given to a good man who is present. But in temporal goods possessed by hereditary right, I think that he is more bound to assist the nearer one in need, even if he is less good.

§ 12. And through this the solution to the first question is evident: because the authority of Ezechiel is understood concerning spiritual goods, and the authority of the Apostle concerning temporal ones.

§ 13. To the second question it must be said further, that we are more bound to assist parents: and yet I well think that affection is more inclined toward sons, on account of this, that in them the nature of the father is preserved, and they are as it were a pledge of the parents.

§ 14. But to the statement of Chrysostom it must be said that by 'juice' is understood the effect: because parents decline: and therefore there is less in them of affection [toward them], but they need more of effect.

Articulus 8 — Whether All Are Bound To Perfect Charity

Whether we are all bound to perfect charity?

§ 16. But afterwards it is asked concerning this which he says, there: It is also to be known that there are diverse degrees of charity, etc.

§ 17. And three things are asked, namely whether we are all bound to perfect charity?

§ 18. Secondly, Whether a perfect man is bound to love more according to act, than an imperfect man?

§ 19. Thirdly, Whether a perfect man is bound to love his neighbor more, than an imperfect man [loves] God?

§ 20. To the first it is objected thus: 1. The sign of perfect charity is to lay down one's life for one's brethren, as it says, John 15:13: Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends: but everyone is bound to this: therefore he is bound to perfect charity. Middle proof. The soul of the neighbor is better than our body: therefore, if we love according to the order assigned above by Augustine, we ought to expose our body for the soul of our neighbor.

§ 21. 2. Also, Matthew 5:48: Be you perfect, as also your heavenly Father is per-

§ 1. -fect: but He Himself loves the soul more than the body: therefore we also ought to love thus: therefore we ought willingly to expose our life for the better thing.

§ 2. 3. Also, Luke 9:26: He that shall be ashamed of me and of my words, of him the Son of man shall be ashamed, when he shall come in his majesty: therefore it seems that for the confession of faith we ought to be prepared to die: but this is of perfect charity: therefore we are all bound to perfect charity.

§ 3. 4. Also, the unpriceable ought not to be placed under any price: but virtue is unpriceable, and especially grace: therefore anyone is bound to be prepared to die for justice and faith: but this is of perfect charity: therefore he is bound to have perfect charity.

§ 4. 5. Also, 1 Maccabees 3:58 and 59: Be ye girded, and be valiant sons:... for it is better for us to die in battle, than to see the evils of our nation, and of the holies: therefore all are bound to die for faith and justice, which is of perfect charity.

§ 5. 6. Also, they who denied on account of punishments, sinned mortally: therefore it seems that they were bound not to deny: and this they could not do without perfect charity: therefore they were bound to have perfect charity.

§ 6. BUT AGAINST: The perfection of charity does not depend on our will: therefore it is not in us: but to nothing are we bound except to that which is in us: therefore we are not bound to the perfection of charity.

§ 7. Solution: It must be said that perfection is multiplex, namely of sufficiency, and to this all are bound: concerning which, Matthew 5:48: Be you therefore perfect, as also your heavenly Father is perfect: and this consists in the observance of the precepts. There is also the perfection of comparison, concerning which it is said, Genesis 6:9: Noe was a just and perfect man in his generations, he walked with God: and concerning this, nothing at present. There is also the perfection of a vow or of religion, concerning which it is said, Matthew 19:21: If thou wilt be perfect, go sell what thou hast, and give to the poor. Perfection is also annexed to a vow, as Chastity to Holy Orders: and concerning this, Matthew 19:12: There are eunuchs, who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven. And it follows: He that can take, let him take it. There is again a perfection sought in the security of conscience, concerning which it is said, 1 John 4:18: Perfect charity casteth out fear: and such men say with the Apostle, Philippians 1:23: Having a desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ. And to these four perfections not all are bound: but to that which is annexed to orders and religion those are bound who have bound themselves. But there is another perfection of prelacy, concerning which it is said, John 15:13: Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends. Prelates are bound to have this, that they may run about the flock: and if the flock is sought, not just the person of the shepherd, they are bound to expose themselves to the wolves, so that by their example faith may stand in the flock.

§ 8. But if you ask, How is it known that the flock is sought? I say that the flock is then sought when they seek to extinguish in the people those things which make it a flock to the Lord, and this is faith and justice. But when on account of hatred of a person someone persecutes the flock, then the shepherd can absent himself, because his absence will give rest both to himself and to the flock: and thus the Apostle permitted himself to be let down by the brethren through the wall of Damascus, that he might escape the hands of the Provost of the Damascenes.

§ 9. According to this therefore it must be said to the first and all the following, which all have the same solution, that this is true in a case, namely when we know in this mode a brother can be liberated from the danger of the soul. But when we probably doubt, we are not bound. Also, when we are comprehended [arrested], for faith or

justice we are bound to stand strongly: but before we are comprehended, we can flee, unless we are prelates, because then for the danger of the flock we are bound to run about,

and to expose ourselves to the teeth of the wolves: and this when the flock is sought commonly, and not the person of the shepherd. Whence also I think that if a preacher had for some time admonished the people to constancy, and afterwards persecution came, that he would be bound to remain with them, lest by the example of his flight they should fail in the faith and justice which he had preached: but nevertheless he is less bound to this than a Prelate, because a Prelate is bound from office, but a preacher from the act which he did, and not from profession, because he never professed this.

Articulus 9 — Whether The Perfect Are Bound To Love More In Act Than The Imperfect

Whether a perfect man is bound to love more according to act, than an imperfect man?

§ 4. Secondly it is asked whether a perfect man is bound to love more according to act, than an imperfect man?

§ 5. It seems that he is: because Gregory says: When gifts increase, the reasons for the gifts also increase: but in the perfect man the gifts have increased: therefore the reasons for the gifts: therefore he is bound to love more according to act.

§ 6. Also, Gregory: From him to whom more is committed, more is exacted: but to the perfect man more is committed: therefore more of love is exacted from him.

§ 7. BUT AGAINST! We see this daily, that neophytes in conversion love and pray more fervently than mature and perfect men: therefore it seems that they are not bound to be more fervent according to act.

§ 8. Moreover, merit is not attended to according to fervor, but according to the very quantity of love: therefore they are not bound to this, that they be fervent.

§ 9. Solution: It must be said that a perfect man is bound to love more according to act from what is committed [to him], not from precept: but to love more according to act, in my judgment, is not attended to in fervor, but rather according to the quantity of the will, because he inheres more strongly to the beloved, and the perfect man is more difficultly separated than the imperfect. For concerning a novice it is like new wine, which has two undigested heats, namely of the place, and natural: and those disturb with inordinate motions and make it ferment: but when the heat of the place has evaporated, and the natural heat is digested, then it is stronger in its convenient and natural operations than the heat of the must, and then it is drunk with sweetness. Thus in novices the new heat of warmth from charity, and the retained heat of concupiscence still fight together: and from this fervor often appears in them, which however is immature, and would quickly yield to adversities or prosperities, unless it were first digested by a long custom of good life.

§ 10. And through this the solution to the authorities of Gregory is evident: because they speak of intensification from what is committed, and not from precept.

Articulus 10 — Whether The Perfect Can Love The Neighbor More Than The Imperfect Can Love God

Whether a perfect man can love his neighbor more, than an imperfect man loves God?

§ 13. Thirdly it is asked, If a perfect man can love his neighbor more, than an imperfect man loves God?

§ 14. It seems, however, that he can: because a perfect man would more quickly die for the salvation of his neighbor than an imperfect man for the sake of God; since this is of greatest charity, it seems he himself loves his neighbor more, than an imperfect man [loves] God.

ON THE CONTRARY: God and the neighbor are disproportionable goods. Therefore, since the good is the reason for love, it seems that God is loved immeasurably more by any charity whatsoever than the neighbor is loved by anyone.

And this seems to be something that must be conceded.

AND TO the first argument it must be said that, in that deed, the perfect man would principally die out of the love of God rather than of the neighbor, and therefore it does not follow that he loves the neighbor more, but rather God.

Articulus 11 — A Difficult Question On The Increase Of Charity

A difficult question concerning the augmentation of charity.

Next, it is asked about what he says there, D, near the beginning: That it may be perfected, it is born; when it has been born, etc.

For here there is a difficult question concerning the augmentation of charity, which was indeed disputed in the first book of the Sentences. But it is still inquired into on account of its difficulty.

§ 1. For every form is simple, and there is no intension in it except through the intension of its causes in the subject, just as whiteness is intended when its causes are intended. Therefore, since charity has no cause in the subject, it cannot be intended, as it seems.

§ 2. Again, a form which is intended: either it is intended through separation from its contrary, just as the Philosopher says that the white is unmixed with the black, and the whiter is that which is more unmixed with the black; or it is intended through approach to a terminus or to the true imposition of the name, as the whiter is that which is nearer to the true white, and the better is that which is more similar to the true good; or it is intended through recession from that, just as an evil is called worse because it is further removed from the good. If therefore charity is intended, it is intended in one of these modes. Not in the first mode, because the least charity has nothing of mortal sin with it; therefore it is universally removed from it. Nor can it be said that it is intended through separation from venial sin, as it seems, because even the greatest charity that exists in the present wayfaring state is compatible with this, as Augustine says, and as was established above, that as long as we are on the way, on account of the battle of concupiscence, that precept is not totally fulfilled by us: You shall love the Lord your God, etc. Therefore charity cannot be intended in this mode.

§ 3. Again, it does not seem that it can be intended through approach to the true imposition of the name. For the true imposition of the name belongs either to that which is truly the habit of charity, or having an admixture of the contrary; or to that which is substantially its own charity. If in the first mode, it is no longer intended, because this is in the least charity. If in the second mode, again it does not seem able to be intended, because charity is not predicated according to one ratio of essential and habitual charity; but every intension and remission is according to the same ratio and species, because the Philosopher says that more and less do not vary the species. Again, nor in the third mode, because the same question returns: what would make one charity approach the terminus more than another? For it is necessary that there be some cause of that excess. Again, nor in the fourth mode, because things are not intended in that mode unless they are spoken of according to privation, such as evil, dark, and the like; but charity is not spoken of in this way. If perhaps you wish to say that charity is intended through fervor. AGAINST this is the fact that fervor is from it: but intension is taken according to the cause of the quality that is intended.

§ 4. Again, the quantity of merit is attended according to intense charity. But it is commonly said that the quantity of merit is not attended according to fervor;

for if it were attended according to fervor, the charity in some perfect man would not be of the same quantity when he sleeps and when he is awake: because when he sleeps, he does not burn with charity.

§ 5. Again, according to this, since the pain of death abstracts the soul from the fervor of charity, merit would be diminished in perfect men by death itself, which is absurd.

§ 6. Again, fervor is according to the lower sensible soul, and does not reach charity which is higher: therefore it does not intend it. For Aristotle says in book XVI of On Animals: If it does not touch, it does not act, and alteration does not follow.

§ 7. Besides, it seems that the Text implies that this intension happens through the addition of essence to essence, because it says that it is augmented. But augmentation is the addition to a pre-existing quantity. Therefore it seems that something is added to a pre-existing quantity. But if this is granted, it is asked: How could this be? For the simple cannot be added to the simple, as it seems. Since therefore charity is simple, it does not seem able to be added to any simple, nor anything to it.

§ 8. Again, things which are added to one another must be such that one is related by way of potency, and the other by way of act: but this is not found here.

§ 9. Again, if a simple is added to a simple, it is not made any greater, as the Philosopher says: therefore from such an addition nothing greater is made, as it seems.

§ 10. Again, augmentation is a transmutation: therefore that which is augmented is transmuted. Therefore further, that which is augmented essentially [per substantiam], is transmuted essentially. Therefore if something is added to charity, it is augmented essentially. But that which is transmuted essentially does not remain the same substance. Therefore augmented charity does not remain the same charity as the one that was, which is false.

§ 11. Again, augmentation (as the Philosopher says) does not occur without nourishment: but it is nourished materially [per substantiam], and augmented quantitatively. And similarly Augustine seems to say here that when it is born, it is nourished, and having been nourished it is augmented. Therefore it seems that what is added is in the ratio of some essence, and has quantity, and again is incorporated into this prior charity by the virtue of another that subsumes it into itself; and this is not easy to find in charity. Therefore it seems that it is not augmented.

§ 12. Again, if so much is added to so much, it increases twofold. If therefore the added charity is like the one to which the addition is made, in that both are simple, and one is not more simple than the other, it seems necessary that either it is not augmented at all, or that in every augmentation it increases twofold.

§ 13. Again, augmentation occurs in another way through extension or rarefaction: but when something is extended, as much as it increases in one dimension, it decreases by that much in another. And we cannot say this of charity. Therefore it seems that it is not augmented in this way. Nor can we say that it is augmented through rarefaction, because it is not a rarefiable substance.

§ 14. Again, augmentation is found through the multiplication of a thing in itself, just as the Lord augmented five loaves to the satisfaction of many thousands. And this again does not seem to be fitting, because what is multiplied in itself is done either through the creation of new matter under its form, or through the sudden conversion of other matter, such as air, into the form of that which is multiplied. Therefore it seems, since charity is not a thing consisting thus of form and matter, and does not have parts, that it cannot be augmented in this way.

§ 15. Again, an augmentation of power occurs when its proper matter is multiplied, just as a natural color is multiplied and augmented in its proper matter, and the heat of fire is multiplied in its proper matter, and a heavy thing is heavier in a greater quantity, and so for others.

But this again does not apply to charity: because it has no matter except the soul; and this cannot be multiplied. Therefore it seems that it is in no way intended or augmented in essence, but only in motion and fervor.

ON THE CONTRARY: Because according to this every man would have charity equal in essence with another, and the least of the saints or the just would have as much as Christ or the Blessed Virgin, which is absurd to believe.

Besides, I ask about that stronger motion of charity of one than of another, whence does it proceed? It is certain that it is from the greater power of charity: but that greater power must necessarily be rooted in some essence. Is that essence equal to another of lesser power, or not? If so: then there is no reason why it should be of greater power than the other. If not: then the same question returns, why is the essence of this charity augmented over the essence of the other charity?

Moreover, the same question applies to the augmentation of every virtue that is not material or bodily.

SOLUTION: To this I say without prejudice, with certain Masters, that it is augmented through the addition of essence to essence: for fewer inconveniences follow from this position. And I suppose two propositions: one from a Saint, and another from a certain Philosopher. For Augustine says that in those things which are not great in bulk, to be greater is the same as to be better; and to this I add: And this is what it is to be better, which is to be more similar to the first goodness. And if it cannot be more similar through purification from a contrary, as has been sufficiently proven, it will be more similar through an added effect of goodness, which makes it approach closer. The other proposition is from the Philosopher in the commentary on book XI of the First Philosophy, that infinite power is not compared by augmentation to an infinite power in duration or in quantity, but in the vigor of the moving power; and it has this vigor from that nobility by which it is the first mover, which is capable of doing through one simple motion what others cannot do except through multiple motions that are not entirely simple. And they have more and more from this, because they approach the first in goodness more and more. According to this, therefore, it only remains to solve how a simple can be added to a simple so that it becomes greater, and whether it is augmented twofold, and by virtue of what the addition takes place.

AND I SAY to the first that this is false: "a simple cannot be added to a simple"; and it has many counter-instances. For a simple species is added to a simple intellect; but it is true that a simple in the ratio of potency and a simple in the ratio of act are added to each other. And it is not like this here, because both charities are in the ratio of perfection and act. And I say that such an addition is of light to light, and of vigor to vigor.

To the next it must be said that a simple is added to a simple, and it does not become greater in that ratio by which they were called simple through the privation of quantity. But it is not so here, because each of the simples has a quantity of good in its essence: and since to be greater is to be better, the whole is made better.

To the next it must be said that although what is added to that to which it is added is not of greater or lesser bulk, nevertheless it is of greater or lesser quantity in "good-value"; and therefore it need not augment except in that proportion by which it is greater, that is, better.

To the next it must be said that it is not as in an augmented body, that one enters into another, and one is attracted by the virtue of the other, but rather one is united to the other by the virtue of the first goodness.

But to that which is objected, that augmentation is a transmutation, etc., it must be said that augmentation is not a transmutation of essence which is a substantial form: but it is true that it is not without the transmutation of another into itself. And therefore it does not follow that the augmented thing is transmuted essentially, but it follows that something is transmuted essentially

into it. And yet this is not true of charity: because in this respect it is not similar, because that which is added is not transmuted, since it is never dissimilar, like nourishment to a body, but always similar. Hence it is not transmuted, but is united by the virtue of the first goodness.

Moreover, this question occurs once more before the end of book IV of the Sentences, and then, what God will deign to give, we will say again.

DISTINCTIO XXX

Divisio Textus

Here it is customary to ask, what is better and of greater merit, to love friends, etc. In this distinction only one thing is contained, namely what is of greater merit, to love friends, or enemies. And therefore we will ask two things here before the Text, which also depend on the preceding reading, namely whether all are bound to the love of enemies?

And, if all are bound, we will ask, whether all ought equally to exhibit affection and effect to enemies, or only the perfect?

Articulus 1 — Whether We Are All Bound To The Love Of Enemies

Whether we are all bound to the love of enemies?

To the first of these we proceed thus: § 1. On that verse of Psalm 118:18: Open my eyes, and I will consider the wondrous things of your law, the Gloss says that the wondrous things which are considered are to love enemies. But it is certain that we are not bound to wondrous things: therefore we are not bound to love enemies.

§ 2. Again, Luke 6:27: Love your enemies, the Gloss says: This belongs to the perfect. Therefore, since we are not all bound to perfection, we are not all bound to love enemies.

§ 3. Again, the Gloss in the same place: Here the Church is not nourished with milk, which is for the simple and imperfect, but is strengthened by the stronger food of charity. Therefore it seems that none are bound to this except the perfect.

§ 4. Again, Matthew 5:43: You have heard that it was said: You shall love your neighbor, and hate your enemy. Since therefore we are not bound to more things than they were, it seems that we can hate our enemies. But that we are not bound to more things than they were is gathered from Matthew 15:36, on that text: And taking the seven loaves and the fishes, and giving thanks, etc. The Gloss: He preaches no other things than those which were written, but demonstrates that the law and the Prophets are more weighty.

Again, this is gathered from Matthew 19:17: If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments. Therefore the commandments which had been given to the ancients were sufficient for his salvation.

Again, this is gathered from 1 Kings 7:23, on that text: He also made a molten sea of ten cubits, etc.: there the Gloss says: In the ten precepts of the law the Lord expressed everything we ought to do. But it is certain that the love of enemies is nowhere [mentioned] there. Therefore we are not bound to it.

§ 5. Again, Ezekiel 20:11: I gave them my precepts... which if a man do, he shall live in them, the interlinear Gloss says: Adding nothing. Since therefore this is not contained in the Decalogue, it seems that we ought not to add it.

§ 6. Again, it is often read in the Old Testament that the Lord killed and commanded enemies to be killed, such as Amalek, and those who dwelled in the promised land before the sons of Israel. Therefore it seems that He wants us to hate our enemies.

§ 7. Again, there seems to be a reason for this: for enmity is the cause of fighting. But the cause of fighting and the cause of friendship are contrary: therefore enmity will not be the cause of love, but of its contrary; therefore it will be the cause of hatred. Therefore the enemy is not to be loved.

§ 8. Again, we see this in every nature, both inanimate and animate, that each fights against its enemy. Therefore it seems that loving enemies is against the natural law implanted in everything: therefore we are not bound to it by charity, because charity is not contrary to the natural law.

But against this are: § 1. Those things which are contained in the Text, and which were held in the preceding distinction.

§ 2. Again, Leviticus 19:18: Seek not revenge, nor be mindful of the injury of your citizens: therefore it seems that the ancients were bound to the love of enemies.

§ 3. Again, Sirach 28:3-4: Man keeps anger against man, and does he seek healing from God? He has no mercy on a man like himself, and does he entreat for his own sins? As if to say: He will neither receive healing, nor be heard.

§ 4. Again, Proverbs 24:17: When your enemy falls, do not rejoice.

SOLUTION: It must be said that all are bound to the love of enemies, both the perfect and the imperfect.

TO the first, therefore, it must be said that there is something wondrous, which is only unusual: and in this way to love enemies is called wondrous: and to this we are indeed bound. And there is a wondrous thing that is unusual and appears above the faculty of the one admiring it: and to this we are not bound.

To the next it must be said that the Gloss speaks of the perfection of sufficiency. But if it calls perfect those who are in the state of perfection, then it is understood of the following verse, which is: Do good to them that hate you, so that it is understood of the exhibition of familiarity through benefits and external signs: because to this none are bound except the perfect.

To the next it must be said that those servile ones who served under the bark of the letter in the Old Testament are called simple there. Or, if it is understood of the perfect, then it is to be glossed like the preceding.

To the next it must be said that it was never said to the ancients, You shall hate your enemy, except by their Doctors, and not by the law: but they observed it as if it had been said, and from that Christ assumed this.

Or it may be said that this was said to them concerning an enemy of the faith, and not concerning a personal enemy: and they understood this of a personal enemy by a perverse intellect. But concerning an enemy of the faith it was said in a precept that they should kill every male in the land which God was going to give into their possession: but the Lord understood this of the good killing, which is by the sword of the spirit, which is the word of God.

To that which is objected, that we are bound to nothing but what they were, it must be said that if what is contained in the law is taken explicitly, then it is false: because they were bound to many things to which we are not bound, and we are bound to many things to which they were not bound. But if it is understood spiritually and implicitly, according to which the truth is in the shadow: then this is true. But we do not fulfill the same thing through the same works: because they were bound not to eat swine's flesh, and nevertheless to be continent; but we are continent, and we eat [swine's flesh], and we fulfill the same thing. And this is what the Gloss means when it says that they demonstrate that the law is filled with spiritual sacraments.

To the next it must be said that it is contained in that commandment: Honor your father and your mother, namely parents: because under the name of parents every man is understood there, as Augustine says. And through this the solution to the following is clear.

To the next it must be said that the Lord showed in this that the enemies of the faith should be killed by the sword of the spirit, so that the masculine, in which the vigor of sin is noted, might be killed, and human infirmity might live, which is noted by the virgins who have not known men in intercourse, that is, those not having the appetite to fornicate away from the faith. But if they do not wish to be converted, there is nothing else except that they should pay in material fire the penalties of the harm they inflict on the Church through the subversion of the simple.

To the next it must be said that enmity as enmity is not to be loved, but rather the enemy, who is the image of God, to the end that he may no longer be an enemy.

To the next it must be said that this is not against the law of human nature: because man is an animal tame by nature, conformable to God rather than to beasts.

Articulus 2 — Whether All Are Equally Bound To Show Signs Of Affection And Familiarity, Or Only The Perfect

Whether all are equally bound to exhibit signs of affection and familiarity, or only the perfect?

Secondly it is asked: Whether all are equally bound to exhibit signs of affection and familiarity, or only the perfect?

It seems that this is a precept only for the perfect.

§ 1. By the Gloss on Matthew 5:43, introduced earlier. If perhaps it is said that it is spoken concerning the perfection of sufficiency. Against this seems to be the fact that the Lord there adds upon the state of imperfection of the Old Testament: therefore all are bound to it.

§ 2. Again, in the same place, another Gloss says that the summit of perfection is to love enemies and to pray for them: therefore it seems that not even all the perfect are bound, but only those in whom there is the summit of perfection.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. In the same place another Gloss says: Sins against the Church are committed in three ways: by hatred, by words, by bodily torture; but the Church on the contrary does three things: she loves, she prays, she does good. Therefore it seems that whoever neglects these things is not a member of the Church. Therefore all are bound.

§ 2. Again, this was commanded even to the ancients, Proverbs 25:21: If your enemy is hungry, feed him.

§ 3. Again, Exodus 23:4: If you meet your enemy's ox or ass going astray, bring it back to him. The Gloss:

This means, love your enemies. And it follows, v. 5: If you see the ass of him that hates you lying under a burden, you shall not pass by, but shall lift it up with him. The Gloss: This means to do good to them that hate us.

SOLUTION: Without prejudice I say that to me it seems harsh if all are said to be bound to exhibit signs of love. Hence it seems to me that they are not bound except in a particular case, if they see him suffering necessity: for then they are bound. But still it seems to me that if he asks for pardon without mocking, then a sign of love must not be denied to him.

Again, it seems to me that if he greets you, he ought to be greeted in return, unless a man probably fears that he is doing it as a mockery, as if not caring that he has provoked a brother.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear. For the perfect are bound on account of scandal to offer signs of love even spontaneously, especially in the presence of those who know that they have been offended.

Articulus 3 — Whether It Is Better To Love An Enemy Than A Friend

Whether it is better to love an enemy than a friend?

Next it is asked concerning what he says at the beginning of the reading: Here it is customarily asked, What is better and of greater merit, etc.

For it seems that to love enemies is better and of greater merit, because:

§ 1. The Gloss on Matthew 5:43 says that this is the summit of perfection: therefore this is better.

§ 2. Again, the Gloss on that verse of Psalm 118:18: I will consider the wondrous things of your law, says: In the works of God nothing is more wondrous than to love enemies. Therefore nothing is higher and better.

§ 3. Again, Bernard on that verse of John 15:13: Greater love than this no one has, that one lay down his life for his friends, adds: Indeed you, Lord, had greater love, who laid down your life for friends and enemies. Therefore it seems to be better and preferable.

§ 4. Again, Matthew 5:46: If you love those who love you, what reward will you have? The Gloss: None in heaven. Therefore to love enemies is better.

§ 5. Again, Romans 5:8-9: But God commends his charity towards us, because when as yet we were enemies, according to the time Christ died for us, namely for the impious. If therefore God's charity is commendable in this, ours will be commendable from the same.

§ 6. Again, Matthew 5:44, on that verse: Love your enemies, the Gloss says: Behold to how great a perfection he advances us! Therefore perfection is taken according to that: therefore it is better.

§ 7. Again, a virtue is said to be the utmost of a power concerning a thing or in a thing. But charity is of greater power above nature when it loves an enemy than when it loves a friend. Therefore its virtue is greater. Therefore this is better than that.

§ 8. Again, what involves a greater battle belongs to a greater glory. But to love an enemy involves a greater battle: therefore it is of greater glory: therefore it is better.

§ 9. Again, nature and grace incline to loving a friend; but the more grace elevates nature, the purer and better the motion is, because in this way it approaches more to conformity with grace. But this is maximally the case in the love of enemies. Therefore, speaking absolutely, to love enemies is better than to love friends.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. For merit to be in a certain quantity is for it to be according to the quantity of charity. But in

the degrees of charity the love of enemies is placed in the last place: therefore this is of the least merit, as it seems.

§ 2. Again, if there is a comparison of one to the other, this cannot be by grace of the habit: because without contradiction it is true that an act of greater charity, insofar as it is such, is of greater merit. Therefore this was in the same or an equal act. But then I see that the love of a friend burns more fervently: therefore it seems that it is of greater merit on account of the fervor.

§ 3. Again, friend and enemy are contraries; to love and to hate are also contraries. But to hate a friend is more evil than to hate an enemy. Therefore its opposite is more good and more eligible than the opposite of the other. But the opposite is to love a friend. Therefore this is more good than to love an enemy. And the Philosopher seems to concede this.

SOLUTION: In my judgment it must be said that absolutely and simply it is better to love an enemy than to love a friend, just as the first reasons prove. However, some say that in these two there can be a comparison of state to state, or act to act, or habit to habit; and all these

either in the same man, or in different men. If a comparison of state to state is made in different men, they say that it is better to love an enemy: because this indicates a state of perfection, but the other does not. But if the comparison is made in the same man, it is still better: because loving an enemy presupposes much more loving a friend as well, but not conversely. And just as two things are better than one of them, so it will be here too: for he who is in such a state that he loves an enemy, is also in that state that he loves a friend. But if a comparison of habit to habit is made in the same man, there is no comparison: because the habit is the same, but in different objects they are related as exceeding and exceeded. But if a comparison of act to act is made: because the acts both in the same man and in different men are separate, and I am speaking of the act in comparison to the object alone, then they say that in a certain respect one is better, and in a certain respect the other. For since the habits are equal, as the comparison supposes, then on account of sweetness and fervor the love of a friend avails more for the accumulation of beatitude; but on account of difficulty and labor the love of an enemy avails more for the remission of sin regarding the penalty which we are bound to pay for sin. And the solution of almost all the Masters comes back to this. But it seems to me that Christ meant that it is simply better to love an enemy: because it is of a stronger charity above nature, and because it also presupposes loving a friend. For just as a fire is stronger which acts upon the near and the remote, than one which acts upon the near alone, so also the fire of charity is stronger toward what is distant from nature than toward what is near to nature. And therefore I concede the reasons introduced first.

To the first objection to the contrary, it must be said that Ambrose posits the order of charity, not according as charity is of a stronger power towards this or that, but according as it agrees with the nature which it perfects. And from this it does not follow that one is better than another: because merit is not attended according to how charity moves with nature, but rather according to how it moves according to the mode of grace alone.

To the next it must be said that that fervor receives only an accidental reward: because the comparison supposes the habits of both acts to be equal, because otherwise there would be no rationale. But I think that that which belongs to charity in a difficult matter can outweigh this accidental [reward].

To the next it must be said that this reason errs in multiple ways. In one way: because it is posited by the Philosopher according as he speaks of the diversity of the love of some fool, who loves an enemy insofar as he is an enemy, and not for the sake of God or directed to God: and that man deserves reproaches, and thus the authority is solved. But the Saints say

§ 1. ...love enemies, so that they might become friends to God, or towards God. In another way: because such a form of arguing is more attended to in a consequence to the contrary, than in a consequence in itself: and in reasoning, the process is according to the consequence in itself; and then it is taken [to mean] to hate friends, and to hate enemies. Consequently, it is inferred that since the antecedent is less eligible than the consequent, its opposite—namely, to love friends—would be more eligible than the opposite of the consequent, which is to love enemies. Thus, the greater opposite of the antecedent would follow from the opposite of the consequent according to what is more and less eligible. Thirdly, it fails [sins]: because given

that the consequence were valid according to the eligible and non-eligible, it still would have no force in those things where positing one presupposes the other. And it is so here, because in charity and in holy men, to love enemies presupposes loving friends; therefore, it is invalid.

Articulus 4 — Whether There Is One And The Same Movement Toward Friend And Enemy

Whether there is one and the same motion towards a friend and an enemy?

§ 2. Next, it is asked concerning what he says there, around the beginning: Whether there is one and the same motion towards a friend and an enemy, etc.

§ 3. For this seems impossible, that it be the same.

§ 4. 1. For it is impossible for one motion to be compared and terminated at two termini; but the two termini are the friend and the enemy: therefore, they cannot be one motion at the same time.

§ 5. 2. Also, a line on one part is not terminated at two points: therefore, neither is a motion towards two termini. If perhaps you say that one is as the terminus and the other as the end: this is ridiculous, because the love of an enemy is not referred to the love of a friend, or to the friend himself, as to an end, but rather to God.

§ 6. Solution. It seems to me that it must be said that this is false. Nevertheless, there are others who object to the contrary thus, that the sensible [power] is less potent than the intellectual; but by the sensible we apprehend many things at once, because one by sight, and another by hearing: or by sight two things sometimes as two, as when one of the eyes is displaced [pressed]: therefore, much more does this happen to the intellectual; moreover, the will belongs to the intellectual parts. Also they say that what the Philosopher says, We can indeed know many things, but understand very few , is not true, but probable: because the Philosopher introduced this as a probable example even in that science; for he introduces many examples in that book which are not entirely true. I, however, think this to be an error. For it is not similar to apprehend many things by multiple organs and multiple powers, and by one power composing as if by many. For I well concede all these things to this extent, that by one non-composing motion, but tending directly to the object, it can apprehend many things. For the visual power is not numerically one in each pupil, but in its principle it is one, namely in the conjunction of the optic nerve at the part of the common sense. Similarly, when it is said, I see the white son of Diares, or the white sweet thing , this will be an apprehension of the common sense composing and dividing. In such cases, many are not apprehended as many, but as many in one subject, which is a magnitude that is per se the object of the common sense. And it is the same in the composing intellect: because in it many things are apprehended in one act of composition. But it is not so in the simple intellect. And therefore Aristotle's statement is most true. However, granting that this could be on the part of the apprehensive power from within, not from without, we still will not grant that this is so in the affection, which brings nothing together: but rather it pursues or flees the intentions of good or evil elicited from the comprehension.

Articulus 5 — Whether All Are Bound To Love Their Enemies

Are all bound to love their enemies?

§ 7. Next, it is asked concerning what he says there, in the first part: Nor this by such a great multitude, etc.

§ 8. According to this, it seems that not all are bound to love their enemies, which is against what was previously determined.

§ 9. Solution. It must be said that it is understood of a love showing an effect through signs of familiarity: for to this, not all are bound.

Articulus 6 — Whether One Not Forgiving His Debtors Ought To Say, Our Father

Should one who does not forgive his debtors say the "Our Father"?

§ 10. Next, it is asked concerning what he says around the middle: If you forgive men, etc.

§ 11. Through this it seems that he who does not forgive ought not to say the Our Father: because he lies: but if he lies, he kills his own soul.

§ 12. But on the contrary: It is enjoined upon him to do whatever good he can, so that God may illuminate his heart: therefore, it is enjoined upon him to pray: therefore, he ought to say the Our Father, because that is the most preeminent of all prayers.

§ 13. Solution. We concede that he ought to say the Our Father. And that clause, And forgive us, etc., is either said by him and verified in the person of the Church; or, because he asks for future forgiveness, it is verified by him as present for the future, that is, just as we propose to forgive in the future, either in act or in habit.

Articulus 7 — Whether The Opinion Of Certain People, Who Say That The Precept To Love Every Man, Even An Enemy, Was Given Only To The Perfect, Savors Of Heresy

Is the opinion of some, who say that the precept of loving every man, even an enemy, is only given to the perfect, smacking of heresy?

§ 14. Next, it is asked concerning what he says, around the end of the Text: Some say that what is simply stated here, etc.

§ 15. For this seems contrary to the Gospel: therefore, it is heresy.

§ 16. Solution. I think that this opinion possesses heretical depravity, unless it is understood of the love of affection in signs of familiarity: because this is given to the imperfect only as a counsel, and is not a precept.

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§ 17. That also must not be passed over, which some assert, etc. Here begins that part in which he treats of charity in comparison to the one loving.

§ 18. And it has three parts: in the first of which he asks, Whether charity, once possessed, can be lost or not? In the second, he shows incidentally how the other theological virtues are on the part of charity, there, C, It must also be noted, how faith, etc. In the third and last, he touches upon the charity of Christ, there, D, Now it remains, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether Charity Once Possessed Can Be Lost

Can charity, once possessed, happen to be lost?

Can charity, once possessed, happen to be lost?

§ 19. Now two questions fall around the intention of the first chapter: the first of which is, Whether charity, once possessed, happens to be lost? And in the second, In what degree does it rise again after charity is lost?

§ 20. To the first, one proceeds thus: 1. The rationale of charity is the same in man and in Angels; but in Angels, once possessed, it does not happen to be lost, according to the opinion of those who say the Angels were created without grace: therefore, neither in man does it happen that, once possessed, it is lost.

§ 21. 2. Also, a less strong thing does not cast out a more strong thing, but the least charity is stronger than every sin and every temptation: therefore, it is not cast out by any sin or any temptation.

§ 22. 3. Also, if it is cast out, the law of contraries must be preserved between it and sin, which Boethius posits in the book On the Two Natures in the One Person of Christ, namely, that no things mutually transmute one another unless they mutually act and suffer upon one another; but these are always proportioned in their powers: therefore, since there is no proportion of the power of charity to sin, it seems it cannot be transmuted by any sin.

§ 23. 4. Also, if it is expelled: it is expelled either by a sin that is, or by a sin that is not. If by a sin that is: either in the same [subject], or in another. If in another. To the contrary: The Philosopher says in book XVI of On Animals , that if it does not touch, it does not act, and no alteration follows. Therefore, it does not expel it from the subject. If in the same: therefore, contraries are simultaneously in the same thing, which cannot be.

§ 24. If you say that they are not in the same instant [nunc]: but in one instant charity departs, and in another sin is present. A twofold inconvenience follows from this: one of which is that one of the contraries yields to the other before it is touched by it, or before it acts upon it. The other is: let those two instants be designated, and let A be the one in which charity yields, and B the one in which sin is present. Since between any two instants there is

time, in that time the soul is neither in charity nor in sin, which is absurd. Therefore, it is left that charity, once possessed, is not lost.

§ 25. 5. Also, the will of itself is indifferent: therefore, when by charity it is made actually good, it is therefore more prepared for good than for evil: therefore, it cannot be conquered by sin.

§ 26. 6. Also, every motion is according to the exigency of the dominant: the dominant is charity, because it can [prevail] over all things: therefore, it never sins.

§ 27. 7. Also, this seems to be said in (1 John 3:9), that he who is born of God, does not sin.

§ 28. 8. Also, Song of Songs 8:6-7: Love is strong as death, jealousy is hard as hell... Many waters could not extinguish charity, that is, many temptations.

§ 29. 9. Also, in Psalm 26:1: The Lord is my light. Gloss: If the gift is taken away, the giver is conquered; but it is certain that the giver cannot be conquered: therefore, neither can the gift be taken away.

§ 30. 10. Also, Chrysostom on John: Love is great, and more vehement than fire: and there is nothing which can sustain its proper impetus. Much less can sin sustain that impetus.

§ 31. 11. If perhaps you wish to say that God takes it away. To the contrary: To the Romans 11:29: Without repentance are the gifts and the calling of God. Therefore, it seems that He Himself does not take it away.

§ 32. 12. Also, 1 Sam. 16:13: The spirit of the Lord was directed into David from that day forward. However, it is certain that he often sinned

mortally. Therefore, charity is not lost on account of mortal sin: therefore, it cannot be lost on account of anything.

§ 33. 13. Also, 1 John 4:16, on that verse: He who abides in charity, abides in God. Gloss: You may abide in God so that you are contained; God abides in you, so that He may contain you.

§ 34. 14. Also, it seems that since God the container is most powerful, he cannot fall: because through charity He inhabits him.

§ 35. 15. Also, upon that of Matthew 7:25: The rivers came, etc. Gloss: He who falls is not built upon Christ. But it is certain that he who has charity is built upon Christ: therefore, he does not fall.

§ 36. 16. Also, Augustine in the Enchiridion: If anyone in the time of temptation prefers to retain temporal things rather than Christ, he does not have Him in the foundation. But he who has charity, has Christ in the foundation: therefore, this one does not fall on account of temporal things.

§ 37. 17. Also, Bernard concerning Peter seems to mean that on account of his denial he did not lose the Holy Spirit or charity. Since therefore the denial of Christ is the greatest of all sins, on account of no other sin does it seem that charity can be lost.

§ 38. 18. Also, Bernard in the book On Loving God: Charity is never without fear, but chaste fear: never without desire, but ordered desire. Therefore, fear expels sin, and the desire for the incommutable good never gives place to the desire for a commutable good. Therefore, no sin will ever fall upon it: because every sin is either from an evilly humiliating fear, or from an evilly inflaming desire, as the Gloss says on that of Psalm 79:17: Set on fire and dug down, they shall perish at the rebuke of your countenance.

§ 39. 19. Also, 1 John 4:1: Many false, etc. Gloss: false prophets went out from us: They were never in us of the number of those having charity.

§ 40. 20. Also, the Philosopher maintains that the mutable and the immutable are not of the same rationale, nor of the same genus. But it is certain that the charity of the way [via], and the charity of the homeland [patria] are of the same rationale: therefore, since the charity of the homeland is immutable, the charity of the way will be immutable. The Master in the Text also introduces many things to this end.

§ 41. But to the contrary is that 1. The Apostle says, 1 Cor. 10:12, Let him who thinks he stands take heed lest he fall: therefore, he who stands through charity can fall.

§ 42. 2. Also, Rev. 2:4: I have against you, that you have left your first charity. Therefore, it can be left behind. And because we see this happening continuously, let these suffice.

§ 43. Solution. It must be said that charity can be lost and recovered quite often in the way [i.e., in this life].

§ 44. To the first, therefore, it must be said that it is not similar: because an Angel, according to that opinion, simultaneously receives charity and confirmation, but man does not; but as regarding the act of making pleasing and of loving, it is similar.

§ 45. To the next, it must be said that sin does not conquer charity: but the will spontaneously casts it out, when it is deflected toward that with which it cannot coexist.

§ 46. And through this the solution to the following is evident.

§ 47. To the next, it must be said that sin is a privation, and not some positing contrary.

§ 48. If perhaps it is said that this is an evasion and not a response: I say then that this is false, that two contraries can in no way be in the same thing simultaneously: but two contraries, such that both are in act, cannot be in the same thing; but when both are in potency, or one is in act and the other in potency, nothing prohibits them from being in the same thing. And so it is here: because charity in that instant is not simply present, but as corrupted and receding, and sin as in generation and approaching. And there is a counter-instance against the proposition in every physical action and passion.

§ 49. To the next, it must be said that the will, of itself indifferent, is habilitated by charity: but it is never so habilitated prior to confirmation that it cannot spontaneously lay aside charity and be deflected into sin. Whence nothing compels it.

§ 50. To the next, it must be said that this is true of a motion in which the mover acts through the intention of nature and not of the will.

§ 51. To the next, it must be said that this is understood of the predestined and of final sin. Or better let it be said that, as much as is in itself, the generation through charity preserves him: but he himself can destroy himself.

§ 52. And through this the solution to the following is also evident.

§ 53. To the next, it must be said that this would also be true if the gift succumbed from its own weakness: however, this is not true.

§ 54. To the next and the following, one must answer in the same way.

§ 55. To the next, it must be said that this is not understood with respect to the act of charity, but with respect to the act of governing the people and of prophecy, which is a freely given grace, and not a grace making pleasing.

§ 56. To the next and the following, it must be said that, as much as is in itself, it contains, but you can fall away from its containing power.

§ 57. To the next, it must be said that he who falls is not built up with respect to permanence, although perhaps he was built up with respect to the essence of charity, as the Master says in the Text.

§ 58. To the next, it must be said in the same way.

§ 59. To the next, it must be said that (as Bernard says) it is understood with respect to the proposition of having mercy, and not with respect to the act of separation from charity.

§ 60. To the next, it must be said that this is true as long as charity exists: but it can be cast out by its opposite, as was said before.

§ 61. To the next, it must be said in the same way.

§ 62. To the last, it must be said that this is true of substances that are immutable by nature. Forms, however, are not mutable through themselves, but through the subject. And therefore it does not hold concerning them.

Articulus 2 — Whether It Is Necessary To Rise Again In A Lesser, Greater, Or Equal Measure

Is it always necessary to rise again in lesser, greater, or equal charity?

§ 63. Secondly, it is asked, Whether it is always necessary to rise again in lesser, or greater, or equal charity?

§ 64. However, it seems that it is in lesser: because 1. In all things it is so, that the first beginning of a being is not according to the perfection of that being, but in a lesser degree, but afterward it advances to the perfect: since therefore charity begins after sin, it seems that it begins according to an imperfect and minimal charity.

§ 65. 2. Also, Amos 5:1-2: The house of Israel has fallen, and it shall not add to rise again. The virgin of Israel is cast down upon her land, there is none to raise her up. There the Gloss: He does not deny that she can rise again, but denies that she can rise again a virgin: because once

going astray, even if carried back on the shoulders of the shepherd, she will not have as much glory as one who never went astray. Therefore, it is impossible that one rises again in equal [charity].

§ 66. 3. Also, Ezek. 44:10, 13: The Levites who went far away from me... shall not draw near to me to serve me in the priesthood. Therefore, it seems that they will never become as near as before. Therefore, they will never have as much charity.

§ 67. 4. Also, this is seen from a similar case: because a woman going astray through fornication is afterward not loved by her husband as much as before; therefore neither does God love the soul as much: but His greater or lesser love is the greater or lesser effect of love; therefore she will never have as much charity.

§ 68. But to the contrary, it seems that 1. He will rise again in equal charity: because penance, as Ambrose says, restores all things taken away: therefore it also restores as much charity as was lost.

§ 69. 2. Also, Malachi 3:4: The sacrifice of Judah and Jerusalem will please the Lord, as in the days of old, and as in the ancient years.

§ 70. 3. Also, the Gloss in the same place: Just as they pleased in the beginning, so after sin, through penance, they began to please, all the filth of vices having been purged.

§ 71. 4. Also, Zech. 8:13, on that verse: I will save you, and you will be a blessing. Gloss: They shall return to their pristine state, when they have done penance.

§ 72. 5. Also, Lev. 6:25, on that verse: This is the law of the victim, the Gloss says: The virtue of the just and the worthy penance of sinners, which restores to the pristine degree, please God equally.

§ 73. 6. Also, Luke 15:22: Bring forth quickly the first robe. Gloss: He restored the son to his pristine dignity.

§ 74. From these things it follows that anyone rises again in equal charity.

§ 75. But it seems that it is in greater: because 1. The Apostle says, Romans 5:20: Where the offense abounded, grace has superabounded.

§ 76. 2. Also, Romans 8:28: For those who love God, all things work together for good. Gloss: Even the fall into sin.

§ 77. 3. Also, Gen. 1:5: There was evening and morning, one day. Gloss: The evening light is eminent, and from which one fell, but the morning is that in which one rose again: but the morning is greater than the evening; therefore one always rises again in greater charity.

§ 78. 4. Also, Baruch 4:28: As it was your mind to go astray from God, so turning back again you shall seek Him ten times as much. Therefore, it is necessary also that one rises again in much greater charity.

§ 79. Solution. The opinion here is that someone can rise again in lesser, in equal, and in greater charity, according as he devotedly prepares himself to receive it, and according as God deigns to infuse it: because we cannot prescribe the bounds of His generosity.

§ 80. And according to this, to the first it must be said that it is not similar concerning charity, and concerning those things which are caused by nature: because natural principles have the beginnings of their being in matter; and these at first are soft and weak, and afterward are strengthened: because all matter of a natural thing relates itself in four ways, as Rabbi Moses says in the Guide of the Perplexed , namely: otherwise when outside the terminating form, and otherwise when running toward it when it is already drawn by the formative power, and otherwise when formed, and otherwise when consolidated in perfect quantity. But God does not operate thus: therefore, it is not similar concerning charity.

§ 81. To the three following, it must be said that this is understood concerning the degree according to dignity, not according to immunity from fault or the quantity of charity: for one who has sinned will have a certain indignity which he will never wipe away, namely, that he cannot boast of innocence.

§ 82. To that which is objected against this, it must be said that all those six which are objected have one solution, namely, that it is understood with respect to the rectitude of immunity from fault, not necessarily of dignity, nor of the quantity of virtue.

§ 83. To those which are further objected, it must be said that the saying of the Apostle is understood that grace superabounded with respect to conquering the offense. And he understands it of the grace of redemption accomplished through Christ, which is greater in good than the offense of the first man was in evil.

§ 84. To the next, it must be said that the fall does not cooperate toward greater charity except occasionally and remotely, as was said, and noted in book I of the Sentences.

§ 85. To the last, it must be said that Baruch says this, that just as they provoked by sinning against ten, so now turning back they will seek ten times in precepts: not that it is necessary to rise again in ten times as great a charity.

Articulus 3 — What Is The Book Of Life

What is the book of life?

What is the book of life?

§ 86. Next, it is asked concerning what he says, there, A, towards the end: The names of some Christ says are written in the book of life, etc.

§ 87. For on the occasion of this, that mention is made here of the book of life, four things can be asked here concerning it, namely: What is it? And, What is it to be written in it? And, Whether anything is written in it under a condition? And fourthly, Whether anyone who is written there can be deleted?

§ 88. To the first, one proceeds thus: 1. Augustine says that the Son of God is what the art of the omnipotent God the Father is, full of all rational plans (rationes). Therefore it seems that whatever is in God through exemplary rationes, this as a living ratio is in the Word; but to be in the book is this, namely, to be written through exemplary rationes. Therefore it seems that the Son of God is the book of life.

§ 89. 2. Also, John 1:3-4: What was made in Him, that is, in the Word, was life, and the life was the light, etc. Since therefore this is the book of life, that the things written there live, it seems that the Son is the book of life.

§ 90. 3. Also, Augustine in book XX of The City of God: The book of life is the prescience of God, in which all things are contained. But it is clear that knowledge by attribution belongs to the Son: therefore He Himself is the book of life.

§ 91. BUT TO THE CONTRARY: 1. All things made and future and those which are, are written in the Word: but not all are in the book of life, because only the elect are: therefore the book of life is not the same as the Son of God, or prescience.

§ 92. 2. Also, it seems that by appropriation it rather belongs to the Holy Spirit that He be the book of life: because life is an act of goodness; and goodness is attributed to the Holy Spirit: therefore it belongs more to the Holy Spirit.

§ 93. 3. Also, life is the act of the Spirit, as the Lord Himself says, John 6:64: It is the Spirit that gives life: therefore this belongs more to the Holy Spirit than to the Son.

§ 94. Solution. It must be said that the book of life, according to Augustine, is prescience, according as prescience is taken for predestination preparing grace in the present, which it has by way of exemplar from eternity, and glory in the future. And this indeed is common to the three persons, but by attribution it specially belongs to the Son.

§ 95. To the first, therefore, it must be said that it is not the same to be the art, and to be the book of life: because the art indicates the order of the artifact to a happy life, although the rationes of the art live in the artisan; but the book of life signifies the order of that which is written in it, to the life of grace and glory.

§ 96. And through this the solution to the following is also evident: because in Him all things are called life; not that in themselves or from Him they have an order to the life of grace and glory, but because in the artisan their rationes live.

§ 97. To the following, the solution is evident through what was said in the beginning of the solution.

Articulus 4 — What It Is To Be Written In The Book Of Life

What is it to be written in the book of life?

§ 98. Secondly, it is asked, What is it to be written in the book of life?

§ 99. It seems that something is written there temporally, because 1. The Saints say that with respect to present justice Judas and many others were written there: but present justice is temporal: therefore something is written there temporally.

§ 100. 2. Also, if it is called the book of life because the things written there ordain to the life of grace and glory, since every justice and work of charity, whether of present justice or of predestination, ordains to life, it seems that every temporal good work is written there.

§ 101. BUT TO THE CONTRARY: To be written denotes the reception of a book: but God temporally receives nothing: therefore nothing is written there temporally.

§ 102. Solution. It must be said that predestination is taken according to a complete signification, and according to a diminished one. In its complete signification it implies the preparation of grace in the present, and of glory in the future: and thus only the predestined and the goods prepared for them are written there. According to its incomplete signification, grace in the present, of itself ordaining into glory, is called preparation, but not the preparation of glory: and thus all the just are written there, and their good works, because all the good works of the Saints, whether they finally remain Saints or not, God prepared from eternity, and they can only do them by His gift.

§ 103. To the first, therefore, it must be said that present justice is written there: not when it is done, but from eternity.

§ 104. Through this the solution to the following is evident.

Articulus 5 — Whether Something Is Written In The Book Of Life Under A Condition

Is anything written in the book of life under a condition?

§ 105. Thirdly, it is asked, Whether anything is written there under a condition?

§ 106. And it seems that it is so. 1. For it is certain that predestination does not infer the necessity of salvation, because thus our works would be nothing: therefore it seems that the possibility of damnation always remains: therefore he who is written, is written under a condition, [namely] if he perseveres.

§ 107. 2. Also, this is taken from Jeremiah 18:7 ff., where the Lord says that when He pronounces good to any nation, and that nation turns and does evil, He will not give the good pronounced, but the evil which they deserved: therefore the pronounced good which the Prophet read there, was not written there simply, but under a condition.

§ 108. 3. Also, Gregory says that the Lord there changes His sentence, but not His counsel: but it is certain that a sentence is not promulgated unless it is written in the prevision of God: therefore it seems that it was written under a condition, because otherwise it would be falsified.

§ 109. BUT TO THE CONTRARY: Every condition imports doubt: but in the First Truth there is nothing by way of doubt: therefore nothing is there by way of a condition. If perhaps you should say that the truth is immobile in order to its cause, although in itself it is mobile,

as that Nineveh was to be subverted according to merits. This also is and always was and will be true, that Hezekiah was to die according to inferior causes: and in this way it is written there, and not simply. This is nothing: because thus God's ordination would depend on our work, which is impossible: and thus the eternal would in some way be caused by the temporal.

§ 110. Solution. It must be said that nothing is known there under a condition, but all things simply: just as predestination itself is a simple truth: but what is simply in God, cannot be said simply by us. Also, what is simply foreseen by God, is not explicated except according to succession in time. Whence pronouncements of this kind are concerning foreseen things insofar as they go forth [into time].

...they are ordered into a work, and thus they have an order, because punishment is against fault, and reward is unto merit. And in this way there are pre-announcements and sentences which God sometimes changes, as we have said elsewhere.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that there is not any condition there, but rather a reason of concomitance and of the term of the work of predestination or of the effect: for these concomitantly accompany each other according to the order of wisdom, namely, to do well and to be saved; and the effect of predestination is terminated at this, as well as to do ill and be damned.

To the next it must be said that Jeremiah speaks of predestination as to its effect in time, and not concerning eternal prevision: for the effect is indeed well caused by our work, although the prevision itself is not.

To the next it must be said that the sentence is called by Gregory the enunciation of the effect, and not of eternal predestination.

To that which is objected to the contrary, the solution is clear through what was said before.

Articulus 6 — Whether Someone Written In The Book Of Life Can Be Blotted Out

Whether someone written in the book of life can be erased?

Fourthly it is asked, whether anyone is erased who is written there?

It seems that they are: 1. Let them be erased from the book of the living, and not be written with the just.

1. Also: Either forgive them this trespass, or if you do not, erase me from your book which you have written.
2. Also, otherwise it would seem to posit a necessity for salvation: therefore virtue or salvation would no longer be voluntary in any way.

ON THE CONTRARY! 1. I will not erase his name from the book of life.

1. Also, the Gloss says: Let them be erased from the book of the living: This is not to be understood as though they are written and erased, but as to the hope of those who think themselves written there.

But then it is asked concerning Judas, who is said to be written there as to present justice, what this saying might be.

Solution. It must be said that no one written there is erased, nor is anything written there erased.

TO THE FIRST, therefore, it must be said that it is said, Let them be erased, with respect to the relation of present justice to a just person who falls from justice. For as long as he is just, the relation of the writing to him remains concerning the works eternally prepared for him. But when he falls, with no change made in the book, he now falls outside the relation of the order to his merits. How a relation is changed when one of the relatives is changed and the other remains immutable, has been sufficiently said according to my ability in the first book of the Sentences. This, therefore, is called being erased from the book.

To the next it must be said that Moses did not desire this: but he predicted the consequence of the fact. For if He had not forgiven the trespass, in some respect he would have fallen from the writing of the book, namely as to the accidental glory of their leadership, and the introduction into the promised land, and the bestowal of the law. And he does not speak of deletion from the book simply, nor as to the substantial reward.

Articulus 7 — Whether Faith Can Be Made Void

Can faith be evacuated?

Next it is asked concerning what he says there, It must also be noted how faith, hope, and knowledge are said to be evacuated, etc.

And four things are asked: the first of which is concerning the evacuation of faith. Second, concerning the evacuation of hope. Third, is charity evacuated? And why not, if it is not evacuated? Fourth, concerning the evacuation of knowledge.

To the FIRST it is objected thus:

1. Faith is the foundation in the spiritual edifice: but if the foundation is evacuated, the whole edifice collapses: therefore if faith is evacuated, all graces and virtues and hoped-for things collapse into nothing, which would be a great incongruity.
2. Also, a greater light does not obscure a lesser light, but perfects it: but face-to-face vision succeeds faith: therefore it does not evacuate it, as it seems.

ON THE CONTRARY! It was proven above very often that faith is of the non-apparent: but in the homeland nothing is non-apparent: therefore there will be no faith there.

Solution. It must be said that in faith there are two things on the part of that by which it is cognition. And a third is that which is an affection. One thing in cognition is a kind of vision. For faith is a certain vision of divine truth: and it is called by some the primary substance of faith, because around specifying that, all forms and differences are posited, which constitute faith in the species of a virtue. But the second is the form informing this cognition or vision to the species of faith. This, moreover, is the mirror and enigma of the non-apparent. And with these removed, there is no faith. Yet there can be a vision of the face, or of another knowledge. The third is an affection, which assents not on account of anything except on account of the first truth absolutely: because if it had a reason, it would not believe on account of it. It can therefore be said that faith is evacuated as to the second, which is the form, and the mode of vision: but not as to the first and last: but rather those remain and are perfected. And thus vision, which is the total reward, succeeds faith: because it is the vision feeding upon what is loved and possessed.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that faith is substance here: and by reason of that which is vision, it is substance: and this does not collapse there. And therefore the edifice remains entire; because that which is distant, and in a mirror and in an enigma, cannot be the ratio of a foundation, since it is of an imperfection, which is not fitting for the glorified.

To the next it must be said that this is true of lights which are not ordered to one another as imperfect and perfect: but it is not thus here. For the imperfect yields to the perfect in all things, just as privation yields to form in nature.

Articulus 8 — Whether Hope Can Be Made Void

Can hope be evacuated?

Secondly, it is asked concerning the evacuation of hope.

For it seems that nothing succeeds hope, and thus it seems to be totally destroyed, and not evacuated.

1. For the Gloss says that beatitude succeeds hope: and this cannot be, since it succeeds all the virtues.
2. Also, Augustine says that vision succeeds faith, which is the total reward: therefore nothing is left that succeeds hope.
3. Also, every change happens according to some common subject: but in hope there is nothing but the expectation of the future, and protension into it: but none of these remains, because neither expectation remains, nor protension into something not possessed; therefore it seems to be totally destroyed: because even faith would be totally destroyed, if no common subject to the mirror and the face or presence remained, as we said, that the vision remains.

ALSO it is asked, Why are these virtues evacuated, since this is not said of the cardinal virtues, that they are evacuated? For what is ordered toward that which is toward the end ought rather to be evacuated than what is toward that which is unto the end immediately: but

the cardinal virtues have their acts in that which is toward the end, and the theological virtues in the end immediately: therefore the cardinal virtues ought rather to be evacuated than the theological ones.

Solution. It must be said that hope and the habit of hope and its act are evacuated, but it is not totally destroyed. And to this it must be noted that in the transit of grace to glory, four things must be observed. For some remain in act and habit substantially and formally, but they are changed as to the mode which they have not from themselves, but from the fact that they are in such a state of their subject: and thus charity is changed and transits in the transit into glory, as will be clear below. But some remain in habit substantially and formally, but not in act, like the cardinal virtues, as will be shown below after the whole tract on charity. But some remain according to substance and not as to form and act, like faith. But some neither as to substance, nor as to form, nor as to act, but remain only in a communion of proportion, like hope. In a fifth way is that which is not a virtue, like knowledge of the way, which will be totally destroyed, in my judgment. And this will be disputed later.

But as to how this which has been said of hope can be understood, it must be noted that the habit of hope has an expectation of glory and a protension: and expectation shows, as it were, that which is, and protension shows that which is the formal element of hope, by which it is distinguished from others to which expecting belongs: and both of these are removed. But because every hoping person, according to what he hopes, is proportioned to the hoped-for thing, therefore that proportion remains when he attains the hoped-for thing: and thus I understand the saying of certain Doctors, who say that in the transit of hope into glory, nothing remains but what is common according to proportion.

To the first it must be said, as we said above concerning hope, that beatitude is taken materially for all the goods remaining in it, and thus it succeeds all the virtues: and it is taken according to a property conjoined to itself, which is great, or high, and glorious, and in this way it succeeds hope.

To the next it must be said that vision is the total reward: yet not every vision, but that which is of what is loved and possessed: and then the seen, insofar as it is seen, succeeds faith, and the possessed succeeds hope, and the loved corresponds to charity.

To the next it must be said that what is common by proportion remains there, as has been said.

To the next it must be said that these are evacuated: because that which is material to them, unformed and formed, is imperfect, and not competent to the state of beatitude. But it is not thus with the cardinal virtues: because although their act is ordered to the way, nevertheless their habit can be common to the way and the homeland, as will be clear below.

But IT IS STILL objected because it seems there is hope even in fruition.

1. For it is said: They who eat me will still hunger, and they who drink me will still thirst. But one hungering and thirsting expects something in the future. Therefore there is hope with respect to that, since this is concerning the substantial reward by which they enjoy.

2. Also, Anselm in the Proslogion: If they love God with their whole heart, their whole mind, their whole soul, such that nevertheless the whole heart, whole mind, and whole soul do not suffice for the dignity of the love: surely they will so rejoice with their whole heart, whole mind, and whole soul, that the whole heart, whole mind, and whole soul will not suffice for the fullness of the joy. Therefore it seems that there is a vicissitude of joy there, and that joy is continually in a state of becoming: therefore something of it is expected in the future. But this is against Augustine in Book XII of the Confessions, where he wills that that contemplation makes the blessed participators in eternity, and elevates them above all mutability.
3. Also, the Philosopher in the Ethics says that change is not delightful except on account of a bad condition: and if anyone's nature were entirely simple, the same operation would always be most delightful to him.

And to this it must be said that I think, without prejudice to others, that there is no hope there, nor change, but rather what is perfect. Nor do I say that there is a future there properly speaking: for although they continually participate in the goodnesses of God according to multiple ratios, nevertheless those are in one uncreated thing, which they always have: and therefore there is no transit there, but delight in him.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that that hunger removes satiety [fastidium], and it does not have a future properly speaking, because if they participate in something whence they are called new, as Dionysius seems to say, nevertheless this is not according to a mode of succession, but rather a recession from succession into a simple one which is beatifying through its essence.

To the next it must be said that Anselm does not intend to posit motion or change, but the immensity of the beatifying good. However, certain ones say that that is measured by the aevum, and that it has a before and an after. But I do not understand this, how something might have a before and an after through the fact that it is made immutable: nor can I understand how something might have a before and an after which is not time.

Articulus 9 — Whether Charity Is To Be Done Away With

Is charity to be evacuated?

Thirdly it is asked, Whether charity is to be evacuated?

Now it seems that it is: because 1. It was held above that faith, hope, and charity are equal: therefore it seems that one follows upon another: therefore if one is evacuated, so is the other: but the first two are evacuated: therefore also the third.

1. Also, Augustine says in Book VIII On the Trinity that nothing is loved unless known: therefore love is founded through cognition: but knowledge will be evacuated: therefore also charity.
2. Also, faith and hope generate charity, as the Gloss on the beginning of Matthew says: but faith and hope are evacuated: therefore also charity.

3. Also, what is for attaining some end, once the end is possessed, is no longer necessary: but charity is for attaining the end of beatitude: therefore once that is possessed, it will not be necessary: it is established that nature does not abound in superfluities: therefore much less does grace: therefore there will then be no charity, because it would be superfluous.
4. Also, if faith will be destroyed for this reason, because it sees in a mirror: therefore by the same reason charity ought to be destroyed, because it loves in a mirror: for it is not conjoined, but rather sojourns, as long as it remains in the body.
5. Also, in the Letter we have that it is imperfect: but all imperfection will be destroyed in the homeland: therefore charity will also be evacuated.

But against this is what the Apostle says, that charity never falls away. Therefore it will never be destroyed, neither totally nor partially.

Solution. It must be said that charity never falls away, but remains the same in number and species in the way and in the homeland. The Master nevertheless says in the Letter that it is increased and perfected: and I do not understand this according to the substance of charity, but as to the mode which it receives from the subject, namely because now by a subject which is subjected to concupiscence, it is drawn back lest it be able to fulfill its proper impetus: and that mode of imperfection will be removed, and as to this it is said to be increased. But in act, now it desires an absent beloved, but then it loves a present one, and penetrates its intimacies by tasting. For on account of this it is attributed to it by blessed Dionysius to be acute and mobile and super-fervid: because by the acumen of affection it penetrates the beloved, and is moved into it, and super-fervents it according to whatever ratio of divine sweetness. And these things are taken from fire; because in fire (as certain Philosophers have said) there is a composition of acute angles, by which fire is penetrative of the combustible, and is motive into it through the nature of heat, and super-fervents every part by igniting it.

To the FIRST, therefore, it must be said that it does not follow: because they are not equal except for the reason that they concur together for every merit: but they are not equal in substantial perfection ordered to glory.

To the next it must be said that nothing loves unless it is known in some way: but although the knowledge which is through the mode of the way is destroyed in the homeland, nevertheless cognition will not be destroyed, but will be most perfect: and therefore most perfect love: for charity is not founded upon knowledge according as it is of the way, but rather absolutely according as it is of the beloved in general.

To the next it must be said that faith and hope do not generate charity except according to the mode of the way. Or let it be said, and better, that vision on the part of that by which it is a certain vision of the beloved, generates charity: and hope on the part of that by which it is proportioned to the beloved to be possessed. And according to this, faith and hope remain in the homeland, as was said before: and therefore charity will not be destroyed.

To the next it must be said that that proposition is absolutely false, unless it be understood thus, that it is toward that end through the mode of inquiry and the way. But if it has the ratio of a conjunction and a bond or of holding the end, it is false: for if it seeks, it seeks only so that it may be conjoined and hold.

To the next it must be said that faith essentially from its specific form is in a mirror and an enigma: but charity accidentally, and more essentially, is of a present beloved.

To the next it must be said that that imperfection is not in the substance of charity, but rather in the subject, as has been said.

Articulus 10 — Whether Knowledge Will Be Done Away With In The Fatherland

Will knowledge be evacuated in the homeland?

Fourthly, it is asked concerning the evacuation of knowledge.

For it seems that it will be evacuated: because 1. The Apostle says: We know in part, and we prophesy in part; but when that which is perfect has come, that which is in part shall be evacuated.

1. Also, the Gloss in the same place says that knowledge will be destroyed. And the text there says this: Whether tongues shall cease, or knowledge shall be destroyed.
2. This is also proved by reason: because all our knowledge is caused by the cognition of sensibles, and is abstracted from them: but such a known thing does not have the ratio of glory: therefore it seems that that habit will be destroyed.

But ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Certainty is a condition of knowledge: but there a greater certainty of vision and intellection will be possessed than here: therefore a greater knowledge: therefore it will not be destroyed, but will be perfected.

1. Also, knowledge is a part of beatitude, because otherwise beatitude would not be a state perfect by the aggregation of all goods: therefore it seems that it ought not to be destroyed.
2. Also, even the Philosophers and the Master in Book II of the Sentences commonly say that the soul was placed in the body so that it might be perfected in it by sciences and virtues. Therefore, since it receives the perfection of knowledge in the body, that perfection ought not to be destroyed after death, because otherwise the entire order of its life would be in vain.
3. Also, if knowledge is destroyed, then we labor in vain all day from early youth by studying, and by laboring for the sake of the slight light of a corruptible life.

Solution. There are two opinions here. For some say that knowledge will be destroyed as to the mode of learning and inquiring, but not as to the substance of the habit.

But it is objected to them, that according to this, a cleric educated in philosophical and theological matters, having lesser charity, would, as to something—because as to knowledge

—have a greater beatitude than an old woman of greater charity. Or if not: then knowledge will be destroyed. Also, the habit of knowable things seems to remain uselessly, since we will then cognize through another mode, namely in the Word. To this they say that such things remain for the sake of beauty and for the cognition of things through another mode than through the Word. I think it is better that one agree with the Master saying here in the Letter that it will be entirely destroyed: because after death, whether we have been good or evil, we will necessarily have another mode of cognizing things in their proper nature, which the demons and Angels have from creation. And I think that it will then be given to us through species, namely those which are similitudes of the universal order of the causes of the world: which mode is more noble than this one. Moreover, the Blessed will also see in the Word: and therefore I consent to this, that the knowledge which is through acquisition will be entirely destroyed. For I do not see rationally, if we posit that there will be knowledge then as there is now, how one of two incongruities would not follow: namely, that either it will be superfluous, or we will have that which is given to the Angels by the Creator, or we will be ignorant of many things by nature, and it will be necessary to study and learn there; and we will fall short of the power of the knowledge of the Angels: both of which I repute to be absurd.

It must therefore be said to the first, that that certainty is not of the same ratio as this one, but of another: because that one will be either in the Word in which all things are present, or according to a deiform intellect which receives nothing from the thing, but rather receives the similitudes of all the causes of the thing from God, who is the principle of universal being.

To the next it must be said that this mode of knowing is not a part of beatitude, but of misery. Nor did Adam have it, but rather he knew all things through the nature of his first condition: and therefore he called all things by their proper names, each one according to the congruence of its nature.

To the next it must be said that that position in the body is for the sake of the merit of a better state: but merit is assisted by sciences and virtues: and therefore this is said.

To the next it must be said that we do not labor in vain: because from this we merit much and we defend our faith against the error of uprising infidels.

To that which is objected afterward, I well think that one having greater charity attains more of knowledge in the Word: but the knowledge which is through the mode of the natural perfection of an Angel, I think will be greater and lesser: just as also in the Angels according to the subtlety of their essence, and the perspicacity of their intelligence.

Articulus 11 — Whether Christ As Man Observed The Prescribed Order According To The Master

Did Christ, according as He is man, keep the prescribed order according to the Master?

Next it is asked concerning what he says in the last chapter, D, there: Now it remains to investigate, if Christ, according as He is man, kept the prescribed order of loving, etc.

Now it seems that Christ kept the prescribed order: because 1. Otherwise not all things would have been in the best order in him, if the order of charity had been lacking to him, as it seems.

1. Also, if it be granted that he did not have this order, this is said only by reason of the love of enemies: but I prove that he loved enemies, because he willed every man to be saved, who offered himself for all.
2. Also, Your commandment is exceedingly broad: and this even in us miserable ones extends even to enemies: therefore much more in Christ.
3. Also, He himself bore the sins of many, and prayed for the transgressors. Therefore it seems that he loved them.
4. Also, the Angels also serve the damned: therefore, since Christ was more perfect than all the Angels, therefore he loved the damned, as it seems.

BUT IF this is conceded, to the contrary is what the Master objects in the Letter:

1. For he does not love his neighbor who does not love him unto that unto which he loves himself, that is, unto salvation: but thus the foreknown, whom Christ himself knew, could not be loved.
2. Also, Augustine says in Book XXI of the City of God, that if the Church were certain concerning some people that they were foreknown to eternal fire, it would not pray for them any more than for the devil. But Christ was certain. Therefore he did not love them.
3. Also, the Master objects in the Letter, that if he loved them, then he willed them to be saved, and desired salvation for them: and this was not done; therefore he did not do whatever he willed: and what he prayed for did not come to pass, one of which is against the Prophet saying: He has done all things whatsoever he willed. The other against the Apostle, saying that in all things he was heard for his reverence.

Solution. It must be said that Christ loved all with an antecedent love, but not with a consequent one. Now antecedent love is that which is in him in no way depending upon us. But consequent love is that which is from our work. Now that he loved all is gathered from this, that to all he offered the gifts of his graces and of redemption, and extended his hand: but some do not accept grace from him. But what the Master says in the Letter, this is true of consequent love or foreknowledge, which as a concomitant has our merit as to the effect of foreknowledge, although not as to eternal prevision.

And through this the solution to almost the whole is clear.

For it must be said to those things which are first objected, that all those show nothing but a love as much as is in him. And this is antecedent love, which relies upon nothing but his goodness. But those things which are to the contrary, are all concerning the love which

concerns our merit in some way, either as accompanying the effect of foreknowledge, or temporally respecting a bad merit.

Articulus 12 — Whether In The Fatherland There Will Be An Order Of Charity Among The Blessed

Will there be an order of charity among the blessed in the homeland?

Next it is asked concerning what he says there, D, around the middle: And that he fulfilled the order of loving, which is kept in the homeland, not in the way, etc.

For by reason of this it is asked concerning the order of love in the homeland.

For it seems that it is according to the ratio of goodnesses, because

1. In the homeland there will be full conformity with the will of God: but God loves the greater good more: therefore so do we.
2. Also, Anselm says a little before the end of the Proslogion, that anyone rejoices more concerning the good of a better person in the homeland, than concerning his own. But this cannot be, unless that order which is now does not remain.
3. Also, Augustine says that in unequal clarity there will be equal joy: and this cannot be, unless the joy of all and singular is one: and this further (as Anselm says) will not be unless I rejoice more concerning the good of one better than me, than concerning my own, so that his joy becomes mine.
4. Also, the Lord answered the Sadducees when they inquired about the conjugal bond if it would be in the homeland: You err, not knowing the Scriptures, nor the power of God. For in the resurrection they shall neither marry nor be given in marriage: but they shall be like the Angels of God in heaven.[279] Therefore the conditions of carnal degree will cease there, as it seems. Therefore the order of charity will not remain with respect to them.
5. Also, Between us and you a great chaos is established.[280] There Gregory says that blessed sons can by no means feel compassion for parents placed in hell: therefore neither can they love them: therefore the order will cease.

BUT AGAINST this is, that 1. Such an order will be in the homeland as there was in Christ: but Christ loved one more than another from another cause than from a greater grace, because Augustine says on John 19:26, upon that word: When Jesus had seen… the disciple standing whom he loved.[281] that he loved John more: and yet he was loved more by Peter: therefore it seems that order by reason of consanguinity and familiarity will remain.

1. Also, grace does not destroy nature, but elevates it: since therefore this is natural, it seems that it remains in the homeland.

2. Also, according to this it would not be necessary to labor much that we might be better than a swineherd: because for anyone made better, I will rejoice as much concerning his good as he himself.

FURTHER it is asked, If the order remains as to our body: such that, namely, we will love the good of the neighbor's soul more there, than the good of our own body?

It seems that we will: because 1. One estimating well prefers a spiritual good to a corporeal good: but the good of the neighbor's soul is spiritual, while the good of our body is corporeal.

1. Also, the soul of our neighbor enjoys with us: which our body does not do: therefore the good of the neighbor's soul is to be preferred.

BUT AGAINST this seems to be, that 1. Our body will then have a perpetual and proper good, which seems to move more than the good of another.

1. Also, without the glory of the body there is no perfect glory of the soul: but we ought to love the perfection of our own soul more than that of another: therefore we ought to love the good of our body more than the good of another's soul.

Solution. It must be said that, as I think, charity among the blessed will have an order: such, nevertheless, that the degree of propinquity follows the impetus of charity, and is a ratio of joy accidentally: because essentially charity rather follows the charity of God. Whence if one rejoices more concerning the good of someone who is conjoined to him by blood, this will be an accidental reward, not a substantial one.

It must therefore be said to the first, that God wills us to will the good of one more conjoined to us in some ratio more than one less conjoined.

To the next it must be said that Anselm speaks of the mode of accidental joy, not of substantial and intrinsic joy. Or let it be said that I will rejoice more concerning a better alien good, in such a way that the word more does not signify the intensity of joy as to the affection of joy, but signifies the ratio of quantity in the object of joy: because in a better person more good is presented to me rejoicing, than in myself, but nevertheless I will not be as much affected, as I think.

To the next it must be said that I understand that thus, equal joy in unequal clarity, that is, concerning what is equal, because one will rejoice concerning the same thing and concerning as many things as the other.

To the next it must be said that the degree is removed which served the state of the way, such as to give birth, and to procreate, and the like: but not as to the affection for the good.

To the next it must be said that it is otherwise for those who are in hell, because they are added to the hostile party: and therefore nature before charity then hastening into the justice of God (as Bernard says) detests them.

279. Matt. 22:29-30.

TO THAT which is asked further, Whether Christ without cause loves one more than another? It must be said that he does not: for Peter and John were unequally conjoined to him by blood: and I well think that they were equally loved in different things, and equally loved in different things. For Augustine says that Peter loved more: and I understand this to mean that he loved God more in the neighbor, and therefore received the divine care over the neighbor in the commission of the sheep. He also says that John loved more, upon that: The two ran together.[282] Thus, He who loved more, ran more strongly, and arrived more quickly. It is established, moreover, that he was John: and this I understand as to the love of God in himself, not in his members: just as contemplatives love God more in himself, as John: and actives more in the neighbor, as Peter: and Christ's greater or lesser love is attended according to the greater or lesser effect of grace. But he received the greater in contemplation, who reclined upon his breast: and Peter the greater in the active life, because he received the pastoral care of the Church after the threefold inquiry and threefold confession of love. If, nevertheless, we wish to collect the sayings of the three Saints: then we would say according to Bernard, that Peter loved more fervently, and was loved more strongly: but John loved more sweetly, and was loved more familiarly: according to Jerome, on account of the privilege of chastity: according to Augustine, on account of the privilege of a special love: according to Chrysostom, on account of a gentleness innate to him.

To that which is further inquired, Whether we will love our body more there than the soul of our neighbor? Some say, no: because there a different agreement is reformed than here: because here we place for the neighbor, in that we are to regain in the resurrection, and because it is only corruptible: but there it is not so: and therefore it can be loved more. I, to confess the truth, do not know what is more true about this, yet it seems more probable that the good of the soul of the neighbor outweighs in love.

And then to that which is contrary, it must be said that although it is perpetual, yet it is inferior in the estimation of good.

To another it must be said, that the beatitude of the soul does not depend on the body, but rather the contrary. But it is true, that not fully, as now a man would be blessed: and this does not contradict: because it is more opposed to it in another than it would lose in that, if it were possible to be lost.

DISTINCTIO XXXII

Divisio Textus

Having set forth the premises, it is to be added concerning the love of God, etc. In this last part, the Master discusses the love of God in comparison to us.

And concerning this, he determines two things, the first of which is whether it is the immutable divine essence. The second, resulting from this, is namely how God is said to love

one more and another less according to it. And this begins there, "But when the love of God," etc.

We will inquire for easier understanding concerning the first in four ways, the first of which is whether it is true what the Master says, that charity is the divine essence. The second, why this is more fitting to charity than to faith or hope. The third, why the Apostle attributes to charity the works of other virtues, and not to faith or hope. The fourth will be whether the love of God admits of more and less, about which the Master inquires in the second part of that lesson.

Articulus 1 — Whether It Is True What The Master Says, That Charity Is The Divine Essence

Whether it is true what the Master says, that charity is the divine essence?

To the first, it is objected thus:

1. Whatever things are entirely the same, whatever agrees with one of them by substance, agrees also with the other: charity and the divine essence are the same, as the Master says, and we speak of the charity by which He loves us: therefore, whatever agrees with charity, agrees with essence: but charity substantially ordains to the act of loving - therefore essence ordains to the act of loving: therefore God loves us by His essence, in such a way that "by His essence" is construed formally with the verb, which is false: therefore charity and the divine essence are not the same.

1. Likewise, Nothing is loved unless known: nothing is known unless true: therefore nothing is loved unless true: but each thing is related to being as it is related to truth, as the Philosopher says: therefore nothing is true, unless it is in truth in its mode of existing, as the complex exists as complex, and the simple as simple. Further, We did not have being from eternity: therefore neither truth: therefore neither could He love us from eternity: therefore neither is the love by which He loved us eternal: but the divine essence is eternal: therefore love is not essence.
2. Likewise, When it is said, Creator God, the word denotes an effect in the creature: and creation is not posited in God on account of this, but rather concerning the thing which is made: therefore similarly, when it is said, God loves us, an effect is denoted, and nothing is posited in God by loving.
3. Furthermore, Either love connotes affection, or effect: because it cannot be considered in multiple ways. Not affection: because thus God would be passible by affections, which is absurd: therefore it denotes effect: therefore it does not denote the divine essence.
4. Likewise, Hugh of St. Victor:

   The power of love is recognized, that it transfers the lover into the beloved. Therefore

281. John 19:26.

love requires the beloved to exist: but we were not from eternity: therefore He did not love from eternity: therefore love is not essence: because the essence of God is eternal.

5. Likewise, This is taken from Augustine who says, that charity is nothing other than the bond of the lover and the beloved.

6. But on the contrary, it is held in the first book of the Sentences, where many authorities are introduced, that He loved from eternity. That charity is the divine essence is held in the first book of the Sentences.

7. Likewise, Whatever is in God, God is: charity is in God: therefore charity is God. The first is evident from the suppositions in the first book of the Sentences. The second is evident from this, that if charity were lacking to Him, since it is the best good, and since it makes all good things delightful, He could not be the best, nor God.

Solution: It must be said, that there is no doubt that charity is in God, and is God, and the divine substance.

To the first objection, therefore, it must be said that that argument does not hold in divine matters because of the attributes, which in divine matters vary the mode of signifying and not the thing. And this is also true according to the Philosophers, as is evident: because they prove, that their will and their action and their substance are the same as being, and yet according to the Philosophers not whatever agrees with one, agrees with the other.

To the other, it must be said, that we are known from eternity, and we had the truth of causes from eternity in ideal reasons, although not in the being of nature properly: and this suffices for love and proper knowledge, as is proven in the first book of the Sentences.

To the other, it must be said, that it is not similar: because creation, when it is the thing of this word, creates, it denotes something new: and therefore formally it is not to be made except in the creature as in subject and matter, but efficiently it is in God: but charity denotes the most perfect thing in the notion of good, and therefore it agrees with God to whom every good and best thing is to be attributed: and therefore it not only denotes effect, but also the divine essence, under another mode of signifying.

To the other, it must be said, that it does not denote effect but the divine essence, as the principle of the act of loving, because habit and affection and such things do not fall in God due to the highest simplicity.

To the other, it must be said, that charity always joins, but it is not necessary that the joined are in one mode, but God is simply: man, however, in the notion of the word from which all proceed to origin.

By this the solution to the following is evident.

Articulus 2 — Why Charity Is More The Divine Essence Than Faith And Hope

Why is charity more the divine essence than faith and hope?

282. John 20:4.

Secondly, it is asked, Why does this more pertain to charity than to another?

And it is said by all: that this is the reason: because

1. It is the most perfect virtue and the form of virtues, which will never fail: and therefore it is principally in God, but in us by imitation.
2. But against this is what the Apostle says, to the Galatians 5:6: Faith works through charity. Therefore, as it seems, charity is the efficient cause of the works of other virtues, and not the form.
3. Likewise, on that: "The just shall live by his faith," the Gloss says: Charity is the form of virtues, without which faith is unformed.
4. Likewise, the Apostle, to Timothy 1:5: The end of the commandment is charity. Therefore it is the end.

Therefore, on account of these four reasons, why is charity essentially in God and not faith? And, why is it called efficient and mother and root? And, why is it the form, and why the end?

And because much has been disputed about this above, it is sufficient to touch upon it here.

Solution: It must be said that charity is an exemplary virtue in God: and this happens to it because of its perfection, namely because it has the most perfect act which will never fail: and because its object is the highest goodness, which is desired by all: and because again it is the greatest good among spiritual goods: which is evident from this, because it divides between the children of the kingdom and of perdition.

To another it can be said that charity is efficient, like the universal heat of organs: as the Philosopher says, each sense has its act and object, which it does not share with another, and all senses have one thing hindering them from act, like the cold descending from the brain, and closing the senses: so also they have something moving them to act, which is the heat expanded outwardly in wakefulness with the animal spirit to the organs of the senses in wakefulness. Hence also a certain Philosopher says that wakefulness is caused by the expansion of heat and spirit outwardly.

In this way we can say that charity is said to be efficient and moving in virtues: which nevertheless takes away from no virtue its proper object and proper act, just as neither does natural heat from the sense. And that this is true seems from what is said: The charity of God is poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us. For the Spirit moves all things. And charity seems to be like the instrument of its motion.

Through this also that it is the heat of the will related generally to all that is good: just as also in the animated body we posit the spirit to cause motion and sense, and that heat is its instrument through which it acts. And through this the reason for the first question is clear.

280. Luke 16:26.

How it is mother and root has been said above. And through this the solution to the second question is clear.

Charity, however, can be called the form, according to which it is the love of good simply, so that it is said simply that no difference is contracted and specified. For that will be preserved in every good contracted and specified by a special reason, as blessed Augustine seems to say: This good, that good: take away this and that, and you will see the good of every good. The good willed in faith is a certain good having something of the simply good and arduous in hope. And similarly the beautiful in temperance, and the strong in fortitude, and the just in justice, and the desirable for work in prudence. But each of these adds something to the good. Charity, however, is of the good absolutely and simply, which is the first good. Since therefore this as a certain reason of every good is preserved in all contracted goods, it will be the form to which all goods strive as much as they can, and from which they have the reason of good, because if it is not good through itself, no particular and contracted good will be. According to this mode, therefore, the love of good through itself is in every virtue, as the reason of the good which that virtue desires, and thus it is the form not giving being simply, but a certain reason from which and under which is taken the reason of the good which the particular virtue desires to acquire through its proper act: and thus again it does not exclude the form giving being, although it is a certain reason of it: just as that which is through itself is the reason of that which receives from it: hence it imitates it in something according to possibility, and not simply: and in this way I say it is the form of virtues. And through this the reason for the third question is clear.

The end, however, is said almost in the same way: because also form and end differ little: yet there is some difference. For the Philosopher says that every operation and choice seems to be the worker of some good: and therefore defining the good he says, that the good is what all things desire or seek or wish for. Let us therefore consider two things, a certain good as true or arduous or beautiful which is the terminus of the act of this or that virtue, and having which it ceases from motion. And let us ask, Whether it desires to acquire that through act because it is this good, or because it is good simply? If because it is this good: then it is necessary that the reason of this good is the cause of desire generally in all desiring good, which is evidently false: therefore that which moves the efficient virtue or whatever else, will be good: and this Boethius proves at length in the book of the Consolation of Philosophy: therefore the good loved simply and the love of good move the efficient: but that which moves the efficient is the end. Therefore the good loved simply, and not this or that, is simply the end. Charity therefore not on the part of the lover, but on the part of the good loved simply, is the end of the commandment and of every good work. This, however, I wished to place here: because it gives a certain more intelligible vision than what is determined above.

And from this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 3 — Why The Apostle Attributes To Charity The Works Of The Other Virtues

Why does the Apostle attribute to charity the works of other virtues?

Thirdly, it is asked, Why does the Apostle attribute to charity the works of other virtues? For justice is a general virtue, as the Saints say: therefore it seems that such works belong more to justice than to charity.

Furthermore, it is asked, By what are they received?

Solution: It must be said that in truth, as was said before, charity is a certain likeness of divine goodness in us, and a heat moving all things, like the heat of the sun: and therefore, in my judgment, not only those works but all works can be attributed to it. However, justice is not a general mover, but a general virtue, and a general state of virtue. For the Philosopher says that general justice is the same as virtue: and this I understand, that is, the same as a certain state generally containing virtue: and this state is the right order of man or of the soul: in the substance of the soul and in the powers towards itself and towards the neighbor and towards God: and therefore, since it is not ordering into act as a general mover, the works of other virtues cannot be attributed to it.

To the other it must be said that those works are either from evil, or are ordering the diligent one into good. If into good: either into the good which is the end, or into the good which is towards the end. If into the end: either with respect to the good, or with respect to the manner of behaving towards both in the state of merit. If with respect to the true: then it believes all things. If with respect to the good: then it hopes all things which it believes. If with respect to the manner of behaving towards both in the state of merit in which promises are deferred: then it endures all things delayed and promised. But if with respect to that which is the end: then either this is with respect to the good existing in itself, or with respect to that which is in the neighbor, or in both ways, or with respect to what is possessed, or with respect to what is not possessed. If with respect to what is possessed in itself: then it is not puffed up in itself about the good received. But if with respect to what is not possessed which it does not receive: then it is not ambitious, because it does not seek those things which are above itself, which God does not wish to give. But if with respect to what is possessed in the neighbor, either according to the order in the true, or according to the order in the good. If according to the order in the true: then it rejoices with the truth. But if according to the order in the good: then it does not envy. But if it is with respect to possessing what is not possessed by the neighbor: then it does not hinder, because it does not seek what is its own, but rather what is of others. But if according to the order from evil from which it turns away, either from the evil of punishment, or from the evil of fault. If from the evil of fault, either it is born to be within, or outside. If it is born to be within, either it is born to be within according to the rational, and thus it does not think evil: or according to the concupiscible, and thus it does not rejoice over iniquity: or according to the irascible, and thus it is not provoked. But if it is born to be outside, thus it does not act wrongly. But if it is from the evil of punishment: either that evil is in another, and thus it is kind in the punishments of others as if melted by goodness flowing to the aid of the afflicted: or it is in itself, and then either it is contracted, and then it suffers it, that is, it bears it for the love of justice flowing: or it is inflicted by another, and thus it is patient of injuries inflicted upon itself.

And from this the solution of the question is clear: and this is also one reason why this is the most divine virtue.

Articulus 4 — Whether God's Love Admits Of More And Less, And, Whether He Loves More The Foreknown Just Man Or The Predestined Unjust Man

Whether the love of God admits of more and less? And, whether He loves more the foreknown just, or the predestined unjust?

Fourthly and lastly, it is asked, whether the love of God admits of more and less?

And this seems evident from what is said in the Text, there, A, at the end: He loves all things that He made: and among them He loves rational creatures more, and of those, He loves more those who are members of His Only Begotten, and much more the Only Begotten Himself.

Likewise, since love places an effect in the creature, as the Saints say, and that effect is found greater and lesser, it seems that the love of God admits of intensity. Or if it is said that as to Himself He loves all equally, as the wise man seems to say, that He has equal care for all?: then it seems that He loves you as much as Himself and as much as His Only Begotten, which is absurd: therefore it seems that it admits of intensity and remission.

Further, it is asked, whether He loves more the foreknown just, or the predestined unjust?

It seems that the foreknown: because
1. In him appears a greater effect of love: therefore He loves him more.

1. Likewise, He Himself says: I love those who love Me: but the foreknown now loves more: therefore he is loved more.

ON THE CONTRARY:
Malachi 1:2-3: I have loved Jacob, but Esau I have hated. Therefore love simply refers to the predestined, and in a certain respect only to the foreknown.

Concerning Peter and John, who loved and was loved more, here could be a question, but it has been determined above.

Solution: It must be said that the love of God is said in three ways, namely, eternal only, and that does not admit of intensity and remission: because it falls only upon the eternal, namely, the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit: and because they are one and highest goodness, therefore there is one essential love of them. In another way, it is called the love of predestination, and that signifies the divine essence and the order of preparation for the effect of grace in life, and of glory after death: and by the grace of that good which is prepared, it admits of more and less, as the Master says in the Text. In a third way, the love of God is said, which signifies the divine essence, and places an effect in the present.

And by this it is clear that He loves the Only Begotten with the first love, and not the members. But with the second and third, He loves Christ the man more than the members. And by this the solution to the first is clear.

For when it is inferred that in Himself He loves the members as much as the Only Begotten, it is nothing: because charity considered in itself is not referred to the members: and therefore there is no comparison.

To the other, it must be said that simply He loves the predestined more: because to more, that is, to eternal life. In a certain respect, however, the foreknown, because as to the state of present justice, and inasmuch as he is actually loved more, and not simply.

And by this the solution to all that is doubtful in this reading is clear.

DISTINCTIO XXXIII

Divisio Textus

After the aforementioned concerning the four virtues which are principal, etc., here the Master presents a single and small distinction concerning the four cardinal virtues, about which he determines three things as if under one chapter, namely the definitions of each, and why they are called cardinal, and whether they will remain in the homeland.

However, it should be noted that what virtue is in general has been determined in the second book of the Sentences.

Here, however, we will inquire about these four virtues, namely first about their number and sufficiency. Second, why they are called cardinal? Third, about the definitions which the Master presents.

And fourth, whether they will remain in the homeland or not?

Articulus 1 — On The Number Of The Cardinal Virtues

On the number of cardinal virtues.

To the first, it can be objected thus: 1. Augustine says that virtue is love, the order of love or ordered love. However, what is ordered is only one. Therefore, it seems that there is only one virtue.

1. Likewise, if one suffices in nature, nature itself does not seek more, because it is better and more noble to act through one than through many: but charity suffices for every good: therefore, it seems that other habits are superfluous.
2. Likewise, there are only two, namely the end and that which is for the end: therefore, it seems that according to these two, there should only be two virtues.

3. Likewise, we see in art that in the same work there is not one art teaching and another executing, but one and the same executing and teaching to operate: therefore, it seems that since virtue is more certain than art, no virtue should be as teaching and another as executing: therefore, it seems that prudence is not a virtue.

4. Likewise, there are only three powers perfectible for work, namely rational, concupiscible, and irascible, therefore there should only be three perfecting habits, and thus again it is left that there are only three virtues.

5. But still it seems that the number of virtues is diminished: for we have a certain virtue ordering in innate delight, which is temperance, and in difficult inflicted passion, which is fortitude: but there are many other things by which man is ordered in himself like these: therefore, it seems that virtues should be taken according to those, as there is the delight of doctrine, and the delight of honor, and the like: therefore, the number is diminished.

6. Likewise, according to the philosophy of Aristotle, there is no virtue which is called chastity, except in the delightful of touch: since therefore other senses have their delights like touch, it seems that they should have ordering virtues. That this is true, Aristotle intends and says, is clear from his words in the fourth book of the Ethics, where he says: They seem, etc. Therefore, it is clear what was said: animals use taste little or not at all. For taste is an indication of flavor, which those who test wines and dishes or spices do: but they do not greatly delight in such things, but not incontinent, but by use which is entirely through touch in foods and drinks and in venereal and other acts. And the Commentator explains in the same way.

7. Likewise, fortitude according to the same Philosopher is only in distressing inflicted losses, not concerning any death, but concerning that which is in war and for the sake of good. Since therefore there are many other difficulties, like confession, and infirmity, and poverty, it seems that we ought to have virtues directing in these: and we do not have: therefore, the number of virtues is diminished, as it seems.

8. Likewise, to the neighbor, it happens that a man is ordered in many ways beyond the passions of debt: therefore, according to those, there should be virtues: and they are not posited: therefore, the number is diminished.

9. Likewise, it seems that there are not those four which he posits here: because, Mark 8:9, on that: And those who had eaten were about four thousand, the Gloss says: By the four thousand, therefore, it seems that four virtues are signified, namely prudence, temperance, and fortitude, and the fourth which diffuses itself through all, the love of God and neighbor: the love of God and neighbor is one of the cardinal virtues.

10. Likewise, Matthew 5:6, on that: Blessed are those who hunger and thirst for justice, the Gloss: To hunger and thirst for justice, is to have the love of good. Therefore, it seems that either charity is one of the cardinal virtues, or charity is the same as justice.

Solution: It must be said that there are four cardinal virtues. And many here have made many assignments of this: but one is substantial. For it is evident that civil virtue is that which pertains to the good state of the city. For the good state of the citizens, two things are required, namely a habit determining the right to works through reason, and this operative habit, because knowledge is of little or no use: and this habit is prudence: and therefore prudence according to Augustine, wisely chooses those things by which it is helped, from those by which it is hindered. According to what is required, it is to behave well in difficulty and optimally, concerning which is every virtue, since in the easy man does not need a governing habit, because in that he suffices for himself. To behave well happens in oneself and in another according to the order of right reason. To another indeed according to the reason of debt: because another reason of behaving towards another does not take the order of law, and then justice is the governing habit. In oneself, it happens to behave well in a double difficulty, namely in innate delight contemporary to life according to touch, as in taste according to what is touch, and in venereal: and thus the governing habit is temperance. Or in difficulty brought from outside, as the danger of war which seeks the subversion of the good of citizens, like justice, faith, or liberty, or something of this kind: and then the governing habit is fortitude. And in this way, virtues are multiplied according to philosophical consideration.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that love, as it falls in the definition of virtue, as some say, is not the habit of charity, but rather general love, by which everything that is loves its perfection. Others intend to say that it is charity: and then it is not true except of formed virtue, and not unformed: and charity then is in them as a general form. For just as good simply is in some particular good, so the love of good simply will be in the love of this or that good, as we said in the preceding distinction: and this then does not exclude the existence of multiple virtues, as was shown in the immediate distinction.

To the other, it must be said that one does not suffice for all acts according to the special being of works, but one suffices as a general mover and agent. Thus heat relates to senses, and the heat of the sun to generables: and this also you will find before how it is understood.

To the other, it must be said that it is true that there are two in general, but there are special differences of each of them: and therefore according to the end, three theological virtues are taken, and their definition was touched upon above.

According to that which is for the end, the cardinal virtues are accepted thus: That which is for the end: either it is according to reason which orders to the end and good: or the good of the end in some way shines in it according to the definition of honesty: because virtue is only about that. If in the first way: then prudence considers that reason, because that reason is helping, distinct from that which hinders in good work. But if it is the good which is the end shining in itself: either it is according to the order of one to another, and then according to it is justice: or in each one per se: and then either it is according to innate, or inflicted: and in the first way is temperance, in the second way fortitude.

To the other, it must be said that operative art through an instrument brings forth the form which is in itself, in the matter which is outside itself: and therefore preparation and the

preparative and inductive virtue of the form must be outside in wood and stone, but in ethics, habits are born in the operator: and therefore it is left from such operations such a habit: and therefore it does not suffice in virtue, what suffices in knowledge: but if art induced the form in the artisan himself, then it would be similar to what is proposed, just as the work of virtue induces the form in the operator himself according to virtue.

To the other, it must be said that although there are only three powers, one nevertheless behaves in two ways, namely reason, namely as governing others, and thus in it is prudence: or as ordering us mutually to others, and thus in it is justice. In the concupiscible, however, temperance, and in the irascible fortitude. And thus now the three multiplications of these four virtues have been had.

To the other, it must be said that virtue is considered differently according to Aristotle, and differently according to Cicero in the Rhetorics, and in the book of Offices. For Aristotle does not take virtue except as it is in difficulty and optimal according to the material in which virtue is: and therefore he does not say there are virtues in the love of doctrine, and the love of honor. Others, however, posit virtues according to those, and reduce them.

§ 1. them to temperance. However, also according to Aristotle, virtue is in one thing as that in which it has its highest state, and from which it is defined, and it uses another thing well: just as he says about the brave man, who is not concerned with just any difficulty of fortune or danger from a natural death, but nevertheless the brave man uses those well through the same habit by which he approaches inflicted dangers. And we can say according to Aristotle, that temperance in its greatest extent and according to its maximum capacity is in the pleasurable things of touch according to nourishment and sexual intercourse: but nevertheless it is well disposed in other innate pleasurable things according to the same habit: and this agrees with the statements of Aristotle in many places in the Ethics, as is clear to those diligently examining that book.

§ 2. Through the same is clear the solution to what is objected concerning fortitude.

§ 3. To the next it must be said, that there is order to another in many ways: but the order falling under the notion of civil life is the order of right and debt. For in other things it happens that one exhibits himself to a neighbor and does not exhibit himself beyond the reproach of the legislator: and therefore concerning those orders no civil virtue is received, nor even can be received. But perhaps species of justice are received according to special notions of debt which is multiplied from the notion of nature, as in natural justice: and from the notion of contracts, and from the notion of state and benefit and condition, just as the Philosopher determines in multiple ways concerning justice in the Ethics in the book on justice, and Tully posits many species of natural and positive justice.

§ 4. To the next it must be said, that these two civil virtues are not condistinct among themselves and cardinal, namely justice, and the love of God and neighbor: and what the Gloss on Matthew says does not intend that charity is a civil virtue, but rather that it orders justice to neighbor and God, so that out of love it does what it is bound to do out of debt.

§ 5. To the next it must be said, that he intends that justice insofar as it is meritorious, is moved by love, and not that love is a civil virtue. However, note that Aristotle seems to hold another way. For he seems to mean that the virtue which is in one thing and is customary, is threefold, namely according to the difficult [arising] from innate pleasure, in which chastity or temperance rules, and according to the difficult of an inflicted thing, in which fortitude rules, and according to the difficult which is in that which we have for the use and sustenance of life, and the virtue which rules in this he calls liberality, and he makes a special treatise about it. But intellectual virtue, as he himself says, does not have a mean in this way, but right reason is present to it through a mean, just as prudence with its associated virtues, which according to him are synesis, science, and intelligence, and the like. But justice, since it is not said simply, is of another order: since it falls under the order of civil right, namely according to statutes and plebiscites, and cases vary in it: and therefore it regards the order of the common city: and this order Aristotle seems to hold in the Ethics, as is plainly evident in the new translation.

Articulus 2 — Why These Virtues Are Called Cardinal

Why are these virtues called cardinal?

§ 6. Secondly it is asked, Why are these virtues called cardinal?

§ 7. For Jerome seems to assign the reason for this in the Text: because by them one lives well in this mortal life, and afterwards arrives at eternal beatitude.

§ 8. But this seems false: because 1. Many wrote about the cardinal virtues, and made no mention of eternal beatitude, such as Aristotle, Tully, Macrobius, and other Philosophers.

§ 9. 2. Also, Basil on the beginning of Proverbs says, that concerning the four virtues which are called cardinal, many, even those who are outside, have written.

§ 10. 3. Also, many infidels also had them, such as Tully himself, and Africanus, and certain other Stoics, whose life is still written by the Philosophers. Therefore it seems that this is not the reason which Jerome posits.

§ 11. 4. Also, by the theological virtues one lives well in this mortal life, and afterwards arrives at eternal life: therefore the theological virtues are cardinal, which is false: therefore it is not the reason which he posits.

§ 12. 5. If perhaps you should say, that they are called cardinal for the reason that in them, as on hinges, all others and civil virtue turn: it seems according to this that only charity is a cardinal virtue: because it alone, as has already frequently been held, seems to cause the whole good that is in the life of a man.

§ 13. 6. Also, among these one seems to be more cardinal than another. For concerning prudence Bernard says, that it is not so much a virtue, as the charioteer of the virtues: therefore the others seem to hinge upon it.

§ 14. Further it is asked, Why are they called principal, and why civil or political?

§ 15. Solution. It must be said without prejudice, that Jerome does not touch upon the general cause, but rather the cause according to the optimum being of those virtues: and this they do not have unless when they are infused and formed: and then they are called cardinal with respect to those which are in the things that are directed to the end circumstantiating the consideration of man, and not with respect to the theological ones.

§ 16. And through this the solution to the first four is clear.

§ 17. But others, such as the Philosophers, call them cardinal, for the reason that they are the hinge of the revolution of human life according to the civil state and that of honesty: and this is the proper and customary reason among Tully and other Philosophers speaking about them.

§ 18. But to that which is objected concerning charity, it must be said that it is not the hinge to whose notion other particular virtues are reduced, just as sobriety to temperance, in that sobriety tempers in a certain innate pleasurable thing, and similarly continence and parsimony and the like which Tully and Macrobius posit: and to justice piety and mercy and religion, in that all those are concerning particular notions of debt. But human life is referred to charity as to a general mover and a certain form and end, and not as to a hinge, as was said.

§ 19. To the next it must be said, that none of those is more cardinal than another, but one can be of a more general matter than another. And for this it must be noted, that every political virtue posits a special notion concerning a matter, just as fortitude posits the notion of the arduous and firm for the sake of the good, and continence or temperance posits the notion of the beautiful concerning the restriction of the pleasurable things of the flesh, and especially in the sense of touch, because in that alone, as Avicenna proves, there is simply and absolutely pleasure: and therefore to temper in that is difficult. But justice, although it has a more general matter than an inflicted or innate passion, nevertheless attends to a special notion concerning it, that is, the notion of debt ordainable by natural or human right. But of a more general matter among all is prudence, because its matter is that which avails for a moral work: but nevertheless it posits a special notion concerning this, namely the eligible thing concerning the right reason of the civil good: and according as it is the inspector of that notion, thus it is a special virtue divided against the others. But according as this eligible thing is shown to the other virtues either in act or in circumstances, thus it is the charioteer of the virtues according to the intention of the blessed Bernard. For just as reason relates to the other motive powers, so too does the habit perfecting reason: because reason has its object under a special notion, namely the true under the notion of the good insofar as it is practical, which good tends to the end of the concupiscible and irascible according to the diversity of their nature. So also is it concerning the habit ruling reason, that it is of a special notion which it posits about a general matter that is determinable to the work of any other. Therefore it must be said, that the cardinality of the virtues is attended to according to the notion which they posit concerning the matter, to which notion those inferior to them look, which are called their parts by Macrobius and Tully, and not from the matter. And because in their notions they are simultaneously equally principal, therefore one is not more cardinal than another, but they are equally cardinal.

§ 20. To the next it must be said, that the notion of cardinality is in this, that the inferior ones look to their notions, as was said. But they are called principal, insofar as they consist in that which is per se of virtue, as fortitude concerning the most difficult inflicted thing, and temperance concerning the most pleasurable thing: and others will then be secondary, which are about a matter that is close to the matter of the virtue, although it is not entirely it, such as sobriety concerning the tempering of things obstructing the paths of reason and the senses, which is not as difficult as restraining the pleasures of touch, and so concerning the others. But they are called civil, according as they constitute the good state of one with another in the order of citizens and this is the same reason why they are called political, except that one is Greek, and the other Latin.

Articulus 3 — On The Definitions Of The Cardinal Virtues

On the definitions of the cardinal virtues.

§ 21. Thirdly, It is asked concerning the definitions which the Master posits here.

§ 22. And first, It is asked concerning that definition which he touches upon, there, A, Justice is in aiding the wretched.

§ 23. 1. For this belongs to mercy, which is a part of justice according to the Saints, and not a cardinal virtue: therefore it is badly defined.

§ 24. 2. Also, Justice is to render to everyone what is his own, as Augustine says, and also the Philosopher. But this is in many ways: therefore it seems, that he badly descends to a certain determinate matter by assuming justice.

§ 25. 3. Also, he who aids a wretched person does not seem to render what is his own, but rather from his own property: therefore this belongs more to charity than to justice: therefore it is badly defined.

§ 26. Further it is asked concerning another definition which he posits: Prudence is in taking precautions against snares.

§ 27. 1. For there are, as Tully says, three parts of prudence, namely memory, intelligence, and foresight: and it does not belong to any to take precautions against snares except to foresight: therefore this does not per se belong to prudence, but to a part of it: because if it per se belonged, it would behove that it belong to every part.

§ 28. 2. Also, It seems that what he says is impossible: for ensnaring things are not necessary, because thus they could not be avoided: therefore they are contingents concerning the future: but those are not known, nor can they be known: therefore neither can they be avoided: because nothing is avoided, except what is known and foreknown.

§ 29. Further it is asked concerning the third which he posits, saying: Fortitude is in enduring hardships.

§ 30. For since virtue is about pleasures and sorrows, every virtue endures the hardships of certain passions about which it is: therefore this is not specially definitive of fortitude.

§ 31. But it is asked concerning the fourth: Temperance is in coercing depraved pleasures. For to coerce does not denote any act: but every virtue seems to ought to be defined by an act substantial to it: therefore it is badly defined.

§ 32. The same objection is concerning the definition of fortitude.

§ 33. Also, Both of these are posited through the said definitions in passions, namely inflicted ones: fortitude, because it endures hardships: temperance, because it coerces bad pleasures: but one does not merit by passions: therefore since virtue is given on account of merit, it is badly defined concerning passions.

§ 34. Further it is asked concerning the order of the virtues. Because in defining the Master posits justice first, then prudence, and fortitude, and temperance: and the book of Wisdom which he adduces in the Text posits sobriety or temperance, and afterwards prudence, and then justice, and lastly fortitude, or virtue.

§ 35. Solution. It must be said to the first, that the Master does not strive to define these virtues except according to conformity to Christ in whom they were in the greatest state. But although the act of justice, to render to everyone what is his own, is more general, nevertheless it is not so excellent in merit, nor does it so conform us to Christ, as that which is of a part of justice, because it is in aiding the wretched, whose wretchedness he makes his own, and [he makes it] that what is ours is owed to him: just as Christ also was made ours, in that by aiding us wretched ones he was made our redeemer.

§ 36. And through this the solution to the first two is clear.

§ 37. To the next it must be said, that that which we exhibit to the wretched, is both ours, and is his: ours by dominion, and his by the notion of the debt of natural right, which in necessity communicates goods: because according to natural right in necessity all things are common.

§ 38. To that which is objected against another definition, it must be said that prudence is in its highest degree through caution against snares, which ensnare virtue and the good life: and therefore it is defined by that act and not for the reason that it is a general habit saved in all the parts of prudence.

§ 39. To the next it must be said, that it happens to take precautions against snares in the universal, although not in the particular: and then prudence fortifies against all snares which can happen.

§ 40. To that which is objected concerning the third it must be said that hardship is principally in fortitude: because an inflicted passion is more bitter and more saddening than another: and therefore it principally belongs to fortitude.

§ 41. To the next it must be said, that to coerce posits an interior act, namely the will of tempering. And through this the solution is clear.

§ 42. To the other thing which is asked concerning the order, it must be said that virtues are considered in two ways, namely in comparison to the subject, and in themselves. But in them-

selves they have two things substantial to them concerning which they are, namely the difficult, and the good. Therefore they can be ordered according to the notions of the difficult, or according to the notions of the good. If in the first way, thus fortitude is first, and temperance second, and prudence third: because it is more difficult to choose operable things sagaciously, than to render to everyone what is his own: and this order Aristotle seems to pursue in the Ethics. But the reason for this is: because ethica in Greek is the same as consuetudo [custom] in Latin: and according as a virtue is more concerning the difficult, so it more needs habituation generating it: and therefore according as they are more customary, thus Aristotle puts them before and after.

§ 43. But if they are ordered according to the good which is in them: then, as Tully proves in book I of On Duties, by many reasons, he teaches that the good of justice is better than all, both justice, and virtue, on account of which also one's own things are to be left behind and the exercises of the other virtues: thus therefore then justice will be first: and because the beautiful and the good, as he himself says in the same place, are determined almost concerning the same thing, and the beautiful is especially in temperance, therefore it is second, and fortitude third, and prudence fourth, because it has something similar to art which does not have the notion of a proper good, but its good is in other things.

§ 44. But if virtue is regarded according to the order to the subject in which it is: then first is prudence, second temperance, third fortitude, and lastly justice. And the reason for this is, that there is not a right operation unless there is first a right choice: therefore prudence is first. And similarly he is not brave in adversities, who is resolved by delights, and therefore temperance is before fortitude.

§ 45. But the book of Wisdom attends to yet a fourth order, namely that something of temperance is before prudence: for unless the spiritual senses are sober, there will not be a judgment concerning a right choice, and as to this temperance is prior according to act, than prudence. But according to act justice is placed before fortitude, because it is a common good, which is always better than a private one.

§ 46. But note, that there are many other orders of these virtues, and sufficient groupings are found, which we pass over in silence: because elsewhere by a very long disputation they have been inquired into in common, and concerning each in special.

Articulus 4 — Whether The Cardinal Virtues Will Remain In The Fatherland

Will the cardinal virtues remain in the fatherland?

§ 47. Fourthly it is asked, Whether these virtues will remain in the fatherland [heaven]?

§ 48. But it seems that they will not: because 1. Faith which is theological, and Hope similarly are evacuated: therefore much more so the civil ones.

§ 49. 2. Also, That which is directed to the end, is not possessed except for the sake of the end: therefore once the end is obtained it will already be superfluous to retain it: therefore

since these four are concerning that which is to the end, it seems that in the end or in the fatherland they will not remain.

§ 50. 3. Also, To what purpose would they remain? For there will not be snares there which we ought to take precautions against through prudence, nor hardships which it is necessary to endure through fortitude, and so concerning the others: therefore they will not remain.

§ 51. 4. Also, Acquired science seems to be less 'in part' [i.e., imperfect] than political virtue: because science is about the incorruptible, and political virtue regards corruptible particular matter: and yet science will be destroyed, as the Apostle says. Therefore also virtue.

§ 52. If this is conceded, against this is what he says in the Text.

§ 53. Solution. It seems to me, that the Master well disputes here through the words of the Saints, and well determines, namely that they will indeed remain, but having other acts. And the reason for this is, because those things which are to some end, and those things which order to that end, are otherwise disposed when conjoined to the end, and otherwise when they are in those things which are ordered to the end, just as reason, and free will, and all other things: and so it is also concerning habits.

§ 54. Hence it must be said to the first, sustaining the dictum of the Master in the Text, that it is not similar: because it is not the reason why a virtue is evacuated, or is not evacuated, that it is theological or cardinal: but rather this is the cause, that imperfection in comparison to the end itself is of its substance, just as of faith and hope, which are imperfect habits in comparison to the end itself. But these four are not in comparison to the end, but through comparison to those things which are to the end: and therefore when these cease their imperfection will cease, and they themselves will remain in the act which belongs to the end, as the Master says.

§ 55. Through this the solution to the following and to the third is clear.

§ 56. To the next it must be said, that science is 'in part' insofar as it is from sense: for then it will not be possessed in that mode, but through forms instilled by the Creator, just as the Angels have science: and therefore this as imperfect will be taken away. But it is not thus in virtue: because it according to some mode conjoins to the end as a perfect and perfecting disposition, and therefore it will remain as the Master says.

§ 57. But note, that there are those who say the total opposite: but because I consider them to speak irrationally, therefore I do not pursue their opinions.

DISTINCTIO XXXIV

Divisio Textus

§ 58. Now concerning the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, etc. Here in the third place among the habits perfecting the soul, the Master treats of the gifts.

§ 59. And it is divided into two parts: in the first of which he treats of the gifts in common. In the second, he treats of the gifts in special, which begins in this same distinction, there, D, And because concerning fear, etc.

§ 60. In the first part he inquires about four things concerning the gifts in common, the first of which is, whether they are virtues, and whether they are in the Angels? And these two are determined simultaneously. Thirdly, Whether they were in Christ? there, B, But in Christ, etc. Fourthly it is asked, Whether they will be evacuated or will remain in the fatherland? there, C, But to these it seems to object, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether The Gifts Are Virtues

Are the gifts virtues?

§ 61. But concerning these we will ask five things. First, Whether they are virtues? Second, how they perfect the soul, and for what? Third, concerning their number. Fourth, concerning the order and combination which they have two by two. Fifth, Whether they are in the Angels and Christ?

§ 62. To the first one proceeds thus:

§ 63. 1. On that passage of Job 1:2: Seven sons were born to him, etc., Gregory says: By the seven sons seven virtues are understood, wisdom, understanding, etc. Therefore the gifts are virtues.

§ 64. 2. Also, in the same place, Against individual temptations, the Holy Spirit imbues the mind with seven virtues: against foolishness wisdom, against dullness understanding, etc. Therefore the gifts are virtues.

§ 65. 3. Also, Those habits which are truly virtues, are called gifts by the Saints: hence the Gloss on that passage of the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 14:1, says: Pursue charity, than which there is no greater among all the gifts.

§ 66. Similarly, James 1:17, on that: Every perfect gift, the Gloss says generally, that gifts are gratuitous: therefore it seems, that the general name is gift, and it is convertible with virtue.

§ 67. 4. Also, Charity is also called the first gift, in which all gifts are given: and this the Master proves in book I of the Sentences.[283] Therefore it seems, that gifts are in no way distinguished from virtues.

§ 68. 5. Also, The seven virtues are defined by a general definition, which is fitting to the theological and cardinal ones: such a definition is also found to be fitting to the gifts, as is, that virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing to the optimum: and as is, that virtue is that which makes its possessor good and renders his work good: and as is, that virtue is operative in the difficult things of the optimum: and as is, that virtue is the ultimate of a power in the thing of which it is the virtue. All these are fitting also to the gifts: and just as that, virtue is a good quality of the mind by which one lives rightly, which no one uses badly, which God works in us. Therefore it seems, that the gifts are virtues.

§ 69. If perhaps you should wish to say, that gifts denote something more perfect, than virtues: this does not seem true.

§ 70. 1. For Macrobius on the Dream of Scipio divides virtue into purgatorial, and of a purged soul, and exemplary: and one is more perfect than another, nor does it thereby lose the name and notion of virtue: therefore neither will this perfection give another notion according to the name to the gifts.

§ 71. 2. Also, More and less do not vary the species; but faith, and understanding, and wisdom lean upon the first truth through consent. Similarly prudence, science, and counsel illuminate towards operable things through the notions of operable things, except that one does more and another less: therefore it seems, that there is no difference according to the notion of species between virtues and gifts.

§ 72. 3. Furthermore, This very thing, that gifts are more perfect than virtues, and thus differ from them, seems false: because the Philosopher says, that virtue is the ultimate of a power in a thing: but after the ultimate there is not something to be taken: therefore there is not a perfection more ample than virtue, as it seems.

§ 73. But if you should wish to say, that there is a difference quantum to the name: this again seems false, for the Philosopher says in the Topics, and Boethius similarly in his Topics, that a gift is an unreturnable giving: and this same notion is fitting to virtue just as to gifts: therefore they are not distinguished as to this, as it seems.

§ 74. To this Doctors are found to have five opinions. For some say, that virtues and gifts do not differ except according to reason [notion], and not according to any substantial definition and difference: but they give this accidental difference, that virtues are principally for acting, and therefore they are defined by acts, and have proper operations: but gifts are for resisting temptations which assail the life of a virtue already possessed. But that this saying is not fitting, immediately appears: because fortitude is for assailing in the difficult and temptation. Similarly it is commonly said, that the least charity can resist any temptation whatsoever. And, 1 Peter 5:8 and 9: Your adversary the devil goes about, seeking whom he may devour: whom resist, strong in faith. And, Ephesians 6:16: In all things taking the shield of faith, in which you may be able to extinguish all the fiery darts of the most wicked one. Therefore it is clear through this, that this also more principally belongs to virtue, than to a gift: and therefore the saying of these men is not fitting.

§ 75. Also, Others wished to amend the saying through subtlety, and said, that there are two things in free will, reason, and will: and virtue is principally in the will, secondarily in reason: but a gift conversely is principally in reason, secondarily in the will. But for this assignment of theirs they adduce such a reason, that among the virtues there is only one which is in reason: and among the gifts, four are posited in reason, namely wisdom, understanding, counsel, and science. But it is clear that this is ridiculous, because two virtues are in reason, namely faith, and prudence. Also, It is ridiculous to say, that gifts are more principally in reason for the reason that more of them are in reason. For then it would follow, that they

283. Peter Lombard, Sentences I.

would be more principally in the irascible, than in the concupiscible: because two are in the irascible, namely fear, and fortitude: and one is in the concupiscible, namely piety. Also, It is false concerning the cardinal virtues: because two are in reason, namely prudence, and justice. For since justice consists in ordination to another, and all order is of reason, thus justice will necessarily be in reason.

§ 76. Therefore thirdly come those who say, that gifts are so called by comparison to God the giver, and therefore they are in the superior part of reason: but virtues regard special works which are upon special matters, and therefore they are in the inferior part of the soul or reason. And this again is nothing: because on that passage: The light of thy countenance is sealed upon us,[284] etc., the Gloss says, that the image is threefold, of creation, of recreation, and of similitude. And the image of recreation is that through which the image of similitude and creation is perfected: and that is faith, hope, and charity. Therefore since according to Augustine, the image is in the soul according to that part than which it has nothing more excellent, it will seem that faith, hope, and charity are in the highest part of the soul, and thus the gifts will not be higher in the parts of the soul, than the virtues. Also, What altitude of the soul does fear denote? None at all. Hence what they say is nothing.

§ 77. Therefore there are fourths who have a great part of the multitude following them: because this opinion was and is very celebrated among many, that virtues are for acting rightly according to the life which suffices for each one according to himself, and for sustaining passions whether innate or inflicted. But gifts are in aid of the powers of the soul, so that we may suffer in conformity to Christ: and this they prove reasonably enough thus: For Christ to suffer three things were required, the first of which is the fear of reverence towards the Father sending him and handing him over for the redemption of the human race: and from that the spirit of the fear of the Lord filled him. But the second was, that he should do this out of love for men, because he was suffering for the sake of saving men, and there the gift of piety acceded. But the third was that he should offer himself to passions manfully and intrepidly: and from that part came the gift of fortitude. But the other gifts accompany these, just as science accompanies piety, counsel fortitude, but understanding and wisdom accompany the intention of the one suffering towards God. And what is objected is not contrary to this opinion, except this alone which, as it seems, cannot be reasonably solved, namely that the gifts would have been given, even to Christ not incarnate and not suffering, as if man had not sinned: therefore this is not a substantial difference of gifts and virtues, but rather an accidental one according to the state of sin.

§ 78. Therefore fifthly they say, that virtues are for acting simply: but gifts are expeditions of the virtues, and are for acting expeditiously: and this opinion once had many defenders on account of the word of Gregory who says, that the gifts were given in aid of the virtues against defect. But this again is clearly not true: because

§ 79. 1. The Philosopher says in the second book of the Ethics, that one ought to take the sign of a ha-

§ 1. ...[con]ceiving delight coming to be in the work. For one is not just and chaste who works just and chaste things, but rather who works these things and rejoices in this very fact. But one rejoicing in the work does not have difficulty: therefore he does not need further help.

§ 2. Also, what is it to say that a virtue, which is a perfect habit and perfecting toward a work, would further need another thing perfecting it? For thus there would be a perfection of a perfection, and thus concerning other perfections it would be necessary to have many.

§ 3. If on account of this it were said that in truth the gifts are virtues, and do not differ from them. Against this:

§ 4. 1. Virtue and gift are not of the same definition: therefore they are not of the same nature. This is evident, because counsel is not a virtue: and similarly neither is science, nor wisdom.

§ 5. 2. Also, on Matthew 6:9, on the Our Father, the Gloss says: "In prayers it is so that gifts may be obtained; in gifts, so that we may work the commandments." Therefore gifts are obtained by prayer: but not virtue, because one must have virtues before prayers are heard: therefore gifts are not virtues.

§ 6. 3. Also, in the same place, another Gloss: "We must labor in prayers, so that we may perceive the gifts." And the same thing follows from this. But nevertheless this Gloss itself has a difficulty: because when one part of grace is had, all are had: and thus gifts are had before prayer is heard, just as virtues are. Whence it seems that nothing is proved through those Glosses.

§ 7. Solution. Without prejudice, I consent to the latter opinion which is founded upon the word of Gregory, because Gregory spoke more concerning the gifts than any other saint. And therefore a certain Doctor holds that opinion: and it is good, although it has not been well explained by some who reject it. For Gregory expressly says that the gifts were given as a help to the virtues. And to understand this, it must be noted that there is a certain impediment of a virtue toward its proper act: and it has this only accidentally from some disposition of its subject: and the virtue itself, growing strong in the use of the work, excludes this through itself. And concerning this Bernard says in the first book of On Consideration to Eugenius: "Nothing is so difficult that custom would not make it easy."[285] And this is especially true in customary things, concerning which the Philosopher introduces that we are innately suited to receive them: but to perfect them is from habituation.[286] But there is another impediment of the power arising from the imperfection of the habit, which is as it were contrary to the first impediment, just as the power of our intellect is directed toward the first truth, and toward this virtue perfects only imperfectly, namely "in a mirror and in an enigma," and therefore "it shall be emptied out":[287] and therefore the power needs another habit assisting it higher into that truth, and on that part as a second perfection, a gift is infused higher. How this is so will be explained more in the following article. And in this way it is understood that the gifts are given as a help to the virtues or powers.

284. Ps 4:7.

§ 8. To all the things which are first objected to prove that a gift is a virtue, there is one solution, namely that virtue is spoken of in two ways, namely broadly, and strictly. Strictly, virtue will then be the first perfection of the powers of the soul toward the acts of a life ordered to the end, or that which is for the end: just as a theological virtue is toward the end, but a political virtue is toward that which we have for use, which is for the end: and in this way, since a gift is a second perfection toward a higher act of certain virtues, it is not a virtue, but a habit distinct from virtue. Broadly, virtue is taken for a habit perfecting toward an act according to the rationale of the good. Thus a gift is a virtue, and a beatitude, and similarly the fruits concerning which mention will be made later. As to what Gregory seems to say, that the gifts are given against the defect into which we fall from sin. I respond that this is said accidentally, namely concerning the gift by reason of the state of the man to whom the gifts are given. For otherwise... § 9. ...the gifts would not be in the Angels and in Christ.

§ 10. But to that which is objected last, that gifts are obtained by prayers, it must be said that we concede the conclusion: nevertheless the argumentation does not proceed according to the intention of the Gloss, because the Gloss is understood concerning the obtaining of the use of the gift, not the habit: because all are infused simultaneously with the virtues.

§ 11. But to that which is objected against this opinion lastly, it must be said that virtue rejoices in its operation, but this is only insofar as the removal of the impediment which it has in the subject: and against this a gift is not given, but rather against that which virtue has of itself, as faith from the fact that it is in a mirror and an enigma, and prudence from the fact that it is through the principles of human law, which is wrapped in the clouds of errors: and all these things are to be discussed in the following article.

§ 12. To the other it must be said that this is not unfitting, that after one perfection there should be another in the same thing, provided they are not of the same rationale: just as opinion and science concerning the same thing, and both remain, although some deny this: for by having science, I do not on account of this lose opinion through signs, since I can still proceed through signs when I wish. Thus one seeing the truth in the light of the intellect does not lose faith on account of this. And therefore this is not unfitting.

Articulus 2 — How These Gifts Perfect The Soul

§ 13. Article 2: How do these gifts perfect the soul?

How do these gifts perfect the soul?

Secondly it is asked: How do they perfect the soul?

§ 14. And so that this may be explained more clearly, I will make a general disputation concerning the mode of the perfection of the soul through the virtues, and gifts, and beatitudes, and fruits, and the grace of the sacraments.

§ 15. And it is objected thus: 1. Every perfectible thing is found to be perfectible in only four ways, namely in being (esse), in power (posse), in action (agere), and in the end (fine). For

285. 1 Cor 13:8.

accidents do not confer perfection: because they are infinite, as the Philosopher says: nor can perfection be attended to with respect to them. The soul is in the number of perfectible things. Therefore it will be perfected by all these perfections. But it is certain that it simultaneously receives perfection in being and in power in its creation: because it is perfect, and has all the powers: therefore if it is perfected further, this will be in action and in the end. But the virtues sufficiently perfect the soul in action: and charity, which is the bond of perfection (as has been proved), perfects by conjoining to the end: therefore the gifts and beatitudes and fruits are superfluous.

§ 16. 2. Also, it cannot be said that the gifts are given against the wound of sin: because, as the Master says in the beginning of the fourth [book] of this volume, sacramental grace is ordered against this. But if you say that man through sin fell into two things, namely into the despoiling of gratuitous goods, and the wounding of natural goods; and for the restitution of the despoiled goods grace is given in the virtues, and for the healing of the natural goods the gifts are given. This seems to be nothing: because, as has already been held, sacramental grace is ordered against the wound of natural goods. Also, according to this, other habits, namely the beatitudes, and fruits, and the grace of the sacraments would be superfluous, which is unfitting. Also, the intellect informed by grace, intending toward invisible things, can be elevated through differing degrees. For example, cognition through a mirror in an enigma elevates it above itself, so that it believes those things which it does not see through reason. But it can take illumination from an interior or exterior hearing, so that it may have from them a light greater than faith: which, because it is greater,

will not be faith: therefore it is of some higher grace than faith is: therefore it seems, since the gifts are for such acts (which I will prove), that it is saying nothing [to say] that the gifts were given against the defect which is from sin. But the proof of that which is supposed is this: because wisdom is defined as a gift which is the cognition of divine things with a savor; and understanding [is defined] as a light causing one to know heavenly things: just as Gregory says, that He gives understanding when He illuminates the mind concerning things heard: therefore it seems that they are not against sins.

§ 18. But if this is conceded, it seems to be against Gregory, who says on the beginning of Job: "Against seven defects, the Holy Spirit imbues the mind with seven virtues [i.e., gifts]: against folly with wisdom, against dullness with understanding, against precipitation with counsel, against fear with fortitude, against ignorance with science, against hardness with piety, against pride with fear."

§ 19. But again, in Gregory's assignment it is asked: Why does he posit six punishments, and orders the seventh against a sin, namely fear against pride?

§ 20. Also, concerning that preceding position which is supposed, if a gift is toward a higher act than a virtue, why do we not have individual gifts corresponding to individual virtues through something higher? Because none among the gifts corresponds to hope. Also, none to charity. Also, none to temperance. For what some say concerning piety is not fitting,

286. Peter Lombard, Sentences I.

since by Philosophers and Saints piety is posited as a species of justice, and not of temperance. And then again the question is: Why does a gift correspond to a species of justice by the same name, and not to others, and not similarly to justice in itself? Also, Why does a gift correspond to fortitude by the same name and not to others? Also, Since charity is more perfect than the others, why does a gift not correspond to it?

§ 21. Also, it is asked concerning beatitude. For this is a state perfected by the aggregation of all goods. Therefore it seems that it is not had absolutely except by God, and is not had by participation except by the blessed in the fatherland: therefore it seems that there is no perfection of beatitude here on the way.

§ 22. Moreover, if someone is called blessed, how is the congregation of good saved in him? For it seems that it ought to be saved: because Augustine says in the Gloss on Matthew 5:10, on that [text]: "Blessed are they who suffer persecution for the sake of justice": that the last one reverts to the head: so that we may understand that it is separated from none, so that the sense is: "Blessed are the poor in spirit with persecutions, and blessed are the meek with persecutions," and so concerning the others. But if that one reverts, the same rationale will apply to the reversion of the others. Therefore it seems that beatitude posits a state of the blessed perfected by congregation.

§ 23. Also, Aristotle says speaking of felicity, that one swallow does not make a spring, nor does one clear day. And another translation is clearer, and says that by one swallow and one clear day there is no prognostication of the spring time. And he understands that there must be many. And by a similarity he infers that felicity will not be the perfection in act of one good, nor of him who had the congregation of goods for a short time, but in all goods, and for a long time.

§ 24. Therefore if these things are of the rationale of beatitude, it seems that the habits of beatitude are not had simultaneously with the virtues and gifts through infusion: which nevertheless is against the common opinion, because God gives all habits simultaneously.

§ 25. Also, the virtues which are first perfections, are multiplied into seven, and the beatitudes into eight.

§ 26. Also, the fruits speak of a certain perfection of the mind, and since a fruit is only of a good to which we adhere by love for its own sake, as Augustine says, it seems to be the ultimate perfection of man on the way tending toward the fatherland: but the fruits are virtues, as the Gloss seems to say in the same place: and the names... § 27. ...of the fruits which it posits, such as charity, patience, meekness, and others which it posits there, although it interweaves certain ones which do not name virtues, such as joy, and peace, and certain others: therefore much more do all things which are prior to the fruits fall into the rationale of virtue, such as the gifts, and the beatitudes.

§ 28. Solution. Speaking without prejudice, I say as before, that the virtues perfect the soul toward first acts, and the gifts toward second acts, and the beatitudes toward third acts, and

287. Ps 4:7.

the fruits toward the end, according as it happens through a good work to be conjoined to the end. And how this happens, let it be taken from the part of reason: because faith is not perfected by a virtue toward the consent of the first truth, which it does not see, except in a mirror and in an enigma: but it happens to see this better in the light of illumination through the inspiration of grace, and it happens to savor it through the experience of itself in the reason (otherwise, in the thing) itself: and thus the gifts perfect.

§ 29. Also, it happens that the gaze is fixed on it higher with maximal certitude: and then it is the act of the beatitude of perfect cleanness, as it is said: "Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God." It also happens to be refreshed in the taste of that certitude: and thus it will be the habit which is called a fruit, and is called faith by the Apostle. And the Gloss says there, that faith is the same as the certitude concerning invisible things: and there ought to be added, through the experience of the spirit: because otherwise it would not be true what Ambrose says in the same place in the Gloss, that it delights its possessors with an unconquered and holy delight: and therefore they are called fruits of the spirit. And according to this, the gifts are second perfections of the soul, and they presuppose the virtues according to nature, although they are infused simultaneously.

§ 30. Also, it must be noted according to this opinion, that there is a perfection of the soul toward an act which is concerning the difficult and the good: and there is a perfection of the soul toward the state of the good, and the acts which are of the best state. If the soul is perfected in the first way toward an act: this happens in two ways, namely toward a first act which is first, by the fact that it itself is first from a good habit: and in this way virtue perfects. But if it is toward a higher or second act: thus a gift perfects. But if it is a perfection according to state: since a state is not in one or two goods, but in all things which can be had according to the perfection which can be in a state: then it is a perfection through infused beatitudes. But the fruit approaches from the part of the conjunction with the end, as was said before. Therefore, sustaining these things, one must respond to the objections.

§ 31. To the first, therefore, it must be said that all perfections are referred to power (posse). For there is a power from a potency: and nature receives this when it receives the potencies in its creation. And there is a power from an infused or acquired habit: and it does not have this perfection except when it acquires the habit, and furthermore this is the cause of perfection in act. But since habits are manifold, it is evident that all of those are necessary.

§ 32. To the other it must be said that the Saints say that they were given as a help to the virtues and powers against the wound of sin: and that they were given as a help, by the fact that they are toward more perfect acts, this is substantial to the gifts: but that they are against the wound of sin, this is accidental from the subject in which that wound is. And this is proved through that objection, that they are in the Angels, and in Christ, and they would have been in us, even if no one had sinned. Therefore it is evident that it is accidental to the gifts to be against the wound of sin. Nor is this saying of certain persons fitting, namely that it is substantial to the gifts to be against the wound of sin, and that in the Angels they are like a preservative medicine: because there is no rationale for a preservative medicine in him in whom there is no potency for disease. Whence, since in Christ there was an impossibility

toward disease, in no way was anything present in Him as a preservative medicine; and yet the gifts are in Christ:

therefore they are not ordered substantially against sin, but accidentally, as has been said.

§ 34. But to that which is objected concerning Gregory, it must be said that he speaks concerning the gifts according to the effect which they have in man condemned on account of sin, and reformed through them: and not concerning the substantial act of the gifts.

§ 35. To that which is objected concerning the sacraments, it must be said that it is not valid: because those punishments and wounds are other than these. For there is a wound of a power toward the act to which it was born, and this wound is only a punishment and not the cause of a fault: and against this punishment gifts are given to us according to the said rationale, such as folly, dullness, and the like. There is also a wound which either is conjoined to sin as inclining toward it, or is a sin: and against this the sacraments are ordered, as baptism against original sin, and confirmation against the kindling of the fomes which is toward evil, and the Eucharist against the defect of the spiritual good lost, from which man is habilitated toward evil, and so concerning others, as is evident in the disputation which is posited in the beginning of the fourth [book] of the Sentences.

§ 36. But to that which is asked: Why does Gregory posit one sin with six punishments? It must be said that pride there does not name a sin, but a punishment which is from sin, and pride is called there "pridefulness" (superbilitas) which fear represses: and thus there is no question.

§ 37. To the other I well concede that the gifts are consequences of the virtues, and are of a higher perfection, but not all of them. For charity is of the highest perfection, and that cannot have anything consequent to it [more perfect] than it itself is. But faith, indeed, according to its substance by which it is the vision of truth, is perfect, and therefore on that part it will remain in the perfect state of the fatherland: but on the part of its form, insofar as it is in a mirror and an enigma, it is imperfect: and therefore two gifts follow from that part: one as showing the first truth under an accepted light, which is understanding; but the other as tasting the sweetness of the truth acknowledged and accepted in the gifts of grace: and this is wisdom. But hope, because it is imperfect in substance and in form, can in no way remain in the perfect state, in which the gift remains more than the virtue: and therefore neither a gift nor a beatitude follows it.

§ 38. Also, among the cardinal virtues temperance is in innate delectables, in which it is not very difficult to be temperate perfectly: whence the Philosopher says that the incontinent man is more blameworthy than the timid man, because [he fails] in that which can be done more easily: and therefore in that delectable thing virtue suffices for the act of ultimate perfection, and therefore no gift follows temperance. But in fortitude it is not so: because that in which it is, is most difficult even for the most constant person: and therefore it requires a habit of a higher perfection.

§ 39. And if it is asked: How can this be, since fortitude is against the perils of death, than which nothing seems more difficult? It must be said that the gift is against the state in which

man is bound to such things if it is necessary: just as even in jousts they are brave who repel or sustain incidental perils: but braver than these are those who voluntarily offer themselves to such a joust when they are not bound: and for this there is the gift in which a man is placed in a state of perfection, either from degree or profession so that he is often compelled to undergo such perils: and for this man needs a gift. And because it is against the same act and the same difficult and good thing as the virtue of fortitude, therefore it is named by the same name with it. But justice according to its genus respects a debt, as was held above in the question on the virtues: and therefore it does not have great difficulty in that: but in the species... § 40. ...which is of piety, and is benevolence to those conjoined by blood, it has further that it should expend through the likeness of the image to those conjoined [by the image] this which it expends to those conjoined by blood: for toward this a customary or civil virtue does not elevate, but rather the gift of the Holy Spirit. And therefore justice according to itself did not have a corresponding gift, but in that part by which it is moved through the rationale of a debt to those who are conjoined by blood, so that it may be moved into those who are conjoined by conformity to the heavenly Father. And because the act of benevolence is the same in both, therefore the virtue and the gift have one name. But that this is true is seen from Augustine, who takes piety [as] the cult of God, and the service of the neighbor, and also [as] a special virtue in the book The City of God, and it is also held from the words of the following distinction. But in other species of justice the rationale of debt is sufficient to complete an act however perfect, as in religion, and in others, and especially in the species of justice which are according to positive law.

§ 41. But to prudence, which is the practical cognition of eligible things, two gifts correspond. For there is a civil prudence using the principles of natural and human law, but it is not raised up to those things which are divinely inspired, except through the gift of the Holy Spirit. But those which are inspired are most certain. And this happens in two ways: either according to those things to which all are bound, and thus it is exalted to the gift of science: or according to those things which do not oblige all, and thus it is exalted in the gift of counsel. But fear according as it is a gift of the Holy Spirit, does not follow any virtue principally: because it principally attends to the majesty which it reveres, because the highest act of fear is to revere: and because one [kind of fear] is initial, or servile, those are gifts according to the state of the receiver, and not according to the perfection of the holiness of the Spirit, nor according to conformity to Christ.

§ 42. But if you ask: Why does it not follow some virtue? It must be said that virtue according to itself orders toward an act. But a gift is added as a help to virtue: and therefore a certain one helps in the act, and a certain one helps according to the removal from the contrary on account of the reverence of God: and on that part fear helps, and therefore it does not follow any virtue properly, unless perhaps you wish to say general justice as to that part by which it is the declination from evil.

§ 43. But to that which is further asked concerning the beatitudes, I say that the beatitudes are higher perfections than virtue or gift. But beatitude is twofold, namely of the way (viae), and of the fatherland (patriae). The beatitude of the way is further twofold, namely of hope,

and of reality (rei). It is called the beatitude of hope when someone is in a state in which he can hope for beatitude by formed hope which comes forth from grace and merits. But the beatitude of reality is a habit perfecting toward the acts of the highest state on the way, and not to one, but to one in comparison to all others. For it is well seen that beatitude is never in one except in comparison to all things which are of that genus. And through this the solution to all things which are objected concerning beatitude for the present is evident: because also concerning the beatitudes it is required elsewhere in a special tract.

§ 44. To the last thing which is asked concerning the fruits, I well concede that they are habits pertaining to the taste of the end, by the fact that they delight their possessors with a holy delight: and if virtue is taken properly, they are not virtues, as was said in the beginning of the solution. But taking virtue broadly, as was said in the preceding article, the Gloss calls them virtues. Nevertheless the tract concerning the fruits seeks a special disputation to be posited elsewhere.

Articulus 3 — On The Number Of The Gifts

§ 45. Article 3: Concerning the number of the gifts.

Concerning the number of the gifts.

Thirdly, it is asked concerning the number of the gifts.

§ 46. For it seems that there are only six: because 1. Fear, as was held, does not follow any virtue.

§ 47. 2. Also, it seems that there are more: because below the Master assigns four differences of fear: therefore it seems at least that there are ten.

§ 48. 3. Also, second perfections toward higher acts are multipliable into many things: therefore it seems that according to all these things gifts ought to be given.

§ 49. Solution. It must be said that a manifold division of the gifts can be assigned: but a threefold one suffices for the intention of this work, of which one is proper, which is according to objects, namely that a gift is either ordered against evil, or into the good. If in the first way, fear. But in the second way: either into the good which is the end, or which is toward the end. If in the first way: either through the mode of the true, and thus is understanding; or of the good, and thus is wisdom, called from savoring (sapore) more than from knowing (sapere). But if it is toward those things which are toward the end: either through the mode of executing, or of directing: and in each way doubly, namely in those things to which all are bound, and thus executing is piety, and directing is science; or to those things which not all [are bound], and thus executing is fortitude, and directing is counsel.

§ 50. And another multiplication is that a gift, as was held, is a perfection higher than a virtue. Therefore that "higher" is either taken from the part of the intellect, or of the affect. If the intellect: either according as it itself is into the end, or according as it itself is into those things which are toward the end. Into the end in two ways, namely as in motion into it, or as resting in it. If in the first way, thus is the gift of understanding, and therefore below it will be

held that understanding is of invisible creatures through which one is moved into God. But in the second way is the gift of wisdom: as Augustine says, that it adheres to eternal things through taste. But if it is into those things which are toward the end, and higher than virtue: either that "higher" is taken from the part of that into which it directs, or from the part of the directing rationale. If in the first way: then it is counsel which directs into higher things than the virtue of prudence. But if from the part of the directing rationale: then it is science, which directs through divine principles in commonly operable things, since prudence directs through civil ones, as is evident from the aforesaid. But if from the part of the affect it is perfecting higher than virtue: either from the part of the end, or of that which is toward the end. If from the part of the end: then it cannot be from the part of goodness, because nothing orders higher into that than charity: nor from the part of charity, because there the gifts of the intellect perfect: therefore it will be from the part of goodness, power, and majesty, or excellence: and to that perfects the holy fear of the Lord enduring forever and ever: and the other fears (as will be evident below) are called gifts through respect to that one. But if it is according to those things which are toward the end, and higher than virtue; either in oneself, or in respect to the neighbor. If in oneself: then it cannot be in respect to innate love: because it does not have so much difficulty that it cannot be well contained by the perfection which is virtue: therefore it will be in respect to inflicted passion according to the state ordering to the sustaining of martyrdom: and then it will be the gift of fortitude, as was held. But if it is in respect to a good which is common and also in the neighbor, it cannot be through the mode of a debt, because this is ordinable enough by the perfection which is the virtue of justice: nor can it be in respect to a good, as charity loves the neighbor, because nothing is more perfect than charity: therefore it will be the force of benevolence to the image of God, and thus is the gift of piety. And

this multiplication is proper according to the disputation held above concerning the gifts.

§ 52. The third multiplication belongs commonly to all the ancient Doctors, and it is very good, namely that the number of the gifts should be taken according to the perfection of the twofold life. And thus the contemplative life indeed is perfected by sight and taste: and sight shows what is to be tasted, and as to sight it is understanding, and as to taste it is savoring wisdom. For just as the Philosopher says, savor is a sequel of the complexion: and therefore it is necessary to penetrate the nature of a thing through taste. But if it is concerning the perfection of the active [life]: either according to the rectification of the directing reason, or according to the executing affect. In the first way: either in those things to which not all are bound, and then it is counsel; or it is according to the rationale of those things to which all are bound, and then it is science. But if it is in the executing affect: either away from evil, or into the good. In the first way, fear. In the second way: either toward those things to which all are bound, or toward those things to which not all are bound. In the first way is fortitude; in the second way piety.

§ 53. To that therefore which is first objected, it must be said that it is true that fear does not follow any virtue according as it is a gift: and nevertheless it is a higher perfection than a virtue: and I say this concerning the fear of reverence, which has the first rationale of fear as a

gift. But from this it does not follow that it is not a gift: and the rationale of this is evident from the things said above: because a theological virtue on that part is less imperfect by which it is into majesty: and the rationale of that imperfection is: because the proper definition of a virtue is toward an act into something determinate either concerning the end, or concerning those things which are toward the end. But majesty cannot be the object of an act which tends into majesty: but rather everything that is recoils from it: and therefore none of the virtues could be in respect to it: but a gift does not necessarily posit such an act, but it suffices that it be a higher perfection than a virtue in whatever way, whether through a tending act or through a recoiling venerating and honoring majesty.

§ 54. To the other it must be said that although below four fears or six or two are touched upon according to diverse divisions, one alone is the fear primarily and through itself called the gift of fear, namely the one which filled Christ: and that is the fear enduring forever and ever, and the others are called gifts through comparison to that one.

§ 55. To the last it must be said that higher perfections in habits respecting singular acts in a genus are not multipliable further than has been said. But habits perfecting according to the highest state, and not existing in one thing, but in one thing in comparison to the use of others, are perfections and multipliable according to eight differences, as the beatitudes of the way: or according to the twelve fruits of the spirit, concerning which the Apostle speaks in Galatians 5:22 and 23.

Articulus 4 — On The Order And Combination Of The Gifts

§ 56. Article 4: Concerning the order and combination of the gifts.

Concerning the order and combination of the gifts.

Fourthly, it is asked concerning the order and combination of the gifts.

§ 57. For it seems that the order is touched upon badly: because 1. First is to withdraw from evil, and afterwards to advance into the good: but in the advance into the good the way occurs prior to the end, and on the way the common perfection of the commandments occurs prior to that of the counsels: therefore it seems that fear is first, and so concerning the others according to a converse order than they are numbered by Isaiah.

§ 2. Again, why is none combined with fear, since all the other gifts have a combination of one ruling and another executing?

§ 3. Again, a certain Gloss says that wisdom rules the intellect: therefore it is asked, how is this so?

Again, since in the others the ruling one precedes, if wisdom rules, then it seems that it ought to be placed before the intellect, so that the intellect is at the extreme.

Besides, it seems false that it rules: because ruling belongs to the intellect and reason, and not to affection; but wisdom is in the affection through savor: therefore it ought to be ruled, not ruling, as it seems.

Solution: It must be said that the order in the gifts is twofold, namely according as they are in us, or according as they are from the Holy Spirit giving them. If according as they are in us: then the first objection holds, and that is the order of the genus of their acts, although they are infused simultaneously in habit. But in the second way, wisdom is closer according to reason than intellect, and thus of the others; and thus they are enumerated by Isaiah[288].

To the next, it must be said that fear signifies a springing back or a flight, and for this it does not need its own ruling principle, but a common one: just as the motion of flight itself is not so that it persists in flight, but rather so that it is converted to the good; and therefore the one ruling the motion toward the good, that will be the rule in flight. And therefore fear receives its rule from the ruling principle of the others, whether it is chaste or initial: but chaste fear receives it from the intellect and from wisdom, whereas initial fear from knowledge and counsel.

To the next, it must be said that intellect simply, as it seems to me, rules, and wisdom in a certain way: just as certain animals follow odors, and the perception of odor rules them on the way, and their sight rather follows upon smell than conversely, so wisdom through the taste of divine sweetness rectifies the intellect according to something, so that what it tastes is more frequently reiterated around it: and according to this a certain Gloss on Isaiah speaks. However, some Doctors concede that wisdom simply rules, but the intellect relatively.

Divisio Textus

And because treating of fear, etc. Here the Master begins to treat of the gifts themselves specifically: and he treats in the following distinction of the other gifts pertaining to the perfection of the intellect or reason, there, Distinction 35, A, After the aforesaid diligently, etc.

That part which is entirely about the gift of fear is subdivided into three parts: in the first of which he sets down the division of fear. In the second, he sets down Augustine's definition, long indeed in words, and short in meaning, concerning the contrariety of David and John: one of whom says fear remains forever and ever, but the other says it does not remain in charity, there, G, But there is another opinion, etc. In the third, he objects according to what rationale fear was or was not, there, K, That also diligently, etc.

Articulus 5 — How These Gifts Are In Christ And In The Angels

How are these gifts in Christ and in the Angels?

How are these gifts in Christ and in the holy Angels?

Fifth and lastly it is asked, How are these gifts in Christ and in the holy Angels?

For it seems that they were not in them: because § 1. It will be held below that fear is born from faith: but faith is not in Christ and in the holy Angels: therefore neither is fear.

§ 2. Again, he who cannot do evil does not need to have a fear that makes him flee evil; but Christ and the holy Angels cannot do evil: therefore they do not need to have a perfecting habit for this.

§ 3. Again, it belongs to fortitude to sustain dangers: but in the homeland there will be no dangers: therefore it seems that the gift of fortitude will not remain in the homeland.

§ 4. Again, knowledge teaches how to converse well in the midst of a depraved and perverse nation: and there will be none of these in heaven: therefore there will be no knowledge there.

Again, the Master said above that knowledge will be evacuated: therefore there cannot be the gift of knowledge in the Angels.

§ 5. Again, Damascene says that counsel is concerning doubtful things. But Christ doubted nothing: therefore He did not have the gift of counsel: therefore all these gifts are not

now possessed by the holy Angels and by Christ.

Which is against the text.

Again, to the contrary is what Gregory says on that text of Job 38:31: Will you be able to join together the shining stars the Pleiades? There he seems to say that no one joins together these gifts of wisdom except Christ: therefore they were and are in Christ: therefore also in the other comprehenders.

But there again a question arises: because if no one joined them except Him alone, then when one is not had, [not] all are had: therefore they are not infused simultaneously. But the contrary of this will be held below.

Again it is asked beside this, why does he specifically say that the spirit of the fear of the Lord filled him, rather than another gift?

Solution: It must be said that these gifts are in the homeland more fully with respect to use than on the way, and they are, will be, and always were most fully in Christ.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that faith generates servile fear; and of this it is not said primarily and principally that it is a gift of the Holy Spirit: because this is said only of chaste fear; and this latter better arises from open cognition than from faith.

To the next, it must be said that that objection proceeds as if chaste fear fled evil; and this is not true, but rather springing back in itself, it reveres majesty.

To the next, it must be said that of the gift of fortitude, just as of the other virtue of fortitude, there is one act in the homeland, another on the way: for in the homeland it has it to adhere most firmly to the first fortitude comforting all things, as Augustine said above concerning the virtue of fortitude.

To the next, it must be said that knowledge is called a light sent forth by the Holy Spirit: and its use on the way is to know how to converse, etc.; but in the homeland it is not so, but rather to intuit the rationale of justice in the act of reason of all operable things.

288. St. Bernard of Clairvaux, De consideratione ad Eugenium, Bk. I, ch. 11.

To the next, it must be said that counsel is not spoken of here from him who seeks it, but from him who gives it: because he does not doubt, but rather the abundance of discretion dissolves doubts and certifies and makes light in the ways, namely by the Holy Spirit.

To the next, it must be said that Christ alone joined them together as regards the most excellent uses in work: but other holy ones join them in habit.

To the next, it must be said that Christ is said to be filled with fear, because taking the form of a servant, He revered the Father, giving us an example in this, so that we may follow His footsteps, rather than in knowledge, or wisdom, or any others: because reverence causes all other good things to be done, and evil things to be avoided; for he who is without fear cannot be justified.

Articulus 6 — What Fear Is

What is fear?

What is fear?

But here concerning fear in general it must first be asked, what is it? Secondly, concerning the division of fear. Thirdly, whether it can be a gift in any rationale? Fourthly, concerning the individual dividing parts.

To the first, the definition of Damascene can be taken: Fear is a desire moving according to systole.

For this definition is true according to him both of natural and of unnatural fear: therefore it seems that fear is a certain desire; but since it belongs to love to desire, it seems that fear is love.

This seems true, § 1. Through Augustine in book XIV On the Trinity, who says that love longing to have what is loved, is cupidity; but having it and enjoying it, is joy; but fleeing what is adverse to it, is fear: therefore fear is love fleeing what is adverse to it.

§ 2. Again, it seems to be held through Augustine, where he says on that text: The hireling flees, Fear is the flight of the mind lest it lose what it loves.

§ 3. Again, it seems that fear ought not to be defined through flight: because flight speaks of nothing but a turning to oneself, or a yielding from that which is feared; but the fear of the Lord does not teach departing from the Lord: therefore the fear of the Lord is not to be defined through flight.

§ 4. Afterwards, what is it that he says, through systole? He himself expounds it, that is, according to contraction. But this seems to belong to some sensible part; but we are asking about the fear of spirits, which also belongs to the Angels.

§ 5. Again, it does not suit a spirit to be moved according to systole: therefore it seems that fear does not suit spiritual substances; since therefore all the gifts are in the Angels, as was held earlier, fear does not seem to be well defined according to that definition.

Solution: It must be said that these disputations are of little worth, and are easy: and therefore one must not linger long on them. It must be said, therefore, that fear is posited in a twofold genus, namely of passion, and of habit: and according as it is in the genus of passion, it is defined by Augustine and Damascene. But according as it is in the genus of habit, thus it has an act which is to revere, and out of reverence to flee certain things which are contrary to what it reveres. And through this the solution to almost the whole is clear.

To the FIRST therefore and the second there is one solution: because those things are said of fear which is in the genus of passion; which nevertheless is not essentially love, but is caused by love; and therefore those statements of Damascene and Augustine are understood through the cause, so that the sense is: Fear is the love of a thing, that is, it is caused by love.

To the next, it must be said that fear which is in the genus of habit does not fear and flee the same thing: because its act is principally to revere, and accidentally to flee: and therefore it rises up into the same thing that it reveres, but flees from the contrary.

To the next two the solution is already clear: because the systole in the motion of that fear which is a habit and a gift is not in the constriction of the heart, or of a sensible part, but rather a springing back from majesty into the recognition of its own smallness, so that from this it may rise up into the reverence of Him who is great over us; and this systole is well in the Angels and the saints and the blessed.

Articulus 7 — Whether The Division Of Fear In The Text By The Master Is Well Assigned

Whether the division of fear in the Text by the Master is well assigned?

Secondly, it is asked concerning the division of fear. For the Master posits two in the Text: first a four-membered one, namely that fear is mundane or human, servile, initial, and chaste. But it seems to be insufficient: because

§ 1. Mundane and human fear are two genera of fear: one is a superfluous fear of the things of this world, and the other is a superfluous fear of one's own body; and one is born from love of oneself, and the other from love of the world.

§ 2. Again, natural fear is not posited here: therefore it seems that there are six.

§ 3. Again, a son, a friend, and a spouse do not fear the same thing: because a son fears reverently, a friend fears a dissonance of wills, a spouse fears a delay of embraces: therefore it seems that chaste fear is divided into five fears.

§ 4. Again, since there is a state of incipient, proficient, and perfect chastity: it seems that just as one fear is taken according to the first and the last, so one ought to be taken according to the middle: and this is posited by no one: therefore the division is not sufficient.

Again, it is objected concerning the division of Bede, which was held in the preceding chapter, that there are two genera of fear, namely servile and friendly: therefore either Bede is deficient, or Cassiodorus is superfluous.

Again, Damascenus gives a division having six members, none of which is any of the enumerated members. For he says there are six genera of fear, namely shrinking [erubescentia], sluggishness [segnities], shame [verecundia], admiration [admiratio], stupor [stupor], and agony [agonia]. Accordingly, sluggishness is the fear of future operation. Shrinking is fear in the expectation of reproach. Shame is fear in a base act. Stupor is fear in an unaccustomed imagination. Agony is fear through a misfortune of chance.

Again, Damascene in Book II, speaking of the fears of Christ, divides fear into natural systole and irrational systole.

Since therefore there are so many genera of fear, it is asked, according to what is the division of them taken?

Besides, it seems that there ought to be no division: because the Philosopher says that if one of opposites is spoken of in many ways, so is the other; but hope is not divided in many ways: since therefore hope is opposed to fear, it seems that neither is fear.

Solution: It must be said that he means this, that hope is opposed to fear according as it is in the genus of passion, and not of habit; and in as many ways as fear is spoken of in the genus of passion, in so many ways is hope in the genus of passion. But in a genus in which it has no opposition, neither hope nor anything else except to suffer, it is not necessary that a division be taken according to the opposition of hope. But that hope and joy are spoken of in many ways in the genus of passion according to the expectation of a natural good or a concupiscible one in sense, is clear through the sayings of the Saints who curse those who place their hope in nothing, as is clear above in the tractate on hope.

These things being held, it must be said to the first division that it is given concerning fear in common, and according as it is related by analogy to passion and habit; and therefore he takes mundane and servile in the division, which I think are passions; and initial and chaste, which I think are habits.

To the first that is objected, it must be said that he does not consider mundane and human, except insofar as they are opposed to the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and in this respect they are of one rationale, according as they serve with the world: yet in themselves they have a division, as was objected.

To the next, it must be said that natural fear is neither good nor bad: but he himself by the division does not intend to take any except that which is a gift, and its opposite.

To the next, it must be said that spousal and friendly or filial fear do not differ in the state of charity, nor in the proper act which is to revere; and therefore they are posited as one, and are one fear; but they differ perhaps accidentally in the things which they fear according to rationale: yet they agree in this, that they all fear separation from God, although under one or another rationale accidentally, namely from a spouse, or from a father, or a friend; and this does not make diverse species of fear.

To the next, it must be said that the middle state of charity does not have a fear diverse from initial fear: because initial is that which still has something of the anxiety of punishment

and the doubt of perfection: and therefore the same fear accompanies those two states of charity, in which there is no perfection.

But that division is taken thus: because fear is either a gift, or it is opposed to a gift. If opposed, thus it is mundane or human. If a gift: either with the opposite of the gift, or not with the opposite. If with the opposite, then it is servile. If not with the opposite: either according to the perfected in grace, and then it is initial; or according to the state in perfection, and then it is filial.

But the division of Bede only divides that which is a gift in genus, namely into that which is with the opposite of the gift, or with the Holy Spirit—which is what some say in other words, into that which is from the Holy Spirit, and not with the Holy Spirit, and this is servile; and into that which is from the Holy Spirit and with the Holy Spirit, and this is initial and chaste.

But the division of Damascene is given concerning fear as it is a passion: and then it is either with respect to evil, or with respect to something great. If of evil: either of the evil of punishment in itself, or of punishment in order to fault. If of the evil of punishment in itself: either in a difficult work which is above our power, and this is the fear which is called sluggishness; or which is not in a work nor from nature, but from fortune and chance accidentally, and this is agony. If with respect to the evil of punishment in order to fault: either a fault which is, and then it is shame in a base act perpetrated, for which a man expects reproach; or a fault which is not, but can be, and with respect to that it is shrinking. If it is with respect to something great: then it is a springing back into one's own smallness: either therefore it is into what we are not able by knowing and working, and then it is admiration; or such that we spring back from it because it is unaccustomed, and then it is stupor.

To the next, it must be said that Damascene divides fear there as a passion only into natural fear contracted from vice, so that he may show that natural fear was in Christ, and not unnatural.

Articulus 8 — Whether Fear Is A Gift

Whether fear is a gift?

Thirdly it is asked, whether fear is a gift?

And it seems that it is not: because § 1. Other passions with fear, such as joy, and hope, and sadness, or sorrow, are not gifts: therefore neither is fear.

§ 2. Again, a gift is given for higher acts, as was said above: but to fear is an act of weakness: therefore it seems that it is not a gift.

§ 3. Again, a gift is given as a help to the powers against a defect, as Gregory seems to mean: but to fear does not signify a help, but rather the destruction of a help: therefore it seems that fear is not a gift.

§ 4. Again, for every nature which can be harmed, the punishment itself is sufficient per se for fearing: therefore also human nature: therefore it does not need any gift for this, that it may fear.

Beside this it is asked, since there are four natural passions, namely joy, sadness or sorrow, and hope, and fear, why does one fall into the rationale of a gift, and another into the rationale of the act of a sacrament, like sadness or sorrow; and a third into the rationale of a fruit, like joy; and a fourth into the rationale of a virtue, like hope?

Again, why does none of these communicate with a political virtue in name?

Solution: It must be said that fear, as was held earlier, is said equivocally of passion and gift. But why it agrees in name with passion by analogy, is stated below. Through this the solution to the first is clear.

To the next, it must be said that fear as a gift is spoken of in many ways. Sometimes it is taken according to what is properly a gift, and then it is considered according to the most perfect state in which fear is in the greatest and best state; and thus it was in Christ, and in the Angels: and this fear has another act which is to revere. But sometimes it is considered according as it is generated by something at least which is above nature, and yet has the act of fleeing evil, the cause of which is present or can be present; and in this way it is called servile or initial fear: and this is of imperfection and is evacuated: and in this way it is not primarily called a gift, but consequently and secondarily. And therefore that gifts are of a higher act, is understood of the gifts according to the best state of the gifts.

To the next, it must be said that to fear reverently does not destroy the power to fear servilely or initially at least: therefore the generator of fear also elevates the power; because the generator of servile fear is faith, which is above nature; and the generator of initial fear is faith working through love: but to fear naturally or mundanely is a sign of a destitute power.

To the next, it must be said that nature is sufficient to fear a harmful injury imminent to itself; but the punishment of hell or sin are not known by one fearing servilely or initially, except by that which is beyond nature, because only faith shows them.

To the next, it must be said that each of those four is spoken of by analogy: because fear is always in the systole of the heart and flight; but the things by which it flees are not of the same rationale. For to flee natural evils does not need a habit: because deficient nature per se suffices for the flight of them. Besides, it is not of perfection according to the rationale of the good to flee such evils: and therefore it does not further need a habit for this. But to flee majesty by a springing back into one's own smallness and the exhibition of honor is indeed a flight, but it is not of one rationale with the flight of evil. Similarly, to flee the evil of fault on account of the evil of separation from God which follows the fault, and this on account of the reverence by which one reveres God: again is of another rationale. Similarly to flee the act of sin on account of the punishment of hell is as regards the generator of another rationale. Whence only fleeing according to analogy regards the perfect state according to the act of reverence. But joy does not signify a perfect act, but rather a womanish passion: because as Augustine says, Joy is a certain diffusion of the mind in the taste or conjunction of the good: and

therefore it sounds in fruit: because we enjoy these known things, as Augustine says, in which the will per se being delighted rests. But sorrow does not signify an act, but rather an afflicting passion: and therefore it does not take the order of a virtue or a fruit or a gift: because a virtue or a gift wishes to have perfection according to a common act, and a fruit according to the womanishness of passion wishes to have sweetness: and sadness or sorrow is not proportioned to this: but it receives the order of sacramental grace, because by voluntary afflictions satisfaction is made for sins. But hope is imperfect with respect to the good: because it signifies expectation, and expectation and being stretched out into the expected do not signify an act of greater perfection than a virtue: because since nature per se expects a reward, what is added to it is the stretching out into the thing hoped for: and therefore a gift does not correspond to hope either, as was said earlier.

To the next, it must be said that none of these communicates with a political virtue: because those virtues are towards determinate matter, such as temperance and fortitude: and therefore the acts of those mediate in these passions, and therefore they cannot agree with them in name.

Articulus 9 — Whether Servile Fear Is Good Or Evil, And, Whether To Fear Servilely Is Good, And, Whether Initial Fear Is The Same As Servile And Chaste Fear, And, Whether That Remains Forever, And, Why It Is More Easily Called Amicable

Whether servile fear is good or bad? and, Whether to fear servilely is good? and, Whether initial fear is the same as servile and chaste fear? and, Whether it remains forever and ever? and, Why is chaste fear called friendly?

Whether servile fear is good or bad? and, Whether to fear servilely is good? and, Whether initial fear is the same as servile and chaste fear? and, Whether it remains forever and ever? and, Why is chaste fear called friendly?

Fourthly, it is asked concerning the individual fears which have the name of a gift.

And let it be asked first concerning servile fear, whether it is good, or bad?

It seems that it is good: because § 1. It is a gift of God, as the Master says: and every gift of God is good: therefore it is good.

§ 2. Again, in the Text it is said that it is useful: and every useful thing is good: therefore servile fear is good.

§ 3. Again, in the Text it says that it introduces wisdom and charity: but everything that introduces charity is good: therefore, etc.

§ 4. Again, it teaches to flee the act of sin: but to be such is good: therefore, etc.

§ 5. Again, that whose generation is good, is itself good: but the generator of servile fear, namely unformed faith, is good: therefore, etc.

This could also be proved by many other reasons from the Text.

ON THE CONTRARY it seems to be § 1. What Gregory says, that when punishment is so feared that the face of the judge is not loved, the fear is rather from trembling, than from charity; but servile fear so fears punishment, that it does not love the face of the judge: therefore it is from trembling: but nothing that proceeds from trembling is good: therefore servile fear is not good.

§ 2. Again, on that text of Psalm 30:2: In you, O Lord, I have hoped, the Gloss says that to hope is from God, and is a gift of God; but what you fear is from yourself: therefore it seems that it cannot be a gift: because a gift is an irreddible giving, and what we have from ourselves is not given to us: therefore neither is it good: because as Augustine says, Every good of ours is from God[289]De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, ch. 6, n. 15..

§ 3. Again, in the Text it is said that in servile fear the will of sinning lives, and the work would follow if impunity were hoped for: but nothing is good in which the will of sinning lives: therefore servile fear is not good.

Again it is asked, Whether to fear servilely is good?

And it seems that it is not: because Augustine says in the Text that one fearing servilely does not do well, even if what he does is good: therefore to fear servilely takes away the rationale of good even from that which is good: but whatever takes away the rationale of good from the good is evil: therefore, etc.

Besides, one good well comparts itself with another good: but to fear servilely does not compart itself with another good of grace making pleasing: therefore, etc.

Again, it is further asked concerning initial fear, whether it is one with servile fear?

And it seems that it is: because § 1. Of one object according to rationale there is one act: but eternal punishment is one object of flight according to rationale: and this is fled by servile and initial fear: therefore it seems that it is one fear.

§ 2. If perhaps you say that it is not, because servile fear is with mortal sin, and initial is not: this does not seem to impede it, because unformed faith also, which generates servile fear, is with mortal sin: and yet it, according to the Master above, is made the same with formed faith: therefore it seems that it is similarly with servile and initial fear, that the servile is formed by the initial.

Again, from the other side it is asked, Whether initial fear is the same as chaste fear?

And it seems that it is: because § 1. Just as perfect and imperfect charity differ, so initial and chaste fear differ: but perfect and imperfect charity do not differ in substance: therefore neither do initial and chaste fear.

§ 2. Again, initial fear is cast out by perfect charity, either by reason of substance, or of the accident which is to have punishment. If by reason of substance: then initial fear and charity would have contrariety by reason of substance, which is false, since they comport with each other in the same person, and one is the beginning of the other. But if by reason of the

accident, which is to have punishment: then the substance remains in chaste fear: therefore it is substantially the same and differs accidentally.

§ 3. Again, chaste and initial fear have an eye to the same thing, namely to possible separation: and both are caused by love: therefore since habits are distinguished by their objects, it seems that they are the same fear.

But against this it seems to be: because § 1. If initial is the same as servile, as seemed to be proved earlier, and initial is the same as chaste: then servile is the same as chaste: and no one says this, since chaste remains forever and ever, and servile is cast out by charity.

§ 2. Again, it seems that initial is not the same as chaste either: for the evacuatable and the permanent forever and ever cannot be the same: but initial fear is evacuatable in this life by perfect charity: therefore it is not the same as chaste fear which remains forever and ever, as it seems.

§ 3. Again, having an eye to punishment, and having an eye to separation, are not moved by the same object according to rationale; but chaste fear has an eye only to separation, initial fear has an eye only to punishment: therefore they are not of the same nature.

FURTHER it is asked concerning chaste fear, whether it remains forever and ever?

And it seems that it does not: because on that text of Psalm 104:11: Let my heart rejoice, etc., the Gloss says that in human fear the cause of danger precedes, but it follows in initial fear, and each fear is mixed with hope: but in the future there will not be fear, but perfect joy: therefore it seems that fear will not be in the future.

But against this is that § 1. Christ was filled with fear, and the holy Angels: since therefore nothing imperfect was in Christ, fear is not an imperfect thing: but every perfect thing will be in the homeland: therefore fear will be there.

§ 2. Again, this is proved in many ways in the Text.

FURTHER here it is asked, why is chaste fear called friendly, and chaste, and filial?

Solution: It must be said to the first, that servile fear is a gift of God, and is good, and useful: but "gift of God" is taking "gift" generally of all things that are given by God, and are above nature for ordering life into the good of grace: therefore just as unformed faith is a gift of God, so also servile fear is a gift of God. But it is good: because it removes from the act of sin through this that it is fear, because it flees the act of sin. But it is useful: because it introduces charity: for by gradually receding from the act of sin, the pleasing of sin is also removed, and the love of God is introduced.

To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that it is not from fear through this that it is fear, but through this that it is servile. And for understanding this it must be noted that servile fear is spoken of in two ways, namely from the condition of servitude, because one is a servant: and from the property of a servant, because by serving he still feels the punishment of a servant, not the liberty of the justice of sons. In the first way it is properly

289. Augustine,

called servile: because one thus fearing is still a servant of sin: and with respect to this Gregory says that it is from fear, and that in him the will of sinning lives...

§ 1. [the] will: and not simply insofar as it is a fear fleeing evil. But in the second way initial fear is called servile in the Text, because it still feels punishment, as will be said below.

§ 2. And through this the solution to the following is clear.

§ 3. To the next it must be said, that to fear servilely, insofar as it is to fear, is good.

§ 4. But to what is objected to the contrary, it must be said through two reasons, that this belongs to fear accidentally on the part of its servility: and that [servility] is not from God, nor is it a gift of God, nor is it good.

§ 5. But to what is further asked about initial fear, it must be said without prejudice [to a better judgment], that servile and initial fear are not the same in substance.

§ 6. But to the first that is objected to the contrary, it must be said that they do not have the same first and proximate mover: because servile fear immediately looks to eternal punishment: and there the cause of flight is principally that, and not the love of the kingdom from which one would be separated: and therefore it does not proceed from gratuitous fear, but rather from the natural love of one's own good: but initial fear is not properly moved by punishments immediately, but rather by separation from the kingdom, and consequently by punishments: because it is necessary that he who is separated from the kingdom be punished in hell: and it arises from the gratuitous love of the heavenly kingdom. And therefore the first objection does not proceed, except concerning what moves consequently in initial fear.

§ 7. To the next it must be said, that there is no similarity: because unformed faith is immediately about all the same things that formed faith is about, although it does not tend [to them] as formed faith does: and it is already clear that servile fear and initial fear are not immediately moved by the same thing, nor on the part of the affection is it caused by a love of the same nature, although on the part of the intellect it is caused by faith, just as initial fear is.

§ 8. To what is asked lastly, Whether initial fear is the same as chaste fear? I think it must be answered that they are substantially the same, and they differ accidentally, namely because initial fear has a punishment which chaste fear does not have, by reason of which it is even called servile by Augustine in the Text: and it has a threefold punishment, namely the anguish of conscience from the fear of insufficient satisfaction for past sin, and the fear of still-infesting temptation, lest perhaps one day it cast him down: and the solicitude of doubt, whether perhaps God despises his service. This threefold punishment is continually evacuated more and more through charity: and then it itself is made chaste through the purification of that penal quality.

§ 9. But to what is first objected to the contrary, the solution is clear through what was said before.

§ 10. To the next it must be said, that it is not evacuated substantially, but rather purified: and as to this it is said to be cast out by charity.

§ 11. To the next it must be said, that initial fear does not immediately have its eye on punishment, but on the separation which is still possible to happen through sin: and therefore it does not look to punishment, except consequently: and this happens to it because of the state in which it is with imperfect charity, just as chaste fear has one act in the present life [on the way], and another in the homeland [in heaven].

§ 12. To what is further asked, Whether chaste fear remains forever? It must be said that it does: but in another act, as was said above in the question on the gifts in general.

§ 13. But to what is objected to the contrary, it must be said that he is speaking of fear according as it has punishment: because thus it is contrary to joyousness.

§ 14. To the last it must be said, that fear is called amicable [friendly] according to the conformity of the will to the lord: because a friend flees those things which would make the will nonconforming: because, as Cicero says, It belongs to friends to will the same thing, and to reject the same thing: but it is filial through the act of reverence and the flight from those things which show an act to be of irreverence to so great a father: but it is chaste from the property of a spouse, who fears nothing except what separates from the embrace.

DISTINCTIO XXXV

Divisio Textus

§ 15. After the premises one must diligently consider, etc.

§ 16. In this part he treats of the difference of the gifts which are in the soul according to the intellect. And the intention of this distinction turns upon five things: in the first of which he distinguishes between wisdom and knowledge. In the second, between wisdom and understanding, there, B, § 1: The difference having been shown, etc. In the third, he similarly distinguishes between wisdom and knowledge and understanding, there, B, § 2: Thus therefore it can be distinguished, etc. In the fourth, he distinguishes between wisdom and knowledge and understanding as gifts, and the same according as they are habits acquired through study and not gifts, according to how gifts are understood here, there, C, And it must be noted, etc. Fifth and lastly, between wisdom as a gift of God, and divine wisdom, there, D, That also must be known, etc.

Articulus 1 — What Wisdom Is

What is wisdom?

§ 17. Concerning the first, two things are asked, namely about wisdom, and knowledge.

§ 18. About wisdom, three things are asked: of which the first is, What is it? Second, What is it about? Third, about the distinction of wisdom from the gifts of understanding and knowledge and counsel.

§ 19. Concerning the first it is objected by accepting the definition of Augustine in the Text about wisdom. But in the Text it is this, that wisdom is the cognition of divine things.

§ 20. Also from the Text this is drawn: Wisdom is in the cognition and love of that which always and unchangeably remains, which is God.

§ 21. But from Gregory this is accepted: Wisdom is a gift refreshing the mind with the hope and certitude of eternal things.

§ 22. But it is objected against the first: because 1. It seems that wisdom is the same as faith: because faith is the cognition of divine things, as was held above: because in all the articles nothing is cognized except divine truth: therefore it seems that faith is wisdom. 2. If perhaps you say, that wisdom is about eternal things without a medium, but faith with a medium, because through a mirror and in an enigma: this is nothing: because wisdom is a gift which is had on the way, and on the way no cognition of God is had without a medium.

§ 23. If perhaps you say, that wisdom is in the affection, and faith in the intellect alone: it does not seem to be true: because if faith were in the intellect alone, it would not be a virtue, as was proved above: therefore it seems that wisdom and faith differ in nothing.

§ 24. But if you say, that it happens that God is cognized in three ways on the way, namely in a vestige, in the image of the soul, and in the likeness of grace, according as likeness means the beautification of the image through the apposition of grace: it seems that this is nothing: for faith is of God in a mirror: but a clear and a clearer thing in a mirror do not substantially diversify the vestige as well.

§ 25. 3. Also, it happens that someone in mortal sin cognizes in the image of the soul and the likeness of grace, not in himself, but in others: and yet he has no gift of sanctifying grace: therefore that cognition in him is of unformed faith: therefore this does not belong to wisdom and understanding.

§ 26. 4. Also, to the same knowable object it happens that one has many mediums, speaking topically, as is clear through the locus from genus, from case, from whole, and thus of others: and yet the habit is not diversified by such things: therefore it seems that neither vestige, nor image, nor likeness can make a diversity of habits: and thus it will not belong to faith to cognize through a vestige, and to understanding through an image, and to wisdom through a likeness.

§ 27. 5. Also, the definition seems not to convert: for the cognition of divine things is had by many, who nevertheless do not have the Holy Spirit. Since therefore the Holy Spirit is always had with His gifts, and especially with the gift of wisdom, it seems that the cognition of divine things is not always the gift of wisdom.

§ 28. Also, it is asked about the second, which is also drawn from the Text, that wisdom is in the love and cognition of that which always and unchangeably is. According to this it seems that: 1. Wisdom is a habit composed out of the cognition of faith and the love of charity: and this cannot be, because habits cannot be so mixed together, or composed, that two make a third. 2. Also, from two virtues nothing is constituted except a virtue: therefore even if they

could be mixed together, they would not seem to constitute a gift, but rather a virtue. 3. Also, concerning this it is objected that in the same place he says, wisdom is worship: which is called latria: because worship is referred rather to justice, than to a gift, as was proved above, when it was asked about latria: therefore what he says, that wisdom is worship, seems to be nothing.

§ 29. Furthermore it is asked about the third: because 1. To refresh is proper rather to a fruit, than to a gift, as was held above: therefore it ought not to be defined by refreshing. 2. Also, hope and certitude belong to faith and hope: since therefore refreshment belongs more to charity, than to faith, or hope, it seems that in the definition of wisdom charity ought rather to be posited than hope, or the certitude of faith.

§ 30. Moreover it is asked, Since of one thing there is one definition, according to what are so many definitions given?

§ 31. Solution. To this last it must be said, that the first respects the matter around which wisdom is, according as it is in the genus of cognition: because it is not placed in one genus, but in diverse ones. Therefore the second will respect those things which are placed in the genus of affection, which are cognition and love, that is, the love of what is cognized, which is proper to the intellect and affection, and not only to affection alone, just as charity is in simple affection. But the third is given according to the affection following the gift itself: and therefore this does not express the substance of wisdom, but its proper operation.

§ 32. To the first therefore it must be said, that wisdom is not the same as faith, although it is about the same things: for it is another light. Whence just as it was said above about faith, that it is a certain light under which the articles are seen: so it must be said here, that wisdom is a certain light of divine things under which divine things are seen and tasted through experience. Whence the gift of wisdom is properly the taste of God in gifts, as Dionysius seems to say of Hierotheus, that by suffering and experiencing and tasting divine things, he learned divine things. Therefore the light shining and warming towards such knowledge of divine things through the taste of God in gifts without which He Himself is not, is called, in my judgment, the gift of wisdom. And through this it is clear, that it is not faith: because in faith God is not tasted in gifts without which He Himself is not.

§ 33. To the next it must be said, that although wisdom is cognition through a medium, yet that medium has more than a mirror and an enigma: because it itself is a gift of sanctity similar to the first goodness, received in the mode of truth, or conversely the likeness of truth in the mode of goodness, for the reason that wisdom illuminates and kindles, and thus it belongs to truth and goodness, according as one is in the other, namely truth in goodness, and goodness in truth.

§ 34. To the next it must be said, that for wisdom the cognition of God in a likeness does not suffice, unless taste is also present, as has been held: and then through taste and a fuller light it is separated from faith: because faith only assents, and receives the gift insofar as it is an emanation of divine goodness containing the sweetness of God.

§ 35. Through this also the solution to the following is clear: because such cognition is not through the experience of taste, nor through a light causing one to experience.

§ 36. To the next it must be said, that that [cognition] which many have, is a speculative cognition, and a habit acquired through doctrine and study, and not a light making an experience of the sweetness of God in His gifts, in which He sanctifies the soul.

§ 37. To the second it must be said, that wisdom is not a habit composed out of cognition and love, but rather it is a light having its proper act according to itself: but Augustine speaks there as regards appropriation, because it has something of cognition and of love: and therefore it is not without those as disposing the intellect, although it is not those, but rather a perfection consequent upon both.

§ 38. To the next it must be said, that this would be true, if we were to say that wisdom is composed out of the composition of cognition and love: but we do not say this, because that habit thus composed, would be nothing but the love of what is cognized: and wisdom does not consist in this, which is rather the taste of the sweetness of what is cognized in a gift of sanctity perceived from God.

§ 39. To the next it must be said, that wisdom is not worship formally, but materially: because namely it is referred to worship, as was said above about faith and charity: because any virtue whatsoever can be referred to the profession of divine worship.

§ 40. To what is objected about the third, it must be said that refreshment, which is the rest of the appetite, is proper to a fruit: but it is refreshment as if through flavor and odor, and not through the touch of the substance: and this incites to a higher progress, and this belongs to the highest gift, namely of wisdom: and therefore the wise man progresses in cognition: but the one enjoying rests in what is cognized.

§ 41. To the next it must be said, that hope and faith are dispositions on the way to taste. But charity perfects the fruit even of the homeland: and therefore in the taste of wisdom mention is made more of the disposition, than of that which does not dispose, but perfects [the ability to] truly enjoy.

Articulus 2 — Whether Wisdom, As A Gift, Is Only Of Eternal Things

Is wisdom as a gift only about eternal things?

§ 42. Secondly it is asked, What is it about?

§ 43. For it seems, that it is about all things: because 1. Solomon says: A wise man hearing, will be wiser therefore it is through hearing: since therefore hearing is through those things which are signs of all things, as the Philosopher maintains, it seems wisdom is about all things. 2. Also, the Philosopher seems to say, that the wise man inquires to cognize the reason of any thing as it is: but this is about everything: therefore it seems, that wisdom is not only of divine things. 3. Also, in the first book of the Metaphysics he seems to posit certain definitions of wisdom, from which it cannot be held that it is only about divine things. For he says thus, We suppose therefore that the wise man knows all things as is fitting, not according to each one having

knowledge of them. Therefore the wise man will be knowing a being through the proper nature of each thing, by which it belongs to it through itself, and not according to each of its individuals, because this is to know accidentally: but this belongs to many non-divine things, as to all demonstrative things, about which are the doctrinal sciences. 4. Also, the Philosopher, We suppose again thus that the wise man cognizes difficult things, and not to cognize easy things, etc: but thus wisdom would be about all metaphysical things, whose principles are most difficult for man to cognize, because through being and definitive reason they recede from sense and image, through which man receives knowledge: and again wisdom would not be only about divine things, which are God Himself. 5. Also, the Philosopher in the same place, Furthermore we suppose that the more certain and most learned knowledge of all causes is the wiser. Therefore it seems, that in no way is wisdom about divine things only, because in none of those modes does it consist about divine things only.

§ 44. If perhaps you say, that wisdom is not so accepted by the Saints, as by the philosophers: and thus these reasons do not hold. To the contrary is, that Augustine divides the definition given by the Philosophers. For when the Philosopher said, that knowledge is the cognition of human and divine things, he himself divides, that it is the cognition of divine things only: and thus he seems to accept one part of the signification, as he does.

§ 45. If because of this it is said, that knowledge is about the others. To the contrary is, that the taste of nothing brings perfect sweetness except of divine things only: since therefore wisdom is the taste of God in gifts, wisdom is not except about divine things.

§ 46. Solution. It must be said, that wisdom as a gift is not except about divine things.

§ 47. To all the others it must be said, that wisdom is spoken of strictly and broadly. Broadly it is thus called from sapere [to know/be wise] only. Strictly from sapere and from sapor [flavor/taste]. And in the first way it is twofold, namely practical, and thus moral knowledge is called wisdom: and speculative, and thus the Philosopher diversifies it in his definitions. However properly it is called wisdom, which is to itself the cause of knowing, and whose end is within, and is not sought for the sake of another, but others are sought for its sake: and in this way only divine knowledge is wisdom, and especially that which is according to piety, as was held in the first distinction of the first book of the Sentences. But wisdom strictly is called from the taste of that which is simply tasty: and that is nothing but divine things: and therefore wisdom is only of divine things.

Articulus 3 — How The Gift Of Wisdom Differs From Knowledge And Understanding

How does the gift of wisdom differ from knowledge and understanding?

§ 48. Thirdly, it is asked about the distinction of the gift of wisdom from knowledge and understanding.

§ 49. But it seems, that it does not differ from knowledge: because 1. Augustine says, that there is no difference except because wisdom is of eternal things, and knowledge of temporal things: but this difference is only material: therefore it seems, that formally they do not differ. 2. Also, there is one habit of charity by which we love God and neighbor: and God is eternal

and the neighbor temporal: therefore by similarity there will be one habit of the gift of wisdom, by which we contemplate eternal things and dispose temporal things. 3. Also, he says in the Text, that understanding is about the Creator and creatures, and wisdom about the Creator only: therefore it seems, that wisdom and understanding differ as a more general and more special habit of cognition: but genus and species do not make diverse species, because the genus is in the species: therefore it seems, that the gift of understanding and wisdom do not differ as diverse species of gifts.

§ 50. Solution. It must be said, that wisdom is cognition through taste, and tasting divine things in gifts most similar to them: but understanding is not through taste, but rather is a light given by God to the cognition of that creature of God, in which God results through grace, and this is spiritual: or in which He is to result through glory or through grace: and therefore it is the light by which we cognize the gratuitous dispositions of heavenly things, and we tend unto God so disposing. And therefore it is clear that understanding and wisdom differ from knowledge: because knowledge is a divine light towards operable things pertaining to this life: and therefore he says in the Text, that it teaches how to converse well in the midst of a crooked and perverse nation.

§ 51. To the first therefore it must be said, that there is not only a material difference: since there is one reason of cognition through a light making taste, and another through a light disposing operable things in time.

§ 52. To the next it must be said, that it is not similar: because in the neighbor there is no reason for love except God, as was said above: but in wisdom the governing light is of another reason than in knowledge.

§ 53. To the next it must be said, that understanding is not about the Creator through taste, but as a sight only tending into the true through a light elevating to those things in which God results more highly than in a vestige and image: such as is the disposition of rewards in the beatitude of spiritual substances. But wisdom has a light which makes the taste of flavor. And this is what Augustine says: In Isaiah understanding is that by which hearts are cleansed from the infirmity of carnal pleasure, so that a pure intention may be directed to the end. For carnal pleasure seems to be called by him a carnality depressing from the contemplation of divine things in which God results more clearly than in these which are corporeal: and of these is understanding, and through them it is directed to the sight of the Creator. And therefore it is said in the Text, that understanding is of divine and spiritual creatures and of all the good affections of the soul. And it is always understood, that it is also of their opposites and through a higher light than is faith: because faith simply assents to the things believed, but understanding sees them in an interior light.

Articulus 4 — On The Acts Of Knowledge, What And How Many They Are, And How Knowledge Differs From Prudence And Counsel

Concerning the acts of knowledge: what and how many they are, and how knowledge differs from prudence and counsel?

§ 54. Next, it is asked about knowledge. And two things are asked, namely about its acts which he posits in the Text, and about its difference from counsel and prudence.

§ 55. As to the first, those things are accepted which are said in the Text which seem to hint, that knowledge has four acts.

§ 56. For he says first, that knowledge is the cognition of human things: therefore to discern human things seems to be the proper act of knowledge.

§ 57. Also, he says that he does not attribute to knowledge all things which can be known by man, but only those by which the most salutary faith which leads to true beatitude, is generated, nourished, defended, and strengthened.

§ 58. But a third act is elicited from this that he says, that it belongs to knowledge to abstain from evil things.

§ 59. A fourth is elicited from this that he says, that when we say: We saw him full of grace and truth, that grace is referred to knowledge, and truth to wisdom. For in this act of knowledge it will be to cognize the grace of the humanity of Christ.

§ 60. But it is objected against the first, that 1. To discern human things, either is accepted generally for all things which can be discerned by man, and then knowledge will be the same as wisdom: or it is accepted for those things which pertain to the life of man, and then it will be the same as prudence, as it seems. 2. Also, as wisdom relates to divine things, so knowledge relates to human things: but wisdom relates to divine things such that it itself is that virtue which is about divine things, namely faith: therefore knowledge relates to human things such that it itself is that virtue which is about human things like prudence. But that wisdom is the same as faith, is proved through Gregory, speaking thus on Job: In the hearts of the elect, the wisdom of following goods is born first, and this through the gift of the Spirit is as it were the firstborn. Which wisdom is surely our faith, as the Prophet attests who says: Unless you believe, you will not understand.

§ 61. Also, it is objected about the second act. For he says in the Text, that faithful peoples do not excel in that knowledge, although they excel in faith itself: therefore it seems, that what will be said in the following distinction is not true, that one being had all are had, since knowledge is not had by all.

§ 62. Also, it is objected about the third act, which is to abstain from evil things. And this he explains, when he says, that to abstain from evil things is to converse prudently in the midst of a crooked and perverse nation: for this is fitting to prudence, as the saying itself also manifests, because to converse prudently belongs to prudence.

§ 63. Also, it is objected about the fourth. Those things which spectate to the humanity of Christ, are adored with one adoration with the deity: therefore it seems, that by the habit of wisdom they are to be cognized just as the divinity: therefore they do not pertain to knowledge.

§ 64. Also it is asked, Since of one habit there is one special and substantial act, how does Augustine here give four acts to the gift of knowledge?

§ 65. Solution. It must be said, that the gift of knowledge is a simple light received from God, in which are seen the reasons of operable things pertaining to life: and therefore it relates to prudence like a better and more perfect habit of operable things. And therefore also is solved that which some could object, whether knowledge is of complex things or incomplex things, or of principles or of conclusions: since it is none of these, but it is a light just like faith towards credibles is a simple likeness of divine truth and justice, under which are seen the divine reasons of things operable by us, which pertain to the mode of living holily and meritoriously, as the Apostle says: Let us live soberly, and justly, and piously in this world, etc.

§ 66. To the first therefore it must be said, that it is only about those things which are operable by us: nor is it however prudence: because that relies on the reasons of human right, and receives reasons from those, but knowledge does not, because it relies on the divine light, which illuminates towards conversation according to divine reasons.

§ 67. To the next it must be said, that that act is not proper to the gift of knowledge, but rather is fitting to it through the matter appropriated to it: for just as to prudence, as Cicero says in book I of De Officiis, the matter of sciences and knowable things is in a certain way appropriated, so also to the gift of knowledge is appropriated the knowledge of Sacred Scripture, through which faith is nourished by exhorting, and is defended by disputing: and therefore this act is fitting appropriately and not properly.

§ 68. But to that which was objected before this, that wisdom is the same as faith, and knowledge the same as prudence: it must be said, that it is invalid: because the saying of Gregory is not understood except for so much, that wisdom and faith are about the same things: and not that it is one habit: and so also knowledge and prudence are about the same things and not by one ratio.

§ 69. To what is objected about the third act, it must be said that prudence rules otherwise, and knowledge otherwise, and towards another thing as to the end and proximate [object]: because prudence through the reasons of human right, and towards honorable things according to the statutes of cities and plebiscites: but knowledge through divine reasons, and towards a holy conversation commending itself to every conscience of men: whence it attends rather to the holy, than to the honorable.

§ 70. And as to what is objected concerning this that Augustine says, to converse prudently: it must be said that he takes it broadly, according as it is the same as providently, just as the Apostle: Providing good things not only before God, but also before all men.

§ 71. To the next which is asked about the fourth, it must be said that knowledge is not about the humanity of Christ, except insofar as it is a governing exemplar both in work and in disposing life through divine doctrine: and therefore if the humanity is considered as on the way, I well concede that there is in it the flavor of deity, and it pertains to wisdom as the objection proves: but according as it is proposed to us as an exemplary form governing in the works of sanctity, and according as it confers upon us a law of life relying on the reasons of divine right and towards sanctity, thus it pertains to knowledge: and so I think Augustine is to be understood.

§ 72. To the last it must be said, that as is clear from the aforementioned, there is only one substantial act, which is to rule in works of sanctity in the midst of a crooked and perverse nation: and to this they are reverted, namely the first, third, and fourth. But the first touches specially upon those things in which it rules, because in human things. But the third touches upon the mode of ruling, because it teaches to converse well through the reasons of divine right, which exhorts to the sanctity of life rather than to the republic. The fourth preestablishes the exemplar. But the second is not the proper act of knowledge, but an appropriated one.

Articulus 5 — Whether Counsel Is A Gift

Is counsel a gift?

§ 73. Secondly it is asked, In what does it differ from the gift of counsel? because concerning the difference of prudence itself it has already been held.

§ 74. And so that we may better understand this, we will introduce a question which the Master omits in the Text about the gift of counsel, and we will ask four things, namely whether counsel is a gift, and what it is, and what is its act, and how it is distinguished from the gift of knowledge?

§ 75. But it seems not to be a gift: because 1. All the gifts were in Christ: but counsel was not in Christ: therefore counsel is not a gift. The first is clear through things said before. The second is proved through John Damascene, who says, that counsel is not fitting to Christ: because counsel belongs to an ignorant one, and Christ was ignorant of nothing. 2. Also, Damascene says, that counsel is about doubtful things: for concerning certain things no one counsels: but doubtfulness is not as any aid of our potencies, nor is it given as an aid: since therefore the gifts were given as an aid, it seems that counsel is not a gift. 3. Also, Counsel is against precipitation, as Gregory says: but caution is against the same, as Macrobius and Cicero say: therefore it seems counsel does not differ from caution: but caution is a certain condition of the virtue of prudence according to that part of it which is providence: therefore counsel is a part of the virtue of prudence: therefore it is not a gift: because as was said, gifts are of a higher habit than virtues.

§ 76. Solution. It must be said, that counsel is a gift, as is commonly said by all the Saints.

§ 77. But to what is first objected, it must be said that counsel is spoken of in two ways, namely from the one giving counsel, and in this it signifies a plenitude of light directing in doubtful things: and thus it was in Christ and is in God: and in this way it is a gift. It is also called from the one seeking counsel, and thus it belongs to a doubting and ignorant one, and thus it was not in Christ, nor is it a gift in this mode.

§ 78. Through this also the solution to the following is clear.

§ 79. To the next it must be said, that caution properly is an impediment against the snares of enemies, and against dangers which can arise: but counsel is a light directing towards great, not dangerous things, for which man is not sufficient without a special aid, such as to

sell everything and give to the poor, and things of this sort, which in Sacred Scripture are called counsels, as will be clear in the last chapter of this distinction.

Articulus 6 — What Counsel Is

What is counsel?

§ 80. Secondly it is asked, What is counsel?

§ 81. But it is defined by Cicero in the Rhetoric thus: Counsel is a true contrived reason for doing or not doing something.[290]

§ 82. But Gregory seems to maintain, that counsel is a gift given to man against precipitation.

§ 1. However, according to the first definition, counsel is not a gift: because

§ 2. 1. We anticipate with thought-out reason all contingent things that are matters of action workable by us: and the virtue of providence, which is a part of prudence, seems to do this. Therefore, it seems that this does not belong to a gift.

§ 3. 2. Also, even according to Gregory, the name of counsel is not restricted to something specific: because rashness lies in wait for all matters of action. Therefore, counsel concerns all things. Yet it does not seem to be taken in this way in Sacred Scripture, in which "counsels" are things to which not everyone is obligated.

§ 4. Further, alongside this, it is asked: Why is it called counsel and not rather choice [eligentia], since choice is more noble according to the Philosopher and John Damascene? Because:

§ 5. 1. Choice is a determined will, whereas counsel is a certain inquiry into things to be done.

§ 6. 2. Also, upon that verse of Psalm 118:24: My counsel is your justifications, the Gloss says: Counsel is to observe justifications. But to observe justifications either belongs to justice or to every virtue. Therefore, it seems that counsel is the directive of every virtue or of special justice. Therefore, it does not exclusively direct the gift of fortitude, as they say.

§ 7. Solution. It must be said that counsel is taken in a general sense according to how it is defined by Cicero. Nevertheless, it can be specially adapted to the gift of counsel, such that it is defined as the thought-out reason of those things in which a human being needs special assistance due to their arduousness. And therefore, counsel here is not about what is doubtful, but rather about the arduous, to which, on account of its difficulty, not everyone is bound except in cases of necessity. And Gregory's statement is understood in the same way, because rashness lies in wait more in a difficult, arduous matter; and therefore, the soul there needs special assistance.

§ 8. To the next objection it must be said that choice is generally about all actionable things to be done by us, and therefore it could not be the name of a special gift. But counsel, as it is

taken here, is not about all things, but about those things in which we need a special directing light. And therefore, its name as a gift follows from its being from the Holy Spirit giving counsel, rather than from one acquiring it, as was said before.

§ 9. To the next objection it must be said that counsel directs nothing but the gift of fortitude. Now, observing justifications occurs in three ways: namely, in the special definition of justifications, and thus it belongs to justice. Or in a general sense, such that observing justifications is the same as persevering in justifying virtues: and thus it belongs to every virtue or to general justice. In neither of these ways is it counsel, except insofar as counsel is taken broadly as the thought-out reason for doing or retaining anything whatever. Thirdly, observing justifications means guarding justifications against those attacking them, that is, defending them from temptations that are difficult to resist: and in this way, executively it belongs to fortitude, and directively it belongs to the gift of counsel.

§ 10. And through this the whole matter is resolved.

Articulus 7 — On The Act Of Counsel

On the act of counsel.

§ 11. Thirdly, it is asked concerning the act of counsel.

§ 12. But it seems from what has been said that counsel is meant to direct in great matters to which not all are bound. Yet, since every directive habit of reason concerns the doubt that can arise in them, and since concerning those things which are called "counsels" in Sacred Scripture there is no doubt, it seems that the gift of counsel is superfluous: for there is no doubt that it will be good to do those things which are called counsels in Sacred Scripture.

§ 13. Solution. Through the aforesaid it is easy to determine these matters: because the acts of counsel in which it differs from other gifts are to direct, through a light divinely inspired, toward higher goods which a human being is insufficient to perform and know through common virtue: such as to sell all things, and give to the poor, and have treasures in heaven. We do not know these treasures and the reward of contemplations except by the light of counsel.

§ 14. To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that there is no doubt that they are good; but it is doubtful to a human being whether they ought to be chosen, because he is not elevated to see that it is useful to leave all things behind except by divine counsel. And he also needs counsel in such matters regarding the mode of fulfilling them, because they are arduous: and for this reason they are closer to rashness.

§ 15. But against this seems to be what blessed Gregory says: Through the solidity of the gift of counsel, one passes from the flux of vices to the solidity of virtue. Therefore it seems that to call one back from vices is the act of counsel.

§ 16. And to this it must be said that Gregory there adapts the seven gifts to the seven days of the works of creation: and then counsel fits in the third place, when the water is divided from the dry land. In this way, that act of counsel will be an appropriated one, not its proper

290. Cicero, De Inventione II, 54, 162.

one. Or it may be said that it is one thing to pass over to virtue, and another to pass to the solidity of virtue: because solidity chiefly consists in the counsels, in which there is perfection, and then this will be proper to counsel.

Articulus 8 — In What Knowledge And Counsel Differ

In what do science and counsel differ?

§ 17. Fourthly, it is asked in what do science and counsel differ, since both are about matters of action?

§ 18. Now it seems that they differ in nothing: because 1. A gift that is for the assistance of a power perfects it insofar as it is directed toward act. But, as John Damascene says, reason takes counsel in all works. For first it inquires and takes counsel. Then it chooses and passes judgment. Then it wills, and afterward it makes an impulse toward the work. But in all such things science also directs. Therefore, it seems that counsel and science do not differ regarding the things they are about.

§ 19. 2. The same seems to be held by Aristotle in Book III of the Ethics, where among the general efficient causes of virtue (such as the voluntary, the will, and choice) he also posits counsel. Therefore, it seems that counsel regards the work of every virtue; and in that work, science directs. Therefore, regarding the things they are about, science does not differ from counsel.

§ 20. But to the contrary is that, just as piety and fortitude are related in execution, so counsel and science are related in direction. But piety and fortitude are not about the same things: therefore, science and counsel do not direct in the same things.

§ 21. And this must be conceded: since John Damascene says that counsel is about great things; for we do not take counsel about small things and things readily operable by us.

§ 22. Hence it must be said that there are great things for which we are not sufficient without assistance, and to which not everyone is bound: and in these things counsel directs, as was said earlier.

§ 23. To the objections to the contrary, there is one solution: that "counsel" is spoken of in two ways. Namely, as a general pre-ordering of things to be done with foresight of the work's outcome and end: and the objections proceed from this counsel, about which Solomon also says: Son, do nothing without counsel, and after the fact you will not repent. But "counsel" is spoken of specially as a directing light in undertaking arduous things elevated above human industry, which God has revealed only for the state of perfection. And in this way, counsel is a spiritual gift that the faithful receive from the Holy Spirit, either so that they may fulfill the counsels, or so that they can fulfill them if they wish.

Articulus 9 — What The Gift Of Understanding Is, And, Whether It Is A Gift By Way Of A Complexion

What is the gift of understanding? And, Is it a gift by way of a proposition?

§ 24. Next, it is asked about what he says there, at B, Having shown the difference between science and wisdom, etc.

§ 25. For here one must inquire about the gift of understanding. And three things are asked: namely, what it is, what it is about, and how it relates to faith and contemplation? Because all the others have been named above.

§ 26. To the first we proceed thus: 1. Augustine says in a certain sermon: Understanding is called that by which hearts are cleansed from all carnal infirmity, so that pure intention may be directed to the end. But it seems that all of this ought to belong to faith: because it is said in Acts 15:9: Purifying their hearts by faith: therefore faith purifies the heart from carnal pleasure.

§ 27. 2. Also, Augustine says that intention makes a work good, and faith directs intention. Therefore, it also directs to the end. Therefore, both of these belong to faith.

§ 28. Further, alongside this, it is asked: Is the gift of understanding by way of a proposition [complex apprehension]?

§ 29. And it seems that it is: because 1. Gregory says that God gives understanding when He illuminates the mind concerning things heard. But things heard are taken in a kind of proposition. Therefore, understanding consists in a kind of proposition, as it seems. 2. Also, on that verse: The Lord will shake the desert of Cades, an authority says: He will shake it, as the understanding of the Holy Spirit matched according to anagoge. But anagogical understanding is composite and complex. Therefore, this understanding consists in a kind of proposition.

§ 30. 3. Also, Dionysius says that it is not possible for the divine ray to shine upon us unless circumvelated by the variety of sacred veils. But this circumvelation is a proposition, or not without a proposition. Therefore, it seems that understanding is composite.

§ 31. ON THE CONTRARY: Faith is simple: and the gift of understanding is more perfect than faith. Therefore, much more so is the gift of understanding simple.

§ 32. Solution. It must be said that, just as was stated above in the question on the gift of wisdom, the gift of understanding is a simple light under which God is seen in those who are blessed, and in their special offices and acts.

§ 33. To that which is objected concerning the description, it must be said that it is given through its effect: because understanding cleanses hearts, even in a mirror and an enigma, so that one may see by the light perceived in it in which truth shines according to a greater clarity than that of a mirror and an enigma; whereas faith does not cleanse except from the falsities of errors.

§ 34. To the next objection it must be said that faith directs to the end in one way, and the gift of understanding in another. For faith directs the work by showing the reward and Him who is simply the end of all good; but understanding directs to the end by seeing the end through its light, either in itself or in the blessed, and it does not direct the work.

§ 35. To that which is further asked, Whether it is by way of a proposition? It must be said that it is in no way so; rather, it is a simple light, as has been said.

§ 36. To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that understanding is from hearing just as faith is from hearing, namely, with respect to the spoken understanding, but only through the light of the gift of understanding. And therefore the hearing of Scripture is subservient to the act of the gift of understanding, but it does not generate the light itself: because this is infused by God Himself along with the other sanctifying graces. Hence that proposition which is in things heard is under the gift, and not in the gift itself, just as it is in faith.

§ 37. Through this the solution to the next objection is clear: since the understanding of Scripture which is anagogical helps the understanding to be elevated, but it does not generate the light under which spiritual things are seen.

§ 38. Dionysius also speaks in this manner. Yet all these things are under the gift of understanding.

Articulus 10 — On The Objects Of The Gift Of Understanding

What is the gift of understanding about?

§ 39. Secondly, it is asked what the gift of understanding is about.

§ 40. And the Master seems to say that it is about God and spiritual creatures, such as Angels, and souls, and their affections.

§ 41. 1. But if it is about spiritual creatures, it seems to be about God in His image: and then, according to this, it seems again to coincide with faith.

§ 42. 2. Also, if it is about the Creator, then it seems that in this respect it does not differ from the gift of wisdom.

§ 43. 3. If perchance it is said that understanding is about God as the first truth, and wis-
dom is about Him as goodness: this also does not seem true, because if truth were its end, it would seem to be in the speculative intellect and not the practical: and thus it would not be a sanctifying grace.

§ 44. 4. Also, Augustine on Matthew 5:8, in the Gloss, says thus: Let man strip himself of the world, love eternal things, embrace God, until he can see God, whom he sees only as much as he dies to the age. In the future, as He is, He will be seen by the eye of the mind. Therefore the spirit of understanding is adapted to this step: because understanding is the eye of the mind. From this it is gathered that the understanding of the gift is to know God and to love and embrace Him: therefore it seems that it differs in nothing from wisdom.

§ 45. Solution. It must be said that, in my judgment, the gift of understanding is principally about God, and about those spiritual things in which divine truth shines forth: and I well concede that it does not apprehend God except by way of truth in Himself. But this spiritual creature possesses more than the image alone: and therefore it is not properly upon the image, but rather uses the image as an instrument and a light infused into it, as illuminating it first: and this is greater than faith.

§ 46. To the next objection it must be said that from the principles already established, it is clear how it differs from wisdom.

§ 47. To the next objection it must be said that this does not follow: because faith also belongs to truth; and yet, because it tends toward Him, faith is a virtue. And thus the gift of understanding tends and receives what is given to it solely under the ratio of the true: and therefore the gift of understanding has the ratio of a virtue, according to how virtue is taken generally. Because truth, which is the end of intelligence, according to the Philosopher is truth abstracted from the thing; here, however, truth received in the thing is the end to which the gift of understanding seeks to be really united.

§ 48. To that which is objected concerning the Gloss on Matthew 5:8, it must be said that Augustine is speaking in order to adapt the gifts to the beatitudes: because although the gifts are less perfect perfections than the beatitudes, they are nevertheless adaptable to them. And according to this, the cleansing of the heart and death to the world is a disposition preceding the act of the gift of understanding, and does not pertain to understanding itself. But because the gift is a virtue by taking virtue in a general sense, therefore it is necessary that it proceed from love. But still, that love does not belong to charity, except insofar as charity is the general mover in every good, as was said above. But although in this way it would also have charity moving it, nevertheless it would differ from wisdom: because wisdom consists in the taste of goodness, as has often been said, but understanding in the contemplation of truth alone.

Articulus 11 — How Understanding Relates To Contemplation

How does understanding relate to contemplation?

§ 49. Further it is asked, How does it relate to faith and contemplation? One of these has already been treated. But how does it relate to contemplation? This must be inquired into.

§ 50. Now it seems that it precedes faith and contemplation: because understanding neither assents nor contemplates: therefore it seems that understanding precedes both faith and contemplation.

§ 51. But against this seems to be what Isaias says: Unless you believe, you shall not understand: therefore faith precedes understanding.

§ 52. Solution. It must be said that there is a certain understanding concerning that which is spoken through discourse: and this is not the gift, but it precedes faith and contemplation. And there is a certain understanding intuiting in a light received from God, which light makes one pleasing [sanctifies], and this is the gift, and it is a nobler perfection of our intellect than faith or contemplation: and therefore, according to the path of the generation of the act (though not of the habit), it follows faith and contemplation. But I say not according to the path of the generation of the habit: because the habits are infused simultaneously; but not the acts, rather the acts follow one another.

Articulus 12 — What The Gift Of Fortitude Is

What is the gift of fortitude?

§ 53. From an abundance [of matter] one can here inquire about two gifts which the Master does not treat here, namely the gift of piety and of fortitude.

§ 54. Concerning the gift of fortitude we ask three things: namely, what is it? And, according to what act does it exist on the way [in this life] and in the fatherland [in heaven]? And thirdly, how does it differ from the virtue of fortitude?

§ 55. To the first it is objected thus: Augustine in the book On the Spirit and the Soul: It belongs to fortitude not only to depress earthly desires, but thoroughly to forget them.

§ 56. Moreover Gregory says: It belongs to fortitude to give confidence to the trembling.

§ 57. Also, Augustine in the book On Christian Doctrine: It belongs to fortitude to be sequestered from all the deadly pleasantness of transient things.

§ 58. Also, Gregory on the Works of the Six Days: The spirit of fortitude is to shine with miracles and doctrine.

§ 59. Against the first statement it is objected: because 1. According to Macrobius, this is rather characteristic of the virtue of a purified mind than of the gift.

§ 60. 2. Also, this belongs rather to temperance, whose role is to repress desires or pleasures for temporal things, than to fortitude.

§ 61. 3. Also, concerning the second. To give confidence to the trembling belongs rather to patience, or long-suffering, or magnificence, than to the gift.

§ 62. 4. Furthermore, the virtue of fortitude itself does this: therefore for this it does not need a higher assistance by which to be helped, that is, the gift of fortitude.

§ 63. 5. Similarly, it is objected concerning the third. Because that seems to belong more to gratuitously given grace, which is the "working of miracles" spoken of by the Apostle, than to be an act of the gift.

§ 64. Solution. All these things in some way belong to the gift of fortitude.

§ 65. And to understand this, it must be noted that the gift of fortitude principally regards the arduous. Now, the arduous, the difficult, and the laborious differ: because the arduous involves an elevation withdrawing one from common interaction, and from what the many desire, and from what the many will attain as the end which is the terminus of the work. The difficult, on the other hand, is what exceeds the faculty of the power, though not infinitely. But the laborious is what inflicts a penalty on the one laboring or enduring it. Hence the gift of fortitude principally regards the arduous; and because counsel is about such an arduous thing, it is directed by counsel.

§ 66. Therefore, to the first it must be said that the purgatorial virtue or the virtue of the purified mind indeed teaches to forget the desires of vice or pleasures, but not the common ones which the many have: because there are many who keep the precept. But the gift of fortitude perfects one toward the arduous, which elevates above what the many do, and above their pleasures.

§ 67. But if it is objected that according to this Augustine speaks badly: Deadly desires or pleasures: because some who keep the precepts do not delight in deadly pleasures. It must be said that they are called deadly because they dispose to death through the subreption of venial sins, from which fortitude turns one away toward the state of perfection in the counsels.

§ 68. To the next objection it must be said that temperance does not depress pestiferous pleasures in this way, but rather through approaching the mean in them, and not through a flight toward the arduous which is above them.

§ 69. To the next objection it must be said that giving confidence equivocally applies to fortitude, its species, and the gift of fortitude: because fortitude is properly against the difficult and laborious, and the habit of fortitude perfects one in those. But the gift is against the arduous, which elevates the mind beyond those things that inflict difficulty. Fortitude or patience does not do this, but rather dismisses one in them; yet it nevertheless comforts one to endure them by professing the faith. Hence from this nothing more is gathered than that the gift of fortitude is present in the same act of enduring or attacking alongside the virtue of fortitude, but it does not comfort according to the same ratio.

§ 70. To the next objection it must be said that Gregory is speaking by appropriating the gifts to the works of the six days. Or it can be said that miracles and doctrine show the altitude of life: and therefore they belong to the fortitude that fulfills the counsels, not as acts, but as signs.

Articulus 13 — Which Is The Act Of Fortitude On The Way, And Its Act In The Fatherland

What is the act of fortitude on the way, and its act in the fatherland?

§ 71. Secondly it is asked, What is the act of fortitude on the way, and its act in the fatherland?

§ 72. Now it seems that on the way it has no act differing from the virtue of fortitude: because the virtue of fortitude is against the greatest danger that can exist, namely, against inflicted death. Since, therefore, nothing is higher than the gift of fortitude, there cannot be any act separated from the virtue of fortitude according to the ratio of altitude.

§ 73. But in the fatherland it seems it can have no act: because 1. There will be no deadly pleasures there, as the first authority introduced above said: therefore there will be no separation from them there.

§ 74. 2. Also, there will be no danger there: therefore it will not be necessary that a habit giving confidence to the trembling be there.

§ 75. 3. Also, miracles will not be there, because they are for the sake of unbelievers, so that they may be converted.

§ 76. 4. Also, since all fortitude is against inflicted passions, and no one inflicts passions there, fortitude will seem superfluous there.

§ 77. 5. Also, Faith and hope, which are directed to the end and are theological virtues, will not remain in the fatherland: therefore much less those things which are directed to the things that are for the end. Therefore it seems that, once the end is attained, all habits will be evacuated.

§ 78. Solution. It must be said that the gift of fortitude has a proper act in its ratio on the way, although not in the fatherland, and it is separated from the act of the virtue of fortitude. Because, as was held earlier, it is the arduous elevating and withdrawing from common interaction—not just from the anxiety of evil—and this is the ratio of the act in the gift of fortitude. And therefore the gift of fortitude comes into danger under a different ratio, and the virtue of fortitude otherwise. Because the virtue endures danger when it is necessary to suffer or when withdrawing from the good of virtue, such as when faith is sought, or justice, or the liberty of the fatherland, or something of this kind of good for the sake of grace or citizens. But the gift of fortitude from superabundance offers itself to a state in which such things are sought more often, such as to the state of the perfection of the counsels. Similarly, they do not comfort themselves to conquer according to the same ratio. Because the gift of fortitude is out of superabundance, for it itself is the salt of perfection; if it vanishes, with what will the others be salted? That is, if the perfect one falls, how will the imperfect one stand? But the virtue of fortitude comforts itself from the good of virtue necessary for salvation.

§ 79. But if it is objected that, according to this, none but the perfect possess the gift of fortitude: therefore, having one sanctifying grace does not mean all are had. It must be said that this is not true, nor does it follow from what has been said: because the perfect have it in act, and generally all those existing in grace have it in habit. Yet the habits of virtue perfect toward the act in different ways, as was said: for he who is imperfect possesses that from which he can do the work of perfection if he wishes.

§ 80. To that which is asked concerning its act in the fatherland, it must be said that it will remain in the fatherland according to substance and a different act. According to substance: just as weapons are not taken away from the best fighting soldier when he returns to the emperor—not so that he may fight in them before the emperor, but so that they may be as the decoration of his preceding victory. But according to act, it remains as the firmest adhesion to that good which was the end of the battle and of the arduous thing he undertook. For it belongs to no virtue to pursue a good in such a way that, after it is possessed, it did not remain in it thus; but just as temperance delights in what is sweet, so fortitude holds most firmly to the arduous, and this according to one ratio for the gift, and according to another for the virtue, as was said.

§ 81. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 14 — In What The Gift Of Fortitude Differs From Fortitude As A Virtue

In what does the gift of fortitude differ from the virtue of fortitude?

§ 82. Thirdly it is asked, though it has already been almost determined, in what does it differ from the virtue of fortitude?

§ 83. And for this, let the statement of Augustine in the book On Christian Doctrine be accepted, where he says thus: Let them rise up next to fortitude, that the world may be crucified to them, and they to the world; let them make use of the perversity of life: and for this, from the depths of iniquity charity does not grow cold, but the hunger and thirst for justice are deleted, until satiety of it is reached in that immortality: and thus it will be true: Blessed are those who hunger and thirst for justice, for they shall be satisfied. But this seems to be proper neither to the gift of fortitude nor to the virtue, but rather to be the act of every virtue: because one is not crucified to the world through the hatred of one vice, but of all.

§ 84. Solution. Almost everything that can be asked concerning this article has already been said in the preceding ones.

§ 85. To the authority of Augustine introduced here, it must be said that crucifying oneself to the world is spoken of in two ways. Namely, materially, according to those things in which one is generally crucified, according to what the Apostle says: Those who belong to Christ have crucified their flesh with its vices and concupiscences: and thus it belongs to every virtue. It is also spoken of formally, as if according to its ratio, and thus it sounds like a certain high thing pertaining to the work of perfection: because the greatest battle of Christ was on the cross. And thus it principally belongs to the gift of fortitude, which fulfills more than it is bound to, just as Christ did for us. Similarly, the thirst and hunger for justice are taken according to the ratio of general justice only, and thus it is not appropriated to the gift: or according to the ratio of the thirst and hunger which out of desire break forth into the most difficult exercise against enemies, as when David asked for water from the cistern which is in Bethlehem: and thus it is fitting for the gift of fortitude. Hence two gifts assist fortitude: for insofar as it exists concerning a terrible thing to be feared, it fears things to be feared, and thus it is assisted by the gift of fear: so that now out of reverence it fears or attacks such things, because this is higher. But on the part where it dares difficult things that ought to be dared, it is assisted by the gift of fortitude arising from the firmness of adhesion to the supremely arduous, which it strives to apprehend and hold, whereas the virtue of fortitude attends only to civil good (and this for the sake of God, if it is infused).

Articulus 15 — What The Gift Of Piety Is

What is the gift of piety?

§ 86. Next, it is asked about the gift of piety.

§ 87. And we will ask four things: namely, what is it? And secondly, what is its act on the way, and in the fatherland? Thirdly, whether it is one in species, or many? Fourthly, what is its difference from mercy, or meekness, or mildness?

§ 88. To the first we proceed thus: 1. Augustine says in Book X of The City of God, near the beginning: Piety is properly understood to be the worship of God, which the Greeks call theosebeia. Yet this is also said to be dutifully held toward parents. By the custom of the vulgar, moreover, this name is frequently used even for works of mercy: which I judge to have happened because God commands these especially to be done for Him, and testifies that these please Him in place of sacrifices.

§ 89. Moreover, at the beginning of his commentary on Job, Gregory says that piety is that which teaches works of mercy.

§ 90. Also, Cicero, before the end of the first Rhetoric, says that piety is benevolence toward parents.

§ 91. Now it is objected concerning the first: because that seems to make piety identical with three things, none of which is the gift of piety. For if piety is called the worship of God, piety will be the same as latria: and it is certain that the gift of piety is not latria. Because, approved in this way, piety executes what the gift of science teaches: but this teaches to converse well in the midst of a depraved nation. Therefore piety lives well in relation to neighbor. But worship orders in relation to God.

§ 92. Also, that which is said, that through it one also lives dutifully toward parents, seems to coincide with what Cicero says, that piety is benevolence toward parents: but this again does not seem to fit the gift of piety, because the gift of piety regards all people.

§ 93. 2. Furthermore, it was conceded above that the gifts belong to a wider perfection than the virtues: but piety, spoken of in this way, is a virtue and a species of natural justice, as Cicero says. Therefore the gift of piety will be of a wider perfection than piety spoken of in this way: therefore it seems that it is not benevolence toward parents.

§ 94. It is also objected concerning the third designation which Augustine introduces, saying that by the custom of the vulgar this name is frequently used even for works of mercy. For it seems that it should rather be used frequently for works of meekness: because on Matthew 5:4, upon that verse: Blessed are the meek, for they shall possess the land, the Gloss says that piety is ordered to meekness. Therefore, since the second beatitude is meekness, and mercy is the fifth, it seems that it is not concerning works of mercy, but of piety.

§ 95. Solution. It must be said that piety is spoken of in many ways, and sometimes it is in the genus of virtue, and sometimes in the genus of a gift: and it is spoken of in those ways by priority and posteriority. Hence it is necessary to posit one way in which it is spoken of per se: and the other ways will be taken in relation to that one. Therefore it can be said that piety is properly benevolence toward the image of God, insofar as it is the image of God. But this is taken in multiple ways: for either it inclines the affection on the part of the exemplar from which that image proceeds, and thus piety is carried more toward the exemplar, and in this way it will be in the genus of the virtue of la-[tria...]

[...just]ice: and according to Augustine it is said especially in this manner, that the exemplar is the root of benevolence in all the other ways by which the affection is inclined toward the image. But benevolence is also inclined toward the image descending from the divine exemplar: and this in three ways, namely, such that it is inclined with nature, and then it is benevolence toward parents, and it is again a virtue and a species of natural justice: or it is generally borne toward the image according as it is an image, and then it is properly a gift, and it is benevolence of the image of God in a rational nature, and it teaches one to bear oneself benevolently toward it: or it is borne toward the image insofar as it is conjoined to an inferior nature, by which the image is surrounded by misery, and thus piety is brought about

concerning works of mercy, and it differs from mercy, because mercy has the rationale of works upon another's misery, whereas piety [regards] the image with its conjunction to the misery that surrounds it in a miserable nature.

Therefore, to the first it must be said that the solution is already clear: because Augustine there takes piety broadly in a community [of meaning], by which it is said through prior and posterior [i.e., analogously] of many things: and through this the solution is clear to all except the last.

And to that it must be said that piety has two things in itself, namely benevolence, and that concerning which is its act: and on the part of benevolence it is ordered to meekness: and the Gloss does not intend that it be meekness according to substance, but that it is ordered to it on account of the similarity of the affection: because he who is benevolent toward all is neither exasperated by anyone, nor does anger or rancor tempt him. Now the act of piety (because it is to expend good upon the image) is especially concerning the indigence of the image: and thus as to its matter it is concerning the works of mercy; and thus nothing prevents it from being ordered to different beatitudes with respect to different things.

Articulus 16 — Which Is The Act Of The Gift Of Piety On The Way

What is the act of the gift of piety for someone on the way (in via)?

What is the act of the gift of piety for someone on the way?

Secondly, it is asked concerning its act on the way and in the fatherland.

§ 1. Now it seems that the act is manifold from the words said above, namely to worship God, to honor parents, to do good to all, to dedicate oneself to works of mercy. Therefore it seems that it is not one gift.

§ 2. Also, on Job 31:19: If I have despised him that was perishing, etc., the Gloss says that this was a work of piety: for in a pious mind nature avails more than acquaintance. Therefore it seems that its principal act is to dedicate oneself to works of mercy.

§ 3. Also, on 1 Tim 4:8: Piety is profitable to all things, having promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come, the Gloss says that the whole sum of Christian discipline lies in mercy and piety. And it does not seem there that the act of one is distinguished from the act of the other: therefore it seems that its act is to relieve the poor.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. Augustine says in the book On Christian Doctrine, and the same is in the Gloss on Matt 7:6: It is the property of piety to honor holy things, not to contradict Scripture whether understood or not understood. Therefore it seems that its principal act is not to intend works of mercy.

§ 2. Also, Augustine in a certain sermon on the Trinity: In the second degree one ascends to piety, so that one does not resist the will of God, and so that in His sermons a depraved sense is not taken, nor is a stumbling block taken in the governance of the creature, since many things happen which private will does not demand. From this it is accepted that the act of piety is concerning two things, namely to understand Scripture religiously, and not to be

offended in the manner in which God governs the world, since many things seem to be done contrary to our will.

§ 3. Also, it seems that none of these is its act. For Gregory says that knowledge teaches, and piety executes: therefore its act will be that which knowledge teaches: but it was held above that knowledge has three acts, namely to defend Scripture, and to know how to converse well in the midst of a depraved and perverse nation, and to know how to distribute temporal goods: therefore it seems that those are of piety by way of execution.

Solution. This last seems to me to be conceded: but nevertheless, just as knowledge has one principal act through which it is in all who have the gifts, namely to know how to use temporal goods well to converse well in the midst of a depraved and perverse nation: so piety has one act which is benevolently and without complaint to desire and do good to all who are marked by the image of God.

To that which is objected first, it must be said that those acts are of piety insofar as it is said in manifold ways: and insofar as it is a gift it is mixed with meekness and mercy, as was said before: and therefore its act is not separated from their acts: and in this respect that Gloss on Job is understood, because piety and mercy do not differ, except that piety respects nature insofar as it has the image, whereas mercy respects misery. Or, to speak more properly, piety respects the nature of the image in misery, and mercy conversely [respects] misery in the image: and therefore it also has a twofold promise, of the life that now is on account of the alleviation of the misery of Christians, and of the life to come on account of reverence for the image.

To the other it must be said that honoring holy things accrues to piety from that part by which it is worship, and relates the image to the exemplar. Similarly, not contradicting and not murmuring accrues to it from a twofold part, namely insofar as it attains the exemplar, and insofar as through benevolence it is conjoined to meekness, whose proper feature is not to be offended in those things that happen contrary to private will: but it belongs to one who worships God not to accept a perverse sense in Scripture, but to honor the sense that the Doctors promulgate. There are, however, some who say that this act, which is not to accept a perverse sense, is reduced to the act of the gift of knowledge by which faith is defended.

And note that when it is said that piety does not accept a perverse sense, it is understood of practical acceptance, that is, it does not imitate it in work, but venerates Scripture by fulfilling it through work out of the benevolence it has toward holy things.

To the last the solution is clear.

Now to this which could be asked further through the foregoing, what act does it have in the fatherland?

It must be said that it has the act which is to rejoice in the goods of the image of God insofar as it is an image: for that is left by way of reward from the one which belongs to the way (in via), namely to do or to expend through affection and work what is good to one marked by the image.

Articulus 17 — Whether Piety Is One Gift Or Several

Whether piety is one gift or many?

Thirdly it is asked, Whether it is one according to itself or many?

Now it seems that it is many: because all the acts enumerated cannot be reduced into one habit: therefore it seems, since according to the sayings of the Saints those are acts of piety, that piety is not one in species.

Solution. Some say that piety is not one in species on account of the adduced words of the Saints, and especially the words of Augustine set forth above from Book X of The City of God. But it must be said otherwise, that the gift of piety is one in species: but the name of piety is said in manifold ways according to analogy, as was held before: and it must be said to the argument that the gift of piety has one act principal and substantial to itself, which is to expend good to one marked by the image of God. The others, however, are non-principal, according as it is conjoined to other habits with which it has some similarity.

Articulus 18 — How Piety Differs From Meekness

How does piety differ from meekness?

Fourthly and lastly it is asked, How does it differ from meekness and mercy?

Now it seems not to differ from meekness: because the Gloss on Matt 5 and 6 reduces it to meekness: therefore piety is meekness or mildness.

For by the same reason it seems not to differ from mercy: because the Gloss, on 1 Tim 4:8, reduces it to mercy. And similarly the Gloss on Job 31:19: and these Glosses were posited above, nor is it necessary to repeat them here.

Solution. It is easy to answer these according to the foregoing: because the Gloss does not intend that piety is mildness or mercy, but that it has an affinity with them: for since two things are part of the constitution of piety, namely benevolence by which it is defined on the part of the affection it informs, and the object which is the image, especially immersed in miseries, from which there is indigence so that it might be helped. On the part of the affection it approaches mildness or meekness, whose property is to be benevolently affected concerning all, and not to be provoked by injuries. But on the part of the effect or work it is conjoined to mercy, although nevertheless it is substantially disjoined from both, as is easy to see through those things which were said in the first problem.

DISTINCTIO XXXVI

Divisio Textus

It is also usually asked, Whether the virtues are so joined to one another, etc.

This distinction is divided against the whole preceding treatise concerning the infused habits: because here it is asked about the comparison of these habits to one another.

And it is divided into three parts according to a threefold comparison: in the first of which he treats of the connection of the virtues in a subject. In the second it is asked, Whether virtues possessed at the same time are also necessarily equal? and this begins there, at B, Whether indeed one possesses all equally, etc. In the third, he treats of the relation of charity to the others and to the works of the precepts, there, at C, And since there are two precepts of charity, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether The Political Virtues Are Connected

Whether the political virtues are connected?

Whether the political virtues are connected?

Now a threefold question falls upon the first part of this distinction. For first it is asked, Whether the political virtues are connected?

And if the political ones are not connected, it is asked secondly, whether the theological ones are necessarily connected?

Thirdly, if the theological virtues are connected, whether vices or sins are also connected or not?

To the first it is objected thus: § 1. Bernard says in the first book On Consideration to Pope Eugene: It is most sweet to notice a certain harmony and embrace of the virtues, and that one hangs from another: just as in this place you see that prudence is the mother of fortitude, and that any daring which prudence has not brought forth is not fortitude but temerity. Therefore it seems that the virtues are connected.

§ 2. Also, Bernard, in the same place: Justice seeks the measure in every virtue, prudence finds it, fortitude claims it, temperance possesses it. Since therefore these are necessary in any virtue whatever, the political virtues seem to be connected.

§ 3. Also, Seneca says: Everything that is done well, is done justly, is done bravely, and temperately: but the work of any virtue whatever is done well: therefore it is done justly, bravely, and temperately: therefore in any work of virtue four virtues concur, and they cannot concur to a work unless they are connected in the operating subject: therefore they are connected.

§ 4. Also, Tully: If you lose one of your curtains, you will be able to say your furniture is safe to you: but if you lose one of the virtues, you must confess you will have none. Therefore, having one, all are had, and one being lost, all virtues are lost.

§ 5. Also, Jerome to Pammachius: The Stoics describe the four virtues as being so connected and mutually cohering to each other, that he who does not have one lacks all: and he who has one has all.

§ 6. Also, Augustine to Jerome: The Stoics seem to me to be deceived, who refuse to allow a proficient man to have wisdom entirely: but only then when he is perfect do they say he is wise. Therefore it seems that according to Augustine, the proficient and the perfect man is entirely wise;

but he is not entirely wise unless he is wise according to every virtue: therefore he himself has every virtue: therefore he who has one, has all: therefore the virtues are connected.

§ 7. To the same point the rationale seems to be thus: Just as a power is related to a power, so a habit to a habit: but the inferior powers which are parts of the sensible soul, such as the concupiscible and irascible, are not ordered and perfected except through reason: therefore the habits perfecting them will not be perfect without the habits perfecting reason: but the habits of the inferior ones are temperance and fortitude, and the habits of reason are prudence and justice: therefore temperance and fortitude are connected to justice and prudence.

§ 8. Also, Prudence is the virtue sagaciously electing by those things by which it is aided, from those by which it is impeded: but it does not elect except in the matter of justice, or temperance, or fortitude: therefore prudence is not without them: and by the same rationale neither are they without it: therefore the virtues are connected.

§ 9. Also, To know how to elect is required in any work of the virtues whatever, etc., and this belongs to prudence: therefore prudence is required in any work of virtue whatever. Similarly, since the work of any virtue whatever is between the superfluous and the diminished, it is necessary that in any work of virtue temperance be required: and since the work of virtue is as it ought to be, justice seems to be present: therefore it seems that all are connected to each other in any work of virtue whatever.

§ 10. Also, Every virtue is about the difficult: fortitude claims the difficult for itself, as Bernard says: therefore fortitude is required in any work of virtue whatever.

§ 11. Also, He who is chaste, has a virtue: but he who has chastity, is chaste: therefore he who has a virtue, is virtuous: therefore he is not vicious: therefore from the first, he who has chastity is not vicious: but someone is vicious by one vice: therefore no vice is present in him who has chastity: therefore the opposites of the vices are present in him, which are the individual virtues: therefore he who has chastity, has all virtues: therefore the virtues are connected.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. Augustine says to Jerome that the science is not divine by which it is said that he who has one, has all. Therefore it seems that it is not necessarily true.

§ 2. Also, Political virtues are generated from acts: but acts are divided and are present divisively: therefore also the habits generated from them: therefore it seems that the virtues are not necessarily present simultaneously.

§ 3. Also, Someone is chaste in work and avaricious: but similar habits are left behind by similar acts: therefore the habit of chastity and of avarice is born in him: but liberality cannot be present with the habit of avarice: therefore the one having chastity does not necessarily have liberality: therefore it is not that he who has one, has all.

Solution. It must be said that even among the Philosophers there were many contentions concerning this matter. For some used to say that operations do not generate virtues, but merely dispose someone to receiving them, and virtues are given by separated substances in the perfection of wisdom above the four natural affections, namely fear, hope, joy, and sorrow

or perturbation. And they used to say that three ordered affections remain in the wise man upon the collation of virtue, and not perturbation or sorrow, which does not fall upon a wise man. And this was the opinion of the Stoics. And they used to take the rationale of virtue according to what is the ultimate of a thing or of a power, nor did they call one prudent who is prudent in a qualified sense, unless he were universally prudent with respect to the act of every virtue: and therefore they used to say that, one being had, all are had. And their most potent rationale was this, that every virtue is either in reason, or from reason: whence every virtue is perfective of reason: but reason is not perfect as is fitting for a wise man whose role is to order and not be ordered, unless it be perfect in itself and in the subordinate powers: but this does not happen through one virtue, but through the virtue of all: and therefore they used to say that every virtue must be present for the perfection of a wise man. But as for him who is not wise, but is exercised in the work of some of the virtues, they used to say that he is in a disposition, and has no virtue: for the reason that operation does not generate virtue, but it is given by the intelligences which are separated substances. And this is taken from the words of Augustine adduced above, where he said that the Stoics refused to allow a proficient man to have virtue entirely, but only a perfect man. But because Augustine does not approve this sentence, therefore it must be said otherwise according to Aristotle in the Ethics, namely that political virtues have their generation from works, if they are customary: or from experience and time, if they are intellectual: and because generating causes are not connected, therefore the virtues do not have a connection.

Now to all the authorities which are first adduced, there is one solution, namely that there are certain general acts of virtues, according to which they are not distinguished: and with respect to those there is something of every virtue in every virtue: for the eligible is in every one, but this is not proper to prudence. Similarly the difficult is in every one, but this is not proper to fortitude, but rather the difficult concerning a determinate matter which is a passion inflicted according to the sense of touch. Similarly the measure according to the superfluous and the diminished is in every one, but this is not proper to temperance, but rather in the matter of innate passions concerning the delectable of taste and touch. The debt also which is in every virtue is not the debt of justice, but rather in a matter ordered to a neighbor according to natural or positive right. Therefore it must be said that there is a harmony in the virtues with respect to that which generally encompasses every work: but when this is had, all the virtues in special are not necessarily had, because this does not belong to some virtue according to species, except by adaptation: but it is a disposition of matter in general in which afterwards this or that virtue may receive its proper rationale.

To that which is objected through reason, it must be said that this is true: because the habit of reason rules the habit of the irascible and concupiscible, just as a power rules a power: but from this it does not follow that, having had one, another is had, except in a qualified sense: for he who is chaste has prudence with respect to the election of that which is required for chastity, but not prudence in an absolute sense, and of fortitude sometimes he has nothing according to how fortitude is properly taken.

To another it must be said that prudence can be had in a qualified sense in each one divisively: but it is not necessary that, having had some one of them, another is had absolutely: or even that, having had one, others are had: because there are many operating to the contrary.

To another it must be said that the difficult and the measure which are in the work of virtue in general, are not properly of fortitude and temperance, except in a qualified sense, and through appropriation: and therefore it is not necessary that on account of that they be had absolutely, but they are had in a qualified sense only.

To the last it must be said that he who has chastity is chaste: but it does not follow that he is virtuous: because virtuous says more than the genus of chastity, namely a plenitude, which is not present except by perceiving all the species. Hence there is not merely a progression from the species to the genus there, but from the habit of the species to the habit of the genus along with an accident, which is the condition of participation with all the species: and therefore the argumentation is not valid, just as this one is not: 'This is a man: therefore he participates in animal according to every species.'

Articulus 2 — Whether The Theological Virtues Are Connected

Whether the theological virtues are connected?

Secondly it is asked, Whether the theological virtues are connected to one another?

Now it seems that they are. § 1. For a perfection ought to correspond to the perfected: but the perfected, which is the soul, is not without the parts of the virtues united in one substance: therefore the perfection, which is grace, is not without the virtues united in the substance of grace.

§ 2. Also, There is no convention of Christ with Belial therefore someone cannot simultaneously be a vessel of God and a vessel of the devil: but through a theological virtue informed by grace someone is a vessel of God and a temple: therefore he is not a vessel of the devil: but through any vice whatever he would be a vessel of the devil: therefore he has no vice: but vices are not expelled except through opposite virtues: therefore he himself has every virtue, who has one informed by grace.

§ 3. Also, Augustine says that it is impious to hope for half a pardon from God: therefore he who receives pardon for sin through one virtue expelling sin, himself receives pardon according to every virtue expelling any sin whatever: therefore he who has one, has all.

Also, He who has charity, has perfection for merit: therefore he has everything by which he can merit: but this is any virtue whatever: therefore he himself has any virtue whatever.

§ 4. Also, on Isa 16:11: My bowels shall sound like a harp for Moab, the Gloss says: A harp does not emit a sound to the composition, if one string has been corrupted. So the spirit or bowels of the Prophet, if one of the virtues is missing, will not resound a sweet melody. Therefore it is necessary that all be present.

§ 5. Also, James 2:10: Whosoever shall keep the whole law, but offend in one point, is become guilty of all. Therefore by opposites he who has one, has all.

§ 6. Also, on that: I have done judgment, etc., the Gloss says: The whole from the part, so that he who has one, has all: and he who lacks one, lacks all.

ON THE CONTRARY § 1. If someone has one, he has all: but Christ had one, namely charity: therefore he had faith, which is false. The same objection holds for the blessed who have charity, and do not have faith.

§ 2. If perhaps it is said that what is said, 'He who has one, has all', is understood according to the state of a pure wayfarer: then there is still a counter-instance: because an innocent has charity, and does not have penance.

§ 3. Also, One having charity does not necessarily have virginity.

§ 4. And if it is said that virginity signifies a virtue with a state: and virtue can be had without such a state. It is objected still concerning perseverance without which there is no salvation: and it is certain that he who has charity does not necessarily have perseverance.

§ 5. Also, We see expressly that he who has faith and hope does not necessarily have charity: therefore not, etc.

§ 6. Also, With charity increasing, initial fear decreases, as was proved above in the Text: therefore fear is lost: and it is a virtue according to how virtue is generally accepted: therefore it is not that he who has one has all.

§ 7. Also, Of every Saint it is read that there was none found like unto him: but this cannot be according to the figure of the body or nature: therefore it is referred to virtue: therefore any Saint whatever has a virtue which another does not have: therefore he who, etc.

Solution. It must be said that infused and formed virtues are connected, such that one being had, all are had. Now of this connection there are three species. The first and principal is from grace, which is a potential whole to the virtues: and therefore just as the perfection of a potential whole consists in all the parts taken simultaneously and united in the whole, so the perfection of grace consists in all the virtues taken simultaneously and united in the whole. Now how this is, and how it differs from the virtues, seek in Book III of the Sentences. Therefore, in order that the perfection of grace be in the essence of the soul and the powers, it is necessary that every virtue be infused in grace. The second rationale is from charity, which is the form of every virtue in its meritorious being: and to the end that the formed be proportioned to the form, it is necessary that all be infused with it. And how this also is, that charity is the form and end of virtue, was noted above in the treatise on charity. The third rationale of connection was touched upon in objecting: and this is of general justifying justice, which does not permit any vice to be present: and since a vice is not formally expelled except through the opposite virtue, it is necessary that all virtues be present.

With these things held, it is plain to respond to the objects to the contrary.

For it must be said to the first, that he who has one, has all, according to what is essential and of perfection in them: and as to this Christ had faith, because he had the cognition which

is of perfection in faith, and he had comprehension which like a perfection corresponds to hope.

To another it must be said that penance signifies a virtue by which one is moved to the detestation of sin along with an accident, which is sorrow for what has been committed. Hence as to the substantial act it is in an innocent person, which is to rise up against sin insofar as it is a sin: but that which is accidental to penance is not necessary to be in an innocent person: and from this accident the name of penance is imposed: and therefore he is not said to have penance, although he has the substance of the virtue of penance.

To another it must be said that virginity also names continence with an accident on the part of the body: and it is not necessary for that accident to be present with any virtue whatever, even if the virtue is present.

To another it must be said that perseverance is said in a twofold way, namely the purpose of persevering, and the habit moving to persevering: and the latter is had with any virtue whatever. Alternatively it must be said that perseverance is the consummation in the good according to act, and this is not given except in the last instant of life: and therefore that is not a virtue, but a gift given by God at the end: and it is not necessary to have this with any virtue whatever.

To another it must be said that it is understood of formed virtues, not unformed ones: but the faith and hope which are had without charity are unformed, and not formed.

To another it must be said that with charity increasing, the imperfection of fear decreases, but the essence of the fear of the Lord remains forever and ever: and how this is, was held above in the question concerning fear.

Therefore to the last it must be said that this is said of the Saints as to the use, and not as to the habit of the virtue. Or it is said according to some according to a gift of gratuitous grace (gratiae gratis datae), and not making one pleasing (gratum facientis). But the first solution is more probable, and fits the sayings of the Saints more.

Articulus 3 — Whether Vices Also Are Connected

Are vices also connected?

Thirdly it is asked, Whether vices are connected just as virtues?

Now it seems that they are: because § 1. Just as good works and virtues have charity as their root, so evil ones have lust (libido) from which they arise: therefore, just as virtues are connected on account of the root of charity, so vices are connected through the root of lust.

§ 2. Also, If a vice is present in someone, no virtue is present: therefore a privation of every virtue is present: therefore to him in whom a privation of every virtue is generally present, every vice is generally present: therefore he who has one vice, has every vice: therefore vices are connected just as virtues.

§ 3. Also, He who offends in one, is become guilty of all but he is not guilty of all except through the vices opposite to all: therefore every vice is present in him: therefore they are connected, as it seems.

§ 4. Also, If some virtue and some vice were present simultaneously, someone would be good and evil: but this cannot be: therefore he who is evil, is universally evil: but he is not universally evil except according to every vice whatever: therefore he has every vice whatever: therefore they are connected.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. If vices are connected: therefore they are all infused by some one infused thing: which is false, because they are not infused, but are caused by us.

§ 2. Also, There is no vice which is not caused by our works: but our works are divided: therefore also vices: therefore it is not that, having had one, all are had. And because it is easy to object to this, let what has been objected suffice.

Solution. It must be said that vices are not connected on account of the cause which was touched upon in the last objection: because namely they are caused by works divisively, of which one being had the rest is not had: and therefore neither are the vices left behind from them conjoined to one another, such that with one inhering, another inheres.

Therefore to the first it must be said that lust is not of one rationale which is in the vices: but rather they are distinguished according to delectable objects, which are diverse according to their rationale. But it is not thus concerning charity: because charity is the love of the highest good, which is always one and the same in whomever it is loved, and therefore it unites the virtues in itself.

To another it must be said that no virtue formed through grace is present in him in whom one vice is present. But when it is said that this person is deprived of every virtue: It must be said that privation is twofold, just as also in natures: for sometimes privation is in matter from the absence of a form, as it is in substantial forms, when the absence and presence of one form makes a mutation: but sometimes it is founded upon a contrary form: just as if we say, From a non-man a man is made, we signify by 'non-man', which sounds like a privation, the subject of humanity without the form, and not a form contrary to humanity. But when we say, From non-white, white is made, we designate by 'non-white' black or a medium which compared to white is black: and then the privation posits a contrary form. So we say that one is deprived universally of formed virtue, such that contrary vices are not supposed, but a bare subject. And from that universal privation it cannot be inferred that vices are present: because that privation does not posit a vice, but a bare subject not having a virtue.

To another it must be said that he who offends in one, is become guilty of all with respect to the punishment of loss, and not with respect to the habits of all guilts, or sensible punishments, that is, he loses the virtues responding to the obedience of all the precepts: but nevertheless from this the contraries of the virtues are not posited, as was said: and therefore it is not necessary that vices be connected.

To another it must be said that no formed virtue is present even in him who has one sin: and therefore he is simply evil: but it is not necessary on account of this that the contrary of every virtue whatever according to species be present: and the cause of this has already been assigned.

Articulus 4 — Whether The Informed Virtues Are Like Or Equal

Are formed virtues equal or alike?

Next it is asked concerning this which he says: Whether indeed one possesses all equally, etc.

Now here two questions fall upon this part, of which the first is, Whether formed virtues are equal or alike? The second, Whether one being intensified, another is intensified?

To the first it is objected thus: § 1. In the Text it is held that the cardinal virtues are equal: therefore much more the theological ones.

§ 2. Further, it was established above that faith, hope, charity, and their operation are equal: therefore the other virtues are as well.

§ 3. Further, if one of the virtues were stronger or better than another in the same human being, one would make the human being better, and more meritorious, than the other: therefore the same human being would be good and better, and more and less worthy of eternal life: which is incongruous: therefore it seems that the virtues are equal.

§ 4. Further, they are all infused at the same time: but if they were not equal when they are infused, it would be necessary that that increase which one has over the other would be either on the part of the efficient cause, or on the part of the grace in which they are infused. But it is evident that it is not on the part of the efficient cause, because God, who is the efficient cause of an infused virtue, relates equally to the virtues which He infuses simultaneously: therefore as much as He creates of the one, so much does He create of the other. Again, if the increase were on the part of the subject, since they are continuously in the subject, they would continuously grow, which is false. But if it were on the part of grace, then it would be necessary that the same human being would have greater grace according to one virtue than according to another, and thus he would be more and less pleasing [to God] according to diverse parts of the soul: and this is ridiculous, because all parts of the soul of any human being whatsoever are equally pleasing to God.

But against this is: § 1. What was established above in distinction 35, that many excel in faith, and not in science: and yet science is a gift and a virtue (taking the name 'virtue' generally): therefore the virtues are not on par or equal.

§ 2. Further, 1 Corinthians 13:13: But now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three: but the greatest of these is charity. [291]

Resolution: It should be said that the virtues are equal in their essence, and in the formation of grace: in essence, because they are simple in the same genus of simplicity, and in one quantity of grace in the same human being: but in the formation of grace, because grace

that makes pleasing informs all of them equally. But in four other things following upon the essence of virtue, they are unequal. And the first is concerning dignity: because charity, by the fact that it never falls away, is the greatest and more worthy among them all. But the second is in the generality of form and end and efficient cause: and thus again charity is greater, because it moves generally in a meritorious work, which another virtue does not do: and it itself is the form and end of the virtues, and as to this it is greater. The third is its radication in the subject: because a disposition through a work operates toward this: and the work of all of them is not equally frequent: and therefore whichever one is more frequently in operation is more radicated than another. The fourth mode is use: because it is not necessary that the virtues which are present equally according to essence, should also be present equally according to use.

Therefore it must be said to the first, that it is understood as to use.

To the other it must be said, that it is understood as to dignity.

And thus the resolution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 5 — Whether By One Intensified Virtue All Are Extended, And, Whether Charity Alone Suffices For Salvation

Whether by one virtue being intensified all are intensified? and, Whether charity alone suffices for salvation?

Secondly, it is asked, Whether by one being intensified all are intensified?

And it seems that they are: § 1. For let it be granted that when one is intensified another is not intensified: then the virtues can be unequal: and this is against what was proven above: therefore it is necessary that when one is intensified another is intensified.

§ 2. Further, the intensification of the virtues is only through the intensification of grace: but grace is in each single virtue: therefore it is equally intensified in each single one.

§ 3. Further, a virtue is not intensified except by God on account of merit, as has frequently been proven above: but God relates equally to all virtues: and merit, as to that which is to elicit all meritorious acts, belongs equally to all the virtues: therefore since the causes of intensification relate equally to all the virtues, they seem to be intensified equally.

§ 4. Further, if on account of their connection in grace and on account of the bond of charity, it is necessary that when one is possessed all are possessed, for the same causes it seems necessary that when one is intensified all are intensified.

§ 5. Further, Augustine in book VII of On the Trinity: "The virtues which are in the human mind, although being diverse they are understood in individual ways, yet they are not separated from one another, but are always equal." Therefore it is necessary that when one is intensified another is intensified: because otherwise they would become unequal.

§ 4. Intensification seems to be from work: and the operation of all of them does not seem to be equal: therefore neither are the virtues equally intensified.

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291. 2 Cor 6:15

§ 5. Further, the reason which is posited, that when one is intensified another is intensified, due to the charity which equally informs them, does not seem to be valid: because in bodily things we see this, that two combustible things are not equally heated by the same fire at an equal distance: therefore also in the virtues it can be thus, that one receives more of the heat of charity than another.

§ 5. Further, it was established above that as charity increases, wisdom increases, and fear decreases: therefore fear and wisdom are unequal virtues.

§ 4. Further, in diverse human beings the virtues are not equal: therefore even in the same human being they can be unequal.

Further, next to this it is asked, Whether charity alone suffices for salvation without the others?

And it seems that it does: because § 1. The merit and quantity of merit consists according to it alone: therefore it seems that the others are superfluous, since they are not possessed except for meriting.

§ 2. Further, Augustine says that charity alone divides between the children of the kingdom and the children of perdition: therefore the others are considered as nothing.

§ 3. Further, in the following part of the distinction it is held that it alone completes the law, and if we are not able to unroll all the scrolls, that we should have charity which fulfills the whole: therefore it alone suffices, and all the other virtues are superfluous, as it seems.

Resolution: It must be said to the first part of this disputation, that when one virtue is intensified all the others are intensified as to a certain mode: and as to another mode one can be intensified without another. For if a virtue is compared to its efficient cause, or to its efficacy of meriting, or if it is considered in its substance, one cannot be intensified without another. But if it is compared to its radication in the subject, one can be intensified without another: because this is from the work in which the virtues are necessarily not conjoined, but divided.

And through this the resolution to all the other things objected concerning the first part of the question is clear: because the arguments proceed according to this distinction.

For to the first which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that according to operation a virtue is not intensified except according to its radication in the subject: and this is well conceded: for thus one virtue is intensified while another is not intensified.

To the other it must be said, that it is not similar, because pieces of wood and other things relate unequally to the reception of fire: but the virtues relate equally according as they are infused to the information of charity.

To the other it must be said, that fear does not decrease in what is substantial to it insofar as it is a gift of the Holy Spirit, but as to its imperfection, as has frequently been said elsewhere.

To the other it must be said, that the virtues in

diverse human beings do not have a connection in one thing by the growth of which they would grow: but in one human being they are connected in grace and charity: and therefore when those are intensified, it is necessary that all be intensified.

To that which is further asked, it must be said that charity suffices as a mover: but for motion there is required not only a universal mover, but also a particular one by which the act may be specified. And something similar to this is in nature, and also in a human being. For in nature, the sun moves universally in generation: but for the generation of this or that thing there must also be a particular mover in this or in that, such as a bean, or a pea. But in a human being, reason or the will moves in mechanical works: but for the motion of the foot or the hand there is also required the particular mover of the hand or the foot. Thus in a meritorious motion the universal mover is charity: but specifying movers of the acts are required, such as those of faith, hope, and temperance, through which we merit.

And through this the resolution to the whole is clear: because those arguments which are brought forward only conclude concerning the force of the universal mover, and not concerning the force of the particular mover.

Articulus 6 — Whether We Are Bound To Fulfill The Decalogue With Respect To The Deed And The Mode Of The Deed

Are we bound to fulfill the decalogue as to the work and the mode of the work?

Then it is asked concerning the third part of this distinction which begins there, C, Since there are two precepts, etc.

And the principal question here is, Whether the mode is in the precept or the work alone? That is to ask, Whether we are bound to fulfill the decalogue only as to the works which the precepts utter, or whether we are bound to fulfill the decalogue as to the work and the mode of the work, so that we may do it in charity?

§ 1. For the text [of the Sentences] seems to mean this: and it has often been held what is said in 1 Timothy 1:5, that the end of the precept is charity and the Gloss says that it is called the end of consummation: therefore the law of the decalogue is not perfectly fulfilled without charity: but we are bound to the perfect fulfillment of the law: therefore we are bound to the mode so that we fulfill it out of charity.

§ 2. Further, Matthew 19:17: If you will enter into life, keep the commandments. Therefore the observation of the commandments leads into life: but it does not lead [into life] except through charity: therefore they ought to be fulfilled out of charity: therefore the mode is in the precept.

§ 3. Further, Deuteronomy 6:5: You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart. But it is evident that this is a precept of the law, and it must be referred to a work, and not except to a work of the decalogue: therefore the decalogue is to be fulfilled in it: therefore we are bound to the mode.

§ 4. Further, the deformation of works is in the prohibition: therefore from opposites, the formation is in the precept.

§ 5. Further, Matthew 5:20: Unless your justice abounds more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven. But it is evident that they did the works: therefore we are bound to the mode.

§ 6. Further, James 2:10: Whosoever shall keep the whole law, but offend in one point, is become guilty of all. The Gloss: that is, in charity: therefore charity is in the precept: and it itself is the mode: therefore the mode is in the precept.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. Augustine and Jerome say that let him be anathema, who says that God has commanded what is impossible to be fulfilled: therefore nothing is in the precept which is not in our power: but to have charity is not in our power: therefore it is not in the precept.

§ 2. Further, the virtues are not in our power: therefore neither is their mode: therefore we are not bound to do works with the mode of virtue.

§ 3. Further, someone loves God with natural love: and it is evident that he does not sin by loving: but if he were bound to love out of charity

he would sin: therefore we are not bound to the mode.

§ 4. Further, someone existing in mortal sin honors his parents: it is evident that he does not sin, but rather is absolved from the commandment: therefore he was not bound to do it out of charity.

§ 5. Further, Augustine says that to turn away from evil always avoids punishment: therefore he does not merit punishment: therefore he who turns away, yet existing in mortal sin, is absolved from that prohibition: therefore he was not bound to fulfill it out of charity.

Resolution: It must be said that concerning this question the opinions of great men are diverse: and as far as I can recall, the sayings of the Masters are diverse concerning this matter in four ways. For some say that the mode is in the precept: and they are divided into two opinions. For some say that to fulfill the decalogue is only an affirmative precept, and obliges always, but not for always. Rather, it obliges for a time and place: and they determine that time as when a human being is bound, when he has charity, and turns his attention to the fact that he is bound to fulfill it out of charity. And it is easy for them to respond to the objections: because they say that a human being is not obliged to the impossible: because although a human being is obliged to do it out of charity, nevertheless he is not bound to discharge and fulfill it except when he has it: and then it is not impossible for him to fulfill the commandment out of charity.

Others say that a human being is bound to the mode always, and for always.

And to the first which is objected to the contrary, they say that although it is impossible for a human being to have charity of himself, nevertheless he can do something, having done

which he will have charity, and thus in a certain way it is possible to have charity. And in the same way they respond to the second.

To the third they say that he who loves God with natural love, does not sin from the fact that he loves, but from the fact that he omits the form.

To the other some say that he is absolved from the work wrought (opus operatum): but because he did not do it as he ought, therefore he sinned.

To the last they say that he avoids the punishment which is due to that transgression who avoids a sin of commission: but he does not avoid the punishment which is due to an omission, from the fact that he omits the mode.

But those opinions have few followers. Therefore others say that one is not bound to the mode: and they have a twofold mode of opining. For some say absolutely that we are in no way bound to the mode, as the last arguments prove.

And they respond to the first which is objected to the contrary, that charity is not the end of the precept according to the work which is in the precept, but according to its being meritorious. And this is true, that without the form the law is not fulfilled meritoriously.

To the other it must be said, that it is one thing to fulfill the decalogue, and another thing to do a meritorious work of eternal life: and the Lord speaks there of him who wishes to come to life through a work, and he ought to have the mode.

To the other it must be said, that in that commandment a human being is not bound to do except what he can, and therefore he fulfills it if by natural love he sets nothing before God: and this is according to the charity of the way, not of the homeland.

To the other it must be said, that it is not similar: because deformation is in our power, but formation is not in our power.

To the other it must be said, that that abundance refers to having life, and not to the absolute fulfillment of the decalogue.

To the other it must be said, that charity is not in the precept, although it is lost through guilt: because guilt is in our power, and charity is not.

But because it is expressly held above in the second book of this volume, that it is the Pelagian heresy that a human being without grace

is able to fulfill all the divine commandments, therefore a fourth group comes and distinguishes a threefold intention [or fulfillment]. The first is that which, not fulfilled, induces the guilt of transgression. The second is that which, fulfilled, leads to life, and not fulfilled, does not lead to it. The third is that which, fulfilled, gives life. As to the first they say that we are not bound to the mode: because provided we do the works of the precepts, we are un-obligated from the precept, and we do not transgress: but as to the second we are bound to the mode: because otherwise we shall not have life, unless we act in charity. As to the third we are bound to the mode and to perseverance: because that immediately joins to life. And this has more defenders than any of the superior views: and it is sufficiently clear how according to

them it will be responded to the objections for both sides through the responses previously made.

DISTINCTIO XXXVII

Divisio Textus

But now the distribution of the decalogue, which in two commandments, etc.

Here begins that part which is concerning the repairing dispositions through works: and these are the works which fall under precept.

And this part is divided according to the number of the precepts into ten parts, in which however the Master posits three distinctions. And in the first part is posited the exposition of seven precepts, namely of the three which are in the first tablet, and of the four precepts contained in the second tablet. In the second and third, which are 38 and 39, is contained the exposition of the eighth precept which is the fourth of the second tablet. And that part begins there, A, The fifth precept is, etc. But in the third part which contains distinction 40, he expounds the last two precepts, which begins there, A, The sixth precept is: You shall not desire, etc.

And through this the division of the whole is clear.

Articulus 1 — What A Precept Is

What is a precept?

But before the Text there occur here four things to be inquired, namely what is a precept?

Secondly, What is the distinction of the precepts and of the tablets in which they were contained according to diverse authors? Thirdly, According to what is the sufficiency of the precepts taken? And fourthly, How are the capital vices prohibited?

To the first however, what is a precept, let the definition of Augustine be taken, given in the book On Virginity, where he says thus: A precept is this to which not to obey is a sin.

But against this assignation it is objected thus: § 1. A counsel is that to which not to obey in a given case is a sin: therefore a counsel is a precept: for in a given case I am bound to sell all things and give to the poor, and in a given case to expose myself to danger for the faith: therefore a counsel is a precept.

§ 2. Further, a vow is that to which not to obey is a sin: therefore a vow is a precept, as it seems.

§ 3. Further, anyone is bound to observe obedience, for to act against it is a sin.

§ 4. Further, a Prelate is one to whom not to obey is a sin: therefore a Prelate is a precept.

§ 5. Further, Scripture is that to which not to obey is a sin: therefore Scripture is a precept.

§ 6. Further, if not to obey a precept is a sin: therefore a commanded work is a meritorious work: which is false according to the opinion of many, as is clear from the preceding distinction.

§ 7. Moreover, since the work of any virtue falls within a precept, it ought to be defined through another virtue just as through obedience: and most of all it seems, that through charity: because as the Apostle says, The end of the precept is charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith.

Resolution: It must be said that the assignation of a precept which is given by Augustine, is given concerning it insofar as it is obligatory, to differentiate it from a counsel: and therefore it follows in the text thus: A precept is that to which not to obey is a sin: not a counsel, which if you wish to use, you will obtain less good, but you will not perpetrate any evil. And therefore if someone wanted to define a precept according to the substance according to which it is obligatory, he could define it thus: A precept is a command obligating to the observation of a commanded act out of the authority of the one commanding, or out of the rationale of the commanded thing. For a precept is in every genus of command, and sometimes it obliges only because it is commanded and not of itself: but sometimes of itself. But Augustine takes in common the mode of obligation which is in a precept.

Therefore it must be said to the first, that a counsel of itself never obliges, as Augustine says: but by accident that which is counseled obliges, namely if in a given case there is a precept concerning the same thing of which there is a counsel: as if I cannot honor my neighbor unless I sell all things, then I am bound to sell all things and give to the poor in a time of necessity, when the poor are dying of hunger unless I sell: and if from a vow a counsel becomes necessary, because to render it is of precept, although to vow is of counsel.

To the other it must be said, that a vow is considered in two ways, namely in vowing, and in rendering. If it is taken in vowing: then not to obey is not a sin, because to vow is of counsel: but to obey obtains a greater good. But if it is considered in rendering: then it obliges necessarily: but this is because to render it is of precept.

To the other it must be said, that one need not obey obedience except insofar as it respects a precept: but obedience obeys a precept: and therefore nothing is said by stating that obedience is what is obeyed, unless obedience is taken in a vulgar sense for the thing enjoined out of a precept: just as religious are accustomed to say,

"I have the obedience of doing this", that is, I have the mandate.

To the other it must be said, that a Prelate is obeyed in one way, and a precept in another: namely a Prelate as the one commanding: but a precept as that which is mandated to execution through the obedience by which we are obligated to it.

To the other it must be said, that we obey Scripture as the rule and doctrine of faith and morals, but precepts as obligating to a work. And the difference of this obedience is taken from this which he says, to which not to obey is a sin: for it is not universally a sin not to obey Scripture.

To the other it must be said, that it does not follow if not to obey is a sin, that to obey is a merit: because many things are required for merit besides the fulfillment of the act of the precept: but nothing is required for a sin besides the transgression of the precept, which is in our power.

To the other it must be said, that particular precepts can be affirmative, and are concerning the work of any virtue: but in the decalogue precepts are not assigned except generally, as they are contained in natural right, as will be clear below.

To the last it must be said, that love or charity does not respect the precept, but rather that which is commanded insofar as it is a meritorious work: but obedience respects the precept insofar as it is a precept, and therefore a precept is rather defined through the act of obedience than of charity.

Articulus 2 — On The Distinction Of The Precepts

Concerning the distinction of the precepts.

Secondly, it is asked concerning the distinction of the precepts and of the tablets according to diverse authors.

§ 1. For Josephus says that there were two tablets, and in each of them were contained five commandments. But Gregory posits four in the first, and six in the second. But Augustine three in one, and seven in the other. And there seems to be contrariety among them.

§ 2. Further, Origen says the first commandment is: You shall not have strange gods before me. The second: You shall not make to yourself a graven thing, nor any likeness, etc.: and Augustine computes these two as one, as is held in the Text. And this is again a certain contrariety.

Further, Origen says it is one commandment: You shall not covet your neighbor's wife: and, You shall not covet another's goods. And Augustine says these are two commandments. And behold again a certain third contrariety.

Moreover, Origen seems to speak better as to the first: because, as is held in the book On the God of Socrates, there were three kinds of gods, and some were spiritual invisible kinds of gods: for whom neither a sculpture could be made, nor a likeness, nor even a figment: and they seem to be prohibited when it is said: There shall be no other gods for you besides me. But there were other gods according to two kinds of bodies, namely celestial, and terrestrial, which are afterwards prohibited when he says: You shall not make to yourself a graven thing, etc. Therefore it seems that they are two commandments, and thus Augustine speaks badly by dividing the precepts.

§ 3. Further, as to the other part Origen seems to distinguish better: because the concupiscence of a wife and the concupiscence of a thing do not differ except through their matter, as it seems: but no distinction is taken according to matter: therefore those which Augustine says are two, seem to be one, as Origen says.

Further, it is additionally asked concerning the contrariety which is about these commandments. For it is said, Exodus 20:18, after these commandments were issued, that all the people

saw the voices and the flames, and the sound of the trumpet, and the mount smoking, etc. and immediately below, vv. 22 and 23, it is subjoined, that they heard only one commandment from heaven from the mouth of the Lord, where he speaks thus:

You have seen that I have spoken to you from heaven. You shall not make gods of silver, nor shall you make to yourselves gods of gold. [292] Therefore there seems to be a certain contrariety.

If perhaps you say that in the second place where he repeats one, it ought to be understood that another is repeated. On the contrary: the Gloss says in the same place: He repeats what was said in the first commandment, so that through silver and gold, all other idols may be understood: as it is said in Psalm 113:4: The idols of the gentiles are silver and gold, etc. [293] But it is evident that there is some special cause why he repeats what was said in the first commandment, and not in the others.

§ 2. Moreover, the text seems to say first, that all the people heard the voices of the ten precepts. And Rabbi Moses says that the people heard only one, namely the first: There shall be no strange gods for you besides me. And he says that this is the opinion of many Doctors. Therefore this seems to be the same contrariety which is elicited from the text.

If perhaps you say that that hearing and seeing was not in the exterior sense only, but in relation to the interior sense, as the Gloss of Augustine seems to say in the same place making the question: How did the people see voices, since a voice is the object of hearing, and not of sight? then it seems that they ought not to have heard all the commandments: because not all have the same order to the intellect. Because nine are in themselves intelligible, and one does not fall in itself in the intellect, namely concerning the observation of the sabbath: therefore it seems that that one should have been specially expressed outside the number of those.

Further, the Jews ask, Why rather did the Lord speak these ten words or some of them before the people and in the hearing of the people, than all the judicial and ceremonial and sacramental ones which follow? For it cannot be that cause which they say, that these generally pertained to all: because those as well they were generally bound to observe.

Further, it is asked concerning the distinction of these commandments. § 1. Since it is commonly said that these are the commandments of natural law, why are those which belong to natural law not inserted into them, as was said to the first human being: Of every tree of paradise eat, etc. And again, Increase and multiply, etc.

If you say that this is so, because they had been given beforehand. Against this is, that according to this the precept concerning the sabbath ought not to have been repeated either, since it had been given beforehand.

Moreover, Augustine in the book On the Ten Strings says that the ten commandments return through reduction into the two commandments of the love of God and neighbor: and these two again are reduced into one commandment of natural law, namely that, Whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also the same to them. And concerning this reduction nothing is determined here: and therefore it seems that it is a diminution.

§ 2. Moreover, either these ten commandments are determined particularly, or universally. If particularly: then there ought to be many more, because then the act of any [virtue] whatever will have a special affirmative commandment, and the act of any vice whatever will have a special negative one. But if they are determined universally: then it was sufficient to determ-

ine them according to that into which as into a first universal they are reduced, namely, Whatsoever you would that men should do to you, etc.

Further it is asked concerning the diversity of the precepts which the Master gives, namely that certain precepts have a cause on the part of that which is commanded, certain on the part of him to whom it is commanded: and those which have a cause on the part of the commanded thing, some have a perpetual cause, some a temporal one. For concerning this diversity nothing is held here, nor even in the law: and thus this treatise on the precepts seems to be diminished.

Further it is asked concerning another twofold

diversity which is found in these commandments. For in the first tablet are posited three commandments, of which the first two are negative, and the third is affirmative. For the reason of the first is pre-posited, when it is said: The Lord your God, is one God: and that reason is a credibile of an article of faith. But the reason of the second is taken from the punishments which he will inflict on the transgressor, when he says, that he will not hold him guiltless who takes the name of God in vain. But the reason of the third is taken from past things which he did: because on the seventh day he rested from all work. But in the second chapter the first one posited is affirmative, and it is not confirmed except through the reason of a reward: and all the others are negative: and no other reason is applied moving to the mode of their obligation.

Therefore let it be asked, Whence comes this diversity?

A second diversity is: because in the affirmative ones it is universally found to use verbs of the imperative mood, as: Remember that you keep holy the sabbath day. Honor your father, etc. But in the negative ones he universally uses verbs of the indicative mood, as, You shall not have strange Gods, etc. And the reason for this is also asked.

Resolution: It must be said to the first, that the tablets of the Testament are considered in many ways, namely in themselves, and in the relation of those things which were contained in them, and to those things to which they ordered. But Josephus considers them in themselves: and therefore it is true what he says, that each contained five commandments. But according to the order of the commandments which were in Scripture, Origen and Augustine consider them. And because four or three order to God, but six or seven order to the neighbor: therefore, such an end having been considered, three or four were in one, and six or seven were in the other. Because there was no reason why two should be given, morally speaking, except so

292. Exodus 20:22-23

that it might be understood that they ordered to two things: or allegorically on account of the two Testaments.

But according to this resolution it seems that there ought to be three on account of the order of oneself to oneself. To this it must be said, that it was not necessary, because every order requires diversity in its extremes: but of oneself to oneself there is no diversity: therefore neither is there an order. Or it may be said otherwise (as was held above) that a commandment of the love of oneself is not given: because in the order to the neighbor there is given to the one loving a principality of loving himself. Thus here in the order to the neighbor the order to oneself is understood: and therefore it was not necessary for there to be a third tablet signifying this.

To the other it must be said, that in truth Augustine distinguishes better than Origen: because Origen attended only to the material diversity, which can be between a figment or idol, and a graven thing, and a likeness: for a likeness is called that to which something responds in the nature of things: but a figment or idol, to which nothing responds in reality, but the mind has fashioned it, such as a goat-stag or a chimera. But Augustine attended to the unity of the end, which is in a likeness and an idol, namely that both are set up for worship, or for invocation: whether it is taken of bodies, or of created unclean spirits, who delude the minds of men in this, that they make themselves to be worshipped as gods.

To the other it must be said, that in the twofold concupiscence there is not only a material diversity, but also of the end: because a wife is coveted for one thing, and a thing for another: for a wife for coitus and a thing for possessing.

And therefore Augustine distinguishes better and more subtly than Origen.

To the other, the resolutions of diverse authors are diverse. Some say, that therefore he om-

§ 1. ...all these things he spoke before the people: because they are of the natural law, and proper reason dictated them to each one.

§ 2. And to the objection to the contrary, they say that by the repetition of one, it is understood that the others ought to be repeated.

§ 3. To the other objection regarding the Sabbath, they say that as far as the rest of the mind in God, and not in a creature, it is of the natural law: but as far as the bodily rest of the Sabbath, it was of common observance among the fathers of the Old Testament, and known to all as if it were from nature: and therefore it was openly spoken among the others. But the others, namely the judicial and ceremonial precepts, needed human interpretation and the teaching of the wiser men: and therefore he proposed such things through the wise men and leaders of the people. But the better ones among the Jews, such as Rabbi Moses, and Rabbi Eleazar, and Rabbi Jochanan, said that although these are of the natural law, yet not equally: and therefore, with the people listening, he spoke only one which conscience commonly dictates to everyone: because men have always consented in this, that the principle of the universe is but one. But the mind does not so dictate the others: because God is named with

293. Psalm 113:4 (Vulgate) / Psalm 115:4 (Hebrew)

many names, and His ineffable name is not understood. And similarly concerning the Sabbath, and other things which are directed towards the neighbor, they receive exceptions in determined cases. And therefore they say, that in the open he spoke to the consciences of men only one: and then that which is had first, that all the people saw the voices, must be referred to interior sight, as Augustine says in the same place in the Gloss:[294] and it is not subjoined in the catalogue of precepts on account of all the preceding things, but on account of the one alone which is first: and that one is also repeated a second time, as the Gloss seems to imply.[295]

§ 4. To the other, it must be said that he rather expresses these, as has been said: because they are natural, and of themselves approach the minds of all: and the others do not do this.

§ 5. To the other, it must be said that those things are of the natural law, concerning which the objection is raised, according as it is ordinative of nature in the necessaries for the being of the individual, and for the permanence of the species: and the care of them has not been clouded over by sin, but rather increased, because defect increases the desire for being: and therefore it was not necessary for those to be determined by the written law by repeating them, but the certain mandate of nature, which was not expressly given to nature outwardly in the beginning, because the mind of man was then well instituted, and by himself he would see in the justice of God what he ought to do for God and neighbor: yet it was written in the mind, namely, "Whatever you wish that men would do to you, etc.", that was the mandate ordering in morals towards God and man, and therefore it was clouded over by sin. But for this the written law was given, so that that which nature, clouded by sin, saw with difficulty, might be explicated by the determination of the Decalogue. And therefore nothing is posited in the Decalogue except what is the explication of the first mandate of nature, which was certain to man in relation to God and to the neighbor.

§ 6. Through this also the solution to the following is clear: because here it is treated of mandates by reduction to one universal first, because nature did not suffice for particulars from that universal: but rather the written law intends to explicate that universal through parts, so that thus corrupted nature may receive more light in morals. But the two precepts of love are not those into which the Decalogue is reduced, as into a common genus, but rather as into the form and perfection of works according as they are meritorious, as has often been said before.

§ 7. To the other, it must be said that these mandates are determined in particular: but by such particulation to which natural reason can attain through its natural power. But further particulation belongs to study and positive right. And therefore such particulation is not treated here: because that falls into many differences according to diverse causes, and cases.

§ 8. To that which is further asked concerning the division of the Masters, it must be said that they consider not that which is commanded, but rather the reason of the precept. And that is threefold, as the Doctors say: because if the reason is in him who commands, then it is a precept of probation and of testing whether he obeys, as was that which was given to Adam, that he should not eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. But if it is on the part of the thing commanded: then either it has a perpetual cause, such as those which by themselves

are of the genus of the honorable in affirmatives, as to honor parents, and to believe God, and the like: and such as those which are inseparably joined to evil in negatives, as "Thou shalt not steal." Or it has a temporal cause: and then it does not bind unless that cause exists, as was, "Increase and multiply": the cause of which was the paucity of men worshiping God: and when that cause does not exist, men are unbound from the mandate. But here precepts are determined only according to those by which man is ordered to God or to neighbor in common, as will be clear below: and therefore such differences are not posited here.

§ 9. To the other, it must be said that that question asks three things, namely why are there more negative than affirmative?

§ 10. And, why does he use a different verbal mood in the affirmatives and negatives?

§ 11. To the first, it must be said that the Decalogue is given according to the state of corrupt nature, which is more prone to harming: and moreover because it happens to sin in many ways, and to do well in one way, therefore there are more prohibitions than affirmative mandates.

§ 12. To the other, it must be said that God is better known through negation than through affirmation, and the neighbor conversely. The reason for which has been stated in the first book of the Sentences. And therefore in the first tablet which orders to God, the negatives are premised, and the affirmatives follow. In the second tablet which orders to the neighbor, for the opposite cause it is conversely. But the first mandate which pertains to faith, which is of truth, it was necessary that it should have an intelligible reason by way of interpretation. But the second pertains to the work of the mouth: and therefore this is not coerced except through punishment. But because prohibition does not merit a reward, but transgression can have punishment: therefore there is determination through punishment, and not through reward. But the third does not have a reason except by showing the end of rest, as will be clear below: because this pertains to reward. But in the second tablet only one is affirmative: because it has a conjoined remuneration on account of the congruity of the act. For as he does to others, so it is congruous for him to receive from God. But prohibitions of themselves do not merit: and therefore a reward is not attached to such: but punishment is not threatened, because it is manifest even according to human laws.

§ 13. To the other, it must be said that command is not over a negation, except in such a way that it is a negation of a command. But that a command should be of a negation, the very nod and inclination of the mind would be founded upon nothing: and no one commanding intends this. Whence just as no one commands himself, so also no one commands, except that something be done. And therefore the imperative mood would be improperly placed before negations, as in affirmations: but negations are well interpreted by indicatives, just as compositions are by affirmatives: and therefore negations are made by the indicative.

Articulus 3 — What The Sufficiency Of The Number Of The Precepts Is

What is the sufficiency of the number of precepts?

294. 1 Corinthians 13:13

§ 14. Thirdly, it is asked concerning the sufficiency of the number of precepts, according to what is it taken? § 15. For no intellect distinguishes in anything unless it has in itself the reason of distinction: and that which it distinguishes must be distinguishable.

§ 16. It is asked therefore, what is its reason, or what is the habit which directs the intellect distinguishing in the precepts?

§ 17. But it seems that there is none pertaining to the proposition: 1. For either they are taken from those things to which the precepts order: and those are none other than God, and the neighbor: and then there ought to be only two mandates: and this is false. Or according to the ways in which the neighbor is helped and harmed, and in which God is served and God is offended: and if they were taken in this way, there would be almost infinite precepts, and not only ten: therefore it seems that the intellect does not have a light directing it in the distinction of precepts: therefore it will not distinguish.

§ 18. 2. Item, if they are distinguished, it is necessary that the distinction be taken according to some of the causes: either therefore according to the efficient, or formal, or material, or final. If they were distinguished according to the efficient. On the contrary: Then there ought to be only one: because the efficient and commander in all mandates is only one, namely God. But if according to the form: then again there will be only one, because the form of obligation necessary for salvation is saved in all precepts. Item, the end is one, namely eternal life. Therefore if they are distinguished, this will be according to the matter of the work, or about what the work is. If according to the matter of the work, since this is very multiplex, as from the matter in which faith, chastity, charity, and all matters of virtues and vices operate: then there will be more precepts than ten. But if according to the matter about which is the act and work, there ought to be only two, namely God, and the neighbor: which again is known to be false.

§ 19. 3. Item, just as it is fitting to tend into one God, so it is fitting to tend into the triune, and thus concerning the other articles of faith: therefore it seems that next to the first there ought to be fourteen precepts according to the number of articles.

§ 20. 4. Item, just as one tends into one God by faith, so one tends by hope and charity: therefore at least there ought to be three mandates concerning the one God.

§ 21. 5. In the same way it is objected concerning the last mandates: because just as there is the concupiscence of the wife and the act of lying with her, so there is the concupiscence of killing and the act of killing: therefore there ought to be two mandates concerning concupiscence and act, as in those.

§ 22. Item, upon that of the Apostle to the Romans: "By murder, contention, deceit": the Gloss says that he speaks in the plural, "By murders", because murder is done by will and by work. Therefore they ought to have been prohibited in diverse mandates, as is done in adultery and the will of adultery, and theft and the will of stealing.

295. 1 Timothy 1:5

§ 23. And the same is the objection concerning the other mandates: therefore it seems that there ought to be more than there are.

§ 24. 6. Item, just as it happens to offend God with heart and mouth, so it happens to offend by work: but we have one regarding the heart or two, namely, "Thou shalt not have alien gods before me." And another concerning the mouth, "Thou shalt not take the name of thy God in vain": therefore it seems that we ought also to have one regarding work: therefore there are fewer than there ought to be.

§ 25. 7. Item, just as the neighbor is harmed in himself, in his possessions, and in his wife, so he is harmed also in his children: therefore it seems that a special mandate ought to be taken regarding this: and this again is not had: therefore they are few.

§ 26. 8. But on the contrary it seems that there ought to be fewer: because it is said in Genesis: "All these evils have fallen back upon me against God": and thus no mandate ought to be taken according to this that it is against the neighbor.

§ 27. Item, he who observes the day of the Sabbath (as Augustine says) abstains from vices in work: therefore he does not kill, nor commit adultery, etc.: therefore, the precept concerning the Sabbath day having been given, it was superfluous to give any other precept: therefore it seems that the number of precepts is abundant.

§ 28. And because all such objections are solved by one solution, therefore let these suffice.

§ 29. Solution. It must be said that the number of precepts is taken according to those things ordering to God, and the neighbor. And according to those ordering to God commonly a threefold difference is found: for either it commands a movement on the part of God simply related to our soul which is moved into Him, or according as conscience is invoked as a witness. If in the first way: either it is taken according to the intellect, or according to the affect. If according to the intellect: then it is the first mandate, which says: "Hear, O Israel, etc." And this is clear through this, because hearing is a disciplinable sense, and leads into the truth of the unity of God, which is the end of speculative intelligence. But if it is an end as the end of the affect: then it is the third mandate, which is concerning the rest of the affect in God insofar as He is good. But if it is according to the invocation of God in testimony of conscience: then it is the second mandate, which is: "Thou shalt not take the name of thy God in vain." But the objection which occurs here concerning vain and false swearing, which is prohibited in the second mandate and the eighth, we will solve below, when it will be disputed concerning each mandate in special. However, the Master distinguishes these three mandates otherwise in the Letter, namely according to the three persons: but his distinction is clear, and is good with respect to us; but with respect to those who receive the distinction of the mandates, and not of the persons, as the Jews and pagans, it is not as valid: and therefore this one which has now been stated is more general. But if it orders the mandate towards the neighbor: either this is according to the order into the good, or according to the removal from evil. If into the good: thus is the first of the second tablet, which is to honor father and mother. But if according to recession from the evil which is inflicted upon the neighbor: this is either by work, or by word, or by thought, or by appetite. If by work: either in respect to the person

in the being of the individual, or in that which is conjoined to the person for the sustenance of the species, or in the things of fortune ordered to the solace of both. If in the first way: thus it is, "Thou shalt not kill." If in the third way: thus it is, "Thou shalt not steal." And these prohibitions are ordered according as they inflict a greater and lesser harm. But if it is according to word: then it is, "Thou shalt not bear false witness." But if according to the harm of appetite: either it is according to the delectable of the flesh: and then it is, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife." Or according to the delectable ordered to sufficiency: and then it is, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's goods."

§ 30. This assignation having been had, we must respond to the objections in order.

§ 31. To the first, therefore, it must be said that the habit of the intellect with respect to distinguishing the mandates is due reason according to the order of justice to God and to the neighbor in common as he is a man, not as he is a prelate, or subject: for it is in the notion of natural right with respect to this order naturally impressed upon the intellect: and that justice is the habit ruling the intellect in the distinction of mandates.

§ 32. To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that although there are only two to which natural right orders us, namely God, and the neighbor: yet it orders to God in many ways, and to the neighbor in several: and according to the diversity of those ways (as is clear in the aforesaid assignation) the plurality of mandates is attended.

§ 33. To that which is objected, that those ways are almost infinite, it must be said that this is true of particular ways: but the common ways are only ten, as was said before.

§ 34. To the other, it must be said that the distinction is taken according to the matter about which the act is, and that matter is God, and the neighbor: but it is in many ways about God, and in many ways about the neighbor: and therefore the number of precepts is multiplied beyond the binary.

§ 35. To the other, it must be said that although there are many articles, yet in all one divine truth is supposed, and one essence of deity: and since the law of the Decalogue is of the natural law, the other articles besides the unity of God are not so expressly but implicitly of natural right: and therefore they are not expressed in the Decalogue.

§ 36. To the other, it must be said that the unity of God is premised according as it is the object of the worship of God. But worship supposes interiorly faith, hope, and love: and exteriorly adoration, and sacrifices, and veneration. And all these are supposed in the first mandate: because under any of these mandates are contained many particular ways. And according to this the multiplication of the mandates of the first tablet can be taken otherwise than before, and better with that which was said pre-understood. To God we hold ourselves in three ways, namely by interior, and exterior worship: and with respect to this is the first mandate. Similarly in word by comparing the truth of our speech to His truth: and this is done through the invocation of the testimony of His truth: and with respect to this is the second mandate. In the third way we hold ourselves with respect to the intention of any work: because the intention always ought to be abstracted from its work and rest in God: just as God

rested from all His work in Himself. And since man cannot be compared and moved into God in more ways, there are no more mandates in the first tablet except three.

§ 37. To the other, it must be said that concupiscence is not prohibited specially separated from the act, except in such concupiscibles which cause the mind of man to rest in themselves with a special love besides the act: and those are two, namely the delectable of the flesh, and the delectable of possessions or things: for in those sins it is sinned many times in the heart besides the intention of coming to the work: but in others, namely in murder and false testimony, there is no delectation besides the act, or it is itself caused from it: because many wish to kill so that they may have what they illicitly coveted in the delectations of the flesh or of worldly things: but those are appetized for their own sake: and therefore those concupiscences had a special prohibition, and not others.

§ 38. To the other, it must be said that that work which tends into God: either tends into Him as the term of the act and the end, and then it pertains to interior or exterior worship: and this is included in the first mandate, such as to believe, to hope, to love, and to adore, and the like. Or it tends into Him as the end of the intention, but not of the work, because the work is about the neighbor: and then it pertains with respect to intention to the first mandate, because it principally commands the intention abstracted from the work to rest in God, according to the exposition of Augustine, and in this way according to the work it will be the first, or third mandate.

§ 39. To the other, it must be said that children are not conjoined as a wife: and therefore they are not separated from parents. Whence they can be offended against in two ways, namely as they are in the power of the father, and are usurped into servitude: and then they are enclosed under that, "Thou shalt not covet the thing." Or it is offended against the persons of the children which are separable from the care of the parents: and then they are themselves neighbors like the parents, and have the general offenses which are in neighbors: and therefore there ought to be no special prohibition concerning them.

§ 40. To the other, it must be said that it is so of any mandate, if anyone observes it also meritoriously: because there cannot be merit with any mortal sin: but yet the observation of the Sabbath has only a special act divided from the others, which is the rest of intention in God.

Articulus 4 — How The Capital Vices Are Prohibited In These Commandments

How are the capital vices prohibited in these mandates?

How are the capital vices prohibited in these mandates?

§ 41. Fourthly it is asked, How are the capital vices prohibited in these mandates?

§ 42. 1. For just as there is a special precept in which lust is prohibited, so there ought to be a special one in which gluttony is prohibited: and there seems to be no such precept: therefore the division is diminished.

§ 43. 2. Item, envy does not seem to be prohibited, nor pride, nor acedia: but lust is prohibited, and avarice. And it is asked, why do those three have special mandates in which they are prohibited, and not others?

§ 44. Solution. It must be said that although Augustine in the book On the Ten Strings seems to reduce fornication to the first mandate, because it is an injury of God in His image which is spotted: yet it is understood here according to the Master, that every illicit lying-together whether according to nature, or against nature it be done, is understood to be prohibited in that mandate: "Thou shalt not commit adultery": and in my judgment gluttony is prohibited in the same, because these two vices have an order as cause and caused: because just as in natures the nutritive serves the generative, so in vices gluttony serves lust. Whence Jerome says: "A belly boiling with wine quickly foams up into lust." But avarice is prohibited there: "Thou shalt not steal": and, "Thou shalt not covet." But anger in that mandate, "Thou shalt not kill." And because envy generates anger through vice, therefore envy is understood to be prohibited in the same. But pride against God is prohibited in the first mandate, and pride against the neighbor is prohibited through the contrary in the first of the second tablet, when it is said: "Honor, etc." And in the same place some understand envy also to be prohibited: because someone cannot at the same time honor and envy. But acedia according to all is prohibited through the contrary in the third mandate of the first tablet: because acedia is a sadness in the difficulty of spiritual things, proceeding from the love of the world: and therefore when the Sabbath is sanctified, by rest in God acedia is understood to be excluded.

§ 45. To the other, it must be said that those vices which are of special harm to the neighbor, have express prohibitions: as anger by which the neighbor is harmed in person, and lust by which he is harmed in the conjoined for the propagation of nature, and avarice by which the sustenance of life is subtracted. But the other vices do not have a special harm, but consist in general acts: and therefore they ought not to be specially prohibited in the Decalogue.

Articulus 5 — Whether The Fashioning Of Idols Is Prohibited, And, Whether An Idol Is Nothing In The World, And, Whether In Negative Precepts There Is Simple Negation, Or Also Something Of Affirmation

Whether the formation of idols is prohibited? and, Whether an idol is nothing in the world? and, Whether in negative precepts there is simple negation, or whether there is also something of affirmation?

§ 46. Next it is asked concerning these things which are said in the Letter around the first mandate.

§ 47. And it is asked concerning this which Origen says: "He who makes a species which the eye has not seen, but the mind, etc." For it does not seem that it intends to prohibit this.

§ 48. Item it is asked, how is that understood which he says, that an idol is nothing in the world? For whatever is a thing of art, is something in the world.

§ 49. Further it is asked, whether in this precept and in the other negative ones there is a simple negation, or is some act commanded in them?

§ 50. It seems, that there is simple negation: because Basil says so upon that of the Psalm: "Blessed is the man, etc.", in a certain sermon: "Just as for those ascending a ladder the first step is to depart from the earth, so also the ascent of virtue and piety has its beginning from descending from evil: for any kind of leisure is to be preferred to any work not right, as are those things which are commanded, 'Thou shalt not commit adultery', 'Thou shalt not commit murder': all of which indicate rather the leisure and rest of the soul than the efficacy of any work. But those things which pertain to the profiting of perfection, exact a work, as that: 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.'" From this it is expressly taken, that the negatives consist in simple negation.

§ 51. But against this is the objection of many: because § 52. 1. Simple negation does not have praise: the observation of a precept has praise: therefore the observation of a precept does not consist in simple negation.

§ 53. 2. Moreover, according to this even he who would never think of the precept, would still observe the precept, which is inconvenient: because even brute animals according to this would observe the precepts.

§ 54. Solution. It must be said that there were certain idols among the ancients, which had as the cause of their error mixtures of virtues from the images of heaven: as in a bull the image of a bull was made with the head of a dog, and it had the virtue of opening secrets, and the like: and therefore such things induced to idolatry: and Origen considered this.

§ 55. To the other, it must be said that the form of art is something: but the form of the composition from the invisible virtue and the corporeal idol was nothing in the idol, except in the opinion of the erring. But what is in the opinion of the erring, is not something in the nature of things or in the world: and therefore the Apostle says, that an idol is nothing in the world.

§ 56. To the other which is further asked concerning negative precepts, one must consent to the Masters, that they posit an interior act: whence when it is said, "Thou shalt not have alien gods before me," the sense is: "You shall will not to have," so that there is posited there a dissent toward alien gods.

§ 57. To what is objected to the contrary, it must be said, that Basil is speaking of the exterior act, and not the interior: because since there are two parts of justice: to decline from evil, and to do good: it could not be a part of justice to decline from evil, if it were a pure negation of act: whence the will of declining is posited in the declining.

Articulus 6 — Whether What He Says, You Shall Not Take The Name Of The Lord Your God In Vain, Is Of The Fifth, And, Whether The Master Expounds This Commandment Well

Whether this which he says, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain," is of the fifth? and, Whether the Master expounds this mandate well?

§ 58. Next it is asked concerning the second mandate which begins there, B, § 2: "The second precept is: 'Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain.'" Where the

Master says, that according to the letter it is commanded, that you shall not swear by the name of God for nothing: but it seems, that

§ 59. 1. This pertains to the fifth mandate of the second tablet, where the Master treats of perjury, which is done by speaking false testimony against the neighbor: and thus this ought not to be of the first tablet, but of the second.

§ 60. 2. Moreover, in speech there is no being false: but there is much difference between vain in speech and false in speech, because the vain can be true: therefore it differs much to take the name of God in vain, and falsely: therefore the Master seems to expound poorly.

§ 61. 3. Item, the Philosopher defines vain in the second book of the Physics, saying, that the vain is that which is towards some end which it does not include (attain): but such a speech is multiplex, as a prayer which is not heard, and a word of preaching which does not convert souls, and a word of truth which is not believed by the hearers: therefore it seems, that the precept is, that the name of God be not taken in all speeches: and thus he sins mortally who invokes God in a prayer which is not heard: and since God does not hear sinners, all such praying in mortal sin, would sin mortally by the prayer itself against the precept: and similarly those preaching, and those swearing true things, when their speech is not believed, which is false: therefore it seems to be inconveniently handed down a mandate of this sort: "Thou shalt not take the name of thy God in vain."

§ 62. Further it is asked concerning the second exposition which the Master posits in the Letter, that it is commanded allegorically, that you should not think Christ to be a creature, because every creature is subject to vanity. For since we are bound to morals from nature, morals oblige equally and approach to the knowledge of all, namely Gentiles, Jews, and Christians: but to know and to believe do not approach equally from nature to the cognition of all: therefore they do not fall under the precept.

§ 63. Solution. It must be said that this mandate according to the first exposition is moral, and obliges all.

§ 64. To that which is objected first, it must be said that he who swears falsely sins in two ways, namely by deceiving: and thus he sins on the part of the word which is ordered to the neighbor, against the neighbor: and with respect to this it falls under the fifth mandate of the second tablet. He sins also by invoking the divine truth as a witness, and thus he sins against God: and with respect to this it is posited under the second mandate of the primae tablet. But the Master treats of perjury under the fifth of the second: because the science of perjury depends on the science of a lie, because without that it is not well known: and a lie falls under the fifth of the second tablet.

§ 65. To the other, it must be said that vain is twofold, namely materially, and formally. But a speech true materially can be vain, that is, concerning vain things, which are not referred to eternal life. But formally a speech is not vain, unless it is frustrated of the end to which it is: and that is the expression of truth to another: because, as Plato says, for this speech was given to us: and when it does not have the end, then it is vain per se and formally: and therefore it is the same to say: "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain," as "Thou shalt

not take the name of God to affirm a false speech." But to take differs from invocation and manifestation: because he who prays invokes the name of God, and does well. But he who preaches manifests the name of God, and does well. But he who takes, assumes to that which is his own, that is, to the speech which is from himself.

§ 66. To the other which is objected concerning a true oath which is not believed, it must be said that the end is twofold, in itself, and in another. But the truth expressed to another is the end in itself, and this suffices for the speech in order that it not be vain. But credulity is the end in another, which if it does not attain, this is from the vice of the other, not its own: just as the Philosopher says that the rhetorician will not always persuade, nor the physician heal: but if he omits nothing of the contingents, he will be said to have attained the end: and if not in another, yet in himself.

§ 67. To the other which is further asked, it must be said that that mandate does not fall in the Decalogue, except according to the first sense, and not according to that sense which is taken from the metaphor of the locution: and therefore that objection is nothing: especially also since the Master says, that that exposition is allegorical: for he would not know how to extract it, unless having faith: and therefore only such a one is obliged.

Articulus 7 — Whether The Observance Of The Sabbath Is Ceremonial Or Moral, And, Why The Sabbath Ceased, And, Whether The Lord's Day Succeeded The Sabbath, And, What The Mode Of Observing The Sabbath Is, And, Why He Used A New Mode Of Speaking, Saying: Remember To Sanctify The Sabbath Day

Whether the observation of the Sabbath is ceremonial or moral? and, Why did the Sabbath cease? and, Whether the Lord's day succeeded the Sabbath? and, What is the mode of observing the Sabbath? and, Why did he use a new mode of speaking, saying: "Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath day"?

Whether the observance of the Sabbath is ceremonial or moral? And, Why did the Sabbath cease? And, Did Sunday succeed the Sabbath? And, What is the mode of observing the Sabbath? And, Why did He use a new way of speaking, saying: "Remember to sanctify the Sabbath day"?

Next, it is asked concerning what he says there, at B, § 3: Remember that the day, etc.

And it is asked: Is this observance of the Sabbath ceremonial or moral?

It seems, however, that it is ceremonial: because 1. It is thus said in Ezekiel 20:12: I gave them my sabbaths, that they might be a sign between me and them. [296] But ceremonials are those whose whole use is in signifying, as the Master says in Book I of the Sentences:[297] therefore it seems that the observance of the Sabbath is ceremonial.

If perhaps you say that the whole use of the Sabbath is not in signifying. On the contrary: Augustine says thus in his book On the Ten Strings: But it is said to you to observe the Sabbath specially in hope of the future rest, which God promises to you: for whoever does whatever he can on account of that rest, however laborious what he does may seem, nevertheless if what he does is referred

to the faith of the promised rest, he indeed does not yet have the Sabbath in reality, but he has it in hope.[298] Therefore it seems that the whole of it is as a sign of the future.

1. Again, Augustine in Book IV of A Literal Commentary on Genesis, treating that word: God rested on the seventh day, says thus: Probably it can be said that the observance of the Sabbath was commanded to the Jews in the shadow of the future: that it might figure the spiritual rest, which God, by the example of this rest, promised by a hidden signification to His faithful who do good works. Which rest our Lord Jesus Christ, who suffered only when He willed, also confirmed by the mystery of His burial.[299] From this again it is expressly gathered that the observance of the Sabbath is ceremonial, and not moral.
2. Again, Augustine, below in the same book: Now in the time of grace being revealed, that observance of the Sabbath which was figured by the designation of one day, has been removed from the observance of the faithful. For in this grace he already observes a perpetual Sabbath, who in the hope of future rest works whatever good he works, nor does he glory in his works themselves as if having a good that he has not received: for thus receiving the sacrament of baptism as a day of Sabbath, that is, of the Lord's cessation in the tomb, and understanding it, he rests from his former works, so that now walking in newness of life, he recognizes that God works in him, who simultaneously works and rests, both providing congruous governance for the creature, and having eternal tranquility within Himself.[300] From this the same is gathered as before.

But against this it is objected: because 1. Nothing comes into the same division of something, unless it is of the same genus as the other co-dividing members: but the observance of the Sabbath comes into the same division with other moral precepts: therefore it is of the same genus as they are: since therefore those are of the genus of moral precepts, it seems also that the observance of the Sabbath is of the genus of moral precepts.

1. Again, it was held above that according to the opinion of certain Masters, the Lord spoke all these precepts in the hearing of the people because they were of the natural law which is accessible to the common knowledge of all: but He spoke that precept among the others before the people: therefore it is of the natural law: but nothing is of the natural law unless it is purely moral: therefore that precept is purely moral, as it seems.
2. Again, Isaiah 58 throughout the whole chapter speaks of nothing but moral things: and at the end he subjoins about the Sabbath, saying: If you turn away your foot from the sabbath, from doing your own will in my holy day: and call the sabbath a delight, etc.[301] Therefore it seems that this too is moral.
3. Again, it is the opinion of all the ancients that the ten precepts are moral: but if the precept about the Sabbath is not moral, there are only nine: therefore the precept about the Sabbath is among the moral precepts.

296. Augustine, Glossa ordinaria.

Furthermore it is asked, If the precept about the Sabbath is ceremonial according to a certain respect, why did it cease?

For it seems that it ought not to have ceased concerning the fixing of the day: because

1. The burning of incense (thurification) did not cease, as the Saints and Masters say, because it signifies that which must always be done, namely the devotion of prayer. Therefore, by similarity, the observance of the Sabbath ought not to have ceased, because it signifies that which must always be done, namely to cease from vices and to work good things in the hope of future rest, as is gathered from the words of Augustine introduced earlier.
2. Again, Tithes did not cease, because they signify that which must always be done, as the Saints say: therefore neither should the Sabbath.

Furthermore it is asked, Did Sunday succeed the Sabbath?

It seems that it did: because 1. It is similarly observed in the New Law just as the Sabbath was in the Old.

1. Again, the Saints say that the fathers of the Old Testament served the hebdomad (the number seven): but the fathers of the New Testament serve the ogdoad (the number eight): but the eighth day is Sunday: therefore it seems that the seventh was changed into the eighth.
2. Again, Jerome seems to intend this in the Prologus Galeatus, where he says that Paul stayed with Peter for fifteen days: for by this mystery of the ogdoad and the hebdomad the future preacher to the Gentiles was to be instructed.[302]

But if this is granted, it seems to be contrary: because the seventh day is of divine institution: but no divine institution is read to have been made concerning the eighth: moreover, it does not seem to have been within the daring of man to change what God established: therefore it seems that the one was not changed into the other.

Furthermore it is again asked concerning the mode of observing the Sabbath, from what works must one abstain on festal days? And this article is the utility of this question regarding counsels.

And it is objected thus: 1. Augustine says in the book On the Ten Strings: It is said to you to observe the Sabbath spiritually, not in the way the Jews observe it with carnal leisure: for they wish to have leisure for their trifles and luxuries: for a Jew would do better if he did something more useful in his field, than to be seditious in the theater: and it would be better for their women to spin wool on the Sabbath day, than to dance immodestly all day in their new moons. But it is said to you to observe the Sabbath day spiritually by working in the hope of future rest.[303] Therefore it seems that the Sabbath

297. Glossa ordinaria.

is not violated except by a work that cannot be referred to eternal rest: but this alone is sin: therefore by doing other works men do not sin on the feast days of the Church.

1. Again, the Saints say that one must abstain from servile works on festal days. But servile works are only those things repugnant to the liberty of the spirit: but these are only sins: therefore it is sufficient to abstain from them.

But against this are the decrees of the Saints and the custom of the Church, which commands to abstain from bodily works, which are not sins.

Furthermore it is asked, Why does He use a new way of speaking in this commandment when He says: Remember to sanctify the Sabbath day? For we only remember past things: since therefore all the commandments of the Decalogue are also of the natural law which preceded the written law, just as the precept of the Sabbath or even more than it, it seems that in all the others He ought to have used the verb of remembering more than in this one: and yet in none of the others did He use that word.

Solution It must be said without prejudice to the first, that He does not say, Remember to observe the Sabbath day: but, Remember to sanctify the Sabbath day. Sanctification, moreover, implies the purity of rest: and therefore it must be said that the precept concerning the sanctifying of the Sabbath is moral as to sanctification, and it was ceremonial as to the mode of observance. And that this may be understood, a distinction must be made in this way. Sabbath is interpreted as rest: and according to the reasoning and authority of Augustine, rest is after labor: whence, since labor is throughout the whole of life, just as Ecclesiastes 9:10 commands: Whatever your hand is able to do, do it earnestly: rest will be after this life: therefore to sanctify the Sabbath is the same as to abstract the intention of rest from the work, and to continually fix it upon eternal rest: just as God, dismissing all His works, rested in Himself: and this is a precept, because whoever by intention rests in his work, that person enjoys his work, and enjoys the things to be used, which is human perversity. That this is so is gathered from two authorities of Augustine in the book On the Ten Strings: of which one is this: You are commanded to labor for this end, that you may rest in the future: but you wish to rest for this end, that you may labor, when you ought to labor for this end, that you may rest.[304] As if he were to say: In the precept of the Sabbath it is commanded to you that the rest of intention should proceed to future rest, and intention should not seek rest in the work of this life. The second is this: In the Holy Spirit, that is, in the gift of God, perpetual rest is promised to us; in the gift we receive the pledge of eternal rest, which will be the Sabbath of sabbaths. On account of that very rest pertaining to the gift of the Holy Spirit, namely toward this hope, whatever we do, if we do it, we observe the Sabbath.[305] Behold, Augustine expressly says what has been held: and therefore according to this it is moral, and not according to the observance.

To all the authorities of Augustine introduced above, therefore, it must be said that according to the observance of the fixed day, namely the seventh, the sign was ceremonial, but according to the sanctification of rest in intention, it is moral: and the authorities introduced

298. Rom. 1:29.

are understood regarding the first, while the reasons adduced to the contrary are understood regarding the second.

To that which is further asked, it must be said that what was in the nature of a sign ceased and ought to have ceased: because it did not signify what was always to be done from institution, but rather what was to be awaited in Christ: for the future rest is held in its cause in Christ, and in the configuration of His death through baptism in which we are buried together with Christ, so that we may simultaneously work our salvation, and rest with Him through intention, just as He works even now with the Father, and rests, as was clear from the words of Augustine introduced above.

But to THAT which is objected concerning thurification and tithes, it must be said that it is not similar: because thurification did not primarily signify something to be awaited from its institu-
tion, but rather the devotion by which it is always and by all offered in every prayer. Tithes, moreover, remain for the sustenance of the ministers of the Church, and not for the purpose of signifying a further liberation from original sin, as they did in antiquity, as was noted above concerning the tithing of Christ.

But to that which is secondly asked further, it must be said that Sunday did not succeed the Sabbath day: because the Sabbath day was not in the Old Law as a precept insofar as it is moral, but rather insofar as it is ceremonial, of which ceremony there are two causes. One was the pre-showing of rest on that day in the works of the creation of the world. The other was the future rest through the works of re-creation in the tomb, and this was more principal in the intention of the Institutor: although the first was more manifest to the people, and therefore was more often indicated to the rude people as the reason for observance. But the Church instituted Sunday for three causes, and changed the Sabbath for two causes: and thus there will be five.

The first cause moved the Church to institute certain days of vacation: and it is this, because man, surrounded by misery, is compelled to labor for necessities, and cupidity also invites to this: but labor calls the mind out to attend to temporal things: and the mind, called out to temporal things, postpones spiritual things, and with spiritual things postponed, it does not refer labor to the hope of eternal rest, and then it does not observe the precept. Whence, to the end that man, by hearing divine solemnities, might be excited to think of the future rest, and thus learn to run to it by intention even when he is at work, the Church wholesomely provided feast days on which the word of God is proposed, and is sung more solemnly, and the people are commanded to abstain from other things, so that they may hear those things with their minds.

Another cause why the eighth day was chosen for this among other principal feasts is this, which is often assigned by the Saints: because the Lord rose on the eighth day, and demonstrated the rest of that beatitude in body and in soul, promising that we are to be conformed

299. Gen. 42:36. (Note: the text attributes "against God" to this verse, likely conflating it with Gen. 39:9).

to Him after the resurrection. It also instituted other feast days, when there is some feast of God or of the Saints, whence a notable memory of that rest is made to the people.

The third cause is, so that by this the error of the Gentile mathematicians (astrologers) might be removed: for they considered in the beginnings of their works the dominion of the hour, and especially the dominion of the ascending sign, and the dominion of the thing for which they were working. But the lord of the first hour on the eighth day is the Sun: and then they used to say it was the most auspicious beginning of all works. And so that this might be thoroughly abolished, the Church decreed that no one should do any work on that day and especially in the morning.

Now the first cause of the cessation of the Sabbath was the principal one: because the reality of the Sabbath had already ceased according to its cause and reality in some way, as was said: and with the truth arriving, the shadow of the future ought to have ceased. The second cause, lest the Church seem to Judaize. The third cause was that the error of the Gentiles might be removed, who observed the lord of the hour: and the lord of the first hour of that day, according to them, is Saturn, who, as they themselves say, has the most inauspicious beginning of works, on account of which the Gentiles also observed the Sabbath. But so that this might be removed, the Church decreed that on that day work should be done.

But to that which is objected, it must be said that the seventh day did not have divine institution on the basis that it was of the substance of a moral precept: but because ceremonials were established by the Lord as signs: and therefore it was not out of human daring that the Church changed it, but rather so that there might be the understanding of the truth, after which understanding it would have been deadly to observe the shadows of future things.

To that which is thirdly asked further, it must be said that festal days do not have their observance from useful and bodily business except from the institution of the Church, for the said causes: and thus the Church can oblige subjects. Whence they are to be coerced from all works not conceded by the Church. But it is true that it would be a lesser evil to engage in useful business, than to be dissipated in theaters and to be idle in drinking: and priests ought rather to urge that they cease from sins, than from good bodily works: yet one must abstain from both, as was said earlier.

TO THAT which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that Augustine is speaking of the comparison of a greater evil to a lesser evil: and therefore he indulges neither.

To the other it must be said that servile works are those which make one a slave of sin, and thus sins are servile works: or those which pertain to the servitude of the penalty of present misery, and thus other works are servile beyond those which are exacted rather than conceded, such as cooking foods, and other things of this kind.

To that which is asked lastly, it must be said that this commandment has less of the natural law than the others, and therefore it is fixed in the memory by that mode of speaking. Others

300. Augustine, De spiritu et littera, c. 14.

say that that commandment was previously in observance: and therefore resuming it, not instituting it anew, He uses such a mode of speaking. But the first solution is better.

Articulus 8 — Whether Rather The Command Is To Be Given To Children Concerning The Honor Of Parents Than To Parents Concerning The Honor Of Children

Should the commandment rather be given to children concerning the honor of parents, than to parents concerning the honor of children?

Next, it is asked concerning what he says there, at C, § 4: In the second table there were seven commandments.

For it is objected against the first commandment: because it seems He ought rather to enjoin upon parents the care of children, than conversely, since the Apostle says, 2 Corinthians 12:14: For children ought not to lay up treasure for their parents, but parents for their children.

Again it is asked, 1. Since by the name of parents every neighbor is understood as Augustine said, why did He not rather put the name of neighbor than the name of parent, so that He would have said: Honor your neighbor?

1. Again, Since by honor here is understood due reverence and the provision of necessities, it seems that He ought rather to say: Help your neighbor, than, Honor your parents.

Furthermore it is asked concerning the promise that is made in the commandment, when it is said: That you may be long-lived upon the earth. For either it is understood of the longevity of that life, or of the longevity of the other life. If in the first way, it seems to have an instance to the contrary: because many honor their parents, who on account of this are not long-lived upon the earth. If in the second way, then nothing seems to be said: because that longevity is not given to one good work in species, but to all, or to any whatsoever: and thus it seems that such a promise made to this commandment is unreasonable.

Solution It must be said that as virtue grows in children, virtue decreases in parents according to nature, and subsidy is owed to decreasing virtue: and therefore the Lord commanded that children should honor their parents. Conversely, however, there was no need: because nature compels that, for the reason that status ascends from the root into the branches, and not conversely.

To the other it must be said that by the name of parent every neighbor is understood, as was objected, and as was proved above in the question on charity: but the Lord simultaneously in one affirmative precept intends both to intimate charity for the neighbor, and the order of the same. But the order would not be insinuated by the name of neighbor, because that expresses nothing but the object of charity: but by the name of parent it is insinuated, because that expresses both the object of love and charity, and the degree. There can also be this other reason: because charity is the perfection of nature: and so that this may be shown,

301. Aristotle, Physics, II.

He puts a name there, towards which both nature and charity are simultaneously moved. But the first reason is better.

To the other it must be said that to help in necessities is not the general act of the precept: because it does not bind except in a particular case, namely if the neighbor is in need, and if we have the ability: but the image of God to be honored is found in every neighbor, and by every neighbor, and can always be exhibited, and everyone has the ability for this act: and therefore He rather put, Honor than help: although He also understands helping in a particular case according to time and place.

And note, that concerning other things which can be asked here, namely when, and from what we ought to help a parent, and in what things to prefer parents to other neighbors, has been held above in the question on the order of charity: because that whole question falls under this commandment.

Articulus 9 — Whether He Who Is Angry With His Brother Is Guilty Of The Same Judgment As He Who Kills, Or Of Another

Is he who is angry with his brother guilty of the same judgment as he who kills, or another?

Next, it is asked concerning what he says there, at C, § 2: The second is: You shall not kill.

For the addition of which he speaks here which was made in the Gospel of Matthew, 5:22 and seq., is this: He who is angry with his brother, is guilty of the judgment. But he who says to his brother: Raca, shall be guilty of the council. But he who says: You fool, shall be guilty of hell fire.

And it is asked first, Whether he who is angry is guilty of the same judgment as he who kills, or another? If another: then it does not seem to be a super-addition in the New Testament.

But it seems that it is the same: because 1. The Interlinear Gloss says there: He who is angry with his brother, shall be guilty of the judgment, which was said above concerning murder.

1. But this seems to be unjust, that anger of the heart should be punished as much as murder.
2. Furthermore, According to everyone, he who is angry with his brother sins mortally, if every movement of anger is forbidden here.
3. Furthermore, Since raca according to the Gloss is an interjection of an indignant person, it seems that any movement of indignation is a mortal sin if it bursts forth into voice: because he who acts against a precept, sins mortally.
4. Again, What difference is there between these things, judgment, council, and hell fire, and being angry, and raca, and you fool? For since murder is greater than all these, the murderer seems to deserve something worse than hell fire; and this cannot be, because there is nothing worse in penalties than hell.

302. Augustine, De decem chordis (Serm. 9).

Furthermore, What is it that the Master says, that here according to the sense which spiritual men had, the will of killing is forbidden?

For it seems that the natural law always forbade that as regards everyone. For it is less to will to harm in goods than in person: and the old law forbade the first according to the sense of everyone, even carnal men, by that precept: You shall not covet your neighbor's goods. Therefore much more is it understood to have forbidden that too, namely the will of killing. But if this is granted: then it seems that no super-addition was made in the New Testament.

Solution It must be said that in truth nothing is posited in the Gospel except what is held in the Law, and understanding this of moral precepts: but due to the bad observance of the carnal people, it was not understood to be forbidden except what the Law punished: and therefore by interpreting, the Lord added it in the Gospel: and also because He gave the grace to fulfill what was not conferred in the Law: and concerning this some necessary things are noted at the beginning of the fourth book of the Sentences.

But to the first which is asked, Whether he who is angry is guilty of the same judgment as he who kills? It must be said, that it is the same in genus, although not the same in species: for God understands according to the Gloss on Matthew, of anger to which one consents to the harm or death of the neighbor, which although it is held in the heart, nevertheless will be punished by eternal damnation: but because it did not proceed into manifestation, therefore it will be made public by the judgment of condemnation and discussion of the Lord, so that it may seem just to all: however, a greater penalty in species is owed to murder.

To the other it must be said that there is anger through zeal, and anger through vice. Through zeal it is done with the zeal of correction, and that is not a sin. Through vice, moreover, it is sometimes in the first movement, to which consent is not given, and that is a venial sin: but that to which consent is given to the intolerable harm of the neighbor, such as death, or mutilation, or loss, is mortal: and of that the Lord speaks: and that is also directly forbidden here. But the first movement falls indirectly under the precept.

And through this same point the solution to the following is clear: because the definition concerning the movement of indignation is the same as that concerning death.

To the other it must be said that according to the Gloss there are degrees in fault, namely anger through consent in the heart, and anger bursting forth into a sign of indignation, and anger bursting forth into a word of reproach and harm to the neighbor: and the first is imported by being angry, the second by raca which is an interjection of an indignant person according to the Greeks, although in Hebrew it sounds like 'empty' or 'brainless'. But the third is imported by you fool. Now by judgment and hell and council the degrees in eternal damnation are significantly expressed (as the Gloss says there), not indeed equal degrees, but their inequality is understood from the mode of condemnation: because he who is judged, will indeed be punished: but it is still asked, Of what penalty is he worthy and how much? But he who is guilty of the council, it is indeed known by what penalty: but it is asked how much should be inflicted? But he who is guilty of hell, this one already has the species of the penalty

303. Origen, In Exodum, hom. 8.

and the quantity of the penalty: not that these things are done in the judgment of the Lord, but rather in a human way they demonstrate the difference of sins and penalties.

To the last it must be said that although the voice of reproach is punished by hell, nevertheless there are differences in those penalties which are certain from the species and from the taxation of the quantity: because a greater penalty in hell is still owed to murder, than to reproach.

To that which is further asked concerning the law which forbids the will, it must be said that as for carnal repugnancies to the spirit, it did not forbid anything except the will proceeding into act through a sign: as if someone threatened or shook at him with whom he was angry. But according to them, if he had the anger of indignation in his heart or in his mind to which he consented, they said the law did not care about this: not because this was true what they said, but because they repelled the true understanding of the law: for in the natural law always both the evil mind and the evil work were forbidden: and this is what the Master intends to say.

But if it is asked, What spiritual understanding did Christ then express by adding? It must be said that there is a spiritual understanding in a moral precept as to the motive, and as to that which is commanded. As to the motive just as in this precept, that the act and will of murder should be dismissed for the sake of God, and for the sake of the love of God. But as to that which is commanded, there was nothing more of the spirit in moral precepts in the New Testament, than in the Old: but they are more amply explained and determined in the New than in the Old.

Articulus 10 — Whether In This Commandment, You Shall Not Commit Adultery, Simple Fornication Is Prohibited, Or Only Adultery, Or All The Other Sins

Is simple fornication forbidden in this commandment: You shall not commit adultery, or only adultery, or all other sins?

Next, it is asked concerning what he says there, at C, § 3: The third is: You shall not commit adultery.

1. Since moechia (adultery) is the same as adultery, and the less grave is not understood to be forbidden in the more grave, it seems that simple fornication is not forbidden in moechia.

1. Furthermore, Matthew 5:28, upon that: But I say to you, that whosoever shall look on a woman to lust after her, hath already committed adultery with her in his heart: the Gloss says, that there every carnal lust by which the soul fornicates from God, is understood to be forbidden: therefore it seems, since in every sin the soul fornicates from God, that in this commandment every sin is forbidden: and thus all the other commandments are superfluous.

304. Basil, Homilia in Psalmum 1.

2. Furthermore, Since fornication or adultery is twofold, just as the murder of the will and of the work is twofold: why does the Master not say here that spiritual and corporal fornication are forbidden, just as he said concerning murder?

3. Again, Since there are some things in this act more enormous, such as sodomy, or copulation with a beast: why does he not say by their name that illicit copulation is forbidden?

Solution It must be said to the first and the last simultaneously, that the prohibition of the second table orders toward abstaining from harms to the neighbor: and because the neighbor was not harmed by other acts except adultery (generally speaking), on account of this He expressed this one alone in the form of the precept, and understood the others, because they are of the same end, namely of carnal pleasure, although they are not of the same guilt in species.

To the other it must be said that that Gloss is understood either morally concerning spiritual fornication: and then it is nothing to the proposition, because the precepts are taken according to the literal sense. Or it is understood concerning the pleasure which is in the flesh, and this is of gluttony or of lust: and one of those is forbidden here as the cause of the other, as was explained above.

To the other it must be said that the will to fornicate has a special commandment, but not the will to kill: and the reason for this was expedited above: and therefore that commandment is not extended as generally as this one of not killing.

To the last the solution is clear through what was said before: for whether it is with a woman, or beside the order of nature, the whole is understood to be forbidden here.

Articulus 11 — What Is Called Robbery In The Present Matter

What is called rapine in the proposed text?

Next, it is asked concerning what he says there, at C, § 4: The fourth is: You shall not commit theft, etc.

For there, as the Master says, rapine (plunder) is forbidden.

And it is asked, What is called rapine? For rapine sounds like violence: therefore it does not seem to be rapine, when exactions and tallages (taxes) of princes are made among the people of the land.

Again, Tolls and customs: which however in many cases is not true.

But to this it must be answered under a distinction: for either the tallage is upon serfs, or upon free tenants of the prince's land. If upon serfs, since the serf has nothing except in the name of his lord which he receives from him, the lord can indeed sin by excessively imposing burdens (corvée) and oppressing the serf, because it is of concern how each uses his own property: nevertheless I do not think that it is rapine, or that he is held to restitution. But if it

305. Ps. 1:1.

is taken from the tenants of his land and the inhabitants: then the acceptance is to be taxed according to the labor of the prince, which he has in the defense of the land, and according to the expenses which it is necessary to make according to the prince's household and dignity in good faith; and if he exacts beyond this, it is rapine: and this is what John the Baptist says...

§ 1. [to the] soldiers: Be content with your pay.[306]

§ 2. But concerning tolls and tariffs it must be said, that these were instituted by the consent of the land to pacify the roads: and therefore according to the labor and expenses which they have in that pacification, they can be taken: and whatever is taken beyond that, is rapine.

Articulus 12 — Whether Sacrilege Is A Specific Sin, Or Denotes Only A Circumstance Of Sin

Whether sacrilege is a special sin, or only indicates a circumstance of a sin?

§ 3. Next one inquires concerning what he says, there, C, § 4: Sacrilege is committed in three ways, etc.

§ 4. For sacrilege does not seem to indicate a special sin, but a circumstance of a sin.

§ 5. 1. For stealing and stealing in a sacred place do not differ except by the circumstance of the place: therefore it seems that, just as he touches upon nothing in special concerning the many cases of theft, similarly he ought to touch upon nothing in special concerning sacrilege.

§ 6. 2. Also, sacrilege is said to be committed in three ways, as is had in the Letter: and a fourth way seems to be missing, namely when a non-sacred thing is taken from sacred persons, as when the goods of monks or clerics are taken.

§ 7. 3. Also, that seems to be sacred which is dedicated to divine worship: therefore, since the goods of Churches are given for divine worship, those who plunder the fields of Churches seem to commit sacrilege, which is not granted.

§ 8. Also it is asked, if someone snatches violently in a Church, and someone steals in it, do both commit sacrilege?

§ 9. It seems that they do not: because the snatcher is excommunicated at least by the sentence of a man, namely the one consecrating the Church, and pronouncing sentence against all invaders of that place, even if he is not excommunicated by the sentence of the canons. But he who steals is not excommunicated by the sentence of a man, nor of a canon, as the Jurisconsults say: therefore it seems that he does not commit sacrilege, because there is no reason why one should be excommunicated and not the other, except sacrilege and non-sacrilege: for the act which is the handling of another's property against the will of the master does not have excommunication attached to it.

§ 10. If this is granted: the contrary seems to be what is had in the Letter, namely that one takes the sacred from the sacred, or the non-sacred from the sacred: therefore he commits sacrilege, as it seems.

§ 11. Solution: It must be said that sacrilege in this case, or rapine, makes a special sin by reason of the place: and therefore it is another species: just as the violation of a nun is another species of sin than fornication.

§ 12. To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that sometimes a circumstance has the force of a species or of a constituting form, and then it makes another species: and this circumstance is principal when it is done to the injury of some sanctity of the Church: because then, by reason of the harm that is joined to the act, the circumstance draws it into another genus of sin.

§ 13. To the next it must be said that it is not sacrilege when the non-sacred things of persons dedicated to God are taken, but it is a greater sin than simple rapine: because no injury to any sanctity occurs through this, because the sanctity is in the place or the person, and neither is involved in such a theft or rapine.

§ 14. To the next it must be said that something is dedicated to divine worship in two ways, namely because it is consecrated for an act of worship: and this is properly called dedicated to worship, such as the chalice, and the paten, and the stones of the Church, and the like: and these cannot be deputed to other uses, as long as the form in which they were consecrated remains: and thus there are places deputed for worship, such as a cemetery, and a dormitory: and therefore in such things sacrilege is committed through injury. In another way something is said to be dedicated to worship, by the fact that it is ordered for the sustenance of those ministering in worship, just as the goods of the Church: and in such things the sacred is not injured except accidentally: and therefore to take away such things is not sacrilege.

§ 15. To the next it must be said that, in my judgment, both commit sacrilege, because the place is injured: but that the snatcher is excommunicated, this is on account of the rash daring which he does not have who comes secretly to steal.

Articulus 13 — On The Definitions Of Usury, And The Doubts Arising Around Them

On the definitions of usury, and the doubts occurring around them.

§ 16. Next one inquires concerning what he says, there, C, § 4: Here also usury is prohibited, etc.

§ 17. And three things are briefly asked here concerning usury, namely what is it? § 18. And, is dominion transferred in usury? § 19. And, does the one giving usury sin just as the one receiving?

§ 20. To the first one proceeds thus: § 21. The Master defines usury in the Letter thus: Usury is when someone exacts more in money or any thing, than is received in the principal. But in the Gloss on Luke 6:35, and Matthew 5:42, he seems to give two definitions: of which the first is this: Usury is profit from a loan owed or exacted from a pact. Another is: Usury is the superabundance which is received beyond the principal. And these definitions are in the Gloss by sentence, not by words.

306. Ezekiel 20:12.

§ 22. But it seems that, according to these definitions, usury does not seem to be theft: because

§ 23. 1. Theft is neither exacted, nor owed from a pact.

§ 24. 2. Also, neither does a thief give anything for a principal. Therefore it seems that the Master speaks badly, that it is contained under theft.

§ 25. 3. Also, by constituting differences usury and theft seem to be contraries: because theft is the handling of a thing against the will of the master, but usury is received with the master willing and consenting: therefore it seems that one is not contained under the other.

§ 26. Also it is asked: What makes usury, either the will to receive beyond the principal, or the hope, or the pact?

§ 27. 1. If the will: then many will be usurers who never received anything beyond the principal, and we are speaking of usury of act, not of will. But if hope makes usury: then the merchant seems to be a usurer, because he hopes to receive beyond the principal. If you say that it is not similar: because the merchant gives money, but the usurer lends: this is nothing: because to lend is neither good nor bad in itself, but can be done well or badly: hence the whole rationale of evil lies in that which is there beyond the act of the loan: and this is the same in the usurer and the merchant: therefore if he commits a sin in one, he commits a sin in the other as well. But if the pact makes usury, this will be against the definition: because, on that verse: Lend, hoping for nothing from it, the Gloss says that usury is the hope of profit beyond the principal: and it does not say a pact.

§ 28. 2. Also, what makes usury to be a sin? For either it is a sin according to itself, or prohibition makes it to be a sin, or the injury of the neighbor. If it is a sin according to itself: then it was never permitted to anyone to receive usury from anyone: for neither was it ever permitted to anyone to fornicate with anyone: and this seems false, because it is thus read, Deuteronomy 23:19 and 20: You shall not lend to your brother at usury money, nor fruits, nor any thing, but to a foreigner.

§ 29. 3. Also, Ambrose: You may receive usury from him whom you deservedly desire to harm: but there are many whom we can harm: therefore there are many from whom we can receive usury: therefore it is not evil according to itself.

§ 30. 4. Furthermore, if prohibition makes it a sin: then before the prohibition it was not a sin: and thus in natural law they could give at usury.

§ 31. 5. Also, if prohibition makes it to be a sin, then concession would also make it to be licit: and thus after it is conceded, it would be licit.

§ 32. 6. Furthermore, if the injury of the neighbor makes it to be a sin, then not every usury is a sin, nor always: because some usuries do not harm, but help the neighbor much: therefore it seems that in no way is usury a sin.

§ 33. 7. Also, human law is derived from divine and natural law: but human law, as certain laws concede usuries: therefore it seems that they are not illicit even according to divine and natural law.

§ 34. 8. Also, to kill is a greater sin than to give usury: and yet in a case it is well done, and is conceded: therefore usury in a case can be conceded for utility.

§ 35. 9. Also, to concede houses and vessels of gold and silver for money and profit beyond the principal is not a sin: since therefore the concession of money does not differ from such concessions except materially alone, it also seems that to concede money for the hope of profit is not a sin.

§ 36. 10. Also, the creditor is made a debtor to him who gives a loan for mutual services: for if someone does well to me, natural reason dictates that I also am obliged to him to do well if I can: but every obligation which natural reason dictates can be deduced into a pact: therefore he who gives a loan so that he may receive something beyond the principal can deduce into a pact that the other is obliged to him in something beyond the principal: but this is usury: therefore usury is not a sin.

§ 37. Also it is further asked, if it is permitted to make such a pact: I give you a loan so that you may give something beyond the principal to the poor?

§ 38. It seems that it is: because to give to the poor is almsgiving and doing well: but it is certain that we ought to provoke others to almsgiving and doing well in whatever ways we can: therefore such a pact can be made.

§ 39. Against this is what the Lord says: Lend, hoping for nothing from it.

§ 40. Also I ask, if such a pact or hope can be held: I give you a loan, so that you may return the favor to me in giving a loan at another time, when I shall need it?

§ 41. It seems that it can: because he is held to this even without the loan which I make to him, that he should lend to me if he can: therefore I can well oblige him to this by the benefit of the loan, as it seems.

§ 42. But against this again seems to be what the Lord says: Lend, hoping for nothing from it.

§ 43. Also, it is difficult to remove from the heart the hope of goods or gifts for benefits. Let us posit therefore, that someone gives a loan to someone, deducing nothing into a pact, and receiving nothing beyond the principal, unless the other offers spontaneously, and he who gives the loan presumes that the other will offer something: is such a one a usurer?

§ 44. It seems that he is: because he hopes for something beyond the principal: and usury is the hope of profit beyond the principal: therefore he is a usurer on account of the loan.

§ 45. ON THE CONTRARY: If it were not done, yet he would give or would have given the loan: therefore it seems that it is a simple gift: but to receive this is not a sin: therefore such a one is not a usurer.

§ 46. Solution: It must be said, without a doubt, that usury is a mortal sin, and it was always so in natural and written law, and it was never permitted nor will it be permitted to give at usury.

§ 47. To the first, however, it must be said that usury is a part of theft and rapine, by the fact that it is rapine or theft in a certain respect. For a robber or a thief touches something alien against the will of the master, that is, he not willing with an absolute will: but a usurer handles something alien, the master not willing, yet willing with a conditioned will. Hence he who gives usury would indeed wish to return only that which is the principal, but he prefers to accept this [condition] than not to have the loan, which he needs: and so he is not willing except with a conditioned will.

§ 48. To the next it must be said that the solution is clear through the same thing: because to give something for a principal does not make a thing to be a sin or usury, but rather to touch that which is beyond the principal against the will of the master, that is, he not willing with an absolute will.

§ 49. To the next it must be said that the constituting differences agree, just as one who is unwilling simply, and one who is willing in a certain respect. For in theft the alien property of one who is unwilling in every way is touched: but in usury the alien property of one who is unwilling simply, and willing in a certain respect, is touched.

§ 50. To the next it must be said that the hope of receiving beyond the principal for a loan makes usury.

§ 51. To the objection to the contrary, it must be said that the merchant does not hope for a loan: and therefore the objection is invalid. For it is not similar concerning trading and a loan: because trading is not about things to be done gratuitously from natural and divine law, but a loan is about things to be done gratuitously from natural and divine law.

§ 52. To the next it must be said that usury is a sin according to itself, and always was a sin.

§ 53. To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that that law is understood just as the law concerning the bill of divorce: for it was commanded to give a bill of divorce, if a wife was dismissed: but that she should be dismissed, this was permitted: and that the dismissed woman could marry another, was permitted on account of the hardness of the heart of the Jews. Thus it was commanded that a loan should not be given at usury: but it was permitted, if it was given, that it should be given to a foreigner.

§ 54. There are however those who say that the law speaks in such a case, namely when foreigners detain lands owed to us, just as the Canaanites did the land of the children of Israel: and therefore by lending at usury with them they did not receive what was alien, but their own which was owed to them by lot. And they say that the Church could do this to pagans. Nevertheless, because it would be a bad example, I consider the first solution to be better. For one must abstain from every appearance of evil. They also say that one person from another who holds something of his own through violent oppression or other illicit reception, could lend at usury for the same cause. But, as it seems to me, this is not safe counsel: because it

could not be done without scandal. Hence I rather agree that he could recover it from him by theft, than by usurious reception.

§ 55. To the next it must be said that Ambrose speaks by an hypothesis of the impossible: because it is impossible that we could desire to harm anyone without sin: therefore it is impossible that we should receive usury from anyone.

§ 56. To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that no one is injured who uses his own right: hence to harm, and to use one's right, are not the same. But by using our right some are indeed burdened: but we do not burden them, but the right is contrary to their injury.

§ 57. To the next it must be said that the Emperor does not involve himself except in those things which a temporal judge has to judge. But these are things which pertain to the state of the republic according to a good state of time, not of eternity. But to give at usury contributes much to that good temporal state: and therefore the Emperor permits it and Kings similarly. But the Ecclesiastical judge judges according to the good state of eternity: and therefore he condemns it. Hence it is also clear why the Ecclesiastical judge judges concerning the penalty of the usurer, but the secular judge concerning the penalty of the thief, by inflicting a penalty, even though usury is theft in a certain respect: because the thief harms the good temporal state, which the usurer in a case helps: but the usurer corrupts the good spiritual state in the service of charity.

§ 58. There are however those who solve this otherwise, saying that those laws were revoked by the fact that the Emperor consents in all things to the four councils in which usuries were condemned.

§ 59. To the next it must be said that that argument is invalid. And there is an instance: because even fornication is a lesser sin than homicide: yet it cannot be conceded: and this is so because sometimes a lesser evil is inseparably joined to an evil end: and then a greater evil can be done for a good end, and not the lesser. But it would be valid if a greater sin were conceded insofar as it is a greater sin: but this is not true, but rather it is punished more severely than the lesser.

§ 60. To the next it must be said that it is not similar: because in the leasing of houses and vessels there is a certain sale of utility for a time: and this utility is determinate, just as the inhabiting of a house or the use of a conceded thing. But in money it is not so, but only a loan and the sale of a loan, which is to be done gratuitously from the charity of the neighbor. Others however solve this otherwise: because in the leasing of such things something perishes in the thing through the use of vessels and the inhabiting of houses: but in loaned money it does not. But the first solution is better: because what the second says is not necessarily true in general. But those who opine that dominion passes in usury, solve it otherwise, saying that it is not similar: because in the leasing of houses or other things dominion is not transferred: and therefore the master of those things can sell the use for a time. But in a loan dominion is transferred: for this is what mutuum (loan) sounds like, as if from mine I make yours (de meo facio tuum): and therefore he cannot sell the use, since it is his own thing which he lends. And

this seems to me more probable than all the solutions. But nevertheless below there will be a disputation concerning this, whether dominion is transferred or not.

§ 61. To the next it must be said that the creditor is made a debtor from the rationale of charity: yet this very obligation cannot be deduced into a pact, for the reason that it is contrary to the loan as to the gratuity on account of which it is to be done for the love of the neighbor. But the argument proceeds concerning those obligations which are not contrary to the contract or act in which they are made.

§ 62. To the next it must be said that such a pact cannot be made, for the reason that it is contrary to the gratuity of the loan. And there is an instance to the argument. To confer a prebend is good, and to give something to a poor person is good: therefore it is good to give to a poor person so that a prebend may be conferred. For in all such things in which the conjunction of one with the other evacuates the gratuity of the other, the division holds: but if it is inferred conjunctively, the form of argumentation is invalid, for the reason that it is not necessary to conjoin whatever things are true divisively.

§ 63. Through this the solution to the following is also clear: because concerning similar things the judgment is similar.

§ 64. To the last it must be said that such gifts can well be received without sin: and I well consider him ungrateful who does not offer himself for mutual services to the neighbor from whom he received a loan or a service.

§ 65. To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that the hope is not there on account of the loan, but as if from a gift: and therefore it does not make usury.

§ 66. And it is to be noted that, as the Jurisconsults distinguish, there are twofold usuries, namely those which are received beyond the principal, and those make a usurer: and there are usuries of usuries which he who receives, is infamous by the very action.

Articulus 14 — Whether In Usury Ownership Is Transferred

Is dominion transferred in usury?

§ 67. Secondly it is asked: Whether dominion is transferred in usury? § 68. And the Legists, wishing to prove that it is, object in this way:

§ 69. 1. Mutuum (loan) sounds like what from mine becomes yours: therefore also in that which is given on account of the loan, dominion is transferred.

§ 70. 2. Also, he who gives usuries is the master of his own things: therefore he can give to whom he wishes: but he gives to the usurer: therefore he transfers them into the dominion of the usurer.

§ 71. 3. Also, let it be that such a contract of a loan is made: I will lend you money, if you will give me so much beyond the principal by your free will: and he admits this form: it is certain that then he gives to him: therefore dominion is transferred, as it seems, into the power of the usurer: therefore in usury dominion is transferred.

SED CONTRA: § 72. 1. Anyone can make an alms of his own, although not a sacrifice at the altar: for an alms can be made from a prostitute, although not a sacrifice at the altar: but a usurer cannot make an alms from usuries: therefore the usury is not his: therefore dominion is not transferred to him. Middle proof. Ecclesiasticus 34:21: The offering of him that sacrificeth of a thing wrongfully gotten, is stained.

§ 73. 2. Also, a usurer is bound to return usuries: either he is bound from the fact that it is his own, or that it is not his own, but deposited with him. If because it is his own: then he is bound to return all his own things, which is false: therefore it remains that he is bound for this reason, because it is not his own: therefore dominion is not transferred to him.

§ 74. 3. Also, the Law says that it is not said to be one's own, which cannot permanently remain in one's possession: but usury does not permanently remain with the usurer: therefore it is not said to be his own: therefore dominion is not transferred.

§ 75. 4. Also from a similarity, if someone has a fief against the will of the master, the property of whose fief cannot be transferred into the power of another: but he who gives usuries has all things from the Lord God in fief: therefore against the will of the master he cannot transfer them into the power of the usurer. But it is certain that against the will of God he does what He prohibited from being done: for He Himself prohibited it, when He said: Lend, hoping for nothing from it. Therefore he cannot transfer it into the power of the usurer.

§ 76. Solution: It must be said that here there are diverse opinions of the Masters. For the Legists say that in usury dominion is transferred, and that this is the reason why the emperor permitted usuries: and because the laws were not established without reason, they have for themselves the reasons introduced above.

§ 77. And they respond to the contraries, saying to the first, that this is not true, that anyone can make an alms from his own: because it is his own in multiple ways: for a certain thing is his own licitly acquired, and a certain thing illicitly acquired, and a certain thing his own basely acquired. From the first an alms and a sacrifice at the altar can be made. From the third an alms, and not a sacrifice. From the middle neither an alms, nor a sacrifice: because from reason and from the order of charity he is bound to return what he acquired badly.

§ 78. To the next they say that he is bound to return from the law of the canon: and this is the law of the pole [the heavenly forum], and not of the forum [the earthly court]: and therefore the Ecclesiastical judge also compels him, and not the secular, and not because it is not his own among men.

§ 79. To the next they say that that law speaks interpretatively and not according to truth: because it is as if not his own, which by the authority of the canon he is bound and compelled to return, and does not permanently remain in his dominion.

§ 80. To the last they say that it is not similar: because God well permits many things which He prohibits: and an earthly master does not do this: hence by divine permission that translation is made. And this response seems to me more probable than all.

§ 81. There are, however, Doctors of Sacred Scripture and of Decrees of a contrary opinion: and they respond to the reasons introduced for the other opinion, saying to all one solution, that he does not have an absolute will of giving, but only a conditioned one: hence through an absolute [will] he himself remains the possessor of his own things, even though he could not act before a secular judge, because he himself renounced his action. Hence just as if someone detained is forced to swear that he will give a hundred pounds, he is indeed bound to give it on account of the reverence of the sacrament, but yet the will remains to have back what he gave through the authority of the canon: so they say it is in him who gives usuries, that he gives so that he may have a loan, not that he wills that the other simply have dominion.

Articulus 15 — Whether To Give Interest Is A Sin Just As To Receive It

Is giving usuries a sin just as receiving?

§ 82. Thirdly it is asked: Is giving usuries a sin just as receiving?

§ 83. It seems that it is: because § 84. 1. If there were no giver, neither would there be a receiver: therefore the giver is the cause of mortal sin to the receiver: but he who is the cause of mortal sin, sins mortally: therefore the one giving usury, sins mortally.

§ 85. 2. Also, Matthew 18, and Luke 17, it is said in the Gloss that saving a threefold truth we ought to avoid scandal, especially active scandal, lest we give to anyone an occasion of sinning mortally. But it is certain that the one giving usuries, saving the threefold truth, namely of life, doctrine, and justice, is able not to give: therefore by giving he sins by scandalizing the neighbor to a mortal sin: therefore they are not to be given.

§ 86. If perhaps it is said that they are not to be given except in necessity: it seems that this is nothing: because this necessity cannot be anything but bodily: and anyone is bound to love the soul of the neighbor more than his own body: therefore he ought rather to perish in body than to give the neighbor an occasion of sinning mortally.

§ 87. Also I ask: How much necessity is exacted for this, that usury be given?

§ 88. For it seems that he ought first to sell all his things, before he would turn to this mode of help, which is the cause of sinning mortally to another: therefore it is not permitted except after every sale.

§ 89. But then no one would give him a loan, because there would be no hope of restitution: therefore he is not bound to sell all things before he gives usury.

§ 90. Furthermore it is asked concerning a priest who teaches that usury should not be given, whether he himself could give it?

§ 91. It seems that he could not: because he ought not to act against that which he teaches.

SED CONTRA: § 92. The priest himself has need just as another: therefore he can contract a loan at usury.

§ 93. Solution: It must be said that in necessity it can be given at usury, but without necessity it is a sin, and, as I think, grave and mortal: just as to swear is licit in a case, and without necessity a sin.

§ 94. To that however which is objected, it must be said to the first, that the receiver and the giver do not similarly relate to scandal or the cause of sinning: because the one giving usuries gratuitously demands what the other from the command of the Lord is bound to expend, namely a loan: but because the other does not do what from the right of the Lord he is bound to do, therefore he gives usury, as if redeeming his vexation, and as if buying him for this that he may do what from right he ought to do gratuitously: and he does not scandalize, even though the other is scandalized: just as also the Jews were scandalized, although the Lord did not scandalize them. And through this the solution to the following is clear.

§ 95. To the next it must be said that the one asking for a loan impedes the salvation of the neighbor in nothing, but rather by asking for a loan, he provokes him to meritorious works: and that usury is given, this is extorted from the impiety of the usurer, not from the causality of the giver.

§ 96. To the next it must be said that to that question I wish to respond nothing of my own, because it seems difficult to me to determine how much necessity is required: but let anyone satisfy himself according to what the Lord will inspire, and let him have recourse to a superior whose it is to ponder and interpret rights. There are however those who say that a probable fear that one might perish in an inheritance by which he governs his family and inherits for his children or feeds the poor, suffices for this that he may give usuries.

§ 97. To the last it must be said that there is the same judgment concerning a priest, and concerning others: because a priest does not beatify him by the fact that he gives usuries, but rather condemns if he gives them unwillingly, not being able otherwise to do well according to the good state of his house and his family.

Articulus 16 — Whether It Was Lawful For The Sons Of Israel To Despoil The Egyptians

Was it permitted to the children of Israel to despoil the Egyptians?

§ 98. Next one inquires concerning what he says, there, C, § 4: But if it is asked concerning the children of Israel, etc.

§ 99. For since it is of natural law not to commit rapine or theft, it seems the Lord ought not to change this: but concerning this there will be a question below on the last distinction concerning natural law.

§ 100. But here it must be said that this was the cause: because the children of Israel were despoiled by the Egyptians, and they had their labor gratuitously: and therefore it was judged by the Lord, who had the power, that it should be compensated in this way.

DISTINCTIO XXXVIII

Divisio Textus

§ 101. The fifth commandment is: Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor.

§ 102. Under this fifth commandment the Master introduces two distinctions: one concerning a lie, the other concerning perjury.

§ 103. And this one which is concerning a lie is divided into three parts: in the first of which he touches upon the division of a lie. In the second, the definitions of a lie and of that which is to lie, there, B, Here it is to be seen what it is. In the third, he touches upon what...

a lie, etc., is to err, and he subjoins a question concerning the saying of Jacob, whether it was a lie or not? There, at B, It is also to be known that in some things, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether A Lie As Such Is A Sin

Whether a lie in itself is a sin?

Now a question arises concerning the first part in the text, Whether a lie in itself is a sin?

And, if it is a sin, Whether in itself it is a mortal or venial sin?

To the first it is objected as follows: § 1. Augustine says in the book Against Lying:[307] "Whoever thinks that there is any kind of lie that is not a sin, shamefully deceives himself, since he judges it honorable to be a deceiver of others." Therefore, every lie is a sin.

§ 2. Again, Augustine, in the same place: "It seems to me that every lie is a sin."

§ 3. Again, Augustine, in the same place: "Therefore every lie must be called a sin, because a man ought to speak that which he bears in his mind, whether it is true, or whether it is thought to be true and is not." Therefore, every lie is a sin.

§ 4. Again, it is proved by reason: For every man who is good is to be believed; no liar is to be believed; therefore no one who lies is good. But in a rational creature, he who is not good is bad before God, and not except through a lie: therefore every lie is a fault before God; therefore a sin.

But against this it is objected that: § 1. Just as it happens that one signifies an intention by a word, so it happens also by a deed, as Anselm says, whence he himself says that there is a truth of signification and of action;[308] therefore it is also possible to lie by a deed. But not every lie of deed is a sin; therefore neither does every lie of word seem to be a sin. The minor premise is proved by the fact that it is held in Joshua 8:6 that he feigned flight to draw the inhabitants of the city farther from the city.[309] And in Luke 24:28: He Himself, namely the Lord, feigned to go farther.[310]

§ 2. Again, it seems also that not even a lie of word is always a sin: because Doctors disputing often deceive by intention, even Doctors of Sacred Scripture, and in the doctrine of

faith; and yet they are not said to sin when they put forward and strive to prove things that are false and which they know to be false; therefore not every lie is a sin.

Solution. It must be said that every lie is a sin.

Therefore, to the first objection, it must be said that such acts are to be referred to what is signified by the intention of the doers, and thus they are not a sin, because they are not done for the sake of deceiving. It is like a metaphorical expression, which according to its primary signification would be false if it were judged according to it; but when judged according to the secondary signification, it is thus true; and such true acts are to be referred to the thing signified. And so Augustine resolves it in a certain chapter in the Decrees.[311] But the Masters say that it is not similar concerning an act and a deed, and a word: because an act or a deed is not an immediate messenger of the heart, but can be referred to many things; whereas a word is the immediate messenger of the heart; and therefore there ought to be nothing else in the word than what is in the heart. But in a deed there can be something else, because it was not instituted for announcing the heart.

To the other it must be said that Doctors do not intend to deceive, but rather through

exercise to teach; and that they show a lie, this is so that one may learn to beware of it, not that it may be approved as true; and therefore they themselves do not lie.

Articulus 2 — Whether A Lie As Such Is A Mortal Sin

Whether a lie in itself is a mortal sin?

Secondly it is asked, Whether a lie is a mortal sin?

And it seems that it is. § 1. For thus says Psalm 5:7: "You will destroy all who speak a lie:"[312] but a man is not destroyed except through mortal sin: therefore every lie is a mortal sin.

§ 2. Again, "The mouth that lies kills the soul;"[313] and the soul is not killed except through mortal sin, because nothing separates the life of the soul from the soul except mortal sin: therefore a lie is a mortal sin.

§ 3. Again, whatever is contrary to virtue and destroys virtue, is a mortal sin; a lie is contrary to virtue and destructive of virtue; therefore it is a mortal sin. The first premise is proved by the fact that venial sin does not destroy virtue in the soul. The second is proved by the fact that truth is a certain virtue, as Aristotle says in the second book of the Ethics,[314] which according to Augustine a lie destroys.

§ 4. Again, every sin against the Holy Spirit is a mortal sin: but a lie is a sin against the Holy Spirit: therefore it is a mortal sin. The first premise is proved by what is held in the penultimate distinction of the second book of the Sentences, where it is said that a sin against the Holy Spirit is graver and more abominable than other sins.[315] The second is proved by the fact that a lie attacks recognized truth: because unless he recognized the truth, he would not

307. Augustine, Contra mendacium, c. 15.

speak a lie, but a falsehood; but in the same place it is said that the attacking of recognized truth is a sin against the Holy Spirit.

§ 5. Again, he who acts against his conscience builds toward Gehenna; every liar acts against his conscience: therefore he builds toward Gehenna. The first premise is presupposed from Augustine, whose authority it is. The second is proved by the fact that nothing is known in the conscience except the truth: and lying and a lie have this as directly contrary. From this it is further inferred: Nothing builds toward Gehenna except mortal sin, because venial sin builds toward Purgatory: therefore a lie is a mortal sin.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. In the text it seems that the lie of the midwives, and of Rahab the harlot, was venial on account of piety. But if it were mortal in itself, it would become venial by no adjunct. Therefore in itself it is not mortal.

§ 2. Moreover, all commonly say that an officious lie is not mortal: and what is said by all is true either in whole or in part: therefore not every lie in itself is a mortal sin.

Solution. It must be said that not every lie in itself is a mortal sin.

To the first and second, therefore, it must be said that according to the Master in the second part of this distinction, those two authorities first introduced are not understood of every lie, but only of a pernicious one. And the reason for this solution is that, since a lie is formally the in-

tention of deceiving, and materially the false signification of a voice, as will be clear below, the intention of deceiving is not predicated equally of a pernicious, an officious, and a jocose lie, but by prior and posterior: and the intention of deceiving according to its primary intention is not found except in a pernicious lie: and the reason for this will be clear below. And therefore I think that only a pernicious lie in itself is a mortal sin: and so said all the ancients, Praepositivus, and William of Auxerre, and the Masters of the Decretals, although they do not assign a reason for their saying.

To the third it must be said that there is the truth of the saying, and the truth of the truth-teller or the truth of the habit, and the truth of the sign in the saying. But a lie in itself is not contrary to the truth of the habit in the mind, just as neither is the first motion in a continent man contrary to the habit of chastity in the soul, but [it is contrary] to the truth of the sign which is in the act of saying: just as also the first motion in a continent man is contrary to the act of chastity: and from such contrariety and destruction it is not a mortal sin, but a venial one.

To the other it must be said that a lie in itself is not a sin against the Holy Spirit: because then every sin would be a sin against the Holy Spirit. But some sin is against the Father, such as that which is committed through fear, or lust, or compassion for another's loss or penalty. But a certain kind is against the Son, as when it is spoken because it is not reputed to be a sin: for although he then knowingly speaks a falsehood, nevertheless he does not speak a false-

308. Anselm, De veritate, c. 9.

hood with a conscience of the great quantity of the sin as it is: and then it proceeds from ignorance moving one to speak.

To that which is objected, it must be said that the attacking of recognized truth which is according to piety, is a sin against the Holy Spirit: but not every lie attacks that truth, nor does every lie attack the truth as a virtue of the mind, nor does every lie attack the truth of the gift out of malice, as is clear from what has been said.

To the last it must be said that a lie in itself does not build toward Gehenna, nor is it against conscience, but beside conscience, like a venial sin, and it disposes to Gehenna.

To that which is objected concerning the truth by which it is known, a distinction must be made as above: because the truth of the act in the saying is destroyed by a lie: and that is known by speculative knowledge, and not practical; and to act against this is not mortal: but to act against the conscience of doing—that is, what conscience dictates from a precept must be done, and if the contrary is done, dictates it to be a mortal sin—that is to act directly against conscience and to build toward Gehenna.

Articulus 3 — Whether A Lie Is Well Divided Into The Libidinous, The Pernicious, And The Officious

Whether a lie is well divided into libidinous, pernicious, and officious?

Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, at A, § 2: Yet it is to be known that there are three kinds of lies, etc.

The division of anything ought to be given according to the things specifying the lie itself.

§ 1. But a lie is not placed in a species, as it seems, by the fact that it results in advantage or disadvantage, since neither the signification is false, nor is there an intention of deceiving: therefore it seems that it is not well divided according to these three.

§ 2. Moreover, a joke and lust are two moving causes to lying, and neither is contained under the other: therefore it seems that there are four kinds.

§ 3. Again, lust is the root of all vices, as Augustine says: therefore it is not separated from advantage as a moving cause or from malignity, and thus it ought not to make a special kind of lie, as it seems.

§ 4. Moreover, it seems that the third kind, which is from malignity, is a sin

against the Holy Spirit: because it proceeds from that which is contrary to the goodness of the Holy Spirit: and this is a sin against the Holy Spirit, as was determined in the penultimate distinction of the second book of the Sentences: therefore it is a sin against the Holy Spirit, as it seems.

Solution. It must be said that this first division of a lie is taken according to the moving causes in general: and this is on the part of the mover: and since there are only three moving

309. Joshua 8:6.

causes, there are only three kinds of lies. But that there are only three is clear thus: The mover to lying is either the lie in itself, or that for the sake of which it is done. If it is the lie in itself: then it is libidinous. If, however, it is that for the sake of which it is done: either this is evil, and then it proceeds from malignity; or it is good, and then it is officious.

Therefore to the first it must be said that that objection proceeds when a genus is divided into species: but here the genus is divided according to all the acts of that genus, which it can have on the part of the liar as moving to the act.

To the other it must be said that the Master places the libidinous and the jocose in one kind: because the lust alone is lying in both, for the reason that the joke adds nothing to which the lust might take on a circumstance of accusation or excuse.

To the other it must be said that habitual indeterminate lust, which is an inordinate habitual pleasure in a mutable good, is the root: but here lust is taken as actual and determinate to the act of lying, and that is a special moving cause: whereas the former is posited in other causes as the root of every sin.

To the other it must be said that it does not have to be a sin against the Holy Spirit through the fact that it is from malignity. For malignity is twofold. One kind is a mover against the goodness of the Holy Spirit: and from such proceeds a sin against the Holy Spirit. But a certain kind is malice intending to harm the neighbor: and from this there is not always a sin against the Holy Spirit, because it alone is not the moving cause, but sometimes personal advantage, or some cause of hatred. Nevertheless, I do not deny that a pernicious lie is frequently a sin against the Holy Spirit: but it does not have this from the fact that it is a lie, or from the fact that it is pernicious, but from a cause specially moving against the goodness of the Holy Spirit in Himself or in His gifts, in that intention by which the gifts manifest Him. And concerning this, let the question raised on the penultimate distinction of the second book of the Sentences be inquired into.

Articulus 4 — Whether It Is A Mortal Sin For The Perfect To Lie

Whether it is a mortal sin for perfect men to lie?

Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, at A, § 2: It is not fitting for perfect men to lie.

And it is asked, Whether it is a mortal sin for perfect men to lie?

And it seems that it is: because § 1. In the text he says: "Lest for the body of another they kill their own soul:" but the soul is not killed except by mortal sin: therefore for perfect men it is a mortal sin.

§ 2. Again, a perfect man has professed to show the truth inwardly and outwardly: therefore if he is found to lie, he acts against his profession: but to act against one's profession is a mortal sin: therefore to lie is a mortal sin for perfect men.

Peter Lombard, Sentences, II, d. 43. Peter Lombard, Sentences, III, d. 38.

310. Luke 24:28.

Again it is asked, Whether a Doctor of truth, such as a Master of Theology and a Preacher, sins mortally by lying?

It seems that he does: because he acts directly against the doctrine of truth: therefore he sins mortally.

Again, he acts against what he says, because he preaches that one must not lie, and he lies: therefore he sins mortally.

Again, to this point there are many authorities of Augustine in the book Against Lying: because he says that it is not fitting for perfect men to lie. But there can be no reason why he specifically names the perfect, unless because for them it is a mortal sin, and for others venial: therefore it seems that for the perfect it is a mortal sin.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. No circumstance aggravates a sin infinitely: a religious person's lying posits nothing but a circumstance on top of the lie: therefore it does not aggravate the sin infinitely. But it would aggravate it infinitely if it made it mortal: therefore it does not become mortal by the fact that a perfect man lies.

§ 2. Again, if on account of the state of religion a perfect man sins mortally in that in which another sins venially, it seems that from the state of perfection he imports a detriment: but this is incongruous: therefore a perfect man by lying does not sin mortally.

Solution. It must be said that a lie is not a mortal sin for a perfect man, if for another it is venial in the same species.

To the first it must be said that Augustine without doubt is speaking of an officious lie: but he calls the perdition of the soul a disposition, and not a real perdition. Others say differently, that someone can lie for his own life out of a twofold love of life, namely mortal or venial: and similarly he can lie for another's. And Augustine is speaking of the case when someone lies, or the lie proceeds from a mortal love of his own or another's life. But this seems to be nothing, since Gregory says that an officious lie in the act itself is conjoined to piety. But if piety is the cause of the lie, it does not proceed from an illicit venial or mortal love of life. And therefore the first solution is truer.

To the other it must be said that to sin against one's profession is said in two ways, namely against the substance of the profession, and against the sign of the profession. Regarding the substance of the profession, it is nothing but the truth of life in continence and obedience and the renunciation of property: and to sin against these is mortal. Whence the Canon says, that a monk possessing a halfpenny is not worth a halfpenny. But to act against the signs happens in two ways: directly, and this does not happen except through mortal sin; or indirectly, and this does not happen except through a venial lie in them: because he has not professed the truth of speech except in the sign of the habit which is a sign of truth.

To the other it must be said that I think the same judgment should be held concerning a Doctor, and a Preacher, and a perfect man.

311. Gratian, Decretum, C. 22, q. 2.

To that which is objected, it must be said that the truth of the sign or of speaking is not the truth of doctrine, but rather the truth of teaching: and the one lying officiously does not act against it, but acts somewhat beside it.

To the other it must be said that he preaches and teaches that one must abstain from every mortal and venial sin, but he does not preach that to sin venially is mortal: and therefore he does not act against what he teaches.

Articulus 5 — Whether The Lie Of The Midwives Was A Mortal Or Venial Sin

Whether the midwives' lie was a mortal or venial sin?

Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, at A, § 2 near the middle: But concerning the lie of the midwives, etc.

And it seems that it was venial: because

Gregory the Great, Moralia, XVIII. Gratian, Decretum.

§ 1. Augustine says this in the text.

§ 2. Again, it was officious: therefore the least among lies: therefore venial.

§ 3. Again, the midwives were not in a state of perfection: therefore they could lie venially, and especially in an officious lie: therefore they sinned venially.

§ 4. Again, if it had been mortal, it would have impeded merit: but it did not impede it, because Augustine says that because the midwives feared God, He built them houses literally, by enriching them and giving them children. And Jerome says that He built them spiritual houses. Therefore they did not sin mortally, but venially, as it seems.

But against this it is objected by Gregory, who says thus in the Gloss in the same place: "The reward of their benignity, which could have been remunerated with eternal life, was exchanged into an earthly compensation for the fault of the lie, so that they might receive goods in their own life which they had wished to protect by lying: and they would have no reward to expect further." But nothing exchanges an eternal reward for a temporal one, except a mortal sin. Therefore it seems that their lie was a mortal sin.

Solution. It must be said that in my judgment the midwives' lie was venial: but not to confess the truth on account of fear for the body in a place of confession of faith and justice could be a mortal sin. For at first, by sparing the infants, they had done well: but afterwards, summoned by Pharaoh and established in judgment, they ought to have confessed the faith of God and justice, and not prolonged their life by lying: and for this timidity in the place of confession it may be that they sinned mortally, and not in the lie in itself. And that this is the opinion of Gregory is clear: because he adds thus in the same Gloss: "For if it is subtly pondered, they lied out of love for the present life, not with the intention of a reward: for by sparing they tried to cover the infants' life, but by lying, their own."

312. Psalm 5:7 (Vulgate 5:6).

Others say differently, namely that there was a threefold will in the midwives, namely the will to spare, and this was remunerable according to Augustine and Jerome. Another was the will to lie, and it was a venial sin. A third was the will to free themselves through a lie: which will was conjoined to the act of sin in lying, and this was in such a case when it was time to confess both faith and justice: and therefore it was a mortal sin: and concerning this they say Gregory speaks.

But that according to Gregory their lie in itself was not a mortal sin, is clear in the beginning of the same Gloss, where he says thus: "A lie is to be guarded against with the utmost effort, although it be of a lighter fault: let no one lie in bestowing a benefit." But a lighter fault is customarily not called anything but venial by the Saints.

Again, Gregory in the same Gloss, below: "If any fault is purged by a subsequent pious operation, how much more easily is this one wiped away, which piety, the mother of a good work, accompanies!" Through this it is clear that he does not mean to say that a lie in itself is a mortal sin, but a venial one.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 6 — Whether The Eight Kinds Of Lies Are Well Assigned By The Master

Whether the eight kinds of lies are well assigned by the Master?

Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, at A, § 2 towards the end: It is also to be known that there are eight kinds of lies, etc.

For it seems that that division is null.

§ 1. For it seems that to lie in the doctrine of piety or religion does not differ from a lie which is in common speech, except by the matter: but a material difference does not make diverse species, because otherwise there would be as many species as

Augustine, Contra mendacium, c. 15. Jerome, Commentary on Ezekiel. Gregory the Great, Glossa Ordinaria on Exodus 1:21.

there are men: therefore it seems that it does not make diverse species of lying, and thus the division is null.

§ 2. Again, a lie that harms someone and benefits no one, and a lie that benefits someone and harms someone, do not differ except according to the matter: therefore it seems that they are not diverse species of lies.

§ 3. Exactly the same objection is about officious lies, namely to lie so that life, or chastity, or money may be preserved, which do not have a difference except a material one: therefore they do not constitute three species of lies.

313. Wisdom 1:11.

§ 4. Moreover, a lie that benefits someone and harms someone has as much of the officious as of the pernicious: since therefore the denomination is made from the worthier, it ought rather to be placed among the officious from utility, than among the pernicious from harm.

§ 5. Moreover, the officious seems to harm someone: because he who lies for preserving money, by lying brings it about that the other is deceived, and does not receive the money which he would receive if the first had told the truth: therefore it harms someone: and what harms someone is pernicious: therefore the officious in retaining money is pernicious.

Moreover it is asked, According to what is this division of lies taken?

Solution. It must be said that the answer to this last point is clear through the prior division, that there are three moving causes to a lie in general, namely harmfulness, lust, and utility: and according to harmfulness the first three species of lying are taken. But that harmfulness is either to the detriment of the spirit, or to the detriment of the body. If to the detriment of the spirit: then it is by way of subversion of the articles of faith, or of those things that precede or follow the articles: as if someone lying should say that fornication is not a mortal sin, or that the Scripture is not true, or that Christ was not incarnated, or something of this sort. But if it is to the detriment of the body: it is either a harm universally, or according to something. If in the first way: then it is the second kind of lie, which harms everyone, and benefits no one: and such is a lie detracting someone, and this harms the listeners, and the speaker, and the one about whom it is: the speaker, to the perdition of his soul; the listeners, to the perdition of the fervor of fraternal charity; the one about whom it is made, to the perdition of his reputation. But if the harm is not universally, it is the third species, which harms someone and benefits someone. But if the lust for lying is the moving cause: it is either with the intention of a lie, or it is with the intention of that which is conjoined to the lie in the listener: and in the first way it is libidinous, in the second way jocose. But if utility is the moving cause: it is either in the goods of fortune, or in the goods of the body, or of the soul, which can be lost: for these are what are so in the soul that they have a state in the body, such as virginity. And in the first way is the sixth. In the second way is the seventh. In the third way the eighth.

But to the first and second and third it must be said that such arguments do not proceed except concerning the matter out of which a thing is, and not concerning the matter about which: just as an object is that about which an act is, because acts are defined by their objects, and potencies or habits by their acts: because such objects have the rationale of moving causes and ends in relation to the acts which are about them.

To the other it must be said that although there is something of utility in the third pernicious lie, yet it is not the moving cause, but the consequent: and therefore it is not defined and specified by it.

To the other it must be said that it does not harm him, because he does not have a right to have that money: but rather it benefits him, because it preserves him from injustice: whence it

314. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II.

harms no one except the speaker, because this harm is inseparable from a lie, for the reason that it is a sin.

Articulus 7 — Whether The Rule That The Master Puts Forth Concerning Lying More Or Less Is Well Assigned

Whether the rule which the Master posits concerning lying more or less is well assigned?

Whether the rule which the Master posits concerning lying more or less is well assigned?

Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, at A, § 2 at the end: But in these, by so much less does anyone sin when he lies, etc.

For this seems to be false. § 1. For let it be posited that someone out of ignorance says that Christ was not in Cana of Galilee, where He made wine from water; and let him speak out of malice a sin against a neighbor, whence the latter is hanged, and his sons are disinherited, such as that he is guilty of the crime of lèse-majesté; it seems that he sins more by the second lie than by the first: and yet the first is in the doctrine of piety, and the second is not: therefore it seems that sometimes the first is a lesser sin than the second.

§ 2. Again, through the first a word is sometimes spoken against the Son, and through the second a word against the Holy Spirit, because it can be out of malice: therefore the second will sometimes be a greater sin than the first.

§ 3. Again, through the first faith is injured, but through the second charity: but charity is a greater virtue than faith: therefore what is against charity is a greater sin than that which is against faith.

§ 4. In the same way this rule seems to fail concerning the fourth and the fifth. For a flatterer harms more than one simply lying: and yet the lie of flattery is the fifth, and a simple lie is the fourth: therefore the fifth lie is greater than the fourth, and thus the rule does not hold.

§ 5. Again it is objected concerning the seventh and eighth. Life is better than bodily cleanliness: since therefore she who is corrupted by violation does not incur anything but bodily uncleanness, it seems that the eighth benefits less than the seventh.

Solution. It must be said that this rule is universally true.

But to the first objection, it must be said that no one lies if he is ignorant: for it is necessary that he go against his mind if he lies: but in the doctrine of piety he cannot speak against his mind unless by intending to subvert the faith which is taught in it: and therefore the first case is null, because it does not posit a lie, but ignorance. But if he were to say that Christ was not in Cana of Galilee in order to show that the Scripture is not to be believed, then it would be to the point: and then the first would be greater than the second.

315. Peter Lombard, Sentences, II, d. 43.

To the other it must be said that it is by accident that some sin is made a sin against the Holy Spirit: but Augustine's rule is understood [to mean] that, other circumstances being equal, these lies differ according as they recede from the first.

To the other it must be said that that argumentation is worth nothing, and is a mere counterexample. Charity is a greater virtue than faith: therefore hatred, which is opposed to charity, is a greater vice than infidelity. For it is clear that it does not follow: because faith has the order of a foundation to the others: and therefore what destroys faith, not only destroys it, but all things built upon it, and by reason of that the evil contrary to faith becomes a greater evil than the contrary to charity, and than that of any virtue.

To the other it must be said that the flatterer does not lie with a jocose lie, but a pernicious one: but here empty talk is understood which intends to move to laughter: for he does not intend to deceive, but to make one laugh: and therefore the motive in such a lie is a lesser evil than where the pleasure of lying moves. Others say differently, that Augustine is speaking in the case when someone by flattering does not harm. But this solution is not

valid: because the rule is universally understood concerning a jocose lie, that it is less than a libidinous one.

To the last it must be said that it scarcely happens that the chastity of the body is corrupted without the infection of the mind: and in this respect a greater good is lost in the violation of chastity than in the killing of the body. Or it may be said, and better, that this is true regarding the rationale of the goods preserved by a lie in general: because a good of fortune is less than that of nature: and a good of fortune is preserved by the sixth, but of nature by the seventh. Again, an honest good is greater than the preservation of fortune and nature, which have only the rationale of a useful good: but the honest is preserved by the eighth.

And thus it is clear that there is no counterexample to Augustine's rule, understanding it generally.

Articulus 8 — What A Lie Is, And What It Is To Lie

What is a lie, and what is it to lie?

What is a lie, and what is it to lie?

Next it is asked concerning that which he says, there, B: "Here it must be seen what a lie is, and what it is to lie."

For it seems that a lie, according to that definition, does not apply to every lie: because § 1. In a jocose lie there is no intention of deceiving, but rather of provoking laughter: therefore it is not a general definition, as it seems.

§ 2. Moreover, the intention to deceive is ordered to deception: but one who errs in the way of morals is more deceived than one who errs in the physical way: therefore the intention of deceiving is not equal: since therefore this differing intention of deceiving is in diverse species of lie, the intention to deceive is not predicated univocally of every lie.

§ 3. Moreover, it is more to intend to deceive in reality and in speech, than in speech alone: but in a pernicious lie, deception is intended according to reality and speech, and in an officious and a libidinous lie according to speech alone, namely that false things be accepted for true: therefore the intention to deceive is not said in one way in the general definition of a lie.

Further it is asked concerning what he says in that chapter, that a man can lie by speaking the truth if he thinks it to be false, but nevertheless it is not called a lie.

For this seems impossible: § 1. For to lie is nothing else than to tell a lie: therefore he who does not tell a lie does not lie, as it seems.

§ 2. Besides, the act which is imported by this verb, "He lies," does not add to the act of speaking anything but a lie: therefore he who does not tell a lie does not lie: but one speaking a truth that he thinks to be false does not tell a lie, as he says in the Text: therefore one speaking a truth that he thinks to be false does not lie, the contrary of which is in the Text.

Solution: It must be said, that without prejudice I think that the first objections are to be conceded, and that "lie" is predicated primarily and secondarily of the threefold genus of lie: and therefore absolutely and according to the perfect substance of a lie, there is no lie except the pernicious one: and this is why the Master says in the Text that the authorities which say that "the mouth that lies kills the soul"[316], and "you will destroy all who speak a lie"[317], are understood of a pernicious lie: because the others participate secondarily in the definition of a lie. There are some, however, speaking otherwise, namely that the intention to deceive according to reality is not of the substance of a lie, but rather a consequent effect: and because the intention to deceive according to speech is in every lie, therefore they say that the definition of a lie posited here belongs to all.

But to that which is said about the jocose, it must be said that the primary intention is that false things be approved as true, although it does not stop in those, just as it does not in the pernicious and the officious.

And through this the solution to all that were first objected is clear. The former solution, however, is truer, and according to it it can be better defended that a lie in itself is not a mortal sin, neither for the perfect nor for others.

But to what is further asked, it must be said that "to lie" expresses the procession of a lie from an agent, and therefore does not contract its substantial definition from the side of the speaker: and therefore it can be true, and yet a lie: because that truth is in the speaker, and with respect to the speaker it is as false: but "a lie" expresses it in rest and abstraction: and therefore it has its matter from the side of the reality, and not from the side of the speaker: and therefore it is that it must be false according to reality, if it is to be a lie.

To the other thing which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that it is not true that to lie is the same as to tell a lie, as has already been shown.

To the other it must be said that it adds more, namely the procession of the lie as it is in the speaker: and this is to be a lie in a qualified sense: and therefore it suffices for it that it be false in a qualified sense, that is, with respect to the speaker.

Articulus 9 — Whether Jacob, Who Said That He Was Esau, Was Lying; And Whether He Could Speak 'With Heart And Heart' According To The Excuse Of Some

Whether Jacob, who said he was Esau, was lying? And whether they could speak in a double heart according to the excuse of some?

Whether Jacob, who said he was Esau, was lying? And whether they could speak in a double heart according to the excuse of some?

Next it is asked concerning what he says near the end of this distinction, there, B, § 2: "It is also usually asked concerning Jacob who calls himself Esau," etc.

For it seems that Jacob lied: because § 1. He spoke a falsehood with the intention of deceiving his father according to speech, that is, so that he would approve the false as true: therefore he was lying. But if you were to say that he is excused, [I reply that] he would also be excused from fornication, which is false: therefore neither can he be excused from a lie by the counsel of the Holy Spirit.

§ 2. Moreover, Augustine says that even if God were to sin, a sin would not on account of this be a good thing: therefore much less will a sin be made good and excusable by the counsel of the Holy Spirit: therefore Jacob is not excused, as it seems.

§ 3. Moreover, a lie (as Augustine says) belongs to those things which cannot be done well: therefore it belongs to those things which cannot be excused; therefore neither is Jacob excused from a lie.

And the same objection stands concerning Judith and others, who seem to have lied according to the surface of the text.

Further it is asked, whether they could speak in a double heart, so that they might say something true according to one sense, and wish to be understood in another sense in which it was false: as some excuse them?

It seems not: because § 1. The Psalm reckons it among sins "to speak with a double heart" (in corde et corde loqui) therefore it seems that this is a sin, just like the other.

§ 2. Moreover, it is held below in the Text in the following distinction, "With whatever art of words anyone swears, God as witness of conscience accepts it in this sense in which he to whom it is sworn, understands it": but there seems to be a similar judgment concerning a simple word, since the use of speaking was given so that we might lay open our affections and counsels to one another: but it is certain that the father understood a falsehood: therefore the statement ought to be interpreted in the sense of a lie.

316. Wis. 1:11.

Moreover it is asked, if Jacob could have sworn to what he said? For if he spoke the truth, and God is the witness of truth: therefore he could have invoked Him as witness of truth: this is to swear: therefore he could have sworn to what he said.

But against this: An oath is accepted in the sense of him to whom it is sworn: and according to his sense he would have spoken a falsehood: therefore he would have sworn a falsehood.

Solution: It must be said that we should not speak rashly concerning the counsels of the Holy Spirit: but rather such things should be venerated with silence than with discussion, were it not for the importunity of disputants. Therefore it can be said without prejudice, that Jacob said this not by his own motion, but by the motion of the Holy Spirit through the instruction of his mother. But although the intellect of man is not of itself sufficient for this, that in one locution it posits multiple senses at once and simultaneously, nevertheless the Holy Spirit has always brought it about, and will bring it about, that in His discourses many pass through, and knowledge is manifold: and no one discovers anything, if he has discovered a truth, that the Holy Spirit did not understand in that signification when He established the discourse. And therefore it can be said that according to the sense which the words make by referring to the reality, Jacob spoke a falsehood:

but he did not speak a falsehood according to the sense which the words make by referring to the mystery of the reality: and this Jacob intended implicitly by the fact that he intended to obey his mother and the Holy Spirit. For he was speaking by another's motion, not his own: and this is also the mode of excusing the others.

And through this the solution to almost everything is clear: for he was not speaking with a double heart, because he well willed that his father should understand the mystery: which also afterwards, when he understood it, he confirmed by a holy blessing. And as for what he said, that he fraudulently stole the blessing, it must be referred to the exterior mode, and not to interior fraud. It is also clear that he could have sworn this in this way, and he would have sworn a truth. Whence the solution to the whole is clear. Now this solution rests on the words of Augustine, who says that such things were said and done mystically: for this which has been stated is the mode of the mystery which the Holy Spirit placed in such words.

DISTINCTIO XXXIX

Divisio Textus

"Now let us see concerning perjury," etc. Here he treats of the oath and perjury, through which one also sins against the fifth commandment.

Now this distinction has three parts: in the first of which he treats of the oath considered in itself according to those things which are substantial to it. In the second, he treats of the oath

from the part of the one swearing and the one exacting the oath, there, K, "This also must be known, that with whatever art of words anyone swears," etc.

In the third and last, it is treated with what reverence one ought to approach an oath, there, M, "The holy synod decreed," etc.

The first of these is divided into four: in the first of which the companions of an oath are treated. In the second, the cause of the prohibition of an oath, there, C, "But if it is asked, whether to swear is evil," etc. In the third he asks, by what must one swear? Whether by God or by a creature, and sometimes by an idol? there, D, "It is also asked, whether it is lawful to swear by a creature," etc. In the fourth and last, the obligation of an oath is asked about, there, H, "Now it remains to see, whether every oath must be fulfilled?"

From these the sentence is easily clear.

Articulus 1 — Whether 'You Shall Not Take The Name Of God In Vain' And Perjury Itself Are Of The Precepts Of The First Or Of The Second Tablet

Whether "Thou shalt not take the name of God in vain" and perjury itself belong to the precepts of the first or second table?

FIRST ARTICLE. Whether "Thou shalt not take the name of God in vain" and perjury itself belong to the precepts of the first or second table?

Now a doubt arises concerning the introduction of that part:

§ 1. For since the name of God is invoked in vain in perjury, it seems he ought rather to have determined it under the second commandment of the first table than under the fifth of the second.

§ 2. Moreover, in perjury one sins against God: since therefore the first table orders man to God, it seems that perjury should have been determined under the precepts of the first table.

Solution: It must be said that no one perjures himself with the intention of sinning against God, but in order to deceive his neighbor: and therefore perjury, insofar as it is committed in false testimony in lawsuits, is more principally and more frequently committed against a neighbor, than against God: and therefore it has to be determined not in the first table, but here.

But to the other objections it must be said that the name of God is indeed invoked: and this is done with the intention of deceiving the neighbor: and therefore it is ultimately against the neighbor, and not against God in Himself, but rather in His members.

Articulus 2 — Whether An Oath Has Three Companions, And In What Respect Those Companions Differ

Whether an oath has three companions, and with respect to what those companions differ?

317. Ps. 5:7.

Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, A, around the beginning: "It must be noted, that an oath has three companions," etc.

It seems that two are superfluous: because § 1. He who swears with the judgment of discretion, swears justly and truly: because he discerns nothing else by the judgment of his discretion: therefore having said that an oath ought to be with the judgment of discretion, it was not necessary to add that it should be true and just.

§ 2. Moreover, nothing false is just: therefore having said that it was just, it is superfluously said that it ought to be true,

Besides, with respect to what is the number of these companions derived? Moreover, why is it said that these companions are rather to be appended to an oath, than to our other speech or work?

Solution: It must be said that these three companions are necessary to an oath: and although one is not perfect without another, nevertheless when one is posited another is not superfluous: because they have distinct properties regarding an oath, as will be clear below.

And there is an instance against the argument: because once one virtue is possessed all are possessed, and yet not on that account when one is possessed do the others become superfluous, on account of the distinct acts which they have.

And through this the solution to the first two is clear.

To the other it must be said that an oath is compared to three things, namely to the swearer from whose will it goes forth, to the thing concerning which it is, and to the cause for which it is made. And according to the first comparison it is ruled by judgment. According to the second it ought to be equated to truth according to the reality. And according to the third it must have justice: because it has no place in an unjust cause, as if someone swears that he will do what is unjust to be done, as is held below.

To the last it must be said that no oath is secure on account of the dubiousness of our speech, as it is said in the book of Wisdom: "The thoughts of mortals are timid, and our foresights uncertain."[318] And therefore when our speech is testified to by divine truth, it needs ruling companions, lest it be found dissimilar to the invoked truth.

Articulus 3 — What Perjury Is

What is perjury?

Next it is asked concerning what he says there, "But better is he believed," etc.

For everyone perjuring himself incurs the guilt of perjury: but one swearing to such a falsehood which is thought to be true, perjures himself, as he says: therefore he incurs the guilt of perjury.

BUT against this is that the contrary is held three times in the same chapter.

Solution: To this it must be said that there is truth according to the conscience of the speaker, and truth of the reality. Truth according to the conscience of the speaker suffices concerning future things whose cause is the will: because they are not except

in the will, and according to it they are true. But the truth of the reality ought to be in an oath concerning the present and the future. Whence what he calls perjury here is not perjury except in a qualified sense, namely insofar as it will not happen so in reality apart from the fault of the swearer.

Articulus 4 — Whether To Swear Is Evil

Whether to swear is evil?

Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, C, "But if it is asked, whether to swear is evil?" And two things are asked: Whether to swear is evil? And, Whether it is a mortal sin?

TO THE FIRST one proceeds thus: § 1. Ps. 109:4 says: "The Lord swore, and He will not repent," etc.[319] But if it were evil, the Lord would not have sworn. Therefore to swear is not evil, but rather good: because whatever the Lord does is good.

§ 2. Moreover, Heb. 6:13: "God, since He had no one greater by whom to swear, swore by Himself," etc.[320] And there follows the same as before.

§ 3. Moreover, Rom. 1:9 says: "For God is my witness."[321] And, 2 Cor. 1:23: "But I call God as a witness upon my soul."[322] Now it is certain that the Apostle would not have sworn, if it were not good to swear. Therefore to swear is good.

§ 4. Moreover, Augustine: "To swear is not evil." Therefore the same as before.

§ 5. Moreover, in an oath there are two things, of which each is good, namely to tell the truth, and the invocation of the name of God: therefore adjoined they would make a greater good: therefore an oath is a greater good than a simple proving of truth.

§ 6. Moreover, it is asked again, why would swearing be called evil? If for the reason that it is without a cause. Against this: According to this even to speak and to walk is evil: because without a cause it is done idly: this is false: therefore from this it is not held that even to swear in itself is evil.

BUT AGAINST THIS: § 1. Swearing is prohibited: but no good is prohibited by the prohibition of the Decalogue: therefore to swear is evil.

§ 2. Moreover, Exod. 20:7, upon that: "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain," the Gloss says: "that is, thou shalt not swear for nothing."[323] But to swear for nothing is the same as to swear simply. Therefore to swear simply is prohibited by the prohibition of the second precept.

§ 3. Moreover, Augustine: "False swearing is pernicious, true swearing is perilous, no swearing is secure." Therefore it is clear that every swearing is evil, as it seems.

318. Wis. 9:14.

§ 4. Moreover, if it were not evil in itself to swear, why would it be so diligently commanded to be avoided in the Gospel, Matt. 5:34, and in the epistle of James?[324]

Solution: It must be said that just as Augustine says in the Text, the Lord diligently prohibits swearing, lest anyone should desire swearing as a good, and harm himself by perjury through the habit of swearing. Whence it must be said without prejudice, that to swear in itself is not evil, but good: but nevertheless such a thing is incautious: and therefore it is diligently prohibited;

because since man is subject to vanity, his speech is even more vain and unstable than the man himself, who never remains in the same state: and therefore it is difficult for one accustomed to swearing not sometimes to confirm what is doubtful or false. Therefore although it is good in itself, nevertheless such a thing is evil, because it is incautious: and thus it is good, but by accident it is evil insofar as it is incautious, and the name of God, or the truth of God shining forth in His creatures, is invoked with less reverence than it ought to be.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that the reason for the prohibition is because it is incautious.

To the other it must be said that an oath is not prohibited by the precept of the Decalogue: because then it could never be done licitly, but perjury is.

To the other it must be said that to swear for nothing is not the same as to swear simply, but to swear for nothing, that is, to swear without a cause: and this oath does not have the companions of discretion and justice: and therefore this is prohibited, yet not swearing simply.

To the other it must be said that the reason for Augustine's saying is not from the side of the oath, but from the side of the swearer, who scarcely is sufficient for a perfect knowledge of the thing concerning which he swears.

Articulus 5 — Whether Every Perjury Is A Mortal Sin; And Whether A Jesting One Is Such; And Whether One Who Swears Falsely By God Venerates God

Whether every perjury is a mortal sin? and, Whether a jocose one is such? and, Whether one swearing a falsehood by God, venerates God?

Next it is asked secondly, whether every perjury is a mortal sin?

Now it seems that it is: because § 1. Perjury is directly against the precept: "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain": but what is directly against a precept is a mortal sin: therefore every perjury is a mortal sin.

§ 2. Moreover, one invoking divine truth as a witness to a falsehood knowingly contemns God: but those knowingly contemning God sin mortally: therefore everyone knowingly swearing a falsehood sins mortally, as it seems.

319. Ps. 109:4.

§ 3. Moreover, a lie in itself is a grave sin: but it is certain that an oath supervening upon it draws it outside the genus of a simple lie: therefore it draws it outside the genus of a venial sin: therefore it is a mortal sin.

§ 4. Moreover, it seems less that the name of God ought to be invoked in vain, than in falsehood: and yet it is prohibited by the prohibition of the Decalogue that it be invoked in vain: therefore much more that it not be invoked in falsehood: therefore one swearing false things directly acts against the precept: therefore he sins mortally.

BUT AGAINST THIS: Just as it happens that one knowingly tells a jocose lie, so it also happens that one knowingly swears a jocose falsehood: and it would be grave to say this, that then it would be a mortal sin: therefore it is not always a mortal sin, because it is certain that this intention does not proceed from a mortal lust.

Further it is asked concerning those oaths which are made as if jokingly, as when someone swears by his boots or his shoes, whether such persons sin mortally, or not?

Now it seems that they do: because § 1. Matt. 5:34 et seq., it is prohibited to swear by a creature: therefore such persons act against the prohibition: therefore they sin mortally.

§ 2. Moreover, in the Text Augustine says that one swearing by a creature swears by God who shines forth in the creature: but one swearing a falsehood contemns that by which he swears: therefore one swearing a falsehood by his boots, contemns God who shines forth in

his boots: but to contemn God is a mortal sin: therefore such a person sins mortally.

Further it is asked, whether one swearing a falsehood by God, venerates God?

It seems that he does not: because he sins against God insofar as he invokes Him as a witness of falsity: but one sinning against God does not honor God: therefore one swearing a falsehood by God does not honor God.

BUT AGAINST THIS: Augustine says that a man honors that by which he swears: therefore by swearing he honors: therefore one swearing a falsehood by God, honors God.

Solution: It must be said that perjury is manifold, namely an indiscreet swearing: and this is when he uselessly swears a truth, or when he swears without deliberation: and then I do not believe it to be a mortal sin. Perjury is also called a perverse swearing, when a man swears with deliberation that which ought not to be asserted by an oath, nor spoken simply, but rather the opposite: and then perjury seems to be a mortal sin.

TO THE FIRST therefore it must be said that the name of God is not taken in vain, except when with the deliberation of deceiving it is taken to assert a falsehood. But other takings, although they can be vain, nevertheless it is not a vanity destroying truth as a habit, just as was shown in the preceding matters concerning a lie: and therefore such an oath is beside the precept, and not against it.

To the other it must be said that such an invocation which is made jokingly, because it does not intend to deceive, but to joke, does not deliberate about the invoked truth, but rather

invokes out of a certain custom: and therefore it does not contemn, but omits, because it does not discern what is to be sworn, and what not.

To the other it must be said that a lie is predicated primarily and secondarily of the jocose and the pernicious: and therefore an oath added without deliberation to a jocose lie does not draw it outside the genus of venial sin, but makes it graver than it was: but of an officious lie it is otherwise, because that is not done without deliberation, and therefore to swear that is not of small fault, but of great.

To the other it must be said that what is vain is there called false: because it does not agree with the invoked truth: and therefore it is invoked in vain. But when it is invoked idly or jokingly, then it is done beside an oath, and not against it.

To what is further asked, it must be said that by boots or by something else one can swear in two ways, namely so that what he introduces is not a mark of confirmation, but of joking: and then I do not repute it to be an oath, but a bad mode of speaking. But if he intends to introduce this for a sign of holiness, because religious make use of it, then he perjures himself gravely: but such oaths are not made in this way.

To the other it must be said that nothing prohibits that in the same work God be honored according to something, and dishonored according to something: and thus it is in an oath where the invocation is a mark of divine honor, because that is invoked which is worshipped. But according as it has the deformity of an act, thus it is against God.

Articulus 6 — Whether An Oath Is So Much The Holier As That By Which One Swears Is Holier, And Also So Much The More It Obligates

Whether an oath is by so much the holier, by as much as that by which it is sworn is holier, and also by so much more does it oblige?

Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, D, "It is also asked, whether it is lawful to swear by a creature," etc.

Now incidentally it is asked here, whether an oath is by so much the holier, by as much as that by which it is sworn is holier, and by so much more obligatory? Because what is principally asked here in the Text is sufficiently determined.

But that it obliges by so much more, by as much as that by which it is sworn is holier, is thus proved first: because § 1. Augustine plainly says this in the Text: therefore it is so.

§ 2. Moreover, one contemning God in Himself sins more than one contemning God in a creature: just as those contemning a king in his proper person sin more than those contemning him in his bailiff. But one perjuring himself by God contemns God in Himself: and one perjuring himself by Him in a creature, contemns Him in a creature: therefore one perjuring himself by God sins more gravely than by a creature: therefore it is stronger to swear by God than by a creature.

321. Rom. 1:9.

BUT AGAINST THIS: § 1. God in Himself is nothing but one single uncreated good: but God in a creature is a created good and an uncreated good: now it is more to contemn two things than one: therefore one perjuring himself by a creature sins more than one perjuring himself by God, as it seems.

§ 2. Moreover, men would more abhor an oath which is made by the eyes or by the heart of God, than that which is made by God: therefore it is greater: but it is certain that this is by a creature: therefore some oath

made by a creature, is greater than one made by the Creator.

§ 3. Moreover, one swearing by an idol, swears by a creature: and it is certain that idolatry is worse than all sins: therefore perjury which is made in an idol, is worse than perjury by God: therefore it seems that the oath is greater.

§ 4. Moreover, it seems that it is equal: for there is no cause that a creature be invoked as a witness to a saying, unless divine truth were shining forth in the creature: for whatever else is in the creature is vanity, and confirming nothing, because it itself is mendacious, just as every man is: therefore it is necessary that in every oath divine truth be invoked, because otherwise it would confirm nothing: but wherever divine truth is, there it is always equal: therefore it is equally contemned: therefore it is an equal sin to swear a falsehood by God, and by a creature.

Further it is asked, whether the oaths of idolaters are to be received?

It seems that they are: because § 1. Laban exhibited an oath, and Jacob received him, although he knew that he would swear by his idols:[325] therefore it seems that others can similarly receive them.

§ 2. Moreover, Christians in the faith of truces receive the oaths of pagans, although they know that they swear by Muhammad, or by idols: therefore it seems not to be a sin.

BUT AGAINST THIS: Rom. 1:32: "Those who do such things are worthy of death: and not only they that do them, but they also that consent to them that do them."[326] But one exacting that something be done, consents to it: therefore one exacting an oath by an idol, consents that it be sworn by an idol: therefore he sins equally as the one swearing.

Solution: It must be said that in truth Augustine's rule is true: because by so much is perjury graver, by as much as that by which it is sworn is holier: and by so much is the oath more obligatory, unless some expression of an excelling holiness in the creature is made, as when it is said, "by God, and by the holy Gospels," or "by the relics of these Saints": so that there is a divine invocation with the invocation of the creature: because then God is contemned twice, in Himself namely, and in the creature in which He shines forth by grace and glory.

TO THE FIRST therefore it must be said that when God is invoked in a creature, the intention is not directed to God except habitually, but actually upon the creature: and therefore according to act He is not contemned except in the creature, unless one expresses the opposite

322. 2 Cor. 1:23.

in voice, saying thus: "I swear by God shining forth in this creature": because then God is actually contemned in the perjury.

TO THE OTHER it must be said that men more abhor it on account of the special grace which they express to have been done in us by those creatures: whence in such oaths God is always actually named, and contemned in word: for one does not swear by the eyes, but by the eyes of God: nor by the Gospels, unless of God. And if it is not said, nevertheless it is understood: because it is not the Gospel, unless of Christ. It must be said therefore that those oblige more, for this reason that God is not only contemned, but His grace which He conferred upon us by the fact that He was made man, and posited the law of living in the Gospel.

To the other it must be said that swearing by an idol is a greater sin, not on account of the oath, but on account of the idolatry and infidelity. Whence in the argument there is the sophistic fallacy of accident.

To the other it must be said that the First Truth is always equal to Itself, but nevertheless It is not equally adverted to in Itself, and in a creature: and therefore It is not equally contemned.

To that, however, which is further inquired concerning consenting oaths which are made through idols, it must be said that they do not consent except in the oath: but they allow the swearing by idols which indeed he would make: and therefore they endure for utility, just as one receiving a loan consents to the reception, but being coerced allows the reception beyond the principal: and therefore they are not worthy of punishment.

Articulus 7 — Whether Every Oath Is To Be Fulfilled, And Especially One That Does Not Tend Toward A Worse Outcome; And Whether It Is Unlawful

Whether every oath is to be fulfilled, and especially this which does not tend toward a worse outcome? And, whether it is illicit?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, H, Now it remains to see, Whether every oath is to be fulfilled, etc.

For it seems that every oath is to be fulfilled, which observed, does not tend toward a worse outcome.
Prosatio: Because the Lord says: You shall not swear falsely, but you shall render your oaths to the Lord. Therefore, they are to be rendered: therefore, they are to be fulfilled.

Likewise, the Master proves this in the Letter.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
1. Let us suppose that someone swears that he will not be a prelate: it is evident that this is licit, because it is good to despise honors: therefore, he is bound to observe and fulfill it. Let it be supposed, therefore, that it is commanded to him: either he will obey, or not. If so:

323. Exod. 20:7.

therefore, he sins mortally by not obeying, and he will sin mortally by not rendering the oaths: therefore, he is perplexed, as it seems.

If perhaps you say that he is absolved from the oath by obedience. On the contrary: He never had the power of exempting himself outside the ordination of the Church and the power of the superior: therefore, to the prejudice of the Church's ordination and power, he could never swear anything: therefore, he is bound to obey and to go against his oath.

1. Likewise, Deuteronomy 25:7 and following, it is said concerning him who does not wish to raise up seed for his deceased brother by taking the wife left by his brother, that the woman will remove his shoe, and his name will be called in Israel, the house of the unshod. And the Gloss says: He who refuses to undertake the care of those to be nourished, will bear the reproach of the unshod in the Church: he does not wish to take the wife of his brother, that is, of Christ. Therefore, he is bound to undertake it: but no one can swear anything against the precept of God: therefore, neither could this one swear that he would in no way be a prelate.
2. Likewise, someone sins by swearing that he will not enter religion: therefore, he is not bound to observe it: but prelacy is not of lesser perfection than religion: therefore, he cannot by his oath make it so that he is not bound to be a prelate if it is duly enjoined upon him.
3. Likewise, in such a case when the Church is in need, he is even bound to expend his own body for the Church: therefore, much more is he bound to expend the care of the pastoral office.

Further, it is asked, Whether any illicit oath obliges?

It seems that it does not: because observed, it tends toward a worse outcome: but in such a case, faith is to be rescinded: therefore, such an oath does not oblige.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
Augustine says that a prostitute who swears to keep faith with a sinner, is evil by adhering to him, but worse by not observing the oath: therefore, since greater evils are to be avoided, it seems that she is bound to adhere to him in fornication.

Solution: It must be said that every oath is to be observed, which observed does not tend toward a worse outcome, as it is said in the Letter, and as long as observed, it does not tend toward a worse outcome: because (as Bernard says) what is instituted for charity ought not to fight against charity. Hence, I say that one who swears that he will in no way be a prelate in whatever case may occur, swears foolishly and indiscreetly: because he cannot swear this, as the objections necessarily prove: for although he is conscious of his own fragility, and his heart dictates to him that it is not useful for him to be a prelate, nevertheless, the cause having been set forth why this seems to him, he ought humbly to acquiesce to the ordination of the Church and the superior: and if he indiscreetly swore the opposite, let him have penance for the

324. Matt. 5:34; Jas. 5:12.

indiscreet oath, because now by disobedience observed, it begins to tend toward a worse outcome.

To that which is objected against, that it is good to despise honors: it must be said that it is true: but the burden is not always to be despised, because even existing in prelacy, one can not desire honors.

To that which is objected lastly, it must be said that an illicit oath does not bind. And to the saying of Augustine, it must be said that he does not intend to say that the prostitute should not depart from the sinner: but since she sins with two sins, he intends that perjury is the greater sin. Others say otherwise, namely that the prostitute has faith in a certain respect with the sinner, namely inasmuch as she does not admit another: and when she violates this, she sins against the oath: and in this respect only they say the saying of Augustine is verified, and not with respect to adherence.

Articulus 8 — Whether Words Ought To Profit One Swearing Deceitfully

Whether words ought to benefit one swearing deceitfully?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, K, This also must be known, that by whatever art of words, etc.

For it seems that when someone deceitfully demands an oath through multiple words, then those words ought to be understood according to how the one to whom it is sworn receives them: however, he deceitfully receives them in a non-straightforward sense: therefore he is bound to fulfill the oath according to that sense, which is false.

Further, it is inquired, When someone without fraud by chance swears through multiple words, in what sense ought the words to be received?

Solution: It must be said that what is said here is understood concerning one swearing deceitfully: and this is noted by what he says, using whatever art of words: for art is the same as deceit: but when he demands deceitfully, deceit ought not to benefit the demander.

To the other, it must be said that in such a case occurring, the oath ought to be received in the sense in which the one swearing believes that the one to whom it is sworn understood: and if he cannot know, it ought to be left to the judgment of good men, who judge according to which sense those words are more frequently accustomed to be received: and in that he is bound.

Articulus 9 — Whether Perjury Under Compulsion Is A Sin

Whether coerced perjury is a sin?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, L, It is also asked, If he sins, etc.

And two things are asked. First, Whether coerced perjury is a sin?

Second, Whether an oath obliges?

320. Heb. 6:13.

To the First, it is proceeded thus:
1. Augustine says: In no way is the reproach of the will drawn to the coerced, which the condition of necessity has extorted: however, an oath is extorted by the condition of necessity: therefore, it is not drawn to the reproach of the will: therefore, it is not a sin.

1. Likewise, Matthew 12:1 and following, where the Lord excuses those plucking ears of grain, the Gloss says: Necessity has no law. Therefore, an oath coerced by necessity does not follow the law of any sin of perjury.
2. Likewise, Necessity simply makes illicit things licit: as is evident, Luke 6:3, and 1 Samuel 21:6, concerning David with his men, who are excused who ate the bread of the proposition in necessity, which it was not lawful to eat except for the priests alone: therefore, perjury is also excused by necessity, as it seems.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
1. Lying is always a sin, and it cannot be done without evil, as Augustine wills: however, perjury is a lie, confirmed by the invocation of divine truth: therefore, much more is perjury always evil, and it can never be done well or without evil.

1. Likewise, the canon says: If anyone perjures for the preservation of the life of the body, because he loved the body more than the soul, let him abstain for three forties.

Solution: It must be said that perjury is always a sin, as the ultimate reasons prove: nor is it excused by coercion from the whole, although it is excused from so much: and this is because the will cannot be coerced: and every perjury proceeds indeed from the will, but not coerced.

To the First objection, it must be said that Augustine speaks of those in which coercion is absolute, as in the members of the body: as if someone is violated entirely against the will.

To the other, it must be said that there is a necessity of nature, and such is to be relieved by an act granted to nature, as hunger by eating. And in necessity, all things become common. Another is the necessity of threat: and on account of this, illicit things ought not to be admitted. And from such proceeds the coerced oath.

Articulus 10 — Whether An Oath Taken Under Compulsion Obligates To Fulfillment

Whether a coerced oath obliges to fulfillment?

Secondly, it is asked, Whether a coerced oath obliges to fulfillment?

325. Gen. 31:53.

It seems that it does: because 1. Let us suppose that someone swears to do something licit, such as to give a hundred marks: but licit oaths are to be kept: therefore, that ought to be fulfilled.

1. Likewise, someone consulted Pope Alexander about a certain coerced oath, whether it ought to be fulfilled? And the Pope responded: You will not have me as an author of perjury: therefore, it seems that the oath obliged.
2. Likewise, someone coerced swore to a certain concubine of his that he would take her as a wife, and would not ask her parents: and he asked blessed Augustine whether he was bound to fulfill the oath? Blessed Augustine responded with the counsel of blessed Ambrose, that he should take her. Therefore, it seems that coerced oaths oblige.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Coerced vows do not oblige, because authority says that coerced sacrifices do not please God: since oaths are certain vows confirmed by the attestation of an oath, it seems that they do not oblige.

1. Likewise, the coerced is involuntary, as the Philosopher says: but the involuntary does not oblige: therefore, neither does a coerced oath.
2. Likewise, Tullius in the Rhetorics introduces a law saying: What is done by force or deceit, such is not ratified, says the Praetor: but an oath is done by force and deceit together: therefore, it ought not to be ratified: therefore, it does not oblige to fulfillment.
3. Likewise, the fear of death with signs of death falls upon a steadfast man: but fear which falls upon a steadfast man excuses entirely, as the Jurists say: therefore, he who swears under such fear is released from the oath.
4. Likewise, fraud ought not to support anyone: but he who coerces to swear does this by fraud, deceit, and violence: therefore, it ought not to support him: therefore, the one swearing ought not to be obliged to fulfillment.

If you say that one swearing to give a hundred is obliged, and in this nothing is lost to him, because he has an action against that one. On the contrary: Let us suppose that he swears not to act against him: therefore, he is also bound to fulfill this for the same reason he is bound to fulfill the first.

If perhaps you say that in such a case he ought to denounce to the Church: and it is bound to act against that one. I also suppose that he swears the Church will not denounce: therefore, for the same reason, he ought to fulfill that: and thus in all ways he is unjustly harmed: and that one gains profit from deceit and fraud.

1. Furthermore, someone swears another thing, namely to consent to the marriage of someone: if therefore he is obliged, he cannot be separated from her.

326. Rom. 1:32.

But on the contrary: Coercion excludes conjugal consent: therefore, it also excludes an oath of consent.

The opinions of the Masters are diverse. For there are those who distinguish between an assertory oath and a promissory oath: and they say that an assertory oath coerced, such that he asserts something he knows to be true, obliges to say that: because he can assert what he knows to be true without just harm to anyone. But a promissory oath is when he promises to pay a hundred to some tyrant, lest he be killed: and then it does not oblige, as they say. Others say that in truth before God and in the forum of penance he is obliged by both oaths, but not in the forum of judgment: because the tyrant does not dare to present himself to the judge, since he has injured justice: and they concede the first part of the objections: and this opinion is held by Theologians.

To what is objected against, they say that an oath is not a vow, but rather an external promise confirmed by the invocation of divine truth, and therefore obliges out of reverence for divine truth: but a vow consists principally in the interior freedom of the will.

To another it must be said that the oath is not entirely involuntary, but involuntary simply, voluntary however in a certain respect, namely lest he suffer worse: as the Philosopher also says there about the simply involuntary and the involuntary in a certain respect. But that which is involuntary in a certain respect does not excuse entirely, but that which is simply involuntary, like being dragged by the hand, because he who drags by the hand dominates the hand, that involuntary is, whose effective cause and principle is in another, contributing nothing, that is, cooperating with the one suffering force, that is, he who suffers force.

To another it must be said that the Praetor speaks of his judgment regarding the civil forum: because the tyrant cannot act on what is promised to him, indeed he would be punished by the Praetor.

To another it must be said that no cause bearing fear of sin falls upon a steadfast man: because otherwise it would be false what is said: Do not be afraid of those who kill the body, and after this have nothing more they can do.

To another it must be said that he has an action after the promise: and if he abjures this, he has the right to denounce to the prince or the Church: and he sins mortally if he does not compel him to restitution: nor can he abjure, because this tends to a worse outcome, that is, the corruption of the state and law: and therefore it stands there.

To another it must be said that a coerced oath obliges: but not marriage, because marriage not only seeks consent, but also free will. This is evident from this, because if he goes against the oath by contracting with another, the subsequent marriage stands, and penance is enjoined for perjury.

DISTINCTIO XL

Divisio Textus

The sixth commandment is, Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife, etc. Here it begins to treat finally of the two commandments pertaining to the heart.

And this distinction has two parts: in the first of which it briefly determines concerning the two aforementioned commandments. In the second, it touches upon the difference between the old law and the new with respect to the decalogue which is in both, there, B, If indeed it is asked, what the Apostle says, etc.

In the first part, it does three things. First, it explains the two commandments. Second, it objects to the contrary of the commandments and resolves, there, A, § 2: But it seems the commandment concerning not coveting, etc. In the third, it raises the question, how it is said that the old law does not restrain the mind, when these two commandments restrain the mind? and resolves, there, A, § 3: But since here concupiscence is prohibited, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether These Two Commandments Are Separate, Namely, 'You Shall Not Covet The Wife,' Etc., Or Not

Whether these two commandments are separate,
namely, Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife, etc.,
or not?

Whether these two commandments are separate,
namely, Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife, etc.,
or not?

A doubt arises here before
the Letter, Whether these two commandments are separate
from the others, or not?

Secondly, Whether they differ among themselves, and
what difference they have?

To the first, it is objected thus:
1. Thought is ordered to work, or
word: therefore, by itself, it does not have
order: therefore, the prohibition of thoughts by
itself should not fall under a precept.

1. Likewise, in the second book of
the Sentences it was held, that will and Work
are one sin, because otherwise anyone
sinning in work would sin with two
sins: however, of one sin there is one

prohibition: therefore, will and act pertain
to one sin: therefore, divided
commandments should not be about will.

2. Likewise, nothing is blameworthy unless in
so far as it proceeds from deliberative will,
nor even praiseworthy: however, it is evident
that work is not prohibited in the decalogue,
unless because it is blameworthy in morals:
therefore, it is prohibited in so far as it proceeds from
deliberative will: therefore, in work
the will is understood to be prohibited: therefore,
it is superfluous to add afterward a new
prohibition.

Solution: It must be said that it is one thing in
the concupiscence of the flesh, and another in
the concupiscence of things, and another in other
sins, as was said above in the question about
the number of precepts: because these two
concupiscences have their delights
even before the work not joined to the work, as
Augustine says. And therefore, because in work
they have harm to the neighbor, on account of
that baseness in which thought rests,
the work is prohibited by a special precept:
and on account of the baseness of concupiscence
before the work, there is another commandment which
prohibits the thought of the heart. But it is not
so in others: and the cause of this is said above.

To the other, it must be said that there is a double
will, namely, of work, and of delight
before work, or without work. And the first
is prohibited in the precept in which the
work is prohibited. But the second cause needs
its own precept, in which it is prohibited.

To the other, it must be said that although work
has the principal cause of blame or praise
from the will, it does not, however, receive from
the will the whole cause of harm: and
as to harm, there can be one
precept, and as to the baseness
of rest in the affection of lust, there can be another.

Articulus 2 — Whether These Two Foregoing Commandments Are Distinct From Each Other

Are these aforementioned two commandments distinct from each other?

Are these aforementioned two commandments distinct from each other?

Secondly, it is asked whether these commandments are distinct.

However, it seems that they are not: because, 1, whether it is a wife or a concubine, when it is said: "Thou shalt not commit adultery," illicit intercourse with any woman is prohibited. Similarly, when it is said: "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife," the concupiscence of a maidservant, which is desired for the same, is also understood to be prohibited. Therefore, when in the second it is said: "Thou shalt not covet the maidservant," the second does not seem to differ from the first.

1. Likewise, those things which are desired beyond the baseness of intercourse are manifold, and they are reduced to three, namely, the concupiscence of the flesh, the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life: therefore, it seems that according to these three there should be three commandments here about not coveting.
2. Likewise, since there are certain knowable things illicit just as desirable things, such as the knowable things of incantations and certain divinations, it seems that there should be a commandment about not coveting certain knowable things, just as there are commandments about not coveting certain things.

Solution: It must be said to the first, that a maidservant is said to be coveted in two ways, namely, for intercourse, and thus it is prohibited in the commandment about not coveting a wife: and as a possession, and thus it is contained in the commandment about not coveting a thing which is a possession, like a servant, an ox, and an ass, etc.

To the other, it must be said that desirable things are desired because of need. However, need is only twofold, namely, for the conservation and sufficiency of the individual, and for the conservation and sufficiency of the species. And the first causes avarice in a broad sense, namely, in things and honors: but the second causes luxury: and therefore avarice of the eyes and pride of life are reduced to possessions, and thus they are prohibited in one commandment: but not the concupiscence of the flesh, because it does not arise from the same need.

Moreover, it must be said that no knowable thing, insofar as it is knowable, is evil: and this is evident from the fact that God has all knowledge, and the holy angels have knowledge of many evils: and therefore there should be no moral commandment about this, because moral commandments prohibiting are only about things that are evil in themselves. However, laws prohibit certain sciences because of the work joined and the proneness of affection.

Articulus 3 — Whether The Law Of The Decalogue Justified, Inasmuch As It Prohibited Hand And Mind

Whether the law of the Decalogue justified, since it prohibited the hand and the mind?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, A, § 3: But since here the concupiscence of another's wife is prohibited, etc.

For the sake of this it is asked, Whether the law of the Decalogue justified, since it prohibited the hand and the mind?

It seems, however, that it did:

1. For justice is the abstinence from evil in heart, mouth, and hand: but all these touch upon and order the precepts: therefore it seems that it justified.
2. Likewise, Matthew 19:17: If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments. And he specifies them, namely, You shall not kill, you shall not commit adultery, etc.: since therefore no one enters into eternal life except through justice, it seems that the commandments justified.

1. Likewise, Bede: Justice of the law was not conferred unless kept in time, it conferred not only temporal goods, but also eternal life: therefore the law of the Decalogue justified.
2. Likewise, to the Romans 3:20: From the works of the law no flesh shall be justified before him. Augustine's Gloss says there: He speaks of the law according to ceremonies, not according to morals which justified.
3. If it be said that they did not justify unless done from charity: and therefore the work performed did not justify, but the work performing: then it seems there was no difference between morals and ceremonies, because in ceremonies also the work performing from charity availed for salvation, and not the work performed.

But on the contrary:

1. To the Romans 3:20: From the works of the law no flesh shall be justified before him. And he speaks of the work of the Decalogue: therefore it did not justify.
2. Likewise, to the Romans 8:15: You have not received the spirit of bondage again in fear, etc., the Gloss says: The precepts in the old law were kept with servile fear: but servile fear is with mortal sin, and one cannot be just and in mortal sin at the same time: therefore servile fear does not justify: therefore neither does the commandment fulfilled by servile fear.
3. Likewise, Exodus 20:17, on that: You shall not covet your neighbor's house, the Gloss says: The law prohibits the hand, not the mind: since therefore justice is principally in the heart, not in the hand, the law of the Decalogue did not justify, as it seems.
4. Likewise, on that of Psalm 19:8: The law of the Lord is immaculate, etc., the Gloss says: The old law did not make souls immaculate: but the Decalogue was in the old law: therefore it did not make souls immaculate: therefore neither just.

5. Likewise, 2 Corinthians 3:6: The letter kills, but the spirit gives life. The Master says in the letter, that the killing letter is the Decalogue: but it is evident that what gives life does not kill: therefore the Decalogue does not justify.

Solution: It must be said that justifying is said in four ways, namely effectively, and thus only God justifies. Formally, and this in two ways, namely as a proper form making an act just, like whiteness makes white, and thus only justice justifies - and as removing a contrary disposition, and thus sacramental grace justifies, which is principally ordered against sin, as is proven in the beginning of the fourth Sentences. In the third way it is said to justify, making worthy of eternal life and by the merit of the work, and thus only charity justifies. In the fourth way it is said to justify, inducing the habit of justice, and thus the work justifies, and consequently the precept which binds to the observance of the work: and in this way the Decalogue always justifies: but yet in two ways, namely by withdrawing from evil, and thus it justified in prohibitions: or in order to good, and thus it justified in affirmatives.

But yet it must be noted that when it is asked whether the Decalogue justified, it is asked concerning justification in the third way: because the habit of political justice, and even the work, can be with mortal sin: and therefore it is not asked concerning justification in the second way, but in the third way.

Therefore it must be said that according to that understanding of the question it did not justify: because from the legislation of the Old Testament it did not confer grace, since those sacraments were figures of grace, and not the truth: but in the New inasmuch as it justifies, that is, that fulfilling the Decalogue, one has the habit of the new sacraments: because from the legislation of the New Testament grace is conferred, by which the work of the Decalogue is fulfilled and informed: and therefore it justifies.

Yet it must be noted the word of Augustine, namely that the just in the Old Testament belonged to the New: because they received justice in the faith of the New: and the wicked in the New, serving with servile fear, belong to the Old as to not having grace.

Therefore it must be said to the first, that the work of the heart, mouth, and hand does not justify except by inducing servile customary justice: and God does not reward this, but that which proceeds from charity.

To the other it must be said that the Lord says to remove the obstacles to life, not that this alone suffices. Or it may be better said: because there the Lord understands the precept of charity to be included, to which all the commandments are referred, as was evident from what was held above.

To the other it must be said that that justice kept did not confer life except in those pertaining to the New Testament, and from the grace of the New Testament: and thus Bede understands.

To the other it must be said that Augustine understands the Decalogue to pertain to the state of perfect justice, because it is moral: but not the ceremonial which pertained to figurative justice: and therefore the Decalogue was in every law, both natural, and of Moses,

and of grace: because its material work is always in merit, which is not the work of ceremonies.

To the last it must be said that although in this there is no difference between ceremonies and morals, because neither availed for merit without charity, yet there is a difference, because the Decalogue is of per se goods always moving in merit, but not ceremonies: just as also other virtues besides charity do not avail for merit, and yet they are per se good, and remain in merit, and specify it in this act and in that which each virtue elicits.

Articulus 4 — Whether The Letter Which The Apostle Says Kills Is The Decalogue

Whether the letter which the Apostle says kills, is the Decalogue?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, B, If indeed it is asked, Which letter does the Apostle say kills? etc.

For it seems that the spirit does not give life: because
1. The spirit is spiritual understanding: and many have this, who are not given life: therefore the spirit does not give life.

1. Likewise, Morals do not have another understanding than that which the letter sounds: therefore it is nothing to say, The letter kills, but the spirit gives life: because there is no other spirit there than the letter.
2. Likewise, Nothing removing dispositions and causes of death kills: but the Decalogue removes dispositions and causes of death: therefore it does not kill. The first is evident by itself. The second is proved from this, that the Decalogue removes sins, which are the cause of death.

Solution: It must be said that the killing letter is the Decalogue, the letter of the law heard without the grace of fulfillment: and it is a killing letter, not by itself, but by occasion: just as when water is shown to one feverish, thirst is more excited in him than before: and so also to a man burning in concupiscence, the Decalogue by the very fact that it prohibits, shows sin: and since it does not give grace, it is an occasion of provoking concupiscence: and this is one mode of killing.

However, another mode is: because every appetite by its nature is so much more fervent in that which it desires, as that is believed higher: but the precept by this that it prohibits a thing desirable by concupiscence, exalts it, and thus concupiscence is more provoked in that. Whence,

We strive for the forbidden always, and we desire the denied.

The third mode is touched upon by the Apostle in the Letter, namely because that which without the precept is only evil against the law of nature, the precept applied makes it also against the written law, and thus adds a certain deformity, which is the transgression of the written law, and thus again aggravates sin, and increases death.

Therefore, in these three ways the Decalogue is a killing letter.

Therefore, it must be said to the first, that the spirit is the grace of the spirit, in which the Holy Spirit is given: and this is given in the new legislation, not the old.

To the other it must be said, that morals do not have the spirit of another understanding, but the very one moving to fulfillment, which is love, not fear, as has been said.

To the other it must be said, that the Decalogue by itself orders to life: and this the Apostle intends, to the Romans vii, 12, when he says: Therefore indeed the law is holy, and the commandment holy, and just, and good, but by occasion in three ways it orders to evil. And this the Apostle notes when he subjoins, there, v.8: Taking occasion, sin through the commandment, namely good, worked in me all concupiscence, and therefore death. However, it is less than the cause by itself, and the cause by accident: because it has no influence over that of which it is the occasion, but is induced from its comparison to another prohibiting it from causality: just as from the comparison of the sun to an opaque body a shadow is caused, which by no means...

in the way the sun causes [it]. In this way, when the Decalogue is compared to a mind depraved by concupiscence, the appetite for the illicit is caused: and the aggravation of sin is not caused by the Decalogue in any way, but is occasioned by it.

§ 2. Here, however, whoever wishes can introduce a long question concerning laws and natural right, which we have disputed in the tract On Justice.

§ 3. Also, note that you will find that part of the reading which begins there, at B, around the middle: But the letter of the Gospel differs, etc., treated in the beginning of the fourth book of the Sentences, in this same work.

§ 4. And therefore I do not see that many things are to be inquired into here. But for what has been found, let thanks be offered not to us, but to God, to whom is honor and power and wisdom forever and ever. Amen.

LIBER IV

PROLOGUS

COMMENTARIES OF LORD ALBERT THE GREAT, OF THE ORDER OF PREACHERS, ON THE FOURTH BOOK OF THE SENTENCES. PROLOGUE.

Wisdom has built herself a house, she has hewn out seven pillars. In this word, in inverted order, are narrated the subject matter of this book, and its division. For we are the house of wisdom, whom she builds for perpetual indwelling through the resurrection of bodies, of which house the Psalmist says, Ps 25:8: Lord, I have loved the beauty of your house, and the place where your glory dwells . For the beauty of your house are the endowments of the body, which we shall have in the resurrection.

And therefore wisdom is also said to build these things wisely, and exemplarily, and effectively. Wisely, so that from the very conjunction of the clay of immortality with the spiritual part which is according to the image, the admirable beauty of wisdom may result. Exemplarily, because he himself will reform the body of our lowliness, configured to the body of his glory . Effectively, indeed: because, as the Gloss on 1 Cor 15:45 says, the resurrection of Christ is the efficient cause of our resurrection. And the Master treats of this part from distinction XLIII up to the end.

But then it is asked: Why are these parts taken up in an inverted order in this word? And to this it must be said that the reality [res] of this sacrament is twofold, namely the contained reality both signified and caused, which is the grace of the sacrament: and it is determined with each sacrament in the same part. And there is a certain reality not caused by any one sacrament, but rather in all of them according to some things which are figured and signified in it: and this is the glory of the rising: and this is intended through every sacrament. And because the intention is prior in the physician before the work, therefore Solomon in the aforesaid word placed first that which is intended. In the order of execution, however, that which is intended is acquired last: and therefore it is placed after all things by the Master.

In the second part of that statement, the first part of the book is taken up through what he says: She has hewn out seven pillars. For a pillar is that upon which the house rests, just as the Church uses the sacrament: and also restoring the ruin of the house, just as the Church is supported by sacramental grace. The seven pillars, therefore, are the seven sacramental graces, which are determined along with the sacraments themselves. They are hewn out, however, because they were diligently prepared in Christ himself. The Master treats of these in the first part of this book.

And that part is divided into two, in the first of which the Master treats of the sacrament of the New and Old Law. And this whole part is contained in the first distinction.

In the second, however, he treats of the sacrament of the New Law: and this begins in the second distinction, there, A, "Now let us approach the sacraments of the New Law, etc."

Now, the Master divides this first distinction into four, as is clear to anyone in the text, namely: What is a sacrament? Why was it instituted? In what does it consist and how is it effected? And what is the difference between a sacrament of the Old and New Law?

And it is also clear where these begin in the text.

A BRIEF EPILOGUE OF THE THINGS SAID ABOVE.

Having treated those things which pertain to the doctrine of things, which are to be enjoyed, and which are to be used, and those which enjoy and use, let us approach the doctrine of signs.

OF THE FOURTH BOOK OF THE SENTENCES OF PETER LOMBARD. ON SACRAMENTS AND SACRAMENTAL SIGNS.

DISTINCTIO I

Articulus 1 — Whether The Sacrament Is Necessary

Whether a sacrament is necessary?

Whether a sacrament is necessary?

Now, four questions arise before the text, namely: Whether there is a sacrament? And, concerning the difference of sacramental grace from the grace which is in the virtues and gifts. Thirdly, How many sacraments are there in number? Fourthly, concerning the order of them to one another.

To the first of these, one proceeds thus:

§ 1. Nothing is superfluous in nature: therefore much less in grace: but through the virtues and gifts a human being is sufficiently healed from sin, and helped toward the good: therefore sacraments are superfluous: therefore they do not exist, because the superfluous is not in grace. The first premise is established. The middle is proved from the fact that any sin whatsoever is expelled by the virtue opposed to it, and any virtue is ordered to the good of its own act.

§ 2. Also, it is not of the order of wisdom that the stronger should be helped by the weaker: but bodily elements in which every sacrament consists, are weaker and lower than the soul of man: therefore it seems that a sacrament ought not to exist.

§ 3. Also, either the artisan or his instrument is shown to be weaker, if he sometimes cured a certain disease with one instrument, and afterward needs two: but sometimes God cured a

disease by faith alone, as we shall hold in the following distinction, but now he cures by faith and sacraments: therefore either he or faith is weaker, which, since it is false, it seems that a sacrament is not necessary.

§ 4. Also, the Philosopher says in book XVI of On Animals: If it does not touch, it does not act, and an alteration does not follow: but the corporeal [element] in which every sacrament is conferred, as we shall have in the text, does not touch the soul: therefore it does not act upon it, and an alteration of health does not follow in the soul: therefore a sacrament is useless.

But if perhaps you say, that this reasoning is valid only of those which are a cause of salvation, and not of those which are signs: because the spiritual is well signified by corporeal things: although that reasoning proves that he could not be cured in it. Against this: Master Hugh says in the eighth part of his book On the Sacraments, that those sacraments which are signs only, are not sacraments except insofar as they signify those which are the cause of grace: if therefore causing is not necessary, signifying will not be necessary: but causing is not necessary, as was proved: therefore signifying will not be necessary: and so a sacrament will be entirely unnecessary, as it seems.

§ 5. Also, a sacrament seems to be a rite of idolatry, and we as it were imitate the athletes of the Gentiles in them: because the Apostle says, Gal 4:9: How turn you again to the weak and needy elements, which you desire to serve again?

ON THE CONTRARY: In the medicine of bodies, the mode of governing the healthy and of curing the sick is not the same: therefore neither will the mode be the same in spiritual medicine. Now, it is established that the healthy is governed by the virtues and gifts: because if man had not sinned, he would have had the virtues and gifts: therefore he ought not to be cured by them, but by other things: and these are the sacraments: therefore the sacraments are necessary.

Solutio. It must be said that there are sacraments, and they are necessary for salvation, without which from the time of the disease there has been no salvation.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that through the virtues and gifts, in themselves, the disease is not substantially cured. For there are two things which are required in a medicine curing a disease: that it should expel the disease by contrariety, and this alone the virtues and gifts have; and that by soothing the pain, as it were by anointing and cherishing the nature of the soul, it should heal, and this the sacraments have essentially, in which the blood of Christ anoints and operates. And this solution is true.

Some say otherwise, that many medicines for the same thing are not superfluous: because health is acquired more quickly by many than by few. But although this is true, nevertheless the virtues and gifts are not substantially ordered against the disease of sin: because they would also be had if there were no sin: and therefore the fact that they sometimes heal it, this is per accidens, namely because they find it in the subject.

Or it may be said to these things more truly: and then the whole is solved, that there is a release from the disease on our part: and this takes place through the grace which is in the virtues and gifts, through which we merit the health of the mind, lost through sin.

And the other release is through the power of the Passion of Christ, without which no merit of ours avails anything, as was held in the third book of the Sentences: and this release from the disease takes place in the sacraments, in which Christ's Passion operates.

To the next doubt it must be said that it is of the order of wisdom that the proud should rise again through humility. And unless the higher nature had unjustly opposed itself to the one higher than it, it would not be relieved by the lower: but because it opposed itself and subjected itself, it was therefore most ordered that it should rise again through that which is lower than it.

To the next it must be said that faith never worked salvation without a sacrament of the New Law: but it only differed in that in ancient times the sacrament healed in the faith of those expecting, and now in the work of those exercising.

Others say otherwise, namely that if faith alone was sometimes efficacious for justification, this was in itself: but that it now does not do it alone, this is per accidens, namely by the grace of the state: and it is not weaker because of this: just as a precept is sufficient for someone for salvation without a vow of the counsels: but if a vow should supervene, it is not sufficient: and yet because of this, obedience in the precepts is not weaker than it was at first: but this is because of another state of the believer.

To the next it must be said that the sacrament touches: and therefore an alteration in the soul follows: for it touches insofar as it is a sign and a cause. For in a sacrament there is not only the visible element: but a conjoined sanctification, the power of which through faith reaches into the soul: and therefore alters and heals it. And this will be more clear below in the text, when it is asked: What is a sacrament?

To the next it must be said that in the sacraments there is no rite of the athletes of idolatry: because they turned themselves to the elements, believing a divine power to be in them from their own nature. And this in diverse ways: for some thought there were natural powers in the elements, and thought the elements were gods: and they established a proper god for each act of nature, as Varro said: and they called the stars gods. Others said the soul of the world was diffused in the whole orb, and especially the soul which is the power of intelligence which they posited in the tenth order, which is under the sphere of the moon. And therefore the Apostle says: How turn you again to the weak [elements], as regards the first, and needy elements, as regards the second: because they neither have power of themselves, so as to be called rich: nor are there souls in them, so as to be thus called needy. But our elements are powerful and rich: powerful, because the Passion of Christ operates in them; rich indeed, because they contain the grace which they figure: and therefore it is salutary to be converted to them.

Articulus 2 — Whether There Are Seven Sacraments, Or More; And, Whether The Sacraments Have A Substantial Order To Pardon

Whether there are seven sacraments, or more? and, Whether the sacraments have a substantial order to venial [sin]?

Whether there are seven sacraments, or more? and, Whether the sacraments have a substantial order to venial [sin]?

Secondly it is asked concerning the number of the sacraments.

For it seems that only one is necessary: because

§ 1. Baptism deletes the whole disease, for it deletes whatever it finds: but this is the whole disease: therefore a fuller medicine is not necessary, as it seems.

§ 2. Also, in the Eucharist the whole fullness of grace is contained, and the very author of grace: therefore it seems that the Eucharist alone should suffice.

§ 3. Also, it seems that there ought to be only two: because there are only two species of disease, namely natural sin, concerning which the Psalmist says, Ps 50:7: For behold I was conceived in iniquities, etc. [327] And personal sin concerning which the same says: To you alone have I sinned, and done evil before you [328]. Therefore it seems that there ought not to be except two species of medicine: therefore there ought not to be sacraments, except baptism, and penance.

§ 4. Also, Jerome says that the second plank after shipwreck is penance: but that shipwreck is the danger of the broken ship of baptismal grace: therefore before this there was no saving ship except baptism from the danger of the first innocence lost in Adam: therefore only two sacraments are necessary.

§ 5. It seems, moreover, that there are three. For a sacrament is instituted on account of the disease: but the disease has no remedy except in two ways, namely because a foulness which cannot be cured, is taken up by some honesty and excused: and because a healing medicine is posited against the disease. Now the first is sufficiently done through matrimony: the second through baptism and penance. Therefore only three sacraments seem to be necessary.

§ 6. Also, there are three powers in wounded man, namely the rational, concupiscible, and irascible: therefore a threefold medicine only is to be applied to the three: therefore there will not be except three sacraments, as it seems.

§ 7. It seems again, that there ought to be four: because every sacrament ought to be a sacrament of the Church: therefore it ought to be in the hand of the ministers: therefore for this a sacrament is necessary which constitutes a minister: and this is order. And moreover the disease is threefold, namely of a twofold fault, natural and personal, and of the penalty which is left from both.

§ 8. Also, there are three states under the ministers of the Church, namely entering, living, and exiting: but to consummate a minister order is required: but those entering receive

baptism: those living, because this life is polluted, need penance: but those exiting extreme unction: therefore these four sacraments alone are necessary, as it seems.

§ 9. Further, it seems that there ought to be five: for the cure of the soul is according to the likeness of a bodily cure: but in the body the cure is multiplied according to the species of the disease, and according to the harms which the disease inflicted: as a wise physician cures a loss through restoratives of humidity, but weakness through comforting things, and the disease through expellers of the disease. Since therefore there are in the soul three species of disease, namely natural, actual mortal, and actual venial: and two damages inflicted, namely the loss and consumption of the natural good in the simplicity of the soul or its spirituality , and the weakness of standing or rising again: it seems that against these five only, five sacraments ought to be ordered.

§ 10. Further, it seems there ought to be six: for any genus of disease has its own penalty, and damage adjoined: since therefore the fault is threefold (as was said), there will be a threefold penalty conjoined to it. Since therefore a sacrament was invented so that the whole disease in fault and penalty might be excluded: it seems that there ought to be three against the fault, and three against the penalty.

Also, re-creation ought to correspond to creation according to number: but creation was in six days: therefore the whole salvation of re-creation ought to consist in six sacraments.

§ 11. But that there ought to be more sacraments than seven, seems from the fact that a sacrament is a cause and sign of grace: but holy water causes and signs grace: therefore it is a sacrament.

The same objection is concerning a pontifical blessing, in which venial sins are remitted: therefore it is a sacrament.

§ 12. Also, it is objected more strongly. In the old sacraments water in aspersion was the matter. Also, oil in many sacrifices. Also, flesh and blood were there in the sacrifices. Since therefore those sacraments are signs of our sacraments, it seems that we ought to have others, in which the material element is flesh and blood: and these we do not have: therefore we are diminished in sacraments.

Further for the understanding of the question it is asked, Whether any sacrament has a substantial order against venial [sin]?

It seems that it does: because § 1. It is a disease: therefore it receives a medicine: therefore the supremely wise physician prepared it: therefore some sacrament is substantially ordered against venial [sin].

§ 2. Also, James says: The prayer of faith shall save the sick man: and the Lord shall raise him up: and if he be in sins, they shall be forgiven him but these are none other than venial sins which have adhered to him, as it seems: therefore it is to be ordered against venial sins. And this some concede.

327. Ps 50:7.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. Venial sins are in the whole of life: therefore in the whole of life it ought to have a remedy, and not in death only: or the physician is insufficient.

§ 2. Also, by the same reasoning the Eucharist is said to avail against venial sins, just as extreme unction.

§ 3. Also, what cures the greater, cures also the lesser: therefore penance avails against venial and mortal [sin].

§ 4. Also, below, in the treatise on Penance, the Master makes a special treatise concerning the confession and satisfaction of venial sins: therefore it seems that this is ordered against venial [sin], just as extreme unction.

§ 5. Also, if any thing is cured equally by multiple divided causes, none of those will be substantially ordered against it: but a venial sin is cured dividedly by multiple sacraments: therefore by none as a substantial medicine ordered against itself.

Solutio. Without prejudice, this last seems to me to be conceded, that no sacrament is in itself ordered against venial [sin].

Now, the division of a sacrament is taken in multiple ways by the Masters, as will be clear below in the beginning of the second distinction. But it seems to me here, that if a true division ought to be handed down, it would be necessary for it to be taken according to the multiplication of those things which are substantial to a sacrament: but these are cause, and sign. Hence according to the division of the cause we will give one, and according to the division of the sign we will give the other.

Therefore that is supposed which will be treated below...

§ 1. [It must be] proved in the fourth article of the question, that every sacramental grace is ordered against the disease of sin. Also it is supposed, that every sacrament of the Church confers some grace against a disease, as is marriage. Then I say, that a disease is either according to fault, or according to penalty left indeed from fault, although also ordering toward fault, as is the proneness of concupiscence. But fault is twofold, namely original, and personal mortal. But the proneness to sin is twofold, namely according as it is proneness, because thus it induces a fight: or according to the effect which it induces from the frequency of inclination into evil: and this is only twofold, namely the loss of spiritual good in the soul, so that it needs restoration, and the inability of organic members, to the end that they be moved by the soul into good, and the inability of the soul to move: and this is a certain remainder of sin inducing languor in the moving soul, and in the body moved toward good through every same mode, as we see a burning of unnatural heat do in the body: for this consumes the moisture which is the root of life, and makes the members dull, and weakens the powers affixed to the members, and takes away flexibility from the members, and facility of moving from the powers. But the proneness which makes the fight, again has two considerations: according to that which is corrupted only: or according to that which is corrupted and infected in delights, according to concupiscence which is in the generative [power].

328. Ps 50:6.

§ 2. We say therefore, that remedies are multiplied according to these wounds. For the disease of sin is either natural: and thus against it substantially is Baptism through grace contained and caused. Or it is personal mortal, and then it has a twofold remedy, namely on the part of the keys of the Church, making through the merit of Christ a taxable and proportioned penalty, and therefore it is Order which is given to this, that there be the power of binding and loosing in the Church: or of commuting eternal penalty into temporal through the remission of the whole fault, and to this is Penance. But the disease of concupiscence according as it induces a fight from common corruption, against itself has as a remedy Confirmation: but according as it suffocates from corruption simultaneously and infection, against itself it has as an opposite remedy Marriage. But the effect or rather defect left from the continuity of fighting, that indeed which is the loss of spiritual good in the soul which was as it were the moisture and fomentation or root of life, against itself has as a remedy the Eucharist, which restores the lost through spiritual fattening food. But the remainders as it were immobilizing, the members, and the powers of the soul moving, against themselves have Extreme Unction: and therefore also that is given to the departing in remedy of soul and body: and if it does not take away the fever from the body, nevertheless it alleviates the members from that evil habit and disposition of contrariety, according as it is an impediment to the overclothing of glory in the resurrection: and similarly it does in the soul, because each is weakened by the other. This I think to be the proper division of the sacrament.

§ 3. Or thus: The moving evil is either in itself, or in another. If in another, then it does not have a remedy unless a repressive one: and to this is given Order: because it is the power to the vengeance of evildoers, but the praise of the good[329], that we may lead a quiet and tranquil life[330]. If in itself then as before, either according to fault, or according to penalty which orders into fault: and there will be had six others.

§ 4. Or thus: A sacrament is against a defect which is from sin: therefore either against a common defect of the Church, or against a defect of the person. If in the first mode this defect is from mortality which diminishes the members of the Church, and destroys: therefore either it will be bodily mortality, and against this is given Marriage as to its principal good of offspring: or spiritual death, and against this is given Order in the spiritual generation of the word, and through the exhibition and dispensation of the sacrament. But if it is against a defect of the person: either it is from an evil, or against a difficulty which is toward good. If in the first mode: either from a natural evil, and then it is Baptism: or from a personal evil, and then it is Penance. But if it is against a difficulty which is into good: either through the mode of one comforting in the fight, and thus it is Confirmation: or through the mode of one restoring the lost, and thus it is the Eucharist: or through the mode of one healing hidden inflicted things, and thus it is Extreme Unction.

§ 5. And in other modes it can be divided according to the sign: but now we will give the division according as the sacrament configures us to the head Christ. But all things are in Christ suffering and rising: because His passion operates in all the sacraments. Let us say therefore, that Christ by suffering for us fought bravely, He Himself priest and victim offered

Himself, the spouse of the Church through death and blood, and rose anointed with the oil of grace. Penance therefore draws power from Christ suffering and configures us to Him, Order from Christ offering, and the Eucharist from Christ the victim, Marriage from Christ espousing the Church to Himself in the earnest of blood, as it is said, Exod. iv, 25: A spouse of blood you are to me: and therefore also because there having extended His arms into the embraces of highest love, when He laid down His soul for her: and thirdly, because just as from the side of the first sleeping Adam Eve was fabricated, so from the side of the dying and dead Christ the Church was fabricated, when the two principal sacraments flowed forth from His side, namely the blood of redemption, and the water of expiation. But through Unction we are configured to Christ rising: because it is given to the departing in the figure of the foretaste of future glory, when all mortality will be cut off from the elect. But below in the beginning of the second distinction we will return to these, and we will object to the opinions of the Masters concerning the number of the sacraments.

§ 6. To the first therefore it must be said, that although baptism deletes whatever it finds, nevertheless it is not ordered substantially against every genus of disease: and therefore by its virtue it deletes only original fault, and the guilt annexed to it. But because God does not cure in part, but in whole, therefore God curing in baptism, cures the whole that He finds. But the sacraments are invented for this that from a substantial order against sin they delete it, and the defects which are from Christ [i.e., healed by Christ].

§ 7. To another it must be said, that although in the Eucharist is contained the Author of all grace, nevertheless He is not contained there as causing all graces, but only as a spiritual food causing one: and therefore the others are necessary.

§ 8. To another it must be said, that the wound of sin is other than the sin itself: and the sacraments are not only against sins, but also against the wound, as is clear in the division posited above.

§ 9. To another it must be said, that Jerome is not speaking of planks of evading the danger of penalty or of wounds, but only of these which evade fault.

§ 10. To another it must be said, that that reason would proceed well if medicine were not posited unless against fault: but this is not true, as has already appeared.

§ 11. To another it must be said, that although there are only three powers ordered to operation, nevertheless more are corrupted than three: and granted that there were only three corrupted, it would not be left, that there ought to be only three sacraments, because although three are corrupted, nevertheless there are more modes of their corruption than three.

§ 12. To another it must be said, that penalty which is the third disease, demands more medicines, because it is varied in more modes.

§ 13. To another it must be said, that the sacraments are not taken according to the number of the states of the Church: because the middle state which is of the living remaining in this life, needs more remedies on account of the many modes of corruption.

329. 1 Pet. 2:14.

§ 14. To another it must be said, that no sacrament is ordered against venial [sin] substantially: but prayer, and many other things, as holy water, beating of the breast on account of the multiplicity of that sin: but there are more defects than those which are enumerated: and it is not altogether similar concerning the cure of the body: because the soul in a certain part is corrupted and infected, and in a certain part there is a burning fighting against the good of nature: and according to such is taken confirmation, and marriage, which are necessary besides the five enumerated.

§ 15. To another which seems to prove, that there are six, it must be said that according to that division the number of sacraments is not taken; because we concede this, that according to venial [sin] no sacrament is taken, nor according to its penalty: and therefore that reason does not proceed.

§ 16. To another which is objected, that there ought to be more than seven, it must be said that there ought not to be more: because holy water and blessing and such things do not justify ex opere operato, but rather ex opere operante. Also, they do not have a special form of words in which they are done. Also, they are not instituted for this. And these three are required in every sacrament, namely that it justify ex opere operato, and signify from institution, and confer invisible grace from the sanctification of the word, as Master Hugh says.

§ 17. To another it must be said, that flesh and blood cannot be matter in our sacraments: because neither in the sacraments of the old law did they signify a sacrament according to the reality of our sacrament, as we now have them in reality, namely in the Eucharist.

§ 18. And through this the solution to the following is almost clear: because we concede, that venial [sin] does not have one sacrament substantially ordered against itself.

§ 19. But to the first it must be said, that it has a medicine, but not per se, not on account of its multiplicity and because it is not a disease per se: but insofar as it is a disposition to mortal sin.

§ 20. To another it must be said, that this is of well-being [de bene esse] which falls under penance, and not of being [de esse], as will appear below.

Articulus 3 — It Is Asked Concerning The Order Of The Sacraments

The question is about the order of the sacraments.

Thirdly, it is questioned about the order of the sacraments. However, it seems that Order ought to be first: because in it is imprinted the character of excellence: therefore it is instituted in a higher degree than others: therefore it is more worthy and prior.

Likewise, Order has all things in dispensation: therefore it seems that it is prior to others.

Likewise, it has the power for the most excellent act, which is to consecrate the body of the Lord: and that which has a more excellent act is first: therefore it is the first sacrament.

330. 1 Tim. 2:2.

But it seems that Penance is first: because the Lord begins to preach from it: however, the order of work corresponds to the order of doctrine: therefore penance is to be received first.

Likewise, Augustine says, and it is placed below in the Letter, that no one can begin a new life unless he repents of the old life: therefore penance is prior.

Likewise, if any adult comes to baptism, he does not receive the reality of the sacrament without penance, because he is fictitious: therefore it is required before baptism: therefore also before other sacraments.

But still it seems that the Eucharist is prior: because it is called by the Saints the sacrament of sacraments: therefore it is most worthy: therefore it precedes all others.

Likewise, it contains the Author of all grace: but the Author of grace is before any universal and particular grace: therefore it is before all sacraments: because all others imprint spiritual graces.

However, it seems that Matrimony is first: because it was instituted before all in paradise, as the Master says below.

However, it is proven by the Master that Baptism is first, because he first acts concerning it: and he proves that it is the foundation of all sacraments.

Solution. The sacraments are to be ordered according to the order of defects against which they are ordained, among which the first is original sin, and this is removed by baptism. And the consequent is the inclination to evil, which baptism does not remove, but diminishes: and therefore confirmation is ordained against this. From the struggle of inclination, and as if from the heat of concupiscence, arises the loss of spiritual goods: and therefore the Eucharist is ordained against this in the third place. However, there is the fall of concupiscence into actual sin, against which penance is ordained. However, the remnants of weakness always arise, against which extreme unction is ordained. However, Order and Matrimony are ordained against a common defect: and Order is before Matrimony: because it is according to a more worthy generation, as was evident from the division. And the Master holds this order.

To all objections, there is one response, namely that they do not prove the order simply: but with respect to that which the reason proceeds: but here the order is not considered by the Master according to that: because none of those is the end of the sacrament except that which has already been said, namely that which it effects in the disease against which it is ordained.

Articulus 4 — What Is The Difference Between The Grace Of Gifts And Of Virtues, And That Which Is Conferred In The Sacraments

What is the difference between the grace of gifts and virtues, and that which is conferred in the sacraments?

Fourthly, it is asked, What is the difference between the grace of virtues and gifts, and that which is in the sacraments?

It seems, however, that in the sacraments only grace freely given is bestowed. For either the sacrament is received by a fictitious person, or by a non-fictitious person. If by a fictitious person, he receives no grace. If by a non-fictitious person. On the contrary: He already has the grace making pleasing when approaching: but nothing is in potency to that which he already has: therefore he cannot receive it further: therefore either he receives nothing, or he receives grace freely given.

If perhaps you say that he receives an increase of grace. On the contrary: If it is substantial to the sacrament that it confers an increase of grace: since grace is always to be increased, it would seem that sacraments are always to be repeated: but this is false, because the principal ones are not repeated: therefore they are not for the increase of grace.

Likewise, it seems that in all sacraments only one grace is conferred. Proof: For there is one grace, whose act is one: but the act is to remit sin: since therefore every sacrament is for this, it seems that all sacramental grace is one.

Moreover, in what does it differ from the grace which is in gifts and virtues?

It seems that in nothing: because both make the possessor pleasing, and render his work pleasing: therefore they do not differ.

If you say that sacramental grace is against sin: but the virtues and gifts are for good. On the contrary: In nature, the same mover in number is from the terminus and to the terminus: therefore also in spiritual things the same is the mover from evil and to good.

Likewise, the same and one motion has only one moving form: but from evil to good is the same and one motion: therefore grace moves in it as one.

Likewise, Gregory says that gifts are given as aid against the defect of sin: therefore there is no distinction.

If perhaps you say that the same grace is conferred in these and in those. On the contrary: Grace in virtues and gifts has a connection, so that he who has one, has the others: but it is not so in the sacraments, because having one sacrament, he does not have all the others.

Likewise, with no precept or sin existing, there will still be virtues and gifts and the grace which is in them; but it is not so with the sacraments: therefore the grace is different.

Solution. I well concede that sacramental grace differs from that which is in virtues and gifts, in those two ways which have been proven, namely, because having one sacramental, the others are not necessarily had: and because with no sin existing, there would be no sacraments. And still in two other ways, namely, because they are against the defect which is ordering to sin, or against sin itself: and because in them the passion of Christ operates specially: none of which per se belongs to the grace of virtues and gifts.

Therefore it must be said to the first, that having the grace of virtues, the grace of the sacraments is not per se had: because virtues are ordered to meritorious acts, but sacraments against the defect of sin: and therefore although the non-fictitious person has the grace of virtues, it is not necessary that he cannot well be in potency to receiving sacramental grace:

and this is the first grace for him, if he did not have it before: or an increase of grace, if he had grace before.

But that the sacrament itself increases grace, does not belong to it per se: but insofar as it finds another grace, not the same, first in the subject.

And by this the solution to the first is clear.

To the other it must be said that one false thing is supposed, that the act of sacramental grace is one: for although in kind it is one which is to make pleasing, yet it differs specially, as was evident above in the division: because one grace per se removes original sin, and another actual sin, and so with the others.

To the other it must be said that it differs from gifts and virtues in this, that gifts and virtues denote perfections of powers to act: but sacramental grace denotes perfection against the disease of sin: but the motion from evil to good is sometimes one, and sometimes two: for when good is intended per se, then there is motion to it, and it consequently recedes from the contrary, and then there is one motion: but when graces are not considered in motion, but as perfecting habits, then it is not necessary that they are against evil per se: because virtues and gifts are not against evil per se, but rather habits perfecting powers to acts: but sacraments are not, rather they heal the wounds of sin per se.

To the other the solution is clear by the same.

To the saying of Gregory it must be said that he does not call aid in the manner of medicine, nor does he note such a defect which is from sin and inclining to it: but he calls defect a punishment, as ignorance of things to be done, and weakness of things to be done. But the sacrament is medicine against the defect inclining to evil universally: and therefore no sacrament or sacramental grace is determined to a special power of the soul, like gifts and virtues.

Articulus 5 — It Is Asked Concerning The Definitions Of A Sacrament

It is inquired concerning the definitions of a sacrament.

Then it is inquired concerning those things which are said in the Text.

And it is first inquired concerning this which is said, there, B, A sacrament is a sign of a sacred thing,

And so that the question may be better understood, let all the definitions of a sacrament be gathered together at once.

And the first is this: A sacrament is a sign of a sacred thing. The second is placed below in the Text: A sacrament is a visible form of invisible grace, bearing a likeness, and being a cause.

Augustine defines thus: A sacrament is that in which, under the cover of visible things, divine power secretly works salvation.

Hugh defines thus: A sacrament is a corporeal or material element outwardly presented to the eyes, representing by likeness, signifying by institution, and conferring invisible grace by sanctification.

However, it is objected against the first: because 1. The serpent set up on a pole, Numbers 21:8-9:

Likewise, the Cross, the tabernacle, the temple: for all these are signs of sacred things; and yet they are not sacraments of the old law or the new: but every sacrament is either of the old law or the new: therefore it seems that the definition is more than defined: therefore it is bad.

1. Likewise, Hugh says that a sacrament is perfected in three things, namely words, things, and deeds: words, as prayers: things, as oil, water, chrism, and the like: deeds, as genuflections, blessings, and the like: therefore it seems that according to this definition there are many more sacraments than those which are enumerated.
2. Likewise, a good life is a sign and cause of a sacred thing, because of eternal life: therefore it seems to be a sacrament, which is false.

Further, it is objected concerning the second:

1. For when it is said visible form, it does not seem to agree with every sacrament: because in some it is not visible, as in confession it is rather audible than visible.
2. Likewise, the baptismal character (as will be said below) is a sacrament, and yet it is not visible: therefore it seems that it is not general, what is said about the visible form.

Furthermore, it is inquired, How is form taken there? For it is either external or internal. If external, then it is exemplary. But on the contrary: Exemplary is that according to which another is made to the same form: but no one is immersed, so that as it is done in baptism, or another sacrament, so he himself may do by baptizing, or perfecting another sacrament: therefore the form is not taken there in such a way. But if it is internal form. On the contrary: It always consists in words, as Augustine says below: Let the word come to the element, and it becomes a sacrament: therefore it should not be called visible, but audible.

Furthermore, speaking according to this, it is false: because a sacrament is not its form, just as neither is it its matter: but it is that which is composed of both,

But if you say that form is said as if remaining outside, as the fourth form of the species of quantity is said: this seems to be nothing: because that form does not seem to be except of something quantified: for that form is the same as figure, differing only in reason: but a sacrament is of no figure: therefore neither of any such form.

1. Likewise, it is objected concerning what is said, That it bears a likeness. For likeness (as Boethius says) is the same quality of things differing in number: but the same quality is not of spiritual and corporeal things: since therefore the element is material and

corporeal, the sacrament itself cannot have the same quality with the soul inwardly: therefore neither does it have likeness.

Further, it is inquired, Of what kind of cause does it exist?

1. For it is either efficient, or formal, or material, or final. But it is clear that it is not efficient: because nothing is the efficient cause of grace except God alone, as Blessed Bernard says: but a sacrament is not God. Likewise, it is not formal: because then there would be some intrinsic sacrament that gives being to grace, which cannot be. Likewise, the corporeal cannot be the form of the spiritual: therefore a sacrament, which is always corporeal, is not the form of interior grace. Similarly, it seems not to be material: because neither is it the matter in which grace is, nor from which. That it is not in which, this is clear: because nothing is the matter in which, except that which is the proper subject of grace: but this is never corporeal, but the soul or another rational substance. That it is not from which, this again is clear: because grace does not have such matter, since it is a simple form. Similarly, it is not final: for grace cannot be for the sake of the sacrament, but rather conversely: therefore in no way does it seem to be a cause.
2. But if you say, as was supposed above, that it is a disposing cause in the subject: this does not seem so: because a disposing cause ought to reach the subject which it disposes: but a sacrament does not reach the soul in sacramental being, but only the body: therefore it seems that it is not a disposing cause.
3. Likewise, disposition is either the last necessity, or is around the last. But if it is the last: therefore such a form is never without it: which is not true, because grace and salvation (as will be said below) are not bound to the sacraments. But if it is before the last: therefore it is not necessary: but it can happen that a sacrament is received by someone not fictitious, and grace is not received, as it seems: therefore in no way is it a cause.
4. But if you say, as almost all the ancients said, that a sacrament is a cause like a vessel: for a sacrament is said to contain grace, as a box contains medicine: this seems to be nothing: because a box is no cause of medicine or health: therefore a sacrament according to this would not have any causality with respect to grace.

Further, it is objected concerning the third which is Augustine's:

1. For it does not seem proper to a sacrament, that it covers, but rather that it reveals, since it ought to show grace.
2. Furthermore, what is said here, divine power, does not seem to agree with a sacrament: because a sacrament ought to have causality by itself: because otherwise it would be badly defined by the reason of cause.

It is also objected concerning the fourth which is Hugh's: for there does not seem to be a difference between representing and signifying: therefore it seems that one of them is superfluous.

Summary. These four definitions are given of a sacrament, so that the first is of a sacrament in general, but the following three are given of the sacrament of the new law. And the first considers those things which are the properties of the matter and form of the sacrament itself: for from the matter it has to be a sign, from the form it has to be a cause. The second considers the effi-

§ 1. Thus it is clear that the fourth point collects all material and formal aspects existing in the sacrament: just as the corporeal element in the sacrament is matter, to which a natural property is joined, giving it the aptness to represent grace, in the way the refreshment of water represents the cooling of grace from the fire of concupiscence, and the moisture of water signifies the ablative power of grace to remove spiritual stains from the soul. The fact that this representation actually leads to grace is due to divine institution: but it is through the sanctification of the form of words that it confers invisible grace.

§ 2. Thus, the solution is evident for what might be queried, regarding under what consideration these definitions are taken, since a single thing has a unique definition.

§ 3. To the first, it should be said that in the definition of a sacrament, the sacred thing and the sign are taken in a restricted sense, namely, so that a sacred thing is said to be that which is ordained as a remedy against disease, and a sign is said to be that which offers a likeness to that by divine institution: and then that definition only applies to a sacrament of the old law or the new.

§ 4. However, if one wishes to say that a sacrament is defined for any sacred thing, whether actively or passively called a sacrament, it would not be incorrect because this seems to be the intention of the Master in relation to the divisions of the sacred thing and the divisions of the sign which he submits. However, since a sign is not a signified thing, properly speaking, there should be a difference between a sacrament called a sign and a sacred thing said to be the signified; for the serpent, the cross, and similar items are not instituted to signify such a sacrament but rather to dispel demons, to show a passion in a typological manner, or to signify God's disposition as the tabernacle did.

§ 5. As for stating that Master Hugh speaks there of any sacrament that pertains to worship, it should not be taken to mean it applies to the proper reason there.

§ 6. Concerning another issue, one must say that a good life is the cause of grace and salvation, but does not show it in the sign of likeness: rather, it shows in a sign akin to merit as the cause of reward, and such a sign is not understood when a sign is placed in the definition of a sacrament. Alternatively, one could say that a good life does not signify salvation by institution but inherently. One might also assert that a good life operates salvation from the operative work, not from the work accomplished, whereas a sacrament is from the work done; thus, it is clear that a good life is not a sacrament.

§ 7. To the issue raised about the second point, it should be said that the visible, in the extended name, is placed in the definition for the sensible, because vision is the more general and noble sense concerning objects.

§ 8. Regarding another issue, one should state that the baptismal character is taken as a thing and as a sign: insofar as it is taken as a thing, it is not a sacrament; but insofar as it is taken as a sign, it is a sacrament; and although it is invisible, it is visible when related to an external action: in itself, it is not a sacrament, but rather it is reduced to external animation.

§ 9. With respect to another issue, the form is said to remain externally and is transposed: because just as it is configured by the fitness of figures, so does the external action conform to the inner action in the sacrament: in this manner, the objection does not proceed, because, with a transposed formula, the form is taken.

§ 10. On another point, a resemblance is derived there according to proportionality: For according to Boethius in the second book of Arithmetic, resemblance of differing things is the same quantity, and proportion is the resemblance of relation between two, whereas proportionality is the likeness of proportions between four. Then we shall say that the property of the external element must be taken concerning its effect on the body on one side, and the property of grace through its effect on the soul on the other side: allegorically or metaphorically a resemblance should be posited between those two proportions. As the refrigerative and washing power of an element is to the body, so is grace to the soul according to the metaphor. And then the objection ceases.

§ 11. Furthermore, it should be said that the sacrament serves as a disposing cause in the subject, and the disposition that is necessary in itself: however, it does not follow that it always operates, but it follows how it is naturally disposed, unless there is an obstacle by the false.

§ 12. To another objection, it is stated that it touches the likeness of proportionality and virtue from sanctification, as Augustine writes in a distich concerning Sacramental Matters[331]. Hence, the force of water is that it touches the body and washes the heart, except through the invocation of the word.

§ 13. Concerning the statement that salvation is not bound to the sacrament, Master Hugh says, although it is indeed in those, it is not from them as an efficient cause, and it should be understood that he did not bind it. If, however, it is questioned, to what cause this disposition is reduced, the response would depend on the matter: since anything before the form from dispositions of the matter is subjected to the form along with that matter, as is evident in the bronze when whitened, for example.

Articulus 6 — Whether In The Sacraments The Sign Is Some Thing

Whether in the sacraments a sign is a thing?

Then the question arises about what is stated there, B, near the beginning: "A sign, however, is a thing beyond the appearance it presents to the senses," etc.

1. For in the first book of the Sentences, the Master divides the treatment of sacred Scripture, which is about things and signs: therefore, it seems that a sign is not a thing.

2. Likewise, it seems that he speaks falsely in what he says, from itself: because a sacrament does not act from itself, but from institution, as it seems.

Response. The Master here takes a sign as it falls under the intention of the thing: because, as was said in the first book of the Sentences, when the treatment is divided into things and signs, that division is rather through different modes of the thing than through different things, and it holds as much as the absolute and the related to another for signifying.

To the other, it must be said that a sign acts from itself, that is, from itself as a sign, or formally accepted: for a thing acts from itself, which it does from its form, and what falls into its definition. And this does not contradict its institution: because a sign from God, and especially a sacramental one, receives its form from institution, although it has aptitude from nature, as was said before.

Articulus 7 — Whether Those Things Which Are Instituted For The Sake Of Signifying Only Are Only Signs And Not Sacraments

Are things instituted solely for the sake of signifying merely signs and not sacraments?

Next, the question arises concerning what is stated there, B, in the middle: For things instituted solely for the sake of signifying are merely signs and not sacraments, etc.

Against this, it seems to be what was said above, that

1. A sacrament is the visible form of invisible grace: however, those things which were merely signs were such as the paschal lamb and certain others: therefore, they were sacraments.
2. Likewise, he later divides the sacrament into the sacrament of the old and new law: therefore, those are sacraments just as these are.
3. Furthermore, he calls them here carnal sacrifices and ceremonial observances: and this does not seem so. For the Apostle says, in Romans vii, 12: The law indeed is holy, and the commandment holy, and just, and good.

If you say that it was carnal for those understanding carnally. Against: Because an understanding person cannot change anything about a thing with their intellect: for a thing is in itself what it is, not from the comparison of my intellect or another's.

Furthermore, according to the same reasoning, the new law could also be carnal: because some understood carnally, and still understand, as Christ says, John vi, 64: It is the Spirit that gives life; the flesh profits nothing.

1. Moreover, why are they called ceremonial? For it cannot be said that they are called ceremonial from decay, which is the rotting of wood, because they were unclean: for I hold it as inappropriate that God commanded something unclean for any reason.

331. Augustine on Distinctio HM.

Also, nothing unclean pertains to the worship of God: however, those sacrifices pertained to the worship of God: therefore, those sacrifices had nothing unclean.

Furthermore, it is often said of the sacrifice that it was a most sweet odor to the Lord: therefore, there was nothing of decay there.

But if you say that they are called ceremonial from wax, it seems that this is not true: because wax does not signify anything pertaining to divine worship.

Solution. It must be said that the Master determines the sacrament according to its greatest capacity: and this is only in the sacrament of the new law, which is both cause and sign: and therefore, those things which were merely signs he says are not sacraments: because even in truth, they were not sacraments, except because they signified our sacraments: and this will be proven below by authority.

Through this, the solution to the following is also clear: because below he takes the sacrament more generally than here.

To the other, it must be said that they were carnal because of the carnal rite, and because of the state of those serving carnally: for at that time sacrifices were offered from carnal things, which signified things that are spiritual sacrifices, of which the Psalm x, 19 says: A sacrifice to God is a contrite spirit: a contrite and humbled heart, O God, you will not despise. And at that time, it was the state of the carnal, and if some offered spiritual things, they pertained to the New Testament.

To the other, it must be said that the law is called holy, by reason of morals, and by reason of figure: because it sanctifies only through faith in the Mediator.

To the last, it must be said that they are called ceremonial, as it seems to me, because they pertained to divine worship. Hence, Tullius at the end of the First Rhetoric says, that religion is, which brings care and ceremony to a certain nature which they call superior. And it is composed of munia, which is service or worship, and Ceres, who is the goddess of crops; because perhaps she was first worshipped: and from her worship, it was transferred to divine worship.

Articulus 8 — Whether To Offer Carnal Sacrifices Is Good In General; And, Whether It Was Of Natural Law; And, Whether They Justified

Whether offering carnal sacrifices is good in general? And, whether it was of natural law? And, whether they justified?

Then it is inquired about what is said there, B, in the middle: Which could never make the offerers just.

And three things are inquired, the first of which is, Whether offering such things was good in general?
Secondly, Whether it was of natural law?
Thirdly, Whether they justified?

To the FIRST, it proceeds thus:
1. Good in general is good according to the principle subject to morals, and this is a voluntary act like the due matter, as to feed the hungry, to clothe the naked: therefore, similarly, it will be to offer to whom it is to be offered: therefore, it seems that if it were informed by charity, it would be meritorious: but to offer a creature to God is to offer to whom it is to be offered: therefore, this informed by charity could be meritorious of eternal life.

1. Likewise, Nothing is in the species that is not in the genus: offering sacrifices is in the species of the virtue of latria: therefore, it is in the genus of good: therefore, it is good in general, as it seems.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
To kill a beast to be burned seems entirely useless. Psalm 49:13-14: Will I eat the flesh of bulls, or drink the blood of goats? Offer to God a sacrifice of praise, etc. Therefore, it seems that offering sacrifices was never of the genus of goods.

To the SECOND, it proceeds thus:
1. The offering of sacrifices began in the natural law and was in the law of Moses: therefore, it seems that nature inclined to this: therefore, it is of natural law.

1. Likewise, All were bound to acknowledge the future liberator by the inclination of nature: but sacrifices showed him: therefore, nature inclined to the offering of sacrifices.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
1. Whatever is of natural law remained and remains in the new law: the offering of sacrifices does not remain: therefore, it was never of natural law.

1. Likewise, What is natural is the same among all: however, it is evident that not all offered sacrifices: therefore, it seems that it was not natural.

To the THIRD, it proceeds thus:
1. Bede says that sacrifices in their time conferred eternal life: but nothing confers eternal life unless it justifies: therefore, those sacrifices justified.

1. Likewise, Whatever God commands to be done, He wills to be done: and I say to be done, because of the command made to Abraham, not to be done, but to be tested: God commanded sacrifices to be done: therefore, He willed them to be done. Thus: Whatever God wills to be done, if it is done out of charity, is meritorious: God willed sacrifices to be done: therefore, if they were done out of charity, they were meritorious: therefore, they justified. If you say that this merit is from the virtue of charity, and not of the work: this is nothing: because all merit is by the virtue of charity, and not of the work.

Likewise, moral acts also did not justify unless they were done with charity: therefore, this is not the reason.

1. If perhaps you say that they had this from the fact that they signified our sacraments. On the contrary: Let us circumscribe the signification, and let the command remain about offering sacrifices: then God commands them to be done, and then the same reason as the first.
2. Likewise, In the second part of the distinction, in the treatise on circumcision, Gregory says: What water of baptism effects among us, circumcision or the virtue of sacrifices effected among the ancients: sacrifices had the power of absolving from guilt: and this is not absolved without grace: therefore, they conferred grace, as it seems.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
1. There is a difference between those sacraments and the new law, that those are not vessels containing grace, but ours are. But what is not grace in itself, and does not contain it, does not justify: therefore, those sacrifices did not justify.

1. Likewise, If they justified, it is asked, To what effect did they justify? It is evident that not to the conferring of grace: because the Apostle denies this, and it is held in the Letter. But neither to the remission of punishment, this is proven: because punishment is connected to guilt: therefore, it seems that they justified in no way.
2. Likewise, Isaiah 1:11: The burnt offerings of rams, and the fat of fed beasts, etc., I did not want. The Gloss says, never.
3. Likewise, On Ephesians 5:2, on that: He gave himself for us an offering and a sacrifice to God for a sweet-smelling savor, the Gloss says that other sacrifices were not for a sweet-smelling savor, except insofar as they were a figure of that: therefore, of themselves, they conferred nothing, as it seems.
4. Likewise, Jeremiah 7:22: I did not speak with your fathers, and I did not command them... concerning the word of burnt offerings and sacrifices: therefore, He never willed those.
5. Likewise, Ezekiel 20:25: I gave them statutes that were not good, and judgments by which they shall not live: therefore, they did not justify, because otherwise, they would have conferred life.
6. Likewise, Hesychius says that they were not pleasing, and he speaks of sacrifices.
7. Likewise, Augustine in the book on the City of God: God is not pleased with the sacrifice of a slain beast, but with a contrite heart: it seems that they did not justify.

But still, two or three things seem to be very probable against this.

1. One is that in the Canon of the most holy host, it is said, after it is consecrated: Upon which may you deign to look with a propitious and serene countenance: and to accept,

as you deigned to accept the sacrifice of your just servant Abel, and the sacrifice of our patriarch Abraham: and what your high priest Melchizedek offered to you: it seems that it was pleasing: therefore, they justified.

2. Likewise, Exodus 20:1 and following, in the same part sacrifices are joined with morals: the reason for this does not seem to be other than because they justified like those.

3. Likewise, This is taken from the tradition of the Hebrews, who say that morals do not differ from sacrifices, except that the people heard morals directly from the Lord, whence it is said there that the whole people heard the voices: but the people did not hear sacrifices, but Moses alone heard: and therefore, they received sacrifices through a minister, but morals (as some Hebrews say) from the Lord: therefore, sacrifices justified, just as morals themselves.

Solution. It must be said to the first, that in general it is good to offer to whom it is to be offered: but good in general receives determination of circumstances according to the diversity of acts: and therefore, determination concerning this good is especially determined by reason to the state and to the time: but the time was when there was disease and the time of the signification of medicine: and the state was a state in sin. And concerning this, the sacrifice is determined. And because now such a sacrifice cannot be determined in this way, therefore now such a sacrifice is pernicious. For although to offer to whom it is to be offered is good in general, yet the determination of what is offered, as a goat or a sheep, does not regard good in general according to the determination which is taken through the knowledge of signification.

To the other, it must be said that at that time it was well drawn to the species: but this was not by the virtue of the matter which is a goat or a sheep, but rather by the reason of the act which is the offering. And it is well conceded by all that that act informed by charity was meritorious: because it is the work operating, not the work operated.

To what is objected on the contrary, it must be said that it was not useless for the beast to be killed in this way in which it was killed: for it was not burned to be consumed by fire, but rather to show the spirituality and warmth of devotion around the sacrifice of a contrite spirit.

To what is secondly inquired, it must be said that sacrifice in general is indeed of natural law: for human reason well dictates this, that one's liberation ought to be prefigured: but it did not dictate that it should be in this way or that, but reason added this determination by conferring and inquiring how the true sacrifice might be better prefigured.

To the other, it must be said that all were bound to acknowledge their liberation, not explicitly, but implicitly: just as they also behaved concerning the articles.

But to those things which are said on the contrary, the solution is clear: because they are not determined in natural law: and therefore, they neither remain, nor are they the same among all.

To the other, it must be said that there is a threefold state, namely before idolatry and the written law, and under idolatry and the written law, and under grace promised and expected in both the natural and Mosaic law. Before the law and idolatry, sacrifices were pleasing in the

figure of the future offering which was made through Christ: but under the law, they were simply displeasing, because then they were offered to idols: but they were pleasing in a certain respect, namely that they were offered to Him rather than to idols. But under grace, they are entirely displeasing: because neither the time nor the state under grace allows them to be determined.

To what is thirdly inquired, it must be said that the Masters rightly say that it is the work operating, and this is the act which was good for the time, and this could be informed by charity: and it is the work operated, as the immolated goat, and this contributed nothing that would inwardly aid beyond the merit of the act. Hence, the statement of Bede is understood in the first way, and not in the second.

To the other, it must be said that signs of will were concerning such things, and not the good pleasure which signifies a quiet will in good: but signs of will as command and counsel were indeed for doing, but for the time and state, for the reason already stated.

To the other, it must be said that if the sign of future liberation is circumscribed, and there is a command concerning them, they will still be meritorious concerning the operating acts; but although the signification is circumscribed in this way or that, it is necessary that the state of liberation is prefigured in some way whatever it may be: and then, even with the sign of the future circumscribed, I say that merit remains in the operating work by the virtue of the command: but reason does not dictate that they are to be offered in this way.

To the other, it must be said that the virtue of the sacrifice is referred there to the future, and not to the present operated work. And this is clear from what Augustine says, that never without faith in the Mediator did anyone have salvation, from a newborn child to an old decrepit man.

But those things which are objected on the contrary, I concede well.

To the other, it must be said that what is in the Canon is understood as the comparison of state to state, of truth to figure. Hence, it is understood thus: That just as that was pleasing in the state of signification and figure, so may this be pleasing in the state of truth and liberation: not, however, only so much, but much more: because even through that, as it was determined, no one had the reason of pleasing except through this: but it is indeed true that the offering in general always pleased God, when what was God's was offered to Him: just as even now it pleases, although the same mode which was then does not please.

To the other, it must be said that they are joined with morals, not because they pertained in species to morals: but because the act in general was moral in ceremonial matters: for nature dictated the act in general, just as it did the act of morals: but the species of the offering is diversified according to place and time, as has been said.

To the other, it must be said that there is a twofold tradition of the Hebrews concerning this, as Rabbi Moses the Egyptian says in the second collation of his book which he calls the Guide of the Perplexed: for the wiser Jews, as Rabbi Moses himself, and Rabbi Joshua, and Rabbi Eleazar say that the hearing of the people was nothing other than that by popular

reason it could be known: and therefore, they say that the people heard only one commandment, which even a simple man immediately dictates by conscience and reason: and this is the first, namely that: Hear, O Israel: The Lord our God is one Lord. You shall have no other gods before me, etc. But the other nine were heard by the wise who were more prepared to receive the illumination of revelation: because this is dictated by natural reason also, although not as perspicaciously as the first. But all other things were heard only by Moses alone: because he knew even those things through the illumination of God, which none of the others could investigate by reason.

But others say that the whole people heard the ten commandments: because natural law dictates these to man, and all were capable of them; but they did not hear sacrifices: because they are not of natural law except in general, by reason of which they are also joined with morals: but they had to be determined by the Prophet who understood the worship of God more for the state and time.

Articulus 9 — Whether Venial Sin Was Remitted By Virtue Of The Sacraments Of The Old Law

Was venial sin remitted by the power of the sacraments of the old law?

Next, the question arises concerning what is stated there, B, towards the end: I understand nothing else by the purification than what the law cleanses, etc.

And two questions are asked here: the first is, Whether venial sin was remitted by the power of those sacraments?

The second, Why in the new law is there nothing that cures irregularity as in the old?

To the first, the procedure is as follows:

1. Below, Augustine says that venial sins were always remitted through sacrifices and ceremonies: therefore, it seems that they at least remitted some sins.

1. Likewise, it has greater conformity with grace that which is not a cause but a sign, than that which is neither a cause nor a sign: but some things which are neither a cause nor a sign, because they are not sacraments, like holy water and the pontifical blessing, remit venial sin: therefore, much more those which were a sign and not a cause: such were the sacrifices of the old law: therefore, they remitted venial sin.

ON THE CONTRARY:

Sin is never forgiven by God without grace: however, those sacraments conferred no grace by their own power: therefore, by their own power, they never cured any sin: which seems to be conceded, except accidentally, namely through the work of the worker, especially since the Saints and the Apostle to the Hebrews expressly say this.

To the FIRST, therefore, it must be said that venial is taken equivocally: because in the law, venial was that which was not punished by temporal death, but was punished by expulsion

outside the camp, or by expiation, or in another way: and Augustine speaks of this, and not of that which by its own nature is worthy of pardon.

To the other, it must be said that that argument does not have necessity, unless it were first proven that something according to its substantial effect as a sacrament was ordained against venial sin: but we do not confess this, as was evident above.

Articulus 10 — Why In The New Law There Is Not Something Curing Irregularity As In The Old

Why is there nothing in the new law addressing irregularity as in the old?

To the second objection, it is argued thus:
The new law is more perfect than the old: therefore, the sacraments of the new law are more perfect than those of the old. Since the latter expiated irregularities, it seems that the former should also do this, and much more.

Furthermore, it is asked, why does irregularity especially impede this sacrament, which is Order, and not others? For no one is irregular for Baptism or the Eucharist, provided they are willing to prepare themselves, nor for Penance, and so on for others.

Solution. It must be said that this very fact indicates the greatest dignity and loftiness of the New Testament. Because in the Old Testament there was only a shadow of the priesthood and priestly act, therefore a light remedy was prepared there, through which a person is made suitable for that act. But here, because it is the true act of the offering of Christ and the true priesthood, irregularity is expiated with difficulty, and sometimes it cannot be expiated.

To the other, it must be said that Order places a person in a dual state, namely of bridegroom and bride: for the whole Church is betrothed to God in the Prelate, and God is united with the people in the Prelate: and therefore he is a mediator between God and the people, and holds the place of both, and therefore, inasmuch as he is the bride, he has the ring of faith and charity, and it is signified that he is not divided, just as the Church is indivisible in heart.

of and signifies the body, and is united to God: and in this respect, bigamy induces unsuitability and irregularity. Since it is he who brings about the communion of the whole people in the place of God, who makes the people common, therefore, communion induces irregularity in excommunication. By reason of spirituality and the worship that the state pretends, the shedding of blood causes unsuitability. And the fact that these are not abolished is not a defect of the new law: because they are not sins, unless perhaps incidentally, but rather unsuitability of certain persons for the act of excellent dignity and the signification of bride and bridegroom.

Articulus 11 — Whether Oblations And Sacrifices Ought To Have Existed Before The Law; And, Whether Then All Were Bound To Know The Reasons For The Figure In Which They Were Placed

Whether offerings and sacrifices ought to have existed before the law? And, whether then all were bound to know the reasons for the figure in which they were placed?

Then it is questioned concerning what is said there, B, at the end, "Because God imposed them in servitude," etc.

For according to this, it seems that they ought not to have existed before the law, which is not true, since Abel offered, and Abraham, and certain other Patriarchs.

Furthermore, by the reason of the second cause which says that they are placed in a figure, it is questioned whether everyone was bound to know the reason for that figure, or not?

It seems that they were: because
1. Otherwise, the offering would have been useless or harmful to some figure: for he would believe that it was accepted by God in itself: therefore it seems that all were bound to recognize the reason for the figure.

1. Likewise, every man was bound to recognize the necessary future liberation: therefore he was bound to pre-signify it: just as we now believe with the heart for righteousness, and confess with the mouth for salvation*: since therefore the pre-signification is through sacrifices, he was bound to know the reason for the sacrifices.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
1. They did not have such a determined relation to the passion of Christ which was signified in them, that reason would dictate this without revelation: therefore unless it was revealed, it seems that no one was bound to know that signification.

1. Likewise, another mode was possible, as Augustine says. Therefore, let it be granted that another would have been: therefore then those sacrifices would not have figured the Passion of Christ: therefore they were not bound to know that these figured those things, namely, which were to be in the New Testament.
2. Likewise, further it seems to follow from this, that they were not bound to sacrifices: because the spiritual ones recognized themselves to be oppressed by the burden, and that those were not pleasing to God: therefore it seems that they could desist from sacrifices whenever they wanted, which is false: therefore they were commanded to do them, and not only imposed for the sake of the figure, as the Master says here.

Solution, It must be said that according to what was said above, there is a threefold state. Before the law, indeed, I think that they simply pleased God, inasmuch as worship was signified in them and the figure of future liberation: and in this way the Patriarchs offered. But after the people learned in Egypt to offer to idols, such a rite did not please God, except in a certain respect, namely, that it was offered to Him rather than to idols.

To the other, it must be said as above, that all were bound, but not explicitly, but in this way that they intended to offer them in the signification and greater rite which those who understood the future revelation understood.

To the first objection: the solution is indeed clear.

To the second, however, it must be said that the mode of liberation was signified in general, namely, that it was necessary for it to be in the mode of satisfaction, so that a contrite and humbled heart would be offered on our part: and whatever mode it would have been, that was always required on our part: and thus the mode of liberation on our part always remains to be signified in the future through sacrifices.

Articulus 12 — What Is The Effect Of The Ashes Of The Red Heifer And Of The Water That Was Made Through Its Mixture

What is the effect of the ashes of the red heifer and the water that was made by their mixture?

Then it is asked about what is said there, B, at the end: The Apostle, however, speaks of the works of the law, etc.

There is a particular doubt concerning the ashes of the red heifer from which the water of sprinkling was made throughout the year, as it is read in Numbers 19:2 and following.

It seems that this water performed two contrary actions: because it rendered the priest who sacrificed it unclean, and it was commanded that he remain outside the camp and be unclean until evening; however, it cleansed the sprinkled people, the vessels of the tabernacle, the tabernacle itself, the book, and all other things that were sprinkled with the water. For if it is said that this was because he touched a corpse while sacrificing, it does not seem so: because even when sprinkled with the blood of the corpse, he was touched, and yet he was cleansed: therefore, it seems that the priest sacrificing should become cleaner from this.

Solution. Here is a twofold good solution, and others are trifles. Augustine says that the ashes of the heifer, which are the remnants of fire, signify sins already cooled by concupiscence and burned by the fire of contrition: the blood, however, is the blood of Christ's redemption: the water mixed, however, is the union of the people with Christ, or the fountain of tears: and from these, a clean sprinkling is made. But the priest is unclean: because we are never sprinkled in such a way that the uncleanness of venial sins does not adhere to us: therefore, we will remain outside the camp of pure society until evening, and then, purified by purgatory, we will enter pure into the lot and dwelling of the Saints: and this is the best solution.

The Masters give another, that the sacrificing priest signifies our priest celebrating and taking the body of Christ: which, although it is most holy, yet because we ought to consider ourselves unworthy in respect to it, therefore when we celebrate, we wash our hands, and consider ourselves outside the camp of the Saints until the evening of death.

And through this, the solution to the contrary is clear.

Articulus 13 — Whether The Threefold Cause Of The Institution Of The Sacraments Is Well Assigned By The Master

Is the threefold cause of the institution of the sacraments well assigned by the Master?

Next, inquiry is made into the second part of that section, where it is stated: "The sacraments were instituted for a threefold reason," etc.

Inquiry is made concerning these causes.

It seems, indeed, that there are none: because 1. It is against the proper order for a man to humble himself under that which is beneath him: a corporeal element is beneath the dignity of man: therefore, it is against the proper order for a man to humble himself to the point of seeking salvation in a corporeal element.

1. Likewise, one is not helped to rise who is further cast down than he had fallen: therefore, it seems that there is no cause which is sought first.
2. Similarly, the second cause seems to be none: because the more open some instruction is, the more effectively it instructs: therefore, something else that would openly show and confer grace would instruct and confer grace more than a sacrament which shows us in a corporeal element.
3. Likewise, if that instruction exists, it is according to some reason or way of reason: but no way of reason investigates grace in that which is not the cause of grace, but rather expects it from God who is the author of all grace: therefore, it seems that there is no instruction in the sacrament.
4. Likewise, objection is made concerning the third cause, which is exercise. For a single act cannot be called exercise: since, therefore, the greater sacraments are not received except once, they do not seem to be instituted for exercise.
5. Likewise, virtues seem to be given more for exercise: because their acts are repeated throughout life, and not the acts of the sacraments: therefore, it seems that none of these causes is reasonable.

Likewise, it is asked, by what is the number of these causes taken?

Solution. To this last point, it must be said first that in a sacrament there are three things, namely matter, the nature of a sign, and the nature of causing. And the first cause is taken according to the matter, which is inferior. The second is taken according to the nature of the sign: because a sign makes something come to the knowledge of a thing beyond the appearance which it presents to the senses.

The third is taken according to the nature of causing: because it causes grace, whose act is repeated in the exercise of life.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that the humiliation of one existing in sin is different from the humiliation of nature considered in itself. I say, therefore, that because man, by humbling himself, had cast himself down, it was fitting that he should be humbled under that which was beneath him, for the sake of God: so that he might descend more humbly under that which was beneath him by nature, as much as he had arrogantly raised himself to that which was above him, by desiring equality with God.

To the second, it must be said that if he were humbled under the element for the sake of the element, then that reasoning would proceed: but he is humbled under the element for the sake of God: and therefore he rises by that humility.

To the other, it must be said that instruction is from our own things, as Dionysius says: because our intellect does not receive divine things except veiled in material things: and therefore, although in itself it is more obscure than the truth itself, yet it is more suitable for us: just as also in philosophy, often the teaching is easier from things that are simply more unknown, but more known to us, than the contrary.

To the other, it must be said that that instruction is by way of reason which contemplates the requirement of our sin: because by the reason of what is fitting, the sinner must be led by things connatural: but, as Dionysius says, to rise from the likenesses of corporeal things to the unknown: and by those things which he has now learned, he learns spiritual things which he did not know. Although reason seeks salvation in corporeal elements, it does not seek it from them, as noted above in the authority of Master Hugh.

To what is objected concerning the third cause, it must be said that exercise is not referred here to the act of the sacrament, but to the act of sacramental grace, which is frequently to be repeated.

To the other, it must be said that exercise is not in the act of virtue, but is of another nature: because it is not so directly ordered against sin as the act of sacramental grace.

Articulus 14 — Whether In Every Sacrament There Are Two, Namely, Words And A Thing

Are there two things in every sacrament, namely words and matter?

Are there two things in every sacrament, namely words and matter?

Next, the question is raised concerning the third part of this distinction, there, D, at the end: "There are two things in which sacraments consist," etc.

For this does not seem to be general in all cases, because:

1. In marriage, consent makes the marriage, even if words are absent; therefore, it seems that not every sacrament consists in words.
2. Likewise, in contrition, the sorrow of the contrite with grace erases sin, and there are no words there.
3. Likewise, an objection is raised from the other side, about which it is said that matter is in the sacrament. For there is a certain matter of the sacrament, chrism: and this matter was not in the Old Testament. And it is asked, why, since there was oil, and wine, and bread, and water, which are matters of other sacraments?

Solution. It must be said that words are in every sacrament insofar as it is a sacrament of the Church. For marriage is considered in multiple ways, namely insofar as it is a duty of nature, and insofar as it is a good of the Church: and in this respect, it can be sufficiently effected by

consent to marital union: but in the third way, it is a remedy, and thus it is placed under the keys of the Church: and it is in the dispensation of ministers, and in this respect, it has a form expressed in the face of the Church, and it receives the blessing of the Church, and it becomes not indeed a sacrament of the Church in itself, but a sacrament of the Church, so that it is a remedy by the power of the keys of the Church.

To the other, it must be said that words are in penance, according to which it is one sacrament in its three parts, and these are the words that the priest says when, binding to satisfaction, he absolves.

To what is objected against the other part, it must be said that in confirmation the Holy Spirit is given for strength: and therefore it is also given only by one who is in a higher degree of the Church: and therefore in a state of imperfection, it was not fitting to have its own proper matter.

Articulus 15 — Whether The Sacraments Of The Old Law Gave Salvation, Just As The Sacraments Of The New Law

Did the sacraments of the old law grant salvation, just as the sacraments of the new law?

Did the sacraments of the old law grant salvation, just as the sacraments of the new law?

Next, the question is raised about the fourth part, which is divided into two parts. In the first part, it determines the difference between the sacraments of the New and Old Testaments in general. In the second part, it touches upon an exception regarding circumcision, because it does not seem to fall under the stated difference. The first part begins there, "E, Now it remains to see the distinction." The second part begins there, "F, however, among those sacraments, a certain sacrament, etc."

However, the question arises first about what is said concerning the first difference.

It seems that those sacraments granted salvation just as these do, because:

1. The Apostle says in Galatians 3:12: "He who does them shall live in them." He does not speak of bodily life, therefore of spiritual life; therefore, they gave spiritual life; therefore, consequently, salvation.
2. Likewise, Master Hugh of Saint Victor in the book on Sacraments: "From the effect by which man fell into sin, God immediately provided sacraments, some before the law, some under the law, some under grace, differing indeed in species, but having one effect." The effect of the sacraments is to confer salvation; therefore, also those which were before the law and in the law; therefore, all healed and gave salvation.
3. Likewise, 1 Corinthians 10:1 and following:

"I do not want you to be ignorant, brothers, that our fathers were all under the cloud, and all passed through the sea, and all were baptized into Moses in the cloud and in the sea, and all ate the same spiritual food, and all drank the same spiritual drink (for they drank from the

spiritual rock that followed them, and the rock was Christ)." It seems that their sacraments did the same for them as ours do for us.

1. Likewise, Augustine: "The same effect was for those eating manna as for those receiving the body of Christ."
2. Likewise, Wisdom 16:20: "You provided them with bread from heaven without labor, containing every delight and the sweetness of every taste." This could not be unless it contained all the spiritual good of grace, just as ours; therefore, it seems that those did the same as ours.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:

1. Hebrews 9:9: "Which cannot make the worshiper perfect in conscience."
2. Likewise, Hebrews 7:19: "The law made nothing perfect."
3. Likewise, if a law had been given that could justify, truly righteousness would be by the law.

Solution. It must be said that the law did not justify concerning the sacramental, but promised salvation. And multiple differences are assigned; however, three are touched upon here: the first is that our sacraments are signs of grace, but those sacraments are not immediately signs of grace, but of our sacraments. The second is that our sacraments are signs and causes, but those are only signs. The third is that those promise what they do not contain, but these give what they contain. Others assign the difference on the part of the fulfillers, through Augustine, who says that the briefest difference between the law and the Gospel is fear and love.

Therefore, it must be said to the first that the Apostle there speaks of the Decalogue, and not of the sacramental; however, neither did the Decalogue confer grace of itself, as the New Testament does. And to understand this, it must be known that the old law was entirely in fear, in fire, and smoke, and terrors; but the new law, entirely in kindness and grace; and even the Mediator himself brought and gave the grace of sanctification for all.

To the other, it must be said that Master Hugh understands this concerning the effect of the sign, not the effect of causality, because all these signified the same.

To the other, it must be said that the fathers did not drink sacramentally, but in spirit, as Christ says in John 8:56: "Your father Abraham rejoiced to see my day; he saw it and was glad." And therefore, the argument does not proceed, because that was more the power of devotion than the power of any sacrament.

To the other, it must be said that it was the same in general and spiritually, but not in species and sacramentally. For we thirst in two ways, namely spiritually and sacramentally; but they spiritually and only in type; and this they did not have by the nature of their state, but rather by a certain privilege, insofar as they belonged through charity to the New Testament.

To the other, it must be said that this was in type and spirit, and not in truth and sacrament.

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There was, however, among those things, etc. Here the Master begins to discuss circumcision.

And he touches upon five aspects concerning it: the first of which is about its effect. The second, about the recipients, there, G, Where The third, however, is about the institution of men, etc., there, H, Here it must be said, in The fourth, about the rite by which it was instituted, etc., there, I, It was done on the eighth day, etc. The fifth and last is about certain doubtful questions concerning the rite, there, L, If indeed it is asked about infants, etc.

Articulus 16 — Which Of The Testaments Was More Grave

Whether the Testaments were more burdensome?

But here arises the question, which of them is more burdensome?

It seems, however, that the New Testament is more burdensome: because it is more difficult to relinquish all things which are in the New Testament than to subject all things which are in the Old Testament.

Moreover, Christ added many things to the old laws, as seen in Matthew 5:1 and following. That which has both as much and more is more burdensome: therefore, the New Testament is more burdensome than the Old Testament.

Furthermore, the Old Testament restrains the hand, but not the mind; whereas the New Testament restrains both the hand and the mind. It is more difficult to restrain both the hand and the mind than the hand alone: therefore, the New Testament is more burdensome.

ON THE CONTRARY:
It is said in Acts 15:10: "Why do you test God by putting a yoke on the neck of the disciples, which neither our fathers nor we were able to bear?" Therefore, it seems that the Old Testament is more burdensome than the New Testament.

Also, in Matthew 11:28 and 30: "Come to me, all you who labor and are burdened, and I will refresh you. Take my yoke upon you, and learn from me, for I am gentle and humble in heart: and you will find rest for your souls. For my yoke is easy, and my burden is light." Therefore, it seems that they are equally light.

Solution. It is easy to determine all such arguments: because as the authorities and reasons go, they indicate a certain distinction. Therefore, it must be known that the New and Old Testaments can be considered as type and truth: and thus one is in the other. However, if they are considered in terms of the material of the precepts and the motivation to fulfill them, then the Old Testament is much more burdensome: because it has more precepts, and fear motivates the fulfillment of them. But if they are considered in terms of the perfection of the state of those things which are commanded, then the New Testament is more difficult.

And through this, the solution to all is now clear.

Articulus 17 — Whether Circumcision Is Well Defined By Damascene

Is circumcision well defined by Damascene?

The first question that arises here is, What is circumcision?

John Damascene defines it thus: Circumcision was a sign distinguishing Israel from the Gentiles with whom they interacted.

But against this definition, there are multiple objections.

1. First, as was previously evident from the statements of Hugh, the sacraments of the old law are called sacraments in comparison to the sacraments of the new law which they signify: therefore, it seems that they should be defined in comparison to those; and this is not done with circumcision.
2. If perhaps you say that it is different with circumcision because it effected what it prefigured. On the contrary: Damascene says in the same place: Circumcision was a type of baptism, but a type should be defined in comparison to that of which it is a type. Also, a little below: With the truth appearing, the type and shadow become useless. Therefore, it is superfluous to be circumcised, and contrary to holy baptism.
3. Furthermore, it is objected regarding what he says: Distinguishing Israel from the Gentiles, etc. Either he speaks of the distinction of interaction or of the distinction of place concerning habitation. If of the distinction of interaction, on the contrary: The law was given for this, as Psalm 147:20 says: He has not dealt thus with any nation, and his judgments he has not made known to them. Therefore, it seems that circumcision was not given for this. If he speaks of the distinction of habitation, then it seems that later, those dwelling in peace in the promised land should not have been circumcised, because then they were not mixed with other Gentiles, which is frivolous: therefore, it determines in no way.
4. Also, every distinction is given through a manifest sign: circumcision is a certain determination: therefore, it should be done on the forehead or in another manifest place, as it seems.
5. Also, since there are two things in a sacrament: to sanctify and to signify: sanctifying is more principal: therefore, circumcision should be defined more by that than by the determination which pertains to the sign. If you say that it does not sanctify of itself, but by the virtue of faith. On the contrary: Hugo says: The sacrament of circumcision was given for sanctifying and signifying the seed of Abraham: therefore, circumcision was given for sanctifying: and thus it should be defined principally by the act of sanctification.

Solution. It must be said that the principal act of circumcision is the remedy for original sin, and a certain sanctification of the time, namely, such as could be provided by circumcision at that time.

As for what is objected concerning Damascene, it must be said that he does not define it in comparison to baptism: because it had a certain effect of grace in the law as a remedy against original sin: and such an effect is always principal in a sacrament: although it was also a type of baptism.

To the other objection, it must be said that the determination of interaction is understood principally from the grace of circumcision, and consequently also the determination of habitation: and therefore Damascene himself says that during the forty years they were in the desert, they were not circumcised: because then they were not mixed with other nations: and in this, he only touches on a secondary cause: because the true cause was that they were under the cloud, and they had to move at the movement of the cloud, and their wounds could not have healed if they had been circumcised.

And to what is objected against this, it must be said that the law was given for interaction, as a rule of morals and works, but circumcision as a sign and mitigator of concupiscence moving towards bad interaction.

To the other objection, it must be said that there were two things in circumcision: because there was a sign, and a remedy for original sin: and from both together, it was necessary to determine its place, namely, in the place of the propagation of original sin, as the Master will say below: but on the forehead or another place, it would not have signified in this way.

To the other objection, it must be said that sanctification does not pertain to circumcision except indirectly, as will be evident in the following question: and therefore it is not explicitly placed in the definition, but implicitly in what is said, distinguishing, it is implied.

Articulus 18 — Whether Circumcision Also Impressed A Character

Does circumcision also imprint a character?

Next, the question arises concerning what is stated there, F, near the beginning: Since circumcision was instituted among the people of God, which was then the sign of the righteousness of faith, etc.

From this, it seems that:

1. Circumcision imprinted a character because a character is the same as a sign.
2. Furthermore, there are other reasons: because the non-repetition of imprinting a character accompanies all sacraments, as is proven by induction: however, circumcision was not repeated: therefore, it imprinted a character.
3. Furthermore, an internal distinction should correspond to an external distinction, of which the external is the cause: therefore, since circumcision is an external distinction, it seems that some internal distinction should correspond to it.
4. Furthermore, that sacrament effects what it signifies; however, suppose that someone fictitiously received it, it is clear that once the fiction is removed, it begins to be valid for him: therefore, it is necessary that something is placed in him in which the sacrament

remains, as we do in baptism: but this can only be a character: therefore, it seems to have imprinted a character.

ON THE CONTRARY:

1. The most perfect sacraments imprint a character: but circumcision is an imperfect sacrament, as is evident, because it was changed into baptism: therefore, it did not imprint a character.
2. Furthermore, suppose it imprinted a character on someone, and he was later baptized, it is clear that he would receive the character again: therefore, he would have two: and since both are of faith, because baptism (as Augustine says) is the sacrament of faith, and circumcision (as the Apostle says) is the sign of faith: therefore, there would be two characters of the same species in one person, which cannot be: therefore, it did not imprint a character.
3. Furthermore, a character is configuring to the Trinity: and this is suitable for both males and females: but circumcision was only for males: therefore, circumcision did not imprint a character.

Solution. It must be said that circumcision did not imprint a character: because a character is a spiritual configuration of the created trinity, which is in the image of the uncreated Trinity.

To the first, it must be said that it was a bodily sign, and not a spiritual one: namely, in that it signifies the diminution of concupiscence from the part of the body, besides the fact that it would imprint a sign on the soul.

To the second, it must be said that that proposition is true of the sacraments of the new law, which can in no way be repeated: but it is not true of those which are not repeated on the same matter, although they are repeated on another, such as penance, anointing, and marriage, and the Eucharist: but circumcision was not repeated, because it signified that which is not to be repeated, namely baptism. Or it is better to say that it was not repeated because it was against the disease of original sin, which is not repeated, and not because of the impression of a character.

To the third, it must be said that it does not follow that an external distinction is in vain unless it is given as a cause to an effect: and this is false: because it has another act with respect to which it is not in vain, but useful.

To the fourth, that once the fiction is removed, circumcision begins to be valid, it must be said that it is not because grace is contained as in a vessel in some character: but rather because the Holy Spirit does not find an obstacle that prevents grace, and what was to be done bodily has been fulfilled: and therefore it is not required to be repeated: just as in other bodily actions, which someone is obliged to, if they perform them fictitiously, it is not necessary to do them again. For if I vowed to give a hundred pounds to the poor, if I give them while in mortal sin, and later repent, it is not enjoined upon me to give again: because although the giving passes, nevertheless the loss remains, and yet it can later be valid for me

according to approval. So I also say about circumcision: because it was also a bodily sign, if some proselyte received it fictitiously, it was not necessary for him to be circumcised again when not fictitious.

If perhaps it is objected that someone circumcised is recognizable from someone uncircumcised by the sight of an angel or spiritual eye: and this cannot be unless there is some sign in the soul, just as also by the character the soul of the baptized is recognized from the soul of the unbaptized. It must be said that that mark is not a character: because thus even the mark of mortal sin would be a character: but it is only called a character when it is a configuration of the image to the uncreated Trinity, and this is not in circumcision.

Articulus 19 — Whether Circumcision Justified

Did circumcision justify?

Next, the question is raised about what is stated there, F, near the beginning: "It was effective for the purification of both the great and the small from original and old sin," etc.

From this, it is inferred that it justified, which also seems to be the case for another reason: because

1. At least against the disease into which it was necessary to fall, not by will but by corrupted nature, it was necessary to have a remedy, especially for the little ones, of whom innumerable would otherwise have been damned: but this remedy was nothing other than circumcision: therefore, circumcision was effective against original sin, as it seems.
2. Likewise, circumcision was not from the law, but from the fathers, and it was given as a sign of the righteousness of Abraham the just: but to others, it was given as a cause of justification, as it is said here in the text: therefore, it was effective against original sin.
3. Likewise, nothing remits sin unless it confers grace: but circumcision, as is evident in the text, remitted sin: therefore, it conferred grace.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:

1. The disease was never interrupted: therefore, if circumcision was instituted substantially against the disease, circumcision should not have been interrupted: but it was interrupted for forty years: therefore, it seems that since no other remedy was instituted at that time, it was not a substantial medicine against the disease.
2. Likewise, the disease is universal in males and females: therefore, if the medicine is substantially ordered against the disease, it should have been universal: but it was given only to males: therefore, it was not universal.
3. Likewise, in a sacrament, there are two things, namely the sign and the cause: and causality does not extend beyond the nature of the sign: therefore, any sacrament causes

as much grace as it signifies of it: but circumcision conferred nothing, but removed: therefore, it did not cause the bestowal of any good, but only the removal of evil.

4. Likewise, in evil, there are two things, namely guilt and punishment: but if guilt is removed, it is removed entirely: but circumcision only removes a part: therefore, it does not signify the removal of guilt, which is removed entirely: therefore, it does not cause it, since causality does not extend beyond the nature of signifying.

therefore it seems that circumcision caused only the remission of that penalty which is remitted in part, and not in whole: and this is the proneness of concupiscence, and not the guilt of the lack of the vision [of God]: therefore it caused only the diminution of the fomes [tinder of sin], as it seems.

SOLUTION. It must be said that sin was remitted in circumcision: but circumcision operated the destruction [i.e., removal] of sin a posteriori. For example, in sin there are three things connected to each other, namely guilt, the lack of the vision of God, and the kindling of the fomes: and if something ought directly to delete sin, it must have primary causality toward the deletion of guilt: and because the other two are connected to it, therefore the penalty of the lack of vision is remitted posteriorly in whole, and the kindling of the fomes in part. And thus baptism operates: because by its power grace washes away the stains of guilt first, and posteriorly the adjoined penalties also fall away. But circumcision, as the last objection proves, posits causality against the kindling of the fomes, and therefore it begins to delete sin a posteriori: for it remits the kindling of the fomes: and because that cannot be diminished unless the guilt [reatus] ceases in whole, therefore that [guilt] is remitted in whole: but because that is connected to guilt, therefore guilt is also remitted. And this is what some of the ancients wrote, that circumcision of itself operates the diminution of penalty: but the virtue of faith in it operated the remission of guilt: and thus are understood the first reasons which prove that it was a remedy for original [sin].

To the first, however, which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that it was indeed ordained against the disease, but not substantially: and therefore for some cause (which was stated above) it could be intermitted.

To the next it must be said that although the disease was universal, nevertheless propagation is in one [the male], and in the other only passively: and therefore the remedy had to be placed in the former. And this will be more evident below.

To the next I readily concede, namely, that circumcision began to delete sin from the posterior part and not directly.

Articulus 20 — What Is Meant By The Bosom Of Abraham; And, Whether Little Ones Dying Are In Any Misery

What is called the bosom of Abraham? and, Are infants dying [without baptism] in any misery?

Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, F, toward the end: However, in the bosom of Abraham after death, consoled with a blessed rest, etc.

For what is here called the bosom of Abraham? If perhaps you should say according to Jerome, that the rest of the good fathers is called the bosom of Abraham: this does not seem right, because

§ 1. That rest is in heaven in which the fathers were not before the advent of Christ.

§ 2. Next, If you should say according to some, that the bosom is called a protection from interior and exterior misery: again it does not seem fitting: since misery is not removed, except by its contrary, which is beatitude: and the fathers at that time were not blessed [beati], since they were not enjoying the vision of God.

§ 3. Furthermore, If you were to say that it is called protection from not being burned by fire, and not being harmed by the worm of conscience: this again does not seem fitting: because even children dying before baptism (as it is believed) are not burned by fire, nor are they gnawed by the worm of conscience, since they bring with them no personal offense, concerning which alone is there a worm: therefore it seems that this bosom could not be spoken of in this way.

§ 4. Furthermore, It seems that this bosom was not in hell: because, in Luke 16:23, it is said that the rich man, lifting up his eyes, when he was in torments, saw Abraham from afar, and Lazarus in his bosom: therefore the bosom was far above hell: therefore not in hell.

But to the contrary: this is what Christ did in death when He descended to Limbo: and this was to descend to hell: therefore this Limbo and bosom is in hell.

Next it is asked, Why is it called the bosom of Abraham rather than of Adam, or Abel, or another: since from Adam all who have multiplied descended, and from Abel the Church began, as Augustine says.

SOLUTION. It must be said that the bosom is spoken of properly, and commonly. Commonly it is the rest of the blessed fathers, as the Gloss on Luke 16:23 says. Properly, however, it is called a place on the border [ora] of hell sequestered for the habitation of the elect, because before the advent of Christ the dead, in happy hope of redemption, were awaiting the price. Hence it is also called Limbo. A limbus is the hem [border] of a garment, just as that place was on the border of hell. And through this the solution to the first is evident.

To the second it must be said that protection is spoken of from the one actually punishing, and therefore it is called [protection from] misery: for protection from all indigence is not what is called this here: because this was not except through beatitude.

To the next it must be said that misery is in children, namely the despair of the vision of God: and therefore they are not protected from all misery: nevertheless I readily concede that children do not have the fire nor the worm.

To the next it must be said that this place is higher up on the border of hell, and far from the hell of the damned, by place, and by difference of mansion: because according to spatial

distance hell is far below, and according to the difference of habitation in hell there is eternal afflicting penalty, and dense darkness, and the worm of conscience: nothing of which was in the Limbo of the fathers, because they had some light on account of the faith and hope which they had.

To the last it must be said that it is called the bosom of Abraham on account of three things: one of which is that he obeyed to go out from the idolaters and his homeland: and therefore he merited to be a father in the homeland. The second is because he was the first to receive the blessing of the blessed seed. The third is because he is the Father of believers in circumcision, and of believers in uncircumcision: and in both he had seed through Ishmael and Isaac.

Articulus 21 — Why Women Were Not Circumcised

Why were women not circumcised?

Next it is asked concerning what is said: But it is asked concerning the men who were before circumcision, and concerning the women, etc.

And there is a doubt, § 1. Why were women not circumcised, since they had original [sin], just as males did?

§ 2. Next, Why was circumcision in males made circular, and not the cutting off of a certain portion?

§ 3. Next, Why was it done on the member of generation rather than in another place?

§ 4. Next, Since in Genesis 17:11 it is said: You shall circumcise the flesh of your foreskin, it seems that this was never fulfilled: because Ambrose says that the flesh of the foreskin is said to be that flesh of the member which is before the cartilaginous sinews: and that was not cut off, but the skin.

§ 5. Next, If that cutting off was done for the tempering of the heat of concupiscence: then it seems that the incision should have been made in the flesh: because sensation and delight flourish more in it than in the skin.

§ 6. Next, It is nothing what some seem to say as to why women were not circumcised: namely because that in which libido is condemned in women is inside: because in men that in which libido is condemned is not cut off: for this, as physical discourses say, is not the skin, but the flesh at the head of the member: but the skin in a woman could be cut off just as in a man.

SOLUTION. It must be said that it was not done to women for three causes: one of which is because our nature is not corrupted in the woman, because in her it was not total, but rather in Adam: and therefore in the sons similar to him it was fitting for the remedy to be placed. The second cause is that the man is the principal in generation, and in the seed of the man is the formative power, and the seed of the woman is like formed and patient matter: and therefore the Doctors also say, that if Adam had not sinned, but only the woman, original [sin] would not have been transfused into us regarding guilt, but regarding the penalty which is called the passibility of nature, not the vice: and therefore it was fitting again that the mark of

obedience to the mandate of circumcision be placed in Adam. The third cause is so that the imperfection of the sacrament might be shown, and another more general and better one might be expected: and I think that this cause is better.

To the next it must be said that it was made circular: so that the circle of sin might be noted: because that (as the Apostle says) was first in the person in the first parents, and then the serpent like a cancer corrupted nature in them, and from that [corrupted] nature in children, and the corrupted nature in children corrupts the person of the children: and thus the circle is concluded from person to person. Or thus: because the soul corrupted the flesh in the parents, and the flesh [corrupted] the sown flesh in the children, and the flesh [corrupted] the soul infused into them: and thus again the circle of the first curse is concluded. To the next it must be said, as the Master says in the Letter: because disobedience was first perceived in that concupiscence of its own libido was corrupted and infected in that place.

To the next it must be said that that cutting off is dangerous, and against the good of offspring in matrimony: but the incision is made in the skin covering that flesh, so that it may be noted that the same flesh ought to be cooled from the heat.

To the next it must be said that women were not circumcised for the reason stated above.

Articulus 22 — Whether All Were Bound To Circumcision

Were all bound to circumcision?

Next it is asked concerning what is said, there, H, Here it must be said, in what circumcision was instituted, etc.

For it seems that all were bound to circumcision: because in all libido was condemned.

Next, Genesis 17:12, it says: whether homeborn, or bought : and no one is excepted: therefore the generation of Rachel is obligated to this, and the generation of Esau.

But against this is what the Gloss of Ambrose says on the Epistle to the Romans 4:13 We cannot say that the peoples of the nations are bound to circumcision, unless they were nourished in the house of the Patriarchs, or bought for a price.

And briefly it is asked, Who were obligated by the mandate of circumcision, and who were not, and by what reason were they obligated?

SOLUTION. It must be said that the reason for circumcision was the diminution of concupiscence in those who pertained to the blessed and promised seed: but they pertained in two ways, namely in receiving the inheritance, and as those through whom the seed would descend: and therefore no others were obligated, as Ambrose says, except those only: but the household was obligated as long as it had a relation through its lords to the service and use of the inheritance, that is, as long as they were in the house of him who was the true heir: and therefore Ishmael and Esau and others, when they were separated from the right of inheritance, and the hope of the promised seed, straightaway as the cause of circumcision ceased in them, they were absolved from the mandate of circumcision, and were no longer bound. And through this the solution to the whole is evident.

Articulus 23 — Whether The Three Causes Of Circumcision Touched Upon By The Master Are Well Assigned

Are the three causes of circumcision touched upon by the Master well assigned?

Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, H, around the middle: But circumcision was given for multiple causes, etc.

For he touches upon three causes here, namely the proving of Abraham's obedience, and a sign of the great faith of Abraham, and the distinguishing of the people from whom Christ willed to be born. To these three are added two in the Gloss on the Epistle to the Romans 4 , namely so that it might indicate chastity of mind and body, and so that it might be a figure of baptism.

And it is asked, According to what are these causes taken?

§ 1. Next, It is asked concerning the first: because Adam was tempted in one indifferent matter: but Abraham in two: one sacrificial, so to speak, and the other sacramental, and both very penal. And it is asked, why this?

§ 2. Next, Concerning the second: because the sign and the signified ought to have some similitude: but circumcision seems to have no similitude. § 3. Next, Against the third: because circumcision is a figure of baptism: and baptism distinguishes no one, but unites all: therefore neither should circumcision have distinguished anyone.

§ 4. Next, Against the fourth: because the human race had failed in other virtues, just as also in chastity: therefore it seems that it ought to have received a sign availing for those, just as it received [one availing] for chastity.

Next, It was a sign of faith, as the second cause says: therefore it was taken rather to indicate faith, than to indicate chastity.

§ 5. Next, Against the fifth: because it does not seem to have a similitude with baptism, neither in matter, nor in form: therefore it was not a sign of it.

SOLUTION. To the first it must be said that these causes are partly taken from the side of the one receiving it first, and partly from the reason of circumcision.

From the side of the receiver in three ways, according to the fact that three things are required for attaining the promised seed. One from the side of life which makes worthy by way of congruity, and this is obedience. Another from the side of the promised thing, and this requires faith: and these are the first two. The third is from the side of suitability for the carnal descent of the blessed seed: and this is chastity, and this is the fourth cause.

But from the reason of circumcision two are taken, because from that part by which it is a sign, the matter is taken: so that that people might be distinguished by a carnal mark, and this is the third. But from the side of the effect the fifth is taken: because through the effect it signified baptism.

It must be said therefore to the first, that Adam was tempted according to the mode of his state, in that in which great obedience was commendable: and only in one thing, because he

did not yet need many, but only that he might receive an experiment of his obedience, in an indifferent matter. But Abraham was tempted as a man needing liberation and a liberator: and therefore in difficult matters: and the temptation regarding the immolation of his son prefigured the need for a liberator, while the temptation regarding circumcision [prefigured] the liberation.

To the next it must be said that circumcision is a sign of faith, not as to any article whatsoever, but, as Augustine says, because he believed that he would have a son in whom the blessing of all would be made: and as to this through the place of generation it posits a similitude to the thing believed.

To the next it must be said that it is a figure of baptism, just as the imperfect of that which is perfect, and just as a particular of that which is universal: and therefore it distinguishes, although baptism distinguishes nothing.

To the next it must be said that although the human race had failed in other things, nevertheless as to the generation of the seed a reparation was chiefly required in faith that it might be cured, and in chastity that it might be fittingly received.

To the last it must be said that it has an agreement in effect with baptism, and as to this it figures it.

Other things which are to be asked, the Master well determines in the Letter, except this alone, which the Hebrews relate, that none but the principal circumcisions were made with stone knives, namely [that] of the sons of Moses when the people of the children of Israel were to be led out at the hill of foreskins into the land of promise: because this signified the state of resurrection, when by the rock Christ all corruption would be circumcised from the elect.

DISTINCTIO II

Divisio Textus

Now let us approach the sacraments of the new law, etc.

Here begins the treatise in particular. And it is divided into seven according to the seven sacraments: and the places of inception of each part are manifest enough.

This treatise which is about Baptism, is divided into two parts: in the first of which the Master treats of the baptism of Christ: and this begins in the following distinction, namely the third, there, A, After these things it must be seen what baptism is, etc.

This distinction is again divided into two parts: in the first of which he touches briefly upon the number of sacraments and the time of inception and institution. In the second, however, he posits a brief treatise on the baptism of John, there, D, But now let us see concerning the sacrament of baptism, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether Sacraments Ought To Be Ordained Against All Punishments; And, What Their Division Is

Ought sacraments to be ordained against all penalties? and, What is their division?

Concerning the first note, that besides the divisions which we posited above according to the division of sign and cause, others indeed make other divisions. And therefore we may object thus:

§ 1. Above it was supposed from the Letter, that a sacrament is ordained against sin: because Luke proved this through the parable of the wounded man who fell among robbers: but since there are certain defects into which man falls from sin, it seems that we ought to have sacraments against those. Now there are four, as Gregory and Bede say, namely ignorance of what is to be done, weakness in doing it, concupiscence for harmful things, and malice against good things. But we have no sacrament against ignorance, and none against malice as such.

§ 2. Next, Even in the works of mercy there is a septenary against the defects into which we fall. One septenary indeed on the part of the body, which is noted in the verse:

I visit, give drink, feed, give a roof, gather, bury. For six are expressed here in words: but the first is taken in a twofold signification: in the visitation of the sick, and for the visitation of captives.

If perhaps you should say that these defects are corporeal, and sacramental grace is not ordained against them: then there is the question concerning the seven spiritual ones which are noted in another verse:

Instruct, chastise, console, forgive, bear with, pray. These also are expressed in six words: but to chastise is taken for the public reproof of delinquents, and the occult admonition of delinquents. Thus indeed these all seem to be spiritual. Therefore it seems that we ought to have remedies against them, or the number of sacraments will be diminished.

SOLUTION. Here we will assign the congruences of the Doctors, and there are three.

For some wish to take the number of sacraments according to the number of virtues: so that Baptism is the sacrament of faith: Extreme Unction of hope, because he who is anointed hopes for the state of resurrection: but the Eucharist is the sacrament of charity: Confirmation, however, of fortitude, on account of the battle for which he is confirmed: Penance, however, of justice, on account of satisfaction: and order of prudence, on account of the keys of science which are conferred upon the ordained: and Matrimony of temperance, by the fact that libido in that sacrament is honorably received by nuptials.

Others wish to ordain them against the seven capital vices thus: that baptism is against pride, by the fact that man humbles himself there under a more common element: but the Eucharist against envy, because envy is contrary to charity, on account of this that envy grieves over what charity rejoices in: confirmation against acedia, by which man is confirmed so that he may be strong in spiritual labors, in which one is saddened, and thus is called acedious: extreme unction against anger, because anger proceeds from a swelling whose mit-

igant is oil: order is against avarice, because the Levites, content with God alone, had no portion among their brethren, just as also clerics when they receive the crown or first tonsure, say through the mouth of the Bishop: The Lord is the portion of my inheritance, etc. Penance operates against gluttony through the affliction of the flesh and abstinence: and matrimony against lust, by receiving base concupiscence with the honesty of nuptials.

Others wish to take them according to the states of contemplatives and actives in the Church thus: The state of actives is of those entering, and fighting, and healing wounds, having over them a leader and aid, whence falling soldiers may be restored, and there are departing veterans. But the state of contemplatives is in the taste of divine things. They say therefore, that baptism is of those entering, confirmation is of those proceeding to battle, but penance is of those healing their wounds, and in the place of a leader is order or the ordained, the departing and veterans are anointed, and their number is restored through matrimony, but the Eucharist is of contemplatives tasting, or even of entering actives on account of the fact that it is a viaticum [provision for the journey].

We say therefore to the first, that those penalties of sin which are not directly ordained into sin, but rather are promotive of good, do not have sacraments ordained against them, such as hunger, thirst, and the like. And through this the solution to the second number of defects is evident. But the other spiritual penalties which are effects: either they have from elsewhere a medicine more substantial to them, as ignorance of what is to be done which is provided for through doctrine: or they are reduced to these against which there are sacraments, just as weakness in doing things is cured in confirmation, but concupiscence chiefly in matrimony: but malice does not state a special defect, but an inclinability into evil, and that is cured not in one but in multiple sacraments, by the fact that it is a general defect more easily inclinable into evil than into good. And through this the solution to that which is objected concerning the first division of penalties or defects is evident.

To the last it must be said that all these defects except one are reduced to penance: because all those consist in the actual sin of another man, who is our neighbor by nature: but that one is the defect of ignorance, which has a more substantial cause, as much through exterior doctrine as through a sacrament: and therefore sacramental graces are not multiplied according to them, but rather the modes of the virtue of mercy, which we cannot have without aiding others who need ours.

Articulus 2 — Why The Sacraments Were Not Instituted Immediately After The Fall Of Man

Why were the sacraments not instituted soon after the fall of man?

Next it is asked concerning what he says there, B, But if it is asked, Why were these sacraments not instituted soon after the fall of man, etc.

It seems that they ought to have been immediately: because § 1. A disease is more easily cured at the beginning than at the end: therefore a wise physician ought rather to have applied the medicine from the beginning.

§ 2. Next, The solution which is posited in the Letter, that man had to be convinced of the natural and written law, is not valid: because a disease long continued in a subject turns into a stupor, as Bernard says in the first book to Pope Eugene therefore it seems that the longer he waited, the less man recognized his disease: and thus the cause which is assigned in the Letter is nothing.

§ 3. Next, Hugh says, that as soon as there is a disease, so soon is it the time for medicine: but the disease was from the beginning from which Adam sinned: therefore from then it was the time for exhibiting sacraments as medicine.

§ 4. Next, The cause he touches upon seems to be nothing, that sacraments having their power from the Passion of Christ ought not to have been instituted before the advent of Christ: because even the ancients were saved by virtue of the Passion in faith of the one to come, as was held in the third book of the Sentences: therefore in the same way the Passion to be handed down, although not completed in work, could operate in the sacraments of the old law and of the natural law.

Further it is asked, Why did the fathers have certain sacraments in the law of nature, and of Moses, just as we do: but certain ones according to a part, and not according to the whole: and certain ones in figure only: and certain ones neither in whole, nor in part, nor in any determinate figure? For example, they had matrimony in whole: penance in part, because they were contrite just as we are, but they did not confess just as we do: but they had order and the Eucharist in figure: but confirmation and extreme unction they seem to have had in nothing: for it cannot be said that in the three unctions of David a threefold unction is signified, but rather none: because he was not anointed with the unction of Levites, nor the unction of fighters, nor the unction of the dying or sick: therefore it is evident that it figured none of these.

Furthermore, the unctions of David were singular: but two of these, namely confirmation, and extreme unction, are universal: therefore they were not signified in that, nor in any other royal unction, as it seems.

Next, It is asked concerning this which some say here, that not only was matrimony instituted before the sin, as the Master says in the Letter in this word, when he said: On whatever day you shall eat of it, you shall die the death: which certain Saints expound of the death of penance. For it seems not to be fitting: because penance is the direct medicine of actual sin: therefore it ought not to have been instituted before sin.

Next, If the Lord understood this so that He might institute a time of penance there for man who was about to fall, lest he perish totally, just as the Angel fell once, and is damned, why did He not say openly: If you shall eat, I will give you a space of penance in another place than in this one: which place will be of mourning, and of death, and of labor?

SOLUTION. It must be said that from the beginning of the disease it was the time for medicine, either in signifying it, or in causing it: for it was otherwise concerning a disease of the mind, and a disease of the body: because a man must pre-recognize that he is sick, and the destitution of the aid which he believes he has from himself: and he must recognize the power

of the physician, and the mode of the medicine. And this is because the cure of the mind depends on our consent and devotion: but it is not so concerning a disease of the body: and therefore a disease of the mind demands a long delay beforehand: for it is not recognized through experience, since it is in the sweet delectables of concupiscence, but rather it is investigated by reason, with divine illumination elevating it to this.

And through this the solution to the first three is evident.

To the next it must be said that the sacraments of Christ did not have power before the Passion: but the Passion had power in faith: and this is not the power of the sacraments of the new law. For the power of these sacraments is in containing, and giving immediately: but to those fathers the whole was promised in the future: and therefore they could not exist before the Passion which actually paid the price of redemption.

To the next it must be said that I do not say that the ancients had the total effect of matrimony insofar as it is a sacrament before the Passion: because I think that it confers grace, namely the sacrament ordained under the keys of the Church, and celebrated in the faith of the two natures united in Christ. But this is true, that it had the integrity of its goods in antiquity. And then we will say that this happens on account of the generality of that material defect, which is repaired by a corporeal act. But in others an act of spiritual grace operates against the defect: and then either it is a sacrament of the fullest grace as to state, or not. And if it is of the fullest grace as to state: then they had it in no way, just as in confirmation, which gives the Holy Spirit for strength: and extreme unction, in which is signified the full purity of body and soul through the removal of all things impeding the glory of both parts of man. Now I say of the fullest grace as to state: because some are of full grace as to state, as the two said sacraments: but some as to effect, such as baptism: some as to the dignity of the thing contained and signified, as the Eucharist: and some as to the degree of prelacy, as order. And through this the solutionis evident to almost everything except the last. For the ancients had penance in part, and in part they did not have it, on account of the personal sin against which penance is ordained. And it is necessary that each person satisfy for himself interiorly and exteriorly if he is able. But because they did not have the power of the keys, and penance in confession presents itself to the keys, they did not have confession except in figure: but the other sacraments they had in figure.

To the last it must be said that penance either was not instituted in the state of innocence: or if this is found, then it was as a purgative medicine, and then it ought not to have been openly signified: lest from the foreknowledge of the fall despair should distress those who had not yet sinned: because if God had predicted it openly, they would have conceived some estimation of their future state: and this is shown to be impossible in the second book of the Sentences.

Articulus 3 — Whether The Baptism Of John Conferred Grace

Did the baptism of John confer grace?

Next it is asked concerning what he says: But now let us see concerning the sacrament of baptism, etc.

For there he touches upon the baptism of John, determining four things concerning it in order in the Letter, namely whether it had an effect? And, why is it called the baptism of John? And, Whether it is a sacrament? And, Whether those who were baptized by him were to be rebaptized?

Now a question arises concerning the first, Whether the baptism of John conferred grace or not?

It seems, moreover, that it did not.

§ 1. For whatever was before the Passion from which all sacraments draw their power, this did not confer grace, as was held in the preceding chapter: but the baptism of John was before the Passion: therefore it did not confer grace.

§ 2. Also, it is so in charity, that that which introduces it, does not give charity or sanctifying grace, like servile fear: therefore, naturally, that which is the introduction of baptism, ought not to give the grace of baptism: but this is the baptism of John: therefore it did not confer grace.

§ 3. Also, if it had conferred grace, by the same reasoning it would have imprinted a character: therefore those later baptized with the baptism of Christ would have had two characters, which is impossible.

§ 1. When the shadow ceased, grace ought immediately to have come: but the Law and the Prophets were until John therefore in the baptism of John grace ought to have come: therefore it conferred grace.

§ 2. Also, it is established that it was not a sacrament of the Old Law: therefore of the New: therefore it effected what it figured: therefore it conferred grace.

§ 3. Also, the baptism of John was closer to the baptism of Christ than circumcision was: because it was a middle between the baptism of Christ and circumcision: therefore it seems that it conferred a fuller grace than circumcision: but circumcision in some way conferred grace, as was held before: therefore much more so the baptism of John.

§ 4. Also, John was sent to prepare a perfect people for the Lord but the people could not be perfect unless his baptism conferred grace: therefore it conferred grace.

§ 5. Also, the baptism of John is after the Law: therefore it adds something over and above the sacraments of the Law: but those signified grace: since therefore the nearest step after acknowledgment is healing, it seems that the baptism of John healed.

Solutio. It must be said that the baptism of John conferred no grace, as all the Saints commonly say.

To that, however, which is objected [in § 1], it must be said that the shadow did not cease before the Passion, as will be said in the following distinction: but it began to decline in the

baptism of John: and therefore it is said that the Law and the Prophets were until John: just as a fever is said to cease when it is in decline, and a shadow to cease when it is in decline.

To the next it must be said that it was not properly a sacrament, as will be clear below: but it was a middle between the sacraments of the New Law and the Old, and therefore it agreed with both: with the latter in not conferring grace, but with the former in act and matter.

To the next it must be said that it was closer to the baptism of Christ in a certain respect, and farther in another respect than circumcision: for in respect to act and matter it was closer, but in respect to effect it was farther: and therefore it is posited as a middle only in the order of signifying, not of causing.

To the next it must be said that the perfection which John brought about was a perfection of doctrine, not of grace. Hence it is said in John 1:8: He was not the light, but was to give testimony of the light. Now, testimony pertains to doctrine, and not to grace.

To the last it must be said that it was after the signification of circumcision: and it does not follow that if it added to the ratio of a sign, it added causality, because a sign compared to a sign of the same thing is more explicit: and it added that explicitness: and therefore it does not follow that it conferred grace.

Articulus 4 — Whether The Baptism Of John Was Unto Penance, And Not Unto The Remission Of Sins

Whether the baptism of John was unto penance, and not unto the remission of sins?

Whether the baptism of John was unto penance, and not unto the remission of sins?

Next, it is asked concerning what he says there in D, around the middle: The baptism of John was unto penance, not unto remission, etc.

§ 1. It seems that penance was rather unto baptism, than conversely: because first he taught to repent, and afterward he baptized: therefore penance was rather unto baptism, than conversely.

§ 2. Also, it seems to have been a baptism unto baptism: because it was ordered to the baptism of Christ: therefore it was unto baptism, and not unto penance.

§ 3. Also, if it was unto penance, then it seems that it was an occasion of error: because baptism does not require groaning and mourning: therefore if the baptism of John was unto penance, this seems to be a teaching in a sign that baptism requires groaning and mourning: therefore it was an occasion of error, as it seems.

Solutio. It must be said that the baptism of John is said to be unto penance which was prerequired, lest the baptism of Christ should find those being baptized by it to be feigned: and therefore penance followed the baptism of John in the order of intention, although perhaps it preceded it in time.

To the next it must be said that it is not said to be a baptism unto baptism unless it is determined: because otherwise it would be taken for the same baptism, and then it would be

the same thing: but because it immediately ordered to the penance which removed the obstacle of feigning for the baptism of Christ, it is therefore said to be unto penance.

To the next it must be said that the baptism of Christ does not require exterior groaning and mourning: but nevertheless, as Augustine says, everyone who is established as the arbiter of his own will cannot begin a new life unless he repents of his old life: and therefore it requires interior groaning and mourning, lest those who are to be baptized be found feigned.

Articulus 5 — Why It Is Called The Baptism Of John

Why is it called the baptism of John?

Next, it is asked concerning what he says there in E, § 2: But it is asked, why was it called the baptism of John, etc.

§ 1. For it seems that by the same reasoning one should speak of the baptism of Paul: since Paul also baptized.

§ 2. Also, this seems to be taken from what is said, 1 Cor 1:12: I indeed am of Paul; and I am of Apollo; and I of Cephas: therefore he was glorying in the baptism of Paul: therefore anyone's baptism was called his own.

§ 3. Also, it is called the Gospel of Paul which Paul preached, and of Peter which Peter preached: therefore by a similar reasoning the baptism with which Paul baptized will be called the baptism of Paul, as it seems.

§ 4. Also, if perhaps you say that the disciples baptized in the name of Christ: and baptism, as Augustine says, is given in his name: therefore it seems that it should not be called the baptism of John, but of Christ: because he himself baptized (as it is said) in the name of the one to come, and the one to come was Christ.

Solutio. It must be said that it is called the baptism of John because there was nothing in it except the operation of John, as Augustine says in the text: but it was not so in the baptism of the disciples, in which the whole principal operation belonged to Christ, namely the interior operation or baptism. For since there are two operations in baptism, exterior and interior: the interior is more principal, and the exterior is various: and therefore it is called the baptism of him who operates by the more principal operation. However, because this is lacking in the baptism of John, it is therefore called nothing other than the baptism of John.

To the first and second, therefore, it must be said that that contention was reprehensible, and was corrected by the Apostle: hence he said: Is Christ divided? or, Was Paul crucified for you? As if he were to say: You, by your contention, dismiss Christ, as if baptism were divided according to the merits of the baptizers: which is not true, since Christ crucified baptizes in every baptism of the baptizers.

To the next it must be said that the Gospel and baptism are not similar: because the former does not have its power from the work worked [ex re operata] immediately from the Passion of Christ: but the word of preaching is often hindered or promoted by the good or bad merits

of the preachers: therefore that act is said to belong to the one exercising it in ministry: but it is not so said in baptizing.

To the next it must be said that John did not baptize in the name of Christ as in the form of the one baptizing: but rather as in the name of him unto whom he directed those baptized by himself. The Apostles, however, baptized in the name of Christ or the Trinity as in the form of the one baptizing.

If, indeed, you object that this is against the text in which it is said that this was his form, because he baptized in the name of the one to come. I answer that it was not a form in which there was an invocation for the sanctification of the baptism, but rather a form, that is, a mode in baptizing: because, namely, he named the one to come, and admonished the people to believe in him: nevertheless no sanctification of baptism was conferred from this by him upon another.

Articulus 7 — Whether Those Baptized By John Ought To Have Been Rebaptized

Were those baptized by John to be rebaptized?

§ 10. Next, it is inquired concerning what he says, there, at F: Here it is to be considered whether those baptized by John were baptized again, etc.

§ 11. For it seems that John baptized some who were not to be baptized [again]: because

§ 12. 1. It is said in the text that if someone was baptized by John, not placing his hope in his baptism, but having faith in the Trinity, that he was not rebaptized: therefore not all were to be baptized again.

§ 13. 2. Also, in Acts 8:15 and following, it is said that Peter and John prayed for them, namely the converts in Samaria, that they might receive the Holy Spirit: for he had not yet come upon any of them, but they were only baptized in the name of the Lord Jesus. Then they laid their hands upon them, and they received the Holy Spirit.[332] Therefore it seems that by the imposition of hands alone what was lacking to them was supplied, and they were not to be baptized again.

§ 14. 3. Also, let us suppose that someone was baptized only with the baptism of John, and has the faith of the whole Trinity: will we dare to say that he is baptized on account of the faith which he has? It seems not: because then the expressed form of words which is required in baptism would be nothing: therefore it seems that such persons were to be baptized.

§ 15. 4. Also, no baptism confers grace in which the hope of grace cannot be had, just as hope is had in a sacrament: therefore it is a meaningless statement, as it seems, that those who did not place hope in his baptism obtained grace in it, while those who placed hope do not obtain it.

§ 16. 5. Also, although it is said below that the word which makes baptism to be a sacrament is the invocation of the Trinity: not because it is spoken, but because it is believed: nevertheless

the three persons must be expressed, whether it is believed or not: therefore it seems that our hope or faith does not confer upon baptism any form of sanctification: therefore, whether they placed hope [in it] or not, those who were baptized with the baptism of John were always to be baptized [again].

§ 18. Solution. On this question some strive to introduce opinions, as if it were permitted for anyone to opine that without the form of a sacrament there could be a sacrament from our faith or from our hope.

§ 19. Whence it must be said that without a doubt grace was never conferred in the baptism of John, as all the Saints say in common: just as he himself also said, John 1:26: I baptize in water, etc.

§ 20. To that, therefore, which is said in the text, it can be answered thus: that one baptized by John not placing hope [in it], and for this very reason seeking another baptism, as of the disciples of Christ after the Passion, was not baptized [again].

§ 21. But as to what is objected concerning the Acts, it is not compelling: because there it speaks of what belongs to confirmation, not baptism. For confirmation supplies the defect of baptism, as Augustine seems to intimate: not in the being of the sacrament, because baptism is a perfect sacrament, but rather in this, that baptism diminishes the fomes [of sin], and does not extinguish it: but confirmation further weakens it. And this is clear in Acts 19:2, where those baptized by John are found not having knowledge of the Holy Spirit in hearing the form of baptism: and therefore they were baptized.

§ 22. But to the other I well concede, that faith and hope do not give the being of baptism, but only remove fiction [i.e., insincerity], so that baptism can obtain the effect of justification in us.

Articulus 6 — Whether The Baptism Of John Was A Sacrament

Was the baptism of John a sacrament?

§ 5. Next, it is inquired concerning what he says, there, at E, § 3: But if it is asked whether it was a sacrament, etc.

§ 6. For it seems to have been a sacrament: because it was a sign of a sacred thing: therefore it was a sacrament.

§ 7. But against this seems to be that divine institution is required for every sacrament. But the baptism of John was not instituted by God: therefore it was not a sacrament.

§ 8. Solution. It is easy to answer this according to what has been said before. For it should be said that it is rather a continuation of the new sacraments to the old: but nevertheless, on account of its likeness to the sacraments in the character of signifying, it receives the name of a sacrament.

§ 9. But to that which is objected to the contrary, it can be said that it was not without divine institution: for thus it is said, John 1:33: He who sent me to baptize in water, said to me: He

upon whom you shall see the Spirit descending, and remaining upon him, he it is that baptizes in the Holy Spirit.

DISTINCTIO III

Divisio Textus

§ 23. After these things it remains to be seen what baptism is, etc. Here the Master approaches the subject of baptism.

§ 24. And this treatise is divided into three parts: in the first of which he treats of the substantials of baptism. In the second, however, he treats of baptism on the part of the recipient: and this begins in the following distinction, namely the fourth, there, at A, Here it is to be said that some receive the sacrament, etc. In the third, he treats of baptism on the part of the giver or baptizer: and this begins in the fifth distinction, there, at A, After these things it is to be known that the sacrament of baptism is given by good and by evil ministers, etc.

§ 25. In the first of these, five things are determined concerning baptism: the first of which is, what baptism is, and what its form is: because these pertain to the same thing: because the definition is given according to the form. Secondly, he treats of its institution, there, at F, Concerning the institution of baptism, when it began, etc. Thirdly, he treats of the matter, there, at H, Now this sacrament is celebrated only in water, etc. In the fourth, he treats of the manner of immersion, which is the act of baptism, there, at I, But concerning immersion, if it is asked how it ought to be done, etc. In the fifth and last, he treats of the cessation of circumcision with the advent of baptism, there, at K, It is also usually asked: If circumcision lost, etc.

§ 26. The first of these is divided into three: in the first of which it is treated what baptism is in reality and definition. In the second, concerning the form of baptism which is, and which sometimes was, there, at B, But what is that word, etc. In the third he raises certain questions concerning the form, there, at C, Here it is asked whether the baptism would be true, etc.

§ 27. From these things the meaning is clear, and from the following disputation.

Articulus 1 — Whether The Definitions Of Baptism Are Well Assigned

Are the definitions of baptism well assigned?

§ 28. But first a doubt arises here: what is baptism?

§ 29. And in the text this definition is posited: Baptism is a dipping made in water, sanctified by the word of life.[333]

§ 30. But Dionysius in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy [says]: Baptism is the principle of the most holy commandments of sacred action, forming our animal habits toward the receptive fitness for other

332. Acts 8:15-17.

divine utterances and sacred actions, making our journey toward the anagogy of supercelestial rest, and the sacred tradition of our most divine regeneration.[334]

§ 31. Damascene again gives another in the fourth book on the Orthodox Faith: Baptism is that through which we receive the firstfruits of the Holy Spirit, and it becomes for us the principle of another life, and regeneration, and a seal, and a guard, and an illumination.[335]

§ 32. And it is asked first: Since of one thing there is a single being, according to what are the three definitions of baptism taken?

§ 33. Also, it is objected against the first. For it is asked: What, according to that definition, is called baptism—is it either

the water, or the dipping, or the character, or the grace?

§ 35. 1. It seems that it is the water: because since every sacrament is signifying from likeness, and its causality does not extend beyond the power of the sign: it seems that the whole substance of the sacrament is in that in which is the whole rationale of signifying: but this whole rationale is in the property of water, which washes, makes to shine, cools, and even enlivens on account of the nature of the transparent which is in it through its agreement with the heavens: therefore it seems that it itself is the sacrament: therefore it ought to have fallen in the nominative case (in recto) in the definition of the sacrament, and not in an oblique case.

§ 36. But against this seems to be that the water does not remain in baptism: but baptism always remains: therefore water is not baptism.

§ 37. 2. If perhaps it should be said, as Augustine seems to intend in the text, that the dipping itself is baptism.

§ 38. Against this is the same objection: because the dipping passes away after the dipping is done: therefore since baptism remains, it does not seem that dipping is baptism.

§ 39. Also, dipping does not seem to belong to every baptism: therefore it is not substantially posited in the definition. For that it does not belong to every one is seen, because there is a baptism of blood, and of penance, to which the dipping of baptism in water does not apply: therefore dipping is not called baptism except accidentally: therefore it ought not to be defined by dipping.

§ 40. Also, when it is said, Baptism is a dipping, etc.: the proper form ought to be expressed in baptism: for the word of life is the word of preaching, and of all the other sacraments: therefore just as one would define man badly, defining him materially thus, "Man is what is composed of body and sense": so it seems to be defined badly when it is said, Baptism is a dipping, etc.: because the word of life belongs to many things, and not to baptism alone.

§ 41. 3. If perhaps it should be said that the character is baptism.

§ 42. On the contrary: The definition of a sacrament in no way belongs to it: because it is not a visible form of invisible grace: therefore it itself is not called baptism.

333. Peter Lombard, Sentences IV.

§ 43. 4. Furthermore, it seems that grace ought to be called baptism: because each thing is denominated from its ultimate and best part: but grace is the ultimate and best part of baptism: therefore it itself denominates baptism: and baptism has to be defined by it, as it seems.

§ 44. But against this it seems: that grace is the effect of baptism: but the effect and the cause are not the same in substance: therefore grace is not the sacrament.

§ 45. Also, in the following distinction he says that some receive the sacrament, and not the reality (res) of the sacrament: therefore the sacrament according to substance can be without grace: therefore grace is not the sacrament.

§ 46. But it is objected concerning the second definition: because

§ 47. 1. Baptism is not said to be the principle of the commandments of sacred action: for confessions and renunciations precede it; for there one confesses the faith, and they renounce the devil and his pomps before baptism.

§ 48. 2. If perhaps you should say that godparents do this: this is nothing: because if he were an adult, he would have to do it by himself.

§ 49. Furthermore, the godparents themselves do this in the person of the child. Whence Dionysius says in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy: For neither does he here—namely, the godparent—say thus: I make renunciations and sacred confessions for the child: but rather that the child renounces, that is, I confess that the child believes, coming into the sacred sense by our divine anagogies, to renounce indeed universally what is contrary, but to confess and cooperate with divine confessions.[336] Therefore

it seems that the child does these things, who is not capable of a commandment: and yet he is capable of baptism, as has been said: therefore it ought not to be defined by this, that it is the principle of the commandments.

§ 51. Also, it is objected concerning the second part: For to form animal habits does not seem to belong to baptism: but since 'animal', as Augustine says in the Gloss on 1 Timothy 3, is said in two ways, namely, regarding life, and regarding sense, it seems that the virtue of temperance forms the animal life, and faith seems to form the animal sense, and not baptism.[337]

§ 52. 4. Also, it is objected concerning the third part: because contemplation makes our journey to the anagogy of supercelestial conversation more than baptism does: therefore it ought not to be placed in the definition of baptism.

§ 53. Concerning the third definition of baptism it is also objected:

§ 54. 1. If someone already sanctified approaches baptism, as Cornelius the centurion and many others, he does not receive there the firstfruits of the Holy Spirit.

334. Pseudo-Dionysius, De ecclesiastica hierarchia, ch. 2.

§ 55. 2. Furthermore, man has in his nature a seal by which he is configured to the Trinity in the image: therefore he does not receive this in baptism, as it seems.

§ 56. 3. Furthermore, why does Damascene put so many clauses in the definition there? For illumination pertains more to the intelligible virtues, such as faith, science, understanding, wisdom, prudence, and the like, than it pertains to baptism, as it seems.

§ 57. Solution. It must be said to the first, that that definition which is Augustine's and is posited in the text through other words, collects the essentials to baptism in matter and form: because the dipping in water, insofar as it is on the part of the one dipped, not the one dipping, is the matter of baptism: but the form is in the word of life. But the second is given concerning baptism insofar as it is the foundation of all the other sacraments, without which it does not happen that one enters the door of the Church: and this will be clear in the explanation of it. But the third, which is Damascene's, is given through the general effects of baptism: and this also will be clear below.

§ 58. To the other, therefore, which is asked: What is called baptism according to the definition? we can now answer in two ways: namely, either that baptism is called the dipping in water in conjunction with the character which it imprints, and thus Augustine seems to intend in the text; or conversely, that baptism is called the character, insofar as it is from such a dipping, and not absolutely.

§ 59. If we speak in the first way, then we answer the argument by saying that although properties of this sort are found in water, nevertheless it does not exercise them in act except insofar as it is dipping: and therefore it itself is not the sacrament except considered in this way, and then it is material: but the dipping itself names the thing constituted from it and the sanctifying word.

§ 60. To the other it must be said that the water and the dipping do not remain in themselves, but according to their conjunction to the remaining character, and therefore they do not pass away simply.

§ 61. To the other it must be said that the baptism of blood and of the Spirit are not called baptism absolutely, but only in a qualified sense (secundum quid), namely insofar as they supply the place of baptism where the article of necessity, and not contempt of religion, excludes the sacrament.

§ 62. To the other it must be said that the word of life is in one way in the sacraments, namely in the invocation of the Trinity, excepting the Eucharist, and extreme unction, and penance, and matrimony: for in the three the invocation is of the Trinity. But this is so because it is not so with God as it is with created forms: for in created forms no two equally special forms relate in one way to what is formed by them: but God relates in one way to everything that is, and not all things relate in one way to Him: and therefore the word of life which is in the others, namely the invocation of the Trinity, is also in

335. John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa IV, ch. 9.

baptism: but it is true that it is adapted to baptism through the act of baptizing and a special intention. Or we can say that life is the first act of a spirit, and to live is the first being for living things: and because in baptism the first being of spiritual life is given, since it is the foundation of the whole life, the word of life spiritually befits baptism more than the others. That this is true is clear from Dionysius in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, where he says thus: If to be divinely is divine generation, by no means at any time would he know any of the things handed down by God, nor indeed what he has done, who has not had divine subsistence.[338] And he intends to say that just as in natures that which does not exist neither understands nor acts: so also in divine things, he who is not first [constituted] through baptism cannot act, nor understand well.

§ 64. To that which is objected against this, that the character is called baptism. It must be said that most properly, in my judgment, the character is called baptism. And to the objection it must be said that it is visible, not in itself, but in comparison to the dipping by which it is imprinted, or in which it is imprinted by God, which is more properly said.

§ 65. To the other it must be said that grace can in no way be called a sacrament. And to the objection it must be said that the denomination is from that ultimate thing which is the perfection of the thing intrinsic to its essence: but grace is in no way of the essence of the sacrament, but is its effect.

§ 66. To that which is asked concerning the second definition, it must be said that we can better understand it through the words of another translation, which says thus: It is asked what is the principle of the most venerable precepts of sacred operation, which forms our animal habits toward the reception of other holy speakings and sanctifications, and conducts us to the upward action of the supercelestial region, which hands down our holy and most divine regeneration.[339] From this also it is clear that he means that baptism is the principle of the precepts, that is, because it is commanded to be done for us, because through it we enter the door of the Church: and it ordains us to three things, namely to being through regeneration, and he touches on this last: and to acting, and he touches on this second, because it ordains the animal senses to spiritual things in works and words according to the active [life]: and it reordains us to higher things so that we may rest in them as in the end of our actions in the contemplative [life]: and this is what he intends.

§ 67. It must be said therefore to the first, that all those confessions and sacred actions contract power from baptism, as it is in the will: for Augustine holds that everything preceding and following baptism operates by the power of baptism: and thus it is first according to nature, although it follows according to time. And that this is true is taken from his own words at the end of the first book of On Marriage and Concupiscence, where he says thus: Thus it must be taken what the Apostle says: Christ loved the Church, so that by the word of sanctification absolutely all the evils of regenerated men might be cleansed and healed: not only sins, all of which are now remitted in baptism, but also those which are contracted later by human ignorance or infirmity: not so that baptism is repeated as often as sin is committed: but because by that which is

336. Pseudo-Dionysius, De ecclesiastica hierarchia, ch. 7, part 3, § 11.

given in it, it comes to pass that pardon of any sins whatever is impetrated for the faithful not only beforehand, but also afterwards: for what would penance profit, either before baptism, unless baptism followed: or after, unless baptism preceded?[340] As if to say: Nothing. And from this the proposition is clear.

§ 68. To the other it must be said that a child is not capable of a precept except according to habit and order to the precepts: and in this

way also baptism is the principle of the operation of the precepts.

§ 70. To the other it must be said that animality is taken here broadly for the habitual obedience to concupiscence: but here baptism forms the sense by conferring the general grace of spiritual life, which begins in it by debilitating the fomes [of sin] universally.

§ 71. To the other it must be said that through the reality (res) signified and not contained it leads to the anagogy of supercelestial rest: but this reality is the brightness and splendor of the future resurrection, when we shall be washed from all corruption, filth, and stain: hence it leads otherwise than the contemplative [life] does: because the contemplative [life] leads through confession and study, but the sacrament through the likeness which it has with eternal things.

§ 72. But to that which is objected concerning the third definition, it must be said, as has already been made clear, that even if the firstfruits of the Spirit are given before baptism, that is nevertheless in the power of baptism existing in purpose as a habit, as in Cornelius: or in act, as in others who know and believe the articles [of faith] explicitly.

§ 73. To the other it must be said that man in nature has a seal of likeness as to the image, but not as to the character configuring in such a habit, as baptism gives: and therefore the objection does not proceed.

§ 74. To the last it must be said that these five things are posited in the definition of baptism, insofar as baptism operates in five ways against original sin: for original sin names a proneness to every evil by reason of the lack of due justice: but the lack of justice is followed by our dissimilitude to God, and guilt unto death: but the proneness to evil is followed by inconsiderate fall, as a blinding by which one is blinded through affection for mutable good. Against guilt, therefore, it gives the firstfruits of the Spirit; against the guilt unto death it gives the principle of life through regeneration; and against dissimilitude it gives a signet or seal; against the precipice of falling it gives a guard; and against blindness on our part it gives illumination: and thus it is clear why he posits these five clauses in the definition.

Articulus 2 — Whether There Is Any Form Of Baptism; And On Each Word Placed In The Form Of Baptism

Is there any form of baptism? and, Concerning the individual words posited in the form of baptism.

337. Glossa Ordinaria on 1 Timothy 3.

§ 75. Next it is inquired concerning what he says, there, at B, But what is that word, which coming to the element, makes the sacrament?

§ 76. For here arises a question concerning the form of baptism. And it is asked: When it is said, "I baptize you in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit," whether the pronoun ego (I) is of the essence of the form?

§ 77. 1. It seems that it is: because the intention of the baptizer is required. But this is not expressed except through the demonstration of the one intending, and demonstration is not made except through the pronoun ego: therefore the pronoun is of the form.

§ 78. 2. Also, to baptize is proper to the minister of the Church: therefore it seems that the ministering one ought to be expressed: therefore since he is not expressed except by the pronoun, for that reason it seems to be of the form.

§ 79. But against this seems to be the rule of the Grammarians who say that in verbs of the first and second person a certain and determinate nominative is understood:

therefore it is not necessary that it be added.

§ 81. Also it is further asked: Whether the word baptizo (I baptize) is of the form?

§ 82. It seems that it is not: because

§ 83. 1. It is more to express by deed than by word: therefore since there is an expression by deed, it is not necessary that it be said by word.

§ 84. 2. Also, when Christ says: Going therefore, teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit [341], he seems to enjoin the exercise, and not chiefly the expression of the act: therefore by virtue of that baptizing it is not imported that it is of the form, nor can the form be obtained by further power.

§ 85. 3. Also, He himself said: Go, teach, baptizing: but when they taught, they did not have to say beforehand: "I teach you," but by merely exercising the act they fulfilled the commandment: therefore by likeness, also by exercising the act of baptism, they fulfilled the commandment of baptism.

§ 86. 4. Also, in other blessings and sealings, as is the blessing of bread, the act of blessing is not expressed beforehand: therefore this is also not required in the act of baptizing.

§ 87. 5. Also, Exod. 14:15: Why criest thou to me? the Gloss says that he cried out with the desire of his heart:[342] therefore it seems that it is sufficient to intend, and not to express.

§ 88. 6. Also, water is of the substance of baptism: and yet it is not required that it be expressed in speech, so as to say thus: "I baptize you in water": therefore it seems that neither is the expression of the act of baptism required.

§ 89. 7. Also, since Christ is the one who truly and inwardly baptizes, it seems that it would be better expressed by saying: "May Christ baptize you," etc., than, "I baptize you."

338. Pseudo-Dionysius, De ecclesiastica hierarchia, ch. 2, part 3, § 1.

§ 90. 8. Also, the Greeks and Dalmatians baptize thus: "Let the servant of Christ be baptized in the name," etc.

§ 91. If perhaps you say that they are not baptized. On the contrary: Blessed Nicholas and other saints were baptized in this way, as it is said.

§ 92. Also, the Lord Pope Gregory, consulted upon this, responded concerning the counsel, that those who are under the Roman Church in Dalmatia should not be rebaptized, but caution should be taken lest it be done further: therefore it seems that this suffices for the form: because otherwise they would have to be rebaptized.

§ 93. 9. But if you should say that on account of the intention the expression of the act is required. On the contrary: According to this it would be better said: "I intend to baptize you," etc.

§ 94. But on the contrary: This sacrament is a sacrament of necessity for which the intention of the act which the Church does is required: therefore in order that all error may be excluded, the expression of the act is required through a verb of the first person and present tense of the indicative mood.

§ 95. Further it is asked: What does this mean which he says, in the name?

§ 96. For either it supposits for essence, or for person. If it supposits for essence: therefore it seems that essence could be posited in its place, so that it be said: "I baptize you in the essence of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit." But if it supposits for person, then it seems that it ought to be posited in the plural, so that it be said: "In the names of the Father," etc.

§ 97. Further it is asked: Whether other names signifying the same thing can be posited in place of these?

§ 98. And it seems that they can: because

§ 99. 1. Augustine says that the Son is called Word in the same way, as He is called Son: and the Holy Spirit is called gift, and love, in the same way by which He is called Holy Spirit: [343] therefore it seems that baptism could be done thus: "I baptize you in the name of the Father and of the Word and of the Love or Gift."

§ 100. 2. Also, since begetter and begotten are the same as father and son, it seems that baptism could be done by saying thus: "I baptize you in the name of the Begetter and of the Begotten and of the Proceeding Gift."

§ 101. 3. Also, since the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit operate in baptism by one indivisible operation, and they ordain to operating by power, wisdom, and goodness, it seems better to be said: "I baptize you in power, wisdom, and goodness," than, "In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit."

339. Pseudo-Dionysius, De ecclesiastica hierarchia, ch. 2 (translation of John Scotus Eriugena).

§ 102. Also, it is asked concerning this which is said by Luke, that the Apostles baptized in the name of Christ.[344]

§ 103. 1. For the Apostle says, to Ephes. 4:5: One Lord, one faith, one baptism. But it is certain that that is one which is one by unity of form, just as any thing is one: therefore it seems that since the baptism of Christ is one, it ought always to have had one form: but it is certain that if the Apostles baptized in the name of Christ, they did not have the same form which we have: therefore it was not one baptism: therefore the baptism of the Church is not one, and so the faith was regarding this article, which is one baptism, which is impossible: therefore the Apostles baptized badly in the name of Christ.

§ 104. 2. Also, whence were the Apostles of such audacity that they changed the form handed down by Christ, since in baptism no institution has validity except divine?

§ 105. Also, could the same have been done in another name as in the name of Jesus?

§ 106. It seems that it could: because Jesus and Christ name the same person: therefore what could be done in one, could also be done in the other.

§ 107. But on the contrary: In this name, Jesus, the faith of the Trinity is not thus expressed: because Jesus is interpreted as savior, which name by its force sounds only the power of deity without distinction of person: therefore it could not be done in it.

§ 108. Also, it is asked by similarity: Whether the Pope could now institute the same if he wished?

§ 109. But it seems that he could: because he is the Vicar of Christ on earth: if therefore the Apostles did this, he likewise seems to be able to do this.

§ 110. BUT ON THE CONTRARY:

§ 111. 1. In the sacraments only divine institution operates: but the Pope is not God: therefore he cannot institute it.

§ 112. 2. Also, the water in the sacrament is inferior to the form, because it is as matter: and it is certain that the Pope cannot change the matter: therefore much less can he change the form.

§ 113. Further it is asked: Whether baptism could be done in the name of one person?

§ 114. And it seems that it could: because

§ 115. 1. So it is said in the text.

§ 116. 2. Also, relatives when posited posit one another, and one is understood in the other: therefore it seems that it suffices to name one.

§ 117. To the contrary is that there is no form in baptism except the invocation of the Trinity: but the Trinity is not one person: therefore the invocation of the Trinity is not the invocation of one person.

340. Augustine, De nuptiis et concupiscentia I, ch. 33, n. 38.

§ 118. Also, it is asked: Whether one could baptize in the name of the Trinity, so that it be said thus: "I baptize you in the name of the Trinity"?

§ 119. It seems that one could: because then

§ 120. 1. None of the persons is omitted, who would not be invoked over the baptism: therefore it will be true baptism.

§ 121. 2. Also, it is said in the text that provided the faith is whole, it suffices to name one: therefore much more does it suffice if the Trinity itself be named.

§ 122. Further, it is asked concerning apposition, whether it is permitted to add something, so that it be said: "I baptize you in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit and of holy Mary," or another, or many things of this sort?

§ 123. And it seems that it is permitted: because this contributes to greater devotion, and yet does not destroy the form.

§ 124. BUT ON THE CONTRARY:

§ 125. According to this I could say: "In the name of the greater Father, the lesser Son, and the Holy Spirit the servant of both." It seems that it would be baptism, since nothing has been omitted from the form.

§ 126. Further, it is asked concerning transposition thus: "I baptize you in the name of the Son and of the Holy Spirit and of the Father."

§ 127. And it seems [it would be baptism], because the persons are equal: therefore it seems that it makes no difference which of them is prior in the sentence or posterior.

§ 128. BUT ON THE CONTRARY:

§ 129. 1. According to this the order of nature which Augustine posits in divine things is not preserved.

§ 130. 2. Also, according to this we could say: "I baptize you in the name of the second Son, and the first Father, and the third Holy Spirit": in which form the Sabellian heresy is expressed through the ordered sequence of distinctions.

§ 131. Further, it is asked concerning corruption, so that it be said: In nomine patria et filiabus et spiritibus sanctibus [In the name of the fatherland and to the daughters and to the holy spirits], whether it is baptism?

§ 132. And it seems that it is: because otherwise those who cannot pronounce [correctly] on account of stammering of the tongue and inexperience, would all baptize badly: and according to this many little ones would be damned, and many would have to be rebaptized.

§ 133. BUT ON THE CONTRARY:

§ 134. Declension is in the beginning [of words], just as also in the end: therefore if it is permitted to corrupt in the end, it is also permitted to corrupt in the beginning.

341. Matthew 28:19.

§ 1. ...which no one says: for it is not baptism if one should say, "I baptize you in the name of the Father and of the Son," etc.

§ 2. Solution. I say without prejudice that what belongs to the form according to the statute of the Church is one thing, and what belongs to it according to divine institution is another.

§ 3. As for what exists as part of the form according to the statute of the Church, if it is violated while the divine institution is observed, the one baptizing sins, and the Church can proceed severely against him: but the baptized person is not to be rebaptized. And in this way some say that the pronoun "I" (ego) belongs to the form: yet I do not think so, but rather I think that it can be omitted if someone wishes, without grave fault, though I say it is safer to add it. But as regards the institution of the Church, many say that the word "baptize" belongs to the form: in such a way that one who omits this would be reproved as for a criminal offense. But I think it more true that it belongs to the form according to necessity, such that if it is omitted, the one being baptized is not baptized: but by the judgment of all, the invocation of the Trinity also belongs to the form according to divine institution.

§ 4. Therefore, according to this opinion of mine—which belongs to many and is more celebrated today—one can respond to the first objection that the intention is better expressed in the act and pronunciation of the word: and this is because it is not the intention of a determinate person that is required, but rather that of the Church, in whose person he baptizes.

§ 5. And through this the solution to the next objection is clear.

§ 6. To that which is asked concerning the word "baptize," I say without prejudice to others that it belongs to the form of necessity of baptism, without which there is no baptism, unless a case arises on account of which it must be done otherwise for a time, just as the Apostles did.

§ 7. To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that the intention of baptism is not expressed by the act itself: because that mode of dipping also exists in other washings—especially since it is said below that an infant may be immersed once or three times, and one must express with a word signifying the Church's act of regeneration, as it seems to me.

§ 8. To the next it must be said that Christ enjoined upon them an exercise with a determination of the mode, and He included both in this when He said: Baptizing them in the name, etc. And this is because that is a sacrament of necessity, and therefore the greatest caution is required concerning it.

§ 9. To the next it must be said that the case of teaching is not comparable: because that can be outside of intention, nor does it belong to the things necessary for salvation: and therefore such an expression is not required there.

§ 10. To the next it must be said that those blessings are prayers, in which the force of intention is not great.

§ 11. To the next it must be said that it is not comparable, because in prayer—which is a pious affection directed toward God—nothing is principally regarded except the heart. But in

the sacraments, divine power operates under a visible species: and therefore intention must be expressed concerning it.

§ 12. To the next it must be said that the case of water is not comparable: because the intention is not referred to the water, but to the act, and therefore it must be expressed in the act.

§ 13. To the next it must be said that although Christ operates interiorly, nevertheless His operation only occurs with the pre-existing operation of the minister, and therefore that requires the expression of intention.

§ 14. To the next which are objected concerning the rite of the Greeks, I think that they would have to be corrected if they would acquiesce. However, concerning those who have been baptized, it may be that this form was first handed down to them on account of the fact that they thought nothing was done in baptism except the operation of a man: and therefore just as the Apostles baptized in the name of Christ, so too by the counsel of the Holy Spirit they handed it down to them, so that the act might be referred to Christ, or impersonally to Christ and the Church: and this for a time: and therefore they sin in observing this rite, just as we also would sin if we were to baptize in the name of Christ.

§ 15. Or let it be said that when it is said: "Let the servant of Christ be baptized," etc., the expression or understanding of a first-person verb is pre-understood, and in this respect it could be tolerated for a time on account of scandal, and by the command of the Holy Spirit inspiring the Church. However, the Pope was doubtful regarding this: because concerning those who are in Dalmatia, he first replied that they should be rebaptized, and later permitted it, but commanded that caution be taken in the future. Moreover, for certain brothers existing in our order (at least three in the city of Rome), he commanded that they be rebaptized.

§ 16. To the next it must be said that it is not well said: "I intend to baptize you": because from this it could not be inferred that I was baptizing according to the act, or that he was baptized according to the act: because we intend many things which we do not do: and therefore it could not be suitably expressed except in the enunciation of the act of baptism.

§ 17. To the next it must be said that the word "name" designates the known essence rendering itself in the effect of grace, which the three persons operate indifferently: and therefore the objection falls away, because although it posits the essence, it nevertheless posits it under another mode of signifying: and therefore it cannot be substituted in its place.

§ 18. To the next it must be said that no names can be substituted in place of these: because they alone express the persons as they are perfect in themselves and distinct from one another, as was proved in the first book of the Sentences.

§ 19. To the next which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that "Word" and "Son" differ by the same formal notion which is a relation, but not by the same formal notion of the name: because "Word" as "Word" does not name a person perfect in Himself, but rather

343. Augustine, De Trinitate XV.

"Word" as applied in divine matters: and similarly "gift," and "love": and therefore they cannot be placed in place of those.

§ 20. To the next it must be said that "begetter" and "begotten" are spoken of as relatives, which according to the intellect arise from the act of generating: but God the Father, and the Son, state distinct persons: hence every father generates, but not conversely: and similarly every son is begotten, but not conversely: and therefore it is clear that those names and these are of different signification.

§ 21. To the next it must be said that power, wisdom, will or goodness, although they name those things which are required for operating, nevertheless only name the unity of essence, because these are in the individual persons: but the form of baptism, according to a distinct confession of faith, must name the unity of essence and the three persons: and therefore those names are not suitable.

§ 22. To the next it must be said that three things concurred for the Apostles to baptize in the name of Christ, one of which is the signification of the name which implicitly expresses the Trinity. The second was necessity, because that saving name—in which every man must be saved—was odious: and therefore, so that by seeing the Holy Spirit visibly descend at the invocation of this name, the name might be shown as lovable and reverend, the Holy Spirit willed that for a time baptism should be in that name, until it became known and venerable. The third is divine institution through the instinct and revelation of the Holy Spirit; although it is not read in Scripture, nevertheless I think that the Apostles would never have presumed to do this unless the Holy Spirit had commanded it to be done.

§ 23. To the next it must be said that the unity of form is preserved implicitly: because in the name of Christ is understood the Father anointing, the Son anointed, and the anointing which is the Holy Spirit.

§ 24. To the next the solution is clear through what was said before.

§ 25. To the next it must be said that this name, "Jesus," was not as suitable: because it does not as clearly express the Trinity: nevertheless I do not wish to contradict that, if the same causes concurred, this could be done in another name just as in that one.

§ 26. To the next it must be said that the Pope cannot do this, just as neither could the Apostles, except through a revelation of the Holy Spirit and a great necessity of the Church.

§ 27. To that which is asked concerning the name of one person, it must be said that it cannot be done, nor was it ever done: and what Ambrose says is understood thus: "He who says one by expressing in faith the Trinity, which occurs in the confession also of the others." Or it may be said better that he speaks of the same case in which the Apostles baptized in the name of Christ: for then it could be done when those three conditions concurred, but otherwise what is said in the text is absolutely false.

344. Acts 2:38, 8:16, 10:48, 19:5.

§ 28. To the next it must be said that although relatives posit themselves via the intellect, nevertheless they are not in this way the form of baptism, but rather expressed vocally: for it is not enough to think or understand; one must express it with the voice.

§ 29. To the next it must be said that "Trinity" does not name the persons by a proper name: and therefore it is not the form: because the articles of faith and the form of baptism lie in the proper names.

§ 30. To that which is further asked concerning addition, it must be said that the one adding sins. But if he adds what does not sound like a corruption of the form, the person is not to be rebaptized.

§ 31. And through this the solution to the next is clear: because that addition, "In the name of the greater Father," etc., sounds like a corruption of the form: and therefore I do not think that someone baptizes who baptizes in this way.

§ 32. To the next it must be said that he who transposes sins: nevertheless I think it is a baptism, if nothing more is done than transposition. But if he adds what sounds like a corruption of the form, then I think it is not a baptism, such as "In the name of the first Father," etc.

§ 33. To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that the order of nature, even with the names transposed, is preserved in the intentions of the names: because the Father is always spoken of as He who is not from another, from Whom another is; the Son as He who is from another, from Whom another is; and the Holy Spirit as He who is from others, from Whom no one is.

§ 34. To that which is further asked concerning corruption, it must be said with the Doctors that if, on account of a speech impediment or ignorance of the language, one corrupts at the end of a word, it does not impede baptism. But if by this he intends to mock and induce error, then he signifies that he does not intend what the Church does, and then he does not baptize.

§ 35. To that which is asked concerning corruption at the beginning of a word, it is commonly said and is true (as the Grammarians say) that declension at the end of a word varies only what is co-signified, and not what is signified: and therefore that corruption does not remove the form of baptism: but declension at the beginning of a word varies the signified meaning, and therefore corruption at the beginning of a word removes the form of baptism.

§ 36. If it is still asked: Why is this form called an "invocation" of the Trinity, since an invocation ought to occur in the deprecatory mode: while the form of baptism is expressed in the indicative mode by way of enunciation in the present tense?

§ 37. And to this it must be said that there is a certain deprecation having the force of indication, as some Prophets, when they desired to prophesy what they were prophesying, like Isaiah 64:1: O that thou wouldst rend the heavens and come down. [345] So also, conversely, there are certain enunciations which have the force of invocations: because what is uttered enunciatively is done so because the expression of intention is required in them, and such is the

342. Glossa Ordinaria on Exodus 14:15.

enunciation in the sacraments, and the sense is: "I baptize you," etc., that is, "I exteriorly baptize you by invoking the Father," etc., "so that He may interiorly baptize you."

§ 38. But if it is asked: Why is it not said thus: "I invoke you"?

§ 39. It must be said that this is done so that no doubt is cast upon whether the Holy Spirit baptizes interiorly.

§ 40. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 3 — When Baptism Was Instituted

When was baptism instituted?

When was baptism instituted?

§ 43. Next it is asked concerning what he says there, at F: Concerning the institution of baptism when it began, etc.

§ 44. For it seems that baptism ought to have been instituted from the beginning: because an efficacious medicine is more valuable at the beginning than at the end of the disease.

§ 45. If you say that it draws its efficacy from the passion of Christ, and therefore ought not to have been instituted before the passion: this seems to be nothing: because the passion profited those who were before the incarnation of Christ in the faith of Him who was to come: therefore baptism also could have been profitable.

§ 46. Moreover, that variety which the Master touches upon in the text must be reduced to some harmony; what then is it?

§ 47. Solution. It must be said that baptism ought not to have begun before the passion of Christ: and the cause of this is because baptism is a sacrament of full effect and full cure: but a full cure of the disease did not exist except after the passion and resurrection of Christ: because then original guilt ceased entirely, and the gate of heaven was opened with respect to the perception of beatitude.

§ 48. To the first objection, therefore, it must be said that those who were before the incarnation of Christ did not have full liberation, but rather each one only made satisfaction for himself: but the guilt of nature remained up to Christ with respect to the descent to Limbo and the closing of the gate.

§ 49. To the next it must be said that baptism was instituted in multiple ways, namely officially, causally, and with respect to the effect of salvation.

§ 50. Officially, in Matthew 10:1ff., when He sent the Apostles to baptize in the same form in which baptism is now performed, as he says in the text, commanding them there: Go ye not into the way of the Gentiles, and into the city of the Samaritans enter ye not.

§ 51. Causally, however, in four ways. Materially, Matthew 3:16ff., when by the touch of His most pure flesh He conferred regenerative power upon the waters in baptism, namely in

345. Augustine, De Trinitate XV.

the one by which He was baptized: in which baptism, nevertheless, the reality of the Trinity was present, although not under the prescribed form of words: because the Father was in the voice, the Son in the flesh touching the water, the Holy Spirit in the dove. Because water is also not matter unless it is sanctified by the word of life, unless one calls it totally indisposed matter: for matter relates to baptism in a threefold way. Namely, as matter only: and in this way water from the beginning of creation is matter, when the Spirit of the Lord was borne over the waters, as Chrysostom says. It also relates as disposed matter, as after the Lord by the touch of His most pure flesh conferred regenerative power to the waters. It also relates as formed matter, when it is under the invocation of the Trinity. According to the formal cause, baptism was instituted in Matthew 28:19: Baptizing them in the name of the Father, etc. And with respect to the final cause, John 3:5: Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God. But efficiently and significatively with respect to the operating cause in baptism, it was instituted in John 19:34, where water and blood flowed from the side of Christ, to show that it has the efficacy of salvation from the side of Christ.

§ 52. But with respect to the effect of salvation, it was instituted in Mark 16:16, where He says: He that believeth and is baptized, shall be saved.

Articulus 4 — Whether The Suitable Matter Of Baptism Is Water

Is water the suitable matter of baptism?

§ 55. Next it is asked concerning what he says there, at H: This sacrament is celebrated in water, etc.

§ 56. But it seems that the suitable matter is not water:

§ 57. 1. For baptism, as was held above, is the principle of new life: but the principle of life is not in the grace of baptism unless it is signified in the property of the matter of the sacrament, because a sacrament is the cause of no reality of which it is not a sign: but the cause of life in the elements is not the moist with the cold, but rather the moist with the warm: since, therefore, water is cold and moist, and oil or wine is warm and moist, it seems rather that the matter ought to be oil or wine than water.

§ 58. 2. Also, grace in a sacrament has something similar to light, like the character: and something similar to healing, because grace heals sin: and sacramental grace also refreshes, as the Master says below, in the following distinction, that it refreshes those already sanctified with a more abundant grace: since, therefore, oil (as he says) shines and heals and refreshes, it seems oil is the suitable matter for baptism.

§ 59. But to the contrary is that: 1. The state of re-creation through conformity ought to correspond to the state of creation: but in the creation of the greater world the first living soul appeared in the waters, over which [the Spirit] was borne: therefore in the re-creation of the lesser world the soul ought to begin to live in the waters, over which the Spirit was borne.

§ 60. 2. Also, it has no generative power except what was touched by the most pure flesh of the Savior: but this element is water: therefore water alone is the matter, and nothing else.

§ 61. 3. Also, Chrysostom in Homily 36 on John: "Water is assumed in baptism as the mother of the offspring being born: what the womb is to the fetus, water is to the believer: for in water he is molded and shaped."

§ 62. 4. Also, in the same place: "At first indeed it was said, 'Let the water bring forth the creeping creatures having life': but since the ruler ascended from the streams of the Jordan, the water renders no longer creeping creatures having life, but rational and spirit-bearing souls."

§ 63. 5. Also, Ambrose on the Epistle to the Romans: "Therefore baptism is uniformly commanded to be done in water, so that it may be understood that just as water washes away the dirt of the body and of garments, so baptism wipes away the stains of the soul and the dirt of vices by cleansing them."

§ 64. But then many side-questions arise. Can baptism be done in water, whether in simple water or in composite?

§ 65. If only in simple water, then it could not be done in the sea: because it has burned earthy matter mixed in, because of which this is false.

§ 66. Also, it would not be done in broth, nor in thin beer, nor in mead, nor in other mixed waters.

§ 67. Also, no rainwater, nor any water among us [is purely simple]: therefore baptism would be done in no water among us, as it seems. But that all water among us is mixed is proved by the fact that it is congealed by cold, and this would not happen unless it were mixed, as Alexander the Philosopher says.

§ 68. Solution. It must be said that water alone is the matter of baptism: of which there are many causes, but six may suffice. Three of these are found in the text, of which the first is taken from the properties of water: because it has the power of cooling through its coldness, and of washing away dirt through its moistness: and therefore it signifies grace washing away the stains of fault, and cooling the fire which is in the heat of the fomes [inclination to sin] and of concupiscence: and these are the principal and first effects of baptism. The second is taken from the ease of obtaining it: because water is prohibited to no poor person, and this is fitting for a sacrament of general necessity. The third is taken from the commonness of finding it: because it is found near every part of the world where men dwell, and this again is fitting for a generally necessary sacrament. The fourth is also implied in the text: because water, not wine or oil, flowed from the side of the Savior. The fifth and sixth are introduced in the authorities of Chrysostom in the objections, namely because the life-giving spirit first appeared over the waters: and because the Savior touched this element in the streams of the Jordan, giving it the power so that it could make spirit-bearing souls.

§ 69. To the first objection, therefore, it must be said that baptism is the principle of new life: but that is not its first effect, but rather the washing of the stain and the cooling of the fomes, and consequently grace in the virtues produces a new life in the soul. And it is not necessary that a sacrament have a likeness to everything it causes in whatever way, but to that which it causes substantially and primarily, according as it is ordered against the defect of sin.

§ 70. To the next it must be said that a certain property of illumination shines forth in water with respect to the nature of transparency, and this suffices to signify the character: but oil posits a likeness more to the healing of punishment, and therefore it is assumed as part of the matter in chrism, where there is an anointing against the punishment of the fomes lest one slide headlong, and in the oil of the sick: but the health of baptism is perfected rather through the washing away of fault.

§ 71. To that which is asked concerning the diversities of waters, I say generally that if it is a mixture destroying the species of the element and drawing it toward another species, baptism cannot be done in that water, such as a broth of fats or other things which, when cooled, congeals. And it is similarly evident that beer, and urine, and a certain lye which has much admixture of sharp bodies, and the waters which Alchemists make for transmuting metals [are invalid]. But there is a certain mixture which does not remove the properties of water, such that it remains in its impulse of cooling and its power of washing: washing, I say, not dissolving the body as sharp waters do, like urine and a certain lye: and in such things baptism can be done, and it is not impeded: hence baptism can be done in the sea, in rain, in turbid waters, and in other things of this kind. And even if it were a broth not removed from the species of the element by the fact that it is cooked, I would well believe that baptism could be done in it.

Articulus 5 — Whether In Baptism A Triple Immersion Is Necessary, Or One Suffices

Whether triple immersion is necessary in baptism, or one suffices?

§ 74. Next it is asked concerning what he says: But concerning immersion, if it is asked, etc.

§ 75. For it seems that it is to be immersed only once: because 1. By the word, the trinity of persons is expressed: since therefore the unity of essence ought also to be expressed, it seems that this ought to be expressed in deeds: therefore by the mode of immersion: therefore one must immerse and lift up once, so that the unity of essence may be signified.

§ 76. 2. Also, by immersion we are conformed to the burial: but Christ was buried once and rose: therefore one must immerse and lift up once.

§ 77. 3. Also, Chrysostom seems to say this on John, thus: "As in a certain tomb, by submerging our heads in the water, the old man is buried, and being submerged downward is totally hidden; then as we look up from the water, the new man ascends. Again, for just as it is easy to baptize and look up, so it is easy for God to bury the old man and show the new." But all this can be done by a single immersion. Therefore others are superfluous, as it seems.

§ 78. BUT TO THE CONTRARY: 1. Chrysostom, in the same place: "A triple immersion is done, so that you may learn that the power of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit fulfills all these things."

§ 79. 2. Also, Damascene: "Since baptism is a type of the death of Christ, by three immersions the three days of burial are signified."

§ 80. 3. Also, Dionysius in the book On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy: "The sacred symbolic doctrine of those to be baptized mystically teaches by three submersions and elevations in water to imitate the divine death of Jesus the Giver of Life for three days and as many nights in the tomb, as much as divine imitation is possible for men."

§ 81. To this also the Master adduces very many things in the text.

§ 82. But then it is asked: 1. By reason of the Churches that immerse only once.

§ 83. 2. Also, certain Churches do not immerse, but pour water once or twice: therefore it seems that what is exhibited in this way is not baptism.

§ 84. 3. Also, certain priests divide the invocation of the Trinity according to the number of immersions: because in the first immersion they say, "In the name of the Father," and in the second, "In the name of the Son," and in the third, "In the name of the Holy Spirit."

§ 85. And it is asked according to them, if the one being baptized dies after the first immersion is done before the second, whether he is baptized?

§ 86. And it seems that he is not: because the invocation of the Trinity is not complete: therefore the form is not there.

§ 87. Also, he is not conformed to the burial of Christ: therefore he is not dead to sin: therefore it seems that such a person is not baptized.

§ 88. Solution. It must be said to this that among all customs the custom of the Roman Church, which immerses three times, is more reasonable: because in that custom the act is conformed to the form of burial and to the effect of baptism: because, as Augustine says, by His one death Christ absolved us from a double death, namely of fault, and of eternal punishment: or of the soul, and of the body: because although the body dies, yet it cannot be detained in death. If nevertheless it is immersed only once, I think the one baptizing is to be corrected: but the infant is by no means to be rebaptized: because he has the full sacrament of baptism.

§ 89. To the first objection, therefore, it must be said that the act ought to correspond to the form: because in the form the unity of essence is expressed by the fact that it is said, "In the name," and in the figure the unity of baptism corresponds to this unity, and triple immersion ought to correspond to the Trinity.

§ 90. To the next it must be said that we ought not only to be conformed to the burial, but also to the mode of burial, as was held in the authorities adduced.

§ 91. To the next it must be said that as is clear in the following passages, Chrysostom does not intend that one should immerse only once, but that one should immerse absolutely, and afterward he teaches the form of immersion.

§ 92. To that which is asked, Whether the form should be divided according to the three immersions?

§ 93. I say no, but it must be pronounced continuously because of the danger to infants. If, however, someone divides it, and the infant dies with the Father having been named and one

immersion having been done, I say that he is baptized: because the High Priest then supplies what the minister could not fulfill: and therefore I think it must be said that if, with one named, the priest should die, that boy is baptized because of the supply of the High Priest.

§ 94. To the next it must be said that pouring water over the whole body, or when the stronger part, that is, the head, is immersed and dipped in waters, one is baptized: but it does not seem to me to be a laudable custom, but rather the custom of immersing is more laudable.

§ 95. But regarding what some ask, whether baptism may be done in a bath, or warm water or hot springs?

§ 96. It is clear that yes: indeed if priests caused warm water to be made, it would be better, because sometimes little ones are so penetrated by the coldness of the water that they contract mortal illnesses and die.

Articulus 6 — Whether With The Advent Of Baptism Circumcision Ceased

Did circumcision cease when baptism came?

§ 99. Next it is asked concerning what he says last, there, at K: It is also usually asked, Whether circumcision immediately lost its force, etc.

§ 100. 1. For it seems that with the coming of the truth, the shadow ought to have ceased: therefore when baptism came, circumcision and other legal observances immediately ceased: therefore it seems that from then on they were dead and deadly.

§ 101. 2. Also, the typical lamb was terminated in the true lamb at the Supper, because it was a figure of Him: therefore similarly since circumcision was a figure of baptism, as soon as baptism appeared, circumcision ought to have been invalid and ceased.

§ 102. 3. Also, it is superfluous to keep the less perfect when the perfect has taken its state: therefore since baptism, which is more perfect than circumcision, took its state, it was superfluous for circumcision, which was less perfect, to remain.

§ 103. 4. Also, the reality which circumcision accomplished was being done through baptism: therefore it remained uselessly.

§ 104. But still the question returns: Why were other legal observances not permitted by the Apostles to be exercised in converted believers after the passion, yet they permitted circumcision to remain for some time after the passion?

§ 105. Also, why did the Apostle circumcise Timothy, and not circumcise Titus?

§ 106. Also it is asked: Did he sin by circumcising Timothy, since he himself rebuked Peter because he compelled the Gentiles to Judaize, and since he said: If you be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing?

§ 107. Solution. It must be said that with the truth coming, the shadow ceased: but the truth came in two ways, namely with respect to the showing forth of the Son in the flesh, and then they ought not immediately to have ceased. It also came with respect to the operation of

salvation, and this was done in the passion, and then the legal observances were dead in themselves, although not immediately deadly to those observing them.

§ 108. Hence it must be further distinguished that it is one thing to be dead, and another thing to be deadly. What is "dead" is that which of itself does not confer salvation: what is "deadly" is that which brings eternal death to the one doing it. And this the legal observances did after the Gospel was divulged and the sound of the Apostles went out into all the earth. And this again happens in two ways, namely through hearing the preaching, and through the passage of time: through hearing the preaching, as among those who heard the Apostles; through the passage of time, as it is among us now, even if we had not heard the preaching of the word of God: because it would not be reasonable that God, having rejected the people and the state of the old law, would have abandoned the care of the world for so long.

§ 109. Therefore to the first objection it must be said that Christ before the passion (as Master Hugh maintains) revealed the rite of baptism to His friend Nicodemus as a counsel. Hence before the passion baptism was nothing but a counsel: which nevertheless availed as medicine for all receiving it, and therefore because it was a counsel, circumcision ran efficaciously alongside it. But after the passion, the price of universality having been paid, it became a precept, especially after the time of the resurrection when it was said: Teach ye all nations, baptizing them, etc.: and then circumcision was dead, but to be carried to the tomb with honor. Yet to those placing their hope in it, it was not deadly to all, except to those for whom the time of the passion was determined either by hearing the preaching, or by consideration of the state of the time: for to those, if they placed their hope in it, it was deadly: but to those who did not place their hope in it, but by the dispensation of the Apostles on account of the scandal of the Jews, and lest it seem to be rejected as sacrilegious, remained in the rite for a time, it was not deadly, but dead.

§ 110. To the next it must be said that before the passion two things were directed to the same end but not in the same way: one as a counsel to be initiated, and the other in a precept to be terminated.

§ 111. To the next it must be said that that reasoning holds from the moment the perfection of baptism was determined and commanded, and not before.

§ 112. To the next it must be said that according to some, the reasoning is the same for all legal observances: but according to others, circumcision especially ran its course for a time, because it alone was as a remedy for original sin: and according to them, the case of the lamb and of circumcision are not comparable.

§ 113. To the next it must be said that the Apostle circumcised Timothy for the stated reasons, because not placing hope in circumcision, but rather because he was the son of a Jewish woman, with a Gentile father, and he wished to set him over the Jews dwelling in those places: but he did not circumcise the Gentile Titus, because he was being set over the Gentiles dwelling in Dalmatia.

§ 114. To the next it must be said that he rebuked Peter because his act was before the weak, who believed that hope was to be placed in the legal observances, of which sort Timothy was not.

§ 115. To the same it must be said that Christ had already been preached to the Galatians, and they had received it, and afterward they turned away to the faith of circumcision, and therefore it was deadly to them.

Articulus 7 — Whether Baptism Opened Heaven

Did baptism open heaven?

§ 118. Next it is asked concerning what he says there: If it is asked, whether baptism opened heaven, etc.

§ 119. And two things are asked here, namely, what opened heaven?

§ 120. 1. For above, in distinction 1, Bede said: Yet that was, etc. And he makes an exception, saying: Except that it did not open the gate of the heavenly kingdom. [346] Therefore if that exception is good which distinguishes between the effect of circumcision and of baptism, it seems that baptism opened the gate of the heavenly kingdom.

§ 121. 2. Also, Matthew 3:17 on that text: And behold a voice from heaven, etc., the Gloss says: "The water of baptism extinguished the flaming sword which prohibited the way to paradise."

§ 122. 3. Also, Luke 3:21, on that text: Jesus being baptized and praying, heaven was opened, [347] the Gloss of Bede says: "While the Savior went down into the waters of the Jordan, He opened the gate of heaven for us: while innocent flesh is touched by the cold waters, the sword formerly set against us is extinguished."

§ 123. 4. Also, Mark 1:10: And forthwith coming up out of the water, etc., [348] Bede says that by the power of baptism the heavens are opened.

§ 124. But if this is conceded, the contrary is said here in the text.

§ 125. Also, Colossians 1:20: Making peace... [349]

§ 1. ...whether they are on the earth, or whether they are in heaven.

§ 2. There Augustine in the original speaks thus: "At the hour when the blood of the redemption of Christ flowing from His side went forth, the sin of Adam was forgiven, and then the entrance into the kingdom of heaven was laid open." But it seems again that it was through this, because He said to the thief: "Amen I say to you, today you will be with me in Paradise" [350].

§ 3. But on the contrary, it seems that it was at the resurrection: because it is said thus in the paschal prayer: "O God, who on this day through Your Only-begotten Son have unlocked for us the approach to eternity, having conquered death," etc.

§ 4. Also, it seems that it was the ascension: because He then ascended, laying open the way before them, as the Prophecy had foretold.

§ 5. Further it is inquired about the second point, what is called the "door" (janua) here? But this was determined above.

§ 6. Solution. It must be said that all these things in a certain way opened it differently: because baptism [opened it] with respect to the loosing of the hindering guilt and fault on our part; but the passion with respect to the payment of the price that was established to be paid by the decree of the Father; the resurrection with respect to the attainment of glory in the head, which is the earnest money for the glory to be attained in the members; but the ascension with respect to the entrance into heaven, which determines the fitting place for beatitude.

§ 7. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

§ 8. To the other thing that is further inquired, What is called the door?

§ 9. It must be said, that [it is] the bar of guilt on our part, and the established debt on the part of God's established decree. Others, however, say otherwise, but it has no force.

DISTINCTIO IV

Divisio Textus

§ 10. Division of the Text

§ 11. Here it must be said that some receive the sacrament, etc. § 12. Here baptism is treated from the part of the recipient. And here a threefold question is posited, and the doubts arising from them are subjoined.

§ 13. The first part of the question is about those who receive the reality (rem) and the sacrament. The second is about those who receive the sacrament and not the reality, there, at B, But those who approach without faith, etc. The third is about those who receive the reality and not the sacrament, there, at C, There are also others, as we posited above, etc.

§ 14. Now the questions following from these are four: of which the first is, What do the already just receive when approaching baptism? Which he treats there, at F, §1: It is also customarily inquired about those who are already sanctified, etc. The second is, why is penalty not removed in baptism, just like every fault? there, at F, §2: But since in baptism sin is wiped away, and exterior satisfaction, etc. The third is, there, at G, If it is inquired, Of what reality is baptism, etc. The last is, What do little children receive in baptism, whether grace only, or virtue only, or both? there, It is also customarily inquired, If to little children in baptism, etc.

§ 15. And all these things are prolixly and well determined in the Letter (the text of the Master); and therefore the questions here are succinct.

346. Bede, Hexaemeron, on Genesis 17.

Articulus 1 — Whether In Infants Who Receive The Reality And The Sacrament There Is An Equal Effect Of Baptism

§ 16. Article 1 § 17. Whether in little children who receive the reality and the sacrament, the effect of baptism is equal?

§ 18. ARTICLE I. Whether in little children who receive the reality and the sacrament, the effect of baptism is equal?

§ 19. It is inquired, however, first concerning the first part of the question, Whether in little children who receive the reality and the sacrament, the effect of baptism is equal?

§ 20. And it seems that it is: because 1. The Philosopher says, "One cause behaving in the same way, produces one effect": but baptism is one cause, and behaving in the same way: therefore it produces one effect. 2. Also, the one passion of Christ operates in baptism, whether it is received by this one or by that one: therefore it seems that it is equally so. 3. Also, the faith of another operates in all little children toward justification: it seems that it is equally so.

§ 21. But against this it seems to be, that 1. According to their natural endowments, the Angels also received gratuitous gifts differently, as the Master says in book II of the Sentences: therefore it seems that similarly also for little children: therefore they did not receive equal grace. 2. Also, we see when they grow up, that they are not equally disposed to acts. Since therefore acts are from habits, it seems that neither did they receive habits equally. 3. Also, some receive grace finally (unto the end) in baptism: but others do not, such as the foreknown (the reprobate): therefore it seems that the effect of baptism is unequal in all little children.

§ 22. Solution. It must be said that the effect of baptism is equal in all little children, as the first objections prove: but it does not hold thus in adults, as will be proved below.

§ 23. But to the first that is objected to the contrary, it must be said that the case is not similar concerning the Angels: because by the judgment of many, according to the difference of orders they differ in species, but little children are in one species. Nor is the quantity of grace given to human beings according to the proportion of natural endowments, but rather according to the mode of preparation; and this is equal in little children, because they do not have preparation except from the merit of Christ, and that is equally exhibited to all.

§ 24. To the next it must be said that a differing use arises not from a deformity of habit, but rather from a deformity of free will.

§ 25. To the next it must be said that to have grace finally, or according to present justice, do not express a quantity of grace, but a quality: and therefore in that argument there is a change of what (quid) into what sort (quale).

Articulus 2 — What Fiction Is

§ 26. Article 2 § 27. What is fiction (feigning / hypocrisy)?

347. Luke 3:21.

§ 28. ARTICLE II. What is fiction?

§ 29. Next it is inquired concerning the second point which he touches upon, there, at B, But those who approach without faith or fictitiously (feignedly), etc.

§ 30. And here three things are inquired, of which the first is, What is fiction? Second, How does it impede baptism? Third, How does the effect of baptism return when the fiction ceases?

§ 31. TO THE FIRST one proceeds thus: 1. He is fictitious (fictus, feigning) (as Augustine says) who does not believe, or who approaches without devotion, or who celebrates the sacrament otherwise than it was instituted, or who despises to receive it. But he who does not believe, does not subject himself to the sacrament: therefore it seems that he does not receive it. 2. Also, Baptism is the sacrament of faith: therefore it seems that what is contrary to faith is contrary to the sacrament. But disbelief is contrary to faith: therefore it is contrary to the sacrament: therefore he who does not believe receives nothing. 3. Also, since there are many articles of faith, someone can disbelieve one, and believe another: as not believing the resurrection, he can believe baptism: and it is inquired, Whether that one receives baptism? And it seems that he does: because this one intends to receive what the Church exhibits: therefore it seems that he will receive it.

§ 32. BUT ON THE CONTRARY: The Holy Spirit of discipline will flee the fictitious (deceitful) therefore the Holy Spirit operates nothing in his baptism: therefore he receives nothing.

§ 33. Further it is inquired concerning the second mode, which is called indevotion. For devotion is a certain fervor of the soul in the compunction for sins, or in the love of charity, as Ambrose says on the Epistle to the Romans: but there are many who do not approach baptism thus: therefore it seems that there are many who do not have the affection of mortal sin, who nevertheless are fictitious: and no one says this.

§ 34. FURTHER it is inquired concerning the third mode of being fictitious: 1. For he who celebrates otherwise, does not observe the form of the sacrament: therefore he does not receive the sacrament: and the contrary of this is said in the Letter. 2. Also, he who despises to receive it, does not seem properly to be called fictitious, but openly evil: because the fictitious man simulates at least.

§ 35. FURTHER it is inquired concerning the number of these fictions.

§ 36. Solution. To this last point first I respond, that a fourfold fiction is gathered from the sayings of Augustine: however, a threefold fiction is posited especially in the recipient of the sacrament of the Eucharist, but by similarity it is also in the recipient of baptism. And that is either on the part of the one giving the sacrament, or on the part of the recipient. Or otherwise and better, either on the part of the rite or act of the sacrament, or on the part of the worked work (operis operati) that the Church does. If in the first mode, then it is he who receives otherwise than the Church exercises the rite, and this I understand of him who derides the rite of the Church, and yet intends to receive what the Church does, even if he derides it: for that one receives the sacrament. But if on the part of the worked work: then it is either according to

348. Mark 1:10.

the rational part, and then he is not believing; or according to the concupiscible part, and then he is indevout; or on the part of the irascible part, and then he is despising.

§ 37. To the FIRST therefore it must be said that he is not believing, yet willing to receive that very thing according to what he sees the Church doing: and he is the one of whom the Master speaks in the Letter, that he receives the sacrament as to the impression of the character. But if infidelity were to turn him away so that he would not will to receive nor receive, then there would be no doubt that he would receive nothing.

§ 38. To the next it must be said that baptism is the sacrament of faith as to this, that it is the foundation of the sacraments, just as faith is of the spiritual edifice in life. But what is contrary to faith, provided he intends to receive what the Church does, is not contrary except to the sacramental grace, and not to the character: and therefore the character is received.

§ 39. To the next it must be said that the disbelief of all the articles impedes the reality (rem) of the sacrament, and if he were to disbelieve all at once, and yet will to receive it according to that which he believes the Church to be doing nothing, he receives the character.

§ 40. To THAT which is inquired concerning the second fiction, it must be said that the indevout here is called from the privation of the habit of devotion, and this is when he is in the state and effect of mortal sin: because such a one receives nothing except the character.

§ 41. To the next it must be said that he who celebrates otherwise, if he does not observe the form, exhibits nothing. But here it is principally taken on the part of the recipient, who namely receives otherwise than is the rite of the Church. For he receives according to a certain abuse, yet he intends to receive this very abusive thing, and on account of the efficacy of the sacrament he is said to receive the character.

§ 42. To the next it must be said that there is a contempt casting away the work, and there is a contempt vilifying it as vile, which nevertheless he intends to do. And the first indeed receives nothing, because he does not subject himself to the sacrament; but the second receives the character.

Articulus 3 — Whether Fiction Can Impede Baptism

§ 43. Article 3 § 44. Whether fiction can impede baptism?

§ 45. ARTICLE III. Whether fiction can impede baptism?

§ 46. Secondly it is inquired, How does it impede baptism?

§ 47. For it seems that it cannot impede: 1. For the stronger is not impeded by the less strong: but sacramental grace is stronger than fiction, and than every sin: therefore it seems that it ought not to impede, nor can it. 2. Besides, if sin impedes: then also original sin in little children seems to be able to impede: and this is not true. 3. Also, certain venial sins are in unbaptized adults. Let us posit therefore, that some adult loving his wife too much, or his little children, and more than God, and yet is baptized: it is evident that he does not lose that

349. Colossians 1:20.

love in baptism, nor lay it aside. Therefore the sin remains: therefore he seems to be fictitious: because God indulges either nothing, or everything.

§ 48. Solution. It must be said that fiction impedes from the fact that it places an obstacle to the Holy Spirit through the actual dissent of the will to the effect of the sacrament: for he wills something that cannot stand with sacramental grace.

§ 49. To the first therefore it must be said that sin of itself is weak, but with a will resisting grace it is made strong to impede grace: because He who created you without you, will not justify you without you: for God does not will malice, as Damascene says, nor does He compel virtue, because then the praise of the good would become sordid, if it were given even against the will.

§ 50. To the NEXT it must be said that in little children there is no resisting will, but rather there is there the preparation of the merit of Christ against another's sin, as was said before.

§ 51. To the next it must be said that nothing prohibits a venial sin from remaining on account of the adherence of the venial: because this does not make fiction: because neither is it in the same part with grace, nor is it even contrary to grace: and therefore total pardon is had, and total sanctity even without having the remission of the venial [sin].

Articulus 4 — How The Effect Of Baptism Returns Upon The Cessation Of Fiction

§ 52. Article 4 § 53. How does the effect of baptism return when fiction ceases?

§ 54. ARTICLE IV. How does the effect of baptism return when fiction ceases?

§ 55. Thirdly it is inquired, How does the effect of baptism return when fiction ceases?

§ 56. Because it seems that it does not return: 1. For dead works are not vivified: but works done in mortal sin are dead: therefore they are not vivified: but baptism of this sort is done in mortal sin: therefore the effect of baptism does not return, but he ought to be baptized again. 2. If you say that the character is imprinted in the fictitious one, and the grace of it [returns, so] he ought not to be baptized [again]. It seems that it is not imprinted: because the Holy Spirit of discipline will flee the fictitious therefore He does not imprint anything on him: therefore neither the character. 3. Besides, the character is a spiritual light, as will be held below, and spiritual light cannot stand with spiritual darkness: but sin, as Damascene says, is spiritual darkness: therefore it seems that the character cannot be imprinted on the fictitious one. 4. Also, sacramental grace is effected by the sacrament of baptism: but when it is not, it is not effected: therefore it is not effected lest this fictitious one be baptized. Similarly it seems that neither is it effected afterward: for when there is no cause, then the cause effects nothing: but afterward there is no baptism, because it has already passed away: therefore it does not effect afterward: therefore that grace is never effected by baptism: therefore it does not return. 5. Also, what never was present does not return: but grace never was present to this fictitious one: therefore it does not return to him afterward when fiction ceases. 6. Also, let us posit that this fictitious one commits many sins between his baptism and before his penance, and after-

350. Matthew 10:1ff.

ward he repents of his fiction: either those sins are remitted without exterior groaning and lamentation, or not. If yes: then actual sin committed after baptism is remitted without exterior satisfaction, which is not said by the Doctors. If it is not remitted: then the grace of baptism does not delete whatever it finds. 7. Besides, a cause ought to be conjoined to its effect: but the grace deleting sin is the effect of baptism: therefore it ought to be conjoined with it: and this is not so in such persons: therefore it seems that it is necessary to be baptized again.

§ 57. If perchance it is said, that the character remains, and that it is the cause of grace in such persons: that does not seem to be true, because the character is equally in the good and in the evil: therefore it is not more the cause of good than of evil: because a cause per se of good cannot be with evil, just as neither can the good [itself]; and a cause of evil per se and formally, cannot be with good, just as neither can the evil [itself].

§ 58. Solution. It must be said to the first, that the fictitious receives the character: and it is one way for the work of man, and another way for the work of God. For the work of man can be dead and mortified by man, and this is what proceeds from free will: but the work of God cannot be dead, and this is the sacrament, in which, as will be held below, divine virtue under the covering of visible species works salvation in baptism: and therefore this objection does not hold concerning the sacraments. But the fictitious places an obstacle or bar to grace lest it be made in him.

§ 59. To the next it must be said that the Holy Spirit inasmuch as He is holy, will flee the fictitious, because He does not work holiness in him, but not inasmuch as He is the Spirit operating in the sacraments.

§ 60. To the next it must be said that the character is a spiritual light on the part of the created image distinguishing the faithful from the infidel according to the state of faith, as we will say below in the question about the character: but that light does not have contrariety to sin, just as neither does the light of unformed faith: nor is this said for this reason, that it is unformed faith, but it is a certain splendor proceeding from the uncreated character into the created image, to distinguish the baptized from the unbaptized: and therefore it can be preserved with sin.

§ 61. To the next it must be said that baptism remains in the fictitious one through the remaining of the character, which is properly called the sacrament: and therefore not having an obstacle it works grace, in the mode in which it itself is a cause, namely disposing, and God then effects grace in that one: whence this was false, that baptism passed away, because it remained as it is the character.

§ 62. To the next it must be said that the effect is not said to return: but it is said in the Letter, that baptism begins to avail from that time when fiction recedes. If however it is said to return, then it must be said that it was previously present in the disposing cause, although not in itself.

§ 63. To the next it must be said that by the virtue of baptism only those things are deleted in that one which he committed up to the hour of baptism: but by the virtue of penance the following things are deleted: and therefore for those he ought to receive exterior penance.

§ 64. And as to what is said, that baptism deletes whatever it finds, it is well expounded by Augustine in the Letter: because the external day is deleted there, and the hour itself before baptism, but not those things which are done after, but rather by the virtue of contrition and penance: because a half-pardon cannot be received from God: so that a man would have grace at the same time as fault: and God and the devil would inhabit him at the same time.

§ 65. To the last it must be said that baptism as it is the cause of grace, remains in the character.

§ 66. And as to what is objected concerning the remaining of the cause, it must be said that this is true of a formal cause: but baptism is only a disposing cause, which nevertheless necessarily induces the effect, unless it is impeded by a contrary will.

§ 67. C. How is that to be understood: Whoever of you are baptized in Christ, have put on Christ?

§ 68. Therefore it is inquired how that is accepted: Whoever of you are baptized in Christ, have put on Christ ? It can be said, that those who are baptized in Christ, that is, in conformity to Christ, namely so that they die to the oldness of sin, just as Christ to the oldness of penalty, put on Christ, whom they have inhabiting [them] through grace. It can also be solved otherwise. For in two modes are we said to put on Christ, either by the assumption of the sacrament, or by the perception of the reality. Whence Augustine: Men put on Christ sometimes up to the perception of the sacrament, sometimes up to the sanctification of life: and that first one can be common to the good and the bad, but this latter is proper to the good and the pious. Therefore all who are baptized in the name of Christ, put on Christ, either according to the perception of the sacrament, or according to the sanctification of life.

Articulus 5 — Whether That Saying Of The Apostle Is True, 'As Many As Have Been Baptized Have Put On Christ'

§ 69. Article 5 § 70. Whether that saying of the Apostle is true, Whoever of you are baptized, have put on Christ?

§ 71. ARTICLE V. Whether that saying of the Apostle is true, Whoever of you are baptized, have put on Christ?

§ 72. Next it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, Therefore it is inquired how that is accepted, etc.

§ 73. 1. For Christ is not possessed as a garment except through the habit of virtue: therefore it seems that such men receive the habit of virtue. 2. Also, Christ is not put on except through the new man, as the Apostle seems to say, saying: Put on the new man, who is created according to God in justice, and holiness of truth . But the fictitious one is not renewed. Therefore he does not put on Christ. 3. Also, according to those things which he says in the Letter, then the character is the sacrament: therefore it is the visible form of invisible grace: and this is clearly

false, because the character is not sensible, nor visible. If you say, that it is seen by the glorified and blessed: this is nothing: because according to this even grace is visible, because it is seen by them. 4. If you say, that it is seen in another thing, that is, in the tinting (tinctio) done in water: this seems to be nothing: for if something is seen in another thing, when that in which it is seen is not existing, that which was seen in it will not be seen: but the character is not seen except in the tinting: therefore when the tinting is not existing, in no way will it be seen: but when the tinting ceases, the tinting is not: therefore then there is no visible form in that one: therefore no sacrament.

§ 74. Solution. It must be said that although the character according to its name is in the predicament of relation, as a distinguishing sign, nevertheless according to that which it is, it is the habit of a certain light illustrating the image by way of disposition, not altogether sufficiently for salvation: and that will be called here the habit by which the sacrament is possessed, and in it in a qualified sense (secundum quid) Christ is put on, and not simply: and therefore also the Letter does not say that they simply put on Christ, but with this determination, up to the reception of the sacrament.

§ 75. Through this the solution to the following is clear, because the Apostle speaks of those simply putting on Christ.

§ 76. To the next it must be said that the character is the sacrament, and it is visible in the tinting.

§ 77. To this which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that although the exercised act of tinting passes away, nevertheless according to having received it, it does not pass away, just as when concerning the past, from its having passed it does not pass away: and to that tinting is referred the visibility of the character: because that tinting was visible in its exercise, and left the cognoscibility of the character in itself thus completed.

Articulus 6 — Whether The Baptism Of Blood And Of Penance Supplies The Place Of The Baptism Which Is Done In Water

§ 78. Article 6 § 79. Whether the baptism of blood and of penance supplies the place of the baptism which is done in water?

§ 80. ARTICLE VI. Whether the baptism of blood and of penance supplies the place of the baptism which is done in water?

§ 81. Next it is inquired concerning the third part of the first question, there, at D, There are also others, as we posited above, etc.

§ 82. And there distinct modes of baptisms are inquired about, which the Master touches upon: because 1. If the baptism of blood supplies the whole baptism, then it seems that it imprints the character. And the same objection is concerning the baptism of penance: but they do not do this: therefore they are of more imperfect effect than the baptism of water. 2. But against this seems to be what Damascenus says, that the baptism of blood is very good, because it is not defiled by secondary filth. 3. Also, penance in one who is already adult is

required before the baptism of water, and yet he is bound to baptism: therefore it seems that it cannot supply the place of it. 4. Besides, if these supplied the place of baptism, it would be necessary that they have something similar to it: and what is that? If it is said, that grace remitting sin: this is nothing: because according to this any virtue would supply the place of baptism: but nothing else is found in which they are assimilated, as it seems: therefore they do not supply the place of baptism. 5. Also, John Damascene does not posit only three kinds of baptisms, but nine, namely the baptism of the flood by which the world was baptized, and the baptism of the Red Sea, concerning which the Apostle says: Our fathers were all under the cloud, and all passed through the sea, namely the Red Sea, and all were baptized in Moses, in the cloud and in the sea . The third is the baptism of lustration in the Old Testament. The fourth, the baptism of John. The fifth, the baptism by which the Lord was baptized. The sixth, the baptism of Christ by which we are baptized. The seventh, the baptism in the Holy Spirit and fire, concerning which the Lord said to the disciples: But you will be baptized with the Holy Spirit not many days hence . The eighth, the baptism of penance. The ninth, the baptism of blood.

§ 83. Why therefore does the Master touch here upon only three kinds of baptisms?

§ 84. Solution. It must be said that the Master does not touch here upon baptisms unless they are similar to our baptism in the principal effect, which is the remission of sin: and those are only two, namely penance, where an article of necessity, not the contempt of religion, excludes the sacrament: and the effusion of blood, where also the water of baptism, due to an impeding tyrant, cannot be had.

§ 85. To that therefore which is first objected, it must be said that they do not imprint the character, because the character is a part of the sacrament: but they supply the whole effect, but they do not exhibit those things which are of the sacrament: and thus are the authorities introduced in the Letter understood.

§ 86. To the next it must be said that the baptism of blood is better in this, that it is not defiled by secondary filth, and because it brings the merit of the aureole, and because it scrapes away with the sickle of bitterness the adherence of venial sins: none of which the baptism of water necessarily does: but not in this that it imprints the character, because that is due to the invocation of the trine benediction in the element of water.

§ 87. To the next it must be said that that penance is not required on account of the imperfection of baptism, but rather that fiction may be removed from him who wills to be baptized lest he place an obstacle to the Holy Spirit.

§ 88. To the next it must be said that a certain authority of Augustine noted above must be resumed, through which he proves that whatever of faults is remitted before and after baptism, the whole is done by the virtue of baptism: and therefore penance does not supply the place of baptism, except inasmuch as baptism is in purpose (in proposito): and similarly martyrdom, and this is what he says in the Letter, where an article of necessity, not the contempt of religion excludes the sacrament. And through that purpose it is not only made similar, but the same thing operating differently: because in the baptism of water it operates per se, but in the

baptism of penance and blood it operates in purpose, inasmuch as it is in him who dies prevented by the necessity of natural death or of martyrdom.

§ 89. To the division of John Damascene it must be said that the Master does not posit here except those which approach the similarity of baptism on the part of causality: and those are only two directly, and one which approaches it, inasmuch as it is a diminution of the penalty which is the infirmity and proneness of concupiscence, which is the baptism in fire and the Holy Spirit, when infirmity and carnality were removed from the Apostles: but the Master does not touch this, because this is rather of confirmation than of baptism.

§ 90. But if it is inquired concerning the sufficiency of Damascene's division, it must be said that the eight kinds of baptisms are taken according to a nearer or more remote approach to the new, which is the true baptism. But they can approach either on the part of the sign, or on the part of the cause: because true baptism is a sign and a cause. If it is on the part of the sign: either that sign is with respect to water only, and it is the baptism of the flood: or with respect to water and the Spirit and thus is the baptism of the Red Sea, on account of the pillar of fire and the cloud which signifies the Spirit: whence also the Apostle says, that in the cloud and in the sea they were baptized or on the part of water and the Spirit and the passion operating in the sacrament of baptism, and thus the sign was the baptism of lustration in the old law, in which there was water and ashes through the fire of the victim as to the spirit, and blood mixed in on account of the figure of the passion. Or it approaches on the part of water, spirit, passion, and act: and thus is the baptism of John, in which there was a form in the name of the one to come, pre-signifying the Spirit, and the one suffering, and water, and the act of immersion. Or he could posit a sign as to the form and regenerative virtue on the part of the matter, and thus the sign was the baptism by which the Lord was baptized, where the Trinity appeared in the form of a figure, and regenerative force was conferred upon the waters. Nor are there more things in true baptism on the part of the sign except water, the passion, the operating Spirit, and the act, and the regenerating force, and the form: and therefore there are no more kinds approaching it in the rationale of signifying. But in the rationale of causing the approach is either on the part of the diminution of penalty, and thus approaches the baptism in the Holy Spirit and fire, with which the Apostles were baptized on the day of Pentecost: or on the part of the remission of fault, and thus approaches the baptism of penance and blood: and all these again true baptism collects together: because it remits the whole fault, and a part of the penalty of infirmity and proneness.

§ 91. Elsewhere however more questions are found concerning this, which it was not necessary to posit here.

Articulus 7 — Whether The Thief On The Cross Was A Martyr, And Baptized With The Baptism Of Blood

§ 92. Article 7 § 93. Whether the thief on the cross was a martyr, and baptized with the baptism of blood?

§ 94. ARTICLE VII. Whether the thief on the cross was a martyr, and baptized with the baptism of blood?

§ 95. Next it is inquired concerning this which is said, there, at D, around the middle: Concerning that thief to whom, not baptized, it was said, etc.

§ 96. For it seems that this thief was a martyr, and thus was baptized with the baptism of blood, not of contrition and faith in penance. 1. For Jerome speaks thus: "Christ from the cross brought the thief into paradise: and lest anyone should ever think a late conversion too late, He made the penalty of murder into a martyrdom." 2. Also, the act of martyrdom is the penalty of death inflicted in the charity of Christ: but thus the thief suffered: therefore he was a martyr. 3. Also, the Innocents are reputed martyrs on account of an act without will: therefore much more will the thief be reputed a martyr, who had both the act and the will.

§ 97. But against this is, that 1. It is commonly said that the cause makes the martyr, not the penalty: but the thief did not have the cause of the death of a martyr, but of a thief. 2. Also, Peter: If you suffer as malefactors, what glory will you have? As if he were saying: None. Therefore it seems that he was not a martyr.

§ 98. Solution. It must be said that in the truth of the matter he was not a martyr: and what Jerome says is first to be understood as to a certain effect of martyrdom, namely as to the deletion of the guilt of fault: because the temporal penalty informed by charity and the confession of faith deleted for him that penalty which he already had to suffer for his faults: nevertheless it did not confer the accumulation of glory in the aureole which the martyr has.

§ 99. To the next it must be said that the act of martyrdom is one in the thief and in the martyr: but that does not make a martyr, as is clear in the objecting.

§ 100. To the next it must be said that in the infants along with the act there was the cause: because in them Christ was sought, and the cause makes the whole rationale of martyrdom, although it does not make the whole glory of the martyr: because the charity of the sufferer and his devotion contribute to the accumulation of the glory of the sufferer.

Articulus 8 — Whether Infants Who Die In The Mother's Womb, Or Are Born And Depart Without Baptism, Are Punished With Eternal Punishment Or Sensible Punishment, Or With The Punishment Of Loss Only

§ 101. Article 8 § 102. Whether little children who die in the womb of the mother, or pass away born without baptism, are punished with eternal torment, or with sensible punishment, or with the penalty of the loss only?

§ 103. ARTICLE VIII. Whether little children who die in the womb of the mother, or pass away born without baptism, are punished with eternal torment, or with sensible punishment, or with the penalty of the loss only?

§ 104. Next it is inquired concerning this which is said, there, at E, toward the end: Most firmly hold that little children, etc.

§ 105. 1. From these words Augustine seems to imply that little children suffer with sensible penalties: because it is not called a torment (supplicium) unless it is a sensible penalty. 2. This also seems to be the case by another reason: For every deformity of sin is corrected

through penalty by the justice of the judge: because otherwise sin would remain unordained in nature: but the foulness of sin is felt in the body of little children, and in the soul, because the flesh is sprinkled with concupiscence which makes the little child concupiscible, and the adult concupiscent, as Augustine says: therefore it seems that it ought to be punished with a sensible penalty. 3. Also, fire will purge the world on account of the infection of sin: and if the world in its elements had sense, it would be sensibly punished: therefore it seems that much more the bodies of infants infected with sin ought to be punished with fire, and also their souls.

§ 1. ON THE CONTRARY: § 2. 1. A sin which is contracted entirely apart from one's own will, and which it was necessary to incur, and could not be avoided, merits the greatest innocence: but the sin of infants is such: therefore it merits the greatest innocence: therefore it ought not to be punished with a sensible penalty.

§ 3. 2. Also, the involuntary through ignorance of fact and through invincible violence merits innocence, since nevertheless in it the doer is in some way not willing: but in original sin there is the involuntary and impotence, and no concomitance with an act: therefore it ought much more to be excused, therefore it ought not to be punished with any sensible penalty.

§ 4. 3. Also, Augustine says that they prefer to be thus than not to be: but it is certain that those who are eternally damned to sensible penalties desire death, and death flees from them: therefore it seems that they do not suffer sensible penalties.

§ 5. This we grasped by saying that they suffer nothing but the punishment of loss [351]. For the ancients distinguished, and well, between the punishment of loss and the punishment of sense, saying that the punishment of loss consists in the taking away of something which is owed to us by the order of nature, such as is the lack of the vision of God, and the lack of eternal felicity: but the punishment of sense is that by which a contrary pain is felt from something afflictive, as the burning of fire, or the constriction of cold, or the like, such as the penalties will be in hell.

§ 6. To the first, therefore, it must be said that Augustine speaks improperly, calling the punishment of loss a torment.

§ 7. To the other it must be said that that evil in the body is punished by the necessity and bitterness of death and reduction to ashes, and not by a subsequent penalty, unless a penal guilt is present, not merely a natural one.

§ 8. To the other it must be said that that fire will burn away the rust of actual sin infecting the elements: because paradise, in which original sin was committed, was cleansed by the casting out of the sinners.

§ 9. But it is further objected: § 10. 1. For it is certain that they know the eternal kingdom has been taken from them on account of original sin: therefore either they grieve concerning the loss, or they do not grieve. If they do not grieve, then it seems that they are foolish and obstinate in malice. If they grieve: then they have an actual penalty.

§ 11. 2. Also, either the worm bites them, or not. If not: then they do not murmur against every sin. If so: since therefore the gnawing of the worm is a certain actual penalty, they seem to be punished sensibly and actually.

§ 12. And to this it must be said that they know themselves to be deprived of the kingdom, but without their own fault, and therefore they excuse themselves inwardly, and would will to have the kingdom: but that will does not induce anguish on account of the cause of the loss: for the reason that it is not their own [fault], but another's, with sufficient excuse.

§ 13. To the other it must be said that the worm never bites concerning that which is not done by one's own fault, but rather from another's fault with the severity of the decree of God: and therefore that objection is founded upon a falsehood.

Articulus 9 — Whether One Ought To Pray For Infants

Whether one ought to pray for infants?

§ 14. Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, E, near the end: They are not separated from the fellowship of the faithful, when the Church prays for the faithful, etc.

§ 15. For an injury seems to be done to such, when prayer is made for them: because it is held that they immediately fly away [to heaven].

§ 16. And to these things it must be said that the prayers are praises for the secure, and suffrages for those who have remained on the way.

Articulus 10 — Whether The Effect Of Baptism Is One And Equal In All The Baptized

Whether there is one and equal effect of baptism in all the baptized?

§ 17. Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, F, § 1: It is also customarily asked concerning those who are already sanctified, etc.

§ 18. And concerning sanctification in general it could indeed be asked here, but it has been disputed in Book II of the Sentences , and pursued at length.

§ 19. But it seems here that there is one effect in all those approaching baptism: § 20. 1. For of one cause causing in one way the act is one: but baptism is one cause causing in one way in all the baptized: therefore the effect is one.

§ 21. 2. Also, all are justified in the merit of the passion of Christ: but this is related to all in one way: therefore all receive equal grace in baptism.

§ 22. 3. Also, if you should say that in baptism preparation is required: but preparation is only so that it may not find an obstacle, because otherwise infants would not receive grace in baptism: therefore it seems that the infant and the adult receive equal grace in baptism, and any non-fictitious adult with any non-fictitious adult.

351. Luke 23:43.

§ 23. 4. To this some say that the act of baptismal grace is threefold, namely the deletion of universal fault, and the diminution of penalty, and the order of virtues in merits. And as to the first acts, grace is given equally in all, but not as to the third.

§ 24. But it seems to be contrary to this, because to one a hundred sins are remitted, and to another ten: because they have sinned unequally: therefore it seems that the act of the remission of fault is not equal in baptism.

§ 25. Solution. It must be said that this solution is good: and to the first it must be said that although baptism is one cause, nevertheless those approaching baptism do not relate to that cause in the same way: and therefore a different effect is produced as to merit: just as fire is also one cause of burning, yet it burns green wood and dry wood unequally.

§ 26. To the other it must be responded in the same way: because the passion of Christ does not cause grace in us unless it is continued to us: but it is continued through faith and devotion, and these possess a great difference on our part.

§ 27. To the other it must be said that preparation does not consist merely in the avoidance of an obstacle: for although that suffices as to the operation of baptism, nevertheless the quantity of contrition and devotion operates much toward the accumulation of merit, as has been said.

§ 28. To that which is objected against the solution, it must be said that in one it deletes more and in another fewer, this is by accident, because it finds more or fewer in the subject: but it is the same as to its efficacy concerning one and a thousand.

Articulus 11 — Whether The Penal Condition To Which We Are Bound By Sin Is Not Removed Through Baptism

Whether the penalty to which we are bound through sin is not removed by baptism?

Whether the penalty to which we are bound through sin is not removed by baptism?

§ 29. Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, F, § 2: It is asked why the penalty to which we are bound for sin, etc.

§ 30. For it seems that that cause which the Master touches upon is nothing: because § 31. 1. Just as the exercise of battle avails to the diminution of sin, so the joyousness of justice avails to the increase of merit, and this is a better good than the diminution of debt for sin.

§ 32. 2. Also, there seems to be no other cause, lest men should place the hope of beatitude in baptism: because if every penalty were removed, then ignominy would also be removed, and thus they would know well that the hope of beatitude must be placed in another.

§ 33. 3. Also, it seems that the penalty of concupiscence is deleted, or that original sin returns: for given a sufficient and efficient cause, the effect is posited: but the infection of the flesh through penalty, and not fault (I mean the penalty of concupiscence) is the entire cause that the soul is fouled by original fault when it is infused: therefore if the same cause remains

in the body after baptism, the same effect will return: therefore it will be infected with original fault, as before.

§ 34. If you should say that then it has grace repugnant to the form: and therefore it cannot infect. ON THE CONTRARY: Let grace be removed just as it is removed by subsequent actual sin; therefore then with actual sin original sin will return. Lest therefore this should happen, it seems that at least the whole penalty of concupiscence ought to have been removed.

§ 35. If perchance this should be conceded. ON THE CONTRARY: One having original sin ought to be baptized, or else the original sin is not deleted in him; but no one is to be baptized repeatedly: therefore no one receives original sin after he has once been without it.

§ 36. Solution. Besides the causes assigned here, the Doctors have been accustomed to posit seven others, of which the first is that man might be humbled. Whence, Job 6:4: The arrows of the Lord are in me, the indignation whereof drinketh up my spirit , that is, pride.

§ 37. The second, that fear of this kind may be struck into him, Job 6:4: The terrors of the Lord war against me.

§ 38. The third is, that an example of not sinning may be given from the trace of ancient plagues, Zech. 13:5: Adam is my example from my youth .

§ 39. The fourth is, that man might recognize himself, Isa. 28:19: Vexation alone shall make you understand what you hear.

§ 40. The fifth, a stimulation to one going to the Lord, Micah 2:10: Arise, and go, because you have not rest here.

§ 41. The sixth, a showing of friendship, Heb. 12:6: For he scourges every son whom he receives. Hosea 11:4: I will draw them with the cords of Adam, with the bands of love.

§ 42. The seventh, the exercise of virtues, Judges 3:1-4: These are the nations which the Lord left, that by them he might instruct Israel.

§ 43. The Master assigns other causes in the Letter, as is evident.

§ 44. To the first, therefore, it must be said that for a man punished and made proud through a disposition to sin, nothing is better and more cautious than a cause of humiliation: because if he did not have that whereby he might be humbled, then he would be disposed to evil: so that it is fitting that after the first fall he would never believe that he would fall through the appetite for sublime things, as he fell at first. Whence another thing can be better in itself, and yet not be better for a man thus disposed.

§ 45. To the other it must be said that the whole penalty cannot be removed in this life, nor can this be the effect of the sacrament, but rather it is the effect of glory: but the Master assigns a certain cause why God did not will that it should be the effect of sacramental grace.

§ 46. To the other it must be said that the fomes remaining in the flesh does not remain in the same power in which it was before: because it does not remain in the power of infecting the soul of which it is the subject. But it is true that from it can be separated the seed which will infect the soul that will be created to be united to it. And this is so because the fomes has

been weakened as to this soul, and not as to another, through the passion of the Lord and the sacrament: and this well happens: because when the grain is shaken out from the chaff, it does not produce chaff for the same grain, but for another. Similarly, when the uncircumcised is circumcised, he can no longer be uncircumcised, but he well generates one uncircumcised.

§ 47. And if the cause of this is asked, I say that this is because the fomes draws the power of infecting the soul from the sentence of the Lord, and from fault: and therefore it cannot infect except where it is in the character of the first origin: but in this one who has been purged, it is not in the character of the first origin: because it is not infected in the seminal principle of Adam: and therefore it infects him no more, but another in whom it is in the character of the first origin, namely in every father who, as he generates, is Adam with respect to his offspring.

Articulus 12 — Whether In One Baptized With Fiction The Reality Precedes The Sacrament; And Whether, The Fiction Not Receding, It Is Truly A Sign

Whether in one fictitiously baptized the reality precedes the sacrament? and, Whether, the fiction not departing, it is truly a sign?

Whether in one fictitiously baptized the reality precedes the sacrament? and, Whether, the fiction not departing, it is truly a sign?

§ 48. Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, G, about the middle: Neither should you marvel that the reality sometimes precedes, etc.

§ 49. For it seems that the solution of the Master here does not suffice: because § 50. 1. Let us posit that the fiction never departs, then it does not seem to be a sign, nor a cause: therefore it is not a sacrament.

§ 51. 2. Also, every sign is a sign of something: therefore one must posit that either in the future, or in the present, or in the past: therefore if it is posited in none of these ways, it seems that it is not a sign.

§ 52. Solution. It must be said that it is a sign of the grace which it causes, so far as it is in itself: just as the sun always causes splendor so far as it is in itself, although it may be hindered by the opposition of a cloud: and through this the solution to the first is clear.

§ 53. To the other it must be said that the effect is posited as to the order of the cause to the caused: and here there is nothing unfitting because many future things are in the order of causes, which will never happen: and therefore it is also a sign of a thing which is future in a certain respect, that is, in the order of cause.

Articulus 13 — Whether Grace Is Given To Infants In Baptism; And Whether They Have The Virtues

Whether grace is given to infants in baptism? and, Whether they have virtues?

§ 54. Next it is asked concerning the last chapter of this distinction, there, H, It is also customarily asked, etc.

§ 55. For it seems that they have virtues: because § 56. 1. Virtue is a good quality of the mind by which one lives rightly, which no one uses badly, which God works in us without us: therefore they have virtues.

§ 57. 2. Also, it is certain that the evil habit of sin is inborn in them: therefore the sacrament of the Redeemer would now be able to do less than the sin of Adam, if a generally justifying habit were not caused in them: therefore the habit of virtues.

§ 58. 3. Also, the potency of the soul always looks to a determinate object, whether it proceeds into it, or not: therefore it is perfected by a determinate habit: but this is virtue: therefore infants have virtues, and they receive them in baptism.

§ 59. But against this is what is said upon that, For perhaps for a good man one would dare to die, etc. . For there the Gloss distinguishes between good and just: because good is the innocence of life, as infants: but just [is understood] by the exercise of virtues: therefore infants do not have virtues.

§ 60. 2. Also, if infants have virtues, and he who has one, has all: then they have faith and hope, which Augustine notes, because he says: They do not have faith except according as baptism is the sacrament of faith.

§ 61. Solution. It must be said that it is easy to determine the prolixity here, which some posit as great. And the Master excellently solves it in the Letter, namely that they have the virtues in gift (in munere), and they do not have them in use: and this does not happen on account of the imperfection of the virtues, but rather on account of the imperfection of free choice which is the subject of the virtues.

§ 62. Whence in the first argument the force is in what is said, by which one lives rightly: for if it is understood by which one lives rightly in habit, it is true: because as Augustine says in the book On the Good of Marriage, a habit is that by which one does something, when it is time: and thus the infant has within himself that whereby he can live well: as Dionysius says: Coming into sense, that is, into the use of free choice.

§ 63. To the other it must be said that they have the virtues in the gift of habit, as the Master says.

§ 64. And through this the solution to the following is also clear.

§ 65. TO THAT which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that it seems to be nothing: because the Gloss says just in the exercise of virtues, and exercise names an act: but infants are called just from habit.

§ 66. To the other it must be said that they have faith in habit: and the sacrament of baptism for this much is said to be the sacrament of faith, because it gives faith in habit, although not in act.

DISTINCTIO V

Divisio Textus

§ 67. After these things it is to be known that the sacrament of baptism, etc. In this fifth distinction the Master asks, If anyone can baptize? because a good and a bad man equally. Secondly, that the power of authority remains with God: but the power of ministry is with men, there, B, Because they have only a ministry, etc. Thirdly, he determines what is the power which He could have given and did not give, there, C, Here it is asked what is that power, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether He Who Ought To Baptize Ought To Have Order And Jurisdiction, And Be Just

Whether he who ought to baptize, ought to have order and jurisdiction, and be just?

§ 68. A question occurs here, however, around the beginning, who ought to baptize. And three things are asked, namely whether it is necessary to have order and jurisdiction for this, that one may baptize? Secondly, Whether it is necessary to have a good life? Thirdly, concerning certain cases which occur sometimes around those being baptized.

§ 69. To the first it is objected thus: § 70. 1. Baptism is a sacrament of the Church: therefore it consists in the dispensation of ministers: but ministers are those having order and jurisdiction: therefore it seems , that he neither ought nor can baptize, unless he has both.

§ 71. 2. Also, Isidore: It is certain that baptism has been handed down to priests alone, and its ministry: nor has it been permitted to the deacons themselves: therefore it seems that he neither ought nor can baptize, unless he is a priest having jurisdiction.

§ 72. 3. Also, among the sacraments there is one which is the sacrament of sacraments, and this is Order: therefore he who does not have this, does not have the power of baptizing: since to baptize is to dispense the greatest sacrament.

§ 73. 4. Also, the order of the Church is like the order of the body: but in the body nourishment does not descend from the mouth to any member whatsoever, but to the stomach, and from that through the veins ordinately to the liver, and heart, and other members consequently: therefore similarly it ought to be in the mystical body: therefore if that order is not observed, the baptized does not attain grace: therefore it seems that he ought not to baptize, except he who is constituted in grade by the Church.

§ 74. ON THE CONTRARY: An old woman baptizes, and it is baptized: therefore what was said is not required.

§ 75. But it is FURTHER asked concerning the second: § 76. 1. For Augustine says, and it is held in the Letter, that those baptizing ought to be just: the ministers of so great a judge ought to be just: therefore one of two things seems to follow: either that the unjust do not baptize, or if they baptize, that they sin mortally by baptizing.

§ 77. 2. Also, in baptism there is an act of man and an act of God: but the act of man is never pleasing unless he is in grace who makes it pleasing to him: therefore when this sinner immerses, his work is unpleasing to God: because immersion is the work of man: therefore either nothing is conferred upon the boy or the baptized, or the baptizer sins mortally: because upon the one or upon both it is necessary that the offense of divine ingratitude fall.

§ 78. 3. Also, we see in our body, that a withered member, although official by form and figure, merely on account of the defect of spirit in it, life and sense are not derived from it to others: but rather if it is of the principal [members], all the other members die: but those dispensing the sacraments are members of the Church, through whom the life of grace and the sense of the intelligence of God is transfused into the whole Church: therefore if they themselves wither in life, all the other members are corrupted: therefore it is necessary that the ministers be good.

§ 79. 4. Also, when Christ determined the ministers, he determined them by signs of sanctity, as is held, Mark 16:20, and Heb. 2:4: God witnessing with signs, and portents, and various virtues, and distributions of the Holy Spirit according to his will. But it is not lawful to transgress the determination of Christ. Therefore it is necessary still to be such that they might not dispense the sacraments.

§ 80. 5. Also, Malachi 2:2: I will curse your blessings. And in the same place, the Gloss of Jerome: Whatever is blessed by you, is cursed by me. Therefore it seems also that it is dangerous to permit such to baptize.

§ 81. ON THE CONTRARY: § 82. 1. In the Letter it is held that Judas baptized, and they were baptized.

§ 83. 2. Also, whether he be a drunkard or a homicide, etc., it is always baptized if he baptizes.

§ 84. FURTHER it is asked here concerning a simoniacal priest who sells the sacraments, and is unwilling to baptize unless hired for a price, whether in such a case he ought to be permitted?

§ 85. It seems, that he ought not: because § 86. 1. Evils are not to be done that good may come but the buyer is made simoniacal, just as the seller: therefore it seems that such a one rather ought to die without baptism.

§ 87. If perchance you say that in that case another can baptize. ON THE CONTRARY: Let us posit that there is no other except the priest, and an adult is to be baptized: then it seems that he rather ought to die than be thus baptized.

§ 88. 2. Also, let us posit that no one has water except the priest, and the father of the boy sees the boy perishing: either he will buy, and then he commits simony: or not, and then he permits the boy to perish when he could help: but it seems that he ought to permit him to perish: because no one ought to commit himself to peril even by a venial sin so that another may escape eternal death: therefore much less on account of the liberation of a boy ought he to commit himself to the peril of simony.

§ 89. Solution. It must be said to the first, that the true minister with respect to the Lord and the Church is one having order and jurisdiction and [good] life: but in a time of necessity it is anyone, even an old woman, having neither male sex, nor order, nor jurisdiction, nor good life.

§ 90. To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that those reasons do not prove, except what kind of minister there ought to be: but in this sacrament something reshapes the sin, namely necessity: and therefore the most generous piety of God, who wills no one to perish: just as He provided a common matter which can be had by all, and found everywhere: so also He willed that in a time of necessity anyone could immerse another.

§ 91. It must nevertheless be said to the first, that dispensation is in two ways, namely as to office, and thus that reason speaks truly: and as to the abundance of God's mercy and the necessity of the sacrament, and thus it does not hold.

§ 92. To the other it must be said that Isidore excepts the time of necessity from that authority, saying, *except in a time of necessity, in which it is permitted to all.*

§ 93. To the other it must be said that a layman baptizing or an old woman, baptizes, and does not have the power of baptizing from order. For there is a power from order, and the objection proceeds from that: there is also a power from the necessity of salvation, and this descends immediately upon anyone from God who has not bound His power to the sacrament of order.

§ 94. To the other it must be said that that similitude of the Apostle of the mystical body to the natural, is not attended to except in the order of offices, and not in the descent of grace: because anyone has grace immediately from God: and therefore also the act of the ministry of salvation, when necessity compels, anyone receives from God.

§ 95. To that which is further asked in the part or distinction, it must be responded that one must also distinguish the times. For as much as it is on the part of baptism, baptism is equal whether it is given by a good man or by a bad one: but on the part of the baptizer, if he is in mortal sin, I say that either that sin is notorious, or occult. If notorious, either it is in a place of necessity, so that namely there is no other baptizer, and thus a peril: then I say that with fear on account of necessity the baptizer is not made guilty, but does well. But if it is not a time of necessity: then he scandalizes, and unworthily usurps the act of the sacrament, and I think that he sins mortally or gravely. But if it is occult, either scandal is feared if he does not baptize: and it is a time of necessity, or not a time of necessity, or scandal is not feared from this for this reason if he does not baptize. But if the scandal of the presumption of sin against his reputation is feared, and it is a time of necessity, he can baptize without sin. Also, if it is not a time of necessity, and scandal is feared, I think that still with fear he can baptize. But if no scandal is feared, nor is it a time of necessity, I think that he sins gravely by presuming to baptize: and through this the solution to the first two is sufficiently clear.

§ 96. To the other it must be said that it is not similar concerning the official members in our body, and concerning sacramental grace: because our members give and prepare nourishment for each other by an interior preparation: but in the Church the minister does not

operate except exteriorly: and grace is not from him, but immediately from God: and therefore without corruption grace passes to the soul through the ministry of man which is only exterior.

§ 97. To the other it must be said that Christ does not so much determine the minister as to suitability as also according to the optimum state of ministers: nevertheless because He did not repel Judas, He intimated that bad ministers must also sometimes be tolerated.

§ 98. To the other it must be said that the pronoun your notes a discretion, namely, I will curse your blessings, namely, because they are so much yours, that they are not mine: but such blessings are not sacraments, because those are divine blessings.

§ 99. To the Gloss of Jerome it must be said in the same way, that when it is said: Whatever is blessed by you, it notes discretion in the pronoun.

§ 100. To that which is further asked concerning the cases, there are those who respond diversely: for some concede the objects as they conclude. But it seems to me that they are not to be conceded: for the reason that one seeking baptism does not buy water, nor does he buy the act of baptizing: but in a time of necessity he can redeem the vexation of his right, both for himself if he is to be baptized, as the first case says: and for a boy, if he has a son or another whom he wills to be baptized. And then evils are not done that good may come, nor is simony committed on the part of the one seeking baptism, nor does he even commit himself to peril for the salvation of another.

§ 101. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 2 — Whether A Drunkard, A Murderer, An Adulterer Can Baptize

Whether a drunkard, a homicide, an adulterer can baptize?

§ 102. Next it is asked concerning what is said, there, A, around the middle: If therefore a drunkard, a homicide, an adulterer baptized them.

§ 103. For drunkard (ebriosus) names an obstruction of discretion: and if discretion is not had, intention is not had, but perversity in the act of baptizing: but the intention and the due act not being had, there is no baptism: therefore a drunkard cannot baptize, as it seems.

§ 104. Next to this it is asked, When someone is so drunk that his tongue is tied, and the use of reason and discretion is not lost, whether he can baptize?

§ 105. If so: then the form of words not being uttered by him who is knowledgeable in Latin speech, it can be baptism, which seems to be false, because the form is of the substance of the sacrament. If not: this seems false: because let us posit that it is a time of necessity, and in no way is there one who could baptize, except such a one, and he has not lost discretion through wine: therefore conscience dictates to him that he ought to succor this one: therefore if he does not do it, he sins mortally: therefore he would be perplexed [in a moral dilemma], which is against the Doctors who say that no one is perplexed.

§ 106. Solution. It must be said to the first, that it is one thing concerning one who is drunk (ebrius) and one who is a drunkard (ebriosus): for a drunkard is not always drunk: and therefore when he is sober, retaining nevertheless the sin of drunkenness, he can baptize, the sin not resisting: and in such a case Augustine speaks. But one who is drunk, in whom reason is suffocated, does not seem to be able to baptize.

§ 107. To the other case it must be said that if there were no other, then such a one ought to baptize: because although such drunkenness strikes the nerves with an inordinate motion of the tongue, nevertheless he can form the words with study: and because he has discretion, he can and ought to study to do this: but if he could express no form, it would be otherwise: but such drunkenness which does not bind reason does not avail to have so great an effect.

Articulus 3 — Whether A Heretic And A Schismatic Can Baptize

Whether a heretic and a schismatic can baptize?

Whether a heretic and a schismatic can baptize?

Next, it is asked concerning what he says there, A, around the middle: "If in any heresy or schism," etc.

For against this is the following: § 1. He who does not believe does not seem to be able to intend; therefore, a heretic does not baptize, since intention is required for the sacrament.

§ 2. Again, it is said that faith is first premised, and baptism follows, when it is stated: "He who believes and is baptized," etc. [352] Therefore, faith is necessary for the sacrament; therefore, a heretic cannot baptize.

§ 3. If you say that this is true on the part of the Church or of the baptized, but not on the part of the baptizer: this is nothing, because there it is also premised concerning the baptizer. For when He had commanded the Gospel to be preached, He afterwards added: "Baptizing them," etc. Therefore, faith is required on the part of the baptizer.

§ 4. Again, Baptism is called the sacrament of faith. Therefore, it seems that faith is required for that sacrament.

§ 5. Again, a confession of faith is required even from the baptizer when he baptizes, so that the due solemnity of baptism may be preserved, as is clear in the interrogations of the godparents. Therefore, it seems that he himself must also have faith. Therefore, a heretic does not baptize. The contrary of this, however, is proved in many ways in the following distinction.

§ 6. Solution. It must be said that a heretic baptizing in a heretical form does not baptize; and according to this understanding the martyr Cyprian said that heretics do not baptize. But a heretic baptizing in the form of the Church, even with the intention, baptizes in the form of faith and the faith of the Church, and therefore that which he so baptizes is baptized. And Augustine in the book against the Donatist gives a fitting example of this: for just as Jacob begot the blessed seed not only through the womb of the free women, but also through the

womb of the handmaids, so Christ regenerates not only by the ministry of the faithful, but also by the ministry of infidels, because the act is His, not man's; and in this the efficacy of the sacrament is shown.

§ 7. Therefore, to the first it must be said that he who does not have faith can intend to do what the Church does, even if he does not intend to induce the effect of baptism. But such an intention of the act which the Church performs suffices for the sacrament of baptism.

§ 8. To the next it must be said that the faith which is required for baptism is the faith of the Church, and not of the baptizer.

§ 9. To what is objected to the contrary, it must be said that preaching the Gospel does not precede baptism as necessary, but as expedient, in which we are taught how baptism will be preserved; and therefore it contributes to the well-being, and not to the essence of the sacrament.

§ 10. To the next it must be said that all this is of the well-being, and not of the essence; because the sacrament is said to be the sacrament of the faith not of the giver, but of the receiver; and if he also is an infidel, and yet receives the sacrament in the form of the Church, it is called of the faith which ought to be, not which is, just as the Master says above about the feigner remaining in his fiction unto the end of his life.

Articulus 4 — What Is The Power That The Lord Retained To Himself, And That Which He Gave To Ministers, And That Which He Could Have Given And Did Not Give

What is the power which the Lord retained for Himself, and which He gave to the ministers, and which He could have given and did not give?

Next, it is asked concerning what is said there, B: "Because they have only the ministry, not the power of baptism," etc.

It is asked here, what is the power which the Lord retained for Himself, and which He gave to the ministers, and which He could have given and did not give?

For it seems that: § 1. He could have given the power of cooperation toward interior cleansing, so that just as one cooperates with the Lord exteriorly, one would thus cleanse interiorly with Him. First, because the Master says this in the text of the following chapter.

§ 2. Secondly, because He gave man the power to expel demons. But it is less to expel an effect than its cause. Since, therefore, sin is the effect of the demon, He could have conferred on man that he should expel sin.

§ 3. Again, a creature which is a substance is more worthy than that which is an accident, and among substances the rational is the most worthy. But grace is an accident, and man is a rational substance; therefore, man is more worthy than grace. But to grace God conferred the power of expelling sin; therefore, much more could He have conferred this on man or the rational soul.

352. Cf. Augustine's concepts on the punishment of unbaptized infants, often referred to as poena damni (the punishment of loss) as opposed to poena sensus (the punishment of sense).

§ 4. Again, upon that text: "He it is who baptizes," the Gloss says: "That is, cleanses from sins."

Also, in the same place Augustine says that John learned from Christ that He could have given the ministers the power of cleansing from sins, and did not give it. But this is through the power of remitting sin, and of cooperation toward interior cleansing; therefore, He could have given this.

§ 5. Again, it is commonly objected that He gave to certain herbs and words and stones the power of curing spiritual diseases.

But against this seems to be that: § 6. Augustine says that it is a greater thing to make a pious man out of an impious one than to create heaven and earth; but He could not have given the power of creating heaven and earth, as they say; therefore, neither the power of making a pious man out of an impious one.

§ 7. Again, the impious does not become pious except by some creature created out of nothing, namely, grace; since therefore the act of omnipotence is to create, as was proved at the beginning of Book II of the Sentences, this could not befit any creature; therefore, He could not communicate that power.

§ 8. Again, suppose that He gave that power to man. Then man can go forth into the act of cleansing. Therefore, he can cleanse the sinner whether the sinner wills it or not, which would be inordinate. Therefore, He could not have conferred that power on man.

§ 9. Again, if you say that God could have conferred it, but none of the ministers could have received it: this is nothing, because here it is asked about the power which He could have given and the minister could have received, but God did not give it.

§ 10. Solution. The Doctors distinguish here a multiplicity of power, namely of authority, of invocation, of excellence, of ministry, and of cooperation. The power of authority is that by which God is the first cause of justification in baptism, and without which no other power can do anything; and this (as they say) He could not communicate to another: just as He cannot communicate to another that he be God. And this is found in the text.

The power of invocation is that He would give to the name of some man the power that at the invocation of his name sanctification and the effect of baptism would be brought about, as happens at the invocation of the Trinity, as also sometimes happens at the invocation of the name of Christ; and this (as they say) He could have conferred, but willed not to do so, and this wisely, lest the hope of salvation and help be placed in man, and thus gradually he should be worshipped in place of God, or begin to be worshipped.

The power of excellence is expounded in two ways by different people. The common exposition is that according to the merits and ranks of the baptizers the effect of baptism would be more excellent or less excellent, so that it would be better if given by a better or greater person in the Church; and this again (as they say) He could have given, but willed not to, lest there be as many baptisms as baptizers; because there had to be one baptism, just as there is one Passion which operates in it, and one original sin which is substantially cured in it.

Certain others, being few, expound the power of excellence differently, namely that it is of excellence in act, so that without the rite of baptism he could absolve from sin, opening the kingdom as if without a key; and they say this was conferred on Christ alone. And the first exposition is better and more common. He gave this, however, only to Christ who is God and man, so that there would not be many heads of the Church, just as the Church is only one.

The power of ministry is that the exterior rite of baptism be committed to dispensation; and this God conferred on all ministers of the Church.

The power of cooperation is that which the Master touches upon in the text, namely that man should have the ministry of curing interiorly or cooperating with God, just as he has it exteriorly; and this, according to the Master, He could have conferred, but willed not to, lest the hope of salvation be believed to be in another, or to depend on another than God, and lest grace be thought to depend on the act of man, if God were to require the work of man to confer grace.

Therefore, the power of authority He neither could have conferred, nor did He confer; but the power of the exterior ministry in which the minister cooperates with God, He could have conferred and did confer. However, the power of invocation, of excellence, and of interior cooperation He could have conferred, but did not confer for the aforesaid reasons.

§ 11. According to this distinction, to the objections it must be said that the first objections seem to prove that He could have conferred on man [the power] to justify; and this is not true. But He could have conferred that, by some operation of spiritual power, he might dispose to justification, just as a sacrament operates by disposing.

Therefore, to the first it must be said that the Master in the text understands [it] concerning the cooperation of disposition.

To the next it must be said that to expel a demon from the infestation of a body is less than to expel sin, because God alone remits sin through the fact that God alone creates grace, by which sins are formally remitted.

To the next it must be said that such arguments are worth nothing, because the dignity of grace and of the rational creature is equivocal. For the dignity of the rational creature is among substances, because it is capable of beatitude, and in this it is preferred to grace. But the dignity of grace is the dignity of a form expelling sin by contrariety, and grace is preferred to man in this, because man or the rational creature cannot be such a form.

To the next it must be said that this is understood concerning the power of disposition toward cleansing, and not concerning the power of giving or creating grace.

To the next it must be said that there is no similarity between the curing of bodies and of souls; because stones and herbs, out of powers consequent upon contrarieties, have their complexions [related] to the causes of bodily diseases; but man can have no such comparison to the cause of spiritual disease; and words do not cure except through invocation.

§ 12. To the other which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that all those things prove only concerning the effective power of justification and vivification, and not the

dispositive power. And it is well conceded that He could not give that, neither to Christ as man, nor to another, nor even the power of creating; and the reason for this was dispatched in the Third Book of the Sentences.

Articulus 5 — Whether John Knew Christ, And What He Knew About Him

Whether John knew Christ, and what he knew about Him?

Next, it is asked concerning what he says there, B, near the beginning: "What did John the Baptist know? The Lord. What did he not know," etc.

For Augustine says that he knew Him to be the Lamb taking away the sins of the world; but he did not know that He was going to retain for Himself the power of baptizing and not give it to others. But Jerome and Chrysostom say the contrary to this, namely that he did not know Him to be the Christ born in the world, and that through His death He was going to redeem the world. Therefore, there seems to be a contrariety between them.

§ 1. Solution. It must be said that both are true, because there is a simple knowledge of Christ, and there is a knowledge of Him in this or that form in which He came to John. Therefore, he knew that He was born and was going to redeem the world, but he did not know that this man who came to him among others was the Christ, before he saw the dove descending, just as God had said to him in the desert; and then he said: "I ought to be baptized by You, and do You come to me?" And Chrysostom assigns the cause for this in his Commentary, saying that in his youth he had known Him, but having dwelled for a long time in the desert he had lost the imagination of His face; and therefore he did not know Him under the form of coming to him, and yet knew Him to have been born as such in the world.

Articulus 6 — Whether Christ As Man Had The Power Of Forgiving Sins

Whether Christ as man had the power of remitting sins?

Next, it is asked concerning what he says there, C, toward the end: "Thus therefore He could have given," etc.

Therefore, it seems that Christ as man had the power of remitting sins: because

§ 1. It is said: "But that you may know that the Son of Man has power on earth to forgive sins," etc. For the Son of Man is Christ according to human nature. Therefore, it seems that He can also confer it on another man.

§ 2. Again, in the Third Book of the Sentences it was held that Christ according to human nature is the redeemer; but He could not redeem unless sin were remitted; therefore, it seems that He Himself could remit sins according to this nature.

§ 3. Again, it is more to redeem than to create, as Augustine says. If therefore He could redeem according to human nature, He could also according to it create the grace by which man is justified.

BUT AGAINST THIS: § 4. Bernard says that grace is not from the man Christ, but only from God. Therefore, He could not have the power of cleansing the soul. But it has often been

proved above that to create is an act of infinite power, and of divine omnipotence alone. But Christ as man was not susceptible of that power, that He should justify souls interiorly.

§ 5. Solution. Almost all say that Christ as man was not susceptible of that power.

Therefore, to that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that the Son of Man wished there to prove His deity; and therefore this belongs to the Son of Man insofar as He is God.

To the next it must be said that God is the redeemer, and baptism is attributed to the man, because in human nature He endured the passions by which He satisfied for us.

But if it is asked, what was the power which the Father gave Him above others?

§ 6. It must be said according to the Doctors that it was the power of excellence toward act, namely that He could loose without the office of the keys as the Lord of the universal Church. For Christ is not read to have received orders, but to have given them; nor to have had power by measure, but for all things. And this power of excellence was given to Christ, which to others in virtue of the keys and of order is both limited and handed down.

DISTINCTIO VI

Divisio Textus

Division of the Text

"Now let us add to whom it is permitted to baptize," etc. In this last part, he treats of baptism on the part of the baptizer.

And this distinction is divided into two parts: in the first of which he touches upon five questions concerning those baptizing and those to be baptized. But in the second part he treats of the sacramentals, there, G: "Furthermore, all coming to baptism," etc.

In the first of these (as has been said) there are five questions, namely, concerning the power of those baptizing. The second is, whether anyone attains the habit of baptismal grace in the mother's womb? there, B: "By this word also it is to be known, that in the maternal womb," etc. The third is concerning the corruption of words out of ignorance of the language, there, C: "It is also customarily asked, If corruptly," etc. The fourth is concerning that of which it is doubted whether it is baptism, there, D: "Furthermore it is to be known, that those of whom no indications exist," etc. The fifth, concerning those jokingly baptized, there, E: "It is also customarily asked concerning him who jokingly," etc.

Also there are added some things concerning the intention of those baptizing, and concerning the time of baptism.

Articulus 1 — Whether Anyone At All Can Be A Minister Of The Church

Whether anyone can be a minister of the Church?

A doubt arises concerning the first part: Whether the minister of baptism is anyone, as seems to be said in the text?

But it seems not, because: § 1. Baptism is a sacrament of the Church. But the sacraments of the Church are committed to the dispensation of the ministers of the Church; therefore, baptism also. Since, therefore, the ministers of the Church are none but the Prelates, it seems that none but the Prelates alone have the power of baptizing.

§ 2. Again, among the sacraments there is one which is the sacrament of sacraments, namely that of Order. Therefore, it seems that the administration of all the others pertains to the ordained person; not therefore to anyone, as seems to be said in the text.

§ 3. Again, Christ sent only the Apostles and disciples to baptize. Therefore, it seems that none have the power of baptizing except their successors; but these are the Prelates. Therefore, it seems that none ought to baptize except a Prelate.

§ 4. Again, there is no power except from God, as is said by the Apostle; and those things that are from God are ordained. Therefore, it seems that the power of baptism falls under that order. But no ordered act from any power is committed to all indifferently; therefore, neither is this act. Therefore, not anyone can baptize, as it seems.

§ 5. Again, the Apostle says that just as in one body we have many members, but all the members, though they are many, do not have the same act, so we, being many, are one body in Christ. Therefore, just as it is in the natural body, so it ought to be in the mystical body. But in the natural body nourishment is digested in one member and transmitted to others, because it is not given immediately to each single one; therefore, it ought to be similarly in the mystical body. Therefore, there will be determinate ministers through whom baptism and baptismal grace are given, and not anyone will be a baptizer, as it seems.

But against this is that: § 6. It is said in the text.

§ 7. Again, because baptism is a sacrament of necessity. And if it were committed to some, since they could not be near to everyone, it would happen that many would be endangered, which would be against God's mercy and the providence of the Church. Therefore, the power of baptizing ought to have been committed to all.

§ 8. Solution. It must be said that there is power and the commission of power. Due power is in him who has power from order, and authority or jurisdiction from authority, and suitability from the merit of his life; and such a one alone is worthily and truly a minister. But he who has order and jurisdiction and not the life, is indeed truly a minister, but not suitably or worthily; and in this way the arguments first introduced proceed. But on account of the necessity of this sacrament and the mode of the fault against which it is, that sacrament receives administration from anyone. And the necessity is from the generality of the danger, as was said in objecting, but the mode of the fault is original [sin], for which Christ satisfied as far as He was concerned, and alien faith suffices for that satisfaction to avail the baptized. Now this faith can be protested in the act of anyone; and therefore in time of necessity anyone can baptize.

§ 9. Therefore, to the first, second, third, and fourth, it must be said that this is true as regards order from jurisdiction and suitability; but another pact reforms in baptism, as was said.

§ 10. To the next it must be said that grace, which is the nourishment of the mystical body as regards spiritual life, is given immediately by God to every member, and therefore as regards this it is not similar. But there is a certain utility in exterior graces which are for well-being, such as prophecy, knowledge, and the like; and as regards those, there is a similarity between the mystical and natural body; and such a grace is the order of power and jurisdiction. And therefore in such graces one member of the mystical body receives from another.

Articulus 2 — Whether A Heretic Can Baptize

Whether a heretic can baptize?

Next, it is asked concerning what is said there, "... baptized by heretics," etc.

For it seems that a heretic cannot baptize. § 1. For the Psalm says: "The sparrow has found herself a house, and the turtle-dove a nest for herself, where she may lay her young." Therefore, outside the house there is no laying of young. But it is clear that a heretic is outside the house; therefore, he does not lay the young of the Church. Therefore, he does not baptize.

§ 2. Again, it is written: "Whatever the unclean person touches, he shall make unclean." And this authority is introduced in the text; therefore, it seems that he does not baptize.

§ 3. Again, John saw the earthly Jerusalem descending from the heavenly. Therefore, because it does not descend from the heavenly, it is not of the earthly Jerusalem, that is, of the Church militant. Therefore, it seems that since the church of malignant heretics does not descend according to order from the heavenly, it confers nothing in the earthly.

§ 4. Again, a stomach or liver ejected outside the body of a man can in no act subserve the remaining members. But a heretic is like a member ejected outside the body; therefore, he subserves the mystical body in nothing; therefore, he cannot confer the baptismal character.

§ 5. Again, Dionysius, speaking of the sacramental character, says that it is given to the receiver by the hierarch. The hierarch is constituted in a sacred order in the Church, and a heretic is not such; therefore, it seems that he himself cannot confer the sacramental character.

§ 6. Furthermore, for the generation of the Church the womb of the Church is required. But the womb of the Church and the womb of the conventicles of heretics are not the same. Therefore, it seems that those who receive the sacraments in the conventicles of heretics do not receive the character.

But against this is: § 7. Whatever is said in the text, except for the authorities of Cyprian.

§ 8. Again, it was said to John, as was held in the premises, that "He it is who baptizes." Therefore, by whomever the prescribed form of words is said in due matter, God is always the one baptizing intrinsically. Therefore, the character is imprinted, because it is clear that grace

is not conferred in a baptism which a heretic known to be cut off confers, if an adult is baptized who knows him to be outside the Church.

§ 9. Solution. It must be said that whoever baptizes, intending and observing the form of the Church, whether he be a heretic or not, he confers the baptismal character, at least, as was held above concerning those putting on Christ up to the reception of the sacrament.

§ 10. But to the first that is objected to the contrary, it must be said that the nest of the Church is the form of the sacraments; and those are not the nests of heretics. And therefore when they lay their young in them, they lay them not outside the Church, but in it; and even if they are afterwards trampled upon by the devil, this is not because of the imperfection of the sacraments, but rather because of the perniciousness of fiction.

§ 11. To the next it must be said that this is understood of a touch which is similar to physical touch: so that if in touching he imitates the touch according to the quantity of the one touching, that is, that the heretic touches in imitation of heresy: for thus it is true that he who is touched will himself be unclean. But when a heretic touches in the form of the sacraments of the Church, that touch is likened to a leper having his hands wrapped in a exceedingly clean white cloth, and therefore unable to make unclean.

§ 12. To the next it must be said that although the rite and convention of heresy does not descend from the triumphant Church, yet it usurps that which descends from the triumphant Church, when it usurps the sacraments of the Church.

§ 13. To the next it must be said that it is not similar; because a heretic is not entirely outside the Church, because he usurps the act of an interior member and its ministry, when he takes the form of the sacraments of the Church. Whence the dependence of spiritual members on one another and the dependence of corporal members on one another is not similar in all respects, as was said in the preceding question.

§ 14. To the next it must be said that Dionysius speaks of the minister according to the order of power, the authority of administration, and suitability for the act; and he is the one who has complete ministry to his own salvation; and it is not understood that the character cannot be imprinted otherwise.

§ 15. To the next Augustine responds that Donatus does not beget through the fact that he is outside, but through the fact that he is inside, when he observes the form of the Church in conferring the sacraments; and therefore it does not follow that he himself is inside, but rather that he himself is outside, and begets through that which is inside.

§ 16. To the next it must be said that the Church, according to Augustine, receives the blessed seed from the seed of her husband Christ: and this sometimes through her own womb, as Rachel and Leah, and sometimes through the womb of a handmaid, as in the handmaids of Rachel and Leah, who bore upon their knees: by whom are signified heretics using the form of the Church in conferring sacraments. Sometimes, however, the seed perishes in the proper womb, just as Esau was reprobated; sometimes in the womb of the handmaid, just

as Ishmael was reprobated: by whom are signified false Christians and heretics baptizing in the form of heresy and not of the Church.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 3 — Whether Character Is In Some Genus, And In What Genus; And If In The Genus Of Quality, In What Species

Whether the character is in some genus, and in what genus: and if in the genus of quality, in what species?

Next, it is asked concerning what is said there, A, § 2, around the middle: "The character of Christ being preserved," etc.

For the sake of that, a question concerning the baptismal character is to be introduced here. And because the knowledge concerning character is easier if it is disputed here in general, namely [including those] of Confirmation and of Order, therefore we will make a general disputation concerning character.

Therefore, let it be asked concerning character in three ways, namely in itself, and on the part of its effect; and on the part of the receiver; since on the part of the giver it is the same to ask about the one giving the character, and the one giving the sacrament, and this has already been held.

Now concerning character in itself five things are to be asked, namely, in what genus is it? Secondly, what is it definitively? Thirdly, which and how many sacraments imprint a character? Fourthly, concerning the number and order of the characters. And fifthly, concerning the comparison of the sacraments of Christ to the mark of the beast.

§ 1. To the first one proceeds thus: It is said by almost everyone that a spiritual character is a quality.

Let it be objected therefore thus: There is nothing in a genus which is not in some one of its species. Character is in the genus of quality; therefore, it is in some one of the species: therefore, it is either a habit and disposition, or a natural power or impotence, or a passion or passible quality, or a form or a figure consisting about this somewhat: and all these species have had an opinion concerning this matter.

But it seems that it is not a habit and disposition: because § 2. Augustine says in the book On the Good of Marriage that a habit is that by which someone does something when it is time. Therefore, every habit is for some act of the power in which it is. But character is not for an act of a power, but for distinction or consignation or both. Therefore, it seems that it is not a habit or disposition.

§ 3. Again, a habit of the soul is natural, or infused, or acquired. Natural, as the habit of sight in the visual power; but infused or acquired is customarily divided into knowledge and virtue. But character is neither knowledge nor virtue. Since therefore it is not a natural habit, it will not be a habit, as it seems.

But against this seems to be what the Philosopher says, that there are three things in the soul, namely passions, powers, and habits. Now it is clear that character is not a passion; therefore, if it is in the soul, it is a habit, as it seems.

But it seems that it is also not a natural power or impotence.

§ 5. For a natural power or impotence is caused by natural causes: just as some say that a natural power is caused by the victory of form over matter, and a natural impotence by the imperfection of the victory of the same: just as the hard has a natural power not to be cut, and the soft an impotence of the same. But it is clear that a character is not caused by such a cause; therefore, it is not a natural power or impotence, although some have said this.

§ 6. Again, natural powers follow nature; but character does not follow nature. Therefore, it is not in the species of natural power.

§ 7. It also seems not to be in passion or passible quality: since this according to the Philosopher is either infused into the sensible soul as are the objects of the senses, or inflicted in the sense or sensible soul, as pleasure and sadness. But it is clear that character is about the intellectual soul; therefore, it is not a passion or a passible quality, although some have also said this.

§ 8. Again, it seems that it is not a form or a figure consisting about this somewhat: because that, according to the Philosopher, is not in spiritual things, but in quantified things. For a figure is a surface contained or terminated by one or more lines; but nothing of such things belongs to a spiritual nature. Therefore, neither is character in that species, as it seems, since it is only in a spiritual nature.

Because of this some have said that even in a spiritual nature there is a spiritual quantity, and according to that character is attended to. But this seems ridiculous for many reasons, one of which is:

§ 9. The spiritual quantity of a virtue is attended to according to the intensity of the virtue toward an act. But this intensity does not change the genus. Therefore, the quantity of a virtue does not signify something in which the rationale of figure is saved, because that is not saved without continuous quantity.

§ 10. Again, every figure is attended to according to the ultimate terminated at this; but virtue, although it is defined by the ultimate of power, is nevertheless not defined by the termination of the ultimate. Therefore, it seems that the quantity of a virtue cannot have the rationale of figure, and thus a character is not figural or a form consisting about this somewhat.

§ 11. Again, if virtue is terminated in the ultimate, that terminus is not one surrounding the substance of the virtue within, but rather the ultimate into which it can [act] on the part of the object into which the virtue acts, just as the virtue of Hercules can [act] upon the thirty whom he defeats. But figure is a terminus surrounding the substance of the terminated thing, enclosing it within itself. Therefore, even if virtue is called the terminus of power, that

terminus is said equivocally with respect to the terminus of a figure. Therefore, if character is in the quantity of virtue, it is nevertheless not of the rationale of figure.

§ 12. Again, virtue is the terminus of power terminated at the ultimate; but figure according to the rationale of figure is the terminus terminating the ultimate. Therefore, terminus in the rationale of figure and in the rationale of virtue will be said equivocally; and thus that solution is null which some have posited, and which almost all have followed.

§ 13. Therefore certain others, taking up the word of the Philosopher which he says in the Categories, "Perhaps, however, other modes of quality will also appear," say that character is a quality outside the four species of quality; because Aristotle implies that there are other species of quality. But that this is nothing is easily proved: for although every form predicates what sort, nevertheless not every form is in the predicament of quality according to reality, but a form really existing in...

§ 1. [the] predicament of quality does not exceed its four species: therefore it is clear that what they say is nothing: because if it were really a quality, it would be necessary that it be in some species of quality.

§ 2. But it seems to be in relation: for things are relative (ad aliquid), whose very being what they are, is towards another: but the very being of a character, just as of a seal or a sign, is towards another: therefore it is in the predicament of relation, and not of quality, as it seems.

§ 3. But since this is conceded by all who understand well, let it be asked: Is the being of a relative founded upon something else or not?

§ 4. But it seems that it is founded in some other nature: because 1. Augustine says that every relative is also something else besides being relative, just as a father is a substance in which there is a relation. Therefore, if the character is a relative, it seems there is also something else besides the relation upon which the relation is founded.

§ 5. 2. Also, the character, as the Masters say, consigns us to the uncreated Trinity through a certain assimilation: but similitude is the same quality of different things: therefore it seems that it is founded upon some quality, whatever that may be.

§ 6. Solution. It seems it must be said without prejudice that the character, according to the being it imports, does not signify an entity in the predicament of relation, such as paternity. For the relative is twofold, namely that itself which is and is spoken of towards another, such as 'father'; and the accident which signifies absolutely and in abstraction, such as 'paternity', and this signifies the mode of disposition by which the relative is spoken of towards something: and in this way the character is also towards something: and [so is] the characterized.

§ 7. But to what is asked last, one must first respond, namely whether it is founded upon the powers of the image barely from the very reception of baptism, or whether it has a subject quality from the matter. It must be said that both are said by diverse [authors]: but nonetheless it seems more probable that it has a subject quality from the matter in which it is founded, and this I think to be a certain habit of spiritual light, which behaves in the manner of an

aptitude for faith and for grace through spiritual light and heat, so that the light enables for faith and the heat for morals.

§ 8. And according to this response, one must first reply to the objections, by saying that the character is founded in a habit just as similitude is in a quality: but habit is twofold, namely perfect and distinct, and imperfect and indistinct: the first is like a habit determined to this matter, and that is divided into science and virtue: and concerning that it is true what Augustine says, that habit is that by which one does something when the time is right. But the imperfect, confused, and indistinct is that which precedes it, and enables one for it. And we can see a likeness of this in the eye, in which, in the pupil and crystalline humor, there is a certain transparency with a light connatural and inseparable from it, and yet it does not suffice by itself for seeing distinctly unless the spirit from the soul, determined toward colors, arrives: so too for the intellect there is a connatural confused light by which it examines what is heard and received according to the Philosopher, and yet that does not suffice for distinctly understanding this or that.

§ 9. Thus we can say that there is, in a certain manner, an indistinct light inseparably infused in the baptized, in which shines a certain assimilation to the uncreated Trinity, although it is not sufficient without faith: and this light is that in which the character is founded, and it is in the genus of gratuitously given grace. And this, I think, was noted by those who placed the character in the species of habit and in the genus of quality: whence those things which are objected against other qualities seem to have to be conceded.

§ 10. And what certain ones have said about an intellectual figure, I either do not understand it, or what they said is not true.

§ 11. And through this the solution is clear to all that was asked concerning this article.

Articulus 4 — Whether The Definitions Of Character Are Well Assigned

Are the definitions of the character well assigned?

Are the definitions of the character well assigned?

§ 12. Secondly it is asked, what is the character by definition?

§ 13. Now, some say that Blessed Dionysius in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy defines it thus: 'The character is a holy sign of the communion of faith and of sacred ordination given to the one approaching by the hierarch.' Although they say so, nevertheless in no translation of Dionysius is this definition found, neither by words nor by sense: and whoever inspects the text of Dionysius knows this well. For there, whence they wished to draw those words, he speaks thus according to the old translation, showing what it signifies that the one to be ordained comes to the high priest, that is, to the Bishop, etc.: And him, namely the one to be ordained, approaching thus, namely to his Bishop the hierarch, the divine beatitude receives into its participation, and delivers [him] by its own light as in a certain sign, perfecting him as divine and communicating parts of divine things and of sacred ordination: of which the sacred symbol is the seal given by the high priest, and the saving description of the priests, commemorating him among the saved and in sacred memories.

§ 14. But so that the words which are obscure may be understood, they are to be expounded thus: 'And him', namely the one to be ordained approaching thus in the reception of orders to the hierarch, 'the divine beatitude', that is, God, 'receives' to parts of power, and this is signified in that the hierarch, that is, the Bishop, gives a part of his power when he receives him: and 'by its own light', that is, from its own light delivers to him: 'as in a certain sign delivers to him', that is, in a certain sign, because in the received sacrament: 'perfecting him as divine', that is, that namely the light perfecting him as divine, that is, so that he may be divine in power at least, that is, he has a part of divine power: and 'communicating parts of divine things', that is, perfects him so that he may communicate parts, that is, in a part of divine things as to the power 'of sacred ordination', that is, perfects him so that there may be a community of sacred ordination, that is, in sacred ordination: because the Greeks do not have an ablative case: 'of which the symbol', that is, of which, namely of the divine perfection and the communion of a part of divine things, and the symbol of the communion of ordination, that is, 'the sacred given by the high priest', that is, that which is given by the high priest: because the sacrament given by the Bishop is a sign that divine power and grace are given to him by God. And he subjoins what that is which is given by the Bishop, this is namely the 'seal', that is, that the pontiff signs him, by imposing hands, and by handing over [instruments], and the like: and 'the saving description of priests', that is, that he describes him as a priest by making him through order: 'commemorating him', if he will have used the power well, 'among the saved and in sacred memories'.

§ 15. If, however, this (as I think) is the intention of Dionysius, it is clear that that definition is not his, and is never found elsewhere: and therefore I do not take it as from a Saint, but as approved by the Doctors.

§ 16. But certain ones also give another, namely this: 'The character is a distinction imprinted by the eternal character upon the rational soul according to the image, consigning the created trinity to the creating and recreating Trinity, and distinguishing from the unconsecrated according to the state of faith.'

§ 17. Now there are multiple objections concerning these definitions of the Masters:

§ 18. Against the FIRST thus: The character is a holy sign: but every sign is natural or by convention: now it is established that the character is not a sign by convention: because then it would not be the same among all, and would vary at will: therefore it is natural: but every natural sign has some similitude with the signified, just as smoke has an agreement with fire: therefore it seems that the character has some agreement with the uncreated character.

§ 19. And it is asked, what is that? But it seems that it is none: because man has conformity through the character: therefore it seems that the character is a disposition found in both extremes, namely in the sealed man, and the uncreated character to which he is consigned: just as if two are similar in whiteness, whiteness is a disposition found in both: and this is false here: because the Son of God does not have a character, as will be proved below.

§ 20. Also, of signs one is a prognostic principle of future things: such as the signs which diviners have in stars and other things, and physicians in sicknesses. Another is rememorative

of past things, such as the ring of faith given to a bride by her spouse, and the necklace of the continence of the marriage bed, and the like. Another is demonstrative in the present, just as present substance is signified by accidents which fall under the senses.

§ 21. Let it be asked therefore, if the character is a sign, what kind of sign is it? 1. For it does not seem to be a sign except of grace: and it does not necessarily signify this, neither in the present, nor in the future, nor in the past, as in the feigned recipient who dies in his fiction: therefore it seems that the character is not a sign of grace.

§ 22. 2. Also, if it is a sign, it will not be except a sacramental sign: but a sacramental sign is a visible, or at least sensible, form of invisible grace: therefore it seems that the character is a certain sensible form, the contrary of which was held in the preceding question, and again will be held afterwards, when it will be proved that the character is not imprinted except in the rational soul.

§ 23. 3. Also, according to Master Hugh in the book on the Sacraments, a sign is taken in the properties of a corporeal element: but the character is neither a corporeal element in the sacrament, nor its property: therefore the character is not a sign, as it seems.

§ 24. Also, if it is a sacramental sign: it is either of the old or the new. But it is established that it is not of the old: because the old law speaks nothing of a spiritual character, although it speaks of circumcision as a carnal character given to a carnal people, as was held above in the tractate on circumcision: therefore it will be a sign of the new law.

§ 25. ON THE CONTRARY: It does not necessarily effect what it figures, as is clear in feigned recipients: therefore it is neither a sign of the old law nor of the new: therefore neither is it a sacramental sign.

§ 26. Further it is asked concerning what it says, 'Of the communion of faith'.

§ 27. For this seems not to be true: because a non-believing feigned recipient receives the baptismal character: and yet he does not communicate in faith.

§ 28. Moreover, the communion of faith can be as to the participation of articles, or of the faithful, or of the habit of faith: and it seems it cannot be in more ways. But it is established that it does not necessarily cause one to communicate with the faithful, as is clear in adults knowingly baptized by heretics, who do not communicate with the faithful.

§ 29. Also, there is no communication as to the articles: because a feigned recipient disbelieving the articles receives the character, as long as he offers himself not contradicting to what the Church does, although he believes this itself to be nothing or of no avail.

§ 30. Also, it seems that he does not communicate in the habit of faith: because he can be an infidel, as was already said: and yet he receives the character: therefore it seems that it is not a sign of the communion of faith.

§ 31. Also, why is it defined more as a sign of the communication of faith, than further of virtue?

§ 32. For it seems that it is a disposition and sign for every virtue. For there are three things in the sacrament, namely the sign only, as the washing made in water; and the reality and sign, which is the character; and the reality only, which is grace with all the virtues. If therefore it is a sign of the reality of the sacrament, and the reality of the sacrament is the fullness of virtue and not of faith: then it seems the character is a sign of every virtue, and not a sign of faith: therefore it is poorly defined by this that it is a sign of faith.

§ 33. Further it is asked concerning what it says, 'And of sacred ordination'.

§ 34. 1. For this does not seem to belong except to the character of order: therefore through that the character in general is poorly defined, according as it is in confirmation and baptism and order in common.

§ 35. 2. Moreover, the character of order and confirmation does not seem to be a sign of faith: but the character of confirmation seems to be a sign of fortitude for fighting, and the character of order seems to be a sign of power for spiritual acts, as is confecting the Eucharist, binding, and loosing: therefore again it is poorly defined by a sign of faith and of sacred ordination.

§ 36. Further it is asked concerning what it says, 'Given to the one approaching by the hierarch'.

§ 37. For this seems to be false: for if a peasant baptizes, the baptized receives the character: therefore it is not necessary that it be given by a hierarch, as it seems.

§ 38. Moreover, if you say that 'hierarch' expresses the proper minister: again it is false: because the hierarch is the high priest or Pontiff: and he is not the proper minister of baptism, but rather even a simple priest, as is said in the Text in this distinction: therefore it is not necessary to approach a hierarch, as it seems.

§ 39. Further it is asked concerning the second definition: and first concerning what it says, 'The character is a distinction'.

§ 40. For if it is a distinction, and a distinctive sign otherwise distinguishes the baptized from the non-baptized: then either to the Church militant, or triumphant, or to God: but not to the Church militant, because that does not distinguish nor discern through invisible signs, since it judges according to the face, and not according to those things which are in the heart: neither does it distinguish as to the Church triumphant, because that does not need it, since the baptized receives sufficient distinction from the non-baptized in the contemplation of the Word: also as to God it is not necessary, because God does not know through signs, but through Himself knows all things.

§ 41. Further it is asked concerning what it says, 'Imprinted by the eternal character'.

§ 42. 1. For the Son is the character, as is held in Heb. 1:3: 'Who since he is the splendor of glory, and the figure of his substance.' In another translation, 'And the character of his substance': therefore it seems that the Son of God imprints the character.

§ 43. 2. Also, to the same, the similitude of the Father is the Son: since therefore the created character is assimilating, it seems that congruently it is imprinted by the Son.

§ 44. 3. Also, the sacrament of baptism is the sacrament of regeneration, by which sons of grace are made: but the filiation of grace has some similitude with the eternal generation: therefore it seems that the character of regeneration is imprinted by the Son as the eternal character.

§ 45. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Through the invocation of the Trinity in the element the character is imprinted: therefore the impression does not pertain more to the Father than to the Son, nor conversely, but to the whole Trinity.

§ 46. 2. Moreover, if on account of the sacrament of regeneration the impression of the character in Baptism belongs to the Son: therefore also on account of the sacrament of spiritual power the impression of the character in Order belongs to the Father, which is false, because by reason of congruence every impression of the character will be appropriated to one person.

§ 47. 3. Also, more is owed to the Father than to the Son, because it belongs to the Father to generate: therefore also to imprint the character of spiritual regeneration: therefore it is not imprinted by the eternal character, as it seems.

§ 48. Further it is asked concerning what it says, 'Imprinted upon the rational soul according to the image'.

§ 49. 1. For no numerically one thing is imprinted upon numerically diverse subjects: but the character is numerically one something: therefore it cannot be imprinted upon the three powers of the image, unless it is multiplied according to number.

§ 50. 2. Also, just as the preceding sign in the sacrament and the following reality are related: so must the middle be related which is sign and reality together: but the sign of perfect washing of the whole soul, and the following reality perfectly cures and perfects the whole soul according to all powers: therefore also the middle which is the sign must be imprinted according to all powers, and not according to the powers of the image only: but the middle is the character: therefore according to all powers the character must be imprinted in the soul.

§ 51. 3. Also, of the same thing is the disposition and the habit: but the habit is the following reality of the sacrament: since therefore that habit is in the whole soul, it seems also that the disposition which is the character, must inhere according to the whole soul.

§ 52. 4. Moreover, it seems that if the character is imprinted in the image (as the second definition says) that it is not light only: because the will, which is the chief part of the image, is not perfected by light, but rather by love: therefore it seems that the character in itself supposes diverse habits and of diverse formal characters (rationum).

§ 53. Further it is asked concerning what the second definition says, 'Consigning the created trinity to the creating and recreating Trinity'.

§ 54. 1. For it does not consign unless it makes to imitate: but we do not imitate except by gratuitously making grace (gratia gratum faciens): therefore it seems that the character is gratuitously making grace.

§ 55. 2. Also, by one habit multiple things cannot be consigned, unless they are of one formal character: but the powers of the image are not of one formal character: therefore they cannot be consigned by one habit.

§ 56. 3. Also, on the part of the uncreated Trinity one thing is not appropriated: therefore it seems that if the character is a certain light, that it does not consign to the uncreated Trinity, but only to one person in the Trinity.

§ 57. Further it is asked concerning what it says, 'Distinguishing from the unconsecrated according to the state of faith'.

§ 58. For it seems that the subtler thing of the character is to distinguish than to sign: because

§ 59. 1. The character, as Damascene often says, is the same as the distinctive: therefore the character is a distinction: therefore it seems that in the definition the ultimate particle ought to have been placed prior to the penultimate.

§ 60. 2. Moreover, why does he say, 'According to the state of faith', rather than according to faith? For distinction according to faith is prior to that according to the state of faith.

§ 61. Solution. Without prejudice it seems to me the second definition is better than the first: yet neither has the strength of authority, except insofar as the custom of the Masters does: because concerning the character in the sense in which the Masters dispute, little is found concerning it in the sayings of the Saints.

§ 62. Therefore, sustaining the first definition, it must be said to the first, that the character is a natural sign of grace which is the effect of the sacrament.

§ 63. To the objection to the contrary, it must be said that similitude is twofold, namely of two things in a third, and thus it is necessary that one quality in which the similitude is founded be in both; but sometimes similitude is between things such that one expresses the formal character of the similitude of one thing to another, just as an image by which it expresses the formal character of the similitude of this statue to Hercules: and then it is not necessary that the same thing be in both of the similar things, but that one be the exemplar, and the other imitate it: and thus the character is similar: because it expresses the formal character of the assimilation of the soul to God.

§ 64. To the next it must be said, that it is a sign demonstrative and causative of grace in the present insofar as it is of itself, and that it does not demonstrate, this is by accident, namely because it finds a resisting obstacle in the subject.

§ 65. To the next it must be said, that although the character is not visible or sensible in itself, it is nevertheless visible in relation to the washing in which it is imprinted, as was said above in the question on the sacraments.

§ 66. To the next it must be said, that the character is not founded in the corporeal element, as in a subject, but as in the cause inducing it: and this suffices for it to be a sacramental sign of the new law.

§ 67. But to what is objected against this, it is [already] solved.

§ 68. To that which is further asked, it must be said that it is a sign of the communion of faith according to the state of faith, as the second definition says: and it can well be that someone does not participate in the habit according to the communion of the faithful, or of the articles of faith, and yet does according to the state, because that is participated also according to the sacrament of faith.

§ 69. Whence the solution to the whole is clear. To the next it must be said that other virtues do not distinguish those things which are in the affection, but faith alone which is in the intellect: and therefore the distinction is taken only according to the state of faith, although it is a disposition for all virtues. Or let it be said, and better, that the state of faith distinguishes the character of the sacraments: because faith is the foundation of the spiritual edifice, and according to its primary distinction the distinction of the whole life is primarily taken.

§ 70. To that which is further asked, it must be said that that definition, as to that member, touches upon the character of excellence, which is in Order: and because it is a character of excellence, therefore it has something special in the definition.

§ 71. To the next it must be said, that the character of Confirmation is not of fortitude except in relation to faith: because namely without blush he preaches faith, and even without fear confesses it before kings and princes. So too the character of Order is not of spiritual power, except for propagating, and multiplying, and confessing the faith: and therefore it always regards the state of faith.

§ 72. But how it regards it differently, will be said below in the question on the number of characters and Order.

§ 73. To that which is further asked, it must be said that in that definition the proper minister is determined from power and authority and fitness. But that it is otherwise given, this happens therefore, because it is a sacrament of necessity, as was said in the beginning of this distinction.

§ 74. To that which is further asked, it must be said that the second definition is better than the first: because it touches the proper act which is to consign, and the secondary which is to distinguish, and the efficient cause which is the uncreated character, and the material which is on the part of the proper subject, because it is imprinted according to the mind in the rational soul: and the final cause, because it is on account of the state of faith.

§ 75. Therefore let it be said to the first, that it distinguishes in itself, and it is not necessary that others be distinguished [by it], although in the soul itself it leaves an indelible mark of beauty, which in the blessed is a reason for glorying in a certain assimilation of themselves to the Trinity, and in the damned a conviction and testimony of just condemnation: and therefore it is not idle.

§ 76. To that which is further asked, it must be said that this which is first proved is well conceded: because although by the common work of the persons the character is imprinted by the three persons, nevertheless by congruence and appropriation it belongs to the Son, of which multiple causes were touched upon in objecting. One also is, because the character (as was said above) is a certain light by attribution to the begotten wisdom which is the Son.

§ 77. To that which is objected against it, it must be said that the invocation operates there commonly in the persons: but nevertheless the appropriated work belongs to the Son, and this is often the case in almost all divine works.

§ 78. To the next it must be said, that although in confirmation and order there are fortitude and power, nevertheless they are referred to the state of faith: and faith signifies something of cognition, and therefore it is appropriated to the Son.

§ 79. To the next it must be said, that although it belongs to the Father to generate, nevertheless properly to regenerate is more congruently of the Son: because regeneration is not done without mission and redemption: and both of these belong to the Son, and neither to the Father: and therefore that argument proceeds from falsehoods.

§ 80. To that which is further asked concerning what it says, 'Imprinted upon the rational soul according to the image', it must be said that through this the immediate subject of the character is touched upon: but the image, although it is in three powers, nevertheless is principally in the power of knowing. Whence Augustine says that man has the image in the power of knowing, and the similitude in the power of loving. Whence the image is principally according to memory and intellect: and the will follows these two. Similarly, the perfection of cognition is in act according to the intellect, and not according to the memory, and therefore the character, in my judgment, is imprinted according to the intellect, namely according as the intellect is formed from memory and eliciting the will, and thus as in a subject it is in the intellect, yet it has an order to memory and will.

§ 81. To the next it must be said that the character is a disposition to grace in which are all the virtues: but nevertheless in its genus it agrees more with faith: and this is not inconvenient; because just as is often the case in corporeal dispositions, so too in spiritual ones: just as heat is a disposition to the whole fire as to all the properties of fire, and yet in its genus it only agrees with burning: and similarly it is in spiritual things: for as was said above, although the character is essentially a certain light, nevertheless it also has heat.

§ 82. To the next it must be said that this proposition, 'Of the same thing is the disposition and the habit,' can be understood in three ways: and in two ways it is true, in the third way it is false. For it can be understood thus, of whatever essence the disposition is, the habit—that is, the habit which is made from that disposition—is of the same essence: and then it is true of the disposition from which a habit is generated, as an easily movable knowledge and a difficultly movable one, after it is strengthened, are of the same essence, and differ in accident. In another way it can be understood, that is, of whatever subject the disposition is, of the same is the habit: and then again it is true: because the habit is induced in the same subject. In a third way it can be understood, of whichever part of the subject the disposition is, of that is the

habit: and then it is not always true: because the disposition is frequently in one part, and the whole habit is not induced in that part: and this happens because that disposition does not equally regard the habit as to all its parts, just as the character regards faith according to generic agreement, and not other virtues except consequently: because one is not given without the other, when it is infused with grace.

§ 83. To the next the solution is clear through what was said before.

§ 84. To that which is further asked, it must be said that there is consignation in an indelible mark, which is imperfect and of gratuitously given grace: and the character makes this: but consignation in the act of imitation, what the objection posits is true: because nothing makes that except formed virtue.

§ 85. To the next it must be said, that although the powers of the image are not of the same formal character, nevertheless the extremes are ordered to the middle, and conversely: and therefore they can be consigned in it.

§ 86. To the next it must be said, that equally through the character a man is not consigned to the Trinity as to those things which are distinctly proper to the persons: but the character, although it is essentially a light consigning to the Son, yet virtually has in itself two things, namely power in faith or battle or grade, and goodness in this that it is a disposition to grace: and through these two it regards the person of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.

§ 87. To that which is further asked, it must be said that the character principally consigns, and consequently distinguishes: and when it is named 'character', it receives its name from the more known [though] not more principal act, just as names are often imposed from that which is more known to us.

§ 88. To the next it must be said, that the character does not distinguish faith, nor anything in faith, but it signifies the distinction of the state of faith according as faith is the fulfillment of beginners or of proficients or of the perfect, and therefore it is rather said according to the state of faith than according to faith simply.

Articulus 5 — Which And How Many Are The Sacraments Imprinting Character

Which and how many are the sacraments imprinting a character?

§ 89. Thirdly it is asked, Which and how many are the sacraments which imprint a character?

§ 90. But it seems that all do, because 1. Just as by some mark the baptized is distinguished from the non-baptized: so by something the communicant [is distinguished] from the non-communicant, and the married from the unmarried, etc.: therefore it seems that a character is imprinted in any [sacrament].

§ 91. 2. Also, if baptism on account of dignity imprints a character, since the most dignified sacrament, as Ambrose says, is the sacrament of the Eucharist, it ought to imprint a character, as it seems.

§ 92. 3. Also, if the invocation of Christ in certain sacraments imprints a character in the invocation of the Trinity, because it was held previously that the created character is imprinted by the uncreated character, it seems that where the whole Christ is received, there it most imprints a character: but in the Eucharist the whole Christ is received: therefore it most imprints a character there.

§ 93. 4. Also, the sacraments in which a character is imprinted have their unctions, namely baptism, confirmation, and order: therefore since there is a fourth which similarly consists principally in unction, like extreme unction, that ought also to imprint a character.

§ 94. 5. Also, the character regards the state of faith: but the state of faith is diversified according to the law of nature and of Moses and of grace, just as is signified in those who went before and followed the Lord, crying out: Hosanna in the highest. Therefore it seems, that it also imprinted something in those laws. Now circumcision in those laws was a testimony of the great faith of Abraham, as is said in the Gloss on Rom. 4:14. Therefore it seems that circumcision imprinted a character.

§ 95. If perhaps it be said, as was solved above in the tractate on Circumcision, that circumcision had a corporeal character, not a spiritual one. Against this is what Origen says, that circumcision was not only corporeal, but also spiritual, and was understood spiritually by the Jews.

§ 96. 6. Moreover, it seems that every sacrament imprints a character: because what can do what is greater, can also do what is lesser: but grace is greater than a character: since therefore every sacrament gives grace: it also seems by an argument from the lesser, that it also imprints a character.

§ 97. 7. Also, the sacrament is sufficient to act, since it can do what is more, as was already proved: and the soul is receptive whether it be feigned or not: because the feigned well receives the character: therefore every sacrament imprints a character, as it seems.

§ 98. Further it is asked next to this, what is the reason that in the baptism of water and confirmation and order a character is said to be imprinted?

§ 99. For either the cause of this is special matter, or the invocation of the Trinity, or grace, or the Passion of Christ operating in these sacraments, or the intention of those giving the sacraments, or the faith of the Church: for we find no more things operating in the sacraments.

§ 100. 1. If it be said that special matter is the cause, it does not seem so: because matter is diversified in the three sacraments, nor is there any matter in order which is of the necessity of the sacrament, except only the one ordained: therefore it seems that this operation is not from the matter. But if it is said that in baptism this operation follows the matter, it seems false: because the same matter is in the baptism of Christ and in the baptism of John, and yet in the baptism of John a character was not imprinted.

§ 101. 2. But if it be said that this operation is the invocation of the Trinity, a twofold inconvenience seems to follow, namely that if the invocation of the Trinity occurs in other

sacraments, a character is also imprinted in them. The other is that those who were baptized in the primitive Church in the name of Christ [received the character].

§ 102. 3. And if you also say that the Trinity is understood in the name of Christ. Against this: It is the same to baptize in the name of Christ, and in the name of the one to come, because Christ was the one to come: if therefore a character was imprinted at the invocation of Christ: therefore a character was also imprinted at the invocation of the name of the one to come: which is false: because thus a character would have been imprinted in John's Baptism.

§ 103. If perhaps you say that in the baptism of John the Baptist a character was imprinted. Against this is that they were baptized anew by the Apostles: therefore they did not have the character: because otherwise an injury would have been done to the character of the sacrament.

§ 104. Moreover, if one had received one character from John, and another from the Apostles, and for the same thing, that is, for the initiation of the state of faith: the other would be superfluous, which is inconvenient: therefore the invocation of the Trinity does not imprint the character.

§ 105. But if you say that the Passion of Christ operating in the sacrament does this. It seems that then the baptism of blood imprints the character more: because in that there is a greater expression of the Passion: and that is better, because it is not defiled by secondary filth: and concerning this it was held above.

§ 106. Moreover, the Passion of Christ operates in all sacraments: therefore in all it imprints a character, which is not said by any of the Doctors.

§ 1. But if you say that intention does this: it seems to be false, because intention, as is held here in the text, is required for every sacrament; therefore, it would imprint a character in any of them. But if the faith of the Church operates [this]. Against this: The faith of the Church does not suffice except in baptism, and only for infants, not for adults. Therefore, no one will receive a character except in baptism, and only infants, not adults, which is false. Therefore, it seems that the disputation about the impression of a character is founded upon nothing.

§ 2. Further, it is asked next to this: Do the virtues imprint a character?

§ 3. It seems that they do, because: 1. They imprint certain marks consigning us to God, and this is the definition of a character; therefore, they imprint a character.

§ 4. 2. Also, a virtue is more distinctive than a sacrament, because a sacrament does not distinguish the good from the bad. Therefore, since distinguishing or consigning is the primary act of a character, as was held, it seems that a virtue imprints a character more than a sacrament does.

§ 5. Solution. It must be said that only three sacraments, which regard the state of faith, imprint a character, according to a threefold distinction which they make among the faithful who are of the household of the heavenly law, as will be clear below when the number of characters is discussed.

§ 6. Therefore, it must be said to the first [argument] that it is one thing for the recipient of a sacrament to be discerned from one not receiving it, and another thing to have an indelible mark for this purpose. But an indelible mark is imprinted only by three sacraments.

§ 7. And if you object that it is impossible for a married person not to have been married, and thus the mark is indelible: it must be said that this argument is sophistical. For that is not through an indelible or perpetual mark in the subject; rather, a statement about the past is true, and therefore necessary, and thus although the thing changes, the statement nevertheless does not change. But three sacraments leave a perpetual mark in the thing [the soul], and therefore that is a character, whereas the other sacraments leave nothing perpetual in the thing.

§ 8. To the next it must be said that it does not belong to the dignity of a sacrament to imprint a character, but rather from the invocation of the Trinity for a state of the distinction of faith, or a distinct state in faith, as will be said below. And therefore that objection accomplishes nothing.

§ 9. To the next it must be said that although the uncreated character imprints the created one, nevertheless it is not in just any sacrament, but in the one in which there is an invocation of the Trinity according to the state of faith. The Eucharist, however, does not regard the state of faith, but rather charity, whence it is also called the sacrament of charity.

§ 10. To the next it must be said that in the law of nature and of Moses there was not a state of explicit faith as in the New Law. But all sacraments imprinting a character imprint it according to the explicit state of faith, not implicitly. And the reason why circumcision did not imprint a character was explained above in the question on Circumcision; [353] for it was nothing but a figure of the baptismal character, just as the spiritual is understood in a corporeal sign.

§ 11. To that which is objected concerning the saying of Origen, it must be said that he understands that certain people understood the virtue of circumcision to be spiritual, not that it imprinted a spiritual character, just as Abraham and others, who in the law understood the future sacraments of Christ.

§ 12. To the next it must be said that this proposition, "what can do the greater can do the lesser," is not true except concerning those things in which one power is ordered to a greater and a lesser; and therefore there is no place there for an argument from the lesser, because the sacrament could also do the lesser if it were ordered to this. Others resolve this differently, saying that although a character is something less than grace in value for salvation, nevertheless with respect to this it is greater, because it is in-

-delible, whereas grace is delible. But the first solution is stronger.

§ 14. To the next it must be said that not just any sacrament is sufficient to produce a character, since it is not ordered to this, as has already been said.

§ 15. To what is further asked, it must be said that the cause of the impression of a character does not arise from the matter, but from the invocation of the Trinity—not simply, but in a sacrament that places a person in a special state of faith: just as faith is generated, defended, and to be propagated to others, or nourished in others.

§ 16. To what is objected to the contrary, it must be said that in the other sacraments, even if there were an invocation of the Trinity, they nonetheless do not place one in a special state of faith. And therefore, an invocation of the Trinity, even if it were in them as the form of the sacrament (which, however, is not true), would still not produce a character.

§ 17. To the next it must be said that in the name of Christ, as was clear above in the explanation of Ambrose, the Trinity is understood, and again this was by dispensation for a time, as was said above. Hence, partly because of the command of God, and partly because in that name the invocation of the Trinity was preserved, which is understood implicitly in it: in that [baptism in the name of Christ], and not in the baptism of John, a character was imprinted in the primitive Church.

§ 18. To what is objected concerning the name of the "One to come," it must be said that although to baptize in the name of Christ and in the name of the "One to come" was the same in reality, nevertheless it was not the same in the mode of signifying. For the "One to come" did not have the same mode of signifying as this name, "Christ," has. And therefore, in the argument about the baptism of John, there occurs the sophistical topic of the accident.

§ 19. To what is asked further, whether the virtues imprint a character? It must be said that they do not, because whatever a virtue effects in a subject is delible and not perpetual. But it belongs to the nature of a character that it be perpetual. And if an objection is raised regarding a statement about the past, it has already been shown above how it is to be resolved.

§ 20. To the next it must be said that although [the virtues] distinguish among the faithful, nevertheless this distinction is not according to an order to morals: but the distinction of a character is according to a special state of faith.

§ 21. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 6 — Whether In The Three Sacraments Imprinting Character, The Character Impressed Is One, And Whether In Any Of Them It Is Several

Whether in the three sacraments imprinting a character, the imprinted character is one, and whether any of them is multiple?

§ 22. Fourthly, it is asked concerning the number and order of characters.

§ 23. For the number has already been shown by the fact that only three sacraments imprint a character. But it seems to be the same character in all the sacraments, because the faith that is generated, strengthened, and capable of being propagated to another is the same. Therefore, the character of faith is also the same, as it seems. But the first is baptismal, the

353. Cf. Albert the Great, In IV Sent., d. 1.

second of confirmation, the third of orders. Therefore, it seems that there is one character in the three according to substance.

§ 24. Moreover, it is asked concerning Order. For the baptismal character is first: because if someone does not have the baptismal character, and receives orders, he is not considered ordained, but is ordained again after baptism. Therefore, it seems that since the character of confirmation is intermediate, it also must necessarily be possessed before the character of orders. And from this it follows that an unconfirmed person cannot be ordained; and the Church does not hold this.

§ 25. Solution. Many accept the number of characters in multiple ways, but a more probable acceptation seems to be according to the number of distinctions in the state of faith. Just as in the household of David we read that there were three distinctions, of which the first was general, namely of the peo-

-ple of God from a non-people: because David was king over the people of God, as is said in Psalm 77:70-71: He took him from the flocks of sheep: he received him from following the ewes great with young, to feed Jacob his servant, and Israel his inheritance. Another distinction was of the mighty men of David, of which it is spoken in 2 Kings [2 Samuel] 23:8 et seq., who defended the worship and the people by fighting manfully: in which the distinction of the character of confirmation is noted. In the same place it is also read that certain ones were distinguished as Prelates, and priests, and scribes, and the like: and in those is signified the character of excellence in order. Therefore, the state of faith is [threefold], namely first, when faith is given so that the faithful are distinguished into the lot of the people of God: and this is through the baptismal character. Second, when they are confirmed as recruits, so that faith may stand firm in them and be defended: and this is the character of confirmation. But the third is that they may propagate it: and this is of orders. And there are no more states, and therefore there are no more characters. Otherwise, it can be said that Christ imprinting a character is wisdom teaching the faith, fighting bravely for the faith, and a priest showing the sacrifice of faith; and according to these three He imprints the character of holy faith. Insofar as He is wisdom teaching divine truth, which is in the articles of faith, He imprints the character of baptism. But insofar as He fought so that faith would stand firm in us, He imprints the character of confirmation. But insofar as He as priest offered the sacrifice of faith, He imprinted the character of orders. But the first acceptation is better.

§ 27. Therefore, to that which is first objected to the contrary, it must be said that characters differ in essence, but faith does not differ except by accident. And this is because a character is not the same as faith, but the distinction is taken according to the state of faith. But the state of faith is diverse, and therefore the character is diverse. The argument, however, proceeds as if the diversity of character were taken according to the diversity of faith.

§ 28. To the next it must be said that order is twofold, namely of necessity, and of congruity. The baptismal character has an order of necessity and of foundation to the other sacraments. But the character of Confirmation does not have a necessary order to the character of Orders, but only one of congruity.

§ 29. And if an objection is made concerning matrimony, which is even in the unbaptized, it must be said that this is not only a sacrament of the Church, but also an office of nature. Yet, insofar as it is a sacrament, it does not have perfect indissolubility except insofar as it is founded upon baptism and faith. For otherwise, if some case compels, it can be dissolved: as if one of the spouses refuses to cohabit except to the insult of the Creator, as will be said below.

§ 30. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 7 — How The Character Of The Sacraments Of Christ Stands In Relation To The Character Of The Beast

How is the character of the sacraments of Christ related to the mark of the beast?

§ 31. Fifthly, it is asked concerning the comparison of the character of the sacraments of Christ to the mark of the beast, concerning which mark it is read, Apocalypse 13:17: That no man might buy or sell, but he that hath the mark, or the name of the beast, or the number of his name.

§ 32. But it is asked whether these characters are founded in the same thing.

§ 33. It seems that they are, because contraries are naturally suited to occur around the same thing. But the character of Christ and that of the beast are contraries. Therefore, they are naturally suited to occur around the same thing.

§ 34. ON THE CONTRARY: Contraries are not simultaneously in act in the same thing. But let us posit that some baptized person sins mortally; it is established that through the sin he does not lose the charac-

-ter of Christ. Therefore, the character of Christ and of the beast, or the devil, are simultaneously had in act in the same thing, which is impossible if they are contraries, as it seems.

§ 36. Further, it is asked next to this: What is the cause of the perpetuity of the character of Christ, and not of the beast?

§ 37. It seems that there is no efficient cause, because: 1. God, who imprints the character, also infuses virtue: and yet virtue is not perpetual.

§ 38. 2. Also, it does not seem that the cause of perpetuity is the non-iteration of the sacrament: because rather the reverse is true, namely that the perpetuity of the character is the reason why the sacrament is not iterated. Therefore, it seems that there is no cause other than the subject. But then the mark of the beast will be perpetual, just like the character of Christ, since they are in the same thing as in a subject.

§ 39. Solution. It must be said that the mark of the beast is mortal sin: and it is not a character according to the full ratio of a character, except that it is made indelible [i.e., in hell]. And even then it still does not have the full ratio of a character, because it does not configure the creature to the Trinity, but rather makes it dissimilar: whence it is called a "character" equivocally.

§ 40. To the first [argument], however, it must be said that the character of Christ and that of the beast are not directly contrary, nor are they entirely according to the same thing: but sin is according to free choice, and the character is according to the intellect, which is part of the image. And because they are not contraries, they can exist simultaneously.

§ 41. To what is further asked: What is the cause of perpetuity? It must be said that the cause of indelibility is the power of the invocation in the sacrament of faith, according to a perpetual subject. For from this it follows that the sacrament itself produces something perpetual, which is either a disposition to a better perpetual good, or a testimony of just condemnation if the power of the sacrament is cast away. But the other sacraments, which give grace without a character, do not have such an invocation, nor a relation to the state of faith: and therefore their entire effect is delible, and therefore they are iterated.

§ 42. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 8 — What Is The Effect Of Character

What is the effect of a character?

§ 43. Next it is asked concerning the effect of a character.

§ 44. But it seems from what has been said previously that: 1. Grace is the effect: because a sign in a sacrament of the New Law is a cause: but the character is a sign of grace, as was held: therefore, it is also the cause of grace.

§ 45. 2. Also, a character is the mean between the first [element], which is only a sign [sacramentum tantum], and the last, which is only reality [res tantum]. Since therefore the last is only in the ratio of effect, and the first is only in the ratio of sign, the mean will be in the ratio of effect and cause. Therefore, the mean, which is the character, is the cause of the last, which is only reality, namely grace.

§ 46. But against this it is objected through the definition of a cause. For a cause is (as Boethius says) that upon whose existence something follows by necessity: but the existence of a character is not necessarily followed by grace, as is clear in one who feigns [fictus]. Therefore, it seems that it is not the cause of grace.

§ 47. But because infinite things have already been said about this both here and above where feigning was discussed, it must be said that the character is the cause of grace in the same way that a sa-

-cramental sign is a cause, namely as disposing in the subject, as was held above in the definition of a sacrament.

§ 49. To the last point, however, it must be said that it is a cause insofar as it is of itself, and thus grace follows: but it is impeded accidentally on the part of feigning.

Articulus 9 — What Grace Sanctification In The Womb Is, And When It Is Given, And How Much It Avails; And Whether Such A One Would Have To Be Baptized If He Were Now To Be Born

What grace is sanctification in the womb, and when is it given, and how much is it worth? And, whether such a person would have to be baptized if he were born now?

§ 50. Next it must be asked concerning the character on the part of the recipient. And concerning this it will be determined below in this same distinction, and therefore let it be deferred until then.

§ 51. And let it be asked concerning this which he says there, B, § 2: Also, this must not be ignored, that no one can be baptized in the maternal womb, etc.

§ 52. For there is no disputation concerning those sanctified in the womb, namely concerning John and Jeremiah, concerning which many things were also disputed in the first book of the Sentences [354].

§ 53. Let it be asked, therefore, what grace is sanctification in the womb, and when is it given, and how much is it worth? And this question pertains to Jeremiah and John, because concerning the Blessed Virgin it was handled above; and, whether an infant ought to be baptized if someone sanctified in the womb were to be born now?

§ 54. But it seems that the grace of sanctification in the womb is not baptismal grace: because 1. That cannot be given, as Isidore says in the text, to one not born according to Adam. But one existing in the womb is not born according to Adam. Therefore, he cannot receive sacramental grace.

§ 55. 2. Also, the whole time of conception is assigned to the primary curse in Psalm 50:7, where it is said: For behold I was conceived in iniquities, and in sins did my mother conceive me. Therefore, it seems that the time of conception is repugnant to sanctification. Therefore, it seems that no one can be sanctified in the womb.

§ 56. 3. Also, whatever is drawn from the mass of corruption is infected with the primary corruption, if it was in it through a seminal cause, as Augustine says. Therefore, at the time of conception it seems that it is not sanctified, when the whole time is one of infection. But the time of conception is the time of drawing the flesh of the child from the flesh of the parents. Moreover, it continuously contracts either substance or nourishment from the infected flesh of the parents. Therefore, it seems that it again cannot be sanctified. Therefore, no one can be sanctified in the womb.

§ 57. But against this there are many Glosses. 1. On that [passage] of Luke 1:44: For behold as the voice of thy salutation sounded in my ears, the Gloss says: In the very moment that the voice enters the ears of the body, the spirit enters the heart of the listener: and it inflames not only the mother, but also the offspring with the love of the One arriving. Therefore, it seems that the child was sanctified, because otherwise he would not have been inflamed with the love of charity.

§ 58. 2. Also, in the same place another Gloss on that [text]: The infant in my womb leaped for joy, says this: John leaped first, because he sensed grace first: and just as she sensed the arrival of Mary, so he sensed the arrival of the Lord. But he could not sense except through an excellent grace of sanctification. Therefore, it seems that he was sanctified.

§ 59. 3. Also, in the same place another Gloss says this: The mother was not filled with the Holy Spirit before the Son. Therefore, it is clear that he was full of the Holy Spirit, and this cannot be without sanctification. Therefore, he was sanctified in the womb.

§ 60. But then it is asked further, When is it given?

§ 61. It seems that it is before animation: 1. Through that [passage] of Jeremiah 1:5: Before I formed thee in the womb, I knew thee: and before thou camest forth out of the womb, I sanctified thee. But the child is formed, as Augustine says on Exodus, when the embryo in the womb is animated. Therefore, he was sanctified in the womb by grace before formation; he was sanctified before animation.

§ 62. 2. This also seems through a certain Gloss on Luke 1:44, which says: He did not yet have the spirit of life, and he already had the spirit of grace. But the spirit of life is the soul. Therefore, he was sanctified before animation.

§ 63. 3. This also seems by reason: because the cause of infection is the matter in the womb. Since, therefore, God is more prone to have mercy than to condemn, it seems that sanctification ought to have preceded the soul.

§ 64. 4. Also, a wise physician cures the cause of a disease from the root. But God is most wise. Therefore, it seems that He began the cure of the original disease from the root. But the root in the body is before the soul. Therefore, it seems that He began sanctification there.

§ 65. ON THE CONTRARY: Sanctification is only through grace. But nothing is susceptible of sanctifying grace, which is in the virtues, except a rational spirit. Therefore, before the rational spirit there could not be any sanctification. Therefore, he was not sanctified before animation.

§ 66. Further it is asked, How much is that grace of sanctification in the womb worth?

§ 67. For it seems to be worth less than baptismal grace, because: 1. Baptism imprints a character, but the grace of sanctification in the womb does not imprint one. Therefore, it seems that it is worth less.

§ 68. 2. Also, baptism operates by the power of Christ's passion, and by divine power, and by the faith of the Church. But the grace of sanctification in the womb operates only by divine power alone. Therefore, it seems that it leaves a lesser effect than baptismal grace.

§ 69. But against this it again seems to be, because the vigor of a singular privilege always transcends a common benefit. But the common benefit is baptismal grace; and the grace of sanctification in the womb operates only by divine power alone. Therefore, it seems that the grace of sanctification in the womb transcends baptismal grace.

354. Cf. Albert the Great, In I Sent.

§ 70. Further, it is asked fourthly, If someone were to be born now in this manner, would he have to be baptized?

§ 71. It seems that he would not, because: 1. Divine power is more efficacious than the power of a sacrament. But in those sanctified in the womb, divine power is operating. Therefore, the sacrament ought not to be applied.

§ 72. 2. Also, in nature nothing is done in vain, therefore much less in divine works. But it would be in vain if there were two operations to induce a single habit, since it would be sufficiently possessed through one. Therefore, since sufficient grace is possessed through sanctification in the womb, it seems that he would be baptized in vain.

§ 73. 3. Also, a sacrament is not iterated lest an injury be done [to it]. Therefore, the sacrament ought not to be conferred lest an injury be done to the divine operation in sanctification in the womb.

§ 74. But on the contrary is the fact that: 1. If some holy person approaches baptism, like Cornelius, he nevertheless has necessity to be baptized, as was held above concerning those who come holy to baptism. [355] Therefore, by a similar reasoning, it seems that even if he is sanctified in the womb, he is still bound to be baptized.

§ 75. 2. Also, it is established that he does not have the character.

§ 76. Therefore, he is bound to receive it; and he cannot except through baptism. Therefore, he is bound to be baptized.

§ 77. And let these suffice for the present, because more things concerning this were asked above in the third distinction.

§ 78. Solution. It must be said that the grace of sanctification in the womb took place concerning three persons, who had a spiritual order of the Holy Spirit to that holiness in the womb, concerning which it is said, Matthew 1:20: For that which is conceived in her, is of the Holy Ghost. And, Luke 1:35: The Holy which shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God. And this order was expounded upon the third book of the Sentences [356].

§ 79. To the first, therefore, which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that someone is "born according to Adam" in two ways, namely by birth in the womb when the child is formed, and by birth out of the womb when he proceeds into the light. And concerning the first birth, what Isidore says is generally true, on account of the sentence of the Lord: because He holds all to be conceived by the law of concupiscence, as is said to the Ephesians 2:3: We were by nature children of wrath. But concerning the second, it does not hold except concerning those reborn through the sacrament, and not through the spiritual benefit of sanctification.

§ 80. To the next it must be said that this [premise] is false, that the whole time of conception is assigned to the curse: because then he would receive diverse curses from individual moments, or would draw one successively. But there is only one moment of the curse, namely that in which the soul is infused.

§ 81. To the next it must be said that although the embryo throughout the whole time of conception draws nourishment from a corrupt mother, or from corrupt parents, nevertheless he does not draw a cause of new corruption. For the nourishment does not become a new body to be animated, but is united to a body already made and animated, and therefore he does not have a cause of corruption except in that.

§ 82. To what is asked further: When is that grace given?

§ 83. It must be said that it is after animation. For in the loins of Adam or Abraham or others, or even in the flesh of parents, or before conception, no one can be sanctified. And this whole [matter] was shown upon the third book of the Sentences, and the cause was stated there [357].

§ 84. To that, therefore, which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that the knowledge by which He knew Jeremiah before sanctification was the knowledge of predestination. And therefore He adds concerning the sanctification of present justice, when He says: Before thou camest forth out of the womb, I sanctified thee.

§ 85. To the next it must be said that the Gloss is understood thus: He did not yet have the spirit of life, that is, the free breath by which he himself is nourished and fostered separated from the mother: but nevertheless he had the spirit which is the cause of life. And this is proved by the saying of the Angel who said to the Blessed Virgin: This is the sixth month with her that is called barren: but no conception is without being formed in the sixth month, especially in hot lands, such as the land beyond the sea, in which sometimes even the seventh month is immediately assigned for birth.

§ 86. To the next it must be said that He is more prone to have mercy; but nevertheless He does not do what cannot be done. But every form, in order to be determined, seeks its proper subject. And therefore He does not give grace before there is a subject in which grace and virtue can be received: and this is not the body. Moreover, spiritual medicine ought to be derived from the spirit to the body according to a reason of congruity.

§ 87. But if anyone should object that God could have removed the cause of infection from the body, and then the soul would not be infected when it is infused: It must be said that God could

have done so: but it did not befit His justice, because He condemned all to be conceived in sins. Moreover, he who would be conceived in this way would not be sanctified from this, but would be in the state of pristine innocence: and this would not be an adornment of justice, but would be a deformity, that one should need a redeemer and another not.

§ 89. To the next it must be said that the cure of the disease of fault cannot begin in the body, because in the body as in a subject there is no fault, but only punishment. And that remains in part after baptism, but it does not infect after baptism on account of the grace of redemption, and on account of the baptismal character, as was said upon the second book of

355. Cf. Albert the Great, In IV Sent., d. ...

the Sentences, in the tractate on original sin [358]. And therefore the medicine begins in the most congruous way from the soul.

§ 90. To what is asked further, it must be said that this grace is simply greater than the grace of a baptized person: because it more greatly weakens the fomes [tinder of sin], as was noted upon the third book of the Sentences. But baptismal grace is greater in a certain respect, because it imprints a character, and according to this it is greater.

§ 91. And thus the solution to all objections against this article is clear.

§ 92. To the other thing that is further asked, it must be said that if an infant in the womb were born with the grace of sanctification, he ought to be baptized on account of the command of the Lord, and on account of the character, just as Jeremiah was circumcised, and John and the Blessed Virgin, as I think, were baptized.

§ 93. But to that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that the divine operation is most sufficient for what it operates; but it does not operate the baptismal character, nor the fulfillment of His command. And therefore, although He gave grace, nevertheless the necessity of baptizing still remains.

§ 94. Through this the solution to the following [objection] is also clear.

§ 95. To the second and third [arguments] it must be said that no one is so full of grace that he cannot be made more full. And therefore there he receives fuller grace and a character; and therefore no injury is done to the divine operation. But if he were baptized to have the same thing which was had through the divine operation, then the objection made would hold.

Articulus 10 — Whether Someone Unwilling, Insane, Asleep, Can Be Baptized

Whether someone unwilling, out of his mind, or sleeping can be baptized?

Whether someone unwilling, out of his mind, or sleeping can be baptized?

§ 96. Next it is asked concerning what is said there, D: Furthermore it must be known that those in whom there are no evident signs, etc.

§ 97. And it is asked next to this: Whether, if someone is mute, or sleeping, or unwilling and objecting, he could nevertheless be baptized?

§ 98. It seems that he could, because: 1. The motion of free choice is not required for baptism, since infants do not have the use of free choice, in whom nevertheless the power of baptism operates.

§ 99. 2. Also, for an alien sin an alien faith seems to suffice, that is, the faith of the Church. But original sin is alien [i.e., contracted from another]. Therefore, it seems that the faith of the Church suffices for them, which is offered equally to the unwilling, and the deaf, and the mute, and the sleeping, and the insane, just as to infants. Therefore, it seems that he obtains the character and baptismal grace.

356. Cf. Albert the Great, In III Sent.

§ 100. Solution. It must be said that it is one way in the unwilling, and another way in others. For the Pope distinguishes between the unwilling and the unwilling. For there is an unwilling person who does not believe, yet submits himself to the operation of the Church without objecting, so that he may obtain the very thing that he believes the Church is doing; and this one obtains the character. There is also an unwilling person who openly objects, and does not submit himself to the operation of the Church; and this one obtains nothing, even if he were immersed a thousand times.

§ 101. But concerning the insane, I think that they are to be baptized, especially if they are the children of Christians. And even if others are baptized, I think that they receive the character and the power of baptism, if they are insane from birth [a natura]. If, however, while they had the use of reason they objected, I think that they obtain nothing if they are baptized in their insanity.

§ 102. Concerning the sleeping I say the same thing, that if they are baptized, and they objected while awake, they obtain nothing. But if they consented, or being asked did not object, I think that those baptized obtain a character at least, and also grace if they were compunctious before sleep: but it is not to be done except in extreme necessity of danger.

Articulus 11 — Whether Someone Can Be Baptized In Jest Or In Mimicry

Can someone be baptized in jest or in mimicry?

§ 103. Next it is asked concerning what he says there, E: It is also customarily asked concerning one who joking, like a mimic, etc.

§ 104. For it seems that it is not baptism: because as is immediately said in the text, intention is required in this and in other sacraments. But one immersing in mimicry intends to jest and not to baptize. Therefore, he confers nothing.

§ 105. BUT THE CONTRARY seems to imply that something else is obtained, because Augustine doubts about this.

§ 106. Also, it seems that intention operates nothing for the sacrament, because: 1. Augustine says that a drunkard baptizes, and [the subject] is baptized. But a drunkard cannot intend, because, as was noted upon the second book of the Sentences, intention is a will with an end, or reason determining an end; and a drunkard does not have the use of reason. Therefore, intention in the sacrament operates nothing.

§ 107. 2. Also, in the Gospel no mention is made of intention, when it is said at the end of Matthew 28:19: Going therefore, teach ye all nations, baptizing them, etc. But it does not say, "Intend to baptize."

§ 108. 3. Also, on the part of the recipient the intention to receive is not required. Therefore, it seems that neither on the part of the giver is the intention to give [required].

§ 109. 4. Also, we are all exposed to danger by this, because we do not know whether the priest intends or not. And it seems that out of hatred he could neglect many by not intending.

Therefore, it seems that since baptism is a sacrament of necessity, intention ought not to be [required].

§ 110. 5. Also, concerning a heretic it was held above that he baptizes: and yet he does not intend to do what the Church does. Moreover, that the work of a heretic imprints a character, Ambrose says thus in the book on Free Choice, concerning the baptism of infants: Many wolves infix a character: who seem to be inside, yet are known by the fruits of their morals not to pertain to that sheepfold which is one out of all.

§ 111. 6. Also, in the same place: The Lord's character, when an erring sheep is freed from error and returns to Christian truth, is recognized, not disapproved.

§ 112. 7. Also, it was expressly held in the text above. Therefore, one not intending baptizes, as it seems. Therefore, intention is not required, as is said in the text; and thus one baptized in mimicry is baptized, even if the whole was mimicry, as it seems.

§ 113. Solution. It must be said that intention on the part of the giver is required for baptism: not the intention of consecrating something, but only of doing what the Church does. And this is expressed by the word of baptizing, when it is said: I baptize thee, as was said above in the question on the form.

of baptism. Hence, if it is pronounced jokingly with the intention of doing what the Church does over an unbaptized person who does not object beforehand or at the time, it is baptized: and then the whole thing is not mimical, because the intention expressed in the first person verb was not mimical. But if it is mimical, and the person objects, then he attains nothing.

§ 1. To the other objection, it must be said that it is one thing to baptize a drunkard (ebriosus), and another a drunken person (ebrius); for a drunken person does not have the use of reason in act, but a drunkard is not necessarily drunk.

§ 2. To the other, it must be said that intention is expressly signified in the act of baptizing, because an action is not ordered by a wise person without intention.

§ 3. To the other, it must be said that on the part of the recipient, intention is placed towards the deed of the Church when he submits himself without objecting: and such an intention is sufficient.

§ 4. To the other, it must be said that from this he is not exposed to danger: because a general intention is expressed in the word of baptizing: and that expression suffices for the intention of the Church, namely, for doing what the Church does: even if he does not believe that this has any value: for such an intention suffices, as has already been said.

§ 5. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 12 — Whether In The Elect To Be Baptized Two Times Ought To Be Observed, Namely Easter And Pentecost

Whether in baptizing the elect they ought to observe two times, namely Easter and Pentecost?

358. Cf. Albert the Great, In II Sent.

Next, it is asked about what is said, there, F, It must be acknowledged also in baptizing the elect, etc. What is the reason for those two times? for It seems that baptism ought to be on the Epiphany: because 1. Then the Lord was baptized, and conferred the power of regeneration on the waters.

1. Likewise, then the heavens were opened over him, just as baptism opens the heavens: therefore then it is more the time for baptizing according to congruence.
2. Likewise, on the day of the Nativity it seems to be the time: because baptism has a similitude with spiritual regeneration: therefore it is ordered to birth rather than to resurrection, as it seems.
3. Moreover, since it is a sacrament of necessity which it is a danger to defer, it seems always to be the time for baptizing.

§ 1. SOLUTION. The time of necessity is always, when little children are born: but the time of congruence is twice a year, as is touched upon in the Letter: because through baptism we are consigned to death and resurrection, as the Apostle says in Romans 6:4, since we are buried with him by baptism into death, etc. and we are immersed three times on account of the three-day burial: and we are extracted naked on account of the testimony of the resurrection. This is what he says: We were buried with him by baptism into death, so that just as Christ arose from the dead by the glory of the Father, so we too might walk in newness of life. And at Pentecost: because the Holy Spirit operates in baptism, who is then celebrated as sent.

§ 2. To that therefore which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that the regenerative power is imperfect for regenerating, which the Lord conferred by the touch of his most pure flesh upon the freezing waters, as Bede says, and it is reduced to act through the truth of the Passion and the invocation of the Trinity: and therefore in the Passion water with blood went out from the side of Christ, so that the blood operating in the water might be understood.

§ 3. To the other, it must be said that heaven was then opened for the exit of grace: but for the entrance into glory it was opened in the Passion and Resurrection, and as regards place in the Ascension, as was determined above.

§ 4. To the other, it must be said that as Peter, Gregory's disciple, says in the blessing of the paschal candle: It profited us nothing to be born, unless it had profited us to be redeemed and therefore spiritual regeneration pertains more to resurrection than to birth: because in the resurrection Christ laid aside the old penalty, just as man lays aside the oldness of sin.

Articulus 13 — Whether Those Coming To Baptism Ought To Profess The Faith, And Whether That Profession Is A Vow

Whether those coming to baptism ought to profess the faith? and, Whether that profession is a vow?

357. Cf. Albert the Great, In III Sent.

Next, it is asked about what is said, there, G. Furthermore, all coming to baptism ought to profess their faith, etc.

For from this the promise which is made in baptism seems to be a vow: because a vow is a spontaneous promise of a better good, confirmed by deliberation and obligation: but it is evident that one sinning against a vow sins doubly by one sin, because he commits an illicit act, and because he acts against the vow: therefore it seems that every baptized person, by sinning after baptism, sins doubly: therefore the baptized makes his condemnation worse.

§ 5. SOLUTION. It must be said that it is not a vow except very generally and improperly

taking it: because a vow is the conception of a better condition of good, and a deliberate promise confirmed by obligation: but a better good is not said except of a counsel, not of a precept: but the one to be baptized does not promise anything except the good of precept, to which he is merely obligated: and therefore it is not properly a vow.

§ 1. And thus the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 14 — Whether A Child Coming To Age Is Bound To Those Things Which The Sponsors Have Vowed For Him, And Whether The Sponsors Are Obligated As Sureties Of Their Faith, And In What Sense The Sponsors Say, 'I Believe'

Whether a little child coming to age is bound to those things which godparents vowed for him? and, Whether godparents are obligated as guarantors of their faith? and, In what sense godparents say, "I believe"?

Next, it is asked about what is said, there, G, §1: But if it is a little child, not able to believe or speak, etc.

Whether a little child coming to age is obligated to those things which godparents promised for him?

It seems, however, that he is: because 1. Dionysius says that the sense of the words which the godparents say is, that that boy, coming to his senses, will hold the sacred confessions which they promised there: therefore he is obligated to this, as it seems.

1. Likewise, it is greater that a human being be ordered to good than to evil: but we are bound to evil by the transgression of another: therefore we can also be obligated to good by the obligation and confession of another: therefore boys are obligated by the words of the godparents, as it seems.

ON THE CONTRARY: If someone vows his son to religion before the years of discretion, the son coming to the years of discretion is not obligated: therefore, by a similar reason, he is not obligated by the responses of the godparents.

FURTHERMORE it is asked, Whether godparents are obligated as if they were guarantors (fidejussores) of their faith?

It seems, however, that they are: because 1. Thus says Augustine in a certain sermon: But I admonish you all, both men and women who receive children in baptism, to recognize yourselves to have been guarantors before the Lord: admonish them therefore to always guard chastity, to cherish justice, to love charity, and above all to learn the creed and the Lord's prayer: and you yourselves hold them, and show them to those whom you have received.[359] Therefore it seems that they are obligated.

1. Likewise, Ambrose: We ought to love the children whom we have raised from the sacred font far more than those whom we have begotten.[360] But it stands that we are obligated to provide goods for carnal boys: therefore much more for spiritual ones: therefore we are bound as guarantors for them.

FURTHERMORE it is asked, In what sense does the godparent say for the little child, "I believe"?

For he either speaks in his own person, or in the person of the little child. If in his own person, this is nothing: because the priest, seeking faith, names the little child, and asks about the little child. But if he speaks in the person of the little child: then he seems to speak falsely, because the little child does not believe.

§ 2. SOLUTION. It seems it must be said that the little child is obligated to faith, and to the morals which are contained from the reception of baptism.

§ 3. But to that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that there is no similarity: because in baptism nothing is promised for the little child to which he is not obligated by natural law: but in a vow there is a spontaneous obligation beyond this: and therefore one cannot do this for another. Hence a little child in baptism does not make nor receive a new obligation: but rather receives a benefit from the confession of another's faith, which ought to become his own.

§ 1. To what is further asked, it must be said that godparents are obligated to diligence, if the children are not otherwise instructed: but because the Our Father and I believe in God are sung in the solemn Church, and morals are preached, and are shown in the examples of good people now: therefore not as much solicitude is applied as in the primitive Church, when little children were nourished among infidels: and this is what the authority of Augustine intends.

§ 2. To what is objected from Ambrose, it must be said that we ought to love spiritual children more relatively (secundum quid), but carnal ones simply: however I say more relatively, insofar as spiritual filiation is more noble than carnal: simply speaking, however, we are more obligated to carnal children: and in the order of those to be loved, carnal ones are placed before spiritual ones, as was noted above in the Third Book of the Sentences.

§ 3. To what is further asked about the sense of the words, it must be said that when "I believe" or "I renounce" is said, it is said in the person of the little child: and "I believe" is worth as much there as "I am prepared to receive the sacrament of faith, since I do not have

the obstacle of a contrary will and dissent": and for this kind of believing the use of free choice is not required.

§ 4. Hence from this the solution to the objection to the contrary can be clear.

Articulus 15 — Why Children Are Catechized, And For What The Catechism Avails

Why are little children catechized? and, What is catechism for?

Next, it is asked about what is said, there, H, But that interrogation and response occurs in the catechism, to which is added exorcism.

For it is asked, Why is the little child catechized, since he is not yet receptive to discipline?

For the Church seems to deviate.

Likewise it is asked, What is exorcism for?

For it either expels the demon from a bodily obsession of the little child, or a spiritual one. If bodily: then it ought not to be done except in those bodily obsessed and furious from the oppression of the demon: and this is not done. But if it is done to expel spiritually from the little child: it either has an effect, or not. If it has an effect: therefore an exorcised person not baptized can be saved, and be in the state of those to be saved: which is false and heretical. But if it does not have an effect: then it is done for nothing and ridiculously.

§ 5. There are, however, some who say to this, that it has an effect not in itself, but in baptism, so that namely baptism may attain a fuller effect. But this seems nothing to me: for this cannot be except by strengthening baptism, or by disposing the subject so that he becomes more apt to perceive grace. If in the first way: this is impossible: because what is not, cannot be conferred: but the person is not yet baptized when the little child is exorcised. Nor does it seem to be in the second way: because it cannot dispose the subject, unless either on the part of the penalty, or on the part of the fault. Not on the part of the penalty: because that is connected to the fault: and it is not weakened, unless the fault is weakened. Nor on the part of the fault: because that is either wholly remitted, or wholly remains: but it is evident that it is not wholly remitted in exorcism: therefore it wholly remains: therefore the subject is equally disposed before exorcism and afterwards: therefore he is in no way disposed by exorcism.

§ 6. Furthermore it is asked here about those things which are done in exorcism and catechism, what and how many they are, and according to what order, and when they are done?

§ 7. SOLUTION. It must be said to the first, that the power of the demon is twofold, namely interior, and exterior: hence through exorcism I think that the exterior power of the demon is weakened, and not the interior: just as the objection proves. But the exterior power of the demon is that by which he stirs up the fomes (tinder of sin) in an adult, so that he may not attain baptism: and in a little child he places actions of death before baptism: and against this exterior power I think exorcism avails.

359. Pseudo-Augustine (Caesarius of Arles), Sermo 228 (PL 39:2165).

§ 8. And through this the solution to the first questions is clear: because baptism operates against the interior power, and exorcism against the exterior power which is in the fomes.

§ 1. But to what is further asked about the number and order of those things which are required in baptism: it must be said that according to the diverse customs of the Church they are varied in number and in order. But more frequently, first he is breathed upon (exsufflated): so that the exterior power of the demon may be driven away. Second, the sign of the cross is made on him on the breast and on the forehead: so that the devil may know himself to be driven from him, both in the secret of the heart, and in the openness of confession. Third, he receives salt in the mouth: so that he may be prepared for the taste of wisdom, and the stench of the fomes may be restrained. Next is made the smearing of the nostrils and ears with spittle: so that he may have the discernment of faith, and that grace, which is signified by the saliva descending from the head, and his senses as regards doctrine in the hearing of faith, and the discernment of faith sealed in the nostrils, may be opened to Christ. Next is made the anointing on the breast for preparing the heart for God, and on the shoulders for the burdens of the Lord with the invocation of the Trinity, without whose help we can do nothing.

§ 2. But after baptism is made the anointing of chrism on the crown of the head: so that the incorruptible mind may be opened to God, so that with the mind he may contemplate eternal things: which are signified by the chrism confected from shining oil and balsam preserving from corruption. Next is made the clothing with the white garment in sign of the innocence which is received in baptism, and of the glory which is received in the resurrection. Finally a lit candle is placed in his hand, so that the word of God may be a lamp to his feet, and a light to his feet against spiritual darkness.

§ 3. And let these things said about baptism suffice.

DISTINCTIO VII

Divisio Textus

Now concerning the sacrament of confirmation, etc. Here in the second place the Master touches upon the sacrament of confirmation, concerning which he determines three things, namely the minister in the beginning of this chapter: secondly, where he also indicates the form and matter and effect, there, A, §2: But the virtue of this sacrament is the giving, etc. In the third place, he touches upon the cause of its non-iteration, and the recipient, there, B, §2: This sacrament ought to be received only by the fasting, and handed over to the fasting, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether The Sacrament Of Confirmation Is Necessary

Whether the sacrament of confirmation is necessary?

360. Pseudo-Ambrose (Maximus of Turin), Sermo 13 (PL 17:610).

But here a question falls before the Letter: Whether this sacrament is necessary for salvation, or instituted only for well-being?

But it seems that it is necessary: because 1. That without which a human being is not a full Christian, this is necessary for the Christian life: but without confirmation a human being is not a full Christian: therefore it is necessary for the Christian life. The first is evident through itself. The second is written above, where Urban says: After baptism they ought to receive the Holy Spirit, so that they may be found full Christians.[361] Thence further: Without the Christian life there is no salvation: therefore without confirmation there is no salvation.

If perhaps you say, what almost all say, that fullness is twofold, namely of sufficiency, and of copiousness: or fullness of grace, and fullness of its strength: and the saying of Urban is understood of the second fullness. On the contrary: According to this the same could be said of the counsels and works of supererogation: because without them there is not the fullness of copiousness: therefore it seems that confirmation belongs to the fullness of necessity and of sufficiency.

1. Likewise, Hugh of St. Victor says: What does it profit if you are raised up through baptism, unless you are confirmed for standing through confirmation?[362] As if to say: Nothing. Therefore it seems that baptism does not profit for salvation without confirmation: therefore confirmation is necessary for salvation.
2. Likewise, without the expulsion of the disease there is no health: because fear always remains, and the cause of danger with the disease remaining: but every sacrament (as was said above) is ordered against the disease of sin: therefore it seems that the cause of danger is not perfectly expelled, unless the grace of the sacrament is perceived: therefore it is necessary that the grace of confirmation be perceived.
3. Likewise, since there are two parts of justice, namely to decline from evil, and to do good: that part which is to do good operates more substantially to salvation than that which is to decline from evil: because as authority says, the avoidance of sin does not merit the palm, but avoids the penalty: therefore by similarity since baptismal grace is ablutive of sin, and thus is ordered to expelling evil: because the grace of confirmation has an order to good: it seems that the grace of confirmation operates more substantially to salvation than baptismal grace. Therefore since without baptism there is no salvation, neither will there be salvation on the way without confirmation.

ON THE CONTRARY: 1. If confirmation is necessary for salvation: therefore he who dies baptized before confirmation, even he who is not feigning, is condemned: which is heretical to say.

1. Likewise, it was held above that in baptism grace and the fullness of

virtues are conferred; but one having grace and virtue has all things necessary for salvation: therefore for salvation he does not necessarily need confirmation.

§ 1. SOLUTION. It must be said that necessity is multiplex, as is determined by the Philosopher in book V of the Metaphysics.[363] For there is absolute necessity: and by this necessity confirmation is not necessary for salvation. There is again necessity of condition, namely of some end: as if a human being ought to remain in life, he has necessity to eat. Thus it can be said that confirmation is necessary for salvation: if the faith ought to be defended robustly and without fear in the impugnations of the enemy: for although otherwise from the grace perceived in baptism he has whence he may stand, yet he does not have this from a grace specially ordered to strength against the weakness which is from the depressing fomes, as will be clear below: and if this strength ought to be had, it is necessary to be confirmed.

§ 2. Let it be said therefore to the first, that that solution of the Masters is legitimate concerning the fullness of sufficiency and of copiousness: or the fullness for being, and the fullness of strength.

§ 3. To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that it is one way in graces ordered to merit, such as are in the virtues and gifts and beatitudes, as was said above: and another way in sacramental grace which is ordered against the defect proceeding from sin. Because those give the fullness of copiousness changing the state of the person: just as the state of one observing the counsels is one thing, and the state of one observing only the precepts is another. But those which are in the sacraments expel sin in whatever state, or the defect proceeding from sin: and therefore without them there is not the fullness simply ordered to salvation or ordering. Hence sacramental grace pertains more to the fullness of Christian salvation than the grace of perfection in counsels and supererogations.

§ 4. To the other, it must be said that the saying of Hugh can be understood in two ways: in one way that he speaks in a case where contempt of religion excludes the sacrament: because to contemn a sacrament is condemnable, although in itself it is not necessary. In another way it can be said, that he does not say this because condemnation follows from this, but because as it frequently follows from weakness of falling in spiritual battle.

§ 5. To the other, it must be said that disease is expelled in two ways by the grace of the sacrament: in one way as regards fault, and thus it is expelled in baptism as regards original fault, and in penance as regards actual fault: and from this expulsion is had the sufficiency of salvation. In another way it is expelled as regards the penalty inclining into fault, and as regards this it is expelled in confirmation, and the sacrament of the altar, and extreme unction: and from this is had the sufficiency of strength for fighting against spiritual enemies.

§ 6. To the other, it must be said that baptism does not consist in the mere ablution of filth: but brightness and beauty from the ablution is placed around the body, which signifies the brightness of the soul posited in grace and in virtues. Although confirmation also sounds of an order into good, nevertheless the grace of confirmation principally speaks of strength from the ablution of the contrary disposition to spiritual boldness which is in the confession of the name of Christ, as will be clear below. And therefore on neither part is it similar.

§ 7. Moreover, the objection presupposes a falsehood: because to decline from evil is said in two ways, namely not to do evil by simple negation: and this is not a part of justice, but avoids penalty. In another way to decline from evil means not to will to do evil, that is, to will not to do evil; and this posits an act of the interior will tending away from evil, which is an interior act in one having grace: and this is properly a part of general justice: and as regards that it merits the palm: and with this baptism has similitude which consists in ablution and positing, and also confirmation which takes away disease and posits strength from grace given simply for standing in battle. But the objection supposed that in the first

way to decline was said to be a part of justice, and would have similitude with baptism.

Articulus 2 — Whether There Is Some Determinate Matter Of Confirmation, And Which It Is

Whether there is any determined matter of confirmation, and what is it?

Next, it is asked about what he says, there, A, § 4, around the beginning: For the form is open, etc.

For the Bishop says these words when he confirms: I consign you with the sign of the cross, and I confirm you with the chrism of salvation in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. But some have this usage: I confirm you with the sign of the cross, and I confirm you with the chrism of salvation, etc. But the first mode is more general.

But many things are asked concerning this form.

1. First, because the Apostles seem to have used no form in the Acts, but confirmed by a simple imposition of hands. Acts 8:17: Then they laid hands upon them, and they received the Holy Spirit. And below, v. 18: When Simon had seen that through the imposition of the hand of the Apostles the Holy Spirit was given.
2. Likewise, in the Gospel, when little children came to Jesus, he laid hands upon them.[364] And it is not read that he signed them with the sign of the holy cross, or confirmed them with the chrism of salvation.
3. Reason also seems to demand this: because in confirmation the Spirit is given for strength: and therefore it is given by him who holds a more excellent grade in the Church: therefore it seems that the Spirit is signified to be translated from him into the one to be confirmed: therefore it ought not to be retorted to another: but it is retorted to another when it is said, I confirm you, etc.: therefore it ought not to be said, as it seems.
4. Moreover, if a sacrament does not have institution except divine, as was determined above, and all Doctors hitherto have said: and the Apostles and the Lord confirmed, not using any form: it seems that neither ought the Church use any form.

362. Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis, Lib. 2, p. 7, c. 2 (PL 176:459).

5. Likewise, nowhere is it read in the canon about the institution of this form of confirmation, which the Bishops of our time use: therefore it seems that it is apposed by the Church for well-being, and is not of the form.

ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Hugh of St. Victor says that a sacrament is a corporeal and visible element signifying from institution, representing from similitude, and conferring invisible grace from sanctification.[365] But a corporeal element (as was held above) is nothing without the word accessing the element: therefore in confirmation there must be had words which are the form of the sacrament, whatever they may be.

1. Moreover, in the fore-had definition Hugh says that the corporeal element confers grace from sanctification: but sanctification is not except through the words of divine invocation: therefore in this sacrament the words of divine invocation are required, which is the form of the sacrament.
2. Likewise, it was held above that God did not confer on ministers the power of cleansing or operating interiorly, but only exteriorly, lest hope be placed in man: therefore confirmation consists in the interior cleansing of the infection of the fomes, drawing into weakness and noxious shame of the confession of faith: but God did not confer that upon ministers: therefore this grace ought not to be signified to descend from the

minister, as seemed to be proved before, but rather from God through the work of the sacrament: but this cannot be done except mediating a form of words of the invocation of God by which he operates: therefore a form of words is required.

§ 1. FURTHERMORE it is asked here about the very words which are of the form: and it is asked about what is said, I consign you with the sign of the cross, etc.

For it seems that this is posited superfluously: because 1. He is signed in baptism with the cross both on the breast and on the shoulders and on the crown of the head.

1. Moreover, in the word which is of the form of the sacrament the proper act of the minister ought to be expressed, just as when it is said, I baptize you in the name of the Father, etc.: but the proper act of the minister in this sacrament is not to sign, but rather to confirm: therefore it seems that the minister ought not to use the word of signing in the form of this sacrament.

§ 2. MOREOVER it is asked, 1. Why in confirmation is mention made of the cross rather than of glorification and resurrection, so that he is said to be consigned with the cross?

1. Likewise, of one sacrament there is only a unique sacramental act: confirmation is one sacrament: therefore it has a unique sacramental act: therefore a double act ought not to be expressed in the form: therefore it ought not to be said, "I confirm and I consign," because these two words express two acts.

363. Aristotle, Metaphysics, V, 5 (1015a20).

§ 3. Likewise, it is asked concerning this which is said, I confirm you with the chrism of salvation, why does he say of salvation, rather than of grace or eternal life?

And it seems that it ought to be said, "of grace": because 1. Salvation which speaks of the evasion of danger is not except from conferred grace: therefore grace according to the intellect is prior to salvation: therefore the collation of grace is more immediate to the act of the sacrament than salvation: since therefore the act of the sacrament ought to be determined through an immediate terminus, it seems that it ought to be said, "with the chrism of grace", and not "of salvation".

1. Likewise, in the form of baptism no mention is made of the matter, or the end, or the efficient cause of the effect of the sacrament: but it is simply said, I baptize you in the name, etc.: therefore it seems that neither here should any mention be made of the matter, and the efficient cause: therefore it ought not to be said, "with the chrism of salvation": but simply, I confirm you in the name of the Father, etc.

§ 4. Moreover, all the questions which were made in the tractate on baptism concerning smearings, additions, diminutions, and corruptions, have to be made here: and they are solved in the same way as there.

§ 5. SOLUTION. It must be said that this sacrament is against the weakness arising from the fomes, from the fact that it is not wholly purged in baptism, but remains weakened for the exercise of battle: but the greater difficulty is in the confession of the name of Christ and the sign of redemption, in this way in which he must be confessed by mouth and work proceeding from the heart, as is said, in Romans 10:9: Because if you confess with your mouth the Lord Jesus, and believe in your heart that God raised him from the dead, you will be saved.[366] The demon also does not sustain this confession: but rises up against scandals: and therefore for this act confirmation is necessary.

§ 6. It must be said therefore to the first, that in my judgment confirmation was never celebrated without a form of words by the Apostles: but Christ who had both the power of authority insofar as he is God, and the power of excellence insofar as he is a human being united to God, was able to confer as he willed: because he did not hold the place of a minister, but of the head in the Church. But, as I think, the Apostles never confirmed without a prescribed form of words: although some have said this and sought the reason why they confirmed without a form of words and a determined matter, but our Pontiffs with a form of words and the matter of chrism.

Hence, to the arguments it must be said that although this is not read [in Scripture], nevertheless the form was instituted by the Lord, and handed down by the Apostles, just like that of baptism. However, it can be said that confirmation is twofold: one is for standing firm in the good universally, and this is done by anyone else, but especially by superiors who hold a place of greater holiness and merit of life, through prayer; and the Apostles used this confirmation, frequently confirming the same person. The other confirmation, which imprints

361. Aristotle, Metaphysics, V, 5 (1015a20).

a sacramental character for the expulsion of timidity arising from the fomes, was never done by the Apostles without words and determinate matter. Because of this, we have a special chapter in Dionysius, who was with the Apostles, concerning those to be perfected in the myron, and he speaks of the sanctification of the chrism and the things to be offered in it[367].

Therefore, to that which is objected to the contrary through reason, it must be said that sacramental grace does not descend from the merit of life, nor from the minister, as has been proved: but from the work of the sacrament, and therefore it must be referred to the work in the matter with the words.

To the following two, the solution is clear through what was said before.

To that which is further asked concerning the words of the form, it must be said that the highest thing in the Christian life is the confession of faith. And this is proved as follows: for although love is high, yet it leans on the knowledge of faith, and hope likewise: because Augustine says[368], "Nothing is loved unless it is believed or known; nor is anything hoped for, unless it is in some way presumed and believed." But what is difficult in the cardinal virtues, although it is difficult for the operating power, nevertheless reason proves and persuades it. This [confession of faith], however, is difficult inside and outside: first inside, because one's own reason is denied; outside, because this is principally sought by visible and invisible enemies. But first, because faith is first and does not lean on another [virtue]: therefore, the grace of confirmation operates principally with respect to this act. It is necessary, therefore, to have a twofold act in confirming: one which is initiative and demonstrative, to which confirmation is principally directed; and another which expresses the proper operation of the sacrament of confirmation. And therefore it is premised by way of insinuation, I consign you [Consigno te], and there follows, with the sign of the cross. I confirm [Confirmo]: and the first is on account of the difficulty within, to which confirmation is ordered; and the other on account of the difficulty without, for which it confirms one to stand firm.

Therefore it must be said to the first and second, that consignation in baptism is a sacramental [sacramentalis], and not of the sacrament [sacramenti]: and it is for expelling the power of the enemy in the fomes, lest it impede the attainment of baptism: and so that the baptized may meditate on God, and think, and carry the yoke of God on his shoulders, as was said above concerning the sacramentals of baptism: but here confirmation becomes as it were insinuative of the banner under which the act of the sacrament of confirmation is to be exercised.

To the other it must be said, that in the incarnation, burial, and resurrection there was not the battle of Christ, but only on the cross: but we are enrolled under the banner of his cross through confirmation: and therefore mention is made of the cross only, and not of the others. This is what the Apostle says We preach Christ crucified, a scandal indeed to the Jews, and foolishness to the Gentiles, but to those who are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God. Hence this was maximally attacked by the Jews and by the Gentiles: and therefore the act of confirmation is properly with respect to that.

364. Romans 10:9.

The second difficulty is of the same [kind] regarding spiritual battle: because the demon lost his prey there [on the cross], regarding the payment of the debt and the fulfillment of satisfaction: and therefore he maximally impedes us from conforming to Him, since this is to take up the cross and follow the Savior: and therefore mention is made especially of the cross.

To the other, the solution is clear from what was said before: because the first act is imported by the first word: the end to which the act of confirmation is directed is also insinuated, and the true cause of this necessity has been stated.

And through this the solution to the following is clear, why a twofold word is necessary here.

To the other it must be said, that as is clear from the questions held above concerning the grace of the sacraments, every sacramental grace is against a danger: but confirmation has a special order: because it is against danger within, and against danger without: within, because it removes weakness and the noxious shame of confessing Christ arising from the fomes. But without, because it strengthens to stand before kings and princes and demons: and therefore it is called [the chrism] of salvation rather than of grace: because salvation is there substantially, which speaks of the evasion of danger.

To the reason moreover it must be said, that although this is done through grace, nevertheless it is not done through grace as grace, that is, which makes the one having it pleasing, and renders his work pleasing: but rather through grace as saving interiorly, and saving exteriorly from the terrors of timidity.

To the other it must be said, that in baptism there is an ordering against a general disease in a universal element, for which it is not necessary to have any insinuation, because it has no difficulty on the part of the receiver; but in confirmation an insinuation is necessary, as has been said. And because a sacrament insinuates principally in a similitude that is invented, not in the property of the material element: therefore it was necessary in the form of this sacrament for mention to be made of the matter: because according to Master Hugh, a sacrament represents from a similitude.

And through this the solution to all the queries is clear.

Articulus 3 — Whether The Matter Of The Sacrament Of Confirmation Is Chrism

Whether the matter of the sacrament of confirmation is chrism?

Then it is inquired concerning that which he says, there, A, § 1, near the beginning: He signs with sacred chrism.

And it is inquired concerning the matter of this sacrament.

365. Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis, Lib. 1, p. 9, c. 2 (PL 176:317).

And it seems that 1. The matter of this sacrament ought not to be chrism: because for a general disease a medicine is required which can be had generally: therefore it seems that chrism ought not to be the matter.

1. Moreover, in baptism which is a sacrament ordered against original fault, the matter is a simple element: it seems therefore, that in confirmation which is ordered against the weakness following from the fomes of original [sin], the matter should also be a simple element.

Item, why in this sacrament rather than in others is a mixed liquor the matter?

It seems that it ought not to be: because the effect of the sacrament is single: therefore a single matter ought to be demonstrated: therefore in a single liquor.

Further it is asked, why are these liquors, namely oil and balsam, taken rather than others?

For it seems that 1. Wine ought rather to be assumed: because this renders a man of good hope, as the Philosopher says in book IV of the Ethics and makes the bold strong, as is held in 3 Esdras and seq. Since therefore confirmation is for fighting, it seems that wine alone ought to be assumed. 2. Item, concerning bread it is said And bread confirms the heart of man; therefore bread is the proper matter of confirmation, as it seems.

1. Item, oil which floats on top, seems to signify mercy and charity more than corroboration: therefore it is not the proper matter of confirmation, as it seems.
2. Item, concerning balsam it is objected: because, as Hugh says, it signifies the odor of good fame: but fame is rather in another than in him who is famous, just as honor is: since therefore the matter of a sacrament ought to have a sign in the one receiving the sacrament, and not in another, it seems that balsam works nothing toward the matter of this sacrament.

Further, it is asked whether unconsecrated oil and balsam can be the matter of this sacrament?

And it seems that no: because chrism is consecrated at a determinate time of the year: and Bishops cannot use another in confirming.

But against this it seems: because 1. The matter of baptism is an unconsecrated element: therefore it seems that similarly the matter of this [sacrament] should be thus.

1. Item, in the Eucharist the bread and wine are not necessarily blessed beforehand, but there is one consecrating and transubstantiating form: therefore it seems that in this sacrament these unconsecrated liquors ought to be the matter of the sacrament.

Solution. It must be said that this sacrament, just as it is against a special disease, so it has something special in its form and in its matter: and therefore such arguments are of little worth: it is so in this or that sacrament: therefore it must also be so in another. For what is special in this one is that it is confirmative and operative; and therefore it vindicates

366. Romans 10:9.

principally for itself three causes for which the sacraments were principally instituted: because from the matter and form it is for erudition insofar as it is insinuative, as was said before: and again from the exercise of the act it confers grace: and from the bodily element it humbles man, so that he may seek salvation from God and for the sake of God in lower things.

It must be said therefore to the first, that considering substantially, neither the necessity of the sacrament, nor its generality are the cause why it has this or that matter: but it has for matter that in which sensible signs signifying and confirming the reality of the sacrament are expressly found, as is clear above from the definition of a sacrament: and therefore in the sacrament of baptism water is the sacrament: because it is ablative of filth, making the washed shine, and the element upon which the spirit of life appeared in the creation of the world, and in which living creatures first appeared, as well as the living and mobile soul: by these properties it has an agreement with the reality of baptism, in which man is first regenerated to spiritual life, and being is given to him through the Holy Spirit: and therefore the first reason is not valid, that if confirmation is against a general disease, it ought to have a general element for matter: because this is not the cause of the matter of a sacrament, as has been said: but it has chrism for matter: because among other liquors it posits a more express insinuation through signs for understanding the reality of confirmation.

Through this the solution to the next is also clear: for these are the arguments of some, and they posit a non-cause as a cause.

To the other it must be said, that although the reality of the sacrament is primarily one, nevertheless it is manifold in virtue and power, according to those things for which it expedites man, such as spiritual battle, and the open confession of faith without trembling, and the like: and therefore it could not be represented in one element with respect to all these, as has already been said concerning the form, that it has a twofold word, namely I confirm [confirmo], and I consign [consigno].

To the other it must be said, that this sacrament has these two special liquors, as almost all those following Hugh of St. Victor say, namely the oil of conscience on account of grace, and the balsam of good fame. And what they say is true, if it is well understood: for oil does three things in conscience, especially that of olives, because another oil cannot be the matter: for this oil illuminates, anoints, and nourishes: and its light is referred to the similitude of the character which is a certain light, as was proved in earlier [questions], but the anointing is referred to the soothing of the pain of the fomes, the wound of which introduced fear, and makes one tremble where there is no fear: and therefore pugilists in the contests of the Olympics were anciently anointed, so that they could not be held by an adversary; but it nourishes not by eating, but by entering into the substance, and administering to it a fomentation of moisture, lest it fail in labors, and become rigid in battle. Moreover, from the nature of the tree it has greenness in summer and winter: and signifies constancy in prosperous and adverse things. Balsam, moreover, as Moses the Egyptian [Maimonides] says, is not born

367. Romans 10:9.

except in the eye of the sun which signifies Christ, who comes anointed for us as prince and leader of the war: from which we are called Christians, because we are similarly anointed. And balsam preserves from putrefaction those things which are anointed with balsam, and has a similitude against the putrefaction of the fomes drawing one into pusillanimity and the fear of the Christian name in persecution. It is clear therefore, that these two liquors joined together posit a greater agreement to the reality of this sacrament than others.

To that which is objected concerning wine, it must be said that wine does not heal, nor does it confer boldness from robustness: but rather from malice and infirmity, because it elevates the spirits and the blood to the higher parts, and blocks the ways of discretion lest the danger into which one precipitates be discerned: and therefore it has no agreement with the reality of the sacrament which confirms from the robustness conferred.

To the other it must be said, that bread confirms one to remain in being and life, but not to fight from the robustness that it ministers: and therefore the unity of the mystical body in the charity of the head and members responds to this confirmation, for which grace is conferred in the sacrament of the Eucharist: and therefore bread is a sacrament there, and not here.

To the other it must be said, that although oil with respect to the property of floating on top has a similitude with mercy, nevertheless with respect to other things it has a similitude with the reality of confirmation, as has been said: however, even this property can be reduced to the similitude of the reality, because the confirmed is not less depressed by threats and terrors.

To the other it must be said, that Hugh touches upon the cause accidentally and consequently: but the principal one is that which was said above: for fame operates accidentally toward the act of this sacrament, namely so that it may be known that he is intrepid not from obstinacy and temerity or pride, but from the robustness of the Spirit: for this is not known except through the good opinion which is held of him.

To the other it must be said, that unconsecrated oil and balsam are not, nor can they be, the matter of this sacrament. For just as it is in the political virtues, so there is also a difference in the sacraments. For in the political virtues it is thus, that some are not perfect virtues unless they have delight in the act, as the Philosopher says: One must take as a sign a habit not producing delight in the act [as being imperfect]. And those do not consist simply about the most difficult thing, but about the most difficult thing of their matter. But some are such, that it suffices in their acts, if they are not saddened to the point of a deduction or perturbation of reason: and those consist in the most difficult thing of their matter and in the most difficult thing simply. So it is also in the sacraments, that the act of the sacramental reality, that is, to which the sacramental grace is ordered, is in the greatest difficulty: and therefore an ampler preparation is required in the matter insinuating that act than in the matter of another sacrament: and so it is here the intrepid confession of faith, having a threefold reason of difficulty, as was said above, on account of which the matter must be consecrated even by him who holds the greater place in the Church: so that abundant grace may be signified.

And from this determination the understanding of the distinction of matter which the ancients gave results, namely that it is one way regarding the matter of confirmation, and another way regarding the matter of baptism: because not the whole water of the river or vessel is the matter of baptism, but only that which adheres by contact to the baptized, and it does not have regenerative power except when touching the baptized: but the whole consecrated chrism is the matter of confirmation: because the whole is prepared for this: and it is only necessary that the form approach, and it is a perfect sacrament.

And from this the solution to those things which are objected to the contrary is clear: because it is not similar concerning this sacrament, and concerning others.

Articulus 4 — Whether One Not Ordained Can Confirm, And Whether One Ordained But Not A Bishop Can Confirm

Whether an unordained person can confirm? and, Whether an ordained person who is not a Bishop can?

Then it is inquired concerning that which he says, there, A, § 1, near the beginning: This sacrament cannot be perfected by others except by the highest priests, etc.

And here is the question concerning the minister of this sacrament, and it should be diversified: either he ought to be good, or he could be bad: and whether a heretic or not? But these were disputed in the tract on baptism.

But here we will ask two things: first, whether an unordained person can confirm? Second, whether an ordained person who is not a Bishop can?

To the first it is objected thus: 1. Let us posit that someone is in necessity, and desires the sacrament, and cannot have an ordained person or a Bishop, it seems to be better that he receive it from a layman, than that he depart without the sacrament: especially since he is not a full Christian who does not have this sacrament.

1. Item, In necessity a layman baptizes, and the person is baptized: and he hears confessions, and that person is absolved from sins: therefore it seems, that in necessity someone can also confirm.
2. Item, Sometimes there is more abundant grace in a layman than in a Prelate: if therefore the robustness of grace ought to be transfused by abundant grace, it seems that sometimes it is better transfused by a layman than by a Prelate or Bishop.
3. Item, In natures it is thus, that where a thing is by essence and presence, there it operates its effect, and not there where it is not, but ought to be: but since the order of grace is not contrary to the order of nature, it seems that in grace it is similarly so: therefore where there is actually abundant grace, it more quickly transfuses grace, than where it is not but ought to be: but often abundant grace is in a layman, and not in a

368. Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis, Lib. 1, p. 9, c. 2 (PL 176:317).

Bishop: therefore sometimes confirmation can be done better by a layman than by a Bishop.

Item, Let us posit that someone bears himself as a Bishop, but is not a Bishop, as those do who call themselves Armenians: and someone comes to him probably thinking him to be a Bishop, and receives confirmation from him: it is asked, whether he is confirmed?

It seems that he is: because 1. He who probably believes himself to be baptized will be reputed baptized: and if he dies, he flies away [to heaven], unless actual sin impedes him.

1. Similarly, If someone confesses to him whom he thinks to be his priest, and that one does not have orders, he is reputed to have confessed: therefore it seems, that that one is also confirmed.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: The Church, subsequently knowing that he was not a Bishop, confirms him again: which it would not do if he were confirmed, because an injury must not be done to the sacrament: therefore he is not previously confirmed.

Further it is asked concerning the second, whether a simple priest can confirm?

And it seems that he can: because 1. Gregory permitted this on account of scandal, as is held in the text: but if it were of the truth of life and doctrine, that this sacrament be conferred by a Bishop, it would not have been permitted for any scandal: it seems therefore, that if a simple priest confirms, the person is confirmed.

1. Item, A simple priest anoints with chrism, and in a more eminent place than the forehead is, because on the crown of the head: therefore it seems, that neither in the matter, nor in the place is there a repugnance, that a simple priest cannot confirm.
2. Item, If a Bishop alone can confirm: either this is from orders, or from jurisdiction. If from orders: then a priest can: because a Bishop has no order which a simple priest does not have. If however from jurisdiction: then an elect before consecration can do this: because an elect has total jurisdiction even before he has orders.

Solution. It must be said that a Bishop alone can confer this sacrament: and the reason for this is the reality and the act of this sacrament: for the reality is the Spirit conferred for robustness: and therefore it is fitting with respect to the sacramental sign, that it descend from fullness: but the act is most excellent, as was said before: and with respect to this it is also necessary to have a more excellent minister.

It must be said therefore to the first, that it is not better that he receive it from a layman: because for one desiring the sacrament nothing is lost of the virtue of the sacrament, although he may not have the character: but concerning baptism it is otherwise, as is clear from the things said above: because baptism does not require an act of free will, because otherwise it would not be given to little ones: and it is a sacrament of necessity.

To the other it must be said, that by simple necessity baptism is a sacrament of necessity: but it is not so concerning confirmation.

To the other it must be said, that there is the grace of the person ordered to the merit of life, and there is the grace of the minister of the Church ordered to the power of the keys and the operations of the sacraments: and of the first what is objected is true, and not of the second: but from the second grace descends according to order in the sacraments.

To the other it must be said, that in the minister of the Church grace is present according to act, although it is not personal grace ordered to the merit of life, as has already become clear.

To the other it must be said, that he is not confirmed, nor does he have the character of confirmation: and the objection concerning the sacraments of necessity is worth nothing concerning this one, as has already been said often.

To the other which is asked concerning the second, it must be said that a simple priest cannot confirm: and this is not on account of the place or the matter, but on account of the sign toward the reality of the sacrament, which is not preserved in him in whose keys grace is contracted and diminished, as was said at the beginning of this solution.

To the other which is objected concerning Gregory, it must be said that he never permitted that there should be a confirmation which was conferred by a simple priest: but on account of scandal , abuse and ignorance he did not correct it. Or let it be said, that it was a certain blessing given to those to be confirmed, just as blessed bread is given to some in place of the Eucharist: and Gregory permitted this for a time.

To the other it must be said, that neither from orders alone, nor from jurisdiction alone can a Bishop do this: but from orders and jurisdiction together: for this is annexed to the Episcopal office, just like the consecration of Churches, and the ordination of clerics, and the veiling of virgins, and the like: and thus the objection is not valid.

Articulus 5 — Whether The Sacrament Of Confirmation Confers Grace, And Whether That Grace Is Grace That Makes One Pleasing, And Distinct From The Grace Of Baptism

Whether the sacrament of confirmation confers grace? and, Whether that grace is sanctifying [gratum faciens], and distinct from the grace of baptism?

Then it is inquired concerning that which he says, there, A, § 2: Moreover the virtue of this sacrament is the donation of the Holy Spirit for robustness, etc.

And three things are inquired. The first is, whether this sacrament confers grace? The second is, if it confers it, whether that is freely given [gratis data] or sanctifying [gratum faciens]? The third is, whether that is special, or the same as baptismal grace?

TO THE FIRST one proceeds thus: 1. In natures it is thus, that that which is in some act, as long as it is having it, is not in potency to it, in the way in which it has it: but the baptized non-feigner is in act having grace: therefore as long as he has it, he is not in potency to it according as he has it: therefore it seems, that through confirmation and the following

sacraments no grace is conferred: therefore that sacrament either does not confer grace, or does not always confer it.

1. Item, Above in the tract on baptism, distinction four, it was held that those who approach baptism holy do not receive there the grace which they previously had, and that in such persons the reality precedes the sacrament: therefore it seems, that neither in this sacrament does he who has grace receive any grace.
2. Item, Grace is not considered except in a twofold ratio, namely in itself, and in the virtues: in itself according as it informs the soul, and renders it pleasing: but in the virtues according as it perfects the powers of the soul, and elicits acts: but with respect to both the fullness of grace is conferred in baptism, as was often held; therefore there is not anything of grace which is received in confirmation, as it seems.
3. Item, It cannot be understood, that the same subject with respect to the same part of itself is susceptible of two accidents of the same species: but sanctifying grace is of the same species: therefore two are not in the same thing according to the same: but the soul according to its essence receives grace in baptism: therefore while that remains, it is not susceptible of grace in confirmation: therefore it confers no grace, as it seems.
4. Item, A feigner receives confirmation, or a non-feigner. If a feigner: it is evident that he does not receive grace: because it is said The holy Spirit of discipline will flee from the feigner. But if a non-feigner receives it, then he has grace before confirmation: but nothing receives that which it already has: therefore he does not receive grace: therefore no grace is received in confirmation.

If perhaps you say, that he who has lost baptismal grace, and comes not as a feigner to confirmation, receives grace in it. Against: He receives grace by the virtue of penance, and not from the virtue of confirmation : and this is clear, because he is bound to confess, and exterior satisfaction is enjoined upon him: which is not done to one approaching baptism, because baptism does not require exterior groaning or mourning: therefore if approaching confirmation, he does not receive grace from the virtue of confirmation: therefore no grace is received in confirmation, as it seems.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. A sacrament of the new law is the cause of every reality of which it is a sign, as was determined above in the text: but confirmation is a sign of grace, because it is given for robustness: therefore it is its cause: therefore it confers grace.

1. To the same [point] are the authorities adduced in the text.
2. Moreover, Exterior unction attests to interior unction: but interior unction does not happen except through grace: therefore it confers grace.

It is asked further, Whether that grace is sanctifying, or not?

And it seems that it is: because 1. The sacraments are given as a help against sin: but grace ordered against sin is sanctifying: therefore confirmation and the other sacraments confer sanctifying grace.

1. Item, Confirmation sounds of robustness of spirit: but robustness of spirit is not except through sanctifying grace: therefore confirmation confers sanctifying grace.
2. Item, In the text it is said, that the Spirit is given with all fullness of grace in this sacrament: but this does not happen except through sanctifying grace: therefore, etc.: and because all concede this.

IT IS OBJECTED to the contrary thus: 1. Just as natural being relates to natural well-being, so spiritual being relates to spiritual well-being: but natural being relates to natural well-being in such a way that it can be without it: therefore spiritual being can also be without spiritual well-being. But being and robust being relate as being and well-being: therefore spiritual being can be without robust being: but robust being is through confirmation: therefore spiritual being can be without confirmation: but everything without which salvation can be, is of the superadded and freely given graces: therefore the grace given in confirmation is freely given, or of the freely given ones, and not of the sanctifying ones.

1. Item, Whatever is such that it does not directly oppose sin, that is of the freely given graces and not the sanctifying ones: but the grace given in confirmation does not directly oppose sin: therefore it is of the freely given graces, not the sanctifying ones. Proof of the first: grace is contrary to fault: hence the Gloss on the Apostle says, that grace is reconciliation to God: and the grace which is in the virtues is contrary to the acts of sins, and to spiritual sins. But the minor is proved from the fact that the grace given in confirmation is given to one having no fault: therefore it seems, that it is not ordered against fault: therefore it is not of the sanctifying graces, as was previously concluded.
2. Item, Grace given to expel bodily infirmity is a freely given one, not a sanctifying one, as is held in the text[369], where the grace of healings is numbered among the freely given graces, not the sanctifying ones: therefore also that which expels punishment, not spiritual fault, is of the freely given graces, not the sanctifying ones: but such is the grace of confirmation: therefore it is not sanctifying, but freely given.

It is asked further thirdly, which is more difficult, Whether the grace of confirmation is distinct from the grace of baptism, or is it only a confirmation of it?

And it seems that it is only a confirmation or comforting of it.

1. So it is in bodily robustness, which is founded in natural virtue, that it is nothing other than the valuation and comforting of it, from whatever causes it proceeds: there-

Therefore, it is similar in spiritual strength, which is nothing other than the strengthening of spiritual virtue. But spiritual virtue is given in baptism, and strength in confirmation. Therefore, it seems that confirmation is nothing other than the vigor and strengthening of the virtue given in baptism.

§ 2. Again, the operation of medicine is like a minister of nature, and nature, strengthened by medicine, operates of itself. Therefore, it is similar in spiritual matters. But a sacrament is like medicine. Therefore, its operation regarding spiritual being is like a minister. Therefore, the operation of the sacrament granting strength will concern the matter of pre-existing virtue and grace, and will not be distinct in itself.

§ 3. Besides, since a simple thing is of the same ratio as a simple thing, it is not distinguished in anything, just as a point from a point. But if it were of different rationes, it would be distinguished, as a point from unity. Since, therefore, baptismal grace is simple, whether considered in itself or in the virtues, it will not be distinguished from the grace given in confirmation, which is considered in itself or in the virtues.

§ 4. Again, confirmation also seems to imply this: for nothing is confirmed except what already exists. Since, therefore, in the order of the sacraments there is nothing before confirmation except baptism, it seems that the grace of confirmation is a confirmation of baptismal grace.

§ 5. Again, if grace is distinguished from grace, this will be according to the cause, or the subject, or the act of grace. But on the part of the efficient cause there is no distinction, because that is God, the author of all grace. Likewise, neither on the part of the subject, because that is the soul, and baptismal grace and the grace of confirmation are present to the soul according to the same part.

§ 6. Again, nor on the part of the act, because in baptism the grace of fortitude is conferred for spiritual strength, just as the other virtues, just as in confirmation. Therefore, it seems that it has no distinction from it; and thus it seems that it is nothing else but a habit of the same genus, placed around it and united to it.

§ 7. Furthermore, it seems that it is entirely superfluous. For in natural virtue it is such that it is generated, nourished, and strengthened from the same things. Therefore, also the spiritual virtue that is given in baptism has in itself that by which it may be strengthened without any other sacrament being added. Therefore, the sacrament of confirmation is added superfluously.

§ 8. Again, political virtue is generated and strengthened from the same thing, because it is from acts. Therefore, infused virtue too. Therefore, the virtue given in baptism is strengthened from itself, or by its own acts, and not by another sacrament.

If perhaps you say that the grace of confirmation increases it: then it is asked, how is it concerning that increase?

369. 1 Corinthians 12:28, 30.

§ 1. For the Philosopher says: If you add simple to simple, you will make nothing greater. But grace is simple. Therefore, if simple grace is added to preceding [grace], nothing will thereby be greater. Therefore, neither will it be increased.

§ 2. Besides, from this it would follow that it would not be posited except concerning baptismal grace: because the increase of an existing magnitude is an addition. Therefore, the grace of confirmation would also be an addition to the pre-existing magnitude of baptismal grace.

§ 3. But if you say that it increases it by way of the separation of a contrary intension: then the question is, what kind of intension is it? For it is either by way of separation from the contrary, just as what is whiter is what is more unmixed with black, according to the Philosopher; or according to an approach to some terminus, or to the true imposition of the name, for what is in the terminus is not intensified. If you say that it is intensified in the first way, this is nothing: because through the least grace the whole contrary, which is sin, is separated; therefore, the least grace would be like the greatest, which is false. But if in the second way, then I ask, how does this happen? For if it has entirely nothing of the contrary, then it seems to be in the true imposition of the name, and in the terminus of its purity. Therefore, it seems that it ought not to be intensified.

§ 4. Besides, an accident that does not depend on the subject, nor on the acts of the subject, nor on the principles of the subject, can have no cause of its intension in the subject. But grace is such an accident. Therefore, it seems that it is not intensified by any of such causes through the act of the sacrament.

§ 5. If you say that it is intensified by the act of the sacrament. On the contrary: the same act ought to be intensifying and generating according to species, as is evident in political virtue. But the act of baptism generates grace; therefore, if anything were to intensify it, it ought to be of the same species, which is false.

§ 6. Besides, to dismiss this disputation, which is introduced here incidentally, let it be intensified in whatever way this can happen: for intension is not posited except concerning what exists previously in baptism, and it is not distinguished from it. Therefore, it seems that the grace of confirmation is not distinguished from baptismal grace, but is posited around it.

§ 7. Again, this seems [clear] from the act to which the grace of confirmation is ordered, namely, the intrepid confession of faith. For this act is elicited by faith, and commanded by charity, according as charity is the general mover of the virtues, as was said above in the third book of the Sentences. But faith and charity are given in baptism. Therefore, it seems that nothing is given in confirmation, except perhaps some improvement and expediting of the grace given in baptism.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. As the sign in a sacrament is related to a sign, so the effect is related to the effect. But the sign in confirmation in no way depends on the sign in baptism. Therefore, neither does the effect on the effect.

§ 2. Again, it was held above that sacramental graces are not so united that, when one is had, all are had, as is the case in the infused virtues. Therefore, the grace of confirmation in no way depends on baptismal grace.

§ 3. Again, the characters of confirmation and baptism are distinct, nor is one the confirmation of the other; therefore, neither is the reality [distinct].

§ 4. Again, when someone is confirmed, it is not asked that baptism be confirmed, but the baptized human being. Therefore, it seems that the grace of confirmation is not referred to baptism, but to the human being.

§ 5. Again, if baptism needed confirmation, it would already be weak in itself, which is unsuitable to say, since it is a necessary and most strong sacrament. Therefore, confirmation is not referred to baptism, but to the baptized human being, who has many reasons for weakness even after he is baptized.

Solution. It must be said that, as was evident above in the disputation on the communion of the sacraments, where sacramental grace is distinguished from grace in the virtues and gifts: one sacramental grace does not depend on another, nor when one is had is another had, but they are divided.

Whence to what is asked first, it must be said that this sacrament confers a grace ordered against the weakness left from the infirmity of the depressing fomes [tinder of sin].

To the first, therefore, it must be said that baptism is not in potency to baptismal grace, but it can be in potency to another grace of another species: just as what is actually white can be in potency to sweet; and in such a way we say that the grace of confirmation differs in species from baptismal grace.

To the next it must be said that the Master is speaking there of baptismal grace ordered against original guilt; and this is not given in contrition except insofar as one has baptism in desire, as was said above, and therefore it is the same as that, which is why one cannot receive it afterwards. But baptismal and confirmation grace are not related in this way, as will be evident below, but they are different according to species.

To the next it must be said that baptismal and confirmation grace agree in certain respects, and differ in certain respects, and

on the part of the difference they are drawn to the most special species. Now, they agree in this, that they make the subject pleasing and the work pleasing, and that they are in the soul and the virtues as expediting the virtues, according as one virtue and grace expedites another, just as also one power of the soul expedites another (as sense [expedites] intellect, and the like). But they differ by ultimate differences, namely, insofar as they are curative of this or that disease, as was shown above in the distinction of the sacraments. Whence, since the grace of confirmation cures a disease that baptism does not cure, it is evident that it is another grace in species from it. That it is so, however, is supposed from what was established previously in the distinction and sufficiency of the sacraments.

To the next it must be said that the unfeigned receiver of confirmation receives in it a grace that he did not have before: not regarding the making-pleasing of himself, or of his work, because he had this before (since in this also the grace of confirmation does not differ from baptismal grace), but regarding the act of curing a disease that was not cured before. And this cure (as was said above) is the expulsion of the weakness left from the fomes drawing one back from the bold confession of faith.

To the next it must be said that it is well conceded that grace according to that act which is making-pleasing is had by virtue of contrition. But one who is gratuitous [pleasing] for one reason can be pleasing also for another reason, and regarding that other reason he receives grace in confirmation, as has already become clear.

To what is asked secondly, it must be said that the grace given in confirmation is making-pleasing [sanctifying], as the first arguments prove.

To what is objected to the contrary, it must be said that as it is in the soul, so it is also in grace: and as it is in the powers of the soul, so it is in the virtues, and the other spiritual graces. But the soul (as the Philosopher says in the second book of De Anima [370]) is the act of the whole, and giving being to the whole body, and the parts of the soul, which are the powers, give being to the parts of the body. Whence he says that if the eye were an animal, sight would be its soul; and a blind eye is equivocally called an eye, just as a dead animal is equivocally called an animal. Whence it is evident that as first being is from the soul in the nature of the animal as a whole, so first being in the parts is from the parts of the soul. And speaking proportionally, it is thus in spiritual being which is from grace, which gives spiritual being to the soul: and its parts give [spiritual being] to the parts of the soul. And the virtues indeed give spiritual being to the powers regarding works, but sacramental grace gives it regarding the expulsion of the contrary. Whence it is evident that it pertains to being in some way.

But to what is objected, that this grace is not ordered against guilt: it must be said that it is ordered against guilt, but not immediately. For it is ordered against the penalty that is an impediment to good and an incitement to evil; and this has a certain likeness with guilt, as Augustine says, like a daughter with a mother. And many things about this are noted in the second book of the Sentences, in the tractate on original sin.

And through this the solution to the questions against the second point is evident.

To those things that are asked against the third point, it must be said that this grace is distinct from the sacramental grace that is in baptism, and is always different from it, just as one virtue differs from another in species, although all are united in infused grace. But here there is a greater difference regarding the fact that sacramental graces are not all infused at the same time.

But to what is objected first, it must be said that that argument proceeds only in those things in which strength and what is strengthened are posited around the same thing, and

around a virtue of the same ratio. But this is not the case here, because no one is strengthened in confirmation by the grace of baptism, but the baptized human being [is strengthened],

as is evident through the objections made to the contrary, which are very good and illuminating for the solution.

To the next it must be said that the grace of baptism is not related to the grace of confirmation as nature is to medicine. And therefore that objection is invalid, nor does it prove anything.

To the next it must be said that a simple thing can differ from a simple thing in two ways, namely through nature or ratio (just as unity and a point), and by position or respect to a subject, if it has positions (as a beginning point from a terminating point and one continuing in the middle). And these two differences are to be found in these two graces, namely of baptism and of confirmation, which are of different rationes, as was held. And also they differ in effect through their order to the subject, because one is substantially ordered against the guilt of original sin, but the other against the faintheartedness left from the fomes even after baptism, toward acts of excellent difficulty: such as the act of the confession of faith, in which a threefold difficulty is found, as was said above. And therefore it is evident that that argument was sophistic.

To the next it must be said that regarding that act which is to make-pleasing [sanctify] in general, it is not distinguished; but regarding making-pleasing according to a special ratio of pleasingness [gratitude/grace]. Because those special rationes can be multiplied, for nothing prohibits what is pleasing according to one ratio from being made still pleasing according to another ratio. Likewise, although faith eliciting the act of the confession of faith is given in baptism, and fortitude expediting in this that one not tremble at terrors, yet nothing prohibits that a grace evacuating the fear left from the fomes could be received; because the gift of fortitude does not evacuate that by way of medicine, nor even the virtue of fortitude.

To the next it must be said that it is neither superfluous, nor is it the confirmation of baptismal grace. For that [baptismal grace] is confirmed from other causes: for regarding its rooting in the subject, it is confirmed from use, from which it is conferred for increase according to congruity from the merit of acts, and according to efficient causality by God.

And through this the solution to the disputation introduced later is largely evident.

But to what is asked concerning the mode of increase, it is indeed said elsewhere on the third and first books. But because it is touched upon here, it can be said that grace is like a certain light that is in the soul from the continuous influence of the divine light: as the Psalm seems to say, where it says: The light of thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us, etc. [371]

And its increase I do not understand to be possible except in one of three ways: and all those ways have diverse opinions around them. For Chancellor Philip used to say that it was increased by the addition of similar grace, which God, the author of graces, unites by creating, and creates by uniting with the preceding. And this seems to me more reasonable and prob-

370. Psalm 4:7.

able than all the opinions. Others, however, said that it grows regarding fervor, but not in itself; and this opinion is held by few, for the reason that lesser grace sometimes is more fervent in devotion than a greater. The third opinion is that God adds nothing, but multiplies grace in itself, just as he multiplied the five loaves. And this opinion would be more probable than all, if it were well proven that something without any addition of extrinsic essence, and without conversion into itself, were multiplicable otherwise than by extension. Because it is not ratified that God, by multiplying the five loaves, did not create matter there under the form of loaves, or did not convert the matter of the elements to loaves. And therefore that opinion is not pleasing, and it would hold well if it were well proven to the intellect. But this is nothing to the proposition, because we do not posit that the grace of confirmation increases the grace of baptism, but rather

that, united in the act of making-pleasing in general, they differ in the special mode of making-pleasing, and in the special effect against the disease of original sin, and also in expediting toward the act of the confession of faith, as is evident from what has been said.

To what is objected concerning the confession of faith which faith elicits, it must be said that William of Auxerre found a good solution regarding the solution of such arguments, namely, that an act is said to be of grace or virtue in many ways, namely elicitively, just as a proper act is elicited from a habit: and thus confession is an act of the virtue which is faith. An act is also said to be of someone who commands that it be done, and thus every act of virtue can be of charity, which commands it to be done. It is also said to be expediting someone: and thus again since any virtue expedites another by removing some impediment of it, in this way the act of one virtue is attributed to another. And in this way the confession of faith, as of faith, is of faith; as for the sake of God, it is of charity; but that it be done without fear and shame, it can be of fortitude regarding magnanimity; and regarding the removal of the disease of the debilitating fomes, thus it is of this, namely the sacrament of confirmation. And this is what many say, and not many subtly consider, that sacramental grace heals, and the grace of the virtues orders to merit: because the grace of the sacrament removes the disposition of the disease intrinsically [per se], and consequently orders to the act; but the grace of virtue orders to the act intrinsically and primarily, in which merit consists.

And through this the solution to all the questions is evident.

Articulus 6 — Whether The Sacrament Of Confirmation Ought To Be Said To Be A Greater Sacrament Than The Others

Should the sacrament of confirmation be called a greater sacrament than the others?

Next it is asked concerning what he says there: Know that both are a great sacrament, but one is to be held with greater veneration, as it is given by greater [ministers], etc.

For this seems false: because § 1. If it is called greater by reason of what it contains, then the Eucharist is the greatest of all. But if by reason of what it effects, then baptism seems to be

371. Psalm 4:7.

greater. But if someone wishes to say to this, as the Master seems to solve in the Text, that it is called greater because it is given by greater [ministers]: still this does not seem to be true, because Order is also given by greater [ministers], because likewise only by Bishops; and yet it is not called a greater sacrament.

§ 2. Besides, the giver is related to the sacrament as an efficient and ministering cause. But an efficient cause is nothing of the reality, but is entirely outside the caused thing. Therefore, the quantity of the reality is not from it. Therefore, it will not be called greater or lesser from the fact that it is effected or ministered by a greater or lesser [minister]. Therefore, the Master's solution does not seem fitting.

§ 3. Again, that solution seems to be against the authority of Rabanus in the Text, who says that in the unction of baptism the Spirit descends to inhabit, but in the unction of confirmation the sevenfold Spirit is given with all the fullness of sanctity and virtue. Therefore, it seems that by reason of the reality effected this sacrament is called greater.

Furthermore, it is also asked concerning the authority of Rabanus just touched upon. For the sevenfold Spirit seems to be given in baptism, because the seven gifts are given there, and every virtue, because he who has one has all. Therefore, it seems that this does not especially belong to confirmation.

Solution. It must be said that one sacrament is called greater than another in five ways according to a distinction of the ancients which is good. One of these is the reality itself: and thus baptism is called greater, because the grace in baptism remits guilt and external penalty, and does not require groaning or weeping. In another way by reason of what it contains, which is the reality and the sacrament: and thus they say the Eucharist is greater among the sacraments. In a third way by reason of the degree in which it is placed from the power of the character: and thus they say Order is greater. In a fourth way by reason of the things signified with respect to a reality not contained but only signified: and thus they say matrimony is greater among the sacraments, because it signifies the union of natures in Christ, and the union of the faithful soul with

God. In the fifth and final way, that sacrament is called greater which is given by a greater minister: and thus confirmation is greater among the sacraments.

It must therefore be said to what is objected to the contrary, that although Order is given by greater [ministers], nevertheless that greatness does not attest to the strength of grace for an act, as in confirmation, whose grace expedites toward an act of maximal difficulty: for there the attestation of greatness is in power, and not in the strength of the one ordained.

To the next it must be said that a certain efficient cause is entirely extrinsic: just like that which does not actualize its own property or species in the effect, like an equivocal efficient cause: and concerning this the objection holds. But there is another efficient cause which posits its species and property in the giver: and this is likened to this sacrament: because through the greater minister it is understood, not indeed that the grace is greater, but that it

has been conferred for a greater [effect] in the strength of the spirit. And therefore a certain greatness of the sacrament also follows the greatness of the minister.

To what is asked further concerning the authority of Rabanus, it must be said that, according to the Philosopher, it is different to speak according to "every" [omne] and according to "each one" [unumquodque]: for "every" regards the universality of nature and species, but "each one" the number of individuals and of matter, just as having three angles equal to two right angles follows a rectilinear triangle through every triangle, and yet it does not intrinsically follow it according to each and every [material] triangle. Thus we can say that in baptism grace is given according to every species of virtue: and yet not according to each and every [individual thing] which is of grace, but what is according to each and every [individual] is given in all the sacraments together. But according to this it can also be objected concerning confirmation: because there it is not given according to each and every [individual thing]: for certain things are given in other sacraments which are not given in confirmation. And therefore it must be said that Rabanus places force on these words: with all fullness: because there is a fullness of copiousness, as was said above, and Rabanus is speaking of this. And there is also a fullness of sufficiency which is given in baptism: and Rabanus is not speaking of this.

Through this the solution to the last point is also evident: because although the sevenfold Spirit is given in baptism, he is not, however, given through the fullness of copiousness.

Articulus 7 — Whether Confirmation Is Given In The More Honorable Part Of The Body, Namely, The Forehead

Should confirmation be given on the more worthy part of the body, namely on the forehead?

Next it is asked concerning what is said there, B, § 4, near the beginning: And it is done on the more worthy part of the body, namely on the forehead, etc.

For this seems false: because § 1. The top of the head [vertex] seems more worthy than the forehead, since it is the seat of reason, and the forehead is as it were the seat of the senses, as the Philosophers say, that the senses descend from the inner part of the head, and motion from the posterior.

§ 2. But this also seems through that passage of Jeremiah 2:16: The children of Memphis and Tahpanhes have deflowered thee even to the top of the head. And the Gloss of Jerome says there: Even to the evacuation of faith, which has its seat in the top of the head in which reason is.

§ 3. Besides, from this it seems that a simple priest could confirm: because he anoints in a more worthy place than the forehead, namely on the top of the head; therefore he can also anoint on the forehead.

§ 4. Again, since the confession of faith is in the tongue in which the motive power for interpreting resides, and confirmation orders toward the interpreting confession of faith, it seems that confirmation should be done on the tongue, and not on the forehead.

§ 5. Again, if the heart is firm, the whole is firmed. Whence Solomon: With all watchfulness...

...keep thy heart, because life issueth out from it . Therefore, it seems that confirmation, as in the root of firmness, should be signed on the heart, and not on the forehead.

Solution. Because, as a certain Gloss on Apocalypse 7:3 says, the seat of shame is in the forehead. Whence to take away evil shame, and to confirm, the sign of the cross is placed on the forehead, as if in the open, so that he may bear it in the open for honor, even when he is put to flight.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that reason does nothing to the proposition. Because although reason dictates the confirmation of faith, nevertheless the open sign is not in the place of reason, because that place is not exposed in all, but rather the forehead. Nor is confirmation given for just any confession of faith, but an open one, putting aside blushing and shame.

To the next it must be said that faith is in the intellect. But nevertheless the sign of confirmation is in a place to which men look: and this is the forehead. And therefore the seat of shame regarding the sign of blushing is also there.

To the next it must be said that confirmation is not so that one speaks expeditiously, which pertains to the expediting of the tongue, but so that one may confess the faith openly without shame.

To the next it must be said that that argument proceeds as if confirmation confers the grace of keeping the heart. And this is not true; but rather it confers a grace expelling the fear and shame of the name of Christ, the seat of which, regarding manifestation to men, is in the forehead.

And through this the solution to the whole is evident.

Articulus 8 — Whether The Sacrament Of Confirmation Ought To Be Given To Both Sexes, And At What Age It Ought To Be Conferred, And How The One To Be Confirmed Ought To Be Presented

Should the sacrament of confirmation be given to both sexes? And at what age should it be conferred? And how should the one to be confirmed be presented?

Next it is asked concerning what he says there, B, § 2: This sacrament ought to be received only by the fasting, and handed on by the fasting, etc.

And three things are asked here. First, whether this sacrament is to be conferred on both sexes? Second, at what age? Third, how the one to be confirmed ought to be presented by his godparents?

To the first it is objected thus: § 1. In the tabernacle of God none were enrolled to minister except males. Therefore, also none ought to be confirmed (so that the truth may correspond to the shadow) except males.

§ 2. Again, those readied for battle with Abraham; and the men of war, concerning whom it is held in Numbers 1 almost throughout, and Joshua; and the most strong, as it is said in 2

Kings [2 Samuel] 23:8 and following, were none but males. Therefore, it seems that for the battle of the Lord none ought to be confirmed except males, and not females on account of the softness of the sex.

But against this is what § 1. The Apostle says, Galatians 3:28, that in Christ there is neither bond nor free: there is neither male nor female, but a new creature. Therefore, females are to be confirmed just as males.

§ 2. Again, 2 Maccabees 7:20 and following, it is said concerning the mother of the seven brothers: Now the mother was marvelous above measure, and worthy of the memory of good things, who beholding her seven sons perishing in the space of one day, bore it

with a good courage, for the hope that she had in God: and she bravely exhorted every one of them in her own language, being filled with wisdom: and joining a man's heart to a woman's thought... Therefore, the sacrament of confirmation is also to be given to women. But because this does not fall into doubt, it is light work to dispute concerning this.

Secondly it is asked, at what age is confirmation to be conferred?

Now it seems that only in adolescence: because § 1. Battle is not declared except to the robust, and in the law none were counted except from twenty years and upwards, who could proceed to wars. Therefore, spiritual battle too is to be declared to the understanding and robust.

§ 2. Besides, the faith of another does not operate except in the sacrament of baptism; therefore, in the others one's own faith operates. But it is not one's own before adult age. Therefore, it seems that adult age is to be awaited.

§ 3. Again, he would seem foolish who armed a boy: because he would rather oppress him than instruct him for war. Therefore, it seems that it is similar in spiritual battle.

§ 4. Again, Judges 8:20, Jerubbaal, namely Gideon, said to Jether his firstborn, that he should rise up and rush upon Zebah and Zalmunna, the princes of Midian, and kill them. And it follows, v. 20: Who did not draw his sword: for he was afraid, because he was yet a boy. Therefore, it seems that the age of boys is not fit for spiritual battle. Since therefore confirmation is given for spiritual battle, it ought not to be given to little ones or boys.

If perhaps you say that it is otherwise in spiritual battle, and otherwise in corporal battle: because spiritual battle is declared to little ones, but corporal is not. ON THE CONTRARY: Spiritual battle requires more than corporal: because it requires the understanding of the cunning of the demon, as the Apostle says, 2 Corinthians 2:11: We are not ignorant of his devices. A special virtue is also required. Whence, Psalm 44:4: Gird thy sword upon thy thigh, O thou most mighty. [372] Therefore, it seems that if corporal battle is not declared to boys, much more strongly will spiritual battle not be declared to them.

Further it is asked thirdly, how are they to be presented?

And it seems that they ought to approach by themselves: § 1. For a sponsor [godparent] is not required except where confessions are to be made for another; but here he confesses for himself, as is said, John 9:21: He is of age, let him speak for himself. Therefore, it seems that he ought to present himself.

§ 2. Again, it seems that a woman can present no one: because in her the fragility of the sex is shown, and thus she is impotent to establish another. Therefore, it seems she ought not to present another who is to be established in battle.

Again, it is asked concerning the rationale of the ancient Ordinals, in which it is found that the sponsor representing another ought to hold him between his hands, and place his foot upon his own foot, and express his name to the Bishop, and afterwards bind the place signed with chrism: for such a custom is now rarely or never observed.

Again, in the ancient Ordinal it is found that a prayer concerning the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit is to be premised over those to be confirmed, and again afterwards others are subjoined, when they are sent armed to spiritual battle: and the rationale of this is asked.

Besides, it is asked concerning what a certain Pope says, that a woman represent a woman, and a man a man. From this it seems that they cannot represent one another from an unequal sex.

Again, it is asked concerning what he says here, Let it be conferred by the fasting and to the fasting: for why is this not observed now? Therefore, it seems that this sacrament is celebrated otherwise [than it should be].

...[sacrament] than he ought, or that nothing at all should happen.

§ 1. Solution. It must be said to the first that this sacrament is to be conferred upon men and women equally, because warfare is declared upon both. To the Ephesians 6:12: For our wrestling is not against flesh and blood; but against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the world of this darkness, against the spirits of wickedness in the high places.[373]

§ 2. But to all the objections raised to the contrary, it must be said that those objections hold concerning those who have a softened mind and cast away the armor of God, to whom nevertheless it must be conferred, so that they may be a testimony to their more just condemnation. And for this reason males in antiquity were led to war; nevertheless in the battle against Sisera, Jael cast down the enemy, and Judith Holofernes, and Esther conquered Haman by prayers; and to the first woman as a type of the glorious Virgin it was said: She shall crush thy head.[374]

§ 3. And through this the solution is clear to all the questions which are about this matter.

§ 4. To that which is asked secondly, it must be said that either can be done, but it is better and safer that they be confirmed first. Nor however is battle declared upon them then, because then they do not understand temptations, and the age is immature for the strong motions of concupiscence; but they are prepared, and weapons are given to them so that they

372. Ephesians 6:12.

might have the means to fight when the time comes; and it is good to be prepared. Now this is signified in Genesis 14:5, where it is said that those who served rebelled in the fourteenth year; because in that year the goads of concupiscence begin, for the reason that, according to the Philosopher, in the second septennary [seven-year period] the seed begins to distill, and the ways of concupiscence begin to be opened.[375]

§ 5. And through this the solution is clear to the whole that is objected: for he is not armed so that he might fight [immediately], but they are given to him so that he might have them prepared when there is need. And this is signified in David preparing the expenses of the temple for Solomon.

§ 6. TO THE THIRD question it must be said that no one can present himself: because the one to be confirmed must be sealed, as not having proper virtue to stand: but he must be set up by another, and therefore he must be presented by another.

§ 7. To the first [objection], therefore, it must be said that this is not done so that he may confess for him, but so that he may signify that he needs alien virtue, namely Christ's, for this, that he may be able to stand in the battle.

§ 8. To the next, the solution is clear through what was said before: for the woman is one having a softened mind, and yielding in every spiritual battle: and by this she is repelled from the army of the Lord, as is contained in Numbers 1:2 and 3.[376]

§ 9. To the next it must be said that the reason of those Ordinaries is excellent, and they express the mode of the Apostles and Fathers: for because the one to be confirmed seeks corroborative virtue, therefore it is signified that he cannot stand by himself, but in the footsteps of someone confirmed whom he may imitate in battle: and therefore one who is not confirmed ought to present no one, as much as pertains to the nature of sacramental fittingness. And if he should presume to do so, the sacrament is not indeed invalidated, but nevertheless he himself sins and must be rebuked. And because spiritual affinity is contracted there, a woman ought not to hold [as sponsor] her husband, nor conversely; nor a man his son, sister, or brother, because the carnal bond suffices to conciliate friendship among such persons.

§ 10. To the next it must be said that that Pope said this to avoid the ensuing danger: because sometimes a man presented a woman, and afterwards contracted [marriage] with her, which cannot be done; and therefore he wished that a woman should present a woman, and a man a man, lest there be made an impediment to marriage.

§ 11. To the next it must be said that this is said on account of the reverence of the sacrament: if however it is done otherwise on account of a lack of Bishops, it does not harm: for it is better to be confirmed after a meal when a Bishop can be had, than that, the Bishop departing, he could not be confirmed.

Articulus 9 — Whether Confirmation Imprints A Character

Whether confirmation imprints a character?

373. Ephesians 6:12.

§ 12. Next it is asked concerning this which he says, there, B, § 2: For no injury is to be done to any sacrament, etc.

§ 13. For this is commonly said, that it is done on account of the character which it imprints.

§ 14. But it seems that it does not imprint one: 1. For spiritual warfare was equally declared upon those who were in the natural law, and in the law of Moses, as upon those who are in the New Testament; and yet they did not have confirmation and a spiritual character. Therefore it seems that neither in the New Testament are fighters to be distinguished by a character.

§ 15. 2. Besides, what is the reason that a sacrament is not to be reiterated? For either this is done because it is a sacrament; or because it is a sacrament of the new law; or because it imprints a character; or because it confers an immovable effect.

§ 16. And it seems that it is by none of these ways. For if because it is a sacrament it were not reiterated: then no sacrament could be reiterated, which is false in penance and extreme unction, as will be held below. If however because it is a sacrament of the new law: again the instance is in extreme unction, because that was not in the Old Testament, except in type and in figure. Nor because it imprints a character: because by this circumcision, which did not imprint a character, could have been reiterated, which is false. Nor even therefore because the effect of the sacrament is immovable: because the effect of the sacrament is grace, and this is often lost. Therefore it seems that there is no cause why it ought not to be reiterated.

§ 17. 3. Also, it seems that it is necessary to be reiterated: for Augustine says, and it is posited below in the treatise on Extreme Unction: If the disease cannot be prevented from returning, why ought medicine be prohibited? Therefore since pusillanimity and timidity frequently return upon someone, it seems that frequent confirmation is necessary for him, and so it ought to be reiterated.

§ 18. Further it is asked: What order does the character of confirmation have to the character of order and of baptism?

§ 19. And it seems that it is that of a foundation: because one ought not to be ordained unless baptized [i.e., confirmed]; therefore it seems that if he does not have the character of confirmation, he is rendered unsuitable to receive the character of Order; therefore if one not confirmed is ordained, he is not ordained.

§ 20. Solution. It must be said to the first, that three sacraments in particular are not to be reiterated, namely baptism, confirmation, and order, because they imprint a perpetual effect and character. And an injury would be done to them if they were reiterated: because either the two characters will be the same in species, which cannot be; or the second sacrament would confer nothing, and this would be useless and injurious if the sacrament were celebrated. But other sacraments, as is said in the Letter, are not reiterated over the same matter, although those sacraments are reiterated concerning the same men receiving them.

374. Genesis 3:15.

§ 21. To the objection to the contrary, it must be said that the ancients had a heavier battle, or as heavy as we do: and yet they did not have the sacrament, because it was not the time of the sacrament. But they had the fortitude of the Lord and of virtue, by which they could stand. Nor could they have a character, because the leader of the war was not yet with us in the battle line, to whom they would be enrolled through a character; and this was expedited above in the common question of the sacraments, why the sacraments began with Christ.

§ 22. To the next it must be said that two things concur jointly, not divisibly, to this that a sacrament is not reiterated: namely the impression of a character (and this is the cause why those three sacraments, baptism, confirmation, and order, are not reiterated), and the unity of the sin against which the sacrament is ordered, just as original sin is only one, and does not infect except once and no more; and this was proved in the second book of the Sentences, where it was asked whether original sin returns after baptism from the infection of the flesh, just as it did in the infusion of the soul. And this is the cause why circumcision was not reiterated, and this cause concurs with the first, and maximally in baptism, but not in the other two sacraments.

§ 23. To the next it must be said that although debility returns, and the tinder [of sin] resumes its forces through the iteration of sin, as Augustine says, nevertheless the character with recuperated grace suffices for the expulsion of that [debility]. And therefore the sacrament ought not to be reiterated, lest it seem that what was conferred was less than sufficient.

§ 24. To that which is further asked, it must be said that it has an order of fittingness to the character of Order, and not of necessity.

§ 25. And as to what is said, that one ought not to be ordained unless confirmed, it imports a debt of congruity: because he who ought to dispense sacraments to others ought to be firm. But nevertheless, because the effect of the sacraments does not depend on the virtue of the minister, he can be unconfirmed.

DISTINCTIO VIII

Divisio Textus

§ 26. After the sacrament of baptism, etc. Here the Master treats in order concerning the third sacrament, which is the Eucharist.

§ 27. And the treatise on the Eucharist is divided according to him generally into two parts: in the first of which the Master sets forth certain preambles, namely concerning its utility, and figures. In the second he divides the treatise, and treats the parts thoroughly. But this begins in the second chapter, there, B, Here however other things to be considered occur, etc.

375. Genesis 14:5; Aristotle, History of Animals VII, 1.

§ 28. He touches upon the utility in the first chapter, where he says: Through baptism we are cleansed, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether The Eucharist Is A Sacrament Of Greater Grace Than Baptism

Whether the Eucharist is a sacrament of greater grace than baptism?

§ 29. And it seems FALSE: because according to him baptism seems to be of lesser grace than the Eucharist:

§ 30. 1. For "to cleanse" denotes nothing but the removal of evil, whereas "to be confirmed in the good" denotes the firm attainment of the good, and this attainment is a good per se, while the removal of evil is a privation. Therefore baptism is of lesser sacramental grace than the Eucharist, which the Master denied in the preceding distinction.

§ 31. 2. Besides, to confirm in the good seems to be the act of confirmation, as was held before; therefore this ought not to be posited here as the effect of the Eucharist.

§ 32. 3. Similarly it is objected concerning that effect: the Eucharist spiritually refreshes: but this is the act of all grace; whence it seems that it is not special to this sacrament.

§ 33. 4. Besides, it is proved from this which is held in Job 1:4, that the sons of Job went and made feasts every one; which Gregory expounds concerning the refreshment of gifts and virtues.[377]

§ 34. 5. Also, through that of Isaiah 4:1: We will eat our own bread, and wear our own apparel: which is the word of seven women taking hold of one man; and the Gloss there expounds this concerning the seven gifts.[378]

§ 35. 6. Also, Matthew 6:11: Give us this day our supersubstantial bread. The Gloss expounds this concerning the bread of the word, and the bread of grace.[379]

§ 36. 7. Also, Matthew 4:4: Not in bread alone doth man live, but in every word that proceedeth from the mouth of God.[380] Therefore through all these it seems that in no way is spiritual refreshment the proper effect of this sacrament.

§ 37. Solution. It must be said that our Masters assign many utilities to this sacrament.

§ 38. The first is principal and proper, namely that just as man lost life through eating the forbidden apple, so he might recover it through eating the tree of spiritual life; and this is for that reason called proper. Because man fell from life in many ways, namely through original and actual guilt, and through the weakening wound of concupiscence, and through the loss of spiritual goods in piety and goodness, and the like, which, as a certain moisture, vegetate and infuse the soul. Against guilt, however, are baptism and penance; and against the debility of concupiscence is confirmation. But for restoring lost spiritual strength, there is the spiritual food, the Eucharist. And a more subtle proof of this was held above in the distinction on the sacraments.

§ 39. The second is as it were close to that one, that it might be the spiritual nourishment of man. Whence man ate the bread of Angels.[381] Upon which Augustine says: That man might eat the bread of Angels, the Creator of Angels was made man.[382] Wisdom 16:20: Thou didst provide for them bread from heaven prepared without labor; having in it all that is delicious, and the sweetness of every taste.[383]

§ 40. The third is that it might unite the members of the body to Christ the head through charity. For it is otherwise in this food, and in others: because other foods are converted into the one fed; but this food converts the one fed to itself, and unites the fed members to itself; and the reason for this will be stated below. Whence, John 6:57: He that eateth my flesh, and drinketh my blood, abideth in me, and I in him.[384] And to Augustine it was said: Believe, and you shall eat me: nor shall you change me into yourself, but you shall be changed into me.[385]

§ 41. The fourth is not as proper and substantial to the sacrament, but follows upon it, namely that the merit of faith might be increased, which in this sacrament is exalted above all things, for the reason that reason can do nothing here without faith. And this the Master touches upon below, where he says why He gave His body under another species.

§ 42. The fifth is the uplifting of hope. Whence, Matthew 28:20: Behold I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world.[386]

§ 43. The sixth is the dilation of charity: because it is in memory of our redemption and liberation. 1 Corinthians 11:24: Do this for a commemoration of me.[387] And in the same place, v. 26: For as often as you shall eat this bread, and drink the chalice of the Lord, you shall shew the death of the Lord, until he come.[388]

§ 44. The seventh is the diminution of venial sins, although it was not principally instituted on account of venial sins, as was proved above. And therefore, in Matthew 6:11-12, after Give us this day our supersubstantial bread, there immediately follows: Forgive us our debts.[389]

§ 45. It can therefore be said to the first, that if the removal from evil and the attainment of good were the termini of the same motion, and baptism caused the terminus from which, and the Eucharist caused the terminus to which: then the objection would proceed. But this is not true: rather baptism removes evil, and induces good. And confirmation in such a good is not the terminus of baptism: but rather in another good of grace which the Eucharist confers, as was shown before: because sacramental graces are not had simultaneously.

§ 46. To the next it must be said that confirmation in the good is twofold, namely from the Holy Spirit given for the strength of battle, and this is the effect of confirmation. There is also confirmation in the good for the restitution of the virtue lost through disobedience, and this confirmation has to be done through spiritual food, and is the effect of the Eucharist.

§ 47. To ALL THE OTHERS there is a true solution, namely that there is spiritual refreshment with the sign and cause of food, and that refreshment is solely of the Eucharist. There is also refreshment through the containment of virtue lest it fail, and it causes its

377. Job 1:4; Gregory the Great, Moralia in Job, I, c. 8.

augmentation without reason in a sign, and this is fitting for the word of God and grace. And the authorities introduced speak of this.

Articulus 2 — On The Four Figures Of The Eucharist

On the four figures of the Eucharist.

§ 48. Next it is asked concerning this which he says, there, A, near the beginning: Whose figure preceded, when God rained down manna to the Fathers in the desert, etc.

§ 49. For here the Master touches upon the fourfold figure of this sacrament, namely manna, and the blood of Christ flowing forth from his side, and the blood of the paschal lamb which liberated from the exterminator, and the oblation of Melchizedek.

§ 50. But it is asked concerning these figures. First indeed, why do baptism and the Eucharist have figures manifesting them, rather than the other sacraments?

§ 51. For it seems that the others ought to have them just as these do: because Master Hugh says that as soon as there was the disease, it was fitting for it to be signified by a medicine: therefore every sacrament ought to have been presignified in figures.

§ 52. However, that the sacraments ought not to have been exhibited immediately, is sufficiently proved above, and therefore it is not to be disputed here.

§ 53. Besides, since there are many other figures of this sacrament, especially those of which mention is made in the canon, such as the oblation of Abel, and of Abraham by which he offered his son, why does the Master not make mention of those just as of these three?

§ 54. Also, it seems that manna is not a figure of the Eucharist: because

§ 55. 1. Manna had every taste: but the Eucharist confers only grace, of one taste: because it is only one: therefore it is not a figure proportionate to the figurated [thing]. But if you say that the Eucharist confers every grace, from this it seems that the other sacraments and the rest of the virtues would be superfluous, which is unfitting: therefore it confers only one grace.

§ 56. 2. Besides, the bread in which our Lord Jesus Christ is consumed, is the bread of oblation and offered to God: but that [manna] was not offered to God: therefore it seems that it does not signify this.

§ 57. Further it seems that nor is the blood flowing from the side of the Lord a sign of this sacrament: because

§ 58. 1. Nothing is a sign of itself according to how "sign" is taken in the definition of a sacrament: but the same blood which flowed forth from the side of Christ, is received in the sacrament: therefore it is not a sign of it, but rather a sign in the sacrament.

§ 59. 2. Also, the ratio of flowing and effused blood is one thing, and that of the blood of drink is another: for flowing and effused blood has the effect of redemption and not of drink,

378. Isaiah 4:1; Glossa ordinaria.

but the blood in the sacrament is the effect of drink: therefore it seems that the effused blood does not signify the sacrament of the Eucharist.

§ 60. 3. Besides, in the Eucharist, blood flowing from the body is not received, but rather contained in the body: but in the passion, blood was effused from the body: therefore it seems that it has nothing similar by which it could signify the blood of the Eucharist, except through identity, namely because it is the same, and this has already been proved above to be impossible.

§ 61. Further it is asked concerning the third figure which he introduces, namely concerning the blood of the paschal lamb with which the doorposts of the sons of Israel were smeared, so that they might be liberated from the exterminating Angel.

§ 62. For it seems that it did not have any similitude with the blood of Christ as it is received in the Eucharist: because

§ 63. 1. That [blood] specially liberated from the Angel slaying the firstborn of the Egyptians, by which is signified original sin from which the passion operating in baptism liberates, and not in the Eucharist: therefore that blood also posits a similitude to the blood operating in baptism, and not to the blood as it is given for spiritual drink in the Eucharist.

§ 64. 2. Also, that was the blood of the leading out from Egypt: but the Eucharist does not lead out from Egypt, but baptism: therefore it signifies the blood operating in baptism.

§ 65. Further it is asked concerning the fourth figure which he introduces, namely the oblation of Melchizedek: for in that there was an oblation made to Abraham, not to God, as is clear, Genesis 14:18, where it is said that he offered bread and wine to him, namely to Abraham, saying: Blessed be Abram by the most high God, by whose protection the enemies are in thy hands: but in the Eucharist the bread offered to God is received. Therefore it seems that it does not have this figure.

§ 66. BESIDES it is asked: Since form is in the Eucharist just as res [reality/thing] and species and location, and we have a figure regarding the res and species and location: why did nothing precede which would signify as to the form? For it seems that there ought to have been a figure regarding the form: because in the baptism of John a certain figure preceded the form of the baptism of Christ: therefore it ought also to have preceded in this one.

§ 67. Lastly it is asked: According to what is the number of these four figures taken?

§ 68. Solution. It must be said to the first, that there are four sacraments which are principally of the New Testament, namely baptism, confirmation, the Eucharist, and extreme unction. The other three are also of the New Testament, namely because they had the plenitude of effect in the New; although in some way they preceded in the Old. But among the four which are of the New Testament, there are two which are so of the New, that they could not have any express figure in the Old. One indeed because of the imperfection of the Old Testament, such as Confirmation, in which the Spirit is given for strength: and therefore it ought not to have

379. Matthew 6:11; Glossa ordinaria.

had a figure in the Old Testament where there was an imperfection of state according to the Spirit. But the other because of the state of original sin, by whose weight before Christ's Passion all were drawn to Limbo: and therefore there could not be a figure of Extreme Unction, which removes the relics of sin to this end that one may fly away immediately to glory. But Baptism and the Eucharist are sacraments, one of which is directly against original sin, against which there was also a remedy in the Old Testament, namely circumcision, and it had many figures. But the other is that in which the liberator Himself who operates in all the sacraments is conjoined to us: and therefore it was also fitting that figures of it precede: and this is the Eucharist. Penance, however, is against the defect of actual sin, which is singularly of every man in whatever law: and Matrimony is for the material multiplication of the faithful, which also was always necessary: and therefore those sacraments always existed, although not with as full grace as under Christ. Order, however, has a spiritual power which was in shadow in the Old, and in truth in the New. And thus it is clear what kind of difference there is in the sacraments in common.

§ 69. To the next it must be said that although there are other figures of the Passion of Christ, or of the effect of this sacrament, such as the oblation which represents the Passion of Christ according to human nature on the cross, and the sacrifice of Abel which represents the oblation by which Christ offered himself on the cross: nevertheless these four specially express not the Passion of Christ, but the sacramental res or species, according to how the res is received under the sacrament, or the species is referred to the res of the sacrament. And this is clear enough in manna, and the oblation of Melchizedek. But that the blood of the Egyptian or paschal lamb is not taken simply, but in the use of the faithful, is clear from this that the doorposts of those liberated are smeared with blood; and in this way the passible Christ is conjoined to the faithful, not as he hung on the cross, but as he is received in the sacrament, and smears the doorposts of the intellect and affection. The blood also flowing from the side of Christ, by the fact that it was with flowing water which signifies the people, has a relation to the blood in the sacrament, where water is conjoined signifying the people. But none of the other figures so expresses the species of the sacrament, or the res according to how it is under the sacrament: and therefore the Master does not make mention of them, but the canon of the Mass does, because it not only posits the substantials to the sacrament, but also expresses those things which were done concerning Christ in the Passion, as Innocent says, just as the paten signifies the stone of the sepulchre, the extension of the hands of the priest the extension of Christ on the cross. And therefore it also makes mention of certain figures signifying Christ's Passion, according to how it was represented on the cross, and not under the sacrament.

§ 70. To the next it must be said that although the proper effect of this sacrament is nothing but one grace, and of one substantial act: nevertheless that which in this sacrament is the res and the sacrament [res et sacramentum], is the whole and perfect Christ, who is full of grace, of whose plenitude we all have received, and grace for grace.[390] And manna expressed this diversity in the diversity of taste.

380. Matthew 4:4.

§ 71. To the next it must be said that manna was bread offered to man by God, and offered to God by man: which is clear in the golden urn, which was placed full of manna in the ark of the testament before the Lord: and so it is in the sacrament of the Eucharist, insofar as God offers the res of the sacrament for food, and we [offer it] to Him as the price of recompense for offenses.

§ 72. To that which is further asked, it must be said that nothing prohibits that the same thing, taken in different dispositions, be a sign and figure of itself, not as it is the same, but rather as it is taken conjoined to different species: and so it is of the blood flowing from the side of Christ: for by this very fact that it was conjoined to water, it had an expression of itself, as it unites the people to itself in the sacrament in which water is conjoined to wine to be transferred into blood. Or let it be said better, that there are two things in the sacrament, namely the consecration [confection] and the use: but in use it unites man to itself, while in the consecration it is made to be presentially under the sacrament. Let it be said therefore, that the blood of Christ joined to the water flowing from the side of Christ, has a similitude with the use in which it unites the people to itself, although it has identity with the blood which is in the consecration of the sacrament.

§ 73. To the next it must be said that blood according as it is for drink, is blood flowing to us. But although in the sacrament it is not without the body, this however is not from the virtue of the sacrament, but rather from the virtue of the indissolubility of blood from a glorious body: whence sacramentally it is received as flowing, although it is contained in the body through union to the body.

§ 74. To the next it must be said that as was said before, that the blood in the sacrament is contained in the body, this is not by virtue of the sacrament, but rather from the nature of a glorious body, in which one cannot be separated from the other.

§ 75. To that which is further asked concerning the third figure, it must be said that in truth that figure according to different things expresses two sacraments: because in baptism there are three things, namely liberation from the demon, and dipping in water, and the remission of sin. And the first of these is done by the Passion of Christ, and this is expressed by the liberation from the exterminating Angel. But the second was expressed by the crossing of the Red Sea. And the third by the submersion of the Egyptians: because otherwise the figure of the Eucharist would even precede the figure of baptism, which I consider unfitting: but it is not unfitting that the figure of the Passion precede, which operates in all the sacraments: but nevertheless the use of the blood and flesh of the lamb expresses the use of the sacramental res of the Eucharist.

§ 76. To the next it must be said that the blood by the fact that it led out, figures the Passion operating in baptism: but the use of the flesh and blood insofar as it comforted and prepared for the exit from Egypt to the fatherland, was a figure of the viaticum in the Eucharist.

§ 77. To that which is further asked concerning the fourth figure, it must be said that according to what was had before, in the Eucharist there is an oblation made to us by God,

376. Numbers 1:2-3.

and to God by us: and Melchizedek expresses both: the first in offering to Abraham after the killing of the kings by whom sins are signified: but the second by this that he blessed the most high God.

§ 78. To the next it must be said that in the form of this sacrament the uncreated Word operates in the created word, and not by the work of the minister as in other sacraments: and therefore the words are uttered by the Priest in the person of Christ, which is not done in the others. And on account of this maximal perfection the form could not be prefigured.

§ 79. To the next it must be said that the four figures are divided so that two are referred to the res which is the res and sacrament [res et sacramentum], and two to the species of the sacrament in the matter. But the species in the matter can be taken absolutely, or according to a comparison to the effect of the sacrament which it signifies through the species: or it can be taken in the matter in comparison to the effect and the rite of the sacrament. If in the first way: then it is prefigured in the manna, which through the species of bread figured the matter, through the taste the effect. If in the second way: then it was figured in the oblation of Melchizedek: because there was both species there, namely wine and bread, and the effect of comforting with the rite of oblation and benediction. But if the figure is referred to the res which is the sacrament and res: this again is twofold, namely as it is in the use of the faithful only, or as it unites us to Christ the head through the effect of spiritual love. And in the first way it is signified in the eating of the paschal lamb, in the second way in the flowing from the side of Christ, where the blood was united with water which signifies the union of the people with Christ the head, as Pope Gelasius says.

Articulus 3 — What The Cause Is Why This Sacrament Is Called A Viaticum

What is the cause why this sacrament is called viaticum?

§ 80. Next it is asked concerning this which is said, there, A, near the end: Whence it is rightly called viaticum, etc. For above he gave it another name, namely the Eucharist.

§ 81. And the reason for these names is asked.

§ 82. And it must be said that it is called viaticum for three causes, namely, because it is a preparation of wayfarers for the way, as is said in the Letter. Whence, 1 Kings 19:7 and 8: Arise, eat, for a great way remains for thee, it was said to Elijah: and he ate, and drank, and walked in the strength of that food... unto the mount of God, Horeb.[391]

§ 83. The second reason is, because this is not a sacrament except on the way. And therefore in what

§ 1. ...in a certain Collect Gregory says: "Grant that what we now enact in the appearance of things, we may receive in truth." And Dionysius in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy: "We judge that the partaking itself of the most divine Eucharist is an image of the participation in Jesus." § 2. The third cause is, because it is a certain memorial of the way of the Lord crossing over to the Passion for us. Exod. 12:11: "For it is the phase (that is, the crossing) of the Lord." And

381. Psalms 77:25 (Vulgate).

Dionysius: "The most divine communion of one and the same bread and wine and chalice and the peaceful handing-over promulgates for them a similar divine life as eating similarly, and brings into sacred memory the most worthy supper and the principal symbol of perfection." § 3. Moreover, it is called Eucharist for three reasons. One is, because it contains him who is the ark and fount of all grace. John 1:14: "Full of grace and truth." The second is the diversity of utility which the sacrament accomplishes: and concerning this it was had above in the first question. The third is, because it is the sacrament of principal grace, that is, of love, in this that it unites us to the head, Christ, just as charity is unitive.

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§ 10. Here also four other things to be considered occur, etc. This part is divided by the Master into three parts: in the first of which he treats of the substantials of the sacrament, which are to be considered before all things. In the second, he treats of the sacrament on the part of the recipient, which begins in distinction IX, there, A, And just as there are two realities of this sacrament, etc. § 11. But in the third he treats of the sacrament on the part of the celebrant, namely there in distinction XI, there, F, After these things it is asked, if what the priest enacts, etc. § 12. But the remaining part of that distinction is divided by the Master into four parts: in the first of which he treats of the institution: in the second, of the form, there, C, But the form, etc. In the third, what is the reality and the sacrament? there, D, Now what the sacrament is there, etc. But in the fourth, he touches upon what he first enumerates, namely the sacrament which is referred to the material species of this sacrament, which are the species of bread and wine, there, D, § 2: Furthermore that visible species, is a sacrament, etc.

Articulus 4 — Whether The Sacraments Of The Christians Are Prior To The Sacraments Of The Jews

Whether the sacraments of Christians are prior to the sacraments of the Jews?

§ 4. Next it is asked about this which Ambrose says, there, A, at the end: It is given to be understood that the sacraments are prior, etc. § 5. For either this is understood regarding the species, or regarding the reality: because there are not many things in a sacrament. If regarding the species, that does not seem true: because certain sacrifices were to be made even in the natural law for the remission of original sin, as Gregory says, as was had above in the beginning of this book. But if regarding the reality, then it is plainly false: because the reality of the sacraments of the new law was not until after the advent of Christ. § 6. Moreover it is asked, What sort of thing was thus special in this one, that it is called more ancient even than the sacraments of the old law, rather than the others? § 7. Solution. It must be said that it is understood regarding the species and the rite of this sacrament: because Melchisedech exhibited in figure both species, and the rite of oblation, and the use of the sacrament, before circumcision in the natural law, before the sacraments of the old law were instituted. § 8. But to the objection to the contrary, it must be said that those sacrifices were not sacraments, nor figures of the old law, but rather figures of the Passion of Christ and of the mortification of the

382. Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, Ps. 77:25; cf. Tractatus in Ioannem, 13.

flesh of penitents, as a certain Gloss says on Leviticus. § 9. To the other it must be said, that this sacrament has a special dignity of its reality which is Christ perfect in deity and humanity, which perfection the other sacraments do not have.

Articulus 5 — Whether The Sacrament Of The Eucharist Was Instituted By Christ At A Due And Fitting Time

Whether the sacrament of the Eucharist was instituted by Christ at the due and fitting time?

§ 13. But a question falls concerning the first, namely concerning the institution. § 14. For it seems that 1. Medicine is suitable from the time of the disease: and so it ought to have been instituted from the beginning of the world. § 15. 2. Also, to the life lost through the eating of the forbidden tree there was no return except through the eating of the tree of life: therefore if he thought to drive away death, as indeed he did, he ought to have provided for everyone from the time of the first fall of Adam the food of the tree of life: but this is in the Eucharist: therefore he ought to have instituted it from then on. § 16. 3. Also, a way was always indicated to wayfarers from the beginning of the age: therefore a viaticum [provision for the journey] ought not to have been denied: but the viaticum is the body of Christ in the sacrament: therefore this sacrament ought to have existed from the beginning. § 17. BUT CONTRA it seems that 1. It ought to have been instituted after the Passion and Resurrection: because baptism is the gate of life, and the generation of spiritual life: but no one is nourished unless he first lives and is generated: therefore the institution of baptism ought to have preceded the institution of the Eucharist: but baptism was formally instituted after the Resurrection, as was held: therefore even the Eucharist much more so. § 18. 2. Also, As the reception of the Eucharist is to the reception of baptism, so the institution of the Eucharist is to the institution of baptism: but the Eucharist is not received except by the baptized: therefore neither ought the Eucharist to have been instituted unless baptism was instituted, as it seems. § 19. 3. Also, It seems that it ought to have been instituted neither from the beginning of the world nor after the Resurrection, but rather in the beginning of the children of Israel in the promised land: because this is said in the letter, that after the typical lamb he gave his body, so that by this he might signify that the legal rites had ceased, and the sacraments of the New Testament had begun: since therefore the more express figure of the Eucharist was the manna, or the oblation of Melchisedech, as was held above, at the cessation of those things this sacrament ought to have been instituted, and not after the supper of the typical lamb, as it seems. § 20. Solution. It must be said to that which is first objected, that such objections would hold optimally, if the disease and the medicine were corporeal: because in those cases both nature is supposed to be operating by necessity, and medicine assists it, and unless it assists quickly, from the corruption of principles through disease nature succumbs. But, as was said from the beginning of this fourth book, it is otherwise in spiritual disease: because in that case nature does not act by necessity, but by will: but to the will a thought is pre-required, and therefore it was necessary that the disease and the medicine be pre-signified by many signs and figures, as Master Hugh says, so that afterwards grace might cure what the will would assist: and there-

383. Wisdom 16:20.

fore the remedy of the sacrament of the new law was not fitting to be given immediately. § 21. To the other it must be said, that it is true, that there was no return except through the eating of the tree of life: but below it will be held, that the mode of eating is twofold, namely spiritual, and that was always in the faith of believers. Whence Augustine: "Why do you prepare teeth and belly? Believe, and you have eaten." And through that there was a return as regards satisfaction, although not as regards the reception of the price. The other is sacramental, and it was not always fitting for that to be, as was held earlier. § 22. To the other it must be said, that to wayfarers, because the way is spiritual, the eating of the spiritual viaticum was sufficient. § 23. To the other it must be said, that it is one thing in this sacrament, and another in baptism: for baptism is a figure of the Passion, and burial, and resurrection: of the Passion in the subversion of sin, of burial in the hiding and threefold immersion under water, and of Resurrection in the shining brightness of the washed: and therefore it could not be formally instituted, except after all these things: but the Eucharist is a commemoration of the Passion only, and therefore it ought to have been instituted immediately before the Passion: although the use of the Eucharist is not given except to the baptized. And therefore the use and institution of these sacraments have no similarity. § 24. To the other it must be said, that it is not true, that as the reception is, etc. And the reason for this has already been assigned: and therefore that proportion is worth nothing. § 25. To the other it must be said, that although those figures may be more express regarding the material species, as was said earlier, which are signs only: yet it was not more fitting to be instituted after this than after those. Otherwise it can also be said, that those were signs, not sacraments: and therefore the species which was prefigured in them, ought not to have ceased, but rather the rite of that species ought to begin: but the legal sacraments ought to have ceased, as was held above in the question concerning legal rites. And therefore after that as if to be terminated, the Eucharist ought to be instituted, not after those things which considered through the species in a genus are not terminated, but are still frequented.

Articulus 6 — Whether This Is The Due Form, This Is My Body

Whether this is the due form: Hoc est enim corpus meum [For this is my body]?

§ 26. Next it is asked concerning this which is said in the second part, there, C, § 1: But the form is that which he himself there uttered saying: This is my body, etc.[392] § 27. For it is objected in manifold ways concerning this form thus: § 28. 1. The form of a sacrament is that which formally makes the sacrament, just as Augustine says: Let the word accede to the element, and it becomes a sacrament: as is clear in baptism in which the form does nothing, unless the baptizing is exercised on the part of the recipient: therefore similarly here when it is said, This is my body, it will not have an effect unless it is exercised on the matter due to the sacrament: therefore this sentence, This is my body, at the supper signified nothing concerning the body of Christ in heaven; and he cannot say, This is my body, unless having demonstrated his body in heaven, which is false: therefore the form ought not to have been handed down through the verb is, but rather through a verb denoting the transition of one thing to another and a mutation. § 29.

384. John 6:57 (Vulgate).

2. Also, It is one thing to signify that something has been made, and another to command its use, and another to make it. But when it is said, This is my body, it is signified that it is the body of Christ, or has been made so. And when it is added, Take and eat of this all of you: the use of what exists is commanded. Therefore that form imports nothing concerning the confection of the sacrament. Since therefore the form of a sacrament is that which makes and confects the sacrament, this does not seem to be the form of the sacrament. § 30. 3. Also, It does not happen that vocal sounds are used except in two ways, namely materially and significatively, or as the vocal sound itself is a sign and a reality: a sign according to which I say, Man is a rational animal: a reality or materially, according to which I say, Man is of two syllables and three letters and an aspiration. Therefore with this vocal sound too, This is my body, it does not happen that it is used in several ways. But it is clear, that it is not taken materially here: therefore significatively: therefore the body of Christ already made is demonstrated, and not that it itself as a form makes it. § 31. 4. Also, A demonstration whether it be to the sense, or to the intellect, is always for signifying that which is: therefore here too, when it is said, This is my body, it is signified that it is the body of Christ, and not that it comes to be. § 32. Also, It is objected concerning the first particle which is the pronoun, this [hoc]. § 33. 1. For since it is a pronoun, it is either demonstrative, or relative: because otherwise its understanding would be void and vain: but not relative, since it does not bear relation to any antecedent suppositum in relation: therefore it is demonstrative: therefore it either demonstrates the substance of bread, or of the body of Christ under the accidents which are seen or understood. If the substance of the bread: therefore the sense is, the demonstrated bread is the body of Christ, and this is false: therefore that locution is false too. If the substance of the body of Christ: therefore nothing else is said, This is my body, than my body is my body: and this is always true, and never makes a translation [change] of anything. Therefore that form does not refer to the sacrament, but to signifying the body of Christ always without any conversion into the body of Christ. § 34. 2. Also, This is false, that the bread will be the body of Christ. Proof: Whatever proposition is true concerning the future, there will be some time in which it is presentially true: but there will never be a time in which this is true, The bread is the body of Christ: therefore this is never true, The bread will be the body of Christ. But the cause of falsity is the discoherence of the predicate with the subject which is noted to cohere in the future: therefore since a nearer coherence is noted by a verb of present tense, that one is much more false which is, The bread is the body of Christ: therefore also this one, This is the body of Christ, or my body, since nothing is demonstrated by the word this [ly hoc], except the substance of bread before transubstantiation. § 35. 3. Also, Either the demonstration is to the sense, or to the intellect. If to the sense: since therefore nothing is subjected to the eyes except the species of bread and the substance of bread, by accident it seems that the sense is, the demonstrated bread is my body, and this is false. But if the demonstration is to the intellect: this again seems unable to be: because then it would behoove, that at least the demonstrative together with the understood reality, would be of a similar species, just as when it is said, This herb grows in my garden: but nothing of a similar species is in the bread with the body of Christ: therefore there cannot be a demonstration to the intellect. § 36. 4. Also, This would never be true, This herb grows in my garden, unless the

385. Augustine, Confessions VII, 10.

notion of herb unequivocally agreed with the demonstrated and understood reality: but nothing here unequivocally is in the bread and the body of Christ: therefore there cannot be a demonstration to the intellect. § 37. 5. Also, Dupliciter [in two ways], as the Sophists say, it happens that demonstration and negation and certain other things are signified, namely as conceived, as is signified in the pronoun this. Therefore when it is said, This is my body, it is signified as exercised: therefore it wishes to fall upon the sensible accidents, whether they are of the same in number, or in species, just as a personal demonstration is distinguished from a simple demonstration. But it is clear, that in both ways the locution is false: therefore it is simply false, This is my body, with the bread demonstrated. § 38. 6. If perhaps you say, as some have said, that the pronoun here is a part of the sentence , and its demonstration is not to be separated from the sentence, therefore what is there in the final term of the sentence is demonstrated here. CONTRA: As the whole relates to the whole, so the part to the part: therefore if the whole is made in the final term of the sentence, the part is made when the demonstrative pronoun this is uttered. § 39. 7. Also, In other sentences a pronoun does not demonstrate that which is future after the sentence in which it is posited, but rather a pre-existing reality: therefore similarly here too: therefore it seems, that the demonstration falls upon the substance of bread under such accidents. § 40. 8. Also, It is prior according to the intellect to take the demonstrated reality than to affirm or deny something of it: therefore when it is said, This is my body, the reality of consecration subjected to the sense having been demonstrated is taken according to the intellect prior to its being said of it that it is the body of Christ: therefore the demonstration of the pronoun does not seem to depend on the following part of the sentence, as that solution says. § 41. 9. If perhaps you say, as certain others have said, that the demonstration refers not to the sign, but to the signified, according to what the Gloss seems to say on that Matthew 26:26: This is my body, saying, that it is seen under the species of bread: therefore according to this already in the utterance of the pronoun the body of Christ was under the species of bread: therefore it would not be effected under the species of bread by virtue of the sentence, which is false, and contrary to the saying of Augustine, in which he says: Let the word accede to the element, and it becomes a sacrament. § 42. 10. And therefore others again say, that it demonstrates the signified in the final term of transubstantiation. But against this it is also objected, that a substantial or accidental term supposing [standing for], is restricted by a verb of present tense to copulatively supposing for present time: but in this sentence the pronoun supposes, with a verb of present tense not being amplified, nor signifying a confused time: therefore it supposes for the present only: but the present is nothing except the supposed substance which was before the utterance of the sentence, and this is the substance of bread: therefore it does not suppose except for that: and then the locution is false, as was proved earlier. § 43. 11. Also, Whence does this pronoun have it that in this locution it demonstrates the reality under the final term rather than in another, since nothing is posited in this one which is not posited in another? § 44. Further it is asked concerning this verb, Is [Est]. § 45. 1. For Is signifies a reality in the present: but the truth of the locution does not admit this, because the bread is not the body of Christ. § 46. 2. Also, In other sacraments a verb signifying the act of the minister and of God is posited, as I baptize: because

386. Matthew 28:20.

God baptizes interiorly, and the minister exteriorly: therefore similarly it ought to be done in this sacrament: but this verb, is, imports no act of the minister or of God: therefore it ought not to be of the form. § 47. 3. Also, The act of the verb in other sacraments in some way says the proper act of the matter: just as I baptize says the act of washing, which is the proper act of water: and I anoint says the act of anointing, which is the proper act of chrism and the oil of the sick: therefore it seems, that even in this sacrament an act ought to be imported, which is proper to the matter of bread and wine, such as I nourish, or I feed: and so he ought to say, I nourish you with my body: and not, This is my body. § 48. 4. Also, A sacrament of the new law effects from its form what it figures: therefore it seems, that a verb denoting this efficiency ought to be posited in the form: and a substantive verb does not do this: therefore it is poorly posited in the form. § 49. 5. Also, In the works of creation, where no becoming [fieri] is a medium between the creator and the work, nevertheless we use a verb of becoming: therefore it seems, that similarly we ought to use it here too. § 50. 6. Also, The bread is passing into the body of Christ: therefore it is poorly said, that it is the body of Christ: because thus the transition of the bread is not signified. § 51. 7. Also, A substantive verb noting the inherence of the predicate with the subject, supposes the subject with form and matter: just as when it is said, Man is an animal, or, Man is white: therefore it does similarly here: therefore the bread which is remaining in form and matter is the body of Christ, which is heretical and most false: therefore it seems, that the word is is poorly posited in the form. § 52. Further it is asked concerning this particle, Body. § 53. 1. For it seems, that it would more fittingly say, flesh: because when he speaks, John 6:56, of the food of this sacrament, he posits flesh, saying: My flesh is food indeed, etc.[393] § 54. 2. Also, No body as organized is apt for eating, nor are all its parts: but flesh alone is apt, or more apt than all other similar and dissimilar members: therefore it seems, that he ought to posit flesh and not body. § 55. 3. Also, Bread is a body similar in the whole and in the parts, which is called homogeneous: because any part of bread is bread, and any part of wine is wine: therefore it seems, that it is a sign of homogeneous food: therefore of flesh, and not of the whole organic body: therefore flesh ought to have been posited, not body. § 56. 4. Also, Wine by the force of the sacrament is not converted except into blood, which is homogeneous: therefore by the same reason bread is not converted by the force of the sacrament except into flesh, which is a homogeneous part. § 57. Further it is asked, Why does he say, My [Meum]? § 58. For it seems more fitting to have said, the body of Christ because § 59. 1. If on account of the reverence of the name God also willed that for a time baptism should be done in the name of Christ: therefore also on account of the greater dignity of this sacrament that name ought to have been posited here. § 60. 2. Also, The form is of greater efficacy in this sacrament than in the others: because here an inanimate and non-glorious body is converted into an animate and glorious body united to the divinity: therefore here the greater effect ought to be attributed to the most worthy name, namely Jesus Christ: therefore he ought to have said, This is the body of Jesus Christ, as it seems. § 61. Further it is asked concerning those things which are added in the Gospel, namely concerning this, Take, and eat, whether it is of the form? § 62. It seems, that it is: because 1. Those things refer to the use of the sacrament: but this which he says, This is my body, refers only to the insinuation of

387. 1 Corinthians 11:24.

transubstantiation: therefore it seems, that equally or more so, take and eat, are of the substance of the form: just as this which is said, This is my body. § 63. 2. Also, An act noting the exercise and use of baptizing is of the form in baptism, when it is said, I baptize thee, etc.: therefore similarly those words which note the use of this sacrament, ought to be of the form, as it seems. § 64. Further it is asked concerning the mutation, addition, and diminution, and corruption: just as in the question concerning the form of baptism, and of confirmation. § 65. Solution. It must be said, that this is the form, This is my body, in my judgment, and no more. § 66. But to the solution of those things which were objected, it must be noted, that that sentence has to be considered in a triple force: for it has one force, according as it is a vocal sound significative of a reality: and from this mode it makes a sign of some demonstrated reality. Also, it has a force, according as it is the form of the sacrament from divine institution: and according to this it is conversive of bread into the body of Christ, and makes a transition or the transubstantiation of the bread. It has a third force, according as the uncreated Word operates in it, in whose person it is uttered by the priest: because said by the priest as if recitatively, it refers to the uncreated Word, according as he operates in the vocal sound of this sentence. And in this mode the more ancient Theologians said, that the vocal sound has to be referred to the reality and the reality operates indivisibly and with indivisible force together with the uncreated Word conjoined to it: and one part is not to be separated from a part, as in another construction: and although it has the capacity to signify insofar as it is a created vocal sound, yet it does not have sacramental operation insofar as it is of this sort, but insofar as the signified uncreated Word indivisibly operates in it, to which this sentence has to be reduced whence it is, namely the body of Christ: although it is expressed by several vocal sounds according to the mode of suppositum and appositum and composition. § 67. To the first therefore it must be said, that that triple use of the form, according as these words are taken with signification, institution, and the operation of the uncreated Word, is not except in the sacrament: although that argumentation proceeds as if the use of this sentence has nothing from the institution and operation of the uncreated Word: and this is not true. § 68. To the other it must be said, that even that objection supposes a falsehood, namely that the sentence is nothing but insinuative of a fact, and not making a transition from the institution and operation of the uncreated Word, in whose person those words are uttered. But why a verb noting transition or mutation is not posited in that sentence, we will determine below, as we will be able. § 69. To the other it must be said, that this is true of vocal sounds instituted solely for the use of signifying, but not of vocal sounds which are the forms of sacraments, in which institution makes the vocal sounds to be operative of invisible grace. § 70. To the other it must be said in the same way, that the pronoun has three forces, according as the whole sentence does: and those argumentations which are made from the common use of speaking, to sentences which are the forms of sacraments, have no force. § 71. To that which is objected concerning the first part of the sentence, namely concerning the word This [Hoc], which is a demonstrative pronoun, without prejudice I will recite the three opinions of the Masters first, and afterwards I will touch upon what seems better to me. § 72. The first opinion is of those who say, that the word this makes a demonstration to the sense, and that it falls upon the

388. 1 Corinthians 11:26.

substance of bread, not simply, but insofar as it is substanciated into the body of Christ: and these say, that it demonstrates the content of the bread, insofar as it is the term of transubstantiation. And if it is objected, that the bread transubstantiated into the body of Christ, is not bread, but the body of Christ: They say, that this is true: but it is not simply the body of Christ, but insofar as it is the end of sacramental conversion. But how they solve those arguments, will be open later: because there is one solution of all of them according to all these opinions. § 73. Others say, that there is a demonstration to the intellect there, and the demonstration falls upon the accidents of the species of bread and wine insofar as they are sacramental species, and not insofar as they are simply species: and therefore the sense is, The signified sacramentally in the species of bread and wine is the body of Christ. And these say, that such a demonstration simply does not demand identity in species between the demonstrated and understood reality, but only the agreement which is between a sign and what is sacramentally signified. And thus they solve the arguments objected to the contrary. § 74. But against both of these solutions and opinions, it seems to be objected. Against the FIRST indeed: because it is impossible in itself, or as a term, for that to be demonstrated which is not before the demonstration: but the body of Christ neither in itself, nor on the altar, nor as the term of conversion, is before the demonstration: therefore it can be demonstrated in neither mode. But against the SECOND it seems to be objected: because that is demonstrated sacramentally which is in act under the sacrament, with the demonstration falling upon the sacramental species: but the body of Christ is not contained under those species, with the demonstration falling upon those species: therefore it does not happen that it is demonstrated sacramentally. § 75. And therefore a third way seems to me to be more probable, that it be said, that the word this is demonstrative and simultaneously operative or conversive: and it has this insofar as it is a part of the sacramental form, from institution, and together with the uncreated Word: and therefore it does not have it dividedly, but rather the vocal sounds are referred to the realities signified in those vocal sounds, and to the uncreated Word simply: and thus in the virtue of one indivisible operating, that sentence which is the form of the sacrament operates, and operating demonstrates, and demonstrating operates: just as is said of the creation and infusion of the soul. § 76. To that therefore which is first objected, it must be said that it demonstrates the body of Christ under the accidents, and by making it to be there it demonstrates it: and therefore more is said, This is my body, than my body is my body: because the sense is, This is my body, that is, the contained under the species is my body, and by virtue of this sentence it has been made there from the substance of bread. § 77. To the other it must be said, that it is true that this is false, that the bread is the body of Christ: and it is not similar unless we were to say, that this verb, is, would denote nothing but the inherence of composition with the consignified present time. But we say, that from institution and conjunction to the uncreated Word, it is conversive just as the whole sentence is: and therefore it does not denote inherence here, but conversion and the existence of the body of Christ under the species of that which is converted into it. § 78. To the other it must be said, that whether a demonstration to the sense is said, or to the intellect, it is always said diminutively: but if it is said to be to the intellect with a conversive force demonstrating to the intellect, then it will be

389. Matthew 6:11-12.

more probable: and yet the inconvenience which the objection concludes does not follow. There are nonetheless those who say the demonstration is to the sense, in the mode in which the sensible reality of the sacrament is said under the sacramental species. § 79. To the other it must be said, that when it is said, This herb grows in my garden, it is nothing but a part of that demonstration: because that one is only ostensive, but this one factive first, and consequently ostensive. § 80. To the other it must be said, that the demonstration is signified here as exercised: but nevertheless this is not its whole virtue, nor is it the first: but rather that which it has insofar as it is the form of the sacrament: and this is operative of that which is demonstrated, and afterwards demonstrates. Whence just as although the soul by being infused is created, and by being created is infused, nevertheless creation according to the intellect precedes infusion: so here although the demonstration of the pronoun simultaneously makes it to be demonstrated and demonstrates, nevertheless the operative virtue according to the intellect precedes the demonstration in the form of the sacrament: and therefore such argumentations have no force. § 81. To the other it must be said, that it is true, that the sentence is not to be divided: and this is on account of the operative virtue which it does not have from the construction or order or conjunction of parts, but rather from divine institution, according as the vocal sound refers to the sense, and in the sense of the word the uncreated Word operates. And therefore the objection made to the contrary has no force: because this is true of a sentence which is only significative: because the construction of that depends on the mode of signifying and the signification of the parts. § 82. To the other it must be said, that it contains this for this reason, because other sentences do not operate their signified, but insinuate only: and therefore nothing is similar. § 83. To the other it must be said, that this is true of a demonstration which is only ostensive of a reality, and not factive by the virtue of the operation in which it itself is: but this demonstration with the virtue of the other words makes that which is demonstrated under the accidents, and by demonstrating makes it.

§ 1. To the next, it must be said that the Gloss is well to be assented to, provided it is understood, namely that what is seen under those species is made there by the power of the prayer along with the demonstration. And it is clear from the foregoing that the objection raised against this is invalid, unless we were to grant that demonstration is merely significative of the thing demonstrated, and not operative.

§ 2. To the next, it must be said that it is true that the word hoc ("this") stands as subject to a present-tense verb, and it stands for that which is in act: but by demonstrating hoc it is effected there, and by effecting it is demonstrated there. And therefore it does not stand for the substance of the bread, but rather for the body of Christ. And it is meaningless to say that the word hoc makes up a part there, as was said before: because the whole expression has this [power] indivisibly referred to the signified thing, and by institution. And therefore it is irrelevant to speak of a final term or an initial term: because the whole operates toward that indivisible effect as one indivisible thing.

390. John 1:16.

§ 3. To the next, it must be said that in this relation the pronoun has what it does not have in another, on account of the fact that it is the form of the sacrament, operative through divine institution.

§ 4. To what is further asked, it must be said that just as it was said of the demonstrative pronoun, that it is not only demonstrative but also operative, so too must it be said of the verb est ("is"), that it does not only denote coherence, but is operative and conversive, as has been said. And there is one and simple operating power in all those words, insofar as they are referred to the unity of the institution, and of the uncreated Word operating in these words. And therefore, just as here is admitted that into which the bread is converted into the body of Christ, so is it admitted here: This is the body of Christ, since the conversion and the signification of the present body of Christ happen simultaneously, and by the power of the same prayer.

§ 5. To the next, it must be said that it is otherwise in this and in the other sacraments: because in the others the minister operates something at least in the matter, just as the minister performs the dipping that takes place in water; but here, neither upon the exterior matter which is the bread and wine, nor interiorly in the effect of grace, can there be any work other than divine. And therefore the act of the minister could not be signified in the form here.

§ 6. To the next, it must be said that in the other sacraments the sacrament is consecrated and confected when it is received, as baptism when baptism is received, and confirmation when someone receives confirmation, and so of the others. In this sacrament, however, it is not so: but the conversion is before the reception of the sacrament. And a verb denoting the congruent act of the matter could not be placed [in the form], because that [act] belongs to the use of the sacrament after the confection: and the Lord touched upon this when He said, Take and eat, etc.

§ 7. To the next, it must be said that a verb denoting motion or mutation is not suitable in this sacrament, because every motion and mutation supposes a common matter for both terms of the motion and mutation upon which it occurs. But here there is no such thing: because bread is not the matter out of which the body of Christ is made, such that some new matter is converted into the body of Christ, which previously was not under the form of the body of Christ (because this could not be without an augmentation); but here there takes place a transubstantiation of the entire composite of bread, from form and matter, into the pre-existing substance of the body of Christ, without any intermediary mutation, and without a temporal interval. And therefore the verb est is more competently placed there with the power of transubstantiating, than any other verb denoting motion or mutation.

§ 8. To the next, it must be said that in the works of creation there is at least a substance made anew, which previously was not, although it is not properly motion or mutation. But here no substance perishes, nor does anything new come to the body of Christ, but rather the transubstantiation is of this sort by the power of the words. And therefore words signifying motion cannot properly be placed here in the form.

391. 1 Kings 19:7-8 (Vulgate: 3 Kings 19:7-8).

§ 9. To the next, it must be said that this objection would proceed if the verb were only denoting the inherence of the predicate with the subject; but it has already been said often that it itself along with hoc, and conceptually before hoc, is conversive, in such a way that the transubstantiation of the whole bread into the whole body of Christ can be called a conversion. And therefore the objection is invalid.

§ 10. To what is further asked about the third particle, which is corpus ("body"), it must be said that a sacrament of maximum perfection was not fitting to be of a part: and therefore the form could not be of the flesh, but of the whole body. And what the Lord says in the Gospel of John, [394] is said by synecdoche, and is understood of the whole. However, my flesh is food indeed is posited there, because by an argument from the lesser it is shown concerning the whole: for if the flesh, which is the more defectible part, gives life, how much more the spirit and the whole Christ.

§ 11. To the next, it must be said that that objection proceeds sophistically. For what it proposes is true of food that is converted into us, not of that into which we are converted. But concerning this food it is true that it converts us into itself, as was said above. And therefore corpus is better placed there in the dissimilitude of parts than caro ("flesh"); because it does not unite us to itself in the use in the ratio of a single grace, but in one it works the use of the spiritual eye, in another the use of the spiritual foot, and so on for the others.

§ 12. To the next, it must be said that although bread is a homogeneous body, nevertheless it is not gathered from one grain, but from diverse grains; and by this similitude it is taken in the sacrament, as is said in the text of the Sentences. And in this way it establishes a congruence with a body dissimilar in its parts, rather than a similar body.

§ 13. To the next, it must be said that the fact that the wine is sacramentally converted only into blood is not because of the homogeneity of the matter, but because of the ratio of its use: because it is given as a spiritual drink and for the effect of redemption. Yet, insofar as it is given to diverse faithful, the wine is gathered from diverse grains of the grape. But concerning the body it is not so: because it is given in the figure of the mystical body of Christ united to Christ the Head: and this body has a diversity of use in the graces of its members: and to this operation a dissimilar body is more fitting than a similar one.

§ 14. To the next, it must be said, regarding what is further asked about the fourth particle, which is meum ("my"), that meum is better placed there than Christi ("of Christ"): because those words are recited by the priest as if in the person of Christ. If, however, Christi were placed there, then it would seem to be ordered to another person, and thus another person would be signified to operate in these words. And it has already been shown that this is not fitting, because the uncreated Word fittingly operates in the created word, as has been established.

§ 15. To the next, it must be said that it is otherwise in baptism. For there the minister operates and invokes God; and that invocation was reduced to the name of Christ for a certain reason. But in this sacrament nothing operates except the Word, the Son, in the created word which He instituted for this purpose. And therefore that word ought to be pronounced as if of

392. Peter Lombard.

His own proper person, and the speech should not be made of Him as of another—which would happen if Christi were placed there, on account of the fact that the noun would signify a person other than the one speaking, or other than the one in whose person the priest pronounces.

§ 16. To what is further asked, it must be said that take and eat pertains to the use of the sacrament, and not to the confection. And therefore I think that it is not of the form. However, what is said, This is my body, is not only insinuative, but operative of the sacrament, as has been said.

§ 17. To the next, it must be said that the act which the verb baptize signifies does not only mean the exercise, but also the coming to be of baptism. Here, however, it is not so, because the confection of this sacrament is prior to perception, as has been said.

§ 18. To the next, which is asked last, let the answer be as in the preceding.

§ 19. From this the falsity of a certain opinion is clear, and the solution to a certain question of the ancients, who on account of this did not know how to distinguish between the use and the confection of the sacrament. For they said that God Himself confected His body with other secret words, and afterwards gave the power of confecting through these words, This is my body. For this is not reasonable; but rather that even then those words were not only significative of the Lord's body, but operative.

§ 20. If, however, it is asked concerning the word enim ("for"), which is said in the Roman books and is found in the ancient books of the Fathers, whether it is of the form?

§ 21. It must be said that it is safe to add it; nevertheless it is not found in the Gospel, and it touches more upon the cause of the use which is imported in the verb of taking and eating, than it is of the substance of the form.

Articulus 7 — Inquiry Is Made Concerning The Form That Is Said Over The Wine, And Concerning The Individual Words Set In It

§ 22. Article 7 It is asked concerning the form that is said over the wine, and concerning each word posited in it.

§ 23. ARTICLE VII. It is asked concerning the form that is said over the wine, and concerning each word posited in it.

§ 24. Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, G, § 1, near the end: Take and drink from this, all of you, etc.

§ 25. For it is asked concerning the form which is said over the wine.

§ 26. And two things are asked, namely concerning the words posited in it, and concerning its comparison to the form which is said over the bread.

§ 27. 1. For it seems that the form which the Church frequents is not the form, namely this: For this is the chalice of my blood, of the new and eternal testament: the mystery of faith: which will be

393. John 6:56.

poured out for you and for many unto the remission of sins. For the Church posits all of this; and it is established that it is found in none of the Evangelists. Therefore, since a sacrament does not have a form unless instituted by God, it seems this is not of the form. This is clear to one running through the individual Gospels. In Matthew, [395] it is held thus: Drink of it, all of you. For this is my blood of the New Testament, which will be poured out for many unto the remission of sins. In Mark, [396] thus: And having taken the chalice, giving thanks he gave it to them, and they all drank from it. And he said to them: This is my blood of the New Testament, which will be poured out for many. In Luke, [397] thus: This chalice is the New Testament in my blood, which will be poured out for you. It is clear, therefore, that it is in none of the Evangelists.

§ 28. 2. Moreover, it seems that it was presumption to add what the Lord did not add: therefore it seems that they even sin in so great a sacrament by holding this form.

§ 29. 3. Also, it seems that what is added has no power of transubstantiating. For words do not have this power except insofar as they belong to the uncreated Word establishing them, as will be held below in the text of Ambrose, that the word of Christ changes the creature. Therefore it seems that those things which man added are not of the form, and they are not found instituted by God.

§ 30. 4. Also, Jerome says: "Let me not be believed if I say anything which I cannot prove through the New or the Old Testament." But that in the form there should be mystery of faith and of the eternal testament can be proved neither by the New nor by the Old Testament: therefore it is not to be believed to be of the form, especially of so great a sacrament, which is entirely above man.

§ 31. Further, it seems that it is not fittingly placed there, Chalice of blood.

§ 32. 1. For those things which are of the form or the matter are of the essence of the sacrament: but the chalice, a vessel, is neither the form nor the matter of the sacrament; therefore it is not of the essence of the sacrament; therefore it ought not to be placed in the form.

§ 33. 2. Also, if you say that the chalice is posited in the form by transumption [metaphor]: from this a manifold inconvenience seems to follow.

§ 34. First, indeed, because a transumed concept presupposes for itself another upon which it is founded, which is proper: because one must first consider the properties of the thing through which the transumption is made, before the concept is transferred to another. Therefore a simple person not knowing how to transfer something or make metaphors can relate to it dangerously. Since therefore the danger of error ought especially to be avoided in this sacrament, on account of the fact that reason can least assist itself in it, it seems that nothing ought to be placed metaphorically in it.

§ 35. Second: because every transumed concept, from the fact that it presupposes another, consists in a certain multiplicity of concepts: but a multiplicity of concepts is a cause of mental wandering. Since therefore in this sacrament, which man scarcely attains by faith with his

394. Gregory the Great.

whole effort, it is necessary for man to recollect himself entirely within himself, and not to wander, it seems that nothing in it ought to be said by metaphor.

§ 36. Third, it seems [to follow], because metaphor is made from one thing to another: therefore the metaphor is made either to the body or to the blood. If to the body: then by the power of those words the body is effected there. And no one says this: because although the body is in the chalice, nevertheless it is not there by the power of the sacrament, but by the power of the connection which it has with the blood. If, however, the metaphor is made to the blood: then the metaphor cannot be made, except from that property by which it is drunk from the chalice. And then the sense will be: The chalice of blood, etc., that is, the drink of blood, etc. Therefore He ought similarly to have said of the body: This is the food of my body. And He did not say this. Therefore the use of this mode of metaphor does not seem [to apply] here.

§ 37. 3. Moreover, if it is placed for the contained, as some have said, then there should not be in the construction the mode of diversity from transumption which oblique cases denote; because between the contained and the blood there is no diversity, as it seems.

§ 38. Further it is asked concerning what it says, Of my blood.

§ 39. 1. For since the principal thing which the form effects is the blood, it seems it ought to be placed there in the direct case [nominative], and not in the oblique case.

§ 40. 2. This also seems from the form of the body: because there it is said, For this is my body. Therefore it should also be said, For this is my blood.

§ 41. 3. Also, where the Master in the text says this is done, and the two Evangelists, namely Matthew and Mark [say so]: therefore it seems that it ought to be conveyed in the direct case.

§ 42. 4. Also, since oblique cases are transitive and denote diversity, there seems to be a diversity between the reality of the sacrament and the blood. But since there is no diversity there, it seems that blood is wrongly placed in the oblique case.

§ 43. Further it is asked concerning what it says, Of the new and eternal Testament.

§ 44. 1. For new is, as a certain Philosopher says, what is near in respect to its beginning. But the reality of this sacrament is eternal, because it is the Son of God; therefore it is not new.

§ 45. 2. Moreover, it is new either as to the reality, or as to the rite. If as to the reality: this is false, because according to this it would not be eternal. If as to the rite: then it is false what Ambrose said above, that our sacraments are prior to the sacraments of the Jews; and this is said for the sake of this sacrament, whose rite preceded in Melchizedek.

§ 46. 3. Also, new and eternal are opposites: because new is what is near in respect to its beginning, and eternal is what lacks a beginning. Therefore, when it is said, Of the new and eternal Testament, opposites seem to be posited concerning the same thing.

395. Matt 26:27-28

§ 47. 4. Also, a testament does not seem to be of blood, but rather of commandments: whence also the tablets containing the commandments are called the tablets of the testament. Therefore it seems that it ought not to have been said, Of the new and eternal testament.

§ 48. Further it is asked concerning what it says there, The mystery of faith.

§ 49. 1. For the mystery of faith is in all sacraments, as is clear from the definition of a sacrament which was posited in a gloss above from the words of Augustine at the beginning of the book, that a sacrament is when under a visible species divine power works salvation more secretly; but mystery means the same as secret: therefore in any sacrament there is a mystery of faith, and not only in this one: therefore it ought not to be specially placed in this one.

§ 50. 2. Also, this sacrament is specially said to be the sacrament of charity. Whence Chrysostom says that to give His flesh to eat was an indication of intimate love. But baptism is especially called the sacrament of faith: therefore it seems to be more fitting for the latter that it be the sacrament of faith, and for the former that it be the sacrament of charity or mystery: therefore mystery of faith is wrongly placed in the form.

§ 51. Further it is asked concerning what it says, Which will be poured out for you and for many.

§ 52. For pouring out is contrary to drinking, as it seems; therefore it ought not to be placed in the sacrament of the chalice which we drink alongside the body in the communication of the blood.

§ 53. Also it is asked: Why does it indistinctly posit, It will be poured out for you and for many?

§ 54. 1. For there is one ratio of pouring out for all: therefore there is no distinction regarding the Apostles and others with respect to the cause of the pouring out.

§ 55. 2. Also, the blood availed all for redemption as to sufficiency: therefore it ought not to be said, For many, but for all.

§ 56. 3. Also, the power of each thing is determined to its maximum. Since therefore the power of the shed blood of Christ is maximal, it ought to have been determined to the maximum effect: therefore it seemed better to be said, for all, rather than for many.

§ 57. 4. Moreover, it seems that this part is not of the form: because it does not speak as it were of the essential of the sacrament, but rather of the effect of the sacrament in us: therefore it seems that it ought not to be placed in the form.

§ 58. Further it is asked concerning what it says, Unto the remission of sins.

§ 59. 1. For this states the end of the entire Passion and Redemption on the part of liberation from evil: therefore it ought not more to be placed in the form of the blood than in the form of the body.

§ 60. 2. Moreover, in Luke, [398] it is appended to the form of the body: which is given for you: and it is not said to be of the form which is said over the bread. Therefore, even although there

396. Mark 14:23-24

is added here, Which will be poured out for you and for many unto the remission of sins, nevertheless it ought not to be said to be of the essence of the form.

§ 61. Solution. It must be said to the first, that although that form which the Church holds is not found in one Gospel and in one place, nevertheless by parts it is found for the most part. And moreover it is found handed down by the Apostles who received it from the Lord. For what is said, This is the chalice of my blood, is taken from Luke. And similarly what is said, Of the new testament, is taken from three, namely Matthew, Mark, and Luke. But what is added, eternal, is held from the tradition of the Lord; and similarly that, The mystery of faith. For the Apostle says, 1 Corinthians: [399] For I received from the Lord what I also delivered to you. But that the Church received it handed down from the Apostles, Innocent III says thus: "The Roman Church has always preserved this in integral faith, which it received from the Apostles themselves who presentialy instituted it with sacred doctrines and taught the rule of the Ecclesiastical rite. For from the Apostles Peter and Paul themselves, whom it had both as living Teachers and as deceased guardians, it received this rite of sacrifice, which it has hitherto preserved in inviolable cult." And this is what is commonly said by the Masters, that although this form is not written all at once, nevertheless it is understood to be handed down by God to the Apostles.

§ 62. And through this the solution to the first three is clear.

§ 63. To what is objected concerning Jerome, it must be said that he did not intend that all true things are written word-for-word in the New or Old Testament. But as Augustine says, "Every truth accords with Sacred Scripture which does not contradict Sacred Scripture." Now it is sufficiently consonant with Sacred Scripture that the Church should frequent this, which Christ handed down. And it is drawn from that word, 1 Corinthians: [400] For I received from the Lord what I also delivered to you; where he is speaking of the rite of this sacrament. And from that: Be imitators of me, as I also am of Christ.

§ 64. To the next thing which is further asked, it must be said that chalice is placed there transumptively [metaphorically], and is transferred to the passion. As He said to the two brothers, sons of Zebedee: Can you drink the chalice that I am to drink? And the chalice of blood means as much as the sacrament of the passion of blood, which is frequented in the use of the faithful through the participation of the chalice.

§ 65. But to what is objected against this, it must be said that in two ways are some things of the essence. Namely, as entering into the constitution of the thing, just as the body and blood of Christ are of the essence of the reality which is the sacrament in the Eucharist; but certain things are essentially joined to them, such that without these the reality cannot be. And in this way the chalice is of the essence on our part: because it is done in memory of the passion when this sacrament is consumed. [As the Apostle says:] [401] As often as you eat this bread and drink the chalice, you proclaim the Lord's death until he comes. And therefore the chalice in this sense is adjoined to the form of the sacrament, and is of the form.

§ 66. To the next, it must be said that the principal solicitude of devotion and faith ought to be in this sacrament. And therefore mention of the chalice is made, so that the passion may be recalled to memory. And therefore if anyone errs in the primary signified thing, he is not excused, because his solicitude ought to induce consideration. And therefore things necessary to the sacrament were not to be omitted on account of someone's negligence.

§ 67. To the next, it must be said that although a multiplicity of concepts is the cause of a certain discursive movement of reason from one thing to another, nevertheless the solicitude and devotion which is enjoined upon those celebrating contains it. And therefore there is no danger there, except with respect to the culpably negligent; but on account of this nothing necessary to the sacrament ought to have been omitted.

§ 68. To the next, it must be said that it has already been said to what chalice is transferred there—to the passion: because the Lord was accustomed to call His passion a chalice, [as in Matthew:] [402] My Father, if this chalice cannot pass unless I drink it, your will be done. And the passion is especially what is recollected in the sacrament, as was said before.

§ 69. But to what is asked, why with the body there is not placed in the canon a commemoration of the passion, as with the blood, since in certain Evangelists it is appended even to the body: This is my body, which is given for you; yet it is not said, This is the chalice of my body?

§ 70. It must be said that in the truth of the matter the drink of the chalice responds more to the passion according to the pouring out of blood, than according to the wounding of the body. And this is also clear from the usage of speaking in the Prophets. Whence, in Isaiah, [403] where He consoles the Church after the torments of the martyrs, He says: Behold, I have taken out of your hand the chalice of stupor, the dregs of the chalice of my indignation; you shall not drink it anymore. And I will put it into the hand of those who have humiliated you. And in many other places. And this is done for this reason, because the chalice inebriates through drink, and so does the passion through anguish. And therefore the chalice is more appropriately appended to the drinkable thing, namely the blood, than to the eatable thing, which is the body.

§ 71. To the next, it must be said that the chalice is metaphorically referred to the passion of blood, and the blood referred to the passion has some diversity of ratio relative to the blood ministered as drink in the sacrament: and that [diversity] is imported by the oblique case.

§ 72. To what is further asked concerning the blood, it must be said that the reason why it is placed in the oblique case has been stated. For although the blood is effected by the power of the sacrament and not the chalice, nevertheless in order that the blood could be effected in the sacrament, it had to be poured out first in the passion. And therefore in the ratio of the first agent—not to the blood in the sacrament, but to the celebration of the sacrament in itself—it is better said the chalice of blood than the blood of the chalice.

§ 73. To the next, what is objected concerning the Master in the text, it must be said that the Master does not expressly determine the form in several sacraments, just as he does not do so in confirmation, and in penance, and in extreme unction, and in order. And thus he does not

398. Luke 22:19

do so here: because the intention of the Master is to hand down a notice of those things in which the sacrament consists materially. And therefore he says that the form is about the blood, before he determines the form: because the Master supposes the form to be known from the frequentation of the Church.

§ 74. But to what is objected against this by the Evangelist, it must be said that the Evangelists did not intend to hand down the form of the sacrament by writing the Gospel, but to hand down a simple notice of history as to the true things said there and the deeds done. And therefore that proof is not efficacious.

§ 75. To the next, it must be said that the transitivity of the oblique case here does not import a diversity between the blood and the reality of the sacrament, but rather a diverse ratio of the blood as it is referred to the passion which conferred the possibility of the celebration of the sacrament, and of the blood as it is ministered in the sacrament for the use of the faithful, as was said before. And because mention of both had to be made in the form, it was better to posit the oblique case rather than the direct case [nominative]. In the body, however, the ratio is not similar, as has been said.

§ 76. To what is further asked concerning what is said, Of the new and eternal Testament, it must be said that it is called new with respect to the use of the sacramental reality under such species.

§ 77. But to what is objected concerning the ratio of that which is new, it must be said that the Son of God is eternal. But the Son of God is not in the chalice by the power of the sacrament, but by the connection of the body and the soul with the deity and the blood. And therefore there still remains something by which the use of the blood is new under the sacrament.

§ 78. To the next, it must be said that it is already clear to what the newness refers. The rite, however, preceded only in the species without the reality in the oblation of Melchizedek: and with respect to this Ambrose says that our sacraments are older than those of the Jews.

§ 79. To the next, it must be said that nothing prohibits opposites from being concerning the same thing or posited, provided they are not posited concerning the same thing in the same respect. For what is called new, he says with respect to the use of the reality under the sacrament; what is called eternal, he says with respect to the person, as some say; or with respect to the predestination of so great a grace which God owed the Church from eternity: and this is more probable. Or with respect to both: and then no objection remains.

§ 80. To what is further asked, why is mystery of faith posited? It must be said that although in all sacraments there is something of faith, nevertheless in this one, through the mode of conversion and reception, and the accidents which remain without any subject, it is entirely of faith: because reason can do nothing in it. Now the fact that baptism is of faith is not because faith is more active there and reason less, but because it confers the first state of fidelity. Whence just as faith is in a certain manner the door of the virtues, so baptism is the door of

399. 1 Cor 11:23

the sacraments. But this sacrament is called the mystery of faith from one thing, and the sacrament of charity from another: it is called the mystery of faith because it is entirely of faith, as has been said; but of charity on account of the similitude of its effect, and as the greatest sign of the charity by which He gave Himself to us. I say, moreover, the similitude of effect: because just as charity unites the members, so that sacrament converts and unites the members to the Head.

§ 81. And through this the solution to all that was asked concerning this part is clear.

§ 82. To what is further asked concerning what is said, Which for you and for many, etc. It must be said that although there is one ratio of pouring out and reception in all, nevertheless the pouring out in which the blood was separated from the body operated toward the celebration of the sacrament. For the sacrament effects nothing but the blood. But that it thus separated could effect what it does not [effect] unseparated, this the pouring out does, and therefore mention of the pouring out had to be in the form of the blood.

§ 83. To the next, it must be said that the priest in that place is commemorated as offering. And therefore he represents a dual person, namely of Christ offering, and with respect to this he does not need an oblation for himself; and he represents his own proper person, and thus he needs to offer for his own and the people's indigence: because, as the Apostle says, he himself is encompassed with infirmity. And therefore, so that that indigence might be noted, the Lord willed the indigence of the Apostles to be expressed in the form, who were the first priests and handed down the rite of the sacrament to others.

§ 84. To the next, it must be said that although it avails for all sufficiently, it does not do so efficiently. And therefore He did not say, for all, but for many.

§ 85. To the next, it must be said that this sacrament does not work salvation without another cooperating thing: and this is faith and devotion which joins the effect to us. And because the cooperating thing fails in some, therefore it could not be determined to all: but according to its maximum effect it is poured out for many.

§ 86. To the next, it must be said that some of the ancients said on account of that objection that it was not of the essence of the form, but nevertheless he who omitted it would sin. But some others of the moderns probably seem to feel that it is of the form as an end: and a ratio conjoined to the form makes the perfection of the thing.

§ 87. To what is further and finally asked, it must be said that in my judgment that too is of the form: Unto the remission of sins. And this utility of the blood is spiritually commemorated in the Psalm, [404] where it is said: What profit is there in my blood, while I go down to corruption? And this is so because just as the soul seems to be the price of redemption offered to the Father, so the whole passion consists in the violent extortion of blood. But the passion made satisfaction for us, and therefore the passion is especially signified according to nature in the shedding of blood, in which is the life of the body. And therefore the remission of sins is more referred back [to it]...

400. 1 Cor 11:23

§ 1. ... to the blood, than to the passion of the body. § 2. To the last point, the solution is clear through the same.

Articulus 8 — Whether The Form That Is Said Over The Bread Awaits The Form That Is Said Over The Wine

§ 4. Secondly, it is asked concerning the operation of the form of the blood, with respect to the form which is said over the bread: and this on account of the ancients who said that these forms await each other in operating. § 5. But it is objected thus: § 6. 1. This sacrament is a sacrament of highest and simple truth: therefore nothing ought to be shown in the sacrament that is not in some way in the reality of the sacrament: but when it is said over the bread, "This is my body," there is shown to be a body there without blood, because by the power of the sacrament there is nothing there except the body: since therefore a body is not without blood, a falsehood is shown there in the sacrament of truth, unless the efficacy of the words of the body awaits the efficacy of the words of the blood: therefore these two forms await each other in operating. § 7. 2. Also, Just as reality is related to reality in the sacrament, so form ought to be related to form: but the reality of the body is simultaneous with the reality of the blood, and conversely: therefore the form of the body operates simultaneously with the form of the blood, and conversely: therefore they await each other in operating: because it is clear that they are not simultaneous in their utterance. § 8. 3. Also, If the form of the body operates without the form of the blood: either it operates the body without the blood, or with the blood. If without the blood: then it operates an imperfect reality, and it operates the body of Christ as it is not: because it is clear that it is with blood. But if it operates the body of Christ with blood: then by the power of the sacrament the blood is there: therefore the form subsequently said over the blood is superfluous: which is again unfitting: because if nature does not abound in superfluous things nor fall short in necessary things, much less does grace do this. § 9. 4. Also, Below in this same distinction it will be shown that this sacrament is one: but of one thing there is a single being: therefore also a single sacramental form; because form gives being: therefore a single form operates over the bread and over the chalice: but the act of one form is undivided: therefore it does not operate divisively over the bread and over the chalice: therefore simultaneously: therefore the work of one does not precede the work of the other. § 10. On the contrary: § 11. 1. When it is said, "This is my body": either the body is there made and demonstrated by the power of the statement, as was said above, or not. If not: then the expression is false: for it is not said, "This will be my body," but "This is." If so: then the efficacy of this statement does not await another statement in effecting. § 12. 2. Also, According to the whole usage and utility of the Church, the body is elevated after these words are said, "This is my body," and then it is adored by the faithful. Either therefore it is there, or not. If so, I have my proposition: because the form over the chalice has not yet been said. If not: then the ministers of the Church cause to be adored with latria that which is not God, and thus compel the people to commit idolatry, which is absurd to say of the Church. § 13. 3. Also, What would be the cause of this dependence, that one should depend on the other? For it is not the division of Christ, because Christ is always perfect: nor the dependence of the thing

401. 1 Cor 11:26

signified, because the signification of one statement is absolute, just as is that of the other: nor institution, because just as Christ divisively gave his body

and his blood to the Apostles, so he divisively instituted it: therefore there can be no cause for dependence: therefore it is clear that one does not await the other. § 15. Solution. It must be said that these statements fulfill their effects divisively [i.e., separately], and one does not await the other. § 16. To the first, therefore, it must be said that, as was said above, this statement, "This is my body," is in a triple power: for it has one from institution, and another according as it is uttered in the person of the eternal Word who operates in it, and it has a third according as there is in it the truth of the sign: and as to the first two it is true that it does not extend itself in operating except over the body, and not over the blood. But the third extends itself to signifying the perfect body, contained not by the power of the sacrament, but under the sacrament: and therefore it shows the truth and the body just as it is. § 17. To the other it must be said, that this is false, that just as reality is related to reality, so form is to form: for although the form in the sacrament is effective of the reality, it is not necessary however for form to depend upon form. And so some say. Better yet, the proposition premised in the argument can be conceded: and it can be said that it is one thing for blood to be simply, and another for blood to be by the power of the sacrament under the sacrament. But in this way it can be without the body which is by the power of the sacrament being under the sacrament: and although for blood to be simply without the body is impossible, nevertheless for blood to be by the power of the sacrament under the sacrament, can be without the body being by the power of the sacrament under the sacrament: and in this way the reality of the sacrament is properly taken as of a sacrament: and thus it is clear that just as reality does not depend on reality, so neither does form on form. § 18. To the other it must be said, that sacramentally the perfect body is operated with the blood, as has been said: but that blood in it for the use of the faithful which is the drink of redemption, is not operated by the form said over the bread, but by that said over the chalice. And therefore that objection is not valid: because although the perfect body is under the species of bread, nevertheless it is not according to what is fitting for both uses of the faithful, namely of food and drink. And therefore it is commonly said by the Doctors that the blood is there not by the power of the sacrament, but from the natural connection of the blood and the body: because a perfect and living body has blood in the liver, and veins, and other parts of the body which ought to be suffused with blood. Now an objection against the argument concerns the soul: because either it operates the body and the soul, or not. If not: then it is imperfect, and thus it is not so. If so: then the bread is converted into the soul, which is impossible. And concerning the divinity there is the same objection. § 19. To the other it must be said, that this sacrament is not one from the unity of species or the form of words, but rather from the unity of that which is there reality and sacrament, and from the unity of that which is there reality only, as will be proved below. And therefore to the argument it must be said, that form gives being in this way in which it is form: and therefore the form of bread gives being as to the containment of the body, and the form of wine gives being as to the containment of the blood. But because Christ is the reality and the sacrament in

397. Luke 22:20

this sacrament, and He himself is truly one: therefore the sacrament is one. § 20. Concerning this, however, there will be a disputation below because it has great difficulty, and requires diligent discussion.

Articulus 9 — Whether This Sacrament Ought To Be Frequented After Supper Just As Christ Instituted It

§ 22. Next it is asked concerning what he says,

there, at C, § 2, around the beginning: "Where it is worthy of consideration, why that sacrament after supper," etc. § 24. For it seems from this that it should also be celebrated and frequented after supper: § 25. 1. For it is more to instruct by deed, than by word: since therefore He himself instituted this by word and work after supper: it seems also that it should be celebrated after supper. § 26. 2. Also, The instruction of the Master avails more than that of the disciple: therefore even if the Apostles decreed the contrary, it seems they should not be obeyed, but rather the Lord: and thus it is to be received after supper, as it seems. § 27. 3. Also, The less the need of food on the part of the body, when spiritual food is received, the more the spiritual food partaken is signified not to be received for the need of the body, but of the soul: but when the refreshment of the body has been made, the need of the body is less than when it has not been made: therefore if the body of Christ is received after refreshment is made, from this it is signified that it is received not on account of the body, but on account of the soul: but it is clear that it should be received in this way, namely on account of the soul, and not on account of the body: therefore it is more fitting that it be received after a meal, than before. § 28. 4. Furthermore, It seems that nothing prohibits it from being received after a meal: for what enters the mouth does not defile the soul, as the Lord says. But nothing impedes from the perception of this sacrament, except sin: therefore it seems that it can be celebrated and received after a meal. § 29. On the contrary: § 30. 1. Augustine says in the Text, that on account of the honor of so great a sacrament, the Lord's body ought to enter the mouth of a Christian before other foods. Therefore it is to be received and celebrated before a meal. § 31. 2. Also, I Cor. 11:20-21: "When you come together in one, it is no longer to eat the Lord's supper: for each one takes his own supper beforehand to eat." Therefore the Apostle posits this for a reason, that the body of Christ is not to be eaten, because one's own supper has been taken beforehand to eat: therefore it ought not to be received after food, as it seems. § 32. 3. Also, This sacrament on the part of the receiver requires the highest devotion: but the highest devotion requires the greatest sobriety of the senses and of reason: the highest sobriety requires fasting: therefore the body of Christ is to be received on a fasting stomach. § 33. Further it is asked here concerning the causes which the Master touches upon in the Text, that Christ gave His body after supper. § 34. For the first does not seem to be valid, namely that the last of the legal observances, which is the typical lamb, might be terminated at the Passion which is recollected in this sacrament: § 35. 1. For if two things are to be continued with each other according to succession, the last of the prior ought to be with the first of the posterior: but it is clear that the first sacrament of the New Testament is not the Eucharist, but rather

402. Matt 26:42

baptism: therefore it seems that it ought to have been continued to baptism. § 36. 2. Also, Just as the eating of the typical lamb was to be terminated at the eating of the true lamb, so circumcision was to be terminated at baptism: therefore by the same reason He ought to have circumcised the Apostles lastly after supper, and afterwards baptized them, just as He gave them the typical lamb, and afterwards the true. § 37. The second cause also does not seem to be valid, namely that He might more closely commend it to the memory of the disciples: § 38. 1. For that which is most necessary, is most to be commended to memory: but baptism and penance are most necessary: therefore they are most to be commended to memory: therefore both those and not the Eucharist ought to have been instituted lastly after supper. § 39. 2. Also further, According to the Philosophers, that which first occurs to memory before other motions are made in it, is more deeply rooted in memory and is more retained: if therefore that was to be commended to memory, as is said in the Text, it seems by that very fact that it should have been given to the disciples before other things, and not lastly. § 40. Solution. It must be said, that in truth, just as the Master proves in the Text, it is one way concerning the institution of this sacrament, and another concerning the frequentation by the faithful: for it was fitting for its institution that it be instituted after supper immediately before the Passion: but for its frequentation, that it be perceived and celebrated before a meal for the reverence and discernment of so great a food and for sobriety of devotion: for as the Apostle says, I Cor. 11:29: "He who eats and drinks unworthily, eats and drinks judgment to himself, not discerning the body of the Lord." Whence that food is to be discerned, as is said in the Text, and distinguished from other foods: and for this the vigor and sobriety of reason is required: but reason after a meal is obstructed because of fumes raised to the brain from the place of digestion, and is rendered less potent in discerning, and devotion is impeded: and also it can scarcely be that some delight, at least venial, does not creep in regarding the food, from which also a man is rendered less suitable: and therefore it had been wholesomely instituted, that it be frequented before a meal. But the causes why the Lord instituted it not only after a meal, but even after supper, are sufficiently touched upon in the Text. § 41. To the first therefore we say, that the Lord did not intimate by this that it should be frequented after supper: but in the Text it is held for what causes He instituted it after supper, so that thereafter it should be frequented before a meal. § 42. To the other it must be said, that this is true in those cases where the instruction of the Master and of the disciple are separate: but if the Master establishes in the disciple, that he not contradict the first operation of the Master which he does by himself according to intention, then the disciple is to be obeyed just as the Master. § 43. To the other it must be said, that satiety is contrary to the reception of the Eucharist from incongruity and non-conformity: but since even before a meal faith supposes that the body of Christ is not to be converted to us, but we to Him, it is sufficiently evident that it is never received on account of bodily need. § 44. To the other it must be said, that the greatest preparation is required for this sacrament: and therefore it is necessary to abstain not only from illicit things, but also from licit things not congruous with so great a sacrament: and attending to this the Church decreed that the faithful approach the sacrament fasting: and therefore one having dined sins by receiving, not indeed by dining, but because against the

403. Isa 51:22-23

reasonable prohibition of the Church he receives so great a sacrament having dined. § 45. To that which is further asked concerning the causes given in the Text, it must be said that they are excellent: and one is taken on the part of the order of truth to the shadow: while the other is on the part of the ingratitude for the love shown to us in the sign of the Passion and the Eucharist: for to forget that love by which He suffered for us, and gave Himself as food for us, is of damnable ingratitude. § 46. To the first therefore which is objected against this, it must be said that although baptism is the first sacrament on the part of its effect in us, nevertheless it is not the first on the part of the worker in all the sacraments: for the worker in all the sacraments is the Passion of Christ and the suffering Christ: but this, as was said before, is specially recollected in this sacrament. § 47. To the other it must be said, that baptism has a reality, which is the newness of spiritual life: and this was exemplarily shown in the Resurrection: and therefore it was more fitting for it to be instituted formally after the Resurrection, than immediately before the Passion: and concerning this enough has been asked in the treatise on baptism. § 48. To that however which is objected against the second cause, it must be said that although baptism is necessary because it is the sacrament of spiritual life, and the door of the sacraments, nevertheless it is not to be frequented: because it is given against original sin which is only one, and infects the soul once: and therefore there did not need to be a memorial of it. But in this sacrament frequency is required, because, as Bernard says in his epistle to the Carthusians, it is the memorial of our friend going away for us to the Passion, of which we ought never to be unmindful. § 49. To the last it must be said, that it is known that the first things are more deeply rooted in memory for retaining, but for frequenting, upon which the mind should always return, the last things are commemorated: because those are like outstanding things in the mind which more quickly present themselves to memory and meditation by themselves: just as in a similar case we can see what Cicero teaches, that the stronger arguments of Rhetoricians are to be placed at the end: so that those, standing out more prominently than other forms which are in the soul of the judge, may present themselves more to the meditation and reason of the judge.

Articulus 10 — Whether This Sacrament Ought To Be Celebrated After A Meal, And What Eating Or Drinking Bars From The Reception Of The Sacrament

§ 51. But still further it is asked, Whether this sacrament can be celebrated after a meal? § 52. Now it seems, that it cannot: because the Apostle says, I Cor. 11:20 and 21: "It is no longer to eat the Lord's supper: for each one takes his own supper beforehand to eat." But it is one thing not to be eating, and another not to ought to be eaten: for what is not eating, does not happen to be eating: and this is so because it is not confected, or because it is not ready for eating: therefore it seems that it is not confected after a meal. § 53. But against this is: that for a sacrament nothing is required except form and matter, and on the part of the confector order and intention: therefore supposing these, it seems that the sacrament is confected: therefore it is confected after a meal and before a meal, as it seems. § 54. Further it is asked, What eating debars one from the perception of the body and blood of the Lord? § 55. For physicians say, that some things are medicine and not food, and some food and not medicine, but some are

404. Ps 29:10 (Vulgate), which is Ps 30:9 in English Bibles.

food and medicine at the same time: let it be asked therefore if someone were to receive those things which are medicine and not food, which exhaust the body rather than are converted into the body, whether he can receive the body of the Lord? § 56. And it seems that he can: because § 57. 1. He did not receive food: and nothing else impeded him: therefore he is not impeded by such things, as it seems. § 58. 2. Also, Such things, as they say, do not break the fast: therefore they do not impede celebration or communion. § 59. On the contrary: § 60. From such things fumes and vapors are well provoked to the brain: therefore they impede reason from the discernment and judgment owed to this food: therefore it seems that they impede from celebration and communion. § 61. Further it is asked concerning those drinking water, whether they are debarred from celebration and communion? § 62. It seems that they are not: because § 63. 1. Simply speaking, water does not nourish: therefore it does not break the fast, nor impede celebration. § 64. 2. Also, Certain Doctors of law say this in their apparatus, that a drink of water does not impede from celebration. § 65. On the contrary: § 66. Although water inasmuch as it is such does not

nourish, nevertheless through the act of moisture it is the vehicle of food: either therefore it conveys the food mixed with the food, or not. If not mixed: then pure water would flow and flow back to the members, and the food upon it, which is false and absurd: therefore it conveys the food mixed with it: but mixed with food it is converted to the members and the body substantially: therefore water nourishes: therefore it breaks the fast, and impedes from celebration and communion, as it seems. § 68. Solution. Without prejudice to the judgment of my elders it seems to me to be said to the first, that if someone having orders and intention confects after a meal while preserving the form and matter of this sacrament, what is confected is confected: but he sins mortally by coming against the institution of the Catholic and Apostolic Church. § 69. But to that which is objected to the contrary, it seems to be said, that the Apostle says there, "is not," that is, "ought not": and not in the sense that it would not be if it were confected. § 70. But to that which is further asked, it must be said that in my judgment every food which we commonly and usually call food, that is, which passes into the stomach, even if it is not converted to the body, impedes celebration. § 71. To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that it is not only instituted on account of refreshment, because refreshment is no evil: but also on account of the vice of the body and the disturbance of the soul, which does not comport with the perception of so great a sacrament: but the body and the powers of the soul are sometimes disturbed more in that which is medicine and not food, than in that which is food: and therefore after the reception of such things the sacrament is not to be celebrated: nevertheless the sick for whom the law is not set, can receive in the hour of necessity, whether after a meal, or before a meal. § 72. To the other it must be said, that it is otherwise concerning fasting: because this is done for the affliction of the body: and therefore the disturbance of the senses is not contrary to fasting: and therefore it is conceded by some, that such things do not break the fast. § 73. To that which is further asked concerning the drink of water, it seems to me to be said, that celebration is not to be done after a drink of water: because materially it is also converted into food, and multiplies fumes to the head. § 74. But to that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that simple water remaining simple, does not nourish: but through digestive heat it is mixed with the food which is in the

stomach: and then it nourishes, just as the works of farmers show who mix it with dung when they want to irrigate plants: and then, as the Philosopher says, it begins thus intermixed to be nourishment. And what happens in plants externally by artifice, happens in man internally by nature mixing better. § 75. To the other it must be said, that simple fasting is one thing, and fasting by the usual reputation of the Church is another: for water without doubt breaks a simple fast: but because its aid is small, therefore by the Church the fast is not reputed to be broken by a drink of water. § 76. To the other it must be said, that Jurists do not have to speak of this, but rather the Physicist or Physician: but the Theologian taking this from the Physician has to determine, whether it is to be confected after a drink of water or not.

Articulus 11 — Whether The Eucharist Is Also A Sacrament, Or Not

§ 78. Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, at D, "Now what is the sacrament there," etc. § 79. Here three things incidental are to be asked, the first of which is, Whether it is a sacrament? because the Master supposes this. The second, what is the sacrament there and what the reality, and what the sacrament and reality? and this he touches upon in the Text. The third is consequent to this, namely whether it is one sacrament, or many? § 80. To the first one proceeds thus: Every sacrament effects what it figures: the sacrament in the Eucharist does not effect what it figures: therefore that which is only a sign or sacrament (as he says in the Text) is not a sacrament of the new law at least. The first premise is supposed from what was held above at the beginning of the book. But the second is proved from this that the species of bread and wine, which are signs, effect nothing: therefore it seems that the conclusion follows. § 81. 2. If perhaps you say, that to effect is to act, and action is not owed to matter, but to form: but the species of bread and wine are material in the sacrament: and therefore action is not owed to them, but to the form of the sacrament. On the contrary: In baptism and confirmation I see, that at least the matter has a corporal act in which the spiritual act of the sacrament is understood: for water washes dirt, in which the washing of sins is understood: and chrism on account of the balsam renders unputrifiable that which is anointed with it, in which the constancy of the confirmed is understood: but the species of bread and wine since they are accidents, have no likeness with the act of nourishing spiritually, because an accident does not nourish: therefore it seems, that in no way is it only a sacrament. § 82. Further it is asked concerning the true body of Christ, Whether it itself is a sacrament? § 83. And it seems, that it is in no way a sacrament: because § 84. 1. It is not visible or sensible: since therefore a sacrament is a visible and corporal element, externally subjected to the eyes, etc., it seems not to be a sacrament. § 85. 2. Furthermore, A sacrament of the new law effects what it figures: the true body of Christ does not seem to effect what it figures: therefore the true body of Christ is not a sacrament of the new law. The first premise is clear from what has been held often. The major premise is proved from the fact that the effect is not before the efficient cause: but the mystical body of Christ and its unity was before the true body of Christ: therefore it is not its effect, as it seems. § 86. 3. Furthermore, In other sacraments something is effected in us: therefore also in this one: but the mystical body of Christ is not something in the faithful, but rather the Christian faithful themselves: therefore it is not the effect of the sacrament, but rather the reality, as it seems. § 87. But if you say, that the

reality is signified, not caused, nor contained (as some say, and as seems to be said in the Text) then it follows, that with respect to that the Eucharist ought not to be determined to be a sacrament of the new law: because the sacraments of the old law well had signified realities not contained, just like the sacraments of the new law. § 88. Solution. Without ambiguity it must be said, that the Eucharist is not only a sacrament, but also the sacrament of sacraments, as will be consequently proved. § 89. But to the first it must be said, that in truth, just as the Master said in the Text, and Hugh of St. Victor, in this sacrament there are three things, the first of which is the sacrament in the ratio of sign only, namely the species of bread and wine. The second is the sacrament and reality, and the sign and cause of the third, and this is the true body of Christ. The third is the reality only, and is the virtue of the second, and the thing signified of the first and the second, and this is the unity of the mystical body. § 90. To that therefore which is objected, that the species effects nothing, it must be said that it is not necessary that the material species be effective, but significative, according to what the solution posited in the objection says. § 91. To that which is objected against this solution, it must be said that the species can be taken in two ways, namely according to what it is, and in comparison and relation to that which it contains, and of which it was as a subject. If in the first way: then it is true, that it is an accident, and does not nourish. But if in the second way: then it contains spiritual food, to whose act it posits a sign by the fact that it is the proper accident of corporal and natural bread, in which it was as in a subject before the conversion: and therefore according to some it still retains after the conversion some act of the bread: concerning which however the question will be manifest below. And in this way it posits a likeness to the spiritual refreshment, which unites us to the mystical body of Christ. § 92. To that which is further asked concerning the true body of Christ, it must be said that it is sacrament and reality, and is the cause and sign of the unity of the mystical body of Christ, and the thing signified and effect of the first, namely the bread and wine with the transubstantiating form. § 93. But to that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that the effect of this sacrament is not the mystical body (and those objections proceed from a bad understanding of the Text) but rather the unity of the mystical body. But that unity is effected in many ways, namely by the unitive spirit, and by the effect of virtues compaginated and connecting and uniting, as the Apostle touches upon. And in this way the unity of the mystical body of Christ precedes the true body of Christ. But there is another unity from sacramental grace according to which this sacrament converts to itself, and unites to itself whoever is fed in this sacrament: for in this that it unites anyone to itself, it unites all to one another: because whatever things are united to one and the same thing, are also united among themselves: and in this way the unity is the effect of the true body of Christ; and follows it as an effect its cause. § 94. Through this also the solution to the last point is clear, which is that to effect the mystical body of Christ is twofold: namely materially, and thus it is not the effect of any sacrament except perhaps matrimony. And it is to effect the unity of the body as to spiritual grace by reason of the food converting to itself: and in this way the unity of the mystical body of Christ is effected by the sacrament, and speaks of the grace contained in the faithful receiving the true body of Christ, and not the faithful themselves.

Articulus 12 — What A Sacrament Is, What The Thing Is, And What Sacrament And Thing Together Are

§ 96. Secondly it is asked. What is the sacrament here, and what the reality only? § 97. Now it seems, that the visible species of bread and wine cannot be the sacrament only: § 98. 1. For that which is the sacrament only, has the expression of a sign to that which is sacrament and reality, and to that which is reality only: but the species of bread and wine do not seem to have such a ratio of sign: therefore they are not the sacrament. The first is clear from what was held before. The second is proved from this that bread and wine are homogeneous bodies: but such things do not have a likeness with a heterogeneous thing, but rather a certain opposition: therefore they will not signify that. § 99. 2. Furthermore, Since the natural likeness to a natural thing is greater than an artificial to a natural thing, it seems that that which is the sign of the true body of Christ which is a natural body, ought to have been a natural body, and not artificial: therefore it seems, that it ought not to be the species of baked bread and pressed wine. § 100. 3. Also, Hugh of St. Victor says: "Since the sacrament is one, three discrete things are proposed in it, namely the visible species, and the virtue of the body, and the virtue of the spiritual soul: and the first is the sign of the second: but the second is the cause of the third: but the third is the effect of the second, and the thing signified of the first." Therefore it seems, that the first has the ratio of signifying both with respect to the second, and with respect to the third. Since therefore the signs of the New Testament ought to be the most fitting, and signs of truth, it seems that the sign ought rather to have been placed in a heterogeneous thing: because a heterogeneous thing expresses the composition of organs in the true body, and the unity of diverse faithful in the mystical body, neither of which seems to be in a homogeneous body. § 101. Solution. It must be said by the authority of Damascene who says, that because it was customary for men to be washed with water, and to be anointed with oil, He joined the grace of the Holy Spirit to the elements of oil and water, so that it might be made a sacrament spiritually washing and spiritually anointing. And because it was customary for men to use bread in food, and wine in drink, He made from these His body and blood united to the deity, and ministered it for spiritual food. And therefore in other things the ratio of signifying spiritual food would not be found so universally and fittingly. § 102. But to that which is objected first, it was also objected and solved above in the question concerning the form of the body of Christ. And it must be said, that there are two things in the bread, namely the ratio of food, and the matter from which the ratio of food is made: one is more in a homogeneous thing than in a heterogeneous thing: and because the body of Christ is food universally and simply, as to these things a homogeneous thing is more fitting than a heterogeneous thing. But if it is considered materially: then it is confected from many discrete grains, and as to this it has a likeness with the operation of the organs of the true body of Christ, and with the aggregation of the faithful. And because both must be signified in the matter of the Eucharist, on account of this it was necessary to have both in a certain way, namely heterogeneous in the matter of the bread, and homogeneous in the being of the confected bread, on account of the single ratio of feeding in the whole Christ: and the same reason applies to the wine. § 103. But to this which is objected concerning the artificial, it must be said that Christ having suffered and having been baked for us by the passion is signified in the Eucharist. But in the passion

there was the work of man, and as to this a work of art has a likeness, which is the work of man's will in which the bread is related as a patient: and he touches upon this exposition... ```

§ 1. Master Hugh of St. Victor says in a certain Epistle to Bernard concerning the paschal epistle: "and therefore Christ is called the unleavened bread of sincerity, because he was baked in the innocence of his passion."

§ 2. And through this the solution and response to the whole is clear.

Articulus 13 — Whether The Sacrament Is One Or Many

Whether the sacrament is one or many?

§ 1. Thirdly it is asked, whether it is one sacrament or many? And this is more difficult.

§ 2. And it is objected thus: It is said in a collect of Blessed Gregory: May the sacraments which we have received purify us, we beseech thee, O Lord, etc. Therefore there are many sacraments.

§ 3. Again, May thy sacraments, we beseech thee, O Lord, perfect in us what they contain, etc. Since therefore it speaks only of the sacrament of the Eucharist, it seems that there are many sacraments.

§ 4. Again, in the authority of Hugh posited above which says that "three discrete things are proposed in this sacrament": but three discrete things are many; therefore this sacrament is many sacraments, as it seems.

§ 5. Again, to be a sign is toward another: therefore if the sign is multiplex, the sacrament will be multiplex: and if there are many signs, there will be many signified things. But here there are two signs, namely the species of bread and the species of wine: and the mystical body of Christ and the true body of Christ are multiple signified things. Therefore there are multiple sacraments.

§ 6. If you say that one of these sacraments is ordered to the other. On the contrary: The species of bread is not ordered to the species of wine, although both are ordered to the body and blood of Christ; but the species of bread and wine are multiple signs, and the true and mystical body of Christ are multiple signified things: therefore multiple sacraments.

§ 7. If you say that the true body and blood of Christ are not diverse but one, and therefore multiple things do not respond to them but one, and from that one signified thing there is one sacrament, as is said by almost everyone. On the contrary: It is one thing for blood to be simply, and another for the blood of Christ to be had upon the altar by virtue of the sacrament. And it is similarly so of the body. But when the confecting of the body of Christ takes place, the blood is not had by virtue of the sacrament, as is clear from what was disputed above; and when the blood is confected, the body is not had by virtue of the sacramental form. Therefore the true body and the true blood, although they are naturally united, are nevertheless sacramentally divided; and in this way they are signified by the species of bread and the species of wine. Therefore in this way there are multiple signified things, and divided

according to the virtue of the sacramental form: therefore there will be multiple signs sacramentally: therefore multiple sacraments, as before.

§ 8. Again, what is commonly said—that from the unity of the ultimate signified thing there is one sacrament—seems to be nothing. For no ratio of union with respect to the preceding things is ultimate, as it seems, because the first things precede it, and therefore even if they are previously many, they are also many with it; and if they are one beforehand, they are also one with it.

§ 9. Again, a universal and a particular cause flow together into one ultimate effect, as is clear when it is said that a man and the sun generate a man out of matter. For the sun is the universal cause of generation (not of this man only), and the man is the particular cause of the generation of this man (not of universal generation); and yet, on account of that one thing which they effect, the man and the sun do not become one cause, but remain multiple causes. Therefore it seems that from the unity of the ultimate effect the things preceding that effect are not made one, but remain many.

§ 10. Again, "one" (as the Philosopher says) follows upon "being": and from that by which being is, from that unity is, because both are from form. Therefore where there are many things giving being, there are multiple unities, and multiple "ones," if one may speak thus. But in this sacrament there are multiple beings, because there are multiple forms. Therefore multiple "ones." Therefore multiple sacraments, as it seems.

§ 11. Again, things which agree neither in genus nor in species are simply many. The signs which are in this sacrament agree neither in species nor in genus: therefore they are simply many. The first premise is evident per se. The second is proved from the fact that the visible species of bread are the signs of the true body, and the wine is the sign of the mystical body; and these signs are neither in the same proximate genus, nor in the same species. Therefore they are simply many.

§ 12. Again, the signified things are also many. Proof: That which is simply one is not the same as that which is one in a qualified sense, namely by aggregation only. But the true body of Christ is simply one and by a natural unity, whereas the mystical body of Christ is one in a qualified sense and by aggregation only. Therefore they are not the same. Since therefore there is neither unity in the signs nor unity in the signified things, this sacrament seems to be simply many, and not one.

§ 13. Again, from two perfect things existing in the same genus, one thing is not made. But Christ is perfect under the reason of bread, and perfect under the form of wine. Therefore He is perfect in both places: therefore one is not made from that which is there and there. Therefore multiple sacraments remain.

§ 14. Again, we see that the unity of a signified thing in the imposition of names (which are signs of things) does not make the same name, nor does diversity make diversity. For Marcus, Tullius, and Cicero are diverse names and signify the same thing; and albus, alba, album (white) are the same name and signify diverse things. Therefore by similarity the same will hold in the sacraments: because the unity of the signified thing does not make the unity of the signs,

nor does diversity make diversity. Therefore it seems again that nothing is said by stating that, although there are diverse species here and diverse signs, nevertheless these are one sacrament on account of the unity of the signified thing.

§ 15. If on account of this it is said that these are multiple sacraments. On the contrary: Above it was proved that the sacraments of the New Law are only seven. But if this one is many, there will be more than seven. Therefore this is only one.

§ 16. Again, one sacrament is that which is effective of one grace. But this sacrament effects a single grace, because it effects the unity of the body of Christ. Therefore it is a single sacrament, and not many.

§ 17. Again, Ambrose says that a sacrament is simple. But what is simple is not many. Therefore this sacrament is one, and not many.

§ 18. Solution. A distinction made by certain Doctors preceding us was that there is something which is simply one (such as that which is of one form and one matter and one effect, like baptism); and there is another which is simply many (such as two or three sacraments which have different forms and matters and effects). But there is a middle between these which is one in a multiplex way, which by many matters and forms effects one effect; and to this they reduced this sacrament. But this distinction does not please me, insofar as one effect is not effected by two equally proximate causes, unless one of them is imperfect; and since grace is not more imperfect than nature, even in grace it seems absurd to me to say that an entirely single effect is effected by two equally proximate causes. And therefore it seems it must be said, without prejudice, that this sacrament is simply one, just like the others; but nevertheless, on account of the mode of grace which it effects, there are materially many things in it. And the reason for this will appear more lucidly in solving the objections.

§ 19. It must be said, therefore, to the first three objections, that they regard those things which are material in the sacrament. And therefore they say "sacraments," consignifying the plural number; yet they do not say "multiple sacraments" signifying the plural number as a concept, or as two or three sacraments, signing the plural number in exercised distinction.

§ 20. But if it is objected that Master Hugh says there are three things in this sacrament, and thus signifies an exercised distinction, it must be said that he signifies it obliquely. Hence he says that, although it is one sacrament, there are three discrete things in it: and therefore the discrete things refer to the matter of the sacrament, which nevertheless are terminated by one form: just as the distinction of the members of the body is terminated by the unity of the form of the whole, and the body from that form is simply one, yet it materially has within itself multiple members.

§ 21. To the next it must be said that, in truth, the being of a sign is not toward another, but toward the same: yet the sign of the species of bread and of the species of wine is referred in a different way, and yet by a single relation, which nonetheless seems marvelous. But I well concede that if multiple things were referred by multiple relations to the same or diverse things, they would be simply many. However, the same thing to which it is referred is the unity of the body, but not in the same way. For the species of bread has a relation of fittingness

to the union with the head, that the members might be bound to the head, just as bread is also confected out of many grains. But the species of wine has a relation to the grace of redemption which unites by a descent from the head: so that, as it were, our relation to the head might be signified in the bread, and His relation to us through the redemption of the ministered blood might be signified in the blood; and without these two there is no perfect union. And this is noted when He says, He who eats my flesh and drinks my blood abides in me, and I in him. Moreover, these species are referred by one relation, because that relation is the relation of a sign. For as Augustine says in the book On Christian Doctrine: Of signs, some are natural, and others by convention, and others from divine institution. And it is true that, as far as it is from a natural likeness, there is not one relation in the species of bread and of wine, because that likeness responds in a diverse way to the perfect unity; but from institution, which is the principal cause in the sacraments as to why they signify and cause, they have one relation: because by institution they were instituted to signify the same thing in diverse ways.

§ 22. And through this the solution to almost all the objections is clear: and this is the root of the whole truth in this article of the question.

§ 23. To the next it must be said that sacramentally the body of Christ and the blood are not entirely divided: because they are for effecting the same thing, namely the union of the mystical body, albeit in diverse ways, as was said.

§ 24. To the next it must be said that the first things are not entirely diverse, since in one there are four from the institution which is principally first: but it is noted that if they were united in none of the preceding things, then they could not be united in the ultimate thing.

§ 25. To the next it must be said that it is not similar concerning a particular and a universal cause: because those are united in nothing by substance, but only in the effect, which is posterior to both causes. But this institution precedes all things, and unites them in one.

§ 26. To the next it must be said that there are not simply multiple forms in this sacrament: and therefore just as the form of the part is one thing, and the form of the whole another, so the form of the whole is one thing and the form of the part of the sacrament another. For both of the forms, related to the unity of the institution, simultaneously confer complete being to the sacrament: but when they are taken divisively, they are material, and do not confer complete being to the sacrament according as it is a sacrament, although they confer the complete Christ, as will appear lower down. And therefore related to the unity of the institution by which Christ intended to institute one sacrament, they do not confer except one being and the unity of one sacrament.

§ 27. To the next it must be said that it is one thing to take that which makes the genus of a sacrament and the species, and it is another to take that which makes the genus of nature or the species: and concerning the genus of nature the objection proceeds, but concerning that which makes the being of a sign according as it is a sacrament it does not proceed: because thus they are not only in the same genus and species, but even in number, as was said before. Similarly the signified things are not in the same mode of unity of nature, but only in the

being of a sacrament one is ordered to the other, just as a sign and a cause are ordered to the signified and caused effect.

§ 28. To the next it must be said, without prejudice, that perfection is twofold, namely of Christ, and of the sacrament according as it comes into the use of the faithful, and perfects and signs the perfect unity of the mystical body. In the first way it is true that Christ is perfect under both species, namely of bread, and of wine: but in the second way it seems to me false, because the use of the faithful and the unity of the mystical body is not perfectly caused and signed except by a double sign, as was said before. And therefore by virtue of the sacrament it is necessary to have both; and these are united in one institution and one sign, although the modes of unity are diverse, as was said before.

§ 29. To the next it must be said that it is not similar concerning names, and signs instituted by God to signify sacramental graces. Because although sometimes it is the same thing upon which multiple names are imposed, nevertheless the institutor does not impose them from the same thing: because since a name signifies a substance with a quality, the institutor respects the quality; and this is sufficient for the Grammarian, if he also has a diverse mode for a diverse institution. And therefore multiple names imposed from such modes of qualities can belong to the same thing; and because even one quality and mode is in diverse things, one institution is made for diverse things signified by the same name varied in its consignifications, such as albus, alba, album. But it does not happen thus in the institution of a sacramental sign: for there the perfect signification of one grace is respected, although the mode of participating it may be diverse. And therefore there is one institution over all those things which avail to express the force of that grace; and all those things are united in that institution.

§ 30. And through this the solution to all is clear.

DISTINCTIO IX

Divisio Textus

§ 1. And just as there are two realities of that sacrament, etc.

§ 2. Having gone through those things which pertain to the substance of this sacrament, he touches upon it in this part according to its comparison to the celebrant or confector, there, Dist. XI, F, After these things it is asked, if what the priest does is properly called a sacrifice, etc.

§ 3. In this part, however, he touches upon the sacrament on the part of the recipient. And it is divided into two parts: in the first of which he touches upon the two modes of receiving, and the opinions and errors which surround those modes. In the second, he touches upon the mode of conversion, and certain consequences of the mode of that transubstantiation, such as concerning the accidents, and fraction, and such things: and this begins there, Dist. XI, A, But if it is asked, What kind of conversion is that, etc.

§ 4. The first of these is divided into two: in the first of which he contains the first chapter of this new distinction, and touches upon the two modes of eating. But in the second, by reason of the authorities introduced, he touches upon the errors which surround this matter: and this begins there, B, These words and others of this kind, where concerning spiritual eating, etc.

§ 5. In this chapter, therefore, he proves that there are two modes of eating, namely sacramental, and spiritual. And concerning these modes three things can be asked in common. The first is about the distinction of these modes. The second is about that mode in particular which is called spiritual. The third, about their number.

Articulus 1 — Whether There Are Two Modes Of Receiving The Eucharist, Namely, Sacramental And Spiritual, And How They Are Distinguished

Whether there are two modes of receiving the Eucharist, namely sacramental and spiritual, and how they are distinguished?

§ 1. To the first it is objected thus: For it seems that these modes are not distinct on the part of the sacrament, but on our part. For in baptism there is always the reception of a spiritual effect, unless there is an impeding fiction [i.e., obstacle]. And therefore baptism of itself works salvation: therefore similarly since the Eucharist is a sacrament of the New Law, it always works spiritual grace: therefore the sacramental in it is not to be distinguished from the spiritual.

§ 2. Again, an earthly king is not less powerful where he is present by himself than where he is present by a minister, but more so. Therefore it is similarly so of the heavenly King: but Christ by Himself is in the sacrament of the Eucharist in three substances and unity of person, whereas in the other sacraments He works only by the virtue of His Passion. If therefore the reception of the other sacraments, as far as it is of itself, is always spiritual, much more will the reception of the Eucharist always be spiritual: and thus there is no distinction, unless it is understood on our part.

§ 3. Again, the operation of a sacrament is distinguished from the operation of virtue and grace, because in the sacraments the divine virtue operates salvation more secretly in a corporal element. Therefore unless the operation of some corporal element precedes, it does not happen that one comes to a spiritual effect. Therefore it seems that the spiritual mode of receiving is never distinguished from the sacramental.

§ 4. Again, in baptism, although a feigned person approaches, nevertheless we do not say that he receives nothing of the spirit, because he receives the character. Therefore much more will this be so in the sacrament of the Eucharist: therefore he who eats sacramentally, eats spiritually. And thus sacramental eating is not distinguished from spiritual; and thus again the distinction seems to be evacuated on our part.

§ 5. Again, in the Text we have from Augustine: Why do you prepare a tooth and a belly? Believe, and you have eaten. Therefore this food does not pass into the body. Therefore it is not of a corporal element. Since therefore in all receivers there is some food, it must be that it is

spiritual in all: therefore to receive spiritually is never separated from sacramental reception: therefore there is no distinction.

§ 6. Again, if there is some mode of receiving sacramentally only, this will be by reason of something which happens in the sacrament: therefore either by reason of the accidents, and then he would more truly receive sacramentally who received the accidents; or by reason of the truth of the body of Christ received, and then either the truth of the body passes into the belly, or into the mind. Not into the belly, because this is denied in the Text: therefore into the mind: therefore it is united to the mind, or the mind is united to the body of Christ, and this is to receive spiritually: therefore he who receives sacramentally, receives spiritually, as it seems: and thus the distinction is worth nothing.

§ 7. If perchance it is said, just as some evade this, that to receive spiritually is to be spiritually united to Christ, and to remain in Christ. On the contrary: To be united to Christ is not the act of the sacrament: therefore to be united to Christ is not to receive the sacrament spiritually. The proof of the first premise is: because before the institution of this sacrament the faithful were united to Christ and to the mystical body.

§ 8. Again, charity toward God and neighbor unites to God and neighbor: yet not everyone having charity receives the sacramental reality spiritually. Therefore it seems that this solution is not true.

§ 9. Again, although grace is the spiritual reality of the sacrament, yet it is not just any grace, but that which properly operates in the sacraments. But the proper effect of anything is never had, without that thing being had. Therefore the proper effect of this sacrament is never had unless the sacrament itself is perceived.

§ 10. Solution. It seems it must be said, without prejudice, that these modes are sometimes distinct, and sometimes joined. They are distinct when there is a perception of the true body of Christ without the effect of interior grace, but rather with spiritual harm, just as is said in the Text in the second part of the distinction, that he who receives this sacrament unworthily acquires for himself a great torment. And again, that a good is an evil, when a good is received badly: and such a mode of sacramental reception is divided from the spiritual. Conversely, there are some who by memory or the habit of the passion of Christ and a spiritual sacrifice unite themselves to Christ the head, and they receive spiritually, and not sacramentally.

§ 11. Therefore it seems it must be said to the first objection, that this distinction is not only on our part, but also on the part of the sacrament: because the sacrament has a twofold contained reality: one from the force of the consecration, which is the true body of Christ which is confected outside us. It has another contained reality, just as a cause contains the caused thing virtually within itself: and that is grace on our part. And this is not so in the other sacraments which do not have a contained reality except as caused in us: and therefore in those there is no distinction of a twofold mode as in this one. Yet this seems to be conceded, that although it has a twofold reality, as was said, nevertheless it is not impeded from that other one of them which it ought to cause in us, except on our part.

§ 12. To the next it must be said that Christ by Himself in a threefold substance is the reality contained in the Eucharist by virtue of the consecration, and it is not from His defect that the ulterior spiritual reality is not induced, but rather from our defect: but nonetheless because one of these realities does not denote anything in us, nor is it effected in us, but outside us by virtue of the consecration in the sacrament, while the other is effected spiritually in our spirit: therefore the ratio of the discretion is on the part of the reality of this sacrament in some way, as was said.

§ 13. To the next it must be said that, without a doubt, that argument has more probability than the others; yet without prejudice it can be said that that objection would hold well in the other sacraments, and especially in those which imprint a character. For although something may supply the place of a sacrament, nevertheless some effect is so proper to the sacrament that it is not effected except by the sacrament. But in the Eucharist the sacramental mode of receiving is totally referred to the spiritual, and is for the sake of it: and therefore the spiritual also by itself can operate the same grace, although the presence of Christ in the sacrament bears a certain delight which the spiritual mode of eating does not have in itself.

§ 14. To the next it must be said that it is otherwise in baptism, and in this one. Because baptism has a special and principal ordering against original sin which is contracted from another, and it places a man in the state of faith (which state is concerning unformed and formed faith, as was said above in the question concerning character): and therefore a feigned person receives the character remaining with him. But in this one he receives the true body of Christ: because that is not caused in the recipient, but outside him: and therefore the unfitness of the recipient cannot impede it.

§ 15. To the next it must be said that Augustine speaks there of incorporation and union through incorporation, and not of the presence of the truth of the body of Christ. However, afterwards there will be a question about this in its own place. Hence I think it must be conceded that the true body of Christ passes into every place into which the species pass, with the species of bread and wine remaining.

§ 16. To the next it must be said that the sacramental mode of receiving is so called by reason of the presence of the truth of the body of Christ in the sacrament, and I well concede that it does not pass into the mind: because Christ as man does not glide into the mind. And what is objected about passing into the belly has already been solved.

§ 17. To the next it must be said that to receive spiritually is to be united to Christ through the spiritual effect of this sacrament: and indeed the sacrament did not have this before it was a sacrament, but the union by which the faithful were united was the union of charity and faith. Yet after the sacrament is, the reality of the sacrament can come to be in the soul through meditation and devotion, which Christ spiritually conjoined works, because (as was said in the beginning of this book) He has not bound His grace to the sacraments. Others say otherwise, and perhaps better, namely that the reality of the sacrament and the union occurs in a twofold way, namely by sacramental grace, and one does not have this unless one worthily receives the sacrament: and thus it can also happen in someone supplying the force of the

sacrament, just as martyrdom and penance sometimes supply the place of baptism. And in this way the faithful receive the reality of this sacrament through the devotion and love of the head and the members.

§ 18. And through this the solution to the following and to the last is also clear.

Articulus 2 — Whether There Is Some Spiritual Mode Of Receiving The Eucharist, And What There Is In Such A Mode On Account Of Which It Is Called Eating

Whether there is any spiritual mode of receiving the Eucharist? And what is it in such a mode whence it is called an "eating"?

§ 1. Secondly, it is asked especially concerning that mode which is called spiritual. For this one seems to be nothing.

§ 2. For although it is said by the Saints and Masters that some things supply the place of a certain sacrament as to something, yet it is not conceded that this sacrament is perceived in them: for no one perceives baptism in penance, nor in martyrdom: therefore it seems that the reality of this sacrament is similarly never perceived except through the act of the sacrament, although something can be perceived in its place.

§ 3. Again, although penance supplies the place of baptism, nevertheless I cannot say that the penitent is baptized. Since therefore the proper act of this sacrament, which is the bread of life, is to be eaten sacramentally, just as of baptism to be baptized, it seems that on account of no devotion ought it to be conceded that someone eats spiritually: although the contrary is said in the second chapter of this distinction.

§ 4. Again, through corporal things one comes to spiritual things in sacramental realities: therefore where a corporal thing has not preceded, one can never find the spiritual proper to this sacrament, as it seems.

§ 5. Again, the spiritual mode of eating either operates entirely the same thing as the sacramental, or it operates less. If entirely the same: since therefore it is nobler to do something by one thing than by two, it seems that the spiritual mode would be superfluous. But if it operates something less than that: then it is not a mode of the sacrament, but of something which supplies its place.

§ 6. Furthermore it is asked further, what is it in the spiritual mode of eating by reason of which it is called an "eating"?

§ 7. But it seems that it is nothing: because in corporal eating there are four things, namely the division of food, the passage of the food into the place of digestion, digestion, and union or incorporation. But none of these happen in the spiritual eating of Christ. For Christ is not divided, nor does He pass to the place of digestion, nor is He digested, nor is He incorporated, but rather He incorporates us to Himself. Therefore it seems that spiritual eating is not a reception of the body of Christ.

§ 8. Again, spiritual eating either occurs by any devotion whatever, or by any act of charity whatever, or by certain spiritual acts. If it is said that it occurs by any devotion, and by any act

of charity: then it follows that this eating was from the beginning of the world, and was before the sacrament was; which cannot be. Because since the mode of perceiving the reality of a sacrament is after the sacrament, there could not be a mode of perceiving the Eucharist spiritually, except after the sacrament of the Eucharist. But if it is some spiritual act and mode of devotion and charity, let it be asked what that act is? And if it is said that this is by the charity of offering for us the price of the world in Christ the head and in the members, it seems that this was from the beginning of the world. Therefore the spiritual perception of the body of Christ was from the beginning of the world, which seems absurd.

§ 9. Solution. Here many have said many things: but it seems to me that it must be said, without prejudice, that the spiritual mode of eating is threefold. One is common, namely the participation in the effect of the sacrament in general, and not from the same cause, such as the participation in the incorporation of the mystical body of Christ and of Christ the head not from the sacrament, but from the faith and charity of the head and the members. And in this way it was perceived by the faithful from the beginning, and will be perceived. In a second way more properly, namely the tasting of the sweetness of the grace of the communion of the body through the meditation and devotion of those things of which the Eucharist is the sign. And in this way the sacramental grace is also perceived, not from the same cause of the sacrament, but from another, because namely it has its force. And in this way it was not perceived spiritually before the sacrament, unless the rite and signification of the sacrament had been revealed to someone. Thirdly most properly, namely the perception of the grace of the communion of the mystical body, and from the proper sacramental cause. And this spiritual eating is never separated from the sacramental: because in this way the spiritual is received in the sacrament, as medicine in a vessel, and the caused thing in the cause.

§ 10. It must be said therefore to the first, that it seems it must well be conceded that in such things there is no perception of the sacramental reality properly speaking, but commonly.

§ 11. And in this way, it seems it must be said to the second.

§ 12. To the third it must be said that if the spiritual is taken as the spiritual of the sacrament as a sacrament, then it seems to me that the objection proceeds. But if commonly or in the second way, then it is clear that it does not hold.

§ 13. To the next it must be said that it does not operate entirely the same thing, as has already been made clear: and therefore the sacrament is not received without cause, but rather with the greatest utility.

§ 14. To that which is further asked, it must be said that those things which are in spiritual eating are in some way similar to those things which are in corporal eating, but not entirely. For whenever two things are united such that one ought to be changed to the other, then that which is more powerful changes to itself that which is weaker. Hence since this food is of a more powerful virtue than those eating it, this food changes those eating to itself, just as is said to Augustine: You shall not change me into you, like the food of your flesh, but you shall be changed into me. There is also another reason for this: because if this food were changed into

us, it would profit us nothing, because we are nothing except through Him; and therefore according to the order of grace it was fitting that we should be changed into Him. Hence the division which is in corporal eating is not except as it relates to the species: of which however there will be a treatise below. But mastication has something similar: for just as teeth frequently return upon that which is masticated, so meditation by the frequent act of discerning this food and the memory of the Passion operates something in spiritual eating. But the passage of the food to the place of digestion does not have a proper similarity. But digestion, which according to the Philosopher is a completion by the natural and proper heat out of contrasting passions, is referred to us: because we are as it were digested by charity, and completed; and the impure is separated in us from the pure; and then follows union, that we may be united to the food which we receive.

§ 15. But it is objected against this: because it seems to someone from this that this food ought to be frequently masticated, since there seems to be a danger here on account of the crevices of the teeth in which something of the species can adhere.

§ 16. Solution. To this it must be said that it is not necessary on this account that it be masticated more frequently, but rather it is to be broken by the tongue, and swallowed. Yet from the fact that the species are masticable, if there were no danger, it would sufficiently come to the memory of the Passion and the charity of Christ by which He loved us when He gave Himself for us.

§ 17. To the last the solution is clear through the distinction posited at the beginning of the solution.

Articulus 3 — Why There Are Only Two Forementioned Modes Of Eating, And In What Respect They Differ

Why are there only the two aforementioned modes of eating, and according to what do they differ?

Why are there only the two aforementioned modes of eating, and according to what do they differ?

Third, it is inquired concerning the number of these two. For it seems that there are more than two.

§ 1. For in the sacrament there are three things, namely one which is the sacrament only, another which is the reality and the sacrament, and a third which is the reality only. Therefore, to these three things three modes of eating seem to correspond; therefore there are three, and not two.

§ 2. Moreover, one who receives unworthily is in two modes, namely having neither faith nor charity, and having unformed faith but not charity: therefore it seems that to each a spiritual mode corresponds. However, it is certain that such persons do not receive spiritually: therefore there are two sacramental modes.

§ 3. Moreover, this is called the sacrament of charity: therefore it seems that at least the spiritual mode ought to be distinguished according to the states of charity: but there are three states of charity, namely beginning, progressing, and perfect: therefore the spiritual mode of receiving seems that it ought to be distinguished according to these three.

§ 4. Moreover, in other sacraments only a twofold mode of receiving is distinguished, according to the feigned and the unfeigned: therefore neither in this one should a distinction be made except according to this, as it seems: therefore it should not be distinguished thus, sacramentally and spiritually: but some receive feignedly, some unfeignedly.

SOLUTION. It must be said that there are two modes distinguished by the Saints, as is held in the Letter (the Sentences), and they are taken according to the twofold reality of the sacrament, of which one it contains by the power of consecration, and the other it causes in us from the fact that it confers grace just as other sacraments of the new law: and therefore it is evident according to what the number of these modes is taken.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that according to that which is the sacrament only, no mode is taken: because here it does not have the intelligible character of food, but rather it is in the use of showing and signifying the food which it contains.

To the next it must be said that, in my judgment, one who does not have unformed faith eats neither sacramentally nor spiritually, except in potency: however, there will be a question about this below. And therefore since he is moved by no motion of faith from the species to the reality, it seems that he does not eat sacramentally, and yet he eats the sacrament. Or, so that all caviling may be forestalled, let it be said that to receive or to eat sacramentally is spoken of in two ways. In the first way, such that the word "sacramentally" designates the mode of the food: and thus to eat sacramentally is to eat the sacrament: and in this way there is no inquiry here concerning the mode of eating. In the second way it can designate the mode of the one eating or receiving: and in this way an unbeliever, who is moved by no motion of faith, does not receive sacramentally. But in my judgment, for one to eat or receive spiritually, it is necessary that it designates the mode on the part of the receiver.

To the next it must be said that this distinction is according to the modes of receiving the body of Christ in a generic way; however, it is not denied that there are many particular modes by which one perceives greater grace, another lesser, according as they approach being diversely prepared.

To the next it must be said that its solution is already contained in the premises: because in this sacrament there is one reality outside, and another inside the soul: and therefore the ratio of distinction arises from those things which are in the sacrament, and it was evident above that it is not thus in other sacraments.

Articulus 4 — What Kind Of Union Is Required So That Someone May Eat The Body Of Christ, Whether Spiritually Or Sacramentally

What kind of union is required so that someone may eat the body of Christ either spiritually or sacramentally?

What kind of union is required so that someone may eat the body of Christ either spiritually or sacramentally?

Next it is inquired concerning this which he says there, at A, near the beginning: "For he eats spiritually, who abides in the unity of Christ and of the Church which the sacrament signifies," etc.

And it is inquired, what kind of union is required for someone to eat the body of Christ either spiritually, or sacramentally?

§ 1. For there is a union according to the contact of bodies, and according to the agreement of the nature of Christ and of man, and according to the conformity of the grace of unformed faith, and finally again according to the conformity of charity. If, however, the first suffices for eating sacramentally, then a mouse whose body is united to the species would eat sacramentally, which will be denied below in the Letter. If, however, a natural union is required in addition, that is, an agreement according to nature by which one can be united and understand, it seems that anyone, even an unbeliever, receives the body of Christ sacramentally; which does not seem true, since thus it would be turned into a mockery by Jews and Pagans.

§ 2. Furthermore, in other sacraments, one who believes nothing, and protests that he believes nothing, nor wishes to receive what the faithful receive, perceives nothing at all: therefore much more does this hold in this one in which the whole is owed to faith: therefore it seems that one believing nothing, even though he has a nature ordered to faith, perceives nothing, neither sacramentally nor spiritually. But if it suffices to have unformed faith: then the inconveniences maintained above follow, namely that from the beginning of the world the body of Christ was received.

§ 3. Furthermore, it seems that having Christ abiding in oneself is not the effect of the sacrament, but of virtue: for so He says concerning one who loves Him: "My Father will love him, and we will come to him, and will make our abode with him." Therefore, to abide in Him is not to eat spiritually, as it seems.

SOLUTION. It must be said that if spiritual eating is taken strictly according to the distinction posited above, then to abide in Christ is to abide in Him through charity and devotion proceeding from the communication of the body of Christ according to act or according to purpose and desire.

And according to this it must be said to the first, that for sacramental eating more is required than the union of the body to the sacramental species, and more than the union or conformity of a nature capable of understanding the signification of the species: and I think that unformed faith is required, as the objection proves: nevertheless I do not deny but that the true body of Christ is there, as long as the species remain, and yet that person does not receive or eat: because to receive and to eat express the union and incorporation of the eater to the food which is received: and this in no way occurs in an unbeliever.

To that, however, which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that although the ancients believed in Him who was to come and be incarnate, nevertheless, properly speaking,

they did not receive spiritually: because to receive expresses the refreshment of the desire and the purpose of communicating, which the ancients did not have, since the sacrament did not yet exist.

Articulus 5 — Whether The Body Of Christ, Once Received, Passes Into The Stomach, And How Long It Remains

Does the received body of Christ pass into the stomach? and how long does it remain?

Does the received body of Christ pass into the stomach? and how long does it remain?

Next it is inquired concerning this which he says there, at A, near the middle: "Why do you prepare a tooth, and a stomach? Believe, and you have eaten," etc.

For from this it seems that: § 1. This food passes into the stomach: which also seems from this which is held:[405] "Whatever enters into the mouth, goes into the stomach, and is cast out into the privy," which is unworthy and wicked to think concerning the body of Christ.

§ 2. Moreover, as bodily food is related to the body, so spiritual food is related to the spirit: but bodily food by entering into the body, refreshes it: therefore spiritual food by entering the spirit, refreshes it, and thus does not enter into the stomach.

§ 3. Moreover, what enters the stomach, goes to the offices of the stomach, which are to digest, and to transmute: but this does not happen concerning the body of Christ: therefore the body of Christ does not enter into the stomach.

But against this there seem to be authorities and reasons.

§ 1. For Pope Clement says, and it is posited in the Decretals in the treatise on consecration, thus: "Let those who consume the remains of the Lord's body which are left in the sacrament, not immediately convene to receive common foods, nor let them think that food which is digested and emitted through the privy is mixed with the holy portion." But there would be no reason why he should command them to abstain for a time, unless the host were cast into the stomach: therefore it goes into the stomach.

§ 2. Moreover, in the same place, Clement: "If the Lord's portion is eaten in the morning, let the ministers who have received it fast until the sixth hour: if they have received it at the third or fourth hour, let them fast until evening, so that the sacraments may be kept holy by sanctification." And from this the same is gathered as before.

§ 3. Moreover, in the same place, Bede: "If anyone through voracity or drunkenness vomits the Eucharist, let him do penance for forty days: clerics, or monks, deacons, or presbyters, seventy." This again would be said without reason, if it did not pass into the stomach.

§ 4. Moreover, Hugh of St. Victor: "As long as the bodily sense is affected, the bodily presence is not removed." But the species in which the bodily sense is visibly affected passes through the mouth into the stomach: and thus if vomiting occurs, sometimes the host or a part of it is found, and thus this food passes into the stomach.

§ 5. Moreover, it passes either into the stomach, or into the mind. If into the stomach, the proposition is held. If into the mind. On the contrary: Nothing flows into the soul except God the Trinity: the body of Christ is not God the Trinity: therefore it does not pass into the soul: therefore it seems that nothing remains except that it passes into the stomach.

Next to this it is further inquired, How long does the body of Christ remain?

For some have said that it immediately flies away from the mouth: but if this were true, since the body of Christ is not under the form of bread except from consecration, if someone removed the host from the mouth, the body of Christ would not be there: and this is not said by the Masters.

Moreover, Hugh holds that the bodily presence remains as long as the sense is affected: but the sense is affected in the vomited matter: therefore the bodily presence is in it.

Whether, however, it nourishes the soul, or not, will be a question below.

SOLUTION. Without prejudice, it seems to me that a distinction must be made in this question: for something is said to pass into the stomach in two ways, and it is said to pass into the mind in two ways. For something is said to pass into

the stomach, passing to the act of the organs of the stomach: namely so that it may be digested in the stomach, and through the mesenteric veins be drawn to the liver, and there be formed into blood, and be distributed in the members, and be assimilated, and be united: and in this way the body of Christ does not pass into the stomach: for this passing is of bodily food, for restoring the loss of the body. It is also said to pass into the stomach: because it passes into it, as into any place of its containment: and thus it seems to me that the body of Christ passes into the stomach: because I do not see reasonably how the body of Christ does not pass to every place to which the species of bread and wine pass, under which according to the truth of the reality the whole Christ is contained. In the same way it seems it must also be said, that something passes into the mind in two ways, namely that it flows in by its substance: and thus only God the Trinity passes into the mind. In another way it is said to pass into the mind, that whose effect comes into the mind by information by perfecting the mind itself: and in this way the body of Christ passes into the mind by working sacramental grace in the mind.

And through this the solution to all the objections is evident: because the first part of the objections proceeds concerning the first passing into the stomach, which does not belong to the body of Christ. But the second part proceeds concerning the second passing: and in this way it passes into the stomach, as it seems to me. And I say this without prejudice: because some Masters say the opposite. Whence on account of reverence for the sacrament, penance is enjoined upon those who vomit the Eucharist through carelessness. And it is commanded, that after communion they fast for a little while, lest they seem to mix sacramental food with bodily.

405. Matt. 15:17.

To that which is further inquired, it must be said that Hugh says, "As long as the sense is affected," that is, as long as the species are able to be discerned, "the bodily presence is not removed," and for so long is Christ there. However, some have said otherwise: but their reason is not probable.

Articulus 6 — Whether The Ancient Fathers In Some Way Ate Sacramentally

Did the ancient Fathers in any way eat sacramentally?

Next it is inquired concerning this which he says there, at A, near the end: "Because he is not deprived of the benefit of that sacrament, when he to have," etc.

For here it is inquired, whether the ancient Fathers ate sacramentally in any way.

But it seems that they did: because § 1. Augustine says in the Letter: "Believe, and you have eaten." But they believed: because, as the same Augustine says, the faith of the ancients and of the moderns was and is the same. But the times have varied, while faith has remained unchanged. Therefore they ate.

§ 2. Moreover:[406] "They all ate the same spiritual food, and they all drank the same spiritual drink (and they drank of the spiritual rock that followed them)." Therefore at least they understood spiritually.

§ 3. Moreover, the Gloss, in the same place: "Because they understood the visible spiritually, they hungered spiritually, they tasted spiritually, so that they might be satisfied spiritually." Therefore it seems that they ate in the sacrament, which nevertheless they understood spiritually.

§ 4. Moreover, the Apostle says,[407] that "all were baptized in Moses, in the cloud and in the sea," etc. In the same way both in spiritual food, and drink they spiritually ate the Eucharist, and communicated in the body and blood of Christ.

§ 5. Moreover, to eat sacramentally nothing is required except the presence of a sign, which besides the species which it ingests into the senses, makes something else come into knowledge: and that this may be understood, the ancient Fathers had

such a twofold sign, namely the flesh of the lamb, and the manna: therefore it seems that since they understood, as the aforementioned Gloss says, that they themselves ate sacramentally and spiritually.

ON THE CONTRARY: Nothing is received in the sacrament except what is contained in the sacrament: but Christ was not contained in their sacraments: therefore He was not received in the sacrament.

If you say, that He was contained, as the signified in the sign, and not as the caused in the cause? On the contrary: A reality signified and not caused is not perceived in the sacrament: Christ was signified, and not contained in the sacraments of the ancients: therefore He was not perceived in their sacraments.

Moreover, it is proved from this that baptism signifies washing from all punishment through glory in the Resurrection: and yet this is not perceived in baptism: and thus concerning the other sacraments of the old and the new law.

SOLUTION. Without prejudice it seems to me that one must not recede from the higher opinion, that properly speaking the ancient Fathers ate neither sacramentally nor spiritually: and this especially on account of the reason stated above: which is, that the mode of perceiving whatever reality, follows the existence of that reality in itself, and does not precede it: since therefore it is certain that that sacrament did not exist, except from when Christ gave His body to the disciples: it seems to me, that before this no one ate neither sacramentally nor spiritually, properly speaking, unless to eat spiritually is taken broadly, as was determined above.

To that therefore which is objected first, it must be said that if Augustine is speaking properly, he does not understand concerning faith according to just any motion, but according to that by which it is moved from a sign remembered or actually perceived to the signified and contained with the purpose and desire of tasting according to the reality, incorporating oneself to the reality contained: and this is not fitting except after the existence of this sacrament.

To the next it must be said that the Apostle calls spiritual taste, spiritual senses in the Scriptures, and the drink of wisdom in which they understood the future.

To the next it must be said that that Gloss speaks of a sacrament not containing the reality: just as it is equivocally called a sacrament, as was held in the beginning of this book. Whence there was not there a taste of a present reality in a containing sign, or proposed, but in faith alone: and this in my judgment does not suffice properly speaking.

To the next it must be said that neither were they baptized properly speaking: but he calls them baptized, because in the figure of baptism they understood something of the efficacy of the future baptism, and through devotion they perceived the remission of sins, and not from the power of the sacrament. And similarly it seems it must be conceded, that they ate, that is, in the type of the Eucharist they understood the future sacrament, and from devotion they were united to the head Christ and the members: but this does not suffice: because in the New Testament in those perceiving the sacrament, the sacrament makes that union from the power of the reality contained (otherwise, operated) and not only from the devotion of those perceiving.

To the next it must be said that this is true, that to eat sacramentally the presence of a sign suffices with faith directing to the signified: but this sign is signifying and causing and containing: but such signs were not in the Old Testament: and therefore they did not perceive the sacrament properly speaking.

Divisio Textus

Next it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, "These words and others of this kind," etc. For the Master touches upon two errors, the first of which he determines in this

distinction, but the rest in the following distinction, which begins there, Dist. X, A, "There are also others transcending the madness of the preceding," etc.

The first is, that the wicked do not receive the body of Christ: and he destroys this in the Letter, and solves the authorities providing an occasion for erring, as is evident in the Letter.

However, five things are usefully inquired here: of which the first is, whether the wicked receive anything when approaching the body of Christ? and this is the question of the Letter. Second, whether they receive to their damnation, or without sin? Third, whether the wicked receiving the Eucharist sin more by receiving the body of the Lord, than by sinning by another sin? Fourth, whether one polluted by nocturnal pollution, or sleeping with his own wife, can receive the body of Christ? Fifth and lastly, whether bodily uncleanness, such as menstruation or flux of seed, impedes from the reception of the body of Christ, as some seem to say?

Articulus 7 — Whether The Wicked Who Approach Receive Anything Of The Body Of Christ, And How The Body Of Christ Remains In Them

Do the wicked approaching, receive anything of the body of Christ? and, How does the body of Christ remain in them?

To the first of these it is objected thus: § 1. The disconvenience of Christ to sin is greater than to the body: but He does not pass into the body, as was held above: therefore He does not pass into the sinful soul: therefore he perceives nothing in the sacrament: because He immediately flies away, as some say.

§ 2. Moreover:[408] "The holy spirit of discipline will flee the feigned": but Christ is not of lesser holiness than the Holy Spirit: therefore Christ also will flee him: therefore the wicked perceives nothing of Christ in the sacrament.

§ 3. Moreover:[409] "Wisdom will not enter into a malicious soul, nor dwell in a body subject to sins." Therefore Christ remains neither in the body nor in the soul of the sinner: therefore He departs from both: therefore he perceives nothing when he approaches.

§ 4. Moreover, the reality of this sacrament exceeds the reality of the other sacraments, as is said in the Letter, because here the whole Christ is received and in other sacraments He is perceived according to the effect of grace: therefore it seems less likely that the realities of other sacraments should depart from a sinner, than the reality of this sacrament: and they do depart, because he perceives nothing of the reality of the other sacraments: therefore He also departs from this one: therefore nothing is perceived by the wicked except only the exterior species.

§ 5. Moreover, an unseemly and harmful work is not the work of a wise man: but it is unseemly for a wise man to be in a place not competent for him: therefore it is also harmful if his presence harms and does not profit: if therefore a wise man does not do this, much less does the most wise Lord Jesus Christ do this: but the most unseemly place is the sinner, and

407. 1 Cor. 10:2.

again His presence would harm him who perceives: therefore it seems that He withdraws Himself, and is not perceived by the sinner.

§ 6. Moreover, what is given for the deletion of sin ought not to increase sin: but the reception of Christ in the sacrament was invented for the deletion of sin: therefore it will not increase it: but it would increase it if He remained: therefore it seems that Christ does not remain in the species when they are perceived by a sinner.

§ 7. Moreover, the disconvenience of Christ to an irrational creature which He Himself created is less than to a sinner: but we do not say that a brute perceives Him in the sacrament: therefore much less

does the sinner perceive Him in the sacrament.

§ 8. Moreover:[410] "But to the sinner God has said: Why do you declare my justices? and take my testament in your mouth?" But the praise of Christ is less than Christ Himself. If therefore He takes away His praise from the mouth of the sinner, much more does He take away Himself.

§ 9. Moreover, it is said,[411] that he who against the precept of the Lord gathered manna on a day not due, or in a quantity not due, it putrefied and swarmed with worms: therefore much more will this be true of the sacrament of the Eucharist, which is of incomparably greater holiness: therefore he who receives unworthily, has received nothing: just as he who received putrid manna or swarming with worms, did not receive manna.

Truly these reasons and similar ones occasioned the error which is introduced in the Letter, and the authorities which the Master appends and expounds.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. Hugh says, that as long as the bodily sense is affected, the bodily presence is not removed: but in the mouth of the sinner the bodily sense is affected, the species remaining: therefore the bodily presence is not removed.

§ 2. Moreover, if God flees the sin of the receiver, then much more does He flee the sin of the maker and consecrator: therefore according to this wicked priests could not confect the body of Christ, which is false.

§ 3. Moreover, since no one knows whether he is worthy of hatred or love, no one would know according to this whether he perceived the sacrament or not: and thus the greatest doubt would be generated concerning that which is principal in faith, which is foolish to say.

§ 4. Moreover, what would be the reason that He should recede? for the sin of the receiver does not fall upon Christ, and there is no other cause: therefore He does not fly away from the species, as some have said less cautiously sometimes.

SOLUTION. Without any ambiguity it must be held and felt that the wicked receive in the sacrament the true body of Christ, which He drew from the Virgin, and which hung on the cross, and He does not fly away unless when nothing more of the species of bread and wine remains, but when the whole has passed into another humor which was in the species,

406. 1 Cor. 10:3-4.

namely color, taste, quantity, and so on for the others: for then the sense which was affected by the species ceases, and then the bodily presence ceases, as Hugh says.

To the first therefore it must be said that Christ does not pass from the body of the receiver, but He does not pass into the body. For it is one thing to pass from the body, and another to pass into the body: and I well concede that He does not pass into the soul through grace, yet there is the presence of Him in the sacrament: as long as the sacramental species are in the body of the receiver.

To the next it must be said that Christ flees the feigned as regards indwelling through grace, and so that word is understood: but on account of the efficacy of the sacrament He does not flee the sacrament in whatever place it may be, because the sacrament always retains its own holiness, and the uncleanness of the place in which the sacrament is, does not abolish it.

To the next it must be said that this also is understood regarding indwelling grace, and not of the withdrawal of Christ from the species of the sacrament.

To the next it must be said that the reality of this sacrament exceeds the reality of the others: yet it is not similar: because the place of the reality of the other sacraments is the soul of the receiver: and therefore the reality does not come to be in a soul having contrariety to the reality of the other sacraments: but the place of the reality of this sacrament is not in the soul, but rather the sacramental species: and therefore, as long as those forms remain, wherever they may be, Christ is in them. However, this sacrament also has another reality, as was said above: and this is not in the sinner, because that is grace.

To the next it must be said that that is not unseemly nor harmful except accidentally:

it is not unseemly: because it has already been shown that the place of Christ is not the soul of the sinner, but the species of the most holy symbols in which Christ is perceived: but that the species be in this place or in that, comes about from the ordination of the use of the sacrament, which is available to all. And in this the great benignity of the Lord is considered, commonly granting His sacrament to all for use. But that it harms, this is accidentally, insofar as someone provides to himself the cause of harm: just as is also the case concerning bodily food, which is taken for utility: but if after taking food he takes something which does not permit the food to be digested or emitted, the food putrefies, and the body is harmed.

To the next it must be said that the sacrament of itself always avails against sin: and if it harms, this is from the cause of the receiver, as has already been said.

To the next it must be said that according to something there is greater convenience in that proportion, according to something it is less. For if nature is compared to nature, the convenience of a sinful man with God, and with the sacraments, is greater than that of a brute: because a brute in the sacramental signs suspects or perceives nothing, nor understands: but a man, even a sinner, is moved at least by reason and faith from the sign to the signified. But if the unsuitability which is on the part of sin is attended to, then the disconvenience is greater:

408. Ps. 49:16.

but this does not impede, because it does not reach to Christ, whose proper place is not the soul of the receiver in sin, but rather the sacramental species: but it well impedes the effect of grace, because the place of grace is the soul, which informed by sin is not susceptible to grace.

To the next it must be said that it is not similar concerning praise and the body of Christ in the sacrament: because since praise is the proclamation of some virtue, it is something of ours: for the act of proclamation is elicited by free choice: and on that part it can be foul in the mouth of a sinner: but concerning the sacrament nothing is ours, but the whole is of divine power: and therefore it is taken away by no one, but the use is given to all in common: but let them see for themselves how they use it.

To the last it must be said that the manna did not contain Christ: whence the putrefaction of the manna signifies the harm which we do to ourselves, by receiving the Eucharist unworthily, and does not signify the corruption of Christ.

Articulus 8 — Whether The Wicked Receive The Body Of Christ

Do the wicked perceive the body of Christ?

Secondly it is inquired, whether the wicked perceive the body of Christ to their damnation?

But it seems that they do not: § 1. For let us posit, that someone is in mortal sin, and is ignorant of it, for this is possible. Thence I proceed thus: One ignorant of his disease is less disposed to health, than one knowing his disease: therefore from what the ignorant is not prohibited, from the same much more the knowing is not prohibited: but one existing ignorantly in mortal sin is not prohibited: therefore neither ought one existing knowingly in sin be prohibited from the body of Christ.

§ 2. Moreover, the Gloss on the epistle to the Romans:[412] "You sin most gravely, because you are ignorant." Therefore ignorance rather works toward the aggravation of sin, than toward medicine: therefore again, from what the ignorant is kept away, the knowing ought not to be kept away.

§ 3. Moreover, given even that ignorance excuses from so much, and not from the whole, as is said by all, and knowledge aggravates: knowledge and ignorance will not relate to sin except as circumstances: therefore through them sin will not distance itself from sin into infinity, as venial and mortal differ. If therefore in some case the ignorant is not kept away from communion, the knowing ought not to be prohibited in the same sin, as it seems.

§ 4. Also, the same thing seems to be concluded in another way: because the more someone is ill, the more he needs medicine, and on account of the infirmity of the body he is not kept away from medicine: therefore it happens similarly concerning spiritual medicine; the one more sick in sin especially ought to use medicine: therefore he especially ought to use communion, in which a similar medicine is contained.

§ 5. Also, Augustine makes a division of goods, namely into the highest, by which one lives rightly, and which no one uses badly; and into middle goods, without which one cannot live rightly, but which one can use badly; and into lowest goods, without which one can live rightly, but which one can use well. And he gives virtues as the example of the first, the powers of the rational soul as the second, and the species of any bodies as the third. Since the body of Christ cannot be anything but among the highest goods, because it is not inferior to any created good, it seems that no one can use the body of Christ badly: therefore neither can a sinner. But that which someone uses well, by that he does not sin: therefore a sinner does not sin by consuming the body of Christ.

§ 6. Also, the divinity of Christ is greater than His body or His humanity: but one is not prohibited from approaching the deity, but rather is admonished to do so; nor does the deity withdraw itself from him, but rather it contains him, and is in him, as before, essentially, presentially, and potentially: therefore it seems that much less should he be kept away from the communion of the body and blood of Christ.

§ 7. Also, if on account of sin someone is kept away from communion, then it seems to follow that in no way should a man be permitted to communicate: because as it is said in Ecclesiastes 9:1: Man does not know whether he is worthy of love or hatred. Therefore he doubts: but one who doubts ought not to commit himself to danger: therefore he ought not to communicate, which no one says: therefore neither should any sinner be kept away from communion.

§ 8. Also, it is objected to the same point in another way thus: He who approaches unworthily (indigne), approaches as one who is unworthy (indignus), and it is not converted [i.e., the reverse is not necessarily true]. Therefore, to approach as unworthy follows upon approaching unworthily. But in such things an accident which follows upon the antecedent follows upon the consequent, especially in individual accidents: just as if a man is white, the animal is white: therefore if one approaching unworthily sins mortally, then one approaching as unworthy sins mortally. But this is false: because according to this, one ignorantly approaching in mortal sin sins mortally. Therefore this is also false, that one approaching unworthily sins mortally.

§ 9. Also, what is white and not appearing so more truly participates in whiteness than what appears white and is not so: but one believing himself to be in mortal sin but not being so, and one being in sin but not believing himself to be so, are related just as what is truly white but not appearing so, and what appears white but is not so. Therefore since it is more true of the one being in sin and not believing it, than of the one believing it and not being it: and since the one being in sin and not believing is not kept away, it seems that the one believing and not being so ought not to be kept away. And thus no one by approaching becomes unworthy: and thus no one should be kept away, as it seems.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. He who approaches unworthily approaches as unworthy, but it is not converted. Therefore the consequent is verified with the opposite of the antecedent:

410. Ps. 49:16.

therefore someone approaches as unworthy, and not unworthily. But this cannot be unless one does not have consciousness of sin, and yet is in sin: therefore such a one is not to be kept away from communion, although one approaching unworthily is to be kept away.

§ 2. Also, he would sin gravely who threw the body of Christ into mud. Therefore, since spiritual mud is viler than corporeal mud, he sins much more who throws it into a spiritual latrine than a corporeal one. But a spiritual latrine is a sinner who is not penitent: therefore such a one sins by receiving the Eucharist.

§ 3. Also, one who is knowingly in mortal sin, and not penitent, is also prohibited from contact with the altar: therefore much more is he to be kept away from the communion of the body and blood of the Lord.

§ 4. Also, it is said of Judas in John 13:27 [413] that he was in the resolution to sin, and after the morsel, Satan entered into him. Therefore, communion increased the sin in him: therefore he ought not to communicate.

§ 5. Also, Luke 18:13 [414] praises the publican because he did not even wish to lift his eyes to heaven: therefore he would be praised much more if he did not communicate: because the body of Christ is of infinitely greater dignity than heaven. And yet that publican was penitent: therefore much more should an impenitent sinner withdraw himself from communion.

Alongside this, it is further asked concerning one whose sin is occult, and who does not have the grace to resolve to leave it, whether he ought to communicate at Easter?

It seems that he should: because § 1. Since there is a precept for all the faithful to communicate, then this man is also bound to make a confession and communicate, and he scandalizes the Church if he does not communicate. But he is bound not to scandalize: therefore he is bound to communicate, as it seems.

§ 2. Also, if he does not communicate, his sin is thereby betrayed, and he is rendered infamous. But Jerome says that he is cruel who neglects his reputation: therefore, since he cannot retain his reputation except by communicating, it seems that he ought to communicate.

§ 3. Also, one who has a non-notorious sin can preach if it is necessary, and perform certain other spiritual acts: therefore by a similar reason it seems that he can also communicate.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. The sin of Judas was not notorious [415], and yet it is said that after the morsel, Satan entered into him. Therefore one communicating in occult sin sins mortally, as it seems.

§ 2. Also, 1 Corinthians 10:21: You cannot be partakers of the table of the Lord and of the table of demons [416]. But an occult sinner is a partaker of the table of demons. Therefore he ought not to partake of the table of the Lord.

SOLUTION. It must be said that one existing in mortal sin knowingly ought not to communicate for any reason, even if he were compelled by excommunication: because he is unworthy and approaches unworthily, like Judas. And this is sufficiently confirmed from two

411. Exod. 16:20.

passages in 1 Corinthians 11, where in one place it says: For he who eats and drinks unworthily, eats and drinks judgment to himself [417]. And in another place, verse 27, it says: He shall be guilty of the body and blood of the Lord [418]. And the Gloss distinguishes a threefold unworthiness there, namely that one is unworthy who does not believe; or who celebrates sacramentally otherwise than it was instituted; or who approaches without devotion.

And the number of these unworthinesses is taken thus: There are two things which make one worthy, and a third is the effect of both. The first is faith, which is the foundation of the spiritual edifice: and from the privation of this is taken the first unworthiness. The second is operative charity which fulfills the law. Romans 13:10: Love is the fulfilling of the law [419]. And from the privation of this is taken the third unworthiness, which is when someone approaches without devotion: for here "lack of devotion" posits the remorse of conscience from a sin existing or believed to be in the conscience, with the resolution of not departing from that sin. The third, which is the effect of both, is union and consensus with the mystical body of Christ: for he who communicates is held in common, and from the communion of the Head he receives refreshment: and from the privation of this is taken the second unworthiness, which is in schismatics, who do not observe the rite established for celebrating the sacraments by the Lord and by the Church.

These things being held, It must be said to the first that ignorance is twofold, as was said in the second book of the Sentences, universal, and parti-

-cular, or of law and of fact. But particular ignorance excuses completely, and such is the case in one who perceives that he has sinned, recounting his years in the bitterness of his soul [420], and something has remained forgotten which perhaps if he recalled he would not dismiss. But the objection proceeds concerning ignorance of the law, and therefore it is invalid. Or it may be better said that although an ignorant person existing in sin is less disposed to health, he is nevertheless more suitable for the act of communicating, because he does not show contempt; but one who believes himself to be [in sin] shows contempt, and therefore by this very fact is rendered unworthy.

To the next it must be said that one who is ignorant sins most gravely, that is, most dangerously, because he does not seek a physician. The contempt is not equal, because in the ignorant person there is none, but in the one who opines [he is in sin] there is great contempt.

To the next it must be said that knowledge and ignorance considered in themselves do not make this difference in sins: but rather the contempt adjoined to knowledge, which is a new genus of sin: and therefore this is not attributed to knowledge except per accidens.

To the next it must be said that even that in the simile is false: because the force of the disease can be so great that a purgative medicine is not given, but he is only preserved from all things harmful to nature, and is comforted to sustain the fight of the disease. And so it is done to the sinner: for the sinner is counseled to abstain from all sins, or at least from some, and in the meantime to do whatever good he can, so that God may illuminate his heart.

412. Isa. 38:15.

Moreover, even if it were so concerning bodily disease, it would not necessarily be entirely so concerning spiritual disease: because medicine does not relate entirely to spiritual disease as it relates to bodily disease. And this has been determined from the beginning of the book: because spiritual medicine operates only by the will, whereas bodily medicine operates by necessity with nature. And therefore by receiving bodily medicine, if it is good and rightly given, one does not fall into another genus of disease. But by receiving spiritual medicine, since the will is free and can show contempt through lack of devotion in preparation, one can fall into a new genus of sin: and what is good in itself becomes evil to him, as Augustine says in the text of the same chapter.

To the next it must be said that although the body of Christ is a greater good than any created good, especially as it is in the sacrament (because it is there through the body, soul, and deity), nevertheless it does not follow that it relates to ordering the act of free choice in the same way as virtue does. Whence the fact that virtue is called the highest good must not be understood simply, but in comparison to the acts of a good life among those things which are called good by participation. That it is also called "that by which one lives rightly, and which no one uses badly" is not because it is the highest good, but because by informing free choice it orders and perfects it toward the good. And in this way Christ perceived in the sacrament does not inform free choice; and therefore the use of a good can be evil for us. And this does not prevent it from being a greater good than virtue.

To the next it must be said that the divinity of Christ is greater than the humanity of Christ; but there is no contempt with respect to the containing and presence of the deity within us, but rather it belongs to the penalty of the imperfection of created nature, which needs the Creator to contain and conserve it. But with respect to His humanity, we are ordered by a will which has liberty, and therefore it can show contempt.

To the next it must be said that this does not follow. For when it is said, Man does not know whether he is worthy of love or hatred [421], this is understood concerning right knowledge which is in-

-fallible through devotion. But when it speaks of one believing himself to be in mortal sin and not being so, "believing" is taken for one who has some signs and some reason by which he fears he is in sin. And therefore it is evident that it does not follow that on account of this every man ought to be kept away from communion.

To the next it must be said that when there is an agreement between antecedent and consequent, and afterwards an accident participated by the antecedent is inferred of the consequent, it is not necessary that the consequent participate in it except insofar as it is participated by the antecedent. For example, when it is said, "If a man is white, the animal is white," it does not follow that 'animal' is white in the scope of its commonality and predication, but rather the animal which is the white man. So it is also here when it is said, "He who approaches unworthily, approaches as unworthy," and afterwards it is inferred, "one approaching unworthily sins mortally: therefore also one approaching as unworthy." It is not

409. Exod. 16:20.

necessary that this be true generally, but only for that unworthy person who, by approaching unworthily, was unworthy. Whence when the conclusion is subsequently inferred that the consequent is not generally true, therefore neither is the antecedent: it is evident that the argumentation is invalid. And such an argument—"an unworthy person made unworthy by approaching unworthily sins mortally: therefore similarly an unworthy person sins mortally"—commits a fallacy or error according to the sophistic topic of the consequent.

To the last it must be said that this would follow well if another sin of new unworthiness were not caused by the fact that he approaches with the belief of sin: just as no whiteness is caused by the appearance of whiteness. But it is evident from what was held above that a new sin is caused: and therefore that argumentation is invalid.

To what is further asked, it must be said that one having remorse of conscience with the resolution of not forsaking his sin ought in no way to receive the Eucharist.

To that which is first objected to the contrary, it must be said that not communicating with such a resolution pertains to the truth of life, which is not to be forsaken on account of scandal.

But if it is objected that in such a state he is perplexed: it must be said that this is not true, because he can do otherwise to evade the sin, namely by grieving for the sin with the resolution of amending it. For if he does what is in his power, God will infuse grace into him, and then he can communicate.

To the next it must be said that he does not thereby betray himself: because there are many causes for which communion is deferred, or even by which someone withdraws himself from communion, namely bodily impurity, humility, and many other causes.

But if it is objected: Let us suppose that a prelate commands that all communicate. I say that such a precept is null, because it is openly illicit. But he can command that all prepare themselves for communion: and then it seems it must indeed be granted that he who has not prepared himself incurs a sin of omission.

To the next it must be said that it is not similar concerning other acts and the act of communion. For other acts are over the members of Christ which need diverse things which for the time can be supplied by those who are not suitable. But in communion the Lord Himself is received, and therefore the greatest suitability is required, and therefore an unsuitable person sins by communicating, as was said.

Articulus 9 — Whether A Wicked Person Sins More By Communicating Than By Another Kind Of Sin

Whether a bad person sins more by communicating than by another kind of sin?

Thirdly it is asked, Whether a bad person sins more by communicating than by sinning with another kind of sin?

413. Isa. 38:15.

It seems that he does: because § 1. The less the contempt, the less the sin. But in certain other sins God is not contemned in Himself, whereas by communicating [unworthily] He is contemned in Himself: therefore one sins more by communicating unworthily than by fornicating or by sinning in another genus of sin.

§ 2. Also, one who communicates unworthily sins knowingly, and without temptation and concupiscence: and these aggravate the sin. But another person sins sometimes knowingly, but tempted by concupiscence: therefore he sins more by communicating than by sinning in another genus of sin.

§ 3. Also, the Apostle compares this to a most grave sin, 1 Corinthians 11:27: Whosoever shall eat this bread, or drink the chalice of the Lord unworthily, shall be guilty of the body and of the blood of the Lord [422]. Therefore it seems that it is most grave.

§ 4. Also, Hebrews 10:28-29: A man making void the law of Moses dies without any mercy under two or three witnesses: how much more, do you think, he deserves worse punishments, who has trodden under foot the Son of God, and has esteemed the blood of the testament unclean, by which he was sanctified? [423] Therefore one communicating pollutedly deserves worse punishments: therefore it is the most grave sin, as it seems.

§ 5. Also, it is clear that one would sin more gravely who threw the body of Christ into unclean mud, than one who fornicates or commits avarice. Since, therefore, a spiritual latrine is more foul than a corporeal one, one sins more gravely by receiving the body of Christ into a spiritual latrine, than by throwing it into a corporeal latrine. But what is greater than the greater, is greater than the lesser: therefore one communicating pollutedly sins more gravely than by any other sin, as it seems.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. If there are two things, of which one makes one approach God, but the other removes one from God: and they are compared to two other things, of which both remove: the two remove more than the one. But in the communion which is made by an unworthy person, the communion itself does not separate from God, but joins; whereas the contempt separates. But in fornication or another sin of the body, both separate, both the act and the contempt: therefore it separates from God more than the communion of an unworthy person. But a greater sin is that which separates more from God. Therefore another sin is greater than the communion of an unworthy person.

If perhaps you say that this does not follow: because that one thing which causes distance in the one case causes a longer distance than the two in the other. ON THE CONTRARY: That which causes distance in the communion of an unworthy person is nothing but contempt. But contempt is also in another sin. Therefore contempt is in both in common: therefore, with the common element removed in both, whichever causes more distance will similarly cause more distance from God even when the contempt is added to both. But with the contempt removed, the other sin causes more distance: therefore similarly it causes more distance from God [when both have contempt], and thus the proposition is established.

414. Eccl. 9:1.

§ 2. Also, let us suppose that someone communicates unworthily, intending by this not to be completely alienated from God per se, but to become nearer to God: then it seems that he does not sin as much as he who fornicates or commits another crime.

§ 3. Also, there can be a case where even a sinner can take the body of the Lord into his hands, as if he finds it in the mud and there is no one else to lift it up: therefore it seems that there can also be some case in which one communicating does not sin, or does not sin as much as one sinning with another sin.

§ 4. Also, what is evil in itself is more to be avoided than what is evil by accident. But to fornicate and other sins which are against the Decalogue are evil in themselves, whereas to communicate is good in itself, but evil by accident. Therefore another sin is more to be avoided than communion by an unworthy person.

§ 5. Also, what is evil in itself is more to be avoided than what is evil for someone, and not in itself. But to fornicate and other such vices are evil in themselves, and for the doer, whereas communion is not evil in itself, but for the doer. Therefore fornication is more to be avoided than communion, as it seems: therefore some sins are greater than this one.

§ 6. Also, what is never and to no one good, but always and to everyone evil, is a greater evil than what is sometimes and to someone evil, and not always, nor to everyone. But fornication and the rest relate in this way to communion: therefore those are greater sins than this.

SOLUTION. It seems it must be said to this that in some respect one communicating unworthily sins more, and in some respect one sinning with another sin sins more. For as regards contempt it seems to me that one communicating unworthily sins more, but not as regards the act, and other circumstances, from which the foulness of sins is caused.

Therefore it must be said to the first, that when it is said, "Where there is less contempt, there is less sin," that this is not true simply, but only in a certain respect, namely the root of the sin which is contempt: for as regards other things, a sin that is from less contempt can be greater.

The same solution applies to almost all of them: because that again which is objected secondly does not hold except as regards whether one sins tempted or untempted.

To the next it must be said that the Apostle says that one communicating unworthily is guilty of the body and blood because he incurs the guilt of blood, but not that he has the guilt of one slaying Christ: but in this he is similar to a slayer, because each is made guilty of the blood of Christ.

To the next it must be said that this is not understood of those communicating unworthily, but rather of those abusing the grace of baptism: because they thought that when someone returned to sin, he needed to be baptized again. And this would redound to the pollution, that is, to the infirmity, of the blood of Christ, as of a sacrament in which the blood of Christ operates and washes interiorly, unless it were of such great power that it made even frequent

415. Emended from notorium, which contradicts the argument concerning occult sin.

sins remissible through penance: and so it is expounded in the Gloss. But if it is generally extended to one communicating unworthily, then it must be said that one communicating unworthily deserves worse punishments, insofar as he sins out of contempt against a greater grace than he who transgressed the law: yet it does not simply follow that he deserves worse punishments.

To the next it must be said that when it is said, "A spiritual latrine is worse than a corporeal one," the expression is metaphorical. And it is understood not to be of greater corporeal foulness: but insofar as sins are against a greater good, they also take away a better good than corporeal foulness does. Hence there remains greater exterior purity in the body of a sinner than in a corporeal latrine: and therefore he would sin more by throwing the body of Christ into a latrine than by communicating unworthily, because he would do greater insult and contempt to Christ. And therefore the Master says in the Sentences that an argumentation from tropes is not valid.

The same mode of responding applies to those things which are objected to the contrary. For I readily grant that one thing can sometimes distance more than two or three. And as to what is objected, that contempt is common to both, it must be said that it is not the same contempt, but greater, and lesser, and diverse in species: because contempt is specified according to that which is contemned, and according to the reason for contemning.

To the next it must be said that one knowing himself to be in sin cannot communicate well: because the intention is perverse and foolish, as was said on the second book of the Sentences, concerning one who intends to steal in order to give to someone, so that by this he might recall her from prostitution or adultery.

To the next it must be said that it is not similar: because then reverence and the necessity of lifting it up excuses and compels it to be done. But in communicating there is no necessity, nor is any reverence exhibited there to Christ, but rather irreverence and contempt.

To the next it must be said that it does not hold except as regards this, and not simply: and therefore the argumentation is invalid in the other cases.

Articulus 10 — Whether Nocturnal Emission Impedes From Communion

Whether nocturnal pollution impedes from communion?

Fourthly it is asked, Whether nocturnal pollution impedes from communion?

And it seems that it does: § 1. For in the Decree (distinction 6), Gregory says in a letter to Augustine, Bishop of the English: If it is born in the mind of a sleeper from the shameful thought of one awake, his guilt is entirely evident: for let him see from what root that pollution proceeded: because what he thought knowingly, this he bore unknowingly. And on account of such pollution he ought to abstain from the sacred mystery on that day. [424] From this it is accepted that pollution impedes from communion.

416. 1 Cor. 10:21.

§ 2. Also, Isidore in the first book of the Sentences: He who is polluted by a nocturnal illusion, even if he feels himself polluted outside the memory of shameful thoughts: nevertheless let him attribute this to his own fault that he was tempted, and let him immediately bind his uncleanness with weeping. [425] But it is evident that a fault is not to be wept over and communion taken at the same time: therefore it seems that he ought to abstain from communion, as it seems.

§ 3. Also, Leviticus 15:2: The man that suffers an issue of seed, shall be unclean. [426] But it is evident that an issue of seed is less in the power of a man than nocturnal pollution. Therefore much more is the polluted man unclean: therefore it impedes from communion, as it seems.

§ 4. Also, ibid., below, v. 16: The man from whom the seed of copulation goes out, shall wash all his body with water: and he shall be unclean until evening. [427] But it is clear that the sacraments of the Old Law were of less holiness than the New. If therefore it impeded from the perception of a sacrament of the Old Testament, how much more will it impede from the perception of the sacraments of the New Testament.

§ 5. Also, Deuteronomy 23:12 et seq., the Lord commanded that those going out for the relief of nature should carry a spade on their belt, and dig, so that if the Lord passes through the camp, the camp may be clean. [428] And the Gloss there says that God loves corporeal purity. If therefore that impurity impedes the decorum of the Lord's transit, much more does it impede from the perception of the body and blood of the Lord.

§ 6. Also, it seems less that corporeal impurity should impede from entry into the tabernacle, which is less holy, than from the communion of the body and blood of the Lord. But it impeded in antiquity: therefore this also impedes now.

§ 7. Also, 2 Kings 6:6 [429], it is said that when the oxen that were drawing the ark of the Lord kicked, Oza stretched out his hand to hold the ark, and the Lord struck Oza. And the reason is given in the Gloss and by the Masters, that he had slept with his wife that night. Since therefore he could do this meritoriously, whereas pollution is never done meritoriously, it seems that pollution much more impedes the communion of that which is signified by the ark, namely the body and blood of the Lord.

§ 8. Also, Gregory says that at the time of matrimonial intercourse, the Holy Spirit did not touch the hearts of the Prophets, on account of the inconvenience to a spiritual act of the act in which the whole man is made flesh. Therefore, since communion is much greater than prophecy, it seems that that delectation which is in the egress of seed impedes from communion.

§ 9. Also, union through spirit and love with Christ, and descent according to the flesh through delectation, are contraries: therefore they ought not to be together. But in pollution there is a descent according to the flesh through ultimate delectation, while in communion there is an elevation of the intellect through faith, and a union of the spirit through charity. Therefore these two do not comport with each other: therefore it seems that communion is to be forsaken on account of pollution.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. Gregory says to Bishop Augustine, and it is posited in the Decree (dist. 6): And indeed when it happens from the superfluity or infirmity of nature, then pollution is not to be feared at all: because the mind, having unknowingly borne this, is rather to be grieved for than to have done it. [430] Therefore pollution does not always impede from communion.

§ 2. Also, Gregory, ibid., When the appetite of gluttony is taken beyond measure in consuming foods, and thereby the receptacles of the humors are burdened, the mind indeed has some guilt from this, but not unto the prohibition of perceiving the sacred mystery, or of celebrating the solemnities of the Mass. [431] From this it is clear that sometimes it even proceeds from some fault of gluttony, which does not impede from sacred communion.

§ 3. Also, nothing impedes from sacred communion except pretense, because the Holy Spirit of discipline will flee the deceitful therefore in the sacraments He does not flee except the deceitful, as is said, Wisdom 1:5. But venial sins do not make one deceitful: therefore even if it is granted that he is polluted from some preceding shameful thought which was not mortal, it still does not follow that he cannot communicate.

§ 4. Also, if venial sins impeded, there would be no one who could communicate: because, 1 John 1:8, it is said: If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. [432] Since therefore pollution proceeds from a venial thought, it does not impede from communion.

§ 5. Also, Gregory says that spiritual sins are of greater weight, although carnal sins are of greater infamy. But spiritual venial sins do not impede from communion: therefore neither do carnal ones. Therefore pollution does not impede, since it is not a sin, or it is a minimal one: because it is not the place here to define whether it is a sin or not.

§ 6. Also, someone goes to bed fortified by the sign of the holy cross with the devotion of prayer, and so on for other things: yet pollution happens to him. Since therefore no one sins while sleeping, he has nothing from which he should be impeded from communion: therefore he can communicate, as it seems.

ALONGSIDE this it is further asked, How long ought he to abstain?

It is said, Leviticus 15:16, that he shall be unclean until evening. But between evening and morning there are only twelve equal hours: therefore it seems that after twelve hours he could communicate. And yet this is not observed, because he abstains for a day and a night.

SOLUTION. It must be said with blessed Gregory that pollution happens from many causes, which must be treated elsewhere, namely from the infirmity of nature in retaining or converting into members: and in this way it is no sin, nor the sign of a sin. It also happens from diabolical illusion, and then it is a sign of negligence, namely that the man went to sleep not sufficiently devout. Sometimes it is also from excessive repletion, especially of foods which provoke venereal acts, such as hot and moist things together: because the hot moves, and the moist ministers the matter. And then it seems to me a distinction must be made

418. 1 Cor. 11:27.

regarding accidents in the engorged person: for either this happens to a starving man by surprise, or it happens because he prepared

eats sumptuously, and is accustomed to feast splendidly. And in the first way, the subsequent pollution indicates nothing but negligence from the surreption of overindulgence: in the second way, it indicates a sin. In another way, a pollution becomes a sin from thought, namely when someone thinks about a certain woman singularly, and afterwards dreams that he copulates with her: and then it is a sign of fixed preceding thought upon a shameful thing. But sometimes it arises from the conjunction of several causes at once, as from thought and overindulgence: and then it signifies both. Sometimes from thought and illusion: and then it is a sign of the sin on account of which he merited that. But sometimes it arises simultaneously from overindulgence, thought, and illusion: and then the two preceding causes are meritorious of the third, and this whole thing is shown in the subsequent pollution, just as a hidden cause arises in a manifest subsequent effect.

And again a distinction must be made regarding the mode of pollution, which Gregory mentions in the previously cited Epistle, where he says that what comes from overindulgence does not impede communion, provided that the body is not shaken by shameful delight in the pollution. For from this it is understood that some are polluted with shameful imagination and delight: but others only through the emission of semen. But according to the Philosopher, a further distinction must be made among those who experience delight: because sometimes it is from flatulent foods, and in the delight a flatulent froth is emitted rather than a humor of nourishment.

With these things thus distinguished, I think that with Gregory one should say thus: that in the first and second cases it does not impede from communion: but if he humbly omits it on account of foulness, he is to be praised. In the third mode, however, if it is from a surreption and from rather flatulent foods, as legumes are, I do not think he is impeded: but in the fourth mode, and successively in the fifth and sixth, I think he must abstain from communion, on account of the doubt of lingering delight in the preceding thought.

As for the fourth distinction which Gregory posits, namely regarding the mode of pollution, it seems that it must be said that pollution rarely and in few cases occurs without a shameful imagination: and this is clear enough to anyone who inspects it according to the Philosopher's book On Sleep and Waking: because he maintains that certain dreams are signs, while others have their cause in the body. Hence the mode and cause of an illness are also recognized in dreams: but since that cause is a moving one, and the acts of active things are in a predisposed patient, as the Philosopher says in Book II of On the Soul, and this according to the power of the patient and not according to the power of the agent, these causes are in the sensible soul which has a colligation with the organs in which the moving cause toward copulation resides, and the matter through the mode of images pertaining to copulation: and therefore that imagination sometimes occurs in dreams without a preceding fault. And therefore, when Gregory says it is from a preceding fault, or thought, I think it must be understood

419. Rom. 13:10.

by way of a sign: for the sign is the subsequent delight, that he meditated on such things while awake: hence it does not seem to me that the shaking always impedes from communion.

Having established these things, we must respond to the objections.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that Gregory is speaking of pollution arising from the fourth cause, or successively, as is manifest enough in the authority itself.

To another it must be said that Isidore does not bind one to abstain: because it is the mark of good minds to acknowledge a fault there where there is no fault.

To another it must be said that such things in the Old Testament, as is proven in the Gloss of Gregory and the Gloss of Hesychius on the same place, were spoken in a sign-bearing way: therefore this is expounded there concerning verbose persons, who always pollute the bed in which they rest with the guilt of a lie, of detraction, or of flattery.

To another it must be said that that law is understood of a man who is mixed with a woman in a fornicating concubinage, and therefore in the same chapter it is immediately added: The woman with whom he copulates shall be washed with water, and shall be unclean until evening[433], that is, she shall do penance until death.

To another it must be said that God loves cleanliness even of the body: but nevertheless all those things are also understood figuratively: because God is not defiled by bodily uncleanness, as it is said in Wisdom 7:25, because on account of her purity, nothing defiled incurs into her, namely wisdom. Although he therefore loves bodily cleanliness, insofar as it attests to the cleanliness of the spirit and to the love of spiritual beauty, nevertheless he does not reprobate us or bar us from the reception of the sacraments on account of the uncleannesses to which we are necessarily subject.

To another it must be said that all those things were figurative, and showing that one who communicates in Holy Things must be spiritually clean.

To another it must be said that perhaps Uzzah had known his wife out of lust, according to those who posit this as the cause: however, I think the literal sense is that, since he was of the Levites to whom it was commanded that the ark be carried on their own shoulders, he permitted what was entrusted to be put to the danger of transport by recalcitrant oxen, and therefore he was deservedly slain.

To another it must be said that a prophetic act has some deformity with the act of copulation: but nevertheless matrimony has that act. So also it is well conceded that there is a certain inconsonance from which they ought not to be simultaneously in act, but according to time, successively one after another sometimes: for I do not think that he prohibits it otherwise.

To another it must be said that it does not prove anything but a certain unfittingness: and he who abstains for a time from communion is to be praised, but nevertheless he is not barred by this, as I think, and thus Gregory seems to say.

420. Isa. 38:15.

To that which is further asked, How long one must abstain? I think the duration is for twenty-four hours in which a whole revolution is completed, except for a small amount because the sun in the meantime has receded backward. For a natural day is an equinoctial revolution with as much of a part as rises with the arc of the ecliptic: which motion of twenty-four hours the sun prescribes by its natural motion in setting through the signs. This arc, moreover, is about seventy minutes and eight seconds. Now, some give such a reason for this: because in that time every rising and setting of the images and stars of heaven occurs over the body for reordering: because although the heaven does not have power over free will, it nevertheless has power over the body to alter and contain it: and the Lord implies this in Leviticus 15:19, where he says: A woman who, when the month returns, suffers an issue of blood, etc. For blood flows when it cannot be digested: but it is not digested when heat is diminished: and heat is diminished as the light in the moon decreases.

Still, there is one more case to be asked, namely let us posit that someone comes to the place of celebration, and his conscience dictates to him probabiliter that the priest is in a bad state and will sin mortally by celebrating, and he himself has been polluted in the night without consciousness of a mortal cause, whether he ought to celebrate for him?

And to this it is answered in diverse ways. For some feel that he should not: because one ought not to sin even venially in order that another may avoid a mortal sin. But it seems to me that I would celebrate in such a case, having first had confession or compunction if a priest were lacking, and with some other prayer had beforehand with devotion.

Articulus 11 — Whether Some Bodily Foulness, Such As Menstruation Or The Like, Impedes The Reception Of The Body Of Christ

Whether any bodily foulness, such as menstruation or the like, impedes from the reception of the body of Christ?

Whether any bodily foulness, such as menstruation or the like, impedes from the reception of the body of Christ?

Fifthly it is asked, Whether any bodily foulness, such as menstruation or the like, impedes from the reception of the body of Christ?

And it seems that it does. § 1. Leviticus 15:19 and 20: A woman who, when the month returns, suffers an issue of blood, shall be separated for seven days. Everyone who touches her shall be unclean until evening, etc. Because it touches upon many things there concerning the uncleannesses of a menstruating woman. Therefore it seems that much more should it impede from the reception of the body of Christ, whose sanctity is greater than that of the old tabernacle, or of a man touching her.

§ 2. Again, the foulness of menstruation is greater than that of nocturnal pollution: therefore it ought much more to impede communion than nocturnal pollution: but nocturnal pollution sometimes impedes, as was held: therefore also the flux of menses.

421. Eccl. 9:1.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. That flux is from the infirmity or superfluity of humors: but neither of these is a sin: therefore it seems that neither does the uncleanness of menses impede from communion.

§ 2. Again, Gregory: A woman, while she suffers menstruation by custom, ought not to be prohibited from entering the Church: because the superfluity of nature cannot turn into a fault for her: and she cannot be prohibited from receiving the mystery of holy communion in those days. If, however, out of great veneration she does not presume to receive the mystery, she is to be praised: but if she does receive it, she is not to be judged: for it is the mark of good minds to acknowledge a fault there where there is no fault. From this it is manifestly grasped that the flux of menses is not an impediment to communion.

To this some wish to say that some women flow continuously, and in them the flux is from infirmity: but some flow intermittently, and those are curable, and they ought to wait concerning communion until after the flux, but the first ones not: and they render a reason for this: and Augustine seems to say that approach to a menstruating woman is not prohibited as a figure of some future thing, but even in itself it is a moral precept that copulation should not take place with a menstruating woman. Hence they say that menstruation bespeaks an uncleanness impeding from communion. Now Augustine's words are upon Leviticus 18:19, on that text: You shall not approach a woman who suffers menstruation, etc. For the Gloss says there thus: Since He had sufficiently prohibited these things above, what does He mean that He wished to add this also here to the same precepts? Was it perhaps lest what was said in the higher places be thought to be taken figuratively, it is also posited here, where such things are prohibited which even in the time of the New Testament, with the observation of the old shadows removed, must without doubt be guarded? However, without prejudice it seems to me it must be said that a woman is never to be prohibited from communion on account of menstruation, as Gregory says: because it is an indication of superfluity, or infirmity, and not of fault.

To that which is objected first, it must be said that in truth it was spoken figuratively concerning the uncleanness of a menstruating woman as to the entrance of the tabernacle, as it is expounded there in the Gloss: and therefore those arguments do not compel.

To the other which is objected concerning Augustine, it must be said that to approach a menstruating woman is a mortal sin: because the approach is ordained to conception: and if the woman conceives then, she conceives a corrupted offspring, such as elephantine [leprous], or leprous, as the Gloss says on Ezekiel 18:6, upon that text: He shall not approach a menstruating woman. And as to this, it is moral: but this was never moral, that she should be unclean for seven days, and be washed with water, and be outside the camp, and the like, which are determined in Leviticus 15:19 et seq.

422. 1 Cor. 11:27.

Articulus 12 — Whether One Receiving The Body Of Christ Unworthily Effects This, That What He Receives Becomes Evil

Whether one taking the body of Christ unworthily brings it about that what he receives becomes evil?

Then it is asked concerning what he says there, at B, around the middle: Behold, for evil is done, when a good thing is received badly, etc.

For he immediately says the contrary at the end of the same chapter: Whoever takes the body of Christ unworthily, does not bring it about that because he is evil, what he receives is evil.

Solution. It must be said that evil of itself is spoken of in multiple ways, namely formally, and thus the second authority is understood: because in this way the body of Christ cannot be evil, but is always good. Evil is also spoken of effectively: and this in two ways, namely as a cause per se, or as a cause per accidens: and in neither of these ways is the body of Christ said to be evil: because it is neither the cause of evil per se, nor per accidens. In a second way, the occasion of evil is called evil, just as the presence of light is called the occasion of injury to a weak eye: and so the body of Christ is good, and is an occasion of evil to him who receives it unworthily.

Articulus 13 — Whether The Priest Should Ask That Christ, Who Is Now Received Under The Species Of Bread, Be Received By Manifest Vision

Whether the priest asks that Christ, who is now received under the species of bread, be received in manifest vision?

Then it is asked concerning what he says there, at C, around the end: He asks that Christ, who is now truly received under the species of bread and wine, in manifest vision, etc.

This again seems false: because § 1. A sacrament will not have its reality (res) in the future: because in the future we do not need a viaticum: for then we will not be on the way, but in the homeland: therefore it seems that nothing has been said: because then he will be grasped by manifest vision, just as he is grasped now under the species of the sacrament.

§ 2. Again, to enjoy God through species in open vision is not an act of a sacrament or succeeding to a sacrament, but rather an act of beatitude succeeding to one or multiple virtues, as is determined in the first distinction of the first book of this volume: therefore it seems that in the prayers of the Church these two are unfittingly joined, that as now through the species of the sacrament, so at some time through the species of divinity in open vision we may grasp him.

§ 3. Again, now we grasp him by the taste of his body and blood: but then we will not grasp him thus, but through contemplation and fruition: therefore it seems that it is no prayer.

ON THE CONTRARY: In the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, Dionysius says that the reception of the most holy Eucharist is a symbol of the divine participation. Now it is established that he under-

423. Heb. 10:28-29.

stands that divine participation which is through fruition in glory. Therefore it seems to succeed to sacramental eating and reception.

Solution. It must be said that this sacrament, just like the others, has a twofold reality (res): one which is contained and signified, and that it attains in the present, and this is proper to the sacrament: and concerning these realities of the sacraments it was often spoken of above. It has another which is signified and not contained: and because a sacrament is the cause of the reality which it contains, and it does not contain that reality, the consequence is that it also does not cause it: just as the reality of baptism is the shining of glory in the resurrection, and so on for the others. So it can be said here, that participation through the fruition of divinity in open vision is a reality signified, and not caused, nor contained in this sacrament, in the way that the fruit of the sweetness of glory in the taste of God is signified by the fruit: and the taste of spiritual sweetness in the sacrament in which Christ is the author of grace: and thus Dionysius understands it.

To the first therefore which is objected, it must be said that there is no need then for a viaticum, but there is the taste of felicity as an end, which is signified in the taste of the viaticum: just as those things which belong to the homeland are often signified by those things which belong to the way.

To another it must be said that it is the act of the sacrament as signifying, but it is not the act of the sacrament as causing it: just as even full glory in the dowries of the soul and the body is said to be the reality of baptism: and upon this the intention of the one praying is founded.

DISTINCTIO X

Divisio Textus

There are others of the preceding madness, etc.

In the previous sections the Master excluded the error of certain people saying that the body of Christ is not received by the wicked: which was an error of lesser unfittingness. Here, however, he touches upon an error of greater unfittingness, namely of those who deny that the body of Christ is on the altar.

Against this, first he introduces certain authorities of the Canon and of the Fathers, from which it had its origin: and secondly, he solves and determines them, there, at B, Which are all to be accepted from the same reason, etc. Thirdly, he posits the sophistical reasons by which they were deceived, and solves them, disproving their saying by authorities, there, at C, § 2: A sufficient response has been given to the heretics, and to the objections, etc.

And this is what he says up to the following part, in which he touches upon the mode of conversion.

424. Gratian, Decretum, dist. 6.

And through this the sentence is clear: and if anything is lacking, it will be manifested through disputation.

Articulus 1 — Whether The Body Of Christ Is Truly On The Altar, Or Only As Signed In A Sign

Whether the body of Christ is truly on the altar, or only as what is signified is in the sign?

Let this therefore be the first question concerning the error which the Master strives to strike down in the Letter, namely whether the body of Christ is on the altar, or not?

For it seems by many reasons that it is not: § 1. For whatever is immutable, discarding nothing, and receiving nothing, this does not come to be in any place through the conversion of something into it: the glorious body of Christ is immutable, discarding nothing, and receiving nothing: therefore it does not come to be in any place through the conversion of something into it. The major premise is evident per se: and if anyone doubts it, it is proven thus: Every mutation occurs through the discarding of something, and the arrival of something: therefore by destruction of the consequent, because it discards nothing, or receives nothing, this is completely immutable. But if it receives nothing, it seems to follow necessarily that nothing is converted into it.

§ 2. Again, everything that is circumscribed by a place, does not come to be in another place unless it first recedes from the place in which it is: the body of Christ is circumscribed by a place: therefore it does not come to be in another place than in heaven, unless it first recedes from the place of the empyrean heaven in which it is: but it does not recede, as all the Saints say: therefore it does not come to be in another place: therefore nor on the altar: therefore it is not on the altar, as that opinion says.

§ 3. Again, according to a manner of speaking, spirits are of greater dignity and simplicity than bodies: but no created spirit can be simultaneously in diverse places: therefore much less can a body be simultaneously in diverse places; but the body of Christ is remaining in heaven: therefore not on the altar.

§ 4. Again, concerning God this is false, God is elsewhere than where He is, even though God is everywhere: therefore much more is it false concerning those things which are defined and circumscribed by a place: but the body of Christ is circumscribed by a place: therefore it is in a determined place, and is not elsewhere than where it is: therefore it is not elsewhere than in heaven, because it is there: therefore it is not on the altar.

§ 5. Again, if it were granted that it could be elsewhere, and this simultaneously and at once, it seems to follow from this that it could be everywhere: and this by two reasons, one of which is: because, as is said elsewhere, if two bodies could be simultaneously in one place, by the same reason infinite bodies could also: so it seems to follow here, that the circumscription of place is not more repugnant to being simultaneously in multiple places than to being everywhere: if therefore it can be in multiple places, it can also be everywhere. The second

425. Ibid.

reason is: because let it be granted that it is consecrated everywhere, and it is in every place where it is consecrated: therefore it will then be everywhere. But if perhaps this does not seem unfitting to someone, it is shown to be unfitting thus: Augustine says that it is proper to God alone to be everywhere: but the body of Christ is not God, just as neither is the soul of Christ God, although the man is God: and thus it does not belong to the body of Christ to be everywhere: therefore it seems not to be on the altar.

§ 6. Again, it seems that it is not intelligible that the body of Christ is on the altar: for it is circumscribed by place, to which a beginning, a middle, and an end are assigned according to the diversities of place: but it is established that that which is never outside the contained limits, which are the limits of the thing located inside, is never outside the containing limits, which are the place of the body: but the body of Christ is never outside the contained limits in the empyrean heaven, which are its dimensions: therefore it is never outside the limits of the containing place: but it cannot be on the altar unless it is outside the containing limits, namely of the place: therefore it is never on the altar, as it seems.

§ 7. If perhaps you say, as almost everyone says, that the body of Christ has three things, and through those three it relates to place. For it is a body having dimension, and through this it has it that it is circumscribed by place. It is the same glorious body, and through this it has it that it can be with another body in the same place. Again, it is united to the divinity, and from this it has it that it can be in multiple places simultaneously. But that seems unable to stand. First indeed: because the body of Christ before it was glorious, according to this, could not have been with another body in the same place, which is erroneous: because He Himself in the supper gave His body before it was glorified: hence that distinction seems to be worth nothing to the proposition.

§ 8. Furthermore, it is one thing to ask, What can God do? and another, What can happen in things? as Augustine says. For that a quantum be moved locally in a 'now' or in an instant, God can do: and yet God cannot bring it about that a first and a last not be necessarily taken: therefore succession necessarily occurs in its motion, and motion in an instant cannot belong to it. By a similar reasoning, although that body is united to the divinity, nevertheless this union does not take away from it its circumscriptible dimension: but with that remaining, it seems impossible that it be simultaneously in diverse places.

§ 9. Again, what is the necessity that Christ be on the altar with body and soul? For it seems He could operate more gloriously where someone is not present, than where he is: therefore it would also be more glorious for Christ to produce the grace of this sacrament where He is not present, than where He is present: therefore it seems that, since He always does what is better, He is not on the altar.

§ 10. Again, above in the beginning of the book, the causes for which the sacraments were instituted were touched upon, and one is posited there, which is the cause of humility, namely so that in this a human being might be humbled, that he seeks salvation in things inferior to himself. But if Christ is said to be on the altar, nothing in this sacrament is inferior to a human

426. Wis. 1:5.

being: therefore the cause of the institution, and the fruit of the sacrament, perish: therefore it is better to posit that Christ is not on the altar, than that He is, as it seems.

IF THIS IS CONCEDED, § 1. It will be expressly against the faith, as is said in the Letter.

§ 2. Again, it would be against grace. For it is said in Deuteronomy 32:4 that the works of God are perfect: if therefore the works of creation are perfect, much more perfect ought the works of grace and recreation to be in the sacraments: but this grace is chiefly that we be conjoined to God, and He be conjoined to us: therefore in some sacrament this conjunction must be complete: therefore in some sacrament He ought to have been conjoined to us bodily.

§ 3. Again, in the gifts of sanctifying grace which is the gratuitous power of the Holy Spirit, essentially, potentially, and presentially, and through indwelling grace He is conjoined and slips into us. Since therefore there is still another part of sanctifying grace in the sacraments, through that He ought to be conjoined to those from whom it draws its effect: but that is Christ having suffered in body and soul, from whom every sacrament has its power; therefore He Himself in some sacrament in body and soul must be conjoined to us, as it seems.

§ 4. Again, in Hebrews 2:14: Because the children communicated in flesh and blood, and He Himself similarly participated in the same, so that He might be conformed to us in nature: but from the same things according to nature a nature is generated, and is nourished: therefore it seems that even in His nature, conformed to us, He ought to be our food.

§ 5. Again, in every way we needed to be conformed to Him: therefore this had to be done through something incorporating us into Him: but this could be nothing but Himself: therefore it was necessary that through Himself we be incorporated into Him: therefore it was necessary that He give us His body in something: but in nothing is it so fittingly given as in food: therefore it ought to have been given to us in food, as it seems.

Solution. Without any ambiguity it must be held that Christ is bodily on the altar: and that what the Master recites in the Letter is a heresy, namely that Christ is not on the altar except as the signified is in the sign.

To the first objecton against this, it must be said that without a doubt the body of Christ is now immutable, receiving nothing and discarding nothing, because it is glorious: nevertheless, it does not follow as a consequence from this, as if it were still further inferred, that it does not come to be somewhere through the conversion of something into it: for it is one thing concerning conversion into another according to the whole essence, and another concerning conversion into another according to parts: but by parts I mean the essential parts which are matter and form: and this is true, that nothing according to matter is converted into another, unless its matter is received by the other, and not its form, because the form is discarded. But it is not so here: because the whole essence of the bread, not annihilated, nor remaining as the substance of bread, passes over into the whole body of Christ according to matter and form: and therefore it is necessary that it remain in the same way receiving nothing, and yet come to be there where such a transubstantiation takes place.

427. 1 John 1:8.

To the proof, however, it must be said that there is a mutation which is made by an imperfect mover, to which the whole mobile matter does not obey, so that what it intends is induced in it: just as natural mutation is: and concerning that the proof holds. There is also a mutation of a mover with infinite power, to which the whole essence which is composed of matter and form obeys in conversion into that which it intends, and such is in the sacrament.

To the other which is objected concerning place, it seems it must be said that this is true of those things which do not have a relation to place except in one way, as are those things which are in a place only definitively or circumscriptively. But concerning the body of Christ it is not so: because it has a twofold relation to place: one per se where it is in its proper form, as where it is circumscribed by a place, and a first, middle, and last in the parts of the place are assigned to it: and where the first is, there the last is not. It also has another relation to a place through another in which it itself is whole in the whole, as is the form of the host: because it itself is whole in the whole host, and whole in any part: and it is not possible to assign to it a first, middle, and last according to the parts of the place of the host itself: and this will be held more fully below. Hence if Christ were to come to be in some place circumscriptively, then I would well concede that He would recede from the place in which He was circumscriptively: but in order that He come to be elsewhere in a place differently than He is here, it is not required that He recede or be moved in that in which He is circumscriptively.

To another it must be said that diversity of place, that is, that it can be diversely in diverse places, does not belong to a spirit insofar as it is a spirit, because neither does it to a body insofar as it is a body: but it belongs to Christ insofar as, living, He operates in Himself and toward those same others: but according to Himself He is in a place circumscriptively: but compared to the others whom He unites to Himself, He must be among them in the rationale and form of food which unites by way of nourishment. But that objection proceeds as if these things were attributed to the body through the fact that it is a body.

To another it must be said that although concerning God who is everywhere, this is false, God is elsewhere than where He is: because He Himself is everywhere, and in itself by the word elsewhere a diversity of place to everywhere is imported, and therefore it is false: nevertheless this is true, God is differently in a stone, and in the Saints, and in Himself, and differently in the temple, and differently in the marketplace, so that the mode of otherness is bent back to the effects. So too it seems it must be well conceded that this is false, that the body of Christ is elsewhere than where it is: because where otherness or aloneness of place to a 'where' is noted: in which it is simply without distinction of the mode of being 'where' circumscriptively or sacramentally: and therefore contradictorily opposite things follow upon those: because since He is where He is, and He is elsewhere than where He is, it would be required that in every place in which He is, He also would not be, but in another. But nevertheless this is true of the body of Christ: The body of Christ is elsewhere than where it is circumscriptively: because it is in the sacrament in which it is not circumscriptively, but essentially whole in the whole, and whole in any part.

428. Deut. 23:12-14.

To another it must be said that if it be granted that Christ can be here circumscriptively, and in many other places sacramentally: it does not follow from this that He could be everywhere: and this is clear, because when it is said, God is everywhere, the sense is, God contains every place and every particle of a place, and infuses into it the power by which it can contain what is located: but in neither way does Christ relate to place: because existing circumscriptively in a place, He Himself is not whole in any particle of the place. Similarly existing sacramentally in a place, although He is whole in any part of the form, nevertheless that form through which Christ is in the place is not whole in any part of the place. And Christ on the altar, as I think, does not have a relation to place except mediating the form of the sacrament: and thus it is clear that it does not follow from this that He Himself is everywhere according to the way it is proper to God to be everywhere.

§ 1. Furthermore, Christ's body cannot be consecrated, or even be had as consecrated, in all places and parts of a place: and therefore again it is not fitting for it to be everywhere: nevertheless, this second reason does not prove that Christ's body can be everywhere per se, but per accidens. But the first reason proves that it is everywhere per se: which does not befit it, but it does befit it to be able to be in multiple places.

§ 2. To the other [objection], it must be said that in truth whatever terminating [surface] within touches the bounded [surfaces] of the locating body outside, that is measured by an interior and exterior quantity: and if it does not have another relation to the place than that by which it is converted by the interior quantity, thus by the exterior quantity it cannot be in diverse places at once, but only successively: and this is so because the dimensions of the locating [body] which are here, cannot be elsewhere at once and at the same time. But in the body of Christ it is not so, because it relates to place in diverse ways, as was previously held: and therefore it can be in diverse places.

§ 3. To the other, it must be said that in order for Christ's body to be able to be a food converting us to itself, it is necessary that it be united to the divinity: and since by the grace of that [union] it befits it to be in multiple places where there are members to be fed or fed [already], some have said that insofar as the body is divine, it possesses [the ability] to be able to be in multiple places: and I well concede that it well has this: not insofar as it is glorious, but rather insofar as it is food.

§ 4. To the other which is objected against this, it seems it must be said that although the united divinity does not remove quantity, nevertheless from the union itself a power is conferred on it which it did not have, namely the power of feeding spiritually: and consequently it is conferred on it that it can be where the members to be fed are in diverse places: and therefore it is not similar regarding a moved quantified thing, on which a new power is not conferred beyond the divisibility of quantity: because it is necessary in the place of its motion to first traverse what is less than itself or equal, before it traverses what is greater than itself, as is proved in the Physics IX, before the end.[434]

§ 5. To the other, it must be said that there is a great necessity: because although Christ absent could give grace, nevertheless that grace would not have complete perfection: because

it itself is not He Himself, and the whole of what He Himself is is that grace itself: and therefore so that He may operate in us with His whole self, it is necessary to give His whole self to us in the sacrament.

§ 6. To the other, it must be said that the cause of institution in the sacrament is still preserved, namely humility, by reason of the species of bread and wine after conversion, and by reason of the substance of bread and wine before conversion: and therefore this does not impede it.

Articulus 2 — Whether It Is True, As The Master Says, 'You Are Not Going To Eat This Body Which You See'

Whether it is true what the Master says, "You are not going to eat this body which you see?"

§ 9. Next, it is asked concerning what he says, there, at A, around the middle: "You are not going to eat this body which you see, etc."[435]

§ 10. For this is expressly false: because they ate the same body, and drank the same blood.

§ 11. If perhaps you say that the Master seems to solve it in the Text, as "not this body, etc.", that is, you will not eat it under the same species in which it will be crucified. On the contrary:

§ 12. 1. According to this, even in the form of the Eucharist, when it is said, "This is my body," we could say, "This is not my body": because it is not there under the species of a body, but under the species of bread.

§ 13. 2. Also, the pronoun "this" signifies substance and points it out: therefore since they are substantially the same body, it seems that he ought not to say, "This is not the body which you see, etc.", but rather thus, "This body indeed, but not administered under such a species."

§ 14. 3. Furthermore, what is this that he says, "The flesh profits nothing"?[436] For if the flesh profits nothing, then nothing which is done in respect of the sacrament profits anything. PROOF. By virtue of the sacrament nothing is converted there into an uncreated or created spirit: therefore concerning spirit there is nothing there by virtue of the sacrament, but only flesh and body: therefore if that profits nothing, it seems that the sacrament profits nothing.

§ 15. 4. Also, by what he said, "Have you understood spiritually? They are spirit and life" he instructed the disciples that they should understand concerning the mystery of the sacrament according to a spiritual intellect: and this is against truth, because Christ is given to us corporeally and essentially in the sacrament, and not spiritually only.

§ 16. 5. Also, the spiritual mode of eating is without the presence of the sacrament: therefore by understanding spiritually, if it is referred to the mode of eating, concerning which the Lord instructs the Apostles there, it seems that nothing is understood concerning the rite of the sacrament, which is false: and therefore Augustine's exposition seems to be null or imperfect.

417. 1 Cor. 11:29.

§ 17. SOLUTION. It must be said to this that Augustine optimally expounds in the Text: and because heretics did not understand the exposition, therefore they took the tinder of error in those words.

§ 18. Therefore it must be said to the first, that to eat is spoken of in two ways: in the first way carnally, according to which it posits a stronger power in the eater converting the food to himself: and in such eating the food is divided and suffers, and is converted from itself to the one fed: and the disciples who went back took this understanding: and they were made heretics and heresiarchs of other heretics who still are, through doctrine, or through imitation: and thus Augustine understands: "You are not going to eat this body and thus [what] you see": the demonstrative pronoun points out the substance. In another way to eat is spoken of, such that it is spiritual food spiritually refreshing, and by the power of which the one fed is converted to the food spiritually through union, and not corporeally through identity: and in this way Dionysius and Augustine understand it: and this he calls spirit and life: and Augustine calls it a spiritual intellect, that is, the intellect of spiritual food spiritually refreshing. Whence the Master in the Text of the following chapter says less: since it is contained by virtue of the words, and leaves the matter of inquiry to the readers. Through this, therefore, the solution is evident to what is objected concerning the form, when it is said, "This is my body."

§ 19. To the other, it must be said that the pronoun signifies substance: but when Augustine says, that "not this body which you see, etc.", he himself does not understand that they were not going to eat the numerically same [thing]: but rather, that they were not going to eat that numerically same [thing] according to the understanding of corporeal eating, as they understood: but that they were going to eat the numerically same [thing] sacramentally.

§ 20. To the other, it must be said that the whole is referred to the same understanding: because if the Savior's flesh were converted to us (as they believed) and divided by teeth, it would not profit us anything: because thus it would not unite us to what is better than we are: but rather it itself would fail in us, and perish: and therefore Augustine says in expounding, and well, that a carnal understanding profits nothing, but even harms very much.

§ 21. To the other, it must be said that what Augustine says: "Have you understood spiritually? They are spirit and life": does not exclude sacramental eating, but rather presupposes it: but it excludes in sacramental eating the understanding of carnal eating, as was already said.

§ 22. And through this the solution to the last is also evident.

Articulus 3 — Whether This Is True, As The Master Says, 'He Himself Indeed, And Not The Very Body That Was Seen, Is Eaten'

Whether this is true which the Master says, "It indeed, and not the body itself which was seen, is eaten?"

430. Gratian, Decretum, dist. 6.

§ 25. Next, it is asked concerning what he says in the following chapter, B, around the beginning: "It indeed, and not the body itself which was seen, is eaten, etc."[437]

§ 26. For according to this Text two contradictories seem to be posited concerning the same thing, since the "it" in the singular points out the body, namely that it was eaten, and it was not eaten. But this seems incongruous: because

§ 27. 1. Contradiction is an opposition of which there is no intermediate secundum se: and it is necessary that according to one it is false, and the other true.

§ 28. If you say that they are not contradictories: because with respect to diverse forms it is not incongruous for the numerically same body to be eaten and not to be eaten: it seems that this is nothing: because certain forms and acts and passions befit absolutely according to the substance of the thing of which they are: but certain ones are relative. For example, whiteness is an absolute form, and is in a white thing, whether it is compared to another or not: but similarity is a respective form: therefore it is not in [a thing] except according to comparison to another: and in those which befit absolutely, they always persist, and they are in [it] with respect to all things: but the eating of a body is concerning those so befitting: therefore if it belongs to a body that it be eaten or is eaten, it befits it both in the form of bread and in human form, that it be eaten, and it never befits it not to be eaten.

§ 29. 2. Also, the Philosopher in I On Generation and Corruption, in the chapter on augmentation, holds that nothing nourishes except according to that which is substance, and augments according to that which is quantified substance: if therefore Christ's body most truly nourishes and more truly than carnal food, it itself is eaten by substance: but what is eaten according to substance, is eaten simply: therefore concerning it itself it does not happen to be truly said, that in one way it is eaten, and in another not: and thus again it is nothing what is said in the Text.

§ 30. 3. Also, taste, insofar as it is the sense of nourishment, is also a certain touch, as the Philosopher says: therefore it does not receive a species except with the touch of the substance which is disposed by that species: therefore nothing is said [by saying] that according to one form something is eaten, and according to another not: because nothing is eaten except according to its substance.

§ 31. SOLUTION. It must be said that in truth Augustine here takes eating for sacramental eating, in which there are two [things], namely the division of the species through chewing and breaking, and the incorporation of the one feeding which occurs in the food, namely in the head, Christ. And Augustine holds that conjointly both together cannot be referred to the body which was seen by the disciples in its proper form: and thus what he says is verified, not it itself visibly: but both are verified in that in which it is invisibly, namely in which it is not seen in its proper form: because there the breaking and division refer to the species of bread, and the incorporation to the virtue of the body: and this is what he calls eating it invisibly.

§ 32. To that therefore which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that although to eat falls upon Christ's body accepted absolutely, nevertheless according as the [word] "to eat"

imports multiple things, which do not befit the body by grace of one thing which is in it itself, but by grace of diverse things: just as division and breaking on the one part, and union or incorporation on the other part: thus it can well be attributed to it to be eaten according to one mode, and not to be eaten according to another mode: because not the whole ratio of sacramental eating is in the body according to the substance of the body: but something which is of the ratio of eating, is on this side of the species of bread and wine: therefore they do not contradict: but if both respected the substance of the body absolutely, then it would seem it must be conceded, that it would be eaten in all modes.

§ 33. To the other, it must be said that the body indeed nourishes us according to substance, and not according to accidents: according to the substance, I say, united to divinity: but that nourishment is according to the other only which is in the ratio of eating, and not according to that which is the chewing and division and a certain breaking of food: and according to this it is well conceded, that Christ's body existing in human form nourishes, although it is not thus exhibited in the sacrament, such that the act of chewing is upon the human species.

§ 34. To the other, it must be said that it is not so in this sacrament: because the accidents here have a certain virtue of substance in this that they are without a subject, and nourish bodies, and are corrupted, and are converted: and concerning this there will be a question below: and therefore since here the nourishment is solely in the accidents, not spiritual, but corporeal, the touch of the accidents alone suffices for taste.

Articulus 4 — Whether The Sacrament Of The Eucharist Is Well Said To Be Composed Of The Visible Species Of The Elements And The Flesh Of Christ

Whether the sacrament of the Eucharist is well said to be composed of the visible species of the elements, and the flesh of Christ?

§ 37. Next, it is asked concerning what is said, there, B, around the middle: "This is what we say, what we contend to approve in all ways, etc."

§ 38. It seems that there is no such confecting or composition which the Master touches upon in the Text, namely that the sacrament is composed of the visible species of the elements and the flesh of our Lord Jesus Christ, namely of the sacrament, and the reality of the sacrament (res sacramenti).

§ 39. 1. For the reality of the sacrament is the effect of the sacrament: but from a cause and an effect something is never made, especially from an efficient cause and its effect: but they always differ according to essence: therefore one sacrament is not made from the visible species of the elements, and the flesh of our Lord Jesus Christ.

§ 40. 2. Also, one is in the ratio of a sign, and the other in the ratio of the signed: therefore they differ, and are opposed relatively: but from correlatives and opposites one thing is not made: therefore something one is not confected from these two: therefore neither is one sacrament: and thus again it is nothing what Augustine says in the Text.

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432. 1 John 1:8.

§ 41. 3. Also, those which enuntiate the sacrament as essential parts, are as form and matter, as was shown above in all the other sacraments: but the visible species of the elements and the flesh of our Lord Jesus Christ, do not relate to one another as form and matter: therefore they do not constitute a sacrament: therefore Augustine seems to say nothing.

§ 42. SOLUTION. To this it seems it must be said, that Augustine does not intend here to determine the essential parts of the sacrament which is only a sacrament: but rather to say those things which are required for the truth and perfection of the sacrament, according as it is effective of the truth of Christ's mystical body which is the Church: but the visible species operate that through the mode of signing, as the Master says in the following distinction: because just as one bread is made from many purified grains, and wine flows together from many grapes, so the Church is congregated from many catholically purified faithful. But the true body of Christ effects that through the mode of such a cause, as the sacrament is a cause. In this way the sacrament, as it is a cause and sign of grace, is confected from these two, so that from one it may have the ratio of signifying, but from the other the ratio of causing.

§ 43. To the first therefore it must be said, that although one is the cause of the other in this mode by which a sacrament is a cause, nevertheless nothing prohibits that both have some order to a third, and are united in that order; just as also is in baptism where the character is caused by the exterior dipping, and with the exterior dipping is the sacrament of grace interiorly dipping and cleansing.

§ 44. To the other, it must be said that in the mode by which they are opposed, they are not united: but rather in the mode by which they are ordered to a third, as was said: and there is an example in a father and son who are opposed relatively in divine and human things: nevertheless they can be united with respect to a third which in some way is from both.

§ 45. To the other, it must be said that the sacrament is not confected by these two as by essential parts, which are form and matter: but rather in the aforesaid mode.

Articulus 5 — Whether The Flesh Is The Sacrament Of The Flesh, And The Blood The Sacrament Of The Blood

Whether flesh is the sacrament of flesh, and blood the sacrament of blood?

§ 48. Next, it is asked concerning what Augustine says, there, B, at the end: "Namely flesh of flesh, and blood is the sacrament of blood, etc."

§ 49. For according to what is said in the Text, the same thing seems to be the sacrament of itself. But that this is a great incongruity, is evident from this if it is said thus, because flesh [is the sacrament] of flesh, and blood of blood: for since a sacrament is a sign and a cause, the same thing will be the sign and cause of itself. But that this is a great incongruity, is evident from this if these are divided.

433. Gratian, Decretum, dist. 6.

§ 50. 1. For since every sign, in that it is a sign, is more known than the signed: if the same thing is the sign of itself, the same thing will be more known than itself, and less known than itself, which is impossible.

§ 51. 2. Also, since a cause is before the caused, if the same thing is the cause of itself, the same thing will be prior and posterior to itself: which is impossible.

§ 52. But if you say, as the Master seems to say in the Text and solve through metonymy, that the containing is posited for the contained in one of those expressions, and the signed for the sign, so that the sense is: flesh is the sacrament of flesh, that is, the species of bread, which is called flesh, because it contains and signs flesh, is the sacrament of flesh or of Christ's body: and in the same way concerning blood. If, I say, you say thus, it seems that what is said cannot stand, namely that by both, namely invisible, and intelligible, and spiritual blood and flesh, the visible, passible body of Christ, full of grace and divine majesty, is signified: for the signing flesh, which according to that exposition is the species of bread containing flesh, is not invisible, and intelligible, and spiritual: but rather visible, and sensible, and corporeal, since it has all the accidents of a body, although it does not have the prior substance of a body.

§ 53. If perhaps again to this it is responded, as the Master says in the Text, that the species of bread which contains Christ's body, is not simply called invisible: but because Christ's flesh is not seen in it in its proper species, but is understood in it just as the signed in a sign, and is spiritually covered in it, that is, in the ratio of spiritual food. If, I say, you say thus, it seems still that what he says is nothing: because it is said in the Text, that through that the visible, and palpable body is signified, as seems to be said by all.

§ 54. To this again the Master objects in the Text, that it ought to be called visible, and palpable: not here, but rather where it appears in its form, namely in heaven.

§ 55. But this seems to be nothing: because Gregory says, that every visible and palpable thing is corporeal: but Christ's body is not corporeal: therefore it is neither visible, nor palpable.

§ 56. To this it seems it must be said, that the Master well expounds, although the exposition is difficult: but this has been declared by disputing.

§ 57. And to the last it only remains to solve, that visible and palpable are spoken of in two ways, namely according to the power of the sentient [subject], and according to the power of the sensible [object], as Aristotle hints in II On the Soul, where he says that excellences are insensible: just as the light in the sun's disc is called visible according to its own power, but not [that] of the sentient [subject]. And what Gregory says, "Everything which is sensible, is corporeal," is understood concerning the sensible according to the power of the sentient [subject]: because that sense is through an organ, which has a harmony proportioned to this or that sensible: and such sensibles are composite and corporeal. But those which are sensible in themselves, do not need to be corporeal: whence I think well that glorious bodies are sensible of themselves: but that they do not immute our sense, this is from the imperfection of

434. Aristotle, Physics IX (sic), before the end.

corporeal senses, which cannot apprehend light of such subtlety: however, there will be fuller discussion of this in the tract on the resurrection.

§ 58. Yet furthermore it seems false what was said, that every sensible according to the power of our sense, is corporeal: and according to some there is an instance concerning light, but according to all concerning the stars which we see. To this however I think it must be said, that it is understood concerning a sensible which is only an object of sense, and not the act and complement of the object according as it acts upon the sense of sight: as color is in the sense of sight, whose act is lumen and lux (light): but in the other senses there is no instance: but stars are seen under that which is the act of the lucid and diaphanous: and therefore it is not necessary that they be corporeal.

Articulus 6 — Whether Those Communicating Receive Their Lord, And Whether The Body Of Christ Is Formed Daily

Whether communicants receive their Lord? and, Whether Christ's body is formed daily?

§ 61. Next, it is asked concerning the reasons of the heretics which the Master proposes at the end of the following chapter: and first concerning that which he posits there, C, § 2: "Who would dare to eat his Lord, etc."

§ 62. For it seems to be well moved: 1. For either that eating is through the conversion of Christ's body to us, or through the conversion of us to Christ's body. If in the first way: then Christ is worn down by teeth, and is digested, and is assimilated to us, and is united to our members, as other food: which is strongly incongruous: because thus it would profit us nothing, just as neither can we profit ourselves. But if it is in the second way: then it is necessary, that we both be united: but whatever is united to another, it is necessary that it be removed from its proper species and substance: if therefore we are united to Christ, it is necessary that we recede from the natural species and natural substance, by which we are: but this is false: therefore neither do we eat Christ, as it seems.

§ 63. 2. Also, that which converts another to itself, is the eater: and that which is converted, is the eaten: but Christ's body converts us to itself: and not conversely: therefore it seems, that Christ's body rather eats us, than conversely we it: but no one dares to say this: therefore the reason seems to proceed.

§ 64. 3. Also, if Christ were truly on the altar, who would dare approach unless presumptuous and rash? since he said to Moses, Exod. 3:5: "Do not approach hither: loose the shoe from your feet: for the place in which you stand is holy ground." Therefore much more if Christ's body were on the altar, one should not approach to it, but recede far away.

§ 65. Also, Luke 18:13, the Publican is praised because he did not want to lift his eyes: much more would he be praised, if he did not want to touch Christ's body; and even more, if he did not want to eat it: therefore also anyone else is to be praised, who does not presume to

429. 2 Sam. (2 Kings) 6:6.

eat his Lord: since therefore it is commanded to all Christ's faithful that they receive Christ's body prepared, it seems it is not on the altar except as the signed in a sign.

§ 66. Further it is asked concerning the second reason which he induces, "Who also would dare to say, that it is daily formed, etc."

§ 67. For this reason seems to have efficacy, because of the many incongruities which seem to follow if the opposite is granted:

§ 68. 1. For either the bread is converted into Christ's body, or not. If yes: then the reason seems to proceed, namely that Christ's body is formed from some matter, from which it was not before: therefore either in whole, or in part. If in whole: therefore let it be generated: therefore it is daily generated anew, which is false. If in part: then it seems necessary, that some part in it be restored, or that it has more parts than another body: both of which is heresy.

§ 69. But if you say, that the matter of bread is not converted into Christ's body: this firstly is against those things which are said in the Text. But secondly, because since it is not converted into something else, or does not remain in its proper essence, it seems necessary that it be annihilated.

§ 70. And if this is granted, this indeed is disproved in the Text below in the following distinction. Secondly also because something of universal matter yields into non-being: and thus already by daily frequentation matter would be much diminished: which is incongruous: because it would be necessary, that all things be contracted into a lesser place than they were on account of the annihilation of parts of matter, the place of which would need to be refilled, because a vacuum cannot be.

§ 71. 2. Furthermore, it is incongruous to posit, that God in the sacraments of all piety and grace annihilates something: since he is never the cause of destruction, but of the creation and governance and perfection of every thing: therefore it seems, that it is most suitable what this heresy says, namely that it is not on the altar except as the signed in a sign. Below, however, where it will be disputed concerning the three opinions in the following distinction, reasons will be posited against the annihilation of the substance of bread: but in this way these are solved: because the opinion in the Text and above is sufficiently disproved.

§ 72. It seems therefore it must be said to the first, that the heretic's argumentation has no power: because it is otherwise in spiritual food, and otherwise in corporeal: for spiritual food is consumed so that we may be incorporated into it: and the reason for this was assigned above in the preceding distinction: because the spiritual is immutable, and cannot be converted to another: but we can be converted to it through conformity of life: nor does it follow on account of this, that it rather eats us, than we it: because this is inferred as if it were a corporeal eating, which is not true, but rather it is a spiritual eating in the sacrament.

§ 73. To the other, it must be said that we do not recede from our natural species, on account of this that the spiritual things which are of grace do not destroy nature in anything,

435. Peter Lombard, Sentences, IV, dist. 10.

but rather perfect it; whence both those sophisms proceed as if it were a corporeal eating and a transmutation in corporeal substance: and this is not true.

§ 1. To the next it must be said that if worthiness of receiving is sought, no one is worthy: nor is anyone so presumptuous that he approaches with confidence in his own virtue. But although we are not worthy, we nevertheless have the necessity of receiving, and confidence from the benignity of God, since he said: "Take and eat." And below: "Drink of this, all of you."

§ 2. To that which is objected concerning Moses and the Publican, it must be said that their humility is commended in the recognition of their own humility [i.e., lowliness]; but their foolishness would be reproved if they had been so foolish as not to approach when the Lord called them, especially since without him there is no salvation. And the ignorance of this distinction which is between proper worthiness and the necessity of our salvation from approaching Christ, causes heretics to err.

§ 3. To that which is objected for the second reason of the heretics, it is harder to solve. Nevertheless, it seems as to the first, that the argument is invalid: because we do not posit that the body of Christ is formed from the bread as from matter: but rather there is a transubstantiation of the whole into the whole body, without the body of Christ receiving anything new into itself.

§ 4. To this that is objected concerning annihilation, it must be said that although certain of the ancients conceded this, it is nevertheless not approved by the more celebrated opinion of the moderns: for what is converted into something else pre-existing is not annihilated, just as the whole substance of bread is converted into the body of Christ, as must be shown below.

§ 5. But because some, albeit few, say that it is annihilated, which however I do not think to be true: if anyone wishes to sustain their opinion, he can respond to the first argument made against this, that it does not follow from this that the heaven or the world is restricted [i.e., diminished], if something of matter returns to nothing: because matter (as some say) is of itself manifold, and in the multiplication of itself in itself it always restores itself in the work of propagation.

§ 6. To the next it must be said that God is not the cause of destruction for the sake of destruction alone: because that would be the operation of a fool, or of a malignant being. For it belongs to a malignant being to always destroy what is useful, while it belongs to a fool to destroy his own work. But nothing prohibits something being destroyed so that something else better may be constructed. And thus it is here, where the substance of the bread is destroyed for this reason, lest man's opinion cling there, but rather that it pass from the accidents to the true substance of spiritual food: and this is not contrary to piety. This response, however, is not according to me, but according to others: because I do not think that anything of this is annihilated, and below I will set down reasons.

436. John 6:64.

Articulus 7 — Whether The Power Of The Words Of Consecration Is A Created Or Uncreated Power, And When That Power Is Given: Whether At The Beginning, Middle, Or End Of The Words

§ 8. Next it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, D, around the beginning: "If the word of Elijah availed so much that [it called down] fire from heaven," etc. Here there is a most difficult question concerning this power of the words, when this power is infused into the words. And before this can be perfectly known, it is necessary to ask: Whether that power is created or uncreated?

§ 9. For it seems that it is created: 1. For uncreated power operates without an intermediary: but this power has a manifold intermediary, because it has the priest's utterance, and the substance of bread and wine, and many other things which are set forth on the altar. Therefore it seems that it is created.

§ 10. 2. Also, the power of a created thing is created. The prayer uttered by the priest is entirely created: therefore its power is created. But the power of nothing other than the prayer operates in the sacrament: therefore it is a created power that operates in the sacrament.

§ 11. 3. Also, it is the form that operates in all things, because every action and every operation is from form. But the form of any sacrament whatsoever is created: therefore the form of this one. Now it is established that the power of acting in all things follows the essence and substance of the thing. Therefore the power of this form follows the essence of this form. Therefore it is created, just as the form is.

§ 12. But against this there seems to be a manifold reason, namely because: 1. The distance of the flesh of the glorious Virgin from the flesh of the Savior is lesser; and yet the flesh of the Virgin could not be converted into the flesh of the Savior, except by an uncreated power. Therefore neither is the substance of bread converted into the flesh of the Savior except by an uncreated power, as it seems.

§ 13. 2. Also, the Philosopher says in Book III of De Anima that the agent in all things is nobler than the patient, and the maker nobler than the thing made. But that power, whatever it is, makes the body of Christ from bread: therefore it is nobler than the thing made. Therefore some created thing is nobler than the body of Christ, which a faithful man will repute to be most absurd.

§ 14. 3. Also, if that power is created, it is given either to the written prayer or to the uttered prayer. If to the written: then in the confecting of the Eucharist it would not be necessary except to have the book, saying nothing, and thus transubstantiation would happen, which is heretical. It remains therefore that it is owed to the uttered prayer. But no power rooted in some essence extends beyond that essence, such that it would exist when that essence is not existing. Therefore it seems that when the uttered prayer ceases, that power also ceases. Therefore it is of small existence and weak being, as it seems. But such things cannot

437. Peter Lombard, Sentences, IV, dist. 10.

act upon that which is perpetual: therefore it cannot act upon the conversion of anything into the body of Christ, which is perpetual and lasting without end.

§ 15. Let it also be further inquired: if it is created, when is it given to the uttered prayer? For since that prayer is a discrete quantity in which there is an order of parts, such that the sound of one is after another, as much in let-

-ters as in syllables, as well as in words; and there is not anything continuing among these, by the fact that speech is a discrete quantity; it seems that it is infused successively through the succession of the utterance of the elements, the letters, and is not infused all at once.

§ 17. If you were to say (as some have said) that it is given in the final terminus of the prayer. Against: Whatever of the prayer has been spoken, this cannot be taken of the prayer any further, according to the Philosopher. Therefore, by the final terminus, you understand either the last part of the uttered prayer, or the terminus at which the whole uttered prayer is terminated. If in the first way: then the rest of the prayer uttered beforehand receives nothing of the power, since there is nothing of that prayer, by the fact that it has been spoken and cannot be taken any further. But it is established that it was uttered only for the sake of the power: therefore, since according to this it has none, it is uttered uselessly in the sacrament. If in the second way. Against: In the terminus at which the utterance of the prayer is terminated, there is nothing of that prayer: because what has been spoken cannot be taken any further. But what is nothing has no power. Therefore, in that terminus, that prayer receives no power: since therefore it is uttered for the sake of the power, it is uttered in vain.

§ 18. If on account of this it is said that the power is infused into it successively. Against: Either the whole is given to each part of the uttered prayer, or its own part is given to each part. If in the first way: since therefore nature does not abound in superfluities, nor fail in necessaries, and much more so is this observed in grace: it seems that once the first part is uttered, whatever that may be, the other parts are uttered in vain, which is false: therefore the whole power is not given to each part. If, however, its own part is given to each part: then that power operates successively upon the matter of the sacrament. Therefore in the utterance of the first part of the prayer something of the bread is converted into the body of Christ, and something remains unconverted which is converted in the second part: and no absurdity can be greater than this.

§ 19. If perhaps you say that this argument also is invalid: because, granted that it is infused even successively, the first part of the prayer does not convert, but disposes, and so all of them up to the last one which converts; just as happens in natural generation, where alterations precede the transmutation of substantial form. If, I say, you speak thus: this is most absurd for two reasons. One of which is that this power is not alterative of the bread, but transubstantiative: and therefore every part of the power transubstantiates. The second is: because in all altered things the altered substance holds itself differently in its accidents when it is near transmutation, than when it first begins to be disposed: but we see that the substance of the bread in its form and accidents holds itself in one way at the beginning and at the end

431. Ibid.

of the prayer. Furthermore, a created power that is successive, just as it demands a terminus from which the transmutation first happens, so it demands a terminus to which, which first was in potency in that which is transmuted, and afterwards in act: but this power does not have a terminus to which of this kind, as is clear to any faithful person: therefore it is not created and successive.

§ 20. Solution. It seems to me it must be said that the secret of God should be committed to Himself. But nevertheless, because heresy is troublesome in our time, I will attempt to respond without prejudice concerning those things which ought only to be set alongside the truth of faith that exceeds reason, by the fact that the word of God has more power than we are able to understand.

§ 21. It seems therefore better to be said here that the power of this prayer is created insofar as the uncreated power is in it: just as we also said above, that the uncreated Word operates in the created word. And this is what is said in the Text through the authority of Eusebius introduced at the end of the chapter, namely that the invisible priest commutes visible creatures into the substance of his body and blood by his word, with a secret power.

§ 22. The same is also introduced by the authority of Augustine introduced shortly before these, namely that just as through the Holy Spirit the true flesh of Christ is created without coitus in the conception of Christ: so through the same [Spirit] the same body and blood of Christ is consecrated from the substance of the bread and wine. The efficacy of this power is from the fact that it is conjoined to the uncreated power operating in it. Whence we say in this way, that it is created, and conjoined to the uncreated power within it.

§ 23. To that therefore which is first objected, it seems it must be said that a lesser distance does nothing to the effect that the transmutation should be easier: because there is no transmutation of things of the same species into one another, since transmutation is not from act to act, but rather from potency to act.

§ 24. But if you object what the Philosopher says, that the transmutation of those having a common symbol is easier, it must be said that this common symbol is not according to agreement in species, but according to agreement in the dispositions of matter: just as that which has no contrary except according to one contrariety, like air into fire, is more easily transmuted into something than that which has a contrary in two contrarieties, like water into fire. Whence that argument does not conclude.

§ 25. To the next it must be said that that proposition of the Philosopher is also confirmed by Augustine: and it is understood thus, that where the agent produces the effect from its entire and sole power, there the maker is more honorable than the thing made. But as was proved above by the authorities of the saints Eusebius and Augustine, the divine power operates in this prayer, and that created power which is infused into it by the divine power: and therefore it is not necessary that the created power be nobler than the body of Christ. Or let it be said more subtly that, since two things are proposed to that power which is created, namely the substance of the bread and the body of Christ, the operation of Christ does not extend itself except over the substance of the bread: because the body of Christ is not made:

but the bread is transubstantiated into the body of Christ, remaining in one way as it was before. And therefore it does not follow that that power is nobler than the body of Christ. The first solution, however, although it does not solve to the point as well as the second, is nevertheless more intelligible.

§ 26. To the next it must be said that this power is not given to the written prayer, as is well proved in the objecting: but it is given to the uttered prayer. But this is not true, that its power fails when it fails: for the power of the prayer is rooted in the signification of the uttered prayer, and the signification does not fail, as Augustine proves concerning the word of the mind, that it does not fail with the utterance of the motion of the voice; rather, this power signified by the prayer remains in the effect. And yet the argument also is invalid: because it is not necessary that if something is effected by something, the efficient cause should be of as much permanence as the effect: and there is an instance [i.e., a counterexample] in efficient causes, which being destroyed, the effect is not on this account destroyed.

§ 27. But to that which is further inquired, it is more difficult to respond well. Nevertheless, without prejudice it seems it must be said that that relation must be referred to the thing signified, and the thing signified to the reality. But the reality is incomplex and its power indivisible and one. And therefore it is nothing to ask: Whether part of it after part, or the whole simultaneously, is infused?

§ 28. But how this is to be understood can be clear thus: When it is said, "This is my body," in this prayer there is a subject and a predicate, and the composition of both is resolved to the thing signified: therefore the thing signified by this prayer will be that this demonstrated thing is the body of Christ. If further this is reduced into its total being, this is nothing but the body of Christ without composition and completion: and on the part of that, the reality of that prayer is one: and insofar as it thus looks to the unity of the reality without composition and completion, its power is one without composition and completion. And therefore it does not seem it must be said that syl-

-lable by syllable, or letter by letter, or according to the order of the utterance of words it is infused: but when it has been spoken, in the final terminus it has the whole power.

§ 30. But to that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that understanding the terminus at which the utterance of the prayer is terminated internally, whether that terminus is composite or simple: because I make no issue concerning this, provided the terminus of the prayer is taken beyond which there is nothing of the prayer, and in which the whole has been uttered.

§ 31. But to this that is objected, that in the terminus of the prayer it has been spoken and cannot be taken any further, it must be said that this would be true if the prayer here were taken only according to the reason of utterance: but (as has been said) it is referred to the thing signified, and the signification of the prayer does not pass away with the prayer passing away. For the time in which it is uttered entirely is one thing, and the time for which it is uttered is another; just as when it is said, "I am sleeping," it is impossible for this statement to be verified for the time in which it is uttered. So I say here, that the signification of the prayer is an

indivisible reality to which the whole prayer is referred for the time finishing the utterance, and then it has the power which is in it by the power of its signification. And thus it is clear that the first part is not uttered in vain, because without it, as it is ordered to the last, the last would not complete the signification of the whole prayer: and through this the solution to all the objections except the last is clear.

§ 32. To which it can be said that this is true of a created power, whose act is proportioned to the matter into which it acts as to both limits of the transmutation: just as natural power is. But it is not necessary that it be so here: because the other of the limits does not subjacently yield to the power: by the fact that it remains in one way always. And therefore this power has nothing except a terminus from which into which it may operate. However, there were some who said that no created power operates in substantial transmutation, except as to the terminus from which: because they posited here that the natural power which is in matter would not give the special specific form, but would only dispose the matter, and afterwards the form would be given by the giver of forms, namely the first intelligence or one of the secondary ones. And according to them the argument is invalid: because it would proceed from false premises. But I think that that opinion is false: and therefore I think and judge the first solution to be truer and better.

Articulus 8 — Whether It Is Of Greater Power To Make The Body Of Christ From Bread Than To Make Something From Nothing

§ 34. Next it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, D, around the beginning: "The Word therefore, that is, the Son, who could make from nothing what was not," etc. For it seems that Ambrose says nothing here. 1. For when something is made from nothing: although the distance is infinite, that is, here the terminus of mutation has no proportion: nevertheless there is nothing reluctant to the divine operation on the part of matter, from which there is a transmutation into something. But when the body of Christ is made from bread, the form of the bread and the nature of the body of Christ are reluctant [i.e., resistant]: because the corruptible gross, inanimate, and artificial has no agreement with the spiritual, incorporeal, glorious, animate, divine. But the transmutation of reluctant things is more difficult than of non-reluctant things; therefore it is greater [i.e., harder] to make the body of Christ from bread, than to make something from nothing.

§ 35. 2. Also, Augustine says that it is a greater thing to make a pious man from an impious one, than to create heaven and earth. But since it is infinitely greater to make the body of Christ from bread than to make a pious man from an impious one, it will be infinitely of greater power to make

the body of Christ from bread, than to make creatures subsist from nothing: therefore what Ambrose says in the Text is nothing.

§ 37. 3. Also, this seems from the fact that the first, namely to make something from nothing, is not so repugnant to reason as the second: whence many of the Philosophers appre-

hended the first, but none the second. Therefore it seems that it is of greater power to do the second than the first.

§ 38. Solution. It must be said to this that these two works of divine power can be considered in two ways. In one way according to the distance of the extremes: and thus it is doubtful to no one that non-being is more distant from any being, than being is from being. And in this way to create something from nothing is of greater power than to turn any being into any other. In another way the extremes of mutation can be considered, not according to themselves and according to their distance from each other, but according to the dispositions by which they are disposed to motion. And thus it is true that nothing is contraried to God on the part of nothing in creation, but something can resist the conversion of something into something. And thus the induced reasons proceed, and through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 9 — Whether One Ought To Seek The Order Of Nature In The Body Of Christ

§ 40. Next it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, D, around the middle: "Why therefore do you seek here the order of nature in Christ's body," etc. For from this it seems that: 1. It is not licit to seek a reason here, and thus those who seek one in disputation concerning these things sin.

§ 41. 2. This also supports the fact that a reason is not sought in those things which are contrary to the principles of reason, by which reason receives science. But the principle of reason is that an accident is in a subject and cannot be without it; that a located body and place are such according to dimensions; that one body cannot be substantially converted into another without corruption; that substantial transmutation cannot happen without agents and patients or physically, and things of this kind: which hold themselves in an entirely contrary way in this sacrament. Therefore it seems that it is against the principle of reason: therefore a reason is not to be sought in it.

§ 42. But against this is: 1. The common disputation of all and of the Holy Masters.

§ 43. 2. Also, Peter says in his first canonical epistle: "Ready always to satisfy everyone asking you to render a reason concerning the faith and hope that is in you." Therefore there ought also to be abundant reason among us concerning the things we believe. Therefore a reason is to be investigated.

§ 44. 3. Also, no truth is contrary to truth. Therefore every truth is saved with any truth. If therefore the things we believe concerning the sacrament are true, they are not disproved or destroyed by any truth. Therefore we can sustain the disputation which is made against the sacrament, lest the truth be disproved.

§ 45. Solution. It must be said that without a doubt in this sacrament and in all other articles of faith there are many things above reason, and there is nothing in them against reason: because God would then be contrary to himself, if he had given us reason, and in the sacraments were to act against the dictate of reason. Therefore there are many things above

reason in the sacraments, so that that of Psalm 138:6 might be fulfilled: "Your knowledge is become wonderful," etc.

§ 46. To the other therefore which is objected from the Tex-

-t first, it must be said that things are considered in two ways, namely according to their proximate causes, and dispositions, and properties, and powers: just as are matter and form, hot and cold, and things of this kind: and reason progressing from them and their effects often and greatly fails in divine things. They are also considered from relation to the first cause, and thus the thing itself and all that belongs to the thing, hold themselves in the ratio of obedience to the first cause: and whatever the first cause, which infuses more than any of the secondary ones, wills, is done in them. And in this way reason proceeds in divine works and miracles, and other things which are above nature. Therefore the reason which is denied to be sought in the Text, is reason proceeding in the first way, and not reason proceeding from principles taken in the second way.

§ 48. To the next it must be said that all those principles hold themselves as obedience according to relation to the first cause. And therefore reason does not suppose them except according to physical transmutation. But when it is inquired concerning divine transmutation, reason proceeds from higher principles: these indeed not contrary, but rather using those at will: because they hold themselves to the others like obedience.

Articulus 10 — Whether In The Sacrament Of The Eucharist The Body Of Christ Can Be Said To Be Created By The Holy Spirit, And Whether Transubstantiation Is Brought About By The Spirit

§ 50. Next it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, D, around the end: "Just as through the Holy Spirit true flesh," etc. For this seems inconvenient in two ways.

§ 51. 1. First indeed: because that is created which is made from nothing. But Christ, as to the substance of flesh, is not made from nothing, but from the most pure bloods of the glorious Virgin. Therefore the true flesh of Christ is not created by the Holy Spirit.

§ 52. 2. But secondly, what is more to the point: because transubstantiation in the sacrament does not seem to be by the Spirit, but rather by the power of the words: because otherwise the form of the sacrament would be useful for nothing.

§ 53. 3. If perhaps it should be said that there must be divine power in the word by which it operates, just as also in the other sacraments: then it seems still that it is inconveniently attributed to the Holy Spirit: but rather this will have to be attributed to the Son, because the uncreated Word has a common symbol for this with the created word. Whence the power of the operating uncreated Word is in the created word. Therefore this is not to be attributed to the Holy Spirit.

§ 54. But against: The same thing holding itself in the same way is not to be referred except to one operating cause. The flesh of Christ in the sacrament is the same as he drew from the Virgin, and holding itself in the same way in its substantials. Therefore it is to be referred in

the sacrament to the same operating cause to which it is referred in the Virgin. But in the Virgin it is attributed to the Holy Spirit. Therefore also in the sacrament, as Augustine expressly says in the Text.

§ 55. Solution. It must be said to the first, that many things concerning this are said upon the third book of the Sentences. But insofar as pertains to the present treatise, it must be said that "to create" is said in multiple ways, namely on the part of the creator: and thus creation is a divine act not subjacent to time: and in this way the body of Christ is said to be created. In another way creation is spoken of according as it is of that which according to its ratio is not founded in anything prior to itself, but all other things are founded in it: because it is necessary that it be made from nothing if it is made. And in this way the Philosopher says that the first of created things is being, and there is not

anything else created before it. And the Commentator says there that being is made through creation, but the good and the true through information: because they hold themselves to being as to a foundation in which they are founded. In a third way that is said to be created which according to its being is not from anything, although according to intention it has something prior to itself: and thus the world and heaven are said to be created from nothing.

§ 57. To the next it must be said that in truth the operation of the body of Christ in the sacrament is principally attributed to the uncreated Word, that is, appropriately, just as was said above in the question concerning the form of the sacrament. Nevertheless, according to something which is in the sacrament, it is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, namely as to the unitive love of the mystical body, and as to this the word of Augustine in the Text is understood.

§ 58. To the other objection, it must be said that in the womb the flesh of Christ was made according to the being of flesh which was not before: and that operation on account of the attribution of grace and goodness appropriately convenes to the Holy Spirit. But in the sacrament it is not made thus: because flesh which was not before is not made, but rather that same which is, and was before. Whence the operation of transubstantiation does not extend itself except over the substance of bread and wine: and this is done by the created word in which the uncreated Word operates. And therefore the mode of operating is not the same: and this is what Eusebius says in the last authority introduced in this chapter, there, "The invisible priest [commutes] visible creatures," etc.

DISTINCTIO XI

Divisio Textus

§ 59. Division of the Text. "If moreover it is asked, what kind that is," etc. Here the Master begins to treat of the mode of conversion.

§ 60. And it is divided into three parts. In the first of which he touches upon the conversion on the part of the act of transubstantiation, and on the part of the terms. In the second, he touches upon the mode of conversion on the part of the remaining forms; and this begins in distinction XII, there, A, "Under another species for three causes," etc. And also in the same place he touches upon the matter of this sacrament. But in the third, he touches upon the sacramental acts: such as breaking, partition, and eating, upon what are they? Whether upon the remaining form, or upon something else in the sacrament? And he touches upon this in distinction XIII, there, A, "It is also customarily asked concerning breaking and partition," etc.

§ 61. But concerning the first, in the remainder of this distinction the Master poses a question in the Text; and for its solution he introduces three opinions, proving some, and disproving another through authorities.

§ 62. But the question is this: Whether that conversion is formal or substantial? And he determines that it is not formal: because the form remains, but what is transmuted according to form does not remain.

§ 63. And afterwards in solving he introduces three opinions, which are evident in the Text, and from the disputation the intention of the chapter will be evident: because all three opinions are introduced in one chapter.

Articulus 1 — Whether In The Sacrament Of The Body Of Christ There Is Some Conversion Or Transmutation

§ 65. Let us inquire therefore around the beginning of the chapter four things: namely, whether there is some conversion in this sacrament? Secondly, what kind of conversion or transmutation? Thirdly, whether that transmutation is in time or sudden? Fourthly, and lastly it is inquired, how it holds itself to the transmutation of creation, and the operation of nature, and that operation by which miracles happen? And in the same place it will be determined, whether it is wonderful, or miraculous?

§ 66. To the first of these it is proceeded thus: 1. In every transmutation it is necessary to accept a subject, and two extremes between which the transmutation happens. But the subject is what is the same under both extremes, although they differ according to form and being. But in the sacrament it is not to be accepted thus. Therefore there is not any transmutation in the sacrament. The first proposition is proved by the sayings of all the Philosophers. For since transmutation is a way to being, it must be in something as in a subject. Similarly, when it is transmuted, there happens a renovation of position, or being, or some accidental form; and there must be two extremes, one from which, and the other to which the transmutation happens. But the second is proved by the fact that nothing is added to the body of Christ.

§ 1. ...nor is there anything according to matter under the form of the body of Christ after the consecration, which was there just before.

§ 2. Also, if there is a transmutation: it is either according to the whole, or according to a part. If according to the whole, such that the whole while remaining a whole is transferred to another place, then there will be a mutation of place, which is false. But if according to a part:

either an essential part, and then it will be generation or corruption; or an accidental part, and then it will be alteration, or augmentation, or diminution. Yet it is established that it is none of these. Therefore it is evident that there is no transmutation in the sacrament.

§ 3. If perchance you should say that those arguments do not hold here, but only in natural mutation, because this mutation is miraculous. On the contrary: In all miraculous mutations I see that there is an obediential potency which is afterwards terminated under an act miraculously introduced, and which remains under it. For although a blind man cannot see, when the potency has been conferred upon him, once that potency is terminated and completed, it remains under the sight restored by a miracle. Therefore it seems that here, too, something of the bread in which the obediential potency of conversion into the body of Christ is founded, remains under the act of the body of Christ; yet nothing remains, as the Saints say: therefore there is not here any conversion or transmutation, as it seems.

§ 4. Also, Boethius in the book On the Two Natures in the One Person of Christ says that every transmutation is according to something common [438]. Since therefore the Author says this while treating a matter of faith, it seems that he holds this also here in the sacraments which are received by faith: therefore if there were transubstantiation here, it would be necessary for something one in number and substance to be first under the form of bread and wine, and afterwards under the form of the body of Christ.

§ 5. Also, the same thing remaining in the same way is in no way mutated: therefore by the destruction of the consequent, if something same and one is mutated, it does not remain in the same way. But a diverse mode is not considered except according to the diversity of the form of bread, and afterwards under the form of the body of Christ. Therefore something same and one is first under the form of bread, and afterwards under the form of the body of Christ: but this is false, as is said by all, and in the Letter it is proved to be false by the sayings of the Saints: therefore nothing is immutated in the sacrament: therefore there is no transmutation in it, as it seems.

§ 6. If perchance you should say that it is otherwise in the works of nature, because God in operating does not seek matter upon which to operate, just as creation is a divine act neither seeking nor presupposing matter, and thus He can make a transmutation which is not founded in any transmuted thing. If, I say, you speak thus, that seems absurd and contrary to faith, for a threefold reason. First, indeed: because creation is out of nothing, but transubstantiation is from bread and wine, whence it presupposes to itself a being from which it is made, whereas creation does not.

§ 7. Secondly: because the transubstantiation which is in the sacrament is of something, and it cannot be said that it is of nothing. Now a transubstantiation which is of something, is either of it as "to which," or of it as "in which" and "from which." But here it is not as "to which," because then it would not be called the transubstantiation of bread, but rather of the body of Christ. Therefore it will be called of something as "in which," and thus the proposition is obtained: and if there is any transmutation there, it seems that something common remains there, which was disproved before: therefore there is no transmutation whatsoever.

§ 8. Thirdly, however, because it is not sought what God is able to do in things, but what is able to be done in things, as Augustine says in Book IV of The Literal Meaning of Genesis but neither does the intellect grasp, nor does nature sustain, that a transmutation should be from the whole substance of a thing, that is, from form and matter: because it would rather be an annihilation than a transmutation. Therefore there is not any transmutation in the sacrament, as it seems: because if there were, it would be from the whole substance of the thing.

§ 9. Solution. It seems it must be said here, without prejudice to a better opinion, that in this sacrament there is a transmutation, which

is properly called transubstantiation, because it is from the whole substance of a thing into the whole substance of another thing; that is, from the whole substance of bread and wine into the whole substance of the body and blood of Jesus Christ with respect to substantial form and matter, and the whole composite of bread and wine ceases to be with respect to its substantials, and the whole Christ is there as to matter. But whether the bread is annihilated or not will be a question afterwards in this same chapter, where the second opinion will be debated.

§ 2. Therefore, to the first it must be said that, in truth, in every transmutation it is necessary to have two extremes, but it is not necessary in every transmutation to have a subject. And there is an instance of this in creation, the reason for which is that it is not truly a transmutation: for transmutation speaks of the becoming of the thing itself, and its exit from potency to act. But when the thing is in that act, then it is not under the form from which the transmutation is, nor is it under that form to which it is, except only in potency; and the transmutation itself is a certain imperfect act mixed with potency, and therefore such a becoming is not without motion, and motion cannot be except in that which is moved, on account of which it is necessary that something be subjected to such a transmutation. There is, however, a transmutation which is not a motion, but a mutation only. And this is twofold, namely by a physical agent: and thus there is simple generation considered absolutely, and thus again it needs a subject, because an agent acting physically does not act unless some matter is subjected to it into which it may act. There is also the First Agent of infinite power, whose transmutation is without motion and indivisible, because there is nothing there except the existence of this from that, and afterwards its substantial being: and therefore it is not necessary that any matter be subjected there. Whence in my judgment that transmutation has only terms, and not a common subject, which is the third element in physical mutation.

§ 3. To the second it must be said that it is well conceded that no transmutation which is posited by the Philosophers is here: because neither did they posit them all, but only those in which there is an exit from potency to act, which act is in the potency of being mutated before it is in the state of having been mutated.

§ 4. To the other objection concerning the works of miracles, it must be said that miracles are for restoring the defections of nature, as when the blind are illuminated, and the like. And therefore it is necessary that in them there be a perfect natural potency, through an act

438. Matthew 25:26. Wait, the quotation is actually from Matthew 26:26-27.

introduced miraculously: because if nature could introduce the act in this way, it would introduce no other than the same one. But the work of this sacrament is entirely of grace for the nourishment of the spirit, and therefore no corporeal potency can remain in it: but in it we receive the spirit to which we are to be united, not indeed mutated in itself or in another, because thus it would not be perfect, but remaining in the same way.

§ 5. To the other it must be said that Boethius is speaking against the heretics Nestorius and Eutyches, who posited that the divine substance in the union of natures in Christ was converted into human nature, just as water is converted into wine. And he disproves this by those principles, that things are not transmuted into one another unless they have one matter communicable to both [439]. And he does not mean to say that there is no divine transmutation which does not presuppose some matter that is the subject of transmutation. Hence that does not contradict this; because although it is in the divine matter of faith, it is nevertheless not with respect to the same mode of article or mutation.

§ 6. To the other it must be said that it is well conceded that the bread is not disposed in the same way: but there is a not being disposed in the same way as to the whole substance and form, and a not being disposed in the same way as to a substantial or accidental part. I say, therefore, that it is not disposed in the same way in its whole substance, because it is transmuted from its whole substance. Christ, however, is disposed in the same way then, and before, and after, because nothing is added to Him nor does anything accrue to Him.

§ 7. To the last it is more difficult to respond:

Articulus 2 — What Sort Of Transmutation Or Conversion This Is

because this is contrary to everything that has thus far been supposed in the solution: yet it can be said that although transubstantiation presupposes for itself a being from which it occurs, it does not nevertheless presuppose it as a matter which is one in the act of that from which and in which the transubstantiation occurs: because then it would not be a transubstantiation from the whole substance, but from the substantial form only; and therefore nothing remains, because just as nothing is subjected as a subject to the act of creation insofar as it is an action, so also nothing is subjected as a subject to this transubstantiation: but it is true that it is dissimilar in the terminus from which, because there [in creation] being is not presupposed, but nothingness, whereas here being is presupposed.

§ 2. To the other it must be said that, in truth, transmutation is of something not "in which", but as "from which," whence it denominates that from which it is: because that thing is transmuted, and that thing is a being, and it does not yield into non-being, although it is a mutation from the whole substance. But to what is objected against this, it must be said that the accidental forms of bread remain, and not the substantial form, and with respect to this there is a transmutation there.

§ 3. But if anyone should object that the species of transmutations are distinguished more according to the terminus to which than from which, such as generation, and corruption, and

the like: therefore this also ought to be distinguished according to the terminus to which. It must be said that this does not follow: because those transmutations are a way into an act by which they are specified, and they introduce it, and that act is in a potency issuing into a pure act unmixed with potency. But here it is not so: because I do not think it is safe to concede that this transmutation in any way attains the body of Christ: whence it is not founded except in one of the terms, insofar as it expresses a mutation. However, there are some who say there are two terms of this mutation, as the mutation is from a whole existing substance into a whole existing substance; but about this inquiry will be made below.

§ 4. To the last it must be said that Augustine speaks there of the institution of the works of nature, namely, how water is above the heavens, and the like: in which matters certain ignorant persons wish to evade the issue [by saying] that they should be attributed to the power of God. And in that case what he says is true: because when He created the world, He did not dispose the parts of the world according to His raw power, but rather according to the exigency of each and every nature, according as this is conserved by that, and assists in the propagation of the world. But here the entire course of the work is miraculous; and therefore that saying does not hold here, just as it does not in other miracles either.

What kind of transmutation or conversion is this?

§ 5. Secondly, it is asked: What kind of mutation or conversion is this which is in the sacrament?

§ 6. For it seems that it is not from the whole substance. 1. For if it were a mutation from the whole substance, the proper act of that substance would not remain afterwards: therefore by the destruction of the consequent, if the proper act of the substance remains, it is not a mutation from the whole substance. But the act of the substance remains, which is to nourish: therefore the substance or something of the substance remains: and thus it is not a mutation from the whole substance.

§ 7. 2. Also, Damascene says that just as we are from a twofold substance, namely soul and flesh, so the food is twofold: for He joined divinity to the substance of bread to make for us an edible food . Therefore it seems that the substance of the bread remains.

§ 8. 3. Also, in the other sacraments, such as in baptism, confirmation, etc., the substance of the matter remains: therefore it seems that it ought to remain here as well. Since, therefore, the substance of the bread is the matter, the matter ought to remain there, and the mutation is not from it, as it seems.

§ 1. 4. Also, when the foundation does not remain, nothing of the things which are built upon it remains. But an accident is built as to its being upon a substance, like upon a foundation: therefore if the substance does not remain, neither does the accident of that substance remain. But the accident remains: therefore the substance of that accident remains, as it seems.

§ 2. 5. Also, it is commonly said that the accidental form remains for the reason that otherwise it would not lead to the notion of food: and this is contrary to the ratio of a

sacrament, of the ratio of which is that it be a sensible sign making one come into the knowledge of something else. Now it is established that although an accident contributes to the cognition of "what a thing is," nevertheless each thing is more truly known by its substantial form than by its accidental form. Therefore the ratio and cognition of food which is to be received in the sacrament is more truly and better received through the substantial form than the accidental. Therefore the substantial form ought to remain rather than the accidental.

§ 3. Also, everything that is mutated is otherwise disposed than before. But what is caused to be mutated from its whole substance is not otherwise disposed after the mutation, because it has been annihilated. Therefore the transmutation ought not to be from the whole substance, as it seems.

§ 4. 6. Also, it does not seem to be intelligible that something is mutated from its whole substance: for what is mutated is otherwise disposed than before; but what is otherwise disposed than before is something else now than it was before: therefore it is necessary that something of it remain now as before. Therefore it is not a mutation from the whole substance, as it seems.

§ 5. 7. Moreover, let it be granted that something is mutated from its whole substance: therefore nothing remains, neither form nor matter. But of that which nothing remains, nothing of it is converted into anything. But if the mutation of the substance of the bread is from the whole substance, nothing of it remains: therefore nothing of it is converted into another. Therefore the substance of the bread is not converted into the body of Christ, which is contrary to all [theologians], because there is no transubstantiation here except of the bread and wine into the body of Christ, as it seems to all.

§ 6. 8. Also, it is one thing for this to be this, and another for this to be transmuted into this, and another for this to be after this. When therefore it is said that bread is transmuted into the body of Christ, it must be said according to one of those senses: namely, that the bread is the body of Christ without transmutation, and this is false, because bread and the body of Christ are disparate things, and one is removed from the other, like a man and a donkey. Or that it is mutated into it: and since everything that is transmuted is first in a state of becoming before it is in a state of having been made, it would be necessary that at some time bread is becoming the body of Christ, which is false; because thus the body of Christ would be in potency and in the exit from potency to act, and would begin to be anew: for everything that exits from potency to act is new and generated, either simply or according to something of itself. And faith abhors all these things concerning the body of Christ. But if it is said in the third way, that to be transmuted into this is the same as for this to be after that. On the contrary: It is not intelligible that the body of Christ is made from bread after bread without an intermediate mutation: therefore it seems that this is not the sense.

§ 7. 9. Moreover, if thus the bread will be the body of Christ, then at some time it will be true to say, "the bread is the body of Christ." For whatever will be true in the future will be

439. Aristotle, De Anima, III, 5 (430a18).

verified in some present. But it will never be true to say, "the bread is the body of Christ." Therefore this was never true: "the bread will be the body of Christ."

§ 8. 10. Moreover, when it is said, "This becomes this," what does the term "this" supposit for? If for the bread, then the bread will be the body of Christ, which has already been disproved. If for something else, then something other than bread is converted into the body of Christ, which is false.

§ 9. Solution. It must be said, without prejudice, that in this matter and in the matter of the Trinity there are not sufficient words to express the mode of the divine operation: but babbling as much as we can, we resound the exalted things of God. Whence I think that this transmutation is more truly called transub-

stantiation, just as certain of the ancients have also said: and its mode is that it is from the whole substance of the bread with respect to form, and with respect to matter, so that, namely, of the whole composite with respect to its essential parts, nothing remains.

§ 2. Therefore to the first it must be said that it is not necessary that the proper act of the substance does not remain when the substance does not remain. For the act of the substance is mediated by forces and powers; but powers are properties which are not of first being, but of second being. And therefore in this transubstantiation the act of feeding and nourishing remains in the powers, founded in those things which immediately follow the composition of the bread, which are flavor, and quantity, and the like: but if those did not remain, then it would be true that the proper act of the bread would also not remain.

§ 3. But if it is objected by the authority in which Damascene says that when a substance is destroyed its proper act does not remain, it seems it must be said that he understands destruction in whole with respect to essential parts and the powers following upon the substance: but such a destruction is not here, and therefore even when a mutation from the whole substance has taken place, the act of the substance still remains.

§ 4. To the other it must be said that the saying of Damascene is understood with respect to the forms and accidents of the bread, to which God joined the Lord's body: therefore not with respect to a remaining substance of bread.

§ 5. To the other it must be said that it is not similar here and in the other sacraments. Because in the other sacraments the divine act is not upon the matter which is subjected to the eyes, but rather upon the soul of the one receiving the sacrament, and transmutates it by altering it to grace. But in this sacrament, on account of the reality contained in the sacrament outside the receiver, of which we have spoken above, the divine act is upon the matter which is subjected to the eyes in the sacrament. And therefore that matter is transubstantiated.

§ 6. To the other it must be said that substance founds accident with respect to being: but the use of accident is twofold. One is in matter: and in this it is necessary that it be founded in a substance. The other is to show a divine work: and in this it is not necessary that it be founded in a substance, but the continence of the divine power whose work it demonstrates suffices for it, just as a sign shows the thing signified: and thus it is here. Whence it is not

necessary that when the subject is removed the accident should not remain. Yet this will be inquired into below in the following distinction of the last chapter.

§ 7. To the other it must be said that a substantial form is properly of one thing according to being, and of things diverse in species there is not one substantial form. And therefore it does not make known except that of which it is properly the form. And therefore if the substantial form remained, it would lead to the substance of the bread, and not into the substance of the body of Christ, and thus it would be an occasion of error. But concerning an accidental form it is not so: because an accident is proper to many, and can lead into that of which it is proper, especially by consignifying diverse properties, such as that bread is gathered from many grains, and the true body of Christ from many drops of blood and many members, while the mystical body is from many faithful, and so on for others which have been touched upon in their own part. And therefore the accident more truly leads to the ratio of food than a being of another mode, whether it be an accidental form or a substantial form: and therefore it remains for the use of the sacrament.

§ 8. To the other it must be said that here something is said to be mutated in such a way that to be mutated is the same as to be transubstantiated from its whole substance, and in such a mutation it is not necessary that some one thing be disposed in a diverse way, but only that it itself according to its whole self be converted into another whole. But that argument is about physical mutation, and many such arguments were solved in the preceding article of the question.

§ 9. To the other it must be said that the middle sense is the one here, namely that it is converted

Articulus 3 — Whether That Transmutation Takes Place Suddenly Or Successively

into it: but it does not follow that it is in potency in it: because, as was said before, this transubstantiation does not have a "becoming" properly so called, nor does it have for this a common subject for both terms, but it is a simple conversion of the whole into the whole.

§ 2. To the other it must be said that when it is said, "the bread becomes the body of Christ," in the sense in which this is received, the substance of the bread which is subjected to the eyes under sensible accidents is demonstrated; and what is further inferred does not follow: because "to become" here is to be transubstantiated from the whole substance.

§ 3. And I readily concede that this is not true: "the bread will be the body of Christ": and concerning this there is a question below in this same chapter. Nor does it follow that sometimes it is true to say that "the bread is the body of Christ": for the reason that that "becoming" is said to be transmuted from the whole substance, and then neither bread remains, nor anything of the substance of the bread, by grace of which this could be verified: "the bread is the body of Christ."

Whether that transmutation occurs suddenly or successively?

§ 4. Thirdly, it is asked whether that transmutation occurs successively or suddenly?

§ 5. Now it seems that it occurs successively: because 1. The power of transubstantiating is the word, according as it is in pronouncement: but in pronouncement it is successive: therefore it operates the transubstantiation successively.

§ 6. 2. Also, the word, when it has been spoken, is not: but nothing operates when it is not: therefore the word does not operate when it has been spoken. Therefore it operates precisely as it is in the act of being spoken: but in the act of being spoken it is successive: therefore it operates the transubstantiation successively.

§ 7. 3. Also, whatever has a whole, especially a discrete one, has this from its parts: but this sentence, "This is my body," is a certain whole of distinct quantity, or a distinct quantity: therefore it has the power of operating from its parts. But the parts succeed one another: therefore it operates successively, as it seems.

§ 8. But against this is that 1. Everything which is transmuted into another successively is first in a medium before it is in the extreme. But the medium is neither of the extremes. Therefore there is a time when it is neither bread nor the body of Christ: which is false, because thus something would be subjected to the transubstantiation, which was disproved long ago.

§ 9. 2. Also, everything that is mutated successively is disposed by dispositions contrary to the form from which it is mutated, just as air, when it becomes fire, receives the dispositions of fire which are contrary to the form of air. But in this transubstantiation all the accidents of the bread remain: therefore it is not disposed by dispositions contrary to the form of bread; therefore it is not mutated successively.

§ 10. 3. Also, it was held above that the power of the Uncreated Word operates in the created word, as is held in the Letter, that the invisible Priest and the Holy Spirit operate in the created word. But the operation of these is not successive, but sudden.

§ 11. To this, however, I say that it is inquired concerning the instant of conversion, in which bread is last, and in which the body of Christ is first?

§ 12. For either this is one instant, or diverse ones. If one. On the contrary: In the instant in which bread is last, it is true to say that it is bread: and it follows from disparates that it is not the body of Christ. But in the instant in which the body of Christ is first, it follows that it is true to say that it is the body of Christ. If therefore those are the same instant, in that same instant that thing is the body of Christ, and is not the body of Christ. Therefore contradictories are simultaneously true with respect to the same instant. Therefore contradi-

ction is not an opposition of which there is no medium in itself, which is contrary to the philosophy of Aristotle. But if they are diverse instants, and between any two there is time: therefore time is after the instant in which bread is last, and before the instant in which the body of Christ is first. Therefore in all that intermediate time, it is neither bread nor the body of Christ, which is false.

§ 2. To this, however, some wish to say that, in truth, motion is measured by time, and the end of motion without time. Whence the end of motion is "to have been moved," and the end

of becoming is "to have been made." And therefore the "having been made" of the body of Christ is measured by an instant: but the last being of the bread, since this is "to be mutated," is measured by time. But time is well continued to "having been moved," such that no medium intercedes: and therefore they say that bread is last in time, but the body of Christ is first now in a "now" [an instant]. To confirm this argument another reason can also be adduced: because when fire is made from air, the desiccation of the air is with motion; but the "having been made" of the fire is the terminus of the motion, and without motion. Therefore it is measured by diverse measures. And similarly the transmutation of the bread is with motion, but the "having been made" of the body of Christ is without motion. And therefore one is measured by time, and the other by the "now" to which that time is continued. The third reason confirming that same thing is this: because in a permanent continuous thing having position in its parts, there are two terms in act, namely the first point and the last point. And one cannot receive in act a penultimate point, or that which follows the first: because those are only in potency, and wherever a quantity of a line is designated, there between two points there will be a line, although it cannot be marked except in a point. Therefore similarly it will be in successive continuity, that it is to take a "now" to which time is continued as to a terminus, and that is in the terminus of the transubstantiation, in which namely the body of Christ is first. However, one cannot take a penultimate "now" before this, but rather the whole time up to that "now," in which whole time the bread ceases to be, and this time is continued to the "now," and this is not incongruous. Thus therefore some have spoken, and it would be well said, as it seems, concerning physical mutation: but it avails nothing for the proposition at hand, which is proved thus: It has already been proved above that there is no mutation there which is a successive becoming. But only such a mutation is measured by time, and not another divine mutation which is in the sacrament. Therefore the bread would be in the last instant without motion: therefore just as it is true to say in the whole time and in whatever instant is after that in which the body of Christ first was, that it is the body of Christ; so it is true in whatever instant is before it, that it is bread. And thus the first incongruity follows. Also, Being is measured by a "now," just as mutation by time: but in all that time there is nothing except the being of bread, and not any mutation: therefore in whatever "now," it is verified that it is bread.

§ 3. Therefore there were others who said that in truth bread is, and the body of Christ is, in one instant: but yet it does not follow that contradictories are simultaneously true: because they are not according to the same respect in that instant: because that instant is the principle of the future, and thus the body of Christ is in it: and it is the end of the past, and thus the substance of bread is in it. But that this is not true, nor can it stand, is proved thus: That an instant is the principle of the future and the end of the past does not make the instant itself to be divisible: just as neither does a point which is taken as the end of one part of a line, and as the principle of the other. In that indivisible, therefore, according to being: either this which is on the altar is under the form of bread, or under the form of the body of Christ, or under both, or under neither. If under the form of bread: therefore nothing of it is that which is under the form of the body of Christ. Proof: For let it be granted that something of it is in which is

if it is under the form of the body of Christ, it then follows that the instant would be divisible, which is false. Therefore, if there is nothing of it [the instant] in which there is the form of the body of Christ, the form of bread and the form of the body of Christ will not be in the same instant, and thus that position is false. But if it is under the form of the body of Christ, by the same manner it follows that there is nothing of that instant in which it is under the form of bread, and thus we must again return to this, that in the same instant nothing is under the form of bread and of the body of Christ. But if it is under each part in the same instant: then in one indivisible [instant], taken according to being, I can say that there is bread, and there is the body of Christ. Therefore in that [instant] it is true to say that bread is the body of Christ, and conversely, which is false. Therefore in that instant it is not under each form: therefore it is under neither, and this again is false, because in this way at some point there would be neither bread nor the body of Christ, and matter at some point would be under no form: all of which are impossible.

§ 2. Therefore, again, there are others who presume to say that in truth in one indivisible [instant] is the bread and the body of Christ: but in one indivisible [instant] they readily concede that there is a prior and a posterior, saying that there is prior and posterior in time, and these are not in one indivisible; and there is prior and posterior in nature, and these are indeed in one indivisible. Whence prior in nature is the bread, and posterior in nature is the body of Christ. However, they confirm this with two arguments, of which one is from similarity: for let there be two lines joined to each other lengthwise in the same space; it is manifest that they touch each other in one point, and that point relates to each according to prior and posterior in nature. By similarity they say here: because there are two beings, namely the being of bread, and the being of the body of Christ, which touch each other in one indivisible of time, in which one yields to the other without any intermediate change; and according to prior in nature the being of bread is there, and according to posterior the being of the body of Christ is there. The other argument is: because, as was proved above, in this sacrament there is no "changing" (mutatio), but rather "having been changed" (mutatum esse); and yet it necessarily follows that it is changed: therefore "having been changed" precedes, not in time, but in nature only.

§ 3. But that this, again, is nothing seems capable of being proved thus: When two lines are joined in a point, the point, namely of space, over which they are joined, in truth is not made actual in the continuum because of this, but only in potency. Proof: For when lines are thus joined, a line will indeed follow, and will touch a line: but that a point should follow a point, this is by accident, because it only has this insofar as it is the terminus of a line. If therefore these agree in a point by accident, it is clear that they do not thereby designate any point in a continuum which might be through itself like a place in which they touch. Furthermore, such contact is only possible in mathematical lines according to the Philosopher [440], who says that many things happen to a straight line insofar as it is a straight line, such as touching a brazen sphere in a point: yet a separate straight line does not touch this. But we are seeking a measure here; yet the being of the nature of bread is in the last [instant], and of the body of Christ in the first: whence this does not seem to make for the proposition. Also, although "to

be changing" precedes "to have been changed" in some things in time, and in some things in nature only: nevertheless it is impossible to understand that there is one measure for both: therefore it seems that this is also not similar. Also, measures differ according to the measured things: therefore the being of bread is measured by a measure fitting for it. Since therefore a body is mutable, it will be measured by time, or by the nunc [now/instant] of time. But the body of Christ, since it is immutable in its being, will not be measured by time, or by the nunc of time. Therefore the body of Christ, since it is immutable in its being, will not have a measure of the same rationale: therefore it will be measured by the nunc of aevum, or by aevum. It is manifest, however, that these are not the same: therefore the being of bread and the being of the body of Christ are not in the same nunc, nor even of the same species in measure, as it seems. Also, without the change of bread, bread does not pass into the body of Christ, but by its change the body of Christ begins to be here: but the measure of being changed, and not being changed, is not the same: therefore these are not in the rationale of one nunc, nor in the rationale of one measure. And he who taught me used to concede this.

§ 4. But this again does not seem true: because the Philosopher says in the penultimate proposition of The Causes [441] that between the being whose substance and action are in a moment of eternity, and the being whose substance and action is in a moment of time, there is a medium, and it is a thing whose substance is in a moment of eternity, and its action in a moment of time. Therefore, although the body of Christ is immutable as to substance and accidents, it is nevertheless mutable as to place, or mobile: for it is manifest that it begins to be here. Therefore this very fact that it is now here, and before was not here, is measured by something; and it is manifest that it is not by the nunc of aevum or eternity, because those are measures of things behaving in the same way. It is left, therefore, that it is measured by the nunc of time. And thus the difficulty of the first opinion returns.

§ 5. Therefore there are others investigating the discourse more deeply, and saying that it is not entirely in time as it is in a continuum having position in its parts: and in this they follow Avicenna and Averroes [442]. One of them in the book De Sufficientia, and Averroes on the last chapter of the fourth book of the Physics, says that in any continuum having position it is possible to take two indivisibles which are in act in the continuum, although they are not separated according to being, just as in a line it is possible to take two points, and in a surface two lines. But concerning time, it is not possible to take anything except one nunc, which is the whole essence or substance of time, although it is not the being of time: because the being of time is the continuity of prior and posterior in the nunc itself. Whence they say that by taking time in its nature, it is not possible to take two nuncs, but only one alone. But if it is taken insofar as it is the measure of motion, which time exceeds, thus two nuncs can be designated, and between them is time, just as in motion there is a first being after which there is motion, and a last being, that is, taking the nunc insofar as it is measuring according to the first being and according to the last being. And in this way they say that it well happens to designate two nuncs following one another, when they are not in the same thing. Just as they say in a line there is nothing but one point in which the line is terminated in act, and it is not possible to

440. Cf. Boethius, Contra Eutychen et Nestorium (also known as Liber de persona et duabus naturis), ch. 6.

take a penultimate one; but if the line is divided, then there will be two following one another in the two lines. Thus they say here, that in the measure of the same motion it is possible to take one nunc in which the motion is terminated, and it is not possible to take the penultimate of that motion because of the indivisibility of motion: if however some motion should be terminated at the next nunc, then it is designated in comparison to that one, and then there will be two nuncs in the comparison of the two termini of two motions, between which there is no intermediate time. But in one motion they say this is impossible, just as in one motion before the term of the motion there is nothing but time up to the term of that motion. Therefore these men speak thus, that in two nuncs there is ultimately bread and firstly the body of Christ: and these two follow each other, and there is no uncertain intermediate time: because that [statement] of the Philosopher is taken concerning nuncs designated with respect to the same motion, and not concerning nuncs designated with respect to two beings between which nothing is continuous.

§ 6. But this seems to be strange: for whatever things are ordered to one another according to preceding and following, it is necessary that they touch each other in something. If therefore the being of bread in rest is measured by one nunc, and the being of the body of Christ by another, it is necessary to posit something continuous between them, in which one passes into the other: for that passage is not the being of bread, nor the being of the body of Christ, as it seems.

§ 7. Solution. I think that none of these opinions should be prejudged. I, however, think rather that the last is to be chosen, and it almost agrees with the one which is the antepenultimate: because those two are more probable.

§ 8. To that which is objected against this last one, it must be said that in truth there is no third thing in which they touch, or by which that passage occurs, because this passage does not happen here by the mode of motion from potency to act, but rather being after being, and act after act; and the passage is only according to the rationale of terms, and not according to the rationale of a medium which is the substance of motion or change. And then it does not disagree with the antepenultimate, except in this, that that one says it is according to the nunc of aevum: and many have said that the nunc of aevum and of time is one. And according to this, the objection made against it must be resolved, because Christ being here does not mean a motion nor the term of a motion, and therefore properly it is not measured by the nunc of time, but by the nunc of aevum, namely because there is no conjunction of prior and posterior in the succession of motion. But if it has a prior and posterior, this will be in the order of nature.

§ 9. For the other opinions, let anyone respond as he pleases, whoever chooses any of them.

§ 10. To that which is asked first, Whether transubstantiation is sudden, or in time? It must be said that without a doubt it is sudden: because many derisions would follow if it were posited to be successive.

441. Cf. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, bk. 4, ch. 12.

§ 11. To that which is objected to the contrary, through those things which were said in the question concerning the form of the sacrament, and in the question concerning the power of the words, the solution is easily manifest.

§ 12. And it must be said to the first, that that speech is not taken in the power of speech only, but also in the power of the institution which is simple and one, and according to how it refers to what is signified and through that to the Uncreated Word which operates in it: and therefore although it is uttered successively, it nevertheless does not operate successively.

§ 13. To the other it must be said, that nothing operates when it entirely is not: but since this speech is referred to the Uncreated Word, and to the institution, it remains according to the power of operating, although it passes away according to the act of utterance, just as Augustine says on John [443], that the voice passes away, and the word remains even after the utterance.

§ 14. To the last it must be said, that that discrete thing which is the speech that is the form of the sacrament, although it has discrete parts, nevertheless refers to other things which are not discrete, namely to what is signified, and the institution, and the Word, and by the power of those it operates according as those are prolated in the speech: and therefore that objection which proceeds as if that speech operated in its utterance is not valid.

§ 15. And by this the solution to the whole is manifest.

Articulus 4 — How This Transmutation Stands In Relation To The Operation Of Nature And To Marvels Or Miracles

How does this transmutation relate to the operation of nature, and of wondrous things or miracles?

§ 17. Fourthly it is asked, How does this transmutation relate to the operation of nature, and of wondrous things or miracles?

§ 18. It seems, moreover, that it has something of nature.

§ 19. 1. For the potency of obedience is in every creature to the will of the Creator. But potency adds something upon essence. Therefore some disposition is present in the creature by which this can be done. Although therefore on the part of the agent it is not through nature, nevertheless on the part of the converted things, namely the bread and wine, it seems to have something of nature.

§ 20. 2. Also, Augustine on Genesis maintains that God placed the seminal reasons of both natural things and wondrous things in the works of creation: but a reason is ordering toward some form. Since therefore the reason of this conversion was in the works of the six days, there is in the matter of the converted bodies some reason why this can be done: therefore it has something of nature.

§ 21. 3. Also, it is either according to nature, or against nature. If against nature, since God reasonably instituted nature: therefore by coming against nature, He comes against His own

institution: therefore He comes against the order of His wisdom and justice: therefore He comes against Himself, which is absurd. But if according to nature, then the proposition is held, that it has something of nature.

§ 22. Further it is asked, How does it relate to miracles?

§ 23. 1. For the act of miracles is potentially present in the subject concerning which it is done: which is manifest when a blind man is illuminated. For sight is potentially present in man even by nature: but by divine work potency is restored to a corrupted organ. And similarly concerning that which seems less so, the potency of bearing a child is present in a virgin, and childbearing is potentially in her. Can it therefore be said similarly that the bread is in potency the body of Christ? And it seems that it is so, through the similarities introduced.

§ 24. 2. Also, whatever in act becomes something, was first in potency that thing: but bread is transubstantiated into the body of Christ: therefore it was first in potency that thing: but whatever is in potency something, according to the same potency remaining in the subject it is subjected to it. But bread is in potency the body of Christ: therefore according to the subject it is the subjective potency of the form of the body of Christ: therefore the matter of bread remains in the body of Christ, which is absurd, and is denied in the Text . Proof of the first: because when air becomes fire, the subject of the same potency, which is of the matter of air, remains in the fire. And it is similar concerning all things, both natural and miraculous. But the second is supposed by the adversary.

§ 25. Solution. As it seems to me, one ought not delay much here: because I concede that that transubstantiation is neither natural nor miraculous, but wondrous (mirabilis): because a miracle is what happens beyond hope, and this is an arduous unusual thing: but this does not happen beyond hope, nay rather it happens with the certainty of hope: because hope is made certain from the words of the Lord. And therefore it is also not unusual, in that by the power of the Lord's word the use and course of that operation is held, just as by the power of nature the course of nature is made certain and frequented. It is left, therefore, that it is a wondrous work, in that we, by knowing and operating, cannot attain it, although we nevertheless hope for it as customary to us from the power of the Lord's speech.

§ 26. To that therefore which is asked first, it seems it must be said that it has absolutely nothing of nature, neither on the part of the matter, nor on the part of the agent, because the matter is bread and wine, but the agent is the word.

§ 27. To that which is objected concerning the potency of obedience, it must be said that the potency of obedience adds nothing upon the substance of the thing. The proof of which is: because if it adds something, since the thing and the substance of the thing according to nature is prior to it, the substance of the thing can be abstracted by the intellect from that added thing. Let it therefore be abstracted: then the potency of obedience will not be in that thing. Therefore what the Creator wills cannot be done from it, which is heresy. Therefore it is left that the thing substantially is the potency for whatever the Creator wills. Whence the first objection proceeded from falsehoods.

443. Cf. John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa, bk. 4, ch. 13 (86).

§ 28. To the other it must be said that those reasons, insofar as they refer to a miracle (as Augustine says), are not in the thing so that it must happen thus, but as that from which it can happen: for the first condition did not have it that a woman would be made from the rib, but rather that she could be made from it. Whence that reason does not posit any disposition upon the substance of the thing, but only an order toward the will of the Creator.

§ 29. To the other it must be said that that division is not sufficient: for some things are neither according to nature, nor against nature, but above nature, namely all things toward which nature cannot act except by obeying: and such is this, and other miracles.

§ 30. To that which is further asked, the solution is already manifest through those things which were said before.

§ 31. To that which is objected first, it must be said that this is not so except in certain miracles, and differently: because if the potency to the act of the miracle is given to the subject, then the act remains conjoined to the subject through the given potency. But if an opposite disposition to the act remains in the subject, the subject is under the act like an indisposed potency, and therefore the act is then miraculous, as in the childbirth of the virgin while remaining a virgin. But here neither the subject remains, nor any disposition, but it is a change from the whole substance of the subject, as was held previously: and therefore that is wondrous above all wondrous things.

§ 32. To the other it must be said that this proposition is false, "Whatever becomes something in whatever way, was first in potency that thing." For the Commentator says on Book IX of the Metaphysics, that nothing is in potency in anything properly speaking, unless it is drawn out from it by one mover, as this bean is in the seed of the bean, because it is drawn out from it by the moving heat of the sun, and therefore the potency is in the seed, not in the earth. And it is true that he is speaking of proximate potency. But this is also false concerning remote potency: because in nature there is not anything of material potency which does not have some one potency acting and completing in nature and drawing out that material potency to act: and this is not so [here]: because neither the substance remains, nor anything [else]. And therefore what he proposes is false.

Articulus 5 — Whether The Change Which Is In The Sacrament Of The Eucharist Is Similar To The Change That Is Called Growth, And Whether Change Of Place Is Conjoined To It

Is the change which is in the sacrament of the Eucharist similar to the change which is called augmentation? And, Is local motion adjoined to it?

§ 34. Next it is asked concerning this which is said, there, at C, around the beginning: "Therefore that the body of Christ, by the change of the bread, etc."

§ 35. For it seems from this that this change is not similar to the change which is augmentation: which is 1. Against Damascene, who says that it is similar.

442. Cf. Boethius, Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, ch. 6.

§ 36. 2. But this again seems false through this, that the Philosopher says that augmentation is the addition to a pre-existing magnitude: but there is no addition to the magnitude of Christ: therefore it does not have a similarity to augmentation.

§ 37. 3. Furthermore, the Philosopher says that where there is augmentation, the whole is augmented according to form, although not the whole according to matter: and this again does not fit here: because Christ is not augmented in form.

§ 38. 4. Also, where there is augmentation of a body, it is necessary that that which augments be in potency quantified flesh, as the Philosopher says. Bread is not in potency the quantified flesh of Christ: therefore it does not augment. Therefore this transubstantiation does not have a similarity to augmentation, as Damascene says.

§ 39. [Perhaps you might say that] Damascene means that augmentation is not similar in all things, but only in this, that the augmented thing is such that the augmenting thing is converted into that which exists beforehand according to form and species, because the augmented thing which was before is converted into a body: and thus here the bread is converted into that which was before according to form and being, because [it is converted] into the body of Christ. If, I say, you speak thus. Against this: Nourishment is also converted into the pre-existing, and it is not in potency except the substance of the nourished thing, and not quantified potency. But the augmentation which is converted into the pre-existing is in potency flesh, and quantified. Therefore that transubstantiation is more assimilated to nourishment than to augmentation, as it seems: and therefore John Damascene wrongly assimilates it to augmentation.

§ 40. Further it is asked, Whether local motion is adjoined to this transubstantiation?

§ 41. For it seems that it is: 1. For to every augmentation is adjoined a certain local motion, according as a change of place is said to be in a greater place than before: but this transmutation is similar to augmentation, as Damascene says: therefore local motion is adjoined to it.

§ 42. 2. Also, local motion happens to that which is where it was not before: but from transubstantiation the body of Christ becomes where it was not before: therefore local motion is adjoined to transubstantiation.

§ 43. 3. Also, that which is not essentially everywhere, if it must be essentially where it was not before, it is necessary that it come there through a motion which is local motion: but the body of Christ is not essentially everywhere: therefore if it must be in a place where it was not before, it is necessary that it come there by a motion which is local motion.

§ 44. But against this is that 1. Damascene says there is no local motion there.

§ 45. 2. Also, whatever by moving changes place, by approaching a place where it was not before, departs from the place where it was before: but the body of Christ does not depart from the place in which it was before: therefore neither is it moved locally to a place where it was not before. The first is self-evident. The second is supposed by faith and by the Text: because it does not depart from heaven when it is on the altar: therefore neither through this that it is on one altar is it any less on another.

§ 46. Solution. It seems it must be said, without prejudice, that this transubstantiation cannot very fittingly be assimilated to any motion or transmutation which is according to nature. Nevertheless, sustaining what Damascene says, it can be said that in augmentation there is what augments, and what is augmented: but on the part of the augmenting thing there is a corruption according to the substance of the augmenting thing, because it is necessary that it lose its proper form and be assimilated to that which it augments. Whence on that part there is no similarity. But on the part of the augmented thing there are many things: according to the terms of the motion it is an imperfect quantity, and a perfect one, and again on that part there is no similarity. And there is also there that to the thing converted to itself it gives the pre-existing form and species, and as to that alone is there a similarity, as Damascene says.

§ 47. And by this the solution to the first three is manifest.

§ 48. To the other it must be said that nourishment restores what is lost and heals a deficiency, and therefore it could not fittingly be compared to nourishment. Augmentation, however, is to the perfection of a body according to a due quantity, and to that it is compared according to something. Nevertheless I think that that authority of Damascene should not be extended: because it is safer to say that it is assimilated to no motion or change.

§ 49. To that which is asked further, If it has local motion adjoined? It must be said, in no way.

§ 50. But to the first objection to the contrary, it must be said that there is no augmentation here, although there is something similar to augmentation as to something.

§ 51. To the other it must be said that this does not suffice for local motion, that something be where it was not before: but it is required with this that it also depart from the place in which it was before: and this is not so here, as is manifest in the objection made to the contrary.

§ 52. To the other it must be said that although the body of Christ is not essentially everywhere, it is nevertheless essentially in many places, as was shown above. The objection made, however, is not valid, except concerning that which cannot be essentially except in one place.

§ 53. But what the cause of this is, must be sought where it was shown that the body of Christ is compared to place in multiple ways.

Articulus 6 — Whether These Expressions Are To Be Granted: 'Bread Can Be The Body Of Christ; Bread Is Changed Into The Body Of Christ; The Body Of Christ Was Bread; Bread Will Be The Body Of Christ'

Are these expressions to be conceded: "The bread can be the body of Christ," "The bread is changed into the body of Christ," "The body of Christ was bread," "The bread will be the body of Christ"?

§ 55. Next it is asked concerning this which he says, there, at C, around the middle: "To this they truly concede, etc."

§ 56. This question is useful: Which expressions are to be conceded in the discourse of a transmutation of this kind, and which are not?

§ 57. Let examples be subjected of four modes of speaking which are extracted in the Text: and first concerning expressions with a verb coupling potency with an apposing nominative (cum recto apponente), as, "Bread can be the body of Christ." Second, with verbs noting motion or change with a nominative or oblique [case], as when it is said, "Bread becomes the body of Christ," or, "Bread is changed into the body of Christ." Third, concerning those which are made with a preposition, as when it is said, "From bread is made the body of Christ." Fourth and lastly, concerning those in which there are substantive verbs according to a difference in time, which are past and future.

§ 58. Therefore let it be asked first concerning this: "Bread can be the body of Christ."

§ 59. It seems that it is true: because 1. So says Ambrose: "What is bread, by consecration can be the body of Christ."

§ 60. 2. Also, bread is changed into the body of Christ: but whatever is changed into something, can be that thing. Therefore bread can be the body of Christ.

§ 61. 3. Also, these are very often written in the Text.

§ 62. BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Potency is twofold, namely material and active: but it is manifest that the active potency of bread cannot be the body of Christ: there is no potency in bread which could make the bread the body of Christ: therefore it is left that it is passive potency. But against this: There is no passive potency which cannot be completed in nature by some active one: therefore if a passive potency to the body of Christ is in the bread, some natural active potency will complete it, which is false.

§ 63. 2. Also, the appetite of a material potency is terminated in the act of that potency, when it has it: but there is no appetite in the substance of bread toward the substantial form of Christ, since the matter of bread cannot by nature attain such a thing: therefore a material potency to the body of Christ is not in the bread: therefore this is false, "Bread can be the body of Christ."

§ 64. Secondly it is asked concerning this: "Bread becomes the body of Christ," or, "Bread is changed into the body of Christ."

§ 65. It seems, moreover, that the first is true: because 1. It is very often posited in the Text by Ambrose and Augustine.

§ 66. 2. Also, Damascene: "Christ made them, namely the bread and wine, his body and blood": but what Christ made, this sometimes was becoming: therefore then it was true to say, "Bread becomes the body of Christ."

§ 67. 3. Also, Damascene: "Do you ask the cause, how bread becomes the body of Christ? I answer you, that the Holy Spirit supervenes, and does this." From this it is taken first in the

question, that bread becomes the body of Christ: and again secondly in the response, which supposes this which was asked.

§ 68. BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. What becomes, unless the becoming is unto infinity, sometimes is terminated at having been made: therefore sometimes it is true to say, "The body of Christ is made from bread," which is false, because it is made from the most pure blood of the glorious Virgin, as is said in the Text.

§ 69. 2. Also, what becomes, when it has been made, is that which is made: but bread becomes the body of Christ: therefore when the body of Christ has been made, we can say that bread is the body of Christ, and this is false.

§ 70. 3. Also, what is made by another, receives dispositions from it transmuting the substance or the accidental forms: therefore if bread becomes [it], it is first disposed toward transmutation: and this has already been denied before in the question concerning this transmutation.

§ 71. 4. Also, to become requires having a subject as a nature which remains in each of the terms of the transmutation: but that this is not so here was proved above.

§ 72. Against the second expression, however, it has already been objected earlier where it was asked, Whether there is any change in this sacrament?

§ 73. Thirdly it is asked concerning this: "From bread is made the body of Christ."

§ 74. It seems, moreover, that it is to be conceded from this, that it is very often written in the Text by various Saints.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. Whatever is made from another, either it is new, or something new is made concerning it: but the body of Christ is neither new, nor is anything new made concerning it: therefore the body of Christ is not made from anything: therefore it is not made from bread.

§ 2. Furthermore, if it were true, the absurdity maintained above would follow: because what is made from something, by that very fact, of it it is true to say that it itself is made from it: therefore of the body of Christ made from bread it is true to say, the body of Christ was made from bread, which is false, since it was not made except from the blood of the glorious Virgin.

FOURTHLY it is asked concerning this [proposition], The body of Christ was bread, or, Bread will be the body of Christ.

For it seems that they are true: because § 1. Ambrose says: "What was bread before the consecration, is already the body of Christ after the consecration."[444]

§ 2. Also, Augustine in the book of the Sentences of Prosper: "We faithfully confess that what nature has formed is bread and wine before the consecration, but after the consecration it is the flesh and blood of Christ which the blessing has consecrated."[445]

§ 3. Also, Augustine in the book On the Trinity: "We call the body of Christ that which, taken from the fruits of the earth and consecrated by mystical prayer, we consume in memory

of the Lord's passion."[446] The Text. Therefore it seems that not only with the past and future tense, but also with the present tense it is true to say, Bread is the body of Christ.

But against this it is objected: When it is said, That which was bread, is the body of Christ, etc., the word 'that which' (quod) is a relative of identity: therefore it requires to have the same substance in the antecedent and the consequent: but whether that be form, or matter, or the composite, the locution is always false: therefore all of them are simply false.

SOLUTION. Without prejudice, it seems it must be said here that those [propositions] concerning which it is first asked are all false, especially absolutely, on account of that proposition, that whose the potency is, his also is the act: hence if it were a potency of nature, it would also be an act of nature. And therefore as a rule it was set down by the ancient Doctors in this science, that locutions concerning transubstantiation with this word can (potest), and a following nominative case, are all false: and if they are found by the Saints, they are not to be extended, but glossed.

IT MUST BE SAID, therefore, to the first, that Ambrose does not say simply, Bread can be the body of Christ, but it can be by divine consecration: and this is the same as that it can be by the power operating in the sacrament: and this is true: because on account of the determination the word can (potest) couples not the material or active potency of bread, but rather the divine, whose [property] it is to use a creature as it pleases.

To the next it must be said that it does not follow, if bread is mutated into the body of Christ, that it can be the body of Christ: for an act does not infer a potency, when the following act belongs to the same thing to which the preceding potency belongs: and this is not true here: just as also it does not follow, A Virgin gave birth, therefore a Virgin could give birth without a determination: but if it is determined thus, A Virgin could give birth by divine power, or something of this sort, then it follows, because then the potency and the act are referred back to the same thing.

To the next the solution is clear through the things said before.

To that which is asked secondly it must be said, that the first is false, namely this, Bread becomes the body of Christ: because to become (fieri) couples a making concerning some subject, and asserts something new: and neither of these belongs to transubstantiation. But if it is found in authority in the Text, and in Damascene, it must be resolved, so that to become (fieri) means to be transubstantiated, and the nominative case is changed into the oblique case, so that it may be

the meaning: Bread becomes the body of Christ, that is, bread is transubstantiated into the body of Christ, which the Holy Spirit does, according as the genus of making couples whatever mode of making, and not only physical action. And through this the solution to the first is clear.

TO THE SECOND, however, it seems it must be said, that it ought to be conceded, because the word is mutated (mutatur) in sacred Scripture couples a manifold mutation: for there are

many mutations in sacred Scripture not having a subject: and then it is especially to be conceded, when the oblique case determines the word can (potest), so that it may be said, Bread is mutated into the body of Christ, and then is mutated asserts the mutation which is transubstantiation.

TO THAT which is asked thirdly, it seems to me speaking without prejudice, that it has many reasons why it is not to be conceded: but on account of the fact that we do not have words by which we may express the mysteries of God, this is found many times by the Saints and conceded by the Doctors under that sense, that the preposition from (de) does not denote matter, as when it is said, from iron a knife is made: nor power, as when it is said, The Son of the Virgin is from the Holy Spirit: but rather it denotes only the order of the starting term (terminus a quo) from which transubstantiation is [directed], as when it is said, from morning midday is made. And that the verb of becoming (fiendi) does not couple a becoming (fieri), but rather a divine mutation such as befits here, that is, to which nothing is subjected, which is from the whole substance of a thing into the whole substance of another thing without the mutation of the latter.

And through this the solution to the whole which is asked against those locutions is clear. And the judgment is the same concerning this one, Out of bread is made the body of Christ (Ex pane fit...): but if it were said, By bread is made the body of Christ (A pane fit...), it would be false: because it asserts an efficient cause.

To that, therefore, which is asked fourthly, it must be said that without doubt all those are absolutely false on account of this rule: Whatever is true of the past, was at that present in which it was verified: hence if the body of Christ was bread, it is necessary to have been at that present, in which it was true to say, The body of Christ is bread: and whatever will be true in the future, it is necessary to be at that present in which it is true to say, Bread is the body of Christ: both of which are false. Hence such locutions absolutely are false and to be denied.

To that, however, which is objected, it must be said that the relative there does not refer to the same substance, but rather to diverse ones under the same accidents, indeed affecting and containing the first, but containing and not affecting the second. Hence when it is said, That which is bread before the consecration, is the body of Christ after the consecration, the meaning is: under that under which there was bread before the consecration, there is the body of Christ after the consecration: just as a little before the Master says that in such locutions the Saints use a trope, by which things signifying are accustomed to receive the words of the things which they signify. And this trope is called metonymy by Donatus.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 7 — Whether The Bread In The Consecration Is Annihilated, Or Reduced To Underlying Matter

Whether the bread in the consecration is annihilated, or is reduced into pre-existing matter?

445. Pseudo-Aristotle (Proclus), Liber de Causis, proposition 30 (or penultimate).

Whether the bread in the consecration is annihilated, or is reduced into pre-existing matter?

Next it is asked concerning this which is said, there, D, But some thus say that conversion, etc.

For this question is very useful concerning the comparison of these three opinions, which the Master touches upon in the Text.

But because all the preceding questions are concerning one of those, namely that the bread does not remain, nor is it annihilated, but there occurs a transubstantiation from the whole substance of bread into the whole substance of Christ: therefore concerning this we will say nothing more: but concerning the second and the third we will make a question.

But because the second says that the bread is either annihilated, or converted into pre-existing matter, therefore let it be asked concerning it.

And it seems that this is the truest, and having less difficulty, thus: § 1. In the transubstantiation of this sacrament, that which now is bread, will no longer be bread, neither simply, nor will anything of that bread remain: but whatever neither simply remains, nor anything of it, is either annihilated, or is converted into pre-existing matter. In other natural transmutations we can see this, namely when from air fire is made: for if nothing of the air remained in the fire, nor in any other body, the mutation itself would be the same as the annihilation of the air. But nothing of the bread remains in itself, or in the body of Christ. Therefore it seems that transubstantiation is the same as the annihilation of bread.

§ 2. Also, whatever is the starting term (terminus a quo) of a mutation there, which in no character of a cause relates to that into which the transmutation is [directed], is not preserved in itself, nor in that into which it is transmuted: but bread thus relates to the body of Christ: therefore it is neither preserved in itself, nor in the body of Christ: therefore it is either annihilated, or converted into another.

§ 3. Also, 'nothing' is the same as 'non-being' absolutely: but once transubstantiation is done, this is false, This bread is a being: therefore its contradictory is true, This bread is not a being: therefore also this one, This bread is a non-being: because a negative [proposition] with an infinite predicate is equipollent to an affirmative also with an infinite predicate: therefore the bread is nothing: and this occurs through transubstantiation: therefore through transubstantiation it is annihilated.

§ 4. Also, a generation succeeding a corruption does not remove the preceding corruption: therefore also the existence of the body of Christ on the altar after it was not, does not remove the preceding cessation (desitio) of bread: therefore it seems that the bread ceases to be: therefore it is annihilated.

§ 5. Also, when it is said, From nothing something is made, the preposition there denotes only order: and similarly when it is said, From bread is made the body of Christ: therefore of the reality

446. Averroes, In Phys., lib. IV, t.c. 132; Avicenna, Sufficientia, lib. II, cap. 11.

of bread nothing remains in the successor to bread, and it does not remain in another: therefore it is annihilated.

§ 6. Also, of every single substance there is some proper act: therefore if that act does not exist, nothing of the substance exists: but the proper act of bread, which is to restore the body, does not remain: therefore neither does the substance: but a substance not remaining, neither according to form, nor according to matter, nor according to the composite, is annihilated: therefore the substance of bread is annihilated.

§ 7. Also, every thing falls into nothingness, whose being is not conserved: but the being of bread here is not conserved: therefore the substance of bread yields into nothingness.

§ 8. Also, let us posit that the universe be so converted as the bread, the universe neither in itself, nor in Christ is something or Christ: therefore the universe is annihilated: therefore by similarity also the bread is annihilated.

§ 9. Also, in everything transmuted in which something remains, there is a production of something: but in this transmutation nothing new is produced, as was frequently proven above:

therefore nothing remains of the transmuted: therefore nothing of the bread: therefore it is annihilated.

But against this it is objected: because § 1. God is not the cause of the destruction of any nature: therefore especially in the sacrament of piety most of all He does not destroy any creature: therefore He will not annihilate the bread, but will contain it in being.

§ 2. Also, whatever is converted into something, by that very fact it is impossible that it be converted into nothing, because nothing and something are opposed in the manner of contradiction: but the substance of bread is converted into something, because into the body of Christ: therefore it is impossible that it be converted into nothing: therefore it is not annihilated.

SOLUTION. It seems it must be said that the substance of bread is not annihilated: and yet it neither remains in itself, nor in anything of itself in Christ. This opinion, however, seems to be consonant with the words of the Saints: hence although it is less intelligible, nevertheless it seems to me it should be chosen on account of the holy Fathers, whose inspired revelation takes precedence over arguments which can be made against this matter.

Therefore it must be said to the first, that it does not follow: if that which now is bread, neither simply, nor according to anything of itself remains, that it is annihilated. And there is almost one response to all, namely that mutated things remain according to the exigency of their mutation: for in a mutation which is from subject to subject, the subject remains, and not the accident: but the subject remains according to matter and form and the whole composite of those: however in a mutation which is from a non-subject to a subject, or from a subject to a non-subject, such as is generation, and corruption, the matter remains, but not the substantial

444. Aristotle, De Anima, I, 1 (403a12-16).

or accidental form. But in this mutation which is from the whole nature and substance of a subject into the whole substance of another subject, the accident indeed remains, but nothing of the substantials: but it is another according as the body of Christ is made through transubstantiation, and therefore it is not converted into nothing.

To the next it must be said that it is not similar with other transmutations to this one: because other transmutations are from the whole substance, but with the matter at least remaining: but here there is a mutation from the whole substance into the whole substance of another.

To the next it must be said that it does not follow, that what in no character of a cause relates, etc., that it is converted into nothing: for this is true in those things which make a transmutation and are imperfect for augmenting: but the Lord here transmuted, and therefore He Himself without any cause converted one into another through Himself: and therefore it is not annihilated.

To the next it must be said that bread is not a being after the transmutation, just as fire is not a being after corruption: and it does not follow that it is annihilated, because it is converted into another: hence that reason proceeds toward diminution: for it ought to be added, it is not a being and is not converted into another: therefore it is nothing, or is a non-being.

To the next it must be said that just as a subsequent generation does not remove the preceding corruption: so neither does the advent of the body of Christ on the altar remove the transubstantiation of the bread: but it does not infer a cessation in being (desitio in esse), since it is not the same to be transubstantiated and to cease to be.

To the next it must be said that although the preposition from (de) denotes only order, yet it does not infer annihilation: because the cause of that is, that the conversion is from the whole substance into the whole body of Christ: and therefore because it is the whole substance, it cannot assert matter: and because it is into the whole, it cannot be an annihilation.

To the next it must be said that the proper act of the substance of bread does not remain, because neither does the substance of bread: but it does not follow that it is annihilated, by the fact that it is converted into another, and its act is found, which is to restore the mind.

To the next it must be said that this is true of a thing whose being is in nothing conserved, nor transmuted into anything: and therefore it is proposed diminutely, when it is said, a thing yields into nothingness whose being is not con-

served: for this is false in every substantial transmutation: hence it is clear that this argument is not valid.

To the next it must be said that, such a position having been made, it does not follow that the universe is annihilated, for the same cause which was said, namely because it is converted into another: and thence it does not follow, it does not remain in itself nor in anything of itself: therefore it is annihilated: but it follows: therefore it is annihilated, or the whole substance is converted into another.

To the next it must be said that this does not follow except concerning those transmutations which are not from the whole substance, as was frequently said above: for what is mutated from a whole substance into the whole pre-existing substance of another, is not annihilated, nor does it remain, nor is anything new produced in such a mutation.

Articulus 8 — Whether In The Sacrament Of The Eucharist The Substance Of Bread And Wine Remains Together With The Body Of Christ

Whether in the sacrament of the Eucharist the substance of bread and wine remains with the body of Christ?

Secondly it is asked concerning the third opinion which he touches upon, there, D, around the beginning:

But others thought the substance of bread and wine remains there, etc.

But that opinion seems more probable among all [of them]: because § 1. It has been said concerning the nature and character of the body, since it is glorious, that it can be with any other body, and in the same place: therefore also with the bread it can be under the same accidents, and under the same place: since therefore the effect of bread remains which is to feed corporeally, it seems that nothing more probable could be said, than that the body of Christ is with the bread and in the same place.

§ 2. Also, it is not intelligible how an accident taken according to its being could be without a subject: but it is certain that there is an accident according to its being there, because it is seen as white and round, and is touched as hard: therefore that accident will be in something as in a subject: but not in the body of Christ: therefore in the substance of bread: therefore it is necessary that the substance of bread remain.

§ 3. Also, from this a lesser occasion of derision would follow for infidels, since they do not believe this sacrament, because they see and touch some substance, which is not the body of Christ because it nourishes a material body: therefore it seems that this is more probably said than any other.

§ 4. Furthermore, an accidental form is not divided except accidentally: but it is certain that something is divided there: therefore that which is divided essentially (per se) cannot be an accidental form only: therefore [there is] some substance upon which it rests: therefore it seems that the substance of bread remains there.

§ 5. Also, if the substance of bread is destroyed, there will be something destroying it: either therefore the body of Christ, or God, or something acting to the contrary. Not the body of Christ: because this did not come for destroying, since it can be in the same place. Similarly God does not destroy it: because God is the conserver of things, and not a destroyer. Thus it seems that it is destroyed by nothing acting to the contrary: because then the accidents would not remain: for the bread would not suffer from a contrary by reason of its substance, but by reason of its forms: because nothing is contrary to substance. Therefore since nothing destroys the substance of bread, it seems that the substance of bread itself remains.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. If the substance of bread remains: then the word of the Lord is false, saying, This is my body because then the substance of bread subjected to the eyes through its accidents is demonstrated by the pronoun.

§ 2. Furthermore, in the Text several authorities are introduced to the effect that no substance is there, except only the substance of the Lord's body: therefore there is not there

§ 3. Also, if it is said that the substance of bread remains there: then the accidents affecting it lead the intellect into the substance of bread: therefore they do not lead into the invisible body of Christ: therefore they do not have there the character of a sign which is required in a sacrament, which is absurd: therefore it is necessary to say that this opinion is false.

SOLUTION. It must be said that this opinion seems false by these many reasons and almost by all, just as the second: yet although the first belongs to almost everyone and to the whole Church: the second still has some defenders: but the third, as I think, has none.

IT MUST BE SAID therefore to this one, that the substance of bread does not remain.

But to the first which is against this, it must be said that although a glorious body and especially the Lord's body could be with bread in the same place, yet the nature of a sacrament, not the nature of a place, is repugnant to it, and the cause of this was touched upon in objecting to the contrary: because an accident would not lead except into its proper substance, and thus it would fall away from the character of signifying. But if it is similarly objected concerning other sacraments, in whose matters the substance remains, above indeed a question was raised, and a certain solution given, in which many Doctors agree. But nevertheless it can be said without prejudice, that in other sacraments the character of signifying is taken from the proper act of the substance which is the matter of the sacrament: just as in the water of baptism there is the act of washing, and in chrism the act of anointing, etc. Hence since such an act is not without a substance, it was necessary for the substance to remain in the others. But here the character of signifying is not taken from that act, but rather from the accidental forms of bread: and therefore it was not necessary for the substance to remain.

To the next it must be said that this is not intelligible, how an accident according to its being remains for the use of nature: but for the use of showing the work of God it is well intelligible: because thus it is contained in being by God operating that work, not in the power of a subject: and this will be discussed in the following distinction.

To the next it must be said that the occasion for derision is removed through this, that either those forms have certain acts of bread in the sacrament, and in passing into the body, or the substance returns after the cessation of the forms, as some say. Since therefore the essence of the sacrament requires this, and impiety is sufficiently precluded, it was not necessary for the substance of bread to remain.

To the next it must be said that this objection proceeds as if the substance itself were divided essentially (per se): and this is false: but rather since a substance alone would be indivisible, as the Philosopher says, but a quantified thing can be divided, it is well conceded

that quantity remains, by reason of which other situational forms, such as whiteness, and taste, are divided.

To the last it must be said that this objection supposes that the substance of bread is destroyed through annihilation: and this was proven not to be true in the disputation of the preceding opinion.

Articulus 9 — Whether At The Hour Of The Immolation The Heavens Are Opened, And For What The Heavens Are Opened

Whether at the hour of immolation the heavens are opened? And, for what are the heavens opened?

Whether at the hour of immolation the heavens are opened? And, for what are the heavens opened?

Next it is asked concerning this which he says, there, D, in the middle: Who of the faithful could have a doubt, that in the very hour of immolation, etc.

And it is asked there, For what is it necessary that the heavens be opened?

§ 1. For just as was maintained above, the body of Christ begins to be on the altar without local motion: therefore it is not necessary for this that the heavens be opened, that it may come to the altar .

§ 2. Also, supposing even that it came by local motion, it would not be necessary for the heavens to be opened: because in passing through the heavens, it would be with the heavens in the same place.

FURTHERMORE it is asked, What is it for the highest and the lowest to be joined together (sociari)?

For the bread which is the lowest, is not joined to the body of Christ, but is transubstantiated into it, since a fellowship (societas) is only between different conjoined things, either according to place, or according to effect.

FURTHER it is asked, What are those invisible things from which one something is made?

For the visible things are in the substance of bread and wine, the invisible are the body of Christ and the blood: and it is certain that from these one something is not made: therefore he seems to speak badly.

FURTHER again it is asked, What is it to be snatched up into heaven, so that it may be consociated with the body of Christ?

For what is snatched up changes place: therefore it seems that it does not remain on the altar.

Furthermore, what necessity is there, that it is snatched up into heaven to be consociated, when on the altar itself is the truth of the body of our Lord Jesus Christ?

SOLUTION. It must be said that the heavens are said here to be opened as to the presence of the celestial power operating in the sacrament: and this is for the heavens to be opened to us: just as it is frequently taken in sacred Scripture, when something celestial is shown, as Ezekiel 1:1, and Matthew 11:16.

Through this also the solution to the second is clear.

To the next it must be said that the visible species are said to be united: and the members of the mystical body: and this so that they may be one sacrament with the body of the Lord: and of what sort of one they are, this was determined above. But as to the members there is a special effect of the union of the members to the head.

AND THROUGH THIS the solution to the following is clear: because the visible things are the species, and the invisible things are the body and the blood, from which one thing is made in the being of relation in the sacrament.

To the next it must be said that the rapture befits the members according to the special effect of union to the glory of the body of Christ, according to which He appears in heaven. And therefore although He is on the altar essentially, yet the Church does not seek to be snatched up to Him through union according as He is on the altar, but rather according as He is in heaven.

And concerning this distinction let these things said suffice for the present.

DISTINCTIO XII

Divisio Textus

But under another species he bestowed it, etc. In this distinction begins that part in which transubstantiation is treated from the side of those things which are transmuted, namely the substance of bread and wine.

And that part is divided into three parts: in the first of which he touches upon the causes why he gave his body under a species other than its proper one. In the second, however, he touches upon what sort of body he gave, there, D, § 2: But he gave such a body, as he then had, etc. In the third, however, he touches upon the mode of remaining

which befits the accidents, there, E, But if it is asked concerning the accidents, etc.

In the first part three things are further touched upon: in the first of which he touches upon why he gave his body under another species. In the second, he touches upon the causes why it is consumed under a double species, there, B, But why is it consumed under a double species, etc. In the third, however, he touches upon the mixed water, there, C, Water is indeed to be mixed, etc.

Articulus 1 — Why Christ Gave The Body Under Another Species Than Its Own

Why did Christ give his body under a species other than its proper one?

Why did Christ give his body under a species other than its proper one?

In the first it is asked concerning the causes which the Master touches upon in the Text.

And first it is asked concerning the first: Why did he give his body under another species? So that faith might have merit: because, as Gregory says, Faith has no merit, etc.[447]

§ 1. For if this cause is true, it follows that any other sacrament ought to be contained under another species, than under that in which its essential truth is preserved: but this is false: therefore that reason is not valid.

§ 2. Furthermore, then all those who seek to assign a reason concerning the things to be believed would sin: because they remove the merit of faith, as it seems.

§ 3. Furthermore, in any irrational thing it could be said that it ought to be believed, and a reason ought not to be sought: because if a reason is sought, the merit of faith is evacuated.

§ 4. Furthermore, it seems that the body ought to have been handed down under the same species: for under the same species it would more excite devotion: but devotion is highly necessary for the merit of faith: therefore it seems that it ought to have been handed down under the same species.

§ 5. Also, a sign containing truth is less distanced from the truth, than a sign not containing and only signifying: the sign of a sacrament of the new law contains the truth and signifies it, but the sign of the Old Testament signifies, and does not cause: therefore the new ought to be less distanced than the old: but the sign of the sacrament of the old law was in the same species with the Eucharist, because it was the body and flesh of the Paschal lamb: therefore much more strongly in the new it ought to be in the same species: therefore it ought not to have been handed down under another species.

§ 6. Also, form and species are the principle of understanding things, and the distinctions of forms are for the distinctions of the intellects which are had concerning things: therefore a determinate thing in its nature and its form is not understood except from the proper species of the form: since therefore the sacramental forms are for the understanding of the true body of Christ, and they are not twofold: therefore this sacrament ought not to have been handed down under a double species, as it seems.

FURTHER it is asked concerning the second cause which he touches upon in the Text, saying that if he had given it under its proper form, the human mind would abhor it: because it is a horror for a man to eat raw flesh, and to drink blood.

And this seems to be nothing: because § 1. Supposing faith, it seems that no horror, but very much devotion would be born from this.

§ 2. Also, it is sufficiently known by the faithful, that that food is not incorporated into us, but we into it: therefore the rawness of the flesh would operate or de-operate nothing towards the consumption: but rather our utility is considered.

FURTHER it is asked concerning the third, which is so that the occasion of deriding may be removed from the infidels who say that we drink the blood of a slain man: because § 1. The infidels, seeing that that blood would be a drink for us, would rather be edified than deride.

§ 2. Furthermore, we see that the Saints sometimes for the confession of the faith prayed, that the Lord [would appear] in his proper species

he would show himself, as is read concerning the blessed Pope Gregory, that for strengthening the faith of the people, by his prayers he received the form of a finger turned into bleeding flesh: therefore if he were to be under his proper species, it would not be ordered to the derision of faith, but rather to its edification. § 2. Next, further on this it is asked: If it should happen that the Lord shows himself in the proper form of a man, or of bleeding flesh, or of some member, whether it should be received or not? § 3. But it seems from the Letter [of the Master], that it should not: because § 4. 1. In the second cause he says, that there is horror in eating bleeding flesh. § 5. 2. Also, he says it is not lawful to devour Christ with teeth: therefore it seems, that it should not be received. § 6. ON THE CONTRARY: § 7. That showing, and the removal of the accidents of bread does not happen except to increase devotion: but the more devotion is increased, the more worthily it is received: therefore the more openly he is shown, the more worthily he is received: therefore even then it will be more to be received, than at another time. § 8. Solution. It must be said, that the causes which the Master touches upon in the Letter, are good. And the first is taken from the words of Gregory. The second from the words of Jerome. But the third from the words of blessed Augustine. However, this cause could be rendered which seems cogent, that some things are to be considered in the sacrament with respect to it according to its essence, but some are to be considered with respect to its use, namely that it is given as spiritual food of the faithful. And in the first consideration the causes dictated in the Letter are touched upon. But in the second consideration there must be in the sacrament breaking, chewing, and the character of food in general. But the first two in no way can fall into the proper form of Christ's body: because that body since it is impassible and glorious, is not divisible or breakable in an alien form. Secondly, according to the third, which is the use of the thing under the character of food and drink in general, it was necessary that it have the form of food in general, and that is the form of bread: and the form of drink in general, and that is the species of wine. However, concerning this it will be asked below, why he gave it spiritually under these forms rather than under others. § 9. To the first therefore it must be said, that it is otherwise in the other sacraments: because in them the author of all grace is not contained, but in this one he is contained, and therefore in it especially, being the highest, faith had to be placed. § 10. To the next it must be said, that the rationale of faith is twofold: the first namely which is drawn from the principles of faith: and this builds up faith, because it presupposes the principle of faith, and presupposing the

447. Gregory the Great, Homiliae in Evangelia, II, 26, 1.

principle of faith, does not doubt concerning what is believed. But the second proceeds not by presupposing the principle of faith, but from physical reasonings: and this frequently strives to overturn faith, and to extinguish the merit of faith: and concerning this the saying of Gregory is understood: and therefore he says, to which human reason offers experience, not divine. § 11. To the next it must be said, that it is irrational [to believe] that it has no rectitude of truth, and this is not to be believed: and whoever believes it, is foolish: but there is something into which reason cannot enter, having nevertheless an argument of truth, because the Lord said it who cannot lie, and we are frequently unable to understand his words: and that must be believed, by the fact that falsity cannot underlie the words of the Lord. § 12. To the next it must be said, that perhaps for a time the natural species would excite greater devotion than the species of bread, but not always: however the principal cause is, because those things which are required for the use of the sacrament, could not be in the proper form: but they are well preserved in another form which is of a corruptible body. § 13. To the next it must be said, that the species of the reality and the species of the sacrament can in no sacrament be the same: because the reality of the sacrament is invisible, but the species of the sacrament must be sensible. And to the argument it must be said, that in the Old Testament flesh was a figure, not of the same species as the flesh of Christ, but rather the flesh of certain offered animals. And the cause of this has been said above: because it did not figure only the sacred reality, but also Christ's Passion, and the oblation which he offered to the Father on the cross. Hence the sacraments of the old law and of the new are not distinguished by the fact of signifying, but rather by the fact of causing. Hence through this the sacraments of the new law are closer to the truth, because they contain it, which the sacraments of the old law did not do. But if we want to say, that they are more express in signifying, then it must be said, that the species of bread is more expressly a sign of the spiritual food of the mystical body, than flesh is: because it is neither food in general, nor is it collected from diverse things as bread is: but yet flesh is more expressly a sign of the passion, and of the oblation on the cross. § 14. To this note, that the sacraments of the old law signified only the sacraments of the new law. But the sacraments of the new law signify not only the sacrament itself, but also together with this the effect of the sacrament in us. But for signifying this effect the species of bread is a more express sign, than the species of flesh. § 15. To the next it must be said, that the reality is understood in one way according to the proper nature of the reality, and in another way in its spiritual effect. In the first way the reality is understood from the proper principles of its species. But in the second way it is necessary, that it be understood through the symbol of corporeal images: and in this way the understanding of spiritual things occurs in the sacraments. § 16. To what is further asked concerning the second cause, it must be said that there is a horror which is born from devotion and reverence: and there is a horror which is born from abomination. In the first way there would be horror in the receiving of the sacrament: for no one would presume to receive the bleeding flesh of Christ, when it would be presented in its proper species. And thus it is understood in the Letter. § 17. To the next it must be said, that although it is known by the faithful, that he is not incorporated into us, but we into him: nevertheless man would fear even approach and contact out of reverence. Moreover, what is most powerful in the sacrament, the character of a sign would not be preserved there, as was

touched upon before, nor those things which pertain to the use of the sacrament. § 18. To what is further asked concerning the third cause, it must be said that infidels seeing the bleeding flesh of Christ divided by teeth, and blood consumed through drink, would not be edified toward faith: because to be divided and to be consumed belong to corporeal things: and therefore they would then think that Christ was also corporeal, and they would think the effect of the sacrament to be a prestige [illusion] or incantation. § 19. To the next it must be said, that sometimes the Saints prayed in a given case for the showing of the effect of the sacrament: but yet in the receiving of the sacrament they prayed, that it would again be under the form of bread: and so did blessed Gregory with the matron, who had offered the bread itself of the sacred oblation, and was doubting concerning the efficacy of the sacrament: and when this was revealed to blessed Gregory, he prayed that God would show the effect of the sacrament: and again afterward he prayed, that the species of bread would return, and he gave it to the same matron to be received. § 20. But to that which is asked lastly, Whether it should be received thus, if it appeared in the proper form of flesh or blood? § 21. It must be said without prejudice, that either it appears to all under its proper form, or to some. If to some, I think that it should be received: but if to all, then it is not to be received, but to be reserved as relics. § 22. But if it is then asked, Whether a priest, to whom this happens, ought to celebrate mass without communion? § 23. It must be said, that if out of the fervor of devotion he can, he ought to celebrate another mass, and communicate in that one. And if the same thing happens in that one: then he can celebrate another, until he communicates in the person of the Church. But if he is impeded out of indevotion, or from the fact that this happens to him more often without intermission, then he can not celebrate: and the communion itself which he ought to have made in the person of the Church, is understood in spiritual reception through the fervor excited from the fact that the body of Christ appears to all in its proper form, etc.

Articulus 2 — Whether In The Sacrament Of The Eucharist A Double Species Is Necessary

Whether in the sacrament of the Eucharist a double species is necessary?

Whether in the sacrament of the Eucharist a double species is necessary? § 26. Next it is asked concerning the second part of this chapter, namely concerning this which he says there, B, "But why under a double species," etc. § 27. For it seems that a double species is not necessary: § 28. 1. For one thing is not terminated at two things, but at one only. But the paschal lamb which Christ ate with the disciples, was only one. Therefore it is not terminated at two realities: therefore neither at two sacramental species, as it seems. § 29. 2. But if you say, that there were many things in the eating of the paschal lamb, such as unleavened bread, and wild lettuces, and the flesh of the lamb: and something had to respond to those on the part of the sacrament: then there should be many more: because there ought to be at least three materials of this sacrament: and this is not true. § 30. Also, The lamb is not terminated at the unleavened bread, as to a reality which is of the same species with it: nor the wild lettuce to the wine, because it does not have conformity: therefore that response is nothing. § 31. Moreover, Those things were not of the truth of the sacrament, but rather they signified the preparation of those who were to eat the paschal lamb: therefore even in the truth of the New

Testament nothing ought to have responded to them: therefore not on account of them ought there to be more species in the matter of this sacrament. § 32. 3. Also, None of the other sacraments has a double species for matter: therefore neither ought this one to have been handed down in a double species. § 33. 4. Also, that because we are twofold, namely corporeal, and spiritual, therefore the body is offered for the body, and the blood for the soul: this seems to be nothing: because by the same reason any sacrament would be to be handed down in a double species, since we who receive, are twofold, and we seek in it a twofold profit, namely of the soul, and of the body. § 34. 5. Also, The whole Christ in blood and soul and body is contained under either of those species: therefore it seems, that it is superfluous to offer the other in the sacrament. § 35. Solution. To this I think it must be said, that for many causes, of which some are touched upon in the Letter, and some by the Masters, this sacrament is handed down in a double species. One is which is touched upon in the Letter: because it is offered for the body, and the soul. Another cause is, as some say, that this sacrament is not only a sacrament of spiritual effect, but also a memorial. Hence through the species of bread which strengthens the heart of man, it makes the union of charity, as the union of the mystical body. But through the species of rich wine it is a memorial of the inebriation of the love of Christ, when in the blood of his passion he offered himself for us, as if forgetful of himself for our love. § 36. Again others touch upon another cause: because it is not only a sacrament of the passion, but also of the incarnation. Therefore the species of bread signifies the incarnation: because his body as if from drops of blood was commixed and coagulated and formed into the bread of the faithful: but through the species of blood it signifies the blood of the passion poured out. § 37. Some touch upon another, namely that this was done in sign of a twofold mode of receiving: for some receive with the difficulty of penance, as the bread of sorrow, and the bread of tears for past sins: and those as it were chew for a long time, and finally swallow. Others with the facility of devotion , hoping for eternal fruition in the fatherland, which is signified here in the sacrament: and those as it were drink and are inebriated from the drunkenness of the house of God, and are given to drink from the torrent of pleasure. § 38. Still others say, that this is in sign of a twofold effect, namely of the union of the mystical body through flesh, and of redemption through blood. Therefore the first is signified in the species of bread which by conforming to itself, unites both head and members: but the second in the species of wine. § 39. But all these causes are probable: but one is better than all the others, as it seems, namely this, that between things united to each other there must be a conjunction and a uniting power: since therefore we are united to Christ the head through this sacrament, there must be something in the sacrament by which our conjunction to him is signified, and something by which the uniting power is signified. But union cannot be signified in bread, because it is not an immiscible body, remaining in its proper species: and therefore there must be a liquid substance, to which another insipid one would be united: but again it could be, that our insipidity through it ought to return to savor. Hence that the union of Christ through nature might be signified, the species of wine is assumed. Because, as it is said, the children shared in the flesh and blood of the Lord, and he himself similarly participated in the same. But that our union to him through grace might be signified, water is added, so that our insipidity, reverted by its savor, may be understood to [return to] savor, and be absorbed, just

as that water is absorbed by the wine. But that the uniting power might be signified, the species of bread is assumed, which strengthens the heart of man, and consequently binds the members with the head. However, when all these reasons are united, one having vigor is effected from all. § 40. I say therefore to the first, that one thing in which there are two, can well be terminated at two things responding to it. But in the lamb there was indeed the eating of flesh and the oblation of blood, and the smearing of the doorposts and lintels: and therefore two things succeed: one responding to the eating of flesh, and the other responding to the drinking of blood. § 41. To the next it must be said, that it is well conceded, that nothing responds to those things in the substantials of this sacrament, but rather in the circumstances of the receivers: just as it is that unleavened bread signifies purity, sincerity and truth, and wild lettuces the bitterness of penance for sins committed. § 42. To the next it must be said, that other sacraments do not so have to signify the mode of union, which is fulfilled in two, as this one does, and therefore they are not handed down in a double species. § 43. To the next it must be said, that this is not the only cause, because we are twofold: but together with this because Christ is corporeally and spiritually joined to us through himself: but in others he is not joined to us, except in one way, namely spiritually through grace: and therefore since here there is both conjunction, namely of body, and of soul, therefore there had to be a double species in the matter of the sacrament. § 44. To the last it must be said, that although the whole Christ is under either species, yet he is whole from the power of the sacrament: since therefore very much utility has been shown in the dictated causes, it was necessary that from the power of the sacrament it should be had under a double species in the sacrament.

Articulus 3 — Whether The Master Says Well That Wine Produces Blood, In Which The Seat Of The Soul Is Said By The Physicists

Whether the Master well says, that wine works blood, in which the seat of the soul is said to be by the Physicists?

Whether the Master well says, that wine works blood, in which the seat of the soul is said to be by the Physicists? § 47. Next it is asked concerning this which he says in the Letter, there, B, near the beginning: "Because wine works blood," etc. § 48. For this seems false according to the Physicists [Natural Philosophers], whom he nevertheless adduces in the Letter as witnesses. § 49. For either the soul is compared to the body as an act, or form, or perfection: or it is compared to it as a mover and principle of works. If in the first way: then what he says cannot be: because thus it is whole in the whole, as Augustine says. For if there were something of the body, in which it were not whole, it would be necessary that there be something of matter not perfected by a form: but of every substantial form this is proper, that it be whole in the whole, just as lapideity [stone-ness] in a stone, and igneity [fire-ness] in fire, and so of others. § 50. If perhaps you say, that this is not true except of homogeneous wholes, and not of heterogeneous wholes: because humanity is in the whole, and not in the parts: this does not stand in the way, because it is one thing to say that it is whole in the whole, and another to say that it is whole in the parts. And the first belongs to every substantial form: but the second does not, but belongs only to the soul: because Augustine says that it is whole in any part of the body. But it seems, that in this way it does not have its seat in the blood, but in

the whole. § 51. Also, Blood is not a part of man, or of another animal, except in potency only: therefore it is not an animated part except in potency only: but the seat of the soul is more in that which is actually animated, than in that which is only in potency: therefore the seat of the soul, by the fact that it is actually animated, is more in the heart or in the brain, than in the blood. § 52. But if the soul is compared to the body, as mover and principle of works: it is still false, and more than before: for natural motions, as the Physicists say, proceed from the liver, and vital ones from the heart, but animal ones from the brain: therefore it sits in these members, when it moves, and not in the blood. § 53. Moreover, The Physicists say, that the seat of the soul is in the heart, and not in the blood: therefore he seems to speak falsely in the Letter. § 54. Solution. It must be said, that in truth the authority of Moses and of the Lord is greater, than that of all the Physicists: therefore without doubt the seat of the soul is in the blood. But this is to be understood in three ways: by which it is verified without contradiction. In one way: because "seat" signifies the first permanence of firmness of the soul in the body: and then animal motions are founded in vital ones, and vital ones are founded in natural ones: but since natural ones are to generate, to augment, and to use nourishment, the nutritive [power] subserves the prior two: and therefore they are founded in it: and thus consequently all in the nutritive. But the nutritive does not locate the others immovably in the body, except through nourishment, because from it is received augmentation, and the seed of generation, and from the evaporation of its spirit in the heart vital and pulsatile [spirits] are generated, and further animal spirits in the head. But it is certain, that the ultimate nourishment which is among the veins, is blood in those having blood, or a similar humor in those not having it: therefore the nutritive is founded in blood, and consequently the others. In a second way it is understood that the seat of the soul is in the blood, as in that which is in potency the whole body in which the soul is. But this is not flesh, nor bone: and therefore since it is whole in the whole, this seems to be more appropriated to it by reason of blood than of another part. In a third way it can be understood on account of the heart, in which according to Aristotle in the books on Animals, blood is first generated, and especially the operation of life proceeding from the soul into the body through the blood generated there. But yet Galen contradicts this: and that contradiction is to be reduced to concord elsewhere: because it does not pertain to the present treatise. § 55. But through the things dictated the solution to the whole is clear: because it is neither understood insofar as the soul is compared to the body, as form: nor insofar as it is compared, as mover to it: but rather insofar as it remains in it through the operation of blood.

Articulus 4 — Whether Under Both Species The Whole Christ Is Taken

Whether under either species the whole Christ is received?

Whether under either species the whole Christ is received? § 58. Next it is asked concerning this which he says, there, B, near the middle: "Under either species however the whole Christ is received," etc. § 59. 1. For from this it seems to follow, that something is converted into the deity: for since the whole Christ is there, and not except by the power of the sacrament, it seems that something of the matter passes into the body, and something into the soul, and something into the deity. § 60. 2. Also, This seems to be gathered from what was

previously held in the Letter, namely, that the same bread is in the sacrament which descended from heaven. But it is certain, as Ambrose says, that the flesh of Christ did not descend from heaven: therefore it is necessary, that by the power of something existing in the sacrament transubstantiated into the deity, the deity is there. § 61. 3. Also, This seems [proven] by reason: because this food is confected for this purpose, that it be spiritual food: but spiritual food cannot be except in the truth of the deity: therefore it seems, that the intention of the consecrator is specially directed to this, that the deity be there: but that is caused in the sacrament upon which the intention of the Church, or of the minister in the person of the Church, is directed: therefore it seems, that the deity is caused in the sacrament. But if this is conceded, a very great absurdity follows: because the deity in some way will have a cause, which is most absurd. But that this follows, is clear from this, that the sacrament is the cause of every reality which it contains. § 62. 4. Also, It follows that there is some mutation in which nothing is common to that from which it is mutated, and into which [it is mutated]: because the deity has no commonality, neither of primary genus, nor of proximate [genus], nor of matter: but this is impossible: therefore nothing is mutated into the deity. § 63. 5. Also, Just as the deity does not begin to be, so there is no place where it begins to be: but the reality of the sacrament begins to be on the altar: therefore the deity is not the reality of the sacrament. § 64. Solution. Without any doubt it must be said, that nothing is converted into the deity: but since there are three proper things of the body of Christ, namely that it is mixed from humors containing them in itself: and it is an essential and natural part of the composite man or hypostasis, whose natural perfection is the rational soul: and that it is united to the deity in the singularity of the person. I say that in the transubstantiation of bread into the body of Christ, the blood of Christ is in the body, not by the power of the sacrament, but by the power of the connection from which the body is: and the soul of Christ by the power of the composition of the hypostasis: and the divinity of Christ by the power of the union made in the singularity of the divine person. Similarly when wine is transubstantiated into blood, the body is there as connected to and containing its blood by nature: and the soul as the perfection of the body: and the deity by the power of the union made in the body according to the singularity of the divine person. § 65. To the first therefore it must be said, that the whole Christ is there by the power of the sacrament, just as something is said to be done by the power of something, which operates one thing to which others are conjoined: and not so that the power of the sacrament extends itself immediately to all those things, which are said to be in the sacrament. § 66. To the next it must be said, that that bread descended from heaven by reason of the person, and not of the human nature: and the same person is in the sacrament, and the power of the sacrament does not immediately extend itself over the person: and nothing else can be had from that authority. § 67. To the next it must be said, that there is an intention which is the end of the work, and an intention which is the end of him who effects the sacrament: the intention which is the end of the work, is not properly called intention, but the terminus of the work: and that [terminus] in the Church is not that by the power of the sacrament the whole Christ be on the altar, so that the power of the sacrament operates the whole which is in him: but the intention of the Church is, that in the power of the sacrament there be the body, or the blood: but by the power of the natural mixture or union to the soul,

or of the gratuitous union to the deity, the other things which are in the person of Christ are there. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 5 — Whether It Is Well Said That This Sacrament Ought Not To Be Repeated

Whether it is well said, that this sacrament ought not to be iterated? § 70. Next it is asked concerning this which is said, there, B, toward the end: "Neither ought the sacrament to be iterated," etc. § 71. For this seems false through what the Lord says, "Do this in commemoration of me." And the Apostle: "Do this... as often as you shall drink, in commemoration of me." Therefore it is iterated many times. § 72. 2. If perhaps you say, that it is not the same, this seems false. For either the identity of the sacrament is attended to according to the matter, or according to the form, or according to the content. Not according to the matter, or the form: because both have plurality in the sacrament. § 73. 3. Moreover, In the Letter it is here said, that the sacrament is said to be one and the same, because under either species one and the same thing is received: therefore the identity is according to the content: but the content frequented is the same: therefore the same sacrament is repeated, as it seems. § 74. 4. Also, If the reality of the sacrament of baptism which is the reality and sacrament of baptism, were repeated, the sacrament would be said to be iterated: therefore by a similar reasoning with this sacrament the reality which is at once reality and sacrament is iterated frequently, the sacrament seems to be iterated: therefore what is said in the Letter is not true. § 75. Solution. It must be said that below the Master touches upon the iteration of sacraments at the end of the treatise on Penance: but as much as pertains to this treatise, it must be said that a sacrament for many causes is said to be iterated, or not iterated. In one way: because the cause is not iterated, as in baptism, because there the cause is original [sin], which is not iterated, for the deletion of which baptism is ordained. In another way: because that which is the reality of the sacrament is not iterated, by the fact that once received it wholely attains its effect, which is in itself, unless there is an impediment on the part of fiction [i.e., insincerity]: and this also does not impede the character, except on the part of the subject susceptible of that which the character has to effect; and therefore when fiction recedes the character operates the grace for the operating of which it had been impressed. In another way a sacrament is said not to be iterated not because it is not received more often, but because its form is not iterated over the numerically same [matter]: and thus it is said here: because if this is iterated, it would be signified that the form once proffered was not efficacious. § 76. To that therefore which is first objected, it must be said that the same thing is received many times: but the form is not repeated over the same species once received: and in this way it is not repeated. § 77. To the next it must be said, that the sacrament is the same in species and in number on the part of the contained reality: but by reason of it the iteration of the sacrament is not denied here: but it is not numerically the same on the part of the matter and the accidents which are signs in the sacrament, and by reason of those since the form is not repeated over the same thing, this sacrament is denied to be iterated. § 78. To the next it must be said, that here it is said to be one from the one relation of the species of body and of wine to the content with them, and not by reason of the content considered absolutely. And therefore with such signs materially multiplied the repetition of the sacrament is materially multiplied, although the signs are

always the same in species, and in every consecration. § 79. To the next it must be said, that baptism is said not to be iterated in one way, and this sacrament in another way, as has already been held for this sacrament is celebrated by one man, and more often, and received more often: but that one not. Hence that one is said not to be iterated in one way, and this one in another way. § 80. Then follows, etc.

Articulus 6 — Why This Sacrament Is Given Under The Species Of Bread And Wine

Why is this sacrament given under the species of bread and wine? § 83. Next it is asked concerning this which is said, there, C, "But water must be admixed," etc. § 84. And there are five things to be asked here. § 85. For since it has been held above why he gave his body under another species, and again why he gave it under a double species, it now remains first to be asked, Why under the species of bread and wine? Secondly, Why under the species of wheat bread and not of another grain? Thirdly, Whether it ought to be confected in unleavened or fermented [bread] on account of the controversy of the Greeks? Fourthly, concerning the admixture of water. Fifthly and lastly, concerning the admixture of the species remaining with other bodies: as if a drop of blood were poured into a cask, or another liquor, how long would the body of Christ remain there, or whether it would be converted into it, or not? § 86. But to the first of these it is objected thus: § 87. 1. In many figures this sacrament was prefigured, as was held in the beginning of this treatise: therefore by the same reason by which the species of one figure is chosen, by the same reason another was to be chosen: but manna was in the species of bread, and the paschal lamb in the species of flesh: therefore the species of flesh which is more fitting ought rather to have been chosen, than the species of manna which is less fitting, since the matter was to be chosen among the figures. § 88. 2. Also, As time grew, the manifestation of truth in figures and signs also grew.

as Master Hugh says: but in the natural law it was prefigured in the species of bread in the time of Abraham, and again afterwards before the law was received in the manna: therefore especially in the New Testament a matter ought to have been added, which would have a sign of greater fittingness: therefore it ought not to have been given in the form of bread.

§ 3. Also, flesh fits with flesh better than bread with flesh: because the fittingness of those things which are of the same genus is greater than that of those which are of diverse genera: therefore it would have been more fittingly handed over in the matter of flesh, than in the matter of bread, as it seems.

§ 4. Also, flesh is a more fitting nourishment for a well-disposed human being than bread, and especially some flesh: therefore it seems that it ought to be handed down in that species.

§ 5. Also, bread is not a universal nourishment, because there are many nations that do not use bread: and likewise infants: since therefore the matter of the sacrament ought to be universal, it seems that it ought not to have been handed down in the species of bread.

§ 6. Also, the food which nature prepares for every born human being fits every animal, such as milk, and it has in itself a threefold substance, as physicians say, namely butyric,

caseous, and waxy: therefore since that nourishment is the most natural and the most fitting, it seems that it ought to have been handed down in the matter of milk, or cheese, or butter.

§ 7. Also, since it has in itself all sweetness of taste, as is said [448], it seems that it ought not to be in the species of one food, but of many.

§ 8. Also, it is read concerning the manna, that it was in the taste of oily bread: therefore something of fatness ought to be added in the matter of the Eucharist: therefore the matter ought not to be only bread, and wine.

In the same way an objection is raised concerning the wine:

§ 1. For a general drink is water common to all: therefore it seems that it ought to be the matter of the sacrament.

§ 2. Also, since blood flowed with water from the side of Christ, it seems that blood and water ought to be the matter, and not wine.

§ 3. Moreover, this sacrament is given for the cure of sin, and is given to the sick still existing on the way: but wine is not given to the sick: therefore it ought not to be the matter of the sacrament.

Solution. It must be said that many causes of fittingness are assigned by the Masters, why this sacrament ought to be confected from bread and wine: and we will not touch upon all those causes in solving the objections, so that prolixity may be avoided. But it must be understood, that one alone is compelling, namely because the Lord gave it in such matter, and instituted that it be frequented: for if He had given and instituted it in another, it would be done in another, and not in this one.

It must therefore be said to the first, that as to many things which are in this sacrament, it was prefigured in diverse figures: and this division was held earlier: but this does not contribute to the fact that the matter is according to them, but rather the institution, as was said. But there could not be a greater fittingness of institution than that which belongs to this matter over another: and that fittingness is principally attended to in three things, of which one is the confection of that food: namely because bread is out of many purified grains, and wine flows together out of many grapes: and from this comes the fittingness of the true body to the mystical body. For the true body is composed of many similar and dissimilar, most pure members: and the blood of Christ flowed out of the many members of Christ. But the mystical body is composed of many most pure faithful: and the blood signifies the redemption of souls from diverse dangers, and not from one: and this is the principal cause.

The second cause of fittingness: because bread is a more general food, which is given to the sick and the healthy: and although wine is not given in a certain sickness, nevertheless from its effect it has a fittingness of signification, because it gladdens the heart, and according to the Philosopher it makes a man of good hope, and it is given to the sick who are already strengthened; and similarly the sacrament gladdens, and makes one of good hope: for because it so graciously communicates itself, we hope that it will give all things: and it is given,

according to Augustine, to those strengthened with a good conscience who have already recovered from sickness.

The third was, because that food is the cleanest among those that are prepared by man, and wine the cleanest drink: and therefore again it has fittingness to the sacrament of maximal cleanness.

To what is objected afterwards, it must be said that the increase of signs is not attended to in the fact that the signs are in this and that other matter: which is clear, because the water of the Red Sea and of lustration was a sign of baptism, and yet baptism is in water: but it is attended to in the fact that the signs are more joined to the reality, and thus it was done in the New Testament.

To the next it must be said, that although flesh fits flesh more in genus, nevertheless accepting the proportion of the sign to the signified insofar as flesh is here taken as signified, it fits less: because here it is signified in the diversity of members, nerves, and muscles, yet all are assimilated into one shining-whiteness and taste of grace: and therefore on the part of the sign which is bread, it was necessary that the composition be such, as was also held before.

To the next it must be said, that although not all nations use bread, nevertheless it is a more general food for well-disposed human beings: because flesh inflames, as physicians say, but not bread when consumed with moderation.

Moreover, this is not the cause, but rather a greater fittingness with the reality contained under the sacrament, as was said.

To the next it must be said, that nature prepares this nourishment not for the strengthened, but for the feeble by age: but this sacrament, as Augustine says, is not given except to those strengthened with a good conscience: and therefore it ought not to have been confected in that matter.

To the next it must be said, that the diversity of taste refers to the diversity of grace in the content: because it contains Him who is the repository of all graces: and to this sufficiently responds the diversity of grains, out of which bread is confected. Or it may be said better, that although the diversity of graces is in this sacrament, nevertheless those graces tend to one, namely the highest good: but the tastes of diverse foods do not tend to one, but to diverse things: and therefore diverse foods are not the matter of this sacrament, but rather one food which is gathered from diverse things tending into one taste.

To the next it must be said, that the taste of oil in the manna belonged to imperfection: because in reality there was nothing, but it was only prefigured: but now the perfect sacrament is given: and therefore the fatness of the oil is wholly comprehended on the part of the reality: and therefore this sacrament by its perfection does not need seasoning.

448. Hebrews 2:14

To that which is further objected concerning the wine, it must be said that for the strengthened ones receiving good blood the better drink is wine, and not water: and therefore since this sacrament is given to such ones, the more fitting matter is wine.

To the next it must be said, that water distinct, and yet according to place conjoined, flowed out from the side of Christ: so that it might be signified not to be the matter, but only to be united to the matter of blood.

To the last, that in truth this sacrament is not given to the sick who are still subject to the disease of sin, but rather to those strengthened with a good conscience: and therefore that objection supposes a falsehood.

Articulus 7 — Whether The Sacrament Ought To Be Given Under The Species Of Bread And To Be Of Wheat; And, Whether Other Grains Can Be Admixed

Whether the sacrament ought to be given under the species of bread and from wheat? and, Whether other grains can be mixed in?

Secondly it is asked, why is it given under the species of bread from wheat, and of wine?

It seems, that it ought to have been bread of another grain: because § 1. Just as in baptism a common element was set down, so that poverty would excuse no one: so also in this it ought to have been, so that no one would be excused on account of poverty.

§ 2. Also, the Lord gave loaves to the crowd, and they were of barley: therefore since the Church ought to conform herself to the head, it seems that the sacrament ought to be confected in barley loaves.

§ 3. Also, this sacrament is consumed in memory of the Lord's passion: but to this memory a bristly and hard grain fits better than a delicate one: therefore it ought to have been confected more in barley which is a bristly and hard grain, than in wheat which is delicate.

§ 4. If perhaps it is said, that He did this for this reason, because the Lord compared Himself to a grain of wheat, saying: Unless a grain of wheat falling into the earth dies, etc., this seems to be nothing: because the Lord there said what fruits would rise up in the Church from His death, and not what ought to be done concerning the celebration of this sacrament.

§ 5. Also, there the Lord attends to the similitude of the sowing of a grain: but in the sacrament bread is made from the grain, and it is not sown for fruit: therefore it seems, that they do nothing to the proposition.

§ 6. If perhaps you say, that from this a more fitting nourishment is made. ON THE CONTRARY: Physicians say that flesh is quickly made from bread, and it does not adhere long to the members, but is easily consumed: since therefore that nourishment ought to remain unto eternal life, it seems that it has no fittingness.

§ 7. Also, soft things are of no benefit to wayfarers, because they are resolved into sweats, and evaporate through the heat aroused by motion, and are consumed: but hard things which are not converted by strong heat, nor easily consumed: since therefore this sacrament is of

wayfarers, it seems that it ought to have been given in such matter: but this is not wheat, but rather rye, or another harder grain: therefore it seems, that the sacrament ought to have been given in rye bread.

§ 8. Also, if it ought to have been given in the matter of wheat, it seems that it ought to have been confected in the species of starch (amylum): and of it it is said by physicians, that a tenacious flesh is generated, and adhering long to the members.

Further it is asked concerning the mixture of other grains. For let us posit, that in a certain land no wheat is found, but only spelt, as is the case in many lands. And let it be asked, whether a confection can be made from the grain of spelt?

It seems, that not: because § 1. The Lord compared Himself only to a grain of wheat: therefore it can be confected from no other.

§ 2. Also, the Lord first consecrated His body in wheat bread: therefore it will be able to be consecrated from no other by any priest.

§ 3. Also, just as water received regenerative power by the touch of Christ's flesh, and baptism cannot be done in any other liquid: so it seems, that bread of wheat received power by the touch of the Lord, so that it cannot be done with another grain except from that: therefore it seems, that it cannot be done from spelt.

§ 4. If perhaps you say, that spelt and wheat are of one species: this is openly false: because neither are spelts of the same figure, nor do the grains have the same connatural earth: since therefore figure, although it is not a substantial species, nevertheless shows the species on the part of quantity: because we see that of those of the same species there is the same figure according to species, it seems that these grains are not of the same species.

§ 5. Also, it is said that the question devolved to the Apostolic See, and there it was judged that spelt was a species of barley: but it cannot be confected from barley: therefore neither from spelt.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. Grains of spelt are scarcely distinguishable from grains of wheat in similitude of grain and color: therefore they are of the same species, or of close species: therefore it can be confected from one just as from the other.

§ 2. Also, it is said by all, that the Lord wished His body to be handed down in wheat for this reason, because the bread of that grain is more delicate and more fitting than of another: but bread of spelt is just as delicate and fitting or more so than of wheat: therefore it ought to be confected in spelt just as in wheat.

Further it is asked concerning the admixture of other grains with bread of wheat, whether a confection can be made from such a mixture? For example, I posit that to a modius of wheat is put a half modius of barley or rye, and bread is made from it, whether a consecration could be made from such bread?

It seems that yes: because § 1. Thus their admixture does not remove the species, as is clear: because if a grain of barley is put in a sack of wheat, it always remains a grain of barley: therefore even of that part which is of wheat, at least it seems a confection can be made.

§ 2. Also, let it even be given that it is admixed, there will be abundant wheat in such a mixture: therefore something passes into wheat: therefore of the whole it will be wheat: and thus there will be a confection from it just as from bread of wheat.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. By sight it is clear, that the color of wheaten bread is remitted, when a third or fourth part is rye: therefore it seems, that the species are also corrupted: but a consecration cannot be made except from wheat: therefore even from such mixed bread no consecration will be made.

§ 2. Also, the Philosopher says, that mixture is said to be the union of alterated miscibles: therefore the miscibles are alterated from their species: therefore in such a mixture the bread of wheat does not remain in its species, but is alterated: therefore since a confection is not made except from wheat, it seems that from such bread no confection of the body and blood will be made.

§ 3. Also, the body of the Lord has nothing in itself alien to itself: therefore also nothing in the figure ought to be made alien from the species of wheat: therefore it seems, that even if a little is added of another grain, the ratio of fittingness is destroyed.

Similarly it is objected, whether a confection can be made from corrupted bread?

It seems that not: because § 1. Nothing corrupted has a similitude with the body of the Lord: therefore a sign ought not to be made: but on the part of the matter the sign of the sacrament is taken: therefore on the part of the matter of the sacrament nothing corrupted ought to be taken.

§ 2. Also, a corrupted human being is not a human being: therefore corrupted bread is not bread: and it ought not to be made except from bread of wheat: therefore it ought not to be made from corrupted bread.

ON THE CONTRARY: We see hosts kept for a very long time by some to such an extent that even if bread in a larger quantity were kept so long, it would be entirely corrupted: and yet they confect from these hosts: therefore it seems, that corruption does not impede the confection.

SIMILARLY it is asked on the part of wine, whether a confection can be made from verjuice (agresta)?

It seems however, that yes: because § 1. It is from the grape: and from the species of the grape diverse species are not generated: therefore verjuice will be of the same species with wine: therefore just as from wine, so it can be confected from verjuice, as it seems.

§ 2. Similarly it is objected concerning vinegar: because the Philosopher says, that vinegar is not wine, nor can it return to wine on account of the corruption made in it: therefore it seems, that a confection cannot be made from vinegar.

Solution. It must be said to the first, that a confection cannot be made except from wheaten bread in its genus: and the causes are, because that grain affords a better and more noble nourishment: and especially because the Lord compared Himself to that grain.

To the first therefore which is objected against this, it must be said that it is not similar concerning baptism and the Eucharist: because baptism is a sacrament of necessity, but not the Eucharist, and therefore baptism ought to have been given to us in a general matter, but this in a matter which has greater fittingness with the signified reality.

To the next it must be said, that those loaves which the Lord gave signified the books of the old law, and not the Eucharist: and those have a hard bark in the letter, and sweetness in the spiritual understanding within: whence from those loaves nothing is proved.

To the next it must be said, that the Lord's passion ought not to be presented in the taste of the bread, because the Christ who suffered was of the best taste: but rather in the mode of preparation of the bread, as Hugh says in a certain epistle to Bernard, that that bread was baked by the fire of the passion on the cross, but formed by the hands of wisdom in the Virgin's womb: and therefore that objection does not proceed.

To the next it must be said, that the Lord attends to both in the grain, namely the confection, and in the falling into the earth the death: but the matter of the Eucharist has its force from Christ, who compared Himself to that grain and not to another.

To the next it must be said, that the very showing of His comparison to this grain and not another, shows the cause of the institution, which was done afterwards, when He gave His body in this bread, and not in another.

To the next it must be said, that this sacrament is the cause of love and perfection of those who are delicate in spiritual delights: and therefore although flesh is quickly consumed, nevertheless if it is guarded as it ought to be, it is not consumed: and this is fitting for spiritual food, which does not suffer with itself the heat of concupiscence proceeding from mortal sin: and also as a sign of this the manna when reserved putrefied.

To the next it must be said, that one must distinguish concerning the corporeal way, and the spiritual way: for corporeal heat from aroused motion resolves soft things, but in the spiritual way from devotion the spirit is strengthened and not resolved; and therefore it is not similar.

To the next it must be said, that starch has no similitude with the body: because something in it is disposed to putrefaction, whence it is made viscous and tenacious: and it ought not to have been confected in it.

Moreover, it would be incautious to confect in it on account of the liquefaction of humors.

To that which is further asked concerning the admixture of other grains, and especially of spelt, it must be said, that without a doubt wheat (frumentum) is a genus, and not a species of grain: and it has under itself common wheat (triticum), and spelt: whence spelt is wheat (frumentum), and the body of the Lord can be confected from it, just as from common wheat (trit-

icum): and this is doubtful to no one considering grain with grain, and bread with bread: and through this the solution to the first is clear.

To the next it must be said, that the Lord constituted it in the species of common wheat (triticum) giving from it the power of the grain in every species of wheat (frumentum): and this is because in that land there is wheat (frumentum) according to the species of common wheat (triticum).

To the next it must be said, that it is not similar concerning water and bread: because baptism is a sacrament of necessity, and water is a general element: and thus it is not concerning common wheat (triticum) and the Eucharist, as was said earlier.

To the next it must be said, that spelt and common wheat (triticum) are not of one species, but of one proximate genus which is wheat (frumentum): and they are very neighboring species, and therefore they are distant by little in the formation of the ears, but they are distant by almost nothing in the form of the grains and the color, and the taste of the bread.

To the next it must be said, that I do not think the curia determined thus: and if it determined thus, this was out of ignorance of the grain of the matter of spelt.

To that which is further asked concerning mixture, it is light to solve: for it must be said, that if there is a mixture a confection is not made: because every mixture properly speaking dissolves the species of the mixed things: but if there is a certain small addition, so that the whole added thing is absorbed by the common wheat (triticum), then a confection can be made: but that absorption can be noted in this that the color, taste, odor, and the like remain entirely the same: as if the whole were wheat (frumentum).

To the first therefore which is objected concerning this, it must be said that of the grains while they remain whole, there is no mixing: but the Philosopher says, that subtle and humid things are miscible: and therefore milled grains even infused in dough would be mixed: whence that objection is worth nothing.

Item to the next it must be said, that mixture is not always according to equality of quantity, but according to the proportion of powers which are in the mixed things themselves: whence when the power of rye can alter the wheat (frumentum) outside the species of bread of wheat, then a confection is not made.

To that which is further asked concerning corrupted bread, it must be said that if it is corrupted from the species of bread, a confection cannot be made: but if it is only disposed to corruption, then it can be made: but those confecting sin unless a great necessity compels them. But this corruption is to be weighed in odor, taste, and color, and the dissolving of continuity: because if all these are changed, it cannot be confected in it: but if the signs are saved, although it is disposed to corruption, and not corrupted, it can be confected in it: and through this the solution to the whole that is objected against this is clear.

To that which is further objected concerning wine, it must be said that a confection of blood cannot be made from verjuice: because it does not yet have the species of wine.

To the object against it however it must be said, that it is not true, that that which has a disposition to the species, and that which has the complete species proceed from the same: because from the same wood proceeds the watery in the leaf, and the more acidic in the juice of the fruit: and therefore what is objected is not valid.

To the last it must be said, that as the Philosopher wishes in the Metaphysics, vinegar is not wine, nor can it become wine: and therefore a confection cannot be made from vinegar: but from acidic wine it can, because this is not vinegar, although it is not safe to confect even from acidic wine on account of reverence for the sacrament.

Articulus 8 — Whether The Confection Ought To Be Made In Unleavened Or In Leavened Bread

Whether confection ought to be made in unleavened or leavened?

Thirdly it is asked, whether consecration ought to be made in unleavened (azymo), or leavened?

It seems that in unleavened: § 1. For it is to be confected in such matter of bread, in which the Lord handed down His body: but He handed it down in unleavened: therefore it is to be consecrated in unleavened. The first is proved through itself. But the second is proved from the time: because the day of the Passover of the Jews was the seventeenth day of the first month, the Parasceve: and on the preceding night He handed down His body: but on the preceding night the passover was killed, and there was not leavened bread in the houses of the Jews. Therefore He Himself handed it down in unleavened. From this the proposition is thus held: but this is especially clear [449], where it is said, that for seven days there was not leavened bread in the houses of the Jews.

§ 2. Also, this is seen from all the Evangelists: for it is said On the first day of the azymes, the disciples came to Jesus, saying: Where do you wish us to prepare for you to eat the Passover? But Mark [450] says: On the first day of the azymes, when they immolated the passover, the disciples say to him, etc. Luke But the feast day of the azymes, the Passover, was approaching. And below, v. 7: But the day of the azymes came, on which it was necessary for the passover to be killed. John Therefore they lead Jesus from Caiaphas into the praetorium. But it was morning: and they themselves did not enter into the praetorium, so that they might not be contaminated, but that they might eat the Passover. But this was on the Parasceve which was the seventeenth day of the lunar month which the Jews use, and on the preceding night He had given the body. Therefore on the fourteenth day at evening. But nothing leavened was then in the houses of the Jews, as is proved [451]. Therefore He gave His body in unleavened: and therefore we ought to do thus.

§ 3. Also, Jesus did not come to loose the law, but to fulfill it: therefore He Himself did not loose the rite of the Passover, but fulfilled it: but the rite was to eat in unleavened: therefore He Himself handed down His body in unleavened.

§ 4. Also, the old passover was eaten in azymes: since therefore the new passover is continued to the old, immediately in the same genus of bread He began the new: therefore He gave it in azymes, and thus He wished it to be observed by us.

§ 5. Also, it is established that in the old law the azyme with which the paschal lamb was eaten had a mystical signification: but it signified nothing except sincerity and truth alien from all corruption. Since therefore that was greater in the new passover than in the old, the new ought to be celebrated more in azymes than the old.

§ 6. Also, it is written Therefore let us feast, not in the old leaven, nor in the leaven of malice and wickedness, but in the azymes of sincerity and truth. Therefore it is necessary that this signification be represented in something as in a sign on the part of the sacrament: but it cannot be represented except in an azyme: therefore it is to be confected in an azyme, and not in leavened.

§ 7. Also, the principal sacrament among the ancients was the Passover. If therefore the Lord had perverted its rite, it would be probable that those who objected to things lesser than it, would have also objected to that, provided they ate with Him in the houses: therefore it seems, that He handed it down in an azyme, because nothing of such things was ever objected to Him.

§ 8. Also, He observed other things of this sacrament, namely by eating the lamb, and at night. Therefore He also observed the azymes: because there is no reason why He would have changed one, and not another.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. It is said Jesus took bread, etc., and in Greek it is held ἄρτον, and this sounds as leavened bread: therefore it seems, that He handed down His body in leavened.

§ 2. Also, it is written Before the feast day of the Passover, Jesus knowing that His hour has come, etc. Therefore the supper was before the feast of the Passover: but then the Jews used leavened bread: therefore He handed it down in leavened.

§ 3. Also, since the Lord's immolation was represented by the oblation of the lamb, the Lord ought to have been offered at the time of the oblation of the lamb: but before He was offered, He Himself had eaten the passover with the disciples: therefore He Himself anticipated the due hour of the old passover: but then there was leavened bread in the houses of the Jews: therefore He Himself gave it in leavened, which He Himself found in the houses of the Jews.

§ 4. Also, we see that in some other sacraments He changed the rite of that nation, and wished it to be changed lest we seem to judaize: just as in the observation of the sabbath, and circumcision, and in others: therefore especially this change ought to have been made in the principal one, in which maximum hope was placed: but this was the sacrament of the passover: therefore He seems to have changed its rite: since therefore it was formerly handed down in azymes, now it seems it ought to be handed down in leavened.

449. Exod. XII, 19.

§ 5. Also, the observance of the legal things is wholly harmful: therefore especially in the observance of the principal sacrament: but the principal sacrament was the sacrament of the passover: therefore that ought to have been wholly changed: therefore also in the observation of the azymes.

§ 6. Also, in this sacrament four things are principally to be observed, namely the roasting of the lamb, the smearing of the doorposts with blood, the wild lettuces, and the azymes: but it seems that three of these have ceased: therefore also the fourth ought to have ceased, as it seems.

§ 7. Also, Pope Leo says, that on account of the insult of the Jews in antiquity, the whole Church statuted that it be confected in leavened, lest we seem to judaize: since therefore this was the custom of the Fathers, it seems that it is also to be observed by us.

Solution. It must be said, that it can be confected in both, namely in azyme and leavened, from the power of the words: but from congruence and right and without sin it cannot be confected, except in azyme: and therefore the Greeks sin against the congruence of the sacrament, and against right in consecrating: but saying that it cannot be confected in azyme, they do not know what they are saying: just as in many other things: because now it is not true what the Apostle says, that the Greeks seek wisdom, but rather they have lost wisdom and study: and therefore they are detained by foolish assertions.

To the first therefore it must be said, that ἄρτος is posited indifferently among the Greeks for azyme and leavened: and therefore in the Old Testament there is frequently found, 'unleavened breads' (panes azymos): and therefore the name sounds as nothing but breads, although the usage of speaking excepts in the word leavened breads, because many use that.

To the next it must be said, that before the feast is said before the first day of the Passover, which as is held [452], was the seventeenth lunar day of the first month: but, as is clear from the other Evangelists, the Lord handed down His body, and ate the passover not long before, but on the preceding night: and then it was the fourteenth day at evening: and then the precept under penalty of death was, that there not be leavened bread in the houses of the Jews: and therefore that proves nothing.

To the next it must be said, that the Lord was not immolated at the same time at which the lamb was immolated: because thus He would have been crucified on the fourteenth day at evening in the night: which is clear to be false: but rather He was fittingly immolated, so that He might signify the new to begin after the old, and the shadow of the Old Testament to be terminated at His passion.

To the next it must be said, that in those things which do not have their signification except on the part of themselves, the Lord imposed an end: just as we do not immolate a lamb, and other such things. But those things which signify what is always to be done, He did not change, such as the azymes, as is expressly held from the words of the Apostle [453].

450. Marc. XIV, 12.

To the next it must be said, that we do not observe it as legal, but rather as competent to the sacrament of the new law: just as we also use water in baptism, although they used the water of lustration.

To the next it must be said, that just as was already said, that is not taken as legal, which also before the law was figured in the oblation of Melchizedek, and, Gen.

where Sarah made unleavened bread baked under ashes but rather it is taken as new, congruing with the signified of the sacrament.

To the last point it must be said that this was done by temporal dispensation: just as baptism was also done in the name of Christ [for a time]: but when the mockery of the Jews ceased, and when the Church prevailed in virtues and strengths, it resumed the use of the first institution of the sacrament. But the more obstinate retained such rites of temporal dispensation. For as Pope Leo recounts, at first it was confected in unleavened bread: then, for the reason stated earlier, in leavened: third, again in unleavened: and then the Greeks began to argue to the contrary.

Articulus 9 — Whether Water Ought To Be Mixed With Wine, And How Much Water; And, How Those Who Omit It Sin

Whether water ought to be mixed with the wine, and how much water? And, how do those who omit it sin?

Fourth, it is inquired concerning the mixing of water.

For it seems that it ought not to be mixed, because: § 1. The Lord does not compare Himself to water: therefore, since that comparison gives congruence to wheat and wine being the matter, it seems that water has no congruence for the sacrament.

§ 2. Also, water is a tasteless element: but it is said that this sacrament has every delight and the sweetness of every taste therefore water has no congruence to it.

§ 3. Also, water is the matter of another sacrament, namely baptism: therefore, since there cannot be one matter for two sacraments, as is clear in each of the others, it seems that water ought to be neither the matter nor a part of the matter in the sacrament of the Eucharist.

§ 4. If perhaps you say that water signifies the people to be united to Christ, just as water is united to wine. To the contrary: nothing is joined to the bread, and yet it signifies the mystical body: therefore neither ought anything to have been joined to the wine, as it seems.

§ 5. Also, the wine, as is held from the Letter, flows together from diverse grapes: by which diversity of grapes it has the power to signify the diversity of the faithful: therefore, since it has in itself one thing by which it can represent the faithful or the people, there is no need for this to be done by another admixed element: therefore it is superfluous to add water.

§ 6. Also, what is the cause why an addition of another matter is not made to the bread, but is made to the wine? And it seems that there is none, because under each the whole Christ is

451. Exod. XII, 16; Levit. XXIII, 5; Numer. XXVIII, 17.

present, as was held above: therefore if no addition is made in one part, it seems also that it ought not to be made in the other part.

Further it is inquired concerning the quantity of the added water: § 1. For since warm wine is vehemently active, it seems that a little wine should be put into much water: therefore it seems that it could be added beyond half.

§ 2. Also, when the wine is red, much water is poured into a little wine: since therefore color belongs to the dominant element, the wine will still seem to dominate in the mixture: therefore it seems that more than three or four parts of water can be added.

Further it is inquired concerning the species of water to be either taken or added: because some waters are sharp, such as lye, and the washings of metals, of which the Alchemists treat; and thin beer, and ptisan, and things of this kind are certain waters.

And it is inquired: Whether, with such things infused, the consecration still occurs?

And it seems that it does: because such water is called water, etc.: therefore it seems that the confection occurs with it.

But against this it is objected first concerning the infusion of water: § 1. For it is agreed that water simultaneously

flowed with blood from the side of the Lord: therefore also in the sacrament it is not to be separated from the blood.

§ 2. Also, this blood washes, as is said: Behold the Lamb of God, etc. [454] And: They have washed their robes, and made them white in the blood of the Lamb. [455] Therefore with the blood there ought to be an ablutive element: but this is water: therefore water ought to be poured out with the blood.

§ 3. Also, the waters... are peoples and nations, as is said. [456] But peoples and nations are redeemed by blood. Therefore water ought not to be separated from the blood of redemption: therefore water, which signifies the nations, ought not to be separated from the chalice.

§ 4. Also, Moses sprinkling the people mixed water with the blood since therefore this preceded in the sign, the same ought to follow in the truth of the sacrament of the new law: therefore water is to be admixed to the chalice.

Then it is inquired: How do those who omit it sin?

And it seems that they sin mortally: because § 1. They sin against a statute of the universal Church: but such a statute obligates everyone: therefore they sin mortally by coming against this.

Also, they do not show in a sign that the redemption of blood pertains to the people: since therefore this is by all means to be shown, it seems that he who does not do it sins gravely.

§ 2. Also, it is said [457] that he who celebrates the sacrament otherwise than it was instituted receives the sacrament unworthily: but he who does not add water celebrates otherwise than

452. Levit. XXIII, 5 et seq.

it was instituted: therefore he receives unworthily: but nothing makes a man unworthy of the sacrament except mortal sin: therefore he sins mortally by not adding water.

Further it seems that water is to be admixed in a small quantity:

§ 1. For it is said in the Letter that the water is to be absorbed by the wine: but this does not happen if the power of the water's action has some proportion to the active power in the wine: therefore it must be so little that it has no proportion to the active power of the wine: therefore it cannot be a third or a sixth, or a proportionally notable part to the senses.

§ 2. Also, since it is not added except as a sign, and that one drop signifies the whole people, just like the whole sea: it seems that it would be foolish to add much.

Further it is objected concerning the species of waters: for it is agreed that when art works with nature, namely through active and passive virtues in nature, it gives a species, although weak and not long-lasting, because otherwise there would be no works of alchemists: but some waters are made by art working through active and passive qualities in nature, as enumerated above: therefore in those there is some species of admixture: therefore since proper water is to be admixed, it seems that such waters are not to be admixed.

Solution. It must be said that without a doubt water ought to be admixed to the chalice. I also think in a small quantity: because in a small quantity there is no danger, but in a large quantity there could be danger, as the last induced objections prove.

Therefore to the first it must be said that water, when admixed to the blood, is not admixed as matter, but rather as a sign of the people being joined to the Redeemer in the work of redemption, and it is to be absorbed by the wine: hence it is not a mixture, properly speaking, but a transmutation of water into wine, as the Philosopher seems to intend in the first book of On Generation and Corruption, that it is not a mixture if a drop of water is poured into ten amphoras of wine: hence it is rightly conceded that the water is neither matter, nor part of the matter, but passes into the wine, and having been made savory by the wine, it retains only the relation of a sign to

the people united in the same spirit to the Redeemer in the work of redemption.

To the next it must be said that water is joined for this reason, because the people are tasteless, so that from this very conjunction they might simultaneously receive both the species and the taste of the wine: just as the people do not have the taste of the spirit and of grace except from Christ.

To the next it must be said that water is not the matter of this sacrament, nor a part of the matter: because in the confection it does not remain in its own species, like the other matter of sacraments: but rather it passes into the species and taste of the wine; hence that objection supposes a falsehood.

To the next it must be said that the addition is made to the wine, and not to the bread, for three reasons: one of which is on the part of the matter, and another on the part of the sign

453. I ad Corinth. V, 8.

signifying the sacrament, and a third on the part of the end of the sacrament. The first on the part of the matter is taken because bread is a dry and gross element of the sacrament: and to such a thing it is not easy to admix something which could be assumed by it and drawn to its own species and taste: but wine is humid, having an acute, dividing heat, and from both parts something is easily thoroughly mixed with it to its own species and taste, and therefore it is more fitting that the admixture be made in the wine than in the bread. Another cause is that the body of Christ in the first oblation, when He hung on the cross, was not joined to anything else, but blood flowed forth from His side with water: and therefore water is congruously joined to it. The third cause is that blood signifies redemption, as was held above, which was entirely undertaken for the sake of the people: but it is not so concerning the body, and therefore the mixture of water signifying the people is more fittingly made with wine than with bread.

To the next it must be said that the body, on the part of its composition, is from heterogeneous or dissimilar parts: but blood is homogeneous and similar in all its parts: and therefore the body has more in itself by which to signify the diversity of the members of the body than the blood does: and therefore a diverse element is added to the wine: nor does it suffice that it flows from diverse grapes: because the flowing [liquid] is of one nature, and the diversity of the grapes does not remain in the wine, just as the diversity of members remains in the body.

To the next, the solution is clear through what has been said before.

To what is further inquired, it must be said that the minimum sensible quantity suffices, as was said: but a large quantity is in danger: because if, by the admixture of water, the wine is corrupted from its species, it will not be consecrated: and this is not easily tasted: because even water placed in a vessel over wine, such that the mouth of the vessel of water is turned over the mouth of the lower vessel and into the wine, contracts the taste and color of the wine, and yet remains water: just as happens when water in a vessel with a narrow and long mouth is placed in a bucket full of wine: and therefore I do not agree with those who say that a half, or a third, or a fourth part can be put in: but it seems to me that it should be put in a very small quantity, especially if the wine is very weak.

To the next which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that taste does not fully indicate the species nor the virtue of the wine in a mixture: because it is not wine, nor is it water, but a mean between both.

To the next it must be said that color indicates it even less: because since water does not actually have any color, it easily receives every color from something very slightly altering it: especially since even without the admixture of wine it receives the color and taste of wine, in the manner stated above, if a vessel of water with a covered and narrow mouth is immersed in a bucket or in a cask of wine.

To what is further inquired concerning the species of water to be poured in, it must be said that living water is called that which performs the operation and act of water: like that which is in the impetus of purifying and cooling. Hence the species of water which were mentioned

454. John 1:29.

are corrupted to another species, since they do not perform the operation, even though the element of water abounds in them: and the reason for this

was also stated in the question concerning the matter of baptism.

But to that which is inquired afterwards, How much does he sin who omits adding water?

It must be said that the consecration is validly performed without water: because water is neither the matter of the sacrament, nor part of the matter, as was said: and therefore one must speak of the cause of the omission. For that can be heresy, or contempt, or negligence: and in the first two ways it is a mortal sin against the rite of the sacrament ordained to heresy or schism. In the third way it seems to me a distinction must be made in the cause of negligence, namely whether this is a detention, or an occupation with vain things, or with illicit things. If in the first way, he does not sin mortally: but he is to be severely reprimanded, lest he be found negligent concerning this in the future. If in the second way, either this is from the care of vain and temporal things which he treats of, or from unexpected subreption: and in the first way indeed he sins gravely: and if it were to happen to me, I would make amends as for a mortal sin. But in the second way one must pray for him, because he did not sin mortally: but he needs help against the tempter. But in the third way, namely when it happens from occupation with illicit things, there is no doubt that he sins mortally.

But to that which seems to prove that he always sins mortally, it must be said that the addition of water is not of the principal parts of the sacrament, but of the adjuncts for a fuller signification.

To the next it must be said that he does not celebrate otherwise than it was instituted: because he neither changes the form nor the matter, although he omits something of what is not principal.

And through this the solution to all the objections is clear.

Articulus 10 — Whether The Sacramental Species, Mixed With Other Liquids, Are Corrupted, Or Remain Intact

Whether the sacramental species, mixed with other liquids, are corrupted, or remain intact?

Fifth, a most difficult question is inquired concerning these species when they are mixed with other liquids.

For it seems that they are never corrupted by any admixture: § 1. For the glorious divine body is not admixable with a non-glorious body: but after consecration it is the glorious and divine body: therefore it is not admixed to anything.

§ 2. If perhaps you say that the species are admixed and corrupted, and the body flies away to heaven: this seems to be unintelligible: because the Philosopher holds in the first book of On Generation and Corruption, where he distinguishes which things are mixable and which are not, that accidents are mixable neither with themselves nor with others: but it is

455. Rev 7:14.

agreed that nothing remains there except pure accidents: therefore they are not admixed to other bodies or accidents.

§ 3. Also, generation and corruption happen in two ways, namely simply, and relatively: but it is agreed that both belong to substance: one with respect to the reception or loss of substantial form, the other according to the reception or loss of accidental form: therefore neither will belong to an accident in itself: therefore it seems that since these are accidents, they are never resolved into something else in themselves.

§ 4. Also, everything that is corrupted, is corrupted according to its being: but the being of an accident is to be in something [to inhere], as the Philosopher says: therefore they are not corrupted except according to inherence: and thus they are not corrupted here, and they cannot be corrupted in another

way: therefore they are simply not corrupted: but they remain incorruptible: and thus the species of bread and wine always remain.

§ 5. Also, Aristotle near the end of the first book of the Physics says that contraries neither act upon nor are acted upon by each other without a subject matter: but things that do not act nor are acted upon by each other, never corrupt each other: therefore accidents accepted in this way neither corrupt each other, nor are corrupted by others: but they are accepted in this way in the sacrament after the consecration is performed: therefore they are never corrupted either by themselves or by others.

§ 6. Moreover, concerning the putrefaction that is in a host reserved for a long time after consecration, it is agreed that it is not primarily referred to the glorious divine body: therefore it is necessary that it be referred to something primarily corrupted: but it is agreed that this is not an accident: because this according to its being depends on something else primarily, if there is not something there standing in for substance: therefore the putrefaction that appears there cannot be reduced to any primary putrefactible thing, which the intellect of man does not grasp.

§ 7. If perhaps you wish to say, according to what certain people have written and said, that after the consecration and the completion of the office of the sacrament the first substance returns, namely under the species of bread and wine, and through that substance it is mixed with other bodies and putrefies and is corrupted. To the contrary: That return is either because the substance was preserved under the accidents, or because it is created anew under the accidents. If in the first way: this cannot be: because, as was held above, it is converted into the body of Christ, and afterwards nothing is left over to it. If in the second way: this again is false: because as long as the remaining species can be discerned, so long is it judged to be the body of Christ: therefore under those accidents another substance is never caused.

Moreover, when it begins to putrefy, it is agreed that the species still remain: therefore the body of Christ is still under them, and not another substance.

Moreover, it would not truly be said here to be the body of Christ if those accidents were leading to another species than to the body of Christ: therefore, since it is true to say that this

is the body of Christ while the accidents remain, it is agreed that under those accidents there is never another substance than the body of Christ will be.

And thus it seems to be saying nothing, that another substance returns. And therefore there were others saying that those accidents in mixture and corruption are converted into substance, and as substances they are corrupted and mixed.

But that this is nothing is easily proven thus: Those accidents are neither of one genus nor of one sense, but one is quantity, another quality, and another is taste, and another sight: therefore if they are converted into substance, they are not converted into a substance of one genus and one sense, but they pass into diverse substances even in genus and sense, and this is saying nothing.

But if it is said that they pass into a substance of the same genus: then it is inquired, what is this kind of conversion by which diverse genera pass into one in genus and number?

Also, since there are many accidents, it seems that there are many substances constituted from them: and this is not true.

Also, the Philosopher says that a substance does not come to be from an accident: therefore those accidents are not converted into substance.

Therefore again there were others who said that only one of those accidents is converted into substance, namely quantity, and the others affect that substance, just as they previously made the substance of bread and wine. But this is ridiculous: because substance does not come to be from quantity, as the Philosopher says.

Moreover, since that substance is quantified, whence comes that quantity, if it is all so transubstantiated into the subject? For it must be that from quantity alone comes both quantity and substance: and this is not

true: therefore it is clear that that is saying nothing, and is unintelligible.

Solution. It seems to me it must be said, without prejudice to others, that the accidents are mixed and corrupted in themselves, either in the transition to another subject, or in corruption into non-being.

To understand this, it seems to me two things must be considered. One is that we say one substantial and accidental form in number cannot be in two subjects successively: because it is not [existent] according to itself, but always has being in a subject: and when it is not in that, then it simply is not: because if it were outside a subject and not in a subject, we would say that just as one and the same mobile object is transferred from place to place, so one and the same form would be transferred from subject to subject.

The other is that an accident in nature neither acts nor is acted upon by another without a subject for this reason: because it is not without a subject: and therefore the subject does not confer upon it the virtue of acting or being acted upon, but rather only sustains it: and therefore the subject is contrary to neither: but if it were according to itself without a subject,

457. 1 Cor 11:23 sqq.

without a doubt it would act and be acted upon by its proper virtue. Since therefore, according to the more celebrated and more catholic opinion, those forms remain without a subject, I say that in themselves they can act and suffer admixture and putrefaction, and in themselves be transferred to another subject: but from that into which they are transferred, they cannot be transferred into a third: because the fact that they could be without a subject, they had from this, that they were in the mystery of the sacrament by way of being significative, and in this way they are not in a third or fourth or successive subject into which they are transferred from the second. The reason for this will be explained below, over the last chapter of this distinction.

These things being held, it is easy to respond to the objections.

Therefore to the first it must be said that the glorious divine body is neither mixed nor corrupted: but the species remaining in themselves pass into another by mixture or corruption: and then the body of Christ is not there.

To the next it must be said that the Philosopher considers only accidents whose being is inherence: and not those which are according to being by divine power for the mystery of the sacrament.

To the next it must be said that physical generation, whether it be simply or relatively, is always of substance, as was said: but here is another mutation, because the accident here remains without a subject by divine power for the use of the sacrament of faith and of the Church.

To the next it must be said that this is understood concerning an accident that totally depends according to its being on the subject in which it is: but such accidents are not here, but rather by divine power they are sustained without a substance, specifically so that the signification of the sacrament of faith and of the Church might be fulfilled.

To the next the solution is clear through what was said before: because this is not so that common matter may give them the virtue by which they act upon each other and are acted upon, but rather by which they do not act unless they exist: and they do not exist except because they are in the matter of both in common in potency: hence if hot and cold were without matter, then without matter they would be repugnant to each other and one would corrupt the other.

To the next it must be said that, speaking without prejudice, putrefaction is primarily in the quantity of the host: because this is prior to taste and color, as will be proven below: and it is in it by another corrupting agent, namely the active qualities of the air, or of another body: or from the fact that those qualities which are in the host have contrary acts, and resolve it.

But to the objection it must be said that in physical putrefaction this holds: because in those things the accident depends on the subject, and not here.

But if it is objected that that putrefaction is physical, I say that indeed it is

456. Rev 17:15.

physical, but it is not of something physically existing, but rather by divine power.

But still then it is objected that the conserving divine power is more potent than any corrupting agent: and thus those species ought not to be corrupted. To this it seems it must be said that the divine power does not conserve and contain except for the act of the sacrament: and therefore its conservation does not impede their corruption according to the natural being which they have in themselves.

But to what is objected against the induced opinions, it seems it must be conceded: but nevertheless in difficult matters one must not prejudge anyone, except only an error, where it is openly known: because certain things underlie faith which cannot be penetrated by reason: and God can do more than we can understand: because no word shall be impossible with God .

Articulus 11 — Whether The Water And Wine That Are Mixed In The Chalice Can Be Separated

Whether water and wine that are mixed in the chalice can be separated?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, C, towards the end: Which coupling of water and wine is so mixed in the chalice of Christ, that that mixture cannot be separated, etc.

For this seems false: because § 1. The Philosopher says that mixed things can be separated.

§ 2. Moreover, if wine has water mixed into it, as the alchemists say, it happens that it can be separated in many ways, by which a substance is extracted from the substance in which it is, and let one way suffice for the sake of example: for since like attracts like, and the porous especially draws the humid: if a dry peeled rush is put into mixed wine due to the likeness of nature, because it grows in water, it attracts its like, and from its porosity it draws the humid: therefore from porosity and likeness to the nature of water it draws the aqueous humid, leaving the wine: therefore the admixed water will be separated in this way: therefore it is separable: and this is against the Letter.

Also, it is against the rite of the Church and faith: because the Church ordains and says that the water is consumed by the wine, such that it passes into the species and taste of wine, as was said before.

§ 3. If perhaps you say that the water is not separated by this manner: but it is wine that the rush or reed contracts. To the contrary: Let the strength and taste of the wine be tested before the insertion of the reed or rush, and after its extraction: and it will be found stronger and more flavorful afterwards than before: but this intensification of taste and strength cannot be except from the removal of the contrary, which is the humid of the water: therefore the rush extracts the water, as it seems: therefore he speaks falsely in the Letter. However, other things could be posited by which this is taught to be done: but because this is natural and more apparent, let it suffice.

Solution. It must be said that the rush does not draw the substance of water from every humid thing, whether it be mixed or pure: but when it is more mixed, it draws that much

more, because it finds more: and the purer it is, the less it draws, because it finds less: hence the very same infused water is not separated: but rather the substance of water in the wine, which is actually wine, by the qualities of water existing in the rush, is converted to the nature of water and is drawn. For wine, as the Philosopher says in the fourth book of the Meteorology, is a species of water: and there are weaker parts in it, more quickly transmutable to the nature of water than the others: and by attracting those the rush or reed alters them: and therefore it is not a separation, but rather a corruption of certain weaker parts of the wine. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 12 — Whether The Chalice Can Be Water Alone, Or Wine Alone, Or A Mixture Of Both

Can the chalice be water alone, or wine alone, or mixed from both?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, D, around the middle: That therefore which was said above, that it cannot be wine alone, etc.

For the exposition seems to be worth nothing, when he says: Unless it be done simply, or ignorantly. Because simplicity or ignorance are dispositions of the consecrator, and not of the essence of the sacrament: therefore they do not contribute to whether the consecration happens or does not happen, but rather whether it happens meritoriously or not meritoriously.

Solution. It must be said that this "cannot" is not a "cannot" of the sacrament [concerning validity]: but rather a "cannot" of law from the ordination of the Church and the congruence of the sacrament, as was said above: and through this the solution is clear.

Articulus 13 — What Kind Of Body Christ Gave To His Disciples, Whether Mortal And Passible, Or Immortal And Impassible

What kind of body did Christ give to His disciples, mortal and passible, or immortal and impassible?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, D, § 2: But He gave such a body as He then had, etc.

Concerning this before the Letter three things seem to be inquired: of which the first is, What kind of body did He give to the disciples, namely whether mortal and passible, or immortal and impassible? Second, And what would it be if it had been preserved in a pyx until the triduum, or had been celebrated in the triduum, or newly confected? Third, Whether He Himself consumed His own body, when He gave it to His disciples, or not?

To the first it is objected thus: § 1. In the Letter, and in 1 Corinthians 11:24 [458], there are the same words in the Gloss, that He gave the body such as He then had: but then He had a passible one: therefore He gave His passible body.

§ 2. Also, Innocent in the book On the Sacraments: The Lord gave to the disciples such a body as He then had: but it is agreed that He had a passible one: therefore He handed over a passible one.

§ 3. Also, it does not belong to truth to feign: but Christ is truth: therefore it does not belong to Christ to feign: but to feign is to exhibit oneself in another mode than one is: therefore Christ did not exhibit Himself in the sacrament in another mode than He was: but He was passible: therefore He gave a passible and mortal body to the disciples.

§ 4. Also, this is accepted from the mode of speaking when He says: This is My body, which will be given up for you: for the body to be given up in the future could not be except mortal, because otherwise the giving up would not have inflicted passion upon it: since therefore He offered the same to the disciples, it seems that it was under the same disposition: therefore He offered a passible one.

§ 5. Also, let it be granted that he gave it impassible: therefore it was impassible, and on the cross it was passible: therefore it was simultaneously passible and not passible. But "impassible" and "not passible" are either equipollent, or one follows from the other: therefore it was simultaneously passible and not passible. But if it was "not passible": therefore it "was not" passible: because a negative with a finite predicate, and an affirmative with an infinite predicate, are equipollent. Therefore it was simultaneously passible and was not passible at the same time: therefore contradictories are verified of the same thing at the same time, which is impossible.

§ 6. If perhaps you say that this does not follow, because they are taken with respect to different things, namely with respect to the form of the sacrament according to which it is impassible, and with respect to its own natural form according to which it is passible. Also, with respect to those receiving the sacrament it is impassible, and with respect to the lance and the cross it is passible. If, I say, you say thus. Against: "Passible" and "impassible" are absolute qualities flowing from a natural potency or impotency of suffering: therefore whether they are compared to another thing or not, they are always in one way. But it is certain that Christ then did not have a natural impotency of suffering, that is, by which he would not suffer when a harmful agent inflicting passion approaches: therefore by no comparison could it be or become impassible, his passible nature not having been altered in him. But it is certain that the sacrament in him did not alter his nature: therefore he gave his passible body, and in no way impassible.

But against this it is objected: § 1. On that text: And he was transfigured before them [459], the Gloss says: "That body which he had by nature mortal, he gave to his disciples at the supper not mortal, not corruptible." This it expressly said: because he gave it incorruptible, although he had it passible.

§ 2. Also, on that text: He who offers the blood, etc. [460], the Gloss says: "His flesh, which before the passion was not fit for eating, he made fit for eating." But it is certain that passible flesh would not be fit for eating: therefore he made it impassible.

458. 1 Cor 11:24.

§ 3. Also, Hugh of St. Victor: "He held himself in his hands, the one holding was mortal, the one held immortal." But this was the body which he gave to his disciples: therefore he gave an immortal and impassible body.

Also, Hugh: "I, without prejudice to the truth, more closely approach this [view], that he is said to have handed over that impassible and immortal [body] insofar as it pertains to the sanctification of the sacrament: for if this could be, that he himself bore himself in his hands, and distributed his body to be eaten without corruption of himself, and yet he who gave and he who was given, and he who bore and he who was borne, were the same: what wonder is it if it is said, that he in that which was given was immortal, and in that which gave was mortal, not two, but one?"

§ 4. Also, the passible suffers when a harmful agent approaches: if therefore he gave it passible, it suffered when a harmful agent approached: but the attrition of teeth is a harmful agent: therefore it suffered and was killed by the mastication of the disciples, which is false: therefore he did not give his passible and mortal body, as it seems.

Solution. One must say that concerning this question both sides have their defenders. And those who follow Hugh of St. Victor say that the Lord before his resurrection assumed the use of the four dowries of the glorified body, although he did not assume the habit. For he assumed the act or use of subtlety when he came forth from his mother's womb while the bars of modesty were closed; the power of agility when he walked with dry feet on the waves; of clarity when his face shone on Mount Tabor, when he was transfigured before the disciples. But [he assumed] the act of impassibility at the supper, when he gave his body to his disciples, not passible according to act, although in habit it was passible: because (as has been said) he did not assume the habit of the dowries, but only the act: and this is the opinion of

Master Hugh of St. Victor. And then the solution is clear to all the first objections, except two, namely what is objected concerning fiction, and concerning the verification of contradictories simultaneously of the same thing.

To the first of those, therefore, one must say that it will not be a fiction (as Augustine says) unless it is ordered toward deception: hence it is also said that he feigned to go further nor is it reputed to be a fiction unless it is good, as Augustine says, because it is not ordered to deceiving, but rather to instruction. Hence just as he showed clarity to his disciples lest they be excessively saddened and disturbed about his death: so at the supper for the sake of instructing them about the resurrection he showed them impassibility, and in other places the acts of the other dowries.

To the next one must say that there was no opposition of contradiction there: because "passible" and "impassible", "mortal" and "immortal", are taken equivocally. For passible and mortal are taken according to habit, but immortal and impassible according to act: so that it is the same thing that is impassible and immortal, because not suffering and not dying in the distribution of the sacrament.

459. Matt. 17:2.

Whoever wishes to say this, can do so, and has the means to respond to the objections. I, however, assent more to the other opinion which the Master touches upon in the Text, and the Gloss on the epistle , and Innocent in the book On the Sacraments, namely that he gave his passible body: and therefore also the sacrament is frequented by the Church in memory of his passion.

To this, however, which is objected first, one must say that the Gloss is understood thus, namely that he gave it immortal and impassible, that is, not having suffered, and not having died in the sacrament or in the reception of the sacrament: and the cause of this is not that it was impassible, but the cause will be clear in the solution.

To the next one must say that that Gloss of Leviticus is not understood of impassibility, but rather because the body in human figure and form is not fit for eating, therefore he handed it over under the form of bread, under which it is fit for eating.

To the next one must say that that was Hugh's opinion which we are not bound to follow unless we wish. If, however, we wish to sustain what they say, we will say that he refers this to that which did not suffer according to act under the sacrament: but he does not determine the cause of this: and I do not believe that this was the cause that he assumed impassibility, because no necessity compels this, as will be clear below.

To the next one must say that that proposition is very true which says: "The passible suffers when a harmful agent approaches." But in the sacrament no harmful agent approached it: because as we will have determined by the Master in the following distinction, mastication and division do not refer to the body of Christ, but only to the forms or accidental species. However, I think this was what compelled those who opined differently from the Master here, that he gave his impassible body: hence since this, as has already been clear, compels absolutely nothing, it is clear that there is no reason why it should be said that he handed over his impassible body.

Articulus 14 — What Would Have Happened Concerning The Body Of Christ If It Had Been Consecrated By One Of The Disciples During The Three Days, Or Kept In A Pyx; And, Whether The Soul Existing In Limbo Could Also Have Been In The Consecrated Body

What would have been done to the body of Christ if it had been consecrated by one of the disciples during the triduum, or kept in a pyx? And; whether the soul existing in limbo could also have been in the consecrated body?

Secondly it is asked: What would have been done to that body, if it had been kept for the triduum by one of the disciples, or newly confected or consecrated by one of them?

§ 1. For since it was one and numerically the same body that hung on the cross and that was kept in the pyx: it seems that whatever happened to it on the cross, all this would have happened to it in the pyx: but on the cross it was wound-

460. Lev. 7:33.

ed, pierced with a lance, mocked, and given vinegar to drink: therefore in the pyx any of these was done to it. And this is plainly false: because the crucifixion and the like were to the sight of men, and nothing of such things was seen to be done around the body in the pyx.

§ 2. But if you say that it was not crucified in the pyx, then it seems that contradictories are verified of the same thing at one and the same time: for on the cross it was being killed, and not in the pyx, and at the same time it was identically existing: therefore one and identically existing at one time was crucified and was not crucified, or died and did not die, which the intellect does not grasp.

§ 3. Also, Either it died in the pyx, or it did not die: but it did not die: therefore the same man at the same time was dead and alive, which faith does not admit nor the intellect grasp. If he died: either by the same kind of death by which he died outside the pyx, or not. If not: therefore Christ died by two kinds of death, which again Scripture abhors. If by the same, but outside he died by crucifixion: therefore also in the pyx he died by crucifixion: but one dying by crucifixion is crucified: therefore Christ in the pyx was crucified, and by the same reasoning lanced, etc.

But against: § 1. Christ was crucified only in one place, namely on Golgotha: but the pyx was not on Golgotha: therefore in the pyx he was not crucified.

§ 2. Also, Although the body of Christ and the soul, from the union to the deity which is everywhere, can be in several places, nevertheless the act of the Jews and Gentiles could not be except where the Gentiles and Jews were, who were only in one place: but they were not in the pyx: therefore neither was their act: but their acts are crucifixion, lancing, nailing, and the like: therefore these were not done in the pyx, but only on the cross.

Also. Further it is asked here: If it had been confected during the triduum, whether it would have been a perfect sacrament, or not?

It seems that not: § 1. For above it was held that from the force of the consecration the bread is only converted into the body, and the wine into the blood, and from the union there is both soul and deity: therefore, the union of the soul to the body not existing, the soul was not there: therefore nothing is confected except a dead body: but a dead body and dead blood would not be a perfect sacrament: therefore in the triduum it would not have been a perfect sacrament, as it seems.

§ 2. Also, the non-living does not vivify: but the body of Christ vivifies: therefore it could not be confected non-living: but if it had been confected in the triduum, it would have been non-living: therefore in the triduum it could not be confected, as it seems.

If then it is asked: Whether Christ could command the soul existing in limbo to be in the consecrated body?

It seems that yes: because § 1. He himself is omnipotent, and has the power of laying down his soul, and of taking it up again: therefore it seems also that he could do this.

§ 2. Also, From this no prejudice to redemption is generated: because the soul can be simultaneously and at once in diverse places: and thus existing in the body under the sacrament,

it would not on this account recede from limbo, shining to those to be redeemed from hell: therefore it seems that Christ would have done this, if it had been consecrated in the triduum.

§ 3. Also, Now he is wholly in heaven, and wholly on many altars simultaneously and at once: therefore the whole soul similarly could be in limbo separated from the buried body, and the whole soul in the body confected under the form of the sacrament, and there seems to be no inconvenience.

But against: This position having been made, the numerically same body

would be in the form of the sacrament, and in the tomb: and in the form of the sacrament it would be animated and alive, but in the tomb inanimate and dead: therefore the numerically same body and at the same time would be animated and not animated, and alive and dead: which is inconvenient, and absurd, and also contrary to faith.

Solution. It seems one should say with the ancients in this question, who say that certain nouns, verbs, and participles signify natural passions or passions common to natural and violent ones, and these can be copulated to the body existing in the pyx if it had been kept through the triduum, such as "suffers", "grieves", "dies", "feels pains", "feels passions", and the like. But some signify violent passions by the very word, such as "is wounded", "is beaten", "is crucified", and the like, and these cannot be copulated to the body except where it is under its proper form, as it was in the place of Calvary or on Golgotha, which is the same. The cause of this is, because such words signify a passion, not according to what belongs to the one passioned, but according to what is the infliction and effect of the action: and since the act of the crucifiers was not except in the place of crucifying, such things cannot be done around Christ except according to the form in which he appeared among the crucifiers, and in the place of crucifixion. But other words signify passion, according to what is only in the patient: and since the patient was the same on the cross and in the pyx, therefore those are copulated to him in both places. Hence the ancients determined this question by two verses, saying thus:

"Kept in a pyx it will be able to couple innate pain: But an inflicted one does not suit it."

According to this therefore one must say to the first, that although the body is the same on the cross and in the pyx, nevertheless under one form and another: and it is true that whatever happened to him on the cross, happened to him in the pyx, regarding what expresses the quantity and substance of the passion itself on the part of the patient: but "to be wounded", and the like, besides the substance of the passion, express a relation to an outside agent: and therefore it is not necessary that they happen to him. And there is in the argument the sophistic topic of a figure of speech from the commutation of that which expresses the "what" of a passion, into that which expresses "what sort" of a passion, namely compared to the action of an agent.

To the next one must say that a contradiction concerning the same thing is not verified; because this is true: "The body of Christ was being crucified," and this is false: "The body of Christ was not being crucified." But this is twofold: "The body of Christ was crucified in the pyx", from the fact that the phrase in the pyx can determine the body of Christ by means of an understood participle, namely existing, under this sense: "The body of Christ existing in the

pyx was crucified", and thus it is true. Or it can determine the word was crucified, and thus it is false. Similarly also this is twofold: "The body of Christ in the pyx was not crucified", as is clear per se from the preceding distinction. And these, "The body of Christ was crucified in the pyx", and, "The body of Christ was not crucified", are not contradictories, unless according as the determination refers to the same thing in one and in the other: and this is not inconvenient, that in this way it was not crucified in the pyx, because from this it does not follow that it was not crucified: and there is there a fallacy of secundum quid ad simpliciter [from a qualified sense to an absolute sense].

To the next one must say that in the pyx it died, and by the same kind of death as outside, but this death in the pyx was not inflicted upon it, but on the cross. And therefore it does not follow: "it died in the pyx by the same kind of death: therefore it was crucified": because to be crucified not only signifies the same kind of death, but also the infliction of it according as it is from an agent, and by virtue of that it does not suit it in the pyx, but by virtue of that which was only on the part of the patient: and this solution states the same kind of death.

To that which is further asked, without prejudice it seems to me, supposing that it were confected in the triduum, that the body of Christ would be in the sacrament without the soul: nor

do I think it to be true what some say, namely that the form of the sacrament would have been suspended in the triduum, but rather I think that if the sacrament had been consecrated in the triduum, it would have had effect.

To that however which is objected against, one must say that a perfect sacrament is spoken of in three ways. In one way from the perfection of the matter and form of the sacrament: just as every thing perfect in its being is by the perfection of those two in composition, provided that thing is not simple, but composed of matter and form. In a second way it is called a perfect sacrament: because it perfectly performs the act to which it was instituted. And by these two that sacrament would have been perfect in the triduum. In a third way it is called a perfect sacrament from the number of those things which the sacrament contains, and in this way improperly. And in this way it is true that it would not contain as many substances in the triduum, as it contains outside the triduum, because it does not contain the soul.

To the next one must say, that the body of Christ is not vivified by a natural life, the cause of which is the soul, but by the life which is the deity: and it would have had that life united to itself in the triduum, and by virtue of that it would vivify, and therefore also Christ by his death vivified the dead by the power of the deity, as Augustine says.

To that which is further asked: Whether Christ could make his soul enter his body under the sacrament, and not in the tomb?

One must say that it is one thing to be able to make, and another to be able to be made, and concerning his ability, and its being made, it was spoken of elsewhere, namely at the end of the first book of the Sentences. But I think it must be said, that that could not be made: because

thus it would follow that the same thing would be animated and inanimate, which is inconvenient.

To the first however which is objected against, one must say that he can do all things: yet not all things can be done simultaneously on account of opposition, or the consequence of an impossibility.

To the next one must say, that this is not the cause, that it can be in several places simultaneously: but rather this, that the numerically same body in one and the same time cannot be animated in one place, and inanimate in another place: because if this were so, everywhere it would be inanimate: and if it is animated here, everywhere it is animated: and therefore it cannot be, that the soul is in the body in the sacrament, and not in the tomb.

But some say otherwise: and those who wish to follow them, can: but to pursue the opinions of all here would be excessively tedious.

Articulus 15 — Whether Christ At The Supper Took His Body In His Own Person

Whether Christ in the supper in his own person partook of his body?

Thirdly it is asked, Whether Christ in his own person partook of his body in the supper, when he gave it to his disciples?

And it seems that yes: because § 1. On that text: Drink of this all of you [461], Chrysostom says: "Drink of this, so that the disciples seeing it would not say: Why do I drink blood? For that they might not be disturbed, as were disturbed many who went back, first he himself drank his blood."

§ 2. Also, on that text: When Booz had eaten and drunk [462], the Gloss says: "Christ ate and drank, when in the supper he handed his body and blood to his disciples."

§ 3. Also, Because the children communicated in flesh and blood, and he himself similarly participated in the same, so that by death he might destroy him who had the empire of death.

§ 4. Also, on that text: Which, namely the ram, when Moses had immolated,

taking of its blood, etc. [463], the Gloss says: "First the priest, afterwards others are anointed with its blood: because at the supper first Christ received his blood, then handed it to his disciples."

§ 5. Also, the Gloss in the same place: "He drank his blood, and gave it to others to drink, when he poured the intelligible blood on the altar, that is, his body."

§ 6. Also, This seems to be the opinion of the ancients, who made verses about the solution of this question, saying:

"The King sits at supper, surrounded by the twelve-fold crowd: He holds himself in his hands, he, the food, feeds himself."

§ 7. Also, We see this, that he himself was circumcised, and afterwards received baptism succeeding circumcision: therefore by similarity since he communicated in the typical lamb, he himself also communicated in his flesh and blood succeeding the typical lamb.

§ 8. Also, The sacraments began from Christ, and from him as from a head flowed into the Church: therefore they ought first to be in Christ, then in the Church: since therefore communion is the principal sacrament of the Church, communion ought to begin from him.

§ 9. Also, Since it is said in Psalm 132: Behold how good, etc. And there is added, v.2: Like ointment on the head, which descends to the beard, etc. therefore from the head the sacramental unction descends to the beard, that is, to the Apostles, as the Saints expound, and from the beard to the hem of the garment, that is, to the least of the Church. Therefore the unction of the principal sacrament, that is, communion, seems to have begun first from him, then derived to the Apostles.

But against: § 1. In nature nothing is vain and in vain: therefore less so in the works of Christ: but it would be, if he had communicated: therefore he did not communicate. Proof of the assumption. That sacrament restores what is lost in spiritual powers, perfecting a greater union of the members with the head: but Christ lost nothing, nor could he be more united than he was united: therefore in him communion would have been to no end if he had communicated: therefore in vain and useless; because the Philosopher says that useless or vain is that which is for some end, and does not include it.

§ 2. Also, Blood causes redemption in those by whom it is received: but Christ was not one to be redeemed, but rather the redeemer: therefore he ought not to communicate in the blood.

Also, It does not belong to the same person to serve his blood as drink and to drink it: but Christ was as the cupbearer of the blood: therefore he did not drink it.

§ 3. Also, It seems to be an occasion of heresy, namely that he himself like others there needed the shedding of his blood, since he received it like others: but Christ in all things intended to build up faith: therefore he ought not to receive his blood.

Solution. Without prejudice to some saying otherwise, it seems to me safer to say this which the holy Fathers expressly handed down, namely that Christ received his blood, and his body. And I confess that I fall short in solving their sayings: but it seems to me that they expressly intend to say this.

To the first that is objected against, it can be said, that there is an end in itself, and an end in another: but the communion of the body and blood of Christ did not have its end in itself [for him], but in another: and the first authority of Chrysostom touches upon that, namely lest others should shudder who had shuddered before, saying: This is a hard saying, who can hear it? And leaving him they went back.

But another cause is to signify, that just as the grace of redemption is derived from him to the members, so also the rite and institution of observation, and therefore he communicated.

461. Matt. 26:27.

To the next one must say, that communion

in Christ does not cause redemption, but rather was as a form and exemplar of the rite to be observed, and of communicating without horror for the future. This also was one of the causes posited above, why also he himself generally handed over his body and blood under the species of food and drink.

To the next one must say, that this was not an occasion of heresy: because already by doctrine and miracle and the testimony of the Father made from heaven, and the transfiguration they had learned, that he needed none of these, but there remained only the information to the rite of the Church by an example received from Christ. Hence the Apostle For I received from the Lord what I also delivered to you.

Articulus 16 — Whether In The Sacrament Of The Eucharist Accidents Remain Without A Subject

Whether in the sacrament of the Eucharist the accidents remain without a subject?

Then it is asked concerning what he says, there, E, But if it is asked concerning the accidents which remain, etc.

This is a very grave question concerning the accidents, because he says accidents here are without a subject.

And against this it is objected manifoldly: because the whole of philosophy seems to be against it.

§ 1. First thus: Being (esse) cannot be separated from a being (ens), because a contradiction would follow, namely a being which is, not to be: but an accident is a certain being: therefore its being is not separable from it: but its being, as the Philosopher says, is "to be in" (inesse): therefore "to be in" is not in act separable from it: but if it is in, it is not in except in a subject: therefore in act it cannot be separated from a subject: and thus it will not be here without a subject.

§ 2. If perhaps you say, that God can do even more than we can understand: but we can understand an accident without a subject: therefore God can do this. Against: It is not asked what

God can do, but what can be done in a creature: but it has already been shown, that the being of any being cannot be separated from it, without a contradiction following if it is separated according to act: therefore this cannot be done in an accident.

§ 3. Also, In the ordination of divine wisdom it is, that an accident is not except in a subject: but against the ordination of wisdom God cannot act, as Augustine and Anselm say: because he would act against himself: therefore he seems not to be able to make an accident be without a subject.

§ 4. Also, If an accident is caused by the principles of the substance in being, so it is contained by the same in being: but each thing naturally fails, when it is separated from the principles causing and containing it: therefore an accident fails when it is separated from the substance, and its principles: therefore if in the sacrament the accident is separated from the subject, the accident does not remain: but it remains as sight judges: therefore it is not without a subject.

§ 5. Also, on that text: One indeed is hungry, but another is drunk [464], the Gloss says, that they were consecrating and eating in great quantity. But it is certain that accidents would not inebriate or refresh anyone: therefore it seems that accidents do not remain there without a subject.

§ 6. Also, Those things which are in diverse genera are more distant, than those which are in the same genus: but body and spirit are in the same genus, accident and per se being in diverse: therefore an accident and a per se being or substance are more distant, than a body and a spirit: but a body cannot become a spirit, as Augustine says, and Boethius proves in the book On the Two Natures in One Person of Christ at the end: therefore much less can an accident become a per se being: therefore it cannot be without a subject.

§ 7. Also, To human sight there appears there not only an accident, but white, round, denominated and informed by an accident: either therefore it is so in the sacrament as it appears, or not. If it is so: therefore there is there something denominated and informed, and nothing except a substance and subject: therefore the accident is not without a subject. If not: therefore it is otherwise in the sacrament of truth, than it appears outwardly to the sight of man, and thus it is a phantasm or prestige, which is absurd to say and believe of the sacrament of truth and of the Church.

§ 8. Also, A definition is not separated from the defined, because the definition states the being of the defined; since therefore an accident is defined by "to be in", it seems that "to be in" cannot be separated from an accident in act: because it is asked concerning that separation here.

§ 9. Also, The Philosopher in the first book of the Physics speaking against Parmenides says: If animal and biped which define man, are an accident, man also will be an accident: and thus it would also happen, that man would be an accident to another: therefore by similarity if the defining of an accident is only to be in another, and never to be per se, the defined accident itself will also be only in another, and never per se: but "to be in" is definitive of an accident, and it never has being unless it is in another: therefore an accident never is unless it is in another. Proof of the assumption. The Philosopher says, that an accident is that which when it is in another, is not in it as a certain part, and it is impossible for it to be without that in which it is: therefore the proposition is clear.

§ 10. Also, Damascene seems to want to say, that the substance of bread remains, and also the substance of wine, in which the accidents are founded, and thus they are never per se: because he himself says, that just as we were composed of a twofold substance, namely body

463. Lev. 8:23.

and soul: so he made a twofold food by conjoining deity to bread and wine into a spiritual food: but deity is not conjoined to bread and wine unless the substances of bread and wine remain there: therefore the accidents are in those, not without a subject, as is said in the text.

§ 11. Also, The Philosopher says, that as great as the surface is, so great will you say the white is: but we see there so much white: therefore the quantity of white is defined by the quantity of some surface: therefore it is...

[there is the] surface: but just as white is related to a surface in its dependence with respect to being, so too a surface is related to a substance: therefore just as white is not without a surface, so a surface is not without a body and a substance in which it is.

§ 12. Also, there will not be a being by accident unless there is a being through itself: but in the sacrament, as is said in the Letter, there is no being through itself: therefore there will not be a being by accident there: but there is a being by accident there, as sight proves: therefore it is necessary that a being through itself, which is a substance, be sublaid to it: therefore the accident will not be there without a subject, as it seems.

§ 13. If perhaps you say that the accident is changed into a substance, this is proved to be impossible in many ways. And first indeed: because the Philosopher says that it is impossible for a substance to be made from an accident. In another way: because if a substance is made from an accident: either it is the substance in which is the accident that is seen in the sacrament, or another substance. If the substance in which it is [is made]. To the contrary: An accident that is in a substance, is caused by the substance in which it is: if therefore it is the cause of the existing of the substance in which it is: therefore the accident is the cause of the cause which causes it, which is not intelligible: and Augustine denies this: because the caused is not the cause of its cause that it exist, but rather conversely. If however it is converted into another substance than that in which it is: let it be asked, which is that, and there will be none to assign. And moreover then the same question remains concerning those accidents which still remain without a substance: since they are not in the substance into which they are converted.

Also, it seems to be ridiculous: because nothing is converted into another while remaining in the same way it was before: but we see the accidents in the sacrament remaining in the same way they were before: therefore the accidents are not converted into a substance.

Also, if they are converted into a substance, into which substance are they converted? For since it is clear from the things said above that there are only two substances, namely of the bread and wine, and of the body of Christ, they are converted into one of these. But it is established that they are not converted into the substance of the bread and wine: because those substances do not remain, but are transubstantiated into the body and blood of Christ: therefore it is left that they are converted into the substance of the body of Christ: and this is absurd: because the glorious body of Christ is neither white, nor round, nor has the taste of bread or of wine.

462. Ruth 3:7.

§ 14. Also, that by which species differ, by those same things their differences differ: but substance and accident are two species of being, or genera, because about this there is no force: therefore by those things by which substance and accident differ, by those same things their differences differ: but substance and accident differ by existing through itself, and by being in another: therefore their differences also [differ by this]: therefore being in another cannot be through itself, as it seems, since it is not a substance, and this is impossible, as has already been proved: therefore an accident cannot be separated from a subject.

This can also be proved in another way in multiple ways, namely through the operation of accidents:

§ 1. For there are two things in heat, namely the essence of heat, and the operation, namely to heat: but it is established that the operation of heating does not belong to heat existing through itself without a subject: which is proved by this which the Philosopher says, that things do not act mutually upon one another unless they are communicating according to nature. And Boethius says this same thing. Since therefore the operation of accidents is expressly found in the sacrament, it seems that there the accidents are not without a subject.

§ 2. Also, for color to act upon sight, it is necessary that it be the act of the transparent, and the light incorporated in it which abstracts it: but if there is no body in which the color is, there will be no incorporated light abstracting the color: therefore there will be no visible color: but in the sacrament there is visible color; therefore there is a body there to which the light abstracting it is incorporated: therefore it is not there without a subject.

§ 3. Also, the Philosopher says, that to a straight line insofar as it is straight, many things happen, such as touching a sphere in a point: but nevertheless it will never touch this separate straight line: therefore for an accident to have an operation which belongs to it through itself, it is necessary that it be in a subject: but the accidents in the sacrament have an operation proper or suited to them properly: therefore they are not there without a subject.

§ 4. Also, the Philosopher says that the sense is receptive of sensible species with matter being present: therefore if matter is not present, it neither receives them, nor will they act upon the sense: but species act upon the sense: therefore they are in some matter, as it seems.

§ 5. Also, the senses properly differ: because some apprehend from afar, some apprehend nothing except a species in matter, such as sight from afar, but touch receives a species in matter, and taste according as it is a kind of touch: but that which is in the sacrament alters both taste and touch: therefore there is a species in matter there.

§ 6. Also, the Philosopher says that touch is only of bodies: therefore that which is touched in the sacrament, is a body: therefore it is not an accident without a subject.

§ 7. Also, the apprehensive senses from outside and from inside are distinguished in this, that the interior ones receive species without matter, but those from outside only with matter being present: therefore whatever is received by a sense which is an apprehensive power from

464. 1 Cor. 11:21.

outside, is a species in matter: therefore since it receives that which appears in the sacrament, it will be a species existing in matter: therefore there is not an accident without matter there.

The third way it is objected still through the putrefaction of those species into those things which are generated from the putrefaction of those species:

§ 1. For it is established that when those things which appear in the sacrament putrefy, whatever those things also are, worms are generated from them: but a worm cannot be generated materially from a pure accident: therefore it is necessary to posit some substance there, which being putrefied is converted into a worm.

§ 2. Also, putrefaction is a corruption, but it is established that generation and corruption occur from contrary causes: therefore it is not generated nor corrupted unless according to its mutation it is receptive of contraries: but this is a property of substance alone, as the Philosopher says. Therefore it does not belong to an accident to be generated and corrupted, as it seems.

§ 3. Also, Porretanus says concerning accidental form, that form is contingent to composition, consisting of a simple and invariable essence: but it is established that that which is invariable neither putrefies nor is corrupted: therefore if the accidents are there without a subject, the accidents neither putrefy nor are corrupted: which is against sight, because we see them being corrupted: therefore they are not there without a subject.

§ 4. If perhaps you say that God corrupts them: this is ridiculous: because God is the cause of the existence of things: and if He destroys what He builds, according to the Apostle, He establishes Himself as a transgressor. Therefore God is not the cause: but rather this happens from the subject in which they are, as it seems.

But against all these things it is disputed thus: § 1. An accident denominates the substance in which it is: but the accidents do not denominate the body of Christ, because the body of Christ is not white, or round: nor the substance of the bread, because that is transubstantiated into the body of Christ: therefore they do not denominate any substance: therefore they are there without a subject, as it seems.

§ 2. Also, in the Decree, all the words of Ambrose say that they are there without a subject. Also, this is said here in the Letter. Therefore it is so.

§ 3. Also, we see that in this sacrament all things which are in it, receive a higher state: for an inanimate body passes into an animate one, and a non-glorious one into a glorious one, and a non-divine one into a divine one: therefore the accidents must also receive a higher state: but they do not receive a higher state except according to the fact that they are without a subject: therefore in the sacrament they are without a subject.

§ 4. Also, accidents remain, so that they may lead to another thing just as sacramental signs: but if the proper substance of the accidents remains, they do not lead except into that substance of the subject: therefore they do not lead into the spiritual refection of the body of Christ, and thus the use of signs in the sacrament would vanish: since therefore this is unfitting, it is necessary that in the sacrament they are without a subject.

§ 5. Also, we see that those things which are above reason, like the articles of faith, cannot be proved except through another thing which is above reason, just as the articles were proved through the working of miracles. Since therefore many things in this sacrament which is also called the sacrament of faith, are above reason, it seems that congruity demands that something in it be subject to sense, which is above reason: but this cannot be except that the sensible accidents be there without a subject: therefore the accidents ought to have remained in this sacrament without a subject.

§ 6. Also, there does not seem to be an impediment on the part of the operation of accidental species in the sense: because if something belongs to a thing through itself, it also belongs to it separately, just as for a triangle to have three angles equal to two right angles, etc.: but the altering of the senses belongs to sensible things through themselves: therefore it also belongs to separated sensible things: therefore although they are without a subject, nevertheless they alter the sense, and act upon it.

§ 7. Also, the sense, as the Commentator says, receives sensible things according to spiritual being: but separated things are more according to spiritual being, than when they are in matter and subject: therefore the sense is more receptive of separated sensible things, than of those which are in matter: therefore there is no impediment why those forms cannot be sensed, although they are separated from a subject.

§ 8. Also, let us posit that a form remains in a mirror, even with the object not present, and when a beholder is apposed, that form will still be seen: and yet it is not in matter: therefore a form without matter can well alter the sense.

§ 9. Also, what is objected in the third way, seems to offer no impediment: for just as it has already been held, that what belongs to a thing through itself, always belongs to it: but those forms are through themselves corruptible: therefore even they existing without a subject will be corruptible.

§ 10. Also, it is clear to sense to every beholder, that they are corrupted: and I prove that it is not by a miracle: because Anselm and Chrysostom say that those things which are done miraculously, are by the divine will alone: but it is established that the divine will which produced them, does not corrupt them: therefore they are corrupted by nature: therefore corruption happens to them separated, just as conjoined in matter.

§ 11. Also, it was sufficiently proved above that a common subject of contraries does not confer upon them a principle of acting and power, but only sustains them: therefore if they were sustained without a subject, the contraries would fight, and destroy each other mutually: therefore those forms remaining without a subject can naturally be destroyed and corrupted, just as when they are in a subject.

§ 12. Also, let wine be poured over dividing those species: it is established that division corrupts: therefore those species can be corrupted: and the same follows concerning the division of the bread: but it is established that when those species do not remain, the body of Christ does not remain there: therefore the species are corrupted naturally, and then the body of Christ is not there.

§ 13. If perhaps you say that the species of bread and the species of wine are infinitely divisible, because the species are of homogeneous things: that is foolish: because to be infinitely divided is a passion only of the continuous, and not of bread, or flesh, or wine: therefore the species of wine can be divided so much that it will not be the species of wine, and the species of bread so much that it will not be the species of bread: therefore it can also be naturally corrupted, although it exists through itself.

Solution. It must be said that the accidents remain there without a subject, as the last arguments prove: and concerning this four reasons have customarily been assigned by the Masters: of which the first is, so that, namely, with the substance which is the proper subject of those species not existing there, the human mind may be ravished to another spiritual food from the signification of the accidents, understanding spiritual things in corporeal things, just as also in other sacraments. Hence Ambrose: "In that sacrament which is the body there is no corporeal food, but spiritual."

The second reason is that it may be shown that everything that is in the sacrament is of faith, and nothing of nature. Hence Hugh of Saint Victor: "Divine wisdom veiled the flesh of Christ under the species of corporeal food, and proposed it to be consumed thus, so that the sense might be fostered in one thing, and faith in another."

The third reason is the habituating of men to believe supernatural things, since they see with their own eyes accidents which affect no subject, as the Master says here in the Letter.

The fourth reason is the complete ordering of those things which are in the sacrament, and this was touched upon in objecting: because since all the inferior things of this sacrament receive a higher state, it was fitting that the accidental signs of the qualities should also receive a higher state in this, that they should remain there without a subject for the service of the sacrament.

And having held these things, we must respond to the objections in order, holding indeed the faith, but not following philosophy except insofar as we can with the faith safe.

Therefore it seems to be said to the first that those accidents are twofold, namely sensible qualities which are the objects of the proper senses: and quantity, and figure, which are the objects of the common sense: and they are not related to the subject equally: but according to the order of nature quantity is closer to the subject, than quality.

Also, among the qualities those which are the objects of touch are the causes of the others, and immediately follow the complexion of the qualities of touch, such as the qualities of taste, because that is a kind of touch: and because odors are signs of taste, therefore odor is closer to the subject, than color. And by this mode it seems it must be said that that which contains color is quantity, and that which causes it is the complexion of the qualities of touch: hence it is not caused there nor contained by divine power alone, but also by nature, as has already been said. And the same seems to be said of odor and taste. But the objects of touch are indeed contained by quantity: but according to cause they cannot be caused by other qualities. Figure also since it is a quality spoken of concerning quantity, as the Philosopher says, is in quantity as in a subject: because it itself is terminative of quantity, just as is received from its definition.

But concerning quantity it does not seem to me that according to nature it can be without a subject unless it is contained by divine power: for although quantity is prior to a natural body, nevertheless it is not prior to the composite of the parts of a substance which are form and matter, such a composite as the Metaphysician considers: because it is proved,[465] that matter is primarily receptive of substantial form, because that alone finishes it: and therefore also the substantial form is not divided by the division of the subject: because it is not greater in a greater part of the subject, and lesser in a lesser: but every form which is received by a subject according to the order of nature after quantity, is divided by accident, and is greater in a greater part, and lesser in a lesser part. Hence I say, that quantity is of the form, and not of the matter, but of the composite of matter and form. But that matter and form are parts of a substance, which is the first being, which the first Philosopher considers separated from quantity and motion, this has already been sufficiently clearly proved elsewhere by the Philosophers. But yet because some in that question contradicted this, therefore these things are posited here.

But to the objection it must be said, that being is never separated from a being: but being is the act of a being, and the act of an essence: hence if we take the essence according to itself, according to the intellect the essence still is. And so I say here, that quantity is the being of the essence, and not the being of some quantity which it informs, as a subject in which it is: and this happens by divine power working this for the congruity of the sacrament.

To another it must be said, that what has already been said can well happen: because just as it was held, the being which an accident has in a subject, is as it were the being of a composite being: but the being by which an essence is that which it is, is understood in the accident according to itself: and concerning this the Philosopher does not understand, that its being is to-be-in, but rather this is constituted from the principles of its essence and its quiddity: just as the Philosopher himself says, that if someone, positing a cubit magnitude, should ask what that which is posited is, to be a quantum, what he says, and he signifies a quantum, and this is not separable from it, such that it remains: but that which it has in a subject, is separable by the power of the Creator.

To another it must be said, that it is from the ordination of divine wisdom, that an accident is not without a subject according to the natural seminal causes which the founder first inserted, as Augustine says: but besides these causes, the Lord also inserted in the first created things the power of obedience to that which the Creator would will for the demonstration of faith: but in this He does not contradict Himself, if He explicates both for a time as He has willed, as Augustine says.

To another it must be said, that an accident is neither only caused by the principles of the substance in being, nor only contained by the same, but by divine power: hence even with the substance of the subject subtracted according to being, it can be held, because divine power does not depend on a subject containing and causing it, but rather conversely, since as has already been clear, not according to every being is an accident caused by the principles of the

subject, because according to the being of its essence or definitive being, it does not depend on the principles of its subject, but rather on those things which enter into its definition.

To another it must be said, that it is answered differently here, and I prejudice no one: for some say that in the passage of those species into another thing, the first substance of those species returns. But some others say that just as the species are there without a subject as if in the act of a substance, so in nourishing they have the act of a substance. And both can be said congruously enough.

To another it must be said, that the accident here is not changed into a substance: and the objection supposes this, and therefore it is not valid.

To another it must be said, that in all accidents information is sufficiently saved except in quantity, as is clear from the things said before, but in quantity it cannot in my judgment be properly said "quantum" by denomination, except in this way by which first things denominate themselves, just as unity is one by itself. And Augustine says,[466] that whiteness is white by itself: although the Philosopher in another sense seems to deny this: for since to denominate belongs to an accidental form, and not a substantial one, as is held from the beginning; and quantity is the first accidental form, it itself will be the first denominating thing: and since it itself is in the place of the subject of the other species which appear there, it will be denominated itself by the others, and denominating itself: and therefore the quantum which is seen there, is the quantity itself, as it seems to me.

To another it must be said, that it is true that the definition is not separated from the defined: but the definition of an accident is twofold, namely according to the being which it has in a subject: and thus those definitions are given which are contained, namely that an accident is that which happens to be in the same thing, and not to be in it: and these belong to an accident according to its name: because an accident is said as if falling towards another. But according to the essence of the accident other definitions are given from the genus and difference of the accident, according as the accident is understood absolutely in its essence: and that definition is not separated from it, such that it remains, as was said: but the objection proceeds as if an accident does not have definitive being except in a subject, and this is not true.

By the same thing the solution to the following is also clear: because animal and biped are of the definition of man, and otherwise to-be-in is of the definition of an accident: because animal and biped constitute the essence of man, but to-be-in does not give the essence to the accident, but only the being which it has in a subject, and with that abstracted the essence of the accident still remains, with something containing it for the use of the sacrament.

To another it must be said, that this must be solved, as the Master said above, through the trope by which those things signing and containing things are accustomed to sort the names of the things which are signed and contained: and this trope is called metonymy by Donatus. Hence Damascene posits there "bread" for the species of bread.

465. 1 Cor. 11:23.

To another it must be said, that that proposition is not valid here: because just as white is related to a surface, so surface is to a subject: because a surface here is contained by divine power for the use of the sacrament, because a surface agrees with the nature of a subject in this, that it itself is the subject of qualities which are in the subject through it: hence it is given to the surface and quantity which according to something agrees with the subject, namely in receiving certain qualities, for the use of the sacrament to agree in whole with the subject, namely regarding its existing through itself without a subject.

To another it must be said, that this proposition, "There will not be a being by accident unless there is a being through itself," is not understood thus, that the essence of an accident does not exist unless the essence of the subject in which it is founded exists: because this is false, since Avicenna expressly says that an accident is that whose being is of an absolute intellect, and is dependent upon a subject: but it is understood that every being by accident is reduced to something through itself, which is prior to it, and this is true: and in this way it is not valid at all for concluding the proposition.

To another it must be said, that I well concede this, that it is absurd to say that an accident is changed into a substance. Hence those things which were objected against this seem to have to be conceded.

To another it must be said, that namely the last one in the first way of objecting, that accident and substance do not differ only in the modes of being through itself and in another, but also in their essences: hence although after the transubstantiation of the substance which is the matter of the sacrament, there is an accident of a subject without a subject through itself, nevertheless it still differs from a substance by the proper essence of accidental nature through itself, namely that it itself in its nature is an accident.

But to this which is objected through the second way, it must be said that this is not valid at all: because the Philosopher does not speak except concerning that operation in which one thing is transmuted into another which throws off from the subject, and not concerning just any operation: because the Philosopher does not consider an accident except as caused and contained in being by a subject: because he himself through reason taken from the natural principles of a thing cannot investigate anything else: therefore he says that it does not act without a subject: but where it is contained by a superior power for demonstrating a divine work in the sacrament, nothing prohibits its operation from also remaining.

To another it must be said, that just as the Philosopher says, Pythagoras called color an epiphany, because it appears on the surface: hence light is understood to be incorporated, when it makes color actually immutative of sight. And what the Philosopher says, that color is the extremity of the transparent in a determinate body, is understood thus, that there is a reflection of light at the determinate body: therefore the extremity of the transparent lucid thing shines more there, and therefore it makes color more in act at the extremity than elsewhere: and therefore also, because light not only abstracts color there, but reflects it to the

466. 1 Cor. 11:21.

sight: and the surface of quantity suffices for all those things as long as it remains through itself, and therefore this impedes nothing from the accidents altering the sight.

To another it must be said, that the Philosopher says, that even touch is metaphysical: and therefore that a separated straight line does not touch a bronze sphere, this is because a bronze sphere is a natural body, and has being in matter on the part of the bronze in which it is: and the straight line does not touch insofar as it is straight: but if there were a straight line in nature insofar as it is straight, it would touch in such a way, just as a wooden or copper straight line touches: but those are accidents, and therefore they can act.

To another it must be said, that it receives with matter being present, this is because it receives a species existing in matter: but if it were without matter, it would receive it without matter: hence this happens to the sense, that it does not receive a species unless matter is present, and nevertheless it would receive it, if it were a sensible thing without matter.

To another and the following there is one solution through those things which were said before, namely that there is there a physical touch with respect to qualities altering the touch, and a metaphysical one with respect to quantity: and that there is no substance there, this does not impede the touch: because a substance insofar as it is a substance is sensible by no sense: and that it is required in other things, this is because tangible things do not have being without a subject as here.

To the last the solution is clear through those things which were said before in the solution of the immediately preceding argument.

To that which is objected through the third way, it is heavier to solve. Nevertheless it seems to me to be said, that those species putrefy in that mode which was determined above in a proper question concerning this. And it well seems to me, that worms or certain other things can be generated from putrefaction in one of two ways, namely that either the substance returns, and it becomes the matter of the thing generated from putrefaction: or if it does not return: because then from the mutual action and passion of those species upon the surrounding bodies, something of the surrounding bodies is thrown off, and from that corruption worms are generated materially. But some say that nothing is ever generated from such putrefaction: but this is against what we frequently see, especially if we consecrate in a large quantity.

To another it seems to me to be said, that just as quantity agrees with substance in this, that it itself is the subject of certain accidents, so it also agrees with a property of a substance, that it itself receives contraries according to its own mutation: nevertheless it is not a substance: because this does not belong to it through itself and primarily, but by accident, namely through the substance holding it in being: and this is from the fact that by divine power it is contained in being in the place of a subject, and therefore they are naturally corrupted by the corruption of a contrary.

To another it must be said, that Porretanus without a doubt speaks there concerning accidental form, and speaks concerning it according as it itself is an essence abstracted from this and from that, and not according as it has being in nature through a containing subject, or

through divine power for the use of the sacrament: and therefore it is not corruptible in such being.

To the other objects it seems to me it must be conceded plainly.

DISTINCTIO XIII

Divisio Textus

"It is also customary to ask concerning fraction," etc. This distinction is divided into two parts: in the first of which the Master first moves a question, what is broken in the sacrament, and solves it according to four opinions. But in the second he touches upon the signification of the parts, there, E, "But what those parts signify," etc.

Still the first is divided into four according to the four opinions touched upon in the Letter. And the second begins there, B, "But others say," etc. The third, there, C, "Others hand down that the body of Christ," etc. The fourth, there, D, "But because the incorruptible body of Christ," etc.

But four things are contained in the first. For first he posits a reason for the fact that the body is broken. Second, a reason to the opposite. Third, he elicits the false opinion of some concerning this. Fourth, he objects against it.

And these things are plainly obvious in the Letter.

Articulus 1 — Whether It Is Possible For Something To Be Broken In The Sacrament

Whether it is possible for something to be broken in the sacrament?

But a question falls here, Whether it is possible for something to be broken there?

And it seems, that it is not: § 1. For whatever is not in act according to itself, this is not broken: but an accident is not in act according to itself: therefore it is not broken according to itself: it is necessary therefore, that the body of Christ be broken in itself: but this is impossible: therefore nothing is broken there.

§ 2. Also, fraction sounds of a violent division: but a violent division is by no means except in a substance: but no substance is breakable there: therefore there is no fraction there except according to fantasy.

§ 3. Also, quantity is indeed divisible, but it is not divisible unless founded in another: but this is not founded in another: therefore it is not divisible.

§ 4. Also, quantity cannot be taken except in two ways, namely according to itself, and according to being: but taken according to itself it is not except in the soul, namely in the imagination or intellect: but according to being it is in natural things: therefore either fraction belongs to it according as it is in abstraction and in the soul, or according as it is in being. It is

established that not in the first way: because according as it is in the soul it is not a quantity, but an intention of a quantity which is not in the soul except through spiritual being, and thus it is not divisible: therefore if it is broken, fraction belongs to it through the being which it has in natural things: but in the sacrament it is not in any natural thing: therefore fraction does not belong to it there.

§ 5. Also, all generation primarily belongs to a substance, and other things do not have generation except through the fact that they are of a substance, or in a substance: therefore also all corruption will primarily be of a substance, and other things are not corrupted except insofar as they are of a substance or in a substance: but fraction is a kind of corruption: therefore it is of a substance, or of something which is in a substance: but no substance is corruptible there, nor any being in a substance: therefore there is simply no fraction there, but an appearance of fraction.

§ 6. Also, in every division of quantity in which there is a true division, a part of the subject is measured by one part of the quantity, and another part by another: therefore if this is a true division of quantity, one part of some subject is measured by one part, and another part by another: but this is not true: therefore this is not a true division or fraction of quantity: therefore it is fantastical, as the first opinion said in the Letter says.

§ 7. Also, as the Philosopher says in the first book of On the Heavens and the Earth, a continuum is infinitely divisible: but since this is a property of a continuum insofar as it is a continuum, it does not belong to a physical body insofar as it is such: therefore bread will not be divisible to infinity. From this I proceed as follows: Whatever is divided by a division that corrupts the species is not divided by a division of continuous quantity alone, but by a division of a physical or artificial body: but the sacrament, when it is broken, is divided in this way: therefore it is not divided by a division of continuous quantity alone, but by a division of a physical or artificial body. The first premise has been proved. The second is proved thus: For let the breakings be multiplied: now it is certain that eventually there will be non-species of bread [i.e., they will cease to be species of bread]: therefore the proposition is certain: but no physical or artificial body is broken there; therefore there is no true breaking there, but only an apparent one.

§ 8. Also, there does not seem to be any cause which the Master assigns against this opinion from the words of Ambrose, namely that there ought to be nothing false in the sacrament of truth, as there is in magicians' illusions. First: because as it is said in the Text, the apparent breaking is not referred to the thing, and therefore nothing deceives or is deceived there. Second: because Aristotle says that "there is no lie on the part of those who abstract," because they do not refer the abstraction to the reality: therefore neither will there be a lie here of an apparent division, because it is not referred to reality.

§ 9. Also, when the breaking is done, there seem to be many things there: and yet it is certain that there is only one thing there, namely Christ: therefore it appears as it is not, and yet we do not say it is an illusion or a falsity: therefore, similarly, even if it is said that an

apparent breaking is there and yet not existing, there will not be falsity or illusion there on this account.

§ 10. Also, the accidents seem to be in something, and yet they are in nothing, as was established before: if therefore falsity is not said to be in the sacrament on this account, neither ought any falsity be said to be in the sacrament on account of those things.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. Aristotle says in the first book of the Physics, that if there is only substance, it is indivisible: therefore substance is not primarily divisible, but quantity is: but in the sacrament there is quantity per se, as was shown before: therefore something is divided there per se and properly: but breaking is a certain division: therefore something is broken there per se and properly.

§ 2. Also, whatever has parts that can be taken in themselves, is in itself breakable: but the parts of continuous quantity are taken in themselves in the sacrament: therefore it seems that it is breakable in itself.

§ 3. Also, in the text of the Gospel it is said that he took bread, and blessed it, and broke it, and said: This is my body.[467] Therefore it was most truly broken: therefore there was also a most true breaking.

§ 4. Also, that which is referred to signifying many things according to a plurality of parts must have many parts, if it is to be a true sign: but the sacrament is thus referred according to its parts to the living, and those who are in purgatory, and the blessed: therefore it is necessary that in truth it has many parts: but it is certain that it is not possible to take many parts in one sacrament except through breaking: therefore it is necessary that a most true breaking is there.

§ 5. Also, illusions are those things which are not in reality, but only in the eyes of the beholders: if therefore this breaking is not in reality, but only in the eyes of the beholders, then it will be an illusion, and not a sacrament: but this is unfitting: therefore there is no breaking there, unless it is in some reality.

§ 6. Also, if a mathematician takes division according to act, he can never not refer it to reality: therefore it will be similar in the sacrament: but in the sacrament, an imaginative or merely understood breaking or division is not taken, but according to act: therefore it is referred to reality: therefore something is broken there really and in truth.

§ 7. Also, whatever may be the case regarding division, breaking implies violence: but violence only happens in things: therefore breaking only happens in things: therefore breaking only happens according to reality: therefore it is not only apparent in the sacrament, but existing in truth.

§ 8. Also, if there were only an apparent breaking, there would need to be nothing for the breaking except an act of the soul, and not of the body: but in the sacrament it is necessary that a bodily act be applied, namely a tearing apart by the pressure of fingers or nails: therefore the breaking is not only imaginary, but real and in truth.

SOLUTION. It must be said that the breaking in the sacrament is in truth real, as the last opinion says, which alone clearly holds the truth of the faith.

To the first objection, however, it must be said that the accident which is quantity is there in itself: but to be in itself is to be without a subject, as was said before, that is, not according to natural being, but by divine power containing the species for the use of the sacrament and of faith. Hence, since it is thus held by divine power, it can be broken in itself and divided.

To the next, it must be said that it happens per accidens that no division by violence occurs except in a substance, namely because quantity does not exist according to natural being except in a substance: nevertheless, if it were to exist in itself, it would be divided: but in the sacrament it is in itself, as has been established, and therefore it can be broken and violently divided there.

To the next, it must be said similarly, that it is one way here, and another way in natural things: because here divine power operates according to the requirement of the signification of the sacrament, and therefore it contains quantity here without a subject.

To the next, it must be said that quantity is taken in one way according as it is an accident of a natural thing in whose definition sensible matter falls, and in another way according as by divine power it is referred to the use of the sacrament. And in the first way indeed the introduced objection proceeds, but not in the second way.

To the next, it must be said that this division is a kind of corruption: and I well concede that the accidental form of the bread is naturally corrupted: and how this is done was established and determined in the preceding distinction.[468]

To the next, it must be said that this is true where quantity remains according to natural being: but it has already been established that in the sacrament it is without a subject.

To the next, it must be said that it seems to me it should well be conceded that division could be multiplied so much that the accidental species of bread which remain there would be corrupted: and therefore the breaking that occurs there is not entirely of mathematical quantity, nor even properly of natural quantity, but of that to which natural breaking belongs on account of the fact that it is contained in being by divine power.

To the next objection against the cause which the Master assigns as to why the opinion from the words of Ambrose is not valid, it must be said that it is excellently objected: because the opinion is worthless. But to that which is objected, it must be said that it is impossible not to refer that division which is done in act to reality: because there is no division except in actual reality; and therefore they say nothing. To that which is objected concerning mathematics, it must be said that it is not similar: because in mathematics the proved property belongs to the quantified thing in itself, although it does not belong to this or that quantified thing: but here it is considered not as it belongs to the quantified thing in itself, but rather to this one according as it is some "this".

467. In the first book of On the Trinity.

To the next, it must be said that in truth there are many things and many parts there, but not many sacraments: because that number is not posited concerning the form of the sacrament, but rather concerning the sacramental species.

To the next, it must be said that the accidents seem to be, and the particular sense is not of the substance which underlies the accidents except per accidens: but here the intellect of the sacrament compels that they be taken without a subject. Hence it is false that they seem to be in a subject there: for sense is only of the accidents: and the intellect takes them without a subject on account of the requirement of the sacrament.

Articulus 2 — Whether The Aforesaid Breaking Is In The Body Of Christ, Or Only In The Species

Whether the aforesaid breaking is in the body of Christ, or only in the forms?

Next, it is asked about what he says there, at A, near the beginning: But on the contrary, since the body itself is incorruptible, etc.

For this seems in no way to impede breaking: because § 1. Eating corrupts more than breaking: and yet it is conceded that the body of Christ is eaten: therefore it ought also to be conceded that the body of Christ is broken.

§ 2. Also, whatever the species is proved of, the genus is too: but whatever is eaten is broken by chewing with the attrition of the teeth: therefore if the body of Christ is eaten, the body of Christ is broken.

§ 3. Also, this sacrament is a memorial of the passion: but in the passion the body of Christ was truly divided by nails and a lance: therefore it was broken: therefore the sacrament will not expressly represent this, unless it is also thus divided in the sacrament: therefore the breaking is most truly in the body of Christ.

§ 4. Also, we see some other things impossible according to nature to be in the sacrament: such as one circumscribed body in number being in diverse places, and an accident being without a subject, and a gross inanimate body being transubstantiated into a divine glorious animate body: therefore I ask, why are those things conceded to be in the sacrament, but not that what is incorruptible is simultaneously broken?

SOLUTION. It must be said that without a doubt the breaking is not in the body of Christ, but rather only in the forms.

To the first, however, it must be said that eating implies many things, namely the division of food by the teeth, and passing it into the body, and digestion, and incorporation, or union. And yet it is passively conceded that the body of Christ is eaten by reason of that which is to pass into the body, because the true body of Christ is passed under the species of the sacrament into our body: but the division by the teeth is referred to the species: while digestion is not there: because it does not pass into the draught, and spiritual union or

468. In the book On the Two Natures in One Person of Christ.

incorporation passively belongs to the eater, as was shown above, and thus it is clear that eating does not posit breaking.

To the next, the solution is clear, that eating is not a species of breaking by reason of passing into the body, but by reason of attrition by the teeth, and that is not referred to the body of Christ.

To the next, it must be said that the passion is represented in the sacrament according as it is effective of redemption and solvent of the price: and this is clear from the very act of immolation into which we offer the sacrament which Christ offered for us on the altar of the cross: but the particular inflicted punishments are not represented, and therefore it would not be fitting for the body of Christ to be divided.

To the next, it must be said that contraries, or things from which things disposed by affirmation and negation directly follow, are never posited to be simultaneously: because this cannot be done. But when it is said that it is simultaneously in many places, this is said by reas-
on of the consecration which is done in many places, and from this there does not follow any opposite to it: and thus regarding the others introduced. But if it were conceded to be broken, since to be broken is to be corrupted in a certain way, it would be necessary by the topic from species to concede that it would be corrupted: and by the fact that it is incorruptible, it has it that it is not corrupted: therefore it would simultaneously be corrupted, and not be corrupted: which is that opposites by affirmation and negation are true simultaneously, which cannot be done.

Articulus 3 — Whether When Christ Showed Himself To The Disciples On The Way In The Appearance Of A Stranger, He Performed A Simulative Or Illusory Act

Whether, when Christ showed himself to the disciples on the road in the species of a pilgrim, he performed a simulated or illusory act?

Next, it is asked about what they introduce for an example there, at A, toward the end: Just as Christ also showed himself to two disciples on the road in the species of a pilgrim, etc.

For it seems to have been an illusion: § 1. For what is not of the essence of a thing does not make the thing true or false in its substance: but what is intended by the agent is not of the substance of his act or deed, because the end is not part of the thing: therefore it neither makes the thing false, nor true: therefore the fact that he did this for the utility of faith did not make his act non-simulatory.

§ 2. Also, simulation is not perfected in one person only, but in two, namely in one showing what is not, and in another understanding it as an ostension of simulation: but the Gospel expressly says that he pretended to go further, and the disciples thought he wanted this: therefore there was a perfect illusion there.

§ 3. Also, nothing is recognized under a species which is in no way in it except by an illusion or an infirmity of the beholder's eye: therefore what is seen neither illusorily nor by an infirm eye, is seen under its proper species: but the disciples' eyes were not infirm, nor bound

by illusion: therefore the species which they saw in God was the species of a pilgrim: but it is certain that according to truth he was not a pilgrim: therefore the species of a pilgrim was simulated by him, and thus there was a most true illusion there.

SOLUTION. It must be said that there was no illusion there. Hence it must be said that the example is good: but nevertheless that that to which it is introduced by that opinion to confirm is false.

To the first, however, it must be said that intention makes the agent non-simulatory: but what is intended is twofold, namely in the work, and through the work: what was intended in the work was to show them through a likeness what sort he was at that time in the minds of the disciples, and as to this he acted most truly and not in a simulated way: because no one else demonstrates this thus: but what was intended through the work was not in the work, but following from it, namely the confirmation of the disciples' faith as to the article of the resurrection, and this is outside the work, and does not make the work true, or simulatory, but rather the first does: just as we also do not say that Ezekiel simulated when he had the house dug through, and himself carried out secretly: because at that time he demonstrated that they would have to flee thus from their houses in transmigration.

To the next, it must be said that simulation is also in one in comparison to another: but it was not so here, but rather instruction through an act which he exercised for the sake of the disciples: because instruction which is done by the likeness of parables and works is easier.

To the next, it must be said that the disciples' eyes in truth were held, and what held them was their doubt of the resurrection. Hence Christ presented himself to them in his proper species: and yet on account of the impotence of the nonglorified eye, they did not see him under the light of a glorified body, but rather under the species of color: and the doubt of the resurrection made them estimate him to be a pilgrim, because they saw him coming from the place of adoration, namely Jerusalem. Hence it is clear that there was no simulation there.

Articulus 4 — Whether, The Consecration Having Been Made, All The Accidents Remain, And Also Mathematical Solidity According To Real Being

Whether, once the consecration is done, all accidents remain, and even mathematical solidity according to real being?

Next, it is asked about the second opinion which begins there, at B: But others say, that just as the species of bread is there, and the thing whose or in which that species is is not there, etc.

For what they introduce as an example seems to be false, namely that there is a species there, and not some thing whose species it is:

§ 1. For it is sufficiently certain from what has been held before, that it is not understood of a substantial species, because that does not remain after consecration, but of an accidental one which does remain: therefore either every accidental species remains there, or some. If every one: therefore also mathematical solidity: therefore a body remains there: therefore after consecration that body which is the species is there: but it is certain that the true body of Christ is not that species, nor any part of those species: therefore the true body of Christ is not

that body which remains in the number of the species: therefore after consecration some body remains which is not the body of Christ in the sacrament of the altar, which was denied in the preceding distinction in the Text.

§ 2. Also, whatever body is found without something is not the same as that without which it is found: but the body which is trinal dimension is found in the sacrament without the body which is bread before consecration: therefore it is not the same as it: therefore in the sacrament there are three bodies, namely the body of bread, and the dimensional body, and the body of Christ: and no one says this.

§ 3. Also, the Philosopher in the fourth book of the Metaphysics in Boethius's translation, objecting against Plato, left it as unfitting that a mathematical body different from a natural one, and a natural body, should be in the same place: therefore this will be unfitting here too: but if a mathematical body remains there, and a natural body, two bodies of which one is mathematical and the other is natural are in the same place, which the Philosopher says is unfitting: therefore there is no such body there.

§ 4. Also, it is impossible for the same lines in number to belong to two bodies: but the passing body which is bread, and the remaining body which is mathematical solidity, are two bodies: therefore the same lines in number will not belong to those bodies: but it is certain that there were some lines by which the bread was measured: therefore there will already be three quantified bodies in the sacrament, namely the bread, and that which is seen as quantified and round after consecration, and the body of Christ: and this will be a marvel, for what purpose they are there.

If on this account it is said that not all species remain in the sacrament, this will be unreasonable, since the rationale is the same for one accidental species remaining and for another.

Moreover, it was shown above that quantity especially remains there as the foundation of the other species: but there is no reason why length should remain, and not width and depth: therefore it seems that the whole mathematical solidity remains.

Also, Euclid in the beginning of the Geometry says that a mathematical body is that which has length, width, and depth: but we see that the remaining species itself has this: therefore a mathematical body remains, and thus it returns to the same thing as before.

SOLUTION. It must be said that just as in the preceding opinion, so too in this one the example is most true: but nevertheless the opinion confirmed by the example is false: and I well concede that all the accidental species remain, and even the mathematical solidity remains there according to real being, not only in the soul according as it has being in abstraction.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that I do not consider it unfitting that after consecration there are two things in the sacrament, each of which is a body: but nevertheless they are not properly called two bodies: because "body" is not predicated by one rationale of the natural and the mathematical, as some say. But nevertheless it seems to me it should be

said, if we wish to speak properly, that there are two bodies, namely a natural and a mathematical one: one of which is a body per se and substantially; while the other is not per se, but by denomination and measure from the former, namely the natural: and nothing prohibits such two bodies from being in the sacrament, and this was not denied above, but rather that there are not two natural bodies there consisting of matter and form which are parts of a physical body.

To the next, it must be said that that proposition is false, unless it is understood to be something else that is a different essence: for the essence of a substance is one thing, and that of an accident is another, if indeed an accident is some essence. Hence if the accident were to remain once the subject was corrupted, the mathematical quantity would be denominated from it: just as we say that this which we see on the altar is a white figure, this white thing will not be diverse from the first white thing which was the bread, unless it be a different essence, but in subject it is the same. For the Philosopher says that one per accidens is said in three ways, namely as accident and subject, as white, and this pointing to whatever, etc.: but it is true that whatever things are separated by nature, those are substantially diverse: but divine power operating for the use of the sacrament does in the sacrament what is above nature, as has often been said.

To the next, it must be said that in my judgment, two bodies, whether natural or mathematical, or of which one is natural and the other mathematical, provided there are two quantities there, cannot be in the same place by nature. Hence I say without prejudice that the body is indeed in truth in the sacrament, but not as in a place, but in a sign: but this will be clearer below in this same distinction, in the explanation of the fourth opinion. And therefore the objection which supposed that there were two bodies there as in a place, supposed what is false, and proceeds from false premises.

But if it is objected that wherever there is some body contained in another body through the truth of its nature and quantity, there it is as in a place: I say that this is false: but this cannot be unraveled without a long disputation which we will posit immediately below, the Lord conceding.

To the next, it must be said that as was clear before, there were the numerically same lines of the bread as subject, which remain essentially in the sacramental forms: and therefore there were never three bodies there, nor three of which each is a subject body divided from another.

Articulus 5 — Whether, The Breaking Having Been Made, One Sacrament Remains, But There Are Several Species There

Whether, when the breaking is done, one sacrament remains, but there are multiple forms there?

But it is still asked about that opinion which is touched upon in the Text, there at C: Thus there is a breaking there which is not done in any reality, etc.

For it seems to be true. For thus we see that in a body which in potency is two, if it is divided, it becomes two in act and its essential being is predicated of it as two according to

being: as a line divided in act is two lines, and two lengths, and two quantities: therefore that whose essential principle remains one according to being, remains undivided: but "sacrament" is essentially predicated of the species, and that remains one once division is done: therefore that division was not in the species, nor in the body of Christ: therefore it is not divided there.

But that it is essentially predicated of these species, is taken from this, that the one falls into the definition of the other, as was clear in the beginning of this book in the Text.

Also, that it remains one sacrament according to act, this is clear from the supposition of all: because through everything that is done in the canon, they do not intend to confect except one sacrament.

Furthermore it is asked: In what does this opinion differ from the preceding one?

For it seems that in nothing: because the preceding one said that a breaking is seen there which is not, since nothing is broken: but this one seems to say exactly the same thing according to reality: therefore it seems either to say what is false, or to be superfluous: since it relates one thing twice or as two.

To this it must be said that one sacrament remains, and the form becomes many forms through division. But that proposition which was introduced, that when an inferior is divided according to being, that which is predicated of it is multiplied, is understood of those things which absolutely inhere in the inferior: but if they inhere respectively, it is not necessary: as if a white thing is divided, there will be two white things, but nevertheless not two likenesses of the white things to a third white thing, but rather one likeness: because a relation does not receive unity or multiplicity from that in which it is, properly in that it is a relation, but rather from that to which it is: and this is clear from the definition of relatives which according to the Philosopher are "whatever are what they are, are said of others." Hence also a relation is more a ratio [concept or account] than a being or an essence: but nevertheless it has something of being or something of essence. But the ratio of the sacrament is in relation: and therefore it draws unity from that of which it is the sign, as of the interior and caused reality which it signifies.

To the next, it must be said that this opinion differs from the one held before: because that one posited that the division is in truth in the sacrament according as it is an act of the one dividing, and not according as it is an act of the divided thing: but the preceding one did not say that division is in the sacrament except according as the division is apparent to sense, but not existing in the truth of reality.

Articulus 6 — Whether That Opinion Is True Which Says That The Body Of Christ Is Essentially Broken And Divided, And Yet Remains Entire And Incorruptible

Whether that opinion is true which says that the body of Christ is essentially broken and divided: and yet remains whole and incorruptible?

Next, it is asked about the third opinion which he touches upon, there at C: Others hand down that the body of Christ is essentially broken and divided, etc.

For this seems to belong to the sacrament: because § 1. They say that since all preceding things in this sacrament are above nature, something also in the breaking ought to be above nature: but this cannot be, except in this that the unbreakable is broken, and yet remains whole: therefore the opinion of these men will stand. But that in all preceding things there is something above nature, is clear in the converted thing, and in the conversion, and the remaining of accidents without a subject, and again in its containment under such small species.

§ 2. Also, in this sacrament an inanimate material body in some way tempers itself by the power of the words to an animate, divine, and glorious body: therefore conversely also in some way the divine body ought to be tempered to a non-glorious material body: but it cannot conform itself to it, unless it is broken: therefore it seems to be essentially broken.

§ 3. Also, it is customary to say that in this sacrament the Lord shows Himself omnipotent, who did this which human reason cannot understand; since He ought especially to do this in the breaking, in which the body is adapted to the parts of the Church which are in glory, or in the world, or in hell, that is, purgatory: it seems that especially in this He ought to do something above the intellect: therefore the body is broken, and yet remains undivided.

§ 4. Also, Gregory says that "faith has no merit for which human reason provides proof:" therefore also in the breaking it is fitting that there be something which is removed from human reason: but that the species be broken is not alien to reason: therefore the body ought to be broken, as it seems.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. Christ was offered whole and entire for individuals : but the division is referred to the parts of the Church: since therefore He was offered whole for the individual parts, the whole Christ ought to remain in the individual parts: therefore He ought not to be broken.

§ 2. Also, contradictories cannot be verified simultaneously: but that the body of Christ is broken and not broken are contradictories simultaneously and in respect to the same thing: therefore they cannot be verified simultaneously: therefore the opinion is false.

SOLUTION. It must be said that this opinion is false and not to be posited: because, as has been proved by reasons, it accords neither with faith nor with reason.

To the first therefore, it must be said that although some things are above nature, it is not necessary that that be above nature, because it does not belong to the sacrament: for some things operate toward the being of the sacrament, some toward its use: and those which are toward the being of the sacrament are above nature: but those which are toward its use need not be above nature: and the breaking is ordered to the use of the sacrament, not to its being, the sign of which is that the breaking is done on account of the triform parts of the Church for which this sacrament is offered, and not as something which operates or pertains to the being of the sacrament.

To the next, it must be said that this is not necessary: because the inanimate material body is not assumed, except so that through transubstantiation a divine glorious body may come to

be there: and therefore the bread is transubstantiated into the glorious body of Christ, as was said above in the question on transubstantiation: for the body of Christ is not transubstantiated into bread, but conversely.

To the next, it must be said that it is not entirely a sign of omnipotence to do things which are above reason, except in such things as are necessary for salvation, and are expedient for the Church: otherwise it would follow that God would operate better by doing contrary to the order of nature, than by operating according to nature.

To the next, it must be said that faith has no proof from human reason: but this is understood such that it does not lean on reason, but on truth: for reason obeys faith: hence in the heart of the believer reason leans on faith, and not faith on reason: and thus the saying of Gregory is understood.

Articulus 7 — Whether The Confession Of Berengar, Who Confessed Before The Pope That The Bread And Wine Which Are Placed On The Altar, After The Consecration, Are Not Only A Sacrament, But Also The True Body Of Christ, etc., Is True

Whether the confession of Berengar, who confessed before the Pope that the bread and wine which are placed on the altar, after consecration are not only a sacrament, but also the true body of Christ, etc., is true?

Next, it is asked about the confession of Berengar who says, there at the end of C: But in truth to be handled by the hands of the priests and broken, and ground by the teeth of the faithful.

§ 1. For if this confession was received by Pope Nicholas, and many Bishops, then it seems to be rash if anyone should think otherwise: but here the Master says that one should think otherwise: therefore he is rash.

§ 2. Also, whatever is commanded by the Apostolic See to be published in diverse parts of the world as of the faith, that must be held for the faith: but this confession was published by the command of Pope Nicholas: thus therefore it is to be held for the faith. That this is so is taken from the decree on consecration, where it is said thus: "This confession of his faith concerning the body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ, made by Berengar at Rome before one hundred and fifteen Bishops, Pope Nicholas sent through the cities of Italy, Germany, Gaul, and to whatever places the fame of his depravity could have previously reached."[469]

§ 3. Also, there it is said, that after the confes-

§ 1. ... a written confession in these words, he swore saying: "By the holy consubstantial [homousion] Trinity, and by these sacrosanct Gospels, I pronounce that those who come against this faith with their dogmas and followers are worthy of eternal anathema." From this it is gathered that the council decreed those should be excommunicated who would hold any other sentiment than what Berengarius professed. And it seems that almost the entire universality of Doctors who hold the fourth opinion falls into excommunication.

§ 2. 4. Also, at the beginning of his confession Berengarius says: "I consent, moreover, to the holy Roman Church and the Apostolic see: and with mouth and heart I confess regarding the sacraments of the Lord's table that I hold the same faith which the Lord and the venerable Pope Nicholas and this holy synod by Evangelical and Apostolic authority handed down to be held, and affirmed to me." From all these things it seems that the Masters do poorly in condemning this opinion.

§ 3. Solution. It must be said that the opinion which is posited as third is not sound, nor is it to be held.

§ 4. To this which is objected concerning Berengarius's confession, it must be said that that confession was introduced for one purpose in the council before Pope Nicholas, and it is introduced for another purpose here: for in the council it is introduced because he himself used to say that the body of Christ was not truly on the altar after consecration: but only in a sacrament, that is, in a sign, and not in truth: and therefore in order that he might express that it is there in truth, he was compelled to this mode of expression. But that it is so, is clear from Berengarius's confession, where he speaks thus: "I anathematize all heresy, especially that of which I have hitherto been defamed: which attempted to assert that the bread and wine which are placed on the altar, after consecration, are only a sacrament, and not the true body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ." Hence the Pope compelled him to such a mode of expression, which shows that by all means, in whatever mode the forms are made, held, retained, and replaced, after consecration they always contain the true body whether beneath the teeth or beneath the hands: and this indeed is true.

§ 5. Hence this is also conceded, that the true body of Christ is ground by the teeth of the faithful in the sacrament: but this is not to be conceded here simply [i.e., without qualification] without a determination. For when it is said that the true body of Christ is ground by the teeth of the faithful in the sacrament, the attrition refers not to the truth of the body of Christ contained, but to the containing forms: and this the Pope and the council understood: because this was directly contrary to his heresy which he had previously held.

§ 6. To that therefore which is first objected, it must be said that the confession is not commanded to be extended, except for the sake of the fact that the body of Christ is in truth contained under the species after the consecration.

§ 7. To the other it must be said that he swore only concerning the truth of the body of Christ contained under the sacrament.

§ 8. And in the same way it must be responded to all the things that are objected concerning his confession.

§ 9.

469. Decretum Gratiani, De consecratione, dist. 2.

Articulus 8 — Whether The Opinion Of Those Is True Who Say That In The Sacrament There Is No Breaking Or Partition Which Is Not In The Substance And In The Sacrament

Whether the opinion of those is true who say that in the sacrament there is no fraction or partition, which is not in the substance and in the sacrament?

Whether the opinion of those is true who say that in the sacrament there is no fraction or partition, which is not in the substance and in the sacrament?

§ 11. Next, it is inquired concerning the fourth opinion which says that there is a true fraction and partition there which occurs not in the substance, but in the sacrament.

§ 12. For this seems to be false: because 1. If some one thing belongs to several, such that it is in the others from the one which is its cause in all, if that does not exist, it will not be in any of the others: but fraction is not in the accidents unless it is caused by a broken substance: therefore, if a broken substance does not exist, there will be no fraction in any of the accidents. The proof of the major [premise] is: because since fire is the cause of heat in all things, if no fire exists, nothing will be hot: and if the first mover is the cause of motion in all things, if the first does not exist, it will not move nor will any of the other moving things be moved. The proof of the minor is intimated in the Text, namely that fraction primarily belongs to substance.

§ 13. 2. Also, every form insofar as it is of itself, unites and contains that whose form it is: if therefore a plurality according to being occurs, this will be from the matter: therefore it is necessary that some things according to being are diverse and multiplied there: therefore in multiple parts there will be broken matter.

§ 14. Solution. It must be said to the first, that although some say that division and fraction also primarily belong to substance, and secondarily to a quantum [i.e., a quantified thing]: I however do not say this, because I do not understand it: because the Philosopher says that if there is only one thing which is substance, it itself is indivisible: and therefore since the first cause of fraction and division is not matter or substance, but rather quantity: therefore the first reason does not seem to proceed.

§ 15. But to that which seems to be intimated from the Text as a proof of this, it seems it must be said that he intimates this in the Text: not because fraction primarily belongs to substance, but because accidents cannot be received except in a substance: and because fraction does not belong to them except as received according to their being, therefore he intimates in the Text that nothing according to nature is broken, except in a substance: however, in truth, if anyone wished to say properly what it is that is broken, he would say that it is a quantified substance per se [i.e., in itself]: but because an accident in the sacrament has being apart from a substance, therefore it belongs to it per se to be broken without a substance.

§ 16. To the other it must be said that a form of itself unites that whose form it is: but division belongs to it per accidens, that is, according to its being: but this being is twofold:

according to nature in matter, and according to the use of the sacrament per se, as has been said more often above.

§ 17.

Articulus 9 — Whether It Can Be Said That The Accidents After The Consecration Remain In The Air

Whether it can be said that the accidents remain in the air after consecration?

§ 19. Next it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, D, around the beginning: Although some assert that they are founded in the air.

Peter Lombard, Sentences, IV, d. 12, c. 1.

§ 20. This opinion seems to be conceded: because 1. As long as something is consonant with the faith, the more it approaches reason, the more it is to be conceded: but it more approaches reason that they are in the air, than without a subject: therefore it should more be conceded.

§ 21. 2. Also, the truth of the sacrament is not excluded by this: because the whole body of Christ is contained there in any part whatever: therefore someone can opine this.

§ 22. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Air is a humid, spiritual, undetermined element: therefore what is founded in it flows, and does not hold shapes in it: therefore if the forms are founded in the air, they retain no shapes: and this is false to the senses: therefore they are not founded in the air.

§ 23. 2. Also, the Philosopher says that accidents contribute to the knowledge of that which a thing is [quod quid est], that is, of a substance: therefore an accident leads to the knowledge of the subject: therefore those forms would lead to the knowledge of the air, if they were founded in the air: but simultaneously and at once one thing behaving in the same way does not lead to the knowledge of diverse things: therefore those accidents would not lead to the knowledge of the body of Christ: therefore they would be in the sacrament in vain, which is unfitting: therefore they are not founded in the air.

§ 24. Solution. It must be said that they are not founded in the air, as is clear from the last two reasons.

§ 25. But to the first it must be said that neither is very close to reason, namely that the accidents are there without a subject, or that they are founded in the air: but nevertheless because this is more according to the fittingness of the sacrament, that they are without a subject, therefore this is conceded, and the other is not.

§ 26. To the other it must be said that the truth of the sacrament would not be excluded by this: and therefore those who said this are not considered heretics: but the fittingness of the sacrament, and of those things which are in the sacrament, would be excluded by this: and therefore it is not conceded.

§ 27.

Articulus 10 — How The Whole Body Of Christ Is Contained Under So Small A Form In The Sacrament

How is the whole body of Christ contained under such a small form in the sacrament?

§ 29. Next it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, D, after the beginning: But Christ remains entire, and is whole in each single part.

Peter Lombard, Sentences, IV, d. 12, c. 2.

§ 30. For there is a grave question: How is the whole body of Christ contained under such a small form?

§ 31. For it seems that this is impossible: 1. For the Philosopher says that place and the placed are equal according to quantity: but the placed is the body of Christ, while the placing is the species which appears: therefore they are equal through quantity, which is false, since the body of Christ is perhaps three cubits or a little less, while the placing scarcely has the width of one finger.

§ 32. 2. Also, Euclid in book II of the Geometry says that a body is what has length, width, and depth: therefore what contains it, must necessarily contain it according to length, width, and depth: but it is unintelligible how the greater could be contained by the lesser according to every dimension, since that form is smaller in every dimension than the true body of Christ which hung on the cross: therefore it seems that it cannot contain it.

§ 33. 3. Also, the particles of the body and of the place, as the Philosopher says, are joined at one common boundary: therefore wherever it is possible to take the particles of the body, it is necessary that the particles of the body of the place be joined to the same, and conversely: but according to two or more cubits it is possible to take the particles of the Lord's body, which hung on the cross: therefore the particles of the place will be extended that much: therefore also the containing forms, which we see to be false, because the form scarcely exceeds the quantity of a fingernail.

§ 34. 4. Also, the sacrament, as the ancients said, contains its realities as medicinal vessels contain medicines: but a vessel is of a larger extension than the thing itself which is in the vessel: therefore the sacramental form is also of a larger extension than the body of Christ: and this we see to be false: therefore the sacramental species does not contain the whole Christ.

§ 35. 5. Also, all day long it is concluded and sup-

posed in demonstrative sciences that the greater is not equaled to the lesser: but the container and the contained, if they are properly taken, are equaled: therefore they are equal: but the form contains, and the body of Christ is contained: therefore they are equal. Hence thus: The species is the size of a finger, and the body of Christ is the size of two cubits: therefore the finger-sized and the two-cubits-sized are equal: but the two-cubits-sized is greater than the finger-sized: therefore the greater is equaled to the lesser, which is also impossible.

§ 37. 6. Also, if a line goes out from the center of the placed to the surface of the place, and another from the center of the place to the surface of the placed, those lines will be equal. The proof of this is: because they differ only by a point: and this does not add any length. Therefore let a line be drawn from the center of Christ's body to the surface of Christ's body according to whatever dimension, and let another be drawn from the center of the species to its surface: therefore those will be equal, which to the senses is false.

§ 38. 7. Also, equal things are, as is said in the first book of Euclid, those which when superimposed upon one another do not exceed one another: but the body of Christ does not exceed the quantity of the species, nor conversely: therefore they are equal: but the body of Christ is seven feet, assuming it is that much: therefore the quantity of those species is seven feet, which is also against the senses.

§ 39. 8. Also, just as a whole container is filled by the contained, so the container and the contained are of the same shape: but that whole form is filled by the body of Christ: therefore the form and the body of Christ are of the same shape: but that form is round: therefore also the body of Christ is round, which is false, since it has a face, and hands, and feet, differing in position.

§ 40. 9. Also, when something is contained through its whole quantity and substance in another, there will be the head in a determinate part, and the feet in another: let it be asked, therefore, where in that form is the head, and where the feet? If you say, above: therefore if someone divides below, there will be nothing under that except the feet, which is false. But if you say, below: then you will have an inverted head: and this is ridiculous.

§ 41. 10. If someone because of this wishes to say that the body of Christ is not in those species like a placed thing in a place, but rather like the signified in a sign: this seems to be the heresy of Berengarius condemned above: therefore it must not be said thus.

§ 42. Moreover it is asked, Whether the signified according to the truth of its whole quantity is contained by the sign, or is not contained, but is only signified? If in the first way: then the same question will return. If in the second way: then the heresy of Berengarius occurs, who said that Christ is contained in the sacrament not according to truth, but according to signification.

§ 43. To this some wish to say that the glorious body of Christ is now in a place not by the mode of a gross body, but by the mode of a spiritual body: and that it might be better understood, they posit a simile in a spiritual body which they say to be light, which is indeed positionally dilated through the world, and yet could be whole in one point. And this indeed is their statement, which if I understand well, I understand to be stated thus, that of a body having a dimensive quantity there are twofold parts: so that some have part next to part: and this demands a place equal to itself. Another is that which behaves indifferently to this, whether it has part next to part, and whether it has part under part: and therefore indifferently it can be in the place of the part and of the whole, and in an indivisible place on account of its spirituality. And this indeed I have fabricated to understand the statements of some moderns: because it is clear that none of the ancients agree with them. Therefore it can be said

according to them that the body of Christ is of maximal simplicity among bodies: and therefore it behaves indifferently to this that it has part next to part, and part under part, and therefore it can be in a place smaller than its stature, and even an indivisible one.

§ 44. But that this figment cannot stand is proven thus: because shape is the termination of a quantity according to a certain

mode of eminence and depression in natural bodies: just as the shape of a man is one thing, and that of a donkey is another: therefore that shape is either the termination of a quantum which has part next to part, or part under part, or as regards both. If in the first way, I have my proposition: because the Philosopher says in the First Philosophy [i.e., Metaphysics] that every natural body has a proper shape, without which it is not itself in its species: and the Commentator says the same on book II of De Anima. Either therefore Christ's body retains its one shape, or it does not. If so: therefore under the species it has part next to part, and then the first question returns. If not: therefore Christ is there without the shape of a nose, and of eyes, and of a mouth, and with the shape not existing, those very members are also not present: therefore he will be there without members, like a trunk, and not even like a trunk, because even the shape of a trunk is destroyed there. But if shape is the termination of a quantum according as it has part under part. On the contrary: Having part under part, it has or can have all parts in one, and then that is indivisible by the senses: therefore the same thing seems to be capable of the shape of the whole, and of the part: but the shape of a nose tends to a cone and inside is triangular: and the shape of a trunk is round and circular: therefore in the same indivisible according to sense there will be a circular shape, and a pyramidal one, inside triangular: which if it is intelligible, it is a wonder.

§ 46. Also, some parts of a man are such that by their nature they are concave, like the nose, the chest, and the like: therefore in that indivisible they are either remaining concave, or compressed under one part. If in the first way: therefore a part will be next to a part and in an indivisible, and not under a part. If in the second way: therefore the glorious body is compressed, and its shape is destroyed, and consequently its nature, as was said before. If it is said that the glorious body behaves in a third way, the same impossibility follows.

§ 47. Moreover, when a part is said to be under a part: either it is understood that the preposition 'under' notes the site and position of one under another only, or containment. If in the first way: therefore it grows as much in increment underneath on account of the aggregation of quantitative parts, as it diminishes in width, or in length: and thus it will not avail for the proposition: because that form will not contain it according to that site which the preposition 'under' notes. If it notes containment: therefore the whole or all the parts can be in one: which again is a wonder if anyone understands it.

§ 48. If perhaps you say that to be part under part notes the indifference of the parts with respect to place, and not with respect to something else. On the contrary: Place is given to a quantum insofar as the quantum is limitable or terminable outside: therefore whatever things have a difference in such a quantity, necessarily differ according to site: but thus do the whole and the part differ: therefore their place will have a difference.

§ 49. If perhaps you say that all these things are true of a body which poses an obstacle to another, and this is a gross and material one: but a spiritual body which is like light is not such. On the contrary: These reasons suppose nothing except the quantity of a body: therefore they indifferently conclude in any body whatever having quantity.

§ 50. Also, let us take some celestial body, whose substance is that it is a round body, having a diameter of a hundred cubits: I ask, whether with this shape remaining it can be in a place indivisible with respect to the senses? If so: therefore the shape received according to being of a hundred cubits in diameter and three hundred in circumference, without its corruption can be in that which is indivisible according to sense: and this is to say that the heaven can be locally in one grain of millet: which he who says, need not deny anything absurd. If in the second way: then the reasons previously held also hold in spiritual bodies.

§ 51. But because concerning this marvelous opinion a great disputation remains for us at the end

of the question concerning the resurrection, for now let the things which have been said suffice.

§ 53. But BY SOLVING we say to the question, that Christ is compared to created things in three ways. For he is compared as God, and thus he is in things in three ways: in one way which belongs to the Father and the Holy Spirit, by which he is in all things essentially, presentially, and potentially. In another way the same belongs to the Father and the Holy Spirit, by which he is in the saints through indwelling grace. In a third way distinct from the Father and the Holy Spirit, by which he is in human nature through union.

§ 54. In the second way he is compared to other things through the assumed flesh, according as he was born of the Virgin, and hung on the cross: and thus he is in place through circumscription.

§ 55. In the third way, according as he, existing full of grace in deity and humanity, by a supermundane rationale is the sacramental reality, and the spiritual food of the Church, and thus he is in the sacrament. Hence just as bread is not according to part and part in this and another ratio of food, but the same ratio of food is in the whole and in any part of the food: so he himself, in order that the signified may correspond to the sign, is not in one part otherwise than in another, but in one mode essentially in the whole: and if it is divided into parts, he will be in any part. And similarly concerning the wine in which there is one ratio of signifying the whole in the whole, and in any part: and therefore although the wine is divided, he will be whole who was under the whole species of wine, and whole under any part: and therefore no reasons are to be received in this sacrament, which are not according to the operation of the sacrament toward being, or use. Hence just as by a supermundane rationale the divine power operates toward the being of the sacrament in transubstantiation and the measure of accidents without a subject: so also it commensurates itself to the whole and to the part according to the fittingness of the signified to the sign: and therefore the reasons which were concerning the comparison of the placed to the place are completely worthless: because although Christ is there quantified in the truth of quantity and substance, nevertheless it is not according to the

laws of place and the placed, but according to the laws of the signified in the sacrament and of the sign containing that which it signifies according to the property of the sacraments of the new law, which this sacrament most fully has among all the sacraments of the new law.

§ 56. It must be said therefore to the first, that a falsehood is supposed by objecting: because that form is not related to the body of Christ like a place to the placed, but rather like a containing sign to a signified thing contained according to truth, not indeed according to the laws of place, but according to the laws of a sign: and therefore even if it is broken, in any part the whole will be, which would not be the case if he were in it as in a place.

§ 57. To the other it must be said that the body of Christ has all three dimensions with a proper shape, and without any contraction, and therefore it is most truly a body: but it is not compared to that form as to a place or an equal to which it is commensurated, but rather, as has been said, as the signified to the sign.

§ 58. To the other it must be said, as has been said, that they do not relate to one another like place and the placed.

§ 59. To the other it must be said that the ancients did not understand that the sacraments were certain vessels insofar as a place is a vessel, but insofar as a vessel is related in a certain way to the act of the medicine and the physician: for we say that the physician heals, and the medicine and the enema and the funnel: but the physician effectively, and the medicine as a power conjoined to nature, and the enema is like an instrument placing the medicine in the due place: and so God, and grace, and the sacrament are related in the healing of the soul: hence the objection introduced is worthless.

§ 60. To the other it must be said that the lesser

is not equaled to the greater: for this has been demonstrated: but here there is no comparison of a quantum to a quantum according to the law and principle of quantity, but rather according to the ratio of food it is compared to the conjoined: and because that ratio is one in the whole and in the part, therefore by one ratio it is compared to the whole and the part, as has been said.

§ 62. To the other it must be said that according to the ratio of the sacrament no line can go out from the center of the round form which appears on the altar, nor is its center figurable: because thus it would already be considered according to the principles and laws of quantity, and we have already said that the commensuration of Christ's body to the sacrament is not thus there: and therefore that objection is worthless.

§ 63. To the other it must be said that equality is twofold, namely according to the quantity of bulk, and according to the quantity of power: equality between the sign and the signified is not considered according to the quantity of bulk, but according to the quantity of power: so that, namely, since there that signified is contained, which that sign also contains, and this is equally in the whole and the part, by the reason stated above, by which we said that the ratio of food is one in the whole and in the part.

§ 64. To the other it must be said that it does not follow, if a whole container is filled by the contained, that it is of the same shape, unless the contained is in the container like a placed thing in a place: but this is not the case here, as has been said more often.

§ 65. In the same way I respond to the following: because this is not true except of those things which are in others in such a way that one part is in one part of the container, and another in another: in the sacrament of the Eucharist it is not so: but there is one comparison of the contained to the whole and to the part on account of one ratio of signifying spiritual food in the whole and in the part.

§ 66. To that which is objected against the induced reason, it must be said that if anyone were to say that the body of Christ is not in the sacrament according to the truth of substance and quantity, but only like a signified thing remote through substance from the sign, he would be of the heresy of Berengarius: but we do not say thus, but rather we say that the signified itself is in the sign substantially in its whole quantity: and therefore, the Lord granting, we will have nothing in common with heresy.

§ 67. To the other it must be said that some things are in a place according to the truth of substance and quantity, and according to the laws of place and the placed: but some are in a place according to the truth of substance and not of quantity, nor according to the law of place: and some are in an intermediate way in something, not as in a place, through the truth of substance and quantity, and not according to the laws of place, but according to the law of that in which they are or are said to be. In the first way, those things are in a place which are circumscribed in a place. In the second way, those things are in a place which are defined in a place, like created spirits. In the third way, the body of Christ is in the sacrament, not according to the law of place, but according to the law of a sign signifying spiritual food equally in the whole and in the part: and therefore the solution of that objection is clear.

§ 68. To the other which is objected concerning the induced opinion, without prejudice let him respond who wishes: because I was never able to understand that light was a body, or that a body had part under part, or that two bodies could be in the same place. And therefore what I do not understand, I do not presume to defend: but our opinion is that which has been said: and below, in the question concerning the resurrection, it will become clear what I think concerning glorious bodies.

§ 69.

Articulus 11 — Whether Each Of The Faithful Communicating Receives The Whole Christ Or His Part; And, Whether The Whole Christ Is In Any Part Of The Host

Whether each of the faithful communicating receives the whole Christ or his part? and, Whether the whole Christ is in any part whatever of the host?

Whether each of the faithful communicating receives the whole Christ or his part? and, Whether the whole Christ is in any part whatever of the host?

§ 71. Next it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, D, around the middle: The faithful know how they eat the flesh of Christ: each one receives his part.

Peter Lombard, Sentences, IV, d. 12, c. 2.

§ 72. But on the contrary: Each one receives the whole Christ: therefore not each one receives his part.

§ 73. If perhaps you say that the part refers to the division of the containing host, and not to the contained Christ, it seems false: for I ask, Whence is this that the whole Christ is under any part?

§ 74. 1. For whatever things are so related to one another, that one according to being does not depend on the other, when one is multiplied, the other is not of necessity under any whatever of the parts received through the multitude: but the body of Christ and that shape which is called the host are so related to one another: therefore with the parts of the host multiplied, Christ will not necessarily be under any whatever of them.

§ 75. 2. Also, in natures we see multiple forms: for some are so in matter that when matter is divided the form is divided, like the form of a stone and of other homogeneous things: some also are so in matter that when the matter is divided, the form does not necessarily remain in any part, like the sensitive soul in a body of great diversity in the composition of parts, as in a lion or a donkey: but some are such that it is not the proper act of any body, since it is not affixed through its operation, but rather its operation is pure and denuded of matter, and similarly its essence, like the rational soul according to the intellect: and that, as the Philosophers say, is neither a body, nor a power in a body: and when the body is divided it does not remain in the single parts, nor is it multiplied in them: but to the likeness of this the body of Christ seems to relate to the sacramental species: therefore it seems that when they are divided, the whole Christ ought not to be under each single one.

§ 76. Moreover it may be asked, Whence does this happen, that the whole Christ is under any part when the host is broken?

§ 77. For it seems that it ought not to happen: for Christ is not had in the host except by the power of one consecration: therefore by the power of one consecration Christ will be had once, and by the power of two twice, and so on: but in all the parts of the host there is only one consecration: therefore he ought not to be had except under the whole, and not under this part here, and under that one there.

§ 78. If perhaps someone wishes to adduce this through examples, and posits an example in a mirror in which one form entirely results [i.e., is reflected], and when broken multiple forms result: it seems that this is nothing: because in one convex or flat mirror one form results on account of the reflection which occurs to one point: but in multiple broken pieces a reflection cannot occur to one point: because the ray is divided at the boundary of the glass, and thus returns to the center of the continuum: but this is not so in the host, hence there seems to be no likeness.

§ 79. Also, some posit a simile in the sensual soul of certain animals having wrinkled or ringed bodies and equal in composition and complexion throughout or almost equal, which when divided the sensitive soul remains through sense and motion in all the truncated parts;

and this again does not seem to have a likeness: because there is not numerically one soul there in both truncated parts, but two made by division from one, which on account of the likeness of complexion become two: but here the numerically one Christ remains in the single parts of the host: hence nothing seems similar.

§ 80. If perhaps you say that nothing prohibits one numerically from being in diverse places. Hence Augustine says that the soul is in...

§ 1. ...in different places, because the whole [soul] is in the heart and in the brain and in other parts. And perhaps someone might wish to say that it is so in other spiritual substances as well. But it seems that this is not to the purpose: because even if we say that it is so in spiritual substances (which nevertheless is not true), it would not on this account follow that it is so in the true body of Christ: because this is most truly a body, and not a spirit.

§ 2. Moreover, concerning created spiritual substances, this is false: because, as Damascene says,[470] they are defined in a place: and as the same Damascene says, to be defined in a place is to be here and not elsewhere: but to whatever it belongs to be in several places at once, to this it belongs to be here and elsewhere: therefore it is not defined in a place, which Damascene denies.

§ 3. But if someone says on account of this, that this belongs to the divine body according as it is a mean between God who is everywhere, and a creature which is in one place, as was said. Whence a created body united to God is in several places, where it is consecrated, and into whatever parts the host is divided: this seems to be false: for the property of a mean always accompanies the mean, as long as it is a mean: since therefore the body of Christ is always a mean between the uncreated God and the creature, if nevertheless it is a mean, it will always be in several places: whether therefore it is consecrated in several places or not, and whether the host is divided or not, it will always be in several places, which is false and heretical: therefore this is no reason, which nevertheless is wont to be assigned by almost all.

§ 4. Solution. Without prejudice [to better judgment] it seems to me it should be said, that the reason why the whole Christ is under any part whatever, when the host is divided, is this: because the formal aspect [ratio] of signifying the whole spiritual food is equally in the whole body and in the part: and therefore when the host is one, there will be one thing signifying one spiritual food: and when it is many [parts], they will all be things signifying the same food: and therefore since in this sacrament (especially because it is the principal among the sacraments of the New Law) the containing follows the formal aspect of signifying, when there is one signifying thing, there will be one thing containing in itself the signified food: and when there are several signifying things, there will be several things containing the same whole and integral food: and this is the reason why, when the host is divided, the whole Christ, the food of the spiritual soul, remains in whatever part under whatever [species].

§ 5. To this therefore which is first objected, it must be said, that according to existence form and matter depend on one another: and in such things the objection proceeds: but according to being contained the sign in the sacrament and the signified depend on one another,

according as the sacrament of the New Law is received: and therefore the sign being multiplied, it is necessary that the signified thing be under each of them.

§ 6. To the next it must be said, that that objection proceeds according to the degree of a more and less separated form: but in the sacramental sign it is not so: for we do not say that Christ is in the sacrament as the soul is in the body, and as the intellect is in the body: although as to this, that the whole Christ is in the whole form, and whole in any part, it has a certain likeness to the existence of the rational soul in the body: which, according to Augustine, is whole in the whole, and whole in any part.

§ 7. To the next it must be said, that as was already said, by virtue of such a signification, and not by virtue of signification simply, this happens, namely that this sacrament is the cause of that according to existence because it signs, and contains it: but the consecration is not a cause except a remote one, namely that it be under the host, whether divided or undivided.

§ 8. To the next it must be said, that signification in general is not the cause of this: but rather a special signification, and especially of this sacrament, which by antonomasia is the sacrament of the New Law, as was said.

§ 9. To this which is said concerning the examples, it must be said that those examples are similar in part, and not in whole, as the objections well prove: for divine things do not have perfect likenesses in corporeal

Articulus 12 — Whether It Is Truly Said That Christ Is Eaten By Parts In The Sacrament, And It Remains Truly Said That Christ By Parts Is Entire And Whole In Heaven; He Remains Entire And Whole In Your Heart

things. Whence Hilary: "If we bring forward any examples for divine things, let no one think that they contain in themselves the form of perfection": and yet they are good likenesses, in the way in which that which is in the part, represents that which is in the whole.

§ 2. To that which is objected concerning Augustine, it must be said that it happens in two ways that something is in another as in a place, namely properly, and improperly: properly as it is circumscribed or defined in a place: and this cannot be in several places at once: but improperly that which is in another, as in matter which has a likeness to a place according to Isidore on account of its capacity: and thus the statement of Augustine is understood: because the soul is in the body as in that which has some likeness to a place: which nevertheless is properly its matter and subject. Whence just as there is no part of matter which is not perfected by a form, so there is no part of the body in which the soul is not essentially: yet it is not properly in several places.

§ 3. Concerning this however which is said, that the body of Christ has this inasmuch as it is a mean between the purely created and the purely uncreated, it seems it should be said that it is false: as the reasons made to the contrary prove.

470. John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa, Bk. 1.

Whether it is truly said: Christ is eaten by parts in the sacrament, and remains whole and integer in heaven, remains whole and integer in your heart?

§ 4. Then it is asked concerning this which it says, there, D, after the middle: He is eaten by parts in the sacrament, and remains whole and integer in heaven, remains whole and integer in your heart.

§ 5. For according to this He seems to be in several places at once and at the same time, which seems unable to stand:

§ 6. 1. For there is nothing of whose substance anything is found outside the boundary of its substance: but place is the boundary of a substance and of a being: for just as time is the measure of existence, so place [is the measure] of a being or of that which is: but in this place is the boundary of Christ in which He is: therefore nothing of Him is found outside that place, as it seems.

§ 7. 2. Also, the Philosopher says:[471] Whatever things are divided by place, are divided also by subject: but it is certain that Christ is not disjoined from Himself as subject: therefore neither is He divided by place: therefore He is not in several places at once: because whatever things are in several places, are divided by place.

§ 8. 3. Also, let it be that Christ on this altar is in a place which is a palm's breadth on account of the species of the host which is that great and no greater, and on another altar He is at one cubit, but in heaven He is according to the proper stature of a body of seven feet. Then I proceed thus: Whatever things are equal to one and the same thing, are equal to each other: but these three places are equal to one and the same thing, because to one and the same body of Christ: therefore these three are equal to each other, which is absurd: therefore it seems, that what was first supposed is not true, namely that He is on several altars and in heaven.

§ 9. Also it is asked, Whether Christ is in several places?

§ 10. For someone could say, that to be in the sacrament is not to be in a place, as was said before, but the sacrament is in several places: and from this it does not follow, that Christ is in several places. ON THE CONTRARY: Whatever is in every place in which it is consecrated, if the places of its consecration are many, will be in several places: but the body of Christ is in every place in which it is consecrated, and the places of its consecration are many: therefore it is in several places.

§ 11. Further it is asked here, How are these three specially enumerated in the Letter, that He is eaten in the sacrament, and remains whole and integer in the mind, and whole in heaven?

§ 1. For either He is bodily in the mind, or not. If not: then He is said equivocally to be in the mind, and in heaven, and in the sacrament: because in the sacrament and in heaven He is bodily, but in the mind only spiritually: therefore it seems, that it ought not to be enumerated with the other two ways. But if He is said to be bodily in the mind: therefore something besides God the Trinity essentially flows into [illabitur substantialiter] the mind: which is

against Augustine who says, that nothing essentially flows into the mind besides God the Trinity.

§ 2. But further it still seems, that He ought to flow bodily into the mind: because it is said, that He is the food of the soul. But it is certain, that food flows into that which it feeds: therefore the body of Christ flows into the soul.

§ 3. Also, Augustine, Why do you prepare your teeth and belly? believe, and you have eaten: therefore it seems, that He does not pass into the belly, but into the soul: therefore He flows essentially into the soul.

§ 4. But because this was much inquired into above, let what was said suffice.

§ 5. Solution. It must be said to the first, that to be in a place is said in two ways, namely per se, and per accidens. Per se I do not believe that any created thing can be in several places at once. This however I say without prejudice to the opinion of others. But to be in a place per se I say [of] that which is circumscribed by a place: and in this way the body of Christ is only in one place, that is, in the empyrean heaven placed in the highest goods of the Father. But something is said to be in a place per accidens, which by grace of another in which it essentially is, is in a place: as the soul is in a place, and the body of Christ is in a place in the Church or on the altar, because the species of the sacrament in which it essentially is, is in a place per se: for nothing prohibits a certain accident from being in a place per se, as the Philosopher wishes: because in mathematical things also place is given, although mathematical bodies are accidents. It is clear therefore, that the objection is not valid: because when it is thus said, that there is nothing of whose substance anything is found outside its proper boundary, this is understood of an inner boundary, as is the surface of the localized thing: or an outer boundary, as is the place of those things which per se are in a place: and thus the proposition has necessity. But it is not understood of those things which are in a place per accidens: because if it were granted through impossibility, that the body of a man were in several places, it follows necessarily that the soul would be in several places per accidens: and so it must be said here by grace of the sacramental species: and this is not unfitting, that they are in several places per se, because those species are many in number.

§ 6. To the next it must be said, that the saying of the Philosopher is understood of those things which are divided or distinguished by place per se, and not of those things which are divided by place per accidens.

§ 7. To the next it must be said, that as was clear from things previously established, Christ is said equivocally to be in a place, in heaven, and in the sacrament: because in heaven per se, and in the sacrament per accidens: but equality is of those things in which there is one or univocal quantity: whence that objection is not valid.

§ 8. Moreover it was held, that between the species of the sacrament and the contained body equality cannot be attended to, except only quantity according to power, and still by

471. Aristotle, Physics, Bk. IV.

relation, that as much as that signifies, so much this is signified: and by this reason again it is clear, that this objection does not proceed.

§ 9. To the next it must be said, that Christ per se is only in one place: but per accidens He is in several places, as was said: and this is not unfitting: for thus He is per accidens in every place in which He is consecrated, and yet essentially and

Divisio Textus

Articulus 13 — Whether Where A Part Of The Body Is, There The Whole Also Is, According To Hilary; And, What That Where Is When It Is Said: "Where The Prince Is, There The King"

according to truth He is there: just as the soul, if the body were in several places per se, per accidens would be in several places and yet according to truth and substance would be in them. For what is in a place per se, is in a place according to the laws of place: and this was sufficiently shown above, that it does not belong to the body of Christ in the sacrament.

§ 2. To the next it must be said, that the modes of saying something is in a place can well be distinguished, even if they are equivocal: and so they are distinguished here: for Christ is said to be in things in three ways, as was said above. But that He is in the mind, this He has in common with the Father and the Holy Spirit, but not this that He is in the sacrament: nor this that He is in the empyrean heaven, because this is understood circumscriptively by grace of the body which is circumscribed there.

§ 3. But to that which is objected, that nothing essentially flows into the mind besides God the Trinity, it must be said that Christ as to the body does not substantially fill the mind, but rather as to the divinity united to the body.

§ 4. But to that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that He is called the food of the mind, because through the effect of grace He fills the mind.

§ 5. But how He passes into the belly, and how not, has been broadly disputed above.

Whether where a part of the body is, there is also the whole according to Hilary? and, Of what sort is that 'where', when it is said: Where the prince is, there is the king?

§ 6. Then it is asked concerning the saying of Hilary, there, D, at the end: Where a part of the body is, there is also the whole.

§ 7. For this seems impossible: because 1. It follows well in an integral whole, where the whole is, there is the part, since the whole put into existence posits the part: but Hilary gives us the converse of this: therefore let these two be conjoined thus: where the part is, there is the whole: and where the whole is, there is the part: therefore where any one part is, there is any part whatever: therefore where the foot is, there is the hand, and the eye, and the ear: therefore all the members are confused in one place.

§ 8. 2. Also, Where the part is, there is the whole: therefore where the foot is, there is the whole: therefore also the head: therefore where the foot is, there is the head: therefore the body is most inordinate and unseemly, because the members do not have the distance which makes the elegance of the body.

§ 9. 3. Also, Where the part is, there is the whole: therefore, as before, the head has itself to the feet: therefore it is reversed: and such infinite things follow from the saying of Hilary, as it seems: therefore it seems to be false.

§ 10. 4. Also, In that in which it is not possible to distinguish whole and part, in that it cannot be said: Where the part is, there is the whole: but in those species it is not possible to distinguish part and whole: therefore one cannot say: Where the part is, and the whole. But the FIRST of these is proved through this that all things which are per se in a place, are distinguished in a place according to beginning, middle, and end. But the SECOND is proved through this that in no part of that host is it possible to say, that the hand is there, or the foot, as is clear from things previously established: therefore it seems to be simply false what Hilary says.

§ 11. Further it is asked, What kind of where is signified when it is said: Where the part is, there is the whole? For where (as the Philosopher says) is the circumscription of a body proceeding from the circumscription of place: and if such a where is signed, this will seem to be impossible: because as was often held, place and localized thing are equal: whence the place of the part, and the part are equal: and if the whole were in the same place, it would be necessary that the whole...

Articulus 14 — What The Parts Mean Into Which The Host Is Divided By The Celebrating Priest

§ 1. ...and the part be equal: and this is against the first principle, Every whole is greater than its part.

§ 2. Solution. It must be said, that Hilary in my judgment intends to say, that Christ is otherwise in the sacrament, and otherwise in a place per se: because where He is in a place per se, there the distinction of parts in a place is assigned to Him: but where He is as in the sacrament, there such a distinction is not assigned to Him: and this Hilary intends to say when he says, Where the part is, there is the whole: because He is everywhere in the form: for if it is broken, any part is everywhere, and the whole is everywhere in all parts: and in this way it is improperly true, that where the head is, there is the foot, because not accepted of just any part of the form. But it does not follow what is inferred further, that the members are confused in one place: because they are not there as in a place except per accidens, as was said before, through this namely, that that form or its part is in a place.

§ 3. To the next it must be said, that it does not follow, that the body is inordinate: because when it is said, Where the foot is, there is the head, it is understood that where as in a signing and containing sacrament there is the foot, there is the head: and this is not unfitting: because neither is the foot contained and signed there as a foot, nor the head as a head, but both as

spiritual food: and from this no confusion or inordination of the body follows: but it would follow if the members were distinguished there as in a place per se.

§ 4. Through the same the solution to the following is clear.

§ 5. To the next it must be said, that in the body of Christ according to itself the members can be distinguished: but in comparison to the signing forms they cannot be distinguished: because through any part whatever of the form the whole body with all its parts is signed and contained. But Hilary speaks here, that where the part is, there is the whole: that he may express that distinction by comparison to the signing and containing form.

§ 6. To that which is further asked, it must be said that where is said per accidens, and per se. Per accidens: as we say, that where the body is, there is the soul, although yet the soul does not have a where per se. But per se, as when we say, there is the circumscribed body: and Hilary intends to consignify here a where per accidens: because where the part is as in the sacrament, there is the whole, as was previously held.

DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

But what those parts signify, etc.

§ 7. Here begins the second part of this distinction in which it is treated of the signification of these parts. And three things are said here in this chapter, namely what those parts signify: and this at the beginning of the chapter. Secondly, what the breaking through which those parts are divided signifies, because [it signifies] the passion of the Lord, there, E, § 2: And as those parts, etc. Thirdly, he touches on, who participate worthily and who unworthily, there, E, § 3: But let everyone beware lest, etc.

§ 8. The sentence of the first is noted in two verses: The host is divided into parts: dipped it notes the blessed Fully, dry the living, preserved the buried.

What do the parts into which the host is divided by the celebrating priest signify?

§ 9. A question arises, Since the division of the Church is multiplex:

§ 10. 1. First, Because some are of the Church in number only, but some in number and merit: and Christ offered Himself for both: therefore it seems, that some partition of the body of Christ ought to be corresponding to them.

§ 11. 2. Also, Another three-membered division of the Church is understood through Noah, Daniel, and Job, which is into prelates, and continents, and married: therefore there ought to be made some division responding to that division.

§ 12. 3. Also, It seems that no part ought to be for the blessed: because they not in species, but in the truth of things already take the sacrament: but the partition is not made except in species: therefore no partition ought to be made for the blessed in the species itself, as it seems.

§ 1. 4. Also, The blessed do not need the oblation of redemption: because they are already saved: since therefore this sacrifice is made for redemption from sins, it seems that nothing in it ought to be made for the blessed.

§ 2. 5. Also, If there were no sin, Christ would not have died and been offered on the cross: but the consecration of the sacrament is made in memory of the Lord's death: as the Apostle says, I Cor. 11:26: therefore for those who no longer need the effect of death, nothing ought to be made in the sacrament: but such are the blessed: therefore nothing ought to be made for them in the sacrament.

§ 3. 6. Further, It seems that it is the same to offer for those who are in the sepulcher and for the blessed: for those who as to the soul are blessed, as to the body are in the sepulcher: and it seems, that thus they do not differ as to persons, but as to parts only.

§ 4. 7. If perhaps you say, that those who are in the sepulcher, are those who are in purgatory: then the Letter speaks badly in speaking generally of those who are in the sepulcher.

§ 5. Further it is asked concerning this which is said in the Letter, that the part offered, put into the chalice, shows the body of Christ which has already risen.

§ 6. For it seems, that this is unfitting: because the chalice signifies the passion: but the body which has already risen, is extracted beyond passions: therefore the part put into the chalice does not congruously signify the part which has already risen.

§ 7. Moreover it is asked, What is that part which has already risen?

§ 8. For we do not have it for certain from the Saints that anyone is already blessed in the body with Christ: for concerning those who rose with Christ, and concerning the blessed Virgin some feel thus and some otherwise: therefore that part which is put into the chalice, signifies nothing but Christ: but this seems unfitting: because Christ did not offer the sacrifice for Himself: therefore neither now ought it to be offered for Christ: therefore no part ought to be offered for those who have already risen, as it seems.

§ 9. Further it seems, that the eating ought not to signify those still walking upon the earth: because

§ 10. 1. Eating signifies incorporation: therefore to those more united to Christ and incorporated it more belongs: but the more united to Christ and incorporated are those who are in glory: therefore they ought rather to be signed by the eaten part: and the contrary of this is said in the Letter.

§ 11. 2. Also, It was said above, that it is not so in this food as in another: because this food converts the fed to itself, which other foods do not do, but rather they are converted to the fed: therefore the eaten part most signifies that part, which is most converted to Christ: but this is the part united to Him through glory: therefore it ought to signify those who are in glory, and not those walking upon the earth.

§ 12. Further it seems, that that part which remains on the altar, ought not to signify those who lie in sepulchers: for at the end of the Mass that part which remained, is consumed through eating: but eating signifies those walking upon the earth: therefore it is also signed by this that those who lie in sepulchers, at the end will rise and walk upon the earth: which is

false, since then they will be caught up in the clouds in the air to meet Christ, and so they shall always be with the Lord, as the Apostle says.[472]

§ 13. Further it seems, that this use of fraction which is written here, is not generally observed by the Church: because in several religious orders, namely of Preachers, Minors, and Cistercians, and in many secular Churches nothing is left at

§ 1. ...the end of the Mass: therefore it seems, that no part in their sacrament signifies those lying in sepulchers: and so it is not general what is said here.

§ 2. If perhaps it is said, that Pope Sergius speaks according to the custom of the primitive Church, in which the subdeacon and deacon consumed the relics of the sacred partition remaining at the end of the Mass after communion: this is nothing: because this was not done in the host divided into three: nor was this done every day, but at the time of the communion of the people: nor then always, but when something remained of the relics: but here the Pope speaks generally of the signification of the parts.

§ 3. Solution. It seems it should be said, that the Pope speaks here of the most congruous signification of the fraction and of the parts: and not of just any less congruous signification: and he speaks only according to the rite which was wont to be observed in the Roman Church for the time. For universally the body of Christ is divided into three, although not universally one of the parts is observed until the end of the Mass; because on account of the danger of parts falling from the sacrament, by some both parts are consumed together, and then also the part put into the chalice: and this not that they wish to signify the contrary of what the Pope says, but rather to avoid danger, understanding the same thing to be signed, which he faithfully expressed.

§ 4. It must be said therefore to the first, that every part in some way signifies those incorporated into Christ who alone communicate: because (as Ambrose says) he communicates spiritually, who brings innocence with him to the altar: but since those who are of the Church in number only, do not communicate spiritually, they are signified by no part: although it is offered for them in redemption and expiation: for not all those are of the parts of the body or are signified, for whom it is offered, but those who are in the mystical body are signified by the parts of the sacrament of the true body.

§ 5. To the next it must be said, that that division is not the first which is signified in Ezekiel,[473] through Noah, Daniel, and Job: but rather it is the division of one part, namely of that which walks upon the earth: and therefore that presupposes this: because of the mystical body of Christ one part is in glory, and another awaits secure in the sepulcher, and a third fights in merit: and that which fights in merit, is triform, as is signified in Ezekiel.

§ 6. To the next it must be said, that the parts do not signify the power of the passion, but rather the parts of the body of Christ which are spiritually united to Him: and therefore those reigning in glory, since they are especially united to Christ, ought to be signified in the parts of the sacrament. There is also another reason for this: because this sacrament is not made [only] for obtaining pardon, but also that praises may be rendered to God through it for the libera-

tion already accomplished: and in this way significations can be made for the blessed in the partition of the sacrament.

§ 7. To the next it must be said, that Christ would not have died, if there were no sin: yet it does not follow, that the liberated one not having sin ought not to have a memory of the liberating death that he may give thanks, and praise the redeemer: and this is signified in the fraction of the body of Christ.

§ 8. To the next it must be said, that it is not the same to offer for the blessed and for those who are in the sepulcher: because since resurrection is threefold, as will be shown below, namely resurrection from fault through grace, which is made here: and resurrection of the soul from punishment, which is made through glory: and resurrection of the body from putrefaction and corruption, which is made in the future: those are understood to have already risen here, who have risen by the middle resurrection: but to lie in the sepulcher, [those] who are still tormented in purgatory which will last until the end of the world.

§ 9. Through this the solution to the following is clear.

§ 10. But to this which is objected, that

he seems generally to understand those lying in the tomb, it must be said that he speaks generally for this reason: because such an alternation of those dying, those being purged, and those flying away [to heaven] will last until the end of the world. Hence, those who are in purgatory lie down, because they have not yet obtained either stole; in the soul they already stand in a way in the resurrection, because they have risen from guilt and also from punishment in their soul.

§ 2. To the next it must be said that it is not considered in this sacrament that the chalice signifies the passion: but since there is a twofold perception of the Eucharist: one is with the labor of chewing, and the other is without labor, but with the sweetness of drink it holds wisdom. Here it is consumed in the species of the sacrament as if under an alien rind which must be chewed; but in the future it is consumed in the taste of saving wisdom without resistance, as a drink, and this is signified by the part put into the chalice. Whence nothing prohibits many things from being signified by one thing according to diverse properties: so that if the chalice through itself signifies the passion, nevertheless inasmuch as it holds a drink, it signifies the state in glory.

§ 3. To the next it must be said that that part which has already risen is that which has obtained the stole of the soul, as is evident from what has been said, or the stole of the body and of the soul, if there are any who are already with the Lord in the homeland: which I indeed believe to be most true of the Blessed Virgin and others who rose with the Lord.

§ 4. To the next it must be said that the part eaten signifies those walking upon the earth, not from that property by which eating is an incorporation, but from that by which eating is the restoration of what is lost and the strengthening of what is weakened by hunger. For the

472. 1 Thessalonians 4:16.

fervor of spiritual grace is lost through the heat of concupiscence, and the spiritual man is weakened: for which reason the custom of eating was introduced; and therefore the objection made concerning union and incorporation is invalid.

§ 5. To the next it must be said that that which remains lying most fittingly signifies those lying in the tomb. And therefore it is left lying on the paten, which signifies the pressing of the stone closing the tomb; and therefore it signifies the punishment which follows death in purgatory. For no others are in the tomb of the Lord except those who descend to the place of good people being purged. But the fact that it is eaten at the end is not done to signify that they must again walk upon the earth, but that through the oblation those punished in purgatory receive comfort just as through food. And it is not necessary that all properties be considered in signifying something according to a mystical reality: because even this same thing has many properties and can signify many things according to its manner in Sacred Scripture.

§ 6. To the next it must be said that it is not necessary that this custom be generally observed: because not everyone has the caution by which they know how to take care lest anything fall from the partition of the sacrament. But I well think that when solemn prelates primarily celebrate, such as the Pope or others who are in the place of general heads in the Church, it ought then to be observed: so that through the persons who generally preside over the Church, the whole state of the parts of the Church may be signified.

§ 7. But to what is ultimately objected, I readily concede that Pope Sergius did not intend this when attributing such a signification to the parts.

Articulus 15 — Whether The Communion And The Breaking Of The Host Are A Sign Of The Same Or Of Different Things; And, What Each Signifies

Are the communion and the fraction of the host a sign of the same thing or of different things? And, what does each signify?

§ 8. Next it is inquired concerning what is said there, F, § 2: That just as those parts hold a mystical signification, so also does the fraction, etc.

§ 9. 1. For it seems that not this, but something else is said to be signified by blessed Dionysius in the book On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, in the chapter On the Contemplation of the Holy Synaxis, speaking thus: But the most divine communion of the one and the same bread and the peaceful handing over promulgate a similar divine conversation for them as those eating alike, and it leads them in sacred memory to the most divine supper and the principal symbol of the perfect. Therefore it seems that it does not signify the passion as it does here: because blessed Dionysius, among the things signified by communion, made no mention of the passion.

§ 10. 2. Also, in the Celestial Hierarchy he says that the assumption of the most divine Eucharist is the image of the divine participation of Jesus therefore since this participation will be future in beatitude, it does not seem that this sign ought to be called a sign of the passion.

473. Ezekiel 14:14 et seq.

§ 11. 3. If perhaps you should say that the fraction signifies something other than communion: since the fraction signifies the passion, but communion signifies communion, and the Lord's supper, and the other things which Dionysius says. Against this seems to be that the fraction is not referred to the body, as was said before, but to the species in the sacrament: therefore it ought not to signify the bread in which the body of Christ was broken, but something else.

§ 12. Solution. It must be said, as was touched upon, that the communion itself is a sign of one thing, and the fraction itself of another: because the fraction subserves communion. Whence it is said, Luke 22:19: He broke, and gave to them, namely to his disciples. Hence the fraction signifies the passion, while the communion signifies the union of charity toward neighbor and toward God. Whence Augustine says in the book of the Sentences of Prosper: While the host is broken, while the blood from the chalice is poured into the mouths of the faithful, what else is designated than the immolation of the Lord's body on the cross and the outpouring of his blood from his side?

§ 13. Therefore it must be said to the first that those words of Dionysius state the things signified by communion, which communion the sacrament effects through the grace of union. And this communion consists in a conversation similar to Christ into whom they are incorporated, and in the memory of the supper in which they are incorporated and comforted, and in the memory of the communion of the charity of Christ into which the first men were perfectly congregated and united, and the Church is still being congregated and united.

§ 14. But to what is objected from the Celestial Hierarchy, it must be said that he is speaking there of the thing signified by communion according to the anagogical sense: and this is true, because it signifies through this reception in the sacrament the reception of realities in truth that will be in beatitude: but this is not imported in the fraction properly speaking.

§ 15. But to the last it must be said that although the fraction is not in the body of Christ, since it cannot be broken, nevertheless the fraction in the species represents that which was in the body of Christ. And this is not unfitting: because even then something mortal and passible was broken, such as it is not now: and that breaking is designated through something that is about the body.

Articulus 16 — Whether Someone Existing In Mortal Sin Can Approach To Communion And Receive The Body Of Christ

Can someone existing in mortal sin approach communion and receive the body of Christ?

§ 16. Next it is inquired concerning what is said there, E, § 3: But let each one beware lest he perceive unworthily, etc.

§ 17. For immediately below he will say that unworthy is he who approaches having mortal sin.

§ 18. Whence three things are inquired here, of which the first is: can someone existing with mortal sin approach? Second: whether a priest can repel someone existing in mortal sin? Third: can one having mortal sin look at the body of Christ?

§ 19. To the first one proceeds thus: 1. Ambrose says: If faith and charity be lacking, he eats and drinks judgment to himself but to him who is in mortal sin, faith and charity are lacking: therefore he eats and drinks judgment to himself.

§ 20. 2. Also, Augustine: Just as Judas to whom Christ handed the morsel gave place to the devil not by receiving something evil, but by receiving something good evilly: so he who unworthily consumes the body of Christ does not bring it about that, because he is evil, it is evil: or that because he does not receive it unto salvation, he receives nothing. From this it is gathered that such a one does not receive unto salvation, but by receiving gives place to the devil: therefore he ought not to receive.

§ 21. 3. Also, it seems less of a sin that an unworthy man thrust himself into holy offices, and clothe himself in sacred vestments, or preach unworthily, than if he unworthily receives the body of the Lord: but he who preaches unworthily, or is clothed in sacred vestments, or receives orders unworthily, sins mortally, as the Masters say: therefore much more so does this one.

§ 22. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Ecclesiastes 9:1 says: Man knows not whether he be worthy of love or hatred: therefore no one knows whether he has charity or not. Therefore all doubt whether they have charity: therefore all doubt whether they are worthy or unworthy: therefore by consequence they also doubt whether they sin mortally by receiving or not. But the rule in Sacred Scripture is that he who does that concerning which he doubts whether it is a mortal sin or not, sins mortally: therefore every man approaching the body of the Lord sins mortally, which is a very horrible thing to say.

§ 23. 2. Also, he is called worthy of eternal life who does something for which eternal life is justly owed to him: therefore he approaches the body of Christ worthily who does something for which the body of the Lord is justly owed to him: therefore the body of the Lord can be weighed against some human work, which is most false, because it is worthier than the whole world and infinite worlds if they existed: therefore no one approaches as worthy: therefore every man approaching sins mortally.

§ 24. Solution. It must be said that someone is called worthy in two ways, namely by equivalence: and in this way no one is worthy of eternal life, nor even of the body of the Lord. In the second way one is called worthy by estimation: and this again in two ways, namely by the estimation of the thing, and thus no one is worthy; or by the estimation of the one estimating through his own goodness on account of our value from the part of our works: as is said in the Epistle to Titus, 3:5: Not by the works of justice which we have done, but according to his mercy he saved us. And thus we are worthy of eternal life and worthy of the communion of the body and blood of the Lord: because he estimates us worthy when we are without mortal sin according to our conscience: but unworthy when, with our conscience accusing us, we are in mortal sin.

§ 25. Therefore to the first objection against this, it must be said that no one knows whether he is worthy with certain knowledge: but many know by the knowledge of presumption: and this suffices: because no one understands his faults. Whence also Augustine says that regarding a

sin which someone does not remember, and yet is prepared to confess and make satisfaction for if he recalled it, either God mercifully pardons it, or reveals it as a devoted father. And therefore such a one is reputed worthy.

§ 26. To the next the solution is clear through the distinction posited earlier.

Articulus 17 — Whether A Priest Ought To Repel Someone Existing In Mortal Sin

Ought a priest to repel someone existing in mortal sin?

§ 27. Next it is inquired: Ought a priest to repel someone existing in mortal sin?

§ 28. But it seems that he ought not: because 1. Augustine says in book IV On the Trinity: Let not the dispenser prohibit the fat ones of the earth from eating the table of the Lord, but let him warn the exactor to fear. But the fat ones of the earth, as the Gloss on that Psalm 21:30 says: All the fat ones of the earth have eaten and adored, are unworthy sinners. Therefore they are not to be prohibited by the priest who is the dispenser.

§ 29. 2. Also, in the Decree that passage is expounded by Augustine, If thy brother shall offend against thee, etc. Augustine says there, against thee, that is, with you alone knowing. If therefore he has offended against thee: and you wish to argue with him before men, you are not a corrector of the man, but a betrayer of his crime. Therefore by a similar reasoning, if the priest alone knows this one to be unworthy, if he repels him from communion, he is not a corrector, but a betrayer: therefore he ought not to repel him.

§ 30. 3. Also, from this the greatest scandal would happen: because a bad priest could in this way impose a stain upon anyone and repel him from communion. Therefore since this ought not to happen, it seems that a priest ought to repel no one.

§ 31. 4. Also, the Lord did not repel Judas, although he warned him to take heed to himself. Therefore since His action is our instruction, a priest ought not to repel anyone, as it seems.

§ 32. 5. Also, the priest is not the lord of the sacraments, but the dispenser. But the sacraments are granted for the use of subjects: therefore it seems that, since to everyone is to be given what is his own, he ought to deny it to no one, worthy or unworthy: therefore he ought to repel no one.

§ 33. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. A sword is not to be given to a madman in a time of fury, because he would kill himself: therefore since killing in the soul is worse, that by which he would kill himself in the soul is not to be given to anyone no matter how much he asks. But by receiving the body of the Lord unworthily, he kills himself by receiving: therefore it is not to be given by the priest: therefore he is to be repelled.

§ 34. 2. Also, Aristotle in Ethics V says that the legally just is of less value than the naturally just: because the naturally just considers what, to whom, and when it is to be rendered: but the legal says that what is his own is always to be rendered. Whence the legal commands that what is another's is to be rendered to him whenever he asks: but the just of itself does not render, except when it can result in utility: and therefore one having a deposit does not render it to the one asking when neighboring robbers would despoil him. Therefore it seems by

similar reasoning here too: although divine law commands that the sacraments be given to all, nevertheless a just priest ought not to give, unless he gives unto salvation: but the unworthy does not consume unto salvation: therefore it ought not to be given to him, and therefore he is to be repelled.

§ 35. 3. Also, divine law even commands that this not be done. Matthew 7:6: Give not that which is holy to dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before swine: but dogs and swine are sinners: therefore it is not to be given to such: therefore they are to be repelled.

§ 36. 4. Also, See thou never do to another what thou wouldst hate to have done to thee by another but if a priest were unworthy, he ought to will that the body of the Lord not be given to him: therefore he ought not to give it to another: therefore he ought to repel the unworthy.

§ 37. 5. Also, one throwing the body of the Lord into a latrine or into the mud sins mortally: but a sinner is viler than mud: therefore one giving it to a sinner sins more than one throwing it into the mud: therefore the sinner is to be repelled.

§ 38. 6. Also, Bishop Cyprian wrote thus to Bishop Eucratius: Out of your love you thought it necessary to consult me, dearest brother, what seems right to me concerning that actor and magician who, established among us, still perseveres in the disgrace of his art, and as a master and teacher, not for the instruction but for the ruin of boys, insinuates to others also that which he evilly learned: whether to such ones holy communion with other Christians ought to be given, or whether they ought to communicate with us? I think it befits neither divine majesty nor Evangelical discipline that the modesty and honor of the Church be defiled by so base and infamous a contagion. Therefore by a similar reasoning some seem to be repelled.

§ 39. 7. Also, from the Council of Carthage: To stage-players and actors, and other persons of this kind, or to apostates, if they are converted or return to God, grace or reconciliation is not to be denied. Therefore by the contrary sense, if such do not return, nor are converted to God, reconciliation ought to be denied to them: therefore they ought to be repelled.

§ 40. Solution. It must be said that a sinner is twofold, namely notorious and occult. The occult ought not to be repelled, but the notorious persevering in sin ought to be repelled. But notorious is twofold, namely by the conviction of witnesses in judgment, as a convicted adulterer who is not penitent: and notorious by the shameful office or art or cohabitation which he exercises, such as usurers and publicans through public exercise and office; and an actor and magician through his art; and through shameful cohabitation, such as a prostitute: for such are to be repelled unless they first make satisfaction by public penance renouncing their prior acts. But others are not to be repelled, lest they be betrayed, and lest the people who are ignorant of their sins be scandalized.

§ 41. To the first therefore it must be said that it is not similar concerning the sinner and the madman: because the madman does not see his own danger, and therefore has nothing drawing him back from killing himself when he has the sword: but the sinner has the use of reason and sees his danger, and can be drawn back if he wills.

§ 42. To the next it must be said that what is just of itself takes precaution for the neighbor concerning danger from the part of another, but does not take precaution concerning the danger of a bad will: and therefore a just man restores to another what is his own, even when he knows that he spends it evilly, although he would not give it when he is among robbers who can take it away: and so is a just priest situated toward a sinner requesting the body of the Lord.

§ 43. To the next it must be said that divine law commands that the priest not give, and the priest does not give, but the other snatches it from his hands: especially since the priest is only a dispenser. Or it may be said that the force is in what he says, Nolite (do not), that is, be unwilling: yet sometimes something else must be done because of the necessity of scandal: just as it is said, James 5:12: But above all things, my brethren, swear not, although sometimes it is necessary to swear because of the malice of unbelief.

§ 44. To the next it must be said that this is false, that the priest ought to will in such a case that it not be given to him: rather he ought to will that it be given to him, but he ought not to will to receive it if it were given: because to give is just, but to receive is unjust.

§ 45. To the next it must be said that it is not similar: because a latrine and mud have an impossibility of cleanliness for receiving the body of the Lord: but not so a sinner who in a moment can be contrite and made worthy. And therefore he ought not to deny it: because he could do much harm if he withheld it from a penitent sinner, and a sinner can be converted in a moment.

§ 46. To the next and the last the solution is clear through the distinction posited at the end of this [article].

Articulus 18 — Whether It Is Permissible For One Having Mortal Sin To See The Body Of Christ, And How

Is it licit for one having mortal sin to look at the body of Christ, and in what way?

§ 47. Thirdly it is inquired: Is it licit for one having mortal sin to look at the body of Christ?

§ 48. For it seems that it is not: because 1. Luke 18:13, the publican is praised who would not even lift his eyes to heaven: therefore much less is a sinner worthy to look at the body of the Lord, which is better and worthier than heaven.

§ 49. 2. Also, 2 Paralipomenon, Manasseh said in his Prayer: I am not worthy to behold and look upon the height of heaven, because of the multitude of my iniquities therefore much less will a sinner be worthy to see the body of the Lord.

§ 50. 3. Also, 1 Kings 6:19, the men of Bethshemesh were struck because they looked at the ark of the Lord, which was only a figure of the body of the Lord: therefore much more will a sinner be struck looking unworthily at the Lord's body.

§ 51. 4. Also, 2 Kings 6:6–7, Uzzah was struck because he stretched out his hand to hold the ark, since the oxen drawing it had kicked. From this it seems that even if the body of the Lord

were endangered by a fall or something else, it would not be licit for a sinner to touch or to see it.

§ 52. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. We often see that the showing of a good provokes to good: therefore it seems that sinners ought not to be prohibited from seeing it.

§ 53. 2. Also, we see that the universal custom of the Church holds that after the consecration is done, the host is elevated to be seen and adored by the people, although it is probably evident to the celebrant that many existing in mortal sins are present in the Church. It is evident, moreover, that the universal Church does nothing dangerous: therefore it is not dangerous to see it, but salutary, as it seems.

§ 54. Solution. It seems it must be said that it can and ought to be seen: but one should not multiply looks out of humility; rather, having seen the body, by striking the breast in penance let him reflect that he is not worthy to remain in the sight and frequent gaze of such holiness.

§ 55. Therefore it must be said to the two authorities that are first adduced, that humility is praised in them. And it is praised in this one in that he does not multiply his look; yet on account of the admonition of the death of Christ which rends rocks and raises up children of Abraham from them, it is good to see the memorial of his death. Whence it is not similar concerning heaven, because such is not His memorial, which so efficaciously converts sinners.

§ 56. To the next it must be said that the men of Bethshemesh who were struck saw the naked ark, which they ought not to have seen unless wrapped, as is said in Numbers 4:6. Whence it is also intimated in the Letter that many rather looked at the ark out of curiosity than call the priests to wrap it. Here, however, the body of the Lord is wrapped in the species of bread and wine: and therefore it can be seen.

§ 57. To the next it must be said that, as is commonly said, Uzzah was struck for two reasons: one, because polluted in the night with his wife, he presumed in the morning to approach nearer to the cart, and wishing to hold it by approaching closer among the others, he ought to have prepared himself worthily; or when he did not wish to prepare himself, he should have let it go and let another approach closer who was more worthy. The other reason was: because since he was a Levite, he ought to have carried the ark on his own shoulders, but he himself permitted oxen to draw it, and therefore he was struck.

Articulus 19 — Whether He Who Celebrates Otherwise Than It Was Instituted By Christ Sins Mortally

Does he who celebrates otherwise than was instituted by Christ sin mortally?

§ 58. Next it is inquired concerning what he says there, E, §3: Unworthy is he who celebrates the mystery otherwise than Christ handed down, etc.

§ 59. For it is asked, Who is this? For it can be celebrated otherwise in many ways, either from the part of the matter, or from the part of the form. And from the part of the matter: like the Greeks who confect in leavened bread, since the Lord consecrated in unleavened; or he who does not mix water with the wine.

§ 60. Therefore it seems that every such one sins mortally: or let it be said who it is who celebrates otherwise.

§ 61. Solution. It must be said that all those things are to be considered concerning the matter and form, and the mode of the Mass and the canon, which were determined above. And he who celebrates otherwise out of contempt sins mortally, and is so unworthy that he ought to be subject to the danger of his rank.

§ 62. Since Pope Julius touches upon certain errors against the celebration of the sacrament writing (and it is posited in the Decree on consecration, distinct. II, chap. Cum omne crimen) speaking thus: We have heard that some, detained by schismatic ambition, against divine orders and Apostolic institutions, dedicate milk instead of wine in the divine sacrifices; others also hand out a dipped Eucharist to the people for the complement of communion; some also offer expressed wine [grape juice] in the sacrament of the Lord's chalice; but others reserve a linen cloth dipped in must through the whole year, and in the time of sacrifice wash a part of it with water and so offer it. How contrary this is to Evangelical and Apostolic doctrine, and adverse to Ecclesiastical custom, will not be difficult to prove from the very fount of truth, from which the ordained mysteries of the sacraments themselves proceeded.

§ 63. A fifth error is in the mode of celebrating and receiving, as will be said a little below. Whence Pope Gelasius: We have found that some, having taken only the portion of the sacred body, abstain from the chalice of the consecrated blood: who without doubt (since they are taught to be bound by some unknown superstition) should either perceive the entire sacraments or be kept from the entire sacraments: because the division of one and the same mystery cannot happen without grand sacrilege.

§ 64. Another error is touched upon in the 12th Council of Toledo: It has been related to us that some of the priests do not consume the grace of holy communion as many times as they are seen to offer sacrifices in one day: but if they offer multiple sacrifices in one day, in all the oblations they suspend themselves from communion: and only in the oblation of the extreme [final] sacrifice alone do they consume the grace of holy communion, etc. Wherefore it is so certain that those who sacrificing do not eat, are guilty of the Lord's sacrament. Whosoever therefore of the priests henceforth shall approach to offer the sacrifice of the divine altar and suspend himself from communion, let him know himself repelled for one year from the very grace of communion of which he indecently deprived himself. For what sort of sacrifice will it be of which the sacrificer himself is recognized not to be a partaker?

§ 65. There are also infinite other modes: but let these modes suffice because they have been touched upon by the holy Fathers in this mode.

Articulus 20 — Whether The Priest Ought To Give To One Existing In Mortal Sin The Consecrated Host Or The Unconsecrated

Ought a priest to give a consecrated host, or an unconsecrated one, to one existing in mortal sin?

§ 66. Next it is inquired concerning what he says immediately after, there, H, §3: Or he who approaches having mortal sin.

§ 67. For it seems since the priest is a physician, and the sacrament is medicine, that the priest ought not to give it to such a one no matter how much he desires it: therefore he ought to repel him, which was disproved above.

§ 68. Next to this it is further inquired: Is it better to give an unconsecrated host to such a one?

§ 69. It seems that it is: because 1. Thus precaution is taken for him lest an unworthy communion of the sacrament harm him.

§ 70. 2. Also, by this scandal is removed: because the people might perhaps be scandalized by the fact that he does not communicate.

§ 71. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. 2 Maccabees 6:18 et seq., Eleazar refused to simulate even for the love of life: therefore it seems that one must not simulate here either.

§ 72. 2. Also, this sacrament is the sacrament of truth: therefore it is repugnant to all falsity: therefore nothing in it is to be done through falsity. But such a simulation would be a certain falsity: therefore it is not to be given.

§ 73. It is further inquired: Whether the priest of himself could give blessed bread, and not the Eucharist, to such ones not asking?

§ 74. But it seems not, 1. Because of the reasons already had.

§ 75. 2. Furthermore, he can be compunct in a moment: and if he is compunct, the priest harms him by withdrawing salutary food: therefore he ought not to do it.

§ 76. 3. Also, nothing benefits the sinner through these things, because he believes he is communicating: therefore he who does not communicate is just as contemptuous as he who communicates: therefore he ought not to give him anything but the host.

§ 77. Also, the Lord gave the Eucharist to Judas: therefore His dispenser ought also to give it to the evil.

§ 78. Solution. It must be said to the first that it is not entirely similar concerning the physician and the priest: because the priest aids the will of man which is free toward this, that he do what is in him: and then God does not deny grace: but the physician aids nature which is subject to necessity, and sometimes cannot be aided, nor can it return when it wills: and therefore the priest gives what he wills, so that thus the will may be drawn back from death and shame, and be converted to the Lord: but the physician does not, because nature is not aided by harmful things, but rather impeded.

§ 79. To the next which is inquired next to this, it must be said that an unconsecrated host can be given to such a one asking, posited apart indeed, not intermixed with the body of the Lord; nevertheless it ought not to be done often, as I think, so that being more terrified of his sin he might return more quickly.

§ 80. To what is objected on the contrary, it must be said that it is not similar concerning Eleazar; because he was asked to simulate that he ate what is illicit, which no one ought to simulate: but here what is licit is simulated, which is even commanded to be done.

§ 81. To the next it must be said that it is not falsity, but rather a caution against an evil that could come from the scandal of many. Nor is it a simulation in the confection of the sacrament, but rather in the similitude of the use of the sacrament.

§ 82. To that which is further inquired, it must be said that in no way ought the priest to do this of his own accord, as was proven: but if he is asked, he can sometimes acquiesce, and not often, as we have said.

Divisio Textus

§ 1. DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

"After these things it is asked, whether what the priest performs is properly called a sacrifice or an immolation?"

This is the last part of this treatise on the Eucharist, in which it is treated on the part of the one consecrating it: and this is on the part of the efficient cause or quasi-efficient cause.

§ 2. And it is divided into two parts: in the first of which it is treated of the act of the priest which he does in confecting. In the second, it is treated of those things which this sacrament requires in consecrating, such as order, and life, and intention: and it begins there, H, But it is customarily asked, Whether depraved priests, etc.

§ 3. Furthermore, the first part has four questions, two of which, however, are touched upon and determined at once in the book, namely, by what name the act of the priest is called, and whether Christ is immolated once or more often? And the first chapter is about the resolution of these.

§ 4. The second question is about the institution of this sacrament: and the second chapter is about this, which begins there, G, For this sacrament was instituted, etc.

§ 5. The third question is, Whether it is to be celebrated and communicated daily or rarely? And about this is the third chapter which begins there, G, § 2: But if it is asked, Whether it is to be communicated daily, etc.

Articulus 21 — Why One Who Is About To Communicate Is Especially Commanded To Forgive His Debtors

Why is one about to communicate specially commanded to forgive his debtors?

§ 83. Next it is inquired concerning what he says, there, E, § 3 : Before you approach, forgive your debtors, etc.

§ 84. Why does he specially make mention of this sin in communicating: for every sin makes one unworthy if it is mortal, as I said before: therefore he ought to make mention generally of all that he might be forgiven.

§ 85. To this it seems it must be said that the sacrifice by which Christ offered himself was especially on account of fraternal love. Whence, Hebrews 2:14 and 15: Because the children are partakers of flesh and blood, he also himself in like manner hath been partaker of the same, that through

death he might destroy him who had the empire of death, that is, the devil: and might deliver them who through the fear of death were all their lifetime subject to servitude. And therefore the sin of hatred of brothers is maximally contrary to communion. 1 Corinthians 11:18: For first of all (that is, the principal evil), I hear that when you come together in the church, there are schisms among you, etc.

Articulus 22 — Whether The Master Says Well That He Eats Spiritually Who Brings Innocence To The Altar

Does the Master say well that he eats spiritually who brings innocence to the altar?

§ 86. Next it is inquired concerning what he says, there, E, § 3, at the end: He eats spiritually who brings innocence to the altar.

§ 87. For according to this it seems that few eat spiritually: because few are innocent who have not sinned.

§ 88. Solution. It must be said that it is understood of innocence as to immunity from mortal guilt, and not of the innocence of baptism: for a man through penance can be immune from guilt: and thus innocence is taken by Blessed Gregory in a certain Lenten Collect: O God, the restorer and lover of innocence, to know whom is to live, and to serve whom is to reign, etc.

Articulus 23 — Whether Christ Is Immolated In Every Sacrifice

Whether Christ is immolated in every sacrifice?

§ 6. Now a question arises concerning the first.

It seems that Christ is not said to be sacrificed and immolated daily on account of the representation of past events:

1. For there is the same rationale regarding crucifixion and death, as there is regarding sacrifice and immolation: therefore if he is said to be immolated because a representation of the immolation once made is enacted, he will be said to be crucified and handed over because a representation of the crucifixion and killing once made is enacted: which is false.
2. Also, it does not follow: "the killing of this man is represented, therefore this man is killed"; therefore neither does it seem to follow here: "the immolation or sacrifice is represented, therefore he is immolated or killed."
3. Also, it seems that this ought not to be done: because that which is an occasion of heresy ought not to be done by the Church: but the representation of death signifies a mortal being, although the Apostle says that Christ rose from the dead and dies no more; therefore it ought not to be done.
4. Also, in a sacrament no injury is to be done to anyone: but Christ, having been offered once, took away the sins of men sufficiently, just as the Apostle says; therefore an injury is done to him if he is offered for sins all day long.

§ 7. Further it is asked, Why is it called an immolation or sacrifice?

§ 8. To this it must be said, that Christ is most truly immolated every day, when the sacrifice is offered to God the Father: for immolation denotes the act of offering on the part of the thing offered , and sacrifice denotes the same act on the part of the effect: whence, since on the part of the thing offered there always remains the offering offered and to be offered for us, we always immolate and always sacrifice. But it is not so concerning the crucifixion: for this denotes not the act of the thing offered, but rather the wicked act of the Jews or the passion, insofar as it was inflicted by them: but thus it was not to be repeated: and therefore it is not similar. And through this the solution to the first is evident.

§ 9. To the next it must be said, that our immolation is not only a representation, but a true immolation, that is, the offering of the immolated thing by the hands of the priests: whence it denotes two things, namely the slain thing, and the offering: because an immolation properly is the offering of a slain thing for the worship of God: and regarding the offering it is not merely a representation, but a true act of offering. But it is not so concerning the killing and crucifixion.

§ 10. To the next it must be said, that here there is no occasion for heresy: but there would be if it were noted that the killing is repeated: and this is said because it is not noted.

§ 11. To the next it must be said, that no injury is done: because the same thing is always offered, and under one effect: but if another thing were sought for killing and redemption, then an injury would be done to the death of Christ.

§ 12. To the last it must be said, that the name itself, which is immolation, is derived from the instruments where the cattle which was offered used to be killed: for it was killed upon a great stone, round in the manner of a millstone (molaris), and the parts of the slain beast were placed upon it: and in place of that we now use an altar; but according to its proper signification it sounds the act of offering on the part of the thing offered and slain: while "sacrification" or sacrifice denotes the same on the part of the effect.

Articulus 24 — Whether Christ Is Daily Immolated In The Sacrament

Whether Christ is immolated daily in the sacrament?

§ 13. Next it is asked concerning this which is said, there, F, after the beginning: But he is immolated daily in the sacrament, etc.

For an instance against this seems to be on the Parasceve (Good Friday): because then there is no consecration.

§ 14. Further it is asked, why is there no consecration on that day?

§ 15. Further still it is asked, Why is the blood not reserved from the day of the Supper until the day of the Parasceve, just as the body is?

§ 16. Solution. It must be said that he is immolated daily, even though he is not confected daily: because even on the Parasceve an immolation occurs without a consecration.

§ 17. To the next it must be said, that the Church instituted this, because on that day Christ truly offered himself on the cross: and therefore the Church did not will that he be immolated in the sacrament, so that the people might be more affected concerning the true offering, with the sacramental one—which is under a veil—having been removed.

§ 18. To the next it must be said, that the cause is none of what some say, that by the intinction of the consecrated host the wine on the Parasceve is converted into blood: because according to this, it would be lawful for any priest intincting the body of Christ in the wine, and afterwards consuming both, namely the body and the wine, to celebrate again on the same day: which is false, since he has broken his fast.

§ 19. Also, wine does not become a sacrament unless the word is added to it: but if what they say were true, a sacrament would be effected without the form of the sacrament. Whence it must be

said, that the blood is not reserved because of the danger of spilling, because it could be spilled: and again because it cannot be transferred from vessel to vessel without some of the liquid adhering to the vessel: and therefore the Church established that it is not to be reserved.

§ 20. Next it is to be noted concerning what he says, there, F, below the middle: As often as the passover is celebrated, etc., that 'passover' is said in multiple ways.

For sometimes it means the unleavened breads, which were eaten then. John 18:28: They did not enter into the praetorium, that they might not be defiled, but that they might eat the passover.

Also, Christ immolated is so called. 1 Cor. 5:7: For Christ, our passover, has been immolated.

Also, the paschal lamb which was eaten then. Matt. 26:17: Where do you want us to prepare for you to eat the passover?

Also, that time when it is celebrated. John 13:1: Before the feast day of the passover, etc.

Also, the supper which they ate in the evening. Matt. 26:2: You know that after two days the passover will be. Whence the verse: "The passover is unleavened bread, Jesus, lamb, evening, supper."

§ 21. Next it is to be noted upon what he says, there, F, after the middle: Do we not offer every single day, etc.

For Innocent says that this immolation is made for five causes.

The first is because we sin daily: and therefore it is necessary that a medicine be prepared: and this is touched upon in the Letter. The second is so that the tree of life may always be in the midst of paradise. The third is so that Christ may be united to us sacramentally, and we to him spiritually. And Hilary touches upon this in book VIII On the Trinity, saying thus: "Why did he set forth a certain step and order of consummating the truth, unless so that he might be believed to be in the Father through the nature of divinity, and we conversely in him through his bodily birth: and he again in us through the mystery of the sacraments: as if the perfect unity of the mediator taught, that while we remain in him he himself would remain in the Father, and remaining in the Father he would remain in us: and thus, to perfect the unity with

which he is naturally in him through birth, we also by nature would be in him, with Christ himself naturally remaining in us. Now that this unity is naturally in us, he himself testified thus, saying: 'He who eats my flesh and drinks my blood, abides in me and I in him'."

The fourth cause is so that we may have a memory of the passion: and this is touched upon in 1 Cor. 11:24: Do this in commemoration of me.

The fifth is so that the converted Jews may use the true lamb in place of the typical one, for which they will hunger, just as Psalm 58 says: They shall be converted at evening, and shall suffer hunger like dogs: and shall go around the city.

Articulus 25 — Whether The Sacrament Of The Eucharist Avails Against Venial Sins

Whether the sacrament of the Eucharist avails against venial sins?

§ 22. Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, F, around the end: Nor is it repeated because of its own infirmity, etc.

For from this which is said here, it seems that this sacrament avails against venial sins: but it seems that it also avails against mortal sins: because

1. It is said in the Collect of blessed Gregory which is said for the living and the dead in common: May it be a washing away of crimes, may it be a strength-

of the fragile, may it be a support against the dangers of the world, may it be a remission of all faults of the living and the dead faithful. From the first part it is accepted that it avails against mortal sins: because only mortal sins are called crimes. But from the last part it is accepted that it avails equally against venial and against mortal sins.

1. Also, it was held above in the same chapter, that it is a representation of the death of Christ and of his offering: but that was against mortal and venial sins: therefore this sacrament is ordained against both kinds of sins.
2. Also, De consecratione, dist. II, Pope Julius says: Since every crime and sin is wiped away by sacrifices offered to God, what else shall be given to the Lord for the expiation of faults, when an error is made in the very offering of the sacrifice? Therefore it seems that this sacrifice avails for the expiation of every fault.
3. Also, this is called the sacrament of sacraments, and the greatest sacrament: therefore it has a greater effect than other sacraments which are not as worthy: but baptism and penance avail against mortal sin; therefore much more so does this one.
4. Also, the act of a man informed by grace avails less than the act of Christ, which is full of grace: but the act of a man informed by grace suffices to wipe away mortal sin, as is clear in the sorrow of penance: therefore much more the act of Christ: and that is represented in communion: therefore it avails against mortal sins.

§ 23. But on the contrary it seems that it does not avail against venial sins. 1. For a sacrament avails for inducing its own proper effect: but the wiping away of venial sins is not its proper

effect: therefore it does not induce it. PROOF of the minor: Whatever is such that many things are ordained against it, none of them will be its proper destroyer, unless all those things are one in rationale, or one is reduced to another: but many things are ordained against venial sin, such as holy water, a pontifical blessing, and the like: and all these do not have one rationale, nor is one reduced to another: therefore none of them is the proper destroyer of venial sin.

1. Also, let it be that someone approaches with two or three venial sins: either it avails for the remission of all, or not. And it cannot be said that it does not avail for the remission of all, because there is the same rationale concerning one and concerning another: therefore if it avails for the remission of one, it avails for the remission of all. But if this is granted: then someone in this life can live without sins, which is against Augustine who says that this cannot happen, and it was written above.
2. Also, since such a purgation is the effect of this sacrament: and all such remedies ought to be repeated frequently: it seems that according to this one ought to communicate several times a day, or several masses ought to be celebrated, which is false.
3. Also, that it does not avail against mortal sin, seems to be proved thus: because either he approaches with mortal sin, or not. If so: then he eats and drinks judgment to himself. If not: then mortal sin is not remitted for him.

Also, at the supper of Christ it availed for everyone except him who approached with mortal sin, namely Judas, of whom it is said, John 13:27, that after the morsel, Satan entered into him; therefore the same happens now: therefore mortal sin is not remitted in the perception of this sacrament.

§ 24. Solution. Just as was said above in the question on the distinction of the sacraments, the Eucharist is ordained neither against mortal nor against venial sin as its proper effect, but rather against the weakness which proceeds from the loss of spirituality: which loss of spirituality happens as much from original as from actual

sin. But what Ambrose says here, and the Master concludes at the end of the chapter, is understood of a consequent effect, and one common to this sacrament and certain other remedies of sin: for when the strength of the spirit is restored through spiritual food, then it excludes the frequency of venial sins: and from the fervor of devotion the venial sin which is present is wiped away, and also the guilt of the punishment of mortal sin, which has been made venial through penance. And in this way the words of the Saints brought forward are understood.

§ 25. To the FIRST therefore it must be said, that the washing away is of crimes, with respect to the remaining relics and the debt of punishment.

§ 26. To the next it must be said, that in this way which has been said, it avails against every sin, but properly it restores the strength of the spirit lost from sin and the punishment of sin.

§ 27. To the next it must be said, that the death of Christ had many things which the sacrament does not have in itself, except through representation: for it had the laying down of his soul in truth, and a punishment satisfying sufficiently for all, although not efficiently: and the sacrament does not have this in itself in truth: because Christ now does not die, nor does he suffer the punishment of the passion: and therefore it does not follow that the sacrament, like the passion, avails against every sin, but that the remission of every sin is represented in it sufficiently, not efficiently.

§ 28. To the next it must be said, that in many ways, just as was also touched upon above, and was held concerning Confirmation, one sacrament is said to be greater than another: because either it is given by a greater person: or it is collative of greater grace: or because the thing contained is worthier: or it is significative of a worthier thing not contained. And in the first way indeed confirmation is said to be worthier, in the second baptism, in the third the Eucharist, and in the fourth matrimony: and therefore it does not follow that if it is greater in genus, it confers greater grace against sin, because this is to be greater according to a certain mode of the majority of sacraments. And there is a fallacy of the consequent there.

§ 29. To the next it must be said, that the act of God which is satisfactory sorrow for our sins, is not in the sacrament in truth, but only by representation: and therefore that objection does not hold.

§ 30. To that which is objected, that it does not avail against venial sins, it well seems that it must be conceded in the manner in which the first objection proceeds. But the second does not hold: because as a consequence it wipes away venial sins: and therefore if someone obtains the remission of all venial sins, which I well believe often happens: nevertheless the word of Augustine and of John the Evangelist remains true: because he cannot remain long in such a state, while concupiscence remains in the flesh.

§ 31. To the next it must be said, that even if it avails against venial sins, it does not follow that it ought to be repeated frequently: because, since it is the most worthy sacrament with respect to the thing contained, it requires great preparation before it is to be done, which cannot happen often: nevertheless he who communicates every day on account of this is commended, as is said in the Letter, provided he communicates worthily: which worthiness is caused from preceding preparation.

§ 32. To the next it must be said, that one must not approach with mortal sin: but nevertheless it avails against mortal sin, not on the part of guilt, but of punishment, as has been said.

And through this the solution to the whole is also evident.

Articulus 26 — Whether The Sacrament Of The Eucharist Was Instituted At A Fitting Time By Christ After The Supper

Whether the sacrament of the Eucharist was instituted by Christ at an appropriate time after the supper?

§ 33. Next it is asked concerning what is asked third: and it is touched upon there, G, For this sacrament was instituted for two causes, etc.

1. For since other sacraments were instituted more often, such as baptism when it was said: Unless one is born again of water, etc.; and in the baptism of the Savior, as was determined above in the questions on the baptism of the Savior, and this sacrament is the sacrament of sacraments, it seems that this one too ought to have been instituted more often.
2. Also, Baptism was instituted after the passion with respect to its form: but the effect of the Eucharist is the incorporation by which the faithful are incorporated into Christ, which happens through a renewal, the example of which is the resurrection: therefore it too ought to have been instituted after the resurrection.
3. Also, Innocent, as we noted above, posits one cause of the Eucharist, that the tree of life may be in the midst of paradise: but the tree of life is the bread of Angels, and this is through the glory of beatitude which was shown after the resurrection: therefore it seems that it ought to have been instituted after the resurrection.
4. Further it seems that it ought to have been instituted before the supper: for the paschal lamb ought not to have been consumed by the lamb, but rather by those who were being redeemed by the blood of the lamb: therefore it seems that Christ, who is the true lamb, ought not to have first eaten the typical lamb, but rather before the supper, or without the supper, to offer himself.
5. Also, when Christ received circumcision, he did not immediately continue baptism onto circumcision, but long after. Since therefore the typical lamb and the true lamb are related to each other in the same way as circumcision and baptism, it seems that the immolation of the true lamb ought not to have been instituted immediately after the typical lamb, but long after: and this was not done.

§ 34. Further it is asked concerning the cause of the institution, which the Master touches upon in the Letter, namely which is the increase of virtue: for concerning the other cause which he touches upon in the Letter, it was held before.

1. For it belongs to the same thing to increase virtue and to confer it: but it belongs to baptism to confer virtue: therefore it also belongs to baptism to increase it; therefore this is not the proper cause of the institution of the Eucharist. But that the first premise is true, is clear through consuetudinal virtue which is generated by acts and is increased by the same acts, and it is thus with other things in nature.
2. Also, above in the treatise on baptism, it is said that virtues are increased in baptism: therefore it is clear that this is not the proper effect of the Eucharist.
3. Also, above in the beginning of this note on this fourth book of the Sentences, it was often proved that every sacrament is against sin and against the wound of sin, and in this sacramental grace differs from the grace which is in gifts and virtues: therefore

according to this, the proper effect of no sacrament will be to increase virtue: therefore neither of this one: therefore also this cause which he touches upon in the Letter seems to be nothing.

4. If it is said, that it does not increase virtues in general, but increases a certain virtue, namely charity. AGAINST: Charity is increased, grace being increased through good works: because Augustine says that charity is given so that it may be nourished, and nourished it may be increased, and increased

it may be perfected: but since doing this belongs to grace and a good life, it will not be the proper effect of this sacrament.

Also, nothing is increased except by that which, united to it, is similar in species, as the flesh of a man by that which becomes the flesh of a man, and thus concerning others: but it was proved above that sacramental grace and the grace of virtues are not of one species: therefore the one does not increase the other: therefore what is said in the Letter is false, as it seems.

§ 35. Solution. It seems it must be said to this, that the Eucharist was instituted, as is said here, by God as a medicine for daily infirmity, which is caused from the lost strength of the abstinence from spiritual food, as has been said often, and it ought not to have been instituted except after the supper before the passion, because it does not draw its effect except from the passion, and is a representation of the passion itself: and therefore, as a memorial to be more strictly commended to memory, it ought to have been instituted last, as will be said below in the Letter.

§ 36. To that which is objected first, it must be said that there were many things in baptism, and according to those many things it had various institutions, as was said above in the questions on baptism: but it is not so in the Eucharist, which is entirely of grace, and therefore it ought not to have been shown except near the showing of the greatest grace.

§ 37. To the next it must be said, that baptism is a sacrament of necessity, to which it was fitting to accustom men in many ways: and therefore before Christ it was introduced by John, and afterwards it was instituted in many ways by Christ, and after the resurrection it had the completion of its form: but the Eucharist is a representation of the immolation made in the passion, and therefore it ought to have been instituted not after, but before: for although it renews, this is its consequent effect, and not its proper one, as was held.

§ 38. To the next it must be said, that the tree of life is the bread of Angels: yet according as it is received under the sacrament, it is bread covered under ashes, that is, the reproaches of those killing him, and spittle, and scourges, and also for this reason the figure of the cross is more frequently repeated in the consecration, which will not be done when it is received with the truth of things uncovered.

§ 39. To the next it must be said, that Christ continued the New Testament in the sacrifices of both to the Old, by first taking the paschal lamb, and afterwards giving his body: and therefore it ought to have been instituted after the supper, which is true: therefore Christ took

the paschal lamb, and did not do it to show that he needed liberation, but by keeping the law in all things, he showed that the law was not profane, like idolatry, but was given by God: and was to be converted into the truth of the New Testament. But that objection proceeds as if the lamb were eaten by no one except for the end that he be liberated by it from the exterminating Angel.

§ 40. To the next it must be said, that it was fitting for men to be induced to baptism in multiple ways, both because it is a sacrament of necessity, and because it is a general sacrament, and also because it is the door of the sacraments: and this having been well and congruously introduced, all the others are introduced: and therefore it was fitting to wait a long time after circumcision was received: but it is not so in the Eucharist: but rather the New ought to be continued immediately to the Old, the Old having been consummated through the passion of Christ.

§ 41. To that which is further asked about the cause which the Master touches upon in the Letter, it must be said that the sacrament of the body of Christ can be shown in multiple ways, according as it has many things in itself.

For it can be considered with respect to its principal reality which it contains and causes on the part of the recipient as far as is in itself: and thus it is properly a sacrament of the new law, collative of a special grace, which is ordained against daily infirmity,

which is from the weakness of spiritual strength, as has been said.

It can also be considered not insofar as it is a sacrament, but insofar as it is a representation of those things which were done around the death of Christ: and thus it is a sacrament of love, because there Jesus showed greater love toward us, and thus excited and purchased our love for himself. Whence Bernard: "Above all things, the chalice which you drank, the work of our redemption, renders you lovable to me, O good Jesus." Also, Bernard: "The difficulty of the redemption took on much difficulty, by which it might make you a debtor of much love, and admonish you to acts of thanksgiving, whom the facility of your condition had made less devout." And in this way the Master speaks here. Whence here it is not the proper effect of the sacrament insofar as it is a sacrament from the reality operated in the sacrament, but rather insofar as it is a representation of the passion of Christ purchasing our charity for himself.

It can also be considered insofar as it has for its reality him who is the cause and author of all grace, and from whose fullness we have all received, and grace for grace; and thus it confers not only an increase of charity, but also of all virtues.

§ 42. And through this the solution to the first is evident: because nothing prohibits there being multiple secondary causes of the same effect, although one is per se according to one mode of causality. Whence baptism gives an increase of virtues, through this, that it is the principle of a greater grace: but the Eucharist, through this, that it is an exciter to greater devotion and love from the memory of the passion of Christ.

Through this the solution to the second is also evident.

§ 43. To the next it must be said, that in truth sacramental grace differs from the grace of virtues and gifts, and does not increase it through an essential union with it, but rather through occasion, namely because it excites to devotion, which being had, a greater grace is frequently conferred in habit, but always in act.

§ 44. To the next it must be said, that the increase of charity by way of merit can be attributed to many things, namely to all things which cause one to merit: but nevertheless it is not essentially increased except by God through the apposition of grace or the assimilation of his goodness, as has to be determined in the question on the increase of virtues.

Articulus 27 — Whether One Ought To Communicate Daily

Whether one should communicate daily?

§ 45. Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, G, § 2: But if it is asked, Whether one should communicate daily, etc.

Now this is the fourth question touched upon in the beginning of this distinction.

1. For Augustine seems to speak badly: I neither praise, nor blame. For either he speaks of the bad, or of the good. If of the bad: then it will be blameworthy. But if of the good: then it seems to be praiseworthy: for it is praiseworthy to do a good thing well: and the more often he does it, the more praiseworthy he is: but the best, or among the best things, is to say masses and to communicate: therefore the more often someone does it, the more he is to be praised: therefore Augustine speaks badly.
2. Also, foolish is the sick man who has the medicine prepared, and does not repeat it as often as the disease returns: but the disease of venial sins always returns: therefore foolish is he who does not take the medicine often: therefore much more blameworthy, because every fool, insofar as he is such, is blameworthy: therefore again Augustine seems to speak badly.
3. Also, to offer a sacrifice to God

has always been good, and will be good: therefore to offer the best sacrifice to God is the best: therefore it is to be offered very often: therefore it is praiseworthy that Christ be immolated and received daily, because he is the best sacrifice.

1. Also, the manna which God rained from heaven was gathered daily except on the sabbath day;[474] therefore it seems also, that that which the manna signified is to be gathered and eaten every day before the rest of perpetual life: but this is the body of Christ: therefore it is praiseworthy that it be done daily.
2. Also, in the old law the continual sacrifice signified this sacrifice: and that was done twice daily; therefore it seems also that this one should be repeated more often: and the more often, the better.

§ 46. BUT ON THE CONTRARY. 1. Gregory says, that it is a mark of good minds to acknowledge a fault there, where there is no fault: therefore much more is it a mark of a good mind to acknowledge its own unworthiness: but it is certain that no one is sufficiently worthy: therefore it is a mark of a good mind to acknowledge oneself unworthy, and to remove oneself from communion.

1. Also, in the old law not all the people entered the Holy of Holies, but only the high priest, and once a year, and with much adornment of vestments, and with incense, and with blood:[475] but it is certain that these were significations of those things which are done now: it seems therefore still that not by all, and not always, but sometimes by ordained men with the incense of prayers, and with blood, namely the memory of the passion, is it to be communicated: since therefore they cannot be thus prepared often, they must not communicate often.

§ 47. Solution. It must be said that the words of the objections proceed on the cause of the saying of Augustine. And this is clear in the decree De consecratione, dist. II, cap. Quotidie, where the words which are lacking here are supplied thus: "If anyone should say that the Eucharist is not to be received daily, while another affirms daily, let each one do what according to his faith he piously believes ought to be done. For they did not litigate among themselves, nor did anyone of them place himself before the other, Zacchaeus, and that centurion, when the one of them rejoicing received the Lord into his house:[476] the other says, Lord, I am not worthy that you should enter under my roof:[477] both honoring the Savior, although not in one way: both miserable with sins, both having obtained mercy." From these things it is accepted, that by reason of diverse virtues, namely of humility recognizing its own infirmity, and of charity desiring to join itself to God, both are praiseworthy. "To this avails, that the manna tasted in the mouth of each one according to his own will."[478] But discretion, which is the charioteer of virtues, tempers both: and the mean is always more praiseworthy than the extremes.

§ 48. Therefore it must be said to the first, that Augustine speaks of the good: and although one may be suitable, yet in his own estimation he is not suitable enough: and because in this he honors God by recognizing the excellence of his body for which nothing is worthy enough, this very thing is converted for him into praise and merit.

§ 49. To the next it must be said, that the fool eats neither sacramentally nor spiritually. Whence he who abstains sacramentally for a time on account of humility, is not a fool, because he does not abstain spiritually: and therefore that objection does not hold.

§ 50. To the next it must be said, that many acts are good in themselves, and yet on account of our fragility compared to those acts... (text cuts off here)

§ 1. [Certain things] become evil or reckless for us, such as taking an oath. For to speak the truth is good, and to call upon God's truth as a witness is good: nevertheless, because of our knowledge which is always mixed with doubt, taking an oath is something we ought to

474. Cf. Exod. 16:26.

avoid. And so it seems it should be said here concerning communion: because although it is excellent in itself, nevertheless because our aversions and unsuitabilities are many, it is sometimes safer for us to abstain on account of humility.

§ 2. To the next it must be said that although the manna signified the future refreshment in the body of Christ, it was nonetheless given for the use of bodily nourishment for those journeying through the desert: and therefore it was not a danger to receive it every single day, but rather a necessity.

§ 3. To the next it must be said that the daily sacrifice signified the future passion of Christ insofar as it is a passion, and not the spiritual food, which is in the suffered Christ as such: and therefore it was entirely burned. And because this passion ought to be daily in the fire of our heart, for this reason it was offered daily. Whence, Psalm 141:2: Let my prayer be directed as incense in thy sight, etc. [479]

Articulus 28 — Whether One Ought To Communicate Three Times In The Year

Should one communicate three times a year?

§ 1. Next, inquiry is made concerning what he says there, at G, § 2, near the end: If not more frequently, let men communicate at least three times a year, etc. For this is the decree of Pope Fabian, as is said there, De consecratione, dist. 2.

§ 2. However, it seems that one ought to communicate more often: because 1. Ambrose says, as we had in the Letter: If as often as the blood of Christ is poured out, it is poured out for the remission of sins, I ought always to receive it, I who always sin: I ought always to have the medicine.

§ 3. 2. Also, Bishop Hilary: If sins are not so great that someone is excommunicated, he ought not to separate himself from the medicine of the Lord's body: therefore it seems that one should communicate daily.

§ 4. 3. Also, From the council of Pope Martin: If anyone enters the Church of God, and hears the sacred Scriptures, and for his own indulgence turns himself away from the communion of the sacrament, and in observing the mysteries declines the established rule of discipline: we decree that such a one is to be cast out from the Catholic Church until he does penance and shows the fruit of his penance: so that, having received communion, he may merit indulgence. Therefore it seems that one should communicate more often.

§ 5. 4. Also, This seems to hold by a likeness to bodily food, which we receive daily: since therefore man does not live on bread alone, but rather on spiritual bread, it seems that this food should be received daily.

§ 6. 5. Also, Upon that passage of Matthew 6:11: Our supersubstantial bread, etc., a Gloss says, the Eucharist. Therefore it itself is daily bread: therefore it is to be consumed daily: therefore not merely three times a year.

§ 7. Furthermore it seems that one should communicate at least four times a year.

475. Cf. Lev. 16:2-15; Heb. 9:7.

§ 8. 1. For Pope Soter says: On the Lord's Supper the partaking of the Eucharist is neglected by some: that it should be partaken of by all the faithful on that same day (except for those to whom it is forbidden on account of grave crimes), Ecclesiastical practice demonstrates: since even penitents on the same day are reconciled for partaking of the sacraments of the body and blood of the Lord. Therefore one must communicate on the Supper at least.

§ 9. 2. Also, the Lord instituted it then, and gave communion to his disciples then: therefore since his action is our instruction, it seems that the whole Church ought to communicate then.

§ 10. 3. Also, In certain religious orders it is observed so strictly that on that day none of the subjects celebrates [mass], but all communicate from the hand of the superior, just as the disciples did from the hand of the Lord: therefore it seems that this practice should be emulated by all.

§ 11. Furthermore it is inquired here, What is the penalty for one who does not communicate according to the statutes of the canons?

§ 12. It seems that he should be cast outside the Church, because 1. It is said, John 6:57: He who eats my flesh and drinks my blood abides in me, and I in him. Therefore, by the contrary sense, He who does not eat, etc., does not abide in Christ: but to abide in Christ is to abide in the mystical body: since therefore such a one casts himself out from the mystical body, he also seems to be someone who should be cast out from the Church.

§ 13. 2. Also, this sacrament has its proper name from that by which the whole Church partakes together with it, namely communion: therefore he who deprives himself of communion ought to have nothing of the community or of communication: therefore he must be cut off from that community and communication: therefore he should be excommunicated.

§ 14. 3. Also, this seems to be from the Council of Toledo, in the decree De consecratione, dist. II: Those who enter the Church of God, and are discovered never to communicate, are to be admonished that if they do not communicate, they should approach penance, that is, if they are excommunicated, they should make satisfaction: if they do communicate, that is, if they are not excommunicated, let them not abstain always: if they do not do so, let them abstain, that is, let them be excommunicated.

§ 15. 4. In the Council of Elvira: Every man before holy communion ought to abstain from his own wife for three or four or six days: nor shall he be counted among Catholics who does not communicate in these times, namely, Easter, Pentecost, and the Nativity of the Lord. From these it seems that one who does not communicate should be excommunicated.

§ 16. Furthermore it is inquired, Why did the Fathers institute that communion be taken in these three times, rather than in others?

§ 17. 1. Because since this sacrament is nothing but a memorial of the passion, it seems that the faithful should communicate only on the day of the Passion, and at least on Easter.

§ 18. 2. Also, On Pentecost it seems [fitting] in no way: because then all carnality was converted to spirit: and the presence of flesh was withdrawn from the heart of the Apostles, so

that the presence of deity might have a place: therefore it seems that one should not then communicate in the flesh and blood of Christ: because as he himself says: It is the spirit that gives life: the flesh profits nothing.

§ 19. 3. Also, In the Old Testament it is read in Exodus 12:10 that if anyone was unclean in the first month, he should celebrate the Passover in the second month. Therefore it seems that the holy Fathers in the New Testament ought also to provide a remedy for this, if someone were not prepared in these times, that he should communicate at another time.

§ 20. 4. Also, in Leviticus 23, passim, it is read that all these three feasts are celebrated for eight days, and on each day sacrifices were made, and the people ate before the Lord. Therefore it seems that this should also be done in the New [Testament], and much more: because the New Testament is of octaves, whereas the old was of weeks: therefore it seems one should communicate for eight days in any feast.

§ 21. 5. Also, Since two of these times have a correspondence in the Old Testament, namely Easter and Pentecost, in which the people ate before the Lord: why does the third, namely the Nativity, not have any correspondent: for in January the people do not convene before the Lord, but rather in September, and at that time we do not communicate.

§ 22. 6. Also, Since the Fathers decreed first that the people should communicate on every Sunday, and subsequently three times a year, how is it now decreed that this should be done at least once a year?

§ 23. 7. Also, Are matrons who have their own husbands, and who abstain from intercourse for one or two nights and otherwise devoutly, to be prohibited lest they communicate more often?

§ 24. 8. Also, Are widows and others living in chastity and desiring to communicate to be prohibited? It seems not: because nothing which increases grace and devotion and the custody of oneself is to be prohibited: but the frequency of communion does all these things in the communicant: therefore it is not to be prohibited.

§ 25. Solution. It seems it must be said to the first, that it does not speak solely of sacramental communion, but rather of spiritual communion: for this is to be repeated more often, even on the same day: because it is the medicine of our infirmity. But the other is to be ordered so that it may be done with the solemnity and honor of so great a sacrament.

§ 26. To the next it must be said that Pope Hilary is speaking of those who abstain always. For they act evilly and contrary to the statutes of the canons.

§ 27. Through this same [point], the solution to the following is clear: because it speaks of those who abstain at the times in which the Church ordains that one should communicate.

§ 28. To the next it must be said that bodily food is not entirely similar to spiritual food: because bodily food does not repel our unworthiness out of its own worthiness, but is always

477. Matt. 8:8.

less worthy than the eater: whereas spiritual bread, because of its worthiness, sometimes repels us from itself, when foulnesses or sins are apparent in us.

§ 29. Also, Bodily bread does not supply our defect unless it is taken materially: but spiritual bread supplies our defect even if it is taken only sacramentally.

§ 30. To the next it must be said that the Gloss [cited] to the contrary speaks under a distinction, namely that it ought to be daily as regards the use of sacramental or spiritual eating: and not as regards the use of sacramental eating alone.

§ 31. To the next it must be said that in truth it is quite consonant with spiritual works to communicate on the Supper: and I well think that those who are otherwise prepared, and then wishing to communicate, are not to be prohibited: but nonetheless because the infirmities of men are many, and when one communicates another wants to communicate: sometimes they are deferred until the day of Easter, so that for the remaining two days they might be in fuller custody of themselves: because the people guard themselves poorly after communion, and guard themselves better in expecting communion. Hence if there is some person in whom this is not feared, I think it should be granted to him that he communicate on that day: and so it is done among religious, as is proven in the subsequent objection.

§ 32. To the next, which is further inquired, What is the penalty for one who does not communicate? It seems it must be said that without a doubt such a one is to be excommunicated after sufficient admonition. But I consider it a sign of one of two sins: namely either obstinate malice, since he in no way wishes to withdraw from his sins, or heresy. Whence in my judgment Prelates also offend greatly by fostering such ones, when they ought especially to excommunicate them: and Pope Fabian seems to mean this when he says that all should communicate in these three times, if they do not wish to lack the thresholds of the Church. § 33. To that which is objected concerning that decree, which commands abstaining from one's wife for three days, etc., it must be said that I well think this is how it should be done: if however one of the spouses is found compelled to render the debt and not to demand it: and does this frequently, because the other does not wish to abstain even at that time: I would grant communion to the one who renders it unwillingly, and not to the other who extorts the debt when it should not be extorted: because it is clear that he is bound to render it even at that time, if he probably fears regarding the incontinence of the other.

§ 34. To that which is further inquired concerning these special times, it must be said that there are three things in communion, namely the spiritual eating which gives life, as the Lord says, and the body which is consumed, and the representation of the passion. And the first responds to the time as regards the advent of the Holy Spirit on the day of Pentecost. The second as regards the Nativity, when that body appeared in the world. The third as regards Easter, when the passion was celebrated.

§ 35. To that which is objected concerning Pentecost, it must be said that the carnal presence which was accompanied by the weakness of faith impeded divine consolation: but it is not such in the sacrament, but rather is accompanied by the fullness of faith: because

478. Wis. 16:21.

nothing operates in this sacrament except faith: and therefore communion is especially fitting at the time in which the Holy Spirit was given.

§ 36. To the next it must be said that the Fathers of the New Testament do not attend to any uncleanness except that of sin: or that which is a sign of sin, such as pollution, or marital intercourse proceeding from the vice of incontinence. And because these infirmities are quickly corrigible, it is not necessary to provide other times, except perhaps for another day, or a third: and the custom of the Church holds this well; nor was it necessary to make a new constitution upon this, as blessed Gregory determines speaking of this pollution, as was also noted above.

§ 37. To the next it must be said that sacrifices were repeated for eight days on account of the memory of the resurrection, to which we come through the sacrifice of Christ. But that they feasted continuously for eight days does not signify sacramental feasting, but rather spiritual eating, which is not to be interrupted, as the Apostle says, 1 Corinthians 5:8: Let us feast... with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth.

§ 38. To the next it must be said that the Feast of Tabernacles (Scenopegia) which occurs in the month of September does not have anything corresponding in the New Testament: because it signifies the journey through the desert, in which the old law was received, which was to be ended in the New Testament: but Easter and Pentecost signify the sacraments of the new law, namely the Passion and the advent of the Holy Spirit: and therefore these have corresponding times, but that does not.

§ 39. To the next it must be said that the ancient Fathers were in a golden age with respect to our time, namely because the Church was still burning with novice fervor. But afterwards dangerous times came in the latest age, in which the charity of many grew cold, and because of the unworthiness of the people it was established [to communicate] three times a year. But because the senses of man are prone to evil from his youth , therefore in these times it was established that the people should generally communicate once a year: and would that they still communicated worthily!

§ 40. To the next it must be said that it seems to me that those preparing themselves for communion by abstinence from intercourse or those having intercourse ought not to be prohibited from frequent communion, especially from month to month according to the greater solemnities: because those who are worthy are unjustly kept away: and they are dealt with impiously when salutary food is withdrawn from them, which being given increases in them the grace they have received. H. Whether heretics and the excommunicated can confect this sacrament

§ 41. It is also usually inquired, Whether wicked priests are able to confect this sacrament? To which it can be said that some, although they are wicked, truly consecrate, namely those who are within [the Church] in name and sacrament, even if not in life: because it is brought about not in the merit of the consecrator, but in the word of the Creator. Whence Augustine; Within the Catholic Church in the mystery of the body and blood of the Lord, nothing more is

479. Rom. 6:9.

accomplished by a good priest, nothing less by a bad one: because it is perfected not in the merit of the consecrator, but in the word of the Creator, and by the power of the Holy Spirit. For it must be believed that sacraments are confected in the words of Christ. Just as it is he himself who baptizes, so it is he himself who through the Holy Spirit makes his own flesh and blood. Also, Gregory: Some think the communion of the body is less sanctified if it is done by the office of those whose life seems ignoble to their eyes. Alas! into how great a snare they fall: that they believe divine and hidden mysteries can be made more sanctified by others, since one and the same Holy Spirit invisibly sanctifies those mysteries in the whole Church by operating, and blesses them by sanctifying. It is called a mystery because it has a secret and hidden dispensation. But a sacrifice [is so called], as a sacred action: because it is consecrated by mystical prayer for us in memory of the Lord's passion. A sacrament is in a certain celebration, when that thing is so done that we receive something of the signified thing. Sacraments are baptism, chrism, the body of Christ: which are therefore called sacraments because under the covering of visible things divine power works the salvation of those same sacraments more secretly. Whence from secret virtues or sacred things they are called sacraments. The sacrament of bread and chalice is called in Greek Eucharist, interpreted in Latin as good grace: and what is better than the body and blood of Christ? Whether therefore it is dispensed through good or through bad ministers within the Church, it is nevertheless a sacrament, because the Holy Spirit gives life: it is neither enlarged by the merits of good dispensers, nor diminished by the merits of bad ones. § 42. This must be said and held concerning the Lord's body, and this also concerning baptism and chrism: because divine power works more secretly in them, and this virtue or power is solely divine, not of human efficacy.

§ 43. But those who are excommunicated, or manifestly marked with heresy, do not seem able to confect this sacrament, although they are priests: because no one says in the consecration itself, I offer, but We offer, as though from the person of the Church. And therefore although other sacraments can be celebrated outside the Church, concerning this one it does not seem so. Which also Augustine seems to hand down saying: Recall the name, and heed the truth. For the Mass is so called, because a heavenly messenger (missus) comes to consecrate the life-giving body: according to the saying of the priest who says, Almighty God, command these things to be borne by the hands of your holy Angel onto your sublime altar, etc. Therefore unless the Angel comes, it can by no means rightfully be called a Mass. For if a heretic dared to usurp this mystery, would God send an Angel from the heavens to consecrate his oblation? especially since he threatened those same ones through the Prophet, saying: I will curse your blessings. But if truth asserts that it will curse their blessings, what will become of the host? Shall we then say that it can be blessed by him whom we know will be cursed by God with his blessing? For if God has cursed the blessings of heretics, and a simoniac has blessed: which of them will prevail? Will the blessing of the cursed one be able to reduce to nothing the most true words of the threatening God? From these things it is gathered that a heretic cut off from the Catholic Church is unable to confect this sacrament: because the holy Angels, who assist at the celebration of this mystery, are not present then, when a heretic or simoniac rashly

476. Luke 19:6.

presumes to celebrate this mystery. For it is not permitted to doubt that where the mysteries of the Lord's body and blood are transacted, assemblies of supernal citizens are present.

§ 44. But in the fulfillment of this mystery, just as form is to be preserved, so order is to be had, namely that there be a priest, and intention must be applied so that he intends to do it. But if he does not believe concerning that mystery as the truth holds, can he intend to confect it? and if he does not intend it, does he confect it? Some say that even those who do not think rightly about that mystery can intend: not indeed to confect that which would now be to believe rightly, but to do that which is transacted by others while it is confected: and thus intention is applied; and if the intention to confect that mystery is said to be lacking, nevertheless since he intends to say and do those things which are transacted by others, the mystery is fulfilled.

§ 45. That also can soundly be said, that the body of Christ is not consumed by brute animals, even if it seems so. What then does a mouse consume, or what does it eat? God knows this.

§ 46. We have touched upon certain things concerning this heavenly mystery to be held faithfully by Catholics. For he who contradicts these is judged a heretic.

Divisio Textus

§ 1. Next one must pass to another part of the distinction which begins there, at H, It is also usually inquired, Whether wicked priests, etc.

§ 2. For in this part it is treated of those things which this sacrament requires in the consecrator.

§ 3. And it has three parts: in the first of which he shows what is required in life, namely that he be within the Church. In the second, he shows that it requires order and intention, there, at H, § 3: But in the fulfillment of this mystery, etc. But in the third he states what is required on the part of the consumer, namely that he be rational. And to these at the end he incidentally adds what a heretic is, because he said in the epilogue that he who contradicts the things determined here is a heretic: and this begins there, at H, § 4: That also can soundly be said, etc.

§ 4. Moreover, two things are said in the first part: in the second of which he shows with many authorities and reasons that he who is not within, but excluded through schism or heresy or excommunication, does not confect the communion, that is, the Eucharist. But in the first he shows that the wicked who are within, not cut off from the Church, do confect, although they are wicked. The second begins there, at H, § 2: But those who are excommunicated, etc.

Articulus 29 — Whether Even A Wicked Priest Confects

Does even a wicked priest confect?

§ 1. A question arises contrary to what the Master intends in the first part, namely whether a wicked man confects? Next, Whether one cut off from the Church confects? Third, Whether the mass of a good priest is better than the mass of a wicked priest? Fourth, Why is it specifically prohibited by the canons that sacraments not be received from heretics, simoniacs, and manifest fornicators?

§ 2. To the first it is objected thus: 1. The Lord Jesus Christ through himself gave the power of confecting: and not to all, but to certain ones: therefore those who are not their successors do not have the power of confecting: but Apostolic men are known by three things, namely life, knowledge, and power: therefore those lacking in any of these do not have the power of confecting: but the wicked lack in life: therefore they do not confect. § 3. 2. Also, The more sublime an act is, the more it requires a perfect agent: but the most sublime act is confecting the body of Christ: therefore the agent ought to be most sublime: therefore the sublimity of life must not be lacking in such a one: therefore if this is lacking, it seems he does not confect.

§ 4. 3. Also, Augustine says that Christ remits sins through the dove, or through the members of the dove: therefore much more does he confect through the Holy Spirit, or the members of the dove: but the wicked are not members of the dove: therefore they themselves do not confect, as it seems.

§ 5. 4. Also, All power is ordered, and descends in an ordered way from God: therefore it descends from God into the Church, and through the Church to individuals: but the wicked are not of the unity of the Church: therefore it does not descend from him to them: therefore the wicked do not confect.

§ 6. 5. Also, Since in natural things it is thus, that a severed member does not have the act of the body, nor even a putrid member. Therefore since the wicked are in the Church like a putrid member, it seems they do not have any act of the mystical body: but to consecrate the body of Christ and the blood of the Lord is a most sublime act: therefore they do not have the power of consecrating, as it seems.

§ 7. 6. Also, Wisdom 1:5: The holy spirit of discipline will flee from the deceitful. Therefore much more will it flee from the openly wicked: but without the operation of the Holy Spirit the body of the Lord is not consecrated: therefore the wicked do not consecrate, as it seems.

§ 8. 7. Also, He who is unable to do what is less, is also unable to do what is greater: but a wicked man cannot obtain the first grace for anyone, which is less than the whole Christ in the fullness of deity and humanity: therefore much less can he confect the sacrament containing Christ in fullness.

§ 9. But if these things be granted according to the heretics,

§ 10. 1. To the contrary are those things which are first adduced in the Letter.

§ 11. 2. Also, Reason argues to the contrary thus: Certain acts are divine, such that they may also be done through other causes: but certain ones are divine only. For example, acts of nature are from God and from nature: but to create, and to give grace, and to resuscitate, are divine only: therefore those cannot be communicated, although man by praying may be able

to operate something through ministry concerning promoting them: therefore in such acts, neither a good nor a bad man does anything: therefore they are done equally through a good and a bad minister: but such are sacramental acts, as is held in that Letter, where a sacrament is defined from Augustine, saying that a sacrament is that which under a certain covering of visible things divine power works salvation more secretly: therefore all such things are done equally through good and bad ministers.

§ 12. 3. Also, Matthew 23:3: All things whatsoever they shall say to you, observe and do: but according to their works do ye not. Therefore the wicked have the power of binding and loosing even over the good: but the power of binding and loosing, and of consecrating the Eucharist, is given in the same order: therefore the wicked have power for both.

§ 13. 4. Also, A gift of God purely having force from the passion of Christ is sacramental grace, and is necessary to man for salvation: but to place such a thing under the power of man would be a danger, since a good man is scarcely found: and he who is believed to be good is frequently wicked: therefore everyone, in perceiving the sacraments from him, would be neglected and damned, which would be the greatest inconvenience: because then a man, totally excused by ignorance, would be damned for the fault of another, which is inconvenient: therefore it is necessary that a minister, whether good or bad or whatever kind he may be found to be, gives grace in the sacrament.

§ 14. Solution. Without any doubt it must be held that wicked priests confect, and give other sacraments: and the opposite is an error, and is defended as a heresy.

§ 15. Whence it must be said to the first, that Christ did not give them power such that they should necessarily be good in life: but Christ, wishing not merely to give ministers of the sacraments, but also to show what kind of minister is suitable who might handle the sacraments meritoriously, chose those perfect in life, and bestowed upon them knowledge and power: but it is not necessary for others to be so: but it is true that unless they are such, they are not worthy, but they handle the sacraments to the perdition of their own souls.

§ 16. To the next it must be said that that act which is transubstantiation is not done by the priest, but rather by the uncreated Word in the created word, as was shown above in the question concerning the form of this sacrament: whence if this act were the priest's, then the objection would make some contribution to the proposition: but the priest does not operate there except in ministry as uttering the words, as was said.

§ 17. To the next it must be said that members of the dove are spoken of in two ways, just like members of the body. For there are members by which the acts of the soul's powers which are in the body are fulfilled. Now the Holy Spirit is the motor of the whole mystical body, and moves it in multiple ways, namely as regards power in certain miracles, and as regards power in the sacraments, and in the dispensations of jurisdictions, and as regards the act of merit. And he who is a member of the dove as regards the act of miracles which the Holy Spirit works through him, is not a member except insofar as he conforms himself to the motor. And therefore they are not members unless they are moved according to grace to meritorious works. Whence a wicked man is a member of the dove as regards the power of the dispensa-

tion of the sacraments: just as the same can be a member through which the act of grace freely given by the Spirit is fulfilled, such as miracles, or doctrine, or prophecy.

§ 18. To the next it must be said that all power descends in an ordered way: but the conjunction of the body to the head is twofold, namely in life, and in power. And as regards life, that which moves formally does not descend into the wicked: because its contrary is in the subject, namely sin: but as regards power it descends, because sin is not contrary to power, but rather is frequently aggravated [by it].

§ 19. To the next it must be said that even in natural things members are not moved in one way by the soul: because some receive sensation and motion: whereas some receive motion and not sensation, such as bones and things of this sort. And in this way the wicked are in the mystical body into whom the strength of power descends for sustaining the whole Church: although they themselves do not receive the sensation of grace.

§ 20. To the next it must be said that the force there is in what it says, The holy spirit of discipline: because the Spirit, insofar as it is holy, inspires holiness and discipline, that is, the correction of morals: and as regards such acts it will flee the openly wicked, just as it will the deceitful. But there are other acts of the Spirit insofar as it is a spirit, such as to corroborate in the power of a miracle, and acts of this sort: and those do not have an impediment in the wicked: and therefore the Spirit, converting all things to its own service, frequently confers upon such men the power for the works of the sacraments.

§ 21. To the next it must be said that that which is unable to do the less, is also unable to do the greater: but it is not greater to operate in ministry for a sacramental act than to obtain the first grace, but rather much less: and therefore that objection does not proceed. Moreover, that act which is transubstantiation is not the priest's, but God's, as was said.

Articulus 30 — Whether One Cut Off From The Church Also Can Confect

Can one cut off from the Church also confect?

§ 1. Secondly it is inquired, Whether one cut off from the Church is able to confect?

§ 1. It seems, however, that they do not: because 1. Augustine says that outside the Church there is no place for a true sacrifice: but one cut off on account of heresy, simony, or schism, or otherwise excommunicated, is outside the Church: therefore he does not have a true sacrifice.

§ 2. 2. Also, the martyr Cyprian: The sacraments of heretics are sacrilegious and empty; therefore they do not consecrate.

§ 3. Also, Jerome: Heretics eat polluted bread: therefore they seem not to have the bread of sanctification: but the Eucharist is the bread of sanctification: therefore heretics do not consecrate, as it seems.

§ 4. 3. Also, Just as the power of consecrating is conferred upon a priest in Order, so is the power of binding and loosing conferred upon him: but it is certain that those cut off cannot bind and loose: therefore they cannot consecrate.

§ 5. 4. Also, From the Council of Laodicea: One ought not to receive the blessing of heretics, since they are curses rather than blessings: therefore it seems that by blessing they cannot consecrate the Eucharist.

§ 6. 5. Also, In the council of Pope Martin: It is not permitted for clerics or laymen to receive eulogiae, that is, blessings, from heretics: because they are curses rather than blessings.

§ 7. 6. Also, Pope Leo: In the Church of God (which is the body of Christ) priesthoods are not otherwise valid, nor are sacrifices otherwise true, unless the true Pontiff reconciles us in the property of his nature.

§ 8. 7. Also, Pope Leo: It is manifest that, through the most cruel and insane madness in the Alexandrian see, the light of all heavenly sacraments has been extinguished. The oblation of the sacrifice has been intercepted, the sanctification of chrism has failed, and by the parricidal hands of the impious all mysteries have withdrawn themselves.

§ 9. 8. Also, Gregory in the third book of the Dialogues concerning King Hermenegild, son of Leovigild: When the day of the Paschal festivity arrived, in the silent dead of night, his perfidious father sent an Arian Bishop to him, so that he might receive from his hand the communion of a sacrilegious consecration, and through this merit a return to his father's grace. But the man devoted to God rebuked the Arian Bishop coming to him, as he ought, and repelled his perfidy from himself with worthy reproaches. And many other things to be done towards this are adduced in the decree Causa I, question 1.

§ 10. From all these things, therefore, it seems to be gathered that, especially in this sacrament, those cut off from the Church do not consecrate.

§ 11. 9. Also, In Psalm 83:4: The sparrow has found herself a house, and the turtle a nest, etc., where the Gloss says that the chicks of heretics are trampled upon, because they are outside the Church: therefore it seems that they do not consecrate this sacrifice.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 12. 1. A heretic baptizes, and it is baptized: he confirms, and it is confirmed: therefore he also consecrates, and it is consecrated. But that these inductions are true is proven by I, q. 1, through many decrees.

§ 13. 2. Also, the power to consecrate is given to the virtue of the words with Order and the intention of consecrating: but all these can be in a heretic and one cut off: therefore such men can consecrate.

§ 14. 3. Also, Augustine speaking against Cyprian says that wherever the sacraments of the Church are, there they are also to be venerated, whether inside the Church or outside the Church. Therefore if one has Order and consecrates in the form of the Church, the sacraments are true.

§ 15. 4. Also, Jacob recognized his seed as his own through the bed, that is, through the womb of the handmaids: and the handmaids signify heretics, as Augustine says against the Donatists: and the seed signifies the sacraments: therefore the sacraments are also made by those cut off.

§ 16. 5. Also, I cau. q. 1: A sacrament, after the manner of light, cannot be defiled by the impure. And there are many other things there concerning this. Therefore it seems that the Master speaks falsely here in the Text.

SOLUTION. § 17. It seems it must be said that the Master is not to be supported: because the common opinion and truth is, as Augustine says, that all the sacraments of God require nothing in the maker except the Order by which he himself is a minister, and the intention, as will be clear below. In themselves, moreover, they require nothing except the due matter and the proper form. Since therefore this Eucharist has these even outside the Church, it can be consecrated, although they do this to their own damnation.

§ 18. And therefore also it seems one should not agree with certain Doctors, who investigate this by subtilizing, why heretics, or schismatics, or simoniacs, or open fornicators do not consecrate? because it is simply false what they say, as will be shown below in the fourth article of this question.

§ 19. If, however, anyone wishes to support the Master, he could say otherwise, namely that the Master speaks of heretics and those existing outside the Church not only with respect to the reputation of the Church which excommunicated them, but also with respect to the mode and rite of celebrating the sacraments: because they do not hold the form of the Church in celebrating the sacraments: and then what the Master says in the Text is true.

§ 20. Therefore to all the decrees which were introduced for that side, it must be said that they do not profit for their own salvation and that of others, according as the reality of the sacrament is twofold. One which is the reality and the sacrament (res et sacramentum): and this they confer, like the character in Baptism, Confirmation, and Order. Likewise in the Eucharist the true body of Christ under the visible species of bread and wine. The other is the reality which makes salvation formally, as grace is caused in the sacraments: and this they cannot confer: because the Holy Spirit of discipline will flee the deceitful. And this solution is common.

§ 21. Another solution, however, was touched upon earlier, that those decrees of the Fathers speak of those who are outside with respect to the true form of consecrating, and with respect to the matter: and then it is no wonder if they do not consecrate the sacraments, because they do not observe the Order and form.

§ 22. But those things which are objected to the contrary, I concede outright.

Articulus 31 — Whether The Mass Of A Good Priest Is Better Than The Mass Of A Wicked Priest

Is the Mass of a good priest better than the Mass of a bad priest?

§ 23. Thirdly it is asked, Whether the Mass of a good priest is better than that of a bad priest?

§ 24. It seems, however, that it is not: because 1. Augustine says that sacraments are made neither better by the good, nor worse by the bad: but a Mass is good by reason of the sacra-

ment of the Eucharist: therefore it seems that the Mass of a good priest is not better than that of a bad one.

§ 25. 2. Also, That which cannot increase in goodness nor be corrupted from goodness, is made neither better by a good man, nor worse by a bad man: but such is the body of Christ which is consecrated in the Mass: therefore, etc.

§ 26. 3. Also, According to this, hope would be placed in man if it were done better by one than by another. The Lord, however, commands that this not be done . Therefore it seems that the Mass of one is just as the Mass of another.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 27. 1. If two goods were equal, and a good is added to one, and nothing to the other: the two are better than the one: but the body of Christ is a certain equal good, whether it be done by a good man or by a bad man: and to this in the Mass of the good man is joined personal goodness in prayers, and devotion, and the like: but in the Mass of the bad man none of such things are added: therefore the Mass of the good priest is better than that of the bad priest.

§ 28. 2. Also, Better is that which, other things being equal, is more fruitful: but that is more fruitful which is excitational of greater devotion, than that which is of lesser, other things being equal: but the Mass of a good man excites greater devotion than that of a bad man: therefore it is better.

SOLUTION. § 29. It must be said that Masses, by reason of the substantial thing which is in the Mass, are equal: but by reason of that which is adjoined, and is the work of man, they are unequal: and thus the Mass of a good man is better, as the objections prove. Nor do I blame one who more gladly hears a good man than a bad man: because frequently a bad man handles the Lord's body irreverently, so that the palls are not clean, nor does he stand attentively at the altar: and this ought to be abominable to everyone who loves the Lord's body.

§ 30. TO THOSE THINGS, however, which are objected first, it must be said that this is true only by reason of the substance of the sacrament; but there are many things adjoined to the sacrament. I said, moreover, "other things being equal": because obedience could compel one to hear a bad man rather than a good man: and then it is better to hear a bad man than a good man, because obedience is better than sacrifice, and than personal goodness.

§ 31. And through this the solution to all the questions is clear.

Articulus 32 — Why It Is Especially Prohibited By The Canons That The Mass Or The Sacraments Are Not To Be Received From Heretics, Simoniacs, Schismatics, And Notorious Fornicators

Why is it specially prohibited by the canons that a Mass or sacraments not be received from heretics, simoniacs, schismatics, and notorious fornicators?

§ 32. Fourthly it is asked, Why is it specially prohibited by the canons that a Mass or sacraments not be received from heretics, simoniacs, schismatics, and notorious fornicators?

§ 33. And concerning heretics, and those cut off, and simoniacs, it is sufficiently found in I, q. 1, and XXIV, q. 3. But concerning fornicators much is found where treating of the life and honesty of clerics.

§ 34. 1. Since therefore the laws prohibit it, men seem to sin who receive ecclesiastical sacraments from such men, or hear their Masses.

§ 35. 2. Also, I Cor. 5:11: If he who is named a brother, is a fornicator, or covetous, or serving idols,... with such a one not even to take food. Therefore much less ought we to hear a Mass from him, or receive the sacraments.

§ 36. 3. Also, Such men seem to be fostered in sin by the fact that they are admitted in the dispensation of the sacraments: therefore it is good and useful that the people, by withdrawing, should show them their condemnation, so that they might sooner repent.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 37. 1. We know many to be fornicators through arguments walking upon the earth (i.e., manifest proofs), and also through non-distinction of bed and cohabitation: but yet we do not see the act itself, because coitus itself cannot be seen: and the holy Pontiffs tell us that we ought to hear such men and not despise them. And the Lord says: All things whatsoever they shall say to you, observe and do . Therefore we ought to receive sacraments from such men, and hear their Masses.

§ 38. 2. Also, We see that such men are frequently prelates and deans and plebans and archdeacons and bishops and archbishops, and such men are not lacking: therefore all such men would have to be fled from.

§ 39. If perchance you say that Pope Lucius III distinguishes between a notorious and an occult fornicator: then the question is, What is to be held and what is to be thought concerning this?

SOLUTION. § 40. It must be said that those existing notoriously in such vices are not to be heard, if indeed it is notorious through confession made before a judge, or the proof of witnesses: or that by no subterfuge can it be hidden that he is a heretic, or schismatic, or simoniac: since he is excommunicated by the law itself, no one ought to receive sacraments from him: and if anyone knowingly receives them, he sins mortally. However, as long as this is not done, and it is concealed from the Church, then he ought to be heard.

§ 41. But concerning fornicators it is to be distinguished in the same way between notorious and occult. If, however, he is only infamous in the mouth of many, a purgation ought to be imposed on him, in which if he fails, he is held as convicted: and then he ought not to be heard: and this is of the rigor of the law, so that the rest may be terrified: because otherwise it would not be evil to hear such men. But before he becomes notorious, such a man ought to be heard: and he is reputed contumacious who will not have heard him.

§ 42. To the first, therefore, it must be said that the Apostle speaks to instill terror, so that they might be corrected sooner: and so also the laws speak.

§ 43. And through this the solution to all that follows is clear.

§ 44. TO THOSE THINGS, however, which are objected to the contrary, the solution is clear: because of anyone, and especially of superiors, good is to be presumed, unless the contrary is proven.

§ 45. To another thing which could be asked, Since there are many mortal sins, why do the laws speak against these more than others?

§ 46. It must be said that these sin directly against the sacrament itself: for this is the entire sacrament of faith, and the causative agent of the union of the mystical body through the charity of Christ having suffered, and of maximum grace, so that it contains in itself the author of all grace, in whom are hidden all the treasures of the wisdom and knowledge and grace of God: and it is the consummative agent of maximum spirituality. But the heretic violates the faith working in the sacrament: the schismatic, charity and unity: the simoniac sets invaluable grace as vile and under a price: and the fornicator, through carnal impurity, is contrary to the spirituality of the sacrament. And therefore these are especially warded off from celebration.

§ 47. Then it is to be noted upon that text, Nothing greater by a good man, etc. For there are verses in determination of this question, thus: The life of the minister alters not the sacrament's force, Just as it is not made worse by a worse one, So it is not made better by a better presbyter, This sacrament is never allowed to be sinister, Though it be often celebrated by a depraved minister.

Articulus 33 — Whether The True Body Of Christ Is Better Than The Mystical Body Of Christ

Is the true body of Christ better than the mystical body of Christ?

§ 48. Then an objection is made concerning what he says, there, H, § 1, near the end: And what is better than the body and blood of Christ, etc. 1. For from this he gathers that the true body of Christ is better than the mystical body of Christ.

§ 49. 2. Also, A cause is always better than its effect: but the cause of the mystical body is the true body; therefore it is better than it.

§ 50. 3. Also, A price worth this much and still more, is better than this demonstrated thing: but the true body of Christ is a price worth the redemption of the whole mystical body, and still more, because if there were infinite worlds, all would be sufficiently redeemed by the blood of Christ: therefore it itself is better.

§ 51. 4. Also, The pure Creator is infinitely distant from the pure creature: but that which is a creature, united to the Creator, is a mean between these two: therefore just as it is a lesser good than the Creator, so it is better than a creature; but the true body of Christ is united to the Creator, and the mystical body of Christ is not: therefore the true cor- pus of Christ is better than the mystical body of Christ.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 52. 1. I Cor. 10:11: All things happened to them in figure. The Gloss: "In good things it is figured much better by a figure than the figure itself is." But the true body of Christ is a figure of the mystical body. Therefore the mystical is better.

§ 53. 2. Also, Augustine says that the whole Christ is the members with the head: but it is certain that the members with the head are something better than the head alone: therefore the mystical body of Christ is better than the true body of Christ.

Response. § 54. It must be said that the true body of Christ is better than the mystical body, properly speaking: because, properly speaking, the mystical body means nothing but the members adhering to the head: and then a comparison is made between the members and the head: and in that comparison the head is not understood in the other of the things compared.

§ 55. And according to this it must be said to the first, that the Gloss upon the words of the Apostle to the Corinthians speaks of those things which are a figure only: whose entire use, namely, is in signifying, and not in communicating, as was the paschal lamb: and it is not understood of those things which are sign, and cause, and reality.

§ 56. To the other, the solution is clear through the things said before: because although the whole Christ is the head with the members, nevertheless when a comparison is made between the true body which is the head, and the mystical body which is the members, the head is not understood to be included with the members.

§ 57. Others say otherwise, distinguishing in the mystical body, namely that it can mean the members only, or the head with the members. If in the first way, they say the true body of Christ is better than the mystical: if in the second way, then they say the mystical is better than the true.

Articulus 34 — Whether It Is Well Called Mass Because The Heavenly One Was Sent To Consecrate Or To Give Life

Is the Mass well named because a heavenly messenger is sent to consecrate or vivify?

§ 58. Then it is asked concerning what he says, there, H, § 2: For it is called a Mass, because a heavenly messenger comes to consecrate the life-giving body, etc.

§ 59. The heavenly messenger is an Angel: therefore an Angel is sent to consecrate and vivify: and this is false: because it was proven above that the uncreated Word consecrates and vivifies in the created word.

§ 60. Also let it be asked, What is vivified there? It seems that nothing is: because the body of Christ was alive beforehand, and those species never live, neither before nor after: and there are not more things there in the sacrament: therefore it seems that nothing is vivified there.

§ 61. If perhaps you say that the heavenly messenger is not called an Angel here, but rather Christ, who is called the Angel of great counsel, according to the Septuagint translation. The contrary is seen from the Text immediately, where it follows: Command these things to be borne

by the hands of your holy Angel to your sublime altar, etc. For since nothing carries itself, it is clear that Angel is not taken there for Christ.

§ 62. FURTHERMORE it seems false what they say, that this is the reason why it is called a Mass. 1. For Hugh of St. Victor says: "The Mass (missa) is called as if transmitted (transmissa), because the people, through the ministry of the priest who performs the role of mediator between God and men, transmit prayers, vows, and oblations to God." § 63. 2. Also, Hugh: "For the sacred host itself can be called a Mass (transmission): because it was transmitted from the Father to us first, namely so that it might be with us: afterwards from us to the Father, so that it might be with the Father for us."

§ 64. 3. Also, Hugh: "The Mass is called from sending out (emittendo), as some say: because when the priest begins to consecrate the host, through the hand of the deacon and doorkeepers, he sends out of the Church the catechumens and non-communicants."

§ 65. Furthermore it is still asked concerning what he says: Command these things to be borne to your sublime altar. For either the species are demonstrated, or the true body of Christ, by the word these things (haec). If in the first way: then he says nothing: because the species are not borne there, and they have no place where the open truth of things is, as in the fatherland: whence they would be borne there uselessly. If in the second way, the petition is useless: because the true body of Christ is always in the superior goods of the Father.

§ 66. FURTHERMORE it is still asked, What is the sublime altar?

Solution. § 67. It must be said to the first, that the heavenly messenger, according to the Master in the text, is called a created Angel who, on account of reverence for such a great sacrament, comes and assists at the altar. Or rather it must be said, that it is a multitude of Angels: and according to this those gerunds, to consecrate and to vivify, descend from an impersonal verb: and the sense is, "so that it may be consecrated and vivified." But if it is understood of Christ, then the first objection has no place.

§ 68. To another it must be said that the vivification refers to the mystical body of Christ, united to the true or understood in the true: and it does not refer to the true body, or to the species.

§ 69. TO ANOTHER it must be said that it is called a Mass for many reasons: three of which Hugh touches upon in the three authorities, and the Master touches upon a fourth in the Text, and many others can be found.

§ 70. TO ANOTHER it must be said that that entire petition refers to the mystical body understood in the true: whence the sense is: Command these things, etc., that is, all the faithful understood in the word these things, to be borne, etc., so that, namely, they may be joined to the true body in heaven according to the goods of the fatherland, just as they are joined according to the grace of the way.

§ 71. To another it must be said that the sublime altar here is called the eminence of the Trinity, in which every sacrifice that is offered by the Church is reposed. For there is a superior, inferior, interior, and exterior altar.

§ 72. The superior, moreover, is twofold, namely the eminence of the Trinity, Exod. 20:26: You shall not go up by steps to my altar. The Gloss: "In the Trinity you shall not make steps, distinct according to more and less." Also, the superior is the Church triumphant, Ps. 50:21: Then shall they lay calves upon your altar.

§ 73. The inferior, again, is twofold, namely the Church militant, Exod. 20:25: If you make me an altar of stone, you shall not build it of hewn stones. Also, the inferior is the table of the temple, Ps. 117:27: Appoint a solemn day in thick crowds, even to the horn of the altar.

§ 74. The interior, moreover, is again twofold. The first is a clean heart, Lev. 6:12: The fire on the altar shall always burn. The Gloss, that is, charity in the heart. Also, the interior altar, faith in the incarnation, Exod. 20:24: You shall make me an altar of earth, that is, you shall have faith concerning the incarnation, not only concerning the deity.

§ 75. There is also the exterior altar, and this is twofold, namely the altar of the cross, Lev. 6:9, Upon the altar of holocaust the evening sacrifice was placed. Also, the exterior, the sacraments of the Church, and especially the Eucharist, Ps. 83:4: Your altars, O Lord of hosts, my king, and my God.

Articulus 35 — How That Saying, "I Will Curse Your Blessings," Is To Be Understood

How is that to be understood, "I will curse your blessings"? How is that to be understood, "I will curse your blessings"?

§ 76. Then it is asked concerning what is said, there, in the note, § 2, I will curse your blessings. For since the blessings of priests are or seem to be sacraments, it seems that they are cursed: which is against the decree I, question 1, because it says that sacraments cannot be made impure.

§ 77. FURTHERMORE it is also asked next to this about two equally bad priests, of whom one celebrates with the conscience of mortal sin, while the other, terrified, does not celebrate, but pretends to celebrate: which of them sins more?

§ 78. And it seems that the first does: because he contemns and, as much as is in him, profanes the sacrament.

Solution. § 79. It must be said to the first, that if force is applied in the Text, there is no objection. For this that is said, your, is taken discretively: and there is then no objection: because the sacraments are not the blessings of priests, but of God: whence, Num. 6:27, it is said: They shall invoke my name upon the children of Israel, and I will bless them.

§ 80. To another it must be said that the one pretending sins more, because he sins against God, placing pretenses in His sacrament: and against the men whom he deceives, and causes to adore a creature, that is, an unconsecrated host: and against himself, because Order was given to him for consecrating. But the other sins against himself.

Articulus 36 — Why The Sweetness Of The Sacrament Is Not Felt By Those Receiving

Why is the sweetness of the sacrament not sensed by the recipients?

§ 81. Then it is asked concerning what he says, there, H, § 2, at the end: For it is not permitted to doubt, etc. For what he says here shows the reverence of the sacrament which is expressed, Wis. 16:20: You provided for them bread from heaven prepared without labor, having in it all that is delicious, and the sweetness of every taste.

§ 82. But then it is asked, Why is the sweetness not sensed? If perhaps you say that the palate is not well disposed in the one tasting, this seems to be nothing: because virtues dispose the palate optimally: and many approach who have all the virtues: because he who has one, has them all: and yet they sense nothing.

Solution. § 83. To this it must be said that this bread is voluntary, and it is sensed as it itself wills, and it holds back its sweetness now so that it is not sensed, so that the merit may be greater at the end, and so that it may be sensed more fully in the future. Furthermore, Although one may have virtues, nevertheless he has not yet purged the remnants of sin, which impede spiritual taste.

Articulus 37 — Whether A Priest Can Celebrate Outside The Altar And Without Sacred Vestments

Can a priest celebrate outside an altar and without sacred vestments? Can a priest celebrate outside an altar and without sacred vestments?

§ 84. Then it is to be noted concerning what he says, there, H, § 3: In the fulfillment of this mystery, just as the form is to be preserved, so the order is to be held, etc.

§ 85. But this seems to be false: 1. For the cause of an effect is outside the thing: therefore the thing does not contract its substance from it: therefore even without order, if someone says those words, he will perfect the body of the Lord.

§ 86. 2. FURTHERMORE, It has frequently been held above that the efficient cause here is the uncreated Word in the created word: therefore whoever, whether ordained or not ordained, utters those words, he seems to consecrate the body of the Lord. But if this is conceded according to the heretics, it seems then that the presbyteral order is given for nothing, which is unfitting.

§ 87. FURTHERMORE it is asked here, If a priest can celebrate not in the due place, that is, an unconsecrated altar, or on the ground where there is no altar, and without sacred vestments? It seems that he cannot: because 1. The Church has instituted that it be celebrated in this way: and God approves the deed of the Church: therefore God does not permit that it be consecrated against the statute of the Church.

§ 88. 2. Also, This would yield to the dishonor of such a great sacrament: and God does not permit this, as it seems: because then he would permit dishonor to befall His Son.

§ 89. Furthermore it is to be noted, that all things that were said in the tractate on Baptism concerning intention and those things which are required for a sacrament, have place here.

§ 90. It must therefore be said to the first, that without order someone cannot consecrate. For every act seeks its proper efficient cause. Whence the proper efficient cause in the ministry is the priest himself, unless he has order: and through this the solution to the first is clear.

§ 91. To another it must be said that the operative efficient cause is the uncreated Word with the created word: but the ministering one is the priest: and he must be appropriated through priestly order.

§ 92. To THAT which is further asked, it must be said that it would be consecrated without sacred vestments, and without an altar, and by one not fasting: but the one consecrating would sin most mortally, and would have to be degraded, if found out.

§ 93. To another it must be said that the Church instituted this as existing concerning the solemnity of the sacrament, and not as concerning the substance.

§ 94. To another it must be said that this does not yield to the dishonor of the Son, because He cannot have dishonor: but God would permit this, if He permitted it, so that the condemnation of the doer might appear more just.

Articulus 38 — Whether A Mouse Or Another Brute Animal Can Take The Body Of Christ

Can a mouse or other brute animal consume the body of Christ?

§ 95. Then it is asked concerning what he says, there, H, § 4: That also can soundly be said, that to brute animals, etc. This seems to be false: because 1. It was proven above that the body of Christ is there as long as those incorrupt species appear there: but in the mouth and in the belly of a mouse the species of bread appear: therefore it seems that the body of Christ is there: therefore a mouse consumes the body of Christ.

§ 96. 2. Also, Sin is more repugnant to the perception of Christ than the nature of a mouse: but a sinner receives the body of Christ: therefore also a mouse, as it seems.

§ 97. 1. FURTHERMORE it is asked concerning the punishment of him who badly guards the body of the Lord, so that out of his negligence it is eaten by mice or by other animals.

§ 98. 3. ALSO, Concerning the punishment of one spilling the blood, and concerning the punishment of one vomiting: and what is to be done when such cases happen?

Solution. § 99. Concerning the first a long question was had above: nevertheless it must be said here that "to consume" implies union or the potency for it, which is not in a brute: but it is in a sinner in whom sense is ordered to reason, according to which he is capable of spiritual eating, which a mouse is not. Well, however, do I concede that as long as discernible species are there, so long is the body of the Lord there: for this that is said in the apparatus of the decrees on consecration, dist. II: "He who has not well guarded," etc., namely that the sacrament immediately ceases after it is touched by a brute, is heretical, and laughable: but it must be said in the aforesaid way.

§ 100. To another it must be said that sin is not repugnant to capacity, but to fitness. But that someone is not fit does not cause him not to consume, but rather that he does not

consume unto salvation: but if one is not capable, he eats neither spiritually nor sacramentally: although under the species of the one eating the true body of the Lord is present, as long as discernible species appear not transmuted into another humor.

§ 101. To another which is further asked, it must be said through the decree on consecration, second distinction: "He who has not well guarded the sacrifice, and a mouse or some other animal has eaten it, let him do penance for forty days. But he who has lost it in the Church: or a part of it has fallen, and has not been found: let him do penance for thirty days."

§ 102. To THIS, however, which is asked, What ought to be done if it is spilled: and how ought the one spilling to do penance? It must be said, that according to a certain decree on consecration, second distinction, of which these are the words. Behold the response from the words: "If by negligence something of the blood has dripped upon the earth, or upon the board, let it be licked up with the tongue, and let the place itself be scraped as much as is sufficient, and let the scraping be burned: but let the ash be recondited in the sacrarium: and let the priest do penance for forty days. If the chalice has dripped upon the altar, let the minister sip the drop, and let him do penance for three days. If upon the linen of the altar, and the drop has reached another, let him do penance for four days. If unto a third, let him do penance for nine days: if unto a fourth, let him do penance for twenty days, and let the minister wash the linens which the drop touched three times with a chalice placed underneath, and let the water of the ablution be consumed, and let it be recondited next to the altar." Of Pope Pius.

§ 103. To another which is asked concerning one vomiting, it must be responded from the words of Bede in his Penitential, who says thus: "If anyone through drunkenness or voracity has vomited the Eucharist, let him do penance for forty days, if he is a layman: clerics and monks or deacons and presbyters let them do penance for seventy days: bishops for ninety. If they have vomited it for the cause of infirmity, let them do penance for seven days."

§ 104. But if it is asked, What is to be done when he receives the species of living flesh or of a member? It seems to me it must be distinguished, that either it is transfigured as regards the sight of all, or as regards the sight of some only. If as regards the sight of some only: then it seems it is to be consumed.

§ 1. But if it is transfigured according to the sight of all: then it seems to me that it should not be consumed, but kept as a relic: and another is to be consecrated, and that must be consumed by the priest: because the canon says that the priest ought to communicate as often as he celebrates. That this is so is clear in the decree De consecratione, Dist. II, where Jerome says on Leviticus: "Of this host indeed, which is miraculously made in commemoration of Christ, it is lawful to eat: but of that which Christ offered on the altar of the cross, it is lawful for no one to eat in itself,"[480] that is, when it takes on the appearance in which He hung on the cross, that is, in the appearance of bleeding flesh, or of some member.

Articulus 39 — Who A Heretic Is, And Whence He Is So Called

Article 39: Who is a heretic, and from where is the term derived?

§ 2. Next, we must consider what he says, there, chapter I: Lest you be ignorant of what makes a heretic, etc.

For "heretic" (haereticus) can come from the Latin verb haereo, haeres (to cling): or from the Greek haeresis, which is choice. If in the first way: then he who clings to his own opinion by defending it is a heretic, if that opinion is heretical. If in the second way: then he is a heretic who follows his own choice, and not the meaning of the Scriptures, and defends it.

§ 3. However, there seems to be a contradiction between Hilary and Jerome in the text: because Hilary says that the crime lies not in the word but in the sense. But Jerome says that heresy is incurred from words spoken inordinately.

§ 4. But the solution is that words are sometimes spoken inordinately under a different signification than they usually have: for the reason that the one speaking...

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Divisio Textus

...thinks they produce a sound understanding. And Hilary speaks in this case: because then, when it is shown that poison lurks in them, the one who spoke should correct his statement: and in such a case it suffices to correct his statement and retain the sense. But if he clings to the words' mode of signifying, then the sense was heretical: and in this way Jerome's statement is understood: and especially in difficult matter, such as concerning the Trinity and the Incarnation.

§ 5. And let these things said concerning the Eucharist suffice.

Division of the Text.

After this, concerning penance, etc. The entire treatise of this sacrament is divided into three parts: in the first of which he treats of penance in itself, namely as it is not contracted to this part which is compunction, or to that which is confession, or to that which is satisfaction. But in the second part he treats of its parts, or of it as considered in its parts: and this begins below, in Distinction XVI, there at A, But in the perfection of penance three things are to be observed, etc. And the third part treats of those things which are sacramental signs in penance: and this part begins near the end of this treatise, before the end of Distinction XXII, there at C, After the aforementioned things it remains to investigate what is the sacrament in the action of penance, etc.

§ 6. Furthermore, the first part is subdivided into two parts: in the first of which he states what penance is in reality and by definition; but in the second he eliminates certain errors

concerning penance, there at A, § 4: By these words certain men more vehemently, etc. Furthermore, in the first part he determines three things: the first of which is the order of this...

Articulus 1 — Whether The Sacrament Of Penance Is Well Ordered With Respect To The Order Of The Sacraments

...sacrament to the others, and its necessity for healing sin. The second is the distinction of penance according as it falls into diverse genera, namely of virtue, grace, passion, and sacrament: and this begins there at A, § 2: Baptism is only a sacrament, but penance, etc. In the third, he defines penance by its proper act, there at A, § 3: For penance is, as Ambrose says, etc.

§ 7. He touches first on the necessity of penance, saying that it is necessary for those placed far from God, that they might approach; and he touches on its order, when he says that penance is the second plank after shipwreck.

Article I: Is the sacrament of penance well ordered concerning its place in the order of the sacraments?

§ 8. But concerning this a double question arises, namely about the order of this sacrament, and about the phrase of Jerome which he adduces: The second plank after shipwreck.

1. For it was held above that no adult in baptism puts on the new man unless he repents of his old life; therefore one approaches baptism with penance; therefore the treatise on penance should be placed before baptism.
2. Also, in Matthew 3:5-6, it is said that they went out to John confessing their sins, and afterwards were baptized; therefore penance precedes baptism.
3. Also, one coming to baptism without penance is considered a hypocrite (fictus), and is one; therefore, in order to remove the obstacle, one must be penitent.

§ 9. It also seems that he ought to have treated penance immediately after baptism: because

1. It is the second plank after shipwreck, since baptism is the first; therefore just as the second plank is immediately after the first, so penance ought to be immediately after baptism.
2. Also, it is the second plank; therefore it is the second sacrament; and this seems to follow because, as was held above, sacramental grace looses from the sin which causes the shipwreck.

§ 10. It also seems that it ought to have been treated before the Eucharist: because

1. Penance is prescribed to all before communion.

480. Ps. 145:3.

2. Also, the lamb was eaten with wild lettuces, which signifies that one must communicate with the bitterness of penance. Therefore it seems that this sacrament precedes the sacrament of the Eucharist, although the Master ordered them conversely.

§ 11. Solution: It must be said that the Master orders the sacraments in a congruent order; which order was assigned above at the beginning of the notes on this fourth book of the Sentences.

But as far as pertains to this treatise:

§ 12. Reply to the first: It must be said that the Master orders the sacraments according to the order of the disease against which the grace of each sacrament is ordained: and because the first disease is original sickness and the penalties following it, for this reason the sacraments that are remedies against it with its consequences had to be placed first. Now baptismal grace is against that disease in itself; but because concupiscence remains, weakening one in the battle, therefore the grace of confirmation is given; but from the motion of concupiscence there follows a defect of powers from the loss of spiritual strength, against which the grace of the sacrament of the Eucharist is ordained. But because after all these things actual mortal...

Articulus 2 — Whether Penance Is The Second Plank After Shipwreck

...disease frequently occurs, therefore in this fourth place he treats of penance, which is ordained against it; nevertheless, in some respect, penance could be ordered before the Eucharist, as was shown elsewhere.

§ 13. Thus the solution to the first is clear, and also to the third: because this is particular and by accident, namely because the adult has actual sin; yet it is original sin in itself which is cured by baptism, and penance is not pre-required as regards the nature of the sin against which baptism in itself is ordained. But rather, because the one baptized, if he is an adult and has sinned, repents—otherwise he would be a hypocrite; but that it is not per se is clear, because if it were per se, penance would always precede baptism, and this is not true, as is evident in infants.

§ 14. To the next, it must be said that those baptized by John were all adults, and existing in actual sins; and therefore it was necessary for them to be prepared by penance for the baptism of Christ; but nevertheless, it is not necessary on this account that per se and according to the nature of the grace which baptism causes, it should not precede penance, as was said.

§ 15. To the next, it must be said that in the disease there are two things, namely guilt and punishment; and numbering guilt with guilt, then the first guilt is original, and the second is actual; and against the first is baptism, and against the second is penance. But since a sacrament is not only ordained against guilt, but also against punishment, it does not follow that it is the second sacrament: just as it does not follow: "actual sin is the second guilt in its genus, therefore it is the second disease"; because the second disease is that which proceeds from the first, with nothing added; and this is concupiscence and proneness to evil, which is

from the fomes [of sin], or is the fomes itself. But a just punishment does not per se cause shipwreck, but rather guilt does; and therefore penance is the second plank, but nevertheless not the second sacrament, nor to be ordered in the second place.

§ 16. To the next, it must be said that sacramental grace looses from sin, not only on the part of the guilt from which it per se makes shipwreck, but also on the part of the punishment, as was said; and therefore that argument does not proceed.

§ 17. To the next, it must be said that just as what is generated is comforted after generation by nature, and thereafter is nourished; so it is also in the sacraments: because first is given the sacrament of regeneration which gives the being of grace against the first defect; then one is comforted from the grace of confirmation, and thirdly is nourished immediately.

§ 18. But if anyone should object that comfort is through nourishment, and therefore according to this the Eucharist ought to precede Confirmation: it must be said that this is invalid, because there is a twofold comfort in nature. One is which is through the removal of contrary dispositions: and this the generator itself gives with the form, or immediately after the form; because otherwise the generated thing would not resist the following alterations, but would immediately be corrupted. But the other is through the restoration of what is lost; and that is done through food.

§ 19. Therefore it must be said that the first comfort is that to which confirmation is similar, just as its name sounds: and its grace weakens concupiscence, and confirms the grace conferred in baptism; but the following comfort is likened to the Eucharist; and thus it is clear that the Master's order stands.

§ 20. To the next, it must be said that this is so by accident, insofar as there is actual sin in the partakers; but nevertheless, the defect against which the Eucharist is generally ordained in all, is prior to actual sin; and therefore the Eucharist is before penance.

Article II: Is penance the second plank after shipwreck?

Articulus 3 — Whether Penance Is A Virtue

§ 21. Secondly, it is asked, in what way is it called the second plank?

For the first shipwreck was caused by original sin, and the saving plank is baptism; but the second shipwreck is by actual or personal sin, and the saving plank is penance. Therefore it is asked whether it is a plank insofar as it is a virtue, or insofar as it is grace, or insofar as it is a sacrament?

For it is in all these genera, as will be clear below.

§ 22. If it is said, insofar as it is a virtue: ON THE CONTRARY: A second virtue ought to share something in common with some first virtue: for it is not congruously said that Peter is the second man, if the one prior to him was a donkey. Therefore baptism would be the first virtue; and this is false; therefore it is not the second plank insofar as it is a virtue.

§ 23. If it is said that it is the second insofar as it is a grace, this seems false: because many graces precede it, namely of confirmation, of the Eucharist, and of baptism.

§ 24. It is objected in the same way if it is said, insofar as it is a sacrament: for it was held earlier that it is not the second sacrament; therefore it seems that it is in no way the second plank.

§ 25. Solution: It must be said that it is the second plank insofar as it is a sacrament ordained against the disease which is guilt: because, as was said earlier, punishment does not cause shipwreck as such, because many punishments promote toward merit; and he who merits does not suffer shipwreck. Whence it is not the second sacrament absolutely, but the second one ordained against guilt. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Article III: Is penance a virtue?

§ 26. Next, objection is made concerning what he says there at A, § 2: Penance is called both a sacrament and a virtue of the mind, etc.[481]

And two things are asked here, namely whether penance is a virtue? And, whether it is a general or a special virtue, if it is a virtue?

§ 27. That it is a virtue, however, seems proven by reason and authority.

1. Matthew 3:2, on the words: Do penance, the Gloss says: "The first virtue is to destroy the old man through penance."[482]
2. Also, Ambrose: "To strip and cleanse minds imbued with vices belongs to perfect virtue and heavenly grace."[483] But it is evident that to strip and cleanse from sins belongs to penance. Therefore penance is a virtue.

Also, this is said in the text in many places.

§ 28. 3. The same is proven by reason: For the Commentator says on the fifth book of the Ethics, that every praiseworthy act is an act of virtue;[484] but to repent is a praiseworthy act, and is the act of penance; therefore penance is a virtue.

1. Also, in the fifth book it is said (both in the text and in the commentary) that legal justice is the same as virtue in general, precisely because the precepts of laws are concerning the acts of the virtues.[485] Therefore much more will the divine precepts be concerning the acts of the virtues; but to repent is commanded; therefore it is an act of virtue.
2. Also, virtue and vice are oppo-

...sites: therefore they mutually expel each other: for the Philosopher says that a contingent is not expelled by a contingent, but an opposite by that which is per se opposite to it; nor does a

contingent arise from a contingent, but from an opposite in position.[486] Therefore that which expels sin is a virtue: but penance expels sin.

1. Also, some things are commanded because they are good; but some are good because they are commanded. To repent, therefore, will be in one of these genera. But it is evident that it is not good precisely because it is commanded, because if it were not com-
   manded, it would still be good to repent; therefore it belongs to things that are good per se. It therefore pertains either to the intellect or to works. That it does not pertain to the speculative intellect is self-evident; therefore it pertains to a good work in morals. But every such thing is a virtue, as is elicited from the text of Tully at the end of the first Rhetoric;[487] therefore penance is a virtue.
2. Also, as the Philosopher says, virtue makes the one having it good, and renders his work good;[488] but penance does these things; therefore it is a virtue.

§ 29. If perhaps you say that to repent is not a work, but a passion. ON THE CONTRARY: It is either a passion only, or it posits an interior act. But it is evident that it is not a passion only: because it is said in the text immediately below, that penance is a virtue, or rather a purpose of amendment by grace, by which we mourn and hate the evils committed with a purpose of amendment, and we are unwilling to commit further those things to be mourned;[489] and this is an act, and to be unwilling to commit an act again posits something, because in this verb "I am unwilling" (nolo, you are unwilling), there remains an actual affirmed and supposed will; therefore there is a purpose, which renders the work good; therefore it is a virtue.

§ 30. But against this it is objected:

1. From the very name which sounds like a passion: for poenitentia (penance) is the same as poena tenta (punishment held); but no passion is a virtue, as is shown in the second book of the Ethics.[490] Therefore penance is not a virtue.
2. Also, certain other praiseworthy things which concern evils by suffering in some way, the Philosopher says are not virtues, as is clear at the end of the fourth book of the Ethics, where he says that shame is not a virtue, but a passion: although it is praiseworthy and has a mean.[491]
3. Also, in the second book of the Ethics he seems to say that nemesis is not a virtue, although it is praiseworthy and has a mean;[492] therefore it seems that neither is penance, which is sorrow for a committed offense, properly speaking a virtue.

§ 31. 4. Also, although the act of a virtue is sometimes concerned with passions, as its material, it is nevertheless in no way accompanied by a passion in the one operating, unless that passion is called joy, which is the sign of a form already possessed. But penance is always a passion, or with the passion of the one operating; therefore penance is not a virtue, as it seems. But that the first premise is true, is indeed written by a certain Philosopher, but it is

481. Peter Lombard, Sententiae, IV, dist. 14, cap. 1.

also proven by induction: because the chaste or temperate man, by containing himself, does not suffer according to the delectable things in sense surrounding him, and so of the others; therefore I have my proposition.

Also, every virtue is a habit; therefore its act will be some act and not a passion; it is thus clear that it does not belong to a virtue properly to suffer.

Also, virtue is with joy, or at least without sadness; but penance is sorrow, or always with sorrow and sadness; therefore it is not a virtue.

§ 32. 5. Also, if it is a virtue: it will be either theological or cardinal. But it is evident that it is not theological: because all those have God as the material object concerning which the act operates, and the end on account of which; but penance does not have God as its material. It also seems that it is not a cardinal virtue: because it is not one of the four.

If you say that it is a virtue reduced to one of them: this seems false: because every reduction is according to something common; but there is no virtue which...

...seems to have anything in common with penance: since virtue is concerning a work ordained to the good, but penance is in a way a detestation, and not a good according as it is a good; therefore it seems that it is not a virtue.

§ 33. 6. Also, Augustine says that virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which one lives rightly, which no one uses badly, which God works in us without us.[493] But all these things do not fit penance. PROOF: Because one does not live rightly by penance; therefore penance is not a virtue. That one does not live rightly by penance is proven thus: Everything by which one lives rightly, one lives by some rectitude of work; but rectitude of work is not penance, because to detest evil does not determinately signify any right work, but rather a certain disposition which precedes every right work, because no right work occurs with complacency in evil; therefore it seems that it is not a virtue.

§ 34. 7. Moreover, it is said commonly by almost all that he who has one, has them all; therefore if penance is a virtue, he who has it, has them all. But infants and innocents have many virtues; therefore they have penance, which is false: for it is said in the Prayer of Manasseh, in the middle: *You have not appointed penance for the just, Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, for those who did not sin against you.*[494]

1. Also, Christ had many virtues: therefore He had penance; and penance is sorrow for a committed crime; therefore from this it would follow that He had committed a crime, which is absurd.
2. Also, all the virtues will be in some way in the fatherland (heaven); penance will in no way be in the fatherland; therefore it is not a virtue. That it will in no way be in the fatherland seems clear because in no way will there be sorrow there, and penance is sorrow, or with much sorrow.

§ 35. It is very easy to adduce many other objections here for both sides, but let these suffice.

482. Glossa ordinaria on Matthew 3:2.

§ 36. Solution: It seems to me it must be said that virtue is taken strictly, and broadly. Strictly indeed by the Philosopher in the Ethics; and according to this it is a habit ordering to the good, either intellectual or moral. Intellectual, indeed, because by teaching and by experiencing concerning operable things it takes the generation of its nature or of itself from that part in which it is material: and the will is what completes the form, according as the Philosopher says that virtues are simply wills or not without the will, such as [choice], and prudence, and the like, which, as the Philosopher himself says in the sixth book of the Ethics, is the same as right reason:[495] and this is understood of the right reason of what is eligible for the work of virtue.

§ 37. But moral virtue is about passions or operations: about passions indeed, innate or inflicted; about innate ones is temperance, but about inflicted ones is fortitude. But justice is about operations, in which there is strictly speaking no passion: for which reason justice itself is called a common good. Because also the virtues moderating delectations or sadnesses are about their proper objects. But as the same Philosopher says in the fifth book of the Ethics, they do not have a mean in the same way:[496] since that virtue which is about passions is strictly a mean of two malices, each of which is an excess and a defect differently: just as the mean of audacity (which exceeds in daring, but is deficient in fearing) and of timidity (which exceeds in fearing and is deficient in daring), and this mean is indeed fortitude; and so it is found in temperance, and in others. But justice is not always the mean of two malices, nor of two of which each differs as excess and defect: which is easily shown in directive justice. Because if injustice exceeds by ten, in which it deceives me, I unjustly lack by ten: and the mean will be that as much is restored to me as I unjustly lack, and as you unjustly exceed: and the malice here is only on the part of the one deceiving or defrauding; but on the part of the one who suffers the injury, there is no malice, but only punishment. Simi-

...larly, there is only one possessor here who has more than he ought, and only one who is lacking. The ratio of the mean also differs in another way: because in the two which are about passions, the mean is relative to us; but in justice the mean is strictly of the thing itself, and therefore it is taken by geometrical or arithmetical proportionality, as the Philosopher says.[497] But of these things elsewhere. Thus, therefore, speaking most strictly of virtue, I readily concede that penance is not a virtue.

§ 38. In another way, virtue by which one lives rightly is taken with an extended name: and this especially by the Theologian, who calls many things virtues which are placed in the genus of passions by the Ethicist: just as Gregory calls fear a virtue, as also generally the seven gifts; [498] and Ambrose calls joy a virtue, as also generally the twelve fruits enumerated in the Epistle to the Galatians.[499] And every theologian calls hope a theological virtue, and similarly charity, and others which according to their very name seem to sound of passion. And according to this, virtue will be more generally defined: namely that whatever habit perfects the rational soul according to an act ordering it into the good or away from evil, that is called a virtue. And thus penance is a virtue, and fear, and joy, and the like, according to the sayings of the Saints.

483. Ambrose, De poenitentia, II, c. 10.

§ 39. However, induced by this diversity of virtue, our Doctors took different opinions, namely with Master William of Auxerre and his followers saying that penance is not a virtue; but with others venerating the sayings of the Saints and saying that it is a virtue. But to me and to certain others it seems that it is a virtue.

§ 40. But we must reply to the objections of both sides, lest we fail those holding either opinion, because in a certain way we agree with both.

§ 41. WE SAY therefore to the first and second, that virtue is taken there with an extended name. But in what way it is called a perfect virtue, will be treated below in a question.

§ 42. To the next, it must be said that this is understood of virtue generally taken: according to which even the treatise of certain passions pertains to the treatise of virtues, such as of shame, and fear, and penance, and the like. Or force may be put on the "praiseworthy act": for a praiseworthy act is determined to the good on account of a good end: and penance does not have such an act, which is in respect to evil.

§ 43. To the next, it must be said that it is not necessary that everything concerning which there is a legal precept be an essential act of virtue. And there is a counter-instance: because there is a precept of the law not to ascend the tower: although nevertheless it is not an essential act of any virtue. And in theological matters, to go to Church, or to appear three times a year in the sight of the Lord. And therefore the Masters distinguish that the act of a virtue is twofold, namely proper and common. The proper act is essential, and that is one alone; but the common act is that which is secondarily intended on account of something that is done around the act of virtue.

§ 44. Also, they distinguish acts as they go forth from a virtue in a twofold way, namely elicitively and imperatively. Elicitively, just as each virtue effects its own act; but imperatively, just as one nicely effects the act of another, according as the former is made commanding to it, and the other obeying it. And thus it is true that every precept is concerning an act of virtue, primary or consequent, elicited or imperated: but from this act thus accepted it cannot be proven that any habit is of virtue, if virtue is strictly taken.

§ 45. To the next, it must be said that again the middle term of that argument does not prove that penance is a virtue, unless virtue is taken generally: because for the ratio of merit it suffices in a virtue that it be an act consequent upon or imperated by some virtue.

§ 46. To the next, it must be said that sin has a twofold expeller, namely by mode of a contrary: and thus any sin is expelled by the virtue contrary to it: and this is the formal expeller, and per se. It also has an expeller by mode of an efficient cause: and this is twofold, namely, an efficient cause per se: and this is God alone, according to what He says, Isaiah 43:25: I am, I am He who blots out your iniquities for my own sake. And there is an expeller by mode of merit on the part of the sinner: and this is the detestation of sin, which is the act of penance, because he merits to abolish sin, to whom sin is not pleasing, but who detests it. And that expeller which expels in this way, is not on this account a virtue: but it would be a virtue

484. Averroes, In Aristotelis Ethica, lib. V.

if it expelled in the first way, namely as a contrary; and the objection proceeds in this way. But that it is so, is clear: because from the terms of motion it is shown what is contrary: just as from healthy comes sick, not from white; and from white comes black, not from a length of three cubits: so from vicious comes virtuous, and not from penitent, unless from there denotes the order of being, as was said.

§ 47. To the next, it must be said that to repent is not perfectly a good per se: because to repent signifies a certain thing which is required for a good per se; whence it is like an adjunct to the good per se; and therefore it does not strictly follow that it is the act of a virtue strictly taken. But when it is said that something is good per se, or from a precept, good per se is taken generally, and not strictly, namely as it commonly applies to the honorable and useful good, to that and what is conjoined to it. And when it is said that virtue is of things good per se, it is taken for the honorable good strictly accepted; which Tully defines, saying, that the honorable is that which draws us by its own force, and allures us by its own dignity.[500]

§ 48. To the next, it must be said that when it is said, "virtue makes the one having it good, and renders his work good," it is understood of a work which is per se good according to the ratio of the mean and the end; but such is not a work which is merely withdrawing from evil, as was said.

§ 49. And thus it is clear how to respond for one side: and this is perhaps the truer part of the opinions.

§ 50. For the other side, namely sustaining that it is a virtue, we say to the first objection to the contrary, that there are many things which by their very name sound of passion, such as mercy, nemesis, and the like, which nevertheless are habits. And therefore because we do not have a proper name for the habit itself, we name them by the names of the passions, on account of some similitude between the act of the passion and of the habit, as in hope, joy, love, etc. And thus also penance (poenitentia) is the name of a passion by which that habit is named which moves free will to detest sin.

§ 51. To the next, it must be said that shame and penance are not similar. Because shame does not properly denote an act, but a passion consequent upon guilt. And therefore also the ashamed person, as the Philosopher says, does not flee the base thing because it is base, but because it has reproach or upbraiding with it; and therefore that is only a passion.[501] But penance detests sin, not because it has reproach or upbraiding, but it detests the perpetrated sin because it is base and evil. And this is a certain simply good act; and therefore penance will be a virtue, and not shame.

§ 52. To the next, it must be said that the act of a virtue does not have the act of the passion outside of which it is, because this is impossible. But it has already been held that it is false that every virtue is operative concerning passions or operations of the best things. And we also say that penance is concerning a certain work, that is, to detest the perpetrated sin; and it is with sorrow adjoined to that act.

485. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, V, 1 (1129b 11-25).

§ 53. To the next, it must be said that a virtue has a delectation which is consequent upon the act of virtue, insofar as it is a virtue; but that it does not have any sorrow concerning its material, or concerning its contrary, or as an instrument, this is not true:

and penance has voluntary sorrow as its instrument, yet it has joy following upon the act, as will be held below from the words of Augustine: Let the spirit sorrow, and rejoice in the sorrow.[502]

To the next it must be said that, as was said, the Moral Philosopher[503] considers only strictly spoken virtues: but if a cardinal virtue is taken broadly, then it will be reduced to one of the cardinal virtues as a secondary habit to a principal one: and according to this it is reduced to a part of justice, insofar as penance is satisfactory for sins, returning the due honor to God, as Anselm says and in light of this it is clear what is common in the act according to which the reduction is made.

To the next it must be said that penance is correctly [called] a virtue: because rectitude is a rule towards the good and away from committed evil according to what is commonly accepted; and therefore here rectitude is from evil. But the objection does not take the "right" except as taken very strictly, which is only towards the good.

To the next it must be said that different people respond differently, and all well: because that objection is made concerning many things. Some say quite probably that virtue is twofold, namely informing towards the good, and reforming from evil: informing towards the good is a perfect and true virtue, such as charity, and justice, and the like: but reforming from evil is called an imperfect virtue. And they say that what is said, He who has one, has all, is understood of perfect virtue informing towards the good: and still in that it does not follow except concerning the perfections of virtues, because faith did not remain according to an imperfect act in Christ, but according to an act of its own genus which is vision. But concerning this many things were noted above in the third book of the Sentences.[504] Others say, to whom it seems one should consent, that although he who has one, has all, nevertheless it is not necessary that he have them according to the same acts, just as was already said of faith which Christ did not have according to which seeing through a mirror in an enigma is an act of faith, but he had that which is perfect in the virtue. So they say also of penance, according to which it is a virtue, that he who has one, has penance, both the little child, and the innocent, and Christ: but not the act to which imperfection belongs, which is the detestation of sin with the will to never commit it again: for the act which is to detest a committed sin and to sorrow over what is committed is of imperfection: and therefore according to this act it is not in them.

But to what is objected concerning little children, it is to be understood of penance, according to which it is a virtue in the genus of passion, and of sacrament: for thus it is true, that no one repents except he who has sinned.

To the next it must be said that this act, which is the detestation of sin and the will not to commit it again, is most complete in the fatherland [heaven]: and in this way it can be said

486. Aristotle, Physics, V, 5.

that penance is in the future, which in every way will be without passion: as Gregory says, that we gladly remember sometimes our wounds: not from which we may be sad, but from which we may give more abundant thanks to the physician.[505]

Articulus 4 — Whether Penance Is A General Or A Special Virtue

Whether penance is a general or special virtue?

Secondly still, for a greater understanding of what has been held, it is asked whether it is a general or special virtue?

It seems that it is general: because

§ 1. Augustine says that penance is a good and perfect thing, which recalls all defects to the perfect: but defects are manifold: therefore they are not recalled by one, but by all opposed virtues: therefore penance is every virtue: and thus it will be the same as virtue in general.

§ 2. Also, Augustine in book V of the Responses There is one virtue which recalls the defect of the irascible [power] to the perfect, and another which [recalls] the defect of the rational: but penance recalls all: therefore penance in the irascible is some virtue, and some [virtue] in the rational: therefore it is diverse virtues: and thus it will be the same as virtue in general.

§ 3. Also, habits are known through acts, and acts through objects opposed to them: therefore an act is general, whose object is general: and an act is special, whose object is special: but to this act which is to repent, a general object responds, because every sin: therefore it is a general act: therefore also a general habit: therefore also penance is a general virtue, and not special.

§ 4. If by chance you say, that sin in general does not respond [to it], but rather committed sin, insofar as it is committed: this seems false: because committed sin, insofar as it is committed, cannot not be committed, since it is a word of the past: therefore penance concerning it in such a respect will be in vain.

§ 5. Also, the sin which someone commits is not contracted by multiplication to one species of sin, or genus: but it is contracted by comparison to the agent only, namely with respect to that which he did not do the same in genus or species: therefore by that determination 'committed' the sin is not contracted to a species or matter, but on that part it still remains general: therefore its act will be general: therefore also a general habit: and thus follows the same as before.

Also, when it is said that of a general object is a general act, and of a special object the act is special, it is not understood except of the generality and speciality of the matter.

§ 6. Also, to will the good and to will this or that good, differ like species and genus: because the will is not determined except by the thing willed. And just as the good and the not-good differ: so too willing this and willing this good. Therefore similarly detesting evil and detesting this or that will also hold themselves by the same reason: but penance is not the

487. Cicero, De inventione, II, 53.

detestation of this or that, but generally of committed evil: therefore it is a general virtue, as it seems.

§ 7. Also, since sin is a certain privation, it will not be specified except by a habit: therefore the privation which is the habit of good in general, is general: therefore the detestation of that privation which is not contracted to a matter or species, is a general detestation: but this is of penance insofar as it is penance: therefore penance is a general virtue.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. Penance detests evil, not any evil whatever, but existing in a proper subject: but this is not general: therefore penance is not a general virtue, but a special one.

§ 2. Also, to detest a sin which is present, because it is vitiated, or because it is base, is a determined and good and difficult act: but virtue is concerning the difficult and the good: therefore that which ordains to this will be some virtue.

§ 3. Also, everything that perfects free choice through a determined act according to the good and the difficult, is a special virtue: but penance is of this kind: therefore it is a special virtue. Proof of the middle premise. Detesting sin with the hope of pardon, is an act reducible essentially to some other virtue, although by command it could be otherwise: therefore this such will be a special virtue which is penance.

SOLUTION. It must be said that a general virtue is spoken of in two ways. In one way it is taken by the Philosopher: in another way by the Saints. For in book V of the Ethics it is said: Justice is a general legal virtue, differing from virtue in general by reason only, not by subject: because virtue is according as it perfects the soul: and justice or injustice is according as it consonant with the law, or not, in the work concerning which the law is:

but in this way penance cannot be called a general virtue, that is, the same as virtue in subject, and differing in reason: because the work of penance is not the general work of all virtues as its work is taken properly, namely the detestation of committed sin because of the hope of pardon and the fear of hell. But if the detestation of sin or sorrow is taken commonly, according as Boethius says, that virtue loves itself and spurns its contrary, then any virtue spurns and detests the vice opposed to it: and in this way the general detestation of vice or sin will be the act of virtue in general. But this is not properly called penance: because all penitence is in a committed act that is not voluntary, that is, to which the will is contrary in that which is done, as is held from the beginning of book III of the Ethics. But virtue in general spurns every vice whether it is done or not.

But general virtue is specially called by the Saints a certain general justice, by which the impious becomes just: which some say is the state of general rectitude to God, to oneself, and to neighbor: and in this way again it is not true that penance is a general virtue. To these modes some add a third, namely that a general virtue is one collecting other virtues integrally, or quasi integrally, according as Chrysostom says, that justice is general: because it is like a vine: and other special virtues are like branches. But I do not understand this thus: but I

488. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II, 5 (1106a 15-17).

understand Chrysostom speaking of legal justice, which is general through the said mode: yet it is not like an integral whole to virtue: but it is called a vine because of the scope of its commonality to the works of other virtues, according as they are referred to the precept of the law: and the others are called branches, because they are particular quasi planted in the reason of legal justice. But in some way in truth it is called a general virtue according to matter, although it has a special form and reason: just like prudence whose object is the eligible towards a moral work, not in one matter, but in every reason: yet in a certain special reason prudence is contracted into a special virtue. But this reason is called by some the order of the work in circumstances and end, according as every virtue is called the inspector of the mean in some way, but prudence simply. And in this way through a certain similitude penance can be called a general virtue: because it has an act which does not determine for itself this or that matter, but rather receives evil or sin in every matter under the reason of a special thing, namely a committed thing, which can obtain pardon.

According to this mode therefore we shall say, that penance is a general virtue with the generality of the matter about which it is: having however a determined reason of existing about it: and therefore it is called special from other virtues.

IT MUST BE SAID therefore to the first, as above, that what recalls defects is twofold, namely by way of form, and by way of something like an efficient and operative [cause] concerning the defective subject, so that it may be removed from the defect. The first is general. The second does not need to be general, but can be special.

To the next it must be said that Augustine speaks there of things recalling individual defects formally.

To the next it must be said that that objection does not prove that penance is general except by the commonality of the matter about which it is, which is like a remote matter. But that is contracted and is made like a proper matter, through the special reason which penance places about it: and this is committed sin, able to have pardon through sorrow, as was said.

To the next it must be said that 'committed' posits the necessity of the committed thing: and according to this penance purging sin is not concerning it: but from the fact that what is committed still is present in some way in the subject, according as the Master says

above in the second book of the Sentences, that sin passes in act, and remains in guilt: and it does not remain indissoluble in the subject, but rather soluble through penance: and in this way penance is concerning committed sin, but insofar as the commission is the cause by which it is in some way in the subject not soluble except through penance.

To the next it must be said that sin is general as to matter: but nevertheless it is restricted by the fact that it is committed concerning the subject: whence from this the sin which is committed is present, and what is not committed is not present: and penance does not seek another speciality: and since the act of penance formally receives that speciality, penance will not be a general virtue, but a special one, just like prudence, as was said before.

489. Peter Lombard, Sententiae, IV, dist. 14, cap. 1.

To the next it must be said that it is true, that the will is determined by the willed thing: but to repent is not to determine evil in such a respect, but rather according as evil is existing in the subject: and through the fact that it is committed, able to have pardon through sorrow: and thus a special will is produced: and therefore it is not similar what is brought for a similar thing in the opposite.

To the next it must be said that sin denotes a privative act, and malice denotes the privation itself: and I well concede that it is not specified except by its opposite: but it is specified by its opposite in two ways, namely by that which is the matter about which it is, or by the reason which it places about the remote matter, which although it belongs to another, yet by determination is made its own: just as prudence which about the matter of chastity or fortitude, places a special reason, and makes it by this proper to itself: and so virtue is also specified on the part of the subject, namely what is present, and through the consequence itself committed, insofar as through a proper privative work it is of this or that virtue. Or better it is said, that penance is not concerning sin insofar as it is solely a privation, but insofar as it is a committed act with a privation: and thus although on the part of the privation it is not specified except by its opposite, yet on the part of the act it can be specified: and in this way penance is concerning it like a special virtue.

But to those things which are objected to the contrary it seems it must be conceded.

Articulus 5 — Whether Penance Is In One Genus, Or In Several

Whether penance is in one genus, or in many?

Then it is asked about this which he says, there, A, § 2: For there is interior penance, and there is exterior, etc.

For from this that is said here, and a little below, it seems penance is placed in a multiple genus: for it is called here a virtue, and a sacrament.

Also, a little below, it is called an act, when Ambrose says, that penance is to weep or bewail past evil things, and not to commit things to be bewailed.

But a little below also a virtue, or grace: since nevertheless grace properly speaking is not a virtue.

Also, further on in the same distinction it is called a sorrow or affliction and bitterness of soul. Therefore penance is in the genus of virtue, and of grace, and of act which is to bewail, and of passion, namely of sorrow, and of sacrament: but since one and the same species is not in diverse genera, it seems that in these ways it is not said univocally, but equivocally.

Also, it seems that the Master speaks falsely in the Littera, when he says that exterior penance is a sacrament: because, as was often held above, in a sacrament a certain thing is that which is a sacrament only, and a certain thing which is a reality only, and a certain thing which is a reality and

490. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II, 4 (1105b 28).

a sacrament: and this is always the interior and truest sacrament: therefore in penance it is similar: therefore the exterior is not solely a sacrament.

Also it is said below, and the Master says in the Littera, that in penance there is a certain thing which is reality and sacrament, and it is interior: therefore he seems contrary to himself to this which he says here.

FURTHER it is asked, Since others are only sacraments, like baptism, and confirmation, and the Eucharist, and so for the others: why is this one a virtue and a sacrament, and grace, and sorrow, and a certain act, just as it was already held, that it is placed in diverse genera?

Also further it is asked, Whether penance according as it is a virtue, is the reality of penance according as it is a sacrament?

And it seems that yes: because

§ 1. This is the reality of a sacrament, which is caused by it: but the virtue of penance is caused by the sacrament of penance itself: therefore it is its reality. Proof of the minor. Every virtue is given to one truly receiving the sacrament of penance: therefore also this one: therefore it is its reality.

§ 2. Also, against the disease according as it is a fault, two sacraments are ordered, namely baptism and penance: but the fullness of virtues is the reality of one, namely of baptism: therefore also the reality of the other, as it seems, because sin also is not expelled except through a virtue.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. Although every virtue is given in baptism, yet it is not congruously said that chastity is the effect or reality of baptism: because just as causes are proper, so they have proper effects in which they differ from others: but baptism and penance are diverse sacraments: therefore they have proper effects: but a proper effect cannot be a virtue, because this effect is caused by many things: therefore it is not the effect of this sacrament, as it seems.

§ 2. Also, unless someone detests the committed sin, he does not receive the sacrament of penance, nor absolution by the power of the keys: therefore since to detest is of the virtue of penance, it seems that before penance according as it is a sacrament, he has penance according as it is a virtue: but a cause always precedes the caused thing according to being and reason: therefore the sacrament of penance is not the cause of the virtue of penance, according as it is such, as it seems.

SOLUTION. It must be said to this, as it seems, that penance is not taken in one signification, according as it falls in the diverse aforementioned genera: but since in sin there are many things, and penance is contrary to sin according to diverse reasons of contracting sins, it falls in diverse genera: for in sin there is a fault, which is contrary to grace: and there is an act there which causes its existence in the subject, because although its act passes, yet the sin still remains in the subject, as was said before: and again sin is a certain wound of natural good,

491. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, IV, 9 (1128b 10-15).

and a despoilment of gratuitous things: and it is the same with a certain delight in the work. Therefore according to the contrariety which penance has to it in that which is a certain fault, thus penance is grace, and is placed in the genus of grace: but in that it is remaining in the subject from the commission, thus its contrary is virtue, and it is placed in the genus of virtue: but sin according as it is a certain wound of the soul, thus has a medicine which is a sacrament, and in this way penance falls in the genus of sacrament: and according as it is in a delectable work, the act which is to bewail or sorrow is contrary to it: and according as it is a certain lust or from lust, the passion which is sadness which is called penitence is contrary.

But if someone should say, that these are differences considered according to certain modes, more than according to reality: since those things which are in diverse genera, differ according to reality: and thus this distinction is not competent. It must be said, that this distinction is according to reality: because in truth penance which is in the whole, that is, as to every mode and all things which are in sin, is: a sorrow proceeding from a habit of free choice informed by grace, having a certain act destructive of sin, and manifested in a sign, and inwardly by the power of the keys: whence penance singularly is called all those things, namely grace, and habit, and act, and sacrament, and sorrow, and also that which is extra enjoined through the keys: and therefore it falls equivocally into diverse genera, although in all significations it has an analogy to one thing, which is to be contrary to a sin which is committed.

To the next it must be said that the Master here takes the exterior, according as it attests to the interior: and thus it is clear, that the objection is not valid. Or it can be said, that the Master here speaks of that which is a sacrament only: but the first solution is better, as is proved below, in distinction XXII, last chapter.

To the next it must be said that this sacrament is ordered against personal sin, insofar as it is proper and personal: but this consists in a voluntary blameworthy act, by the fact that it is base: and therefore it necessarily has a twofold contrary remedy, namely insofar as it is an act, and insofar as it is a wound: and in the first way virtue is contrary to it, in the second way the sacrament of medicine: and therefore penance which in whole is contrary to it, is a virtue and a sacrament by diverse consideration. But other sacraments are not against sin thus considered, but rather are against original [sin], which is not done, but contracted: or they are against the punishments of sin, as is proved above in the question on the division and sufficiency of the sacraments; and therefore because those do not regard a voluntary act about which is virtue and vice, therefore they in no way have the reason of a virtue.

To the next it must be said that the reality of the sacrament of penance is not properly the virtue of penance, as is clear through the contrary objection, which is good, and renders the cause, why it is not its reality: because the reality of the sacrament is twofold, namely proper, and common, or conjoined to it: proper indeed is the special grace curing that special disease against which the sacrament was instituted: and having one sacramental grace, another which is properly the virtue of another sacrament is not had because of this. But because no grace is

492. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II, 7 (1108a 35).

given in part, but in whole, every virtue already accompanies that grace: and therefore it receives every virtue: and this is a consequent effect: and in this way proceed the objections proving the virtue of penance to be an effect of the sacrament of penance. But those things which are objected to the contrary, although according to the argument they are of little value, I concede. But I say, it is of little value: because it was said above in the questions on baptism, that sacraments are compared in two ways to inducing one effect, namely according as they are in the purpose to receive and according as they are received in reality: and thus nothing prohibits, that coming to receive the sacrament of penance, one has the effect...

Articulus 6 — Whether Penance Is Justice

Whether penance is justice?

Whether penance is justice?

Then it is asked about this which is said, there, A, § 2: Penance is called from punishing, etc. And three things are asked, of which the first is, Whether penance is justice: as the Master seems to intimate in the Littera. Secondly, Whether it is charity? Thirdly, If it is a special virtue, in what power of the soul is it?

But to the first it is objected thus: § 1. Upon that of Psalm 4:6: Sacrifice a sacrifice of justice, the Gloss says: What is more just, than that each one should be angry at his own evils rather than at others', and punishing himself through penance and satisfaction should offer himself to God? Therefore penance is a species of justice, or justice itself.

§ 2. Also, Isidore: Then anyone establishes judgment of himself, when through worthy penance he condemns his own depraved deeds: but judgment is the execution of justice: therefore it seems that penance is the same as justice.

§ 3. Also, below in the Littera it is said, that penance is a virtue, or grace, by which we bewail and hate committed evils with the purpose of emendation. But the purpose of emendation belongs to directive justice, as the Philosopher seems to intend. Therefore penance is justice, or a species of it.

§ 4. Also, through reason the same is seen: For Aristotle in book V of the Ethics distinguishes two species of justice: one of which he calls distributive, but the other directive: but directive is that which satisfies the injured party as much as it exceeded by injuring, or by inflicting an injury: but this penance does especially: therefore penance is a species of justice, as it seems.

§ 5. Also, by the Canons a priest is called a judge in the cause of penance, so that he may enjoin satisfaction according to the measure of the offense: therefore it seems that penance regards what is ordained by a judge and judged: but this proceeds from justice, as Tully says: therefore penance seems to be a certain justice.

§ 6. Also, this is seen from the Gloss on Epistle I to the Corinthians 11:31, upon that: If we would judge ourselves, we would not at all be judged. For Augustine says in this Gloss, that a man

should ascend the tribunal of his own mind: but let conscience be the witness, and the fear of God the executioner: but it is established that he speaks of penitential judgment: therefore it seems that penance is a certain justice, whose execution is such a judgment.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. Special justice (as the Philosopher says) properly taken is not of a man to himself, but rather a metaphorically spoken justice: but penance is of a man to himself: therefore penance is not justice.

§ 2. Also, the Philosopher says that in justice there is a certain middle equality between loss and gain: but according to the equality of the loss the penitent does not restore the loss, but much less: therefore penance is not justice, as it seems.

§ 3. Also, Gregory: To repent is to cut out the root of sins, and not to indulge further entry to their suggestions: but the roots of sins do not attend to any proper debt: but all properly taken justice is about some debt: therefore penance is not properly taken justice.

SOLUTION. It must be said that this question is light, and of little value. For penance can be considered in habit or in act. If in habit, it is a distinct habit moving free choice essentially into the detestation of sin under the hope of pardon: and it is not justice, nor properly a species of justice,

of which justice is predicated like a genus of a species: as common justice of distributive justice, and of directive justice. But if it is considered in the act which is to detest: then its act can be commanded by justice according to what Augustine says, that penance is a certain sorrowing vengeance, punishing in oneself what one sorrows to have committed. And according to what Anselm says, that the penitent restores to God the due honor: and such words the Saints frequently say: yet justice does not properly elicit this act, but only commands it: and then it assumes the reason of a debt. But according as it is considered in habit, it is a secondary habit taken alongside a principal one which is cardinal justice: just as also other secondary virtues are taken alongside the cardinal ones, which neither are cardinal, nor species of cardinals, like magnanimity, liberality, magnificence, meekness, and the like, of which it is determined in book IV of the Ethics. And through this the response to the objections is clear.

It must be said therefore to the first, that that Gloss speaks in that sense by which the imperative of penance is justice: yet there is another habit eliciting that act. And in this way proceed the objections brought to that part: whence the solution to all is clear.

But to those things which are objected to the contrary, it must be said that justice properly is not of a man to himself, unless as the Philosopher says, it is of a man to himself insofar as there are diverse things in one man, like the superior and inferior powers, and in a certain way it is just for the inferior to serve, and the superior to command: and this justice is not called mathematical by the Philosopher. Nor is it properly the justice of a man to his own, as they are his own: as of a father to a son of the family, or of a servant to a master, or of a husband to a wife: because a servant and a son of the family and a wife do not have their own except in the name of the master and father and husband: and that properly is not rendered to

494. Prayer of Manasseh, 8.

them unless they are equal in something, and unless one is in the power of the other, like a wife and husband in matrimony, and the like. Broadly, however, there is justice between these persons, which justice the Philosopher calls directive justice. But justice properly is between those who by their own right are peers and equals, so that the own of one is not the own of the other: and in this way penance, according as its act is commanded by justice, is a certain parity of right between God and man: so that God indeed is injured in His own, and man is superabounding and injuring: but penance is an equality, restoring to God as much as He was injured and man injured.

To the next it must be said that there is equality of reality, and equality accepted by him who was injured, which is the equality of estimation [reputation]. And we cannot restore an equal of reality: but an equal which is of estimation, namely because God does not exact more from us than He gives us from the gift of grace: just as if I owed you a hundred, and gave you ninety-nine, and I restored to you one, I would have justly restored.

To that which is asked concerning Gregory, it must be said that it is understood of the roots of a committed sin: and this can be done by the command of justice, although it is not always necessary for it to be done thus, as was said.

Articulus 7 — Whether Penance Is Charity Or Another Virtue

Whether penance is charity or another virtue?

Secondly it is asked, Whether it is charity, or another virtue, or some species of it? § 1. For to this some object, although it has little appearance: as Augustine says upon that of Psalm 89:17: Burnt with fire and dug up, Gloss: Every sin arises from badly persuading love, and also fear: for from love it happens, that...[506] Therefore in the opposite similarly...

§ 1. ...he fears for himself.

§ 2. ...it will be that every hatred proceeds from the love of the good: therefore this hatred on account of an enacted sin proceeds from the love of the good, and especially of the highest good: and this is charity: therefore the first thing in penance is charity. Moreover, from the motive principle the act itself must be drawn to its species: because that informs the act, which first moves the power: therefore penance will be an act of charity, as it seems: therefore habitual penance is charity.

§ 3. 3. Also, love of the good universally is in the concupiscible power: but from that proceeds the hatred of evil: therefore also the hatred of evil is in the concupiscible power: and the first perfection of the concupiscible power is charity: therefore the first love of the good and the hatred of evil belong to charity: and these belong to penance: therefore penance is charity.

§ 4. But to the contrary it seems that 1. It is patience through that which is held below from the words of Chrysostom: Perfect penance compels the sinner to sustain all things willingly: but to sustain belongs to patience: therefore penance is patience.

495. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VI, 5 (1140b 20).

§ 5. 2. Further it seems, that it is temperance. For Hilary says in Book II On the Trinity: That is the perfect affection of compunction, which repels all the affections of carnal desires from itself.

§ 6. 3. Further it seems, that it is prudence. Luke 6:21, upon that verse: Blessed are ye that weep now, etc., the Gloss: Behold the prudence by which it is considered how miserable are these earthly things, and how blessed the heavenly. Now to mourn belongs to penance: therefore penance also is prudence.

§ 7. SOLUTION. To this and all such things it must be said that penance is not charity: but it is one thing for it to be an act of some virtue naturally, or per se elicitively, as the Masters say, because it actively elicits such an act by the mode of a certain nature: just as a hot thing elicits from itself heating. And it is another thing for some act to be of some virtue by some command: and this act has something of the nature of the commanding virtue. And it is another thing for an act to be of some virtue as promoting and expediting by some aid toward the act: because, as Saint Gregory says, the virtues invite each other to feasts and mutual aids. [507] Now all the objections introduced here do not prove that the act of penance belongs to this or that virtue, except by way of assistance.

§ 8. BUT NEVERTHELESS it must be known that the first two arguments are worth nothing at all. For what is first objected there, that all fear is from love: this is plainly true: but that love is a habitual self-complacency, which is said to be the root of vice, not some vice determined in species or genus. Similarly, when it is said that hatred of evil proceeds from the love of the good, that love is not charity or another virtue, but a habitual complacency even of the natural good, according to how the proposition is generally taken. If, however, it is taken particularly, because sometimes the hatred of sin is from the charity of God, when sin is hated insofar as it is contrary to the beloved God: then that act will be by the command of charity. And the form of arguing is invalid: because it proceeds from all particulars.

§ 9. To the other it must be said that this is false: the love of the good universally is in the concupiscible power: for whether the word universally determines the word good: so that the sense is, 'the love of the good taken universally, is in the concupiscible power': or whether it places a distribution around the word love, and determines the composition, the proposition is false: for the good is particular, which it loves from the concupiscible power, as all know who have already learned elsewhere that the concupiscible power is a sensible part of the soul. Similarly the good is something of each individual object which the power loves: just as the concupiscible power also loves its own good. Hence the proposition is false in every way.

§ 10. If however it is said that the good simply is loved by the concupiscible power, and by others its own good and in a qualified sense, the proposition is still false, if we agree that the concupiscible power is a sensible part of the soul: as all the authorities both of the Saints and of the Philosophers concordantly pronounce. If however we say that the proposition is understood concerning the human concupiscible power which some say is a part of the rational soul: then it is worth nothing to the point at hand: because, as was shown before, that

496. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, V, 3 (1131a 10 sqq).

love is not universally charity: and if sometimes it is charity, then the act of penance will be by the command only of charity, and not essentially. And the form of arguing from equals is invalid.

§ 11. To the other it must be said that to sustain is taken equivocally concerning patience and penance: for patience is in dangers, and in afflictions inflicted by violence from without: but in penance it is the sustaining of pain assumed voluntarily: hence the objection is invalid.

§ 12. TO THE OTHER it must be said that this objection does not prove anything, except that temperance by way of an addition promotes penance: and in the same way proceeds that which is finally introduced concerning prudence: and such adaptations of the Saints consider certain similitudes, and not properties: and they prove very little concerning the point at hand.

Articulus 8 — In Which Power Of The Soul Is Penance

In which power of the soul is penance?

§ 13. Thirdly it is inquired, In which power of the soul is penance?

§ 14. 1. Now it seems that it is in synderesis. For if some act always belongs to something, and to another not always, it more essentially belongs to that whose it always is, than to that whose it is not always: but it always belongs to synderesis to detest sin, whereas not always to any other power of the soul: therefore this act properly belongs to synderesis: therefore also the habit from which it is elicited; but that habit is penance, as has been said: therefore penance is in synderesis.

§ 15. 2. Also, it seems that it is of reason: because upon that verse of Psalm 42:5: Why are you sad, O my soul? etc. The Gloss there says: Because there reason consoles sensuality saying: I will still confess to him, that is, I will do penance: but to whichever power it belongs to do penance, in that is penance as in a subject: but it belongs to reason to do penance, as has already been proved: therefore penance is in reason as in a subject.

§ 16. 3. Now it seems that it is of the concupiscible power: because the love of the good and the hatred of the opposite evil are concerning the same thing: but the love of the good belongs to the concupiscible power, and the hatred of the opposite evil, and the hatred of sin is penance: therefore penance is in the concupiscible power.

§ 17. 4. But it seems again that it is in the irascible power. For upon that verse of Matthew 13:33: The kingdom of heaven is like to leaven, which a woman took, etc., the Gloss says, that in the rational we possess prudence, in the concupiscible the desire of virtues, and in the irascible the hatred of vices: but to hate vices is to repent: therefore penance is in the irascible power.

§ 18. 5. Also, it seems that it is in free choice. For it belongs to the same power to sin and to do penance: but it belongs to free choice to sin: therefore also to do penance: therefore penance is in free choice.

497. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, V, 3-4 (1131a 31, 1132a 1).

§ 19. 6. Also, it seems that it is in all the powers simultaneously. For a virtue is in that power in which its matter is: but the matter of penance concerning which it acts, is sin: and diverse sins are in individual powers: therefore penance is in all simultaneously.

§ 20. But again this seems impossible: because it is not possible for one and numerically the same form to be in diverse subjects: but penance is one numerical form: therefore it is only in one subject: but all powers simultaneously are diverse subjects: therefore penance is not in all simultaneously.

§ 21. SOLUTION. It must be said that although some say that the powers of the soul are the subjects of both virtues and vices, nevertheless this is not true: and what they say is not said by subtle reasoning. For it is impossible that something be a subject not having some property of matter: hence the soul is the subject of all those things which are in the soul according to that which it is, and not according to that by which it is: but it is true that since the soul is perfected by the habits and forms which are in it, in a certain way it is perfected as to this power, and in a certain way as to another: and in this way perhaps they mean to say that a virtue is in this or that power. Therefore I say, without prejudice to those who say otherwise, that that habit which is penance is in the irascible together with reason participating in something of reason, according as it is ordered to reason; and this seems to be from the saying of Augustine, that penance is a vengeance punishing in itself what it grieves to have committed. Also from this, that penance is said to be indignation against oneself for a perpetrated sin. And again the name itself implies this, which sounds like 'holding to punishment', by which a man punishes himself.

§ 22. To the first therefore which is objected, it must be said that synderesis does not murmur against sin in that way in which the irascible power does: because synderesis murmurs against sin universally, not perpetrated insofar as it is in the subject: but the irascible power murmurs just as the penitent murmurs: because this is said improperly: but it detests perpetrated sin according as the perpetration is the cause that it is in the subject and in particular: and thus the solution to the first is manifest.

§ 23. To the other it must be said that reason is spoken of here as the orderer of the other powers: and therefore what belongs to the other powers is attributed to it, since it is their orderer.

§ 24. To the other it must be said that in the concupiscible power is the love of the good generally, just as was also said in the preceding question. If however it is conceded: then let it be said that the hatred of vice is twofold. One which is the dissent to vice in general and follows the love of virtue in general: and this love does not belong to the concupiscible power properly, but appropriately, since it belongs commonly to all. But there is also another special hatred with indignation and insurrection against it, insofar as it is in the subject: and this belongs to penance and the irascible power, and this is not opposed to the love of virtue or of the good in general, but in the species by which the irascible power loves its proper object.

§ 25. To that however which follows, although we concede the conclusion, nevertheless it must be known that that Gloss speaks not of the proper features of the powers, but rather of appropriated ones: and concerning such things, what we were able to understand we have written in our conclusions On the Soul in the tractate on the motive powers.

§ 26. To the other which follows it must be said that not every sin is in free choice as in a subject: nor in the soul according to free choice: but every sin is in free choice as in the cause causing and completing the sin: for reason begins through the determination that it should so be done, but the will completes it. Then note that some concede this, and use this reason: because the inferior powers are moved movers: hence if the virtues were in them, they would be virtues moved by reason: and since they are gratuitous, it would be necessary that the movement of nature on the part of reason, or of free choice, precede the movement of grace, and this is incongruous: therefore they say that no virtue is in the inferior powers. And if this is true what they say: then it seems that whatever is said at the end of the first book of the Ethics, and by Damascene, and by Gregory of Nyssa, and by Avicenna, is all false: and this I consider absurd: and therefore I say that the movement by which reason orders and rules the inferior powers, is equivocal to the movement of the gratuitous virtue informing the work: and therefore if that preceded this, it would not on this account be prior unless it were of the same nature.

§ 27. Furthermore, it is not incongruous that reason informed by grace precedes the concupiscible or irascible power informed by grace: because the movement of grace will always be first.

§ 28. To the last it must be said that penance is not in just any power, although the matter concerning which it acts is in all or can be: and this is the reason why it is not in all according to what concerns penance itself, but only in the irascible power: for it belongs to the irascible power to detest a perpetrated sin under the hope of pardon, and insofar as the sin is to it unworthy and contemptible: and in this way sin is made the proper matter of the irascible power: and in this way penance is concerning it.

Articulus 9 — Whether Penance Is Prior To The Other Virtues

Whether penance is prior to the other virtues?

§ 29. Next it is inquired concerning that which is said, there, A, § 2: The virtue of penance is conceived by fear, etc.

§ 30. And three things are inquired here: first concerning its order to the other virtues, both on the part of the intellect and on the part of the affection. And secondly, how is it true what he says, that it is conceived by fear? Thirdly, why is it not said that it is conceived by love?

§ 31. To the first however it is objected: 1. Through this which is held in Matthew 3:2, in the Gloss: Do penance, etc., where the Gloss says: The first virtue is to destroy the old man through penance: therefore no virtue precedes penance.

499. Galatians 5:22-23; cf. Ambrose, De paradiso, c. 3.

§ 32. 2. Also, penance is the cause of justification: but in justification all virtues are infused: therefore by consequence it is the cause of every virtue: therefore it is itself first among all virtues: because the cause is prior to the caused. Now the first premise is proved by Hilary in Book I On the Trinity, where he speaks thus: Just as we believe all sins are remitted in baptism, or by martyrdom we believe no sin is imputed: so by the fruitful compunction of penance we confess that sin is wiped away: for the tears of penitents are reputed before God for baptism.

§ 33. Also, Bernard says that vices must be extirpated before virtues are implanted: but penance extirpates vices: therefore it is itself before the implantation of virtues: therefore no virtue precedes it.

§ 34. Also, Augustine: No one unless he repents of his old life, can begin a new one: but the rejection of the old life is before the beginning of the new: therefore penance is before the beginning of the new life: moreover the beginning of the new life is through the virtues: therefore penance is before the other virtues.

§ 35. 3. Also, Hebrews 6:1, it is said: Not laying again the foundation of penance from dead works: but the foundation is first: therefore penance is first.

§ 36. BUT TO THE CONTRARY: 1. Life is the first act of the soul in the body, or the first act of substance: but life in morals proportionally corresponds to life in nature: therefore also in morals the first act is life: but this is the act of faith: therefore faith is the first virtue. Proof that it is the act of faith, Romans 1:17, and Hebrews 10:38: The just man lives by faith.

§ 37. 2. Also, the first thing purifying the heart is the first purgative virtue: but faith is the first thing purifying the heart: therefore it is the first virtue. Proof of the minor premise, Acts 15:9: Purifying their hearts by faith.

§ 38. 3. Also, Saint Gregory and Bede say that fear is born from faith: therefore faith is prior to fear: but what is prior to the prior, is prior to the posterior: but fear is prior to penance, because penance is conceived by fear, as is said in the text: therefore faith is prior to penance: therefore penance is not the first virtue.

§ 39. 4. Also, in every work or movement the directing is prior to the executing: for it is prior to open one's eyes, than to walk: therefore it is prior to see what is to be grieved over, than to grieve: but this faith shows: therefore faith is before penance.

§ 40. SOLUTION. It must be said that the habits of the virtues are all infused simultaneously in time: nevertheless the nature of one has an order to another according to the order of their acts: because acts are prior to habits. Hence, without prejudice to certain moderns who say otherwise, I say with the ancients that by that priority faith is first, but penance is proximate to justification, and the fear of the Lord is a middle virtue, and hope similarly. Now this can be expressly seen from the very movement of the penitent, concerning which Gregory says that between hope and fear we are stabilized by faith: for he that cometh to God, must first believe that he is, and is a rewarder of the good, and a retributor of the wicked. Now from this habitual and actual concept had beforehand, there follows the fear of punishments, and the

500. Cicero, De inventione, II, 52.

hope of goods, and of pardon, or of goods through pardon: and from this follows sorrow for sins with the hope of pardon from the consideration of punishment. And this the ancients concordantly write and say: although certain moderns by some deliberation attempt to say otherwise.

§ 41. It must be said therefore to the first, that the first virtue there is called the proximate one, not that which is first according to the order of nature. Or it is better said that penance is called first, not simply the first of the virtues, but on the part of the justifiable subject: because on his part it is prior to cast away vices, than to be imbued with virtues: and since vices are cast away through penance, it itself will be first on the part of the matter of its subject. And this is first in generation, and not formally: and it is not first in nature except in that mode by which matter is called nature: and this is by posteriority, as the Philosopher maintains.

§ 42. To the other it must be said that from the fact that it is the cause of justification, it is not proved to be prior except in the stated mode. For the cause of justification is twofold, namely the one removing the contrary, and there is the formal cause: but the formal cause of justification is not penance insofar as it is such, but rather justice: but it is the one removing the contrary on the part of the matter. By this also the solution to the sayings of the three Doctors is clear, namely of Hilary, Bernard, and Augustine.

§ 43. To the other it must be said that it is called the foundation of goods on the part of the preparation of the subject or the place where it is to be built, and not as the first underlying thing which is an essential part of the building: because in this way faith is the foundation.

§ 44. And by this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 10 — How Penance Is Conceived By Fear

How is penance conceived by fear?

§ 45. Secondly it is inquired, how is penance conceived by fear?

§ 46. But it seems that it is not conceived: because all virtues are given simultaneously by infusion: therefore none is conceived by another, as it seems.

§ 47. Furthermore, how is it conceived rather than generated?

§ 48. Further it is inquired, if it is conceived by fear, by what fear is it conceived?

§ 49. It seems, however, that by servile fear: because that is prior, and flees punishment: therefore it induces sorrow concerning the merit or guilt of punishment: and this is the act of penance: therefore it is conceived by servile fear.

§ 50. To the contrary: The conceived thing is within the conceiving thing: therefore penance is within the conceiving fear, but penance is with grace: therefore the fear by which penance is conceived is gratuitous: but servile fear is not gratuitous: therefore it is not conceived by servile fear, as it seems, but by initial fear.

§ 51. SOLUTION. It must be said that 'conceived' means taken within, imperfect: and therefore since there are two things between which the penitent is moved, as Gregory says, namely hope and fear: and there are two things in penance, namely sorrow, and informing grace, which is followed by joy concerning the sorrow, as will be held below. On the part of hope, grace and joy hold themselves more, which are perfective of penance insofar as it is meritorious: but on the part of fear, sorrow holds itself more, which is material in penance, and in itself imperfect. And this is manifest from the fact that contrition has a common sorrow with attrition: although nevertheless attrition is an unformed sorrow concerning sins: and because conceived means taken within imperfectly, and on the part of sorrow holds itself to fear, it is rather said that it is conceived by fear, than by hope or another virtue.

§ 52. To the first therefore it must be said that although all are infused simultaneously in time, nevertheless they have a certain order according to the nature of the acts of the virtues themselves, and also on the part of the subject to whom they are infused, as was determined in the preceding question.

§ 53. To the other it must be said that to be generated means the building up of the perfect: and according to this penance is reduced also to fear as to an effect, as it encloses penance within itself.

§ 54. To the other it must be said that either fear can be signified when it is said, The virtue of penance is conceived by fear. Now by 'conceiving' can be signified the efficient agent outside, and closing penance within itself, not simply, but imperfectly: and this is in the sorrow of attrition.

§ 55. And thus what is objected to the contrary does not follow: because penance thus accepted is like an unformed fetus, therefore it is without grace: and therefore servile fear generates it and encloses it within itself. If however by 'conceiving' is understood generating within and enclosing penance having the form of grace, just as formed fetuses are enclosed: then the conceiving thing will be initial fear: and the first argument is invalid, because the showing of punishment is not the cause of penance insofar as it is such, but of sorrow only.

Articulus 11 — Why Penance Is Not Conceived By Love, Or By Another Virtue

Why is penance not conceived by love, or another virtue?

§ 56. Thirdly it is inquired, why is it not conceived by love or another virtue?

§ 57. For it seems to be conceived by faith, because 1. Faith is in the intellect, as was held before: therefore it seems to be the conceiving thing.

§ 58. 2. Also, love is the mother of virtues: and it belongs to a mother to conceive: therefore it seems that it is conceived by love.

§ 59. 3. Also, as was held above, love is also the root and cause of fear: therefore love is the first conceiving thing of both fear and penance.

502. Gratian, Decretum, pars III, De consecratione, dist. 2, c. 41. (Cf. Jerome).

§ 60. 4. Also, the penance turning to God, which is truly penance, is love, and the first is love, as was held: therefore it is the first cause of penance: therefore the conceiving thing.

§ 61. SOLUTION. It must be said that all those questions are light. It must be said nevertheless, that faith is first in the intellect, and love according to the order to the good is the first of virtues in the affection, and fear is the first of virtues in the affection according to the withdrawal from evil. And so according to diverse considerations nothing prohibits diverse things from being first: but nevertheless the thing conceiving imperfect penance, and enclosing it in itself, this is the efficient cause of penance immediately conjoined to it, and this is nothing but fear, as was shown before. Now through the first distinction the solution of the objections is clear: because all proceed upon that distinction.

Articulus 12 — Whether The Definition Of Penance Is Well Assigned By Ambrose

Whether the definition of penance is well assigned by Ambrose?

§ 62. Next it is inquired concerning that which is said, there, A, § 3: For penance is, as Ambrose says, to lament past evils, etc.[508]

§ 63. For it is objected against this definition: because

1. As the Philosopher says in the VI book of the Topics, they err who put an act in the definition of a habit, as its genus:[509] but to lament past evils is an act: therefore it does not fall into the definition of penance which is a habit.

§ 64. 2. Also, to lament means a lamentation: but not every penitent can have lamentation: therefore it is not essential to penance to lament past evils.

§ 65. 3. If perhaps you say that to lament means a lamentation of the heart, not of the eyes, or of the sense in the flesh. It seems that it is still not essential to penance to lament: for to lament, whether it be interior or exterior, means an act elicited from a power informed by grace. For this to be elicited, time is required, before which the penitent himself is in grace which is infused in an instant. Let us suppose therefore that he has grace, and does not elicit the act of lamenting, and dies thus: it is certain that he will be saved since he has grace: therefore he had penance availing for salvation without lamentation in act: therefore it is not essential to penance to lament: therefore it ought not to be so defined: Penance is to lament past evils.

§ 66. 4. If you say that to lament is necessary for the penitent on account of the sorrow which is supposed in the name of penance: for one who sorrows cannot not lament. This still seems to be false: because either the infusion of grace precedes that sorrow, or not. If not: then it is the sorrow of attrition, and not of penance: therefore lamenting which essentially defines penance does not follow it: and thus what Ambrose says would be nothing. If grace precedes it: then in the instant in which grace is infused, all virtues are infused simultaneously with it: therefore also penance: and this infusion is followed by sorrow which cannot be except in

503. Peter Lombard, Sententiae, IV, dist. 13.

time: and between the instant of the infusion of the virtues, and the time of sorrow, there is time: therefore there is some time in which penance is a virtue, and there is no sorrow, or lamentation: therefore it is not essential to penance to sorrow and to lament, as it seems.

§ 67. 5. If perhaps you say that the sorrow of attrition is the sorrow of contrition according to the opinion of those who say that natural things become gratuitous. This still seems to be false: because, Matthew 3:8, upon that verse: Bring forth fruit worthy of penance, etc.[510] The Gloss: Discretion is in penance which sets the fear of God and the dread of punishments before the eyes, recollecting ancient turpitude. Thus the sorrow of the heart breaks out into weeping: because there are no wounds without pain, unless the vitals of the members have become mortified. It is grace that feels, and feeling seeks health. Thus the Gloss.[511] Therefore grace gives feeling, as is said in the last part of the Gloss: therefore grace precedes sorrow, as a cause its effect: and so the proposition is held.

§ 68. Also it is objected concerning this that he says, Past evils.

§ 69. 1. For past evils cannot not be past: but it is foolish to lament what cannot not be: therefore every penitent is foolish.

§ 70. 2. Also, through penance the sinner is made conformable to the divine will: therefore he wills what God wills: but God wills the past to have been done: therefore also the sinner wills the past to have been done: but no wise man laments what he wills to have been: therefore the penitent who is wise, does not lament past evils, as it seems.

§ 71. 3. If perhaps you say that although with respect to necessary past things there is no absolute will, nevertheless there is a velleity which is the same as a conditioned will, namely that he would will past evils not to be, if this were possible: therefore according to this the penitent simply wills past evils to have been done, and under a condition would will them not to be: therefore simply he does not lament past evils: although nevertheless Ambrose implies above, that he laments past evils.

§ 72. Further it is inquired concerning this that he says, Evils, etc.

§ 73. For either he laments evils which are, or evils which are not. If evils which are, since they are not evils unless when they are present, it seems that they are present: but opposites are not present simultaneously: therefore when evils are present, virtues are not present, nor grace: therefore when he laments evils, he does not have grace nor virtues: therefore such a lamentation is not the lamentation of the virtue of penance, and informed by grace, which is false. If however he laments evils which are not. To the contrary: No one sorrows concerning that which is not, according as it is not: therefore he does not lament it: therefore he does not lament evils which are not.

§ 74. Further it is objected concerning this that he says, And not to commit again things to be lamented.

504. Jerome (cf. Gratian, Decretum, II, C. 24, q. 3).

§ 75. 1. For through that particle it expressly seems that he who suffers a relapse, has never repented: and this immediately below in this same distinction is condemned as heresy.

§ 76. 2. Furthermore, it seems that this apposition is not essential to penance. First indeed through the definition of Ambrose, which will be posited below: True penance is the sorrow of the heart and the bitterness of the soul for the evils which each one has committed.[512] For in this the whole being of penance is explicated: and yet nothing is touched upon concerning future sins.

§ 77. 3. The same seems by reason: For penance is with respect to past things, as is accepted from the beginning of the III book of the Ethics:[513] therefore it is not to be defined with respect to future things.

§ 78. 4. Also, Boethius says there is a topic from commonly occurring accidents: he repented: therefore he sinned.[514] But there is not from commonly occurring accidents: he repented: therefore he will beware of future sin: therefore it seems that penance respects the past, and not the future: therefore penance is not to be defined by the future.

§ 79. 5. Also, penance differs from caution: for penance is not caution, nor conversely. Since therefore caution is with respect to the future, penance will not be of the same, as it seems.

§ 80. 6. Also, to repent is not penance: therefore the definition of penance is not the definition of what it is to repent: but immediately in the Text it is said, that to repent is to bewail prior committed evils, and not to commit things to be bewailed: which is wholly the same as the prior definition: therefore it seems that the Master errs in the Text.

§ 81. 7. Also, it seems that the parts of this definition are badly ordered: because Augustine in the book On Ecclesiastical Dogmas defines it thus: True penance is not to admit things to be repented of, and to bewail things admitted.[515] Therefore what was with respect to the future, ought to be the prior part in the order of the definition: and that which is with respect to the past, ought to be the posterior.

§ 82. Further it is inquired here, Whether this definition belongs to the sacrament of penance, or to the virtue of penance?

§ 83. Now it seems that not to the sacrament: because it is essential to a sacrament to be a sign and a cause: but nothing here is posi-

...is defined as being a cause and a sign insofar as it is of this kind: therefore, it is not given concerning penance as it is a sacrament.

§ 2. Also, the sacrament of penance, as is said below, has parts: contrition, confession, and satisfaction: and nothing is posited that responds to confession and satisfaction; therefore this definition is not given concerning the sacrament of penance.

On the contrary: To all those to whom penance is enjoined by a priest, it is specially commanded that they lament past things and not commit future things: therefore it seems that what he says is understood concerning the sacrament of penance.

505. Peter Lombard, Sententiae, IV, dist. 14, cap. 1.

SOLUTION. It must be said that this definition is given through its effect, and it is not, strictly speaking, a definition, but a kind of assignment (description): for an act is the effect of a habit, on the grounds that a habit moves the free choice of nature to such an act. And it touches on two things which belong to penance according as it is an exercised act. One is what is essential, and this is to lament past evils; and the other is what coexists with it, so that what is essential may be efficacious: and this is not to commit the things to be lamented: and therefore some ancients said that this is the foundation for the first, because without it the first avails nothing.

TO THE FIRST, therefore, it must be said that the saying of the Philosopher is understood concerning definitions given through the essence of the thing defined; but this one is given through its proper effect.

And if it is objected that a cause is prior to its effect, and therefore a cause should not be defined through its effect. It must be said that priority is twofold, namely, with respect to us and absolutely: absolutely, indeed, a cause is prior to its effect; but with respect to us, an effect can be prior to a cause. And thus the definition is given, which is a kind of description from what is prior with respect to us.

To the other it must be said that to lament is briefly said to be sorrowing in act or in habit; and it is the essential act of penance, and therefore it is posited in its definition. And what is brought forward by the objection made must well be conceded, insofar as sorrow is always supposed in the penitent, to whom it is always essentially conjoined to sorrow.

TO WHAT is objected to the contrary, it must be said that by nature sorrowing is prior to the infusion of grace, although in time sorrowing from the information of grace and the infusion of grace are simultaneous. But I say 'by nature' according as nature is called matter: and this is evident from what the Doctors say, namely that four things are required for the justification of the ungodly, namely the movement of free choice toward sin, the movement of free choice toward God, the remission of guilt, and the infusion of grace. Now the movement of free choice toward sin is detestation with sorrow. And thus it is evident that since penance is here defined from what is prior with respect to us, that sorrow by nature precedes grace, according as nature is matter, so that it first notes priority on the part of the subject and matter.

To that, however, which is objected against this, it must be said that something false is supposed in the objection: because although between an instant and an instant there is time according to Aristotle, nevertheless between an instant and time there is not time: just as between a point and a point there is a line, yet between a point and a line there is not [a line]; and so I say that between the instant of the infusion of grace and the time in which the penitent meritoriously sorrows, there is no medium.

To that which is objected concerning the Gloss on Matthew, it can be answered in two ways. In one way, indeed, that the Gloss speaks of freely given grace, which is unformed faith, which places punishments before the eyes and other such things: and then the objection has

493. Augustine, De libero arbitrio, II, c. 19.

no force. Otherwise it can be said that it speaks of sanctifying grace: and then it must be said that the infusion of grace precedes sorrow, not in time,

but by nature: but taking 'nature' differently than before, namely for form: whence the infusion of grace precedes sorrow absolutely, but sorrow precedes the infusion of grace with respect to us, and on the part of matter.

To what is further objected concerning what he says, "Past evils, etc.", it must be said that lamenting is not concerning sins according as they are in being perpetrated, but rather according as the perpetration of sin in some way precedes (alias, causes) sins with respect to existing in the subject: just as it is commonly said that sin passes in act and remains in guilt: and this was also noted in the preceding sections.

To the other it must be said that it is not always necessary to conform our will to the divine will in the thing willed: but, as we noted toward the end of the first book of the Sentences, it is sometimes sufficient to conform our will to the divine will with respect to the efficient cause: namely, that we will this which God wills us to will: and in this way the penitent conforms.

To the other it must be said that the penitent absolutely wills not to have committed the sin: for although with respect to the future it is contingent, and necessary from the past (but I say necessary by accident), nevertheless that necessary thing was caused by our will, and therefore it is not necessary except in a qualified sense (secundum quid): and concerning such things there can be an absolute will that they be, or not be.

To what is further asked concerning what is said, "Evils, etc.", it must be said that he laments evils which absolutely are not, but they are in a qualified sense, namely in memory, and according to their effect, which is the guilt of punishment: and through this it is evident that he who laments in this way is neither foolish nor has contrariety to grace.

To what is further asked, it must be said that what he says, "not to commit the things to be lamented," refers to his purpose, that is, that he has a purpose of not sinning for the rest of his life: and therefore this coexists with penance: because just as in other sacraments the sacrament always requires something that removes feigning, which the Holy Spirit flees from: and this must therefore be added in a definition which is from those things that are prior with respect to us, as was said before.

And through this the solution to the following is evident; because it is not essential, and yet with respect to obtaining the effect of penance, lest the penitent be feigned, it is necessary that it coexist with penance in the penitent: and therefore it is added by the Saints in the notification of penance.

To the other it must be said that this definition is not given through essence, but rather through effect, as has been said: for below he says that repenting is the same thing, where he notes its essence.

506. Glossa Ordinaria on Psalm 89:17 (Augustine).

To the other it must be said that Augustine regards the order of parts on the part of the penitent: because in him it is prior to remove the obstacle, and then for penance to be posited: but Ambrose orders the parts according as they are more essential to penance.

To the other it must be said that this definition belongs to penance insofar as it is a virtue, and insofar as it is a sacrament: for it is a virtue moving free choice to a work which is to weep for sin, and the same is a sacrament according as it draws causality from a sign and from the power of the keys: from a sign, I say, some external one, concerning which there will be discussion below.

But if it is objected that the being of diverse things is diverse, and a definition notes essence, and virtue and sacrament are diverse according to being, it must be said that many false things are supposed in this objection. The first is that nothing prohibits the same thing being diversified concerning the being of diverse things, just as to repent in the ratio of an act, and in the ratio of an act to be manifested in signs. The second is that this definition does not state the being, as has been established. The third is that penance as a virtue and penance as a sacrament are not diverse in subject, but only in ratio, and the being which follows that ratio: because it is a virtue as it is moving free choice to a work: but the sacrament of penance is as it is conjoined to certain signs signifying and causing interior grace, which is ordered against actual sin. And through this the solution to the whole is evident.

Next it is inquired concerning that part in which the Master crushes errors which are about penance: which is divided into two parts, according to two errors which were against penance. The first is of those who said that one truly repenting cannot fall: and this is crushed in the remainder of this distinction. The second is of those who say that someone remaining in one sin can do penance for another: and this is crushed in the following Distinction XV, which begins there, And just as their error is convicted in the aforesaid authorities, etc.

The first part is subdivided into three parts: in the first of which the Master posits certain authorities from which the first error seems to be confirmed and proved. In the second, however, he responds to those adduced authorities, there, But that which Ambrose says, They are reprehended, etc. In the third he confirms his solution through authorities, there, But that penance is not done only once, etc.

The subdivision of these parts is evident on its own in the Letter.

Articulus 13 — Whether One Truly Penitent Can Fall, And Thereafter Sin In A Damnable Way

Whether one truly repenting can fall, and for the rest sin damnably?

The question arises first concerning the error itself: because although the Master sufficiently brings forward authorities by which it seems to be proved, nevertheless reasons can also be brought forward, and thus:

§ 1. The foundation of penance is to not will to sin for the rest of one's life unto death: but if there is no foundation, there is no building built upon it: therefore if someone does not

continue penance unto death, it was not penance: if he continues, he does not fall: therefore it seems that he who truly repents cannot fall for the rest of his life.

§ 2. Also, penance is not said to have unto punishment (ad poenam habere), but rather to hold unto punishment (ad poenam tenere): but "to hold" implies perseverance in punishment: if therefore he does not persevere, penance does not hold the punishment: and if it does not hold the punishment, he does not repent: therefore from the first, if he does not persevere, he does not repent: and this is what he says in the Letter.

§ 3. Also, an infinite penance is owed to an infinite sin: therefore if it be finite, it was not a just penance for that sin: but where he falls, there the penance is finished: therefore he did not have penance for that sin which was mortal: therefore if he falls, he did not truly repent. From this it seems by the opposite, that someone never repents unless he remains and does not fall. And this is the error which is spoken of in the Letter.

§ 4. Also, to the Hebrews it is said that it is impossible for those who were once illuminated, have tasted also the heavenly gift, and were made partakers of the Holy Spirit, have moreover tasted

the good word of God, and the powers of the world to come, and are fallen away, to be renewed again to penance. Therefore repeated penance cannot happen: therefore neither a second: therefore it is necessary for the first penance to be continued, or it will not be penance.

But to the contrary the Master adduces many things in the Letter. And to the contrary also is that:

§ 1. Penance, as was established before, does not regard the future as essential to itself: therefore it is without it, and thus even if he will have sinned in the future, he truly repented in the past.

§ 2. Also, it is one thing not to sin, and another to purpose not to sin: and it was proved above that penance with respect to the future has nothing but a purpose: and this is present. Therefore, since one purposing not to sin can sin in the future, his purpose being saved in the present, it is established that even one truly repenting, the truth of his penance being saved in the present, can sin.

SOLUTION. It must be said that what is said in the Letter, without any ambiguity, is a very bad heresy, and in no way to be held: and the Master constructs the Catholic faith by destroying that heresy.

To the first, therefore, which was objected, it must be said that the foundation of penance is not to not sin for the rest of one's life, but to not have the purpose of sinning, as the last objection made to the contrary proves: and therefore it proceeds from false premises.

To the other it must be said that it is not necessary for there to be that holding of punishment, except only in purpose.

To the other it must be said that penance in truth necessarily is infinite, but in duration it cannot be infinite, because at most it is finished at death: but it must be infinite on the part of

the will, namely that for no thing would one will to sin or to have sinned: and therefore the objection proceeds badly, which seems to suppose that it must be infinite in its rationale (ratione).

To the other it must be said that it is one thing to be renewed again to penance, and another to repent again. For to be renewed to penance is to be baptized for the remission of sins unto penance: and this is impossible: but to repent again, while the first baptismal character remains, is possible.

But if someone objects that baptism is a sacrament ordered against original sin, and it is not repeated because it is perfect: and injury is done to the sacrament if it is repeated: therefore penance also ought not to be repeated, which is ordered against actual sin, and cures it perfectly. It must be said that there is no similarity, for three reasons. The first is that baptism immediately draws its power from the passion of Christ, because the satisfaction of the first sin is completed to God the Father in the passion of Christ alone: and therefore just as that is not repeated, so neither is baptism: but penance supposes something in our will, which is mutable and repeatable. The second is that baptism imprints a character that always remains: and therefore if a second baptism were received, there would be two characters of the same species, or one would have no effect: both of which are inconvenient: but penance does not imprint any character. The third is that although Rabanus below seems to say that original sin returns, nevertheless it must be known that it does not return, neither the same in species, nor the same in number: and to the authority of Rabanus a response will be given below in its proper place: but the disease against which penance is ordered is repeated, and therefore it is necessary to repeat the medicine.

Articulus 14 — Whether Someone Can Be Washed Through Penance Up To Purity

Whether anyone can be washed through penance unto cleanness?

Whether anyone can be washed through penance unto cleanness?

Next it is inquired concerning what he says, there, A, § 4: Be washed, and be clean, etc.

For it seems that no one can be washed through penance unto cleanness from mortal guilt, thus:

§ 1. For an infinite injury there ought to be an infinite vengeance: but an injury to God, as Augustine says, is infinite: therefore the vengeance ought also to be infinite: but man cannot inflict an infinite vengeance upon himself: therefore by repenting he cannot avenge mortal sins: and guilt is not remitted unless the sin has been justly avenged: therefore it seems that the penitent is never cleansed from guilt.

§ 2. If perhaps you say that God's mercy exalts itself above judgment, and God's mercy holds back justice. On the contrary: He cannot deny Himself: therefore He cannot do anything against His justice: therefore He demands an infinite punishment.

§ 3. Also, a sin greater than an irremediable sin is irremediable just like it: but the sin of the Angel is irremediable, and the sin of man is greater than it: therefore the sin of man is irremediable, just like the Angel's: therefore he is never washed nor clean through penance. That the sin of man is greater than the sin of the Angel seems thus: The Angel willed to be equal to God, and man similarly: but man is by nature inferior to the Angel: therefore having less of divine equality: therefore more proud in desiring it: therefore man's sin proceeded from greater pride than the Angel's: therefore it is greater, and thus the proposition is held.

SOLUTION. It must be said that a sinner is washed and is clean through penance, if he has the will of not sinning for the rest of his life.

To this, however, which is objected concerning an infinite injury, it must be said that an injury to God on the part of the object is infinite, because it is against an infinite good: but on the part of the root by which it is rooted in the sinner, it is not infinite: because it neither proceeded from an infinite lust, nor from an infinite contempt, nor was the act of sin infinite in itself. But when a sin is weighed, it is principally considered on the part of the root which is founded in the sinner. Hence the Apostle says: I obtained mercy, because I did it ignorantly. And Augustine says that the sin of the Jews killing Christ was remediable, being done through ignorance, although it was against an infinite good which is the life of Christ. Hence it can well receive a finite medicine from that part, although from the other part it is infinite: and there it has an infinite remission, which is the mercy of God.

TO THE OTHER it must be said that He does not deny Himself on account of this: because justice is the rendering for merits according to the form and forum of judgment established for the utility of the people: and the forum here is one, and in the future another: and therefore here justice demands little on account of the obedient will of the penitent: but in the future it demands eternal things on account of the obstinate will.

To the other it must be said that the sin of man is less, if it is considered on the part of the sinner, than the Angel's. But if it is considered on the part of the object, then it is equal to it. For the sin of the Angel proceeded from fatness [i.e., arrogance] with respect to the sin of man: because the will of the Angel was elevated into pride from the beauty and nobility of natural endowments which he had within himself: but man had nothing such within himself whence he would become so proud, but rather, deceived from without, he listened: and therefore the pride of man is not

of a greater swelling, but takes the judgment of an inferior and weaker state. Whence it is evident that that objection was not valid.

Articulus 15 — Whether The Prior Laments Profit Those Who Repeat Sins

Whether prior lamentations profit those who repeat sins?

Next it is inquired concerning what is said, there, A, § 4: Lamentations profit nothing, if sins are repeated, etc.

508. Peter Lombard, Sententiae, IV, d. 14, c. 1.

For this seems to be false. § 1. For lamentations profit unto the remission of past things: and this is to profit much: therefore they profit somewhat.

§ 2. Also it is asked, By what reason are past lamentations said not to profit? Because salvation is impeded from future sins: by the same reason baptism is said not to profit, if someone sins after baptism: but this is false: therefore that is too.

SOLUTION. It must be said that it is understood concerning those who repeat sins with a habitual will, even if they lament with an actual will: and those do not have the foundation of penance: and therefore their penance is nothing. Or it may be said, as the Master says below, that they profit nothing, not absolutely, but unto obtaining salvation.

TO THE OTHER it must be said that it is not similar concerning baptism: because although a feigned man approaches baptism, nevertheless he receives a character, and thus baptism profits somewhat: but penance does not profit one receiving it feignedly. According to another response which the Master holds below in the Letter, it must be said that it is not similar concerning baptism: because baptism is the foundation of the sacraments, and still when a man sins, it profits unto having a foundation: but it is not so concerning penance: and therefore it is said not to profit, because nothing of it is left through the subsequent sin.

Articulus 16 — Whether He Who Laments What He Has Committed, Yet Does Not Abandon Them, Subjects Himself To A Heavier Punishment

Whether he who laments committed things yet not forsaking them, subjects himself to a heavier punishment?

Next it is inquired concerning what Gregory says, there, A, § 4: He who laments committed things, yet does not forsake them, subjects himself to a heavier punishment.

For this seems to be false: because § 1. Through the punishment of the first lamentation he blotted out something of the punishment owed for the sin: therefore he subjects himself through the lamentation to a lesser punishment: and thus what he says is false.

§ 2. Also, sorrow for sin is not a circumstance aggravating a sin: therefore it does not make a sin worthy of a heavier punishment.

§ 3. Also, the opposites of sorrow and lamentation aggravate a sin, namely impenitence and the affection of sinning: therefore sorrow and lamentation diminish sins: and thus again what is said in the letter seems false. Proof of the first. In Job it is said: He has run against him, namely God, with his neck stretched out, and is armed with a fat neck.

SOLUTION. It must be said that he is speaking of hypocrites who lament as regards the outer man and in order to be seen: therefore they sin more heavily, as Augustine says, because simulated equity is not equity, but double iniquity. But it seems better to say that he is speaking of certain ones to whom sin is displeasing absolutely when reason comes, and yet, conquered by the sweetness of sin on the part of sensuality, they still have their will in sin: whence in them the punishment is aggravated by accident, on the grounds that they do not

509. Aristotle, Topics, VI, 6 (144a 15).

avoid the sin, and yet they advert to it: and because afterwards they do not withdraw, they are not excused by subreption or ignorance, but rather adverting

to the sin: and since they do not forsake it, they contemn more heavily: and concerning such ones Gregory speaks, as the word seems to sound.

To the objections to the contrary, it must be said that they proceed concerning him who is withdrawn from sins both by will and by act: and concerning such a one Gregory does not speak.

To the other it must be said that although sorrow is not an aggravating circumstance, nevertheless it supposes an aggravating circumstance in the sinner, insofar as the sorrow is not a true cessation, on the grounds that it is an evil [associated] with an actual thought of the punishment which is owed to the sin.

TO THE OTHER it must be said that the opposite of sorrow aggravates: and from this it well follows that sorrow in itself does not aggravate, but diminishes: but insofar as the movement of the motive power of the soul is not caused except from some contempt apprehended in the soul on the part of the apprehensive power, sorrow supposes an actual contempt of the sin and of the punishment which is owed to the same: and from this it aggravates the sin: because to not abandon a sin on account of the punishment is of greater contempt than if the punishment were not adverted to.

Articulus 17 — Whether To Will Not To Sin Or To Cease From Sin Is True Penance

Whether to will not to sin or to cease from sin is true penance?

Next it is inquired concerning what he says at the beginning of the second part in his solution, there, A, § 4: But Ambrose says: This is true penance, to cease from sin.

For this seems to be false: because § 1. To cease from sin is a pure privation: and to do penance is to do something: therefore to cease from sin is not true penance.

§ 2. If perhaps you say that to cease from sin posits an interior act of the soul, although it deprives the exterior act, as the Doctors say concerning negative precepts. Whence the sense is, to cease from sin, that is, to will not to sin. It still seems false what they say: because, as was established above, penance has its whole essence with respect to past sin: but the will of not sinning is with respect to future sin: therefore the will of not sinning is not true penance: therefore neither is ceasing from sin, as it seems.

SOLUTION. It must be said that if force is applied to the word of Ambrose, it is a very good and subtle word: because he does not cease from sin, who sins: whence he who omits, does not cease from sin. Also, he who transgresses, does not cease from sin. Now there is an affirmative precept that we should repent, as we have in Mark and Matthew: and although this does not oblige continuously (ad semper), nevertheless it obliges then, when a man has

510. Matt. 3:8.

sinned and remembers the sin: therefore if then he does not repent, he does not cease from sin: because he does not do what he ought.

Also, there is a negative precept, not to sin, not to will to sin, neither in the past nor in the future: and from this every man is obliged always to will not to have sinned, and to will not to sin: and if he does the contrary, then he does not cease from sin.

It is therefore evident that to cease from sin imports to repent, and to will not to have sinned, and to will not to sin: and these are the things which are required in penance.

And through this the solution to both objections is evident.

Articulus 18 — Whether Sins Are Blotted Out Through Penance Insofar As It Is A Virtue, Or A Sacrament; And, Whether It Has Two Acts, Namely, To Lament And To Hate

Whether sins are blotted out through penance according as it is a virtue, or a sacrament? and, Whether it has two acts, namely to lament, and to hate?

Whether sins are blotted out through penance according as it is a virtue, or a sacrament? and, Whether it has two acts, namely to lament, and to hate?

Next it is inquired concerning what he says, there, A, § 4: Penance is a virtue, or grace, etc.

And because all things which pertained to that definition have been said, except two sought above in the other definition: therefore it is inquired here, Whether sins are blotted out through penance according as it is a virtue, or according as it is grace, or according as it is a sacrament? because the Master says here that it is a virtue, or grace: and it is supposed that it is a sacrament.

But it seems that it is according as it is grace: because § 1. Grace is contrary to guilt: if therefore guilt is blotted out by something, the blotting agent must be grace: but guilt is blotted out by penance: therefore penance blots it out according as it is grace.

§ 2. Also, if it were essential to a virtue to blot out guilt: then every virtue would blot out sin: but I see that this is false: because there is had a political virtue which is truly a virtue, and does not blot out sin: therefore it is not of virtue, but of grace as virtue.

§ 3. Also, with grace existing in act, and virtue in gift [as a habit] only, as in infants, the blotting out of sin is done according as it is guilt: therefore it seems that it is essential to grace to blot out guilt: therefore if penance remits guilt, this is done insofar as it is grace, and not insofar as it is a virtue, or a sacrament.

If perhaps you say that virtue is said equivocally of infused and political virtue: and therefore although political virtue does not blot out, nevertheless infused virtue blots out sins. This seems to be false: because a virtue is defined through its proper act: but its proper act is not equivocal in infused and acquired virtue.

§ 4. Also, when infused virtue and acquired virtue are so called, a diversity is not touched upon except of the efficient cause: but the efficient cause is no part of the essence of a thing:

511. Glossa Ordinaria in Matt. 3:8.

therefore infused and acquired virtue will not take a ratio of equivocation on the part of the efficient cause: therefore if it is not essential to an acquired virtue to blot out sin, neither will it be natural to a gratuitous [infused] one.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. Sin is left behind from the act and the impotence of the agent: therefore that which removes it ought to be in penance according as it is ordered to a work: but this is a virtue, and not grace as such: therefore it seems that the blotting agent is a virtue, and not grace.

§ 2. Also, sin is voluntary, as Augustine says: and if it were not voluntary, it would not be sin: therefore it is in the will: therefore it regards a power of the soul: but grace regards the essence of the soul more than a power: and virtue regards a power more than the essence: therefore sin is removed more by penance as it is a virtue, than as it is grace.

BUT IT SEEMS that sin is removed by penance as it is a sacrament: because, as was established above,

§ 1. Sacramental grace is principally ordered against the defect of sin: but penance is a sacrament instituted against the disease of actual sin: therefore it is the cause of that [remedy]: therefore it removes sin insofar as it is a sacrament.

§ 2. Also, every sacrament of the New Law is a sign and a cause of grace: therefore this one too: therefore insofar as it is a sacrament it causes grace remitting the disease of actual sin.

Further it is inquired concerning what is said,

[it is said], "We lament, and we hate": For of one thing there is one proper and essential act: but penance is only one thing: therefore it has one act: therefore the other is superfluous.

§ 1. Again it is asked, in what do lamenting and hating or having hatred for a sin differ?

§ 2. It seems that both are with respect to the past: because it is prefaced in the text, Which committed evils we lament and hate therefore it seems that one of them is superfluous: because it suffices to lament past committed evils.

§ 3. Also, Gregory says that hatred is inveterate anger: and this does not seem to fit the newly penitent, because he is not yet angry about his sins.

Solution. It must be said without prejudice to the first, that penance deletes guilt insofar as it is grace. But whether there is any difference, and what it is, between grace and virtue, we noted in the second book of this volume: and therefore it is not necessary to repeat it here. But nonetheless, there are three things in a sin, namely the guilt which stains by the privation of gratuitous good and the vitiation of natural good, and the act which infects the power by leaving a vice in it, and the wound that it inflicts. And as for the first, it is properly removed by grace; as for the second, by virtue; and as for the third, by the sacrament: and yet principally the deletion of sin and guilt is an act of grace: because virtue, insofar as it is virtue, does not have this of itself, but rather according as it is informed by grace, and similarly according to how a sacrament does not have this except insofar as it is causative of grace.

512. Pseudo-Ambrose (Augustine), De vera et falsa poenitentia, c. 8, n. 22.

Let it therefore be said to the first and the second, that although grace essentially has contrariety to guilt as such, nevertheless it does not reach the powers from which sin is also expelled, except insofar as it is united to the virtues: and therefore sin is sufficiently remitted by grace, and the virtues, and the sacrament.

To the other it must be said that, as is well objected to the contrary, infused virtue and virtue acquired by our own effort differ essentially and formally: and therefore what belongs to one need not belong to the other.

But to that which is objected against this, it must be said that although the efficient cause is diverse, nevertheless more than the efficient is imported in these words, infused virtue, and virtue acquired through a human medium: for when it is called infused, that is understood which is rooted in grace: and when it is called acquired, that is understood which is left behind from custom, as if coessential with it: just as the Philosopher says, that as the operations are, such also are the habits: and therefore it is necessary that those virtues differ essentially.

To what is objected, that virtue purges sin, it must be said that virtue informed by grace does this, and not another, as was said.

And through this the solution is clear to all that was objected concerning the first part of the definition.

To that which is further asked, namely about lamenting and hating, it must be said that there are two things essential to sin, and two which coexist with it: and therefore four things are touched upon in this definition. The first essential is to detest the committed sin as such, as was said before, and this is denoted by lament. But there remained the root of that sin and the guilt, and with respect to it there is the hatred of the committed crime, and this hatred presupposes anger through zeal. But the first thing that coexists is the purpose of amendment through confession and satisfaction. The second is the purpose of not committing it further. Thus therefore there are four things in penance. One with respect to the committed act, a second with respect to the root: and a third coexists with respect to the past, and a fourth coexists with respect to the future: which two are necessary, lest the penitent himself be a hypocrite.

And through this the solution to the last two is clear.

Articulus 19 — Whether Almsgiving Removes Guilt, And Makes The Sinner Clean

Whether almsgiving takes away guilt, and makes the sinner clean?

§ 1. Next it is asked concerning what is said, there, A, § 4, around the middle: He is not to be bought off in a certain way for this end, so that it may always be permitted to commit these things with impunity.

513. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, III.

§ 2. For this seems to be false. 1. Through what is said, Luke 11:41: But yet that which remains, give alms; and behold, all things are clean unto you. Therefore it seems that through almsgiving general cleanness is possessed.

1. Also, 1 Timothy 4:8: Piety is profitable to all things, having promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come. If therefore piety avails for all things, it seems that it avails for the abolition of sin.
2. If perhaps you say that this is understood of the piety which is informed by grace making one pleasing (gratia gratum faciente). Against this: Ambrose on the same place in the Gloss: "Piety which works good things for the brethren avails for meriting divine things: for the whole sum of Christian discipline is in piety and mercy, which if anyone follows, if he suffers the slipperiness of the flesh, he will doubtless be beaten, yet he will not perish." But the just does not suffer the slipperiness of the flesh: therefore it seems that one existing in mortal sin buys impunity for himself by almsgiving.
3. Also, this seems to be shown by that which is held, Daniel 4:24, where Daniel said to the impious king: O king, let my counsel be acceptable to thee, and redeem thou thy sins with alms, and thy iniquities with works of mercy to the poor.
4. The same seems true by reason: For there are two parts of justice, namely to decline from evil, and to do good: and to decline from evil, as is commonly said, avoids punishment: therefore much more so does doing good: but even he who, being outside of charity, out of mercy supports the poor for God's sake, does good: therefore he avoids punishment: but he cannot avoid punishment unless almsgiving takes away guilt: therefore it seems that such almsgiving avails for the remission of guilt.
5. Also, Ambrose says that there precedes something in sinners by which they are worthy of justification: but what can precede, as the chief thing in them, is mercy and piety toward the poor: because in these, as the same Ambrose says, there exists the summit of Christian life: therefore it seems that this makes one worthy that guilt be remitted.
6. Also, Augustine in the Enchiridion: "To whom the suffrages for the dead are profitable, they are profitable either for this, that there be full remission, or certainly that the damnation itself be more tolerable": therefore much more does an alms given by oneself avail for a more tolerable damnation: but it cannot, unless the mortal sin is released by God: therefore it seems that it avails for the remission of certain sins.
7. Also, it is supposed by all that no good goes unrewarded. Let us posit, then, that someone existing outside of charity does many things of the genus of goods, and alms, and is not rewarded here: therefore he will be rewarded in the future: but he cannot be rewarded as regards the remission of punishment, while guilt remains to be punished, because this would be against God's justice: therefore it seems that guilt is remitted to him: therefore he buys impunity for himself.

514. Boethius, De differentiis topicis, II.

If perhaps you say that God rewards such people here: there is nothing contrary: because He can not-reward, even if He does reward: and if a false but not impossible thing is posited, what follows ought to be false and not impossible: but it follows that He might not reward some good: and this is impossible for a just God.

1. Also, it seems that God could not reward sufficiently here: because someone is not rewarded if he receives what is less valuable for what is more valuable: but a work of piety, even unformed, is worth more than any earthly gain: therefore it is not sufficiently rewarded by any earthly good: whatever is given here is an earthly good: therefore it cannot be sufficiently rewarded here. That an unformed work of piety is worth more than all earthly goods is clear: because even the civil life is posited as the best in life, or at least better than all pleasure, and riches, and honors: therefore it seems that Augustine speaks badly in the text.

ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Augustine says that one existing in mortal sin is not worthy of the bread he eats: therefore it seems that nothing he does can buy anything for himself from God with respect to worthiness: therefore not impunity either.

1. Also, equally displeasing to God are the impious man and his impiety, as is said in Wisdom 14:9: but the work of a displeasing one cannot be pleasing to God: therefore the impious man can do nothing, it seems, unless he first becomes pious and just: but this cannot be done without grace making him pleasing: therefore without grace he cannot do any work by which he may merit anything with God: therefore neither can he buy impunity.

Solution. It must be said that good works done outside of charity avail for many things about which there will be a question below in the following distinction: but here there is no doubt except concerning almsgiving. And therefore it must be said that almsgiving avails for the approximation of grace here, and in the future for a more tolerable punishment, as is said here: but in both ways by accident. One way is: because by the fact that he becomes accustomed to alms, he is withdrawn from sins, and thus commits fewer sins than if he were wholly bent upon sins, and continued in sin: and because the guilt that would be committed if the almsgiving were not present is subtracted, the punishment that would follow the guilt is also subtracted. Another way is: because he who is accustomed to piety begins to find good pleasing, and consequently the lust for evil and contempt of God are remitted in him, and thus he does not sin out of as much lust as otherwise, nor out of as much contempt: and therefore his sin is less as regards the root of sinning, than that of another who has no works of piety: and therefore a lesser punishment also follows, and consequently a more tolerable damnation.

I say therefore to the first, that that passage of Luke 11:41: Give alms, etc., is understood accommodatively, that is, above all other goods of fortune that you have conceded to your use,

515. Gennadius of Massilia (Pseudo-Augustine), De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus, c. 54.

not that by this one's whole life is made clean: but the sense is that from goods of fortune illicitly retained, the uncleanness of sin is not generated for them.

To the other it must be said that piety avails for all things: but not unformed piety, but rather formed piety, of which the Apostle speaks there.

But to the other which is objected through the Gloss of Ambrose there, it must be said that the slipperiness of the flesh does not signify there a mortal slip, but a venial one which continually arises from concupiscence: and such a one will not perish: because although a venial sin is a disposition to a mortal one, nevertheless such a person is contained in the good by works of piety lest he perish.

To the other it must be said that Daniel's intention was that the king should first correct his life through penance, and then alms would avail him for the remission of sin on the part of the owed punishment, which the vision he had seen threatened him with.

To the other it must be said that to decline from evil is said in two ways, namely not to do evil insofar as it denotes nothing but the negation of an evil work: and thus it is true that it only avoids punishment, and is not a part of justice properly speaking. In a second way, to decline from evil is said to mean to will not to do evil, and thus it posits an interior act, and merits the palm, and is a part of justice: but doing an unformed good is not a part of justice, but a disposition to it, as was said above. But when it is said that not to do evil avoids punishment, this is not understood of that punishment which one has merited by a preceding sin, but rather of that which one would incur if one did the evil which one did not do: and in this way doing an unformed good avoids punishment: but then it does not follow that on account of it some sin is remitted to which punishment is owed, or the punishment which is owed to a perpetrated sin.

To the other it must be said that Ambrose is speaking of the merit and worthiness of congruity, not of condignity: for it is less incongruous to give grace to those exercised in alms than to others who do not attend to alms.

To the other it must be said that, as many of the Doctors say, Augustine calls damnation there the burning of the fire of purgatory, and not of hell: but all who are there have charity and works informed by grace. Whence nothing concerning the proposition is proved then by Augustine's word. If, however, it is said that it is understood of those who are in hell, then it must be said that suffrages are only profitable by accident, as was said, and in this way works done outside of charity are profitable.

To the other it must be said that no good goes unrewarded: but it is not necessary that it be rewarded with a reward not corresponding to it, and incomparably more valuable. Whence we say that such things which are not worth an eternal reward, are not rewarded in eternity: but even the chief reward is here: because through them they are made closer to grace: and this is a spiritual reward, and better than their works.

But that which is said in objecting to the contrary, that whatever is given here is earthly, is false: because many spiritual things are given here even to those who are in mortal sin

sometimes, and especially to those who are exercised in almsgiving. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 20 — Whether All Good Things Done Before Are Vivified Through Subsequent Penance

Whether all previously done good works are vivified by subsequent penance?

§ 1. Next it is asked concerning what is said, there, A, § 4, after the middle: For that penance is mortified, and other previously done good works, etc.

§ 2. For the sake of this, five things seem to need to be inquired into here, so that this text may be more perfectly understood: of which the first is, Whether all previously done good works are vivified by subsequent penance? Secondly, If not all, whether all mortified ones? Thirdly, Whether they are vivified with respect to all that is in them, or with respect to some things? Fourthly, Through what are they vivified? Fifthly, What is called life there?

§ 3. But it seems against the first, that all previously done good works are vivified by subsequent penance, whether they were dead, that is, done in mortal sin, or whether they were mortified, that is, done in charity, and mortified by a subsequent sin.

And it is objected thus: 1. Adamantius [Origen] says on Joshua: "There are in the Church certain believers and those acquiescing to divine precepts, who are religious and dutiful towards the servants of God, and sufficiently prompt for the adornment of the Church or the ministry of the Church: but in their own conversation they are enveloped in obscene vices, nor do they altogether lay aside the old man with his acts, they apply nothing of the amendment of morals or of innovation. To these, therefore, Christ Jesus grants salvation: but they will not escape a certain mark of insanity." From these things it is gathered that good works done in mortal sin, either in themselves or through a subsequent vivification, avail for eternal life.

1. Also, Adamantius, in the same place: "Jesus, seeing the narrow purpose in faith, preserves a most just moderation, so that they may obtain salvation who have little faith: and yet they do not receive the summit of the kingdom or of liberty: because their faith is ennobled by no addition of works." From these things the same is gathered as before.
2. Also, Leviticus 25:25, on that: If thy brother being impoverished sell his little possession, etc., the Gloss says that the little possession is the inheritance of eternal life, which is sold by mortal sin: and the Gloss and the text say that if he wishes to redeem it, the fruits shall be computed from the day on which he sold it: but the fruits from the day on which he sold it were after a mortal sin: therefore they are computed for life as dead through the subsequent penance: therefore they are vivified by the subsequent penance.
3. Also, it is objected by reason thus: If any two things are ordered to a third thing, that one of the two which is more closely ordered to it will more essentially participate in that third thing: but the good of nature and of morals which is said to be of the genus of goods, is ordered to the good of grace which gives life: therefore that which is closer

498. Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, lib. II, c. 49.

will more essentially participate in the life of grace: but the good of morals is closer: therefore it will participate in life more than the good of nature: but the good of nature is vivified: therefore the good work which is good in its genus [is vivified].

But that it is more closely ordered to grace is proved thus. Ambrose says that there precedes something in sinners by which they are worthy of justification: and this is nothing but the good which is said to be of the genus of goods, or the good of unformed virtue: therefore that good makes a man worthy to obtain life, and not the good of nature: therefore it is closer to life: and this is what we intend to prove.

1. Also, let us suppose now the opinion of those who say that natural things become gratuitous, and I proceed then thus: That which is better and more perfect among unformed goods, is more apt by nature to become gratuitous: but the act of a moral virtue, as the Philosopher proves in the first book of the Ethics, is more perfect and better than the habit: therefore it is more apt by nature to become gratuitous than the habit: and the habit is vivified, because natural things become gratuitous: therefore much more the act.

If you say that this cannot be, because the habit remains and its act passes away: this is nothing: because absolutely speaking in mortified works the act passes away, and yet they are said to be vivified by subsequent penance.

1. Also, in natures it belongs to much greater power to vivify something mortified like something killed, than something which never had life but could have had it. An example is that it is more to vivify a slain person, than an embryo which could live and never lived: but he who can do what is more, can do what is less, as Boethius says: therefore if grace can vivify a mortified work, it can also vivify what never lived, but could have lived: but it can do the former, as is said in the text: therefore also the latter: but a work which never lived, yet could have lived if grace had been present, is a dead work: therefore dead works can be vivified by subsequent grace.

But against this is what 1. Is said in the text.

1. Also, a sinner does not have a work ordered to life except through the motion of grace: but he himself is not in grace: therefore nothing of the potency of life passes from him into the work: but what has no potency of life is not vivifiable: therefore such a work cannot be vivified.
2. Also, in natures from a non-living thing is generated a non-living thing, and one not having the potency for life, as is clear in minerals: therefore in morals it will be similar: but a sinner is non-living: therefore the work which is generated by him neither lives, nor has the potency for life: therefore it cannot be vivified by a subsequent potency [penance].

501. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, IV, 9 (1128b).

Solution. It must be said that in truth, as all confess, dead works cannot be vivified, because, as the last objection proved, no potency for life passes into the generated from a generator which does not live, unless it is generated in it by accident, as a worm from putrefied matter.

To that therefore which is objected from Adamantius, it must be said that Adamantius calls "salvation" the sign of salvation in the Church among the faithful, and in the anointing of certain sacraments: and such salvation those possessing unformed faith obtain, who are signified by the Gibeonites. And that this is so is proved through Isidore on Joshua 9:1ff, who says thus in the Gloss there: "The Gibeonites signify those who believe, and seem to have devotion towards the servants of God, or the worship of the Church: yet they have nothing of amendment in morals: such ones indeed only proffer the sign of salvation within the Church: but among the spiritual ones, that is, among the Saints of God, they do not obtain the eternal kingdom or liberty." These are the words of Isidore as if glossing the obscure words of Adamantius.

Through this the solution to the following is also clear.

Or we can say that there is salvation in reality, and salvation in hope: the first is of the blessed, but the second of wayfarers. And this latter is again twofold, namely informing faith and hope: and this is of the Saints: or unformed, and this is of those who live by obscene acts in the Church, yet believing rightly and doing works of the genus of goods. And Adamantius speaks only of this last.

To the other it must be said that after sin and before penance there is no fruit of life in a man, but the law: and similarly the Gloss is understood of those things which are after compunction, and before the exterior satisfaction enjoined by the priest: for the priest ought to attend to all those things, and compute them into the redemption of the eternal inheritance.

Or it can be said otherwise, that it is understood of good works done in mortal sin: but a thing is computed into the principal in two ways, namely as it is a part of the principal, and thus it is understood in the Gloss: because nothing is a part of the principal except a meritorious work: or as impeding the excrescences of usury, and thus meritorious works are computed into part of the principal, because by them a man is detained lest he rush from sin to sin, since the usury of the preceding is as it were the subsequent sin: and by those goods grace is also brought nearer, as was said in the previous question.

To the other it must be said that that opinion which says that natural things become gratuitous is not understood according to becoming, that essentially these become those, because this is impossible and quasi-heresy: but it says that these become those because they can coexist with them, and with them bring something of good to the subject, such as the facility of working well, and the like: and then virtue is said to become gratuitous, because it remains: but the act in no way remains, nor does it have the potency for life, as the last objection proved, and therefore it cannot be vivified.

507. Augustine of Hippo.

But to that which it says, that a mortified act also does not remain: it must be said that, as is held below in this question, that act at least remains in the mystical body, but a dead act in no way: and therefore it is not similar.

To the other it must be said that what is adduced from natures is not similar: because what is slain is corrupted not only in the act of life, but also in the potency for life: but it is not thus with what is mortified in morals: because it is only deprived of life, and is in potency for life: and that which does not have life in morals, and proceeds from one not having life, is not similar to an embryo which proceeds from a living being from which it receives the potency for life.

And thus the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 21 — Whether All Things Mortified Can Be Vivified

Whether all mortified works can be vivified?

Whether all mortified works can be vivified?

§ 1. Secondly it is asked, whether all mortified works can be vivified?

§ 2. But it seems that they cannot: 1. For life, as the Philosopher says, is the act containing the spirits: therefore life will be conserved in the living thing when the principles of life are conserved: but if the per se cause of the conservation of life is the conservation of the principles of life in the living thing, when life is destroyed, it is necessary that the principles of life or one of the principles be destroyed: it is necessary therefore that in this mortified work the principles of life are destroyed: but when the principles of life are destroyed, the potency for life is destroyed, and when the potency is destroyed, that thing is not vivifiable: therefore since in a mortified work the potency for life is destroyed, it remains a dead work which is not vivifiable: therefore it is not vivified.

1. Also, whatever lives in potency, has being in that manner in which it lives in potency: but a mortified work in no way has being in the time following penance, and also in the time of mortal sin which is before penance: therefore it is in no way vivified. Proof of the middle premise. If that work is, it can only be in act, or in habit: but it is certain that it is not in act: nor even in habit, because the habit of virtue whose it was to elicit that work, was destroyed by mortal sin: therefore, et cetera.
2. Also, Ezekiel 18:24: If the just man turn himself away from his justice, and do iniquity according to all the abominations which the wicked man useth to work, shall he live? All his justices which he hath done, shall not be remembered: therefore they will not be remembered for justification.
3. Also, an act is an accident: therefore it only is when it inheres: but it does not inhere in the time of sin: therefore it is not: and what is not, is not vivified: therefore that act will not be justified [vivified], as it seems.

Against this are: 1. The authorities of the Saints, which are posited in the text.

1. Also, Jerome on the Epistle to the Galatians: "If they repent, they will return to life."
2. Also, Augustine: "Penance is a most excellent and perfect thing, which recalls all defects to the perfect": therefore also the merit made defective by subsequent sin: and it does not recall unless it vivifies: therefore it vivifies mortified works.
3. Also, sin cannot be stronger than merit: but if all things were destroyed by sin, sin would be stronger: therefore the meritorious work is not totally destroyed: therefore something remains in it of the potency for life.
4. Also, an eternal reward is owed to a meritorious work: therefore if it is not owed to it, it is dealt with unjustly: but if it is killed, it will not have its reward: therefore there still remains in it the potency for life: but what has potency for life can be vivified: therefore, etc.
5. Also, Apocalypse 3:11: Hold fast that which thou hast, that no man take thy crown. And this crown is also owed to the works of present justice: therefore if this is lost, another can take it: therefore meritorious works remain, even when this person loses: but by the same reason by which the remaining things can be given to another, they can also be restored to this person: therefore they can be vivified by subsequent penance.

Solution. It must be said that works mortified by subsequent penance are vivified. And so that this can be understood more fittingly, it must be known that a meritorious work does not receive life from the worker, but rather from grace itself: and it is said to live effectively, because it gives life to the meriting and working person. But grace is considered in two ways, namely insofar as it informs the subject and the act, and thus it is an accident, and cannot give life: and insofar as it is a certain likeness of divine goodness and acceptable to God along with all that in which it is, and thus it gives life, and it is principally in the acceptor, that is, in God, with respect nevertheless to the work and the worker. And because God's acceptance which is with respect to a work done in the charity of God always remains, therefore the work remains even after mortal sin, not absolutely, but according as divine acceptance is with respect to it. Nevertheless the influx of life from God's acceptance and the accepted work is impeded on account of the mortal sin which is in that person: thus namely, that through that work God's acceptance does not flow life into him: but it is reputed to another in a certain way, as was said elsewhere, where it was shown concerning this how that authority of the Apocalypse 3:11 is understood: Hold fast that which thou hast, etc.

The solution to the first is therefore clear: because the work is not destroyed according to how it is under divine acceptance: because that work is always accepted, and it is not a principle of life unless considered thus: but the influx of life is impeded through mortal sin: and therefore it is not true that the potency for life is destroyed in a mortified work: because it is not mortified in itself, but rather as regards this person lest it flow life into him, and when the obstacle is removed it flows as before. And that works remain there, is clear through that passage of Matthew 6:20: Lay up to yourselves treasures in heaven. For those treasures are the

treasures of merits written down in divine knowledge and approbation. And through that passage of the Apostle, 2 Timothy 1:12: I know whom I have believed, and I am certain that he is able to keep that which I have committed unto him, against that day, namely the just judge.

To the other it must be said that the work is in that manner by which it is the principle of life, as was already said: because in divine acceptance it is never destroyed: because it pleased God on account of the form of grace which was with respect to that work: and therefore that objection supposes something false.

To the other it must be said that the Prophet's intention is that the justices will not be remembered with respect to the just person: but nevertheless they remain absolutely under remembrance, as was said: and thus the response to the whole is clear.

To the other it must be said that this is true, that it does not remain as it is an accident, but as regards that rationale, as was already said.

Articulus 22 — Whether Works That Have Been Mortified Are Vivified With Respect To All The Things That Are In Them

Whether mortified works are vivified with respect to all things that are in them?

§ 1. Thirdly it is asked, whether mortified works are vivified with respect to all things that are in them?

§ 2. For it seems that they are: because 1. Augustine says that penance is a most excellent and perfect thing which recalls all defects to the perfect: therefore whatever is defective in goods through sin, is reduced to the fruit of life through penance: therefore all things are vivified.

1. Also, virtue is always more powerful than sin: but sin extinguishes all virtues when it follows them: therefore penance also vivifies all when it follows sin.
2. Also, Romans 6:1ff. [cf. Rom. 5:15], Not as the sin, so also is the good. And this is because the good is according to itself: and the evil is in respect, and useless, and sluggish: if therefore evil could kill the good, much more could the good vivify them.

On the contrary: 1. Virginity is indeed among the greatest goods: and it is not vivified, nor redeemed, nor restored: which is clear through Jerome [who says]...

In a certain letter to the virgin Eustochium, he says thus: I will speak boldly: although God can do all things, He cannot restore a virgin after ruin.

1. Likewise, Apocalypse III, 1: You have a name that you live, and you are dead. Be watchful, and strengthen the things that remain, which are ready to die. From this it is taken that someone dead had some living works, and the living are not vivified: therefore not all dead or mortified works need vivification.

Solution. It must be said that mortified works, in the manner in which they were dead, are all vivified through subsequent penance, as is suggested in the Text.

To the objection concerning virginity, first take the authority of Jerome in the Text, which says the complete opposite over Hosea 11, 2 and following, where he says thus:

See what is the difference between the agreement of God and of men: for a man takes a wife, makes a woman from a virgin, that is, not a virgin or corrupted: even being joined to harlots, he changes them into virgins. Master Hugh of Saint Victor solves Jerome's statement thus: These are the words of Israel has fallen, and shall not rise again. The virgin Israel is cast down upon her land, etc. Jerome placed some ambiguous words here saying thus: Although God can do all things, He cannot make the corrupted not corrupted: yet if this is understood of the corruption of the flesh, it is foolish to think thus: because a man could corrupt his flesh, but God could not heal it. But if it is understood of the corruption of the heart, it is similarly foolish to say this: because a man could sin, but God could not justify, and justify as much as this one could sin. But if it is said that God cannot do this because it is done: and what is done cannot be undone: because what is true cannot be false: and therefore He cannot, because He cannot be against the truth: because if He could be against the truth, He could be against Himself who is the truth: this statement has more weight than if it were said of any other thing that is done, and now cannot be undone. Hugh's. The weight, however, why it is said more of this than of any other past thing, is because the mind having voluntarily descended upon the actual and present delight of the flesh, causes the corruption of virginity: and this past induces an ignoble state in mind and body, which no other sin does. It is clear, therefore, that according to how virginity was meritorious, it is restored: because penance restores the integrity of purity from sin, but not the integrity of state according to dignity.

To the other it must be said that the Apocalypse speaks of the Church in which some were living, and some were dead, but about to die by the example of others: and therefore it warns to be watchful: and therefore the objection is of no value.

Articulus 23 — By What The Mortified Works Are Vivified

By what are dead works vivified?

Fourthly, it is asked, By what are they vivified?

And it seems that 1. By general justice.

1. It belongs to him who makes the impure pure to justify: this is of general justice: therefore also that.
2. This also seems through what is said in Ezekiel 18:24 and 22: But if the wicked... does judgment and justice, he shall live and not die... In his justice, which he has worked, he shall live.

1. It seems that this is of faith: because, in Romans 1:17, and in Hebrews 10:38, it is said: But the just shall live by faith.

2. However, it seems that it is the effect of charity: for Augustine says that charity is the life of the soul.

3. Likewise, it seems that it is grace: because life is divided into natural life, gratuitous life, and the life of glory: therefore life will be from grace: but to whom it belongs to justify, to him belongs life: therefore grace vivifies dead works.

Against this is what is said in the text, that this is penance: and this is taken from the words of Bernard in the Canticles, thus saying: You know that you have spoken, if you feel your conscience bitten by fourfold compunction, twin shame, and twin fear: for the triple species of confession attests to life to perfect the sevenfold. Therefore, the parts of confession and compunction attest to life and restored sense: therefore they make the dead alive.

Solution. It must be said that life is properly and primarily the act of grace, as is also noted in the second book of the Sentences: and it does not primarily belong to virtue, but rather secondarily: and therefore it is attributed in different ways to different virtues. However, penance is as the remover of the cause of death on the part of the matter or subject: because it is the cause of justification prior in reason, not in time, as was said above. And in this way, the Master speaks when he attributes to it the justification of dead works.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that justice is said to be the cause of life rather in living works, as it is said that works show the living: because it is first on the part of the term to which there is movement in the justification of the impious. Hence, justice is not properly said to be the cause of life, but rather consequent to life, and showing it through the rectitude of act: and thus the just is said to live by justice, but after living simply.

To the objection that proved that justice is the cause of life, it must be said that justice is not said to justify as an efficient cause, but rather as the form to which he who is justified is moved. But it is well conceded that it belongs to the same to justify, to whom it belongs to vivify by way of an efficient cause.

To the other, it must be said that the saying of Ezekiel is understood of the life of glory which is given to the one doing well in works of justice: but we speak here of the first act of life, which is restored from non-being to spiritual being according to grace, according to what the Philosopher says, that to live in living things is to be.

To the objection, it must be said that life is attributed to faith as first showing life, and in some way making it, not indeed by itself, but rather as it is informed by grace. And an example of this is in light: which manifests other things, and also vivifies, insofar as there is in it a certain celestial power, which is diffused in it over lower things. So also faith, insofar as it is a certain knowledge, manifests those things in which there is life, and insofar as it is a certain grace, causes and diffuses the same life.

To the other, it must be said that the charity of God is that which continues life: yet it is not necessary that it be its first cause: because to live perfectly, after faith and hope, nothing is required except charity, which unites by effect to the first source of life, namely God.

To the other, it must be said that in the beginning of the first solution it was said how to live is of penance.

And thus the whole is solved.

Articulus 24 — How And According To What Mode Life Is Given When It Is Said That Mortified Works Become Living

How and in what manner is life said, when it is said that dead works become alive?

Fifthly, it is asked, In what manner is life said, when it is said that dead works become alive?

For it seems that they ought not to be said.

For in no case is it so, that the works of someone are denominated and disposed as the doer himself: therefore, works of the living are not said to be alive, as it seems, nor even forms of life disposed or informed.

Likewise, if a white thing is whitened, the whitening itself is not properly said to be white, although the whitening is the proper operation of the white: therefore, also the works of the living are not properly said to be alive.

Solution. It must be said that living is said in many ways, but it is reduced to two, namely according to being, and according to well-being.

According to being, it is said properly and metaphorically. Properly, however, in two ways, namely as the per se effective cause of life in the living is said to be life and to live, like the soul, and like the form adhering to the living, that is, participating in life from that which is the cause of life. Thus we say the body lives and is formally alive. And this living is distinguished in the second book of the Soul and by its sign in that text, where the Philosopher says:

"However, with living itself said in many ways, and if one of these is present alone, we say it is living, as intellect and sense, motion and position according to place, or motion according to nourishment and diminution and growth." Then he reduces it to four modes, namely understanding, sensing, moving, and using nourishment. These are signs of the life of the soul, just as an effect is a sign of its cause: I say, the proper and essential effect, which is converted with the cause. However, life said metaphorically is according to the likeness of this, and this is said, namely according to the likeness of that which is the cause of life: and this is what gives being to the living, and permanence, and species: and thus life is taken from the Philosopher, where in the eighth book of the Physics he says, that it is a certain life for existing things, or according to the likeness of the living, which we then say is living, when it attains its perfect operation according to its species, which it has from the celestial power, influencing above the whole species: just as we say living water which is in the force of purifying and cooling, and a living adamant when it strongly attracts iron, and the like.

But life according to well-being is distinguished according to well-being in sense, and according to well-being according to reason. And according to well-being in sense, life is said

to be of pleasure, as Aristotle says of Sardanapalus, that choosing a voluptuous life, he chose the life of beasts. But according to well-being of reason, it is said to live according to the good of reason, which is lawful and gratuitous. And gratuitous is twofold, namely of grace, and of glory.

Therefore, it must be said to the proposed, that works are said to be vivified by life said metaphorically: because, namely, it is restored to man, that they do in him what the best works do: and this is worthy of doing by eternal life. Because just as a stone is said to be alive, because it performs its proper operation excellently, and dead which cannot do so: thus a work is said to be alive, when it can perfect what the best work does, and this is the work of grace, which can avail for eternal life.

And through this also the solution to the objections is clear.

Articulus 25 — Whether The Third Definition Of Penance Is Well Assigned

Whether the third definition of penance is well assigned?

Whether the third definition of penance is well assigned?

Penance is a certain saying of the grieving, etc.

This is the third definition of penance. And it seems bad: because,
1. As Tullius says, Vindication is a species of natural justice: it is above, that penance is not properly natural justice: therefore it seems badly said to be vindication, etc.

1. Likewise, Tullius says, that vindication or revenge is that by which force and injury and altogether everything that is harmful is repelled by defending or avenging: penance, neither by force nor by injury of anyone, but rather by one's own will: therefore it seems that vindication is not of them.

Likewise, further inquiry is made about what he says, Always punishing in oneself, etc.

1. For thus he always punishes, always performs acts of penance: but one cannot be moved by several motions according to one power at the same time: therefore he is never moved by another virtue. If it is said that it is understood as always punishing in habit, not in act: it seems false by what he says, that where pain ends, penance also ends: therefore it seems that he is always actually bound to grieve. If you say that nothing prohibits grieving with affection at the same time, and being moved by another motion according to charity, namely, or another virtue: this seems against the Philosopher in the book, where it is said, that of Sleep and wakefulness one power of the soul being in act, another is drawn: therefore much more if one and the same is in one act, it is drawn from another.
2. Likewise, he always grieves: and where pain ends, penance also ends: therefore if he is moved by charity towards God, and does not grieve, it seems that penance is finished - and where penance fails, there grace fails, as it is said consequently in the Letter -

therefore he who is moved by charity, loses grace, which is false: therefore it is not always to be grieved.

3. Likewise, it seems that it is harmful to always grieve: because Bernard says in the Canticles: Thus I advise you, my friends, to sometimes turn your foot from the troublesome and anxious remembrance of your ways, to escape into the smoother paths of the serene memory of the benefits of God: so that you who are confounded in yourselves, may breathe in his sight. From this it is taken, that it is not always to be grieved for sins, but sometimes to rejoice in the benefits of God.

Likewise, shortly thereafter in the same place: Therefore it is better that necessary grief for sins is not continuous. Indeed, let it be interspersed with a more joyful remembrance of kindness, lest perhaps the heart be hardened by sadness, and perish more by despair. Therefore, it is better to intersperse grief than to always grieve: therefore he who avenges sin in himself, should not always avenge by penance what he grieves to have committed.

Solution. We say to the first, as was previously touched upon, that penance sometimes assumes the nature of justice, when justice commands the act of penance. And thus Augustine speaks here of penance. Hence it is not thereby held that it is a species of justice, in the way that a species is said to be placed under an assigned genus.

And there is an instance in the word of Aristotle in the Topics, where he says that if someone, having placed a magnitude of two cubits, says that what is placed is quantity, what he says is quantity and signifies quantity. Where it is clear that although other categories sometimes assume some nature of substance, they are not properly said to be species of it. Hence that form of arguing is not valid: therefore it is a fallacy of accident, which such an argument is: vindication is a species of justice: and penance is a certain vindication: therefore penance is a species of justice.

To the other it must be said that although sins are committed with the will of man, yet they are injuries and harmful, and thus they are avenged. Hence they have from another that they are voluntary, and from another that they are injuries: because they are voluntary in act, as in act there is a conversion to a changeable good: but they are injuries to God and man, inasmuch as they strip of gratuitous gifts, and wound in natural things: and in this way revenge is in them.

To the other we concede that a created spirit according to the same power is not moved by several motions at the same time: and we well concede that when it is moved by another virtue, it is not moved by penance, if penance and that virtue are in the same power of the soul. But the saying of Augustine is understood, that he should always grieve, so that he never admits anything contrary to grief. However, to be moved by other virtues is not contrary, but fitting: because virtue is consonant with virtue, and not contrary. Others, however, say otherwise: but because I do not understand, therefore I do not care about their sayings.

And by this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 26 — Whether The Sinner Ought Always To Grieve, And To Rejoice Over The Grief

Whether a sinner ought always to grieve, and to rejoice in grief?

Then it is asked concerning what is said there, A, § 4, at the end: But let him always grieve, and rejoice in grief, etc.

For it seems that it is not always to be grieved: because 1. As Bede says, Contraries are cured by contraries. Therefore, if some sins are cured with pain and sadness, they are not to be cured with grief, but with joy and delight: but many are such, like anger, sloth, envy, rancor, and the like: therefore, they are not to be cured with grief: therefore, it is not always to be grieved.

1. Likewise, II Corinthians 2:7-8: Comfort him, lest perhaps he be swallowed up with overmuch sorrow. Wherefore I beseech you to confirm your love toward him.
2. Likewise, II Corinthians 7:10: For the sorrow of the world worketh death. Therefore, some sins are with grave pain and sadness: therefore, they are not to be cured with grief and sadness: therefore, they are not always to be grieved.
3. Further, it seems impossible what is said, Rejoice in grief. For grief existing in something by essence makes it grieve: but grief exists by essence in the one grieving: therefore, it makes him grieve: therefore, he cannot rejoice, as it seems, because grief and joy are opposites.
4. Likewise, Grief and joy are opposite affections: therefore, they arise from opposites: therefore, one is not the cause of the other: therefore, it is not to rejoice in grief.
5. Likewise, It is of the same to rejoice, as it is to grieve: if therefore someone rejoices, he simultaneously rejoices and grieves: and it is of the same to rejoice and to grieve: therefore, according to the same, he rejoices and grieves, as it seems.

To this, some say that joy is sweet and delightful to the one grieving. And this they prove

1. By Augustine in the first book of Confessions saying: If I were to read of Dido's death, I would grieve: because I would not read what I would grieve. About his dead friend: I demanded my soul to be carried by me, and where I might place it I did not find, not in pleasant groves, not in games and songs, not in fragrant places, nor in prepared feasts, nor in the pleasure of the bed, not finally in books and poems did I find rest. The very light was a horror: and whatever was not what he was, was wicked and hateful except for groaning and tears. For in them alone was there some little rest: and thus only weeping was sweet to me, and it succeeded in my soul in the delights of a friend. Even disordered grief can be the matter and cause of joy: and thus the objection previously introduced does not hold. On the contrary: Sweet and delightful expands the heart: therefore, it excites laughter and joy: therefore, not weeping and bitterness. If therefore weeping was delightful from the death of a friend, it would no longer be weeping and sadness, which is false: therefore, it returns to the same as before.

If you say that the one rejoicing grieves in a certain respect, and grieves simply: and this is not inconvenient, namely for one contrary to be simply present, and the other in a certain respect. On the contrary: He who repents, simply rejoices, because otherwise his joy would not suffice: therefore, it seems that his joy is not present to him in a certain respect.

1. Likewise, There is a difference between voluntary grief and involuntary: but in every voluntary grief there can be joy in a certain respect, as in grief over the death of a friend: therefore, he rejoices and delights in weeping: therefore, with voluntary grief there seems to be simple joy: but in penance, grief is simply voluntary: therefore, also simple joy, as it seems.
2. Likewise, Simple joy is obtained from the acquisition of what is simply desired: but the penitent has simply obtained what is desired, when he acquires grief over sins: therefore, also simple joy is generated in him.
3. Likewise, It makes no difference to the generation of his joy, that someone simply acquires a good, or a good for himself: the penitent having obtained a good simply rejoices.
4. Likewise, The possession of virtue (as Boethius says) is pleasant: but penance is a certain virtue: therefore, its possession is pleasant: but it is most possessed by a man in act, when he actually grieves: therefore, then the penitent simply rejoices, and is glad.
5. Likewise, On Galatians 5, on that: But the fruit of the Spirit is charity, etc., Ambrose says: These virtues are called fruits: because they delight their possessors with sincere and holy delight.

Solution. It must be said, as Augustine says, Joy is the diffusion of the soul from the conception of present good: on the contrary, sadness is the constriction of the soul from the conception of present evil, and fear is a movement according to systole or constriction in flight from future and expected evil. Hope, however, is the extension or dilation of the soul in expectation of future good, whether this good is simply, or as now good, provided that good is as good in itself, and not as desired for another: because then it could be desired in itself, not as burning and cutting are desired for health, although in itself no one wishes to be burned or cut, whence also such things are not simply desired, but rather endured for something that is simply desired: and therefore, because of this, it is not contrary in such things to will to endure evil, and to rejoice in that which induces the evil that is endured, as in health. In the same way, I say, that no one wills or desires grief insofar as it is grief, but wills it rather insofar as it is purgative and inductive of pardon: and if he rejoices in grief, he does not rejoice in it insofar as it is grief, but rather insofar as it is inductive of justification and liberation from sin. It is clear, therefore, that in this way it is not contrary to rejoice and to grieve: because they do not refer to the same.

Therefore, it must be said to the first, that grief is considered in two ways, namely from the part of the one grieving, and from the part of the same about which there is grief, as moving, and the matter around which it is, and the end: because all these in such things fall into the

same. If in the first way: then it is considered only in general: because it does not receive its species except from the part of the moving object. But if in the second way: then it receives the species of the moving object around which there is grief: and from that part nothing prohibits grief from being contrary to the grief which is of contrary species. And thus I say, that the grief which is in penance for envy, is contrary to the grief or sadness which is in envy itself. For to grieve over the prosperity of others is envy: and to grieve over this that he grieves thus, is a contrary grief opposing it, and expelling it. And thus it is clear to be true, that contraries are cured by contraries. However, I think this solution is truer among all. Yet the common opinion is, that such sins are not without some delight, and with respect to that the grief of penance is contrary to them: for he who is saddened by the good of his neighbor, rejoices in his own good. But this solution, in my judgment, is of little value: because although envy has its root in one's own good, yet it receives its species and substance from the sadness of the good of the neighbor: and therefore in that part a contrary remedy should be sought for it.

Through this, the solution to the second and third is clear.

To what is further asked, it must be said that in the way previously mentioned, it is not contrary to have joy and grief together: because they are not about the same, nor in the same according to the same. That they are not about the same is clear: because grief is about sins committed, but joy is about grief, as it is said in the Letter. And that they are not in the same according to the same is clear: because grief is in the affection with the contact of the sense, in some way of the present sin: but joy is in the affection from some sense of the effect of grief, and not of grief as it is from the sense, but insofar as it is inductive of the purity which is rendered through grief.

But if it is objected, as noted above often, that we assent to this opinion, that the soul is not moved by multiple movements at the same time, but multiple movements and passions are of grief and joy, and we concede that these stand together in the affection, and therefore we contradict ourselves. It must be said, that we do not posit them equally in the affection, nor as two movements, but as one composite. And to better understand, it must be noted, that there is a certain power of the intellect simply, which the Commentator on the first book of On the Soul calls information which is of the incomplex. And there is a certain power of the composite intellect or reason, which the Commentator there calls Adem. Therefore, taking one mode of composition, which is by way of composition or reasoning, because Isaac says that reason makes the cause run into the caused: we say, that as it is in concept, so follows passion or movement in the affection. But in concept, voluntary grief is apprehended as inductive of pardon: therefore, a composite movement follows in the affection, which is joy in grief, thus purging and cleansing the soul. And thus it is clear, that they are not two movements, but one.

Moreover, many things have been said about this in the notes on the third book of Sentences, where it is treated of the passion of Christ.

To the other objection concerning Augustine, that simply sad is sweet: it must be said that it is false: nor does he intend this, but the will of remaining in mourning is a will in a certain respect, and this in two ways, namely because it conquers the one grieving and excludes

delights, as happens in the death of friends: and then there is no rest in mourning except accidentally, namely because another rest is not found, because consolations are excluded, with the sad prevailing: or because to this delightful it has help, as histories and fables have, which although they are simply sad, yet because they pretend certain wonders, and men from the desire of hearing wonders, intend them, although they are sad: and therefore such things are simply sad, and delightful in a certain respect.

To what is objected against that saying, it must be said that I concede about the weeping.

To what is objected against the solution, that one is present per se, the other in a certain respect, it must be said that in truth the penitent grieves and rejoices, as is said: and both can be conceded to be simply in the way previously mentioned: because grief is present in sensuality, but joy is in reason, neither about the same, nor according to the same. Nor is there any inconvenience there.

Articulus 27 — Who Are Called Perfect; And, What Is The Penance Of The Perfect

Who are called perfect? and, What is the penance of the perfect?

Then it is objected concerning what he says, there, B, Concerning the penance of the perfect, etc.

For the perfect are those who have bound themselves to perfection by vow: and it is not fitting only for these always to repent in themselves, but also for others: because all ought to have the intention of persevering in penance.

Summary. It must be said that the perfect are called here those who according to the state of penance are perfect here, and they are those who continue penance until death. For there is a perfection of penance according to being, and according to well-being in the attainment of the end. According to being, four things are required for the perfection of penance, namely, withdrawal from evil, sorrow for what has been committed, the intention of not committing, and diligence in making satisfaction. According to well-being, which is in the attainment of the end, when it is actually continued until salvation after death: whence Ambrose: Just as charity is one thing beginning, another progressing, another perfect: so penance is one thing of beginners, another of those progressing, another of the perfect.

And through this the solution to the objection is clear: because he does not speak here of such perfection which is through vow, or in the sign of the habit of religion.

Articulus 28 — How Many Modes Of Penance There Are

How many are the modes of penance?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said, there, C, around the beginning: Solemn therefore is the penance, where Ambrose, etc.

It must be noted, therefore, that there are three modes of penance, namely solemn, private, and public.

Solemn is that which is begun at the beginning of Lent, when the penitent is placed outside the Church. However, this expulsion of the penitent ought to be done by the Bishop with the Presbyters, who know the manner of the fault: and it is not to be imposed except for a crime which moves the whole city, as it is said in the canon: Presbyter without consulting the Bishop. However, this penance is not to be repeated: because it is a representation of the expulsion of Adam from paradise: but the introduction is not into paradise except after the death of Christ at least, which is represented at Easter. Hence concerning the first it is said, that with frequent sighs the Bishop announces to them, that just as Adam for his sins was expelled from paradise, so they for their sins are cast out from the Church: afterwards he orders the ministers, that they expel them, the clergy saying:

In the sweat of your face you shall eat bread so that seeing the holy Church moved by your crimes, they do not slight penance: nevertheless they ought to be sent into the Church on the Lord's Supper: but then they will not communicate with others in the Eucharist, or in the kiss: and thus they will remain until the octave of Easter, and then again they will go out. If, however, they repent, they will be able to have entrance to the Church, according to what seems expedient to the Bishop: sometimes, however, they will remain until the end of life. If, however, solemn reconciliation is given, it is to be done only by the Bishop or Abbot or priest by the mandate of the Bishop, if it cannot conveniently be done by the Bishop, especially indeed in the article of necessity: because then it can be done by a simple priest.

Likewise, this solemn penance is not to be imposed on priests, nor deacons, as it is said below, it is to be considered nor even on a cleric, unless first deposed.

Likewise, he who undertakes such penance, meanwhile while he performs it, ought not to contract marriage: if, however, he has contracted, it is contracted and holds.

However, public penance is that which someone does publicly in signs of the publication of penance, although not so solemn: and this also, as some say, is not to be enjoined on priests, as it is held in the twenty-eighth distinction, Presbyter: where it is said, that a priest ought not to do public penance among the laity. However, the contrary seems to be said in the twenty-eighth distinction, Presbyter. It is resolved: because if it is a hidden crime, he ought not to do public penance. If, however, it is public, the enormity of the crime can be so great, that he can do public penance, and ought.

In another way, public penance is spoken of, namely any which is done in the face of the Church: as when a pilgrimage is imposed through the world with a staff of a cubit. This, however, as they say, any priest can impose on his parishioner: because the contrary is not found, unless perhaps it is otherwise by the custom of that Church.

Private penance, however, is said to be that which anyone does with his priest, to whom he confesses his sins, and receives from him a worthy manner of satisfaction.

Exposition of the Text.

Then it is asked concerning what is said, there, C, after the middle: Some mortal fault, etc.

For there is a certain mortal fault, and a certain non-mortal, as venial sin. A certain mortal, against grace, as fornication: a certain mortal and against grace and against reason, as perjury: a certain mortal and against grace and against reason and against nature, as sodomy: a certain one, however, is worthy of accusation in judgment: a certain blasphemy, which is the imposition of a false crime on God, or when something is attributed to Him that is not fitting, or when something is denied to God that is fitting to Him, or communicated to another that is fitting to Him alone.

Articulus 29 — Whether Penance, However Often It Is Repeated, Always Grants Pardon For Crimes

Whether frequently repeated penance always grants pardon for sins as often as it is repeated?

Then the third part of that part must be seen, which begins there, D, "That indeed penance is not done only once," etc.

Here the Master introduces many authorities, that penance is frequently repeated, and always pardon is granted for sins.

However, it seems false to say: because Amos 1:3, on that: "For three transgressions of Damascus," etc., the Gloss of Jerome says: "It signifies that the Lord can grant indulgence three times, who on the fourth time to those committing the same sins neither penance nor indulgence will He grant."

On the contrary, it seems, 1, Matthew 18:22: "I do not say to you, Peter, up to seven times, but up to seventy times seven."

1. Likewise, Augustine on that John 13:14: "And you ought to wash one another's feet," etc. Why would the Lord have washed Peter's feet, and also taught to do this same thing, except because just as offense is daily, so it is necessary that remission be daily.
2. Likewise, Bernard on the Song of Songs: "My iniquity is greater than that I may deserve pardon, far be it. Greater is piety than any iniquity. But impiety is so great that it is frequently repeated: therefore greater piety is always ready to destroy."
3. Likewise, the mercy of God is infinite; therefore it is not limited by any number of repetitions of sins: therefore however much sins are repeated, penance is always granted, if it is sought.

This must be conceded, and first it must be said, that according to Jerome, the first sin is to think. The second, to consent to the thought. The third, to act on the thoughts. But the fourth, finally not to repent. And this is clear, that it is not remitted: because life ends in sins. And, as Damascene says, what death is to men, this is the fall to evil angels: because just as to men after death no place for penance is given, so neither to angels after the fall. And thus it is clear, that by that it is not proven that penance cannot be repeated.

Articulus 30 — Whether One Rising Again From Sin Through Penance Rises Again In Greater Charity Than He Had Before

Whether one rising again through penance from sin, rises in greater charity than he previously had?

Whether one rising again through penance from sin, rises in greater charity than he previously had?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said, there BD, § 1, in the middle: Nor does He give less than He had given before, etc.

From this it seems that whoever rises again through penance, rises in equal or greater charity than he previously had.

But against this it seems,
1. Numbers xi, 34: Having gone out from the Graves of Lust, they came to Hazeroth, says the Gloss of Jerome: The prudent reader, attend, that after the virtue completed in the twelve, because Israel became proud in the Graves of Lust, desired the Egyptian meats, and again lays the foundation, and enters the courts, that is, the vestibules of virtues, showing us that those who stand can fall, and those who have fallen can rise again. The courts are interpreted: but the vestibules of virtue are called the beginnings of virtue. Therefore, since they previously had completed virtue, which is signified by the number twelve in Hazeroth, through the fall in the Graves of Lust they were reduced to the beginnings. Therefore, they rose again in lesser virtue: not therefore in equal or greater, as it seems.

1. Likewise, Ezekiel xliv, 10 and 11: But, etc. Therefore, the fall of those Levites who went far from me in the error of the children of Israel, and erred from me after their idols, and bore their iniquity, they shall be in my sanctuary as porters and janitors, He cast them into lower offices: and greater office is owed to the more virtuous: therefore, they rise again in lesser virtue, as it seems.
2. Likewise, the least charity can rise again after a prior fall: therefore, it is not necessary that it rises in greater or equal, because previously it could have had greater, lesser, or equal.
3. Likewise, it is said, Matthew xxv, 15, that He gave to each according to his own virtue: but virtue in those rising again is not the power of natural good, and natural power is weakened by sin: therefore, it seems that after the fall less is given than before: therefore, it rises in lesser, not therefore in greater.
4. Likewise, if it rises in greater or equal: therefore, however enormous the sins committed, they do not prevent him from such a resurrection. Let us suppose, therefore, one fell through one fornication, and another through much greater sins: therefore, they rise again in equal charity and virtues, as it seems. Let it be supposed, therefore, that they equally prepare themselves to receive grace, and in all things are equal except these two alone, that the one who offended more had greater grace before, and that he fell more

disgracefully: therefore, it seems that nothing helps this one to have greater grace, except that he sinned more. If you say, Indeed because he previously merited more from greater grace. Against: From this that he fell from greater grace, he was more ungrateful: and from this that he was more ungrateful, he sinned more: and from this that he sinned more, he ought to have obtained less: therefore, from the first, the greater grace he had, the less afterwards he ought to have obtained of virtues and grace: therefore, he does not rise again in equal or greater.

5. Likewise, let us suppose two falling from grace, one from greater, the other from lesser: and the one who fell from greater, prepared himself much less to receive grace than the other. Hence thus: God gives to each grace according to his own virtue: and it is commonly glossed, that is, the effort by which he prepares himself: but the one who fell from lesser grace prepared himself more than the one who fell from greater: therefore, he receives greater grace: therefore, consequently the other receives lesser: not

therefore, he rises in equal charity and virtue.

1. Likewise, Amos v, 3: The city from which a thousand went out, etc., says the Gloss:

Unity has the sacrament of one God: therefore, and to be in this one is the highest beatitude as one and true God is. The second in the second, namely in the decade. The third in the third, namely in the centenary. For as the denary is completed from ten units: so the centenary from ten decades, and the thousand from ten centenaries, through which the fourth, that is, the highest beatitude is signified: from which if anyone does penance, from the fourth, namely the thousand, he scarcely returns to the third, namely the centenary: and if he is in the centenary, he scarcely returns to the second, namely the denary: it is clear that the Gloss wants that he rises in lesser: not therefore always in equal or in greater.

1. Likewise, what is the cause, that he rises in equal or in lesser? For in the health of the body lost, we frequently see the restoration of health in lesser strength of the body: therefore, similarly and proportionally it will be in the lost health of the mind: therefore, he rises in lesser frequently, as it seems.

CONTRA:
4. To Romans viii, 28: For we know, etc., because to those who love God the Gloss: If any of these deviate and those who stray, and God makes this itself profit them for good. Therefore, by falling, profiting, he rises in greater virtues than before.

1. Likewise, to Romans v, 20: Where sin abounded, grace superabounded. But grace cannot superabound unless greater is given by the Lord than before. Therefore, after the fall greater grace is given than was had before. Therefore, the one falling rises in greater charity than he had when he fell.
2. Likewise, Joel ii, 25: I will restore to you the years which the locust has eaten, etc. Where the Gloss says: I will not allow the abundance to perish, therefore the Lord restores the

virtue which was lost before for tribulations: equal after the fall to the virtue which was before the fall, because otherwise something would have been lost.

3. Likewise, Luke vii, 43 and 44: He loves more...to whom more is forgiven when he rises again more is given than if he had never fallen. Therefore, he loves more. Therefore, he rises in greater charity: because greater charity is that which loves more, as it seems.
4. Likewise, Matthew viii, 13: The fever left her: and she arose, and ministered to them. Gloss: For the health given by the command of the Lord is given all at once. Therefore, much more strongly in spiritual health: therefore, he gives spiritual health all at once: therefore, he restores the whole previous: therefore, at least he rises in equal.
5. Likewise, Hugh of Saint Victor: But they are not better unless they were permitted to fall so that from their very fall they might be corrected, and made better. Therefore, etc.

If perhaps you say, that they rise better as to prudence, but not as to charity. Against: Virtues are equal, and one being intensified, all are intensified. If therefore they rise more prudent: in any previous virtue they rise better.

1. Likewise, through subsequent penance previous merits revive: therefore all, or some. It is agreed that all through the previously held disputation: and afterwards something is added because of the subsequent conversion: therefore, always the latter has the whole former, and something more: therefore, the latter charity is always greater: therefore, they rise in greater charity.
2. Likewise, Leviticus vii, 1 and following, where the sacrifice for sin is offered, says the Gloss:

As the virtue of the just pleases God, and worthy penance of sinners, which restores to the former state, by erasing sin: the former, unless it were equal to the first: therefore, etc.

1. Likewise, Ezekiel xvi, 24 and 22: If the impious does penance from all

his sins, which he has committed,...of all his iniquities which he has committed, I will not remember. But if iniquities harmed to the diminution of grace previously had, God would remember the iniquities: because the sense is: I will not remember to punish with the penalty of loss or the penalty of sense: therefore, it seems that equal virtue is restored to the one rising: therefore, he rises in equal charity at least.

1. Likewise, Luke xv, 7: I say to you, that, etc. Augustine: so there will be joy

It seems more to justify the impious, than to create and preserve the just. The cause of this is assigned by all Doctors and by Augustine, because in creation nothing resists the operation of God: but in the justification of the impious sins resist: therefore, also to the sinner rising again sins resist: therefore, he needs greater virtue to rise again, than if he had remained just. But it

is agreed that he is given all that he needs to rise again: therefore, he is given greater virtue than he had before he fell: therefore, he rises in greater virtue than before.

1. Likewise, God wise and good has disposed best concerning the predestined: but the best disposition is, and then he is called from this life, when he was in the best state of life: but it is agreed that many predestined fall from justice, and rise again, and then they are called from this life: therefore, they are called in a better state in which they ever were before the fall: but the state cannot be better unless they rise in better charity: therefore, etc.

And the same reason is for others falling: therefore, etc.

Solution. This question is determined by Master Hugh of Saint Victor, thus saying: It is certain, he who falls can rise again: and not only can he rise again, but also rise better than he was when he fell. Many have fallen, and even rose better than they would have been if they had not fallen. Master Hugh does not want this to be so in all. Hence it seems to me to be said, that it is possible to rise better and worse, and equally good. And the sign of these is easy to see in those rising again, who are sometimes found more lukewarm and weaker after than before. According to these sayings, it should be answered to the objections induced secondly.

TO THE FIRST thus, that the fall cooperates to good by accident, and not per se: and this good is not always greater virtue, but greater caution in standing, and greater devotion in the service of God: and thus they can also agree with lesser virtue: just as lesser charity sometimes burns more fervently than greater, as we see in novices and perfect men.

To the other it must be said, that it is not noted that grace superabounds over some preceding state, but rather over the power of sin: and this is not: for as all were concluded under sin, so much more grace liberating opened. However, it sometimes happens that grace abounds, and in great sinners more than in others. But this is not always necessary.

To the other it must be said, that this is not understood except as to the vivification of previous merits through penance: but it is not necessary that virtues are restored in the same quantity: and this is because previously held virtues do not remain after the fall, although works remain in the reputation of God, as we said above: and since essential virtues remain in beatitude, the quantity of beatitude cannot be according to preceding virtues, but rather according to following: but works previously done are computed to merit: and this does not increase except accidental reward, not substantial which is considered according to the quantity of virtues and charity in the subject of the soul, which all take the quantity of charity, and thus

essentially they will pass into beatitude.

To the other it must be said, that to love more is said in a greater sign of love, or in a greater debt: but it does not necessarily follow that such a one also has greater charity.

To the other it must be said, that the Lord restores the whole health of the mind at once as to the habit of all virtues, because this is owed to justification: but not as to the quantity of

virtues, because this is not owed to justification, but rather to subsequent merit. And therefore Augustine says, that charity given merits to be increased, and increased to be perfected, perfected he says: I desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ.

To the other it must be said, that it is not necessary that they become better except in the manner of guarding: and this itself is not necessary: but it is true that this is the intention of permitting the fall, which Master Hugh says, and he speaks of the sign of intention, and not of good pleasure, because it frequently happens otherwise.

To the other it must be said, that it does not follow if they are more prudent, that they have greater prudence: because nothing prohibits a lesser virtue in essence, being more in act, than a greater, namely because of greater attention around it, or greater custom of work, or a complexion more inclined to its act, or something of this kind. And therefore that argumentation is not valid.

To the other it must be said, that the merits of works previously done, through subsequent penance revive according to being in the reputation of merit: but it is not necessary, that according to the same power of meriting, or the quantity of reward which they had before.

To the other it must be said, that it is one thing the penance which is required from us by God, and another worthy penance: because worthy penance is what the sinner has from the consideration of his fall: and he owes more than the just, and does more: and, as it is commonly said, he recovers in syllables what he lost in times. Or it may be said, that it pleases equally for justification, but not as to the quantity of charity and virtues. However, the former solution is according to the intention of the Gloss.

To the other it must be said, that God does not remember the former impiety as to that for which the cause is meritorious of impiety, that is, the infliction of penalty: but that the one rising does not have as many virtues as before, this is from the manner of rising, namely because he prepared himself lukewarmly for the reception of grace, and not from the reservation or remembrance of sins. For if this were from sins, every man would rise in lesser charity: and this is not true.

To the other it must be said, that the least charity suffices to rise: but it is true, that when he rises, it is necessary that he be in a certain greater fervor: and this the least charity suffices to elicit: and it does not show a greater habit, but rather more power in work.

To the last it must be said, that I do not think this is true, that every one to be saved dies in the best state in which he was at the time of his life: although I have already heard this from a great Doctor, who wanted to prove this through that of Proverbs iv, 18: The path of the just is as a shining light proceeding, and growing until the perfect day. But this is not so understood: which is thus clear: because in that which falls it does not grow, but rather the light of present justice is intercepted. Hence as far as it is of itself it grows: because charity either profits or diminishes: but the increase is an impediment according to him who is just.

And what is said, that God disposes best concerning those to be saved, it must be said that this is true as to caution and occasion of more intense fervor: and as it was said, that he does not rise in greater charity, is beyond the intention of God from the tepidity of the one rising.

TO THOSE indeed which were first induced, which seem to prove that he rises in lesser charity, it must be said that all those authorities induced are understood of the lesser dignity, and not of the lesser virtue.

And the other is plain to solve.

An example of this is, that a bishop degraded because of heresy, converted sometimes returns to greater virtue, but not to the grade of former dignity. Nor is it true, that to him who has greater virtue, God gives greater dignity: because this is impeded by those noted in the Letter, namely irregularity, and that the former crime may be more feared, and that an example of caution may be given to others, and other such things.

Articulus 31 — Whether There Is Some Supreme Evil

Whether there is some highest evil?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, D, § 1, towards the end: Even if someone reaches the highest of evils, etc.

It seems that there is no highest evil:
1. For since evil is the privation of good, there cannot be some highest evil unless it is universally deprived of good. However, since good is not in a genus, as the Philosopher says, it is convertible with being; therefore, it is also deprived of being. But what is deprived of being is not; therefore, the highest evil is not.

1. Likewise, in those things which receive intensity by approach and by withdrawal from one and to one, there is no reaching to this highest. But evil is intensified by withdrawal from good; therefore, it is not in it to reach some highest; therefore, there is no highest evil. Proof of the first: In those in which a terminus to which is not posited but only from which, the motion is infinite, because motion is not finished unless it is in the moved being, and this is in the terminus to which. But in comparisons which are according to withdrawal from one, and not according to approach to something, a terminus to which is not posited; therefore, the withdrawal is infinite according to potentiality. But every highest posits a terminus; therefore, in such things there is no highest.
2. Likewise, if there were some highest evil, it would be contrary to the highest good; therefore, it could have as much power in evil as the highest good in good. But the highest good can constitute every being; therefore, the highest evil would destroy every being. But this is false; it is clear, therefore, that nothing is the highest evil.

Solution. It must be said that nothing is supremely evil absolutely; but according to act, there is something so evil that nothing in act is worse. And this the Master notes here and John Chrysostom.

However, the highest evil is twofold, namely simply, and according to state. Simply, as the demon than which there is nothing worse. According to state, however, still in two ways, namely comparing state to state: and thus the damned are supremely evil. Or comparing the state of one person to the state of another person in the state of life, and thus we call the obstinate and impenitent supremely evil. And concerning such, Chrysostom speaks here.

Articulus 32 — Whether The Wicked Can Return To The Way Of Virtue Through Penance

Whether the wicked can return to the way of virtue through penitence?

Whether the wicked can return to the way of virtue through penitence?

Then it is asked concerning what is said there, D, § 1, at the end: "If indeed he wishes to return to the way of virtue," etc.

It seems this is false for the damned demons and souls. For that they wish to return to the way of virtue seems

1. By what Dionysius says in the book on Divine Names: Therefore I argue thus: To whomsoever it is fitting to desire the good and the best, inasmuch as they desire to be, to live, and to understand, it is fitting to desire the good and the best in itself: but the good in itself is virtue and the way of virtue: therefore they desire it: therefore God ought to receive them to penitence according to what is said here.
2. Likewise, everyone desiring to be and to live with wisdom and deliberation desires it in the best way possible for them, because otherwise it would be a vain desire, which the Philosopher considers inappropriate in the first book of Ethics: but demons (as Dionysius says) desire to be, to live, and to understand: therefore they desire it in the best way that can be according to nature: but this is according to grace and glory: therefore they desire it in those ways: but to desire according to grace is not without the way of virtue: therefore the desire is for the way of virtue: therefore they ought to be received to penitence.

But on the contrary. If it is said that they cannot flee evil, and thus cannot return to the way of virtues or penitence. ON THE CONTRARY:

1. If they cannot flee evil: either the cause of this impenitence will be outside them or within them. If outside them: then it will be entirely violence: therefore in no way culpable according to Damascene, Gregory Nazianzen, and the Philosopher: therefore it is not imputable to them, but rather to the one inflicting violence: but the one inflicting violence from outside cannot be other than God: therefore God would be blameworthy for the fact that they cannot convert to good. But if the cause is intrinsic to that obstinacy, it seems it can only be twofold: one, namely, that they do not have the perceptive power of the evil that is harmful to them, just as we see plants not fleeing harm because they do not perceive the harmful: or because, when they perceive, they do not wish to flee. If you say it happens in the first way. On the contrary: To everyone

> to whom nature gives the perceptive power of harm, it also gives some power of fleeing it. This is also evident in those which do not move progressively, which nevertheless (as the Philosopher says) are constricted in the presence of the harmful, and expand in the presence of the suitable. If therefore evil Angels and damned souls have the perceptive power of the harmful: therefore either it is insufficient, or it gave them the power of fleeing.

Likewise, the rational nature is better than the irrational: but the irrational sensible nature is never deprived of some power of fleeing evil: therefore neither is the rational nature: therefore this cause cannot be.

However, it seems that neither can the second be, namely that it perceives and does not wish to flee. For everything that has a will which it can withdraw from this or that evil, can remove the will universally from evil: but the damned, however much evil they do or wish, can not do it: therefore they can remove the will universally from evil: and thus they do as much as they can to virtue: therefore they return as much as they can to the way of virtue.

Likewise, freedom from coercion (as the Saints say) is natural, and is separated from no rational creature: and this is known from the fact that free will does no act which it cannot abandon, and turn to its opposite: therefore demons who have free will from coercion do no act which they cannot abandon, and do its opposite: therefore if they wish, they can abandon evil, and turn to good as much as they can: therefore they can undertake penitence.

If perhaps you say that God does not give them grace, nor wishes to give: this is entirely false, since Anselm says that they do not have it because they do not receive: not because God does not wish to give.

Solution. It must be said that here many have many opinions to which, prejudicing none, I do not depart from my opinion which is noted in the third and second book of Sentences: and it is this, that the cause of the obstinacy of the damned in evil can be assigned in two ways, namely one by congruence, but the true one in the manner that Legislators in civil matters inflict penalties: therefore I seek the second cause from such, namely the just judgment of God, which is gathered from three things, namely the nature of the damned, the determination of the state, and the perpetual will of sinning.

But the nature of the damned is either of a demon or of a man. If of a demon: then its evil is against the deiform intellect, which is not to be perfected through a mirror and enigma, namely to progress from created things to the creator, as Augustine and Bernard say in the fifth book of Consideration in these words: Indeed, Bernard thus far. I say therefore, citizens do not need a ladder, but exiles. Which the author of this sentence saw, who when he said the invisible things are seen through the visible, significantly placed from the creation of the world. And truly what need is there for a ladder to one already holding the throne? That creature of heaven is there, having at hand through which it rather contemplates these things. It sees the Word, and in the Word the things made through the Word. Nor does it need to beg knowledge of the maker from these things which are made.

For neither to move itself does it descend to these things, where it sees them there, where they are far better than in themselves. Whence it does not require a medium to them of the body's sense: the sense itself to itself, sensing itself. The best kind of seeing, if you need nothing, content with yourself for everything you wish to know. Such an intellect is immediately to receive the end, or to be deflected from it voluntarily: and because after the end there is nothing, therefore such an intellect has the aptitude to stand in the end immediately, or to depart from it: which departure is a voluntary fall from the highest nobility of the intellect. Which natural aptitude of the deiform intellect follows confirmation in good, or obstinacy in evil, from justice with other circumstances concurring to the same. Whence Augustine in the book on Miracles: Therefore the Angel in the highest honor was struck with an irremediable punishment, when sinning and the command of his creator transgressing man is afterwards called to penitence. Established in the summit, he had no change to a more excellent state, unless confirmed in that state by the contemplation of his Creator, where he was established: and therefore having fallen he could not be recalled, who fell from the most sublime state of his order. From these it is clear that justice follows the aptitude of obstinacy to the nature of the sinner itself.

But if the damned is a man, then he has to go through many means to the Creator: and therefore falling in the middle, he falls venially, returning to the way: but falling at the end of the way, where there are no more means, he falls irremediably, because his evil is then against reason, as Dionysius says, because he falls from one to another: and he has not intuitive knowledge of the Creator, but rather discursive, as Dionysius says. Whence Augustine in the same book: Man is placed on earth for this, the things understood are seen, etc.

destined for the duty of generating, deputed for the use of food, would receive the transformation of food into a more sublime, better, and more spiritual life without death, if he had persisted: and therefore when he fell, he did not fall from the highest degree of his order.

The second is the determination of status. For it is just that to everything that is born to receive some perfection, a status and time and place of acquiring it, or of lacking it if it falls, should be determined: and because the deiform intellect does not need discourse, therefore to the Angel that status is deputed which is at the moment or hour of conversion or aversion: but to man throughout the time in which he uses the senses and draws from those things which are the way to the Creator: and therefore the Angel is made confirmed or obstinate after conversion, and man after death. Whence, in Apocalypse 12:9, it is said that their place was no longer found in heaven. And, Psalm 74:3: When I shall take the time, I will judge justices.

The third is confirmation in malice and the will not to return: but this follows from the first two. Whence, Isidore in the book On the Supreme Good: And this is taken from what was said about the fall, when they commit themselves to God through pride, and man fell and the devil: but man returned to penance, recognized God to be superior to himself: but the devil, not content with this, because estimating himself equal to God, fell: moreover, he even says himself to be superior to God, according to the saying of the Apostle, who says: He opposes and exalts himself above all that is called God, or that is worshipped. Therefore the devil no

longer asks for pardon, because he is not moved to penance. It is before, that the justice of condemnation follows such a state of Angel and man. Augustine says in the book On Faith to Peter thus: The part of the Angels which departed from its creator God, by whom alone it was blessed, by a voluntary aversion, found the beginning of its damnation in the very aversion of the will: so that there was nothing else to be punished in the work, than to be deprived of the love of that benefit: which God commanded to remain in eternal punishment, so that he also prepared eternal fire, in which those transgressing Angels, neither can they lack evil will, nor punishment: but with the evil of unjust aversion remaining in them, the eternal damnation of just retribution also remains. It follows further, that the evil will which is in the damned, is not sin in them. However, because it is for them in punishment, and more punishment than sin. And therefore it seems to some, that it does not aggravate the punishment of their damnation, except indirectly with respect to the worm of conscience.

There are also other congruities placed by the Saints, and collected by the Masters, seven, why the Angel fell irremediably immediately.

The first is despair, which is of Alcuin on Genesis thus saying: Why is the devil so hostile to the salvation of men? I answer, Because of hatred towards the Creator and envy towards man from despair of his own salvation.

Another is, because he sinned by himself, not by the persuasion of another. Whence Gregory in the Morals: The apostate Angel is not recalled by any hope of pardon, nor by any amendment of conversion: nor does he ever receive the light of his former state, because he did not lose it by persuasion. Thus indeed the blindness of perpetrated pride weighs him down, so that he never rises again to the light of penance through the memory of divine regard.

The third is, because since he is not assumable, it does not suit him to have a restorer. Whence Anselm at the end of the book Why God Became Man: You will then understand the reconciliation of the devil to be impossible, if you diligently consider human nature: just as man could not be reconciled except through a man God who could die, through whose justice what the sin of man lost would be restored to God: so the damned Angels cannot be saved, except through an Angel God who could die, and who through his justice would repair what the sins of others took away: and just as man ought not to be raised by another man who was not of the same kind, although he was of the same nature, so no Angel could be saved by another, although all are of the same nature: because they are not of the same kind, as men: for not all Angels are from one Angel, as all men are from one man.

The fourth is, because in him there is no infirmity, neither burdening nor depressing. Whence Isidore in the book On the Supreme Good: The apostate Angels therefore do not have pardon, because they were not burdened by any infirmity of carnal infirmity so that they might sin. Men after sin therefore return to pardon, because they drew the weight of infirmity from clay material. Therefore because of the condition of weak flesh, the return to salvation is open to man: as also the Psalm 103:14 says: He knows our frame: he remembers that we are dust. And again, Psalm 89:48: Remember what my substance is.

The fifth is the perspicuity of intelligence: but this was previously touched upon somewhat. Whence Dionysius: The evil of the Angel is to be against the deiform intellect, the evil of the soul against reason, and the evil of the body against nature.

The sixth is the particularity of the fall: because not the whole angelic nature fell: but the whole human nature fell. Whence Augustine in the Enchiridion: It pleased the creator and moderator of the universe, that since not the whole multitude of Angels perished by deserting God, that which perished should remain in its own perdition. But because the rational creature which was in men, since it had perished entirely by sins and punishments, could be repaired in part.

The seventh and last is the impugnation of God, who ought to infuse the grace of conversion: and therefore he does not receive the influence. Whence Augustine on Genesis literally: That it is thought that the devil never stood in truth, but fell from the very beginning of his condition, is not to be understood as if he were created evil by the good God: otherwise he would not be thought to have fallen from the beginning: for he did not fall, if he was made such: but made, he immediately turned away from the light of truth, swollen with pride, and corrupted by the delight of his own power.

Considering all these causes, it must be said that the first, which is a certain congruity of nature, is in some way the cause of the second, and the second is in some way the cause or disposition of the third; from which the justice confirming him in such a state is composed so that he cannot return, so that his sin is the punishment, which was for the one committing the sin, as we have said.

To the first objection it must be said, that good and the best can be considered or taken in two ways, namely in the genus, or outside the genus. Outside the genus, good is absolutely good, and the best is absolutely the best which is one alone: and this they do not desire with perfect desire: although they have an imperfect natural instinct towards this. But if good and the best are taken in the genus, namely natural good: then this is still considered in two ways, namely absolutely: and thus to be, to live, to understand are goods desired by the damned: or respectively, namely by comparison to punishment: and thus in my judgment nothing prohibits them from not desiring them, as namely such goods are under punishments. And therefore Dionysius says: Insofar as they are, they desire good and the best, and therefore it is clear, that that reasoning is of no value: because Dionysius does not speak of good in the genus of good or virtue, as we have said: and if it is extended to this, there is some imperfect desire of good: which is not in them except insofar as they are, and not simply; because simply they do not have a will except what befits them as they are under punishments and malice.

To the second it must be said, that I do not know well to see, what is the necessary cause of the immobility of the evil of the damned, or the impotence of flight: but yet it seems to me, that the cause is partly within, and partly outside. Within as the disposition is the aptitude of the nature from which they fall, and the determination of the status at whose end they fall. Outside, however, divine justice confirming in that which the damned finally chose the will.

And as to this last, there is no doubt that the obstinacy of the will has more the nature of punishment than of sin.

To what is objected, that if it is outside, that it is violence: it must be said, that this would be true, if it were only outside: but dispositively meritoriously it is within.

To what is objected, that if they perceive the punishments, and do not flee, etc., it must be said, that the damned perceive the punishments: and the perceived punishment is considered in two ways, namely insofar as it is contrary to the good nature which it punishes: and if it were considered by them only in this way, they would flee it: because, as was said before, they desire good, insofar as they desire to be and to live and to understand. And to that good the punishment is contrary, as Augustine says, that punishment is not evil, except because it is contrary to good nature: but because the appetite and such consideration is not perfect in them, but as it were in potency, namely in the root of nature only, therefore they do not consider the punishment, except insofar as it is a just consequence of the fault. And because they immovably will the fault, therefore they do not flee the punishment: and therefore they are accidentally disposed not to flee the punishment, namely insofar as it is bound to the fault, which they do not flee, but rather pursue and desire.

To what is objected, that they are of worse condition than beasts: it must be said, that in beasts there is only the instinct of nature, but in demons the instinct of confirmed malice: and therefore there is no comparison: but if according to nature this were, that they would not flee punishment, then the objection would be valid.

To the other it must be said, that the demon always wills evil: but this evil or that he does not necessarily will: whence in this obstinacy is noted, that from deliberation he always wills evil: and he is not properly compelled, because the cause of obstinacy is not only outside, as was said. But if he could universally turn away from evil, then the argument would follow.

To the last it must be said, that in truth he has freedom from coercion: because he is not coerced to evil: because then the cause would be only extrinsic, but it is intrinsic, as was said: and therefore he never follows this part, namely good: because freedom is weakened to good and corrupted by the habit drawing to evil.

Articulus 33 — Whether There Is A Return To The First State Through Penance

Whether there is a return to the first state through penance?

Then it is questioned concerning this which he says, there, D, § 1, towards the end: "He does all things so as to recall to the former state," etc.

This does not seem true: because
1. The former state is that of innocence: and to that there is no return through penance.

If it be said that it recalls to the former state as to the immunity from guilt, but not as to dignity.
On the contrary: We see that when the penitent rises again, there still remains in him the

difficulty of doing well: and this is from the remnants of sin, which he did not have before: therefore through penance, he does not entirely receive the former state.

1. Likewise, the former state is that he is ready for doing well according to every work of virtue: and this cannot be unless from the perfect habit of every virtue: therefore this is not solely of penance, as the Master seems to suppose in the Text.

Solution. It must be said to this, that penance in its parts has to restore to the former state, namely in contrition, confession, and satisfaction: and especially as to that part, which is satisfaction: because that supposes the exercise of work according to whatever virtue is commanded by penance: and thus all that was objected ceases.

Articulus 34 — Whether David Ought To Have Been Punished On Account Of The Census

Whether David ought to have been punished on account of the numbering?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said there, D, § 2: He gravely sinned afterwards in the people, etc.

It seems that David ought not to have been punished by the numbering itself: because

1. There were many numberings, and they were not punished: as Moses, and Saul: and other kings of Israel and Judah.
2. Likewise, since David sinned by numbering, and not the people, it seems unjust that the people were punished.

Response. Others numbered by the command of the Lord, as Moses: others, however, for the sake of an expedition to battle, as Saul: but David numbered on account of pride, and therefore he sinned.

To the other it must be said that he is punished to show the relationship of the people to the ruler, just as the whole people were punished on account of the sin of one, namely Achan. Hence Augustine: Or it may be said, and better, it is shown in the punishment of Achan, how great a good in the people is unity itself, so that not in themselves individually, but in the whole, the parts are considered. Because he was proud in the people: and therefore he was punished in it as in possession: and thus the punishment itself redounds upon the king.

DISTINCTIO XV

Divisio Textus

And just as by the aforementioned authorities, etc. Here begins the part in which he refutes the second error, namely that penance can be done for one sin while another sin is retained in delight.

And this part is divided into two parts. In the first, he objects from the canon and resolves it. In the second, he objects from the sayings of the Fathers and resolves it.

The first part is subdivided into two, namely into objection and solution.

The second begins there, A, § 2: But concerning these, it must be understood only that, etc.

In this chapter, he does three things. First, he recounts the error; then, for that error, he first introduces an authority; third, he forms an objection from the sentence of the authority. And these are evident in the Letter.

Articulus 1 — Whether One Can Do Penance For One Sin While Another Sin Is Retained In Delight

Whether penance can be done for one sin, while another sin is retained in delight?

Here arises the question, whether it is true what they say?

It seems that it is so: 1. For debts contracted separately can justly be paid separately: sins are debts contracted separately: therefore, etc.

That sins are debts is evident from that in Luke 7:41: "Two debtors." And, Matthew 18:27: "He forgave him the debt." Also Matthew 6:12: "Forgive us our debts."

1. Also, in the fifth book of the Ethics, Aristotle holds that justice in one way, although not generally, is the same as counterpassion, and the just is the same as the counterpassioned, as Plato says. Let us suppose, therefore, that someone has offended in ten, and in two he is counterpassioned by enduring: either God, to whom he owes, requires satisfaction, or not. If so: then he seems to proceed unjustly: because it is not commanded by law, unless he who has offended is counterpassioned. If not: then the position is held.
2. If perhaps you say that the justice of God still requires satisfaction, but not human justice: this is nothing: because divine justice is infinite, and always mercy before judgment; since therefore in such a case human justice requires nothing, it seems much less that divine justice requires anything further from him.
3. Also, it has been held above from Augustine in the book on Penance, that it is evident to him that sins displease much, who is always ready to destroy them: therefore it will be much more evident if he entirely destroys what can be destroyed: but this will be by destroying individually: therefore it seems that the penitent individually destroys sins.
4. Also, if someone suffers from two or three diseases, which have different and opposite causes: the physician expels the more dangerous disease, leaving or even confirming the other in the subject. Since therefore it is similarly in the diseases of the soul, as in the diseases of the body, as the Saints say, it seems that penance can be done for one sin, while another remains in delight.

5. Also, no king or emperor would again require amendment from someone to whom for part of the injury a fitting penance had been imposed by his vicar, who is in his place: but it is evident that the priest is the vicar of God in confession, and according to what he hears imposes true penance for two or three, others being silent, therefore the supreme emperor will not require further penance for these.
6. If it is said that the sinner cannot satisfy unless he satisfies in charity: and because he does not have charity who repents of one and not of another: therefore he cannot satisfy. Against: Ecclesiastes 9:1: "Man does not know whether he is worthy of love or hatred." Therefore no one knows whether he satisfies or not. Therefore all day everyone should repeat their penance, and despair that they cannot satisfy: because this is completely unknown, what is required for satisfaction: but this is false: therefore also this that someone must satisfy in charity.
7. Also, Daniel: "Redeem your sins with alms." But it is evident that when Daniel gave this counsel, he knew the king to be unjust: therefore the unjust in one sin can do penance for another.
8. Also, Luke 16:9: "Make friends for yourselves with the mammon of iniquity." Riches are called iniquities, because they are collected from iniquities. But it is evident that alms cannot be made from such things which would cause one to be received into eternal tabernacles, unless part of the iniquity is retained, from the other part alms and satisfaction could be made: therefore remaining in one sin, one can satisfy for another.
9. Also, sins do not have such a connection as virtues have, but each is separate from the other: but whatever things are separate from each other, one of them can be destroyed, the other not destroyed: therefore one sin can be destroyed, the other retained: but sin is destroyed only by satisfaction: therefore satisfaction can be made for one, the other retained in will.
10. Also, it is not so with political virtue that having one excludes all vices: therefore it seems that this should not be the case with theological virtue, since God, desiring our salvation, helps in all ways by which man can be helped.

If you say that with political virtue it is so, that he who has one has all, as Isidore says, as noted above in the third Sentences, that this was the opinion of the Stoics, and Aristotle in the fourth Ethics, when he speaks of magnanimity and the magnanimous: if, I say, you say thus: this is nothing, and against the intention of the Philosophers: because they do not attribute this to virtue according to its being by which it perfects its own proper and essential act, but rather according to its greatest power which it has in the subject. And therefore virtue according to its being can be in the subject, with some vice remaining in the same subject which does not contradict that virtue: and thus the proposition is held, as it seems.

But that this error is most pernicious and anathematized, it seems thus:

1. II Corinthians 6:13, the Apostle says: "What agreement has Christ with Belial?" therefore Christ has no communication with a heart in which the devil dwells: but he who is in

one mortal sin is the habitation of the devil: therefore Christ has no communication with him: but Christ accepts no satisfaction unless with whom he participates in grace: therefore Christ does not accept such satisfaction, as it seems.

2. Also, among men during enmities satisfaction of the offender is not accepted: but he who is in sin still acts in enmity against God: therefore his satisfaction is not received.

3. Also, Matthew 5:23: "If you offer your gift, etc." But it is evident that your gift at the altar is not of lesser concern to God, that man reconciles himself to Him, than to man: therefore it is necessary first to be reconciled in all things to God, and then his offering is accepted. But a kind of offering is worthy satisfaction: therefore it is necessary first to have grace for all sins, before satisfaction is accepted: but no one remaining in will in one has grace for all: therefore remaining in will in one, he cannot satisfy for another.

4. Also, he who is in one sin, as Augustine says, is worthy only of eternal punishment: therefore he is not worthy that his work of satisfaction be accepted: and he does not satisfy unless by a work accepted by God; therefore he who is in one sin cannot satisfy for another.

5. Also, without grace there is no satisfaction: but grace encompasses all virtues: therefore without all virtues together there is no satisfaction: but opposites are not together: therefore with virtues there cannot be opposite vices: therefore he who has grace does not have any sin: and no one satisfies unless he has grace: therefore he who satisfies does not have any sin: therefore from the destruction of the consequent, he who has any sin does not satisfy.

6. Also, he does not satisfy who does not restore to God what is His: but he who does not restore to God the soul which he has taken away, does not restore to God what is His: therefore he does not satisfy, who restores the soul: but the soul is not restored as long as the will of any sin remains: therefore as long as any sin is in the will, satisfaction cannot be made.

7. Also, let it be that someone satisfies for one sin, another retained in will: either he loves the Creator as he ought, or not. If not: then he does not satisfy. Proof. Luke 7:48: "Many sins are forgiven her, because she loved much." If so: therefore everything he loves concerning God he loves: but loving everything concerning God, he loves nothing in mortal sin: therefore he loves nothing mortally: therefore no mortal sin remains in his will: and this is against the position: therefore it is impossible to satisfy for one, another retained in delight.

Solution. It must be said that this must be conceded, that what is put forth at the beginning of the chapter as an opinion, although false, must be condemned as contrary to faith, and it is reduced to the contrary of that article: "I believe in the Holy Spirit," namely the holy Catholic Church. Or against that: "The forgiveness of sins."

To the first, it must be said that although the debts of sins are contracted separately as to conversion to a changeable good, and as to act, yet they agree in aversion from one uncreated

good: and in this respect they have the nature of offense and guilt: and therefore since that aversion remains, with any other sin remaining, man cannot satisfy for one, another retained. And this is similar to offenses against men: because the offender cannot satisfy for that offense, while continuing in offending. Although the sinner cannot harm God, yet as far as he is concerned, he harms.

To the second, which proves that sins are debts, it must be said that human debts are twofold. For some are those which are voluntarily believed by the debtor: and to such no offense is attached: and in this way sins are not called debts. Some are debts which arise from unjust harm to someone, either in person, or in goods, or in honor: and to such an offense of the harmed is attached: and therefore he cannot be satisfied unless the offense ceases: but this does not cease while he continues in any way of harm: and to such debts sins are likened. And therefore it is clear that that reasoning is not valid.

To the other, it must be said that although according to Plato the just is the same as the counterpassioned, and this is true in some cases, as in the rectification of inflicted injury, where the one inflicting injury is counterpassioned as much as he inflicted: yet this just supposes a cessation from harm generally: and from spiritual harm there is no cessation, as long as the will of any sin lasts.

To the other, it must be said that the justice of men also well requires cessation from harm, as has already been shown: but other debts to which the offense of him to whom we are debtors is not attached, can be paid separately. And to those debts in spiritual matters sins are not similar, but rather the gifts which are given by God, that we may gain in them, as it is said, Matthew 25:14 and following.

To the other, it must be said that actual sin is not destroyed in us without us: because, as Augustine says, "He who created you without you, will not justify you without you." It cannot be destroyed except by grace, to which the will turned away from the unchangeable good is opposed: and since that remains turned away even in one sin retained in delight, another sin cannot be erased: although God in Himself is always ready to destroy, whenever there is no impediment on our part.

From the above we concede that it is not similar with bodily diseases and spiritual ones: because bodily diseases do not have one cause: but spiritual ones have a single cause, which is the will, or free choice, which as long as it remains turned away is not susceptible to medicine: and therefore no spiritual disease is cured in it.

To the other, it must be said that the priest does not receive such a one to penance unless deceived: but what is exhibited by a deceived minister is well revoked by the justice of the king: therefore the objection brings forth not a similar for a similar, or something false is supposed in it, namely that true satisfaction is what is received by a deceived vicar.

To the other, it must be said that although man cannot know he has charity with infallible knowledge, he can know, namely with knowledge by probable signs accepted: and this suffices, as has often been noted in this work.

To the other, it must be said that Daniel does not intend that any king should persist in any sin, but rather that he should change his life for the better, and then with alms he will redeem the penalty of sins which he foresaw to be due to him because of sin.

To the other, it must be said that the meaning of that word is not that money is retained in part, which is acquired from iniquity: but rather it supposes what is of positive and common law, that first what was taken away is restored: then from the remainder which is called iniquitous, because it is retained unjustly, that is, avariciously against the poor, the poor are bought as friends, that they may receive their benefactors into eternal tabernacles: as below in the same distinction will be held in the question of alms.

To the other, it must be said that sins do not have a connection in any positive being, which is like a habit, or root, or something of this kind: but yet they have a commonality in the privation of conversion to the unchangeable good: from which part they all have the nature of sin and evil and guilt of offense. And since such privation remains in him who persists in sin, the wrath of God remains upon him: and therefore grace is not perceptible.

To the other, it must be said that different people have different opinions about this. And as far as I am concerned, I well think that one of the political virtues is had without another: although not as to all the power it can have in the subject: and then it must be said that it is not similar with political and infused virtues: because infused virtues are understood as formed virtues, which are as it were certain virtual parts of grace making one pleasing: and therefore they have a connection in grace, so that one is not had without another. And therefore also none is there, as long as the contrary of any virtue is in the subject.

But it is not so with political virtues: because they take their generation from custom and experience, and the customs of acts are diverse: and therefore one is generated in the soul, another not generated. And by this the solution to the following two is clear.

Articulus 2 — Whether For One Sin A Twofold Tribulation Can Arise

Whether for one sin a double tribulation can arise?

Then it is inquired concerning that which is said, there, A, at the beginning: A double tribulation will not arise, etc.

It seems contrary

1. In Psalm 105, 29, where it is said: Let them be covered as with a cloak by their confusion.

1. Likewise, Ecclesiasticus 11, 16: Error and darkness were created together with sinners.

2. Likewise, In Psalm 148, 8: Fire, hail, snow, etc.

Solution. It must be said that a double tribulation will not arise for a sin that is simply one: but for that which is one in subject, and multiple in deformity: or for multiple sins a double tribulation will indeed arise; just as when the act of sin is one, yet there is lust, and contempt, and the like, to which something corresponds in punishments.

Hence it must be said to the first, that this is not understood by reason of diverse punishments owed to one sin, but by reason of the two parts of the sinner himself, which are body and soul: and just as he sinned in body and soul, so also he is punished in both.

To the other it must be said, that this is understood by reason of the privation of the habit directing in moral matters. For error...

There is in choosing, and darkness in providing what is to be done.

To the other it must be said, that those punishments do not correspond to one sin simply, but to many, or to a sin which is one in subject, and with much deformity.

Articulus 3 — Whether The Penances That Are Commuted Into Good And Are Enjoined In Satisfaction Are Just Or Not

Whether the penalties which are changed into good, and are enjoined in satisfaction, are just, or not?

Then it is asked, concerning what is said there, A, § 2: Those who are changed into good by present punishments, etc.

Here it can be asked, Whether those expiatory penalties which are changed into good, and are enjoined in satisfaction, are just, or not?

It seems that they are just: because 1. The Lord punishes sinners with these penalties: and God punishes no one unless justly: therefore these penalties are just.

1. Likewise, It is just that a judge renders according to merits: but the merit of guilt cannot be except by penalty: therefore when it is inflicted on the sinner, it is done justly to him: therefore such a penalty is just.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. To mortal sin is owed eternal penalty: therefore it is unjustly punished, when it is punished with temporal penalty.

1. Likewise, If the sinner is justly punished with a set penalty, it seems unjust if the set penalty is converted into a greater one: but this is not unjust: therefore that set penalty was not just. By the middle proposition. If the penitent does not complete the enjoined penance, he is punished in purgatory, where the penalty is more severe.

Conclusion. It must be said that if that penalty is set discreetly, it is just: because then the circumstances of the sinner are considered, namely devotion, will, and the like, and the circumstances of the forum of the Church militant, which helps, and others. Hence the conclusions first introduced must be conceded.

To the objection, it must be said that to mortal sin in itself is owed eternal penalty: but to mortal sin which by the event of subsequent contrition and confession has become venial, eternal penalty is not owed, but temporal.

To the other, it must be said that by accident the penalty becomes greater: namely because the circumstances of the penitent change, and the circumstances of the forum in which he repents. For voluntary penalty here becomes necessary there: and therefore of lesser power in purging: and therefore it must be intensified, and other circumstances changed.

Articulus 4 — Whether The Five Modes By Which Scourges Happen Are Well Assigned And Distinguished

Whether the five ways by which scourges occur are well assigned and distinguished?

Then indeed it is questioned concerning this which is said, there, A, § 2, in the middle: For scourges occur in five ways, etc.

It seems that the first way is none: because
1. It does not presuppose sin in the scourged, since Jerome says: Whatever we suffer, our sins have deserved.

1. Likewise, on Romans 8:28, on that: To those who love God, all things work together for good, the Gloss says: Death and therefore without sin, all evils proceed from the merit of original sin: some way of just scourge, as it seems.
2. Likewise, Job 6:2: Would that my sins were weighed, etc. Therefore it is manifest that whatever evil we endure happens for our sins.

1. Likewise, Gregory: No adversity will harm if no iniquity dominates.
2. Likewise, Augustine: It is unjust, but God does nothing unjustly: therefore a rational creature is not punished without sin: He punishes none except for sin.

On the contrary:
1. Job 16:18: I have suffered these things without the iniquity of my hand, when I had pure prayers to God.

1. Likewise, Job 19:6: Understand that God has afflicted me not with an equal judgment, and has surrounded me with His scourges.
2. Likewise, Gregory in the Gloss: The just Creator did not seek to extinguish the vices of blessed Job with so many blows, but to increase his merits.
3. Likewise, John 9:3: Neither did this man sin, nor his parents: but that the works of God might be made manifest in him.

Further, it is objected concerning the second way, which seems that it is none: because

1. Incitement to vice is not the custody of virtue: but provocation to anger without cause is incitement to vice: therefore it is not a good custody of virtues: but he who is scourged without merit is provoked to anger: therefore it is a bad custody of virtues.

2. If you say that this is lest pride tempt. On the contrary: Augustine says that pride rages after all virtues. Therefore even after penance in tribulation: therefore pride is not more guarded against by tribulation than by another way.

Further, it is questioned concerning the third way. For it seems not to be the correction of sin.

1. For sin is not corrected except by grace which is contrary to it, or by virtue: but punishment is not contrary to sin: therefore sin is not corrected by punishment.
2. Likewise, punishment which corrects sin: either it has this insofar as it is punishment, or insofar as it is voluntary, or insofar as it is inflicted, or as to two of these, or as to all three. If in the first way: then in all it corrects sin: and thus the fifth way is also understood. If in the second way: therefore where there is greater will, there will be greater correction of sin: but to the sweet works of virtues, and prayers, and suchlike, the will is greater and sweeter: therefore sin will be more corrected by those, as it seems: therefore that purgative of sin seems ill-ordered by the highest wisdom. If as to the third, this again cannot stand: because in demons and the damned punishment is inflicted, and yet it does not correct sin. If you say, as to two; either this will be because punishment is voluntary, or because punishment is inflicted. If in the first way: since this is not caused by what is punishment, but by what is voluntary: it seems that in those in whom the will is more devout, it is more corrective of sin: and those are acts of virtues, and other works of devotion, as is commonly said by all.

Further, it is questioned concerning the fourth way which he touches: because it seems to be entirely without reason:

1. For the glory of God can be manifested in many other ways without the harm of men: therefore it seems that this is useless.
2. Likewise, it seems to be a certain conformity to the miracles of the demon: because, as it is said in the life of blessed Bartholomew, the demons first harmed, and afterwards ceasing, they seemed: and so it seems to be here: therefore this way seems to be none.

Similarly, it is questioned concerning the fifth: because
1. Augustine says in the book on Penance: Whatever God permitted to suffer, but know it to be a scourge of correction: Herod suffered: therefore his suffering was a scourge of correction, as it seems.

1. Likewise, as long as a place for correction and penance is given, so long should the beginning of condemnation be deferred: but through this whole life a place for penance is given: therefore condemnation should not begin here: therefore no one is punished before the beginning or taste of his condemnation: and thus the fifth way seems to be none.

Against this is what is said, II Maccabees 9:13, concerning Antiochus punished when he was humbled by punishments, and prayed: But this wicked man prayed to the Lord, from whom

he would not obtain mercy. Therefore punishment did not avail him for the amendment of the crime.

Moreover, it seems that that whole division is insufficient: because another is given which is contained in these words:

He instructs, turns, tests, and makes joyful, constrains,
Strengthens, satisfies, consummates, then crowns.

He instructs, Jeremiah 31:18: You have chastised me, and I was instructed.

He turns, that is, converts, Psalm 15:9: Their infirmities were multiplied, afterwards they hastened.

He tests, Ecclesiasticus 27:7: The furnace tests the potter's vessels, and the trial of tribulation tests just men.

He makes joyful, James 1:2: Count it all joy, my brethren, when you fall into various temptations.

He constrains, Isaiah 26:19: Only vexation will give understanding to the hearing.

He strengthens, Job 6:9 and 10: Let Him loose His hand, and cut me off. And this would be my consolation, that afflicting me with pain, He does not spare.

He satisfies, that is, makes fruitful, Exodus 1:12: The more the Egyptians oppressed them, namely the sons of Israel, the more they multiplied and grew.

He consummates, Matthew 5:10: Blessed are they who suffer persecution for justice's sake.

He crowns, II Corinthians 4:17: For that which is at present momentary and light of our tribulation, works for us above measure exceedingly an eternal weight of glory.

In conclusion. It must be said to the first, that sin is twofold, as Augustine says, namely of nature, and of person. And without the sin of nature no one suffers, not even Christ, as noted in the third Sentences, question on the passion of Christ, but without the sin of person many are punished, as Christ, and Job, and certain others: and thus the authorities first introduced are understood.

To what is questioned concerning the second way, it must be said that all tribulation, insofar as it humbles, avails for the custody of virtues: and although this is universally true, yet there is a certain species of tribulation which shows the infirmities of man and the utilities of the body, which has a special efficacy of humiliation, as was the tribulation of blessed Paul, namely the thorn of the flesh.

To what is objected against this, it must be said that tribulation is not a provocation except of a mind ill-disposed, namely angry: but here Bede speaks of a tranquil mind, and the mind of the wise: concerning which the Philosophers have proved that perturbation does not fall into the wise: and therefore the virtue which is presupposed in the scourged guards against perturbation: but the mode of scourge is per se humiliative.

To the other it must be said, that although pride rages after all virtues, yet it rages less after that which reduces man into the actual knowledge of his state: and therefore it concludes false as far as it is of itself.

To what is objected concerning the third, it must be said that in sin there are two things, namely the substance of sin, and the guilt consequent to sin: and sin as to its substance is not purged except by grace:

but the guilt which is the debt of punishment is purged by the payment of punishment.

To the other it must be said, that punishment purges sin insofar as it is voluntarily accepted for sin.

To what is objected against this, it must be said that works of devotion indeed avail more for the merit of eternal life: because they kindle charity and fervor: but punishment voluntarily perceived avails more for the merit of the diminution of punishment. And this for this reason, because the guilt of punishment is by way of the debt of justice: which is said by the Philosopher to be directive of loss. And such justice requires that as much be paid as was offended: but it is paid when one atones for punishment: and therefore it avails more for the payment of punishment to endure punishment voluntarily. The reason introduced proceeds as if the merit of eternal life and the diminution of punishment were the same, which is not true.

To what is questioned concerning the fourth, it must be said that that mode has reason: because by this that He punishes and satisfies, the Lord shows Himself to be the founder of nature, as He Himself says, Jeremiah 16:6: Behold, as clay in the hand of the potter, so are you in My hand, house of Israel. But by other ways He would not so show Himself the artificer of the clay of our nature.

To the other it must be said, that demons conferred some health: and their harm was violent: but the Lord sometimes weakens by moving nature through dispensation: but He confers true health, with humors reduced to equality, or with the members of the composition of the body reintegrated. Hence it is not similar what is introduced for the similar.

To what is questioned concerning the fifth, it must be said, that I well think, that as far as the intention of the scourge and the scourger is concerned, no one is scourged here except to be corrected: but that he is not corrected is foreknown by the scourger, and therefore it is said to be the beginning of eternal punishment. For that it is just of punishments, this itself ought to make him recoil from sin as far as the nature of punishment is concerned: hence that he does not return, this is from the obstinacy of the scourged - and then it is per accidens as if the beginning of eternal punishment.

And by this the solution of those things which are objected is clear: because Augustine speaks according to the intention of the scourger and not of the scourged. And in the same sense the reason proceeds. But Bede speaks in the Letter concerning the scourge on the part of the scourged, which in him makes obstinacy, which is the beginning of eternal punishment.

To what is objected concerning the division, it must be said that many particular causes can be assigned for the scourge: but yet they fall under these five universals - as is clear in the

eight members of the second division. For instruction is reduced to the custody of virtues: conversion however to correction: testing and making joyful, strengthening and healing and crowning all fall under the first cause here posited. And two causes posited here are not touched in the second division: because it has more general parts than the second.

And the number of causes posited here can be taken thus: Scourge is made either for the promotion of good, or for the removal of evil. If in the first way: either in the Church, or in the person. If in the Church, thus it is for the glory of God to be manifested, as in the blind man. If in the person: either it is for the good which is not present, but ought to be induced by the scourge: or for the good which is present, and can be improved by the scourge: because as the Poet says:

It does not harm to apply the spur to the admitted horse.
If with respect to that which is not present: thus it is for the correction of vice, that virtue may be introduced: because Boethius says, that vices must first be extirpated, that virtues may be inserted:

If however it is with respect to the good which is present, but can be amended for the better: then either it is on the part of the subject: and then it is the rooting of greater good and conservation, and thus it is the custody of virtues. Or on the part of the good itself which is present: and this does not accept improvement except according to quantity: and then that is the cause which Augustine calls merits. If however it is with respect to evil: either this will be with respect to removing evil: and thus it is again for the correction of vices: because nothing prohibits the same being of two or both ends: of one, as of that which is the end: of the other however, as of that which is to the end: and by the scourge first virtue is to be inserted: but that this may be done, it is necessary that vices be extirpated. Or it is to indicate evil, which cannot be extirpated because of the obstinacy of the scourged: and thus it is for the beginning of eternal punishment.

But there are verses concerning these causes:

Job tests, inclines Paul, and purges Mary,
In the blind man He manifests Himself, punishes Herod.
Or thus:
Why is man tormented? lest pride dominate.
When is man tormented? that merit may be accumulated for him.
Why is man tormented? that guilt may be expiated by punishment.
Why is man tormented? that Christ may be glorified.
Why is man tormented? that he may be punished doubly.

Articulus 5 — Whether God, In Punishing Sins, Observes The Due Measure

Whether God in punishing sins preserves a due measure?

§ 21. Next it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, B, after the beginning: That God as of all things, so also of punishments knows the measures, etc.

§ 22. For it seems, that God Himself does not preserve the measures of the penalty of crimes: 1. For it is clear, that the crime is temporal: but the penalty is eternal: therefore it seems, that the measure is not preserved.

§ 23. 2. Also, below it is said, that the penalty even of purgatory exceeds every genus of passion, which a man can suffer in this life: therefore much more the penalty of hell: but the delight of sin does not exceed every genus of delight of this life: therefore the bitterness of the penalty according to intension exceeds in quantity the delight of sin: therefore penalty and fault are not measured against each other, as it seems.

§ 24. SOLUTION. It must be said, that the measure of penalty is not proportioned to the quantity of time, or of delight, but rather to the quantity of the root and of the contempt and of the command of the will, as the Saints say. For example, the root of sin is contempt: and the quantity of this is attended to according to the quantity of the eternal uncreated good, which it contemns: and this is a certain infinite good. And therefore if it is punished by a finite penalty, this will be from God's mercy. Similarly the act of sin is temporal: but nevertheless when a man voluntarily subjects himself to sin, with the knowledge of it that he is not able to rise per se, as much as is of himself, he chooses to be in sin eternally: and consequently also to this eternity responds an eternal penalty. And this is what Gregory says, that because man sinned in his eternal, therefore he is punished in God's eternal.

§ 25. And through this the solution of both objections is clear.

Articulus 6 — Whether By The Sentence Of The Priest The Sentence Of The Judge Is Forestalled

Whether through the sentence of the priest the sentence of the judge is prevented?

§ 26. Next it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, B, after the beginning: And that the sentence of the judge is not prevented, etc.

§ 27. For we see, that all day it is prevented through temporal penance.

§ 28. Also, John xx, 23: Whose sins you shall forgive, etc. And, Matt. xvi, 19: Whatever you shall loose, etc.

§ 29. But it is certain, that this whole is understood as to penalty: because God by Himself absolves from fault: therefore the sentence of the judge is prevented.

§ 30. SOLUTION. It must be said, that through the sentence of the priest the sentence of the judge is not prevented: because the sentence of the judge and of the priest is the same, if the priest enjoins penance by the order of the keys. But if he does not preserve the order of the keys, then it is the sentence of a man, not of God: and then again he does not prevent it, because the sentence of God does not on this account recede from the sinner, who willingly is deceived by the priest.

§ 31. Whence the first authorities, and the first reason speak of the sentence of the judge, inflicted by the ministry of the priest. And through this the solution is clear.

Articulus 7 — Whether For A Light Fault, As Gathering Wood On The Sabbath, Death Ought To Have Been Inflicted

Whether for a light fault, as to gather wood on the sabbath, death ought to have been inflicted?

§ 32. Next it is inquired concerning this which is said, there, B, below the middle: And he who had gathered wood on the sabbath, etc.

§ 33. 1. For he seems to mean, that the fault of this Israelite was light: since nevertheless he was stoned, and for a light fault death would not have been inflicted.

§ 34. 2. Also, it is read, Levit. xxiv, 14: Lead the blasphemer outside the camp. Therefore he blasphemed: and blasphemy is a sin against the Holy Spirit: and this is a sin which is not remitted neither in this world, nor in the future: since nevertheless the Letter implies, that he afterwards was not punished.

§ 35. SOLUTION. It must be said, that the lightness of that fault is signified from the species of the twofold sin, namely of the gathering of wood on the sabbath, and of the curse by which he cursed not God, but an Israelite man: and he speaks only of these two sins.

§ 36. But to the first it must be said, that sins were then heavily punished on account of the recency and rigor of the law, that others might be terrified, and not on account of the gravity of the sin. § 37. To another it must be said, that as Richard of St. Victor says, the spirit of blasphemy is one thing, and blasphemy is another: because the spirit of blasphemy is, when the one blaspheming breathes not ignorance, but malice in blaspheming, as is clear, Matt. xii, 24, and Luke xi, 15, where they saw signs indicating the spirit of God, and said they were done in Beelzebub. But blasphemy is done sometimes from ignorance, or provocation: and then it is not a sin against the Holy Spirit: and such was that of that Israelite, who perhaps repented between the blows of the stones: and then by the merit of patience the sin was remitted to him.

§ 38. Also other authorities, etc. This is the second part, and it is divided into two parts: in the first of which he posits objections, and in the second the solution, there, C, To these it can be responded, etc.

Articulus 8 — Whether Without Faith Any Punishment Is Satisfactory

Whether without faith any penalty is satisfactory?

§ 39. But a doubt occurs concerning this which he says in the first part, there, B, § 2, in the text of Ambrose: Second, through punishment: where even if faith is lacking, etc.

§ 40. For against is that of the Apostle, to Rom. xiv, 23: All that is not from faith, is sin. And, to Heb. xi, 6: Without faith it is impossible to please God. Perhaps it is also necessary to displease: therefore it seems, that without faith penalty is not satisfactory.

§ 41. SOLUTION. There is an equivocation in faith: because faith is a virtue by which invisible things are believed on account of the first truth: and he is not speaking of this here.

Faith again is a certain credulity of reason concerning something apprehended, according to what the Philosopher says in III De Anima, that opinion aided by reasons becomes faith: and thus it is accustomed to be said, that faith is of something opined or known: and thus Ambrose speaks here. Whence the sense is: If faith, that is, conscience of the crime is lacking, because no one understands crimes: penalty satisfies, because such things God either piously indulges by the patience of penalties, or reveals to be confessed.

§ 42. TO THE FIRST therefore it must be said, that the sense of the authority of the Apostle is: All that is not from faith, that is, against faith, is sin: because he who acts against conscience, builds to Gehenna.

§ 43. To the other two it must be said, that he speaks of faith as a virtue.

Articulus 9 — Whether One Satisfying In Mortal Sin Has Satisfied

Whether one satisfying in mortal sin has satisfied?

§ 44. Next it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, B, § 2, at the end: This seems far from reason, and the custom of the Church: which for the same sin, unless it is reiterated, imposes penance on no one twice.

§ 45. For it seems, that the Church does not enjoin another penance on him just as these also say.

§ 46. 1. For let us posit, that a priest has enjoined upon someone, that he should go beyond the sea, or that he should give a hundred marks of silver: and he completes the journey, or gives the silver in mortal sin, the Church does not enjoin upon him that he should do this again: therefore he himself is absolved: therefore he has fulfilled the penance: therefore he was not bound to do this in charity.

§ 47. 2. Also, the precepts of God do not include grace, as many say: because there is not commanded except the act: therefore the priest does not intend, that he fulfill the penance existing in charity: if therefore not existing in charity he fulfills this, he will seem to be absolved.

§ 48. SOLUTION. We believe, that if anyone existing in sin, pays what is enjoined, it is not necessary, that after he has repented, he pay again: but nevertheless it is necessary that he be contrite, and confess, and satisfy concerning that which he did not do enjoined in that mode in which he ought. Therefore he has not properly satisfied, as it seems: because contrition and satisfaction respect the dimission of sin as to the essence, for which dimission a man ought to be made pleasing to God: and therefore they cannot be done without charity: but they differ, because contrition not only is done in charity, but from charity, since through it fault is deleted, to the deletion of which the motion of free choice informed by grace is required. But although it is necessary that satisfaction be in charity, nevertheless it is not necessary that it always be done from charity. But confession does not respect the dimission of sin per se, but only the disposition to the dimission of fault, because it is made to the minister of the Church, that he may know how great and what is the fault, so that thus he may enjoin the due penalty. Therefore existing in sin he can pay the debt, but not satisfy: because payment only respects

the quantity of the debt, but satisfaction respects this, and further says that it be done according to the will of the good pleasure of him to whom it is done.

§ 49. C. How are the premises to be accepted?

§ 50. To these it can be responded thus, That of Gregory: The Lord rains, etc., is to be referred not to the pardon of the crime, but to the desertion of the depraved work: so that therefore a part of the city is said to be rained upon, because from the act and delight of sin to which it formerly served, it now ceases: not that it has its pardon. And that rain is called such continence by which he is revoked from the work of sin: because from the fount of God's grace this is instilled into the heart, that either thus gradually he may come to penance: or thereby he may be less punished by God who by a longer delight and act of sin would have accumulated a greater torment for himself. But if the rain is referred to the indulgence of guilt, it will seem to be contrary to the Evangelical sentence[516]. For if on account of the unmercifulness by which someone does not show mercy to his neighbor, even the things which were dismissed, are replicated to penalty: much more the things which are not yet dismissed on account of fraternal hatred are proved to be reserved to penalty. And if he who is constituted the arbiter of his own will, cannot begin a new life, as Augustine says, unless he repents of the old life: how will he arrive at the newness of indulgence, who has not laid aside the oldness of hatred?

§ 51. Also that which Ambrose says: And if faith is lacking, penalty satisfies, etc., is not understood of the faith, by which it is believed in God, but of the conscience of the crime. For faith is lacking, when the conscience of sin is not underneath. For since no one understands all crimes, there is sometimes in a man a sin of which he does not have conscience. Whence the Apostle: I am conscious to myself of nothing, but I am not justified in this[517]. When therefore anyone is scourged for a sin of which he is not conscious, if he patiently bears the penalty and humbly embraces it, thinking that perhaps he has a sin which he does not understand, and for it is punished by God, that penalty satisfies and relieves the burdened. But to this which is objected concerning that satisfaction: if there was not satisfaction, it is to be imposed again. But if it is not to be imposed again, there was satisfaction: and if there was satisfaction, he obtained pardon. It can be responded that there was therefore not satisfaction, because he did not do worthy fruits of penance. For the satisfaction of penance is, as Augustine says, to cut out the causes of sins, and not to indulge an approach to their suggestions. Also, Indeed those who live wickedly, and do not care to correct such a life and morals, and among their very crimes do not cease to frequent alms: in vain therefore do they flatter themselves, because the Lord says: Give alms: and behold all things are clean to you[518]. For they do not understand how widely this extends. For there are many genera of alms: which when we do, we are aided. Not only he who gives food to the hungry, drink to the thirsty, and such things: but also he who gives pardon to the one asking, gives an alms: and he who emends by a blow him over whom power is given or coerces by some discipline, or prays that a sin be dismissed to him, gives an alms: because he provides mercy. For many things are well provided to the unwilling, when their utility and not their will is consulted: but that is greater by which from the heart we dismiss what anyone

has sinned against us. For it is less great to be benevolent towards him who has done you no evil. That is much grander that you also love your enemy, and to him who wishes you evil, and if he can does it, you always wish good and do what you can. What therefore the Lord says: Give alms; and all things are clean to you: are we to understand it thus, that to those not believing in Christ all things are clean, if they give those alms? For he who wishes to give alms ordinately, ought first to begin from himself, and give it first to himself. For alms is a work of mercy: and it is most truly said,

Have mercy on your soul pleasing God[519]. Let them not therefore deceive themselves, who by the most lavish alms of their fruits or money estimate that they buy impunity, remaining in sins: which they so love, that they opt to converse in them. But he who loves iniquity, hates his own soul and he who hates his own soul, is not merciful to it, but cruel. For by loving it according to the world, he hates it according to God. If therefore he wishes to give it an alms through which it is made clean, let him hate it according to the world, and love it according to God. By this alms, which a man first owes to himself, the interior things are cleansed. Exhorting to which Christ says: Cleanse the things which are within. For to the unclean nothing is clean: but their mind and conscience are polluted, as the Apostle says[520]. But all are unclean, whom faith does not cleanse, by which it is believed in Christ: concerning which it is written, Cleansing their hearts by faith[521]. But lest Christ should seem to reject those alms which are made from the fruits of the earth: These, He says, it behoved to do, namely judgment, and the charity of God: and not to omit those[522], that is, the alms of earthly fruits.

§ 52. From these things it is given to be understood, that those remaining in mortal sin, although they do lavish alms, nevertheless do not satisfy through them: because they act inordinately, while they do not begin from themselves. Nor is such a work properly called an alms, while to themselves they exist cruel, not pleasing God. Therefore that is not to be called the satisfaction of sin, which anyone does for one sin, while he perdures in another. Because it profits nothing to fast, and pray, and do other goods, unless the mind is revoked from sin: and if sometimes converted he has confessed a silent sin to a priest, for both satisfaction must be imposed upon him: because for the first he did not satisfy condignly.

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§ 53. To these it can be responded, etc. Here he begins to solve. And it is divided into three parts: in the first of which he solves according to his own opinion: but in the second according to the opinion of others, in which nevertheless he seems to have been. Thirdly, he confirms the solution by authorities, there, F, I judge it enough, etc.

§ 54. And the subdivision of these parts is clear per se.

§ 55. But here fall useful and many questions.

516. Matt. 18:35.

Articulus 10 — Whether One Making Satisfaction Needs Grace That Makes One Pleasing In Order To Satisfy

Whether one satisfying needs making-pleasing grace that he may satisfy?

§ 56. The first question is concerning this which he says, there, C, § 4, after the beginning: Because from the fount of God's grace this is instilled into the heart, etc.

§ 57. 1. For it seems from this that grace or a drop of grace is in the sinner, still existing in sin: and since having grace he can satisfy, it seems, that the one satisfying does not need making-pleasing grace to this end that he may satisfy.

§ 58. 2. Also, This seems from a simile, that even without grace he can do this: because if anyone ought to satisfy a man for an injury, and there is enjoined upon him exile, or fasting, or some such thing: it is not required whether in a state of grace he pays the penalty, or not, provided that he pays it: therefore it seems, that similarly it is to be satisfied to God.

§ 59. 3. Also, Restitution is a part of satisfaction, and it can be done even in a state of mortal sin: therefore also satisfaction.

§ 60. But that restitution can be done in a state of mortal sin, is proved, Luke xix, 8, of Zacchaeus who says: If I have defrauded anyone of anything, I restore fourfold: therefore he seems to have the proposition.

§ 61. 4. Also, Levit. xxv, 25: If thy brother being impoverished sell his little possession, etc. And it follows, vv. 26 and 27: But if he have no near kinsman, and he himself can find the price to redeem it, the fruits shall be counted from that time in which he sold it. But according to the Interlinear [Gloss] there, the little possession is conversation, which is sold to the devil when a man mortally sins: and the fruits of satisfaction will be counted from that time in which he sold it, that is, from that time in which he mortally sinned: therefore satisfaction made in mortal sin, or with freely given grace only, seems to avail to the deletion of sin.

§ 62. BUT AGAINST: 1. It was held above, that dead works do not please God: and it does not happen to satisfy except through works pleasing to God: therefore it does not happen to satisfy through dead works: but outside of grace only dead works are done: therefore outside of grace no satisfactory works are done: therefore no satisfaction: therefore, etc.

§ 63. 2. Also, To satisfy is more than to merit: because to merit names only a work worthy of eternal life, and to satisfy names this and the payment of the debt of penalty: but it does not happen to merit, which is less, without grace: therefore also it does not happen to satisfy, which is more, without grace.

§ 64. SOLUTION. This question was almost determined, where it was inquired concerning works done outside charity, whether they can be works of penance: and therefore here is supposed what was said there, namely that works of penance, just as also the rest of works in which the placation of God is sought, are done according to the divine will and acceptation: but the acceptation of God is not in us from us, nor in our work from us, or from our work,

517. 1 Cor. 4:4.

but rather from that which we have received from Him: and this is making-pleasing [grace]: and therefore it is necessary that such works be done in making-pleasing grace.

§ 65. IT MUST BE SAID therefore to the first, that the cessation from the act of sin, proceeds from servile fear which is a gift of the Holy Spirit, and therefore it is called an instillation from the fount of grace: and nevertheless servile fear is not making-pleasing grace, but a certain disposition to it.

§ 66. To another it must be said, that without grace it does not happen to satisfy, and it is not similar: because it is said, 1 Kings xvi, 7: Man sees those things that appear, but the Lord beholds the heart: and therefore to man it happens to satisfy according to the face, but not to God, unless the heart of the one satisfying is reconciled to God.

To the other it must be said that restitution is not an essential part of satisfaction, but is pre-required by way of a foundation. Hence, since restitution is concerning those things which are done to a man, who judges according to the face, it is not always necessary that it be done in charity. Alternatively, it can also be said, and it is another reason for the same thing, that restitution is not made except in the taking away of corporal things, and since the act is simply corporal, not spiritual, it is not necessary for such an act to be done in charity.

To the last it must be said that it is not understood that the fruit is computed from the time at which he sinned, but rather thus: from the day on which he sold, that is, on which it was last in a state of sale. But it was last in a state of selling when he was last in sin, after which time he was not in sin: because then he was beginning to be converted: so that, namely, the preposition, when it is said from the day, notes the terminus outside, not inside. And then it is clear that it does not follow that he can satisfy while remaining in mortal sin.

Must anyone who has offended satisfy?

Articulus 11 — Whether It Is Necessary That Whoever Has Sinned Should Satisfy

Must anyone who has offended satisfy?

Next it is inquired concerning this which he says there, chapter C, §2: For the satisfaction of penance is, as Augustine says, to cut off the causes of sins, etc.

And here three things are inquired, namely: whether it is fitting to satisfy? Secondly, concerning the definition of satisfaction laid down here. Thirdly, how the work of satisfaction differs from the other parts of penance, namely the work of confession, and of compunction?

To the first one proceeds thus: 1. Satisfying is measured against the other to which the satisfaction is terminated: which is clear: because he who satisfies the injured party measures what he does against the quantity of the injury which he inflicted, and similarly he who satisfies the one who suffered damage. And in the same way he who satisfies the Creator. Therefore, satisfying is nothing unless an equal is paid to the damage or injury: but no one can

518. Luke 11:41.

pay an equal to the injury and ingratitude to God which he inflicts by sinning: therefore no one can satisfy.

1. Also, he is more bound to satisfy who injures the majesty of a king or prince, than he who injures his equal: therefore infinitely more bound is he who offends an infinitely higher majesty than is that of a king or prince: but anyone sinning mortally offends an infinitely higher majesty than is that of a king or prince: therefore he is bound infinitely: but it is established that he cannot pay an infinite amount: therefore he cannot satisfy.
2. Also: All our justices are as the rag of a menstruous woman. Therefore they are not satisfactory: and we cannot satisfy otherwise than by works of justice: therefore since we do not have them, it seems that we cannot satisfy.
3. Also, if someone has two reasons of debt, namely that he is a slave who can possess nothing except in the name and right of the lord, and so has contracted a loan from the same, or from another: if all that he has he must pay for one reason of debt, he cannot pay the other debt: but thus it is of any man: because he himself from the condition of nature owes to God whatever he is, and whatever he is able: therefore for sins he does not have what he may render: but every one satisfying must render something: therefore it happens to no man to satisfy for sins.

ON THE CONTRARY 1. Take away all iniquity, receive the good: and we will render the calves of our lips. Therefore it happens that one can satisfy.

1. Also: Have patience with me, and I will render all to thee.

SOLUTION. It must be said that satisfaction is twofold, namely according to the equivalent of right, and according to the arbitration of him to whom the injury was done. Concerning the first satisfaction, it does not happen that God is satisfied by any pure creature: but concerning the second it happens, because it happens to pay God for sin what He exacts from us. Hence: What worthy thing shall I offer to the Lord, etc.? And it follows: I will show thee, O man, what is good, and what, etc.

And through this the solution is clear to the two reasons first introduced, which proceed as if satisfaction for sins were according to the equivalent of right which measures between the damage inflicted, or between the injury of the patient and the agent.

To the other it must be said that our justices are considered in two ways, namely in comparison to us, and in comparison to the informing grace which we have from God. And in the first way, humbling himself, Isaiah says that all our justices are as the rag of a menstruous woman, because our defects are many. But in the second way considered, our works are accepted by God.

519. Eccli. 30:24.

To the other it must be said that although we owe all that we are and can do by reason of our condition, nevertheless God does not exact all this from us which we owe by strict right: and therefore according to His arbitration we can satisfy even for sins.

Is the definition of satisfaction good?

Articulus 12 — Whether The Definition Of Satisfaction Is Good

Is the definition of satisfaction good?

Secondly, it is inquired concerning the definition posited here.

And it is inquired first, what is meant here by to cut off the causes of sins?

1. For Augustine says that sin does not have a cause, and of that which does not have a cause, it does not happen that its cause is cut off: therefore there seems to be nothing which is said in the Letter.
2. Also, Dionysius: Sin is uncaused and involuntary and unfruitful and lazy. And from this follows the same thing as before.
3. Furthermore, if no force is applied to this, but it is said that the deficient will is the cause of sin: it seems that still what he says is nothing: because to satisfy is an act and work of the one satisfying: but the cutting off of the deficient will is not the work of satisfaction, but of God alone, whose it is to convert the will: therefore to satisfy is not to cut off the causes of sins.
4. Also, the cause of sin is that which holds sin in the soul: therefore it is more strongly adhering than the sin itself: but sin is not loosed except by God: therefore neither is the cause of sin: therefore this is not the work of the one satisfying.
5. Also, this cause which is cut off is the cause of sin: but Boethius says that a cause is that to whose being another follows: therefore with the cause of sin existing in the soul, sin exists in the same: but it does not happen that he satisfies who is in sin, as was held before: therefore it does not happen that he satisfies who is in the cause of sin: therefore it does not happen that the one satisfying cuts off the causes of sins.
6. Also, this cause of sins which is to be cut off, of which the definition speaks: either it is conjoined, or remote. If it is conjoined: then with the cause existing, sin is present in the soul, as has just been proved. If remote: but this is the natural will of man, or the free choice flexible to evil: therefore it happens that the natural will is cut off through the work of satisfaction, which is altogether absurd.
7. Furthermore, by another way of disputing it seems that the definition is badly handed down: because satisfaction regards the lesion or injury inflicted on another: therefore it ought to be defined by comparison to that injury to be restored through the rigor of right or the arbitration of the will of him to whom the injury was inflicted: but this is

520. Tit. 1:15.

not done here, but rather it is defined according to that which the penitent does in satisfaction: therefore it is badly defined.

8. Furthermore, the cause of sin in man is the fomes [tinder of sin]: and that is not extinguished in this life: therefore it does not happen that the causes of sins are cut off: but it happens that one satisfies, as was held before: therefore to satisfy is not to cut off the causes of sins.

Further it is inquired concerning the other part of the definition which he posits, when he says: Nor to indulge access to their suggestions.

1. For since satisfaction is for past sin: but the access of suggestion is expected in the future, it seems that this second thing is not of the essence of satisfaction: therefore it is badly posited in its definition.
2. Also, suggestion seems to be the same as the cause of sin: therefore the same thing is posited twice in the same definition.
3. Also, from this last part there seems to follow an error which is condemned in the preceding definition, namely that he who gives access to the suggestion of sin does not satisfy: but he who after penance falls into sin gives access to the suggestion of sin: therefore he does not satisfy: therefore he does not repent: because satisfaction is a part of penance.
4. Further it is inquired, because Anselm seems to give another definition of satisfaction in the book Cur Deus homo, speaking thus: To satisfy God is to render due honor. Therefore it seems that it is badly defined here.
5. Also, concerning Anselm's definition it is objected, because it is not convertible: for it is established that an innocent person keeping the commandments of God renders due honor to God: and yet he does not satisfy: therefore Anselm's definition is not good.
6. Furthermore, it is said that it belongs to magnanimity to render honor to oneself and to others: therefore this is not of satisfaction.
7. Also, it is said that honor is sought on account of virtue, and chiefly from those who know the virtue of him whom they honor: therefore it is also rendered in testimony of virtue: but satisfaction is a recompense for sin: therefore it seems that it is badly defined by the rendering of honor.

SOLUTION. It must be said that satisfaction can be defined in three ways, namely according to its substance, so that satisfaction is a recompense for damage or injury inflicted according to judgment and the order of right, or the arbitration of him to whom the injury is inflicted.

It is also defined sometimes according to what is a part of the sacrament of penance, which is the medicine for actual sin: and thus it is defined by the medicament of the wound which it makes in the one satisfying, and this is its proper definition in this treatise: and therefore it is

521. Acts 15:9.

so defined in the Letter. For the wound is healed through this, that the causes of sins are cut off, and access is not further indulged to suggestion: and therefore that definition is introduced here in this way.

Thirdly, it is defined in comparison to the end: for since we can neither injure nor damage God, by sinning we withdraw the honor due to Him: and to this end we satisfy, that the honor due to Him and previously withdrawn may be restored: and thus it is defined by Anselm: and from that definition is extracted, as it were, the truth of this whole question.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that the cause of sin is said to be collected from three things, namely from concupiscence kindled by the act and custom of sin, and the relics of past sin, and the occasions of sinning, such as place, society, time, and the like. For the will affected by these three sins, although not necessarily: because it cannot be forced, as will immediately be clear below in this same solution . But what Augustine says, that sin does not have a cause, is to be understood of an efficient cause, which univocally or equivocally by acting would give it essence in that it is evil, just as we see a hot thing when it heats, by a univocal action, gives its essence according to the same species to the heated thing: and a hot thing when it dries, by extracting moisture, by an equivocal action induces aridity, which is a certain essence. But privations do not have essences. Hence nothing is the efficient cause of blindness: because blindness, since it is not any essence, receives essence from nothing: and so it is concerning evil in that it is evil, and concerning sin in that it is sin. But nevertheless the act of sin under deformity has a cause partly efficient, and partly deficient, as is noted above according to the second book of the Sentences. But this cause, conjoined with the three said things, is inclined to a mutable good, and consequently is turned away from God, and thus is made the cause of sins.

Through this the solution to the second is clear.

To the other it must be said that God alone, by aversion from fault, converts the will: but nevertheless it still remains bound by the forenamed three: and these are loosed by satisfaction through the custom of good.

To the other it must be said that the cause is twofold, namely that which is by way of privation of form: because sin does not have a formal cause insofar as it is sin: and this is the aversion of the will from the incommutable good: and this God cuts off. But the aforesaid causes which are by way of inclining things, and as it were certain infirmities left behind from sin, are rather punishments, and not causes: and therefore man can cut those off.

To the other it must be said that the saying of Boethius is understood of a true cause: but sin does not truly have a cause: but there are certain things inclining to it, and those are broadly called a cause here.

And through this the solution to the following is clear.

To the other it must be said that it is not understood of a conjoined and proper cause, but rather of a remote one: and this is twofold, namely the most remote, and this is the will alone:

522. Luke 11:42.

and the nearer, and this is the will affected and inclined by the three which have been stated. And therefore those, through the contrary custom of good, are to be cut off by satisfaction.

To the other it must be said that satisfaction is defined here as it is a medicinal part of the Sacrament of penance: and the reason for this was stated above: but in the way the objection proceeds, it is to be defined by laws, or an ethicist, or a politician: but this is a sign, that the work of satisfaction is enjoined through the contrary of that by which the occasion of sin was greater in the sinner, such as fasting for the lustful, prayer for the proud, and almsgiving for the avaricious: because, as Bede says, what heals the heel does not heal the eye, nor conversely.

To the other it must be said that although the fomes could not be cut off in its entirety in this life, it can nevertheless be weakened and put to sleep: and this suffices for cutting off.

To that which is further inquired concerning the second part of the definition, it must be said that although the sin of which the suggestion is made is future, nevertheless the cause drawing to it is present in the subject, and this regards satisfaction, as was said.

Or it may be better said that not to indulge access to suggestion refers to the foundation of satisfaction: and this according to a proposition, so that, namely, he does not further propose to consent to the devil: and according to this it is posited in the definition of satisfaction: because, as Gregory says, just as all medicaments avail nothing for healing a wound as long as the iron remains infixed, unless it is extracted: so all benefits will profit nothing unless the sin itself is relinquished. Hence it falls into the definition of satisfaction just as penance does: because without it there cannot be satisfaction, although it is not of its substance.

To the other it must be said that suggestion refers to the demon, but the cause of sin to the man, according to the three drawing things which were stated above. For just as Augustine says: Sin is sometimes from the flesh, and sometimes from man: and thus it is clear that sin, and suggestion, and the cause of sin are not the same.

To that which is objected concerning Anselm, the solution is clear, how the difference of the definitions is to be taken.

But to that which is objected against Anselm's definition, it must be said that debt is manifold, but here we distinguish a threefold debt. Namely, debt from something committed: just as a receiver of God's gifts owes it to gain with them and bring back gain from them. There is also a debt from something remitted, just as he is a debtor to whom much is remitted: just as it is said: Many sins are forgiven her, because she hath loved much. The third is debt from sin: and this as if from damage inflicted: and this is the debt by which the penitent is bound in satisfaction: and in such a signification it is taken in Anselm's definition: and therefore not everyone keeping the commandments renders debt to God in this respect.

To the other it must be said that magnanimity in this way in which it is simply, rather attends to honor by which virtue is worthy: but just restitution attends to honor insofar as it restores the perdition of honor through sin.

To the other it must be said that honor is owed by the honorer to virtue and the virtuous person: and therefore from us it is owed to God: nevertheless this exhibition of honor also has the character of satisfaction, insofar as it is commanded by justice, which is directive of damage or injury inflicted, of which the Philosopher speaks.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

How does the work of satisfaction differ from the other works of penance?

Expositio Textus

§ 4. Exposition of the Text

Exposition of the text.

Next it is inquired concerning this which he says there, chapter C, § 2, in the middle: Give alms, and behold all things are clean unto you, etc.

For in this part is a great question concerning almsgiving, which we will divide into parts on account of the Letter.

And here we will inquire six articles, namely in what genus is almsgiving, what is it, and whether it is in precept or in counsel? Where it will also be determined to what precept it is reduced, and how it is distinguished from the other parts of satisfaction: and whether it consists more in the interior will, or in the exterior gift, or in the quantity of the exterior gift? And sixth, whether almsgiving can be without compassion, or whether compassion is essential to it? For these six are inquired concerning almsgiving in itself.

But afterwards proceeding in the Letter we will inquire concerning almsgiving according to three other considerations, namely on the part of the giver, and of the gift, and of him to whom it is to be given.

Is almsgiving in the genus of virtue?

Articulus 13 — How The Work Of Satisfaction Differs From The Other Works Of Penance

How does the work of satisfaction differ from the other works of penance?

Thirdly it is inquired: How does the work of satisfaction differ from the other works of penance, namely of confession and compunction?

For it seems that in nothing. 1. For each of these three satisfies for sin: therefore each of these three is a work of satisfaction.

1. Also, Augustine, and it is found below in the Letter: He has offered much satisfaction who, mastering his shame, denied nothing of the things he did to the messenger of God. Therefore confession is not distinguished from satisfaction, as it seems.

Solution. It must be said that satisfaction here is not called every thing that looses guilt in some way, or the penalty due to guilt: but that only which is enjoined and taxed by the power of the keys, and by the arbitration of the priest: for that penalty is simply voluntary, and

ordained according to the quantity of the offense. But in contrition and confession there are penalties, namely sorrow in contrition, and shame in confession, which are penalties inflicted from corrupt nature for sin, nor are they taxed, nor limited according to a certain time, but the greater they are, the better it is: provided the service is discreet and reasonable. Therefore although sin is expiated through them, nevertheless they are not properly satisfactory according to the judgment and arbitration of the forum of confession. And therefore this part which is satisfaction is distinguished from the others.

Furthermore, sorrow in the contrite and shame in the confessing declare nothing but an inward penalty: but in satisfaction it is outward in the conspectus of the Church: and therefore the whole man is then punished, because the interior penalty manifests itself in the exterior. And because the whole man then has a penalty, on account of this (as some say) it is more called satisfaction. But the first solution is better: because, as was held, satisfaction regards the judgment of the arbitration of the divine will.

Through this the response to the first is clear.

To the other it must be said that the blessed Augustine broadly takes satisfaction for every penalty which is borne for sins, whether it is enjoined or not: but satisfaction properly taken is not accepted for such a penalty.

Articulus 14 — Whether Almsgiving Is In The Genus Of Virtue

Is almsgiving in the genus of virtue?

It is inquired therefore first concerning the genus of almsgiving, whether it is in the genus of virtue?

For it seems that it is: 1. For the Commentator says that the property of a virtue is that its act is worthy of praise: and this is drawn from the text: but the act of almsgiving is praiseworthy: therefore it is an act of virtue: therefore almsgiving is of some act of virtue.

1. Also, it has been accustomed to be said by all that the act of a virtue is that upon which a divine precept falls. And this from authority is held in the text and in the commentary, where it is distinguished between legal justice and the justice of the special virtue of justice. But it is established that the precept is concerning giving alms: therefore it is an act of some virtue.
2. Also, it is supposed by almost all that that which is meritorious is an act of some virtue: but it is established that the act of almsgiving is meritorious: therefore almsgiving is an act of some virtue.
3. Also, that which works towards the expulsion of a vice has contrariety to the vice: but almsgiving does this, as is said: therefore almsgiving has contrariety to vice, or to an act of vice: but nothing has contrariety of this kind except a virtue or an act of virtue: therefore almsgiving is an act of some virtue.

But against this it is objected thus: 1. Every gratuitous good and good of virtue has an exemplary virtue in God: but almsgiving does not have it: therefore almsgiving is not a work of any virtue. But the first is proved from this, that virtue is a most perfect good: and this is not to be taken away from the most perfect and highest good. But the second is proved from this, that in whom there is no passion, in him there is no compassion: and almsgiving is with compassion, as its name shows: and this is supposed, and is proved above. But in God there is neither passion nor compassion.

1. Also, there are three things in the soul, namely passions, potencies, and habits, as the Philosopher says. But virtue is in the genus of habit, and not of passion: therefore what is in the genus of passion is not a virtue: but compassion, from which proceeds the act by which almsgiving is denoted, is in the genus of passion, as its name shows: therefore almsgiving is the act of that passion: therefore it is not the act of any virtue.

But then it is further inquired concerning almsgiving in species, of what virtue is it said to be?

And it seems that it is of justice: because 1. Upon that: When thou dost an alms, etc., the Interlinear Gloss says: Almsgiving is a part of justice.

1. Also, everything satisfactory is reduced to the virtue to which it belongs to satisfy: but almsgiving is satisfactory, as is said in the Letter: therefore it is reduced to the virtue to which it belongs to satisfy: but this is justice: therefore almsgiving is an act of justice.

But against this it seems that it is an act of mercy, which is elicited from its name: because 1. It is said from eleos, which is mercy, or misery: because it makes another's misery its own. But this belongs to mercy: therefore almsgiving is an act of mercy.

1. Also, on that: He showeth mercy all the day, the Gloss says: Almsgiving begins from mercy, and afterwards opens the hand: therefore the mover to the act of almsgiving is mercy: therefore it is not an act of justice.

If you say that it is an act of both: because mercy is a part of justice: this does not seem so: because the beatitude of justice is sequestered from the beatitude of mercy. For He says afterwards, Blessed are the merciful: and earlier it is said, Blessed are they that hunger and thirst, etc. Therefore they are diverse virtues: therefore what is the act of one is not the act of the other.

But it seems to someone that it is an act of piety: because it is said that piety is profitable to all things. And it is expounded of almsgiving. Therefore since piety is neither mercy nor justice, it seems that almsgiving is neither an act of mercy nor of justice.

SOLUTION. It must be said that almsgiving is an act of the virtue which is mercy, as I think: although some say otherwise, whose reason I cannot understand.

To the first part of the question, therefore, it seems it must be responded that the first reasons conclude truth: although some have calumny as to their force of inferring: because it is not universally true that that which has praise is a work of virtue: but of this there will be another discourse.

But to that which is objected against, it must be said that virtues have an exemplar in God in diverse ways: for there is in virtue something perfect, and something imperfect, which belongs to virtue insofar as it is in an imperfect nature, and is evacuable from it when the imperfect nature passes to the state of perfection: as is clear in faith, in which the vision itself is perfect, but the mode of vision is imperfect, and it has an exemplar according to vision, and not according to a mirror and an enigma. So I say here that almsgiving and mercy, by reason of subvention of misery, have perfection: but they have compassion on the part of the deficient and passible nature which they perfect. And therefore according to the reason of subvention they have an exemplar, because God chiefly comes to the aid of the miserable, but not by reason of compassion, which does not befit a most perfect nature. And this is what our ancient Doctors said, that mercy in God sounds an effect, not an affect.

To the other it must be said that although virtue is not a passion, but a habit, nevertheless moral virtue is about passions or operations, as the Philosopher says. And therefore nothing prohibits an act of virtue from being in a passion, although the first motive is a habit. And so it seems it must be said here that there is a certain habit which moves to well-compassionating: and further to giving to him with whom we compassionate, which giving is with some passion, although it is not from it as from the first mover to the act.

To the second part of the question it must be said that it is a work of mercy: but just as we noted before in the preceding distinction, an act which is of one virtue per se and properly, which the ancient Masters call elicited, can be of another as commanding: and thus it can be of justice or piety. It will be of justice, indeed, as the giver gives from his superfluity, considering that he is rather the dispenser of the superfluity to the poor than its lord. And considering on the part of the poor person, that although he is poor in things, nevertheless he holds the place of Christ in receiving, who is the Lord of all: for then he gives as a dispenser to the poor person, who has the character of a patron in that he receives in the place of Christ: as is said: Amen I say to you, as long as you did it to one of these my least brethren, you did it to me. But it puts on the character of piety when someone gives moved by this, that the poor person is in the same nature with us, or in the divine image, just as we are: because political piety is benevolence toward those who are joined by nature, as Tully says. But gratuitous piety is benevolence toward those who are marked with the same divine image with us.

And through this the solution to all the questions is clear.

Is almsgiving well defined?

Articulus 15 — Whether Almsgiving Is Well Defined

Is almsgiving well defined?

Secondly it is inquired, What is almsgiving?

But almsgiving has been accustomed to be defined by the Masters thus: Almsgiving is a work in which it is given to the indigent out of compassion for the sake of God.

But against the definition it is objected thus: No one gives to himself: but someone bestows almsgiving upon himself: therefore almsgiving is not a work in which it is given to the indigent. But the first is proved from the reason of giving. But the second is written: Have pity on thy own soul, pleasing God.[523] And by Gregory: He who wishes to have mercy on his neighbor, let him draw the origin of showing mercy from himself.

Also, it seems that almsgiving is not always a work. For sometimes someone does not have to give, and gives compassion: therefore it seems that then there is no work operated there: and this is called a work here: therefore almsgiving is not always a work, as it seems. But that a work operated is understood to be almsgiving is clear from the common usage of speakers, who call a thing accepted for the sake of God and out of indigence an alms.

Further it seems that it does not always proceed from compassion.

1. For it is said: God loveth a cheerful giver.[524] And he speaks of those giving alms: therefore it proceeds more from cheerfulness than from compassion: therefore also it is more to be defined by cheerfulness.
2. Also, let it be posited that someone indeed gives willingly, like a liberal or magnificent person, and yet does not have compassion. It is established that he gives to the indigent for the sake of God: therefore he gives almsgiving.

and nevertheless it does not proceed from compassion: therefore compassion is not the substance of almsgiving: therefore it ought not to be defined by it.

§ Again, an objection is raised regarding his saying, To one in need: for it is not always given to those in need, but also to others: as is clear in the case of clerics, who, needing nothing, nevertheless do not cease to accept alms, and contend that those givings are alms: therefore it seems that almsgiving is not always a giving which is made to one in need.

§ Furthermore, an objection is raised regarding his saying, For the sake of God. 1. For the end is not the essential cause of a thing: but for the sake of God names an end: therefore it does not name an essential cause: therefore it ought not to be posited in a definition. 2. Again, suppose that someone gives out of natural compassion; it is proved that that giving is almsgiving: because almsgiving (eleemosyna) is named from eleëmon, which is mercy or misery, which signifies passion or compassion on the part of the receiver, and on the part of the giver: but the whole of what is from this name is in this definition: Almsgiving is a giving which is made to one in need out of compassion: therefore what is added, for the sake of God, is superfluous.

§ Solution. It must be said that almsgiving is well defined in the aforesaid manner, according as it is properly taken. And it is the definition which is found in the writings of the learned Masters, who preceded us in this science.

§ For almsgiving is spoken of commonly and properly. Commonly, any subvention of a miserable person is called almsgiving: and thus a man, when he subvenes himself, does almsgiving, and also when he subvenes another in whatever manner. But properly, almsgiving is called the giving of some temporal or spiritual good, which is bestowed upon a neighbor in

need for the sake of God, toward which compassion properly tends: because compassion is, as it were, a suffering with another (cum-alio-passio), as is said in Sirach: The compassion of man is toward his neighbor.[525]

§ Therefore it must be said to the first, that properly a man does not give to himself, nor does he bestow alms on himself.

§ To that, however, which is introduced to prove this from Ecclesiasticus (Sirach), it must be said that in that authority, and in the text of blessed Gregory, the order of the effects of mercy is touched upon: because just as charity has an order in its effect and affect, so also does mercy, namely, that one should not so attend to others as to neglect oneself: nevertheless, because almsgiving is a certain giving, which is not properly made to oneself, therefore almsgiving is properly made regarding a neighbor, and not regarding oneself, although in giving an order must be observed, that a man ought to prefer himself to a neighbor in need.

§ To the other it must be said, that almsgiving is properly a work operated (opus operatum), and not the one operating (operans). This is clear from a certain word which is written by the Philosopher at the beginning of the Ethics, where he distinguishes arts, on the grounds that in some the end is a work (opus), and in some an operation (operatio), as in musical arts: but in almsgiving the giving is not praised on account of the giver, but rather the given thing (datum): for it is not commanded on account of the operating work, but rather on account of the operated work.

§ To the opposite, however, against this, it must be said that he who wishes to give, and does not give, does not properly do almsgiving: but nevertheless he has the merit of one giving almsgiving on account of his complete will: as is said in 2 Corinthians: For if the will be forward, it is accepted according to that which a man hath, not according to that which he hath not.[526]

§ To this, however, which is further objected against what is said out of compassion, it must be said that almsgiving is always out of a compassion for misery which moves one to give: but there is a highly sensible compassion, and a compassion of the will, namely the willing that one not be miserable, or a dissent from the misery which the poor man suffers.

§ To that, however, which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that this cheerfulness is understood as that which does not take away sorrow from the giver through greed for the thing given: for there are greedy persons in whom the sorrow of alienating the given thing takes away compassion; and there are those in whom the sorrow of alienating fights with compassion, but nevertheless compassion conquers: and there are those in whom sorrow is not felt on account of compassion: and these are the most praiseworthy, who even rejoice in giving: and of these the Apostle speaks. Hence cheerfulness is a good condition of the giver: it is not, however, of the substance of almsgiving properly speaking.

§ To the other it must be said, that the work of a liberal or magnificent man is not properly almsgiving, although they discern to whom it should be given, and when, and how much, as is said in IV Ethics: because they do not attend to nor measure the given thing according to the

523. Ecclesiasticus 30:24.

exigency (need) and for the sake of God: hence I well concede, that one giving in this way does not do almsgiving except materially speaking.

§ To the other it must be said, that alms are given to clerics as to ministers of the poor, and dispensers of alms: and therefore what is given to them, is sent through them to the poor: but they themselves should see to it that they dispense it faithfully.

§ To the other it must be said, that it is one way in moral acts, and another in other things: for in other things the end is sometimes not of the essence, but in moral matters the denomination is principally from the end, and therefore it is of the essence.

§ To the other it must be said, that he who does not give for the sake of God, does not merit, and therefore he does not give alms properly: because almsgiving is a meritorious work of eternal life, if it is done in charity: or of nearness to grace, if it is done in mortal sin, as will be a question in this same distinction, when it will be treated, for what purpose works done in mortal sin are valid. It is nevertheless a praiseworthy work to give even out of natural compassion, and it signifies a nature easily inclinable to the good.

Articulus 16 — Whether Almsgiving Is Of Precept Or Counsel, And, If Of Precept, Under Which Precept

Whether almsgiving is a matter of precept, or of counsel? And, if of precept, under which one?

§ Thirdly, it is asked, whether it is in precept, or in counsel?

§ And here we will ask three things at once, namely whether it is in precept, and in which precept, and how it obliges?

§ But it seems that it is in precept. 1. Luke: But yet that which remaineth, give alms: and behold, all things are clean unto you. There the Gloss says: That which remains over and above necessary food and clothing, give to the poor, or I give counsel, etc. Therefore he wills that giving the superfluous is a precept.

1. Again, Matthew: But when thou dost alms, let not thy left hand know what thy right hand doth, the Gloss says: To the conscience doing almsgiving for the sake of fulfilling a precept, the appetite for praise mixes itself. From this again it is accepted that it is a precept.
2. Again, Luke: He that hath two coats, let him give to him that hath none. Gloss: A precept is given concerning the dividing of two coats.
3. Again, Ambrose: Feed him who is dying of hunger: if you have not fed him, you have killed him. Therefore it is in precept.
4. Again, all that is in precept without which there is no salvation: but without the giving of alms for him who is able to give, there is no salvation: therefore giving for him who is able to give, is in precept. The proof of the middle premise. Gregory: He is convicted of loving his neighbor less, who does not share even those things which are necessary with him in necessity.

524. II Corinthians 9:7.

5. Again, 1 John: He that hath the substance of this world, etc.

6. Again, this is taken from Matthew, where the Lord, as the reason for the just condemnation of the wicked, alleges that they did not give alms; but a counsel not fulfilled does not condemn: therefore if almsgiving were merely in counsel, the Lord would not condemn the impious on account of the withholding of alms, as it seems.

7. Again, Isaiah: the Lord requires this from the people, saying: Deal thy bread to the hungry, etc. And He adds: Then shalt thou call, and the Lord shall hear, and the like. But it is certain that if it were merely a counsel, it would not impede his being heard.

8. Again, Tobit enjoins this upon his son as necessary for salvation.

9. Again, Daniel says this is necessary for the king's repentance. Therefore it is of the things necessary for salvation: therefore it is in precept.

§ But on the contrary, it seems that it is only in counsel. 1. Luke: And the multitudes asked him, etc., where the interlinear Gloss says: Struck with terror by the words of John, they seek counsel: but John responded that they should attend to almsgiving: therefore he responded by counseling: therefore almsgiving is a counsel, as it seems.

1. Again, one's own property is justly possessed: therefore if it is retained, injury is done to no one: therefore neither to the poor man: therefore neither is anyone bound to give to the poor man by precept: therefore, etc.

§ Further it is asked, If it is in precept, under which precept does it fall?

§ But it seems that it falls under a negative one. 1. On account of the saying of Ambrose introduced above: Feed him who is dying of hunger, etc.: therefore it is reduced to the precept which is, Thou shalt not kill: therefore a negative one.

1. Again. Every illicit taking and retention is reduced to this precept, Thou shalt not steal: but not to give alms is an illicit retention: therefore it is reduced to that: but this is negative: therefore, etc.

§ But against this is the fact that 1. When it is said, Honor thy father and thy mother, Augustine says that by the name of parents the neighbor is here understood in general: and by honor three things are understood, namely reverence, and bodily subvention, and spiritual subvention. But almsgiving is the bodily or spiritual subvention of the neighbor: therefore it is reduced to that precept: and this is affirmative: therefore it is reduced to an affirmative precept.

1. Again, it is said by almost all, that negative precepts oblige always and for always (semper et ad semper): but to give alms does not oblige always and for always, but according to place and time: therefore it is not reduced to a negative precept.

525. Isaiah 64:6.

§ But then it is asked, How does this precept oblige?

§ For either it obliges then when signs appear that someone will fall into extreme necessity unless he is subvened: or then first when signs of extreme necessity appear. If in the first way: against this it seems to be, that in all poor people signs appear that they do not suffice for themselves: but these are signs of falling into extreme necessity: therefore all poor people must be subvened by anyone having something beyond what suffices for himself: and if he does not do so, it is a mortal omission, which is grave to say. If however in the second way: against this is, that a man is not in extreme necessity, except when he has nothing else he can do, if that one does not subvene him: and this never appears to anyone, because there is always such a probable state that if I do not subvene, nevertheless another will subvene: therefore it seems that that time will never be in which anyone is bound to subvene: and this is ridiculous to say.

§ Solution. It must be said that giving alms is considered in two ways, namely on the part of the giver, and of the receiver. On the part of the giver in two ways, namely by reason of superfluities, and by reason of necessities. If it is considered on the part of the giver by reason of superfluities, then it is a precept: if however on the part of the giver by reason of necessities, then it is a counsel.

§ But what things are superfluous, and what necessary, we say here briefly: because it will be in a question below, namely that superfluous things are those which being taken away, the house and family can still be conserved and the licit business and office of that person can be exercised: and this according to the estimation of a wise and good man. But necessary is that which being taken away, these things cannot be commodiously done.

§ Similarly on the part of the receiver it is considered in two ways. For either signs appear of his falling into extreme defect, unless one gives something, or not. If they appear, then it is a precept to give even from what is necessary. But I call necessary, as before, not that without which there is no life, but that without which the house cannot be commodiously maintained and the office congruous to the person exercised. If however such signs do not appear, then it is a counsel to give.

§ Therefore it must be said to the first to the contrary, that that interlinear authority concerning Luke does not prove that it is a counsel, except in a case, and concerning a certain kind of almsgiving, as has been said.

§ To that however which is further asked, To which precept is it reduced? whether to an affirmative, or to a negative?

§ It must be said, that it is reduced to an affirmative, and according as it is done from the superfluous, it is reduced to this precept, Thou shalt not steal. And according as it is taken on the part of the indigent in whom signs of indigence appear, it is reduced to this precept, Honor thy father and thy mother: because nothing prohibits the same thing from being reduced to different precepts according to different aspects.

526. Hosea 14:3.

§ To that however which is objected, that if it is reduced to a negative precept, that then it is negative: it must be said that this does not follow: just as this is not valid, this is reduced to the genus of substance: therefore it is in the genus of substance; or this is reduced to the genus of quantity: therefore it is quantity. For no precept is so negative that it does not have in itself an affirmative act, and certain consequent affirmations, just as thou shalt not steal has in itself the willing not to steal as an affirmative act, and the willing to possess and receive whatever is one's own as a consequent affirmation: and as to this consequent affirmation this precept concerning almsgiving is reduced to not stealing: because the superfluous is not ours, and we ought to will that the poor man receive what is his own.

§ To that however which is objected concerning Ambrose, it must be said that he himself speaks interpretatively, not properly. And the sense is: If you have not fed him, you have killed him, that is, by occasion it will be reputed to you as a fault, although not as great as it would be if he killed him by his hand: and this is so, because since he could prolong his life by giving, he did not do so.

§ To that however which is further asked concerning the mode of obligation: It must be said that it obliges when signs appear of falling into extreme necessity. But signs are of two kinds, as is said in another faculty: for some are proper, which convert with the cause and are immediate, from which sometimes even the demonstrator argues: and those are not to be expected, because such cannot appear concerning the future poverty of someone. But some signs are common, which probably argue such a future poverty, if I do not give something: such as that I see him to be in need, and others to be lazy to give. For these ought to suffice especially for giving from the superfluous. Nevertheless, all things which ought to be said concerning these signs, I do not think anyone knows, except him whom the unction teaches concerning all things. For I know that some wish to be excused from the poor, seeing that they are tramps (trutanni), feigning a poverty greater than they suffer: and let those hear John Chrysostom speaking thus on John, in Homily 76, in the moral part of that homily: "How is it not unfitting for us indeed, laughing, to sit at the table and enjoy pleasures: but others, passing through the crossroads, we hear howling, and we do not turn our attention to the howling, but bear it ill, and call him a deceiver. What are you saying, O man, does anyone deceive for the sake of one loaf of bread? Why not, you say? Because of this, therefore, this necessity is to be removed. But if you do not wish to give, neither should you hurl insults. If you do not wish to solve the shipwreck, do not push him into the abyss."

Articulus 17 — Whether Almsgiving Is A Part Of Satisfaction

Whether almsgiving is a part of satisfaction?

§ Fourthly it is asked, How is it distinguished from other parts of satisfaction?

§ And by reason of this, two things are asked here, which must be determined at the same time, namely whether it is a part of satisfaction? and if it is, how is it distinguished from the others?

§ But it seems that it is not: because 1. Satisfaction respects a preceding sin, nor is anyone bound to satisfy unless he has sinned: but a man is bound to almsgiving, even when he has not sinned: therefore almsgiving is not an essential part of satisfaction. The first is proved from the rationale and definition of satisfaction, posited above in the text. But the second is proved from things previously held: because almsgiving is done from the superfluous, and it is in precept even for him who has not sinned, and is not bound to satisfy.

1. Again, Matthew: This kind of demons, etc., the Gloss of Jerome says: By fasting the plague of the body is healed, by prayer the plague of the mind. But there are no plagues to be healed except of the mind and the body. Therefore it seems that almsgiving does not heal any plague: but every part of satisfaction ought to heal some plague: therefore almsgiving is not a part of satisfaction.
2. Again, that is not an essential part of something, without which the thing can be according to its substance and effect: but it happens that satisfaction is made for sin, and satisfaction exists without almsgiving: therefore almsgiving is not a substantial part of satisfaction. The first is evident per se. The second is proved in those for whom in the sole contrition of heart sin and penalty are remitted, as for Mary Magdalene.
3. Again, it is not a general part, which cannot be in every satisfaction: but almsgiving cannot be in the satisfaction of a poor man, because he has nothing to give: therefore it is not a part of satisfaction.

§ But against this is what is said in Tobit: Prayer is good with fasting and alms: where the Gloss says, that prayer has wings, fasting and almsgiving: therefore just as a bird is elevated by its wings, so is prayer by fasting and almsgiving: therefore without almsgiving it is not valid.

§ Solution. It seems to me that it must be said in this question with a distinction, namely that there is almsgiving from the superfluous, and this is not essentially a part of satisfaction: but it is pre-required for it like a foundation, and it has the act of satisfaction in another, because the poor man whom it respects prays for him, and satisfies, and sometimes obtains first grace for the giver, if the poor man to whom it is given is in charity. There is also almsgiving which is from the necessary: and this is an essential part of satisfaction: and I call necessary, not that without which a man cannot live, because this no one ought to subtract from himself, but rather that which by the estimation of the wise is conceded to him to have for the dispensation of his house, and can be repaired by the industry of a businessman or daily revenues.

§ To this however which is objected first, it must be said that he who is without sin is bound to the first kind of almsgiving, and not to the second.

§ To the other it must be said, that there is a conjoined healing agent, which is conjoined with the disease in the subject: and that Gloss touches upon these healing agents: because prayer humbles the spirit, and fasting attenuates the body: hence those two heal plagues on the part of the one sinning. But one must moreover have healing agents on the part of the occasions of sinning: and these are the principal goods conceded to infirmity: and by commu-

nicating these, almsgiving heals plagues of mind and body: because both are occasioned from them.

§ To the other it must be said, that in almsgiving there are two things, as will be evident below. One is the will of communicating oneself and one's goods to the indigent poor of the Church: and on that part it altogether has the force of merit, when that will is through grace making pleasing (gratia gratum faciens). And the other is the given thing itself: and this sometimes is not had. And it must be said, that the first makes almsgiving to be a part, when it is perfect: and without that part there is no satisfaction.

§ And through this the solution to the following is also evident: because every man can give this almsgiving: and it is called by the Apostle, in Romans, communicating to the necessities of the Saints.

Articulus 18 — How Almsgiving Is Distinguished From The Other Parts Of Satisfaction

How is almsgiving distinguished from other parts of satisfaction?

§ Then it is asked secondly next to that, how almsgiving is distinguished from other parts of satisfaction?

§ But it seems that it is in no way regarding satisfaction: because 1. The parts of satisfaction satisfy through this that they are penal: therefore it seems that all three convene in the ratio of penalty, and are not distinguished except materially.

1. Again, over that in Luke: Bring forth therefore fruits worthy of penance, the Gloss says: To give alms is a part of penance. And it is certain that it is not a part of contrition or of confession: therefore of satisfaction.

§ And again they are not parts of penance except by reason of penalty: therefore it seems that these three parts convene in this that they are certain penalties.

§ But against this is that 1. If they did not differ except according to the ratio of penalty, then there would be no reason why these three would be posited as parts of satisfaction, rather than others in which there is naturally a penalty: and this is not true.

1. Again, if one were multiplied, the penalty which is in it would be multiplied: therefore one alone could suffice for satisfaction, if it were commanded to be done many times.

§ To this some say, that in a homogeneous whole all parts are denominated by the name of the whole: and because satisfaction is, as it were, a homogeneous whole with respect to the parts, therefore each of them satisfies in the ratio by which satisfaction is a part of penance: and this is a certain penalty.

§ But against this, first, is that this solution in no way responds to the reasons introduced: hence this solution being given, the question still remains.

§ Again, because this solution seems to suppose a falsehood: because in a homogeneous whole the parts are of one name only, for every part of fire is fire, and is called fire: but here

one part has a different name from another: therefore it seems that they are not parts of a homogeneous whole.

§ Solution. It seems it must be said to this, that those three parts of satisfaction are distinct: although they convene in this common aspect, which is to be penal: for the penalty of loss (poena damni) has one ratio of penalty, and the penalty of sense (poena sensus) another: and thus almsgiving in its species of penalty differs from the other parts of satisfaction.

§ Again, that which punishes a proud spirit has one ratio of affliction, and that which afflicts the body another: and thus fasting differs from prayer, even formally in the species of affliction, although they convene in genus.

§ And through this the solution to the whole is evident.

§ But if it is objected, that one of them without the other can satisfy: which would not be true, if they were integral parts: but if they are subjective parts, then all ought to convene in ratio and species.

§ It must be said that there are many genera of parts: hence it must be said, that these parts are by the mode of a potential whole: and although one alone can satisfy, nevertheless the others are in purpose and virtue: and there is there what is meritorious of them in this way which was said in the preceding article.

Articulus 19 — Whether Almsgiving Consists More In The Interior Will, Or In The External Gift

Whether almsgiving consists more in the interior will, or in the exterior given thing?

§ Fifthly it is asked, Whether it consists more in the interior will, or in the exterior given thing?

§ And it seems that it is in the interior will. 1. For exterior things are rooted in interior things, and from them have praise or blame: therefore since compassion is interior, and the given thing exterior, the given thing is praised according to the interior devotion and compassion, and not per se: therefore that which is interior is better than that which is exterior.

1. Again, Matthew: A good man out of a good treasure, namely of his heart, bringeth forth good things: therefore the treasure and cause of the good thing brought forth is in the heart: but the cause is always better and worthier than the effect: therefore the devotion and compassion of the giver, or the will, is better than the given thing itself.
2. Again, 2 Corinthians, over that: For this is profitable for you, etc., the Gloss says: I give you counsel, that you give alms to the poor: for this is profitable for you not only to do, but also to be willing, which is more than to do.
3. Again, the will is computed for the deed, even if it is without the work on account of impotence: but the deed without the will is never meritorious: therefore the will is

better than the deed: therefore also concerning almsgiving the will is more attended to than the given thing.

4. Again, 2 Corinthians: He that had little, had no want, etc., the Gloss: He who gives much as a rich man, and he who gives little as a poor man, if the will is equal, they shall have an equal reward. Therefore it seems that the given thing itself contributes nothing or almost nothing to the ratio of merit.

5. Again, Luke, where it is read concerning the poor widow, who put two mites into the treasury, and the Lord praised her, that she had put in more than all: because the others out of their superfluity, but she out of her necessity, which showed greater devotion in the will.

6. Again, over that: They that sow in tears, the Gloss says: A great will gave much, sowed much. In this will also that widow who put in two mites, sowed not a little. And from this the same is accepted as before.

7. Again, it is commonly said, and it is a word of Augustine, that God does not attend to how much, but from how much it is given. Therefore since from how much is the same as from how great a will, it seems that the will is attended to simply, but the given thing only relatively (secundum quid), namely according as it proceeds from the will.

9. Again, poverty is praised in sacred Scripture, and riches are blamed: therefore it seems that in nothing should the condition of the rich man be better than that of the poor man: but if the substance of the merit of almsgiving were more attended to in the given thing than in the will, merit would be more in the faculty of the rich man than of the poor man: therefore the substance of the merit of a greater almsgiving is more in the will than in the given thing.

§ But on the contrary: 1. In the suffrages of the dead he is liberated more quickly for whom more things are done, as is said by all, and will be proved below: but for him who gives more, more things are done, than for him who wishes to give more, and does not have it: therefore it seems that the rich man is liberated more quickly than the poor man, even if in other things they are equal: and he is not liberated except on account of a more abundant merit: therefore it seems that there is more abundant merit in the given thing than in the will.

1. Again, enjoined penance is done according to the proportion of the sin. Therefore let there be two of equal will in penance, but of unequal sin, a discreet priest enjoins more alms to be given to the one sinning more, and enjoins less to the one sinning less: therefore the one giving more expiates the sin more with an equal will, than the one giving less: therefore it is of virtue in meriting: therefore merit is attended to in accordance with the given thing.

§ Solution. It must be said to this as before, that there is merit per se, and merit per accidens. Merit per se is what is for acquiring the good of grace and glory. But I say the gift of grace, as it is the augmentation of grace, and the perfection of grace: and not as it is the first grace, because that is not given for merit, but from a gift. But merit per accidens is like the

diminution of penalty, and the merit which is acquired by the intercession of another, who are as it were bought for this by prayers or by the gifts of alms.

§ Therefore it must be said that merit per se is attended to in accordance with the devotion of the will, if it is perfect. But it is not perfect unless the given thing attests to it, and the quantity of the given thing, if he is able to give so much. But merit per accidens is attended to concerning the given thing, which nevertheless in some way proceeds from the will informing it. But Gregory seems to attest to this, who says: Charity works great things, if it exists: but if it ceases to work, it is not charity.

§ And from this distinction the solution to all those things which are introduced first is evident, except the last.

§ And to this it must be said, that nothing prohibits the condition of the rich man from being better than that of the poor man in those things which contribute to merit per accidens, such as riches, and the like. And similarly it is in happiness and the act of happiness to which certain virtues contribute per se. But certain goods, as the Commentator says on I Ethics, operate towards it organically, such as riches, and secular powers, and nobility, and bodily strength, and the like: and in the same way merit operates in the given thing: and it is not unfitting in such a case that the condition of the rich man is better than that of the poor man.

Articulus 20 — Whether Almsgiving Can Be Without Compassion, Or Compassion Is Essential To It

Whether almsgiving can be without compassion, or is compassion substantial to it?

§ Sixthly it is asked, Whether almsgiving can be without compassion, or is compassion substantial to it?

§ But it seems that it is substantial to it: because commiseration is nothing but the work of mercy: but the work of commiseration is almsgiving, as is evident in the interpretation of the name-

§ 1. [Argument concluded] ...from the argumentation and distinction posited above: therefore, almsgiving is not without mercy; but compassion is substantial to mercy, as is evident from the definition itself; therefore, compassion is substantial to almsgiving.

§ 2. ON THE CONTRARY: There are many who do not have compassion on the miserable, and yet give for God's sake. Therefore, almsgiving does not always arise from compassion; therefore, it is not substantial to it.

§ 3. Solution. It is to be said that just as it was said above concerning the sorrow of penance, that it is twofold, namely sensible and rational, so too it seems it must be said concerning compassion. For the will to have compassion is spiritual compassion, owing to the fact that someone, out of their constitution (complexion), can scarcely feel sensible passion upon observing the miseries of a neighbor; and from such compassion, almsgiving always proceeds.

§ 4. And by this the solution is clear, because the argument made to the contrary proceeds regarding sensible compassion.

Articulus 21 — Whether Burial Is Almsgiving, Or A Species Of Almsgiving

Whether burial is an alms, or a species of almsgiving?

§ 5. Next, inquiry is made concerning that which is said there, chap. 2, in the middle: "Not only he who gives food to the hungry, and to the thirsty, etc."

§ 6. Here the question concerning the species of almsgiving is to be treated, regarding which we will inquire into three things: First, concerning the sufficiency of corporal alms. Secondly, concerning spiritual alms. Thirdly, concerning the comparison of spiritual to corporal alms.

§ 7. Therefore it is asked: Is burial an alms?

§ 8. It seems that it is, because: 1. Tobias is praised because that work proceeded from compassion; therefore it is an alms.

§ 9. 2. Again, this is said by everyone, that the corporal alms are seven, one of which is assigned as burial.

§ 10. Again, an alms relieves a defect; but the defect to which everyone is ordered is death. Therefore, it ought maximally to be relieved. But the relief is burial; therefore, it seems that it is an alms.

§ 11. 3. Again, something is owed to a body that will rise again, which is not owed to a body not rising again. But the body of man will rise again, and the bodies of brute animals will not rise again. Therefore, since brute animals are cast away unburied, this one ought to be buried out of compassion, as it seems.

§ 12. 4. Again, it is reputed a sign of faith that someone dying chooses burial in the place of the congregation of the good, and in sacred places. Therefore, such a burial is praiseworthy, and it is exhibited to one failing; therefore, it is a work of mercy, as it seems.

§ 13. 5. Again, epitaphs are read posited on the tombs of the fathers, as that Simon built the tomb of his father and brothers, and is praised. Therefore, it seems that death does not stand in the way of good things being able to be done concerning the dead out of compassion; but burial is the principal thing which is exhibited to the dead. Therefore, it is a work of almsgiving, as it seems.

§ 14. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Almsgiving relieves the indigence of the poor or of the failing person concerning whom it is done. But burial does not profit the dead person concerning whom it is done; therefore, it is not an alms. The proof of the minor premise: Augustine says, and it is contained below in the Letter: "The pomp of a funeral, the processions of obsequies, and the sumptuous diligence of burial, are whatever sort of consolations for the living, not helps for the dead."

§ 15. 2. Again, Aristotle says that good and evil no longer change the dead. Therefore, neither do they help them; but almsgiving always helps him to whom it is done.

§ 16. It is also asked concerning the others, namely concerning feeding? 1. For it seems that some food is not required on account of a defect, but on account of delight. Therefore, he who gives those does not seem to do an alms.

§ 17. 2. It is objected secondly concerning garments, which are sometimes sought for the sake of adornment, as it seems.

§ 18. 3. Furthermore, there are many other corporal defects about which human services are ordered. Therefore, it seems that there are more genera of alms. For example, to medicate, to lead the erring back to the way, to raise up the falling, and many such things which are around men. Therefore, the works of almsgiving seem to be insufficiently enumerated by the Saints.

§ 19. Solution. It is to be said that almsgiving (as was held above) is named from the mercy of the one doing it, and not necessarily from the misery of the one receiving it, because it suffices that there be in the recipient an opined or presumed misery which ought sufficiently to move the heart of man to succor him.

§ 20. Therefore, regarding what is objected concerning burial, I well concede that it is an alms which is bestowed upon a man for the sake of the body that will rise again, so that it may be stored more honorably than other bodies not rising again, and be removed from the horror of men.

§ 21. But to the first which is objected to the contrary, it is to be said that it relieves a defect which man incurs for the sake of the body.

§ 22. To the saying of Augustine, it is to be said that he means that it profits only those who have made themselves worthy in life so that these things might be able to profit them. Hence, just as suffrages referred to preceding merit profit or harm, so also does burial. Whence Gregory narrates that certain wicked men buried in sacred places were cast out by demons.

§ 23. To another, it is to be said that Aristotle speaks of civil goods and those ordered to civil happiness; and it is true that those do not change the dead, such as the fortunes of descendants, and the like. But the Church does not speak thus, which believes that suffrages in alms profit the dead who live unto God.

§ 24. To the first which is further asked concerning food, it is to be said that nature sometimes fails in desiring necessaries on account of some infirmity; and then it is necessary to succor by means of delicate things moving the appetite, and those things in this way according to such a state are ordered against misery.

§ 25. To another, it is to be said that a delicate garment can be given out of mercy in two ways. Indeed, in one way, when a weakened constitution requires soft clothing, being impotent to sustain the necessary. In another way, when although he is poor, he nevertheless held an honorable state, and it is shameful for him to use common ones; just as it is read of Blessed

Nicholas, that he gave gold to the virgins and the father, who, blushing to beg, were being disposed for the brothel.

§ 26. To another, it is to be said that there are many secondary defects; but these are the principal ones. Just as medicine is reduced to the visitation of the sick; and because a sick person is taken generally, and his visitation generally is every help, a falling person can also be called sick, and his visitation the raising up of the same.

§ 27. But if it is asked: According to what are defects of this kind taken?

§ 28. It is to be said that the relief which is given to the miserable is either done to remove the defect in itself, or indeed not to remove it, but to mitigate it, lest it generate horror in others. If it is done in this last way, it is burial. If in the first way, it is either against a natural defect, or an accidental one. If against a natural one, it is either in a defect of the hot and dry, and then it is to feed; or of the cold and moist, and then it is to give drink. For we naturally desire these, because, as the Philosopher says, from the same things we are generated and nourished. And because we consist through generation from those four, on account of this we also desire them for the preservation of the individual. But if it is in accidental things, it is either according to a defect of interior things, or of exterior things. If in the first way, then it is an infirmity which proceeds from the corruption of the interior constituent elements (complexionants). If in the second way, it is either in those things which impede in removing them, or in bringing useful things. If in the first way, then it is the succor and ransom of the imprisoned. If in the second way, then it is concerning things conserving against those which, standing around the body, dissolve it by contrary qualities, and thus is clothing; or concerning those things which recreate through rest after labor, and thus is hospitality, in which the poor traveler rests.

§ 29. And by this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 22 — On Spiritual Alms

On spiritual alms.

§ 30. Secondly, it is asked concerning spiritual alms.

§ 31. For it seems that to teach is not an alms: 1. For alms are not ordered against nature; but nature produces everyone ignorant; therefore it seems that no alms is ordered against ignorance.

§ 32. 2. Again, if teaching is an alms, as the Master seems to say in the Letter, it seems that a wise or instructed person is obliged to it. Therefore, according to time and place he is bound to succor. But this is the time of ignorance, namely when that one is ignorant and is present. Therefore, it seems that the instructed person is bound to teach every such person; therefore, if he does not teach, he sins mortally, just as if he does not give food to the hungry in the time of necessity; and this is grave to say.

§ 33. 3. Again, it is objected concerning what he says: "We forgive what anyone has sinned against us." For this precept seems to be in the precept of the love of enemies. Therefore, this is

an act of charity; therefore, of mercy; therefore, not of almsgiving, because in the Letter he hints that he who bestows mercy gives an alms; and without mercy there is no alms.

§ 34. 4. Again, counsel which is given to someone seems to be reduced to the teaching of the ignorant, because everyone seeking counsel is ignorant. Therefore, it seems that it is superfluously posited among the works of almsgiving.

§ 35. 5. Again, those works do not seem to belong to mercy, but rather to charity tending toward the neighbor through effect. For as it is said, 1 Cor. 13:5: "Charity seeks not her own."

§ 36. 6. Again, among the corporal works of mercy there are some which help after death; and since the soul remains more nobly after death than the body, it seems that there ought to be a spiritual work for this which may be done to man after death. Therefore, they are insufficiently enumerated, as it seems.

§ 37. 7. Again, to remit seems to be a work of justice, as is clear in Matt. 6:15, where he says: "If you will not forgive men, neither will your Father forgive you your offenses."

§ 38. Solution. It is to be said that in truth there are seven spiritual alms, as is commonly said, ordered against a defect of the spirit. For either that defect is of fault, or of punishment. If of fault: it is either in oneself alone, or it is sinned against you through the infliction of injury. If it is sinned against you, against this is ordered to endure patiently and to forgive: because there are two things in an inflicted injury, namely the fault, and this demands forgiveness; and the inflicted punishment, and this demands endurance, lest one judge for oneself. But if it is in oneself alone: it is either with the hope of amendment, or without such hope. If in the first way, then chastisement has place; if in the second way, then prayer to God has place, that He Himself may supply what is lacking in human help. But if it is a defect of punishment: it is either according to the intellect, or according to the affect. If it is according to the affect, thus is sorrow, or fear which is ordered to the same; and then he needs consolation. But if according to the intellect: either according to how it itself is speculative, and then he is ignorant, and needs teaching; or according to how it is practical, and then he is deficient in the knowledge of things to be done (agibilia); the succor of which will be through counsel. And thus it is clear that there are seven spiritual alms.

§ 39. To the first, therefore, which is objected first, it is to be said that ignorance is not the nature of instituted man, but of damned man; and therefore it is a defect in man.

§ 40. To another, it is to be said that although generally ignorance is a certain defect, there is nevertheless a certain ignorance which is dangerous, like of those things without which there is no salvation; and in such matters I think that the instructed person is bound to teach others not taught. And on account of this, priests are posited for the people, who may instruct in such things; and therefore a wise instructed person probably presumes that there are others who may succor out of duty, even if he himself does not teach; and therefore he does not sin mortally, because the time of necessity is not pressing.

§ 41. To another, it is to be said that nothing prohibits one work from belonging to multiple virtues, according as diverse ends move in it. Whence I well concede that to forgive can be a

work of justice, and of charity, and of mercy; but it will belong to mercy properly as eliciting it, and to the others as commanding it; and this is so done because it is ordered to the relief of misery which is a fault against the neighbor; and mercy, proceeding from compassion for the neighbor, elicits such a work.

§ 42. To another, it is to be said that teaching and counsel differ: because teaching is about anything ignorant; principally, however, it ought to be about those things which pertain to salvation, like certain parts of Sacred Scripture and the articles of faith. But counsel is sought in doubtful things to be done by us (agibilia), as is proven in the second book of the Ethics.

§ 43. To another, the response is clear through what was said before.

§ 44. To another, it is to be said that the soul remains alive after death; and therefore some of those things which help it while it is in the body, suffice to help it after death. But it is not thus concerning the body; and therefore it is not necessary for there to be a spiritual work for this by which the soul is specially helped after death.

§ 45. To another, it is to be said as was held before.

Articulus 23 — Whether Spiritual Alms Are Better Than Corporal Alms

Whether spiritual alms are better than corporal ones?

§ 46. Thirdly, it is asked concerning the comparison of corporal alms to spiritual ones.

§ 47. Now it seems that the spiritual ones are better, through that which is posited a little below in the Letter: 1. "But that is greater by which we forgive from the heart what anyone has sinned against us."

§ 48. 2. Again, the spirit is nobler than the body. Therefore, the succor of the spirit is better than that of the body; but a spiritual alms succors the spirit, while a corporal one the body. Therefore, the spiritual is better than the corporal.

§ 49. 3. Again, operations differ in their essences. Now it is established that the spiritual are better than the corporal, just as the spirit is better than the body. But spiritual alms are spiritual operations, while corporal alms are corporal operations. Therefore, the spiritual are better.

§ 50. 4. Again, the body does not have life, nor vice, nor virtue except through the spirit; therefore, all those things first belong to the spirit. Therefore, also in operations there will be no praise except through the spirit. But each thing is more efficacious in its own proper things, than in alien ones; therefore, the spirit too will be more efficacious in spiritual things, than in corporal things. Therefore, spiritual alms are more efficacious; therefore also better.

§ 51. 5. Again, corporal alms have a difference of goodness according to their matters: for he who gives gold makes a better alms than he who gives silver, if they are equally abundant in the faculty of giving. Since therefore spiritual gifts are better than all corporal ones, spiritual alms seem to be better than corporal ones.

§ 52. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Alms are for the succor of indigence. But man is more indigent in body than in soul; therefore those alms are better. Proof of the minor premise: the indigence of the soul can be removed through inquiry, and in many other ways, and once removed does not return, or does not naturally return; but the indigence of the body afflicts continuously, and cannot be avoided, and once removed it returns, such as hunger.

§ 53. 2. Again, the less it is recompensed to the one giving an alms in the present, the better and more fruitful is the alms. But it is less recompensed in corporal things than in spiritual things; therefore, an alms is more fruitful in corporal things than in spiritual things. Proof of the first is Matt. 6:3 and 16, where He says of those seeking the reward of praise, that they have received their reward; and He teaches to invite the poor who cannot repay. Proof of the second is that spiritual goods communicated to another grow in the possessor.

§ 54. 3. Again, corporal indigences are felt more than spiritual ones. Therefore, the supplying of the defect is more desired; and that alms is better which is more according to the desire of the poor person, because it consoles more. Therefore, a corporal alms is better than a spiritual one.

§ 55. Solution. It is to be said that a corporal alms has more of the supplying of need, but a spiritual one has more of utility and moral goodness (honestas). Simply speaking, however, an alms in spiritual things is better than in corporal things, as is said in the Letter.

§ 56. And the first reasons do not conclude except in a qualified sense (secundum quid), namely that that alms is nobler; but they do not conclude that it is more required: because corporal defects are felt more than spiritual ones.

§ 57. But to those things which are objected to the contrary, it is to be said that this does not make an alms more meritorious, that it is of greater indigence, but rather that it is given from a greater affection. Or it is to be said that it is not concluded to be better except in a qualified sense: for if the comparison ought to be made well, parity ought to be supposed in all things, except in this, that one is spiritual and the other corporal; and then it is plainly clear that the spiritual would be better.

§ 58. To another, it is to be said that although this is true in teaching and counseling, it is nevertheless not true in the others. And if it is in some way also true in the others (because the more often someone pardons an injury, the more easily he can do this), nevertheless the merit of the alms is not diminished on account of this. For what the Lord says concerning the reception of reward is not understood of spiritual reward, but of corporal and transitory reward, and not of the augment of grace, which often happens by the merit of almsgiving.

§ 59. To the last, it is to be said that sensation does not make it more meritorious, but more necessary, according to that time in which the defect is felt.

§ 60. Note, moreover, that these genera of alms are comprehended in two verses, of which the first is this: "I visit, I give drink, I feed, I ransom, I cover, I harbor, I bury." (Visito, poto, cibo, redimo, tego, colligo, condo.) The second is this: "Instruct, chastise, console, forgive, bear, pray." (Instrue, castiga, solare, remitte, fer, ora.)

§ 61. And these verses are clear throughout, except in this alone, that 'instruct' (instruo) ought to be taken in a twofold signification, namely for the instruction of the one teaching the ignorant, and for the instruction of the one informing for counsel.

Articulus 24 — From What Almsgiving Can Or Ought To Be Made

From what can or ought an alms be made?

§ 62. Next it is asked concerning what is said there, chap. 2, past the middle: "Give alms, and behold all things are clean unto you, etc."[527]

§ 63. But here the question is: From what can or ought an alms be made?

§ 64. Now it seems that from everything which is possessed, and can out of compassion be bestowed on the miserable. Because: 1. For giving, nothing is required except the faculty on the part of the giver. But one possessing in whatever way, has the faculty for giving; therefore, possessing in whatever way, he can make an alms.

§ 65. 2. Again, that which is superfluous cannot be retained out of justice; and yet an alms can be made from it. Therefore, an alms will be from that which is possessed, although it cannot justly be retained. And from this it follows that an alms could be made from usuries and other illicitly acquired things, which many deny.

§ 66. 3. Again, of two evils the lesser evil is to be chosen. But it is a greater evil to acquire illicitly and to retain unmercifully, than to acquire illicitly and to disburse mercifully. Therefore, the second is to be urged, namely that an alms be made from illicitly acquired things.

§ 67. 4. Again, concerning that of which someone is the master (dominus), he can do what he wills. But according to many, one is the master of usury; therefore he can do what pleases him; therefore he can also make an alms from it. That he is the master of usury is clear from the fact that many say dominion transfers in usury.

§ 68. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Gregory in the Decretum, cause I, quest. 1: "It is not to be thought an alms, if what is acquired from illicit things is dispensed to the poor."[528] Therefore, an alms cannot be made from illicitly acquired things.

§ 69. 2. Again, Gregory, in the same place: "For whatever in a sacrifice to God is offered from crime, does not placate the wrath of Almighty God, but irritates it."

§ 70. 3. Again, in the same place treating that of Solomon, Ecclus. 34:24: "He that offers sacrifice of the goods of the poor, etc.," he speaks thus: "Now let us perpend how great is the sorrow of a father, if a son is sacrificed in his sight: and from this it is easily known how great a sorrow is exasperated before God, when a sacrifice from rapine is rendered to Him."

§ 71. 4. Again, in Decretum XIV, quest. 5, Augustine in his homilies: "Perhaps someone thinks, and says: There are many avaricious and covetous Christians, I shall not have sin if I take away their property and give it to the poor: for whence they do no good, I shall be able to have a reward. But a thought of this kind is suggested by diabolical cunning: for if he bestows

upon the poor all that he had taken away, he rather adds to his sin, than diminishes it."[529] There are also many other authorities for this.

§ 72. 5. But let us insist upon reason: What one receives illicitly, he is bound to return. Therefore, he must do nothing whereby he is rendered impotent to pay. But by giving to another, whether poor or rich, he is rendered impotent. Therefore he is bound not to give to another; therefore he is bound not to make alms of this.

§ 73. 6. Again, as the Apostle says, evils are not to be done that good things may come. [530] Therefore, no one ought to do evils that good things may come about. But to acquire illicitly is to do evil; and to give an alms is for good things to come about. Therefore, an alms cannot nor ought to be made from illicitly acquired things, etc.

§ 74. 7. Again, to fornicate with some Jewish or pagan woman so that she might be converted, is illicit and a mortal sin, and ought not to be done, owing to the fact that it is a sin in itself. Therefore, since an unjust acquisition is no less a sin than fornication, an illicit acquisition ought not to be made so that an alms might be given from it.

§ 75. BUT THEN it is asked concerning cases which are around this question.

§ 76. Let us posit, therefore, that someone has things illicitly acquired through usury or rapine, and he sees someone placed in extreme necessity, and he does not have anything else from which to pay the one from whom he illicitly took it. And it is asked: Is he bound to give it to the poor person, or not?

§ 77. It seems that he is, because: 1. In such necessity all things are common. Therefore, if he gives to this one, it seems that he is absolved from the other.

§ 78. 2. Again, in such a case he could violently snatch from another, and give to this one. Therefore, he can also give the illicitly acquired thing to him, such that he is not further bound to pay.

§ 79. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. A sin is not remitted unless the taken thing is restored. But he does not restore the taken thing by the fact that he gives it to another; therefore the sin is not remitted to him.

§ 80. 2. Again, the other has an action against this one, as long as he retains his property. Therefore, since he is said to retain as long as he does not pay, an action still belongs to him after such a giving. Therefore, he is still bound to return; therefore he is not absolved by such a giving.

§ 81. FURTHER, it is asked in the same case, if he to whom he owes it is present, and denies permission to give to him who is in extreme necessity, whether he is still bound to give?

§ 82. It seems that he is not, because: 1. He gives another's property against the will of the master (dominus); and this is illicit.

527. Luke 11:41.

§ 83. 2. Again, from another's property (as was clear before) an alms cannot be made. But this which he has is another's; therefore, he can never give it, against the will of him to whom he owes it.

§ 84. ON THE CONTRARY: Ambrose says: "Feed him dying of hunger, etc.:" but this one is able to feed, and does not do it: therefore he kills. Therefore it seems that he ought to give to such a needy person.

§ 85. AGAIN it is asked here concerning other cases, whether an alms can be made of gambling winnings (aleato) and the price of prostitution?

§ 86. It seems that it can, because in such things he who lost does not deserve to receive it. Therefore, by giving, one is not rendered impotent to pay; therefore it can be given to the poor.

§ 87. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. "Thou shalt not offer the hire of a strumpet:"[531] but an alms is a certain sacrifice; therefore it ought not to be made of those things.

§ 88. Again, in an Epistle of Jerome, the priests of Babylon are rebuked, who accept the gifts of harlots; therefore an alms is not to be made of this.

§ 89. 2. Again, by illicit commerce nothing is licitly acquired. But prostitution is illicit commerce; therefore by it nothing is licitly acquired. Therefore neither is the price; but from an illicitly acquired thing an alms cannot be made, as was clear from the words of Gregory introduced above. Therefore, neither from prostitution, nor from gambling.

§ 90. Solution. As those who have taught the laws (jura) with probability say, it seems to me that a distinction must be made regarding the illicitly acquired thing. For either dominion is transferred, or it is not transferred. It is transferred, as in usury, according to some: and concerning this you will find a note above at the end of the third book of the Sentences. It is not transferred, as in rapine. If it is transferred: either an action for recovery (repetitio) from the canon belongs to him from whom he accepts, or not. It belongs, as in usury. It does not belong, as in prostitution and gambling, because the patron of a harlot and the gambler deserve to lose it.

§ 91. I say therefore, that if it is an illicit thing in which dominion is transferred, and an action for recovery does not apply, an alms can be made from it.

§ 92. But if it is an illicit thing in which dominion is not transferred, as in theft, rapine, or a deposit; or if it is transferred, yet an action for recovery applies to him, an alms cannot be made.

§ 93. And according to this distinction I respond to the first, saying that there is a faculty from the abundance of a thing which can be given, and there is a faculty from the right of giving. The first does not suffice for almsgiving, but the second; and he who illicitly acquires what he is bound to restore does not have this.

§ 94. To another, it is to be said that it is not similar: because that which is superfluous, although it ought not to be retained, is nevertheless his own, and he is bound to no one for it. And therefore he can give this; but concerning an illicitly acquired thing which he is bound to restore, it is not in this way.

§ 95. To another, it is to be said that although for one placed in necessity, who cannot escape otherwise, the lesser evil is to be chosen, nevertheless the law determines neither to be licit, nor a lesser evil, nor a greater, but one is less illicit than the other. And therefore both are sins, although two are a greater evil than one.

§ 96. To another, it is to be said that if he is master (dominus) in such a way that the other cannot take action against him—neither from the fact that dominion was transferred, nor from the canon—then the objection truly proves, and then it is conceded. But if he is not master from the settled law of the canon, then it is not valid. And thus it is in usury: because although according to some dominion is transferred, nevertheless from the canon he is bound to restore.

§ 97. But to those things which are objected to the contrary, it is to be said that all those decrees speak of that illicitly acquired thing which someone is bound to restore.

§ 98. To this which is objected by reason, it is to be said to the first, that it proceeds well concerning an illicit thing which someone is bound to return.

§ 99. To another, it is to be said that in order that one may have whence an alms may be given, one must not acquire from shameful means, as the decree says, cause I, quest. 1, and cause XIV, quest. 5. But if it was acquired shamefully, nothing prohibits that it can sometimes be disbursed in alms, as was already said.

§ 100. To another, it is to be said in the same way, that it must not be thus acquired. But having been acquired thus, nothing prohibits dispensing it well. And in that objection, Eustratius on the V book of the Ethics seems to be contrary to the decree and to us, who says that although the law commands another's wife not to be known, nevertheless it is good to know the tyrant's wife, so that through her the tyrant may be mitigated towards the citizens. But Eustratius errs in that place, or he himself speaks by reporting the laws of the pagans.

§ 101. To another, it is to be said that it seems to me in such a case, that he who has another's property ought to signify it to him to whom he owes it, if he can. And if he cannot, he ought to give it to the needy person in his name, and he is absolved from the debt: just as also certain ancient Doctors before us said. But if he signifies it, whether he gives permission or not, he himself is nevertheless bound to give it to the needy person, and he is absolved, as I think, from the debt simply: such that he is never further bound to pay, unless he to whom he owes it is in similar indigence.

§ 102. To those things which are objected, it is to be said that this one pays: because in such a case that other, if he had it and willed not to give, would sin mortally. And therefore, since this one gives in his name, this one is absolved: just as if I owed you a hundred, but you owed

529. Decretum Gratiani, C. 14, q. 5, c. 1.

another a hundred, and I paid for you to him whom you owed, I am not bound to pay you again.

§ 103. To another, it is to be said that an action does not belong to the other against this one in such a case—provided it is established to him that he gave in such necessity, and he had nothing else to give besides his own necessaries. But rather, he is simply absolved from the debt by the law of nature: because those things which were the creditor's, he makes to be owed to the poor person in such necessity.

§ 1. To the next it must be said that, with permission denied, he still ought to give on account of necessity: because many goods (as Augustine says) are bestowed upon the unwilling: and thus even this is done well despite his unwillingness, when from his goods nature, failing in a neighbor, is sustained.

§ 2. To the next it must be said that this person gives alms not from what belongs to another, but returns to the poor man what is his own: and the alms-giving is done in the name of him to whom restitution was owed.

§ 3. To this that is further asked concerning prostitution and gambling, it must be said that alms can be given from such things, and especially from prostitution, but not an offering at the altar on account of scandal: and the authorities introduced are speaking about sacrifice, not about alms.

§ 4. To that which is objected by reason, it must be said that in truth it is acquired by illicit commerce. But nevertheless what is "illicitly acquired" is spoken of in two ways: in one way commonly, namely when the act by which it is acquired is illicit: and this does not always prohibit that alms might be made from what is so acquired. It is also called "illicitly acquired" when it is acquired with unjust damage to a neighbor in his goods, which is proper to avarice, which according to Aristotle is properly called a special injustice: and then alms cannot be given from it to me: because it is owed to another, either from the fact that ownership is not transferred, or from the fact that an action is competent to him from whom it is taken away, by the authority and law of the canon.

Articulus 25 — Whether A Wife From The Goods Of Her Husband, Or Conversely, And Whether A Monk, A Son Under A Father's Power, Or A Servant Can Give Alms

Whether a wife from her husband's goods, or conversely, whether a monk, or a son in a household, or a servant can give alms?

§ 5. But still it is further asked concerning certain cases, namely those which do not suppose something illicitly acquired, but as being in the power of another, such as whether a wife can give alms from her husband's goods?

530. Romans 3:8.

§ 6. It seems that she can: because 1. Augustine says that she was taken from his side for this reason, that he might know her as a companion to her husband, not a handmaid: therefore she herself has power over goods just as the man: therefore she can give just as he can.

1. Also, Aristotle in Ethics V, where he distinguishes economic justice from justice strictly speaking, says that justice is more with a wife, than with a son, or a servant: but it is evident that he says this on account of some equality which is between a man and a wife: therefore since she is equal, she can give just as the man.
2. Also, the dearer good that a man has, namely his own body, is in the power and dominion of the woman: therefore much more are other things: if therefore she is mistress in those things, she herself can distribute to the poor, as it seems.
3. Also, it is read in the life of blessed Lucy, that she secretly, with her betrothed being ignorant of it, divided and sold her patrimony and gave to the poor: and yet she is praised: therefore it seems that this would also be praiseworthy in others.

ON THE CONTRARY: 1. If two are partners in trade, neither can give without the other consenting: since therefore goods are common between a man and a wife, it seems that she can give nothing without the consent of the husband.

1. Also, Concerning her own body she can do nothing without the man's consent, which nevertheless seems to be more her own: therefore much less concerning things.
2. Also, Things are given to a husband by the wife's father, such as a dowry, and other things, on account of the burdens of matrimony: therefore without his consent those things are not to be alienated: therefore much less other things, which are his, or acquired by him.
3. Also, 1 Corinthians 11:3: I want you to know that the head of every man is Christ: but the head of the woman is the man . But without the consent of the head a member can do nothing. Therefore neither without the consent of the man can a woman give anything, as it seems.

§ 7. Further it is asked, Whether a son of a household or a daughter can give anything?

It seems that they cannot: because 1. He has nothing in his power: therefore he can give nothing.

1. Also, Galatians 4:1: As long as the heir is a child, he differs nothing from a servant, etc. Therefore he can give nothing.

ON THE CONTRARY: The inheritance pertains to him: therefore it seems that as from his own he can give something.

§ 8. Further it is asked here, Whether a monk or a nun can give anything?

531. Deuteronomy 23:18.

It seems that they cannot: because 1. It is said, that a monk having a halfpenny, is not worth a halfpenny: but he who has nothing, can give nothing: therefore a monk can give nothing.

1. Also, The renunciation of property is of every rule of religious: but he who has nothing proper to himself, can give nothing: therefore a monk cannot give anything: therefore neither can he give alms.

ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Suppose that he sees someone placed in necessity: either he gives, or he does not give. If he gives, I have my proposition. If he does not give, since he could give from the goods of the monastery, he kills him, as Ambrose seems to say.

1. Also, One good does not prejudice another: but religion is good, and giving alms is good: therefore religion does not prejudice the giving of alms: therefore it seems that from religion he is more bound to give, than if he were not a religious.

§ 9. Further it is asked concerning servants and handmaids who give bread, and the like of their masters, whether they can do this?

It seems that they cannot: because nothing is their own: therefore they can give nothing of this.

ON THE CONTRARY: The dispensing of them is left to some in the house: but a dispenser can give alms under the hope of ratification: therefore both a servant and a handmaid.

§ 10. Solution. It must be said with a manifold distinction.

First thus: Either the woman has paraphernalia [property outside the dowry], or not.

Also, Either the woman is gainful like the husband, or even more than the husband, or not.

Also, Either from the woman's giving the husband is impoverished, or not.

Also, Either the husband expressly prohibits her from giving with a sign that he so intends in his heart, or not.

§ 11. If the woman has paraphernalia, and is gainful, even with her husband prohibiting she can and ought to give alms, which do not impoverish the man: and if he prohibits, yet not by a sign that he so intends, but because by prohibiting he wishes to draw her back from a superfluity of giving, I still say that she ought to give with that conscience that it would please the husband in his heart, even whatever he might say with his mouth. If however she does not have paraphernalia, and is gainful: I say the same as before. If however she has paraphernalia, and is not gainful: still the same seems must be said. If however she neither has paraphernalia, nor is she gainful by her own labors: then it seems must be said, that she ought not to give without the consent of the man, except perhaps bread and wine and other things which are in the daily use of the house: and this moderately lest she make the matrimony too burdensome for the husband by her giving.

528. Decretum Gratiani, C. 1, q. 1, c. 27.

§ 12. To the first therefore it must be said that although she was taken from his side, yet she ought to be ruled by the man: and she is not equal to him, except only in the conjugal act and debt: just as will be shown below, when matrimony is treated.

§ 13. To the next it must be said that Aristotle does not intend that justice strictly speaking is between a man and a woman, but less improperly than between a master and a servant: because it more approaches equality, although she is not entirely equal.

§ 14. To the next it must be said that only the body of the man is given to the woman: because this is pertinent to the undivided custom of life of the sacrament, according as it is for the good of offspring, and as a remedy for concupiscence: and therefore she is mistress of it. But it is not so concerning other goods: and therefore those remain in the dominion of the husband, unless by a mode predetermined in the distinction.

§ 15. To the next it must be said that blessed Lucy was only a betrothed: nor was the matrimony yet ratified or consummated: and therefore it was lawful for her to choose the safer part of chastity, and to divide the goods, which had not previously passed into the dominion of the betrothed.

§ 16. To those things however which are objected to the contrary, the solution is evident through the distinction.

§ 17. To that which is asked concerning a son of a household, it must be said that he can give nothing without the consent of his parents, except perhaps bread, and the like, which do not inflict a sensible loss.

§ 18. To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that although he is the heir, yet he is not yet the master: and therefore he cannot give.

§ 19. To that however which is asked concerning a monk, it is fitting to distinguish. Either some dispensing is committed to him, or not. If so: then from that he ought and can give alms, just as the Abbot himself in the name of the chapter. If however he does not have the dispensing, either he himself is in the monastery, or not. If he is in the monastery: then he ought not to give except by permission, unless he sees someone placed in extreme necessity, because then he could even receive from the altar, and give to him: unless perhaps he gives under the hope of ratification, with the Abbot being in no way present. If however he is outside, as in study by permission of the Abbot: then he can give alms: because since expenses are given to him, the dispensing of those things which are given to him is committed to him.

§ 20. To this however which is objected against, it must be said that although he has nothing in possession, yet as a dispenser he can have something in use.

§ 21. Through this also the solution to the following is evident: because no religion renounces use: because without the use of the goods of fortune life cannot be.

§ 22. To the next it must be said that that proposition is false: because religion, by the fact that it renounces what is proper to oneself, makes that which in itself is good, evil for him.

§ 23. To that which is asked concerning a servant and a handmaid, I say through itself, that they can give nothing of their masters' things without their consent, except from their own wages.

§ 24. To that which seems to be objected against, it must be said that they are not dispensers as having some power in the thing, but as handling them for the utility of their masters.

Articulus 26 — Whether One About To Give Alms Ought To Begin In An Ordered Way

Whether one about to give alms ought to begin ordinately?

§ 25. Next it is asked concerning this which is said, there, C, § 2, after the middle: He who wishes to give alms ordinately, ought to begin first from himself, etc.

For it seems from this that order is in almsgiving, just as in charity.

ON THE CONTRARY: 1. No precept is given concerning loving oneself, because nature suffices for this: since therefore nature orders each one to subvene himself as much as he can, it is not necessary for an admonition to be introduced for this.

1. Also, No misery moves so much in another, as in oneself: since therefore alms is given from mercy, which is compassion for misery, it seems that the sense of one's own misery suffices for this without exterior doctrine.
2. Besides, It seems to be impossible, that a man give alms to himself: because it is given to someone who does not have: therefore if a man gives to himself, he simultaneously has, and does not have, which is impossible.

§ 26. Besides it is asked further, Why does he say this rather of spiritual alms, than of corporal? For he says: Have mercy on your soul, etc. not your body.

For it seems that he ought to say a similar thing about the body because just as men are found to be cruel to their soul, so they are found to be cruel to their body: like those who irrationally afflict themselves, and sometimes even kill themselves.

§ 27. Solution. It must be said that in truth in the bestowing of alms order is attended to, according as it is informed by charity: for the order of charity is posited concerning all things, which are informed by charity: and concerning this many things are said upon the third book of the Sentences, in the tractate on charity.

§ 28. To the first however it must be said that we do not have a precept concerning corporal alms, because in corporal misery we suffer enough with ourselves: but concerning spiritual: and this is understood in the precept of giving alms to a neighbor: just as also the precept concerning loving oneself is understood in the precept of loving one's neighbor, as Augustine says.

§ 29. To the next and the third it must be said that misery is nearer in us than in another, if it is felt as misery: and in this way it is not except concerning corporal misery. Spiritual misery

however, which is more truly misery than corporal, is not felt as misery, but as a good now on account of the sweetness of sin: and therefore spiritual alms which supplies the defect of sin especially, needs a more ample admonition, than exterior alms.

§ 30. To the last it must be said that spiritual things in a certain way one can give to oneself: because in truth he does not have spiritual things, and so properly someone can receive; and someone can cause that they be given to him, although properly he cannot give: and thus he is said to give in this way in which he who causes that it be given is said to give.

Articulus 27 — Whether This Saying Is True, "He Who Loves Iniquity Hates His Own Soul"

Whether that is true, He who loves iniquity, hates his own soul?

§ 31. Next it is asked concerning this which is said, there, C, § 2, after the middle: He who loves iniquity, hates his own soul, etc. For this seems to be false: because

1. Ephesians 5:29: No man ever hated his own flesh therefore much less the soul which is the better part of man.
2. Besides, This seems to be a good thing, that he hates it: because it is said, John 12:25: He who hates his life in this world, keeps it unto life eternal . Therefore he does not seem cruel to his soul who hates it: therefore what is said in the Letter seems false.

§ 32. Solution. It must be said that the sin is of equivocation in "to love", and "to hate": because love is of affection, and of effect: by love of affection no one hates his soul: and of that the Apostle speaks to the Ephesians. By love of effect however he who loves iniquity does not love his soul: because he acts against his own soul: and of this the Psalm speaks.

§ 33. To the second it must be said that the equivocation is in the word "soul" [anima]: because Christ in John calls the soul, animal life: which he hates, who flees delights, and embraces the cross: and he keeps it, not in that it is animal, but according as it is beatifiable stripped of animality unto eternal life: here however he speaks of the soul according as it is spiritual and the principal part of man in meriting or demeriting.

Articulus 28 — Whether Nothing Is Clean To The Unclean

Whether to the unclean nothing is clean?

§ 34. Next it is asked concerning this which he says, there, C, § 2, before the end: To the unclean nothing is clean, etc.

For this seems false: because 1. Sinners consume the body of Christ: and yet that is clean: and they communicate in many other sacraments.

1. Also, A creature is not made unclean by this, that sinners have it for use: therefore he seems to speak falsely.

§ 35. Also it is asked, Whether it follows, to the unclean nothing is clean: therefore the unclean thing which they consume?

And it seems that it does: because as is evident, Leviticus 11, throughout, between clean and unclean there is no middle: if therefore it is not clean, it seems that it is unclean.

§ 36. Solution. It must be said with the Apostle, that to the unclean nothing is clean . And it is understood compositely, not dividedly, that is, to the unclean insofar as they are unclean nothing is clean: because the effect of cleanness is made by nothing in them.

§ 37. To the first it must be said that the body of Christ is not clean in them, because it does not make the effect of cleanness in them: yet in itself it is clean: for just as it is said of divine Wisdom, Wisdom 7:25, that on account of its cleanness nothing defiled runs into it: so conversely concerning these it can be said, that on account of their uncleanness, nothing clean runs into them by effect.

§ 38. To the next the solution is evident through what has been said.

§ 39. To the next it must be said that it does not follow, if it is not clean to them, that it is unclean: for uncleanness is twofold, namely in itself, and with respect to us. And that which is of the thing in itself, has no middle: but that which is with respect to us, has a middle with respect to us. Just as contrariwise every man is clean in himself, or unclean: and yet for a certain thing not every man who is clean is clean, just as in the loaves of proposition not everyone clean in himself, was clean.

Articulus 29 — Whether It Is True That It Profits Nothing To Pray, Fast, And Do Other Good Things, Unless The Mind Is Recalled From Sin

Whether it be true, that it profits nothing to pray, to fast, and to do other good works, unless the mind be recalled from sin?

§ 40. Next it is asked concerning this which is said, there, C, § 2, toward the end: It profits nothing to fast, and to pray, and to do other good works, unless the mind be recalled from sin, etc.

1. For it seems if they profit nothing, that these things are not to be advised to sinners, which would be impious to say: therefore what is said in the Letter seems false.
2. Also, To Nebuchadnezzar the impious king Daniel said: Redeem your sins with alms therefore they profit.

§ 41. Solution. It has been said above in what way they profit, namely for obtaining grace more nearly: but they do not profit unto eternal life: and because these things have been disputed above, I will dismiss them here.

Divisio Textus

To some however it seems, etc. Here he touches upon the opinion of certain ones, and solves it in a twofold way, and recoils from the solution had.

And it is divided into three: and the beginning of each part is evident through itself.

Articulus 30 — Whether Satisfaction Outside Charity Ought To Be Repeated When Charity Returns

Whether satisfaction outside charity, is to be repeated when charity returns?

Whether satisfaction outside charity, is to be repeated when charity returns?

§ 42. Next it is asked concerning this which is said, there, C, § 2, at the end: Concerning both satisfaction must be imposed: because concerning the first he did not satisfy condignly.

For this seems to be harsh. For let us suppose, that he first accepts from the priest, that he give a hundred, and pays it in mortal sin: therefore afterwards he must again give a hundred.

The same objection is concerning going beyond the sea, and other things which cannot be repeated without heavy expenses and labors.

§ 43. Solution. It must be said, that as is evident from previous things, in penance there are two things, namely sorrow of heart, and exterior work. The interior things however because he was not contrite, are worth nothing. In exterior things however it must be distinguished for certain exterior things are, which by loss and affliction remain in the agent after they are done, such as giving, and pilgrimage, and the like: certain others however pass away entirely, such as prayer, and other such things. I say therefore, that works which remain in some way, afterwards revive through grace: and those it is not necessary to repeat: but others ought to be repeated: and this was noted above in the question concerning dead and mortified works.

Articulus 31 — Whether A Good Work Done Outside Charity, Being Dead, Can Ever Revive

Whether a dead good done outside charity, can ever revive?

§ 44. But it is objected concerning the error itself first.

For it seems, that these say true because: 1. Good is more powerful in acting, than evil in destroying: but evil destroys a previously had good, not only conjoined to evil, but also a good of grace had by itself: therefore much more does a following good vivify a had good, which was not conjoined to good, but was done outside charity.

1. Also, Baptism with fiction removed operates salvation: therefore it seems that penance ought to do similarly.

§ 45. Solution. All these things can be gathered from being sufficiently broadly disputed above in the preceding distinction.

Therefore it must be said, that these err, because a dead good cannot be vivified: by reason that nothing is vivified of those things which die, unless it contracts the possibility for life from conjunction to something which perpetually lives: just as through charity the goods of eternal life are conjoined, and the body when it will rise is conjoined to the soul: but a good done outside charity, is conjoined to none of such things, and therefore can never revive.

§ 46. To the first objection however it must be said, that it is not from a defect of the following good, that it is not vivified, but rather from a defect of the preceding, that it is not vivifiable: because it is impossible for life, as has been said.

§ 47. To the next it must be said that it is not similar what is introduced for similar: because baptism imprints a character, by reason of which it remains in men: but penance imprints nothing of such things.

Besides, The baptized immediately receives the virtue of operating from the passion of Christ: but the works of penance are partly from us, and especially those which are in attrition before contrition: concerning which the Master speaks here.

Articulus 32 — Whether Good Works Done Outside Charity Diminish The Fire Of Hell

Whether good works done outside charity diminish the fire of hell?

§ 48. Next it is asked concerning this which is said, there, D, before the end: But it must be estimated perhaps that the future judgment will be more tolerable for him, etc.

This seems to be false: 1. For in the fire of hell each one burns as much as he made himself combustible through sin, as Gregory says: but those goods do not diminish sin: therefore he burns as much with those goods, as without them.

If you say, that they diminish sins. On the contrary: Whatever is apt by nature to diminish something, has contrariety to it: these goods thus diminish sin: therefore they have contrariety to sin, which is false, since it is saved with it in the same subject.

1. Also, Whatever diminishes something, if intensified will destroy it, if it itself is finite: therefore if these goods diminish sin, when multiplied they will destroy it, which is false and heretical: therefore this is also false, that they diminish the fire of hell.

§ 49. Solution. It must be said, that they do not diminish directly, but indirectly: just as he is said to diminish a fire, who prohibits wood from being placed on it: for goods from the genus of goods accustom to the good, and consequently elongate from the custom and appetite of evil, and thus they diminish sin, which would not happen if those goods did not exist: and thus by diminishing the cause of the fire, they diminish the fire.

§ 50. To those things however which were objected, the solution is evident: because they proceed as if they diminished directly: and this we do not say.

§ 51. Next it is asked concerning this which is said, there, E, around the middle: When we commit evil, not without cause do we recall past goods to memory, etc.

For from all the previously had disputations this seems to be false: because whether they were done outside charity, or in charity, it has been shown, that they avail much: therefore they are not recalled to memory without cause.

§ 52. Solution. It must be said, that he does not intend to say "without cause" simply, but as to this that eternal life is hoped for from them, if he continues in sins.

§ 53. F. He introduces other authorities against those who say that penance is done for one sin while another is kept silent.

I consider that sufficient response has been given to those, who assert that penance is done for one crime, and pardon is granted, with another retained in delight, or not exposed through confession, who are confuted not only by the premises of the authorities, but also by those subjoined. For Augustine says: "There are many who repent of having sinned, but yet entirely reserving to themselves certain things in which they might delight, not animadverting that the Lord simultaneously freed a mute and deaf man from a demon": through this he teaches us that we are never healed except of all. For if he wished sins to be reserved in part, he could have perfected the one having seven demons, with six being expelled: but he expelled the seven that he might teach that all crimes are to be cast out simultaneously. Moreover ejecting a legion of demons from another, he left none of all of them, to possess the freed man: showing that even if sins are a thousand, one must repent of all of these. For the Lord never healed anyone, whom he did not entirely free. For he healed the whole man on the sabbath: because he freed both the body from all infirmity, and the soul from all contagion: indicating that the penitent ought simultaneously to sorrow for every crime. For I know that the Lord is an enemy to every criminal. How therefore will he who reserves a crime, receive pardon concerning another? He would obtain pardon without the love of God, without which no one ever finds grace. For he is an enemy of God as long as he offends perseveringly. For it is a certain impiety of infidelity, to hope for a half pardon from him who is just and justice. For then he would find grace without true penance. For true penance endeavors to lead to the purity of baptism. For a penitent ought rightly to absolve whatever of dirt he contracted after the purification of baptism at least with the tears of the mind: but he is hard enough, the sorrow of whose mind the eyes do not declare. But let him know himself to be culpably hard, who weeps for the losses of time, or the death of a friend, and does not show the sorrow of sin in tears. Whom therefore it repents, let it repent entirely." The same, "Penitents, if you are truly penitents, and are not mocking, change your life, be reconciled to God. You do penance, you fix your knees, and you laugh: you mock the patience of God. If you do penance, let it repent you: if it does not repent you, you are not a penitent. If therefore it repents, why do you do the things you did badly? If it repents to have done them, do not do them: if you still do them, certainly you are not a penitent." Also, Innocent II: "We admonish our brothers, lest they suffer the souls of the laity to be deceived by false penances, and dragged into hell. Moreover a false penance is established to be, when with many spurned, penance is done concerning one alone: or when it is so done concerning one, that it is not departed from another.

Divisio Textus

I consider that sufficient, etc. Here begins that part in which he confirms the solution through an accident. And he does two things here: namely he introduces his express authorities, and repeats what true penance is, there, G, From the premises it is perspicuous, etc.

Articulus 33 — Whether God Can Heal From One Sin And Not From Another

Whether God can heal of one sin and not of another?

§ 54. However a question falls in concerning this which he says, there, F, after the beginning: Through this he teaches us never to be healed except of all, etc.

For it is asked, Whether God can heal of one, and not of another?

It seems however, that he can: because 1. To God nothing is impossible: therefore neither that.

Also, A corporal doctor can heal of one disease, with another left: therefore much more God, who is more powerful than a corporal doctor.

1. Also, Corporal healing is a sign of spiritual healing in the miracles of the Lord, as is evident in the Letter: but in Mark it is read, that a certain blind man received sight in a certain respect, who namely saw men walking as trees: therefore for a part in that time he was also healed in a certain respect and not simply in mind: therefore God can do this not only in body, but also in mind.
2. Also, Just as in the work of creation according to the opinion of most, namely of Gregory, John Chrysostom, and others, God first produced matter according to its substance, and afterwards distinguished and adorned it: therefore it seems, that he could do similarly in the works of recreation, that namely he might make it according to something, and leave it infected according to something.

ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Whatever God can do according to his goodness, someone can hope for from him: but no one ought to hope for a half pardon from him, as is said in the Letter: therefore he does not seem to be able to make a half pardon.

1. Also, Let it be given that he could: from thence thus, If he cures, he cures through some good, which conjoins to life, and puts flight to death: but with all such goods the Holy Spirit is given: therefore with such a good the Holy Spirit is given: but the Holy Spirit inhabits all such, to whom he imparts such goods: therefore the Holy Spirit inhabits such a one: but again on account of sin it is the habitation of demons: therefore the same man is the habitation of demons, and of the Holy Spirit through grace, which is absurd, and against the Apostle saying: What convention of Christ with Belial? And, What consent to the temple of God with idols?

§ 55. Solution. It must be said, that God cannot do this: because it would be impotence, and not power: just as medicine which cures half a disease, is impotence.

§ 56. To the first therefore it must be said, that nothing of those things which are of power and nobility, is impossible to God: but he cannot do weak things, such as to run, to eat, to lie, to be imperfect, and other things of this kind.

§ 57. To the next it must be said, that he was entirely healed inside and out: but the habit of sight not being coordinated, signified faith interiorly not yet confirmed from enrooting in the subject and determination of articles.

§ 58. To the next it must be said, that it is otherwise in the works of creation: because in those the imperfect is not imperfect from malice contrary to itself: but in recreation nothing is imperfect except from malice contrary to God, and to the good of his grace.

Articulus 34 — Whether All Whom Christ Healed In Body He Also Healed In Soul

Whether all whom Christ healed in body, he also healed in soul?

§ 59. Next it is asked concerning this which is said, there, F, around the middle: The Lord never healed anyone, whom he did not entirely free.

1. The Gloss upon John 9:1 and seq. It is asked, How did Christ illuminate this man without faith? Therefore it seems, that he did not entirely cure that man born blind, because not except on the outside.
2. Also, Another Gloss in the same place upon that: Who is he, Lord, that I may believe, etc. Now the Lord washes the face of the anointed one, now he illuminates the eyes of the heart: therefore it seems, that before he was not illuminated: therefore he was not then illuminated in heart, when he was illuminated in body.

§ 60. Solution. I think, that it is universally true what is said here in the Letter, that namely the Lord rendered healthy in both body and soul all whom he healed in body. However the Gloss upon John solves it otherwise saying, that it is understood of those who were infirm on account of sin: because in them it was necessary first to exclude the cause, before the disease would be healed: and therefore with the cause removed, they were healed in soul: and with the effect removed, they were healed in body. But I think, that that Gloss is marginal, or of a certain Victorinus, whose sayings are not of great authority.

§ 61. To that therefore which is primarily objected, it must be said that that blind man was illuminated inside, and outside but he first received an indistinct and implicit faith, which afterwards, when the Lord was known, became distinct.

§ 62. To the next it must be said, that that Gloss...

§ 1. ...is understood thus: he illuminates the anointed, that is, he determines the light of his faith and makes it distinct, so that he distinctly knows and believes him to be the Son of God in person. § 2.

Articulus 35 — Whether A Half Pardon Can Be Hoped For From God

§ 3. Whether a half-pardon can be hoped for from God? § 4. Next it is asked concerning what he says there in F, in the middle: "For it is a certain impiety of infidelity to hope for a half-pardon from him who is just and justice itself, etc." § 5. For this seems to be false: § 6. 1. For it does not contradict human justice to receive satisfaction according to a part: since therefore human justice is patterned after the divine, it seems that it ought not to contradict divine justice either. § 7. 2. Item, it seems that this would rather go against mercy than justice: because it belongs to mercy to relax sins both in whole and in part: therefore he seems to speak badly when he says, "who is just and justice itself." § 8. Moreover, why does he say, "just and justice itself"? For "just" would suffice. § 9. Solution. It must be said that it contradicts human justice to receive an amendment when the person still intends to multiply the fault: but if he offends no more, then he can satisfy by parts. But it is similar in divine justice: for he who satisfies for one and persists in the will of another, thus multiplies the fault: and therefore

amendment is accepted for none. § 10. Or it may be said, as was noted above at the beginning of the distinction, that it is one way in human justice, and another in divine. § 11. And this is because man sees those things that appear, but the Lord looks at the heart: and therefore unless he has the heart, he does not receive satisfaction: but man looks to external works, which are divided, and therefore he receives divided satisfaction for them. § 12. To the argument, however, it must be said that although human justice is patterned after the divine, nevertheless something belongs to it insofar as it is human, which does not belong to the divine: and this is with respect to the outer man, and not to the inner. § 13. To the other it must be said that it belongs to mercy to relax sins freely: but to remit with the demand for amendment belongs to justice: and he speaks of such pardon here. § 14. To the other it must be said that he says "just and justice itself" by reason of simple essence, and of the effect in us: because, namely, he effects general justice in us, by which he deletes sins with the purpose of amendment: just as Aristotle says that it is called wisdom and justice insofar as it fills us with wisdom and justice. § 15.

Articulus 36 — Whether And What The Tears Of The Mind Are, And Whether He Is Culpably Hard Who Does Not Show The Sorrow Of Sin By Tears

§ 16. Whether and what are the tears of the mind? And, whether he is culpably hard who does not show sorrow for sin by tears? § 17. Next it is asked concerning what he says there in F, after the middle: "It is necessary that he wash at least with tears of the mind, etc." § 18. For it seems that there are no tears of the mind: because § 19. 1. Nothing is difficult to the mind in itself, because it is of a spiritual nature: therefore it is not subjected to passion: but no tears are without passion: therefore there are no tears of the mind. And that a purely

spiritual nature is not subject to passions, Aristotle says that sorrows and pleasures are generations into the sensible soul. § 21. 2. If you say that tears of the mind are tears of the will, which are in the mind, that is, to will to have tears, and to will to weep. On the contrary: A will not coming to act is imperfect: but this is not reputed for the deed: therefore such a will does not suffice: therefore neither do the tears of the mind, as it seems. § 22. 3. Item, to will to weep for sins belongs to many who still persist in sin: therefore they have tears of the mind: therefore they wash away the filth they contracted, which is false: therefore what is said here about tears of the mind is false. § 23. 4. Item, it was held above that the penitent ought to rejoice about his sorrow: but it is manifest that he ought to rejoice according to the mind, and not according to sense and flesh: therefore he ought to have tears and joy according to the same thing: and this because it is said that he ought to have tears of the mind: therefore he is commanded to have contraries at the same time, namely sorrow and joy, and according to the same thing, which is impossible: therefore an impossibility is commanded him: which is contrary to Jerome who says, "Let him be anathema who says God has commanded the impossible." § 24. Further it is asked concerning what he says there in F, before the end: "Let him know himself to be culpably hard, who weeps for the losses of time, or the death of a friend, and does not show sorrow for sin in tears." § 25. For this seems to be false: because § 26. 1. Weeping is not a sign of greater sorrow. Hence we do not see the most constant men weep in

maximum sorrows, but rather we see women weep. § 27. 2. Item, let us posit that he who weeps at the death of a friend cannot weep for sins, and yet would will to be able: then therefore according to this Letter he is culpably hard. § 28. On the contrary: He does what is in him: therefore God gives him grace: therefore he has no fault: therefore he is not culpably hard, as it seems. § 29. Further it is asked, § 30. 1. Since there are many other signs of sorrow, such as thinness of voice, sighing, and other such things, why does he make no mention of these? § 31. 2. Moreover, thinness of voice is a more infallible sign of sorrow than weeping, as the wise in natural things say: therefore he ought to have made mention of that rather than this. § 32. Item, that which is a sign of temperate sorrow does not signify supreme sorrow insofar as it is such: weeping is a sign of temperate sorrow: therefore it does not signify sorrow in the highest degree. The minor is proved from this that, as the wise in natural things say: great sorrow is more drying of the moist than of resolution through tears: therefore the Master posits this sign badly. § 33. 3. Item, we often see some weep much in confessions, and yet not be prompt for works of satisfaction: but some weep nothing at all, and are prepared for all things enjoined for sins: therefore it is clear that weeping is a fallible sign of sorrow: therefore if he does not weep, he is not culpably hard on this account. § 34. Item, we generally see women weep more than men, and yet men frequently sustain harder things for sins: therefore, etc. § 35. If this be conceded: it will first be against the Letter. § 36. Secondly, against what is said of Mary Magdalene , that she began to wash his feet with tears, etc. § 37. Item, against what is said that Peter, going outside, wept bitterly: and washed his crimes through weeping, as Ambrose says. § 38. Item, Gregory: "Among the feasts she offered tears, and by tears she washed the stains of crime." § 39. Item, Gregory: "You ask, By what

art could Magdalene be cured? She wept bitterly, and drawing sighs from her inmost parts, kindled by saving sobs, she vomited forth the gall-like humors." § 41. Item, this seems to be against the example of the Lord, who wept for us. "Who in the days of his flesh, offering prayers and supplications to him who was able to save him from death, with a strong cry and tears, was heard for his reverence." § 42. Item, he wept over the city of Jerusalem . And over Lazarus . § 43. And: "Let us weep before the Lord who made us." § 44. Item: "I have heard your prayer, and seen your tears." § 45. Therefore it seems that tears are exacted in penance. § 46. Solution. It must be said without prejudice that tears of the mind are a complete will to weep, if by accident tears were not impeded. But I say this accident is twofold, namely dryness of complexion, because the heat excited by the sorrow of penance then dries the brain more than it resolves it into tears. § 47. Item, excessive sorrow exciting heat that consumes the moisture of the brain: just as we see in the external world that dry air does not rain: and when it is temperately moist, the strong heat of the sun consumes the moisture, and again it does not rain: and in these two ways the one who does not weep can sorrow more than he who weeps much: and in such the tears of the mind are possessed. § 48. There is also still one mode not founded in nature, but in constancy of mind, namely when a man contains himself lest he weep, so that he may be more hidden before God, and then again the tears of the mind suffice before the priest: but when he is alone, he lets go the reins to tears, as blessed Augustine did in his conversion: because when he is alone, he has no witness except God, before whom he is ashamed of the sin. But in others bodily tears are exacted. § 49. Therefore, to what is first

objected, it must be said that the mind is considered in two ways, namely as the mind which is absolute from the body, existing as the act of no body, and as a nature moving and ruling the passible nature on the part of sense, where there is conjunction to the body. And in the first way indeed passion does not pertain to it, but rather in the second, yet by redundancy from the lower nature of the sensible part which is subjected to passions in itself. § 50. To the other it must be said that a complete will of weeping is reputed for the tears of the mind themselves: and that this does not have effect, is impeded by accident, as was said. § 51. To what is objected to the contrary, it must be said that it is an imperfect will from the imperfection of desire: and of this it is true that it is not reputed for the deed. There is also an incomplete will, not insofar as it is a will, but insofar as the faculty of fulfilling what it desires is lacking: and this is reputed for the deed. § 52. To the other it must be said that in such persons the will is imperfect from the imperfection of desire and appetite, because they do not desire sufficiently: and therefore it is not reputed for the deed for them. § 53. To the other it must be said that it is not impossible to rejoice about sorrow: because sorrow is there as the matter of joy, and then it does not have contrariety to it, just as you will also find noted above: but to rejoice and sorrow simultaneously about the same thing and according to the same thing, cannot happen: and therefore no impossible thing is commanded to the penitent. § 54. To the other it must be said that the Letter speaks there of him in whom tears are not impeded by an accident of complexion, or constancy, but only from imperfection of desire for pardon for sins: and of him it says the truth. § 55. And to the argument the solution is clear through the things said before. To the other it must be said that women without doubt weep more, and the Letter speaks of such. § 56. To the other it must be said that he who weeps

at the death of a friend can be disposed in two ways in repenting: for if the sorrow for sins is greater than for temporal death, then the greater sorrow dries up the moisture of the brain in him, so that he cannot weep: and then he is of greater praise than if he wept. But if it is of lesser sorrow: then it is a sign that he sorrows less about a spiritual thing and the loss of the soul, than about a temporal thing and loss of the body: because the heat aroused concerning a temporal thing sufficed to resolve the moisture of the brain into weeping: but the small heat aroused concerning a spiritual loss does not suffice to move it: just as we see that when cold exists in the macrocosm, even if the air is temperately moist, it does not rain, because the cold constricts and impedes resolution: and the Letter speaks in this way. § 58. To what is asked about other signs that could be posited, it must be said that those signs do not indicate one thing, but dubiously indicate two or more: just as thinness of voice is more a sign of weakness of the spiritual parts than of voluntary sorrow which is in penance: but groaning can be a sign of weakness, or sadness, or melancholy, because melancholic persons groan much: and therefore those signs are less common: but sorrow as it happens frequently is indicated by tears, unless it is impeded by accident, as was said: and therefore he does not posit other signs like tears. § 59. To the other it must be said that great sorrow is indicated by great tears, unless the complexion is repugnant, as was said. § 60. To the other it must be said that tears indicate sorrow: but nevertheless the confessor ought to test whether that sorrow is of the contrite or the attrite: and the sign that he can best have of this is that he tests whether the penitent freely

receives the enjoined penance: for if he receives it freely, it is a sign of contrition: if not, it will be judged to have been a sign of insufficient attrition: nor is it inconvenient that several signs are required for the same thing. § 61.

Articulus 37 — Whether This Saying Holds, "If Therefore You Repent, Why Do You Do What You Have Done Badly"

§ 62. Whether this saying holds, "If therefore he repents, why do you do the things you have done badly?" § 63. Next it is asked concerning what he says there in F, near the end: "If therefore he repents, why do you do the things you have done badly?" § 64. For this seems not to hold: because often penance is of the past, and not of the future by reason of the sweetness adjoined to the future: therefore it seems that what he says is not true. § 65. Item, concerning that of which there is no fruit, but shame, there is penance when it has passed: and such is sin: therefore penance is of the past, and it is not necessary that it also be of the future: for as the Philosopher says, in such things we rather will to act than to have acted: because it is better to be delighted, than to have ceased to be delighted. § 66. Solution. It must be said that Augustine speaks of those who repent of sin insofar as it is an offense against God: and not insofar as there is a shameful delight in it which we will when it has passed: and therefore we are drawn to it in the present and in the future: and then what he says is plain: because he who repents of sin insofar as it is an offense against God, avoids the future, which is also an offense against God. § 67. And through this the solution to the whole is clear. § 68.

Articulus 38 — Whether The Two Modes Of False Penance Are Well Assigned By The Master

§ 69. Whether the two modes of false penance are well assigned by the Master? § 70. Next it is asked concerning what is said there in F, at the end: "We admonish our bro-

thers, lest they allow the souls of the laity to be deceived by false penances, and dragged into hell, etc." § 72. For he posits two modes of false penance in the Letter, namely "when having spurned many, penance is done for one alone, or when it is done for one such that there is no departure from another." § 73. But it seems that these two modes are one mode: because § 74. 1. He who does not depart from another spurns it: and to spurn many is the same as not to depart from them through affection and purpose of not committing further: therefore it seems that these modes are one mode alone. § 75. 2. Item, since there are many other modes of false penance, namely when those responding to the sin are not enjoined, but heavier or lighter ones, why does he not touch upon those modes? § 76. Item it is asked: for it is manifest that here he calls "penances" that which is enjoined externally by the priest for the amendment of the fault. But it seems that by no such thing are they deceived and dragged into hell: because before the enjoined penance, contrition wrought the remission of the fault of sin: and he whose fault is remitted, is not dragged into hell: therefore what he says seems to be false. § 77. 3. Item, this is of common right, that a man recognize the quantity of his offense in general: therefore ignorance of it excuses no one: therefore since all are bound to know it, it seems that they cannot be deceived about this. § 78. 4. Item, from a similar case they can

understand that such penances are false: because they do not satisfy a man, who thus placate him in one thing that they provoke him to anger in another: therefore they can know by themselves that they do not satisfy God, who so repent of one that they sin in another: therefore they are not deceived about this, as it seems. § 79. To this it must be said that he calls false penance here a false mode of repenting, which is of one such that it is not of another. § 80. To the first, however, it must be said that those two modes differ: because the first is when penance is done for one, and not for another, which yet is not reiterated in act. But the second is when it is done for one, and another is reiterated: and that is more false than the first. And what he says, "having spurned many," is understood to spurn in the sense of making little of a sin, so as to do penance for it, because he does not consider it to be so great. § 81. To the other it must be said that that is not always false penance, when little or more is enjoined: because this can and ought to be done for diverse causes: and he does not treat here except of penances which are always false and damnable. § 82. To the other it must be said that it is of common right that a man know his sin: and this indeed every man does when offering himself to the priest: but it is not of common right that he repent thus or thus, but rather of special right, about which even the wise feel diversely: and therefore he is not bound to know it, unless he learns it by another's teaching: and therefore he can be deceived about these things. § 83. To the other it must be said that it may well be that conscience dictates such a mode of penance to be false: yet on account of the sweetness of the sin he is made ignorant, not in the speculative intellect, but in the practical: and therefore then he can be deceived: because he wills as it were to be deceived, just as the Lord says: "They deceived my people, etc." , and: "The prophets prophesied a lie, and the priests applauded with their hands." On account of which he commands: "Cry, cease not, lift up thy voice like a trumpet, and announce to my people their wicked doings, and to the house of Jacob their sins." § 84.

Articulus 39 — Whether And What True Penance Is

§ 85. Whether and what is true penance? § 86. Next it is asked concerning what is said there in G, after the first words: "For that is true penance, which abolishes sin, etc." § 87. For it is asked, what is the difference between true penance, and worthy penance? § 88. But it seems that there is none: because § 89. 1. They have the same opposite: for an unworthy penance is insufficient: therefore it does not correct the crime, nor abolish the sin: therefore it is not true: since therefore they have one

opposite, it seems that they are one. § 91. 2. Item, since "true" is said in many ways, it is asked, according to what mode is "true" taken here, when it is called "true penance." For if "true" is said to be the indivision of being and what is: since such truth is from the form, it seems every penance is true: because every penance is penance from the form of penance, which signifies what it was to be: and the circumstance of the letter does not seem to will this, because "true" seems to restrict penance: therefore some penance will be non-true, as it seems. § 92. Solution. To the first it must be said that worthy and true differ: because true speaks of a penance unmixed with the contraries of penance: just as it is called truly white, which is unmixed with other intermediate and contrary colors: and true gold, unmixed with other

baser metal. But "worthy" signifies the due quantity of penance, namely that it be according to the quantity of the fault made at discretion without fraud. § 93. To that, however, which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that the argument is invalid, "They have one opposite: therefore they are one and the same": and it is the fallacy of the consequent. And there is an instance: because involuntary through ignorance, and involuntary through violence, have one opposite which is voluntary: nor however on account of this are they the same. And because the Philosopher says, that if one of the opposites is multiplex, so is the other, the proposition must be understood in many ways: and this solution is taken in book V of the Ethics, in the text and in the commentary. § 94. Or it may be better said, that the opposite is not said in one way, insofar as it is opposed to those two: for "unworthy" can be said by reason of quantity, or by reason of essence: and in the first way it is opposed to "worthily": in the second way it is opposed to "truly". § 95. To the other it must be said that "true" here signifies unmixed with a baser alien thing, as was said: just as we say true gold and true silver: and truth is not taken there in common as it is the indivision of being and what is, unless being is taken as pure and unmixed. § 96. And through this the solution to the whole is clear. § 97.

Articulus 40 — Whether Perfect Penance Compels The Sinner Willingly To Endure All Things

§ 98. Whether perfect penance compels the sinner to sustain all things freely? § 99. Next it can be asked, Whether perfect penance compels the sinner to sustain all things freely? § 100. For this seems false: because it is not necessary that he freely sustain all things, nor do all things, but rather only things necessary for salvation. § 101. If you say that the distribution is accommodated, and it distributes only for things necessary for salvation. § 102. It still seems to be false what he says, because § 103. 1. Confession is in the mouth, contrition in the heart, total humility in the work: because contrition alone frequently works salvation: therefore it seems that the rest are not exacted. § 104. 2. Item, a crime was always corrected by penance: but there was not always confession of the mouth, and enjoined satisfaction: therefore those, as it seems, are not exacted. § 105. But concerning this there will be a question in the following distinction: and therefore let us pass over it here. § 106. It must be said to the first, that the distribution is accommodated: and it is understood of the things necessary to the penitent in such or such a crime for salvation. § 107. To the other it must be said that just as we said above in the treatise on baptism, something operates in another or with another in two ways, namely by power, and by essence. And it is true indeed that essentially those three are not always required for the deletion

of any sin even accepted singularly: hence contrition does not in its own power alone delete sin, but as it is with the vow of confessing and satisfying: and then confession and satisfaction are in it by power, and not by essence: and this suffices when an article of necessity, not contempt of religion, excludes the sacrament. § 109.

Articulus 41 — Whether It Can Be Said That Someone Has Been Unable To Amend A Sin

§ 110. Whether it can be said that someone was unable to amend a sin? § 111. Next it is asked concerning what he says there in G, in the middle: "So that he was not only unable to amend, etc." § 112. For this seems to be false: for if he was unable to amend it, then it is not to be imputed to him: but it is imputed to him: therefore he was able to amend. § 113. Solution. It must be said that according to the common mode of speaking he is said not to be able who cannot while remaining in such a state, although simply speaking he could do it: just as we say, those persisting in the will of transgressing cannot amend their faults. And this mode is attributed to Judas: because being led by penance concerning the betrayal, he persisted in the will of transgressing, namely of hanging himself. § 114.

Articulus 42 — What Restitution Is

§ 115. What is restitution? § 116. Next it is asked concerning what is said there in G, near the end: "Nor should anyone think on that account, who unjustly abstracted an alien thing, etc." § 117. Here four things are asked about restitution: namely, what is restitution? Secondly, what ought to be restored? Thirdly, to whom ought restitution to be made? And fourthly, how does restitution relate to the works of penance? § 118. To the first, the Jurists say thus, that restitution is the returning or compensation of an abstracted thing. § 119. But it seems that this does not fit: because § 120. 1. Many things are restored which are not abstracted, like deposited, leased, and loaned things: therefore it seems that this description is invalid. § 121. 2. Item, it happens that something is abstracted which cannot be compensated, such as fame, which is better than any other temporal good: therefore it is not compensated by it: therefore restitution is not made by it. § 122. 3. Item, virginity is violently abstracted from some girl: and that cannot be compensated: and yet it happens that satisfaction is made for the sin: therefore it seems that it is not compensation of an abstracted thing. § 123. 4. Item, many are bound to restitution who do not abstract, but command to be abstracted, or give counsel about abstracting, or do something of this sort: therefore it seems that it is not generally true, that restitution is of an abstracted thing, etc. § 124. For the sake of this it is further asked, Who are they who are bound to restore? And verses are given about this: § 125. Command, counsel, consent, flatterer, recourse, Participant, mute, non-obstructor, non-manifester. § 126. But concerning the first, it seems that command does not always make one bound to restitution: because § 127. 1. There is the command of one not having jurisdiction over him to whom he commands: and then it is not done on account of his command: therefore he is not bound to restore. § 128. 2. Item, no more is exacted in restitution than was inflicted in damage: but

only one inflicted the damage, namely the one robbing: therefore he alone is bound to restore, and not the commander. § 130. It is also objected concerning the second which is counsel: for one counseling a deed does not directly operate towards its being done: therefore it seems that he does not directly act: therefore also he is not directly bound to restitution. § 131. But it is objected concerning the third which is consent: for all consent who will something to be done, and rejoice about the deed: if therefore consent makes one bound to restitution, it seems that all who will the damage of someone, and rejoice concerning the

inflicted damage, are bound to restitution: which would be burdensome to say, because § 132. 1. Not all such persons can be induced to restitution. § 133. 2. Item, the Philosopher in the fifth Ethics, where he speaks of justice, seems to mean that no one is bound to restore unless he has more than he ought: but neither the counselor nor the consenter, on account of the fact that he consents or counsels, has more than he ought: therefore it seems unjust that he be compelled to restitution. § 134. It is further objected concerning the flatterer. For the flatterer is an adulator: but it seems that he operates nothing towards inflicting damage: therefore it seems that he is not bound to restore the damage. § 135. Moreover, if the flatterer is bound, what will be of clerics and religious who persuade the prince of the land to such appropriations which are unjust, or do not make him restore, or are silent? For if the flatterer is bound, they too are bound: and this they do not concede. § 136. It is further asked concerning what is called recourse. For it is understood of him to whom those illicitly robbing have recourse, as to a defender, or preserver, etc.: and since he receives nothing of the alien property, as is supposed here, but preserves those having recourse to him for affection or consanguinity, it seems he is not bound to restore. § 137. But concerning participation it is asked, whether they are bound for the whole (in solidum)? And it seems not, since they receive only a part. § 138. It is also objected concerning the mute: for a mute is one who does not reprehend, nor protest: but many are such, especially in the robbery of princes, even religious: therefore all such are bound to restitution, which is difficult to say. § 139. It is further objected concerning the non-obstructor. Because not all would easily restore who could prohibit, and do not prohibit. § 140. Item, they are not bound to prohibit: therefore it seems they do not sin if they do not prohibit. § 141. The last especially seems untrue, namely the non-manifester. For sometimes the abstractor would be manifested with danger to the body: and then it seems that he is even bound not to manifest. § 142. Item, thieves are often known by holy men: and they are not manifested: therefore it seems that this does not make one bound to restitution. § 143. Solution. It must be said that restitution is sufficiently well defined through that mode, namely that it is the returning or compensation of an abstracted thing. Because an abstracted thing is either restored as numerically the same, and then it is returned: or in equality, and then it is compensated. § 144. To what is first objected, it must be said that restitution is only of an abstracted thing: and returning also respects this: because what is had is not returned, but what was in some way lost: and therefore it is nothing against this that is objected concerning leased things, and other things of this sort. § 145. To the other it must be said that these and such things are solved in the Letter, namely that it is understood of goods of fortune which can be restored: because if an action which the debitor's poverty excludes is void, much more void is an action which the impossibility of restitution excludes. § 146. Or it may be said, that one happens to restore in two ways, namely according to the value of the abstracted thing, or according to the acceptation of him from whom something was abstracted. And th-

...although in the first way certain things cannot be restored, nevertheless it happens that they are restored in the second way: and this is restitution according to the arbitration of good men: and this is done whenever the debtor does whatever he can to satisfy the injured party: for whether the injured party then remits it or not, the one who took it is nevertheless excused before God.

§ 1. To that which is further asked about the number of those things which work toward the taking away, and make one bound to restitution: some have said that not all of those things make one bound, but five of them make one bound unconditionally, and the others only in certain cases. And it seems to me that they speak the truth. Now, the five which unconditionally make one bound to restitution are these: command, consent, recourse, participating, and not hindering when one is bound to hinder.

§ 2. Now, command makes one bound: because he acts principally who commands [a thing] to be done: and the taken thing falls to his use or that of his people: for otherwise masters who do not take with their own hands, but command to be taken, would not be bound to restitution.

And through this the solution to the first objection about this is evident.

To the next it must be said that this is false, that only one inflicted the damage: rather, many and diverse persons inflict the damage, and therefore they are bound to restitution: especially, however, when the taken thing falls to the uses of the commander: but nevertheless, even if it did not so fall, if because of his command the thing is lost, he himself is bound to restore.

To that which is objected about the second, namely about counsel, it must be said that not every counselor, in my judgment, is bound, but only he who gives efficacious counsel, such that his counsel probably causes the thing to be lost.

To that which is objected about counsel and consent, it must be said that the counselor or consenter himself operates directly in his own way: because many things concur for one act, without any of which it would not be done: as there are counselors like Achitophel, who, wishing to please robbers and tyrants, invent evil modes of extorting and taking; and emissaries who execute what is dictated by their counsel: and of those it is understood that they are bound to restore.

To the next it must be said that Aristotle accepts "having more" very broadly. For someone is said to have more who by any means whatever has extorted the thing of another, not because he has it in use, but because the other has lost it by injury: and in this way directive justice makes him compensate the damage which he inflicted.

To that which is said about the flatterer, it must be said that not every flatterer is bound: but he who, by praising in the act of taking, incites to the taking: saying that this is a sign of vigor, or that otherwise he could not rule, or that this is owed to him by common right as the lord of the land, or something of this sort.

To the next it must be said that, as it seems to me, whether clerics or religious, flattering in this, they are bound to restitution.

To that which is objected concerning recourse, it must be said that it is understood of him to whom recourse is had, as to a defender and preserver of robbers and robbery: as are certain hosts of thieves, and others who make themselves defenders and advocates of such men. But if he is sometimes bound by proximity of blood, I do not believe that because of this he is

bound to restitution: or even if he were bound, when he is sought for judgment, by reason of the compassion of nature and the hope of repentance, I believe that in such a case he to whom recourse is had gains merit.

To that which is objected further about the mute [i.e., the silent person], it must be said that only that silent person is judged [liable] who is bound ex officio to cry out, and does not cry out: and even he, I do not believe, is bound universally to restitution, but rather then when he is silent while consenting to and promoting what is being done. But it is true that if he is bound ex officio to cry out, and does not cry out: if he wishes to do penance, he is bound by crying out to cooperate with the injured party, so that satisfaction may be made to him.

And through this the solution to what was objected against this is evident.

§ 3. To that which is objected concerning the one not hindering, it seems it must be said that it is understood of him who is bound ex officio to hinder: such as a baron, or prince, who, since he receives the tributes of the land in order to pacify the land, if he does not hinder those taking illicitly, he himself is bound to restore.

Concerning the last, namely concerning the one not manifesting, it must be said that it is not understood of every one who does not manifest, but only of him who by concealing is a participant in the gain and the crime.

And therefore the objections against this do not hold.

Articulus 43 — What Ought To Be Restored, And How It Is To Be Restored

What ought to be restored? and, How is it to be restored?

§ 1. Secondly, it is asked what ought to be restored?

And this is a difficult question. For since the taken thing ought to be restored, it happens that a reputation is taken, sometimes by truth, and sometimes by a lie: as if we suppose that someone defamed the crime of another, a true one indeed, but nevertheless hidden: if he ought to restore it, it seems that he sins: because if he says, "I said this falsely in order to defame him": he himself lies, because he spoke the truth. Therefore, since every man ought to avoid a lie, it seems that he ought to avoid restitution. But if he says thus: "I indeed spoke the truth, yet with the evil intention of defaming", he will defame him more: because he will be believed more than before: therefore he will injure more the second time than the first.

If you say that a reputation ought not to be restored. On the contrary: 1. That which is possessed more dearly, is lost most unwillingly: but a reputation is possessed more dearly than gold and silver: therefore it is lost most unwillingly: therefore it seems that it mostly ought to be restored.

1. Again, Jerome: "Cruel is he who neglects reputation" but he who does not demand the restitution of reputation, neglects reputation: therefore he is cruel: therefore it seems that even this injury ought not to be remitted without compensation: therefore anyone

is bound to demand the restitution of such a thing: therefore someone is bound to pay: but it is certain that no one is, except he who took it: therefore he is bound to restore.

§ 2. In the same way, there is a grave case concerning him who impedes someone so that he does not attain what he would have had if the other did not impede him, such as a prebend, or a dignity, or whatever spiritual or secular things, because with respect to this case they do not differ, whether he is bound to restitution if he is able?

If you say that he is. On the contrary: 1. Nothing has been taken from this man: because nothing is taken except what is possessed, but this man did not yet possess it: therefore it seems that he is not bound.

1. Again, How will he restore if he is bound: for if he has the prebend or Church, and impeded the other from attaining it, it seems that he is bound to withdraw from his own, and cause the other to be invested: and this is grave to say, because few or none would do this.

But if you say that he is not bound. On the contrary: He gives the occasion of damage: therefore he must be interpreted to have done the damage: therefore he is bound to restitution.

Again, If I were to ask you, whether he who thus impeded his neighbor: sinned, or not? And if you should say that he sinned. Let it be asked therefore further, whether against God only, or against God and against the neighbor? You will say, that against God and against the neighbor. But if it is again asked, by what genus of sin did he sin against the neighbor? you will say, by damaging the neighbor. Therefore, since every one who causes damage is bound to restitution, this man will be bound.

§ 3. Again, It is asked concerning him who by plowing turns over seeds, how is he bound to restitution?

For if you say that he is bound to pay the future fruits. On the contrary: Fruits could be impeded by many causes: therefore they were not yet held to be certain: therefore he did not take fruits: therefore he is not bound to render them.

But if you say that only the seeds. On the contrary: A thing is worth as much as it can be sold for: but he would receive more for a sown field by selling it than for the seeds: therefore he is bound to render more.

§ 4. Again it is asked, Whether those laws of the Lord which are touched upon concerning restitution, Exod. 22:1, namely, that a sheep be rendered fourfold, and an ox fivefold, still hold or not?

It seems that they do: because they are concerning morals and necessary for salvation: therefore they still hold. The proof of the first is: because restitution is of things necessary for salvation, and of the morals of men.

On the contrary: 1. Here in the Text no more is said, except that the taken thing be restored: therefore it seems that he is not bound to more.

1. Again, We see that in a judgment one is not condemned to more than he inflicted in damage: therefore he is not bound to more.
2. Again, Aristotle says that the just is of such a kind that one renders as much as he inflicted in damage: but it is certain that if he renders more, there will be inequality: therefore, since inequality is the same as injustice, it is unjust if he is forced to give more, as it seems.

§ 5. Solution. It seems it must be said that for everything taken which is lost with sorrow, and which is possessed with pleasure and utility or honesty, there follows an obligation to restitution on the part of the one taking it by whatever means he takes it: as many modes were held in the preceding article of this question.

To that, however, which is first asked, I say that the detractor is bound to restitution, but reputation is twofold, namely in a matter pertaining to true praise, the opposite of which is truly blame: and this is virtue and life according to virtue, or at least without vice, because nothing is truly worthy of praise except the act of virtue. There is also reputation in knowledge, or military service, and the like: in which there is no praise except a vain one. And the first, he who took it unjustly is bound to restore. But he does not take unjustly who speaks where it ought to be of benefit, namely to a Prelate, or to several reproving persons: and if this does not avail, denounces it to the Church, so that by confusion the sinner may repent: for he does not take away such a reputation, but manifests the veil of malice. But if with the intention of defaming he vomits forth evils, I say that he is bound to restore, provided however he vomits forth criminal things.

To this, however, which is objected, I say that even if what he said is true, he himself can go to those to whom he spoke, and say that he spoke with the intention of defaming. But if it is asked whether he spoke the truth or not? To this he is not bound to answer, but to evade cautiously without a lie, as Augustine teaches in the book De Mendacio. And through this the solution to the second is evident, and to all the things that are asked concerning that.

§ 6. To the next it must be said that he who impedes another: either impedes justly, namely because he knows him to be unworthy of such an honor or such a thing, and then he is not bound: or unjustly, and then I say that he is bound to make satisfaction, but not however to render the thing, because the other had not yet attained that thing: but this satisfaction ought to be made according to the possibility of the one satisfying, and the arbitration of good men.

To this, however, which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that he does not give the occasion of damage for a thing which is possessed, but which it was probable to possess, yet by some chance it could happen not to be possessed, because unforeseen misfortunes often occur.

To the next it must be said that this man sinned against his neighbor by damaging him: but not as much as if the thing itself had quietly

already been possessed: and therefore he is not bound to so much, but according to the arbitration of good men.

§ 7. To that which is further asked concerning the third case, it must be said that to solve it is not difficult: but he is bound to as much as a sown field was accustomed to be sold for at that time: and this is more and less, according as the fruits are expected nearer or farther from the harvest.

§ 8. To this which is asked about the laws, Exod. 22:1, it must be said that today they do not hold unless they are sanctioned by a new constitution. For judicial laws of this sort were having something of signification about the future: and as to the fact that they were judicial, for the time and place they aggregated more or less into a terror of that vice which was vigorous in the populace, so that namely they might more quickly turn the populace away from such a vice. But according as they had something of signification about the future, along with other ceremonies they are fulfilled and evacuated in the New Testament.

To this, however, which is objected, that they are concerning morals, it must be said that they are indeed concerning morals: but they are not properly moral, according as moral things are divided against judicial ones: because in this way moral precepts are only those which command the acts of some moral virtue: but this does not happen in those [laws], rather it was for the terror of those aggravating damage, because through avarice they freely snatched the things of others, especially animals, which were abundant in that populace at that time.

Articulus 44 — To Whom Restitution Ought To Be Made

To whom ought restitution to be made?

§ 1. Thirdly it is asked, To whom ought restitution to be made?

For let us suppose that he who has the thing of another does not know whose it was: then, since he does not know to whom he owes it, he seems to be absolved from the obligation: because everything which someone owes, he owes to someone.

Again, let us suppose that someone knows: but the person is so remote that he cannot reach him without great difficulty: and it is asked, what should be done then? or if he knows him to whom he owes, yet does not know where he remains, or he cannot be found? For if he then gives to the poor, it can be that the person is by chance found afterwards. Since therefore it has not been restored to him, it would be necessary that he restore a second time: and this would be unjust: therefore he is bound to keep it until he comes, or his arrival is despaired of. And then it is asked, when is that? It can be that he makes sons in a distant place: and tells them that such a man is bound to him, and when his own life is despaired of, afterwards the sons to whom he must restore will appear: and in this way his arrival will never be despaired of, either in himself or in his heirs.

§ 2. Again, let us suppose that someone has unjustly taken [something] in some military expedition, and does not know to whom he did damage specially. For if he gives it to the poor, it is asked to which ones he is bound, and at whose arbitration ought the compensation to be made?

For it seems that he is bound more to the poor of that land in which he did the damage, than in another in which the damager dwells: because perhaps some one of the poor of the land in which he inflicted the damage was reduced to poverty by him, and that one ought to have the compensation.

§ 3. Again, let it be supposed that someone, by the license of some Prelate, unjustly claims for himself the goods of the Church, which the Prelate cannot give, it is asked, to whom ought restitution to be made?

If you say, to the Church. On the contrary: The Prelate holds the goods of the Church: and he conceded or gave the goods to this man: therefore they are not taken away from him; therefore restitution ought not to be made to him, [and] since no one else has a right, it seems that to no one: which is absurd, since the goods of the Church cannot be held by him.

§ 4. Again, let us suppose that someone lent his money to someone gratis until a certain day of the fairs, and then he does not return it, and the other is impeded from his licit business: it is certain that he damaged him: therefore he is bound to render: and it is asked, in what, and how much?

§ 5. Solution. These and such things have to be considered more by Jurists than by Theologians: and therefore without prejudice I say what seems reasonable.

To the first therefore it must be said that when the true master is not known, the poor are the heirs: and he is not absolved from the obligation unless he gives it to the poor.

To the next it must be said that one must distinguish: for either the debt is so great that he ought deservedly to undergo the journey, or not. If so: then he is bound to send or carry it to him, unless the return of him to whom the damage was inflicted is hoped for. But if it is little, and his return is not hoped for, I say that it must be given to his relatives with such a protestation, that they should give or compensate the principal party if he should come. But if he does not have relatives, I would counsel that it be given to some monastery with such a promise confirmed by writing, that if ever any of his heirs appears, or he himself, the monastery would restore it, or would be bound to answer for it.

To the next I well concede that he who is in an expedition, what he took, he is bound more to render to the poor of that land in which he did the damage, than in another where he dwells. And also at the arbitration of the Bishop of that place which was damaged, the restitution ought to be made, namely for the common work of the town, or to the poor of the same town, or in another way as it will reasonably seem expedient to the Bishop.

To this which is asked about him who has the goods of the Church, I say that he is bound to restore to the Church, so that it may devolve to the Prelate who is the successor: because he who conceded it, does not merit to receive it.

And through this the solution to the whole is evident.

Articulus 45 — How The Works Of Restitution Relate To The Works Of Penance

How are the works of restitution related to the works of penance?

§ 1. Lastly it is asked, How do the works of restitution relate to the works of penance?

It seems that they are of penance. 1. For penance itself is a remedy for actual sin; since therefore restitution is for the emendation of any such sin, it seems to be a part of satisfaction: therefore it is also a part of penance: because whatever is a part of a part, is a part of the whole.

1. Again, In penance according as it is a sacrament, a man is perfectly reconciled to God and neighbor: but to restore is for compensation and reconciliation to the neighbor: therefore it is a part of penance, as it seems.

ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Penance [poenitentia] is said as if a holding of a penalty [poenae tenentia], and sorrow for what one has forfeited: but for restitution such sorrow is not required, but however he restores, whether sorrowing or not sorrowing, he himself is released from the obligation by which he was bound to restore: therefore it is not of penance as a part.

1. Again, Penance releases from sin: but rendering only releases from the debt of obligation to the neighbor, and not from sin: therefore it is not a part of penance.
2. Again, One must do penance from one's own property: but restitution is always from another's property: therefore, etc.

4. Again, If it is a part of penance, it is certain that it is only a part of a part, which is satisfaction, which is either almsgiving, or prayer, or fasting, because satisfaction does not have more parts in genus: but it is certain that it is none of those: therefore it is not a part of penance.

§ 2. Solution. It must be said according to the ancients, that it is not a part, but is presupposed in the penitent, as a disposition of the penitent lest he be fictitious: and this the ancients called the foundation: whence they said that restitution is the foundation of satisfaction, and consequently of penance.

To that, however, which is first objected, it must be said that it itself is not a remedy of a certain sin, or a destroyer of sin, but rather is a disposition presupposed in him in whom through penance sin is destroyed.

To the next it must be said that the restorer is reconciled to the neighbor in two ways, namely insofar as he is bound to him for the damage inflicted, and in this way restitution reconciles, not penance properly speaking: or insofar as the neighbor was de-edified [i.e., scandalized] through the evil example: and thus satisfaction by good works reconciles, and penance consequently. And so it is understood that a man through penance is reconciled to God and neighbor: for restitution is received even from one who is not penitent: as the things objected to the contrary well prove.

DISTINCTIO XVI

Divisio Textus

"Now in the perfection of penance three [things are required]", etc. Here begins that part which is about the parts of penance.

And it is divided into two parts, in the first of which the difference of these parts is handed down. But in the second it is asked, Whether one without another can work the destruction of sin? and this begins in the following distinction.

Articulus 1 — Whether The Sacrament Of Penance Is One

Is the sacrament of penance one?

Is the sacrament of penance one?

§ 1. To the FIRST it is thus objected: 1. The sacraments of the Church are only seven: but this would not happen if penance were several sacraments: therefore penance is only one sacrament.

1. Again, A per se cause whose effect is one, is itself one according to the ratio of that causality: but the effect of this sacrament is one, namely the deletion of actual sin: therefore penance which is the cause of the sacramental deletion, is one. The minor is evident per se: but the major is evident from this, that in one ratio of causality, there is only one cause of one effect, as is proved in the second book of the Physics, and the fifth of the Metaphysics of Aristotle.

Again, The act is one, namely to weep over committed things with a purpose of emendation: therefore penance also is one, as it seems.

ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Nothing is one for the perfection of which three things are required: but for the perfection of penance three things are required: therefore it itself is not one. The proof of the first is in the fifth book of the First Philosophy, where the Philosopher says thus: "The substance of anything is according to once, as six is not twice three, but once; for six is once six." But the minor is written in the Text at the beginning of this distinction.

1. Again, It is impossible that one habit acting (unless nature acts) be the principle of acts separated diverse in species: but if penance is one, it will be a habit of this sort, as is certain from the things said above: therefore it cannot be the principle of diverse acts separated in species: but it is the principle of such acts: therefore it is not one. Proof that it is the principle of such acts: because to be contrite, to confess, to pray, and to fast, and to give alms, are acts diverse in species, to which penance moves: therefore it itself is not directed to one thing, as it seems.

§ 2. It is asked further, If it is one, of what sort is that one?

For many modes of 'one' are posited by diverse Authors, as well Saints, as Philosophers. The Saints are Bernard in the fifth book On Consideration. And Dionysius in the book On the Divine Names, and Boethius in the book On Unity and the One. The Philosophers however are Aristotle in the fifth book of the First Philosophy, and Avicenna in his metaphysics, and Al-gazel: and it would be long to posit the distinctions of all of them: nor is it necessary, because some do not say 'one' absolutely, but only in a certain respect.

It is asked therefore, whether it is one by form?

And it seems that it is: 1. For everything which is truly one, is one by some form making it one: but this sacrament is truly one: therefore it is one by form.

1. Again, 'One' is converted with 'being': therefore whence there is being, thence there is one: but being is from form: therefore also 'one'.

ON THE CONTRARY:

The form of this sacrament seems not to be one: because one is the form of contrition, another of confession, and another of satisfaction: therefore it seems that it is not one by the unity of form.

If you say that this is the unity of the sacrament which none of the Philosophers posits: because it was not of their consideration. On the contrary: It is asked, what is that unity of the sacrament?

For it seems that it is of the form which

Bernard calls native or constitutive: because a sacrament has form and matter: but whatever things have form and matter, have them as essential parts: but in all such things the unifying principle is the form itself: therefore this unity is of form: and then the above posited argument proceeds, namely, since the form is not one, that the sacrament is not one, as it seems.

If you say that the unity of the sacrament is that it be united in one effect: it seems again that it is not one: because the effect is not one. For either sin according to guilt is remitted in contrition, or not. If so: therefore confession and satisfaction do not operate against guilt: therefore they are not directed to the same effect with contrition: therefore they are not thus united.

If you say that it is not remitted in contrition. On the contrary: therefore it will not be anything except attrition, and not contrition: and this does not stand with the hypothesis: because it was supposed that contrition had occurred, when it is asked, whether it is remitted in contrition?

1. Again, Dionysius implies that every multitude is reduced to some one thing: because many things by parts are reduced to one whole, and many by accidents into one subject, and many in number or in powers into one species, and many in species into one genus, and many in genera or processes into one principle. And the Philosopher says

altogether the same thing in other words in the fifth book of the Metaphysics, in the distinction of 'one'. It is asked therefore, If these many things which are here, are many by parts: then they ought to be reduced into one by a whole. And it is asked, what is the form uniting the whole, and it will scarcely be assignable.

§ 3. Solution. It seems it must be said that this sacrament is one by the unity of the sacrament, as was said in objecting. And further it seems it must be conceded that it is one by the unity of the sacramental form. Now the form of this sacrament is not accepted in the same way as in the others, in which the minister of the sacrament who performs the act with words gives the form by pronouncing the words: for the matter and form of this sacrament are not so accepted, as the Master will determine below: for it does not have exterior matter, nor a form outside the Penitent: but that is said to be matter, from which it receives the ratio of signifying, as it is in baptism, and in others: but because sorrow manifested in certain signs is that, I say that sorrow is the matter, I mean voluntary sorrow manifested in exterior signs, through which signs it signifies the thing which it causes: but the form of that sacrament is properly whence it has the power of sanctifying, as in all other sacraments sanctification is from the form. Whence the form of it itself is the information of grace, or grace informing this sorrow, insofar as it is thus informing.

And if it is objected, that according to this the form and the reality [res] of the sacrament are the same, which happens in no case: because according to this the maker and the effect, cause and effect, would be the same, which are altogether impossible. It is answered, that the same objection is concerning contrition which is informed by grace, and otherwise it would not destroy sin, nor would it be contrition: and nevertheless it confers grace. Whence I say that grace not in its genus, but a certain grace is that form, namely which gives power to the sorrow, so that it becomes destructive of sin: but its proper effect is the remission of sin: but this form accepted in the general sorrow, namely which informs the sorrow in contrition, confession, and satisfaction, I say that it is the form of this sacrament, from which the sacrament is said to be one.

But if anyone says that the form of penance is the word which is said by the priest when he absolves, or that it is some sign: it is certain that he does not attend to what the form does in a sacrament according to Augustine and Hugh of St. Victor: because it is that which coming to the sacrament, makes it potent to sanctify: and this is not done in penance by the word which the priest says, or even by signs, or by the voluntary sorrow itself, but rather by this which has been said, namely grace informing that sorrow, so that it can destroy sin: and the reality [res] of it is the all-encompassing deletion of sin in guilt and penalty.

It must be said therefore to the first, that this sacrament is one.

To that therefore which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that for the perfection of something, something or some things are said to be required in a twofold way, namely as that out of which it is perfected, and as the completing perfection itself. But if it is said as that out of which it is perfected potestatively or universally, the first proposition is false: because for the perfection of every composite in this way many things are required. But if it is said as the

ultimate completing perfection: then it is true: because every ultimate completing act according to species, is one simply: and thus the proof which was adduced from the fifth book of the First Philosophy is understood: and it does not have a place here: because the three things which are required for the perfection of penance are potestative parts of penance, as will be evident below: and it itself is perfected in them as a potestative whole is perfected from its parts.

To the next it must be said that penance according as it is a habit moving to the detestation of sin, is a virtue, and not a sacrament, and in this way it does not have parts: but as it is a sacrament, it is sorrow informed by grace manifested in exterior signs, and thus it has parts in which a medicinal disposition is perfected against the disease of actual sin.

Or it is said and perhaps better, that nothing prohibits secondary acts from being plural, provided they are ordered to one end: and so it is concerning to be contrite, and to confess, and to make satisfaction, because all have one end, which is the full destruction of actual sin.

§ 4. To that which is asked further, By what unity is it one?

I say that nothing is truly one, unless it be one by form. But it happens that the ultimate form is accepted: and to this the proper matter responds. And it happens that the first form in a genus is accepted: and to that the first matter in that genus responds: as is the example of Aristotle concerning minerals: for if the form of gold is accepted, matter responds to it, because it is out of subtle and combustible sulphur, and clear subtle quicksilver well mixed together. But if minerals are accepted according as they are dryable by dry heat, the matter which is water responds to them. Thus I say that if the proper form of this sacrament is accepted, which is grace operating the destruction of actual sin, according as it is of this sort, the matter responds to it which is sorrow dispositively operating toward that destruction: and this is the unity of the sacrament from its sacramental form.

To that therefore which is objected to the contrary it must be said that these three are parts of penance, and are united in the form of the whole, and in the whole: because in all of them the above-said sorrow operates: whence it does not follow that from this there are several forms there simply: just as it does not follow concerning man from this that the form of the foot is one, and that of the hand another: or concerning the soul from this that the form of the intellect is one, and that of the will another, which are its potestative parts.

To the next it must be said that the multitude of these parts is reduced to the whole: because the sorrow destroying sin is in a certain way one, and is subjected as a whole to contrition, confession, and satisfaction.

Articulus 2 — Whether This Sacrament Has Parts, And What Those Parts Are

Whether this sacrament has parts, and what those parts are?

§ 1. Secondly it is asked, Whether this sacrament has parts, or not: and what those parts are?

For although in part this has already been held, nevertheless it must still be distinguished more subtly.

But it seems not to have parts: because 1. Ambrose says, that a sacrament is unconditionally

moreover, everything that is simply [one] is : that which does not have parts: therefore this sacrament does not have parts.

§ 2. Again, a certain medicine is ordered against the original disease; and it is established that it does not have parts except form and matter, about which parts we are not speaking here, because those are in every sacrament. Since therefore another medicine is against the actual disease, which is called penance, it seems that it ought not to have parts, just as that one does not.

§ 3. Again, of one disease there seems to be one medicine by way of contrary: but actual [sin] is one disease. Therefore, it ought to have a single medicine by way of contrary; therefore not diversified into parts.

§ 4. Again, if it has parts, this is either because by itself it does not suffice for the expulsion of sin, or for another reason. If in the first way: then the grace informing the sorrow would be imperfect in its act, which is absurd. Therefore, it seems that this is not the reason why it should have parts. If in the second way. On the contrary: to whatever nature gives parts pertaining to a determinate act, it gives them for the sake of perfection in acting. Proof: because otherwise nature would abound in superfluities. Therefore much less is this the case in the works of grace which are ordered with greater diligence. Therefore the whole is imperfect without them in acting: and this is held to be unfitting, because the form of the whole is grace.

Further it is asked here, of what kind are those parts which are of penance?

§ 1. For all parts are reduced to integral or subjective parts: just as the parts of a whole in quantity to the integral, and the parts of a whole in mode to the universal or subjective. Therefore, they are either integral, or subjective. If integral: then they do not receive the predication of the whole, which is false. But if subjective: then that which is the essential form of one is the form of another. Therefore, that which is the form of confession, is itself the real form of contrition, which is false.

§ 2. Again. If they were such parts, it would be necessary that there be one name and one definition of them, which is again false.

If you say that it is otherwise with homogeneous parts and the whole, and otherwise with heterogeneous parts, as Aristotle says in the fifth book of the First Philosophy[532], where he distinguishes the modes of a whole: because the parts of a homogeneous whole, although they are material, yet because the whole is predicated of them, they follow the nature of a universal whole: whence it is said, "every water is," and it is not said, "the whole water," except by metaphor. But parts in which position makes a difference, because they are heterogeneous,

follow the nature of an integral whole; and therefore it is said "the whole bed," and not "every bed," or "every man," so as to distribute for the integrating parts. And thus, although these parts integrate the power of penance, nevertheless they receive the predication of the whole, because those parts are homogeneous. On the contrary: Every homogeneous whole has parts that are not diverse in the form of the parts, as water, oil, and other liquids: penance has parts diverse in the form of the parts. Therefore it is not a homogeneous whole with respect to them.

Solution. It must be said, without prejudice to the many who say many diverse and almost contrary things here, that penance has parts, and those parts are potential (potestative). For penance is a certain thing operating for the destruction of the actual disease; but the actual disease is not only the fault, but also the guilt (reatus) following the fault, and it is a difficulty toward the good generated from custom and the dispositions of sin. Moreover, the consequent guilt is threefold. For one is conjoined to the fault, which is the debt of eternal punishment; and when that is dissolved, there still remains the guilt and debt of purgatorial punishment not proportionate to the powers of the penitent. When that is dissolved, there still remains the guilt and debt of arbitrary expiatory punishment according to the measure of the fault, and the powers of the penitent. But when that is dissolved, the guilt does not remain, but there can still remain the difficulty of acting well. Now, to destroy this entire disease of sin, I say that three things are required, namely contrition destroying the first, confession destroying the second, and satisfaction destroying the third; the difficulty, however, is removed by the custom of good in all these. And thus it is evident, that the power of penance is perfected in these three, and without these three it is not perfect.

To that which is first objected, it must be said that that authority is doubted: because it was sought in that book and not found. But if it is conceded, it must be said that a sacrament is called simple by reason of a simple effect, and not from the fact that it has no parts: in this way in which one is called simply of one, because 'simply' is said in many ways, just as is said about the four coevals in another Summa, in the question concerning heaven.

To the next, it must be said that baptism does not have such potential parts, because it is not ordered against the whole disease of origin, but a part, namely the fault. But the punishment of concupiscence remains for exercise in the struggle. Penance, however, is ordered against the whole actual disease, insofar as it is actual: whence just as that is diversified in its effects, so the parts of penance are varied, insofar as it is a sacrament ordered against that disease.

To the next, it must be said that of one disease, insofar as it is one, there is one medicine: but just as the parts of the disease are diversified, so also the medicine ordered against it is varied, as was held before.

To the next, it must be said that this does not happen from the imperfection of grace, but rather on account of the order of perfection: because otherwise the consequences of sin in us could not be ordinarily destroyed. For thus it also could be objected that sorrow would be

532. Cf. Pseudo-Jerome, Epistola de honorandis parentibus, PL 30, 114: "Crudelis est qui famam suam negligit."

superfluous, because grace would suffice for the whole: for sufficiency is not given in nature or grace except according as it can be done most ordinarily according to the fittingness of that nature which ought to be perfected: just as to man the ambulatory power is not given without feet. So to the actual disease a destructive agent is not given without our act, and its destructive agent is diversified according to the diversity of the disease.

To what is further asked, the answer is already evident: because we say they are potential parts. And if one considers it subtly, they are parts of such a whole that it is a mean between the homogeneous and the heterogeneous. Nor is this absurd to posit: because the Philosopher posits this in book V of the First Philosophy[533], saying that in wholes in which transposition makes a diversity according to something, and does not make it according to something, they receive 'whole' and 'every', like number. For according as number is a multitude numbered by one, it is called 'every number'; but according as it is numbered by two or three, in which order makes a diversity, it is called 'the whole number': and therefore it is a mean between a homogeneous and a heterogeneous whole. And so it seems it must be said here: because these parts are such that they indeed receive the predication of the whole, according as sorrow informed by grace acts in all of them; but according to their relation to the diversity of effects they do not receive it, namely the name of 'whole' (totius), but rather 'every' (omnis): because thus neither is the whole penance in contrition, nor the whole in confession, nor the whole in satisfaction, but in all together.

And through this the solution to all the objections is evident.

Articulus 3 — Whether Penance Is Predicated Of All Its Parts Together In Sum, Or Severally

Whether penance is predicated of all its parts together in sum, or singly?

Whether penance is predicated of all its parts together in sum, or singly?

Thirdly it is asked: Whether penance is predicated of all those parts together in sum, or singly?

It seems, however, that the whole is preserved in contrition: because

§ 1. We believe many are saved through contrition alone, in whom not contempt of religion, but an article of necessity excludes confession.

§ 2. Again, Luke 7:37ff., concerning Mary Magdalene, whose signs of contrition are written, yet not confession, nor enjoined satisfaction.

§ 3. Again, concerning Peter, Matthew 26:75, whose contrition is signified, not confession, or satisfaction. And in the following distinction many authorities are introduced concerning this in the Letter. Therefore it seems that these three are neither integral nor essential parts, but only according to well-being.

§ 4. Again, this seems [true] concerning satisfaction: because often the lament of contrition suffices for the deletion of the whole. Therefore then it is not necessary to enjoin satisfaction

for the sin; and if it is enjoined, this is done for preserving in the good rather than for the deletion of sin.

§ 5. Again, let us suppose that someone contrite dies immediately: it is established that he will be saved. Therefore, confession and satisfaction are not required for salvation.

§ 6. From these reasons it seems that contrition is more substantial than any of the others: because contrition is sometimes done without the others and suffices; but the others never without contrition.

Solution. To these and all similar things it seems it must be said that these three are potential parts of penance, and all operating together in it, and also successively. All indeed together, according as one is in act, and two, or one in desire (in voto): as when contrition is in act, and confession and satisfaction are in desire; and when confession is in act, the virtue of contrition is in it, and satisfaction in desire; and when satisfaction is in act, the force of confession is in it according as it is enjoined for sins, and the force of contrition with respect to sorrow and the detestation of sin: and thus one is never separated from another; and these are not repugnant. And penance is perfected in one without another, and is not perfected in one without another. And these again have no repugnance.

And through this the solution to the first is evident.

To the next, it must be said that it is otherwise in those in whom the Lord himself had the form of an absolving priest: because presentation sufficed before him who knew both the disease and the circumstance of the disease. And a general satisfaction is understood in this which Jesus said to the adulterous woman: "Sin no more."

To the third about Peter, the same must be said: nevertheless in these the desire of confessing, or even the act of confession, is not excluded: because many things were done which are not written, as is said at the end of the Gospel of John.

To the next, it must be said that satisfaction is required at least in desire and interior lament: because the mode of satisfaction is manifold, namely through interior and exterior punishment, according as even something adjoined to confession is reduced to satisfaction, like the shame and lament of contrition. And in this way there is also a certain satisfaction: because, as we said, in penance it is in a certain way as in number, which according to something is homogeneous and according to something is heterogeneous.

To the next, it must be said that he who is thus contrite has confession and satisfaction in desire.

To the next, it must be said that those parts can be considered in habit, or in act, or desire, and execution. If in the first way: then contrition is more essential to penance than the others. But if in the second way: then all are substantial, but ordinately, as was said before, where it is assigned how one is in another.

533. Cf. Pseudo-Jerome, Epistola de honorandis parentibus, PL 30, 114: "Crudelis est qui famam suam negligit."

Articulus 4 — Whether, Just As We Offend God In Three Ways, Namely In Heart, Mouth, And Deed, So The Three Parts Of Penance Correspond To These Three Ways Of Offending

Whether just as we offend God in three ways, namely in heart, mouth, and work: so the three parts of penance correspond to these three ways of offending?

Whether just as we offend God in three ways, namely in heart, mouth, and work: so the three parts of penance correspond to these three ways of offending?

Then it is asked concerning those things which are said in the Letter, there at A, around the beginning: "This is fruitful penance, so that just as, by three, etc."

For this seems to mean nothing: because

§ 1. For a sin which is committed in the heart, we are bound to be contrite, to confess, and to make satisfaction. Therefore if the other two modes of sinning also cease, all parts of penance concur for the sin of the heart alone. Therefore the three parts of penance do not correspond to these three modes of sinning.

The same objection applies to the sin of the mouth alone, and to the sin of work alone.

§ 2. Again, Penance is ordered to the expulsion of actual sin according to punishment and fault: but it is established that fault and punishment are in the sin of the heart alone. Therefore the whole penance is ordered against it. Therefore it is false that the parts of penance are so taken, that according to the three instruments of sinning, there are three parts of penance.

If you say that here the mouth of the flesh is not understood, but rather the mouth of the spirit: just as the Lord says, that those things which proceed from the mouth, come forth from the heart, like evil thoughts, thefts, blasphemies, etc. These are the things that defile a man.

On the contrary: That mouth is either of sensuality, or of pleasure according to the lower part of reason, or of the thought by which a man inwardly speaks to himself about committing a sin. And in whatever way it is said, what is called the sin of the heart is superfluous: because it will be the same to say the sin of the heart, and of the mouth.

§ 3. Again, Then a third part is superfluous in certain sins, namely in the sin of the heart and the mouth.

Again, According to this the parts of penance do not correspond to it: for we do not say, that just as there is an interior mouth by which we sin, that so it suffices to confess with the interior mouth, but rather confession must be made with the exterior mouth. Therefore it is not the interior mouth of which he speaks here, that confession corresponds by way of contrary to the sin of the mouth.

§ 4. Further, It seems that according to this assignment there ought to be only one part of penance, namely contrition: because in every disease it suffices to counter the cause: for when the cause is amputated, the disease is cut off. But the motive principle in man is the heart, while the mouth and hands are merely moved. If therefore the motive principle will be well-disposed, those things which are moved will necessarily be well-disposed. But through contrition the heart is well-disposed, as is said in the Letter: therefore through contrition the

others will be well-disposed immediately: therefore confession and satisfaction are superfluous.

§ 5. Again, It seems to speak badly, that confession corresponds to the sin of the mouth: because the sin of the mouth supposes the sin of the heart as a cause. Therefore two correspond to the sin of the mouth, namely contrition and confession.

The same objection applies to the sin of work: because that also supposes the sin of the heart: therefore contrition and satisfaction will correspond to it without confession, as it seems.

Solution. Some have said, just as was said in the objection, that in every sin those three concur, namely heart, mouth, and work: and this is drawn from Augustine in book XII of De Trinitate, who, expounding that word of the Lord, Matt. 15:18: "Those things which proceed from the mouth, come forth from the heart," etc., posits an interior mouth, and it returns to this, that the heart makes the first conception of sin. But because the mouth serves two uses, namely speech, and eating, therefore the perpetration of sin within oneself is called the speech of the heart, and is the act of the interior mouth, according as it serves the use of speech. Again, according as it serves the use of eating in which there is the pleasure and incorporation of food, the interior pleasure of sin corresponds to it. Moreover, besides these two there is the act of sin itself, which is interior or exterior. And thus some wanted to say, that for every sin three parts of penance are required. But I judge that this is not according to the intention of this Letter. Whence I say that the parts of penance correspond to sin in two ways, namely as medicine only, and thus all three parts of penance correspond to all sins; they also correspond as medicine simultaneously having a congruence in act and in the instrument of acting, and thus contrition corresponds only to the sin of the heart, and confession only to the sin of the mouth, and satisfaction only to the sin of work. And this is not difficult for anyone to understand; and this is the understanding of the Author introduced in the Letter.

It must be said therefore to the first, that all parts are required against any difference of sin whatever, as they are medicine, and in this way they are parts of penance: but it is not necessary on account of this that all should have an agreement with any difference of sin whatever in the act and instrument of acting.

Through the same, the solution to the following is evident.

To what is further asked concerning the adaptation of some, it must be said that it is from Augustine, as was said, but not to the point according to the intention of the Letter.

But to the other which is objected on the contrary, it must be said that the heart, when all things are posited within, is taken more strictly. For although all those three acts are of the heart, nevertheless in conceiving it is in the act of the heart, which is the first cause of movements; and in speaking inwardly or taking pleasure it is the heart, not as heart, but in the office of the mouth, and in ministering the interior act, it is in the office of the hand.

To the next, it must be said that it is not similar entirely in the perpetration of sin, and the medicine of sin: because the medicine is from without, while the perpetration of sin is from

within: and therefore the parts of penance do not correspond to it in the same way according to this adaptation. And therefore confession must be made from without: because it receives medicine from the keys of the Church, which cannot be done unless the sin proceeds into the knowledge of the one having the keys. And for this the interior mouth does not suffice, but the exterior must be present.

To the next, it must be said that the heart cannot be sufficiently well-disposed except through the work of the mouth and hand: because, as was said, the medicine of sin in fault and punishment is from the parts of penance. And the part of the medicine which is from the keys is not received except by confession by which the sin proceeds into the knowledge of the one having the key. But the other part is drawn from custom which makes a good habit of the heart removing the difficulty of acting well: and that cannot be in the heart except through work.

To the next, it must be said that the parts of penance correspond to sin in two ways, as was said: and that objection does not proceed except in one way: and yet what it concludes is true. Because confession supposes contrition, if it is true; and satisfaction supposes contrition and confession. But it does not follow that in the sin of work two suffice, namely contrition and satisfaction, and in the sin of the mouth another two, namely contrition and confession. And the reason for this has already been stated above.

Articulus 5 — Whether To The Three Differences Of Sin, Which Are Heart, Deed, And Habit, The Three Parts Of Penance Correspond

Whether to the three differences of sin which are heart, deed, and custom, the three parts of penance correspond?

Whether to the three differences of sin which are heart, deed, and custom, the three parts of penance correspond?

Then it is asked concerning what he says there, at A, around the beginning: "For there are three differences of sin, etc."

For this is another adaptation of those parts.

But this seems insufficient: because § 1. There is nothing here to which confession properly corresponds: for satisfaction corresponds to every deed.

§ 2. Again, It seems that this assignment does not suit every sin: because many sins are not brought forth in public, but remain hidden. Therefore neither confession nor satisfaction will correspond to them, as it seems.

Again, Many sin once, and do not draw it into custom: and to those again this adaptation does not seem to suit.

If you say that confession corresponds to the defense of sin, and satisfaction to custom: still it seems not to apply: because there are many who never defend their sin, and yet are bound to confess.

§ 3. Again, Gregory in the Gloss on Job 3:11-12, distinguishes otherwise there: "Why did I not die in the womb, etc." For according to him, sin in the womb is sin in the heart; coming forth from the womb, in work; received by the knees, in which the flattering fomentation flatters it through adulation; and nursed at the breasts, nourished through the custom of evil. Therefore it seems that according to this there ought to be four modes of making satisfaction.

§ 4. Again, According to the kinds of diseases diverse medicines are multiplied: but it is established that there are seven kinds of capital diseases in actual sin. Therefore according to this the parts of the medicine ought to be multiplied. But the medicine of actual sin is penance: therefore there ought to be seven parts of penance, as it seems, and not only three.

If you say that the medicine is ordered against the root of the disease. On the contrary: Because according to this there ought not to be except two parts or one: because, as Augustine says, "Every sin is either from fear badly humbling, or from love badly inflaming." And this is the Gloss on that of Psalm 79:17 "Burned with fire."

Furthermore, the same Augustine reduces that root which is badly humbling fear, to that which is badly inflaming love. Therefore according to this there ought not to be except one part of the medicine, which is ordered against evil love.

Again, If against differences of sins of this sort the parts of penance are ordered, it is asked:

§ 1. What is ordered against those which John touches upon in his 1st Canonical Epistle 2:16 "All that is in the world, is the concupiscence of the flesh, etc."? For against none of those is any part of penance directly ordered.

§ 2. Again, It seems that Augustine's adaptation in the Letter is insufficient: because he does not adapt except against a killing or mortifying disease. But a venial disease does not mortify; therefore against it no part of penance is ordered: which is against those things which will be said below in this same distinction in the Letter, where the Master makes a treatise on the confession and satisfaction of venial sins.

Solution. It must be said that this adaptation which Augustine makes also occurs through congruence to the parts of penance: and it is not made according as those parts are taken in the ratio of medicine alone. But this adaptation differs from the preceding one: because the preceding one was made through the congruence of the substance of sin and its instrument, to the substance of the parts of penance; but this one is made through the conformity of property to property, and can be done thus: Every mortal sin commonly has the mortification of spiritual life. But with this, three things are conjoined to it, namely two in comparison to the sinner, and a third in comparison to the neighbor. In comparison to the sinner there are two: the zeal for turpitude lest it be reproved, and this is evil; and iteration or defense when he is reproved, and this signifies hardness of heart, or obstinacy of will in sin. The third, in comparison to the neighbor, is scandal through bad example. And these are signified in the three dead persons, as is clear in the Letter. Now, compunction, through the fact that it is a hidden sorrow of the heart, is ordered against pleasure in secret; and confession against the evil manifestation of sin, because the one confessing through the minister of the Church is recon-

ciled to the Church; but satisfaction through the altitude of good is contrary to evil custom by inducing a contrary habit, which removes the difficulty of acting well.

To the first therefore it must be said, that this adaptation is by way of congruence to that which is more frequent in sin. Or it must be said that the manifestation of sin is twofold, namely in the present before men, and in the future judgment, and then before God and the Angels. And the shame of confession now abolishes the shame which would happen in the judgment, if it were not manifested now.

To the next, it must be said that every evil act leaves a weak or strong disposition inclining to a similar act: and that disposition is called custom here.

But to this which is objected concerning the distinction of blessed Gregory, it must be said, that it is taken according to those things which retain a man in sin, and sometimes are not the sins of the same person: as when one is flattered by the vice of adulation, the adulation is in another, namely in the flatterer. But nursing is the same as custom, and coming forth from the womb is the same as manifestation generally taken, and conception the same as the hidden part of the heart: and therefore with the fourth removed, that division reverts to this one signified under another metaphor.

To the next, it must be said that the parts of penance are not adapted to the capital vices: because since penance is in an interior work, it is necessary that it be multiplied according to the instruments of operating, in which it cuts out the root of the disease. Now all the capital vices can be perpetrated by the three instruments of sinning; and therefore all the parts of Penance correspond to each capital vice.

To the next, it must be said that the root of sin is twofold, namely innate from a corrupt root, and made from the work of sin. And against the first the parts of penance are not ordered, but against the second. Whence it was held in the preceding distinction, that satisfaction is to cut out the causes of sin, etc. But the roots which Augustine touches upon are innate from a corrupt nature.

But I call roots made from sin such things as guilt and proneness, which are left behind from actual sin and incline to a subsequent sin of the same species.

To the next, it must be said that John does not touch upon the roots of sin on the part of the sinner, but rather on the part of the object moving to sin. But the parts of penance are not ordered against sin on the part of the moving object, but rather on the part of the sinner, according to what is left behind in him through the work of actual sin inwardly or outwardly. And through this the solution to all that is objected concerning the roots of the vices is evident.

To the last, it must be said that a venial sin is not a sin except in a qualified sense: and its penance is penance in a qualified sense, and not simply; and therefore the parts of penance are not adapted to it.

Articulus 6 — What Contrition Is In General

What is contrition in genus?

Then it is asked concerning what is said, there, at A, after the beginning: "Compunction is commended to us, etc."

And six things are asked here concerning compunction: the first of which is, What is it in genus? The second, What is it by its proper definition? The third, What is the difference between contrition, attrition, and compunction? The fourth, Of what part of the soul is contrition? The fifth, Whether it is always made in the same way in the New and the Old Testament? The sixth, What moves one to contrition, whether faith, or another virtue? And if faith, by reason of which article does it move to it?

To the first it is objected thus: § 1. Every sorrow is in the genus of passion: contrition is a certain sorrow: therefore it is in the genus of passion. The first is evident of itself. The second is evident through that saying of Augustine held above: "Let him always sorrow, and rejoice in the sorrow, etc."

§ 2. Again, Augustine: "If you repent, punishment holds you." This is said chiefly on account of contrition: therefore contrition is a punishment holding the penitent: but every punishment is a passion. Therefore, etc.

§ 3. Again, Contraries are in the same genus: but sorrow and pleasure are opposed contrarily; therefore they are in the same genus: but pleasure is in the genus which is passion, as the Philosopher says. Therefore sorrow is too, and consequently contrition.

§ 4. Again, Everything according to which something is properly altered is a passion, or a passible quality. But according to sorrow an alteration of man properly occurs; therefore it is a passion or a passible quality. The first is written in the seventh book of the Physics[534]. The second is evident through this, that the Philosopher says in VIII of the Ethics[535], that in having sense, alteration is by sorrow and pleasure. Since therefore contrition is a certain sorrow, it will be in the genus of passion, etc.

§ 5. Again, If contrition is contrary to sin, insofar as it relates to something it has contrariety to it. Now there are two things in sin, namely libido or pleasure in a mutable good, and aversion from the immutable good. But it is established, that it is not contrary by reason of the aversion; therefore by reason of the pleasure in a mutable good, because contrition sorrows over the pleasure. Since therefore pleasure is a passion, sorrow is also a passion, as it seems.

§ 6. Again, It was held above that penance is a bitterness of the soul for the evil that one has committed. And this belongs to it chiefly by reason of contrition. Therefore contrition is a certain bitterness of the soul: but bitterness of the soul is a passion; therefore also contrition, etc.

§ 7. Again, As the body relates to a passion inflicted on it, so the spirit to a passion which is inflicted on it. But everything immuting the body, is a certain passion of the body; therefore

also everything immuting the spirit, will be a certain passion of the spirit. But the sorrow of contrition immutes the spirit; therefore it is a certain passion of the spirit.

§ 8. If you say, as some say, that in contrition the sorrow is material, and the actual will is around the sorrow, and that is the act and the formal part of contrition: and therefore contrition is not in the genus of passion except by grace of that which is material in it. On the contrary: Anger, mercy, nemesis, are not without the will: and yet they are said by the Philosopher to be passions. Therefore from the fact that the will is around something, it does not make it not to be a passion.

§ 9. Again, From the fact that the will is around something, its essence is not varied: because otherwise it would be necessary to say, that any thing is varied in essence when it is willed, and when it is not willed. But it is established that sorrow or sadness in itself is a passion. Therefore also whether the will is around it, or not, it will still be a passion. But contrition is sorrow; therefore it is in the genus of passion.

§ 10. Again, Everything inflicted by a certain agent is a passion: but every sorrow is inflicted by a certain agent; therefore it is a passion.

§ 1. [Conclusion]. The first is proved from the definition of a passion. The second is proved from the fact that sorrow is from a corrupting contrary; and a corrupting contrary is a certain agent other than that which is corrupted.

§ 2. But ON THE CONTRARY: 1. By no passion do we merit: contrition is a certain passion: therefore by contrition we do not merit. The first premise is proved both by those speaking commonly, and by the fact that the principle of merit is in us, while the principle of a passion is in another. The second, however, is taken as a hypothesis by the adversary.

§ 3. Again, nothing whose effective principle is not in us as patients falls under a precept: the effective principle of a passion is not in us as patients: therefore it does not fall under a precept. But contrition falls under a precept; therefore, by the destruction of the consequent, it is not a passion. The first premise is proved because no work is commanded except that of which we are masters and the cause. The second is evident through the definition of a passion.

§ 4. Again, no passion is a virtue or a part of a virtue; contrition is a virtue, or a part of a virtue: therefore contrition is not a passion. The first premise is proved from what is found in the second book of the Ethics, that virtues are habits, not passions.[536] The second is proved by what was established earlier, because it was said that penance is a virtue, and contrition is a virtue, or a part of penance.

§ 5. Again, no passion is operative of the best things; but contrition is operative of the best things: therefore contrition is not a passion. The proof of the first is because nothing works the best things except a habit, which is not in the genus of passion, as the Philosopher says. The second is evident by the fact that the work of contrition is praiseworthy and rewardable.

534. Aristotle, Physics VII, c. 3.

§ 6. Again, no passion has contrariety to any habit; but contrition has contrariety to the habit of vices: therefore contrition is not a passion. The first premise is proved from the fact that contraries are in the same proximate genus. The second, from the fact that nothing expels another except its contrary; and contrition expels all habits of vices.

§ 7. Solution. Without prejudice [to other views], it seems to me that a distinction must be made regarding contrition: for it belongs either to penance as a virtue, or to penance as a sacrament. What the difference between these is, is sufficiently clear from the foregoing. Since it belongs to penance as a virtue, it is thus not a part, but a certain act to which the virtue of penance moves, insofar as it detests the perpetrated sin precisely as a perpetrated sin. And because this act is self-punishing and vindicative, it is not without punishment; yet that punishment does not give it its formal essence, because the punishment is related to the act of the will as the thing made is to the maker. And then it is called contrition, not the passion of the contrite person, but rather the act of the one contriting, which is productive of punishment in the contrite person. And although the one contriting and the contrite person are the same in substance, their being is nevertheless not the same, as will be clear below.

§ 8. If, however, penance is taken as a sacrament, then nothing prevents passion from being something of the essence of contrition: because penance is ordered against sin, satisfying for sin through punishment. Thus, in my judgment, contrition is the passion of the contrite person voluntarily undertaken or produced for sin. Therefore, according to these two ways, one must respond to the arguments adduced for both sides.

§ 9. To the first objection, therefore, maintaining that contrition is a certain movement of the virtue of penance, we say that sorrow is indeed in the genus of passion, but contrition taken in this way is not sorrow, but rather the act productive of sorrow in the contrite person. Therefore, contrition is either a virtue, if taken in habit, or an act, if considered in act; and it is not in the genus of passion when taken in this manner.

§ 10. To the proof, it must be said that Augustine calls it sorrow insofar as it is the matter of the sacrament of penance, and not insofar as it is a virtue or an act of virtue.

§ 11. To the next, it must be said that Augustine is speaking of the signs of penance in this way,

insofar as the cause is signified by the effect; for punishment is the effect of penance and contrition, as has already become clear, and he does not intend that punishment is essentially penance or contrition.

§ 12. To the next it must be said that contrition, insofar as it is an act or habit of the contrite person, is not contrary to pleasure, but only insofar as it is a passion of the contrite person. And I call contrition a habit according to what it is, although properly it names either an act or a passion, because it is a verbal noun and can descend from both the active and the passive. But we also name the habit by the same name for this reason, that certain habits do not have proper names.

535. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VIII.

§ 13. To the next it must be said that, in truth, everything that alters, speaking physically, is a passion or a passible quality. But we do not say that the one receiving habits is altered, but rather perfected; nor is the one who acts from a habit altered, unless this be a different kind of alteration, as the Philosopher says in the second book of De Anima.[537] But we do not say that contrition, insofar as it is called the act of the one contriting, is altering the contrite person, but rather insofar as it is a passion of the contrite person and subject. And this is indeed only in the genus of passion; but in this way it is neither a virtue nor an act of virtue, but rather its effect in that about which the virtue of penance or contrition acts, as was established earlier.

§ 14. To the next it must be said that contrition and any other virtue have a twofold contrariety to vice and sin. One is in the essence of its species, just as white is contrary to black, and thus one virtue is opposed to two vices or to one, of which it is the mean. It has another contrariety to sin in its whole in which it is rooted, which is sanctifying grace (gratia gratum faciens), which is contrary to sin not in this species or that, but to all sin, insofar as it is a fault and an offense against God; and with respect to this also, one virtue is not without another. And according to this mode, by the power of the whole and of the others conjoined to it in that whole, it has one contrariety to every sin. In both of these ways contrition is contrary to sin in its entirety. But it is true that the pleasure which is from the act of sin has as its contrary the sorrow which is from the act of the one contriting, just as it happens that a passion is contrary to a passion.

§ 15. To the next it must be said that penance is taken there in the sense of a sacrament, in which sorrow is the matter, as was said before.

§ 16. To the next it must be said that it is well granted that sorrow mutating the spirit is a passion as such; but that is essential only to the sacrament, not to the virtue, as has been established. Nor should anyone take what I say—"the spirit to be mutated"—to mean anything other than that the man is mutated according to the spirit; because the soul, properly speaking and intrinsically (per se), is not moved, but rather accidentally (per accidens).

§ 17. To the next it must be said that this solution is good, provided it is properly understood: for it is not understood in such a way that sorrow is material in the way a material part is essential, but rather it is that about which the will of the one contriting is concerned, as about an effect. And then it is clear that nothing is a part of contrition insofar as contrition is a virtue. But I do not consider it absurd that sorrow should be essential to penance insofar as it is a part of the sacrament and remaining in the genus of passion.

§ 18. And by this same point, the solution to the following is also clear: because the will does not vary the object willed, but rather the converse. But contrition does not name this insofar as it descends from the active verb, but rather the habit or act of the one contriting, as has been said.

§ 19. To the next it must be said that even if we speak of sorrow, it is not inflicted by another agent, but rather by the same, though not taken as the same; and how this occurs is inquired into below. But here it suffices that the contrite person inflicts sorrow upon himself.

536. Aristotle, Metaphysics V, c. 26.

Yet I plainly concede that sorrow is a passion, and also contrition, insofar as it is on the part of the contrite person and not of the one contriting; but in this

way it is a part of the sacrament, and not a virtue, or a part of a virtue.

§ 20. To the proof it must be said that the contrary does not cause sorrow, but rather the same thing affecting contrarily through the will concerning sin; because first he willed it when he committed it, but now he detests it and grieves. And these two fittingly respond to sin by reason of two things that are in it, namely, lust or the love of a mutable good, and the aspect of divine offense.

§ 21. To the one [argument] which is objected to the contrary, we must again say that we have conceded that by sorrow we merit, insofar as it is something of the sacrament, as the matter in which the sacrament is perfected; for this sacrament seeks for itself internal matter, just as others seek external matter. And the cause has already been stated above.

§ 22. It must be said, therefore, that passions are considered in two ways, namely in comparison to the agent, and in comparison to the patient. In the first way they are considered twofold: for the agent of them is either within, voluntary and discrete (that is, willing and discerning in acting), or outside. If within: then that passion can be meritorious or demeritorious, because it is voluntary, excluding violence and ignorance; and thus is the sorrow in contrition. But if it is outside: then it is neither meritorious nor demeritorious, and in this way it is proved that by passions we do not merit. If, however, it is considered on the part of the recipient, it is again considered in two ways: either insofar as it is only transmuting the patient, or insofar as it is well or badly informed by the will to sustain it for an honorable or dishonorable cause. If in the first way: then it is also true that by passions we do not merit, and this is to consider passion as passion. If in the second way: then it happens that someone merits or demerits by passions, according to how it is well or badly informed through the will; but the passion will not be meritorious from itself, but from that which the will places around it.

§ 23. To the next it must be said that the first premise, speaking strictly (per se), is true. But the second, proposed universally, is false, though particularly it is true. And the reason for this is clear from the distinction previously drawn.

§ 24. To the next it must be said that the passion which is sorrow, insofar as it is a passion, is not the virtue of contrition, nor anything of its essence, but is something of the sacrament.

§ 25. To the next it must be said that it is not contrary to vice by the fact that it is a passion, but rather by the fact that it is a habit, as was said. Nevertheless, the passion itself expels sin, but by the operation of the sacrament, not of the virtue.

Articulus 7 — What Contrition Is By Its Proper Definition

What is contrition by its proper definition?

537. Luke 7:37ff.

§ 26. Secondly, it is asked: What is contrition by its proper definition and essence, or what is it to be called?

§ 27. Now, some say that it is a voluntary sorrow for sins, always punishing in oneself what one grieves to have committed.

§ 28. BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. As was established above, this is a certain definition of penance; therefore, it is unfittingly applied to a part of penance.

§ 29. 2. Moreover, it seems not to be sorrow: for Augustine says in the book The City of God: "Sorrow from the flesh is a certain disagreement from its passion: just as the sorrow of the soul, which is called sadness, is a disagreement from those things which have happened to us against our will."[538] Now, it is clear that sins did not happen to us against our will, especially actual mortal sins, against which contrition is specially ordered. Therefore it seems

that there is no sorrow for them. And contrition is for them; therefore contrition is not sorrow, as it seems.

§ 30. 3. Again, it seems that the phrase "voluntary sorrow" is meaningless: for either this is to say that the will sorrows, or that the will is concerned with a sorrow by which something other than the will itself sorrows. If in the first way. On the contrary: The will does not sorrow for anything regarding which there is a will as of an object willed affecting the will, but rather it rejoices in the attainment of it. But in this way, as the adversary says, the will is concerning sorrow; therefore it does not sorrow, but rejoices in its attainment.

§ 31. 4. Again, it does not seem to be a philosophical saying that the will sorrows: for Damascene, Gregory Nazianzen, and Aristotle say thus: "Every will is in reason; and if it is not rational, it is not a will." But Aristotle says in the seventh book of the Ethics, that every pleasure is a coming-to-be or movement into the sensible soul.[539] Therefore no pleasure is in the rational soul. And the will is a part of the rational soul; therefore no pleasure is in the will. But opposites are bound to occur concerning the same subject; therefore also no sadness is in the will. But sorrow is sadness, as Augustine says in the authoritative text, such that the will itself is affected by sorrow, as it seems.

§ 32. 5. Again, nothing can be affected by sorrow intrinsically (secundum se), except that which has a contrary intrinsically. But the will taken intrinsically, insofar as it is a part of the rational soul, has no contrary intrinsically; therefore it is not affected by sorrow intrinsically.

§ 33. 6. If, however, sorrow is called voluntary in the second way, namely because there is a will for a sorrow by which something outside the will sorrows. On the contrary: Sorrow which is generally destructive of sin is concerning every sin. But sorrow taken in the sensible soul is not concerning every sin; therefore it is not destructive of sin. The first premise is self-evident. The second is proved by the fact that there are many sins which have no object or pleasure in the sensible soul.

§ 34. Hence thus: The sorrow of contrition is general, and generally destructive of sin. But sorrow spoken of in the aforesaid way is not general, nor generally destructive of sin; therefore it is not the sorrow of contrition. But it was said that it is the sorrow of contrition.

§ 35. 7. Furthermore, it is asked about what it says there, "always punishing." For it is clear that it does not speak of punishment according to habit, but according to act. But when punishment exists according to act, another act cannot intensely be present; therefore one could never be intensely moved by another act, and therefore one could not intensely love, or believe, or anything of the sort, which is a great absurdity.

§ 36. FURTHERMORE, it is inquired about several other definitions which are found.

§ 37. For Isidore defines it thus: "Contrition is the compunction and humility of the mind with tears, coming from the remembrance of sin, and the fear of judgment."

§ 38. Now, it seems that this definition is insufficient for many reasons.

§ 39. 1. First, because humility is a virtue distinct from contrition, whether it be a sacrament or a virtue; therefore it ought not to fall into its definition.

§ 40. 2. Secondly, because it seems that compunction or contrition does not properly belong to the mind, but rather to the sensible part. For all sorrow is in the sensible part, as Augustine intimates, saying that sorrow is "the sense of those things from which the soul dissents, arising from the flesh."

§ 41. Again, the Philosopher says that sorrow is "the sense of the division of a continuum."[540] Therefore it seems that it does not belong properly to the mind.

§ 42. If you say that the mind is what makes the compunction: then I ask, what is called "mind" there? For it is clear that the mind does not refer there to any part of the sensible soul. Therefore it refers either to reason, or memory , or will, or something else which is in the rational part of the soul. If reason. On the contrary: Sorrow is said to be voluntary, as has already been established from the preceding definition; therefore it does not refer to reason, but to the will. If it refers to memory, the same objection applies. But if it refers to the will, this is clearly against the sayings of the Saints and Philosophers, who never put "mind" for the will.

§ 43. 3. If you say that it is put for the higher part of the soul, in which there are three powers of the soul, namely memory, intellect, and will. On the contrary: To be contrite is a determinate act; therefore it proceeds from a determinate power; therefore it does not belong to the mind insofar as it is common to those three powers.

§ 44. 4. Moreover, what does it mean by saying, "With tears"? For many are contrite without tears, as was established above in another distinction.

§ 45. 5. Again, it is asked, why does it say, "coming from the remembrance of sin"? For the remembrance of sin is suited by nature to induce pleasure. Since, therefore, the same thing

538. Augustine, The City of God XIV, c. 15.

behaving in the same way is not the cause of contraries, it seems that it ought not to induce sorrow.

§ 46. 6. Again, the fear of judgment is servile fear, and that is not in contrition; therefore contrition does not come from the fear of judgment, as it seems.

§ 47. AGAIN, some put forward yet another description from the words of Gregory thus:

"Contrition is the humility of the spirit, annihilating sin between hope and fear."

§ 48. 1. Since, however, many virtues move to contrition, it seems that it ought not to be defined solely by humility, but also by others.

§ 49. 2. Again, it cannot be an essential predication when it is said, "contrition is humility": therefore either contrition is the cause of humility, or conversely. If in the first way: this does not seem to be any more than it is of another virtue; because it is thus the cause of justice, and of temperance, and of the other virtues which are infused in contrition. Therefore, since it is not said to be the cause of the others, neither does it seem to be the cause of this one. If in the second way. On the contrary: Faith and fear are rather the cause, because one shows whence one ought not to be proud, and the other flees insofar as it is ordered to punishment. Therefore it ought not to be called the contrition of humility, but rather the contrition of faith and fear.

§ 50. 3. It is also asked about what Gregory says, "annihilating sin." Because on that text of Job 3:19: The servant is free from his master, Gregory says that he who committed sin is not perfectly freed from it in this life. Therefore it seems that sin cannot be annihilated in this life.

§ 51. 4. Again, it is asked about what it says, "Between hope and fear." For faith is the first of the virtues; therefore the penitent is rather moved between faith and fear, than between hope and fear.

§ 52. 5. Again, hope does not arise except from merits and from grace, as is clear from its definition; but the contrite person in this present moment does not initially have merits. Therefore he cannot have an act of hope; therefore he is not moved between hope and fear, as Gregory seems to mean.

§ 53. THERE IS FOUND also another definition in the Gloss, on Psalm 50:1 (Miserere mei, Deus), where it is said thus: "Contrition of heart is a sacrifice in which sins are loosed."

§ 54. 1. But it is asked here, why is it called contrition "of heart", since it is general?

§ 55. 2. Moreover, it is asked concerning what it says, "a sacrifice." For this seems to belong most of all to that part of penance in which a man offers himself to the minister of the Church, to whom he ought to offer sacrifice. But this happens in confession; therefore confession is more a sacrifice than contrition.

539. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VII.11 (1152b12-14).

§ 56. 3. It is also asked concerning what it says there, "in which sins are loosed." For since the whole of penance is only for the loosing of sin, it seems that the other two parts are superfluous.

§ 57. 4. Again it is asked, how are sins loosed in contrition? If with respect to fault. On the contrary: Contrition is a certain punishment of the contrite person, or a certain act of the one contriting, as is clear from the foregoing. If it is the punishment of the contrite person, since punishment is not contrary to fault, it does not seem it ought to loose fault. But if it is the act of the one contriting, then it is an act of some virtue which is informed by grace. Therefore, prior to that act, the fault was remitted. Therefore it is not remitted through that act. Therefore sins are not loosed with respect to fault in the sacrifice of contrition.

§ 58. If you say that they are loosed with respect to punishment. On the contrary: With respect to punishment they are also loosed in confession and satisfaction; therefore it is not proper to contrition, and so it ought not to be set down as the ultimate difference in its definition.

§ 59. THERE IS FOUND still another which is Augustine's, namely this: "Contrition is sorrow with the remission of sin, or remitting sin."

§ 60. And this has the same objection as the previous one, and another proper to itself.

§ 61. 1. For the sorrow of contrition is either finite or infinite. If finite: now, it is established that fault and sin are infinite; therefore the finite can act upon the infinite, which is against the Philosopher. If infinite: now, it is established that it is a passion of the contrite person, or an act of the one contriting, and principally it is a passion; therefore of a finite thing there will be an infinite passion, which again is against the Philosopher. Therefore it seems that it is not a sorrow remitting sin.

§ 62. 2. Again, it is established that that sorrow is from us, and is ours; but what is remissive of sin is never from us and ours; therefore that which is remissive of sin is not sorrow. The first premise is evident from the fact that to sorrow belongs only to an infirm, sensible nature such as ours. The second is evident through that of Isaiah 43:25: I am, I am he that blot out thy iniquities for my own sake, and that of Augustine, "He who created you without you, will not justify you without you."

§ 63. Response. It must be said that contrition is defined well enough by all these descriptions; and at the end we shall state the respect in which they differ.

§ 64. For although the first is given concerning penance, nevertheless it most of all befits it on account of contrition, just as certain men before us have said, with whom we agree in this. And by this the solution to the first is clear. Because, as was said above, although penance has three parts, nevertheless its essence is saved most of all in the first, which is contrition, because that must be present in act in every penance, while the others sometimes are not, except in the will, or in vow, or in purpose.

540. A definition of pain frequently attributed to Aristotle (or reflecting Avicenna's medical philosophy).

§ 65. To the next it must be said that the will is twofold, or rather is considered in a twofold way: namely, before the act, and after the act with respect to that which remains of the act in the agent, as a disposition, or habit, or guilt, or stain, or all of these. Hence, although the sin did not happen while we were willing it with a will preceding the act, it is nonetheless present in us while we are willing it with a subsequent will; and this suffices to arouse sorrow in the manner noted in the preceding article of the question.

§ 66. To the next it must be said that sorrow is called voluntary in both ways. Nor do we say this is to be solved in the way some have written, namely that the will is twofold: as deliberating, and as nature; and as it is deliberating, thus it is concerning sorrow, and the sorrow is called voluntary; and as it is nature, thus it sorrows. For this is absolutely nothing, because the will as nature sorrows over things contrary to nature, and rejoices over things agreeable to it; and such things are not sins or grace, because sin is not contrary to the nature of the individual, although it is contrary to the good of nature. How this is so, we have discussed in the second book of the Sentences.

§ 67. But it must be said that the deliberative will is that by which the sorrow is voluntary, and which sorrows, in one way, according to what St. Bernard says, that nothing is punished except the will. For it is not unfitting that the will should be concerning sorrow. And

therefore sorrow is there the matter about which the will is concerned. And therefore joy in the attainment of what is willed, and sorrow, are not related to the will under the same aspect, and therefore they are not contraries. Because this sorrow is made by the will, and it is sorrow insofar as it is punishing a misdeed, and voluntary insofar as it is curative and expulsive of sin. And in this way nothing prevents the same subject from sorrowing and rejoicing over that sorrow insofar as it is of such efficacy. An example of this is in one cut for an abscess: for out of his will he causes himself pain, and he rejoices in it according as it is curative of the abscess.

§ 68. Against this some object thus: because according to this, the sorrow of contrition is not voluntary strictly speaking (per se), but accidentally (per accidens); and they consider this unfitting. But I consider it unfitting that any sorrow should be sought for its own sake (per se), since all sorrow is an evil of punishment, and no punishment insofar as it is such is desired.

§ 69. Through this the solution to the first point objected concerning this is clear.

§ 70. To the next it must be said that pleasure is spoken of in two ways, namely properly and improperly. Properly speaking, according to our usage, pleasure is a passion of the sensible soul arising from the conjunction of what is suitable to it with what is suitable. And the Philosopher speaks of pleasure in this way, reducing all pleasures to sense, and further to the pleasure which is in touch, which alone according to him and Avicenna is simply pleasure. But we extend the name of pleasure more broadly, namely for any joy and pleasantness resulting from the conjunction of the suitable with the suitable. And thus it is fitting for the rational soul to take pleasure, as Psalm 36:4 says: Delight in the Lord, and he will give thee the requests of thy heart. And opposite to this, sadness or sorrow can also be in the rational part.

§ 71. To the next it must be said that what is simply spiritual has no contrary in its being; but insofar as it is ordered to something, it can have a contrary to that order. And in this way

the rational soul has sin as its contrary, because it is contrary to conjunction with, and order to, God.

§ 72. To the next it must be said that if sorrow is in sense, it is particular; but in contrition it is nevertheless universal. For it is considered in two ways, namely on the part of the subject in which it occurs, and on the part of the efficient cause, together with which there flows into it the form by which it perfects the efficient cause. If in the first way: then it is particular, and thus the objection proceeds. If in the second way: then it is universal, just as the will is the universal mover of all those things which are in the realm of the soul; and in this way grace, perfecting the will, flows into it with the movement of the will, by reason of which it can expel sin.

§ 73. To the next it must be said that, in my judgment, "always punishing" is said in the habit of one punishing, not in act. Or it may be said that to punish always occurs in two ways: namely by the proper act of contrition, and thus it does not always punish in act; or by an act restraining or containing the flesh lest sin arise from it, and blocking the root of sin, and this punishment takes place in the difficulty of every virtue. And thus one can repent always. But nevertheless, the first solution is more to the point.

§ 74. To what is further objected concerning the definition of Isidore, it must be said that humility is not posited there for the virtue of humility itself, but rather for humiliation, which is the same as abasement. And this is the first thing in contrition, namely that it casts down the mind erected against the commander and the command in the transgression which is sin. And therefore the expression ought to be expounded through the cause: because contrition is said to be humility not by essence, but by cause, because it is the cause of it, just as it is said, "Day is the sun shining upon the earth."

§ 75. To the next it must be said that "mind" there is taken, in my judgment, for the whole inner man.

§ 76. And to the objection that to be contrite is a spiritual act, it must be said that

to be contrite is, according to its essence, a spiritual act. But something of it belongs to one faculty, and something to another. For to be contrite is to detest sin by sorrowing over it; and for this there is required a consideration of the sin in its state, in its fault, in its time, and in the other circumstances which Augustine mentions in the text. This consideration belongs to reason and intellect. The knowledge of past sin is also required, and this belongs to memory. And a dissent is required, which belongs to the will. Hence, although the act is one in itself, it nevertheless requires and co-requires several things for itself, and by reason of them it also has something in other powers of the soul.

§ 77. And by this the solution to everything that was objected concerning the mind is clear.

§ 78. To the next it must be said that tears there are the tears of the will; and the reason for this is clear from what was said in the preceding distinction. Or if sometimes they are the tears of the eyes, those are there as a sign, and not as the essence of contrition, nor as anything essential to it. Nor do the Saints care so much about proper definitions in which there is

nothing but what is essential, because they intend to make known the thing of which they are speaking; and this frequently becomes better known to us through signs than through substantials.

§ 79. To the next it must be said that the remembrance of sins designates a certain common thing which can cause pleasure or sorrow. But here is understood the remembrance of sins with indignation toward oneself and detestation of the sin; and thus the remembrance is by nature suited to cause nothing but sadness and sorrow.

§ 80. To the next it must be said that the fear of judgment is spoken of in two ways: namely, that which has its principal eye upon the judgment; and that is caused by unformed faith; and according to Gregory, the will to sin lives in such a man, and the deed would follow if impunity were hoped for. And this is servile fear, and it is not in contrition, but in attrition. Again, there is a fear of judgment (or rather of the judge than of the judgment) which has its principal eye upon eternal things, namely upon God who is the judge, from whom through love one shrinks from being separated, and out of that separation falling into the punishments of those to be judged. And this is initial fear, which is in contrition. For Gregory says: "When punishment is feared in such a way that the face of the judge is not loved, the fear is from fear, not from love; but when it is feared in such a way that the face of the judge is loved, the fear is from love, not from fear." And in this way the fear of judgment is understood in the definition of Isidore.

§ 81. To what is further asked concerning the definition of Gregory, it must be said that humility here is taken for humiliation, as has been said. Yet the act of humility is caused by the act of contrition, as has already been said, and thus Gregory speaks here. And thus humility is nearer to it than any other virtue on account of the conformity in the act of abasement in the one sorrowing and humbled, who everywhere casts himself down.

§ 82. To the next, which seems to be against this, that contrition should cause humiliation: it must be said that contrition in a certain way causes all the others, as was noted above, but yet specially humility in act. Because the abasement of oneself is the beginning of divine reconciliation, just as pride is the beginning of apostatizing from God, as is said in Ecclesiasticus 10:14.[541]

§ 83. To the objection concerning faith, which shows whence one ought not to be proud, and fear, which flees punishment, it must be said that these two move toward contrition not proximately, but as immediate prerequisites (quasi ante quae nihil): one according to the intellect, and the other according to the affection. But humiliation is the proximate consequent of contrition, insofar as through it there is access to God, because one must cast oneself down so as to be subject to the precept and the commander. The other virtues, however, are caused in some way by contrition, insofar as it is the term of justification, not as conjoined

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§ 1. ...to the act of contrition insofar as it is contrition.

§ 2. To the next it must be said that sin can be annihilated in three ways, namely according to the guilt of the fault, and according to the fear lest it rise again or according to the potency of sinning, and according to the certainty of forgiveness. In the first way, sin is annihilated in the penitent; but not in the second and third ways, because as long as a man lives, he can sin, and therefore he fears; and as long as he lives, he does not have certainty of forgiveness, because as it is said in Ecclesiastes 9:1: Man knows not whether he is worthy of love or hatred. And this is the slavery of which Gregory speaks, that the servant who has once served sin is not freed as long as he lives.

§ 3. To the next it must be said that the penitent and contrite person is moved between hope and fear, rather than between faith and fear; because faith only points out, but hope elevates desire to expectation, and fear by stinging interiorly incites to flight from sin. Hence, since the contrite person is elevated to eternal things and flees sin, he is moved rather between hope and fear than between faith and hope, or between faith and fear.

§ 4. To what is objected concerning that definition which is posited on Psalm 50:3: Have mercy on me, O God, it must be said that it is metaphorical, and not properly a definition, but a certain assignation of a certain property of contrition, through which it is similar to a sacrifice. For two things happen in a sacrifice, namely the assumption of the animal body in the fire, and the purification in the offerer; and contrition is assimilated to these two, because in the fire of the heart it consumes the bestial habits which are sins, just as Psalm 38:4 says: My heart grew hot within me: and in my meditation, etc. And sin is forgiven in it.

§ 5. To what is objected to the contrary, it must be said that the similitude is not taken in this, but rather in the intention of the sacrifice.

§ 6. To the next it must be said that sin is considered in two ways, namely in the guilt [and penalty] due to it per se insofar as it is a sin, and in the penalty which is due to it from the subsequent event. In the first way, indeed, eternal penalty is due to it. But in the second way, a temporal penalty, because contrition and confession were made concerning it; and as to the first way it is dissolved in contrition, and therefore it is said to be properly dissolved there. But when it is said that penance according to all its parts is ordered against sin, sin is understood in its guilt, and the penalty commonly due to it per se and from the event; because against that which has been made venial from the event, confession and satisfaction are ordered, as was held earlier.

§ 7. To the next it must be said that contrition, whether it is a passion or an act, is destructive of sin, and also the sorrow, because it is not sorrow in itself, but informed by grace; and therefore it can expel sin.

§ 8. To what is objected, that if it is an act of virtue, that it is consequent to the expulsion of sin: it must be said that it is true that it is consequent according to nature, but nevertheless it is simultaneous according to time; and therefore it operates toward the expulsion of sin.

541. Sirach (Ecclesiasticus) 10:14: "For pride is the beginning of all sin..." or "The beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from God."

§ 9. To what is further asked about that which seems to be Augustine's, it must be said that an infinite sorrow by reason of its form, which is of infinite virtue, namely grace, can [avail] into infinity; and therefore the objection concerning it ceases.

§ 10. But if anyone doubts how grace is of infinite virtue, let him seek in the questions held concerning grace on the second book of the Sentences; and he will find there all that is expedient for the solution of this difficulty.

§ 11. But if it is asked: According to what is the diversity of these definitions attended?

§ 12. It must be said that contrition is considered in two ways, namely as to the essentials,

§ 1. ...which are voluntary sorrow, and punishment of oneself, and the proper object which is sin; and according to the accidentals which manifest it by way of signs. And in the first way, the first definition is given above. But the accidentals vary: for they are either in the act, or in relation to the cause exciting one to be contrite, or in relation to the effect, or in relation to the virtues helping in the act, because one virtue helps another. And in the first way, through the sign of the act and through the relation to the exciting cause, the second definition is taken, which is Isidore's, which cause is the remembrance of sin, and the fear of judgment. But the third, which is Gregory's, is taken through the sign and the effect. The fourth, however, through conformity to its figure in the Old Testament. And the fifth and last, through the instrument and the effect; because sorrow is like an instrument of contrition, by which it grinds down sin.

Articulus 8 — What The Difference Is Between Compunction, Attrition, And Contrition

What is the difference between compunction, attrition, and contrition?

§ 2. Thirdly it is asked: What is the difference between compunction, attrition, and contrition?

§ 3. For it seems that compunction and contrition are entirely the same: because on that verse of Psalm 4:5: The things you say in your hearts, be sorry for them upon your beds, the Gloss says: "In your hearts be pricked (compungimini) with the sorrow of penance, so that the soul punishing itself may prick itself, lest it be tormented, damned in the judgment of God." [542] But all these things belong to contrition. Therefore it seems that compunction and contrition are the same.

§ 4. But against this is the fact that 1. In the same place another Gloss says: "Be pricked (compungimini), that is, as if by applying certain goads arouse yourselves not for the sorrow of sins, but for seeing the light of Christ, namely not for the lower irrigation, but for the higher, so that you may burn with the love of invisible things." [543] Since, therefore, contrition is only for sins, while compunction is not [always] for sins, contrition and compunction are not the same.

§ 5. 2. Also, this seems to follow from the meaning of the names: for nothing is pricked (compungitur) unless it has the sense of a puncture, and it is not wholly toward annihilation,

but rather ought to incite to something through the sense of compunction; but that which is contrite (conteritur) is ground into dust and annihilated. Therefore contrition and compunction are not the same.

§ 6. FURTHERMORE it is asked concerning attrition, whether it is the same as contrition?

§ 7. And it seems that it is: because whatever is contrite is attrite, and conversely. Therefore it seems that contrition and attrition are either the same, or are convertible.

§ 8. If you say this: Against this is what is commonly said, that attrition is sorrow without sanctifying grace, whereas contrition is sorrow for sin with sanctifying grace. Therefore they are not the same.

§ 9. But then a difficult question is further asked: Whether attrition can become contrition?

§ 10. And it seems that it can: 1. For every material for some form can receive that form while the same substance remains; but sorrow for sins is material for grace; therefore it is susceptible to it while the same substance remains; but according to itself it belongs to attrition; therefore the sorrow of attrition is, or can become, the sorrow of contrition; therefore attrition is also contrition.

§ 11. 2. Also, the Philosopher says at the end of the first book of the Physics, that matter is one in substance and subject, according as it is under privation and under a form, although its being is not the same. [544] Therefore

§ 1. ...similarly there is one sorrow according to substance under the privation of grace, and one [under] grace, although according to being it varies. Therefore attrition can become contrition.

§ 2. 3. Also, grace is said to inform sorrow; but nothing is informed which does not exist; therefore that sorrow is prior to grace. Either, then, it is at that time a sorrow of attrition, or of contrition. But it is clear that it is not of contrition, since it does not have the sanctifying grace which makes contrition; therefore it remains that it is the sorrow of attrition. Therefore the same thing in the substance of matter is in attrition and in contrition; therefore the sorrow of attrition becomes the sorrow of contrition; and this is what we intend.

§ 3. 4. Also, nature operates by the shorter route; and therefore it does not give a new matter: because the one matter which belongs to one thing can also be the matter of another, the substance of the matter remaining the same; but it gives a new form, because there cannot be one form of two things in species. Since, therefore, grace is more ordered in its works than nature, it seems that grace also expedites itself by fewer things [as much as] it can. Therefore, since the shorter route is to inform a found sorrow than to make a new one and inform it, it seems that it informs the found one which is nothing other than the sorrow of attrition. Therefore, etc.

§ 4. 5. Also, there are three principles of transmutation, although there are only two of the existing and generated substance; but this could not be unless the same material principle

remained under privation and form. Therefore it is similar in the works of grace by which man is justified: because otherwise it would be necessary to posit two material things, and thus there would be four principles; since, therefore, the subject of privation and of form is the same, the sorrow before the form of grace and after will be the same. Therefore, etc.

§ 5. But against this is the fact that 1. Things whose principles are diverse are themselves altogether diverse; but the principles of the sorrow of attrition and of contrition are diverse; therefore they are diverse. The first premise is self-evident. The second is proved from the fact that initial fear and formed faith generate the sorrow of attrition [read: contrition]. [545]

§ 6. 2. Also, according to the common opinion, natural things do not become gratuitous; but the sorrow of attrition is of natural things, because whatever is prior to grace is called natural. Therefore it seems that it does not become the sorrow of contrition.

§ 7. 3. Also, in natures there is not one univocal matter of corruptible and incorruptible things, as the Philosopher says in Book X of the First Philosophy [546]; but it is clear that a divine form is more distant from a natural form than a natural form is from an incorruptible one. Therefore there is not one univocal matter for a divine form and a natural form; but in contrition there is a divine form, whereas in attrition there is a natural one; therefore they do not have one matter, as it seems.

§ 8. 4. Also, those things of which the matter is one (as the Philosopher says) have a transmutation into one another; but of contrition and attrition there is no transmutation into one another; therefore of them there is not one material sorrow. The minor is proved from this, that of those things of which there is a transmutation into one another, each is transmuted into the other; but no one says that contrition can become attrition, although conversely some have sometimes conceded that it can be done. Therefore the proposition is clear.

§ 9. SOLUTION. It must be said that, in my judgment, one and the same sorrow in substance can be of attrition and of contrition, just as unformed faith can also become formed. Nevertheless, there are opinion-holders on both sides, but what has been said seems more probable to me.

§ 10. To what is first asked about the difference between contrition and compunction, it must be said that although the Saints often use one for the other, nevertheless they differ in two respects. One of which is that compunction is of greater extension than contrition; and this difference is had from the collation of the two Glosses introduced, namely because compunction is a stinging sorrow, whether it be for sins,

§ 1. ...or for the habitation of misery.

§ 2. There is also another difference from the name: because compunction properly signifies the sorrow of penance, according as it pricks the penitent; whereas contrition signifies the same sorrow, according as it annihilates the repeated sin upon individual differences: just as contrition in a contrite thing [is], when a blow is made upon the individual divided parts.

543. Aristotle, Metaphysics, X, 10 (1058b 26-28).

§ 3. And through this the solution to everything that is asked concerning the difference of compunction and contrition is clear.

§ 4. To what is asked about the difference between contrition and attrition, it must be said that the difference assigned in objecting is good. And it seems to me that the sorrow of attrition can become the sorrow of contrition: because attrition does not posit any form around the sorrow, but only states the lack of the form which is grace; and this is clear from the fact that it is defined by a privation, when it is said that attrition is sorrow for sin not informed by grace.

§ 5. To what is objected to the contrary, it must be said that the principles of a thing are twofold, namely those entering into its essence and constituting it, and principles making a thing and not entering into its essence. And concerning principles spoken of in the first way, it is true that those things of which the principles are diverse, etc., but not concerning principles spoken of in the second way; and such are those by which that proposition is proved in objecting.

§ 6. To the next it must be said that, whatever may be the case concerning that opinion, I firmly think that natural things do not become gratuitous: here it seems it must be said that the sorrow of attrition is not of natural things, rather it is a gift of the Holy Spirit: just as servile fear is also said by some to become initial fear, and unformed faith becomes formed.

§ 7. To the next it must be said that in the natures of corruptible and incorruptible things there can be one matter, although not the proper matter, but the primary one. And whatever the case may be about this, here it is a different matter: because both of these are gifts, but one is a diminished gift, like a gratuitously given grace (gratia gratis data), and the other is as something perfected by sanctifying grace.

§ 8. To the next it must be said that it is not true according to the Philosopher that of those things of which the matter is one, there is a transmutation into one another such that each is transmuted into the other: because when it is said that "this becomes from that," the word from (ex) sometimes denotes order and privation simultaneously; and then it is not reversed, just as from a boy comes an old man, and from the morning comes the day. And so it is here: for the order of sorrow in attrition is as of an antecedent to contrition; and therefore from the sorrow of attrition comes the sorrow of contrition, but not conversely.

§ 9. But if anyone is of another opinion, he can easily solve the reasons previously introduced; and therefore I pass over them.

Articulus 9 — Of Which Part Of The Soul Contrition Is

To which part of the soul does contrition belong?

§ 10. Fourthly it is asked: To which part of the soul does contrition belong?

§ 11. It seems that it belongs to the will, because: 1. It is said to be voluntary sorrow.

544. Aristotle, Physics, I, 9 (192a 1-3).

§ 12. 2. Also, Bernard says that nothing sins except the will; but it belongs to the same thing to be contrite as it does to sin; therefore to be contrite belongs to the will alone.

§ 13. 3. Also, contrition is destructive of mortal sin; therefore it must be in the same thing as mortal sin; but mortal sin is in the free choice, as Augustine says; therefore it seems that contrition is in the free choice.

§ 14. BUT THEN IT IS ASKED further: Since contrition is the act of the one crushing, as was held above, and the passion of the crushed, to what does it belong as crushing, and to what as crushed? And whether these are the same, or diverse?

§ 15. It seems that the act itself belongs to reason, because:

§ 1. 1. That act is the detestation of sin with an indignation by which one is indignant at the sin and the sinner; but to compare such things belongs only to reason; therefore the act of contrition belongs to reason, as it seems.

§ 2. 2. Also, penance is moved against sin insofar as it has been perpetrated, and thus there is a certain collation (comparison) there; but to compare belongs solely to reason; therefore it seems that contrition belongs solely to reason.

§ 3. 3. Also, in an exterior judgment the crushing of robbers or malefactors is attributed to two as agents, namely to the judge by command, and to the beadle or lictor by execution. Therefore it will be similar in the interior judgment: but Augustine says in the book On Penance that the judge is reason. Therefore contrition, which is the act of the one crushing, can be of reason, or of the executioner, who is fear according to blessed Augustine.

§ 4. It seems, however, that contrition as a passion belongs to every power of the soul: because in whatever power partakes in some way of reason, sin is committed or can be committed; but in whatever power there is sin, in that it is necessary to be contrite. Therefore it is necessary that one be contrite in every power. Therefore it will not be the passion of one power, but of all those called rational in whatever way.

§ 5. But as to this which could be objected, whether it belongs to the same thing to sorrow and to will to sorrow, it has been objected and solved in what preceded.

§ 6. SOLUTION. It must be said that contrition is chiefly of the part of the soul which is called the will, just as was proved in certain objections. Although some have sometimes said that it is in the irascible power, because one is indignant at oneself; for it does not belong to the irascible power to be indignant at oneself, but rather at an extrinsic injurer. But the perpetrated sin, insofar as it is perpetrated, is properly detested by the will dissenting from it.

§ 7. To that, therefore, which is objected, that the action of contrition belongs to reason: it must be said that it does not, but rather to the rational will. And therefore order and collation belong to reason discerning what is to be detested; but nevertheless the sorrow itself belongs to the will.

542. The text has dolorem attritionis (the sorrow of attrition), but the sense requires contritionis (of contrition), since formed faith and initial fear are principles of contrition, whereas unformed faith and servile fear belong to attrition.

§ 8. To the next it must be said that in many things it is the case that an act of the will, because it is from pre-ordaining reason, is of a certain compared thing, although it does not compare, such as loving a friend for the sake of the friend, and loving a parent more than an enemy, and so of others. Hence, although the will does not compare, nevertheless its affection sometimes falls upon compared things; and so it is here.

§ 9. To the next it must be said that reason does not crush except by way of discerning, just as the judge does not; but the will executes by way of crushing through dissent and sorrow.

§ 10. To what is objected concerning contrition as a passion, that it belongs to every power of the soul, it must be said that nothing prohibits this. Nevertheless, it will not be primarily except of the will dissenting from the perpetrated sin: because this is, as it were, punished in all the others, and is participated by the others, insofar as it is their mover. And through this the solution to everything is clear.

Articulus 10 — Whether Contrition Has Always Been In The Same Mode In The New And Old Testament

Whether contrition was always in the same mode in the New and Old Testament?

§ 11. Fifthly it is asked: Whether it was always in the same mode in the New and Old Testament?

§ 12. And it seems that it was, because: 1. That whose cause is in one and the same mode, is itself in the same mode; but actual sin is the cause of contrition, and it was in the same mode in the New and Old Testament; therefore contrition also was in the same mode.

§ 13. 2. Also, contrition is not ordered against a sin of nature, but rather of the person; and these have always been divided, and are, and will be. Therefore it seems that the re-

§ 1. ...medy of actual sin ought always to have been by one mode; therefore contrition was in one mode in the New and Old Testament.

§ 2. 3. Also, Joel 2:12 says, Be converted to me, etc. And after, v. 13: Rend your hearts, etc. But nothing else is imposed on the contrite and penitent person in the New Testament. Therefore it seems that in the same mode, etc.

§ 3. BUT AGAINST THIS: 1. The other two parts, namely confession and satisfaction, were not in the same mode as they are now; therefore neither was contrition.

§ 4. 2. Also, the law brought nothing to perfection, as it is said in Hebrews 7:19. Therefore a sacrament of perfection did not belong to it; but contrition as it is observed in the New Testament leads to perfection; therefore in the Old Testament it ought to have been according to a type, and lesser, as it seems.

§ 5. SOLUTION. It must be said that contrition was in the Old Testament just as in the New, as the first reasons prove.

545. The text has dolorem attritionis (the sorrow of attrition), but the sense requires contritionis (of contrition), since formed faith and initial fear are principles of contrition, whereas unformed faith and servile fear belong to attrition.

§ 6. But to what is objected to the contrary, it must be said that it is otherwise with confession and satisfaction, because those had to be done by the ministry of priests; hence, since the priests of that state were different from those of this state, those two parts could not be in the same mode in the New and Old Testament. But in contrition, nothing is looked to except God who blots out sins; and therefore it was always in the same mode always both in the law of nature, and of Moses, and of grace.

§ 7. To the next it must be said that although contrition was observed in the law, nevertheless it is not of the law like the moral commandments, as was disputed above at the end of the third book of the Sentences; and therefore contrition could lead something to perfection in the faith of the one to come.

§ 8. And through this the solution to everything is clear.

Articulus 11 — What The First Mover To Contrition Is

What is the first mover to contrition?

§ 9. Lastly it is asked: What moves one to contrition?

§ 10. 1. It seems that it is fear, through the definition of contrition posited by Isidore.

§ 11. 2. Also, Isaiah 26:17-18: From your fear, O Lord, we have conceived, etc. But this parturition is in contrition. Therefore it seems that it is conceived from the fear of the Lord; therefore fear first moves to contrition.

§ 12. BUT AGAINST THIS it seems that faith first moves: because faith shows the penalties due to the perpetrated sin as harmful; therefore it first causes flight and detestation; and this is contrition; therefore contrition is conceived and caused by faith.

§ 13. And because enough was held about this above in the question on penance, it is asked: by reason of which article does it move to contrition?

§ 14. And it seems that it is by reason of this one: And he will come again with glory to judge the living and the dead; because that article moves to sorrow for sin concerning those to be judged in the judgment, and that fear or sorrow is contrition; therefore faith moves to this, that someone be contrite.

§ 15. But it seems that it is the one which is: The forgiveness of sins; because in contrition sins are forgiven; therefore that article moves to contrition.

§ 16. RESPONSE. It seems it must be said that

§ 1. ...faith moves on the part of the intellect, and fear and the affection of love on the part of the affect: because on that part by which the eye is to punishment, fear moves; but on that part by which it is to glory, love moves.

§ 2. But to the first which is against this, it must be said that fear moves, but not primarily, but proximately on the part of the contrite person according to the affect.

546. Aristotle, Metaphysics, X, 10 (1058b 26-28).

§ 3. Through this also is solved what is objected concerning Isidore.

§ 4. But to what is asked: By reason of which article?

§ 5. It must be said that it is by reason of the one which is concerning the judgment, as is expressly held in the aforementioned definition of Isidore.

§ 6. But to what is objected to the contrary, it must be said that the forgiveness of sins moves to this; but nevertheless faith conjoins the hope of forgiving sins; but the consideration of the judgment, because it strikes fear, excites to contrition. And through this the solution to everything is clear.

Articulus 12 — Whether Confession Is Of Precept And Binds All

Whether confession is under a precept and obliges everyone?

§ 7. Next it is asked concerning what he says there, at A, after the beginning: Confession is there: The just man in the beginning of his speech is his own accuser [Proverbs 18:17].

§ 8. Seven things are asked here concerning confession. First, Whether confession is under a precept, or not? Second, Whether it is of natural or positive right? Third, How it was in the natural and the old law, and whether in the same mode or diverse? Fourth, Whether it is an work of some virtue, or only of a sacrament; and if of some virtue, which virtue is that? Fifth, What it is by definition, and essence, or being? Sixth, Which article of faith moves to confession? Seventh, On which attribute in God does it rest, whether of mercy, or of wisdom, or another?

§ 9. To the first it is objected thus: 1. Whatever is necessary for salvation is under a precept; confession is necessary for salvation; therefore it is under a precept. The first premise is clear from the common distinction of all between a precept and a counsel. The second is proved from the saying of Ambrose, who says thus: "No one can be justified, unless he has confessed his sin."

§ 10. 2. Also, a fulfilled precept gives entrance to life; but one who does not confess does not enter into life; therefore it seems that confession is under a precept. The first premise is proved by that of Matthew 19:17: If you will enter into life, keep the commandments. The second is commonly supposed by the Church.

§ 11. 3. Also, it is commanded to the pastors of the Church that they diligently know the face of their flock [Proverbs 27:23]; but they cannot know unless they know in what things it is sick, because in that part it needs guarding, not in the part where it is healthy. Therefore it seems that the flock itself is bound to expose the causes of its sicknesses; but this does not happen except through confession. Therefore it is commanded to them that they confess; therefore confession is under a precept.

§ 12. 4. Also, in corporal medicine the sick person is commanded to expose to the corporal physician in how many things, and in what things, and where he hurts. Since, therefore, spiritual sickness is more dangerous than that of the body, much more ought the spiritually sick person be commanded to expose the causes of his sicknesses to the spiritual physician.

§ 1. BUT AGAINST THIS: 1. If it is under a precept, then it equally obliges everyone; but some have been cleansed from sin who are not read to have confessed; therefore it does not seem to be under a precept. The proof of the first premise is from what is commonly said, that we are all bound to precepts, but not to counsels. The second is proved from what is held in Luke 7:47 concerning Mary Magdalene, to whom many sins were forgiven, not because she confessed, but because she loved much. And concerning Peter who denied, and yet is not read to have confessed, but to have wept. [547]

§ 2. 2. Also, nothing is required for the expulsion of one contrary except the introduction of the other contrary in the same subject; but without any confession, through the infusion of virtues which takes place in contrition, and the consuetudinal justice which takes place in satisfaction, a virtue contrary to any sin is introduced in the subject. Therefore it seems that this suffices for the expulsion of sin. Therefore the confession of sin is not necessary. Therefore it is not of precept.

§ 3. 3. Also, in sin there are only two things, namely the guilt and the penalty: because even if it is said that there is a difficulty in acting well there, that also is a certain penalty. But the guilt together with the eternal penalty conjoined to it is sufficiently expelled through contrition. But the remaining penalty, namely the debt of temporal penalty with the difficulty of acting well, is sufficiently expelled through satisfaction. Therefore confession is necessary for nothing. Therefore it ought not to be under a precept.

§ 4. 4. Also, in natures, for the perfection of a thing in being and in potency, nothing is required except the induction of form in matter, and the strengthening of the same in it. Therefore it is similarly in spiritual being: but the form of grace is sufficiently induced in the soul through contrition, and is sufficiently strengthened through satisfaction. Therefore confession is altogether superfluous. Therefore, etc.

§ 5. 5. Also, if confession is under a precept and among the things necessary for salvation, then it operates toward the forgiveness of sin in some way: either, therefore, in the penalty, or in the guilt. If in the guilt. AGAINST THIS: Before confession the guilt is frequently forgiven; therefore it does not operate toward the forgiveness of the guilt. But if it operates toward the deletion of the penalty. AGAINST THIS: Either that penalty is eternal, or not. If eternal. AGAINST THIS: It is adjoined to the guilt, and while the guilt stands it stands, and when it is dissolved it is dissolved: but it has been held that the guilt is dissolved in contrition; therefore confession does not operate against the eternal penalty. But if it is a temporal penalty. AGAINST THIS: Nothing operates against another thing except through the fact that it is contrary to it; confession does not have contrariety to the penalty temporally due to sin. Therefore it does not expel it, as it seems.

§ 6. 6. Also, a wholly corporal act does not seem to be expulsive of sin; but confession of the mouth is a wholly corporal act; therefore it is not expulsive of sin.

§ 7. FURTHERMORE it is asked here: If it is under a precept, of what kind is that precept?

§ 8. For it is either ceremonial, or sacramental, or judicial, or moral.

§ 9. 1. If purely ceremonial: then it seems that it ought not to be kept in the New Testament. PROOF. Whatever things have their whole use in signifying, cease when the truth which they signified arrives; the whole use of ceremonials is in signifying; therefore they cease in the New Testament, in which the truth which they signified has been made manifest. The first premise is proved from the fact that nothing is useless in the works of the Church; and it would be useless that what has use only in signifying should be kept when the truth has been made manifest: because anyone is better instructed through the manifestation of the truth than through a type and figure. But the second premise is prescribed by the Master in Book IV of the Sentences. [548]

§ 10. 2. But if it is said to be sacramental:

§ 1. ...either of the New Testament, or of the Old. Now it is established that it is not of the Old, because then it would have ceased in the New, just like the other sacraments of the Old Testament. If it is of the New Testament. On the contrary: Nothing in the New Testament is a sacrament except by divine institution: confession is not read to have had divine institution: therefore it does not belong to the sacraments of the New Testament.

§ 2. But if it is said to be a judicial precept. On the contrary: Judicial precepts vary according to the diversity of humans and sects; but confession does not vary in this way: therefore it does not belong to the judicial precepts.

§ 3. But if it is said to belong to the moral precepts: then it is asked, to what is it reduced? For in word [i.e., regarding speech] they consist only of two: one pertaining to God, namely, 'You shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain'; and the other to neighbor, 'You shall not speak false witness against your neighbor'. But it is established that it is not reduced to the first, because it is not an oath; nor to the second, since nothing is said there against a neighbor: therefore it seems that it falls under no genus of precepts, namely moral ones.

§ 4. 3. If perhaps it is said that it belongs to the precepts of the Fathers. On the contrary: Nothing that is of the precepts of the Fathers is a part of a sacrament, or a sacrament: confession is of the precepts of the Fathers: therefore it is not a sacrament, or a part of a sacrament. The first is proved by this, that all sacraments with their essentials have their force from divine institution. The second is supposed from the hypothesis.

§ 5. Item, the precepts of the Fathers admit of dispensation, on the grounds that they are not concerning things necessary for salvation: therefore if confession is of the precepts of the Fathers, a dispensation could be made, such that someone might die without confession: which is not done in the Church, nor is it judged possible to be done.

§ 6. 4. If perhaps you say that this precept has divine institution, as when the Lord said to the lepers: 'Go, show yourselves to the priests.' On the contrary: Those priests to whom the Lord commanded the lepers to present themselves were legal [i.e., of the Old Law], and not true priests: therefore from this it is not held that confession should be made in the way the faithful confess in the New Testament.

547. James 5:16.

§ 7. Item, They were not commanded to confess, but only to show themselves cleansed: therefore from this it is not held that there must be confession by mouth: so that individual sins are recounted, as happens in the New Testament: therefore it still seems to be held that it is not commanded.

§ 8. 5. If perhaps you say that on account of enjoining penance the disease must be known: and therefore it is commanded to confess, and this precept is promulgated [549] where it says: 'Confess your sins to one another.' It seems that this is nothing: because penance cannot remit sins from condignity, but rather from congruity according to the priest's judgment, having weighed the powers and state of the penitent: and in this way sufficient satisfaction could be made in common, even without the sins being known: therefore it seems that it is not necessary on this account.

§ 9. 6. Item, Some bind themselves to perpetual penance and to a greater one than they would be forced to undertake according to the priest's judgment: therefore according to this they would not be bound to confess, which is false: therefore it seems that confession is not in any precept.

§ 10. Solution. I answer without prejudice that in confession there are three things that logically follow one another: of which the first is the manifestation of the sin with detestation and a sign of detestation. The second is the recounting of the perpetrated acts of sin which occur to memory. The third is the accusation of oneself in blaming oneself, and not excusing the act of sin through circumstances. And it seems it must be said that with respect to all these

three, it is under precept: but with respect to the first, it is only under divine precept, and the Church, by determining it, added and commanded the second and third, first in the Apostles, and afterward in the other successors of the Apostles: yet according to the testimony of the divine will: for the testimony of the divine will in the confession of the act of sin in species is held from the first question that He asked the first sinner, namely Adam, when He asked, 'Adam, where are you?'; for He did not ask about his place, but so that he would simply confess the act of sin. But the testimony of the divine will concerning the accusation of oneself, and that one should not excuse the sin, is held from the fact that He condemned Adam and Eve excusing themselves. Similarly in their descendants it has a sign of the recounting of acts in species, in the canticle of Hezekiah saying 'I will recount to you all my years in the bitterness of my soul'. The sign of accusation is had where it is said 'Incline not my heart to evil words, to make excuses in sins'. Therefore the Church, considering these things, taught by the Holy Spirit, instituted that every faithful person of either sex should confess their sins once a year: and because it was done by the instigation of the Holy Spirit, therefore also the precept of the Church in this is reduced to a divine precept.

§ 2. It must be said therefore to the first, that although the confession of blessed Peter and Mary Magdalene is not read, yet they confessed: because many things were done which are not written, as is hinted at the end of John [550], as is said in the following in the Letter by the Master.

548. Isaiah 38:15.

§ 3. Or it can be said perhaps better, that confession is made on account of two things, namely so that the penitent, according to his past way of life, might become known to the priest enjoining the penance, and so that he might merit from his shame. But since Christ was a true priest and God, neither had to be done before Him: because He Himself as God saw those things that were in the heart, and penitents were more ashamed at His gaze than at the hearing of a priest alone: and therefore it was not necessary to impose the recounting of sins upon those penitents who were absolved by Him immediately: but before the vicars of Christ who do not see inward things, and at whose bodily gaze a human is not so shamed, there must be a hearing of sins in confession on the part of the one confessing.

§ 4. To the next it must be said, that because of the inherence of one of the contraries in a subject, many things are sometimes required for the removal of the other contrary: and especially when there is fear of its return, and when the cause holding the contrary in the subject lies hidden from the one expelling it: and so it is with sin which is feared to return: there is also a hidden proneness on the part of the one sinning: and therefore many things are required for the expulsion of sin, such as the detestation of sin, and the induction of a contrary custom through works of satisfaction: but if the contrary could immediately be expelled without fear of return, and it were known by what it could be best expelled: then what the objection proves would be true.

§ 5. To the next it must be said that (as was said above) all these three parts of penance operate jointly against sin: but it is not necessary that all be present in act, but it is sufficient for two or one to be in purpose, and the other or others to be in act.

§ 6. But if what it says is conceded: then it must be said that temporal penalty is twofold, namely disproportionate and proportionate by the power of the keys: and the penalty disproportionate to the powers of the penitent is owed to the one not having confessed, because the power of the keys has not yet operated in him, which keys, I say, having power from the passion of Christ, dismiss the greater part of the penance or penalty owed to sin through the rationale of condignity: and therefore after confession, by the virtue of the keys, the penalty is made taxable and arbitrary, which in itself

was not taxable, because it was disproportionate to the powers of the penitent, but corresponding to the condignity of the sin: and therefore it is clear that confession is necessary for the deletion of sin.

§ 2. To the next it must be said, that in nature things are different where nature operates, and where art aids nature: for what is said in objecting is true where nature alone operates. But this is not similar to the work of sacramental grace: because then a minister of the sacrament would not be required, who is called a physician in Scripture 'Will you work wonders for the dead? Or shall physicians raise them up, and praise you?' But rather it is that work where art aids nature, and in that it is required that the artisan know the disease and the cause and the quantity and duration of the disease before he can aid in the expulsion of the disease: and so it is in the work of penance: and therefore confession is required for the

549. James 5:16.

manifestation of the sin: yet especially for that cause, because confession operates to the diminution of the penalty: which is why also satisfaction is so called by Augustine saying: 'He offered much satisfaction who, mastering his shame, hid none of the things he committed from the messenger of God'.

§ 3. To the next it must be said, that (as has already been established) it operates per se to the deletion of the penalty, or of the sin according to the debt of penalty.

§ 4. To the objection to the contrary, it must be said that it happens in two ways that something is contrary to another, namely in itself, when they are most distant in the same genus, and mutually expel one another from a susceptible subject: and thus penalty is not contrary to penalty, nor confession to sin in penalty. There is also a contrary, because it somehow makes a contrary in effect: and thus confession makes a contrariety to sin, and pays the debt of penalty. For in the perpetration of sin there was a shamelessness before God who sees all things and His Angels, and a casting away of the passion of Christ for sins through contempt, which is the root of every mortal sin: and confession has the contraries of these when a man is ashamed before the vicar of God, and humbly submits himself to the keys having power from the passion of Christ: therefore it operates to the expulsion of sin.

§ 5. To the next it must be said, that it is not entirely a bodily act: because it proceeds from a lower virtue of the mind: just as also giving bodily alms has its force from the virtue of the mind which inclines to giving.

§ 6. But if it is asked, How can this be? It must be said that the power of the mover is in the motion and in the movable thing, whether it moves in the manner of nature, or in the manner of will: just as the power of the mover in the motion of heaven, on account of which it is said to be a certain life for all things existing below. So also, because virtue and grace move in the manner of nature, the power of virtue and grace remains even in bodily motions and works: and through that power it operates to the deletion of sin, and the augment of merit.

§ 7. To that which is further asked, the solution is clear through the things which were said in the beginning of this solution, that it is of divine precept according to the fact that it is a certain manifestation of sins: but this manifestation according to the progress of time had an increment, as also other things operating for salvation: and therefore it received determination from the Apostles and from the Church: and it can still receive a further one than it has, if it seems expedient.

§ 8. To this, however, which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that penance was instituted in paradise according to all its parts: because otherwise it would not put sin to death, and give life to justice: and some say that it was in that word: 'On whatever day you shall eat of it, you shall die the death': and it received innovation from Christ in the New Testament

550. John 21:25.

§ 1. 'Do penance: for the kingdom of heaven is at hand.' Now it is established that he did not intend penance, except insofar as it is perfected in its parts: and therefore confession is understood to have been instituted.

§ 2. Yet special mention is made of confession , where it is said that they came to John confessing their sins: and this same thing is understood that they did when receiving the baptism of Christ, as the Master says in the second part of this distinction.

§ 3. There it is also understood to have been instituted, as was said in the objection, namely , where Christ said to the lepers that they should show themselves to the priests, and offer for themselves the gift which Moses appointed.

§ 4. To this, however, which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that it is a sacramental precept variously in the law of nature, the old, and the new, receiving determination through the Fathers by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit: but as it is now observed, it is a sacramental precept of the New Testament: and it is already clear where it was instituted.

§ 5. To the next it must be said, that it is not of the Fathers in such a way that the Fathers promulgated the whole of it, but rather because the Fathers determined it: and therefore it does not admit of dispensation from a pure man.

§ 6. To the next it must be said, that those priests and lepers are considered in two ways, namely as simple men serving God in the state of the Old Testament, before legal observances were deadened by the passion of Christ: and as a figure of future things, indeed the lepers are those confessing, and the priests are the priests of the New Testament. And in the first way indeed the objection proceeds: but in the second way the will of Christ is signified to be about the showing of sin signified by leprosy, and about satisfaction signified by the gift: and this will of Christ was expressed by the Apostles in the precept of confession , where it is said: 'Confess your sins to one another.'

§ 7. To the next it must be said, that it is necessary to know the disease, as was said before: but this is not the principal reason for which confession was instituted, but rather on account of the operation of the keys which joins perfection to the penitent: hence what the objection posits is secondary in the cause of confession: and yet what it intends to prove does not follow, because an arbiter must know concerning the cause of which he is the arbiter: hence since the priest does not only look at the powers, but the cause of taking up the owed penalty, he must know in how many and in what things one has offended.

§ 8. To the last it must be said that even if one binds oneself to perpetual penance, than which no greater will ever be enjoined, nevertheless for the said reasons he must make a confession of all sins.

Articulus 13 — Whether Confession Is Of Natural Or Positive Law

Whether confession is of natural or positive law?

§ 9. Secondly it is asked, Whether it is of natural or positive law?

§ 10. Now it seems to be of natural law: 1. For Adam is blamed for this, that he excused his offense when he should have humbly confessed: therefore he sinned against a law not yet written, because there was none written or positive: therefore it is left that he sinned against natural law: therefore confession is of natural law.

§ 11. 2. Item, it is objected concerning Cain, of whom the Lord asked what he had done: and he is blamed because he did not humbly acknowledge and confess: therefore since at that time there was nothing but natural law, he seems to have sinned against natural law.

§ 12. 3. This also seems through the Gloss on

that text, 'Adam, where are you?' where the Gloss says thus: The words of one rebuking and compelling to confession, not of one who is ignorant. If therefore He compelled to confession, he was bound to confess: and it is established that he was not bound from positive law, because then there was none: therefore he was bound from natural law: therefore confession is of natural law.

§ 2. 4. Item, on that text of Genesis 'The woman, whom you gave me as a companion, gave me of the tree, and I ate': the Gloss says: Not humbly confessing, but proudly excusing himself, and throwing the blame back on the author of the woman. Therefore humble confession was then owed, because otherwise he would not be blamed for the opposite: and from this as before.

§ 3. 5. Item, on that text of the Psalm 'Incline not my heart to evil words, etc.', the Gloss says: For this place a door, that my sin may not be excused: which highest vice dominates in men, whence they are slower to repent. Now it is established that, other things being equal, it is more and a greater thing to sin against natural law than against positive law: since therefore this vice is the highest, it seems to be against natural law: therefore its opposite, namely the humble confession of an offense, is of natural law.

§ 4. 6. Item 'If I have hidden my sin as a man, and concealed my iniquity in my bosom.' Now it is established that Job was under natural law: therefore it is of natural law to confess sin.

§ 5. 7. Item, in the same place, Gregory in the Gloss: One who is truly humble both knows his evil deeds, and opens them with the voice of confession. Since therefore true humility concerning sins is of natural law, it seems that to open sins with the voice of confession is of natural law.

§ 6. 8. Item, Gregory in the same place in another Gloss: To conceal iniquity in one's bosom, is to hide one's conscience in the hiding places of sin, and not uncover it through confession. Since therefore Job says this in the state of natural law, it seems that confession is of natural law, and its opposite is against natural law.

§ 7. 9. Item, It is established that penance is of natural law: therefore its parts as well, because it itself is not without them: but one of its parts is confession: therefore confession is of natural law.

§ 8. 10. Item, Penance is a certain whole, as was held before, which has several parts constituting it from a certain order: and in that order the first is contrition which is of natural law, and the last is satisfaction which is of natural law: therefore since confession is the middle, it itself is also of natural law. Or let it be said why not.

§ 9. But if this is conceded, it is objected to the contrary in this way: 1. Isidore says that natural law is the same among all people: but confession was not always the same among all: therefore confession is not of natural law. The minor premise is proved from this, that confession is otherwise in the New Testament, and was otherwise in the Old.

§ 10. 2. Item, the Philosopher in the V of the Ethics [551] says that the right of nature is in the same mode in all things: as fire has the same power of burning in Persia and in Greece. And from this it is argued as before.

§ 11. 3. Item, Tully: The law of nature is that which opinion did not engender, but a certain power inserted in nature. Now it is established that no power inserted in nature commands man to confess his sin, but rather teaches him to hide it lest he be shamed by men: therefore confession is not of natural law, as it seems.

§ 12. Solution. I answer without prejudice, that natural law is spoken of in two ways, namely what the nature of man dictates is to be done: and thus it is called natural law strictly. In another way that is called natural which is constituted by naturing nature [the Creator]:

and thus whatever is contained in the Old or New Testament is said to be of natural law: and in this latter way confession can in some way be of natural law, but not in the first.

§ 2. To this therefore which is first objected, through which it seems to be proved that it is of natural law in the first way said: it must be said that Adam is blamed for this, that he did not acknowledge his sin in himself, and before God, but not for this, that he did not confess to a human: because then there was no one besides his wife, who could not hear confession: and this recognition of sin which is before God, is of natural law.

§ 3. And through this the solution is clear to the following which is objected concerning Cain.

§ 4. To the next it must be said, that confession is twofold, namely the recognition of sin between oneself and God, and the manifestation of sin through a recounting made to a priest. And concerning confession spoken of in the first way it is said 'I said: I will confess against myself my injustice to the Lord: and you forgave, etc.' But concerning it spoken of in the second way it is said 'With the mouth confession is made unto salvation.' And the Gloss introduced from Genesis is understood of it spoken of in the first way, and not of it spoken of in the second way, which is only sacramental: nor were all bound to that at that time.

§ 5. To the next it must be said, that it is argued concerning the excusing of sin before God, not before man, as was said.

§ 6. To the next it must be said, that that is not called the highest vice simply by reason of guilt or deformity, but because it is a sin among others more contrary to penance: because penance is only in one recognizing, but one excusing does not recognize sin: and a similar saying is in Romans [552], on that text: 'Do you not know that the benignity of God leads you to penance?' where the Gloss of Ambrose says: You sin most gravely if you do not know: not by reason of the quantity of the sin in guilt and deformity, but rather of the danger: because one not knowing his fall, does not seek a remedy, and therefore remains in danger.

§ 7. To the next it must be said, that Job does not understand this of the hiding which is in confession made to a priest, but rather of the hiding which one does when caught in a sin, when he denies having committed the sin, so that he may seem just to others. And this exposition is drawn from the Gloss in the same place: and therefore that is not to the proposition.

§ 8. To the next it must be said, that it does not follow, if one who is truly humble opens his sin with the voice of confession, and if true humility is of natural law, that confession made by voice is also of natural law: because confession made by voice does not always in every state follow upon one who is truly humble and recognizing his state: hence this happens to one who is truly humble in some state, not in every one: hence the sophistic locus of accident [i.e., the fallacy of accident] happens there.

§ 9. To the next it must be said, that Gregory speaks of one who, caught in a sin, denies having committed it: or he speaks mystically of the time of grace in which a man is bound to confess his sins to a priest.

§ 10. To the next it must be said, that penance is considered in two ways, namely according to the fact that it is in the genus of virtue, and according to the fact that it is in the genus of sacrament. According to the fact that it is in the genus of virtue, it does not have parts, but is saved in contrition alone, according as contrition is the act of the one contrite: and satisfaction then will be a species of justice, and then confession made to a man is not required for penance, but that which is made to God in the heart in the recognition of sin is sufficient. But according to the fact that it is in the genus of the sacrament of the new or old law, it is not of natural law, just as certain other sacraments are not: and thus it has these three parts, which are attributed to it.

§ 11. To the next it must be said, that these three parts of penance are not in the same way: because the first and last parts regard the sin in the penitent according to fault, or according to penalty. But confession does not regard this except what is in the minister

of the Church, who is constituted for the dispensation of the sacrament, and has the power of the keys: and therefore the first and last parts are of natural law, but not the middle, which does not regard anything except only those things which belong to the sacrament, and not to the virtue of penance, except perhaps with respect to the recognition of sin before God. But this is not confession as we are now inquiring about confession: and therefore it does not

551. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book V.

follow, if the first and last parts are of natural law, that the middle one is too: because its parts are not in the same way.

Articulus 14 — Which Were Of Natural Law Therefore Confession Was Not Then Observed Moreover It Is Not Asked Here What Someone Did But That To Which All Were Bound

How differently was confession in natural, old, and new law?

§ 2. Thirdly it is asked, According to what different mode was it in the natural, old, and new law?

§ 3. For it seems not to have been in the natural law: because, as has already been held, 1. Confession is not of natural law: but at that time only those things which were of natural law were observed: therefore confession was not observed then.

§ 4. 2. Item, it is not asked here, What anyone did, but that to which all were bound? Therefore even if someone then confessed his sin, provided however that not all were bound to confession, it seems that confession was not in natural law.

§ 5. 3. Item, Since there was no use of the keys, there could not be that which did not have its effect except through the keys: but in the natural law there was no use of the keys: therefore neither was there even confession which is not had except through the keys.

§ 6. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Whenever there is a disease, it is time for medicine: but there was always the disease of actual sin in the natural law: therefore confession was always a medicine: therefore in the natural law confession was necessary, as it seems. Similarly, It seems that it was in the law of Moses: because [553] it is said: 'Relate if you have anything, that you may be justified.' As if saying: If you do not relate, you will not be justified.

§ 7. 2. Item [554], it is said that the priest shall imprecate the sins of the whole multitude upon the head of the goat, and send it away into the desert. Now it is established that he cannot imprecate sins which he did not know: therefore he had to know: but he could not know unless through confession: therefore they were bound then to confess to the priest.

§ 8. 3. Item [555], concerning lepers it is said that they were separated at the judgment of the priest, and he recognized concerning the leprosy: but leprosy according to the Gloss in the same place signifies sin: therefore the priest must recognize concerning sins: but he cannot unless they are manifested to him through confession: therefore they were bound then to confess to the priest.

§ 9. ON THE CONTRARY: As was held above, the principal cause of confession is on account of the benefit of the keys: but there were no true keys in the Old Testament: therefore neither was there true confession.

§ 10. Solution. It must be said that in truth the recognition of sin is in confession, and with this the manifestation of sin: and thirdly, the unraveling or exposition of sins in species and of

552. Romans 2:4.

their circumstances. And confession was not in the natural law except with respect to the recognition of sin between oneself and God, as was said. But in the law of Moses there was added some manifestation of sin, but in general, not in species: in a sign, not in a word. Because by offering a she-goat or a kid, it was known that they had sinned: but because this sacrifice was for any sin done through ignorance, there was no manifestation except in general, and not in species. In the New Testament, however, the recounting of species and other circumstances is required on account of a greater expression of truth and appearance of grace.

§ 11. To the first therefore it must be said, that the reco-

gnition of sin is always of natural law: and with respect to this alone there was confession in the law of nature.

§ 2. To the next it must be said, that all were bound to a recognition of sin of this sort, and that they should not deny it if they were caught, as is held from the authorities of Gregory introduced in the preceding article of the question.

§ 3. To the next it must be said, that it is true that then there was no use of the keys: yet then the passion operated and made the penalty proportionate, which otherwise would have been disproportionate: but it operated in the faith of those believing implicitly or explicitly.

§ 4. To the next it must be said, that in the old law there was some confession, but not as it is now in species and circumstance, but in general: and of this the saying of Isaiah is understood.

§ 5. To the next it must be said, that the priest did not confess the sins of the multitude except in general: and he understood them in general by the mode of sacrifices, and not by recounting of mouth.

§ 6. To the next it must be said, that the diversity of leprosies did not signify what was to be done then, but what is to be done now in the time of grace: and therefore it is not concluded that they confessed sins then in species and circumstances.

Articulus 15 — Whether Confession Is An Act Of Virtue, Or Only Of The Sacrament

Whether confession is an act of a virtue, or only of a sacrament?

§ 7. Fourthly it is asked, Whether it is an act of some virtue, or only of a sacrament? And if it is an act of some virtue, what is that virtue?

Now it seems that it is of the virtue of penance: because 1. It is for the detestation of sin: and the virtue of penance detests sin: therefore confession is of the virtue of penance, as it seems.

§ 8. 2. Item, Acts are defined by their opposites, that is, objects: therefore those of which there is the same object, are acts of the same virtue: but a perpetrated sin is the same object of confession and of penance: therefore confession is an act of the virtue of penance.

553. Isaiah 43:26.

§ 9. 3. Item, Those of which there is the same end, are of the same virtue if it is a proximate end: but the end of penance and confession is the same, namely the destruction of sin: therefore they are of one virtue: but they are not so of one that both are acts of a single third virtue; therefore the virtue itself is penance, and its act is confession, or one of its acts, as it seems.

§ 10. 4. Item, Some virtue elicits this act whatever it may be: now it is established, as Tully says, that virtue moves in the manner of nature: therefore it omits nothing of what is necessary for it: but what is necessary for the expulsion of sin is confession: therefore it does not omit this motion: therefore it seems that confession itself is a motion of the virtue of penance.

§ 11. But on the contrary it seems that it is a motion of the virtue which is truth: because 1. On that text of the Psalm 'For behold you have loved truth, etc.', the Gloss says: Truth, because I do not refer the fault to you, but I profess the truth which you love: now it is established that to speak truth is of the virtue which is truth: therefore confession is of the virtue which is truth.

§ 12. 2. Item, In the same place another Gloss: Here the penitent receives [grace], because in confessing he spoke the truth which God seeks above sacrifices, he supplicates that he be assisted. From this the same thing is accepted as before.

§ 13. 3. Item, Some act is proper to truth, as it is in sayings. Now it is established that there is none, except to speak the truth: but this especially happens in confession: for concerning all things which he says of himself, the penitent is believed without a witness: therefore confession is an act of truth, as it seems.

§ 14. 4. Item, The opposite of the truth which is in confession, is not the same in penance,

namely the lie of confession: therefore confession is not an act of penance.

§ 5. Also, the statement of the one confessing generates belief in the listener: but it is established that it does not do this except insofar as it is under the form of truth: therefore it seems that confession is under the form of truth: but this form of truth which is in act, emanates from some habit: but it is established that it emanates only from truth: therefore it seems that it is an act of truth.

BUT AGAINST both of these it is said that: § 1. The act of no sacrament is necessarily of some virtue: but confession is an act of a sacrament: therefore it is not an act of any virtue.

§ 2. Also, no act equally proceeding from a vicious person who has neither infused nor customary virtue, is an act of virtue: confession is an act of this kind: therefore it is not an act of any virtue. The first premise is self-evident. The second is proven from the fact that someone wishing to turn away from sin, and who even to others is not accustomed to tell the truth, often confesses in truth concerning all his sins. And it is established that then he does

554. Leviticus 16:21.

not have infused virtues, nor does he even have the customary one which is called truth, because that is not innate except through custom: therefore the proposition is established.

§ 3. Also, virtue is concerning the difficult and the good: but it is not difficult to tell the truth: therefore there is no virtue concerning it: therefore it is not of any virtue which is truth. Proof of the middle premise. It is more difficult to speak against one's mind, than according to one's mind: but a liar speaks against his mind, while a truthful person speaks according to his mind: therefore the truthful person labors less than the liar: therefore the proposition is established.

Solution. I respond that some good and praiseworthy act is said to belong to some virtue in two ways, namely as commanding, and as eliciting. As commanding, however, the act of confession can belong to several virtues: but more frequently it belongs to the virtue which is called penance, concerning which it was treated above. As eliciting, indeed, this act is of the virtue which is called truth, as is proven in objecting.

To that therefore which is first objected, it must be said that confession has certain things from its own rationale and substance, and certain things from the commanding virtue. From its own substance it has nothing but the simple narration of truth, but from the commanding virtue it has that it be with detestation of sin. And still it must be added, that according as it takes on the rationale of a sacrament, it has that this narration be made to a minister of the Church with certain signs signifying the detestation of sin, and the obedience of the will toward undertaking exterior penance through the judgment of the priest: and thus what is attended to in confession is made up as if from three things. But the objection would proceed well if it had what it says from its own substance.

To the other it must be said that that matter is given to it according to the command of penance, and according to the being of a sacrament, which is concerning whatever matter in which the form of truth is present.

To the other it must be said that the proximate end of confession and of penance is not the same, but the remote end is: for the proximate end is that into which the act terminates, and that is the knowledge which it generates in the listener: but the ultimate end does not make it so that the things which are for that end are the same in species or in number.

To the other it must be said that penance is not lacking in the motion itself, but it only has it through the mode of command.

To the other it must be said that nothing prohibits some act from being both of a sacrament and of a virtue, according to different rationales: and this especially in this sacrament, which is ordered against actual sin, which is contrary to the virtue that regards the act of free will. Hence, regarding the simple enunciation of truth itself, it is the confession of truth which is a virtue: but according as it is in such a forum and form and with such signs, it is an act of a sacrament: and nothing prohibits this.

To the OTHER it must be said that this act does not proceed from a vicious person insofar as he is vicious, but from one having some truth, either in the power of free will, or according

to grace, or according to a civil habit. For if the penitent is in charity when he confesses, then there is no objection. If however he is truthful by custom, even if he is in other vices: again there is no objection: because of customary virtues, in my judgment, one can be possessed while another is not possessed. If however he does not even have a customary virtue: then it must be said that that act of truth in the one confessing is from the free will capable of passing into an act generative of a customary virtue: for although virtues according to habit and the vice opposed to them cannot be present together, nevertheless an act ordered to generating a virtue can be present together with a vice, even one opposed to the virtue: and therefore that act is not from a vicious person insofar as he is vicious.

Articulus 16 — Whether The Definitions Of Penance Are Well Given

Are the definitions of penance [i.e., confession] well given?

Are the definitions of penance well given?

Fifthly it is asked, What is it in definition and essence?

Now, several definitions of confession are found, all of which that occur to us we shall set down.

It is defined by the Masters who preceded us thus: "Confession is the sacramental accusation of his sins by the delinquent, from shame and satisfactory through the keys, obliging to the performance of enjoined penance."

But other predecessors of ours define it thus: "Confession is the legitimate explanation of sins."

Gregory: "Confession is the uncovering of sins, and the breaking open of a wound."

Augustine thus: "Confession is that by which a hidden disease is opened in the hope of pardon."

Certain novices, indeed, like Raymond, have defined it thus: "Confession is the legitimate declaration of sins before a priest."

It is objected concerning the first definition thus: § 1. "Sacramental" is denominative from sacrament: but no denominating term becomes substantial to that which it denominates: therefore the sacrament is not substantial to confession, which is false, since confession is under the sacrament as a part under the whole.

§ 2. Also, since confession is an act of the virtue moving to confession, it ought thus to say, "the accusation by the delinquent of virtue," etc., just as "sacramental."

§ 3. Also, as the act of virtue is related to virtue, so the act of a sacrament is related to a sacrament: but no act of virtue is said to be virtuous, but rather properly of a virtue: therefore no act of a sacrament ought to be "sacramental," but rather of a sacrament.

555. Leviticus 13:44.

§ 4. Also, intinction is not said to be a "baptismal" act, nor consignation a "confirmational" act: therefore it seems that neither should confession be called "sacramental."

§ 5. Also, why is it not denominated from its proximate genus, so that it would be said, "Confession is the penitential [accusation] of the delinquent," etc.? For it seems that it ought to be done thus: because confession is related more proximately to penance, than to sacrament in general: therefore it ought rather to be denominated from that.

§ 6. Also, it is objected concerning what is said, "Of the delinquent": for confession does not seem to belong to the delinquent [i.e., one currently offending], but to one who has offended, and is repenting.

§ 7. Also, no delinquent, insofar as he is such, is a penitent: but every confessor, insofar as he is such, is a penitent: therefore no penitent, insofar as he is such, is a delinquent: therefore confession is not of a delinquent.

§ 8. If perhaps you say that it is understood of venial fault, in which we all offend in many things: without which, as Augustine says, life is not led. Against this: the act of such a delinquent is prayer and many other things: therefore just as it falls into the definition of confession, so it ought to fall into the definition of prayer, contrition, charity, and all other things.

§ 9. Moreover, this is accidental according to that exposition, "confession is the sacramental accusation of his sins by the delinquent": because the sense is, of him who daily offends: but nothing accidental ought to be posited in a definition, especially what is accidental in this way, because this is infinite, and nothing can be made known through it: therefore the ancients spoke badly in defining that confession is the accusation of the delinquent.

§ 10. Further, it is objected concerning what is said, "Accusation." For before a rhetorician and in civil law the accuser and the defendant are not the same: but here the one confessing presents himself as the defendant: therefore it seems that he is not the accuser: therefore confession is not an accusation.

§ 11. Also, no one is justly accused in judgment to whom a place of defense is not granted: if therefore the confessor is accused by someone, whether by another or by himself, a place of defense ought to be granted to him in the same forum: and thus it will not be a vice of confession if it is with a defense of sins, which is false, since Psalm 140:4 says: "Incline not my heart to evil words; to make excuses in sins."

Moreover it is asked, since conscience is the witness, why is it not called "testification" just as "accusation"?

§ 12. Further it is asked concerning what it says, "From shame." Because this does not seem to be substantial to confession: because not everyone can have shame.

§ 13. Also, as sensible sorrow is related to contrition, so shame is related to confession: but contrition is not defined through sensible sorrow: therefore neither is confession to be defined through shame, as it seems.

§ 14. Also, upon that of Psalm 68:20: "Thou knowest my reproach, and my confusion," etc., Augustine distinguishes in the Gloss between shame or modesty, and confusion: because confusion is with a remorse of conscience, when true things are objected. But shame is when false things are objected with modesty. Since therefore the one confessing feels modesty with a remorse of conscience, it seems that it ought rather to have said, "from confusion," than "shame."

§ 15. Also, it does not seem to be true that from this shame it is satisfactory: because that passion of shame is also corporeal: and no corporeal passion is meritorious: therefore from that confession is not satisfactory.

§ 16. Further it is asked concerning what it says, "Through the keys." For what is satisfactory without the keys, does not have the power of satisfying through the keys: confession is of this kind: therefore it does not have the power of satisfying through the keys. The first premise is self-evident. The second is proven: because in the Old Testament there were no keys, and yet there was there in some way sacramental confession: and in the New Testament sometimes confession is made to one not having the keys, and yet the confession is satisfactory.

§ 17. Moreover, it is objected concerning what is said, "Satisfactory." Because satisfaction is a dividing part of penance with confession: therefore one ought not to be posited in the definition of the other.

§ 18. Also. Things which are diverse in species, their proper acts and effects are diverse: confession and satisfaction are diverse in species: therefore their proper acts and effects are diverse: but it is established that the most proper act of satisfaction is to satisfy: therefore that act does not belong to confession: therefore confession is not satisfactory, as it seems.

§ 19. Further it is asked concerning what it says, "Obliging," etc. For the one confessing is not obliged from the fact that he confesses, but rather from the subsequent will, by which he receives the satisfaction heard and taxed for him: therefore confession is not obliging, as it seems.

§ 20. Also, if it obliges to satisfaction: therefore every confession obliges to it. Let us posit therefore, that someone frequently confesses the same sin to several priests, and they enjoin different penances, any one of which by itself would suffice: therefore this person is obliged to perform all of them: therefore from confession he is obliged to a greater penance than he ought to sustain from the sin. And this is incongruous, since confession according to itself diminishes something of the penalty due to sin.

§ 21. Also, whether the enjoined penance is insufficient, or too great: still it seems that he would be obliged to it: and thus confession would burden him, and not alleviate him, which is very incongruous.

§ 22. Also, it is objected concerning what it says, "Enjoined." For it seems from this that that penance cannot be changed by another: and this is false.

§ 23. Also, we see relaxations being made all day long through indulgences concerning enjoined penances: therefore it seems that confessors are not obliged to perform enjoined penances.

But concerning the second definition it is objected, by which older authorities said that "confession is the legitimate explanation of sins."

§ 1. For "legitimate" is what is taught by law, or issued by law: and we do not find the manner of confession expressed in the new or old law: therefore it seems that it is not a legitimate explanation of sins.

§ 2. Also, it seems that it is not only of sins: because he is also bound to confess circumstances sometimes: and thus it seems to be diminished.

§ 3. Also, it does not seem to be an explanation, but a simple narration: for the one confessing does not expound sins, but simply narrates them.

IT IS ALSO OBJECTED concerning that of Gregory concerning what he says, "The uncovering of sins." § 1. For since uncovering a sin is ordered toward the scandal of the neighbor, it seems that sins are not to be uncovered, but rather covered.

§ 2. Also, Isaiah 3:9, those who uncover their sins are blamed, when it says: "They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they have not hid it." Therefore confession will not be an uncovering.

§ 3. Further it is asked concerning what he says, "The breaking open of a wound." For this is a metaphorical locution: therefore it ought not to be posited in the definition of that to which the metaphor is applied: but this is confession: therefore it ought not to be posited in the definition of confession.

§ 4. Also, it is established that the uncovering of a sin and the breaking open of a wound are the same, differing only through significant locution: therefore neither contracts the other: but the uncovering of sin can be done well and badly, and confession only well: therefore the uncovering of sin is related more commonly than confession, and it is contracted: therefore the definition is not convertible with the defined: therefore it is not proper to it: which is incongruous, whether it be a definition, or a description through proper attributes.

FURTHER it is asked concerning that of Augustine: "Confession is that by which a hidden disease is opened in the hope of pardon." § 1. For not only a hidden disease is opened by confession, but also an open disease: because general confession is of all things, whether hidden or open: therefore he says badly, "hidden disease."

§ 2. Also, if it is hidden: then let it be asked, to whom is it hidden? Either to the priest and others: or to the priest alone, or to others alone. And whichever of these is given, there will not be confession concerning a crime open to the priest and others, or to the priest alone, or to others alone: which is incongruous, since confession is of all things.

§ 3. Moreover, it is asked concerning what he says, "In the hope of pardon." Because frequently, confession is made more from the fear of penalty: therefore it ought to have been defined through the fear of penalty.

§ 4. Also, let us grant that this person does not confess in the hope of pardon: and yet conceals nothing of the things he did from the priest: therefore this person will not have confessed, and is bound to iterate the confession, which is not said.

§ 5. Further it is asked concerning what he says, "Is opened." For it seems that it is rather closed: because that which is said in confession, is closed by the seal of confession: therefore it does not open.

FURTHER it is asked concerning the last, which says that "confession is the legitimate narration of sins before a priest."

For it seems that it is not always before a priest, since it is said, James 5:16: "Confess your sins one to another." And there the Gloss says: "Greater ones to greater persons, lesser ones to lesser persons." And it does not say that it ought always to be done to a priest.

And because a great tract on this occurs in the following distinction, let these suffice for now.

Solution. It must be said that the first definition is better than all the others: because it gathers all the essential things, and the proper subject, and the end, and those things whence it draws the power of deleting sin. For the essential things are those which are touched upon when it is said, "Sacramental accusation." For accusation is the genus, and sacramental is the difference distinguishing it from civil and rhetorical accusation. "Of the delinquent," however, contracts it just as the subject specifies a passion: because as the Commentator says on Metaphysics VII: "The proper subject in the definition of a passion is in place of the ultimate difference which is convertible, as the Philosopher says in First Philosophy VII." Those things, however, whence it draws the power of deleting sin, are shame and the keys: while its end is that satisfaction be taxed, which he obliges himself to perform.

To THAT therefore which is first objected concerning what it says, "Sacramental," it must be said that a contracting difference through the mode of quality is in the definition, although it is an essential quality: and because accusation is not properly a sacrament, but its act, therefore it is not an essential quality of a sacrament except informatively and denominatively: and therefore although confession according to itself is a sacrament, nevertheless because it is defined here through an act, and the act is denominated from the sacrament, therefore it is defined denominatively.

Or it can be said that "sacramental," just like "rational," is said in two ways, namely as a difference which makes a sacrament to be a sacrament: and in this way it is not predicated denominatively of the defined, just as neither is "rational" when it is said, "Man is a rational animal": and thus sacramental accusation is said here, which is a certain sacrament, just as a rational animal is a certain animal: and sacramental is not posited as denominating, but rather in the act of a constituting difference. In another way sacramental is said from the power of a

sacrament following upon the being of the sacrament itself: and concerning that it is true that it is denominative, just as "rational" is accepted concerning the power of reasoning following upon the being of man: and through this the solution to the first is evident.

To the SECOND, it must be said that a falsehood is supposed in the objection: because an act is sometimes denominated from a virtue: hence it is called a "virtual" act or an act "of virtue": and nevertheless if it is not granted to be done, it must be solved like the preceding.

To the other it must be said that sacramental dipping is called baptism, but not properly "baptismal": because baptism denominates the whole species of the sacrament, and not solely its difference by which it is signable through the mode of quality, but not the species: and thus it is called here "sacramental" and not "penitential"; and through this the solution to the following is evident.

To THAT which is objected concerning what it says, "Of the delinquent," it must be solved that he is called delinquent here according to habit, not according to act: not in such a way that he has the habit of sins, but because he had it, and is in the process of changing it into the habit of virtues: and such a person can well be in the state of penance.

To the other it must be said that it is true that no delinquent in act is a penitent, but a delinquent in the aforesaid way can be a penitent.

To the other it must be said that I well grant that it is not understood of venial fault.

To THAT which is further asked by objecting concerning accusation, it must be said that it is one thing in the forum of penance, and another in the forum of judgment. For in the forum of penance no one, however truthful, is believed against the one confessing, but nevertheless he is believed against himself: and therefore the accusation of the one confessing is stood by. But in the forum of exterior judgment it is totally the contrary: because nothing is believed there to a man for himself, but rather to another who is greater by exception: and therefore in that judgment one is the accuser, and another is the defendant and the accused.

To the other it must be said that when an accusation is made after conviction, no place of defense is given. And it is similar in confession: because the accusation is a testimony convicting the confessor through relation to conscience: and therefore no place of defense is given to him.

To the other it must be said that shame is twofold, namely spiritual, and that which leaves a passion in the body. But spiritual fear is in a base accusation lest it be manifested, or when it is manifested: as can be drawn from the words of Damascene: and that which is spiritual is required for confession, and not that which occurs in the body through exterior blushing: for as was held in the preceding, that varies according to the diverse complexion of men.

To the other it must be said that that proof is good enough: because it is granted that nothing is required except spiritual shame.

To the other it must be said that that Gloss most properly accepts confusion and shame: but here shame is taken commonly for confusion.

To the other it must be said that a passion, according as it is done and informed by the will, even if it is inflicted, is meritorious, as is evident in the preceding question concerning contrition.

To the other it must be said that a confession which is not subjected to the keys actually, is not a confession simply speaking, but in a qualified sense: and I well grant that in the Old Testament there was no confession except in a qualified sense: and the reason for this is evident from the preceding article of the question. But a confession which is made to someone other than a priest, is not a confession except insofar as it supplies the place of confession: just as the baptism of penance [i.e., of John] is not baptism, except insofar as it supplies the place of baptism.

To the OTHER it must be said that there is one mode of satisfaction in confession, and another in that part which is strictly called satisfaction: because in confession there is satisfaction through the death and passion of Christ concerning the part of the penalty which is unproportionable, and therefore inarbitrable: but in satisfaction there is the deletion of the fault by a taxed penalty. Nor is it incongruous that contrition and confession take on the rationale of satisfaction in some way, according as satisfaction is taken broadly: because, as was held above, penance in some way is a totally homogenous whole in its parts: and thus a satisfying penalty is in all three.

To the other it must be said that those middle parts are between diverse and homogenous things: and therefore since they are not entirely diverse, what is objected does not hold. And the reason for this is very easily evident, if one looks at what was noted concerning those parts at the beginning of this distinction.

To the other it must be said that in truth the will of embracing enjoined penance is signified in confession: because just as it presupposes for itself according to reason and time contrition in reality or in the presumption of the priest, so it co-requires the will of obeying in the reception of enjoined satisfaction: and therefore from confession itself, by reason of what it requires in the penitent, he is obliged to it.

To the other it must be said that no penitent and confessor has several proper priests, but one only, and of that one alone is he bound to perform the penance which is enjoined according to the statutes of the canons: because otherwise it is not properly called enjoined satisfaction. If however he confesses out of abundance to others, he ought to inquire about the things enjoined by his proper priest, and superordinate nothing, if it is enjoined according to the statutes of the canons.

To the other the solution is evident through what has already been said: because it is not satisfaction properly, unless it is according to the judgment of the canons or of a canonical priest, and not according to the judgment of a man's will, which someone ignorant or malicious enjoins.

To the other it must be said that an enjoined penance can be changed for a cause by one who has authority: but then he perfects it in an equivalent either simply or according to the reputation of the Church.

Through what has been held the solution to the last is also evident: because indulgences are made in commutations according to an equivalent in the reputation of the Church, or simply.

To that which is objected concerning the second, it must be said that it does not gather anything except the essential things constituting confession.

To that however which is first objected, it must be said that it is called "legitimate" from the law ordering the mode of accusation in the forum of confession: and this law indeed was promulgated universally by God, as was evident above when it was disputed what kind of precept that concerning confession was: but this which was universally said by God, was explained and interpreted by Ecclesiastical Doctors and Prelates, and therefore it is called legitimate both by the old law and the new law and the law of the fathers.

To the other it must be said that a circumstance posits something of a sin: and therefore a sin according to itself is not explained, unless the circumstances are supposed, as will be said below in this same distinction.

To the other it must be said that it is not a simple narration, but it is necessary that the mode be explained, so that the priest may understand the quantity of the crime. But a simple narration does not suffice for this.

To the other however which is objected concerning the third which is of Gregory in the Morals, treating that of Isaiah 38:21: "Isaiah had ordered that they should take a lump of figs, and make a poultice upon the wound," etc.

It must be said that it is not a definition or a description, but rather a certain allegorical adaptation. And through this the solution to the first is evident.

To the other it must be said that there is an uncovering of a sin as a sin, and an uncovering of that which is a sin. But a sin as a sin is not uncovered except in confession to a priest: just as a disease of nature as a disease is not uncovered except to a physician, or to one who is in the place of a physician in the counsel and aid of medicine. But that which is a sin is sometimes uncovered boastfully: but then it is uncovered as a praiseworthy act, according as it is praiseworthy among those who are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things. And it speaks of them, Proverbs 2:14 et seq.

To the other it must be said as was said before.

To the other it must be said that if the locution is understood through itself, then it is convertible as a proper attribute, but not as a definition: because it seems well to me that Gregory did not intend to define or describe confession.

To THAT which is further asked concerning the fourth, it must be said that it is given in comparison to the moving or inclining factor toward confession: for this is the hope of pardon.

To that however which is objected against it, it must be said that sin is opened and closed in confession: for it is closed from others, but it is opened to him who is in the place of God: and this Augustine here calls "opening."

§ 2. To the other it must be said that even if it is known, yet it is not known through the mode of conviction: just as a judge also does not judge concerning that which he knows as a man, but concerning that which he knows as a judge. Similarly a sin is called "hidden" when a judgment cannot be made concerning it: because it has not been denounced in that forum, namely of confession.

To the other it must be said that fear is not as essential to confession as hope is: for if fear were alone, it would not incline to confession, but rather to silence because of desperation: and therefore confession was not to be defined by fear as much as by hope.

To the other it must be said that if someone confesses without hope, he is not bound to iterate the confession, on account of the fact that the priest knows whatever he did: but he is bound to confess the desperation to the same priest. If however he confesses to another, since he did not receive condign satisfaction, I say that in total with opined hope he is at least bound to make a confession.

To the other the solution is evident through what was said before: because that which is said in confession, is both closed and opened.

To that which is asked concerning the last, it must be said that it is the same as the second, except that it adds the proper listener of confession who is the priest.

To that however which is objected against it, it must be said that in the Gloss mortal sins are called "greater," and venial sins are called "lesser," which we are not bound to confess except in a general confession: and this is not a confession simply speaking, but in a qualified sense.

And thus the solution to all the questions asked is evident.

Articulus 17 — Whether Some Article Of Faith, And Which, Moves One To Confession

Whether some and what article of faith moves to confession?

Sixthly it is asked, What article of faith moves to confession?

But it seems that by reason of the one that is, "Life everlasting": § 1. For hope is concerning everlasting life: because the hope of pardon, as is evident from the definition of Augustine, moves to confession on the part of faith: therefore it seems that the article concerning everlasting life moves to confession on the part of faith.

§ 2. Also, it seems that either that one, or the one concerning punishments moves to confession: but the fear of punishment is not praiseworthy, because Augustine says concerning such fear, that no one does well unwillingly, even if what he does is good. Therefore since confession is concerning praiseworthy things, it seems that the faith of everlasting life moves to it more than [the faith] of everlasting punishments.

But against both of these it seems to be objected: for the passion of Christ operates in the keys, and through the keys confession is satisfactory: therefore it seems that faith mo-

move [one] to confession by reason of Christ's passion.

It seems, however, that [it does so] by reason of that [article]: Who is to come to judge the living and the dead: because the one confessing anticipates this judgment upon himself, and discloses his sins lest they be disclosed to all in the judgment: therefore, if faith moves [one] to confession, it seems that it does this by reason of that article which is about the judgment.

Solution. It must be said to this, that faith chiefly moves to confession by reason of the article which is about eternal life: because, in the hope of pardon on account of eternal life, one confesses whatever one confesses.

To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that the passion gives efficacy to confession, and faith illuminates to this [end], that such an effect is believed to be in the keys: but nevertheless it does not move to confessing by reason of that [passion]: because the one confessing does not confess on account of this, but rather because he hopes that on account of this he will obtain the pardon of his sins.

To the other, it must be said that that article can help: but nevertheless it is not principal in moving: because he would not obtain pardon from this, since this is more an inducement of fear than of love.

Articulus 18 — Upon Which Attribute In God Confession Rests

On which attribute in God does confession rely?

Seventhly and lastly it is asked: On which attribute in God does confession rely?

It seems, however, that § 1. [It relies] on wisdom and truth: because created truth is exemplated and caused by uncreated truth: but created truth is in confession: therefore it is caused by uncreated wisdom and truth: therefore it relies most on them.

§ 2. Also, confession is said [by rule] that it ought to be prudent: and it is established that all prudence goes forth in an exemplary manner from wisdom: therefore also confession.

To the contrary: Confession is made in the hope of pardon: therefore it entirely relies on mercy and goodness.

Reply. To this it must be said that, in truth, penance in its three parts is configured to the uncreated Trinity: for compunction or contrition, which by a small penalty exchanges eternal torments, entirely relies on goodness, which is attributed to the Holy Spirit. But confession, which is a legitimate and prudent computation of sins so that it may be appraised for penance, corresponds to wisdom, which is attributed to the Son: and satisfaction, which embraces enjoined things according to [one's] powers, is supported by power, which is appropriated to the Father.

Therefore, let the first two arguments be conceded, although they are not very valid for proving this.

But to the other let it be said that, although the motive for confession relies on mercy, nevertheless the confession itself, having been made, is rather compared to wisdom on account of the said cause: for it is not true that if the motive for it corresponds to goodness, it

also corresponds to it in itself. And there is an instance [counter-example]: because the hope of building up the Church relies on goodness and charity: and yet the study and teaching to which that hope inclines are exemplated by divine wisdom.

Articulus 19 — Whether The Institution Made Through John Suffices For Satisfaction

Whether the institution made by John suffices for satisfaction.

Next it is asked concerning what he [the Master] says there, [Dist. 16] cap. 1, after the beginning: Satisfaction is commanded by John, where he says: Bring forth worthy fruits of penance, etc.

And we will ask three things here, because many things have been held about satisfaction before, and again will be held afterwards. The first of these is, Whether the institution made by John suffices for satisfaction? The second is, Whether satisfaction is under a precept, or not? The third is, What are the worthy fruits of penance? and, Whether to make satisfaction and to bring forth worthy fruits of penance are the same thing?

It seems concerning the first, that it does not suffice: because § 1. Satisfaction is a part of the sacrament of penance: but in this sacrament a divine institution is required: therefore also in satisfaction.

§ 2. Also, the effect of grace is only from God, as Bernard says on the Canticles therefore also the vessel necessarily containing grace, provided he who approaches is not unrepentant [fictus]: therefore to determine that [vessel/satisfaction] belongs only to God. It is established, however, that sacramental satisfaction is also a part of the sacrament: therefore it seems that the institution of John does not suffice.

§ 3. But it is objected differently to the same point: For satisfaction was always necessary for one actually sinning: therefore even before John: therefore it is not commanded [for the first time] by John, as it seems, but it was under precept before him.

§ 4. Also, satisfaction corresponds either to a sin of nature, or to a sin of the person. It is established, however, that [it does] not [correspond] to a sin of nature: because a mere man cannot make satisfaction for that, as Anselm proves in the book Cur Deus homo. If it corresponds to a sin of the person: therefore it obligates the person in himself, in whatever state, to make satisfaction for his sin: therefore it seems that it is not commanded by John then for the first time when the faith of the New Testament began to be preached.

§ 5. Also, satisfaction is of natural law: therefore opinion did not beget it, but an innate force implanted it: therefore it is not instituted by John, as it seems.

Reply. In satisfaction three things are to be considered, namely, for what satisfaction is made, and what the state of the one satisfying is, and to whom satisfaction is made. That for which satisfaction is made has always been, from the time sin began to enter the world, and there was no diversity in it except in the quantity of sins. But the state of the one satisfying was not always the same: and since the mode of satisfying corresponds to that state by congruence, it was not the same [always]: for since all our satisfaction draws its force from the

satisfaction of Christ, as Ambrose says and because all our penance draws its force from His penalty and satisfaction, therefore for those future penalties [or penances] which were not yet except in the faith of those making satisfaction, a mode foreshadowing that penalty and satisfaction was congruent: as in the law of nature through sacrifices and figures, and also in the law of Moses through ceremonies. But in the new law which begins from John, as it is said, Luke 16:16: The law and the prophets were until John. And, Matt. 11:12: But from the days of John the Baptist until now, the kingdom of heaven suffers violence, and the violent bear it away, a congruent mode is satisfaction through the imitation of Christ, because from then the foreshadowing of the future ceased, and the form of truth which we should imitate was manifested. But He to whom satisfaction is made is God, always holding Himself in one way.

These things having been noted beforehand, it is not difficult to answer the objections.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that the mode of satisfaction is proclaimed in one way, and instituted in another: by John it was only proclaimed, but by Christ it was instituted, when it is said: Do penance .

To the next it must be said that, according as satisfaction is sacramental and has its force from the passion of Christ, it has its institution from God: but it is not necessary that it be by a different institution [from the sacrament as a whole]: because the whole and the parts are instituted by one institution: hence it has its institution in its whole, which is penance. Some, however, say that He instituted it there, where He told the leper that he should offer for his cleansing what Moses instituted: but this is not true, except concerning a figurative institution.

To the next it must be said that satisfaction in itself, abstracting from this mode and from that, always was, even before John: but inasmuch as it is considered as accepted with a mode of signification or imitation of the truth, it was not always: and as to this mode it is promulgated by John, and confirmed by Christ, as the Master says in the Text.

To the next it must be said that that objection only concludes that it was always necessary to make satisfaction on the part of the one satisfying, and on the part of Him to whom satisfaction is made: and this indeed seems to be conceded, because it does not vary except in mode, as was said, because they could not look back to Christ making satisfaction, from whom our satisfaction draws its force, except by foreshadowing it in signs. But those who were from the days of John could not look back to Him except by imitating the form of truth which was manifested in Him.

To the next it must be said that satisfaction in itself is of natural law, which opinion did not beget, but an innate force implanted: but the mode of satisfying which has been spoken of, is entirely sacramental and divine, and therefore it has varied according to the times of the diverse sacraments.

Articulus 20 — Whether Satisfaction Is Of Precept

Is satisfaction under precept?

Secondly it is asked, Is it under precept?

But it seems that it is not: because § 1. Jerome says: Let him be anathema who says that God has commanded anything impossible: but it is impossible to make satisfaction: therefore satisfaction is not under precept. The proof of the middle [premise]. An offense grows according to the one against whom it is sinned: but God is infinite in all His attributes: therefore an offense against Him is infinite: therefore it does not happen that one makes satisfaction for any sin, because we can repay nothing for an infinite [offense].

§ 2. Also, the Philosopher says in the fifth book of the Ethics, that one striking a prince does not suffer back [only] as much, but is condemned to death: therefore much more if he offends someone infinitely greater than any prince is: but God is infinitely greater: therefore one offending God ought to pay back infinitely more: but it does not happen that one can pay this: therefore he is not commanded to pay, because he would be commanded in vain.

§ 3. Also, the very name of satisfaction seems to show this: because to make satisfaction [satisfacere] is said to do enough [facere satis]: but it is never enough, unless it is according to the estimation of the sin and the offense: but this is infinite, as has already been proved: therefore there is no satisfaction unless one pays infinitely: but it does not happen that one pays this: therefore it seems that it ought not to be commanded.

§ 4. Also, this same thing is proved by another way: For let us suppose that someone is a debtor to someone else for several reasons, namely that he owes him by right of servitude, which is such that he possesses nothing except by the title of his lord, and is bodily a serf of the soil, and then he is bound

to him from a loan: because he has nothing, except what he has received as a loan from him: and he has not received more as a loan, than he has in those very goods: and again, thirdly, he owes him from an offense, because he has offended him most grievously concerning the lord's property: it is established that he cannot make satisfaction. Because if you say that he will make satisfaction from his own goods: against this is the fact that those belong to the lord. If from his person: against this is the fact that he is a servant in his person, and owes his whole self to the lord even beyond the reason of the offense. But it is established that a similar case exists in man in comparison to God: therefore it seems that man cannot make satisfaction to God for sin: therefore it is not commanded to him.

Besides. If it is commanded, let it be asked, where is it commanded, in the New or in the Old Testament?

If it is said that [it is commanded] there, Do penance . To the contrary: To repent is not to make satisfaction: because someone repents of that concerning which, nevertheless, he never thinks of making satisfaction.

If you say that [it is commanded] there where the Lord commanded the leper to offer for his cleansing what Moses instituted . To the contrary: What Moses instituted did not correspond to the quantity of the sin: therefore it was not satisfactory.

If you say that it is commanded by John, Matt. 3:8, where it is said: Bring forth fruit worthy of penance, etc., as the Master seems to say in the Text. To the contrary: Worthy fruits of penance are in the same impossibility in which satisfaction is: therefore it does not happen that one produces them: therefore it is not commanded.

If you say that it is found in Matt. 12:36, where it is said: But I say unto you, that every idle word that men shall speak, they shall render an account for it in the day of judgment. To the contrary: As has been held, it does not happen that one renders an account of the infinite: and mortal sin is an infinite offense: it does not happen that one renders an account of it.

But to the contrary: § 1. Of whatever debt it happens that one can pay as much and tenfold, of that it happens that there is a sufficient payment: but of sin it happens that one pays as much and tenfold: therefore of sin it happens that there is a sufficient payment: therefore satisfaction can be commanded, and ought to be commanded. The proof of the middle [premise]. Baruch 4:28: For as it was your mind to go astray from God; so when you return again you shall seek him ten times as much.

§ 2. Also, Matt. 18:24 and 26: One was brought to him, that owed him ten thousand talents... But that servant falling down, besought him, saying: Have patience with me, and I will pay thee all. Therefore it happens that one pays: therefore also to make satisfaction.

Solution. It must be said that, although some place great force here, nevertheless in truth there is little force in the question: and from what has been held in the preceding [distinction], it is easily determinable, by distinguishing that the mode of satisfaction is twofold, namely according to the estimation of the offense, and according to the will and judgment of him to whom satisfaction is made: and in the first way it does not happen that one makes satisfaction, nor is it commanded: but in the second, as it is said, Micah 6:8: I will shew thee, O man, what is good, and what the Lord requireth of thee. As if he were to say: Not what is just [in strict estimation], but what He requires, which suffices for Him. And this is confirmed by what is held, Luke 7:41 and 42: A certain creditor had two debtors: the one owed five hundred pence, and the other fifty. And whereas they had not wherewith to pay, he forgave them both. And, Matt. 18:27, where it is said that the lord of that servant, being moved with pity, let him go and forgave him the debt.

To all therefore that were introduced afterwards, the solution is clear: because they prove nothing except that it does not happen that one makes satisfaction according to the estimation of the perpetrated sin:

and this indeed is true: and on account of this, it is entirely of grace what we are, as it is said, I Cor. 15:10: By the grace of God I am what I am.

To that, however, which is asked, Where is it commanded? It must be said that [it is commanded] in many places: nevertheless, according as it is a sacramental mode of satisfaction, as the Master says here, I say that it is promulgated by John, and is confirmed by a precept by Christ, Matt. 4:17, where Jesus preaching says: Do penance, etc.

To this, however, which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that to repent is said in two ways, or even three ways. For in one way, repentance for a perpetrated act is a sign of the involuntary through ignorance, which merits mercy and pardon, as is said in the third book of the Ethics. In a second way, repentance of some perpetrated act is not satisfying on account of the injury, when he does not wish to make satisfaction to the injured party, or on account of despair, as Judas repented. In a third way, penance is the affliction of oneself with the purpose of confessing and making satisfaction for the evil committed. And this alone is penance as a sacrament and a virtue: and Christ commanded this, because this alone finds the fruit of salvation: and in that is commanded all that is required for it, namely confession and satisfaction. Yet it could be said that it is commanded in Luke 13:24, where it is said: Strive to enter by the narrow gate, etc., and Matt. 25:19, where it says that he reckoned an account with his servants, who had received his goods.

To that, however, which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that it does not happen that one pays the tenfold of sin intensively, but as it were extensively through discretion or distinction, because [one observes it] in the obedience of the ten commandments: and this is the sense of Baruch.

To the other it must be said that that servant did not intend that he would pay according to the estimation of the damage inflicted, but rather according to the estimation of the mercy of the one demanding the debt: and therefore he premised, saying: Have patience with me, and I will pay thee all.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 21 — Whether To Satisfy Is The Same As To Make Worthy Fruits Of Penance, And What The Fruits Worthy Of Penance Are

Is making satisfaction and bringing forth worthy fruits of penance the same? And what are worthy fruits of penance?

Thirdly it is asked, What are the worthy fruits of penance? And, is it the same to make satisfaction as to bring forth worthy fruits of penance?

The Author [Peter Lombard] says in the Text, and it is in the Gloss on Matt. 3:8, that worthy fruits of penance are such that, according to the quality and quantity of the fault, there is the quality and quantity of the penalty.

But it seems that this cannot be: § 1. For either this quality is understood of the lust delighting in the sin, or the quality of the act of sin. If in the first way. To the contrary: Sensible delight is what is in sin: but it is never sensible in virtue and in works of mercy: therefore there is no likeness in quality. If in the second way. To the contrary: Those acts are contraries: therefore they do not have likeness in quality, because the Philosopher says in the fifth book of First Philosophy [Metaphysics V], that things are alike whose quality is one.

§ 2. Also, it seems impossible that the quality of the penalty should be according to the quality of the sin, in this way: because the quality of the fault cannot be except according to the act, because the fault, insofar as it is an evil, is nothing: but in the act there is no quality except according to the relation to the agent: but this is either according to lust, or according

to contempt: but according to lust there cannot be the quality of the penalty, because a penalty is bitter to the sense, and lust is sweet: but according to contempt it is also related through an opposite: because just as the one sinning contemns God and His precept, so by the opposite the penitent in the penalty subjects himself to God and His precept: therefore it seems that the penalty of the penitent and the fault of the transgressor are never according to the same quality.

§ 3. If perhaps you say that it is called a likeness in genus, through the contrary, namely that just as the fault pleased in delighting, so the penalty may please in enduring: this does not fit the Text: because this is equally so in one sinning little and [one sinning] much: but that likeness of quality is not equally in one sinning little and much: therefore a likeness in genus is not denoted, as it seems.

Further it is asked concerning what he says, That according to the quantity of the fault is the quantity of the penalty.

For either the equality is in genus, or in species. If in genus. To the contrary: According to this it is equally in one sinning little: because to a great fault a great penalty is owed, and to a lesser a lesser: but worthy fruits are not equally in one sinning little and much, as is said in the Text: therefore it is not understood of quantity in genus. But if it is understood of quantity in species. To the contrary: The quantity of the fault is infinite, and the quantity of the penalty finite: therefore it seems that it never happens that one makes satisfaction through worthy fruits of penance.

Besides it is asked, What is the difference here between quality and quantity?

For it is established that there is not continuous quantity here per se, but per accidens: but this seems to be the intensity of the quality, which makes the vigor of the sin and a great sin, and the vigor of the penalty and a great penalty; but the likeness or proportion in quality seems to be regarding the same thing: therefore here quality and quantity come back to the same thing.

Besides it is asked, Why are they called worthy fruits of penance, since they are not fruits except in the future?

Moreover, these works when done are rather assimilated to cultivation or labor ordained toward perceiving fruits: as James also says: Behold the husbandman waiteth for the precious fruit, namely the fruit of his labor .

Reply. As was also held above in the preceding distinction, fruit is not taken here properly, but is taken for the cause of the fruit, which is the cause of fruition in the future. For the works of penance are called fruits, not that we enjoy them properly here, or in the future: but because with the joy of hope we use them to obtain that which is to be enjoyed. Nor is it the

same to be good fruits, and worthy fruits of penance: because every tree, that is, man, is bound to good fruits, and worthy fruits: which are called good from the root, which is good when free will is informed by virtue and grace. But worthy fruits are from the proportion of the fruit to the state of the fructifying tree: because it is one thing for a cleric, another for a prelate, another for a subject, and so according to the other differences of those bearing fruit. And in this way, by having a proportion to a special state with regard to the works of penance, they are called worthy fruits, when according to the quality and quantity of the sin there is also the quality and quantity of the penalty.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that the quality of the one sinning is considered here together with the quality of the sin. The quality of the one sinning is the free servitude of sin: because, namely, not coerced, nor exacted, but freely he served the devil in joy: and in this way let him freely and with joy serve God in penance. But the quality of the sin according to the form

of the sin in species, according as one is carnal, and another spiritual, and another as it were a medium, like anger, and avarice: and thus it ought to be in bodily and spiritual and medium penalty: just as fasting is a penalty of the body, prayer humbles the spirit, and almsgiving inflicts a loss of exterior things.

To that therefore which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that it does not correspond in the species of the delight: but rather in the likeness of the subject of the delight, and of the penalty, namely because each is bodily, and sometimes spiritual, and medium, as has been said.

To the other it must be said that likeness can be considered in two ways, namely in the proximate affect, and in the affect which is the cause of the proximate affect: and in the proximate indeed there cannot be a likeness: because one is lust, and the other is charity: but in the remote, that is, in the will, there can well be a likeness: and it is even more in the good, because Augustine says that charity infinitely more loves God, than cupidity loves gold.

To that which is asked about quantity, it must be said that quantity here is twofold, namely intensive, and discrete. The one corresponds to the magnitude, and the other to the numerousness of the sins: but that which is intensive, is considered from many things, yet the principal is the species of the sin or the genus: just as we say that in genus homicide is greater than adultery, and adultery than fornication, and in genus avarice is greater than fornication: but in species adultery is greater than theft. The other quantity, however, is from the circumstances of the agent and of the act, from which it is called a great sin, and to that a greater penalty is owed than to a lesser: just as to one sinning many times either in one genus of sin, or in two, more penalties, or one more enduring, is owed.

To that therefore which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that in genus it is called quantity, as has been said: and what it infers does not follow: because sins even in genus are not equal, but one is greater, and another lesser: and therefore also the penalties will be unequal.

To the other it must be said that quantity and quality are founded in the same thing, but are not the same thing, as is clear from what has been said: because quality is a vice from that part by which it is drawn into a distinct species, as carnal, spiritual, and the like: or more specially still, like fornication, the delight according to the act in fornication: and gluttony, the delight according to the act in gluttony: but quantity is taken from the quantity to the whole.

Articulus 22 — Whether Circumstances Aggravate Sin

Do circumstances aggravate sin?

Next it is asked concerning the words of Augustine which are had, there, [Dist. 16] cap. 1, in the middle: Let him consider the quality of the crime, in the place, etc.

But six things are asked here for the understanding of that place.

First, do those things which he mentions aggravate a sin? Second, do they aggravate by leaving the act in the same species, or by conferring a new species of sin? Third, is the penitent bound to confess all those things exactly as they were in the individual acts? Fourth, is he bound to turn them over [in his mind] in contrition and satisfaction? Fifth, what and how many are those circumstances? Sixth and lastly, what is the comparison among them, namely whether some aggravate more, and others less, or do all aggravate equally?

To the first of these it is objected thus: § 1. From whatever things an argument for the accusation of a defendant or for defense in judgment is drawn, those things aggravate or excuse the act on account of which the defendant is called to judgment:

but from circumstances arguments of this kind are drawn: therefore circumstances aggravate or excuse the act of the defendant on account of which he is judged: but that act is a sin: therefore circumstances aggravate a sin. The first premise is evident per se. The second is written by Cicero in the first book of the Rhetoric, where he says that circumstances are those from which arguments for the accusation or defense of a person in judgment are drawn.

§ 2. Also, whatever things are the constitutive particles in which an act consists, give to the act the form of evil or good, and of greater evil and greater good: circumstances are of this kind: therefore they give to the act the form of good or evil, etc. The first of these again is evident per se. The second is written by Damascene thus: The individual things which are called constitutive particles by the rhetorician: for instance, who is it that did it, who is it that suffered, what did he do, with what, namely with what organ, where, namely in what place, and the like.

§ 3. Also, whatever things make a rhetorical question about the praise or blame of a person, increase the good and the evil in the act of the person: but circumstances are such: therefore they increase the good and the evil in the act of the person. The first premise is evident per se. But the second is written by Boethius in book IV of his Topics, where he says that circumstances are what make a rhetorical question about the praise or blame of a person.

§ 4. Also, Ecclesiastes 3:4: All things have their time. Therefore in their own time they are better: therefore their contraries in that time are worse: therefore time aggravates. And the same argument applies to the others.

§ 5. Also, Bernard to Eugenius: In the mouth of a secular, trifles are trifles: but in the mouth of a priest, trifles are a sacrilege [556]. Therefore the circumstance of person aggravates. It is similar with the others.

§ 6. Also, Ezekiel 8, passim, is much aggravated against the Jews, because they had placed idols in the temple, so much so that then the glory of the Lord is written to recede from its place: and this is not written when they worshipped them elsewhere than in the temple: therefore place also aggravates.

§ 7. Also, Isaiah 57:8: Thou hast uncovered thyself near me, and hast received an adulterer. As if he were to say: Elsewhere it would have been more tolerable. Therefore it seems that similarly all the other circumstances aggravate.

But to the contrary: § 1. Augustine says in the second book of On Free Will, that evil is nothing but an aversion from immutable good: it is established, however, that a privation is not intensified except through a recession from a habit [or state]: therefore it is not a greater evil except because it recedes more: therefore not from circumstances: but circumstances do not aggravate, except by making a greater evil: therefore it seems that circumstances do not aggravate.

§ 2. Also, it is established that a mutable good is a good: but a conversion to a good is not except in a good: therefore a conversion to a mutable good is a good. It is established, however, that all those circumstances surround the act from that part by which a conversion to a mutable good occurs: therefore none of them creates a majority in the act, or increases it, as it seems: therefore none aggravates a sin.

§ 3. Also, it is established that malice in an act is a defect: therefore it is not caused or increased by something positively, but rather defectively, namely because something is lacking there of those things which ought to make or increase the good: since therefore circumstances positively cause what they cause, such as place, time, and the like, it seems that none of them either makes an evil, or increases it.

§ 4. Also, as has been said, malice in an act is a defect: if therefore it is caused by circumstances, it is established that multiple and different causes leave multiple and different effects: but in the act of sin there are multiple and different circumstances: therefore they leave multiple and different malices: therefore any sin would be made as many [times evil as there are circumstances].

sins, as it has circumstances, which is absurd to say.

§ 5. Again, it seems that evil cannot be aggravated: for nothing is made heavier, unless it receives intension or remission. No privation receives intension or remission: therefore it is not intended. The first is self-evident. The second is proved thus: That which is nothing, is not more nothing now than before: but privation is nothing: therefore the proposition stands: therefore circumstances do not aggravate it, as it seems.

Solution. To this it must be said without any doubt that circumstances aggravate a sin: for although they do not produce good in an act either of grace or of political virtue, nevertheless they produce and increase evil in an act: and they also produce legal civil good which the judge considers, who does not judge about habit, but about act. For that they do not produce the good of grace is doubtful to no one who is not of the heresy of Pelagius: because that good, both in habit and in act, is from God alone. That again they do not produce the good of political virtue, is necessarily evident from what is held in the second book of the Ethics,[557] where it is said that they are not just and chaste who do just and chaste things, but those who, as just and chaste, do just and chaste things: who nevertheless consider the circumstances in which the act is. But that they produce evil is clear, because the Philosopher and Blessed Dionysius hold that evil is caused by all particular defects, whether in the circumstances of the act, or in habits.

And thus the three things that were premised in order stand firm.

It must therefore be said to the first, that in evil there are two things, namely that it is evil, and that it is a vice. And the whole ratio of evil is a receding from the good. But because the good perfects nature, and when perfection is removed it is necessary that what was perfect be corrupted, therefore consequently, as if in relation to the subject of evil, vice occurs, which is the corruption of the good of nature and of natural things. And this is what Augustine says, that evil is because it harms: and it harms because it takes away the good: for unless the good were taken away, it would not vitiate, nor corrupt. And therefore the corruption of circumstances necessarily follows the aversion from the good. I mean aversion from the good in act: because we are speaking of that; and in this way evil is aggravated from corrupted circumstances, as will be more evident in the solution below.

To the next it must be said that in truth conversion to a mutable good, insofar as it is such, is not evil, as Augustine proves. But such a conversion that concieves an aversion by reason of a defect of mode and harmony due to that conversion, is evil: for example, a conversion as if to the end of a mutable good. For since there cannot be two ends, it is necessary that aversion is conceived in such a conversion, and a defect of due mode and harmony or commensuration necessarily falls into such a conversion. For the due mode of this conversion is that the conversion be made in relation to the end to which that good is ordered: and that mode is lacking. And harmony is that concerning God, as the left hand may be under the head, and the right hand may embrace: and this again is lacking. And from this defect the conversion is evil, and not from the fact that it is to a mutable good. But since that conversion is conceived with such a defect which is evil, in this way circumstances surround it, and not insofar as it is a conversion alone: and therefore they aggravate the evil itself.

To the next it must be said that from no position is evil caused or increased through itself, but by accident: as Dionysius also says, that evil is repugnant to the good. But I say through another: because they increase such a conversion that is to a conceived good with evil, through

556. Bernard of Clairvaux, De Consideratione, lib. II, cap. 13.

the good in which it is; and necessarily from this a fouler defect occurs from the fact that a mode is deprived in place, or time, or person, or

something else, which is a circumstance of the person or of the business of his act.

To the next it must be said that it does not follow, if there are multiple circumstances in an act, that they make multiple sins or evils; but rather, that from the defects of multiple circumstances in mode and harmony, multiple deformities will be caused in one act: and I plainly concede this. The ancients called such a sin a single multiple sin, or double, or triple, or in some other number of deformities.

To the next it must be said that privation is not intended essentially, because it is not any essence: but it is intended by recession from a habit. And thus one evil is worse than another, because it is elongated from the good by more things or to a greater degree. That it is so, Aristotle says in book IV of the First Philosophy [i.e., Metaphysics] speaking against Heraclitus: [558] for thus he contends that there is a falser than the false. Just as he who says five is a thousand lies more than he who says five is six. Then it would be necessary to concede one thing to be true, by recession from which something is said to be false and falser.

However, against this solution it can be objected what Anselm says, namely that blindness is not more a something in a stone, than in a non-seeing man, nor conversely. But it is certain that in a stone it recedes more (because it is not born to have it) than in a man who is born to have sight: therefore it seems that a greater or lesser recession does not cause intension and remission in evil.

And to this it must be said that privation is considered in two ways, namely in itself, and in comparison to its cause which it has by accident. In the first way it is neither intended nor remitted. But in the second way it is intended and remitted. Now the cause by accident of a privation is that which, when it is, a privation necessarily coincides. And we see this in bodily things: just as if someone is dividing the veins that are called varicose, or the tibia, limping in gait necessarily coincides. Thus if such a conversion is to a mutable good, a defect of mode and harmony necessarily coincides, both in things circumstancing the act, and in the act itself, as was said before. And the more of such things there are, the more deformities coincide.

Articulus 23 — Whether Circumstances Aggravate While Leaving The Act In The Same Species

Do circumstances aggravate while leaving the act in the same species?

Secondly, it is asked whether they aggravate by leaving the act in the same species, or by conferring a new species of sin?

It seems that they confer no new species: § 1. For it is certain that a privation is not specified except by its subject and the habit of which it is the privation. But all circumstances are of the same habit and subject. Therefore, all of them confer only one species.

557. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II.4 (1105b5-9).

§ 2. Again, the good is more powerful than the evil. And the good from all its circumstances confers only one species: therefore neither does the evil from its circumstances confer anything but one species.

§ 3. Again, intension and remission do not vary the species. But a circumstance does nothing but intend evil or good in an act: therefore it does not vary the species, but leaves it the same.

§ 4. Again, that which is extrinsic to an essence, as it is extrinsic, confers no species. But place and time and the like are extrinsic. Therefore they confer no species: therefore neither do other circumstances, as it seems.

§ 5. Again, accidents do not vary the species. Circumstances are accidents of an act: therefore they do not vary its species.

The second is proved from the fact that the circumstances of place, time, person, and assistance, and of all others, of diverse actions of the same species, are di-

verse and the same; and yet the actions are not thereby varied in species.

But against this: § 1. Dionysius says that evil is caused in every way: therefore from the corruption of any of the circumstances: therefore the corruption of any circumstance causes a singular species of evil.

§ 2. Again, circumstances confer a different being upon the act. But it is certain that it is not a being of nature: therefore it is a being of morality. Therefore, they confer a species according to the being of morality. Therefore, when some corruption of a special circumstance is added, there will be a new being of morality: therefore also a new species of sin, as it seems.

§ 3. Again, it is certain that an act of intercourse with a woman is one in species in nature and in the species of nature. But I see that to have intercourse with an unmarried woman makes one species of sin, and to have intercourse with a married woman another, and again another with a blood relative, another with a veiled nun. And those acts do not differ except by circumstances, as it seems. Therefore a circumstance aggravates by conferring another species to the act.

§ 4. Again, to steal is a certain simple sin: but to steal a sacred thing, or from a sacred place, is sacrilege. Since therefore stealing here and there does not differ except by circumstance, it seems that a circumstance aggravates outside the genus, conferring another species to the act, because conferring another species to the act is called aggravating outside the genus.

Solution. It must be said that no circumstance properly aggravates by conferring another species. For the substantial being of a moral act according to species is from the end of the will: for as the Philosopher says, Acts are defined by their opposites, that is, their objects: and this is understood of objects which are ends. For although that same thing is the matter about which the act is, nevertheless because the act which is about that object is not of a potency unless formed by the species of the object, therefore the act itself receives its being from the

558. Ambrose (or Pseudo-Ambrose / Ambrosiaster).

nature of the subject insofar as it is moving in the intention of the end for the sake of which the act is. This is evident from the very naming of sins: Fornication is pleasure according to an act in a fornicator, and adultery in an adulteress or a married woman, and avarice in money, and other such things. But circumstances are those conferring well-being or ill-being by way of a passion to the act itself, whether they are circumstances of the person or of the business. And therefore none confers a species properly speaking, nor varies it.

Therefore it must be said to the first that Dionysius does not understand this of the corruption of circumstances or omission: because it may well happen that a good is less praiseworthy when it is not in its proper time or place. But nevertheless from this it is not made an evil through itself, or a species of vice, or of a mortal sin. But Dionysius understands this, like the Philosopher, with respect to the matter around which virtue is. It is around three things, namely choosable things toward an operation, the operation itself, and passions. Thus prudence is around choosable things toward an operation operable by us, as the Philosopher says in the sixth book of the Ethics; justice is around operations, as he says in the fifth; and temperance and fortitude around passions, as is taught in the third. Since therefore virtue is around so many things, it is always substantially a mean in that around which it is, although differently: but vice is not a mean, but an extreme. And because it happens in every way to decline from the mean in whatever matter, and to not be in the mean except in one way, therefore he says that virtue is from one whole and single cause, and vice in every way: because the mean is corrupted by any declination to an extreme. Yet that it is a mean, it does not have from circumstances: but rather circumstances are caused by that which is substantially a mean, and therefore they do not confer another being.

To the next it must be said that circumstances do not confer first being, nor second being, but they do confer accidental being, but rather of an accident per se. And because from that which is frequently, is drawn

a rhetorical question, therefore they make a rhetorical question, and praise or blame: and this is the being of morality. The first being an act has from the species of the object around which it is: which species, I say, is the end of the one operating.

To the next it must be said that intercourse is compared to a potency in two ways, namely to the generative potency which is natural: and thus, with whoever it may be, it is of one species, because it is an act of the generative potency shedding seed for the salvation of the species. It is also compared to a potency ordainable by reason: and this is informed by many species of diverse subjects, such as delectability in a fornicator, or in a married woman, or in a male, or in a blood relative. And according to this it confers a new being to its act: and thus that act is diversified in the species of morality as to the first being of a moral act.

And if you object that this does not seem to be a solution, because he does not delight in a married woman or a blood relative as a blood relative, but in a woman as she is a woman.

It must be said that this is false: because if he delighted in a woman as she is a woman, he would delight in every woman, which is false. Whence, although he would wish her not to be a blood relative or married, yet the will is of delighting in this one whom he knows to be

married or a blood relative: and therefore consequently there is a will of delighting in a married woman or a blood relative. Because otherwise no sin will be voluntary, there would never be a will for evil, and we would not be the cause of evil through the will: all of which are against the Saints, and excellently disproved in the third book of the Ethics.

To the next it must be said that to steal from a sacred place, or sacred things, has a will which is of stealing from a sacred place, or sacred things, in the same way as was said of the will of lying with a married woman. And thus that moving species makes another sin: because there is not a circumstance only there, but an end and form giving species and being to the act.

Articulus 24 — Whether The Penitent Is Bound To Confess All His Sins And The Circumstances

Is a penitent bound to confess all his sins, and their circumstances?

Thirdly, it is asked whether a penitent is bound to confess all these things, as they are in individual acts?

It seems that he is: § 1. For divine judgment is more strict than human judgment. But in human judgment one is accused from individual circumstances: therefore from individual circumstances one ought to be accused in divine judgment. And he himself is his own accuser in confession as if in divine judgment: therefore he is bound to accuse himself.

§ 2. Again, the quantity of evil and foulness ought to become known to the priest in confession: but it cannot become known unless all aggravating things become known. Therefore the one confessing is bound to narrate them. But all circumstances aggravate or alleviate: therefore he is bound to narrate all of them.

§ 3. Again, in the Letter this seems to be said expressly by Augustine here: therefore it seems that he is bound to confess all of them.

§ 4. Again, in Genesis 19:17, Lot is commanded to depart from Sodom: and it is added that he should not stay in all the surrounding region. Now it is commonly expounded that Sodom signifies sin, and the surrounding region the occasions and circumstances of sin. Since therefore penance is the way of going out through confession, it seems that he ought to go out from circumstances through confession by confessing them.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. The Canon says that nothing ought to be confessed except sin: therefore circumstances do not need to be confessed.

§ 2. Again, in Psalm 31:5: I said, I will confess my injustice against myself: it does not say, the circumstances of the sin.

§ 3. Again, just as there are circumstances aggravating a sin, so there are alleviating ones. If therefore circumstances ought to be confessed so that the quantity of the sin may be known, then alleviating ones ought to be confessed just as aggravating ones, which is false: therefore aggravating ones alone do not need to be confessed either.

§ 4. Again, it is one thing in the judgment of men, and another in divine judgment. For in the judgment of men circumstances are not sought except so that a presumption may be formed by the judge: which is not necessary in the divine judgment, since the witness is the conscience before him who is in the place of God, namely the priest. Since therefore the conscience suffices to convict the one confessing, it seems that it is not necessary to say the circumstances in confession.

I RESPOND, without prejudice, according to the ancient Doctors, that it is not necessary to confess circumstances, unless they draw the sin into another genus. Nevertheless it is safe to also say the others, especially if someone's conscience bites him. But still they say that he is not bound from a precept. Whence to say circumstances which do not draw into another genus of sin, is for the well-being of confession. Now the utility that is from this, is that which they say, namely that as was held above, confession through shame satisfies some part of the penalty: and it often happens that a man is more ashamed of a circumstance than of the sin: and therefore it is good to confess it. There is also another utility: because the priest better knows the deformity of the sin, and will better know how to tax the penance and satisfaction. A third again, the greater humility of the penitent.

Therefore it must be said to the first, that if in human judgment mention is made of circumstances, this is not for the sake of distinction, but rather because of the doubt of the judge who does not know the truth: and a presumption about the quantity of malice cannot be made for him, except from circumstances. But out of confession by accusing himself the penitent manifests his whole self, and therefore it is not necessary to say certain circumstances.

To the next it must be said that, as was said above, the substantial quantity of evil and foulness is not from circumstances, but rather from the aversion from the incommutable good. But a certain foulness is from circumstances: and because it is accidental, it does not have its own proper penance, but rather one conjoined with penance: and therefore it does not need to be singularly and discretely confessed.

To the next it must be said that Augustine says these things not by commanding, but toward well-being. Nor does he say they are to be done in confession, but rather in contrition between himself and God.

To the next it must be said that the exit from sin is in contrition: and this is good enough, that one does not remain in circumstances. But nevertheless it is a consequence that whoever exits from sin, exits from circumstances: but not conversely. And therefore that does not touch upon it, except that it may be for the well-being of confession.

Articulus 25 — Whether The Penitent Is Bound To Consider The Circumstances In Contrition And Satisfaction

Is a penitent bound to revolve circumstances in contrition and satisfaction?

Fourthly, it is asked whether the penitent ought to revolve them in contrition and satisfaction?

It seems that he ought, because: § 1. Augustine says in the Letter: Let him consider the quality of the crime, in place, and time, in perseverance, in variety of person, etc. And below: Let him dwell on each of these, and feel the mode of the crime, purging with tears every quality of the vice. Therefore it seems that he ought to revolve all things in contrition.

§ 2. Again, "contrition" is said to be a rubbing together (simul tritio), in that it wholly deletes sin. But a circumstance is something of the sin: therefore it itself is to be rubbed away. But it is not rubbed away, unless an act of sorrow is reiterated over it: therefore the penitent ought actually to sorrow over the individual circumstances of the sins. And he cannot actually sorrow over them, unless he revolves them in his mind: therefore he ought to revolve them in his mind.

§ 3. Again, in things which are bodily rubbed away, those things over which the rubber does not reiterate are not crushed: therefore it will be similar in spiritual things: because that word "contrition" is transferred from bodily things to spiritual things. If therefore the sorrow which crushes is not reiterated over the circumstance, the circumstance of the sin is not crushed: therefore neither is it remitted, as it seems: therefore it is necessary to actually sorrow over each one, and revolve them in contrition.

§ 4. Again, Isaiah 14:22: I will destroy the name of Babylon, and its remnants, and its seed, and its offspring, says the Lord. Now it is certain that circumstances are of the offspring: therefore they are to be destroyed; but they are not destroyed, except through contrition: therefore contrition ought to be had for them. And it cannot be had unless they are recalled to mind. Therefore they ought to be recalled to mind, as it seems.

§ 5. By the same reasoning it seems it can be proved that they ought to be recalled to mind in satisfaction, and by another reasoning proper to it: A wise physician in applying medicine actually turns his attention to the dispositions of the disease: therefore a spiritual physician will do the same. But the application of medicine is satisfaction: therefore in satisfaction the disposition of the spiritual disease ought actually to be attended to. But the spiritual disease is sin, the disposition of which is circumstance. Therefore in making satisfaction one ought to attend to the circumstances of the sin.

§ 6. Again, whenever one thing is proportioned to another, it is necessary to turn attention to both of the proportionable things. But the one making satisfaction proportions and compares his work to the sin and the circumstance. Therefore it is necessary that he actually rethink the sin and the circumstances of the sin.

§ 7. Again, Bede: What heals the heel does not heal the eye. But it is satisfaction he is speaking about: therefore one satisfaction is necessary for one sin, and another for another. But in every such antidote it is necessary to rethink that to which the antidote is counterposed: therefore it is necessary for the one making satisfaction actually to rethink the sin and the circumstances of the sin.

BUT TO THE CONTRARY is this, that: § 1. According to this, few would be compunctious and do penance: because very few are seen to do this.

§ 2. Again, the Apostle says, I Corinthians 6:18: Flee fornication. And it is expounded that it should be fled even lest it be thought about: because being thought about it moves one. Therefore it ought not to be recalled to mind in thought, as it seems.

§ 3. Again, Avicenna says that a pleasant bodily species sometimes even moves the one remembering: but that movement is toward the illicit: therefore to be fled. Therefore the cause is also to be fled. But the cause is thought: therefore thought is to be fled. Therefore not every sin is to be recalled to memory in contrition or satisfaction.

§ 4. Again, some prove this from a simile. For we see a pomegranate or another fruit whole does not move the appetite or intellect: but if it is divided, it will move. Therefore by a simile sin is to be recalled to memory in the universal, but not dividedly through individual circumstances, because thus it would move to the illicit.

I RESPOND that he is not bound at all times, although it is good sometimes to revolve circumstances. I well believe that in the contrition which first deletes sins, because it must be virile, he is bound to revolve, and to confess all those things which he remembers, but not circumstances, except those which draw into another genus, which also are not properly circumstances, as was said above.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that Augustine counsels this to excite compunction: because the consideration of quantity makes one more vehemently compunctious, and sorrow more bitterly: and he does not say this for the reason that a penitent is bound to them.

To the next it must be said that it is called "contrition" because it is of two things, namely grace, and sorrow proceeding from free choice, or sensible and rational sorrow. Or because it is of all the sins at once that are in memory. But it does not need to be of all circumstances, except as to the well-being of contrition, namely so that it may be more fervent and more devout.

To the next it must be said that it is true in those things which are bodily crushed, because those are crushed successively. But sins are crushed simultaneously in a single moment of the infusion of grace: and therefore it is impossible that then all of them are thought of individually, but in the universal. And therefore then the circumstances are crushed in them: and they do not need to be recalled to actual memory individually.

To the next it must be said that the whole seed of Babylon is destroyed through the infusion of grace: but it is not necessary to actually think of the whole, because some are even unknown, which nevertheless are remitted there. And the reason for this universal destruction and contrition has already been said, namely that the sorrow is concerning all things in the universal, although not individually and in particular.

TO THAT which is objected concerning satisfaction, it must be said that it is not always necessary to actually turn attention to them: because the penitent is not the physician, but rather the priest, and he in confession discerns the genera of diseases. But just as a physician does not seek all the accidents of a disease, but only the dangerous causes: so also the spiritual physician does not seek accidental circumstances, but only those drawing into another genus.

To the next it must be said that satisfaction is not proportioned to individual sins and circumstances, because it would be impossible that the penitent could sustain this; but rather to the roots of the sins, as was held in the preceding distinction. For if the sin is rooted in the flesh, he enjoins things afflicting the flesh: but if in goods of fortune, he enjoins almsgiving, and so of others. And thus it is not necessary that the one making satisfaction always think of whatever sin and circumstance.

To the next it must be said that in this way Bede's saying is understood of the roots of sins, and not of the sins themselves, and the circumstances of the sins.

BUT TO THOSE THINGS which are objected to the contrary, it is only to be noted that they hold only when the recollection of sins does not harm the penitent. And this happens in two ways, namely when he declines into despair from the mere consideration of guilt: or when they move the appetite from the memory of the previously had pleasure in them. For then it seems to me that the thought is to be averted. But otherwise it is good often to rethink all one's years in bitterness of soul before God, to excite greater compunction and humility.

Articulus 26 — What And How Many Are The Circumstances Aggravating Sin

Which and how many are the circumstances aggravating a sin?

Fifthly, it is asked which and how many these circumstances are?

Now if one inspects the Letter diligently, one can collect nine diverse things which it posits, namely the quality of the crime, the place, the time, the perseverance, the variety of the person, the temptation, the multiple execution of the vice. And after many things he adds two, namely the loss of the virtue which

meanwhile he lacked, and the ingratitude by which the offender is made guilty of all, and deprives himself of all received graces.

Moreover he seems to divide the variety of the person into three, namely dignity, order, and age, whether a youth, or an old man, or in many years. And as it seems to me, more cannot be collected from the Letter.

BUT IT IS OBJECTED concerning these, and first concerning the individual ones.

For it seems that: § 1. The quality of a vice is not a circumstance. For it is understood either of the essential quality which gives the species to the vice, or of the accidental one. If in the first way, it is not a circumstance. If in the second way, then it is asked, what is that quality? And if it is said that it is the mode of the act. ON THE CONTRARY: That mode which belongs to a mortal sin is one, namely because it is from contempt of the precept, and from the lust for a mutable good. But it is certain that there is not one quality of many sins or of all. Therefore that mode is not the quality of the crime.

§ 2. Again, place does not aggravate unless it is sacred. And then it makes sacrilege, which is another genus of sin. Therefore place does not remain a circumstance simply, but also gives the form of a species of vice.

§ 3. Again, it is objected concerning time, because it does not aggravate unless it is a time established for prayer or for festivals. And this again induces sacrilege which is another genus of sin, as some have said.

§ 4. Again, perseverance is a certain virtue: therefore it is not a circumstance of a criminal vice. Again, perseverance adds nothing over the act of sin, except continuity. But continuity does not say something in the act, but rather concerning the agent, that he remains in the vice.

§ 5. Similarly, it is objected concerning the variety of the person: for he implies that there are various things in the person which aggravate sin. And this does not seem right, because thus every act of a person would aggravate, because every man has a variant person from another.

§ 6. Again, the dignity of a person insofar as it is such, does not increase merit: for we do not say that a Bishop merits more by praying, other things being equal, than a non-Bishop: therefore it seems that it does not aggravate a sin.

§ 7. Again, if it aggravates a sin: either this is on the part of the root of the sin, or on the part of the act, or on the part of the end of the act, or on the part of the harm which it inflicts. Now it seems that it is not on the part of the root: because a non-Bishop fornicates or can fornicate from as great or a greater lust as a Bishop. Therefore the Episcopate does not contribute to a greater quantity of the root. Similarly it seems that it is not on the part of the act: because there can be as great an act of fornication in a non-Bishop as in a Bishop, or greater. The end can also be just as foul or fouler, and similarly the harm greater. Therefore it seems that it in no way aggravates.

§ 8. Again, if we are to speak per se, according to the doctrine of the Philosopher, things which confer no power to an act upon a person, do not have themselves toward eliciting or aggravating the act, but rather are related to that act by accident. But such is dignity or order in a person: therefore it neither elicits nor aggravates the act of sin, but has itself by accident to it. THE PROOF of the first is this. If I say, "The white sculptor makes a statue," white confers nothing to the act, and therefore is not related to the act to elicit or aggravate, but only by accident. THE PROOF of the second is, that if I say, "The Dean or Bishop fornicates," the Episcopate or the deanship does not confer the power of fornicating; just as the art of building confers on the carpenter the power of making a house: therefore the proposition stands.

§ 9. Similarly, it is objected concerning age which he posits among the things varying the person. For he seems to speak imperfectly: because diverse ages make sins fouler, and not one age. For the Philosopher says that old men are more covetous, and young men more luxurious: therefore by the opposite, there is greater in youths

the baseness of avarice, and in old men the baseness of lust is greater: therefore he ought to have distinguished age.

§ 10. Further, it seems that age again does not do this, but rather another disposition of the one having the age: for it is evident that such a person from choler in youth, when heat increases, is dried out, and is made impotent for intercourse from dryness: and as time

proceeds, the heat being remitted and the moisture increasing, he is made potent: therefore he desires lust more in old age than in youth. Since therefore the rule according to the Theologian [Augustine] and the Ethicist [Aristotle] is that a sin is greater which proceeds from greater lust, it seems that the cause of this aggravation is not age, but another disposition of the one having the age.

§ 11. Furthermore, concerning this it is objected that he says temptation aggravates sin. For this seems to return to age: for age does not aggravate except insofar as it is an incitement to greater temptation: therefore age and temptation are the same circumstance, as it seems.

§ 12. Further, temptation makes greater merit in the good, as the Saints say: therefore it seems that it is not productive of greater sin in the evil: because it cannot be that the same thing is the cause of contraries.

§ 13. Further, temptation is prior to the essence of sin: therefore it is also prior to the quantity of sin, because the quantity of sin does not extend beyond the essence of sin: therefore it seems that it does not give any quantity to the sin.

§ 14. Furthermore, it is inquired concerning this which he calls the multiple execution of vice. For this multiplicity is either in the mode of the act, or in the species. If in the mode: then it returns to that which is concerning the quality of the vice, which he posited earlier. If in the species: then it adds nothing above the species of the vice except discrete quantity: therefore it does not aggravate towards this singular sin.

If perhaps you say that it aggravates sin from multitude. On the contrary: Unity, which is the principle of discreteness, adds nothing above the entity of the thing which is an essence, but rather a mode which is rooted in negation, as Aristotle maintains in multiple places of the First Philosophy but that is the principle of multitude: therefore multitude does not posit anything added to any single one of the many, except that mode of negation: therefore it does not aggravate: because every aggravation is from some added entity of the thing itself which is aggravated.

§ 15. Furthermore, it is objected concerning this that he says, that he should bewail the virtue which he lacked in the meantime. For this does not seem to bring quantity to the sin: for what follows every sin in whatever quantity, great or small, does not give any quantity to the sin: but to lack virtue follows every mortal sin in whatever quantity, great or small: therefore it does not give any quantity to the sin.

§ 16. Further, since there are many other goods which we lack in the meantime, namely grace, the natural good, or its integrity, virtue, and merit: why does he not say that the others are to be bewailed just like that one?

§ 17. Furthermore, it is inquired concerning this that he says, that he should bewail the ingratitude, that offending in one, he is made guilty of all . For from this God seems to be more ungrateful than he himself who sins: for if there were some master whom a servant served much, and it happened that the servant sinned in one thing, and the master imputed to him

sin in all things, and not in one only, the master is more ungrateful for the servant's service than the servant: therefore by a simile it will be so here as well.

§ 18. Further, it seems to be the greatest injustice that offending in one, he is made guilty of all: for if someone were caught in a single robbery or theft, and the judge were to heap upon him adultery, homicide, and the crime of high treason, he does him an injustice. Since therefore human laws are patterned upon divine laws, it seems that they are not contrary to divine laws: therefore if anyone transgresses one precept, he is dealt with unjustly if he is reputed to be guilty of all.

§ 19. Furthermore, it is objected here that Tully posits many more circumstances in the first book of the Rhetoric for he says that in common there are indeed seven, namely who, what, why, when, where, how, by what aids. According to Tully and Boethius, however, some of these seven are attributed to the person, and some to the business: to the person indeed one, which is who, and to the business the remaining six. And Tully himself divides that which is who into eleven circumstances, namely name, nature, manner of living, fortune, habit, disposition, pursuits, counsels, deeds, chance occurrences, speeches. And again he subdivides some of these, as nature into sex, nation, fatherland, kinship, age: and manner of living he divides into nine, namely society, love or the choice of association, pedagogues or preceptors, all those whom he used, in what business he is occupied, in what trade he transacts business, of what craft he is, how he manages his domestic affairs, with what justice, with what domestic custom. Similarly he divides the others, as is clear to one examining the first book of the Rhetoric. Therefore it seems that this one [Augustine] also ought to have posited more.

Solution. It must be said first to this last point, that it does not belong to the present instruction to treat of circumstances, except insofar as they aggravate the act of sin, and make for it some quantity, either according to guilt, or according to baseness: and therefore Augustine does not touch upon them, except for the circumstances from which this kind of quantity in sin is notably effected. But Tully treats of circumstances as they are a rhetorical topic. Now a rhetorical topic is that from which through an enthymeme (which is a rhetorical syllogism) one argues two things concerning the accused before a judge, namely the notice of the thing, and the notice of his guilt. And therefore not all of his circumstances aggravate, but all make known to the judge concerning the accused or his guilt. But in penance no notice of these things is made to a judge: but rather the quantity of his guilt is shown to the guilty party, so that it may incline him to a greater lamentation. And therefore none are posited here except the circumstances that only aggravate guilt: and this suffices for the present lesson. However, we have disputed at length concerning circumstances elsewhere: and whoever wishes can inspect this: but here we shall say all things which pertain to the present passage, and no others.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that the quality of a vice is understood in my judgment as the essential quality, which constitutes its species: for one vice is distant from another vice from the quantity which the specific difference brings. In which manner, all other things being equal, we say that one vice in species is greater, and another lesser, as adultery rather than theft, and homicide rather than lying, and so of the others.

To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that circumstance is spoken of in two ways, namely circumstancing the act, and circumstancing the agent, as is expressly gathered in the circumstances which Tully posits: and in this way what he did is reduced to a circumstance taken on the part of the act or business: for although what expresses the essence of the act, nevertheless insofar as it brings with it a quantity of baseness, it conceives also that which stands around it, and thus it is called a circumstance.

To that which is objected concerning place, it must be said that place as such does not draw into another genus, even if it be sacred, unless another act supervenes violating the place. Whence Jurists say that he who secretly takes something in a place, does not incur the excommunication which the Bishop consecrating the place bears against violators of the place: but he incurs it who takes violently in a sacred place: because by another act than the handling of another's property he injures the immunity of the place: and thus it is clear that when nothing is added to the act of sin except a sacred place, it will not be place drawing into another genus of sin, but an aggravating circumstance.

In the same way the solution is clear to the following point which is objected concerning time: because it can relate to the act in two ways, just as place does.

To that which is further objected concerning perseverance, it must be said that perseverance is not called here solely remaining in the act of crime, nor even the actual intention of persevering, because this would be an actual sin divided from the others: nor even the gift of perseverance which is a virtue or something conjoined to virtue: but perseverance here is called that which is left behind from the iteration of a vicious act. And it is twofold, namely the evil disposition, through which a man is made apt for sinning: and the diminution of the natural good, through which he is distanced from the immutable good. And the more he is thus disposed, the more prone he is made to sinning: and from such proneness a certain quantity of sin is effected, especially in this that he sins more voluntarily and more freely, and as to this it is posited among the things aggravating sin.

To that, however, which is objected concerning the variety of person, it must be said that he does not consider all things which can be considered in a person, but only those which make the baseness in the act greater from a comparison to the agent. And through this the solution to the first is clear.

Moreover, Person is taken as it is a name of dignity, both according to the science of law, and according to the dignity of nature: according to which manner we say a dean is a person, and we do not say that a simple cleric is a person.

To the other it must be said that that argument is invalid: this does not increase merit, therefore it does not increase sin: because merit and what increases merit is from God alone, and not from man: but sin and what increases sin is from man, and not from God: and therefore something posited concerning the Person, such as dignity, makes a greater congruity of the act in the good, and a greater incongruity in the evil: and in the good indeed it does not increase the merit, but it increases the debt of congruity: but in the evil it increases the sin on account of the reason previously assigned.

To the other it must be said that it increases the deformity, not on the part of the root, nor on the part of the act considered absolutely, but from the comparison of the act to the state of the agent: for such a state ought to draw him back from sin, and it has a greater incongruity with sin: and therefore the baseness of the sin is aggravated from the state of the person. Whence that argument proceeds from an insufficiency.

To the other it must be said that the Philosopher speaks of those things which confer power from art in doing this act or that: but Augustine speaks here of those things which from congruity or incongruity increase or diminish the baseness of a vice, which is from the consideration of the sin to the sinner: and therefore what the Philosopher says is not to the point.

To that which is objected concerning age, it must be said that Augustine does not touch here except upon the genera of aggravating factors, and he well consents to this, that if the genus is drawn apart through species, that there will then be a diverse comparison.

To the other it must be said that among those speaking commonly, age is understood according to that which age leaves behind in the subject, both on the part of the body and on the part of the soul: for in the body it leaves behind growth, and gray hair, and such things: but in the soul the confirmation of reason, and of counsel, and such things: and according to this mode the disposition of the one having age is understood in age.

To that which is objected concerning temptation, it must be said that temptation and age are not the same, although certain causes of temptation aggravate more in a certain age, and certain ones in another: because age signifies a disposition left behind from time in the subject: but temptation does not signify except an impulse to the illicit, whether the impulse be from the flesh, or from the demon, or from the world: and it does not signify that impulse according as it is left behind from time.

To the other it must be said that temptation does not increase merit in itself, but the merit which is the remission of punishment: but when an aggravating circumstance is posited, this is not in the same way by which it increases merit: for it increases merit from the fact that it draws back from the good, and yet is overcome: for on account of the greater difficulty in the work a greater merit of the remission of punishment is had: but it increases sin by the opposite mode, namely because the lesser the temptation is, the greater is the sin: because he resisted less, and thus fought less: and consequently he was more voluntary in the sin.

To the other it must be said that those things which are prior to the essence of sin by way of inclinations and causes of sin, can well increase and diminish sin: because then they are reduced to the circumstances of the agent, or of the person, as Tully says.

To that which is further inquired concerning that which is called the multiple execution of vice, it must be said that it is understood in the mode: but the mode here is accidental: and in this way it appears especially in sexual intercourse, which has one mode of baseness in lying down, another in standing, and another in sitting, according to what is perceived from confessants. And in lying down it has modes according to the disposition of the one lying on the back, or on the side, or otherwise, according to what confessants promulgate under the instig-

ation of concupiscence. And through this the response to the first is clear: because this is not the quality of the vice, as was said above.

To the other it must be said that Augustine advises to bewail the virtue which he lacked in the meantime, not as a circumstance of sin absolutely, but as a certain aggravating factor from the harm done: because through this the sin is baser and greater, in that the privation is of a greater good and a greater virtue. Nor is it understood of the privation which follows every sin, but of that which follows the sin in itself, according to which we say that the sin which is contrary to a greater virtue is greater, as hatred which is contrary to charity, and the like. And thus the solution to the argument is clear.

To the other it must be said that none of the greater goods is directly contrary to sin, except virtue: because virtue perfects the potency for the act, but not grace, or merit: but vice or sin weakens the potency for the act, and therefore he does not name the other goods which the sinner lacks, like that one.

To that which is objected concerning ingratitude, it must be said that God is not ungrateful: because since any sin whatsoever is against the infinite good, it deserves the loss of every good. But it is otherwise concerning human judgment: because one does not sin against a man except insofar as he is harmed: and since he does not harm except in one thing, it would be unjust to heap other harms upon the sinner: and therefore what is introduced as a simile is not similar.

To the other it must be said that it is not understood in the way the objection proceeds, that offending in one he is guilty of all: but rather, as the Master says in the text, namely because he is deprived of the good which is acquired by the obedience of all the precepts: and this is because any sin whatsoever is opposed to the end of all the commandments: but grace is not given without the end of grace, because God giving grace does not come to man through Himself [without His end]. And therefore that objection is founded upon a false understanding of the text.

To all the others, however, the solution is through those things which are said in the beginning of these solutions.

Articulus 27 — Which Of The Circumstances More Aggravates The Vice

Which of the circumstances aggravates a vice more?

Which of the circumstances aggravates a vice more?

Sixthly it is inquired, Which of these circumstances aggravates a vice more?

And it seems that § 1. The variety of person, and the mode which is changed in the multiple execution of vice: because these two circumstances are especially required from the confessant, but the others not so: therefore it seems that these are more potent.

§ 2. Further, these two circumstances are those which make the incongruity of the act greater: and from incongruity they aggravate the sin: because as great as the incongruity is, so great is the baseness: therefore it seems that these two aggravate more.

§ 3. Further, place and time are extrinsic, but mode is intrinsic, and the order or dignity of the person are intrinsic to the agent: but the intrinsic aggravates more than the extrinsic: therefore dignity and mode aggravate more than the other circumstances, as it seems.

But it seems that that which is concerning the quality of the vice aggravates more: because

§ 1. It signifies the quantity of the vice which determines the very species of the vice: but this is greater than that which is from other accidents: therefore it seems that it aggravates more.

§ 2. Further, in natural things it is thus, that every species of corporeal substance has a quantity naturally following its species, in which the power of the species itself is completed: as the Philosopher says in the second book of De Anima , that of all things constituted by nature there is a certain limit and ratio of magnitude and growth: therefore proportionally that will be so in those having spiritual quantity: but this is the quantity following the very species of the vice or virtue. Since therefore this is essential to the vice, it seems to aggravate the vice more: but this is attended to in the quality of the vice, or in the circumstance which is called what: therefore that aggravates more.

Moreover, it seems that temptation aggravates more than all: § 1. For Augustine says that every sin is voluntary: if it is not voluntary, it is not a sin: therefore it seems that the will gives being to the sin insofar as it is a sin: therefore the quantity of the will will give quantity to the sin: but the quantity of the will is greater or lesser from the fact that the temptation is greater or lesser, because in a greater temptation there is less will, and in a lesser one there is less [Wait, the text says "in minori minor": in a lesser temptation, lesser will—actually it should mean greater will, but Albert responds to this]: therefore from the quantity of the temptation the quantity of the sin is maximally attended to: therefore it maximally aggravates, as it seems.

§ 2. Further, the Gloss on Matthew As much as you intend, so much you do: and the Masters commonly say that this is true in evil. But Augustine says that intention is the will with an end: therefore the will final, or conjoined, or tending to an end, gives quantity to the work: therefore it also gives the aggravation to it: but everyone sinning mortally, tends to a creature as to an end: therefore he has a will with an end in every mortal sin: therefore according to that a greater or lesser quantity is attended to. But it is evident that the quantity of the will is greater or lesser from a greater or lesser temptation: therefore it seems that the aggravation of sin is attended to principally according to the temptation.

But ON THE CONTRARY it seems that place and time: because

§ 1. Those two are principally inquired of the confessant: but they would not be principally inquired, unless they were greater: therefore it seems that they aggravate more.

§ 2. Further, 2 Maccabees 3:38, it is said of a place, that in the place is a certain divine power . And in Genesis 28:16: Truly the Lord is in this place, etc . But concerning time, 1 Corinthians 7:5: Do not defraud one another, except perhaps by consent for a time, that you may

devote yourselves to prayer . Since therefore these two are specially expressed in the canon, it seems that these two among the rest bring a notable quantity to the sin more.

§ 3. Further, those which can more draw a sin into another genus, it seems also that remaining the same they can more aggravate it: but place and time can do this maximally: therefore it seems that they maximally aggravate sin. Now the first is PROVED from this, that unless those which draw into another genus according to their own proper deformity bring something to the sin, they cannot draw it into another genus. But the SECOND is proved from this, that sacrilege is committed in the injury of a sacred place, or time.

§ 4. Further, for the fulfillment of sacred acts we do not see anything determined by God and the Church in all circumstances, except only place and time: therefore by opposition these maximally bring deformity to works opposed to sanctity: but such works are sins: therefore it seems that place and time bring the maximal quantity of baseness to sins.

BUT IT SEEMS that perseverance aggravates more than all.

§ 1. For whatever of itself is apt to give quantity to a habit, by which a potency is disposed to act, that consequently maximally gives spiritual quantity to the act: but frequency and perseverance do this: therefore it maximally gives quantity to sin. The first is clear through this, that the act of a more intense habit is more intense. But the second is written in the second book of the Ethics because from such operations similar habits are generated.

§ 2. Further, the quantity of evil is nothing except a distancing from the good: but it is evident that the longer one has persevered in sin through the frequency of sin, the more he is distanced from the good: therefore the greater the evil is made in him: but this is the aggravation of evil and of sin: therefore perseverance in evil maximally aggravates sin.

Moreover, it seems that ingratitude maximally aggravates: because on account of ingratitude, as is held below, even remitted sins return: but nothing of the others bears such a heavy weight, as does the return of sins: therefore it seems that ingratitude, among all those which Augustine enumerates here in the text, maximally aggravates sins.

Solution. It must be said that the gravity of sin is attended to in three ways, namely essential, which is owed to it according to its species, or its genus: and accidental, which is owed to it from something extrinsic to it, which is in some way measuring it, or the agent: or mediate, which relate to the sin almost by way of a passion.

And the first gravity is indeed twofold, namely from the nature of the genus, and from the nature of the specific difference contracting the genus. Now an example of gravity in the genus is what Gregory says , that spiritual sins are of greater fault than corporeal ones: although corporeal ones are of greater infamy than spiritual ones. But an example of gravity from a specific difference is, that covetousness or avarice in its genus is greater than sexual intercourse: and yet adultery according to Solomon in Proverbs is greater than theft. Whence he says, that the fault is not great when someone has stolen, etc . And this twofold quantity is manifested in the very name of the sin: because immediately in the very name the genus and specific difference of the sin become known. And I say that this quantity of sin is to be

weighed more than every other quantity, although it is not inquired about in confession: because through itself it becomes known as soon as the sin is named: just as if a whale and a polyp [octopus] are named, by the very name it becomes known that the whale is greater than the polyp, provided the hearer knows both of these fishes.

But the accidental quantity is from two extrinsic things, one of which is the measure of the act, and the other of the agent, which are place and time. And because sometimes the accident does not become known with the name of the thing, therefore it is necessary to express them: yet they do not make as much gravity as the first two.

But because the mode of the act, and the varieties of the person, are as it were intermediates between them, therefore they confer a quantity more essential than the second, and less essential than the first, because they are not of the intelligible account [ratio] of the sin, and therefore when the sin is named they do not immediately become known, but must be expressed so that the quantity which is from them may be known: and in this they agree with the accidental ones. However, because the mode is a certain form of the act, and the variety of the person is a form of the agent, and both are inseparable from the baseness of the sin whose quantity they increase, therefore in some respect they agree with the essential ones: and thus they are intermediates, lesser indeed than the first, and greater, as it seems to me, than the second, if all those are understood as equal.

It must be said therefore to the first, that it proves that there is a greater quantity from these, because these two are more required from the confessant: and the inquiry is made because in the name of the sin these two do not become known by themselves: nevertheless the other two give a greater gravity to the sin.

To the other it must be said that speaking of the accidental incongruity of the sin it concludes truthfully: but it is false speaking of the essential incongruity.

To the other it must be said that as is clear from what has been said, it is well conceded that other things being equal, those two aggravate more than place and time.

To the two following objections where it treats of the quality of the vice, I think it is simply to be conceded.

To that which is further inquired concerning temptation, it must be said that the will of the tempted without doubt is greater and lesser even according to the Ethicist, as Aristotle intimates in Book VIII of the Ethics , according as the temptation is greater or lesser; therefore he says that the profligate is more blameworthy than the incontinent: we call a profligate him who anticipates his will, but incontinent him who is drawn by the force of pleasure. However, because the will is the efficient cause of the act, it does not give it an accidental quantity only, like the mode or the dignity of the person, because those add a baseness as if new, which otherwise would not be in the act: but a drawn will adds nothing except a greater or lesser blameworthiness of the essential baseness, which nevertheless would be in the act: and therefore even that circumstance is rarely inquired of the confessant, unless he spontaneously wished to say it himself.

But to the objection it must be said that the will which is the root of the sin is not meant here: but rather a certain quality of affection is called the will, when it is said that temptation increases or diminishes the will.

To the other it must be said that that Gloss says well, and the Masters expound well: but nevertheless that is the will by which the interior act is, and from the conceived end is the cause of the exterior act, or the potency itself which by conceiving the end is the cause of the interior act: but the will which increases when temptation decreases, and decreases when it increases, is a certain quality and affection of that will: and therefore it is not necessary that it bear a greater quantity to the sin.

To that which is further objected concerning place and time, the solution is clear through what was said before: because that such circumstances are inquired into in confession, this is not because they bring a greater quantity to the sin: but rather because they do not become known with the naming of the sin.

To the other it must be said that in truth from that argument nothing is proved, except that these two aggravate: because it is falsely supposed that the mode and the persons of sacred acts and their office are not determined. For order is that by which power is given for a sacred act and office: and their mode is in the rite, which is taught all day long in Scripture.

To the other it must be said that in the canon it is thus determined on account of doubt: for there could be doubt whether these aggravated the sin, because they are extrinsic: but the mode and the dignity of the person aggravate even according to the dictate of proper reason.

To the other it must be said that these do not draw the sin into another genus of themselves only, as was said above: but from this, that the sin is not absolutely simple, but is as it were composed of the act of sin, and the act injurious to the place: as is the infliction of vengeance, and the like; and therefore sacrilege is also more committed concerning a place, than concerning a time: because no injury can be done to time.

To that which is further inquired concerning perseverance, it must be said that although perseverance in some way aggravates the harm which is from the sin, nevertheless it does not properly aggravate the sin: because it is not properly said to aggravate the sin, except what brings to the act itself some aspect of baseness, which without it it would not have: and perseverance does not do this by strengthening or generating a habit: but nevertheless it wickedly disposes the sinner, and therefore the frequency is to be bewailed: yet it does not properly make the quantity of the sin: and from the first argument nothing more is proved, except that the one sinning is wickedly disposed from the frequency of the sin.

To the other it must be said that that distancing is not in any one act of sin whatsoever, as would be required if it aggravated the sin: but rather it is in the possibility through the diminution of the natural good: and therefore that objection does not conclude to a direct aggravation of the sin, but rather to a certain harm of the sinner, which is to be bewailed from the fact that he was long in sins.

To the last point which is objected, namely concerning ingratitude, it must be said that ingratitude does not aggravate any sin, but rather is an effect of the sin following it from the state of the sinner: nor do sins absolutely return on account of it, but in a certain manner, as will be clear below.

Articulus 28 — Whether The Penitent Ought To Put Himself Entirely Under The Judgment And Power Of The Priest, Reserving Nothing Of His Own Right To Himself; And, Whether He Is Bound To Enter Religion If The Priest Enjoins It

Must the penitent place himself entirely in the judgment and power of the priest, reserving nothing of his own right to himself? and, Is he bound to enter religion if the priest enjoins it?

Next it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, A, § 1, around the end: Let him place himself entirely in the judgment and power of the priest, etc.

For this does not seem to be required of the penitent: because the priest's judgment can be erroneous or malicious: and then it would be dangerous to place oneself entirely in the judgment of the priest.

Furthermore, for the sake of this a useful question is inquired here, Whether a penitent is bound to obey the priest if he enjoins him to enter religion?

It seems that he is: because § 1. The canons enjoin such a penance: therefore since the priest follows the canon, the priest is to be obeyed just as the canon.

§ 2. Further, Genesis 19:17, the Angel enjoined Lot to go out of Sodom, and not to stand in all the country round about. Sodom...

Moreover, [Sodom] signifies sin, and all the surrounding region signifies worldly conversation; therefore, since the priest is an Angel of the Lord, it seems that he too can enjoin [entry into religion].

§ 3. Again, it often happens that someone frequently suffers a relapse from the fact that he is of his own right (proprii juris), which he could not do if he were in the custody of another; therefore, since the priest ought to beware of the penitent's relapse almost before all other things, it seems that he can enjoin him to place himself in the custody and power of another. But this cannot be done except through entry into religion; therefore it seems that he can, from his office, enjoin entry into religion.

§ 4. Again, certain sins require a seven-year penance, according to what the canons say; therefore, if those are repeated, it seems that the penance could be extended throughout one's whole life; and this in fastings and vigils and prayers. But the observance that is in religion seems to add almost nothing to such things; therefore it seems that the priest can enjoin the observance of religion.

§ 5. If perhaps you say that religion is bound to counsels, but a penitent is not, and therefore religion cannot be enjoined. On the contrary: we are not bound to a seven-year penance by precept, unless we have merited it through sin; and yet it is a counsel to do it, and

he who does it is praised; therefore, that which is simply in counsel can be enjoined by precept for some sin; therefore by a similar reason, religion too.

§ 6. Again, for a certain sin I see that someone is condemned by a spiritual judge to perpetual prison, and also to a meager diet, such as bread and water. But it is certain that this is much heavier than any religion; therefore, much more can someone be condemned in penance to the observance of religion.

§ 7. Again, in the text it is said, Reserving nothing of his own right for himself [559]; but as long as a man does not have the profession of religion, he is always of his own right. But the penitent ought to reserve nothing of his own right for himself; therefore he ought to make a profession of obedience and religion, as it seems.

§ 8. Otherwise it is also objected against that text: For whoever puts himself entirely in the judgment of the priest, retains nothing of his own judgment for himself; therefore he is bound to do whatever the priest enjoins, the key not erring. But if another changes his penance, he does not do what this one enjoins; therefore it seems that this other cannot change his penance for him.

§ Solution. To this it seems it must be said regarding the first objection, that the judgment and power of the priest, insofar as he is a priest having the keys and the authority of a judge in the forum of penance, is one thing; and the judgment of a man is another. For the judgment of the priest as such is according to the canons, having weighed the sins and the state of the penitent, and this never errs, nor is it malicious; but the judgment of a man, which is often erroneous and malicious, the penitent is not bound to undergo.

§ To that which is further asked, I say without prejudice, that because the observance of religion is of will, and not of necessity, as Augustine says, it cannot be enjoined in the forum of penance, except conditionally, if the penitent should will to undertake it; for all things that are of supererogation are indeed praiseworthy if done, but no one is to be compelled to them.

§ To the first thing that is objected against this, it must be said that the canons do not enjoin by way of necessity, but by way of counsel for the terror of some sin that requires a greater penance than others, and throughout one's whole life.

§ To the next it must be said that the region around Sodom signifies things inclining to sin, such as society and other things; but nevertheless it was permitted for Lot to dwell there, unless out of his will he had turned aside to the mountain; and therefore the saying of the Angel is reduced to a counsel, and not to a precept.

§ To the next it must be said that a relapse can be guarded against otherwise; for there are many ways of avoiding sin, even if one cannot avoid it as well. However, the principal reason why religion cannot be enjoined is that in religion a man's right over himself is taken away; and this cannot be done in penance, except with respect to certain things, and not with respect to all things.

§ To the next it must be said that penance can well be prolonged throughout one's whole life, and even more, if life could last longer; but yet it does not follow that religion can be enjoined; for religion, beyond perpetuity, posits the abdication of one's own will in all things and the lack of personal property, to which no one is bound, unless he chooses them of his own will; and therefore it cannot be enjoined.

§ To the next it must be said that it well happens that out of sin something becomes a precept which otherwise would not be a precept; for what is commanded to the one sinning and to the one not sinning is different. For penance is a precept with respect to him who has sinned, and also confession; but it is not a precept for him who has not sinned. But nevertheless, not all things which are not a precept become a precept, but only those without which the sin cannot be justly amended; and therefore no other things than those can be commanded to him in the forum of penance.

§ To the next it must be said that it does not follow, if the priest can command what is more difficult, that he can also command what is less difficult; and this happens because they do not have the same order of necessity for the amendment of sin: for without religion a sin can be amended, but without canonical penance it cannot; and therefore canonical penance can be commanded, and not religion, even if sometimes it is more difficult than religion.

§ To the next it must be said that this is not understood in all things, but only in those which pertain to the canonical amendment of sin.

§ To that which is further objected against the text, it must be said that without doubt the penitent ought to stand by the judgment of the priest; but the judgment of the priest is preserved not only in that which he enjoins, but in what is equivalent to the Church or to the penitent; and therefore commutations and relaxations subsequently have a place.

Articulus 29 — Whether Contrition Can Be Intensified

Can contrition be intensified?

§ Then it is asked concerning what is said there, at A, § 1, near the end: That he may be prepared to do all things at his command for recovering the life of the soul, etc.

§ Let us inquire here into six things concerning the quantity of contrition: of which the first will be, Can contrition be intensified? Second, According to what is the intensification of contrition measured? Third, Concerning its quantity, how great ought it to be? Fourth, Whether it ought to be equal concerning all sins, or greater for some and less for others? Fifth, Concerning its quantity with respect to time, whether it ought to last throughout one's whole life, or not? Sixth and lastly, Concerning its quantity with respect to the will of sinning or not sinning.

§ To the first of these, namely whether contrition is intensified, it is objected thus:

§ 1. In no genus is there anything less than the minimum. Contrition denotes the rending of the heart into the smallest parts (per minima); therefore it seems that it cannot be rent more

559. Aristotle, Metaphysics.

and more; therefore neither can there be intensification in contrition. The second proposition is proved from the fact that the notion of "contrite" (crushed) differs from the notion of "broken"; for the contrite is divided into the smallest parts, but the broken is not. The first proposition, however, is self-evident.

§ 2. Again, nothing can be intensified to infinity; but contrition is infinite; therefore it cannot be intensified. The first proposition is proved from the nature of the infinite. The second from the effect by which it deletes sin and unites to God: neither of which belongs to anything but divine and infinite power.

§ 3. Again, everything that is intensified is intensified by this, that it approaches more to the true imposition of the name, as the Author of the Six Principles says . If therefore contrition is intensified, it is intensified by such an approach. But everything that approaches something by motion is not yet in it; therefore the contrition which is intensified is not in the true notion of contrition. But what is not truly contrition does not delete sin; therefore such contrition which can be intensified does not delete sin, which is false: because since all contrition preserves grace, and grace cannot exist with sin, all contrition deletes sin. Therefore this is also false, from which it follows that contrition cannot be intensified.

§ 4. Again, that which is intensified is intensified in a twofold way, namely by purification from a contrary mixed into it—as the Philosopher says, that the whiter is that which is more unmixed with black—and by approach or recession towards that which expresses that thing at its terminus, as the good is better by approach to that which is good in itself and substantially, and the evil is worse by recession from it. If therefore contrition is intensified, it will be done in one of these modes: either therefore by purification from a contrary, or by approach and recession from something. If in the first mode: then that contrary is either on the part of the grace informing the sorrow of contrition, or on the part of the sorrow which is about the sin. If in the first mode: since grace has no contrary except sin, contrition would be mixed with sin, which is false, because this would be against the notion of contrition. If in the second mode: it is certain, however, that the sorrow for sin has no contrary in the genus of passion except joy for sin, and not joy for sorrow; therefore someone could be contrite and have joy for sin. But joy for sin cannot exist without sin; therefore someone would be contrite and have sin, which is absurd.

§ Again, if it is said to be intensified by approach to a one which is contrition in itself: then there follows that which was concluded in the preceding, that it is not truly contrition: therefore it does not truly have the effect of contrition: therefore it does not truly delete sin, which is unfitting.

§ But against this it is objected thus: § 1. Everything that can be intensified on the part of its formal and material principle can truly be intensified; contrition is of this sort; therefore it can truly be intensified and remitted. The proof of the second proposition is: because grace is greater in one than in another, and in the same person it can be greater than it is: and this is the formal principle in contrition; sorrow also can be greater in the same person than it is, and

is greater in one than in another, which is the material principle in contrition. The first proposition is self-evident.

§ 2. Again, what cannot be intensified or remitted is equal in all those in whom it is present; if therefore contrition cannot be intensified or remitted, it is equal in all in whom it is present; but contrition being equal, it is necessary that grace and sorrow be equal; therefore all the contrite receive equal grace and have equal sorrow for their sins, which is absurd.

§ 3. Again, it is certain that contrition is an act from some virtue, whether that be penance or another, because no force is placed on this as regards the present question: but any virtue can be intensified; therefore that one too; but the virtue being intensified, its act is intensified; therefore actual contrition too can be intensified.

§ I answer. It must be said that without doubt contrition can be intensified absolutely and simply, both on the part of form and on the part of matter, as has been proved; and it seems to me rather insanity than an opinion of those who say otherwise.

§ Therefore it must be said to the first, that there are three things in contrition, namely sorrow, grace, and the object of sorrow: and with respect to the first two it is intensified. But with respect to the third, it is at the minimum of its genus, because it crushes all differences of mortal sin found in the mortar of the heart. Whence, just as it happens in a mortar, that what is crushed is reduced to dust: that crushing can be done with a larger or smaller pestle, and with stronger or weaker blows, provided however that each reduces it to dust: so it is in contrition in which sin is always crushed, even if with unequal sorrow and grace. Whence it does not follow, if the dust of weaker contrition is not greater than the dust of the blows of the stronger, that because of this the action of contrition, or the blow of the pestle, is not stronger in one contrition than in another. For although it is not possible to admit "less" in the effect of the deletion of sin, it is nevertheless possible to admit "less" and "greater" on the part of the crushing action, which is actual contrition, and also on the part of the passion.

§ To the next it must be said that grace in its essence is finite, and also sorrow; but because grace is such a gift that when it is given God inhabits us, an infinite power follows from that gift. But this is rooted in that which deletes sin effectively: and this indeed cannot be intensified; but grace and sorrow which are finite can be intensified.

§ To the next it must be said that this intensification is by approach to the highest in grace; because, as Augustine says, "in the good, to be greater is to be better" and thus by a greater assimilation to the highest good grace is said to be greater and to be intensified. But on the part of sorrow it happens that there is the true imposition of the name, when it is entirely separated from its contrary. I mean voluntary sorrow from deliberating reason, which is required in contrition.

§ But as to what is objected, that what approaches something is not in it, it must be said that it does not follow: for the approach of something to something is twofold, namely as to a nature, and as to a terminus, or to the highest peak of that nature. And what is in a certain nature can still approach the perfection and highest peak of that nature, as a boy who is in the

nature of a man, and yet is in motion toward manhood, as the Philosopher says. And similarly sorrow has the true nature of the sorrow of contrition, but can approach the terminus and highest peak of that nature.

§ To the next it must be said that since there are two things in contrition, namely form and matter, intensification is measured differently according to the two: for grace by approach to the per se good, but sorrow by separation from its contrary. And on the part of grace the answer is clear from what was established in the immediately preceding reading; but the intensification of sorrow through recession from a contrary is not as transparent. And therefore it must be noted, that not everything that is intensified through recession from a contrary has that contrary in itself, or mixed with it: because according to this, everything that is so intensified would be an intermediate, and the extremes would never be intensified, which is also against the logic of grammar. But that which is intensified has the contrary mixed in itself, or something of it by which it is held back from being at the terminus; and that which is "something of the contrary" is sometimes not the essence of the contrary, but rather the cause or the remnants following the contrary, or dispositions of the subject left from the form of the contrary which was inherent: and through separation from them it happens that the remaining contrary approaches the terminus of its imposition. And so it is here: because the remnants of sin and the corrupt nature which is as a cause of sin, and the evil pronenesses left from sin, sometimes hold back the sinner so that his sorrow of contrition is not intensified, even though he has the true sorrow of contrition separated from the contrary, which is joy in sins.

§ And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 30 — Whether The Intensity Of Contrition Is Considered By Means Of Something, And With Respect To What

Whether intensification of contrition is according to something and measured by something?

Whether intensification of contrition is according to something and measured by something?

§ Secondly it is asked, According to what is the intensification of contrition measured?

§ For it seems that nothing is found in the penitent according to which it may be intensified: because § 1. Whatever form is intensified in something, is intensified by this, that its causes are intensified, as is evident in all things, namely the white, the hot, and so of others. But contrition does not have a cause in the contrite person; therefore it seems that nothing can be taken in him according to which it is intensified. The proof of the middle premise is because contrition is a gift of God, and not from man.

§ 2. Again, contrition is the cause of justification and salvation; therefore if contrition had a cause in the contrite person, since whatever is the cause of the cause is the cause of the effect, something in the contrite person would be the cause of justification and salvation, which would be the Pelagian heresy.

§ 3. Again, if something in the contrite person is the cause of intensification, this is nothing but attrition; but attrition is not contrition, and according to many Doctors it cannot even become contrition; therefore it seems that when attrition is intensified, contrition is not thereby intensified; therefore the intensification of contrition is not measured according to that.

§ If on account of this it is said that it is intensified on the part of God intensifying it, so that God is the cause of its intensification:

§ It seems that this is not so: because § 1. Blessed Dionysius says: God holds Himself equally toward all things, and especially toward all men ; therefore He would be the cause of equal contrition in all, which is false; therefore it seems that He Himself is not the cause why contrition is intensified.

§ 2. Again, a multiform effect is not from a uniform cause in all things and always. But contrition is a multiform effect, because sometimes it is great and sometimes small; therefore it does not have a cause which is always uniform. But such a cause is God; therefore it does not have God as its cause, as it seems. If perhaps you say that sorrow is intensified on the part of the contrite person, and grace on the part of God intensifying it. On the contrary: then it is asked, whether these hold themselves equally in intensification, or the intensification of one is the cause of the intensification of the other according to nature, even if perhaps in time they are simultaneous? It seems that they are not equal: for everything that is a meritorious act in us is caused by prevenient grace. But meritorious sorrow is a meritorious act in us; therefore it is caused by prevenient grace; therefore they are not simultaneous in nature. But if this is so, then the same thing returns: because then the intensification of sorrow follows upon the intensification of grace. And then it will be asked concerning the intensification of grace, what is the cause of its intensification, as before.

§ 3. Again, it is certain that one does not grieve meritoriously before one wills to grieve; but Augustine says that grace preveniently causes us to will; therefore it does not preveniently cause us to grieve; therefore a greater sorrow is due to greater grace, and a lesser to a lesser; and then the difficulty will return again.

§ Response. It must be said to this that the cause of intensification is twofold, namely the efficient cause, and that which is by way of preparation and disposition in the subject. And the efficient cause does not seem to be any other than God. But the preparing and disposing cause in the subject is on the part of man. And I well concede that grace preveniently causes the actual sorrow which is in contrition, just as a habit prevents the acts which it informs. But what that sorrow is, whether sensible or rational, was partly evident in another disputation which was held concerning contrition, and again it will be evident below in this same disputation.

§ I say therefore to the first that contrition does not have a sufficient and efficient cause...

...in the subject, but it has a preparing and disposing cause: and this suffices for intensification, when the efficient is not lacking, as is evident when, with an equal combustible present, a greater heat flares up in dry wood than in green wood.

§ To the next it must be said that it is indeed true that contrition is the cause of justification and salvation; but it is not generally true that whatever is the cause of a cause is the cause of the effect, unless it is understood in the same mode in which it is a cause. And thus nothing prohibits a cause of justification and salvation from being in the subject, but by way of disposition and preparation, and not by way of efficient cause and form. And this is what Augustine says on Matthew: Something precedes in sinners by which, although they are not yet justified, they are nevertheless made worthy of justification; and conversely, something precedes in others by which they are worthy of blinding.

§ To the next it must be said that attrition and other preparatory acts are a cause, yet in the mode which has been stated: and it is clear to anyone that that argument does not hold.

§ To what is objected against the other part, it must be said that although God holds Himself in one way toward all, yet not all hold themselves in one way toward Him in receiving the grace of contrition: and the diversity of the preparation that was mentioned makes the diversity.

§ To the next it must be said that a multiform effect is not from one simple uniform cause; but if it has multiple causes, according to a different mode of causality nothing prohibits that effect from being multiform; and so it is in contrition, whose multiformity is caused by the multiformity of the recipients, as has been said.

Articulus 31 — How Great Contrition Ought To Be

How great ought contrition to be?

§ Thirdly, it is asked concerning the quantity of contrition, namely, how great ought it to be?

§ It seems, however, that the minimum suffices: § 1. For the minimum is conjoined with grace; and the minimum grace deletes all sins; therefore minimal contrition suffices to delete all sins. Since therefore the deletion of sin is the effect of contrition, it seems that the minimum contrition suffices.

§ 2. Again, minimal charity suffices for the expulsion of all sin, and for resisting any temptation. But minimal contrition is conjoined to charity; therefore it suffices to delete all sins and to resist every subsequent temptation. But it is given for nothing else than to delete sin; therefore it seems that the minimum suffices.

§ 3. Again, minimal contrition has grace and every virtue; but nothing is required for the crushing of sin except that the contrary of any sin, which is virtue, be in the subject; therefore it seems that through the minimum all sin is excluded by the virtue contrary to any sin; therefore the minimum suffices, as it seems.

§ But on the contrary it seems that the minimum does not suffice: because

§ 1. It is thus commanded, Jer. 6:26: Make for yourself the mourning of an only son, a bitter lamentation. But the mourning for an only son is not the minimum; therefore since the mourning of the contrite ought to be so great, it seems that the minimum contrition does not suffice.

§ 2. Again, Romans 6:19: I speak a human thing, because of the infirmity of your flesh, etc. There Augustine says in the Gloss [560] that we ought to exhibit to God as much...

...as to sin; although we ought to exhibit infinitely more because of the dignity of virtue. But it is certain that minimal contrition does not mean this. Therefore it seems that the minimum does not suffice.

§ 3. Again, on that verse of Psalm 118:127: I have loved thy commandments above gold and topaz, Augustine says that charity loves the law of the Lord more than cupidity loves gold and topaz. But it is certain that contrition is informed by such charity. Therefore it seems that the quantity of contrition ought to be above all the pleasure of sin; therefore the minimum does not suffice, as it seems.

§ Again, it seems it can be further proved that contrition must be infinite: because § 1. However great the pleasure and the harm of sin was, so great or greater ought to be the contrition deleting the sin. But in sin something was loved, on account of which the infinite good, which is God, was lost; therefore it seems that the contrition deleting it must be with infinite sorrow and contrition: therefore the minimum does not suffice.

§ 2. Again, Revelation 18:7: As much as she hath glorified herself and lived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to her. And in Deuteronomy 25:2 it is said that according to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be. But the measure of the glorification and of the sin is according to Him against Whom it is committed. But it is committed against God, and God is infinite; therefore the measure of the sin is infinite. And Anselm also proves this in the book Cur Deus homo [561]. Therefore it seems that the contrition which excludes that sin ought to be infinite.

§ BUT ON THE CONTRARY it again seems that:

§ 1. The sorrow of contrition is, as it were, the least of all sorrows that are sustained in this life. For it is certain that that whiteness is the minimum which has the most admixture of blackness; therefore that is the minimum of all sorrows which has the most admixture of joy. But such is the sorrow of contrition; therefore it is the minimum. That the sorrow of contrition is such is evident from Augustine saying that the penitent should grieve, and rejoice concerning his sorrow [562].

§ 2. Again, in many other troubles we sensibly experience greater sorrows; therefore it seems, since experience is the most certain judgment of sorrow, that there are greater sorrows even in such things.

§ 3. If, however, you say that the sorrow is maximal, but is not felt: this will be against the Philosopher in Book VII of the Ethics, where he says that every pleasure is a certain producing into a sensible nature. But it is certain that since opposites are produced around the same

thing, sadness too is produced around a sensible nature. Since therefore sorrow is sadness about a contrary, it seems that all sorrow is around a sensible nature. But it is certain that that in which sorrow is by essence, that is what grieves. Since therefore it is in the sense, the sense alone has sorrow; and thus sorrow is felt, if it exists.

§ 4. Again, the Philosopher in Book VI of the Topics reproves the definition of sorrow given thus: Sorrow is the distancing of natural parts with force. Because in this way even insensible things would grieve. But this definition is praised: Sorrow is the sense of the division of a continuum. Therefore it seems that sorrow supposes sense; and thus there will not be a sorrow which is not felt. It seems therefore that in contrition the sorrow is minimal: because less is felt there than even in the beating of a rod, in that none of the sensible parts is divided.

§ 5. Again, on the part of the intellect the Philosopher says that it is unfitting that any of the knowable things should escape our notice, possessing the noblest habits; therefore also on the part of the affection, possessing the noblest passions and affections, it is unfitting that this should escape our notice; therefore if anyone has the maximal sorrow in contrition, it cannot escape his notice, as it seems.

§ Response. To this it is not difficult to respond.

§ For it must be said that in contrition the minimum sorrow is spoken of in a twofold way: namely, minimum on the part of the passion according to the sense, or of the action (because, as was said above, the penitent acts his sorrow, and is the cause of it); or minimum according to reason. If it is called minimum according to the experience of the senses, that suffices, provided it is of contrition. Because that sorrow, along with its quantity, varies rather according to the diversity of the constitution of the penitents, than according to the quantity of the detestation of the sin. And the reason for this, as far as it seemed to suffice for the present treatise, was had in the question immediately preceding this one. But if it is called minimum according to reason—in such a way, however, that the essence of the sorrow which is of contrition is preserved in it—I still say that it suffices. But if this is not preserved in it, then it does not suffice, because there is no contrition there. But I say that the minimum according to reason suffices: because, as we said above, in the sorrow of contrition three things are considered, namely the informing grace, and the sorrow as action and passion, and the object of the sorrow or the cause of the passion. And through any grace whatsoever, however minimal, it has an infinite power to delete sin; and therefore it suffices for the deletion of sin as to the whole fault and the eternal punishment; although the penitent remains a debtor to temporal punishment on account of the smallness of the sorrow as action and passion: because that sorrow could be so great that it would delete the whole punishment due to the sin. Hence a greater one would be better than a smaller one; but nevertheless the smaller suffices.

§ Therefore it must be said to the first three objections that what is concluded is true concerning the deletion of the fault and the eternal punishment communicating with it: but it does not suffice for the deletion of temporal punishment. And penance is not only ordained

560. Glossa Ordinaria on Rom 6:19.

against sin so that it may delete eternal punishment with the fault, but also so that it may delete the temporal.

§ To what is objected to the contrary, it must be said that this is said with respect to the measure of the sorrow, which is also in minimal contrition. But this measure is that one should grieve more for the sin through which God was lost, than for any temporal thing. Hence it is not said that he should make for himself the mourning of an only son, on the grounds that it ought not to be even greater, but because in external sign it could not be compared to any greater thing. In the text here, in the words of Augustine, more is said, namely that he should be prepared to do all things for recovering the life of the soul, which he would do for avoiding the death of the body: for this measure is required for the minimum sorrow of contrition; however, there will be a fuller question about this below. And therefore, because minimal contrition is thus measured, what was adduced is not unfitting.

§ To the next it must be said that this is understood concerning the disposition of the will, and not that we ought not to exhibit ourselves more to God. But that disposition of the will is that we should serve God just as freely and uncoercedly, and pleasurably according to reason, as we exhibited ourselves to sin. Yet to no sin did we so exhibit ourselves that we would not have been separated from it out of the fear of death; but nevertheless neither death nor life ought to separate us from the charity of Christ.

§ To the next it must be said that charity loves the law of God infinitely more as to appreciation than cupidity loves gold and topaz: because it loves it above life, which cupidity does not do, which loves gold for the sake of the sufficiency of life, as Boethius and Augustine say; although perhaps cupidity experiences more sensible pleasure in gold: and the reason for this will be evident below.

§ To the next it must be said that the minimal sorrow is of infinite power, as was said before, and also of infinite estimation in value: because just as he lost the infinite good, so now he appreciates that same good above every price, even that of bodily life, since he loves God above all things: because unless he does this, without doubt it will not be the sorrow of contrition.

§ 1. To the next it must be said that a twofold equality is noted in that authority, namely in genus and in species. In genus it is noted regarding exterior lamentation, so that just as by inordinately offering himself he gloried in sins, so then by ordinately repenting he might humble himself. In species, however, equality is noted regarding interior mourning, so that just as by glorying in sins he preferred a temporal thing to God, so now in receiving God he would place the loss of God under no price, not even under the price of his own life or that of his relatives.

§ 2. To the first objection, that it is the least of all [sorrows], it must be said that that conclusion does not follow from the reason introduced: because no joy remits sorrow, unless it is contrary to that sorrow: just as heat is not remitted by humidity, which is not contrary to it, but rather by coldness, which is contrary to it. For joy about sorrow is not contrary to that

561. Anselm of Canterbury, Cur Deus Homo, I, 21.

sorrow, and thus it does not remit it. Moreover, this was held above, as well as how there can be the sorrow of affliction and yet it be voluntary.

§ 3. To the next it must be said that we are not speaking here of sensible sorrow, but of rational sorrow: and we experience that this is greater regarding sins than even in the piercing of our vital organs. This is evident, because we choose rather for our vitals to be pierced than [to commit] a sin: therefore we detest sin more than the piercing of vitals; and according to the quantity of that detestation is the quantity of sorrow in contrition.

§ 4. To the first counter-objection, it must be said that the Philosopher [563] speaks there only of natural sorrow, and not of that which is through grace, because he could not know the latter through reason. And I readily concede that "sorrow" is said almost equivocally of sensible or natural sorrow, and of rational sorrow: because, since the rational nature does not have a contrary in nature, the Philosopher calls it impassible, except perhaps accidentally in the body; and yet our faith posits that it suffers naturally in itself in the fire.

§ 5. But I say "naturally" means the same as to suffer in its own nature. Now, as to what the Philosopher says, that pleasure is something "brought about in the sensible soul" [564], he takes pleasure in the most proper sense, according as it changes and alters; or rather, according to him, insofar as it is the terminus of alteration from some passion, as he himself says in the tenth book of the Ethics [565]. But taken more commonly, it indicates the rest of the will in an attained desirable object: and in this way there is rational pleasure.

§ 6. To the next it must be said that he is speaking of natural sorrow.

§ 7. To the next it must be said that sorrow does not escape our notice: but it escapes our notice whether it is of contrition or not: because we know that we detest sin and sorrow over what is committed, but we do not know that we have grace. Because, as is said in Ecclesiastes 9:1: "Man knows not whether he is worthy of love or hatred." [566]

§ 8. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 32 — Whether Contrition Ought To Be Equal For All Sins

Must contrition be equal for all sins?

§ 9. Fourthly it is asked, whether contrition must be equal for all sins?

§ 10. And it seems not: because 1. As was held, contrition is a rational sorrow. Now reason estimates the sins concerning which one must sorrow; but the things estimated are not equal: therefore the sorrow for them is not equal.

§ 11. 2. Also, there is greater sorrow for a mortal sin than for a venial one, on account of the distance between mortal and venial: therefore, since there is also a distance [in gravity] among mortal sins, the sorrow will be greater for one than for another.

§ 12. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Contrition is entirely about this, that God is lost through sin: but this

562. Augustine, De vera et falsa poenitentia, ch. 13.

is equally the case through every mortal sin: therefore contrition for any mortal sin is equal, as it seems.

§ 14. 2. Also, contrition deleting fault and penalty is momentary: but in a single moment it cannot be greater for one thing and lesser for another: therefore it seems that it is equal for all.

§ 15. 3. Also, whatever acts upon many things simultaneously, in such a way that it does not act upon them individually, does not act upon one thing more and another less, so far as it pertains to the part of the agent itself. The sorrow of contrition acts upon sin in this way: therefore, so far as it pertains to the part of the acting sorrow, it does not act upon one thing less. The proof of the first premise is: because if it were to act upon one thing more and another less, so far as it pertains to itself, it would be necessary that the action be divided by reason of those things, and thus it would not act upon all things simultaneously, which is contrary to the hypothesis. The proof of the second premise is: because in contrition sin is not deleted after sin, but all are deleted simultaneously through the act of contrition.

§ 16. Answer. It must be said that contrition is twofold, namely, that which operates in the justification of the ungodly, and that which crushes sin regarding the debt of penalty, although not in the fault. The first contrition is a movement of free will regarding sin, and this movement is directed at all sins simultaneously; and it is the same as the detestation of mortal sin insofar as it is such. That detestation is considered in two ways, namely in act, or in the order of reason eliciting the act. If in act: then there is an undivided action regarding all sins, and not more for one and less for another. But if it is considered in the order of eliciting reason, then there is greater detestation for a greater sin, and lesser for a lesser one in the habit of reason.

§ 17. And this distinction is the same as the one [which says] that actual sorrow is considered in two ways, namely on the part of the object, and on the part of the agent. On the part of the object, indeed, it is equally about all simultaneously in sum. On the part of the agent, however, the order of reason is presupposed. But contrition which is the destroyer of penalty is successive: and this is greater for a greater sin, and lesser for a lesser sin.

§ 18. And through this the solution to all arguments is clear, all of which proceed according to the parts of this distinction.

Articulus 33 — Whether Contrition Can Be Brief And Finite

Can contrition be brief and finite?

§ 19. Fifthly, it is asked concerning its quantity with respect to time.

§ 20. And it seems that it can be brief and finite with respect to time: because

§ 21. 1. If the parts of any whole constitute it simultaneously, when one fails the whole fails. Now penance is constituted in this way by contrition, confession, and satisfaction. Since therefore satisfaction is finite, and confession is finite, it seems that penance is then finished in time: therefore contrition too.

563. Peter Lombard, Sententiae, IV, dist. 16.

§ 22. 2. Also, no medicine is extended beyond the disease. But contrition is a certain medicine: therefore it is not extended beyond the disease. But the disease is often deleted in time regarding fault and penalty, such that a man may not have any mortal fault, and may not be a debtor of any penalty: therefore he ought not to have a sacramental medicine at that point: therefore neither contrition, which is the sacramental medicine for actual sin.

§ 23. 3. Also, nothing is crushed which in no way exists: therefore a sin which in no way exists cannot be crushed either: and contrition is only regarding sins: therefore it seems that contrition is then finished. That an actual mortal sin is in no way possible to exist is proved from what has been said, that this man can become immune from mortal fault and penalty.

§ 24. 4. Also, God is more prone to showing mercy than to condemning: which is evident from the fact that He remits the entire fault

and eternal penalty, and demands only corporal or temporal penalty: therefore He Himself does not desire our penalties when we are not debtors. But this man can be a debtor to no penalty: therefore not to interior penalty either: therefore God does not desire it either: therefore the penance of contrition is finished in him.

§ 26. 5. Also, it was held above that penance restores one to the pristine state of innocence. Now it is established that an innocent person is not bound to be contrite: therefore neither is he who has fulfilled what he owed for sin: therefore the sorrow of contrition is finished in him according to time.

§ 27. But if this is conceded, it will be: 1. Against Augustine, who says this: "Let him always sorrow, and rejoice in his sorrow: and where sorrow is finished, penance is finished: and where penance is finished, life is finished" [567]. It seems that contrition or the sorrow of contrition ought not to be finite in this life.

§ 28. 2. Also, Job 3:19 says: "The small and great are there, and the servant is free from his master." Expounding on this, Gregory says that he who is once a servant of sin will not be free from sorrow except in the next life [568]. Therefore it seems that sorrow is not finished in this life.

§ 29. 3. Also, no one knows whether he is worthy of hatred or love: therefore neither does he know whether his sins have been remitted: but while that doubt exists, there ought always to be sorrow for perpetrated sin. Since therefore that doubt is extended through one's whole life, the sorrow ought to persevere through one's whole life: therefore the sorrow of contrition is not finished in time.

§ 30. 4. Also, let us posit that it is revealed to someone that his sins have been forgiven in penalty and in fault. And if it is then asked of him whether he sorrows for the perpetrated sin, it is established that he will answer, 'yes'. Since therefore he is not lying, he truly sorrows: but he does not sorrow except with the sorrow of contrition, because every rational sorrow for perpetrated sins which is informed by grace is the sorrow of contrition. Therefore he still has

564. Augustine, quoted in Lombard, Sententiae, IV, dist. 16.

the sorrow of contrition: and thus he will always repent until death: therefore the sorrow of contrition always perseveres in him: therefore contrition is not finished in him before death.

§ 31. 5. Also, the Saints assign the cause why God punishes eternally for the sin of a single hour, saying: because a man sinning mortally commits himself to a sin from which he cannot of himself be separated in his own eternity, that is, in his life; and because, so far as it pertains to himself, he sins in his own eternity, God punishes him eternally in God's eternity. Therefore, by a similar reasoning, through the same justice, if contrition commutes eternal penalty, it is necessary that he himself punish the sin in his own eternity: but his own eternity is the whole time of this life: therefore the sorrow of contrition ought to be made in the whole time of this life.

§ 32. I answer that the latter objections must be agreed with: because the sorrow of contrition is not finished in this life, but is finished in the next. And thus penance and contrition are of infinite quantity regarding the eternity of man: because if he were to live eternally in this life, he would sorrow eternally for perpetrated sin.

§ 33. Therefore it must be said to the first, that penance is not equally saved in those parts, but properly in contrition: and this has been verified above as much as we could. And therefore penance in contrition has the eternity of man, although not eternity simply speaking, because penance is a mean between a universal whole and an integral whole, and its parts are a mean between homogeneous and heterogeneous parts: and this whole point was explained above.

§ 34. To the next it must be said that it is impossible for the disease to be entirely finished: for it remains, as Master Hugh of St. Victor says, regarding the bond of perpetual detestation in the memory of the perpetrated offense, inso-

far as it was perpetrated. And therefore that [objection] is founded upon a falsehood; and the reason for this will be clear in the solution to the subsequent objection.

§ 36. To which it must be said that a certain penalty of sin is assessed by the priest, and a certain one follows the sin in the penitent. And the first indeed is capable of being finished, but the second is not: and this is the perpetual detestation of sin, which the Lord indicated, John 8:11, when He said: "Go, and now sin no more" , that is, will not to sin, which is to detest sin.

§ 37. To the next it must be said that penalty is twofold, namely afflicting only, and promoting along with affliction. And it is true that the Lord does not delight in penalty insofar as it is afflicting; but He well desires our penalty insofar as it is promoting. And such is the penalty of contrition, and it is a medicine which is simultaneously against the disease, as persevering away from the disease, and it fittingly remains through one's whole life.

§ 38. To the next it must be said that penance does not restore one to the pristine state of dignity, but to the pristine state of merit and of immunity from sin regarding fault and

565. Author of the Liber de sex principiis, ch. 1.

exterior penalty here, but not regarding absolution from every penalty, except insofar as it is extended through one's whole life, as has been said.

Articulus 34 — How Great The Quantity Of Contrition Ought To Be With Respect To The Will To Sin Or Not To Sin

How great ought the quantity of contrition to be with respect to the will of sinning or not sinning?

§ 39. Sixthly and lastly, it is asked concerning the quantity of contrition with respect to the will of sinning or not sinning.

§ 40. Now it seems to be accepted here from the Letter [of the Sentences] that 1. The quantity of contrition ought to be so great, that not even for the ransom of this natural life would one will to sin. Since therefore life is possessed more dearly than any other things, it seems that for no other thing ought one to will to sin.

§ 41. 2. Also, the Apostle, to Romans 8:35: "Who shall separate us from the love of Christ?" etc. Therefore nothing can be preferred among created goods or evils which is to be put before God: therefore it seems that he who puts anything before [God] is not in charity: therefore he is not contrite. Therefore the quantity of contrition ought to be so great that for no prosperous or adverse thing would one will to sin.

§ 42. 3. Also, Joel 2:12: "Convert to me with all your heart, in fasting, and in weeping, and in mourning." Therefore nothing is to be retained of the whole heart which is not converted in contrition to God, setting aside all separating things. If therefore one's conscience tells someone that he would rather be separated from God through mortal sin than see himself or any of his dear ones hanged, or even killed more foully, he would not be contrite.

§ 43. 4. Also, in simony there is sin because what is unpriceable is put under a price. Therefore wherever this occurs, there is sin, although not simony. But he who on account of something difficult or prosperous would will to be separated from God, places God as sellable for that thing: therefore he puts what is unpriceable under a price: therefore he sins. And one sinning actually and mortally is not contrite; therefore he himself is not contrite.

§ 44. 5. Also, Augustine in the book of Confessions: "He loves You less who loves anything along with You" [569]. Therefore it is not permitted to love anything equally with God in affection or effect: therefore much less is it permitted to love anything in affection or effect above God. But everyone loves something in effect above God who would rather be separated from God than lose some created thing: therefore every such person sins mortally: therefore he is not contrite. Therefore for contrition there is demanded the conscience of that will which, for no prosperous or adverse thing, wills to be separated from God. This is held through what is said in Deuteronomy 6:5: "You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart," etc. For if even in his heart he puts anything before God,

566. Augustine, De Trinitate, VI, 8.

it is established that he does not love with his whole heart: therefore he does not have charity: therefore neither does he have contrition.

§ 46. If perhaps you say that this precept is not given to be fulfilled on the way [in this life], but in the homeland [in heaven], as Augustine says [570]. On the contrary: It is commonly said that there is a totality of the way, and a totality of the homeland. And the totality of the way is said by all to be that nothing is put before God in the heart; whereas the totality of the homeland is that the whole heart, through thought and affection, is directed toward Him. And it is fulfilled on the way according to the totality of the way. But this person in his heart prefers something to God: therefore he does not love: therefore he is not contrite either. And you will find much disputed concerning this in the third book of the Sentences, in the questions concerning love [571].

§ 47. But if this is said, it seems difficult to some: because

§ 48. 1. There are many in whom the signs of penance appear, yet to whom if it were proposed that they would see themselves and all their dear ones suffer foul deaths, they would rather choose to sin: therefore it seems that they are not bound to these things.

§ 49. 2. Also, in love there is something to which the perfect is bound, and something which suffices for the imperfect. Therefore it is so in contrition as well: therefore, since the perfect cannot be more contrite except by placing nothing before God, it seems that a lesser contrition suffices for the imperfect: therefore he can put something before God, as it seems.

§ 50. 3. Also, charity grows and is perfected, and sometimes it is imperfect: therefore contrition too. But contrition cannot grow beyond the aforementioned state: therefore it seems that a beginning contrition is short of that [state]; but it cannot be short of it except by placing something before God: therefore a beginning contrition can place something before God. Since therefore that suffices for salvation, just as beginning charity does, it seems that the contrition which gives salvation does not demand that quantity by which nothing is put before God.

§ 51. Answer. Here one must speak cautiously, so that the truth is saved and no snare of despair is cast.

§ 52. I say therefore without prejudice, that the reasons first adduced conclude an irrefragable truth according to the way of our faith and Catholic doctrine: yet a priest ought not to demand this kind of quantity such that the penitent must profess it before him, but he ought to suppose it in him habitually through signs, even if perhaps the penitent, on account of his recent conversion, does not yet experience the same in act. If, however, the penitent professes it spontaneously, and says he has such a disposition, he is to be encouraged in it. Because blessed Gregory says in his Moralia that a man is made bold to suffer for Christ from the fact that he frequently imposes terrible things on himself, and strengthens himself in his heart to endure them [572]. But if the penitent should profess that he is in ambiguity as to whether he would yield or endure rather than sin: I think that the matter is safe, because the cause of that ambiguity is natural fear, which we experience in act more than charity. Therefore such a

567. Pseudo-Augustine, De vera et falsa poenitentia.

person already has a sign of charity, which causes the ambiguity; and with the help of God such a person would endure—without whose help nothing can be done meritoriously. But I say that ambiguity suffices: because no one is certain whether he would yield or endure, as Augustine says in the book On Holy Virginity [573]. If, however, from a deliberate conscience he should say he is certain that he would rather sin: I do not believe this person is contrite, nor does he perceive any remission of sins. Yet he is not to be cast away, because the custom of attrition induces contrition, just as servile fear induces initial and filial fear.

§ 53. To that therefore which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that many by the grace of God are in ambiguity: and also having hope in the consolation of God's help of not returning [to sin], although future falls are unknown. And therefore this is not terrible.

§ 54. To the next it must be said that in interior love the perfect is not separated from the im-

perfect, but in exterior signs. But this quantity of contrition is entirely in the interior will and conscience: and therefore both the perfect and the imperfect are bound to it.

§ 56. To the next it must be said that a beginner by this posits charity, loves God before all things, and to have Him above all things and for His own sake. But he grows in the vigor of meriting and in assimilation to God's goodness. And similarly, contrition does not grow in that quantity, because this is demanded for every contrition, but it grows in other ways, namely regarding its essence and its potency to purge the relics of sin.

Articulus 35 — Whether There Is Some State Beyond Which Contrition Is Neither Intensified Nor Grows

Is there some state beyond which contrition is not intensified, nor does it grow?

§ 57. Next it is asked concerning what he says there, A, § 4, near the end: And this with desire, because he recovers an infinite life. [574]

§ 58. For it was held that contrition is intensified and can grow. Therefore let it be asked: Is there some state beyond which it does not grow, but stands still in it?

§ 59. And it seems that there is: because 1. The Philosopher says that for all things constituted by nature there is a limit and a formula for magnitude and increase therefore, since those things which belong to grace are more ordered, it seems that those things which belong to grace also have a state of their perfection.

§ 60. 2. Also, as is said in Revelation 21:16, the sides of the city are equal: and the sides are virtues: therefore the virtues are equal. Therefore if any one stands still and does not grow beyond, all the others will stand still: but charity stands still: therefore all the others too: therefore contrition too. Proof that charity stands still: for Augustine says that charity, nourished, is increased; and increased, is perfected; and after perfection nothing is added to it [575]. Therefore the proposition stands.

568. Gregory the Great, Moralia in Job.

§ 61. 3. Also, Macrobius on the Dream of Scipio, following Plato, says that virtues do not progress beyond the state of the virtues of a purified soul, insofar as they are in a man [576]. Therefore they stand still there: and contrition is of some virtue: therefore it will stand still in that state.

§ 62. 4. Also, nothing is perfect unless it has its ultimate according to nature: if therefore contrition will not have its ultimate according to nature, it will always be imperfect: but always growing, it will never have its ultimate according to nature: therefore always growing, it will always be imperfect, which is unfitting.

§ 63. 5. Also, it is established that human virtue is finite. Let it be therefore that a man is contrite out of his whole virtue, for this is possible: since therefore his whole virtue is finite, its act will be finite, and so great that there cannot be a greater one from that virtue: therefore it then stands still. Therefore there is some state beyond which it cannot grow.

§ 64. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Bernard: "To stand still in the way of God is to go backwards" therefore there is no standing state in the way of God, as it seems: therefore any merit whatever can grow: therefore contrition too.

§ 65. 2. Also, Seneca: "There you cease to be good, where you cease wanting to become better." [577] Now it is established that this will is not an empty desire. Therefore one can become better in any good whatsoever: therefore in contrition too: therefore contrition can always grow.

§ 66. 3. Also, in the reward concerning men there is no state which cannot have under God a better and higher state: therefore neither is there in the merit ordained to the reward. But one of the merits is contrition: therefore in contrition there is no state beyond which it could not grow.

§ 67. Solution. It must be said that there is no state of contrition in which it cannot grow; yet every act of contrition is a state, but it can be greater both in the same man and in another.

§ 68. To that therefore which is first objected, it must be said that things are perfected in two ways, namely from the ultimate of their nature, both on the part of essence and on the part of quantity: and in this way natural things are perfected in the form and quantity due to them. But certain things are perfected from the fact that in assimilation they approach more to something that is substantially such per se. And in this way moral things, and especially divine things, are perfected through grace and merits. And because these are infinitely distant from that [exemplar] which they approach through assimilation: therefore there is no state of that good which could not be greater and better.

§ 69. To the next it must be said that charity does not stand still: whence Chrysostom says that charity flows from the fountain of God more and does not stand still, but always progresses or regresses . And therefore its perfection is not a standing still in some state, but

569. Augustine, Confessions, X.29.40 (paraphrased).

rather in the exclusion of imperfection regarding signs: then it is said to be perfect when it suffices for the works and signs of perfection.

§ 70. To the next it must be said that in the same way the virtues of a purified soul are called those virtues which perfect the soul in such a state in which nothing is manifested of a passion contrary to virtue: yet it is not called [of a soul] "purified" for the reason that it cannot grow in approach to the exemplar virtue.

§ 71. To the next it must be said that "ultimate" is said in two ways, namely essentially completing, and only concerning this is it true what is objected. "Ultimate" is also called that to which there is an approach and which alone is simply perfect. But everything else is more perfect by as much as it approaches it more: and concerning this, what he says is not true: because such things have perfection which is simply in one only, and in others through participation and assimilation of it: just as the Philosophers and Saints also said that intelligences are all the more perfected and united and made simple, by as much as they participate more in the goodnesses which are in the first cause. And in such things each one is perfect, but it can always be more perfect.

§ 72. To the next it must be said that potency is twofold, or better, there is a consideration of potency according to itself, and according to comparison to a perfecting habit. For if the potency is considered according to itself, then the objection introduced necessarily concludes. But if it is considered in comparison to the habit to which it is conjoined: either that habit perfects only by a created virtue, as every acquired and innate habit; or it perfects simultaneously by a created and uncreated virtue, by the fact that the virtue of the uncreated essence is conjoined to it. If in the first way, it is still true what the objection concludes. But if in the second way: then it has no force. Because although in itself the virtue is finite, yet its capacity always grows in itself, from the fact that it receives a greater sanctifying grace: and then it is capable of more. And because it thus makes good use of the grace received, a greater grace is given to it again, by which having been received, it is capable of a more ample act of merit: and there will never be such a state of merit in which man cannot grow.

§ 73. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 36 — Whether Confession Ought To Be Integral

Ought confession to be integral?

§ 74. Then, through the preceding questions had concerning almsgiving, all things are clear up to that place, there, A, § 2, where he says: Let him beware lest, led by shame, he divide confession within himself, etc. [578]

§ 75. For it is asked here concerning the integrity of confession.

§ 76. And it seems that it does not need to be integral: 1. For confession is on account of the judgment of sin: but an equal or even better judgment is made concerning sin when one part is laid bare to one, and another part to another, because "the mind intent on many things is

570. Augustine, De perfectione iustitiae hominis or similar.

less attentive to single things." Since therefore division is useful for a better judgment of sin, it seems that a divided confession is better than an integral one.

§ 77. 2. Also, there is no danger in penance: because if each one enjoins a competent penance concerning the things he has heard, the penance collected together will be competent and condign for all. Therefore it deletes the sin, although it is divided.

§ 78. 3. If perhaps you say, that just as is said in the Letter, this happens on account of shame: because one is more ashamed to say all things before one person, than dividedly before many. On the contrary: Shame is accidental to confession. But a thing ought not to be varied in its substance on account of an accident. Therefore on account of shame it cannot be that a confession is not divided, provided otherwise it is a confession.

§ 79. 4. Also, if this happens on account of shame: then also other things inducing greater shame ought to be commanded to the one confessing. Now it is established that one is much more ashamed before one priest than before another: therefore it seems that it ought to be commanded to him that he confess to the one before whom he is most ashamed—which is false: therefore shame is not the cause.

§ 80. 5. Also, it is possible for someone to divide confession not from the cause which is assigned in the Letter, namely so that he praises himself through hypocrisy: because someone can do this out of ignorance, or out of the quantity of his contrition, because he wishes that more [priests] would enjoin more [penances], and thus he would better satisfy. Therefore it seems that then such a person could divide his confession.

§ 81. 6. Also, what he says seems to many to be impossible. For Psalm 18:13 says: "Who understands sins? Cleanse me from my hidden faults." Let us posit therefore, that someone in his confession has forgotten some things, which he would gladly confess if he had them in memory; and after he has confessed all that he had in memory, the priest departs from him, or conversely he from the priest, such that he cannot opportunely approach him; and then he remembers some things which he did not confess. Then therefore I ask, whether the confession previously made was valid, or not? If it was valid: then he is not bound to repeat it: therefore he can say those things which he has in memory and previously did not have to another [priest]: therefore a divided confession is valid. But if it was not valid: then from the [subsequent] remembrance no confession is valid in which not all things even forgotten are said, which is to damn almost all men, and therefore this is absurd.

§ 82. 7. If perhaps you say that it was valid: but immediately as he remembers more, it begins not to be valid, unless he confesses those things which he remembers, and also those previously said, to some single person. On the contrary: That which is not conjoined to something in time nor in essence, seems not to destroy it. But the subsequent remembrance of sins is not conjoined to the previously had confession: therefore it does not destroy it. Therefore if it was valid before this, it also is valid afterwards, as it seems.

§ 83. 8. If you say that this reason is not valid: because a subsequent sin mortifies prior good deeds done, to which however it is not conjoined essentially or in time, but in the same

subject only. On the contrary: That a subsequent sin mortifies prior good deeds done, happens on account of the contrariety of fault and grace. But a prior confession and a subsequent remembrance do not have this kind of contrariety: therefore one does not destroy the other.

§ 84. 9. Also, if from a subsequent remembrance he is obliged to the confession of preceding ones: it is asked, whence does this happen? For this could not happen unless because the previously made confession was not valid, or now is not valid from the time that [the memory] of more...

remembers. If it was not valid previously: then that part of penance is deficient: therefore true penance is deficient: but nothing except true penance is deletive of sin: therefore sin was not deleted in him previously, which is false: because it can be that all things are deleted, both those which he previously confessed, and those which he subsequently remembered. If, however, it was valid previously, and now is not valid: it seems that this is from the contrariety of the subsequent remembrance to the confession: but a subsequent remembrance is a certain good, and a previously held confession is a certain good: therefore a good is contrary to a good, which is absurd.

§ 2. Further it is asked, Whether, supposing that he has perfected the penance previously enjoined, and afterwards remembers some things, he is bound to confess the whole anew, or not?

§ 3. 1. If so, since confession is only on account of the penance concerning the whole: therefore he is punished twice on account of that sin: which is false, since a double tribulation does not arise, as was held above. If not: therefore he will not receive penance except for a part: but he is not bound to confess except for the assessment of penance: therefore he is not bound to confess except that part of the sins for which he did not receive penance: therefore he can divide confession, which is against the Letter.

§ 4. 2. Item, From this a certain perplexity seems to be generated: for there is scarcely anyone who simultaneously remembers all his sins. Let us posit, therefore, someone successively recollecting some things which he had not confessed, for a hundred times or more, always after some interval of time, and that he is always passing from place to place, where he cannot have the opportunity of the same confessor: this man, therefore, is always bound to repeat his confession from the beginning: therefore he will scarcely ever rest secure in his conscience that he has confessed well: and this is difficult to say: therefore it seems that in some case a confession can be divided.

§ 5. But against this it is objected: because 1. If confession is divided, none of the priests hearing it will know the total quantity of the disease: therefore no due satisfaction will be enjoined upon him: therefore such a confession is not valid.

§ 6. 2. Item, Penance is enjoined by way of medicine against the habit of an old sin: but if confession is divided, no one sufficiently knows the habit: therefore no one sufficiently knows how to counter the disease of the sin: therefore such a confession is not valid.

572. Gregory the Great, Moralia in Job.

§ 7. 3. Item, In bodily medicine, if some sick man suffers from diverse kinds of sicknesses, and one physician knew one, and another knew another, it happens that the sick man is endangered: because one physician would only operate against one sickness, and then perhaps the other would be aggravated: therefore it is similar in spiritual sicknesses: therefore one priest who is a spiritual physician ought to know all the diseases.

§ 8. Solution. It must be said that a confession divided on purpose is worth nothing, as is said in the Letter, but rather causes harm: because it accumulates the sin of simulation, as is said in the Letter: and the causes of this are most properly touched upon in the objections lastly introduced: and it is not difficult to collect them into three, according to the number of things that were objected.

§ 9. It must be said, therefore, to the first, that the judgment of sin is twofold, namely, the judgment of sin as to what the sin is, and the judgment of the proportion of the whole sin to condign penance. And the first judgment is in the confessor proceeding from hearing: and concerning this alone is what is objected true. But there is a second judgment, which is more substantial to confession, and this cannot be made by anyone, unless he hears the total quantity of the sin simultaneously: and if there are many [priests], such that each one hears the whole, then it is true that it is better done by many than by one: but nevertheless it is impossible for it to be done by many, if each of them does not know the total quantity of the sin.

§ 10. To the next it must be said that the priest, since he is bound to correct the endangered penitent, intends by works of justice to habituate him to the contrary: and therefore this is impossible, unless he knows the whole old habit. But that question proceeds as if satisfaction were imposed on sins individually and divisibly in penance: and this is not true.

§ 11. To that which is objected concerning shame, it must be said that shame is twofold: one is a bodily passion which consists in the blushing of the body, and this is accidental to confession. There is also a rational shame, which is a certain confusion of oneself in the magnitude of the fault: concerning which it is said, Romans 6:21: *What fruit did you have then in those things of which you are now ashamed?* And this is substantial to confession, as is said in the Letter.

§ 12. To the next it must be said that a greater shame contributes to the well-being of confession: and because the precept is not about a better good, but only about what is necessary: therefore that is not commanded.

§ 13. To the next it must be said that although confession is separable from that shame which is a bodily passion, it is not, however, separable from that which is an interior confusion of the mind with a detestation of sin.

§ 14. To the next it must be said that such a confession is and was valid, because it is concerning all those things which were in memory: and yet he is bound to repeat it on account of that which he subsequently recalled to memory. For it does not follow, if it is valid, that he

573. Augustine, De sancta virginitate.

is not bound to repeat it: because it was valid for the state in which he then was, and intrinsically so. But that it is repeated, this is by reason of another state, and accidentally: because what is subsequently brought back to memory causes it not to be concerning every remembered sin, nor to be integrated.

§ 15. To the next it must be said that although the remembrance is not joined in act to the preceding confession, nevertheless that which is remembered makes it imperfect: because it is a part of those things which ought to be confessed, and it is lacking to the confession: but every such thing is imperfect, as the Philosopher says, to which something of its essentials is lacking: and therefore the preceding confession is imperfect, because it is not concerning all remembered things.

§ 16. To the next it must be said that it is not necessary that that which shows something to be imperfect be contrary to it: but it is indeed true that that which destroys another is intrinsically contrary to it: but a later remembrance does not destroy a previously held confession: because it was valid, and is valid, if that which is lacking is supplied to it. That this is true is clear thus, because a subtracted part is not contrary to the whole: and yet when it appears as subtracted, it shows that the whole is imperfect, and that it is perfected if it is added.

§ 17. To the next it must be said that if he fulfilled the penance previously enjoined, he ought to tell this itself along with the sins to the second priest if he cannot have the first priest, or to a third if he could not have the first or the second, and so on successively: and then he will not enjoin penance for the previously stated things, except insofar as what is now stated manifests to him a danger of habit in some sin, which danger the other priest could not understand, because he did not know the total quantity of the sin.

§ 18. From this it is further evident that a double tribulation does not arise, and yet he is bound to confess anew.

§ 19. To the next it must be said that no perplexity is generated, because he is not bound to confess except what is remembered: and this he can easily do: and if he recalls some past things to mind, let him tell them to the same [priest], or if to another, let him repeat the prior things: and this is not difficult, since they are in memory. But if he does not wish to study so much into the discussion of himself, so as to comprehend simultaneously all that he can, I think that he is damnably negligent, nor does he have sufficient care for his salvation.

§ 20. Hence, however, some have determined otherwise, saying that it suffices, along with what is remembered, to say the prior things in the genera of each, and that it is not necessary for them to be expressed in the individual instances of the genera: but I repute this to be contrary to the sayings of the Saints, and presumptuous.

Articulus 37 — Whether Hypocrisy Is Well Defined

Whether hypocrisy is well defined?

574. Peter Lombard, Sententiae IV.

§ 21. Next it is asked concerning this which it says, there, A, § 2, after the beginning: To tend toward hypocrisy.

§ 22. For we shall ask here incidentally five things concerning hypocrisy, namely: What is it? Second, Whether it is a special sin, or a general one conjoined to several others or to all? Third, In what works does it frequently appear? Fourth, How is it related to vainglory? Fifth and lastly, Whether it is always a mortal sin, or venial?

§ 23. To the first of these it is objected thus: Upon that of Matthew 6:16: Do not become like the hypocrites, sad, the Gloss says: A hypocrite is one who simulates what he is not, a representer of another person.

§ 24. But this definition seems not to be general: because 1. A hypocrite sometimes simulates what he is, or dissimulates what he is, namely when he boasts of a hidden good, or hides a hidden evil: and yet he is a hypocrite: therefore he does not always simulate what he is not.

§ 25. 2. Item, Simulation and dissimulation are related as opposites, just as similar and dissimilar: but the dissimilar is never similar insofar as it is such: therefore neither is dissimulation a simulation: but dissimulation is an act of the hypocrite, as Master Hugh of St. Victor says: therefore it is not always a simulation: therefore it is not a [good] definition.

§ 26. 3. Item, Master Hugh of St. Victor seems to posit four acts of penance, treating that of Daniel 7:6, concerning the leopard which had four wings, saying that the four wings of the hypocrite are boasting of a manifest good, excusing a manifest evil, simulating a hidden good, and dissimulating a hidden evil: therefore this is badly defined through simple simulation.

§ 27. 4. Item, Still otherwise it is objected against that definition: because simulating what is not happens sometimes to be done well, as for the sake of avoiding scandal: and then it is not evil: but it is certain that all hypocrisy is evil: therefore simulating what is not is not always hypocrisy.

§ 28. 5. Further, It seems that Joshua simulating flight, and the Savior the form of a pilgrim and a gardener, and by pretending to go further, simulated what they were not, and presented other persons: nor yet were they hypocrites: therefore that definition does not apply, as it seems.

§ 29. 6. Item, Since virtues are certain wills, or not without will, as the Philosopher says, it is certain that vices too are similarly certain wills: but a will receives its species and quality from its end and what is willed: therefore this ought to be posited here in the definition of hypocrisy: and this is not done: therefore the definition is bad.

§ 30. 7. Item, This same thing is clear by another reason: because Augustine says that all human perversity is to enjoy things to be used, and to use things to be enjoyed. But it is certain that one enjoying things to be used loves something temporal for its own sake, and more than God: since therefore this is in all human perversity, this will also be in hypocrisy:

575. Augustine, Tractates on the First Epistle of John.

therefore in hypocrisy something is loved for its own sake, from which it contracts both its species and notion: therefore this ought to have been posited in its notion.

§ 31. 8. Further, if it is asked, In what does pride differ from avarice, and these two from fornication? It will be answered, that it is with respect to the ends of the will: because avarice rests in riches, pride in dignities, and fornication in the pleasurable things of venery. Therefore it is thus in hypocrisy: but that with respect to which those things which are of the same genus differ, is in the place of the constitutive difference of the species, or is the difference itself: therefore it will hold similarly in hypocrisy: but it is certain that this is most potent in the definition and completes it: therefore this especially ought to be posited in it: but here it is not done so: therefore it is badly defined.

§ 32. Response. It must be said that the hypocrite is defined, in the previously held assignation, from his proper act: because acts are prior to habits according to notion. And if one wishes to sustain it, he will say that "to simulate" is taken broadly, namely for showing oneself in another disposition than one is, so as to represent the person of another: and since he himself is evil, it can be understood as the person of another in genus, not in species, in this way in which the Philosopher says that good and evil are the existing genera of others. And in this way also must be understood what it says, that he simulates what he is not, namely in genus, not in species. Furthermore, it must be understood that this very thing which it says, to simulate what he is not, is done for this end, which is to please concerning simulated goodness: for this is the end of the hypocrite's will. If anyone, therefore, wished to comprehend the entire essence of hypocrisy, he would say that hypocrisy is a vice desiring to please another concerning simulated goodness under the appearance of an extrinsic good, or by the palliation of an evil.

§ 33. To the first, therefore, it must be said that a hypocrite never simulates what he is in genus, because he is evil: and thus it is understood here. But that it is so is clear through Gregory upon that of Job 15:34: The congregation of the hypocrite, etc., where he says thus: The mind of the hypocrite is never empty of evil: because what he appetites, he envies in others, so that out of their despising he might be more illustrious: whence he also sets snares so that he alone might capture esteem.

§ 34. And as to what is objected concerning a hidden good, it must be said that this is understood concerning a good in genus, or concerning a civil good: because he does not have a good in genus, unless it is simula- ted: and therefore, understanding according to genus, he always simulates what he is not.

§ 35. To the next it must be said that simulation and dissimulation are not related as opposites, except as concerning the same good or evil: and therefore the simulation of good is not opposed to the dissimulation of evil, but rather here both are comprehended under simulation, because both show the cloak of a good man, but extrinsically.

§ 36. To the next it must be said that Master Hugh descends to the special acts of hypocrisy, and it is true that these are multiplied according to how, in the appearance of good and evil,

576. Macrobius, Commentary on the Dream of Scipio, I.8.

insofar as it comes in some way into the notice of another, he can attain the pleasure of apparent holiness. But these in genus are good and evil, and each is either hidden or manifest: and thus four wings are produced: yet all these acts are comprehended under one according to genus, which is the showing of holiness or goodness in order to please the neighbor.

§ 37. To the next it must be said that this is true, that it happens that someone simulates what he is not, but not in genus: and therefore such a one does not entirely simulate what he is not: because he does not care about this, that he be judged holy or good, but rather he cautiously guards his neighbor as much as he can, lest he be scandalized, and this is the mark of a prudent man.

§ 38. To the next it must be said that, as is clear in a certain chapter of the Decretals, there is a good simulation, and a bad simulation: and it is a distinction of Augustine: but nevertheless those things which seem to be simulations in the Saints or the Lord, are not purely simulations, but indications of mysteries: because just as the Lord feigned to go further as a pilgrim, and was further in the minds of the disciples: but this [hypocrisy] is a pure simulation of something, which does not even pertain to the simulator according to genus, and with a dishonest end.

§ 39. To all those things, however, which are subsequently induced, it must be plainly conceded: but it must be said that the end here is imported by this, that he is a representer of another person in genus. But since another person, insofar as he is another, would not move any will, it is understood that it moves it, and is its end, by reason of the adjunct in the notice of others, which is the pleasing of apparent holiness.

Articulus 38 — Whether Hypocrisy Is A Special Sin, Or A General One Conjoined To Others

Whether hypocrisy is a special sin, or a general one conjoined to others?

§ 40. Secondly it is asked, Whether it is a special sin, or a general one conjoined to others?

§ 41. But it seems that it is a general one conjoined to others: because 1. Here it is defined through simulation: and it is certain that simulation is a sin other than hypocrisy, as is clear in 1 Kings 14:6, where the Prophet says to the wife of Jeroboam: Enter, wife of Jeroboam: why do you simulate yourself to be another? yet that wife was not a hypocrite on account of this. Since, therefore, it is conjoined to simulation, it seems that by the same reason it is conjoined to others.

§ 42. 2. Item, From the authority of Gregory previously induced, it seems that it is conjoined to others, and especially to envy, and to pride: because from this that he says, that the mind of the hypocrite is never empty of evil, it seems that it is adjoined to all evils: because there is no special evil of which the mind of the hypocrite is ever empty. But from this that he says, that he envies others, he shows that it is conjoined to envy: and from this that he says, that

577. Seneca, Epistolae Morales.

he despises others so that out of their despising he might become more illustrious, he shows it is conjoined to pride: and by the same reason it is conjoined to all others.

§ 43. 3. Item, Especially it seems to be conjoined to lying and guile and fraudulence: because those vices show something other than they are: and this is the proper act of the hypocrite, as has been said.

§ 44. 4. Further also otherwise by a universal reason this same thing is seen: because good and evil cannot be reduced to some common thing which is one genus: because the Philosopher says that they are not in a genus, but are the genera of others: therefore the simulation of good and the dissimulation of evil cannot similarly be reduced to one genus of one appetible thing in which they might rest, as it seems: therefore this is in every genus: therefore it is not an evil in one, but in all: therefore it is conjoined to all, as it seems; therefore it is not one special evil.

§ 45. But against this it is objected: Whatever divides one genus diversely with others which are species of that genus, is a species, not a genus; hypocrisy divides this genus which is 'vice' with other special vices: therefore it itself is a special vice: therefore separated from others.

§ 46. Further also, Although charity loves every good, yet it is a special virtue on account of a special end: therefore by similarity, although hypocrisy desires to appear in good, yet it will be a special vice on account of the end, which is to please another concerning holiness.

§ 47. Which we concede, saying to the first, that simulation is taken in two ways, namely generally, and specially. Taken generally, simulation is not a sin: but taken specially, it is again taken in two ways, namely insofar as it sounds a certain appetite to deceive, and thus it is not a special sin, but conjoined to several sins, as was proved in objecting: as it is said, Job 36:13: Simulators and crafty men provoke the wrath of God. In another way it is taken most specially for the simulation of non-existent goodness, and thus it is hypocrisy, which the very name hypocrisy shows, which is said from hypo which is 'under', and chrisis, 'conversion', as if malice lurking under the figure of conversion and exterior goodness: or 'turned under', that is, having a hidden conversion: because he converts the good outside, while he is evil inside.

§ 48. To the next it must be said that Gregory does not mean that it is a sin conjoined or commixed with others: but he says this for the reason that it is more frequently sought by them, on account of which it is also posited as a daughter of vainglory : as he also says in the last Gloss upon Job.

§ 49. To the next it must be said that it is not conjoined to lying except accidentally, namely if the lie seeks the pleasing of apparent holiness. But that a lie shows what is not, is not understood concerning the disposition of the man quantum to the virtue of goodness, but rather specially with truth: because since it is false, it pretends truth in speech.

§ 50. To the next it must be said that this is solved by the last objection adduced to the contrary: because although the matter in which the hypocrite seeks to appear is not in a single

578. Peter Lombard, Sententiae IV.

genus, nevertheless the end is special: and this is the completing difference in wills, and from its specialty the vice is drawn into a species.

§ 51. Through the same thing, the solution to the subsequent query is clear.

Articulus 39 — In Which Works Hypocrisy More Frequently Appears; And, In Which Act It Is Worse

In which works does hypocrisy more frequently appear? and, In which act is it worse?

§ 52. Thirdly it is asked, In which works does it more frequently appear?

§ 53. But it seems that 1. In confession, through those things which are said in the Letter.

§ 54. 2. Item, By such a reason: Where there is a place of accusation in a civil judgment, there is also properly a place for the showing of innocence and purity of life: but this is in confession quantum to divine judgment: therefore there properly is the place of the showing of goodness and purity of life: therefore, since the hypocrite principally intends this, it seems that in confession he maximally pretends hypocrisy.

§ 55. But it seems that it maximally shows itself in fasting: 1. Through that which is specially prohibited there by our Savior, Matthew 6:16, saying: When you fast, do not become like the hypocrites, sad.

§ 56. 2. Item, By reason: For in this the hypocrite maximally seeks to appear holy, which is maximally suited to pretend exterior holiness: but this is fasting: therefore he maximally seeks hypocrisy in fasting. The first premise is proved through the astuteness of the hypocrite: because he knows which act is more useful to him for attaining the end. The second is proved from this, that fasting exterminates and macerates the body, which is proper to exterior holiness.

§ 57. 3. Further, the Lord says in the Gospel, that hypocrites exterminate their faces. Since therefore fasting maximally exterminates, in that maximally does the hypocrite seek to appear.

§ 58. But it seems that in almsgiving: because Gregory says, that in almsgiving hypocrites especially sound a trumpet before themselves, so that they might appear good.

§ 59. Further it is asked, In which act is hypocrisy worse?

§ 60. But it seems that in almsgiving: because Chrysostom says: Everywhere vainglory is evil, but maximally in philanthropy: but philanthropy is the love of men: and thus he calls piety concerning the poor, because it proceeds from the love of men.

§ 61. ON THE CONTRARY: Chrysostom: In other things it is nothing admirable to glory vainly, but in fasting and prayer it is extraneous and full of tears.

§ 62. Solution. It must be said that hypocrisy principally seeks to appear in acts of holiness, and those are parts of sanctification or of satisfaction, namely fasting, prayer, and almsgiving: and therefore it more often turns itself to those than to others, unless hypocrisy is taken very

571. Albert the Great, In III Sententiarum (dist. 27).

generally for every other showing that is, whether it be done by word or by a sign of holiness: as Blessed Bernard says, that a hypocrite is every Doctor who does not correct himself before another.

§ 63. To the first, therefore, it must be said that hypocrisy is often shown in confession, but not as frequently as in the other aforesaid things: because there are not as many judges of apparent goodness there, since confession is made to one alone.

§ 64. To the next it must be said that in truth the hypocrite excuses himself: but yet that is not the act by which he more frequently obtains the end, as has been said.

§ 65. To the next it must be said that according to the diversity of hypocrites, diverse works of the three works of penance are exercised. For a rich man who is not avaricious, but a hypocrite, more frequently turns himself to almsgiving: because he obtains a double pleasing, namely from what is given, and from the apparent holiness: but a poor man prays more often: and no one fasts more frequently on account of its difficulty, unless he cannot do otherwise on account of men: and therefore among all men, certain heretics fast less.

§ 66. And to that which is objected against this, it must be said that the Savior prohibits the vice of hypocrisy in this and in other things, in which it is more frequently accustomed to be found.

§ 67. To the next it must be said that the hypocrite does not seek the extermination of the face for its own sake, and therefore in truth he does not love leanness, but the similitude of leanness: and yet he wants to have a fat belly: and therefore he is not as frequently in fasting, as in prayer, and in the corners of the squares.

§ 68. To the next it must be said that he is speaking of a certain hypocrite, and not of every one.

§ 69. To that which is further asked, it must be said that such operations of sins are related as exceeding and exceeded on account of diverse circumstances which can aggravate on either side.

§ 70. But if it is asked, In what genus is hypocrisy more grave? I think, that in that which is least according to truth in the hypocrite, whatever that is, if it pertains to holiness.

§ 71. But to that which is objected concerning Chrysostom, we could say that although he says this concerning vainglory, nevertheless it is not consequent that this is true concerning hypocrisy: because hypocrisy and vainglory are diverse vices, as will be shown below. If, however, force is not placed in this: then it must be said, that as to something, it is worse in philanthropy: because there it extinguishes a work which has the promise of the life that now is, and of the future: but in the others it does not extinguish a work which thus has a double promise, and as to this, it is worse in that one, because it is of greater harm.

§ 72. To the next it must be said that Chrysostom does not say this because it is worse there, but because it is more irrational there: because the affliction itself of the flesh and spirit ought to draw one back from the appetite for praise, and this is not so in the others, which almost consist in a certain laudable excellence, as almsgiving which is conjoined to the excellence of liberality, and the like.

Articulus 40 — How Hypocrisy Stands In Relation To Vain Glory

How does hypocrisy relate to vainglory?

§ 73. Fourthly it is asked, How is it related to vainglory?

§ 74. But it seems that it does not differ from it: because 1. Vices are wills, or not without will, as the Philosopher says concerning virtue: but such wills are defined by the end: therefore those of which there is one end, are one vice of the will: but there is one end of hypocrisy and of vainglory: therefore they are one vice of the will. But that the end is the same is proved, Job 8:16, upon that: In its rising its sprout shall go forth, where Gregory says: The hypocrite, when he acts well, wants to be seen by all: for through all things that he does, by hidden thought he seeks praises: but praise is the end of vainglory: therefore the proposition is certain.

§ 75. 2. Item, A daughter in no generation differs in species from the mother: but hypocrisy is the daughter of vainglory: therefore it does not differ in species from vainglory. But the middle [premise] is proved from this that is said in the Gloss at the end of Job, thus: From vainglory are born disobedience, boasting, and hypocrisy.

§ 76. TO THE CONTRARY of this is, that just as one of the daughters differs from the mother, so does the remaining one differ: but disobedience differs from vainglory: therefore hypocrisy does too.

§ 77. Response. It must be said that they are diverse vices.

§ 78. But to the first it must be said that the substantial end of vainglory and of hypocrisy is not the same: because vainglory rests in praise, but hypocrisy in the opinion of goodness, or it does not seek praise except accidentally, namely insofar as vainglory is conjoined with it: and because this is frequent and almost always, on account of this Gregory says that the hypocrite seeks praise.

§ 79. To the next it must be said that this is true of univocal generation: but Gregory in that Gloss calls generation the exit of an effect from a cause: whence the daughter of a capital vice is named by him as that mediating thing by which the capital vice more often obtains the end which it intends: and it is not a univocal generation, as is excellently proved by the objection which was made to the opposite.

Articulus 41 — Whether Hypocrisy Is Always Mortal Or Venial Sin

Whether hypocrisy is always a mortal sin, or venial?

§ 80. Fifthly and lastly it is asked, Whether it is always a mortal sin, or venial?

§ 81. But it seems that it is mortal, 1. Through this which is said, Isaiah 16:13, upon that: In three years, like the years of a hireling, the glory of Moab shall be taken away over all the great people, the Gloss of Jerome: In comparison of two evils, it is lighter to sin openly, than to simulate holiness: but to sin openly, as it is taken there, is mortal: therefore much more is hypocrisy mortal.

§ 82. 2. Item, To Ephesians 6:7, upon that: As to the Lord, and not to men, Augustine: Simulated equity is not equity, but double iniquity: but simple iniquity is mortal: therefore also simulated equity: but this is hypocrisy: therefore, etc.

§ 83. 3. Item, Lamentations 4:6: The iniquity of the daughter of my people is made greater, etc., the Gloss says: The crimes of the soul which slips in hypocrisy are lamented, whose iniquity is greater than the sin of Sodom. But it is certain that the sin of Sodom was grave and mortal: therefore hypocrisy is too.

§ 84. 4. Item, Upon that: He takes seven other spirits more wicked than himself[579], the Gloss says, that the spirits of simulation are more wicked than those of open iniquity. For it says, that the spirit of pride is evil, but worse than it is the simulator of humility, and so concerning the other capital sins: therefore, etc.

§ 85. 5. From those things it is further elicited, that it is graver to sin secretly than manifestly, other things being equal.

§ 1. But against this is the fact that one who sins openly scandalizes; whereas one who sins secretly does not scandalize: therefore, all else being equal, one who sins openly sins more gravely than one who sins secretly.

§ 2. Response. It must be said that hypocrisy is not always a mortal sin, but sometimes it is venial, and sometimes greater, and sometimes lesser, according as it is clothed in different circumstances.

§ 3. Therefore, to the first it must be said that Jerome is speaking in a qualified sense (secundum quid), and not absolutely (simpliciter), for it is simply more grave to sin openly. However, in this respect, that which has a greater power to deceive is called more grave, and it is in this respect that the Gloss speaks there.

§ 4. To the next it must be said that Augustine's statement is not understood of every mode of hypocrisy, but only of that in which simulation is accumulated with sin: because then, on account of a double deformity, it is called a double iniquity. If, however, it were merely a simulation of holiness, it would not be a double iniquity.

§ 5. To the next it must be said that this is not understood absolutely, but only with respect to the efficacy of the deception: because he who proclaims his sin like Sodom cannot deceive; but the simulator deceives his friend with his mouth.

§ 6. To the next it must be said that it is called more wicked by reason of accumulation, and not by reason of the simulation taken in itself.

§ 7. To that which is asked further, the solution is already clear through what was said previously.

Articulus 42 — Whether The Strengthening Of A Good Conscience Is Required In One Who Ought To Communicate

Is the comforting of a good conscience required in him who is to communicate?

§ 9. Next, a question is raised concerning what he says there, A, § 2, after the beginning: "Let him also beware lest he approach the Lord's body before his good conscience is comforted," etc.

§ 10. For this seems to be false: because 1. The comforting of a good conscience implies more than a good conscience: therefore, more than having grace is required for communion, which almost all deny.

§ 11. 2. Moreover, nothing is required for communion except that the communicant not be unworthy: but unworthiness arises only from mortal sin: therefore, one who does not have mortal sin can communicate. However, not everyone of this sort is comforted by a good conscience: therefore, someone who is not comforted by a good conscience can communicate.

§ 12. 3. Again, in natural things we see that being and living are prior to being comforted in being and life: therefore, it is similar in spiritual things. But spiritual being is through grace, and living is through virtue perfecting one for action: therefore, comforting follows both of these. If therefore this is required for communion, more is required for communion than having grace and virtues, which everyone denies.

§ 13. 4. Again, in the Letter he says that he should mourn that he does not yet dare to receive the saving food which he greatly desires. Now it is evident that this desire for the saving food comes from the love of charity: therefore, one having charity still ought not to receive the saving food, which everyone considers absurd.

§ 14. But against this is that if 1. Hugh of St. Victor says the following in his epistle to Bernard on the Paschal Epiphany: "I say boldly that even if he is contrite, nevertheless he ought not to communicate before he has confessed." But it is established that one who is contrite has charity and grace: therefore, as he says here, he is still bound to await the comforting of a good conscience through meritorious works.

§ 15. 2. Again, in the primitive Church, the newly penitent were not only segregated from commu-
nion of the body and blood of the Lord, but even from the place in which they were consecrated, namely from the Church. Yet the newly penitent had grace and virtues: therefore, as is said here, comforting through meritorious works is required for communion, even after grace is possessed.

§ 16. But if this is said, let us ask concerning certain cases.

§ 17. Let us suppose that someone, in approaching the body of Christ, remembers one or two things which he never confessed: it seems, according to Hugh's statement, that he ought not to approach.

579. Cf. Luke 11:26.

§ 18. But against this is the fact that the communion of the body gives greater grace to the recipient: therefore, if he withdraws himself, he distances himself from grace or from the augmentation of grace: and he ought to do neither of these things: therefore, he ought to approach and receive.

§ 19. Again, let us suppose the case of a priest who has a congregation, and there is no one else to celebrate, and he has not confessed, and there is no priest present to whom he can confess: yet he is contrite. What must he do? For either he must approach, and then he seems to act against the authority adduced above and against what is said in the text; or he will not approach, and then he scandalizes the people: therefore, he seems to be perplexed.

§ 20. Response. It must be said that a man having grace, or presuming from a probable sign that he has grace, can approach the body of Christ. And a probable sign is if he has confessed, and his conscience dictates to him that for no reason does he will to sin further, and that he will willingly undertake penance at the due time.

§ 21. To that which is objected first, it must be said that, in truth, if one carefully considers the Letter, Augustine then intends that a newly penitent person ought not to communicate: but he said this by way of counsel, or concerning one solemnly repenting for the terror of others. If anyone wishes, however, he can resolve it thus: that every conscience of an adult having grace is comforted: because the act of contrition detesting sin is a meritorious act: similarly the act of faith in God, and the like, and by these acts he is moved when he is justified: and thus immediately after the first moment of contrition, the conscience is comforted by an interior meritorious work, even if not an exterior one.

§ 22. To the next it must be said that, regarding suitability, nothing more is required for communion than what the objection states: but because amendment cannot take place except through detestation and sorrow for sin, therefore a meritorious act comforting the conscience accompanies that suitability: and thus he is already comforted when he approaches.

§ 23. To the next it must be said that as it is in nature, so it is in grace, because "the grace of the Holy Spirit knows no slow efforts," as the Gloss of Ambrose says on Acts 8:1 and following . Therefore, although the habit of grace is naturally prior to the meritorious act, yet in time they can be simultaneous.

§ 24. To the next it must be said that Augustine, as was said, states this by way of counsel, or concerning one solemnly repenting. And I well think it is cautious that a man fresh from the wounds of sins should not communicate for some time: but nevertheless, it is not necessary.

§ 25. To what Hugh says, it must be said that he is speaking of one who has a confessor ready without hardship: because he is negligent if he does not confess: and this negligence impedes him from communion.

§ 26. To the next it must be said that in the primitive Church this was done either to strike terror, or it was done only concerning solemn penitents, as was said.

§ 27. To that which is further asked concerning cases, I say that one approaching who previously made a general confession ought not to step back on account of remembering some sins which he did not confess specifically: because in the general confession those were remitted: nay, he can wait for an opportune time until he confesses, as was said above in the question on confession.

§ 28. To what is asked about the priest, it must be said that such a priest can celebrate with sorrow, and should have a firm purpose of confessing at an opportune time.

§ 29. And what is objected to the contrary is resolved by the foregoing: because his good conscience has already been comforted in some mode.

Articulus 43 — Whether Games Are A Mortal Sin, And Which Are, And Which Are Not

Are games a mortal sin, and which are, and which are not?

§ 31. Next, a question is raised concerning what he says there, A, § 2, around the middle: "Let him also restrain himself from games, spectacles," etc.

§ 32. For according to this, it seems that games are a mortal sin: and then let it be asked, concerning which games is this understood?

§ 33. 1. For it is said in 1 Corinthians 10:7, Neither become idolaters, as some of them, as it is written: The people sat down to eat and drink, and rose up to play. And according to this it seems that dances are a mortal sin, because playing is lustful gesticulation in dances.

§ 34. Moreover, this seems true by four reasons, of which the first is this: because in such play immodest gesticulations are shown: but signs of immodesty are mortal sins, because in them there is progressive concupiscence: therefore such a game is a mortal sin.

§ 35. 2. The second is: because a dance is first read to have been done before an idol: and it is established that idolatry only invented this so that men would be more moved to lust: therefore it seems that it is a mortal sin.

§ 36. 3. The third is, because in Isaiah 3:16 and 17, the Lord specially threatened this game, saying: Because the daughters of Zion are haughty, and have walked with outstretched neck, and went with winking of eyes, and were clapping, walked on their feet, and proceeded with a composed step: the Lord will make bald the crown of the head of the daughters of Zion, and the Lord will lay bare their hair. Now all these things are done in dances and prancing. Therefore it seems that it is a mortal sin.

§ 37. 4. The fourth reason is taken from the word of the Apostle, 1 Thessalonians 5:22, which says: Abstain from all appearance of evil. Now it is clear to all that it is an appearance of evil by which the lustful mutually reveal their concupiscences to one another: and this especially happens in dances.

§ 38. Further it is asked: Are hunting, and lyre-playing, and the like, called spectacles?

§ 39. And it seems so: because 1. On Romans 13:10, regarding that text: Therefore love is the fulfilling of the law, Augustine says in the Gloss that in human spectacles the hunter is one

thing, and the lyre another: therefore it seems that one doing penance ought to abstain even from such things, as is said in the Letter.

§ 40. 2. Moreover, those things are called vain and idle which are not done by reason of just necessity or with the intention of pious utility: but all human games and spectacles are of this sort: therefore they are vain and idle. But an account will be rendered for such things on the day of judgment, as is said in Matthew 12:36: therefore such things are sins: therefore the penitent ought to abstain from them. Now this seems to apply much more to chess and dice, in which there is no goodness or utility.

§ 41. 3. Again, it was held earlier in the Letter that the penitent ought to restrain himself even from licit things, so that he might more easily find grace: therefore much more from superfluous things. Now it is established that games and spectacles are superfluous: therefore he ought to abstain from them.

§ 42. 4. Again, whatever draws a neighbor to vanity ought to be avoided: but such things draw one to vanity: therefore they ought to be avoided.

§ 43. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Exodus 15:20 and 21: Therefore Miriam the prophetess, the sister of Aaron, took a tambourine in her hand: and all the women went out after her with tambourines and choruses, for whom she led the singing—namely, dances: and in this she merited: therefore that act is not evil in itself.

§ 44. 2. Moreover, in Psalm 67:26 and 28: In the midst of the young maidens playing on tambourines... there is Benjamin the youth. And it is established that according to the literal sense he speaks there of dances, and does not reprehend such signs of joy.

§ 45. 3. Moreover, Jeremiah 31:4: Thou shalt yet be adorned with thy tambourines, and shalt go forth in the dance of them that play. And it is established that there, according to the literal sense, the Lord promises such signs of joy to those returning from Chaldea. Therefore they are not evil in themselves: therefore a penitent does not need to restrain himself from such things.

§ 46. Response. It must be said that dances and games of this sort, whether done with singing or with musical instruments, are not evil in themselves, as was proven last through the authorities. But they can become evil from circumstances for three reasons: one of which, and the principal one, is an evil intention, as when they are done to show or provoke lust, as almost everyone practices them now: and for this reason even ecclesiastical persons have set such things aside, because even of notable joy one must not commune with sinners. Another reason is when they are not done at their proper time, as in a time of sadness: because, as is said in Ecclesiasticus 22:6: Music in mourning is an annoying tale: and in this way it is forbidden for a penitent to be at games: because while he is repenting, it is a time for weeping, not a time for laughing and giving oneself to spectacles. A third reason is taken from the office of the person, just as hunting and other games are forbidden to clerics: because, being chosen for the lot of the Lord, they ought to be occupied with other exercises.

§ 47. Therefore, to what is objected first concerning dances, it must be said that a dance is not evil in itself: but it becomes evil through such circumstances, as was said.

§ 48. To the next it must be said that dancing also existed beforehand, and perhaps more often, and at least in Exodus 15:20 it was exercised by Miriam, the sister of Moses, and other women as a sign of joy, or of victory given from heaven over enemies.

§ 49. To the next it must be said that Isaiah is speaking of those who turn a sign of joy into the gesticulations of harlots: and it is well said that for them it is a sin.

§ 50. To the next it must be said that this is understood of an appearance of evil which is evil in itself, and not of those things which can become evil from a circumstance, and even good from other circumstances.

§ 51. I think, however, that when five conditions concur for a dance, it is not reprehensible. The first is that it be at a proper time of joy, such as at weddings, or at a time of victory, or the liberation of a person or the homeland, or at the arrival of a friend from a distant land. The second is that it be with honorable persons, concerning whom no presumption of evil arises, not with male and female libertines. The third is that it be done by laypersons: because for nuns, monks, and clerics, owing to the fact that they ought to be occupied with other things, I consider all dancing to be illicit. The fourth is that it be done in an honorable manner, not with excessively inordinate or dishonorable gesticulations. The fifth is that the rousing singing in such things, and the music, not be about illicit things, but about morals. The melody, however, is not to be worried about, as I think, because in such things I think it is necessary that a light melody be made, which in some way expresses the mode of dancing.

§ 52. To what is further asked concerning other spectacles, it seems the answer must be given under a distinction: for either they have an annexed utility, or they are invented only to remove boredom as a solace for the tediousness of this life. If the first way: either they are exercised by lay persons or by spiritual persons. If by laypersons, in whatever way they are done at a time and place not forbidden: I think they are to be tolerated, such as hunting, and fowling, and the like. If, however, they are exercised by spiritual persons, a distinction must be made: for since in a spectacle there is both utility and vanity, either the utility moves one to the work, and the vanity is only mixing itself in there: and then, in that case, hunting is conceded to religious and clerics—namely, in the case if their revenues consist in such things, and they derive their necessities from there, such that they are in forested lands, as are the revenues of certain monasteries in wild game and fowling and the like. Or it is the case that vanity moves them: and then I think it is a grave sin for spiritual men, and especially religious: because they excessively distract the mind, and as it were turn them away so that they do not return to spiritual study. However, in non-harmful games of hoops (troci), throwing sticks (asticularum), chess (scaci), and dice (aleae), I believe they are not a sin: because such things are done only to remove boredom, and do not excessively turn the mind away from spiritual study.

§ 53. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 44 — Whether The Worthy Fruits Of The Virtues Are Called The Worthy Fruits Of Penance

Are worthy fruits of virtues called worthy fruits of penance?

§ 55. Next, a question is raised concerning what he says there, A, § 2, near the end: "For there are worthy fruits of virtues, which do not suffice for penitents," etc.

§ 56. For this seems to be false: because 1. Even penance is a certain virtue, as was held above: therefore the fruits of penance are fruits of virtues: therefore the worthy fruits of penance are also worthy fruits of virtues: for if one thing follows upon another, if the same thing is added to both, it still follows upon that.

§ 57. 2. Again, virtue is concerning the difficult and the good, as the Philosopher says: but penance is also concerning such things, nor can it extend itself beyond them: therefore it cannot extend itself beyond the work of virtue: therefore the fruits of virtue and of penance are the same.

§ 58. 3. Again, nothing is enjoined according to the law except a work of virtue: but that which is enjoined is a fruit of penance when it is put into work: therefore the work of virtue is a fruit of penance: and the same is a fruit of virtue: therefore the fruit of virtue and of penance is the same.

§ 59. I respond to this that the fruits of penance and of virtue are not the same: because virtue is in all good things, and penance is not.

§ 60. To the first, therefore, it must be said that penance is in a manifold genus, as was said above, and here it is taken insofar as it is in the genus of a sacrament having three parts, namely contrition, confession, and satisfaction. For these three are not required of everyone having virtues, but only of the penitent.

§ 61. To the next it must be said that there is something more difficult than the difficult: now virtue is concerning what is difficult in act, but penance is concerning what is excellingly difficult—not regarding the power of the agent, but regarding the mean of virtue according to the common mode of observance: because a penitent restrains himself from licit things, and gives from his necessities, and the like, which is not required of one simply having virtue.

§ 62. To the next it must be said that according to the law, more is enjoined than the mode of virtue demands, although it is always reduced to some virtue moving one to that act. And this happens on account of the spiritual mode of the penitent, who is bound to more than is commonly required by all living according to virtue: and this is how what is said in the Letter is understood. For it is not absurd that a virtue which is the same in species moves diversely according to the diverse state of the man whom it moves, just as justice moves one who causes injury differently (to make satisfaction), and differently moves anyone else in common to works of justice.

Articulus 45 — Whether Penances Which Are Not Imposed According To The Quality Of The Crimes According To The Authorities Of The Canons Ought To Be Called False Penance

Ought penances which are not imposed for the quality of crimes according to the authorities of the canons be called false penances?

§ 64. Next, a question is raised concerning what Gregory says there, B, after the beginning: "We call false penances those which are not imposed according to the authorities of the canons for the quality of the crimes," etc.

§ 65. For this seems to be false: because

§ 66. 1. The canon says simply that fornication is to be punished by a seven-year fast. Therefore, according to this, one who has fornicated a thousand or a hundred times could not make satisfaction through his whole life: and this would draw a man to despair. Therefore what is said in the Letter seems false.

§ 67. 2. Moreover, penances are at the judgment of the priest. Therefore it seems that they can be less than the quality of the crimes demands.

§ 68. To this, however, it must be said that this Letter does not intend that nothing be enjoined upon any penitent except what the canon says and what the quality of the crimes demands: but rather it says that the canon should be the rule for enjoining penance: yet the proportioning of this rule to this or that penitent is according to the judgment of a discreet priest. For just as authors give the rules of medicine, yet to moderate them belongs to the discreet doctor, so it is in the premises instituted by the canon.

§ 69. Therefore, to what is objected first, the resolution is that the canon does not draw the proportion of adaptation for this one or that one, but is only an exemplar of the rule in universal: and this could not be done for every faculty and state of penitents: because that is according to particular things which are infinite. And for this reason, the canon forces no one to despair.

§ 70. To the next it must be said that the proportioning of the penance is in the judgment of the priest, as was said.

Articulus 46 — Whether Military Service, Public Commerce, Taxes, And Tolls Are Lawful Or Unlawful

Are military service, public commerce, taxes, and tolls licit or illicit?

§ 72. Next, a question is raised concerning what he says there, B, after the beginning: "And therefore a soldier, or a merchant," etc.

§ 73. And it is asked, if these things which he touches upon here are illicit businesses?

§ 74. It seems that they are not: because 1. In Luke 3:14, John the Baptist does not forbid military service, but only commands that they be content with their pay: therefore it seems that military service is not illicit in itself.

§ 75. 2. Again, the Gloss on that text: Be content with your pay, says this: "By a just moderation he prohibits them from seeking plunder by false accusation from those whom they ought to have benefited by their military service: teaching therefore that wages are established for the military so that, while sustenance is sought, the plunderer might not roam at large." From this the same is gathered: that military service is not illicit in itself, but rather the abuse of plunder that happens around it.

§ 76. 3. Again, nothing ordered to the preservation of civic life and the republic is a sin: military service is ordered most of all to the preservation of these two: therefore, it is not a sin. The first premise is self-evident. The second is written in the Ethics.

§ 77. Further it is asked concerning merchants.

§ 78. For what he says seems false: because 1. Genesis 49:13 says: Zabulon shall dwell on the seashore, and in the roadstead of ships, reaching as far as Sidon. And according to the literal exposition, the land of Zabulon is well spoken of by the gain of commerce by sea: therefore they are not illicit.

§ 79. 2. Again, Proverbs 31:14 says of the valiant woman: She is like the merchant's ship, bringing her bread from afar. Where, according to the literal sense, the same is argued.

§ 80. 3. Moreover, commerce is useful to the whole earth, by carrying away abundance in one land, and bringing back what is deficient: but nothing serving the utility of the community is a sin: therefore such commerce is not a sin: therefore he ought not to have said generally concerning commerce that it was a sin.

§ 81. 4. Moreover, nothing of those things without which civic life is dissolved, and with which it is optimally preserved, is a sin: but commerce is something of this sort: therefore it is not a sin. The first premise is clear from this, that every laudable study of morality is concerning things that preserve civic life. The second is taken from Book V of the Ethics, where he speaks of commutative justice, for the sake of which he says even ministries were invented: because it consists entirely in the exchanges of commerce.

§ 82. 5. Moreover, that which the common law judges to be just can in no way be a sin: but in many commercial dealings the common law judges the contract to be just: therefore it is in no way a sin: therefore commerce generally is not a sin.

§ 83. But against this it is objected by that text of Ecclesiasticus 26:28: A merchant is hardly freed from negligence: and a huckster shall not be justified from the sins of the lips: therefore he who engages in commerce commits himself to a danger from which it is difficult to escape sin: but no one ought to commit himself to a danger: therefore no one ought to engage in commerce.

§ 84. Further it is asked here concerning publicans, who...

§ 85. 1. As it is said in the Gloss on that text: And the publicans also came, it says thus: "Publicans are those who exact taxes, or who are contractors of the revenues of the treasury and of public affairs: and also those who pursue the gains of this world through commerce: each of whom in his own degree he equally restrains from doing injury: so that while first they restrain themselves from the appetite for the things of others, they might at length reach the

point of sharing their own things with their neighbors." From this Gloss it is gathered that even just taxes and tolls can be received: and publicans who preside over such things are not to be restrained from the act, but from injustice.

§ 86. 2. Moreover, this seems true also by reason: For tolls and customs and taxes are paid to the prince so that the land may be defended in peace: so that inhabitants may travel through it, and procure their own utilities: but the prince can justly receive this: because in such things he acts for the commerce of all in labor and expenses: therefore they too ought to give: therefore there is no sin on either part. But the publicans are only the ministers of his giving and receiving: therefore they give their labor to a licit thing: therefore they do not sin.

§ 87. But against this it is objected by Gregory on that text of John 21:3: I go a fishing: who in a certain homily asks why it was licit for Peter to return to fishing after his conversion, and not for Matthew to the tax office: and he resolves it, speaking thus: "There are many affairs which can scarcely or not at all be exercised without sin: therefore to those things which implicate one in some sin, it is necessary that the mind not return after conversion." Therefore, since the tax office is discussed there, it seems that tolls and taxes implicate one in some sin: therefore they are illicit.

§ 88. Solution. It must be said that military service, considered as military service, is not illicit in itself, but rather the abuse, which although it is manifold, nevertheless consists principally in three things: namely, in the extortion of the innocent, in the exaction of a larger salary than can be earned by military service, and in exercises for the display of strength with harm to men and property, such as tournaments, jousting, and the like, as they were invented. Yet there are certain exercises of the military that are necessary: such as the running and turning of warhorses, and the art of striking, defending, and projecting weapons, which are not prohibited. And this is taken from the Second Book of Kings, everywhere, where David commanded the people that they should teach their sons the bow, that is, the art of archery.

§ 89. Now, what the Master says in the Letter is said for this reason: that according to customary use, it is practiced with difficulty without sin. And through this sin is the solution to all those things which were objected concerning military service.

§ 90. To those things which were objected concerning commerce, it must be said according to a certain Gloss which is on that text of Ecclesiasticus 26:28, A merchant is hardly freed from negligence, etc., which says thus: "A very bad act, not an honorable thing, is condemned; he who through immoderate ambition burdens his mind more with perjury than with price." From this it is gathered that licit commercial dealings are not prohibited.

§ 91. However, they are made illicit in several ways. But in modern times three things principally seem to make commerce illicit: namely, person, time, and manner.

§ 92. The person, such as a person consecrated to divine offices, like a cleric and a monk: because these ought not to buy and sell, but they can sell their own things given to them, arising from annual fruits: and yet I do not believe that they ought to sell them in a bad manner, as wine is sold in a tavern, unless they could not otherwise sell them all at once. And

the reason for this is because gatherings of bad men take place in a tavern, and an immoderate consumption of wine: the patronage of which the tavern-keeper provides. And therefore it is not licit, as it seems to me, for a religious or a cleric to exercise an office of this sort.

§ 93. Furthermore, the time makes commerce illicit in two ways: namely, by reason of a feast day, that is, when it is a feast day; and in the case when the commerce can probabilistically induce a scarcity (caristiam), such as if too much grain is bought at the new harvest, or too much wine at the vintage, so that when it is not possessed by others, this man may sell it for as much as he wants.

§ 94. The manner concerns the contract, such as if the contract is vicious, namely with deception and fraud regarding the price. Now the just price is what the thing sold can be valued at according to the estimation of the market of that time.

§ 95. And through this the solution to all the things asked concerning commerce is clear.

§ 96. Through this also the solution to the doubtful case is clear: such as if someone defrauds another of his property, when it is worth more in the common market, whether it be grain, or wine, or something else; and he wants to restore the same in number or species to him when it is worth less according to the common market: for it is clear that he has not made satisfaction, unless he adds the profit of the time when it was worth more: because he damages him to that extent, namely in the greater price which could then have been had for that thing according to the common market.

§ 97. To what is asked concerning publicans and taxes and tolls, without prejudice it seems it must be said that four things are required for such gains to be just. One is that they be imposed by the consent of those whose interest it is to rule the land, and by the consent of the prince. The second, that they not be imposed except for a cause of necessity or common utility, namely because without such expenses the land cannot be pacified. The third is that the defense of the land actually be provided by those receiving. The fourth is that they not be immoderate, but according to the estimation of the expenses and the works which are expended by those defending the land: and thus speaks the Gloss on Luke, which intimates that such things are licit. And this is what is said in Romans 13:7: Render to all their dues: tribute, to whom tribute is due: custom, to whom custom: honor, to whom honor.

§ 98. To that which blessed Gregory says to the contrary, it must be said that he does not say that they cannot be exercised without sin, but scarcely or not at all. For they can scarcely be exercised unless they are justly imposed: and this is because of the agents who force the unwilling givers: and therefore it is difficult that they do not exceed the debt in exacting it. But they can not at all be done where the four aforesaid conditions are not observed.

§ 99. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 47 — Whether Penance Is Well Divided By The Master

Is penance well divided by the Master?

§ 101. Next, a question is raised concerning what he says in the second part of this distinction, there, C, "But to the aforesaid it must be added that penance is done in three ways," etc.

§ 102. And two things are asked here: namely, concerning the division of penance which he posits here, and concerning penance before baptism.

§ 103. To the first one can object thus: 1. A common element which remains according to one formal concept in all its dividing parts, in such a way that the dividing parts add no new form upon it, is not divided except by matter and accident. But penance...

penance before baptism and after baptism is of entirely the same formal character [ratio]: therefore it is only divided by matter and accident.

§ 2. Also, "before" and "after" baptism express nothing but a difference in time: but a thing is not divided according to form and species by differences of time: therefore, penance is not divided according to species by the fact that it is before or after.

§ 3. Furthermore, man who existed in the past, who exists in the present, and who will exist in the future, is not divided in species: therefore, neither is penance divided by such differences of time.

§ 4. And if you say that these are *modes* of penance, and not species, as the Letter seems to say. On the contrary: That mode is either essential or accidental. If essential: therefore it is founded upon some diverse essence. But it is not founded upon a diverse essence of the genus: therefore it is founded upon a diverse essence of the species, and then the first argument returns. If, however, it is accidental. On the contrary: The accidental modes of each and every single thing are many: therefore there ought not to be only three, but many, and as it were infinite.

§ 5. Furthermore, prior sins are grave and light: therefore it seems that the first mode is of as great a scope as the other two: and thus it seems that the division is null.

§ 6. Furthermore, penance for venial sins does not seem to be of the same formal character as penance for grave sins and in genus: because neither confession nor an assigned satisfaction is exacted for them: therefore it seems that it makes a poor division: because it posits dividing parts which are not univocally contained under the same common whole.

§ 7. Response. This division is of the *modes of repenting*: because the modes are taken from the part of the object of penance, about which it is, namely from the part of the sin: and I well concede that something essential corresponds to them. And to understand this, it must be known that penance is taken here insofar as it is integrated and constituted from contrition, confession, and satisfaction, just as was said at the beginning of this distinction: for then, an essentially different penance is required before baptism, which brings it about that no obstacle is found to the Holy Spirit in the one receiving baptism: and a different one is required in him who sins after baptism: because in the one receiving [baptism] exterior penance is not required, unless perhaps a confession by which it becomes known to the minister that he is not insincere [fictus]: but in the other it is required. Similarly, there is one penance for mortal sin, and another for venial: because for mortal sin confession with the expression of aggravat-

ing circumstances is required, and with assigned satisfaction: none of which is required in penance for venial sins, but only sorrow with daily satisfaction. It is evident, therefore, that if penance is considered under the formal aspect of a potestative whole, it is different on either side. Hence, this threefold mode is founded upon this sort of threefold potestative being of penance.

§ 8. To the first objection, therefore, it must be said that if the common whole is taken according to the formal character of a potestative medicine with its parts, it will not be the same in all the dividing parts, but rather in one it will abound more than in another.

§ 9. To the next, it must be said that "before and after baptism" here do not only express differences of time, but also the status of the penitent for one sin, from which the diversity of penance is understood according as it is considered in its parts, as has been said.

§ 10. To the next, it must be said that even that objection proceeds as if "before" and "after" differed only by the succession of time, and this is not true, but rather it is a diverse being of penance, according to whether it is concerning this or that sin.

§ 11. To the next, it must be said that the mode is founded upon a certain being of penance, as was said at the beginning of the solution.

§ 12. To the next, it must be said that it is true that the first mode regards both venial and mortal sins: but nevertheless, by reason of status, it is required for a different being of penance.

§ 13. To the next, it must be said that it is not of entirely the same formal character as the penance of mortal sins: and therefore it says there are two modes for venial and mortal: nevertheless, the common penance in its genus is preserved in the penance of venial sins, because sorrow with some satisfaction is there.

Articulus 48 — Whether Penance Is Before Baptism

Is there penance before baptism?

§ 15. Secondly, it is asked concerning penance before baptism, and two things are asked, namely: is there penance before baptism?

§ 16. And, What is it, and of what sort is its foundation?

§ 17. To the first, one proceeds thus: 1. It was held above that penance is the second plank after shipwreck; but the first in the shipwreck is baptism: therefore penance does not precede baptism, but follows it: and this is against the things that are said in the Letter.

§ 18. 2. Furthermore, Augustine says that baptism is the door of the sacraments: but before the door there is nothing pertaining to the mansion of the house: therefore before baptism there is nothing pertaining to the mansion in the sacraments: therefore no one can abide in penance who has not been baptized.

§ 19. 3. Furthermore, just as disease relates to disease in order, so does cure to cure, or medicine to medicine: but the disease against which baptism serves is the first one, which we

have contracted from birth, while the second against which penance is ordered is the one we commit by our own will: therefore it seems that baptism is altogether before penance.

§ 20. 4. Furthermore, baptism does not seem to have a different order to penance than it has to the other sacraments, according to the order of those preceding penance and those following: but to all the others it is so ordered that unless baptism has been received, nothing is accomplished in the others: therefore [this applies] to penance as well: therefore there is no penance preceding baptism, as it seems.

§ 21. 5. Furthermore, Blessed Dionysius in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy says that the non-existent acts nothing: and in the same place he says that existing is given through baptism: therefore the unbaptized person acts nothing of spiritual actions: but penance is among the spiritual actions: therefore the unbaptized person does not do penance: but thus penance always follows baptism.

§ 22. BUT AGAINST THIS is: 1. The saying in the Letter of Augustine against Felicianus, and the Gloss which is set down concerning Acts 2.

§ 23. 2. Also, Augustine in the book of Eighty-Three Questions: The old life is ended unto penance: but where the old is ended, the new begins: therefore the new begins from penance: but that is first, where the new life begins: therefore penance is the first of all the sacraments.

§ 24. 3. Furthermore, upon that passage of Acts: Do penance, and let every one of you be baptized, etc., the Gloss says: "Being about to speak of baptism, he premised the laments of penance: so that they might first bedew themselves with the water of affliction, and afterward wash with the sacrament of baptism." From this it is gathered that penance is before baptism according to the order of receiving the sacraments.

§ 25. 4. Furthermore, upon that passage: Do penance, the Gloss says: "It is the first virtue, to destroy the old man through penance." Therefore it seems that penance is the first sacrament.

§ 26. 5. Furthermore, according to the process of sin in the world, actual sin was prior to original sin: because Adam first sinned actually, from which sin, as from a cause, nature was corrupted, which corruption of vice and passibility is original sin from concupiscence [fomes]: therefore the medicine of actual sin ought to be before the medicine of original sin: therefore penance is prior to baptism.

§ 27. 6. Furthermore, above in the treatise on baptism it was held that there is a certain baptism of the Spirit [flaminis], and that is of penance: since, therefore, the baptism of the Spirit is before even the baptism of water [fluminis], just as is determined in the same place, it seems that penance is generally before baptism.

§ 28. Solution. It must be said here that there is a prior simply [simpliciter], and a prior in a qualified sense [secundum quid] and with respect to something. Baptism, indeed, is the first sacrament simply: but in a qualified sense and with respect to something, penance is prior according to a certain mode by which it is preparatory to the interior act of compunction, and not as it is satisfactory through the power of the keys: because baptism of itself does not demand mourning or weeping: but he who intends to be baptized, if he is constituted as the

arbiter of his own will, requires compunction, lest the Holy Spirit of discipline who operates in baptism flee a feigned [insincere] person.

§ 29. AND IT MUST BE SAID to the reasons first introduced: to the first, indeed, that this is true according to the order of the general floods: because the first flood is that of original sin, and the second is that of actual sin.

§ 30. To the next, it must be said that there are certain sacraments in which there is nothing but the divine, such as Confirmation, Eucharist, Holy Orders, and Extreme Unction: and Baptism is the door, such that nothing is accomplished in them unless baptism is first received. There are others in which the divinity operates around our works and presupposes something in us, such as Penance, and Matrimony: because Augustine says of Penance that he who created you without you will not justify you without you: because in such things we must remove the obstacle to the operating Holy Spirit: and concerning these, with respect to that which is from our work, Baptism is not the door, but only with respect to that which is divine: just as it is in Penance, that it be satisfactory through the keys of the Church: and in Matrimony, that it be entirely indissoluble: because those who contract matrimony not in the faith of the Church can, in some cases, be separated: nevertheless, with respect to that which is divine in them, baptism precedes: hence the penance which is before baptism does not satisfy through the keys: but through interior grace man is disposed to receive baptism, lest he be found insincere.

§ 31. To the others, the solution is evident through what has been said: because they necessarily conclude concerning the order of the sacraments simply, with respect to that which is divine in them.

§ 32. To the first objection made in opposition, however, it must be said that this is said with respect to the separability of sin, not in all, but in adults, in whom a certain mode of penance must precede: and the following objection is understood in the same way.

§ 33. Or it could be said that baptism in the resolution of the penitent works the deletion of sin in this way, just as was noted above in the treatise on baptism: but nevertheless, the first response is better.

§ 34. To the next, it must be said that although it is the first virtue in an adult, it is nevertheless not the first in the order of the sacraments simply, as has been said.

§ 35. To the next, it must be said that it is not necessary that the order of the sacraments of the Church be according to the order of the disease in a person: because although in one person actual sin preceded original sin as its cause: nevertheless, in all people generally, actual sin is rooted in original sin: and the sacraments are given not to a single person, but to the Church, and rather to the children of Adam than to Adam himself: and therefore baptism simply is still prior, although penance is prior with respect to something and in someone.

§ 36. To the next, it must be said that this happens by accident: because the baptism of the Spirit suffices, namely where there is no contempt for religion, but the article of necessity excludes the sacrament: and therefore from this it cannot be concluded that baptism simply

follows penance, but only in a qualified sense and in a certain case: and that penance is not there in its total integrity, but there is there something of penance which does not have exterior satisfaction: nor does it even need the interior, except insofar as this is required to remove insincerity, and not with respect to the remission of fault or penalty: because for this, baptism suffices. Hence although fault and a certain part of the penalty are remitted there, this is nevertheless not exacted by baptism, but it is done by the grace which is given to the penitent preparing himself for baptism.

Articulus 49 — Whether Penance Is A Foundation, And How It Is

Is penance a foundation, and in what way is it so?

§ 38. Secondly, it is asked, Whether penance is a foundation, and in what way is it so? And concerning this, four things are asked, namely: is it a foundation, and in what way is it so? Secondly, What things are in that foundation? Thirdly, Concerning the number of them. Fourthly, In what order are they placed in the foundation?

§ 39. It seems, concerning the first, that penance is not a foundation.

§ 40. 1. Through that text of the Apostle: For no one can lay another foundation than that which is laid, which is Christ Jesus: but in one building there is only one foundation: therefore it seems that penance is not a foundation.

§ 41. 2. Furthermore, in Hebrews 11:1: Now faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, where the Gloss says, that is, the foundation: and from this follows the same as before.

§ 42. 3. Furthermore, the foundation is what first occurs in a spiritual building. But faith occurs first: therefore faith is the foundation and not penance. The proof of the minor premise is what the Apostle says: He that cometh to God must believe that he is, and is a rewarder to them that seek him.

§ 43. 4. Furthermore, nothing is a foundation in a spiritual building whose being is preceded by something else spiritual in the same building: but the being of penance is preceded by something else in spiritual matters: therefore it is not a foundation. The proof of the minor premise is what was held above, where it was said that the virtue of penance is conceived by fear: and because all those things which are found disputed first (how penance is the first virtue) are valid for this point, therefore let all things concerning this suffice for the one side.

§ 44. BUT ON THE CONTRARY it is objected: 1. Through that text of the Apostle: Not laying again the foundation of penance: where the Gloss says, that is, not laying penance down, as it were for a stone in the foundation: therefore penance is a foundation.

§ 45. 2. Furthermore, the new life is first founded in that from which the prior old life fails: but that, as has often been held, first fails in penance: therefore there the new life is first founded: therefore penance is a foundation, as it seems.

§ 46. Solution. It must be said that "foundation" is taken in multiple ways in Sacred Scripture, namely, as the first founding externally, namely in God: and this is the immobility

of divine election: and concerning this it is said: But the sure foundation of God standeth firm, having this seal. Hence in the same place the Gloss says: "Those stand whom God has elected, and founded immovably in faith."

§ 47. In another way, foundation is spoken of as founding in the mystical body, and not in the spiritual member: and it is the foundation of virtue infused from heaven, concerning which: I will lay thy stones in order with sapphires: and I will make thy bulwarks of jasper, where the Gloss says: "Because by sapphires, which have a heavenly color, virtues are signified."

§ 48. Thirdly, foundation is spoken of as founding the member singularly: and this in multiple ways, namely on the part of the intellect, and on the part of the affection. Now on the part of the intellect, in two ways, namely, according to what is from exterior hearing, or according to what is through the infused light of the intellect founded in the truth of things to be believed: and in the first way, the doctrine of the preaching of the Apostles and Apostolic men is called a foundation: concerning which it is held: The foundations of the wall of the city were twelve, which foundations are the doctrines of the twelve Apostles. The foundation of the intellect, however, is called faith. But on the part of the foundation in the affection, penance is the foundation, and certain other things about which it will be spoken below in the following article of the question.

§ 49. To the FIRST objection, therefore, it must be said that there he is speaking of the foundation of one coming to the building, not of one existing in the building itself: because faith first opens the eyes of the one coming: but penance places him, and brings about the contrary from the spiritual building.

§ 50. To the next, it must be said that faith is the first, which through cognition makes the things to be hoped for subsist in us: but nevertheless, it is not the proximate placing of the building, but rather penance clearing the place, and initiating the foundations in the good.

§ 51. To the next, it must be said that it is not necessary that this be the foundation: and this is because faith and fear, according to their unformed acts, can precede the substance of the foundation: because faith is like pointing out the cause for building, and fear is like digging: while penance is like constructing the whole building through contrition, confession, and satisfaction, although the habits of fear and faith, informed by grace and charity, belong to the foundation and the building.

§ 52. And through this, the solution to the following is also evident.

Articulus 50 — What Things Are In That Foundation; And, Whether Penance Which Is A Foundation Is A Virtue Or A Sacrament

What things are in that foundation? and, Is the penance which is a foundation a virtue or a sacrament?

§ 54. Secondly it is asked, What things are in that foundation?

§ 55. Now the Gloss on the epistle to the Hebrews 6:1 says that there are six things belonging to this foundation: and these are the words of the Gloss: "Now he divides this

foundation into six things, which are the beginning, namely penance, faith, the doctrine of baptisms, and the laying on of hands, and the resurrection, and judgment." Concerning penance indeed it has been sufficiently disputed in the preceding question.

§ 56. But it is asked, Concerning which penance is it understood that it is a foundation, whether concerning that which is a virtue, or that which is a sacrament?

§ 57. It seems, however, that it is concerning that which is a virtue: because 1. Virtue is contrary to vice: and penance is the virtue which destroys the old man: therefore it first begins the new man: and this is to be the first foundation in the building: therefore the virtue of penance is that which is the foundation.

§ 58. 2. Furthermore, the virtue of penance is that which moves to the detestation of sin, as was held above: but this is what must be done first, namely the motion unto the destruction of sin: therefore penance, according as it is a virtue, is the first thing founding the penitent in the spiritual building.

§ 59. BUT AGAINST THIS: 1. Upon that text of the Apostle: Not laying again the foundation of penance, Jerome says: "Whoever converts any persons to the faith, first teaches them to repent, and to be baptized for the remission of sins": but penance according as it is taught by a minister of the Church, is a sacrament: therefore penance according as it is a sacrament, is the foundation.

§ 60. 2. Also, certain other sacraments are placed in the foundation, namely baptism, and confirmation: therefore penance is also taken there for the sacrament.

§ 61. 3. Also, John who taught repentance, taught to confess and to satisfy. Hence it is said there that they went out to him confessing their sins: and he gave them counsel on how to bring forth worthy fruits of penance in satisfaction: but penance thus considered in its parts is a sacrament: therefore according as it is a sacrament, it is a foundation.

§ 62. THEN it is asked concerning the second thing which is in the foundation, namely concerning faith.

§ 63. For it seems that charity is more a foundation: because 1. The foundation is the root: but charity is the root of the good: hence Gregory: "A branch of good work has no greenness, unless it remains in the root of charity": therefore charity is the foundation.

§ 64. 2. Also, to the Ephesians: Rooted and founded in charity, that you may be able to comprehend, with all the saints, etc.

§ 65. 3. Furthermore, fear seems to be the foundation: because fear is the beginning of wisdom. But certain other things availing to this were noted above, where it was asked how penance is the first virtue.

§ 66. THEN it is asked concerning the doctrine of baptism. 1. Since indeed a neophyte is not only taught to be baptized, but many other things, why is the doctrine of other things not placed in the foundation, like the doctrine of baptism?

§ 67. 2. Furthermore, there is only one baptism, as the Apostle says: One Lord, one faith, one baptism: therefore he says inappropriately, "of baptisms".

§ 68. THEN it is asked concerning the fourth, namely concerning the laying on of hands which is done in Confirmation.

§ 69. It seems, however, that the Eucharist is more a foundation: because 1. In it is the Lord of the sacraments, from whom every sacrament draws its vigor: therefore it founds more than confirmation.

§ 70. 2. Furthermore, without a foundation nothing of the spiritual building is had: but without confirmation something is had with respect to grace and glory: therefore confirmation is not a foundation. The first premise is self-evident. The second is proved from the fact that many dying unconfirmed pass over to glory, such as many infants and adults, since it is not a sacrament of necessity.

§ 71. 3. Furthermore, the confirmation of buildings is rather at the summit through the subtle closing of the vault [the keystone], than in the foundation: therefore it seems that confirmation pertains more to perfection than to the foundation.

§ 72. 4. Furthermore, that which is founded, is not [yet complete]: but that which is confirmed, is [already complete]: therefore that which is founded, is not confirmed: therefore confirmation is not a foundation.

§ 73. THEN it is asked concerning the fifth, which is resurrection.

§ 74. For it seems that this is superfluous: because 1. It is understood in faith.

§ 75. 2. Furthermore, since all sins are remitted in the unity and communion of the Church, it seems that the penitent in whom the new life is founded ought to be moved more by believing that article which is, In the holy Church and the communion of saints, than that which is, The resurrection of the body: therefore the former ought more to be placed in the foundation, than the latter.

§ 76. LASTLY it is asked concerning the sixth, which is judgment.

§ 77. For in judgment there is the terror of the judge: therefore an inclination to desperation: because the second coming terrifies, and the first soothes the sinner to hope: therefore since hope is more expedient to the penitent than terrifying fear, the article of the incarnation which is about the first coming ought more to be placed in the foundation, than the judgment which is about the second.

§ 78. Solution. It must be said that, just as the Gloss on the epistle to the Hebrews 6:1 says, those six things are of the foundation of the Christian religion, which is founded in the one coming to it: and certain of these are like the proximate foundations of the building: and certain ones are like the first foundations placing the proximate foundation, as will be held in the following article.

§ 79. To that therefore which is first asked concerning penance, it must be said that according to the state of an adult coming to the Christian religion, the sacrament of penance

with respect to a part of itself, namely removing insincerity, is among those things which are first required: and therefore it belongs to the foundation, just as both the Gloss seems to intimate, and the objection made to the contrary.

§ 80. But to that which is first objected to the contrary, it must be said that it is true that virtue is contrary to vice: but according to this it is prior by infusion rather than from doctrine: for penance here is called the rudiments of penance, which are proposed to the penitent: just as also faith refers to the rudiments of faith, which are expounded to those who are catechized, when they are neophytes: and these rudiments are rather of the sacrament than of the virtue.

§ 81. To the next, it must be said that the virtue of penance is not the first foundation: because certain things to be done for the foundation are prior to all virtue, such as those which are the elements of the beginning of the word of justice, and those are what the Apostle calls the foundation, as the Gloss on the epistle to the Hebrews 6:1 says.

§ 82. To the next, it must be said that almost all of those have been resolved above. It must be said, nevertheless, that charity does not properly found, but connects perfection, as it is said, in 1 Timothy 1:5 and following.

§ 83. But to this which is objected concerning Gregory, it must be said that it is the foundation of a meritorious work: because it gives the form of being a merit: but it is not the foundation of the Christian religion, which is proposed to one assuming the Christian religion: and therefore that has no validity for the proposition.

§ 84. To the next, it must be said that to be rooted and also founded does not happen in charity, except with respect to the form of a meritorious work: and this is not to be the foundation of the Christian religion, as has been said, except accidentally and in a qualified sense.

§ 85. To the next, it must be said that fear, according to its act, is as it were digging a trench in the foundation through the flight from evil, but not as disposing the stones, which are a part of the building, but rather penance does this.

§ 86. To that which is further asked, it must be said that to neophytes only those things first occurring that are necessary for the beginning are proposed: and one of these is baptism, which gives spiritual being to the baptized person, as Dionysius says: and therefore just as being is first required before operation in natural things, so also in gratuitous things: but other things are not so primarily congruent.

§ 87. To the NEXT it must be said according to the Gloss, that he speaks in the plural, of baptisms: because baptism is threefold: and much has been held about this in the treatise on Baptism, and let it be sought there, because these points are valid: but it is called one baptism because there is one substantial cause, and one character, and it is not reiterated: nevertheless, its effect is given in multiple ways, and because of this it is spoken of in the plural, of baptisms.

§ 88. But TO THIS which is asked concerning the fourth, it seems it must be said that Confirmation, insofar as it confirms in the fight, belongs to the building: for a building not only saves, but also fortifies in battle.

§ 89. TO the first therefore which is against this, it must be said that the Eucharist, although it is the most worthy of the sacraments with respect to the reality contained, is nevertheless not necessary for him who is being built up in the Christian religion, like confirmation is: because a continuous fight presses upon the Christian: and therefore it is necessary that the Christian be founded in it.

§ 90. To the next, it must be said that it is true that Confirmation is not a sacrament of necessity: but because the Christian religion attends not only to those things which are of necessity, but also to those things which are of perfection, therefore it is necessary that the things sustaining the perfection of the building be placed in the foundation. Now the fight of persecution belongs to the perfection of the Christian life and religion: and therefore, as that upon which it may be built, Confirmation is premised in the foundation. Hence in the primitive Church they were immediately confirmed after they were baptized.

§ 91. To the next, it must be said that the confirmation of a building already made is one thing, because that happens through consolation and the increase of grace: and the confirmation which is in the foundation is another, because that is nothing else than the collation of grace, upon which many things can be founded without fear of ruin, and in this way confirmation confirms, in which the Holy Spirit is given for strength, and this confirmation belongs to the foundation.

§ 92. To the next, it must be said that, just as it is said in Romans 6:4, resurrection is shown in an exemplary way in justification, which is in penance: and therefore justification is also called the first resurrection: and therefore the penitent must be founded in the resurrection: for the resurrection of grace prefigures the resurrection of glory, and is ordered to it.

§ 93. To THAT which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that faith is not placed in the number of those six, except for the sake of the rudiments of faith, especially for the sake of the articles concerning the Trinity and unity, which operates in the sacraments: therefore they are also asked about in exorcisms and catechisms: and this is not posited by reason of all the articles: and therefore this one is not superfluous, nor is its position.

§ 94. To the next, it must be said that justification itself is one thing, and its foundation is another: but the foundation is the resurrection, because if it is not believed the whole is overthrown, and because it is shown in an exemplary way in penance.

§ 95. To the next, it must be said that judgment induces a fear which makes one repent, lest one fall into the future judgment: and therefore it belongs to the foundation.

§ 96. But TO THAT which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that hope follows fear: because fear flees evil, and therefore judgment founds first through fear. Or it may be said that in the second judgment both are understood as moving, namely both fear by reason of the punishments which will be inflicted there on the wicked, and hope by reason of the rewards

which will be given there to the good: and both of these are not in the first coming, but only one of them: and therefore not the faith of the first coming, but of the second is placed in the foundation.

Articulus 51 — Whether The Foundation Of The Things To Be Hoped For Of The Christian Religion Is The Same As The First Zeal

Is the foundation of the things to be hoped for of the Christian religion, and of the eternal reward the same?

§ 98. Thirdly, it is asked concerning the number of those things which are in the foundation. But it seems that there is only one, through that text of the Apostle: For no one can lay another foundation, etc. And since of any corporeal building there are not multiple foundations: therefore neither of the spiritual building.

§ 99. But because this entire disputation is almost determined by the preceding article, it must be said that foundation (as was said above) is spoken of in multiple ways, namely of faith, of things to be hoped for, and of the Christian religion, and of the reward.

§ 100. Concerning the foundation of faith, it is understood what is said in 1 Corinthians 3:11, because the whole faith is upon Christ's deity or humanity: for according to His deity He is from the Father, and from Him is the Holy Spirit, who is sent to the Saints and unites the Church: but according to His humanity He is incarnate, suffered, and rose again as the cause and argument of our resurrection.

§ 101. But of things to be hoped for—through which namely the things to be hoped for subsist in us—faith according to its act is the foundation: because it first opens the eyes to see the things to be hoped for, and consents to them that they are: and through this it founds them in us.

§ 102. But the foundation of the Christian religion is gathered from the six things which are numbered in the Gloss on the epistle to the Hebrews 6:1: because the Christian religion begins from what is hidden to our reason, and difficult, and the removal from sins: and therefore it is founded, that is, it is begun from three things in genus, namely from the removal and destruction of the contrary, and this is as it were making a place for the building: and this is penance either according to order into the difficult good which it begins, or according to conserving in it. If according to order, this is in two ways, namely to being and to strength in the difficult fight: and with respect to being it further happens in two ways, namely with respect to the grace itself giving being to the Christian religion, and with respect to the order which is in the acts of virtues: and with respect to the order of acts, faith founds; but with respect to the grace giving being, the doctrine of baptisms founds. To the fight in the difficult, the strength of grace given in the laying on of hands founds: but the conserving things are those inducing hope and fear: and this happens especially from the future judgment, for which two things are required, namely the judgment on the part of the judge, and the possibility of presentation in judgment on the part of the one to be judged: and on the part of the one to be judged, the resurrection

induces hope and fear, and thus it founds: but on the part of the judge, the future judgment founds.

§ 103. And through this the solution concerning all the things which are required here is evident.

Articulus 52 — Whether Faith Precedes Penance

Does faith precede penance?

§ 105. Fourthly, it is asked concerning the order of these things.

§ 106. For it seems that faith precedes penance: because 1. In Hebrews 11:6, it is said that he that cometh to God must believe that he is, etc.: but the penitent has already approached: therefore before this approach faith already existed: therefore it has to be ordered before penance in the foundation.

§ 107. 2. Furthermore, Augustine says that faith is the first virtue, and the first foundation: therefore, et cetera.

§ 108. 3. Moreover, in the catechisms they are instructed first concerning the resurrection of the dead and concerning the judgment, before they receive baptism: therefore it seems that they ought to be ordered in the foundation before baptism: and the Gloss says the contrary.

§ 109. Furthermore, it is asked concerning the Lord's Prayer, which is touched upon in a certain Gloss as being of the beginning of the Christian religion: why is it not ordered among those things which belong to the foundation?

§ 110. For a certain Gloss says thus: "It is of the beginning of faith, by which the uninstructed to be catechized..."

§ 1. ...are, as is the symbol of faith, and the Lord's Prayer.

§ 2. Response. To this it seems it must be said, that these are ordered in the foundation according to the manner in which they are explained by him who approaches the Christian religion. Hence, because penance first removes one from the contrary, therefore it is placed first; but faith distinguishes the things to be believed which are in the Christian religion, and therefore it is placed second; and baptism gives being to the affection prepared by penance, and to the intellect prepared by faith: and therefore it is placed third. But that which corroborates being itself is fourth: just as in natural things perfection of quantity follows being, and after these come conserving factors. But because the resurrection makes one fear or love the judgment: for if one does not rise, one will neither fear nor love: because one will receive neither good nor evil there: but if one rises, one will fear or love: therefore the resurrection is placed before judgment.

§ 3. To this, however, which is first objected concerning faith, it must be said that faith is twofold, namely indistinct: and in this way, regarding a certain act of confused cognition of God and of sin, it precedes penance. But there is a faith distinctly assenting to the believed article, and this does not exist unless grace has already been given through penance, and such

is that upon which the Christian religion is founded: and therefore the articles of faith are explained to catechumens.

§ 4. To the other it must be said, that faith is the first virtue both in the intellect, and as to the act of confused cognition, and not distinctly: but distinctly assenting, it follows the destruction of sin through penance.

§ 5. To the other it must be said, that resurrection and judgment as believed things, are supposed in faith, as are other articles of the symbol of faith, as the Gloss says, introduced in this same article of the question: but as conserving factors in the Christian religion they follow as things constantly remembered, thus they are ordered in the foundation.

§ 6. To the other it must be said, that the Lord's Prayer is not essentially of the foundation, although it is in some way of the inchoation: because before the essence of the Christian religion someone can pray: but by that Gloss it is posited of the inchoation extrinsically, and thus it is impetrating the foundation of the Christian religion.

§ 7. And let these things said concerning the modes of penance suffice.

Articulus 53 — Whether Every Sin Is Expressed In The Decalogue

Whether every sin is expressed in the Decalogue?

§ 8. Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, C, just below the middle: Another is the action of penance after baptism, etc.

§ 9. For it seems from this, that every sin is contained in the Decalogue, which seems false.

§ 10. 1. Concerning pride, hypocrisy, vainglory, envy, and many others, if one descends to particulars: since therefore penance is for these, it does not seem to be only for those which the Decalogue of the law contains.

§ 11. 2. Furthermore, bad will prohibited in the Decalogue is not except as regards the sin of avarice, since a bad word prohibited there is not except by reason of perjury and lying: since therefore sin occurs in many other ways, both in heart and in mouth, and pardon is granted for every sin through penance, Augustine seems to distinguish imperfectly the mode of penance which is after baptism.

§ 12. If by chance you say, that just as something is in a predicament [category] in two ways, namely as directly contained in it, like a subalternate genus, or species, or individual: but something else as reduced to it as a first genus, just as we say matter and form are in the genus of substance, and a point and unity and the "now" in quantity: thus something is in two ways pro-

-hibited in the Decalogue, namely as directly prohibited, and as reduced to the prohibited according to the ratio of cause or effect. Against this: When something is reduced to a predicament, it is not sufficient that it be in some way or other first, but it must be the first from which the essence of the predicament flows: therefore it will be similarly in the precepts: but

no sin essentially flows from another: therefore no sin can be thus reduced to the prohibition of another sin.

§ 14. 3. Furthermore, the precepts are not only prohibitive, but rather some are affirmative: therefore according to this solution every good which must be done must be reduced to the honoring of parents or the keeping of the Sabbath, as a principle or a principiate: and how this could be is difficult even for those wishing to imagine it.

§ 15. Response. It must be said that every mortal and venial sin is understood to be prohibited in the Decalogue, and every good to be done is commanded to be done there, that is, what is so to be done that unless it is done, the one omitting it will not be saved. Now, sin is understood in general to be prohibited in two ways, namely directly, or indirectly. Directly indeed all mortal sins are prohibited, and indirectly venial ones. But mortal sins are prohibited in three ways, namely expressly, or because they are causes of things expressly prohibited, or because they are their effects. Expressly again in two ways, namely by the name itself and by the scope of the community of the name itself: expressly, as under moechia (adultery) adultery is prohibited: because when it is broadened, under the name of moechia within the scope of the name all illicit coitus is prohibited, and any illicit effusion of seed: and thus fornication, defloration, rape, incest, sodomy, and the vice of pathics are prohibited. But as a cause, gluttony, and drunkenness, and all things which excite the concupiscence of the flesh to the illicit. And as an effect, scurrility, impurities, illicit dances, and all such things: and thus it is plain also to understand concerning others. And it is similar in affirmative precepts: for it is necessary that by the broadened name of "parent" the neighbor is understood, and the neighbor is (as Augustine says) he who is created with us to possess eternal joys: and by the name of "honor" is understood due reverence and subvention, as much in spiritual things as in temporal things. But there are some things as inducing to this by way of cause, like love or affection for the neighbor: and certain effects, like congratulation, speaking well, and such like: and thus it is plain to see in others.

§ 16. But to that which is objected against this reduction, it must be said that it is impossible in the whole to find a perfect likeness between two things: because thus the similar things would not be two, but one: but just as it is in the predicaments, and in first essences, and in those reduced to them, so it is in the primary things to be done, and to be avoided, and those reduced to them: and just as those flow from their principles essentially, so these flow from their principles voluntarily: because in morals the greatest of principles is the will: and because the nature of an essence is subject to necessity, therefore those necessary things flow from their principles. But because these are causing and caused mediating the will, and the will is free: therefore these remain in liberty inclining the will.

§ 17. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

§ 18. But something must be added to this disputation from that which was disputed upon the end of the third book of the Sentences concerning the precepts.

Articulus 54 — Whether Penance Belongs To The Good; And, Whether The Good And Humble Ought To Do Penance For Venial Sins

Whether there is penance for the good? and, Whether the good and humble ought to do penance for venial sins?

Whether there is penance for the good? and, Whether the good and humble ought to do penance for venial sins?

§ 19. Next it is asked concerning what he says, there C, in the middle: There is also a penance of the good, etc.

§ 20. For it seems that this is false: because 1. The good and humble have more cause for joy than for penance: therefore penance is not of them.

§ 21. 2. Also, penance is of evil: therefore it is not of the good and humble, because those things are best: therefore it is not of the good and humble.

§ 22. If by chance you say, that it is not of the good and humble, insofar as they are good and humble, but insofar as they admit venial sins,

§ 23. Let it be asked, Whether the good and humble ought to do penance for venial sins?

§ 24. But it seems that they should: because to whomever it belongs to satisfy, to him it belongs to repent: but it belongs to the good and humble to satisfy for venial sins: therefore it also belongs to them to repent. The proof of the middle premise was held above, that to satisfy is to cut out the roots of sins, and not to indulge further access to their suggestions: but in the good and humble there are the roots of sins, because of the fomes, and the corruption of vices, and the proneness to sinning: therefore the proposition stands.

§ 25. But on the contrary is this, that 1. It is said to be a topic from commonly occurring accidents: he repents: therefore he sinned.

§ 26. 2. Furthermore, it was held above, that penance is of perpetrated evil insofar as it is perpetrated: therefore he who has not perpetrated evil, does not have to repent; and therefore penance is not of the good and humble, as it seems.

§ 27. 3. Furthermore, the Philosopher in IX of the Metaphysics, and Avicenna in VI of his Metaphysics say, that from a potency for good or evil no one is good or bad: because in evil the act is worse than the potency, and in good the act is better than the potency: but in the good and humble who have not sinned, there is nothing but the potency for evil: therefore they have not sinned: therefore they are not bound to repent.

§ 28. Solution. It must be said that penance is of the good and humble, as the Letter says: but it is not insofar as they are good and humble. Now the penance of such persons is two-fold, namely for good, and for evil: for good not insofar as it is good, but insofar as it is mixed with evil: because thus it is said, Isa. 64:6: All our justices are as the rag of a menstruous woman. Hence the negligence and indevotion that fall upon them force the good and humble to fear even their own good works, and thus in a certain way to repent of them: and this is what Job 9:28 says: I feared all my works, knowing that thou didst not spare the offender. In another way they

repent of venial sin which falls daily in the use of life: concerning the penance of which is treated in the following chapter.

§ 29. But to the 1st thing which is asked, Whether the good and humble not sinning are bound to repent?

§ 30. It must be said that they are not.

§ 31. To the objection to the contrary, it must be said that the root of sin is twofold, namely contracted and made, according to the fact that similar dispositions and habits are left behind from works, as the Philosopher says. Now the first root is weakened and dried up, not by penance, but by the contrary use of doing good: and the second is that which is eradicated through the satisfaction of penance: and concerning that root the introduced authority is understood.

§ 32. And through this the solution is clear.

Articulus 55 — Whether Someone Not Having A Debt Can Say The Lord's Prayer

Whether someone having no debt, can say the Lord's prayer?

Whether someone having no debt, can say the Lord's prayer?

§ 33. Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, C, in the middle: Saying: Forgive us, etc.

§ 34. For it is asked, Whether someone having no debt, can say the Lord's prayer?

§ 35. It seems, that he cannot: because 1. He does not have a debt: therefore he will not truly ask for a debt to be forgiven him: therefore he cannot say the Lord's prayer.

§ 36. 2. Furthermore, in a certain parable of Matthew 18:23 et seq., where the Lord speaks about the forgiveness of debt, he supposes those servants to owe something: therefore he who owes nothing cannot demand that a debt be forgiven: therefore such a one cannot say the Lord's prayer, as it seems.

§ 37. If by chance you say, that that case never happens in anyone: because as it is said, 1 John 1:8: If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. AGAINST: Augustine glosses this passage thus, saying that this is said because we cannot be without sin for a long time: but we can be without sin for an hour: therefore it seems, that in that hour such a one could not say the Lord's prayer.

§ 38. 3. Furthermore, James 5:15 speaks doubtfully of the state of sin, saying: If he be in sins, they shall be forgiven him: for speaking thus he intimates that it is possible for someone to be without sin for a long time: and then the question stated above has a place.

§ 39. 4. Furthermore, Augustine says that venial sin does in a just man what a drop of water does in a furnace of fire: but a drop by its very fall into a furnace is immediately consumed, and does not remain: therefore venial sin falling into the soul of a perfect man is immediately consumed: therefore he remains without venial sin: and it is established that he

is without mortal sin: therefore such a one has no debt of venial or mortal sin: therefore he cannot say the Our Father.

§ 40. Solution. It must be said that every Christian man can and ought to say the Our Father.

§ 41. But to this which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that such a state is rare, on account of three things, namely the multitude of venial sins, and ignorance, and adherence. I call "multitude" the mode of sinning venially, of which there is a great noise around us, as much in the senses as in the heart: "ignorance," because it seems to me impossible to notice everything: hence the Psalmist says by reason of the multitude: Who can understand sins? And by reason of ignorance: From my secret ones cleanse me, O Lord. And by reason of adherence he says: From those of others spare thy servant: because certain things adhere to us alienating us from the fervor of charity, but they do not alienate from the habit. Yet if such a state exists, I still say, that even if it is, nevertheless a man ought not to presume to be in such a state: because, as blessed Gregory says: It is the mark of good minds to acknowledge a fault there, where there is no fault.

§ 42. But if you say that it is so, that through revelation he knows that all sins have been forgiven him: I say still, that it does not yet follow that he himself is not a debtor of some punishment, and by reason of that he can say the Our Father.

§ 43. But if you posit that he is not even a debtor of punishment, and knows this through revelation: I say still, that he ought to say it in the person of the members of the Church: for thus Christ the head of the Church, by reason of the members, says that the faults are His in the Psalm where it is said: O my God, look upon me, etc.

§ 44. Thus one member ought to transform into himself that which belongs to another: hence He teaches to pray in the plural by saying: Forgive us our debts, as we also forgive, etc., not, Forgive me my debts.

§ 45. And through this the solution to all the questions asked is clear.

§ 46. Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, C, a little before the end: For what does it matter to a shipwreck, whether by one great wave, etc.

§ 47. For from this it seems, that venial sin becomes mortal: and concerning this let it be asked below.

DISTINCTIO XVII

Divisio Textus

§ 48. Here arises a manifold question, etc. The Master in this distinction makes a collation among the parts of penance taken individually, and touches first on three questions, as is clear in the

Letter: and according to the prosecution of those three the whole distinction is divided into three parts: and this is easy for anyone to see, and therefore we must insist on the disputation.

Articulus 1 — Whether In Contrition Alone Sin Is Remitted

Whether sin is forgiven in contrition alone?

§ 49. First therefore it is asked concerning the first question, namely Whether sin is forgiven in contrition alone?

§ 50. But it seems, that it is: 1. For what can do more, can also do less: but contrition alone in a case of necessity can supply the place of baptism: therefore it can also supply the place of confession and satisfaction.

§ 51. 2. Furthermore, whatever medicine includes within itself all things which are opposed to the disease and the causes of the disease, that per se without another is efficacious for the expulsion of the disease: but contrition is this kind of medicine against actual mortal sin: therefore without confession and satisfaction it expels the disease. The first is evident per se. The second however is proved from the fact that in actual sin there is nothing but guilt and punishment: and the contraries of those are in contrition because grace is contrary to guilt, and the punishment of sin is contrary to passion, which is delight, and the sustaining of that sorrow loosens the obligation of punishment which is in the guilt.

§ 52. 3. Furthermore, a medicine which is sometimes given, and sometimes not given, with the same causes of diseases existing, and other things

holding themselves similarly, is not necessary, but of well-being (de bene esse): but confession is sometimes given to contrite sinners, and similarly satisfaction, but sometimes not: therefore confession and satisfaction are of the well-being of penance, and not of its very being. The first is evident: because art insofar as it can always exhibits all things necessary for a cure. But the second is proved in Mary Magdalene, who (as Gregory says) had seven demons, because she was full of all vices: and yet, Luke 7:37 et seq., by the contrition of the heart alone she was healed: therefore the proposition stands.

§ 54. 4. Furthermore, whatever things are of the essence and necessity of something, never leave it: but confession and satisfaction were sometimes not of penance, or not as they are now, as is proved from the disputation held above concerning confession: therefore they are not of the essence: therefore since penance by its essence is sufficient for the expulsion of the disease, and contrition alone is essential, it seems that it without confession of mouth and satisfaction of work suffices for the deletion of actual sin.

§ 55. 5. Furthermore, in the moment of the infusion of grace guilt and eternal punishment are loosed: but this moment is in contrition before confession and satisfaction: therefore it seems, that confession and satisfaction are not necessary for the loosing of guilt.

§ 56. 6. Furthermore, let us posit, that someone is contrite in truth: it is established, that in truth sin according to guilt and eternal punishment is forgiven him: let it be therefore, that this man dies unconfessed: therefore he will be saved, because in dying he does not sin,

because nothing falls between contrition and death: therefore confession and satisfaction are not among the things necessary for salvation.

§ 57. 7. If by chance you say, that penance exacts a vow of confession and a vow of satisfaction. AGAINST: Either it exacts this, on the ground that it is of the essence of penance, or because it is commanded that he confess: if it is exacted for this reason, because it is of the integrity of penance, then there was never true penance without it: which is evident to all to be false. If it is exacted for this reason, because it is commanded: therefore it is not exacted except accidentally, and on account of another thing: therefore by itself contrition sufficed.

§ 58. 8. Furthermore, the constitution of the Church either weakened the force of contrition, or conferred nothing upon it, neither harmed it, nor helped it. If it weakened it. AGAINST: Blessed Bernard says: What is instituted by charity, ought not to militate against charity: but whatever the Church statutes it institutes by charity: therefore it ought not to militate against it: but everything weakening the force of a sacrament, militates against charity: therefore it ought not to be observed: but contrition is a sacrament, as will be held below in the Letter: therefore the constitution concerning confession ought not to be observed. But if it neither conferred, nor harmed: therefore it was useless: but nothing useless is to be universally observed in the Church, especially against the sacraments: therefore again this constitution ought not to have been kept. But if it helped. AGAINST: What by itself can produce some effect, is stronger than that which with another and not except with another which is in will or in act: but contrition without the purpose of confessing, could delete actual sin: and you say, that now it cannot without the will of confessing on account of the constitution of the Church: therefore its force is lessened on account of the constitution of the Church: therefore that constitution is not to be observed.

§ 59. 9. Furthermore, it is established, that God absolves in contrition: therefore He either absolves him simply, or with a condition. If simply: therefore not under that condition, that he confess and satisfy: therefore he is not bound to confess and satisfy. If with a condition: but every condition belongs to one doubting: therefore doubt falls upon God absolving the sinner himself, which is absurd: therefore He absolves simply: therefore he is not bound to confess and satisfy.

§ 60. 10. Furthermore, in all judgments it suffices

the cognition of the cause and the amends of the fault, according to which the cause is cognized: therefore this suffices in the judgment of God, who judges the penitent: but the cause of the fault is in the heart which God intuites, and perfectly cognizes: therefore if He cognizes the amends according to the same, it suffices for the whole correction of the sin: but contrition exhibits a perfect amends in the heart: and this God cognizes: therefore it alone suffices for the whole correction of the sin.

§ 62. 11. Furthermore, in every kind of disease it is countered at the source and not in the members over which the stream of the disease flows: therefore it ought to be done thus in spiritual medicine: but every sin has its cause in the heart: and if the heart were not, there would be no deformity in the mouth, nor in the work: therefore it seems, that the medicine

ought not to be except in the heart: but this is done by contrition alone: therefore the contrition of the heart alone suffices.

§ 63. 12. Furthermore, whatever contains in itself the perfect ratio of penance, this per se suffices without another for the expulsion of the disease: but contrition contains in itself the perfect ratio of penance: therefore contrition alone suffices for the perfect expulsion of the actual disease. The proof of the first is from the fact that nothing but penance is given against actual mortal sin, and not another spiritual medicine. But the second is proved from what Ambrose says in the Letter: Penance is the true sorrow of the heart and bitterness of soul for the evils which each one has committed: and it is established, that this does not belong to penance except by reason of contrition.

§ 64. But against this it is objected, and 1. All the authorities introduced in the Letter are subjected, which prove that without confession sin is not forgiven.

§ 65. 2. But by reason it is objected thus: Nothing can be detested unless recognized: but sin in every penance must be detested: therefore it must be recognized: but recognition is diversified according to the things in which it is: for recognition is one thing in intellectual things, and another in corporal things, and another in sacramental things: therefore just as in intellectual things intellectual recognition is exacted, and in operations operative recognition, so in sacramental things sacramental recognition is exacted: but this is in the narration of sins: and this is confession: therefore to the sacramental detestation of sin and penance confession is exacted.

§ 66. 3. Furthermore, every sacrament consists in the dispensation of the ministers of the Church: but nothing is dispensed unless cognized: therefore in order that the minister may operate about the sins of the penitent, he must cognize the sins: but he cannot know them except through confession: therefore to the dispensation of the sacrament of penance confession is exacted.

§ 67. 4. Furthermore, the sorrow of the penitent is satisfactive through the keys: but the force of the keys consists in the discretion of the sin, and in the absolution of the penitent: therefore before the effect of the keys the minister must cognize concerning the sins: and he cannot except through confession: therefore to the penitent, in order that he be absolved, confession is necessary.

§ 68. 5. Also, Daniel 9:4 et seq., and in other places of the Old Testament it is said, that when they wished to impetrate grace, they confessed their sins: therefore much more is it exacted in the New Testament in which grace is greater. [580]

§ 69. 6. Furthermore, Joshua 7:19: Joshua said to Achan: My son, give glory to the Lord God of Israel, and confess, namely, your sin, and tell me what thou hast done, hide it not. [581] Therefore he who returns from sins cannot glorify God, except through confession: therefore confession of fault is exacted in penance.

§ 70. 7. Also, in every judgment of condemnation the conviction of the condemned is exacted: but in penance there is a certain judgment in which the penitent is condemned to a determined punishment: therefore conviction is exacted: but it cannot be done through witnesses: therefore it must be done through confession: therefore in penance confession is exacted.

§ 71. Response. I say, as was held above in the beginning of the preceding distinction, that penance, insofar as it is a sacrament ordained against the whole disease of sin, has three parts: contrition, confession, and satisfaction: and in this way it must well be conceded, that the absolution of sin never occurs without confession existing in vow or in effect.

§ 72. But how it operates against sin, is manifest from the higher things [treated earlier], as far as I can understand.

§ 73. But if penance is accepted as it is in the ratio of a virtue, or a grace, or a passion only, I well think that it is not necessary that confession be present: hence also all the reasons introduced for that part, that confession is exacted, are taken from the ratio of penance insofar as it is a sacrament, because otherwise they seem to have no appearance [of truth].

§ 74. To this therefore which is first objected to the contrary, it must be said that contrition never excludes the vow of being baptized in the unbaptized, but only the effect: and thus I well concede, that in a similar article of necessity it can exclude the effect of confession, but never the vow if the faculty is present: but all the said things operate existing in a vow, because God looks upon the will: and thus it is said, 2 Cor. 8:12: If the will is prompt, it is accepted according to that which it hath, not according to that which it hath not. [582] And this is what is said by the Doctors, that a complete will is reputed for the deed.

§ 75. To the same it must be said, that the first proposition is not true, unless just as it contains all things, so it contains them sufficiently: and this is not true of contrition, because it itself is not sufficient without confession existing in vow, or in act and vow. Or it may be said, that it does not contain all things: because in penance there is the edification of the neighbor, and contrition of itself does not contain the edification of the one satisfying: and therefore through the minister in confession it is exacted, that the Church be reconciled: and this last solution is common, but yet the first is truer.

§ 76. To the other it must be said, that some recognition of sin was always exacted producing the sin in general, or in species, or in number, as was held above in the question concerning confession: but that which according to itself is divine, can well receive a diverse determination in the process of time: and therefore when the true Church had the keys, not merely the figure of the keys, then it was determined, that a man having sin should recognize it by detesting it before a man through confession: and therefore although penance was sometimes without such confession as now is in the Church, nevertheless it was not simply without confession as to the substance of confession in general.

580. 2 Corinthians 8:12.

§ 77. To the other it must be said, that although the confession of Mary Magdalene, and of Peter, and of certain others is not read, nevertheless it was done: because many things were done, which nevertheless were not written.

§ 78. Yet you have another solution above in the preceding distinction, that it was one thing concerning those who received from the Lord Himself, and another concerning others: because the Lord cognized it, and the blush of the heart before His presence according to humility was greater, than to us is the blush of the face before a priest cognizing the face: and therefore for such persons the confession of the heart could suffice, but not for us: because not from Him, but from a human priest, the vicar of God, do we receive penance.

§ 79. To the other it must be said, just as to the preceding, namely that they are almost the same.

§ 80. To the other it must be said, that although guilt is loosed in a moment, nevertheless a movement of free will in the detestation of sin is exacted: because in the justification of the impious four things are simultaneous in time habitually, although not actually, and they are simultaneous according to nature: of which one is the movement of free will upon the sin by detesting it, and that movement supposes the vow of confessing and satisfying: and thus it is evident, that nothing prohibits that three things be in

one and the same moment: one in act, namely contrition, and two supposed in vow, namely confession and satisfaction.

§ 82. To the other it must be said, that such a position is well possible: but it is never true contrition which excludes confession and satisfaction, not by an article of necessity, but by contempt of religion: hence if he is truly contrite, he himself has the vow of confessing and satisfying: and if he dies thus, confession and satisfaction operate in him existing in vow.

§ 83. To the other it must be said, that confession in general has a divine precept, but in species it receives determination through the Church, as was said above in the same question.

§ 84. To the other it must be said, that the institution of the Church confers much upon penance: because, as was said, contrition never suffices without some confession: but now a time has been determined, which is once a year: and a mode through the narration of the sin with certain circumstances on account of the judgment of the keys and their effect: and this confers very much upon the penitent for the remission of the punishment of sin, and also for a greater detestation of the guilt: and yet it weakens contrition in nothing: nor does it make the state of moderns worse than that of the ancients, on account of the great benefit which they attain from the force of the keys, which the ancients did not attain: just as the state of him would not be worse who gives a denarius and a half-penny, so that he may receive something bought with a great addition, than his who buys it for a denarius without the addition.

§ 85. To the other it must be said, that God simply absolves in contrition: but absolution is accepted in one way from the part of the absolver, and in another way from the part of the

581. Daniel 9:4.

absolved. For from the part of the absolver there is no condition and no doubt: but from the part of the absolved the vow of confessing and satisfying is supposed, without which there is no contrition. Nor is this unfitting, that on the part of God creating nothing is material, nothing is temporal, nothing is conditioned: and yet on the part of the created thing materiality, temporality, and condition fall upon it according to the nature of the created thing: and perhaps Master Hugh of St. Victor considered this, saying in the book On the power of binding and loosing to blessed Bernard, that God looses by binding, but the priest binds by loosing: because God looses from the bond of damnation by binding with the bond of confession and expiation: but the priest binds with the bond of satisfaction, and looses from the bond of confession: and this does not state a condition except on the part of the penitent and of those things which are supposed in the penitent.

§ 86. To the other it must be said, that this is true according to the form of the forum according to which the judgment proceeds: for the judiciary order must be observed, and it is varied according to the diversity of the forum. But the judgment of penance is not only divine, but also Ecclesiastical: for it is divine by inchoation, and perfected by a human minister in the Church: and therefore it is necessary, that it be more than that which is of the heart which God intuites: but the future judgment is only divine: and therefore the confession of the mouth is not necessary there, but only the testimony of conscience accusing or defending.

§ 87. To the other it must be said, that although a fever is always from the heat of the heart increasing the smoke of putrefied matter, nevertheless the matter of the fever is not always in the heart. And so it is also in spiritual diseases: because although originally they are in the heart, nevertheless the matters about which they occur are not of the heart, but also of the mouth and the hand: and therefore for a perfect cure it is necessary, that the disease be countered in all the members, into which the matter of the disease is diffused, although principally it is countered in the heart: and thus it is concerning spiritual diseases: hence the medicine of the heart alone does not suffice.

§ 88. To the other it must be said, that that definition, as was evident above, was given concerning peni-

[pen]ance, according as it is in the genus of a passion and not of a sacrament: and thus it is well conceded that he has only contrition, and not confession, and satisfaction.

Articulus 2 — Whether A Vow Ought To Be Reckoned For The Act

Whether a vow ought to be reputed as a deed?

Next it is inquired concerning what he says there, in A, § 5, near the beginning: For a vow is judged as an operation [deed].

For this seems to be false: because § 1. If there are two things of which one suffices, the other is superfluous, or belongs to well-being and not to necessity: but a vow and an opera-

582. Psalm 21:2 (Vulgate).

tion are two things, of which one suffices, as is said in the text: therefore the operation is superfluous, or does not belong to necessity: which is false.

§ 2. Moreover, what he says does not seem to be general, because someone gives three pennies for God, and wishes to have given seven or a hundred marks, and there the vow is not computed as the deed.

§ 3. If perhaps you say that this is understood of a vow preceding the act, which is accompanied by an inability to act. Against this is the following: because a certain woman wishes to have lost her virginity, and only inability prevents her from losing it: therefore according to this she is reputed to have lost it: therefore if she later repents, the aureole is not owed to her, which is false: therefore what he says is not general.

§ 4. Moreover, someone has the full will to kill someone, and only inability prevents him from killing him: therefore he is reputed as for the deed: therefore he is just as irregular for the will as for the deed, which is false: therefore what Cassiodorus says here in the text holds neither in good nor in evil.

Response. It must be said to the first that a vow is twofold, namely full, and half-full or imperfect. A full vow is impossible in certain acts due to vehement pleasure willed in the act. But a full vow is possible in all acts that do not have vehement pleasure in the flesh, as is the case in lust: but in other things the act does not add much to the pleasure, but rather brings sorrow, as in anger, prodigality, mercy, compassion, and the like.

Therefore it must be said that whenever the will is full, such that nothing excludes the work except inability alone, as to the substance of merit or demerit it is reputed as the deed, but not as to the adjuncts or consequences of the merit or demerit: such as the harm or benefit, which are in the act: and therefore a vow of murder has the same guilt in species as the act of murder, but nevertheless the act harms more than the will: just as also in good purposes a vow has the same merit in substance as the act, although not as much in quantity: and this because the benefits are not as great.

Through this the solution to almost everything is clear: for although they are two things, namely the vow to confess and the confession itself, nevertheless the vow is never full if an act of contempt for religion excludes it, and not an article of necessity: but if it is full, and only inability hinders the act, the vow suffices as to the substance of the indulgence: although it does not attain all those things in continuous or discrete quantity which follow upon and are adjoined to confession existing in act: such as the diminution of penalty through the power of the keys, and de-obligation from the debt of confession simply, and the like: and the actual shame in the act of confession also removes something from the penalty which it would not otherwise attain.

To the next it must be said, that it is not a full will if he is able to give more and does not wish to: but if he cannot give more, then he attains the same indulgence in substance as the one giving more: although the one giving more has something accidental which he who gives less does not have.

To the next it must be said, that the aureole is owed to continence not according to itself, but according to the integrity of the flesh: and therefore although that accidental reward is not lost except by a deed of the flesh, nevertheless substantially the reward of continence is lost through a full vow of fornication, and is restored through penance, just as all other spiritual things are restored in full through penance, as was said above.

Through the same is clear the solution to the last, that irregularity is an accidental penalty which the Church, according to divine counsel, determines only for the act of murder: and therefore although substantially the guilt of a will for murder and of the act is the same, nevertheless the accidental penalty is only for the one.

Articulus 3 — Whether It Suffices To Confess To God Alone

Whether it is sufficient to confess to God alone?

Next it is inquired concerning what he says there, A, § 5, after the beginning: There is not yet a voice in the mouth that man may hear the confession, etc.

For from this it seems that § 1. It is sufficient to confess to God alone.

Also, this seems true by another reason: For Adam, who is the form [pattern] of all sinners, is not reproved except concerning this, that he excused himself before God in confession: therefore it seems that in other sinners it is sufficient to accuse oneself before God.

§ 2. Moreover, a double tribulation never arises, as was established above: therefore only one confession is owed to one sin in penance: but this is made to God, as Augustine says here: therefore it is not necessary to add a second, which is made to a man.

§ 3. Moreover, no other part of penance is doubled: for even a single contrition alone suffices for all sins, and a single satisfaction enjoined through the power of the keys: therefore a single confession suffices: but this is made to God: therefore an oral confession is not necessary, as it seems.

But to the contrary of this it seems that § 1. The Church establishes nothing unless it is just, nor does she aggravate burdens upon her children in general statutes: but it is of the constitution and precept of the Church that everyone must confess to his priest once a year: therefore this is just, nor is there salvation without it.

§ 2. Moreover, if someone were to say that one should not confess to a priest, and that the confession made to God alone suffices, he would be condemned as a heretic: therefore this belongs to the necessities for salvation, that a man is bound to confess to a human priest: therefore that confession which is made to God alone does not suffice: the contrary of which the text seems to say.

Response. It must be said to this, that if the faculty to confess to a priest is present, the confession made to God alone does not suffice: and what is said in the text is understood of the remission of sin as to the fault and the eternal penalty: which remission precedes the act of confession, but not the vow.

To that which is objected first, it must be said that there were not yet truly keys, nor priests: and therefore the Lord then acted by Himself alone what He now does by Himself and a vicar: and together with this He taught Adam how he ought to recognize his sin by accusing himself in confession, and how he should instruct others to do this same thing.

To the next it must be said, that a double tribulation does not arise, because in sin there is an offense against God and against neighbor: and therefore through the neighbor who is the vicar of God the sinner also has to be reconciled: and again, because the law of divinity is (as Dionysius says) to lead back through the lowest means: and therefore the sinner, as such, since he is in the lowest state, has to be led back through him who is in a higher grade concerning the order and the power of the keys.

To the next it must be said, that this part is not doubled: because what is done before God is not properly confession, except insofar as it is ordered to that which is done before man: and therefore that confession is full which is the narration of sin with detestation, proceeding from the recognition made before God.

Articulus 4 — Whether By The Groan Of Penance Before Oral Confession Sin Is Remitted

Whether sin is remitted through the groan of penance before oral confession?

Next it is inquired concerning what is said there, A, § 5, around the middle: It is not said, he shall have confessed with the mouth: but being converted he shall have groaned, etc.

From this it seems to follow expressly that confession is necessary for nothing.

Response. It must be said that groan is taken there for the groan of contrition, which presupposes the vow of confessing and satisfying according to canonical sanction, because otherwise he does not properly groan with the groan of penance: and he intends to say nothing else, except that in such a groan of penance before oral confession and the satisfaction of a work, sin is remitted according to fault and the guilt of eternal penalty, but not before the vow of confessing and satisfying: and this is clear according to what was disputed above.

Articulus 5 — Whether We Are All Bound To Oral Confession

Whether we are all bound to oral confession?

Next it is inquired concerning what he says there, A, § 5, after the middle: Hence also, those lepers, etc.

For from this a valid argumentation seems to be drawn for the fact that we are not bound to oral confession. For in Luke 17:14 and seq., it is said that while they were going, the ten lepers were cleansed: and only one returned. And it is probable that he alone fulfilled the command of Christ in making an oblation to the priest, and nevertheless they were cleansed. Since therefore the return signifies a return through thanksgiving, and the showing signifies confession: it seems that without confession and thanksgiving someone may be cleansed from the leprosy of sin.

To this it must be said, that the Lord wished to show in this what He does by Himself, and what He would do through priests. For priests, who are called physicians in the Psalm, do not raise up, nor do they vivify, nor do they heal from fault: but the leprosy signified fault, and therefore before they presented themselves to the priest, they were cleansed, lest their cleansing be believed to have been done by the priests: nevertheless, they were not absolved from the debt of presentation and oblation except by presenting themselves to the priest, and the Lord accomplishes that de-obligation from remaining outside the camp through the reconciling priest: for he is not reputed to be within the spiritual camps of the Church who has wandered away and has not been reconciled through the ministry of a priest. And it is no objection that the leprosy did not return: because in allegorical matters a similitude is not expected in all things, but only in certain ones.

Articulus 6 — Whether Confession Necessarily Ought To Be Made In Charity

Whether confession must necessarily be made in charity?

Whether confession must necessarily be made in charity?

Next it is inquired concerning what he says there, A, § 5, towards the end: No one can confess unless raised up, etc.

According to this, a confession which is not made in charity avails for nothing. And this also seems to be the case:

§ 1. Through that which is brought forward in Ecclesiasticus 17:26: From the dead, as from one who is not, confession perisheth.

§ 2. Moreover to the same point, No dead work avails for eternal life: but a confession made in mortal sin before the raising up of the soul is a dead work: therefore it does not avail for eternal life, nor for grace: because if it availed for one, it would also avail for the other.

Moreover, confession (confessio) is named from con [with/together] and for, faris [to speak]: but he does not speak together, who speaks with the mouth and not with the heart: therefore he does not confess: therefore that confession does not avail.

§ 3. Also, Ambrose: "That confession liberates the guilty, which is made with penance: true penance is sorrow of heart and bitterness of soul for the evils which one has committed": but a confession which is outside charity is not a confession with penance, although it can be with affliction: therefore it does not liberate: therefore it does not avail, because it was not invented except to liberate man.

§ 4. Moreover, every true and liberal confession is with perfect detestation of sin: but he does not perfectly detest it who is still dead through the will for sin: therefore such a one makes no availing confession, and he is bound to make an availing one: therefore such a one is still bound to confess.

ON THE CONTRARY: Everything that is ordered to something as a cause, precedes it: but confession is ordered to justification as a cause: therefore it precedes it. The first premise is

self-evident. The second is written in the text of the following chapter, where he says: No one can be justified, etc.

Then it proceeds thus: § 1. Everything that precedes justification, precedes charity: confession precedes justification: therefore it precedes charity: therefore it is not necessary that the man who confesses be alive through grace and charity.

§ 2. Moreover, confession is made so that the confessor may be instructed concerning the quality and quantity of sins: but this can equally be done in grace and outside of grace: therefore confessions made in grace and outside of grace avail equally.

§ 3. Moreover, confession differs in something from contrition and satisfaction: for since contrition is of the heart, and satisfaction is of the work, confession will be of the mouth: but the mouth is equally free for pronouncing in a sinner and in one having grace, although they are not equally free for meriting in work and in heart: therefore it seems that confession may be made equally by one having grace and by one not having it.

§ 4. Moreover, no one is bound to what is impossible for him: but every man is bound to confession by precept: therefore the mode of confession is not impossible for him: but it is impossible for us to have grace, because we cannot from ourselves attain grace: therefore we are not bound to confess in grace.

§ 5. Moreover, what is equally imposed upon the sinner and the just must and ought to be done in a mode that corresponds to both, namely both the sinner and the just: but confession is imposed equally on the sinner and the just: therefore it must be done in a mode corresponding to both: but this mode is not that it be done with grace, but rather from free will: therefore confession is not an act of grace, but of free will alone: therefore it is not required that it be done in grace.

§ 6. Moreover, in certain other corporal acts enjoined for penance a man is absolved, even if he performs them existing outside charity: as if someone is enjoined to give a hundred marks, and he gave them outside charity, it is not enjoined upon him that he give them again when he has charity. Similarly, if it is enjoined upon him to cross over to Rome or beyond the sea. Since therefore confession is a corporal act of penance, if it is done outside charity, it ought not to be enjoined that he do it again: but if it avails nothing when done outside charity, it would be enjoined upon him that he do it again: therefore, etc.

§ 7. Moreover, in another sacrament which is of necessity, such as Baptism: and others which are not of necessity, such as Confirmation and Orders, one can receive the sacrament: and it begins to avail from the moment the fiction [feigning] recedes. Since therefore Penance is a sacrament of necessity, it seems to have something similar: but this cannot be in contrition and satisfaction: therefore this will be in confession: therefore a confession made in mortal sin avails, and even begins to avail for eternal life from the moment the fiction recedes.

§ 8. Moreover, in Ecclesiastes 9:1, it is said that man knoweth not whether he be worthy of love or hatred: if therefore someone is bound to confess in charity, and this cannot be done unless he knows he has charity, and he cannot know this, it follows that he does not know whether he

has made a confession: therefore every man is perplexed in this regard, and confessions will have to be repeated all day long: nor should a man do anything through his whole life except confess, so that at least one may avail: therefore, etc.

Response. It must be said that there are two things in confession, one on the part of the one confessing, the other on the part of the one hearing the confession. On the part of the one confessing is the act itself, according as it is from the agent, such as the shame and penalty in narrating. But on the part of the hearer is the knowledge of the hidden disease and its circumstances. I say therefore without prejudice, that that which is on the part of the one confessing avails nothing for justification and the merit of eternal life, unless the confessor is in charity: however, it avails for more easily impetrating grace, and for the humiliation of the confessor, and for certain other things for which those goods are said to avail which are called of the genus of goods done outside charity. But as for that which is on the part of the hearer, it seems to me that it simply avails regarding this, that it fulfills the precept of the Church, and he is de-obligated from the debt of confessing: and the fact that he himself does not obtain the effect of the keys in the diminution of penalty, is by accident, namely because he is fictive [feigning]: and because the effect of the keys is founded more upon the passion of Christ than upon human merit, it seems to me that when the fiction recedes, if no other sin intercepts the confession and the enjoined satisfaction, the effect of the keys to which he submitted himself will avail for him, the fiction receding.

To that therefore which is objected from the text concerning all those things which are brought forward for that side: it must be said that all those things speak of what is in confession on the part of the one confessing, according as they avail for grace and eternal life: but they do not speak according as they avail for drawing oneself near to grace, nor do the objections proceed, nor do they avail even for that which is in confession on the part of the hearer and the power of the keys which operate through the hearer: and in this way they are true, and in another way they are false.

To the first, however, which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that confession is optimal in grace, nor is it ordered to justification as a cause by procession of time, nor even according to that mode of priority which the Philosopher states, that the cause is prior by nature: but it is ordered thus primarily according as it is supposed in the vow from the act of contrition, and not according as it is in the actual narration of sins.

To the next it must be said, that although confession is for this, yet it is not only for this: rather it has many causes on the part of the one confessing, from which it is made a part of the penalty, as Augustine says in the text of the preceding distinction : and therefore that argument proceeds from a diminution.

To the next it must be said, that pronunciation is considered in two ways, namely in substance with the due form of penitent pronunciation, insofar as he is a penitent: and in the first way indeed what that reason concludes is true: but in the second way it is false. Nor can it be concluded through that argument, because the form of the whole is in all the parts: and this is penitential grace, although the parts differ among themselves in the form of the parts.

To the next it must be said, that impossible is said in two ways, namely that which we can in no way do, nor do anything which having been done it would become so, just as subverting mountains is impossible for us: and this is not commanded to anyone. In a second way that is called impossible for us which we cannot do in itself, but we can do something which having been done it will inevitably happen: and this by reason of an antecedent which is in our power, and is in a certain way possible for us, and this is to have grace: because if we do what is in us, God will inevitably give us grace: and this by reason of the antecedent can be under precept: and this is according to the opinion of those who say that the form of the work is in the precept, and not only the substance of the work.

Concerning this you will find many things before the end of the third book of this work.

To the next it must be said, that although it is equally commanded to the just and the sinner: to the just, I say, who has something to confess: nevertheless it is not intended that the sinner remaining a sinner should do it, but rather having been justified through confession. If, however, existing as a sinner he does it, it avails him as to those things which belong to confession on the part of the one hearing the confession, as was said: and also for certain other things, although not for the merit of eternal life.

To the next it must be said, that in grievous corporal actions distinction also has a place: for such things chiefly have two aspects, namely, action and passion: for a similar action is the very exercise of giving or going on pilgrimage: and this is attended to according to the root from which it proceeds: and if that is grace, the work is meritorious. But if it is a good of the genus of goods, the work itself is of the genus of goods: nevertheless it does not make a meritorious work, but it avails for drawing oneself near to grace. Passion, however, is the effect of the action, and the confessor intends this more when enjoining penalties that cut away the petulance of sins, from which the wanton person sinned: just as the penalty of loss is effected by the giving of alms, and this penalty remains in him who gave, even after the giving has passed: and the penalty of weakness in the limbs remains with the pilgrim, even after the pilgrimage has passed. Hence just as we said that the passions of the martyrs are considered in two ways, namely, insofar as it is merely a passion, and insofar as it is the will of the martyrs concerning it: and in the first way it does not merit, but in the second way it merits: so it seems it must be said that this remaining penalty is considered in two ways, namely insofar as it is a remaining penalty, and avails nothing for merit, although it avails for the taming of petulance: and insofar as there is a will concerning it: and if that will has grace even after the deed, because the remaining penalty can have a will concerning itself which follows the work, then I say that that remaining penalty so informed begins to avail for eternal life: because it pleases him to have been impoverished for God, and weakened in the honor of God. But confession is not penal in this way, as to a penalty remaining after the act of confession: and therefore it is not similar.

I concede, however, that on the part of the hearer it avails for absolution from the debt of confessing, and for the other things which were said above.

To the next it must be said, that it is not entirely similar regarding Baptism, Confirmation, Orders, and Penance: because in those a character is imprinted which remains, and a grace whose operation the sacrament begins to effect when the fiction recedes: but in Penance no spiritual character is imprinted at all: and then that preceding operation does not operate as an operation that has passed, because it remained neither within nor without: nevertheless, by reason of new contrition and penance, new grace is given, and he is not bound to confess by the reason stated above.

To the next it must be said, that although no one knows with certitude that he has charity, nevertheless he can opine this from signs, if sin displeases him, and the vow of confessing or satisfying is present, and of perpetually detesting sin: and this suffices for us in this life, because no more can be required of us here than it is possible for us to pay.

And through this the solution to all the queries is clear.

Articulus 7 — Whether, As The Soul Is The Life Of The Body, So God Is The Life Of The Soul

Whether just as the soul is the life of the body, so God is the life of the soul?

Next it is inquired concerning what is said there, A, § 5 at the end: Which just as it is the life of the body, so God is its life.

For this seems to be false: because § 1. It is the life of the body by nature, because it is the act of a body in potency having life: and whatever is organic is of this kind: but God is not the life of the soul except through grace: therefore there seems to be no similitude.

§ 2. Moreover, as the Philosopher says, when the soul departs, the body expires and decays: but when God departs from the soul, the soul still lives: therefore it seems that there is no similitude of life on either side.

If perhaps you say that all things would fall into nothingness unless the hand of the Omnipotent held them, as Gregory says: and so, God departing from the soul, the soul would fall into nothingness: just as the body falls, the soul departing presentially. ON THE CONTRARY: According to this mode of containment by which He is essentially, presentially, and potentially in all things, He does not contain the soul of the just more than that of the sinner: but here he speaks of the Death by which the sinner dies: therefore it is clear that that is nothing to the proposition, and is not an instance.

Furthermore, in that mode of containing He does not contain the body less than the soul, nor the animate less than the inanimate, or conversely: but in the text he speaks only of the one having grace and the one not having it: therefore it is clear that it is not an instance against the adduced objection.

FURTHERMORE it is inquired, Whether the life by which God vivifies the soul belongs to it according to essence or according to power?

It seems that it is according to essence: because § 1. For living things, to live is to be: and to be is an act of essence rather than of power.

§ 2. Moreover, the life of the soul is primarily the act of the essence of the body, rather than of a bodily organ. Proof. For whatever is related to something as first act, and to something as second act, primarily belongs to that which receives it as first act, rather than to that which receives it as second act: but the soul is related to the essence of the organic body as first act, and to the organ as second act, because it moves it to operations: therefore it primarily belongs to the essence of the body rather than to the organ. But if God is related to the essence of the soul and its power just as the soul is related to the essence of the body and its organ: therefore the divine life primarily belongs to the essence of the soul rather than to the power.

ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. Life is not spoken of except in two ways, namely of nature, and according to well-being: but well-being is to live according to order, and this is not except according to the order and distinction of powers: therefore to live according to well-being primarily belongs to power rather than to essence: and such is God's living in grace: therefore it primarily belongs to the power rather than to the essence of the soul.

§ 2. Moreover, life is also said according to well-being in the sense, according to which pleasure is called life: but pleasure is according to the powers prior to being according to the essence: therefore in reason similarly, living according to the being of reason will be prior according to power, than according to essence.

Response. It must be said that there is not a similitude in all things, but in certain ones: such as namely in this, that just as the soul is the indefectible principle of the life of the body insofar as it is of itself: and if the body is not vivified indifferently by it, this is not on the part of the soul, but rather on account of the corruption of the body itself: so also God is the indefectible principle of the life of the soul of Himself: and if the soul is not always vivified, this happens on account of the corruption of the soul itself, and its aversion from the fount of life.

Again in this there is a similitude, that there is no life in the body except that which is the continuous act of the soul in the body, the being of which is continuously to be made by the soul itself, as also seems to be said in the book De motu cordis: so there is no life of grace in the soul except through the continuous presence of God indwelling in us through grace. There is, however, a dissimilitude in this, that God is not united to the soul for the constitution of any third thing, as the soul is united to the body. And in this, that God is not the natural act of the soul, as the soul is of the body: and in many other things.

And through this the solution to the first and second is clear.

And it must be well conceded, that although the instance adduced contains in itself a certain appearance of truth, nevertheless it does not stand against the proposition.

To that which is inquired further, it must be said that that "living" is spoken of in two ways, namely according to the object of life which is the good in the state of grace and glory, and according to the habit of life: and the object indeed primarily respects the power, because the soul is capable of it through reason and will: but according to the habit of life it is primarily in the soul according to essence, and in the power by consequence.

To the first it must be said, that there is no similitude regarding the life of nature and the life of grace: because the life of nature is the essential act of the soul, but the life of grace is by metaphor, and is taken according to well-being: and this is to be optimally according to the good of reason, and therefore it must be through the perception of that which vivifies according to reason and intellect: and this perception is the apprehension of the good which is God, and affection concerning Him: but this first happens according to power, and by consequence according to essence: and therefore what is brought forward as similar is not similar.

To the next it must be said, that the soul is not the act of the body in the same way that the formal aspect of the object is the act of the power: because the soul is the act of the body giving being to it, which is to live only in living things, or to sense in sensing things, and to understand in understanding things: but to live, spoken of in this way, is not to exercise life or sense or intellect, but rather to have the being of a living thing, and the being of a sensing thing, or an intellective being: but when the formal aspect or species of the object is called the act of the power receiving it, it is understood indeed as an act inferring a passion upon some thing to which it infers itself, as color to the eye, and sound to the hearing according to act in fact, and so of others.

Articulus 8 — Whether In The Penitent Confession Precedes Justification

Whether in a penitent confession precedes justification?

Tell your iniquities, etc.[583] From this it seems that the spoken iniquities precede justification: but before justification a man is in mortal sin: therefore according to this, confession always happens while the one confessing is still existing in mortal sin.

§ 1. On the contrary: Man is justified in contrition, and confession follows contrition: therefore, it follows justification: therefore, confession belongs to one who has been justified.

§ 2. Response: that confession, operating in a vow along with contrition, operates justification: and in this way it precedes it necessarily, not in time, but by nature. But confession taken in act does not operate otherwise, except by absolving from the debt of confession, which belongs to justice.

§ 3. Division of the Text

Divisio Textus

No one can be justified from sin, etc. Concerning the justification of the ungodly, nine things are asked here. First, What is it? Second, What things are required for the justification of the ungodly? Third, Concerning the order of those things. Fourth, Whether it is natural or miraculous? Fifth, Of which attribute is it the proper effect? Sixth, What is the motive towards it? Seventh, Whether it is a work of justice, or of mercy, or of both? Eighth, Concerning its comparison to dilection, calling, and magnification. Ninth, Concerning its comparison to the healing of the mind and the renewal of the image.

What is the justification of the ungodly?

Articulus 9 — What The Justification Of The Ungodly Is

What is the justification of the ungodly?

§ 5. Concerning the first, namely, what is the justification of the ungodly? Bernard: Justification is the revelation of the divine counsel.

§ 6. But the Gloss on the Epistle to the Romans 8:1 and following: "Justification is the remission of sins, and the consummation of good works."

§ 7. But some define it thus: Justification is the effect of general justice, by which the ungodly becomes godly.

§ 8. Against the FIRST definition it is objected as follows: 1. The revelation of the divine counsel is only according to the intellect in the soul: but justification occurs according to every part of it: therefore, justification is not the revelation of the divine counsel.

1. Also, the revelation of the divine counsel happens in prophecy, and it produces the gift of prophecy: but the gift of prophecy does not necessarily place one in grace that makes pleasing (gratia gratum faciens): therefore, neither does the revelation of the divine counsel. But justification always places a person in the state of grace that makes pleasing: therefore, etc.
2. Also, the revelation of the divine counsel is given equally to the good and the bad: but justification is given only to the good: therefore, etc. PROOF of the first premise: God revealed His counsel to Nebuchadnezzar, Daniel 2:29: "God who reveals mysteries, has shown to you what things were to come," etc. And God revealed to Isaiah, and also to many other good men.
3. Also, it seems unfitting to call it the revelation of the divine counsel, because justification is the effect of predestination, which concerns grace in the present and glory in the future, and it is not the effect of counsel, which is an immovable disposition concerning future things, whether good or bad: therefore, it should rather be said: Justification is the revelation of divine predestination, rather than of the divine counsel.

§ 9. Against the SECOND it is objected as follows: 1. For the remission of sins is an effect of grace, and justice has a different formal character (ratio) from grace: therefore, justification is not well defined through the remission of sin.

1. Moreover, in Proverbs 10:12, it is said that charity covers a multitude of sins:

therefore, the remission of sins should rather be attributed to charity, than to justification.

1. Also, a multitude of sins can be destroyed in two ways, namely, through that which is contrary to it in genus, or through that which is contrary to it in species. But justice is not contrary to fault (culpa) in genus, but rather grace is: therefore, its destroyer in genus is grace, not justice. But in species, not just one virtue is opposed to it, but many,

583. Cf. Isaiah 43:26.

because one is opposed to fornication, another to avarice, and so on: therefore, its destroyer in species is not one thing, but many virtues, or all of them: therefore, this should not be attributed to justice.

2. Also, since the theological virtues are more efficacious than the cardinal virtues, the remission of sins should rather be attributed to a theological virtue than to a cardinal one: but justice is a cardinal virtue: therefore, it should not be attributed to justice.

3. Similarly, it is objected concerning this statement that justification is the consummation of good works. For this seems false, because the consummation of a thing follows the completed thing according to the order of nature and reason: but justification precedes good works in reason and nature: therefore, justification is not the consummation of good works.

4. Also, the law prescribes works: therefore, what is the consummation of the law is the consummation of works: but charity is the consummation of the law, as is held in Romans 13:10 and 1 Timothy 1:5: therefore, charity is the consummation of works.

§ 10. Against the THIRD it is objected as follows: 1. The Philosopher says in the fifth book of the Ethics, that general justice is the same as every virtue, differing only by reason (ratione): therefore, if justification is the effect of general justice, justification is the effect of every virtue. But the effects of the virtues are divided, just as the virtues themselves are divided: therefore, justification is not just one single thing.

1. Also, in justification virtues are infused: and that which is infused in another is not the other thing itself: therefore, justification is not every virtue, or the effect of every virtue: and general justice is every virtue: therefore, justification is not the effect of general justice.

2. Also, to make a godly person out of an ungodly one belongs to a special virtue only in a qualified sense (secundum quid), but rather it belongs to grace in its genus: therefore, this does not belong to justice.

§ 11. Response: that the first is not a definition, but rather, as Bernard says, a certain consequent of justification by accident. For the divine counsel, which is an immovable disposition of future things, is made manifest in every effect of its own: because we do not arrive at the divine cause except through its effect. Hence, when God has disposed to give grace to someone, this lies hidden before it happens; but when it becomes known through a sign, then it is revealed, and this follows justification by accident, namely, insofar as the divine counsel is known to us through signs: and therefore it must not be granted that it is a definition.

§ 12. To the first argument, therefore, which is objected against the first definition, we say that revelation is twofold, namely, through the inspiration of a hidden truth by illuminating the intellect, and through an effect. And the first happens according to the intellect; but the second belongs to any thing to manifest through its work.

§ 13. To the next it must be said that in the gift of prophecy there is revelation through inspiration, and not the manifestation of the divine will or good pleasure through a work. For this counsel is restricted only to those things concerning which there is a disposition to confer grace. And through this the solution to the following argument is also clear.

§ 14. To the next it must be said that this manifestation

by which a person is manifested to himself, is only through the effect of grace, and this befits only the good.

§ 15. To the next it must be said that counsel is taken here for the definition in the knowledge of the good pleasure concerning the future granting of grace: for this counsel is both made manifest and revealed in justification, when grace is applied.

§ 16. To what is objected concerning the second, it must be said that justification is described there through its proper effect: for since justification implies a "made just" (factum justum) or a "making just" (justificatio), if it is taken for a "made just," it signifies the terminus of a certain motion, which is from sin to general justice. And since the termini of a motion are contraries, it will belong to general justice to destroy and remit sin, like a formal contrary. And therefore, speaking in this way, the remission of sin will be the proper effect of justice. But if it implies the very "becoming just" (fieri justum) or "justification": then it will still be the expulsion of sin and the induction of justice: just as whitening is the expulsion of blackness and the induction of whiteness.

§ 17. To the object raised against this, we say that nothing prevents the same thing from being considered by different people under a different formal aspect. For sin does three things in the soul. First, it turns one away from the immutable good; second, it perverts the right order of the powers toward one another, and toward what is higher, and toward what is alongside, and toward what is lower. Third, it also corrupts the powers in relation to special and particular works. And therefore, in the motion of justification there are three things that perfect the soul: of which the first is grace, which is contrary to sin turning away and disturbing the image of God. The second is general justice, reordering the powers into a right and due state toward one another, so that reason rules and the others are ruled, and toward what is higher, and toward what is equal, and toward what is lower. The third is the infusion of every virtue, perfecting the individual powers for individual works.

§ 18. But then it is asked: Why is this motion named from the middle state rather than from the ultimate or the first? Namely, why is it called justification rather than gratification, or the infusion of virtues, or perfection?

§ 19. Response. It must be said that grace by itself denotes only gratitude toward God; but in conversion there is much more, and therefore it would be imperfectly denominated from grace. But it cannot be denominated from the ultimate, because this implies perfection for individual acts, and justification implies a state of rectitude in general.

§ 20. To that, therefore, which is secondarily objected concerning the second definition, we say that charity does not cover a multitude of sins as a general covering formally contrary to

sin, but rather as the form of merit, insofar as it is a merit: because the quantity of merit is attended to according to the quantity of charity.

§ 21. To the next it must be said, as was clear before, that there are three considerations of sin: and therefore the argument proceeds from a diminution.

§ 22. To the next we say that the theological virtues are not general: and therefore general rectitude cannot be attributed to them as an effect.

§ 23. To the next it must be said that the consummation of works is spoken of in two ways, namely, either in cause or in effect. In effect, indeed, it follows the works; and in cause, it precedes them. And that which is in the cause is further spoken of in two ways, namely, either in the habitual cause, or in the efficient cause. In the habitual cause, every infused virtue perfects the works; but on the part of the efficient cause, general justice is the consummation of the works, because it consummates the operating powers toward what is higher, and toward themselves, and toward the neighbor, as has been said.

§ 24. To the next it must be said that charity is the consummation of works as a motive habit; in the termination of its proper end, charity moves to every act, and on account of the good which is its end. And thus it itself is not the terminus of that motion by which he who from ungodly becomes godly is moved: but general justice perfects, as placing the powers of the soul into a right and due state according to nature.

§ 25. To that which is objected against the third definition, it must be said that justice is spoken of multi-

Articulus 10 — What Are Those Four Things Which Are Required For The Justification Of The Ungodly

ply. For it is called divine and human justice. Concerning divine justice, nothing for the present. But human justice is spoken of in three ways, namely, as a genus, as general, and as special. As a genus, it is the same as virtue in general: but it is called justice insofar as it accords with the ordination of the law, for which reason the Philosopher also calls it legal justice. But it is called virtue insofar as it perfects the soul or power for an act. But general justice is a certain disposition (habitudo) that signifies a right state of the powers, as has been said, resulting from grace: and it is understood of this when it is said that justification is the effect of justice. But special justice is that by which, in exchanges, one renders to each what is his own.

§ 26. And through this it is clear that what is objected concerning justice as a genus is nothing: because genus and general are not the same.

§ 27. And through this the solution to the following argument is also clear: for general justice is rather a certain disposition resulting from grace, than a habit of virtue.

§ 28. To the next it must be said that one is made godly from being ungodly in three ways, as was said at the beginning of the solution to the second definition: however, that these

things may be well understood, they depend upon the questions we have disputed elsewhere concerning justice.

What are those four things that are required for the justification of the ungodly?

§ 30. To the second we proceed thus: It is said by all that four things are required for the justification of the ungodly, namely, the infusion of grace, the motion of free will toward sin or contrition (which is the same thing), the motion of free will toward God, and the remission of sin. Now, these are noted in Psalm 59:4: You have moved the earth: behold the infusion of grace. And You have troubled it: behold contrition. Heal its breaches: behold the remission of sin. For it has been moved: behold the motion of free will toward God.

§ 31. But against this it is objected: because 1. Bernard says: "By fear we are called to God, but by love we are justified": therefore, two things are required besides the four mentioned, namely, fear and love.

1. Also, Proverbs 15:27: By mercy and faith sins are purged: therefore, more things are required than those mentioned.
2. Also, Acts 15:9: Purifying their hearts by faith: but justification is nothing other than the purification of the heart from sin: therefore, faith is required for justification.
3. Also, it seems that charity is required: because Augustine says that this alone is what divides the sons of the kingdom from the sons of perdition. But the sons of the kingdom are those who are conformed to the image of His Son, as is said in Romans 8:29. Therefore, etc.

Also, Luke 7:47: Many sins are forgiven her, because she has loved much. And from this follows the same as before.

1. Also, Chrysostom on John: "Let us reconsider with diligence all the things we presumed to do in our former time, and let us strive to wipe them away in every manner; for God has opened many ways to us for this. Say your sins (he says) that you may be justified." And again, Psalm 37:19: I will declare my iniquity, and my sorrow, etc. "For a continual accusation and memory of our sins is of no small benefit to us for diminishing their magnitude. There is also this more manifest way, that we keep no memory of the wrongs of those who have sinned against us. Do you want to learn a third? Listen to Daniel 4:24: Redeem your sins with almsgiving, etc. There is certainly also another with this: continual prayers, and also persisting with expectation in supplications directed to God, which bring us no small consolation. Similarly, and fasting , which, together with charity toward the neighbor, extinguishes the vehemence of God's wrath: for water extinguishes a blazing fire, and alms expurgate sins." From these words it is held that there are five things by which sin is expelled and justice is put on, and none of these were enumerated above: therefore, that enumeration is defective.

§ 32. But it seems that there are fewer: because 1. The infusion of grace either suffices by itself for justification, or it does not. If so, then none of the others is required. If not, on the contrary:

Because whiteness suffices by itself for whitening, and spiritual forms are more perfect in operations than corporeal ones: therefore, much more does grace suffice by itself for justification.

1. Also, in corporeal mutations there is no other mutation of the subject except the expulsion of one form and the induction of another: and it is not necessary that the subject move itself toward the artisan or toward expelling the color: therefore, similarly, in spiritual mutation nothing is required except the expulsion of sin and the infusion of grace: and it is not necessary that the free will be moved toward God, or toward sin: and thus two suffice.

§ 33. Also, it is asked about each of those four individually: 1. For since justification is denominated from justice, it should rather be said that the infusion of justice is required there, rather than of grace.

1. Moreover, that motion is either of the intellect only, or of the intellect and affectus together, or of the affectus only. If of the intellect, on the contrary: Virtue is more on the part of the affectus than of the intellect, and virtue operates maximally toward justification: therefore, that motion should maximally be on the part of the affectus.
2. Moreover, the motion of free will toward God is meritorious and informed by grace, or not. If it is: every such motion is consequent upon justification and grace: therefore, it follows justification. But what essentially follows something else is not required for it as a cause: therefore, the motion of free will toward God is not required as a cause for justification: therefore, it is wrongly placed among the justifying things.
3. Also, the motion of the intellect toward God is common to the justified and the unjustified: therefore, it is not properly required so as to be enumerated among the things that justify the ungodly.
4. Also, it is asked about the remission of sin: because this seems to be the same thing as the infusion of grace: because, as the Philosopher maintains, the generation of one thing is the corruption of another.
5. Similarly, it is objected concerning the motion of free will toward sin. For this motion is a recognition of sin, and this motion is common to all, both good and bad.
6. Moreover, there is one argument common to the above division and to this member: because into whatever free will is moved, it has the power to move into that. If, therefore, free will is moved into God and into sin, whether through the intellect or through the affectus or through both, then it has the power of itself to move into God and into sin, which is false. Therefore, these are not required for the justification of the ungodly.

§ 34. But against all these members together it is objected: For that motion of free will toward God and toward sin, is either making pleasing (gratum faciens), or merely natural. If the first way: then it follows justification, just as a motion that makes pleasing follows the justification

of the one operating: because Augustine says that we do not work justice in order to be just; but rather we receive justice from God, in order that we may work. But if it is a natural motion of free will, since to such a motion no justification is owed, it seems incongruous to place it among the justifying things.

§ 35. Solution. It must be said that these four are required for the justification of the ungodly.

There are two things effecting justification:

one which is as an agent through a habit which, by creating it, He gives in the heart contrary to sin, and this is God. The other is as disposing and preparing the subject, and obeying the first operator, which is God. And so I say, that on the part of the operator through the habit which He gives by creating, two things are taken: one on the part of the terminus to which the motion of justification is directed, and in this way it is the infusion of grace; the other, however, on the part of the terminus from which, which is the remission of sin.

But on the part of the dispositions, two things are taken: one on the part of the terminus from which, and this is the motion of free will toward sin by detesting and expelling it; the other on the part of the terminus to which, by receiving and embracing grace, and this is the motion of free will toward God. But if it is asked why these two motive elements are required? I say that, as Augustine says, "He who created you without you, will not justify you without you: but He will justify you with you." For just as in a subject in which some blackness is held by glue, it is impossible for whiteness to be induced unless that glue is dissolved, so it is impossible for grace to be induced in the soul unless the evil will holding the sin is dissolved: and this is not dissolved unless it is moved toward sin and toward God.

And this is the reason why the ancient Doctors posited that these four are present in the justification of the ungodly.

§ 36. To the first, therefore, it must be said that there are certain things preceding justification as inclining toward it as causes: and these Bernard touches upon. But the Masters touch only upon those things in which the motion of justification itself is perfected.

§ 37. To the next about Proverbs, it must be said that those things destroy sin by way of merit, and not only sin regarding its fault, but also regarding the punishment owed to it.

§ 38. To the next it must be said that the passage from Acts is understood of the purification of phantasms from the intellect. Or it can be said that the motion of faith is comprehended under the motion of free will toward God; and similarly the motion of love which Bernard posits, and the motion of chaste fear is comprehended under the motion of free will toward sin. And how this is so, will become clear below.

§ 39. To the next it must be said that explicit charity is not required, but only the love supposed in the motion of free will toward God. And what is said, that charity remits sins, is understood by way of merit, and not by way of the essence of the motion of justification.

§ 40. To the next it must be said that Chrysostom is speaking about things remitting sins in punishment by way of satisfaction, and not about the remission of fault alone: and these are indeed many, but the ones he enumerates here are the principal ones.

§ 41. To that, however, which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that in its own way the infusion of grace suffices, just like a form in nature: for it suffices by itself to perfect matter, but not so that there may be motion: because there are more principles of motion than of a composite being. Hence, just as dispositions preparing the matter, and privation, and form are required there in order that there may be a mutation to a form: and these do not cause an imperfection in the form, but rather exist on account of the imperfection of the matter which is perfected by the form: so also here. Hence, infused grace is most perfect for perfecting free will and the whole soul; nevertheless, when the soul is under sin as under the privation of grace, it is imperfect: and therefore it is necessary to seek dispositions that make the sin soluble, and grace driving away the privation. And therefore, just as in a natural motion, so also in the motion of grace, multiple things are required.

§ 42. And what is objected is understood concerning the perfection of a form in perfecting matter, and not concerning its perfection in initiating a mutation: because more things are necessary for mutation than for the composition of a being, as has been said, both in corporeal and in spiritual matters.

§ 43. To the next it must be said that in corporeal mutations there must be dispositions which render soluble the privations from the matter, or contrary forms, in which the privation of the form to be induced is supposed: as is evident in air which is said to become fire; for it is necessary to dry out the moisture that holds the air, before the "air-ness" is driven out and the "fire-ness" is induced. And it is similar here, because the will turned away from God and loving sin is a disposition to itself holding sin in the soul and impeding the induction of grace. But the will moved toward God and against sin is a disposition to itself inclining to the expulsion of sin, and the introduction of justice and grace.

§ 44. To the next it must be said that, as we said in the preceding question, the infusion of grace is first, which the rectitude of powers and perfection for works follows: and since here only the essential principles of justification are enumerated, nothing is touched upon here except the infusion of grace, and not the conferring of justice or virtues: because from the infusion of grace these two result, just as a stream from a fountain, and an effect from a cause. And this imagination is according to how the light of a star is in itself, and in its image; and then in its expansion within the body of the star; and third, according to the divergence of the travelling light in its rays. So grace is in itself, and as if expanded in the general rectitude of the powers; and third, divergent in the perfections of individual powers for works through individual and special virtues.

§ 45. To the next it must be said that the motion of free will means there a composite motion, whether it be toward God or toward sin. For there are some simple motions of the soul, which belong to one virtue in itself, and to one power of the soul in relation to one special object, such as to understand, to love, or to believe. But some are composite, which do

not belong to the virtue of one power in itself, but rather to one insofar as it behaves consecutively to another, whose act in some way remains in it, such as to enjoy (frui) and to use (uti): and this is treated in the first book of the Sentences . And so I say here, that this motion toward God and toward sin is composite, and it is of the affectus insofar as it follows from the intellect illuminated by faith, and through chaste fear fleeing, and hope elevating the affectus with love: and therefore the motion toward God is a motion of the affection fearing and loving, which presupposes faith from the preceding intellect showing whatever is to be feared and loved and hoped for.

§ 46. Similarly, the motion of free will toward sin is from the intellect illuminating the motion of the affectus crushing and destroying sin through the sorrow of compunction: so that the immediate or proximate mover in them is the affectus, but the showing principle is the intellect, just as in enjoying and using.

§ 47. To this, however, which is asked, whether it is informed by grace? We say that it is. And what is objected, that it follows justification, has no force: because as is evident in the following article, all these four are indeed simultaneous in time, but not in nature: whence it follows that although by nature it follows the infusion of grace, nevertheless justification follows it: because justification is as that in which the rest of that motion consists: and that motion of free will thus dissolves or renders soluble the contrary on the part of the subject.

§ 48. To that which is objected concerning the remission of sin, we say that although one follows upon the other, nevertheless one is not the other. And what is said, that the generation of one is the corruption of the other, is understood through causality, and not through essence.

§ 49. To the next it must be said that the composite motion spoken of above is not common to the good and the bad, but only the motion of the cognition of sin: and we do not say that this motion is such a one.

§ 50. To the next we say that free will alone does not move that motion, but rather by the force of grace moving it: and therefore that objection does not follow.

§ 51. To that which is asked, whether it is natural or making pleasing (gratum faciens)? The solution is clear through the things said beforehand: because it is making pleasing: and nevertheless by nature it precedes justification, although it does not precede the infusion of grace.

What is the order of those things which are required for the justification of the ungodly?

Articulus 11 — What Is The Order Of Those Things Which Are Required For The Justification Of The Ungodly

What is the order of those things which are required for the justification of the ungodly?

§ 53. Third, it is asked concerning the order of those four.

And it seems that these are not simultaneous: because 1. Boethius says that vices must be extirpated before virtues are implanted: therefore, the remission of sin precedes the infusion of grace.

1. Also, in every mutation of nature it is necessary to remove the privation before the form is induced. But sin is in the soul as a privation: therefore, it is necessary first to remove it, before grace, which is like a form, is induced: therefore, the remission of sin precedes the infusion of grace.

2. Furthermore, if the soul ceases to have sin in the justification of the ungodly, there is some instant in which it will have it for the last time: let that, then, be A. And if it begins to have grace, there will be some instant in which it will first have it: and let that be B. Then B and A are either the same instant, or different. If the same: but things which are in the same instant of time are simultaneous in time: therefore, sin and grace are in the soul simultaneously in time. Therefore, contraries and privative opposites are simultaneously in act in the same subject, which is absurd; and a man is simultaneously worthy of eternal life and eternal death, and simultaneously the dwelling of God and of the devil: and many such incongruities follow. Therefore, A and B cannot be the same instant. But if they are different. On the contrary: The Philosopher says that between any two instants there is an intermediate time: therefore, between A and B there is an intermediate time. But A is the ultimate instant in which the soul is in sin: therefore, after it, it is not in sin. Also, B is the beginning instant in which the soul is in grace: therefore, before it, it is not in grace. But the time which is intermediate between the two instants is after A, and before B. Therefore, in that whole intermediate time the soul is neither in grace nor in sin. Since, therefore, the man is mortal then, if he were to die then, he would neither descend to hell, nor ascend to the kingdom.

3. Furthermore, it seems to be false that the motion of free will toward God and the motion of free will toward sin are simultaneous with these two: for just as it was held from the preceding article of the question, those motions are meritorious: therefore, before those motions it is required that he have grace. Thence I proceed thus: In nature, motion toward being, which is the act of some form, is prior to the operation of a composite existing in that form: therefore, it is also thus in spiritual things: therefore, the infusion of grace is prior in time to the motion of free will toward God, or to that toward sin.

4. Also, a second act depends on the first, and presupposes it: just as to consider presupposes to know, and to carve presupposes the figure of the art which is a species of being: therefore, the first act must precede the second. But the habit of grace, regarding being moved according to that habit in a meritorious work, is related as a first act to a second act: therefore, the infusion of grace seems to precede the motion toward God in time.

5. Furthermore, it seems that moving toward God and moving toward sin are not simultaneous either: because the motions of one power toward diverse objects cannot be simultaneous: therefore, they are not simultaneous. But there we have motions of one

power toward diverse objects: therefore, they are not simultaneous. PROOF of the first is:

...because the power is simple and acts as a whole in itself, and the whole cannot simultaneously be turned toward diverse things. The proof of the second is: because there are movements of free choice into God, and into sin.

§ 1. Solution. It must be said that these four are simultaneous in time, but not in nature. However, according to priority and posteriority of nature they are ordered in various ways, on the grounds that nature is spoken of in multiple ways: for as the Philosopher says in the second book of the Physics [584], nature is said to be matter, form, and the path which is in nature, namely generation. And according to that mode by which nature is called form, because the form is the end of the efficient cause, that which is nearer to the efficient cause in the justification of the ungodly is prior: therefore according to this the infusion of grace is the first. But because the being of grace is followed by the movement of grace, namely its act, therefore the movement of free choice into God is the second: and the movement of free choice into sin to be destroyed is the third, because for the destruction of sin there operates the dissent from sin lest an obstacle be placed against the Holy Spirit. And the fourth and last is the remission of sin. But if we begin from nature which is the subject and matter: then since that subject is first turned away from sin, and second is turned to God, and third receives the help of grace, and fourth the effect of the help follows: the first in this path will be the movement of free choice into sin, and the second into God, and the third the infusion of grace, and the fourth the remission of sin. And this is easily evident to someone considering how someone first seeks to withdraw from sin. If however we begin according as nature is called the path in nature, namely generation, then since in that movement or mutation there is first made the terminus from which the movement is, and second the path itself, and third the terminus to which the movement is: the first in nature will be the remission of guilt: the second, the movement of free choice into sin: and the third, the movement of free choice into God, which are by way of a path to exit from sin: and the fourth is the infusion of grace.

§ 2. But having established these things, one must respond to the objections.

§ 3. To the first and second it must be said that these proceed according to the third mode of nature: and thus they must be conceded, as is evident in the last ordering.

§ 4. To the other it must be said that as we noted in the second book of the Sentences [585], time is spoken of in multiple ways: for there is a certain physical time, which is the measure of the movement of the first movable thing, by the fact that it is its number according to prior and posterior, which is in it and in its movement: and about this the Physicists teach, that it is the measure of all that movement, which as to its cause is reduced to the movement of the first movable thing: and it makes this nature to be moved according to alteration, and increase, and decrease, and place and generation, and corruption. And concerning this blessed Dionysius says, that time is what is measured along with generation and corruption . But this time is not the measure of movement unless a divisible movable thing is subjected to it, which

is partly in the terminus from which, and partly in the terminus to which, when it is moved, on account of which it takes on act and potency, and prior and posterior, according to how movement is defined by the Philosopher, that it is the act of what exists in potency according as it is in potency and therefore he says that it is an imperfect act, because it does not remove the entire potentiality from the movable thing: but form is a perfect act, by the fact that matter no longer remains in potency toward that form. But in divine mutations, to which either nothing is subjected, or nothing divisible is subjected to them, a time of this kind does not measure: for nothing is subjected to creation: and yet Augustine says, and it is posited in the first book of the Sentences , that time is coeval with the creature. And therefore it is necessary to distinguish time spoken of otherwise: in spiritual movements, where there is movement from act to act, rather than from potency: and to which nothing divisible is subjected, and in which the forms themselves are not remissible and intensible, and intercepting nothing of their contrary. Similarly, a time of this kind cannot be called measuring: on account of which the Philosopher also says in the book On the Soul , that the soul is not moved in any way.

§ 5. It must therefore be said, if A is the last instant in which one is in sin, that sin is not present in him then absolutely, but in exiting and ceasing: but grace is present absolutely: and therefore sin is corrupted in B, and in B there is grace: nor is this unsuitable: because the Philosopher maintains that the corruption of a thing and the death of anything is indeed in time, but not its being or life: just as to be made or to fail is in time, but not to have been made. For if it is posited that sin is present in A, it must be said that in this reckoning of time nothing prohibits an instant being after an instant. Whence Augustine says , that God moves a spiritual creature through time only, but a corporeal creature through time and place. And what the Philosopher says , that between any two instants there is an intermediate time, is understood of time spoken of in the first way: because there it is partly in the terminus to which: and therefore in such a movement it is not possible to assign a last divisible part in which the movement is wholly and solely, nor even is it possible to assign a first in such a movement: but in all spiritual movements it is possible to assign them, in my judgment. And therefore because they are not truly movements, but rather certain successions of intellects and affections: neither do they have a measuring time of the same ratio as other movements. Concerning this however inquire above, and upon the first distinction of the second book.

§ 6. To the other and the following there is one solution according to my judgment, namely that if those four are always taken in act, then it is impossible for all to be simultaneous, as those reasons necessarily prove. But if they are taken habitually, then nothing prohibits them from being simultaneous: and thus the ancients said. But there are moderns who say that it is not unsuitable to simultaneously accept being according to first act, and to act according to the form giving that being in second act: and therefore it is not impossible for one power in number to simultaneously do diverse things not ordered to one another, and to be moved by multiple movements simultaneously, and for us to be able to understand multiple things simultaneously, just as to know. To whom not prejudicing, I say only this, that it seems wondrous

584. Cf. Glossa Ordinaria on Romans 8:30.

to me, if anyone could ever experience this in himself. And if experience does not prove it, then it is wondrous if anyone understands it.

§ 7. Through this therefore the solution to the whole is evident.

Articulus 12 — Whether The Justification Of The Ungodly Is Natural Or Miraculous

Whether the justification of the ungodly is natural or miraculous?

Fourthly it is inquired, Whether justification is natural or miraculous?

§ 1. But it seems that it is miraculous: because 1. Augustine says , that it is a greater thing to make a godly man from an ungodly one, than to create heaven and earth: but it is established that the creation of heaven and earth is not natural from any lower nature: therefore neither is the justification of the ungodly, and much less so.

§ 2. Further, The natural is that to which nature moves: but no created nature moves to that: therefore it is not natural.

§ 3. Further, When the Philosopher speaks concerning certain habits , whether they are natural, namely the customary virtues: he himself determines that in a certain respect they are natural, and in a certain respect not: because we are innately disposed to receive them, but to perfect them is from habituation: but it is established that if that perfecting of habituation were not in us, he himself would not have said that they were natural in some way. Since therefore to perfect grace is in no way in our power, it seems that justification is in no way natural.

§ 4. Further, The natural is called either caused by nature, or given by nature, or given in nature: but in none of these ways is grace related to nature: therefore the grace of justification is not natural.

§ 5. BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. A miracle, as Augustine says , is something arduous and unusual, appearing beyond the hope and capability of the one marveling: but this does not happen beyond hope, because we hope for justification: therefore it is not miraculous.

§ 6. Further, The event of a miracle is rare: which is evident, because in its definition 'unusual' is posited: but the justification of the ungodly is frequent: therefore it is not miraculous.

§ 7. Further, Chrysostom says , that the course of miracles is caused by the will of God alone: but the justification of the ungodly is not by the will of God alone: therefore the justification of the ungodly is not miraculous. And the second premise is proved from the saying of Augustine: He who created you without you, will not justify you without you .

§ 8. Solution. It must be said that, as the Masters say, the justification of the ungodly is marvelous. And they posit the marvelous as a sort of mean between the natural and the miraculous. I say natural according as the natural is taken broadly, namely for all that which is done by the course of lower nature, and according as it includes voluntary things caused by

585. Cf. Peter Lombard, Sententiae, Book I.

the will. For they say that in the three things which were touched upon in the last three objections, it falls short of a miracle: but in the others it exceeds the course of natural things. But it seems better to be said, that the justification of the ungodly is miraculous.

§ 9. And to what is first objected, it must be solved through a distinction of hope: because, as the Gloss says on the epistle to the Romans 4:18, upon that: Who against hope believed in hope: Hope is twofold, namely of nature, and of grace. Whence it must be said that hope, according as it is posited in the definition of a miracle, is the hope of nature, and not the hope of grace: and it is true that a miracle happens beyond the hope of nature, although not beyond the hope of grace.

§ 10. To the other it must be said that 'unusual' is spoken of in two ways, namely in cause, and in effect: and when 'unusual' is posited in the definition of a miracle, it is called unusual in cause, namely that it does not have a standing and ordained cause from which it proceeds: which is evident from this, that if the dead were to rise more often every day, the resurrection of the dead would nevertheless be miraculous, on account of the cause being unusual and supernatural to us. It must be responded therefore, that the cause of justification is unusual to us: and therefore it is a miracle.

§ 11. To the other it must be said that it is not said in the definition of a miracle that it is 'beyond capability' on the grounds that our capability in no way concurs with it: because thus even the parturition of the Virgin would not be miraculous, since it was not done without the Virgin consenting: but it is called 'beyond capability' on the grounds that it is done without us operating. And thus God justifies us not without us consenting, but without us operating.

§ 12. And through this the solution to the whole is evident according to that path, which I believe to be sounder.

§ 13. Holding the other path which has customarily been that of the Doctors, it must be said to the first, that something is called greater for God or in divine things in two ways, namely because it is of greater power in the substance of the effect, or because it is of greater power in the mode of effecting. And indeed the creation of heaven and earth is of greater power in the substance of the effect, than the justification of the ungodly: but the justification of the ungodly is of greater power in the mode of effecting: because in the creation of heaven and earth nothing opposes the voice of the Creator, but the whole obeys: but in the justification of the ungodly, in some respect there resists the sin which lies within the soul, and is contrariwise to justification. Others have customarily said, that Augustine notes it is 'greater' there, because it is indicative of greater mercy: but this solution is crude.

§ 14. To the other it must be said that it is well conceded that it is not natural, that is, existing under the power of nature, but above nature.

§ 15. To the other it must be said that although 'to perfect' is not in us, but in God, nevertheless nature is innately disposed to receive grace, just as toward its end and complement. For it is one thing concerning the perfection of man, another concerning the perfection of natures: because man, created in the image of God, is capable of grace which no one infuses into him except God, and he is not perfectible except by God Himself, just as neither is an

Angel: for each thing, with its superior moving it, proceeds by a certain natural movement toward perfection.

§ 16. To the other it must be said that if justifying grace is called natural, it will not be said otherwise, except because from the highest nature which is God, that creature is innately disposed to perceive it, which from the imitation of the image of God is capable, and not otherwise. And I well think that the Philosophers were ignorant of this mode of nature, because it cannot be apprehended through philosophical reason: but rather the pious mind strives to apprehend it by the vivacity of its faith.

Articulus 13 — To Which Attribute The Justification Of The Ungodly Belongs

To which attribute does the justification of the ungodly belong?

Fifthly it is inquired, Of which attribute is it the proper effect?

§ 1. But it seems that it is of power. 1. Through the authority previously adduced, namely that it is a greater thing to make a godly man from an ungodly one, than to create heaven and earth: for it is established that the creation of heaven and earth indicates power: therefore also the justification of the ungodly.

§ 2. Further, To overcome what resists some efficient cause belongs to power: but in the justification of the ungodly the resisting sin is overcome: therefore it belongs to power.

§ 3. Item, To bring something into being from nothing belongs to power: but in the justification of the ungodly the ungodly man is brought into the being of grace from the nothing of sins: therefore it belongs to power. The proof of the minor. Augustine says: Sin is nothing, and men become nothing when they sin .

§ 4. Item, Through that of Psalm 50:12: Create a clean heart in me, O God: but that is created which is drawn forth into being from nothing.

§ 5. BUT IT SEEMS that it belongs to wisdom: because, 1. Job 26:13, it is said: His hand acting as midwife, the twisting serpent was drawn forth: but the serpent is drawn forth in the justification of the ungodly, and to act as midwife belongs to wisdom: therefore it seems that the justification of the ungodly belongs to wisdom.

§ 6. Item, Ecclesiasticus 4:12: Wisdom inspires life into her children: but that life is inspired in the justification of the ungodly: therefore it seems that it is the effect of wisdom.

§ 7. Further, For the justification of all the ungodly there was not sent the power of the Father, nor the goodness of the Holy Spirit, but the wisdom of the Son: therefore it seems that even particular justification is the effect of wisdom, not of power, nor properly of goodness.

§ 8. But against this again it seems that it is the effect of goodness: because 1. It is said, in Romans 3:24: Being justified freely by his grace: but grace is the effect of goodness: therefore also justification.

§ 9. Further, In Romans 2:4: Knowest thou not that the benignity of God leadeth thee to penance? But in penance the grace of justification is given: therefore benignity leads to the grace of justification: therefore it is the effect of goodness.

§ 10. Further, Augustine says in the second book On the Trinity , that the Spirit is sent to sanctify the rational creature: and the sentence of Augustine is posited in the first book of the Sentences but in justification the rational creature is sanctified: therefore it seems that to sanctify belongs to the mission of the Holy Spirit: but goodness is attributed to the Holy Spirit: therefore it is the effect of goodness.

§ 11. Response. In truth it must be said that justification principally is the effect of goodness: but nevertheless because the works of the Trinity are undivided, there is one thing there which is attributed to power, and another to wisdom, although the substance of the work is the attribute of goodness, and consequently of the Holy Spirit. For the fact that being is made there from nothing with some contradiction of sin, although there is no contradiction of the sinner there, because he consents to receive grace, and detests sin: in this there is a certain showing of power.

§ 12. And according to that mode the first three reasons proceed. And through this the solution to them is evident.

§ 13. But if the mode and order of the work itself is attended to, because namely it is done most suitably and best with such an order, which moves to the giving of thanks, and more fervent penance, and perseverance in good things, which God foresees in thus justifying the sinner: as to this, wisdom appears in that work: and thus the following three reasons proceed.

§ 14. But the substance of the deed is entirely good in itself, and of the first goodness as a cause: and thus the last three proceed.

§ 15. And through this the solution to all the objections is evident.

Articulus 14 — Whether The Justification Of The Ungodly Is An Effect Of Justice Or Of Mercy

Whether the justification of the ungodly is an effect of justice or of mercy?

Sixthly it is inquired, Whether it is the effect of justice or of mercy?

§ 1. It seems that of justice: because 1. Ambrose says: There precedes a certain something in sinners, by which they are worthy of justification: and in others a certain something, by which they are worthy of obduration . Therefore all who are justified, are worthy of justification: but when things are distributed according as is worthy, this belongs to justice, as Tullius says , and this also Aristotle intends in the V of the Ethics therefore it seems that it is a work of justice, and not of mercy.

§ 2. Item, Every effect which it is better to be simply than not to be, has an exemplar in God: but to be just is simply better to be, than not to be: therefore it has an exemplar in God. The first premise is proved from that word of Anselm , that whatever is better simply to be than not to be, is attributed to God. And the second is evident per se: because it is simply

better to be just, than not to be just. Thence one proceeds thus: God makes good, because He is good: therefore He also makes the one capable of justice just, because He Himself is just: but in the justification of the ungodly a man is made capable of justice: therefore it is done by Him insofar as He is just: therefore it is a work of justice, not of mercy.

§ 3. Item, Origen says , that God is wise insofar as He is the bestower of wisdom and knowledge: therefore by a similar reasoning He is just insofar as He is the bestower of justice: therefore our justice is the proper effect of divine justice: therefore not of mercy.

§ 4. BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Mercy is to relieve misery: but no misery is greater than that which is of sin: therefore to relieve the misery of sin is of the highest mercy: but this is done in the justification of the ungodly: therefore the justification of the ungodly is a work of mercy, and not of justice.

§ 5. Item, in Psalm 50:3: And according to the multitude of thy tender mercies blot out my iniquity. Therefore the blotting out of iniquity is the effect of mercy: but the blotting out of iniquity is done in the justification of the ungodly: therefore the justification of the ungodly is the effect of mercy.

§ 6. Item, Augustine says , that the sinner is not worthy of the bread he eats: therefore it is not just that any good be given to him: but grace is the best thing that can be given to a man in this life: therefore he is not worthy that grace be conferred upon him: therefore when grace is given to him, it is not a work of justice but of mercy.

§ 7. Response. It must be said that in every work of the Lord there is mercy, and truth, that is, justice: but this work is principally of mercy. For according as justice is called that which becomes the goodness of God, as Anselm says justice is called , thus in the work of justification there is justice. But as it is called that justice is the rendering for merits, thus there is no work of justice there, if merits are taken in act: but merits in the future, or in foreknowledge, cannot be the cause of preceding grace: and therefore in no way is there justice there, except according as justice is the becomingness of divine goodness. Whence Anselm at the end of the Monologion When you punish the evil, it is just: because it accords with their merits. But when you spare the evil, it is just: not because of their merits, but because it is condign to your goodness.

§ 8. Whence the arguments lastly made seem to be conceded.

§ 9. But to that which is first objected, it must be said that justice is twofold, namely of congruity, and of condignity. But concerning the justice of condignity, nothing precedes in sinners by which they are worthy of justification: but concerning the justice of congruity, in certain sinners there precede works from the genus of good things, which are not in certain other sinners: and therefore they are only worthy of reprobation, that is, of the effect of reprobation, which is obduration in sin. And when it is said that they are worthy of justification, the sense is that they hold themselves more congruously or less incongruously to justification than others. Yet the ancient Doctors said to that authority, that it was of Ambrosiaster, and falsely inscribed in the books of blessed Ambrose.

§ 10. To the other it must be said that justice made in the copy has the justice of God for its exemplar: but the cause of the exemplar is one thing, and the cause inclining the efficient cause to the act is another. And indeed the cause of the exemplar is justice: but the cause inclining the author to this, that He justifies the ungodly, is divine mercy.

§ 11. Through this also the solution to the following is evident: because they have one force, except that the one proceeds through reason, the other through authority saying the same thing.

Articulus 15 — What The Motive For The Justification Of The Ungodly Is

What is the motive toward the justification of the ungodly?

Seventhly it is inquired, What is the motive toward it?

§ 1. But it seems that it is fear: because 1. It is said, Ecclesiasticus 1:16: The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom: but wisdom is called there the savor of grace in the one justifying: therefore it seems that fear initiates it: but what initiates it, moves toward justification: therefore, etc.

§ 2. Item, Bernard By experience I have learned, that nothing avails so much for acquiring, recovering, and preserving the grace of God, than always not to savor high things, but to fear: but that which acquires and recovers, inclines and moves to justification: therefore the fear of God in act moves to justification.

§ 3. BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Acts 15:9, it is said: Purifying their hearts by faith: but to purify is the same as to justify: therefore faith moves to justification.

§ 4. Item, Augustine says , that the justification by which a godly man is made from an ungodly one, is faith itself: and from this the same follows as before.

§ 5. Against this Hugh of St. Victor says , that we are justified by love: therefore it seems that love moves to justification.

§ 6. Response, that justification is a certain movement from sin or the evil of guilt to the good of grace and rectitude: and therefore nothing prohibits there being diverse moving things, namely from evil to good: for from evil, which is the terminus from which of justification, fear moves in the affect: but toward the good it happens in multiple ways, namely as to the intellect, and as to this faith moves: and as to the affect, and thus charity moves: and thus there are three moving things.

§ 7. Yet it must be known that if any virtue moves to justification, this is not except as to the order of acts: because the habits are all infused simultaneously: and how this is so, was stated above in the first article of this question.

§ 8. And much was noted concerning this in the second book of the Sentences.

§ 9. And through this the solution to the whole is evident.

Articulus 16 — How Love, Predestination, Calling, Election, Justification, And Glorification Stand In Relation To Each Other

How do love, predestination, calling, election, justification, and magnification relate to one another?

Eighthly, It is inquired concerning the comparison of justification to love, calling, and magnification, with which it is conjoined in the epistle to the Romans 8, passim.

§ 1. But it seems that calling is an intermediate between justification and predestination: because, in Romans 8:30, the Apostle enumerates thus: And whom he predestinated, them he also called: and whom he called, them he also justified, etc.

§ 2. But then it is inquired, Whether calling bespeaks sanctifying grace (gratia gratum faciens), or freely given grace (gratia gratis data)?

§ 3. And it seems that it is freely given: because 1. The immediate consequent of predestination, just as the effect follows the cause, is justification: because predestination is the preparation of grace in the present, and of glory in the future: the justification of a man seems to be of a man still existing in sin: but calling is prior, as was proved: therefore it is of a man existing in sin: but of a man existing in sin there is nothing but freely given grace: therefore calling is freely given.

§ 4. Item, One is not called unless distant: since therefore in spiritual things there is no distance of place, but of dissimilarity, as Augustine says on the Gospel of the prodigal son [586], it seems that calling is of one distant through merit: and that one is in mortal sin: therefore calling bespeaks a grace which can befit mortal sin: and that is freely given grace, not sanctifying grace: therefore calling does not bespeak sanctifying grace.

§ 5. Item, What befits the good and the evil, cannot be a grace unless freely given: but calling befits the good and the evil: therefore in its genus calling does not bespeak a grace except freely given. The first of these is evident per se to any faithful person. But the second is evident through what is said in Proverbs 1:24, concerning certain ones: I called, and you refused: I stretched out my hand, etc., where it is evident that calling befits the evil. But in Matthew 4:19, it is said concerning Peter and Andrew, that Jesus called them: and there it befits the good.

§ 6. If perchance you say, as the Gloss says on the epistle to the Romans 8:30 [587], that calling is twofold: interior, and exterior. Exterior is that which is through preaching: and concerning that the Apostle does not speak. But interior is to assist the cognition of faith, or to cause compunction in him whom He knows will listen. And that the Apostle does not speak of the exterior, is evident: because this belongs to both the good and the evil: but the interior belongs to the good only, and of that the Apostle speaks. Against this: The cognition of faith which is assisted, is either of formed faith, or of unformed. If of formed. Against: Formed faith is not formed except through grace and charity: but what is formed from something is subsequent to that from which it is formed: therefore this faith follows grace and charity: therefore it does not precede justification. And this is against the enumeration of the Apostle, who enumerates calling before justification. But if it is the cognition of unformed faith. Against: This belongs to

both the good and the evil: therefore it is nothing but freely given grace, as was proved before: and thus it can be of a man existing in mortal sin.

§ 7. Further it is inquired, What is the difference of these to election, of which the Gloss makes mention saying, that calling belongs only to the elect?

§ 8. But it seems that this is false. For election is only of those having final grace: calling belongs only to the elect: therefore calling is only of those having final grace. And whom he called, them he also justified, as the text says: therefore he did not justify anyone except men having final grace, which is openly false, since there are many who are just according to present justice, who are not just according to final grace.

§ 9. It is inquired also concerning the magnification which the Apostle posits there in that order.

§ 10. For it seems not to differ from justification: because the Gloss says, that he magnified with every genus of virtues: but every genus of virtues is given in justification: therefore in justification itself he magnified.

§ 11. Response. It must be said that these follow one another according to order: love, predestination, election, calling, justification, magnification. And indeed the first three posit nothing in man, but in God, who is the author of justifying grace: yet they posit something with respect to man: but the other three posit grace in the justified man according to diverse considerations. For in God there is something inclining the will to giving grace, and this is love, and it is the first which befits the good only, because foreknowledge is with respect to the good and the evil. But there follows upon the inclined will the preparation of that which will be given in grace and glory, and this is called predestination according to its name. But from the giving there follows the distinction of him to whom it must be given, from him to whom it must not be given, and this is the separation from the mass of the lost and this is called election. But in the effect of the giving, which is concerning man, there is a movement from evil to good and to perfection in it. And regarding the terminus from which, it is calling, because...

§ 1. [one] is not called unless one is distant: but with respect to the terminus ad quem, there is justification; and with respect to perfection in it, there is magnification. And these things are expressly gathered from the Epistle to the Romans 8:29-30 [588], both from the text and the Gloss: and their difference is manifest, and will be clearer in the response.

§ 2. To the objection, therefore, it must be said that calling, according to its substance, signifies the same grace as justification, but under another notion, namely insofar as it turns one away from evil. And because this is prior in the motion of the soul of the one who is justified, it is therefore placed in the middle between predestination and justification: since it is not before justification in time, but in nature, according as nature is called the way into nature, which is generation.

§ 3. To the next objection, it must be said that 'distant' is spoken of in two ways, namely distant through an obstinate will, and this one is not called by the interior calling which

belongs only to the elect. And one is said to be distant through the vicinity of sin, namely one who is already fleeing, and in fleeing is closer to sin: and to this one belongs the interior calling: but this person is not in mortal sin, but rather in grace: but is in it according to the detestation and flight of sin.

§ 4. To the next objection, it must be said that there is an exterior calling, which belongs to both the good and the wicked: but the interior calling belongs to the good alone: because in it a human being is called practically, when he is drawn away from sin by grace. And the following distinction is to be conceded.

§ 5. To the disproof, however, it must be said that the Gloss speaks of formed faith. And this is assisted, when that which is formal in faith is assisted, and this is of attrition when by drawing it helps so that what cognition dictates may come to be, according to Psalm 110:10 [589], saying: "A good understanding to all that do it."

§ 6. To the objection to the contrary, it must be said that faith is considered in two ways, namely in act, and in habit. And in act again in two ways, namely in an act tending to God through merit, and in an act as it were showing God: of which Augustine says that faith first opens the eyes: and the Apostle, in Heb. 11:6 [590], that "he that cometh to God must first believe that he is, and is a rewarder to them that seek him." If therefore it is considered in this ultimate act: then it precedes justification, not in time, but in nature: because thus it inclines toward it on the part of the one who is justified, according to Acts 15:9 "Purifying their hearts by faith." But if it is considered as tending to God for the sake of God, insofar as it is an act willing to obtain eternal life, thus it follows justification in time. But if it is considered in habit: thus they are infused simultaneously in justification itself.

§ 7. To that which is further asked concerning election, it is already clear from the solution to the question, namely what the difference is.

§ 8. To the objection, however, it must be said that according to the Gloss, in truth, calling belongs only to the elect, who are to have final grace - but it does not follow that justification belongs only to them: because although in order justification always follows calling in the elect, yet it is not necessary that in everyone justification be ordered to an interior calling.

§ 9. And there is a counter-instance: supposing that four human beings are not whitened unless they be knowing, others without knowledge can be whitened: it can truly be said that those who are knowing are whitened: yet it does not follow that none are whitened unless they be knowing. And there is an error according to the sophistic topic of the consequent.

§ 10. To that which is further asked concerning magnification, it must be said that the order of virtues is considered in two ways, namely in itself, and in the efficacy of the work. In itself there is no magnification, and thus it is given in justification. But in the efficacy of the work a virtual quantity is required: and it is called magnification by the Gloss: nevertheless, another Gloss expounds this concerning the magnificence of the reward in penance.

587. Glossa Ordinaria on Romans 8:30.

Articulus 17 — What The Healing Of The Mind Is

What is the healing of the mind?

What is the healing of the mind?

§ 11. Ninth and lastly, it is asked concerning the operation of justification with respect to the healing of the mind, and the renewal of the image.

§ 12. But here seven things must be asked. First, we will ask, What is the healing of the mind? Second, What is the renewal of the image? Third, Whether these two have a difference, or not? Fourth, Whether they are accomplished by prevenient or subsequent grace? Fifth, Whether they are accomplished by the grace of a sacrament, or of virtues, or of gifts? Sixth, Whether they occur suddenly, or successively? Seventh, In what do they differ from justification?

§ 13. To the first of these it is objected thus: 1. Joshua 5:8 [591], upon that text: "But after they were all circumcised, they remained in the same place of the camp": in the Gloss which thus begins: "But the circumcised children of Israel rested in the same place, etc. In this time therefore, as if in the pain of our circumcision, we are said to reside, until the scar being drawn over we are healed, that is, we fulfill the new institutes without difficulty, and what was formerly unusual and seemed difficult is turned into use: and then it will deservedly be said to us: Today I have taken away the reproach of Egypt from you." From this it is gathered that the healing of the mind is the perfect drawing over of the wound that is inflicted from sin. But it seems according to this that the mind could never attain health, because the wound is not drawn over in this life: therefore health will not be attained. That the wound is not drawn over, the Gloss says upon Psalm 102:3 "Who healeth all thy diseases", thus: "Now by cherishing with blandishments, now by cutting with harsh things he heals: for no incurable languor occurs to the omnipotent physician. But especially in the end he will heal languors, when this corporal being shall put on incorruption."

§ 14. 2. Also, it is certain that in this life that which is said in 1 John 1:8 [592] will never be falsified: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us": and that, "In many things we all offend" [593]. Therefore the wound always remains in this life: but sin in itself is an infirmity, and the cause of the infirmity of punishment: therefore it seems that in this life infirmity never ceases: therefore health will never be attained in this life.

§ 15. 3. Also, extreme unction which is the sacrament of the departing, is given against the remnants of the infirmity of sin: therefore up to that point the infirmity of sin remains: but after that nothing remains of life: therefore it seems that health is never possessed in this life.

§ 16. BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Psalm 146:3 "Who healeth the broken of heart": therefore the broken of heart are healed: but many in this life are broken of heart: therefore many in this life are healed.

588. Rom. 8:29-30.

§ 17. 2. Also, Jerome says that the Lord healed no one in the body, whom he did not first heal in the mind: but he healed many in this life in the body: therefore he healed many in this life in the mind.

§ 18. Response. It must be said that infirmity is twofold, and health is twofold: for there is an infirmity of the soul, just as there is an infirmity of the body. Hence just as in a fever there are two things, namely the cause of the fever, and the essential substance and form of it: so it is in the soul. For the cause of the fever is the smoke of putrefied matter kindled by the heart: but the form is the inequality of humors in which and in the members which are nourished by those humors, it has the formal being of a fever.

§ 19. Similarly it is in the soul: causally indeed infirmity is sin: but formally it is the distemperature of the powers of the soul to themselves, and to acts, and to the body which it has to rule. But causal infirmity is twofold, namely mortal, and venial which does not extinguish the life of grace, but impedes fervor.

§ 20. It must be said therefore, that mortal causal infirmity is healed in this life, and venial according to every venial sin this and that demonstrated, but not in universal so that there is not always some infinite number. But the proportion and contemperature of powers is twofold, namely to the life of merit, and to the life of felicity and beatitude. And according to the first mode infirmity is put to flight, and health returns in this life, but not according to the second mode.

§ 21. And through this the solution to the first is clear; because the Gloss speaks of perfect formal curing, not causal which is grace, which will be in the fatherland when this mortal shall have put on immortality, as is said, 1 Cor. 15:53 [594].

§ 22. To the next it must be said that in this life there will always be causal infirmity: but that does not take away health, but diminishes some delight of health: just as in corporal health the delight of health is diminished from some raised pustule: yet health is not taken away. For as the Philosopher says, we do not say someone is healed from an infirmity, unless he is healed according to the whole, or a principal part, such as the head, or the heart.

§ 23. To the next it must be said that the remnants do not cause infirmity except in a certain respect (secundum quid): and against that extreme unction is given, so that anointed with the oil of gladness one may pass to the state of felicity: because as to this state no one is healed in this life.

§ 24. To the following the solution is clear through what has been said.

Articulus 18 — Whether The Renewal Of The Mind Is Brought About Through The Virtues And Through Grace

Whether the renewal of the mind is accomplished through virtues, and through grace?

§ 25. Secondly, it is asked concerning the renewal of the mind.

586. Augustine, Quaestiones Evangeliorum, II.33.

§ 26. 1. Now the Gloss says upon the Epistle to the Romans 6:4 [595], upon that text: "Let us walk in newness of life", that "innovation begins from justification, and is perfected in immortality": therefore it seems that innovation is accomplished through virtues and grace: and thus it does not seem to drive away entirely the oldness.

§ 27. 2. Also, in Heb. 8:13 [596], it is said: "That which decayeth and groweth old, is near its end." It seems therefore, that destruction is the effect of oldness: but the old remains in us, while we live: therefore also oldness.

§ 28. 3. Also, Job 16:9 "My wrinkles bear witness against me." But those wrinkles remain, because Job was holy. Therefore the testimony of oldness always remains: therefore oldness is not taken away in this life, as it seems.

§ 29. BUT ON THE CONTRARY: "Thy youth shall be renewed like the eagle's" [597]. Therefore the saints are renewed here.

§ 30. Also, Col. 3:9-10 "Stripping yourselves of the old man with his deeds, and putting on the new, him who is renewed unto knowledge, according to the image of him that created him."

§ 31. Also, 1 Cor. 5:7 "Purge out the old leaven, that you may be a new paste, as you are unleavened." But a new paste does not come to be except through the innovation of this life. Therefore innovation can happen in this life.

§ 32. Solution. It must be said that there is an oldness of guilt, and an oldness of punishment: and renewal from

the oldness of guilt, that is, from guilt proceeding from the old guilt of Adam, and rendering the soul old through defect and corruption, happens through grace in this life. But oldness from all punishment is not perfected except in the other life, although it is begun here.

§ 33. And through this the solution to all the objections is clear except for that which is adduced concerning Job: and it must be said that literally he speaks of the oldness of punishment insofar as it is indicative of guilt which is meritorious of punishment: for although Job had not sinned, yet he seemed to have sinned from so great a scourge which he sustained. Allegorically however Christ speaks there in the person of his members, and indeed of his members, that is, of those who are members through election, although they do not yet adhere to the body through present justice, because they are subject to oldness.

Articulus 19 — Whether The Health Of The Mind And The Renewal Of The Image Are The Same, Or Differ

Whether the healing of the mind and the renewal of the image are the same, or differ?

§ 34. Thirdly, it is asked concerning the difference of these.

§ 35. And it seems there is none: because if the cause of both is considered, it is grace: and if the effect of both is considered, it seems to be a certain reintegration of the virtue of the soul,

589. Ps. 110:10 (111:10).

which was in a certain manner corrupted from sin: therefore there is no difference between healing and the renewal of the image, as it seems.

§ 36. BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Health is attributed to the whole soul, renewal to the image alone: therefore they are not the same: for forms are diverse, whose proper subjects are diverse.

§ 37. 2. Also, all who transfer well, transfer according to some similitude: but those things from which this similitude is taken are not the same: therefore neither will those to which the transfer is made be the same. PROOF of the middle. Health in the body and youth are not the same: therefore the proposition is certain.

§ 38. Response. It must be said that the healing of the mind and the innovation of the image differ in notion, but not in substance: for healing is spoken of insofar as it drives away the weakness and infirmity of sin. But innovation is spoken of insofar as with strengthened virtue, the oldness of ancient sin and its effect is driven away. Hence innovation signifies a strengthened virtue, which healing does not do.

§ 39. And through this the solution to the first part of the objections is clear: because we concede that they are substantially the same.

§ 40. But to that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that renewal is not attributed to the image, as if that were its sole subject, but as to a subject in which its act chiefly appears: because it is made in act imitating the exemplar, whereas before it only imitated in potency, and had an actual aversion from the ratio of imitation, when it was under sin.

§ 41. To the next it must be said that corporal youth is twofold, namely from time, and from the effect which time leaves concerning the subject: and according to the first mode it is not the same as health, nor is it founded upon health. But in the second mode, because youth is the time of augmentation in the state of an existent in which the power is strengthened, by reason of that the transfer is made: and therefore it signifies strengthened virtue for works, and therefore it is founded upon spiritual health, according to notion adding something to it, but substantially it is the same.

Articulus 20 — Whether The Health Of The Mind Is Brought About Through Prevenient Grace

Whether the healing of the mind is accomplished through prevenient grace?

Whether the healing of the mind is accomplished through prevenient grace?

§ 42. Fourthly it is asked, Whether it is accomplished through prevenient, or subsequent grace?

590. Heb. 11:6.

§ 43. 1. For Augustine says in the fifth book of On the Trinity: "Who heals all thy diseases, unless he who will be propitious to all thy iniquities?" As if to say, no one: but the propitiation of iniquity is through prevenient grace: therefore also the healing of infirmity.

§ 44. 2. Also, in bodily matters the driving away of infirmity and healing is not accomplished by another medicine, but by the same one: therefore similarly in its own way it is in spiritual matters: but spiritual infirmity is driven away through prevenient grace: therefore the soul is also healed through the same.

§ 45. 3. Also, prevenient grace is not more impotent than some bodily or natural form: but a natural form gives being to matter and purges the privation which was in it: therefore much more strongly will grace do this in the soul: but the privation is the infirmity of sin in the soul: therefore grace gives being to the soul, and also wipes away the infirmity.

§ 46. BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. The drawing over of the wound is health, as was held above: but the wound is not drawn over immediately in its entirety once grace is possessed: therefore health is not accomplished through prevenient grace.

§ 47. 2. Also, circumcision signified the taking away of sin through grace: but it is certain that, circumcision having been done, the circumcised was not immediately healthy: therefore it seems similarly that, spiritual circumcision having been done through grace, spiritual health is not immediately returned.

§ 48. Response. It must be said that health is twofold, namely imperfect which is in the cause of health: and perfect which is attained in perfect habituation to acting well, the remnants of evil custom having been purged. And the first indeed is accomplished through prevenient grace: but the subsequent through subsequent grace: and these graces are the same in substance, although they differ in notion: and this was noted in the second book of the Sentences.

§ 49. And through this the solution to both parts of the objections can be clear to anyone.

Articulus 21 — Whether The Health Of The Mind Is Brought About Through The Grace Of The Sacrament

Whether the healing of the mind is accomplished through the grace of a sacrament?

§ 50. Fifthly it is asked, Whether it is accomplished through the grace of a sacrament, or of virtues, or of gifts?

§ 51. But it seems that it is through sacraments. 1. Ecclesiasticus 38:7 "The apothecary shall make sweet confections, and shall make up ointments of health": but those ointments, as the Saints say, signify the sacraments: therefore health will be accomplished through the grace of a sacrament.

§ 52. 2. Also, in the beginning of this fourth book of the Sentences, the Master adduces that which is found in Luke 10:34 [598], that the Samaritan approaching the wounded man, and

591. Jos. 5:8-9.

pouring in oil and wine: and he expounds it of the grace of the sacraments, and the infirmity of sin: therefore it seems that sacramental grace properly effects health.

§ 53. 3. Also, if there were always health, a perfective of health would never be sought: therefore that which is sought at the time of infirmity , and not unless it be the grace of health, seems to be the proper perfective of health: but this is sacramental grace, not of virtues, or of gifts: therefore the grace of the sacraments is properly the perfective of health. But that sacramental grace is not sought, except at the time of infirmity, is proved from this, that if sin had not existed, the virtues and gifts would nevertheless exist according to their substance, but the sacraments would not exist.

§ 54. 4. Furthermore, above in the beginning of this fourth book it was proved that sacramental grace differs from the grace which is in virtues and gifts: because sacramental grace regards sin, or the disease of sin: but the grace which is in virtues and gifts does not: therefore it seems that properly speaking health and justification and renewal are accomplished through sacramental grace.

§ 55. But to the opposite of this it is objected: 1. Through this which the Gloss says upon that text: "Who healeth the broken of heart, and bindeth up their bruises" [599], thus: "by repenting and by faith God binds up their bruises": but faith is a virtue: therefore it is accomplished equally by sacraments and by virtue.

§ 56. 2. Also, contraries are cured by contraries: but virtues are contrary to vices: therefore the disease of vices is properly healed through the infusion of virtues: therefore not by the grace of the sacraments, because sacraments are not contrary to vices.

§ 57. 3. Also, Gregory says that the gifts were given in assistance to the powers against the defects into which human beings fall from sin: therefore it seems that the gifts cure those defects: but those defects are infirmities: therefore they cure infirmities: therefore the cure is not accomplished through sacramental grace alone.

§ 58. Response. It seems it must be said that through sacramental grace alone properly speaking the healing of the mind or of the inner man is perfected, and this is clear from what was disputed in the beginning of this fourth book.

§ 59. To that therefore which is first objected to the contrary, it must be said that faith heals, according as it has the effect of a sacrament, and not through itself: hence it belongs to faith to heal by accident: for if infirmity had never existed, faith would still exist, and it would be better than it is now.

§ 60. To the next it must be said that virtues are contrary to vices: but a human being would not be healed by political virtues alone, but they are made curative according as the virtue of the passion of Christ is conjoined to them through the reception of the sacraments, and then they heal by the force of the sacramental grace in which they are infused.

§ 61. To the last it must be said that the gifts are not given as an assistance of powers against sin, but rather for higher acts, than could be perfected from the habits of the virtues:

and this assistance a human being would need, even if he had not sinned. And how this is so, must be inspected in the third book of the Sentences, in the tractate on the gifts, where this is found noted.

§ 62. To this however it was otherwise solved by a distinction, namely that infirmity is twofold, namely of sin insofar as it is sin, and the infirmity of powers to act. And the first indeed is cured by sacramental grace, the second by grace in virtues and gifts. And let the reader say whatever he wishes, yet I repute the first solution to contain the truth.

Articulus 22 — Whether The Aforesaid Health Comes About Suddenly, Or Successively

Whether the aforesaid health is accomplished suddenly, or successively?

§ 63. Sixthly it is asked, Whether it is accomplished suddenly, or successively?

§ 64. But it seems that suddenly: because

the grace of the Holy Spirit knows no slow endeavors: therefore it operates nothing except suddenly: but it operates healing and renewal: therefore it operates it suddenly.

§ 65. 2. Also. Divine operations proceed from an infinite power: but an infinite power acts suddenly: therefore all those operations are done suddenly: but healing and renewal are divine operations: therefore they are done suddenly.

§ 66. 3. Furthermore, in some respect a divine work ought to be distinguished from a natural one which signifies potency: but the work of nature is successive: therefore the work of God is done suddenly.

§ 67. BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. We are renewed more from day to day but to be renewed from day to day is to be renewed successively: therefore this renewal is accomplished successively.

§ 68. 2. Also, Hezekiah, Isa. 38:21 [600], was not immediately healed when he received the promise of health: but a poultice was laid upon the boil: therefore it seems that the healing of the mind is accomplished successively.

§ 69. Response. It must be said that according to the twofold health, health occurs suddenly, and successively: for causal infirmity is cut off suddenly: but formal infirmity which adheres to the powers of the soul is cured successively, and gradually through the custom of good works.

§ 70. To the first therefore we say that this is said of purifying grace, not of the effect of subsequent grace.

§ 71. To the next it must be said that although God operates with infinite virtue, yet he does not operate all things through himself alone, but certain things we operate with him, namely health, which is accomplished by the purgation of the remnants of sin: and therefore on the part of our work a succession of time accedes to the effect.

593. Jas. 3:2.

§ 72. To the next it must be said that a work of God which he alone operates, is suddenly, just as creation: and justification is a work of God according as it is with us, and with nature, it does not anticipate our faculty and the infirmity of nature: because otherwise he himself would destroy our faculty and that of nature: and therefore it is not necessary that that divine work be distinguished from the work of nature in this.

Articulus 23 — In What Healing And Renewal Differ

Healing and renewal, in what do they differ?

§ 73. Seventhly it is asked, In what do these two, namely healing, and renewal, differ from justification?

§ 74. And it seems that they differ: because those things whose opposites are different, are themselves different: but the opposites of these are essentially different: therefore they themselves are different. PROOF of the middle, because the first is certain. Impiety is opposed to sanctification, and oldness to renewal, and infirmity to health: and these are diverse both in name, and in notion: therefore the proposition is certain.

§ 75. I respond that they differ in notion, as was said before: and so that this may be better seen, it must be noted that two things are considered in sin, namely the absolute foulness, according as it is the privation of justice, where justice ought to be, according as it is also called injustice or iniquity or impiety: and according to that which is left in the subject through the effect, or rather defect, because its effect is a defect. In the first mode justification is opposed to it, which makes the impious pious, and the unjust just. But in the second mode it is considered in two ways, namely according to the simple relation to the cause of all sin and the effect, or according to the effect alone according as it is the privation of a natural good. And in the first indeed it makes the soul taste the first oldness: and thus it is oldness, and renewal is opposed to it. But in the second mode it is an infirmity of mode and commensuration and harmony in the natural habits of the soul: and the health of the mind or healing is opposed to it.

§ 76. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 24 — Whether Confession Frees The Soul From Death

Whether confession delivers the soul from death?

Whether confession delivers the soul from death?

§ 77. Next it is asked concerning this which it says, there, A, § 6, after the beginning: "Confession delivers the soul from death, confession opens paradise, confession bestows the hope of salvation, etc."

§ 78. For it seems to touch upon three effects of confession, none of which seems to belong to it:

594. 1 Cor. 15:53.

§ 79. 1. For that which delivers from the death of sin, is that which takes away sin, and first vivifies: but this is contrition with grace: therefore this is not the effect of confession.

§ 80. 2. Also, "Shall physicians raise to life, and give praise to thee?" [601] there the Gloss says that priests do not resuscitate the soul: but rather having been resuscitated, it is presented to them in confession, already resuscitated by the Lord in contrition: just as Lazarus was resuscitated inside the tomb, but was presented living to the disciples to be loosed: therefore since in confession a human being is presented to the priest, it seems that it is not the effect of confession that it vivifies the soul, but rather of contrition.

§ 81. 3. Also, above in the Letter was had that of Ecclesiasticus 17:26 [602], that "From the dead, as nothing, confession perisheth." Therefore he is vivified beforehand so that he can confess.

§ 82. 4. Also, Isa. 38:19 "The living, the living, he shall give praise to thee, as I do this day." Therefore it seems that to vivify is not the effect of confession.

§ 83. SIMILARLY it is objected concerning the second effect which is, that confession opens paradise. For this seems false: because

§ 84. 1. In the genus of a sacrament, as was held above, baptism opens paradise: therefore this is not the effect of confession: for the effects of the sacraments are distinct, just as the sacraments themselves.

§ 85. 2. Also, to the passion of Christ this effect is given, namely the opening of paradise, according to what Christ said to the thief: "This day thou shalt be with me in paradise" therefore it seems that it does not belong to confession.

§ 86. 3. Also, with respect to what does confession open paradise, if it opens it? For either it opens with respect to the loosing of the closing guilt, or with respect to the loosing of the deferring punishment. If in the first mode. On the contrary: Before confession, the guilt is loosed in contrition: therefore to open paradise belongs to contrition rather than to confession. If in the second mode. On the contrary: Satisfaction removes the entire punishment deferring paradise: therefore to open paradise is attributed to satisfaction rather than to confession, as it seems.

§ 87. Similarly it is objected concerning the third effect which is, that it bestows the hope of salvation:

§ 88. 1. For this does not seem proper to confession, but to all meritorious acts, because hope rests upon every merit: therefore this ought not to be specially attributed to confession.

§ 89. 2. Also, Gregory says that a person rises up stronger in hope toward God, by as much as he has endured stronger things for his name. Therefore it seems that the hope of salvation is generated by the tolerance of passions rather than by confession: which is taken in the Epistle to the Romans 5:3-4 [603], where it is said that "tribulation worketh patience; and patience trial; and trial hope." Therefore this does not seem to properly belong to confession.

595. Rom. 6:4.

§ 90. Response. It must be said that these effects in a certain respect properly belong to confession, and in a certain respect are more properly of others. And it is taken according to the three things which are in confession. For confession, as Gregory says, is the opening of a wound: but in

the first opening of the wound is the first seeking of the physician and medicine: but according to this, confession is the recognition of sin in itself, and before God, with the purpose of confessing before the priest-physician: and then a human being begins to be vivified: and thus the first effect is attributed to it, which is the justification of the soul. But because a human being still remains a debtor to purgatorial punishment, from which he is not absolved except through the power of Christ's passion constituted in the keys, which passion loosed the flaming sword, therefore through the telling of the sin with the purpose of avoiding them, paradise is opened to him. But because the hope of salvation does not belong to a human being unless while he is conjoined to the head Christ and his members through the reconciliation of the Church, and in confession a human being is first reconciled and incorporated into the Church, therefore then first is it shown that the hope of salvation is given to him: because there is no salvation, except in the mystical body of the Savior.

§ 91. Therefore to the first it must be said that although the soul is first vivified in contrition, yet this is not according to the act of contrition and its name: because contrition signifies the act of one crushing the cause of death, after it is inquisitive of the vivifying one and medicine according to a vow: and this confession does in its origin, because confession begins in the cognition of sin in itself before God, with the purpose of telling this before a priest. Hence although to crush sin and to renew life are the same, yet the notion of both is not one, and one is done in contrition, the other in the vow of confessing.

§ 92. To the next it must be said that physicians do not resuscitate, nor is confession begun before the priest-physician: because confession is a divine act: otherwise it would not differ from confession which is in law, or another human telling: but rather confession begins before God, and there the confessing one first begins to receive life.

§ 93. To the next it must be said that there he speaks of the act of confession, which is the telling of sins: because vivification preceded that.

§ 94. Through the same the solution to the following is clear.

§ 95. To that which is asked concerning the other effect, it must be said that the opening of paradise belongs to baptism in one way, and to confession in another, and to the passion of Christ in another. To baptism indeed it belongs with respect to the loosing of original sin, which is contracted from the vice of origin: and if it looses actual sin, this is by accident, because it finds it, as was noted above in the question concerning baptism. But to confession it belongs with respect to the removal of purgatorial punishment: for although someone, as the Master says below, in contrition which is with the vow of confessing, may be loosed from mortal sin and eternal punishment before confession: yet still the punishment temporally owed would be disproportionate and insupportable, if the punishment of Christ who satisfied

596. Heb. 8:13.

for us did not diminish it: and this punishment is conjoined to us through the faith of the keys in confession, and as to removing that insupportable thing, which removes one from the entrance of paradise, because no one still a debtor of punishment may enter paradise, it is said that confession opens paradise.

§ 96. And through this the solution to the first two is clear.

§ 97. To the next it must be said that it opens with respect to the absolution of a certain punishment, namely that insupportable to the powers of the penitent, which a human being would owe, if he did not submit himself to the keys and the passion of Christ: for this cannot be deleted through satisfaction: rather satisfaction does not have a place, except when that absolution has been made in confession, if he himself has the opportunity of confessing: and if he does not have it, then necessity and not contempt excludes the act of the sacrament, and this power of the keys descends into such a person by merit and the unity of the mystical body, to which he is united by grace.

§ 98. To that which is objected concerning the third, it must be said that the hope of salvation is spoken of here as to the first exclusion of the cause of desperation: for the medicine having been received through confession, he is shown to be reconciled to Christ and the Church: and therefore the devil does not have power over him, as he does over those who [are in sin].

they are outside: and this, according to this reason, does not pertain to every merit.

To the other it must be said that hope is one thing, and firmness and strength of hope is another. But hope of salvation is from the first giving security of life, just as a confessor gives to one confessing to Christ and to the sacraments and to the Church. But the strength and firmness of hope is from the greatness of merit: and through this it is especially in the more difficult things which are, namely, the endurance of sufferings. For this reason Gregory says that higher hope follows stronger sufferings. Through the same the solution to the word of the Apostle is clear.

Articulus 25 — Whether The Modes Of Purging From Sin, According To The Master, Are Well Distinguished

Whether the modes of purification from sin according to the Master are well distinguished?

Then it is asked concerning what he says, there, A, § 6, around the middle: No one can receive the grace of God, etc.

For here he seems to touch upon three modes of purification from sin, namely through penance, through confession, and through baptism.

597. Ps. 102:5 (103:5).

And it seems that the first two do not differ: because

1. Penance has three parts, as was held above: but a part with the whole does not make a number: therefore, there is not a different mode of purification through penance and through confession.
2. Likewise, it seems that the third requires the two preceding: because in the preceding distinction it was held concerning the modes of penance, that an adult approaching baptism ought to repent and be contrite for sins: therefore, it seems that these modes are conjoined.

Response. It must be said that these three modes of purification from sins are different: for either one needs purification which is with external lament, or not. If not, then it is purification through baptism: because that does not require external lament of sin. But if it is needed: then it is either for the solution of guilt, or for the disproportionality of punishment. If in the first way, it is penance purging: if in the second way, it is confession. And this is clear from the prior disputation.

But if it is asked, Why is satisfaction not posited?

It must be said that nothing is posited here as purging, except that which purges without us working, although not without us consenting: but satisfaction does not purge without us working, but rather purges us through our work informed by grace.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that the purification of sin is considered in two ways, namely divided as to those things which are in sin, and conjointly. And if it is considered divided, namely guilt, and disproportional punishment, and expiatory punishment, then they will have divided purifications: because guilt with eternal punishment is purged in penance, as already defined in the Letter, where he said: Penance is true, etc. And this definition you have disputed above. And this most fittingly pertains to contrition. If as to disproportional punishment, it is purged in confession; and the punishment of expiation through our work in satisfaction. But if all are taken conjointly: then through total penance in all its parts accepted conjointly they are purged. In the first way, however, the saint speaks here. But concerning the second, you have many things noted at the beginning of distinction XV.

To the other, it must be said that he speaks here of purification which is through external lament, which spreads ashes and sackcloth. And although baptism requires penance and confession in adults, yet it does not require these except to remove the obstacle to the Holy Spirit: and therefore nothing is enjoined except the faith of the one baptizing: because in that all things are resolved, and no external lament is assumed.

Articulus 26 — Whether The Penitent Is Bound To Manifest His Penance To Others Besides The Priest

Whether the penitent is bound to manifest his penance to others besides the priest?

598. Luke 10:34.

Then: it is asked concerning this which is said, there, A, § 6, around the middle: No one says to himself, I act secretly, etc.

From this it is clearly concluded, it is necessary to confess.

However, it is asked, If someone is bound to make known in penance, except to the priest alone?

However, it seems that he ought to make known to all who saw him in sin: because

1. As much as someone has harmed, he is bound to benefit, if he can. However, this one by sinning openly harmed many through scandal: therefore in penance he ought to make known to the same at least, so that he may benefit by example.
2. Likewise, spiritual harm is greater than corporal: but in corporal harm someone is bound to restitution: and sin is not forgiven, unless what was taken is restored: therefore much more in spiritual harm: however, this one harmed many by bad example: therefore to all those he ought to restore by good.
3. Likewise, Gregory says concerning bad prelates, that they are guilty of so many souls, therefore by a similar reasoning those who by bad example sent many to perdition to hell: they are bound to edify their neighbor by good example, but they cannot unless they make known: therefore to those they ought to be made public in penance.

If perhaps you say, that by the very fact that we see them cease from sin, and do works of the kind of good, they are made known to be in penance. On the contrary: these works are of many, even of those not penitent: therefore by these works penitents are not necessarily made known: therefore it is seen, that this does not suffice.

If this is not conceded, it proceeds thus: | Against: Some penances are prescribed for crimes: if therefore penance is made known, the crime will immediately be known: but no one is bound to manifest the crime: therefore neither is he bound to make known by penance, as far as penance is concerned.

Response. It must be said, that no one is bound to disclose his penance to anyone, except to the priest alone.

To the first, therefore, it must be said, that anyone who caused scandal in common, is not bound except to the showing of good example in common: because by this very fact that they see a good example, since concerning anyone it is to be presumed good, they ought to presume penance and remission concerning past things.

To the other it must be said, that although spiritual harm is greater, it is not so injurious to the neighbor: and this is because in spiritual harm only the willing is harmed, but in corporal harm even the unwilling is harmed: and therefore he is not bound so directly to restitution: because spiritual harm, which is done by imitated scandal, can be an occasion: but he by his

599. Ps. 146:3 (147:3).

own will is the cause: and therefore in restoring he is not bound except to show a good example, which is an occasion of good, although it is not a cause.

To the other it must be said, that Gregory extends there the name of guilty, namely who is guilty by giving occasion of perdition: but he is not as guilty as he who was the cause.

To what is objected against this solution, it must be said that works of the kind of good are sufficiently an occasion of good, although they are not causes: and this suffices by the reason previously assigned: because namely by giving a bad example, even it was only an occasion of evil, and not a cause.

Articulus 27 — Whether We Are Bound To Confess In The Sight Of The People

Are we bound to confess in the sight of the people?

Then it is questioned concerning what is said there, A, §6, after the middle: Job says: If I was ashamed in the sight of the people, etc.

For from this it seems that we are bound to confess in the sight of the people:

1. For the word of Job is an oath of execration: and it should be added: If I did this, woe to me, that is, may it happen badly to me.
2. Likewise, Mary Magdalene, because she was gravely ashamed inwardly, nothing that she should be ashamed of outwardly was growing: therefore, he who is well ashamed inwardly, also ought to confess before the people.

But against this is that which is instituted for charity should not fight against charity: but confession is instituted for charity: therefore, it should not fight against charity: but if we were bound to confess publicly, many would be drawn away from confession: and this would be to fight against charity: therefore, it seems that it should not be confessed publicly.

Solution. It must be said that it should not be confessed publicly: for there is neither a precept concerning this, nor counsel, unless perhaps it were a crime that moved the entire city, or even the world, like the heresy of Arius or another heresiarch, which for the greater confusion of others would be said publicly. But nevertheless, general confession is not advised to be done publicly: because it would be to the harm of many, and the humiliation of one should never be advised in such a way that it generates an occasion of harm to another.

However, the text which is introduced here is according to the translation of the Septuagint, which is corrupted, especially in Job, as Jerome says: and it is taken from Job 31:33, and our text has thus: If I have hidden, like a man, my sin, and concealed my iniquity in my bosom. And this text does not say that it should be confessed before the people.

But if anyone wishes to sustain that text, it must be said that to confess before the people is said in two ways, namely, the narration of confession: and this is not necessary: or the

592. 1 John 1:8.

manifestation of penance enjoined in confession through good example, and this is necessary, as was said before: and thus Job was not ashamed to confess sins before the people.

To the other, it must be said that Mary was not confessed publicly, but she manifested herself as penitent publicly: and from this shame did not draw her back: and this Gregory intends to say.

Articulus 28 — Why Some Sin Is Called Venial

Why is some sin called venial?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said, there, A, 6, after the middle: Venial is the fault, which confession of sins follows, etc.

For it seems that this is false: because it is said there to be venial by genus, or by event. If by event: then it is not venial except that which subsequent penance with grace makes venial, that is, to have pardon: but this is first done by contrition, before confession arrives: therefore it is not venial on account of this, that confession follows: but on account of this first, that contrition follows. But if venial by genus. On the contrary: This is not held to be confessed in number, except by general confession, as was held before in the preceding distinction: therefore it seems, that what is said in the Text, is false.

Response. It must be said, that it is called venial here by the event of subsequent grace. And because although contrition removes the fault and eternal punishment, it does not yet take away the intolerability of the punishment, but rather this is done by the power of the keys in confession: after the effect of the keys, however, the punishment becomes arbitrary, which is tolerable and light for the penitent for the expiation of the sin: and therefore this is not attributed to contrition as to confession.

Articulus 29 — Whether Despair Comes From Contempt Or From Fear

Whether despair arises from contempt, or from fear?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, A, § 6, before the end: He closes over him who in the depth despises, etc.

For this is taken from Proverbs, xvii, 3, where it is said: The impious man, when he has come into the depth of sins, despises.

However, it seems that this is false: because
1. Despair does not arise from contempt, but from excessive fear: excessive fear, however, humbles, as Augustine says. Therefore, since contempt proceeds from pride, it seems incongruous to join these, to come into the depth of iniquity and to despise.

1. Furthermore, if he despises, it is asked what he despises? If it is said, that he despises God. On the contrary: No one despises him whom he excessively fears, but he excessively fears here: therefore he does not despise God.

600. Isa. 38:21.

2. If it is said, that he despises to repent and confess. On the contrary: If someone does not subject himself to that which he believes to be of no value to him, it is not contempt, but wisdom, either apparent only, or existing and not apparent: but the despairing person does not believe repentance and the sacraments to be of value to him: therefore if he does not subject himself to them, it is not contempt, but apparent wisdom.

And it seems not to be to the purpose what he introduces here. For he says a little before:

Therefore confess, and say: Out of the depths I have cried to you, O Lord. From this it seems that he does not intend, as Augustine does, except concerning the confession of praise before the Lord: and thus that authority will prove nothing concerning the purpose.

Response. It must be said, that every impious person in the consideration of the most profound iniquity despairing, despises in his own sense at least: because he relies more on his own sense than on the words of God and the Church consoling and recalling him: and this is the greatest pride. Hence Gregory says: When the judge is so feared, that the face of the judge is not loved, fear is from fear, not from humility.

To the first, therefore, it must be said, that although he does not despise God in himself, yet he despises God recalling from sins in his words.

To the other, it must be said, that he despises God in his words and sacraments, in the manner which has been said: because unless he preferred his erroneous sense to the words of God and the Church, he himself would return to repentance.

To what is further asked, it must be said that this authority is much to the purpose. And what Augustine says:

Out of the depths I have cried, he does not intend, that he cries only before the Lord, but before the vicar of the Lord he confesses not only the sin, but the depth of it: and this is called crying.

Articulus 30 — Whether It Is True What The Master Says, That No One Duly Receives Pardon For A Heavier Punishment

Whether it is true what the Master says,
No one duly receives pardon for a graver penalty?

Whether it is true what the Master says,
No one duly receives pardon for a graver penalty?

Then it is asked concerning what is said there, A, § 6, before the end: No one duly of a graver, etc.

1. For there is no mention of confession: therefore it is of no value to the proposition.

2. The same objection is concerning the authority of Jerome following.

601. Ps. 87:11 (88:10).

3. Furthermore, it is asked concerning what Jerome says there: Let him sleep in sackcloth. - For it seems that many are truly penitent, and yet are clothed in linens and not sackcloth.

Response. It must be said that the force is in the first authority in what it says: Although the penalty is indeed lessened through the effect of the keys in confession, it is far less than it ought to be, he has paid the penalty.

Likewise, the force is in what it says, He pays: because he cannot pay the penalty unless it has been assessed at the discretion of the Church through the vicar of Christ: otherwise he does not pay, but only endures the penalties.

To the objection, it must be said that Jerome places force in what he says, Enter, because he cannot enter the Church unless through penance he is shown to be reunited to the mystical body which is the Church: otherwise he enters only in number, and not in merit and truth.

To the other, it must be said that sackcloth is placed here for the humility and harshness of penance, through that trope of speaking by which the species is often placed for the genus.

Articulus 31 — Whether Confession Is A Virtue

Is confession a virtue?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, B, towards the end: "Now he has the gift of the Holy Spirit," etc.

For it seems according to this that confession is a virtue, which is false: since it is a certain external act, suitable to both good and evil.

Response. To this it must be said that he speaks of fruitful confession, which is a meritorious act, and is called a gift of God, because it is not from us in that part where it is meritorious, although free will gives the act and substance. And concerning this, more has been noted upon the second Sentences. Throughout this whole chapter, the solution of the Master is notable and good, and in agreement with what has been disputed thus far.

Articulus 32 — Whether One Ought To Confess To A Man

Whether it is necessary to confess to a man?

Whether it is necessary to confess to a man?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, C, Now according to the article of the question let us consider, etc.

Let there be a disputation first concerning the principal question, Whether it suffices to confess to God alone, or it is necessary to confess to a man?

It seems, however, that it suffices to confess to God:
1. For two things suffice for the deletion of sin, namely God and the sinner: but on the part of

602. Ecclus. 17:26 (17:28).

God, mercy giving grace is not lacking, and on the part of the one confessing before God, there is recognition of sin with detestation: therefore it seems that these two suffice for the deletion of sin: therefore it is not necessary to confess to a priest.

1. Furthermore, Sin which is transmitted through another is also deleted without the consent and work of our will, as is evident concerning original sin in infants: therefore for sin which is committed by us, it suffices if we cooperate with God in deleting it: but this is sufficiently done when someone confesses to God, recognizing his sin before God with detestation: therefore it seems that it is not necessary to confess to a man.
2. Furthermore, More should not be required in amendment than was committed in fault: because the Lord commanded that according to the measure of the offenses, the mode of stripes should also be: but in the act of sin, insofar as it is sin, only God and the sinner are harmed: therefore in its deletion, no one should be sought except God and the one who sinned: therefore it suffices to confess before God alone. But that no one is harmed in sin except God and the sinner, this is evident from this, because if the divine is separated from sin, the neighbor is not harmed in sin: and thus the Proposition is established.

Moreover, For what reason is confession applied to a man? If it is said, for counsel. On the contrary: There is one substantial counsel in every confession, namely, Go, and sin no more. And if nothing else is added, that observed saves the man: therefore it seems that anything else is only for well-being. Since therefore the substantial counsel is one, this can be made known to the penitent by public preaching and doctrine: therefore confession which is made to a man is not necessary.

1. Likewise, An earthly king has a vicar and needs him because he cannot personally be everywhere in his kingdom: therefore a king who is everywhere in his kingdom by himself does not need a vicar; but God is such a king, who does not need a vicar: therefore it is not necessary for someone to confess to the vicar of God in place of God.
2. Likewise, That an artisan works with many cooperating, that cannot be unless either because of the inexperience of the art, or because of the impotence of the artisan, because he cannot work the whole through one: for the Philosopher says that it is better to work many things through one if it can be done, than many things through many: but God, who is the highest artisan, knows and can work the remission of sins by himself: therefore it seems that he superfluously applies a human vicar to himself: therefore it suffices to confess sin before God and detest it: and it is not necessary to confess to a man.
3. Furthermore, The judgment of confession is divine judgment, and therefore it does not need witnesses except the conscience alone: but in every judgment it suffices that the cause is made known to the judge alone: and it is not necessary that it be made known

603. Rom. 5:3-4.

to another: therefore in confession it suffices that the sin is made known to God alone, nor is it necessary to confess the sin to a man.

1. Penance with its parts is a sacrament, as has often been held above: but the being of a sacrament consists in the dispensation of ministers: therefore also that: nothing, however, is dispensed by another unless known by him: therefore it is necessary that the minister recognizes the quality of penitents in that they are penitents: but this cannot be known unless the sin is known: therefore it is necessary for the minister to recognize the sin: and this cannot be done except through confession: therefore confession must be made to a man.
2. Likewise, Satisfaction is not except after the power of the keys, as was previously held: but the keys operate in confession made to a man: therefore it is necessary that confession be made to a man.
3. Likewise, Penances are arbitrary, as the Saints and Doctors say: but penance can never be arbitrated unless the quantity of the offense is known through confession: therefore it is necessary for the penitent who wishes to do penance to make confession to a man.
4. Moreover, If confession were not required for the sake of man, then no confession would need to be made: for to him who knows all things, confession is not necessary: but God knows all things: therefore confession is not necessary to Him: if therefore confession is sought from the penitent, it is evident that this is done for the sake of man, and not for the sake of God.

However, there are many authorities on both sides of this disputation in the Text.

Response. It must be said that without doubt confession must be made to a man, and not to God alone, as the Master determines in the Text.

To THAT therefore which is first objected, it must be said that although in sin there is no guilt except for the sinner, nevertheless he alone does not suffice for deletion: for more things are required for reconciliation than for departure through sin: for the merit of Christ in the keys must be present, and also the intercession of the Church through its minister: for just as in the first sin one man alone sinned, and yet he alone could not repent for all nor even for himself unless the merit of Christ supported him, so also it is in the sins of others in that more things must concur for reconciliation.

To the other it must be said that that sin is not entirely deleted through another: because at least the sacrament of the Church must be received: and thus something is done there through the Church. And similarly it is necessary in actual sin that through the Church in its minister the merit of Christ, which is in ecclesiastical power in the keys, is joined to it.

To the other it must be said that it is already clear from the foregoing: because it does not follow that more things are required in amendment than were committed in fault. However, lest we be thought to avoid the argument, it can be said that in sin there is a certain harm to the sinner, namely that he is divided from the mystical body of Christ through sin, and from

the head Christ: and thus God has ordained that he does not return except through the minister in vow and work, if he has the ability: and thus to what is in amendment, something corresponds in fault.

To the other it must be said that a benign earthly king uses a minister for three reasons, namely because of his own imperfection, and for the utility of the subjects, and for the beauty of order. Because of his own need, because he cannot be everywhere, nor judge all things by himself. For the utility of the subjects, however, in two ways, namely of the inferiors and superiors. Of the superiors: because he wishes that the superior be honored with this dignity, and serve him in this to perfect the inferior. Of the inferiors, however: because perhaps the inferior has more boldly access to some inferior than to the king himself. And for these last two reasons God has a vicar. And the first cause is of Augustine and Gregory speaking similarly concerning the Angels, whom God uses in perfecting men. The second, however, is of Master Hugh. For himself, however, he does not use a vicar: because he is everywhere, and able to judge all things by himself. The third cause is order: and this is of blessed Dionysius: because although God can perfect all things by himself, and illuminate, and consummate, nevertheless for the beauty of order it is the law of divinity to lead through the first to the middle, and through the middle to the last to purification, illumination, and perfection: and therefore in the ecclesiastical hierarchy grades are constituted as in the celestial.

To the other it must be said that the Philosopher understands concerning that which is in every way better, both on the part of the doer and on the part of him concerning whom he operates: and if God were thus, then God would operate by himself: but in the solution of the preceding argument it was shown that it is not so.

To the other it must be said that it is one thing concerning the judgment of conviction to condemnation, and another concerning the judgment of reconciliation of the thing to perfection, through purification and illumination: for in the first, nothing is required except that the judge knows the cause as to the substance of the judgment: and if it is made known to others, this is done so that the condemnation may seem more just: and such will be the judgment in the future, which God will make by himself. But the judgment of confession is the judgment of reconciliation and reduction: and therefore those things are required which were said above.

Articulus 33 — Whether This Saying Of The Master Is True, Saying, "Tears Wash Away The Sin Which It Is A Shame To Confess By Voice"

Whether this saying of the Master is true, saying, "Tears wash away sin, which is to confess with the voice of shame?"

Then it is asked concerning what he says there, GC, after the beginning: "Tears wash away sin, which is to confess with the voice of shame," etc.

For either this is understood, that someone confesses with shame: or thus, that it would be shame if he confessed. If in the first way: then there would be nothing that follows: "Repentance advises pardon and modesty," for modesty does not advise if it is necessary to undergo

modesty by confessing. But if in the second way: then it will be against what the same Ambrose said: "I read Peter's tears, I do not read satisfaction."

1. Furthermore, what is it that he says: "What cannot be defended, can be washed away," for if it is absolved, then it seems that it comes to the knowledge of the absolver: and therefore it is not valid for the proposition.
2. Furthermore, it seems there is nothing in what he says: because if sin cannot be defended, in no judgment should the accused be absolved: therefore if the sinner is absolved, it can be defended: and thus he says nothing, "What cannot be defended, can be washed away."

Furthermore, it is further asked here, whether this opinion is heretical or can be sustained?

However, it seems that it can be sustained: because 1. Both here and also in the Decree it is recited only as an opinion, and not as an error: therefore it seems that the Church judges it as an opinion and not an error.

1. Likewise, this practice was not always in use, that a man would confess to a man: therefore it seems that it is not of morals that a man confesses to a man, because morals always hold: and it is also evident that it is not of things to be believed, since it is not an article of faith, nor even reduced to any article: therefore it is neither of things to be believed, nor of things necessary to be done: in all such things, however, the Masters say that we can opine for either side: therefore it is of things to be opined, and it is not to be judged heretical what they say.
2. Likewise, Augustine and Bernard distinguish things to be believed, understood, and opined, saying that what we believe, we owe to authority: what we understand, to reason: what we opine, to error or uncertainty of doubt: but in this question we do not have certain authority of the canon of the Bible, therefore it is not of things to be believed: nor do we have firm and stable reason, therefore it is not of things to be understood: therefore it remains that it is of things to be opined: but in such things the opposite speaker is not blamed: therefore this opinion is not to be condemned, as it seems.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Whatever dissolves the ecclesiastical order and ecclesiastical power, that is heretical: this assertion dissolves: therefore it is heretical. The proof of the first is: because this is against the article, in the Second it is proved from this, "the holy Church and the communion of Saints," that he who denies the act, consequently denies the power: but the act of purification, illumination, and perfection is denied to proceed according to the order of ecclesiastical power in reducing inferiors: therefore the proposition is evident.

1. Further, what contradicts sacred Scripture is heretical: but that contradicts sacred Scripture: therefore it is pure heresy. The first is evident by itself: because we have no rule of believing except Scripture. The second is evident: because with the mystery of sacred Scripture, which in the Old Testament says that the leper does not return to the

camp except by the judgment of the priest, this assertion contradicts, it is evident that it contradicts sacred Scripture: and thus the proposition is evidently proved.

Response. It must be said that the Letter is understood thus: "What is to confess with the voice of shame," that is, what someone confesses with shame.

To the objection, however, against, it must be said that the Letter not only implies that it does not read confession: but also expressly says that it does not read satisfaction: and yet natural law does not permit that he has satisfied if he has sinned: and thus it must also be understood concerning confession: although elsewhere we have noted two other solutions on this, which we do not repeat here, lest it become prolix.

To the other it must be said that the sin which cannot be defended is the sin manifested to the priest in the judgment of confession: because such is that judgment which absolves the accuser and condemns the defender of his sin.

To the objection, however, it must be said that it is true concerning the judgment of conviction and the judgment of condemnation, and not concerning the judgment reconciling the accused: and I well concede that it is not valid for the proposition for this assertion: because falsehood cannot have a good testimony of authority.

To what is further asked, it seems it must be said that heresy is twofold, namely open and implicit. Open heresy, which expressly preaches the contrary, either what precedes the article or follows it: as that God is not triune and one, is heresy against the article: that fornication is not a mortal sin, is heresy against the consequent article: that sacred Scripture speaks falsely, is heresy against the preceding article. Implicit heresy, however, is an assertion from which heresy follows, as is this: because although we are not now bound to confess to three or two bishops, if however it is commanded by the Church, then we are bound. Hence if I say it is not to be confessed to those bishops, from this it follows that the power and ordination of the keys is not to be obeyed: and therefore it is heresy. And I judge this assertion as such: because although sometimes a man would not confess to a man by narrating the sin orally, as now, yet by the precept of the Church he is bound to that.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that neither the Master here, nor...

§ 1. Gratian in the Decree recites this, not approving it, but rather condemning it, and manifests the error by disputing for the opposite side.

§ 2. To the other [objection], it must be said that from that reasoning it cannot be held that it concerns matters of opinion, but rather that it is not entirely a moral matter, but partly disciplinary: just as was established above through disputation, that it is substantially a moral matter, but its determination is disciplinary, and made by the Church: and this can be done all day long for the utility of men and of Ecclesiastical unity.

§ 3. To the other [objection], it must be said that although the authority of the canon is not about the whole determination, nevertheless the canon hints that this can be done, and is useful both in the Old and in the New Testament: for in the Old it commands one to diligently

recognize the face of the flock; while in the New, in the canonical epistle of James, explicitly saying: Confess your sins to one another.

§ 4. But many things concerning the mode of that precept were noted above: and therefore it must be passed over here.

Expositio Textus

Exposition of the Text

§ 5. Then it is asked concerning what he says there, at C, after the beginning: Reveal your way to the Lord. For from that authority of Chrysostom, it is held that we are not bound to confess except before God.

§ 6. Response. It must be said that sacramental confession is one thing, and the confession of supplication is another: it is necessary that sacramental confession be made to a man, and Chrysostom is not speaking of this. But the confession of supplication is when someone, humbling himself in prayer, accuses himself, so that he may thus be more easily heard: and this is done before God alone: and the Saint speaks of this: just as Daniel 9:20 also, where it is said that he confessed his sins and the sins of his parents in prayer, so that, being humbled, he might be more easily heard.

Articulus 34 — Whether One Acknowledging One's Sins Can Hold Anything Against One's Neighbor In One's Heart

Whether one who recognizes his sins can hold anything against his neighbor in his heart?

§ 7. Then it is asked concerning what he says there, at C, around the middle: If you have your sins in mind, etc. For this seems not to be necessary: for we see many recognize their own evils, who nevertheless do not forgive their neighbor, and who plan out many evils.

§ 8. Response. It must be said that it is understood concerning holding them in memory with perfect detestation: for he who perfectly detests the remembered sin, as a truly penitent person does, does not multiply his sin by plotting evil for his neighbor.

Articulus 35 — Whether Someone Can Confess To His Fellow-Servant

Whether anyone can confess to his fellow servant?

§ 9. Then it is asked concerning what he says there, at C, around the middle: I do not say that you should confess them, etc. For a fellow servant of a man is any man: therefore he ought to confess to no man: and thus all that was disputed above is false.

§ 10. Response. It must be said that emphasis can be placed on "fellow servant": because a fellow servant can be called one equal in condition and grade, and thus a priest is not a fellow servant: and then what is understood here is only the confession of a lay and common person, which is often made for the purpose of reproach: because laypeople, not having the discretion of the seal of confession, reproach the confessor for what they have heard.

§ 11. Or it can be said otherwise, because the emphasis is on what he says, So that he may reproach you: because although a priest is a fellow servant, one nevertheless ought not to confess as to a man, because thus he could reproach the one confessing, but one ought to confess as to God: because thus the priest is prohibited from reproach by the seal of confession: because he knows this as a secret of God, and not as a human narration.

Articulus 36 — Of What Sort Confession Ought To Be

What kind of confession ought there to be?

§ 12. Then it is asked concerning what he says there, at C, around the middle: Say it groaning and weeping, etc.

§ 13. Here a useful question must be posed: What kind of confession ought it to be? And the Masters say that sixteen [conditions] give it due quality, which are noted in these verses: Let the confession be simple, humble, pure, faithful, And frequent, naked, discrete, willing, shameful, Integral, secret, tearful, accelerated, Strong, and accusing, and thus ready to obey.

For these are the sixteen qualities which are assigned to confession by the Masters.

§ 14. 1. It is asked, however, in what way is it called simple? For it seems that it would be better if it were multiplex: because another of its conditions is that it be frequent.

§ 15. But if it is said that it is called simple with respect to the recounting of the sin. On the contrary: A sin ought not to be recounted simply, but rather a sin with its circumstances: therefore it seems that it ought not to be simple.

§ 16. But if you say that it is understood of the simplicity of the one confessing. On the contrary: To the Romans 16:19: I want you to be wise in what is good, and simple in what is evil. But confession is one of the best of those acts: therefore in it one ought not to be simple.

§ 17. 2. Then it is asked, in what way is a confession humble? For humility seems to be a quality not of confession, but rather of the one confessing. Moreover, it seems that every confession is humble: for every act humbling the agent is humble: but nothing humiliates the agent so much as confession: therefore it seems that every confession is humble.

§ 18. 3. Then it is asked concerning what he says, Pure. For this does not seem to differ from simplicity. For pure is that which has no alien thing mixed in, and similarly that is the same as simple: therefore it seems that these two in confession are one. But if you say that purity refers to the one confessing. On the contrary: Because according to this no impure person would confess, that is, one having mortal sin: and this was disproved above: therefore it seems that it ought not to be posited that it be pure.

§ 19. 4. Then it is asked concerning what he says, Faithful. For either it is understood of the faith of the one confessing, or of the confession. If in the first way: then it is not proper to confession, because nothing pleases God without faith. But if of the faith of the confession, as is commonly said: then for a confession to be faithful is the same as for it to be true: and this truth is presupposed in simplicity and purity: and therefore that member seems to be superfluous.

§ 20. 5. Furthermore it is asked concerning what he says, Frequent. For this is not necessary: because a confession well made once suffices. Also, every act frequently repeated becomes light, and is done with greater negligence by the agent, because study is not applied except to what is difficult: therefore a frequent confession becomes more negligent: but this is a bad quality: therefore frequency is not a good quality of confession.

§ 21. 6. It is also objected concerning what is said that it ought to be naked. Because this seems to differ in no way from simplicity, which was assigned above: therefore it ought not to be posited as a diverse quality.

§ 22. 7. It is also objected concerning what is said, Discrete. For if discretion is understood with respect to computing all things, then it is the same in reality, even if not in reason, to be discrete as to be integral: and thus one of them is superfluous. But if discrete is understood with respect to the one confessing, who ought to be discrete. On the contrary: Confession obliges both the discrete and the indiscrete equally: therefore it belongs to the discrete and indiscrete equally: therefore it ought not to be called discrete from the discretion of the one confessing.

§ 23. 8. Also concerning what he says, Willing. For it is impossible that something be both willing and bitter at the same time: but confession ought to be with bitterness, as is said, Isa. 38:15: I will recount all my years to you in the bitterness of my soul. Therefore it cannot be willing, as it seems.

§ 24. 9. But concerning what is said that it ought to be shameful [or modest], it seems false: because nothing drawing one away from confession is a good quality of the one confessing or of the confession: but shame, in itself, draws one away, unless someone masters it: therefore it is not a good quality of confession. Also, in nature whatever impedes a certain act in itself is not a good quality of the agent insofar as he is an agent: therefore it will be so in holy morals as well: but shame in itself draws one away from confession, as is clear to anyone: therefore, etc. Also, Blessed Gregory praises Mary Magdalene because she was not ashamed among the banqueters, saying in confession: Because she heavily shamed herself inwardly, she believed there was nothing outwardly to be ashamed of: therefore for others too, not to be ashamed is a praiseworthy quality. Also, a little earlier it was held in the Text: If I was ashamed to confess my sin before the people. Therefore if Job says, praising himself, that he was not ashamed, shamefulness cannot be a praiseworthy quality of confession.

§ 25. 10. Then it is objected concerning what he says, Integral. For this seems impossible: because Psalm 18:13 says: Who understands his offenses? Therefore no one confesses integrally. But if you say that what is remembered must be integrally confessed with its circumstances. On the contrary: It was held above that circumstances do not need to be confessed, unless they drag it into another genus: therefore this is not an essential quality of confession. But if you say that it is called integral because the whole must be confessed to one person. On the contrary: Let us posit that two [priests] enjoin two halves of true penance: but in any thing, two halves of the thing are equivalent to the whole: therefore those two halves suffice:

therefore confession can thus be halved: and moreover it seems better, because shame is greater before two or three than before one.

§ 26. 11. But it does not seem that it ought to be secret: because already earlier in the Text the confession which is made before the people was praised. Also, Magdalene confessed in deed at least, namely by weeping, before the people: and her confession is highly praised: therefore it seems that it ought not to be secret. Also, we already said earlier that it ought to be shameful: therefore a more shameful one is better: but one which is made before many is more shameful than a secret one.

§ 27. 12. Also, it does not seem that it should be tearful. For from a certain disputation held above, it is held that sometimes one who sorrows less weeps more: and one who sorrows more, [weeps] less or not at all: therefore since a confession made with greater sorrow is more praiseworthy, it seems that a non-tearful one is more praiseworthy. Also, Augustine said above that a penitent ought to rejoice in sorrow: but it seems impossible to simultaneously rejoice and weep for anguish: therefore it seems that confession ought not to be with tears, but rather with joy.

§ 28. 13. But it does not seem to be accelerated and discrete at the same time: because nothing that in its making requires great deliberation of discretion can be accelerated: but confession thus requires precognition and deliberation: therefore it cannot be accelerated. But if you say that it ought to be accelerated by reason of time, because it ought not to be delayed. On the contrary: The Church does not oblige, except that it be done once a year: therefore beyond this time one does not need to confess: therefore it does not need to be accelerated in this way. But concerning this there will be a special question below.

§ 29. 14. But it does not seem that a confession is in any way strong: because there is nothing difficult in recounting sins: but fortitude is only required in what is difficult: therefore it seems that fortitude is not a due quality for confession.

§ 30. 15. Confession is indeed accusing: but this seems to be presupposed in what is called shameful: because it is not shameful except from a divine accusation: therefore when it is posited to be shameful, that [other condition] seems to be superfluous.

§ 31. 16. But it seems that it need not be ready to obey: because even if it is not ready, it is still a confession, as was proved above. Also, he who confesses, and does not amend, nevertheless fulfills the mandate of the Church: therefore it is not necessary that it be always ready to obey. Also, some priests strive to enjoin what the penitent is not obliged to do: therefore in such a case it is not necessary that it be ready to obey.

§ 32. 17. Still, it seems that this number does not fit the words of St. Bernard on the Canticles: Let it by no means be judged of that which is neither voice nor sense: if nevertheless the confession has proceeded from a humble and faithful heart: therefore whatever bites the conscience, confess humbly, purely, and faithfully, and you have fulfilled these roles. From this it is gathered that there are only three qualities of confession: and thus the others seem to be superfluous.

§ 33. Response. To this it must be said that those conditions of confession are of a confession not of just any sort, but of one perfect according to a meritorious state: and therefore they do not apply to all confessions.

§ 34. But those conditions are drawn partly from the consideration of the one confessing, and partly from the consideration of the confession.

§ 35. For on the part of the one confessing, seven are taken, namely that it be humble, willing, tearful, accelerated, strong, discrete, and ready to obey: but all the others circumstantiate the act of confession. For confession in the one confessing is considered in four ways, namely insofar as it is an act of a sacrament, and insofar as it proceeds from the virtue of penance, and in order to the subsequent satisfaction, and insofar as it is a recounting of sins: and this is to consider it in its proper species. And in the first way indeed it is willing: because thus the will of the penitent assents to it, on the grounds that the sacrament purges sin, and he supremely desires to be purged. But if it is considered as an act elicited by the virtue of penance, thus it is with difficulty: and with respect to this it is required that the penitent be strong. But if it is considered in order to the subsequent satisfaction, thus it belongs to it that it be ready to obey. But if it is considered insofar as it is a recounting of sins, it is considered in two ways, namely in the genus of evil, and in species: and in genus in two ways, namely according as the sin committed is shameful, and thus it is shameful [modest]; and according as it is evil, and thus it is tearful. In species similarly in two ways, namely according to those things concerning which it is according to species and number, which are many, and thus it requires that it be discrete: and according as there is a precept concerning it, and thus it ought to be accelerated, because swiftness in fulfilling the precept is required lest transgression occupy [the time].

§ 36. But in the confession itself, all the others are [found] in this way. The act of confession has three things in itself, namely the object, the mode, and the act. But the object is the sin itself, which is in a shameful multitude, clothed with evil circumstances, having an attracting pleasurable adjunct. But if the object is considered as in a multitude, thus it seeks integrity lest it be divided: but if as clothed with aggravating circumstances, thus it seeks the accusation of oneself: but if it is considered by reason of the pleasurable adjunct, thus it ought to be secret, lest anyone be infected by hearing it, and be dragged by the force of pleasure to similar things. But if the act which is declarative of sin is taken, it is either compared to the speaker, or to the hearer: and to the speaker in two ways, namely insofar as it is meritorious, or insofar as it is merely fulfilling a precept. If in the first way: then it ought to be frequent. If in the second way: then it ought to be simple, that is, simply recounting the deed without any excuse, by which the one confessing intends to oblige the Church. But if it is compared to the hearer, the confession ought to be naked, so that the priest can openly understand the whole heart of the penitent and confessor. The proper mode of confession is twofold, namely that it be unmixed with the contrary act, which is sin, and thus it is called pure: and that it be true as it is spoken, and thus it is called faithful, that is, truthful.

§ 37. Therefore to the first, it must be said that the simplicity which is opposed to addition, is not opposed to the frequency of the same act, but rather to the interposition of fables and

deeds which are not sins: just as many confess by reciting the whole history of their life, against whom it is said, Isa. 43:26: Tell if you have anything so that you may be justified: namely, tell your iniquities so that you may be justified: do not tell all the fables of your life. To the other [objection], it must be said that it is not opposed to the recounting of sins and circumstances, but only to that which has already been said.

§ 38. To the other [objection], the solution is clear by the same: because it is not denied by this that the one confessing ought to be very wise: because the wiser he is, the more simply he confesses without the interruption of other acts.

§ 39. To that which is objected concerning humility, it must be said that he ought to be humble: and we well concede that this belongs to the one confessing, but nevertheless because it belongs to him according as he is in the act of confession, therefore it is assigned to the confession as a quality.

§ 40. To the other, it must be said that every good confession is humble: but nevertheless not every confession is humble: for some confess their sins while boasting, of whom Isa. 3:9: They have proclaimed their sin like Sodom, and have not hidden it. And especially those sin against this condition who confess an ignominious sin, such as theft or something similar, with lowered head: but another which sounds of worldly vanity, such as a tournament, or victory in disputing, or audacity in fighting, they confess with raised head and a smiling mouth.

§ 41. To that which is objected concerning this, that it ought to be pure, it must be said that it is called pure because by confessing one does not multiply the impure: just like some who by the very act of confession multiply sin, by boasting, or by lying, or by despairing, or by presuming, or from some act of this sort.

But to the objection to the contrary, it must be said that from the aforesaid it is clear in what purity differs from simplicity: because purity denotes the non-admixture of sin, and simplicity excludes the admixture of a story, not of an existing sin.

§ 42. To the other, it must be said that it is well conceded that purity there does not mean immunity from sin on the part of the one confessing.

§ 43. But to this which is objected concerning the fourth, namely in what way it is faithful, the response is clear through the things said before: because it is faithful through the truth of what is said, according as conscience attests to what is said: and through this the solution to the first part of the objection is clear, because it is not understood of the faith of the one confessing.

§ 44. To the other, it must be said that a true confession is not always simple: because it is called true for the reason that the reality is as it is said: and sometimes many true things concerning the history of life are interposed, which take away its simplicity.

§ 45. To the other, it must be said that frequent confession is not necessary: nor are only the essential conditions of confession assigned, but also the conditions of confession according to its optimal state: and this is one of them: for the more frequently one confesses, the better,

although it is not necessary: because shame always removes something of the punishment, and also the power of the keys, and the prayer of the confessor.

§ 46. To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that there are certain acts which nevertheless have an added gravity such that frequency never induces pleasure, although in some way it diminishes gravity: as is clear in the acts of fortitude: and what fortitude has by reason of gravity in sustaining, this confession has by reason of shame in manifesting oneself to diverse persons: and then just as it always remains a grave act, so negligence never creeps in, but it is always done with attention and sorrow: nevertheless I well concede that the shame is diminished: and this is supplied by the devotion of one frequently confounding himself before diverse persons.

§ 47. To that which is asked sixthly concerning what he says, that it should be naked: it must be said that from the definition it is clear in what it differs from simplicity: because naked sounds like open, not wrapped up in circumlocutions, so that it may be openly understood by the hearer: but simple means the privation of history not pertaining to the sin.

§ 48. To this which is objected concerning discretion, it must be said that it expresses the mode of the one confessing in the act of confession, according as the confession is of many things: because sins are diverse: for a discrete confessor ought to state a greater sin with greater detestation, and a lesser with lesser: and thus it is clear that it differs from integrity: because integrity dictates lest it be divided between two hearers, but discretion dictates that each thing be weighed with its due weight by itself: whence an integral confession can be indiscrete, and a discrete one can be not integral. Whence it is clear that these are separated from one another.

§ 49. To the other, it must be said that a confession can be willing and bitter, but not according to the same thing: for it is considered as a purging sacramental act, and thus it is willing and willed, done with great devotion: it is also considered according as it is rememorative of committed sins, and thus it is done with bitterness, yet done through the will, as we noted above in the preceding matters concerning voluntary sorrow.

§ 50. To that which is objected against the ninth, namely that it ought to be shameful, it must be said that this is one of the most praiseworthy conditions of confession, if it is moderate.

§ 51. But to that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that shame is twofold: one namely before God concerning the shamefulness of the act, and the other before men. And the first is good and incites to confession so that what is shamefully shameful may be purged. The second is evil and drawing away: and from that proceed the first three objections. And concerning that which is before God, Bernard says: With what face do I now lift up my eyes to the face of so good a father, being so bad a son? It shames me to have done things unworthy of my birth, it shames me to have lived degenerate from such a father. And a little below: Unhappy and insane, I was not ashamed to prefer what is falling, vain, and almost nothing, and whose end is death, to the love and honor of the eternal Father? I am confounded, I am confounded to hear, If then I am a father, where is my honor? But even if he were not a father, he would overwhelm me with benefits. He institutes

witnesses against me (to keep silent about innumerable others): the food of this body, and the use of this time, and above all the blood of the beloved Son crying out from the earth. I am ashamed of my ingratitude, although to the accumulation of my confusion I am even accused of having returned evil for good, and hatred for love. Blush and grieve nonetheless, my soul, since even if it befits him not to repeat and not to reproach, it entirely misbecomes us to have existed as ungrateful and unmindful.

§ 52. But to the last, it must be said that just as was clear above, where it was distinguished concerning that word, that one ought not to confess before the people for the sake of the proper act of confession, but for the sake of what follows, which is the example from the enjoined satisfaction: so that just as he sinned before the people, so he may show a good example, and shame from these may not draw him away, but rather the shame which is before God may incite him.

§ 53. To the tenth, which is objected concerning integrity, it must be said that integrity is opposed to division with respect to the hearer: and therefore the first argumentations do not do anything against it.

§ 54. But to the last, it must be said that the quantity of a sin, namely, is in the act, and in the root of the act: and although the quantity of the act becomes known in a divided confession, nevertheless the quantity of the root does not become known, because those many turns indicate a great habit, and a great root, and one difficult to dissolve, and this quantity the priest principally intends to cut out through the enjoined satisfaction: and that is why a halved confession is never sufficient, nor can it be: and also for the reason assigned above, because to neither does he appear as evil as he is, and this is to excuse oneself, and to tend to hypocrisy, and to always lack pardon, as was said in the preceding distinction.

§ 55. To that which is asked eleventh concerning secret confession, it must be said that it is good that it be secret because of scandal.

§ 56. To that which is objected first to the contrary, the solution is clear through what has been said.

§ 57. To that which is objected concerning Mary Magdalene, it must be said that she did not expose her sin in public, but showed herself in public as a sinner in genus: and this does not incite nor instigate those who do not know to sin: and nevertheless even this itself is not necessary, unless someone wishes it in great crimes.

§ 58. To the last, it must be said that it is understood concerning the shame which is discrete before God, lest it procure harm or scandal to anyone.

§ 59. To that which is objected twelfth, that it ought to be accelerated, it must be said that in the act there ought to be no swiftness, as the first objection proves: indeed, delay is required for the sake of deliberation, and the sobbing of penitents: but an accelerated [confession] removes the procrastination of penitents, lest they delay to be converted to the Lord, and lest they put it off from day to day, as is commanded, Ecclus. 5:8.

§ 60. But to the objection to the contrary, it must be said that although the Church has commanded a time, it nevertheless has not excluded counsel: because the sooner, the better:

whence it is secure to accelerate as much as one can: and as was said, here the conditions of confession are assigned according to its optimal state.

§ 61. To this which is objected thirteenth concerning tearfulness, it must be said that tearful is posited for groaning, as is said here in the Text: and as Blessed Gregory says in a certain homily concerning Mary Magdalene thus: Who while tearful groaned inwardly to him, is presently cured from the plague by which she had miserably languished. And Blessed Bernard on the Canticles: O whatever soul you are, let not that place seem vile or despicable to you, (namely before the feet of the Lord which are judgment and mercy) where the holy female sinner laid down her sins, and put on holiness. There the Ethiopian changed her skin, and restored to a new whiteness, already then she faithfully and truly answered the word to those reproaching her: I am black, but beautiful, O daughters of Jerusalem. Do you wonder by what art she could do this, or by what merits she obtained it? Receive it in a few words. She wept bitterly, and drawing long sighs from her inmost bowels, shaken inwardly by saving sobs, she vomited forth her bilious humors.

§ 62. But to that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that it is called tearful more from the tears of reason and hope, than of the spirit and the body.

§ 63. To the other, it must be said that Augustine does not intend that that joy should exclude sorrow and tears: and the reason for this has been assigned very often above.

§ 64. To that which is objected concerning the fourteenth, that it be strong, it must be said just as was clear in the division, that to confess is among the most difficult of works. For just as Augustine says above in the Text, that he seems to purge perfectly who, mastering his shame, hides nothing of the things he has done from the messenger and vicar of God: and by reason of the difficulty which human confusion induces, fortitude is required in the one confessing: and this the Psalmist asked for, Psalm 68:16: Let not the pit urge its mouth over me: just as was clear above in the Text, where this is brought in by Augustine.

§ 65. To this which is objected fifteenth, namely concerning accusation, it must be said that shame is not presupposed there: because it is accusing when one does not pour back the fault from oneself onto another, as Adam did: and this the Psalmist asked for, Psalm 140:4, saying: Do not incline my heart to evil words, to make excuses in sins. But shame denotes a passive confusion before God, while accusing makes for oneself an active shame before the human priest: and therefore it is clear that one is not presupposed or left behind in the other.

§ 66. To that which is objected sixteenth, that it be ready to obey, it must be said that this condition belongs to a fruitful confession: and through this the solution to the first two is clear.

§ 67. To the last, it must be said that it is understood that one ought to be obedient concerning those things which are necessary for salvation: and concerning this a special question was had in the higher sections, namely, Whether counsels and works of supererogation can be enjoined?

§ 68. To that which is objected concerning the conditions of Bernard, it must be said that he does not assign any except the necessary and essential ones, in which sacramental confession

differs from other recountings of sins. And humility indeed is its movement according to the consideration of its object which is humiliating, because it is sin. Purity is called here the exclusion of everything alien, both of history and also of sin cumulating sin through boasting, or something of this sort: and fidelity is truthfulness in what is said.

§ 69. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 37 — Whether Eternal Punishments Are Changed By Temporal Punishments

Whether eternal punishments are changed into temporal punishments?

§ 70. Then it is asked concerning what he says there, at C, before the end: By temporal punishments

§ 1. ...will change eternal punishments, etc.

§ 2. It seems this is false: 1. First, indeed, because we do not merit by a passion [i.e., by undergoing suffering passively]; but temporal punishments are certain passions; therefore we do not merit by them; therefore we do not change eternal fires by meriting via temporal punishments.

§ 3. 2. Furthermore, even positing that we do merit by punishments, it seems impossible to say: because no temporal thing can reach into eternity; but bodily punishments are temporal; therefore they cannot reach into eternal punishments; therefore they ought not to change them; therefore what he says in the Letter is false.

§ 4. 3. Likewise, Furthermore, the Doctors commonly teach that eternal punishment is conjoined to mortal guilt, and that once the guilt is dissolved, the punishment is dissolved: but mortal guilt is not dissolved by punishment, but by grace making one pleasing [sanctifying grace], which is infused into the contrite person; therefore the eternal punishment also; therefore the destroyer of eternal punishment is not bodily punishment.

§ 5. 4. Furthermore, everything that deletes and destroys something is more powerful than it; but, as the Letter says, temporal punishment deletes eternal punishment; therefore the former is more powerful; therefore a temporal thing is more powerful than an eternal thing of the same genus, which is impossible.

§ 6. Response. It must be said that temporal punishment deletes the eternal, as the Letter says: but this temporal punishment begins and is rooted primarily in the sorrow of contrition informed by grace at the first infusion of grace: because four things exist simultaneously in the justification of the ungodly, as was determined above.

§ 7. To the first, therefore, it must be said that according as punishment is merely a passion, we do not merit: because, as the Author of the Six Principles says, passion is the effect and undergoing of an action: and thus it is from another, and not from us. But every praiseworthy, remunerable, and meritorious work is from us. But one must consider punishment brought about and willed by us, of which sort is the punishment of penance: and according to this mode it is meritorious of eternal life and of the diminution of punishment.

§ 8. To the next it must be said that the temporal, through the fact that it is temporal, cannot reach into eternity, but the temporal informed by a form having the power of eternity —such as is grace, which is a likeness of the divine goodness—and through this divine power, it has the power of deleting the eternal contrary to itself.

§ 9. And through this the solution to the last is also clear.

§ 10. To the next it must be said that sin, together with its punishment, is deleted by grace and sorrow: but sorrow immediately acts upon the punishment, and consequently upon the guilt, and grace conversely: and this has very often been said above in the disputation of this fourth book of the Sentences: and thus it must be said here, that grace alone deletes sin; and if anything else deletes sin, this is from the virtue of grace, namely because it is itself informed by grace.

Articulus 38 — Whether Someone Can Do Penance With Others Not Knowing, And Whether Someone Can Excommunicate Himself

Whether someone can do penance with others being ignorant [of it]? and, Whether someone can excommunicate himself?

§ 11. Then it is inquired concerning what he says there, at C, before the end: With others being ignorant, they voluntarily pass the sentence of excommunication upon themselves, etc.

§ 12. For he seems to say, or to suppose, two false things here.

§ 13. 1. One is that, with others being ignorant, someone can do penance, which is false, since it is necessary that at least a confessor know his sin.

§ 14. 2. The second is that he seems to suppose that someone can excommunicate himself: which again seems false: since excommunication belongs to the jurisdiction of a superior; but no one is superior to himself; therefore no one can excommunicate himself.

§ 15. 3. Thirdly, what he says seems incongruous: And to be separated from the altar at which they ministered, not in mind, but in office.

§ 1. For participation in the altar confers the maximum grace: therefore one needing grace will maximally seek participation in the altar; but no one so needs grace as a penitent sinner; therefore he maximally ought to conjoin himself to the altar, and thus he ought not to separate himself in mind from the altar.

§ 2. 4. Likewise, to no one returning is the way of returning forbidden: but there is no return from sin except through the sacraments; therefore the sacraments ought not to be forbidden, but the most powerful of the sacraments is participation in the altar; therefore that ought not to be forbidden; therefore he ought not to separate himself in mind from the altar: and thus what is said in the Letter seems to be nothing.

§ 3. Response. To the first it must be said that it is not said, With others being ignorant, on account of the exclusion of the confessor: but because no one knows in a human mode, but in

the mode of God the confessor alone knows: and this is what was said above, that one condition of confession is that it be secret.

§ 4. To the next it must be said that excommunication is posited here for the likeness of the effect of excommunication, and not for excommunication itself: now a certain effect [of excommunication] is suspension from sacred places and from participation in the Eucharist: and this someone sometimes does of himself out of humility; and then it denotes that he strikes himself with excommunication.

§ 5. To the next it must be said that although the Eucharist is the most worthy sacrament, for the reason noted above in the treatise on the Eucharist, nevertheless it is not necessary, and therefore out of humility it is good sometimes to distance oneself from it: and multiple reasons for this were stated above.

§ 6. To the last it must be said that the way of returning is denied to no one: because the more compendious way is the humility of the penitent: and the Eucharist is not a necessary way, but it is expedient for taking up a suitable way.

Articulus 39 — Whether One Ought To Confess To The Priest Alone, Or A Confession Made To Any Man Avails

Whether one must confess only to a priest, or whether a confession made to any human being is valid?

§ 7. Then it is inquired concerning what he says there, at D: But that it behooves one to confess to priests, etc.

§ 8. For this is the principal question to be treated first, namely whether one must confess to a priest, or to any human being? Then, Whether it behooves one to confess to one's proper [i.e., parish] priest? Third, Whether there can be multiple proper [priests]? Fourth, If in some way there are multiple confessors, whether, with confession having been made to one, the confessed person is bound to confess also to another, if that one commands confession to be made to him? Fifth, Whether someone out of privilege can hear the confessions of those who are subjects of another? Sixth, Whether afterwards, when they have confessed to the privileged one, they are bound to confess also to their proper priest? Seventh and last, What follows regarding absolution from him who has the privilege?

§ 9. To the first of these one proceeds thus:

§ 10. It seems that a confession made to any human being is valid: because 1. James 5:16, upon that text: Confess your sins one to another, the Gloss says: Greater sins to greater men, and lesser to lesser: but lesser men are not priests; therefore it seems that some confession is valid which is not made to a priest.

§ 11. 2. Likewise, in confession two things are considered, namely the one confessing, and the one to whom confession is made: and it is established that on the part of the one confessing there is no impediment preventing confession from being made both to a priest and to a nonpriest . Moreover, it seems there is none on the part of him to whom it is made: because in

him, besides what God operates, nothing is required except the counsel of making satisfaction; but this counsel is sometimes found even more so in a non-priest; therefore it seems that it can be made to a non-priest.

§ 1. 3. Likewise, Penance is a sacrament of necessity for the one who sins: but in sacraments of necessity, both the matter and the minister ought to be common, as is evident in baptism, where a common element is the matter, and the minister can be both a man and a woman, and even the proper father and mother of the child; therefore it seems that such a minister ought to be common in penance as well; therefore not a priest alone; therefore confession can be made to anyone.

§ 2. 4. Furthermore, if confession is made to a priest alone, either this is done on account of what God operates in confession, or this is done on account of what the human being operates. If on account of what God operates: either this is because God operates according as He is in all things essentially, presentially, and potentially; or according as He is in the rational creature through indwelling grace; or according as He is in the human Christ through union. If in the first mode: then He is equally in the good and the bad priest, and in the non-priest; therefore it seems that confession made to all of these is equal. If in the second mode: then He is only in good and holy men and women; therefore confession made to all of these is equally valid. If in the third mode: then confession made is not valid, unless it were made to the human Christ. If, however, it were done on account of what the human being operates there: but this is only on behalf of the intellect, or the affect; and according to the illumination of the intellect there is nothing but counsel, which is equally found in a priest and a non-priest; and according to goodness and charity in the affect, it is again equally found in a priest and a non-priest; therefore confession made to a priest and a non-priest is equally valid.

§ 3. 5. Furthermore, there was confession when there was no priest who truly had the sacerdotal character: but things that are divided in time do not essentially have a dependence upon one another; therefore it seems that confession does not essentially depend upon being made to a priest; therefore one can confess to anyone.

§ 4. 6. Furthermore, in James 5:16, no mention is made of a priest: but he seems to speak indifferently to all who are in the Church, saying: Confess your sins to one another, and pray for one another that you may be saved. Therefore it seems that it is not necessary for confession to be made to a priest.

§ 5. But to the contrary of this it is objected thus: 1. An act proceeds from some proper power of that act itself: to absolve in confession is an act; therefore it proceeds from its own proper power. Now it is established that this act is not in a human being by nature, because then a human being could absolve himself; therefore it is in a human being from some reception of a superior power, namely God's: but this power is not received except in the sacerdotal order; therefore no one can absolve except a priest: but absolution does not happen except in confession; therefore confession cannot be made except to a priest.

§ 6. 2. Furthermore, every act ordered to justification is in some way ordered to the justifier: but no one justifies except God; therefore it is necessary that it be ordered to God: but

what is ordered to God is a vicar of God precisely as he is a vicar of God; therefore it seems that such an act always ought to be done to God, or to His vicar; but not to God in Himself; therefore to His vicar: but confession is such an act: because it is said in Isaiah 43:26 Declare if you have anything, that you may be justified. Therefore it seems that it ought to be made to a priest alone, who is the vicar of God.

§ 7. 3. Likewise, the Constitution says that confession ought to be made to one's proper priest; therefore it cannot be made to anyone.

§ 8. 4. Furthermore, in John 20:23, the Lord did not speak to all, but to the disciples who were already priests: Whose sins you shall forgive, etc.: therefore it seems that to others He did not give the power of absolving, except to priests.

§ 1. 5. Furthermore, in John 11:44 , when He raised Lazarus, He did not tell just anyone to unbind Lazarus, but only to the disciples who were priests; therefore, since only priests regarding the succession of office are in the place of the disciples, only priests have the power of absolving: but confession is not made except for the sake of absolution; therefore only priests have the power of hearing confessions.

§ 2. Solution. It must be said that only priests have the power of hearing confession: for the power of hearing confession is a power of office; and order, as Isidore says, is the name of a dignity and an office: therefore no one has the power except him who has the sacerdotal order, because no one has the power of binding and loosing the mystical body except he alone who receives the power of dispensing the true body, which is called communion, because the absolved communicate in it. Now these are none other than priests alone.

§ 3. To the first, therefore, it must be said that Bede in the Gloss on that passage speaks of the distinction of confession. For there is a twofold confession, namely general and private. General is that which is made at Prime and Compline concerning venial sins, without which this life is not led: and because we are not bound to confess those except in general, this can be made at any time to anyone: although it is better that it be made to a priest when one can be had. But private confession is that which is about mortal sins, and this cannot be made except to a priest, except in necessity, where the article of necessity does not exclude the sacrament out of contempt for religion: nevertheless, such a person can depart [this life] in the vow of confessing, and he is not bound to confess to another unless to one having the keys: and if he does so, that humility and shame diminish the punishment.

§ 4. To the next it must be said that on the part of the one to whom confession is made, something else is required than a confessor, namely the absolution of authority, which the Lord gave to the disciples, and not everyone has that: and this authority, through the power of the key, remits part of the punishment.

§ 5. To the next it must be said that penance is a sacrament of necessity: but there is a different necessity in an adult and in a little child: because any person can baptize a little child who cannot signify his defects, although not anyone can hear confessions.

§ 6. And if perhaps someone objects that if an old woman baptizes even an adult, he is baptized, and no one dares to rebaptize him: but it is not thus with confession. It must be said that this happens on account of several causes: one of which is the impression of a character, which baptism imprints, and not penance: and therefore it cannot be iterated.

§ 7. But there is another differing cause of necessity: because the cause of baptism is from another, and through a vitiated nature, namely through original [sin] which is contracted only once: and therefore only once does one die together in that Christ, and is buried in baptism: but in confession the necessity is more from the institution of the Church, and for personal sin: and therefore a determinate minister is given for it, unless one is excused in the article of necessity: and then, if he survives, he is bound to iterate the confession before a priest who has the keys.

§ 8. To the next it must be said that confession cannot be made to a non-priest for this reason, because it is made to him in whom God operates in a certain mode, in which He does not operate in another. For God is in a human being through grace in a twofold way, namely making pleasing [sanctifying] and freely given [charismatic]: and according as He is in a human being through grace making pleasing, the objection made holds; but according as He is in a human being through freely given grace, which is the office and power in the keys, the objection does not hold: because just as those graces differ, so too differ those divine operations which He operates through the human being: and this is what the Apostle says, 1 Cor 12:11 All these things one and the same Spirit works, dividing to each one as He wills.

§ 1. To the next it must be said that when a priest did not exist, confession was not sacramental, not only signifying, but also causing a diminution of the sin according to punishment: for in this mode the causation of the sacraments of the New Testament is understood. And through this it is not held that sacramental confession, such as it is made now, ought not to be made to a priest.

§ 2. To the next it must be said, as to the first, that the Apostle there intimates a distinction of a twofold confession, which is further explained in the Gloss of Bede on the same place.

Articulus 40 — Whether One Ought To Confess To One's Own Priest, And Whether A Confession Made To Any Priest Avails

Whether confession must be made to one's proper priest? and, Whether a confession made to any priest is valid?

§ 3. Secondly it is inquired, whether confession must be made to one's proper priest? or whether a confession made to any priest is valid?

§ 4. But it seems that to one's proper [priest], because: 1. Thus says Urban II: It has pleased us that it should henceforth be lawful for no priest to receive to penance anyone committed to another priest, without the consent of him to whom he first committed himself, unless through the ignorance of him to whom the penitent previously confessed. From this it is gathered that one must confess not to just anyone, but to one's proper priest.

§ 5. 2. Likewise, Extra in the Decretals, book V concerning penances and remissions, Innocent III says in the General Council: Let every faithful of either sex, after having reached the years of discretion, faithfully confess all his sins alone at least once a year to his proper priest, and strive to fulfill the penance enjoined upon him according to his strength, reverently receiving the sacrament of the Eucharist at least at Easter. From this the same is gathered as before.

§ 6. 3. Likewise, Jerome says, writing to Bishop Heliodorus: The cause of a monk is one thing, that of a cleric another. Clerics feed the sheep, I am fed: they live from the altar, for me the axe is laid as if to the root of a fruitless tree: if I do not bring a gift to the altar, it is not lawful for me to sit before the presbyter: if I sin, it is lawful for them to deliver me to Satan for the destruction of the flesh, that the spirit may be saved in the day of the Lord. From this it is gathered that it is not lawful for monks to bestow care upon the flock: therefore no one ought to confess to them: and the reason is the same concerning other priests to whom one is not committed: therefore no one ought to confess except to his proper priest.

§ 7. 4. To the same point, Jerome writing to Villicus says thus: The Church has a senate, an assembly of presbyters, without whose counsel it is lawful for monks to do nothing: Rehoboam, the son of Solomon, lost the kingdom for this reason, because he refused to hear his presbyters. The Romans also had a senate, by whose counsel they did all things: and we have our senate, the assembly of presbyters. From this it is argued thus: It seems rather that it would be lawful for a monk, who knows in some way how to direct himself, to do something without the counsel of his priest, than for a layperson who cannot direct himself and does not know how: and it is not lawful for a monk: therefore neither for a layperson: therefore he cannot direct himself in confession without the counsel of his proper senator, who is his priest.

§ 8. 5. Furthermore, Pope Eugene says thus: It has pleased our common council that no monk for earthly gain should presume with most wicked daring to exit the monastery, nor to give penance, nor to receive a godchild from baptism. From this it is gathered that it is not lawful for just any priest to hear confessions: therefore it is not lawful to confess to just anyone: therefore it behooves one to confess to his proper one. To the same point there are many decrees which can be seen in the Decree.

§ 1. 6. Furthermore it is objected: As the subjects of a Bishop stand in relation to the Bishop in episcopal rights, so parishioners to their proper priest in parochial rights: but the subjects of a Bishop cannot have recourse to another except to their proper Bishop: therefore neither the subjects of a priest except to their proper priest.

§ 2. But that it is not lawful for the subjects of a Bishop to have recourse to another bishop is proved by many decrees, as is that of Pope Callixtus: Let no one usurp the boundaries of another, nor presume to judge or ordain or excommunicate another's parishioner: because such a judgment or ordination or excommunication or condemnation will neither be ratified, nor have any force: since no one will be held or condemned by the sentence of another judge than his own.

§ 3. Likewise, in the same place: Let no Primate, no Metropolitan, none of the rest of the Bishops enter another's city, or access a possession which does not pertain to him, and the parish of another Bishop over his disposition, unless called by him to whose right it is known to belong: so as to dispose or

ordain or judge anything there, if he wishes to possess the honor of his grade: but if he presumes otherwise, he shall be condemned, and not only he, but also his cooperators and those consenting to him.

§ 4. In the same place, from the Council of Antioch: That no Bishop ought to dare to make a transit from one province to another, and ordain any persons in the Church, or promote them to the sacred ministry: nor let a Bishop be drawn there by others, unless perhaps requested by letters he departs, not only by the Metropolitan, but also by all the Bishops of his province who are with him.

§ 5. Likewise, from the same council: That a Bishop ought not to rush into an alien city, which is proved not to be subject to him, nor into a region which is known by no means to pertain to his care, to ordain anything.

§ 6. In the same place, from the Council of Constantinople: Let Bishops who are outside a diocese not approach Churches which are outside their boundaries, nor let them confound and mix Churches according to the established rules. Very many other things concerning the same matter are in Decree 9, quest. 2, which can be read there.

§ 7. BY REASON it is objected to the same point thus: 1. Anyone who is bound to render an account of something committed to him, ought to have the entirety of what is committed under his disposition: but a priest is bound to render an account of his subject: therefore, etc. The first premise is proved. If the opposite is granted, that he ought not to have the entirety under his disposition, it will be unjust to demand an account from him of that which he did not have under the disposition of full obedience. Thence thus: A subject existing entirely under the obedience and disposition of his proper priest cannot have recourse to another except by permission: but everyone is thus subject to a proper priest: therefore in confession he cannot recur to another except by permission of his priest.

§ 8. 2. Furthermore. The Church Militant descends from the Triumphant, and orders from orders: as is said in Apocalypse 21:2 I saw the holy city, the new Jerusalem, descending from heaven from God. But in the Triumphant, each subject has recourse and reduction to his proper superior, and not to another. Therefore it also ought to be thus in the Church Militant: therefore it is necessary that everyone in the reception of penance have recourse to his proper priest.

§ 9. 3. Furthermore, in 3 Kings 10:4 and 5 [604], the queen of Sheba marveled at the order of those ministering to Solomon, so that there was no more spirit in her: but it is established that it is no order for anyone to have recourse in sacraments to just anyone: therefore it is necessary that recourse be to one proper [superior]: but that is the proper priest: therefore in confession recourse is to be had only to the proper priest.

§ 1. 4. Furthermore, Dionysius writing to the monk Demophilus says that the correction of laymen pertains to proper priests, of priests however to Bishops, and of Bishops to the Hierarch: but to whom the correction of a crime pertains, to him also pertains the cognition of the same crime: therefore the proper priest has to cognize the sin of each subject, and not another: but it cannot be cognized except through confession: therefore in confession he ought to recur not to another, but to his proper priest.

§ 2. 5. Furthermore, whatever things in the logical predicables of reasons are reduced to one absolute first, are first reduced to their proper immediate proximate, and not to another: as individuals into species, species into a subaltern genus, and subalterns into the most general: therefore reason reduces things thus, and a similar reduction happens in the Militant Church into the grades of rulers, and it is necessary that the inferior multitude of people be reduced into the proximate grade of spiritual power, and through that into the superior, and finally into the supreme: but it is established that the proximate superior over the people is the proper priest: therefore in all sacraments to be received the people will not have recourse except to him: therefore not to another.

§ 3. 6. Furthermore, we see this in the natures of things which proceed from their causes. For if metallic things are reduced (as the Philosopher says) into their first material cause, they have to be reduced into quicksilver and sulfur, and quicksilver into subtle aqueous and subtle earthy strongly commingled, and this further into water. And it is the same in efficient, formal, and final causes. Since therefore the regiment of men has proceeded from nature, as Tullius says, such ought to be also the reduction of the regiment into proximate grades: therefore the people will not have recourse to another than to their proper priest.

§ 4. 7. Furthermore, that is held in offices. For as the Philosopher says in Book I of the Ethics: Whichever acts and doctrines fall under some one power, in the way that the making of bridles and whatever other equestrian instruments fall under horsemanship: but in this mode also every military operation falls under the military art. And according to the same mode utique others under others. Therefore, by similarity, this also ought to be the case in the order of the faithful among the ministers of the Church: therefore it seems that the people ought not to have recourse except to their proper priest.

§ 5. 8. Likewise, Dionysius says: The law of the divinity is to reduce the lowest through the middle, and the middle through the firsts. Since therefore the grades of reduction are determined, there will be no reduction of the lowest except through their proper superior grade: but the proper priest is in that grade: therefore the proper subject cannot be reduced into the divine in confession except through his proper priest.

§ 6. 9. Furthermore, the order of the universe is that inferior things be reduced into their proper superior movers, as the Philosophers say: just as the moisture of water into the orb of the Moon, and complexional moisture into the orb of Venus, and so of others: and this further into the starry orb of the signs, and this into the non-starry orb, and through this all things into the prime mover: therefore it is necessary, since the reduction of men into the divine does not contradict the natural order, that in this way the inferior populace be reduced into the proximate grades of superiority, and through them finally into one highest grade: now in the proximate grade over the people there are none but priests distinct in their proper parishes: therefore it is necessary that subjects have recourse in divine matters only to these, and not to others.

§ 7. But against this it is objected thus: 1. First through authorities: John 20:22 and 23 [605], the Lord says thus: Receive the Holy Spirit: whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them. And He

does not distinguish or order among them: therefore it seems that without distinction anyone having the power of a disciple from the received order can remit sins in confession: therefore confession can also be made to him without distinction.

§ 1. 2. Likewise, Ambrose says: We commend that learned and upright monks dedicated in the honor of a presbyter ought to preach, baptize, give penance, relax debts for the miserable, and enjoy a just portion of the tithes, first-fruits, and oblations of the living and the dead by a moderate dispensation. From this it is gathered that monk presbyters can give penances: therefore a confession made to them is valid: but monks are not proper priests, as is evident from the authorities of Jerome introduced earlier: therefore confession does not always have to be made to one's proper priest.

§ 2. 3. Likewise, Gregory: By the governance of the Apostolic see (or authority) we decree that monks, if they are dedicated in the honor of a presbyter, with the power of binding and loosing, may commendably vindicate for themselves no less than the rest of the priests a portion of the tithes, first-fruits, oblations, and donations which are made for the living and for the deceased, according to the canon for the utility of themselves and their neighbors, by the merit of a more perfect justice. From this the same is gathered as before.

§ 3. 4. Likewise, Gregory: By apostolic governance and the office of piety it has been constituted by us: It is lawful for monk priests holding the figure of the Apostles to preach, baptize, give communion, pray for sinners, impose penance, and loose sins. From this again the same is gathered as before.

§ 4. 5. Likewise, Pope Boniface: Yet there are some, supported by no dogma, inflamed most audaciously indeed with a zeal more of bitterness than of dilection, asserting that monks who are dead to the world and live to God are unworthy of the power of the sacerdotal office, and cannot bestow penance or christianity, nor absolve by the power of the sacerdotal office divinely enjoined upon them: but they completely lapse: for the blessed Benedict, the bountiful preceptor of monks, was by no means an interdictor of this thing. From this again the same is gathered as before.

§ 5. Many other things acting to the same point may be sought in the text 16, quest. 1.

§ 6. BY REASON it is objected thus: 1. In whomever there is complete power for some act, in him is the execution and exercise of that act whenever he wishes: but in every priest there is complete power for the act of absolving in the forum of penance: therefore he can exercise that act whenever he wishes: therefore he can exercise it in anyone: therefore anyone can make confession to him, because he obtains full absolution. The first premise is self-evident, and by induction if it is denied. The second is evident through this, that there is no grade of spiritual power above the priesthood: therefore a priest is of the most complete power.

§ 7. 2. Likewise, the confection of the true body and the absolution of the communicant in the sacrament are conjoined acts in the priesthood: but it is established that the confection is more perfect than the absolution: but I see that any priest indifferently can confect: therefore

605. John 20:22–23.

much more can anyone absolve anyone: therefore anyone can make confession to him, because confession precedes absolution.

§ 8. 3. Furthermore, the spiritual grace of the sacrament always effects what is signified in the sacrament: but I see that in the ordination of every priest the power of binding and loosing is signified through the collation of the long stole: therefore that power is given to every priest: therefore whoever wishes can advance to another without dispensation of his proper or non-proper [priest]: therefore anyone can make confession to the same.

§ 9. 4. Furthermore, the benefits of God are generous and

in many ways occurring to all men: therefore they are not to be restricted in any way: but it is evident that they are restricted if it is said to be done by one and proper, what could be done by anyone having order: therefore it is not to be said that a penitent cannot be absolved except by his own priest.

1. Further, spiritual powers are no less than corporeal ones: but in corporeal powers I see that a body having power acts on anything approaching it, as is evident in fire, which burns anything combustible approaching it: therefore much more strongly this is in spiritual power: therefore it seems that any priest can absolve anyone coming to him.
2. Further, any lock of the same kind is opened and closed by a key of the same shape: but sin is like a lock closing heaven, and of one kind, because it closes not insofar as it is a conversion to a changeable good, but as it is an aversion from the unchangeable, as Augustine wills.
3. Likewise, the power of order in every priest is of one species: therefore like a key of one shape: therefore it seems that any power of any priest can open and close the sins of any sinner confessing to him: therefore a proper priest is not required for this, as it seems.
4. Further, whatever is luminous dispels material darkness, and a determined and proper luminous thing is not required for the dispelling of these or those darknesses: since therefore spiritual light is more powerful than corporeal, any spiritual light removes any spiritual darkness: this power is like light, because a priest is an illuminator and perfecter and purifier, as Dionysius says: therefore any power of order dispels any spiritual darkness: but sin is spiritual darkness, as Damascene says: therefore any priest having order can absolve anyone: therefore any sinner can confess to any priest, as it seems.

Solution. It must be said that the first part of this disputation contains truth - but the second part induced to the contrary has falsehood in its conclusions: for only a proper priest can absolve, and one can only confess to one's own priest.

To the first authority therefore which is first objected from the Gospel, it must be said that the Lord presupposed the order in the disciples which he had made before, namely that Peter was over all, and over all others. For in Matthew, X, 4 and following, he chose twelve and

604. 3 Kings 10:4–5 (1 Kings 10:4–5 in modern Bibles).

under them designated another seventy-two. He set Peter over all, Matthew xvi, 19, where he said; I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven. And, Luke x1, 32, where he said: And you, when you have turned, strengthen your brothers. Therefore this order of jurisdiction was instituted by the Lord before, he set him over it so that according to it he might confer the execution of the office which he gave, when he breathed on them, and said: Receive the Holy Spirit, etc.

To all the decrees of the Fathers brought forward, there is one solution, namely that one is a presbyter, and another having the honor of a presbyter according to the canons of the Fathers. For a presbyter is one who has order, not the honor of priesthood or presbyterate. But he has the honor of priesthood or presbyterate who, elected by the people or by others whose concern it is to elect him, and confirmed by a superior, is established in the jurisdiction of a parish priest. And concerning this, namely who has the honor of priesthood, the canons speak, and not of the first, decreeing that a monk and anyone else of good life and learned can be elected and confirmed in the promotion of such honor: and then through such jurisdiction he becomes a proper priest: and therefore the canons say nothing contrary.

To what is first objected by reason, it must be said that the first is true, and the middle false: because there are two things that complete the power of absolving, namely order, and jurisdiction. And a priest from order has only one of those, and lacks jurisdiction, unless it is committed to him: and this is what is said, that although a priest has wings, yet he has them bound, and cannot fly, unless they are loosened by jurisdiction.

To another it must be said that according to something those acts are coordinated like major and minor, and according to something not. For if the object or matter around which they operate is considered, there is no doubt that the act of consecration and confession is greater than the act of absolution: and in this way the objection proceeds. But if jurisdiction is considered, which is rather of office than of order, because order is an imperfect disposition for this, and the office enjoined is formal: then the act of absolving is greater than confessing: and in this way it is not always necessary that he who can do one, can do the other, because a priest has from order complete power in one, but does not have complete power in the other.

To another it must be said that the visible form in the sacrament does not lie, but effects what it signifies: but it does not signify jurisdiction, but only the disposition to that power accepted from order: and therefore although a priest in order receives a certain power, yet he does not receive jurisdiction: and therefore he does not have all that is required: and therefore he cannot absolve and bind.

To another it must be said that the benefits of God are never in their ministers without order: for the best or one of the best is order. And this is signified in Psalm cxxxii, 2, where the ointment descends on the head, and from the head to the beard, and from the beard to the garment, and from the garments to the hem of the garment.

To what is objected, that it is restricted, it must be said that it is not: because what is done by the proper does not diminish the abundance of grace: because it flows as abundantly

through the proper as through all together: just as the benefits of an earthly king would not be said to be restricted, if all were given rather through one than through many.

To another it must be said that it is not similar concerning corporeal and spiritual powers: because corporeal things act by necessity of nature, and such things suffer by the same necessity, and this necessity is of impotence and ignobility: but spiritual things, although they are more powerful, are free and have greater order: and therefore they do not approach those in which they act, except according to order and freedom: yet they act more powerfully than corporeal things, because they consume the contrary, namely sin, in whole, and do not destroy nature: which corporeal things do not do, and the more powerful they are, the freer and more ordered they are: because order is part of power.

To another it must be said that the similar brought forward is not well adapted in every respect, and therefore the objection does not proceed: for a key applied by itself to a lock neither closes nor opens: because it does not have the motion by which it moves the lock, but moved in the hand it opens. And it is evident that the motion of the hand is not the same in closing and opening in different cases: and jurisdiction in the ordained is like the motive force of the key, and that is not one in one priest and in another, but differs by distinctions of the people: and therefore he who solves this, does not for this reason solve that.

If it is objected, however, that this jurisdiction is only of one species: it must be said that the species of jurisdiction is the species of office, and it does not act unless joined to matter: and therefore it is inseparable from its matter around which it is: and therefore invisible dignity suffices there for this, that he who can do one, cannot for this reason do another: just as we see in human offices, that he who is a cupbearer in one court, is not for this reason a cupbearer in another court: because such things are committed over determined matter, from which it is not permitted to separate them, because the species of such things is always conceived with its proper matter: as Aristotle said the species of natural things is related to material and divine things.

To the last it must be said that order is not similar to any light, but to light mixed with the nature of a luminous body: for as the Mathematicians say, the light of Jupiter or Saturn reaches many, to whom the utility of the star does not reach, because it is not viewed by the illuminating star at the same angle: and under the angle is the diffusion of utility and harm. And so order is in itself as a certain indistinct light, but in jurisdiction it is like mixed light, and then its utility is determined to those specifically regarding it, from jurisdiction. And therefore although others can be edified by example or doctrine, yet the utility of absolution, or even the harm of excommunication, or of any such thing, is not diffused into them.

Articulus 41 — Whether Several Can Be One's Proper Priests

Whether there can be several proper priests?

Thirdly, I ask, whether there can be several proper priests?

And it seems that there cannot be, and this 1. From the reason of the proper: because the proper is that which belongs to one alone: therefore there cannot be several proper ones.

1. Further, in no multitude is there a reduction to two equally immediate: therefore neither should the multitude of people be reduced thus: therefore it seems that there are not several equally proper priests.
2. Likewise, in no kind of degrees are there two equally high. For the centurion is under the chiliarch, and the quinquagenary under the centurion, and under this the decanus, and under him there are ten who have regard to him and not to another, because two decani are not constituted over the same ten: therefore it seems that those who are under the same priest do not have regard to different ones as to their proper priests.
3. Further, in the order of the universe we see that a multitude which is ordered to one as a motive is not ordered to another in the same order: just as generation and corruption to the motion of the stars in the oblique circle, and this motion to the divine in the straight circle: and thus it ascends to the first mover: therefore it seems that it should also be so in the degrees of the Church: therefore there are not several proper ones to whom one multitude has regard.
4. Further, in the orders of the army we see that those looking to one assigned to them as their proper leader do not look to another: therefore since the Church is as an army set in array, as it is said in Canticles vi, 3, it seems that those ordered under one priest do not have to look to another proper one, except to him.
5. Further, confusion seems to be induced if there are several proper ones: for they do not necessarily agree in precepts: therefore then the people are bound to obey two commanding contrary things, which is against the Gospel, because the Lord says, Matthew vi, 24: No one can serve two masters. And the Gloss there says: to those commanding contrary things.
6. Further, the people relate to the priest as the priest to the Bishop, and the Bishop to the Archbishop, and he to the Primate, that is, the Pope: but never is one priest under two Bishops, nor a Bishop under two Archbishops, and so of others: therefore never is the same multitude of people under two proper priests: therefore there cannot be several proper ones.

On the contrary, it is objected thus: 1. To whomever a proper priest is appointed, another can be constituted by the same Bishop: but by the same Bishop over the same people several can be constituted: therefore there can be several proper priests. The proof of the first is that priests do not have jurisdiction except conferred on them by a superior Bishop, and he who confers on one can confer on another.

1. Likewise, we see this all day, that one hears confession by parochial right, and another by the authority of the Bishop, and a third by the authority of the Legate, and a fourth

perhaps in the place of the Pope, and thus many perform the office of a proper priest: therefore it seems that many can be proper priests or vice-proper.

2. Further, it seems that it should be so according to reason. For the Church ought to have more aids than the devil has impediments for himself: but, as the Glosses of the Saints say, many demons strive to weaken one man: therefore many more perfect in holiness ought to be: but priests are more perfect in holiness, as blessed Dionysius says: therefore several priests ought to be ordained for the same man: therefore much more will there be several immediate priests in the same people.

3. Likewise, just as the triumphant Church perfects the militant, so the ministers of the militant Church ought to perfect holiness as much as they can: but many guardian Angels are ordained for the same man: therefore also many proper priests. The first is proved by this that the militant, as much as it can, imitates the triumphant. The second, however, by what is held in IV Kings vi, 14 and following, where the whole mountain was full of horses and fiery chariots around Elisha: of which he said to the boy: Do not fear: for more are with us than with them. Similarly, it is held by that in I Maccabees x, 29 and 30, where namely five men appeared around Maccabeus, of whom two holding Maccabeus in the middle, surrounded him with their arms and kept him safe: but against his adversaries they threw darts and lightning, from which, confused by blindness and filled with disturbance, they fell.

4. Further, in the triumphant Church there is not placed only one perfecter and illuminator and purifier of the inferiors: but anyone superior of his own order or of a superior can do this, as the Doctors say: since therefore the militant Church descends from the triumphant, it seems that in the militant Church there ought to be several perfecters and illuminators of one: therefore there will be several proper priests, since this is the office of a proper priest.

Solution. There cannot be several proper ones, but one alone is proper: however, others can cooperate with one proper, as will now be clear in the solution of the arguments.

Therefore, it must be said to the first, that the Bishop cannot by the power of law constitute several proper ones: because thus one Church would have many who have equal right in it, and one would be equally bound to two, from which perplexity could arise: but the Bishop can give assistants to the proper priest: and this in three ways, as it seems to me, namely in grave cases, in which, so that they may be more abhorred, the Bishop reserves to himself the power of absolving, and he can commit that to one or several who absolve those coming to them, and in this they bear the burden of the proper priest: because in those cases the penitent is bound to obey those having the place of the Bishop more than the proper priest, if they are found to be contrary.

In another way also he can give some, who by preaching and giving example, generally move the people, and hear those whom they have moved in preaching: but nevertheless they do not exempt their subjects from obedience to the priest, and therefore in penance already

constituted by them they ought to make it known to the proper priest, and through his approval perform that penance.

In the third way, when the people are many, and one cannot hear all, or even the priest is weak and unable to hear: then indeed again some can be constituted by the superior who hear and absolve, and they are not bound to recur to another priest: yet all those are rather assistants of the proper prelates than proper prelates. And therefore if the proper prelates reasonably command something, they cannot contradict: and therefore they are not prelates, but as it is said, assistants.

To the other it must be said, that those who hear by the authority of superior prelates, hear as assistants, and not as proper priests.

To the other it must be said, that according to reason it cannot be that there are several proper ones: nor does a man have a proper demon for exercise except one, and all others come as assistants. And yet if he had several demons as exercisers, it would not follow from this that he ought to have several proper priests: because he would have another remedy against this, namely several Angels helping.

To the other it must be said, that when individual guardians are ordained, one is the guardian, and others are either his prelates or assistants: and those who appeared around Elisha were assistants: but prelates, who were around Maccabeus: for Maccabeus was the prince of the Jewish people, and therefore the Angel was the prince with him: Maccabeus also was a singular man, and thus he had a guardian: and those two were bound to surround him. But it was the power of the Potestates to ward off the enemy's strength in the opposing army, and of the Virtues to meet with miracles of blinding, and of the Archangels to reveal the machinations of the adversaries, and those are signified by the other three who were around him: and therefore nothing contrary is proved by that.

To the other it must be said, that according to blessed Dionysius this is false: because no two Angels in heaven according to him are of the same height: and therefore one does not have two equally principal above him.

But yet otherwise some of the Doctors, not supported by any authority, say that many are equal in the supreme, middle, or lowest hierarchy, or even in one order: then it must be said that it is not similar concerning the orders of confirmed Angels and the orders of men: because in the orders of Angels perplexity and confusion cannot arise from those commanding contrary things, but the concord of illuminations is from the first front of light descending: but the commands which proceed from men are frequently mixed with diverse opinions: and therefore confusion and perplexity would be induced from several, which cannot happen in heaven, where all things are reduced to concord by the light of God: and this is what Job says, xxv, 2 and 3: Who makes peace in his high places, Is there any number of his armies? and upon whom does not his light arise?

Articulus 42 — Whether, Supposing That One Proper Priest Has Several Coadjutors, After Confession Has Been Made To One, The Penitent Is Bound To Confess To Another If He Commands

Whether, assuming that one proper priest has several coadjutors, having made confession to one, the confessed is bound to confess to another if he commands?

Fourthly, it is asked, if it is so that one proper priest can have coadjutors, whether, having made confession to one, the confessed is also bound to confess to another if he commands?

It seems, however, that he is:

1. By that which is defined by Innocent II in the general council:

If anyone wishes to confess his sins to another priest for a just cause, let him first ask and obtain permission from his own priest, since otherwise he cannot absolve or bind him. For, by giving permission to confess to another, he does not exempt him from his obedience: therefore he is still bound to obey, as before: but before he was bound to confess to him once a year: therefore also afterwards if he commands him, he is bound to make confession.

1. Likewise, Suppose that the Bishop sends a coadjutor or even the Pope: it is clear that by this they do not intend to remove subjects from the care or obedience of their own priest. Therefore, since by obedience he is bound to show himself to him in confession, it seems that if he has confessed a thousand times to others, he is still bound to confess to him if he commands.
2. Further, He who is the proper priest is bound to administer the sacraments to him: but absolution precedes the administration of the sacraments: therefore he is bound to know that he is absolved: and this he cannot know unless he hears him, and first sees the signs of penance: therefore, since this is not done in confession, he is bound to confess to him if he commands.
3. Further, It seems that danger would arise if he were not bound: because many under the pretext of hiding could say they have confessed, and remaining unconfessed, communicate: and then the proper priest could not restrain them: therefore it seems, since that which is instituted for charity should not militate against charity, as Bernard says: and coadjutors are introduced for charity, that because of these a man is not absolved from the necessity of confessing to his own priest if he commands.
4. Further, In the orders of Angels, although one Angel is sometimes illuminated by another of a different order, as is clear from the exposition of blessed Dionysius on Isaiah, vi, 6, where it is said: One of the Seraphim flew to me: where the holy Father says, that is, another of the lower ones in the place of the Seraphim, and thus illuminated by the Seraphim. Although, I say, it is so, yet he is not exempted from the illumination of his own superior, but still, as before, he receives illuminations also from him: therefore, since the militant Church descends from the triumphant, it seems that although one man confesses to another, and is absolved by another coadjutor of his own

priest, yet he is not thereby absolved from his own priest, but is bound to confess to him if he wishes.

On the contrary, however, it is objected:

1. Let us suppose that the proper priest does not know how to discern between leprosy and non-leprosy: therefore, since the Lord says, Luke vi, 39: Can the blind lead the blind? Will they not both fall into the pit? it seems that he is not bound to confess to him even if he commands.

If perhaps you say that he ought to ask and obtain permission. On the contrary: Let us suppose that he asks and cannot obtain it, as often happens: either then he will obey his own priest, or not: if he obeys, he will be in danger and peril, because he is blind: if he does not obey, the proposition is held.

If perhaps you say that he can ask permission from a superior, it may be that he lives far away, and cannot approach him either because of the expense of the journey or danger: it may also be that he does not wish to give permission, nor can a man always in such a case approach the court: therefore it seems that he is not always bound to obey his own priest in making confession.

1. Further, Let us suppose that the proper priest is malicious, as many are, and strives in confession to tempt concerning consent to sin, as many priests do, threatening women with betrayal of confession unless they consent to them, and intending to touch them impudently in the secrecy of confession, even superiors, namely Archbishops and Bishops, do likewise, as I most certainly know that in many places many do: it seems that in such cases to ask for permission is dangerous, because they will deny it, and then they sin more: therefore it seems that in such a case he ought not to obey his own prelate concerning making confession.
2. Further, Let us suppose that the priest is a hidden heretic, and strives in confession to draw to heresy: therefore, since this is especially to be avoided, it seems that in such a case even out of contempt for his own priest, he can confess to another, and is not bound to his own.
3. Further, Let us suppose that someone who is a parishioner of one sins in the parish of another: it is clear that the priest is indeed a spiritual judge: but by reason of the offense he becomes of the jurisdiction of another judge, who otherwise would not be of his jurisdiction: therefore he also becomes in such a case of the jurisdiction of another priest: but he who is of the jurisdiction and has sinned, is bound to the judge for amendment: therefore he also. But amendment is through confession and enjoined penance: therefore it seems that he is bound to confess to him even if his own priest objects.
4. Further, Let us suppose that he has changed his domicile and lives in the parish of another: it seems that then he is not bound to confess to his own priest: because he receives the sacraments in the Church of him in whose parish he lives: but he is bound

to know him through confession: therefore he is bound to confess to him, and not to his own priest, as it seems.

5. Further, Let us suppose that he is a wanderer through lands: for he is removed by a great distance of place from his own priest in whose parish he was born: therefore, since no difficulty of salvation should be generated for anyone in the sacraments of necessity, it seems that he can confess to any priest, and is not bound to another however much he commands the contrary.
6. Further, Let us suppose that he is sick in the article of necessity: since salvation is denied to no one, it seems that he can confess without the permission of his own priest to the nearest one he finds: therefore he is not bound to confess to his own, as it seems.
7. More generally, it is objected about this thus: If the sacrament of baptism is given by another than one's own priest, even against the obedience of one's own priest, it is not repeated when returning to the obedience of his own priest: therefore it seems that penance should not be repeated.
8. Likewise, It is said below that no sacrament is repeated upon the same matter: therefore concerning the same sin confession should not be made twice: but it has once been made to a coadjutor or another by the permission of one's own: therefore it should not be repeated: therefore if his own commands him to confess, it seems that the confessed is not bound to obey unless he wishes.
9. Likewise, Confession, as was held above from the words of Augustine, is the greatest penance because of the shame it has attached: but, as it is said, Nahum 1, 9: Affliction shall not rise up the second time: therefore it seems that concerning the same sin even if the proper priest commands, it is not necessary to make confession twice.
10. Further, If a Bishop gives permission to a cleric to be ordained by another: and he, being ordained, returns to him, he cannot command him to also receive ordination from himself: therefore similarly, if a priest gives permission to confess to another, when he returns, he cannot require him to also confess to himself.

Further, By giving permission he uses the power he has once a year: therefore since he is not bound to confess to him except once a year, and his priest has already used his power which he had in him, it seems that he cannot compel him to confess again.

Further, it is asked concerning superior prelates, such as priests, Archdeacons, Bishops, and the like, who are their proper priests?

It seems that none: because

1. In no nature is there a motion of motion, or a rest of rest: therefore neither is there a priest of a priest: therefore they are bound to confess to none. Likewise, there is a different grade of superior and inferior, and they are not to be mixed: therefore nature in spirituals, being superior, does not descend under the inferior: therefore by this at least the Pope will not have any confessor, which is false.

2. Further, Superior Angels never descend for the reception of sanctity under inferiors: therefore, since the militant Church descends from the triumphant, neither should this be done in the militant, as it seems.

Response. It must be said without prejudice, it seems, that if someone confesses to another by the permission of his priest, that year unless he incurs the danger of illness, and has something new to confess, he is not bound to confess to his own priest: but if he confesses to another coadjutor appointed to that priest by a superior, and not by the permission of the priest, he is bound to also confess to his own priest: nor should he impose penance on him except by indicating to him that as soon as he can, he should present himself to his own priest, except in the cases which are five, as will be said below.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that although he does not exempt him from his power by giving permission, yet by giving permission he is deprived of his jurisdiction for that year. It would be otherwise if another gave permission, namely the prelate of the priest: because he would neither intend to impede the jurisdiction of the priest, nor to exempt the subject from the power of the priest.

And by this the solution to the following is clear.

To the other it must be said that the proper priest administers the sacraments, and in such a case when he gives permission for a reasonable cause, he knows the face of his flock through another worthy of faith, and this suffices for him to administer the sacraments to him.

To the other it must be said that no danger arises from the fact that he himself gives permission, because he knows to whom he gives it, and to whom: but if the permission of another than the proper priest sufficed, then danger could arise.

To the other it must be said that in truth the inferior Angel is not illuminated except by a superior, whether proximate or remote: and so it can also be done in the Church: because what the priest can do, the Bishop can do, and much more, and so on ascending. Nor is he thereby exempted from the obedience of the proximate prelate: but if the priest gave permission, he would not be subject to him that year concerning this precept: just as also after he has once confessed to the priest, he is not bound to confess again, nor is he thereby exempted from his obedience.

And thus the solution to the first part of the objections is clear.

However, these things which have been said are to be understood only of him who has the authority to impose penances from a superior Bishop, namely either a Legate or the Pope: because the proper priest cannot give permission to go to another. And the reason for this is, because although the priest could release the subject to confess to another, he cannot transfer jurisdiction to him who has bound wings, but only the superior: and therefore although the subject in such a case could confess to another, not just any other can hear him.

To those things which are objected in opposition, saving a better opinion, it seems to me to be said that in five cases, according to what the Jurists say, he ought to seek permission to confess to another than his own priest, namely first, if the priest is deficient in knowledge, or

even malice impeding confession, as if he solicits to sin. Second, if he sins in the parish of another. Third, if he lives in the parish of another. Fourth, if he wanders on a long journey. Fifth, in the article of necessity. And in this last case, it is to be confessed to anyone having bound or unbound wings, whether cleric or layman, provided he is faithful.

To the first objection, therefore, it must be said that in such a case by permission he can seek another.

To the objection against, it must be said that it should be believed that permission has been obtained: because it is reasonably obtained, namely when the priest or his prelate hears and approves reasonable causes, or is said to have approved: for then even if permission is denied...

In my judgment, another can and ought to complain: because otherwise foolishness is judged: because, with all the ordinances of the Church contradicting, I can avoid danger in the body, and it would be foolish to say that in some case I would be bound to follow myself willing to cast down in mind.

To the other, it must be said that even in that case when he tempts, it ought to be signified to his superior, and it is probable that he will restrain him: but if he does not, as, alas! it frequently happens, then he ought to confess secretly to another discreet person, lest scandal be generated: and I say this without prejudice to a better sentence.

To what is objected concerning the heretic, it seems it must be said that not even in the article of such necessity is it to be confessed: but rather with sorrow without confession one must die, if another to whom confession might be made is not found.

In the following four cases in four objections, the solution is clear through the aforementioned.

To what is objected generally, it must be said that it is not similar concerning baptism and penance, because baptism cannot be repeated: and the reason for this has often been noted above. But penance is so much the better, the more often it is repeated in contrition, confession, and satisfaction.

To the other, it must be said that penance and confession, insofar as they are subject to the keys of jurisdiction, follow order: and therefore when they are done before one not having jurisdiction, they are interpreted as not having been done: and therefore it is not done twice when repeated, because the prior was not sacramental confession.

To the other, it must be said that what is said, Nahum 1:9, is not understood thus, that no double penance is made for the same sin, since it is written, Isaiah 12:2: "He has received from the hand of the Lord double": but in this way it is understood for all his sins, if he sustains the due punishment, that it is not necessary to repeat it. However, it has been said that we do not believe it due, unless it is done before one's own priest, except in the cases assigned above.

To the other, it must be said that it is not similar: because order is indeed given outside the Church, yet in the form of the Church, just as baptism: but it is not so with confession in

which no character is imprinted, and there is the act of the penitent man: and therefore it is not valid except before one's own minister, or one who has the place of one's own by the license of the superior and the consent of the priest, as has been said.

To what is further asked, it seems it must be said with some Jurists, that a priest and Bishop, and especially a Bishop, can choose for himself a confessor whom he wishes near him: because for the danger of salvation this is not to be denied to him, since it is difficult for a confessor, whom Prelates always need at hand for the sacraments which cannot be handled except by the pure, to travel far.

To the objection against, it must be said that as the Philosopher says, that a physician heals himself, not insofar as he is a physician, but insofar as he is suffering: so also it happens that a priest is of a priest, namely insofar as the priest is in the place of a subject in the infirmity of sin, and not insofar as the priest existing from a higher degree. But what the Philosopher says, that there is not a motion of motion, it must be said that it is understood thus, that there is not a motion to motion as generation to generation, etc.: and thus a priest is not of a priest, but of a sick sinner, to whom it happens to be a priest.

To the other, it must be said that some ancients denied this saying, that superiors receive certain illuminations from inferiors, because of that of the Apostle to the Ephesians 3:10: "That it might be made known to the principalities and powers in the heavens through the Church," etc. And this has been disputed over the second Sentences. However, I think that it is true as the objection says. Hence it must be said that in superior men the infirmity of sin is found, by reason of which they sometimes need the help of inferiors: but it is not so in an Angel: and this is what the Apostle says, to the Hebrews 5:2 and 3: "Because he himself is also surrounded by infirmity, and therefore he ought, just as for the people, so also for himself, to offer for sins from the infirmity of sin."

Articulus 43 — Whether Someone By Privilege Can Hear Those Who Are Subjects Of Another

Whether someone by privilege can hear those who are subjects of another?

Fifthly, it is asked whether someone by privilege can hear those who are subjects of another?

1. It seems that he can: because
2. By the privilege of a prince, someone who is a subject of another can be exempted from him without prejudice to the one to whom he is subject: therefore, by privilege, jurisdiction can also be conferred regarding confession in the subject of another.
3. Furthermore, a lower prelate does not have any jurisdiction over a subject except by the authority of a superior: therefore, if the superior limits or diminishes the authority, it does not cause any prejudice: therefore, if he sends another who also hears the subjects, it is not prejudice.

4. Furthermore, it is permitted for a prince to do what he wills, provided his will is useful to the community: but it is evident that it is useful to appoint many who hear the multitude, and expedite and absolve doubts: therefore, it seems that the privilege of hearing confessions can be conferred on many without any prejudice.
5. Furthermore, whoever the inferior can hear, the superior can also hear: but it is not converted: therefore, from his power, he can send others to hear, and give them privilege concerning this.
6. Furthermore, in 1 Chronicles 24:1 and following, it is read that David expanded the worship of the Lord, who was praised for this because he appointed twenty-four chief priests, so that the people could be more expedited: therefore, it seems that it is also praiseworthy that the privilege of hearing be conferred on many.
7. Furthermore, in 2 Chronicles 30:13, Hezekiah sent messengers running, who would admonish the people to return to the Lord God of their fathers. And it is evident that they were not Levites: therefore, in the New Testament, there ought to be some messengers subordinate to priests, who, by hearing the people, admonish them to return to the Lord God of their fathers.
8. Furthermore, in Esther 8:10, Ahasuerus sent couriers, swift messengers bearing letters, who were subordinate to the governors of one hundred and twenty-seven provinces, who announced the liberation of the people of God. Therefore, in the New Testament, without any prejudice, there ought to be such messengers, ordained for the liberation of the people in hearing confessions.

This could also be proven in countless other ways: therefore, it seems that some can and ought to be appointed by privilege to preach and hear confessions: and in this, no prejudice seems to be generated.

But on the contrary, it is objected thus: Privileges are not to be conferred to the injury of anyone: but for the subjects of someone to go to another without his will is to the injury of him who is their prelate: therefore, a privilege should not be conferred on anyone concerning this.

Again, suppose someone has the privilege of hearing: it is asked whether priests and bishops can prohibit their own from confessing to him?

It seems that they can: because 1. By that privilege, they are not exempted from the power of their priests: therefore, just as before they were bound to obey him, not to confess to another, so also now: therefore, if the priest prohibits, they ought not to confess to him who has the privilege.

1. Likewise, to whom the care of tending the sheep in the administration of the sacraments and rendering account falls, to him also falls when and to whom they confess: therefore, without his license, they ought not to go to anyone: therefore, even if someone is privileged, he still cannot hear the subjects of another, if that one prohibits.

2. Furthermore, although this one is privileged to hear, yet the subject of the priest is not privileged not to obey his priest: therefore, if he prohibits him from confessing to the privileged one, he ought to obey by not confessing: and from this, it follows that he who has the privilege will not hear, although he is privileged.

BUT on the contrary: 4. The benefit of a privilege is not to be rejected, so that it is useless to him to whom it is given: but if confessors can be withdrawn so that they do not confess to the privileged one, which even in the prohibition of the priest they cannot be withdrawn so that they do not confess to someone having a privilege concerning this.

1. Likewise, to whom some benefit and principal thing is granted, to him is also granted the accessory, without which the principally granted cannot be exercised: but the hearing of confession cannot be unless someone confesses: therefore, it seems that to whom it is granted to hear confessions, it is also granted to the subjects that they can confess to him without the license of another.

Solution. It seems without prejudice to be said that it is useful to grant the privilege of hearing confessions to religious and honest persons. And it is confirmed by the authority of the Old and New Testaments. And many things from the Old Testament have been introduced. From the New, however, in Luke 14:23, it is held, where the householder sent his servants, who went out into the highways and hedges, and brought in and compelled to enter so that the house of God might be filled. And this is especially necessary in the last times, when perilous times are imminent due to the abundance of wickedness. And if the privilege is conferred, the privileged can hear all whom they move by word and example to repentance in preaching: whence I concede the first part of this disputation.

To what is objected on the contrary, it must be said that no prejudice is done to anyone in this: because even a priest, or another prelate, does not have any jurisdiction over subjects, except insofar as it descends from the head: and therefore if others are called and privileged in his aid, it is not prejudice, but solace, especially since the fruits of the revenues from this are in no way diminished for him.

To what is further asked, it must be said that if such a privilege were granted, in my judgment, the privileged one ought to induce the subjects to confess to him with the conscience and license of their priest. However, if the priest would maliciously wish to impede this, he could not: because in this, his subjects are not bound to obey him. For he who gives the privilege seems consequently to give the subjects the power to confess to the privileged one: because otherwise, the grace which he grants would be frustrated.

To the other, it must be said that the priest does not have the care except by the will of the superior, and therefore he ought to presume that those sent by him dispose the people well for salvation, nor will he render account for that.

And finally, it must be said that to this privileged one for hearing, it is permitted for another to confess to him: because he who grants the principal, grants also the accessory

without which the principal cannot be done, as was said in the objections which are brought in the contrary.

Articulus 44 — Whether Someone Having Confessed To A Privileged Person Is Also Bound To Confess To His Own Priest

Whether someone who has confessed to a privileged confessor is also bound to confess to their own priest?

Whether someone who has confessed to a privileged confessor is also bound to confess to their own priest?

Sixthly, it is asked whether, after they have confessed to a privileged confessor, if such a person exists, they are also bound to confess to their own priest?

And it seems that they are:

1. For it is commanded to one's own priest, "Diligently know the face of your flock": but this cannot be known except through the confession of the spiritual face of the flock: therefore, one's own priest is bound to hear their confessions: therefore, they are also bound to confess to him.
2. Furthermore, in Jeremiah 33:13, it is said, "The flocks shall pass again under the hands of him that telleth them": but the hand of the one who counts touches each one: therefore, the hand of the priest who examines should measure each sheep by the touch of confession and knowledge: but this cannot be except through confession: therefore, they are bound to confess to him.
3. Likewise, in John 10:3-4, it is said that the good shepherd calls his own sheep by name... and goes before them. And below, verse 14: "I am the good shepherd, and I know mine, and mine know me." But all these things can in no way be done without confession: therefore, to whomever the subjects have confessed, it seems that they are still bound to confess to their own priest.
4. Furthermore, in Acts 20:28, Paul says: "Take heed to yourselves, and to all the flock, over which the Holy Spirit has made you overseers, to feed the Church of God, which he has purchased with his own blood." But it is of no small estimation, that which is bought with the blood of Christ: therefore, with all diligence, the sheep must be seen and known by their own shepherd: but they are in no way sufficiently known, except through confession in which a man shows his whole heart and conscience to the priest: therefore, it seems that they are bound to confess to him.
5. Furthermore, in 1 Thessalonians 5:14, the Apostle says: "Admonish the unruly, comfort the fainthearted, support the weak, be patient with all." But this can in no way be done, unless they are known to be such or such: therefore, they ought to be known: but they cannot be suitably known, except through confession: therefore, all are bound to confess to their own priest, even if they have confessed to another.

But if you say that he knows through another. On the contrary: This only generates opinion: and opinion is not sufficient for human judgment: therefore, much less will it suffice for divine judgment: and this is in penance: therefore, it does not suffice in penance.

1. Furthermore, in Hebrews 13:17: "Obey your leaders, and submit to them: for they watch over your souls, as those who must give an account." He who must give an account, even of temporal things, seeks to know the account by himself: therefore, much more is this required in divine matters: therefore, the priest ought to know by himself about the confession.

On the contrary, however, it is objected thus.

1. If someone confesses to a privileged confessor, it is certain that he is absolved, because otherwise the privilege would be of no value: but the absolved is not bound to confess: therefore, he is not bound to confess to the priest, nor to another more than once a year.
2. Furthermore, Master Hugh of Saint Victor in the book on the Power of Binding and Loosing says that among other bonds which the priest hearing confession loosens, one and the first is that he loosens the debt of confessing to which God bound him, when he absolves him in contrition from the debt of eternal death: he is not bound to confess to anyone: therefore, since he has confessed, he is not bound to confess to his own priest.
3. Furthermore, if someone confesses to the penitentiary of a superior, he is not afterwards bound to confess even to an inferior: but the privileged is as it were a particular penitentiary of the Lord Pope: therefore, having confessed to him, he is not bound to confess to anyone else.
4. Furthermore, there are never two remedies entirely of the same species against one disease: therefore, neither should it be so in spiritual matters: but these two confessions would be remedies entirely similar and of the same species against one disease: therefore, it seems that they should not be: therefore, having confessed to one, he is not bound to confess to another.
5. Furthermore, nature does not abound in superfluities, nor does it lack in necessities: and this is because, as the Philosophers say, it is most disordered: but the divine work is more ordered than the work of nature: therefore, it does not abound in superfluities: but it is superfluous to posit two, when one suffices: therefore, it seems that since confession made to one avails, he is not bound to confess to another.

I respond without prejudice, that if the privilege of hearing confessions in the manner above said were given to someone, as the privilege of hearing those whom some move by the word of their preaching is given: it is most firmly to be believed that the Supreme Pontiff gave this because of the excessive negligence of priests: because with our sins increasing at this end of the age, very few priests are found who are true shepherds, but rather vicars hired for a cheap price: and what is more abominable, they are not perpetuated in many lands, but hired for a year, or even for half a year, or a month. And I know all this because I have seen it: so that it

seems to fulfill that of Ezekiel 13:19: "For a piece of bread and a handful of barley, they corrupted me and my people?" Therefore, those who hear and absolve the people by life and knowledge are quite necessary: yet for the pastoral office and reverence of priests, and because it is not to be detracted from them before the subjects, it seems that the privileged absolver should enjoin the one confessed to him, that at least in general he shows himself to his own priest if he is a shepherd, or even a perpetual vicar. But if he is hired for a time, then it seems that it is not necessary.

To what is objected against this, it must be said that such a confessed person is absolved: but nevertheless, the absolved ought to make himself known to the governor of his Church who is his own priest, and therefore he ought to show himself to the priest at least in the kind of sins in which he was; and also for the priest's conscience, and so that he may be secure about him: because he ought to minister the sacraments to him, and give an account for him.

To another it must be said, that as it has been said, he is absolved before God: but nevertheless, many things are required of him: because no one is so absolved, that he cannot fall again into mortal sin due to contempt of the ministers of the Church: and therefore, to assure his governor, he is bound to show himself to him in kind if he wishes.

To another it must be said, that even if he confesses to the penitentiary of a superior, it is still useful, lest the penitentiary dissolve the order of the Church and the office of priests to the people, and in some way remit him to his own priest. And I would believe that the penitentiary sins gravely, who would not do this: yet if he does not remit, then it must be said that it is otherwise in that case, because the penitentiary of a superior imposes penances in the place of the superior, and so there is sufficient presumption of the priest, that he does all things well, nor does he have to judge the deed of the superior: but others hearing by privilege are called as it were to relieve the negligence of priests: and it is more their concern to beware lest they dissipate the office of priests to the people, and the reverence of the people to priests: and therefore it is not similar what is induced for the similar.

To another it must be said, that multiplied remedies avail for a hidden and grave disease: because even if they do not cure the disease, yet they contribute to the confirmation of health: but here it is not otherwise: because he was obliged to the priest, and for abundant caution he goes to the privileged.

To another it must be said, that even nature does many things for the strengthening of the species, so that it can resist subsequent alterations, and those are not superfluous: and so it is also in the works of grace: whence also from him who presides over the utility of the Church, such are sometimes sent for abundant caution for the strengthening of the people in penance and confession. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 45 — Whether Any Advantage Is Gained If One Confesses To A Privileged Person

Whether any utility is obtained if someone confesses to a privileged person?

Whether any utility is obtained if someone confesses to a privileged person?

Seventhly, it is asked, What utility is obtained from a privileged person?

Although it is almost determined from the preceding, nevertheless without dispute it must be said to this, that at least three utilities are obtained. One is perfect absolution, which makes a due diminution of penalties doubled and a strengthening of grace. The second is the abundance of counsel, from which the penitent becomes more secure about the sufficiency of the penance enjoined upon him. The third

is the multiplicity of prayers and witnesses before God: because the more people one confesses to, the more intercessors and witnesses one has before God.

Articulus 46 — Whether The Definitions Of Scandal Are Good

Whether the definitions of scandal are good?

Then it is inquired concerning what is said there, D, after the beginning: But even in such scandal, etc.

We will inquire about scandal, first, what it is? Second, about the division of scandal. Third, whether it is a special sin distinct from other sins, or always conjoined with others? Fourth, whether it is a mortal sin or not? Fifth, whether to scandalize in any way befits the good? Sixth, of whom is it to be scandalized? Seventh, what things are to be omitted on account of scandal, and what not?

To the first of these, it is proceeded thus: Matthew xvi, 7, upon that: Woe says the Gloss: from scandals! Scandal is a word or deed less right, providing others an occasion of ruin.

Another notification of scandal is had upon that of Numbers, xxxi, 2: Avenge, etc., thus, to deceive first the sons of Israel Scandal is, where to one walking rightly deception is submitted to ruin.

However, it is objected thus against the first: because 1. Every sin which is in words or deeds, is an occasion of ruin to another: therefore every sin existing in words and deeds is scandal, which is false.

1. Further, every sin proceeding to the knowledge of a neighbor, is an obstacle placed to one walking rightly: but every sin existing in words or deeds, is proceeding as far as it is of itself to the knowledge of a neighbor: therefore every sin existing in words and deeds is an obstacle placed to one walking rightly, which is false, because many sin, and do not scandalize.
2. If perhaps it is said, that a sin which is in words or in deeds, becomes scandal when someone falls by the example of it. Against: It happens to the sinner, that someone falls by the example of it or does not fall: therefore scandal is by accident in the one scandalizing, and per se in the one scandalized: but in whom it is per se, it is of that one and is imputed to that one: therefore scandal is more in the one scandalized and is imputed to him, which is against the whole Scripture which always blames those scandalizing.

Further, it is inquired, why is not the sin of the heart placed?

For it seems that it can be an occasion of ruin: because the heart comes forth to knowledge through signs: therefore it can be an occasion of an obstacle: therefore it is an occasion of scandal: therefore it itself ought to be placed, as it seems.

It is also objected against the second definition: 1. Not only those walking rightly are scandalized, but also others: therefore it is badly said, Where to one walking rightly.

1. Further, there is not always deception in scandal: but also this one knows, that he does badly by imitating: therefore it is badly said, Deception is submitted.
2. Likewise, it does not matter to the fall to the obstacle, whether the obstacle is hidden, or manifest, as long as it throws down the one walking: therefore it is similarly in the way of morals: therefore it is not always necessary to be deception.

Response. It must be said, that scandal is Greek, and it sounds in Latin as much as impact or fall: hence in spiritual scandal which is transumptively called scandal, there must be something to which impact or fall is made: and this is sin opposing one walking rightly insofar as it opposes. I say then one walking rightly, all and him who in that work in which he is, does not deviate, so that it may be said to be right that which recedes from the curvature of sin or deviation: and thus all acts are comprehended under right which are licit, that is, which are prohibited by no precept: thus indeed is defined licit in the Gloss upon that of the Apostle, to the Corinthians vi, 12: All things are lawful for me, but I say not all things are expedient because if sinning insofar as opposing had a circumstance making it not oppose one walking rightly, it would not be scandal, as is the circumstance of concealment. However, the circumstance making it oppose the feet of one walking rightly, is that which places sin before him: and this is that which is said manifestly. For this before one walking rightly in the way of morals places sin as an obstacle impeding the steps of works.

To the first, therefore, it must be said, that this is false, Every word or deed, because not every word or deed etc., is manifest in the spectacle of those walking rightly, and does not of itself come forth to knowledge, when it is hidden.

To the other, it must be said in the same way, that it does not yet come forth, when it is concealed and closed: for it is withdrawn as if from the way of morals, when it is withdrawn from the knowledge of neighbors.

To the other, it must be said, that circumstance is not entirely accidental to the act and this is evident in morals, where the species of right and oblique are distinguished by when it is necessary, and how much, and where, and with what aids, and why, etc. It is also evident in rhetorical places from which arguments of accusation or defense of a thing are drawn from circumstances: and therefore it does not by accident belong to every sin, that it belongs to it by circumstance. However, one of the circumstances is open; and therefore of itself it has, that it is scandal when it is open. But that another falls, or not, this is contingent to him: because scandal is not the sole cause of ruin, but also requires a cause on the part of the other imitating it in sin. Hence whether he falls or not, this one nevertheless gave as far as it is of itself an occasion of ruin: occasion, however, is called an imperfect cause, which requires with itself

another principally causing, which it excites and invites to cause, and of this kind in scandal is the will of the one imitating the one scandalizing in the sin which it places before his eyes.

To the other, it must be said, that the sin of the heart is by its nature hidden: because the sin of the heart is discretively said, which is so of the heart, that it is not of the mouth or of the work.

To the objection, however, it says, that a sign is multiple, namely common, and convertible sign: common does not certify: but makes a weak estimation, and therefore it is not scandal. However, a convertible sign is equivalent to a cause, as the Philosopher says: and such is not manifest in the sin of the heart. If, however, it were, something would be found which would show the sin in its proper species, and place it before the eyes of one walking rightly: therefore it would not be a sin of the heart only, but would be reduced to the sin of the mouth or work.

To what is objected against the second, it must be said that one not walking rightly insofar as of this kind, is not scandalized, because inviting to sin does not take from outside in sin, but has the cause of his sin within: but one walking rightly and not walking crookedly, for he inviting to sin when he does not have within, takes from outside in the sin of a neighbor opposing him in the way of morals.

To the other, it must be said, that deception is here taken broadly for not foreseen: for suddenly and beyond hope it presents itself the sin of scandal inviting to sin on the part of the one scandalized: and this is called here deception, because when the neighbor insofar as he is the image of God ought to invite to good, beyond foresight it presents an occasion of ruin.

But then it is objected: because according to this if a public sin is foreseen to be future, it will not be scandal, and thus again it would follow, that it would happen to it to be scandal on the part of the one scandalized, from this that it is foreseen, or not foreseen. Response, that there is a double foresight, namely speculative, and practical. Speculative does not invite to sin: because thus all premeditating some sins, would be moved to sin, which is false. Hence if such precedes on the part of the one scandalized, it is no less scandal or sin of another, because it is the first inviting him to sin of itself. If, however, practical foresight precedes: then there is consent or pleasure of that sin, which moves to the seen sin. And then it is indeed still of itself scandal: but nevertheless this scandal does not first scandalize him, but rather the first inclining to sin brought with it in the will of sinning: hence this one sins as if he were not scandalized, because if the sin of the neighbor were withdrawn from him, he would still be moved to sinning.

To the other, it must be said, that much matters in the way of morals, although it does not matter in the way of feet: because it never throws down as the first inviting to sinning, unless it proceeds into the knowledge of another: and this is to be manifest to another. It has been said already, since of the essence of scandal properly is, that it is the first inviting to sinning others, not sinning by that kind of sin.

Articulus 47 — Whether Scandal Is Well Divided Into Active And Passive

ARTICLE XLVI. Whether scandal is well divided into active and passive?

Secondly, it is asked concerning the division of scandal.

It is divided into active and passive. And active is said to be that which acts in scandal, passive, that which suffers in the same. For example, if I give occasion for ruin, I act in scandal: but if you receive it, you suffer: and in me is active scandal, but in you passive.

But against this it is objected thus: 1. For the most principal agent is the agent immediate to the deed or work: but the agent immediate to the work is the will of the one imitating manifest sin: therefore it is the most principal agent: therefore in the imitator there is not passive scandal, but active, which is against all speaking of scandal.

1. Further, Occasion does not act, because it is not a cause, but less than a cause even per accidens: therefore it seems, since manifest sin is only an occasion of another's sin, that it ought not to be called active scandal.
2. Further, Augustine says that every sin is so voluntary that if it is not voluntary, it is not sin. But it is evident that actual mortal sin is not called voluntary unless by the will of the agent itself: but I see that sin perpetrated by imitation of sin is called voluntary by the will of the scandalized, and not by the will of the scandalizer: therefore it seems that the scandalized is the agent in the ruin of scandal, and not the scandalizer.
3. Further, A cause by occasion is a cause in some way disposing: but this in some way is reduced to a material cause, since it speaks of the preparation of matter, as the Philosophers say: therefore to give occasion in scandal is a cause reduced to the material: but that is the scandalizer: therefore it causes in scandal only as matter or disposition: and that is to suffer, not to act: therefore it is more fitting for the scandalizer to suffer in scandal, and for the scandalized to act, than conversely.

Response. It must be said that the definition of scandal introduced stands, and is good.

To the solution of the objections it must be said that there is a first agent, which is only an agent: and a second agent, which is an agent suffering, and a mover moved, because it is moved by the first mover. An example of this is the desired and the desire, as the Philosopher says. For the desired by itself, that is, by its species, which is delightful, moves the desire: the desire, however, moved by the species of the desired, moves to the work, and into conjunction with the desired. And in this way active scandal is said to be that which is the first mover of the desire of the one seeing it: the desire, however, moved by the seen sin, is the second mover to the act of sin, and is a mover moved, and an agent suffering. Since therefore the sin of the scandalizer is the first object to the eyes of the one walking rightly, it is only an agent: and therefore it is called active scandal. The desire or will of the scandalized, however, is a mover already moved, and an agent already suffering: and it follows the moving passions, by which it is suffered from another: and therefore passive scandal is with it.

With these things established, it is easy to respond to the objections.

For it must be said to the first, that the most principal agent is said in two ways, namely that which has more of the nature of an agent, and that which is the cause of action. And in

the first way the first agent in any order is the most principal agent: and thus it is said the most principal agent in active scandal. In the second way, however, the immediate agent is the most principal agent, although not the agent according to the species of the agent.

of the first, by which it has already been acted upon; and in this way the will of the scandalized person is the principal cause of the sin that occurs in the scandal.

§ 1. To the other it must be said that it is called an occasion because it is not the perfect cause of that passion which occurs in the will of the one falling by the example of that person: because the object of desire moves desire per se.

§ 2. To the other it must be said that Augustine is speaking of the will which is the proximate cause of the sin, and not of the first cause.

§ 3. To the last it must be said that a disposition is not an occasion, but rather it follows the efficient cause, as is clear through Aristotle in Book II of the Physics, where he places the accidental cause next to the efficient cause.

§ 4. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 48 — Whether Scandal Is A Special Sin Distinct From Other Sins

Whether scandal is a special sin distinct from other sins?

§ 5. Thirdly it is asked, whether it is a special sin divided from others, or conjoined to others?

§ 6. 1. Now it seems that it is a general sin through the definition introduced above, which says: Every word or deed, etc.: for this is in every public sin: therefore it seems that it is not a special sin.

§ 7. 2. Moreover, here in the Text he seems to imply that it is a circumstance of sin rather than a sin, when he says, If his sin was not only in the grave evil of it, but also in so great a scandal to others, etc. A circumstance is not separated from the sin whose circumstance it is: therefore it seems that scandal is not separated from other sins, of which it is a circumstance: therefore it seems that scandal is not separated from other sins: therefore it is not a species of sin in itself.

§ 8. 3. Moreover, every corruption orderable to the acts of diverse sins in species, is a corruption of a common circumstance, and not of a proper act according to species: but scandal signifies a corruption of this kind: therefore it is a corruption of a common circumstance, and not of the proper act of anyone according to species. The first [premise] is clear through the fact that ultimate and completive specific differences are not orderable to diverse sins. The second is proved through the fact that the corruption of scandal is found in every public sin. Thence thus: Whatever is conjoined to the species of diverse sins, is a certain common thing, which in itself does not constitute a species: scandal is of this kind: therefore scandal is a certain common thing conjoined with other sins, in itself not constituting a species.

§ 9. 4. Moreover, one can argue to the same by the second definition: Through every public sin an occasion of falling is given to one walking rightly: therefore scandal is conjoined to every public sin.

§ 10. On the contrary to this it is objected: 1. A special sin is from a special evil will, and special harm, and end: but a special evil will is one that wills to make another fall, and a special harm is the ruin of another, and a special intention, because the scandalizing person intends the fall of another. Therefore, since these are in scandal, it seems that scandal is a special sin.

§ 11. 2. Moreover, Numbers 31:2 and following, it expressly appears that it was special: because there they intended, through the exposing of girls serving gods, to cast them down to idols: therefore it seems that it is a special sin.

§ 12. Response. It must be said that scandal is sometimes called a conjoined sin, sometimes separate. It is conjoined, when it does not have a will and intention separate on the part of the agent from another sin, but only has a separate harm. For example, someone sins publicly, and does not intend to harm another, nor wills it: and yet he harms, because he draws him to ruin by his bad example, and then it is conjoined to another sin, and is not a special sin in itself: and the Saints speak of scandal in this way, because scandal is rarely committed otherwise. In another way scandal is spoken of, when someone specially intends and wills to provide ruin through his word or deed: and then in one action he has two intentions: one as instrumental to the other, because he uses the sin he commits only as an instrument to another sin, which is to cast his neighbor down into sin: and in this way it is taken in Numbers, where the Midianites scandalized the sons of Israel.

§ 13. Moreover, through this distinction the solution to both parts of the objections is clear: because the objections proceed directly upon the parts of the distinction.

Articulus 49 — Whether Scandal Is Always A Mortal Sin

Whether scandal is always a mortal sin?

§ 14. Fourthly it is asked, whether it is always a mortal sin?

§ 15. Now it seems that it is. 1. Matthew 18:7: Woe to the world because of scandals! Gloss: "Eternal damnation threatens the worldly on account of scandals": but eternal damnation does not threaten except for a mortal sin: therefore scandal is a mortal sin.

§ 16. 2. Moreover, in the same place it is said (v. 6), that he who scandalizes one of these little ones who believe in me, it is expedient for him that an ass's millstone be hung about his neck, and he be drowned in the depth of the sea: but this would not be said unless it were a mortal sin: therefore it seems that scandal is always a mortal sin.

§ 17. 3. Moreover, it is a lesser harm to harm corporally unto the subtraction of things or of bodily life, than to harm spiritually unto the perdition of the soul: but the former is a mortal sin, as is clear in robbery, theft, and homicide: therefore also scandal.

§ 18. 4. If perhaps it is said that scandal does not take away [life]. Now this is against the definition: because there is no ruin except through the fall of a mortal sin, which is ruin simply.

§ 19. If perhaps someone says, as some of the ancients solved it, that scandal is mortal when conjoined to a mortal sin, and venial when conjoined to a venial sin. Against this: To eat meats offered to idols in itself is truly venial, and yet on account of the stumbling block it is a mortal scandal: therefore it is not mortal from the fact that it is conjoined to an act of mortal sin. The minor is proved, Romans 14:15, where it is said: Destroy not him with thy meat, for whom Christ died. And, 1 Corinthians 8:11: And through thy knowledge shall the weak brother perish, for whom Christ died? And in the same place, v. 12: Now when you sin thus against the brethren, and wound their weak conscience, you sin against Christ. Now a brother is not destroyed except through mortal sin: therefore they sinned mortally in scandalizing in an act licit in itself: therefore the proposition is held.

§ 20. But on the contrary to this it is objected thus: 1. Through what is said, Matthew 16:23, where Christ said to Peter: Go behind me, Satan, thou art a scandal unto me: because thou savorest not the things that are of God. And yet the Gloss says there, and it is a Gloss of Bede: "But to me the error of the Apostle coming from an affection of piety, will never seem an incentive of the devil": therefore Peter scandalized, and yet he did not sin mortally. But yet another Gloss says there: "He does not think it possible that the Son of God be killed." But this is not against the proposition: because even if it be granted that he sinned mortally through infidelity (which however is not true), yet he did not sin mortally through scandal, as the first Gloss seems to imply.

§ 21. 2. Moreover, certain sins are mortal in their genus: while others are venial in their genus. Therefore, since scandal adjoined to other sins seems sometimes to be venial and sometimes mortal, it seems that scandal is sometimes venial and sometimes mortal.

§ 22. 3. Moreover, one sin belongs to one will and one act: but scandal is adjoined to the same act of sin, and to the same will, and does not have a divided will and act, as was clear above: therefore it seems that it is not a difference of sin in itself: or if it is, that it does not fall into another difference than that to which the sin is determined through its act, venial or mortal: but not every such sin is mortal: therefore neither is scandal always mortal.

§ 23. Response. It must be said that scandal is sometimes mortal, and sometimes venial: but mortal scandal is threefold, as it seems to me. Namely, from conjunction with a mortal sin: and this is self-evident to anyone. And sometimes it has a division of a special will and intention of casting down the neighbor into mortal sin: and this again is clear. Thirdly, also when it is conjoined to an act which from a circumstance can probably be believed mortal, although it is not [mortal] as regards the agent; because then the negligence and inconsideration of the agent make that act to be a mortal sin. As was the sin of the Corinthians who reclined in the idol's temple to eat meat offered to idols at a time when such a rite was observed in honor of the idols: for then every weak person, ignorant of the faith of the one eating, could according to common judgment judge nothing else than that he ate to honor the

idol: and since he was a Doctor of the faith, the disciple was also built up to eat in honor of the idol: and therefore he actively gave his brother a cause of ruin through the sin of infidelity. But in whatever other way it is done, it is a venial sin. And I say this without prejudice: because perhaps to another more modes of mortal scandal will occur, but to me now no more come to mind.

§ 24. To the first two, therefore, it must be said that the Saints speak there only of mortal scandal, and not of venial.

§ 25. To the other it must be said that it is true that he who acts directly to the injury of the soul, harms more than if he harmed corporally: yet it does not follow that he sins more, because the quantity of the sin is not measured from the quantity of the harm, but rather from the quantity of the deformity in the act and the root and the will of the sinner. That this is so is plainly clear, because the harm is in another, and not frequently in the sinner, and the quantity of the sin is taken from those things which are in the sinner. If however it is granted that a certain deformity of the act is also taken according to the harm, as is true, then it must be said that the argument still is not valid: because to a corporal harm one acts directly intending through the will to harm: but to a spiritual harm in a scandal conjoined to another sin, one does not act directly intending, but it coincides with his sin. If however the scandal were specially intended, and it were unto mortal sin, then the reason would not have to be conceded.

§ 26. To the other it must be said that when scandal is defined through ruin, ruin is taken commonly for absolute ruin which is mortal sin, and for an occasion of ruin which is venial: and thus the definition befits both, yet it primarily befits mortal sin.

§ 27. To the other which is objected concerning Peter, it must be said that scandal is taken there equivocally in comparison to the scandal of which we speak: for an obstacle for men on the right path of morals is the scandal about which we inquire here. But scandal is sometimes called an obstacle to joy or to the equanimity of affection: and thus whatever disturbs is called a scandal: and in this way Peter is called a scandal to Christ: because as far as was in him, he was disturbing the path of our salvation. And in this way Christ, disturbing the Scribes and Pharisees, is said to have scandalized them in life: and He says, Matthew 17:26, to Peter concerning those receiving the tax: But that we may not scandalize them, go to the sea, etc., that is, lest we disturb them.

§ 28. Some, however, distinguish this a little, namely that there is material scandal, and formal. They call material that in which someone by his own fault, not by the vice of the doer, receives an occasion of falling: and in this way they say Christ scandalizes. But formal, when by his own vice he gives an occasion of falling. And both distinctions conjoined, I think are truer than either alone by itself.

§ 29. Whatever the case may be, it must be said that Peter did not sin mortally by scandalizing: because the impediment of redemption which he strove to interpose, did not issue forth except from piety: because he willed Christ not to suffer, and yet to redeem the human race:

and these things indeed were compossible: but even if they were not compossible, then one of them could be separated from the other by an act of the soul.

§ 30. To the other it must be said that the Gloss says that Peter was not an infidel: because suddenly terrified at the word of God, he did not ponder nor confer: and therefore immediately corrected by the Lord he received discipline.

§ 31. To the other it must be said that in truth scandal is both mortal and venial, in diverse ways as has been said: and yet it does not follow that the sin of the one scandalizing is two sins: but Master Praepositivus used to call such sins double or composite, when in one act there are two or more deformities from diverse corruptions of diverse circumstances: and therefore also a separate penalty is not enjoined on the one scandalizing, but only that by the example of the enjoined penalty he may edify his neighbor. And this is drawn here from the Text, where it is said: Yet let him do that which not only profits himself unto salvation, but also which may be an example to the rest.

§ 32. And through this the solution of all the objections is clear.

Articulus 50 — Whether It In Any Way Befits The Good To Cause Scandal

Whether to scandalize in any way befits the good?

§ 33. Fifthly it is asked, whether to scandalize in any way befits the good?

§ 34. 1. For concerning Christ it is said, Luke 2:34: Behold this child is set for the fall, and for the resurrection of many in Israel. Now the occasion of ruin is scandal: therefore Christ scandalized many: therefore also other Saints could scandalize.

§ 35. Also, Matthew 15:12: Dost thou know that the Pharisees, when they heard this word, were scandalized? Therefore Christ scandalized the Pharisees: therefore also other Saints can do this.

§ 36. Also, Isaiah 28:16: Behold I will lay a stone in the foundations of Sion, a tried stone, a corner stone, etc., and it follows: He that believeth, let him not hasten. As if he were saying: If he hastens, he strikes against it and falls. Now it is certain that Christ is speaking: therefore Christ was an occasion of ruin in the Jews: therefore he scandalized.

§ 37. Also, 1 Peter 2:8, it is said that Christ was a stone of stumbling, and a rock of scandal: therefore, etc.

§ 38. 2. Moreover, concerning Blessed Anthony it is read, that a certain hunter was scandalized in him because he comported himself more relaxed by walking with the brothers through the woods: therefore it sometimes happens to the good to scandalize others.

§ 39. But on the contrary it is objected thus: Because they are contraries, to provoke by examples to the good, and by examples to draw back from the good, and to provoke to evil: but the Saints are bound by their examples to call back from evil, and to provoke to the good: therefore it does not befit them to draw others back from the good, and to provoke them to evil. The proof of the first is: because they are done by contraries, namely by good and evil.

The proof of the second is what the Lord says, Matthew 5:16: So let your light shine before men, that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father who is in heaven.

§ 40. Response. To this it must be said that scandal is material, and formal. Materially the Saints were made a scandal to some, but formally to none. And what material scandal is, and what formal, has been said above.

§ 41. And through this the solution to those things which are objected concerning Christ is clear.

§ 42. To the other which is objected concerning Anthony it must be said that in truth it was nothing but the matter of scandal: because he did not give a bad example by an illicit act, but after too much rigor he had led the brothers out to recreation: whence that hunter was not scandalized unto anything illicit, but thought there was something less of the good of religion in them than he had believed: and therefore Blessed Anthony cured him through the tension of a bow, which if it were bent beyond what is bendable, would break. And thus he said it is concerning the virtue and strength of a man, on whom if more is imposed than he can bear, his virtue will break, and his strength will not be able to sustain it.

Articulus 51 — To Whom It Belongs To Be Scandalized

Whose is it to be scandalized?

§ 43. Sixthly it is asked, whose is it to be scandalized?

§ 44. Now it seems that it is of all: 1. For because an agent has itself in the same way, if the patient also has itself in the same way (as the Philosopher says in Book X of the Ethics), it always does the same thing: but a bad example has itself in one way with respect to the species of evil, and every onlooker according as he is an onlooker, has himself in the same way: therefore it seems that if one is scandalized, all are also scandalized: therefore it belongs to all equally to be scandalized.

§ 45. 2. Also, it is certain that everyone giving a bad example, scandalizes by this very fact, as is clear from what has been previously held: therefore, to object grammatically, since it is a transitive verb, and there is nowhere for its act to pass except into a passive, it is necessary that someone be scandalized: but he is not scandalized unless looking upon him: therefore of all onlookers, by the fact that they are onlookers, it is to be scandalized: but these are all indifferently: therefore of all it is to be scandalized.

§ 46. But on the contrary: 1. Matthew 18:6, where the Lord speaks of scandal, He does not seem to speak except of the scandal of the little ones: therefore it is of the little ones to be scandalized: but not all are little ones: therefore it is not of all to be scandalized.

§ 47. 2. Moreover, the Gloss in the same place says that it is of the little ones to be scandalized, not of the advanced and perfect.

§ 48. 3. Moreover, 1 Corinthians 8:10, the Apostle seems to mean that it is of the weak to be scandalized: for he says thus, If any man see him that hath knowledge sit at meat in the idol's

temple, shall not his conscience, being weak, be emboldened to eat those things which are sacrificed to idols? And through thy knowledge shall the weak brother perish, for whom Christ died?

§ 49. 4. Moreover, to be provoked to evil by the example of another is not characteristic of one having a habit confirmed to the good: therefore it does not belong to them to be inclined to evil by another's example.

§ 50. 5. Moreover, in the second book of the Ethics it is said that the wise men of the people suffered differently towards Helen, and differently the young men living in concupiscence: for the wise men fled from her all the more when they saw her, but the young men were attracted: therefore much more does this befit the perfect when they see evil: therefore it seems that it is not of them to be scandalized.

§ 51. Which we concede, saying to the first that the passives are not disposed in the same way, except as regards the extrinsic condition, that is, as regards solely the seeing: but because seeing is not the cause of passive scandal, unless concupiscence of evil and consent are adjoined, therefore it does not follow that those are scandalized, although others act unto scandal. And it is similar, that fire burns, and yet dry wood is burned by fire in one way and green wood in another.

§ 52. To the other it must be said that in grammatical matters the mode suffices, even if sometimes the reality is lacking. Just as a stone grammatically is said to be "injuring the foot", even if it never injures: so the verb is called transitive, because as much as is of itself, it passes over, but yet in reality a passive cannot always be inferred from the active, namely when it receives nothing of the action of the agent from its immutation: and so it is here. And therefore it does not follow according to reality: this one scandalizes, therefore that one is scandalized, or someone is scandalized. Nor does it validly hold conversely: this one is scandalized, therefore someone scandalizes him: as is clear in material scandal, because the Jews were scandalized, and yet our Lord Jesus Christ did not scandalize them.

Articulus 52 — Which Are Those Things That Ought To Be Omitted On Account Of Scandal

What are those things that must be laid aside on account of scandal?

§ 53. Seventhly it is asked, what things must be laid aside on account of passive scandal, because actively no one ought to scandalize?

§ 54. For it seems that all things not pertaining to salvation [must be laid aside]: 1. For the tranquility of the neighbor is better than all such things: therefore it is to be chosen before all such things: therefore before he is disturbed, all things not pertaining to salvation ought to be laid aside.

§ 55. 2. Moreover, concerning Blessed Bernard it is read in his Life, that when dying he said: "To no one did I ever cause scandal, but when it happened, I settled it as best I could." Therefore it seems that for no thing not pertaining to salvation ought anyone to cause scandal.

§ 56. 3. Moreover, we ought to love our neighbor as ourselves: but we love ourselves in such a way that for a temporal thing we do not wish to be disturbed or scandalized by others: therefore neither ought we to scandalize another for a temporal thing.

§ 57. 4. But according to this it seems that it is not licit to demand back one's own things with scandal: because without demanding back one's own things there is easily salvation.

§ 58. Also, this seems [to follow] from the words of the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 6:7, where it is said: Why do you not rather take wrong? Therefore it seems that injury is rather to be sustained, than to litigate in judgment to recover one's own things.

§ 59. Also, Hebrews 10:34: You took with joy the being stripped of your own goods, knowing that you have a better and a lasting substance. For from this the same follows.

§ 60. But against this again it seems to be: because an incentive to delinquent acts must be furnished to no one: but if one's own things are not demanded back, an incentive will be given to always detain the things of others: and this is worst: therefore one's own things are to be demanded back, even however much he may be disturbed.

§ 61. Next to this it is further asked: Since the works of mercy are better than [those] of justice: but the works of mercy are sometimes laid aside on account of scandal, lest they be believed to be done with the intention of vain praise: why are the works of justice not similarly intermitted?

§ 62. To this without prejudice it seems to me to be said, that the one suffering the injury does well if he sustains the loss without demanding back his own things, but he is not bound [to do so]. And what the Lord says, that to the one taking the tunic the cloak is also to be relinquished, I repute as a counsel.

§ 63. To this, however, which is objected, that an incentive to delinquent acts is not to be furnished: it must be said that this man does not furnish it, but that man had it when he robbed another's things. But this man by the patience of sustaining [it] provokes him more to the good than by the demanding back of his own things. And this is clear from what is said, Romans 12:20 and 21: If thy enemy be hungry, give him to eat: if he thirst, give him to drink. For, doing this, thou shalt heap coals of fire upon his head. Be not overcome by evil, but overcome evil by good. And by many other things which are said in the text and in the Gloss.

§ 64. That however he is not bound, is clear through Gregory saying thus upon that of Job 39:16: He hath labored in vain, etc. [Gregory:] "Gathering from these things we say: When the necessity of the journey imposes upon us the care of things, some, while they rob them, are only to be tolerated: but some, charity being preserved, are to be prohibited; yet not by the sole care lest they subtract our things, but lest they who rob what is not theirs, destroy themselves. For we ought to fear more for the robbers themselves, than for the irrational things to be defended. For these things, even if not robbed, we lose when dying: but with them [the robbers] we are one both now in the order of condition, and, if they strive to be corrected, after the perception of the reward. But who would not know, that we ought to love less those things which we use, and more what we are? If therefore even for his own utility we

speak to the robbers, already we vindicate not only the temporal things for ourselves, but also the eternal things for them. In which matter this must be shrewdly considered, lest through the fear of necessity the cupidity of things creep in: and the prohibition, inflamed by zeal and distended by a more immoderate impulse, break out into hateful words and the baseness of contention. And while for an earthly thing peace is torn from the heart with the neighbor, it clearly appears that the thing is loved more than the neighbor." From this [it is gathered] that it is licit for all to demand back: but yet it is also licit for all to dissimulate, unless in some case it could probably be estimated that the robber would be corrected more by the fear of judgment than by the example of patience: because Gregory speaks thus.

§ 65. To the first, therefore, it must be said that in some way it is reduced to salvation, namely insofar as, having compassion on the neighbor more than on our own things, we will that he be corrected by judgment: for thus the Lord also commanded evildoers to be struck. Or if they are despaired of being corrected through judgment, the tranquility of life in others ought to be intended: because without this we cannot serve God; and thus the demanding back of one's own things is reduced to those things which produce salvation.

§ 66. To the other it must be said that this which Bernard did was characteristic of the perfect: and perhaps he knew that they were corrected more by patience than by the severity of judgment.

§ 67. To the other it must be said that we ought to will that we be disturbed unto penance or to the recovering of the tranquility of life, which we disturbed when robbing the things of others: and what we ought to will for ourselves, suffices to bestow on the neighbor. § 68. To that which is objected on the contrary, the solution is already clear. However, some distinguish, that to the perfect it is not licit to demand back their own with scandal, but to the imperfect it is licit to demand back their own with scandal. But it does not seem it should be said thus, because the scandal here is only material, because demanding back one's own is a licit act. And on the part of the doer it is a just disturbance, and vexation can give him understanding. Whence I think that it is licit for all if they will, whether in their own name, or in the name of their chapter, or of their proctor, to demand back their own things.

§ 69. To the other objections the solution is clear through the aforementioned things.

Articulus 53 — Whether An Indulgence Is Received In Contrition Or In Confession

Whether indulgence is received in contrition or in confession?

§ 70. Next it is asked concerning this which he says, there, D, a little before the middle: Unless they can obtain the indulgence of God by the supplications of the priests, etc.

§ 71. For it seems from this, that indulgence is not received in contrition: because

§ 72. 1. The supplication of priests is not in contrition, but rather in confession, which is false.

§ 73. 2. If it is said, that it is understood as regards the remission of the entire fault, not only in the fault, but also in the debt of punishment. Against: It is certain that contrition deletes

something of the punishment: but the debt of punishment is finite, from the moment the fault is remitted: and the sorrow of contrition is a certain amount which deletes an aliquot part of the punishment, let it be a tenth: therefore if the sorrow of contrition is tenfold, it deletes the whole: now it is possible for the sorrow of contrition to be tenfold: therefore it is possible for the whole punishment to be remitted in contrition: therefore in such a case the supplication of the priests is not necessary: therefore what he says is not generally true.

§ 74. Furthermore, it seems to follow from the saying in the Text, that the form of absolution made by the priest in confession is by way of supplication: therefore it seems that the Church errs which absolves by a common judicative enunciation; which is false.

§ 75. Moreover, the sacraments most certainly attain their end: but certainly the attainment of the end is not expressed, except by the indicative: therefore the form of absolution ought to be made by the indicative, and not by the supplication of the priest, but rather by the absolution indicatively signified does the sinner attain pardon.

§ 76. On the contrary, first seems to be the mode of speaking in the Text: because

§ 77. 1. The supplication of the priests through which the sinner attains pardon, cannot be by the indicative mood, but rather by the deprecative mood: therefore it seems that the form of absolution ought to be made deprecatively, and not indicatively.

§ 78. 2. Also, divine power is not bound to the sacraments, as Augustine says: therefore it seems that if it ought to operate there, it behooves it to operate through supplication: therefore the form ought to be made through supplication.

§ 79. 3. Moreover, penance is ordered against actual [sin]: and God does not cure that without us: but we are impotent and in need of grace: therefore supplication ought to be made in the sacrament to obtain that grace: therefore absolution from sins ought to be made in the mode of supplication, as it seems.

§ 80. Response. To the first it must be said, that as we have often said above, in contrition the other parts of penance also operate, through the fact that they are in the resolve of the contrite person, and they give power to contrition: just as Augustine says, that the faith of the Redeemer also availed before there was a Redeemer: because although He was not [yet] through an assumed nature, He was nevertheless in the faith of the believers. Therefore, since confession is in the vow of the truly contrite, it operates in the vow to the sins...

§ 1. ...for the remission of sin: and consequently the supplication of the priests operates there.

§ 2. And through this the solution to the first is clear.

§ 3. To the next it must be said that the remission of sin never occurs without supplication existing in this way: but it can well be that it is sometimes remitted such that a supplication in act does not approach it, namely where the article of necessity, not the contempt of religion, excludes confession.

§ 4. To that which is further asked, it must be said that the form of absolution, on account of the certitude of the sacrament, ought to be done through an indicative enunciation: but that a deprecation precedes it, belongs to the well-being (de bene esse) of the sacrament, and not to its essence (de esse).

§ 5. To that, however, which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that "supplication" here is called the suppliant and devout ministry of the priests in the forum of penance.

§ 6. To the next it must be said that although the grace of God is not bound by force to the sacraments, nevertheless, by the inevitability of the divine promise and the honesty of the truth of the divine utterance, the sacrament always attains its effect, unless the one who receives it is feigning: and the grace of this inevitability is pronounced indicatively: for otherwise all the sacraments of the Church would be placed under doubt.

§ 7. To the next it must be said that the grace of God is to be invoked upon the conversion of the will, because that is doubtful: but the grace of God is never to be invoked upon the effect of the sacrament: because this would be a sign of doubt regarding the entire foundation of the Church: grace can, however, be invoked for the preparation of the one receiving the sacraments, and for the sanctification of the matter of the sacraments. But that the sacrament itself, celebrated in due matter and due form, has its full effect as far as it is from itself, ought to be left as a constant by every Christian: nor should God be prayed to for this in any way, lest we seem to place our faith under doubt.

Articulus 54 — Whether Confession Can Be Made By Signs Or Writing, And Whether By An Interpreter

Whether confession can be made through signs or writings? And, whether through an interpreter?

§ 8. Next it is asked about what he says, there, D, around the middle: Not to be manifested through writings, etc.

§ 9. For according to this, people of an unknown tongue would not be able to confess.

§ 10. Also, neither would the mute, who cannot speak.

§ 11. Furthermore it is asked, when someone confesses through an interpreter, whether the interpreter is bound to conceal the confession just as the priest?

§ 12. For it seems that he is: because otherwise he would draw many men back from confession: and the concealment of confession, as will be held below, is done for this reason, lest men be drawn back from confession: therefore the interpreter is bound to conceal the confession.

§ 13. But to the contrary of this it is objected because he himself is not a priest, and only priests receive what is heard under the form of confession: therefore this man receives it only like another worldly thing: but he is not bound to conceal another thing, unless he wishes to or has promised: therefore neither this.

§ 14. Response. It must be said that he is speaking of those who communicate with priests in the potency of speaking and in language. For others can confess through writing or through a sign by themselves, or through an interpreter.

§ 15. And through this the solution to the first question is clear.

§ 16. To the next it must be said that the interpreter ought to be obligated by the priest to retain it: and even if he is not obligated, he is nevertheless bound to remain silent.

§ 17. To the objection to the contrary, it must be said that he is there as the ear of the priest: and therefore he shares in the act of the priest in some way on account of necessity: and therefore he does not receive this like another rumor, but rather as a confession, which is to be concealed entirely: and therefore he is to be severely punished if he reveals it: and yet the one revealing it is not to be believed to any prejudice of the one confessing.

Articulus 55 — Whether Sins Are Sometimes Remitted In Contrition, Sometimes In Confession

Whether sins are sometimes remitted in contrition, sometimes in confession?

§ 18. Next it is asked about what he says, there, D, a little after the middle: And if it is not immediately purged, it nevertheless becomes venial, etc.

§ 19. For what is said seems false: because there are many who are also absolved from the whole in contrition, and many who in confession: and the sign of this is that no penance was enjoined upon Mary Magdalene by the Lord: therefore many are immediately purged in confession.

§ 20. Further it is asked about what he says, that it becomes venial, which he had committed as mortal: for Avicenna says that the artisans of alchemy know that species cannot be transmuted: but mortal and venial are diverse species of sin: therefore one is not transmuted into the other.

§ 21. Response. It must be said to the first, that he speaks of what happens frequently: because frequently all three parts of penance are required.

§ 22. Or it may be better said that he speaks of what happens always: but then one must return to the solution often noted above, namely that the parts of penance operate, namely insofar as they are in vow, not only in act: because then it is true that the sin which he had committed as mortal, is made venial through the taxation of penance with pardon following.

§ 23. To that which is further asked, it must be said that "venial" is said in three ways, just as we noted in the second book of the Sentences, namely from its genus, like an idle word: from the outcome (ex eventu), just as when a mortal sin having been remitted through contrition, penance is also enjoined through the keys giving pardon in whole through satisfaction. Thirdly, anything in itself mortal is called venial: if nevertheless it has something in its circumstance, by which it can be excused through pardon. And this is opposed to the sin unto death, which is against the Holy Spirit. For a sin proceeding from ignorance or infirmity, which is said to be against the Father or against the Son, is a venial sin in this way.

§ 24. To the argument, however, it must be said that venial and mortal are not diverse species of sin: and seek the proof of this around the end of the second book of the Sentences.

§ 25. If nevertheless this is not done, then it seems it must be said here that a mortal sin is not changed into a venial sin, insofar as "venial" is called another species of sin, dividing sin with mortal; but the mortal sin is destroyed, and no venial sin succeeds it: but because the guilt (reatus) is not entirely destroyed, rather the debt of temporal punishment remains, therefore it is said to be changed into venial: and this is venial from the outcome. And it is similar to if someone, by the grace of the judge or the senate, is absolved from the judgment of death, and it is commuted for him into a judgment of the satisfaction of money or of something else.

Articulus 56 — Whether God Uses Justice Alone, Or Also Mercy In Condemnation

Whether God uses justice alone, or also mercy in condemnation?

Whether God uses justice alone, or also mercy in condemnation?

§ 26. Next it is asked about what he says, there, D, before the end: For justice alone condemns, etc.

§ 27. Against: 1. Immediately below he says, that he preserves mercy in justice, and justice in mercy: therefore it seems that justice alone does not condemn.

§ 28. 2. Furthermore, the Saints commonly say that in every divine work there is mercy and truth: and the Master will prove this below: therefore what is said here seems false.

§ 29. Further it is asked about what he immediately adds: And since shame is a great punishment, he who blushes for Christ becomes worthy of mercy.

§ 30. For according to this it seems that the first grace falls under the merit of the one receiving it: because to blush at our sins is in our power: and this was proven to be false at the end of the first book of the Sentences, and also in the second book.

§ 31. Response. It must be said to the first, that the Master here recites the words of Augustine, who speaks under a certain hypothesis, namely that if God were to use justice alone towards sinners, then indeed it would be true that He would condemn all: and this without doubt seems to be the meaning of the Letter. Others, however, solve this otherwise, namely that in punishing God principally uses justice: and that mercy precedes, or as it were follows, because it is not mercy liberating in whole, but as it were relaxing something of the punishment: and it does not impede justice, but as it were holds it back lest it avenge upon the sinner as much as he merited: and therefore the whole is attributed to justice. But the first solution speaks the truth of the Letter, not the second.

§ 32. To that which is further asked, it must be said that the first grace does not fall under the merit of condignity (meritum condigni), as far as the one who receives it is concerned, but under the merit of congruity (meritum congrui); for it is congruous that he who has prepared himself to receive grace through attrition, confession, and the flush of shame should receive grace. Grace, however, falls rather under the merit of another, than of the receiver: because

one can well merit the first grace for another, although the same cannot merit it for himself. And this was disputed above in the treatise on reprobation.

Articulus 57 — Whether It Is Always Necessary To Confess To One's Own Priest

Whether it is always necessary to confess to one's own priest?

§ 33. Next it is asked about what he says, there, D, towards the end: For confession suffices, which is first offered to God, etc.

§ 34. For it seems from this, that it is necessary to always confess to one's own priest. 1. Let us suppose therefore, that I probably know that he would reveal the confession, then I will fall into the improbable custom which is condemned here.

§ 35. 2. Furthermore, let us suppose that someone has fornicated with the daughter or sister or mother or concubine of the priest, and he probably knows that if he were to tell him in confession, he would always hate him: it seems that then it would not behoove him to confess because he will scandalize him.

§ 36. 3. Furthermore, let us suppose that a woman must confess, and she probably estimates that the priest will incline her to evil through prayers or an unchaste touch, it seems that in such a case she ought not to confess.

§ 37. Response. It must be said that in all these cases, if he can conveniently do so, he ought to recur to a superior, or someone who has the power of a superior. But if he cannot because of the danger of the road, or the quality of her sex, because perhaps she is a woman, and she fears being corrupted on the road: she ought to ask this through another, that license be granted to her to confess to another, lest the order which is in the prelates of the Church be contemned. But if she cannot even do this, which nevertheless rarely happens: then under the hope of ratification, by the fact that the superior ought not to deny such license, she can confess to another until she comes into the presence of the superior, and can obtain license.

§ 38. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

§ 39. I also say the same concerning an ignorant priest or one not knowing how to distinguish between venial and mortal.

§ 40. But in this chapter above it was treated of shame and blushing, and therefore we ask nothing here about it: and above it has been disputed much about it, and let it be sought there.

Articulus 58 — Whether Someone Can Confess To His Companion, And To What That Confession Avails

Whether someone can confess to his companion, and what is that confession worth?

§ 41. Next we must transition to that chapter E, Now before to the premised authorities, etc.

§ 42. And it must be asked first concerning what he says, there, after the beginning: But is it equally valuable for someone to confess to a companion? etc.

§ 43. Secondly, whether that confession is a sacrament, or not?

§ 44. To the first, it is thus objected: 1. Confession is made for the sake of absolution: but a layman does not have the power of absolving: therefore confession made to a layman seems to be worth nothing.

§ 45. 2. Furthermore, a part of the punishment is remitted by the virtue of the keys: but a layman does not have the keys: therefore it seems that confession made to him confers nothing.

§ 46. 3. Furthermore, the reconciliation of the Church is done through a minister of the Church: but a layman is not a minister of the Church: therefore it ought not to be made to a layman.

§ 47. But because many things have been held concerning this, let these suffice.

§ 48. Solution. It must be said, however, to the objection, that a confession made to a layman is valid, where an article of necessity, not a contempt of religion, excludes one's own or another priest.

§ 49. To the objections, however, our fathers in this science have responded, saying that the power of absolving is manifold. For there is the power of absolving from authority which is of God. And there is the power of superexcellence: and this belongs to Christ as man, who absolved penitent sinners without confession made outwardly, and without the exaction of a taxed satisfaction. The third power is from the merit of life, and the suffrages of prayers: and this belongs to the saints in the Church, by which one merits for another the first grace by which he absolves from sins. But another power is from the office of ministers, conceded to priests. And the last is from the unity of faith and charity, and this descends for the article of necessity into every man for coming to the aid of his neighbor: and the layman has this power in the article of necessity, and similarly a woman.

§ 50. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 59 — Whether A Confession Made To A Lay Companion Is A Sacrament

Whether a confession made to a lay companion is a sacrament?

Whether a confession made to a lay companion is a sacrament?

§ 51. Secondly it is asked, whether this confession is a sacrament?

§ 52. And it seems that it is not: because 1. Every sacrament is in the dispensation of the ministers of the Church: but this man is not a minister of the Church: therefore it is not a sacrament.

§ 53. 2. Furthermore, the power of the keys precedes the form of absolution which is a sacrament: but this layman does not have the keys: therefore he does not give a sacrament.

§ 54. To the contrary is that baptism, by whomever it is given, is a sacrament: therefore similarly penance, as it seems.

§ 55. Solution. It must be said that the ancients said that contrition and confession are not a sacrament, but absolution alone. But it will be proven below in the Letter that this is nothing. Whence it must be said that it has the sacrament of confession.

§ 56. To the first therefore it must be said that the minister is twofold, namely true, and there is a vicar, and such a vicar minister suffices here for the article of necessity.

§ 57. To the next [it must be said] that absolution through the keys is that in which true confession abounds over a confession made in necessity: but nevertheless there is a certain absolution here, namely that which is done by the merit of the unity of the Church. Therefore although it may not attain as much effect as if he were to confess to a priest, nevertheless it attains absolution in common, and for this the power of the keys is not necessary, where a priest cannot be had.

Articulus 60 — What Kind Of Priest Is To Be Sought, And What Are The Conditions Of The Confessing Priest

What kind of priest is to be sought? And, what are the conditions of a confessing priest?

§ 58. Next it is asked about what he says, there, E, after the beginning: But let everyone take care to seek a priest who knows how to bind and loose.

§ 59. For it seems that there is no such person: because some things in the genus of sins are so perplexed that even great clerics can scarcely untangle them through the greatest distinctions, and many doubts still remain after their discussion: therefore it seems that such a one can scarcely or never be found.

§ 60. Further it is asked here concerning the conditions of a confessor priest, which some express in verse:

A confessor sweet, affable, and smooth, Prudent, discreet, mild, pious, and benign.

For such a one is scarcely ever found, who has all these things in himself.

§ 61. Besides, these conditions do not seem to be necessary, but rather only those which contribute to the act of confession: but these are to discern things heard, and to extract hidden things, and to medicate salubriously the things found: therefore it seems that no more is required in the one hearing confessions: for the discerning of things heard is done through the science of discerning between leprosy and non-leprosy, while the extraction of hidden things is done through discreet inquiry, and the medication of found wounds is done through a discreet injunction of penance or satisfaction.

§ 62. Solution. It must be said that a priest is not bound to know how to discern except in common, namely which are the common capital mortal sins, and which are venial from their genus: and this is very easy. For the doubt which happens among the wise, whether something is venial or mortal, happens from an incoming morose delectation, or from contempt, or the like, and not from the genus of the act. He who knows those things which have been said, therefore, is sufficient or is reputed so for the necessity of this time for hearing confessions. But nevertheless I think that one not knowing these things sins mortally in hearing confes-

sions, and the one instituting him sins even more than he does. And the one permitting the instituted one to minister also sins mortally, if it is his concern to prohibit such a one.

§ 63. To the next it must be said that the Masters do not posit only the conditions of a confessor from the disposition toward the act of hearing confession, but also those which can lead and attract men to confessing: and therefore they do not belong to the essence (de esse) of the confessor as he is a confessor, but rather to his well-being (de bene esse): but the three mentioned are those without which he cannot be without sin.

Articulus 61 — Whether For One Willing To Confess, But Prevented By Death, The Vow Is Reckoned For The Deed

Whether for one willing to confess, but prevented by death, the vow is reputed for the deed?

§ 64. Next it is asked about what he says, there, E, before the middle: Lest since he existed negligent concerning himself, etc.

§ 65. For let there be two, each of whom has an equal vow of confessing, and one dies unconfessed, because prevented by necessity he could not have a priest: but the other confesses to a priest: and in all other things they are equal: it is asked therefore which will be liberated sooner, and will fly away?

§ 66. But it seems that equally: because the vow is reputed by God for the deed, who looks at the heart: therefore one flies away just as quickly as the other.

§ 67. Against: Something is bestowed upon one from the power of the keys, which the other does not receive: therefore it seems that by reason of that, he will also fly away sooner.

§ 68. Response. It must be said that the one having confessed to the priest flies away sooner, just as the last objection proves.

§ 69. To the first therefore it must be said that the vow is reputed for the deed in all things which ought to be done by himself, and as to substantial merit: but as to those things which are done through another, it is impossible that the vow be reputed for the deed: but there is a diminution of punishment through the keys which are in the ministry of the priest, and by the virtue of the passion of Christ: and therefore in that the vow is not reputed for the deed: but the diminution of punishment is neither of substantial merit, nor of substantial reward. And in such things exterior works avail more than the will: and as to this they are unequal.

Articulus 62 — Whether Different Solicitude Ought To Be Had With Respect To Penitents

Whether a diverse solicitude is to be had regarding penitents?

§ 70. Next it is asked about what he says, there, E, around the middle: He raised her inside, whom he found inside, etc.

§ 71. For it is asked here concerning the diverse solicitude of priests to be had regarding penitents.

§ 72. 1. For the one dead inside is he whose sin lies hidden within himself, or in the heart alone: but he is raised through penance: therefore something of an exterior work ought not to be enjoined upon him, but only something hidden: therefore those enjoining fasts, alms, pilgrimages, and the like sin, which is false.

§ 73. Furthermore, the presence of the three disciples, namely of Peter, James, and John, imports something. But it seems from this that a priest could admit with himself to hear hidden confessions good persons who can benefit and not hinder, so that they may pray for the penitent. And this is condemned by the Church: for it is not licit for a priest to admit anyone to the hearing of anyone's confession.

§ 74. 2. Furthermore, from the raising of the second dead person it seems that confession and the injunction of penance ought to be made in the presence of a multitude: therefore it seems that everyone who has manifestly sinned ought to manifestly confess, and undergo public penance: and this also is not read.

§ 75. 3. Also, it is objected concerning the third who was raised by the cry of the Lord, in which it seems to be signified that the sin of the obstinate must be cried out into the ears even of those not knowing: and this is most false: therefore it seems that these three things are badly brought forward regarding the deed of priests in hearing confessions.

§ 76. Response. It must be said that the girl of whom Matthew speaks (9:23 ff.) and Mark (5:37 ff.), who was raised inside, in truth signified hidden sin: but that the disciples were admitted was done for the sake of the disciples who were future priests and doctors, and for the instruction of priests, so that in a figure by detecting the mystery they might learn to veil the hidden sins of men.

§ 77. But as to what is objected concerning hidden and manifest penance, it must be said that manifest penance is spoken of in two ways, namely either that which is manifest as the penance of such a sin, or that which is manifest, not as penance, but as a meritorious deed undertaken from devotion from the stole of the priest. And in the first way indeed, a manifest penance ought never to be imposed for a hidden sin, because this would be in some way to betray the confession. But in the other way a manifest penance can be done, because from this no sin is detected: since even without the confession of sins such works are often undertaken by the faithful from the stole of the priests.

§ 78. Nevertheless some say that the virtues which ought to be in priests are morally signified by the three disciples: by James the constancy of the fight against the devil, that he may snatch away the sheep committed to him: by Peter power and knowledge: and by John grace in the bowels of mercy: and we do not care for this, because this is a place of disputing more than of preaching.

§ 79. To the next it must be said that a public sin, which has drawn all or many into scandal, ought to be punished by a public penance, as was held above in the authority of Augustine in this same distinction. So that if his sin is not only in his grave evil, but also in so great a scandal of others, and this seems to the Bishop to be expedient for the utility of the Church, he should not refuse to do penance into the notice of many or of the whole people.

§ 80. To the objection, however, it must be said that this is not to publish the confession, but rather to punish the sin with a condign emendation: so that just as he de-edified the Church by sinning publicly, so he may emend it by publicly satisfying.

§ 81. To the next it must be said that the cry does not signify public proclamation, but rather a devout postulation of suffrage from God, and a petition of intercession from the Church, which is signified by the crowd led to the tomb. The gate, however, in which the youth is raised signifies the opening of the notice of those whom he scandalized.

Articulus 63 — Whether One Excommunicated By The Church And Not By God Is To Be Avoided

Whether one excommunicated by the Church, and not by God, is to be avoided?

Whether one excommunicated by the Church, and not by God, is to be avoided?

§ 82. Next it is asked about what he says, there, E, before the end: Let no one seek priests divided from the unity of the Church by any fault, etc.

§ 83. The Church seems often to err by excommunicating those who are not excommunicated: if therefore such a one is sought who is not excommunicated as regards God, but as regards the Church, it seems that he ought not to harm the penitent.

§ 84. Solution. It must be said that by the very fact that he knows him to be divided, he begins to harm if he seeks him: because God approves and commands that man should judge according to the face, because faith cannot be made to man except from the face. Whence although the Church may err, nevertheless God approves that this man conduct himself as excommunicated, and that others avoid him. And he who does not wish to avoid him contemns the bond of the Church, and therefore sins. And yet the Letter seems to excuse them from the objection: because it says, by some fault, etc., but if he is divided from the Church even without real fault, but only for an opined fault, then the first solution has place.

Articulus 64 — Whether We Are Bound To Confess Venial Sins, And Whether The Confession Of Those Things That Have Been Said Is To Be Repeated

Whether we are bound to confess venial sins? And, whether the confession of those things which were said is to be reiterated?

§ 85. Next it is asked about what he says, there, E, before the end: To coequals daily and light things, etc.

§ 86. For it seems that we are not bound to the confession of venial sins: because 1. Those are what escape our notice, concerning which it is said: Who understands his offenses? therefore it seems that we are not bound, because it is impossible to confess the unknown.

§ 87. 2. Furthermore, venial and mortal have no proportion: therefore neither do their medicines: but some medicine is confession for a mortal sin: therefore there will be none for a venial sin.

§ 88. Although it has been held and solved concerning this above, that, as I think, we are not bound to the confession of venial sins except in general, namely by the confession of Prime and Compline and before the altar: nevertheless for two cases we begin to be obligated as much as we can, namely because it is not very certain what is venial, what is mortal on our part, although in genus it is easy to distinguish: and the second case is for the sake of security.

§ 89. To that, however, which is first objected, it must be said that we are not bound as to the unknown ones, but we are bound to confess the known ones in the predicted way, and in no other, unless it is doubtful to us how great they are on account of adherence and custom.

§ 90. To the next it must be said that it does not follow, if mortal and venial sin are improportionable, that their medicines are improportionable: because on the part of the aversion some sins are improportionable, but on the part of the conversion they are proportionable: and the medicine of penance regards them on the part of the conversion, not of the aversion, as was held above in the question on satisfaction, and in the question of how a venial sin becomes mortal.

F. Here he opens how the abovesaid authorities are to be understood.

§ 91. Since therefore from these and many other testimonies it becomes perspicuous and is indubitably established that sins are to be confessed first to God, then to the priest: and if he is lacking, even to a companion: that statement of John Chrysostom placed above is not to be understood so that it is licit for anyone, if he has time, not to confess to a priest: but because it suffices where a crime is hidden, to speak to God alone through a priest, and once. Nor does it behoove what is hidden to be published in the presence of many. Which he noted saying: I do not say to you that you betray yourself in public. For just as a public harm needs a public remedy, so also a hidden one is purged by a secret confession and a hidden satisfaction. Nor is it necessary that what we have confessed once to a priest, we confess again: but we ought to continually confess it by the tongue of the heart, not of the flesh, before the true judge. Whence likewise John says: But now if you remember your sins, and frequently pronounce them in the sight of God, and pray for them, you will more quickly destroy them. But if you forget them, then you will remember them unwillingly, when they will be published, and brought forth in the sight of all friends and enemies, and of the holy Angels. Thus also that statement of Ambrose: Tears wash the offense, which it is a shame to confess with the voice: is to be referred to public penance. For there, showing the virtue of tears and of confession, he wished to signify that hidden tears and a secret confession, such as that which is made to a priest alone, wash the offense which shames someone to confess publicly. But because he says that he has read of Peter's tears, not of his satisfaction or confession: he does not exclude those by this. For many things were done which are not written: and perhaps the institution of confession, which now exists, was not yet made. Similarly also that statement of Prosper: If they become judges of themselves, they will commute eternal punishments. And that statement: They will more easily placate God for themselves, who either betray their crime by their own confessions, or, while others are ignorant, bring a sentence of excommunication against themselves: behooves to be referred to public confession and satisfaction. For the right of binding and loosing is not given to priests alone, if it is licit for anyone by his own judgment to bind himself with a penalty or a sentence of excommunication, and to

reconcile himself to God or the altar without priestly judgment: which is thoroughly repugnant to ecclesiastical institution and custom. Rather therefore if you have sinned publicly, publicly confess yourself guilty, and emend it. But if you have offended hiddenly, even so you should not remain silent: nor yet do I say that you should publish it. For the taciturnity of a sin is born from the pride of the heart. For someone conceals his sin for this reason, lest he be reputed outwardly such as he has already exhibited himself to the divine sight: which is born from the fountain of pride. For it is a species of pride to wish oneself to seem just who is a sinner: and he is convicted as a hypocrite who, in the likeness of the first parents, either contends to lighten his sins by a tergiversation of words, or like Cain seeks to suppress his sins by remaining silent. Where therefore pride reigns and hypocrisy, humility has no place. But without humility it is not licit for anyone to hope for pardon. Where therefore there is the taciturnity of confession, the pardon of the crime is not to be hoped for. Now it is most certainly clear how detestable is the silence of a sin, and conversely how necessary is confession. For confession is the testimony of a conscience fearing God. For he who fears the judgment of God, does not blush to confess his sin. Perfect fear looses all shame: the confession of a sin has shame, and blushing itself is a grave punishment. And therefore we are commanded to confess sins, so that we may suffer blushing for a punishment: for this itself is a part of the divine judgment.

§ 92. If therefore it is asked, whether confession is necessary, since the sin has already been destroyed in contrition? We say that it is a certain punishing of the sin, just as the satisfaction of a work. Through confession the priest also understands how he ought to judge concerning the crime. Through it also the sinner becomes more humble and more cautious.

Expositio Textus

Exposition of the Text

§ 93. Next that chapter F is to be taken up, Since therefore from these and others, etc.

§ 94. And it must be asked concerning what he says, there, Nor is it necessary that what we have confessed once to a priest, we confess again, etc.

§ 95. For let us suppose that he has suffered a relapse: for then it behooves him to confess again: therefore what he says is false.

§ 96. Response. He does not speak of this case:

§ 1. ...but rather when someone fulfills the enjoined penance.

§ 2. Next, it is asked concerning what he says there, at F, before the end: Which is born from the fount of pride, etc.

§ 3. For according to this, pride seems to be the fount of other evils: which is against the Apostle, in 1 Timothy 6:10, where it is said: The root of all evils is cupidity.[606]

§ 4. And the solution to this should be sought in the second book of the Sentences, where the roots of sins are disputed.

§ 5. Let these things suffice for this distinction.

DISTINCTIO XVIII

Divisio Textus

§ 6. Here it is usually asked, if sin entirely, etc. Here, confession is treated on the part of the one absolving, namely on the part of the priest's power.

§ 7. Moreover, it is divided into two parts: in the first of which he treats of the power of the keys, and their essence and use. And in the second, concerning the keys on the part of the one receiving the keys, there, Distinction XIX, A, After it has been shown, etc.

§ 8. Further, the first is subdivided into three par-

Articulus 1 — Whether Some Keys In The Church Are Necessary

-ts: in the first of which he treats of the power of binding and loosing in the penitential forum; in the second, concerning the power of binding in the forum of causes, there, G, § 2: There is also another mode of binding and loosing, etc. In the third, indeed, he adapts the words of the Gospel to these two, there, H, According to these modes of binding and loosing, etc.

§ 2. Further, the first of these has three parts. For first it is asked, whether there is a key? Second it is asked, what and how many they are? there, B, Those keys are not corporeal, etc. Third, he treats of their use, etc., there, C, The use of these keys, etc.

Whether any keys are necessary in the Church?

§ 3. Moreover, according to these three things we will also inquire concerning the keys.

§ 4. First, upon the first chapter by reason of that word which he says: Where are those keys, etc., we will ask: Whether there are keys?

§ 5. Now, it seems that there are not: because: 1. Fault (culpa) and penalty (poena) are annexed: therefore, one remitting the fault necessarily absolves from the penalty: therefore, keys are not necessary: and if they are not necessary, they do not exist, because nothing is in vain in the works of grace: therefore, it seems that there are no keys.

§ 6. 2. Further, the power of contrition often looses the whole before every act of the priest: but the acts of the priest are in the keys: therefore, keys are not necessary.

§ 7. 3. If perhaps you should wish to say that in contrition the whole fault is relaxed, but not the whole penalty: and the key remits a part of the penalty. On the contrary: That which is dismissive of the greater is also capable of the lesser: but contrition looses the eternal penalty: therefore, it can also remit the temporal part of the penalty which remains: therefore, the key

606. Ps. 18:13.

is given uselessly: because it is better done by one what is done by two, provided it can be done by one, as the Philosopher wills.

§ 8. 3. [sic] Further, someone is not a debtor to a penalty except from a fault: if therefore nothing remains of the fault, nothing seems to remain of the penalty: but after contrition nothing remains of the fault: therefore nothing remains of the penalty: therefore the key is given uselessly.

§ 9. 4. Further, this is proved by a simile: because if whiteness is not made in something, except what is caused in the whiteness of milk, either by the hot or the cold: if nothing remains of the cause of whiteness, nothing will remain of the whiteness: but it is certain that one is a debtor of no penalty, except from fault as from a cause: therefore if nothing of the fault remains after contrition, nothing of the penalty remains: and from this it follows as before, that the keys are useless.

§ 10. 5. If perhaps you should wish to say, as Master Hugh of St. Victor says to Bernard inquiring about this question, that the bond by which a sinner is bound from sin is manifold, namely, of obduracy, of diabolical captivity, of servitude which compels giving the usury of eternal death, and of obligation to confession. And from the first four indeed God absolves by Himself, binding to the fifth, from which He absolves through the priest by binding to one, namely, the penalty of expiation to be carried out in satisfaction: for he says that He looses from the bond of obduracy by the softening of the heart to penance: moreover, from the bond of diabolical captivity by which he is held lest he be able to rise by himself, He absolves by the aid of uplifting prevenient grace: moreover, from the bond of servitude by the aid of cooperating grace, by which he can work good things: but from the bond of eternal death by absolution from the guilt of eternal penalty. If, I say, you should say thus: I ask first, what necessity does God have to loose from the four said bonds by binding to a fifth? For since it is said, in Deuteronomy 32:4: The works of God are perfect,[607] it seems to be a more perfect work of God if in nothing he should remain bound, than that He absolves from four, and binds to a fifth bond.

§ 1. 6. But further, the work of God seems to be conditioned, in this namely, that He does not absolve this one unless he be obligated to confession: but a condition induces doubt and time: therefore the work of God seems rather to be subject to doubt and temporality: and every wise person reputes this the greatest absurdity: for the work of no one is certain, if the work of the intemporal and eternal God is rather uncertain and temporal.

§ 2. IF PERHAPS on account of this you say that these are not the keys of the Church. On the contrary:

§ 3. 1. Matthew 16:19, it is said: To thee I will give the keys of the kingdom of heaven, etc.[608] Therefore priests have the keys.

§ 4. 2. Further, the entrance to paradise signifies the entrance to the Church: but I see that that entrance is closed by the power of a ministering Angel: therefore the entrance to the

sacraments of the Church ought also to be closed by the power of the ministers of the Church: but that power is called a key: therefore the keys are in the ministers of the Church.

§ 5. Moreover, many other authorities are adduced for this in the Letter: and therefore let these suffice.

§ 6. Solution. It must be said that without ambiguity there are keys of the Church, which the Church has (as Jerome says) in its Bishops and priests: by which not only the sacraments, but also heaven is opened to the worthy, and is closed to the unworthy.

§ 7. Moreover, concerning the solution of the objections, it must be said to the first that the key opens the kingdom in two ways, by working toward the removal of the impeding sin: and one mode is often stated, and it is a good one, namely when someone is contrite, his sorrow has power from informing grace, and from the vow of confessing and satisfying, which he has in his purpose. Therefore, just as it is in composite medicines, which expel the whole disease, in such a way, however, that any simple medicine placed therein operates against some part of the disease and its cause: so I say that in sin there is fault and penalty, and there is an eternal penalty disproportionate to the powers of the penitent, and harsh in proportion to the debt of the guilt: and grace indeed has an effect against the fault, and sorrow against the harshness of the penalty: but the sorrow of the passion of Christ against its eternity: and the vow of submitting oneself to the keys having power from the passion, has the power to loose that disproportion, by which it is greater than the powers of the penitent: and the vow of satisfying sometimes looses the whole remainder, but sometimes it is loosed through subsequent satisfaction in act. Whence nothing prohibits the key from operating before the outward act of the priest: just as the grace of the mediator also operated before He was a mediator in nature by true mediation. In another way, the key operates in the absolution of confession by dismissing a part of the owed penalty through the grace of the ministry of the priests of Christ, which is not to be believed to lack grace, but rather to possess grace maximally. Although therefore penalty and fault are loosed in contrition, this is not done, however, by the power of contrition alone, but rather also by the power of the keys: just as although some disease is loosed in a medicine, yet this is not done by the virtue of one of the ingredients received in the medicine, but by the virtue of each one something of the disease is loosed.

§ 8. To the next it must be said that the power of contrition never looses the whole in such a way that its effect is not there, as is evident through what has been said before: and also he is bound to submit himself in act afterwards, because otherwise, through contempt of religion, he would begin to be as malignant as before.

§ 9. To the next it must be said that sometimes the whole penalty is dismissed in contrition, but never by the power of contrition alone: and therefore so that the vow which he had in contrition, and which he was bound to have, may be fulfilled, he ought also to submit himself afterwards to the confessor and to satisfaction: but it is true that if the priest knew such a person to be absolved in his vow, he would not impose upon him a penance in satisfaction for past things: but he would either impose none, just as the Lord did not for Mary Magdalene: or

607. Matthew 16:19.

if he were to impose something, he would do this as a medicine for future things, just as preservative medicines are given: but because the priest cannot know this, therefore he enjoins penance for all venial sins.

Articulus 2 — Whether The Definition Of A Key Set Forth By The Master Is Well Given

§ 1. To the next it must be said that it is otherwise in an effect and cause conjoined by nature, and a cause and effect conjoined by will in the behavior of man: for in nature on account of this, when the whole cause is loosed, the whole effect is loosed, because nature acts by necessity: and therefore when the agent is removed, nothing remains of its effect. But in the will, because the will is deliberative, it falls into blame and praise from its work: and therefore when the cause passes, the effect does not pass, but rather remains: just as when fault passes in act, it does not pass in guilt (reatus), but rather remains. And similarly as to the debt of satisfying, it can well remain in whole after the recession of the fault. Whence such arguments in morals, even speaking civilly, are worth nothing, as has already become clear.

§ 2. To that which is objected concerning Hugh, it must be said that in truth that is the whole science of that little book, and it is understood, not such that the Lord looses conditionally, but the Lord absolves simply: nevertheless because in contrition there is a vow of confession, and without that there would be no contrition, on account of this he is bound to confession. And because the vow is conjoined to the absolution from the four said bonds, therefore Master Hugh says that God absolves by binding: but the priest conversely binds by loosing: for by binding to the penance of expiation he absolves from the vow of confession, by dismissing a part of the owed penalty if any remained after contrition. And through this it is clear that in the work of God, according as it is of God, there is no condition, nor temporality, but the necessity of that obligation is from the vow of confessing and satisfying at the arbitration of the ministers of the Church, without which there cannot be true contrition.

§ 3. And through this the solution to the last is clear.

§ 4. TO THE THIRD, however, it must again be said that although all things are equally possible for Him, yet not all things are equally useful for us: for it is useful for us that we be bound by such vows on account of shame and expiation, which not only avail for the expiation of past things, but also as a caution against future things. And whatever things are more useful for us, these God has ordained in the sacraments.

Whether the definition of the key posited by the Master is well given?

Whether the definition of the key posited by the Master is well given?

§ 1. Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, B, Those keys are not corporeal, but spiritual, etc.

§ 2. And four things are asked, namely: What is a key? Second, How many keys are there in number? Third, Concerning the key which is called the science of discerning. And fourth, Concerning the key which is called the power of binding and loosing.

608. Matthew 16:19.

§ 3. As to the first, moreover, let the definition of a key be extracted from the Letter, where from the words of Jerome the Master says, that the keys are the science of discerning, and the power of judging, that is, of binding and loosing: by which the ecclesiastical judge ought to receive the worthy, and exclude the unworthy from the kingdom. All these words are also in the Gloss on Matthew 16:19, and they are of Jerome.

§ 4. Now, the definition is formed in common thus: A key is the power of the ecclesiastical judge, by which he receives the worthy, but can exclude the unworthy from the kingdom.

§ 5. 1. Since however an ecclesiastical judge is from jurisdiction, not from order, it seems that he does not have the keys, unless having jurisdiction in the forum of causes: and this is false.

§ 6. 2. This seems also by another reason: because every power which is entirely perfected by some one thing, when that is had, it can be reduced to act: if therefore the power which is called a key were perfected from that one thing which is the sacerdotal order, with the sacerdotal order having been had, it could be reduced to effect: which is false, because according to this all monk-priests could absolve and bind, which is false: therefore it seems that the ecclesiastical judge is the one having jurisdiction. From this it is argued as before.

§ 7. 3. Furthermore, it is objected concerning what he says, By which to receive the worthy, etc. For the worthy, by the very fact that they are worthy, are received by the merit of their dignity: and therefore they are uselessly received afterwards by the priest, or are in no way received.

§ 8. But if you say that to receive them is to show them as received: then according to this the power of the key would be nothing except in relation to men, which will be shown below to be incongruous.

§ 9. 4. Furthermore, it is objected concerning what he says there, From the kingdom: because the power of man seems not to be over the kingdom. PROOF. The power of man in ministry is over that which is handed over to the dispensation of his ministry: but only the sacraments are handed over to the ministry of priests to be dispensed, and not the kingdom: therefore it seems that he ought not to say, from the kingdom, but from the sacraments.

§ 10. Response. It must be said that that definition is optimal: because in it is posited the genus, which is power, and the proper subject of that power, which is the ecclesiastical judge: and the differences pertaining to the special and substantial act, which is to receive the worthy, and to exclude the unworthy: and the end intended through all things, which is the introduction into the kingdom.

§ 11. To the first objection, therefore, it must be said that the ecclesiastical judge is taken here in the penitential forum, and not in the forum of causes, unless the power is enlarged for him: and it is not necessary that he have jurisdiction over subjects, but that he be apt to have it from order, and that nothing be lacking to him except the commission: for the act is not posited in the definition by saying, by which he receives: but, by which he avails or can receive, so that the faculty from the habit is noted: and the fact that he does not operate, is only because he does not have the subjected matter, which he cannot have except through jurisdiction.

§ 12. To the next it must be said that, the order being had, nothing is lacking as to the one operating: and therefore no perfection is added to the one operating...

Articulus 3 — How Many Keys There Are

§ 1. ...more than the order: and this is evident from the fact that if a people is committed to a priest, he does not receive any consecration on account of this. Now it is certain that all power is given through consecration in spiritual things: and therefore it is evident that he who has the order is entirely perfected insofar as it is from the part of the agent: but because every faculty demands matter, it is suspended from operation for as long as the matter is not determined for him through jurisdiction.

§ 2. To the next it must be said that the worthy become more worthy: for the dignification of God precedes, removing the indignity of the fault: and the work of the order and the key follows, removing something of the indignity of the penalty: and therefore they not only show them to be loosed by God, but they also absolve from something by which they came bound, and thus imbue them with the sacraments.

§ 3. To the next it must be said that the ultimate end of the act of the order is posited: because reconciliation to the sacraments does not occur except on account of the kingdom.

§ 4. Moreover, to the argument it must be said that the ministry of the priest is not over the kingdom immediately, but through a medium, namely through reception to the sacraments: and in this way it is well committed to them to dispense the kingdom.

How many keys are there?

§ 5. Second it is asked, How many keys are there in number?

§ 6. For it seems that there is only one: 1. For the Gloss on Matthew 16:19 says that the keys are the science of discerning, and the power of binding and loosing: but the science of discerning is certain to be informing and directing toward the act of loosing and binding: and such things, of which one is directing and the other executing, are not two, but one in act: therefore the keys are not two, but one.

§ 7. 2. Further, in us three things are required for a perfect work, namely to know, to will, and to be able: and yet the work going forth from these is one: now it is certain that the science of judging holds itself as 'to know' in us: therefore it seems that there is one key according to act, and one act of the key.

§ 8. 3. Further, in material things there is only one key to one lock: but in all spiritual things there is only one lock which is sin in common: therefore it seems that only one key is required: and thus it seems that there are not two keys.

§ 9. Also, of one effect there is only one power: but the effect is one, namely to bind and loose: therefore there is only one power: therefore one key.

§ 10. FURTHERMORE it seems that there are two keys: because: 1. Thus it is proved in the Letter through many authorities both of the Bible and of the holy Fathers: and let those suffice.

§ 11. 2. Through reason the same is argued thus: There are two things in free choice making a sin, namely reason and will: but the one committing sin is closed off by the sin so that he may not enter the kingdom: therefore each requires an unlocking: since therefore these differ between themselves, it seems that the keys unlocking them differ: but these are two different things: therefore the two keys unlocking them will differ.

§ 12. 3. Further, sin impedes the cognitive in one way, and the affective in another: because it impedes the cognitive like an interior spiritual darkness: but it impedes the affect through a downward inclination, and aversion from the incommutable good: but it is certain that whatever is in the rational soul is reduced to these two: therefore it seems that with these loosed, all other things are absolved: but the cognitive is bound in one way, and the affective in another: therefore they require different unlocking principles: since therefore they are two, it seems that the unlocking principles are two.

§ 13. 4. Further, and it is more to the point: The work of the priest in confession where he uses...

§ 1. ...a key, is twofold, namely the drawing out of the sin, and the absolution of the guilty: as is evident through that of Job 26:13: By His obstetricating hand the tortuous serpent is drawn out: behold the first work.[609] And, John 20:23: Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them: behold the second work.[610] Now it is certain that each work requires a power in the priest, because every work goes forth from some power: but the drawing out of the sin is not done except through the judgment of discretion, which shows how vile the sin is, how detestable, how much one is viler than another, and such things: therefore for this act the key of the science of discerning is required. Now it is certain that after contrition follows the absolution or retention of sins: and this work similarly is not done except by some power which is called a key. Therefore, since there are not many substantial works, except this one over the sin, and the other over the sinner, it seems that there are two and not more keys. Now this objection is to be noted: because it concludes the truth from proper things, and from those things according to which the definition of the keys is properly taken.

§ 2. HOWEVER it seems furthermore that there are three keys: because 1. There are three persons from whom all sacramental power flows: but one of them is according to what is appropriated to the Father, namely the power of binding and loosing: another is according to what is appropriated to the Son, namely the science of discerning: therefore there remains yet a third according to what is appropriated to the Holy Spirit.

§ 3. 2. Further, in every rational creature free to act, three things concur for a work, namely to know, to will, and to be able: therefore since a key is taken according to two of them, it seems that by the same reason one key is taken according to the third: therefore there will be three keys.

§ 4. 3. Further, to know and to be able are imperfect for an act: but if willing should supervene, then they will operate. Since therefore a key is a most perfect power for an act, it seems that necessarily there ought to be something there corresponding to the operating will: and besides that there are two: therefore with that one there will be three, as it seems.

§ 5. Furthermore it seems that there are four; 1. For every mode of opening or absolving requires a different instrument: but four modes of binding and loosing are determined by the Master in the Letter: therefore there will be four instruments: therefore four keys: for he says that he looses and binds, when he demonstrates someone to be absolved or bound. Also, when he reconciles and restores to the Church, and when he dismisses a part of the penalty, and when he bears excommunication, or absolves from it.

§ 6. 2. Further, when the Lord speaks to Peter concerning the keys, He names not only the keys of the kingdom of heaven, but also the gates of hell: if therefore there are two for the gates of the kingdom, by the same reason there will be two for the gates of hell: therefore there will be four.

§ 7. 3. Further, it seems that there are more than four: because there are the gates of hell, of paradise, of limbo, of purgatory, and of heaven: but it is certain that all these gates are opened: therefore it seems that they exercise distinct and determinate keys: therefore since two keys are adapted to one gate, it seems that at the least there are ten keys.

§ 8. RESPONSE. It must be said that, as is had in Isaiah 22:22, where it is said: I will give the key of the house of David upon his shoulder: and he shall open, and there shall be none to shut: and he shall shut, and there shall be none to open.[611] The Son of God is the true key of the kingdom of heaven, because He Himself unlocked for us the entrance of the kingdom, which Adam by his sin had shut off: whence it is read in the Easter prayer: Almighty God, who through Thine Only-begotten, our Redeemer, having conquered death, hast unlocked for us the entrance of eternity. Now in the divine Son there are two things, as is said, in 1 Corinthians 1:24, namely, Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God.[612] And therefore because He Himself unlocked the kingdom with these two, He gave to His priests the power of unlocking in these two. And according to these two, two keys are taken.

§ 1. Now to this reason let the three be conjoined which are posited in the three objections adduced for this part, and especially the third: and there will be four according to which the two keys which the Saints speak of are distinguished.

§ 2. To that therefore which is first objected, that there is only one key: it must be said that the keys are not distinguished according to the ultimate end, but rather according to the proximate, substantial, and necessary acts. Now it is certain that a necessary act is the distinction of sins in confession, which is over the sins: and also a necessary act is absolution. And therefore according to those, although one directs to the other, there are nevertheless two keys. And it is similar: because although the virtue of prudence is the charioteer of the virtues, as Bernard says to Eugene, and directs the others, nevertheless because it has a proper act, it is called and is one cardinal virtue distinct from the others which it directs.

609. 1 Timothy 2:4.

§ 3. To the next it must be said that those three which are in us, although they refer to one ultimate act, nevertheless have proper and proximate acts that are different, according to which they are also distinguished, and are distinct faculties: and therefore also the proper and proximate acts of the keys are different, although the end is one: and this suffices for the divisibility of power and faculty, as has already been touched upon.

§ 4. To the next it must be said that in material things, to one lock holding itself in one way and closed in one way, there is one key: but to one lock having two closures, nothing prohibits there being two keys, because then one lock is as two: and so it is here, because there is one lock from the fact that sin is not discerned and distinguished, and another is from the guilt (reatus) which is innate to the sinner from the sin: and therefore necessarily there are two modes of unlocking and opening, as has already been said.

§ 5. To that which is objected, that there are three keys, it must be said that only two are necessary on account of the said cause.

§ 6. Moreover, to the first objection it must be said that the will or goodness appropriated to the Holy Spirit is not equal toward binding and loosing: but a key speaks of such a power that closes and opens equally: but God's will or goodness is always toward opening, as He who wills all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth;[613] and this is true as far as it is of itself: and if He wills otherwise, as Damascene says, He wills this from our cause: and therefore in the keys there could not be any power corresponding to the Holy Spirit: but He Himself gives the gift, through which sin is dissolved.

§ 7. Otherwise it could be said, and less well, namely that the two keys are not taken according to the attributes of the Father and of the Son, but according to the attributes of the Son alone, because He first closed and opened: and this was proved above through the authority of Isaiah.

§ 8. To the next it must be said that, as the Auxerrois (William of Auxerre) said, it is not necessary that anything concerning the keys respond to the will of man, because in the keys man ought not to follow his own will, but the will of God first absolving through grace: and this solution seems to be optimal.

§ 9. Others said more subtly and worse, that these acts, to open and to close, are not on our part: and therefore their faculties ought not at all to be taken on our part: but the will is on our part, and therefore no key is to be taken according to the will.

§ 10. To the next it must be said that it is true that where the first two follow the liberty of the will, there they are imperfect for the work, unless the will should supervene: because, the confession having been made and the power had, the will is still free to act or not to act if it wishes. But because in divine things the operation follows from the necessity of the divine precept, therefore, the first two faculties having been had, perfection is sufficiently had for the work.

610. John 20:23.

Articulus 4 — Whether The Knowledge Of Discerning Between Leprosy And Not Leprosy Is A Key Of The Church

§ 1. To that which is furthermore asked, Whether there are four? It must be said that there are not.

§ 2. To the objection it must be said that the first premise is false: because all those modes are reduced to two: for that he demonstrates someone as absolved and bound, is not done except through the dismissal of the penalty, as will be evident in the Letter: and through this very thing he reconciles to the Church. But to bind and loose the anathema is another mode: but because it is not except through the cognition of the fault, or rebinding or loosing, it agrees in form with that which is in the forum of confession and penance: and therefore it does not require other keys: and thus it is evident that that objection was nothing.

§ 3. To the next it must be said that although there are gates of hell, nevertheless the keys of the Church are not determined toward those: for each thing, as the Philosopher says, is determined and denominated through a definition toward the best things of itself: moreover, the closing and opening of the doors of hell follows upon the closing and opening of the gates of heaven, and the gates of heaven are the intended and final things of the keys, and therefore they are named from them: and there are two keys, because from the moment heaven is closed to someone, hell is yawning over him with open gates: and by the very fact that heaven is opened, the entrance of hell is closed.

§ 4. To the next the solution is clear through the same, except concerning paradise, and purgatory, and limbo.

§ 5. And to these it must be said that there is no entrance for us to the beatitude of the animal life which we lost in Adam: and therefore a way of coming to the place of the corporeal paradise, where Adam would have lived forever in an animal life, is not given to us through the keys: and therefore the Church does not receive the keys to that place. Now why there is no entrance for us to paradise is to be determined elsewhere, namely on the second book of the Sentences, where the ejection of Adam from paradise and the re-closing of paradise is treated.

§ 6. But concerning purgatory and limbo it must be said that they do not have perpetual fastenings, but are continually open for flying out at a determined time: the fathers indeed from limbo when the debt of Adam was loosed through Christ, and souls from purgatory when each is purged to the full: for we are speaking here of the limbo of the fathers, not of the limbo of children, which is perpetually closed.

§ 7. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Whether the science of discerning between leprosy and non-leprosy is a key of the Church?

§ 8. Third, it is asked concerning this key which is called the science of discerning between leprosy and non-leprosy.

611. Isaiah 22:22.

§ 9. For it seems not to be a key. § 10. 1. For everything which does not always follow one having the keys, seems not to be a key, since the key always follows one having the key: but the science of discerning between leprosy and non-leprosy does not always follow one having the keys; therefore it is not a key. The FIRST premise is evident of itself. The SECOND is proved from this, that every priest has the keys: yet not every priest has the science of discerning between leprosy and non-leprosy.

§ 11. 2. Further, nothing had indifferently besides the order and after the order and before, is a key: the science of discerning is such a thing: therefore it is not a key. The FIRST premise is proved by this, that the keys are given in the order of priesthood, and never without it. The SECOND is proved from this, that many before priesthood have this sort of science, and some non-priests have it more than priests.

§ 12. 3. Further, as the Philosopher says in VI Ethics, science is an intellectual virtue: therefore its generation is through experience and time: therefore it is not given in the order: but every key is given with the order: therefore science is not a key.

§ 13. If perhaps you should say, that the science is infused...

§ 1. ...key, not an acquired one; and the acquired one is that of which the Philosopher speaks. On the contrary: We see expressly that priests do not receive an infused knowledge in Orders: therefore, the infused is not the key, as it seems.

§ 2. Furthermore, infused knowledge is more certain in judgment than acquired: therefore, if infused knowledge were the key, every priest having the keys would judge more certainly than the Doctors who have acquired knowledge through long study: and this we do not see; rather, they either judge badly, or in doubtful matters they have recourse to those who have studied.

§ 3. But if this is said, it will be: 1. Against the Letter, where Jerome says that the two keys are the knowledge of judging and the authority of absolving.

§ 4. 2. Moreover, four reasons were adduced above, [showing] that knowledge must be a key.

§ 5. 3. Furthermore, every act of a purely motive power needs some ruler, or else sometimes it will be perverse: but to bind and loose is an act of a motive power: therefore, it needs a ruler, so that it may not sometimes be perverse. But the ruler can be nothing other than the knowledge of judging who is to be absolved and who is not; therefore, it must precede that [act]: therefore, the key is the knowledge of judging.

§ 6. Response. It must be said that many have said many things here, whose sayings, because I do not understand them, I pass over, up to three opinions, of which one is the Master's in the Letter, namely that it can be conceded that not all have the key of the knowledge of judging: but those who lack it, lack it to their own damnation, if they have the jurisdiction of using the keys and wish to remain in it. But I think this opinion is false, unless

612. 1 Corinthians 1:24.

the key is said to be the matter of the key, as will be clear below: for it is well conceded that not all have the matter of this key, that is, that which is material in the key.

§ 7. Others say that there are those who have knowledge as a key: and there are those who have it as a little key. For those having acquired or infused knowledge concerning discerning good and evil according to the differences of sins which it is necessary to know, have this knowledge as a key: but those having less, and following natural industry, have only a little key in themselves. And this too I consider false, unless it is understood in the same way as the preceding, namely that as to that which is material in the key, some are said to have a key, and others a little key; but as to the formal, all who are priests are said to have a key.

§ 8. The third say, of whose number I am, that knowledge is not a key, but rather the authority of discerning and judging: and this every priest receives in Orders, even though he does not receive knowledge. If, however, he has knowledge along with the other things that are required, he receives Orders well. But if he does not have knowledge, even if he is adorned with all the others, and he receives pastoral care, he receives it to his damnation.

§ 9. According to this, therefore, it is plain to answer the objections.

§ 10. To that which is first objected, it must be said that knowledge is not a key: but it is sometimes called a key, because it is the matter in the key: and the key is not in act except through it, because it itself is the disposition which the key wishes to find in the subject: and granted that it does not find it, then the key is frustrated from act. And it is similar in natures and in grace: for the motive power wishes to find the sensible power in the subject; and if it does not find it, it will not move. Similarly, a subsequent Order, such as the diaconate, wishes to find the preceding subdiaconate in the subject: and if it does not find it, it will not be in act: rather, it is suspended until he receives the Order which he skipped. Similarly, the visive power wishes to find pure and illuminated crystalline humor in the eye: and if it does not find it, it is suspended from the act of seeing, until the crystalline humor is purified. That it is thus in the priesthood is evident through that [word]: "Because you have rejected knowledge, I will reject you, so that you may not serve me in the priesthood." And that, "The lips of the priest shall guard knowledge, and they shall seek the law from his mouth, because he is the angel of the Lord of hosts." And that, "Furthermore the sons of Heli were sons of Belial, not knowing the Lord, nor the office of the priests to the people." And many other such things which are found throughout the whole Scripture.

§ 11. To the other it must be said in entirely the same way: because the authority of discerning is never given except in Orders: but the disposition which it is necessary to find in the subject, is had indifferently before and after.

§ 12. To the other it must be said that the Philosopher in truth speaks of knowledge acquired by the habit of moral matters, and experience and teaching concerning them: nevertheless, the response introduced against this is also, in my judgment, worth nothing; but the solution to it and the rest is evident through what was said before.

613. 1 Timothy 2:4.

Articulus 5 — On The Second Key, Which Is The Power Of Binding And Loosing, Whether It Is Communicable

On the second key which is the power of binding and loosing, whether it is communicable?

§ 13. Fourthly, it is inquired about the second key, which is the power of binding and loosing.

§ 14. For it seems that this power is incommunicable: because 1. Augustine says: He was unwilling to give the power of cleansing interiorly in baptism to a servant, lest hope be placed in man. Since, therefore, to absolve is the same as to cleanse interiorly from something spiritually obligating, it seems that such a power ought not to have been communicated to a minister, lest hope be placed in him.

§ 15. 2. Furthermore, in the Gospel of Mark, 2:7, where Christ said that he forgave sins on earth: thinking him only a man, they said: "Why does this man speak thus? He blasphemes. Who can forgive sins, but God alone?" Therefore, no one but God can forgive sins: therefore, the power of binding and loosing from sins is not conceded to a man who is a minister of the Church: therefore, this power is not a key.

§ 16. 3. But if you say that they do not forgive sins, but the punishment for sins. On the contrary: John 20:23 expressly says: "Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them: and whose you shall retain, they are retained." Therefore, it is understood concerning the remission of sins.

§ 17. BUT ON THE CONTRARY to this it is objected: because to anyone to whom the principal is committed, the accessory is also committed, according to the rules of law. But it is committed to the priest that he consecrate the holy communion, and minister it to the people: therefore, the preparation of the people for that holy communion is also committed to him. But the preparation can be nothing other than by absolution: therefore, the power of absolving is committed to priests: therefore, they themselves have this key.

§ 18. This same thing is proved in the Letter by the authorities of many saints: and therefore let these suffice.

§ 19. It must be said, therefore, without a doubt, that the Church in its priests has the full power of absolving: and this is the key of the ministering priests. But what its use is, will be evident afterwards in its proper place.

§ 20. To the first, therefore, it must be said that hope is not placed in man on account of this: because man does not operate except as a minister. Whence a good and an evil one have it equally: but God operates as the author and bestower of the gift of absolution in every way, just as he does in baptism, namely through his grace which he gives in the ministry, whether it be through a good or an evil one.

§ 21. To the other it must be said that man does not remit sin on the part of the guilt: because it belongs to God alone to do this. But through his ministry a part of the punishment is remitted to him, sometimes in act, sometimes also when the key exists in desire, as was said

above: and this by the power of Christ's passion, which is in the keys, and not by the power of the minister.

§ 22. To that which is objected concerning John, it must be said that it is understood concerning the remission of sin on the part of the punishment.

Articulus 6 — Whether A Heretic Having Orders Also Has The Key

Whether a heretic having Orders also has the key?

§ 23. Next, it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, at B: "It is certain that the Church is permitted both, heresy has neither."

§ 24. For this seems false: because 1. In the treatise on Orders it is proved that true Orders are also those which are received from heretics in the form of the Church: therefore, those things which follow upon true Orders are there. But the keys are among the things following upon true Orders: therefore, it seems that heresy has the keys of jurisdiction.

§ 25. 2. Furthermore, a true stone, like a true man, and a true ass, is said to be that which has the act of a stone and of a man and of an ass: and these are called dead, when they lack their acts. But let it be supposed now that a true Order is received in the form of the Church among heretics: therefore, that Order has the act of an Order. But the act of a priest's Order is the act of a key: therefore, it seems that he has the act of a key or of the keys.

§ 26. BUT ON THE CONTRARY: One who knowingly goes to a heretic sins mortally: therefore, he is not absolved: therefore, on the part of the one confessing, the final act of the key does not take place in him. Likewise, neither on the part of the one hearing the confession: because he does not have jurisdiction, and is suspended, and also sins mortally by involving himself. Therefore, from neither part can the act of the Order be preserved there: therefore, it seems that heresy does not have the use of the keys; therefore, neither [does it have] the keys, as it seems, unless false and dead ones: just as a dead man is not a man simply, even if he is called a man.

§ 27. Response. It must be said in this question that there is the power of a key from Orders, and there is power from jurisdiction: for, as was clear above, every act seeks matter about which it may be, and those in the keys are subjects, who cannot be had except through jurisdiction descending from the Supreme Pontiff. It must be said, therefore, that heresy having Orders in the form of the Church, has the keys, according as power is taken from Orders: but it does not have it from jurisdiction, and therefore it can execute nothing at all; and if in fact it absolves, it does nothing at all: and yet moreover both the one absolving and the one absolved have sinned mortally, if he knowingly approached such a one. And in this way is understood what is said in the Letter.

§ 28. To that which is first objected, it must be said that the execution of the key does not follow upon Orders, but only the power in one having the power, but not being able to act on account of a defect of matter: because the matter is not a man being heard, but rather a subject determined for himself through jurisdiction descending from the Supreme Pontiff. And as to

the latter, heresy is said in the Letter not to have the keys: because it does not have the execution.

§ 29. To the other it must be said that there are essential acts, of which this is true which is said in objecting, and those are the ones which follow upon the substance, and such an act the key well has in everyone having Orders. But this act is to perfect the one having it according to that power, just as the act of light is to shine, and the act of essence is to be, and the act of knowledge is to be knowing, and the power of the key is [to have] power according to the key. But this is not to be understood of the act which is an operation upon external matter: for a true stone, even if it never acts upon anything externally, possesses essence, and similarly a true man, and the like.

Articulus 7 — Whether A Priest Is Able To Absolve From Guilt And From The Liability To Eternal Punishment

Whether a priest is able to absolve from guilt and from the guilt of eternal punishment?

§ 30. Next it is inquired concerning what he says, there, at C: "But the use of these keys," etc.

§ 31. For by reason of this it is inquired concerning the use of the keys: and because this question is manifold, we will deduce each article of it where it falls upon the Letter.

§ 32. And first, let us inquire concerning that common use which the Master determines first in the Letter, namely whether a priest is able to absolve from guilt, and from the guilt of eternal punishment?

§ 33. And it seems that he is: 1. For it is greater to merit first grace for someone who is unworthy of grace, than to absolve from guilt one who is worthy of absolution. And a man can merit the first, even one who is not a vicar of Christ: therefore, a man can also do the second, especially one who is a vicar of Christ. But this is the priest in confession: therefore, in confession the priest can absolve from guilt and the punishment of eternal death, as it seems.

§ 34. 2. Likewise, Hugh of St. Victor in the booklet On the Power of Binding and Loosing says thus: Just as in divine absolution eternal punishment is changed into purgatorial, so in sacerdotal absolution a divine sentence is transferred into a human one. But the divine sentence is eternal punishment, and the guilt of eternal punishment: therefore, in human and sacerdotal absolution eternal punishment is transferred. But this cannot be transferred unless the guilt is absolved: therefore, it seems that in the priest's absolution guilt is relaxed.

§ 35. 3. Furthermore, if an earthly king were to commit his stead to someone in the judgment of affairs, he would give him plenary power of absolving those willing to make satisfaction, and of binding and condemning those who remain impenitent: that minister would be able to absolve from guilt and punishment. Therefore, since divine indulgence is freer than any human [indulgence] can be, it seems that the vicars of Christ, to whom in the forum of penance he said: "Whatever you shall loose," etc., can absolve from guilt and punishment.

§ 36. But if this be conceded, the contrary is proved through those things which are said in the Letter from the sayings of Jerome and Cassiodorus, which it is not necessary to adduce here.

§ 37. But through reason it is objected thus: A finite temporal thing cannot act upon the infinite and eternal: but all the power of priests is temporal and finite: therefore, it cannot act upon the infinite and eternal. But guilt is infinite and eternal: therefore, no priest can act unto the remission of guilt and eternal punishment.

§ 38. Response. It must be said that a priest cannot absolve from guilt and eternal punishment: but he absolves only by relaxing a part of the punishment, except in that way which was stated above, that the desire for the keys is in contrition, having a certain power towards the remission of the whole sin.

§ 39. To that, however, which is objected first, it must be said that what is introduced is not similar: because he who merits first grace for someone, does not give the grace, but inclines God to give it: but ministers in the sacraments act in some way towards this, that the effect of the sacrament be brought about: and therefore it cannot be in the power of the minister to confer grace, but only the diminution of punishment.

§ 40. To the other it must be said that Hugh calls the "divine sentence" a temporal purgatorial punishment, not however proportioned to the powers of the penitent: and he calls the "human sentence" a bearable punishment proportioned to the powers of the penitent: and this indeed takes place in the absolution of a man.

§ 41. To the other it must be said that the vicar of a king is not appointed except over a finite and temporal offense: and that can be placed in the power of a man. But concerning an offense against God it is otherwise, which is infinite, and therefore it cannot be placed in the power of a man.

§ 42. D. Whether a priest can forgive or retain sins? But it is asked, whether a priest is able to loose from sin, that is, from guilt: so as to wipe away the stain of guilt, or is able to loose the debt of eternal death? Some have judged that, since the sinner is held bound in two ways, as was said before, namely by the contagion and blindness of the mind, and by the debt of future punishment: the one is cured by God, the other loosed by the priest. For through sin he suffers certain interior darknesses and stains, from which unless he is freed, he will be cast into the exterior darkness. But when he is freed from these, he is raised from the death of sin. Whence the Apostle: "Rise, you who sleep... and Christ will enlighten you." For Christ alone, not the priest, resuscitates the soul, and, with the interior darknesses and stains driven away, enlightens and cleanses it, who washes the face of the soul; but he conceded to priests to loose the debt of eternal punishment. Which they assert was signified in the resurrection of Lazarus: whom Christ first vivified interiorly by himself, and then ordered to go outside; and him still bound he commanded the Apostles to loose: because, as they say, he himself interiorly cleanses the soul from the mist and stain of sin, but gave to priests to loose the bond of eternal death.

§ 43. But others say that God alone, not the priest, remits the debt of eternal death, just as he also interiorly vivifies the soul by himself: nor yet do they deny that the power of forgiving and retaining sins has been handed over to priests, to whom it was said: "Whose sins you shall forgive," etc. For just as Christ retained for himself the power of baptism, so also of penance. And therefore just as he interiorly enlightens the soul with his grace, so also at the same time he relaxes the debt of eternal death. For he himself by himself covers the sins of penitents: and he covers them then, when he does not reserve them for punishment. Then, therefore, he covers, when he looses the debt of punishment. But that he himself covers, Augustine says in part, expounding that place of the Psalm: "Whose sins are covered," that is, covered over and abolished. For if God has covered sins, he did not wish to advert to them: if he did not wish to advert, he did not wish to animadvert, that is, to punish, but to pardon. Thus therefore he says they are covered by God, so that God may not see, that is, eternally punish. For God to see sins is to impute them to punishment. But to turn away the face from sins, this is not to reserve them for punishment.

§ 44. Likewise, Jerome: To whom God forgives sins, he covers them lest they be revealed in judgment. Likewise, Cassiodorus: As to those who have grave sins, to some God imputes them, to others through mercy he does not impute them. From these it is openly shown that God himself looses the penitent from the debt of punishment: and he looses it then, when he inwardly enlightens by inspiring true contrition of heart. Reason supports this opinion, and authorities attest to it. For no one is truly compunct for sin, having a contrite and humbled heart, except in charity. But he who has charity is worthy of eternal life. No one, however, is at the same time worthy of life and of death. He is not therefore then bound by the debt of eternal death. For he ceased to be a child of wrath from the moment he began to love and repent. From then on, therefore, he is loosed from wrath, which does not remain upon him who believes in Christ, but upon him who does not believe. He is not, therefore, afterwards freed from eternal wrath through the priest to whom he confesses, from which he has already been freed by the Lord from the time he said, "I will confess." Therefore, God alone interiorly cleanses a man from the stain of sin, and looses from the debt of eternal punishment, who through the Prophet says: "I alone blot out the iniquities and sins of the people."

§ 45. Likewise, Ambrose: The Word of God forgives sins, the priest is the judge. The priest indeed exhibits his office, but exercises the rights of no power. The same: He alone forgives sins, who alone died for our sins. Likewise, Augustine: No one takes away sins except God alone, who is the lamb taking away the sins of the world. Moreover, he takes them away both by forgiving what has been done, and by helping lest they be done, and by leading to life, where they can absolutely not be done.

§ 46. By these and many other testimonies it is taught that the Lord alone by himself forgives sins: and just as he forgives to some, so also he retains the sins of some others.

Articulus 8 — Whether Sin Ought And Can Be Called Darkness

Whether sin ought and can be called a darkness?

§ 47. Next it is inquired concerning what he says, there, at D, after the beginning: "For he suffers through sin certain darknesses," etc.

§ 48. It is inquired here, What are these darknesses? For since light is the proper perfection of the intellect, and darkness is opposed to light, it seems to be according to the intellect only. But: 1. Sin is principally according to the affect: therefore, it seems that sin is not a darkness.

§ 49. But if it is said that sin is called darkness because it deprives the soul of the uncreated light of grace: in the same way it could be called cold, because it deprives of the heat of the Holy Spirit.

§ 50. 2. Furthermore, sin is more opposed to charity than to faith, because it deprives of charity in whole, and does not deprive of faith except as to form. Since, therefore, charity is heat, and faith is light, it seems that sin should rather be called cold than darkness.

§ 51. 3. But if you say that the effect of sin is the darkening of the intellectual virtues. On the contrary: We see many existing in sins understand more quickly than others: therefore, it seems that sin does not induce interior darknesses, which are a darkening of natural endowments.

§ 52. 4. Furthermore, if anyone through sins should have darkened natural endowments, that would most of all be the devil, who "did not stand in the truth," but "is a murderer from the beginning," as it is said, John 8:44. But on the contrary, Dionysius says in the book On the Divine Names that "the natural gifts given to them, we by no means say they have been changed: but they are entire and most splendid, although they themselves do not see, closing up their own virtues capable of inspecting the good." Therefore, others are not darkened from sin either.

§ 53. If perhaps you say that it is understood concerning infused knowledge: for in that the sinner does not perceive as much as the just. An instance against this seems to be concerning Balaam, who "knew the doctrine of the Most High, and beheld the visions of the Almighty." [614] Therefore, it seems that it cannot be understood concerning that either.

§ 54. Furthermore, the Lord says in the Gospel that "the children of this world are more prudent in their generation than the children of light." [615] Therefore, it seems that sin is not a darkness.

§ 55. To the contrary of this it is objected that Damascene expressly says that sin is an intellectual or spiritual darkness. And, 1 John 2:11, he says that "he who hates his brother is in darkness," etc. And, John 8:12: "He who follows me does not walk in darkness, but will have the light of life," says the Lord. Therefore, it seems through the opposite, that every sin is an intellectual darkness.

§ 56. FURTHERMORE it is inquired here concerning the other things which he touches upon here in the Letter, namely "the contagion and blindness of the mind." And above, in the first chapter of this distinction, he touched upon two, namely "stain" and "stench." And it is

inquired concerning the difference of these among themselves, how they agree with the effect of sin.

§ 57. Likewise, he touches upon guilt, by this that he says "the debt of eternal death." But there are things which he does not touch upon, namely fault, and sin, and evil, and vice: and the difference of all these is inquired.

§ 58. It seems, moreover, that not every sin produces contagion. 1. For contagion is a disease proceeding from a similar contact: just as a contagious disease is said to be that which is contracted from living together and a certain contact of association and of communication which is in association: but not every sin is such: therefore, not every sin produces contagion.

§ 59. 2. Furthermore, contagion is always in someone other than the first one sinning: therefore, it seems that not every sin produces contagion: therefore, it seems that it ought not to be universally attributed to sin.

§ 60. Furthermore, contagion is more apt by nature to happen concerning the body than concerning the mind: therefore, he ought much more to say contagion of the body, than contagion of the soul or mind.

§ 61. 3. Furthermore, blindness bespeaks a defect of the organ: but it is certain that through sin the organ of the body is not taken away, nor even the organ of the mind, which is the power that is the form of the organ: therefore, it seems that the sinner does not incur blindness.

§ 62. 4. But if you say that through sin there comes to be a privation of the habit of spiritual light which is grace: against this it will then be that it is still called darkness: therefore, spiritual blindness is superfluously posited there.

§ 63. 5. Similarly, it is objected concerning stain: for stain is not spoken of except in two ways, namely through the defect of that which ought to be for the comeliness and for the integrity of the beauty of a thing: just as we say that one whose nose is cut off or who has one eye has a stain. Or it is spoken of through the power of something defiling the comeliness: just as we say that one having morphea in the face has a stain. In neither of these ways, however, does sin seem to be called a stain: because it neither amputates natural endowments, nor does it posit anything in the soul, because it is nothing and posits nothing: therefore, it seems that it is not a stain.

§ 64. 6. Moreover, the stench which he names seems to be posited entirely irrationally: because there is no stench in spiritual things: but these are spiritual things: therefore, there is no stench in them.

§ 65. But concerning fault, sin, and evil, enough has been said upon the last part of the second book of the Sentences.

§ 66. Response. It must be said that all these things correspond to sin. For in sin there is an aversion from the incommutable good, and a conversion to the commutable good. Insofar as it

614. Num 24:16

is an aversion from the incommutable good, it is itself interior darkness, or the intellectual blindness of the mind. But insofar as it is a conversion to the commutable good, it is contagion and stench. For light is the universal form of the first movable thing, through which primarily the whole matter of generable and corruptible things is moved to the reception of the form of any species. But I say universal: not that the first movable thing universally shines, but because it moves to every form, and not specially to this one or that one. And through this, light has a convenience with grace, which is the first form moving to the formation into well-being of all the powers, and the essence of the soul itself, producing as if out of itself the other particular forms of the powers, namely the theological and political virtues, according as they are infused. And in this way infidelity is not opposed to light, nor any sin in species: but sin in genus, insofar as through aversion it is privative of this kind of general grace. But insofar as superior light is the perfective of exterior and interior sight, and sin depriving of the reception of light causes blindness in the spiritual sight of the soul, which the very name of darkness (tenebrae) shows: because tenebra is derived from tenendo (holding), because it holds the eyes lest they be able to see. But insofar as it is toward the commutable good, which is corporeal and corrupting, it is considered in three ways, namely insofar as the first impression of this kind of passing good remains in the soul; or insofar as it is inveterate by an impression of this kind; or insofar as it makes defective the beauty of proportion which the soul had through conjunction to the highest good. And in the first way indeed it is called contagion, in the second way stench, and in the third way stain. But concerning evil and sin it has been spoken elsewhere, namely at the end of the second book of the Sentences.

§ 67. It must be said, therefore, to the first, that light is not taken there for the spiritual perfection of sight, but rather in that general property which was stated. And in this way it is better called darkness than cold: because heat is not the total universal form, leading the forms of generable things to being, as is light which, according to the diversity of luminous bodies and angles and figures of those luminous bodies, leads all forms of generable things generally to being.

§ 68. To the other it must be said that it is true that sin is more opposed to charity than to faith: but it is not opposed to it more than to grace. And through this the solution is evident.

§ 69. To the other it must be said that in truth, as the Philosopher says in the sixth book of the Ethics, [616] the speculative intellect indeed is not corrupted through sin: but nevertheless the intellect of the prudent and of the happy man is corrupted through sin, even of the happy man according to speculative happiness, because that [happiness] wishes to be pure and not filled with [base] delight. It can therefore be said that the intellect is toward the pure true, or toward the true under the aspect of making, and toward the true under the aspect of happiness. And in the first way indeed it is not corrupted. But in the second way it is doubly toward the true under the aspect of the good, namely speculatively and practically: for there are some who are wise concerning those things about which prudence is, and yet are not affected concerning operable things. But others have the knowledge which doing follows, which is moving of itself, as the Philosopher says: just as one knowing how to play the cithara has it in

615. Luke 16:8

habit to play the cithara, and operates when he wishes. And this is darkened through sin: just as the Philosopher says, disputing against Socrates, that the estimation of the prudent man is corrupted through delight in the minor premise, where it is mixed with the operating affect: and in this way the intellect is darkened toward the good: because thus every evil man is ignorant. But according as it relates to the felicitating true, it is that true affected under the aspect of delighting the powers, which does not have repentance admixed: and then again it is darkened and impeded through sin.

§ 70. But to the other which is objected concerning Dionysius, it must be said that he himself speaks of the speculative virtues, according as they are only speculative: for thus it is true that they are not darkened.

§ 71. To that which is objected concerning contagion,

§ 1. It must be said that every sin imprints a contagion: for here contagion is called not only that which merely creeps from one to another, but also a corruption contracted from the impression of what defiles and putrefies, just as a bodily good to which the affect is subjected.

§ 2. To the next, it must be said that a contagion spoken of in this way is not always in another, but in the same one to whom the contagion is united as a corrupting agent.

§ 3. To the next, it must be said that blindness is spoken of here from the lack of the influence of light descending from above to the practical intellect on that part where it is mixed with the operative power or the affect: just as if the light descending into the eye were deprived as to the discernment of certain workable things, and not of others: and in this way the interior power of the mind is well hindered.

§ 4. To the next, it must be said that it is not called darkness with respect to this, but insofar as it deprives of the general form forming all spiritual things, as is clear from what has been said above.

§ 5. To the next, it must be said that a stain is spoken of through the defect of natural beauty, which it has from the corruption of the natural good conjoined with the gratuitous and uncreated. But that sin does this insofar as it is evil, and takes away the good, no one doubts who reads well those things which were said in the second book of the Sentences, in the tract on evil.[617]

§ 6. But to that which was objected concerning the stench, it must be said that it is taken spiritually in the way that Dionysius says in the book on the Celestial Hierarchy,[618] that the intellectual distribution is signified by odor: in which with respect to the lost devotion of the soul it is called fetid by the evaporation of concupiscence following the corruption of the true complexion, as was said.

616. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VI.

Articulus 9 — Whether Absolution From The Debt Of Eternal Punishment Is Effected Through Absolution Made By A Priest

Whether there is an absolution from the debt of eternal punishment through the absolution made by a priest?

§ 7. Next, it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, D, before the middle: But others say God alone, not the priest, etc.

§ 8. For it seems that they say what is false: because 1. Master Hugh says so to blessed Bernard in the book On the Power of Binding and Loosing: "The Lord by Himself looses the bond of obduracy, but by Himself and by a minister the debt of eternal damnation." Therefore they say what is false, who plainly say the contrary.

§ 9. 2. Furthermore it is also evident, that without a priest [someone] through contrition is not absolved from the debt of eternal damnation, unless he confesses and is absolved if he has the ability: therefore if he does not confess and is not absolved, he will still remain a debtor of eternal punishment: therefore the absolution made by the priest works something toward the payment of that debt.

§ 10. But against this is the fact that the debt of eternal punishment is eternal and infinite, as was proved above: but what is temporal cannot act upon what is eternal: but absolution is temporal: therefore it seems that absolution from the debt of eternal punishment is not accomplished by the absolution made by the priest.

§ 11. Response. It must be said that in no way does the priest absolve from the debt of eternal death: but the keys work towards this in one way, as was said above.

§ 12. But to the saying of Master Hugh it must be said that he is speaking of the absolution that impedes the return of that debt, not numerically the same, but similar in species , as will be clear below, when the guilt of sins is discussed. For the absolution of the priest operates toward this: because he absolves, as he himself said, from the debt of confessing: which if he did not fulfill, the debt of eternal damnation would return: moreover, he absolves by binding to the temporal punishment enjoined.

§ 1. To the next, it must be said that the absolution of the priest does not operate toward the payment of that debt: because God pays it simply and without an intermediary order: but toward the payment of that which would be born if confession and absolution were not received, as is just and due.

Articulus 10 — Whether The Word Of God Remits Sins

Whether the Word of God forgives sins?

§ 2. Next, it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, D, before the end: The Word of God forgives sins, the priest, and the judge, etc.

617. Hos 4:6

§ 3. For he seems to imply by this enunciation that these three forgive sins in diverse ways: and this does not seem so, because

1. The Word of God is understood either of a created word or of the uncreated Word. If of a created word: then it does not forgive sins except by way of persuading and inducing: therefore his division is worthless, because there are many things remitting sins in this way, such as grace, and good work, which he does not enumerate here, which nonetheless are more efficacious in forgiving sin than the word of God. If, however, the division is understood of the uncreated Word: then it seems that it does not differ from the judge whom he also posits here.

§ 4. 2. Furthermore, it seems that the judge does not forgive sins: because when he shall have taken up judgment and time, he will judge justices: but by judging justly, sin is not forgiven, but punished: therefore it seems that it is nothing when he says that the judge forgives.

§ 5. Moreover, when the Lord comes to judgment, it is not believed that he will forgive sins even for the faithful: therefore it is nothing when he says that the judge forgives sins.

§ 6. 3. Furthermore, he seems to speak falsely, when he says concerning the forgiveness of the priest: The priest indeed exhibits his office, but exercises the rights of no power. For the priest does exercise his power by forgiving a part of the punishment, as was said above: therefore what he says is false.

§ 7. Response. It must be said that the Word of God is called the only-begotten Son, insofar as he speaks to the Father in the world: for he forgives sins by a power of excellence, as was noted above, because his merit was of infinite value: and the Father has given all things into his hand. Hence it is said: Behold the Lamb of God, behold him who takes away the sin of the world. But the judge is God by forgiving through authority, and the priest through ministry: and thus it is clear how these three differ.

§ 8. To the objection, it must be said that the way the uncreated Word forgives is one thing, and the way the judge forgives is another: for God the Trinity is called the judge, yet is not called the word. But the Incarnate Word forgives in the manner of redemption by which he pays the price for us, which God the Trinity does not do: hence the objection supposes what is false.

§ 9. To the next, it must be said that it is understood of the judgment by which God will judge penitents with a judgment of mercy, in which there is little of justice, and much of mercy: for he remits all eternal punishment, and exacts temporal punishment: but in the future he will not remit.

§ 10. To that which is objected concerning the office of the priest, it must be said that it is not denied that he has power in ministry: but it is denied that he has power for wiping away interior stains, and relaxing the debt of eternal

618. Mal 2:7

death: but he has power over a part of the punishment in ministry: hence when he says, Of no power, etc., this is understood of absolute power in relaxing guilt.

Articulus 11 — What And Of What Kind Is The Power Of Priests In Remitting Sins

What and what sort is the power of priests in forgiving sins?

§ 1. Next, it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, E: Yet we do not therefore deny, etc.

§ 2. But here a useful question is asked: What is the power of priests in forgiving sins?

For it is evident that this is not over guilt, nor over eternal punishment: let it be asked, therefore, over what punishment does it extend?

§ 3. 1. Now it is possible to accept in the genus of punishment three modes of punishments, namely eternal punishment, and transitory punishment unproportioned to the strength of the penitent, and transitory punishment proportioned to the strength of the penitent.

Likewise, there are three things in penance operating against the punishment for sin, namely sorrow formed by grace which operates against eternal punishment, and confession making a transitory punishment proportioned to the strength of the penitent, and satisfaction which destroys the punishment assessed to the strength of the penitent. Therefore, since the power of the keys is in the middle, after the first and before the third: it seems that it operates upon the middle punishment which is indeed transitory, and yet not proportioned to the strength of the penitent.

§ 4. 2. Furthermore, once eternal punishment is forgiven, man has not yet departed from divine judgment, because there remains for him the punishment of purgatory: but it is not taken away by the keys and satisfaction: therefore purgation according to the order of justice is intermediate between eternal punishment, and that which is enjoined in satisfaction: therefore it seems that the eternal punishment is immediately commuted into that one, and that one through the keys into the one which is of satisfaction: therefore the power of the keys is over purgatorial punishment: but this exceeds all punishment of this life, as Augustine says, and will be held below: therefore it itself is not proportioned to the strength of the penitent according to this state: and thence as before.

§ 5. 3. Furthermore, the key operates through the virtue of the sorrow of Christ's passion: but that sorrow is unproportioned to every passion which anyone can endure in this life, as was proved upon the third book of the Sentences: therefore it seems that it operates against that punishment which is indeed transitory, yet is not proportioned to the strength of the penitent: and thence it is argued as before.

§ 6. 4. Furthermore, Ambrose says, and it is posited in the third book of the Sentences, and Anselm proves in the book Cur Deus homo,

that no penance of ours would suffice, unless the merit of Christ were co-assisting: but there is no cause why our penance does not suffice except that we are debtors of greater than

we can pay: and this is the unproportion of the power of paying in us: and this Christ paid for us: therefore again as before, the passion of Christ which operates in the keys has an effect against that mode of punishment which exceeds our strength.

§ 1. BUT TO THE CONTRARY of this it is objected thus: 1. The punishment of purgatory is not of the forum of the Church, because those existing there do not demerit: but the priest can change and remit through the keys of the Church only the punishment which is of the forum of the Church: therefore he can neither change nor remit purgatorial punishment.

§ 2. 2. Furthermore, let us posit that someone dies before he completes the penance enjoined on him by the priest, which was due to his sins: it is evident that he will cross over into purgatorial [punishment]: but he would not cross over, unless he were a debtor of that punishment: therefore he is still a debtor of that punishment: therefore it was not commuted, as it seems.

§ 3. If you say that in such a case the expiatory punishment through satisfaction is changed into purgatorial. Against this: Purgatorial punishment is incomparably heavier than expiatory punishment through satisfaction: therefore if the expiatory punishment through satisfaction was sufficient, the one that is in purgatory will be beyond condignity: but God punishes no one beyond condignity: therefore God will not punish him with the punishment of purgatory, which is false: therefore this too is false from which it followed, namely that the expiatory punishment enjoined on him through penance was changed into purgatorial.

§ 4. FURTHERMORE it is asked, Since many punishments respond to sins besides the sensible punishment in the harshness of heat and cold, namely the punishment of the worm of conscience, and the punishment of the lack of the vision of God, and the punishment of the horror of prison and of evil society, into what are all these punishments changed?

For it seems that they ought to be commuted: because the reason is the same for one and for the other: and one is changed, namely the sensible one in the harshness of heat and cold: therefore the others ought also to be changed.

§ 5. Response. To this it must be said that in truth, in my judgment, the essential act of the key is over that punishment which is called purgatorial, just as the reasons first brought forward seem to conclude quite probably: yet it does not seem to be denied that he who has greater jurisdiction in the keys, such as a Bishop, a Legate, and the Pope, could also forgive more and less of the expiatory punishment according to the discreet judgment of a cause of necessity or utility, as we will say below, when there will be a discussion about indulgences and relaxations.

§ 6. To that therefore which is first objected to the contrary, it must be said that this punishment is not called purgatorial from the place or forum of purgatory, because thus it would not be except after death: but it is called purgatorial from the likeness of property in two respects, namely because it is according to the judgment of God, and because it is unproportionable to the strength of man, just like the punishment of purgatory if it were now imposed to be endured. For since the mutation to the extreme is not except through a middle at least according to reason, and one punishment is eternal, but the other temporal assessed

according to the strength of the penitent, the expiatory punishment is intermediate according to reason, which is indeed temporal and finishable like the second, and not assessed according to the strength of the penitent, but due to the sin commuted in contrition: and this is called purgatorial by the reason stated, and it is at least intermediate according to reason: and also, if the merit of Christ were not in the keys, I think that it would be exacted from man: therefore the commutation of that one into the third is the essential effect of the key, which it has in everyone submitting himself to the keys through a vow.

§ 7. To the next it must be said that although such a one crosses over into purgatorial punishment whether after confession is made, or before, provided that contempt of religion has not hindered him

from confession, the punishment called purgatorial in the first way is always commuted in him. And therefore the objection does nothing to the proposition. But that the punishment which is after death is greater, this is by accident, namely because the state is changed: and the former is voluntary, and the latter necessary, and therefore has less virtue in purging: and therefore it is necessary for it to increase in harshness, and perhaps also in duration. Hence it is clear that God does not punish him beyond condignity: but this happens from the mutation of the state of him who ought to be purged.

§ 1. To that which is asked furthermore, it seems to me that the question is null: because although a punishment is evil, because it is from evil, and contrary to a good nature, yet it is not expiatory insofar as it is of this sort, but insofar as it is voluntarily undertaken: and not every punishment is expiatory in this way: because the punishment of loss in spiritual things is contrary to such expiation, likewise the punishment of the remorse of conscience: hence these are cast away, but expiatory punishments are inflicted, which alone are those that promote towards virtue, and they alone are the ones around the difficulty of which vices are eradicated, and virtues are implanted: and therefore it is not necessary that those punishments in which this is not present should pass over into something: but they are cast away with the sins just like darkness, and blinding, and stench, and such things, concerning which it was spoken above.

§ 2. And if you object that either God punishes, or man: therefore it is necessary that these punishments pass over into some punishments of man, or God will reserve them. It must be said that this is true, that either God punishes, or man: but it is not necessary that man punishes with the same punishment as God, because certain punishments are adjoined to sin, and pass away with sin, such as the corruption of the natural good, and the lack of the light of God, and such things which are punishments. In which every inordinate act is a punishment to itself: and therefore those do not remain toward virtue, and therefore those must be fled from, and other punishments promoting towards virtue must be undertaken: and therefore this question is null, as it seems to me.

§ 3. However, the ancients said in the solution to this question, that the punishment of the lack of the vision of God is changed into the delight of the presence of God through grace, and the punishment of the worm into the detestation of sin, and the punishment of the prison into

the long-suffering joyfulness of the Church, by which the penitent is bound: and the punishment of horrendous society into the joy of Ecclesiastical unity and communion, so that he may say: Make me a partaker, O God, of all those fearing you, and keeping your commandments, O Lord.

Articulus 12 — Whether The Charity Of The Church Remits Sins

Whether the charity of the Church forgives sins?

§ 4. Next, it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, E, after the beginning: The charity of the Church which is poured out by the Holy Spirit in the hearts of those, namely the faithful, who are its partakers, forgives sins, etc.

§ 5. For it seems that this does nothing for the proposition: because 1. The charity of the Church does not forgive except by way of merit: and it is not treated here of forgiveness through merit, but rather through the power of the keys, which is done equally by the good and the bad, who are unequal in merit.

§ 6. 2. Besides, an inconvenience seems to follow, if it is said as the Letter sounds: for given that there are only three or four men, and none of them is in charity: then the charity of the Church will be in no one: therefore if one of them repents, it seems that sins are not remitted to him, since they are not forgiven except in the charity of the Church.

BUT AGAINST THIS § 1. 1. It is said: Make me a partaker, O God, of all those fearing you, and keeping your commandments. Therefore sins are forgiven in the participation of the goods of the Church: but charity is what makes goods common and participable by diverse people: therefore sins are forgiven in charity for those participating in them.

§ 2. 2. Furthermore, one article is, I believe in the Holy Spirit, the communion of Saints, and it is usually expounded by all through charity communicating the goods of the Church: but evils are remitted through goods: therefore it seems that offenses are absolved through the charity of the Church.

§ 3. 3. Furthermore, it is said: Charity covers all offenses.

§ 4. Response. It must be said that every sin is forgiven in the charity of the Church: for this which is the mother of the good, communicates goods, so that what is lacking to one may be supplied in another, and those common riches are under the keys, and are communicable through the ministers of the Church according to the dispensation to be made by the discreet judgment of one key, which is the authority of discerning.

§ 5. To the first, therefore, it must be said that certain sins are forgiven by way of merit: but to dispense or give this merit to this or that person belongs to the power of the key.

§ 6. To the next, it must be said that there is one dove whose charity never fails: because at least it is in the triumphant [Church], and in its charity it forgives sins, and especially in the charity of Christ, by which he suffered for us.

§ 7. And if you object that the Saints of the triumphant Church do not merit, it must be resolved that this is true, that they do not merit for themselves, but they merit all day long for

others who are in the militant Church: and therefore in litanies we ask that they intercede for us.

Articulus 13 — Whether The Evangelical Priest Differs From The Legal Priest

Whether an Evangelical priest differs from a Legal priest?

§ 8. Next, it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, F: But he did not concede this to the priests, to whom nevertheless he gave the power of binding and loosing, that is, of showing men to be bound or loosed, etc.

§ 9. 1. For according to these things which are said here, it seems that an Evangelical priest with respect to power does not differ from a Legal priest, which is absurd.

§ 10. 2. Also, this especially seems from the authorities brought forward in this chapter, especially of Jerome.

§ 11. But against this it seems that 1. As priesthood is to priesthood, so the power of the key is to power: but the priesthood of the new law abounds over the priesthood of the old law: therefore the power of the key also abounds over the power of that one: but they only showed the cleansed: therefore these do something more than showing: therefore they remit something from the sin, either from the part of guilt, or from the part of punishment.

§ 12. 2. Furthermore, as disease is to disease, so medicine is to medicine: but in the Old Testament they were presented to the priest for a bodily disease, but in the New for a spiritual disease: therefore in the Old Testament there was only bodily medicine, and in the New it will be spiritual: therefore just as the priest of the Old Testament restored to the camp bodily, so the priest of the New Testament restores to the camp spiritually: therefore he does something more than showing them loosed or bound.

§ 13. Response. It must be said that a showing is done in two ways, namely by a demonstration alone, just as what is colored is shown by a finger: and through an exhibition in a work, just as a craftsman demonstrates an artifact when he makes it stand perfect before the eyes of the beholders. And a showing is not taken here in the first way, but according to some mode of the second demonstration and showing: but that one is twofold, namely when the artifact is completely made, or when it is made in the ultimate completive part: for then that which is according to a part demonstrates the perfect whole. Thus it is here: for God has forgiven the guilt in contrition, and has relaxed the debt of eternal death: and for completion there remains that which is committed to the ministers of the Church, namely the relaxation of purgatorial punishment, and the enjoining of expiatory [punishment]: and this is a part of the cure and absolution of sin, and demonstrates that the whole is complete, because it is the ultimate part, as is clear from the aforesaid. And in this way all the authorities of this chapter are to be glossed.

§ 1. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 14 — Whether The Legal Priest Had The Keys

Whether a Legal priest had the keys?

§ 2. Next, it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, F, after the beginning: Just as formerly the Legal [priest] in those who, etc.

§ 3. For it is asked, Whether a Legal priest had the keys?

It seems that he did: because 1. He had an order: and the key is a sequel of order: therefore he had the keys.

§ 4. 2. Furthermore, the keys are the knowledge of discerning and the power of binding and loosing: but the office of the priests was to discern between cleanness and uncleanness, and also to send outside the camp, and to restore to the same: which is to bind and loose: therefore the Legal priest had the keys.

§ 5. 3. Furthermore, it is evident that power in spiritual matters was committed to the Legal priests over the people of God: but spiritual power consists totally in the power of binding and loosing with respect to those things which pertain to the cohabitation of the people: therefore the Legal [priest] had the power of binding and loosing: therefore he had the keys.

§ 6. BUT AGAINST THIS: 1. The whole fact of the sacraments of the old law consisted in an exterior work, just as also the law itself which prohibited the hand and not the mind, because it did not confer grace toward the prohibition of the mind: therefore the order of the old law did not confer anything interiorly: therefore it did not imprint a character, nor give an interior and spiritual power: but spiritual power is a sequel of a character and a key: therefore the Legal priest did not have a key.

§ 7. 2. Furthermore, the sacraments of the old law signified and did not confer grace: therefore the order signified what is conferred in the order of the New Testament, and did not confer it: but spiritual power, which is the key, is conferred in the order of the New Testament: therefore it was not conferred in the Old, but only signified.

§ 8. 3. Furthermore, the New Testament abounds over the Old in some spiritual power: but it does not seem to abound in another, except because it is in spiritual matters, whereas that was in bodily matters: but the key is a spiritual power: therefore it is necessarily among those things in which the New Testament abounds over the Old Testament.

§ 9. Response. It must be said that in the Old Testament the Legal priest did not have the keys but he had a shadow of the key, that is, the power of absolving and binding concerning bodily uncleannesses, which signified the spiritual uncleannesses in which the Evangelical priest absolves and binds. Therefore we concede the reasons last brought forward.

§ 10. TO THE FIRST therefore it must be said that the priest had a key just as he had an order; but he had a shadow of an order, because it did not imprint a character, and therefore he had nothing but a shadow of a key either.

§ 1. To the next it must be said that the authority of discerning in spiritual matters, and the power of binding, is the key, and not in bodily matters, but rather it is a shadow of the key, when it is concerning bodily uncleannesses.

§ 2. To the next it must be said that the spiritual things of the Old Testament and of the New are said to be spiritual almost equivocally: for those are spiritual which signify spiritual things, and they are divided concerning the kingdom, and such things, which are dispensed through secular persons and laymen: and in such a way spiritual matters were committed to the priests of the Old law, and these are spiritual matters relatively speaking. Then there are spiritual things conferring the spirit, and these are the spiritual things of the New law, and therefore power in such things is simply the key: but power in the former is a power relatively speaking.

Articulus 15 — Whether That Saying Of The Savior Is True, "Whatever You Shall Bind Upon Earth," Etc

Whether that saying of the Savior is true, "Whatever you bind upon earth, etc."?

§ 3. Next, it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, G: The priests also bind while [enjoining] satisfaction, etc.

§ 4. For it seems that in this way not whatever they bind is bound also in heaven: and whatever they loose is loosed also in heaven.

§ 5. 1. For the priest can impose a lesser [penance] than condign, with the key not erring, because punishments are arbitrary: and then if that one dies having fulfilled the penance which the priest enjoined on him, he does not fly up, but finishes it in purgatory: therefore it seems that what he loosed even with the key not erring is not loosed in heaven.

§ 6. 2. Furthermore, there seems to be an instance in someone approaching falsely: because he is absolved by a man even with the key not erring, and yet he is not absolved by God. But that he is absolved by a man with the key not erring is clear: because a man ought not to judge nor can he, except according to exterior signs: and let us posit that all these concur in a false deceiver: therefore he is to be absolved: and yet he is not absolved by God: therefore it seems that there is an instance to the proposition.

§ 7. 3. Furthermore, if any judge is constituted in the forum of causes, he will not be bound to judge except according to exterior things, not interior things: therefore it seems, since the one hearing confessions is also a man, that signs ought to suffice: therefore he is bound to absolve according to exterior signs: and yet it very often happens that those are not absolved before God.

§ 8. Solution. To this some say that the Lord uses a verb of the subjunctive mood both in Matthew and in John: and this signifies the reality of the verb already perfected, because otherwise another [act] would not be conjoined and subjoined to that act. Hence the sense is: Whatever you shall loose, that is, of whoever you shall perfect the loosing begun by me in contrition, it will be loosed also in heaven. And likewise it must be said concerning the verb noting binding.

§ 9. And thus they say to all the things brought forward, that there is no instance: because their loosing is not perfected by the priest.

§ 10. But that this is completely nothing, is proved thus:

1. Let it be posited that the priest enjoins a condign penance for the sins: and yet that one dies before he fulfills it: he goes to purgatory: and yet according to this grammar, the priest had perfected the absolution: therefore the solution is worthless, because God does not immediately repute him absolved.

§ 11. 2. Furthermore, it is also objected against this solution: because once absolution is made, the priest has already discharged his office entirely: therefore then he absolves: and yet that one is still bound by the bond of satisfaction: therefore God does not repute entirely loosed him whom that one loosed.

§ 12. But if you say that the absolution of the priest is first completed then when the penance is fulfilled: this is ridiculous, because Master Hugh of St. Victor says that the priest looses by binding:

moreover, he binds to temporal punishment: therefore his entire absolution is perfected when he binds with every bond of expiatory satisfaction.

§ 1. Response. It must be said that that solution in my judgment is completely null: but it is understood that God reputes him loosed for as much as the priest absolves him, that is, by relaxing a part of the punishment: for God never exacts that part from him: and whatever he binds, with the bond remaining, he never absolves.

§ 2. To the first therefore it must be said that there is no instance: because God absolves him only relatively, namely from a part of the punishment, and not from the whole: and therefore he pays the other part in purgatory.

§ 3. But to this which is objected concerning the false approacher, it must be said that the Holy Spirit of discipline flees him: and therefore he has the sacrament, but not the reality of the sacrament. But this which the Lord says is understood of those participating in the reality and the sacrament: just as also in baptism it does not follow, "If baptism cleanses from every sin, that on account of this it cleanses the false approacher."

§ 4. But to those two things which are brought forward to prove it, it must be said that in truth the priest does not err, nor is there a defect on his part, because he reconciles well: but that one is not reconciled on account of the impediment of falseness.

§ 5. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 16 — Whether The Definition Of Excommunication Given By The Master Is Good

Whether the definition of excommunication given by the Master is good?

§ 6. Next, it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, G, § 2: There is also another mode of binding and loosing, which is done through excommunication, etc.

§ 7. But let us inquire here first, What is excommunication? Second, In how many modes is it done? Third, Against whom is it to be brought? Fourth, By whom is it to be brought? Fifth, How is it to be brought? Sixth, Whether minor excommunication is a mortal sin?

§ 8. Excommunication is defined by the Jurisprudes thus: Excommunication is separation from the communion of the Church with respect to the fruit and common suffrages of the Church.

§ 9. But it seems that it is not general: because 1. Someone is excommunicated unjustly, or even justly with respect to the exterior man, and yet unjustly with respect to the interior: and then he is not separated from the communion of the Church. Proof. The Church does not commune in bodily things, but in spiritual things: and this one still partakes of the spiritual things of the Church, because he does not lose charity on account of this, but has it: therefore not every excommunicated person is separated from the Church: therefore excommunication is not generally separation from the communion of the Church.

§ 10. 2. Furthermore, the Church prays for heretics publicly on Good Friday, and privately often: therefore it does not withdraw from them the suffrages of the Church: therefore it seems that the last part of the definition is also false, and does not apply, etc.

§ 11. 3. Besides, what is called fruit there? For it is evident that it is not the fruit of temporal goods there: because he is not spoiled of his goods on account of the fact that he is excommunicated. But if it is said that it is spiritual fruit of which it speaks: then it seems that it does not differ from that which follows, namely the suffrages of the Church.

§ 12. To the first of these, one proceeds thus: Response. It must be said to this, that

§ 1. Excommunication is defined inasmuch as it expresses a privation of communion: and thus the Decretists say: Excommunication is a separation from any licit communion or legitimate act. And that communion is said to be what is done in these cases, which are noted in this verse: Os, orare, vale, communio, mensa negatur. (The mouth [kiss], praying, greeting, communion, and the table are denied.) Namely, lest he be received with a kiss, lest one pray with him in the same oratory, lest anyone have communion with him in the sacraments, lest one eat with him at the same table. For these are called legitimate acts: hence since privation is spoken of in this way, it is clear that it belongs to the same genus as communion, which is a relation of ecclesiastical unity and conjoined society according to those acts. § 2. Therefore it must be said to the first, that if that definition is sustained, that when someone is excommunicated before man, and is not excommunicated before God, this happens from error and a defect of proof: and then he is even for that reason separated before man, although before God he is conjoined: and this suffices for excommunication, according as it is a bond of the Church by which it is united in this life, which is full of errors. § 3. To the next it must be said, that one prays for all, so that they may be brought near to grace: nevertheless one does not pray with all, and as long as they remain in true excommunication, they will not perfect fruit: but the Church asks that they be made worthy of absolution, and thus participate in the fruit of the Church's communion. § 4. To the next it must be said, that the fruit in the Church is manifold

besides suffrages: because the very living-together of the members of the Church provides a great fruit for remaining with God. There is also fruit from the communion of the sacraments. But suffrages consist in prayers and oblations, in which the excommunicated do not participate, as long as they are justly excommunicated.

Articulus 17 — In How Many Ways Excommunication Is Carried Out

In how many ways does excommunication occur? § 5. Secondly it is asked, In how many ways does excommunication occur? § 6. It seems, that in many ways: because 1. We see men excommunicated for so many and diverse and new causes: therefore it seems that the mode of excommunication cannot be reduced to one certain number. § 7. 2. It seems again, that everyone sinning mortally is excommunicated, and that a new mode of excommunicating is a mortal sin: because one sinning mortally does not communicate in the sacraments and the spiritual fruits and suffrages of the Church: therefore he himself is excommunicated. § 8. 3. Moreover, the Apostle says, that if he who is named a brother, namely among you, is a fornicator, or covetous, or serving idols, or a reviler, or a drunkard, or an extortioner, with such a one not even to take food therefore it seems that he himself is excommunicated. § 9. 4. Moreover, in the same place, he excommunicates a fornicator, who had his father's wife, namely his stepmother. And by the same reasoning one can be excommunicated for any other sin: therefore it seems that there are as many species of excommunications as there are species of mortal sins: and these are not reducible to one certain number, because evil is manifold, as the Philosopher says, and blessed Dionysius confirms: therefore it seems that the species of excommunications are not reducible to a certain number. § 10. BUT ON THE CONTRARY to this it is objected, that excommunications are not inflicted by those having jurisdiction except in two ways, namely major, and minor. The major is said to be that which cuts off from three things, namely the participation of the sacraments, entry into the Church, and the communion of the faithful in legitimate acts: and this is also called anathematization. The minor, however, is that which only removes from the participation of the sacraments, and not from the other two: therefore it seems that there cannot be more species of excommunications. § 11. Response. To this it must be said, that there are only two species or modes of excommunications, as the last adduced objection proves, the reason for which is this: because excommunication is a privation: and therefore it is necessary that it be known from its habit: but the communion of the faithful regarding the militant Church is generically in these three things, namely in the purely spiritual which is the participation of the sacraments, and the purely corporeal which is the legitimate act without which there is no human conversation and conjunction: because as the Philosopher says, man is a political animal: and he must communicate with his neighbor in legal and legitimate acts. The third, however, in which he communicates, is partly corporeal and partly spiritual, which is the gathering at the place of worship and the consecration of the sacraments. If therefore it is a privation from the whole that constitutes communion, it is anathema, or major excommunication. If, however, it is a spiritual privation only, it is the excommunication which is called minor. § 12. But if you should ask, Why is there not one minor which would deprive only of the corporeal, just as one minor which deprives only of the spiritual: and again another which would deprive of two of these, namely the purely spiritual and purely corporeal, or purely

spiritual and the middle between corporeal and spiritual, or purely corporeal and the middle, so that thus we would have five minors? It must be said, that excommunication is a spiritual bond, and for it to be an excommunication it must always deprive of the spiritual. Hence also it never deprives of the corporeal, except in order to the spiritual: and therefore it is necessary in the minor to deprive of the participation of the sacraments. But another reason for the same is: because frequently a just excommunication supposes a mortal sin in the excommunicated: and he would add to the sin, if he communicated in the sacraments, namely the Eucharist: because penance is forbidden to no one: but he does not sin mortally by communicating in corporeal things, unless he ought to withdraw himself by the precept of the Church in major excommunication. And therefore again there are no minors which deprive of communion in those four ways which have been stated. § 13. To all those things which were first adduced, it must be said that one sinning mortally is excommunicated as regards the triumphant Church: but the militant Church cannot live in the perfection of that one, and therefore it is necessary to sustain those sinning mortally in the communion of corporeal things for a time in many cases: because otherwise, as the Apostle says, it would behoove us to go out of this world, if we ought to associate with no one existing in mortal sin. To that which is objected concerning the Apostle, it must be said that he did not command to excommunicate those sinning mortally by the very fact that they sinned mortally, but because having been rebuked by their Bishop they were found contumacious, and refused to make satisfaction: and even today for any mortal sin anyone can be excommunicated. § 14. To the others the solution is clear from what has been said.

Articulus 18 — Upon Whom Excommunication Is To Be Imposed

Against whom is excommunication to be pronounced? § 15. Thirdly it is asked, Against whom is excommunication to be pronounced? § 16. It seems, that against no one: 1. For harm is not to be done to anyone in corporeal things: therefore much less harm in spiritual things: but the subtraction of spiritual things is harm in spiritual things: therefore it is not to be done to anyone: but this is done through excommunication: therefore excommunication is not to be pronounced against anyone. § 17. 2. Moreover it seems, that as long as there is another way of correction and salvation, the sentence of excommunication is not to be pronounced: but as long as there is hope of salvation through conversion, so long does another way remain: therefore as long as there is hope of conversion in someone, so long he is not to be excommunicated: but the conversion of no one is to be despaired of, as Augustine says: therefore no one is to be excommunicated. § 18. 3. Moreover, Augustine says, that rash judgment is committed in two ways, namely when doubtful things are judged as certain, or when someone is finally condemned who is able to repent: but one who excommunicates condemns in this way: therefore he himself sins mortally: therefore no one is to be excommunicated. Proof of the middle premise. As has been said, excommunication is not to be pronounced as long as the hope of conversion remains: but the hope of conversion remains as long as a final condemnation is not yet made before the one excommunicating: therefore the sentence is not pronounced unless a final condemnation is made, and thus the proposition is held. § 19. But if this be said, it seems that the whole Church errs, which excommunicates many. § 20. Further it is asked here, Why

the whole multitude as a community cannot be excommunicated? For a multitude can consent together into contumacy: therefore it seems that it ought and can be excommunicated: although nevertheless a new constitution establishes the contrary. § 21. Response. It must be said, that every contumacious person insofar as he is contumacious, can and ought to be excommunicated, and for no other vice is anyone to be excommunicated: the cause of which is this, because excommunication is a medicine by accident which is given to the desperate, when there is no other way of health and salvation for him, just as to a desperate sick man it is permitted to live according to his own will, so that from some aroused cause nature may multiply its forces to expel the disease. Thus to the contumacious one who can be corrected by no other way, the bond of communion is cut off, so that thus rushing from sin to sin without a bridle, having considered his own utility and his defect, he may return to humility and full conversion, and the grace of conversion. § 22. To the first therefore it must be said, that harm is not done to him simply: but because he himself has despairingly deprived himself of the fruit of spiritual things, the Church seeks a remedy by accident, where nothing else is able to bring back such a one. § 23. To the next it must be said, that the Church does not so despair of him, that she does not labor for his return, and therefore she excommunicates him: but she despairs of another mode of conversion inasmuch as it is from the signs considered in him: but the Church never despairs of the mercy of the Lord which converts sinners. § 24. Through this the solution to the following is also clear.

Articulus 19 — Whether Anyone Who Has The Keys Can Excommunicate

Can anyone who has the keys excommunicate? § 25. Fourthly it is asked, By whom is excommunication to be pronounced? § 26. It seems, that by everyone who has the keys: 1. For as the Philosopher says, to whom the power belongs, to him also belongs the act: but the power is the key, as is held from the Text, and its act is to bind and loose through excommunication and absolution: therefore everyone having the keys can excommunicate. § 27. 2. Moreover, a simple parish priest has some coercion over the people committed to him: but he cannot have it except through spiritual bonds, which are excommunication, and other spiritual penalties: therefore he can excommunicate. § 28. 3. Moreover, it seems to belong to the same person to give communion, and to excommunicate: but a simple parish priest gives communion to his people: therefore he can also excommunicate. § 29. If this be said, the use of the Church holds the contrary, saying that a simple priest cannot excommunicate except in general cases, as for unknown thefts, or violated thefts, and the like. § 30. Further it is asked, Whether Archdeacons can excommunicate? § 31. And it seems that they cannot: because to whom the power does not belong, his is not the act: but the power does not belong to him who does not have the key: therefore neither does the act. But that Archdeacons do not have the keys is proved from this that the key is of the sacerdotal order, as will be held in the following distinction, and they are not priests. § 32. But against this is, that one having jurisdiction ought to have the arms of such a judge. Archdeacons have jurisdiction: therefore, etc.: but such arms are excommunications: therefore, etc. § 33. Further it is asked here, Whether one suspended or excommunicated can excommunicate? § 34. It seems, that he cannot: because one bound by a corporeal bond, can neither bind nor loose another: but spiritual bonds are stronger than

corporeal ones: therefore also one bound by a spiritual bond, can neither bind nor loose another: but the spiritual bond is excommunication, and suspension. § 35. But against this is, that one suspended from office has not on this account lost jurisdiction: similarly neither has the excommunicated, because his jurisdiction is not given to another, nor is he himself invested again, when he is absolved from excommunication: therefore it seems that he also has those things which are annexed to jurisdiction: but this is the power of excommunicating and absolving: therefore he still has the power of excommunicating and absolving from excommunication. § 36. Response. It must be said, that one having the jurisdiction of an ordinary judge or a delegate can excommunicate and absolve, as some say who are knowledgeable in law: and it is reasonable enough to be so: because these bonds are coercions in the forum of cases: but judges have to cognize cases: hence it is reasonable that they have power in these bonds. § 37. To the first therefore it must be said, that this act is of a complete power, and not of a diminished one: but diminished is the power from order alone, and not outside of jurisdiction: and therefore not everyone having a key, also has the power of excommunicating. § 38. Another reason for this is: because the key of jurisdiction is greater than that of order: and therefore again it does not follow, that everyone having a key, also has the power of excommunicating and absolving. § 39. A third reason for this is sufficiently pious: because since excommunication is the greatest loss which can be done to a Christian in this life, it is to be done rarely and with moderation: and therefore to a few and only to superiors who are presumed to be more discreet, such power is committed. § 40. To the next it must be said, that in many other ways through communication and rebuke a parish priest can turn his subjects away from evil: and if he cannot do this, he ought to have recourse to a superior, and by his authority denounce him as excommunicated. § 41. To the next it must be said, that the argument is not valid: because the Church is more prone to communicate spiritual things, than to subtract them: and therefore the first she committed in many ways, but the second to a few and discreet ones. § 42. To that which is further asked, it must be said, that Archdeacons are the eyes of the Bishop, and they have jurisdiction, although they do not have the key. And because they are the eyes of the Bishop, there descends into them from the Bishop who has the keys and jurisdiction that which belongs more to jurisdiction than to the key, but not that which belongs more to the key than to jurisdiction: and therefore they can absolve and bind through excommunication in the forum of cases, but not in the forum of confession or penance. § 43. To the objection to the contrary the solution is clear: because the power of excommunicating is more of jurisdiction than of the key and order, and therefore it descends into them. § 44. To that which is further asked, it must be said, that it differs concerning one suspended and one excommunicated: because one suspended can be suspended in three ways, namely from office only, from jurisdiction only, or from both: and however he may be suspended, then it must always be said, that he cannot do those things which belong to that from which he himself is suspended. For if he is suspended from office, he cannot do those things which belong to the office, such as to celebrate, to consecrate, and the like: but he can do those things which belong to jurisdiction, such as to excommunicate, and the like. But if he is suspended from jurisdiction, then in his capacity it is the converse. But if from both, then he can do neither. § 45. To the argument however adduced it must be said, that it is true provided

the simile is well understood: for one bound in some member, does not have the use of that member, so that he may bind or loose another with it: but with another member not bound, he can loose or bind another: but one bound universally in his entirety, can neither absolve nor bind anyone: and so it is in spiritual things, as is clear from the aforesaid distinction of the suspended one. § 46. To that which is asked concerning the excommunicated, it must be said that one excommunicated with the major excommunication cannot excommunicate anyone. § 47. To the argument however made to the contrary, it must be said that jurisdiction is in habit, and not reducible into act, as long as he is excommunicated, it resides with him: and this such jurisdiction can neither loose nor bind.

Articulus 20 — How Excommunication Is To Be Imposed

How is excommunication to be pronounced? § 48. Fifthly it is asked, How is excommunication to be pronounced? § 49. But it seems, that with the greatest diligence: because the greatest danger is in excommunication: but where there is the greatest danger, there it seems the greatest diligence is needed: therefore in excommunication the greatest diligence is needed. § 50. But against this seems to be this abuse of the Church: because excommunications are cast with even less diligence, than anything else which is done in the Church. § 51. Next to this it is further asked, When someone in necessity due to infirmity is absolved, because then he can be absolved by any priest, and afterwards he does not fulfill the mandate of the Church as he promised by swearing, whether the excommunication returns upon him? § 52. It seems, that it does because: 1. To the servant not forgiving his fellow-servant the debt was revoked. Therefore by a similar reasoning to this one not doing what he ought and promised, the excommunication is revoked: therefore it returns. § 53. 2. Moreover, to one who ought to confess and does not confess, the guilt is revoked which had been loosed in contrition: therefore also to this one by a similar reasoning the excommunication is revoked on account of a similar cause. § 54. But on the contrary: This one through the priest in truth was absolved: therefore the excommunication was annihilated: but those things which are annihilated, do not return numerically the same: therefore this excommunication never returns: but he was not excommunicated by any other excommunication except that one: therefore this one is excommunicated by no excommunication: therefore the excommunication does not return upon him. § 55. Response. It must be said, that for the just form of excommunication three things concur, namely that the excommunication be from intention, and from order, and from a cause. From intention, as with a zeal for rebuking, not of avenging oneself, with a diligent admonition sent ahead. From the order of right which is described in the new constitution, namely that after the admonition, and the despair of another way, the judge should write the cause of the excommunication, and the contumacy of the excommunicated one, and the sentence itself, and by sitting as though quiet he should pronounce it, and within forty days he should be ready to give it, when he will have requested, to the excommunicated. But the cause is what he himself who is excommunicated merited according to the truth or through things alleged, which is also given to him in writing, if he requests it within forty days. And therefore the first reason is to be conceded. § 56. To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that it is an abuse, and they sin mortally thus hurling sentences of excommunication: and beyond this in

the new constitution the penalty is that for forty days he should abstain from entering the Church, and the excommunicated one should be absolved by a superior without difficulty, and moreover the one excommunicating should be condemned to all the expenses which the excommunicated one incurred in the case of his absolution, and to all interest. § 57. To that however which is further asked, it must be said that in my judgment it is impossible for an excommunication once loosed to return numerically the same: hence such a one is absolved simply, and will always be absolved, unless he be again excommunicated, on account of the fact that he did not keep the mandate of the Church as he promised by swearing. § 58. To those things which are to the contrary, there is a single solution, that neither in those cases does the preceding debt return numerically the same: but another one specifically the same is born for the subsequent contempt. § 59. But this will be better declared below, where it will be treated concerning the return of sins.

Articulus 21 — Whether To Participate With An Excommunicate Is A Mortal Sin

Is it a mortal sin to participate with an excommunicated person? § 60. Sixthly and lastly it is asked, Whether to participate with an excommunicated person is a mortal sin? § 61. But it seems, that it is: because 1. As of a mortal sin the Apostle rebuked the Corinthians, who communicated with such a one, 1 Cor. 5:6, where he says, that a little leaven corrupts the whole lump. Therefore it seems, that in others it is a mortal sin. § 62. 2. Moreover, to act against a precept is a mortal sin: but the precept of the Church is, that no one should communicate with such persons: therefore it seems, that to communicate with such persons is a mortal sin. § 63. But on the contrary: I see, that the one excommunicating communicates with him in food and word and kiss, if it is necessary, and this is seen all day long in the Bishops of our time. Since therefore I am not bound to be more perfect than my Prelate, it seems that I too can licitly communicate with such persons. § 64. Solution. To this without prejudice it seems it must be said, that it is one thing to communicate with him who is excommunicated, and another thing to communicate with the excommunicated person insofar as he is excommunicated: for one communicating in the second way, communicates with him in the cause of the excommunication, or in the crime for which he is excommunicated: and he is excommunicated with the major excommunication just as the first one is. § 65. But to communicate with him who is excommunicated, happens in two ways, namely by the major excommunication, and by the minor. But one communicating with an excommunicated person by the minor excommunication, is not excommunicated: but he who communicates with a person excommunicated by the major excommunication sins in an unpermitted case. But the permitted cases are for those whose association cannot exist without him: such as if it be a wife, son, servant, bailiff, peasant, or the like, which look to civil association, if he is ignorant, if there is evident utility, or necessity. And this is noted by this verse: Utile, lex, humile, res ignorata, necesse. (Utility, law, lowliness, ignorance, necessity.) Law is said to be marriage, and lowliness namely servitude, and the others are clear. However if two are excommunicated by such a communion in an unpermitted case, one can absolve the other. And therefore they commonly say, that one communicating with an excommunicated person, either not caring, or contemning the bond of the Church, sins mortally. But he who induced by the cause of fear, or by the bond of friendship, commu-

nicates only by word with fear, I would not dare to say, that he thereby mortally sins. § 66. To that which is objected, the solution is clear through the distinction. § 67. Note also, that no one is bound to believe someone to be excommunicated, unless he is present at the denunciation, or it is intimated to him through the one denouncing, or he is so certified through public fame, that in no way could a doubt about this be generated for him: because good is to be presumed of anyone, until the contrary is proved. § 68. Next the verses concerning that which he says, there, G, § 2, after the beginning, are to be noted: The sentence of the Church from the place of prayer, etc. Grace is subtracted, more and more with the barrier broken, From vice he rushes into vice, he loses the suffrages Of the Church, he is handed over to Satan to be vexed, Whom anathematization binds from his own faults.

Articulus 22 — Whether Stain, Darkness, Fomes, And Other Things Which Are In The Sinner, Can Be Said To Be From God

Can the stain, darkness, tinder, and other things which are in the sinner, be said to be from God? § 69. Next it is asked concerning that which he says, there, I, Here it is asked, What is that stain, etc. Namely whether the stain and darkness is from God, or not? § 70. But it seems, that it is: because every penalty is from God: but the stain and darkness are penalties: therefore they are from God. § 71. But on the contrary: 1. God does not make anything by which His work would be worse, as Augustine says: the stain and the fault make the work of God worse: therefore God does not make them: therefore they are not from God. § 72. 2. Moreover, Fulgentius says, that God is not the author of that thing, of which He is the avenger: but He avenges onto the stain and darkness: therefore He is not the author of the stain and darkness. § 73. Response. It must be said, that a penalty has a twofold comparison, namely to the inflicting cause which is the just and right judgment, and to the meritorious cause which is iniquity. But spiritual penalties are sometimes named by a name which does not express only the penalty, but also the other of those comparisons: as when to suffer burning for a sin is named, it is named in comparison to the judgment, just as a thief is said to suffer hanging. But when it is called tinder, or darkness, or stain, the penalty is named by a name enclosing in its notion also the order to the meritorious cause, which is the fault: and because in such an order it is not from God, it must be said that the tinder is not from God, nor the stain, nor the darkness, nor anything of this kind. § 74. To that which is objected against this, it must be said that a penalty does not speak of a comparison to the fault: and therefore when he assumes the stain, he assumes it not directly under the middle term, but with an accident which is extraneous to the middle term. And therefore that argumentation sins according to accident: just as, you know Coriscus: Coriscus is the one coming: therefore you know the one coming.

DISTINCTIO XIX

Divisio Textus

§ 75. After it has been shown what they are, etc. In this distinction it is treated concerning the keys on the part of the one receiving the keys. § 76. And it is divided into two parts. In the first it is asked and determined who has the keys. In the second, who has them worthily, there, C, But to others it seems, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether Christ Had The Keys

Did Christ have the keys? § 77. But circa the first four things are doubted, namely whether Christ had the keys? Secondly, Whether the key is equally for closing and opening, or for only one of these? Thirdly, How are the keys related to order? Fourthly, Whether one not having the sacerdotal order has the keys? § 78. To the first it is thus objected: 1. Christ had the plenitude of all power: therefore He also had the power of the key. § 79. 2. Also, He fully had the power of baptizing and confirming: therefore also of operating in penance: and this is done through the keys: therefore, etc. § 80. 3. Also, He absolved sinners, namely Magdalene, Zacchaeus, and the like: but this could not be done except through the keys: therefore, etc. § 81. 4. Also, Nothing gives what it does not have: but He gave the keys to Peter: therefore as before. § 82. On the contrary: 1. One having the keys, does not have the power of binding and loosing except through them: but Christ did not have anything from the keys, but rather the keys from Him: just as also whatever baptism has, it has from Christ: therefore Christ did not have the keys. § 83. 2. Also, The keys are the instruments of the ministers of the Church: but Christ existing as the head of the Church according as He is man, is not a minister of the Church: therefore He did not have the keys. § 84. 3. Also, In worldly things we see, that it does not befit royal excellence to have the keys of his treasuries, but they are committed to faithful ministers: but Christ is more excellent than any king: therefore it does not befit Him to have the keys, but His ministers. § 85. Response. It must be said, that power through the keys is said in two ways. For the preposition through can speak of an instrumental cause: and in this way nothing prohibits Christ from having the keys, not from the key, but from the Father: because even in natural things every motion by which an instrument is moved, is from the motion of the one moving it. But in this way we say, that He had the keys excellently: because without inquiry and labor He used both the authority of discerning, and the power of binding and loosing. But if the key or the power through the key, should speak of the cause of the power, by such a reasoning it would not befit Christ to have the keys: because this would be of minoration. § 86. And through this the solution to the first which is objected against this is clear, and to the second and third: because in truth the keys as they are in the ministers, give them a power which they would not have from others, and they are the sign of their office which they received from the Lord. § 87. But to the first we say, that Christ had power from Himself, although He had it from the Father: for, as Hilarius says, Christ does not thus act through Himself, that is, from the power of His nature: because whatever He is, and can do,

and does, He has the whole from the Father from whom He proceeds through generation. § 88. And through this the solution to the three following is clear.

Articulus 2 — Whether The Key Is Equally For Shutting And Opening

Is the key equally for closing and opening? § 89. Secondly it is asked, Whether the key is equally for closing, and opening? § 90. Which it seems it is: because 1. A material key is equally for both: therefore also a spiritual one. § 91. 2. Also, Matt. 16:19 and John 20:23, mention is made of both: therefore as before. § 92. But on the contrary: Nothing is for two things, namely for two equally principal ends, as the Philosopher proves: just as medicine is of two things, namely of health, and of sickness, yet not as of two ends: but of one as an end, and of the other as by accident, or as of that which is towards the end: therefore neither is the key for two equally principal works as for an end. § 93. Response. It must be said, that it is only of one per se, namely for opening: and the other is not intended, rather it happens from a defect of opening on account of the fault of sin. § 94. To the first however we say, that a key in corporeal things is made out of fear of thieves: and therefore on account of the possibility of the loss of things it is more principally for closing. But in spiritual things it is the converse: and therefore principally from its whole intention it is for opening. § 95. To the next it must be said, that the Lord makes mention of the things consequent upon the key, and not of the principally intended end: for they only follow upon the key from our work to close and to open, but nevertheless they are principally intended for opening, and for this they were given by the Lord.

Articulus 3 — How The Key Is Related To Order

How is the key related to order? § 96. Thirdly it is asked, How is the key related to order? § 97. But it seems, that it is as a separable accident. 1. For it happens that the sacerdotal order is preserved with the key separated, as in the degraded, who retain the character of order, and not the key, because they can neither bind nor loose: but that which can be separated with the other preserved, is related as an accident to that thing: therefore, etc. § 98. 2. Also, When someone is degraded, it is not said, I de-ordain you, but I de-authorize you: therefore since the key principally regards authority, it seems that the key is taken away while order remains: and thus it seems the same as before. § 99. But on the contrary: 1. Order is a potential whole: therefore it contains parts under it: but these are not as is commonly said, except the power of consecrating, and the power of binding and loosing: it seems, that the power of binding and loosing are a part of order. § 100. 2. Also, If a degraded person is restored, the power of binding and loosing is not conferred upon him, but only his jurisdiction is relaxed: therefore it seems, that he previously retained it with the order. § 101. Response. It must be said, that the key is a potential part of order, and is not separated from order, while order remains. § 102. To the first therefore it must be said, that in the degraded person the power of absolving remains, not reducible to act: and the reason for this was said above, because namely it is not reduced to act except through jurisdiction, and right.

The jurisdiction is taken away from him who is degraded.

To the other we say, that this is said to denote that the power which is from the character of the order cannot be taken away from him, but the administration, insofar as it depends on the jurisdiction which is lost through degradation.

Articulus 4 — Whether Doorkeepers Have The Keys

Whether doorkeepers have keys?

Fourthly, it is asked whether one not having the priestly order has keys?

And here four questions are asked.
First, whether doorkeepers have keys?
Second, whether kings anointed with holy unction have keys?
Third, whether a congregation has keys, such that no one from the congregation?
Fourth, whether women, namely prioresses and abbesses, have keys?

To the FIRST, it is objected thus:
1. Isidore says: Doorkeepers holding judgment, however, that they have keys, guard all things inside and outside: and having judgment between good and bad, they receive the worthy and reject the unworthy. To have power between good and bad is a key, as was held above.

Likewise, some key is the power of rejecting or receiving to the sacraments. Therefore, doorkeepers have keys.

1. Likewise, when doorkeepers are ordained, the keys of the Church are given to them by the Bishop: but it is evident that in the promotion of spiritual power, the visible and corporeal is referred to the spiritual, as is done in all sacraments: therefore, since the corporeal key is referred to nothing more fittingly than to the spiritual key, doorkeepers receive in their order the keys of spiritual power: and thus they have keys.
2. Likewise, Isidore says in the same place: To whom the act belongs, to him belongs the power: the act of the key is to receive the worthy to the sacraments and to eject the unworthy: and this is of the doorkeepers according to Isidore: therefore, such power is of the keys: therefore, as before.

But on the contrary, it is held,
1. Here in the Letter, that it is of the priests and Jerome on Matthew 16:19: The Church has the keys in its Bishops and priests. Others are excluded.

1. Likewise, in ordination, it is said to no one except the priest: Whose sins you remit, they are remitted to them. Therefore, no one has this power except the priest.
2. Likewise, in the sacraments, nothing spiritual is given that is not signified by a visible and corporeal element, as is evident from the definition of a sacrament disputed at the beginning of this book: but the stoles' bands directly descending are given only to the priest: and these are signs of incorporeal and spiritual bonds: therefore, only priests receive the power of binding and loosing from bonds.

3. Likewise, to whom the power of communion in the true body of Christ is given, to him should be given and is given the power in the mystical body to prepare for communion: but only to the priest is given the power of confecting the true body of Christ, which is sacred communion: therefore, only to the priest is given the power in the mystical body to prepare it for that communion: but this is done through the keys in penance and in the forum of causes: therefore, only the priest receives the keys.

What we have conceived, saying that doorkeepers receive only material keys ordered to the custody of sanctified things. And we say that Isidore speaks of the keys of the temple where holy things and sacraments are kept: and some call this key the key of those keeping watch in the temple: and that name pleases me well.

To the reasoning formed from authority, we say that this judgment is not over the cause of unworthiness, but rather over some determined by someone as worthy or unworthy, namely by a priest or Archdeacon: but the priest knows by himself who are worthy and unworthy.

Similarly, the power of receiving or excluding of the doorkeeper is not to the sacraments, but to the place of the sacraments: and therefore he does not have keys to the communion of the sacraments, but to the place of the sacraments fitting: and those are material lest the unworthy intrude upon the holy things.

To another, we say that they receive keys from the Bishop, not spiritual, but ordered to something spiritual, because to the custody of the place of the sacraments: and it is false that all things are received in the sacraments: yet, because something spiritual is understood in them, the persons themselves handling the sacraments need ordination, so that they may dare to touch and handle the vessels themselves.

To another, it must be said that they neither exclude nor receive, except in the aforesaid manner, namely determined by a superior to be unworthy or worthy and to the place of the sacraments, not to their communion: and this is not the act of the key of binding and loosing of which is treated here, as is evident from the aforesaid.

Articulus 5 — Whether Anointed Kings Have The Keys

Whether anointed kings have the keys?

To the second, it is objected thus:
1. 1 Kings 16:13, concerning David: "The Spirit of the Lord came upon David from that day forward," and it speaks of the day of anointing; but the Spirit of God operates for the remission of sins: therefore kings receive the power for the remission of sins; and this is the key: therefore they receive the keys.

1. Likewise, anointing signifies the Holy Spirit: therefore, since through it one is established over the multitude of the people of God, it seems that he receives the power of that act which the Holy Spirit operates in the multitude: but that is to communicate with the multitude and to sanctify by remitting sin: therefore the king receives the power of that act: but that act is the key: therefore, etc.

On the contrary:
Chrysostom in a certain Epistle to Basil says thus: "Indeed, the princes of the world have some power of binding, but only in bodies: however, the bond which is committed to priests touches the soul itself: therefore kings do not have the keys."

Response. It must be said that kings have no key, nor any spiritual jurisdiction: and the cause of this is that they receive power over blood, and spiritual power would be unsuitable to be joined with such power.

To the first, therefore, we say that the Spirit of the Lord was directed in David to accomplish royal works: such as victory over bodily enemies, discretion in governance or peace of the land, and the good disposition of the people. For as it is said in VIII Ethicorum: "The perfection of the kingdom is governance and statutes tending to the utility of the people, not the king: and its corruption is in tyrants, when they seek not the utility of the people, but their own in governance, and accomplish statutes and laws for their own profit."

To the other, it must be said that the Spirit of God operates in each as an organ ordered to its proper act. Hence in the king, it perfects royal acts, and in the priest, priestly acts. And therefore the argument is not valid: because although the Spirit remits sins, yet it does not operate only this act: because, Wisdom 7:22, it is said that the spirit of wisdom is manifold in its acts and gifts.

To the other, we say that the anointing of the king signifies the gentle power of the kingdom in the Holy Spirit, as it befits the faithful to command subjects; but the anointing of the priest is different, therefore it signifies a different power.

Articulus 6 — Whether A Congregation Has The Keys

Whether a congregation has the keys?

Thirdly, it is asked whether a congregation has the keys, such that no one from the congregation? And this is especially asked because of that use of the keys, which is to excommunicate and absolve.

However, it seems that it does not:

1. The key is only of sacramental order: but no congregation has such an order: therefore no congregation has the keys.
2. Likewise, the key of knowledge cannot be had by a multitude, such that no one singularly, nor the key of absolving and binding in confession: therefore by a similar reasoning, neither the key of the power of excommunicating.
3. Likewise, whose is the power, his is the action: therefore whose is not the power, his is not the action: but the action cannot be of a multitude, such that of no one: therefore neither the power.
4. Likewise, as the new constitution says: A multitude cannot be entirely excommunicated, such that no one: but individuals from the multitude can be excommunicated, and then

the multitude will be excommunicated: therefore neither can it excommunicate, such that no one.

CONTRA: 1. Just as there is jurisdiction, so there is the instrument and power of jurisdiction: but jurisdiction is of one over many, and of many over one, and of many over many, such that of no one by itself: therefore also the power of excommunication, which is as it were an instrument and power of spiritual jurisdiction: therefore the multitude has the power of excommunicating, such that no one.

1. Likewise, one is the servant of some multitude, such that of no one according to itself: therefore thus it can be in spiritual matters: therefore the multitude has the power of coercing by excommunication those who are rebellious to it.

Response. It must be said that the multitude of some congregation which is reduced to one can have spiritual power of jurisdiction of excommunicating and absolving, such that no one from that multitude: and thus civil matters agree. For the Philosopher says in the eighth book of the Ethics, that ordered power is divided into two: both in politics, that is, in the governance of the city, and in economics, that is, the governance of the house. In politics indeed it is divided into a kingdom or monarchy which is the principality of one, and aristocracy: and it is called from &pisto¢ which is prince, and xpacocs which is power: and it is the power of many together according to the virtue of those commanding, such that of no one: as it is read of the Romans, 1 Maccabees 8:14 and following, that when they did many praiseworthy things, no one imposed a diadem on himself, but they followed the senate. The third polity which is called democracy is not a polity, but a certain corruption: and it is called from time which is price, and xpdcos which is power; and it is the principality of many rich having nothing of right in the principality, except because they excel in riches and prices. There is another governance in economics of the father over the sons, similar to a kingdom, and the governance of the man over the wife, or over wives, as in the Old Testament, similar to aristocracy. Thus therefore we can say that in spiritual matters there are two kinds of jurisdiction, namely the first which is of the royal priesthood, and the second of many together who have one heart and one soul, which is like a spiritual aristocracy.

To the first objection against this, we say that (as was said before) this use of the key is more of jurisdiction than of order: and therefore from one having the key and jurisdiction in the excellence of power it can descend even to one not having order, yet having jurisdiction: and if we wished to speak properly, such a personal multitude has the use of the key rather than the key.

To the other it must be said that it is not similar concerning the keys of penance: because those are only according to personal acts, and in causes which regard persons separately, such as sins: for the sins of one are not of another: and as the new constitution says, the sins of the multitude are none at all, but the jurisdiction of the multitude is not none, as has already been proven, both in urbanities and in congregations of the Church.

To the third we say that it does not follow: just as there is no act, etc., because acts are of individuals, but powers are caused from the multitude itself. Or let the reasoning be conceded, and let it be said that the act of such excommunication or absolution is of the multitude, and not of any person according to itself.

To the fourth we say that it is most reasonably constituted that the multitude cannot be excommunicated, because the multitude does not sin. And another reason is natural: because the multitude well causes active power in excellence, but never defect and impotence or passion. An example of this is that the multitude can draw a ship and draws it, and no one by itself from the multitude: yet the multitude does not draw unless each one draws: nor does the multitude lie unless each one lies: because the abundance of virtue in acting well is generated in the multitude, but not defect in suffering: and therefore it does not follow, if it can excommunicate, that it can also be excommunicated; or if it cannot be excommunicated, that it cannot excommunicate.

Articulus 7 — Whether Abbesses And Prioresses To Whom The Rule Of Women Is Committed Have The Keys

Whether abbesses and prioresses to whom the governance of women is committed, have the keys?

To the fourth it is objected thus:
It seems that abbesses and prioresses to whom the governance of women and sometimes of men is committed, have the keys: because

1. It is from the use approved by the Church, that men and women make profession in their hands: but through profession jurisdiction is received over the professed: therefore they have jurisdiction: and by that power is the key or the use of the key, as has been said: therefore such women have the keys.
2. Likewise, priests professing to them and living with them are suspended: therefore they have jurisdiction: therefore the use of the key or the key.
3. Likewise, Judges, iv, 4 and following, Deborah the prophetess judged Israel. Therefore she had jurisdiction: therefore other women can also have it.
4. Likewise, women communicate in greater spiritual matters than these: which is evident through Anna, and certain others, who were prophetesses: therefore they can also communicate in these.
5. Likewise, in polities a woman receives jurisdiction: therefore also in spiritual matters.

On the contrary:
1. Genesis iii, 16: You shall be under the power of a man. Therefore a woman ought not to be

in authority: therefore neither to have jurisdiction: therefore neither the keys, nor the use of the keys.

1. Likewise, 1 Corinthians xiv, 34: Women in the churches should be silent: for it is not permitted for them to speak, but to be subject, since to be subject is not to have jurisdiction, it seems, etc.
2. Likewise, 1 Timothy ii, 12: I do not permit a woman to teach, nor to have authority over a man.

If it is said that these authorities speak of women joined to men, and not of nuns. On the contrary: The Philosopher says that the corruption of civility is for a woman alone to take power. Therefore much more is this judged a corruption in spiritual matters: therefore a woman alone, whoever she may be, should never receive jurisdiction.

1. Likewise, on that of the epistle 1 Timothy ii, 12: I do not permit a woman to teach, nor to have authority over a man, the Gloss says: Therefore she cannot have spiritual preeminence, even in her own sex: but she can have jurisdiction over women.
2. Likewise, Chrysostom: Women can do nothing, but accomplish all things through others.

Response. It must be said that a woman has no key, neither in the forum of penance, nor in the forum of causes: but she can govern a power committed to her only as to use. I say, however, a power committed, granted by an order or abbot or by the pope: because a woman is not a proper subject of power, but of subjection in spiritual matters. But nevertheless, by reason of danger, because it is dangerous for men to govern women with continuous communication and cohabitation with them, therefore the governance of power is committed to them: and only as much governance as she can, such as to command according to the rule or customs of the Church, or to appoint officials, and to impose certain penalties for excesses: although they are not properly called penances. But no key or keys can be committed to them.

To the first, therefore, we say that obedience is not promised to the abbess as superior or having the care of souls: but through her it is promised to the abbot, or bishop, or pope: and because of the danger of cohabitation it is permitted for the abbess to receive. And this seems to me, unless the authority of a superior perhaps judges otherwise: because in such matters I think one should stand by the judgment of the Pontiffs and superiors: but according to the sayings of the Saints, that seems to be said.

To the other it must be said that a woman does not suspend, but the excesses: and it is the sentence of the canon, when it comes against the constitution or custom from a woman denounced.

To the other it must be said that Deborah judged in temporal matters, but in divine matters judgment belonged to the priests.

To the other it must be said that it is not similar: because prophecy is according to divine illuminations in which there is neither male nor female, but the image of God is illustrated in both. But in jurisdiction and power, man and woman are not equal.

To the other we say that in polities she can have dominion both alone and with others: because this is temporal, but not in spiritual matters, for the reasons above introduced.

To the objection that the Gloss seems to say that she does not have dominion except in the same sex, we say that it is understood of borrowed power, as to certain things, namely the imposition of penalties, and such things as have been said above: and not as to the keys or the use of the key.

Articulus 8 — Whether By The Key Of Jurisdiction Someone Can Validly Be Excommunicated More Than Once Before Absolution From The Former, And Whether One Absolved From One Excommunication Is Absolved From Another

Whether by the key of jurisdiction someone can be excommunicated more than once before absolution from the prior excommunication? And, whether absolved from one excommunication, he is absolved from another?

Whether by the key of jurisdiction someone can be excommunicated more than once before absolution from the prior excommunication? And, whether absolved from one excommunication, he is absolved from another?

Then it is asked concerning what is said there, A, at the end: So that it may be used to close or open.

Here four questions are asked.
First, Whether by the key of jurisdiction in causes someone can be excommunicated more than once before absolution?
Second, Whether that key can be used against someone greater than oneself, or against oneself?
Third, If it can be used on others, or only on one's own subjects?
Fourth, If a subject unwilling to submit can be absolved?

TO THE FIRST, it is objected thus:
1. Origen says: He who is outside cannot be more excommunicated: he is outside; therefore, etc.: therefore the following excommunication does nothing to him.

1. Likewise, 1 Corinthians 5:12: What have I to do with judging those who are outside? Therefore, he who is outside by penance no longer pertains to the Church to judge him: therefore, he cannot be excommunicated more than once.
2. Likewise, one who is killed cannot be killed again: but the excommunicated is killed by the spiritual sword: therefore, etc.
3. Likewise, privations do not admit of more and less: for one is as blind by one blindness as by two or three: nor can one blind by one blindness be blind by another: since

therefore excommunication is nothing but the privation of communion, one cannot be more excommunicated than once.

But against this is the entire practice of the militant Church. For someone is excommunicated multiple times for multiple causes, but the universal Church does not err. Therefore, someone can be excommunicated multiple times.

Likewise, it is further asked, Whether absolved from one excommunication, he is thereby also absolved from another, if he has been excommunicated by multiple excommunications?

And it seems that he is not: because the cause for which he is excommunicated does not depend on the cause: therefore, neither does excommunication depend on excommunication: therefore, neither does absolution depend on absolution: therefore, absolved from one, he is not absolved from another.

But ON THE CONTRARY:
1. He is as much outside communion by one as by many: therefore, absolution from one without the other is of no value to him: but the Church does nothing that is of no value: therefore, the Church does not absolve him from one without the other.

1. Likewise, one is not absolved from excommunication unless he is absolved from sin: but one is not absolved from one sin unless he is absolved from all: therefore, etc.

Response. It must be said that someone excommunicated by one excommunication can also be excommunicated by another for two reasons. One is that although privations in themselves are not multiplied in the same species, nor are they intensified and remitted, yet in their causes they are multiplied, and intensified, and remitted. Hence, one blind by one blindness can be blind for multiple causes; and the more and stronger the causes, the further he is from sight: and one cause can be resolved without another. And thus excommunication distances more because it is multiplied by more and stronger causes. Another reason is that there are two effects or rather defects of excommunication: one is to cast out, the other is to retain outside. As to the first, although excommunication done multiple times does not increase, yet the cause increases as to the second.

To the first, therefore, the solution is clear from the aforesaid because one can be retained outside more, although not made more outside.

To the other, it must be said that the Apostle speaks of those who were never inside by the reception of faith and sacraments: and they cannot be excommunicated except in the case, namely if they do wrong to those who are inside: and that excommunication then does not make such a one outside, but withdraws the insiders from his conversation and communion in legitimate acts.

To the other, we say that the excommunicated is not entirely killed as to the militant Church, but is handed over to the devil to be vexed: and therefore he can be further wounded.

To the other, the solution is clear from the principle of this solution.

To what is asked, we say that he can be absolved from one excommunication, so that not from another.

To the objection against, we say that absolution from one is of value to him: because he is now retained outside by fewer bonds and causes: and therefore his return to communion is more easily open to him.

To the other, we say that it is not similar: because someone can be excommunicated even without sin. Hence, since excommunication is done according to the forum of the militant Church, and the remission of sins according to the mercy of God who reigns in the triumphant Church: it is not true that excommunication is not absolved unless sin is remitted: rather, with sin remitted by contrition, excommunication can still remain, and with excommunication remitted by absolution, sin can still remain as to God. Hence, that objection is founded on a falsehood.

Articulus 9 — Whether A Priest Can Use The Key Of Jurisdiction Against One Greater, Equal, Or Lesser Than Himself

Whether a priest can use the key of jurisdiction against someone greater, equal, or lesser than himself?

Secondly, it is asked whether a priest or bishop can use the key of jurisdiction against someone greater than himself, or equal, or himself?

It seems that he can:
4. By that in the epistle to the Galatians 1:8, where Paul excommunicates himself, and excommunicates an angel preaching another gospel: therefore he can excommunicate himself and someone greater: therefore much more an equal.

If it is said that he speaks of an evil angel who is lesser than Paul. On the contrary: the Gloss says: the angel from heaven is good or if you say that the angel is evil, lesser than Paul. On the contrary: it is said in Matthew 11:11: He who is lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he, namely John the Baptist: than whom no greater has arisen among those born of women: therefore also greater than Paul.

Furthermore, Christ was made lesser than the angels because of the passion: therefore also Paul.

1. Furthermore, a priest in the Church excommunicates for theft: and let it be supposed that someone greater than him or he himself did it: therefore he will then excommunicate someone greater or equal, or himself.

ON THE CONTRARY:
The canon says that an equal does not have jurisdiction and power over an equal: therefore neither the power of excommunicating someone greater, or equal, or himself: because as it is said in geometry, anything equal to itself is such that it neither exceeds itself nor is exceeded by itself.

On the contrary.

Response. We concede that no one can excommunicate someone greater, or equal, or himself.

TO THE FIRST, therefore, we say that Paul speaks hypothetically, as Altiodorus says: just as it is impossible for an angel to do this, or us: so, etc. it is better to say that the Apostle does not pass sentence, but states the justice of excommunication to be passed. As if he were saying: It is just to excommunicate such a one: because he already ceases to be a good angel, or apostle, and attacks the faith and sacraments.

TO THE OTHER, we say that in such a case the priest excommunicates no one: because there is no jurisdiction of an equal over an equal.

Articulus 10 — Whether Someone Can Use The Key Of Jurisdiction Upon Another's Subjects

Whether someone can use the key of jurisdiction on foreign subjects?

Thirdly, it is asked, Whether he can use it on foreign subjects?

It seems that he can: because
1. A diocesan can, by reason of a crime, excommunicate and absolve even those not subject to him, as the Decretal and priest say: therefore, etc.

1. Likewise, a Legate in transit also absolves those who are not of his legation: therefore a parishioner and Bishop can similarly do so.
2. Likewise, Matthew 15:24, where Christ says: "I was not sent, etc.," yet he saved a foreigner: therefore, etc.

Likewise, by the Samaritan woman who was not of Israel, the same is proven.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
1. The Constitution says that no one should send a sickle into another's harvest: but another's harvest is a foreign subject: therefore it is not lawful for him to excommunicate or absolve a foreigner.

1. Likewise, there are many decrees that the bishops of Egypt have Egyptian subjects: the bishops of Thrace, the Church of Thrace: and that it is not lawful for one bishop to ordain or receive the subject of another: therefore he cannot excommunicate or absolve him.

Response. It must be said that no one can extend his jurisdiction beyond what is permitted to him by his superior on a foreign subject by excommunicating or absolving, or even by absolving in penance, except in the manner which was said above.

To the FIRST, we say that by reason of a crime, by Papal constitution, one becomes of another's forum: and this is done as a punishment: hence it cannot be done in other cases.

To the second, we say that it is not similar concerning Legates and others: for a Legate of the Apostolic See ought to have reverence: and therefore the Pope allows that he bestows benefit on those through whom he passes, so that they may be more devoted to showing him honor: but it is otherwise with other bishops and parish priests: and therefore they cannot do such things.

To the other, it must be said that in the place of Christ on earth there is only one Pope: and he can do in all things - but others are called to a part of the solicitude, and therefore it is not lawful for them to extend jurisdiction beyond what is permitted to them.

Articulus 11 — Whether A Bishop Can Absolve The Unwilling

Can a Bishop absolve an unwilling person?

Fourthly, it is asked, if a Bishop or priest can absolve an unwilling subject?

It seems that he can: because
1. Augustine says that many goods, but the highest good, are bestowed upon the unwilling: absolution from excommunication is a good on the way: therefore, this can be bestowed even upon an unwilling subject.

1. Likewise, a carnal father does many things concerning his son, with the son unwilling: but a priest or Bishop is a spiritual father: therefore, by similarity, etc.
2. Likewise, one can be excommunicated unwillingly: since therefore the Church is more powerful in benefits than in penalties, one can be absolved unwillingly.

ON THE CONTRARY:
Whatever you shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven: and if it is not bound in heaven, it shall not be bound on earth: but no one dissenting from absolution is absolved in heaven: therefore, neither on earth can he be absolved.

Response. It must be said that someone can be absolved from the bond of excommunication even unwillingly, but not from the bond of sins in confession.

To the objection against, we say that: this is understood of the absolution which is done in the forum of confession from sins, and not of that which is done in the forum of causes and jurisdiction from excommunication. Or it may be said that he is also considered absolved by God from excommunication, although he is not considered absolved from sin: and then this is false, which destroys the consequent: but he is not absolved in heaven, that is, before God.

Articulus 12 — Whether The Good And The Bad Who Have Jurisdiction Have The Keys

Whether the good and evil having jurisdiction have the keys?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said there, B, after the beginning: For some think this power is granted only to those who keep both the doctrine and life of the Apostles, etc.

These are those heretics who are called Caractari.

However, it seems that reason argues for them.
§1. Matthew 16:19, where the Lord gave the keys to Peter and his successors: He wished to precede with the testimony of confession, because flesh and blood did not reveal it to him. Therefore, those who live according to flesh and blood do not persevere in that confession: therefore, such do not have the keys.

§2. Likewise, Wisdom 1:4: Wisdom will not enter into a malevolent soul, nor dwell in a body subject to sins. Therefore, since Christ is the power and wisdom of God, Christ does not inhabit such. Therefore, neither does He exercise the works of His power through such: but the works of His power are the works of the keys: therefore, such do nothing through the keys, nor do they have them.

§3. Likewise, from the unclean what will be cleansed? But one not having life and knowledge is unclean: therefore, he can cleanse nothing: therefore, neither does he have the keys: because the keys operate towards cleanness.

§4. Likewise, in the preceding distinction Augustine says that God remits sins through the dove, or the members of the dove: but these are not the dove, nor members of the dove: therefore, neither do they remit: therefore, neither do they have the keys, because the keys are given for the remission of sins, as it is said, John 20:23.

§5. Likewise, it seems to be against the whole nature: because nothing in inferior nature moves by the operation of some form which it does not have by itself: but it will be by accident if it moves thus. For example, the hot heats; and the not hot cannot heat, and so with others: therefore, since grace is the perfection of nature, it seems that neither in grace can it be otherwise: therefore, a sinner cannot cleanse from sins: therefore, neither does he have the keys, nor the use of the keys.

§6. If you say that Christ inhabits such by power, but not by the sanctity of life: and therefore by the power of Christ accepted in the keys they can operate remission in others, while they themselves are subject to sins. On the contrary: 2 Corinthians 6:15: What agreement has Christ with Belial? Therefore, there is no man who is partly of Christ, and partly of the devil: rather, he is wholly of Christ, or wholly of the devil.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
§1. Matthew 23:2: Upon the chair, etc. Therefore, it is to be obeyed in sa-

§ 1. [to] Moses of the sacraments and the dispensation of doctrine even to the wicked: but this would not be so, if they did not have the keys: therefore they have the keys.

§ 2. Also, it was proved above, that even the wicked have the power of dispensing other sacraments: therefore they also have power in this one: therefore they have the keys, because they do not operate in this sacrament except through the keys.

§ 3. Also, all things operating more excellently in nature produce the act of a form by which they themselves are not disposed: just as Jupiter heats and moistens, and yet is neither hot nor moist: and Mars heats and dries immoderately, and yet is neither hot nor dry, and so for the others. Therefore, since the principles of grace are not less efficacious than the

principles of nature, someone to whom sins are not remitted can operate toward the remission of sins.

§ 4. Also, in human offices it does not matter whether the key-bearer consents to the distribution of those things which are unlocked by the keys, or dissents, provided that the lord wills to dispense them. Therefore, it is similar here in the divine keys: therefore it does not matter whether the minister is good or bad, provided the Lord is good.

§ 5. Response. It must be said that good and bad priests have the key, if they have jurisdiction: they also have the execution of the keys.

§ 6. To the first against this, therefore, we say that the Lord praised two things in Peter, namely the dignity for receiving the key, and the solidity of the truth of faith. But yet he did not found the reception of the key except upon the second of these, namely upon the truth of faith. And it is true that every priest ordained in the form of the faith and of the faithful receives the keys, but he receives them to his own damnation if he is not of good life and sufficient knowledge.

§ 7. To the next it must be said that it is understood with respect to inhabiting grace, and not with respect to the operation of gratuitously given grace.

§ 8. To the next we say that that authority speaks regarding those who work impurities out of a habit: and these are bad works, and bad examples. And this is evident through what follows there "What truth will be spoken by a liar?" because many true things can be spoken by a liar: but he speaks nothing true when speaking from the habit of a lie.

§ 9. To the next we say that the members of the dove are twofold, namely with respect to motion, and with respect to sensation. Prelates of this sort, therefore, are members of the dove that are moved only for the utility of others: but they do not feel by experience the grace of the dove vivifying in the spirit.

§ 10. To the next we say that although it is so in the lower elements and elemented things, yet in the higher things it is not true, as the objection made to the contrary proves. Or otherwise and better it must be said, that that simile shows what kind of men worthy ministers ought to be, and not what kind they necessarily are: because it is only per accidens that something can cooperate toward its contrary, as the Philosopher says in II Meteorology, because being hotter sometimes cooperates toward greater cold: just as a hot cloud is rare, and being rare it receives the surrounding cold from all sides, on account of which it happens that the cold sinks deeper into such a cloud, and solidifies into hail: yet from another, less hot cloud, only rain is generated. For it is not a general rule in nature which is brought forward for the simile.

§ 11. To the next we say that Christ does not inhabit such men: because he is not said to inhabit except those whom he inhabits through grace making pleasing: but he is in others, yet does not inhabit them. And that this is not unfitting is evident: because in some he is only through the operation of miracles and prophecy, and yet they are members of the devil: and he operated through a donkey, and yet he did not inhabit the donkey: and therefore this that

is brought forward from the epistle does nothing, because there the Apostle is speaking of those who thought God could be held in sins through inhabiting grace.

Articulus 13 — Whether The Good And The Bad Equally Rightly And Worthily Have The Power Of The Keys

§ 13. Next, it is inquired concerning what he says there, C, after the beginning: "But they do not have it, namely the key of binding and loosing, rightly and worthily," etc.

§ 14. AGAINST: Everyone who uses a power for the use to which it is destined, rightly has the power. But these men use the power in this way: therefore they have it rightly. But such men rightly baptize, and rightly absolve: therefore, etc.

§ 15. Response. The rectitude of power is twofold, namely with respect to the act and with respect to the subject. And with respect to the act some hold themselves rightly, but not rightly with respect to the subject.

§ 16. Through this the solution to both is clear: because they proceed in that sense in which rectitude is taken with respect to the act.

Articulus 14 — Whether Moses And Aaron Were Priests, And How Differently

§ 17. ARTICLE XIV. Were Moses and Aaron priests, and how differently?

§ 18. Next, it is inquired concerning what he says there, B, around the middle: "It was said by the Lord in Numbers to Moses and Aaron the priests," etc.

§ 19. AGAINST: Aaron alone was the high priest, and not Moses, as appears .

§ 20. Response. It must be said that Moses is called a priest, not by the office of offering oblations, but of revealing sacred things: because he gave the sacred things immediately received from God to the people, and he ordained the oblations for them.

Articulus 15 — Whether Caiaphas Is Rightly Said To Have Prophesied

§ 22. Next it is inquired concerning what he says there, C, after the middle: "Since he was the high priest of that year, he prophesied," etc.

§ 23. 1. This seems false: because the Gloss says: "One is not a prophet except by intellectual vision." But he did not have an intellectual vision, because he did not understand what he said in the way that the Evangelist says the Holy Spirit understood it: therefore he did not prophesy.

§ 24. 2. Also "Intelligence is needed in a vision." Since therefore this man did not have intelligence, he did not prophesy.

§ 25. 3. Also, what the Evangelist says seems false: "But he did not say this of himself." Because he who speaks falsehood and sin, speaks of himself. This man speaks falsehood and sin: therefore, etc. The proof of the first is "When he speaks a lie, he speaks from his own." The

proof of the second is: because when he said, "It is expedient," etc., he understood it of temporal utility, and of the unjust death of Christ. And in this way it is false; therefore, etc.

§ 26. Response. In the utterance of Caiaphas there were four things, namely the intention of the speaker which moves the speaker, and the understanding of the speaker which he himself understood in the words, and such a mode of the words through which he spoke, and the voice itself which he spoke. The first of these was wicked, the second false, and neither was from the Holy Spirit. But the third was from the Holy Spirit. For when he wished to speak, the Holy Spirit guided the utterance, so that it might be expressed in such a mode, in which the necessity of Christ's passion was pronounced. Moreover, the voice itself, referred to the eternal exemplar, offered one true sense to Christ's faithful: but referred to the understanding and intention of the speaker, it offered another sense to the infidels. Whence it must be said regarding that which the Evangelist reports, that "he did not say it of himself": and it ought to be understood with precision, so that the sense is, that he did not say it only of himself.

§ 27. To the first therefore we say that he was not a Prophet. But it does not follow, if he was not a Prophet, that therefore he did not prophesy: just as the donkey was not a rational animal, but it had the act of a rational animal; and someone who is not a singer, nevertheless sometimes sings.

§ 28. And through this the solution to the next is also clear: because in the vision constituting a prophecy, intelligence is needed, but not in every vision of one prophesying. Because thus every prophetic vision would be intellectual: and this is false, because according to this two genera of visions would be emptied out, namely the corporeal and the spiritual.

§ 29. To the next, the solution is clear through the distinction posited at the beginning.

Articulus 16 — Whether Heretics Or Evil Christian Prelates Confer A Blessing

§ 31. Next it is inquired concerning the words of Malachi, there, D, "I will curse your blessings," etc. From this and certain other things introduced it seems that heretics and bad Christian prelates confer no blessing: yet this was disproved above in the treatise on baptism and the Eucharist, where it treats of baptism given by heretics, and of the Eucharist consecrated by them.

§ 32. BUT AGAINST: A heretic baptizes and it is baptized; he confirms and it is confirmed, and so for the others. Therefore also if he excommunicates, it is excommunicated, and if he absolves it is absolved; which is false.

§ 33. Response. When it is said: "I will curse your blessings," it is understood by virtue of grammar through the discrete pronoun "your," that is, which are so "yours" that they are not "mine"; for the Lord never curses his own. Now it is certain that in the sacraments God alone operates inwardly by Himself, but man performs the ministry outwardly. And therefore the effects of the sacraments are the blessings not of man, but of God. But it does not follow: he baptizes and it is baptized, etc., therefore if he excommunicates it is excommunicated, etc.: because excommunication belongs to jurisdiction, which belongs to man, and in it occurs the act of a man who is a prelate and has jurisdiction over other men. And therefore this act is

sometimes cursed by God, and [sometimes] blessed: it is blessed when the heretic curses by excommunicating, and it is cursed when he blesses by absolving.

Articulus 17 — Whether Fraternal Correction Is Well Defined By The Master

§ 35. It is now inquired concerning what he says there, E, "But what sort of person he ought to be who is constituted as a judge of others," etc.

§ 36. For the sake of this, because correction pertains to judges, we will inquire concerning fraternal correction as to six things, namely: First, What is it? Second, Whose is it? Third, Whether all are bound to fraternal correction? Fourth, Whether it belongs to all toward all, or toward certain persons only? Fifth, In what order ought it to be done? Sixth, In what does it differ from judicial correction?

§ 37. Concerning the first, the Masters say that fraternal correction is: 1. "An admonition of a brother concerning the emendation of a fault proceeding from fraternal charity." But since admonition is of one who has forgotten, and one sinning in act does not sin out of forgetfulness, "admonition" is badly placed there.

§ 38. 2. Also, admonition does not sound like any sort of accusation. But one correcting a brother sometimes accuses him before a judge: therefore as before.

§ 39. 3. Also "If your brother sins against you, go and correct him." But "correcting" sounds like a certain harshness and rebuke through words, but "admonition" does not. Therefore fraternal correction, which is called a "correction" [correptio] by the Lord, is badly defined by "admonition."

§ 40. 4. Also, it is inquired concerning what he says, "Concerning the emendation of a fault." For I can correct a brother not only concerning a perpetrated fault, but also concerning a sign of a fault to be perpetrated, so that he may beware. Therefore it is badly said, "Concerning the emendation of a fault."

§ 41. 5. Also, it is objected concerning what he says, "Proceeding from fraternal charity." Because according to this no one would correct except one who had charity; although nevertheless this is not required, as will be evident below.

§ 42. Response. This definition is excellent. For admonition is correction in the spirit of gentleness, so that he seems to correct rather by admonishing than by exasperating.

§ 43. To the first therefore we say, that everyone who sins falls away from the intellect, as Aristotle says, and follows the part of rational concupiscence, especially with respect to the judgment of the higher rational part and of synderesis, which is always right. And with respect to this it is called here an admonition toward a reversion to the light of the intellect, which rules the way of right and does not err. And in this way it is said "Return, transgressors, to the heart."

§ 44. To the next it must be said, that generally correction is made for the sake of an admonition of a brother of this sort. And if he wakes up, it is good for the one correcting. If not, then accusation first has a place, and therefore accusation is an act consequent to

correction, and is owed to one confirmed in evil who is difficultly corrected. And therefore the first and essential act is admonition, and it is defined through that.

§ 45. To the next we say, that admonition as it is taken here in the aforesaid manner has a certain correction in it: because it points out the evil with a moderate rebuke, inasmuch as he fell away from the rule of the intellect. For this is what admonition sounds like here.

§ 46. To the next we say that "fault" is taken here conjointly, as it is in the exterior and interior act, which is demonstrated outwardly through a sign, because it already begins to be a fault when it begins to be rooted inwardly.

§ 47. To the next we say that "fraternal charity" is named from the mode of fraternal charity in the act of correction, just as the Apostle commands "Correct him in the spirit of gentleness." Whence it is not required that it always proceed from this habit, but that sometimes it proceeds from the mode or zeal of fraternal charity.

Articulus 18 — Whether He Who Ought To Correct Ought To Be Irreprehensible

§ 49. Secondly it is inquired, whose is it to correct with fraternal correction, or more truly, what sort of person is he who corrects or ought to correct?

§ 50. Now many authorities are introduced in the Letter. But 1. Moreover, that he ought not to be reprehensible seems to be said by Gregory in the Pastoral Care: "No one in the Church harms more than he who, acting perversely, has the name or order of dignity. For no one presumes to correct this delinquent; and the fault is vehemently extended into an example, since for the reverence of his order the sinner is honored." Therefore it seems that he sins mortally who, uncorrected, accepts the office of correcting others.

§ 51. 2. Also "First cast out the beam," etc.

§ 52. 3. Also, the Gloss there: "It is impossible that he should remove a speck who bears a beam." But he who has the office of correcting is bound to remove the speck. Therefore as before.

§ 53. 4. Also, another Gloss there: "The moderation of judgment is that one anticipated by greater [sins] should not judge others in lesser or equal ones."

§ 54. 5. Also, there: "With what mind does he prepare to heal, who carries a wound on his face?"

§ 55. 6. Also "Will you build a house for me?" There Gregory says: "He is unable to wipe dirty hands, who retains mud."

§ 56. 7. Also "He among you who is without sin," etc. The Gloss: "Let them first be just, and afterwards [judge] the guilty woman," etc.

§ 57. 8. Also, on that word of the Apostle "The judgment of God is according to truth against those who do such things," the Gloss: "Who do such things, concerning which they reprehend others."

§ 58. 9. Also, the Philosopher says: "The straight is the judge of itself and of the crooked."

§ 59. 10. Moreover, he sins against the order of nature who is not himself straight, and straightens others through correction: therefore, etc.

§ 60. 11. Also, every corrector insofar as he is such, is like a judge of the one corrected. But the Philosopher says in V Ethics that they flee to the judge as to animate justice. Therefore the one judging is bound to be just; otherwise he ought not to be a judge nor to correct, because the corrector is a judge, according to this that he corrects.

§ 61. 12. Also, every corrector corrects according to some norm or rule. The perverse man does not match the rule: therefore he ought not to correct.

§ 62. 13. Also, if a perverse man corrects, contentions arise from this: because the one corrected can also object similar things against him, and from the objection of similar things perturbation and contention arise. Since therefore these are to be avoided, a perverse man ought not to correct anyone.

§ 63. BUT AGAINST: 1. Philippians 1:18: "Whether by occasion or by truth Christ is proclaimed," etc. But in a certain way Christ is proclaimed when a neighbor is corrected in Christ. Therefore whether it is done by occasion or by truth, in this one is to rejoice. But in no way is one to rejoice concerning an evil. Therefore it is not an evil: therefore he does not sin who corrects.

§ 64. 2. Also "If your brother sins against you," etc. The Gloss: "He sins who sees a brother sin and is silent, just as he who does not forgive the penitent." Therefore if some sinner sees this, he sins if he is silent. Therefore he is bound to correct, and it is not an evil if he corrects.

§ 65. 3. Also, a spiritual alms is better than a corporeal one. And someone existing in mortal sin is not prohibited from giving corporeal alms. Therefore neither ought he to be prohibited from giving spiritual alms. But spiritual alms is the correction of a delinquent: therefore, etc.

§ 66. 4. Also, suppose someone is seeing evils being done, and if he corrects them, they would be dismissed on account of him. It seems then that he is in a dilemma (perplexed). For if he does not correct, he will be culpable: because he who gives an occasion of harm seems to have given the harm. But this man gives an occasion of harm, who could prohibit and did not prohibit: and from this follows the same. Also, if the one correcting is in a similar or worse sin, he has sinned: therefore he is perplexed. Also, he is said to have done it who could prohibit it and did not prohibit it: and from this follows the same.

§ 67. 5. Also, he still seems to be perplexed. For suppose that he has the office of correcting, inasmuch as he has the care of souls; he is bound to correct, and he does not do it: therefore he sins. Also, he is in a similar sin: therefore if he corrects, he himself sins. Therefore he is perplexed. But no one is said to be perplexed: therefore this man can correct even existing in a similar sin.

§ 68. Response. It must be said that one correcting another ought not to be existing in a similar notorious or greater sin. And if he is in a notorious sin, he is not bound to correct, unless perhaps by way of prayers, in this way: "I beg you lest you sin through my example." But if he does not will to acquiesce, he cannot judge him without a mortal sin, nor even

denounce him to the judge by way of an accuser. And according to this we concede the authorities and reasons first introduced.

§ 69. To the 1st therefore which is objected against it, it must be said that the thing done pleased the Apostle; but nevertheless the action according as it proceeds from the agent did not please him. And it is similar concerning the passion of Christ, which in itself was gracious, and yet the action displeased [God]. Thus this worked work (opus operatum) was good: but the action on the part of the agent was bad.

§ 70. To the next it must be said that one existing in sin, if he sees and can prohibit by way of prayers, let him do so. But if he is in a notorious similar crime, or of whatever other species, he is not bound to judge: because he would scandalize, and would not profit, except that he would rouse indignation against himself.

§ 71. To the next it must be said that it is not similar: because scandal is not conjoined to corporeal alms, inasmuch as it is received with benevolence. But correction is received with harshness, and denunciation follows it, if he does not amend. And therefore it has scandal adjoined to it.

§ 72. To the next we say that no one is perplexed: because it is in his power to correct his life: and then he may correct another as well. Moreover, in the second case, either let him yield the office of correcting, or let him change his morals for the better; and then there is no obstacle to him doing it.

§ 73. But I said, "In a notorious [sin]": because if his sin were occult, he would have the face of correcting and he ought to; because nothing could be objected against him.

Articulus 19 — Whether We Are All Bound To Fraternal Correction

§ 75. Thirdly it is inquired, whether all are bound to fraternal correction? Which seems true from the Gloss on Matthew 18:15 stated above:

§ 76. 1. For all equally, greater and lesser, men and women, religious and seculars, and such like, are bound to forgive a sinning neighbor: therefore by similarity they are bound to fraternal correction.

§ 77. 2. Also, all are bound to almsgiving according to place and time. But spiritual alms is to correct the delinquent: therefore, etc.

§ 78. 3. Also, this seems to be the form of the precept, which says thus: "If he sins against you," etc. But by the name of "brother" there is understood every neighbor. Therefore also on the part of the one correcting, every man is supplied.

§ 79. 4. Also, I ought to will to be corrected by every man if I have sinned. Therefore since anyone ought to do to another what he would will to be done to himself, every man ought to correct the delinquent.

§ 80. BUT AGAINST: 1. The Lord said this to Peter alone. But Peter is the prelate of the others. Therefore from the form of the precept none are obligated to this except prelates.

§ 81. 2. Also, he who corrects expends care. But none has care except a prelate: therefore, etc.

§ 82. 3. Also , the Apostle speaks to the Prelate alone, saying: "Those who sin, reprove before all, so that the rest may also have fear." Therefore as before.

§ 83. 4. Also, Jerome: "Let priests strive to fulfill that Evangelical word, 'If he sins against you,' etc. For what mercy is it to spare one, and lead all into peril? The people is polluted by one sinner, just as the entire flock by one diseased sheep." Therefore none are bound to this except priests alone.

§ 84. 5. Also, it belongs to the same person to correct and to punish the corrected one with condign penance. But it belongs only to the Prelate to give condign penance to the corrected one: therefore, etc.

§ 85. Response. It must be said that from office none are bound except prelates: but from charity every man is bound to correct a delinquent brother, and to guard him from sin. Whence Augustine in his Rule: "If you see him doing this very thing, admonish him immediately, lest the evils begun should progress, but let him be corrected closely. If your brother has a wound in his heart," etc. In this way therefore we concede the first objections.

§ 86. To that which is objected against it, there is one solution to all, namely that prelates are bound more than others: because [they are bound] from charity, authority, and office. And therefore it is said specially to them.

§ 87. To the last it must be said that what it says is not generally true: because a common corrector is not bound except to simple denunciation, if that one does not hear him.

Articulus 20 — Whether Fraternal Correction Is Of All Toward All

§ 89. Fourthly it is inquired, whether it is from all toward all? Which seems true: because:

§ 90. 1. On that text: "If he sins against you," etc., the Gloss says: "That is, with you alone knowing." But anyone can do this with respect to anyone. Therefore anyone is bound to correct another.

§ 91. 2. Also, by the name of "brother" any man is understood: but in the form of the precept the Lord uses the name of "brother": therefore as before.

§ 92. 3. Also, we are bound to will the good to every man, and to guard him from sin, as much as we can: but fraternal correction guards from sin: therefore as before.

§ 93. BUT AGAINST: 1. Hebrews 12:20: "If a beast touches the mountain, it shall be stoned." And it is expounded: If a subject touches a Prelate with the hand of correction, he is rebuked.

§ 94. 2. Also, Dionysius rebukes the monk Demophilus, who corrected a priest because he led an unclean man into the Church. Therefore that monk did badly by correcting a priest.

§ 95. 3. Also, Miriam was struck with leprosy because she murmured against Moses her brother. Therefore she did badly by correcting.

§ 96. 4. Also, Gregory in the Pastoral Care, as was held above: "For no one presumes to correct this delinquent." Therefore it is a presumption to correct such a one: and presumption is a sin: therefore it is a sin to correct a Prelate.

§ 97. Response. It must be said that every man is bound to admonish and correct every man concerning a fault with reverence and meekness, but he cannot denounce him further if he is disobedient. Because if he is the supreme Prelate, he has no judge. Thus therefore we concede the first part of the disputation.

§ 98. To that which is objected against it, there is one solution, that this is understood of those who from a certain presumed authority wish no longer to admonish, but by a certain coercive force through a jurisdiction which they do not have, wish to compel to correction. And through this the solution to all is clear.

§ 99. Note however, that according to the discretion of the wise, moderation must be had, looking to four things, namely the quantity of the fault of the delinquent, and the hope of emendation, and the state of the person who is admonished, and the zeal which moves the one correcting. For if the fault is light, and it is feared that a more grave disturbance will follow, he is not bound to correct: because something worse is aroused.

§ 100. Also, if there is probable despair of an amendment, he is not bound to correct, because he would do nothing except provoke to worse.

§ 101. Also, furthermore if the state of the person is high, he ought with reverence and excuse of the fault to admonish rather than correct, and to ask rather than rebuke.

§ 102. Fourthly, if he sees himself to be moved from rancor or envy, or some other root, then he ought not to do it: because such men quickly break forth into words of insult: and then from a lesser evil a greater evil is made. And this distinction is excellent.

Articulus 21 — Whether In Fraternal Correction Some Order Ought To Be Observed

§ 104. Fifthly, it is inquired concerning the order of fraternal correction. For it seems that the order is determined "Correct him between you and him alone... If he does not listen to you, take with you one or two... But if he does not listen to them, tell the Church."

§ 105. Now it seems that this order cannot be observed. 1. For through this, that it proceeds, it is clear that it is understood of an occult sin, because it proceeds: "If your brother sins against you." And the Gloss says, "With you alone knowing." Since therefore he takes with him one or two, either he takes those to whom the sin of the brother is known, or to whom it is unknown. If in the first way: therefore he did not know alone, which is against the Gloss. If in the second way: then he will be a betrayer of the crime of his brother, which is not to be done: therefore such an order is not to be observed.

§ 106. If you say that it is understood of those who can profit, and not hinder. It is inquired, who are they? For either they are Prelates who have the power of correcting, or they are from inferior associates. If in the first way: then he would immediately denounce the brother before the Prelate, and testimony would be competent to him. And a Prelate also cannot be a witness

in a case in which he is a judge. But in the Gospel it is said: "In the mouth of two or three witnesses every word stands." Therefore it cannot be understood of Prelates. But if it is understood of associates. Against: They can profit in nothing, but they can hinder by defaming: therefore they are not to be assumed. Moreover, that they cannot profit, is clear: because they do not have the power of correcting.

§ 107. 2. Moreover, when he takes with him one or two: let us suppose that he denies [the sin] before them. Then what is to be done by him with whose knowledge he sinned? For he cannot announce it to the Church, because he does not have proof before the Church, and the Church will not believe him, but rather will punish him who defamed a brother.

§ 108. 3. Also, it seems that the testimony of one is insufficient: because [619] it is said: "In the mouth of two or three witnesses every word shall stand." Therefore he says badly: "Take with you one or two."

§ 109. Also it is inquired, whether the same order is to be observed with respect to any man whatsoever? And it seems that it is: because Christ does not determine except one: therefore toward every man this order is to be kept.

§ 110. Against: 1. Suppose that a Prelate sins; he cannot be denounced to the Church: because it would be a scandal, and there would be no one before whom he would be denounced: because no one can be denounced before himself.

§ 111. Also, he cannot be compelled through excommunication just as a heathen and a publican: because he cannot excommunicate [himself].

unless having jurisdiction: and he who is to be excommunicated is the one who has jurisdiction: therefore, since no one can excommunicate himself, that order cannot be maintained.

1. Likewise, it seems that the Lord did not maintain this order in the case of Judas: because he did not first rebuke him privately, nor afterwards did he take one or two with him, but immediately announced it to the Church of the disciples: therefore, by his example, the aforementioned form is no longer to be observed.
2. Likewise, this seems especially evident from the deed of Peter, Acts 5:1 and following, who did not first rebuke Ananias and Sapphira privately, nor afterwards admonish them before one or two others, but immediately excommunicated them: therefore, he learned this from the example of the Lord: therefore, we also ought to do likewise, and immediately pronounce in common, so that the sentence may be given.

Response. It must be said that the sentence of the Lord as it stands is to be observed.

And we say to the first question, that it is understood concerning the hidden: because concerning the manifest, the Apostle prescribes another form, 1 Timothy 5:20: "Rebuke those who sin before all, that the rest also may fear."

To what is objected against this, it must be said that those are to be taken to whom it is not known, but made known by the one knowing, or by him who did it, which is better, if he can be induced: and yet the crime will not be betrayed: because they can benefit, and not harm: they can benefit by praying and admonishing and bearing penance with him, and consoling the penitent. And we say that they are to be taken from the number of companions.

And what is objected is not true: because in a brother is understood the name of one loving and guarding the honor and reputation of the brother: hence such are to be taken from whose life and conversion it is presumed that they will bear the burden with him, and will not defame the crime, since they desire correction and not defamation.

To what is posited, that he denies before them and conceals, it must be said that then nothing remains but to pray and lament to God for him: because then he demonstrates himself to be incorrigible. And it must be cautiously observed whether at another time he does it before some who can testify against him: and if the testimony of someone can be had, he is to be punished: but if no opportunity is found against him, then nothing remains but to pray for him. But the Lord speaks in the case in which before witnesses he acknowledges, or by some similar act manifests his sin, so that it can be brought to light.

To the other, we say that in fraternal denunciation the testimony of one approved man suffices, not that the accused be condemned, but that custody be applied to him by the Prelate: because if two witnesses make full faith, one makes a presumption against the accused: so that custody be applied to him lest he have such liberty as he had before: and this suffices for the amendment of the offense: and the Lord in the Gospel intends nothing else, because he does not delight in punishments, but in the repentance of the sinner, and the correction of offenses.

To the other, some skilled in law say that a Prelate ought not to be corrected by fraternal correction for a past sin, but to be admonished for the future lest it happen again. But this solution is null: because the Gospel of Matthew 18:15 speaks of a past sin, and not of the future. Therefore, others have said that fraternal correction is among equals: but it does not extend to Prelates. And this especially by that of Gregory said above: But against this again is the Gospel: because it excepts no one. Therefore, with some others we say that it extends to all: but to all Prelates the admonition of denunciation does not proceed. In others, however, it can proceed to denunciation: and this has been said above and answered to the authority of Gregory.

To the other objection concerning the Lord

and Judas, it must be said that in the deeds of the Lord there are many things which we ought not to observe, but to admire: for he had knowledge of all knowable things, even contingent ones: and he knew who would betray him alone, or with one other, or two: which we cannot imitate. Therefore, that he did not observe this in Judas, it is clear that this was the cause. And since it has now been made clear, this is not to be observed by us: because we

619. Deuter. XIX, 15.

ought to presume the corrigibility of everyone, unless he himself exhibits the contrary in himself after being admonished repeatedly.

To what is objected from the deed of Peter, it must be said that perhaps his sin was public. Or better, it must be said that he sinned in the community, and being questioned before the common chapter, he was admonished: and therefore, for the terror of all others, he was punished publicly. This manner is still to be observed in religious orders: because if those things which come to the knowledge of many were corrected in secret, the discipline of religion would quickly be dissolved.

Articulus 22 — How Fraternal Correction Differs From A Judge's Correction

How does fraternal correction differ from the correction of a judge?

Sixthly, it is asked, In what does that correction differ from the correction of a judge?

However, it seems that in no way: because in the Gospel it is said that witnesses are to be brought, and the Church is to be informed: by which is understood accusation: and that one is to be cut off from communion by sentence, and be as a heathen and a publican: and all these are in the correction of a judge: therefore in no way does fraternal correction seem to differ from the correction of a judge.

But on the contrary of this is: because a brother does not have coercive correction over a brother, as it is said in X Ethics, just as neither does a father over a son. However, a judge has coercive correction over him whom he judges by law. Therefore, this is not that.

To this it seems it must be said that they differ in the reason which the last objection introduces.

To the first, however, it must be said that sometimes from fraternal correction it can become judicial, as is clear from what has been disputed above: but nevertheless this is not that: as the Philosopher says, that a father does not compel a son: but nevertheless the stubborn one, if by law, even according to the Philosopher, he denounces to the judge, then he compels him.

Articulus 23 — Whether God Justly Freed The Harlot, When No One Was Found To Cast The First Stone

Whether God justly liberated the harlot, no one being found to cast the first stone?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said, there, E, after the beginning: For He liberated the sinner*, because there was no one who justly could cast the stone, etc.

From this it seems, that if there had been someone just there, He would have commanded him to stone her.

But if this is conceded, it will be against what is said, Ezekiel 16:23: Is it of my will that the wicked should die? says the Lord God: and not that he should turn from his ways, and live. Hosea 6:6: I desired mercy, and not sacrifice: and the knowledge of God more than burnt offerings.

To this it must be said, that without doubt even if there had been just ones, the Lord would have wished the adulteress to live for repentance: but He used the mode of simulation with those present, so that He might confound them, and, making them blush, incline them to faith in Him and to repentance.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 24 — Whether In The Old Law Venial Sins Were Remitted Through The Ceremonials

Whether in the old law venial sins were remitted through ceremonial acts?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, E, shortly after: For venial sins were remitted through ceremonies.

On the contrary: No sin is remitted to one not having grace: but they did not have grace: therefore no sin was remitted to them.

Response. It must be said that it does not say they were remitted, but that they thought they were remitted, because according to the law they were not punished.

Note also that ceremonies are called from "acarie" which is the decay of wood, and "mene" which is defect: because they were deficient commands having no use except for signifying: whence some made thus saying:

From decay and defect ceremony derives its origin.
"Mene" is defect, "caries" is called decay.

But because Tullius and other Gentile philosophers had ceremonies, and understood no use of signification: it seems to be false what they say. For Tullius says that religion is a species of justice and defining this he says that it is a virtue which brings care and ceremony to a certain superior nature which they call divine. And therefore every divine worship is called a ceremony: and it is said to be from "munia" and Ceres who is the goddess of crops: for out of the necessity of crops divine worship was first invented: and therefore from Ceres the term is transferred to all divine worships.

Articulus 25 — Whether Everyone Who Binds Others Is Just

Whether everyone who binds others is just?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said, there, E, § 2: And by these things it is sufficiently considered, etc.

For we see that not everyone who binds and looses others is just.

Response. It must be said that it does not say that he is, but that he ought to be: and this is plainly true.

DISTINCTIO XX

Divisio Textus

It must also be known that the time of penance is, etc. After it has been determined concerning the power of the keys, here it touches upon penance at death, and after death, and the return of sins previously mentioned. And therefore, he sets forth here in order three distinctions of those enumerated: in the first of which, namely this one, it touches upon the penances of the dying. In another, concerning the remission of sins after death. In the third, concerning the return of sins.

However, in this distinction, there are two principal questions: in the first of which the Master inquires about the time of repenting. In the second, however, about the mode of extreme penance, there, B, If indeed it is inquired about those who in this life, etc.

And let these suffice as to the division.

Articulus 1 — Whether At The End Of Life Penance Can Be Given

Whether at the end of life penance can be given?

It is first inquired concerning this which is said, there, A, after the beginning:
We can give penance, etc.

However, in the following part of the same distinction, it immediately contradicts, saying that penance is not to be given at the end of life, but to be made known.

But "to give" is here taken to mean to admit to penance: but penance is later set forth as external penance enjoined: and that is not to be given to the dying, but to be made known.

Articulus 2 — Whether A Healthy Penitent Can Conjecture Concerning The Certainty Of Charity, Whether He Is Worthy Of Hatred Or Of Love

Whether a healthy penitent can conjecture about the certainty of charity, whether he is worthy of hatred or love?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, A, a little later: Hold the certain, and dismiss the uncertain.

AGAINST:
Ecclesiastes 9:1: Man does not know whether he is worthy of love or hatred. Therefore, a penitent and confessing healthy man is not certain whether he is worthy of hatred or love.

Response. He understands this concerning the certainty of conjecture: because he can conjecture about the love of charity, when he repents while healthy: but it is a sign of fear only, when he does not repent except when sick. However, Ecclesiastes speaks of the certainty of knowledge: for no one has this.

Articulus 3 — Whether God Hears Late Repentance

Whether God hears late repentance?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said, there, A, a little later: In whatever day he is invoked, etc.

ON THE CONTRARY:
Micah 3:4: They shall cry to the Lord: Gloss: internally, and He will not hear them, it is understood concerning late repentance: but none is so late as that which is at the end of life: therefore God will not hear such.

Response. It must be said that late repentance is twofold according to the two things moving to repentance, which are servile fear and love. Therefore, God does not hear repentance from fear: and the Gloss speaks of that: but here it speaks of that which is from love: and God hears this: but because weakness is rather an indication of fear, therefore it rarely happens that someone then repents from love.

Articulus 4 — Whether One Who Repents Late Has Freedom Of Choice

Whether the late penitent has freedom of will?

Then it is questioned concerning this which he says, there, A, shortly before the middle: God seeks the freedom of wills, so that they might be able to be erased, etc.

For from this it seems that late penitents do not have freedom of will, which is not true: because as long as a man lives, he has freedom of will and the power of doing good.

Response. It must be said that free will is frequently taken away in infirmity with respect to use: however, it is always impeded. The use of free will is taken away when the mind is seized upwards and hinders discretion: however, it is impeded when the violence of the disease is averted and drawn away: and this always happens in the infirm: for this is the nature of the powers of the soul, that when one is in vehement act, the other is drawn away from action. Therefore, since in the infirm there is vehement pain in the sense, free will is impeded from the judgment of the discretion of sins. And in this way he understands: whence he says that the time must be sought when he has free will, supply, unimpeded and not hindered by the violence of the disease with sensible pain.

Articulus 5 — What The Fire Of Purgatory Is, Whether Corporeal Or Spiritual

What is the fire of purgatory, whether corporeal or spiritual?

Then it is inquired about this which is said, there, A, after the middle: First, it must be purged by the fire of purification, etc.

However, two things are inquired here at the beginning about the purgatorial fire, namely, what it is in reality, and where it is according to place?

To the first of these, the procedure is as follows: 1. The name is of the fire of the body: therefore it seems that the purgatorial fire is corporeal fire.

1. Furthermore, many saints say that the fire of hell is corporeal: therefore, as it seems, so is the fire of purgatory.
2. Likewise, Gregory? The fire of Gehenna is corporeal, which corporeally burns the wicked.
3. Likewise, Augustine: Why should we not say, although in wondrous, yet true ways, that even incorporeal spirits can be afflicted by the punishment of corporeal fire, if the spirits of men, although incorporeal, could be enclosed in corporeal members?
4. Likewise, Augustine: Gehenna, which is called the lake of fire and sulfur, will be corporeal fire. From this it is gathered that it is corporeal fire tormenting souls. Since, therefore, there is one reason concerning the fire of hell and purgatory, it seems that the fire of purgatory is corporeal.
5. Furthermore, if it is said to be incorporeal, an inconvenience seems to follow. For Aristotle says, and proves in the fourth of the Ethics, that purely spiritual pleasure has no contrary, nor is it a remedy: but future pleasure is purely spiritual: therefore it has no contrary: therefore it has nothing contrary acting towards sadness: if, therefore, that fire is only spiritual, it will not act towards causing sadness: and then those punished there would not be saddened: and this is false.
6. Moreover, purely spiritual things are separated from motion and matter: but all contrariety is with motion and matter: therefore in spiritual things there is no contrariety: therefore neither is there any action of contrariety: but all punishment is from a contrary agent: therefore in such things there is no punishment. If, therefore, it is granted that the fire is purely spiritual, it seems that it is in no way afflictive: and this is heresy: therefore it is necessary to posit it as corporeal.
7. Moreover, no substance as such is changeable, as Aristotle says, giving an example even in fire, which neither acts nor changes anything as it is a substance: if, therefore, it acts and changes, this will be from some quality of the substance itself: therefore the agent by changing is a substance disposed by quality: but it is evident that not every quality acts, but only the physical, as all philosophers say: therefore it is necessary that it has a physical quality.

Likewise, not every physical quality acts: but it happens that the contrary is active: therefore it is necessary to have such contrariety: but every such substance is corporeal: therefore every changing and acting thing is corporeal: but the purgatorial fire acts by changing and punishing: for there is no punishment except by the change of the patient: therefore it seems that the fire of purgatory is corporeal.

But if this is said, it is objected on the contrary first by authorities, and afterwards by reasons.

1. For Gregory says in the Moralia: A corporeal fire, to be able to be fire, needs nourishment from the body: which, since it must be preserved, is undoubtedly nourished by gathered wood: nor can it exist unless it is kindled and sustained by heat. On the contrary, however, the fire of Gehenna, since it is incorporeal, corporeally burns the reprobates in itself, nor is it kindled by human effort, nor nourished by wood: but once created, it lasts unquenchable, and does not need succession, nor lacks heat. It is clearly held that it is neither corporeal nor nourished and sustained in the manner of corporeal fire.
2. Likewise, in the same: If we take the gnashing of teeth and the weeping of eyes spiritually, we must also believe the flames of torments in them to be not corporeal, but spiritual.
3. Likewise, Augustine in book XXI of the City of God says that the flame in which the rich man was tormented was such as the eyes which he lifted when he saw Lazarus, such as the tongue for which he desired moisture to be poured, such as the finger of Lazarus from which he asked that it be done: but it is evident that those members were not corporeal, but spiritual: therefore it seems that neither was the flame corporeal: therefore, as it seems, neither is the fire of purgatory.
4. Likewise, Damascene in the last chapter of his book: But this fire is not corporeal, but such as God knows.
5. By reason, however, it is objected thus: Every agent and patient agree in matter with transmutation, as Boethius says in the book on the Two Natures in one person of Christ: but the purgatorial fire and the soul to be purged relate as agent and patient according to the transmuted: therefore they communicate in matter: but the soul is either not of matter, or not of corporeal matter: therefore it seems that that fire is either not of matter, or not of corporeal matter: therefore it is not corporeal.
6. Moreover, the author of the book of the Six Principles says that it is impossible for a non-body to be moved by a body: but the soul is not a body: therefore it is not moved by a body: but it is moved and changed by the purgatorial fire: therefore the purgatorial fire is not a body: therefore neither is it corporeal: because it is evident that that fire, whatever it is, is without quantity.

These, however, up to the treatise on the resurrection, suffice for objections: because there will again be a place to inquire about this there.

Response. All the saints disputing this question say that what they say, they wish to be taken without the arrogance of their assertion. Thus also I say what the fire of purgatory is, I do not think anyone knows, except to whom God has revealed it. However, whether it is, will pertain to the following distinction to inquire.

Concerning this, however, which is inquired here, it seems to be said that it is corporeal. And I think that whoever attentively considers the inconveniences to which the reasons first introduced lead, will scarcely incline to another opinion, unless it is corporeal. Unless perhaps, which may it not be, someone falls into the heresy of certain philosophers, to say that all things written about the places of punishments and punishments are altogether frivolous and vain. Therefore, consenting to the reasons first introduced, I say that it is corporeal.

To what is objected against, it must be said that a distinction is made between the first afflicting and the proximate afflicting: for the first afflicting a spiritual substance, whether in the body or outside the body, is corporeal: but the proximate afflicting is spiritual. To better understand this, let us give an example: for the incision of a wounded hand is corporeal, and the body suffers, and the soul suffers with it. The first afflicting of both of these is the sword: but since the soul suffers from the passion of the body, it is evident that what causes movement in the affection of sadness in the soul is the likeness of the wound apprehended as contrary to the conjoined: however, as such a likeness is in the soul, it is spiritual: and thus the proximate afflicting of the soul is spiritual. Thus I say in purgatory, that the first afflicting is corporeal fire, having the power to afflict the spirit from the fact that it is an instrument of divine justice avenging iniquity. And the proximate afflicting is the likeness of fire received by the punished souls, as it is an instrument of justice avenging sin, to which the soul itself submitted according to its will. This, however, will be more discussed in the treatise on the resurrection. This seems to be the opinion of Gregory in the fourth book of the Dialogues where he says: This is to burn in the fire for them, which is to see the fire, drawing punishment from the fires, not giving life to the fires.

Therefore, it must be said to the first, that Gregory speaks of the immediately afflicting, and not of the first afflicting: and in the same way, it must be said to all the following authorities.

To what is objected by reason, it must be said that that proposition is understood of agents and patients physically: but the soul suffers from the purgatorial fire having power from the fact that it is a body existing as an instrument of divine justice: and this is another power of heat than the natural power of heat alone. An example of this is that heat according to the Philosopher is fiery: and yet according to what it is an instrument of the soul governing the body, it does not act by the action of fire alone, because thus it would incinerate, but by the vivifying action of the soul, and we see that by digesting it assimilates to flesh and bone and nerve, as Aristotle says in the second of the Soul, speaking against the opinion which said that it acted by the power of fire alone. From a similar it seems to be said of the heat of the purgatorial fire, that insofar as it is moved by the power of avenging justice, it has the power of punishing incorporeal souls, which have lost the order of their dignity either irrecoverably or recoverably, as those existing in hell irrecoverably, and those existing in purgatory recoverably have lost.

To the objection, it must be said that this is understood of every corporeal and physical motion, as has been said. For in other things, even in natures, it is false: because a body is

moved by an immobile incorporeal first: and this will be more expressly proved in distinction XL.

Articulus 6 — In What Place Purgatory Is

In what place is purgatory?

Secondly, it is asked, Where is purgatory?

For it seems that it is here on earth. 1. For Gregory says in the fourth book of the Dialogues, that Paschasius, in the place of the baths where by the advice of the doctors the Capuan Bishop prepared himself for the bath, stood ready for service: and Paschasius was already dead, and there he rendered service, to induce that Bishop who was sanctified to intercede for him. Therefore, it seems that some are punished here near us.

1. Furthermore, Gregory expressly says this in the same place.
2. Furthermore, by reason it seems the same: because by what things one sins, by these he is tormented: but one sins by those things which are here near us: therefore by the same he will be punished: but by these he cannot be punished unless being here near us with us: therefore some are punished here near us.
3. Furthermore, in the life of blessed Patrick it is read, that he obtained that some in Ireland be punished in a certain place in the manner of purgatory: therefore it seems, that similarly others can be punished in their places.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. The place of reward and merit is not the same: but here is the place of merit: therefore here is not the place of reward: but they receive in purgatory what is worthy for merits: therefore it seems, that the purgatorial fire is not here.

1. Likewise, Gregory seems to want that the fire of hell and purgatory is the same: but the same fire is in the same place: therefore in the same place is hell and purgatory: but hell is under the earth, and not here, as the Saints seem to say: therefore purgatory is not here, but under the earth.

By the composition of the name of the Dialogues: because it is said in the lower part: therefore it is necessary that it is under the earth: but purgatory is a part of hell, as the Saints and Masters say: therefore it is under the earth, and not here.

Solution. It must be said that in this question nothing is to be asserted. And therefore without prejudice I say, that purgatory is different by the order of justice determining the place of penance for him who lived in sin and did not fully satisfy: and another by dispensation. In the first way, there is only one place of purgatory, which I think is the upper part of hell having in itself affliction for purification with some consolation of hope for future liberation through mercy. However, by dispensation there are many purgatorial places. And this dispensation is sometimes made for the living, sometimes for the dead. And although it is done for many reasons, yet a threefold cause sometimes occurs more frequently in the life of the Saints, namely to demonstrate merit in someone requesting this: as it was read about

Patrick, who requested that someone be punished there. Another cause is faith concerning the punishments of the dead: and therefore, as Gregory says, some are shown to be punished here around us, so that we may presume the same about others, of whose punishment it is not certain, although it is certain about their similar guilt. The third cause was in Paschasius who performed a miracle by healing a certain demoniac, who had touched his bier: and yet he had a sin, which to show it was a sin, because he had consented ignorantly and deceived in the conspiracy of some which seemed to be done out of zeal for justice: therefore he appeared to the holy Bishop of the city of Capua, and there he was shown to be punished.

And by this the solution to all is clear except one, namely that by which one sins, etc.

And to this it must be said, that it is understood by all in a similar way concerning eternal punishments, and as it frequently happens in temporal punishments. And the book of Wisdom speaks of those who say this. For just as the Egyptians sinned in water by casting the Hebrew children into the river, so they were punished by water with the river boiling with frogs, and the sea submerging them. And just as they sinned by shedding innocent blood, so they were also punished in that the river offered them blood for drink.

Articulus 7 — Whether The Fire Of Purgatory Is Eternal Or Temporal

Whether purgatorial fire is eternal or temporal?

Then it is inquired concerning what is said in the Text, there, A, before the end: However, this fire, although it is not eternal, is nevertheless in a wondrous manner grievous, etc.

But it is inquired here, Whether purgatorial fire is eternal or temporal?

And it seems that it is eternal: because
1. Gregory says that just as in a furnace under the same fire gold glows and straw smokes, so in hell under the same fire the damned are burned and the elect are purified: but the fire of hell is perpetual: therefore also the fire of purgatory, as it seems.

1. Likewise, To the same, the fire of the Last Judgment will envelop the reprobate as coals, and it will never end in them, and it will purge what is criminal in the elect: therefore it seems to be similar concerning the fire of purgatory and of hell: therefore it seems that it does not end: therefore it is perpetual.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY is this
1. Which is said here in the Text.

1. Likewise, That whose act and end are finite, itself is finite, or it will be useless: but the act and end of purgatory are finite: therefore it itself ends, or it will be useless: but nothing will remain useless in divine works: therefore it itself will not remain, as it seems.

2. Further, All elements in whatever way they serve man, will receive an end according to this state, and will be in another state, in which they will receive the reward of their labor: therefore also those which serve man outside the world: but purgatorial fire

serves man: therefore it will be in another state in which it will be rewarded, and it will end according to the state of purging.

Response. It seems to me to be said without prejudice, that purgatorial fire is finite according to the purgatorial reason, but it is not finite according to substance: because I suppose that it is the same in species of fire with the fire of hell, as Gregory seems to wish.

Therefore, what is first proven, that it is perpetual according to the substance of fire, in which it agrees with the fire of hell, seems to be conceded: because all objections proceed in this manner.

To that which is secondly objected on the contrary, it must be said that in truth this objection only proves it to be finite according to this use in which it now is: and this is conceded: and it will then be for another use, because it will be for burning the damned.

Moreover, it seems to be said without prejudice, that this is understood of those serving man according to the state of merit: but purgatorial fire does not serve man.

§ 1. ...to this state. Hence it seems to me it must be said that just as in the state of grace the pure exists alongside the impure of sin and penalty, so too in the serving elements and elemental bodies pertaining to the state of grace, the pure is mixed with the impure; and in the renovation, the pure that contributes to delight will be separated upwards to the place of the elements above the circle of the earth, while the impure will descend downwards below the gloomy orb of the earth into the center. But in those things that precede the state of impurity, nothing is posited to be impure: and therefore such things will never be renovated, but will remain, punishing the damned.

§ 2. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

§ 3.

Articulus 8 — Whether The Punishment Of Purgatory Excels Every Punishment That Someone Has Suffered, Or Can Suffer, In This Life

Whether the penalty of purgatory exceeds every penalty which anyone has suffered, or can suffer, in this life?

§ 5. Next it is asked concerning what he says there at A, before the end: For it exceeds every penalty which anyone has ever suffered in this life, etc.

§ 6. For it seems that what he says is false: because 1. The more something is conjoined to an agent, the more it feels the penalty in suffering if it has sense: but an animate composite of contraries is more passible than what is simple, and an uncomposed spiritual thing, not composed of contraries: therefore, what is conjoined to the agent acting upon it feels the penalty more: but the body on the way (in this life) is thus composed: therefore, someone is punished more here in this life than he is punished in the soul after death: and thus he seems to speak falsely.

§ 7. 2. Moreover, a passion transmuting and casting away from substance is greater than one transmuting and not casting away: the passion of this life is transmuting and casting away from substance, whereas that of the other life is transmuting and not casting away: therefore this penalty is greater than that one.

§ 8. 3. Moreover, whatever active and passive principles have a greater contrariety, their undergoing (passion) comes with a greater sense of penalty: but there is greater contrariety of fire to the body on the way (in this life) than to the soul in purgatory: therefore, etc.: and thus again what he says is false.

§ 9. 4. Moreover, whatever patient is more susceptible to the form of the agent according to one aspect, more deeply feels its action if it has sense: but a corporeal patient is more susceptible to the species of fire according to the nature of fire than an incorporeal one is: therefore it feels its passion more than the incorporeal. The first premise is proved from the fact that all action and passion are ordered to this, that the patient receives the species of the agent as much as it can. The second is proved from the fact that the heat of fire disposes the body so that it may be called and may be hot: but to call the soul hot seems ridiculous.

§ 10. 5. Moreover, theologically it is objected against the Text thus: God punishes no one beyond what is deserved (condign): therefore neither one sinning venially: but the least penalty is owed to venial sin in this life, and it is lesser than many temporal penalties: therefore one is punished there by a lesser penalty as well: therefore not by a greater one than any present penalty: but a purgatorial penalty is owed to it: therefore the purgatorial penalty is not greater than every present penalty: and thus what he says is false.

§ 11. 6. Moreover, a mortal sin and a venial sin are disproportionable: but a mortal sin is sufficiently punished by a temporal penalty: therefore an infinitely lesser one is owed to a venial sin: therefore it is not punished by a penalty that is greater than every temporal penalty: but it is punished by a purgatorial penalty: therefore the purgatorial penalty is not greater than every temporal penalty.

§ 12. 7. Moreover, Blessed Gregory says that certain souls are not punished except by remaining for a time in a certain shadow: but this is not more grievous than every temporal penalty:

therefore it seems that what he says is not a general rule.

§ 2. Response. It must be said, just as the Text says simply, that the penalty of purgatory, even the least, is greater in sadness than any corporeal penalty of this world could be. How this is so can be seen in this way. For the soul, having been stripped of the body, desires the highest good as the object of beatitude in that manner by which a perfected thing desires its own place when existing outside its place: and this is seen from the words of Gregory in the fourth book of the Dialogues, where he says that souls are elevated after death by their own powers, or depressed by their demerits.[620] Hence if sadness is caused by the absence of something delectable, as the Philosopher says,[621] maximal sadness will be caused by the absence of the supremely desired. And since health or life or the delight of sense in this life have no

comparison to the highest good that beatifies the blessed, the things taking away delights in this life will bear no comparison to the things taking away or deferring the delectable thing which is in the other life. And therefore the sadness of the other life is incomparably greater than any sadness is in the present.

§ 3. But if you object that the damned do not desire the highest good, it must be said that this is false: rather, even demons desire the highest good and the optimum, as Dionysius says.[622] But in what manner they desire it is the business of another inquiry.

§ 4. But these statements suffice to show that this sadness is incomparable to other sadness. And that this consequent follows is expressly gathered from Book X of the Ethics, where by a similar consequence the Philosopher proves that intellectual pleasures are infinitely more delightful than corporeal ones which are in the sense.[623]

§ 5. With this established, it should be responded to the first by saying that the first proposition is simply and universally true. But the second has a counter-instance because "more passible" is said in two ways, namely externally, and thus that proposition is true. "More passible" is also said from the order of divine justice correcting errors through penalties: and thus what has made itself more passible by sins is more passible: and thus it has a counter-instance in souls and Angels made obstinate through sin.

§ 6. To the next it must be said that a greater passion is said in two ways, namely as more afflicting, and as receiving more of the species of the agent. In the first way the first proposition is not true, if even in life someone is posited to suffer in such a way that he remains in the complexion and composition of his members, that he lies in fire, he is afflicted more than another whose substance is cast away: because in the first the sense remains alive and whole, and excellently feels the thing altering it. But in the second the sense is deadened after a short while, and then it grieves less, and after a little time it dies and grieves not at all. Hence in that first way the proposition is false: but in the second way it is true: because the more it receives of the species and properties of the agent, the more its own proper species and properties are cast away.

§ 7. To the next it must be said that there is a contrariety of the soul and fire in the manner by which contrarieties exist in moral matters: just as the rectitude of hanging or beheading is contrary to iniquity or robbery: for a correcting penalty has an effect contrary to the fault disordering nature: hence the rational soul which has transgressed the order of its dignity is subjected by the omnipotent judge to a nature inferior to itself, namely to fire having not only the power of fire, but also the power of its mover which is the justice vindicating what was admitted through sins: and this contrariety is stronger than natural contrariety and therefore is more presumed, and the action against the soul is greater according to the quantity of affliction than against any animate body before death.

§ 8. To the next it must be said that the species of the acting fire is twofold, just as is the species of natural heat. For according to what is the heat of fire, fieriness is its species. But according as the motion is derived

620. Gregory the Great, Dialogues, Book IV.

from the soul, flesh is its species, and nerves, and form, and the like. So I say of the fire of hell, that according to its nature it has a species which it does not impress upon the soul: and therefore the soul is not called hot. But according as it is an instrument of vindicating justice, it has another species, which I consider to be an affliction from heat for him who has transgressed: and it impresses this on the transgressing soul: and therefore I do not think the soul is hot, but rather that it is inestimably afflicted by what is hot: and the stripped soul is more susceptible to this species than any animate thing in this life.

§ 2. Note, however, that some here assign other reasons for this which Augustine states, such as, for instance, that the soul suffers more after death than before: because that passion belongs to the soul, and so it comes wholly upon it. Likewise, it is more to suffer in oneself, than to co-suffer. For in the body it only co-suffers, but after death it suffers. Likewise, because here it is in some way voluntary: but there entirely involuntary. And they touch on reasons of this sort which are more ridiculous and vulgar than true: because those things which they bring forward are not true reasons, nor of a greater passion in a spiritual substance, but rather of a lesser one, or even none at all: and therefore one must recur to the things said above.

§ 3. As for that which is objected from the order of justice, it must be said that a venial sin is twofold, namely venial from its kind, and venial from the outcome. According to Gregory in the fourth book of the Dialogues, where he speaks of purgatory, he gives the example of an idle word: yet God does not punish beyond what is deserved: because the venial from outcome is changed by mercy into such a thing that it is expiable by punishment: and this is always a mercy and a punishing short of what is strictly deserved, wherever it may be punished. But that it is stronger there and lesser here, I consider to be from the change of state: and this is accidentally so. However, the penalty there is sharper for those reasons which are hinted at in the resolution and at the beginning of the resolution. For in each resolution one reason for the sharper penalty is hinted at. But a venial sin from its kind is a disposition toward mortal sin and toward aversion from God: and therefore a lesser penalty is owed to it here, and a greater one there by the stated reason.

§ 4. To the next we say, that a mortal sin remaining mortal is not expiated by any penalty: and therefore if the objection is understood concerning that, then the first proposition is false: but a mortal sin made venial by its outcome is expiated by some penalty: but then it is made proportionable to a venial sin from its kind, and then the conclusion does not follow.

§ 5. To that which is objected concerning the sayings of Blessed Gregory, it must be said that that penalty insofar as it is a deferment of the supremely desired glory, itself bears a greater sadness than that which takes away health and life in this body: and the reason for this was made clear at the beginning of the resolution.

§ 6.

621. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, likely alluding to the nature of pain and pleasure.

Articulus 9 — Whether It Is A Terrible Thing To Fall Into The Hands Of God

Whether it is a horrendous thing to fall into the hands of God?

§ 8. Next it is asked concerning what he says there at B, around the middle: It is a horrendous thing to fall, etc.

§ 9. On the contrary: God is infinitely more merciful than any human being: therefore it is less horrendous to fall into the hands of God, than into the hands of human beings: because His mercies are many: therefore it seems that he speaks falsely in the Text.

§ 10. Solution. It must be said that, in the work of mercy supremely exalting judgment, it is lighter to fall into the hands of God than into the hands of man, that is, while it is the time for mercy and penance: but when He will judge instances of justice in the future, it is more horrendous to fall into the hands of God than into the hands of man: because then, as is said, Prov. 6:34-35: The zeal and fury of a husband will not spare in the day of revenge, nor will he yield to anyone's prayers, nor will he accept many gifts for ransom. And by this the solution is clear.

§ 11.

Articulus 10 — Whether Venial Sin Can Be Changed Into Mortal Sin

Whether a venial sin can be changed into a mortal sin?

Whether a venial sin can be changed into a mortal sin?

§ 2. Next it is asked concerning what he says there at B, toward the end: For certain mortal sins, etc.

§ 3. On the contrary: The artisans of alchemy know that species cannot be transmuted: but the species of sin are diverse, namely venial and mortal: therefore one is not transmuted into the other.

§ 4. Solution. It must be said that a venial sin from its kind never becomes mortal except by the mode stated above: nor does a mortal sin become venial in this mode, but a mortal sin becomes venial from the outcome, that is, expiable by a penalty through pardon, for the reason that God deletes the fault through His grace, which afterwards makes the guilt capable of being loosed.

§ 5.

Articulus 11 — Whether If A Sinner Lived Forever, He Would Always Sin

Whether if a sinner were to live always, he would always sin?

§ 7. Next it is asked concerning what he says there at B, at the end: For if he were to live always, he would always sin.

622. Pseudo-Dionysius, Divine Names, Ch. 4.

§ 8. This conditional seems to be impossible: because there seems to be no consequence in: He who has sinned, lives always: therefore he always sins. For he is able not to sin, and nevertheless to live always.

§ 9. Response. It must be said that man is a spirit going, and not returning: hence man has it from himself that he sins: but man does not have it from himself that he rises again.

§ 10. Therefore it must be said to the Text that, just as "to see", according to the Philosopher, is said in two ways, namely to have sight, and to use sight: so also "to sin" is said in reference to having sin, and using sin. And here it is understood in reference to having sin: because he who sins once, as far as it depends on himself, is always in sin and always will be: and according to this the consequence is good: and so the Text is understood.

§ 11.

Articulus 12 — Whether One Who Has Not Completed The Enjoined Penance Will Be Bound To Complete It In Purgatory

Whether he who has not completed an enjoined penance will be bound to complete it in purgatory?

Whether he who has not completed an enjoined penance will be bound to complete it in purgatory?

§ 2. Next it is asked concerning what he says there at C: But if it is asked concerning him who has fulfilled the enjoined satisfaction, etc.

§ 3. For it seems that 1. He is treated unjustly if God punishes him: for he did what the Lord commanded, Matt. 23:2: All things whatsoever they shall say to you, observe and do:[624] but this man did whatever he sitting upon the chair of Moses commanded him: therefore it seems that he is absolved in totality.

§ 4. 2. Moreover, this man is not bound to know the taxations of penances: therefore it seems that if even a lesser one is enjoined, and he completes it, his ignorance absolves him from the residue: therefore he ought not be punished any further in purgatory.

§ 5. Moreover, as was evident above, a penance is enjoined not only for the quantity of guilt, but also that it might be a medicine: hence although sexual intercourse is a greater sin in an old man than in a young man: nevertheless sometimes a greater penance is enjoined upon the young man than the old man: because that disease in the young man needs a greater medicine than in the old man. Let us suppose, therefore, that such a person fulfills only as much as is appropriate for the guilt he committed, and yet does not fulfill in totality what the priest enjoined. And let it be asked, whether he will complete it in purgatory?

§ 6. It seems that he will: because he did not fulfill the whole penance enjoined upon him here: therefore in purgatory he will fulfill the residue according to those things which are said here in the Text.

623. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book X, Ch. 7.

§ 7. On the contrary: According to the measure of the sin shall be the measure of the stripes: [625] but he has already received a penalty according to the measure of the sin; therefore he is treated unjustly if he is punished further.

§ 8. Response. To the first question it must be said that, just as he himself says in the Text, he will fulfill it in purgatory.

§ 9. To the first objection raised to the contrary, it must be said that it is understood thus: all things whatsoever they shall say to you according to the discretion of divine right and of the sinner: but here the discretion of divine right is not observed.

§ 10. To the next it must be said that it is ignorance of the right, although the right may be obscure: because he is bound to know that the satisfaction ought to be proportioned to the fault: and this sort of ignorance, as Augustine says, excuses no one so that he does not burn: but it can excuse so that he burns less.

§ 11. To that which is asked further, it must be said that such a one flies out immediately: because he needs no further medicine.

§ 12. To the objection to the contrary, it must be said that it is understood of things enjoined solely to delete guilt.

§ 13.

Articulus 13 — Whether The Thief, As Soon As He Was Converted, Deserved To Enter Paradise

Whether the thief, immediately as he was converted, merited to enter paradise?

§ 15. Next it is asked concerning what he says there at C, after the beginning: Immediately as he was converted, namely the thief, he merited to enter paradise.

§ 16. On the contrary: Before the ascension no one entered heaven except the thief: because it is said, Micah 2:13: He shall ascend opening the way before them.[626] Therefore it seems that he speaks falsely in the Text.

§ 17. If perhaps you say that the proposition which

lies in the Text is twofold, from the fact that the word statim (immediately) can determine the verb merited, and thus it is true; or the verb to enter, and thus it is false. On the contrary: Luke 23:43: Amen I say to you, this day you shall be with me in paradise.[627] Therefore it seems that it determines to enter: and in this sense it was false: therefore it is false simply.

§ 2. Response. It must be said that there are three general opinions concerning paradise, as Augustine says at the beginning of Book XII of The Literal Meaning of Genesis, namely that it is corporeal, that it is spiritual, and that it is a place for both. Therefore it must be said that the spiritual paradise is that in which the Saints converse with God: and it has three things, namely rest, and delights in the object of those enjoying it, and congruity of place which is the

624. Psalm 77:39.

empyrean heaven. And as to the first two, the thief immediately entered paradise with Christ after death, namely as regards rest and the delights of fruition. But as to the third, it is true that no one entered except after the Ascension.

§ 3. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

§ 4.

Articulus 14 — Whether The Measure Of Time Is Prescribed Sufficiently Clearly For Penitents

Whether the measure of time is clearly enough prescribed to penitents?

§ 6. Next it is asked concerning what he says there at C, a little before the end: The canons therefore do not clearly enough prescribe the measure of time in doing penance, etc.

§ 7. For what he says seems false, because the canons determine penances of seven years, and three years, and forty days, and more, and less, as is evident in the Decretum: therefore it seems that Jerome speaks falsely here.

§ 8. Response. It must be said, as was noted above, that the rule of penance is never clearly prescribed: but nevertheless three things at least must be attended to, namely the quality of the sin, the quantity of contrition, and the state of the penitent. The canon, however, attends to only one of these: and therefore what it says is only like an exemplar to direct one in other cases either to diminish from it, or to add to it, according to the judgment of a discreet priest solemnly observing these three things.

§ 9.

Articulus 15 — Whether It Ought To Be Made Known To The Penitent How Much He Ought To Do According To The Canon, Yet Not Enjoined

Whether what one ought to do according to the canon should be notified to the one confessing, yet without enjoining it?

Whether what one ought to do according to the canon should be notified to the one confessing, yet without enjoining it?

§ 2. Next it is asked concerning what he says there at D, after the beginning: Yet the quantity of penance is not to be imposed on them, etc.

§ 3. For it seems that it is a danger to make the penance known to them: because a grave penance indicates a grave sin: and once known it induces them into despair: since therefore it must be supremely avoided that an infirm penitent falls into despair, it seems that the penance should not be made known.

§ 4. To this it must be said that in truth it is to be made known: because it is good for the infirm one to know the quantity of his fault, so that he may be more contrite: nevertheless the

625. Aristotle, De Anima, Book II, Ch. 1.

priest ought to indicate to the infirm one the mercy of God, for Whom it is as though nothing to relax many sins, and equally as easy for many as for few: and then he will not fall into despair. And through this the solution of the objection is clear.

§ 5.

Articulus 16 — What An Indulgence Or Relaxation Is

What is an indulgence or relaxation?

§ 7. Next it is asked concerning the rationale of what he says there at D, a little after: And the weight of penance is to be alleviated with the prayers of friends and the giving of alms, etc.

§ 8. It is asked concerning relaxations or penances.

§ 9. And seven things are asked, namely, what is a relaxation or indulgence? Second, whether it is valid, and has an effect, or not? Third, for whom is it valid? Fourth, whether it is valid for one not giving but having the will to give? Fifth, whether the Pope can grant indulgences while existing in mortal sin, and to one who is in mortal sin? Sixth, whether a Bishop can grant indulgences? Seventh and finally, whether a parish priest can grant them, or an abbot to his monks?

§ 10. To the first of these it is objected thus:

§ 11. The Masters define relaxation thus: Relaxation is a fitting and discreet commutation of a greater satisfaction into a lesser one. Others define it thus: Relaxation is the promised diminution of a temporal penalty owed.

§ 12. But neither of these seems to fit: because 1. Relaxation speaks of a remission: but a commutation is not a remission, but the exaction of something else in place of it, equal in quantity, or value, or both: therefore relaxation is not a commutation: therefore the first definition is bad.

§ 13. 2. Moreover, because those whose concern it is to give relaxations do not use relaxations in this way. For they say: We mercifully relax: and they do not posit anything into which they commute, nor do they use the word commutation: therefore it seems that relaxation is not a commutation.

§ 14. 3. Moreover, in 2 Cor. 2:10, the Apostle makes a relaxation, saying: And to whom you have pardoned anything, I also: for, what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, for your sakes have I done it in the person of Christ.[628] And it is plain here that there is no commutation: therefore it seems that relaxation is not a commutation.

§ 15. 4. Moreover, commutation belongs more to the will than to power: the proof of which is that humans even not having power commute wills: but relaxation more regards the will (or rather, power): therefore

relaxation ought not to be defined by commutation.

626. Micah 2:13.

§ 2. 5. Moreover, in corporeal matters a commutation does not occur by way of relaxation, but by way of remission: therefore it seems that neither should it happen thus in spiritual matters: therefore it is badly defined.

§ 3. But against the second definition it is objected thus: For let us posit that someone is sufficiently contrite for the dismissal of both fault and penalty: it is certain that he is a debtor to no penalty: therefore no diminution of penalty occurs for him: and yet a relaxation can be made for him: therefore it seems that a relaxation is not a diminution of penalty.

§ 4. To the contrary of this it is objected: because divine relaxation is the exemplar of the relaxation of the Church: but every divine relaxation involves the commutation of a greater penalty into a lesser one: therefore the relaxation of the Church ought also to be of this sort. The first premise is self-evident. The second is proved by Master Hugh of St. Victor who says that the remission of the fault and the eternal penalty obligates one to a temporal purgatorial penalty: and thus it is a commutation of a greater penalty into a lesser one: and thus the proposition stands.

§ 5. Solution. It must be said that the given definitions can be adequately sustained. If someone, however, wanted to give this one, I think he would define it better, namely that an indulgence or relaxation is the remission of an enjoined penalty proceeding from the power of the keys, and from the treasury of the supererogation of the perfect: then "remission" is there as the genus. But because there is the remission of fault which God alone does, and the remission of penalty which God and man do, therefore "of a penalty" is added. But because, again, there is an eternal penalty which God remits, and the temporal penalty of an enjoined satisfaction which man remits, therefore "enjoined" is added. Because, in truth, only one having jurisdiction and the keys can make this remission, therefore "from the power of the keys" is added. And because what is enjoined for sins upon one cannot be duly and discreetly remitted, unless recompense is made by another who does more than he owes, therefore it subjoins "proceeding from the treasury of the supererogation of the perfect." For in this treasury the Church holds the riches of the merits and passion of Christ, and of the glorious Virgin Mary, and of all the Apostles, and Martyrs, and the living and dead saints of God. And for the utility and necessity of the Church they can be expended as suffrages for those who serve the Church in her necessity. And therefore I judge this definition to be better than the others.

§ 6. Nevertheless, sustaining the first definition, I say to the first objection that a commutation into something lesser is accompanied by remission: and because the Church demands something profitable to herself in her necessity, therefore commutation is posited there.

§ 7. To the next it must be said that they do use them in that manner in relaxations: because they receive either the vow of the cross, or the collection of alms, or the hearing of the word of God: and these are certain lesser penalties: and then they make the relaxation when these are held.

§ 8. To the next it must be said that the Apostle relaxed the penalty because that man had been greatly contrite: and the rebuke which he had sustained from many was sufficient for him, as is said in the same place,[629] and he needed relaxation: and there was no commutation there: because he was sharper in punishing afterwards for the edification of the Church which he had scandalized.

§ 9. To the next it must be said that the commutation of contracts is subject to the will: but a commutation which is of a greater into a lesser, respects the authority of him who has to govern the Church: because without his power it cannot be done: and such is the commutation of indulgences or relaxations.

§ 10. To the next it must be said that in corporeal matters relaxations are also twofold, namely of the whole, or of a part: and the indulgence of the Church is likened to an indulgence in which a part is indulged and relaxed, and not the whole.

§ 1. To the next which is objected against the second definition, it must be said that it may well be that one who is thus contrite is not a debtor with respect to God, but nevertheless he is a debtor with respect to the Church, as is expressly gathered from the Text of the preceding chapter from the words of Augustine and Jerome. And therefore a diminution and relaxation can be made for him concerning that.

§ 2. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

§ 3.

Articulus 17 — Whether Relaxation Also Has An Effect, And Whether It Avails

Whether relaxation also has an effect, and whether it is valid?

§ 5. Secondly it is asked, whether a relaxation is valid? and, whether it has an effect, or not?

§ 6. But it seems that it is valid for nothing.

§ 7. 1. 2 Tim. 2:13: He remains faithful: he cannot deny himself.[630] Gloss: Which he would do if he did not fulfill his words. But he said that according to the measure of the sin shall be the measure of the stripes.[631] Therefore he can relax nothing of that: therefore it seems that relaxation is valid for nothing.

§ 8. 2. Moreover, Augustine: Either God punishes, or man punishes: but man does not worthily punish what is relaxed: therefore God will punish it: therefore the relaxation was not valid.

§ 9. 3. Moreover, Isa. 40:2: Her iniquity is forgiven: she hath received of the hand of the Lord double for all her sins.[632] Therefore it seems that penalties are rather to be doubled, than to be indulged: therefore an indulgence is valid for nothing, as it seems.

628. 2 Corinthians 2:6.

§ 10. 4. Moreover, the Gloss on that passage of Isaiah: She received torment in body and in soul for all her sins. Therefore relaxation was not valid for her: therefore neither is it valid for another, because concerning similar things the judgment is the same, as Boethius says.

§ 11. 5. Moreover, a corporeal disease cannot be cut out and cured except through an antidote: and if the antidote is relaxed, the disease remains: but a spiritual disease is more difficult, and an enjoined penance is its antidote: therefore if anything of the penalty were to be relaxed, the disease would remain: therefore relaxation of an enjoined penance is valid for nothing, but rather it even hinders.

§ 12. 6. Moreover, it seems to be a mockery to buy an indulgence of forty days, or of one year, or of five, or of more, for a halfpenny (obol).

§ 13. 7. Furthermore, it seems that simony is even committed in such things: for it is certain that what is remitted by the Church is spiritual, and what is exacted and expended for it is temporal: therefore a buying of the spiritual with a temporal price occurs there: and this constitutes simony: therefore simony is committed in such things.

§ 14. 8. Moreover, let us posit that seven years of fasting are enjoined upon someone, and he comes in one day seven times to a Church which has an indulgence of one year from the Pope, and each time he offers one halfpenny: therefore this man, in a single day, by seven halfpennies, is absolved from seven years of penance justly enjoined upon him: but this is a marvel if even the infidels do not mock it.

§ 15. If, however, it is conceded that it is valid for nothing. On the contrary: 1. 2 Cor. 2:10: For, what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, for your sakes have I done it in the person of Christ.[633] The Gloss: As if Christ had pardoned: but it is certain that what Christ pardons, is pardoned: therefore also what the Apostle pardoned: but the Pope is of as much power as Paul was: therefore also what the Pope pardons, is pardoned: therefore also what they pardon who, so that they might be able to pardon, have it from the Pope: therefore indulgences are as valid as they are said to be valid by those who grant them.

§ 16. 2. Moreover, Chrysostom on Matthew 16:19 on that phrase: I will give to thee the keys, etc.[634] To a mortal and earthly man. It is certain, however, because

God has entrusted the power of all things that are in heaven, and has shown the Church to be stronger than heaven. What is granted in heaven is entirely granted: therefore, since the Church is stronger than heaven, it seems that what is granted is that which is relaxed in the Church.

1. Furthermore, the universal governor of the Church, especially in those things which the whole Church receives and approves, is not to be believed to wish to deceive anyone: it is evident, however, that he preaches indulgences to be valid and causes them to be preached: therefore, as it seems, they are simply valid, just as they are preached to be valid.

627. Matthew 23:2-3.

2. Furthermore, Luke 22:32: "I have prayed for you, Peter, that your faith may not fail." But this was said to Peter in the person of the Church: therefore the universal Church does not err: therefore it seems that indulgences are valid.

3. Furthermore, we see that such things are promised to Peter in the person of the Church when it is said: "I do not say to you, Peter: Dignit: therefore it seems that the more indulgences the ecclesiastical dispenser gives, the better he acts: but he would not act better if indulgences were worth nothing: therefore indulgences are valid and have effect.

4. Furthermore, in the human body we see that the weight and infirmity of one member is received by another member: for a wise physician causes it to flow over another less dangerous one: therefore it will be so also in spiritual matters: therefore one can act for another: therefore, since indulgence is made for one from this that he has done more for another, it seems that indulgence has effect and is true.

Response. It must be said that there were three opinions of old concerning indulgences. For some, moved more by the aforementioned reasons than was necessary, said that indulgences were worth nothing at all, and that they were now a fraud by which a mother, deceiving her children, provokes them to good, namely pilgrimages, alms, and hearing the word of God, and such things, and they gave the example of a mother provoking little ones to walk, which is useful for little ones, and at the end of the way promising them an apple, and afterwards withdrawing it: which deception is even pious. But these distract the deeds of the Church to the play of children: and I think this almost savors of heresy: for nothing would be believed of the Church, if in those things which are preached to the people and exhorted to do, deception is found. Therefore others, contradicting more than was necessary, said that indulgences, as they are pronounced, are simply valid without any other condition understood or said. But because these give too good a forum to the mercy of God, therefore it seems to me that the third opinion is to be consented to, which chooses the middle way of opinions, namely that indulgences are valid as the Church preaches them to be valid: but six conditions are required which are supposed or said by the Church.

Two, however, are on the part of the giver, of which the first is the authority of the giver from the jurisdiction he has, such as the Pope, Bishop, Legate, and the like. The other is the pious cause moving the giver, not private, but public. This cause, however, is divided as it were into two, so that there is a just necessity of requesting such things from the faithful, or public utility. Just necessity, such as the danger of the homeland, the liberation of the holy land, endangered faith, endangered study, and the like: utility, however, such as the poverty of the place, hearing of the word of God, frequentation of relics, and the like. Two others are supposed on the part of the recipient, namely that he is contrite and confessed in vow or in purpose, and that he has faith that this can be done for him through the power of the keys. And therefore it is always contained in the letters of indulgences: "To all who are contrite and confessed," etc., otherwise the penalty would not be solvable by him, unless remission of guilt

629. 2 Corinthians 2:6.

had already preceded in him. Two others are required on the part of grace or the Church in which the remission of sins is made, namely the abundance of the treasury of merits stored in the spiritual chests of the Church, of which merits it has been said above: and the just estimation of its solution, for which the indulgence is instituted. I call just estimation, however, not that which is made according to the estimation of the recipient of the indulgence, who perhaps would estimate too little what he gives, as some said: nor even according to the estimation of the giver of the indulgence, who perhaps would estimate too little what is given: and this others said. But I call just estimation that of good men according to the necessity of the Church, considering the time and the ability of the person: because at one time a little help is worth more than at another a great deal: and it is more for one to give a little than for another to give much. However, some wish to add two other things, namely if the priest imposing the penance has promised, and if it is useful for the penitent to receive such a penance. Hence they note the verses thus:

If the confessor promises you, if it is perhaps expedient for you and in a devout place, with salt the bishop makes you secure, after this let the offering be made.

But I think it is not necessary to add these last two: because indulgence is always given by a superior, who has nothing to seek from the priest who imposed satisfaction, but rather can do what he wills even against the will of the priest concerning the subject. Of the second it is evident, that it is not to be added: because I do not think it is doubtful to anyone that indulgence is always good.

Therefore, it must be said to the first, that God does not deny Himself by confirming the indulgence of the Church, but rather shows Himself truthful in what He said: "Whose sins you forgive, they are forgiven them" and He fulfills these words, because according to the measure of the offense the penalty is proportioned in two ways, namely in quantity, and this the key attends to in confession: or in the value of the Church, and this the key attends to in relaxation, when it commands to do what is more valuable to the Church, in which all sins are forgiven.

To the other it must be said, that man presumes this, but not the same man, but another who has the Church in the power of dispensing in the penalties of supererogations: and this can well be done: because as it is held, 1 Corinthians 12:14 and following, in the Gloss and text, just as the goods of the natural body are communicated from one member to another, so the goods of the mystical body are communicated.

To the other it must be said, that the double do not say in the penalty a duplicity: because this would be to punish beyond what is deserved, which does not befit God, whose property is to have mercy and to spare: but this is to be punished in body and soul. And indeed in the soul every penitent is punished by the pain of contrition: in the body, however, by some satisfaction: which although it is not that which the confessor imposes, is nevertheless that which he who gives the indulgence requires: because, as it has been held above, there is a

630. John 20:23.

certain commutation of penalty into penalty, although it is less in quantity, yet it is greater in value, time of utility, and necessity of the Church.

To the other it must be said, that the Gloss does not intend by the penalty of body and soul, anything other than what has been said.

To the other it must be said, that in truth that objection is good: but it must be said, that in spiritual matters it is different than in bodily matters: because in spiritual matters all diseases depend on one cause which is perverse will, and that is supposed to be converted before indulgence has place: and therefore whatever penalty is satisfactory of the residue remaining, so that the disease does not return: but in bodily diseases not all diseases depend on one root, and therefore medicine cannot be changed into medicine: however, my counsel in such matters is accustomed to be, that even after relaxation the penitent remains in the penance which the discreet confessor imposes after diligent examination of confession because he does not impose only for the guilt to be deleted, but also that it may be a medicine against the proneness contracted from old sins, which are not deleted by indulgence, but rather by works of satisfaction imposed in the aforementioned way. And although he is not bound to keep fasts to satisfy for guilt, it is nevertheless useful that he keeps them for the medicine of the remnants of sin just as also the bodily physician gives medicine, and orders a diet: for this is imposed as the ordering of a certain diet, suitable for him who has sinned in such a way.

To the other it must be said, that there is no simony: because that which the Church requires, is not referred to the corporeal, but to the spiritual: nor is there buying, but the largess of the Church thus provoking her children to good.

To the other it must be said, that in truth there is no deception: because for a penny he receives, as much as according to his ability and the Church it is worth: the offerings also do not receive as much as the deceivers believe.

And by the same it is also clear the solution to the following, and the whole is solved.

Articulus 18 — To Whom An Indulgence Avails

To whom does indulgence avail?

Thirdly, it is asked, To whom does it avail?

And there, under one article, three questions are asked, namely, whether it avails one existing in mortal sin? And secondly, whether it avails equally the secular and the religious? And thirdly, whether it avails one existing in hell or purgatory?

It is argued, however, that it avails all those existing in mortal sin: because

1. Indulgence is preached to all, but the Church deceives no one: therefore it avails equally to all.
2. Likewise, the Church devised indulgences because of the necessity which sinners suffer, doing more in sins than they can satisfy in penalties: but according to this, none are in

631. Deuteronomy 25:2.

such need as those existing in mortal sin: therefore it seems that indulgence chiefly avails them.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY, it is said that 1. No penalty is absolved by anyone unless the guilt is absolved by the same: but by this one the guilt is not absolved: therefore the penalty is insoluble: but the Church does not relax anything except the penalty: therefore it seems that it relaxes nothing for such.

1. Furthermore, the key in confession absolving the confessors is more certain in its effect than the key in relaxations: but in confession, it does not absolve unless one is first absolved by God from the guilt of mortal sin: therefore in relaxation, nothing is absolved from the penalty unless the guilt is first remitted by God.

Further, it is again asked about the second, whether it equally benefits the religious and the secular?

It seems, however, that it benefits the secular more: 1. For remission is due to those in need, who do less in satisfaction: but such are the seculars. Therefore, relaxation is chiefly given to them.

1. Furthermore, there is not one state of giving stipends in temporal matters and receiving them: therefore neither in spiritual matters: but spiritual ones are those from whose abundance the defects of others are supplied: therefore it seems that whatever is relaxed in seculars, this is all imposed on the religious to supply: therefore it seems that when indulgence of one year is given to seculars, one year is added to the religious for satisfaction for sins.

On the contrary, it is objected: because more combustible is more burned: and it is so in all other things, that what is more susceptible of something, receives more of it: therefore what is more susceptible of spiritual benefits, receives more of them: but what is more purified is more susceptible of spiritual benefits: therefore it seems that such receive more: but religious are more frequently pure and susceptible: therefore they receive more of spiritual gifts: but indulgence is among spiritual gifts: therefore religious and spiritual men receive more indulgence, as it seems.

But it seems that indulgence is necessary for both: for to anyone to whom their own goods are not sufficient, common goods and indulgences of the Church are necessary: but to no religious or secular are their own goods sufficient: therefore it seems that indulgence and the common goods of the Church are necessary for both the religious and the secular.

Further, it is asked whether indulgence can be given to both the living and the dead who are in purgatory or in hell?

It seems, however, that it can: because 1. The Church preaches the cross and makes it preached for itself and for two or three or sometimes ten souls of both the living and the dead,

632. Isaiah 40:2.

at the choice of the one signed with the cross: but those souls are sometimes in hell, sometimes in purgatory, sometimes, however, they are still of the living: therefore it seems that the indulgence of the cross avails all those souls mentioned.

1. Furthermore, the suffrages of the Church extend to those existing in purgatory, because otherwise the Church would offer for them in vain: and according to a certain opinion, they extend to those existing in hell: but indulgence is among the chief suffrages of the Church: therefore it seems that indulgences extend to all those.
2. Furthermore, to whomever the personal merit of one from the Church benefits, the common merit of both the head and the members of the Church can benefit much more, if it is derived to them: but the personal merit of one from the Church sometimes benefited the damned in hell: therefore the common merit of both the head and the members of the Church can benefit the damned in hell, if it is derived from them: it is derived, however, through indulgence: therefore if indulgence is given to them, it will benefit them. The first is evident by itself: because the common merit is of greater efficacy than the personal. The second is evident from what is read about Trajan and Gregory, because Trajan was extracted from hell at the prayers of Gregory: therefore the proposition is established.

On the contrary of this, it is objected: because 4. It is said to Peter: Whatever you bind, etc.: but the dead whom you bind on earth are not among those existing on earth: therefore it seems that the keys of the Church do not extend to them.

1. Furthermore, indulgence has no place except where merit has a place: therefore indulgence has no place except on the way: but the dead are not on the way: therefore indulgence has no place in the dead. The first is proved from this, that indulgence is satisfactory by way of merit. The second is evident from the distinction of the way and the homeland or the terminus: because they are distinguished by merit and reward both by the Saints and by the Masters.
2. Furthermore, When I shall take the time, I will judge justices*: but after death, the Lord takes the time, as is commonly said: therefore then He will judge according to justice and not according to indulgence: therefore then indulgence has no place.

Response. It seems to be said in response to those things asked in the first article, that indulgences avail all those both existing in mortal sin and in the state of grace, but differently: because to those existing in the state of grace they avail for the diminution of expiatory penalty: whether imposed or to be imposed, if the priest imposing it erred. But to those existing in mortal sin, it avails in two ways: in one way, in the manner in which we said one can merit the first grace of conversion for another, if he prays and fasts and does other good works for him: for if one can do this, much more can the Church do this through the treasures of common merits which it places upon him by indulgence. In another way, as we said, that

633. 2 Corinthians 2:10.

works of the kind of good things bring a man closer to grace, because something precedes in some sinners, as Augustine says*, by which they are worthy of justification, by the dignity of congruity not of condignity: so also much more does indulgence with even unformed faith bring a man closer to grace and makes him more suitable for conversion. Otherwise, I do not think indulgences avail those existing in mortal sin.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that in this way they would avail, and thus the Church understands them to avail. And sinners suffer the greatest necessity for conversion.

To what is objected, it must be said that it is well conceded that it does not avail them in that manner: because indulgence never has a place as to the remission of penalties unless first the penalty of contrition is placed in the penitent, namely the pain of contrition, which makes the penalty soluble, changing the eternal into the temporal.

And by this also the solution to those things asked in the first article is evident.

To those things which follow in the second, it seems to be said that indulgences benefit both: but yet I think that according to the first intention of the Church, they are not given except to those in need of another's merit because of the defect of their own: and those are the seculars building wood, hay, stubble, as will be said in the following distinction: or religious only in habit, who imitate the life of seculars, because truly they are to be called irreligious.

By this, the solution to the first two which proceed according to the first intention of the Church is evident: and I well think that they conclude truly in this way: nor is the condition of the religious worse because of this, but rather better: just as the condition of one abounding in merit is better than that of one in need, and therefore not receiving another's: just as the Lord according to the sentence of Paul in Acts says: It is more blessed to give than to receive*: this is especially true in spiritual matters.

To what is objected on the contrary, it must be said that spiritual gifts are twofold, namely according to the order to good which are gifts and virtues: and of these, the better are more susceptible. Others are according to the order from evil, like the good of contrition and satisfaction and indulgence: and of these, the more in need are more susceptible.

And there is an instance to the argument: because the innocent as such is purer than he who has sinned: yet nevertheless, the innocent is not more susceptible of penance and contrition or satisfaction, although all those are spiritual gifts.

To the other, it must be said that if it is dealt with strictly with us, no one's own merit suffices except Christ's: because He did not need anything for Himself: but one thing is condign, and another is required of us: for God does not require impossibilities from us, but certain few and light things, namely the keeping of the commandments: and we can super-erogate much with those, and these we store in the treasures. And it is similar, that if the Lord from the profit of the talent entrusted to the servant, from a thousand marks demanded one denarius: for the servant could store all the rest in the treasures: and having that from the

634. Matthew 16:19.

benevolence of the Lord more than from justice, he would not need to beg for another's suffrage.

To what is asked about the last article, it seems to be said without prejudice, that indulgences do not benefit those existing in hell: but they benefit those existing in purgatory much. And the reason for this is that they are insusceptible of good, just as the demons who are in hell. Hence Damascene: What death is in men, this is in demons the fall. Because just as men are insusceptible of penance after death, so also are angels after the fall.

To what is first objected, it must be said that I have never seen such a form issued from any authentic source from the court: but rather it is always added: To those who have confessed and received penance, or who have confessed and received penance: or are still on the way penitent, or in purgatory satisfying by suffering in penalties what they have done: and therefore it avails only to them. If, however, any other form were issued, which did not mention these, yet it should be understood in this way.

To the other, it must be said that as will be proved below, the suffrages of the Church do not benefit the damned for the mitigation or absolution or suspension of penalties, except very incidentally for a certain diminution of the penalty which is called the worm of conscience: and therefore from this it is not inferred that indulgences benefit such.

If, however, you say that it is an opinion, it seems to be said that that opinion is more an error than contains any probability. And in it especially is true what Augustine says, because what we opine, we owe to error.

To the other, it must be said that the miracle of blessed Gregory is not sufficiently proven, nor is it authorized, but apocryphal. Hence it is not read afterwards what happened to Trajan, where he repented, and how he was saved: and therefore I consider this a fable. If, however, something else is found by which that miracle is confirmed, then I say that Trajan was not dead, so that he received the final sentence of his condemnation, but rather that the glory of God might be manifested in the merits of blessed Gregory: just as the Lord says of Lazarus, that this sickness is not unto death, but for the glory of God, that the Son of God may be glorified through it*: for if he had fulfilled the time granted to him for merit, and thus had died, even if he were raised a thousand times, he would never repent: because he would be confirmed in evil, and insusceptible of penance: without penance, however, a sinner cannot be saved: and then it does not follow that it benefits the damned, because he according to this was not condemned by the final sentence, but suspended from life for a time, that the glory of God and goodness might be more exalted through the merits of Gregory.

To what is objected on the contrary, it must be solved for those who are in purgatory, by saying that according to something those existing in purgatory are on earth: because namely they merited while living, that even after death they might be able to avail for a quicker liberation. And this is held in the following in the Letter from the words of Augustine. For purgatory is in a way the way and in a way the terminus: for as to confirmation, because they can no longer sin, they are in the terminus: but as to not yet having reached the amendment by which they are amended, they are still on the way and in transit to the homeland.

To the other, the solution is evident by the same: because the alien merit for the reason stated has a place in purgatory: and this will be more proved below.

To the other, it must be said that the Lord judges justices in this regard, because with a stricter penalty of penance: but they are not entirely on the way: and this they merited while living: and in this it is mercifully dealt with them, that the alien merit benefits them.

And by this the solution to the whole is evident.

Articulus 19 — Whether An Indulgence Avails Equally For The Giver And For The Doer Of What The Church Requires, And For The One Having The Will To Do It But Not Doing It Because Of Lack Of Ability

Whether an indulgence equally avails the giver and the one doing what the Church requires, and the one having the will to do, but not doing due to lack of ability?

Fourthly, it is asked, Whether it equally avails the giver and the one doing what the Church requires, and the one having the will to do it, but not doing due to lack of ability.

And it seems that it does: because
1. The will is reckoned for the deed: but this one would willingly give if he had [the means]: therefore it seems that it is reckoned to him as the deed.

1. Further, the Lord praises the widow putting in two mites, saying that she put in more than all+: but this could not happen except on account of the will: therefore it seems that the will even avails better than the deed.
2. Further, in 2 Corinthians 8:12: If the readiness is there, it is acceptable according to what one has, not according to what one does not have, the same as before.

On the contrary, it is objected: because let us suppose that many indulgences are distributed on account of different gifts or deeds, which the Church requires for indulgences: therefore they do not avail him who cannot do these: therefore the will alone does not avail as much as the deed for all: therefore they are not equal for all.

Response. It must be said that this question is light: for there are certain things substantial to merit and reward, and certain things accidental: for the quantity of charity is substantially required in merit, and according to the quantity of that, the quantity of merit and reward is considered together: but in accidental reward, the work is more considered, as is the diminution of punishment or quicker liberation. Hence it can well be that one having many indulgences will be liberated more quickly than one not having, but having the will to have: but he will not be more fully liberated, nor will he have fuller glory, but quicker: because the quantity of glory is according to the quantity of charity.

To the first three, it must be said that it is understood concerning merit by reason of substantial reward, what is objected, and not with respect to accidental reward.

And through this, the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 20 — Whether The Pope, Being In Mortal Sin, Can Grant Indulgences, Even To One Who Is In Mortal Sin

Whether the Pope existing in mortal sin can grant indulgences, even to one who is in mortal sin?

Fifthly, it is asked whether the Pope existing in mortal sin can grant indulgence to one existing in mortal sin?

However, it seems that he cannot: because
1. Works done in mortal sin are dead: but a dead work vivifies nothing: since therefore indulgence is ordained for vivifying or for spiritual life, it seems that such indulgence is not valid.

1. Further, a stream into which the source does not flow can flow nothing: but the Pope who is in mortal sin is a stream into which the source, that is, the Holy Spirit, flows nothing, because the Holy Spirit flees from the feigned discipline. And, Wisdom will not enter into a malevolent soul, nor dwell in a body subject to sins: therefore he cannot flow into others: therefore neither indulgence.
2. Further, a ray of the sun which a cloud intercepts does not come to us: but the grace of the Holy Spirit is called a ray by blessed Dionysius, and sin a cloud by Isaiah: therefore grace which sin intercepts does not come to us: but indulgence flowing or ought to flow from such a Pope is grace intercepted by sin: therefore it does not come to us: therefore such indulgence is not valid.

On the contrary of this is: because prophecy is grace and a divine ray: and yet it flowed through Caiaphas, because he was the high priest of that year, as the Evangelist John says, xi, 51. The same is held by what is read in Numbers, xxii, xxi and xxiv, because the most illustrious prophecy flowed through the most wicked Balaam to the whole Synagogue and Church.

For this reason we say that indulgences are equally valid, whether they are given by a bad or a good person.

TO THE FIRST, therefore, which is objected against, it must be said that to grant indulgences is a grace freely given, which is of power, not of the goodness of life: and all such graces are equally done through good and bad.

To the other it must be said that the first is true: the second is false, because to such a Pope the Holy Spirit flows those things which are of power.

To the other it must be said that sin does not intercept the ray except of grace making pleasing. But it has already been said that this ray is of power, and of grace freely given, just as prophecy.

Articulus 21 — Whether A Bishop Can Make And Grant Indulgences

Can a Bishop make and grant indulgences?

Sixthly, it is asked whether a Bishop can grant indulgences?

It seems, however, that he cannot: because he does not have power over the treasures of the Church, but only the Pope, who is established over the whole: and indulgences draw their force from the treasures of the Church, as has already been shown: therefore a Bishop cannot dispense.

On the contrary, it is argued that he who has jurisdiction and the keys has the power of granting indulgences, because the power of granting indulgences accompanies the keys with jurisdiction: therefore it seems that he has the power.

Further, it is asked concerning what is done in our times, that a Bishop of another diocese grants an indulgence not in his own diocese due to the approval of the diocesan: and thus many indulgences are gathered by forty and forty days. And it seems that this can be done: because a Bishop can grant the power to a non-Bishop to grant indulgences: therefore he can also grant this to a Bishop: therefore such an indulgence is valid.

On the contrary, it is argued that the Constitution determines that even many Bishops cannot grant at the same place and time more than forty days: therefore what is added beyond this does not seem to be valid.

Response. To this it must be said that a Bishop in his own diocese can grant an indulgence, and as much as he wishes, unless it is distinctly set by the constitution of the Lord Pope.

§ 1. [is] limited: just as now it is up to forty days.

§ 2. To the first, therefore, it must be said that he himself has in his power the treasures of his diocese and of the passion of Christ, although not as fully as he who has the universality of power. And therefore he cannot confer so great and full an indulgence. Hence the first [proposition] is not true.

§ 3. To what is further asked, it must be said that, as it seems to me, the limitation is reasonable on account of the excessive abuse of indulgences which is currently taking place. Hence it seems right that they should not confer more than forty days at a time. If, however, the power were not limited, they could undoubtedly, by the concession of the diocesan, confer more or less, according to what the diocesan would permit.

Expositio Textus

Exposition of the Text

§ 1. Yet a priest ought not, etc. But this is not observed: because even with the Bishop present in the same town, the priest does not always have recourse to him, but absolves and reconciles.

§ 2. Response. It is understood of a penitent bound by the Bishop or another priest, or of a public penitent.

§ 3. Another distinction follows.

Articulus 22 — Whether A Simple Priest Can Confer Indulgences, And Whether A Layman Can Give His Indulgences To Another

Whether a simple priest can confer indulgences? And, whether one layperson can give his indulgences to another?

§ 1. Seventh and lastly it is asked: Whether a simple priest can confer indulgences?

§ 2. And it seems that he can: because he himself has in the power of his keys the riches of his flock: therefore from those he can communicate to the more indigent: and this ratifies indulgences: therefore such a one can confer indulgences.

§ 3. To the contrary of this it is objected: parish priests do not have power in jurisdiction: hence they cannot even excommunicate, except in common. But the giving of an indulgence follows the key conjoined with jurisdiction. Therefore it seems that parish priests cannot give indulgences.

§ 4. Further, it is asked here concerning the abuse which currently takes place, that even laypeople receive indulgences, and give what was given to them to another, either in whole or in part. For example, I receive ten days of indulgence, and anyone else of the people the same; afterwards, out of those ten, I give three to my dear one, and someone else gives three; and thus in one people many are gathered three by three, and given to one living or dead person.

§ 5. But it seems that this can be done: because spiritual goods are more exchangeable than corporeal goods. But in corporeal goods it is the case that what is given to me I can give to another either in whole or in part as I wish. Therefore I can do this in spiritual goods as well, as it seems.

§ 6. To the contrary of this is the fact that the giving of indulgences requires jurisdiction in the giver. But that layperson has no jurisdiction. Therefore it seems that he cannot give what was given to him.

§ 7. If perhaps you say that there is a counter-instance, because I see that simple preachers having no jurisdiction give indulgences by the permission of the Bishop, and thus a layperson can as well: there is no counter-instance, because in such cases the preacher is the pronouncer of the indulgence rather than the giver: and therefore the conferring is done by the Bishop, and not by the preacher.

§ 8. Response. It must be said that a simple parish priest cannot give any indulgence, for the reason introduced earlier.

§ 9. To what is introduced to the contrary, it must be said that although he may have some treasures in his flock, nevertheless he does not have abundant ones: but an indulgence requires the abundance of many Churches and flocks.

§ 10. To what is further asked, it must be said that such an indulgence is worth nothing, except for the delusion of the people, for the reason introduced.

§ 11. To what is objected to the contrary, it must be said that it is otherwise with an indulgence than with other spiritual goods, as was shown above ; because Augustine says

that nothing has indulgence except sin: and this is private, not common, like the good, virtue, and grace. And therefore the one receiving the indulgence, being weak in his private penalties for sin, receives it; and therefore, because it is private, it cannot be derived to another. He can, however, communicate to another the merit of his labor, insofar as he acts for the indulgence; but then it is not taxed at a third, or a fourth, or the like, but rather as much as God grants it to be worth, in the way that any meritorious work done for a neighbor avails him for meriting grace or retaining it if he has it.

DISTINCTIO XXI

Divisio Textus

§ 1. It is also usually asked, Whether after this life, etc.

In this distinction two things are determined, the first of which is about the remission of certain sins after this life. Second, however, certain doubts regarding confession left over from the preceding [distinctions]: and it begins there, at E, After these things it must be considered, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether Some Venial Sins Are Remitted After This Life

Whether any venial sins are remitted after this life?

§ 1. But a question arises concerning the beginning of the reading: Whether any venial sins are remitted after this life, as seems to be proven in the Text?

§ 2. And it seems that they are: 1. Gregory in book IV of the Dialogues: Certain faults are relaxed in this age: but certain small ones both in this and in the future [age].

Bede says the same words on Matthew 12:32, in the Gloss: It shall not be forgiven him, neither in this age, nor in the future.

§ 3. 2. Also, 1 Corinthians 3:12: But if anyone builds upon this foundation... wood, hay, stubble. Throughout the entire Gloss it is expounded concerning venial sin. Suppose that someone existing in grace, yet having venial faults, is in the last instant of his life, and dies with the will for venial sins, not grieving over them. It is certain that he will be saved, because he is in grace, and venial sins do not take away grace. It is certain again that a sin remaining in the will is not remitted. Therefore it seems that it is necessary that they be remitted after death.

§ 4. If perhaps you say that it is converted into a mortal sin on account of the will to repeat it: this is ridiculous, that on account of this an idle [word] would be converted into a mortal sin, because he has the will to repeat it.

§ 5. If perhaps you say that the will is confirmed in the state in which he dies: this indeed which you say is not proven. But suppose what you say is true; according to this, the will of that person will be simply conjoined to God also according to habit, yet having a disposition to aversion according to act: and there is no such state of a confirmed person. Hence it is clear that what you say is a fiction. Therefore it seems that some fault is remitted after death.

§ 6. But TO THE CONTRARY of this some object thus: 1. After death is not a time for meriting: but the deletion of a fault occurs through merit: therefore after death is not a time for the deletion of any fault: therefore not of a venial one either.

§ 7. 2. Moreover, a venial sin arises from the fomes [tinder of sin]: but the fomes belongs to the composite, and not to the soul in itself: therefore the venial sin does as well. Therefore, once the fomes is dissolved, the venial sin is also dissolved. But the fomes is dissolved in death: therefore the venial sin is too.

§ 8. 3. Moreover, a penalty does not liberate except from a penalty: but after death there will be nothing expiating except a penalty: therefore it only liberates from a penalty: therefore not from any fault.

§ 9. 4. Moreover, it was held above that a venial sin is not destroyed, unless some contrition has been premised: but after death there will be no contrition: therefore after death a venial sin is not destroyed as regards the fault.

§ 10. 5. Moreover, whatever some penalty can destroy, the greatest penalty can destroy even more. But the greatest penalty is death. Therefore whatever some penalty destroys, death will destroy it. But a penalty can destroy a venial sin, as you say: because after death the penalty of purgatory relaxes [it], as you say. Therefore it destroys it even before death, and thus he will not come to purgatory. Therefore no fault is remitted after this life, as it seems.

§ 11. Solution. Since Gregory in book IV of the Dialogues not only says, but also proves that penalty and fault are destroyed after this life, I consider it a presumption to say that no venial fault can be destroyed after this life. But it seems it must be said and asserted with the Saints that many venial sins can be destroyed after death.

§ 12. To the first against this, it seems it must be said that after death is not a time for increasing merit, but for using merit toward the efficacy to which it touches upon. But Augustine says that some, while they lived, merited that suffrages could profit them. So I say that those, while they lived, merited this, that grace and penalty could profit them toward the deletion of venial sins. And therefore they receive the use of their merit after death aside from an increase in merits; and the increase in merits looks to a greater crown, and they will have a greater one.

§ 13. To the next it must be said that this is invalid: "If something arises from something, that it is destroyed only with the destruction of that thing." For every sin arises from the fomes, and yet remains in the soul when the fomes is destroyed; and the universal arises from sense, and yet remains in the soul when sense is destroyed. Hence that consequence is in no way valid where something is caused in a remaining subject: and the grace of a subject can also remain even when its cause is destroyed.

§ 14. To the next it must be said that a penalty in itself liberates only from a penalty: but a penalty in a subject which is informed by grace can liberate also from a fault: and such are those who are in purgatory.

§ 15. To the next it must be said that a venial sin is not destroyed otherwise [than by contrition], but that in this way it is more fittingly destroyed: for since it is rather a disposition to a fault than a fault, it can also be destroyed in another way.

§ 16. To the last it must be said that the penalty of death would indeed destroy [it] if it were ordered to this, as in the martyrs: but it is not directed to this in others who commonly die: and therefore it does not destroy [it].

Articulus 2 — Whether There Are Some Who Build Wood, Hay, And Stubble, And What Those Things Signify

Whether there are some who build wood, hay, and stubble? And, what do those signify?

§ 1. Then it is asked concerning what he says, there, A, before the middle: Also concerning those who build wood, hay, etc.

§ 2. Two things are asked here, namely, what these are, and concerning their difference.

§ 3. And it seems that they are differences of mortal sins: because 1. In the original on Isaiah 5:8, on that verse: Woe to you who join house to house, etc., Jerome says: Heretics join dogmas to dogmas: and they who upon the foundation ought to have built gold, and silver, and precious stones, on the contrary build wood, hay, stubble. But it is certain that heretics do not build anything except mortal sins, insofar as they are heretics and preserve heresy. Therefore it seems that these three express differences of mortal sins.

§ 4. 2. Moreover, on Joshua 4:1 and following, a certain Gloss of Adamantius expounds it in this way.

§ 5. But against this it seems to be that: 1. Here they are taken for venial sins. 2. Moreover, wood, hay, stubble are consumable in the fire: but mortal sins are not consumed in the fire. Therefore they are not well expounded by wood, hay, and stubble.

§ 6. To the second it is proceeded thus: 1. Many and quasi-infinite are the differences of venial sins: therefore it seems that they cannot congruously be assigned by three differences.

§ 7. 2. Moreover, Augustine in the Text does not seem to distinguish the venial sin which is signified by these three, except in the love of temporal things. But venial sins occur in many other ways. Therefore it seems that it is insufficiently signified by these three.

§ 8. Response. It must be said that by these three the differences of venial sins are most congruously signified. Hence what Jerome says, and the Gloss on Joshua, is a certain adaptation beyond the literal intention.

§ 9. To what is further asked, it must be said that a venial sin is not signified by these three according to the diversities of its species, but rather according to its quantity which accompanies every species of venial sin, according to the diversity of the act, and of the root, and of the adherence, from which it proceeds. For the Philosopher says that of all extremes determined according to quantity, a mean is determined. Hence, since there is a venial sin of the greatest adherence which can be around God, and of the least which is scarcely sensible,

there is a venial sin of mean adherence. And therefore the quantity of a venial sin is signified only in a threefold manner, and this metaphorically: just as the diversity of a cause is signified in the diversity of the effect, for the duration of remaining in the fire shows the quantity of the adherence of the venial sin. But it is certain that among consumable combustibles, wood generically remains longest in the fire, and stubble least, because it is dry and weak and highly combustible, and hay in a middle way. And therefore the diversity of venial sins is signified by these three.

§ 10. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 3 — Whether Wood, Hay, And Stubble Are Built Upon The Foundation

Whether wood, hay, and stubble are built upon the foundation?

§ 1. Then it is asked concerning what he says, there, A, after the middle: Who have built wood, hay, stubble, etc.

§ 2. For it seems that such things are not built upon the foundation: because faith does not have an order except to good works: but venial sins are not good works. Therefore it seems that they are not built upon faith.

§ 3. To this it must be said that the foundation of the spiritual edifice at the bottom is faith, which makes the things to be hoped for subsist in us, in that it is the first thing for those approaching God. But that which concludes at the top is charity, which is the bond of perfection: and the erecting wall is hope extending itself to eternal things. But the cardinal [virtues] are the matter, which give substance to the edifice. And matter is said to be upon the foundation only in three ways: namely, by direct position, and in this way nothing is built upon it except good works.

§ 4. Upon is also said, that is, next to, as there, Upon the rivers of Babylon, etc.: and in this way venial sins are built upon it.

§ 5. Thirdly, upon is said, that is, after, as in Ezekiel 48:3: Upon the border of Asher, etc. The Gloss says, that is, after the border of Asher.

§ 6. And in this way mortal sins are built upon it, according to the exposition of Jerome introduced above.

Articulus 4 — Whether There Is Or Is Not A Purgatorial Fire After Death

Whether a purgatorial fire is or is not after death?

Whether a purgatorial fire is or is not after death?

§ 1. Then it is asked concerning what he says, there, A, before the end: I do not refute it: because perhaps it is true, etc.

§ 2. For here Augustine seems to doubt whether purgatory exists or not. And in the same mode of doubting Gregory speaks in book IV of the Dialogues.

§ 3. Therefore it is asked: Whether there is or is not a purgatorial fire after death?

§ 4. And it seems that there is not, thus: 1. Of contraries the effects are contrary: charity and mortal sin are contraries; therefore their effects are contrary. But mortal sin condemns immediately after death. Therefore charity saves immediately after death; therefore there is no purgatorial place between salvation and damnation.

§ 5. 2. Moreover, charity is of no less efficacy in saving than mortal sin in condemning. But mortal sin condemns immediately after death, even if many works of the genus of goods are present, which are dispositions to the good. Therefore charity also saves immediately after death, even if many things are present which are dispositions to evil: but these are venial sins. Therefore purgatory is not owed to a multitude of venial sins; and it is for no other use: therefore purgatory does not exist, as it seems.

§ 6. 3. Moreover, there are two genera of evils, namely venial and mortal. Likewise, two genera of goods, namely gratuitous good, and works of the genus of goods. Likewise, two genera of rewards, eternal and temporal: and again two genera of penalties, namely temporal and eternal. From there I proceed thus: As the good is related to the reward, so the evil is related to the penalty: but a good of the genus of goods does not merit any reward: therefore neither does the evil corresponding to it [merit] any penalty: therefore there is purgatory for nothing. The proof of the middle premise is: If he who does works of the genus of goods were to merit a reward, then God would deal unjustly with him, because He would not confer it. But we see that He often does not confer it: therefore he merited nothing; because it is unfitting for God to deal unjustly with anyone.

§ 7. 4. Moreover, upon the same division: as a mortal and a venial sin together are related to eternal and temporal penalty together, so charity and a good in its genus are related to the reward of both together. Therefore, as a mortal sin and a work of the genus of goods together are related to an eternal penalty and a temporal reward, so charity and a venial sin are related to an eternal reward and a temporal penalty. But I see that for a mortal sin with a good in its genus, nothing is owed out of condignity except an eternal penalty, and no temporal reward. Therefore, for a venial sin with charity, nothing is owed out of condignity except an eternal reward and no transitory penalty. Since therefore purgatory is only for such people, it seems that purgatory does not exist.

§ 8. 5. Moreover, God does not reward after death anyone except one who is similar to Him through charity and love: therefore He does not punish after death anyone except one turned away from Him through pride and divine hatred. But such a one alone is he who dies in mortal sin: therefore it seems that he alone is punished after death. Therefore it seems that venial sin is not punished after death. And for that [sin] there is purgatory: therefore it seems that there is no purgatory after death.

§ 9. To the contrary of this it is objected thus: 1. Matthew 12:31 and 32, it is said that the blasphemy of the Spirit shall not be forgiven, neither in this age, nor in the future. From this it is implied that some sins will be forgiven in the future. It is certain that not in the kingdom, nor in hell, because in hell there is no redemption. Therefore it is necessary that there be some purgatorial place for such things: and this we call purgatory.

§ 10. 2. Moreover, 1 Corinthians 3:15: But he himself shall be saved, yet so as by fire. And it is certain that he speaks [of something] after death, because there is no true salvation except after death: and certifying this he says, He shall be saved. Therefore a fire purging crimes will be after death.

And this we concede.

§ 11. 3. Moreover, a certain Greek expositor says upon that text of the Apostle: Yet so as by fire, etc.: This fire we believe to be a katharterion, that is, a cleansing, in which the souls of the deceased are tested like gold in a furnace. From this it is accepted that the purgatorial fire is after death.

§ 12. 4. Moreover, Anselm in the book, Cur Deus homo: It is impossible for a defiled soul to enter paradise. But, as was proven above, many die defiled by a venial sin. Therefore it is necessary that there be a place in which they are purged: and that we call purgatory.

§ 13. 5. To the same it is objected by reason: In the II [book] of the Ethics: Of civil faults there are two kinds of penalties, namely rebukes of the acts of civility, and perpetual condemnations. Therefore it seems that similarly they are in the divine judgment: therefore some will be judged and punished with a light penalty with restitution, and others will be perpetually condemned. But such a mode of punishment which is with restitution after penance, we call purgatory. Therefore it seems that purgatory exists.

§ 14. 6. Moreover, there are two habits perfecting nature, namely grace and glory; but differently: because grace is compatible with a disposition to its opposite, but glory is not. But it is certain from what was said before, that some depart from this life with depraved dispositions: therefore it is necessary that they be purged before they put on the habit of glory. But the place of purgation we call purgatory: therefore it seems that purgatory exists.

§ 15. 7. Moreover, in every nature we see that before the ultimate perfection is induced, the subject must be purged from contrary dispositions. Therefore, since the form of glory is purer than any natural form, the subject must similarly be purged before it. But it is certain from what was previously maintained that such dispositions are found in many souls after death. Therefore it will be necessary for them to be purged before they are glorified.

§ 16. 8. Moreover, in medical matters, before the induction of health, it is necessary that nature be purged from corrupt humors. But in ethical matters vices are proportioned to humors. Therefore also in those matters purgations must precede perfect health; but perfect health is according to glory alone, which excludes fault and penalty. Therefore it is necessary that after death a purgation takes place before the induction of glory.

§ 17. Response. It must be said that in every way it is necessary according to all reason and faith that purgatory exists. The principal reasons here are moral: and it is certain that according to them it is fitting that there be a purgatory.

§ 18. Furthermore, the Saints expressly say so: therefore it is a heresy to deny it.

§ 19. To the doubt of Augustine, therefore, it must be said that he himself did not doubt whether it exists: but he doubted whether the Apostle understood what he says [to refer to]

this. For that you should not doubt that purgatory exists, is clear through his many words which are posited here in the preceding distinction.

§ 20. In the same way it must be said to the doubt of the other Saints: for such a doubt belongs to a good and humble Expositor, who, however well and divinely he may expound, does not presume that this is the understanding of the divine eloquence which the author inspired by the Holy Spirit intended.

§ 21. To the next it must be said that it is not similar concerning charity conjoined with a venial evil, and concerning a mortal sin conjoined with a good in its genus: because a venial evil with charity is in the being of evil, and disposes to the contrary of charity: but that which is of the genus of goods with a mortal sin is not in the being of a good, but is rather dead, having no efficacy toward another good after death. And therefore it does not follow, if a mortal sin condemns immediately without works of the genus of goods impeding, that charity saves immediately without venial sins impeding.

§ 22. To the next it must be said that charity is of greater efficacy for saving than mortal sin is for condemning. But from this it does not follow that it saves more quickly than the other condemns, notwithstanding the goods and evils conjoined to them, but rather that it saves more fully, and liberates from more things. And this is true, because one charity liberates from every sin, and from every penalty: which one sin does not do with respect to penalties. Similarly, it confers every virtue, and glory according to any virtue: but no one sin confers every sin, and [causes one] to be condemned according to every genus of sins. But there is a counter-instance to the arguments, that every form of art and nature is stronger for perfecting, than corruption is for destroying: and yet a thing is destroyed more quickly than it is generated and perfected.

§ 23. To the next it must be said that those things which are posited in the division are not true.

§ 24. But to the first objection upon that division, it must be said that what is inferred does not follow: because a venial evil and a good of the genus of goods are not opposed: because a venial evil is not an evil in its genus which could well be done by some circumstance, and yet a good in its genus or of the genus of goods can be done badly by some circumstance.

§ 25. Likewise, as was said in the first book of the Sentences, a good in its genus is imperfect according to the being of a good: but a venial evil is a species in the being of evil. And therefore it does not follow, if the former does not have a reward, that the latter does not have a penalty: nor is there a single proportion in all things which says that as such a good is to a reward, so such an evil is to a penalty.

§ 26. To the next it must be said that both proportions are false, or are not universal. For it is not true that as a mortal and a venial sin together are related to an eternal and temporal penalty, so charity and that which is of the genus of goods are related to an eternal and temporal reward together: for to a venial sin conjoined with a mortal sin, an eternal penalty is owed: and yet it is not at all said that to a work of the genus of goods conjoined with charity an eternal reward is owed. But if that proportion is in some way conceded, the second is

invalid, namely that as a mortal sin with a work of the genus of goods is related to a temporal penalty and reward, so charity with a venial sin is related to an eternal penalty and reward. And the reason for this was assigned above: because a venial sin conjoined to charity still remains in the being of evil and having the rationale of a sin: but a work of the genus of goods with a mortal sin does not remain in the being of a good, and having the rationale of something remunerable: and if it is remunerated, this is out of mercy, and not out of condignity. Therefore it does not follow, if for the former there is no coordinated remuneration before the condemnation of penalty, that for the latter no purgatorial penalty is ordered before eternal premination.

§ 27. To the next it must be said that it is true that God after death remunerates no one except one similar to Him through charity, and condemns no one except one turned away from Him and hating Him. But it does not follow: He does not condemn: therefore He does not punish by purging: because no one of those who are purged will be condemned.

Articulus 5 — Why The Punishments Of Hell Are Named By Many Names, But Those Of Purgatory By Only One Name

Why the penalties of hell are named by many names, but of purgatory only by one name?

§ 1. Then it is asked concerning what he says, there, B, at the end: They shall be purged by a cleansing fire, etc.

§ 2. And it is asked, Why are the penalties of hell not named by one name, but by many, such as that they will pass from the snow waters to excessive heat; and by certain others, such as the worm; but the purgatorial penalties are named by only one name, namely the fire of purgatory?

§ 3. For it seems that they ought to be named by many and diverse names: because of things of which there are many, diverse, and dissimilar causes, there are many, diverse, and dissimilar effects. But of the penalties of purgatory there are many, diverse, and dissimilar causes. Therefore the penalties are many, diverse, and dissimilar. Therefore they are not to be named by one name.

§ 4. Response. It must be said that hell is only for punishing: and therefore all things that punish are gathered there, such as the hot, the cold, and the like. But purgatory is for emending and purging; and therefore it cannot be named except by such a name of a punisher which has a purgative and consumptive power: and this is the heat of fire. And therefore it is named only by the name of that. For the cold, although it punishes , nevertheless does not purge, because it does not have a consumptive power.

§ 5. To the next it must be said that although there are many venial sins meriting that fire, nevertheless they are nothing but a disposition to evil, and a certain rust. And they agree in this, that they are compatible with charity. And therefore a penalty does not correspond to them according as they are diverse, but according as they agree in this, which is to be a disposition to evil. But concerning mortal sins it is otherwise: because they agree in nothing,

and they perfectly turn away from the incommutable good through diverse conversions to a commutable good.

Articulus 6 — What Is Understood By Those Building Gold, Silver, And Precious Stones

What is understood by those building gold, silver, and precious stones?

§ 1. Then it is asked concerning what he says, there, C, after the beginning: In gold is understood contemplation, etc.

§ 2. For it seems that those building gold, and silver, and precious stones, will feel the purgatorial fire. 1. For it is said in 1 Corinthians 3:12, upon that: Gold, silver, etc., in the Gloss: They shall not be consumed by the fire who build gold, silver, and precious stones, but they will feel [it] nothing [or] little. Therefore they will feel it.

§ 3. 2. Likewise, in the text it is said: The fire shall prove every man's work, of what sort it is, even of the one building gold, silver, etc.

§ 4. Further, it is asked here concerning the rationale of this exposition, that gold is contemplation, and silver the love of neighbor, and the precious stone the work.

§ 5. Response. It must be said that we could say by adaptation that, just as in dividing fire by its matter there are three species of material fire, namely light, flame, and coal: and light indeed is in the pure surrounding airy [element], but flame is in an earthy and moist vapor, whereas coal is in the matter of earth. Thus we could say that as it were a certain light burns the venial sins of the perfect: and there is no notable feeling and resistance to the fire there, but rather a momentary one: just as it is said in the Text, that like a drop in a furnace, so does a venial sin fare in a just man; and this is noted by the Gloss as feeling little or nothing: and they are obscured little or nothing, but remain luminous. But others are inflamed and obscured more, who build wood, hay, stubble: and yet the impurity is extracted from them, like a certain vapor; but the damned are enveloped and blackened like an inconsumable coal.

§ 6. And through this the solution to the first two is clear.

§ 7. To what is further asked, it must be said that he reduces every remunerable good to three general things: of which two are as motives, and the third as the motion itself. For the intellect is contemplating God: and there is the highest fortification and the highest happiness, as Aristotle proves. But charity relates to works as a mother and general form, and no other virtue. But the work is universally meritorious. And therefore by these three general things all goods are comprehended.

Articulus 7 — Whether Those Existing In Purgatory Are Purged Voluntarily Or Involuntarily

Whether those existing in purgatory are purged voluntarily or involuntarily?

Whether those existing in purgatory are purged voluntarily or involuntarily?

§ 1. Next, it is asked concerning what he says there, at C, before the end: Nevertheless, they will feel the most severe punishment, etc.

And here it is asked: Whether those existing in purgatory are purged voluntarily, or involuntarily?

It seems that it is voluntarily, because: 1. They have an upright heart. But Ambrose says that one having an upright heart conforms his will to the divine will; but God wills them to be purged: therefore they themselves also will to be thus purged.

1. Furthermore, every wise person wills that without which he cannot attain his end; but those who are in purgatory are wise: therefore it seems that they will that without which they cannot attain glory; but this is purgation through punishment: therefore they will to be purged, as it seems.
2. Furthermore, one who is bodily ill wills to be cut so that he may be healed. Therefore, since spiritual health is more to be chosen, he wills to be burned so that he may be cured, if he cannot be cured otherwise; but it cannot be otherwise on account of divine ordination: therefore they will to be purged in this way, as it seems.

§ 2. If perhaps you should say (as certain ancients said) that the sense of pain is so great that the collation of reason is totally absorbed, and they cannot confer about the one thing or the other, and therefore they will neither the one nor the other: this is very much contrary to the statement of blessed Gregory. For everyone seeking those things that deliver more quickly knows that he is to be delivered, and he confers about deliverance; but the souls of the deceased seek these things, as Gregory says in book IV of the Dialogues.[635] Therefore they confer about such things.

§ 3. If on account of this it is conceded that they will to be so punished that they may be purged. To the contrary:

1. Almost all the Masters assign one cause for the slower deliverance in purgatory than on the way [in this life]: because that punishment [in this life] is voluntary, and that [in purgatory] is necessary. Therefore they do not suffer it voluntarily, as it seems.
2. Furthermore, everything that someone suffers, whether he wills it or not, he suffers necessarily, and not voluntarily; but those having combustibles with them suffer the punishments of purgatory whether they will it or not: therefore they suffer necessarily, and not voluntarily.

§ 4. Response. Without prejudice it must be said that the will is twofold, namely, conditional, and the will simply speaking [unqualified]. Therefore I say that simply speaking they would will not to suffer the punishments of purgatory; yet by a conditional will they do will it, namely upon the condition of purgation and salvation. For they well will to be purged, and they well will to be saved; but they do not will to be thus purged except under a condition, namely because otherwise they cannot be saved and delivered: and all the reasons previously induced are understood of this will.

§ 5. But to that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that it does not follow, if it is necessary, that it is not voluntary. For it can be necessary in two ways, namely, on the part of the will acting, or the will receiving [undergoing]. Concerning the acting will it is true that if it is voluntary, it is not necessary, because the will acting in this mode is not a cause of necessity, but it freely operates when it wills, and when it wills it ceases from the work. But in the one receiving it is not true, because what is necessary to endure or receive on account of the violence of the agent can nevertheless also be received and endured voluntarily. And there is an example in the punishments of the martyrs: because it was necessary for the one beheaded to die, and the one burned to feel pain; yet these things were endured voluntarily. And so it is concerning those enduring in purgatory. But the punishments which are satisfactions here [in this life] are voluntary by an acting will.

§ 6. To the other argument that follows, the solution is exactly the same.

Articulus 8 — Whether In The Damned Venial Sin Is Punished Externally

Whether in the damned a venial sin is punished eternally?

Whether in the damned a venial sin is punished eternally?

§ 1. Next it is asked concerning what he says there, at D, But perhaps you will say, etc.

For it is asked: Whether a venial sin in the damned is punished eternally?

And it seems that it is not, because: 1. Venial and mortal are incommensurable: therefore their punishments are incommensurable; but the punishment of a mortal sin is eternal: therefore the punishment of a venial sin will not be eternal, but temporal, and proportionate to it.

1. Furthermore, Master Hugh says that a venial sin is that to which a transitory punishment is due. Since therefore God does not punish beyond what is condign [strictly deserved], it seems that God does not punish it eternally.
2. Furthermore, as the retributions are disposed, so are the good and bad merits disposed: but there are two punishments retributing the wicked, namely eternal, and transitory; and there are two evils which are retributed, namely venial, and mortal: since therefore eternal punishment is due to mortal sin, transitory punishment is due to venial sin. And thus the proposition is held.

§ 2. To the contrary of this it is proved: 1. By that of Luke 12:59: You shall not go out from there until you pay the very last mite: but the "last mite" is a venial sin; and it is established that one dying in mortal sin can pay nothing acceptable to God: therefore he is closed in an eternal prison even for a venial sin: therefore the venial sin is punished in him for eternity.

1. Also, Matthew 5:26: You shall not go out from there till you pay the last farthing. The Gloss: Minute sins, because nothing is unpunished. From this the same follows as before.

2. Furthermore, it is established that fire corresponds to this kind of sin, and the worm of conscience, as it is said in Isaiah 66:24 concerning the damned: Their worm shall not die, and their fire shall not be quenched. Therefore they will burn for eternity, and they will suffer the worm for venial sin.

3. If perhaps you say that in the death of the wicked such venial sins are released: the things determined here in the Text are to the contrary.

Furthermore, the death of the good is better, and more meritorious, than that of the wicked: and it does not necessarily blot out venial sins, as is proved here: therefore neither does the death of the wicked.

1. Furthermore, no sin, neither small nor great, can be loosed without grace; but the damned are not susceptible to grace: therefore no sin will ever be blotted out in them. But with the sin remaining, the punishment will also remain: therefore the punishment of a mortal sin remains for eternity: and thus the proposition is held.

§ 3. Response. It must be said that a venial sin conjoined to a mortal sin is punished for eternity in hell: but for eternity a lesser punishment corresponds to it than to the mortal sin, just as the final arguments and authorities prove.

§ 4. To the first argument, therefore, it must be said that in themselves a venial and a mortal sin are incommensurable; but by accident they are made proportionate in the duration of their punishments, namely if the subject is not expiable from the fault to which he is subjected, as in the damned. Whence what the objection proves is true essentially [per se], and false by accident: and it does not hold except essentially, namely that a mortal sin is taken as a mortal sin, and a venial sin as a venial sin; but when a venial sin is in a subject not susceptible to grace, it is made into something that never has nor ever will have pardon: and then the argument does not hold.

§ 5. The solution to the two following arguments is exactly the same.

Articulus 9 — Whether Souls In Purgatory Are Punished By Demons

Whether souls in purgatory will be punished by demons?

Whether souls in purgatory will be punished by demons?

§ 1. Next it is asked concerning what he says there, at D, after the beginning: He is good, and has charity, and in charity passes from this life, etc.

Here it is asked, which many desire to know, whether souls existing in purgatory are punished by demons as ministers of punishments?

And it seems that they are: 1. By those things which are read in the deeds of the Saints, just as in the life of blessed Martin, that the devil stood by him. And it is established that he [the devil] knew by his [Martin's] works that he was not to be damned: therefore he stood by him

635. Gregory the Great, Dialogues IV.

so that, according to his estimation, he might be dragged to purgatory: therefore it seems that demons are the ministers of the punishments of purgatory.

1. Furthermore, in the judgments of this world certain wicked torturers are appointed: therefore also in the divine judgment: therefore those to be purged are tortured by demons.
2. Furthermore, even Saints who will fly away [immediately to heaven] and are perfect in this life, are permitted by God to be vexed by demons, as is read concerning blessed Anthony and others established in the desert: therefore, since those who are in purgatory are not holier than these, it seems also that God permits them to be vexed by demons.
3. Furthermore, a venial sin arises from temptation: but the ministers of temptations are demons; yet an authority says that a person will have as torturers in punishment the very ones he had as instigators in fault: therefore it seems that those sinning venially will have there, as torturers in the punishment of purgatory, the very demons whom they had as instigators in the venial fault and temptation.

§ 2. To the contrary of this it is objected, that:

1. Blessed Gregory says in book IV of the Dialogues that the souls of the wicked descend to punishments by themselves. Therefore much more will the souls of the Saints to be purged be in punishments without the violence of the devil.
2. Furthermore, a consent is not made to the devil in the one who sins only venially: rather, he habitually consents to God: therefore it seems that by justice he ought to be subjected to no one except God: therefore it seems that justice alone condemns him, and he is not subjected to the devil as a torturer.
3. Furthermore, Saints are not handed over to the devil here except for a greater crown; but there will be no such necessity in the future: therefore it seems that they are not handed over there, but are simply purged.
4. Furthermore, in politics we see that the one punishing a son is different from the one punishing a robber or an enemy: for over a son there is only the discipline of the father, but against a robber and an enemy an emissary is directed: therefore it seems, since our justice is patterned after the divine, that it is similarly so in God's justice. But it is established that those who are in purgatory are sons: therefore over them there ought not to be anything but the discipline of a father: therefore a fatal torturer ought not to receive power over them.

§ 3. Response. In this question I do not know what can be asserted; but I piously think it should be believed that souls existing in purgatory are not punished by demons as ministers of punishments: however, I well think that demons delight in their punishments, and therefore they are sometimes read to stand by them: and by this the first argument concerning blessed Martin is solved.

§ 4. To the next argument it must be said that this is true concerning the judgments of those to be condemned, as is clear from the final objection, because that solves that argument: but it is not true in the discipline of a father toward a son.

§ 5. To the next argument it must be said that the rationale is one thing here, and another there: because here is the place of temptations and of growing in merit, but not there: and therefore He permits the tempters here to exercise the office of temptation, but not there.

§ 6. To the next argument it must be said that a venial sin is a sin relatively speaking [secundum quid]: and therefore it does not behoove it to be so tyrannically avenged as a mortal sin: and therefore that authority is understood of mortal sins.

Articulus 10 — Whether This Error Of The Greeks Ought To Be Approved, Who Say That No One Enters Heaven Or Hell Before The Day Of Judgment, But Is Kept In Middle Places

Whether this error of the Greeks is to be approved, who say that no one enters heaven or hell before the day of judgment, but they are preserved in middle places?

Whether this error of the Greeks is to be approved, who say that no one enters heaven or hell before the day of judgment, but they are preserved in middle places?

§ 1. Next it is asked concerning what he says there, at D, a little before the end: Therefore after this life he will be purged by it, etc.

For it can be disputed here concerning a certain error of some Greeks, who say that no one enters heaven or hell before the day of judgment, but they dwell in middle places up to that point.

And it seems that they speak well: 1. By that of the epistle to the Hebrews 11:39–40: And all these, being approved by the testimony of faith, received not the promise: God providing some better thing for us, that they should not be perfected without us. Therefore it seems that one will not be perfected without another; but the perfection will be on the day of judgment: therefore until then no one will receive glory in heaven, nor punishment in hell. Because God is not more prone to condemn swiftly than to reward swiftly.

1. Furthermore, Revelation 6:11: And it was said to them that they should rest for a little time, until their fellow servants and their brethren should be completed in receiving the robe of glory; and from this the same is held as before.

If it is said that they were in glory with respect to the soul, but they were seeking to be glorified with respect to the body. Against this is what is said there: because it was said to them that they shall endure a little time; but endurance implies punishment; and in glory there is no punishment: therefore it seems that with respect to the soul they will not be in glory.

1. Furthermore, Matthew 13:30, it is said: Suffer both to grow until the harvest:... they shall be bound in bundles to burn, but the wheat gather ye into my barn. Therefore up to that point they will not be bound to burn, nor will the wheat be placed into the barn of heaven.

2. Furthermore, Matthew 25:33 ff.: And he shall set the sheep on his right hand, but the goats on his left. Then the king shall say to them that shall be on his right hand: Come, ye blessed, etc. And to them that shall be on his left: Depart from me, you cursed, etc. Therefore it seems that up to that point they will not be separated, nor will these be sent into hell, nor those called to the kingdom: and thus again the proposition is held.

3. Furthermore, Matthew 20:8: And when evening was come, the lord of the vineyard saith to his steward: Call the laborers and pay them their hire, namely their own. But the evening is the consummation of the age: therefore it seems that neither the good nor the bad will receive their reward before the consummation of the age.

4. Furthermore, in Psalm 16:15 (according to another translation): I shall be satisfied when thy glory shall appear. But glory will not appear before the day of judgment, as He Himself says, Luke 21:27: Then they shall see the Son of man coming in a cloud, with great power and majesty. And truly, that is, He shall so come in like manner as you have seen Him. Therefore until then they shall not be satisfied: therefore neither shall they have glory: therefore neither the damned the punishments of hell.

5. Furthermore, by reason the same is argued: For of no thing that is to be possessed through judgment will the attainment occur before the pronouncement of the sentence; but hell and heaven are to be possessed through judgment, as is proved, Matthew 25:33 ff.: therefore the attainment of neither is before the pronouncement of the sentence. But the sentence will not be pronounced except on the day of judgment: therefore up to that point no ones will attain heaven or hell: and thus the proposition is held.

6. Furthermore, it does not belong to a highest and magnificent king to give anything, except what is declarative of great magnificence; but God is supremely magnificent: therefore, etc. But it is more magnificent and more joyous to give an infinite good simultaneously to all at once in body and soul, than to give it individually to this one and that one: therefore He will give it to all simultaneously, and not individually to this one and that one. And thus again the proposition is concluded: because it is supposed by all that God does all things in the mode in which they are most honorably done, and according as they show the greatest glory and virtue.

7. Furthermore, in civic affairs in which strife is engaged in common, the crown is not imposed on anyone without another, but triumphing in common, they are crowned in common; but these earthly things descend from the divine through the similitude of imitation: therefore in divine things it is similarly so. But it is established for all that the Saints engage in common triumph over every enemy impeding salvation: therefore it seems that all have to be crowned simultaneously in common. But this cannot be done except commonly: therefore it seems that no one will receive full beatitude, except after the resurrection: therefore neither the punishments of hell: because by opposition the rationale is the same for the punishments of hell and the joys of the kingdom of heaven.

8. Furthermore, there are two parts of the rational nature, namely that existing in flesh, and that separated from flesh. But it is established that that which is separated [the

angels] was wholly rewarded at once on the part of the good, and wholly punished at once on the part of the evil: therefore similarly it will be in the other part of the rational creature, namely in that which is conjoined to flesh: and thus again the proposition is held.

§ 2. To the contrary of this it is thus objected: 1. Luke 23:43: Amen I say to thee, this day thou shalt be with me in paradise.

If perhaps you say that he was not in full fruition: but paradise there means rest from punishments. To the contrary: Chrysostom expounding that word says thus: Some say that the thief has not yet attained paradise: but the thief indeed possessed paradise: for He cannot lie who says: Today thou shalt be with me in paradise.

If perhaps you say that, even according to us, the thief was not in the empyrean heaven on that same day, although he was in full fruition of the deity of Christ. Let it be proved by another authority descending from the opposite, Luke 16:22: And the rich man also died: and he was buried in hell. But it is established that he speaks of the hell of the damned, as is proved by the fire which he was suffering: therefore by a similitude before the day of judgment hell is entered: therefore since God is more prone to have mercy than to condemn, even before the day of judgment the kingdom of heaven is entered.

1. Furthermore, upon that of the epistle to the Hebrews 11:40: That they should not be perfected without us, Chrysostom says thus: Some received according to their labors, but not according to their crowns. For if we are all one body, a greater delight is effected for the body itself when it shares in common and not particularly. From this it is clear that the Saints already in their soul have received according to their labors, although according to the glory of bodies they still await the common resurrection of men; but the labors of men are meritorious of the kingdom of heaven: therefore they have already received this: therefore they have entered heaven.
2. Furthermore, Revelation 6:11: And white robes were given to every one of them one; and it was said to them, that they should rest for a little time. But it is established that individual robes signify the beatitude of souls: therefore they are already in heaven where they were seen by John, and they have received the beatitude of the soul.

4. Furthermore, Athanasius in the book of Questions: We are taught from the divine Scriptures, that the souls of sinners are in hell beneath all the earth and sea, as Psalm 38:7 [LXX] says: In the dark places, and in the shadow of death. But the souls of the just after the coming of Christ, as we say concerning the thief, are in paradise: because not only on account of the soul of the thief did Christ open paradise, but also on account of the remaining souls of the saints. But it is established that he does not speak of the earthly paradise, because that is the region of bodies, not of spirits: therefore he speaks of the empyrean heaven, which is the region of blessed spirits.

1. Furthermore, by reason: Whatever things are disposed differently in merit and the cause of merit, ought to be disposed differently in reward: but it is established that the

soul and the body are differently the cause of merit, because the soul is the whole cause, and the body merely obeys: therefore it seems that they ought to be disposed differently in reward. Therefore they ought not to be rewarded simultaneously; but the soul was more principal than the body in merit: and thus it is held that the soul, as soon as it is loosed from the body, is to be rewarded in heaven.

2. Furthermore, in the first state if innocence had been preserved, not all would have been translated simultaneously into another state of beatitude according to Basil (otherwise, according to the opinion of those speaking more probably), but rather the fathers having been translated would have given place to their sons: therefore it seems that neither is this to be done in this state.

3. Furthermore, one who is supremely influential infuses his beatitude and goodness immediately to every perceiver as much as it can perceive; but God is in this mode supremely influential: therefore, etc. But immediately resolved from the flesh the soul is susceptible to beatitude supremely in heaven: therefore God immediately infuses it to it: and thus the proposition is held.

4. Furthermore, one who is supremely wise does nothing vainly, and that does not proceed to some utility; but God is supremely wise: therefore, etc. But no utility, but rather a detriment would proceed from the delay of the Saints according to their souls until the day of judgment: therefore He Himself does not delay them according to the glorification of the soul. Proof of the minor premise: If any utility or honor or advantage were to proceed from this, either this would be on the part of God, or on the part of the Saints. On the part of God it is not: because His goodness shines forth in an equal number of goods and equally great ones by rewarding them divisively just as conjointly, because there are as many and they are rewarded with as much in one mode as in the other. But on the part of the Saints a detriment of expectation would proceed. And thus the proposition is established.

5. Furthermore, it does not belong to the supremely just one to defer the wages of the laborer, even until the morning, if the laborer is able to receive it; but no one doubts that God is supremely just: therefore He does not defer the wages. But the soul resolved from the flesh is immediately receptive: therefore immediately after death God gives to it: therefore it immediately enters the kingdom of heaven.

§ 3. And because this has no doubt if the Gospel and the Apocalypse and the Epistles are read, in which Saints were also caught up to the vision of God in the heavens, just as Paul says he was caught up: the Saints are also said to follow the Lamb in white robes in heaven, and to sing a new canticle before the throne of God: therefore the first [position] is condemned as the worst heresy.

§ 4. And IT IS RESPONDED to the first argument, that according to the understanding of the Text that is not the understanding of the Apostle: but according to the Text he enumerated the Saints of the Old Testament, and showed that they cannot be perfected without the grace of the New Testament which perfects the Saints of the New Testament who are the faithful of

Christ: whence that whole perfection was done through Christ. And that this is the understanding of the Text is clear to anyone reading the preceding and following parts of the epistle.

But if someone wishes to argue from the Glosses: then the authority of Chrysostom cited to the contrary solves it: because it speaks of the Saints according to the perfection of bodies, and not according to the perfection of the soul. But why bodies are rewarded simultaneously, and not souls, is to be sought in the tract on the resurrection.

§ 5. To the next argument it must be said that the very vision of John proves that the souls of the Saints are under the throne of God in heaven with individual robes of souls: and to "endure" is the same as to await the robe of the body with certitude.

But to that which is objected, that to endure implies a punishment, it must be said that this is false: because often it is put for expectation alone. However, the Saints say that souls vehemently desire to be incorporated into glorious bodies, and out of desire they are drawn back a little from the contemplation of God: and the word for enduring can name this.

§ 6. To that which is objected concerning the tares [zizania], it must be said that the mingling of the evil with the good in the militant Church is noted there: and this is signified by "to grow": for after death neither the tares grow, nor the wheat. And this is true, that a general separation of the good from the evil will not be, except then when the warfare of the Church will be finished, and it will be universally segregated from its enemies.

§ 7. To the next argument it must be said that the Gospel there touches upon the judgment that will be in body and soul, and not in the soul alone: whence it does nothing for the proposition.

§ 8. To the next argument it must be said that at the end of the age is the time for calling the laborers in every part in which they labored, namely in body and soul: but even before the end in the evening the householder-soul receives a consolation which was more principal in the labor: just as even now in the labors of rustics we see that the better laborers have a special consolation from the one who hired them.

§ 9. To the next argument it must be said that the glory of the Lord immediately appears when the body is not disobedient: but it is true that the majesty of the judge will not appear.

§ 10. TO THE FIRST REASON it must be said that judgment is twofold, namely particular which is of the man, and universal which is of nature: and a supremely just judge fails in neither judgment. And therefore in the death of a man there is adjudicated to the soul what it merited, and on the day of universal judgment it is adjudicated also to the body. And this we see in every perfect human judgment: for a judge would be most impious who would delay one man in his own case which is singular, until he could judge an entire nation simultaneously.

§ 11. To the next argument it must be said that in truth God is supremely magnificent; but this is not magnificence, to crown simultaneously and not divisively, because they merited divisively: for the Saints have divided merits according to time and according to works. But it

is of magnificence to enrich many and great ones. But that this is done simultaneously or divisively is not magnificence, but happens from this, that they came to the magnificent one simultaneously or divisively.

§ 12. To the next argument it must be said that this is false, that the Saints engage in strife simultaneously for triumph, unless "simultaneously" is the same as "in concord": but if it denotes similar acts or the same time, the proposition is false: but only in that sense would it conclude anything for the proposition: and therefore it is clear that it proceeds from what is false, and proves nothing.

§ 13. To the last argument it must be said that it is not similar concerning Angels and men: because Angels were all created simultaneously, in that one is not in potency to another, and one is not brought forth from another: and therefore their merit was simultaneous, and consequently their reward was simultaneous. But in men it is otherwise: because one is in potency to another, and generation in them passes away, and generation arrives: and therefore their merits are divided according to time and acts: and consequently they are rewarded divisively according to the soul, as was said before.

Articulus 11 — Whether In Confession All Crimes Ought To Be Expressed Individually

An oportet in confessione omnia criminalia sigillatim exprimi?

Whether all criminal sins must be expressed individually in confession?

§ 1. Next it is asked concerning what he says there, at E, After these things it must be considered, What confession profits, etc.

For it seems to be false: because in contrition someone is not held to recollect sins individually in order that the contrition be valid: therefore neither in confession: but it suffices to confess in general.

§ 2. Response. It must be said that it is not similar: because contrition is before God, who sees all things equally whether resumed individually or in common through memory: but confession is before a man, who does not know how to enjoin penance unless they are expressed individually: and also the shame is greater before a man, before whom sins are expressed individually.

But whether one ought to repeat confession, and when not, should be sought above: because it also has a place here.

§ 3. Next it is asked concerning what he says there, at K, after the beginning: But venial sins, as Augustine says, because they are innumerable, etc.

Upon that it has been disputed above and it falls here just as there: and so those things which were said there in the question are confirmed by those things which are said here in the Text.

Articulus 12 — Whether Pious Minds Ought There To Recognize Fault Where Fault Is Not

Whether pious minds ought to recognize a fault there where there is no fault?

§ 1. Next it is asked concerning what he says there, at F, But just as the penitent ought not to conceal, etc.

For to this it seems contrary that: 1. Gregory says that it is characteristic of good minds to acknowledge a fault there where there is no fault:[636] therefore also to confess it once acknowledged.

1. Furthermore, Augustine in the book of Confessions: If it is asked of me, whether I am just? I say that I am not.[637] And yet it is established that Augustine was just.

§ 2. Furthermore, it is further asked here: How is a doubtful sin to be confessed, whether as mortal or venial?

For it seems that if he confesses it as venial, that: 1. He is in danger: because he does not do condign penance. But if as mortal: then he pronounces a doubtful thing as certain, and thus he lies: therefore he sins, or the things which he says in the Text are false.

1. Furthermore, a little before he said that if any are repeated more frequently, those are to be expressed: therefore either because they are made mortal from repetition: or because they are repeated venial sins. If in the first mode: then a venial becomes a mortal sin: and this was disproved above. If in the second mode: then that general confession which is made at Prime and Compline is to be made concerning venial sin, which is against those things which are said in the Text.

§ 3. Furthermore it is asked: If he confesses such repeated things which are venial by genus, whether a penance is to be taxed to him?

It seems that it is: because confession is made for the sake of the taxation of penance.

To the contrary: The taxed [penance] suffices for a mortal sin: therefore none is due to a venial sin, because they are incommensurable.

§ 1. Response. It must be said that all these matters were discussed in previous sections: yet to the first it can be said, that there is an acknowledgement of the intellect judging what is in the soul, and what is not: and there is an acknowledgement of the fearing affect as to whether it acts rightly or not: as it is said,[638] I feared all my works, knowing that you would not spare the offender: and such is the acknowledgement of a good mind, of which Gregory speaks, and it does not demand confession.

§ 2. To the next it must be said, that every man is unjust compared to God: and thus speaks Augustine. Thus also Job says:[639] Can a man be justified compared to God? And thus it is said:[640] All our justices are as the rag of a menstruous woman. However, this injustice, because it is not absolute in the work, but in comparison to the primary justice, which mortal infirmity cannot perfectly imitate, therefore he is not obliged to confess it.

§ 3. To the next it must be said, that doubts are to be interpreted toward the more certain side: for let penance be received as if for a mortal sin: and yet let not the mortal sin be pronounced in confession, but let him confess that he doubts whether it was mortal or venial.

§ 4. To the next it must be said, that mortal sins are not made from repetition per se, but accidentally, namely if contempt and lust increase: and enough has been said about this above.

§ 5. To the next it must be said, that penance is not to be enjoined upon one confessing venial sins, but the daily satisfaction for venial sins instituted by the Church is to be recalled to memory, namely the striking of the breast, the Our Father, Hail Mary, and the like: and if penance is undertaken, it will not be enjoined by precept, but by counsel. Nevertheless this argument is invalid: "some penance suffices for a mortal sin: therefore none is owed for a venial sin": because some penance does not suffice for a mortal sin, except once it has been made venial; and this has often been explained above.

§ 6. Now, this which he says in the following chapter G, But let the priest beware, is contained in the decree on penance, distinct. IV, etc., and the whole is clear from the disputations above.

DISTINCTIO XXII

Divisio Textus

§ 7. And since by many authorities, etc. In this last distinction concerning penance, the return of sins is treated, and consequently the repetition of penance.

§ 8. And two things are inquired into in the Letter, of which the first is what was said: but the other is about the sign and the reality of this sacrament, and it begins there, C, After the predicted things it remains to investigate, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether Sins Remitted Return Through Any Relapse

Do forgiven sins return through any relapse? § 9. Here falls the question: Whether forgiven sins return through any subsequent relapse into mortal sin?

§ 10. And it seems that they do: 1. By that of Ezekiel: All his justices, which he had done, shall not be remembered. Therefore, if he had done no justice, he would be punished for all his sins: but he is not punished except for the sin which he has: therefore every preceding sin returns upon him through the subsequent relapse.

§ 11. 2. Furthermore, Justice is equal in rendering equals for good and evil things: but to the converted, past good things mortified by an intermediate sin are restored: therefore to the

636. Gregory the Great, Epistolae, lib. XI, ep. 64.

perverted, past evil things mortified by intermediate penance are restored: therefore sins return.

§ 12. 3. Furthermore, in human laws a freedman is recalled into his former servitude and the punishment of servitude on account of a subsequent offense: since therefore those laws are patterned after divine ones, it seems also that this is just according to divine laws: therefore on account of an offense the former servitude of forgiven sins must be recalled.

§ 13. 4. Furthermore it is argued by that of James: Whoever shall keep the whole law, yet offend in one point, is become guilty of all. Now he cannot become guilty of all, except through all returning upon him: therefore it seems that all sins return on account of one subsequent offense.

§ 14. Furthermore it is objected more strongly: Let us suppose that someone is sufficiently contrite for the deletion of guilt, but not for the deletion of punishment: and afterwards he contemns repenting and confessing, and thus dies: it is certain that God will punish the sin which man did not punish: but man punished nothing of the past acts: therefore God will punish all: but He cannot punish except where he is: but he is in hell: therefore He punishes in hell all his sins: and they are not punished unless he has them by return: therefore all sins forgiven in contrition have returned through the subsequent sin.

§ 15. Exactly the same objection applies concerning him who is contrite and confessed, and did not fulfill condign penance, and falls into one mortal sin, and thus dies.

§ 16. On the contrary to this it is objected: 1. Because the Philosopher says: What entirely passes into non-being, is not reiterated as numerically the same: but a forgiven sin has entirely passed into non-being: therefore it is not reiterated as numerically the same: therefore the same sin which was forgiven is not reiterated.

§ 17. But if it be said that a sin is not reduced to nothing when it is forgiven. ON THE CONTRARY: If it remains: then it remains either as guilt, or as a stain, or as the liability to eternal punishment: for these three things are in mortal sin. Not in the first or second way: because according to this, guilt and grace would be in the same subject, and grace and the stain of mortal sin, which cannot be. Similarly it cannot remain in the third way: because the liability to eternal punishment is conjoined to guilt, and when the latter is loosed the former is loosed: therefore it seems that nothing of the mortal sin remains: and thus the proposition stands.

§ 18. If perchance you say that some circumstance of the sin remains: this is ridiculous: because a circumstance is a property and a certain form of the sin: but a form does not remain unless the formed thing remains in being.

§ 19. 2. Furthermore the ancients object, that if any of the past sins returns through any subsequently committed sin: let us suppose that someone sins through avarice, and afterwards falls into mortal prodigality: it seems that the prodigality brings the avarice back into being: and thus a contrary leads a contrary into being, which is impossible.

637. Cf. Augustine, Confessiones, lib. IX, c. 13.

§ 20. 3. Furthermore, this seems to be contrary to God's justice: because no good remains unremunerated by Him, nay even more than it is worth: but the intermediate penance was worth an eternal good, and was a perfect remedy against sin: therefore it seems that he would be dealt with unjustly, if all his sins were to return upon him.

§ 21. But there are some who say to these things, that the preceding sin does not return in stain or liability: but on account of the subsequent sin a liability is born so great that it is equivalent to all the preceding sins which were forgiven. But this seems false: for sin is not measured except from its species or root which is contempt: but a subsequent sin in its species is not equivalent to the quantity of all the sins: nor even in its root as a frequent occurrence: but rather it can proceed from a lesser contempt: therefore it seems that it is false, that from it is born a liability as great as from all the forgiven sins.

§ 22. Furthermore, this liability is either born from that sin according to its being a certain sin in itself, or according to its order to the preceding sins, or according to its order to the preceding penance, or simultaneously according to its order to the preceding sins and to the preceding penance. If in the first way: then from any mortal sin such a liability is born: because the reason is the same for one, and for all others, which is false. If in the second way: then from any second sin a liability would be born as great as that of two sins, and from a third as great as of three, and from a fourth as great as of four, and so of others: and God forbid, because thus a sinner could never make satisfaction. If in the third way: then a good conjoined to an evil makes a greater evil, which is impossible. The same follows if it is said to be in the fourth way: therefore this opinion is impossible.

§ 23. Because of this came a third opinion, and it says that preceding sins return on account of four sins, and not on account of others: and these are drawn from the Letter. Now these are fraternal hatred, apostasy from the faith through heresy, and contempt of confession on account of the objection introduced above, and regret of penance (sloth). For then they say that God makes his past penance to be of no avail to him: and about this the ancients made a verse, because almost everyone held this opinion. And the verse is this:

He hates his brothers, becomes an apostate, and scorns to confess, It irks him to have repented, his pristine guilt returns.

§ 24. But then it is asked, What is there specially in these sins, on account of which the prior guilt is said to return rather than in others? For either they have this from the side of the species, or from the deformity of the root. If in the first way: then preceding guilt ought to return through murder, because it is a greater sin than fraternal hatred: and this is not said, unless in fraternal hatred any sin against the neighbor is supposed, which is not true according to them. If it has this from the deformity of the root. ON THE CONTRARY: because then the preceding guilt ought to return from a sin against the Holy Spirit, because it has the most deformed root: and this again is not true according to them.

§ 25. Furthermore, If anyone inspects the authorities which are introduced in the Letter, he will find more things on account of which the Saints say sins return. In the sixth which is of

638. Gregory the Great, Dialogi, lib. IV.

Bede on Luke, the carelessness of negligence, or of idleness, is posited: and in the seventh which is of the same, human cupidity is added. Therefore it seems that sins do not return only for these four causes.

§ 26. Therefore there were some of a fourth opinion, following the Master in the Letter, saying that sins return solely on account of ingratitude.

§ 27. But AGAINST these it is objected: because ingratitude is not found except in one of three ways: for either it denotes an actual returning of evil for good, done by heart, mouth, or work: or it denotes an actual non-caring for a received benefit, namely either that the benefit is not esteemed, or is esteemed less than it is: or it denotes a certain habitual forgetting of benefits, through the fact that one does something contrary to the benefit. But in the first two ways ingratitude is a special sin, divided from others, not conjoined to any subsequent sin whatsoever: therefore by ingratitude taken in those two ways, sin is not posited to return on account of any subsequent sin. If therefore ingratitude is taken in the third way, let it be asked what it is, that is of such great efficacy? But it seems that it is not an act of sin: because one act of sin is distinguished from the act of another sin in species: and ingratitude is conjoined to any subsequent sin: therefore it is not an act of sin. In the same way it seems that it is not a circumstance either: because a circumstance of one is not the circumstance of another: and ingratitude is one and the same for any subsequent sin. Furthermore it seems that it is not an effect of the subsequent sin either: because diverse causes have diverse effects: but ingratitude of one nature follows upon diverse sins following upon penance: therefore it is neither an act, nor a circumstance, nor an effect of sin: therefore it seems that it is nothing of sin: therefore through it a preceding sin cannot return.

§ 28. RESPONSE. It seems to me that it must be said in this question, that a sin never returns as numerically the same, nor specifically the same, nor with equal liability: but out of the ingratitude of the subsequent sin it is said to return as regards the reproach and deformity of the one sinning, which is a greater ingratitude than if his sin had not been forgiven: and therefore he merits ampler rebukes, and a more just condemnation: and it cannot be understood otherwise how sins return.

§ 29. Now to understand this, some have invented a distinction of those things which are from sin in the penitent: for the penitent is bound to sorrow for things committed, and detestation of things to be admitted, and memory of the benefit received, which is as great, as will be clear below, as are those things which were forgiven: but it is certain that the subsequent sin interrupts all these three things: and therefore there is born in him a certain deformity of ingratitude from comparison to the forgiveness of preceding sins: for he to whom many things have been forgiven is more bound to give thanks, and it is more shameful for him to sin against the forgiver: and thus preceding sins not as sins, but as so many forgiven things, give quantity to the subsequent ingratitude: and as to this they are said to return, because as to this they in a certain way result in the subsequent sin. But if they return in some other way, at present I do not understand it, except for the objections introduced.

639. Hugh of Saint Victor, De Sacramentis, lib. II, p. 14, c. 3.

§ 30. To the first therefore it must be said, that Ezekiel does not intend that justices should not be remembered for a lesser punishment, because this would be against God's mercy: but he intends that they should not be remembered for the attainment of eternal life: and this is true.

§ 31. To the next it must be said, that justice is never so equal, that it is not more toward indulgence than toward condemnation, because otherwise it would be cruel. If however it is granted to be equal: then it must be said that it does not follow: because what is introduced as similar is not similar: for a good work of itself had a vivifying spirit, which afterwards can avail for merit: but an evil work does not have anything sustaining it, by whose return it could afterwards return: whence an evil is much more deficient than a good. Similarly, all good works have a union in grace, and therefore when grace returns they can return: but evil works have no union at all except that of aggregation, which is simply a plurality, like the union of a heap: and therefore since they have no union by whose return they could return, they cannot return like good works. But how good works return, was investigated above.

§ 32. To the next it must be said, that in human affairs many things are done for precaution and the fear of future events: like the law itself which recalls a manumitted sinner into servitude: for this renders them more cautious, and instills fear in others, and without such precautions man could not live civilly: but in divine matters it is not so, but they are directly according to the norm of justice, and especially in the condemnation and punishment of sins: because God never punishes beyond what is condign.

§ 33. To the next it must be said, that he is never punished for that part which was forgiven him: but such a one is punished in hell forever for the past sin, just as a venial sin conjoined to a mortal sin is punished eternally: but nevertheless he is punished less in hell, than he would be punished if he had never repented.

§ 34. Now to all the things which are to the contrary up to the second opinion, they can be conceded straightforwardly.

§ 35. But concerning the second opinion I think it must be said that it is false, unless it is stated in this way, that the liability of the subsequent sin has a greater deformity by comparison to the preceding committed ones.

§ 36. And all the things which are objected against this opinion, I think should be conceded.

§ 37. To the third opinion I think again it must be said that it is false: nevertheless to that which it asks, what was the reason why they posited those four sins? It must be said that this could be because preceding sins seek remission on the part of God and of the neighbor and of the penitent himself. And on the part of God indeed more generally is apostasy from the first of those things which are in justification: and this is faith: and therefore because he sins against the first thing in justification, as to God the sin returns: but as to the neighbor communicating charity works well towards the remission of sin, because the charity of the

640. Glossa Ordinaria on Matthew 5:26.

Church merits the justification of the impious: and therefore again sinning against this, he sins against justification: and then the sin returns for him, namely. But on the part of the penitent there are two operating things: one against the guilt, namely sorrow informed by grace and contrition: and the contrary of this is the regret of penance. But the other operates against the punishment by the power of the keys: and against this is the contempt of confession enjoining satisfaction. But the others are not so directly against justification: and therefore through them it does not return.

§ 38. And by this the solution to the objection concerning this opinion is clear, if anyone should wish to sustain it: for it could be said that a sin does not have from the quantity of deformity in the act that it causes the sin to return, nor from the quantity of deformity in the root, but from this that he sins against the things affecting justification. Nevertheless I think that this opinion too is false, as was said before.

§ 39. To the last opinion it must be said that neither does it return on account of the ingratitude of the sin, except as was said in the beginning of the solution: and then ingratitude is taken in the second way for the habitual non-remembrance of benefits, and especially of that benefit, that sins were forgiven.

§ 40. To the objection to the contrary, it must be said that it is neither an act, nor a circumstance, nor an effect of the subsequent sin, but a certain deformity consequent upon the sin by the fact that it interrupts habitual thanksgiving: and thus it is something of sin, in the way in which a defect is said to be something of a defect: yet it does not follow that it is an act or circumstance or proper effect: because a defect has only a defect as its cause.

§ 41. But if it is asked, Why do the Saints in the Letter touch upon those sins which they touch upon? It must be said that concerning the four it is already clear: because in them one sins more directly against justification: but the two which are carelessness and love of the world, are general, and are posited rather for the roots of sins, than for sins: because from them frequent sins frequently befall, which induce ingratitude.

§ 42. And by this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 2 — Whether Venial Sin Also Returns Through Ingratitude As The Others

Does a venial sin also return through ingratitude like the others? § 43. Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, A, after the beginning: Until he should pay the entire debt, etc.

§ 44. Whether from this it is held that a venial sin returns through that mode, by which it must be conceded that the others return through ingratitude?

§ 45. It seems that it does not: because 1. That which is not contrary to charity, is not contrary to ingratitude either: but a venial sin is not contrary to charity: therefore, etc.: therefore it ought not to return on account of its opposite, namely ingratitude.

§ 46. 2. Also, It is not said to return on account of ingratitude, except that it makes ingratitude greater: but venial sins do not make ingratitude greater: therefore they do not return in it. The first is clear from the foregoing. But the second is clear from this, that:

whatever things neither take away nor diminish charity, do not increase ingratitude: and thus the proposition stands.

§ 47. But ON THE CONTRARY is the Letter: because 1. The entire debt is said here, and in that venial sins are included.

§ 48. 2. Also, Since the Lord's Prayer is for daily things which are venial, and in it is said, Forgive us our debts: therefore venial sins are included under debt.

§ 49. RESPONSE. It must be said that venial debts do not return, except by that mode by which the others do: and I well concede, that they return in this mode.

§ 50. To the objection to the contrary, it must be said that it is a disposition disposing towards the contrary, and thus it is contrary to the fervor of charity. And through this its remission increases ingratitude.

§ 51. In the same way the solution to the following is clear.

Articulus 3 — Whether Original Sin Also Returns Through Ingratitude

Does original sin also return through ingratitude? § 52. Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, A, after the beginning: But also original sins, etc.

§ 53. 1. For original sin is only one, against which baptism is ordained: therefore it seems that it does not return: because if it were to return, since it is not deleted except by baptism, one would need to be rebaptized: and it is heretical to say this.

§ 54. 2. Moreover, Since original sin is one, how does he call it plurally original sins?

§ 55. RESPONSE. It must be said that original sin according to its essence never returns: but it returns in the predicted mode: because its remission increases the debt of thanksgiving, and increases ingratitude.

§ 56. To the second it has been disputed and answered in the second book of the Sentences in the tract on original sin.

Articulus 4 — Whether He To Whom More Has Been Forgiven Is More Bound To Give Thanks Than He Who Has Preserved Innocence

Is he to whom more has been forgiven, more bound to thanksgiving, than he who preserved his innocence? § 57. Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, A, a little before the end: He ought therefore to have thought of as many gifts of God, as his own evils, etc.

§ 58. And three things are asked here, namely who is more bound to thanksgiving, namely he to whom more has been forgiven, or he who preserved his innocence? Secondly, According to what is a greater or lesser thanksgiving measured? Thirdly, Whether for many gifts there is one thanksgiving, and one ingratitude, or many?

§ 59. To the first it is objected thus: 1. In bodily things continuous health is worth more than interrupted and restored health: therefore similarly in spiritual things the continuation of innocence is worth more than the restoration of grace by penance: but for a greater good

greater thanks are to be given: therefore to greater thanksgivings the innocent one is bound, than the penitent restored to his pristine state.

§ 60. 2. Furthermore, The state of innocence is worthier and more secure, than that of penance: because the penitent does not know that his sin is forgiven him, but the innocent one knows with certainty, because it was not committed: therefore as before.

§ 61. ON THE CONTRARY 1. Luke 7:42 and 43: Who therefore loves him more?... I suppose that he to whom he forgave more. And He, namely Jesus, says to him: You have judged rightly: but more was forgiven to the penitent: therefore he is more bound to love: therefore also to give more thanks.

§ 62. 2. Furthermore, He who is helped in danger is bound to his liberator, to whom he who was never helped is not bound: but the innocent one was never helped, whereas the penitent is helped: therefore to greater thanksgivings the penitent is bound, than the innocent.

§ 63. SECONDLY it is asked, According to what is the quantity of thanksgiving measured?

§ 64. But it seems that it is according to the quantity of the gifts: because thanksgiving is the recognition of a benefit from perceived gifts with praise and compliance: therefore for a greater gift there is a greater thanksgiving, and for a lesser one a lesser.

§ 65. But if this is conceded, the Gospel will seem to be against it: because everyone says that charity is the greatest gift: and yet the Gospel seems to intend that he must give more thanks to whom more is forgiven, as is clear from the previously introduced authority.

§ 66. THIRDLY it is asked, Whether for many things there is one thanksgiving, and one ingratitude?

§ 67. But it seems that there is not: because just as causes properly differ, so do their effects differ: but the proper cause of thanksgiving is the perception of a gift: therefore for diverse gifts there are diverse thanksgivings and ingratitudes: and the proposition is had.

§ 68. RESPONSE. It must be said that Augustine determines the first article of this question in the book On Virginity, saying that other things being equal, each is bound to equal thanksgivings: because from as many sins as the grace of God rescued the penitent, from so many it preserved the innocent from falling: nor could he have stood, except by Him preserving him: but if they are not equal in other things: then he is more bound who has greater charity, and other greater gifts. Whence in those cases nothing prevents one from being more bound in one respect, and the other in another respect: because in such things operations are related as exceeding and exceeded.

§ 69. To the first therefore it must be said, that in one sense it is so, and in another it is not: because if interrupted health is greater than continuous, it is not true what he says: but if it is equal, and other things are equal, then it is true. And so it is also in spiritual things: because then the avoidance of danger is a great good, for which he who fell into danger is not bound.

§ 70. To the next it must be said, that it does not conclude, except as to this: but in other things the opposite can be true, as was said.

§ 71. To the next it must be said, that the objection to the contrary proves that the penitent is bound from more things, because from what is forgiven and what is committed, but not more: and thus the Lord speaks.

§ 72. And by this the solution to the whole first part is clear.

§ 73. To that which is asked secondly, it must be said that quantity is twofold, discrete, and continuous. Now the discrete spiritual quantity of thanksgiving is measured according to the number of gifts, and the quasi-continuous spiritual quantity is measured according to magnitude, and especially according to the magnitude of charity, because that is more excellent than any other gift.

§ 74. To that which is objected to the contrary, the solution is already clear by what was said before.

§ 75. To that which is asked thirdly, it must be said that thanksgivings do not regard gifts differing specifically, but according as they are indicative of divine bounty and magnificence: and because in this mode they fall under one formal notion, therefore thanksgiving is one in species, and there ought to be many in number by the diversity of the remembrance of the gifts: and consequently ingratitude is one by species able to be divided into many in number.

§ 76. And by the aforesaid things the solution to the objections is also clear: because it is not true that for a diversity of gifts in species diverse thanksgivings in species are owed: because thanksgiving does not regard gifts in this mode, but in the predicted mode.

Articulus 5 — Whether The Sacrament Of Penance Has Three As The Others Do, Namely A Thing Only, A Sign Only, And A Thing And Sign Together

Does the sacrament of penance have three things like the others, namely the reality only, the sign only, the reality and the sign together? § 77. Next it is asked concerning the second part of this distinction which begins there, C, After the predicted things it remains to investigate, etc.

§ 78. And in the beginning immediately five things are asked. The first is, Whether this sacrament like the others has three things, namely the reality only, the sign only, the reality and the sign together? The second is, What is in it the sign only, and what the reality and the sign, and what the reality only? The third, Whether it is one sign, and a unique sign and reality, and one reality or many? The fourth, Whether it is itself one sacrament? And the fifth, According to what mode is it one?

§ 79. To the first of these it is objected thus: 1. Nothing among those things which perfect their entire reality by an interior operation, has a sacramental sign: penance perfects its entire reality by an interior operation or can perfect it: therefore it has no sacramental sign. The first premise is proved from the definition of a sacramental sign posited in the beginning of the book. But the second is proved: because from interior contrition frequently the whole sin is forgiven, nay the whole sin with its whole punishment can be deleted, before anything is ever done exteriorly.

§ 80. 2. Furthermore, Everything that has no matter externally subjected to the eyes to be administered by the ministers of the Church, has itself no sacramental sign: but penance is such a thing, or can be: therefore it has no sacramental sign. The first is proved by the definition of a sacrament, which Hugh gives,[641] that a sacrament is a visible and bodily element, externally subjected to the eyes, representing by similitude, signifying by institution, and conferring invisible grace by sanctification. But the second is proved, just as what was previously held of the preceding argument.

§ 81. On the contrary to this it is objected by this that penance is a sacrament: but every sacrament is a sign of a sacred reality, whose image it bears and whose similitude it exists as: therefore penance also.

§ 82. RESPONSE. It must be said that there is one judgment concerning penance, according to its being a virtue moving free choice into the detestation of sin, as was said above: and another, according to its being a sacrament. For according to its being a virtue, it does not have these three things, but it is moving free choice in the manner of a certain nature to detest committed sin insofar as it is committed. But according to its being a sacrament, it has sorrow for matter, and grace for form, and it has exterior signs, consisting in three parts, namely contrition, confession, and satisfaction: and all these have been noted above: for thus...

those three parts are all together, not in act, but in desire. But according as it is a virtue, it does not have the conjoined vow of confessing to a minister of the Church, nor of satisfying by a satisfaction exacted under the power of the keys.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that penance according as it is a sacrament, does not perfect its reality interiorly, rather it has a conjoined vow to proceed exteriorly: and this is its sign in which it necessitates toward an exterior manifestation.

To the next it must be said: in entirely the same way.

Articulus 6 — What In The Sacrament Of Penance Is A Sign, And What Is A Thing And Sign, And What Is A Thing Only

What in the sacrament of penance is the sign, and what is the reality and the sign, and what is the reality only?

Secondly, it is asked, What is here the sign, and what the reality and sign, and what the reality only?

Now the Master says in the Text, that exterior penance is the sign only, while interior is the reality and the sign, and the dismissal of sin is the reality only.

But against this it is objected: because 1. According to this, the reality precedes the sign in time, since in other sacraments the sign precedes the reality: for the remission of sin precedes exterior penance.

1. Further, it is objected thus: Many things are done exteriorly in this sacrament before exterior penance: therefore it seems that exterior penance is not the first and principal sign of penance: for confession is enacted, and many other things, before exterior penance, which is the enjoined satisfaction.
2. Further, there is a sign of the future, which is called prognostic by Physicians and Astronomers; and there is a sign of the present which is called an icon or type; and there is a sign of the past which is called rememorative by Tully in the third book of his Rhetoric: therefore the sacramental sign is one of these signs. And it is certain that it is none other than a prognostic: and that always precedes the signified. Therefore in penance, since it is a sacrament, there can be no sign that does not precede the remission of sin: therefore it seems that exterior penance is not the sign.
3. Further, if exterior penance is called the enjoined satisfaction, as the Master seems to wish, it seems that many contrite and confessed persons die without the sacrament of penance; who nevertheless are saved, because many die without exterior satisfaction. And this seems unfitting.

Further, in the preceding distinction it was held that satisfaction is to be moderated according to the quantity of sorrow and devotion: therefore to some nothing will be imposed, namely to those for whom interior sorrow and devotion suffice. And thus they would have nothing of the sign of the sacrament of penance, which is absurd.

1. Otherwise it is objected against the same thing, namely that nothing exterior can be a sacramental sign in penance: because in a sacrament of the New Law the sign is a cause, and effects what it figures; but the exterior things in penance do not effect, but the interior: therefore it seems they are not sacramental signs.

Against this it is objected, that every sacrament has a sign subject to the senses on the outside; but in penance only exterior penance is subject to the senses: therefore it alone is the sign, as the Master says in the Text.

Response. To this it must be said with the Master in the Text, that exterior penance is the sign only, and interior is the sign and reality; and the remission of sin in fault and punishment is the reality only. But exterior penance is not called, in my judgment, only the enjoined satisfaction: but rather in common, taken according to the three parts of penance, it is the exterior sign of sorrow in gesture, the voice of confession, and the work of enjoined satisfaction: and this is divided according to the three parts of penance, namely that the sign of sorrow on the outside is the sign appropriated to contrition, and the exterior recounting is appropriated to confession, and the exterior acceptance of satisfaction is the sign of satisfaction. But the

641. Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis, I, IX, 2.

reality and sign together, as the Master says, is interior penance: and this similarly must be taken in common, namely according as it is voluntary sorrow with the vow to confess and to satisfy through the keys. But the reality only is the remission of sin in its total fault and total punishment: and these two are divisible, because to contrition corresponds the sign which is interior sorrow informed by grace; to confession the vow to confess by which one already confesses within; and to satisfaction the vow to satisfy by which one already embraces the enjoined penance within. Similarly the reality is divided: because in contrition there is the remission of fault and eternal punishment, in confession the remission of punishment in purgatory, and in satisfaction the remission of temporal punishment.

To that which is first objected, it must be said that the Master resolves it in the Text: because sometimes it is not unfitting for the reality to precede the sign, as happens frequently in the baptism of adults: but because this happens, therefore it can be said otherwise, namely that it is one way in a sacrament only, and another way in that which is a virtue and a sacrament. In those which are sacraments only, nature always precedes the sign, even if in time it sometimes accompanies, sometimes follows; but in penance which is a virtue and a sacrament, penance as it is a virtue is prior to itself as it is a sacrament, that is, the act of virtue is before the action of the sacrament, and sin cannot be together with virtue: and therefore the reality, according as it induces the total remission of sin in fault and punishment, precedes some sign in nature, or sometimes in time.

To the next it is already clear: because confession and whatever appears exteriorly is comprehended under satisfaction.

To the next it must be said that this is a sign preceding the reality according to some part: and this suffices on account of the said cause.

To the next it must be said that they do not die without the sacrament: because exterior penance is not only called the sacrament, but more truly the interior: but it follows that they die without a certain sign which is in the sacrament: and this is not unfitting. Indeed, even without the sacrament, yet with the reality of the sacrament, it is not unfitting for some to be saved, as was held in the tractate on baptism.

To the next it must be said that the objection of some in this place is founded upon a falsehood: because no sacrament among them all has a sign that is causative of the reality: for water does not cause sanctification, but rather the power of the words in the water: and the species of bread and wine do not cause the body of Christ, but rather the words in such matter, and so of the others. And this is what Master Hugh says, that from sanctification a sacrament is made conferring invisible grace. Hence what he says is false: but it suffices that that which is reality and sacrament, with form and matter, is significative and causative: and this indeed happens here, because sorrow with its signs is the matter and it is formed by grace: and this sanctifies, because in such sorrow it causes the remission of sins.

Articulus 7 — Whether In The Sacrament Of Penance The Sign Is One Or Several

Whether in the sacrament of penance the sign is one or many?

Thirdly it is asked, Whether there is one sign, and a single sign and reality, and a single reality, or many?

Now it seems, that there is a single one: because 1. The reality of one sacrament ought to be single: but penance is one sacrament: therefore, etc.

1. Further, the Master in the Text names one, namely exterior and interior penance, and the remission of sin: therefore, etc.

Response. It must be said that they are many and one in different respects. For penance taken in common, as it includes within itself its three parts, is one sign only, and one sign and reality, and similarly is one reality only. How this is so, was said in the preceding article of the question. But if the parts of the act of penance are taken, then they have these three divided: and this also was said in the same place.

To the objection, therefore, it must be said that there is only one in common, but in particular they are many, in this and in other sacraments, as is clear in the Eucharist, where the signs are the species of bread and wine.

To the next it must be said that the Master does not touch upon these things except according as they belong to the whole penance in common.

Articulus 8 — Whether The Sacrament Of Penance Is One Or Several

Whether the sacrament of penance is one or many?

Fourthly it is asked, Whether this sacrament is one or many?

Now it seems, that it is one: because 1. There are only seven sacraments of the New Law, and this is one of them: therefore it is one: for if it were granted that it was many, it would follow that there were more than seven sacraments of the New Law.

1. Further, there are two kinds of sins, namely original and actual: and one sacrament, namely baptism, is ordained against original: therefore also one against actual: but this is penance: therefore it seems that penance is only one sacrament.

Against this it is objected: because where there are many signs and many signified realities, there are many sacraments.

Response. It must be said that almost the whole matter is clear through what has been said: for the sacrament of penance is a single sacrament: and so it was said above. Its reality is single, namely the deletion of all actual sin in fault and punishment: and to this deletion the three parts come in order, just as in medicine there are three doses operating individually and in order.

To the argument therefore it must be said that there is one reality in common and one sign and cause: and yet it does not follow, if there were many things which are signs only, that there would be many sacraments: and the counter-instance is in the Eucharist, in which there are many signs, yet not many sacraments: and this is the cause, because the sacrament draws

its unity from the reality, and especially from that which is reality and sign: and this is one in the Eucharist: and this is the cause why it is so in such things, because one and the same signifiable thing is signifiable by diverse signs: and therefore a diversity of signs does not make a unity or diversity of realities.

Articulus 9 — In What Way The Sacrament Of Penance Is One

How is the sacrament of penance one?

Fifthly it is asked, How is it one?

For "one" is said in many ways, as diverse Authors distinguish. For there is a substantial unity of three persons in one divine substance; a personal unity in Christ; a spiritual unity, in which a holy man and God are one spirit. Beyond these there is an aggregative unity, like a heap of stones; and a constitutive unity, as members constitute one body; and a native unity, as body and soul naturally perfect one man; and a conjugative unity, by which a man and woman are one flesh.

Now it seems that the sacrament is not one in any of these ways. And this is clear, 1. For one easily deducing it through each of the unities.

1. Further, Dionysius posits many modes of "one," saying that those things which are many in number, are one in species: and those many in species, are one in genus: and those many in processions, are one in principle. How then will this sacrament be called one?

Response. The determination of this question depends much on what was said in distinction 15, near the beginning: I say, however, that it is one by a native unity in Bernard's division, which is from matter and form: for everything that is from form and matter is reduced to native unity in that division: now the form is grace, and the matter is sorrow, manifestable or manifested with its exterior signs: and thus the solution is clear.

And note, that some have said that this is the special unity which is called that of a sacrament: and Boethius posits this mode of unity in his book On Unity and the One: but that mode has to be reduced to native unity according to Bernard's division. Note also, that some say the unity is of principle according to Dionysius' division: and this is nothing: because a principle is called there that from which many proceed, not in a single mode: and it is according to some mode through prior and posterior in some of them: just as from being proceed the most general genera: but after this in the division it is one in species, in the way that a species itself consisting of matter and form is called one in species.

Articulus 10 — Whether The Sacrament Of Penance Needed Institution

Whether the sacrament of penance required institution?

Then it is asked concerning what he says, there, chapter 1, at the end: But the sacrament of penance, just as of marriage, etc.

And five things are asked concerning its institution. First is, Whether it required institution? Second, Whether it was instituted before sin, as the Master says in the Text? Third, Whether it was instituted in the time of the law of nature, and how is it? Fourth, How was it in the time of the Mosaic law? Fifth and lastly, How was it in the time of the law of Christ?

To the first of these it is proceeded thus: 1. None of those things which nature dictates to man require institution: but nature dictates to man that penance is necessary after a sin has been perpetrated: therefore penance does not require institution.

1. Further, Master Hugh says that a sacrament signifies from institution. From this it is accepted that if there were no institution, it would neither signify, nor oblige by way of a sacrament. Thence I proceed thus: Everything which equally obliges to make satisfaction, whether an institution has been made or not, is not instituted by way of a sacrament: but penance equally obliges in this way: therefore penance is not instituted by way of a sacrament. Proof of the middle term. Let it be that it is not instituted; it is still necessary for the sinner willing to make satisfaction: but it is not so concerning baptism and the others: therefore the proposition stands.
2. Further, what is instituted by way of a sacrament is not rendered a cause except from the power of the institutor and the form: but penance does not have its causation in this way: therefore it is not instituted like a sacrament. Proof of the minor. For if penance is not instituted, it will still move toward the destruction of sin, and thus the proposition stands.

Against this is the definition of a sacrament which Master Hugh posits, that it signifies from institution: therefore it seems that every sacrament has an institution.

To the same is that which is said in the Text.

Solution. It must be said that it is one thing concerning penance according as it is a virtue, and another concerning penance according as it is a sacrament. For as a virtue it does not have institution, but belongs to those things dictated by nature: but for a sacrament institution is exacted: because every sacrament exists in a certain exterior rite essential to it, which rite is in the dispensation of ministers: therefore it does not seem it should be conceded that a sacrament as a sacrament is dictated by nature, but rather the sacrament as it is a virtue, or penance as it is a virtue.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that reason does not dictate that penance is necessary as it is a sacrament, which is with some display of the disease with the sign of the keys or with the keys: indeed, if there were no institution, salvation could be had without such penance.

Through this also the solution to the two following is clear, and to the whole of what was asked concerning this article.

Articulus 11 — Whether The Sacrament Of Penance Was Instituted Before The State Of Sin

Whether the sacrament of penance was instituted before the state of sin?

Secondly it is asked, Whether this sacrament was instituted before sin?

Now it seems that it was: because the Master says so in the Text.

Further, when the Lord said: On whatever day you shall eat of it, you shall die the death: it is certain that He understood it of the death of penance: because of the death of the body it was not true: and He said this before sin: therefore He instituted penance before sin.

Against this it is objected thus: 1. Penance is only for a preceding sin: therefore the foretelling of penance foretells a future sin: but foretelling a future sin before it exists reveals to man his future fall, which ought not to have been done, as Augustine proves: therefore neither ought penance to have been instituted before sin.

1. Further, a cause necessarily precedes its caused effect: but the fall is the cause of the institution of penance: therefore the fall was before the institution: therefore it seems that penance ought not to have been instituted before sin.

Response with the Master, that penance according as it is a remedy for the fall, was instituted before sin: because since the Lord is prone to show mercy, He applied a remedy before the fault was admitted: so that falling into fault, he might immediately find a remedy prepared.

To the objection to the contrary, it must be said that He did not thereby reveal it: because it does not follow that someone will sin from the fact that sins require penance, for the antecedent cannot be inferred from a conditional : but it is true that Adam knew himself to be capable of sinning: and if he were to sin, that he would need a remedy. And thus the solution to the first is clear.

To the next it must be said that the fall is the cause of institution, but it is not necessary that it be in act; but it suffices that it be in possibility: just as a wise physician prepares medicine for a disease which it is possible will arise.

Articulus 12 — Whether The Sacrament Of Penance Was Instituted In The Law Of Nature

Whether the sacrament of penance was instituted in the law of nature?

Thirdly, it is asked concerning its institution in the law of nature.

1. For Master Hugh of St. Victor says in his book On the Institution of the Sacraments, that as long as there is a disease, there is a time for medicine: but the disease existed in the law of nature: therefore the medicine also exists.
2. Further, in the Text it is said that it was from the beginning of the human race. Therefore it seems that it was in the time of the law of nature: because there was no law from the beginning of the human race, except only the law of nature.
3. Further, on that text of Genesis 3:9: And the Lord God called Adam, and said to him: Where are you? the Gloss says: While He calls, it denotes that He calls back to penance. Therefore penance was instituted then.

4. Further, the sacrament of penance has three parts: contrition, confession, and satisfaction: all these existed in the law of nature: therefore also the sacrament of penance. Proof. Adam was contrite, because he sorrowed for his sin: he confessed, when he said: The woman, whom you gave me as a companion, etc. he received penance from the Lord, when He said to him: In the sweat of your face, etc. and to Eve: I will multiply your sorrows, etc..

Against this it is objected: because 1. Hugh enumerating the sacraments of the law of nature, says they are tithes, sacrifices, oblations: and none of these is the sacrament of penance: therefore it seems that penance was not a sacrament of the natural law.

1. Further Hugh: The sacraments of the law of nature do not seem to have been introduced by precept, because they were proposed from counsel for a vow: but it is certain that everyone is obliged to penance by precept: therefore it is not a sacrament of the law of nature.

To this it must be said that this sacrament had a certain institution in the law of nature. And contrition indeed was instituted when He said: Adam, where are you? Hence the Gloss expounds: See in what misery you are, that is, recognize and confess your sin. But satisfaction in this indeed: In the sweat of your face, etc. And these sufficed in the law of nature: because it was not yet necessary to recognize one's sin before a man, and to expect enjoined penance from him.

It must be said therefore to the first, that Master Hugh does not enumerate the sacraments, except those very signs of the future liberator and of the liberation through Christ, which conferred no grace ex opere operato. But penance always conferred some grace, although not fully, as it does in the New Testament.

To the next it must be said that this saying of Hugh is understood of those things which were signs only, according to that definition, that a sacrament is the sign of a sacred reality only, in the same way that all the signs of the fathers speak of the future liberator.

Articulus 13 — How The Sacrament Of Penance Was Instituted In The Time Of The Mosaic Law

How was the sacrament of penance instituted in the time of the Mosaic law?

How was the sacrament of penance instituted in the time of the Mosaic law?

Fourthly, it is asked concerning the institution of penance in the law of Moses.

1. For it seems to have been instituted again then, as is clear, Leviticus 4 and 5, where it is said what must be offered for the sin of the soul of a ruler and of the synagogue: since therefore penances were taxed in the old law for sins, it seems that penance was specially instituted there.
2. Further, it seems to be said of penance in Proverbs 28:13: He that hides his sins shall not prosper: but he that shall confess, and forsake them, shall obtain mercy.

Likewise, concerning contrition, Joel 2:13: Rend your hearts, and not your garments. And in Psalm 50:19: A contrite and humbled heart, etc. Therefore it seems the whole of penance was instituted in the old law.

Against this it is objected, that penance is satisfactive through the keys: therefore before the keys there was no institution of penance: but the keys were not in the Old Testament: therefore neither was the institution of penance, as it seems.

Solution. It must be said that penance was instituted in the Old Testament according to a certain mode: and this mode will be clear in the following article of the question.

To the argument to the contrary, it must be said that it was not instituted according as it is dismissive of punishment by the power of the keys, but according as it was a remedy for actual sin with grace and exterior penance: for the law did not diminish burdens, but rather increased them. And thus the solution is clear.

Articulus 14 — How The Sacrament Of Penance Was Instituted In The Time Of The Evangelical Law

How was the sacrament of penance instituted in the time of the Evangelical law?

Fifthly and lastly, it is asked concerning its institution in the New Testament.

For it seems that it is not instituted in the New Testament: because 1. Everything which was observed before the New Testament, would be superfluously instituted in the New Testament: but penance was instituted and observed before the New Testament: therefore it would be superfluously instituted in the New Testament: but Christ did nothing superfluously in the New Testament: therefore He did not institute it in the New Testament.

1. Likewise, if He instituted it, where did He institute it? If it is said that, Matthew 3:2: Do penance, etc., by the same reason John instituted it, Matthew 3:2, who began his preaching from the same sentence.

If it is said that, Matthew 8:4, where He says: Go, show yourself to the priest, as was held above. Against: Neither does the text there expressly say so, nor can it be had from it except very allegorically.

Further, if He had instituted penance there as it is in the New Testament, it seems that He ought to have committed the administration to the priests of the New Testament: but conversely it seems that He sent him to the priests of the Old Testament: therefore He did not will to institute penance there, according as it ought to be observed in the New Testament.

Further, in the institution of baptism He did not send to the priests of the Old Testament: therefore neither in the institution of penance according to what belongs to the New Testament.

If it is said that He instituted it in John 20:22 and 23, where He said: Receive the Holy Spirit, etc., whose sins you shall forgive, etc. Against: There He gave power to those having the keys: and this is something other than instituting penance: therefore He did not institute penance:

therefore it seems that He instituted nothing, because in those places He seemed more to institute.

Against this it is objected thus: 1. It belongs to a Lawgiver to ordain the whole of life: but Christ is the Lawgiver: therefore, etc.: but a great part of life is in the state of penance: therefore the mode of penance is to be instituted by the Lawgiver: therefore penance was instituted by Christ: because it is left as a constant that whatever was to be instituted for salvation, this was instituted by Christ.

1. Further, other sacraments which preceded in another way, like orders, and marriage, received a new institution from Christ: therefore penance also ought to have received a new institution.
2. Further, such a mode of confession and satisfaction by the power of the keys never existed except in the new law: therefore it seems to have been instituted in the new law.

To this it must be said that there are four things in penance, namely the recognition of the necessity of medicine against the disease of sin, and the recognition of the perpetrated sin with the purpose of amending, and the manifestation of the sin according to its kind in some sign before a man, and the explanation of the sin by its circumstances with faith in the remission of punishment by the power of the keys. And regarding the first of these penance was instituted before sin, regarding the second in the law of nature, and regarding the third in the written law before grace, and regarding the fourth in the law of the Lord, namely grace.

And the prior is always contained in the posterior, and the posterior relates to it as more perfect through addition to that which is prior, as is manifest to anyone per se. For there is a recognition of the medicine in the knowledge of the sin with the purpose of amending through penance. Similarly, manifesting the sin before a man, promising amendment, recognizes the sin with the purpose of amending: but the converse is not true. And similarly, declaring the sin with its circumstances, and seeking pardon through the keys and satisfaction, explains it before a man, etc.: but the converse is not true. And through this it is clear how penance diversely considered had diverse institutions.

To the first therefore it must be said that in the last mode penance was never instituted before, nor even observed: and therefore the institution was necessary.

To the next it must be said that penance had its institution in another way in all those places which have been touched upon. For there is in penance the very act of voluntary sorrow, and the minister whose keys diminish a part of the punishment and tax the enjoined penance, and the power of those keys. And as to the first of these penance was instituted, Matthew 3:2 et seq. As to the second, Matthew 10:3 et seq. as to the third, John 20:22 and 23. And as to the work of the ministers it was further instituted, John 11:44, where He said to the disciples that they should loose Lazarus and let him go.

To the first object to the contrary, it must be said that as for John it was not his to institute, but to prepare the way: hence his preaching was a way to penance, and Christ gave place to

penance through institution, because, as it is said, Acts 4:12: There is no other name under heaven given to men, whereby we must be saved.

To the next it must be said that the disciples were not yet placed in the ministry of order: but were still only a type of the ministers of the New Testament: and therefore He sent to typical priests, implying in ministry what is owed to true priests.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

And let these things said concerning the treatise on Penance suffice.

Divisio et Expositio Textus

§ 77. Division and Exposition of the Text § 78. Division and Exposition of the Text.

§ 79. After these things it must be considered what marriage is, etc. In this distinction three things are said. For first he gives a foretaste concerning those things of which he speaks. Next, he reveals what matrimony is, there, B, There are therefore, etc. Thirdly, he speaks of the consent which is the efficient cause of nuptials, there, C, Now the efficient cause.

§ 80. But a question occurs concerning what he says, there, B, There are therefore nuptials or matrimony, etc.

§ 81. For he seems to err by placing two names for one defined thing: for those naming name according to something: therefore those imposing diverse names name something diverse: therefore a single definition does not respond to two names.

§ 82. To this it must be said that he considers the same reality according to diverse properties. For nuptials are named from the act of matrimony: but matrimony is named from its goods, because the woman conjoined to the man has the duties of a mother in the pouring forth of offspring, and of other works in which she communicates with the man.

§ 83. But now it is asked, Why is it not called patrimony?

§ 84. And it must be said that the bond of matrimony burdens the mother more, that is, her who is made a mother, because in sorrow she brings forth and nourishes: and therefore it is more the duties of a mother, than of a father.

§ 85. But to what is objected, that one definition follows two names, it must be said that it is a definition of the thing rather than of those properties from which the names are imposed. Or let it be said that the property by which nuptials are called nuptials, is toward that by which it is called matrimony: and therefore each name responds to the definition: one in remote differences, but the other in proximate and ultimate ones: for since it is necessary that definitions begin from the most general, they contain both remote and proximate differences.

DISTINCTIO XXIII

Articulus 1 — Whether Extreme Unction Is A Sacrament

Whether extreme unction is a sacrament?

§ 4. But it seems that it is not a sacrament: 1. For every sacrament of the New Law is ordered against some special disease of sin: but extreme unction is not ordered against a special disease: therefore extreme unction is not a sacrament. The first premise is proved through the distinction of grace in virtues and sacraments, proved at the beginning of this work. The second is proved: because the disease is only original, and actual mortal, and venial, and the infirmity left behind from both: but Baptism is sufficiently ordered against original [sin], Penance against actual mortal, Confirmation against the infirmity left from both, which is why it is even called confirmation: but the Eucharist against the multitude of venial [sins], as many say: therefore it seems that Extreme Unction is ordered against no disease.

§ 5. 2. Furthermore, Every sacrament of the New Law in some way preceded in a figure of the Old Law: but extreme unction did not precede: therefore it seems that it is not a sacrament. The first is proved by induction. But the second is proved from this, that nothing was done in the Old Testament concerning the sick that corresponded to extreme unction.

§ 6. 3. Furthermore, Every sacrament of the New Law is effective of spiritual grace: this unction is not effective of spiritual grace, but of corporeal: therefore it seems that it is not a sacrament, but a corporeal medicine. The first is clear from the definition of a sacrament of the New Law posited at the beginning of this fourth book of the Sentences. The second is written in the Letter, that it avails for the alleviation of the body: and if it avails for grace, as many say, that this is through the prayer of faith joined with contrition: and thus per se it avails only for the body.

§ 7. To the contrary of this is that: 1. The whole Church enumerates seven sacraments of the New Law, and this as one: but what the whole Church holds cannot be false: therefore this is a sacrament.

§ 8. 2. Furthermore I see that there is one sacrament of infants, such as baptism. There is again one of those progressing, such as the viaticum. One of those standing, such as confirmation. One of those returning, as penance. One of those ministering, as orders. Therefore there will also be one of those departing: and this can be nothing other than extreme unction: therefore it seems that

it is a sacrament, or the Church would be diminished in its sacraments.

§ 9. 3. Furthermore, Everything that confers invisible grace represented in a visible element, is a sacrament: but extreme unction is something of this sort: therefore it is a sacrament. The first is clear through this, that to whatever the definition applies, also the defined applies. But the second [is clear] through what is said in James 5:14-15 "Anointing him with oil in the name of the Lord: and the prayer of faith will save the sick man, and the Lord

will alleviate him: and if he be in sins, they shall be forgiven him." But sin is not forgiven except through grace. Therefore the proposition stands.

§ 10. Response. It must be said that without any doubt extreme unction is a sacrament, which had the origin of its institution from the Lord and the Apostles, as will be clear below.

§ 11. Therefore to the first it must be said, that this sacrament is ordered against a special disease of sin, against which no other is specially ordered, even if secondarily another can cooperate. But that disease is the remnants of spiritual infirmity remaining from original and actual [sin]: and this was much discussed above around the beginning, where the division and necessity of the sacraments were taken up.

§ 12. Nor is it true what it says, that another sacrament has a substantial ordering against venial [sin]: and all these things are required above in the aforesaid question: and there the perfect solution of this question is clear.

§ 13. To the next it must be said, that this sacrament did not have any sacrament in the Old Law corresponding to it on account of its own perfection, and the imperfection of the Old Law. For just as it is said in Hebrews 7:19 "The law brought nothing to perfection." Hence those dying in it were drawn to Limbo. But unction, on account of the fact that it removes the remnants, avails for immediate flight [to heaven]: and therefore it did not have a place in the Old Testament, nor did a figure of it.

§ 14. But this is found most excellently in the Gospel of Nicodemus, where it is hinted that Adam sent his son Seth to receive the oil of mercy from the Angel of Paradise, with which his body that was sick might be anointed: and it was denied him until Christ should come, who by His unction would restore bodies and souls: because such an unction has no place except in the full grace that is made through Christ: and therefore it could not even be shown by any type, because such a type concerning the sick would have been entirely useless.

§ 15. To the next it must be said, that a falsehood is supposed in the objection: and I think that it is presumption to say that this sacrament does not confer invisible grace making acceptable (gratiam gratum facientem): and yet certain people have said and written this, supported by no authority, nor even by a strong reason. Hence we say, that it confers grace principally operating against sin, and secondarily against the infirmity of the body. Nor is it imported from the words of James, that grace is given from the prayer and not from the unction: but rather it is hinted from those words that it is given from both.

§ 16.

Articulus 2 — Whether Extreme Unction Is Well Defined

Whether extreme unction is well defined?

§ 17. Secondly it is asked, What is extreme unction?

§ 18. Now some say that extreme unction is an anointing made with sanctified oil for the alleviation of both infirmities, namely of body and soul.

§ 19. But it seems that this definition is not valid: because 1. If something is common to the defined and the definition, the remainder that is added

in whole is the definition of the remainder: just as if I were to say, a white man is a colored man, disgregative of sight: this that I say, "colored, etc.," in whole is the definition of white. Similarly when it is said: "Extreme unction is an anointing made with sanctified oil, etc.," it seems that the whole of this that I say, "Anointing, etc.," is the definition of "extreme", which is false: therefore it seems that the definition is entirely invalid.

§ 20. 2. Furthermore, with sanctified oil is made the anointing of children and priests and kings, as is said in the Letter, for the alleviation of the body and the soul: because the body is anointed so that it may not impede the soul, and so that the power of the demon in the fomes may be weakened: therefore it seems that this definition applies to many anointings.

§ 21. 3. Furthermore, many anointings are read of as being done by Saints, just as it is read of St. Genevieve, that she anointed the sick with oil, both sanctified and blessed, and they recovered in body and soul: therefore it seems that that was extreme unction.

§ 22. 4. Furthermore, there is no sacrament that is equally of two effects: therefore it is poorly posited in the definition, "For the alleviation of both infirmities, etc."

§ 23. 5. Furthermore, as spiritual medicine relates to a spiritual disease, so corporeal relates to a corporeal [one]: but corporeal medicine avails only for the alleviation of bodies: therefore spiritual medicine avails only for the alleviation of the spirit: but every sacrament is a spiritual medicine: therefore it avails only for the alleviation of the soul: therefore it is poorly said, "For the alleviation of both infirmities."

§ 24. 6. Furthermore, Baptism is more strongly a sacrament than extreme unction: and it does not avail for the curing of bodily infirmity: therefore it seems that neither [does] extreme unction, which is a less efficacious sacrament: and thus again it seems that it is poorly said, "For the alleviation of both infirmities."

§ 25. Response. If someone wished to state the whole being of extreme unction, he could define it thus, that extreme unction is a sacrament from an anointing made through sanctified oil, conferring on the sick a remedy against the remnants of sin, and if expedient, bringing alleviation to the infirmity of the body. And this definition is plainly gathered from those things which the Master determines in the Letter.

§ 26. If however someone wished to sustain the one first introduced on account of antiquity, he could say to the first, that in the defined, "extreme unction" is posited for one name of the defined: and because we do not have it [in one word], we circumlocute it through two: and "unction" which is posited in the definition, sounds as an act or passion which is in the one receiving the sacrament itself. And this can well be done, that a sacrament be defined through its act, just as baptism is a dipping made in water, etc.

§ 27. And through this the solution to the first is clear, that it is not the same in the definition and the defined.

§ 28. To the next it must be said, that it is understood concerning oil sanctified by the sanctification of sacramental matter: but this sanctification is only done by a Bishop.

§ 29. And through this the solution to that which is objected concerning the anointing of the Saints is clear, such as of Saint Genevieve, and of certain others in the Lives of the Fathers.

§ 30. But through this which is added, "For the alleviation of both infirmities, etc.," it is distinguished from the anointings of children in catechism, and the anointings of others who are anointed not on account of infirmity, but so that they may be strong for works.

§ 31. But to that which is objected concerning the two effects, it must be said that this sacrament is only of one effect according to itself, namely of the alleviation of the soul regarding the purgation of the remnants: and of the other it is secondarily, as was said before: and this fits well: because even baptism somewhat purges the body, but principally the soul.

§ 32. Nevertheless, another solution and question will be upon this below, where it will be better discussed in its own place.

§ 33. To the next it must be said, that it is not similar concerning corporeal things to spiritual things, and spiritual things to corporeal things: because the spirit contains bodies: but it does not convert. And therefore certain infirmities are caused in the body from the soul, as from a cause, and not conversely, except by occasion: and therefore things availing against the infirmity of the soul, avail by consequence against a disease of the body: because when the cause is cut off, the effect is cut off: but not conversely. And therefore the argument is not valid, and especially in this sacrament: because then it especially avails against a disease of the body, when this disease is caused from a disease of the mind: and thus one medicine can well be ordered against two diseases, of which one is the cause of the other.

§ 34. To the next it must be said, that it is not from the efficacy or strength of this sacrament that it avails in this way or that way, but from the institution and order of corporeal things to spiritual things: and therefore the argument which is made from the efficacy of baptism is entirely invalid.

§ 35.

Articulus 3 — Whether The Oil Consecrated By The Bishop Is The Matter Of The Sacrament Of Extreme Unction

Whether oil consecrated by a Bishop is the matter of the sacrament of extreme unction?

§ 36. Thirdly, it is asked concerning the matter of this sacrament.

§ 37. And the Master says in the Letter, that it is oil consecrated by a Bishop for the use of this sacrament.

§ 38. Hence two things are asked here, namely: whether oil is the matter? And secondly, whether it is necessary that consecrated oil be the matter?

§ 39. For it seems that its matter ought not to be oil: because 1. Since this sacrament is a sign of the smearing of glory after the resurrection: but chrism confers incorruption: therefore it seems that chrism is a more congruent matter than oil.

§ 40. 2. Furthermore, in its name it sounds of an anointing (unctio), as is said in the Letter: therefore it seems that the most convenient matter is of extreme unction: therefore it seems that chrism ought rather to be the matter, than oil.

§ 41. 3. Furthermore, it seems that neither oil nor chrism ought to be the matter: because in the sacrament of baptism it is assigned as a cause, that it has a common matter which is found everywhere, because it is of all generally: therefore also since extreme unction is of all generally, it ought to have a matter which could be found everywhere: but this is not oil, but water: therefore it seems that water ought to be the matter.

§ 42. 4. Furthermore, none are so frequently in danger as the sick: therefore since they ought to be provided with a swift remedy, there ought to have been some matter of this sacrament which could immediately be had at hand: but this is not olive oil: therefore it seems that its matter ought not to be oil.

§ 43. 5. Furthermore, in the Old Testament the cure of infirmity was done through the poulticing of figs: therefore since the things which are in the New Testament ought to correspond to those which are in the Old Testament as much as they can, it seems that the matter of this sacrament, which is the medicine of the sick, ought to have had this same thing as matter in genus or in species.

Likewise, the sacrament of the Eucharist has blood in reality and in sacrament, and it was signified in the blood of sacrifices.

Similarly, the sacrament of baptism is done in water, and it was signified in water, as Damascene says: therefore it seems that this ought to have something similar to figs, because it was signified in them in the Old Testament.

§ 44. Furthermore it is further asked, for what purpose must the matter of this sacrament be sanctified oil?

§ 45. For it seems that it is superfluous: because 1. No sacrament ought to have two sanctifications, one upon the matter, and the other upon the form: because one sanctification suffices: therefore neither [should] this one: therefore the sanctification which is done upon the matter is superfluous. The first premise is proved. In natures one form suffices, and two substantial forms are never impressed upon one matter: but spiritual things are more complete than natural things: therefore in spiritual things one ought to suffice.

§ 46. 2. Furthermore, in the greatest of all sacraments a common non-sanctified matter suffices, as in baptism and the Eucharist: therefore it seems that much more ought it to suffice in the others.

Furthermore, a non-sanctified matter can be had more commonly than a sanctified one: but what can be had more commonly is more suitable for those using the sacrament: therefore it seems that non-sanctified oil ought to be the matter.

§ 47. 3. Furthermore, in a sacrament, according to Hugh [of St. Victor], there are only three acts, namely to signify, to represent, and to sanctify. For he says that a sacrament is "representing from similitude, signifying from institution, and conferring invisible grace from sanctification." Now it is certain that it has representation from the non-sanctified matter, because oil in itself is lenitive of pain: but from institution it has signification, and from the form which is said in the exercise it has sanctification: therefore the sanctification which is done upon the matter does nothing for it; therefore it seems that it is superfluous.

§ 48. 4. Furthermore, in the principal ones of the sacraments, certain things are of the well-being (bene esse) and solemnity of the sacrament. For nothing is of the being (esse) of baptism except the dipping made in water, sanctified by the word of life through the invocation of the Trinity. And in the body of the Lord nothing is of the being except the due matter, and the words which cause the transubstantiation: the rest are of solemnity. Therefore it seems that it ought to be so also in the others: therefore only oil with the words which the priest says in the anointing are of the being: therefore it seems that the sanctification of the matter is superfluous.

§ 49. 5. Furthermore, in baptism we say that Christ by the touch of His most pure flesh conferred regenerative power to the waters: therefore by a similar touch of His institution He conferred to all other sacraments a certain other effective power of grace which they have: but it is certain that He instituted this sacrament just as the others, as is clear in Mark 6:13 , where He sent the disciples, and it is said that "they anointed many sick with oil, and healed them": therefore beyond the anointing, the matter of this sacrament does not need any sanctification.

§ 50. Response. It must be said that in truth in this sacrament, as the Master says in the Letter, there is no more competent matter than oil sanctified for the use of the sick.

§ 51. Therefore to the first it must be said, that the smearing of glory is the thing signified (signatum) of this sacrament, not the thing contained (contentum), nor is it caused by it alone, but by all sacramental grace and that of virtues and merits: and to such a signified thing the sacrament does not posit a proximate similitude, but a remote one, and it has this, because bodies smeared with oil are preserved, and they become radiant on account of the lucidity and clarity of the substance: but its contained thing, caused and signified, is to be a lenitive of the pain of the soul caused from the remnants of sin: and to this it posits a proximate similitude, because oil in itself, especially olive oil, is mitigative of pain. And olive oil, and no other, is the matter of this sacrament.

§ 52. To the next it must be said, that as is said in the Letter, there are many anointings: but on account of the dignity of the minister and the place of those anointed, one is called unction antonomastically, namely of confirmation: and therefore for that one He retained as matter that unction which is made by the confection of oil and balsam, which

unction is called chrism. Another reason for the same could be: because it perfects the Christian in the power of fighting for the Christian faith, and because it is thus perfective, therefore He retained that unction for the matter. You will find other reasons also in the questions concerning the matter of confirmation noted above in this work.

§ 53. To the next it must be said, that the sacrament of baptism is a sacrament of necessity, and therefore it takes a common matter, which nevertheless posits a convenience to its effect: but in this sacrament neither of these is true: because it is neither of necessity, nor is there any common matter, so that it might posit a convenience to its effect in that way: and therefore it ought to have had this one. For the proper cause of any sacrament having this or that as matter, is to have a proximate convenience with its effect.

§ 54. To the next it must be said, that because it is not a sacrament of necessity, sufficient provision is made for the danger of the sick in this, that ministers are prepared: and if he should not attain it, provided there is a desire of receiving it, it suffices before God for salvation, although the sick man may not perhaps so quickly obtain the effect of full liberation.

§ 55. To the next it must be said, that what Isaiah did was not generally convenient for every infirmity, but only for an ulcer: because sweet things are mundificative of pus, and extract it from the deep to the surface: but in this sacrament there ought to be a general mitigative of all pain: and for this no liquid is as convenient as oil, as was said.

§ 56. To the same it must be said, that this sacrament was not signified in that deed of Isaiah: nor was what Isaiah did a sacrament of the old law: because this sacrament had nothing corresponding to it in the old law, for the reason said above in the first article of the question: but the deed of Isaiah was a corporeal medicine, in which something could be understood morally concerning the satisfaction of sins, as the Saints say, expounding that place: but extreme unction was not signified there, or anything of extreme unction: for that was given to one recovering, but extreme unction is not given except to one of whom it is presumed that he ought to depart from this world, as will be clear below.

§ 57. To the next it must be said, that every sacrament which seeks an abundance of grace, seeks a double sanctification: one upon the matter, and the other when it is received. And this is clear in Confirmation, and Orders, and Extreme Unction. And it is for this reason that it is so in these three: because an abundance of grace is sought either on account of the excellence of the act in comparison to our powers, or on account of the excellence of the grade received, or on account of the shortness of time, because it cannot be done to merit through the works of man. And in the first way indeed it is sought in Confirmation to fight manfully and suffer for the faith, if necessary: in the second way in Orders: and in the third in Extreme Unction; they have the sanctification of their matter essential to them, nor can they be done in another matter.

§ 58. But to that which it proves in natures, it must be said that both are not substantial, but one is the necessity of matter and the ultimate disposition, and the other is what completes the sacrament in species. And this well happens in natural things: for Plato says that forms are not infused except according to merits: calling the ultimate dispositions of matters "merits".

§ 59. To the next it must be said, that the fact that unconsecrated matter suffices in certain sacraments is not because they are the greatest regarding effect, such as Baptism and the Eucharist: but the cause is that, for the stated reasons, they do not require excelling grace, but

they require grace in common for the gaining of virtues and the restitution of lost spirituality. But in

these it is otherwise: and therefore matter does not suffice for them unless consecrated by one in whom according to his grade there is an abundance of grace, namely by a Bishop, although he might perhaps lack grace inasmuch as he is this man, because he might perhaps be a sinner. Hence in that objection a non-cause is posited for a cause, and therefore it is invalid.

§ 60. To the next it must be said, that conferring invisible grace is fitting to some from one cause, and the reason was assigned above: but to this one it is fitting from a double cause: and thus it is clear that it is not superfluous.

§ 61. To the next it must be said, that in this sacrament certain things are of the being, certain things of the well-being, just as in other sacraments: but it is not necessary that all those things should be of the being in one, which are of the being in another: but more things can be of the being in one than in another, because its effect requires this: and the reason for this was said here: and therefore in Confirmation and Orders more things are of the being than in the others.

§ 62. To the last it must be said, that although it is not read, yet I think it must be believed that if the disciples anointed the sick with oil, they anointed with sanctified oil: and He conferred the power of making this sanctification to the disciples as to Bishops: but the touch of the matter by Christ did not suffice, for the reason stated, but rather on account of the abundance of grace which these three sacraments demand.

Articulus 4 — What The Form Of This Sacrament Is

What is the form of this sacrament?

Fourthly, it is asked concerning the form of this sacrament. And concerning this three things are asked. First, whether it has a form? Second, whether one or several? Third, which of them is formal to the other if it has several?

Now some have said, that it does not have a form outside of itself: because the anointing itself made with such oil, is the form for it: and to this they adduce these reasons:

§ 1. Everything whose sacramental form is not held and exercised in one way by the Church, does not have a sacramental form: but this sacrament is such: therefore, etc. Now they prove the first: because since the form is of the essence of the sacrament, it would happen that those who celebrate differently, would not perfect the sacrament. But they prove the second through this, that certain Churches hold an indicative prayer, while certain ones a deprecative one.

§ 2. Still, every sacrament having a form, by the power of that form confers the sanctification of invisible grace; this sacrament does not confer the sanctification of invisible grace by the power of its form: therefore this sacrament does not have a form. But the first is proved by the saying of Augustine on baptism, who says: Whence this power of water that it touches the

body, and washes the heart, unless from the word? As if he were saying, from no other. And the same must be in the others: because there is one rationale in all. But the second is proved by the saying of James at the end of his epistle, where he does not say, The anointing will save the sick: but, The prayer of faith will save the sick : and thus he does not attribute the effect to the sacrament, but to faith and prayer.

§ 3. Still, that which is effective of bodily health, perfects that from a bodily form, and does not need a spiritual one: but this sacrament is such: therefore it needs nothing but bodily anointing, and not another sacramental form. The first is evident per se. But the second is evident through the sayings of James.

§ 4. Still, whatever things are toward one act, are of one form, but that act is theirs per se: but actions which are done by holy men are to the same act as extreme unction: therefore they are of one form. The first is proved from the fact that form is the principle of act and of acting. But the second from this, that Genevieve and the holy Fathers in Egypt, sent oil blessed by themselves to anoint the sick, and they were healed. Thence thus: The anointing of the Saints does not require another form than the sanctification of the matter: therefore neither does extreme unction.

§ 5. Still, there are only two things on account of which this sacrament is performed, namely the infirmity of the soul and the infirmity of the body: but it is certain that bodily anointing suffices to soothe the pain of the body: and a pontifical blessing is less efficacious than the bodily power of the oil: therefore it suffices for the alleviation of the soul: therefore another form is not required in the collation of the sacrament. These reasons are or can be those of certain men, so that it is concluded by them saying [these things].

BUT TO THE CONTRARY of this it is objected thus: § 1. The Master says in the text, and Hugh, and they take it from Augustine, that every sacrament is in things and in words. Now it is certain to all, that the sacrament is not in the matter of the sacrament, but is in the one receiving it: therefore according as it is in the one receiving it, it is in things and in words: therefore there must be some words when it is given to the receiver.

§ 2. Still, there are two others which require the blessings of their matters, namely Confirmation and Holy Orders, and the word of blessing the matter does not suffice for them: therefore neither for this one, but there must be a special form.

§ 3. Still, for every sacrament of the Church the intention of doing what the Church does is required: but this intention is imported through the form of the Church, through which it distinguishes that work from other works, and makes that be of the Church: therefore for every sacrament some form is required in the work, which is conferred by the Church: therefore also in this one there ought to be a certain form of words under which it is conferred.

§ 4. Still, in sacraments in which grace is conferred for ministering or meriting in the Church, in which the recipient is more able than in this one, a form is required, by the power of which the grace which is desired to be done may be done: therefore much more is this required in this sacrament, which is conferred on one already impotent, in whom it is neces-

sary that grace supply the whole: therefore it seems that it has a special form, just like other sacraments too.

Furthermore it is asked here, What is that form, and whether it is one or several?

Now it seems that it ought to be of an indicative prayer: because

§ 1. The sacraments of the Church most certainly perfect their effect, if the fiction of the recipient does not impede: therefore the effect itself ought to be signified in the mode of certitude, but there is no mode of certitude except through the indicative: therefore it ought to be done through the indicative.

§ 2. Still, in all others it is done through the indicative, which is evident in singulars, because in penance it is said: I absolve thee: and in matrimony: I take thee for my own: therefore also in this one it will be done through the indicative, as it seems.

§ 3. Still, the intention of doing what the Church does, is not expressed except through the indicative: for it does not follow, that if I say, May God give thee grace, that I intend to give just as the Church gives: or if I say, Would that God might give thee grace, or in another way: but if I say, I baptize thee, or I anoint thee, it follows that I am performing the act, and I outwardly show myself to be doing what the Church does: and this suffices in sacraments: therefore it seems that in this one too the indicative mood is required.

§ 4. Still, many Churches have an indicative prayer for a form, such as the whole Church of Germany: and that is said to be Gregorian: therefore it seems that it ought to be so.

Besides, it is certain to me, that the most ancient books in those lands have an indicative prayer for a form, and afterwards a prayer is subjoined. And these are the words written in the most ancient books, which because of antiquity I could scarcely read: I anoint these eyes with sanctified oil in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. And afterwards it follows: Through this anointing and His most pious mercy may God indulge thee whatever thou hast offended through sight. And similarly it was written for the hands, and for the feet, and for the mouth and the other places of anointing. Therefore it seems that it ought to be done thus.

But to the contrary of this it is objected: § 1. The use of other Churches which have only that deprecation: Through this anointing, etc. or, Through this most sweet anointing, etc.

§ 2. Still, in James it is held, that the prayer of faith will save the sick. But the saving element in the sacrament is the form giving sanctification. Therefore it seems that the form ought to be in the mode of a prayer.

§ 3. Still, one departing from life withdraws from the disposition and governance of the Church: therefore the Church can do nothing more regarding him, except to commit him to the disposition of the Lord: but this is more congruously done through prayer, than through enunciation: therefore it seems that the form of this sacrament is more congruously a prayer, than an enunciation.

Furthermore it is asked here thirdly, Since according to the use of diverse Churches both are found among those which have both, which of them is referred to the other, as to the formal [element]?

Now it seems that the enunciation is referred to the deprecative prayer: because

§ 1. Deprecation is ordered last: but preceding things are referred to the last as to a form: therefore it seems that the deprecation is formal.

§ 2. Still, this sacrament is exhibited to a sick person destitute of strength, who awaits everything from divine indulgence: but for this a deprecation avails more than an enunciation: therefore it seems that a prayer is more substantial to this sacrament than an enunciation.

To the contrary of this is: because § 1. That which directly expresses the Church's intention seems to be more formal and substantial in a sacrament: but an enunciation expresses more directly than a deprecation: therefore it is more formal and substantial: therefore the deprecation is referred to it, like a disposition to material things.

§ 2. Still, in other sacraments deprecations both preceding and following are referred to that form, which is by way of enunciation: therefore it seems that it ought to be done thus also in this sacrament.

Solution. It must be said without prejudice, that, as I think, the first opinion adduced is an assumed novelty against the observation of the Church, and the sentence of all the ancients: and therefore I think it to be incautious, and not able to be sustained without the danger of error.

But to that which they first object, it must be said that there is one sacramental form, which is held in one way by the Church: and that is formal and substantial, as will be evident below. And in the other which is a certain disposition, the use of the Church is difform, by the fact that it is of well-being rather than of being: whence that objection relies on a falsehood.

To the other it must be said, that the first is true, and the second is false. But to the proof of the second, it must be said that James calls the prayer of faith the form of the sacrament, which is by way of prayer: and he calls it of faith, because in sacraments faith operates most: and therefore what is attributed to the prayer of faith, is attributed to the operation of the sacrament.

To the other it must be said, that this sacrament secondarily has an effect concerning the body, and especially then when the infirmity of the body is caused by the infirmity of the mind, as was said before: and therefore that objection proves nothing.

To the other it must be said, that the unctions of the Saints do not with certitude consequently attain their effect, nor are they for purging the relics of sins: and therefore it is false that the substantial act of this sacrament is the same as the act of unction, which is caused from the devotion and sanctity of the one blessing: and therefore this sacrament requires another form than the blessing of the matter.

To the other it must be said, that it is true that there are two things on account of which the sacrament exists: one principal, and the other adjunct and secondary; but it does not have the effect from the blessing of the matter, but rather from the ultimate form, by which the matter cannot be impressed unless disposed through blessing, as was said before: and therefore that objection is not valid.

But those things which are objected to the contrary, I think should be conceded.

To that which is asked secondly, it must be said that the formal elements in the act of ministry of this sacrament are two, but one is referred to the other. The reason of which can be: because this sacrament is for the departing who are destitute of their own strength, and insofar as it is a sacrament, for its well-being it has an indicative prayer: but insofar as it is of the departing who are committed to divine grace alone, for its being it has a deprecative prayer.

To that which is first objected against it, it seems it must be said, that the prayers of the Church are certain, although particular or singular prayers are uncertain. Whence this sacrament contracts the certitude of its effect through the fact that it does not rely on the prayer of one person, but of the Church: for it is impossible for the prayers of the Church not to be heard: and therefore on account of certitude it was not necessary for its form to be in an enunciative prayer.

To the other it must be said, that a falsehood is supposed in the objection: because in Holy Orders prayer is the form, in which the translation of power from the Bishop to the ordained is signified, as, Receive the Holy Spirit: or, Receive these keys: or, Be a relator of the word, as will be evident below, when Holy Orders is treated. Whence sacraments sort their forms in prayers of that mode which is more competent to their effect. But concerning the destitute departing from the Church, no mode is more competent than the deprecative.

To the other it must be said, that the intention of the Church is sufficiently expressed through the mode of exercise: because other unctions are not exercised in this mode, like the unctions of medicine or the devotions of the Saints: but if in baptism and in certain others it is done otherwise, this is not for expressing the intention, but on account of such an institution of the sacrament. Now the Institutor of the form had consideration to the mode of causing the effect, as was said. And since this effect is committed to divine disposition, it is evident that it is most competently expressed through the deprecative.

To the other it must be said, that the ancients in those Churches wanted to affix whatever is of the being and of the well-being of the sacrament: and indeed I think that it is better to do so, than to affix only one of them. But if it is not affixed, it would be grave to say that the sacrament is not celebrated: because many Churches do not affix it, and even certain orders of great authority.

To that which is asked thirdly, the solution is already evident through the things said before.

But to that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that enunciation more directly expresses the intention, and nevertheless the indicative is not posited in the form for the expression of intention, as was held: but that mode is more formal, which in the sacrament is more competent in effecting its reality: and that is the deprecative, as was said.

To the other it must be said, that in certain other sacraments it is otherwise: because those are exhibited to one who remains in the Church, and is disposed by the Church: and therefore concerning him the operation of ministers in sacraments is more signified to be: but this one is presumed to be in the state of one passing to divine disposition: and therefore the Church, doing what she can, commits him to divine disposition.

Also another cause of this, without prejudice, I say is the magnitude of the reality of this sacrament: for its reality is the purgation of all the relics of sin impeding immediate transit to rest as to the soul, and glorification as to the body: but such a reality is so great that it cannot be totally effected by sacramental grace: but what sacramental grace works, still requires that the completing residue be petitioned through prayer from divine mercy. And because this sacrament transmits this person to the operation of divine mercy, therefore its form is in the mode of deprecation to mercy, completing the operation of the sacrament.

And through this the solution to the whole is evident.

Articulus 5 — Whether The Sacrament Of Extreme Unction Is Well Ordered Among The Other Sacraments

Is the sacrament of extreme unction well ordered among the other sacraments?

Fifthly and lastly, it is asked concerning the order of this to the other sacraments.

For it seems that it is badly ordered here by the Master: § 1. For the sacrament of those ministering in the Church is before the sacrament of those departing from the Church: but Holy Orders and matrimony are sacraments of those ministering in the Church, while unction is of those departing: therefore Holy Orders and matrimony ought to have been treated before this.

§ 2. Still, extreme unction is not truly called extreme, if some unction follows it: but in Holy Orders there is an unction: therefore that will be before it, and thus again they are badly ordered.

§ 3. Still, after the extreme reception of a sacrament no sacrament is received: but this unction is called extreme because it is received last: therefore none is received after it: therefore it itself is the last sacrament: therefore it ought to be handed down in the last place.

Response. It must be said that just as is evident above in a certain question concerning the order and sufficiency of the sacraments, some are sacraments of the person, and some of the Church. Among the sacraments of the person the last is extreme unction, and therefore among them it is posited in the last place: but all sacraments of the person are before the sacraments of the Church: and therefore this is posited before the two following which are sacraments of the Church: one for the spiritual multiplication of the Church, the other for natural multiplica-

tion, in which the spiritual life of the Church is saved. And through this the order is evident: for just as the Church is from many persons, and therefore the person is prior to the Church, so the sacrament of the person is before the sacrament of the Church.

To the first therefore it must be said, that this sacrament is of persons departing, and not of the Church departing: but Holy Orders and matrimony is of the persons of the Church instituted for the multitude of the Church: and therefore it is not given to a person on account of the person, but to a person on account of the Church: and therefore they are ordered subsequently.

To the other it must be said, that it is truly called extreme with respect to the recipient, but in the ordering of the sacraments it is not called extreme.

To the other it must be said, that the anointed receives nothing beyond, as the objection says: but nevertheless the Church remains in the others: and secondly it does not follow, if it is received lastly by this one, that it is the last in the order of the sacraments of the Church.

Articulus 6 — Whether It Ought To Be A Bishop Who Consecrates The Oil Which Is The Matter Of Extreme Unction

Is it necessary that the one who consecrates the oil which is the matter of extreme unction be a Bishop?

Is it necessary that the one who consecrates the oil which is the matter of extreme unction be a Bishop?

Then it is asked concerning what he says, there, A, § 1: With oil consecrated by a Bishop.

For it seems that it is not necessary that it be a Bishop who consecrates the oil: because

§ 1. To whom the greater is conceded, the lesser is also conceded: but it is greater to dispense the sacrament in its form, than to bless the matter and dispose it: and this is conceded to many priests: therefore the blessing of the matter ought also to be conceded to priests.

§ 2. Still, in all artificial things the same artisan prepares the matter and induces the form: therefore it seems that also in this sacrament it ought to be done thus: but a simple priest gives the ultimate form to the recipient: therefore the same one ought also to prepare the matter.

§ 3. Still, in ethics arts are ordered according to works: and that one is more worthy which has the perfecting work, but less worthy which prepares the matter, just as the maker of bridles is less worthy than the equestrian: therefore it seems that it is similarly in sacraments: therefore it belongs to a less worthy one to prepare the matter, and to a more worthy one to operate in the prepared matter to induce the form: but the priest performs the ultimate work: therefore it will belong not to Bishops, but to someone less worthy than a simple priest, to prepare the matter of this sacrament.

To the contrary of this it is objected: because, § 1. As was held, an abundance of grace is required in this sacrament: but an abundance of grace does not descend except from one having

a higher grade in the Church: and such are Bishops: therefore it seems that this matter ought not to be prepared except by a Bishop.

§ 2. Still, in other sacraments requiring an abundance of grace the matter is prepared by a Bishop: therefore also in this one.

§ 3. Still, in Psalm 132:2: Like the ointment on the head, that ran down, etc. Therefore it necessarily ought to flow from the head: but Bishops are in the place of the head: therefore the preparation of the matter of this sacrament ought to flow through from Bishops to inferiors.

Response. To this it must be said, that in truth the ultimate reasons are to be consented to.

And to the first it must be said, that the exercise of the sacrament is conceded to a priest on account of the danger of the sick: for this often happens in divine sacraments. And this is done for the reason that the Church, instructed according to the counsel of God, in all ways consults for the sick in the utility of the sacraments: and therefore she wishes to have such ministers as can easily be had by those who are to receive the sacraments: but since they are sick, in this sacrament it pleased God that there should be simple priests who could be had closely in all places. And on account of necessity He willed that every man could baptize every man: nevertheless He holds the order in the others, in which there is no danger without the sanctification of the matter.

BUT TO THE ARGUMENT it must be said, that what is said, To whom the principal is committed, the accessory is committed, it must be said that it is understood concerning that accessory without which someone cannot be in the operation of the principal: but this is not the case here: because even if he does not bless the oil, he can nevertheless anoint the sick with blessed oil.

To the other it must be said, that it is one thing to prepare the matter, and another to induce the form of the already prepared matter: and another to prepare the matter through some form, and to use it for the end of that form. For the first two belong to one habit, which is one art, according as Aristotle says, that art is a factive habit with true reason: just as is evident in the smith's art, which heats the iron, and polishes it, and induces the figure of a sword, existing as one art. But the second two are never of one habit which is an art, but rather of two, as is evident in the sword-making art, and the military art. For the first makes the sword, and the second uses the sword for its end, and knows that end, on account of which it is also architectonic with respect to the prior one. But so it is here, that one induces sanctification in the matter, and the other uses it for the utility of the Church by anointing the sick with sanctified oil: but which is more principal, will be evident in the solution of the following question.

To the other it must be said, that in divine things it is not as in political things: because divine things descend from one power, but political things descend from many and ordered powers: and therefore in political things the more principal art is that which is nearer to the good which is the end of politics: but in divine things that one is more worthy from which more divine things descend: and therefore since the sanctity of the matter according to origin descends from a higher grade, as it also ought, it belongs to the more worthy one to confer

sanctity on the matter, than to exhibit use in the sacrament. But that this is so in divine things, is evident: because those things by derivation are from one: and therefore what is prior is both nearer and more worthy to it, by a totally contrary order than in political things: and therefore since to sanctify the oil is prior, this will belong to the superior: and to exhibit the use of the sacrament, will belong to the inferior and posterior.

Articulus 7 — Whether There Is Any Principal Anointing, And Whether That Is The One Which Is Done In Baptism, Confirmation, Or Extreme Unction

Is there some principal unction? and, Is it that which is done in baptism, confirmation, or extreme unction?

Then it is asked concerning what he says, there, A, § 2: Which is called the principal unction, etc.

For it seems that Confirmation is not the principal unction. For it is called principal either from the principality of the office or of the place which is anointed: or from the principality of grace: or from the principality of the matter of the unction itself. If the first: then the more principal unction is the unction of Holy Orders: because there a character of excellence is given for the more principal office of the Church which is the dispensation of the sacrament. But if it is said in the second way: then the unction of a catechumen is called principal: because there the crown of the head is anointed for the perfection of the intellect, which according to Aristotle is the principal part of the soul. If in the third way: then again the anointing of Baptism will be called the principal unction: because in baptism the greatest grace is brought. But if it is said in the fourth way: then the unction both of Holy Orders and of Confirmation is called principal: because in both the unction is done with chrism.

Response. It must be said, as was noted in the question concerning Confirmation, that for three causes that unction is called the principal unction, namely from the place, from the grace, and from the liquid of the matter of unction. The place is the forehead, which is the seat of shame in man, where the place of honor is: and that place is of more excellent dignity in the confession of faith, than the crown of the head: although the latter is more excellent in the place and order of the parts of the body. But the grace, as is said in the Text, is not for being as in baptism, but for strength to fight. This again is more excellent than grace merely for being. And the liquid is from oil and balsam.

And through this the solution to the whole is evident.

Articulus 8 — Whether Kings Ought To Be Anointed On The Shoulders With Oil, Not Chrism, And Not On The Head

Ought Kings to be anointed on the shoulders with oil, not with chrism, and not on the head?

Then it is asked concerning what he says, there, A, § 2, before the end: With which the heads of Kings and Pontiffs are anointed, etc.

For the contrary is in the custom of the Church: because Kings are not anointed with chrism on the head, but on the shoulders.

Response. It must be said, that if we wish to sustain what he says: then one of the two substantives is reduced to the adjective of the other, so that the sense is, with which the heads of King-Pontiffs, that is, royal pontiffs: because they have a royal priesthood: and then what he says is true. Or we can say, that in antiquity in the Old Testament kings had power over priests: because they were not true priests, but a shadow of true priests: and then they were anointed with chrism, and on the head: but now because they are ministers of the Church and do not need grace for spiritual things, by the fact that there they administer temporal things, they are not anointed with chrism, but with oil, in which is noted the fame which they ought to have among subjects: and on the shoulders on which burdens are borne, so that they may recognize that they are posited to support the burdens of subjects and of the Church.

Articulus 9 — Whether Only The Sick Are Capable Of Receiving This Sacrament

Are only the sick perceptible of this sacrament?

Then it is asked concerning what he says, there, A, § 2, at the end: The third unction is that which is called the oil of the sick concerning which, etc.

Here it is also implied that none but the sick are perceptible of this sacrament.

And for the sake of this it is asked concerning those participating in this sacrament. And four things are asked. First, Whether the healthy as well as the sick is perceptible of it? Second, In what age is one perceptible? Third, Whether in every sickness one is perceptible? Fourth and last, Why are the furious primarily removed from the perception of this sacrament?

To the first of these it is objected thus: § 1. Every medicine against some disease is exhibited to him in whom the disease is: but this sacrament is a medicine ordained against the disease of the relics of sin: therefore it is exhibited to him in whom the disease is found: but the healthy as well as the sick have the disease of the relics of sin: therefore the healthy as well as the sick are perceptible of this unction. The first is evident per se. But the second is proved from the division of the sacraments posited at the beginning of this book, and will be proved below.

§ 2. Still, for the consecution of perfect health in the body a medicine purging relics is required: therefore it is similarly in the mind: but perfect health of the mind is required for merit: therefore it seems that everyone who wishes to be in the state of meriting, ought to receive this sacrament: but

such persons are especially healthy: therefore this sacrament is especially for the healthy. § 2. If perhaps you say that this sacrament is ordained against bodily disease. On the contrary: the sacraments of the New Law effect what they signify in one who does not feign [reception]: but this is a sacrament of the New Law: therefore it always effects bodily health in one who does not feign, which is evidently false: because we see that many holy men who are anointed do not recover after the unction. § 3. If perhaps you say that it thus effects [it] in all for whom it is expedient: it is ridiculous to say that a sacrament of the New Law sometimes effects its

principal effect in one who does not feign, namely when it is expedient, and sometimes does not effect it, namely when it is not expedient: because thus all sacraments would be drawn into illusion. § 4. But if it is said that a healthy person is a capable recipient. § 5. On the contrary: it is said Is any man sick among you? Therefore no one is a capable recipient unless he is sick. § 6. Also, it is said They anointed with oil many that were sick, or infirm: therefore no one is a capable recipient unless he is sick. § 7. Response. It must be said that no one is a capable recipient of this sacrament unless he is sick. § 8. Now to the first [objection] it must be said that the purging of the remnants [of sin], insofar as they are immediate impediments to the flying away [of the soul] and the glorification of the body, is the substantial effect of this sacrament, as will be proven below: because there will be a question about this. Because, therefore, a healthy person is not on the way of passing over to glory, for this reason he is not a capable recipient of this sacrament. § 9. To the second it must be said that it is indeed true that the remnants of sins, insofar as they are impediments to merit, are sufficiently eradicated by the Eucharist and other sacraments: and therefore this sacrament is not ordained against them in this way: but rather in the aforesaid way, when they drain the powers of the body and impede the flying away of the soul, especially insofar as they are caused by forgotten sins and those committed through ignorance: and therefore the tabernacle was anointed once a year on account of irregularities contracted from unknown and forgotten things. § 10. To the other things which were objected, I think they must be conceded: because that response is worthless.

Articulus 10 — At What Age The Sick Person Is Capable Of Receiving The Sacrament Of Extreme Unction

At what age is a sick person a capable recipient of the sacrament of extreme unction?

§ 11. Secondly, it is asked: Who is a capable recipient of this sacrament? § 12. Now it seems that [one is capable] at every age: because § 13. 1. An authority says that no one is clean from sin, not even an infant of one day: since therefore unction is given against final sins, it seems that every human being should be anointed. § 14. 2. Furthermore, Although its principal reality is not bodily health or the curing of pain, nevertheless the sick are alleviated by hope from the participation in this sacrament: and the natural philosophers say that infants more easily fall sick and die: therefore it seems that unction is more necessary for them than for the elderly. § 15. 3. Furthermore, All personal sacraments are given to everyone in whom is found the cause against which they were instituted: therefore this one as well: but the remnants of sin are in the elderly just as much as in the young: therefore this sacrament must be given to all. § 16. To the contrary of this is that § 17. 1. In infants there is nothing but original [sin]: and against this, baptism is sufficiently ordained: therefore extreme unction would be superfluously conferred upon infants through this anointing.

§ 1. 2. Furthermore, Here there would be a false supposition in the form, when it would be said: May the Lord indulge you through this anointing whatever you have sinned through sight: because this does not hold in the saints, nor in an infant who has offended in nothing through sight, and similarly through hearing, and walking, because perhaps he has never walked:

therefore it ought not to be exhibited to infants. § 2. Which we concede, saying that this sacrament is to be exhibited only to adults advanced in age. § 3. Therefore to the first objection, it must be said that that authority is understood concerning original [sin], and not concerning any other: and this sacrament has its principal ordination against the remnants of forgotten and unknown actual [sins]. § 4. To the next it must be said that bodily health is never the reality of this sacrament, except when it depends upon the infirmity of the mind: and this never occurs in infants who have never sinned: and therefore also they are never to be anointed on account of bodily infirmity. § 5. To the last the solution is evident through the aforesaid: because the cause against which this sacrament is principally ordained is not found in infants. § 6. And through this the solution to the whole is evident.

Articulus 11 — Whether In Every Illness Someone Is Capable Of Receiving This Sacrament

Whether in every sickness someone is a capable recipient of this sacrament?

§ 7. Thirdly, it is asked: Whether in every sickness someone is a capable recipient of this sacrament? § 8. Now it seems that this is the case: because § 9. 1. Every sickness according to any species of sickness can be caused by sin and the infirmity of the mind: but in such [cases] this sacrament has a place, as was said: therefore in every sickness this sacrament ought to be received. § 10. 2. Furthermore, Neither in James nor in Mark is any special sickness specified: therefore it seems that it can generally be received in every sickness. § 11. 3. Furthermore, Spiritual things differ from bodily things, as Augustine says: because the more general bodily things are, the more useless are the individual ones: but spiritual things are the converse: but this sacrament is a spiritual medicine: therefore the more general it is, the more useful: but that which is said to avail against every disease is more general than that which avails only against a certain disease; therefore it seems that it is better to say that this sacrament should be received in every infirmity. § 12. To the contrary of this it is objected: § 13. 1. Through the name of this sacrament, because it is called extreme unction: therefore it is never to be exhibited except in the extreme: but not every infirmity shows the extreme of a human being: therefore this sacrament is not to be exhibited in every infirmity. § 14. 2. Furthermore, Aristotle in the book On the Causes of a Longer Life says that certain infirmities are the cause of a longer life: but this sacrament is never to be received in a cause of a longer life: therefore the sacrament is not to be received in those infirmities. § 15. 3. Furthermore, This sacrament is called by all the "extreme sacrament": but extremes are not present except when death is at the gates and life is despaired of: therefore they are never capable recipients of this sacrament unless they are such: but this is not the case in every infirmity: therefore this sacrament is not to be received in every infirmity. § 16. Response. It must be said that this sacrament is not to be received in every infirmity, just as the last introduced arguments prove. § 17. To the first therefore it must be said that this would well follow if the principal effect of the sacrament were concerning the body: but this is not

true, rather it is an effect which it never attains, except when the infirmity of the body depends upon the infirmity of the mind: and then this is not always the case, except when it is

useful to the sick person who receives the unction: and therefore that argument is invalid: because the sacrament is never to be received merely for the utility of the body. Since therefore its effect is the purging of remnants insofar as they are an impediment to receiving the stole of the soul and the body, this sacrament is never to be received except in transition [from this life]. § 1. To the next it must be said that the Apostle is speaking because every bodily infirmity by increasing can lead a human being to death: and when death is presumed to be imminent, the sacrament ought to be received. § 2. To the next it must be said that it is well ordained secondarily against all diseases, as was said, and insofar as they are caused by a sin of the soul: but this medicine is not for every state of a disease, but rather in a state of a disease that is above the nature of the location.

Articulus 12 — Why The Insane And The Mindless And Others Suffering From Similar Infirmities Are Prohibited From The Reception Of This Sacrament

Why are the furious and the mad, and others laboring under similar infirmities, prohibited from the reception of this sacrament?

§ 3. Fourthly, it is asked concerning certain infirmities, such as fury, and mania, and certain other species of madness, why those sick with these infirmities are prohibited from the reception of this sacrament? § 4. For it seems that they ought not to be prohibited: because § 5. 1. It is dangerous to prohibit medicine to a sick person when he is in transition from this life: since therefore they are sometimes near death, it is dangerous to prohibit medicine to them. § 6. 2. Furthermore, Baptism is of a more excellent sanctity than extreme unction: but baptism is not prohibited to them: therefore neither ought extreme unction be prohibited to them. § 7. 3. Furthermore, Those who cannot help themselves are most in need of the help of the Church: but the help of the Church is in the sacraments: therefore extreme unction is most especially to be conferred upon such [people]. § 8. To the contrary of this is that this sacrament is not to be exhibited except to those who recognize it and request it: but the mad and the furious are not such: therefore it seems that it should not be given to them. § 9. Response. It must be said that extreme unction is not to be given to such persons: because they do not recognize it, and there could be a danger in the irreverence of its reception: because they could throw it away or behave irreverently with other impurities in the reception of the sacrament. § 10. Moreover, [the reception] of this sacrament [involves] more [cooperation] than that of another sacrament, as was said before, because of the faith and devotion of those cooperating with the sacrament: and such things cannot be conferred upon these [persons], unless they have lucid intervals, and then in that time in which they have the interval, this sacrament can be given to them. § 11. To the first therefore it must be said that medicine is not to be prohibited from a sick person who knows how to apply it to himself, or who is capable of learning from another how it is to be applied: but otherwise the medicine is harmful, and therefore he is prohibited from it. So it is concerning the sacraments: because they yield to the detriment of one who uses them badly, and it would be a sin of the ministers to give the sacraments of God to a beastly human being. § 12. To the next it must be said that baptism is not ordained except against original sin, which was contracted from elsewhere: and therefore another's merit suffices for him: but concerning the other sacraments it is not so, but rather they are ordained against

actual [sin]: and therefore in that case it is true that He who created you without you, will not justify you without you: and therefore it demands a ready judgment and a free will for receiving. And this is true of all [the sacraments] except Confirmation, which is ordained against the infirmity caused by concupiscence: and therefore also it comes from elsewhere

and does not require one's own merit except accidentally, just as Baptism does, namely if it is an adult who receives it: and therefore also Confirmation and Baptism can be exhibited to infants. § 1. To the next it must be said that such persons experience the mercy of the Church in other things, namely in prayers and custodianships: but in these things it would be foolishness, because it would yield to the sin of the ministers, and to no utility of the recipients on account of the aforesaid cause.

Articulus 13 — Whether The Sacrament Of Extreme Unction Was Instituted By The Apostles Or By Christ

Whether the sacrament of extreme unction was instituted by the Apostles or by Christ?

§ 2. Next it is asked concerning what he says there, at B: This sacrament of the unction of the sick, etc. § 3. For this seems to be false: because § 4. 1. In sacraments a human institution is not sufficient, but it is necessary that it be divine: therefore it seems that it was not instituted by the Apostles. § 5. 2. Furthermore, It belongs to a legislator to establish laws and to sanctify: but Christ alone is our legislator, as it is said The Lord our lawgiver, supply is: therefore it belongs to Christ alone to confirm and institute laws, and especially divine ones: but divine laws are especially in the sacraments:

therefore it seems that in any sacrament there is a divine institution. § 1. 3. Furthermore, Augustine says that a sacrament is that in which divine power more secretly works salvation: but there is no human institution above the operation of divine power: therefore in every sacrament there must be a divine institution. § 2. 4. Furthermore, All the sacraments of the Old Law which were infirm, because the law brought nothing to perfection , God instituted through Himself: therefore since the sacraments of the New Law are perfect, much more ought He to have instituted these through Himself: therefore it was not instituted by the Apostles, as is said in the Text. § 3. 5. Furthermore, Christ instituted all the other sacraments of the New Law through Himself, even matrimony: therefore this one as well. § 4. 6. Furthermore, Master Hugh of St. Victor says that a sacrament signifies from divine institution. § 5. To the contrary of this is: § 6. 1. That which is said in the Text. § 7. 2. Furthermore, Because it is not read that it was instituted by the Lord: therefore it seems that its institution was not made by the Lord. § 8. 3. Furthermore, Sacraments are said to be instituted by the Lord in two ways, namely by word, such as Baptism, and Penance, the Eucharist, and Matrimony: and by the exhibition of a deed, such as Holy Orders, as when He read the prophecy in the book of Isaiah and when He changed bread into His body: and Confirmation, when He laid hands upon the little children but in neither way is it read that He instituted extreme unction: therefore it seems that He did not institute it. § 9. Response. It must be said that this can be answered in two ways: for some have said that the Apostles, inspired by God and by divine authority and the will of God, were able to institute certain sacraments: because it was not they, but God

who instituted them within them. And through this they solve the arguments introduced. And they give a similar case, that they temporarily changed the form of baptism, thus inspired, so that it would be done in the name of Christ and God. And concerning this it was held above in the questions on baptism. But this does not seem agreeable: because it is one thing to change, and another to institute an entire sacrament to be celebrated anew: for a man having authority could interpret some doubt in the sacraments, and a man having authority and an inspiration known to the whole Church, as the Apostles had, can change something temporarily for some cause: but to institute the whole I do not believe anyone can, except God: and therefore it seems that the first arguments must be agreed with. § 10. To the first in the contrary it must be said that the Master is speaking of the institution of the canon, not of the authority of the person: because James first published the canon and rule for observing this sacrament. § 11. To the next it must be said that many things are not read: which nevertheless are proven to have been done by the Church itself in the general observance taught by the Apostles. For in Mark it is read that the Apostles going forth, having been sent by the Lord to preach, anointed with oil many that were sick, and healed them: and it is not to be presumed that they did anything except by the institution and command of the Lord. § 12. To the next it must be said that God did not institute it by a deed: because already by Himself He would seem impotent for the curing of the sick, but rather it is presumed He instituted it by word, when He sent the disciples to preach, as was said before.

Articulus 14 — Whether The Master Well Says That The Sacrament Of Extreme Unction Was Instituted For A Twofold Reason

Whether the Master rightly says that the sacrament of extreme unction was instituted for a twofold cause?

Whether the Master rightly says that the sacrament of extreme unction was instituted for a twofold cause?

§ 1. Next it is asked concerning what he says there, at B, after the beginning: In which it is shown that this sacrament was instituted for a twofold cause, etc. § 2. This that he says seems false: because there is no single cause of two per se effects: but a sacrament is a single cause: therefore it is not of two effects per se. § 3. If perhaps you say that it is of one per se, and of the other as something adjoined to it: for it does not cure infirmity per se, except that which depends upon the infirmity of the mind: then let it be asked, what is the per se effect of this sacrament? And it is said in the Text that it is the remission of sins. But it seems that this is false: because the remission of sins is the effect of contrition, and contrition is not extreme unction: therefore the remission of sins is not the effect of extreme unction. § 4. If perhaps you say that nothing prohibits one effect from being of diverse causes, this is impossible: because thus none of them would be a cause per se: and it would happen that there would be some effect which would have no cause per se: and this whole thing is impossible. § 5. Moreover, He immediately says below in the Text, that the reality of this sacrament is perfected by the remission of sins and the amplification of virtues: but the amplification of virtues is also perfected by baptism, and similarly the remission of sins: therefore there are two sacraments

of the same reality. And the same objection concerning penance is touched upon: and since one of them is sufficient, it seems that the other two are superfluous. § 6. If perhaps you say that one of them does not suffice without the other, there follow two other absurdities, one of which is that divine causes are more imperfect with respect to their effect than natural causes. The second is that when someone receives baptism or penance, he does not yet have the remission of sins and the amplification of virtues, unless he receives extreme unction: because one sacrament is not sufficient without the other. § 7. Response. It must be said that the effect and the reality of this sacrament (as the Master says) is the remission of sins and the amplification of virtues according to a certain mode; because nothing prohibits the same thing in genus from being caused by many causes according to the diverse species which it has: hence the remission of sins, insofar as it is conjoined to the purging of original [sin], is the effect of baptism: but insofar as it is conjoined to the purging of actual [sin] caused from the detestation of sin by a movement of free choice toward God, it is caused by penance: and these two are sacramental causes, which are like necessary dispositions in the subject: but formally it is the effect of justification. But insofar as sin is removed in the remnants which impede the passage to rest, it is purged in extreme unction. And in this way the Master understands it: and according to this diversity, an augmentation of virtue is demanded for every purging of sins and follows it diversely. § 8. And through this the solution to the whole is evident: because the first objection is solved through the argument introduced to the contrary.

Articulus 15 — Whether The Sick Person Receiving This Sacrament Ought To Be Anointed In Some Determinate Place

Whether a sick person receiving this sacrament must be anointed in some determinate place?

Whether a sick person receiving this sacrament must be anointed in some determinate place?

§ 1. Next it is asked concerning what he says there, at B, around the middle: Whence it is established that he who faithfully and devoutly receives this unction, etc. § 2. And three things are asked here on the part of the recipient of this sacrament, namely whether the sick person is to be anointed in some determinate place? Secondly, In what place? Thirdly, Whether multiple unctions are many sacraments or only one? § 3. To the first of these it is thus proceeded: § 4. 1. In every location of a disease, it is necessary to apply the antidote there: but the disease against which this sacrament is ordained, whether it is received in the body or in the soul, is in every member and place of the body: therefore it seems that the unction must be done universally on the whole body. § 5. 2. Furthermore, Sin is principally in the rational soul: and this, according to the Philosopher, is the actuality of no body: and it is commonly glossed, that is, of no part of the body: therefore it seems that the whole body is to be anointed, and not certain parts of it. § 6. 3. Furthermore, Augustine says that the soul is whole in the whole [body]: since therefore one is anointed principally on account of the infirmity of the soul, it seems that the whole [body] should be anointed. § 7. 4. Furthermore, In medicines of bodily unctions, when the location of the disease is determinately unknown, all the places of the body around it are anointed: therefore it must be done similarly in a spiritual disease, if the

location of the disease is unknown: because it is impossible that the minister of the Church should know the location of the remnants of sin: therefore it seems that the whole body ought to be anointed. § 8. 5. Furthermore, The thing signified by this sacrament, namely the anointing of glory, will be done with the oil of future gladness, and in the whole body: therefore as before. § 9. To the contrary of this it is objected: because § 10. 1. To whatever the act belongs, to that belongs the habit and the remnants remaining from the act and the habit: but the acts of actual sins belong to determinate powers of the soul and determinate organs of the body: therefore the remnants and habits belong to the same: but unction is done to remove such remnants: therefore it ought to be done in determinate places of the body. § 11. 2. Furthermore, The right usage of the Church holds that the sick are anointed in determinate places of the body: therefore it must be done thus: therefore not on the whole body. § 12. Response. It must be said that the last two arguments must be agreed with. § 13. And to the first it must be said that although the infirmity is in the whole, yet the cause of the infirmity is in certain parts, and for the removal of the infirmity it suffices to cut off the cause through the sacrament. § 14. To the next it must be said that sin is in the rational [soul] as in its primary efficient cause: but not every sin is in it as in a subject: rather, the remnants of sin abound on the part of the powers which are conjoined to the body: because through them one operates concerning pleasures and communications with human beings: and therefore they contract evil dispositions and the remnants of sins from frequently operating badly. But through those powers the effect of the sacrament redounds into the rational soul, which moves those powers united to the body. § 15. To the next it must be said that the soul through its essence is whole in the whole [body], but not through its powers. But the powers are those which maximally contract evil remnants from sin. § 16. To the next it must be said that there is no doubt concerning the instruments through which we have sinned:

for they are the very same ones which nature gave for operating well: and therefore, once those are anointed, it is certain that the location where the cause of the infirmity against which this sacrament [is ordained] dominates, has been anointed. § 1. To the last it must be said that the anointing of glory is not caused by this sacrament, but is only signified, and is also signified by baptism: and for noting other signified things, it is not necessary that the sacrament posit an express signification. But it suffices for this sacrament that it signifies the whole anointing of glory through the anointing done on the principal organs, which have an ordination toward the whole body: because by their movements the whole is administered and moved.

Articulus 16 — In Which Parts Of The Body The Sick Person Ought To Be Anointed

In which parts of the body should the sick person be anointed?

§ 2. Secondly it is asked: In which parts of the body should the sick person be anointed? § 3. Now it seems that § 4. 1. On the breast and on the shoulder blades and on the crown of the head and on the forehead, for this reason: because in whatever organs one is armed and perfected for work in the other sacraments through the unctions of the other sacraments, in the same one contracts the stains of evil operation: but in the aforesaid places one is armed

and perfected by the other sacraments: therefore, etc. The proof of the first is: because good and evil operations belong to the same organ. But the second is proven through the rite of the Church in confirmation and in catechism. § 5. 2. Also, It seems that one ought to be anointed only in three places: because there are only three things in the substance of sinning, as was held above, namely the mouth, the hands, and the breast: therefore it seems that one ought not to be anointed except on the mouth, breast, and hands. § 6. 3. Furthermore it seems that it suffices to anoint only the head: because all sensation and movement are rooted in the head, as the natural philosophers say: but every sin of ours is in internal or external sensation, or in movement: therefore it seems that only the head is to be anointed. § 7. Further it is asked here concerning mutilated members, how they are to be anointed, or concerning those blind from birth? § 8. It seems that it is not necessary to anoint those places: because § 9. 1. They have not sinned with them. § 10. 2. Moreover, If they were anointed in them, it seems that something false would be supposed by the minister saying: May the Lord indulge you whatever you have offended through the feet and hands or eyes, which perhaps he never had, or does not have then. § 11. Response. To this it must be said that there is diverse usage of diverse Churches and orders: because in certain Churches more places are anointed, and in certain ones fewer. Nevertheless I think that it suffices to anoint the places of the five senses. Now I assign this reason for it: because our every will or appetite is informed concerning [its] account and species, as if from phantasy or reason: but everything that is in phantasy or reason arises from sense, as a proper or common sensible: or is elicited from it by a collation made by composing and dividing: and therefore the first fount of our appetites are the senses concerning the objects themselves: and there it suffices to place the unctions: for it would be shameful to anoint certain organs and places of sin, and not without injury to the sacrament would certain places be touched with consecrated things. § 12. To the first therefore it must be said that in the other sacraments unction is not done to prepare those organs for acts: which is evident, because nothing is done with the forehead, on which the principal unction is placed: but on the crown

and on the breast unctions are done on account of the operations of the heart and the intellect, which are originated within: and on the shoulder blades on account of bearing burdens under the yoke of Christ. But sins are not originated from those places, but rather from the senses, as was proven before in the beginning of the solution: because even spiritual [sins] have their origin from the senses insofar as they are in act: because our every concept begins from sense, as the Philosopher says and Dionysius confirms. § 1. To the next it must be said that although a sin is originated from three as from operating principles: nevertheless it is originated from many according to objects outside: and this is attended to in extreme unction: and therefore in the more approved orders and in certain Churches only the extremities are anointed, such as the mouth, and nostrils, and eyes, and ears: because the organs of the five senses are in them: nevertheless others besides these anoint the shoulder blades, and the breast, and the loins in which the pleasure of venereal things exists, although it is not necessary. § 2. To that which is objected concerning the unction of only the head, it must be said that although all sensation and movement originate from the head regarding the sensitive and motive power: nevertheless the senses do not draw to themselves from there the

objects which are the causes of desires and operations, but rather in the hands and feet, insofar as one goes through the feet to the desired thing, and the progressive movement, which is for the completion of desire, is perfected through them. But unction is against that which is born from sensibles drawn from outside, and not against the sensitive and motive [power] itself: and therefore the aforesaid places are anointed, and not only the head. § 3. Through this the solution to the following is also evident. § 4. To the next it must be said that I think such persons are to be anointed in the places of mutilation: because although they lack the member, they nevertheless do not [lack] the power by which the act of sin is completed within, even if not outside.

Articulus 17 — Whether Extreme Unction Is One Or Several Sacraments

Whether extreme unction is one or many sacraments?

§ 5. Thirdly it is asked: Whether it is one sacrament or many? § 6. It seems that it is many: because § 7. 1. The matter is more often received in multiple unctions, and the form is more often iterated: but when baptism is done more often with the iteration of the form, it is established that there are many sacraments of baptism: therefore it seems that there are also multiple unctions here: therefore multiple sacraments. § 8. 2. Furthermore, Here there are multiple unctions, each of which is a sacrament: therefore there are multiple sacraments. Proof of the first. It is established that multiple unctions are done according to the diversity of organs, as was said: but each of them is a sign of a sacred reality, the similitude of which it bears and exists as its cause: therefore each is a sacrament: therefore the proposition is established. § 9. 3. Furthermore, Every sacrament is in the one receiving it: because it is ridiculous to say that a sacrament of the Church is in the pyx: but I see that there are multiple unctions there: therefore multiple sacraments. § 10. To the contrary of this is that this sacrament is never to be iterated over the same infirmity, as will be said in the following chapter: therefore there is only one: and it is received once: therefore there are not many. § 11. Response. It must be said that multiple unctions do not constitute anything but one sacrament: because all the unctions are for one single effect which was stated above. § 12. To the first therefore it must be said that the ma-

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The third is one, although divided by parts: and from all the prayers together is understood one purification of remnants beseeched by the Church. Nor is it similar concerning baptism: because that is done by the general immersion of the whole or principal part of the body: and therefore its form is said only once. Another reason for this is: because, as was said above, the effect of this sacrament requires others cooperating: and therefore the desires of the faithful are multiplied in different prayers.

To the other it must be said, that there are many anointings there, which all unite in one effect, which they complete: and therefore all are one sacrament. And as it is said, that each is a sacrament, it must be said, that all are one sacrament: because each is a sign and cause of the purification of remnants not according to part, but according to the whole all together: for as

was disputed above, sacramental graces are not had simultaneously. Hence when each is called a sacrament, this is from incomplete signification and causality of the effect: and when all together are one sacrament, this has the complement of signifying and causing.

To the other it must be said, that in the recipient the perfect sacrament is only one, as is already clear from what has been said, although he receives many incompletely signifying and causing.

But if it is asked, which anointing completes the whole and perfect essence of the sacrament? It must be said that the last in comparison to all the others preceding: just as when we say, that from acts the habit of virtue is caused, the last act in comparison to the remaining left from all preceding causes the habit. And a similar judgment is here in the perfection of the sacrament.

And through this the solution to the whole question is clear.

Articulus 18 — What Ought To Be Done If The Priest Anointing Dies While Anointing

What is to be done if a priest, anointing, dies while anointing?

Fourthly, the question is asked which is left from those, from which the completion of the sacrament depends on the last anointing in comparison to the preceding ones, what is to be done in the case when the priest anointing dies, when he has already performed some anointings, and has not completed others, one, or two, or more?

For it seems that it should be begun from the beginning; because 1. The action of one is one: but the action of the conferring of the sacrament is one of only one: therefore, he who has not completed this, has done nothing, as it seems: therefore, from the beginning the whole must be repeated.

1. Furthermore, Ambrose says that the sacraments of Christ are simple: it is impossible for the acts of two to be simple: therefore, one sacrament cannot be of two: therefore, the second ought to begin from the head.

But on the contrary of this is what the Pope responds in the Order, because in the imperfectly ordained, what is lacking is supplied, and what has been done is not repeated: therefore, much more is this to be done in extreme unction.

Therefore, it is conceived: whence the following ought to begin where the preceding left off, prevented by death.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that this sacrament, by reason of its great effect, has the form in the manner of a prayer: and it is more effective when more say that prayer: because the prayers of many are heard more quickly: and this is suggested in James 5:14, when it says: Let him call the presbyters of the Church, not a presbyter.

To the argument, however, it can be said that in such a case two are as one: and this suffices for the unity of the sacrament.

To the other, it must be said that the saying of Ambrose is understood concerning the simplicity of the sacraments in effect, and not in species, or matter, or form.

Articulus 19 — Whether In The Sacrament Of Extreme Unction There Is Something Which Is The Sacrament Only, And Something Which Is The Sacrament And The Thing, And Something Which Is The Thing Only, And Whether It Imprints A Character

Whether in the sacrament of extreme unction there is something which is a sacrament only, and something which is both sacrament and reality, and something which is reality only? And, whether it impresses a character?

Then it is inquired concerning what is said there, B, §2: And as in other sacraments, etc.

For it seems that this is false: because in other sacraments there is something which is a sacrament only, something which is both sacrament and reality, and something which is reality only: but in this one it is not necessary for there to be something which is both reality and sacrament: therefore it seems that he speaks falsely.

Concerning this it is gratuitously inquired, Whether it impresses a character which is in this sacrament and reality?

And it seems that it does: because
1. In other sacraments which consist in anointing, a character is impressed: therefore also in this one.

1. Furthermore, to whom the act belongs, to him also belongs the habit and power: but the act of the character belongs to the anointed: therefore, etc. First proof: because the anointed is distinguished from the non-anointed, and to distinguish is the act of the character: therefore, etc.
2. Furthermore, bodily anointing does not reach the soul: therefore it is necessary that there be something joining it or its power with the soul: but this medium does not seem to be anything except the character: therefore it seems that it impresses a character.

On the contrary, it is objected: because no sacrament impressing a character is repeated: but this one is repeated: therefore it does not impress a character. The first proof is from induction and the nature of the character: because it is an indelible sign placing one in a state of faith, and an indelible sign would be injured if it were repeated: therefore the proposition stands.

Response. It must be said to this that it does not impress a character. And yet I think it should be well conceded that there are three things in it as in any other sacrament: but it is not necessary that the medium which is both reality and sign be a character. However, I think that the medium is a certain spiritual disposition inducing grace purging the remnants of sins.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that the medium has already been stated what it is.

To the other, it must be said that sacraments do not have from anointing that they impress a character, but rather from this that they distinguish according to some special state of faith

the faithful who receive them: and this is explained in the treatise on Baptism, where it is discussed concerning the character.

To the other, it must be said that it is false, To whom the act belongs, to him belongs the habit: and Aristotle gives an instance, that not every grammarian grammaticizes, and not every doctor medicates. However, the distinction of the character is different from that of any other form which another does not perceive: for the character distinguishes by a sign placing in a special state of faith in which without this it would not be: but other forms distinguish from those not having those forms by a certain distinction of restriction from supposits of the same species not participating in that form.

And by this the solution to all that is objected is clear: because the non-anointed is distinguished from the anointed.

To the other, it must be said that although bodily anointing does not reach the soul, yet its power reaches to the soul, which is its power through the sanctification of the matter and form which is said in conferring the sacrament.

Articulus 20 — Whether Extreme Unction Can Be Repeated

Whether extreme unction can be repeated?

Then it is asked concerning what is said there, CG, QGuerunt aligui, If this sacrament, etc.

For it seems that it ought not to be repeated: because
1. No injury should be done to a sacrament: but repetition, as Augustine says, is an injury to the sacrament: therefore it ought not to be repeated.

1. Furthermore, the very name seems to show that it ought not to be repeated: because it is called extreme unction: but after the extreme, there is nothing: therefore it seems that it cannot be repeated.

2. Furthermore, after the purgation of the remnants of sin, nothing remains to be purged of sin: but when nothing remains to be purged of sin, the sacrament is uselessly repeated: therefore it seems that it would be uselessly repeated if it were repeated: but nothing is useless in the works of the Church: therefore it seems that the sacrament is not repeated.

It is further asked concerning the reason of the two opinions which the Master introduces, which is truer?

Response. It must be said that this sacrament, like certain others, is repeated if their cause is repeated: as Augustine expressly says in the Letter: If the disease does not return, the medicine should not be repeated. But if the disease cannot be restrained, why should the medicine be prohibited?

To the first, therefore, it must be said that no injury is done to the sacrament when it is repeated on the same subject, but when it is repeated on the same cause in number: hence

those sacraments which have their causes immobile are not repeated, like Baptism, because the original sin never returns: and Confirmation, because the weakness from the fomes never returns. Similarly, the deprivation of ecclesiastical power never returns in him who receives Order: and therefore those are never repeated. However, some have mobile causes on the same subject: and therefore in the same man they are repeated, although not for the same cause.

And through this solution it is clear how both opinions which are recited in the Letter are to be reconciled, and the solution to the last is clear.

To the other, it must be said that extreme unction is called from the presumption and sign of the extreme of life, and not from the extreme according to act and thing: for it suffices that the extreme of life is presumed to be imminent for the sick to be anointed. And thus it is clear that the objection is not valid.

To the other, it must be said that after the remnants are purged, other sins return again, and other remnants if life is prolonged: and therefore such a one again needs unction.

Articulus 21 — Whether In Chronic Illnesses Extreme Unction Ought And Can Always Be Repeated

Whether in chronic illnesses extreme unction ought and can always be repeated?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said there, C, after the beginning: If indeed the illness cannot be restrained, etc.

The question here is concerning chronic illnesses which never recede, such as paralysis, leprosy, consumption, and the like: whether the sacrament can be repeated in them?

And it seems that it cannot: 1. By those things which are said in the Letter: because that illness does not return, since never receding it never returns: therefore it seems that medicine ought not to be repeated upon it.

1. Further, One cause does not require more than one spiritual medicine: but here there is one cause: therefore one spiritual medicine.

On the contrary of this is that as long as the illness remains after the reception of the sacrament, so long are sins and the remnants of sins contracted: but the sacrament is principally ordained against the remnants of sins: therefore it seems that even in the same chronic illness it ought to be repeated.

Response. To this without prejudice I think it should be said that if the illness remains beyond a year after the unction has been received, the unction can be repeated. And the cause of this is: because it is not judged to be the same illness in number, which is altered according to the perfect imitation of the higher things: for our bodies by the influence of the higher things according to the four humors in the four seasons of the year are changed, and habits are broken into dispositions, and they are not the same: and therefore the sacrament will not be repeated from the same cause entirely. If, however, it is found to be determined otherwise

in this question by some holy father or by the Lord Pope, I would judge that opinion should be adhered to rather than mine: because in this part it is more to be believed in the inspiration of the Church than in reason conjecturing from uncertainties.

By the aforesaid the solution to both objections is clear.

However, the words of Augustine are to be noted, by which he says: Just as prayer can be repeated because from this it expressly seems to testify, etc.: to favor that opinion, which says that a supplicative mode ought to be placed in the form of this sacrament.

And let these things said about extreme unction suffice.

It follows concerning the sacrament of Orders.

Divisio Textus

§ 1. DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

"Besides the premises there is also another sacrament, etc." Here also the Master touches upon three things concerning extreme unction, namely concerning its essence regarding form and matter, and he does this in the first chapter; and concerning its institution, and this in the second; and, Whether it can be repeated, or not? and this in the third, and in that he touches upon two opinions, as is clear in the Letter. And through this the division and content of the Letter are clear.

§ 2. But concerning this sacrament, around the beginning of the distinction, five things are asked, namely: First, Whether extreme unction is a sacrament? Second, What is it? Third, Concerning its matter. Fourth, Concerning its forms. Fifth, Concerning its order to other sacraments.

§ 3.

DISTINCTIO XXIV

Divisio Textus

DIVISIO: TEXTUS.

Now let us approach the consideration of sacred ordination. Having dealt with personal sacraments, here the Master touches upon the sacraments of the Church, or of the mystical body in common. And first he touches upon Order. Second, upon Matrimony.

However, concerning Order, he determines in two ways. First, indeed, he inquires about order in itself in common, and according to parts. Then he inquires about order from the side of the giver and the recipient. And this begins in distinction XXV, there, A, It is accustomed to be asked, If heretics cut off from the Church, etc.

However, concerning Order in itself, he inquires four things, namely about the individual orders by distinction to the preceding order: and about the individual orders according to

their proper acts, there, C, The same of the doorkeepers and janitors. Third, What order is in common, there, K, But it is asked, What is called order here, etc. Fourth, about the names of the offices joined to the ordained having jurisdiction, there, L, There are also certain others, etc.

Through this, the division for the introduction of questions is sufficiently clear.

Articulus 1 — Whether The Sacrament Of Order Follows Well After The Sacrament Of Extreme Unction

Whether the sacrament of Order rightly follows the sacrament of Extreme Unction.

Here arises the question concerning the order of this sacrament.

It seems, however, that before all it ought to be ordered: because
1. The sacrament to which the dispensation of all other sacraments is granted, is before all others.

1. Further, the sacrament placing in a degree of dignity is prior to that which only places in a degree of subjection: but such a sacrament is Order with respect to all others: therefore, before all others, Order ought to be treated.

2. If perhaps you say, that it is for the spiritual multiplication of the Church: and others are personal. On the contrary: Because the material multiplication of the Church is before the spiritual: because no one can become spiritual unless he first is something in nature: but marriage is for natural multiplication, and order for spiritual: therefore marriage is before order: and the Master determines in the contrary way, namely concerning order before marriage.

Response. It must be said that the order of sacraments has been sufficiently treated. To the preceding, however, it was said that in truth personal sacraments are before those which serve the Church commonly: and therefore the five preceding are before the two which remain.

Moreover, Baptism is the gate of the sacraments, without which none can be received: the other personal ones are as dispositions for worthily receiving order: for if one has conducted himself well in the reception of those, he is worthy to be promoted to order.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that it is not valid: because ministers of the sacraments are not otherwise disposed except through personal sacraments, which are ordained against personal defects: and therefore it is not necessary for those to precede.

To the other, it must be said that this sacrament is more dignified in that it places in a sublime degree: but this order cannot be attended to, because worthiness precedes the degree of the Church. And this, as was said, is not done except through other sacraments.

To the last, it must be said that in the New Testament spiritual fecundity is more attended to than carnal: and therefore the sacrament which gives the office of spiritual propagation is before the sacrament of bodily fecundity, that is, order before marriage.

Articulus 2 — Why This Sacrament Rather Than The Others Is Divided Into Parts

Why is this sacrament divided into parts more than others?

Then it is inquired about what is said there, A, near the beginning: There are seven grades or orders of spiritual offices, etc. Four questions are asked here. The first is, Why is this sacrament divided into parts more than others? The second, By what division is it divided? The third, Whether it is one sacrament or many? The fourth, What is the sufficiency of the orders?

To the first, it is objected thus. 1. A single grace has a single and indivisible sacrament: but order is of a single grace: therefore it is one and indivisible sacrament: therefore it ought not to be divided into parts. The second is proved from this, that there are only seven sacramental graces, just as there are seven sacraments. The first is evident by itself.

1. Furthermore, Two, as often held, are ordained against the defect of the Church, namely marriage and order: but marriage is not divided into parts: therefore neither should order be divided.
2. Furthermore, Division is of no value where some common genus is divided with a species. For example, if it is said: Of substances, one is animal, another is man: but the sacrament taken in common is divided into seven sacraments: therefore if one sacrament is an indivisible species by differences, all other sacraments will be species: but baptism, confirmation, etc., are most specific indivisible species, except by division of matter: therefore also order: therefore order ought not to be divided, except as it is said order of Peter and Martin, and so of others receiving the order.
3. Furthermore, Aristotle in the Tenth Book of Ethics says that the more powerful things are, the more indivisible and smaller in quantity they are: but that sacrament is more powerful which places in a degree of dignity: therefore it is smallest in quantity: therefore it seems that it is most indivisible.
4. Furthermore, United power is more infinite than multiplied, as it is said in the Book of Causes: therefore the more it is united, the more powerful it is: but this sacrament is most powerful: therefore it ought to be most one and united: therefore least divided: therefore not divided into seven, as it is said in the Letter.

On the contrary is what is said in the Letter from the words of Isidore.

Furthermore, by reason thus: 1. The more something is closer to the first, the more it participates in its goodness with many gifts and offices and powers: but order places most closely next to the first head of the Church, namely Christ: therefore according to all that it participates, it can be divided. The first is written by sense in the Book of Causes: because it is

correlative to a certain proposition, but the second is evident from the prelation and dignity of ministers having the order.

1. Furthermore, In natures it is so, that those which have the most dignified form, are the greatest in division: therefore it will be so in graces: but order is most dignified: therefore it will be most of division. The first is evident in man, who even in body and soul agrees with what is: because he has the mixture of simple things, and the complexion of mixed things, and the composition of dissimilar things in the body: in the soul, however, there is to live, to sense, to reason, and to understand simply through the possible and agent intellect: therefore the proposition is evident.

Response. It must be said that it was fitting for order to be divided by differences, as the reasons ultimately prove.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that order is of a single ultimate grace, which nevertheless, because of its perfection, requires many preceding, to which inferior orders are given.

To the other, it must be said that it is not similar concerning marriage and order: because spiritual fecundity requires the greatest perfection according to power and grace: and for this, not one, but many are required: but material fecundity is because of the infirmity of the flesh, and is of the imperfect in the Church: and therefore it is the least of grace, nor does it require many into which it is divided.

To the other, it must be said that order, insofar as it divides the sacrament with other species, is not a genus of the sacrament, but a species: because all inferior orders are united and completed in the last, namely in the order of priests, as will be evident below, and by reason of that it is a species dividing the sacrament in common with others.

To the other, it must be said that it is true that such things are least in quantity of motion, as he himself says there, but nevertheless they are of many powers: and therefore if such things are divided by power, they are most divisible: for he speaks of the power of the intellect with respect to other powers joined to bodily organs: and in this way he speaks truly. But it is not valid for the proposition, unless it is inferred from the division of movable quantity, and not from division by powers and virtues.

To the last, it must be said that united power outside the first cannot be unless in which many powers concur: just as it is the ultimate power of the whole power, like a kingdom in urbanities, and to reason or to understand in spiritual natures: and in this way is priesthood in orders. And because in it they are thus united as in the last, it itself can be divided according to them.

But what the Philosopher says, that united power is more potent than multiplied, he understands of multiplicity which is not gathered into one ultimate, as is the multitude of mass. And by this it is evident that it is not for the proposition.

How, however, the powers of orders are gathered into one, will be evident below.

Articulus 3 — According To What Division This Sacrament Of Order Is Divided

By what division is this sacrament of orders divided?

Secondly, it is asked, by what division is it divided?

It seems, indeed, that it is not by the division of genus into species; because 1. In that division, one species is not a disposition to another: but one order disposes to another: therefore, the division of orders is not a division of genus into species.

1. Furthermore, species are disparate forms over diverse matters: but all orders are impressed upon one subject as matter, because one man has all orders: therefore, orders are not species of orders taken in common.
2. Furthermore, the division of the sacrament by the seven sacraments would be none at all, as was held in the preceding article.

If perhaps it is said that it is a division of the whole into parts. On the contrary: 1. Parts do not receive the notion and predication of the whole: but particular orders receive the notion and predication of the whole order in common: therefore, they are not its integral parts, because it is about these that we are dealing here.

1. Furthermore, parts coming together constitute the whole: and before this, neither is the whole, nor is it called as a whole: but order in one and two and three, etc., is called, and is order: therefore, particular orders are not its integral parts.

However, it is evident that the division of the equivocal is not here. If, however, there is some division of accidentals: this seems inconvenient: because then either the inferiors will be accidental to the superiors, or conversely: and both are inconvenient: because they could be absent, so that the following would have the power of execution, and this the Church does not hold, nor admit.

Response. To this, it must be said that this division is of the whole into parts: but the parts differ, just as the whole does. For a certain whole is gathered from parts of quantity according to mass, like a house, and other things corporally composed: others, however, are gathered from parts of quantity according to power and virtue, just as governance is gathered under monarchy from the part of the bailiff, the prefect, the praetor, and the president, and all others, and they are perfected in that: and in this way, the soul is divided by its powers in those which perfect the soul, like order: for order, even according to Grammarians, is reduced to power, because it is a part of power.

Hence, I say that this whole is intermediate between the integral and the universal: because in the mode of constitution or perfection from parts, it is similar to the integral, that is, by the respect of parts to the whole: but by the respect of the whole to the parts, it has similarity with the universal whole, which is predicated of each part: but it falls short of both in some respect: of the universal indeed, because although it is predicated of all, yet according to the perfect notion of its power, it is not predicated except of the ultimate: and of all others, it is predicated not according to the perfect notion, but as something of the ultimate power of

the part is participated: because in every potestative whole, the potestative part of the antecedent is always in the subsequent. Hence Boethius says that whatever the inferior can do, the superior can also do, and it is not converted: and Dionysius, that the superiors have the power of the inferiors excellently and eminently, but it is not converted. However, it falls short of the integral whole: because the essence of the whole is present to each part, and for this reason also the notion is present, although according to imperfect and perfect power, as was said before.

And through this, the solution to the whole is clear: because I think the first reasons must be conceded: because it is not a division of genus into its species. However, the second do not proceed except from the integral whole corporally composed according to mass from its parts.

Articulus 4 — Whether This Sacrament Is One Or Several

Whether this sacrament is one or many?

Thirdly, it is asked, Whether this sacrament is one or many?

It seems, however, that it is many: because
1. The multiplication of the inferior also multiplies its superior, whence many men are many animals: but it is evident that there are many orders, as it is said in the Text: therefore it seems that there are many sacraments.

1. Furthermore, Whenever powers are divided by diverse acts not reducible to one notion of object, they differ in species, and are many: but such are the powers of orders: therefore they are many simply: therefore there are many sacraments, as before. The first is proved: because every power is defined by its act: because acts precede power according to reason, as the Philosopher says. The second is proved by introducing the acts of individual orders: just as to exorcise demons is not an act of the same notion as to read prophecies: and neither of those is the closing of doors, and none of these is the same as the carrying of candles, and the like: therefore the proposition is clear.
2. Furthermore, The following order is entirely obtained without the preceding being received: therefore it is entirely divided from it: therefore the sacrament is divided: therefore there are many sacraments. The first is proved: because one making a leap never again receives the subsequent order, but always has it, although lacking the execution which is rather of jurisdiction than of order: and thus the proposition is evident.

On the contrary of this is that
1. The Church numbers only seven sacraments: and one of those it says is order: therefore order is only one sacrament.

1. Furthermore, All preceding are united in the last, as previously was evident in the whole of power: therefore all are one in that: therefore all are only one sacrament.

Response. It must be said that Order is simply one sacrament, but in some respect many. For according to imperfect powers it is many, but according to the perfection of power it is only one: and the reason for this is sufficiently clear from what has been previously stated.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that if the division of the inferior were by things perfectly separating from each other, then what was said would be required: but they are not separated, but rather one is a disposition to the other: and therefore they are ordered among themselves. Perfectly separating things, however, are two, namely opposite specific differences which formally separate into diverse species by deduction: and separate matter, namely which separates individuals of one species. And neither of these is in the division of the whole power, as has already been evident.

To the other, it must be said that all acts of orders are reduced and refer to one ultimate: whence the middle is false.

To that by which it proves it, it must be said that doors are not objects to doorkeepers simply, but as the place of conservation of the Eucharist is closed by them. Similarly, the exorcist does not exorcise demons simply, but as they impede the perception of the sacraments. And similarly, the acts of readers and candle-bearers, as will be evident below, refer to the communion of the Eucharist: and the common reason is in some way regarded in their objects: and therefore the objects are not entirely divided.

To the last, it must be said that the following order is divided by the division of part from the preceding, and therefore it is not again received: but by the division of the perfect it is not itself divided, but rather it is thus ordered to the preceding, as having all that is of the preceding: and it is ordered to the following, as in which its power is completed and perfected: and therefore it does not follow that the sacrament is simply many, but simply one, and in some respect many.

Articulus 5 — What The Sufficiency Of The Orders Is

What is the sufficiency of the orders?

Fourthly, it is asked, What is the sufficiency of the orders?

It seems, indeed, that there are more orders: because
1. the human hierarchy descends from the celestial: but in the celestial there are nine orders: therefore also in the human.

1. Furthermore, the more things are inferior and more material, the more they are of a broader division, as is evident in descending from the most general to individuals in categories, and from the first mover to the entire diversity of natural things in the natures of things. It is evident, however, that the ecclesiastical hierarchy is inferior and more material than the angelic: therefore it is of a broader division than that, or at least it ought to be as great: therefore at least nine orders ought to exist.
2. However, it seems that there ought to be eight: because of two acts not reducible to each other concerning the sacrament, there are two powers: but to consecrate the body of

Christ, and to bind and loose, are acts of this kind: therefore they require two powers: and power makes a special order: therefore there are two sacraments for those two acts: therefore in the whole there are eight sacraments.

3. However, it seems that there ought to be only three: because in the primitive Church, as is evident in the hierarchy of Dionysius, there were only three, namely ministers, priests, and bishops: therefore it also seems that now there ought to be only three.

4. Furthermore, it does not seem that more are required: because if for the sake of reverence, as it is said, of the sacrament, lower orders are required, it is evident that they are required only for ministering: however, the entire ministry of offerings on the altar (as will be evident below) belongs to the order of deacons: therefore it seems that that alone, besides the priesthood, is required.

Concerning tonsure and psalmists and others of this kind, objections will be placed in their proper places below.

Response. It must be said to this question that there are only seven orders.

§ 1. ...names, as the Master says; and there are other names not of orders, but of offices; and some are preparations for orders. Now, although the sufficiency [of orders] can be understood in many ways, it can nevertheless be assigned from this, namely, by saying that only the order which is called the presbyterate is the perfect order. It has one principal act, namely, to confect the body and blood of the Lord; and another secondary act, which is given for preparing the people so that they may fittingly communicate in the body and blood of Christ, and this act is to bind and to loose. All other orders, however, subminister to it in one of these acts.

§ 2. Let it therefore be stated thus: order, which is a spiritual power, is given either over the true body of Christ, or over the mystical body of Christ. If over the true body of Christ: it is either in the principal act, or in an act ordered to minister to the principal act. If in the principal act: then it is the priesthood or presbyterate in its principal act. But if in an act ordered to minister to the principal act: then it will be over the hosts from which the true body of Christ is confected. Now, these [hosts] have two relations: one to the people offering them in the temple, the other to the priest consecrating them by sacred prayer. If over the hosts in relation to the people offering them in the temple, it is the subdeacon who receives the hosts from the people, as Isidore says, and places them in the presbytery. But over the hosts in relation to the priest, the deacon receives power: as Isidore says, it belongs to the deacon to place upon the altar the hosts received from the subdeacon in the presbytery, and to arrange them so that the priest may consecrate them for himself. But if the order is over the mystical body of Christ: it is either in a principal act, or in a secondary act ministering to it. If in the principal act: then again it is the order of the presbyterate in the act which is over the mystical body of Christ, preparing it so that it may worthily receive the true body of Christ. But if by ministering concerning it: it ministers either by removing from evil, or in relation to the good.

§ 3. If by removing from evil: either from an external evil, or from an internal evil. If from an external evil: then it is the order of porters, whose office is to exclude the unworthy and

vile things, lest they violate the place of the communion of the faithful. But if from an internal evil: then it is the order of exorcists, whose office is to ward off the power of the demon in the fomes [tinder of sin], lest it impede the reception of the sacraments. But if it ministers in relation to the good: it is either on the part of the intellect, or on the part of the affection. If on the part of the intellect: then it is the order of lectors, whose role is to read distinctly and openly for understanding, as Isidore says. But if in relation to the affection: it is the order of acolytes [candle-bearers], whose role is to drive away the darkness of sin through fiery speech, so that the affection may grow warm and be inflamed.

§ 4. To the first objection, therefore, the solution is clear: because the orders of the celestial hierarchy are multiplied according to conversion towards God, towards the Angel, and towards man; but the hierarchy of the Church according to conversion over men only. And therefore the celestial, which is according to a threefold conversion, is of a broader division than the Ecclesiastical.

§ 5. To the argument, it must be said that it does not follow: because although the latter descends from the former, it nevertheless cannot imitate it in its entirety. Therefore it descends from it particularly, namely through conversion to man only. And it differs from it because the offices of an Angel toward man are one thing, and the offices of man are another. But it imitates it in this: that it reduces the purged, illumined, and perfected inferiors unto God, just as the celestial [hierarchy] does.

§ 6. To the next, it must be said that the proposition is doubtful: for Dionysius seems to say the opposite; he says that if these material things consist in such great multitude, then it must be believed all the more that the superior things are in a maximum multitude. If, however, it is conceded: then a twofold descent from the one must be distinguished. For one is in a mutable number through motion and governance, and then it is true

what he objects. The other mode is the procession from the One into participation in the glory of the First, and it is in this way that Dionysius speaks; and he says that the inferior things are far more numerous than the superior things, because it would not befitting to divine generosity to display the beatitude of His presence to merely a few. And since order concerns the differences of that glory, it is evident that according to this, it must be of a greater division than the order in the Church, which belongs to grace alone.

§ 8. To the next, it must be said that those acts cannot be divided from a single power, because the true body of Christ is not consecrated except on account of the mystical body; and to unite the true body with the mystical subject is not of an inferior power than to consecrate it for the mystical body.

§ 9. And to the objection it must be said that to bind and to loose absolutely are not the acts of priests, but rather to conjoin to the sacraments by binding and loosing, as was determined above in the question concerning the keys. Thus it is clear that those acts are conjoined and ordered to the same thing.

§ 10. To the next, it must be said that in the primitive Church there are not said to have been orders, except those that are simply orders and sacraments. And that which we now call orders, and which in truth are orders, they called offices.

§ 11. To the next, it must be said that although there is nothing but ministry in the secondary orders, nevertheless the ministry is manifold, as was clear earlier in the division and sufficiency of the orders.

Articulus 6 — Whether There Are Seven Orders On Account Of Sevenfold Grace

Are there seven orders on account of the sevenfold grace?

§ 12. Next it is inquired concerning what he says there, at A, around the middle: But there are seven on account of the sevenfold grace, etc.

§ 13. For this seems to be false, because: 1. The seven grades of order cannot be adapted to the seven gifts: therefore the number of orders is not taken according to the number of gifts.

§ 14. 2. Further, once the gifts of the Holy Spirit are possessed, then first the first order is to be received: therefore all the gifts are pre-required before the reception of an order; therefore the number of orders is not taken according to the number of gifts.

§ 15. I think this should be conceded here: but what he says, he intends only on account of the suitability of the recipient. Nevertheless, there are some who say that to porters is attributed fear, which is the principle of wisdom, or the door; to exorcists, knowledge, which teaches how to avoid evil ones, just as exorcists expel demons; to lectors, piety, through the fact that they illuminate according to the intellect those marked with the image of God; to acolytes, the spirit of fortitude, who expel the darkness of the air through the fortitude of fiery speech and example; to subdeacons, the spirit of counsel on account of the excellence of their life, because they fulfill counsels through chastity; and to deacons, the spirit of understanding, because they penetrate interior things, which is signified by the fact that they stand immediately at the altar next to the priest; and to priests, the spirit of wisdom on account of the savor of eternal things, because the soul of priests is inebriated with richness in the confection of the body of Christ. But nevertheless, because this exposition is strained, the first view is more pleasing. But if anyone wishes to say it thus, he will be able to answer that they are adapted in the aforesaid manner.

§ 16. To the next it must be said that they are not so adapted that by receiving one order one gift is received, or conversely; but rather, because the acts of the orders have some congruence with the acts of the gifts, as was clear before.

Articulus 7 — What Things Are Required For This, That Someone May Be Able To Receive Orders

What things are required so that someone may receive orders?

§ 17. Next it is inquired concerning what he says there, at B: But such clerics are to be elected to spiritual ministry, etc.

§ 18. Here is a useful question concerning the suitability of those to be promoted to orders. And concerning this let us ask six things summarily. First, What things are summarily required for someone to be suitable? Second, What knowledge suffices for him who is to be promoted? Third, What life [character]? Fourth, How much does one sin who promotes an unsuitable candidate: whether mortally, or venially, or if he is excused by some necessity? Fifth, Whether one who is unworthily promoted sins mortally in every act of his order, or not? Sixth and lastly, How a remedy can be had for that sin, whether through dispensation or in another way?

§ 19. To the first of these it is objected: 1. Through the words of the Apostle, 1 Tim. 3:2 ff.: It behooves a bishop to be blameless, the husband of one wife, sober, prudent, adorned, which the Apostle enumerates there. [642]

§ 20. If perhaps you say that these things are required for a Bishop, but not for anyone ministering in the orders. On the contrary: In the same place he adds, v. 8: Deacons in like manner chaste, etc. Now it is established that in the primitive Church there were no orders except of deacons, who are called ministering, and of priests, who attended to the greater things: therefore it seems that all the ordained are bound to this at least.

§ 21. 2. Further, in another decree nine things are enumerated, namely that he has not been a public penitent, not a curial [state official], not a slave, not physically impaired, not born of a priest or otherwise illegitimate, not baptized as an adult in sickness, not a foreigner or unknown, not of minor

age, not infamous: therefore it seems that they are bound to all these things.

§ 23. 3. Further, all that is there in the priest is reduced to four things, two of which are on the part of him who receives the order, and two are expedient for the act. The two on the part of the one to be ordained seem to be regularity [absence of canonical impediment] and legitimate age. But the two expedient for the act are knowledge and life [character]. Therefore it seems that these are summarily the things to which they are bound.

§ 24. On the contrary to this, it is objected that: 1. We see depraved men promoted to some orders, concerning whose knowledge and morals there is no certainty; and we see this done both by religious and by others, and they are not said to sin mortally. Therefore it seems that not universally are those to be ordained bound to these things.

§ 25. If perhaps you say that by receiving orders he can be prepared for these things, so that he may thus minister fittingly, and is not bound to have these before the reception of the order. On the contrary: No form is impressed in a subject that is merely being prepared, but rather in one already prepared; therefore, since the things of grace are more ordered than the things of nature, the form and character of order also ought not to be impressed except upon one already prepared, and not upon one to be prepared. Therefore the proposed solution is null.

§ 26. 2. Further, if someone were to see the form of a man in a stone with a wholly hollowed and unorganized body, he would judge it a monster: because it is contrary to nature for the form of anything to be in a subject unless it is first prepared for it; therefore this will be much more strongly monstrous in morals. Therefore, if the order is impressed upon someone not suitably disposed but merely to be disposed, it will be monstrous and against nature; therefore this solution is null.

§ 27. Response. To this it must be said that order has parts, as was said above; and by reason of the ultimate order, the one to be ordained is bound to certain things of necessity, and to certain things for fittingness [de bene esse]. Of necessity, it seems to me that he is bound to the four things introduced above, unless perhaps concerning age a dispensation is sometimes made for a reasonable cause; and then it is required that a reasonable age be possessed.

§ 28. But if it is asked, which are the things to which they are bound by necessity, and which are those to which they are bound from honesty and fittingness? It must be said that there are some things without which there is no life of virtue, such as sobriety, prudence, and the like; and some things without which he cannot execute the act of his office, such as knowledge, and the age in which physiological temperament settles, because boys cannot execute their acts wisely: and to these he is bound of necessity. But there are some things which adorn a man: and if they are lacking, the life is not on that account vicious, nor is the office frustrated of its act, such as that which the Apostle calls adorned, that is, composed in morals and exterior decency; and to such things they are bound from honesty and fittingness.

§ 29. As to what is asked, Whether order wishes to find these things in the subject, or whether by receiving orders he ought also to dispose himself in them?

§ 30. It must be said that, as far as the congruence of reason goes, every order wishes to find these things in the subject; but of necessity the ultimate order, which is the priesthood, wishes to find those things which are required for its office: for knowledge is required less in a monk, and more in him who has the care [of souls].

§ 31. To the two objections which are to the contrary, it must be said that the preceding orders are like certain dispositions to the ultimate order; and therefore it is not a monstrosity if the former are received before some of these things; but if they were ultimate perfections, then without doubt the objections would hold.

Articulus 8 — What Knowledge Is Required For The Promotion Of Orders

What knowledge is required for the promotion to orders?

What knowledge is required for the promotion to orders?

§ 32. Second, it is inquired: What knowledge is required for the promotion to orders?

§ 33. It seems that [the knowledge] of Sacred Scripture [is required]. 1. In the Decretals, 38, dist. 1, a chapter says: "Ignorance, the mother of all errors, is chiefly to be avoided in the priests of God, who have undertaken the office of teaching among the people." [643] But it is es-

642. 1 Timothy 3:2.

tablished that they have not undertaken the office of teaching except the sacraments. Therefore they are bound to know Sacred Scripture.

§ 34. 2. Further, Cap. 1, Omnes psallentes, etc., it is said thus: "The substance of our high priesthood are the divinely handed down oracles, that is, the true discipline of the divine Scriptures." [644] And from this follows the same as before.

§ 35. 3. Further, in the fourth distinction Isidore says: "Just as the worthy conjunction of a man and a woman makes one marriage, and just as the copulation of two perfects one body: so the clerical state and the priesthood make one presbyter." [645] And he calls the clerical state clerical knowledge.

§ 36. 4. Further, Gregory in the Pastoral Care: "No art is presumed to be taught unless it is first learned by intent meditation. By ignorant pastors, therefore, the pastoral magisterium is undertaken in great temerity, since the governance of souls is the art of arts." [646]

§ 37. 5. Further, in the same place: "Who, however, would not know that the wounds of thoughts are more hidden than the wounds of the viscera? And yet often those who have in no way known spiritual precepts do not fear to profess themselves physicians of the heart, whereas those who do not know the power of drugs would blush to appear as physicians of the flesh." [647]

§ 38. 6. Also, Deut. 23:1: "An eunuch shall not enter the Church of the Lord." The Gloss says there: "He who does not have the seed of the word of God cannot beget good works: or he ought not to enter, that is, receive a place of governance." [648]

§ 39. 7. Also, Isidore: "Let him cease to receive a place of teaching who does not know how to teach. The ignorance of prelates, indeed, does not befit the life of subjects: for if the blind lead the blind, both fall into the pit." [649]

§ 40. 8. Also, it is commanded by the Lord that doctrine and truth be written on the breast of the priest; and in the Gloss: "Let the priest remember that he was consecrated by the received priesthood for studying doctrine and inquiring after truth, not for caring about and ruminating over secular affairs." [650]

§ 41. 9. Also, 1 Pet. 3:15: "Be always prepared to give an answer to everyone who asks you for a reason concerning the hope that is in you." [651] But this cannot be done except through the knowledge of Sacred Scripture: therefore, etc.

§ 42. 10. Also, Mal. 2:7: "The lips of the priest shall guard knowledge, and they shall seek the law from his mouth, because he is the Angel of the Lord of hosts." [652]

§ 43. 11. Also, Hosea 4:6: "Because you have rejected knowledge, I will reject you, so that you shall not exercise the priesthood for me." [653]

§ 44. 12. Also, the Apostle to Titus, 1:9: "Embracing that faithful word which is according to doctrine, that he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to refute those who contradict."

643. Decretum Gratiani, Pars I, dist. 38, c. 1.

654 From this authority it is held that he is bound to know even excellently, so that he can refute heretics.

§ 45. 13. Also, 1 Tim. 4:13: "Attend to reading, to exhortation, and to doctrine." 655

§ 46. 14. If perhaps you say that these authorities are for the purpose of instilling terror, it is objected by reason thus: No one presumes an act, not having the habit for it. The act of the priesthood is a certain act. Therefore no one except perversely presumes it, not having the habit. But it was held above that knowledge and the key have one act:

therefore one not having knowledge does not presume the act of the key except perversely, and therefore neither the act of the priesthood.

§ 48. 15. Further, an operation is perverse which is not rectified by a governing habit; but to govern the people is the operation of a priest. Therefore it will be perverse unless he has a governing habit; but this habit can be nothing other than the knowledge of Sacred Scripture. Therefore priests are bound to the knowledge of Sacred Scripture.

§ 49. On the contrary to this, is that we see in many lands priests who are entirely ignorant and do not understand the things they read: and yet they are not condemned, but are tolerated by the Church. Since therefore the Church does not err, it seems that priests are not bound to have knowledge.

§ 50. Response. It seems to me that a distinction must be made among those to be ordained: for some receive orders out of devotion alone, such as monks and other religious; but some others receive orders so that they may minister to the people by dispensing words and sacraments, such as certain religious and those who are titled to the care of souls. Concerning the first, I think a further distinction is to be made: for either they have the care of souls in their orders, like abbots and confessors appointed by abbots, or they do not have it and will not have it. If they have it, the same judgment seems to apply to them as to others who have the care. But if they do not have it, and receive the order for the sake of devotion, it seems to me that they are bound only to know the pronunciations of the Psalms and the distinctions of the readings, which are learned from the knowledge of grammar. If, however, they accept the office of teaching from a benefice, as titled clerics, or from profession, as certain religious: it seems it must be said that they are bound to know more, and I believe those things to be what must be expounded in general to the people regarding faith and morals, which are called the rudiments of the Christian faith; and so that in other cases they may determine issues and questions according to the counsel of superiors.

§ 51. Hence I understand the authorities introduced above concerning those ordained in this way, and with regard to this kind of knowledge of discerning, namely, what is venial and what is mortal in common matters, and which articles are solemnized by the Church, and other such things. And to other things, in my judgment, they are not bound, because theological matters cannot be proven except through the constancy of martyrdom. In perplexing questions, however, he is bound to be so discreet that he knows such things to be difficult, and

644. Decretum Gratiani.

that one must not proceed in them without the counsel of superiors or the authority of the canons: and these things I think suffice for the reckoning of him who asks a reason concerning the faith and hope that is in us.

§ 52. As to the reasons introduced, it must be said that the act will not be perverse when presumed with such an extent of habit; but this much suffices for governance in my judgment, unless perhaps he is in a higher grade; because a superior is bound to greater things, as an Archbishop or a Bishop, as will be clear below when treating of Bishops.

§ 53. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 9 — What Life Is Required For This, That Someone Be Suitable

What life [character] is required for someone to be suitable?

§ 54. Third it is inquired: What life is required?

§ 55. It seems, however, that it is that which is known according to reputation, and good according to virtue: and this is shown

§ 56. 1. Through many authorities of the saints, some of which we will touch upon, and others we will omit to avoid prolixity.

§ 57. 2. Jerome in a certain epistle: "A Bishop is commanded to be without crime: let him be without any crime not only for that time when he is to be ordained, but from that time when he was reborn through Christ, let him be bitten by no conscience of sin." [656] Therefore it seems this is also proportionally true of a priest.

§ 58. 3. Gregory in the Pastoral Care: "Let each man measure himself skillfully, lest the place of governance" [657] And from this it is argued as before.

§ 59. "...he dare assume, if a vice still damnably reigns in him: for those whom their own faults still blacken are not able to wash away the faults of others." [658]

§ 60. 4. Further, Lev. 21:17 and 18: "A man of your seed throughout their families, namely of Aaron, who has a blemish, shall not offer bread to his God, nor shall he approach to His ministry." [659] The Gloss there says that by blemish is understood vice. Therefore it seems that one having a vice cannot perform the office of a priest even in the sole celebration of the Mass.

§ 61. 5. Also, Isidore: "He who does not live as he teaches makes the very truth which he preaches contemptible: as the Psalmist, Ps. 49:16, says: But to the sinner God has said: Why do you declare my justices? etc." [660] Therefore much less can a sinner hold the office of declaring.

§ 62. 6. Also, Ecclus. 15:9: "Praise is not beautiful in the mouth of a sinner." [661] Also, Isidore: "An Ecclesiastical Doctor ought to shine as much in doctrine as in life: for doctrine without life renders one arrogant, and life without doctrine renders one useless."

645. Isidore of Seville, cited in Decretum Gratiani.

§ 63. 7. Further, Gregory: "He who preaches contempt for temporal things must necessarily first contemn them himself: for preaching is brought forth usefully when it is efficaciously fulfilled."

§ 64. 8. Also, Gregory: "To him who is ignorant of the law, let your tongue be a book, and in your work let him look upon what he should imitate."

§ 65. 9. Also, Augustine: "An innocent conversation without speech harms by its silence as much as it profits by its example."

§ 66. 10. Furthermore, it seems that a cleric is bound to have even an excellent [life]. Hence Isidore: "He ought not to undertake the leadership of honor who does not know how to precede his subjects on the path of a better life."

§ 67. 11. Also, Gregory: "The action of a prelate ought to transcend the action of the people as much as the life of a shepherd is accustomed to be distant from the flock: for he who is required by the necessity of his place to teach the highest things is compelled by this same necessity to demonstrate the highest things."

§ 68. 12. Also, Jerome in the Decree, cause 8, q. 1: "For what sort of edification will there be for the disciple, if he understands himself to be greater than the master? Hence not only Bishops and priests and deacons ought to greatly foresee that they precede all the people over whom they preside in conversation and speech: but also the inferior grades, exorcists, lectors, keepers of the buildings, acolytes, and absolutely all who serve the house of God: because it vehemently destroys the Church of God that laymen are better than clerics." [662]

§ 69. 13. Infinite other things in agreement with these are found. Hence it is also to be proven by reason: In every thing the exemplar must be more direct than the exemplified. But the cleric is the exemplar for the layman: therefore he must be more direct than the layman.

§ 70. 14. Further, to one approaching holy things more closely, greater holiness is imposed: because they must be cleansed who bear the vessels of the Lord [663]; but a cleric approaches more closely than a layman: therefore it seems that he is bound to a greater perfection of virtue.

§ 71. 15. Further, every teacher must necessarily have an appropriate instrument of proof: but a cleric cannot prove what he teaches except through the excellence of his work, as the Saints say: therefore it seems that he is bound to excellence of work.

§ 72. To the contrary of this seems to be what the Lord says, Matt. 23:3: "All things whatsoever they say to you, observe and do: but according to their works do not do: for they say and do not." [664]

§ 73. Response. To no one of sound mind is it a doubt, as was proven first, that a cleric, as long as he ministers in the house of God, is bound to greater perfection than a layman, and especially if he undertakes pastoral care.

§ 74. Therefore, to what is objected to the con-

646. Gregory the Great, Regula Pastoralis, Lib. 1, c. 1.

trary, it must be said that the Lord says this so that power may be recognized even in the wicked: for such ones have power to the augmentation of their own damnation.

Articulus 10 — How Great A Sin One Who Promotes One Not Suitable Commits, And Whether He Can Be Excused By Some Necessity

How great a sin does one commit who promotes an unsuitable candidate? And, can he be excused by any necessity?

§ 76. Fourth it is inquired: How much does one sin who promotes an unsuitable candidate, or if he is excused by some necessity, as they commonly say?

§ 77. It seems, moreover, that [he sins] mortally. 1. Ezekiel 44:7: "You bring in aliens uncircumcised in heart, and uncircumcised in flesh, to be in my sanctuary," etc. [665] And there He reproaches the priests of the Old Testament. Therefore much more is this damnable for the prelates of the New Testament.

§ 78. 2. Further, it is a lesser sin not to correct an unsuitable person when he is promoted, than to promote an unsuitable person. But Eli, because he did not correct [his sons], was expelled from the priesthood along with his kindred, and Israel was led to the sword and captivity, and the ark was captured, and his sons were slain, and he himself died, as is contained in 1 Sam. 2, 3, and 4 passim. [666] Therefore much more most damnable is he who promotes an unsuitable candidate.

§ 79. 3. Further, this is said in the Littera [Sentences], that "an unsuitable person brings a heavy burden upon the one ordaining": but a heavy burden is nothing other than the burden of eternal damnation. Therefore he sins mortally who knowingly promotes an unsuitable candidate; therefore much more he who gives him a benefice, especially one having the care of souls.

§ 80. 4. Further, putting the temporal goods of the Church at risk is a mortal sin; therefore much more he who puts souls at risk. But by promoting an unsuitable [wait, it should say inidoneum, reading context: promoting an unsuitable] candidate, he puts souls at risk; therefore he sins mortally.

§ 81. Furthermore it is inquired here: Can he be excused?

§ 82. And three causes are posited which they present for their excuse. First, because the Church is honored by him on account of his nobility. Second, because another equally useful to the Church in temporal matters is not easily found. Third, because it is better to have some than none.

§ 83. But against all these three causes it is objected thus: 1. Nothing concerning the truth of life is to be omitted for any cause. But to promote a suitable candidate belongs to the truth of life; therefore it is in no way to be omitted.

647. Ibid.

§ 84. 2. Further, Rom. 3:8: "And let us not do evil that good may come: whose damnation is just." [667] Therefore much more strongly evils must not be done lest evils come; but to promote the unsuitable is an evil. Therefore it is not to be done in any way.

§ 85. Response. It must be said to this, that there is no doubt that every one who knowingly promotes an unworthy candidate to sacred orders, or to pastoral care, or to any ecclesiastical benefice, sins mortally. Now a candidate is unworthy in two ways, namely contrarily, and privatively. Contrarily unworthy is he who has what is contrary to dignity: and he is in no way to be promoted. But privatively unworthy is he who is deprived of dignity, yet without having the contrary: and in such cases, on account of the necessity of some Churches which lack literate men and defenders, a dispensation could be made so that they might have something from the Church until they learned. But I think that the care [of souls] or a prebend cannot be conferred upon them without sin: rather, expenses for them could be made from the Church or from the benefice of the Church which in the meantime is committed to another.

§ 86. To that which is objected against the causes, it must be said that the one concerning the nobility of his lineage, so that an evil person could be promoted on account of this, is ridiculous: because the more

noble he is, the more harmful he is if he is evil. Nor do I think this suffices, that he is not evil; but I think it is necessary to know that he is good by such knowledge as it is possible to have of a man.

§ 88. But what is said, that another would not be as useful, is nothing at all: because every temporal utility must be subordinated to spiritual utility.

§ 89. The third is completely null: because in the Littera it is said that it is better to have a few good men, than many bad ones.

§ 90. Furthermore, what is conferred upon bad men makes you bad: because they know that such men hold a place in the Church and good men are expelled; and therefore they become bad, so that they may be promoted more quickly.

Articulus 11 — Whether One Promoted Unworthily Sins Mortally In Any Act Of His Office

Whether one unworthily promoted sins mortally in every act of his office?

§ 91. Fifth it is inquired: Whether an unsuitable person promoted sins mortally in every act of his order and office?

§ 92. It seems, moreover, that he does: because 1. On account of the holiness of the order he sins mortally by first approaching it; but the same holiness always remains in the order. Therefore if he is unsuitable, he will always sin equally by executing the order. But in every act of the order he executes the order. Therefore in every act of the order he sins mortally.

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648. Deuteronomy 23:1, with Glossa Ordinaria.

§ 93. 2. Further, the reception of the order is for the sake of its execution: therefore the execution is greater. But in receiving it, he sinned mortally at least on account of his unsuitability. Therefore also in executing it, he will sin more mortally for the same reason.

§ 94. 3. Further, 2 Sam. 6:6 ff., Uzzah was struck down, as Dionysius says, because he unworthily communicated with holy things. Now, the striking down signifies mortal sin which kills the soul. Since therefore the things of the New Testament are holier than those of the Old, everyone who unworthily administers an order or ecclesiastical office will sin mortally. But administration in any act of the order is an ecclesiastical office. Therefore in every act of his order and office he will sin mortally. [668]

§ 95. To the contrary of this is that: 1. This would be a grave judgment to make.

§ 96. 2. Further, because one vowing virginity with a simple [non-solemn] vow sins mortally by contracting marriage, yet not afterwards by rendering the debt. Therefore, by similar reasoning, one receiving an order or ecclesiastical office unworthily will sin mortally, but not afterwards when administering.

§ 97. 3. Further, if he sinned mortally in every act, he would seem to be perplexed: because from his office and order he is bound to administer, therefore he sins mortally by omitting it.

§ 98. Also, from his unworthiness he is bound to resign lest he minister; therefore he will sin mortally by ministering. Therefore whatever he does, he will sin mortally; therefore he is perplexed.

§ 99. Response. It seems to me that he sins mortally as often as he knowingly and without necessity administers an order or office in any act while he is unworthy, as the first part of this disputation proves. I say without necessity, which is twofold only: for if the body of the Lord or something of the sacred things were to fall, and there were no other to lift it up, he could then with humility of heart and with fear and reverence lift it up. Also, if someone were led to sin by his example, he could ask him with sorrow not to take an example from him, as we said above in the question concerning fraternal correction. In all other cases he sins mortally by administering holy things unworthily.

§ 100. To what is objected to the contrary, it must be said that broad is the way that leads to hell, and many there are

who go by it, as is contained in Matthew 7:13.

§ 102. To the next it must be said that it is not similar, since in a contracted marriage the vow does not remain, but is broken; and therefore it does not make every subsequent act illicit. But with the administration, the unworthiness remains, and therefore every act is rendered illicit.

§ 103. To the next it must be said that he is not perplexed [caught in an unavoidable dilemma of sinning]: because let him yield his office, and not administer, and he will be freed;

649. Isidore of Seville, De ecclesiasticis officiis.

or if he prefers, let him amend his sin, and administer worthily: and again he is freed from perplexity.

Articulus 14 — Whether Tonsure Was Prefigured In The Old Law In The Nazirites

Whether the tonsure was figured in the Old Law in the Nazarites?

Whether the tonsure was figured in the Old Law in the Nazarites?

§ 11. Next, inquiry is made concerning what he says, there, B, around the middle: But the use of the Ecclesiastical tonsure, etc.

§ 12. For it seems to be false: because 1. Whatever pertains to the sacrament of Order in the New Testament was signified in the priesthood and priests of the Old Testament: but the Nazarites were not necessarily of the priests: therefore it seems that the Ecclesiastical tonsure was not signified in them.

§ 13. 2. Furthermore, the Nazarites offered (otherwise, shaved) their hair at the end of their vow, as is held in Numbers 6:18 but clerics offer their hair at the beginning of their religious life: therefore it seems that there is no agreement: therefore no sign.

§ 14. 3. Further, it seems that order in the Old Testament could not have a corresponding sign: for it was held above that sacraments of excellent effect had nothing corresponding as a figure in the Old Testament: but order places one in a most excellent state through its office: therefore it seems that it could have had nothing corresponding in the Old Testament.

§ 15. Response. It must be said to this, that those things that belong to the New Testament, because of their perfection, could not be signified in only one single type of the Old Testament, but were signified in many according to diverse aspects. And so also the priesthood as to the tonsure is signified in the Nazarites, and as to the power of offering in the priesthood, and as to the power of binding and loosing in the power of judging between leprosy and non-leprosy, and the cleanness and uncleanness of the priests. And through this the solution to the first is evident.

§ 16. To the next it must be said that although there is no agreement in time, nevertheless there is an agreement of fact to fact: because hair formerly nourished is offered to the Lord both here and there. And the Author intends this in the Letter: for allegory is taken in many ways, as Gregory says.

§ 17. To what is further inquired, it must be said that this is not to be understood of the excellence of power, but of the excellence of grace, as was said in confirmation, and extreme unction as to the immediate flying away [to heaven], which could not be done there: but the perfect power of the ministers could well be signified there.

650. Cf. Exodus 28:30, with Glossa Ordinaria.

Articulus 15 — Whether Clerics Have A Right Of Inheritance Among Their Relatives Or Not

Whether clerics have the right of inheritance among their parents or not?

§ 18. Next, inquiry is made concerning what he says, there, B, a little before the end: Because they are of the lot of the Lord, or because they have God as their portion, etc.

§ 19. For from this it is argued that clerics do not have the right of inheritance among their parents.

§ 20. This also seems to be so by other reasons: 1. For it is said in Matthew 5:20: Unless your justice abounds more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven. But the Levites and Scribes and Pharisees in the Old Testament did not have an inheritance: therefore neither ought they to have one in the New. Now that the Levites did not have an inheritance is evident in Numbers 18:20, 23, and 24, where this is said many times: The sons of Levi shall not have an inheritance in the midst of their brethren: for I am their inheritance.

§ 21. 2. Furthermore, in the tonsure they are commanded by the Bishop to say with their own mouth: The Lord is the portion of my inheritance and of my cup, etc. therefore with their own mouth they seem to resign earthly inheritance: therefore from now on they have no right in it.

§ 22. 3. Furthermore, he who has earthly things necessarily has to think of earthly things: but a cleric is shaved for this reason, as is said in the Letter, because he ought to think of nothing except heavenly things: therefore he ought to have nothing earthly: therefore neither does he have a right in an earthly inheritance.

§ 23. 4. Furthermore, earthly possessions are possessed by the right of Emperors, as the laws say, and as Augustine confirms: but a cleric ought to have no respect concerning Emperors or Kings: therefore it seems that he ought to possess nothing earthly.

§ 24. To the contrary of this is what is said, 1. Jeremiah 32:7: Possess for yourself my field which is in Anathoth, in the land of Benjamin, because the inheritance belongs to you, and you are the near kinsman to possess it. For Hanameel said this to Jeremiah: who nevertheless was a priest: therefore inheritance belonged to priests.

§ 25. 2. Furthermore, Leviticus 25:32: The houses of the Levites which are in the cities can always be redeemed. Therefore the Levites had the right of redeeming an inheritance, even more than others: since therefore the priests of the New Testament are not less worthy, they can have the right of receiving their inheritance.

§ 26. Response. There is no doubt that clerics have a right in their inheritance, which is a patrimony: for it seems otherwise in the case of certain fiefs: for some fiefs are exhibited to someone for an annual price with homage: and some are owed for the stipends of military service. Therefore it seems that they can have a patrimony. And I know that in many places they also have fiefs, and they exhibit a price: and by price or entreaties they induce someone else equivalent to themselves in temporal matters, and equally worthy, who does homage in

651. 1 Peter 3:15.

their place: but those fiefs that are, as it were, for the stipends of soldiers, it seems to me, cannot be had without injury to the Lord of the fief.

§ 27. To the first, therefore, it must be said that the Levites had the right to receive the inheritance of their parents in the Old Testament: but they did not have the right to divide the land equally with the other tribes. And the Lord commanded this for this reason: because if they had had one portion equally like the other tribes, then they would have dwelt in one place, and would not have been dispersed through the people to teach everyone: and this would not have been fitting for their office.

§ 28. To the next it must be said that in the tonsure he does not renounce anything except the solicitude of inheritance that draws him back from the clerical office: for a layman is not bound to this: and thus is understood what he says with his own mouth before the Bishop.

§ 29. To the next it must be said that they can well think of earthly things in relation to heavenly things: because this is meritorious. Likewise, they can well think of them without drawing their thought back from heavenly things: but they ought not to think of earthly things as earthly: and the tonsure and the unveiling of the senses signify only this.

§ 30. To the next it must be said that fiefs and other things for defense are possessed by the right of Emperors: and therefore since a just tribute is not withdrawn from princes, a cleric or another man assigned to the offices of the Church can possess such things.

Articulus 16 — Whether The Order Of Doorkeepers Is The First, And Has Some Spiritual Act

Whether the order of doorkeepers is the first, and has any spiritual act?

§ 31. Next, inquiry is made concerning what he says, there, C, Doorkeepers, the same as porters, etc.

§ 32. And two things are inquired here, namely concerning the act of doorkeepers; and, Whether this order imprints a character?

§ 33. As to the first, let what he says in the Letter be accepted.

§ 34. 1. To guard those things which are inside and outside is the act of doorkeepers: but to make such a guard with a material key is purely corporeal: therefore it seems that only corporeal power is ordained to this: but every order is a spiritual power: therefore it seems, since the order of doorkeepers is a spiritual order, that this is not its act.

§ 35. 2. Furthermore, a minister ministering spiritual things is required in vain for a corporeal act: but in the order of doorkeepers a minister excellent in the Church ministering spiritual things is required: therefore it is not for a corporeal act: therefore the act which is said in the Letter is not its act.

§ 36. 3. Furthermore, to the sacraments which Christ exhibited in Himself, He conferred a spiritual virtue: but He exhibited this through Himself, as is said in the Letter: therefore He

652. Malachi 2:7.

exhibited spiritual force to these: but spiritual force is for a spiritual act, not a corporeal one: therefore it seems that this is not its act.

§ 37. To the contrary of this it is objected: because the act in the order is conferred for this purpose, the instrument of which is given by the Bishop to the ordained: but the material keys of the temple and the sanctuary are given to the doorkeepers: therefore order and power are conferred upon them for this purpose: but the act of a key is to close and open temples and sanctuaries: therefore this is the act of that order.

§ 38. Response. It must be said that that which is called the order of doorkeepers is the first order, and having acts over the corporeal ordered to the spiritual: for its proper role is to guard the place of the sacraments, in which both the sacraments are conferred and the people communicate in the sacraments, from unclean things and men.

§ 39. To the first, therefore, it must be said that it is not purely corporeal: and therefore a spiritual power is required for this, because spiritual things are well conversant about corporeal things ordered to spiritual things: but it is true that this spiritual power is in the lowest grade of spiritual things.

§ 40. To the next it must be said that this would follow, if it were a corporeal act, and concerning a purely corporeal thing: but it is a corporeal act concerning a corporeal thing ordered to the spiritual: and the spiritual is the end: because the whole guarding is done lest spiritual things be violated.

§ 41. To the next it must be said that Christ gave spiritual force to this power: because just as when Christ expelled the unclean from the temple, a certain divine reality shone forth, as the Gloss on John 2:15 says, by which those He expelled were terrified, and yielded to Him; so a certain element of divine power makes the doorkeepers prevail, so that they may expel from the sacred place those things that violate sacred things: and those receiving this order have this from Christ.

Articulus 17 — Whether The Order Of Doorkeepers Imprints A Character

Whether the order of doorkeepers imprints a character?

§ 42. Secondly it is inquired, Whether this order imprints a character?

§ 43. For it seems that it does not: 1. For as was said in the question on baptism, in the treatise on the character, the character consigns the created trinity to the uncreated, and establishes one in some spiritual state of faith: but this order does not seem to do this: therefore it does not imprint a character. The middle [premise] is proved: because a state of faith is of prelacy or subjection, and then of beginners or of those fighting for perfect faith: and this order confers neither of these, because it does not make prelates, but rather ministers, because doorkeepers are ministers: therefore it does not imprint a character.

653. Hosea 4:6.

§ 44. 2. Furthermore, it belongs to the most perfect sacraments to imprint a character: but this order is not the most perfect, but rather the order of priesthood: therefore it seems that it does not imprint a character.

§ 45. 3. Furthermore, although one thus ordained may be distinguished from the people so that he may minister in the temple, nevertheless he is still conjoinable to the people, because he can take a wife: therefore it seems that he is not distinguished by a perpetual distinction: but a perpetual distinction belongs to a character: therefore it seems that it does not imprint a character.

§ 46. 4. Furthermore, this office is entirely of the way [i.e., of this earthly life], because in the future there will be no need of guarding: therefore it seems that it ceases with the way: therefore its ministers need nothing except a character of the way: but a spiritual character is perpetual: therefore it seems that this sacrament does not imprint a spiritual character.

§ 47. 5. Furthermore, those guardians who are in the celestial hierarchy and are guardians of souls, are more worthy than the guardians of temples: and yet we do not say that a character is imprinted on them because of their office: therefore a character is not imprinted on these because of the office of these.

§ 48. 6. Furthermore, into the act of that sacrament or office which imprints a character, none is capable except one characterized by it: but one not having this order is capable of the act of this order: therefore it does not imprint a character. The first [premise] is proved by induction: because none can be for the detestation of original sin except one receiving baptism if an article of necessity does not exclude the sacrament, nor for the strengthening which is from confirmation, nor for the consecration of the body and blood of the Lord except one who has the order. The proof of the second is obvious to the eye: because even any layman can guard temples: therefore the proposition stands.

§ 49. To the contrary of this it is objected thus: 1. Nothing establishes one immovably in a grade of spiritual power, unless something immovable is received by the recipient: the order of doorkeepers establishes one immovably in a grade of spiritual power: therefore it itself is something immovable. The first [premise] is proved from this, that no cause which is as disposing in a subject is separable from its effect, whatever also may be the case concerning an efficient cause, since the Philosopher says this is true of every cause, and Avicenna proves it: but because of prolixity it is accepted here in a disposition, because in that it is transparently true. Now every sacrament causes its effect as a disposing cause in the subject, as is evident from what was previously held around the beginning of this fourth book of the Sentences. The second, however, is proved: because a doorkeeper, however much he may deviate, is never reordained, but is only reconciled: and thus he ministers, if it seems expedient to the Prelate. Thence thus: Neither that which is there a sign only, nor that which is there a reality only, is immovable from the one receiving this order: therefore there is there an immovable mean, which is both reality and sign: now the immovable mean existing in all sacraments is the character: therefore also in this sacrament: therefore this sacrament imprints a character. The

654. Titus 1:9.

first is proved: because the action of the Bishop over the doorkeeper is transitory: and because grace, which is only a reality, is often lost: therefore the first stands. The second is proved from induction in baptism, confirmation, and priesthood.

§ 50. 2. Furthermore, there is only a twofold cause for the non-iteration of sacraments over the same subject, namely because the cause does not return, just as original sin does not return after baptism: and because something immovable remains in the recipient, because of which it cannot be iterated: it is certain therefore that the first cause is not in this sacrament, as to why it is not iterated: therefore it will be the second: therefore something immovable is imprinted in this sacrament, which is never deleted: but this in all cases is called a character: therefore also in this one.

§ 51. 3. Furthermore, a distinctive sign establishing one in a grade of faith and to a spiritual act seems to be a character: such a sign is given to a doorkeeper: therefore a character is given to him. The proof of the middle [premise]: for it is certain that by separation in office he is determined and distinguished from others, not by a distinction of disposition as in the corona, but by assignment to a spiritual office: therefore the proposition stands.

§ 52. 4. Furthermore, it belongs to the uncreated character to characterize with a created character: but I see that the uncreated character has characterized this office: therefore He Himself imprints a character on the one assigned to this office.

§ 53. Response. It must be said that it does not seem doubtful to me that it imprints a character: because otherwise it could in no way be seen how an indelible power would be impressed upon the doorkeeper, as the last arguments prove.

§ 54. To the first, however, it must be said that this character makes a configuration: because it is imprinted upon our image so that in spiritual power he may imitate Him who "will not slumber nor sleep in keeping Israel" [Ps 120:4], and it places one in a state of prelacy and in a state of faith.

§ 55. To what is objected to the contrary, it must be said that he is a prelate among the people not having the power of approaching thus, although he is not a prelate absolutely: for he is in a higher grade than the simple ones of the people: and this suffices for a state of prelacy in a state of faith: just as the whole tribe of Levi was prelate, nor however were the Levites of the lower orders prelates absolutely.

§ 56. To the next it must be said that this order is something of the most perfect sacrament, just as a part of a potestative whole is something of the whole: and therefore insofar as it is ordained to that, it has something of its effect: and this is to imprint a character of power according to a part, just as that [the priesthood] has to imprint the character of perfect power: for otherwise it would not be a potestative part of it. And this is easy to see: because unless he gives power to the bailiff in part, he will not be a potestative part of the kingdom which has the capacity to give power perfectly, and so it is of others. Here, however, because of the

655. 1 Timothy 4:13.

indelibility and the state of faith and the configuration to divine power, such or such a power is given through the impression of a character.

§ 57. To the next it must be said that he is never conjoinable to the people in such a way that he loses the seal, rather he is bound to have it outwardly in perpetuity, just as he cannot lack it inwardly: but he can lose jurisdiction, and as to this be made like one of the people: because if he were in total made like one of the people, he would be reordained when he again returned to the clericate: and this is not done.

§ 58. To the next it must be said that it does not follow, if some office is entirely of the way, that it does not imprint a character: because even baptism belongs to the way, and confirmation, and priesthood, and yet they imprint a character: because although the use of such a grade will not be in the homeland when all prelacy will cease, nevertheless the sign of the grade remains for glory because he ministered faithfully and well in the office committed to him.

§ 59. To the next it must be said that concerning the signs of the Angels it is uncertain to us: but nevertheless concerning the grades of the Angels this is certain to us, that as regards the eminence of dignity one remains above another perpetually, although perhaps they may be evacuated as to act and office, when God will be all in all, as is said, 1 Corinthians 15:28. Whence I think it is false that Angels are not distinguished by seals of nature, grace, and glory among themselves, according as their offices are diversely higher and lower.

§ 60. To the next it must be said that into the act of that order nothing is capable except one having the order. And to understand this, it must be recalled to memory what was said before, namely that just as Christ showed a certain divine ray, by reason of which those who violated the holy place were terrified and yielded, so a certain divine power of deterring the unclean from a sanctified holy place is conferred upon the doorkeepers, and out of such a power to repel the unclean is the act of the doorkeeper. And it is plain that he who does not have that power cannot do this: but he does not have it, who does not receive the order.

Articulus 18 — Whether In The Sacrament Of This Order There Is Some Special Form

Whether there is any special form in the sacrament of this order?

§ 61. Next, inquiry is made concerning what he says, there, C, in the middle: And it is said to them: Act thus as those about to render an account to God, etc.

§ 62. For from this it seems that this is the form of this order.

§ 63. But against this it is objected: 1. For the form of a sacrament is either by way of indication, or deprecation: but this one is by way of command: therefore it seems that it is not the form of the sacrament.

§ 64. 2. Furthermore, divine power operates in a sacrament: therefore the operation of a sacrament is not subject to human command: therefore neither ought the collation of a sacrament to be conferred by way of command.

656. Jerome, Commentary on Titus 1:7.

§ 65. 3. Furthermore, what is done by someone's command consists in their power: but the operation of an order does not consist in the power of the Pontiff, but of God: therefore the form ought not to be by way of command.

§ 66. 4. Furthermore, those words seem rather to sound like an enjoining of an office to one already having power, than a collation of power: for if he were then conferring power, he ought to say: Receive the power of closing and opening.

§ 67. Response. It must be said that the forms of the sacraments are diversified according to the diversity of the sacraments, as was evident in baptism, and the Eucharist, and extreme unction. Whence since in this sacrament power is conferred to divine acts and about divine things, it ought to be signified by way of a transferring of power from one to another, just as it was signified by the Lord, John 20:22 and 23, when He said: Receive the Holy Spirit: whose sins you shall forgive, etc. For in that word is understood by similarity as to the mode every form of collation of the sacrament of order signified and instituted.

§ 68. To the first, therefore, it must be said that the solution is evident.

§ 69. To the second it must be said that although in a sacrament divine power alone works the ultimate effect, nevertheless the act of that sacrament is in the power of the ministers: and since an order is for receiving power to that act, it is signified by way of a transferring of that power by the Bishop, who is there in the place of Christ conferring that power.

§ 70. To the next it must be said that it is in the power of a man as a minister participating in the place of God: but it is not in the power of a man insofar as he is a man, and the power of a man is referred to the act: but it is true that divine power alone is for the effect of grace which is done in the sacraments: and this is signified from the mode of speaking by which he does not say: Receive grace, etc., but rather: Act thus, etc.

§ 71. To the next it must be said that power is not complete except in its act to which it is ordered: and therefore so that complete power may be noted, he says: Act thus, etc. And nevertheless this is the sense: Have complete and perfect power of acting.

Articulus 19 — Whether The Order Of The Lectorate Is Well Ordered Among The Orders

Whether the order of the lectorate is well ordered among the orders?

§ 72. Next, inquiry is made concerning what he says, there, D, The second grade is of lectors, etc.

§ 73. And three things are inquired, namely concerning the order of this to the preceding, and to the following non-sacred orders. Secondly, On the difference of it to the psalmistate. And thirdly, On its proper act.

§ 74. For the others, namely whether it imprints a character? and concerning the form, have been held from the preceding: because the mode of disputing is the same in both places.

§ 75. To the FIRST one proceeds thus: 1. Among the four non-sacred orders there are two removing from evil, namely of doorkeepers, and of exorcists: and two ordering to good,

namely of lectors, and of acolytes: but things having a symbol [in common] are more fittingly conjoined: therefore it seems that exorcists ought to be ordered immediately prior to janitors [doorkeepers].

§ 76. 2. Furthermore, in the way of justice it is prior to decline from evil, than to do good: but exorcists are by way of declining from evil, whereas lectors are for doing good: therefore exorcists are before lectors: therefore lectors do not have the second grade.

§ 77. 3. Furthermore, Boethius says that vices are to be extirpated before virtues are inserted: but exorcists extirpate vices, and lectors insert virtues: therefore it seems that exorcists are before lectors.

§ 78. To the contrary of this is that the evil of the will is not forsaken unless known: therefore to know evil is prior to forsaking it: but the lector's office is for the knowledge of evil, and the exorcists' for the forsaking of evil: therefore the lector's grade is before the grade of exorcists.

§ 79. Which must be conceded. It must be said therefore to the first, that orders are ordered here according to how their acts are generated in those receiving the sacraments. Whence the first among them is the preparation and guarding of the sanctified place, and then all the rest consists in the preparation of those communicating in the sacraments and in the confection of the sacraments. Now as Aristotle says in the last chapter of book X of the Ethics: Admonition is the first thing disposing to virtue and to good through words, although it does not have coercive power. And therefore among the grades it is the first, and therefore the second among all: and they are not ordered according as they agree in a certain general aspect, namely which is to be from evil, and to be to good.

§ 80. To the next it must be said that in the way of justice, even that which is from evil is preceded by persuasion and the showing of evil, which belongs to the office of the lector. Whence although reading implants the good of the intellect, and therefore is said to be in an order to good, as is evident in the division of orders assigned above: nevertheless for the continuation of the readers, that is, of those things which are read, it precedes both the order from evil and the order to good, as the last objection proves.

§ 81. And through this the solution to the last is evident.

Articulus 20 — On The Difference Between The Lectorate And The Psalmistate

On the difference of the lectorate to the psalmistate.

§ 82. Secondly, inquiry is made concerning the difference of this to the psalmistate, which he touches upon in the Letter.

§ 83. Now it seems that they differ in nothing: because 1. As he says in the Letter, the office of lectors is to read prophecies in the Church: and the psalms are a nobler part of prophecy: therefore it seems that they do not differ except by matter; because lectors pronounce one part

658. Gregory the Great, Regula Pastoralis, Lib. 1, c. 10.

of prophecy, and psalmists another and nobler part: therefore either the psalmistate is an order, or a part of the order of lectors.

§ 84. 2. Furthermore, if force is made in the sanctity of the reading or in the difficulty of those things which are read, psalms are in as much excellence as other prophecies are: therefore just as an order is required for reading other prophecies, so it is required for reading psalms: from which follows the same as before.

§ 85. 3. Furthermore, an order is principally required for those things which the ministers of the Church frequent more: but they frequent the psalms more than all other prophecies: therefore a special order is required for them.

§ 86. 4. Furthermore, Gregory on Ezekiel, on that word of Psalm 49:23: There is the way by which I will show him the salvation of God, says that in the singing of psalms, either the spirit of compunction is given, or the spirit of prophecy, if it is done with attention and devotion but it is not done thus in other prophecies: therefore the psalms are even of greater authority and greater sanctity and utility than other prophecies: therefore there ought to be an order for them just as for reading other prophecies, or it will be a part of the order of lectors.

§ 87. To the contrary of this is that the singing of psalms is a deprecation and a certain prayer: but these are to be forbidden to no one: and what is forbidden to no one does not have an order, since order is of distinct persons: therefore there ought not to be an order for reading psalms.

§ 88. Response. It must be said that the psalmistate is not an order, but the office of the whole choir. Now the whole choir is the assembly of the faithful responding to certain ones leading the singing in the praise of God: and therefore the office...

It pertains to the community and the whole body of the Church serving God in devotion, and not to the office of ministers as they are ministers. And that hours and psalms are imposed upon them, this is done for perfecting them in the merit of holiness, just as they are perfected in the power of order.

To what is first objected, it must be said that prophecy, as it is simply read in the Church, does not have an order ordained to itself, but as it is read with explanation: for thus it has an order giving authority to do this, because for this it requires the power and grace of the Holy Spirit, as will be evident in the following article.

To the other, it must be said that in neither is there force, but only in the authority of explaining that which is read or sung concerning prophecies.

To the other, it must be said that certain things are frequented for the accumulation of merit by the ministers of the Church, and certain things for the communion of the faithful so that they may communicate in the sacraments. And those which are frequented in the first way do not have an order, but free will informed by grace, so that they may merit. But those which are frequented in the second way necessarily have an order in which the power of fre-

659. Leviticus 21:17-18.

quenting such things is conferred, according to which sacraments are said to be for exercise at the beginning of this fourth book of the Sentences.

To the last, it must be said that this does not show the necessity of order, but the force of those prayers which are said in the psalm for obtaining grace.

Articulus 21 — What Is The Act Of The Order Of The Lectorate

What is the act of the order of lectorate?

Thirdly, it is asked about the act of this order.

It seems, indeed, that it is not the act of the order: because
1. The ability to accentuate and pronounce distinctly is sufficiently caused by the science of grammar: therefore, for this, it is not necessary to have one order. Similarly, the power of explaining is sufficiently caused by the science of theology: and thus again, for this, it is not necessary to have an order: therefore, from the act of this order, it is shown that this order is superfluous.

1. Furthermore, we see many who have the order, and yet cannot do those things which are said in the Text. Since, therefore, everyone who has perfect power to do something can do it whenever he wishes, it seems that they do not have perfect power: therefore, neither the order: because order confers perfect power.

2. Furthermore, two acts are touched upon here in the Text, namely, to pronounce distinctly and to preach, which belong to different faculties, namely, grammar and theology: therefore, it seems that they should not be reduced to one immediate power: therefore, neither to one order, because one order is a single power for some act of ministers, as has often been shown from what was said before.

Response. It must be said that the power of this order is to read prophecies with the authority of explaining them to the people. And the reason for this is gathered from the Text in two places, namely, in the form of this prayer, which the Bishop says when transferring power and imprinting the character, he gives the book saying: Be a true relator of the word of God, having, if you faithfully and usefully fulfill your office, a part with those who have well administered the word of God from the beginning: for such are called in the Church unless preachers of the words of God.

The second is that the Lord, when he exhibited the act of this order, not only read plainly and openly, but immediately explained to the people.

From the third, it can also be gathered, namely, that it says the order arose from the Prophets, when they said: Cry out, do not cease!: for they preached the prophecies to the people for edification. And these three arguments are valid for the confirmation of our intention.

Therefore, it must be said to the first, that the order is not given to read or to explain, but to the authority of reading and explaining: and yet it is false that the faculty of explaining prophecies is sufficiently had from theology: for although the faculty of accentuating is sufficiently had from grammar, it is not so sufficiently had from theology for explaining: because it is not from the reason that is taught there, but from grace: hence there must be an order conferring both grace and authority.

To the other, it must be said that in truth, unless necessity urges the Church in some way, no one who is not sufficiently literate should receive this order. Hence in the Text, it says that for this order, the knowledge of letters is required. If, however, there is necessity: then power can be conferred, and the act expected for a time, as is done now, because this order is sufficiently conferred on boys.

To the other, it must be said that both acts follow each other: because the first is as if the acceptance of the matter and theme, so that the people may know the source of preaching to be Sacred Scripture: but the perfection of the office consists in the second, and there is the ultimate of this order.

To what is objected against, it must be said that as far as voice and significations are concerned, they are referred to the habits of different faculties. But here it is not taken so: rather, pronunciation is referred to the things pronounced, and the things pronounced are contained under the power of the order and the grace which is conferred in the order: because, as was said before, neither science nor the faculty of reason, but rather from the power of the order and grace. And according to this, they are reduced to one power and faculty.

Articulus 22 — What Is The Act Of The Exorcists

What is the act of exorcists?

Then it is inquired about what is said, there, E, the third is the order of exorcists, etc.

And two things are inquired about this order, namely about the act to which it pertains, and whether it in itself gathers all preceding according to the nature of the whole power.

To the first, it is objected thus:
1. Exorcisms have power from the words of the exorcisms: therefore, whoever pronounces those words, always achieves their power: therefore, they are equally effective when pronounced by the ordained and the non-ordained: therefore, order is not required for this act, as it seems.

1. Furthermore, Solomon invented exorcisms: and it is certain that they had effect: and yet he had no order: therefore, it seems that order is not required for this.
2. Furthermore, the acts of the sacrament of the New Testament never have the same effect in the New and Old Testament: but this act has the same effect in the New and Old

661. Sirach (Ecclesiasticus) 15:9.

Testament, as is clear from the Letter: therefore, it does not seem to be an act of the sacrament of the New Testament.

3. Furthermore, to the same effect, there is not the power of the evil spirit and the sacrament of the Church: but to expel demons through exorcisms is the power of the evil spirit: therefore, for this, it is not a sacrament of the Church. The first is evident by itself. The second is proven through the art of necromancy: and thus the proposition is established.

4. Furthermore, the exorcisms of Solomon that are held, all are necromantic, as is clear in the book called Alman Det, which is inscribed to Solomon, king of Israel: therefore, it seems that those acts had their origin from necromancy: therefore, such acts should not be of the sacrament of the Church.

Further, it is inquired about the acts mentioned in the Letter: because it seems to place three in the Letter, namely to expel demons, to miraculously cure the mute and deaf, and to open the mouths of men for confessing and hearts for understanding.

And it seems that these acts are not reducible to one power: because the expulsion of demons is of exorcisms, and the curing of the sick is the grace of miracles, and the opening of mouths for understanding is the doctrine of preachers or teachers: therefore, it seems that they should not be assigned to one sacred order.

Response. It must be said that the power of exorcists is to expel or diminish the power of the demon in the impediment of the reception of the sacraments: and the others, namely the liberation of the possessed and the curing of the sick, are adjuncts, when it is expedient, and not always.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that exorcisms do not have all their power from the words, but rather they require a proper agent and minister, as they are for such an act as has been said: just as the confection of the Eucharist does not have everything from the form, but also seeks a proper agent, because a non-priest could not do this.

To the other, it must be said that Solomon invented exorcisms of imperfect curing, as they were fitting for the Old Testament. And I think that they were only effective for the curing of bodies: but these are effective for souls: and if they are referred to bodies, then this is done insofar as the infirmity of the body depends on the mind: and if the curing of the infirmity of the body is effective for the curing of the mind, then sometimes it is also effective for the body. And although Solomon invented them, yet he was not the proper agent, but the Levites: just as David also invented the Psalms, and yet they were committed to the Levites for singing.

To the other, it must be said that it did not have such a full effect in the Old Testament, as has been said: because in the New Testament it weakens its power in the impediment that hinders the perception of the sacraments, but in the Old Testament it was only effective in the body.

662. Decretum Gratiani, C. 8, q. 1.

To the other, it must be said that it is far from this, that the power of the evil spirit is for this: but, as it is said in the life of blessed Bartholomew, sometimes demons harm, and they seem to cure when they cease from harming: and thus necromancy operates, because one demon harms, and another wards off the harming one or makes it cease from harming: but the sacrament operates through grace contrary to all the operations of demons.

To the other, it must be said that it is a false inscription: because it is not believed that Solomon made it: but if he did, without a doubt he did it when he worshipped idols and inclined his thighs to women.

To the last, it must be said that those three acts are referred to one, namely to expel the power of the demon insofar as it is an impediment to the perception of the sacraments: for when it operates in the body, whether possessed or deaf or mute or otherwise infirm, it does not operate concerning this except insofar as it is cured through the body by the demon impeding the mind: and the ultimate of this order and its power is to open the intellect and mouth for confessing, but to open by removing the power of the demon closing: but the lector opens by infusing the illuminating habit to the act. And in this diverse way, nothing prohibits different orders from being for the same.

And through this, the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 23 — Whether The Order Of The Exorcists Combines The Two Preceding According To The Nature Of The Whole Potestative

Whether the order of exorcists gathers the two preceding according to the nature of the whole potentiate?

Secondly, it is asked, Whether this order gathers the two preceding according to the nature of the whole potentiate?

However, it seems that it does not: because
1. Those things which are of the same power have an order, such that the preceding is necessarily presupposed in the power of the following, just as in the sensible the vegetative is presupposed, as a triangle in a tetragon: but the operation of readers is not necessarily presupposed in the operation of exorcisms: therefore it seems that it does not unite in itself the acts of the preceding orders.

1. Furthermore, in the whole potentiate the following is in no way without the preceding: but the exorcistate can be without the readership, as is evident in those making a leap: therefore it seems that it does not unite in itself the preceding orders. Proof of the middle: if someone makes a leap, he indeed has the following order, although he does not have the execution: therefore the proposition stands.

Response. To this it must be said that this order unites in itself the preceding, and the characters of the preceding are united in its character, since character is a habit according to

663. Isaiah 52:11.

substance, and it is accidental if something is by reason of which it distinguishes, the habits of the preceding acts are united in the habit of this one, just as those who are ordered to one end: and yet the faculties remain for the acts of each, as happens in every whole potentiate: for this has parts related separately to acts, and unity in the power of the last act, which is from perfect power.

Therefore, it must be said to the first, that in the parts of the soul union is by nature. But this union is perfected by the institution of the Church and Christ. For to whomever it is granted to ward off demons, in him is presupposed the power of doorkeepers and readers, because they are powers of inferior acts ordered to the expulsion of demons: and although the union is less than nature, yet it is such as suffices for the offices of the Church.

To the other it must be said, that in this way the preceding is presupposed in the following, namely because it is ordered to the same, although it is of a lower degree of office preceding: and therefore one making a leap when he has the character, does not yet have the execution, because it is necessary for the power of the inferior to concur. And it is similar as if the sensible did not have the vegetative, it could not act, because every act of the sensible is founded in the vegetative.

Articulus 24 — Whether The Acolythate Is An Order

Whether the acolyte is an order?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, "Fourthly, the acolytes succeed."

And two things are inquired here, namely, whether the acolyte is an order? And secondly, when is the character imprinted on them?

To the first, it is objected thus:
1. For a corporal act, no order is required: to carry candles and tapers is a corporal act: therefore, for this, no order is required.

1. Furthermore, the preparation of lights in the sanctuary belongs to the doorkeepers and custodians, who are said above to be ostiaries: therefore, it seems that for this, no special order should be instituted.
2. Furthermore, a book is holier than a candlestick: and for the preparation and carrying of a book, no order is required: therefore, neither for the preparation of candlesticks and candles.
3. Furthermore, if there is an order for this act which is to prepare and carry tapers and candlesticks, it seems that it is of a much lower grade than the order of readers or exorcists. Since, therefore, orders are ordained according to how they are more remote from the last, which is the priesthood, it seems that this should be the second or first and not the fourth.

664. Matthew 23:3.

4. Furthermore, how is it true separately, that three preceding ones are required for its act, when we see that both the learned and unlearned can carry candles: and to the office of the reader pertains to be learned?

Response. It must be said that according to my judgment, to carry candles is not the act of this order, except as a sign shows that of which it is a sign: but its act is to work by fiery speech and example to the kindling of affection.

And through this, the solution to the first and second is clear.

To the third, however, it must be said that the order of readers is more for this, that the book is given to them: for the perfection of the intellect is more through knowledge, and the perfection of affection is through the grace of examples, not words: whence it seems that this order is a continuation to the sacred orders, which work upon the matter of the body of Christ.

To the following, the solution is clear through the preceding.

To the last, it must be said that this is clear in this way by understanding as it has been said: because then it is the highest among the four offices. And that it is so is clear through this which the Master says in that place: "Not to dispel the darkness of the air, since the sun at that time shines, but, etc."

Likewise, through that which he says, that Christ exhibited this order when he said: "I am the light of the world."

Articulus 25 — When A Character Is Imprinted On Acolytes

When is the character imprinted on acolytes?

Secondly, it is asked, When is the character imprinted in this order?

For two things are said here, namely that he carries the candle, and he himself carries the vessel with wine and water suggested for the Eucharist. However, it is evident that the work closer to the Eucharist is what he has when he carries the vessel with water, rather than the carrying of candles: but in the more dignified part, the facility to operate is imprinted: therefore, it seems that the character is imprinted when that vessel is given to him.

On the contrary of this is that 1. He is named from the carrying of candles: therefore, it seems that when he receives the candlestick, then the character is imprinted on him.

1. Furthermore, by receiving the candlestick from the Bishop, he is first taught how he ought to minister in the office: and then he receives the vessel from the archdeacon: however, it is evident that the archdeacon does not give the order, but the Bishop: therefore, it seems that he gives them the order in this, that he gives them the candlestick, and not the act of the vessel.

Response. It must be said that it seems to me that the character is imprinted when the candlestick is given with the instruction of the signification to dispel the northern darkness, that is, of the devil: for thus the figure in the Old Testament corresponds to it, as is evident in the Letter: and thus Christ exhibited the order. However, what the archdeacon does, this is to denote the excellence of the order, to show the continuation in this to be towards the sacred orders.

Therefore, to the objection, it must be said that the work of the vessel is not a work in the orders except accidental and popular, except when it is given to the subdeacon: and therefore it is not except for the acolyte to minister with the vessel immediately to the deacon: but rather to provide that there is no impediment on the part of the offering people, who in the consecration is the prepared matter from which the Eucharist is made: but the divine work that he does concerning the sacraments is to dispel spiritual darkness with the light of word and example: for he himself is almost an argument of the proof of what he says to the divine colloquy.

And through this, the solution to the whole is evident.

G. Concerning subdeacons.

The fifth is the order of subdeacons. In Greek, they are called dnedizxeves, whom we call Subdeacons. They are thus called because they are subject to the precepts and offices of the Levites. For they receive the offerings in the temple from the faithful, and carry them to the Levites to be placed on the altars. Among the Hebrews, they were called nathinnet, that is, serving the Lord in humility. It pertains to the subdeacon to carry the chalice and paten to the altar of Christ, and to deliver them to the Levites, and to minister to them. Also, to hold the vessel and basin and towel for the Bishop and Priests and Levites, to provide water for washing hands before the altar. To them, the law of continence is imposed: because approaching the altar, they carry the vessels of the body and blood of Christ. Hence, they ought to fulfill that: Cleanse yourselves, you who bear the vessels of the Lord. It also pertains to them to place only as much of the offerings on the altar as may suffice for the people, and also to wash the corporals and palls and coverings. When they are ordained, they receive from the hand of the Bishop the paten and empty chalice. From the archdeacon, however, the vessel with the basin and towel. The Lord used this office when he girded himself with a towel, and pouring water into a basin, washed the feet of the disciples and wiped them with the towel.

Articulus 26 — What Is The Act Of The Subdeacon, To Which The Character Is Imprinted

What is the act of the subdeacon, to which the character is imprinted?

Then it is inquired concerning what is said, there, G, the fifth order of subdeacons, etc.

Three things are inquired here, namely, what is the true act of the subdeacon, to which the character is imprinted? Secondly, whether it excels the four preceding ones? Thirdly, why certain orders are called sacred, but others not sacred?

666. 1 Samuel (1 Kings in Vulgate) 2-4.

To the first, it is objected thus:

1. The subdeacon is subject to the deacon: therefore, he has an inferior act for an act: but the New Testament is given to be read by the deacon, as is said in the following chapter: therefore, the Old is given to be read by the subdeacon: but this same is given to the lector: therefore, it seems that the act of the lector and the subdeacon is one and the same.

1. Furthermore, in the text it says that they ought to carry the chalice and paten to the altar and hand them to the Levites: but this is less than expounding the divine readings: therefore, it seems that it is a nobler act that they read the epistles and prophecies: but an order, like anything else, is defined by its ultimate act: therefore, it is defined by reading: and hence as before.

2. Furthermore, it is greater to minister to the bishop and priests than to the deacon: but in the ewer and towel and basin, he serves the bishop and priests, in the chalice and paten only the deacon: therefore, it seems that it is a sign of more excellent power that he receives the basin and towel than that he receives the chalice: but in more excellent power the character is given: therefore, it seems that the character is imprinted on him when he receives the basin and towel.

1. Furthermore, that is the act to which the character is imprinted, which Christ exhibited prefiguring this order: but Christ exhibited the act of washing in the basin and towel prefiguring this order: therefore, to that the character of this order is imprinted. The first is evident from this, that this order, like no other sacrament, had any power except from divine institution. The second, however, is written in the text at the end of this chapter.

On the contrary, it is objected to this: because the act is more excellent in orders, the closer it is to the act of the priest, which is to consecrate the body of Christ: but to prepare the chalice and hosts on the altar proportionate to the number of those receiving, above all, is closer to the act of the priest, which is to consecrate the body of Christ: therefore, it seems that that act is more excellent: but to the more excellent the character is imprinted: therefore, the character of this order is then imprinted when he receives the chalice from the hand of the bishop with the words pertaining to this.

Response. What was lastly proven here, seems to me to be conceded.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that the subdeacon is so called because he ministers to the deacon in the principal act, which is that the deacon ministers on the altar to the priest the matter of the body of Christ, as was evident in the division of orders placed above.

To the other, it must be said that this is much more than to read the readings: because this is to minister to the true body of Christ, but the other only to the mystical: and yet the reading of the subdeacon is higher than that of the lector, just as the explanation of the Gospel, which is in the epistles, is greater than the explanation of the law, which is in the prophecies.

667. Romans 3:8.

To the other, it must be said that this is true insofar as he is a bishop: but he does not perform this ministry for himself except in common, as a certain purity is required to shine in all ministers. Hence, in the same ministry, he also serves the Levites, as it says in the text. Hence, the act of that minister is not done for the bishop as he is a bishop, or for the priest as he is a priest: but this is the common ministry of those serving near the altar, and this is adjunct to the deacon, who among the inferior ministers can more approach the holy things.

To the other, it must be said that Christ exhibited both at the supper: for it was necessary to prepare the vessels in which he would consecrate that body and blood: hence he also said: Take, this chalice is of the New Testament: but the Master here from the latter act demonstrates the former to be supposed: because no one doubts if Christ performed by himself the inferior and adjunct act, which is of humility, that he also performed by himself the more excellent act, which is closer to the sacrament of the Eucharist.

Articulus 27 — Whether The Order Of The Subdiaconate Excels The Four Other Orders

Whether the order of subdiaconate excels the four other orders?

Whether the order of subdiaconate excels the four preceding orders?

Secondly, it is asked whether this order excels the four preceding orders?

And it seems that it does not: because

1. As Aristotle says in Book X of the Ethics: the operation of the intellect is more worthy than any operation of man: the act of the lector is concerned with the operation of the intellect, and the subdeacon's is concerned with certain irrational and inanimate vessels: therefore it seems that the operation of the lector is more worthy than the operation of the subdeacons: but as operation is to operation, so is order to order: therefore the order of lectors is more worthy than the order of subdeacons.

1. Furthermore, to ward off demons is a supermundane power, but to prepare the vessels of the Church is a mundane operation: but a supermundane operation is more worthy than a mundane or human one: therefore it seems that the operation of exorcists is more worthy than the operation of subdeacons: therefore as before.

On the contrary of this is that

1. The subdeacon enters into the holy things, to which it is not permitted to approach for those of lower order grades: but he who is closer to the holy things is more worthy: therefore the order of subdeacons is more worthy than all lower orders.

1. Furthermore, the order which in its operation is closer to the first act of priests is nobler: but among all, the subdeacon approaches more in operation except for the deacon alone: therefore that order is more worthy except for the order of the diaconate.

Response, It must be said that assent should be given to the last two reasons.

668. 2 Samuel 6:6-7.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that although it is concerned with irrational and inanimate vessels, it is not concerned with them as they are such, but rather as they are referred to the containment of the body of Christ, which is more worthy than the whole world, even if the world were multiplied.

To the statement of the Philosopher, it must be said that it is understood of the operations of man insofar as he is man: but those operations which are of ministers in the sacraments are divine rather than human.

To the other, it must be said that to ward off demons is in no way as worthy as to operate concerning the vessels of the body of the Lord as they are containers of the body of Christ: and although that is a supermundane power, yet this is also supermundane, because this power is given to man by God.

Articulus 28 — Why These Three Orders Are Called Sacred

Why are these three orders called sacred?

Thirdly, it is asked concerning the sacred orders, why these three are called sacred?

And it is objected thus:
1. Every operation is sacred, which is around sacred things: but every operation of order is around sacred things: therefore every order is sacred.

1. Furthermore, an operation is said to be sacred in two ways, namely from the sanctity of the one operating, just as a meritorious act is holy: or from the sanctity of the matter around which it is. And it is evident that in the first way order is not said to be sacred: because many not having orders have such sacred operations. But if in the second way order is said to be sacred, then it follows as before, that every order is sacred.

Response. It must be said that these orders are called sacred on account of the sanctity which is enjoined upon those ministering in them: for it is necessary to have a vow of continence either simply or according to time. Simply, as in the Western Church, because these last three orders are not given except to those vowing and keeping perfect chastity. According to time, however, in the primitive Church, and in the Eastern Church, if any receive order in marriage, they remain in marriage: but yet as long as they minister, they are separated from their wives: and again, with her dead, they cannot take another.

And through this the solution to both objections is clear.

Articulus 29 — What Is The Principal Act Of The Order Of The Diaconate

What is the principal act of the order of the diaconate?

Then it is inquired concerning what is said, there, "The order of deacons holds the sixth place," etc.

657. Gregory the Great, Regula Pastoralis, Lib. 1, c. 10.

Three things are inquired concerning deacons, namely concerning the principal act of this order. Secondly, whether that order, like others, requires other sacraments beforehand, or can be received without these.

Thirdly, it is inquired concerning the sacred vestments of this order and of the preceding ones.

To the first, it is objected by those things which are said in the Letter, where it says: "To the deacon pertains assisting priests," etc. For it enumerates nine things pertaining to the deacon, namely, assisting priests in ministering in the sacraments. Secondly, bringing in the offerings of the faithful and arranging them on the altar. Thirdly, composing the Mass. Fourthly, carrying the cross. Fifthly, preaching the Gospel and other Scriptures. Sixthly, frequenting prayers. Seventhly, reciting the catechumens. Eighthly, that he warns to have ears towards the Lord. And ninthly, that he gives and announces peace. Therefore, it is inquired, which of these is the principal act? For of one power there is one act: and the order of the deacon is one power only: therefore, it has only one act.

However, it seems that it is to preach the Gospel: because

1. The preaching of the Gospel was the office of Christ: however, it is evident that the office of Christ was the most dignified and most divine: therefore, no act can even the deacon have more dignified.
2. Furthermore, in the Letter it says concerning this act, that to deacons is granted the preaching of the New Testament just as to readers of the Old: but to preach the Old and New differ only by matter: therefore, the order of the reader and the deacon differ only by matter, which is false.
3. Furthermore, it seems false: because even to subdeacons is granted the recitation of the epistles of the New Testament: and when they recite, they preach as if in a choir: whence also the choir responds to them by singing the graduals through which is signified progress from virtue to virtue, and the tracts through which is signified long-suffering in the tribulation of the present life, and the alleluia through which is signified joy in the hope of future things: and this is the whole that is preached. Through this also it seems that it is not true that it is proper to deacons to preach the New Testament.
4. Furthermore, to minister by setting the table and carrying the cross does not seem to be of deacons, but rather of acolytes: because according to the use of the Churches we see acolytes doing this.

Response. To this and similar things it must be said that the highest and principal act of the deacon is to minister to the priest in the consecration of the body of Christ immediately upon the altar. For he gives him the chalice with the host and wine, and by kissing the hand he returns the paten to the subdeacon, arranges the corporal, and upon it arranges the hosts to be consecrated. He also, if necessary, dispenses the sacrament itself already made to the people,

660. Psalm 49:16 (Vulgate); Psalm 50:16 (RSV).

as is evident where it says that the Lord used this office when after supper he dispensed his body and blood to the disciples. To this act, however, all others are referred: for what he ministers to the priest, all is referred to the composition of the hosts on the altar. However, what he warns the people by saying: "Let us bend the knees. Lift up," what he gives peace immediately taking it from the priest, what he recites the catechumens, what he preaches, etc., all this is ordered to this, that he may worthily communicate from his hands the Eucharist dispensing. Whence it is evident that this is the first act.

To that, therefore, which is objected, it must be said that to announce the Gospel is the most dignified act that can be done concerning the mystical body: and in this way Christ worked our salvation: but he had a more dignified act concerning his true body, when from bread and wine he made for us the sacrament of himself, and to that act the deacon approaches by ministering on the altar to the priest, as has been said.

To the other it must be said that as Dionysius says, those things which are of the lower orders, the higher have more powerfully and eminently. Whence the preaching of the reader is according to the obscure resonance of the Old Testament: but of the subdeacon clearer, and of the deacon most clear. And in this way it cannot be distinguished sensibly, except that to one the Old, to another the Epistles, and to the third the Gospel is committed: so that it may be known that in full clarity it is fitting for the deacon, which in a proportionate manner is fitting for the reader and subdeacon. And therefore this difference is not only material, but of power: just as I say that a candle shines, and the sun, does not differ materially only, namely by the small and the eminent, but according to the power of shining: and the causes of this power are diverse forms.

To the other the solution is evident by what has been said: because the eminent mode is proper to the deacon, and the inferior to the subdeacon. And if anyone objects that more and less do not diversify the species: it is nothing: because Aristotle says,

Those who believe this, that what is spoken of according to more and less is univocal, have not believed upon a sufficient sign: because 'more and less' are sometimes caused by the powers of diverse forms that are more and less noble, and then they are not of one species: and thus it is here. But sometimes they are caused through movement toward a terminus by the same form, and then they are of the same species: and it is not so here. But this was also noted in the second book of the Sentences, in the question: Whether the soul and an Angel differ in species?

The solution to the other [objection] is clear, that on great feasts in the celebration of Bishops, a deacon carries the cross, especially before an Archbishop: and the preparation of the altar here is understood as the bodily arrangement [i.e., of the corporal] on the altar: for no one ought to do this except a deacon!

And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

665. Ezekiel 44:7.

Articulus 30 — Whether Both The Diaconate And The Other Prior Ones Pre-Require Other Sacraments

Whether both the diaconate and the other prior [orders] pre-require the other sacraments?

Secondly it is asked: Whether both this [order] and the others pre-require the other sacraments in the recipient?

And it seems that they do: because § 1. Order is joined to order more essentially than to the other sacraments: and a subsequent order can be received without the preceding ones having been received: therefore it can also be received without the other sacraments having been received.

§ 2. Furthermore, let us posit that someone is not baptized, yet firmly believes upon probable signs that he is baptized, and he receives the diaconate or another sacred order, and ministers: does he effect the act of the sacrament, or not? If he does not effect it: then the Church would be deceived. For suppose there is such a priest: then neither would those whom he heard in confession be absolved, nor would it be the true body of Christ which he confects, and many abominable things would follow. But if he confects and effects the act of the order: since the act does not proceed except from the power of the character, it seems that he can have the character of order without the character of baptism, which almost all deny.

If perhaps you say that such a one is reputed as baptized by the Church. ON THE CONTRARY: It is certain that he does not have the character of baptism, although he perhaps has the grace and a certain effect of baptism: therefore the character of order can be had without the character of baptism: and this is what we proposed to show.

IN CONTRARY to this is that the character of baptism is the foundation of the other sacraments and characters: and without a foundation nothing stable is built: therefore without the character of baptism he receives no order.

Furthermore, let it happen that such a one is known not to be baptized, either through revelation or in another way: it is certain that he will be reordained: but he would not be reordained if he had previously had the character of order: therefore it seems that he did not previously have the character of order. If perhaps you say that he had it previously, but was ignorant [of not being baptized], but lost it when he knew: this is ridiculous, that an indelible character should be destroyed through the knowledge of something.

RESPONSE. Without doubt it must be said that one not having baptism does not receive any order, but he can receive it without the other sacraments: because although actual sin is greater than original sin, nevertheless penance is not required in the same way as baptism, because penance is not the door of the sacraments and the foundation through which we are founded in Christ just as baptism is.

To the first objection, therefore, it must be said that although order is more substantial to order as regards the form of the sacrament, yet it does not have an order to the foundation in this way, because it has diverse acts: but order has no act diverse from faith: and therefore the sacrament of faith, which is baptism, is the foundation. And it is similar in the senses also in

nature: because hearing is more similar to sight with respect to the form of sensing, than touch is: and yet sight can exist without hearing, but in no way without touch, because touch is not so much a sense as the foundation of the senses.

To the other it must be said without prejudice that such a one has no character of order: yet I think that he confects the sacraments, not in his own power, but in the power of the Church: and therefore he is reordained when it is known through some means that he was not baptized: for then a power descends into him from the virtue of the Holy Spirit animating the Church, lest the Church be deceived, and invincible ignorance excuses him.

Articulus 31 — Whether A Sacred Vestment Is Required For The Act Of The Order To Be Performed

Whether a sacred vestment is required for the act of the order to be performed?

Thirdly, it is asked about the sacred vestments of this and the other orders: because the Master first makes mention of them in the Text.

Now it is asked: Whether a sacred vestment is required for the act of the order to be performed, such that it cannot be done without the vestment?

And it seems that it is: because § 1. Those vestments, just like the orders, were instituted by the Lord, as is clear from Leviticus 8:2 and following: but there is no force in the sacraments to confer an effect except from divine institution: therefore if what was instituted by God is omitted, it will not be a sacrament: but vestments were instituted: therefore if they are omitted, it will not be a sacrament.

§ 2. Furthermore, in all arts it is thus, that the artisan must be perfect according to the habit proper to that work which he does, or else he does not operate well according to the art which is in him, but rather accidentally and badly, just as an old woman heals: therefore it ought to be similar in the sacraments: but vestments, as he says in the Text, signify the proper habits of the ministers, such as the cleanness of chastity, and so on for the others: therefore it seems that if those vestments are not on the ministers, they do not operate as ministers: but the acts of the sacraments belong to them as they are ministers: therefore without the vestments they do not effect the acts of the sacraments.

SOLUTION. To this it must be said that vestments pertain to the well-being [bene esse], and not to the essence [esse] of the orders.

To the two objections that were made, therefore, it must be said that the habit of the minister is twofold, namely of suitability and of necessity. The vestments show the habit of suitability: but the habit of necessity is the order which is given to them: and this alone is similar to the habit of artisans: for just as without art the artisan does not operate artfully, so without order the minister does not operate as a minister of the sacraments.

Articulus 32 — Whether The Priesthood Is Conferred By Consecration Or By The Merit Of Holiness

Whether the priesthood is conferred by consecration or by the merit of holiness?

The seventh order is that of priests, etc.

Four things are asked here concerning the priesthood. First it is asked: Whether it is given by consecration or by the merit of holiness? Secondly, Whether the priesthood of the New and Old Testament is the same? Thirdly, How the character of the priesthood unites to itself the characters of all the preceding orders? Fourthly and lastly, concerning the acts of the priesthood, which he touches upon in the Text.

To the first it is objected thus: § 1. Chrysostom says: Not every priest is holy: but everyone who is holy is a priest. But it is certain that not every holy person has the priesthood from consecration. Therefore it seems that the priesthood is conferred by the holiness of merit, not by consecration.

§ 2. Furthermore, Revelation 1:6: He has made us a kingdom and priests to God and his Father. And from this the same follows.

§ 3. Furthermore, in Psalm 98:6: Moses and Aaron among his priests: and it is certain that Moses was never consecrated: therefore as before.

§ 4. Furthermore, 1 Peter 2:9: You are a chosen generation, a royal priesthood, a holy nation, a purchased people. And he is speaking to all who were in the Church, to women as well as to men: therefore as before.

IN CONTRARY to this is: that one thing which is required for the reception of orders is sex [i.e., being male], as the canons say: therefore a woman cannot become a priest: yet she can be holy in body and spirit, as the Apostle says, 1 Corinthians 7:34: therefore holiness does not confer the priesthood.

SOLUTION. To this it must be said that holiness confers suitability for the priesthood, but not the priesthood.

To all the objections it must be said that 'priest' is said in two ways, namely according to its signification, and according to the interpretation of the name. According to its signification, no one is a priest unless legitimately consecrated as a priest. According to the interpretation of the name, any just person is called a priest [sacerdos]: because he is a priest by merit, and a sacred leader [sacer dux] by example. And in this way also any just person is called a king, as is said in the Text. Now it is in this way that 'priest' is taken in the authorities adduced.

Articulus 33 — Whether The Priesthood Of The Old Law And Of The New Is The Same Priesthood

Whether the priesthood of the Old Law and of the New is the same priesthood?

Secondly it is asked: Whether the priesthood of the New and Old Testament is the same?

And it seems that it is: because § 1. Ezekiel 10:10: A wheel is in the midst of a wheel: therefore the priesthood is in the priesthood: therefore it is not distinguished.

§ 2. Furthermore, 1 Corinthians 10:3: All ate the same spiritual food. Therefore the spiritual food was prepared in the Old Testament just as in the New: and this is the priesthood of the New Testament: therefore the priesthood of the New and Old Testament is the same: because to whatever the proper [accident] belongs, to that also belongs that of which it is the proper [accident].

§ 3. Furthermore, Augustine says that the faith of the ancients and of the moderns was one. Therefore the charity is the same: therefore the priesthood is also the same.

IN CONTRARY to this is that: § 1. The Apostle says, Hebrews 7:12: For the priesthood being translated, it is necessary that a translation also be made of the law. Therefore he supposes that that priesthood has been translated. But the New remains, as he proves in the same place, because Christ is a priest forever according to the order of Melchizedek: therefore they are not the same priesthood.

§ 2. Furthermore, a priest of the Old Testament converting to the faith had to be ordained: but this would not be done if it were the same priesthood: therefore it is not the same.

RESPONSE. It must be said that it is not the same: but they differ as figure and truth: and thus the old is in the new as a figure in the truth: but the new is in the old as truth hidden in a figure. Hence the old is in the new openly through the showing of the signified truth: and therefore it is no longer kept, but has been translated. But the new is in the old hiddenly: and therefore it was kept until the revelation of this [new]: and this is what Ezekiel intends to say: and through this the solution to the first is clear.

To the other it must be said that they were not the same except through spiritual understanding and faith, and not according to species: because these things were understood in those: but the species of the sacraments on each side is different, and therefore a different rite, and a different power, and a different grace of the priests, as was held in the question concerning the keys.

To the other it must be said that the unity of the priesthood is not from the unity of faith, but rather from the unity of the power and rite of the sacraments.

Articulus 34 — In What Way The Character Of The Priesthood Unites To It The Characters Of The Preceding Orders

How does the character of the priesthood unite to itself the characters of the preceding orders?

Thirdly it is asked: How does the character of the priesthood unite to itself the characters of the preceding orders?

For whatever are many and not united, are simply many: if therefore the characters of the seven orders do not have something uniting [them], they will simply be many, and not one sacrament.

IN CONTRARY it is objected, that we see the acts of the orders to be divided: and just as acts are related, so are habits: therefore if the powers of the orders are divided: therefore also the characters [are divided].

RESPONSE. It must be said that the sacerdotal character alone is as the perfection of the sacrament, and all the others are dispositions.

To the argument to the contrary, it must be said, as was solved above in a similar question, that in every potestative whole the acts of the parts are distinct, but through this they are perfected in the subsequent and in the whole: because in that they receive perfection according to eminence: just as sensible cognition in the sense is imperfect, and is perfected more in reason and most of all in intellectuality. Hence all the characters of the preceding orders are as dispositions in this way to the ultimate order: and it is itself uniting in itself and perfecting them all.

Articulus 35 — Whether The Three Acts Of The Priesthood Set Down By The Master Are Sufficiently Assigned

Whether the three acts of the priesthood posited by the Master are sufficiently assigned?

Fourthly and lastly, it is asked concerning the acts of priests.

Now he seems to touch upon three in the Text, namely to confect the sacrament of the Eucharist, and to say prayers, and to bless gifts.

Now it is asked: § 1. Since the power of binding and loosing is conferred on priests alone, especially in the forum of confession: why does the Master not touch upon the act which is to bind and loose in the forum of confession?

§ 2. Furthermore, since several acts are given here, which is the principal one to which the character is conferred?

RESPONSE. It must be said that from the previous disputations on the keys, almost whatever can be asked concerning this order has been said.

Nevertheless it must be said to the first, that the Master here touches only upon the principal act of the priest, to which the order substantially [pertains], and not the secondary act: because this was sufficiently spoken of in the tractate on penance, where the keys were treated.

To the other it must be said that the principal act is to confect the Eucharist: and the others are adjoined for the suitability of those communicating in the Eucharist, and of the priest, such as prayers, blessings, and the like.

Note, however, that some here moralize all the vestments of the priests of the Old and New Testament, and the signs which are made in the Mass, and the things which the other ministers have for a habit and do: but because this is preaching rather than disputation, therefore it is entirely passed over by me, because it is not proper to this science.

Articulus 36 — Whether The Canons Properly Call Two Orders Sacred

Whether the canons rightly call two orders sacred?

Next it is asked concerning this which he says there, chapter 1, § 2, near the beginning: The canons excellently call only two orders sacred, etc.

For this seems contrary: § 1. To those things which were determined above, namely that there are three sacred orders.

§ 2. Furthermore, he seems to speak falsely in the Text: because nothing is a sacrament except from divine institution: but the inferior orders, especially the subdiaconate, are sacramental: therefore they were from divine institution: therefore [they were] from the beginning of the Church.

§ 3. Furthermore, he seems contrary to himself: because in every order he shows when and how Christ functioned in the office of that order: but it is certain that the Apostles and the primitive fathers did not neglect what Christ so solicitously exhibited in Himself: therefore those orders were in the primitive Church.

RESPONSE. It must be said that without doubt all the orders were in the primitive Church, and were instituted by Christ in that mode of institution which was determined above: but an order is observed in two ways, namely joined to another order, and disjoined. For in the primitive Church, on account of the scarcity of ministers and the great suitability of the recipients, because almost all were of excellent holiness, all the inferior orders were conferred with the diaconate: just as still in some Churches the first four are conferred together. But afterwards the number of ministers increased, and suitability decreased; and then the Church decreed that the orders should be divided among themselves. Hence the Master means that in the primitive Church they were not observed dividedly among the ministers.

And through this the solution to all except the first is clear.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that the Master calls the orders sacred here for one reason, and they are called sacred today for another reason: because his reason is the authority of the primitive Church, which is sacred and worthy of veneration: but today they are called sacred from holiness, which although few have, yet all the ministers vow and profess it simply or in a qualified sense, as was said above in the question on the order of subdeacons.

Articulus 37 — Whether Order Is Well Defined In The Text By The Master

Whether order is well defined in the Text by the Master?

Next it is asked concerning this which he says there, chapter K: But if it is asked, What is it that is here called order?

And two things are asked, namely, What is order? and, What does it have as matter, and what as form?

To the first, let the two definitions posited in the Text be accepted. The first is this:

Order is a certain signet [signaculum], that is, a certain sacred thing by which spiritual power is handed over to the ordained, and an office.

The second is as if concluded from this:

A spiritual character where a promotion of power takes place, is called order or degree.

The third is of the ancient Masters, and it is this: Order is the sacrament of spiritual power ordained to some office in the Church for the sacrament of communion.

Now IT IS OBJECTED against the first: because § 1. Signet is either said of the character, or it designates exterior signs. If of the character: therefore since a character is also imprinted in two other sacraments, it seems that it ought to have been posited in their definition: and this is false: therefore neither ought it to be posited in the definition of this one. If it designates exterior signs: since these are in all the sacraments, 'signet' ought to be posited in all the sacraments when they are defined, as it seems: and this again is false.

§ 2. Furthermore, the exposition of 'signet' through 'sacred thing' seems bad: because many signets are not sacred, such as that of which it is read in Ezekiel 28:12: that it is the signet of resemblance, etc.

§ 3. Furthermore, it is better called a 'sacrament' than 'a certain sacred thing': because sacrament is the genus of order, whereas a sacred thing is outside the genus of order, because it also applies to a meritorious work, and to other things which are not sacraments.

§ 4. Furthermore, there is no mode of defining through a particular sign: for it means nothing to say, 'man is a certain animal': because if that were a definition, then the definition of man would also apply to a donkey, because a donkey is also a certain animal: therefore it seems that the definition is bad.

In the same way it is objected against the second, where he says, Character, etc.: because

§ 1. A character is imprinted in [other] sacraments: and yet they are not defined through character: therefore neither [should] this one.

§ 2. Furthermore, order and degree either mean a degree of nature, or a degree of dignity, or a degree of grace. If you say in the first way, it is false: because all men, ordained and not ordained, are of one nature: hence Gregory says that to be proud against nature is for a man to wish to be placed over a man. If in the second way. ON THE CONTRARY: That to which the recipient of the sacrament is promoted is the reality [res] of the sacrament: therefore if the recipient of the sacrament is promoted to a dignity, the dignity will be the reality of the sacrament: and this is false, because as he says here in the Text, grace is the reality of this and of all the other sacraments.

But if it is said that degree means a promotion in grace: then every sacrament will be an order or degree, because in every sacrament there is a promotion according to degree: and this again is false.

RESPONSE. It must be said that in truth the second definition of the Master corrects the first, and is an explanation of it. Hence the first is not a definition, but an investigation or assumption of the proximate genus. But the second he says to be of order.

To what is therefore first asked, I say that 'signet' supposits for 'character'.

To the argument to the contrary, it must be said that although a character is imprinted in two others, yet not a character of excellence or dignity, as in this one: and therefore it is specially posited in the definition of this one.

To the other it must be said that such a signet is always sacred, and the sign of a sacred thing, and a cause insofar as it is in itself: and yet the objection is not valid, because that is a signet of resemblance, which is expressed in the image of God: and there is an equivocation in the argument.

To the other it must be said that 'sacred thing' is posited there as contracting 'signet' to its proper genus: and this is the same as a sacrament which is truly a sacrament imprinting a character: hence 'signet' is a more immediate genus taken in this way, than 'sacrament': and therefore it is more fittingly posited in the definition.

To the other it must be said that the word quoddam [a certain] intends nothing except to distinguish the equivocation which is in 'signet', as was said. Or better it may be said, that he intends through a particular sign to take a genus under a genus, namely a sacred signet under sacrament, and thus to conclude a true definition: and this can well be done when we are hunting for a definition.

To that which is first objected against the true definition, the solution is clear through what has been said before.

To the other it must be said that degree is of dignity.

To the objection to the contrary, it must be said that one is promoted to two things by the exterior sacrament, namely to that which is reality and sign [res et signum], and therefore substantially a sacrament, and this is the character of excellence according to dignity: and one is promoted to that which is reality only [res tantum], and this is grace.

Articulus 38 — What There Is In The Sacrament Of Order Concerning Matter And Form

What is in the sacrament of order as matter and form?

What is in the sacrament of order as matter and form?

Secondly it is asked: What is here as matter, and what as form?

For every sacrament (as the Master said above) consists in things and words. And Augustine says the same. It is asked: What is the matter, especially in the inferior orders?

For it seems that it ought to be chrism or oil consecrated by a Bishop: because

§ 1. In excellent sacraments the matters ought to be excellently prepared: but this one is excellent: therefore the matter ought to be sanctified by a Bishop.

§ 2. Furthermore, as some say, the keys or candlesticks, books of exorcisms, the chalice, which are given to the ordained in the orders, are the matter of this sacrament: then it seems that just as baptism does not exist without water and oil, and confirmation without chrism, etc., so ordination cannot exist without these: therefore if someone does not touch them, he is not ordained, which would be grave to say.

RESPONSE. It must be said that the matter is those things which are enumerated, and are extended by the Bishop to the ordained.

But to the first it must be said that the matter is not sanctified on account of excellence, because it is not sanctified in baptism: but on account of the act which these sacraments confer, as was clear when they were treated. Hence this sacrament has for matter that in which its act and effect is shown through similitude: and the acts of these orders are shown in the instruments which are extended to them by the Bishop.

To the other it must be said that nothing is required except the extending, and the touching pertains to the well-being [bene esse]: because as was said, in this sacrament is the form signifying the handing over of power: and this is signified by the whole extension, when he to whom it is extended does not expressly dissent: for he is understood to have accepted, when he shows that he does not dissent when he is presented to accept. But others say otherwise: but it is not to be heeded, because they have little reason.

Articulus 39 — Whether The Episcopate, And The Others Which The Master Enumerates, Are Orders

Whether the Episcopate, and the other things which the Master enumerates, are orders?

Whether the Episcopate, and the other things which the Master enumerates, are orders?

Next it is asked concerning this which he says there, chapter M: But the order of Bishops is quadripartite, etc.

And two things are asked, namely whether those things which he enumerates here are orders? And secondly, When and how are they conferred?

To the first it seems that they are orders: because § 1. They are powers for divine acts in the Church, such as to veil nuns, to consecrate Churches, and the like: therefore they are orders.

§ 2. Also, this is a signet of the promotion of power: therefore from the definition they are orders.

RESPONSE. All this is clear through what has been said before: for since there can be no more excellent act than to confect the body of Christ, there can be no order after the priesthood: but those which he enumerates are distinct offices of jurisdiction over the mystical body, to which those thus officiated intend: and when they obtain them, they receive grace not for an order, but for the execution of jurisdiction in the Church if they are worthy.

And through this the solution to the objections is clear: because when it is said that order is a promotion of power, it is not understood of the power of jurisdiction, but rather of operating concerning the sacrament of the Eucharist.

Articulus 40 — When And In What Way The Aforesaid Are Conferred

When and how are the aforesaid conferred?

Secondly it is asked: When and how are they conferred?

§ 1. For the Apostle says, Hebrews 7:7: that without any contradiction, that which is less is blessed by the better. Therefore an Archbishop is not blessed by a Bishop: therefore neither is he consecrated: therefore no jurisdiction is conferred on him: but according to every usage of the Church, an Archbishop is blessed by a Bishop: therefore, etc.

§ 2. The same is the objection concerning the Lord Pope, whom the Bishop of Ostia blesses.

§ 3. Furthermore, since Dionysius in the epistle to the monk Demophilus seems to distinguish only priests and Bishops in the hierarchy: whence comes this quadripartite order of Bishops?

§ 4. Furthermore, there are Primates in the Church, whom he passes over here: therefore it is insufficient, as it seems.

To this it seems it must be said that 'order' is here called a degree of dignity according to jurisdiction, as was said before: and it is called an order because it exercises certain sacred acts of jurisdiction.

But to this which is objected, it must be said that an Archbishop is not consecrated by a Bishop, but rather a Bishop by him: but the Archiepiscopal right is conferred on him by the Pope with the pallium: hence since he is a major Bishop, he is not blessed by a Bishop.

To the other it must be said that even the Supreme Pontiff is not consecrated by the Bishop of Ostia insofar as he is supreme, but only insofar as he is pontiff: but the jurisdiction of the universality of power descends into him from the Lord, from the fact that he succeeds Peter.

To the other it must be said that Dionysius comprehends three orders under the hierarchies, namely the Primacy, the Archiepiscopate, and the Papacy.

To the other it must be said that Master Hugh calls Archbishops those whom the Church now calls Primates: whereas those whom the Church now calls Archbishops, he calls Metropolitans.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 12 — How Remedies Of That Sin Can Be Acquired

How remedies for that sin can be acquired

Sixthly it is asked, How the remedies for that sin are to be acquired?

Now it seems, that they are acquired by dispensation: because 1. It is certain that he who has the universality of power has the power of dispensing: but a dispensation is a relaxation of law: therefore what he is bound by law to do can be relaxed for him: but by law he is bound to be worthy in life and knowledge: therefore this can be relaxed for him.

1. Further, we see this being done all day in the Curia of the Lord Pope, concerning which it is not lawful to presume that anything unjust is being done: therefore it seems that this can be done by dispensation.
2. Further, it is not ours to judge of a dispensation: therefore it seems that either he with whom it is dispensed is entirely deceived, or he is absolved from the sin.

Against this is what Bernard says to Pope Eugene, that if a dispensation lacks a cause of public utility or legitimate necessity, the dispensation is not a dispensation, but a dissipation.

Response. It must be said that with an unworthy person a dispensation can never be made in such a way that he himself does not sin mortally by any act of administration, as long as he is unworthy. For the Lord Pope, as he himself protests in a certain Decretal, leaves each one to his own conscience with respect to God: but sometimes, because it is necessary to tolerate evils lest worse ones happen, he dispenses in this way, that in the judgment of men what has been dispensed cannot be objected against them.

To this therefore which is first objected, it must be said that he has the universality of power over human judgments, but not over divine judgment: and this is the judgment of conscience.

To the next it must be said that abuses do not diminish evils, but aggravate them: and therefore if in such dispensations a prelate does anything, he himself sins mortally. But if he endures it, compelled by the necessity of an evil lest a worse one happen, then he does not sin mortally, but then he does not dispense, but dissimulates for a time until it can be corrected.

To the next it must be said that it is true, that it is not ours to be judges: but yet it is ours to be doctors, and to know speculatively what is worthy and what is just, and to say this to others: hence we do not know by way of judgment in order to correct or punish: but we know by way of those wise in the law of God, what accords with the law of God and what discords from it, by whomever of men it is done, whether superior or inferior.

Articulus 13 — Whether The Crown Is An Order Or Only A Disposition To Order

Whether the tonsure is an order or only a disposition to an order?

Whether the corona [tonsure] is an order or only a disposition to an order?

§ 1. Next, inquiry is made concerning what he says, there, B, a little before the middle: For the corona is a seal, by which they are sealed, etc.[669]

§ 2. For it seems that the corona is an order: because 1. In all spiritual matters, exterior things are done for the sake of interior things: but an exterior seal is made in the corona:

therefore, it is made for the sake of an interior seal: but the interior seal is the character: therefore, the corona imprints a character: but whatever imprints a character, establishing one in a grade of dignity in the Church, is an order: [therefore] the corona is an order.

§ 3. 2. Furthermore, the corona is either purely corporeal, or a spiritual thing is held in the corporeal. If purely corporeal: then it could be conferred by anyone, which is false: because today it cannot be conferred except by a Bishop. But if a spiritual thing is received in the corporeal: then it is a sacrament by the definition of a sacrament: but it is certain that there is no sacrament except that of Order: therefore the corona is an order which is a sacrament.

§ 4. 3. Furthermore, it belongs to the excellent ones in the Church to give something excellent, as is evident in confirmation, where the excellent ones in the Church give the Holy Spirit for strength: but the corona is not given in the Church except by the excellent ones in the Church, such as Bishops: therefore in it they give something excellent: but nothing excellent is corporeal: therefore it seems that they give something spiritual: and this cannot be anything except a character: therefore it imprints a character: therefore it is an order.

§ 5. 4. Furthermore, in baptism where a man is distinguished from an unbaptized person, a character is imprinted: therefore also in the corona where a man is distinguished into the lot of the Lord: but this is done in the corona: therefore it seems that a character is imprinted in the corona.

§ 6. To the contrary of this is that: 1. By the Master in the Letter only seven orders are distinguished: and the corona is not one of them: therefore the corona is not an order.

§ 7. 2. Furthermore, every excellent form in nature demands many dispositions on the part of the matter: therefore it will be similar in grace: but the excellent thing in grace is order: therefore it pre-requires dispositions on the part of the recipient. But the first thing that is received is the corona: therefore it seems that the corona is the first disposition to order, and not an order.

§ 8. We concede this, saying to the first, that exterior things in the corona are done for the sake of interior things: but the interior thing which corresponds to the corona is the unveiling of the mind toward divine things, so that a man may thus be disposed to receive order: and it is not a character or an order.

§ 9. To the next it must be said that the corona is not purely corporeal, but is corporeal ordained to the spiritual: but this spiritual thing is partly conjoined, and partly consequent: for the conjoined thing is the unveiling of the mind toward divine things, as has been said; but the consequent thing is the order which is received.

§ 10. To the next it must be said that this is not the reason why it cannot be conferred except by a Bishop, because something excellent in the corona is conferred: because sometimes it used to be conferred by non-Bishops. But this was instituted so that those who are being prepared to receive orders may be known by the Bishop: because one must act with

669. Genesis 3:9.

greater solicitude regarding such men: and therefore they were instituted to pass through the corona to the hand and acknowledgment of the Bishop.

DISTINCTIO XXV

Divisio Textus

It is also usually asked, If heretics, etc. In this chapter of the distinction two things are contained, namely, whether heretics can give sacred orders?

And, concerning the diversities of simony, there, D, But concerning simoniacs there is no ambiguity, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether Heretics Cut Off From The Church Can Confer Orders

Whether heretics cut off from the Church can confer orders?

Concerning the first the Master disputes much in the Text: and we ask there: Whether heretics cut off from the Church can confer sacred orders, or not?

And it seems that they cannot: § 1. Everything which descends from one into another, descends into him either by personal merit, or by the merit of the Church: but in a heretic there is nothing of personal merit, nor of the merit of the Church, since he is cut off from the Church, as has been posited: therefore nothing descends through him: therefore nothing is conferred: therefore neither is order.

§ 2. Furthermore, through a channel not joined to a source, nothing flows from the source: but a cut-off heretic is like a channel not joined to a source: therefore nothing descends through him: therefore neither does order.

§ 3. Furthermore, no wise person works toward the destruction of his own work. But if a heretic, as it says, were to confer the sacraments of the Church, this would be to the destruction of the Church: therefore the author of the Church does not work that work: but the author of the Church works every effect of a sacrament: therefore he works nothing through cut-off heretics: therefore they confer nothing.

§ 4. To this very point many authorities are adduced in the Text.

IN CONTRARY it is objected thus: § 1. In the collation of the sacraments nothing operates except form and intention: if therefore these are preserved by a heretic, of necessity the effect, which is the sacrament, will be conferred by the heretic.

§ 2. Furthermore, in the collation of the sacraments a bad minister does not differ from a good one: therefore neither does a faithful one from an unfaithful one, provided he preserves the form and intention of the sacrament: therefore even those cut off confer [them]: and...

In this part also many authorities are adduced in the Text.

The Master, however, to resolve these matters, introduces four opinions, which are known to one inspecting the Text. But among moderns there is no doubt concerning this; because all sacraments are conferred by heretics, whether they still exist inside the Church or even outside it, provided they are priests or Bishops, or in other orders in which they can minister the sacraments, and provided they preserve the form and intention of the Church.

Therefore, according to this, it must be said to the first, that a sacrament does not take place by the merit of the Church, but by the power of the institutor, who gave this power to man, so that when he preserves the form and intention, such or such a sacrament is effected.

To the next it must be said that this channel is joined to the Church through the likeness of form and intention: and these suffice, as has been said.

To the next it must be said that God does not operate for the destruction of His own work, but rather for its construction: because He shows the power of His own work even by operating through evil men: and on account of this the Church adheres to Him all the more, and the damnation of heretics is more just.

Articulus 2 — What Simony Is

What is simony?

Next it is inquired concerning the second part, concerning that which is said there, D, Concerning simoniacs, etc.

Now four things are inquired here concerning simony. First, what is it? Second, whether it is a heresy, as it seems to say in the Text? Third, whether an inferior can commit simony with a superior? Fourth, in what ways is simony committed?

For the first, the definition of the Jurists is taken, who commonly define it thus:

Simony is the deliberate will of buying or selling a spiritual thing, or a thing annexed to a spiritual thing.

Therefore it is inquired: What is called a deliberate (studiosa) will? 1. For either this is one that strives to go out into act, and does not go out: or one that is perfected, and goes out. If in the first way: then the will of buying a spiritual thing would be simony, which is false, as is clear below in the division of simony. But if it is that which strives and goes out into the act of buying or selling: then many simonies take place in the selling of chalices and other vessels of the Church: which again is false, since such things can be done licitly.

1. Furthermore, it seems that the will alone without deliberation suffices for simony: because simony is baser than usury: and someone is a usurer from the mere hope of gain: therefore it seems that one is also a simoniac from the mere will or hope of buying.

Furthermore, this seems to be the case from Acts 8:18 et seq.,[670] where Simon never bought a spiritual thing, but only willed to buy it: and yet he was a simoniac, such that all simoniacs are named after him: therefore it seems that the will alone makes a simoniac.

1. Furthermore it is inquired: Why does it say deliberate? For that which is done out of ignorance is done without deliberation: but there are many who are ignorant that spiritual things ought not to be put under a price: therefore if they put spiritual things under a price by buying or selling, they do not have a deliberate will in this: therefore they do not commit simony, which is absurd.

Also, Tully says that deliberation (studium)

is a vehement application of the mind to doing something. Therefore it seems that this is not present in buying or selling: and therefore it is badly posited in this definition.

1. Furthermore it is inquired concerning that part which says, Of buying or selling a spiritual thing. For there was a deliberate will to buy the vessel of the tomb [i.e. right of burial] in Abraham, when he made an agreement with Ephron concerning the double cave of the field;[671] and yet he is not called a simoniac: therefore the definition is false, as it seems.
2. Furthermore, nothing is more spiritual than the kingdom of heaven: and yet it is bought and sold all day long, as it seems, Matthew 13:45: The kingdom of heaven is like to a merchant man seeking good pearls, etc.[672] And Augustine says: He holds it for sale. Gregory: this, etc. The kingdom of heaven is worth as much as you have. Therefore it seems that other spiritual things can also be sold.
3. Furthermore, it is inquired what is called annexed to a spiritual thing? For nothing is annexed to itself: therefore a spiritual thing is not annexed to itself: therefore what is annexed to a spiritual thing is a bodily thing. But a bodily thing can be sold, which is annexed to a spiritual thing, as is clear when a knight sells a villa in which he has the right of patronage: therefore the definition is false.

Response. To this it seems that the definition is good: and that which is said, Deliberate will, speaks of the will with the effect of the work as far as it is on the part of the simoniac. And that it says, Of buying or selling, speaks of the proper act of simony. And that it says, A spiritual thing or what is annexed to a spiritual thing, speaks of the matter.

Therefore to the first it must be said that it speaks of the will with the act on the part of the simoniac.

To the objection against this, it must be said that chalices and such things are spiritual according to the fourth mode of spirituality, as will be clear below: and such things can be sold: and this is the solution of the Decretists, and it has no reason. Hence it must be said that when it says, Of buying or selling a spiritual thing, it is understood insofar as it is spiritual, that the buying or selling falls upon the spiritual thing insofar as it is spiritual, so that the

spirituality increases the price: and then the definition is true, because thus simony is committed as much in chalices as in other things.

To the next it must be said that although this sin is baser, nevertheless it is perfected in something other than usury, because in an external act, whereas for perfection the completed will suffices. And there is a counter-instance: because murder is baser than usury, and a greater sin: and yet it is not completed in the will alone as usury is.

To the next it must be said that deliberation (studium) here is taken for the diligence applied by the simoniac himself to perfect the sin: and therefore the equivocation deceives, because it is not defined in that sense by Tully.

To the next it must be said that ignorance excuses no one: and someone can well be diligent in that which he is ignorant of whether it is a sin, yet he knows it insofar as it is a certain act which he strives and intends to do.

To the next it must be said that Abraham was not a simoniac, but Ephron was, as Jerome says, because he knew that unless he gave something for the redemption of his right, he would be molested in the future by him: and if it pleased Jerome it could be said that neither was a simoniac: because he did not buy a cemetery, but rather a non-sacred place, namely the field of a certain peasant named Ephron: and afterwards he made a cemetery out of it, because he buried the bodies of the Saints there, in which the Holy Spirit had rested: and this it is always licit for any man to do.

To the next it must be said that the kingdom of heaven is not properly bought, but merited: for a properly bought thing passes from the dominion of the seller into the possession and dominion of the buyer: but here he who buys the kingdom of heaven passes into the dominion

of the seller of it, so that the Lord of the kingdom of heaven possesses even this buyer.

Another cause of the same is assigned: because buying in this way he gives nothing to God which was not His own, but only orders to the Lord what was disordered by sin: and this is a work of virtue which every man ought to do.

To the next it must be said that what is annexed to a spiritual thing is called annexed to spiritual things: because it ought not to be had except by spiritual persons, or places, such as the right of patronage: which even if a knight is said to have it, yet he does not have it except for the uses of spiritual persons and places: and thereby the objection ceases, because numerically the same thing is not annexed to itself, but the same in genus or species.

Articulus 3 — Whether Simony Is Heresy

Whether simony is a heresy?

Secondly it is inquired, Whether it is a heresy, as is said in the Text?

670. Acts 8:18.

But it seems that it is not: because 1. To Titus 3:10, on that text: A man that is a heretic, after the first and second admonition, avoid,[673] the Gloss says: Heretics are those who impugn the law through the words of the law: but simoniacs are not such: therefore they are not heretics.

1. Furthermore, above Augustine says that a heretic is one who, for the sake of some temporal advantage, and especially for the sake of glory and his own principality, begets or follows false or new questions: but a simoniac does not do such things: therefore it seems that he is not a heretic.
2. Also, heresy is in knowable or credible matters: but simony is only in operable matters: therefore simony is not a heresy.

If perhaps you say that he errs in operations. Against this: because if this were so, since every evil man is ignorant, every evil man would be a heretic, which is false: therefore, etc.

Response. To this it must be said, according to some, that heresy is to attribute to God what is not fitting to Him, as Augustine says in the book On the Trinity: and the simoniac does this: therefore they call him a heretic, because he says it is fitting for him that His [God's] things and he himself be put under a price. But it seems wondrous if this moved the holy fathers.

To the next it must be said that simony is a heresy; because simoniacs do not attribute this by asserting it, but by willing to possess it in whatever way possible. Hence it seems it must be said that just as Jerome says, and as was noted above, heresy is incurred from words inordinately uttered, especially when those words are about spiritual things to be believed and hoped for. Now there are two things which we believe and hope for concerning spiritual things: namely, that they exist, and that they infinitely exceed these worldly things in value, because they are things which eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love him.[674] Against the first of these, therefore, heresy strictly taken sins. But against the second simony directly sins: because it posits them as viler than the temporal things for which it sells and buys them: and therefore it is called a heresy.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that there heresy is taken strictly insofar as it is opposed to things to be believed on the part of the knowledge which is had of them, that they exist. And it is similarly taken by Augustine above, dist. XIII. But simony sins rather against the value which one ought to believe to be in the spiritual things themselves.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 4 — Whether An Inferior Together With A Superior Can Commit Simony

Whether an inferior can commit simony with a superior?

Thirdly it is inquired: Whether an inferior can commit simony with a superior: and especially someone of the Church with the Lord Pope?

671. Genesis 23:9.

And it seems that he cannot: because 1. Jacob did not commit simony by buying that which was owed to him by succession, but rather Esau did, who willed to give it in another way: therefore since all things of the Churches are entrusted to the Lord Pope, it seems that he never commits simony by receiving from ecclesiastical persons for spiritual things, since they otherwise would not give to him.

1. Furthermore, no person has a right in ecclesiastical goods except through the jurisdiction of the Lord Pope: therefore just as the person himself receives, so the Pope can receive.

To the contrary of this is that: 1. Simony is called simony from the contract which Simon willed to make with Peter, who was the Pope of the Apostles: therefore much more can simony be committed with other Popes.

1. Furthermore, one who aids toward mortal sin, and does not impede when he can impede, sins with an equal sin as the doer, as the Saints say: but the Pope knows that this man can commit simony with him, and he commits it: therefore if he does not prohibit it, but aids by deceiving and granting what he asks, he himself sins with an equal sin: therefore he is made a simoniac.

Response. It must be said that in truth I well think that he can commit simony: nor does this seem doubtful to me, when he sells a spiritual thing.

To the first therefore it must be said that it was not similar: but rather the right of the firstborn had been given by the Lord to Jacob: and therefore it was a redemption from the vexation which he caused rather than a contract of buying. But the goods of the Churches are not given to Prelates to possess, but to dispense for the uses of others, namely the poor: hence they cannot buy and sell or even give at their own pleasure to whomever they will: but they are to be expended for the general necessities of the Church or the uses of the poor or of the persons of the Church.

To the next it must be said that it is true that no one has a right in the Churches except through him: but nevertheless I do not think this is from the fact that they are his, and that he confers them as his own, but because the patronage of defense has been collated upon him: just as the legislator also says that all things belong to the Emperor for defense and protection: for as Basil says, and Aristotle had said before him, a tyrant is one who extorts all things for his own uses, and does not seek the utility of his subjects.

Articulus 5 — In What Ways Simony Is Committed

In what ways is simony committed?

Fourthly it is inquired: In what ways is simony committed?

Now many ways are posited by the Jurists, which are noted in these verses:

672. Matthew 13:45.

A gift, a tongue, fear, flesh with popular fame, Do not make a spiritual thing to be given for free. Or thus: Praise and kinship, violent request, gifts, Vile service, sell the spiritual right.

Therefore it is inquired concerning these: 1. For praise is a gift from the mouth. But, as the Philosopher says, praise is properly about an act of virtue, and about virtue according as the act proceeds from it, and it is sought from the good and the known: but it is established that the good according to virtue intend nothing evil: therefore they do not intend to buy spiritual things: therefore simony is not committed through praise.

1. Furthermore, praise is not a bodily gift, because fame is necessary even for the Saints: therefore in praise a spiritual thing is not given for a bodily thing, but rather for a spiritual thing: therefore simony is not committed.
2. Similarly, kinship does not seem to make simony: because in all simony there is a contract: but kinship brings it about that a gift is given without a contract: therefore kinship destroys simony rather than making it. The first is proved by this, that in the definition of simony there falls buying or selling, which do not happen without a contract. But the second is established by this, that kinship is for conciliating friendship, which makes gifts to be given for free.
3. Furthermore, we see that the priesthood of the Old Testament was held by right of propinquity, and all the other grades of the Levites: therefore it seems that kinship can also be a reason for holding spiritual dignities in the Church: therefore it does not make simony.
4. In the same way an objection is raised concerning what he calls a violent request. Because there seems to be a contradiction in terms: because if one requests, one does not compel: and if one compels, one does not request: because a request is made to incline a free will to act for the petition: whereas violence excludes the will from the extremes, because violence is (as the Philosopher says) that whose principle is in another, with the one suffering force contributing nothing: now principle denotes a factive cause, as Damascene says: therefore it seems that there is no violent request, or armed prayers.
5. Furthermore an objection is raised concerning gifts. Because the Philosopher says that a gift is an unreturnable giving: therefore gifts do not seek that something be given for the gifts, neither spiritual nor temporal: therefore they do not constitute simony.
6. Lastly also concerning vile service. For vile service is in vile things: therefore if one were to serve in honorable things, he would not seem to commit simony: and this is false: therefore it seems that these are none of the things which are said to make simony.

Furthermore, it is inquired concerning cases occurring all day long, namely of hypocrites, who sell long prayers for the praise of men, whether they are simoniacs?

And it seems that they are: because they give a spiritual thing for a temporal thing.

Furthermore, cloistered monks or canons indeed make no pact: but yet they delay for so long and consider the circumstances, until they probabilistically know what the one to be received as a confrere will give: and if then it is much, they receive him: if it seems little, they refuse. Therefore it is inquired: Whether they are simoniacs?

It seems that they are: because a cause is (as the Philosopher says) that which being posited the effect is posited, and being destroyed it is destroyed: but among them, with such an emolument posited which they conjecture they will perceive, they offer the prebend, and when it ceases they do not confer it: therefore the temporal thing is the cause of conferring the prebend: therefore they commit simony.

If perhaps you say that they do not inquire by themselves, but others in their place, who nevertheless are their procurators. Against this: It does not differ to do by oneself or by another, where the whole cause of the collation of the prebend is the expectation of temporal gain: because by whomever it is done, they themselves expect this in return for the collation: therefore simony is committed in whatever way it is done.

But if this is said: 1. Then all places of religion would perish: because so many would be placed there that the goods would not suffice: and this seems to be inconvenient.

1. Furthermore, it is not evil to induce men to alms: therefore if they induce that by receiving him they might confer an alms, whom otherwise they would not receive, it is not evil: therefore it is not simony.

Response. It seems it must be said, as the Jurists say, that the spiritual is fourfold.

For a certain kind is not possible to be sold on account of its spirituality, because it communicates nothing with bodily things, and therefore cannot pass into the dominion of another, such as the gifts of the Holy Spirit themselves, and the virtues, and the beatitudes.

A certain kind is spiritual in the second place, which is essentially entirely spiritual, yet given in bodily things, such as sacramental graces: and therefore this indeed cannot be sold by its own nature and by right: but it is sold in hope on the part of the bodily work, which is in the power of the ministers: but it is never sold without simony.

A third kind is not essentially spiritual, but rather bodily: but attributed to spiritual persons, to sustain them in spiritual exercises, such as prebends, and other revenues of the Churches: and therefore these are sold: but simony is committed in them by reason of the spiritual thing to which they are attributed.

In the fourth and last mode of spirituality, inanimate bodily things are called spiritual, by which certain spiritual things are treated, such as the vessels of the beauty of the house of God, like chalices, a thurible, crosses, books, and the like: and only of these is it true that they can be sold without the commission of simony. But they differ, for either a Church sells to another Church: and then they can be sold whole without the price being increased for the consecration of their value. Or they are sold to lay persons: and then they must first be broken

674. 1 Corinthians 2:9.

up and melted down by sacred persons, with a prayer premitted for the indulgence of the breaking. As for cemeteries, they seem to have a spiritual right: for either they are only consecrated: or bodies are buried there. If they are only consecrated, they say that they can be deconsecrated and reduced to other uses. But if the bodies of the blessed are buried there, since the ash of the bodies cannot be separated from the rest of the earth, just as the body of a Saint cannot be sold and reduced to other uses, because of the Holy Spirit, whose temple it was while he lived: so neither can the place of burial of that body be reduced to other uses.

Therefore it must be said to the first, that it is one thing for which praise ought to be, and another for which it is: for the Philosopher touches upon only that which ought to be praised: but nevertheless the impious man is praised when he has done evil: and therefore when the reason for giving a spiritual thing is praise, it becomes simony.

To the next it must be said that popular praise has nothing spiritual in it: rather it is more temporal even than time itself: because it is rarer, and is dissolved into the air: but the fame of the Saints is in spiritual things, and therefore is spiritual.

To the next it must be said that it is similarly understood that kinship must be the cause and reason of giving: for if goodness of life were the cause and kinship the con-cause, it would not be simony, because kinship is a bodily thing and derived from the flesh.

But to the argument it must be said that buying and selling are not taken so strictly in the definition of simony: but it is called selling when whatever price causes spiritual things to be given, with price taken in a broad way for every temporal thing which is the whole and sole cause of the giving.

To the next it must be said that the priesthood of the Old Testament did not have the spirit, but was a shadow of the spiritual priesthood: but the New has the spirit: and therefore the spiritual things of the new priesthood ought to be given in the liberty of the spirit.

To the next it must be said that a violent request is taken there for that which induces fear in a constant man. Now I call fear the loss of things, or the injury of fame or person. For when this is the cause of giving, simony is committed.

To the argument it must be said that violent is not taken so strictly here: but for violence here the necessary mixed with violence suffices: such as is the throwing of merchandise into the sea in a time of storm: for of such things the Philosopher says that

they are mixed from the voluntary and the involuntary: and this suffices here to lose the liberality of the donation of spiritual things.

To the next it must be said that every temporal service which is the cause of giving spiritual things is vile in comparison to spiritual things, even if it is honorable or useful simply speaking: and thus vile service is understood here.

To the last it must be said that in the giving of a prebend three things seem to me to be considered, namely the poverty of the place, the liberty of the spiritual things, and the

673. Titus 3:10.

intention of the salvation of the one to be received. If the place is poor, it seems that a prebend cannot be conferred without much burdening of the persons dwelling there, no matter how liberally they would will, if they could, to give a spiritual thing, and to intend the salvation of the one to be received: and then it seems to me that by themselves or by others providing for them they could say that if their goods were to increase, they would gladly receive him, and otherwise they could not receive him. Now I understand increase as with a notable increase, so that the person received can be sustained without notable burdening of the others in that place. But if they do not increase, that they cannot receive him. But to receive under a pact, especially when there is no necessity of the place, is openly simony.

But to the argument it must be said that this does not make the cause of the giving, but rather necessity extorts it: because they would gladly give for free: and therefore they have an eye to this in the collation.

But to the authority of the Philosopher it must be said that what he says is true in natural things: but in voluntary things it fails every day: because it can well be that I will something simply speaking for a good and honorable cause, and yet I am not able: and then with something posited I do it, which not being posited I do not do it: and it is not the cause of the doing according as it proceeds from my will, as is clear to anyone.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 6 — Why Sellers Of Spiritual Things Are Called Simoniacs, Although They Do Not Follow Simon But Rather Gehazi

Why are sellers of spiritual things called simoniacs, since they do not follow Simon, but rather Gehazi?

Next it is inquired concerning that which it says there, G, But the simoniacal heresy, etc.

It is inquired: 1. Since sellers do not imitate Simon, but rather Gehazi, why are they called simoniacs?

1. Also it is inquired: Since simoniacs do not have the right of perceiving prebends, are they held to restitution?

It seems that they are: because they perceive what is not theirs.

1. Furthermore it is inquired concerning a certain case. For let us posit that I know my Bishop to be a simoniac, or otherwise irregular, and latently so. He is still tolerated by the Church. And orders are impending: and it is commanded to me that I receive orders; what ought I to do? For if I receive from a simoniac, I am to be degraded: but if I do not receive, I am disobedient: therefore I am perplexed.

Response. It must be said to the first that they are called simoniacs broadly whether they buy or sell: because Simon also thought to sell the purchased grace afterwards: however there is a verse noting the difference:

What Gehazi sells, Simon seeks to buy (hire).

To the next it seems it must be said that if he knowingly committed simony, he is held to restitution. But if it was committed for him by others while he was ignorant of it, he is not held to it as long as he is ignorant: but after he knows, he is held to it, as it seems.

To the next it must be said that in such a case I ought to seek permission, or another way

of evading: but if I cannot have it, I ought to seek an escape from obedience: but if I cannot have even this, I ought sorrowfully to receive the order of the title.

To the argument to the contrary, it must be said that it is not understood of those who are latent, whom the Church still tolerates. But today this scarcely has a place, because almost no one except a money-changer has a place in the temple.

Articulus 7 — Whether The Canons Have Well Determined Concerning The Age Of Those To Be Ordained, Although It Is Not Observed

Whether the canons have well disposed concerning the age of those to be ordained, since nevertheless it is not observed?

Next it is inquired concerning that which it says there: The sacred canons, he says, etc.

For today this is not observed, especially in religious orders: therefore it seems that they violate the canons of the holy fathers: and this is a mortal sin.

Response. It must be said that just as in marriage malice sometimes makes up for age, so conversely in religious orders gravity of morals and discipline make up for age: especially since what is said here concerns those who are promoted not to orders only, but also to jurisdiction, such as archdeacons and Bishops.

And let these things concerning Order be said by us for the present time.

DISTINCTIO XXVI

Divisio Textus

§ 7. Division of the Text

Since other sacraments after sin, etc. In this part the Author inquires concerning four things regarding marriage: namely, first concerning the cause. Second, concerning the effect, namely where he treats of the goods of marriage, dist. XXXI, there at A, After these things concerning the goods of marriage, etc. Third, concerning its state, dist. XXXIII, there at A, It is inquired here concerning the ancient fathers, etc. Fourth, concerning the matter, namely which persons are legitimate, and which are not, dist. XXXIV, there at A, Now it remains to consider which persons are legitimate, etc.

Regarding the first, two things are inquired. The first is concerning the cause of the institution of marriage. The second is concerning the cause of marriage itself in itself: and this is touched upon in dist. XXVII, there at A, After these things it must be noted, etc.

In this distinction he does three things: for first he touches upon the institutions of marriage. But because God instituted nothing except what is good, therefore in the second part he reprobates the error of certain heretics who say that marriage is evil, there at E, There were some heretics, etc. But because again from its institution every sacrament is signifying,

as Master Hugh says, therefore in the third part he shows what is the thing (res) and what is the sign (signum) in this sacrament, there at F, Since therefore conjugal union is a sacrament, etc.

And from these things the Text is sufficiently clear.

Articulus 1 — Why Marriage Was Instituted

Why was marriage instituted?

Now first a question arises concerning that which it says there, A, Since other sacraments, etc.

1. For in Luke 10:34,[675] it is said that the bindings of the sacraments are the bound wounds of the wounded: but bindings are not necessary except for the wounded: therefore sacraments are not necessary except for one wounded by sins: but the rationale of a sacrament and of every sacrament is the same: therefore it belongs to every sacrament to bind up the wounded: therefore to this one as well: therefore what it says in the Text is false.
2. Also, a sacrament by itself is ordered against sin, as was noted in the beginning of these notes on the fourth book of the Sentences: therefore if there is no sin, neither will there be a sacrament: but if it is not a sacrament, it is not marriage, by an argument from genus: therefore if there is no sin, there is no marriage: and thus again it speaks falsely in the Text.
3. Also, grace differs in sacraments, and virtues, and gifts, as was proved above: since therefore every sacramental grace is ordered against sin, it seems that the grace of marriage also is ordered against the same.
4. Also, as the door and foundation of the sacraments stands, so stand all the things built upon it: but the door of the sacraments, which is baptism, is ordered against the wound of sin: therefore all the things built upon it as well: but one of the things built upon it is marriage: therefore marriage is ordered against sin.
5. Also, whatever is done according to indulgence is ordered against sin: but marriage is done according to indulgence: therefore it is ordered against sin. The first and second propositions are written later in this same distinction in the Text.

6. Also, to what is maximally corrupted, a medicine is maximally necessary: but the generative power is maximally corrupted: therefore a medicine is maximally necessary for it: but it has no medicine except marriage: therefore marriage is its medicine: but it is established that a medicine is not ordered except against a disease: therefore marriage is ordered against the disease of sin.

7. Also, that in which a disease is first felt, against that a medicine is principally ordered: but the disease is first felt in the genitals: therefore the medicine against this is found first: but this medicine is marriage: therefore marriage is a medicine, and only that, as before.

To the contrary of this is that: 1. Those who do not pay attention to the medicine for sin ordain the laws of marriage, such as the civil laws: therefore it is not only against sin. 2. Also, even if sin had not existed there would still have been multiplication: but not except through marriage: therefore marriage would have existed even if sin had not existed: therefore it is not spiritually or substantially ordered against sin. 3. The things which are said in the Text, which are supposed for the present, argue to the same conclusion.

Response. It must be said with the Master that marriage does not have a substantial order against sin: but it is principally for an office, in which office nevertheless a remedy is found against the wound which occurred from sin.

§ 1. To the first, therefore, it must be said that all sacraments are bandages for the wounds of the injured; but this bandage is applied partly by those newly instituted, and partly also by those instituted beforehand, but which nevertheless draw their medicinal effect from the passion of Christ. Hence that which is a sacrament could have existed before sin; but nevertheless, according as a sacrament is the anointing of a wound, thus it was instituted against sin.

§ 2. To the next it must be said that every sacrament, insofar as it is a sacrament, or an action healing by its own consecration, is ordered against sin; but nevertheless it is not necessary that everything that is a sacrament have this, as is clear from what has been said before.

§ 3. To the next it must be said that this difference is accidental to sacramental grace as such, and does not belong to that which is a sacrament if it is taken generally.

§ 4. To the next it must be said that baptism is the foundation of matrimony according to a certain respect. For it is its foundation with respect to making persons simply legitimate: because those who are of disparate worship can, in some cases, be separated; but according to the substance of matrimony it is not the foundation of matrimony. And therefore it is not necessary that, although baptism is ordered against sin, matrimony also be ordered against sin.

§ 5. To the next it must be said that matrimony does not have indulgence simply speaking, but only according to this, that copulation takes place for the sake of satisfying lust. But it can

675. Luke 10:34.

take place for other causes, namely for the hope of offspring, or for the cause of fidelity or rendering the debt. And then it is an act needing no indulgence.

§ 6. To the next it must be said that what is most corrupt needs medicine more than what is less corrupt; but nevertheless matrimony is not in every way its medicine, but only according as it is for a remedy. Whence nothing prevents that, according as it is for an office, it could have been instituted before sin. And through this the solution to the last [objection] is clear.

Articulus 2 — Whether Adam Felt Pain In The Removal Of The Rib

Did Adam feel pain in the removal of the rib?

Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, in A, around the middle: A deep sleep having been sent upon Adam, and one of his ribs having been taken, etc.

§ 8. And here two things are asked principally, and a third incidentally. The first principal thing is: Did Adam feel pain in the removal of the rib? The second is concerning the part that He took. The third, however, which is asked incidentally, is the whole question concerning ecstasy [raptus].

§ 9. To the first one proceeds thus: 1. Pain is the sense of the division of a continuum, as the Philosopher says; but in him a continuum was divided; therefore there was pain in him, as it seems.

§ 10. 2. Also, the soul not only according to itself as a whole naturally appetites the conjunction of the body, but also every part appetites the conjunction of that part to which it is united: therefore it naturally suffers pain in division from that part. Now it is established that the soul of Adam, or a part of it, was separated from that part which was divided from Adam; therefore he naturally felt pain.

§ 11. 3. If perhaps you say that sleep so bound the senses that he did not perceive it. Against this: Sleep does not bind so strongly that even a minor pain would not wake one up, especially one of a good complexion, as Adam was: therefore it seems that Adam would have woken up in such a great division: therefore he felt pain.

§ 12. Furthermore it is asked: Whence did that deep sleep come? 1. For the Lord, by sending the deep sleep, sent a sleep into him either against nature or according to nature. If you say that it was against nature, it seems false: because Augustine says that the Lord did not work against the nature which He Himself made. But if He did it according to nature: according to nature sleep does not occur except through the evaporation of food; but Adam had not eaten then: therefore he could not have had sleep according to nature.

§ 13. 2. Moreover, it seems false what he says in the Letter, that in spirit he understood for what use the woman was made: because sleep is the binding of the senses per se, and of the rational powers per accidens; but when the rational powers are bound, it is impossible to understand anything; therefore Adam could not then understand for what use the woman was made.

§ 14. 3. Also, if some power receives from a prior one, if the prior one is not in act, the posterior one will not be in act. But reason receives from sense. Therefore, since sense is bound, reason will not be in act. But in sleep, sense is bound; therefore reason cannot be in act; therefore what he says in the Letter is false.

§ 15. Response. It must be said that Adam did not feel pain in the separation of the rib from him. Of this a manifold cause is assigned: one which Augustine has: because He who created him was able to do this, that he would not feel pain when He took the rib.

§ 16. But there is, or can be, another cause: because that which in man belongs to the superfluity of the individual, although necessary for the species, is separated from man not only without pain, but even with delight. And this indeed is in two ways: for sometimes that superfluity is that in which a man is made, as is human seed; and this is separated through the action and cutting off of nature. But another is not that in which it is that a man be made, but that he could be made, as Augustine says, that is, in which there is the possibility of obedience: and this is not separated except through the act of the first Maker. And in this way the rib was separated, in which it was not that a woman be made, but that she could be made. In seed, however, there is not only a material possibility, but also a formal one; whence in it, it is that a man be made from it. Both, however, are separated with delight, as I think, even if there were no sin, but it would not be a delight binding to reason. And this is what Avicenna and Constantine say, that nature placed delight in copulation so that it would be appetited because of the need of the species.

§ 17. To the first, however, it must be said that the sense of the division of a continuum which causes pain, is the sense of the division or separation of a conjoint thing pertaining to the consistency of the individual: but the rib was not so, but rather was a superfluity of the individual given for the multiplication of the species.

§ 18. To the next it must be said that the soul does not appetite to be united to anything, except to that which is the matter of the soul, according as it is the mover and form of a physical organic body: but the rib was not such, as has already been held.

§ 19. To the next it must be said that he did not wake up, because the separation for the said causes did not inflict pain.

§ 20. To that which is asked further, it must be said that He sent the deep sleep according to nature.

§ 21. But to that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that the Lord created Adam perfect in all things according to the state of animality; and therefore his veins were full of blood, and his nutritive vessels full of nourishment: and from those proceeded sleep for him.

§ 22. To the next it must be said that the powers of the rational soul are not always bound; but sometimes they are rather relaxed, insofar as the soul is then not occupied with other things: and then revelations occur, as is said in Numbers 24:4: Who falls, and so his eyes are

opened, that is, who lies sleeping and slumbering, and thus sees the visions of God. And thus it was in Adam.

§ 23. To the next it must be said that the intellect does not always take from sense, but rather sometimes takes from separated intelligences, and their impressions are in it, when it is not occupied with the clamors of the senses. And this occurs in sleep, and especially in deep sleep [sopor], because of the difference which some have assigned between sleep and deep sleep, saying that sleep is the rest of the animal powers with the intensification of the natural ones, whereas deep sleep is the rest of the animal powers with the intensification of the intellectual ones.

Articulus 3 — Whether Eve Ought To Have Been Formed From Bone Or From Flesh

Ought Eve to have been formed from bone or from flesh?

Second, it is asked concerning the part which He took, namely concerning the rib.

§ 25. For it seems that He took flesh and the rib: because 1. Below he says: This now is bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh.

§ 26. 2. Moreover, it seems that it would have been better to take flesh: because flesh was more formable than bone, and more apt for figuration; therefore it seems that He ought rather to have taken flesh than a rib.

§ 27. 3. Also, a woman is softer than a man; therefore she seems to have been taken from a softer matter. But this is not bone. Therefore it seems that she ought not to be taken from bone.

§ 28. 4. Moreover, it seems that she ought not to have been taken either from bone or from flesh: because what is in act something, cannot be in potency to that [same thing]. But a bone is in act a bone. Therefore it could not be in potency a bone; therefore the bone of the woman could not be made from bone.

§ 29. 5. Moreover, what is in act one part of a man, is not in potency all the parts; but a bone is in act one part of a man; therefore it is not in potency all the parts. But that from which the woman was made, was in potency the whole woman; therefore it ought not to have been in act some part of a man. But a bone is in act one part; therefore that one thing from which the woman was made, ought not to have been that part which is bone.

§ 30. Response. It must be said that the woman was made and ought to have been made from bone, for a manifold cause: of which one cause is that through this the power of the Maker would be given to be understood: because He can produce any soft things not only from obedient matter, but also from disobedient and hard matter. Another cause is: because if she had been taken from soft matter, she would have been made too soft, and she would seem excused for her softness: and therefore the Lord taught to temper the softness of her complexion through the hardness of the matter: so that thus the woman might universally be taught constancy and the hardness of continence.

§ 31. But why she was taken from the side, and not from the head or the foot, the Master assigned the reason in the second book of the Sentences; and let these suffice.

§ 32. To the first, therefore, it must be said that he does not say "Flesh from flesh" for the reason that she was essentially taken from his flesh, but because originally: because flesh was filled in for the rib, and the rib was transformed into flesh and the other parts of the woman.

§ 33. To the next it must be said that although flesh is more formal than bone, nevertheless to an artisan of infinite power one is not more formal than the rest; and therefore for the aforesaid causes He took bone and not flesh.

§ 34. To the next it must be said that the woman has this from her complexion, and not from her matter, as was explained earlier.

§ 35. To the next it must be said that this is true as long as it remains in the act of that part whose form it has; but the Lord transformed or transmuted the bone from the form of bone, and then induced another form into it.

§ 36. To the last it must be said in the same way. And thus the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 4 — Whether Adam Said Prophetically This Now Is Bone Of My Bones And Flesh Of My Flesh

Did Adam say prophetically: This now is bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh?

§ 37. Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, in A, before the end: After the ecstasy he said prophetically, etc.

§ 38. For concerning present things which are subjected to sense and reason, there is no prophecy. But that the woman was made for this use was subjected to reason receiving from sense; therefore he did not say this prophetically.

§ 39. But if it is said that the prophecy refers to the future state of the Church, which was signified in the woman, this seems to be false: because the sacraments would not have been propagated from the side of Christ unless man had sinned. Therefore the propagation is not known unless the sin is known. Therefore Adam foreknew his own fall, which Augustine denies, and it is also proved in the second book of the Sentences.

§ 40. Solution. To this it must be said that the prophecy refers to the future state of the Church, and not to the present use of the woman: because that could be sensibly known from the distinction of sex and reason.

§ 41. But to that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that it does not follow: this does not happen without that, therefore it is not known without that. And there is a counter-instance: because mathematical lines do not exist without sensible matter, and yet they are known without it; and the universal animal does not exist without the individual, and yet it is known without it. And it is the fallacy of the consequent.

§ 42. However, some say that Adam did not foreknow his fall for this reason, that he did not collate [the premises], nor was he bound to collate, because otherwise he could have been freed. Yet it seems to me that it can also be said that he could know the future propagation

from the side of Christ, and not foreknow the fall, even if he collated: because Christ could have been incarnated for many causes, and not only for sin.

Articulus 5 — Whether Marriage Can Be Instituted Several Times

Can matrimony be instituted multiple times?

Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, in B: Moreover, the institution of marriage is twofold.

§ 44. For this seems to be false: because 1. Divine institution is that from which marriage receives its power, just as every sacrament does. But divine institution is most efficacious. Therefore it is not doubled or tripled to effect the same thing. The first is proved through the definition of a sacrament by Master Hugh, who says that it is signifying from institution.

§ 45. 2. Moreover, other sacraments are more efficacious than this one; and one institution suffices in them; therefore also in this one.

§ 46. 3. Moreover, a cause is not multiplied for the same thing according to one causality, unless it is inefficacious. But the institution is here said to be multiplied for the same thing: because it is done through the same words and for the same act, namely to increase and multiply, as is clear to one inspecting the Letter in the two institutions made in Adam and Noah and his sons; therefore the divine institution was inefficacious, which it is nefarious to say.

§ 47. 4. Also, in human laws one single institution sanctioned by the emperor suffices; therefore much more in divine laws. Therefore there could not be a twofold institution of matrimony.

§ 48. Against this is what is said in the Letter.

§ 49. Solution. It must be said that nothing prohibits the same thing from being instituted twice or thrice or multiple times according to its multiple reasons and effects. Whence since matrimony is for an office of nature, and for a remedy against concupiscence; and this in two ways, namely from the act itself ordered through the fidelity of the marriage bed, and through the signification of the sacrament, and from the grace which is from the espousal of human nature with the divine in the person of Christ: nothing prohibits matrimony thus from having two or even three divine institutions: one with respect to nature according to itself, another with respect to corrupted nature, and a third according to the state of nature repaired through Christ. And thus matrimony is a sacrament of innocence, of the old law, and of the new law.

§ 50. To the first, therefore, it must be said that the institution of the one openly instituting is efficacious; but nevertheless, on our part, it is necessary for it to be doubled or tripled, so that we may know that it is for many things, and not for one, since it cannot effect those many things except by the power of the institution.

§ 51. But if anyone should object, saying that He could have instituted it with one expression, saying: "Let matrimony be valid", to this however it must be said that this was not fitting: because thus He would have revealed to man his future corruption.

§ 52. Furthermore, the disease and the medicine ought to have become known with the succession of time, as is said in Matthew 5:31-32; and the causes for this were assigned above.

§ 53. To the next it must be said that some of the others are more efficacious; but greater or lesser efficacy is not the cause of one or multiple institutions, but rather the plurality of effects, as has been said. And if anyone should argue that if this has more effects, therefore it is more efficacious: it must be said that he fails according to the fallacy of figure of speech, by changing the species of the predicament, namely the discrete into the continuous or quasi-continuous.

§ 54. To the next it must be said that it is not multiplied according to the same causality.

§ 55. But to the proof it must be said that although the same act is repeated, it is not however under the same dispositions: for because the flood had inundated on account of the very act of concupiscence, and Noah, and his sons, and their wives were commanded to enter the ark dividedly, they could out of fear of concupiscence fear lest the human race were to be multiplied again; and therefore again it was commanded, especially having excepted concupiscence through the fidelity of the marriage bed and the good of the sacrament, lest it rush headlong.

§ 56. To the last it must be said that that argument proceeds as if the power of the institutor were the cause of one or multiple institutions. And this is not true, as is clear from the aforesaid.

Articulus 6 — Whether In Paradise There Would Have Been Nuptials And Marriage

Would there have been nuptials and matrimony in paradise?

Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, in B, a little after the beginning: Where the marriage bed would be immaculate, and nuptials honorable, etc.

§ 58. 1. For Augustine says in the book De Bono conjugii that nuptials are a good of mortals. But in paradise human beings were immortal; therefore there would not have been nuptials in paradise.

§ 59. 2. Also, John Damascene says that if man had not sinned, he would have remained immortal. Therefore human nature would have been propagated not through nuptials, but otherwise; therefore what Augustine says in the Letter is false.

§ 60. 3. Also, according to every nature, that which has perpetual salvation [i.e., preservation] in itself, never seeks to be perpetuated in another of the same species. But if man had remained immortal, he would have had perpetual being preserved in himself. Therefore he would not seek to be perpetuated in another; therefore there would not have been nuptials, because nuptials in paradise would not have existed except on account of that.

§ 61. 4. Also, nothing seeks in another what it has more nobly in itself. But he who has this permanence in himself, has it more nobly than he who has it in another. Therefore he who has it in himself does not seek it in another. But man, if he had not sinned, would have had it in

himself; therefore he would not have sought it in another, namely in children through fecundity.

§ 62. To the contrary of this is that: 1. According to nature, everything whose entire matter is not within it, multiplies itself through individuals, so that it may induce matter under its form. But the matter of man was not entirely within him. Therefore he would have multiplied himself through the generation of individuals. The first is established from what was disputed by Aristotle in the first book of De Caelo et mundo. The second is proved by this, that that which has its entire matter within it, is impossible to be multiplied through individuals: but man is multiplied.

§ 63. If perhaps it is said, as Damascene seems to feel, that propagation would have been done otherwise than through the commingling of sex. Against this: Sex was created distinct by the Lord in paradise. Therefore, since every wise person intends a determined end in his work, He Himself intended the end of distinct sex; but it is nothing other than commingling: for the male is he who generates in another out of himself by his own seed, whereas the female generates in herself out of another, as the Philosopher says. Therefore it seems that they would then have commingled.

§ 64. 2. Also, through the text of Genesis 2:20 and seq., it is clear that Eve was made as a helper for Adam. Now it is established that it was not as a helper for life, or for operations: because man had no indigence then, especially since a man would cooperate more with a man for life and operations than a woman with a man. Therefore it is left that she was made as a helper for generation. But she could not help in a diverse sex except through the commingling of sex. Therefore it seems that propagation would have been then as it is now with respect to this.

§ 65. Response. It must be said that, with respect to the commingling of sex, the mode of propagation would have been the same then as now.

§ 66. To the first, therefore, it must be said that the statement of Augustine is understood according to the nature of mortals in the animal state; for man, according to his nature indeed, was always mortal even in paradise, but through the grace of innocence he had immortality, as one can find disputed at the end of the second book of the Sentences.

§ 67. To the next it must be said that Damascene does not refer the dissimilitude to the act of commingling, but to what is conjoined [to it], which is corruption in conception, heaviness in pregnancy, and pain in childbirth.

§ 68. To the next it must be said that the Philosopher speaks of things incorruptible according to nature: and these are only those things which nature has removed far from contrariety and mutation. And man was not such by nature in the first state, but out of grace, as has been said.

§ 69. Through the same, the solution to the following is clear: for it is true that such naturally incorruptible things do not seek to be preserved or multiplied according to the species, except in individuals.

Articulus 7 — Whether In Paradise Conception Would Have Been Without The Heat Of Lust

Would conception have been without the ardor of lust in paradise?

Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, in B, a little after the beginning: From which they would conceive without ardor, and bring forth without pain.

§ 71. For this seems to be false: 1. For either ardor there is understood as the heat of the members in copulation, or as that vehement delight which is felt in copulation. But in the first way it is false: because even in the first state man would have had heat complying with the works of nature more than now. Therefore, since the work of nature is to generate, heat would then have complied with that work. But to comply is to extend the members, as the Philosophers say. Therefore then as now, or more, he would have extended the members; therefore then there would have been ardor. But if it means delight. Against this: It is natural in a well-disposed nature to be delighted in its proper operation, as Aristotle maintains in the tenth book of the Ethics. But nature would have been optimally disposed in the state of innocence if man had stood [firm]. Therefore he would have delighted in his proper operation more than now. But the proper operation is generation; therefore in the act of generation he would have delighted then more than now.

§ 72. If perhaps someone says that he would have had the use of his members at the command of reason, and not by the power of heat. Against this: This is foolish to say: because reason does not move like a power affixed to an organ, but only through command. Therefore there must be some power affixed to an organ which it commands; but this, whatever it is, does not move without an instrument: and since this is nothing other than heat, it follows as before.

§ 73. 2. Also, in every well-disposed complexioned nature, the heaviest pain arises from an excessive touch of the nerves, and vehement delight from what touches fittingly and sweetly. But in the resolution of seed a most fitting touch of the nerves occurs, and similarly it would have been then as now; therefore then as now, or more, man would have been delighted; therefore he would have felt the ardor of delight.

§ 74. Furthermore, it seems that she would have brought forth with greater pain than now: because pain is the sense of the division of a continuum; therefore the sense of the division of a more nobly conjoined continuum causes more pain. But the woman would then have been more nobly conjoined than any woman is now. Therefore she would have felt more pain in division. But it is impossible for an infant of due quantity to be born without the division and extension of the genital member. Therefore then it would have been impossible to bring forth without pain.

§ 75. Response. It must be said that conception would then have been without ardor, and childbirth without pain. Now "ardor" means a delight which suffocates reason according to its act. And I well concede that then there would have been a greater and purer delight in the work: and nevertheless under the command of reason: because reason would then have been

comforted by the grace of innocence, so that nothing existing under it, however vehement it might be, would have averted it from the intuition of the immutable first good.

§ 76. And through this the solution to everything that is objected concerning ardor is clear.

§ 77. To the other which is objected concerning pain, it must be said that there would have been no pain, nor division: because the excessive extension and narrowness of women comes from sin; but then the members would have been proportioned to those being born, so that infants could have been brought forth through an extension not dividing the body of the woman. If however even then the body had been struck by iron, it would not have been divided, as Isidore says; and therefore it also would not have been susceptible to pain.

Articulus 8 — Whether Matrimony Is A Remedy And Medicine Against The Disease Of Concupiscence

Is matrimony a remedy and medicine against the disease of concupiscence?

Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, in B, around the middle: What is for an office to the healthy, is for a remedy to the sick, etc.[676]

§ 79. For this seems to be false: 1. For no infirmity receives medicine from the same thing from which it receives intensification. But the concupiscence of copulating is an infirmity; therefore, etc. Now it is established that carnal concupiscence is satisfied from the matter exhibited to one's faculty and the license of copulating; and this happens through matrimony. Therefore matrimony intensifies concupiscence; therefore it is not a remedy against the disease of concupiscence.

§ 80. 2. Also, no infirmity is cured by that which it appetites. But concupiscence is an infirmity of destitute nature. Therefore it is not cured by the same thing that it appetites. But it appetites copulation; therefore it is not cured by it. Since therefore matrimony is consummated by copulation, it seems that matrimony does not cure concupiscence. The first is proved by the statement of Galen and Aristotle, who say that the appetites of the sick are corrupted by their sickly habit; and therefore they are not to be satisfied.

§ 81. 3. Also, no infirmity remains after its cure if the cure is efficacious; but the concupiscence of copulating still remains and acts after matrimony. Therefore matrimony does not cure the concupiscence of copulating.

§ 82. 4. Also, in all corporeal and spiritual things medicines are by way of the contrary. Therefore it seems that also in this one. It seems therefore, since matrimony does not have contrariety to the concupiscence of copulation, that it is not its cure.

§ 83. 5. If perhaps you say that matrimony is a medicine in this way: because the concupiscence of copulation, which would rush headlong through absolute copulation, is bound to one [woman]; and because it restricts by the fidelity of the marriage bed, therefore it is made not illicit, and thus it receives medicine. Against this: No disease is medicated in such a way that it is restricted to a part of the matter in which it is diffused: because the more it is restricted,

the more severe it is made concerning that in which it is. Therefore neither ought concupiscence to receive medicine in this way.

§ 84. Also, what is in itself illicit, is never made licit from the fact that it is concerning one and not concerning many. But the concupiscence of copulation is in itself illicit. Therefore it is not made licit from the fact that through matrimony it is restricted to one marriage. The first is proved in all moral matters. For avarice and prodigality, and thus of others, which are in themselves illicit, are never made licit from the fact that they are concerning one. The second is proved by this, that nothing in itself rushes into vice and headlong, except what is in itself illicit; but the concupiscence of copulation in itself rushes headlong, as is often said in the words of Augustine in the Letter. And thus the proposition is established.

§ 85. Also, in natures it is thus, that a natural power restricted to one is more intensified in it, as is clear in the hot, the cold, and all others. Since therefore concupiscence acts in the mode of nature, it seems that neither can it take medicine in this way.

§ 86. Solution. To this, however, it seems it must be said that matrimony is a twofold medicine for the concupiscence of copulating. In one way from the grace which it gives in the faith of the Mediator to those contracting, which for it is sacramental grace. And this mitigates concupiscence, as is clear, Tobit 6:16-17: Hear me, and I will show you who they are over whom the demon can prevail. For those who undertake marriage in such a way as to exclude God from themselves and from their mind, and so give themselves to their lust, as the horse and mule which have no understanding, the demon has power over them. And he subjoins, vv. 18 and seq., that others receive it in the fear of God, over whom he does not have power. Now the power of the demon there is called power in the fomes [of sin] with respect to the concupiscence of copulating.

§ 87. But in another way it medicates by restricting with divine and human laws, by which the turpitude which is conjoined to concupiscence is excluded; and in this way it is excepted lest it rush headlong, as is said in the Letter.

§ 88. To the first objection, therefore, it must be said that it does not receive intensification and medicine from the same thing: because matrimony through interior grace remits the fire of the fomes, and through the honesty of exterior divine and human laws removes the turpitude of the vice; so that nothing remains except the turpitude of the penalty which is inseparably conjoined to the act. And this is false, that through matrimony the faculty and license of copulating is given: for although this is in matrimony, nevertheless it is not for this, but rather for those things concerning which it has been spoken.

§ 89. To the next it must be said that this infirmity does not appetite this twofold restriction of itself, but rather licentious copulation. And thus it is clear that that argument does not proceed.

§ 90. To the next it must be said that the infirmity of the vice of concupiscence does not remain after matrimony, but the infirmity of the penalty is diminished for the two causes stated above.

676. Peter Lombard, Sententiae, IV, d. 26, c. 2.

§ 91. To the next it must be said that medicine cannot be made entirely by way of the contrary, when the infirmity is rooted in radical members and is chronic: because nature could not sustain such medicine. And thus it is here: because concupiscence is rooted in corrupted nature, and therefore it is done by way of the contrary as much as possible, so that the good of nature and grace may be preserved, lest it be subverted by the violence of the disease.

§ 92. To the other which is objected against the adduced solution, it must be said that this...

§ 1. ...the two arguments proceed as if that restriction were made only through the diminution of the matter, and not through the diminution of concupiscence: and this is already clear to be false from what has been said. And this is confirmed by the fact that even he who burns with equal concupiscence for his wife as for a harlot or an adulteress is called an adulterer in the sentences of Sextus the Pythagorean, as Jerome will say below in the Text.

§ 2. And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 9 — Whether Concupiscence Is Mortal Or Lethal, And, Since Concupiscence Inheres In Intercourse, Whether That Is Always Mortal

Whether concupiscence is mortal or lethal? And, since concupiscence inheres in coitus, whether it is always mortal?

§ 3. Next, it is asked concerning what he says there, at B, towards the end: "The law of lethal concupiscence has inhered in the members, etc." § 4. From this it seems that: 1. Concupiscence is lethal, because lethal and mortal are the same thing. § 5. 2. Also, if something is blamed on account of something inevitably conjoined to it, it will always be blamed. But, as is said in the Text, intercourse is blamed on account of concupiscence. But this inevitably inheres in coitus. Therefore, it is always blamed. Therefore, it is always mortal. § 6. 3. Also, one act is called specifically the same in morals, which is about a specifically identical object of will, and with the same formal mover. But this act is thus specifically the same regarding a harlot and a wife. Therefore, it is specifically the same. But the judgment of things that are specifically similar is the same. Therefore, if it is mortal regarding a harlot, it will also be mortal regarding a wife. The first premise is proved by induction, because in all things an action is called an action for the reason that it is from the act of the maker, that is, from the form, as the Commentator says on the first book of First Philosophy. The second premise is proved, because a harlot and a married woman are of the same species, and the concupiscence moving toward a wife and a harlot is of the same species, which is the form of the pleasurable thing apprehended in the wife and the harlot. § 7. 4. Also, in the Text a little below he will say that coitus is evil unless it is excused by the goods of marriage. If therefore it cannot be excused, it will always be evil. Let us prove, therefore, that it cannot be excused. For the good of offspring accompanies coitus in both cases, namely in a married woman and an unmarried one. But the good of faith seems not to operate, because faith does nothing except that, while she is alive, he is not joined to another. But this faith can be given to an unmarried lover. Therefore, it does not seem to make an excuse. But the sacrament is caused by the indivisibility of the flesh: but when one is joined to a harlot, they are made one flesh. Therefore, it seems that it is altogether equal in a harlot and a wife. And therefore, since they do not excuse in the

one, they do not seem to excuse in the other; and thus the proposition is held. § 8. 5. Also, everything that is excused is evil. But every matrimonial coitus is excused, as is said in the Text. Therefore, it is evil. § 9. 6. Also, if perhaps you wish to say that when it has an excuse, it is made not evil. This, first of all, is against rhetorical discipline, in which arguments of excuse are referred to nothing except to an evil. But secondly, it seems that it cannot be excused, because evil things must not be done so that any good things whatsoever may result , but coitus is evil, as is said in the Text. Therefore, it is not to be done so that any good things whatsoever may result. Therefore, neither so that the goods of marriage may result. § 10. And these are, or can be, the arguments of the heretics condemning every matrimonial intercourse. § 11. To the contrary of this, it is objected thus: 1. In Luke 1:6, concerning the parents of John the Baptist knowing each other mutually in charity, it is said: "They were both just before God, walking in all the commandments and justifications of the Lord without blame," etc. But this could not be true if coitus were a sin. Therefore, coitus is not a sin.

§ 12. 2. Also, 1 Corinthians 7:3: "Let the husband render the debt to his wife, and the wife also in like manner to the husband." It is evident that he is not speaking of a debt of money, but of the body. But a sin is owed to no one. Therefore, to share the body for intercourse is not a sin for spouses. § 13. 3. Also, it is objected by reason thus: Every voluntary act rooted in nature or in human communication takes a mean of virtue. But coitus is an act of this kind. Therefore, it takes a mean of virtue. Therefore, sometimes it is not only not a sin, but even a virtue. And this is nowhere but in marriage. Therefore, matrimonial intercourse is not always a sin. The first premise is proved by induction in the works of chastity, fortitude, and justice. The second premise is evident from the fact that the generative power is a natural power, and therefore its act is necessary. § 14. 4. Also, in every nature that is maximally divine which maximally attains perpetuity. Therefore, it is similar in man. But what maximally attains perpetuity is the act saving the species. Therefore, this is maximally divine. Therefore, even if it is formed by divine or human law, it will be honorable. Therefore, then it will not only not be a sin, but even an act of virtue. § 15. 5. Also, what nature does in some things within one subject and in other things through diverse subjects, is equally natural done in one or in diverse subjects. But nature accomplishes impregnating and being impregnated in one subject in plants, and in a diversity of sexes in sensible creatures. Therefore, it is equally natural in both. But what is natural in all things, if it is made voluntary, is not thereby made blameworthy. Therefore, to impregnate and be impregnated by a rational will is still not made blameworthy. But every natural voluntary act ordainable by reason with the due circumstances of nature will be an act of virtue. Therefore, the intercourse impregnating and being impregnated, or of the impregnator and the impregnated, can be an act of virtue; and from there as before. § 16. Response. It must be said that those things which the first arguments attempt to prove are profane; and to rebuke those heretics it suffices to say that they themselves are children of adulterers and children of darkness and of the devil according to their own confession, and therefore they will also receive the inheritance of their father the devil, that is, eternal punishments, unless they repent; and this is most certainly true. § 17. To that therefore which they object first, it must be said that concupiscence is called lethal because it is induced by death, not because it always induces death. It is also called lethal

because it inheres in a mortal body. § 18. To the next, it must be said that concupiscence is almost inevitably adjoined to coitus, but not to fault. And a punishment is not blameworthy except in a qualified sense, namely insofar as it is from sin. § 19. To the next, it must be said that according to the species of morals, matrimonial intercourse and unmarried intercourse are not the same act in species. § 20. But to the proof it must be said that materially the remote object is the same in species, but not the formal and proximate object. For the remote object is materially the same in both cases, but the proximate object is materially under circumstances which in the one case are an undue loosening as a kindling of one's own wantonness, but in the other case bounded and bound by human and divine laws from divine and human right, in which the good of offspring or of medicine is sought. Similarly, the moving habit in the one is the concupiscence of fornicating; in the other, however, the honorableness of nuptials. And therefore it is clear that that argument does not proceed. § 21. To the next, it must be said that none of the goods of marriage is in the unmarried woman. For there is no good of offspring, which is clear from the fact that it belongs to the definition of the good of offspring that it be received honorably, which is not sought in an unmarried woman. Nor is faith there, because it does not happen to have faith except toward one's own; and this one is not his own, but there is a certain established baseness there. Nor is the sacra- ment there, because this is more rooted in the division of spirits than of bodies. Whence it is clear that that proof is worth nothing. § 22. To the next, it must be said that that which is excused is excused in two ways, namely as that which is essentially guilt, and as that which is not essentially guilt, but is conjoined to a baseness on account of something preceding which was the guilt of the same in species not in number, from which there is a dependence, as upon a father. That therefore which is excused in the first way, this without doubt is an evil of fault; and concerning this the objection holds. But that which is excused in the second way is not an evil in itself, nor is it the fault of him in whom it is excused, but rather a punishment proceeding from the fault of the father. § 23. To the next, it must be said that evils of fault must not be done, not even the least, so that any goods whatsoever may result. But coitus in itself is not a fault of this kind, as is clear from what has been established previously. § 24. However, when it is said that coitus in itself is evil or a sin, there is a twofold equivocation of that which is "in itself." For if it denotes the property or condition of the nature and essence of coitus, the expression is false, because in this way coitus in paradise would also have been evil. But if it denotes the exclusion of those things which order coitus by the laws and goods of marriage, then it is true; and in this way coitus "in itself" is understood, that is, alone by itself not constrained by the law and good of marriage. § 25. And this distinction is valid both for the preceding and the subsequent ar- guments.

Articulus 10 — Whether The First Institution Of Marriage Had A Precept

Whether the first institution of marriage had a precept? Whether the first institution of marriage had a precept?

§ 26. Next, it is asked concerning what he says there, at C: "The first institution had a precept, etc." § 27. For this seems to be false: 1. Because either this was an affirmative precept or a negative one. If affirmative: therefore every man is always bound to it. Therefore, no man

is absolved from it, because it is not read to have been retracted. Therefore, at some time even monks and nuns are bound to the act of marriage; which seems false, since they vow perpetual continence, and "no weight is worthy of a continent soul." But if it is negative: then it obliges always and for always; and then it is always necessary for a man to be in the matrimonial act, which is impossible and frivolous. § 28. 2. Also, if there was then a precept: either this precept was then for us, or about things to be done in themselves. If in the first way: then it ought to have been in an indifferent matter, and not to oblige after the state of sin, just like the precept about not eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. But if it is about things to be done in themselves, since things to be done in themselves are always in one way, the precept will oblige in one way. Therefore, it still obliges every man, which is false. § 29. 3. Also, we see that the precept concerning the salvation of the individual, which is about eating, still obliges every man. Therefore, by similarity, the precept concerning the salvation of the species ought to still oblige every man. § 30. 4. Also, the species is more worthy and more necessary than the individual. But there is a greater obligation toward what is more worthy and more necessary. Therefore, there is a greater obligation toward the act saving the species than the individual. But we are still obliged to the act saving the individual. Therefore, to that one too. Therefore, all who vow continence sin mortally by vowing continence. § 31. 5. If perhaps you should say that it obliged when there were few men, and it would still oblige in a similar case. To the contrary: A moral precept obliges equally when there are few and when there are many. Therefore, if this is moral, it seems that it is saying nothing to state that it obliges when there are few and does not oblige when there are many. But if it is said to be ceremonial, this is evident to anyone to be frivolous. § 32. 6. Also, it seems that in all ways it still obliges everyone, because according to the desire of nature there ought always to be an order of natural things. But the desire of nature is towards the all-encompassing multiplication of individuals. Therefore, the precept and order of natural things ought to be towards this. The first premise is proved by the fact that nature never errs, as the Philosophers say, and is most wise in its effects and acts. The second is self-evident. § 33. 7. Also, when there are many, if anyone does well by living continently, generation would be dissolved; and this would be evil. Therefore, he would not do well by living continently. But the reason is the same for one and for another. Therefore, either all would do well by living continently, or none. Not all. Therefore, none. Therefore, all who live continently sin. § 34. And these are, or can be, the arguments of the Jews who say that all must contract marriage, and of certain Judaizing heretics. § 35. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Sirach 26:20: "No weight is worthy of a continent soul." But continence is principally in virginity, namely in indivisibility. Therefore, it seems that it is better than matrimonial chastity. § 36. 2. Also, the principal good is that which principally offers the faculty of keeping oneself for the Lord without impediment. But this is virginal and widowed chastity. Therefore, it seems that that is better than matrimonial chastity. § 37. 3. Also, virtue is about the difficult and the good, namely the honorable. But virginity and widowhood are more about the difficult and the good. Therefore, they are more good than marriage. § 38. 4. Also, the sixtyfold fruit is owed to widowhood, and the hundredfold to virginity, but only the thirtyfold to marriage. Therefore, it seems that virginity and widowhood are better than marriage. § 39. 5. Also, there is no precept concerning an easy

thing to which nature by itself inclines, even if it is about things to be done. But nature inclines to the act of matrimonial intercourse, and it is easy. Therefore, there ought not to be a precept about it. The first premise is proved by the fact that everyone says that there is no precept about loving oneself because this is easy and nature inclines itself to it. The second is self-evident. § 40. 6. Also, everything that is commanded for some cause seems not to oblige when that cause does not exist. But when it is said: "Increase and multiply," if there is increase and multitude, the precept does not have a cause and reason. Therefore, it seems that then it does not oblige. § 41. Response. It must be said that this precept belongs to nature from the cause of a defect of multitude; and therefore I well concede that it does not oblige when a multitude exists. § 42. To the first, therefore, it must be said that it was an affirmative precept made for a determinate cause, and it obliges every man when the cause is the same, because then it is a time of necessity; and then I well concede that, no vow withstanding, every man would be bound if the case were similar. § 43. But to that which is proved, it must be said that the weighing of personal good is not worthy of a continent soul; but yet the weighing of the common good outweighs any personal good whatsoever, especially such a good as is the salvation of the human species. And this is what Aristotle says, that if the good of one man is good, that of the city will be better, and the greatest good that of the nation. § 44. To the next, it must be said that it is about things to be done in themselves from a cause which is a defect of inhabitants of the world and of those serving God; and therefore it does not oblige unless that cause exists. § 45. To the next, it must be said that it is not similar, because the salvation of the individual is not procured except through that same individual, but the salvation of the species can be procured through another. § 46. To the next, it must be said that it is true that the species is more worthy than the individual, and it is better that the species be saved than the individual, if the one cannot be saved without the other. But the salvation of the species is in no way in danger when many men exist, for the reason that nature, concupiscence, and the love of offspring incline towards the act of generation; and therefore one who abstains for the sake of God merits. § 47. To the next, it must be said that this precept, "Increase and multiply," was not given simply, because it does not happen to increase after perfect increase, nor to be multiplied after perfect multiplication; but it was given for a cause, as has been said, and therefore it obliges when that cause exists, and not otherwise. § 48. To the next, it must be said that there is integral nature and corrupt nature, and according to this it has a twofold desire; and because the desire of corrupt nature is mixed with corruption, therefore it is necessary to resist the desires of nature, and maximally of Venus. But the argument proceeds concerning the desire of integral nature alone. § 49. To the next, it must be said that when many exist, anyone does well by living continently; and if everyone were to vow continence, it is certain that then God would reveal His will concerning the disposition of the world either by Himself or through faithful dispensers of the Church; and then they would have to be obeyed in all things that they would command, either concerning keeping the vow, if perhaps from those present the nu- mber of the elect would be fulfilled; or concerning breaking the vow and recompensing through the material multiplication of the faithful, lest the world be dissolved.

Articulus 11 — Whether The Marital Act Has Indulgence, Or A Reward

Whether the matrimonial act has indulgence, or a reward?

§ 50. Next, it is asked concerning what he says there, at C, after the beginning: "But indulgence, because it does not choose the better things, has a remedy, not a reward, etc." § 51. 1. For it seems first that this consequence is null, and there is a counter-instance, because any precept of the Lord does not choose the better things, but rather a counsel does. Therefore, it only has an indulgence, not a reward; and this is false. § 52. 2. Furthermore, it seems to be false: for what is announced by an Angel to be done has a reward, not an indulgence. But the act of marriage is sometimes announced by an Angel to be done. Therefore, it has a reward, not an indulgence. The first premise is proved from the fact that God announces through Angels neither great evils nor small ones. But everything that has an indulgence is a sin, as is said in the Text from the words of Augustine. The second premise is proved by the conception of John the Baptist, Samson, and certain others. § 53. 3. Also, every act to which a formed virtue moves is meritorious and has a reward. But the act of marriage is many times such an act. Therefore, many times it has a reward. The first premise is proved because an act receives the ratio of merit from the form of a formed virtue. The second premise is proved because the faith of the marriage bed is a formed virtue in those having charity, and it often moves to the act of marriage. § 54. 4. Also, every act of formed justice is meritorious and has a reward. But the rendering of the debt in the act of marriage is an act of formed justice. Therefore, it is a meritorious act, and it has a reward. § 55. 5. Also, an act of virtue in whatever state, as long as it remains formed by charity, is meritorious and has a reward. But the act of marriage is an act of a certain state of continence having the form of charity. Therefore, it has a reward, and it is meritorious. § 56. 6. Also, everything that divine and human law commands, and punishes if it is not done, is meritorious if it is done in charity. But divine and human law commands the act of marriage, and punishes if it is not done. Therefore, it is meritorious if it is done in charity. § 57. 7. Also, everything that is done in the sole fear of God, not with human lust, can be meritorious. But such is the act of marriage. Therefore, etc. The proof of the major premise is in Tobit 8:4-5, where Sarah said: "I consented to take a husband with fear of You, not with my lust." § 58. 8. Also, the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 7:5: "Return together again." But it is evident that he would in no way command a sin to be committed. Therefore, to return to the act of marriage is not a sin. Therefore, it does not always have an indulgence after sin, as the Text seems to sound. § 59. 9. Also, there is a rule among the Doctors that no one ought to commit a lesser sin so that another may avoid a greater one. But if the coitus of marriage always had an indulgence, a woman consenting to her husband for coitus lest he fall into adultery would be committing a lesser sin so that another might avoid a greater one. Therefore, this must not be done by a woman. Therefore, women must be counseled not to render the debt, which is absurd. Therefore, intercourse does not always have an indulgence. It is false, therefore, that after sin it was always for a remedy, which nevertheless the Text seems to sound. § 60. ON THE CONTRARY: 1. The Apostle speaks generally when he says in 1 Corinthians 7:6: "But I speak this by indulgence." But whatever has indulgence is a sin, as is said in the Text. Therefore, generally every matrimonial intercourse is a sin. § 61. 2. Also, that whose cause is evil, itself is also evil. But the cause of intercourse is the concupiscence necessarily adjoined to

it. Therefore, matrimonial intercourse generally is evil. § 62. 3. Also, in natural things, that is called evil and corrupt which is mixed with evil and corruption. Therefore, similarly in morals, that is called evil which is mixed with the corruption and evil of morals. But the coitus of marriage is inevitably mixed with the evil of morals, which is the foulness of concupiscence. Therefore, every coitus of marriage is evil. § 63. 4. Also, that which an evil always follows, when it is caused by it, seems to be evil as a cause of evil. But the concupiscence of coitus is always followed by the evil of original sin, as Augustine says in the book On Marriage and Concupiscence against Julian the Pelagian. Therefore, matrimonial coitus generally is evil. § 64. 5. Also, Damascene says that there is shame in the act of marriage. Therefore, it is base. But everything base is opposed to the honorable. Therefore, matrimonial coitus is opposed to the honorable. But nothing is opposed to the honorable except a vice. Therefore, the act of marriage is a vice. Therefore, it is a sin. § 65. Response. It must be said that the act of marriage can be done for four causes, and with three moving factors. The first cause is the hope of offspring. The second is the faith of rendering the debt. The third is in remembrance of the good of the sacrament. The fourth is the cause of healing infirmity. The moving factor, moreover, is sometimes solely a virtue, and this in three ways, namely the love of propagating the worship of God in offspring, the love of justice in rendering the debt, and the faith of future union in one spirit to God. Sometimes the moving factor is nature with virtue. Sometimes the moving factor is nature with vice, and this in two ways: for sometimes nature precedes vice, and sometimes conversely vice precedes nature. § 66. Therefore, it must be said that if intercourse is done for the first three causes, and with the first two moving factors, in my judgment the act is meritorious, and has a reward, and has no indulgence. But if it is done for the fourth cause, and with the third moving factor, in such a way that nature precedes by restraining concupiscence lest it move towards the wife as towards an adulteress, then it is a venial sin, and it has an indulgence. But if concupiscence precedes, and lust is posited as the ultimate end, it is a mortal sin not having an indulgence, except through penance just like any other mortal sin; because these give themselves over to their lust "as the horse and mule in which there is no understanding; and therefore the demon has power over them," as is said in Tobit 6:17. § 67. Through this, therefore, the solution to the first objections is clear. § 68. To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that the Apostle does not speak generally, unless it is called the indulgence of concession, as is distinguished in the Text; but then not everything that has an indulgence is a sin. § 69. And what Augustine says, that whatever has an indulgence is a sin, is understood of the indulgence of permission. § 70. To the next, it must be said that the cause of matrimonial intercourse is not always evil, as is clear from the aforesaid; and therefore that argument is worth nothing. § 71. To the next, it must be said that the coitus of marriage generally is mixed with the evil of punishment, but not with the evil of fault; and therefore it cannot be called an evil of fault, but of punishment. § 72. To the next, it must be said that this original sin which is born from concupiscence is not from an evil act, because it is not evil, but rather from the force of the sentence of a just Judge, from which penal concupiscence draws its strength, infecting the infant who is born, for the reason that every generating man (as Anselm says) is Adam in the generating nature, whatever he may be in person. § 73. To the next, it must be said that the base is twofold, namely of punishment

and of fault. And matrimonial coitus has the baseness of punishment, not of fault. But many punishments of such a kind have shame, yet not an accusable one, just like defecation, urination, and the like; and such baseness is commonly called base, but it is not opposed to the honorable. There is another baseness which is a crime not having beauty in an act of virtue, and this is opposed to the honorable, and is a sin; but this baseness is not in the act of marriage.

Articulus 12 — Whether Permission In The New Testament Is Of Moral Goods

Whether permission in the New Testament is concerning moral goods?

§ 74. Next, it is asked concerning what he says there, at D, after the beginning: "And there is a permission in the New Testament, concerning lesser goods, etc." § 75. For this seems to be false, because: 1. Since there are five signs of the divine will, as was held before the end of the first book of this volume: but permission there is always concerning evil. Therefore, it is not concerning lesser goods. § 76. 2. Also, divine operation and permission are not of the same thing. But God operates lesser goods, just as greater ones. Therefore, it seems that He does not permit them to be done. § 77. 3. Also, the precept of God and permission are among the signs of the will. Since therefore they are diverse, they will not be about the same thing. But there is a precept concerning lesser goods. Therefore, permission is not concerning lesser ones. § 78. Furthermore, it is asked, why does he say "in the New Testament"? § 79. For it seems that permission is not about ceremonial things, but about moral things. Therefore, it applies equally to the New and the Old Testament. Therefore, it is not only in the New Testament that it is concerning lesser goods. § 80. To this it must be said that permission, insofar as it is a sign of the divine will, and insofar as it is concerning lesser goods, is not taken in a single sense. For there it is opposed to operation, since both are about the present, one about evil, and the other about good; but here it is opposed to counsel, for the reason that the greater goods are those about which there is counsel; and when a man is not inclined to those, God permits a man to be saved in lesser goods, that is, He concedes it. But there is another difference: because in permission insofar as it is a sign of the divine will, God does not will the act, but something surrounding it which is elicited from that very evil act being ordered; but here God wills the act itself, but He would reward more him who was of a more excellent merit. § 81. And through this the solution to the first objection is clear, which fails according to equivocation. § 82. Through the same, the solution to the second and third is also clear. § 83. But to that which is asked further, it must be said that in the Old Testament something else reforms sin, because there was a state of imperfection, grace not yet made public, and there were few serving God, and all the nations around were drawing towards idolatry. And therefore then there was not a permission, but a precept, so that there would be a multiplication of those worshipping God, so that with the propagation of seed there would be a propagation of religion. And therefore then there were multiple wives of one husband.

Articulus 13 — Whether The Opinion Of The Heretics Saying That Intercourse With One's Wife Is A Sin Should Be Tolerated

Wheth-
er the opinion of the heretics saying that coitus with a wife is a sin, is to be tolerated? Whether the opinion of the heretics saying that coitus with a wife is a sin, is to be tolerated?

§ 84. Next, it is asked concerning what he says there, at E: "But there were some heretics, etc." § 85. 1. For what the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 7:29 seems to be in their favor: "Those who have wives, let them be as though they had none." [677] For one not having a wife does not use a wife. Therefore, even one having her ought not to use her. § 86. 2. Also, that which impedes receiving God seems to be a sin. But the coitus of a wife does this. Therefore, it seems that it is a sin. The first premise is proved by the saying of Isaiah 59:2: "Your iniquities have divided between you and your God." The second is written in Exodus 19:15, where when the people were to meet the Lord, Moses said that they should not approach their wives. § 87. 3. Also, in 2 Samuel 6:6-7, Uzzah is said to have been struck because, when he had lain with his wife, he wanted to hold the ark lest it fall, for the reason that a kicking ox had tilted it; but this could not be unless coitus were reputed an iniquitous sin. Therefore, these heretics seem to speak the truth. § 88. 4. Also, the disciples, hearing from the Lord how the case of a man with his wife was, said: "It is not expedient to marry." [678] Therefore, it seems that this is an evil, because every good is expedient or honorable; and even the honorable has the expedient joined to it, as Tully says. Since therefore marriage is a good, it itself will be expedient. § 89. 5. Also, it is proved by reason thus: An act of nature is not diversified in species on account of what the will posits around it. But coitus is an act of nature. Therefore, it will be diversified in species on account of no circumstance of the will. Therefore, whether it is done with a married woman or with an unmarried one, it is the same in species. Therefore, it will be of the same judgment in good and in evil. But the first premise is proved from the fact that artificial things are caused by the will, and they do not diversify the species. The second is self-evident, because the generative power is a natural potency. § 90. 6. Also, as the Philosopher says in the tenth book of the Ethics, the whole good of man insofar as he is a man is the good of reason and intellect. Therefore, what subverts that is an evil in itself. But coitus subverts and binds reason. Therefore, it is an evil. But the evil of man which is a fault, as Dionysius says, is to be against reason. Therefore, coitus generally is an evil of fault. § 91. 7. If perhaps you should say that coitus subverts reason in act, but not in habit. To the contrary: From all acts (as the Philosopher says) which are voluntary, similar habits are left behind. Therefore, from the voluntary act which is the act of marriage, a habit is left behind. But as act relates to act, so habit relates to habit. Therefore, as the act subverts the act, so the habit subverts the habit. § 92. 8. Also, acts which are about innate passions, and those which are about equally intense pleasures, are equal in superfluity. But the act of marriage and the act of unmarried intercourse are about equally intense pleasures. Therefore, they are equal in superfluity. But acts which are equal in the superfluity of pleasure are equally vicious. Therefore, the act of marriage and unmarried intercourse are equally vicious. Therefore, just as unmarried intercourse is a mortal sin, so too is the act of marriage. § 93. 9. Also, in acts which are about pas-

§ 1. ...inflicted passions, those are equal which are about the equally terrible: therefore, by similarity, the acts which are about the equally pleasurable are equal: but the act of matrimony and free intercourse are about the equally pleasurable: therefore they are equal: therefore, as much as free intercourse is a vice, so much is the act of matrimony a vice.

§ 2. To the contrary of this is: § 3. 1. What is said They that buy, as though they possessed not. But this cannot be understood regarding the use of the bought thing: therefore neither is what he says They that have wives, let them be as though they had none, understood regarding use.

§ 4. 2. Also, either matrimony absolutely impedes the reception of God, or not. If so: then Moses should have absolutely forbidden wives, and not only for three days. If not: then the proposition is held, namely that it is not a mortal sin: because every mortal sin absolutely impedes the reception of God.

§ 5. 3. Also, the father of John is praised, and similarly his mother: but those heretics condemn John: therefore this cannot be understood concerning a spiritual father and mother: therefore it is understood of carnal ones: therefore a carnal father who has intercourse with his wife can be holy: and this would not be so, if intercourse were a sin: therefore intercourse is not a sin.

§ 6. 4. Also, the Lord [679] says: Whosoever shall put away his wife, excepting for the cause of fornication, maketh her to commit adultery. Therefore he must remain with her: therefore intercourse with her is not a sin.

§ 7. Also, nothing prevents an act of greater pleasure from being an act of virtue, and one of lesser pleasure from being an act of vice, as is evident in eating pleasurable things when one ought, and where one ought, and as much as one ought, and in eating coarse foods as one ought not, and when one ought not, and as much as one ought not, like Esau who sold his birthright for a vile meal: therefore, by similarity, thus it is in intercourse: therefore it does not follow that if the intercourse of matrimony is of as much or greater pleasure as intercourse with an unmarried woman, that if one is a sin, the other is as well.

§ 8. RESPONSE. It must be said that these are the worst heretics who were once called Tatiani, but now Paterniani, who assert about themselves that they are the sons of fornications and prostitutes: and therefore no right in temporal inheritance ought to be left to them, just as they have no right in eternal inheritance. But it must be said that they lie, not understanding what they speak about, nor what they affirm.

§ 9. To the first, therefore, it must be said that, as is evident from the objection made to the contrary, it is not understood that they ought not to know their wives, but that they ought not to place their hope in them as in an enjoyable thing.

§ 10. To the next it must be said that it does not impede the reception of God, but has an incongruity for seeing God immediately after intercourse, on account of the annexed concupiscence.

677. 1 Corinthians 7:29.

§ 11. To the next it must be said that Uzzah was perhaps not struck for this reason as is said in the Book of Kings: but because, although he was a Levite, he did not carry the ark on his own shoulders. But if he was struck for this reason, then it was on account of unsuitability arising from concupiscence and carnality, and not from sin.

§ 12. To the next it must be said that the disciples say it is not expedient, for this reason, because due to the entanglement of worldly things it withdraws one from divine service: just as the Apostle says by contrast concerning virginity [680], that it provokes to that which is honorable, and that it gives the facility of attending upon the Lord without impediment. And it is not true that the good of grace is opposed to such an inexpedient thing, nor is it itself an evil of fault: but only to that expedient thing which follows the honorable: for sometimes evil itself is called expedient, insofar as it cooperates toward good: although it is said improperly, because it does not cooperate toward good except occasionally.

§ 13. To the next it must be said that the act of nature is twofold: for one is the act of the will which is a certain nature, and the act of a determinate nature which behaves in one way, which is defined by Aristotle, that it is the principle of motion and rest in that in which it is per se and not accidentally. Therefore it must be said that the act of nature, according as the will is a certain nature, is well varied by the will, and intercourse is an act of such a nature: but the act of nature spoken of in the second way is not varied by the will.

§ 14. But to that by which he attempts to prove it, it must be said that the generative power is not the first mover in the act of generation, but rather the commanding will: and therefore from that first mover intercourse is a voluntary act, and on account of diverse circumstances it is made a sin in an unmarried woman, and an act of virtue in a married one.

§ 15. To the next it must be said that reason holds itself in a twofold way toward those works, insofar as reason is right reason, namely as preceding, and as accompanying: for the preceding [reason] orders the circumstances, how much one ought, and as, and when, and with whom, and how: but the accompanying [reason] directs. Therefore it must be said that vice subverts preceding reason, as Socrates said, and Aristotle attests, that pleasure subverts the estimation of prudence in the minor proposition: and this is written in Book VI of the Ethics, in the chapter on prudence. But the act of matrimony does not subvert preceding reason, but accompanying reason: and therefore it is not a vice.

§ 16. And if it is objected that because that accompanying reason directs, if it is subverted, the act remains undirected: it must be said that it does not direct as ordering, but as inspecting: rather the act is ordered by the preceding discretion of reason: and this order remains in the act of matrimony, just as the projective force remains in the medium, even when the first projector ceases.

§ 17. To the next it must be said that from all acts a habit similar to the act is left behind: and therefore if from the acts of matrimony a habit is left behind, since those acts are ordered, the habit will not be unordered.

678. Matthew 19:10.

§ 18. To the next it must be said that what is supposed as true is false, namely that acts are equal in evil and good which are about equal pleasures: because the act of nature makes neither evil nor good that which is about pleasures: which is evident from this, that the acts of virtues and vices are about pleasures and sorrows: but what makes acts good or evil is having undue or due circumstances and ends.

§ 19. And through this the solution to the last is evident: because that argument proceeds upon a false similarity.

Articulus 14 — Whether Marriage Is A Sacrament, And What Its Reality Is, And From Whom It Draws The Power Of Its Effect

Whether matrimony is a sacrament? and What is its reality? and, From what does it draw the power of its effect?

§ 22. Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, E, Since therefore marriage is a sacrament, etc.

§ 23. And the disputation proceeds over the whole chapter.

§ 24. For it seems that the Master poorly determines the reality of such a sacrament:

§ 25. 1. For a contained and signified reality is more substantial to a sacrament of the New Testament than a signified and non-contained reality: but the union of a faithful soul with God in one spirit, or the union of two natures in Christ is a reality signified and not contained: therefore it seems that it ought not to be determined with respect to that.

§ 26. 2. Also, a sacrament of the new law effects what it figures: but matrimony is a sacrament of the new law: therefore it effects what it figures: but it figures the union of two natures in Christ: therefore it effects it, which is false: therefore it is not its reality: it seems therefore that he says what is false in the text.

§ 27. 3. Also, what is equally effected by every grace and merit, or most especially by charity, does not seem to be the reality of matrimony: but the conjunction of the faithful soul with God in one spirit is effected with virtue, and especially charity: therefore it is not the effect of matrimony.

§ 28. NEXT TO THIS three things are further asked, namely whether matrimony is a sacrament of the new law? Secondly, What is its reality? Thirdly, From what does it draw the power of its effect in it?

§ 29. TO THE FIRST of these it is objected in many ways:

§ 30. 1. Firstly, indeed, on the part of the form of the sacrament: for every sacrament has a form promulgated by divine institution, which grants sanctification to the sacrament: but matrimony does not have such a form: therefore it is not a sacrament of the new law. The first is evident from the saying of Augustine who says, that the word is added to the element, and it

679. 1 Corinthians 7:3.

becomes a sacrament. But the second is evident: because the consent which effects matrimony is according to the laws of those who contract, as is held below in the text.

§ 31. 2. Secondly, it is objected to this same thing from the consideration of matter: for every sacrament of the new law or most have matter which is some visible element, as water, oil, bread, and things of this sort, as Hugh says: but this does not have matter: therefore it is not a sacrament of the new law.

§ 32. 3. To the same it is objected thirdly from the consideration of effect: because every sacrament of the new law effects grace which assists inwardly: but matrimony does not effect anything such: therefore matrimony is not a sacrament of the new law. The first is PROVED from the definitions of a sacrament assigned at the beginning of this fourth book of the Sentences. But the SECOND is written below, where he says: Matrimony does not merit the palm.

§ 33. Secondly it is asked, What is its reality if it is a sacrament of the new law?

§ 34. For it seems that there is none: because 1. An act with baseness is what consummates matrimony: therefore it does not confer grace.

§ 35. 2. Also, for what is conceded to infirmity, it suffices that it avoids punishment: but matrimony is conceded to infirmity: therefore it suffices that it avoids punishment: it seems therefore that it does not confer any grace.

§ 36. 3. Also, everything that confers grace, if its exercise can be repeated, is not dissuaded: but the repetition of matrimony, when a wife has died, is dissuaded, and the penalty of irregularity is added: therefore matrimony does not confer grace.

§ 37. Further it is asked thirdly, On what is its efficacy founded?

§ 38. But it seems that it is founded on nothing: because every sacrament effects what it figures by the virtue of the passion of Christ: but this does not have a figure with the passion of Christ, because it consists in maximal pleasure: therefore it seems that it does not have anything from which it might draw its effect.

§ 39. RESPONSE. It must be said to the first, that the Master does not touch in the text upon anything except the signified and not contained reality: because according to him and many others baptism did not have another reality. But what seems to us concerning this will be evident below in the solution of the same question.

§ 40. To the next it must be said that a sacrament of the new law is twofold: one which is a sacrament only, another which is a sacrament and an office. A sacrament only is one whose whole substantial effect is in the opus operatum [the work performed], as is baptism, confirmation, the Eucharist, holy orders, and extreme unction. A sacrament and office is twofold, namely an office of the person, and an office of nature. The office of the person is penance, the office of nature is matrimony. Therefore, as to what is said, that a sacrament of the new law effects what it figures, some say this is understood concerning that which is a sacrament only: because that is so of the new law that it did not exist before it, and draws its entire force from

680. Sirach 26:20.

the new law. And it is not understood concerning that which is a sacrament and an office: because in that there is a personal and moral and civil act, which also existed before the new law, and it does not draw its force from the opus operatum alone, but also from the opus operantis [the work of the one performing].

§ 41. To the next it must be said that it is well conceded, that the conjunction of the faithful soul with God is not a contained effect of this sacrament, but a signified one only. And the reason was stated earlier.

§ 42. To what is asked, Whether matrimony is a sacrament of the new law, it must be said that matrimony is considered in four ways regarding four things which are in it: the first of which is the commingling of the sexes for the salvation of nature. The second is the distinction concerning conjunctions in the diversity of sex. But the third is its effect against the wound of concupiscence. And the fourth and last is the honorableness which surrounds the efficient cause of matrimony, and the friendship which follows from it, and the mutual aid of the spouses from mutual works communicated to one another.

§ 43. Regarding the first, indeed, matrimony is of the law of nature: and because the law of nature accompanies every law, therefore this remains in every law: and thus it was instituted in paradise.

§ 44. But regarding the second, it is of the law of Moses, in which the distinction of persons legitimate for matrimony is made.

§ 45. But regarding the third, it is specially of the law of Christ, because from the very opus operatum it confers medicine against the disease, which it did not do before except in the opus operantis.

§ 46. But regarding the other three things following matrimony from its efficient cause and from its effect, it is of the civil law. And in this way the philosophers speak of the honorableness of nuptials, as Cicero, Aristotle, Aspasius, and certain others.

§ 47. But to the objection which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that matrimony has a form which is consent expressed through words. Nor is it necessary that a sacrament always have sanctification from its form: because this is not necessary except in that sacrament which is purely a sacrament: and penance and matrimony are not such, as was said earlier: because those are directed to things around which our works are concerned: and therefore it is necessary that they draw their perfection in some way from us. And therefore in matrimony, standing in for the formal perfective principle, is the indivisibility of life, which is caused from the consent existing perfectly in each of the spouses.

§ 48. To the next it must be said in the same way: because such matter does not exist except in those sacraments which draw their entire rational principle of effecting from the passion of Christ, and the sacraments which are in Christ, such as the baptism of Christ, the passion of Christ, the resurrection of Christ, and things of this sort. But in those which are concerned with our works, some of our own things are the matter, or we ourselves under some disposi-

tion: just as in penance sorrow is the matter, and in matrimony we ourselves, existing under the potency of the commingling of the sexes.

§ 49. To the next it must be said that it well effects what it figures: because it effects medicine against concupiscence. And how it effects that will presently be evident in the solution of the following article, and partly it has become clear from the premises.

§ 50. Therefore to that which is asked whether it confers grace?

§ 51. It must be said that concerning this there are three opinions, none of which is to be prejudiced.

§ 52. Now the first is that of some saying that it does not confer any grace: and according to these, 'sacrament' is said of this and the others by priority and posteriority, because of the others it is said by signifying and causing grace, but of this one by signifying only. And this seems to have been the opinion of the Master in the text: and it was the opinion of Praepositinus and William of Auxerre, and of other ancients.

§ 53. There were others who said that it confers grace, namely a withdrawal from sin, but not an order toward the good. And if it is asked, What is that grace? they say that it is that by which it intercepts concupiscence lest it rush headlong: and according to them it must be said that that grace is according to matrimony, or something adjoined to it externally, which mitigates concupiscence, lest it burn beyond the honorableness of nuptials and the goods of matrimony. And in this last way they say is the grace which matrimony confers. And these state probably that this is the reason why certain Fathers seem to say that it does not confer grace, because it does not confer it in order toward the good, but only away from evil: for toward the good it has a certain impediment not from itself, but from its consequent burdens. And this they say the Apostle senses , saying: And this I speak for your profit; not to cast a snare upon you, but for that which is honest, supply, I may provoke, and that which may give you power to attend upon the Lord without impediment. Now this opinion is more pleasing to me than the first.

§ 54. A third group, sufficiently skilled, said that it confers grace in order toward the good, not just any good, but this good which the married person ought to do: and this is that he faithfully assist his spouse, and communicate his works to her, and religiously nourish the offspring received, and things of this sort. And this is also highly probable.

§ 55. But to the objection to the contrary, it must be said that it confers grace: and how it is understood that it does not merit the palm was explained above. But as to what is said, that it is consummated through an act of baseness, it must be said that it is false, but rather it is consummated through an honorable act blessed by the Lord, to which the baseness of concupiscence is adjoined as a punishment: and this is no obstacle, as was said above.

§ 56. To the next it must be said that it is conceded to infirmity, as the Saints say: but infirmity is twofold. One is a prostrate infirmity lying in the lowest things, and another which does not lie, but is infirm toward an elevated excellent thing, which nevertheless is worthy of greater praise. And what is conceded to infirmity in the first way is like what is said He that is weak, let him eat herbs. And this has no reward nor grace. But what is conceded to infirmity in

the second way is a meritorious good, but it does not have excellent praise: and this is matrimony, and therefore it confers grace.

§ 57. To the next it must be said that this happens to matrimony from adjoined things, and not from itself, but especially from two adjoined things, namely the concupiscence which is adjoined to the act, and the impediment to attending upon the Lord, which is adjoined to its burdens: and therefore that argumentation deceives by accident.

§ 58. TO THAT which is asked thirdly, it must be said that it draws the power of effecting from the union of natures in Christ, in which natures the spouse of the Church suffered: on account of which it is said A bloody spouse thou art to me.

§ 59. And thus the solution to the whole is evident according to the last two opinions, but according to the first they do not need this solution.

Articulus 15 — Whether Marriage Before Carnal Union Is Perfect

Whether matrimony before carnal copulation is perfect?

§ 62. Next it is asked concerning what is said in that chapter G, a little after the beginning: There is no doubt that that woman does not belong to matrimony, etc.

§ 63. For this seems to be true what the three decrees first introduced say: § 64. 1. For according to the Philosophers it is the same thing for a thing to be perfect and consummated: but matrimony is not consummated without carnal copulation: therefore neither is it perfect.

§ 65. 2. Also, the perfect is that to which nothing is lacking of things yet to be done: but in those conjoined by consent alone, something is lacking of things yet to be done, because of the commingling of bodies: therefore it seems that matrimony before the commingling of bodies is not perfect.

§ 66. 3. Also, the words of the first formed man seem to imply this, who said: They shall be two in one flesh : therefore if they will not be in one flesh, they are not in perfect matrimony: therefore before they are made into one flesh, they do not have perfect matrimony.

§ 67. 4. Also, if something of the essentials of a thing is not perfect, the thing itself is imperfect; but to signify is something of the number of the essentials of the sacraments: therefore if it itself is not perfect in something, the sacrament is imperfect there: but the signification of matrimony before carnal copulation is imperfect, as the Master says in his solution in the text: therefore before this matrimony is an imperfect sacrament. The first is PROVED from this, that all things are thus perfected when their essentials are perfect. But the SECOND is shown through this, that signifying is placed in the definition of a sacrament, and the sign is predicated of it univocally and in the nominative [directly], just as a superior of an inferior, that is, as of a subject, as Aristotle says in the Categories.

§ 68. 5. Also, from the same thing a sacrament draws causality and signification, as was held in the beginning of this book: therefore what is of imperfect signification, is also of imperfect causality: therefore it is imperfect in all those things which are of the essence of a

sacrament of the new and the old law: if therefore that matrimony is imperfect in signification, that matrimony will be absolutely imperfect: and thus the proposition is held.

§ 69. RESPONSE. It must be said that matrimony is perfect through consent: because from that essentially is caused the indivisibility which is the essence of matrimony: and therefore whether they are continent by an equal vow, or are commingled, it is always equally matrimony as to essence.

§ 70. But to that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that the Philosophers call perfect in essence and consummated in essence the same thing, and the Theologians also say that, because perfect is what attains the term and end of its becoming: and this is the ultimate form, and this is also its highest point by reason of which in essence it is called consummated, if it is the highest point of the thing not only in being, but in its ultimate potency: and according to this, 'consummated' adds something above 'perfect', because perfect speaks of that which attains the term of its making and becoming, but consummated speaks of the ultimate potency following the perfect itself: just as we call an infant a perfect human, but not a consummated one. And in this way 'consummated' is taken when matrimony is called consummated, namely when it is in its ultimate potency able to signify maximally: and it does this when the bodies are commingled, because then it signifies more things.

§ 71. To the next it must be said that that is perfect in which nothing is lacking of things to be done regarding being: but regarding well-being something can be lacking: and that is carnal copulation which contributes to well-being according to signification.

§ 72. To the next it must be said that the first formed man said this about consummated matrimony, such as was necessary then, humans not yet being multiplied.

§ 73. To the next it must be said that perfect signifying is in the sacrament of matrimony, even before carnal copulation: because it perfectly signifies both what it figures outside its conjunction, and what it figures within: outside, the spiritual conjunction of the Church with God: within, the spiritual union between the spouses, as the Master says at the end of this chapter: but it signifies more things through commingling, yet it does not signify more intensely or to a greater degree. And therefore in the argument there is the fallacy of figure of speech, in that the continuous is changed into the discrete.

§ 74. Through the same the solution to the last is evident.

§ 75. And through these things what is said in this distinction is somewhat evident: because concerning what he says about the holiness of the continent, there will be a special treatise below.

§ 76. Another distinction follows.

DISTINCTIO XXVII

Articulus 1 — In What Genus Marriage Is

In what genus is matrimony?

§ 88. This being held, there occur here three questions pertaining to the understanding of these chapters, of which the first is this, In what genus is matrimony? But the second, What is it? The third, concerning the things consequent upon matrimony, of which mention is made in the text.

§ 89. To the first it is objected thus: 1. There is no bond unless there be something binding which is the tying by which it binds: but matrimony is the bond by which legitimate persons contracting matrimony are bound: therefore it is not the tying itself: therefore it is something which is prior to the tying itself: but this is absolute: therefore matrimony is in some absolute genus.

§ 90. 2. Further, If it is asked of someone joined in matrimony, by what is he bound? he will say, by matrimony: therefore the essence of matrimony is diverse from the tying itself: therefore as before.

§ 91. 3. Further, There is never similarity between any persons, unless there be one absolute quality in them both: therefore by similarity there will never be a conjunction or bond between any persons, unless there is some absolute thing conjoining both: and this is the essence of matrimony: therefore matrimony is in an absolute genus.

§ 92. 4. Further, Augustine says that there is no relative thing that is not also something else which is not relative: but the conjunction of matrimony is a certain relation: therefore matrimony is also something else which is not relative, but absolute: therefore it is in an absolute genus.

§ 93. 5. Further, concerning what is essential to it, nothing absolute is predicated obliquely, nor is what is essential predicated of it obliquely: because it is not said, man is of an animal, but rather an animal: but it is sufficiently clear that matrimony is predicated obliquely of conjunction, because we say that this is the conjunction of matrimony: therefore matrimony is not essentially a conjunction.

§ 94. 6. Further, Aristotle says that the definitions of passions and subjects are different: because in the definition of a passion that which is essential is like a genus, and the subject of the passion is like a defining difference: just as when snubness is defined, and is called the curvature of the nose, curvature is specified and contracted by the nose: and yet curvature is the essence of snubness, and the nose is the subject: and in all such things the contracting element is no part of the essence of the contracted: therefore by similarity when it is said, the conjunction of matrimony is a conjunction, it seems that conjunction is drawn by the fact that I say matrimony: therefore matrimony is not of the essence of conjunction: therefore it seems that it is in some absolute genus, and not in relation: and this is contrary to everyone.

§ 95. To the contrary of this it is objected thus: 1. Matrimony is divided through conjunction and bond: therefore it is in it as in a proximate genus: therefore it is in the genus of conjunction as in a primary genus.

§ 96. 2. Further, When one is predicated of another as of a subject, that which is the genus of the superior is also the genus of the inferior: but conjunction in this way is predicated of matrimony: therefore what is the genus of conjunction is also the genus of matrimony: but the genus of every conjunction is relation: therefore matrimony is in relation as in a genus.

§ 97. 3. Further, Whatever is in one with respect to another, and conversely in the other with respect to this one, is a relative of equivalence: but thus is matrimony in the man and in the woman: therefore, etc.

§ 98. RESPONSE. To this it must be said that matrimony is in the genus of relation, just as the last objections prove, and it speaks of a relation of equivalence: because the man and the woman are equal in those things which are of matrimony.

§ 99. But to the first which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that matrimony is the bond itself: but just as it is said that paternity is the very nature of the relation by which the father is referred to the son, and yet paternity is a relation: but because it is signified as abstract, therefore it does not seek to be determined externally: so matrimony is spoken of as abstract: and therefore matrimony is called a bond or conjunction, just as paternity is called a relation: and there is no diversity there, except in matrimony.

§ 100. And through this the solution to the first three is evident.

§ 101. To the next it must be said that Augustine understands a relative as what is related, and not the nature of the relation itself: and concerning that, what he says is true. But matrimony speaks of the very nature of relation.

§ 102. And through this the solution to all except the last is evident.

§ 103. And to that it must be said that they are not conjoined in such a way when one says the bond of matrimony, as when one says a curved nose. For the first are conjoined in the habitude of a form to its act, but the second in habitude to its subject and form; and therefore it is not similar. For when it is said the bond of matrimony, it is similar as if it were said, the relation of paternity is that by which the father is referred to the son.

Articulus 2 — Whether The Definitions Of Marriage Are Well Assigned

Whether the definitions of matrimony are well assigned?

§ 106. Secondly it is asked, What is matrimony?

§ 107. And let whatever definitions are found concerning it be accepted.

The first in the Letter is this:
Marriage is the marital union of a man and a woman among legitimate persons, retaining an indivisible way of life.

The experts of law define it by saying:
Marriage is a partnership of common life, and a union of divine and human law.

Hugh of Saint Victor defines it thus:
Marriage is the legitimate consent of two suitable persons to a union.

Against the first, it is objected thus:
1. Because it says: Of a man and a woman: for sometimes more women could be had by one man: therefore it should say, Of a man and a woman or women.

1. Likewise, it is questioned about what it says: Marital union: for just as there is a non-marital union, so also a wifely one: therefore it should as well say, wifely or wifely union as marital.
2. Likewise, in those things which pertain to marriage, man and woman are equal; therefore that union should as well be named from the woman as from the man.

Likewise, marital union does not seem to be except in the act of the husband: but the act of the husband is carnal copulation: therefore it seems that there is no marriage except in carnal copulation: and this has been previously refuted.

1. Likewise, it is questioned about what it says: Among legitimate persons: for every person is legitimate, because what is not legitimate to one is legitimate to another: therefore it seems that this is superfluously added to the definition.
2. Furthermore, if it is said that legitimate are those who are able to come together. Against: Marriage is neither perfected nor is by carnal concubinage: therefore, with that not existing, it is not impeded: therefore it seems that even if they are impotent to come together, they are still legitimate to contract.
3. Likewise, legitimate persons are those bound by the laws of marriage: therefore the wife of someone is still legitimate to contract, which is false: therefore it seems this is badly added.
4. Further, it is objected about what follows: Retaining an indivisible way of life. It seems that it is a divisible life: because neither in merit nor in the act of sin do they agree, but are distinguished: therefore they do not have an indivisible way of life.
5. Likewise, if divorce or separation from the bed is made perpetually, then there is not an indivisible way of life between them: therefore there is no marriage between them, which is false.

Further, it is questioned about the second thus:
1. Among partners, as the Philosophers, Aristotle and Cicero, say, there is a partnership of common life, and also among citizens, and similarly between father and son, and communica-

tion of divine and human law: therefore it seems that there is marriage among them, which is false.

1. Likewise, what is called divine law there? for they do not communicate in divine things. For divine things (as blessed Dionysius says) are not given except by merit: but merit is unequal between woman and man: therefore they do not communicate divine things to each other.
2. Likewise, it often happens that one of the spouses participates and follows divine law, and the other does not: therefore it seems that they do not communicate divine law to each other.
3. A similar objection is about human law: because by human and divine law the man is the head of the wife: and this law does not communicate to the wife: therefore it seems that neither the communication of divine nor human law is marriage.

Further, it is questioned about the third which is Hugh's in the book II of the Sacraments:

1. For there seems to be an instance against what it says, Of two persons, etc., that Jacob had two wives, and David ten: therefore it is not only of two, but of two, or three, or more.

1. Likewise, it seems that it is badly added, Suitable: because suitability is through virtue, or grace of dignity: and not only those, but also those existing in sins can contract.

Likewise, Suitable either says suitability by grace, or by nature. If by grace. Against: Those existing in sin can contract, and are suitable to contract: therefore it does not say suitability by grace. But if it says suitability by nature. Against: According to this, nature begot men equal: therefore all are equally suitable to contract, which is false, therefore it is badly placed there, Suitable.

1. Further, Legitimate consent is the efficient cause of marriage: and the efficient cause is not its effect: therefore legitimate consent is not marriage: it seems therefore that the definition is bad.

Response. It must be said that these definitions are quite good. For the first says the genus, and the remote and proximate matter, and the act which is the indivisibility of life. The genus, however, is like the form: and therefore it can be given to all others.

To the first objection, it must be said that according to nature it is best instituted, as the Master Moses says, that there is not but one of one: for which Adam said: This now is bone of my bones... and they shall be two in one flesh: he did not say three or four. And as to this, which according to nature is best instituted, this definition of marriage is given. And this is what Master Hugo says: At this time with one woman not at the same time with many is marriage entered, as the Apostle says: For the sake of fornication let each have his own wife, he does not say wives.

To the other, it must be said that marital union is a union into marital copulation.

To what is objected against this, it must be said that marital copulation is called the communication of operations by that communication by which man and woman communicate conjugally: but this can happen even without subsequent carnal copulation. And thus the solution to the objection against that part is clear.

To the same, it must be said that that copulation is named from the more dignified, namely from the husband.

To what is objected, that they are equal, etc., it must be said that it is true in the payment and request of debt: but yet in many other things the man is the head of the woman.

To the other, it must be said that not all persons are legitimate, but some are legitimate simply, and some legitimate in a certain respect. Simply legitimate are those to whom none of those impediments which make persons illegitimate are an obstacle. Legitimate in a certain respect are those to whom something is an obstacle. Nor is it valid, This woman is legitimate to this man: therefore she is legitimate: because there is a fallacy of the certain respect and the simple.

To what is objected about those impotent to come together, it must be said that this is one cause of the illegitimacy of persons: but more are determined below.

To the other, it must be said that legitimate persons are those to whom no impediment is an obstacle: but it does not follow that they can always contract, because they have already contracted: and then essentially there is marriage between them.

To the other, it must be said that life is called indivisible, because it communicates works to marriage, and is ordered to relieve the burdens of marriage, namely because they cannot be separated while living to be joined to others as long as both live: and it is not called a communion in merit or sin, because in such things persons remain distinct.

To the other, it must be said that even if separation from the bed is made either from malice, or from another just or unjust cause, nevertheless indivisibility remains as to this, that they cannot be joined to others.

To what is objected about the second, it must be said that the partnership of man and woman is a partnership of indivisible and indissoluble life, except by death: and such a partnership is not among partners and other persons introduced: and therefore it is not a partnership simply, except among spouses, as it is said, Esther, vii, 8: The partner of our kingdom, Esther, he wished to oppress.

To what is said about communication, it must be said that it is understood of the communication of souls and bodies, unless by equal consent they abstain: and this is confirmed by divine and human law. And if the definition is understood thus, then the objections do not hold: however, the Decretists are little accustomed to care about definitions or other things pertaining to subtle understanding.

To what is objected about the third, it must be said that according to Hugh as he glosses, that definition is understood of marriage contracted in the New and not the Old Testament. If, however, someone wished to extend it to all time, it is said as before, that according to the nature of marriage one is of one: but for a cause more can be taken: and this happens by accident, namely when few worship God.

To the other, it must be said that suitability is neither from nature, nor from grace, but from legitimate causes: and therefore that reasoning proceeds from the insufficient.

To the other, it must be said that indeed this definition is given by the efficient cause: hence there is not essential predication there, but rather it is said by cause, just as day is the sun shining upon the earth.

Divisio Textus

DIVISIO TEXTUS,

Then it is inquired concerning what is said, there, C, Efficient cause of marriage, elec.

This part is divided into four parts: in the first of which he shows the efficient cause of marriage. In the second, he introduces opinions on why she who is joined in marriage is called a spouse, there, E, For from the very betrothal, etc. In the third, he states the reason why the spouse is not immediately given when the marriage is contracted, there, M, Concerning the nuptial. In the fourth and last, he speaks of how a spouse becomes a widow, upon the death of the husband, and who does not, there, N, It is to be known, that that bride, etc.

Of these parts, the second is divided into three: in the first of which he touches upon the true opinion; in the second, the false with its assertions, there, F, However, some as In the third, by opposing they have solved, etc. there, 1, To these things we thus respond, etc.

And let these suffice concerning the division of this distinction.

Articulus 3 — Whether One Of The Spouses Can Be Continent Without The Other

Can one of the spouses contain without the other?

Thirdly, it is asked concerning those things which the Master subsequently says in the explanation of the definition, and especially concerning what he says there, B, that without the consent of the other, neither can profess continence, nor devote themselves to prayer: and that between them while they live, the conjugal bond remains, so that it is not lawful for one to join with another, and that they should render to each other, etc.

For it seems that this is false: because
1. True spouses are made by consent: but after that, before carnal copulation, one can, without the other being asked, fly to the fruit of a better life: and then permission is given to the other to marry: therefore it seems false what is said in the Letter.

1. Likewise, a lesser good does not prejudice a greater good: but a vow of continence is a greater good than marriage: therefore marriage does not prejudice the vow: therefore

marriage does not exclude the vow of continence: therefore even after marriage is contracted and consummated, a vow of continence can be made, even without the other being asked.

2. Likewise, in natures, a lesser light does not exclude a greater, but conversely: but marriage is like a light, and a vow of perpetual continence is like a greater light: therefore although a vow excludes marriage, yet it does not exclude a vow of perpetual continence.

3. Likewise, the way of progressing to a better state should not be closed to anyone: therefore not even to one joined in marriage: but by the vow of continence one progresses to a better state: therefore marriage should not impede him from this vow.

4. Likewise, in no other virtue does a lower state exclude a higher state, just as beginning chastity does not exclude the state of progressing and perfect chastity, and so it is with justice, fortitude, and all others: therefore even in continence, a lower state does not exclude a higher state of continence: therefore although a person is joined in marriage, it cannot be prohibited by the spouse that they pass to continence of a higher state.

On the contrary, nothing should be done with prejudice to the right of another person: but by marriage, a woman becomes a person of another's right, and conversely: therefore nothing should be done with prejudice to that right: however, a vow of continence cannot be made without prejudice to the other spouse: therefore it cannot be made without their consent. The first is proved by what the Apostle says, to the Romans 1, 8: And let us not do evil that good may come: whose damnation is just, by what the Apostle says, I to the Corinthians vii, 4: The woman does not have power over her own body, but the husband: likewise also the husband.

Which is to be conceded, by saying to the first, that before carnal copulation there is only a spiritual bond between them: and therefore for the dissolution of that, spiritual death suffices. Hence, when one flies to the fruit of a better life in the cloister, then they die spiritually: and then the other is absolved.

To the other, it must be said that a lesser good, when it is simply so, does not prejudice a better good: but when the better cannot be done except with damage and injury to another's right, then one should not pass from a lesser good to a better: because what is unjust is not better.

To the other, it must be said that what is introduced is not similar: because a vow of perpetual continence in such a case is not like a greater light, but rather like the darkness of injustice from the invasion of another's right, as has been said.

And by this, the solution to the last two is also clear.

Articulus 4 — Whether Mutual Consent Expressed By Words Or Signs Is The Efficient Cause Of Marriage

Whether mutual consent expressed through words or signs is the efficient cause of marriage?

Three questions arise concerning the first question of the Master here: of which the first is, Whether mutual consent expressed through words or signs is the efficient cause of marriage? The second, Whether such consent has always been the efficient cause of marriage, or not? The third, Why in this sacrament consent is required as a cause, and not in others?

To the first, it is objected thus:
1. Hugh of Saint Victor says in the book on Sacraments, in the treatise on marriage: Those who are joined must consent so that they may receive each other spontaneously. Therefore, consent makes marriage.

1. Moreover, many authorities are introduced in the Letter to this effect.
2. Likewise, it is objected by reason thus: because what is mine cannot become yours without my consent: therefore, since in marriage what is mine becomes yours, and vice versa: therefore, mutual consent is required to effect this.

But because this is said by all, it is objected to the contrary thus:

1. Marriage is a sacrament: but in every sacrament the efficient cause is divine power, as Augustine says: therefore, in marriage the efficient cause is divine power: therefore, mutual consent is not the efficient cause of marriage.
2. Likewise, different species have different efficient causes: but a sacrament and a contract of justice are different in species: therefore, they have different efficient causes: but consent is the cause of the contract: therefore, it is not the cause of marriage.
3. Likewise, every sacrament of the Church consists in the operation of the ministers of the Church: therefore, also marriage: but those contracting marriage are not ministers of the Church: therefore, their operation should not be the efficient cause of marriage.
4. Likewise, consent is hidden: but the efficient cause should be manifest at least in operation: therefore, it seems that consent is not the efficient cause.

If you say that it is expressed through words. On the contrary: A word is often a deceitful messenger, because it is said in Psalm 110:11 that every man is a liar: therefore, it seems that it cannot be sufficiently certified through words.

1. Likewise, let us suppose that someone speaks words expressing consent to deceive, and not to consent: it is clear that here there is no consent: therefore, there is no marriage: therefore, the woman admitting him would fornicate, which is grave to say, and false.
2. Likewise, marriage, just as it seeks consent in one, so it seeks consent in the other spouse: therefore, there must be two consents: and these two cannot be certified: therefore, it always remains in doubt whether there is marriage or not: but whoever makes doubtful what he fears to be mortal sin, sins mortally: therefore, anyone knowing his wife, according to this, would sin mortally, which is false.

3. Likewise, it is objected concerning what is said, Expressed through words: for some are mute, who do not form words: therefore, they cannot contract, which is false.

4. Likewise, some do not understand each other: therefore, they cannot contract.

5. Likewise, either consent has from words that it makes marriage, or conversely words from consent, or both together have to make marriage. If you say that consent has from words. On the contrary: Nothing gives what it does not have: therefore, words have it even without consent: therefore, if someone speaks words, even if he does not consent, he effects marriage, which is false. Conversely, if words have from consent, it is similarly objected: therefore, consent has it before words: it may happen, therefore, that two persons silently consent to each other: therefore, there will be marriage between them: therefore, they cannot be joined to others, which is false. But if both together have it: then it is badly said in the Letter that only consent makes marriage.

6. Likewise, we see some not expressing their consent, but remaining entirely silent while their parents give them to others: therefore, it seems that such would not be marriage: which again is false.

7. Likewise, an oath is stronger than a simple word. Let us suppose, therefore, that someone contracts today in the face of the Church through a word of the present, and tomorrow or at another time swears in the face of the Church that he never consented, it will be more credible to his oath than to his word: therefore, the Church should not compel such a one to remain.

If you say that the Church is a witness of past consent. On the contrary: The Church is not a witness except of what it has seen: but it has not seen consent: therefore, it cannot be a witness of consent, except as much as it believes the word that was then spoken: but this one now swears that he never intended to consent: therefore, it seems that his oath should be upheld, which is false: therefore, it seems that the efficient cause of marriage is not consent.

Further, it is asked concerning what is added in the Letter: Through words of the present: and if they consent in the future, that consent is not effective for making marriage.

For it seems this is false: because
1. A contract can be made in the future concerning any other thing: therefore, also concerning this.

1. Likewise, philosophers have spoken of exchanges and contracts, and they never posit another efficient cause of a contract in the future, and another cause of a contract in the present: therefore, it seems that nothing is said in the Letter.

2. Likewise, just as the future is distant from the present by expectation, so the past by memory, as Augustine says: therefore, since consent in the future does not make marriage, it seems that neither does consent which was in the past make marriage: which is false, because marriage is between those who consented in the past.

3. Likewise, the future and the present differ only by matter: but those things which differ only by matter do not differ in species by the efficient cause: therefore, there is not another efficient cause of marriage in the future and in the present.

4. Likewise, it is greater to enter a cloister than to contract marriage: but I can consent in the future to entering a cloister: therefore, I can also consent in the future to the contract of marriage: therefore, there is nothing that is said in the Letter, as it seems.

Response. It must be said that the Master speaks truly in the Letter.

To the first objection, it must be said that this sacrament, as was previously determined, is not only divine: and Augustine's statement is understood of sacraments that are only divine: but this, since it is about human acts, depends on human acts, just as penance does in some of its acts.

To the other, it must be said that the ministers of the Church simply have in administration the sacraments of the Church that are only divine: but those that are human must be administered according to doctrine: and therefore, such things, because of the imperfection joined to them, they do not administer, but teach how they may be done honorably and according to God: and this suffices in such sacraments.

To the other, it must be said that entirely hidden consent cannot make marriage, because it is only of one, since it does not proceed to the other: and therefore, consent expressed in signs makes it, and then it is not hidden.

To what is objected against, it must be said that a word is sometimes a deceitful messenger: but nevertheless, because the Church does not strive for the impossible, and it is impossible for man to know the heart, therefore it judges according to appearance: and therefore it says there is marriage when it is contracted through words of the present, and therefore compels him to remain.

To the other, it must be said that for him who does not consent, there is no marriage, nor is there simply marriage: because marriage is not in one, but in two, and it does not limp: yet the other is excused in coitus, because according to appearance it is fully satisfied concerning marriage: and therefore there is ignorance of fact particular, but not of law or universal: and the Church compels her to remain, because it judges according to appearance: and if he wishes to avoid hell, it is necessary that he consents.

But let us suppose such a case, that someone deceives the first through words of the present in the face of the Church, but contracts truly with the second, what is to be done for him? It must be said that the Church should compel him to the first: but he should rather endure excommunication than remain with her: but let him go with the second to distant regions, and there remain with her rendering the debt: which if he cannot, let him endure excommunication with sorrow of heart and die in it.

To the other, it must be said that for man it should suffice to have certainty according to appearance: because he cannot have another, and he has that through words of the present expressing consent.

To the other, it must be said that words are put there generally for any signs expressing consent of the present, and especially for coitus if a promise of the future follows.

To the other, it must be said that words have from consent, and consent alone would effect if it could proceed into the knowledge of the other.

To the objection against, it must be said that such do not have consent expressed through words, and consent in words alone makes marriage, for the reason stated: and therefore that objection is of no value.

To the other, it must be said according to Hugh saying thus: Those who are joined must consent so that they may receive each other spontaneously: it is judged to be done if in the betrothal there is no contradiction: for he consents who does not contradict, according to that of the Pandects: He seems to consent to his father's will, unless he evidently dissents elsewhere. What does not oppose the father's will is understood to consent.

To the other, it must be said that even if he swears with many, as long as the antecedent can be proven, he will not be believed: because the Church judges according to appearance, but God looks at the heart: and therefore such a one should make peace between himself and God as he wills and can: because the Church compels him to return to the first.

To the other, it must be said that only consent of the present makes marriage, and not of the future.

To what is objected against, it must be said that another contract of the future is not even a contract, but it will be a contract if in the future it is made through the present: but nevertheless, another is a contract of the future, and another is the expectation of the price in the future of a contract already made. Whence it is clear that a contract can be present, with the price received in the future. And similarly, it is in marriage, that betrothals of the future do not make marriage, but it will be marriage when consent of the present intervenes.

To the other, it must be said that the statement of the philosophers is true both of contract and of marriage, as is clear from the foregoing.

To the other, it must be said that a contract of the past does not effect marriage, but it effected it: and so it is with a contract of the future, that it does not effect, but it will effect when it is converted into the present.

To the other, it must be said that those things which differ in species in things, nothing prohibits them from differing in species in will and desire: because an accident that happens to a thing per se as the end of the will is taken from the act of the soul: and therefore an accidental difference in a thing sometimes makes a substantial difference in wills, which differ according to the willed things which are taken as ends. And so it is in consent relating to the word of the present time and the future.

And this solution is to be noted in the whole matter: because it is necessary.

Articulus 5 — Whether Such Consent Always Brings About Marriage

Whether such consent always effects marriage?

Whether such consent always effects marriage or not?

Secondly, it is asked whether such consent always effects marriage or not?

It seems, however, that it does not: because
1. Master Hugh says: I think,
Therefore it seems that a man then
that it sufficed in ancient times
of the fathers to contract marriage
by the mutual provision of man and woman in necessary matters,
and by consent concerning the payment of the debt of the flesh:
provided, however, that the woman
promised to keep the faith of the bed to the man,
but the man could sometimes take another
and, having given a bill of divorce, dismiss his wife.
He was not bound to consent.

1. Likewise, if the words were of the present,
I take you as mine: since he who is another's cannot be mine,
it seems that
a woman cannot say this, who
is joined to one who has many: therefore she cannot consent to him:
therefore it seems
that then consent did not make marriage.
2. Likewise, he is not mine who can dismiss me:
but then he could dismiss by giving
a bill of divorce: therefore it seems that he was not
hers: therefore neither was there consent, because
consent makes one his own. And this was sometimes
the opinion of Hugh of Saint Victor.

On the contrary, it is objected: because
4. It is said, Genesis 24:57: Let us call
the girl, and ask her
will: and the consent of the girl was sought:
but it was sought only for

marriage: therefore consent of the present,
and then it made marriage.

1. Likewise, what would make marriage
   if not consent? It is evident, however, that she
   who is matrimonially joined
   is known as his own: but nothing can make her his own except consent: therefore
   it seems that even then consent made
   marriage.

Response. It seems to me without
prejudice, that even then consent made
marriage expressed by words of the present.
And I say that a man can be his own
of a woman in two ways, namely simply in
all things: and thus he could not be of another spouse:
and in this way he is his own in the New Testament
in which one is of one. In another way, he could
be his own in the work of generation: and in this
way one can be of many, as
Aristotle says in IV of the first philosophy,
that one fulfills many. And the consent
of the Old Testament when it was said,
I take you as mine, was understood thus,
and that was the consent which then effected
marriage: and the cause is that which
was said, namely the scarcity of those serving God,
and the multitude of those who were led to idolatry,
when the time of spiritual fecundity
was not yet.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that the
authority introduced is understood that they did not
consent entirely as now.

To the second, it must be said that the sense
of the words when they said,
I take you as mine, has already been explained.
And through that exposition of the distinction previously held,
the solution to that argument is clear.

To the third, it must be said that as the
Lord says, Matthew 5:34 and 19:7, a bill
of divorce was given because of hardness, and therefore

it was beyond the law of marriage: and therefore the dismissed was still his own by law.

Whether, however, such dismissal was imputed then or not, will be in the question below.

Articulus 6 — Why In This Sacrament Rather Than In Another Consent Is Required

Why is consent required in this sacrament rather than in another?

Why is consent required in this sacrament rather than in another?

Thirdly, it is asked, Why is consent sought in this sacrament rather than in another?

It seems that it ought not to be sought: because 1. Matrimony is of the lower members of the Church: but it is for the lower to be moved according to the disposition of the higher in the reception of sacraments: therefore it seems that the consent of the lower ought not to be sought, but of the higher.

1. Likewise, every participation of the hierarchical is derived from the hierarch, as Dionysius says: but every sacrament is a certain participation of the hierarchical: therefore it seems that it is participated according to the consent or dissent of the hierarchy, and not according to the consent of the lower.

The response to this is that this sacrament, as was said before, consists in a certain exchange or contract of the person contracting: such an exchange cannot be made without the consent of the one exchanging or contracting: and therefore in this and not in others is consent required.

To what is objected against this, it must be said that in all things which pertain to the hierarchy, the lower ought to be moved at the nod of the higher: but matrimony is of those things, namely when, and in what form they contract, and suchlike: but the contract itself is not subject to obedience, but to the consent of the contracting party.

To the other it must be said, that from that part where it is only about human acts, it is not of the hierarchical: but from that part where it is a sacrament, and in this way it is dispensed by ministers having power from the hierarch: and in this part also marriages are blessed, and presented to the Church.

Articulus 7 — Whether Marriage Is Said To Consist In The Union Of Souls Or Of Bodies

Whether marriage is said to consist in the union of souls or bodies?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, E, "But from the very betrothal," etc.

For it seems to be objected for this opinion thus:
1. To have a debt in the body of another, when before it was not had, does not continue unless in another conferring that right in that body: but that right is conferred from the first consent

expressed by words of the present: therefore from then is that debt: but this debt is the effect of marriage: therefore then is marriage: therefore marriage is from then.

1. Likewise, the soul is nobler than the body: therefore the union of souls is nobler in marriage than of bodies: therefore marriage is more perfected by the conjunction of souls than of bodies: therefore in such conjunction there is more marriage.
2. Likewise, it was proven above that marriage is more perfected by the consent of souls: therefore from then it is also called marriage, and neither before nor after.

§ 4. Further, that makes a thing by the positing of which it is posited, and by the destruction of which it is destroyed: but the consensus of conjugal union does this: therefore they are called spouses from that moment. The minor premise is evident from this, that if the joining of bodies made a marriage, it would always make it: and this is evidently false: therefore since there is nothing in a marriage except consensus and the commingling of bodies, it seems that they are called spouses from consensus.

§ 5. Further, copulation does not effect a conjugal union unless consensus precedes it, and through consensus: therefore consensus rather effects the marriage: and thus again the proposition is established.

To the contrary of this, it is objected in favor of the following opinion, that: § 1. Augustine says that marriage is a good of mortals: but mortality is not aided except through the commingling of bodies: therefore marriages are not marriages except through the commingling of bodies: therefore they ought not to be called spouses except through the commingling of bodies.

§ 2. Further, a wife is given to a man as a helpmate, as is said in Genesis 1:19 but there is no help except of generation: since therefore this does not happen except through corporal commingling, it seems that she is called a wife from corporal commingling.

§ 3. Further, Adam did not say: "They shall be two in one soul," but rather, "they shall be two in one flesh" therefore they are called spouses from the unity of flesh: therefore before corporal commingling they ought not to be called spouses.

§ 4. Further, certain persons are prohibited from marriage both in the law of nature, and in the old law, and also in the new law: therefore this happens either on account of the joining of hearts, or on account of the commingling of bodies, or on account of both. If in the first way, it seems that this is false: because consanguinity rather serves to foster unity of hearts: therefore such persons ought not to be prohibited from marriage: therefore it remains that it is either on account of the unity of bodies, or on account of both: and whichever is said, the result is what the following opinion says.

§ 5. Further, where Moses prohibits persons who cannot be wives, he uses this mode of speaking there: You shall not uncover the nakedness of your mother but it is evident that this does not happen except through the commingling of bodies: therefore she does not become a wife except through the commingling of bodies.

§ 6. Further, a joining of hearts exists among many without conjugal union: but a joining of bodies with a preceding pact of marriage exists among none except spouses: therefore it seems that the joining of bodies makes a marriage, and not the joining of minds alone.

Solution. To these it must be said that the first opinion is true, but the second is false.

And to what is first objected in favor of the second, it must be said that marriages are called a good of mortals by reason of the good of offspring: but nevertheless they are not only a good of mortals, because they would also exist if there were no mortality: and therefore it is not necessary that it be effected by the act of intercourse.

To the next it must be said that a wife is given to a man as a help for generation, and according to Aristotle she is also given as a help for other operations: because man is a conjugal animal, inasmuch as he does not suffice for himself in his operations, and therefore he is also a gregarious animal, as the Philosopher says. But nevertheless, if it is granted that she is given as a help for generation, it does not follow on this account that she is made a spouse by intercourse itself, but rather by the preceding conjugal pact: because otherwise he would not know her as his own in the first intercourse.

To the next it must be said that Adam said this concerning marriage by reason of its principal good, and he did not say this by reason of the essential cause of marriage: and the principal good of marriage is the good of offspring.

To the next it must be said that those persons are prohibited by reason of the well-being of marriage: because since consanguinity is a sufficient cause of a human pact, God wished to give a pact by which even more remote persons would be bound together: and therefore He excepts closer relatives, so that He might create a necessity of joining oneself to others in a matrimonial pact. Whence this does not touch the essence of marriage: and therefore that does not demonstrate the proper essential of marriage.

To the next it must be said in the same way.

To the last it must be said that society in general is one thing, and conjugal society is another. For the first can exist among many who are not joined by marriage. But the second cannot: because even if he never knew her corporally, a man still could not have a conjugal pact with prohibited persons.

And thus the solution to the whole is evident.

Articulus 8 — Whether And When It Is Necessary To Render The Debt

Whether and when it is necessary to render the debt? Whether and when it is necessary to render the debt?

Next, it is inquired concerning what he says, there, G, after the beginning: Because although to a spouse before carnal copulation, etc.

For it is inquired here: When is it necessary to render the debt if it is requested?

It seems that it is immediately: because § 1. Through words concerning the present, each one has power and right in the body of the other: but I can demand my right immediately: therefore it seems that immediately after marriage each is bound to pay the debt.

§ 2. Further, if someone makes a contract with someone absolutely, not determining a time, he is bound to pay immediately: but in the contract of marriage the contract is made such that the time is not determined: therefore he is bound to pay immediately.

§ 3. Further, 1 Corinthians 7:5: Do not defraud one another, except perhaps by consent for a time. The debt cannot be denied to a man except by consent: therefore he is bound to pay immediately if it is requested.

§ 4. Further, let us suppose that a danger of temptation threatens someone, taking precautions against which he contracts marriage: since therefore he ought to beware of his own danger, he ought immediately to request the debt; therefore the other is also bound to render it immediately.

To the contrary of this is what will be held below, that § 1. A spouse should not be presented immediately, lest a husband hold cheap the given woman whom he sighed for when delayed: therefore it seems that he ought not to render it immediately.

§ 2. Further, Tobit 7 and 8, passim, the younger Tobit did not render the debt immediately: but first for three nights they both called upon God, he and his wife according to the teaching of the Angel: therefore it seems that others must also do thus.

Solution. It must be said that according to what the Jurists say, he is bound to render the debt within a month. For this time is prescribed for him on account of three causes. One and the principal cause is so that he may have deliberation about passing to higher vows if he wishes. The second is the preparation of those things which are required for the solemnity of the marriage. The third is so that delayed desire may afflict their minds, and from this they may persevere more abundantly afterwards in mutual love.

Therefore, to the first it must be said that he immediately has the right, but he does not immediately have the use: because it concerns the Legislator how each one uses his right: and therefore the law has established how marriage should be consummated honorably.

To the next it must be said that it is otherwise in the purchase of another thing: because a burden and an individual fellowship are not attached to it, but only use, which can displease no one: and therefore it is not necessary that the desire of the buyer be suspended for this, so that he may love the possessed thing more abundantly: but both of these are in marriage.

To the next it must be said that the Apostle is speaking of a marriage that is already consummated.

To the next it must be said that he who contracts on account of temptation can add a condition that copulation through carnal copulation be done immediately. However, he is excessively weak who cannot resist temptation for even such a short time.

Articulus 9 — Whether A Husband Can Dismiss His Wife

Whether a man can dismiss his wife?

Next, it is inquired concerning what he says, there, H, shortly after the beginning: And if human law conceded this, nevertheless divine law prohibited it, etc.

For it seems that divine law ought not to have prohibited this: because § 1. Divine law is more perfect than human law: therefore it ought to accord more with the perfect: but it belongs to the perfect to be without marriage: therefore the law of God ought to have conceded this.

§ 2. Further, human law is patterned after divine law: therefore human law is either just, or unjust. If it is just: since therefore every just thing accords with what is just, the divine law ought not to have prohibited what human law conceded. But if it is unjust: therefore it was so patterned after divine law, which is against the hypothesis.

§ 3. Further, some are sterile from one of the spouses, or from both: but he who is sterile is more usefully occupied around the contemplative life: but since nothing would be lost if license were given him to marry another: therefore it seems that, since this seems to be more perfect, the divine law ought to have urged or permitted this.

§ 4. Further, human law conceded this. Whence Marcia, the wife of Cato, separated from him on account of Cato's sterility, was joined to another for a time: and Philosophers also write that this is just: therefore it seems that it was patterned after divine justice: therefore divine justice promulgated in the Gospel ought to have urged and conceded this.

Response. It must be said that it is unjust that a wife be dismissed after a consummated marriage, unless both spouses consent to vows of continence: and it was always unjust.

And to what is first objected, it must be said that nothing belonging to the perfect is that which is done with injury: but the loss or taking away of another's right against their will can never be done without injury: and therefore since it would be done if she were dismissed against her will, the divine law prohibited dismissing a wife on account of religion, unless she herself wishes to be made religious.

To the next it must be said that human law which is without error is patterned after divine law: but this was with error, and the cause of the error will be determined below in this solution.

To the next it must be said that even if both are sterile, or one: nevertheless on account of the faith of the pact and the sacrament, they cannot be separated while they live, such that they might be able to be joined to others: because the Apostle says, 1 Corinthians 7:39, that a woman is bound to the law as long as her husband lives, etc.

To the last it must be said that gentile Philosophers did not consider marriage except from the good of offspring: and therefore when this was lacking, they dissolved it: but divine law considers it from three goods: and therefore although the good of offspring is lacking, nevertheless it commands that it not be dissolved on account of the two remaining goods.

Articulus 10 — Whether, After Entering Religion And Making A Vow Of Continence, A Man Can Return To His Wife, And Whether The Wife Is Bound To Receive Him

Whether after entrance into religion and the emission of a vow of continence a man can return to his wife, and whether the wife is bound to receive him?

Next, it is inquired concerning what he says, there, H, § 1, before the middle: Wherefore we command your experience, that you discuss with diligent inquiry lest perhaps he was converted by her will, etc.

For it seems to be invalid: because § 1. A time of probation is established, in which he can return to the world and to worldly things: therefore without the wife's will, if he has not assumed the habit, in some case she can receive him and is bound to.

§ 2. Further, let us suppose that it was done by her will, and both entered religion, and before the time of profession they wish to leave, it seems that they have the power: because they did not enter except to be tested: therefore they have already tested that they do not wish, or cannot further sustain it.

§ 3. Further, let us give another case, namely that they profess on the first day, and afterwards they repent, and one wishes to leave, it seems that she is bound to receive him: because the time of probation was instituted by the Pope and the holy Fathers on account of the good of the community, lest those who leave religion on account of the violence of temptation remain entirely infamous. But what was introduced on account of the community cannot be renounced by one person. Therefore it seems that such a profession is not a profession: therefore if he wishes to return to the world, then the other is also compelled to leave in order to render the debt. § 4. Further, Pope Innocent IV commands this, saying that a profession which is made before a year should be considered void and empty: but what is void and empty does not impede a return to marriage: therefore it seems that such a one returning ought to receive his wife, even if she is in another religion.

§ 5. Further, I posit that in a house they emit a vow of perpetual continence, and one of them wishes to break it, it is inquired whether the other ought to consent to him?

It seems that she should: because a vow of religion is greater than a simple vow of continence: and from that he can return: therefore from this too.

On the contrary: By breaking a vow he sins mortally, but one consenting to a mortal sinner also sins mortally, as the Gloss says on that passage of the Epistle to the Romans 1:32: They did not understand that those who do such things are worthy of death, etc. Therefore if the woman consents to him, she herself sins mortally: but for nothing ought one to sin mortally: therefore for nothing ought she to consent: therefore nor to render the debt.

Solution. It must be said to the first that he is speaking there in that case when he has emitted a vow of continence with the reception of the habit pertaining to profession: because otherwise he would not command that he provide that he remain in the Monastery.

To the next it must be said that such persons, unless a vow other than that of probation stands in their way, such as a vow of perpetual continence is, can well return to their former

embraces with a sound conscience on account of weakness: nor does the Text speak of such persons.

To the next it must be said without prejudice, that unless a precept of a superior stands in their way, who prohibits or has prohibited this, they can well make profession on the first day: and then by license of the superior they have renounced the time of probation. And then the objection is invalid: because although it was introduced for the community, nevertheless it can be revoked by the license of a superior.

To the next it must be said that that precept and constitution of Pope Innocent liberates him from the impediment by which religion would impede him, if he professed before the established time: however, because the Pope does not interpose himself concerning the heart, let him himself see how it is between himself and God.

To the last, I concede plainly that after a vow, even a simple one of perpetual continence, a woman sins mortally by receiving him, nor is she bound to render the debt.

But to that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that it is not similar unless in a vow of religion a vow of perpetual continence is co-understood. But if it is a vow of probation only, then it is not similar: because the eternal prejudices the temporal: nor is it a vow, but an experiment of himself, whether he wishes to vow or not.

Next, it is inquired concerning what he says, there, H, § 1, in the middle: He cannot be partly converted, and partly remain in the world, etc.

For according to this, the woman could not be holy, and the man not be holy, nor conversely.

Response. It must be said that conversion is spoken of here in the transition to religion through the reception of the habit, and a vow of perpetual continence.

Articulus 11 — Whether Impotence Of Intercourse Or Another Impediment Can Dissolve Marriage

Whether the impotence to copulate or another impediment can dissolve a marriage?

Next, it is inquired concerning what he says, there, H, § 1, before the end, from the words of Augustine: If you abstain without your wife's will, etc.

For it seems by a similarity: because § 1. Those who are made impotent to copulate give their wives an occasion for committing adultery: therefore it seems that such persons should be separated, and license should be given to the wife to join herself to another.

§ 2. Further, Blessed Bernard says: What was instituted for charity, ought not to militate against charity. Therefore, by a similarity, what was instituted for medicine, ought not to militate against medicine: but the contract of marriage was instituted for medicine: therefore it ought not to militate against medicine: but it militates against medicine by the very fact of being impotent to copulate: therefore in such cases the marriage ought no longer to be observed.

§ 3. Further, in all things to be done this is true, that when the end of a reasonable action ceases, the action and the observation of the action cease: therefore also in the contract and observation of marriage. I posit therefore that she contracted only on account of her infirmity, and to the end that it be a marriage: but subsequent impotence to copulate removes both: therefore it seems that the marriage ought to be dissolved as lacking the intended end.

§ 4. Further, he who takes away another's property deserves to lose his own: but this impotent man does not pay what is another's, that is, the wife's debt: therefore he demerits his own, that is, the debt which the wife owes him: but if she owes him nothing, then she is absolved from him: and absolved from him, she can join herself to another: therefore by the very fact of being impotent to copulate, she can join herself to another.

Response, that no impediment supervening upon a marriage dissolves the marriage.

Whence it must be said to the first, that it is not similar: because in him who denies the debt when he can render it, an injury is caused by the iniquitous will of a man: and therefore it is imputed to him, and he is compelled to render it and satisfy the one requesting: but when impotence to copulate supervenes upon a marriage, then it is caused by a just, hidden judgment of God: and therefore then the inability of the debtor excludes the action of the woman.

To the next it must be said that it does not militate against marriage, but rather for it: because marriages are holier without intercourse than with it: and therefore it is not similar, because nothing militates against charity except evil: but it is not so, as is evident from what has been said.

To the next it must be said that the end is twofold, namely of marriage, and of the one contracting marriage. But the end of marriage is still preserved in the good of faith, and the good of the sacrament: but one must not look to the end of the one contracting marriage, because the intention of those contracting is often vicious, but marriage is never vicious, but always honorable.

Articulus 12 — Whether The Definition Of Betrothal Has Been Well Assigned

Whether the definition of betrothal is well assigned? Whether the definition of betrothal is well assigned?

Next, it is inquired concerning what he says, there, I, To these we thus respond, etc.

For it is inquired here, first, What is betrothal? Second, Of whom is it? Third, What are its effects? Fourth, In what ways is it contracted? And fifth, In what ways is it dissolved?

To the FIRST: § 1. Let the definition of betrothal be taken from the Jurists, which is this: Betrothal is the promise of future nuptials. And this definition is drawn from the words of Pope Nicholas. And below: But after betrothal, which is the promise of future nuptials, pacts are also celebrated by the consensus of those who contract this, and of those in whose power they are, etc.

§ 2. Further, it is proved by reason: because betrothal (sponsalia) is derived from the word for promising (spondendi): but promising looks to the future: therefore betrothals are nuptials promised in the future.

To the contrary of this it is objected: § 1. What is uncertain cannot be promised with certitude: but a future copulation is uncertain: therefore it seems that it cannot be promised without a condition: therefore betrothal is never contracted absolutely, which is false: therefore this is also false, that betrothal is the promise of future nuptials.

§ 2. Further, James 4:15: What is our life? It is a vapor appearing for a little while, and afterwards it shall vanish. For that you ought to say: If the Lord wills, and: If we live, we will do this or that. Therefore it seems that on account of the uncertainty of life such a promise ought not to be made absolutely.

§ 3. Further, in other matters a promise made and confirmed obliges to payment, such that he is compelled to payment, even if he afterwards makes an opposite promise to another: therefore much more in this is it also to be done thus: therefore whatever is promised to another man after a betrothal, it seems that he is compelled to this, that he contract marriage with the first one: therefore even if he contracts with another through words concerning the present, it seems that he is bound to return to the one he first promised.

§ 4. Further, either some right is acquired in the girl for him to whom betrothal is promised, or nothing. If yes: therefore since he loses it by no sin of his own, the girl ought in every state to be compelled to pay this: therefore even if she contracts with another, she still ought to be compelled to pay the first, which is false: therefore betrothal is not a promise, etc. But if no right is acquired for him: therefore she is in no way joined or united to him: therefore by no reason is he prohibited from accepting her blood relative, which again is false: therefore the definition is null, from which this follows.

§ 5. Further, future nuptials are either future at a determined time, or at an undetermined time. If at a determined time, then it seems that the time should be appended in the definition, as is usually done in other contracts of sale and purchase: and it is not appended: therefore the definition is diminished. But if the promise is made at an undetermined time: therefore it seems that he is never bound to pay at any determined time: and thus if she comes to the years of puberty, she cannot be compelled to the payment of what was promised, which is false: therefore it seems that the definition is unfitting.

Response. It must be said that the definition of Pope Nicholas is fitting: for this that he says, Promise, is as a genus. But this that he says, Of future, excludes marriage which is contracted through words concerning the present. But this that he says, Nuptials, makes it differ from other promises, in which men communicate with each other.

Therefore it must be said to the first, that in a promise that which necessity does is understood: because Jerome says that he is cursed who says that God requires impossible things. And if God does not require impossible things, neither ought man to require them: because if he dies, then through the very impossibility of paying he is absolved.

To the next it must be said that James in common speech teaches us to speak cautiously: but in contracts it is understood by the law itself that a legitimate impediment dissolves a contract concerning the future, as also death, or the like.

To the next it must be said that this promise binds, just as another: but it binds to contracting marriage: and he is compelled to pay unless he has a legitimate impediment. For legitimate impediments are if something after the first deed prejudices it: for then he is not compelled: and this is so because unwilling conjugal unions meet with bad outcomes: on account of which even in the Old Testament the Lord permitted a bill of divorce to be given.

To the next it must be said that he acquired some right in her whom he betrothed: but this is not the right of the debt in her body, but rather a disposition to that debt: and on account of the smallness of that in which he is damaged, and because he can recover it in another, the girl is de-obligated in some cases on account of a subsequent deed, even without any sin of the other spouse who had contracted betrothal with her.

To the next it must be said that no promise is made to an infinite time: but the time is sometimes determined by word, sometimes by things. I mean the time of rendering what was promised. But it is determined by things, namely when by the discretion and quantity of the body they are made pubescents: and then they are to be compelled to pay what they promised, unless they proffer a legitimate impediment.

Articulus 13 — To Whom Do Betrothals Belong

Of whom is betrothal?

Second, it is inquired, Of whom is betrothal?

§ 1. It seems that it belongs to all who can be joined in the future matrimonially: but children from the cradle can be joined thus: therefore recently born children can contract betrothal.

§ 2. Further, a contract which can be made by another and by me, can be made whether I can discern or not: but such is the contract of betrothal: therefore it seems that they can be contracted at every age.

§ 3. Further, it seems that seven years is not the time in which betrothals ought to be contracted: because some children at seven years are less discerning of nuptials than others at five years: therefore it seems that seven years should not be prescribed generally for all.

§ 4. Further, Blessed Gregory narrates in the fourth book of the Dialogues, that a certain boy of five was so small and such a great sinner, that even on account of the sin of blasphemy the devil killed him: since therefore sin is not imputed to any indiscreet person, it seems that that five-year-old boy had discretion: therefore he himself could at least contract betrothal.

§ 5. Further, it seems that the cause which is assigned is null: because betrothals then please. For either this is taken from signs, or from the incitation of complexion. If from signs, it seems to be nothing: because children even before this age are frequently seen to practice shameful games with each other: therefore even before this age betrothals please them, it seems. But if from the incitation of complexion. On the contrary: Seed does not distil before the second septennium, as the Philosopher says: therefore it seems that on the part of the passive quality in intercourse, namely on the part of humor, one is not incited before the

second septennium: therefore by reason of this, the age ought not to be posited at the first septennium.

If perhaps it is said that this happens by reason of the inciting element on the part of the active quality. On the contrary: The active quality which is heat extends the members even before seven years: therefore incitation on the part of the active quality is before seven years: therefore the age of the contracting parties is irrationally posited at the first septennium.

§ 6. Further, the age of matrimonial contract in a boy and a girl is not one: because a twelve-year-old girl can contract, and a fourteen-year-old boy: since therefore a boy and a girl are related to contracting marriage just as to contracting betrothal, it seems that the age of contracting betrothal in a boy and a girl ought not to be one.

§ 7. Further, nature does not form a boy and a girl at the same time, but a girl more slowly: therefore also a greater age ought to be given to a girl for contracting betrothal than to a boy: therefore if seven years are assigned to a boy, more ought to be assigned to a girl for contracting betrothal.

§ 8. Further, let us suppose that an adult contracts betrothal with someone younger than seven years: and it is inquired, what is to be said? If you say that it holds. On the contrary: Betrothal cannot be contracted before seven years. But if nothing. On the contrary: Betrothal is the promise of future nuptials.

§ 9. Further, for one party there is more than a legitimate age for contracting betrothal: therefore in regard to him at least something can be done.

§ 10. Further, let us suppose that such a one contracts through words concerning the present, since he himself is of full age, because he himself does what is in him: therefore he binds himself to her, although she is not bound to him: therefore in regard to him there is a marriage. On the contrary: Marriage is not in one, but in two, as was held above: therefore unless marriage is enacted by both spouses, nothing is enacted: but here it is not enacted from both: therefore nothing is enacted.

§ 11. Further, I posit if an adult contracts through words concerning the present with a seven-year-old or one less than seven years, it seems that at least betrothal is effected there: because nature, when it cannot do the greater thing intended by it, nevertheless does what can be done: therefore this is also so in the works of men: but betrothal can be contracted between such persons: therefore betrothal is effected by such a contract. But on the contrary: In voluntary things it is said by Ambrose that intention imposes the name on the work: but this one through words concerning the present intends to contract marriage, and not betrothal: therefore betrothal is not effected there, nor can marriage be effected between such persons: therefore nothing is effected between them.

§ 12. Further, I posit another case: for let us suppose that children before seven years contract betrothal as much as they can, and after seven years contract through words concerning the present before the time of puberty, it seems that nothing is effected between them: because betrothal before seven years cannot be contracted: and things which are not contrac-

ted can never be consummated: therefore by the subsequent contract betrothal is not consummated.

Further, by words concerning the present they do not intend to effect betrothal, but marriage: and this cannot be between them before the years of puberty: therefore they effect neither betrothal nor marriage: therefore they effect nothing.

To the contrary of this is that betrothal contracted before seven years, and afterwards approved by a certain sign of pleasure, holds, as the laws say: but a subsequent contract through words concerning the present is a certain sign of pleasure of a betrothal contracted before the years: therefore it seems that they perfect the betrothal.

§ 13. Further, I posit that an adult wishes-

§ 1. ...[if someone] being near adult age, contracts with a girl younger than the age of puberty, or nearly close to puberty, and he contracts by words of the present, and it is asked whether he effects a marriage or a betrothal? It seems that it is not a marriage; because both are not of lawful age: therefore they do not effect a marriage. On the contrary, it seems that it is not a betrothal: because the form of words which is in betrothals is not observed, nor do they even intend to complete a betrothal: therefore they complete neither: therefore they do nothing. But against this: the Decretals, concerning betrothal, just as Alexander III said of those who are betrothed at a minor age: "If they should be so close to the age of puberty, that they were able to be joined by carnal copulation, they ought not to be separated out of consideration for their minor age, if one is seen to consent to the other," etc.[681] It seems, that such persons effect a marriage between themselves.

§ 2. Response. It must be said that seven years is laid down as the time in which marriages are pleasing: although that age is impotent for carnal commingling. This authority, moreover, is sufficient, because it so pleased the Fathers inspired by the Holy Spirit: nevertheless, because this is founded in natures, the reason for it must be drawn from philosophy.

§ 3. Aristotle, moreover, says in Book XVIII of On Animals, that all impregnations and maturations of the parts are according to the revolutions of the celestial orb.[682] Moreover, those who speak of natural things, namely Ptolemy and Albumasar, write that the revolution of the circle in the one born gives a year for each sign. Now the first computation of the circle is into the sign opposite the ascendant, and this is seven years from the ascendant. And the second computation is into seven years from that one, and this is the ascendant. And the third is again into the seven years which is opposite. And the fourth is again into the ascendant according to the iterated circle. And according to this there is a change of complexion [temperament] in the one born. Whence after the first seven years, in most cases the flowing humor settles down, which dominates in children on account of the closeness to the seed: so that then they are capable of understanding the things they hear, especially those pertaining to the body. Whence from then on they begin to be subjected to disciplines, and from then on to be handed over to literary studies: and therefore then they are said to be capable of being pleased by or displeased by a marriage, and therefore they can promise a betrothal. In the

second septennium, however, the genitals already begin to vaporize, and they gather down-hair there on account of the drawing of the seed to those places: and therefore then there can be a marriage between them. But in the third septennium when the half circle is already completed, according to the Philosophers the seed tends to a maturity which is completed in the second perfect circle, and then it is in a steady state until the third circle, and afterwards it begins to be in decline: this however is varied according to the dominion of the planets which preside over the figures of nativity: because as Augustine says in the fifth book of The City of God: "It is not incongruous that the afflatus of the stars should avail for the alteration of bodies, although they cannot act upon free will except insofar as it is drawn by the body."[683]

§ 4. To the first, therefore, it must be said that before seven years, as in most cases, they are not capable of discipline, nor of the good of marriage: and therefore then they can promise nothing, because a promise is an act of reason, and it is necessary that reason be in some established state, when it is able to promise. But because, by sitting and resting, as the Philosopher holds in Physics VII, the soul becomes knowing and prudent, and while the flowing humor settles, and the animal power begins to rest: a turning of the soul toward the apprehended thing is brought about: and this begins after the first septennium, as has already been held.

§ 5. To the other it must be said that, if a contract is made through another, both children, or one of them, before the years of puberty can raise a claim against it, and nothing has been enacted: so much so that one of the children is not even forbidden to take a blood-relative of the other, on the grounds that nothing has been done between them: but as to what is said, that parents sometimes promise on behalf of children, this is understood in this way: if the children coming of age hold the promise of their parents to be ratified.

§ 6. To the other it must be said that although certain individuals in whom the natural humidity is less, at seven years of age are less discreet, and less capable of the good of marriage, nevertheless as in most cases at seven years they are rendered capable of discipline, and of the things they hear and see: and therefore the law considers that which happens in most cases: for since the particular accidents which are according to each individual are infinite, the law could not be given according to each individual singularly, but according to that which happens in most cases.

§ 7. To the other it must be said that, without prejudice, I rather think this was done for the terror of the parents: and the boy was only punished for this in body, who like a brute animal spoke what he heard from his parents, since at that age almost no reason yet appears.

§ 8. To the other it must be said that this pleasing [consent] is taken from the signs of discerning among those things which children hear, as was previously said that it first begins at the age of seven years.

§ 9. To this, moreover, which is objected, it must be said that as Aristotle says, the genital members are of many vapors, and therefore excite itching: and therefore I think that the

681. Cf. Gen. 2:18. Note that the original text cited Gen. 1:19, but the allusion is clearly to the creation of the woman as a helpmate in Gen. 2:18.

motion of boys of a lesser age than seven years, proceeds from corrupt nature: but after seven years reason begins to be mixed in, as was previously shown. Whence the proper sign of this is, that then reason begins to be mixed into human acts.

§ 10. To the other it must be said that the age of the contract of marriage is not single [identical for both]: because in a girl the flesh is soft and extensible: and therefore the humor is easily digestible to maturity: and therefore it is more quickly matured for receiving, because receiving is caused by the cold humor, so that the humid [fluidity] is receiving and the cold is holding. But the humor of a boy is digested for imprinting and sealing: and this is caused by the hot and dry, because it results from the hot overcoming the humid. And therefore more time is required for the maturation of a male than of a female: just as more time is required for the hot to overcome the humid by drying it out, than for it to merely direct and extend it for receiving. And therefore the age of coition for a male is one thing, and for a female another. But in the admixture of reason to acts it is not so: because this is caused by the fact that the humor begins to settle, and not to impede the turning of reason toward things heard and seen: and this happens equally in male and female.

§ 11. To the other it must be said that the animation of a girl is of a longer time than of a boy: but nevertheless because the humor of the already born boy equally begins to settle, or not to settle, the time of betrothal is given to them equally: but the time of contracting [marriage] is unequal, because frigidity in a female when it is with humidity, operates toward the good disposition of the female, as was said: and this is when the hot does not fully overcome the humid.

§ 12. To the other it must be said that, according to many great men, in such a case one can use words in two ways: for if he says, "I take you as mine," and she answers, "And I take you as mine," or equipollent words, nothing is enacted: because a marriage cannot be enacted, and they do not intend to contract a betrothal. But if someone should say, "My words, even if they cannot contract a marriage, let them avail for what they are able to avail": then betrothals are contracted, because these can be contracted between such persons, and it may well be that they are speaking the truth.

§ 13. But to that which is objected, that before seven years they are not contracted, it must be said that this is true unless after seven years they are pleasing. But if the girl is seven years old and the other is a pubescent, betrothals are contracted, and the betrothed man is bound to wait for her, until she comes to the years of puberty.

§ 14. To the other it must be said that as to one part nothing can be done there: because it is necessary that everything which is done in marriage, should be done by the common consent of both: whence nothing is effected there.

§ 15. To the other it must be said that he who so contracts, also effects nothing, by the reason previously stated. And the objection made to the contrary, holds and resolves it.

682. Gen. 2:24.

§ 16. To the other it must be said that it is otherwise regarding nature, and regarding this work: because nature operates toward an intent, but this person neither intends a betrothal, nor operates toward it: and therefore it is not similar.

§ 17. To the other case it must be said that such betrothals hold, because they did nothing before: nevertheless by a subsequent deed they are understood to have approved the deed which preceded: and this approval makes a betrothal between them.

§ 18. But to that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that the approval of the past, which is most certainly supposed in a word of present tense, makes a betrothal: and it is false that entirely nothing was done before: but it is true that they did nothing of a betrothal, but they did something toward a betrothal, namely a disposition, which even if it had been done by others beforehand, could be consummated by their subsequent approval.

§ 19. But to that which is objected, that they do not effect a marriage, I concede plainly, especially if they are far distant from the year of puberty.

§ 20. TO THE FURTHER case it seems it must be said that such persons can contract, especially if the lacking age is supplemented by the disposition of the body and the sagacity of mind. Now I understand the disposition of the body especially in the genital areas, namely that they can act and suffer in the carnal work. However, some say that the time of distance from the due age ought not to be extended beyond six months: but it seems to me rather, that it must be determined according to more and less, even according to the diverse disposition of members and sagacity: because I have seen a girl of whom it was claimed that, being nine years of age, she conceived and gave birth to a boy when she was beginning to complete her tenth year. And the Philosophers say that some are born with teeth and with down-hair and hair in the genital areas, and they are more quickly matured for coition than others. And I think that this also varies in hot and dry regions: just as impregnation itself and bodily growth do.

§ 21. And through this the solution to the whole is evident.

Articulus 14 — What The Effect Of Betrothal Is, And Whether Betrothals Can Be Dissolved

What is the effect of a betrothal? and, Can a betrothal be dissolved?

§ 22. Thirdly, it is asked concerning the effect of a betrothal.

§ 23. It seems, moreover, that the effect is to oblige to contract a marriage: because 1. The effect of the genus is preserved in the species: but the genus of betrothal is a promise: therefore it seems that just as a promise obliges one to pay, so a betrothal should oblige one to pay.

§ 24. 2. Also, in the Decretals, Book IV on betrothals, Ex litteris, Alexander III says to the Bishop of Poitiers: "You should admonish him: and if he does not acquiesce to the admonitions, you should compel him with ecclesiastical censure, that he receive her as a wife, and

683. Lev. 18:7.

treat her with marital affection." And he speaks of a certain woman whom he had betrothed beforehand: and he says that he is to be compelled to marry the one he betrothed: therefore betrothals oblige one to contract [marriage].

§ 25. To the contrary of this is that: 1. An obligation which is made by law, is not dissolved unless payment is made: but betrothals in many cases are dissolved without payment being made: therefore betrothals do not oblige.

§ 26. 2. Also, if betrothals obliged, then it would be a mortal sin not to pay: but the pastor of the Church is bound to ward off from mortal sin: therefore by ecclesiastical censure he is bound to compel always those who have contracted a betrothal to contract [marriage]: but this is false, as is clear in the Decretals, Book IV on betrothals, Praeterea hi, where Innocent II says: "But if they are unwilling to admit each other mutually, lest perhaps something worse should befall from it, namely that he should marry such a one whom he holds in hatred: it seems that after the likeness of those who contract a fellowship by the interposition of faith, and afterwards remit the same to each other, this can be tolerated in patience."

§ 27. Further it is asked concerning another effect of betrothal, which is a certain affinity.

§ 28. For it seems that betrothals do not make this: because 1. What is promised for the future, does not exist: but in betrothals, nuptials are promised for the future: therefore they do not yet exist: but what does not exist, effects nothing: therefore such nuptials effect nothing: therefore not even affinity.

§ 29. 2. Also, affinity cannot be made unless there is one kin-group [genus], as will be held below: but the betrothed are not united to a kin-group: therefore let there be no affinity between them. Proof of the minor. He who is carnally copulated with no one of a kin-group, is not united to the kin-group according to the flesh: but one contracting only a betrothal, is carnally copulated with no one of the kin-group: therefore he is not united to the kin-group: and thus the proposition is held.

§ 30. 3. Also, in other contracts where something is promised concerning the future, if it is rescinded, it does not impede that one can make that contract with another of the same kind: therefore neither in this one ought it to impede, as it seems.

§ 31. To the contrary of this is what is said in the Decretals, Book IV on betrothals, Ad audientiam, etc., Alexander III says thus: "Since it is written, that a brother cannot have the betrothed of his brother, we mandate that you do not permit him to fulfill his proposition." And he speaks of a certain man who wished to give his own daughter to that one's brother, who had beforehand, with the consent of the girl, betrothed her.

§ 32. Response. It must be said that the effect of a betrothal is to bind to contracting a marriage, as long as the betrothal remains, as the first arguments prove: but it is true that for certain causes they are dissolved, as will be evident below, and then they do not bind, because they are dissolved: nor is this surprising, because they do not bind when they are dissolved.

§ 33. To that therefore which is objected against this, it must be said that as long as they remain, so long do they bind: but they are dissolved in cases in which they would bind with a

greater harm: therefore according to the common law they are reputed dissolved: for what is established for the utility of the contracting parties and the honor of the Church, is set aside when it is observed against the utility of the contracting parties and the honor of the Church.

§ 34. To the other it must be said that Alexander says this in a case in which betrothals are dissolved on account of a supervening marriage with another: because a lesser bond yields to a greater, and is broken when that one supervenes.

§ 35. But to that which is objected, that the Church ought to ward off from mortal sin: it must be said that she does so: because she indicts and enjoins penance for the sin, but she does not compel the fulfillment of the promise: because already by common law the betrothals are dissolved.

§ 36. To that which is asked concerning the further effect, it must be said that they make affinity, as has been said according to the institutions of the Fathers.

§ 37. But to that which is subsequently objected, it must be said that that which is not, does not effect, but that which is: but betrothals are, and they are something of a marriage, namely a disposition toward it, as was said above.

§ 38. To the other it must be said that there is in betrothals a conjunction to the kin-group in a qualified sense [secundum quid], although not absolutely: for just as in natural things something is made akin to fire by a disposition of fire, even before it has the species: so also in moral matters someone accedes to the kin-group of another through a disposition, when he contracts with him a betrothal, although he is not made one flesh with him: and therefore the holy Fathers established that affinity should be contracted between such persons.

Articulus 15 — In What Ways Betrothals Are Contracted

In what ways are betrothals contracted?

§ 39. Fourthly it is asked, In what ways are betrothals contracted?

§ 40. Now Law experts say that betrothals are contracted in two ways, namely absolutely, and under a condition.

§ 41. They are contracted absolutely in four ways, namely by nude promise, such as, "I will take you as mine," or conversely: by giving betrothal earnest-money [arrhae], such as some money, or other things: by the subarrhation of a ring, and by an intervening oath.

§ 42. They are contracted under a condition in two ways, namely under an honest condition, or under a dishonest condition. Honest, as if he says thus: "I will contract with you if it pleases your parents": and then they say that while the condition stands, the promise stands, and when it does not stand, it does not stand, unless consent by words of the present or carnal copulation follows. A dishonest condition is twofold, namely contrary to the good and honor of marriage, and not contrary. An example of the first is, if he says thus: "I will contract with you, if you procure poisons of sterility, or procure an abortion, or are joined with me sodomitically, or gain a living for me by committing adultery," or something of this sort: and then the promise made concerning marriage does not stand. An example of the second condition is, if

he says: "I will contract with you, if in the future you gain for me, either by usury, or by something of this sort involved in sin": and then the condition must be renounced, and the betrothals hold, according to that saying of Bede: "In a base vow break your faith, and in evil promises change your resolve."[684]

§ 43. Also, when they are contracted absolutely, if they are contracted without an oath, they are to be admonished to consummate it, but not to be compelled if they are unwilling. But if they contracted with an oath, they are to be compelled on account of the oath by ecclesiastical censure: and I understand this of those who are both seven years old, because if both or one are minors they cannot contract betrothals, as is clear from the disputation held previously.

§ 44. And this is all that the laws define concerning the contracting of betrothals.

§ 45. Against this, however, it is objected:

§ 46. 1. And first indeed concerning the division which says that betrothals are contracted absolutely in four ways. For in a promise a man is not obliged except from himself: but the holy Fathers say that God promising is not obliged from us, but from Himself alone, and He would not be unjust if He did not pay: therefore by similar reasoning one contracting by a nude promise will not be unjust if he does not pay: therefore it seems that the other party cannot bring action, which is false: therefore betrothals are not contracted by nude promise.

§ 47. 2. Also, it seems false what the law says, that one contracting by nude promise is not to be compelled to consummate the marriage. For he who promises and does not pay the promise, lies: but "a mouth that lies slays the soul":[685] therefore that one sins mortally: but anyone ought to be warded off from mortal sin: therefore anyone ought to be warded off [by being forced] to the consummation of the promise.

§ 48. 3. Also, he who deceives another in money deceives in a lesser thing, than he who deceives him in marriage and in himself: but one deceiving in money is compelled by a judge to payment: therefore much more ought he who deceives another in marriage and in himself be compelled to payment: therefore it seems to be nothing what the laws say. § 49. Further it is objected concerning the second way.

§ 50. For it seems that that way is illicit: because 1. Marriages ought to be free: but that which is appraised is not free: therefore marriages ought not to be appraised: but earnest money [arrha] is part of a price, as the Gloss on the Apocalypse says:[686] therefore betrothals ought not to be sealed by earnest.

§ 51. 2. Also, marriage, as will be proved below, is in the genus of the honorable [honestum] by reason of two of its goods, and in the genus of the useful by reason of the third: but everything spiritual is honorable: therefore marriage ought not to be placed under a price: therefore neither is it contracted by giving earnests, because an earnest is part of a price, as has already been held.

§ 52. 3. Also, it happens that those betrothals are dissolved by some case: therefore either the earnests are returned, or not. If they are not returned, Against this: because according to

this it seems to be dealt with unjustly with him whose part of the price is retained: and yet the contract is rescinded. But if they are returned: then it seems that the marriage was placed under a price: because there seems to be no cause for the returning, except because the contract which the price effected is rescinded.

§ 53. Concerning the third way it is similarly objected: because 1. A ring signifies marital faith: but this is consequent upon marriage: since therefore in betrothals a marriage is not contracted, it seems that the subarrhation of a ring does not pertain to the contracting of a betrothal.

§ 54. 2. Also, a necklace [monile], as Isidore says, is so called as if a fortifier [munile], because it fortifies the bosom lest an adulterer insert his hand:[687] therefore it seems, since betrothals bind to one rather than to another, that they ought rather to be made by a necklace than by a ring.

§ 55. 3. Also, Genesis 24:22 and 47, Eliezer gave to Rebecca earrings, and rings:[688] let it be asked therefore, What do earrings signify in betrothals, and what do necklaces, and what do rings, and why are they made more frequently with these three than with others?

§ 56. Further it is objected concerning the fourth way which is done with an oath interposed.

§ 57. For it seems that that way is illicit: because 1. For many causes an oath can become illicit: but no one can swear that which can become illicit: therefore an oath ought not to be made for a betrothal.

§ 58. 2. Also, it seems that in some case an oath induces perplexity. For example: let us posit that he hates her before he contracts by words of the present: then there is danger in completing the marriage, because unwilling marriages sort out bad ends, and what is done with danger is not to be done: therefore that marriage is not to be consummated. But on the contrary, a licit oath is to be observed: and the oath is about the marriage: therefore it is to be consummated, and not to be consummated, which is impossible: therefore it seems that an oath is not to be interposed.

§ 59. Further it is objected concerning those ways which are done under a condition.

§ 60. And let it be objected first concerning an honest condition: for this is twofold according to the Law experts, namely simply honest which pertains to good morals, such as, "I will contract with you if it pleases parents, or pedagogues, or priests, or the Church," or something of this sort. And a condition useful on account of the burdens of marriage, such as, "I will contract with you if you give a hundred marks."

§ 61. Let it be objected therefore concerning the first condition which is simply honest.

§ 62. For it seems that it ought not to be attached: because 1. One cannot contract a marriage for another, unless he himself consents: therefore it is nothing to say, "I contract with you if it pleases this one, or that one."

684. Isidore of Seville, Synonyma, lib. 2, cap. 58 (often attributed to Bede or cited via Gratian).

§ 63. 2. Also, if it pleases the parents and not the daughter, neither a marriage nor even a betrothal is made there: if therefore in negating, the consent of the daughter does not depend on the parents; therefore neither in affirming does it depend: therefore in no way does it depend: because consent is either by affirming, or by negating: therefore for naught is a condition of the consent of parents, or even of any others, attached.

§ 64. 3. Further it is objected concerning the other condition which is also reputed not dishonest, namely that which is with the adjunction of money.

§ 65. For it seems that that one does not hold: because marriages ought to be free. But the Philosopher says that that is free which is the cause of itself: therefore marriage ought to be the cause of itself: therefore there ought not to be a condition of price or money.

§ 66. 4. Also, Aristotle says that some things are mixed between voluntary and involuntary, namely those which we do not will simply, but nevertheless lest other worse things happen, we choose them, like throwing merchandise overboard in the time of a storm lest the ship be submerged: and these are not praiseworthy in morals. Since therefore in morals according to all Philosophers the honor of marriage is of the number of praiseworthy goods, it seems that it ought not to be thus partly voluntary and partly involuntary. Now it is mixed thus if a pecuniary penalty is added: therefore there ought not to be a condition of a pecuniary penalty.

§ 67. 5. Also, coercion excludes consent which is the efficient cause of marriage: whence the Praetor says: "What is done by force or because of fear, I do not hold ratified." But fear is twofold, namely of person, and of nature: and both fall upon a constant man, whom civil law reputes constant: therefore it seems that it excludes the consent of marriage: since therefore such fear of loss occurs when the addition of a pecuniary penalty is made, it seems that consent is evacuated: therefore betrothals ought not to be contracted in such a way.

§ 68. 6. Further it is objected concerning a base condition, not contrary to marriage.

§ 69. For it seems that it evacuates the marriage: because there are certain things, as Augustine says, which cannot be done with a good end, because they are essentially conjoined to an evil end, such as theft, adultery, and the like: but marriage is a good: therefore if it is taken as an end, the end itself will be good: therefore it cannot be the end of such an evil: therefore it seems that the marriage is annihilated, when it is contracted with such an end, or when it is made the end of such an evil.

§ 70. Next to this it is asked, Whether it is worse to contract with such an end, or condition, or not to contract, and to use a woman for this without a contract in the manner of pimps who prostitute whores?

§ 71. For it seems that the second is worse than the first: because at least he is excused in his coition who knows his own [wife]: but he who knows not his own and prostitutes her, is excused neither in his own, nor in another's: therefore the second is worse than the first. Against: In the prior there is adultery into which the husband consents: but in the second only fornication: therefore the first is worse than the second.

685. Wisdom 1:11.

§ 72. Further it is asked concerning the last condition, which is base and contrary to marriage.

§ 73. For it seems that it does not nullify the contract, because from everything the good that can be elicited from the same must be held: but there are two contracts [items], and the condition of the contract is good, and the condition is bad: therefore the contract is to be held, and the condition refuted. Moreover the first is confirmed from this which is said, 1 Thessalonians 5:21 and 22: Prove all things, hold fast that which is good. Abstain from all appearance of evil.

§ 74. Solution. It must be said that the above-mentioned ways are those by which betrothals are contracted, as those teaching the laws say. But they are reduced to two, namely of simple promise, and of confirmed promise. But confirmed is twofold, through a condition, or through a further bond. And a condition is then spoken of in that way which was said above. But a bond binding more amply than a promise: is either a sign appropriating the betrothed woman, or a confirmation of the promise. But a sign is either concerning things pertaining to a gift on account of nuptials, or to the ornament of the betrothed woman. And the first is seen to be a nuptial earnest: but in the second way the subarrhation of a ring. But if it is a confirmation of a promise: then it is an oath. However, of this reduction to art [i.e., systematic classification] the Law experts do not care: because they focus on broad things for common people, about which there are cases and particulars.

§ 75. These things having been held, it must be responded to that which is objected concerning the first way, and it must be said that it is otherwise regarding God, and man: because God promising neither has the cause of the promise in us, nor utility, nor an end, and therefore He is not obliged by an obligation of debt: because, as the saints say, God owes nothing to man, but man owes all his things to God. But when a man promises, he has the cause of the promise and utility in him to whom he promises: just as here in the contract one of the conjugal parties promises, and the cause is in the other who promises back to him, and the utility which is a debt in the body of that one with whom he contracts, which he can even exact by the right of marriage: and therefore that one is obliged.

§ 76. To the other it must be said that the one promising is bound to pay as much as is in him, unless it should stand hindered by the other: and I well concede that he sins not paying if he is able to pay.

§ 77. But to this which is objected, that he should be compelled, it must be said no: because frequently a lesser evil is passed over, lest a greater occur. It is passed over, I say, such that it is not brought into the face of the Church for judgment, although it is not passed over in confession. And this is what is said, Decretals, Book IV on betrothals, Praeterea hi qui, etc., where Innocent II says: "But if they are unwilling to admit each other mutually, lest perhaps something worse should befall from it, namely that he should marry such a one whom he holds in hatred: it seems that after the likeness of those who contract a fellowship by the

686. Cf. Glossa Ordinaria.

interposition of faith, and afterwards remit the same to each other, this can be tolerated in patience."

§ 78. To the third it must be said that although he deceives in a greater thing, nevertheless it is a more recoverable loss, than that of money: because he can contract with many others: but other money it does not happen that he recovers easily: and therefore that is not brought to judgment just as this is.

§ 79. To that which is further objected concerning the second way, it must be said that it is a certain confirmation of the promise, because through gifts the betrothed woman is in a certain manner appropriated to the betrothed man, or conversely, as is hinted at in Genesis 30:16, where Leah said to Jacob: Thou shalt come in unto me, for I have hired thee with a reward for my son's mandrakes.[689]

§ 80. But to the first which is objected against it, it must be said that earnest [arrha] here is taken otherwise than for a price, or for part of a price: for just as by an earnest a bought thing is appropriated to the buyer, so the betrothed woman to the betrothed man by a nuptial subarrhation: and therefore the first argumentation fails through equivocation. If however it were conceded, that it was part of a price, then it must be said that marriage is not placed under a price: but that which is given, is for relieving the burdens of marriage.

§ 81. And through this the solution to the second is evident.

§ 82. To the third it must be said that if it were given under the name of a dowry, or promised, and marriage did not follow, he would be bound to restore it. But if other gifts are rather indicating love, than bringing great utility, I do not believe that he is bound to restitution: but nevertheless it does not follow, that the marriage is placed under a price for the reason stated above.

§ 83. To that which is further objected concerning the third way, it must be said that that ring signifies the faith of betrothals in the present, namely lest she promise another, and that she may preserve the faith of the marriage bed in the future: and therefore it is placed on the finger of the left hand, which is called the ring finger, because a certain pulsating vein, or artery, comes into it from the heart, which is bound by a circle as a sign of love.

§ 84. And through this the solution to the first is evident: because it proceeds from a false, or from an insufficient cause of the ring: and therefore it does not conclude.

§ 85. To the other it must be said that nothing prohi-

or by a necklace that the betrothal [subarrhation] be done, but it is more fittingly done by a ring: because since the faith of betrothals obliges to two things, one of those is principal, and the other is consequent: and the principal one indeed is to preserve faith to the groom: but the consequent one is to guard oneself from another. Now the ring signifies the principal thing, and the necklace signifies the consequent thing: and therefore it is more fittingly done by a ring than by a necklace.

687. Isidore of Seville, Etymologiae, lib. 19, cap. 31.

§ 1. To the third point it must be said that the bride is related to the groom in three ways: for insofar as the husband is the head of the woman, she is bound to hear, follow, and obey him.[690] For from matrimony she is bound to fidelity, and to guarding herself from another: nor are there more things so substantial to the bride insofar as she is a bride. Now the first of these is signified by the earnest [arrha]; the second is signified by the ring; and the third by the necklace. And therefore in ancient times girls were betrothed with these three.

§ 2. To what is further objected concerning an oath, it must be said that it can well be done if the contracting parties do not otherwise believe each other: because as the Apostle says, in Hebrews 6:16: Men swear by one greater than themselves, and an oath for confirmation is the end of all their controversy.[691]

§ 3. To what is objected to the contrary, it must be said that in such cases, as will be clear below, betrothals are dissolved: and then he is de-obligated from the oath, for the reason that he is not bound by the oath except in the mode of betrothals: and therefore once the betrothals are broken, he is not bound by the oath any longer: but I readily concede that it is incautious to swear in such matters.

§ 4. To another point it must be said that in such cases there is no perplexity, because he can fulfill the oath: otherwise he sins mortally. But if another matrimony supervenes: then he sins mortally contracting with another, but nevertheless he is not bound to perfect the betrothals, because they are dissolved: but he ought to do penance for perjury.

§ 5. To what is asked, Whether he is to be compelled? It must be said that although certain ones have said that he is to be compelled on account of the oath: nevertheless it seems to the wise that he is not: but it is to be passed over if out of hatred for the bride he does not wish to fulfill what he swore, because a greater evil could follow: and this case is expressly written in the Decretals, book four, title De sponsalibus, chapter Requisivit, where Lucius III speaks thus: Your fraternity has asked us by what censure a woman ought to be compelled who, having neglected the religion of an oath, refuses to marry the one to whom she affirmed by an interposed oath that she would marry. To which I briefly respond that, since marriages ought to be free, she is to be admonished rather than compelled, since compulsions frequently are accustomed to have difficult outcomes.[692]

§ 6. To what is objected concerning a simply honorable condition, it must be said that it is meritoriously to be added, such that the contracting parties can be blamed if they do not add it: because the contracting parties are either of mature age, or infants. If they are adults, although reason is confirmed in them, nevertheless one alone cannot see what is expedient as well as many faithfully consulting can see. But if they are infants, they cannot discern except by the doctrine and counsel of other elders: and therefore since discretion makes for the liberty and honorableness of consent, such a condition makes for a free matrimony rather than an ancillary or servile one: for liberty is not called free among the wise when it has liberty as a sort of bond or cloak for malice, but rather that which is done freely according to virtue: and therefore such a condition holds, and is favorable.

And thus the solution to the first is clear.

688. Genesis 24:22, 47.

§ 7. To another point it must be said that consent is twofold, namely of making matrimony, and this does not depend on another in matrimony . There is also a conditioned consent, when out of one's own will one adds a condition, for the reason that a human being does not suffice for himself as to counsel, and that one depends on the reason previously introduced.

§ 8. To what is further asked concerning a condition of utility, which is money, it seems it must be said that it can be added in two ways: namely, either in the manner of a dowry, or in the manner of a penalty if the marriages are not consummated. If it is added in the first mode, I say that it stands and can be exacted: and if the condition does not stand, he is not bound to the consummation of the promise. And this happens on account of the burdens of matrimony, as was said above. But if it is added in the manner of a penalty, as if it is said thus: 'Unless I contract with you, I will give you a hundred marks': I say that the condition does not hold nor can it be exacted if the matrimony is not consummated. The argument for this is in the previously cited decretal, Requisivit: namely because marriages ought to be free.[693]

§ 9. To what is objected to the contrary, it must be said that matrimony is not put under a price, as is clear from what was said above.

§ 10. To another point two things must be conceded: because those arguments proceed in that sense in which a pecuniary condition is added in the manner of a penalty, and they are good against those who feel otherwise than what is determined here.

§ 11. To what is further objected concerning a base condition that is contrary to matrimony, it must be said that matrimony is never the end of an evil, nor even for an evil end. For there is a twofold end, as you will find noted upon the second book of the Sentences, namely, the end of the work, and the end of the worker. The end of the work of matrimony is never for a bad end, nor is it the end of an evil. But the end of the worker can thus be in evil: and the saying of Augustine is understood concerning the end of the work, not of the worker. And because the end of the worker is not the essential end of matrimony, therefore the law says that the condition ceases, which is the intention of a base end on the part of the contracting party, but not the contract: and the contract of betrothal holds.

And through this the solution and the reason of the law are clear.

§ 12. To another point it must be said that one sins more in the act, and the other more in the circumstance drawing into that kind of sin, that is, into adultery: for nothing prohibits each from sinning more from a different consideration.

§ 13. But if it is asked, Who sins more absolutely? It seems it must be said that he who prostitutes his own wife, sins by a greater sin from this, which is adultery, and against more things: for against whatever things a panderer sins, this one also sins, and moreover against the good of matrimony.

§ 14. To what is objected concerning the ultimate condition, it must be said that it annihilates the contract: because there is no consent in such cases to matrimony according to the intellect, but according to the voice alone: but according to the intellect they consent to a base

689. Genesis 30:16.

cohabitation, because there cannot be matrimony where all the goods of matrimony are renounced.

And through this the solution to the objection is clear: because in such a contract there is nothing of good: and therefore nothing of good can be elicited from it which might hold, as was the case in other conditioned contracts.

Articulus 16 — In What Ways Betrothals Are Dissolved

By what modes are betrothals dissolved?

Fifthly it is asked, By what modes are betrothals dissolved?

Let that first be accepted which is determined by the law.

There are therefore eight cases in which betrothals are dissolved: of which the first is if one of the spouses crosses over to religion, which he can do even with the other unwilling and reclaiming before carnal copulation: and then the one who remains in the world is absolved from the bond of the betrothals, even if they were betrothals by words of the present. The second is when the groom is not found, because he transfers himself to another region: provided, however, it did not stand through her fault that the matrimony was not consummated: for if it stood through her fault, then she shall do penance for the promise, and also for perjury if an oath intervened.

The third is if one of the spouses, after betrothals have been contracted, incurs leprosy, or paralysis, or epilepsy, or has been shamefully mutilated in the nose or eye.

The fourth is if affinity supervenes, namely if the groom has carnally known a female blood-relative of the bride, or conversely: and this is sufficient to prove by rumor alone.

The fifth is if they mutually absolve themselves: which case, however, some do not accept.

The sixth, if one of them has fornicated.

The seventh, when matrimony supervenes contracted with another by words of the present: because then the lesser bond is dissolved on account of the greater supervening: but then he ought to do penance for the lied-about faith, oath, or promise.

The eighth, when a minor comes to adult age, and asks to be absolved from the bond of the betrothals, and for a license to marry another to be given to him.

Moreover, legal experts say that in two cases they are dissolved by the law itself, namely when one enters religion, and when one contracts with another by words of the present. But in all other cases they are to be dissolved by the judgment of the Church.

Behold what the law determines concerning this article.

But it is objected against the first case: 1. The offering of one who sacrifices from what is unjust will be execrable but he sacrifices from what is unjust who sacrifices what is another's: therefore it is not accepted by God. But that is another's which is promised to another, and owed

690. Gregory IX, Decretales, lib. 4, tit. 2, cap. 9.

through a promise: since therefore the groom is thus made bound through betrothals, and the bride conversely, it seems that he cannot sacrifice himself to God: therefore he cannot enter religion.

1. Also, if someone were made my debtor for money, he could not sacrifice or offer that money by which he would be made not paying me: but the debt of matrimony is greater: therefore much less can it be offered by which he is made not paying another: but if he enters religion, on account of the vow of continence he is made impotent to pay the debt of matrimony: therefore it seems that he ought not to enter religion.

TO THE CONTRARY of this is what is said in the Decretals, title De conversione conjugatorum, book III. For Alexander III speaks thus, in Ex publico instrumento, etc.: Furthermore, because although she was betrothed by the aforementioned man, nevertheless (as she asserts) she is still unknown by him, we mandate that if the aforesaid man has not known her carnally, and the same woman wishes to cross over to religion: having received sufficient caution from her that she ought either to cross over to religion or return to her husband within the space of two months, you may absolve her from the sentence by which she is bound: such that if she crosses over to religion, each must restore to the other what he is known to have received from him, etc. Of course, what the Lord says in the Gospel, That it is not lawful for a man except for the cause of fornication to dismiss his wife, is to be understood according to the interpretation of sacred eloquence concerning those whose matrimony has been consummated by carnal copulation, without which it cannot be confirmed. From these it is clear that the law speaks truly in this first case.

Further it is asked concerning the second case.

For it seems that it is unjust: because 1. In doubtful matters the safer part is to be accepted or held: but it is safer that he wait: because in waiting no prejudice is done to another: therefore it seems that betrothals are not dissolved from that absence.

1. Also, the absence of bodies is in no way repugnant to a spiritual bond: because it was contracted between the spouses from consent: therefore it seems that on account of the absence of bodies the bond which is between them will not be dissolved: therefore neither the betrothals.

To the contrary of this it is objected: because in the Decretals, book four, title De sponsalibus, Alexander III writes thus to the Bishop of Palermo: But concerning those who, having taken an oath, promise that they will marry certain women, and afterwards dismiss them unknown, transferring themselves to other parts: we wish to make this known to you, that it will be free for those women themselves (if it has not proceeded further in deed) to transfer themselves to other vows: having received, however, a penance for perjury, if it stood through them [i.e., if it was their fault] that the matrimony was not consummated.

691. Cf. Aristotle, Historia Animalium.

Further it is asked concerning the third. 1. For it seems that a bodily necessity ought not to make someone fall from his right: but this person acquired a right of contracting matrimony: therefore it seems that he ought not to lose it through a bodily infirmity.

1. Also, the involuntary that compels a human being, according to Aristotle, merits forgiveness and pardon: therefore much more that which God inflicted: but such is the necessity of this infirmity: therefore it seems that the bride ought to forgive such things.
2. Further it is asked, Why does a fever or something similar not dissolve it in this way, just as the infirmities mentioned above?

To the contrary of this it is objected through what Urban II says, in book four, title De conjugio leprosorum, chapter Litteras. And further down: Because you have asked whether, if after betrothals concerning the future contracted between legitimate persons, before the woman is led over by the man, one of them incurs the disease of leprosy, the other ought to be compelled to consummate the marital copulation. We respond that he ought not to be forced to take her, since matrimony has not yet been consummated between them.

Further it is asked concerning the fourth case.

For that one seems entirely unjust: 1. For from the sin of another, another ought not to be punished by him: therefore if one of the spouses makes an affinity through fornication, he who does not fornicate ought not to be punished: therefore he ought not to lose the right acquired to him through the betrothals.

1. Also, let us posit that someone fornicates with a blood-relative of the bride for this very purpose, so as to dissolve the betrothals: for it is certain that fraud ought to patronize no one: therefore neither to this one: therefore neither ought this one to attain absolution from the betrothals through his fraud.

To the contrary however it is objected through what is said in C. 27, quaest. 2, from the Council of Tribur: If anyone violates the bride of his son, and afterwards his son takes her: let the father afterwards not have a wife, nor the woman a husband: let the son who was ignorant of the father's crime take another.

Further it is asked concerning this fourth case, whether it is sufficient to prove it by rumor alone? Because

1. Since it ought rather always to be judged in favor of matrimony, it seems that betrothals ought to stand until the fact is most certainly proved: therefore betrothals are not to be dissolved on account of rumor alone.
2. Also, rumor is often false: and therefore it seems that rumor alone is not to be believed.

To the contrary of this is what is held in the Decretals, book four, title De consanguinitate et affinitate, where Urban III writes thus to the Archbishop of Bordeaux: Concerning the fact that you

692. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, lib. 5.

assert a young man betrothed a not yet nubile girl with an interposed pledge of faith, who, now made nubile, demands him: and he rejects her, saying that he ought not to marry her, for the reason that after he pledged faith to the girl, he carnally knew a female blood-relative of hers. I respond that if it is ma- nifest that the young man knew the relative of the aforesaid girl: or if it is not manifest, but nevertheless the rumor of the place holds this, since she was only a bride concerning the future, he ought to be absolved from her hindrance.

Further it is asked concerning the fifth.

Because that one seems entirely not to be accepted; because 1. What has once been justly done, cannot be held for not done: therefore it seems that an absolution by which they mutually absolve each other is null.

1. Also, what belongs to levity, the Church ought not to admit: but it is of the greatest levity to contract now, and mutually absolve oneself now: therefore this case ought not to be accepted by the Church.

To the contrary is the previously cited decretal, Extra, title De sponsalibus, chapter Praeterea, where Innocent II says that after the likeness of those who contract a society of faith, and afterwards remit the same to themselves, it can be tolerated in patience if they mutually absolve themselves: so also those who have contracted betrothals.

Further it is asked concerning the sixth, if one of them has fornicated.

For from this the betrothals do not seem to be dissolved simply, but only to the separation of the bed: yet the bond seems to ought to remain: because the Lord says, that he who marries a dismissed woman, fornicates.

Still it is asked, whether he is to be admonished that he receive her?

But it seems that he is: because 1. It will be held below, that it is mercy to receive a penitent: but every human being is to be admonished to mercy: therefore this one also is to be admonished that he receive her who has fornicated: or conversely the bride the groom.

1. Also, we see this every day, that grooms fornicate: and yet brides receive them by the right of the contracted betrothals: therefore it seems that this case is null.

To the contrary of this is, that 1. Even in consummated matrimony a wife is separated from the bed on account of fornication: therefore much more through it ought betrothals to be annulled.

1. Also, nothing renders spouses so hateful as fornication: but it is a danger if they contract while mutually hateful to each other: therefore it seems that such a case ought to separate or dissolve betrothals.

Further it is objected concerning the seventh.

693. Aristotle, Physics, VII, 3 (247b11).

For it seems that that one does not hold: because 1. What is posterior ought not to infringe upon that which was done prior: but the betrothals were done justly prior: therefore it is not derogated from them by a supervening matrimony.

1. Also, if someone sells to another a thing which he previously sold to me: if I prove that that thing was previously sold to me, it will be restored to me: therefore by similarity it is so in betrothals, and with a supervening matrimony: therefore in such a case one must recede from the matrimony, and return to the betrothals.

To the contrary of this, however, is a decretal of Gregory IX, book four, title De sponsalibus, chapter Si inter virum et mulierem, etc.: But if between them there acceded only a promise of the future, with each saying to the other, 'I will receive you into mine,' and, 'I you into mine,' or similar words: if another betroths that woman by words of the present, even if between her and the first an oath intervened concerning the future (as we have said), in consideration of this sort of betrothal the second matrimony cannot be separated: but a penance is to be enjoined upon them concerning the violation of faith.

Further it is asked concerning the eighth and ultimate. Because that seems nothing to the purpose because, 1. As was held above, a minor without due age cannot contract betrothals: therefore this case is null.

1. Also, from that which binds nothing, absolution is not to be asked: but before the due age betrothals bind nothing: therefore absolution is not to be asked from them.

To the contrary of this is a decretal of Alexander III, book four, title De sponsalibus: Concerning those who contract betrothals below the years apt for matrimony, whether both, or one reclaims, before they have arrived at the years apt for matrimony, and they ask to be separated, they are not to be heard in any way. But if one of them has arrived at the years of puberty, while the other is below those years when betrothals are contracted, if he who is of minor age, when he arrives at those years, reclaims, nor wishes to consent to the other, they can be separated from each other by the judgment of the Church.

Solution. It must be said that in contracting betrothals many things are considered: for when a promise is made for the future concerning contracting a marriage, that promise is for the payment of matrimony in the determined time of puberty for the good of offspring undertaken in an indivisible life with a legitimate person for contracting.

The first case therefore dissolves betrothals, for the reason that a spiritual death intervenes, impotent to pay what it promised: and therefore also the other is absolved from the promise.

The second case, however, sins against the determined time of the sponsion: because he does not appear at the agreed-upon time for the payment of the promise.

But the third case would sin against the good of the offspring on the part of the body: because from the infirm, the infirm are born. It also sins against a certain end of matrimony which is the collation of works, for the reason that one human being is insufficient for himself in work: and three Philosophers posit this end of matrimony, namely Cicero, Aristotle, and

Aspasius: for a groom who is infirm with a chronic infirmity cannot contribute anything of his works, so that the burdens of matrimony might be lighter.

The fourth case, however, sins against the legitimacy of the persons to be joined.

The fifth case, however, against indivisibility in this mode by which he dissolves the betrothals, because he does not dissolve them in every mode, as will be clear below.

But the sixth sins against the good of faith.

The seventh, because it binds in the opposite direction with a greater bond: and therefore it is contrary to the future indivisibility in the promised matrimony.

The eighth case, however, is for the reason that there was no due disposition in the contracting parties: for just as every form requires a due disposition in the matter, so also do betrothals: and one of those dispositions is a due age, as is clear from what was held previously.

And through this the reason of the law is clear, if anyone should wish to reduce it to the universal and to an art: for although it is positive [law], nevertheless according to Cicero there is no positive law that has not set out from reason: and what has set out from reason can be resolved to reason and the universal.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that he does not sacrifice from what is unjust: because the betrothals are dissolved through a better and greater bond: but if he were to do it while the betrothals remained, then the objection would be valid.

But if it is asked, How are they dissolved? It must be said, by the law itself: just as when a greater light supervenes, a lesser light is obscured.

To another point it must be said that it is otherwise concerning money: and that reason was expedited in the preceding article: and therefore that objection is not valid.

Moreover, between spouses each equally owes the other, and therefore as much as he who enters religion subtracts, so much is compensated to the other by the retention of his own debt who remains in the world. The decretal, however, brought forward to the opposite, is to be conceded and proves the case. And in the same mode it must be said concerning all the laws which are introduced in this question.

To what is further asked concerning the second, it must be said that the doubt is determined from the mode of the promise: because the time is certified in the years of puberty. Whence, in the Decretals, book four, title De sponsalibus, it is commanded that at the time of puberty, or within two months, she should render the debt to the groom, or enter religion: and therefore when at that time the groom is not found, the other who remains in the land is absolved.

To another point it must be said that absence is repugnant to the matrimonial effect which is carnal copulation, and therefore it is also repugnant to the bond: and therefore the betrothals are dissolved.

To what is further asked concerning the third, it must be said that when a defect of the body of this sort is present before matrimony, it makes the spouses abominable to each other, and the indivisibility of their life is bitter: and therefore it is better that they not be joined, because such marriages sort out bad outcomes, and because the offspring would be destroyed on the part of the body: but if it should supervene upon matrimony, then that which is objected holds. For since betrothals are nothing but a disposition to matrimony, they are more easily dissolved than matrimony.

To another point it must be said that such a necessary or involuntary thing in act, merits pardon and forgiveness: but in contracts it is otherwise, because there a human being considers his own utility, and therefore guards himself from an undelightful and harmful contract.

To another point it must be said that chronic sicknesses, both generating horror and impotence to cooperate toward alleviating the burdens of matrimony, dissolve betrothals. But fevers and the like are temporal, and therefore do not dissolve them: because they do not always render one impotent, but for a brief and moderate time.

To what is objected concerning the fourth, it must be said that he who fornicates loses his right, and is made abominable to the other: and therefore a license is given to him [the innocent party], that he is not bound to the betrothals unless he wishes: whence he loses nothing of his right, but rather gains liberty from him who rendered himself abominable to God and to himself.

To another point it must be said that fraud does not patronize him, but harms him when he loses his right: and this is introduced in favor of the other who does not sin, as was said.

To what is further asked, Whether in such a case it is sufficient to prove it by rumor alone? It must be said that it is: because this crime especially perturbs spouses, and makes them hateful to each other: and therefore separation is easily permitted on account of that crime.

To what is objected to the contrary, it must be said that this is true of matrimony; but betrothals are not matrimony, as was clear above: and therefore on account of a future danger which is accustomed to be generated from hatred, separation of betrothals is admitted even on account of rumor alone.

To another point it must be said that that case is not posited by certain ones: and they respond to the introduced decretal that it is not a decretal, nor does it contain law, but speaks of comparative permission, that is, that just as the violation of a society is permitted lest a greater evil be done, so also the dissolution of betrothals through the fact that each absolves the other, lest convening in hatred they mutually kill each other. Yet it could be said that this case holds when they are moved from the promise with money: for then it is a sign that they do not convene well: and therefore then the Church suffers it rather than that it should enact their separation.

To what is objected to the contrary, it must be said that betrothals do not speak of something perfectly done, but rather to be done: and therefore they can be revoked: because concerning the principal thing that is in them, they depend upon the future.

To another point it must be said that in truth, absolving themselves in such a way, they do not take heed to the vow: nevertheless the Church suffers it out of the aforesaid cause. To what is objected concerning the sixth it must be said that it is otherwise in matrimony and betrothals: because in matrimony a joining to another cannot be made: and therefore he is admonished to return to his own, lest his chastity be in danger: but in betrothals a joining to another can be made, and therefore they are dissolved: and he is not admonished, because such persons are hateful to each other: and through this the solution to the second is also clear.

To another point it must be said that it is otherwise in males, and otherwise in females: because the male has a greater impulse toward lust than the female: and therefore it is less base concerning a male if he fornicates: and therefore the vices of a male are more easily received by females, but not by right.

To what is further objected concerning the seventh, it must be said that matrimony is a greater supervening bond: and therefore when it binds in the opposite direction, the bond of betrothals is broken.

But to the objection it must be said that if they were equal in all things, then the objection would hold: but they are unequal, as has already been said.

To another point it must be said that it is not similar, as was expedited above.

To what is further objected concerning the eighth, it must be said that there is a mode of betrothals there, although not the matter for the whole, but for the other part only: and therefore this case is posited in the treatise on the dissolution of betrothals.

To another point it must be said that because he seemed to approve in the years deputed for contracting betrothals, and on account of a good example, he asks to be absolved: and not for the reason that he knows himself to be bound to such a person.

Articulus 17 — Whether Betrothals Are Said Of The Future Or Of The Present Or From The Solemnity Of The Nuptials

Whether betrothals are so called from a bride concerning the future, or concerning the present, or concerning the solemnity of nuptials?

Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, L, near the end: For there are certain nuptial pacts, etc.

For here it is gathered that "bride" is said in three ways, namely concerning the future, and concerning the present, and the solemnity of nuptials. And the Master says that betrothals are properly called in the ultimate mode.

But it seems false. 1. From the decree of Pope Nicholas introduced above, where he says that betrothals are the promises of future nuptials: therefore betrothals and bride are properly spoken of in the first mode, as it seems.

1. Also, the name seems to sound this, as was held above: therefore he lies in the Letter.

Further it is asked here, Whether it is said equivocally or univocally of these three?

But it seems that it is equivocally: because 1. He distinguishes the voice of betrothals in the Letter into its significations: but such a distinction does not convene except to an equivocal term: therefore it is equivocal.

1. Moreover, no one distinguishes in such a way that a man might signify Socrates in one way, and Plato in another: but the Master says that it signifies one thing in one way, and another in another: therefore it is equivocal.

To the contrary of this it is objected: For it is said from a single betrothal in whatever mode it is said: therefore it has one ratio: therefore it is univocal.

Response, that betrothals are properly called the pacts of future nuptials made with solemnity: and therefore what the Master says is not understood concerning the solemnity alone, but rather concretely concerning the solemn sponsion of future nuptials: and through this it is clear that it is not contrary to what was previously held: and through this the first two are solved.

To another point it must be said that it is neither said univocally of these, nor even equivocally, but rather by analogy to one thing, as the last objection proves. For an analogue is said of several diverse modes looking back to one thing: and therefore the Master in the Letter distinguishes the modes of diverse betrothals.

And this is the solution to all the things asked.

Articulus 18 — Whether In Betrothals There Ought To Be A Term For Solemnizing Marriage

Whether in betrothals there ought to be a term for solemnizing the matrimony?

Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, M, Concerning nuptial pacts, where there is only a sponsion of the future, etc.

For it seems that the cause which he assigns in the Letter is null: because 1. That, as the Author says, is understood concerning betrothals promised for the future: but betrothals are not contracted for the future [merely for that reason], but because the age of the contracting parties is not sufficient: therefore the cause is not that it is not exhibited immediately so that

he may desire it delayed, but because there is not sufficient age and habit of body to consummate the matrimony.

1. Also, it seems to be against the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 7:9: It is better to marry than to burn. Since therefore in the delay one of the spouses burns, or both, it would be better that it be exhibited immediately.
2. Also, every delay is to some term which is in human contracts: therefore it seems that a term ought to be assigned to this delay.

Response. It must be said that the holy Fathers constituted it thus from the beginning, as the Letter contains, and on account of the cause which is assigned in the Letter.

To the first, however, it must be said that frequently even those having age contract betrothals of the future: and I think that he speaks of those: and this is clear by this, because little children contracting before age would not sigh at the delay of the nuptials.

To another point it must be said that it is not delayed long: and therefore concupiscence cannot burn up much: for it is not delayed except up to two months, as is clear from the decretal introduced above: if nevertheless temptation should grow too dangerously, I should think it better, saving the judgment of a greater authority, that matrimony be consummated immediately.

To the ultimate point it must be said that the time for contracting parties having age is prefixed by the law, namely to at most two months or one, as was clear above.

Articulus 19 — Whether The Definition Of Bigamy Has Been Well Assigned

Whether the definition of bigamy is well assigned?

Whether the definition of bigamy is well assigned?

Then it is inquired concerning what is said, here, N, at the end: For a widow marrying again is prohibited from becoming a priest just as a bigamist, etc.

However, four things are inquired here concerning bigamy:
First, What it is, and whence it is named?
Second, In how many ways it occurs?
Third, By what reason is irregularity joined to it?
Fourth, Whether that irregularity admits any dispensation?

To the first of these, it proceeds thus:
It is the statement of some that bigamy is the division of one into not one wife or wives.

However, it seems that this definition is not valid: because
1. Bigamy is opposed to monogamy: and the monogamist is divided: therefore bigamy is not the division of one, etc. By the middle. Everything that is united to another from itself, it is

necessary that it be divided in itself: but every man adhering to a wife is united to another from himself: therefore he is divided in himself.

1. If perhaps you say that it is divided into one. On the contrary: It is proven that it is not: because she herself is also divided from herself and united to the man who mingles with her: therefore it is divided into not one.
2. Likewise, Nothing seems to be said, if not one: because Boethius says that every thing is one: therefore every wife is one wife: therefore no one is divided into not one.
3. Likewise, Everything that is (as the Philosopher proves) is one or many: therefore also the wife or woman into whom this one is divided is one or many: but it is evident that not many: therefore one: therefore it is false that anyone is divided into not one.
4. Likewise, We never say something is divided into more which are not, but into more which are: if therefore no one is divided into more wives which are, no one is divided into more wives: but those which are not at the same time in the same time, but one has died, and another remains, those wives are not more: therefore he who first has one, and after her death another, it seems that he is not divided into more.
5. Likewise, This seems from the words of the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 7:39: A woman is bound by law as long as her husband lives; but division is from the law: therefore when she is freed from the law, she is freed from division: therefore after his death she is not divided into him: if therefore then into one afterwards taken she is divided, it does not seem that she is divided into more.
6. Likewise, It is objected concerning what is said, Wife, or wives. For division follows the separation of one: because Aristotle says that we know number by the division of the continuous: but such a union is also to a harlot, as it is said, 1 Corinthians 6:16: Do you not know that he who is joined to a harlot is one body? Therefore such a division follows if he is joined to many by fornication: therefore he who fornicates with many is a bigamist, which is false.

Response. It must be said that the definition previously introduced is quite good. For a bigamist is said from "bis" and "γυνή" which is woman in Greek, as if divided twice into a woman: just as also a monogamist is not so repeated, and a trigamist thrice repeated, and a quadrigamist, and a pentagamist, and a hexagamist, and a heptagamist, and a polygamist.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that the separation which is in bigamy is opposed to the unity of the sacrament: but the unity of the sacrament is the individuality of the sign: and this is never better known than from the signified: but the signified is twofold, namely the union of the faithful spirit with the uncreated spirit, and the union of the divine nature with the human in one person of Christ. And the first indeed is signified by the individuality of consent: the second however by the individuality of the flesh, as was evident above in the distinction previously held. It must be said therefore that the individuality of the sign is nothing other than the individuality of consent and carnal conjunction. But the individuality

of consent is from two things, namely that it is from an individual and an individual: and from these two is caused the individual conjunction of the flesh: but no one is individual unless he is undivided in himself: and similarly no woman is individual unless she is undivided in herself: and this alone is she who never had any conjunction with another through individual coupling. And thus it is evident that bigamy is the privation of this individual coupling, because bigamy is the privation of individuality, just as blindness is the privation of sight. Whence it is evident that a monogamist does not have the privation of individuality: because with one there is only one individuality, not separated.

To the proof it must be said that she is unique in this kind of individuality if she was a virgin when she was transferred: because individuality is of marriage, as was said, rather than of one person in itself, because it is of the sacrament and the sign.

To the other it must be said that one sometimes says the unity of the supposit, and sometimes the unity of the accident: and similarly negation or privation is made in not one. It must be said therefore that here it denies the accident according to which one is said in such individuality and unity of the sign, which was or is of one: and not one which was or is of many, although it is always one according to the supposit.

To the third it must be said that if "one" says the unity of the supposit, then it is true that nothing is that is not one: because everything that is, is only one. But if it says the unity of the accident opposed to the aforementioned division, then there are many women who are not one: because they are not uniquely of one, as it is taken, Canticles 6:8: One is my dove, my perfect one, one is her mother's, chosen of her who bore her, that is, unique.

To the other it must be said in the same way, that it is understood of the unity of the supposit.

To the other it must be said that something is well divided into those which are not, but which were: although indeed the woman in whom the man was first divided does not remain, nevertheless the division remains in him when he is joined to the following: and this is evident by looking at the signified through the indivision of marriage: because the unity of natures in Christ is only between two extremes and once. Therefore the sign can not respond to the signified in three ways, namely if it is as one, but not one: or if one, but not one: or if not once, but this third mode cannot be between the same man and the same woman: because sacraments are not repeated over the same numerical matter: and thus it is evident that it is in the first two ways. However, the form of arguing is not valid: because the instance is, because if something is first divided, as wood into fire: for with the fire not existing, the division still remains in the wood: and if afterwards it is divided, it will be twice divided: and it will not be the division of one into one, because although the first with the second is not according to the thing, it is nevertheless according to the effect which it leaves in that into which it is divided.

To the other it must be said that the Apostle understands concerning the law of rendering the debt and obedience, and not concerning the effect which remains in the man even after the death of the woman.

To the other it must be said that there is a twofold union between a man and a woman, namely of carnal work, and of the individuality of the sign. The first is with any woman whom he knows carnally. The second however is only with the legitimately joined: and therefore only that one can make bigamy: for the other does not make it except through conjunction to this one by right or by consummated fact, as will be evident below.

Articulus 20 — In How Many Ways Bigamy Occurs

In how many ways does bigamy occur?

Secondly, it is asked, in how many ways does bigamy occur?

There are, however, four ways noted by law on this matter: and let these be taken first, and afterwards objections be made against them.

The first is the proper way, when someone successively has two wives, both of whom he has carnally known. The second is an improper way, when he has two at the same time, one in fact, and the other in law. The third is when he has one in law, and she having died, he takes another in fact, and not in law. The fourth is when someone contracts with a corrupted woman.

It is objected first against the first way,

1. For he is never joined to two, who is joined to one, and is not joined to another, unless released from her: but he who takes two successively is joined otherwise: therefore it seems that he is never joined to two: therefore he is never made a bigamist.
2. Likewise, in ancient times, several could be joined to one in one marital affection: therefore much more can several be joined successively to one in one marital affection: but to one marital affection corresponds one individuality of the sacrament: therefore in one individuality of the sacrament someone can be joined to several successively: since therefore bigamy does not occur except from the violation of this individuality, it seems that such a one is not made a bigamist.
3. Likewise, he who is never except of one, is never made a bigamist: but he is never except of one alone: therefore, etc. The proof: because there is no time in which he is of two: therefore the proposition is held.

On the contrary of this is what is held in the Decrees, where Jerome says:

Let the detractors of me open their ears, I pray, and see that I have granted second and third marriages in the Lord, etc. And so I do not condemn bigamists, nor even trigamists: but if it can be said, nor octogamists. It is accepted that he is a bigamist who consummates second or subsequent marriages: therefore that is one and the proper way of bigamy.

Further, it is asked about cases that are often taken according to this way. For I suppose that someone takes one by words of the present, and before he consummates the marriage she dies: and afterwards he takes another, and knows her carnally. For it seems that he is a bigamist by what is expressly said in the Letter from the words of the Master and the distinc-

tion of Pope Nicholas, which is made in the Letter between contracting with the bride of someone deceased who was by words of the present.

On the contrary of this, however, is objected what Innocent III writes to the Bishop of Metz, book 1, Extra, on Bigamists, The Duty of Pastoral Office, etc., and below: Since therefore it is prohibited due to the defect of the sacrament, that a bigamist or the husband of a widow should presume to be promoted to sacred orders: because neither is she the only one of the only one, nor is he one of one, indeed where the commixture of bodies is lacking among such spouses, the sign of the sacrament is not lacking. Hence he who takes as a wife a woman led by another man, but not known, should not be hindered from being able to be promoted to the priesthood.

The decretal is very notable: because it abrogates what the Master says in this chapter.

Further, it is asked about the second way. 1. For that does not seem to be the case: because there is no defect of the sacrament, where there is no sacrament: but with her with whom he contracted, in fact there is no sacrament: therefore it does not seem that a defect of the sacrament occurs because of this.

1. Likewise, it would be absurd to say that commixture with a prostitute would signify the copulation of natures in one person of Christ: therefore that adherence by which he adheres to a woman in fact does not have any individuality: the sign of which is, because he separates from her whenever he wishes: therefore it seems that he never has except one individuality with one: therefore he should not be considered a bigamist.

On the contrary of this is what

1. Jerome says, 31, question 4, How to Virgins. And below: First, from this it is accepted that Lamech, a bloodthirsty and homicidal man, divided one flesh into two wives, fratricide and bigamy were destroyed by the same punishment of the flood, etc. It is said that he who has two at the same time not in law, like Lamech who did not have in law, nor by divine inspiration, is called a bigamist by Jerome.
2. To the same effect is what is held, distinction 34, from the Council of Toledo: It is accepted from this that it is not lawful for a Christian to have, I will not say many, but not even two at the same time, unless only one, either a wife, or certainly in place of a wife (if the spouse is lacking) a concubine. However, if such a concubine is not, and the age of him about whom it is discussed is known to remove suspicion of future incontinence, by Apostolic concession he can be promoted to the order of deacon. In the contrary sense, that if he contracted in fact with a second, he is prohibited from orders, and not except because of bigamy: therefore such a one is a bigamist.
3. To the same effect is what is held, Extra, on divorce, We Rejoice, and it is a long decretal: but there it is said that it is not lawful for anyone to have two at the same time: therefore much less one in law, and another in fact, without being considered a bigamist.

Further, it is asked about cases that are reduced to that.

1. Let us suppose, therefore, that he has one in law, but did not consummate the marriage with her, but only contracted marriage with her by words of the present, and with another he contracted in fact, and knows her: for it seems that he is a bigamist, because he has either in law or in fact two: and he who has two is a bigamist: therefore he is a bigamist.
2. Likewise, the individuality of consent signifying the individuality of the faithful soul with God is preserved in her whom he has in law: but with another there is also a certain individuality of flesh: therefore he is not the only one of one, but rather double of two: therefore the reason of the sacrament is not preserved in him: therefore he is a bigamist.
3. Further, let us suppose that he returns to the first whom he has in law: it is clear that he is then a bigamist: since therefore before the return he sins more against God and against marriage, it seems that then he should be more considered a bigamist.

On the contrary is that he has not actually divided his flesh into many: therefore according to the decretal of Innocent above introduced, he should not be called a bigamist.

Further, it is asked about the third way.

For it seems that he is not at all: because

1. It is more to be divided with sin than without sin: but if someone is divided into many fornicators, he is not made a bigamist: therefore it seems that neither is he who had one in law, who having died, takes another in fact.
2. Further, let us suppose that after the death of his wife he knows many by fornication, and does not contract with any: it seems that he is more a bigamist, because neither is the form of honesty preserved in him: therefore it seems that even such a one is more a bigamist than the first.

On the contrary of this, however, is what is said, Extra, on bigamists not ordained, etc. And below: We, however, in this question respond in such a way, that with such clerics who as much as was in them joined second women to themselves matrimonially, it is not lawful to dispense with them, as with bigamists, although in truth they are not bigamists, not because of the defect of the sacrament, but because of the affection of intention with the subsequent work.

Further, it is asked about the fourth way. Because no reason seems to be for that:

1. For I am not divided because of the division of another: therefore neither is a man divided because of the division of a woman: therefore he remains the only one of one: therefore he is not a bigamist.

2. Likewise, the son will not bear the iniquity of the father, as it is said, and the father will not bear the iniquity of the son: therefore neither will a man bear the iniquity of his wife, nor vice versa: therefore neither the punishment of bigamy: therefore it seems that he is not a bigamist who contracts with a corrupted woman.

On the contrary of this is what

1. It is said, distinction 32, where Pope Leo against the letter of Nicetas the Abbot:

Let us proceed serially and openly, what is accepted from this, that whether the holy Roman Church says about the degrees of clerics: Clerics, doorkeepers, readers, exorcists, acolytes, if they are found outside the vow and habit of a monk, and are unwilling to profess continence, they are permitted to take a virgin wife with priestly blessing, but not a widow or repudiated woman: because because of this they will not be able to be promoted to the subdiaconate: because neither is a layman considered a bigamist unless he has taken a virgin wife, and has taken a widow or repudiated woman, he is considered as a bigamist irregular for sacred orders.

1. Likewise, distinction 34, it says: Therefore it must be taken care of in the first place, that no one who has not taken a virgin as a wife as written in the prior deeds above, aspires to sacred orders.
2. To the same effect is what Gregory writes to the Bishop of Syracuse: We command you not to ever make illicit ordinations, nor to permit a bigamist, or one who has not taken a virgin as a wife, or one ignorant of letters, or one in any way defective in body, or one subject to penance, or to the court, or to any condition, to approach sacred orders: but if you find any such, you should not dare to promote them.

Further, it is asked here about cases that seem similar. For let us suppose that someone first deflowers someone by fornication, and afterwards contracts with the same.

For it seems that he is a bigamist: because

1. He does not take a virgin wife, but a corrupted one: therefore according to the decrees introduced he is irregular as a bigamist. This seems to be confirmed by what is held, distinction 832: No one should be permitted to approach sacred orders, unless either a virgin, or of proven chastity, and who up to the subdiaconate has had one and a virgin wife.
2. To the same effect seems to be, 30, question 5: What kind of wife should be had according to the law, a chaste virgin, and betrothed in virginity, and legitimately endowed, and given by parents to the spouse, and to be received by paranymphs. If she is not such, she does not seem to be the only one of the only one: therefore contracting with her he is made a bigamist: but the above said is not such: therefore contracting with her, he is considered a bigamist.

On the contrary of this it seems that

1. He is not divided into another, except into this one: therefore he should not be considered a bigamist,
2. To the same effect is what is held, Extra, on bigamists, Debt. And it is the decretal introduced above, which says that unless he is divided into many according to carnal concubinage, he is not considered a bigamist.

Further, it is asked about another case, namely that if someone contracts with someone whom he believes to be a virgin, and when he consummates the marriage, he does not find her a virgin: for it seems that he is not a bigamist, because

1. There is pure ignorance of fact: therefore if there were even sin there, it would be excused in whole: therefore much more would he be excused from punishment: therefore he should not be considered irregular from this for receiving sacred orders.
2. Likewise, in things that are not openly evil, intention imposes a name on the work: but he intends to contract with a virgin, and does what is in him for this, that he contracts with a virgin: therefore it seems that he is not punished with the irregularity of bigamy from this that he does not find her a virgin.

On the contrary of this is the decree of Pope Leo, that those handmaids of God, who lost the integrity of modesty by barbaric oppression, will be more praiseworthy in humility and modesty, if they do not dare to compare themselves to uncontaminated virgins. Therefore such a one is not at all to be compared to monogamists: therefore it seems that he is a bigamist and irregular.

Further, it is asked about another case, namely that someone contracts with a virgin and knows her: then she is known by another through adultery: and the husband, ignorant of this, knows her.

For it seems that he is not a bigamist: because he is the only one of one: therefore he is not a bigamist.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. She is not the only one, who is divided into many: therefore she is not the only one of one: therefore he violated the sacrament: therefore it seems that he should be considered a bigamist.

1. To this also seems to be what is said, distinction 34: If someone's wife has evidently committed adultery while he was a layman, he cannot be admitted to ecclesiastical ministry. But if she committed adultery while he was already constituted in the clergy, he must give her a divorce. But if he wishes to retain her company, he cannot enjoy the ministry he has undertaken.
2. To the same effect, in the same place, in the following chapter,

If a layman's wife is caught in adultery, such a one should not be brought to ecclesiastical ministry in any way. But if after the ordination of a cleric his wife is adulterated, he should dismiss her. But if he wishes to remain with her, he should be alienated from the ministry.

Further, it is asked about another case. Let it be that a husband accuses his wife of adultery, and she before the sentence is given, asks for the debt, and he renders it as he is bound, and afterwards the sentence declares her guilty. And it is asked whether he should be considered a bigamist?

It seems that he should not: because 1. He does what he ought: but no one is punished for doing what he ought: therefore neither should he: but irregularity is a great punishment: therefore he is not made irregular.

1. Likewise, he does not act, but rather suffers: but passions do not deserve punishment: therefore he should not be punished with irregularity.

On the contrary is that irregularities are often contracted only by the fact beyond will and sin: since therefore he is mixed with an adulteress as the only one of the only one, it seems that he should be considered a bigamist and irregular.

Solution. It must be said to the first, that those four ways receive the predication of bigamy by prior and posterior: because the first is said properly: because in it sacramentally he is neither the only one, nor of one wife. But the others are said by some approach to this way, according to which he can be deprived of being the only one and of one. Either therefore he is deprived by the likeness of the sacrament, or without likeness. If with likeness: either with succession, or without succession. If without succession, it is the second case: and this imitates Lamech. If with succession, it is the third case: and this imitates second marriages, although it does not have existence, except as that which in fact imitates that which is in law, so that at least it keeps the form of honesty before the Church. But if it is without the likeness of the sacrament of marriage which is between two successively in first and second marriages: then it is the fourth case: and in this way particular laws are reduced to universals.

Therefore it must be said to the first, that just as to Christ only one nature was united to the human, and by one union not repeated, so it must be in the sign: hence since in such a one he is divided into many and by many unions, it is clear that the sacrament is not preserved. And when it is said that there is never except one sacrament, it must be said that this is true in act, but nevertheless successively there are two: just as there is never except one hour of the day, and yet successively there are many.

To the second it must be said, that never were there many wives of one according to the perfect state of marriage: but by divine dispensation it was sometimes allowed to be joined to many: and among them the sacrament was never preserved, just as today it is not preserved in bigamists.

To the third it must be said, that he is never except of one in act: but nevertheless he is divided into many, because the division remains in him, even with the wife dead, as is clear from the above.

But what is brought in the contrary, must be conceded.

To what is objected to the further case which is taken according to this, it must be said that today what is said in the Letter does not hold, and it is abrogated by the decretal of Innocent which is brought in the contrary.

To what is objected about the second case, it must be said that he is considered a bigamist: because as much as is in him, he has worked for this that he is a bigamist, and he has divided himself into many.

To the objection against, it must be said that it is not necessary that in every bigamy there is a repetition of the sacrament: but it is necessary that there is some union not of one with one: and so it is here, because he is united first with one, and he afterwards as much as is in him, is united with another: and therefore the sign is not preserved.

To the other it must be said, that no individuality is signified in the adherence to a prostitute: and therefore from the conjunction to them as to prostitutes bigamy is not contracted: but in those with whom in fact or in law individuality is contracted, there is a sign: which when the form of the sacrament fails, it is violated: and therefore bigamy is incurred.

But the objection in the contrary is to be conceded.

To what is asked about the case according to this case introduced: it must be said that he in my judgment is not a bigamist, because he is not a bigamist, except when having consummated the marriage in law or in fact he divides his flesh, as is clear from the decretal of Innocent introduced above.

To the objection against, it must be said that there are not diverse carnal unions there: but only mentally a diverse union does not induce bigamy.

To the other it must be said, that he is the only one as to the only one, although not uniquely, because she is not his: and therefore she is not his only one: but nevertheless as to the external form he is as his only one: and therefore he is not a bigamist.

To the third it must be said, that as Augustine says on the letter to Titus, here it is about the sacrament, not sin. Hence although with sin he adheres to her with whom he contracted in fact, having dismissed her with whom he contracted in law, nevertheless if he returns, and knows the first carnally, his flesh will be actually divided, and then he will be a bigamist.

To what is asked about the third case, it must be said that such a one, as the decretal introduced in the contrary proves, is considered a bigamist.

To the objection against, it must be said that greater sin does not make bigamy: for sometimes bigamy is contracted without any sin: and therefore although he who knows many by fornication is not made a bigamist, nevertheless he is made a bigamist in whom is the form of the sacrament, and he is not the only one to the only one.

To the other it must be said, that such a one is not made a bigamist: and it is not similar to the proposition, as is clear from the above.

To what is asked about the fourth case, it must be said that he contracts irregularity as a bigamist, and has a certain mode of bigamy.

But to what is objected against, I say without prejudice, that he is not divided except into one: and the sacrament remains well as to this, that he is the only one: but it is violated as to this, that he is not of one or of the only one, because the woman with whom he contracts is divided, and thus disagrees with the nature betrothed in Christ: and therefore he is irregular.

To the other it must be said, that bigamy is not iniquity, but punishment: and to what is objected, that it is beyond fault: therefore it is not just, etc., it must be said, that punishment is not directly inflicted except for fault made in itself or in many. But this punishment is inflicted indirectly, and follows more some other thing, than it is inflicted: for it follows the defect of the sacrament: and this can well happen justly. But if it were inflicted by the sentence of a judge, then it would not be just, unless it were caused by fault.

But those things which are brought in the contrary, are to be conceded.

To what is further asked about him who contracts with her whom he deflowered before: it must be said, that there are opinions on both sides: but the opinion seems to be that it should be said, that he is not a bigamist, because of those things which are introduced in the contrary.

But to what is first objected, it must be said, that he is not divided by carnal concubinage except into one: because even by the concubinage which was before the copulation of marriage, she is not made of another, and therefore not divided: but both before and now she is his only one and of his only one: and this is the reason of the law saying that such a one is not a bigamist: for one is not made not the only one, except by this that she is not the only one: nor is anyone made not the only one, except by this that she is not of one.

But to the things which are alleged in the contrary, it must be said that they speak of those who are corrupted by others, and not by those same who afterwards contract with them.

To what is further asked about him who contracts with her whom he believes to be a virgin, and finds her corrupted: it must be said, that he is a bigamist.

But to the objections which are objected in the contrary, it must be said that it would well follow if it were about sin: but here it is not about anything except the sacrament. But the reason why he is a bigamist here is this, because she is not his only one, as is clear from the above.

But what is brought in the contrary, is to be conceded.

To what is further asked about him who contracts with a virgin, who is known to have committed adultery, and he knows her ignorantly: it must be said that as is proved by the canons introduced, he is a bigamist.

But to what is first objected, it must be said that she is not his only one: and therefore what is supposed in the objection is false.

Hence the objection made in the contrary solves the first objection.

To what is asked lastly about him who knows her whom he accuses, before adultery is proven, at the request of the wife: it must be said that there are opinions on both sides, and their reasons are hinted at in objecting: nevertheless it seems consistent with the sayings of the Saints, that he should be considered a bigamist.

Therefore, it must be said that it is not a punishment directly inflicted, but rather consequent upon the defect of the sacrament: and this frequently arises in someone without sin.

Or it must be said that this well excuses the sin and the harm that would be generated for him in the one whom he accuses now: but here the question is about the sacrament: and because that is lacking, I think that he is to be considered a bigamist.

And through this, the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 21 — Whether Irregularity Is Attached To Bigamy

Is irregularity joined to bigamy?

Thirdly, it is asked, By what reason is irregularity joined to bigamy?

For this is done either by reason of concupiscence or by reason of sin.

Not by reason of concupiscence: because 1. In fornication with many, there is a greater sign of concupiscence: and yet irregularity is not joined to it.

1. Likewise, in sodomy and effeminacy, concupiscence burns against grace and reason and nature: but in fornication, against grace, and not against nature, nor against reason: but in bigamy, neither against grace, nor against reason, nor against nature? Therefore, since irregularity is not joined to sodomy, it seems that it should not be joined to bigamy either. But if it is by reason of sin: it still seems that it should rather be joined to fornication: and it is not: therefore, as it seems, neither to bigamy.
2. Likewise, as Gregory says, spiritual sins are of greater guilt than carnal ones, although they are of lesser infamy: and irregularity is not joined to them: therefore, neither to this.

Further, there is a question here about the controversy between Jerome and Augustine: and it is placed in the Gloss on the Epistle to Titus 1, 6. For Jerome says that if anyone had several before baptism, or one before baptism and another after, he is not a bigamist. But Augustine says the exact opposite, that whether he had them before or after, he should be considered a bigamist.

It seems, however, to object for Jerome thus, 1. Whatever is sordid is erased in baptism: but bigamy is something sordid: therefore, it is also erased in baptism: therefore, it seems that after baptism he should not be considered a bigamist.

1. Likewise, what does what is greater, seems also able to do what is lesser: but it is greater to expel all sin than to purge bigamy, and baptism does the first: therefore, also the second.
2. Likewise, in baptism man is conformed to the uncreated Trinity, as noted above in the question about baptism: therefore, it seems that whatever deforms that configuration, all is removed: but bigamy deforms: therefore, it is removed, as it seems.
3. Likewise, it seems that even remaining bigamy does not impede: because Augustine says on the Epistle to Titus, and it is placed in the Decretals, dist. XXI: A man of one wife, a bishop signifies from all nations unity subjected to one man: but it is evident that in the gathering of all nations there are many divisions: therefore, it is better signified by the divided than by the unique: but bigamy divides: therefore, it is better signified by a bigamist than by a non-bigamist.
4. Likewise, in the Church which according to the words previously held is signified by the bishop or by the priest, there is perfection of active and contemplative life, which is signified in the two wives of Jacob, namely Leah and Rachel: and they cannot be signified in one: therefore, it seems that the perfection of the Church is better signified by a bigamist than by a non-bigamist: at least, therefore, after baptism it seems that a bigamist can be ordained, as Jerome says.

On the contrary of this is that 1. Augustine says in the Gloss on the Epistle to Titus, ii, 3, and dist. XXVI, thus, Those understand more acutely, who judged that even he who had an adulteress as a catechumen or pagan should not be ordained: because it is about the sacrament, not about sin, because of the sanctity of the sacrament, just as if a catechumen woman is violated, she cannot be consecrated among the virgins of God after baptism: so it is not absurd to see that a bigamist has not sinned, but has lost the norm of the sacrament, not to the merit of life, but to the sign of ordination.

1. To the same, there, Ambrose

Only one union, not repeated, is permitted to us: and in marriage itself, the law is not to repeat marriage, nor to seek the second union of a spouse, which seems strange to many, since even before baptism repeated marriages generate impediments to the choice of office and the prerogative of ordination: since even sins are not usually an obstacle if they have been remitted by the sacrament of washing. But we must understand that in baptism guilt can be remitted, the law of marriage cannot be abolished: in marriage, it is not guilt, but law. What is

of guilt, therefore, is relaxed in baptism: what is of law, is not dissolved in marriage. How, then, can he be an exhorter of widowhood, who himself has frequented marriages?

1. To the same, below, A bigamist should not be promoted to priesthood: not because he sinned by taking a second wife, but because he is excluded from the prerogative of priesthood.

The response is that there are several causes why irregularity is joined to bigamy. However, one is true, and the cause of others, namely, because the sacrament fails in it, that is, the sign of the individual conjunction of one to one: and this has been sufficiently held in the preceding and explained.

This, however, is drawn from the decree of Augustine introduced, Acutius: and from the decree of Ambrose, Only one: and from the decretal above introduced about bigamists, Debitum.

Other secondary causes are assigned to this, one of which is because of the irregularity joined: but that is caused by this: and here it is not to the purpose, because this is in question why it happens. However, some assign this as a cause, like Jurists, not sufficiently noticing in their solution that the principle has been begged.

Hence, another cause is assigned as a sign of incontinence: because neither cooled in him did concupiscence cease by the first wife, but it flared up in the second. And this is drawn from the words of Ambrose introduced at the end of the chapter, where he says: How can he be an exhorter of widowhood, who has frequented marriages?

Another cause is the excellence of orders, that to such an excellent degree, namely, to be in the degree of a minister of Christ, it is not fitting to admit those who are divided, and are compelled to think about the things of a wife, and how to please a wife. And this is also drawn from the words of blessed Ambrose, etc. The middle of the authority introduced is also drawn from the words of the Apostle, 1 Corinthians ix, 25, where he says about the priest, that everyone who contends in the contest abstains from all things, etc.

Another cause can be: because although marital intercourse is not a sin, it nevertheless has the uncleanness of concupiscence joined: but in the office of order, there is the greatest cleanliness and congruity: therefore, the greatest cleanliness and repeated uncleanness with the second is the cause that it is prohibited to be promoted. And this is drawn from what is held, Isaiah lii, 11: Be clean, you who bear the vessels of the Lord. And, Exodus xix, 15, Moses commanded that they should not approach their wives, who wished to see God. And, 1 Samuel xxi, 4, where the priest Abimelech asked David when he gave him to eat the showbread: if the young men are clean, especially from women.

Another cause again can be: because the exercise of spiritual offices and especially of psalms gives the grace of prophecy, as Gregory says, for the illumination of the intellect: but the agitation of concupiscence impedes: and therefore, since the agitation of concupiscence is denoted in a bigamist, he is prohibited from being ordained to divine offices.

Another cause again and better than all others is drawn from the words in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy of Dionysius, in the theory of the holy synaxis, that is, communion: where he says, that the priest is proceeding among the people and returning to the holy altar, as God proceeds into all creation and returns into himself, not detained, nor polluted by anything. It is prohibited for the priest, and it signifies the detention of his heart in those whom he has to sanctify, and to return into himself through the contemplation of divine things: and if a sign of affected and persevering concupiscence is found in him, he is considered irregular.

Many other causes of this can also be found: but these suffice for the present.

Therefore, it should be said to the first, that this is done principally by reason of the sacrament, namely, the violated sign, and secondarily because of the sign of the weakness of incontinence adhering to him from a long time, which urges him to contract with the second.

To the objection against, it should be said that in fornication and sodomy there is no violation of the sacrament: and although a greater fervor of incontinence is signified there, it is not so adhering from one to another binding itself because of the weakness of continence.

To the other, the solution is clear by the same.

To the other, the solution is clear by the things said before: because it is not because of sin, but because of the cause stated.

To what is further asked about the sayings of Jerome, it should be said that Jerome is contradicted in this. But if anyone wishes to save him, it should be said that he speaks concerning an easier dispensation to be made with him than with another: especially if he was ignorant that such irregularity was joined.

To what is objected for this, it should be said that irregularity is not something sordid: because it is a penalty, not a penalty of sense, but of loss: it is indeed a certain defect consequent from the violation of the sacrament of the individuality of marriage, as is clear from what has been held: and therefore it is not necessary that it be dissolved in baptism: because baptism is not ordained against such penalties.

To the other, it should be said that that proposition generally understood is false, unless more and less are of the same kind: like the overcoming of a hundred men and one, and eating a hundred grapes and one, and the like: for it is not necessary that these are so when they are not of the same kind: because then they do not even have a properly said comparison: it is not properly greater to overcome ten men than to eat a morsel of bread. And it is similar here: because to expel sin and to expel penalty are not of the same power, nor of the same kind: and therefore also one is not properly said to be greater than the other: nor is it necessary if baptism does one, that it also does the other.

To the other, it should be said that man is conformed to God in baptism, according to which he is three and one in himself, but not according to which he united our nature to himself: and such configuration is required in him who is not irregular. Hence, what is introduced is not to the purpose.

To the other, it should be said that that objection proceeds according to a false understanding of the letter: because some decretists have thus explained it. But the true sense is this, that the fact is compared to the fact: so that the unity of the gathered Church has a relation to Christ, as one to one man who is a bishop, when a married man is made a bishop: and then the objection is not valid except from the part made about the wife: and then it should be said, that although in the Church now there are many varieties of persons and works, and many impurities mixed, yet the sign of the Church should not be of impurity, but of perfection which will be in the future, when the whole Church will be united not having spot or wrinkle, as it is said, to Ephesians v, 27.

However, that exposition happens to some decretists: because they do not know how to solve an objection they make, namely, if a woman is corrupted by fornication or even violently, as Pope Leo seems to want, she cannot be consecrated among sacred virgins: since therefore a bishop ought to be of greater perfection than a veiled woman, it seems that a bishop who has fornicated should not be ordained.

To solve that objection, they say that the veiled signifies the triumphant Church in which there is all purity: and therefore she must be entirely pure. But the bishop signifies the militant Church, in which there are many impurities: and therefore the bishop can be impure, provided he is not a bigamist: hence it is said, Matthew xiii, 47 and 48: The kingdom of heaven is like a net cast into the sea, and gathering of every kind of fish. Which when it was full, drawing it out, and sitting by the shore, they chose the good into vessels, but the bad they cast out. But as it seems to me, their solution is worth as much as the objection: because it seems to be said that the same is signified in different ways: hence the veiled virgin signifies the Church in the custody of love and conformity of minds: and it is of her to admit or have admitted no lover besides him: because otherwise she is not said to be among virgins, but next to virgins: as Augustine says in the Gloss on that Psalm xiv, 15: They will be brought to the king virgins. But the bishop signifies the bride purging and illuminating and perfecting the bride united to him, as Dionysius says in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy: and because it is not necessary for the type to fulfill the prototype in all things, therefore, as the Apostle says, to Hebrews v, 2: And he himself is surrounded by infirmity: and therefore it is possible to have many imperfections, provided he does not have that which takes away the sacrament: just as the veiled can have many imperfections of envy, gluttony, and the like, provided she lacks that which takes away the sign of conjunction in chaste love. But according to them, if a virgin ought to be entirely pure, because she signifies the triumphant, then she should not be veiled stained with envy, or pride, or anger, or avarice, or gluttony: because none of these are in the triumphant Church, just as neither is fornication.

To the other, it should be said that Leah and Rachel agree in the integrity of purity: and therefore although they were two women, yet not as to this do they signify two acts of the Church, but rather as they in common entirely built the house of Jacob, namely by acting and contemplating: and although there is dissimilarity in the type as to something, it is not necessary that similarity be taken from that: because it is not necessary to be similar in all

things, because thus it would not be similar, but the same; and therefore here one wife is fitting to be working and contemplating, and not to lack the sacrament of unity.

And by this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 22 — Whether Bigamy Admits Dispensation

Does bigamy admit dispensation?

Fourthly, it is asked whether bigamy admits dispensation?

It seems, however, that it does not: because

1. The Apostle says that a bishop must not be a bigamist: but in these things, he must be blameless, the husband of one wife, etc.

What must not be, does not admit dispensation which makes it be: therefore, it seems that in bigamy, dispensation is not admitted.

1. To the same, Extra, concerning bigamists not to be ordained, and below: We, however, respond in this question in such a way that with such clerics who, as far as it was in them, have joined second wives to themselves matrimonially, it is not lawful to dispense as with bigamists.
2. To the same, it is objected by reason: For the deeds of the Church ought to be reasonable: but it is an unreasonable deed, which does not have congruence with what it signifies: therefore, such ought not to be the deed of the Church: but if a bigamist were ordained, it would lack congruence: therefore, it seems that it should not be dispensed with them.
3. Likewise, Dionysius says in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, that in all things, therefore, and in this which is the Church's invisible theorems are considered: to ordain a bishop or priest. Dionysius, however, says in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, that the invisible are the principles, therefore if the invisible are the principles of the visible sciences: they are unique and individual, it is necessary that even the visible themselves be of this kind, or they will not be principled by those: but if it is dispensed with a bigamist, it will be an individual principle of division and science: therefore, it seems that the rite of the Church is nullified: but because this is impossible: therefore, it cannot be dispensed with such.

On the contrary of this is that

1. It is read, dist. 34, where it says: Pope Martin, if a Reader has taken a widow or another's wife, let him remain in the readership: or if necessity requires, let him become a subdeacon: but nothing above if he has been a bigamist. At least for receiving a lesser sacred order, dispensation can be made.

1. Likewise, it is commonly said that Pope Lucius dispensed with the Bishop of Palermo who was a bigamist: therefore, it seems that it can be dispensed.

2. Likewise, II Corinthians 2:10: To whom you forgive anything, I also forgive: for what I have forgiven, if I have forgiven anything, it is for your sakes in the person of Christ. As if it is clear that if Christ forgave. Christ would dispense with a bigamist, it would be dispensed: since therefore Apostolic authority is on earth, it can still be dispensed by those who have the authority of the Apostles.

But then it is further asked, by whom could it be dispensed, whether by his Bishop, or only by the Lord Pope?

And it seems that by the Bishop: because

1. That decree of Pope Martin above mentioned cannot be understood of the Pope: because an equal does not have power over an equal: therefore, it is understood of the inferior, namely of the diocesan Bishop: therefore, he in necessity can dispense.
2. Likewise, Extra, Who clerics or those vowing can contract marriage, where Alexander the Third thus writes to the Archbishop of Reims: Concerning a deacon, who on Holy Saturday wounded another deacon, and took a wife. We respond in such a way that if with a contrite and humbled heart he wishes to return to the Church, having dismissed her whom he took as a wife, and having obtained absolution, and penance having been enjoined for both excesses, after it has been performed, you can dispensatively restore to him the office of deacon: and if he is of perfect life and good conversation, ordain him a priest. However, a subdeacon, whether he has killed a man or not, cannot contract marriage, the censure of the sacred canons demonstrates. This is understood, that the Bishop can both dispense and restore the execution of the order previously received, and dispense for receiving a further order.
3. Likewise, there it says: Alexander

From the tenor of your letters we have received that the bearer of the present, constituted in the office of subdeacon, has joined a certain woman to himself in marriage, whom you have made him abjure. Concerning which we commend your prudence in the Lord, commanding that if he wishes to transfer to the monastic order, and it seems to you after his laudable conversation, you may allow him to be promoted to higher orders. But if he does not wish to transfer to religion, neither allow him to minister in the subdiaconate, nor to be promoted to further orders.

Response, It must be said that with a bigamist it can be dispensed: and without prejudice, I say that by the Bishop it can be dispensed to minor orders if necessary, that is, up to the subdiaconate, and that he may minister in those received: and thus is understood the decree of Pope Martin above mentioned. Or if a bigamist enters religion for the favor of religion and the praise of conversation and the discourse to be observed, the Bishop can also dispense for receiving major orders. And in such a case, the last two decretals of Alexander above mentioned speak. But if he remains in the world, he cannot dispense for receiving minor orders except only the Pope.

From this, the solution to all the introduced objections is clear except for the reasons which are introduced.

To the proof of those, it must be said that the Pope in that decretal restricts the power to the Bishops, not to himself.

To another, it must be said that the deed of the Church is always reasonable: but reason varies according to the state, because it reasons differently for necessity, and differently when ministers abound: and therefore with a lesser sign it accepts ministers in time of necessity, provided there is suitability on the part of life.

To another, it must be said that that congruence is of the well-being of the order, and draws force from the institution of the Church, and not from being: and therefore even by the Church with such it can be dispensed.

To another, it must be said that blessed Dionysius speaks of the theories of the perfect according to the highest and best state: hence he posits many things which are of the well-being, and not of being: and therefore in such the vicar of Christ in the Church can dispense.

And thus the solution to all questions concerning bigamy is clear.

DISTINCTIO XXVIII

Divisio Textus

Here it ought to be asked, Whether consent concerning the future, etc. Having considered the consent which makes marriage, here it treats of confirmed consent, whether it completes marriage if it is concerning the future?

However, this distinction is divided into two parts: and in the first, it treats of this question, Whether consent concerning the future makes marriage? In the second, it treats of what matter consent is.

In the first question, it first touches upon the truth. Second, an objection is made to the contrary, there B, The aforementioned sentences, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether An Oath Together With Betrothal Makes A Marriage

Whether an oath with betrothal makes a marriage?

Here arises a question concerning the principal inquiry: and three things are asked,

First, Whether an oath with betrothal makes a marriage? Second, If they do not make a marriage, whether betrothal and an oath concerning the future with subsequent intercourse make a marriage? Third, If they do not make it sometimes, what penance should be imposed on the one who deceives?

To the first, it is objected thus: 1. If two things are ordered to do the same, if the weaker can effect it, then also the stronger can effect it: but a simple word and an oath are ordered to make the obligation of marriage, and a simple word is weaker than an oath: therefore, since a simple word makes a marriage, an oath will much more make it: therefore it seems that an oath with a word concerning the future makes a marriage.

1. Likewise, God is greater than man: but in an oath divine truth operates, in a simple word only human truth: therefore an oath can do more than a simple word: therefore an oath concerning the future makes a marriage.
2. If perhaps you say that this is true of an oath concerning the present. On the contrary: What is present is under the eyes: therefore it is not necessary to swear about this: therefore, since it makes a marriage, it will be concerning the future: and thus the aforementioned reasons proceed. However, it is clear that a simple promise concerning the future makes a betrothal: therefore, since an oath is of greater obligation, an oath adds something beyond what simple promises do: but there is nothing that can be added to betrothal except marriage, because there is nothing intermediate between betrothal and marriage: therefore it seems that an oath adds to it marriage, and makes a marriage.
3. Likewise, Matthew 5:33: "You shall render your oaths to the Lord": and this is in divine law: therefore it is to be observed in all ways: and if anyone comes to the contrary, it is to be revoked as null: therefore if anyone swears to someone that he will take her in marriage, and does not take her, but takes another, the following is to be revoked as null: therefore an oath dissolves a contracted marriage, not otherwise unless because it first made a marriage: therefore an oath with a promise of the future makes a marriage.
4. Likewise, an oath that does not tend to a worse outcome, as Bede says, is to be kept: but this oath is licit, and does not tend to an evil outcome: therefore it is altogether to be kept: therefore if he even afterwards contracts with another by words of the present, it seems that he ought to return to the first.

1. Likewise, a divine obligation is greater than a human one: but in a human obligation, if I were to obligate myself to one, I could not obligate myself to another to the prejudice of the former: therefore much more is this the case in a divine one: therefore it seems that if he even afterwards obligates himself to another by words of the present, he should return to the first.

On the contrary, the Master in the text sets forth three reasons. 1. One is: because what is promised in the future is not yet done: but nuptials are promised in the future with an oath: therefore they are not yet done: but a thing is done when it is acted upon by an efficient cause:

therefore nuptials have not yet been by an efficient cause: therefore a promise with an oath is not the efficient cause of marriage.

1. Likewise, if by the force of an oath they immediately become spouses, it is not necessary to add anything in the future to that marriage: but when nothing is to be done in the future, it is in vain to swear to do something in the future: therefore such an oath that makes a marriage is in vain sworn, which is inconvenient: therefore it is also false from which it follows, namely that an oath concerning the future makes a marriage.
2. Likewise, if an oath makes a marriage: therefore what they swear they will do is already effected: but what they swear they will do still remains to be done: therefore what still remains to be done is already effected, which is impossible.

It must be said with the Master, that an oath with a promise concerning the future does not make a marriage.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that the first is true: but the second has a fallacy, because a simple promise absolutely does not make a marriage, but a simple promise of the present: and it is indeed true that if an oath is also made of the present, it will obligate more strongly: but a simple promise of the future and an oath are not ordered to make a marriage, but only betrothal: and there again an oath makes a stronger obligation.

To the other, it must be said that if it were of the present, then the oath would hold.

To what is objected against, it must be said that concerning what is under the eyes according to what is under the eyes, it is not necessary to swear, but according to what is not under the eyes: for although he speaks truly, it is nevertheless doubtful whether he intends and consents with the heart, and this can be confirmed by an oath, so that the contract is firmer and in this way an oath falls upon words of the present.

To the other, it must be said that an oath added to a promise of the future does not make anything, but rather confirms the same: for no oath is made to effect something more than what the word says, although it is invented for confirmation, as the Apostle says, to the Hebrews 6:16: "Men swear by one greater than themselves, and an oath for confirmation is the end of all their controversy."

To the other, it must be said that that reason proves nothing more than that an oath is to be held as long as it is licit: and this is plainly to be conceded: but it must be said that as soon as he contracts with another by words of the present, the oath becomes illicit: and therefore it is not to be kept then. And the precept that says, "You shall render to the Lord," etc., is to be understood according to what is possible and licit to render: and therefore this is done because a contracted marriage gains strength from the divine sentence which said: "What God has joined together, let not man separate": for all legitimate persons contracting by words of the present are joined by God: and therefore the first oath is made perjury: and therefore penance is to be imposed for perjury, and the marriage stands: and in this way also the laws determine, which would be long to insert here.

To the other, it must be said that the oath is first licit, but by the subsequent act it becomes illicit: because the sentence of the Lord would be violated, for the following marriage, strengthened by the firmness of the divine sentence, is a greater bond than the first oath: and therefore the bond of the oath is broken, and penance for perjury must be undertaken.

To the other, it must be said that in all other things being equal, a divine obligation is greater than a human one: but here they are unequal, because the divine obligation is only in an oath concerning the future: but in marriage there is a contract of the present, having firmness from the divine sentence.

And by this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 2 — Whether, When Carnal Copulation Is Added, A Promise Of The Future Makes A Marriage

Whether with the carnal union added, a promise concerning the future makes a marriage?

Secondly, it is asked, Whether with the carnal union added, a promise concerning the future with an oath makes a marriage?

It seems, however, that it does (On this there is a clear text, xtra, on betrothals and marriage, chapter, "Quae fidem") because

1. Each thing is made actual by that which consummates it: but the carnal union is the act consummating marriage: therefore it seems that in such cases marriage is effected.
2. Likewise, a promise and oath concerning the future are about carnal union: therefore with the coming of carnal union, that which was promised and sworn concerning the future is made: but this was the perfection of marriage: therefore with the carnal union added, the perfection of marriage is made.
3. Likewise, those who have premised betrothal agreements are united differently than those who have not premised them: because those keep the faith which they promised, but others do not: but to keep the promised faith is of the honesty of marriage: therefore it seems that those are united matrimonially: but to be united matrimonially is nothing other than the perfection of marriage: therefore it seems that through such a union marriage is perfected.
4. Likewise, if in other matters a contract is made, and afterwards it is fulfilled, that which was previously promised is completed: therefore it is similarly the case in betrothals: therefore the following union perfects the marriage previously promised, as it seems.

On the contrary, it has been held above, that

1. Only consent through words concerning the present makes a marriage, which if it is lacking, the rest, even with the union itself, cannot effect a marriage: but it is evident that this consent is lacking here: therefore it seems that marriage is not effected.

2. Likewise, let us suppose that someone has contracted betrothals, and does not intend to consummate the marriage: it is evident that this one does not consent: but only true or interpreted consent makes a marriage: therefore that one perfects or consummates the marriage.
3. Likewise, besides betrothals there is nothing here except union: but union is a bond not consummating marriage, because more sacred are the unions by the vow of the continent: therefore through union alone marriages are not effected.
4. Likewise, the same is not both consequent to something and making it: but union is consequent to marriage: therefore it is not making it. Proof of the middle: because the first is evident by itself. As Augustine says, that union is excepted from the honesty of marriages: but whatever is excepted from something while it is done, is consequent to that which excepts it, and thus the proposition is evident.

On the contrary, also of this is for the solution, that

1. Interpreted consent, not only expressed, makes a marriage: no one, however...

the more interpretable is that by which after the betrothal they come together carnally: therefore that makes marriage, and this is in the very act of intercourse: therefore marriage either is perfected by intercourse with betrothal, or is perfected by the intercourse itself.

1. Likewise, Augustine says that it is more to say by deed than by word: therefore it is also more to consent by deed than by word. But in intercourse with preceding betrothal, consent is given by deed: therefore since consent expressed by words makes marriage, much more does consent expressed by deed make marriage.

Response. To this it seems to be said that interpreted consent is if after betrothal they come together carnally, having the age and condition of body for the power of cohabiting: and I think that it makes marriage, unless dissent from marriage is expressed by both or one.

To that which is first objected, it must be said that the force is in what he says, who if he should fail, etc.: for here it is not understood to be absent unless it is protested: indeed it is most likely understood to be present: for a vehement conjecture suffices for the judge, as is proven in Rhetorics.

To the other it must be said that if he does not intend and expresses it: then it is clear that it is not marriage. But if he does not intend and does not express it: then as far as he is concerned it is not marriage, and the other is excused because of ignorance of the fact.

To the other it must be said that because of intercourse there is interpreted consent which makes marriage.

To the last it must be said that intercourse in such marriage is naturally consequent and temporally concomitant: and this suffices, because in many things even according to nature it is so.

Articulus 3 — What Penance Should Be Enjoined Upon One Who Expresses Words Of Consent And Does Not Intend It, And Thus Deceives The One With Whom He Seems To Contract

What penance is to be enjoined upon him who expresses words of consent and does not intend: and thus deceives him with whom he seems to contract?

Thirdly, it is asked, What penance ought to be enjoined upon him who expresses words of consent, and does not intend, and thus deceives him with whom he seems to contract?

It seems, however, that none except that he should contract marriage from the heart: because

1. Sin is not forgiven unless what was taken away is restored, as was held above in the treatise on penance: but he took away marriage from her: therefore it is necessary for him to restore it.

If you say, that it is not: because he can contract with another, On the contrary: He perhaps deflowered her, and then he cannot contract as well as when she was a virgin: since therefore he cannot restore virginity, it seems that he is bound to take her in marriage.

1. Likewise, Deceit ought to protect no one: but he committed deceit: therefore it ought not to protect him: therefore he ought to be condemned to penance, so that the marriage stands.

On the contrary of this is, that
1. The Lord, Exodus 22:16 and following, does not condemn him who deflowered a virgin determinately to this that he should have her as a wife, but that he either have her, or provide for her concerning marriage if she is free. Therefore, since the New Testament is less to condemn than the Old, it seems that neither should the New determinately condemn to this that he should have her as a wife.

1. Likewise, Let us suppose, that he after the deception of the first according to truth contracted with the second: it then seems, that he cannot be separated from the second: therefore he is not always to be condemned to take the first whom he deflowered.
2. Likewise, From the distance of condition or fortune the deception is easily known, as if a free man by promising deceives a maidservant, and a rich man a poor woman: for it is then easy to notice, because he does not intend in heart what he says with the mouth: therefore it then seems, that he is not entirely deceived: because from externals he could conjecture about internals, if he wished, and concupiscence does not blind his heart: therefore it seems, that in such a case he is not to be condemned, except as for simple fornication and the lie of the word: neither of those is condemned, that he either take her, or provide for her concerning marriage: therefore it seems, that he who speaks words with deception, is not always bound to take her or provide for her concerning marriage.

Response. It must be said without prejudice, that if there is equality of both persons in condition and fortune, or even on the part of the deceived person there is better fortune, and the deceiver has not contracted with another: it ought to be enjoined upon the deceiver, that he contract from the heart, or provide for her concerning marriage, as the first objections prove. But if he does not do this, I think that he sins mortally. The deceived, however, in such a union is excused by ignorance of the fact, because she admitted him as her own. But if there is a great distance of persons, it seems to me, that he is bound to neither, as the last objection proves.

And from this the solution to all objections is clear.

Articulus 4 — Whether A Daughter Of The Household Can Be Given To A Husband Against The Parents' Will

Whether a daughter of the family can be given to a husband against the will of the parents?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said, there B, after the beginning: A legitimate marriage is not made, unless by those who seem to have dominion over the woman, etc.

For it seems that this is simply true:

1. For a thing existing in the power of another is not transferred to another, unless by the one in whose power it is giving it: but a daughter of the family is in the power of the parents: therefore she ought not to be given to a husband unless by the parents giving her.
2. Likewise, 30, q. 2, Pope Leo says what kind of wife ought to be, who according to the law is to be a chaste virgin, and betrothed in virginity, and legitimately endowed, and given by the parents to the spouse, and to be received by the groomsmen. From this it is clear that she is not a wife unless she is given by the parents: therefore it is true what is said in the Letter.
3. Likewise, from the Council of Carthage:

The bridegroom and bride when they are to be blessed by the priest, are to be offered by the parents or groomsmen in the Church to the priest. From this follows the same as before.

If you perhaps say that it is true as to solemnity, as the Master says here, but not as to the being of marriage. Against: There Gratian says: By all these authorities marriages are secretly prohibited; and therefore when marriages are made against authority, they ought to be considered as not made. Therefore it is clear that if these things which he says are not in the marriages, the marriages are not: therefore they are not only of solemnity, but also of essentials.

1. Likewise, the Philosopher says that the seed emitted by man is likened to a son going out from the house of the father: because that has a part of substance from the father, and this multiplies by the augmentation of menstrual blood: just as the son receives a part of substance from the father, and this he multiplies by gain outside the house: but it

is evident that thus going out, he goes out from the power of the father, and takes with him the things which are of the father: therefore it is necessary that this be with the consent of the father: such is the going out to marriage: therefore it seems that it is necessary to make marriages with the consent of the father.

2. Likewise, Genesis xxiv, 58, Rebecca was asked by the parents: therefore it seems that this would be in vain if the consent of the parents did not operate towards marriage.
3. The same is clear, Tobit, ut, 18, where Sarah is asked by the parents.
4. Likewise, either the statute of the Church pleases God, or not: but it is evident that it pleases: therefore one omitting the statute of the Church sins against God: but it is the statute of the Church that she be asked by the parents: therefore not asking her from the parents, one sins against God: but no sin at all against God is stable: therefore such a marriage is not stable, but every marriage is stable; therefore no union which is without the consent of the parents is marriage.
5. Likewise, the mode of honest and dishonest cannot be the same: but marriage is honest, and fornication dishonest:

therefore they are not of the same mode: but the mode of fornication is to be done secretly without the consent of the parents: therefore by opposition marriage will be with the consent of the parents and the blessing of the priest.

On the contrary of this is that

1. It has been said above that only consent of the present makes marriage: therefore the consent of the parents is not required.
2. Likewise, although the daughter is in the power of the parents as to something, yet not as to all things, because she is not their maid or servant: but it is evident that since she is not their servant, it is hers and not another's to give that in which it is not another's but hers: but this is the common service of the body in the office of marriage, because thus she is not under the father: therefore for this, that in this she be made another's, only her consent operates.

Response. It is to be agreed with these last reasons, and especially the second: because that says the whole cause of it which the Master determining says in the Letter.

To the first, therefore, which is against this, it must be said that it is not in the power of the parents to possess, but to educate and direct until adult age.

To the other it must be said that the decretal introduced is understood of marriage, of which the Church judges, and not of marriage according to its first being: but rather as it falls under the judgment of the Church according to its greatest honesty.

To the other it must be said that Gratian speaks according to the judgment of the Church: because the Church holds it as not marriage, unless the consent is made known: because otherwise the ecclesiastical censure would compel them to separate as fornicators.

To the other it must be said that in part it is similar, and in part dissimilar: for the son cannot have substance which the father does not give him, and in this it is similar: but yet because he has in himself power as to giving the due of the body to whom he wills, in this it is dissimilar.

To what is further objected, it must be said that as it is said at the end of the same chapter, the girl was called, and her consent was sought: whence the consent of the parents makes for the well-being.

To the other it must be said that according to the saying of Master Hugh confirmed by the law of the Pandects, Sarah consented when she did not contradict the father: and such often happens through the parents, because girls are ashamed to do such things by themselves.

To the other it must be said that God is pleased with every deed of the Church which is truly of the Church: and he sins who contracts secretly, but he does not sin who contracts: and therefore that which is sin does not remain, because it is made public: but that which was not sin, namely the contract proceeding from the consent of both spouses, remains firm and ratified.

To the other it must be said that the substantial mode of honest and dishonest is not the same: because in fornication there is not the contract and matrimonial consent, but in marriage: and thus the substantial mode is not the same. But nothing prohibits the accidental mode from being the same, as also in many other vices and virtues: just as the mode of liberality and avarice is the same in retaining what is to be retained.

Articulus 5 — Whether Consent Which Is Made In Secret Sanctifies Matrimony Or Only That Which Is Made In Public

Whether the consent which is made in secret sanctifies marriage, or only that which is made in public?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, B, shortly before the end: But marriage was not sanctified by the consent, which was in secret, etc.

For it seems that this is false: because that sanctified marriage, which makes it: but consent makes it: therefore also it sanctified.

To this it must be said, that the Master speaks of confirmation in the judgment of the Church, not in the penitential judgment: because in that it is sufficiently sanctified by the consent made in secret, but he speaks of the judgment of the forum of causes.

C. Of what thing is that consent: whether of carnal copulation, or of cohabitation, or of another?

Here it is asked: Since consent of the present makes marriage, of what thing is that consent: whether of carnal copulation, or of cohabitation, or of both? If the consent of cohabitation makes marriage, then a brother with a sister, a father with a daughter can contract marriage. If of carnal copulation: then between Mary and Joseph there was no marriage. For Mary had

proposed to remain in virginity, unless God should command otherwise: according to what she seems to have said to the Angel: How shall this be, since I know not a man, that is, I have proposed not to know. For neither because she did not know a man was it necessary to inquire how she could have a son: but because she had proposed never to know. For Bede says, that she had disposed to remain in virginity. If therefore against her proposal after consent to carnal copulation, she seems to have been made guilty, in mind, even if not in deed violated. Let us say therefore, that the consent of cohabitation or carnal copulation does not make marriage: but the consent of conjugal society, expressed in words according to the present time: as when a man says, I take you into my, not mistress, not handmaid, but wife. For because she is not given as a handmaid or mistress, therefore neither from the highest, nor from the lowest was she formed from the beginning, but from the side of the man, for conjugal society: lest if she were made from the highest, as from the head, she would seem to be created for domination. But if from the lowest, as from the feet, she would seem to be subjected to servitude. But because she is assumed neither as a mistress, nor as a handmaid, she was made from the middle, that is, from the side: because she is assumed for conjugal society. When therefore they thus agree that the man says, I take you into my wife: and the woman says, I take you as my husband: by these words or others signifying the same thing, consent is expressed, not of carnal copulation or bodily cohabitation, but of conjugal society from which it is necessary for them to cohabit, unless perhaps for the sake of religion by mutual will they are corporally separated either for a time, or until the end.

Articulus 6 — Whether Consent Is In Carnal Copulation

Is consent in carnal copulation?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, C, Here it is asked, Whether consent of the present makes marriage, etc.

For it seems that consent is in carnal copulation:
1. For the consent of a ratified marriage is ordained to consummate the marriage: but marriage is consummated through carnal copulation: therefore it seems that there is consent in that.

1. Likewise, Genesis 2:24, Adam says: "They shall be two in one flesh": but this is not except through carnal copulation: therefore according to the prophecy of divine inspiration consent is in carnal copulation.
2. Likewise, the chief among the goods of marriage is the good of offspring: this, however,

is principally intended: therefore to this
it is principally consented, as is proven,
Tobit 8:9, where it says: "Behold, Lord,
you know that I take my sister as wife not for
lust, but for the love of posterity, in which
your name may be blessed forever and ever": but
offspring cannot be made except through carnal
copulation: therefore it seems that to that
it is principally consented.

3. Likewise, marriages are a good of mortals:

   but mortality is not remedied
   except through coitus: therefore the consent
   of marriage is principally to coitus.

4. Likewise, imperfect signification
   is reduced to perfect, just as every
   imperfect thing must be reduced to perfect:
   but marriage in which there is only
   consent of minds is of imperfect signification, as was held above: and
   marriage of bodily commingling
   is of perfect signification: therefore that
   is ordained to this as perfecting and
   completing: but the first is in consent,
   and the second in concubinage: therefore
   consent is to concubinage: and thus the
   proposition is held.

5. Likewise, let it be granted that it is ordained only
   to conjugal society, as the Master says
   in the Sentences: but conjugal society
   does not impede the transition to the fruit
   of a better life: therefore after cohabitation
   of conjugal society one spouse
   could pass to religion with the other unwilling,
   which many consider false.

6. Likewise, the instance which he brings in the Sentences,
   seems to be none: because by all it is
   said and believed that the blessed Virgin committed
   her will to God to be preserved, or not
   preserved: therefore she by her consent
   ordained herself into the power of a man, if

he wished to demand the debt: therefore the instance seems to be none.

On the contrary of these is what is said in the Sentences.

And furthermore what Augustine says, that holier are marriages by equal vow therefore also better are of the continent: but each thing is ordained to its better: therefore marriage is rather ordained to continence than to concubinage: therefore consent to concubinage is not ordained.

Response. It must be said that the Master says the truth. However, some say that consent in common is made to carnal copulation, and to cohabitation, not

any, but marital: and I well think that they speak more expressly. But for the Master it is, that carnal copulation unless it impedes the vow of either, is included in marital society, and thus the two solutions return to the same: but the former is more express.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that coitus does not consummate marriage in the first being, but in the second being, which consists in having the conjunction of the bed, as is clear from what was said above.

To the other, it must be said that Adam said this by reason of the state which was then, and not because of the essentials of marriage: because then there were only two humans, and multiplication was necessary: yet he did not wish to say that there was no marriage without this.

To the other, it must be said that the good of offspring is an effect consequent from a certain matrimonial act, and not consequent to marriage immediately, but after its work

and a certain act, as was said:
and therefore this does not show that
it is consummated by that in being, nor that it is made for this,
but rather it is for its best, which
is the signification of the double union of which
was held above: for this is much
better than the good of offspring.

To the other, it must be said that marriages are
a good of mortals according to the state
of marriage after the fault: yet even if
there were no fault, still marriages would be a good
of humans: and therefore it happens
to marriage. Nothing, however, is to that which happens to it,
but rather to its substantial end.

To the other, it must be said that there is a fallacy
of the figure of speech: for it perfectly signifies
this, which perfect marriage signifies,
but not all, which consummated: and therefore
the discrete is changed into the
continuous, and therefore the process is not valid.

To the other, it must be said that it is not
considered inconvenient that one passes to
religion: because then one dies spiritually,

and the other is absolved from the bond
of marriage: yet after cohabitation,
the Church compels her to stay with the other,
unless also he consents: and this for this reason,
because it is not certain that they continued
cohabiting with equal consent.

To the other, it must be said that the instance
is good: because it is probable that it was
revealed to her about Joseph, that he also
was in a similar vow. And what the Saints say,
that she committed her virginity to God:
it must be said that she did this because of the state of the law
and divine command, if perhaps God commanded otherwise.

Articulus 7 — Whether The Husband Is The Lord Of His Wife

Whether the man is the master of his wife?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said, there, C, after the middle: For since she is not given as a maidservant or mistress, therefore she is formed neither from the highest nor from the lowest from the beginning, etc.

For it seems that she is taken from the most excellent place: because
1. As Basil and Aristotle say,
The heart is the principle of life and generation in man. Since therefore she is taken from that which is near the heart, it seems that dominion is handed over to her.

If you say that she is not taken from the heart, but from the rib. On the contrary: Ribs are the defenses of the heart and belly: therefore it seems that the woman ought to be the defense of virtue: and she is not, but rather the opposite: therefore it seems that she is taken from a bad part.

1. Likewise, the Philosopher says that the most extraneous mode of having is that by which a man has a wife: therefore it seems that he does not properly have her: but everything superior to something governing it, properly has it: therefore the man is not superior to the woman: therefore he is not her head, just as the head is the head of the side and the helm.

Likewise, in the second book of the Ethics it is said that
dominative justice is not properly between a man and a wife: therefore he is not properly the master: therefore neither the head: therefore it seems that she ought to have been taken from an equal part either of the earth or of the body.

1. Likewise, those of which each is had from another, are equal: but between a man and a woman it is so: therefore each is equal to the other: therefore she ought to have been taken from equally high parts.
2. Likewise, in those things which pertain to marriage, they are equal: therefore also in bodily formation they ought to have been equal.

On the contrary is what the Lord says, Genesis 3:16: But you shall be under the power of the man, and he shall rule over you. And, 1 Corinthians 11:3: The head of the woman is the man. And, 1 Timothy 2:12: I do not permit a woman to teach. Therefore it seems that she ought not to have been assumed from a higher part of the body to dominate over the man.

Response. It must be said that the Master speaks well in the Letter, and it is the reasoning of Augustine.

To the first objection, it must be said that the dignity of the first mover or the one influencing life is not considered here, but rather the dignity of height in the seat of the members which is manifestly apparent to men.

To the other, it must be said that the cause of the Philosopher's statement is, as he explains in the fifth book of the Ethics, the equality of right in dominion and the rights of marriage between a man and a woman, since nothing is properly had unless it is possessed as one's

own: however, it is had with respect to the use of governance and the due in the body. For this use also the woman has the man: and this mode is also extraneous.

To the third, it must be said that although each of the spouses is had from another, yet not each is governed by another: and therefore the governing one alone retains the dignity of the head.

To the other, it must be said that it is true that in those things which pertain to the due of marriage, they are equal: but in the governance of the house and family, they are unequal.

And thus the solution to the whole is clear.

DISTINCTIO XXIX

Divisio Textus

DIVISION OF THE TEXT,

It is necessary, however, for the consent of the spouses, etc.

In the two distinctions here following, the Master removes two impediments to the consent which makes marriage: for according to the fact that consent proceeds from the will, coercion excludes it, and about this he deals in the first distinction; but according to the fact that it proceeds from reason, error excludes it, and about this he will deal in the following distinction.

Likewise, in this section there are three parts. First, he shows that coercion excludes the consent which makes marriage. Second, he deals with the consent that subsequently approaches marriage, there, A, §2: But third, however, those who are unwilling and coerced, etc., he deals with interpretative consent, there, B,

However, to consent is proven, etc.

And by this, the things said in the Text are sufficiently clear.

However, here arises a question concerning the principal inquiry in the Text: concerning which five things are asked.

The first is, What is force or coercion? The second, Concerning the division of coercion. The third, Whether any coercion falls upon a steadfast man or not? The fourth, Whether coercion or force nullifies the consent of marriage? The fifth, Whether in him who suffers force, any sin remains, and how that should be amended?

Articulus 1 — How Force Or Coercion Is Defined

How is force or coercion defined?

How is force or coercion defined?

Concerning the first, let definitions of authority be taken. Aristotle, Gregory of Nyssa, and Damascene say that what is done by violence or force has its principle in another, with nothing contributed by the one suffering the force.

In the Digest or Pandects, it is thus defined: Force is the impetus of a greater thing, which cannot be repelled.

And there it is said concerning Fear: Fear is the trepidation of the mind caused by imminent or future danger.

Also, Tullius says, Force is the impetus of a dominating one retaining a thing within foreign boundaries.

It is objected concerning the first. Because 1. That which has its principle entirely in another does not have in the one who suffers it praise or blame: but those things which are done by force or coercion sometimes have praise or blame: therefore it seems that they are not done by violence. The first is evident by itself, since in those things which we only suffer, there is neither praise nor blame. The second is proven by this, that if someone coerced by fear or violence commits perjury, he will be condemned by the ecclesiastical judge in the forum of penance, and he who denies out of fear of death dies.

1. Also, it seems that what is coerced or violent, although it does not regard the will of man, yet the will does not suffer force in such a way that it contributes nothing: but in this definition it is said, with nothing contributed by the one suffering the force: therefore it seems that it is not concerning the will.
2. Also, Aristotle wishes that those things done because of fear, like the jettison of goods from a ship in a storm, are mixed: for simply they are involuntary, but in a certain respect they are voluntary: since therefore in those the will of the one suffering contributes something, it seems that they are not violent: therefore similarly when someone is coerced by a powerful man to give or promise something, it is not simply to be judged involuntary, and done by force or violence.

But if it is conceded, on the contrary is that which is held in the old Digest, book four, concerning those things done by force or fear, where the Praetor says: What is done by force or fear, I do not hold valid: but it stands that the Praetor holds every promise in some way voluntary as valid: therefore it seems that no promise made because of fear is simply involuntary.

Further, it is objected concerning the second.

For it seems that it is not well said, the impetus of a greater thing: because 1. Often this impetus is also from a lesser thing: as a servant sometimes coerces a master, taking the

opportunity with the help of friends or others: therefore it seems that it is not always the impetus of a greater thing.

1. Also, it seems not well said impetus: because what is done by impetus is done without premeditation and suddenly: but human coercions are not always done thus, but frequently with deliberation: therefore it seems that it is not well said impetus.

Also, every impetus can be repelled by one who cannot be coerced: but the will cannot be coerced: therefore every impetus can be repelled by the will of man.

Further, it seems that that is not a competent definition of fear: because 1. If someone being in possession sees armed men coming and flees, he cannot act as if he were ejected from possession because of fear: and yet there was danger there: therefore it seems that the fear about which it is treated here, which restores integrity, is not the trepidation of the mind caused by future or present danger.

1. Also, there is no fear of imminent danger, but rather of future: therefore it seems that it is badly said, Present or future, etc.
2. Also, the trepidation of the mind is sometimes in small and fearful dangers: and yet those are not excused by fear, as Pedius says. For he says thus, book 7: If therefore it seems, someone fearfully feared something in vain, he is not restored by the edict, namely what the Praetor says: What is done by fear, I do not hold valid: which does not well define civil fear.

Further, it is objected concerning that which is Tullius's. 1. For not always does only the dominating one exert force, but also the repulsed one before he is repelled: therefore it seems that it is not always the impetus of the dominating one.

1. Also, foreign boundaries are either of essence or of place. If it is said that of essence: then someone would not suffer force remaining essentially what he is, which is false. But if they are boundaries of place, again it seems false: because someone sometimes suffers force in his own place.

Response. It must be said that each of these definitions is sufficiently good. But the first which is Aristotle's in the Ethics, that is of what is simply and absolutely violent, such as a man cannot suffer except according to the body, as is the oppression of a virgin in body, or the taking away of money without any consent of the will, both interior and exterior: and therefore such merits pardon, or forgiveness and mercy, according to Aristotle.

To what is first objected, it must be said that such violent never has blame, but sometimes has shame and embarrassment, as in the oppression of women: because of which also Pope Leo says that those virgins who were corrupted by barbaric oppression do not dare to compare themselves to sacred virgins.

To the argument, it must be said that the ecclesiastical judge then considers the act proceeding from the will, which has its principle in the one swearing, and therefore is not entirely violent: and therefore one perjuring in such a way is condemned by him.

To the other, it must be said that such coerced does not fall upon the will of man: but yet because it falls upon something which is the state and decorum of the virtue of chastity or justice, because of this it is treated by the ethicist, and takes laws from the civil.

To the other, the solution is evident from the aforementioned: because it is well conceded that such are not simply violent.

To what is objected by the law of the Praetor, it must be said that the Praetor regards natural equity, according to which it is regarded in contracts and promises to a sufficiently inducing cause: and this is sometimes the will of another, and sometimes fear: and then the Praetor rescinds, because although there is an act of will there, yet the cause is not voluntary.

To what is further inquired concerning the second, it must be said that that is of a certain Paul, a jurist, and good: and there it takes force civilly, as force is said to be necessity contrary to the will, lest one falls into greater danger.

To what is objected against, it must be said that everything here is called a greater thing, which is sufficiently stronger to coerce: and it is not said there greater in dignity or status.

To the other, it must be said that the will cannot be coerced sufficiently, that it contributes nothing to the act: but it is efficiently coerced by fear, which falls upon a constant man: and this suffices in civil law.

To what is further inquired concerning the definition of fear, it must be said that it is of Vulpian, as is said above in the old Digest, book four, concerning those things done because of fear: and it is good.

To what is objected against, it must be said that in this case he cannot act: because it was not yet time.

There is little fear, because he did not know for what purpose the enemies came: but then is the time of fear, when they strike or threaten to strike, intending this probably as estimated.

To the other it must be said, that there is mentioned an imminent danger, whose instruments and efficient cause are present, although they are not yet exercised in action: and of that there is rightly fear, because it is present in a certain respect, and future simply.

To the other it must be said, that here danger is not said to be a danger to someone, but what seems to be a danger to all: for this is what cannot be averted: and therefore Pedius the Jurisconsult rightly says in his laws.

To what is objected concerning that which is of Tullius, it must be said, that unless it is from a dominant one, it is not and is not called danger in law simply: because it is not a danger that can be easily avoided. Hence Vulpianus calls danger a necessity contrary to the will: for what is necessity is elevated above our power, and oppresses the sufferer: and it takes away from him free consent to do this.

To the other it must be said, that the terms are there called the terms of free power to consent: for outside the terms of freedom one is placed by a coercing or forcing one: because the free one is the cause of himself, as the Philosopher says: and freely doing his acts, he is the cause of his acts.

Articulus 2 — How Coercion Is Divided

How is coercion divided?

Secondly, it is inquired about the division of coercion.

Let any divisions that are in law be accepted.

It is gathered from the fourth book of the ancient Pandects that some force falls upon a steadfast man, while another does not.

Likewise, force or fear is sometimes of oppression, sometimes of the body, sometimes of things, sometimes of a wife, sometimes of children.

Likewise, fear or force is sometimes concerning disgraceful things, sometimes concerning honorable things.

Likewise, fear is sometimes about a worse condition concerning oneself or children, sometimes about another's matter.

However, it is objected concerning the first. For it seems that no fear falls upon a steadfast man:

1. For steadfastness is only from virtue and grace: but such a one ought to do nothing out of fear of death: therefore it seems that it does not fall upon him.
2. Likewise, Seneca proved that no disturbance falls upon a wise man: therefore neither upon a steadfast man: therefore neither does the disturbance of fear: therefore he ought to do nothing because of fear.
3. Likewise, if any fear falls upon a steadfast man, it is the fear of death: but the Lord commands in the Gospel, Matthew 10:28: "Do not fear those who kill the body." Therefore, none of the other dangers ought to be feared: therefore no fear falls upon a steadfast man.
4. If perhaps you say that no fear falls upon a steadfast man to compel sins, but to compel other things, such as to promise something temporal, namely marriage, or money, which if he promises, he is not bound to pay. Against: 1 Thessalonians 5:22, it is said

"Abstain from every form of evil": but it is an evil form to promise and not to pay: therefore it must be abstained from: therefore he sins who does not abstain: therefore coercion makes it be paid, because otherwise sin would occur.

1. Likewise, Aristotle says that even in great dangers, such as in death, the brave man is not bent: therefore it seems that no one is excused by fear.

Further, it is inquired here whether this division is the same as that given by some jurists, that violence is either light or violent.

And it seems that it is so: because violent falls upon a steadfast man, and light does not: therefore it is the same.

But on the contrary, it seems that it is not the same: because something falls upon a steadfast man that does not fall upon another: but violence is in one way with respect to all: therefore it seems not to be the same. Proof of the major: because the law says that it is not probable for a man of clear dignity to have feared in a city where a man of unclear dignity fears. But it is proved from the reason of simple violence, that it seems violent to every man.

Further, it is inquired about the second division.

For this seems to be good for the first part, and which falls upon a steadfast man: because

1. Jerome says that he is cruel who neglects his reputation: therefore also he who does something out of fear of reputation, he ought to deserve pardon and forgiveness.
2. Likewise, Aristotle in the first book of the Regimen of Lords says that reputation ought to be most desired by kings and others: therefore he who tarnishes reputation ought to be most feared: therefore for the danger of reputation, the fear held excuses, as it seems.

Against this is that

1. Ulpian says that what is done because of fear is not contained in this edict as fear of infamy. Pedius says the same.
2. Likewise, it is ridiculous if someone wants to be satisfied by a judge for rape, because fearing to be noted for infamy, she did not cry out: therefore fear of infamy is no fear, as it seems.
3. Likewise, concerning fear of the body, nothing seems to be: because it is said, Job 2:4:

"Skin for skin, and all that a man has he will give for his life." Therefore it seems that for the danger of the body, it should not be omitted: therefore if he does something for the danger of the body, it is blameworthy: blameworthy does not excuse: therefore it seems that he does not deserve excuse from the judge.

1. Likewise, evil excuses no one, but human fear is evil, as Bede and Gregory say: therefore no human fear excuses, when someone fears for his skin: therefore such a one is not excused: therefore if he contracts with such fear, he ought not to be excused.

Further, it is objected concerning fear of things: because even Aristotle says in the Ethics that the brave man does not suffer great things for small things: but small things are things: therefore for them, no one ought to suffer great things: therefore he who does this is blameworthy: but by blameworthy, no one is excused: therefore it seems that fear of things does not excuse anyone before a judge.

Against this is the decretal of Alexander III in the first book concerning things done by fear and force: From this it is accepted that he who did it

of St. Edmund from whom R. the presenter is known to hold his patrimony, sent knights and burgesses to the house of the said R., who would expel him from the house and all possession unless he completely abjured his church: which when the same W. had done in such a way, the abbot granted the said church to another. Hence, because things done by fear and force ought by law to be revoked into nullity, we command that you restore all things to the said R. with integrity, that resignation made by fear of things, namely expulsion from possession and house: and yet it is revoked into nullity by the Pope: therefore fear of things excuses, and restores in full.

Further, it is inquired about what is said to be fear of a wife. It seems not to be done: because

1. We read, Genesis 12:11 and following, and 20:2 and following, that Abraham exposed his wife to another out of fear of the body, when he said she was his sister. And Isaac did similarly. Therefore it seems that rather the wife should be exposed than something penal be done: therefore fear of a wife does not excuse.
2. Likewise, Augustine says in the first book of the City of God that another's lust does not stain the soul: and it is placed in the decree, cause 13: but because of that which does not stain, it is foolish to suffer something: therefore he who does something because of fear of a wife is foolish: and because of foolishness, no one is excused: therefore neither does this fear excuse.

The same objection is entirely about children.

Against this, however, is what the law of Paul says: What is done because of fear, as we have said, pertains to the edict, it does not matter whether one feared for himself or for his children: yet parents are more moved by affection in their children.

Further, it is inquired about another division, that fear is sometimes concerning disgraceful things, sometimes concerning honorable things.

For no force or fear seems to be concerning disgraceful things: because rather we ought to endure all things according to the Philosophers, before we ought to admit disgraceful things: therefore it seems that this is nothing that is said.

Against this is what Ulpian says: We accept force as atrocious, and that which is done against good morals.

Further, it is objected concerning the last.

Because it seems that it is vain to care about condition: therefore it seems that condition is not a sufficient cause of fear. It is proved, 1 Corinthians 7:21, where it is said: "Were you called as a slave? Do not let it concern you," etc. Therefore it seems also that we ought to desire to change our condition for the worse: therefore it seems that this cause is not sufficient.

Against this is what Paulus says:

I think even the fear of servitude should be admitted. And so Paulus in the same book: If he receives money who is about to take up again the instruments of my status unless I give, it is not doubted that I am compelled by the greatest fear, certainly if I am already sought into servitude, and with those instruments lost, I cannot be declared free.

Response. It must be said that every division of fear is properly reduced to three; one of which is on the part of those inflicting fear, and this is noted in this verse, namely, of disgrace or status, of blows and of death.

Another is on the part of those concerning which there is fear, as concerning the matter, and these are sometimes honorable, sometimes disgraceful or existing against good morals: sometimes not. For example, if someone is compelled to give or promise not to be raped, or is compelled to promise not to be hindered from rape: because Aristotle says that the absence of pleasures in the continent causes sadness.

The third is taken on the part of him who is compelled, namely that one falls upon a steadfast man, but another does not, but upon a fearful one: and this is what Ulpian says: Fear, Labeo said, is not to be taken as any, but of greater evil. And Paulus, Fear not of a vain man, but which ought rightly to fall upon a most steadfast man, we say pertains to this dictum.

Therefore, it must be said to the first, that fear is with respect to a lesser good than that which fear threatens: as fear threatens death, or that money be given, money is to be given or promised. In the same way, if it threatens rape, or deterioration of condition. But if it threatens death for the denial of faith or justice,

fear is not to be regarded even according to the Philosophers and according to the civilians. And so the law is understood which makes it whole to restore, if something is done because of fear: which restoration cannot be done in the denial of faith or justice: for it is the wise man's choice to choose the lesser evil, namely death rather than the denial of faith: or even the loss of goods rather than virtue, or the body. And this is what is said, Hebrews 10:34: "You accepted the plundering of your goods with joy, knowing that you have a better and enduring substance."

And by this, the solution to the first three is clear.

To the other, it must be said that the law of the Praetor is understood concerning those things which are lesser, and rather to be endured, than that which fear threatens, as has been said.

To what is objected, it must be said that it is not an evil form to promise, because this can be done badly and well: but not to fulfill a promise unless excused is an evil form. And I concede well that where there is judgment, defense can be found. Also, one compelled by a judge ought to fulfill the promise: and he has an action from law and canon, and the judge ought to restore him in full. But if there is a defect of the judge, I think he ought not to fulfill, but to do some light penance for caution concerning the promise, especially if faith or oath did

not intervene: for if he made an oath to fulfill, many say, which also seems quite probable to me, that it must be fulfilled. But if he does not fulfill, and violated the oath, and later comes to penance, it seems to me he ought not to be compelled to fulfillment, but only to the amendment of the broken oath.

To the other, it must be said that Aristotle speaks of those who endure dangers for the sake of a good man, or the city, or winds: for then it must be endured, which is the lesser danger, than that which intends to extort.

To what is further inquired, it must be said that the division is the same, although given for another reason. For the first regards the constancy of the sufferer, and the second the quantity of the evil inflicting fear.

To what is objected against, it must be said that that which is not violent is said which does not move the steadfast, and this is not in one way: and therefore it is falsely supposed in the objection.

To the other, it must be said that fear of reputation does not excuse: for it is not understood of the reputation that is, but of that which could arise from what fear threatens if it were done, as was done in Susanna, Daniel 13:21 and following, to whom the elders said, unless she agreed with them, they would testify against her that a young man was with her: and she said: "It is better for me to fall into your hands without doing it, than to sin in the sight of the Lord." But the saying of Jerome is understood of him who gives occasion of infamy by his own deed, or negligence.

To the other, it must be said in the same way: and therefore the law speaks differently, the Philosopher differently.

To the other things objected concerning fear of the body, it must be said according to the rule held above, that fear of bodily torture or fear excuses when it is with respect to a lesser evil than that which fear threatens: and thus it is clear that those objections are not valid.

By the same, the solution to what is objected concerning fear of things is clear: yet that fear is not contained in the verse held above, but according to the rule previously held, fear is in all fears: because, as Aristotle proves, it is not wise and brave to endure greater danger for a small or lesser thing than the danger of those.

To what is further objected concerning fear of a wife, namely lest she be adulterated, it must be said that that cause is most sufficient because the law of Paul says that if he gives lest he or she suffer rape, this edict has place, since for good men this fear ought to be greater than that of death.

To what is objected concerning Abraham, it must be said that the deeds of the Patriarchs are not to be drawn into consequence: because they did all things in the figure of future things and by the instinct of the Holy Spirit. Nevertheless, it can be said that Abraham did not exhibit his wife, but protected himself, assured by inspiration that she could not be defiled. Hence in Psalm 105:14 and 15: "But he reproved kings for their sakes. Do not touch my anointed ones, and do not malign my prophets."

To the other, it must be said that another's lust, as long as it is another's, does not stain the mind: but what is first another's, by consent becomes one's own, and then it stains. And therefore if someone even compelled were to say he consents to the rape of his wife, he would sin mortally: because he would already cooperate somewhat by permitting to the disgrace which is graver than what the tyrant threatens.

To the other, it must be said that Ulpian's saying is understood when the violence of the tyrant compels to do something against good morals, such as to unjustly promise or give, or to consent to marriage, or to rape, or to something such: for then what is done because of fear is revoked into nullity. But when it compels to what is according to good morals, such as to restore, or something such: then it is not judged violence.

And by this, the solution to the whole is clear.

However, this last has two doubts,

Let us suppose, for example, that a judge who has power compels someone to unjustly promise, will it be revoked into nullity?

It seems not: because a thing done by a judge ought not to be rescinded. On the contrary: Here nothing is done except because of fear.

To this, it must be said that it ought to be revoked into nullity by a superior: and this is what the law says thus, If by injury something is done by a magistrate of the Roman people or a governor of a province, Pomponius writes that this edict has place. Perhaps, he says, if by the terror of death or blows he extorted money from someone.

The second doubt is, if I suppose that someone committed adultery whom I can betray, and lest I betray him to death, he gives money, whether this edict of the Praetor has place or not?

It seems, however, that it does not have place: because he gives for a disgraceful thing: therefore what is done by force ought not to be restored.

Response. It must be said that the edict has place: because the judge ought not to regard the cause of giving, but rather the manner of extorting: and this is what Paulus says speaking in the same case

The Praetor ought to intervene to restore: for even if it is done in a bad manner, the Praetor does not regard whether the one who gave is an adulterer, but only that he received because of the fear of death inflicted.

Articulus 3 — Whether Fear Falls Upon The Constant Man, And Who The Constant Man Is

Whether fear falls upon the constant? and, Who is constant?

Thirdly, it is asked, Whether any force or fear falls upon a constant man or not?

It seems, however, that it does not: because it is of the nature of the constant not to tremble in danger: therefore no danger brings fear,

1. Further, it is asked here, Who is the constant man, whether a man is called constant from the virtue of the soul, or from nature?

It seems, however, that it is not from the virtue of the soul: because he who has one virtue, has all: therefore he who has constancy of soul, has all virtues: if therefore he is called constant from the virtue of the soul, he will not be constant unless he has all virtue: therefore a sinner would never be excused by fear: and this is false, since even an adulterer is sometimes excused by fear from a promise, as was previously held from the sentence of Paulus the Jurist.

If, however, he is called constant from nature: therefore all whose nature is one, have one constancy: but all men have one nature: therefore there is one constancy: and this again is false.

Further, it is asked, Why is it not similarly said of a constant woman, since a strong woman is praised, Proverbs 31:17, of whom it is said: She girded her loins with strength, etc.

Further, it is asked, Whether constancy is in all constants in one way?

And it seems that it is: because 1. Perfection following the species of man is equally in it: the honest, however, as Avicenna says, man naturally participates: therefore it seems that he equally participates both the honest and parts of the honest: but of the parts of the honest one is constancy: therefore it seems that it is equally in all constants.

1. Likewise, Humility, mercy, and the like, do not differ in great and small, except according to merit: therefore it seems that neither does constancy: therefore where the small is called constant, there also the great, and conversely: and where the small fears, also the great,

ON THE CONTRARY is the response of the wise, that a small man and a constant can fear this, that if a man of clear dignity fears, he will be called fearful: therefore constancy is not said in one way in all constants.

Response. It must be said that a constant man is one who does not fear things not to be feared. And he is called constant from the part of civil fortitude. And the understanding of the constant is principally taken from four things, namely, the virtue of the soul, state, time, and place. From the virtue of the soul, that he has much confidence in overcoming dangers proportionate to him, and is not immediately cast down, like a vain and fearful man, of whom it is said in Psalm 12:5: They trembled with fear where there was no fear. As in Job 15:21: Fear was upon him when peace was. From state: because a prince does not have to fear what a commoner has to fear. From time: because it is different in a time of desolation, or of help to be feared. From place: because something is feared in the field, and something else in the city where helpers are ready. In all these, however, if there is proof of sufficient fear, a constant man of clear dignity in a city in a time of peace can have fear rescinding every promise. But these conditions are of the constant as frequently.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that it is not of the nature of the constant to fear nothing, but rather not to fear things not to be feared, just as it is also of the nature of the brave: but one who fears nothing, and is excessive in daring, is called presumptuous and bold.

To the other, it must be said that he is called constant from the virtue of the soul: but that virtue is civil: and therefore it is not necessary that he who has one, has all, namely, that he is not a sinner: because Hercules, Hector, and certain others, had this kind of virtue excellently: and yet they were sinners. For what is said, He who has one, has all: is understood of infused virtues, and not cardinal virtues according to all their state, but rather according to the most perfect state, as is proved in the Ethics, towards the end.

To the other, it must be said that even if it were said to be a natural virtue, that is, natural strength of the soul, it would not follow that it is in all equally: because it does not follow the species, but rather the complexion, namely, melancholy. For since melancholy is earthy cold, it has black vapors to the clear brain, by which terrible phantasms are imprinted: and there is in them not sufficient heat to warm the heart and blood, to make the heart's motion according to diastole, and the exhalation of blood and spirits into the exterior members and body: and therefore they remain destitute cold and trembling, with the blood fleeing to the heart and standing there. And since this complexion is not in all, it is not necessary that all are equally constant.

To the other, it must be said that the complexion of women is very timid because of weak heat and prevailing moisture, in which terrible things are quickly sunk: and weak heat is not sufficient to warm the heart and blood, as was said before: hence every woman is naturally timid, unless it is by accident, as virgins who do not fear.

And what is objected from Proverbs, it must be said that it is understood of fortitude in spiritual matters, and not internal and external.

To the other, it must be said that constancy is not in all constants in one way, and it varies from two things, namely from complexion, and the study of virtue, as was said. And what Avicenna says, is not understood except in relation to the capacity of the honest, and not that it is equally participated.

From the other, it must be said that even other virtues in their acts are unequally held for the above-mentioned causes: and therefore of every saint it is verified: There was not found one like him, etc.*

Articulus 4 — Whether Force Makes Void The Consent Of Marriage

Whether force nullifies the consent of marriage?

ARTICULUS 1Y.

Whether force nullifies the consent of marriage?

Fourthly, it is asked, Whether force nullifies the consent of marriage?

It seems, however, that it does not: because
1. In the reception of other sacraments, if one consents externally, it is not necessary for him to consent internally: therefore neither in this case.

1. Likewise, Marriage falls under the judgment of men: but this is not from the heart: therefore even if fear internally dissents, as long as he externally says he consents, the marriage seems to stand.

On the contrary is what is said, Extra, Cum locum, where Alexander the Third writes about betrothals: Since marriage has consent alone, where fear or coercion intervenes, it is necessary that where the assent of anyone is required, the matter of coercion be repelled. It is contracted by consent: and where it is questioned about itself, he whose mind is to be investigated ought to enjoy full security, lest through fear he says to himself that he pleases what he hates, and the outcome follows which is wont to arise from unwilling marriages, etc.

Response. It must be said that fear which falls upon a constant man excludes the consent of marriage, so that the contract is revoked as void.

To the first, it must be said that it is not similar concerning other sacraments and this one: because others do not have obligation except perhaps divine, but this one is effected in a certain human obligation, which can be done by fear.

To the other, it must be said that the judgment of the Church is from what is seen and heard: and although fear is in the heart, yet it is manifested externally through signs, as when arms, swords, and the like are seen, and when threats are heard: and therefore then the Church can judge.

Articulus 5 — Whether Fear Leaves Any Sin In One Who Suffers Violence

Whether fear in him who suffers violence leaves behind any sin?

Fifthly, it is asked whether fear in him who suffers violence leaves behind any sin?

It seems, however, that it does not: because
1. What is done by another should not be imputed to us: but fear is caused by another: therefore it should not be imputed to us: therefore it leaves no sin in us.

1. Likewise, human justice does not impute what is done through fear: therefore neither does divine justice: therefore there is no sin from it.
2. Likewise, if it were a sin, then a judge would do wrong by absolving or restoring to him who did something because of fear: but it is clear that he does not do wrong: therefore it seems that it leaves no sin in him who suffers violence.

On the contrary,
1. He who promises out of fear lies: because he says a word and intends otherwise: but every lie is a sin: therefore fear leaves sin in him who suffers.

1. Likewise, it is a kind of evil to promise and not fulfill: therefore it must be abstained from, as it is said in 1 Thessalonians 5:22. Therefore he is bound to fulfill: and if he does not fulfill, he sins, as it seems.
2. Likewise, promises and oaths that do not tend towards a worse outcome must be kept, as Bede says: but the observance of this promise or oath does not tend towards any evil outcome: therefore it seems that it ought to be observed.
3. Likewise, to this, Judges 21:23, where the sons of Benjamin seized the daughters of Shiloh: and yet the marriage stood: therefore it seems that it should also be enjoined on others that they keep what they promised or permitted under compulsion.

Response. It must be said that it is not always to be enjoined that it be kept: but when it is useful to keep it because of fear of future danger, then they can be advised, but they should not be compelled, nor should this be enjoined on them in penance.

To what is objected against this, it must be said that for that lie penance can be enjoined, or even for perjury, and he can be induced to be bound: but I do not think it should be enjoined.

To the other, it must be said that it is a kind of evil not to fulfill a promise made voluntarily: but it is not so with a coerced promise, because this would harm many if it were observed: and therefore it should not be enjoined.

To the other, it must be said that this tends towards a worse outcome: because the stain of sin is increased in him by receiving what is another's: and also Bede's saying is understood of voluntary vows and oaths, not coerced ones, in which voluntary consent is established. But in this case, for perjury, penance should be enjoined, and it should not be enjoined that it be done, although he can be induced and advised, as was said before.

To what is objected about the sons of Benjamin, it must be said that the magistrate of the people did that violence lawfully, lest any tribe perish: and that force holds, as Ulpian says in the law cited above.

DISTINCTIO XXX

Divisio Textus

Not only coercion impedes, etc. Here it is discussed concerning the impediment of error.

It is divided, however, into three parts. In the first, it treats of the error of the person which nullifies consent. In the second, concerning the marriage of the Blessed Virgin, there, B,

"Having premised something." In the third, it treats of the secondary causes of marriage, there, C, "Something must be added," etc.

Exposition of what is the efficient cause of marriage, etc.

Further, the first is subdivided into two. In the first, it touches upon which error of marriage nullifies consent, and which does not. In the second, it objects against this, there, A, §2: "But it is objected concerning Jacob who for Rachel," etc.

Articulus 1 — What Error Is

What is error?

However, here falls the question concerning error.
And four things are sought before the Letter.
First, What is error?
Second, Whether by its nature it impedes marriage or by some other thing?
Third, What is the error of the person?
Fourth, concerning the division of error which the Master places in the Letter.

To the first, it is objected thus: Augustine says that error is when false things are approved as true; therefore error is the approval of false things as true.

It seems, however, according to this, that error does not differ from ignorance: because

1. From ignorance of fact, false things are approved as true: therefore ignorance and error are the same, which is against Augustine in Book II of On Free Will, where he says that ignorance is the not-knowing of some things to be done.
2. Likewise, it seems rather that ignorance should be posited as an impediment to consent, since consent ought to be voluntary, that which is contrary to the will seems to be contrary to consent: but the involuntary through ignorance is contrary to the will: therefore to consent: therefore it seems that this more excludes consent: therefore it ought more to be posited as an impediment to consent.
3. Likewise, the will supposes knowledge of the willed: therefore that which entirely deprives knowledge of the willed more removes the will than that which leaves knowledge in part: but ignorance removes it in whole, error however only in part: therefore it seems that ignorance more impedes consent than error.
4. Likewise, it is not said that error of fact excuses, but rather ignorance of fact, but that which excuses in all things, because it does not permit it to be voluntary, that ought more to impede the consent of marriage than that which is not said there: but ignorance is posited by all to excuse the fact: therefore it seems that it ought more to be posited as an impediment than error.

Further, it is asked: because

1. Aristotle says that the involuntary through ignorance follows the not-knowing of singulars, in which is the act and repentance in act: but error is not accompanied by every ignorance of particulars in which is the act: therefore it seems that ignorance ought more to be posited as an impediment than error.
2. Likewise, it seems that in every lie and deception, false things are approved as true: therefore it seems that in all such things there is error: therefore all such things would be involuntary, which is false.

Response. It must be said that that definition of error is good: for error is not ignorance or not-knowing: because not-knowing is the privation of knowledge of any speculative thing, and therefore is not a sin: but ignorance is the not-knowing of things to be done which ought to be known, and therefore is a sin: but error does not remove all knowledge, but sometimes arises from the supposition of opposites of principles, and then it is called by the Philosophers ignorance of bad disposition, and then it occurs in the major proposition: sometimes however it occurs in the minor proposition, and then it is error of quality, or of person, or of some other of those enumerated in the Text. And from this it is clear that error always presupposes some knowledge of that about which one errs, namely through reputation, or sight, or opinion, as the Jurists say: and therefore it is clear that it is not pure privation: and this is what the definition says, to approve true things for false: because ignorance or not-knowing approves nothing for anything, but simply the ignorant is deprived of knowledge: but error in the major proposition is like error of law, and error in the minor is like error of fact, like the error of Nicholas, Apocalypse 1, 6, who because God said: "Increase," etc., said it is not a sin for a woman to mix in any way in the sex which the Lord created, and whose mixing He commanded and blessed the fruit. But the error of Jacob, Genesis 29, 23 and following, was like error of fact, which recalls the done to the not done.

And through this the solution to the first is clear.

To all others except the last there is one solution, that in ignorance and not-knowing there is no consent at all: because concerning the unknown there is no cognition, and therefore it never happens that consent of marriage is made: and therefore it does not nullify it: but the erring one thinks about that which he knows in a certain respect and not perfectly: and therefore he takes another for him, but in him whom he knows in a certain respect, he consents: and therefore it nullifies consent in this one: although it does not simply nullify consent in him who is known in a certain respect.

To the last it must be said that in every lie there is the intention of deceiving: but he who lies is not deceived: because he does not approve what he says: but the listener can err and be deceived concerning the statement: and therefore concerning the listener a lie can well attach error.

Articulus 2 — Whether Error By Its Nature Makes Void And Impedes Marriage

Does an error by its nature nullify and impede marriage?

Secondly, it is asked, Whether by its nature it nullifies the consent of marriage?

It seems, however, that it does not:

1. For that which by its nature nullifies marriage seems to sin against some of the goods of marriage: but such an error does not sin against any of the goods of marriage: therefore it seems that by its nature it does not nullify marriage. This is evident per se. The second is proved from this, that marriage does not make honest except the goods which make it.

1. Again, That which by its nature impedes marriage, according to the whole scope of its community impedes marriage: but error does not impede marriage according to the whole scope of its community: therefore it does not impede it by its nature. The first is proved from this, that whatever is fitting for man according to his nature, is fitting for every man. The second is written in the Letter: because it is said there, that an error of quality or fortune does not impede marriage.
2. Again, That which is fitting for something according to its nature, is most fitting for that in which that nature is most: but the nature of error is more in the error of a universal proposition or law, than in the error of a minor proposition or fact: therefore that error more nullifies marriage: but this is false, because just as ignorance of the law excuses no one, so neither does error: therefore it seems that this is also false from which it follows, namely that error by its nature nullifies marriage.

On the contrary of this is what Gratian says, 29, question 1:

Consent is of two or more. But he who errs does not feel nor consent, that is, he does not feel together with others: it is therefore evident from the definition of error and consent, that error is contrary to consent: therefore also according to nature: because that which is most fitting for a thing by nature, is what is fitting for it from the definition.

1. Again, Every error excludes the voluntary: but every consent is voluntary: therefore every error excludes consent concerning that about which there is error: therefore this is fitting for it naturally, because generally.
2. Again, In the Digests, concerning the jurisdiction of judges, book II of the ancient pandects, Ulpian says: If by error another has been added as Praetor, nothing will be valid that has been done: for it is not to be endured that they are said to have consented to the president, since, as Julian writes, those who err do not consent: for what is so contrary to consent as error which is chosen by ignorance? it is so contrary to consent as error: therefore by its nature it nullifies consent.
3. Again, 39, question 1, Gratian: As if he were to say, if someone were to agree to sell a field to Marcellus, and afterwards Paul were to come saying he is Marcellus, and buy the field from him, did he agree with Paul about the price? no: therefore error by itself

excludes the pact of communication in any contract: therefore by its nature it also excludes consent.

4. Again, Aristotle, Gregory of Nyssa, and John of Damascus commonly say, that the voluntary is that whose principle is in itself, being aware of the singulars in which the act is: but one erring in person is ignorant of the principle of singulars: therefore the act is not voluntary: therefore neither is there consent concerning this, because all consent is voluntary: and thus the same is held as before.

Response. It must be said that by its nature error of person nullifies consent, and consequently marriage, so that even if the Church did not so determine and establish, yet by natural equity consent would be excluded by error.

To the first, therefore, which is against this, it must be said that error sins against the very essence of marriage, which is the individuality of souls and bodies, retaining the individual custom of life: and therefore afterwards the goods of marriage do not have place, because it immediately nullifies the faith of those contracting by consent.

To the other, it must be said that according to the whole scope of the species it impedes marriage, and annuls the contract, because it is not a contract: and this happens because the impeding force of consent follows this species and not the genus: and therefore error of person impedes, but not error of quality.

To the other, it must be said that error in the law of marriage concerning the contracted marriage could not be except in this way, that it would be said to be marriage if it were not contracted by legitimate consent, and among legitimate persons: and then it would indeed be nullified, because there would not be the consent of marriage, and it would be imputed to them as a sin who would agree thus. And therefore that objection is not to the purpose.

And what it infers, that error of law does not exclude, he himself says is false: but it is true, that it does not excuse him from sin as error of fact does.

And by this the solution to the whole is evident.

Articulus 3 — What Error Of Person Is

What is the error of the person?

Thirdly, it is asked, What is the error of the person?

For it seems that this is to approve a person for a person: just as if I intend to consent to Peter, and Marcian is presented to me.

However, it seems that this does not exclude marriage: because 1. All things which are required for the goods of marriage are found in one as in the other: therefore it seems that presenting one is as valid as the other.

1. Again, if I intend to buy some gold, and another presents to me other gold equivalent to it, I cannot say I am deceived: therefore if a woman consents to a man of a certain

dignity and condition, and a man of equally good condition is presented to her, it seems that she cannot say she is deceived: therefore neither will the marriage she contracted be impeded.

2. Likewise, let us suppose that she who erred in the person has lived with him for many years, and after the birth of children first realizes, and demands him in whom she consented: it seems that then it is grievous to depart from this one: therefore it seems that not always does the error of the person exclude the consent of marriage.

3. Likewise, let us suppose that a brother is substituted for a brother, and she consented to the first by words of the present: but with the second she has carnally mingled. It therefore seems that it is better that she remain with the second, although she is joined to him by error, because due to affinity the first seems not to have her.

To this it must be said that where there is error, there is no will, as the law says: and therefore the error of the person entirely excludes consent, and no marriage can exist there.

To the first, therefore, it seems well to be conceded that such is the error of the person as is explained there.

To the other, it must be said that although with another there can be the faith of the bed, offspring, and sacrament, yet there is no marriage, because there is no consent to him: and therefore there is no essence of marriage there.

To the third, it must be said in the same way, that it is not similar, because in the contract of buying and selling there can be recompense by equivalence: and this cannot be in marriage: for a woman cannot receive an equivalent for her own, because she is bound by the law, as the Apostle says, as long as her husband lives, 1 Corinthians 7:39.

To the other, it must be said that if she consented with the first by words of the present, the second cannot be her husband, even if she has children by him, and he is the brother of the first: and therefore she ought to be separated from him, and returned to the first.

Articulus 4 — Whether The Division Of Error Which The Master Sets Forth In The Text Has Been Well Assigned

Is the division of error which the Master places in the Text well assigned?

Fourthly, it is asked concerning the division of error which he places in the Text, namely that there is an error of condition, person, fortune, quality, etc.

However, it seems that all these errors exclude the consent of marriage: because

1. Every consent of itself makes voluntary, and every error of itself makes involuntary: therefore every error of itself excludes consent.

2. Furthermore, it seems that error nullifies the will by that of Aristotle previously introduced: because the voluntary knows singulars: but the erring one does not know: therefore every error excludes consent.

3. Further, it seems that the error of condition does not nullify: because it is not contrary to the good of marriage, therefore it seems that it ought not to exclude.

4. Truly, an error of a certain quality, like leprosy, more corrupts cohabitation and offspring than an error of condition: and the first error does not exclude: therefore neither does the second.

5. Further, it seems that the error of quality sometimes excludes consent: because impotence to copulate is a quality: and it excludes, as will be had below: therefore the error of quality sometimes nullifies marriage.

6. Likewise, a bad quality of the soul is more to be avoided than of the body: but some bad quality of the body excludes, as has been proven: therefore also a bad disposition of the soul: therefore if one is believed to be good, who is bad, it seems that that error excludes consent.

7. Further, it seems that even the error of fortune nullifies consent: because there are many burdens of marriage, on account of which it needs a dowry and paraphernalia: but the poor cannot bear these burdens: therefore when one consents to a poor person who is believed to be rich, it seems that the error of fortune ought to exclude the consent of marriage.

8. Further it is asked, since there are many qualities both those which he enumerates in the Text, such as youth and old age, health and infirmity, and many others which make the cohabitation of spouses burdensome or pleasant, why does he not touch upon all those in the Text as these qualities?

Response. It must be said that no error nullifies the consent of marriage, except that which is concerning the thing upon which the consent falls, as upon the matter: because one ought to know that if one consents, as is clear in the examples introduced in the Text. And this is expressly clear in the error of person. But because condition is immobile concerning the person, therefore it is impossible that the same person is both free and a slave: and therefore when one consents to a free person, and a slave is presented, it is not only an error of condition, but also of person: and therefore these two errors nullify consent.

To the first objection, that every error nullifies the consent of marriage, it must be said that not every error nullifies the consent of marriage, nor makes the consent involuntary concerning the person, but concerning something which is believed in the person by accident and changeably, such as wealth, goodness, and the like: and therefore since it does not directly make the consent involuntary, it does not exclude marriage.

To the other, it must be said that one knows singulars under some act: because one knows in whom or in what one consents: but something is concerning that by accident, which one is ignorant of, and this does not hinder marriage.

To what is further objected concerning the error of condition, it must be said that it nullifies consent for the reason previously stated.

To the objection against, it must be said that it is against the free state of marriage, and against all the rights of the spouse and offspring, and it defiles the entire honesty of both spouses and children, and therefore freedom is favorable, and therefore the error of condition excludes consent.

To the other, it must be said that it is not from this that it excludes consent, but rather from this that the error of condition implies an error of person, although it adds the defilement of condition in spouses and children, as has been said.

To the other, it must be said that quality is not taken here broadly, but specifically for that which is not contrary to the matrimonial act: because that quality also is: but the other is like a certain substantial privation of marriage.

To the other, it must be said that the quality of the mind can be cured otherwise than by the exclusion of marriage, namely if the woman does not imitate the man: because in such a case it is also sometimes useful to join a bad man with a good woman, or conversely: because the Apostle says, 1 Corinthians 7:14, that one spouse is frequently sanctified by the other good one.

To what is further asked concerning the error of fortune, it must be said that it is changeable concerning the person, and therefore does not exclude.

To what is objected against, it must be said that this is for the well-being of marriage, and not for the being: and therefore the objection does not hold.

To the other, it must be said that such qualities frequently lie open to the eyes of the contracting parties, namely old age, youth, infirmity, and health: and therefore such do not need to be placed: because when they see to be, they can consent or dissent. But those which he enumerates here are more hidden, and it might seem to someone that they would exclude consent unless they were expressed.

Articulus 5 — Whether Leah, Joining Herself To Jacob Who Had Consented To Rachel, Sinned Mortally And Committed Adultery

Did Leah, joining herself to Jacob who had consented to Rachel, sin mortally and commit adultery?

Then it is inquired concerning what is said, there, A, § 2: But it is objected concerning Jacob, etc.

For it seems false to say in the Text, that Leah is excused by this, that she rendered the marital debt with conjugal affection, thinking by the law of the firstborn and paternal commands that she was lawfully joined: for this seems false, because

1. Ignorance of the law excuses no one:

but this is ignorance of the law, that someone by that very fact believes herself to be the spouse of her sister's betrothed, because she is the firstborn: therefore it seems that Leah is not excused.

1. Furthermore, without the consent of the girl, marriage cannot occur; however, consent is the agreement of two, as was held before: and Leah knew well that she did not do this: therefore she knew she was not the spouse: therefore she sinned mortally by joining herself to Jacob.

To this it must be said that Laban sinned mortally, but not Leah: because the consent of marriage is not only made by oneself, but through another existing as a mediator, and thus through the father as a mediator Leah consents.

And thus the solution to the objections is clear.

Articulus 6 — Whether Someone Adoring The Devil Transfigured Into An Angel Of Light Sins Mortally

Whether someone worshipping the devil transformed into an Angel of light sins mortally?

Then it is asked concerning what is said there, A, 8, 2, at the beginning: For if the devil transforming himself into an Angel of light, etc.

For it seems that he speaks falsely: because it is said, 1 John 4:1: Do not believe every spirit, but test the spirits to see whether they are from God. Therefore, he sins who does not test, but believes the spirit; but he does not test, who worships the devil in place of Christ, therefore it seems that he sins: therefore the similar does not hold.

But because this is noted on the third of the Sentences, it must be said that he speaks in such a case, when sufficient caution of testing the spirit is applied: then he ought still to say with Bartholomew: I worship, but not an idol, and if then also it is, but I worship God, not a demon, but Jesus Christ: deceived, it does not harm.

Articulus 7 — Whether One Receiving A Heretic Under The Name Of A Catholic Sins Mortally

Whether one receiving a heretic under the name of a Catholic sins mortally?

Further, it is inquired concerning another similar matter which is touched upon there, A, § 2, shortly after: If anyone is a heretic under the name of Augustine, etc.

For this seems to be of no value: because he receives heresy; but he who receives heresy is not excused even if he had received it through an Angel: therefore he sins; and thus the similar case is of no value. But that the minor is true is evident, according to Galatians 1:8: "But though we, or an angel from heaven, preach any other gospel unto you than that which we have preached unto you, let him be accursed."

Response. Here it speaks of the deception of a man, not of error: for although the deceivers of heretics are condemned, yet one receiving a heretic under the name of a Catholic will not be condemned. And this is intended in the Text. And through this the solution is evident.

Articulus 8 — Whether There Was A True Marriage Between Joseph And The Glorious Virgin Mother Of God

Was there a true marriage between Joseph and the glorious Mother of God the Virgin?

Was there a true marriage between Joseph and the glorious Mother of God the Virgin?

Then it is asked about what is said there, B, Something must be added to the premises about the manner, etc.

However, five questions are asked there, the first of which is, Whether there was a marriage? Secondly, Whether it was perfect? Thirdly, Whether a vow is contrary to the consent making marriage? Fourthly, Whether the good of the offspring of that marriage was good? Fifthly and lastly, Whether there was individuality of life there?

To the first of these, it is objected thus: 1. The highest status was fitting for the mother of God: but the highest status is outside marriage; therefore the mother of God was not bound by marriage: therefore there was no marriage between her and Joseph.

1. Furthermore, A vow made absolutely is more perfect than one made under doubt: but the best and most perfect must be attributed to the mother of God: therefore it seems, that her vow was such: but this impedes marriage: therefore she afterwards did not contract marriage.

2. Furthermore, Genesis xv, 16, says, that

in the fourth generation they shall return here: and this is contrary to the second: because the first was of a man from the earth. The second of a woman virgin from a man not betrothed. And the third from the mingling of sexes customary in marriage. Therefore the fourth ought to have been of a man from a woman not married: therefore the blessed Virgin did not have marriage with Joseph: because I hold it as certain, that she did whatever she ought.

1. If perhaps you say, that God willed, that she be married to have the solace of a man in provision, On the contrary: It is of greater merit not to have a man nor the provision of a man, than not to have indeed through mingling, but to have his provision: but she always did what had greater merit: therefore it seems, that

she in no way had a man: therefore it seems, that she in no way had a man: therefore between her and Joseph there was no marriage.

On the contrary of this is, that 1. The highest wisdom ought to have most carefully provided for his mother both from infamy, and from danger: but it would not have been provided except through betrothal, because otherwise she would have been believed an adul-

teress, and stoned: therefore Christ who is the highest wisdom, ordained that she be married: therefore there was marriage between her and Joseph.

1. Furthermore, The higher status is of virginity, the more it has an assailant, provided it perseveres in perfect purity: but such an assault is especially in the most holy continence of marriages: therefore in such the highest status of the virgin is: but the highest status was fitting for the mother of Christ: therefore it was fitting for the mother of Christ to be married, provided she was not joined to her spouse in concupiscence.

Further it is asked about the causes of the betrothal of the blessed Virgin which Origen touches upon in the homily on the vigil of the Nativity of the Lord saying thus: What was the necessity And below, that Mary be betrothed to Joseph, except for the reason that this sacrament might be hidden from the devil? and that wicked one might find no fraudulent schemes against the betrothed virgin? Or for this reason she was betrothed to Joseph, that to the born child and to Mary herself care might seem to be given whether going into Egypt, or coming again from there. For if she had not been From these are gathered three causes betrothed, the incredible enemies of all good and the Jews would have killed her with stones. why Christ willed to be born of a married woman, that the sacrament might be hidden from the devil, that solace and service might be shown to the mother and to himself, and that the mother might not be defamed and stoned by the Jews as an adulteress.

However, the first seems to be nothing: because 1. Demons, as Dionysius says, have not lost natural gifts, but through nature they know and recognize God: therefore

through nature they recognized the deity in Christ: therefore this sacrament was not hidden from the demons through marriage.

1. Furthermore, Demons see all natural things: therefore they recognize the signs of virginity and corruption: therefore through these signs they recognized the mother of Christ to be a virgin after birth: therefore they knew Christ to be the son of a Virgin: therefore through this the sacrament was not hidden from them,
2. Furthermore, They themselves knew Christ not to have sin through this that they found nothing of their own in him: therefore they knew him either to be cleansed, or born beyond the common law: but they did not know him to be cleansed, because he never had sin: therefore they knew him to be born beyond the common law: therefore not from a man, nor from a woman, but born of a virgin: therefore the sacrament was not hidden from them. That which follows is proved by Augustine in the book on Marriage and concupiscence against Julian the Pelagian, and by Anselm in the book on the Conception of the Virgin, who strive to persuade with many reasons, that everyone who is born through the common law from a man and a woman contracts original sin: and therefore the blessed Virgin could not transmit original sin, because she gave birth beyond the common law.

3. Further it is asked about the second: because when he came to suffer poverty for us, it seems that he ought more to have willed his mother to be deprived of such solace, than to help her.

4. Similarly it is objected about the third: because the Jews had read the Scripture of Isaiah, vii, 14, in which it is said: Behold a virgin shall conceive, etc.: but then they were expecting redemption: therefore it seems, that if she had given birth without betrothal, they would not have stoned her, but would have received her with joy.

5. Likewise, It seems that marriage was an impediment to them believing: because they knew, that Christ ought to be born of a Virgin, and she through marriage concealed her virginity: therefore it seems to have generated an impediment to them believing through this.

Response. It must be said, that there was a true and perfect marriage between the glorious Virgin, and holy Joseph, the witness and steward of her virginal chastity.

To what is first objected, it must be said that marriage by reason of conjugal consent does not lower the status of virginity, but rather by reason of intercourse: and that was not in this marriage: because as Origen says, although she was betrothed, she was not joined in concupiscence.

To the other it must be said, that a vow is the conception of a better good: but the better good is twofold, namely simply, and according to the time in which it is more valuable. For the Philosopher says in the Ethics of Tropics, that each thing in the time in which it is more valuable, is more to be chosen: and therefore the vow of the blessed Virgin was best, because simply it was of the best, that is, of virginity: but the good which then was more valuable, she committed to dispensation: hence she did not doubt whether she wished to remain a virgin, but rather whether she ought to remain what she wished, because then the fruit of the womb according to the time was more valuable to the Church, than virginity: because many were being led to idolatry, and few worshipped the true God. And this is what the Lord commanded, Leviticus ii, 13, that in every sacrifice salt should be offered: because no vow ought to be made, unless discerning the will of God concerning the good which he then more willed.

To the other it must be said, that in the fourth generation they return, as the objection says: but it is not necessary, that in all things it be similar to the second: and this for the reason, because the state of the time was not the same: for one existing alone cannot have a wife, but a wife was formed for him, and to the blessed Virgin a husband was not born, but a most sweet son, who by his generation begot all sons, to lead them back to the homeland of eternal salvation.

To the other it must be said, that because merit is in the will, and indiscretion is

to lack the solace of necessity, God provided the mother with the solace of necessity, and excluded the solace of pleasure: - and therefore that objection supposes a falsehood, namely that it is of greater merit to lack the solace of necessity, than to have it: but if it speaks of the solace of pleasure, then it is not to the purpose.

From what is objected about the causes which Origen assigns, it must be said that they are good.

To what is objected against the first, it can be answered in two ways. In one way indeed: because although demons have natural knowledge of divinity, yet not of union: and therefore it does not follow, that they knew the deity as united: and thus it was hidden from them, because if the son had been of a non-married virgin, they would have had more certain conjectures. In another way it can be said, that Origen speaks of the devil in his members, and not in himself. But the first is better: because the Gloss on the epistle I to the Corinthians ii, 8, on that: Whom none of the princes of this world knew: for if they had known, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory: is explained of the demons who did not know the sacrament of the Incarnation: because if they had known, they would never have persuaded the crucifixion: for they would have known that they would lose power through this.

And if it is objected against that, which is said, Matthew viii, 29: What have we to do with you, Jesus, Son of God? Have you come here before the time to torment us? the demons said through conjectures of miracles and the holiness of life, and not from certain knowledge.

To the other it must be said, that it can well be, that by divine will they were impeded from daring to consider anything about the mother of God: and therefore their knowledge of her natural things was as if in habit and dormant, as someone knows something in universal, which yet in particular he does not consider.

To the other it must be said, that of the Son

They well knew God, that they had no right in Him: but this could be done by the divine will for many other reasons: and therefore from this they had only conjecture. And therefore, in Matthew 4:1 and following, and Luke 4:2 and following, the devil insists much on temptation, so that he may take true experience of divinity.

To the other, it must be said as before, that to refuse the solace of necessity is perverse and not meritorious, and especially in the case of a virgin who, when she is alone, is not to wander through lands and roam through various businesses.

To the last, it must be said that those loving primacy had become blind, and therefore they would not have believed the testimony of Scripture, but would have stoned, as was later discovered in the work, where great and evident miracles could not bend them. Hence, although they had the Scripture, yet they would not have believed the Blessed Virgin to have been she, of whom this was foretold.

Thus through this is also clear the solution to the following: because it would not have been an impediment to them, but rather an argument of credulity confirmed by the testimony of the holy man Joseph.

Articulus 9 — Whether The Sacrament Of Marriage Between Mary And Joseph Was Perfected, And Whether Joseph Wished To Dismiss Mary Justly

Whether the sacrament of marriage between Mary and Joseph was perfect? And, whether Joseph justly wished to dismiss Mary?

Secondly, it is asked, Whether the sacrament there was perfect?

However, it seems that it was not, and this in three ways.

1. First, from the efficient cause itself: for simple consent causes marriage simply: therefore conditional consent does not cause marriage simply, but in a certain respect: but the consent of the Blessed Virgin was conditional: therefore it did not cause marriage except in a certain respect: but marriage in a certain respect is imperfect: therefore the marriage of the Blessed Virgin was imperfect.

1. Likewise, on the part of the good of faith it seems to have been imperfect: because the vow of absolute chastity is one thing, and the faith of the bed is another: for the absolute vow keeps absolute chastity from every man, and at every hour: but the faith of the bed neither at every hour nor absolutely, and this custody was not in the Blessed Virgin: therefore her marriage as to the faith of the bed was imperfect.
2. Likewise, also as to offspring it seems to have been imperfect: because the offspring was not caused by the marriage: therefore it was not its good: therefore it does not receive any perfection from it.
3. Likewise, as to the good of the sacrament: for perfect in the good of the sacrament is perfect in signifying: but this is imperfect in signifying, as the Text says: therefore it is an imperfect sacrament: therefore it also seems imperfect.
4. Likewise, as to the essence of marriage it seems imperfect: because individuality is the essential perfection of marriage: but those who never perfectly become one, never have perfect individuality: but the Blessed Virgin and Joseph never perfectly were one: therefore the proposition is clear. The proof of the minor is that the unity of souls is ordered to the unity of bodies: but the final in all things is completing: since therefore they never were one in the unity of body, they never perfectly were one.
5. Likewise, everything in which the ultimate completing is lacking is imperfect: but in the marriage of the Blessed Virgin and Joseph the ultimate completing is lacking: therefore it is imperfect. The proof of the minor is: because the ultimate consummating of marriage is the mingling of sexes.
6. Likewise, the cause which the Text says seems to be nothing, because chastity does not perfect marriage, although it perfects merit in some way: therefore what it says is nothing.

1. Likewise, that perfects marriage in which the spouses consent to exercise: but this is not chastity: therefore chastity does not perfect. The first is clear by itself. The second is

proved by this, that if chastity perfected marriage, mother, sister, and daughter, and such persons would be excluded from marriage in vain.

But the contrary is what
1. Is said in the Text, and the same is in decree 31, throughout.

1. Likewise, it is still objected by reason thus: God's works are perfect: therefore especially those are perfect which He does concerning Himself and His own: but this marriage He did concerning Himself and His own: therefore it is most perfect.
2. Likewise, the Angel himself says, Matthew 1, 21: Do not fear to take Mary as your wife. But they are not called spouses, as was proved above, unless from the time when marriage between them is perfect: therefore there was perfect marriage there.

But if this is conceded according to truth, it is then asked, why Joseph, since he was just, and did not wish to expose her, wished to dismiss her secretly: for he could not dismiss her and take another, nor remain in the world, if it was a perfect marriage: but it was allowed since he was just, for a just man does nothing unjustly: therefore it was not a perfect marriage, as it seems.

Response. It must be said that it was a most perfect, uncontaminated, and immaculate marriage: because, as was shown above, carnal intercourse follows marriage, and does not perfect it, but rather consent expressed by words of the present.

Therefore, not repeating what was said, we say to the first, that the consent was sufficient for marriage, which was in the matrimonial union permitted under divine disposition: for charity by itself wills better things: but sometimes it is compelled to act concerning those things which are lower and more necessary at such a time, as the Gloss says on the epistle to Titus: Charity. And therefore charity of truth always wills what is better simply: but the truth of charity compels those things to be willed from time. It must be said that the argument does not proceed except from a condition diminishing conjugal consent, and such is not this.

To the other it must be said that faith keeps chastity for its own sake, and offers itself maritally to the joined one for infirmity or the good of offspring. Hence what it offers itself, this is for another: but the custody of chastity is as desired for its own sake: and therefore in the first is the perfection of the good of faith, and not in the second.

To the other it must be said that two things make the good of marriage, namely the reception of offspring through marriage, and education in it. Therefore it must be said that Christ has the latter expressly, because He is educated by the piety of parents, and is presented to the Father in the temple, to present Him to the Lord: and in place of the first He has that He was received in marriage, although not through it, and therefore it is called the good of marriage, not entirely as other infants.

To the other it must be said that signification is of the essence of the sacrament inasmuch as it agrees with the old sacrament: and therefore it follows the genus of the sacrament, and not

the species: and therefore from signification the sacrament does not contract essential perfection.

To the other it must be said that no union is the essential reason of marriage, unless marital founded in the consent of souls: but that which is of the flesh is consequent to it: and therefore the first is not ordered to that as to the essential, but as to the effect which can follow if the spouses will: and therefore the argument falsely supposes.

To the other it must be said that the act of lying together is not perfecting and consummating according to being: and the reason for this is sufficiently had from the above.

To the other it must be said that the cause given in the Text is good: for there is a twofold chastity, namely simple chastity and in kind, and specific chastity. And simple chastity indeed does not perfect marriage, but in species, and this is marital chastity, and this is which is according to the will of the spouses whether to contain or to render the debt: and it is more perfect when it is to contain, and such was in this marriage from the will of both, because both vowed chastity, and for this reason from common will they continued; and such is not the chastity of a virgin not joined to marriage, nor even the chastity of a widow.

To the further PROBATION it must be said that among illegitimate persons there cannot be conjugal chastity, as was already and above evident: and by this all things which were first objected are solved.

To the last, Origen responds that Joseph did not think this, to have suspicion of the glorious Virgin, but rather, because he deemed himself unworthy to serve such sanctity: and therefore unless he had been strengthened by the Angel, he wished to withdraw himself elsewhere, to give place to another more suitable by his reputation.

Articulus 10 — Whether The Good Of Offspring Was The Good Of This Marriage

Whether the good of this marriage was the good of offspring?

Thirdly, it is asked, Whether the good of offspring of this marriage was good? For although this is now almost assumed, yet it is further to be inquired.

However, it seems that it is not:
1. For the good of marriage relates to marriage as an effect to a cause: but this offspring was not effected by this marriage: therefore it cannot be its good.

1. Likewise, an adopted son by someone cannot be the good of his marriage: therefore much less he who is not, nor is even adopted.

2. Likewise, as the father relates to the daughter who is joined in marriage, so the son to the marriage: but the father of Christ was not Joseph truly, but only putatively: therefore it seems that Christ was only a putative good of the offspring of that marriage: but it does not follow, this is a putative good of that: therefore it is the good of that: therefore it seems that it ought not to be called the good of that marriage.

3. Likewise, it is not the good of marriage which is before the matrimonial conjunction: but Christ, conceived as a true man, existed before the matrimonial conjunction of the blessed Virgin and Joseph: therefore he was not the good of that marriage. The first is evident by itself. The second is written, Matthew 1:18: Before they came together, she was found to be with child of the Holy Spirit.

To this it must be said, as before, that for offspring to be called the good of marriage, several things are required, namely that it be received in marriage according to the fear of God and be religiously educated, and that divine worship remain in it as it remained in the parents, as it is said, Tobit 6:9: And now, Lord, you know that I take my sister as wife not for the sake of lust, but only for the love of posterity, in which your name may be blessed forever. In Christ, by reason of which it is called the good of the offspring of that marriage, namely because he is received in marriage, although not from marriage, but from the Holy Spirit, and in marriage he was nourished and educated, subject to them, as it is said in Luke 2:51: and the religion of the parents not only remained in him, but also all that had fallen, rose again.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that marriage would not have been sufficient for such an effect, but it effected something concerning him, namely the protection of the mother, and his education.

To the second, it must be said that Christ is not an adopted son of anyone, but the natural son of the mother, and through her pertaining to the marriage.

To the other, it must be said that that comparison is not valid: because Christ can be compared to marriage in two ways, namely through the mother, and Joseph: but Joseph is not compared to Christ, except as a putative and nurturing father: and therefore the argument does not proceed.

To the other, it must be said that Christ was conceived before cohabitation: but the Gospel does not say that he was conceived before the conjugal pact, but implies that after, when it says: When she was espoused, etc.: but whatever happens after the conjugal pact which is there called espousal, all pertains to marriage.

Articulus 11 — Whether The Blessed Virgin's Vow Of Chastity Was Contrary To Matrimonial Consent

Whether the vow of chastity of the Blessed Virgin was contrary to matrimonial consent?

Fourthly, it is asked, whether that vow was contrary to matrimonial consent?

It seems, however, that it was: because

1. Those whose acts are contrary, they themselves are contrary, as the Philosopher says: but the acts of the vow of chastity and of marriage are contrary: therefore the vow and matrimoni-

al consent are contrary. The proof of the minor is that the vow wills to abstain from all, but not the consent of marriage.

1. Likewise, a vow is not about those things which are subject to a precept, because everyone is bound to these things without a vow: therefore a vow does not exclude fornication there:

since therefore it excludes something of those things which are not under a precept, it seems that it excludes marriage: therefore it seems that it is contrary to matrimonial consent.

1. Likewise, to one vowing voluntary poverty it is not permitted to return to having riches for use, even if he subjects them, but he must renounce them: therefore similarly to one vowing the state of virginity it is not permitted to return to the state of marriage, even if he abstains in marriage: therefore it seems that since the Blessed Virgin vowed thus, she could not afterwards consent to marriage.

But if this is said, it is contrary to what is said in the Letter, and in the Gospel, and by all the Fathers.

Response. It must be said that she never vowed absolutely to remain a virgin: but she always willed this absolutely, and never willed carnal union, unless God revealed that this was better for that time: for which reason, as it is said in the Letter, she entrusted her virginity to divine providence and disposition because of the state of the time: because everyone who at that time descended from the line of David through the right line desired to be a participant of that promise, and sought to leave behind a posterity from which Christ would be born, and in this hope she consented to marriage.

Therefore, it must be said to the first, that the vow of chastity was conditional, and therefore was not contrary to marriage: for Augustine wills in the Letter that she consented to marriage in such a way that unless God commanded the opposite, she would even have rendered the debt.

To the other, it must be said that this seems to follow if she had made the vow solemnly and without condition.

To the other, it must be said that it is not similar: because he who vows to renounce riches does not renounce but uses them when he has them: but one vowing virginity and keeping it with a man does not use the act which is in carnal union.

Articulus 12 — Whether Between The Blessed Virgin And Joseph There Was An Indivisibility Of Life

Whether there was an individuality of life between the Blessed Virgin and Joseph?

Whether there was an individuality of life between the Blessed Virgin and Joseph?

Fifthly, it is asked whether there was an individuality of life between the Blessed Virgin and Joseph?

It seems, however, that there was not: because

1. Individuality is when separation is impossible: but this does not occur except through carnal union: therefore, it seems since this was not between them, that there was not full individuality there.

1. Likewise, there is a different individuality of charity and friendship and marriage: but I see that individuality of spirit is between those who love and friends: therefore, that is not proper to marriage: since therefore it does not have another, it seems that they did not have the proper individuality of marriage between themselves.

On the contrary, individuality is caused by consent: however, it is most fully established that they consented to each other: therefore, it seems that they had the fullest individuality.

Response. It must be said that the individuality of souls was greatest in that sacrament, which never was among other spouses.

To that which is objected against, it must be said that union posits possible separation through death, and that is among such in spiritual death: because this was not there except a spiritual bond: and the reason for this is clear from what was said above. Hence it is false that there is a possible division, as long as they endure in life with the possible marriage itself united.

To the other, it must be said as above, that here individuality is specified by the contracting form and difference, which is marital conjunction: for such is not among those who love or among friends.

D. Concerning the final cause of marriage.

Having explained what is the efficient cause of marriage, it follows to show for what cause marriage is usually or ought to be contracted. Therefore, the principal final cause of contracting marriage is the procreation of offspring: for this reason God instituted marriage among the first parents, to whom He said: "Be fruitful and multiply," etc.[694] The second is, after the sin of Adam, the avoidance of fornication: whence the Apostle says, "Because of fornication, let each man have his own wife, and let each woman have her own husband."[695] There are also other honorable causes, such as the reconciliation of enemies and the restoration of peace. There are also other less honorable causes for which it is sometimes contracted, such as the beauty of a man or woman, which often inflames minds with love and impels them to enter into marriage, so that they may fulfill their desire. Profit and the possession of riches are also frequently causes of marriage, and many others, which are easy to discern for anyone who applies diligence. Nor should assent be given to those who say that it is not marriage which is contracted for these less honorable causes. For it is established from the premises that marriage is made from mutual consent expressed in words of the present, even if love has drawn to this. A document of this matter is provided by Jacob, who loved Rachel, beautiful in face and with a pleasing appearance, and said, loving her greatly: "I will serve you for Rachel seven years." In Deuteronomy it is also read: "If you see among the captives a beautiful

woman, and you desire her, and wish to have her as a wife, you shall bring her into your house," etc.[696]

E. That an evil end does not contaminate the sacrament.

And although marriage is contracted with a not good end, when the appearance of the contracting party moves the mind, nevertheless the marriage is good: because the evil life or perverse intention of someone does not contaminate the sacrament.

However, the marriage of Mary and Joseph had other special causes, namely that the virgin might be sustained by the solace of a man, and that the birth might be hidden from the devil, that Joseph might be a witness of chastity, defending her from the infamy of suspicion, lest she be condemned as an adulteress.

Articulus 13 — Whether Matrimony Can Be Contracted For Several Causes

Whether marriage can occur for multiple reasons?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said, there, D, Exposition of what is the efficient cause of marriage, etc.

1. For it seems that one and the same thing ought not to have multiple final causes: but offspring, infirmity, beauty, wealth, friendship, and reconciliation of enemies are many not of the same kind: therefore it seems that they cannot be the cause of one marriage.
2. Likewise, if something is caused by multiple causes not existing in one kind, it is impossible for it to be simple: but marriage is simple: therefore it seems that it is not caused by multiple causes differing in kind, as are those which are enumerated in the Text.
3. Likewise, Boethius: Of which the cause is good, it itself is also good: of which the cause is good and evil, it itself is good and evil: therefore further by similarity, of which the cause is honest and less honest, it itself is at once less honest and more honest, which is false.
4. Likewise, no sacrament is required under a dishonest cause: this is false, therefore it is said in the Text.
5. Likewise, the Church does not judge or ordain concerning dishonest things, or concerning those things which are done for dishonest causes: but it judges concerning marriage: therefore it is never done for less honest causes.

Response. It must be said that there are twofold causes of marriage, namely per se, and per accidens. The per se causes of marriage are always honest, but the per accidens causes are not always: however, the per accidens causes are those which are not direct causes of marriage, but rather causes inclining to contract: and therefore they are rather causes of contracting than of marriage, as the Master expressly says in the Text.

694. Genesis 1:28.

Therefore, it should be said to the first, that this is understood of the per se cause.

To the other, however, it can be said that this is true of essential causes: but it has already been shown that these are not such.

To the other it must be said that this would follow very well if the causes were of equal causality: and therefore since the honest ones are essential to marriage, it itself is similarly honest, as it is said in the Text: but since the dishonest ones are not essential causes of it, but rather inclining to contract, they do not place their dishonesty around marriage, but rather around those contracting marriage.

And through this the understanding of all those things which are said in this distinction is clear.

DISTINCTIO XXXI

Divisio Textus

After these things concerning the goods of marriage, etc. This is the part in which the goods of marriage are treated by the Author, and it is divided into two parts.

In the first, it is treated concerning the goods of marriage. In the second, how by these goods the act of intercourse is excused: and this begins, there, By Cran therefore: three goods, etc.

Likewise, the First is divided into three. In the first, he shows what the goods are. In the second, he shows that they are not in every marriage, there, C, Lé est scien. In the third, he inquires whether it is valid, etc. that a marriage is, in which there is none, there, E, Hicgueri solet, etc.

However, here before the Letter, six things are to be inquired, of which the first is, In what kind of good is marriage?

The second, In what kind do its goods fall?

The third is concerning the comparison of these goods.

The fourth, Whether they are fitting to it according to what is a remedy, or according to what is an office, or according to both?

The fifth, Whether this pertains to every marriage of whatever persons?

The sixth, Whether these are fitting to marriage inasmuch as it is initiated, or inasmuch as it is ratified, or inasmuch as it is consummated?

695. 1 Corinthians 7:2.

Articulus 1 — In What Genus Of The Good Marriage Is

In what kind of good is marriage?

To the first it is objected: and it seems that it is in the kind of useful: because

1. Augustine says in the book On the Good of Marriage, that marriage is a good of mortals: but every good of mortals, insofar as it is such, is only useful to mortality: therefore marriage is useful for that: therefore it is in the kind of useful.
2. Likewise, that which is not desired except for the sake of something else is in the kind of useful: but marriage is not desired except for the sake of something else: therefore it is in the kind of useful. The first is proven from the definition of useful, which is given by Tully at the end of the first Rhetoric. The second is suggested in the words of the sacred Scripture, Tobit 3:16, where it says: "You know, Lord, that I have never desired a man, etc." For there it suggests that she never desired marriage except for the love of posterity.
3. Likewise, the Philosopher wishes that nothing seeks generation except that it may participate in the divine good as much as possible, so that what cannot be saved in the individual may be saved in the species: therefore generation is desired for the sake of another: but marriage is not desired according to nature except for the sake of generation: therefore marriage is much more desired for the sake of another than generation: and thus the proposition is held, as before.
4. Likewise, at the end of the first Physics it is said that the female desires the male insofar as she is imperfect: therefore for the sake of another: therefore the conjunction of the female to the male is for the sake of another: therefore it seems that marriage is in the kind of useful.

On the contrary of this, it seems that it is in the kind of pleasurable:

1. For marriage is a remedy for concupiscence: but this is done through the pleasure which is in marriage: therefore it seems that it is desired for this: therefore it is in the kind of pleasurable good.
2. Likewise, Solomon seems to wish this, Proverbs 5:18: "Rejoice with the wife of your youth, etc." And there, verse 19: "Let her breasts intoxicate you, etc." However, it is clear that he speaks there literally of those joined in marriage: therefore it seems, since the intoxication of the breasts is in the kind of pleasurable good, that marriage is also in the same.
3. Likewise, in the book On Intercourse the Author says that nature has placed the highest pleasure in intercourse, so that it may be more desired: and since this is in marriage as in other intercourse, it seems that it is referred to the appetite as a pleasurable good.
4. Likewise, if it were useful, then it would not be useful except for the end of attaining beatitude, because every useful thing is referred to this end: but it presents an

impediment to that, as the Apostle says, 1 Corinthians 7:14: therefore it seems that it is not desired as useful: therefore it seems that it is desired as pleasurable.

On the contrary of this, it seems that it is in the kind of honorable:

1. For every state of virtue and degree is in the same kind as virtue itself: but virtue is in the kind of honorable: therefore also the degree of virtue: but marriage is a degree and state of the virtue of continence; therefore, etc. The first is evident by itself. The second is written at the end of the first Rhetoric.
2. Likewise, Hebrews 13:4: "Marriage is honorable among all, and the bed undefiled." But everything honorable is in the kind of honorable: therefore also marriage. The second is taken from the definition of honor, which is gathered from the first Ethics, namely that honor is the exhibition of reverence as a sign of virtue. And, 1 Thessalonians 4:4: "That each of you should know how to possess his own vessel in sanctification and honor, etc." And he speaks there literally of the marital vessel: therefore possession is in sanctification and honor: but everything thus possessed is in the kind of honorable, like sanctity itself, and honor: therefore it seems that marriage is in the kind of honorable.

Response. It must be said that marriage is among mixed goods. What mixed goods are, Tully teaches at the end of the first Rhetoric, namely those which are partly desired for the sake of utility, and partly draw us by their own power and allure us by their own dignity. But it must not be conceded in any way that it is a pleasurable good in my judgment: because pleasure is not in it, except as an incidental without which the act is not exercised. But these mixed goods (as Tully says) are named from the more dignified, and are called honorable.

Therefore, to all that is first objected, it must be conceded: but nevertheless this is not the only reason why it is desired, but also the honesty of faith and the sacrament, and the consent of the individuality of life, and other things.

Similarly, the solution to the last is evident: because it is truly honorable in marriage, but it is implicated concerning the useful.

To the objections concerning pleasure, it must be said to the first, that it is remedied by the honorable which is in it, namely by the faith and grace which it confers: for it is ridiculous that someone is remedied of concupiscence by that which excites it more, and makes the itch burn more: for when there was not such suffocating pleasure, there was marriage. And by this it is evident that its good is not in the kind of pleasure: for pleasure does not regard the essence of marriage, but sometimes speaks of the cause in the contracting party only.

To the other it must be said that that exposition is ridiculous: but Solomon intends that they delight in it, as pleasure is joined to the honorable: and this is pleasure in the good of reason, namely in conjugal faith, and signification, and the piety of the offspring received.

696. Deuteronomy 21:11-12.

To the other it must be said that marriage does not make an impediment to the attainment of beatitude per se, but per accidens, namely by the burdens joined to it: and therefore that argument is not valid.

Articulus 2 — Whether The Goods Of Marriage Are In The Same Genus With Marriage, Or Are In The Genus Of The Honest Good

Whether the goods of marriage are in the same genus with marriage, or are in the genus of the honest good?

Secondly, it is asked, In what genus of good do its goods fall?

It seems, indeed, that they do not fall into the same genus:
1. For the sign, which is the good of the sacrament, is not desired except as it is an aid to knowing the signified; therefore, it is not desired except for the sake of another; therefore, it is in the genus of the useful; but it is certain by faith that it is in the genus of the honest; therefore, it seems that it is not in one genus of the desirable.

1. Likewise, it is certain that offspring is not in the genus of the honest; therefore, it seems that it is not in one genus with faith; therefore, as before.
2. Likewise, as Tullius says, nothing but sacrament and offspring is in the genus of the honest except virtue and part of virtue; they are not virtues, nor parts of virtue; therefore, since faith is a virtue, offspring and sacrament are not in the same genus with faith.

Therefore, it is asked whether offspring and sacrament are in the same genus of good?

It seems, however, that they are not: because

1. One is in the genus of natural good in which nature stands, but the other is in the genus of moral good: therefore, they are not in the same genus.
2. Likewise, the sacrament serves faith, but offspring rather serves succession; therefore, etc.
3. Likewise, the sacrament does not remain after marriage, but the good of offspring remains: therefore, and so forth.

Response. It must be said that these three are considered in two ways, namely absolutely, and as they are goods of marriage: if each of these is considered absolutely in itself, then they are not in the same genus. But if they are considered as goods of marriage, then they are all goods according to the form of that goodness in the same genus of the honorable, although not according to the same species of honorableness.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that it does not follow, if something is desired for the sake of another, that it is not honorable: as Augustine says in Book I of the City of God: Virtues are desired for the sake of happiness: and yet they are in the genus of the honorable.

And when it is said that the honorable is desired for its own sake, it is understood not accidentally: because Ambrose says on the epistle to the Galatians 1, 16, that they have certain innate sweetnesses, by which they delight their possessors with sincere and holy delight. Hence, since "per se" is opposed in two senses, namely to "for the sake of another," and to "accidentally": it must be said that the honorable is desired "per se," that is, not accidentally: and yet for the sake of another: and thus all three goods of marriage are desired.

To the other, it must be said that offspring is not a good of marriage, as is clear here from the text given: but rather offspring as it stands under the piety in which it is received and educated, so that there may be in it the propagation of religion, as well as of flesh: and in this way it has in itself the form of the honorable. Hence, inasmuch as it is a good, it is in the genus of the honorable.

To the other, it must be said that although nothing is essentially in the genus of the honorable, except virtue and the parts of virtue, nevertheless each thing is referred to the genus of the honorable, insofar as it participates in virtue and a part of virtue: and in this way, not essentially, but through the form of the good of marriage, the sacrament and offspring are referred to the genus of virtue.

To the other, the solution is clear from what was said before.

To the objection, it must be said that offspring is one thing, and the good of offspring is another, as was previously clear. And indeed in offspring nature stands, but in the good of offspring stands the good custom of religion.

To the other, it must be said as before, that offspring serves succession only through substance, and serves religion through habit.

To the last, it must be said that the good of offspring remains afterward, which is in a different subject than the subject of marriage: but faith and sacrament do not remain accidentally: and from the fact that one remains afterward, and the other does not, it does not follow that it is in the same genus. And there is an instance: because the son often remains after the father, and yet is in the same genus and species with the father.

Articulus 3 — Which Of The Goods Of Marriage Is More Excellent

Which of the goods of marriage is more excellent?

Thirdly, it is inquired about the comparison of these goods.

It seems, however, that the good of offspring is more substantial and better in marriage: because

1. In the Text it is said that this is the principal reason for which marriage was instituted: therefore it is also more substantial and better.
2. Likewise, this seems through the word of Adam, Genesis 2:24: "They shall be two in one flesh." For it seems from this that the final cause of marriage is the good of offspring

rather than anything else: and this was also expressly held in the Text before the end of the preceding distinction.

This is also taken from the words of Tobit, 8:9, who said: "And now, Lord, I take not this my sister for lust, but for the love of posterity."

1. Likewise, the blessing of marriage is ordained for this, when it is said: "Increase," for this cannot be understood except concerning the good of offspring: therefore, etc.
2. Likewise, this alone is the end of natural desire, which seeks to be preserved in the similar: therefore it is more substantial and principal.

On the contrary of this is, because 1. That which leads to the best is the best: but the sacrament leads to the best, because it leads to understanding the union of the faithful in one spirit with God, and of natures in one person of Christ, which are better than all children: therefore it seems that it is the best.

1. Likewise, that which is more essential and general in every marriage seems to be its best good: but this is the sacrament, for this is in every marriage, even when faith is violated: therefore it seems that this is its principal good.
2. Likewise, in all natural and moral causes which the Philosophers consider, the principal effect of a cause is always judged, which it always and everywhere follows: but the good of the sacrament is so related to marriage: therefore it is the principal.
3. Likewise, that which is most similar in name and essence to the cause, that is its more essential and principal effect: but the good of the sacrament is most similar in name and essence among them to marriage: therefore it is its more essential and principal effect: therefore it is also the principal and more essential good. The first is evident by itself. The second, however, is proved by this, that both are called a sacred sign, and both are a certain individuality: and this has been proved above: and thus the proposition is evident.

It seems further that faith is the principal: because

1. If some things are called good, that which is more essentially good is better: but faith is more essentially good, because it is a virtue in the genus of honesty, and the others are not so: therefore it seems that faith is the principal good of marriage.
2. Likewise, the efficient cause of marriage directly obliges to faith, and regards the others only consequently: therefore it seems that it is more principally effected by marriage: therefore it is the principal good.
3. Likewise, let the other two goods be understood not to be, namely the sacrament and offspring, there will still be marriage: but if faith is understood not to be according to habit and act, the marriage is dissolved: therefore faith is a more essential good of marriage than the sacrament and offspring. This is proved, however, because if the

conjugal pact does not exist, there is no marriage: and the conjugal pact will not be unless faith is according to habit at least and due, although it is not according to act.

Response. It must be said that the principal good of marriage is said in three ways, namely greater and more principal as intended by the institutor, and also commonly intended by those using marriage: and thus the good of offspring is the principal good of marriage. Otherwise, the principal good is said which more essentially participates in the nature of goodness: and thus faith is a more essential and principal good. In the third way, the principal is said which more essentially and ultimately follows marriage: and thus the good of the sacrament is the principal good. And so by different considerations nothing prohibits each of these from being principal.

And through this the solution to all the arguments of the first order is clear: because all those consider the intention of the institutor, and the more common observance of those using marriage.

But to what is objected for the second part, it must be said to the first, that that which leads to the best is twofold, namely leading cognitively and motivating: just as the knowledge of what is above, and the light, lead differently upwards. But that which leads upwards motivating to the best, this is the best: but in this way the sacrament, which is the good of marriage, does not lead to the best, but only cognitively.

To the following it must be conceded: but not every sacrament is the principal good, except in a determined way.

And through this the solution to all that is inquired is clear.

Articulus 4 — Whether These Goods Befit Marriage Insofar As It Is A Remedy

Whether these goods befit marriages inasmuch as it is a remedy?

Fourthly, it is asked, Whether they befit marriage according to that which is a remedy, or according to that which is an office?

It seems, however, that according to that which is an office; because
1. As Tullius says, an office is, as I see, the duty of marriage according to the institutions of the fatherland: an office is exercised in these acts: for if it is taken according to that which is the office of nature, offspring is elicited: and if in comparison to the spouse, faith is elicited: and if in comparison to future and divine things, a sacrament is elicited: none of these, however, is according to that which is a remedy: therefore, these do not befit it according to that which is a remedy, but according to that which is an office.

1. Likewise, If there were no sin, still marriage would have these three: but then it would only be in office: therefore it seems that these befit it according to that which is an office.
2. Likewise, An office sounds in the effective of utility: but marriage effects those utilities: therefore this compels it according to that which is an office, because every officious thing is effective of some utility.

On the contrary of this is that
1. It is said in the Letter, because the act of marriage is joined with concupiscence, through these goods it is excepted lest it fall headlong: but according to that which it is excepted, it is in medicine: therefore through these goods excepting coitus, it is in medicine. But that it is in medicine according to that which concupiscence in it is excepted, is proven from this that it does not need exception according to that which is an office: and thus the proposition is established.

1. Likewise, Everything that is medicated through excuse must have adjunct goods, through which the evil is excused and cured, by the mode of medicine: but marriage is medicated through excuse, inasmuch as it is in medicine: therefore according to that which is in medicine, it must have adjunct goods, through which it is excused and medicated.

Response. It must be said that those three goods are effected by marriage inasmuch as it is in office, but they are joined to it according to that which is a remedy: because otherwise they would in no way excuse coitus: whence the first reasons must be plainly conceded.

To the objection, however, it must be said that it excepts concupiscence not through the goods which it effects inasmuch as it is in medicine, but which it had from the first institution, and make it honorable, even after concupiscence has entered.

To the other, it must be plainly conceded that it has adjunct goods inasmuch as it is medicated, but it does not make them inasmuch as of this kind, but rather uses those made by it for the excuse of carnal concupiscence, which otherwise would be mortal sin, unless it were excused by the honesty of these goods.

Articulus 5 — Whether Every Marriage Has These Goods Of Marriage

Whether every marriage has these goods of marriage?

Fifthly, it is asked whether every marriage of whatsoever persons has these goods?

It seems that it does: because
1. Marriage is of all persons according to what is in office: and it effects these goods insofar as it is of this kind: therefore it seems that the marriage of all persons has all these.

1. Likewise, in every marriage of certain persons there is individuality which of itself signifies the faithful soul to whom it is a society with God, and carnal commingling which signifies the union of natures. Then, procreation of offspring follows. There is also faith in rendering the debt: therefore these are of marriage generally accepted as it is of all persons.
2. If perhaps you say that unbelievers do not have the sacrament, because they do not understand it. On the contrary: If anyone had understood circumcision to be given as a sign, nonetheless it would still be a sign: the same is similarly true of the sacrament of marriage: therefore no response seems valid.

3. Likewise, the first state in man preceded every state: therefore every other state took its beginning from it: but these three were fitting to marriage as it was instituted in paradise: therefore every state of men received marriage according to these three.

On the contrary of this is that
1. In the marriage of unbelievers there is not altogether the impossibility of division: therefore there is not there complete individuality: therefore the good of the sacrament is not perfect there.

1. Likewise, faith is in this that it is not joined to another: but the case can happen that, being absolved from an unbelieving husband, she can be joined to another: therefore it seems that neither is the good of faith perfect there.
2. Likewise, offspring is not the good of marriage, as the Letter seems to say, but rather piously received and religiously educated for the worship of God: but unbelievers do not receive any such offspring: therefore it seems that they never acquire the good of offspring through their marriage.

Response. It must be said that these three goods belong to the marriage of believers and unbelievers in a prior and posterior manner: for they belong perfectly and integrally to the marriage of believers, and they belong imperfectly to the marriage of unbelievers, as the last three reasons clearly prove because these three goods are not perfect there: for there is the sacrament habitually, faith movably, because it can be moved and changed, and the good of offspring only materially.

Therefore, to the first, it must be said that although it is in all in office, it is not, however, an office according to the laws of Christ, but is only ordered according to polities and civilities: and therefore it effects these imperfectly: because the principles and laws upon which it is founded are imperfect.

Through this the solution to the following is clear.

To the second, it must be said that habitually in such things there is a sign, as was said before, and it is dissoluble: and therefore individuality is imperfect there.

To the third, it must be said that every state, as much as it has of equity, takes as much from the first state: yet by the persuasion of men many things are depraved: and therefore by perverse and imperfect laws nothing is effected perfectly: but in the faith of Christ all things are perfect: and therefore in the marriage of believers these three are perfect.

Articulus 6 — Whether These Goods Befit Marriage Insofar As It Is Initiated, Or Ratified, Or Consummated

Whether these goods belong to marriage insofar as initiated, or ratified, or consummated?

Whether these goods belong to marriage insofar as it is initiated, or insofar as ratified, or insofar as consummated?

Sixthly, it is asked whether these three belong to marriage insofar as it is initiated, or insofar as ratified, or insofar as consummated? For it is said by some that it is initiated through consent of the present, ratified through translation, and consummated through carnal commixture: or initiated through betrothal, ratified through consent of the present, and consummated through carnal copulation.

However, it seems that two of these belong to initiated marriage: because there is a pledge of faith and indivisibility there: therefore, sacrament and faith are of initiated marriage.

Likewise, it seems that these two belong to ratified marriage: because this expressly makes faith and indivisibility of minds: therefore, it seems that these two belong to ratified marriage.

However, the good of offspring does not seem to be except of consummated marriage: because offspring is not born without carnal commixture: and this is only in consummated marriage: therefore, etc.

Likewise, further it seems that neither is the perfect good of the sacrament: because it was said above that it is not to be doubted that a woman does not pertain to marriage who does not experience carnal intercourse: and it was said there that this is understood as to signification: therefore, signification is not complete except of consummated marriage: and thus the proposition is held.

Likewise, further it seems that none of these is of initiated marriage: because when marriage is initiated through betrothal, it is not marriage: but where there is no marriage, none of the goods of marriage is: therefore, of initiated marriage none of the goods of marriage is.

Response. It must be said that the three are most fully of consummated marriage, and are less fully of ratified marriage: because there is faith, and imperfect signification, and the good of offspring in expectation if they wish carnal commixture: but in initiated marriage, if it is said to be initiated through betrothal, none of these goods is, as the last objection proves.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that there is a pledge of these, but not the essence and truth.

To all others, the solution is clear through what has been said.

Articulus 7 — Whether The Nuptial Good Is Threefold

Whether the nuptial good is threefold?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, A, after the beginning, at the words of Augustine:

The nuptial good is threefold, etc.

For it is asked here, By what is the number of the nuptial good taken?

For it seems to be of a greater division:

1. For just as faith is in the preservation of the bed, so justice is in the rendering of the debt: therefore it seems that justice is one of the nuptial goods.

1. Likewise, Aristotle proves that man is a conjugal animal because he is not sufficient for himself in operations: but when two confer works into one operating, they suffice: therefore the sufficiency of works is one good: therefore more goods.
2. Likewise, There is there a medicine of concupiscence for each spouse: and this is the best of goods: therefore it seems that there are more.
3. Further, In Proverbs, xxxi, 10 and following, many and very many goods are placed of the strong woman, in whom the heart of her husband trusts: therefore it seems that it is badly restricted to a trinity.

Response. It must be said that the nuptial good is called that good alone which always or frequently follows from those things which essentially constitute marriage and consummate it: for from this that there is a union of two legitimate persons united into an individual life, and made one body, these three follow: for from the union of souls follows faith, and from the very individuality of life follows the sacrament, and from the union of bodies follows offspring.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that justice does not immediately follow the essence of marriage, but through faith: because faith is the cause why the body preserved from another is exhibited to the spouse.

To the second, it must be said that although this can be one of the causes why man among other animals is a conjugal animal, and contracting marriage, nevertheless it cannot be a good effected by marriage, but is ordered to well-being.

However, below we will consider that man is a conjugal animal alone.

To the other, it must be said that there are many praises of a good woman depending on her virtue, and not effected by the essentials of marriage, and therefore they are not called goods of marriage.

Articulus 8 — Whether Faith, Insofar As It Is A Good Of Marriage, Is Well Defined

Whether faith, insofar as it is a good of marriage, is well defined?

Then inquiry is made concerning what is said there, A, in the middle: In faith it is attended to, etc.

And two questions are asked, namely, what is faith insofar as it is a good of marriage? and, What is its act?

To the first, Haymo on the Apocalypse says that faith is said and composed from fio, fis, factus sum, and dicta: whence it is said that faith is that by which things said are done:

therefore it seems that the faith of marriage is the preservation of things said through promises made to each other in the conjugal pact.

Against this definition, however, it is objected: because
1. According to this, faith is effected from words of the present making marriage: therefore it is not effected by the marriage itself: but faith, which is a good of marriage, is posited as an effect of marriage: therefore it seems that faith is poorly defined.

1. Likewise, according to the Philosophers, faith is a conception in which the intellect consents because of the aid of reason: for Aristotle says that opinion is aided and Boethius says, faith is made by reasons, which is an argument of the reason of a doubtful thing, but in marriage there is nothing making faith: such are the reasons: therefore it seems that in marriage there is no faith.

If perhaps you say that faith is there a virtue. Against: Either it is a cardinal virtue, or a theological virtue. Not cardinal * which is evident by induction: therefore theological: but that faith intends only towards God: therefore it is not between spouses towards each other: therefore it is not a good of marriage.

If perhaps someone wishes to say that there is faith there, as the Apostle to the Romans xiv, 23, says: Whatever is not from faith is sin. Against: the Gloss says that there faith is called conscience: but it is evident that conscience is not one of the goods of marriage: therefore neither is faith.

The response is that faith is taken in the first way according to which things said are done: and I well concede that things said are nuptial pacts through words of the present: and things said are taken broadly to every mode by which nuptial pacts can be made.

To the objection, it must be said that faith is not effected immediately by things said, but through the mediation of marriage: and this is proven thus * Suppose that the words of some pact do not effect marriage, I ask whether they are then bound to keep faith with each other? It is evident that they are not: therefore, with marriage posited, faith is posited, and with it destroyed, it is destroyed: therefore marriage is the immediate cause of this faith, which is the same as fidelity.

And thus the solution of the whole disputation is clear.

Articulus 9 — What The Act Of This Faith Is

What is the act of this faith?

Secondly, it is asked, What is the act of this faith?

And it is said in the Letter, that it pertains to faith that after the bond of marriage one should not unite with another.

But against this it is objected: because
1. More is contained in faith than what is said: for fidelity in what is entrusted implies two things according to human laws, namely, that it should not be given to another, and that it

should be rendered to me when I wish: therefore it is similarly in the fidelity of spouses: therefore it is not only contained that they should keep themselves from others, but also that they should communicate themselves to each other.

1. Likewise, the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 7:5, "Do not deprive each other, except perhaps by consent for a time." Therefore, it is fraud to withhold the due by consent for a time: but fraud is contrary to faith: therefore in fidelity is contained the communication of the body and the payment of the due.
2. Likewise, more principally in faith is contained the payment of the due than the keeping from adultery. Proof. The inability to give something to another is caused by the fact that another is in possession of that thing: therefore similarly in the faith of marriage, that one keeps oneself from another is caused by the fact that one belongs to one's spouse: therefore, since this is more principal, it seems that this should have been principally stated: therefore it is a fault when the secondary is stated.
3. Likewise, this is expressly contained in 1 Corinthians 7:4, where the Apostle says, "The wife does not have authority over her own body, but the husband does; likewise the husband does not have authority over his own body, but the wife does." Since therefore this makes the obligation of faith between them, it seems that this is principal in faith: therefore mention should have been made of this rather than of another.

Further, it seems that neither of these is of faith: because
1. One act in number cannot be proper to two virtues: but the act of conjugal continence is not to unite with another: therefore it seems that it is not an act of faith.

1. Likewise, in no nature is it found that one act is per se of two natures: therefore neither in morals should it be so, since Cicero says at the end of the first Rhetoric, and Aristotle in the books of Ethics, that virtue moves to acts as nature does.

If perhaps you say that it is similarly here: because this act is per se of one, and per accidens of another: as heat when it is strengthened against cold by opening pores through which cold enters and constricts. Against: This act, since it is about the matter of continence and circumstances, will be per se of conjugal continence: therefore it will not be of faith per se except per accidens: but by what belongs to something per accidens, it can never be determined: therefore faith cannot be determined by this act: therefore what Augustine says in the Letter, when he determines faith, is nothing.

Solution. It must be said that, as Augustine says, so the truth is: but I concede the first part of the objections, namely that what is more principal of faith is to serve each other with the service of the body: and what Augustine says is as a consequence to this.

To what is objected against, it must be said that the consequence is more manifest to many; and therefore Augustine declares faith by that.

To what could be objected, that any thing should be determined by what is essential to it, and not by consequences, and thus Augustine errs when he does not do this. It must be said

that there is a twofold determination of a thing: in itself, and to us: either definitively, and exemplarily. And in the first way it is true that it should be determined by prior essentials: but in the second way by consequences more manifest to us: and thus Augustine does here, because he does not define, but exemplarily manifests the act of faith.

To what is further objected, it must be said that when one formal virtue is to another, then nothing prohibits one act from being of both, one as commanding and directing, the other as eliciting and executing: and thus it is here: because faith here commands to render the first and consequent act: but conjugal continence executes.

And by this the solution to the first is clear.

To the other it must be said that in nature it is similarly: for the virtue of the heavens moves the elemental virtues, and governs them, and they execute: and the universal virtue in man moves and governs the particulars. But what is proposed in the objections holds when the virtues are equally particular, or equally universal: and this is not here: because faith is in reason, and as a certain form encompasses the concupiscible, so that according to the promise one is faithful in communicating the body to the spouse, and keeping it from another. This is clear by such a sign: if it is asked of a discreet spouse, why do you communicate yourself to your spouse? he will say because he is bound to keep faith in the promise: and thus it is easily clear how faith is as a formal reason to the act which is elicited by conjugal continence.

And by this the solution to the whole is clear: for this act is not per accidens of another virtue, but per se according to the diverse reasons of virtue.

Articulus 10 — Whether Offspring According To Substance Is A Good Of Marriage, Or According To Goodness

Whether offspring according to substance is a good of marriage, or according to goodness?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, A, shortly before the end: for offspring to be lovingly received, etc.

For it seems that this is false:
1. For the sacrament of marriage does not work the goodness of offspring, but the substance: therefore it seems that offspring according to substance is a good of marriage, and not according to the goodness which is placed concerning offspring.

1. Furthermore, it seems that which falls under the command of the Lord, when He said, Genesis 1, 28: Increase, etc. For it is evident that He understood this concerning multiplication according to number: therefore it seems that offspring is only through number, and not through merit the effect of marriage: therefore neither is it a good: because nothing is a good of marriage, unless through that which it effects itself.
2. Likewise, this seems to be taken from the words of Adam, where he says: They shall be two in one flesh: and he does not say, in one merit, but according to that which is expounded concerning one flesh of the child: therefore it seems that offspring according to flesh, and not according to merit, is a good of marriage.

On the contrary of this is that
1. It is held in the following chapter in Latfera, where it says: Nor all those even. For it is evident there, that not those who receive offspring have the good of offspring, etc. it is called the gift of offspring, only insofar as it is under goodness pertaining to religion.

1. Likewise, it is not of the married to destroy the good effected by marriage: but, Deuteronomy 21, 18 and following, it is commanded to parents to have a contumacious son stoned: therefore a contumacious son was not a good of marriage: therefore it is necessary that only a son standing under the goodness of religion is a good of marriage.

Which must be conceded.
To the first, therefore, it must be said that marriage, according to this, that it is founded upon divine worship, from the foundation has to make through such a disposition a good, although it does not have through the mixture of flesh alone.

To the other, it must be said that as it is said, Wisdom 4, 3: The numerous multitude of the impious will not be useful. And therefore God never willed the multiplication of the wicked, as He willed the propagation and multiplication of religion: and therefore He commanded that they increase.

To the other, it must be said that they are two in one flesh of the child, because they work that materially and effectively: but they do not work goodness except dispositively and educatively, but God effectively: and therefore they are not said to be in goodness as in flesh.

Articulus 11 — What Divorce Is

What is divorce?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said, there, A, at the end: In the sacrament so that marriage is not separated, etc.

Here it is inquired about divorce: and two things are inquired. The first is about divorce on account of the impediment of marriage. The second, however, is about separation from bed on account of fornication.

Concerning the first, however, three things are inquired, namely, what is divorce? Second, who are those who can declare the causes of divorce? Third, how is divorce effected?

Concerning the first, it proceeds thus: The Jurists say that divorce is a sacramental separation made on account of a legitimate impediment of marriage: and this definition is as if drawn here from the Text, where the Master divides separation into corporal and sacramental, as is evident to one inspecting the Text.

However, it is objected against this definition: because 1. Sacramentally they are never divided, who were never sacramentally joined: but those having a legitimate impediment

were never sacramentally joined: therefore it seems that they are never sacramentally divided: therefore the definition is null.

1. Likewise, when it is said, Sacramental separation: it is either understood concerning the sacrament of marriage, or concerning the sacrament which is the good of marriage. If the first is said: then sacramental separation is the same as matrimonial separation: but there they are opposites: because matrimonial is joined in the indivisible of life.

custom: therefore, when sacramental separation is spoken of, there is opposition in the adjective, just as if I were to say, division of the indivisible. However, if it is said from the sacrament that it is the good of marriage, then this follows more, because that is the indivisibility itself.

1. Likewise, in no nature or science does one opposite denominate its opposite, for it is never said that the indivisible is divisible, and that white gathers sight, or something of this sort: therefore, neither here does one of the opposites denominate the other: but separation is opposed to the sacrament: therefore, it cannot be called sacramental separation.
2. To the same, it is objected by what is held in the Letter: because in the Letter it is said that it pertains to the sacrament that marriage is not separated: and from this, it is objected as before.

Response. It must be said that this definition could be better: nevertheless, it can be sustained.

And then it must be said to the first, that sacramental separation is called the separation of the bond of the sacrament, not of what was, but of what seemed to be before the impediment was proven: whence if even the definition is thus corrected, so that it is said: Divorce is the separation of those who seemed to be sacramentally joined, due to a legitimate impediment that prevents marriage from being contracted, and dissolves the contract: this would be a better definition.

And through this, the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 12 — Who Are Those Who Can Denounce The Causes Of Divorce

Who are those who can denounce causes of divorce?

Secondly, it is asked, Who are those who can denounce causes of divorce?

1. It seems, according to the statements of the Jurists, that all are prohibited from accusing the marriage of another, if there are any of consanguinity able and willing to accuse the marriage: but if they are lacking, the older and more truthful neighbors are admitted. That this is so is confirmed, Extra, Who can accuse marriage, it seems to us, where Celestine the Third writes to the Bishop of Florence, that parents, brothers, From this it is taken, that relatives and kinsmen of both sexes are admitted in testimony for joining or dissolving their marriage, approved by both ancient custom and laws. Therefore,

especially parents, and if parents are lacking, the nearest are admitted: because each one labors to know his genealogy with witnesses and documents from the recitation of elders: for who ought to be better received than those who know better, and whose interest it is, so that if they were not present and did not give consent, according to the laws no marriage is made? But what is read, A father is not received in criminal cases and in the cause of the son, nor the son in the cause of the father, is true in contracts. But in joining or disjoining marriage, by the prerogative of the marriage itself, and because it is a favorable matter, they are fittingly admitted. Or neighbors, if relatives are lacking, ought to accuse the marriage that is to be separated.

2. Likewise, the reason seems to be the same: because no one ought to testify to what he does not know: but they do not know the causes of marriage as to kinship unless they are joined from infancy, to whom the progenitors were born: therefore only those can be witnesses in this cause.

3. Likewise, Not knowing any person, much less does he know the genealogy of that person: strangers do not know the person: therefore, etc.: therefore they cannot be witnesses.

On the contrary of this is, that a stranger proving the truth of his statement, is to be heard beyond exception if he wishes to testify against someone: but a stranger is beyond all exception: therefore if he proves what he says, he is to be heard.

According to this, it is further asked, Whether the passage of time or prescription makes a marriage not accusable, even if it has a legitimate impediment?

It seems, however, that it does: because 1. It is difficult to separate a marriage after offspring has been had, and it is ordered to the destruction of congregations and civilities: therefore it ought not to be admitted in law.

1. Likewise, Prescription is alleged in other matters: therefore also in marriage.

On the contrary of this is what is held,

Extra, concerning consanguinity and affinity, where it says Innocent in the general council I prohibit. And below:

And if anyone presumes to be joined against this kind of prohibition, he is not defended by any length of years, since the duration of time does not diminish sin, but increases it: and the crimes are so much graver, the longer they hold the unhappy soul bound.

But suppose that someone was present when certain persons were joined, and was silent, and later wishes to denounce the impediment, is he to be heard?

It seems that he is not: because 1. First he was silent when he could have denounced without harm: therefore when later he wishes to denounce with harm, it seems that he is not to be heard.

1. Likewise, Since he did not speak when first present, presumption is against him, or it may be that he later maliciously composed: therefore it seems that he is not to be heard.

On the contrary of this is what is said, Extra, Who can accuse marriage, Cum in tua. And below: If indeed from this decretal after the marriage contract someone appears as an accuser, since he did not come forth in public when the banns were published according to custom in the churches, whether the voice of his accusation ought to be admitted, it can rightly be asked. Upon which we have decided to distinguish, that if at the time of denunciation the one who now impugns the joined was outside the diocese, or otherwise the denunciation could not come to his knowledge, as if he were suffering from the fervor of excessive illness, enduring exile of a sane mind, or was of such tender years that his age could not suffice for the comprehension of such things, or was impeded by another legitimate cause, his accusation ought to be heard. Otherwise, since it is reasonably presumed that he did not ignore the denunciation publicly made while he was in the same diocese, he is undoubtedly to be repelled as suspect: unless he confirms by his own oath that he later learned what he objected, and does not proceed from malice: because then even if he learned from those who were silent at the time of denunciation, the access to accuse ought not to be closed to him: because even if the fault contracted from such silence would exclude those from such impugnation, yet he could not be removed, since he is not culpable. It is taken that even if he was first silent, in many cases he can later accuse the marriage.

Further it is asked here, Whether the father, mother, and brothers of those whose separation is being dealt with can be brought as witnesses?

And it seems that they cannot: because 1. Suspect witnesses from private love or hatred are not admitted: such are these: therefore they ought not to be admitted.

1. Likewise, Hatred often arises between spouses, so that one of the spouses would induce his parents to testify against the marriage: therefore lest this happen, the judge ought not to receive parents and kinsmen as witnesses.

On the contrary of this is what is said,

Extra, concerning witnesses: where Alexander the Third says, Concerning what your devotion has asked of us, whether the mother of the woman and another woman can be received as witnesses when the man denies that he betrothed the woman. I respond in this way, that since the mother seems to love the increase and honor of her daughter, where the man is superior in wealth, nobility, power, or honor, her testimony seems suspect, and therefore ought not to be admitted in any way. But the father or mother of the spouse, being inferior in wealth and honor of marriage, are to be heard: because it is presumed that they do so unwill-

ingly, compelled by the conscience of truth, since they would more willingly have their daughter joined to that man than separated from him.

Further here it is asked, Whether the same person can be both accuser and witness in this cause?

And it seems that he cannot: because if one related by blood to the accuser is held suspect, much more ought the same person compared to himself be held suspect: therefore he cannot be both witness and accuser.

On the contrary of this is, 1. What is held, Extra, concerning witnesses, where it is written, that Pope Celestine and it is established, public witnesses who are called synodal can be witnesses in marriage: which are the same as accusers.

1. An argument to the same is taken in decree 35, question 6, Bishops in synod. And especially in the apparatus of the decree under the same place.

Solution. It seems to be said, to this, that all persons not infamous, that is, beyond exception, that is, not impeded by the infamy of crime, however close, can denounce marriage, if it is a matter of a perpetual impediment to marriage, which impedes contracting and dissolves the contracted. But if it is a matter of the contract itself, whether it is contracted or not, then parents as suspect are to be repelled: unless it is so, that the parent who testifies against the marriage is inferior in dignity, wealth, and honors: because then it is probable that he would willingly have the marriage stand,

Therefore it is to be said to the first objection, that he who is objected is to be heard if he proves what he says: but it cannot be sufficiently proven except by relatives, because a stranger as a stranger cannot know the consanguinity of those who are strangers to him: and if he speaks without the assumption of relatives, he is repelled as suspect, because thus anyone could weaken a marriage.

To what is further asked according to this, Whether the passage of time makes any difference? It is to be said that in such matters where conscience is concerned, prescription has no place, as is shown in the cited decretal.

To what is objected against this, it is to be said that although it is difficult, yet that difficulty is more to be endured than to stand against conscience in fornication, or that someone be permitted to remain in fornication: because narrow is the way that leads to life, and few are those who find it: and therefore it is not to be neglected.

To the other, the solution is clear from the above.

To what is objected later by the decretal, it is sufficiently well distinguished when he is to be heard and when not to be heard: and therefore by the decretal itself a full response is clear.

To what is further asked, it is to be said that they can be brought according to the manner determined at the beginning of these solutions.

To what is objected against this, it is to be said that as is clear in a certain decretal cited in the objection, this does not hold in this case: and this is because since the detriment is of honor and things to separate such marriages, it is probable that parents do not desire such separation, and therefore say nothing out of love for their children: and especially because they know the impediments more certainly.

To the other it is to be said, that it is better, that is, less evil for such to be separated than to remain, lest homicide follow: and therefore the judge in such a case admits suitable witnesses.

To what is lastly asked, it is to be said that the same subject in this cause can be both accuser and witness, although not the same according to reason; because in truth in such a case something is acted against by way of inquiry rather than denunciation or accusation: in such a way of acting against someone (as is said in law) fame accuses: and afterwards what is introduced are witnesses of the truth of fame: yet because there is no other man here accusing and testifying, therefore it is said that the same is witness and accuser.

To what is objected against this, it is to be said that the accuser here does not testify to what he himself says, but rather to what fame proclaims: and therefore there is here a certain diversity of accuser and testifier.

However, it is to be noted here something that is said in 35, q. 6, in the apparatus, which holds in many places, namely that it is special in marriage, that the same can be both accuser and witness: just as also, that there is no oath in this cause concerning calumny, since it is almost a spiritual cause, and that relatives are admitted, and that the judicial order is not entirely observed there, since with such denunciation made, the contumacious can be excommunicated without the case being contested: and that testimony from hearsay is valid here, and because after the publication of the attestation witnesses can be brought.

Articulus 13 — Whether And When Marriage Can Be Accused

Whether and when can marriage be accused?

Thirdly, it is asked, How is divorce made, and since the cause of this is accusation, therefore it must be asked, when can marriage be accused?

It seems, however, that as soon as it begins to be culpable: 1. This is in the first will and promise of contracting: therefore then it can be accused: therefore in betrothals accusation can be made.

1. Likewise, To the same is that then accusation more easily has place, and with less scandal and harm to the contracting parties: therefore it seems that then it ought to be made.

On the contrary, it is that 1. That which is not cannot be accused: but marriage in betrothals is not: therefore in those it cannot be accused.

1. Likewise, It seems that it cannot be accused: because as Innocent says in the general council, accusation is made by inscription: but denunciation of the marriage bond can be made by inscription, and without inscription.
2. Likewise, In accusation the accuser obligates himself to the penalty of retaliation if he cannot prove what he says: but in denunciation of the marriage bond nothing such is done: therefore it seems that it is not accused nor can it be accused.

Further it is asked: Let us suppose, that two brothers have two sisters, and one is separated from his wife because of proven consanguinity, whether the other is separated from his wife by the same law?

It seems, however, that yes: because of similar things there is similar judgment: but their marriages are in all things similar as to the marriage bond: therefore if one is separated, the other will also have to be separated.

But on the contrary of this is what is said, Extra, concerning faith instructed. Among the beloved: and the Pope says there, that a matter done between others does not prejudice another.

But then further it is asked, Whether they can render and demand the debt from each other?

It seems, however, that yes: for what is prohibited by no law, can be licitly demanded: but this (as has been held) is prohibited by no law: therefore it can be licitly demanded.

On the contrary of this is, that conscience reproaches, because it knows itself to be judged similarly: but he who acts against conscience, builds towards hell: therefore it seems, that neither ought he demand nor render.

Response. It must be said, that as is held from the council of Urban held in Apulia: If two or three have confirmed consanguinity by oath, or they themselves perhaps have confessed, marriages are dissolved: if neither has happened, Bishops should beseech them by baptism, by the faith of Christ, by the judgment of Christ in true obedience that they make it clear whether they, as is the rumor, recognize themselves to be consanguineous; if they deny, they are to be left to themselves: yet so, that if they have something else in conscience, they know themselves to be segregated and made infamous from the thresholds of the Church, from the body and blood of the Lord, from the communion of the faithful, until they desist from the incestuous crime: if they have segregated themselves by the judgment of the Bishops who are young, they are not prohibited from contracting another way. As to the number of witnesses and the inquiry, divorce is to be made. However, one denouncing marriage can do this by word or writing through such words: I say or denounce to you, Lord, that the marriage of N. and B. cannot stand, because they are consanguineous in such a degree. He ought to append

this in a little book, Moreover concerning consanguinity and affinity he is held to give the little book to the accused, so that he may know who impugns and how he can respond.

Having this, it must be responded to the first, that marriage cannot be accused unless when it is, and therefore in betrothals it cannot be accused: but a denunciation of a simple impediment can be made without proof by witnesses, unless perhaps the betrothals are confirmed by oath: because then due to the obligation of the oath he is held to proof.

To the argument, however, which is against this, it must be said that marriage does not begin: because no part of it is then, but only a disposition towards it, as was held above, when it was disputed concerning betrothals.

To the other it must be said, that denunciation of consanguinity can be made, but not accusation of marriage, because it is not.

To that which is further asked, Whether it can be accused? It must be said that not properly: but accusation is taken here in an extended name for denunciation: and through this the solution to the following is clear.

To that which is further asked, it must be said that another brother ought not to withdraw from his wife because of this: because often human judgment is deceived, which proceeds according to what is alleged: and therefore it is not necessary to judge similarly concerning this.

To that which is objected concerning conscience, it must be said that either there is knowledge of consanguinity, or opinion, or he has nothing of such in conscience. If in the first way, he can neither render nor demand. If in the second way, he can render, but not demand.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Concerning separation from the bed, there will be a question below in its proper place.

Articulus 14 — Whether Marriage Imprints A Character

Whether Matrimony imprints a character?

Whether Matrimony imprints a character?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said there at B, around the middle: "Just as the apostate soul," etc.

For from this it seems that matrimony imprints a character: because
1. Otherwise, the likeness introduced is worth nothing.

1. Likewise, when the cause ceases, the effect ceases: but immediately after the hour of the first contract, the effect departs and ceases: therefore the cause ceases as well: therefore, since the effect does not cease, it is necessary that something conserves it: but this can only be a character: therefore matrimony imprints a character.
2. Likewise, the sign of an eternal character is not a corporeal and deletable character: but matrimony signifies the eternal conjunction of the faithful soul with God: therefore it is

necessary that this is done through something indelible: but this can only be a character: therefore matrimony imprints a character.

3. Likewise, the soul of the married person passing from this world, is either distinguishable from the unmarried or not. If so: then since this is a character, because nothing distinguishes except a character, matrimony imprints a character. But if it is not distinguishable, then matrimony according to its whole being is corporeal, and does not signify something remaining in eternity.

On the contrary of this is that sacraments imprinting a character cannot be repeated in the same person: but matrimony can be repeated: therefore it does not imprint a character.

Response. It must be said that it does not imprint a character.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that the likeness is in part, and not in whole: so that matrimony does not follow similarly in part: because just as on account of the perpetual character the sacrament is not rendered to the soul apostatizing from God when it returns, so here on account of the bond which lasts as long as one of the spouses lasts, matrimony is not repeated.

To the second, it must be said that those whose being is in becoming, it is necessary to be with their causes: but those whose being is after their causes, especially not proximate ones, can remain after, and especially voluntary effects of ours: hence this does not hold in voluntary contracts.

To the third, it must be said that it is distinguishable not by a character, but by the knowledge of the prior life which remains with him and with others.

Articulus 15 — Whether The Preservation Of Continence Belongs To The Things Confirming Marriage And Its Essence

Whether the preservation of continence pertains to the confirmers of marriage and its essence?

Then it is inquired concerning what is said there, B, shortly before the end: Indeed, it adheres more firmly the more those agreements, etc.

For it seems to be false: because the preservation of this continence is not of the essence or confirmers of marriage, but rather of the confirmers of the will of continence: therefore, it is falsely stated in Liddera.

Likewise, it seems contrary to the consummation of marriage: therefore, it does not confirm it.

Response. It must be said that it speaks in the Letter of the confirmation of the sanctity of marriage more than of the essence of marriage.

And through this, the solution to both is clear.

C. These three are not present in every marriage.

And it must be known that some contract marriage where these three goods do not accompany. For faith is lacking where a man lies with another, or a woman with another. Therefore, this good adheres to marriage in such a way that if it is present, marriage is more commended: if it is not present, it is not thereby annihilated. For she who is an adulteress is not for that reason not a wife: indeed, if she were not a wife, she would not be an adulteress: for it is not adultery unless the faith of the legitimate bed is violated. When this happens, a fault is committed, but the sacrament is not ceased. The good of offspring is also not present to all spouses. For some by mutual vow preserve continence. Others, due to the defect of age or some other cause, are not able to generate. Nor do all those who receive offspring have the good of offspring. For the good of offspring is not said to be the offspring itself, or the hope of offspring which is not referred to religion, but rather to hereditary succession: as when someone desires to have heirs of earthly possession, but the hope and desire by which offspring is sought is that it may be informed by religion. Many therefore have offspring, who nevertheless lack the good of offspring: yet for that reason marriage does not cease to be. But the sacrament adheres so inseparably to marriage of legitimate persons, that without it marriage does not seem to be, because the marital bond always remains among the living: so that even with divorce intervening for the cause of fornication, the firmness of the marital bond is not dissolved. Where marriage is not contracted among legitimate persons, that good which is called the sacrament is not present: because the bond of such can be dissolved, about which it will be said later. But that marriage is among those who come together with marital affection, not for the grace of offspring, but for the sake of fulfilling lust: they are not called fornicators, but spouses, as Augustine shows saying: It is usually asked, When a male and a female, neither he the husband, nor she the wife of another, join together not for the sake of procreating children, but for the sake of mere intercourse due to incontinence, with that mutual faith, that neither she with another, nor he with another does that: whether they are to be called nuptials? And perhaps it can not absurdly be called a union, if it pleases them until the death of one of them: and the generation of offspring, although they are not joined for that reason, they do not avoid so that they either do not want children to be born to them, or even do something evil so that they are not born. But if either both or one of these is lacking, I do not find how we can call these nuptials. For if someone takes a woman for a time, until he finds one worthy of honors or his means, whom he may lead into marriage, he is an adulterer in intention: not with the one he desires to find, but with the one with whom he lies in such a way that he does not have marital consortium with her. Behold, they are called spouses, who come together for the sake of mere intercourse, if nevertheless they do not avoid the generation of offspring by some evil deceit.

Articulus 16 — Whether Every Marriage Has The Goods Of Marriage

Whether every marriage has the goods of marriage?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, G, around the middle: Where indeed marriage is not contracted among legitimate persons, that good which is called the sacrament is not present, etc.

It seems this is false: because

1. There is the indivisibility of individual life and custom: but this is the sacrament: therefore it is said to be false in the text.
2. Likewise, there is no marriage that does not have some good: but I posit that such cannot have offspring, nor even keep faith with each other: therefore, since there is neither the good of the sacrament, there is none of the goods there: however, there is marriage among such, as is proven below: therefore there is some marriage that has no good, which is absurd to say.

Response, It must be said that sacrament is said in two ways, namely in habit, and in act. In act, the sacrament is not there, because it does not lead to any sacred thing, but in habit it is there: but in the text, he speaks of the sacrament existing in act.

Or it can be better said that there is a twofold indivisibility, namely from that which the preposition can deprive of the act of division, or potentially. And in the first way indeed, the marriage of unbelievers is indivisible. In the second way, however, it is not: because in some contingent case it can be divided, if one converts to the faith, and the other does not wish to cohabit with them except in contempt of the Creator. And in this way, he understands in the text.

Articulus 17 — Whether There Is Marriage Between Those Who Are Joined For The Sake Of Exercising Lust

Is there marriage among those who are united for the sake of exercising lust?

Then it is asked concerning what is said there, C, shortly after: It is accustomed to be asked, When a male and female, etc.

For it seems that there is no marriage among such: because
1. In such a case, no good of marriage is sought from the woman, which is evident to the one asking through each point: but in every marriage some good is sought: therefore it seems that this is not marriage.

1. Likewise, Sextus the Pythagorean says, as will be said below, that the more ardent lover of his own wife is an adulterer: but he seems to be more ardent, because he follows only the lust of passion, therefore it seems that he is an adulterer.

1. Likewise, in the Letter it says, If he does not act against it, then it is marriage: therefore if he acts against it, by contrary sense it is not marriage: let us suppose, therefore, that he prevents birth, then it seems that the marriage previously contracted and consummated is dissolved, which is false.

Response. It must be said that there is marriage among such, as is said in the Letter: and this has been sufficiently inquired above.

To what is objected, it must be said that the good of medicine is sought in such a marriage, and this is not a small good: and others are supposed in potentiality and in habit, although not in act.

To the other, it must be said that the saying of Sextus the Pythagorean is understood concerning fervent passion outside the common honesty of marriage, namely, one who knowingly and with intention uses his wife in the place and name of a prostitute, which even if she were not a wife, he would want to lie with her.

To the other, it must be said that the Master does not say this because he understands that a supervening impediment to marriage impedes or dissolves the contracted marriage: but because then they do not act as spouses, but as adulterers against the goods of marriage: and indeed, the spouses themselves, being spouses, do not perform the conjugal act.

And through this, the solution is clear.

Articulus 18 — What Penance Is Owed To Those Who Procure Poisons Of Sterility

What penance is owed to those who procure poisons of sterility?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said,

there, D, "But those who procure poisons of sterility," etc.

However, it is asked here concerning the penance of these,

1. For it seems that they are parricides, or killers of their own children: because he who gives occasion for harm seems to have given the harm: but he gives occasion for homicide; therefore, he commits homicide.
2. Likewise, in external matters, it is more damaging to render the land infertile than to uproot the crops once: therefore, by a similar reasoning, in human nature, to make nature sterile is a greater sin than to kill one living infant or two: therefore, they are to be punished with a graver penance than murderers.
3. Likewise, in Genesis 38:9, it is said of Er and Onan, who spilled their seed, that the Lord struck them. Therefore, it still seems that such should be punished by death or with very grave penance.

Further, it is asked concerning those who give counsel and assistance for sterility, whether they are irregular?

It seems that they are: because they make homicide interpreted: but murderers are irregular: therefore, such are irregular.

On the contrary, it is held below that they are not murderers unless after the formed fetus: therefore, neither are they irregular.

Response. It must be said that great penance is to be enjoined, and that they cease, lest they do such things hereafter: and if they can be induced, because they sin against matrimony, they

are to be induced not to use matrimony hereafter: but if they cannot be induced, I do not believe that they can be constrained, lest worse things happen.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that it is not certain that a child will be born: because it is doubtful concerning conception: and even after it is conceived, it is doubtful concerning animation and birth: and therefore, he does not directly give occasion for such.

To the other, it must be said that in this respect it is graver, because it is probably more damaging: but it is not of greater deformity in the act of sin: and from the quantity of deformity sins are said to be graver simply, and from other circumstances they are said to be graver in a certain respect.

To the other, it must be said that those two were wicked: but it does not follow, if God punished that sin with death, that they also are to be punished with death: because the Lord did this for terror, and the Church does not punish except the contrite for satisfaction of the offense.

As to what is further asked, it must be said that they are not irregular, because they are not murderers: and therefore, what is supposed in the objection is false.

F. When are those who procure abortion murderers?

Here it is usually asked concerning those who procure abortion, when they are judged murderers, or not? Then the fetus pertains to homicide when it is formed and has a soul, as Augustine asserts on Exodus. But the unformed fetus, where there is not a living soul, the law did not wish to pertain to homicide. Augustine also says that the unformed fetus does not have a soul, and therefore it is punished with money, not life for life. But

Now to the formed body the soul is given, it is not born in the conception of the body derived with the seed. For if with the seed both the soul exists from the soul, then many souls perish daily, since the seed by flow does not advance to nativity. First, the house must be constructed, and thus the inhabitant introduced. Therefore, when the lineaments have not been compacted, where will the soul be? Likewise, Jerome to Algasius: Seeds are gradually formed in the womb: and it is not considered homicide until the elements completed receive their images and limbs. From this it appears that they are then murderers who procure abortion, when the offspring is formed and ensouled.

Exposition of the text. Then it is asked concerning what he says, there, E, in the middle: For if with the seed, etc.

Concerning this, however, because much has been disputed in the treatise on the Soul, it is to be inquired there: because it is not introduced here except incidentally, nor is it of the matter. However, verses useful for this can be noted here thus:

Conceived from seed in the first six days rightly It becomes as milk, and in the remaining nine it is blood: That which a twelve-day period consolidates, twice nine thereafter It shapes, the following time brings forth to birth.

Articulus 19 — Whether The Act Of Rendering The Debt Is Meritorious

Is the act of rendering the debt meritorious?

Then it is inquired concerning what is said, there, F, "When therefore these three goods concur together in some marriage," etc.

For it seems false to say: because

1. What is good does not need excuse, but such an act is a certain good: therefore it does not need excuse.

1. Likewise, it seems that it is meritorious: because according to the species of the mover, the motion and act are informed: but the species or form of the mover here is the piety of offspring and justice: therefore the act is meritorious, as it seems: and thus again it does not need excuse.
2. Likewise, the one rendering the debt renders to another what is theirs: but the one rendering to another what is theirs merits if they are in charity: therefore spouses rendering the debt to each other merit if they are in charity: therefore such an act needs no excuse.
3. Likewise, it is absurd to say that the act of the marriage of the Patriarchs needs excuse: therefore it seems that it is not necessary for many goods or one to be present, so that it may be excused.
4. Likewise, it seems that if it needed excuse, then the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 7:5, would speak badly by commanding: "Do not defraud one another, except perhaps by consent," etc.: and then return to the same, etc.

On the contrary of this is that

1. Every passion leading reason is base for a rational creature: because as the Philosopher says: From the leading away of reason follows a perverse custom: every coitus is such a passion: therefore every coitus is base: everything base, unless excused, is considered a crime: therefore every coitus is criminal if not excused.

1. Likewise, everything that excludes the act of virtue and the Holy Spirit needs excuse if it should not be a sin: but every concubitus does this, as is held below, and it is said in the Gloss on the epistle 1 Corinthians 6:17, on that: "He who fornicates sins against his own body." Therefore every conjugal concubitus needs excuse.

Response. It must be said that every concubitus needs excuse, that is, that something be added to it, by which, if removed, it becomes base. And yet I well concede that sometimes it is meritorious from that adjunct; and this is because the knowledge of woman is not evil in itself, but from the concupiscence added: and that is sometimes only a penalty, and is base not as a vile fault, but as a penalty, which is a mark from fault: and on account of that it needs excuse.

And through this the solution to all that is first objected is clear: because that act is good and meritorious in itself, but from the adjunct it has a base penalty annexed, which is protected by the good of marriage: because otherwise a man would sin, who would subject himself to it from will.

To that which is on the contrary, it must be said that reason has a twofold act towards the voluntary work of virtue or vice, namely the preambulatory by which it orders things to be done, and the concomitant by which it as if inspects the execution. In the coitus of marriage which is done by the species of the good moving, reason does not fall, nor is it led away as to the preambulatory act of the work, but as to the concomitant act of the work: but this does not make something to be a sin, but only subjects it to a penalty not lacking in shame, because reason, if it had not been sin, would always have remained in its power and dignity.

Through this also the solution to the following is clear.

Articulus 20 — Why A More Ardent Lover Of His Wife Is Compared Rather To An Adulterer Than To A Fornicator, And Who Is Called A More Ardent Lover

Why is a more ardent lover of his wife rather compared to an adulterer than to a fornicator? And, who is called a more ardent lover?

Then it is asked concerning what Sextus Pythagoricus says, there, F, after the middle: Every more ardent lover, etc.

For it seems to be false: because
1. He knows his own, which the adulterer does not do: but the fervor of intercourse is equal in both.

1. Likewise, "more ardent" indicates a comparison, and comparison denotes excess, it is asked with respect to what? If it is said with respect to the ardor which is in intercourse that occurs due to the goods of marriage moving, then the more ardent lover will be the one who, overcome by concupiscence, uses his spouse: but this is false, because Augustine says in the Letter, that this is venial. But if it is said that it denotes excess with respect to the one who, overcome by concupiscence, uses his spouse: then it seems that he should be called most ardent, because the first degree is in him who uses his spouse moved by the good of marriage: the second, however, in him who is overcome by concupiscence: and the third in the one exceeding those.
2. Likewise, it seems that no intercourse of marriage is venial, but all are mortal: because acts which are of the same and equal conversion to a changeable good, are also of the same aversion: but it is evident that he is mortally averted, who uses a prostitute: therefore also he who uses his spouse.
3. Likewise, in the eighth book of the Ethics, Aristotle suggests that pleasure corrupting the estimation of prudence is blameworthy in ethics: but what is blameworthy there, is mortal to theologians: therefore such pleasure is mortal, because it is corruptive of

virtue: but such pleasure is in every intercourse: therefore it seems that every intercourse is mortal sin.

Response. It must be said that "more ardent" here is called the ardor exceeding the concession and honesty of the whole marriage. Under the concession and honesty of marriage, fervor is in a positive degree with respect to which excess is noted.

And through this the solution to the first is clear.

If, however, it is asked why such a one is compared to an adulterer, and not to a fornicator? It must be said that this is because the fornicator does not sin against marriage, but such a one does sin: and therefore from the corruption of marriage he is called an adulterer, not from the transgression of the bed.

And through this the solution to what is objected concerning the adulterer is clear: because it does not make a comparison in this respect.

To what is further asked, it must be said that conversion is twofold: for there is one through reason preambulating the act, and another through the act itself. And concerning the conversion of reason preambulating the act, it is true what is objected, namely that those which are of the same and equal conversion, etc.: but this does not hold here: because he considers the concession and honesty of marriage, and therefore is converted under God: but the other considers only foul pleasure. And this solution is valid in many cases.

To the other it must be said that the pleasure of marriage does not corrupt the estimation of prudence: because preambulatory prudence orders it: but the act of prudence concomitant suspends it for a time.

Articulus 21 — When Intercourse Is Good

When is coitus good?

Then it is asked concerning what Jerome says there, F, before the end: "The impulse of the will does not reign in it," etc.

Since indeed there can be three simple movers in coitus, and two composite, because a third cannot be: let it be asked concerning coitus according to each of the movers, whether it is good or bad? and how much it is good, and how much it is bad?

For there is a natural mover which desires the health of the species, and again a mover for the good of marriage. Likewise, there is a mover of lust; these are simple. However, there is a mover of nature with grace, and nature with lust, which are two composite movers.

Let therefore the first mover be nature.

However, it seems that then it is good: 1. For natural being is good: therefore also this.

1. Likewise, the act of nature is more dignified, which operates towards the better: but the species is more dignified and better than the individual: therefore the act operating towards the species is more dignified than towards the health of the individual: but

coitus operates towards the health of the species, while eating operates towards the health of the individual: therefore it seems that it is better to copulate than to eat.

2. Likewise, the Philosophers say that coitus is a divine thing, in which nature has placed an abundance of delight, so that it may be more strongly desired for the permanence of the species: therefore it seems that it is the best and most dignified act.

3. Likewise, in higher natures than man, we do not doubt that the best and ultimate in them is to generate another like each of them, as it is written in the second book of the Soul: therefore it seems that it is similarly in man: therefore if nature moves to coitus to expand and sustain the species, it seems that it is not only not bad, but very good.

In contrast to this is that 1. Whenever that which is of a superior nature inclines to an inferior nature, it is worsened according to nature: and Aristotle hints at this proposition in the first part of the tenth Ethics: but man has a superior nature, intellectual, not organic: therefore if he operates according to an inferior nature, it will be an operation not according to his own nature: therefore man is defiled in it according to his own nature: but to copulate is according to an inferior nature, which is of the brute: therefore it naturally defiles man.

1. Likewise, we see Philosophers who do not consider this sin as a theologian does, nor even the goods of marriage, to blame coitus, and to praise those who insist on contemplative happiness: since therefore they consider only nature and natural good, it seems that coitus is among the disgraceful things of men.

Further, it is asked concerning the good of marriage as a mover.

For it seems that it cannot move: because 1. That which is mixed with evil is evil: but good never moves to evil: therefore neither does it move to good mixed with evil: but every coitus is mixed with the evil of concupiscence: therefore good never moves to coitus.

1. Likewise, virtue is more certain than art, as the Philosopher says: art never seeks the end by a more remote way, but by a nearer one: therefore neither does virtue: but every good more easily and quickly attains the good moving to the simply good, than to that mixed with disgrace: therefore it seems that none of the goods of marriage ever moves to coitus, because it is mixed with disgrace.

2. Likewise, nature never moves to something in which it is necessary for natural acts to fail: therefore since virtue moves in the manner of nature, it seems that virtue never moves to something in which it is necessary for the acts and operations of virtue to fail: but all acts and operations of virtue fail while coitus is: therefore no good ever moves to coitus, as it seems.

In contrast to this is, 1. What is said, Tobit III, 18: "But with your fear, not with lust," etc.: therefore the fear of God and the love of posterity move to coitus.

1. Likewise, that which God commands by the special appearance of an Angel to a priest attending to worship, is done by virtue and good moving to it: such is the knowledge of a wife sometimes: therefore, etc. The first is in Luke 1, 5 and following, in the conception of John the Baptist.

Further, it is asked concerning lust as a mover.

For it seems that this is always a mortal sin. 1. For Augustine says that lust is an improper will: but everything caused by an improper will is a vice: therefore every such coitus is a vice: but every vice is detestable: therefore such coitus is a mortal sin.

1. Likewise, that which neither has a preceding reason ordering, nor accompanying, entirely perverts reason: but such is coitus in which lust moves: therefore such coitus subverts reason: but everything that subverts reason is a mortal sin: therefore every such coitus is mortal.
2. Likewise, Tobit vi, 17: "For those who," etc., "receive marriage in such a way that they exclude God from themselves and their mind, and so devote themselves to their lust, like a horse and mule, therefore whoever thus receives, sins mortally: but everyone whom lust incites, thus receives: therefore everyone whom lust moves to act, sins mortally.

In contrast to this is that intercourse which is done for the sake of satisfying lust is placed among daily and light sins here in the Letter by Augustine: therefore it is not a mortal sin.

Further, it is asked concerning this act, when lust moves with nature.

For it seems that this is always: because 1. As Avicenna says: Unless lust is present in the soul, it does not command the virtues preparing the emission of semen, and extending the members: coitus cannot occur: therefore neither without lust.

1. Likewise, Augustine says that from concupiscence joined to coitus original sin is born in infants: but from every intercourse as to the act of copulating an infant can be born: therefore in every act of copulating there is concupiscence: therefore intercourse never occurs without it.
2. Likewise, the digestive act of lepers never occurs without the corruption of leprosy, because the vessels themselves and the humors in the vessels are corrupted: therefore similarly in the corrupted by concupiscence, the act of concupiscence will never occur without the corruption of lust: but the generative in all is thus infected and corrupted: therefore it can never be in act without the corruption of lust.

Further, it is asked concerning that intercourse, which is done by nature and the good of marriage as movers.

For that seems to be the best act: 1. Because it is perfected by a double perfection, namely of nature, and of custom; therefore the best: but the best acts are meritorious: therefore such an act is meritorious.

1. Likewise, whatever has the species of the good of virtue, is ordered to happiness: but every such act is meritorious: therefore also this one.

In contrast to this is that 4. The Apostle says that it is an impediment to observing the Lord: but none of such things is meritorious: therefore neither is marital coitus.

1. Likewise, in the Letter it is never said that it is meritorious, nor does the Apostle say this, but only says that the virgin does not sin if she marries: therefore it seems that it does not have merit.

Response. It must be said that as the objections proceed, all these can sometimes be movers by intention: because the one copulating can be moved by the intention of the good of nature, or of piety, and religion, or of justice, or by the delight of lust together with nature, or by the good of piety together with nature.

But when lust alone moves, it must be further distinguished: because either it moves fervently outside the honesty of marriage and concession, and then in a certain way it is adulterous, as was shown a little before. Or it fervently within the bounds of the honesty and concession of marriage: and then it must be said to be venial, as is clear from the words of Augustine placed in the Letter. Similarly, when lust precedes, and nature follows, and, as I think, then it is a more serious sin, but not mortal: or lust follows, and then it is less.

Having these, it must be responded to the objections. Therefore, to what is first asked, it must be said that there is no sin when nature thus moves: and this, as Tully says, orders coitus to honest marriages and certain children: because otherwise no one would recognize certain children: but nevertheless although it is not evil, because it is not necessary, it is not as evil to abstain from coitus, as from food. And this for two reasons: of which the first is, because the subsistence of the individual is more necessary to me, than the species in another. The second is: because it is not true generally, that the better simply is always more to be chosen, but the better for me is sometimes to be chosen and so it is with food, and coitus. However, all the reasons proceed as if the more dignified and better simply is always more to be done by me.

And through this the solution to the first part of the objections is clear.

But to what is objected in contrast, it must be said that from this it is not proven that it is evil, but rather it follows that it is not proper to man. And thus Aristotle solves the argument: because it is fitting to man according to the common, and not according to the proper, that is, intellect. Otherwise, it can be said and better, that descents and lower delights occur in two ways. The first is with reason ordering the delights themselves: and this mode does not contradict the good of reason. The other way is according to the corruption of reason perversely: and this contradicts. But in marital coitus there is a descent in the first way, not in the second way.

To what is later objected, it must be said that the intellectual nature, whose happiness the Philosophers praise, is considered in two ways, namely according to itself, and according to its being. If it is considered according to itself then it is separate, and also the act of its happiness is separate. But if it is not considered according to itself: then it must incline to lower things, ordered however by reason: because otherwise it does not have being except in the lower, and according to the multiplication of that the intellectual nature is multiplied, although it is not multiplied by the same: because the lower nature is multiplied by generation, but the higher by creation: and according to this the happinesses differ.

To what is further asked it must be said that the first two objections conclude only concerning the evil of fault, but not concerning the evil of penalty, and such an evil of penalty is mixed in marital coitus.

To the third it must be said that nature is not moved to that in which it fails essentially, but often moves to that in which due to the intensity of one act of a power, it is withdrawn from the act of another power: and thus it happens here: because the good of marriage moves to that in which it is abstracted from the act of another good and power due to the vehemence of delight.

To what is further asked, it must be said that if lust follows reason, it is not a mortal sin: but if lust precedes and dominates, then it is a mortal sin, as the objections prove.

To the first it must be said that lust is said in two ways, namely an improper will against God, resting in lustful coitus: and the objection proceeds concerning this. Again, there is lust not so much an improper will, but a penalty of improper concupiscence: and this is not entirely perverting, but rather following reason, and not corrupting the order of reason.

To the other it must be said that this does not hold concerning lust which precedes reason.

To the other it must be said that the Angel speaks to Tobit concerning him who is a more ardent lover of his wife: and concerning that one it is true, because he excludes God from his mind, because in him lust dominates.

To what is further asked, it must be said that lust does not always move with nature: because as Augustine says, lust is the pleasure of a changeable good: but this does not always move the one copulating, but rather the eternal or natural good sometimes.

To the objection it must be said that he calls lust the desire of the pleasurable in venereal matters; and this is not always called lust, except by an extended name: and concerning this Avicenna speaks truly, because unless it is desirable according to the body, the body is not disposed to attain it.

To the other it must be said that this happens from penal concupiscence, not vicious, as Augustine says in the book on Marriage and Concupiscence. And the reason for this is assigned in the second Sentences, in the treatise on original sin.

To the other it must be said that it is not similar concerning leprosy except to concupiscence of penalty, because this is necessary: but concupiscence of fault is not necessary: and therefore it is not similar to that which is introduced as similar.

To the last it seems to me to be conceded because of the first objections, that it is a meritorious act: although some think otherwise, about whom it is not now to be concerned.

To what is objected in contrast, it must be said that as was said above, this is said by reason of the adjunct, and not by reason of the act, that it is an impediment: because if it had been an impediment according to itself, it would always have been an impediment, which was shown above not to be true.

To the last it must be said that in the Letter it is not said because of the difficulty of that good which concupiscence strives to exclude, and there were many snares.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 22 — Whether The Debt Should Be Rendered To Pregnant Women

Whether the debt is to be rendered to pregnant women?

Then it is inquired concerning that word of Jerome, there, D, before the end: "neither at least the cattle, etc."

For it seems this is unreasonable: because
1. Marriage is for a remedy, as has already been held: but a remedy is most necessary in a time of greatest infirmity: therefore marriage is most necessary in a time of greatest concupiscence: but this is in the time of impregnation, as the Philosophers say.

Therefore then the debt ought most to be rendered to her. For the Philosophers say that then embryos begin to touch the nerves, and by tickling they excite concupiscence: and therefore a woman never so much desires intercourse as when she is impregnated: it seems therefore that it is badly said in the Text.

1. Likewise, now infants are not lost because of this: because once conception has occurred, the Philosophers say that the inner orifice of the womb is closed, which even a needle could not enter: therefore then there is no danger of effusion: therefore it seems that infants are not lost from intercourse.
2. Likewise, it does not seem similar: because man, on account of the delight and abundance of food, desires intercourse more than other animals: since therefore marriage is its remedy, it seems that at all times he can and ought to have intercourse: therefore it is not similar to what is induced.
3. Likewise, other animals have conjunction with other females of their species: but man does not: therefore it seems that nothing is similar.

To this, however, it seems it must be said, as Avicenna says in his book on Naturals, that the movement of the womb is caused by delight in intercourse, because of which also Pythagoras thought the womb to be an animal: but movement and delight together cause the dilation and opening of the womb: and then frequently the seeds and conceived embryos are expelled. And in this way Jerome speaks.

To the first, it must be said that therefore then, on account of the fear of great danger, one ought to restrain oneself: yet if one uses intercourse, one does not sin mortally.

To the second, it must be said that in truth it is closed: but yet on account of the movement arising from delight it is opened again, and especially before the first four months, before the embryos are rooted.

To the other, it must be said that this is true: but yet it is reasonable that one should temper oneself then from food and intercourse: for the kingdom of heaven suffers violence, and the violent take it by force.

To the fourth, it must be said that therefore man has reason, which makes him do what other animals do not do: and to this blessed Jerome exhorts, he does not command.

Articulus 23 — Whether It Is A Mortal Sin To Ask For The Debt At The Appointed Time Of Prayers

Whether it is a mortal sin to request the debt during the appointed times of prayer?

Then it is inquired concerning what is said there, G, around the middle: If, however, he is not so excessive as to impede, etc.

1. For from this it seems that it is a mortal sin if during the appointed times of prayer one demands the debt.
2. And this also seems to be the case from that of the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 7:5: Do not defraud, etc.: and it is the end of prayer. Give to each other.

Likewise, Exodus 19:15: Be ready. Thus Moses said when the law was to be given on the third day, and do not approach your wives: therefore, much more should this be observed in the New Testament.

Likewise, Genesis 6:18 and 7:7, Noah and his sons are commanded separately from their wives to enter the ark. Therefore, since God commands only what is right and just, it seems that one who does the contrary sins mortally: therefore, during times of mourning and sacred times, the debt should not be rendered.

Likewise, Joel 2:16: Let the bridegroom go forth from his chamber, and the bride from her bridal chamber.

Likewise, 2 Samuel 11:11: My lord, thus said Uriah to David, and the servants of my lord remain upon the face of the earth, and I... shall I sleep with my wife? Therefore, it seems that during times of mourning and sacred times, one should abstain.

1. Likewise, the same is proven by reason: for spirit and flesh cannot be in act simultaneously: but during the time of prayer, the spirit ought to be in the highest act: therefore, at that time, one should abstain from carnal work. That the spirit ought to be in act at that time is proven, John 4:23, where it is said: True worshippers shall worship the Father in spirit and truth.

Likewise, Jerome says that during the time of prayer, one should abstain even from lawful things, so that grace may be more easily obtained. Therefore, it seems that at those times it is a mortal sin to act contrary.

On the contrary of this is that

1. No circumstance makes a venial sin mortal: but to know one's wife due to weakness is venial: therefore, it seems that from the circumstance it does not become mortal: but time is a circumstance: therefore, from that it does not become a mortal sin, which otherwise is venial.
2. Likewise, one who is bound without a term must immediately fulfill: but the married are bound to each other without a term: therefore, they must immediately fulfill: therefore, if one requests during sacred time, one is bound to fulfill.
3. Likewise, marriage is for medicine: but we ought to use medicine at all times of illness: therefore, also in marriage: if therefore the present illness of concupiscence occurs during the appointed time of prayer: therefore, then I ought to use the medicine.

Response. It seems to be said that

it is incongruous to use carnal commixture during the appointed times of prayer: but it is not a mortal sin to demand the debt. However, if a worse case is probably feared if it is not rendered, I say that one of the spouses is then bound to render, and does this without sin, but the one demanding sins venially.

To the other that is said in the Text, it must be said that it does not intend to exempt from venial sin, but rather from the indulgence of concession. Or it can be better said that it notes excess when it burns beyond the concession and honesty of marriage, which neither cares for it nor the honesty of marriage, concerning which it was said above, that the more ardent lover of his wife is an adulterer.

To the other it must be said that force must be applied to the words of the Apostle: because they are said with weight: whence he by what he says, perhaps and by consent, implies that there can be such an instance of demanding the debt in one of the spouses, that even then it must be rendered. That it is perhaps said to be done, it is implied that there can be something why it is not done. Similarly, that it is done by consent, if the other does not consent, it should not be done.

To all other things that are brought forward by authorities, it must be said that they prove nothing more than that to render in marriage at that time is a venial sin and to demand, and neither is mortal. Nor did God command Noah to enter separately, but rather showed what would be fitting.

To what is objected by reason, it must be said that the married cannot pray and copulate simultaneously, nor are they bound to this: but after copulation and before they can pray, because they cannot always copulate. However, it will be had in the Text below which times are appointed for prayer.

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Articulus 24 — Whether There Can Be Use Against Nature With One's Own Spouse, And Whether One Having Intercourse Against The Due Use Sins Mortally

Whether in one's own wife there can be use against nature? And, Whether one engaging against due use happens to sin mortally?

ARTICULUS XNIY.

Whether in one's own wife there can be use against nature? And, whether one engaging in intercourse against the due use happens to sin mortally?

Then it is asked concerning what is said there, G, around the middle: Nor is it matured in any use which is against nature, etc.

For it seems that no use against nature is in one's own wife.

1. For to use that which is made for use is not against nature: but the woman is made for the use and help of the man: therefore, that use is not against nature.

If you perhaps say that the perversion of the mode of intercourse is against nature. On the contrary: As long as he engages in intercourse in the due vessel, no use or mode of intercourse seems to be determined: therefore, no mode of intercourse will be more against nature than another.

1. Again, the members pertaining to intercourse are proportionate to each other: therefore, as long as that proportion is maintained, there will not be force in another disposition of the body: if therefore the man is below, or above, whether standing, or lying, or sitting, whether from behind, or from the front joined, it does not matter, as it seems.
2. Likewise, in some cases the common mode is impeded by accident: because due to the thickness of the belly they cannot be joined belly to belly, and they would be well joined if the woman were disposed bent backward against the man; since therefore they have not lost the due in the body of the other because of fatness, it seems that they can be joined in this way without sin.
3. Similarly, it sometimes happens that the belly of the woman is swollen or is pregnant, so that it is not applicable to the man from the front: and then the same objection as before: it seems therefore, that none of those uses is against nature.

Further, it is asked, whether one engaging in intercourse beyond the common mode always happens to sin mortally?

However, it seems that yes: because

1. It changes the natural use: but this the Apostle, in Romans 1:26, calls passions of ignominy.

And by such a name are not considered except those sinning mortally: therefore, it seems that it is a mortal sin.

1. Likewise, in the Letter it seems to except this from venial sin: therefore, it is left from the Letter, that it is mortal. For it says that marriages are deprecators of intercourse, which is not done for the sake of generating, unless it is changed into use against nature: therefore, from the destruction of the consequent, if it is changed into that use which is against nature, marriages will not be deprecators: therefore, such intercourse is not venial: therefore, it is left that it is mortal.
2. Likewise, Aristotle says that the body of every animal is formed for intercourse: just as in the camel the rod is disposed backward, and therefore it mates from behind: and in some it is disposed in front, and in females behind, and they mate by leaping through ascensions. But the same Aristotle says that the vulva of the female is disposed in front: for he says that all female animals urinate backward except the female of man: and it is evident that this is because of the disposition of the vulva. He also says that the rod of the man is rooted above the nerve of the leg: therefore, both the vulva of the female is disposed from the front, and the rod of the man: therefore, according to this they are applicable from the front: therefore, if they are applied otherwise, the mode of nature is changed: but to change the natural mode into unnatural is a mortal sin: therefore, every mode of intercourse other than that in which the woman lies on her back, and the man lying on her belly, is a mortal sin.

Response. It must be said that such shameful questions should never be treated unless those monsters compel, which are heard in confession in these times.

However, it seems that it must be said that nothing of those things which a husband does with his wife, preserving the due body or vessel, is in itself a mortal sin: but it can be a sign of mortal concupiscence, when namely the mode which nature determines by the disposition of the members does not suffice for them, and they enter into the modes of brute animals. Therefore, in order that the natural mode and the corruption from it may be better understood, it must be noted that because according to Aristotle, only man is of a long and broad body, and because the virile member is founded upon the nerve of the leg, and the member of the woman at the end of the belly, nature teaches that the due mode is that the woman lies on her back, and the man on her belly lies upon her, as was proved by the natural reason lastly induced: and in this mode women conceive more easily than in another, unless it is impeded by accident. However, deviation from that is less in lateral intercourse, and greater in sitting, and greater than that in standing, and greatest in that which is backward in the manner of beasts. And therefore some have said that this last is a mortal sin, which nevertheless did not please me, as was evident elsewhere.

Having these things, it must be said to the first, that a natural sin is said in two ways, namely greater and lesser. It is more unnatural when the act is not fulfilled by the instruments

formed for this by nature. It is less unnatural when the act is fulfilled which does not preserve the mode of nature which is taken from the natural disposition of the members.

To what is objected concerning proportion, it must be said that although the proportion of the instruments is preserved, nevertheless the proportion of the mode of disposition is not preserved.

To the other, two things must be said, that in such a case it is well permitted: because otherwise they cannot agree.

To what is further asked, I say that it is not in itself a mortal sin.

From the objection to the contrary, it must be said that the Apostle speaks of the unnatural which is not preserving the due vessels.

Similarly, it must be said that the Letter here speaks of such a mode.

Finally, it must be said that from this the unnatural mode is not proved except in a lesser way: and thus it is not a mortal sin in a spouse, as it seems to me.

Articulus 25 — Whether Intercourse Proceeding Beyond Necessity Is A Mortal Sin

Whether intercourse proceeding beyond necessity
is a mortal sin?

ARTICULUS XNXY.
Whether intercourse proceeding beyond necessity
is a mortal sin?

Then it is inquired concerning what is said,
there, G, around the middle: He who
proceeds beyond necessity, etc.

For it seems false: for that which
serves lust is immediately named
conjoined with evil: and such is mortal sin:
therefore also such an act is
a mortal sin.

But if it is said, the Letter is in
contrary, which says that the honesty
of marriage is the intercessor of this act: which
would not be, if it were a mortal sin.

Response. It must be said that it is not
a mortal sin.

From the aspect it must be said that it does not
serve lust as an end, but as
an infirmity. And the objection proceeds as if
it served it as an end. But in order that this

may be understood, it must be known that he serves infirmity,
who is compelled by temptation
rather than wills this: but he serves lust,
who seeks and procures such things in the manner of a sinner:
on account of which it is said in VIII
of the Ethics that the fornicator
is more blameworthy than the incontinent: and he calls
the fornicator who seeks venereal things in the manner of fornicators,

and the incontinent who is drawn by the temptation
of infirmity.

Articulus 26 — What Are Those Things That The Apostle Granted By Way Of Concession

What are those things which the Apostle granted according to indulgence?

Then it is asked, concerning what is said there, G, after the middle: What is it that the Apostle grants according to indulgence, etc.

For it seems that such a concession is a permission of evil:
1. However, permissions are corrected so that they do not occur in the New Testament, as is evident in Matthew 5:31 and 19:7. Therefore, it seems that here the Apostle ought not to have granted indulgence.

1. Likewise, permission does not befit supreme perfection: but the New Testament is of supreme perfection: therefore, no permission occurs in it.
2. Likewise, according to the doctrine of the New Testament, there is judgment: therefore, what is granted in the New Testament will not be judged: but marriage is granted, as is said in the Letter: therefore, it will not be judged, which is false.

Response. Some have said that mortal permission was in the Old Testament in the bill of divorce, and venial permission in the New in intercourse which occurs for the sake of satisfying lust. But this does not seem to be fitting.

Indeed, concerning the bill of divorce, there will be a question below.

But with these things not distinguished above between concession and permission being supposed, it must be said here that there is no permission of evil per se in the New Testament, but per accidens, that is to say, something is granted in the New Testament, to which many goods are attached: and evil can occur to it, and on account of the evil which can mix with it, it is not revoked: and indeed such is intercourse, to which the goods of marriage are attached and lust can mix with it, and on account of that it is not revoked. And therefore it is clear that the objections conclude well concerning per se evil, but concerning evil attached to that which is good, and the cause of many goods, they do not conclude: because those goods are greater than that evil.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 27 — Whether Every Intercourse Is A Vice Or A Sin, And Whence That Sin Or Vice Has Its Origin

Whether every coitus is a vice or sin? And, whence does that sin or vice have it?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, ii, H, But perhaps someone will say, every concupiscence of the flesh, etc.

For it seems that this is true:
1. For everything that is most excellent in passions is always a vice and sin: but every coitus is of this kind: therefore every coitus is a vice and sin. The first is proved from the reason of ethical virtue, which is in passions concerning the mean relative to us. The second is evident by itself.

1. Likewise, everything that in act turns away from conversion to the immutable good is at least a venial sin: but such is every coitus: therefore it is at least a venial sin.
2. Likewise, every act frustrated in its essential and natural end is vain and evil: but every intercourse that is done for the sake of pleasure is of this kind: therefore every such is vain and evil: therefore it is a sin. The second is proved by this, that the natural end of intercourse is the procreation of offspring: because nature found it for this, and for this it thus formed the organs. The first is evident by itself: because evil is nothing but the privation of a perfecting end.
3. Likewise, we see brute animals not moved to coitus except for the sake of procuring offspring: since therefore reason is in man which ought to govern the lower powers in man more than they are governed in the brute, it seems that man is bound to the same or to more: therefore he sins whenever he cohabits unless with the intention of generating.

Response. It must be said to this, that not every carnal intercourse is a sin.

To the first, it must be said that an act is not said to be in the mean by reason of pleasure, but by reason of circumstances, namely when he ought to cohabit, and where, and with whom, and how, and the like: and therefore the objection and the first proof of the proposition is founded upon a perverse exposition of the words of Aristotle.

To the other, it must be said that it does not turn away the reason preambulatory to the act, but only concomitant, as has been often said above.

To the other, it must be said that this act is not always frustrated in its end: because it has the end of medicine, and of the honor of faith, and of the sacrament, because it shuns separation.

To the proof, it must be said that this act is of nature and of man, and insofar as it is an act of marriage, it is more accepted as an act of man than as of nature: and therefore the end of man suffices for it. The objection, however, proceeds as if it were of nature only.

To the other, it must be said that this happens in certain brutes (as Aristotle says) because of the smallness of food: whence also when they take more of food, unless they are weakened, then they begin to leap often: and therefore also man because of the abundance of food desires more than others. Or it must be said that man is of a softer complexion than others, and therefore is more quickly changed by desires: because of which he also speaks, as Avicenna says: and therefore a remedy is constituted for him for those desires in the sacrament of marriage.

Articulus 28 — Whether One Having Intercourse With His Wife In Some Case Should Be Repelled From The Church

In cognoscens uxorem suam aliquo casu sit repellendus ab Ecclesia?

In cognoscens uxorem suam aliquo casu sit repellendus ab Ecclesia?

Then it is questioned concerning this which is said, there, 1, after the beginning: "Loc autem quoties fil, ab ingressu Ecclesiae est abstinendum," etc.

For this seems to be false: because 1. The Church does not eject except the excommunicated: however, such are not excommunicated: therefore it seems that it is not necessary to abstain from the entrance of the Church.

1. Likewise, besides excommunication, we do not see anyone ejected from the Church except solemn penitents: however, solemn penance is not done except for a crime by which someone has disturbed the whole city, as was held above in the treatise on penance: since therefore that is not except a venial sin, it does not seem that it is necessary to abstain from the entrance of the Church in this case.
2. Likewise, as Dionysius says in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, in the theory of holy synaxis, that is, communion, five kinds of men were ejected from the Church at the time of communion by the deacon in the primitive Church, namely infidels, catechumens, energumens, newly converted, and solemn penitents: but these are in none of those orders: therefore it is not necessary to abstain from the entrance of the Church because of the act of matrimony and its use.
3. Likewise, we have above in the Letter from the words of Augustine, that this which spouses use each other beyond the intention of procreating children, is to be placed among those for which we daily say: "Forgive us our debts" therefore it is reckoned among daily and very light sins: but for those it is never necessary to abstain from the entrance of the Church: therefore it seems false to say in the Letter.
4. Likewise, Gregory says that spiritual sins are of greater weight than carnal ones: therefore also venial ones in those are of greater weight than venial ones in these: therefore for a movement of anger or pride it is more necessary to abstain from the entrance of the Church than for such an act of the use of matrimony.

Response. It must be said that this is said not to show the magnitude of guilt, but to demonstrate the incongruity of the act of coupling to understanding and seeing spiritual things which are treated in sacred places in divine services and sacraments: because contemplation of divine things cannot be, unless the spirit ascends above the body: and in intercourse the spirit lies as if suffocated under the flesh. Nor is it said that it should be so observed, but rather that those serving the flesh may be moved, that they then humbly withdraw themselves from sacred places, but they are not to be reproved if they have not done so.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that excommunication ejects from a sacred place even unwillingly: but here only the incongruity of the delight of the flesh to the contemplation of sacred things is shown, so that a man then humbly withdraws himself.

By the same it is clear the solution to the three following.

To the last it must be said that although spiritual guilt is greater than bodily, nevertheless they do not suffocate the spirit by the impetus of delight, but remain in their vigor, and do not have shame attached: but intercourse entirely enervates the spirit, as has been said: and therefore then a man ought to withdraw himself from the contemplation of divine things.

However, how he ought to conduct himself in communicating, in the following distinction will have its own disputation, although here certain things of value to this are said in the Letter.

DISTINCTIO XXXII

Divisio Textus

That indeed without the consent of the wife, etc. Here it is treated concerning the payment of the debt in which spouses are equal.

However, it is divided into two parts: and in the first, he does what has been said. In the second, he determines the times of the payment of marriage, namely, C, And although the debt, etc.

And let these suffice concerning the division.

Articulus 1 — Whether Spouses Joined In Matrimony Are Equal To One Another

Whether spouses joined matrimonially are equal to each other?

Then it is inquired concerning what is said there, A, "It must also be known that since in all other things the man is superior to the woman," etc.

For it seems false what is said in the Text:

1. In any act of two, one is principal and acting, the other secondary and suffering; in that, those two cannot be equal: but thus the man is principal and acting in the act of

matrimony, the woman, however, secondary and suffering: therefore it seems that they are not equal.

2. Likewise, this is taken from the text of Genesis 2:18, where the Lord says: "Let us make him a helper," therefore he is principal, and is helped by Eve: therefore they are not equal.
3. Likewise, the Philosopher says that the female desires the male as the imperfect desires the perfect, and as the base desires the good: however, it is evident that the imperfect and perfect, base and good, cannot be equal: therefore neither can man and woman be equal in the act of matrimony.
4. Likewise, it is impossible that the same according to the same be head to another and equal: but in matrimony the man is the head, as the Apostle says; therefore in the same he cannot be equal.
5. Likewise, the distinction of sex is like that of generating in another, and generating from another: because the male generates in another from his own seed, the female however from another's seed: but these are unequal as to the mode of nature: therefore it would be against nature that they be reduced to equality in matrimony.
6. Likewise, sealing is not equally of the wax and the ring, because the ring makes the whole sealing, and the wax only receives: but thus are the masculine and feminine, as the Philosophers say: therefore it is impossible that they be equal.
7. Likewise, this is intimated from the very words of the Lord, where it is said: "You shall be under the power of the man, and he shall rule over you."

On the contrary of this is,

1. What is said, 1 Corinthians 7:4, as it is held in the Text: "The woman does not have power over her own body, but the man," etc.
2. Likewise, matrimony does not make the consent of one, but of two, as was held above: but what two make equally, is equally effected by both: therefore matrimony is equally effected by the man and the woman: therefore also the rights which follow from matrimony are equally of the woman and the man.

Response. It must be said that in the right of matrimony, in rendering the debt and demanding, the spouses are equal, as was lastly proven: but in the dispensation of the house and acts of governance they are unequal: because the man in such things is principal, and also in the act of generation: and this the objections previously introduced prove.

Therefore to the first it must be said that this is true in the act of generation, but as to demanding and rendering they are equal.

To the other it must be said that that help pertains to the act of generation, and not to the governance and management of the house.

Through this also the solution to the following is clear.

To the other it must be said that the same which has in itself many things, some can be equal and unequal: and this is to say the same, but not according to the same: and so it is here.

To the other it must be said that it would be against the mode of nature if they were equated in the power of generating: because two equal in the power of generating never generate: because those would either both be active, or both passive: but two unequal in generating, in the right of matrimony can be equal, as has already been evident from the things said before.

And through this the solution to all the following arguments is clear.

Articulus 2 — Whether It Always And Equally Falls To Render The Debt

Whether it always and equally happens to render the debt?

However, here first arises a threefold question.
The first is: How does it happen to pay the debt?
The second is: Whether this is counted for the perfection of sanctity to the one paying, as it is said in the Letter?
The third is: Whether the debt ought to be paid to one not demanding or asking.

To the first, it is objected thus:

1. To whom the debt is paid, it is necessary that it be paid at the time of need, because since it is an affirmative precept, it obliges for the time of necessity to pay: but in the spouse, this is the time of present concupiscence: therefore, then it is to be paid. But let us suppose that then the husband is impotent due to some cause which he made for himself: therefore, it seems that he sins mortally by not paying then.
2. Likewise, the payment of this debt is valid in the manner of medicine: therefore, it is to be applied at the time of illness: but perhaps then he cannot as before: therefore, if he knows afterwards, it seems that he does not pay the debt.
3. Likewise, let us suppose that the husband pays many times, until with the heat evaporating and the moisture flowing, he can no longer pay, and the woman still insists from the incitement of concupiscence: it is clear that he cannot pay: therefore, he is not bound, because the action is vain which the debtor's lack excludes: therefore, it seems that it does not always happen to pay the debt.
4. Likewise, it is objected concerning those who, by exercises, dry and cool themselves, that they cannot frequently copulate, or even by excessive drinking suffocate the natural heat, and their wives demand intercourse: what is to be done? It is clear that they are bound by law to pay: therefore, they sin by omitting, as it seems.

Response to this, that it happens to render the debt.

To the first objection, it must be said that at the time of need, it is to be paid according to the ability of the one paying. Concerning the cause, it must be said that it is either caused by

marriage, or by other causes. If in the first way: then this is because either he has copulated, and then he has sufficiently paid, because he is not bound to immoderate copulation: because if the woman complains after a decent payment, she shows herself more a harlot than a wife. But if it is from another cause: it is either lawful or unlawful. If lawful: then he is not bound to pay, because God made him impotent. But if it is unlawful: then I think well that the following sin of the wife is in some way imputed to him, unless he repents and does as much as he can, that the wife may contain herself from good will: for the fragility supervening upon marriage does not dissolve the marriage.

And by this, the solution to all the questions is clear.

Articulus 3 — Whether Rendering The Debt Is For The Perfection Of The Sanctity Of Marriage

Whether to render the debt is for the perfection of the sanctity of marriage?

Second, it is asked, Whether this is accounted for the perfection of the sanctity of marriage?

It seems that it is: because
1. Augustine expressly says this in the Letter.

1. Likewise, justice, which is a good virtue, or better than chastity: therefore its act is worth the act of chastity: but the one rendering exhibits an act of justice: therefore it seems that it is accounted also for the perfection of sanctity.
2. Likewise, Cicero proves in the first book of "On Duties" that the duty of justice is better than all the duties of other virtues: therefore its act is worth more than the acts of others: but the one rendering exhibits justice: therefore it seems that he does more than if he held perfect chastity.
3. Likewise, Aristotle in the fifth book of "Ethics" says that justice makes the ultimate good, and it is like the evening star shining in the sky: but this chastity does not do: therefore it seems that the act of justice recompenses more even than chastity: and from there as before it is inferred.

On the contrary of this is,
1. What is said, Ecclesiasticus 26:20: "All weight is not worthy of a continent soul." Therefore justice cannot recompense the worth of a continent soul.

1. Likewise, it has been held above, that marriages are holier with the equal vow of the continent: therefore the use of intercourse diminishes sanctity: therefore it is impossible that intercourse is imputed to anyone for the perfection of sanctity.

To this it must be said that Augustine here speaks of the one rendering unwillingly, whose whole devotion is to continence, and only by the debt of marriage, and by the faith of the bed is compelled to the solution, rather than incited by carnal desire.

To the first reasons, it must be said that if justice and chastity are compared according to what they are worth in politics and to others, justice surpasses chastity: but if they are compared according to the decorum and honesty which they have, chastity surpasses justice.

And according to the first mode proceed the reasons first introduced: according to the other, however, proceed the reasons secondly introduced.

And through this the solution to each part of the objections is clear.

Articulus 4 — Whether The Debt Ought To Be Rendered To One Not Demanding It

Whether a debt ought to be paid to one not demanding it?

Thirdly, it is asked, Whether it ought to be paid to one not demanding it?

It seems that it should not: because 1. He who is silent, consents: therefore a woman or man not requiring the debt seems to consent in this, that it is not paid: since therefore it is better to abstain than to engage in intercourse, it seems that such a one ought not to pay.

1. Likewise, Even one demanding can be turned away by prayers so that he does not demand: therefore much more can one not demanding be not paid.

On the contrary of this is, that the payment of the debt is ordered against damnable corruptions of softness, and sodomy, and adultery: but some spouses are out of modesty not revealing themselves to their spouses, and yet burn in their desires: therefore it seems that it ought to be paid to them, even not demanding.

Response. It seems to me to be said, that it is discreet to pay even to one not demanding, who sometimes has signs of wantonness, and also to the spouse who does not contradict, but silently endures the payment.

To what was first objected, it must be said that although it is not required out of modesty, yet the right of previous petition, namely when one contracts marriage, still stands, and then in the first contract it is always understood to ask unless one protests at some time for some reason.

But what is objected, that he who is silent, praises: it must be said that this is true, when he has said nothing to the contrary: but this is not in spouses who contract so that the debt may be paid to them.

To the other it must be said, that it is not safe unless it is done for a legitimate cause of time or infirmity: and then also I think, that it ought not to be turned away with insistence and pertinacity.

Articulus 5 — Whether A Husband Can Vow Not To Render The Debt Without The Consent Of His Wife

Whether a husband can vow not to render the debt without the consent of the wife?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said, there, B, before the middle: For such things are not to be vowed by the married, except by consent, etc.

Let us suppose, indeed, that one of the spouses vows without the consent of the other, that he will never demand.

For it seems that this is a lawful vow: because
1. To demand itself is not in the power of the spouse, but only to render: therefore he can vow that.

1. Likewise, To demand is of infirmity, but to render is of justice and necessity: but those things which are of infirmity are to be rejected by man as much as he can: therefore it seems that it is also good for a man, that he vows, that he does not demand the debt from the spouse.

On the contrary of this is that
1. It is forbidden for spouses not to depart from each other except by mutual consent, unless both go to religion: therefore much more should it be forbidden for this one not to vow what he can scarcely or never observe while remaining with the wife.

1. Likewise, Proverbs 6:27: Can a man hide fire in his bosom, so that his garments do not burn? As if he would say, no. Therefore, being in marriage, he cannot preserve himself from burning with fire: therefore he ought not to vow.
2. Likewise, Bede says, that in a fool it is established to rescind the promise: therefore, what is a foolish vow is to be rescinded: therefore he ought not to vow.

Response. It must be said that no one ought to vow this: and if he has vowed, I believe that he can even be dispensed by the Bishop: and then he is to be reproved for foolishness, and penance is to be enjoined upon him: and thus he ought to be absolved from the obligation of the vow: because if before marriage it is better to marry than to burn, much more in marriage this is better.

To the first, however, it must be said that it is indeed in his power: but it matters how each one uses his own thing: and this pertains to the judge to know, and it is not without some prejudice to the other spouse: because it induces shame in her for so often asking, and it seems as if he cohabits with her unwillingly: and therefore that vow is foolish and irrational.

To the other it must be said that not all things which are of infirmity in any state are to be vowed and rejected, namely when the destruction of such things is not without prejudice to others, as previously became clear in this case.

Articulus 6 — Whether One Of The Spouses Can Abstain From Rendering The Debt In Order To Be Free For Prayer

Whether one of the spouses can abstain from rendering the debt so as to be free for prayer?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said, there, B, around the middle: "Nor for a time so that they may be free for prayer," etc.

For it seems that this is false: because
1. An interdiction of the Church imposes necessity: therefore, whether he consents or not, then it is necessary to cease from rendering the debt.

1. Likewise, this is written in the canon, Joel 2:16: "Let the bridegroom go forth from his chamber, and the bride out of her bridal chamber." Therefore, even if one of the spouses commands to remain in the chamber, it is not necessary to remain on account of him.

According to this, it is further asked concerning those vowing pilgrimages without the consent of the wife.

For it seems that they cannot do this: because
1. It is said in the Text, that it is not permitted to abstain even for a time except by consent: but in pilgrimages, it is necessary to be absent for a long time: therefore, it is not permitted to vow pilgrimages except by consent.

1. Likewise, he who owes without a term, owes immediately: but such is the debt of matrimony.

It follows: therefore it is immediately owed: therefore a man cannot withdraw by pilgrimage without rendering.

1. Likewise, let us suppose that a woman wishes to vow a pilgrimage, and the husband objects: it is evident that she cannot vow, and her vow will be considered as nothing: since in those things which pertain to matrimony they are equal, even with the woman objecting, the man cannot vow such a pilgrimage.

Response. It must be said to the first, that the prohibition of the Church regards suitability, and not necessity.

To the other concerning Joel, it must be said that he speaks of a time of great mourning: and yet even in that it does not bind, as is clear from what was said previously.

To what is further asked, it must be said that if the wife objects due to the inability to contain, and the husband knows this, I believe that he sins by vowing the pilgrimage, and by dispensation he ought to change the vow. However, if she objects due to affection for companionship, then I believe that for the necessity of the Holy Land and the visitation of the thresholds of the Apostles he can pilgrimage: because then she does not object stubbornly.

And through this the solution to all is clear except to the last: to which it must be said, that this is because men have a greater incitement to lust than women: and also because men go on pilgrimages cautiously, and with the utility of the Church and edification: none of which is in women.

Articulus 7 — Whether If A Woman Vows Something With Her Husband Consenting, She Is Bound To Its Observance If The Husband Later Opposes

Whether if a woman has vowed something with the husband's consent, she is bound to the observance when the husband later opposes?

Then it is asked concerning what is said there, B, shortly after the middle: For since it pertains to the sin of the same husband, etc.

For it seems that something false is imposed here by Augustine:
1. For this is drawn from Numbers 30:11 and 12, where it is said that if the husband did not immediately contradict when he heard, the woman herself will be held guilty of the vow. Therefore, it is false what is said in the Letter.

1. Likewise, Augustine says that if she vowed with the husband first consenting, it is truly of the will, and to render is of necessity: if the husband, not contradicting, vowed, it will be necessary that she renders.
2. Likewise, if something is vowed by common consent, it is clear that she is bound: but being silent when he hears, and can contradict, and does not contradict, he consents as it is said in the Digest. Therefore, it seems that this is understood to be the vow of both: therefore, the woman is bound to observe this, even if the husband later contradicts.

Response. It must be said that Augustine draws this from a certain word which is said at the end of chapter 30 of Numbers, verse 16, where it is said: But if he contradicts. Perhaps according to another translation it is more expressly: after he knew, he himself will bear her iniquity.

To the other, it must be said that to render is always of necessity: but it is not understood to be a vow, which is usurped with the husband contradicting. But to what is said, that the husband first consents, it must be said that it is understood that the husband did not consent, but rather before deliberation he dissimulated: and after he deliberated, he contradicted: and in such a case I understand Augustine to speak, because if he had expressly consented, the woman ought not afterwards to incline to the breaking of the vow.

And through this the solution to the last is clear: for he speaks in such a case, when the husband is silent only as deliberating, and not as expressly consenting.

Articulus 8 — Whether A Woman Who Has Vowed Continence With Her Husband Permitting, When The Husband Later Forbids, Is Bound To Render The Debt

Whether a woman who, with her husband's permission, has vowed continence, is bound to render the debt if the husband later forbids it?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said, there, B, shortly before the end: To some it seems that the woman not departing, etc.

For it seems that this opinion is not true, because
1. Although a vow preceding marriage impedes contracting, it does not dissolve a contracted

marriage unless it is solemn: therefore much less does a subsequent vow dissolve a marriage: because there are many impediments which, preceding marriage, dissolve a contract, which, however, do not dissolve the marriage when they occur subsequently: but this vow occurs subsequently, and is not yet solemnized: therefore it does not dissolve a marriage already contracted: therefore he cannot compel his wife to the payment of the debt, as before.

1. Likewise, that vow is only private: therefore it does not dissolve a contracted marriage: but this is contracted and consummated: therefore it does not dissolve it; therefore this opinion speaks the truth.

Response. It must be said that that opinion is false: but the one which he subsequently posits as his own is true.

To the first objection, it must be said that this is understood of a marriage which the vow precedes: because then a greater bond always supervenes and breaks the marriage: but now the vow of continence follows by common consent, therefore it does not dissolve the marriage, but suspends the debt of demanding and rendering: because this is in the power of the spouses, and by their will, to vow or not to vow.

By the same it is clear the solution to the following.

And therefore it is clear that they sin mortally by breaking the vow.

Whether, however, that vow receives dispensation or not, must be determined below in the question concerning the vow.

Articulus 9 — Whether In Marriage The Debt Should Always Be Rendered, But Not Demanded

Whether in marriage the debt must always be rendered, but not demanded?

Then it is inquired concerning what is said there, C, "And although the debt must always be paid to the one demanding it," etc.

Three things are inquired here.

First, concerning the Letter, why it is more fitting to always render rather than demand the debt of marriage?

Second, why those times enumerated in the Letter are more fitting for demanding than other times?

Third, whether one is obligated equally at any hour of that time, or in some is obligated, and in some not, and in some more, and in some less?

To the first, it is objected:

1. To Romans 1:32, on that: "Not only those who do them, but also those who consent to those doing them," the Gloss says, "he consents who, when he can, does not contradict: and those consenting and doing are worthy of equal punishment." Therefore, since the

one rendering the debt consents to the one demanding in sacred time, the one rendering sins as much as the one demanding: it is false, therefore, that the debt must always be rendered, and not always demanded.

2. Likewise, I ought not to sin venially so that another avoids mortal sin: but it is certain that every corrupt circumstance makes sin: therefore, to render the debt when it ought not is sin: therefore, this one ought not to render, even if he thought that the other would fall into mortal sin: therefore, it seems that what is said in the Letter is false.

3. Likewise, those sharing in one act act or suffer equally in that act: but in this marriage, the one rendering and the one demanding share in the act of intercourse: therefore, they act and suffer equally: but those acting and suffering equally concerning the substance of the act merit or demerit equally, all other things being equal: therefore, it seems that the one demanding and the one rendering at such a time demerit equally: but what is demerit should not be done in any way: therefore, this one ought not to render the debt for anyone.

4. Likewise, a sword should not be given to a madman so that he kills himself: but sin kills more than a sword: therefore, the faculty of sinning should not be granted to him: but the one rendering gives such a faculty of sinning: therefore, he ought not to render.

5. Likewise, Aristotle says that equity is better than justice because it considers what is to be done in particulars: just as if the law says that a pledge is to be returned to one who redeems, or a deposit to one who lends, yet equity does not return it when robbers are present, nor at a time when it would be in danger of being lost through one's own foolishness or another's violence. Therefore, it should be similar in marriage: but the one rendering knows that it is not expedient for the debt to be rendered in that way: therefore, at that time he ought not to render.

6. Likewise, at such times one rests from works of necessary service, and a worker hired by someone is not then bound to work for him, since it is forbidden by ecclesiastical censure that he should work for him: therefore, much more should one rest from lustful works: and the one owing the debt should not render it then, and he who renders it then should be restrained by ecclesiastical censure, as it seems.

In opposition to this is what the Philosopher says, that whatever is more effective at a certain time is more to be chosen: but medicine is most effective in time of sickness: therefore, it is then most to be chosen: but the medicine of lust is marriage: therefore, in time of lust the use of it is to be chosen, and then most to be exhibited: therefore, the rendering of the debt is owed at the time of the feast if the other demands it out of fear of incontinence.

Response. It must be said that one is bound to render at the time of the feast, as is said in the Letter, and the last objection proves.

To the first, it must be said that he does not consent, but rather gives reluctantly what is his: he grieves over the lust, but provides such a remedy as can be to prevent the infirmity from being aggravated to mortal corruptions.

To the other, it must be said that he does not sin venially by rendering, but rather merits strongly from the act of faith and justice of the marriage bed.

To the other, it must be said that the proposition concerning the act of nature is false, but concerning the act of morals it is true: but in such a case the married do not share one act of morals, but of nature: because the act of morals is caused by all its circumstances and form and end. And it is clear that these are not the same: because in one there is informing lust, and in the other justice and faith: in one the end is the relief of lust, in the other merit according to the exercise of justice.

To the other, it must be said that a sword is not given to him, but medicine to the madman: just as if someone's memory begins to be seized, the head is perforated to the brain: although a wound is given to him, yet this itself is medicine to him: but if an occasion of mortal sin were given to him, then a sword would be given to him.

To the other, it must be said that the one rendering at the time of lust is the mind, because then the one to whom it is rendered is most effective for the preservation of ruin: and it is clear from the aforementioned that the objections brought forward are worth nothing, because they are not similar.

To the other, it must be said that there is not such an instance of temptation of other concupiscences as of lust, which quickly precipitates a man: and therefore against this disease a more prepared medicine must be had than against another.

Articulus 10 — Whether It Is Lawful For Spouses To Come Together In The Times Named In The Letter

Whether it is permissible in the times in the Nominal Letter for spouses to come together?

Secondly, it is asked, Why are these feasts rather than others determined?

1. For indeed the days of processions according to truth are only three, when Christ Himself held a procession, namely the day of the Presentation, when with the procession of His parents the Lord came to the temple, and with the procession of Simeon and Anna and those who awaited the redemption of Israel, He was received in the temple; and Palm Sunday, when with a great crowd He came to Jerusalem and was received with palms and olives; and another day is the Ascension, when He led the disciples to the mountain and ascended into heaven. There are, however, other days equal to these, such as the Annunciation, Passion, Resurrection, Epiphany: why then are those days not determined like these?
2. Likewise, the days of fasting are only forty, and the Ember Days, and other fasts are not authentic in the Church: it seems, therefore, that it is not necessary to abstain on other fasts.
3. Likewise, it determines three weeks before the feast of John, and Advent, and others: therefore, it is asked, what is the reason for these?

Response. It must be said that the Saints speak of the times of contracting marriages in the last chapter; but here they speak of the time of demanding the debt of already contracted marriages.

Hence it must be said that the days of processions and fasts are very well determined, but the days of processions are twofold, namely those established from the processions of the Lord, as was introduced in the objection: and those which are caused by common and legitimate necessity, such as the days of rogations for pestilence, and such are also done in particular Churches for this according to the will of the Prelates instituting them, because on such days the spirit ascends in the Lord, for prayer is the ascent of the intellect to God, as Damascene says, and it is inappropriate that at one hour the spirit ascends to God, and at the end is depressed under the flesh. The same reason is for great feasts, especially of the most blessed Virgin, and of Christ: because then commemoration is made of the immaculate chastity and flower of our Lord Jesus Christ, and it is incongruous then for a member of Christ to give itself to incontinence and pleasure and corruption.

However, the times of fasting, such as Lent, and the Ember Days, and vigils, are instituted to mortify the flesh, and it is inappropriate that when the flesh is withdrawn from necessities for the individual, it should be filled with the indulgence of pleasure ordering to the salvation of the species.

And through this the solution of all that is asked in this chapter is clear.

For what is said in the authority of Ambrose about the time of conception and birth, had a question above.

But concerning the times of contracting marriages, it will be asked below.

Articulus 11 — Whether At Every Hour Of The Said Feasts One Must Always Abstain

Whether at any hour of the aforementioned feasts
one must always abstain?

Whether at any hour of the aforementioned feasts
one must always abstain?

Thirdly, it is asked, Whether any hour
of that time is inconvenient?

However, it seems that it is not: because
1. Not all that time is
instituted for prayer: therefore, when lauds are not
said in the hours or masses, it seems
that someone can demand: because from this
one is not impeded in divine matters.

1. Likewise, Through marriage the highest
spirituality is signified, both in the person

of Christ, and also in the conjunction
of the faithful soul with God: but such signs
are especially to be used in the chief festival:
therefore it seems that then the use of marriage
should be insisted upon.

Response. It must be said that by no means,
but rather abstaining, as it is said in
the Letter, because it is very incongruous.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that although
we cannot attend to prayer and divine praises
at every hour of these days,
nevertheless we must always hold ourselves fit:
and therefore we must abstain from
embraces, which depress the mind so that it cannot rise
to heavenly things.

To the other, it must be said that it does not hold:
because to some is joined foul concupiscence

subjugating reason in the impulse of delight
much more than that sign
can demand: and therefore it is prohibited
by the Church due to the congruence of the time.

Articulus 12 — Whether When One Ought To Be Free For Prayer, One Can Render The Debt

Whether when it is time to devote oneself to prayer, someone can render the debt?

Whether when it is time to devote oneself to prayer, someone can render the debt?

Then it is asked about what is said there, "However, what was said, that rendering the debt is not a sin," etc.

And two things are asked here. The first is, When it is time to devote oneself to prayer, can another demand the debt at the same hour? The second, Whether one rendering the debt can eat the flesh of the Lamb on the same day? And for the sake of this, it is also asked, Whether one demanding the debt ought to eat the flesh of the Lamb?

To the first, it is objected thus: 1. To pray is a positive precept: therefore it obliges to be fulfilled at some time: therefore let any time be given, and at the same time one of the spouses demands the debt: either he will render the debt, or not. If so: since therefore he cannot pray at the same time, nor do anything spiritual, as it is said in the Letter, he will not fulfill the precept of prayer: therefore he omits it at the time when he ought to do it: but to omit at the time when he ought to do it is a mortal sin: therefore he sins mortally. But if he does not

render the debt: then he defrauds the sick of medicine in time of danger: therefore he is the occasion of his own death: but such a one also sins mortally: therefore he is perplexed, which is false, because according to Theologians no one is perplexed.

If perhaps you say that he is absolved from the obligation of the debt by reason of the time appointed for prayer. On the contrary: the Apostle says, 1 Corinthians 7:5: "Do not defraud each other, except perhaps by consent." Therefore even at that time he is not absolved except by the consent of the other spouse:

but it was posited that he does not consent, but demands.

1. The same objection is made concerning a sacred place, if the debt is demanded in a sacred place. For it seems that it should be denied: because if it is rendered, the sacred place is harmed: but the sacred place is not to be contaminated: therefore the debt is to be denied.
2. To the same: because it seems less that the Church is harmed by eating and selling there than by copulating there: but it is clear that it is harmed in the first two: therefore also in coitus. For the lesser, 1 Corinthians 11:22: "Do you not have houses to eat and drink in?" etc. Matthew 21:12, Jesus expelled those buying and selling from the temple.

But against this it seems that in certain lands, due to the assaults of warriors, it is necessary to remain with children and wives in the Church for many nights and many days: therefore, since they ought not to be without the debt for a long time, it seems that in the Church it can be demanded and rendered.

Response. It must be said that the debt of marriage is always owed to the one asking, and at every hour it must be rendered according to opportunity and ability. I call opportunity: because, however, since coitus has a certain shame attached, it is not necessary that it be rendered in public before people, but at every hour, leaving aside the business in which one is, if he knows the other to be in dangerous concupiscence, he is bound to seek the privacy of the bed and render the debt.

To what is asked about the precept of prayer, it must be said that there is never a time of necessity for rendering, unless in which if he does not do it, he omits: and this is caused by two things, namely by the institution of the Church, and by the impossibility of recovering. By the institution of the Church, however, they are not obliged, except ecclesiastical persons who ought to be chaste as long as they handle divine sacraments;

otherwise, the Church does not oblige, but advises. The impossibility of recovering cannot occur here: because even if he renders the debt now, he can recover the prayers later or on the morrow: and thus it is clear that he is not perplexed: because he does not have the necessity to do the other, since there is no determined time instituted for prayer for the married. And by this the solution to the first is clear.

To what is asked about the place, it must be said that he is not bound to render the debt in a sacred place if another place can be had: but if it cannot, then he should render it with

sorrow of heart, and even if he demands it with lamentation, which cannot be without the use of marriage, I do not believe that he sins mortally.

To what is objected, that the place is contaminated, it must be said that the contamination of the place is twofold, namely from the incongruity of the work done in it to the consecration and act of the place, and from the contrariety proceeding. That which proceeds from incongruity does not so contaminate the place that it needs reconciliation, but rather that which proceeds from contrariety, and that occurs from great crimes, namely sacrilege, homicide, and the like.

To what is further asked, it must be said that the Apostle does not want the place to be contaminated by this, but there was a certain incongruity: and therefore he corrected it so that necessity would not occur.

To what is objected from Matthew, it must be said that in the negotiation: there were joined robberies, thefts, and simony: and therefore he expelled them from the temple. And therefore it is not similar, because in the oratory, as Augustine says, "No one should do anything except for what it was made, from which it also takes its name."

And by this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 13 — Whether One Of The Spouses Rendering The Debt Can On The Same Day Eat The Flesh Of The Lamb, And Whether The One Demanding Can Receive The Body Of The Lord, And Whether On The Same Day On Which It Is Received One Can Render The Debt

Whether one of the spouses fulfilling the debt, on the same day can eat the flesh of the Lamb? And, whether the one demanding can receive the body of the Lord? And, whether on the same day when it is received, can the debt be rendered?

Secondly, it is asked, whether the one fulfilling the debt can eat the flesh of the Lamb on the same day? Or even on the same day on which the flesh of the Lamb is eaten, ought to fulfill the debt?

It seems, however, that not: because
1. In the Letter here it is said, that the bread which descended from heaven cannot be violated and touched by those who shortly before adhered to conjugal embraces: this is the proposition.

1. Likewise, a less incongruous act to the sacrament of the Eucharist is to eat than to copulate, and he sins mortally who receives the body of the Lord after eating: therefore also after copulation: but nothing should be done that is a mortal sin: therefore the one fulfilling the debt should not touch or take the flesh of the Lamb.
2. Likewise, in wild lettuces of penance and sorrow the Eucharist is to be taken: but it is impossible to be in the pleasure of copulation and in sorrow at the same time: therefore it seems that after the pleasure of copulation the Eucharist should not be taken. But that it is impossible is evident from the Gloss on 1 Corinthians 6:13, where it says that

nothing can be done or thought in the meantime, because the whole spirit descends into the flesh.

3. Then, Gregory writes to Augustine, Bishop of the English, and it is placed in the decree, distinction 6, that even after nocturnal pollution one should abstain from the flesh of the Lamb. Therefore much more after copulation perpetrated in the vigil.

1. Likewise, to receive a thing of highest spirituality in the greatest carnality is perversity: but the Eucharist is of highest spirituality: therefore it seems that in the greatest carnality after copulation it should not be received.

On the contrary is this, which in the preceding distinction was held by Gregory: If anyone uses his wife not seized by the desire of pleasure, but only for the sake of procreating children, he indeed should be left to his own judgment whether to enter the Church or to take the body of the Lord in ministry: because he should not be prohibited by us from receiving, who being placed in fire does not know how to burn. It is evident that he who fulfills for the sake of justice or for the sake of children, he after such a concubitus can receive the body of the Lord: because it does not matter whether he fulfills for the sake of justice or the faith of the bed, or for the piety of procreating children.

Likewise, it is further asked, whether the one demanding due to infirmity can receive the body of the Lord?

It seems that not: because
1. In the preceding distinction from the words of Gregory it was held, that even from entering the Church one should abstain: therefore much more strongly from the communion of the Eucharist he should abstain.

1. Likewise, Augustine said: Believe, but this one still, and you will eat me: he is small to whom carnal things taste dangerously: therefore he should not eat the flesh of the Lamb.

2. Likewise, in figure it is said of this sacrament, Exodus 12:11: Gird your loins. But Gregory says, that we gird our loins when we restrain the luxury of the flesh through continence: therefore he who does not gird his loins should not eat the flesh of the Lamb: but the one demanding the debt from infirmity does not gird his loins: therefore he should not eat the flesh of the Lamb.

3. Likewise, 1 Samuel 21:4, Achimelech said: If the young men are clean, let them eat. Therefore if they are not clean from women, it was not lawful to eat even the figure of this sacrament. Therefore much less will it be lawful to receive the thing: therefore after such a demanded debt it will not be lawful to eat the flesh of the Lamb.

On the contrary of this is that
1. Such a concubitus is only venial, but for venial things one should not be dismissed: because

thus every man should be dismissed, since in many things we all offend: therefore it is not necessary that this one dismisses taking the body of the Lord because of this.

1. Likewise, Peter is argued by blessed Bernard, because he said: Depart from me, because I am a sinful man, Lord? God is rather to be called, as by Zacchaeus, provided he grieves for sins: but this one grieves: therefore he should approach God as much as he can through the perception of the Eucharist.
2. Likewise, Matthew 9:12: It is not the healthy who need a physician, but the sick. It is evident, however, that the highest medicine and physician is the Lord himself perceived in the sacrament: therefore it should be taken by him who is ill in concupiscence for which he demands the debt.

Further it is asked here, whether after the body of the Lord has been received, on the same day shortly or much later the debt can be demanded or rendered?

It seems that not: because
4. The motions of concupiscence and of the sacrament are contrary: because one moves to the highest spirit, and the other to the lowest of carnal pleasures: therefore the motion of one excludes the other, because contrary motions exclude each other: therefore the motion of concupiscence in concubitus excludes the motion of spiritual nourishment: therefore the effect of the sacrament is lost: but by all means it must be avoided that the effect of the sacrament is lost: therefore by all means it must be avoided

that the debt is demanded or the requested is fulfilled.

1. Likewise, I see that even suitable foods which are of the same kind, if one is taken immediately after the other, the second evacuates the first, and there will be a distemperance from indigestion: therefore much more will this be done by spiritual food and the most intense bodily pleasure immediately succeeding each other: therefore the pleasure of copulation evacuates the effect of the sacrament: therefore it must be avoided by all from the pleasure of copulation after the taking of the Eucharist.
2. Further it is asked here, whether the body of Christ should be taken by a menstruating woman?

It seems that not: because according to the law such a woman is unclean, as is evident, Leviticus 12:4: therefore nothing of the holy should be touched: therefore neither the Eucharist.

In the same way it follows that neither a polluted man, nor one with a seminal flow, as Leviticus 15:1 and following, is expressly prohibited.

On the contrary of this is that such things are penalties, not faults according to themselves: but the punished should not be punished further: therefore neither in this should he be punished again, that the saving food is withdrawn from him.

And because much has been asked about these in the treatise on the Eucharist, let these now asked suffice.

Response to the first, that the one rendering the debt for the faith of the bed and justice, or even demanding for the good of offspring, should not be prohibited from the flesh of the Lamb, but should be left to his own judgment concerning this, whether from humility, because such a business was not without pleasure, he wishes to abstain, or from devotion he wishes to take.

To what is objected from the Letter, the Master responds in the Letter. However, it can be said otherwise, that Jerome speaks of those who are excessive lovers of their wives, that is, too ardent, of whom it was held above, that they are adulterers.

To the other it must be said, that it is because of the institution of the Church which opposes: but here there is no institution of the Church to the contrary, but rather the concession of the Apostle saying, Do not defraud one another, etc.

To the other it must be said, that pain and pleasure are not together according to act, but pain according to habit can be with pleasure according to act, and after the pleasure of copulation, when he goes to communion, he can grieve according to act and exclude the pleasure which was before at the time of copulation.

To the other it must be said, that Gregory speaks of priests confecting the Eucharist in the mass: because greater sanctity is imposed on them, as in the Letter the saying of Jerome is explained: whence if the saying is taken generally, it must be said that pollution is a sign of preceding fault: and therefore since it is of good minds to fear fault where there is no fault, much more must they fear where the sign of preceding fault is found: but the rendering of the debt is not a sign nor effect of any fault: and therefore it is not similar to what was introduced. However, concerning this our question must be looked at in the treatise on the Eucharist: and thus the manifestation of the solution will be made.

To the other it must be said, that to take one thing with another according to existing act would be perversity: but nothing prohibits after carnality with which there is spirituality according to habit, to take that which is of highest spirituality: because carnality has already ceased.

To the first, however, which is further asked about the demanding one, it must be said that he should be admonished not to take, not left to his own judgment as the first: if however in all respects...

in ways from devotion he should engage, he is not to be prohibited.

To that which is objected against, it must be said that as was stated in the preceding distinction, by this is shown only an incongruity inviting to humility, and Gregory does not intend to impose necessity.

To another it must be said, that it is one thing to receive the effect of the Eucharist, and another to perceive. The first is of the sick palate: the second of the healthy palate. And in this

respect, Augustine's statement was that it would grow, and not in the first respect: for anyone who is contrite can receive the Eucharist.

To another it must be said, that everyone having the continence of conjugal concession has loins girded: and Gregory's statement is understood of girding from illicit intercourse.

To another it must be said, that the cleansing of boys was sought for the reason of suitability, because the loaves were priestly, and not for the reason of necessity.

To that which is further inquired, it must be said that on that day the debt is not to be demanded, nor even rendered, unless the other spouse insists greatly: if however it is done, I do not believe it is a mortal sin.

To the objection against, it must be said that although they are contrary in act, not however in habit: because one is of one sacrament, and the other of another: and one of charity, and the other of conjugal continence, which have no contrariety between themselves: hence the act of intercourse is not against spirituality, except as a disposition remaining for a time and passing.

To another it must be said, that this is so because it oppresses nature, and suffocates the following digestive heat: but it is not so here, because as already stated, the delight which is in intercourse is not deepened as a habit, but passes as a temporal disposition.

To that which is further inquired, it must be said that such things are from infirmity rather than fault.

A competent solution is sufficiently had in the treatise on the Eucharist.

Then by reason of this where it is said, there, D, at the end: Nor yet at the time when conjugal acts are conducted, will the presence of the Holy Spirit be given, even if he seems to be a Prophet, etc.

The question of prophecy must be treated, so that it may be perfectly seen why this is said in the Letter.

DISTINCTIO XXXIII

Divisio Textus

Here it is inquired about the ancient fathers, etc. In this distinction, it is treated of the various states of marriage.

However, four things are inquired here by the Master. The first is, Why did some of the ancients have multiple wives? The second, concerning the comparison of their marriage to the celibacy of the new grace, there, B, But truly the chastity of virginity, etc. Thirdly, it is inquired, Whether it was permitted for one woman to have multiple husbands, there, D, But under the law, etc? Fourthly, it touches upon the state of celibates and celibacy, there, iM, But virginity of the mind is better than of the flesh, etc.

And let these suffice concerning the division.

However, around the beginning, by reason of the first chapter, six things are to be inquired here. The first is, Whether marriage is natural? The second is, Whether having multiple wives is natural, or against nature? The third, Whether one woman having multiple husbands is against nature or the order of nature? The fourth, Whether only the lustful then committed bigamy, as it seems to intend in the Letter? The fifth, Whether it was then permitted or ever permitted to have a concubine? The sixth, How the good of marriage, which is a sacrament, was preserved in the marriages of the ancient fathers?

Articulus 1 — Whether Marriage Is Natural Or Of The Law Of Nations

Whether marriage is natural or of the law of nations?

Whether marriage is natural or of the law of nations?

To the first objection it is argued thus: 1. Nature dictates only the copulation of male and female: but this does not make marriage: therefore it seems that marriage is not natural.

1. Likewise, Aristotle says in the second book of Ethics, that natural things are the same among all: but the contract of marriage is not the same among all: therefore the contract of marriage is not natural: therefore neither is marriage natural.
2. Likewise, Tullius in Rhetoric at the beginning says that men were originally wild: and then no one knew their own children, nor certain marriages; but it is evident that men lived naturally then: therefore it seems that marriage is not natural, but rather of the law of nations.
3. Likewise, at the beginning of the Digest of the ancients, it is said that natural law in the Institutes is what nature teaches all animals: but nature does not teach all animals marriage: therefore it seems that it is not natural. The middle proposition is that we see many dogs following one female dog, and certain animals not having specific females with whom they mate: therefore the proposition is clear.

On the contrary of this is, 1. What is said at the beginning of the Pandects: Natural law is the union of male and female, which we call marriage: therefore it is natural.

The same is said entirely in the Institutes.

Likewise, it is said that Tullius in Rhetoric natural law is what opinion did not give birth to, but some innate force inserted, as the union of male and female: therefore, etc.

1. Likewise, Aristotle in the ninth book of Ethics says these words: Man is a naturally conjugal animal more than political, and as much as the house is prior and more necessary than the city. Therefore, man is more naturally conjugal than political, and as much as the order of the house is more necessary and prior to the order of the city: but man is naturally political, as Aristotle and Avicenna prove: therefore he is more naturally conjugal: therefore marriage is natural.

2. Likewise, Aristotle introduces another reason to the same, saying thus: And the procreation of children is common to animals: he intends to argue thus: To whomsoever the procreation of children is naturally common, to them also the manner by which children are certified is natural, as birds join to one in a special nest: therefore also man joins to one due to him in a special house: but this is marriage: therefore marriage is natural.

3. Likewise, the Philosopher introduces a third reason there, saying thus: Men cohabit not only for the sake of procreation of children, but also for those things which pertain to life: for immediately the works are divided, and they are of the man and the wife: therefore they suffice to each other for the common provision: Whatever contributes to life preserving nature is natural: marriage is of this kind: therefore marriage is natural. The first is assumed by the Philosopher as self-evident. The second is proved: because when men are born and grow up, they have divided works, and are insufficient for themselves for the safety of nature and the provision of the house. But when man and wife contribute their works, they will be sufficient for the building of the house and the safety of nature: but they do not contribute unless joined in marriage: therefore marriage is natural; and thus the proposition is established.

4. Likewise, Aspasius on the same place in the commentary says that what is from the genus is more natural than what is from the difference, although both are natural: but man has from the difference that he is a civil and political animal: and because of this the life of one alone, as Avicenna says, is not unless worse than it can be: but from the genus he has that he is conjugal, as was shown before in birds and the lion: therefore marriage is more natural than political.

Response. It must be said that the words of Aspasius solving this question in the commentary on the ninth book of Ethics are very noteworthy, and they are these: It cannot be. Up to this point, the union of male and female is entirely without fault, unless it intends the procreation of offspring: and since man is a rational animal, and reason not perverted intends the best, not only does the generating man intend to procreate offspring, but also to educate the procreated, and by educating to advance them to perfection: not only in the goods of the body, but also in the goods of the soul, which are virtues and sciences: but it is not only the man generating, nor only the woman, but both together are one generating: therefore it is necessary that both together intend with one common intention the procreation and education and advancement of offspring to perfection: therefore it is necessary before they come together, that they mutually consent to each other in one individual life for the procreation and education and advancement of offspring to perfection: for there cannot be a rational intention of the generating rightly, unless each of the generating consents to an individual life: since therefore the natural end of the generative virtue, and the act of generating in man is the offspring perfect in both perfections, and the safety of the species is not only in the first being, but also in the second being, which is the true consummation of man: but this end cannot be intended by man and woman generating with a common intention, who are more one generating, unless matrimonially united: and what is not done with a right end is a sin, it is evident that marriage is natural, and that every union outside of marriage is a sin, and transgresses

the law of nature. The words of Aspasius: and they determine the whole question, nor do they need exposition.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that nature dictates or instigates nothing to any animal, unless it also gives it the instinct and faculty of perfectly accomplishing it according to the mode of its nature: and so also marriage as to the mode that it is accomplished by its wife, so that it may be known who are the proper children, and who are not, will be natural.

To the other it must be said that in one substantial thing all agree, which is the consent of both, but in accidentals they differ: and this does not impede.

To the other it must be said that Tullius understands this of nature as it is considered only in generation, and in no way in species: and if it is also considered in genus, still its union is determined to the certain knowledge of their children even naturally in many animals, as was previously evident. And the expert who joined men in the habitations of houses and cities, and the contract of marriage, did this by the demonstration of natural reasons: and therefore from that reason it does not follow that marriage is not natural.

To the other it must be said that as was said before, nature teaches all animals this, but in different ways according to the diversity of species: for it teaches some the procreation of children without the determination of a certain female: and this is in those in which the male has no care about educating the children, like the bull, horse, donkey, dog, and the like. But in others the father is concerned about the children, and therefore seeks a certain union with one female of his species, and with her generates and nourishes the children, like almost all birds, and many walking animals: nevertheless, however, some marriage is in all in which there is male and female: but in the most perfect animal marriage is most perfect according to nature, and this is man.

Articulus 2 — Whether To Have Several Wives Is Natural

Is it natural to have multiple wives?

Is it natural to have multiple wives?

Secondly, it is asked whether having multiple wives is natural.

It seems that it is: because 1. Aristotle says that one man fulfills many: therefore it seems that this is not against nature.

1. Likewise, in other animals we frequently see that many females are possessed by one male: since therefore natural law is what nature has taught all animals, it will not be against nature for a man to have multiple wives.
2. Likewise, in the order of nature we see that one mover towards generation moves many movables, just as the sun generates all things below, and the first mover moves and in a certain way impregnates all animals: therefore it seems according to the order of nature that one male, who is as a mover, can have many wives.

3. Likewise, Plato posited that universals are like art and male: particulars, however, like the material of artifacts and female: because one universal form impregnates many particulars, and one form of art is in many artifacts: therefore a male can have many females according to the order of nature.
4. Likewise, there is no head to which only one member coheres: but the man is the head of the woman: therefore it is necessary that many women cohere to him.
5. Likewise, in the Scripture, it is said in the authority of Augustine, which is drawn from holy virginity, that the ancient fathers did not do this against nature: therefore it seems that a man according to nature could have multiple wives.
6. Likewise, we see that many men, excellently following nature and reason, like Cato and certain Arabs, had and have multiple wives: therefore it seems that this is not against nature.
7. Likewise, to cast seed ordered to the multiplication of nature where it is lost is beyond the order of nature: but when a woman is impregnated and has a closed womb, if someone then has intercourse with her, he casts seed where it is lost: therefore he ought to know another: therefore at least at the time of conception he can use multiple in marriage, as it seems.
8. Likewise, if it is against nature to have multiple, it is asked against which nature? For it is clear that it is not against sex, nor against the customs of animals in general, nor against reason, nor against the species of man: therefore it seems that it is not against nature.

Against this, it is objected thus: 1. That seems to be most natural which was established in the first nature created: but then it was instituted that one should be for one: therefore this is most natural: it seems therefore that it is against nature to have multiple. This is proved from what is held in Genesis 2:24: "And he shall cleave to his wife," and it does not say, "to his wives."

1. Likewise, in other animals we see that those for whom the works of educating offspring are not sufficient, but it is necessary to contribute something, as birds do, especially those that have chicks that must be fed by parents, that one is for one: therefore since man is such an animal, it seems that according to the nature of the genus one should be for one. The Philosopher says that this is most natural, which agrees with the reason of the genus: therefore it seems that according to the nature of man one should be for one.
2. Likewise, if a more remote genus than animal is taken, like one that is in plants, then it is clear that in the same subject masculine and feminine power are joined: but in those, only one masculine power is joined with one feminine: therefore it seems that this should be observed according to nature in all following the genus in man: therefore according to nature only one is for one.
3. Likewise, in all nature it is so that one moving form is not proportioned except to one matter: since therefore the male is as a mover, and the female as moved matter, it will

seem according to nature that only one is joined to one: therefore it will be against nature if one has multiple.

4. Likewise, according to Aristotle, both in arts and in natures, the way is more in few, that nature expedites itself with the fewest: therefore it seems that in seeking generation the natural way is in fewer than it can: but these are two, namely male and female: therefore it seems that it is beyond the way of nature for more to be joined to one.
5. Likewise, in all nature it is not found that one proper mover is of other movables: but according to nature in generation the male is as a proper mover, and the female as movable: therefore it seems that it is against nature for one male to have multiple females.
6. Likewise, in the heavens and elements it is never joined except one agent as male with one female as patient, as is clear in stars, signs, planets, and elements, where it is never except one hot with one dry or one moist, and one cold with one dry or one moist: therefore it should also be so in the conjunction of humans.
7. Likewise, every agent in nature is diminished if that in which it acts is multiplied, and its diminution will be a cause of hindrance or weakness of the effect: but the male is most truly the agent in generation: therefore, with the multiplication of that in which it acts, it will be diminished, and its diminution will be a cause of hindrance or weakness of the effect: but the effect is the production of the similar: therefore if one had multiple, this would be a hindrance and weakness of generation. The first is proved by induction in individuals, and it is also written by the Philosophers in many places.

Response. To this, without prejudice, it must be said otherwise, that according to Aristotle, the nature of man is twofold, namely that which is from the genus, and that which is from the difference. According to that which is from the genus, it is not against the nature of man to have multiple wives: and this nature is in man as potential and as imperfect. However, the perfect and formal is that which is from the difference: and this is twofold according to how reason is taken in two ways, namely as nature which is in the form of man considering only natural things: and as deliberative reason of those things which man alone among others perceives, such as what is honorable, base, preservative of peace, and incitative of discord, deliberative of the city, and destructive of the city and house. And in the first way, it still seems that it is not against nature to have multiple. However, in the second way, it seems to be beyond nature. That it is so is held from the Scripture, as Augustine says, that it was not against nature that Jacob had multiple: and there are many things about this in the decree, question 4: and many of those are also placed here in the Scripture from Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine. And thus it is not necessary to solve except the second part of the objections: because all the first objections proceed in the two prior senses of nature.

Therefore, it seems to be said to the first, that marriage was not then instituted in the office of nature in the genus or in the species absolutely, but as in the species related to the end of moral good, of which the perceptive is the nature of man alone: because the Philosophers say that it is the nature of man alone to discern between the base and the honorable: and therefore

also afterwards, doing nothing against the nature which God instituted, when few were good and many were evil, by the dispensation of the good, many had multiple.

To the other, it must be said that animals are joined to one for multiple causes, and also are not joined to one for opposite causes. There are, however, chiefly three by which they are joined to one, of which one is that the motivating power of the male is not sufficient for impregnating many: and this sometimes happens due to the diminution of food, sometimes also due to the deprivation of the nature of the living. The second is: because in fostering and nurturing one is not sufficient, because within the womb the offspring cannot be completed, nor can they be completed outside unless they are warmed by the heat of the parents' bodies, as is seen in birds warming successively in alternating turns. Hence we see that birds of which only one warms, or even animals that do not warm their eggs, are not so ordered that a certain male has a certain female, as is clear in every kind of chicks and geese, and also in fish, and lizards, and serpents. The third and last cause is the ingenuity that nature has for discerning its own offspring: because as Aristotle says, animals are not equally memorative, nor equally teachable, and consequently not equally ingenious concerning the care of offspring. Hence some nurture other offspring as their own, in which the partridge is argued where it is said: "The partridge warms what it did not bear." Some, however, never nurture others unless deceived, like the buffalo which does not suckle another's offspring unless it is first smeared with its own dung, and then it suckles deceived. Some, however, can in no way be deceived in their own, and reject all others, and do not bestow care on them. These, therefore, are the causes by which animals claim certain females for themselves, and with these ceasing, they do not do so, like the horse, and the donkey, and many walking animals. However, in man, due to industry, there is the procreation of multiple females: and therefore it is not against his nature to have multiple, unless nature is taken in the last way: because it is true that a house is not well governed with multiple wives existing, and consequently neither a city nor a nation.

To the other, it must be said that the masculine power which is in plants is indeterminate and imperfect: because, as it is said in the book on Plants, plants do not have a soul, but a part of a part of a soul. That it is imperfect is clear from its indetermination and materiality: because it is immobile and indeterminate, generating leaves, branches, and fruits, and in the fruit it generates many things surrounding the fruit: and therefore it must be joined in distinction to move due to its imperfection. However, if it moved by some imagination, it could move many: hence it does not move many except as nature, and also by natural qualities which are hot, cold, moist, and dry. However, it is not so in animals which are of perfect nature, and move by imagination which is diversified in images: and therefore one mover in such moves many.

By this also the solution to the following is clear.

To the other, it must be said that in few there is a way in one act, but in many acts it is not necessary: for generation is always completed in two minimums: but many generations can be completed by one with many.

To the other, it must be said that this is understood of the proximate mover, and in such a way the male and female do not relate in the species of man: and therefore nothing is proved by this.

By this also the solution to the following is clear. To the last, it must be said that by one simple action the agent in many is diminished, as much as those are multiplied, but successively acting cannot be diminished: because, as Aristotle says, he fulfills one at a time, and after this, with the seed drawn to the seminal vessels and matured, he fulfills another, and a third, and so on.

Articulus 3 — Whether For One Woman To Have Several Husbands Is Against Nature

Whether for one woman to have multiple husbands is against nature?

Whether for one woman to have multiple husbands is against nature?

Thirdly, it is asked whether for one woman to have multiple husbands is against nature or the order of nature?

It seems, however, that it is not: because 1. It seems that man and woman are of the same species: therefore, what is not against the nature of man is not against the nature of woman: but it has been held that it is not against the nature of man to be joined to many: therefore, neither will it be against the nature of woman to have multiple husbands.

1. Likewise, a woman desires a man as matter desires form: but I see that matter desires not one form, but many: therefore, neither does a woman by natural desire desire one man, but many: therefore, according to nature, she can be joined to many.
2. Likewise, inferiors relate to superiors as woman to man, as the Philosophers have said: but I see that the earth, which is impregnated by the starry sphere, is not joined to one impregnator, but to many: therefore, it seems that a woman according to nature can be joined to many.
3. Again, in many animals we see that many males follow one female, and never many females one male, as in dogs and wolves: therefore, it seems that by the nature of the genus, a female can be joined to multiple husbands and males.
4. Likewise, a woman is related in generation as a recipient: but every recipient is receptive of many according to the nature of the recipient: therefore, a woman can receive from many men: therefore, according to nature, she is joinable to many men.

On the contrary, however, is that 1. Aristotle says that one man fulfills many: but one woman is not fulfilled except by one: therefore, although a man can be joined to many according to his nature, yet a woman is joined only to one.

1. Likewise, the joining of women to men according to nature is only for generation, because sex is distinguished by God and nature only for this: but when a woman receives from one, she is not receptive from another except with the danger of the first

conception: therefore, according to nature, she is not joinable to another when she has received from one: but after she has given birth, she can receive from the same: therefore, she is sufficiently joined to one for generating: but it has been held before that the way of nature is in fewer as much as possible: therefore, according to nature, a woman is not joinable except to one.

2. Likewise, according to nature, there are many members of one head, but never are there many heads of one member: since, therefore, a man is as the head, and a woman as a member, one man can according to the order of nature have many women, but in no way can one woman have many men.

3. Likewise, in many animals we see that the male claims many for himself and fights for them to the death, as stags, boars, and roosters: but we do not see that females fight for many males or follow many males: therefore, it seems that according to the natural order of the genus, it is natural indeed that a man can have many, but in no way is it according to the order of nature that one woman should have many husbands at the same time whom she follows.

4. Likewise, from this would arise dissension in household and political matters: for a wife is subject according to laws, canons, and natural reasons. Therefore, let it be granted that one has many: therefore, she will obey both, and follow them: therefore, when one commands to build his house, another perhaps commands about building another house: therefore, destruction and confusion of the house and city follows from this.

5. Likewise, as Cicero says, marriage was invented so that certain children may be known: but if one has many, no one will know certain and proper children: therefore, no one will be solicitous for them: therefore, the children, for whom nature invented marriage, will perish, which is inconvenient: therefore, according to nature also, it is inconvenient that one should have many husbands.

Therefore, it must be conceded, and it is to be said to the first, that for many reasons it is in no way according to nature that one woman should have many: but I will assign four more evident reasons, three of which I will take from the nature of the genus, and one from the nature of the difference.

The first, taken from the nature of the genus, is that excessive shaking of the womb causes the offspring to fall, because the conception adheres by cotyledons, like fruit to a tree, and at the beginning of conception because of the tenderness of the cotyledons, and at the end because of the maturity and weight of the infant, it easily falls: but in the middle time, it adheres more strongly: and therefore even with one, much intercourse is dangerous to conception, as Jerome said above in the Letter, and it is placed in the decree 32, question 4, but to have intercourse with different ones would be entirely contrary.

The second is that from excessive flow of semen both injected and ejected, the womb is lubricated, so that it holds nothing: therefore, prostitutes do not conceive: and therefore those who are with one in too frequent intercourse conceive less and more rarely.

The third is that although the semen of a woman is material in conception, yet it operates towards conception: and therefore it is necessary for it to have due maturity: but due maturity cannot be in semen that flows too much, because for it to mature, it must be drawn in the seminal vessels for a time: and therefore it is not fitting that a woman should have many. But that this does not impede in a man will be shown below, where it will be asked if many could then be had.

The fourth, however, which is taken from the part of the difference, is that this would be ordered to the destruction of household and political matters, as is proven in the objection.

TO THE ARGUMENT, therefore, it is to be said to the first that it does not follow: because although man and woman are in one species, they are, however, differently related in sex to generation: and therefore it is not of the nature of woman what is of the nature of man.

To the other, it is to be said that there is a likeness in a certain respect, namely in imperfect desire: because a woman is imperfect as matter: but yet as proximate matter, she is not of many forms, thus neither is a proper woman of many men: but it is not similar in this that remote matter desires many forms.

To the other, it is to be said that superiors are not proper movers of inferiors, but rather common: but if proper matter is taken, it will be only one. However, a man is not similar to a proper and conjoined mover, but rather to a separate and common one, as was held before: just as the recipient is always proper, although the impressor is frequently common.

To the other, it is to be said that in animals there is diversity, nor do many males follow one female, except in those for whom there is no concern for the upbringing of children: and such an animal is not man: whence also dogs do not recognize their offspring, nor are they solicitous for them, but rather the female dogs: but in man, it is not so, but he imitates the nature of those who certainly discern their children, and are solicitous for them with special affection.

To the other, it is to be said that a woman is related as a recipient proportioned to one infusing, and not as a recipient commonly for the reasons induced above: but a proportioned recipient is not receptive of many. And this

In the manner all natural recipients are disposed, which are filled by the acts of those from which they receive: for in all such cases the recipient is determined, and the filling is separate, being the fulfilling of many.

Articulus 4 — Whether Before The Law Of Grace Only The Lustful Were Bigamists

Whether before the law of grace only the lustful were bigamists?

ARTICLE LY.

Whether before the law of grace only the lustful were bigamists?

Fourthly, it is asked, whether only the lustful were then bigamists?

It seems that they were: because

1. It is said in the Text that the first Lamech is read to have introduced bigamy or to have had

two wives: and this is concluded because he is said to have done it for the fulfillment of carnal pleasure: therefore it seems that only such were reprehensible for bigamy at that time.

1. Likewise, in the Text it says that the marriages of the Patriarchs are compared to the celibacy of this time. Therefore it seems that they are not accused of anything: therefore neither of bigamy.
2. Likewise, that someone is called a bigamist, this is by reason of a violated sign, as was held above: but in the marriage of the Patriarchs there was the best sign: therefore it seems that they are not accused of bigamy from having many. The first is evident from what was said in the question about bigamy. The second is written, 32, question 4, where Augustine says that the generation of Jacob through the handmaids signifies those reborn through the wicked, but the generation through the free women signifies those reborn through the good: and both pertain to the inheritance, because they are from the seed of the father.

On the contrary of this is that someone is made a bigamist in four ways, as was touched upon above: and one of these is he who has many at the same time: but the ancient fathers had many at the same time: therefore they were bigamists.

Which is to be conceded.
To the first, it must be said that Lamech is first reprehended for sin, and not for bigamy, because he was not reprehensible: and also then it did not obstruct the priesthood, because there was not a true priesthood there, but only a figure of our true priesthood.

To the other, it must be said that the comparison is made in personal merit and utility, which is for the variety of time: but the comparison is not made in integrity.

And thus the solution to the whole is clear: because the last has a sign not a sacrament, but an allegory.

But for the individuality of marriage to be preserved, it is necessary that the sacramental sign of marriage be preserved: and this is not preserved in the marriage of the ancients who had many.

Articulus 5 — Whether It Was Ever Lawful To Have A Concubine

Whether it was ever permissible to have a concubine?

Fifthly, it is asked whether it was ever permissible to have a concubine?

And this question is one cause of the decree of Gratian.

And it is objected concerning Abraham, who sought offspring from a concubine, Genesis 25:1, and concerning Jacob, who sought offspring from two maidservants, Genesis 29 and 30, throughout: and concerning many others. Therefore, it seems that this was permissible at some time.

Likewise, Leviticus 19:20 says, "Whoever lies carnally with a woman who is a slave, he shall not be punished, nor shall he be condemned: because she is his property." Therefore, if in the Old Testament by divine law it was not punished by death of the body, then it does not seem that now it ought to be punished or imputed to the death of the soul.

On the contrary of this is what Ambrose says in the book on the Patriarchs: "Let no one flatter himself, by the laws of men every fornication is adultery, nor is it permitted for a man what is not permitted for a woman: because the same chastity is owed by a man as by a wife. Whatever is committed with one who is not a legitimate wife is condemned by the crime of adultery."

Likewise, it is not permitted for anyone to know a woman except his wife: therefore, the right of marriage is given, lest you fall into a snare, and sin with another's woman. It is not permitted for anyone to have intercourse with a maidservant, that he might seek children from her.

Response. It must be said that it was never permissible to know a maidservant or another's woman, but a maidservant taken in marriage by the instinct of the Holy Spirit: and thus the Patriarchs did.

And through this the solution is clear.

Articulus 6 — How The Good Of The Sacrament Was Preserved In The Marriages Of The Ancients

How was the good of the sacrament preserved in the marriages of the ancients?

Sixthly, it is asked, How was the good of the sacrament preserved in the marriages of the ancients?

It seems, however, that it was not preserved: because 1. This good is the individuality related by sign to the individuality of the faithful soul with God and of the two natures in Christ: but the ancient fathers were divided into many: therefore, there was not such individuality in their marriages.

1. Likewise, He is not individual who is not unique to one, as was held above in the question of digamy: but the ancient fathers were not unique to one: therefore, in their marriage, there was not the good of the sacrament.
2. Likewise, It seems more to be preserved in him who successively does not use many at once, than in him who uses many at once: and it is not preserved: therefore, neither in him who uses many at once: but such was the marriage of the ancient fathers; therefore, in their marriage, there was not the good of the sacrament.

On the contrary, it is objected that 1. Whatever exceeds the greater, exceeds also the lesser: but the marriage of the ancients exceeds the greater, than is the marriage of our time: therefore, it exceeds also that which is of our time. The first is evident by itself. The second is written in the Letter, that their marriage exceeds the celibacy of our time. Hence thus: Marriage is not

said to exceed another except by reason of the goods which are in it: therefore, that marriage had as many or more goods as this: but this has the good of the sacrament: therefore, also that.

1. Likewise, That which signifies the Church according to every difference of its state, signifies it more nobly, than that which signifies it only in general: but the multiple wives of the holy fathers signify the conjunction of the Church with God according to every difference of state, as is evident, 32, question 4, in the decree of Augustine above: therefore, it signifies the conjunction of the Church with God more nobly, than marriage in which one is joined to one: since therefore a lesser sign suffices for marriage for the good of the sacrament: therefore, also a greater: therefore, those marriages had the good of the sacrament.

Response. It must be said that the good of the sacrament and also of celibacy was not preserved in those marriages except in a certain respect and imperfectly: but in the marriage of the New Testament, it is perfectly preserved. I say imperfectly: because there was a sign of the conjunction of the Church with Christ in faith as to the Church militant: but in our marriage, it is as to the Church triumphant: for the Church is joined in faith according to a multiple state with Christ in which one goes thus, another thus: but the triumphant is joined in one state of open vision face to face, which is the whole reward, as Augustine says.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that their marriage is not said to exceed the marriage of our time, except as to the sanctity which is the chastity of the soul, and not in the act of chastity: and this does not regard this sign which is called the sacrament. But as to what it says, that marriage is better and holier in all goods: it must be said that this is false: because marriage is holier with the equal will of the continent: and yet it is not so perfect in signifying as marriage consummated by carnal union, as was held above.

To the other, it must be said that that mode of signifying is rather allegorical from the spouses themselves, than sacramental taken from the individuality of the spouses, as is evident from the aforesaid.

Articulus 7 — Whether It Was Ever Permitted To Any Man To Have Several Wives

Whether it was ever permitted for any man to have multiple wives?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said, there, A, shortly after the beginning: It is permitted by God to join multiple in marriage to oneself, etc.

However, it seems that this was never permitted: because

§1. Nothing of those things which are against human good was ever permitted: but to join multiple to oneself was and is against human good: therefore this was never permitted.

§2. Likewise, it is impossible for one thing to belong simultaneously to two who are not ordered to each other: but the husband belongs to his wife: therefore it is impossible for him to belong to two wives not ordered to each other: but one wife was not ordered to another, but equally they were of the husband: therefore it is impossible for one husband to be matrimoni-

ally joined to multiple: no union was ever permitted except matrimonial: therefore it was never permitted to join multiple in marriage to oneself.

§3. Likewise, let it be granted that one belongs to two, perplexity follows: for let it be that both demand their due at one hour, if he satisfies one, it is evident that he becomes unable to satisfy the other: therefore he leaves or defrauds the other: and if he satisfies the other, by the same reasoning he defrauds this one: therefore he is perplexed: but according to the theologian no one is perplexed: therefore it was never permitted for anyone to be joined to multiple.

§4. Likewise, man and woman are judged by equal rights in marriage: a woman could never have multiple husbands: therefore neither could a man have multiple wives: therefore it was never permitted to have multiple.

§5. Likewise, no cause seems to be as is said in the Letter: because when many were then idolaters, an easier and better mode of multiplying the faithful would have been through preaching than through fecundity: therefore it seems that that should have been, and not this.

§6. Likewise, evils are not to be done that good may come, as the Apostle says, Romans 8: but it is evil to have multiple: therefore this was not to be done for any good that could arise from it: therefore it was never permitted for the cause of fecundity and religion to have multiple.

§7. Likewise, when there was a great scarcity of men, no one was joined to multiple, namely neither Adam, nor Seth, nor Noah, nor any of his sons. Jude objects thus: What is not done because of the scarcity of men and divine worship, is not to be done because of the rarity of worship alone: but the joining of one to multiple was not done because of the material scarcity of men: therefore it also should not have been done because of the rarity of worship alone: therefore it was never permitted to have multiple wives.

On the contrary of this are:
1. The examples of the holy Patriarchs, who in no way would have committed something illicit: and they had multiple: therefore this was permitted, and they did it licitly.

1. Likewise, what is prohibited neither by custom nor by law nor by nature, that is permitted: but to have multiple wives is prohibited neither by custom nor by law nor by nature: therefore that is permitted. The first is proven by what is held, 1 Corinthians 6:12, on that: All things are lawful for me, where the Gloss says: This is permitted, which is prohibited by no precept. The second, however, is written shortly below in the Letter: and, 32, question 4: They are objected. And it is proven in Jacob four wives. Letter.

Response. It must be said without prejudice, that if human good is considered from the end of reason ordering the offices of human acts in the city, then it was never permitted to have multiple, although it is not entirely against nature, as was said above.

And if it is objected that the law of nations in laws permits having multiple: it must be said that permission is one thing, ordering that it be so is another: and it must be known that in

permissions the law is not ordered to divine justice as it is ordering human acts, but rather as it is permitting certain evil deeds: and therefore unless a dispensation were made concerning this by the familiar counsel of the Holy Spirit, I say that it would never have been permitted: and thus also said Pope Innocent III.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that when the multitude of those leading to idolatry was pressing, and the scarcity of those worshipping God to such an extent that (as Philo narrates in his Pentateuch) Abraham was compelled by prison and fire to offer his name engraved on a brick to posterity for veneration by leaders who came from the East: then by the familiar counsel of the Holy Spirit, the use was had, that they could take multiple, so that with the propagation of seed there would also be the propagation of religion. And from the same cause, it was that they did not want to take wives except from their own progeny, lest the minds of their sons be subverted from divine worship by foreigners, just as also in the New Testament for a time God willed the form of baptism to be done in the name of Christ, as is noted above in the treatise on baptism, not that it should be observed thus thereafter, but rather that his name might be made lovable to men; and then it would return to the true form of baptism.

To the other, it must be said that custom is said in two ways, namely true custom, and that which necessity makes. True custom is a habit serving according to human good to anyone. And if indeed custom is taken thus, such marriage was not of custom. If, however, it is taken in the second way, it is true that then such marriage was of custom, but that custom is nothing else than an observance caused by the necessity of danger, just as we also say that to take another's in time of necessity, if necessity were to last long, would be of custom: yet it would not well follow that it would simply comply with good customs.

Similarly, I say concerning nature: for if nature is taken from the difference of man related to human end, it was never of nature: and from this nature alone are human acts and offices ordered in cities, as is evident in all the books of the Philosophers who have spoken of urbanities and polities. If, however, nature is taken in other ways which are noted above, then it would not be against nature: many things, however, not against such nature, are illicit: for to lie with a woman is not against such nature, and yet it is illicit.

Similarly, I say concerning law: because it is natural and written: and natural seems just as nature. Hence it is against some nature, and against some natural mode it is not. But against the written it was not: because it had not yet been given. And in this way Augustine understands.

Hence it is evident that from this it is not proven that they were simply permitted, but rather from cause and divine dispensation.

Articulus 8 — Whether The Intercourse Of Lot With His Daughters Was Lawful

Whether the intercourse of Lot with his daughters was permissible?

Then it is asked concerning what is said, A, shortly after the beginning: "The daughters used their father Lot while he was drunk," etc.

The example seems inappropriate because:

1. The daughters were not joined to the father in marriage: therefore it is not to the purpose.

1. Likewise, it seems false because wine taken immoderately constrains lust: therefore drunkenness removes lust: therefore they could not use the father while he was drunk.

2. Likewise, it was impossible for him to have intercourse except in imagination: therefore imagination presented a woman to him: therefore it seems false what is said in the text of Genesis, xix, and 33-35, that he did not perceive, neither when he lay with his daughter, nor when he rose.

Response. It must be said that it is similar in regard to the intention of the deed, not in regard to the substance of the deed: because by the intention of conception, not of lust, they were joined to the father: and therefore they are excused not entirely, but to a certain extent. However, other Fathers excused them entirely: Ambrose calls Lot holy: but this must be referred to repentance through subsequent works.

To the other, it must be said that drunkenness is an excess of drink: for it is a measure (as Haymo says on the Apocalypse) a cup in which a man is accustomed to drink, and an excess of the measure which is called a measure. Or, drink is called drunkenness: and this happens in two ways, namely enormously or moderately. Enormously it happens when the excessive humor of wine impedes digestion, and excessive vapor obstructs the passages of imagination and reason: and this drunkenness cuts off intercourse. However, there is another moderate kind, namely when the heat of wine elevates the spirits and subtle blood upwards, but does not block the passages: but nevertheless by strong motion it destroys the stability of images and confuses, so that those things which are before the eyes seem to be doubled: and with closed eyes many things occur as if confused dreams: and this does not cut off intercourse, rather it incites to it from heat, and provides material from moisture, and from the multiplication of motion upwards in the animal spirit it confounds discretion: and yet imagination remains uncertain. And such was the drunkenness of Lot: hence what is said that he did not perceive, is to be understood that he indeed perceived a woman in general, but did not discern whether this one or that one, nor whether it was an image or reality.

Thus through this the solution to both questions is clear.

Articulus 9 — Whether The Marriages Of The Ancients Are Equal To Our Virginity

Whether the marriages of the ancients are equal to virginity?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, A, a little before the middle: When the marriages of those equal our virginity, etc.

Concerning this Augustine thus says in the book On the Good of Marriage: If we compare them, there is no way to doubt that the chastity of continence is better than the chastity of marriage, although both are good. But when we compare men, he is better who has more good than another.[697]

Concerning this, inquire in the treatise on Virgins, question on continence, where I have said and discussed many things: and the safe solution depends on the authority introduced.

Articulus 10 — Whether The Immoderate Use Of Our Time Nearly Imitates The Shamefulness Of The Fornication Of Ancient Times

Whether the immoderate use of our time
almost imitates the baseness
of fornication of ancient times?

Whether the immoderate use of our time
almost imitates the baseness
of fornication of ancient times?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, A, in the middle of the chapter: The immoderate use of marriage of our time almost imitates the baseness of fornication of that time, etc.

For it seems this is false: because fornication of that time was a mortal sin, but the use of marriage never.

Response. It must be said that he speaks as to the intention of the contracting parties in most cases, who in these times contract on account of the infirmity of lust: but then they did not come together except for the sake of receiving offspring. Similarly, fornicators come together for the sake of lust, and not for the sake of receiving offspring. Hence there is a certain similarity in intention, and not in fact.

Articulus 11 — How The Patriarchs And Apostles Took Delight In The Advancement Of Religion

How did the Patriarchs and Apostles delight in the progress of religion?

Then it is asked concerning what is said there, A, in the middle: As the Apostles with the listeners marveling, etc.

It seems that nothing is similar: because every man ought to rejoice in good things, and this joy is honorable and beautiful: but the delight of intercourse is always base: therefore, nothing is similar to what is introduced.

697. Augustine, De Bono Conjugali

Response. It must be said that it is similar in that the ultimate intention delighted in both in the progress of religion: but the act of progress was different: for there it was through the flesh, but here through the spirit; yet here and then similarly in one did the Fathers of the Old and New Testaments delight.

Here, however, the whole question concerning continence, and its states, and the comparison of states ought to be set forth: and this was noted before in the treatise on the Cardinal Virtues*, and therefore I entirely pass over it here.

Articulus 12 — Whether It Was More Difficult To Be Continent In Ancient Times Than In These Times

Whether it was more difficult to be continent in ancient times than in these times?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said, there, A, after the middle: Who could and would be continent much more easily, etc.

For every art and virtue is about the difficult and the good: since therefore virtue is about being continent, it was more difficult to be continent than to contract.

To this it must be said that there is difficulty on the part of sensuality: and from that proceeds the objection. There is also difficulty caused according to reason from the force of honesty,

just as it is difficult for the just to sin: and concerning that he speaks in the Letter.

Articulus 13 — Whether Under Different Laws Those Who Had Several Wives Were Excused In The Same Way

Whether under different laws those who had multiple wives were excused in the same way?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, A, after the middle: Consider first, that Abraham before the law, etc.

For it seems that this cause is none: because
1. Even under the law many had multiple wives as at the beginning Regeam Elea~nat, and David had, and many others: therefore it is clear that this cause is none.

1. Likewise, the written law is nothing but an explanation of the natural law: therefore it does not excuse, that he did not sin against the written law, because he could have sinned against the natural law.

To this it must be said, that he does not say this for the excuse of Abraham, but because of the state of the time: because then there was a need for material multiplication: and therefore by the familiar counsel of the Holy Spirit (he says) many had multiple wives.

And through this the solution to the second is clear.

To the first it must be said that before the law in the time of Abraham there were much fewer worshipping God than under the law: and therefore they were more excused, and the dispensation was more reasonable.

Articulus 14 — Whether Moderate Intercourse Can Be Absent From Lust

Whether moderate intercourse can be absent from lust?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, A, a little before the end: Which nevertheless modified and restraining, etc.

For it seems that there is no modification there: for if there is any, it is around the passion around which virtue consists, but that is caused in the wife or greater than in the prostitute: therefore it seems that it is not modified.

If perhaps you say that it is modified and restrained by others, and not in the intensity of the passion itself, which is delight. On the contrary: In gluttony I see well also, that to be ardently delighted in a single food is a vice of gluttony, as is evident in Esau, who for a single meal sold his birthright. Therefore, since lust in general is a greater sin than gluttony, it seems also that lust is where there is vehement delight in one woman.

To this it must be said that restraint occurs in two things, namely in the object, because it is confined to one: and restraint occurs in the circumstances, namely that he knows how much is fitting, and when, and where, and how much, etc., which the rhetorician determines.

To the objection on the contrary, it must be said that that excessive delight arises from corrupt nature, and not from reason preordaining: but in gluttony such delight is intended: and therefore one sins, and the other does not.

Articulus 15 — Whether Gluttony Is Well Defined

Whether gluttony is well defined?

Then it is inquired by reason of this which he says, there, A, a little before the end: But that food is licit in sustaining life, etc.

It is inquired, I say, here concerning the species of gluttony, and its daughters.

Concerning the first, five things are inquired.

The second is, Whether gluttony is a carnal vice? The third is, Whether gluttony is concerning what is delightful to taste, insofar as it is taste, or insofar as it is a certain touch? The fourth is, Whether every movement of will is a sin? The fifth, Whether gluttony is a capital vice?

To the first, it is thus proceeded, and it seems that the definition of Hugh of Saint Victor, Gluttony is an immoderate appetite, is incompetent:

1. For gluttony is not only committed concerning the quantity of food, as he says, but also concerning other things, as when it is sought too studiously or ardently: but immodera-

tion signifies an excess of quantity: therefore it does not encompass the nature of gluttony.

2. Likewise, Those whose conception is with matter, ought to have matter placed in their definition, as the Philosopher says, of which kind are all natural things: but gluttony has a determined matter: since therefore matter is not placed in its definition, its definition seems incompetent.

3. But it seems that gluttony is only concerning quantity. For contraries are made concerning the same: but the mean of sobriety, to which gluttony is contrary, as the Philosopher wills, is determined according to quantity with respect to us: therefore gluttony will also be only in the excess of quantity.

4. Likewise, The insensible person who lacks appetite for food does not have a moderate appetite for eating, because he does not reach the mean, nor is he moderate: but he is not gluttonous: therefore an immoderate appetite for eating is not the definition of gluttony.

5. Likewise, Gregory places under one chapter drunkenness, which consists in drink, and gluttony, which is especially in food: and that capital vice is defined here: therefore both ought to have been placed, namely of eating and drinking.

6. Likewise, Nothing desires its own corruption: but, as Gregory says, the dignity of the human condition is wounded by immoderation: therefore an immoderate appetite cannot be.

7. Likewise, Sin, as Augustine says, corrupts the mode, species, and order: but gluttony is a certain sin: therefore it ought not only to be defined by the corruption of mode, but also of others.

8. Likewise, As Gregory says, It does not matter what or how much is taken: but an immoderate appetite regards what or how much is taken: therefore it does not matter concerning it: but concerning gluttony it matters, because it is a vice: therefore they will not be in one appetite of eating.

9. Likewise, In a perfect definition it is not sufficient to say what it is, unless it is said why, as the Philosopher says in the book of the Posterior Analytics: but in the said definition it is not said why it is an immoderate appetite: therefore the definition is imperfect.

10. Likewise, In natural appetite few or none err: but in gluttony many err: therefore gluttony is not an immoderate appetite for eating.

11. Likewise, As Augustine says,

The people in the desert did not sin, because they desired, but because they blasphemed from desire: they desired moderately, whence it is said in the text, that the people burned with

desire for meat; therefore an immoderate appetite is not a sin: but gluttony is a sin: therefore it is not an immoderate appetite for eating.

1. Likewise, He who is ignorant in what the due mode consists, can desire immoderately: yet he is not gluttonous: therefore the definition is in excess, more than the defined.
2. Likewise, He who provokes others to eat by words is called gluttonous: yet he perhaps does not desire immoderately: therefore the definition does not agree with all of whom the defined is said.

1. Likewise, The gluttonous person not only delights in eating, but also in drinking and smelling: therefore this also ought to be contained in the definition.
2. Likewise, Natural and moral sciences are distinct from each other: but gluttony, since it is a vice, pertains to the moral, but appetite pertains to the natural: therefore gluttony ought not to be defined by appetite.

Solution. It must be said that gluttony can be considered in two ways, either in act or in habit: and the said description is given of it according to how it is in act, because thus the Saints strive to define vices. Hence appetite is taken here for appetite in act, and it is determined by the proper act of gluttony which is to eat, which is an act upon determined matter, namely food: and thus the definition of the act ought to be given. But because gluttony is a vicious act, and evil is specified insofar as it is evil, from the corruption of the opposite habit, therefore it is completely manifested both concerning the nature of the act and concerning the nature of the vice.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that mode is said in two ways. In one way according to the measure of quantity: and in this way it is not deprived here. In another way according to determination to the mean according to all circumstances in which the mean is preserved: and thus mode is substantially the virtue itself, and thus it is deprived here.

To the other, it must be said that determined matter is included in the act of eating which is placed in the definition of gluttony: and therefore it is not necessary to add further.

To the other, it must be said that the Philosopher does not understand that the mean of virtue is determined according to the quantity of the thing in itself, because thus it would be simply the mean of the thing: but as it stands under appetite, and thus it is determined with respect to us, all circumstances being preserved according to the proportion of appetite: whence the mean is corrupted not only by quantity, but also if more is desired than is fitting, or not fitting: and similarly it is concerning other circumstances.

To the other, it must be said that the insensible person, although he does not have a moderate appetite, yet he does not have an immoderate one: because he does not desire. But a composed negation is not carried beyond the term to which it is joined: whence the affirmed appetite remains.

To the other, it must be said that drink is never desired for its own sake, but for carrying food through the limbs: and therefore in the definition of the capital vice it ought not to have been placed, but only the ultimate end.

To the other, it must be said that although nothing desires its own corruption, yet it can desire that which corrupts its own nature, not however insofar as it corrupts, but insofar as it is an apparent good: whence it is a fallacy of the accident.

To the other, it must be said that mode is not deprived here as it divides natural good against species and order, but as it regards the measure of circumstances according to the determined mean: and thus it is substantially the virtue itself, and contains those three.

To the other, it must be said that it does not matter what or how much is taken according to what is in the thing, but according to what is referred to desire, and thus what the moderate appetite desires regards privation.

To the other, it must be said that although the matter from which something is made does not fall into the hands of others: yet concerning which the act is, is the end and moving according to metaphor: and therefore from the determination of the proper matter or object it is determined why.

To the other, it must be said that in those whose appetite is natural, few or none are deceived, according to which their appetite is natural: yet speaking simply concerning those many can be deceived: because, as the Philosopher says, in common things according to which their appetite is natural among all, not many are deprived, as concerning this which is desired for the nourishment of the body: but in proper things which each desires according to his own concupiscence, there is sin, as to desire for sweetness, or something else.

such, which is not common, but proper to the concupiscence according to gluttony.

To the objection, it must be said that in desiring, the people did not sin in the desire of them: but according to the state under the appetite which is enticed by certain proper things added to the common ones; for they sinned because they so ardently desired that they despised the food of the Lord, and by despising God they blasphemed.

To another objection, it must be said that although the ignorant does not observe the mode, he does not corrupt the mode, because he does not will something contrary to the mode: but the immoderate one indicates the corruption of the mode.

To another objection, it must be said that he who provokes with words to gluttony is called gluttonous: for he provokes to this, that they may be like him: but from the fact that he provokes, it is not reduced to gluttony as species to genus, but by reduction of principle, as a point to a line. Hence it is not necessary that according to this the definition of gluttony agrees with him, just as neither the definition of line with point.

To another objection, it must be said that the glutton does not take delight in color and odor for their own sake, but refers everything to the delight which is according to taste: as the Philosopher says at the end of the first Ethics.

To another objection, it must be said that just as the moralist can consider the parts of the soul to a certain extent: just as the physician considers the nature of the eye to know how to cure infirmity. Similarly, however, this consideration pertains to the natural philosopher. For appetite can be considered in two ways: either according to that it is a part of the soul which is the perfection of the natural body, and thus the consideration of it pertains to the natural philosopher: or according to that it is compared to its proper object of virtue, or in an opposite ordination, and thus the moralist can consider it.

Articulus 16 — Whether Gluttony Is A Carnal Sin

Whether gluttony is a carnal sin?

Secondly, it is asked, Whether gluttony is a carnal sin?

And it seems that it is: because

1. Ambrose says: Sin where it arises, there it dies: as Bernard says, Fasting heals the plagues of the body: therefore, since gluttony is healed by fasting, let it be granted to be a plague of the body and of the flesh: and thus it is a carnal sin.

1. Likewise, That sin is called carnal, which is effected in the flesh: but as it is said in the Conferences of the Fathers, the effect of certain sins is consummated in the flesh, such as gluttony and lust, and of certain others not: therefore gluttony is a carnal sin.

On the contrary of this is what the Apostle says, 1 Corinthians 6:18: Every sin whatsoever a man does is outside the body, and he excepts only fornication. Gloss: Outside the body, that is, outside the bond of carnal concupiscence. Thus: No carnal sin is outside the bond of carnal concupiscence: therefore gluttony is not a carnal sin.

1. Likewise, To desire is not of the body, but of the soul: but gluttony is defined by desire, as has been said: therefore it is not a carnal sin.

Response. It must be said that a sin is said to be carnal in three ways. Either because it has its first origin from the flesh: and thus every sin in us is carnal, even infidelity, because it has its first origin from the corruption of the flesh contracted through original sin. A sin is also called carnal, which is not perfected without some act or motion of the body, although it also has a spiritu-
al object: and thus anger is also called a carnal sin, because anger does not occur without the boiling of blood and another carnal passion. But infidelity is not thus a bodily or carnal sin: because it consists entirely in the act of the mind. A sin is also called carnal, whose object is delightful to the flesh, in whose conjunction delight is perfected: and thus it is divided against spiritual sin, whose object is spiritual, as anger desires vengeance, and hatred, and pride, and the like. And thus gluttony and lust are called carnal: of which gluttony is about what is delightful to taste, because it is ordered to the conservation of the individual: and lust about what is delightful to touch, because it is ordered to the conservation of the species.

To that which is opposed first in the contrary, it must be said that only lust is said to be a sin in the body, because through it the body is divided, and not through gluttony, although both are about what is delightful to the body.

To the Gloss it must be said that a bond is called from binding: hence gluttony is said to be outside the bond of carnal concupiscence, because reason in the delight of gluttony is not so bound and subverted as by the delight of lust due to its vehemence.

To the second it must be said that although gluttony begins in the act of the soul, nevertheless it is completed in the act of the flesh and about a carnal object, and on this account it is called carnal.

Articulus 17 — Whether Gluttony Is About What Is Pleasing To The Taste

Whether gluttony is concerned with what is pleasurable to taste?

Thirdly, it is asked whether gluttony is concerned with what is pleasurable to taste, insofar as it is taste, or insofar as it is a certain touch?

1. For if some two things are opposed to one, it is necessary that according to some one thing they are opposed to it, which is concerned with that around which its opposite is, because opposites are naturally made around the same, and one is opposed to one in the same mode of opposition:

but temperance is opposed to gluttony and lust: therefore, it is necessary that temperance is concerned with the pleasures of touch: if therefore gluttony is concerned with the pleasures of taste, it will be insofar as it is a certain touch,

1. Likewise, as the Philosopher says, gluttony is concerned with food not insofar as it is around the pleasure of flavor only, but insofar as it is referred to some use which tastes the flavors of foods: and in this the glutton is said to delight: but taste is not referred to the use of nourishment except according to the objects of touch in hot, cold, moist, dry: because from these the body is constituted, and as the Philosopher says, we are nourished from the same things from which we are: therefore gluttony is concerned with taste insofar as it is a certain touch,

In opposition to this is,
L. What Chrysostom says: The region of touch is not divided into two, namely the tongue and the palate: rather, they are common to all parts of the body: therefore gluttony is not concerned with taste as it is touch, but as it is divided to itself.

1. Likewise, as the Philosopher says, a sweet friend loves wine, not because of the wine, but because of the sweetness: but the glutton seems especially a sweet friend: therefore he loves and delights in food because it is sweet: but sweetness is the proper object of taste: therefore gluttony is concerned with such things.

Response. It must be said that gluttony is concerned with taste insofar as it is a certain touch: for it does not only seek to delight in food, insofar as it is a delightful flavor, but insofar as it comes into the use of nourishment: and this is fitting only according to the objects of touch. And we concede the reasons for this,

But to what is first objected in opposition, it must be said that gluttony is not simply concerned with food insofar as it is suitable for the nourishment of the members, but it is necessary that what is suitable be known: but this happens in those two parts, and therefore they are appropriated to gluttony.

To the second, it must be said that the sweetness of food delights because of the suitability of the food: but what is suitable is according to the object of touch: and therefore gluttony is concerned with such things.

Articulus 18 — Whether Every Movement Of Gluttony Is Sin, And Whether Gluttony Is Always Mortal Sin, And Whether Gluttony Is A Greater Sin Than Lust

Whether every movement of gluttony is a sin? and, Whether gluttony is always a mortal sin? and, Whether gluttony is a greater sin than lust?

ARTICLE XVIII, Whether every movement of gluttony is a sin? and, Whether gluttony is always a mortal sin? and, Whether gluttony is a greater sin than lust?

Fourthly, it is asked, Whether every movement of gluttony is a sin?

It seems that it is: because 1. As it is said in the second Sentences, every temptation from the flesh is a sin: but in any movement of gluttony there is a temptation from the flesh: therefore every movement of gluttony is a sin.

1. Likewise, Every appetite in the delight of lust is a sin, so much so that if someone approaches his wife for delight, he sins: but every appetite of gluttony is for the delight of food: therefore every such is a sin.

Further, it is asked, Whether gluttony is always a mortal sin?

And it seems that it is: 1. In sin, there is a threefold occurrence of movement: either when nature precedes and desire follows: or when they move together, so that it is not discerned what moves first: or when desire precedes and nature follows. But when nature precedes and desire mingles, it is a venial sin: therefore it seems that when desire precedes and nature follows, it is mortal: and this is the reason for judging something mortal in gluttony: and this happens many times.

1. Likewise, The excellence of an act corrupts the mean: but the excellence of an act is greatest when reason is forbidden, which happens when desire precedes and nature follows: therefore then the mean of virtue is corrupted: but it is not corrupted except by mortal sin: therefore according to the aforesaid rule it will always be a mortal sin.

2. Likewise, Every abundance corrupts the mean: but gluttony is always consisting in abundance, otherwise it would not always be a vice: therefore it corrupts the mean of virtue, and thus it is always a mortal sin.

3. Likewise, In the acts of men nothing can be more base, unless when the mover is base, the matter is base, and the end is base: but when desire precedes, the mover is base, namely desire: and the end, because it is for delight: and also the matter or object, because it is about a changeable good: therefore nothing can be more base: therefore it is a mortal sin.

Further, it is asked, Which is the greater sin, gluttony or lust?

And it seems that gluttony: because 1. As the Philosopher says, That to which we are more inclined, more opposes the mean: we are more inclined to the delights of gluttony than to the delights of lust, because we cannot be without them: therefore gluttony more opposes the mean of virtue than lust.

1. Likewise, As Augustine says, Where there is greater corruption, there is less sin: the generative is more corrupt than the nutritive, because the generative is also infected: therefore since lust is about generation, gluttony about nutrition, lust will be the greater sin.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: Where there is greater necessity, there is less sin: but greater necessity lies around the delights of gluttony than around the delights of lust: therefore gluttony is the lesser sin.

Response. It must be said that gluttony is always a sin, yet it is not always mortal: nor even whenever desire precedes and nature follows, is it a mortal sin: for this happens whenever someone desires food solely for delight, or intending some utility, either of soul or body: which happens many times without mortal sin. But to know the rule by which we can judge when it is mortal and when venial, it must be noted that for the determination of the mean in which the mean of sobriety consists, three things are required, namely determining reason, and the determined mean, and that with respect to which it is determined, namely the nutritive virtue, so that only as much is taken as the natural virtue can convert, and as much as can suffice to be preserved in its being and in its vigor, and in comparison to the work which it ought to exercise. Similarly, the corruption of the mean can be attended to according to these three: for the corruption of the mean can be according to itself, and according to this the reason of sin cannot be attended to without it being hidden how much the determined mean is: hence the mean can be corrupted in this way with right reason preserved. But if the corruption of the mean is attended to according to that by whose proportion it is determined, if the determination of reason is separated by the intellect, according to this there will be sin in nature which is generated from the superfluity or diminution of food. Therefore, it remains that the rule of sin is taken when the mean is corrupted on the part of right reason: but reason is regulated to determine the mean, either by natural reasons determining the mean according to the proportion of the nutritive virtue: and if it is corrupted according to this, it will be sin in

nature, as also a premium: or by civil reasons, so that the mean is determined in foods by civil circumstances, which it is fitting to observe in the conservation of citizens, so that when and where and how much is fitting according to one's condition and according to one's work: and according to this also there is again a civil vice in the corruption of the mean, and not according to the theologian who considers the reason of sin according to the comparison to the guilt of divine vengeance. Sometimes indeed it is regulated by divine reasons to determine the mean: as when it determines by taking less than the natural virtue requires according to its vigor, although it does not subtract from it what it needs for the sustenance of being: or for satisfaction for sin, because with the addition of the necessary at the same time concupiscence is increased, or also for some statute. And in this consideration is the measure of sin when reason determines the mean against the precept, it is a mortal sin: when indeed there is no contrary precept, but it determines beyond the precept, it is a venial sin. And this is universally to be held in all in which there can be mortal and venial sin.

We concede the first two objections.

To the other, it must be said that not whenever desire moves for delight, is it a mortal sin, for although desire precedes, yet nature does not altogether follow, so as to place its end in that delight, but it can still be regulated, although it follows desire in some way.

Similarly, to the following it must be said.

To the other it must be said that because the mean is hidden, it suffices to be the proper mean, however much it is departed from the mean in some way, but when it is perfectly departed from it to the contrary,

To the other it must be said that the end is not simply base: because the delight of food is not placed as the ultimate end in which one rests so as to be turned away from God, but it is baser when it is placed as the ultimate end,

To what is further asked, it must be said that gluttony is a lesser sin than lust.

To what is objected, That to which we are more inclined, etc., it is said to oppose the mean more, not because it differs more from the mean, but because it more hinders that one may reach the mean, and for this reason it is a lesser sin.

To the other it must be said that the generative is said to be infected and more corrupt because of the vehemence of delight: but such corruption induces infirmity: and therefore it does not excuse from sin, as the conclusion wishes.

Articulus 19 — Whether Gluttony Is A Capital Vice

Is gluttony a capital vice?

Fifthly, it is asked whether gluttony is a capital vice?

And it seems that it is not:
1. For whatever vice is reduced to something before it, is not capital; but gluttony is of this kind: therefore it is not a capital vice. By the proper middle. If two things are opposed to one,

there must be something common to them according to which they are opposed, for one is opposed to one: but gluttony and lust are opposed to temperance: therefore there must be one common vice to both, which will be prior to both, because the common is prior to the proper.

1. Likewise, as the Commentator says on the fourth of the Ethics: the incontinent is one who eagerly hunts after every pleasurable thing: but incontinence which is about any pleasurable thing is prior to that which is about some determinate pleasurable thing, such as gluttony: therefore it is not a capital vice, since it has something prior to it.
2. If you say that gluttony does not have any vice in reality before it, but only according to reason: this, however, does not take away from it the notion of a head. On the contrary: Whatever things are such that they fall under the will according to more and less, those can be separated according to the act of reason which the appetite follows, and concerning those there can be different inordinations in ordering the act of the will: but concupiscence in the whole is less voluntary, as the Philosopher says, than in part, for few or none desire to be concupiscent: but those things in which concupiscence is determined, such as foods, many desire: therefore concerning concupiscence in the whole and in part there can be different inordinations of the will, and thus a different vice in reality, and not only in reason: and thus follows what is prior.
3. Likewise, on that of Psalm 134, 8: "Who smote the firstborn of Egypt," the Gloss says: The firstborn of Egypt are gluttony and lust, which the belly first generates: but the belly is not taken for the nature, because from this evil is not generated per se: but it must be taken for some vice of the belly: which is not gluttony, because nothing generates itself, but something prior to it: therefore gluttony is not a capital vice.
4. Likewise, as Isidore says: From gluttony drunkenness and revelry are generated, which is gluttony: therefore it is a capital vice, because it is generated.
5. But since contraries are those which are most distant, that vice would be contrary, whose act is most intense in the corruption of the mean: but such an act is concerning the most intense pleasurable thing, which is not pleasurable in common, but rather a proper pleasurable thing: therefore, a capital vice will not be a vice which is concerning a pleasurable thing, but rather gluttony which is concerning the pleasurable thing of food.
6. Likewise, as the Commentator says on the fourth of the Ethics, gluttony is called from "gaster" which is belly, and "margia" which is madness; but madness denotes a vehement appetite which is not subject to the governance of reason: such an appetite, however, cannot be except concerning a determinate pleasurable thing of the belly, since a pleasurable thing in common does not have the perfect notion of a pleasurable thing: therefore gluttony is not a common vice, but the same as gluttony: and since it is a capital vice, gluttony also is a capital vice.

Response. It must be said that gluttony is a capital vice: and we concede the reasons for this: for it is of the nature of a capital vice that it has an object containing the complete notion

of a pleasurable thing, so that it need not be referred to another, but is posited as the end of the appetite in which it perversely delights, to the attainment of which even other things are called together in the cause: just as a prince in an army calls his subjects to his aid, and even other princes: to the likeness of which it is called a head in vices: and all this agrees with gluttony.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that gluttony is not reduced to any prior vice which has the complete notion of a pleasurable thing in its object, but to something which is prior according to reason: and this reduction, since it is not to a head, but to a genus, does not take away the notion of a head.

To the second, it must be said that incontinence is one mode of the seven which he enumerates: yet it is not a capital vice, nor are there more from the other modes enumerated there.

To the other, it must be said that although it may happen that there is some vice which disorders the will concerning a pleasurable thing in common, yet such a pleasurable thing does not have the perfect notion of a pleasurable thing. For sensible delight is a generation in the sensible soul, as the Philosopher says, concerning which is gluttony: but perfect delight is only in the act of conjunction suitable to itself: but the acts of singulars are and most of all of the sensible soul. Hence delight can be perfect in two ways: either because it precedes the act as is the delight of hope, or because the object is common, and needs addition to become singular, and desire and delight are perfected in it: and therefore that vice which is concerning a pleasurable thing in common cannot be capital, but rather is concerning a determinate pleasurable thing, as is gluttony, and lust.

To the other, it must be said that the belly is taken for the habitual concupiscence of the belly, from which those arise as from a cause, not as from a head, but as from a root.

To the other, it must be said that gluttony is the same as gluttony, and revelry is not called gluttony in common, but its daughter: for revelry is in banquets, which happen when each one puts forth his part, or in some similar way.

Articulus 20 — Whether The Five Species Of Gluttony Have Been Well Assigned By Gregory

Whether the five species of gluttony assigned by Gregory are well assigned?

Secondly, it is questioned concerning the species of gluttony. Gregory assigns five species of gluttony over chapter xxv of Genesis, which are contained in this verse:

Hastily, sumptuously, excessively, ardently, eagerly.

1. It seems that in what is excessive eating, there is no species of gluttony: because, as Tullius says in the book of Offices, four things determine, namely nature, reason, fortune, and will: but nature is not the same in all, so that the quantity of food can be determined by it, because what is excessive for one is little for another: reason, however, follows nature, nor is it contrary to itself: nor are all men of one fortune, because one is

rich, and another poor: nor is the will the same: therefore concerning what is excessive, there is no vice of gluttony, since there is no determined mode there.

2. Likewise, as it is said in the Collations of the Fathers, fasting is indifferent: therefore when its opposite consists in excessive eating, it is not a vice.

3. Likewise, fault and punishment differ: but excessive eating is a punishment, both with respect to nature which is burdened, and with respect to the things which are expended: therefore it is not a fault: and thus truly it is not under the species of fault.

1. Likewise, it seems that concerning what is hastily, there is no species of gluttony: for different people desire food at different hours, and without vice, either from nature or from custom: as it is read in the Itinerary of Clement, concerning Clement, that when he came to Peter, they desired food before the day, because he was accustomed to it with sailors: nor is he reproved: therefore it seems that there is no determined time for taking food, which to anticipate is a vice.

2. Likewise, either the time from whose anticipation there is a vice is determined by nature, or by the Church: but not by nature, because the nature of different people requires food at different times: nor does it seem to be able to be determined by the Church, because it is not determined by any Scripture, and especially since it does not suit nature: therefore it seems in no way determined time, and thus the same as before.

3. Likewise, it seems that concerning what is sumptuously, no species of gluttony is taken: for sumptuously is the same as eating sumptuously, which is done for the cleanliness which is required concerning food: but cleanliness is not blameworthy: whence the Lord often in the Old Testament commanded sanctification: therefore concerning this there is no species of gluttony.

4. Likewise, it seems concerning what is ardently, that there is no species of gluttony: for that which is not in our power is not a vice: but to desire food ardently is not in our power, but either it is from infirmity, as in embolism, and then it is more a punishment than a fault: or also from the vigor of natural heat: therefore concerning this there is no gluttony.

5. Likewise, it seems that concerning all these together there is no gluttony: for as Augustine says, all human perversity consists in enjoying what should be used, or using what should be enjoyed: all these can occur together, yet no one enjoys what should be used: therefore there will also be no perversity: therefore concerning this there will be no gluttony.

Response. It must be said that the aforementioned are the accidental species and modes of gluttony: and gluttony is divided by them as by accidents: and their number can thus be taken from the properties of gluttony. For what provokes to an immoderate appetite for eating is either intrinsic or extrinsic. If extrinsic: this can be in two ways: either because the species of the food itself provokes, as when food is sought inordinately chosen and precious: as it is said,

Amos, vi, 4: "Who eat the lamb from the flock, and calves from the midst of the herd": and thus it is sumptuously. Or the adjunct of the species provokes, which makes it more desired, like taste, and other such things, of which Bernard says, that they deceive the palate: and thus it is eagerly. If, however, the appetite which is within provokes: thus it is in two ways: because either it is according to what precedes the act, and thus it is hastily: or according to what is in the act of eating: and this again in two ways: because either the appetite is immoderate in itself, as when it pours itself entirely over the food, and thus it is ardently: or in comparison to the object, because namely it desires too much of the food, and thus it is excessively.

To what is first objected, it must be said that although due to the diversities of men a mode in the quantity of food cannot be determined in particular, it can nevertheless be determined in common, which will be a rule by which someone can be directed in most or all: just as a legislator (as the Philosopher says) cannot by establishing a law consider all particulars without in some case someone transgressing the established law without punishment: just as if against prohibition someone ascends a wall to defend against enemies: for if the legislator were present, he would discern this to be done: nevertheless right reason can determine in three ways the quantities of food in particular, by divine, civil, or natural reasons: and thus by transgressing the mode, one sins concerning what is excessive eating.

To the other it must be said that fasting considered in itself is indifferent: however, according to what is added to it by some cause from divine reasons, as because it is done for satisfaction, or to repress the concupiscence of the flesh, it is good: but according to what is considered without such a cause, thus it is blameworthy, and it is the vice of insensibility, in which one is diminished in food.

To the third it must be said that excessive eating is not fault and punishment for the same reason: but it is punishment in comparison to the effect, fault however as it is considered in itself without the mode of due quantity from a freely operating cause.

To the fourth it must be said that although time cannot be determined for all in particular, it can nevertheless be determined in common, according to which it will be regulated by its own reason in its operation: and the determined time is in common at the sixth hour, as Hugo of Saint Victor says over the rule.

To the fifth it must be said that the time of eating is found determined in Scripture, as Peter says, Acts ii, 15: "For these are not drunk, as you suppose, since it is the third hour of the day": considering after the third hour it is fitting to be the time of taking food commonly, which is at the sixth hour. It is also determined by nature: for the fitting time of taking food is when heat is called forth to the exterior: for then the stomach is empty, and winds and fumes settle, and then it desires: the time of the calling forth of heat to the exterior is determined according to the motions of the sun itself heating. The middle of the sun's motion is from the meridian of the sky, where the sun is at the sixth hour. If therefore food is taken, since it is necessary to give to the taking of food and its placement in the place of digestion at this time, it indeed serves for the fourth part of the natural day, in which the sun moves to the point of the West: but because for digestion to occur, it is necessary to gather heat within, which was outside by

the heat of the sun: and this is successively completed by the constriction of pores and the subtraction of the sun's rays until the end of another fourth, when the sun is in the angle of the night, namely in the part opposite the beginning of its motion: then another fourth serves for complete digestion until the sun comes to the point of the horizon. But because digested nourishment must be divided through the limbs, which cannot be done without heat carrying it to each limb: however, heat when it is gathered cannot carry nourishment through the limbs unless it is called forth to the outside by the heat of the sun, therefore when the sun begins to ascend, heat begins to carry nourishment: and when the sun has reached the middle, nourishment is completely distributed to each limb: and then is the hour of taking food, and it is the sixth hour. That indeed the motion of the sun begins from the meridian of the sky is proved by Psalm xvi, 7, where it says: "From the summit of the sky is its going forth": and it speaks literally of the motion of the sun. It can also be proved astronomically: because from that point the sun begins to move, where the motion of the sun is divided into equal arcs: but this does not happen at the point of the horizon, or in the East, or West: because thus day and night would always be equal: but they are equalized at the point of the meridian of the sky: because as much as is diminished in one fourth of the day, so much is added in the fourth of the night: and therefore there the motion of the sun will stand. A natural reason can also be assigned: because when the sun begins to ascend at dawn, heat is excited and moisture exhales: and thus when the ascent of the sun is completed, moisture has already exhaled, and the limbs emptied need food, as the Philosopher says in the book on the Conservation of Health, that it is not the time of taking food until a man is emptied of the prior food.

To the sixth it must be said that sumptuously is not said when cleanliness is sought in those things which pertain to food: but when those things are sought according to the mode, when sumptuously among others, as a lamb is chosen from the whole herd.

To the seventh it must be said that although in

Although the vehemence of appetite is not in our power, yet it is in our power to follow the appetite or to restrain it, not pouring ourselves out entirely upon food.

To the eighth, it must be said that although sometimes in these matters there is not a perfect fruit, when there is venial sin, yet it is not entirely a use, but is a disposition towards fruit, just as venial is to mortal: and therefore there is some perversity, although not mortal.

Articulus 21 — Whether The Daughters Of Gluttony Are Well Assigned

Whether the daughters of gluttony are well assigned?

Thirdly, it is questioned concerning the daughters of gluttony.

Gregory assigns five, namely, much speaking, scurrility, inept joy, uncleanness, and dullness of mind.

1. It seems that much speaking arises from the weakness of reason: but drunkenness, which pertains to gluttony, especially impedes reason: therefore it is not a daughter of gluttony.

2. Likewise, it seems that scurrility is not a daughter of gluttony: for one daughter cannot have two mothers: but according to Isidore, scurrility is a daughter of lust: therefore it is not a daughter of gluttony.
3. Likewise, it seems that dullness of mind is not a daughter of it: for punishment is divided against fault: but dullness is a certain punishment: therefore it ought not to be placed among the vices generated from gluttony.
4. Likewise, it seems that uncleanness is not a daughter of it: for uncleanness is a species of lust, whereby someone procures the delight of intercourse without intercourse by some movement of their own body: therefore it seems to pertain more to lust than to gluttony.

If it is said that such uncleanness is not called a daughter of gluttony, but that which is in foods.

On the contrary: Augustine in the book "On the Conflict of Three and Four" enumerates the uncleanness of which it was spoken among the daughters of gluttony: for he introduces it speaking thus: "It is a crime to delight in some movement of the limbs without intercourse": therefore the response was nothing.

1. Likewise, it seems that inept joy is not a daughter of it: for inept joy is joy from evil: but this is in every sin, as it is said in Proverbs 2:14: "They rejoice when they have done evil, and exult"; therefore it ought not to be placed among the worst things specifically as a daughter of gluttony.
2. Likewise, Isidore places two, namely drunkenness and revelry. Gregory, however, otherwise. Therefore either one is superfluous, or the other is diminished.
3. Likewise, in the "Conferences of the Fathers" it is said that from gluttony is born lust, from lust avarice, from which is born anger: therefore this anger ought to be counted among the daughters of gluttony.
4. Likewise, what is generated not according to univocal generation does not have the name of a son, as Augustine says, that a worm is born from a body, yet they do not call it a son, nor is a man the son of the sun: but the generation of the said daughters from gluttony is not according to univocal generation, since there is no likeness in species: therefore the aforementioned ought not to be called daughters of gluttony.
5. Likewise, Ambrose says: "A base thing generates a baser daughter: while Chrysostom says, nothing is baser than gluttony: therefore it has no daughter."

Response. It must be said that the same vice is called both mother and head, although for different reasons: it is called head because it has the end of perfect delight which it enjoys, to the attainment of which it calls others in considering that it receives something from outside: hence from the reason of such calling it is called head. But for another reason it is called mother: because a mother is one who generates from another, and is called mother from the reception of something external: just as by the conception of the end it produces another vice,

so that it may have the perfection of delights in it, just as gluttony produces much speaking, so that the delight is consummated not only in eating, but in making it more delightful by vain words. The same is true in virtues: for some virtue like charity calls the act of another virtue to its end, just as someone believes in God not for the first truth, but for love: and this is to import an act: and it is said that charity imports the act of other virtues, but it only elicits its own act which is to love, it is said to elicit that act which it produces by way of nature, and of one nature thus is its own act. Because therefore different vices can call some vice to their end, it is not inconvenient that the same vice is called the daughter of different vices for different reasons, because the reason of filiation is from the end: hence according to the diversity of the end there will be a diversity of reason. Therefore, in the aforementioned way, those five are said to be daughters of gluttony.

And their number can be taken thus: for what follows gluttony; either it follows it according to its matter, or according to its effect. But since gluttony consists in the delightful according to taste, according to the conjunction of such delightful and its effect, there is a multiplication of spirits and heat exciting vapors: and thus multiplied by gluttony they can be referred to the heart, which is the immediate principle of bodily passions, and thus from the dilation of the heart will also be caused inordinate joy spreading through the limbs, and dissolving them from the restraint of modest honesty: and thus is inept joy. Or they are referred to the brain, which is the proximate principle of animal operations: and thus phantasms are multiplied, as appears in sleep, how much more in wakefulness and not less: and hence words are multiplied not measured by reason, and thus proceeds much speaking, because wine, as it is said, makes a man speak by talents. Or they are referred to both: and thus scurrility is produced, when someone by illicit words and gestures and dissoluteness provokes others to laughter. On the part of the matter as it serves the generative there is uncleanness, because it is a species of lust due to the multiplication of matter arising from gluttony: but according to what is drawn to the higher, dullness of mind is produced.

To the first and second, therefore, it must be said that much speaking and scurrility according to different reasons are daughters of gluttony or of lust: for according to what someone by illicit words or deeds intends to provoke a harlot to use and to delight with her, it is a daughter of lust: but according to what is from food and for the delight of food, it is a daughter of gluttony.

To the third, it must be said that dullness of intellect which is from nature or sickness is not called a daughter of gluttony, but that which is from depraved action, whereby someone is affected around the delights of food and becomes wholly carnal, and does not perceive spiritual things: as Chrysostom says, that not so vehemently does the course of flowing waters usually gnaw and undermine the banks, as do delights and luxury undermine all the foundations of our health. For if you enter a medical office and inquire, you will find almost all the causes of diseases there. For a frugal and slight table is the mother of health: and for this reason the skilled of the physicians have named it so, not indeed calling satiety health (for the lack of food is health), and less aptly calling satiety the mother of health. But if poverty is the mother of health, it is clear that satiety is the mother of sickness and produces infirmities and

diseases. Even those who transgress the art of the physicians, foot pains, and heaviness of the head and dizziness, and torments and tremors of the hands and relaxations and curvatures, and long and burning fevers, and many more than these (for it is not possible to run through all) are usually born not from lack and frugal living, but from gluttony and satiety.

To the fourth, it must be said that uncleanness pertains to lust as a species, to gluttony as a daughter to which it supplies material.

Another is solved above in the response.

To the fifth, it must be said that inept joy which is from evil is not taken here, which is common to every sin, as was said.

To the sixth, it must be said that the two which Isidore places are taken according to the general things into which the object of gluttony is divided, namely into food, around which is revelry: and drink, around which is drunkenness: but the five which Gregory places are taken in whatever way something is born from gluttony.

To the seventh, it must be said that that production is by way of root, not by way of mother.

To the eighth, it must be said that they are not called daughters properly, but only metaphorically.

To the ninth, it must be said that a vice can be called baser in two ways: either according to the quantity of fault, and in this way gluttony is not the basest: or according to ignominy, and in this way nothing is baser than it: because, as Gregory says, carnal vices are of lesser fault, and of greater reproach: nor is it necessary that the saying of Ambrose be understood universally.

Articulus 22 — Whether The Saints Who Say That It Is Good For All Men To Be Virgins Judge Well

Whether the Saints think rightly who say
it is good for all men to be
virgins?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, B, shortly before the end: He served his law and his time, let us also serve our law and our time, etc.

For from this it seems that Jerome wished that all would be virgins.

And it contributes to the same, what is said, 1 Corinthians VII, 7: For I wish all of you, that is, to remain to be like myself in chastity.

However, this seems to be inconvenient: because if all were chaste, the world would be dissolved: and God does not wish the world to be dissolved: therefore it seems that He does not wish all men to be chaste, therefore since the Apostle wished this, he did not conform his will with the divine will, which is inconvenient.

To this it must be said, that some say, that it was revealed to the Saints speaking in such a manner, that if those present remained chaste, the number of the elect would be fulfilled. But because this cannot be proven by any reason, therefore others say otherwise,

namely that the will there is perfect and conditional: and the sense is, I wish all of you to be like myself, that is, I would wish, if it were possible. But because it is not probable that the saints had an imperfect will, therefore others say, that the distribution is understood divisively thus: I wish all, etc., that is, concerning each one I wish this divisively, although concerning each one I do not wish the same conjointly.

Otherwise it can be said as Jerome here suggests, that the Apostle wishes this according to the condition of the time: whence the sense is, I wish all, etc., as much as is opportune for the time. And yet Jerome says, that just as they were in their time, so we in ours.

And through this the solution to all objections is clear.

Articulus 23 — Whether The Concubines Of The Patriarchs Were Handmaids Or Wives

Whether the concubines of the Patriarchs were maidservants or wives?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is stated there, LB, at the end: For now he calls wives, etc.

It seems that they are not concubines: because
1. If a maidservant is led into marriage by her master, she is made free: because according to the law of marriage, a wife is from the side, lest she be held as a maidservant.

However, it is evident that such a great Patriarch did not engage in fornication with maidservants. Therefore, they were truly and freely wives: therefore they should not be called concubines.

1. Likewise, they received an equal portion with the other brothers: but this could not be unless they were legitimate sons: but they are not legitimate unless from a free and legitimate wife: therefore neither concubines nor maidservants should be called the mothers of those sons.

On the contrary, it is stated in Genesis 25:6 that Abraham gave gifts to the sons of the concubines when he separated them from the inheritance: therefore they were not legitimate sons.

Response. I think it should be said here that the maidservants remained joined with conjugal affection: so that the future mystery might be signified: whence, in 32, question 4, Augustine gives the reason, what the maidservants signify, and what the free women signify.

To the first objection, therefore, it should be said that it is true in a marriage that is of one with one: but in other marriages where one by the dispensation of God has several, it is not necessary that it be so: because the wives would remain in a condition more suitable for signifying the future state.

To the other, it should be said that this was not general: hence neither legitimately nor from a concubine were the sons of any father pertaining to the future inheritance, unless concerning whom the Lord had commanded. And therefore Ishmael, born of a maidservant, is cast out, and Esau, born of a free woman: so that it may be known that the whole inheritance is possession from the one choosing, and not from one's own merits or those of others.

And thus the solution is clear.

Articulus 24 — Whether The Ancient Fathers Having Wives And Handmaids As Concubines Kept The Fidelity Of The Bed

Whether the ancient fathers having wives and maidservants as concubines kept the fidelity of the bed?

Whether the ancient fathers having wives and maidservants as concubines kept the fidelity of the bed?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, C, If anyone objects, etc.

However, it seems that there was not fidelity of the bed in that marriage: because
1. Fidelity of the bed in itself has that one is not joined to another: but they were joined to others: therefore they did not keep the fidelity of the bed.

1. Likewise, Fidelity of the bed binds both spouses equally: but the woman does not have power over her body for another man: therefore neither does the man for another woman: since therefore the men of that time joined themselves to another woman, it seems that they did not keep the fidelity of the bed.

Response. It must be said that the fidelity of the bed was kept according to the requirement of the time and the dispensation concerning having many, as the Master says in the Text. And therefore it was kept in this respect, that they were not joined to others except their own wives, and with the intention of offspring: nor did the woman have the power to demand otherwise.

And through this the solution to the first is clear.

To the second, however, it must be said that the fidelity did not then bind both equally, due to the causes stated above, and due to the dispensation of marriage, which was then, the reason for which dispensation has been sufficiently stated above.

Articulus 25 — Of What Kind The Bill Of Divorce Was, And What Was Written In It

What sort of document of repudiation was it, and what was written in it?

Then it is asked concerning what is said there, C, around the middle: However, he permitted divorce to be made by giving a document of repudiation, etc.

Three things are asked here.

The first is, What sort of document of repudiation was it, and what was written in it?

The second, Why was it permitted?

The third, Whether those who took dismissed women sinned? and, Whether they could be saved in second marriages if they did not return to the first marriages?

To the first, it is objected thus: L. Deuteronomy xxiv, 1 and 2, the Lord says:

If a man takes a wife, and has her, and she does not find favor in his eyes because of some indecency, he shall write a document of repudiation, and give it into her hand, and send her away from his house. However, since the text says some indecency, and does not specify, it seems that she could be dismissed for any indecency.

1. Likewise, the Gloss on the same place says that there were many causes, therefore it seems that for which a man could dismiss his wife according to the law. He could allege any indecency against her.
2. Likewise, it is commonly said by the saints Jerome, Augustine, and Ambrose, that Moses permitted the document of repudiation lest homicide be committed: but any indecency could be a cause of hatred of the husband towards the wife: however, hatred leads to homicide: therefore, for any indecency, the wife could be dismissed.

On the contrary, it is objected thus: Every marriage that was before the law of nature, in which there was perfect multiplication of the faithful spiritual, was ordered to fecundity: therefore, a foul wife ought not to be repudiated, unless in that in which fecundity could not be found: therefore, only those indecencies ought to be repudiated, which impede the good in the body and soul conceived of women. I say, however, in the body, as if she were simply sterile, or to the one whom she had as a husband: or if she were suffering from chronic illness, such as leprosy, epilepsy, paralysis, hemorrhoids, menstruation, and the like: for all these impede conception, or destroy what is born in the body. In the soul, however, foul, if she were contumacious, turning daughters away from God, and the like.

If perhaps it is said that it ought to have been so according to the reason of the time: nevertheless, men did not observe it thus. On the contrary: It is not asked here about the justice of the person, but rather about the justice of the law given through Moses: since therefore the law is a certain written right adopting the honorable prohibiting the contrary, as the Philosopher says, it must have honorable causes: therefore, it seems that the document of repudiation could only be given for these causes.

Further, it is asked here, Whether the causes of dismissal were written in the document?

It seems that they were: because 1. Otherwise, the dismissal seems to be unjust: therefore, it seems that the causes of dismissal were written.

1. Furthermore, this is expressly stated in the Letter, where the Master and the Gloss on Matthew, v, 31, say that in that document they wrote the causes for which they were dismissed.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: Those causes were either sufficient or insufficient. If insufficient: then they precluded her way to second marriages: and this was not to be done, because second marriages are granted in the same place. But if they were not sufficient: then it was shown that the dismissal was unjust: therefore none: because an unjust dismissal is none. Since therefore she was not yet dismissed according to the law from the first husband, again her way to second marriages was precluded: and it was inconvenient, since they are granted to her according to the law.

To this, saving better judgment, I think it should be said that the document of repudiation was not given for any indecency: for if there was any indecency which he could see or know when he contracted marriage with her, it seems to me that he could not dismiss her for that, but he was bound to sustain her for the faith of marriage. Similarly, if there was any bodily indecency not diminishing or taking away the good of offspring, it seems to me that neither could the wife be dismissed for that.

But if it is objected that it was done lest a greater evil occur: it must be said that this is true: but nevertheless, a cause of hatred which could move was to be set forth. However, a cause which could not commonly move to hatred could not be a cause of separation. For if he had killed his wife out of will, the law would have avenged upon him: and so it avenged when there was no cause which could move to hatred, if he had killed her.

However, the causes introduced in the objection could greatly move for the state of that time.

To the first, it must be said that the Lord says some indecency: because there are many things which either take away offspring or corrupt it in soul or body: and therefore he did not specify in particular. It could also be said that he did not specify in particular so that he might leave any particular case in doubt: so that they might fear more to dismiss,

By this, the solution to the following is also clear.

To the first, however, which is further asked, it must be said that the causes could be written in two ways, namely in general and in particular. In general, I think well that they were written, as the two objections introduced prove. However, not in particular: because by this, prejudice would have been done to the woman.

Articulus 26 — How The Bill Of Divorce Was Permitted

How was the bill of divorce permitted?

Secondly, it is asked, How was that bill permitted?

1. For laws proceed differently in the judgment of external acts and causes, and differently in the judgment of conscience: because in the judgment of causes, a lesser evil is tolerated to prevent a greater evil, but not in the judgment of conscience. However, God judges according to conscience: therefore, no law ought to have been given by Him in which any evil would be permitted: therefore, it seems that if the law is unjust, it was

not given by God: but if it is just, then it was not a permission, but rather a law ordering and obliging to observance.

2. Likewise, Chrysostom on Matthew says: It was permitted by Moses. From this, I argue that just as divorce, indeed an evil, was nevertheless lawful: for the reason that the Apostles permitted second marriages because of the incontinence of men. Hence, just as marriages are lawful in the New Testament, so divorce given by a bill was lawful in the Old Testament: therefore, that bill was lawful.

3. Likewise, human judgment, especially given by God, is exemplified by divine judgment: but I see that if a case was brought, a sentence was given according to the judgment of the Lord for the man, who could dismiss his wife, having given such a bill. Since therefore this judgment was informed by justice which was exemplified by divine justice, the judgment itself was just: therefore, both the bill and the divorce and all that followed from it were just and lawful.

On the contrary of this is, 1. What the Lord says, Matthew 19:8, that Moses permitted you to dismiss your wives because of the hardness of your hearts, namely to give a bill of divorce: but what is permitted because of the hardness of heart is simply unjust: therefore, that bill was simply unjust.

1. Likewise, Chrysostom on Matthew 5:32: Moses permitted the bill to be given. From this it is understood that the bill of divorce was given so that blood would not be shed out of hatred: he permitted evil to be done so that worse evils would not occur. The bill was simply evil: but every evil is illicit: therefore, it seems that the giving of the bill was illicit.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the Gloss on the same, and this is placed here in the Letter: Moses writes in Deuteronomy 24:1-2, that if a wife does not please her husband because of some indecency, he may dismiss her: which permission Christ explains was because of the hardness of husbands, not to allow separation, but to prevent homicide: and from this follows the same as before.

Response. I think it should be said here, saving a better opinion, that this bill was simply unjust, just as it was also unjust to have multiple wives: but according to the time and the congruence of men, it was just. This seems to be said from the text of the words of our Lord Jesus Christ, Matthew 19:4 and following, where the Lord prefaces the sentence about divorce with how God from the beginning created man male and female, and that they would be two in one flesh, and what God has joined, let not man separate, and afterwards He adds about the bill of divorce. Hence also Chrysostom says on the same, that a woman should think only of one male created, just as God Himself created one for one, and one for one from the beginning.

Therefore, it should be said to the first, that the law of God, as the Apostle says, to the Hebrews 7:19, is imperfect, and brought nothing to perfection: but it was given according to the congruence of the time and persons, as a pedagogue to lead to Christ. Hence also many

good significations are elicited from the dismissal of the wife in the Gloss on Deuteronomy by Origen and Gregory: and therefore it had imperfect commands, and was dispensed for the time.

To what was objected from Chrysostom, it should be said that it is not similar except in the first incitement to the giving of the law, because here and there it is disgraceful: but here it is the disgrace of cruelty, and there the disgrace of lust.

To the other, it should be said that a right principle corrects each thing according to the possible mode for itself, and not according to the truest rectitude: and so also does the judgment of causes which is exemplified by it: because it seems to me that this was judicial, not primarily ceremonial, nor sacramental, nor moral: and such things are changed by the variety of times and persons: hence that objection does not compel, that divorce was simply just.

To what is objected on the contrary, it should be said that without doubt the law permitted divorce for the reasons stated, and also the Justinian law: and every law always permitted divorce except the law of Christ: in which the perfection of Christ's law is noted in holiness, piety, and chastity.

Hence to the objection it should be said that the hardness of hearts was then the moving cause: but nevertheless unless there had been utility, it would not have been granted. Its utility was exemplified above: and therefore according to the time the bill was just, although not simply.

To the other, it should be said that Chrysostom touches on the inciting or exciting cause for giving the judicial law: but nevertheless there was also another cause of utility which excused for that time.

Similarly, it should be said to what Augustine says,

And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 27 — Whether The One Dismissing His Wife By A Bill Of Divorce And The Repudiated Woman Could Be Saved In Another Marriage

Whether one dismissing a wife through a bill of divorce and the divorced could be saved in another marriage?

ARTICULUS XXVII,
Whether one dismissing a wife through a bill of divorce and the divorced could be saved in another marriage?

Thirdly, it is asked, Whether the one dismissing could be saved in another marriage, and also the dismissed?

It seems that not: because
1. Christ says, Matthew 19:9: Whoever dismisses his wife and marries another commits adul-

tery, and adulterers and adulteresses are not saved: therefore it seems that in another marriage neither of them could be saved.

1. Likewise, because of the hardness of heart the bill was permitted: but it is said, Ecclesiasticus 27: A hard heart will fare badly: therefore such as these will fare badly in the end.

To the contrary of this it is objected:
1. By what Jerome says: By permitting this, He did not show the justice of God, but removed the guilt of sinning from the sin: so that what is done according to the law does not seem to be sin, it does not seem to be sin: but from any act from which guilt is removed, no one is demerited. In the second union, none were condemned, as it seems.

1. Likewise, both the law and the prophecy agree in the same. Malachi 2:16, where it is said: When you hate, namely the wife of your youth, dismiss, says the Lord. Therefore it seems that the whole people would have been miserably neglected, that their wise men would know there is no salvation for them, and yet would permit such unions: but this would be too absurd: therefore it seems that then they could be saved being joined to others.

1. Likewise, if the law attended only to the hardness of heart, then it ought to persuade a return; but it does the contrary, because it says that if the second dismisses her through repudiation or through death, the former could not take her back: therefore it seems that it was lawful in the second marriage.

Response. To this I think it must be said that in the second marriage there was salvation for them because of the statute of the law and the congruence of the time: just as also in multiple wives, which God never willed except for a time, as in the victims of holocausts, which God never willed except accidentally, namely lest they be sacrificed to idols. And this seems to be what Jerome wants, saying that the legislator removed the guilt from sin when he granted repudiation.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that Christ says this with respect to the abundant justice in the New Testament, fulfilling the imperfect of the Old Testament.

To the other, it must be said that Christ says this with respect to the principal cause of permission, according to which it was a judicial law: yet from the state, the time was ordered to greater fecundity: because it was congruent to that time, and according to this it was dispensative and indulgent: because often she is barren to one who is not barren to another: and therefore the law also commanded that if she married many and was barren to many, she cannot return to the first, nor can the first receive her. In this way Cato agrees who dismissed Marcia so that she might be fruitful, and the Philosophers have spoken thus about repudiation.

And because this agrees with reason, it seems it must be said thus: which, however, I do not entirely assert in this question, but let each say what seems good to him.

Expositio Textus

Exposition of the Text

Then it should be noted, that upon that chapter: "But better is virginity" should be placed

of the mind than of the flesh, etc. the whole question concerning virginity and widowhood, and concerning the veil of virgins: and that has been diligently treated among those which we have written concerning the cardinal virtues*.

Articulus 28 — Whether Some Wives Are Said To Be Several, And Which They Are

Whether some wives are called many? and, Which are they?

Whether some wives are called many? and, Which are they?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, D, after the beginning:

The king shall not have, etc., many wives.

For it is asked here, Which are many?

1. For if it is said that those are many who allure his mind to idolatry. On the contrary: A single one can allure his mind: therefore a single one can be many: but this is false: therefore they are not called many.
2. Likewise, It is not determined by law how many he ought to have, but more are granted without determination: therefore it seems that there is no greatest number for him.

But if it is said that many are those who exceed his strength in sustenance, namely that he cannot feed them. On the contrary: A king and a rich man can feed more than a poor man: therefore what are many for one are not many for another: and the law speaks nothing of this: for it never says that a rich man should have more than a poor man: therefore it seems that it is not to be understood thus.

1. Likewise, More were then permitted for the sake of fecundity: but if there are more, so much greater is the fecundity: therefore it seems that there is no greatest number: but rather he who had more than another served that time more: just as he who is more chaste than another serves our time more, as Jerome said above.

I respond, that as I think, they are called many excelling in the power of impregnating, for which three things are required, namely perfectly moving heat, perfectly digested seed, and the vigor of nature: for through excessive intercourse the natural heat exhales, and the dry extracts the moist: and thus the body is cooled through excessive intercourse, and the seed is ejected before it is digested: and then it easily expires, and is found ineffective. Excessive intercourse is also placed by Aristotle as one of the causes of a shorter life, and it loses the vigor of nature, so that through it fecundity continuously remains: and therefore according to

this I think it is to be measured. But this power, if it ought to fecundate all equally, I think that it exceeds seventy women, or around this more or less, according to the diversity of men: and therefore Solomon is accused of having many, and David is said to have remained among many.

And through this the solution to all is clear, except to one: to which it must be said, that the law did not say how many should be had: because for us it is necessary that this be determined, and therefore the number varies: and perhaps because the law never intended this except accidentally, and therefore spoke little concerning this except by indulgence.

DISTINCTIO XXXIV

Divisio Textus

Now it remains to consider which persons, etc.

Here falls that part which is about legitimate or illegitimate persons: and it is divided into two. In the first, it treats of the effect of impediment in general. In the second, however, of the impediments themselves, there, B, Concerning those which are the cause of frigidity, etc.

FOR UNDERSTANDING, however, three things are sought, namely, what is the legitimacy of contracting persons? Secondly, By what is the number of impediments taken? Thirdly, Why are impediments assigned to this sacrament and not to others?

Articulus 1 — What The Legitimacy Of The Persons Contracting Is

What is the legitimacy of contracting persons? and, By what law is it said to be legitimate?

To the first objection it is thus objected: The Master says in the Letter, that legitimate persons are those to whom no impediment of marriage is opposed: therefore legitimacy itself is immunity from impediments of marriage.

However, it seems that this is badly defined: 1. For a definition is given through essentials: but negations are essential to none: therefore it ought not to be given through negation: but it is given through negation: therefore it seems that it is not valid.

1. Again, Defining things are essential predicates of the thing: but these can never be denied of the thing: therefore no definition is constituted from negations of the thing: therefore as before.

Further, it is asked more by touching the thing, By what law is a person said to be legitimate?

For either by a law universally accepted, or particularly. If universally, it is necessary that a legitimate person be legitimate according to every law: but this is false, because one is legitimate when one is according to one law only, as Pope Nicholas said above, that for marriage it suffices according to the law of those who contract, consent.

But if it is said to be legitimate by a particular law. On the contrary: For either it is of the law of nature, or of Moses, or of Christ: and whatever is said, it is clear that it is not true, because not every person by that law is legitimate.

Further, it is asked about the division which the Master gives, that some were legitimate before the law, etc.

For it seems that this is not true: 1. For marriage is of morals: therefore it was in one way in the law, and before the law, and after, just as other morals.

1. Also, I see that the same bodily medicines are given to the sick for the same cause in any law: therefore since marriage is a medicine of infirmity, for the same cause from the beginning of the world by the same laws marriage ought to be given to all: therefore there were not other legitimate persons according to the diversity of times.
2. Also, it is objected about another division, where it says that some are fully legitimate, etc. For if legitimacy is defined by negation and privation, as it says in the Letter, and negations and privations do not admit of more and less, or more and less, it seems that all are either equally legitimate or equally illegitimate: therefore there is nothing that it says in the Letter.
3. Also, in other works it is not said legally just, except one who agrees in every law: and if he disagrees in one thing, and agrees in another, he is simply said to be legally unjust, as Aristotle says in the Fourth Book of Ethics. For a thief agrees in some things with the laws, because perhaps he is chaste: and yet he is hanged, because he is legally unjust by handling another's property against the will of the owner: therefore it seems that also in this case one who does not agree with all laws is an illegitimate person: therefore none ought to be said moderately legitimate, or simply illegitimate: therefore his division seems to be nothing.

Response. It must be said that the Master gives a description of legitimate persons through a consequent negation from affirmation, because it is more known to us from those things which it denies, and he principally intends to be well understood, rather than to define well. However, the definition of a legitimate person is one who according to the laws has the freedom of contracting marriage with whomever he wishes. And from this follows the negation which the Master places in the Letter; because legitimate is one to whom no impediment is opposed, etc.

And by this the solution to the first two is clear.

To what is further asked, it must be said that by the law which is of persons contracting marriage according to what it abstracts from the law of nature and of Moses and of Christ, persons are said to be legitimate.

To what is objected first against this, it must be said that it is not valid: because this law is universal, not universally taken: and this is taken in the genus which is verified according to any species by dividing: and since the species of laws are varied by different times and states,

therefore the Master rightly says that others were legitimate before and after the law of Moses: and by this also the solution to the following is clear.

To what is further asked, it must be said that although marriage is of morals according to its substance, yet the mode of contracting is judicial: and therefore it is varied according to the laws of those contracting, as Pope Nicholas says.

To another it must be said, that the disease was not similar except concupiscence: but many other diseases were varied according to times, such as the scarcity of men, and the scarcity of women and men, and of one and the same worship, and the scarcity of foreigners; and therefore the law gave a sister, a relative, a foreigner, according to the diversity of time.

To another it must be said, that it is a privation consequent from a certain preceding affirmation: and therefore the argument is not valid. Otherwise it can be said, that negation and privation are considered in two ways, in themselves, and in their cause. In themselves they do not admit of more and less. In the cause they are varied according to the variation of the cause. Hence when privation is false, Aristotle does not say that he lies more who says five is a hundred, than he who says five is six.

To another it must be said, that he does not say legitimate moderately, because he moderately agrees with the laws, as the objection implies: but because he can easily be reduced to the law: hence it is clear, that it is not similar, which was introduced for the similar.

Articulus 2 — What Is The Number Of Those Who Impede Marriage

What is the number of those who impede marriage?

Then it is asked about the number of impediments,
They are noted in these verses:

Error, condition, vow, kinship, crime,
Disparity of cult, force, order, bond, honesty,
If you are related by affinity, if by chance you cannot consummate.
These prevent unions from being joined, retract what is done.

And again there are other verses through which
impediments are understood, which impede

contracting, but do not dissolve the contract:

The Church's prohibition, and also the time of feasts,
Impediments to be made, they allow the joined to be held.

However, it seems that not all these
have one reason for impeding marriage: because

1. Not all dissolve, as was evident in
   the verses; therefore, there is not one reason for impeding.

2. Condition does not impede, unless
the free spouse wishes: therefore, it is not similar to others.

For concerning each, it will be objected below:
it is asked, Whether these impede marriage?

And it seems that they do not: because
1. What is ordered to greater sanctity of marriage, should not impede marriage: but many of these which exclude union, are ordered to greater sanctity of marriage: therefore, they do not impede marriage. The first is evident through this, that sacraments are more perfect, the holier they are. The second is proven through what Augustine said above, that marriages are holier with the equal vow of the continent.

1. Also, If something impedes something from being done according to nature, it, supervening upon it, destroys it: but these impediments supervening upon marriage, do not destroy it: therefore, they do not impede it from being done. This is evident in all natural causes operating something: just as coldness impedes heat, and supervening upon it, destroys it.

2. Also, Madness is not placed here among the impediments; and yet the Master pursues it in the Book: therefore, the division seems insufficient.

It is asked again, What is properly an impediment, and by what are each distinguished?

Response. It seems to be said that there is one reason in common for an impediment, which makes a contracted impediment special: and this reason is contrary to the laws, by which marriage is joined.

To the objection, however, it must be said that this happens because the differences which contract an impediment in the genus are unequal: for this difference can be so valid that it excludes something essential to marriage, and then it dissolves the contract: because it was never a true marriage. Hence, to dissolve marriage is the same as to show that there is no contract, and therefore no marriage. However, some do not have such a valid difference that excludes something essential, and those impede it from being contracted: but because they do not impede the contract, it remains, and also the essence of marriage is inviolate by them.

To the other, it must be said that condition impedes on the part of the material cause of marriage: but it can be accepted if one wishes, because anyone can make their condition worse.

To the other, it must be said that it is not ordered to the sanctity of marriage, unless what allows marriage to stand: but here marriage does not stand: hence neither can the sanctity of marriage stand: but if marriage stood, then I would well concede that sanctity would be with the equal vow of the continent.

To the other, it must be said that this in contracts is worth nothing, even in the contract

of buying or selling grain: because many impede before, which supervening do not dissolve:

just as if the grain becomes worse in its power. And this happens because these do not occur by necessity, but by will: and therefore, whatever cause was made first, the will cannot act contrary: but natural causes act by necessity of their essence, and therefore destroy what was done before if they impeded what was to be done.

To the other, it must be said that madness is contained under error: because it cannot discern so as to consent.

To the last, it must be said that an impediment is something truly an impediment: but something else is in a certain respect.

However, that which is truly an impediment, is that which impedes contracting, and dissolves the contract. And this can be in two ways: for it is either against marriage insofar as it consists in the disposition of the ministers of the Church: or according to what is taken in itself. If according to what is in the disposition of the ministers of the Church, who are in the place of God on earth, then those things are against marriage which are from the institution of the Church. Therefore, either that institution is about betrothals, or about weddings. If in the first way, then it is the justice of public honesty. But if it is about the weddings themselves, either this is for the reverence of a more excellent sacrament to which the act of marriage is not fitting, or it is for the relationship of persons joined in marriage. If in the first way, then it is order. But if for the persons themselves: either it is in the person itself according to comparison to those from whom it is propagated, with whom it is as if one flesh, because derived from one with them: or this is for the spouse with whom one flesh is made. And in the first way, it is kinship both spiritual and corporal. But in the second way, it is affinity. But if it regards marriage in itself; either it regards marriage according to the efficient cause to which it is contrary: or according to the act in which it is consummated: or according to the matter, which is legitimate persons: or according to goods, and especially according to the principal good, which is offspring: or on the part of the form: and marriage cannot be considered in more ways. If in the first way, either this is from an opposite bond, or contrariety to the efficient. If in the second way, this is in two ways, namely either on the part of reason, or on the part of free will. And in the first way, it is error. But in the second way, it is force or violence. But if it regards it according to the act in which it is consummated, then it is impotence of consummating, from whatever cause it happens. But if it regards the matter, this cannot be unless from the malice of the matter which is induced to it, and thus it is crime. But if it is contrary to the best disposition of offspring, thus it is condition, because no one wishes to have free servants, and subject to others, as much as it is in itself. But if from the contrariety of the foundation, then it is disparity of cult. And if it is in the last way according to the contrariety of form which is individuality, then it is a bond with another, because no one can be individual with two.

The other two are evident: because one is taken from the simple prohibition of the Church, but the other from the incongruity of time caused by prohibition.

Articulus 3 — Why This Sacrament Alone Has Impediments

Why does this sacrament alone have impediments?

Thirdly, it is asked, Why does this sacrament alone have impediments?

For it seems that it ought not to have them alone: because even penance depends on our will and act: and yet no impediments are assigned to it: therefore it seems that neither should this one.

Response. It must be said to this, that there is a twofold cause why others do not have impediments: one of which is that they consist around one simple person, and he cannot be impeded by another. Another cause is because they are around spiritual acts, which God alone operates in us without us, in which He can have no impediment: because nothing is stronger than Him to impede Him. But both of these fail in marriage: because it depends on the wills of two, and on two agents: and its consummation consists in a bodily act: and therefore it can have multiple impediments.

And through this it is clear that it is not similar to penance, which was introduced as similar.

Articulus 4 — Whether Frigidity Is An Impediment To Marriage

Whether frigidity is an impediment to marriage?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said, there, B, Concerning those who on account of frigidity, etc.

However, it seems that frigidity ought not to impede: because
1. That which is ordered to the continence of marriage does not impede marriage, but frigidity is ordered to greater continence of marriage: therefore it does not impede.

1. Likewise, it is evident that all old men are naturally frigid: and yet an old man can contract with an old woman: therefore frigidity does not impede.
2. Likewise, if they know themselves to be frigid and contract, the marriage stands: therefore frigidity by itself does not impede marriage, but rather the intercourse which follows a certain marriage, as was proven above: therefore it is wrongly posited that frigidity impedes marriage.
3. Likewise, an impediment of marriage which is natural can equally happen to either spouse: but frigidity does not impede the woman: therefore neither ought it to impede the man: therefore it ought not to be posited as an impediment.
4. Likewise, excessive heat impedes, just as excessive frigidity: because excessive heat dries up moisture: therefore excessive heat ought to be posited as an impediment.
5. Likewise, in many males an impediment is found from excessive heat: therefore it seems that it ought to have been posited as one of the impediments.
6. Likewise, excessive moisture dissolves the nerves: therefore it impedes the vigor which is required for intercourse: therefore that also ought to be posited as an impediment.

Further, it is inquired here concerning those who have weak heat: for this suffices to move the members to concupiscence, but quickly evaporates, and extends weakly: therefore having a virgin wife, since he has only the first impulse, he cannot deflower her: and yet he could know a corrupted one, if he had such a wife. What then is to be done for him?

It seems that he can do nothing: because if he causes another to corrupt, he is the cause of adultery, and this ought not to be done.

Likewise, if he corrupts her by hand, this is a species of sodomy, since it is not done with the due instrument: therefore it seems that he ought to lack the due for which he contracted marriage.

The response is to this that frigidity here encompasses every natural and perpetual impediment of intercourse from whatever cause: but nevertheless because frigidity is more general, and is intensified always with advancing age, for this reason it is posited: for if it were an accidental impediment, namely by the removal of the penis, or the cutting of the testicles, or the perpetual constriction of the woman, which cannot be remedied by the benefit of medicine, then according to the verses placed above, the whole is contained under that member, which is perpetual impotence of intercourse, and here it is contained under frigidity: and this because the law does not speak of frigidity as frigidity, but as it causes impotence of intercourse: and therefore all things which cause the same naturally and perpetually, it calls frigidity.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that conjugal consent is in carnal copulation, and that supposes the power of intercourse if the due is demanded: and therefore frigidity excludes marital copulation in that which it supposes: nor is there conjugal continence, where such copulation by the exclusion of the due, if demanded, is excluded.

To the second, it must be said that old men have sufficient heat to move, although not to generate: and therefore marriage is granted to them as a remedy with respect to the faith of the bed: and therefore it is not similar.

And by this the solution to the following is clear.

To another, it must be said that in intercourse the woman is passive: for which reason Aristotle says that a woman is not properly called continent, because the impetus of the agent in intercourse does not pertain to her: but for suffering, frigidity suffices, although not for acting: because Avicenna says that frigidity stops motion: and therefore since the male behaves as an agent, if frigidity supervenes, motion is cut off, and he cannot act, and therefore on his part it impedes marriage.

To another, it must be said that it is not the same with excessive heat: because heat is hardly ever a perpetual impediment: because when foreign moisture is digested by food continuously taken, natural heat begins to be moderated, and is tempered in such a way that what before consumed, afterwards begins to dissolve and consume, and finally to dissolve without consumption. This also happens with the process of age: and therefore the Philosophers hand down that many impotent in youth for intercourse, with the process of age begin to

copulate: and many not generating in youth, with the process of age begin to generate: and therefore it is not posited as an impediment like frigidity. If however it were found to impede intercourse for three continuous years, they would be separated: but this hardly happens: because even when they are impotent to generate and copulate with respect to the mixing of seeds, because the seed is consumed in them, yet they can render the due from excessive vigor of the genitals, which is not in the frigid.

By this also the solution to the following is clear.

To another, it must be said that excessive moisture cutting off intercourse is only from frigidity inducing and inspiring that moisture: because frigidity is an active quality, and moisture more passive: and therefore moisture by itself cannot be the cause of an impediment.

To what is further inquired, saving a better opinion, it seems to be said that by the application of the hand a way could be made.

To what is objected against this, it seems to be said that it differs to apply the hand, as medicating, and polluting. For the hand applied as polluting induces softness or sodomy: but the medicating hand does not induce: just as we also say in women whose womb descends outside the mouth of the vulva: it is prescribed that they replace it with their fingers, and yet we do not say those hands pollute or corrupt them, but rather heal them.

Articulus 5 — Whether A Woman Wishing To Be Separated From Her Husband On Account Of Impotence Ought To Swear With The Seventh Hand Of Friends That She Has Not Been Known By Her Husband

Whether a woman wishing to separate from her husband on account of impotence ought to swear with the seventh hand of friends that she has not been known by her husband?

Whether a woman wishing to separate from her husband on account of impotence ought to swear with the seventh hand of friends that she has not been known by her husband?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said, there, B, shortly after the beginning: It was decreed that each of them with the seventh hand of relatives, etc.

For this seems inconvenient, since
1. The Lord says that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word stands: therefore it also seems that here two or three witnesses suffice.

1. Likewise, the Apostle also in the accusation of a presbyter says that two or three witnesses suffice. Therefore, it seems that the seventh hand is unjustly noted here.
2. Likewise, relatives are more suspect than others, because they willingly help their relatives to achieve the effect of their will: therefore it seems that it would be better to call strangers to the oath.
3. Likewise, since the work of marriage is very hidden, how can they swear concerning that which they have not seen?

4. Likewise, in what manner is the oath to be given to them?

Response. It must be said that in favor of marriage and because of the horror of separation so that others may be deterred, the multiplication of witnesses was introduced.

But what the Lord says, He understands in causes which are not so favorable and can come to knowledge better than this.

To the other, it must be said that the crime of a presbyter can be known better than the act of marriage, in which, as Augustine says in the book On Marriage and Concupiscence against Julian, even parents wish to have their own children whom they have begotten as witnesses because of the impudent concupiscence which is in intercourse.

To the other, it must be said that such familiar things are known to none so much as to relatives, who, if they are lacking, neighbors are assumed: who also, if they are not, others are taken who are greater than exception: and all those are said to be relatives here, with the term taken broadly.

To the other, it must be said that synodal witnesses or witnesses do not swear that they have not been mixed, but rather that they believe those to have sworn truly: whence those whose marriage is denounced by them first swear that they have never met carnally, and others afterwards swear that they believe them to have sworn truly.

To the last, it must be said that the man ought to swear in this manner, that for three continuous years he has faithfully without deceit given effort to know such a woman carnally, and he has never been able to know the same woman. She, however, swears that she has faithfully helped him to be known and has not impeded without deceit, and yet she has not been known by him: and others afterwards swear that they believe them to have sworn truly.

Articulus 6 — Whether, A Separation Having Been Made On Account Of Impotence, And Afterwards It Being Found By A Just Judgment That There Was Not Impotence, If They Have Contracted With Others They Ought To Be Separated

Whether separation is made on account of impotence, and afterwards it is discovered through just judgment that there was no impotence, if they have contracted with others, whether they ought to be separated?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, B, before the middle: But if he has taken another, let them be separated, etc.

Of this, however, in the Decretals, concerning the rigid and bewitched, a reason is given: because then it is evident that coldness was not the cause which they alleged, but rather by the instigation of the devil, because they held each other in hatred, they sought separation: whence when the Church, after the fact, saw itself deceived, it revokes the prior marriages which were true marriages: but separates the second ones which appeared only in the sight of men.

But against this it is objected: because

1. As it is proven in natural things, someone in youth is impeded from intercourse, and as age progresses begins to have intercourse: therefore the alleged impediment of the man can be true at first, and yet later the ability returns: it seems, therefore, that when the marriage was separated due to a true impediment, they ought to remain separated.
2. Likewise, one woman is more lovable than another: let us suppose, therefore, that someone does not have sufficient heat from complexion for intercourse: yet he can be excited by accidents of the soul which are love, concupiscence, and the like: for this is possible according to nature: because accidents of the soul also transform the body into infirmities and health, as the natural philosophers say: and thus it seems that such a one would be sterile perpetually to an abominable woman, and yet would have intercourse with a lovable one. If, therefore, he is separated from the first, and is permitted to contract with the second: and again when he has intercourse with the second, he is returned to the first, it seems unjust: because he has a perpetual impediment to that one, and not to this one.

Response. It must be said that this cannot happen except from excessive heat: and because such a one can render the debt, although he does not emit seed or generate: therefore such a case does not occur. But complete impotence of having intercourse is caused by coldness which always increases as age progresses: and therefore if for three years he has made the effort, and could not have intercourse, it is presumed to be a perpetual impediment.

To the other it must be said that perhaps in such a case consultation should be had from the responses of the wise: and without prejudice it seems to be said similarly as about the bewitched: because also a certain kind of bewitchment is the abomination which he conceives towards the woman: whence she is to be advised that she present herself clean and with adornment and affability lovable to the man: and he is to be advised that he consider the causes by which the woman may become more lovable: and if this does not help, it seems to be similar to bewitchment: and therefore they can be separated, and joined to others.

Articulus 7 — Whether, If A Husband To Whom Impotence Is Imputed Asserts That He Has Rendered The Debt, But The Woman Denies It, The Assertion Of The Husband Should Be Upheld

If a man to whom impotence is imputed asserts that he has rendered the debt, but the woman denies it, should the assertion of the man be upheld?

If a man to whom impotence is imputed asserts that he has rendered the debt, but the woman denies it, should the assertion of the man be upheld?

Then it is inquired concerning what is said, there, B, shortly before the end: But if the man asserts that he has rendered the debt, etc.

1. It seems this is unjust, when it can be proven by bodily inspection: and then by the judgment of the multitude the woman prevails over the assertion of the man, as it is

said, Extra, concerning the frigid and bewitched. Therefore, the assertion of the man is not always upheld.

2. Hem, it seems there is no cause as he says: because they are equal in marriage: therefore, it is said in vain that the man should be believed because he is greater.
3. Likewise, marriage is a medicine: but if the medicine is withdrawn, the sick falls into danger: but if the man lies to the woman, the medicine is withdrawn: she is exposed to fornication: therefore it seems that the judgment is unjust.
4. Likewise, a woman who could remain continent while lying alone, if she is compelled to lie with the man, from the continuous imagination and contact of the man, becomes incontinent: if therefore the man does not have intercourse with her, many other corruptions follow: and thus it seems that the judgment would be tolerable if they were separated.

Response. It must be said to this that this statute is just and most equitable, both because of the constancy of the man, and also because he is understood to be the head of the woman, all other things being equal except this alone, that the woman denies and the man affirms.

To the first, it must be said that if it is proven by inspection, then the woman prevails by ocular faith: and then the other things are not equal.

To the other, it must be said that the man is the head of the woman in governance, but in rendering the debt he is equal to her.

To the other, it must be said that the medicine is not withdrawn from the woman, but she fails in proof: and therefore the judge who does not see the hidden cannot involve himself in the cause.

To the other, it must be said that there is no doubt that such a woman is more incited to lust: and therefore she should provide for herself, namely by lying separately: for such a man will not deny this: and if he were to deny it, I do not think that the woman would be bound to consent.

Articulus 8 — Whether By The Impediment Of Sorcery Someone Can Be Hindered From The Power Of Having Intercourse

Whether someone can be impeded from the power of coition by the impediment of witchcraft?

Whether someone can be impeded from the power of coition by the impediment of witchcraft?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said, there, C, Concerning the impediment of witchcraft, etc.

Three things are inquired here,
First, Whether someone can be impeded from the power of coition by the impediment of

witchcraft?
Second, Whether witchcraft can be impeded or cured by another witchcraft?
Third, What is the statute of law concerning those bewitched?

To the first, it is objected thus:
1. The devil does not have power over pigs without divine permission: therefore, for him to receive power over pigs, he cannot be compelled by witchcraft: therefore, much less can he be compelled to receive power over a man.

1. Likewise, If someone is impeded by witchcraft, it must be by the operation of demons who are compelled to this, but with God permitting: however, it is evident that God does not relax the power of anyone through any work unless it is good and meritorious: but witchcraft is not meritorious: therefore, through this, power is not given to anyone: therefore, power is not given to impede someone from coition.
2. Likewise, The power of the demon is not read to have been given except to the Saints: but he who performs witchcraft has the demon in his power: therefore, he himself is a saint: therefore, it seems that witchcraft is holy: therefore, it is not done through incantation.
3. Likewise, The work of the devil cannot nor should destroy the work of God: but witchcraft is the work of the devil, while marriage is the work of God: therefore, witchcraft cannot impede or destroy marriage.
4. Likewise, If someone is bewitched, it is necessary that some operation be done either concerning the bewitched body or concerning the soul: therefore, the demon will operate. Therefore, the mode is sought: for he cannot operate through contact, because he does not have a body. Similarly, he cannot operate through command, because he is not established above anything: and there are not multiple modes of operations: therefore, the demon cannot impede anyone.
5. Likewise, The demon more wishes someone to be in the concupiscences of women and coition than continent: therefore, since witchcraft makes someone continent, it seems that it bewitches no one.

To this, it must be said that it should be doubtful to no one that many are bewitched by the force and power of demons: because the holy Fathers say this, and the Church has promulgated laws concerning this: and this is also evident to all those who know something about necromancy and the deeds of images.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that the devil receives this power permitted because of the sins of the sufferers, or as an example to others. However, how this happens through witchcraft, it must be said according to Theologians, that by divine virtue compulsion is made, and it is rather a certain vengeance and gravest punishment of sin, than by the aid of witchcraft, namely that he who is in filth, becomes more filthy, and receives the cooperation of error, who did not wish to believe the truth. Hence, compulsion is made by God and by the holy Angels, but the operation by the demon.

To the other, it must be said that it is not a meritorious work, but pestiferous, and the effect follows with God permitting. Hence, also sometimes the effect does not follow: and I think that this happens because God in his mercy restrains demons of this kind. Necromancers assign another cause about which nothing at present.

To the other, it must be said that the power of demons, that is, over demons, coercing from witchcrafts, is not read to have been given except to the Saints: but the power of the demon for the operation of error is often read to be given to infidels, and evil men, as it will be given to Antichrist, and is given daily to necromancers.

To the other, it must be said that the work of the demon by its own authority does not destroy the work of God, but with God permitting, and the man deserving to suffer this: but often the devil destroys the work of God, namely charity, faith, and the effects of other sacraments.

To the other, it must be said that the operation of demons is diverse concerning such things: however, the principal one is through command, as you will find noted on the second of the Sentences, where it is treated of the operation of demons.

Articulus 9 — Whether Sorcery Should Be Excluded By Sorcery

Whether evil is to be excluded by evil?

Secondly, it is asked, Whether evil is to be excluded by evil?

1. For necromancers teach that one evil is excluded by another: as is evident in the book of Hermes, which is titled concerning the secrets of Aristotle. Therefore, it seems that this way can be sought.
2. Likewise, in bodily medicines, it is of the same art to cause an illness and to cure the same: therefore, it will be in the same way in spiritual matters: but it is of the necromancer to confer evil: therefore, it will also be of the same to remove it: therefore, it seems that one can resort to it for the medicine of evil.

On the contrary, it is that
1. The Law of God commands that he who consults magicians and seeks truth from the dead be killed: therefore, no one ought to resort to them.

1. Likewise, in the Sacred Scripture, medicine is not taught except through fasts, and prayers, and suchlike: therefore, another medicine is not to be sought, since the demon operates nothing except by God's permission: if therefore God is pleased, the operation of the demon will be removed.
2. Likewise, Isaiah viii, 19 and 20, it is said that they ought not to go to diviners, who mutter, but to the law and to the testimony. Therefore, medicine from necromancers ought not to be sought.

The response is that medicine is in no way to be sought through an enchanter: but rather evil is always to be endured.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that those teach as pestilent to know: and when demons cease from harming, then they seem to cure, as is said in the life of St. Bartholomew.

To the second, it must be said that it is not similar: because medicine is a salutary art, and uses reason through the operations of a creature, to which God has given the power of making cures. Hence it is said, Ecclesiasticus xxxviii, 1: Honor the physician for necessity: for the Most High created him. And there, 3.4: The Most High created medicines from the earth, etc.: but necromancy is a pestilent art concerning its operations, and uses experiments more than reason, and uses the power of the demon as an antidote: and therefore the Church has condemned this entirely.

Articulus 10 — Whether Those Bewitched Should Be Separated

Whether those bewitched ought to be separated?

Whether those bewitched ought to be separated?

Thirdly, it is asked, What law is established concerning this?

What is said here in the Letter, and also, in the Decretals, concerning the frigid and bewitched is stated, and is held by the universal Church, namely that one bewitched to one is not bewitched to another: and therefore if he cannot be helped by the prayers of the good, he is separated, and both are given license to marry another, nor is this license ever revoked.

But against this it is objected: because in the book of Images it is taught that an image can be made which simply bewitches: for it causes love of chastity, and universally cuts off intercourse: therefore it seems that someone can be bewitched to all: therefore if he contracts, and is separated because of impotence of consummation, and afterwards knows another, it seems that he ought to return to the first just as the frigid, as was held above.

1. Likewise, just as the frigid can be cured, so also the bewitched: therefore just as the cured frigid is returned to the first marriage, so the bewitched, as it seems.

On the contrary, it is that the bewitched: when he contracted, was an illegitimate person: therefore the contract is null: therefore he ought not to be restored to a contract which is null.

Response. It must be said that it is to be held as the Letter says.

And to the first it must be said that there are many bewitchments: but without destruction of the body, and great infirmity, the body cannot be brought to this, that it is moved to none: but it is true that the love of chastity is indeed induced through necromancy, and the abomination of intercourse, but nevertheless a movement remains towards some due to the inflammation of concupiscence, unless he is entirely chilled.

To the other it must be said that the bewitched can be cured if he wholly devotes himself to God in prayer, compunction, and satisfaction: but nevertheless because then he was an illegit-

imate person for contracting when he contracted, therefore he is absolved from that. But in the cured frigid it is presumed that because he contracted, he was not entirely frigid, but feigned when he contracted: and therefore he is restored to the prior marriage according to the judgment of the Church, which especially follows external presumptions.

Articulus 11 — Whether Madness Impedes Marriage

Whether madness impedes marriage?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said, there, D, "Also while they are in madness," etc.

For it seems that it ought not to impede, because
1. It is not against any good of marriage: therefore it seems that it ought not to impede.

1. Likewise, some are mad who have lucid intervals, and then they can discern: therefore they can contract: therefore it is not generally true what is said here.
2. Likewise, it has been held above that the commixture of male and female is of natural law: but this is naturally in the madman as in others: therefore he can contract marriage.
3. Likewise, in the text it says that if marriage has been contracted, it should not be separated: but whatever contract stands, was valid in the contract itself: therefore when the madman contracted, the contract was valid; therefore madmen can contract.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:
Consent to marriage ought to be voluntary, as was shown above: but the madman cannot have voluntary consent: therefore he cannot contract marriage. The first is proved from the pre-established concerning the efficient cause of marriage. The second from the third of the Ethics, where it is written that involuntary is said in two ways: because one is through ignorance, and another through violence. And involuntary through ignorance is, whose principle is in the one not knowing the particulars in which the act is.

Response. It must be said that madmen, as long as they are in the act of madness, cannot contract: and the reason for this is given by the last objection.

To the first, it must be said that it is contrary to the good of faith: because such a one does not know what faith is, and therefore does not keep it: however, it is principally contrary to the efficient cause of marriage.

To the second, it must be said that some have lucid intervals, and then they do not have madness according to act: and therefore they can contract.

To the other, it must be said that marriage is of natural law in the manner which was said above from the words of Aristotle and Aspasius, namely according to the resolution to the end of man: because otherwise it would not be law, because law considers the reason of the just and the unjust, and therefore supposes the discretion of reason.

To the fourth, it must be said that it is understood of one who contracted not in the time of madness.

Articulus 12 — Whether He Who Has Known One Sister Can Take The Other As A Wife

Whether he who has known one sister can take another as wife?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said, there, H, Concerning those also who with two sisters, etc.

It seems unjust what is said here: because

1. The marriage was lawful, and intercourse with the sister of his wife occurred: but a supervening impediment to marriage does not dissolve it: therefore it seems false what is said in two decrees of the Saints.
2. Likewise, the wife is not aware of the crime: therefore it seems that she is unjustly treated, namely that she is deprived of her due in the body of her husband: therefore it is unjust what is said in the Letter.
3. Likewise, God joined them first when they were legitimate persons: therefore they ought not to be separated: therefore license should not be given for marrying while the husband lives: therefore Pope Zacharias speaks unjustly in the Letter.

Response. Although the Master in the Letter resolves this last point, yet I think that the Holy Fathers speak here of the impediment of crime, which prevents marriage: and then it is clear that if he carnally knew one sister, he cannot take the other in marriage. Or if he speaks of a subsequent crime: then it must be understood that he speaks according to the rigor of the law, namely that he ought not: but yet if there is danger of incontinence, even with the wife dead or alive, license is given to him to demand his due: and also after the death of his wife to contract with another.

Through this the solution to the first is clear.

To the other it must be said that the wife has not lost the power of demanding, but he has: and thus the decree speaks: whence it is illicit for him to demand, but not to render: and he ought not to demand by right. However, I think that license ought to be given to him by the Church, if she does not demand separation from the bed: because otherwise there would be danger.

Articulus 13 — Whether An Adulterer Can Contract With An Adulteress

Can an adulterer contract with an adulteress?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said there, E, a little before the end: "But an adulteress never, even if her husband has died," etc.

For it seems false: because
1. We see many adulterers contract.

1. Likewise, the laws say that even an adulterer can contract with her whom he previously defiled through adultery, except in the three cases which are contained in the Letter: therefore, much more can he contract with another.

Response. It is from the strictness of the law what is said here: whence Gregory touches on what he ought to do concerning the contradiction of his crime, but not what he ought to do if he does not wish to contain himself.

Articulus 14 — Whether Someone Can Dismiss His Wife For However Small A Cause, Fornication Alone Excepted

Whether someone can dismiss a wife for any cause whatsoever, except for fornication alone?

Whether someone can dismiss a wife for any cause whatsoever, except for fornication alone?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said, there, F, Lud it must also be known, that for some infirmity, etc.

For it seems unjust: because
1. It incites hatred, and frequently leads to adultery: therefore it ought to be guarded against by the Church: therefore it seems that in such a case she can be dismissed.

1. Likewise, there are many burdens of marriage, even if the spouse is delightful: therefore it is not necessary that one should also be burdened by the spouse: therefore it seems that in such a case she ought to be dismissed.
2. Likewise, certain infirmities are passed on to children, such as leprosy, and the like, and then the good of marriage is destroyed: therefore it seems that then the marriage ought to be separated.

Response. It must be said generally, that nothing supervening upon marriage separates it, as is said in the Text.

To the objections, however, it must be said that the fidelity of the bed and the charity of Christ ought to restrain from hatred, and make one willingly endure burdens for the sake of Christ.

To the last objection, however, it must be said that offspring from such cases is not destroyed, except in the body, and it has been shown above that according to the body is not the good of marriage, but rather according to the soul.

DISTINCTIO XXXV

Divisio Textus

It is also to be noted that when the Lord grants, etc. Having certain impediments, which in the law itself and nature impede the contracting of marriage and dissolve the contracted, the Master touches upon separation from bed, in which there is no sacramental separation: concerning which he inquires four things.

The first is that the right of each in this separation is equal.

The second, that if they are in similar crime, neither spouse can dismiss the other, there, B, If indeed it is asked whether the adulterer, etc.

Thirdly, he shows that the dismissed man or woman cannot join themselves to another, while both the dismissing and the dismissed are alive, there, CG, But if anyone is free from fornication, etc.

Fourth and lastly, with a reason suitable to the matter, he touches upon those who first defiled themselves through adultery, and afterwards contract marriage, there, E, But all these things are to be understood concerning that, etc.

And let these suffice concerning the division.

Articulus 1 — Whether The Right Of Each In Separation Is Equal

Is the right of each in separation equal?

The determined question arises in the first chapter, namely that the right of each in separation is equal.

For it seems that it ought not to be so:

1. For right perfects nature: but according to the order of nature, man excels woman: therefore, they ought not to be considered with equal right in dismissing each other on account of fornication. The first part is evident by itself. The second is proven in the books on Animals, where it is said that particular nature never intends woman, but rather that the female is an occasioned male.
2. Also, Tullius says that all right has proceeded from nature through reason: since therefore nothing proceeds from nature contrary to the order of nature, it seems that there can never be a right that judges man and woman equally in dismissing.
3. Also, according to the law of Christ, the man is the head of the wife: but the head is never cut off with the body being safe, but some other putrid member can be cut off: therefore, since the woman is like a member, the woman can be cut off from the man if she becomes putrid through fornication, and not vice versa the man from the woman.

4. Also, one good of marriage ought not to prejudice another: but I see that a fornicating woman makes the offspring uncertain, as Tullius says: therefore, she ought not to be tolerated for the good of the sacrament, but rather cast off, so that certain children may be born from another.

5. Also, if the woman fornicates, uncertain children are established for the husband's inheritance and marriage, as it is said, Ecclesiasticus 1:3: but if the man fornicates, uncertain children are not established in marriage and inheritance for this reason: since therefore they are unequally affected in harm, it seems that they ought to be unequally affected in the right of dismissing each other.

6. Also, in the Old Testament, Deuteronomy 24:1 and following, it was permitted for a man to dismiss his wife, and not vice versa: therefore, it seems that even in the New Testament they ought to be unequally affected in this right.

On the contrary, that which is effected by two concurrent vows ought to have an equal cause in both: but such is marriage: therefore, both are equally affected in the cause of separation from the bed.

Response. It must be said that those things which are said in the Text are without ambiguity true.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that the man does not excel in all things, but only in governance and the efficacy of generation: but in establishing the individuality of marriage, and in the debt, and in the faith of the bed, they are in all things equal: because these are as it were civil, and are effected by the will of both.

To the other, it must be said that all right proceeds from nature: but it is not necessary that it proceeds from one condition of nature: for in the woman, it is that she is female: and this is sex, and on account of this she needs a ruler, and an effective generator: and from this it proceeds that she does not dominate over the man, that she is subject, that she is not permitted to teach him, that she is rather an aid to generation than generating. It is also in her that she is a human having reason and free will: and from this it proceeds that she is the mistress of her own acts, that she makes marriage by her consent, that she has a debt acquired for herself, and that she can keep the faith of the promise. And thus it is clear how this right proceeds from nature.

By this, the solution to the following is also clear: because she is not the head in all things, but in some, as was evident.

To the other, it must be said that one good does not prejudice another, but rather preserves it, just as the faith of the bed certifies the children. Hence what is objected held when the paucity of men merited dispensation of separation: but after the good began to multiply through preaching, the state of continence is praised: and therefore the fruit of the womb is not sought in another woman.

To the other, it must be said that although the sin of the man does not generate doubt of offspring, nevertheless he sins in marriage, and therefore loses the debt in the body of the

wife, which he had acquired by the right of marriage. And that objection proceeds from a non-cause: because the cause of separation from the bed is not the uncertainty of children, but rather the sin which he commits in marriage.

To the other, it must be said that in the Old Testament this was not as a right, but rather as a dissimulation in the judgment of causes rather than in the judgment of the soul, as was said before in the question of the bill of divorce: and therefore it is nothing to the purpose.

Articulus 2 — Whether Men Ought To Accuse Their Adulterous Wives To The Priests

Whether husbands ought to accuse their adulterous wives to priests?

Then it is inquired concerning what is said there, A, a little before the end: Husbands, however, more freely accuse their adulterous wives to priests, etc.

It seems that the contrary of this ought to be: because
1. Chrysostom says that the proper passion of women is lust: therefore it is less to be imputed to them if they commit fornication: therefore they are less blameworthy in accusation than men.

1. Likewise, in the following chapter below, Augustine says that men ought to be punished more severely, as it pertains more to them to conquer in virtue and to rule women by example. And from this follows the same as before.

2. Likewise, on account of the easy incontinence and inclination of the sex, the Philosopher says that they are not properly called continent, but rather men: therefore it seems that an incontinent woman is not as blameworthy as a man: therefore she is not as blameworthy in action as a man.

Response. It must be said that there are two qualities which conjointly cause incitation to intercourse and the faculty of coition: these are heat and moisture: women have less active than men, because they are colder than men in general as pertains to complexion, and thus they have less incitation to intercourse than men: and therefore their incontinence is more blameworthy. But it is true that they resist the temptation of intercourse more weakly, namely in this that they are more moist than men, and that moisture easily receives impressions and is more quickly bent than dryness: but this is material: and therefore they are simply more blameworthy than men. However, in marriage there are two special causes, one of which is that according to the faculty of one man, he can generate in many, and not a woman: and the reason for this has also been explained above. The second is: because the uncertainty of children arises from the sin of the woman, but not from the sin of the man: and this has also been explained above.

Therefore, I say to the first, that the saying of Chrysostom is to be referred to the passive quality, which causes resistance to reception, and this is a secondary quality, and the active is principal.

By the same it is clear the solution to the saying of Augustine, because men have to resist from dryness.

To the other it must be said that the Philosopher says this because every virtue seeks a certain highest state, because virtue is the ultimate potency in a thing: but since continence is said from resisting and holding passions, especially from venereal ones, and women fail in holding such passions due to abundant moisture, he says that they do not have the virtue of continence in the highest, because they are not agents, but rather patients in venereal matters. And therefore the Poet said:

Chaste is she whom no one has asked.

Articulus 3 — Whether Adulterers Are Bound To Dismiss One Another And To Be Separated, Or Can Live Together

Are adulterers bound to dismiss and separate themselves, or can they dwell together?

Whether adulterers are bound to separate and part, or can they live together?

Next, it is asked concerning what is said there, I, If indeed it is asked, Whether an adulterer can dismiss an adulteress, etc.

For it is asked here, Whether they are bound to separate on account of fornication, or can they still cohabit if they wish?

It seems, however, that they are bound to separate: because
1. A separating act always divides, unless something reunites it: but fornication is a separating act: therefore it divides, unless a reunion is made: but there cannot be a reunion there: therefore it is necessary that the division remains.
This is assumed by the destruction of the consequent: between two and the same persons, a matrimonial and legitimate union is not repeated: therefore, since they were previously united, after the separating act, the union will not be repeated, lest injury be done to the sacrament.

1. Likewise, it seems that an adulterer can dismiss an adulteress, because the adultery of one causes separation: but in every nature it is such that when the cause is doubled, then the effect is strengthened: but by the adultery of both, the cause of dismissal is doubled: therefore the effect is strengthened, therefore much more can an adulterer dismiss an adulteress than a non-adulterer can dismiss an adulteress.
2. Likewise, the sin of both is greater than that of one simply: therefore it seems that both sin more against marriage than one; therefore they divide the cohabitation of the bed more by both sinning than if one sinned: therefore it seems that they can dismiss each other.
3. Likewise, both have lost their right in marriage: therefore, since this is not acquired again for them on account of sin, it seems that they sin by remaining together afterwards: therefore they are bound to separate.

On the contrary, this is what the Lord says, John 8:7: "He who is without sin": and he said this concerning the adulteress: therefore it is yours, let him who is without sin cast the first stone

at her; an adulterer cannot accuse an adulteress: therefore neither can he bring her to judgment by accusation: but he cannot dismiss her except by judgment: therefore a wife adulteress cannot be dismissed by an adulterer.

Response. It must be said that an adulterer cannot dismiss an adulteress, as is said in the Text.

To the first objection, it must be said that it is not simply a separating act: because it separates from the bed, but not from the sacrament: and therefore the objection is not valid: for such union and separation are personal, and therefore cannot be repeated often between the same persons.

To the other, it must be said that the adultery of one is a cause of separation by the merit of the faith kept in the other: for it is adjudged to him, that the adulteress has sent away the debt she had in the body of the other, although the other has lost nothing. But when both commit adultery, then that faith merits nothing, and therefore they cannot be separated: because neither can be judged to the punishment of the other. The objection proceeds as if the judgment is made by the merit of adultery alone: and this is not true.

By this, the solution to the following is also clear.

To the third, it must be said that neither has lost their right: because what one loses their right, it is judged in favor of the faith kept by the other: and this does not happen here.

And thus the reason for the assigned law is clear here.

Articulus 4 — Whether A Husband Who, Being Free From Fornication, Has Dismissed A Fornicatress, Can Be Joined To Another

Whether a man who is free from fornication can dismiss a fornicating wife and marry another?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said, there,

C, If anyone, however, is free from fornication, etc.

From this it seems that in this chapter it is said that it is entirely unjust:

1. For the Lord says in the Gospel that not all receive the word concerning continence: therefore, it ought not to be imposed on all: either therefore the man will dismiss, or he will not dismiss. If he dismisses, then since he is imperfect, perfection is imposed on him: but this is a snare for the imperfect, as the Apostle suggests, 1 Corinthians 7:35: Moreover, I say this for your benefit, not to cast a snare upon you, but for that which is honorable, I supply, to provoke, and which provides the ability to beseech the Lord without impediment. But if he does not dismiss, then he provides an incentive to sin: because he is foolish who holds a harlot, as it is said in the Letter: therefore it seems unjust what is said here.

2. Likewise, This woman from marriage had nothing more than the debt in the body of the man, and this she lost by the merit of fornication: therefore she has nothing more in common with him: therefore it seems that although she is not released from him who did not sin in marriage, yet he is released from her: therefore he can marry another, although she cannot marry another.

3. Likewise, Since there are three goods of marriage, I see that by fornication two are expressly violated, namely faith and sacrament. And concerning faith indeed it is clear. Concerning the sacrament, however, it is also clear thus: because the sacrament according to being is the very individuality of marriage, by which man and woman were one in soul and body: but it is impossible for that unity to remain in union with another: therefore since by fornication one unites with another, he divides himself from the first: therefore individuality is dissolved: therefore these goods which are made null do not hold the being of marriage between man and woman. But the good of offspring is better and more certainly sought in another, and even in animals: therefore it seems that none of the goods of marriage prevent that he who has not fornicated can contract with another: therefore it is false what is said in the Letter.

4. Likewise, Marriage is a medicine: but no art of medicine is such that it prepares only one electuary or antidote, but rather if one is offended, another is prepared: therefore by similarity, since the disease of concupiscence is more dangerous than the disease of the body, it seems that different antidotes ought to be continuously prepared for it. If therefore one of the spouses offends (because it is better to marry than to burn) the ability to contract with another ought to be given.

On the contrary of this is that everything inducing lasciviousness and dissolution of the civilities of the Church ought to be prohibited by law, as the Philosopher says in the Politics: but to be joined to several successively is of this kind: therefore it ought to be prohibited: therefore the law which is set here is right. The middle is proven: for if the separated one is joined to another, hatred of kinship towards kinship is born, and dissension of the house of children against children: therefore the proposition is established.

To this it must be said that those things which are said in the Letter are to be held without ambiguity.

To the first objection, however, it must be said that it is permitted and advised to him, that with caution he spare his wife, and thus remain with her: because she is not a harlot who is penitent: and if she does not wish, let her impute it to herself: nor by this does he provide an incentive to sin, because the man can rightly restrain her with disciplines and priests, so that he will not fear a second lapse.

By this also the solution to the second is clear.

To the other it must be said that the good of the sacrament is not violated: because such separation is not sacramental: because although she is united to another bodily, yet not sacra-

mentally: and bodily union with another does not contradict sacramental union with the husband, and therefore does not sever it.

To the other it must be said that marriage is a medicine: yet if the sick person abhors the medicine, which alone avails against the disease, another cannot be made for him, but the same differently disposed will be salutary: so it is with the woman first a harlot, and afterwards penitent.

Articulus 5 — Whether A Husband Can Dismiss A Fornicatress And Be Joined To Another, As It Is Falsely Imputed To Ambrose That He Held This

Whether a man can dismiss a fornicator and join with another, as it is falsely attributed to Ambrose that he held this?

Whether a man can dismiss a fornicator and join with another, as it is falsely attributed to Ambrose that he held this?

Then it is asked concerning what Ambrose says, there, C, after the beginning: Because it is permitted for a man to take another, etc.

For this seems to be true: because
1. As was said before, men have more incitement than women: therefore, they ought to be more assisted by the statutes of marriage: therefore, something ought to be granted to them, which is not to women: but this cannot be, unless it is that they take others: therefore, it is permitted or ought to be permitted for men to take others.

1. Likewise, a man fulfills many, as was proven above: therefore, according to the nature of his sex, it ought to be permitted for him to contract with many: therefore, what is said is licit:

therefore, it is not falsely attributed to Ambrose's books, but rather it is decreed or said from reason.

Response, that it was added by a falsifier to Ambrose's book, and is openly false.

1. To the first, it must be said that the law of continence is enjoined on the one dismissing: or if he does not contain, to be reconciled, and this befits the perfection of the New Testament: nor will God deny grace, provided that he prepares himself by repenting for reception, to which if he does not prepare himself, he imputes it to himself and not to another.

To the second, it must be said that here the Philosopher speaks of the nature which is the sex from the genus: because every male is thus disposed: and this is not the proper nature of man, but rather that which is from difference. And what this means is clear from the above. Thus, however, the law of the fathers speaks concerning the right of man insofar as he is man, that is, insofar as he uses reason and intellect through the consideration of the reward of chastity.

Articulus 6 — Whether A Husband Is Bound To Dismiss An Adulteress, Or To Keep Her With Him

Whether a man is bound to dismiss an adulteress, or to keep her with him?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said, there, D, John Chrysostom says, etc.

For this is confirmed by reason: because
1. The ease of pardon begets an incentive to sinning: but often to receive is an ease of pardon: therefore it begets an incentive to sinning: therefore it is not to be hoped for in receiving.

1. Likewise, on that of the epistle to the Romans 1, 82: Not only those who do these things, etc., the Gloss says, that he consents, who, while he can rebuke, is silent: by sending away the woman through this that he accuses her of fornication, he can rebuke: therefore he sins by being silent and dissembling: but reception is made from the dissembling of fault: therefore he sins by hoping to receive.
2. Likewise, to be a patron of disgrace and of lenocinium, is a mortal sin: but to keep a fornicator is to be a patron of disgrace and lenocinium, as it is said in the Letter: therefore to keep a fornicator and not to cast her out, is a mortal sin.

On the contrary of this it is objected thus:
1. A wise man takes care not to lose an irreplaceable remedy for himself: but a wife is an irreplaceable remedy for concupiscence while she lives: therefore a wise man does not cast her out: therefore he does not wish to separate from her, as long as she lives, whatever she may do.

1. Likewise, Jerome says on Hosea, that it is good to induce a harlot to be invited to continence: therefore it is much more good to keep one already led: therefore it is evil to dismiss a wife even practicing prostitution.
2. Likewise, if she were an unbeliever, he would be advised to keep her in hope of repentance: therefore much more should he be advised to keep a believer, but erring in morals: therefore in no way is she to be dismissed.
3. Likewise, as long as she is with the man, she has some restraint from disgrace: but when she is dismissed, she has none; therefore it seems that it is better to keep her than to dismiss her.

Response. It must be said, that as long as there is hope and the faculty of correction, so long the man is to be advised not to dismiss his wife: but if neither of these is present, it is rather to be advised to the man that he withdraw himself from disgrace: because he is judged a patron of disgrace, when he dwells with one unwilling to withdraw from fornication.

And through this the solution to the first part of the objections is clear.

To the first objection in the contrary, it must be said that a wise man has something of the fear of God and love of honesty: and therefore he more willingly lacks a remedy which does

not directly heal, because by the grace of nature a remedy is against concupiscence, which he uses with infamy and participation in sin in a nefarious woman.

To the other it must be said, that it is true, where there is hope of repentance: but if there is no hope, then he is foolish, who takes such a woman.

To the other it must be said, that it is true concerning an unbeliever who cohabits not in contempt of the author of marriage: but such a harlot in whom repentance is not hoped for, cohabits with contempt of the honesty of marriage and blasphemy of chastity.

To the other it must be said, that if the man can restrain her from disgrace, then without doubt he is to be advised to keep her: but if he cannot, then it is safer to dismiss her, lest the man himself also perish in the crime of the woman.

Articulus 7 — In What Manner The Accusation Of Adultery Ought To Be Made

How ought the accusation of adultery to be made?

How ought the accusation of adultery to be made?

Then it is inquired concerning what is said, there, E, But all these things are to be understood, etc.

First, How ought the accusation to be made? Second, When is the husband admitted to the accusation of the adulterous wife, or conversely? Third, What is the effect of this separation? Fourth, In which cases can the husband not act for the separation of the bed? Fifth, Whether after the sentence of separation of the bed has been pronounced, he is bound to receive the adulteress if he himself has also committed adultery? Sixth, Whether the woman after the sentence has been pronounced ought to be reconciled to the husband recalling her, even if she does not wish? Seventh, Whether the adulterous woman after penance for adultery can repel the husband from accusation? Eighth, Whether the secretly adulterated husband can without sin act against the manifestly adulterous woman for the separation of the bed? Ninth, Whether the reconciled adulteress has lost the debt she had in the body of the husband, so that she cannot without sin demand the debt, but only render it?

To the first, it is objected thus: Accusation is properly made concerning a crime by inscription, with the accuser obligating himself to the law of retaliation before the judge if he fails in proof.

However, it seems that this cannot be observed in the accusation of adultery: because

1. Accusation ought to be concerning what is known: but that sin is committed in secret. Therefore, it cannot be accused.
2. If you say that it ought to be accused by suspicion. On the contrary: Human judgment is often deceived: therefore suspicion does not lead to the certainty of judgment: therefore neither will the judge proceed to a definitive sentence.

3. Likewise, How is the inscription to be made? For it cannot be understood to inscribe that which is to be proven: but the act of intercourse cannot be proven, because it very rarely happens that this sin is committed before so many as to suffice for proof.

4. Likewise, It seems that it cannot be maintained, that he obligates himself to the law of retaliation: because if it is granted that he does not prove, then he himself would be separated from the spouse, because this is just as if the wife were separated from him: therefore whether he proves or does not prove, he would achieve his purpose: and this is not just: therefore the mode of accusation cannot be made in this case.

Response. It must be said that the accusation of marriage on account of manifest adultery is twofold: one for legal punishment, the other for the separation of the bed. That which is for legal punishment is made before the secular judge by inscription and the penalty of retaliation: because then the same penalty ought to be inflicted on the man if he fails in proof as would be inflicted on the woman if he could prove what he says. But that which is made for the separation of the bed is made by inscription before the ecclesiastical judge and without the law of retaliation: because the law of retaliation does not apply: because as was objected, the man would achieve his purpose, whether he proves what he objects or not.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that it is judged known according to what is violently presumed at least according to the rhetorician, who proceeds from violent signs, as if he finds her alone with him alone in bed or lurking in the dark. Sometimes even both men and women, when they know adulterers, lie in wait for them, and then they catch them in the act with clothes, and then it can be evident to the judge concerning the fact.

To the other, it must be said that suspicion is called light and violent, according to what even in dialectics sometimes a sign is found deepened, which is almost turned with cause, and this sometimes makes knowledge almost demonstrative like a cause, and such is presumption in rhetoric, and this well makes faith to the judge: but light ought not to be admitted.

To the third, it must be said that inscription is to be made thus: In the year from the incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ 1249, with Lord N. presiding.

To the other, it must be said as is evident in the beginning of the solution.

Articulus 8 — When A Husband Is Admitted To The Accusation Of An Adulterous Wife; And Whether It Can Be Done For Sodomy; And Concerning Heresy And The Other Cases

When is a husband admitted to the accusation of an adulterous wife? And, can it be done through sodomy? And, concerning heresy and other cases?

Secondly, it is asked, When is a husband admitted to the accusation of an adulterous wife, or conversely?

It seems, however, that when fornication or adultery is committed: because
1. The Lord says, Matthew 5:32 and 19:9, that dismissal cannot occur except for the cause of fornication: therefore, if there is fornication, then it seems accusation can be made.

1. Likewise, accusation is concerning a crime sinning against marriage: but that is fornication: therefore, with that perpetrated, accusation can be made.

On the contrary, it is said,
4. According to the Lord, Matthew 18:17, everyone must first be admonished before being accused before the church: therefore, it seems that immediately with fornication existing, the wife is not to be accused, but admonished to repent.

1. Likewise, in such fraternal correction, a man is held to an outsider: therefore, much more in such matters is he held to his wife: therefore, she is not to be immediately accused.

The question arises here, Since the more disgraceful mode is abusing oneself in sodomy, whether through sodomy accusation can be made for the separation of the bed?

It seems, however, that it can: because
1. It is more to sin against nature than against marriage: but sodomy is against nature, whereas fornication or adultery is against marriage only: therefore, sodomy is a greater sin than adultery: therefore, separation should more be made because of sodomy than because of adultery.

1. Likewise, Genesis 38:7 and 10, the Lord killed him who spilled his seed on the ground: therefore, much more will He kill him who acts against nature and annihilates the seed: therefore, it seems that for the enormity of the crime, separation should be made concerning the marriage bed.

On the contrary of this is that it does not divide itself into another: therefore, it keeps the faith of the bed in that it does not communicate itself to another, and to another the faith of the bed is not obligated: therefore, it seems that it does not sin against marriage: therefore, neither is it to be punished in marriage concerning the separation of the bed.

Another question arises here concerning spiritual fornication:
1. For that is greater than bodily: therefore, since it sins against the author of marriage through heresy or Judaism or paganism, it seems that he who sins in such a way in marriage is to be punished concerning the separation of the bed.

1. Likewise, in such fornication, the evil of the offspring is more feared than even in bodily: therefore, such a wife is more to be separated from the bed than one fornicating bodily, lest the offspring be infected with heresy.

On the contrary is: because

1. Such a one in no way sins against marriage: therefore, it is unjustly acted with him if he is punished in marriage.

1. Likewise, let us suppose that he does not cohabit in contempt of the Creator, nor teaches heresy to the other spouse or children, it seems that then separation is not to be made.

Response. It must be said that in these three cases accusation can be made of those who are touched in objecting.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that there is a manifold mode of accusation, through accusation, through denunciation, and through inquisition. The objection, however, holds concerning the mode of denunciation, but not concerning the mode of accusation: because in the mode of accusation it is more acted towards the punishment of the accused than towards correction: but in the mode of denunciation it is the converse. And there is an instance: because in theft I can act towards my thing, and accuse the thief before the ecclesiastical judge, yet I am not held to admonish him first.

To the other, it must be said that this is true when a man acts towards the correction of the person: and then the mode of accusation is not that which is done through inscribed accusation.

To the other which is further asked, it must be said that, as I think, for sodomy violently presumed and proven, the wife can be dismissed, and conversely, unless it is presumed that by the exhibited female concubinage she is purged from the vice of sodomy.

To what is objected against, it must be said that it does not keep the faith of the bed: because it stains chastity, for whose custody the faith of the bed is to be kept: but it is true that it does not unite itself to another, but rather loses chastity, than if it united itself to another.

To what is further asked, it must be said that without doubt for heresy or other pertinacious infidelity the wife can be dismissed, when it objects to carnal fornication: but when it objects to spiritual, then custom must be alleged, because otherwise it would not be judged pertinacious in its sense.

To what is objected against, it must be said that it sins against the foundation of marriage and the author: and this is worse than if it directly sinned against marriage: and therefore, supervening, it causes separation from the bed.

To the other, it must be said that this itself is contempt: because it has fallen into heresy from the Christian faith, and there is less hope concerning her than if she had never been faithful: and therefore it is not similar, because the Apostle speaks there of those who contracted in gentility, and afterwards one of them was converted: but here it speaks of him who, existing in Christianity before, contracted, and afterwards fell into heresy.

Articulus 9 — Whether The Effect Of Separation Is Severance From The Bed

Is the effect of separation a cutting off from the bed?

Thirdly, it is asked, What is the effect of separation?

And it is commonly said that it is a cutting off from the bed.

However, it seems that it ought not to be: because
1. To no one from whom fear is held, and who can be guarded, should the liberty of sinning be given: but a woman thus departing receives greater liberty of sinning: therefore it ought not to be granted to her by the husband: therefore she ought not to be separated from the bed.

1. Likewise, Hosea 1:6 speaks of an adulteress saying: "I will hedge up your way with thorns, and I will hedge her in with a wall, and she shall not find her paths," and she is not to be separated from the bed.
2. Likewise, Jerome in the prologue of the Galeated Prologue of Hosea describes an adulterous woman shut in the chamber of her husband, and sitting as a widow for a long time, and awaiting the return of her husband to her: therefore, in this way it can also be done here.
3. Likewise, a madman wishing to kill himself is bound and well treated: but the death of the soul is more dangerous than the death of the body: therefore it seems that one wishing to cause the death of the soul to himself ought not to be released, but bound.

On the contrary, it is what the Pope says, that no one is injured who uses his own right: but he who dismisses uses his own right: therefore he injures no one: therefore he can do this licitly.

Response. It must be said that she can be dismissed even for simple fornication: but she also ought to be dismissed when she frequently repeats it and does not wish to repent, for the reasons assigned above.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that force cannot be applied to her because coerced services do not please God, and, as Damascene says, neither does it compel virtue nor persuade malice: and even if she were bound externally, the heart could not be bound: and therefore she is not to be bound.

To the following two, it must be said that the way of fornication of the soul is to be hedged with thorns by the Lord, who can convert in this way: but the husband cannot convert, and for the favor of the husband it is permitted to him to act towards separation, so that the woman, thus confused, may return to herself, just as excommunication is medicinal.

To the fifth, it must be said that it is not similar to the madman: because he does not foresee his danger, but the adulterous woman sees well.

Articulus 10 — In Which Cases A Husband Cannot Bring Action For Separation Of Bed

In which cases can a man not act for the separation of bed?

Fourthly, it is asked, In which cases can a man not act for the separation of bed?

And seven are mentioned. The first case is, if he is similarly convicted of fornication. The second, If he prostituted his wife. The third, If she believed her husband to be dead due to his

long absence. The fourth, If she was secretly known by someone in the guise of her own husband entering the bed. The fifth, If she was oppressed by force. The sixth, If he reconciled with her after the adultery was committed. The seventh, If in infidelity the marriage was contracted, the other converted gives a bill of divorce to the one unwilling to cohabit, and he departing marries another, and after dismissing that one is converted: for then he is bound to receive her, notwithstanding that she was known by another in infidelity.

However, it is objected concerning the first case: because 1. Double fault increases guilt: therefore also punishment: since therefore the punishment of the wife's fornication is separation from bed, on account of double fornication they ought to be separated.

1. Likewise, Each of them sins against marriage: therefore each of them ought to be punished in marriage: therefore they ought to be separated from each other.
2. Likewise, The faith of each is harmed towards the other: therefore they cohabit dangerously: therefore it seems that it should be granted to them that they act for separation from each other.

Concerning the second, it is objected: because 1. Then most of all the companionship between man and woman seems vile: therefore the right should be given that they be separated from each other.

1. Likewise, The circumstance is more disgraceful to be prostituted by a man than by a stranger: therefore it seems that some right should be introduced by which she is separated from the man: and this cannot be unless an accusation is given for separation: therefore such a one should not be hindered from acting for the separation of bed.

Concerning the third, it is similarly objected: 1. For let us suppose that she prefers the love of the following to the preceding, and does not wish to return when admonished: therefore it seems that she, guilty of adultery, becomes so, as will be said below in the text: therefore it can be acted against her for the separation of bed.

1. Likewise, Doubts are to be interpreted in the better and safer part: but with the husband long absent, it cannot be certain of his death: therefore it seems that she is bound to choose more safely, namely to wait continuously: because in that there is no danger: if therefore she has not waited, it seems that this can be objected to her: therefore the man can act against her for the separation of bed.

Concerning the fourth, it is similarly objected: because 1. A man is easily notable from another man in touch and speech and other signs: therefore if she does not discern, it seems that she does not do what is in her power: therefore she becomes guilty: therefore that sin can be objected to her for the separation of bed.

1. Likewise, Ignorance does not excuse from everything, but from so much: therefore not the whole accusation against her is removed by the man.

Concerning the fifth, it is also objected, if she is oppressed: 1. For by no fear ought she to fornicate, because in this respect no fear falls upon a constant man, because this is a mortal sin: therefore by this she is not absolved, but that the man could act against her.

1. Likewise, She contributes something to the action, because she grants the body, although unwilling: therefore it is not entirely force.
2. Likewise, Those corrupted by force are not veiled: therefore by similarity they are not entirely absolved from the action of the man: therefore the man in such a case can act for the separation of bed.

Concerning the sixth, it is also questioned thus: 1. Either reconciliation is understood through the judgment of the Church, or because he asked for the debt from her, and she rendered it. If in the first way: then there is no case: because it has already been judged by the Church that that adultery is not to be held as adultery, and then there is no doubt there. But if in the second way. On the contrary: Let it be supposed that while the case is pending before the sentence given by the Church, she asks for the debt: either it will be denied, or not. If he denies: therefore he does injury: because he is not yet absolved from her by the sentence of the Church: therefore he does not render to her what is still considered his: therefore he sins mortally. But if he renders: then he is reconciled to her after adultery: therefore he cannot afterwards act for the separation of bed: and this is nothing: therefore this case is none, as it seems.

1. Likewise, For a benefit no one loses the action which he has against someone: but by reconciling himself to her he does well: therefore from this he does not lose the action: therefore it seems that even after reconciliation he can act as before for the separation of bed. The first is proved: because if the opposite is granted, then it follows that someone is punished for a benefit: because to lose an action which is granted to him by law in favor is the greatest punishment. The second, however, is evident by itself.

Concerning the seventh, it is objected: because 1. The Apostle says, 1 Corinthians 7:15: "But if the unbeliever departs, let him depart." Therefore similarly for the brother or sister is not subject to servitude in such a case who is separated from an unbelieving spouse, in no way is he bound to them: but by conversion...

§ ... departure, he does not become liable to her by a new servitude: therefore he is not bound to receive her: therefore it seems that this case is null.

§ 2. Also, if he must receive her, this is only by the bond of marriage that remained even after her departure. But let us suppose that the believer contracts with another woman before the first wife, who was his wife while he was an unbeliever, converts. Therefore, if the first wife subsequently converts, he is bound to withdraw from the believing wife and receive the first, and this is contrary to the Apostle.

§ To the contrary of this is what Innocent III says (Extra, de divortio, cap. Gaudemus): "If she who has converted follows the one who has converted to the faith, before he has taken a

legitimate wife for the aforementioned causes, he shall be compelled to receive her. Furthermore, although according to evangelical truth he who marries a dismissed woman commits adultery, nevertheless the dismisser cannot object fornication to the dismissed woman on the ground that she married another after the repudiation, unless she fornicated otherwise." [698]

§ Response. It must be said to the first case, that it holds according to the sentence of the Lord in the Gospel of Matthew 5:32 and 19:9.

§ To the first objection to the contrary, it must be said that there is a greater sin in both from a double fornication than from a single one. However, because this action is granted by law in favor of the one who has not committed adultery, when neither merits that favor, the action for the separation of the bed will cease.

§ To the next it must be said that both sin against the marriage, and yet neither can bring an action, because each has a beam in their eye. And therefore no judgment is made except of inquiry and penance, and not of accusation for the separation of the bed, because this saying is understood of that mode of acting, John 8:7: "He that is without sin," etc.

§ To the next it must be said that for the violated faith penance must be enjoined upon both in the forum of confession, or even by a visitor if it was denounced; but the action said for this cause ceases by way of accusation.

§ To what is objected concerning the second, it must be said that it is true that the sin is greater there if the husband prostitutes his wife than if he does not prostitute her. However, because that right was introduced in favor of innocence, the husband prostituting his wife does not merit to enjoy such a right. The objection, however, proceeds as if the right was introduced only for the detestation of the crime.

§ And by this the solution to the following is also clear.

§ To what is objected concerning the third, it must be said that without a doubt if a woman does not want to return to her prior husband after she knew him to be alive, and flees from him, preferring the love of the following one to him, she will then be reputed guilty of adultery. And the husband can object this to her before an ecclesiastical judge for the separation of the bed; and in this case she is not excused, but only when, thinking her husband dead, she contracted with another.

§ To the next it must be said that the better part is more reasonable; and since our reason in such particulars cannot proceed except from sensible judgments, a part is called safe enough according to human judgment when it sufficiently has sensible things from which reason may be caused, such as fame by hearsay, and a long expectation beyond the agreed time for return, and the like.

§ To what is objected concerning the fourth case, it must be said that when a malicious machination is presumed, then it could be discerned easily. But when nothing evil is presumed, then such caution is not applied, nor is she bound to apply it: because she presents

herself in the customary place for the frequentation of her husband and at the customary hour, and she is not bound to do more.

§ To the next it must be said that this is understood of ignorance of the law, not of fact: for ignorance of fact completely excuses: and

§ such is this ignorance, when one is received for another, just as Leah was received by Jacob for Rachel.

§ To what is objected concerning the fifth, it must be said that this case is understood of absolute force, which although it does not fall upon the mind, yet falls upon the body; and it is not understood of the fear of honor, or of parents, or of anyone else. And this force is called oppression, rather than fear or the violence of fear.

§ By this the solution to the following is also clear: since it is certain that she contributes nothing, but only suffers.

§ To the next it must be said that women thus oppressed are not veiled, for the sake of caution. However, if complete force is done to them, they can in my judgment be veiled, as was noted in the question concerning the veil of virgins, and this is proved by sufficiently fitting reasons, and also by authorities, although Pope Leo alone seems to say something to the contrary, which was said for the sake of caution of greater humility. If, however, someone wished to hold the contrary opinion, namely that they ought not to be veiled, he can say to this that it is not similar: because the veil requires a sign rather than virtue and grace. But that right [to accuse of adultery] is introduced in favor of virtue and the detestation of vice, and since it does not find greater virtue in one union than in another, nor the vice which is principally in the mind, license is not given to the other to object to this kind of fornication.

§ To what is asked concerning the sixth, it must be said that it can be understood in either way. For if he renders the debt to her, he either renders it as to a reconciled woman whose fault he has dismissed, or he renders it as to one from whose debt he has not yet been absolved by ecclesiastical judgment. If in the first way: then the case holds, because it is not right that what is once dismissed be repeated again or objected as a crime: because, as the Prophet says, a double tribulation shall not rise up; [699] nor can the same sin be both pardoned and punished as if it were not pardoned. But if he renders it in the second way: then it does not stand in his way that he can still accuse her.

§ And by this the solution to the first objection is clear.

§ To the next it must be said that concerning benefits no one loses anything of his right: but from a benefit a loss sometimes follows, just as if you owe me a hundred, and I remit it to you for the sake of God as a benefit of alms, I lose the right of seeking a hundred from you. And so it is here, for by remission this man loses the right of accusing.

§ And to what is further objected concerning the seventh, it must be said that the Decretal introduced last states the entire law that exists in this case.

698. Decretales Gregorii IX, lib. 4, tit. 19, c. 8.

§ But to the first that is opposed to the contrary, it must be said that this is true which the Apostle says, that in such cases a brother or sister is not subject to servitude; but in another mode he is subject, that is, if he is made of another mode, that is, a believer like the husband.

§ To the next it must be said that if he took another woman before the conversion of his spouse, then in favor of the faith he is absolved: because the bond of marriage which is founded upon the faith of Christ is stronger than that which is contracted in infidelity. And therefore the second marriage stands, even if the one he had previously converts. But when no bond was binding in the opposite direction, it was otherwise, as is clear in corporal bonds, that a weak one binds by itself; but if a stronger one comes binding in the opposite direction, the first is broken, which when it was alone, was not broken.

§ But nevertheless it must be noted that in the same Decretal it is said shortly before, namely, that if he had several wives in view of his infidelity, since it was never lawful for anyone to have several except by divine dispensation, he should choose one from the many,

§ if all are converted with him, the one who is more suited to him. And license to marry is given to the others, because they were never truly wives. But she whom he chooses is made his true wife by the new contract of the Christian faith.

Articulus 11 — Whether After A Sentence Of Separation Has Been Pronounced, The Husband Is Bound To Receive Back The Adulteress If He Himself Commits Adultery

Whether after a sentence of separation has been passed, a husband is bound to receive an adulterous wife if he himself commits adultery?

§ Fifthly it is asked: Whether after a sentence of separation of the bed has been passed, he is bound to receive the adulterous wife, if he himself also commits adultery?

§ And it seems that he is: because § 1. Then he has nothing to object to her: therefore it seems that he is bound to receive her.

§ 2. Also, this right was introduced in favor of continence; but falling into crime, he does not merit the favor of the law. Therefore this man ought no longer to enjoy that right: therefore he is bound to receive her, as it seems.

§ 3. Also, Alexander III writes in Extra, de divortio, Hiis litteris, and further: "Indeed, having convened your chapter, since by their advice you enjoined upon both private individuals that continence must be observed, so that they should live chastely separated from each other, the aforementioned V. furtively and rashly celebrated betrothal and nuptials with another. But when you labored to inquire into the fact, the above-mentioned V., explaining and expounding the series of the matter, is reported to have appealed to our audience. Wherefore we command your fraternity that if he proceeded thus, you compel the said husband to return to his legitimate wife." [700] From this I argue that since on account of nuptials he is compelled to return and receive his first wife, much more so on account of fornication.

699. Nahum 1:9.

§ 4. Also, it pertains to an ecclesiastical judge to compel by ecclesiastical censure the avoidance of crime: but the other cannot if this fornicator is in a crime. Therefore it pertains to the ecclesiastical judge to compel him to avoid that crime; but he cannot fitly avoid it except by taking up his adulterous wife. Therefore it pertains to him to compel such a one to take up the first wife whom he had dismissed.

§ To the contrary of this is what is said thus: What has been well defined once, ought not to be retracted by any repetition. But the separation of that man has been defined once: therefore it ought not to be retracted: therefore he ought not to be compelled to receive her any more, whom he once dismissed by sentence.

§ Response. It must be said that by the rigor of the law he is not bound to receive her, as was proved last. But nevertheless the ecclesiastical judge, by his office, ought to compel him to receive her.

§ And by this the solution to the last two is clear, which prove nothing except that the judge by his office ought to compel such a one to receive her whom he dismissed.

§ To the first it must be said that although after the fact he does not have anything to object, nevertheless when the cause was in judgment, then he had. And because the matter was defined then, it ought not to be retracted for any cause. Now the cause of this right can be this: because when the woman first fornicates, she does not have a cause, since she is not provoked by her husband, and she could use marriage as a remedy for concupiscence; and therefore her fornication is detestable and lacking excuse. But when the husband fornicates afterwards, when he had no medicine for concupiscence and was provoked by his wife, he has a greater cloak of excuse. And therefore by the rigor of the law it is granted that he cannot on account of this be summoned by the wife for reconciliation. And the same is true conversely of the wife if she kept the faith of the bed, while the husband committed adultery.

§ To the next it must be said that that favor looks to the state of the person bringing the adultery into court, and not to a future state:

§ for since future events are uncertain, no right can be introduced in favor of a future state, but rather in favor of a present state.

Articulus 12 — Whether An Adulterous Woman Is Bound To Be Reconciled To The Husband Recalling Her After A Sentence Of Separation Of Bed, Even If She Is Unwilling

Whether an adulterous woman is bound to be reconciled to her husband who recalls her after a sentence of separation of the bed, even if she is unwilling?

§ Sixthly it is asked: Whether an adulterous woman is bound to be reconciled to her husband who recalls her after a sentence of separation of the bed, even if she is unwilling?

§ And it seems that she is: because § 1. The husband lost no right in her: but he himself had a right in his wife's body: therefore she is bound to render it to him: therefore also to be

700. Decretales Gregorii IX, lib. 4, tit. 19, c. 3.

reconciled. But the husband recalled her. The first premise is proved from the fact that no right is lost except through sin. And the husband did not sin, and thus the proposition is established.

§ 2. Also, she is not separated except at the husband's action: therefore if the husband ceases from the action, she is bound to remain together: therefore even if he ceases from the effect of the action, she is bound to return: therefore if she has been recalled by the husband, she is bound to return.

§ 3. Also, anyone can renounce that right which is introduced in his own favor: but this right is introduced in favor of the husband who does not fornicate: therefore he can renounce it: therefore if he renounces it, she is bound to pay the debt just as she was bound before.

§ 4. Also, if she were not bound to the pristine servitude, then she would recover liberty and advantage from her own sin. But this is unfitting: therefore she is bound to return if the husband recalls her.

§ To the contrary of this is that: § 1. By a sentence he was separated from her. But what is done by a sentence of law, is done justly: therefore the separation is just. But anyone can use what he has justly obtained by sentence: therefore she can lawfully remain separated, even if he recalls her.

§ 2. Also, she can fear hatred and bodily harm: because, Proverbs 6:34, concerning such a husband whose wife has fornicated, it is said: "Because the jealousy and rage of the husband will not spare," etc. But anyone can take precautions for themselves: therefore she too can remain separated, even if she has been recalled.

§ Response. It must be said according to the law which states: "What is introduced in my favor ought not to be twisted to my detriment." Whence the husband can seek her even against her will, as the first objections prove.

§ But to what is objected to the contrary, it must be said that if that sentence were founded upon the truth of the cause, then the objection would hold; but it is not so: but rather it is introduced in favor of the one who keeps the faith of the bed.

§ And by this the solution is clear.

Articulus 13 — Whether An Adulterous Woman, After Penance For Adultery, Can Repel Her Husband From Accusation

Whether an adulterous woman, after penance for adultery, can repel her husband from accusation?

§ Seventhly it is asked: Whether an adulterous woman, after penance for adultery, can repel her husband from accusation?

§ And it seems that she can: because § 1. Ambrose says that penance is a most excellent and perfect thing, which recalls all defects to perfection: therefore it also recalls this defect to perfection, for which she could be accused: therefore she cannot be accused henceforth.

§ 2. Also, in the text Gregory says that she ought not to be reputed what she was, but

§ what she is now, holy and just. Therefore adultery ought not to be objected against her.

§ 3. Also, human judgment ought not to be stricter than divine judgment. But God in his judgment does not object past things which have been wiped out by penance. Therefore neither ought a human to object them: therefore it seems that the woman ought not to be accused for adultery wiped out by penance.

§ To the contrary of this is that: § 1. The penance of another does not take away from me a right which was introduced in my favor. But this right, namely, accusation for the separation of the bed, was introduced in my favor: therefore by the penance of another it is not wiped out, nor is it taken away from me.

§ 2. Also, if she is dismissed before penance, I am not bound to receive her when she is penitent. Therefore a penitent woman cannot impede me from accusation either.

§ 3. Also, penance wipes out guilt, but not punishment, because in penance one must undergo punishment. But separation is a punishment: therefore separation is not taken away from him: therefore she can be accused for the separation of the bed.

§ Response. It must be said that penance ought to induce the husband to cease voluntarily from accusation; but nevertheless he is not compelled if he is unwilling. He must be admonished, however, to cease, and he is hard-hearted if he cannot be induced, because what suffices for God ought to suffice for him.

§ To the first therefore it must be said that penance recalls defects with respect to immunity from guilt, but not with respect to immunity from unworthiness and any punishment whatever.

§ Moreover, penance is valid in the forum of God or of confession; but not in the forum of judgment or of contention, because a judge cannot see this, but God alone.

§ To the next it must be said that the saying of Gregory is a counsel, not a precept.

§ To the next it must be said that human judgment is not stricter, nor more right, than divine; but it is through other means, because it is through exterior things which can be certified from the vices of men. And this is not penance; but God alone sees penance in the heart. And therefore what suffices for God does not suffice for man; and sometimes what suffices for man does not suffice for God.

Articulus 14 — Whether A Husband Who Has Secretly Committed Adultery Can, Without Sin, Bring An Action For Separation Of Bed Against A Wife Manifestly Adulterous

Whether a husband who has committed adultery secretly, can without sin bring an action for separation of the bed against a woman who has committed adultery manifestly?

§ Eighthly it is asked: Whether a husband who has committed adultery secretly, can without sin bring an action for separation of the bed against a woman who has committed adultery manifestly?

§ It seems that he can: because § 1. What is secret cannot be objected; and nothing can impede him from accusation except the objection of a similar crime. Therefore it seems that the husband can bring an action for the separation of the bed.

§ 2. Also, he who is in secret mortal sin can preach when necessity is urgent. But to preach is much greater than to bring an action for the separation of the bed. Therefore he who is in secret adultery can also bring an action for the separation of the bed.

§ 3. Also, there is no scandal concerning the husband's sin; but there is scandal concerning the woman's sin. Therefore she ought to be punished publicly, as the Apostle says, 1 Timothy 5:20: "Them that sin reprove before all, that the rest also may have fear." Therefore this woman ought to be punished publicly; now this punishment is in that wherein she sinned, namely in marriage. Therefore since she cannot be punished except by separation from the bed, it seems that the husband can bring an action for the separation of the bed without sin.

§ To the contrary of this is that: § 1. For an exception against the husband, the woman lacks nothing except proof; but the truth even unproved by witnesses profits her and suffices before God. Therefore before God the woman has an exception against the hus-

§ band: therefore before God he sins when he accuses her.

§ 2. Also, "secret" and "manifest" are circumstances of similar adultery according to species. But circumstances do not alienate a sin nor infinitely weigh one down over another. Therefore it seems that the same sin in species creates a similar right in both: but this is the right of separation: therefore one has the same right against the other as conversely, although in a different circumstance. Therefore the woman can except before God against the husband.

§ Response. It must be said that what was proved last is true and probable.

§ Whence it must be said to the first, that in a human judgment he can object without obstacle; but this is not what is asked, but rather, whether he can do it without sin or not?

§ To the next it must be said that it is true that such a one can preach in necessity, because preaching is necessary for souls. But it is not so concerning the separation of the bed, which is for disturbance rather than for consolation.

§ To the next it must be said that it is true that such a one can accuse, although there is no scandal: yet he himself is bound in conscience by his own sin. And therefore his own conscience ought more to incline him to compassion for his wife, than to casting her away.

Articulus 15 — Whether A Woman, After Reconciliation, Has Lost The Right Of Demanding The Debt From Her Husband

Whether a woman after reconciliation has lost the right of seeking the debt from her husband?

§ Ninthly it is asked: Whether after reconciliation she has lost the right of demanding the debt?

§ And it seems that she has: because § 1. Unless the husband were absolved from that debt, he himself would be bound to render it even after separation. But since this is false, it seems

that the woman has no right in the husband's body. Therefore since that right is not restored to her, it seems that even when reconciled she cannot seek it.

§ 2. Also, that right is conferred only by matrimonial consent; but that is not repeated after reconciliation. Therefore the right is not conferred upon her: therefore she does not have the right of seeking the debt.

§ 3. Also, by what things one sins, by these he will also be punished; but she sinned in faith and the right of the bed. Therefore she ought to be punished in that. Now she is not punished except by losing the right which she had. Therefore it seems that she will never henceforth have any right of seeking.

§ To the contrary is that: § 1. The reconciliation of a husband is different from that of any other friend; therefore something special is conferred in it. But this in which he is distinguished from other friends is nothing except the right of seeking the debt, because she previously had all the others. Therefore the right of seeking the debt is restored to her in reconciliation.

§ 2. Also, if it is granted that it is not restored: therefore if she denies herself to him after reconciliation, he cannot demand it again. Therefore even after reconciliation he could enter religion against her will, which is false and absurd. Therefore it is also false that the right of demanding the debt is not restored to her.

§ Response. The last part seems to be concedable, namely that she can seek the debt after reconciliation, and receives power over the husband's body just as she had before.

§ To the first therefore it must be said that that right is considered in two ways, namely in habit or sacramentally only, or according to an order to an act, which is rather the use or execution of the right. And in the first way indeed the adulterous woman never loses that right while she lives, but in the second way; and this is restored to her when reconciliation takes place.

§ To the next it must be said that matrimonia-

§ l consent creates that right sacramentally and habitually; and this is not repeated, but on account of fault someone can be suspended from the use and execution of their right; and this is relaxed in reconciliation.

§ To the next it must be said that she is sufficiently punished in marriage when she is suspended from the use and solace of her husband, even if she is not sacramentally and habitually separated from her husband.

Articulus 16 — Whether An Adulteress May Be Taken In Marriage

Whether an adulteress may be taken in marriage?

§ Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, F, "It is also customarily asked, whether she may be taken in marriage," etc.

§ For it seems that what is said here is not law: because § 1. The Church does not have the power to reject what God has shown to be lawful; but God has shown that it is lawful for adulterers to be joined. Therefore the Church does not have the power to reject this: therefore neither to interdict it. The first premise is self-evident. The second is proved by what is said in the Gloss on 1 Corinthians 9:4 and following, thus: "Lawful is what is prohibited by no precept." [701] Therefore the proposition is established.

§ 2. Also, those whom no impediment stands in the way of can contract, since they are legitimate persons; but no impediment stands in the way of these: therefore they can contract with one another. The first premise is established from what was said before. But the second is proved from this, that adultery does not stand in the way, as is plain, nor even homicide; therefore if both are joined, nothing will stand in the way. Therefore even if she plotted the death of her husband with effect, she herself can contract with the adulterer; and thus the proposition is established.

§ 3. Also, in other sacraments if the form is observed and the matter is present, a sacrament is made: therefore similarly in this one. Therefore both the man and the woman pronounce these words making a contract regarding the present: therefore it seems that they effect a true marriage.

§ 4. Also, other sins are greater, because Gregory says that spiritual sins are of greater weight than corporal ones; and yet they do not impede, because a proud man can contract with a proud woman, and an envious man with an envious woman. Therefore an adulterer with an adulteress: therefore it seems that what is said here is not law.

§ 5. Also, let us suppose that a woman kills her husband so that she could contract indeterminately with another; it seems that according to this law she could contract with no one. But this is false: therefore also what he introduces.

§ 6. Also, one evil is more to be tolerated than two; but adultery is one evil, and separation from the other is a second evil: therefore it seems that on account of the first the second ought not to be commanded.

§ 7. Also, I posit that first they plotted death, and afterwards they repented. And let it be asked: Whether they could then contract?

§ It seems that they could: because penance wiped out what stood in the way, namely the crime: therefore they can contract after penance.

§ Response. It must be said that there are three cases, of which if any one exists, he cannot contract with her whom he previously polluted through adultery: namely, if on account of this, in order to contract with her, he plots with effect for the death of her spouse (for if he only thought of doing it, and did not proceed to the deed, he would not be impeded on account of this). The second is if he gave her his faith to contract after the death of the spouse. The third, if he contracted with her in fact. Now this is ordered reasonably by the Church, so that many homicides and adulteries may be avoided, which would or could be committed for the sake of that familiarity.

§ To the first therefore it must be said that the Lord therefore gave the Church the keys and the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, so that she may ordain expedient things in such matters; and these are not so much human statutes, as also divine.

§ To the same it must be said that the impediment of crime stands in the way of these persons.

§ To the next it must be said that although separately they do not impede, yet conjoined they impede: because things conjoined are capable of more than things divided, as can be seen in many other things: for two move a stone which neither alone could move, and thus it is easy to see concerning other things.

§ To the next it must be said that here the matter is not under the due disposition, and this is required in every thing to be generated: because the malice of the obstructing crime is in the matter.

§ To the next it must be said that although certain other sins can be greater, nevertheless they do not sin so directly against marriage: and therefore they do not impede like this one.

§ To the next it must be said that such a woman has the impediment of crime, which impedes contracting, but does not annul the contract: because no man was in fault with her. And therefore, on account of the innocence of the man who contracts with her, the contract is permitted to stand.

§ To the next it must be said that it is not an evil that such a marriage is annulled, because it is null, as Augustine says. If however it were an evil, it would not be a common evil, but a personal one, and such would be compensated by the common utility which is in the fear of others, lest they easily perpetrate adultery.

§ To the last it must be said that penance can wipe out the guilt: but nevertheless some just punishment remains, and of those this is one.

DISTINCTIO XXXVI

Divisio Textus

§ Nunc de conditione videamus, etc. ("Now let us see concerning condition," etc.) In this distinction he determines two things. One is principal, namely concerning the impediment of condition. The other is secondary, concerning the age of the contracting parties, there, D, Hoc etiam sciendum est, quod pueri, etc. ("This also must be known, that children," etc.).

§ Concerning condition he determines three things in order in three chapters, namely: which condition impedes? Whether the slave of one can contract with the maidservant of

701. Glossa ordinaria, ad 1 Cor 9:4.

another? And, Whether a marriage is dissolved by servitude supervening upon the marriage? And these lie plainly in the Text.

§ But for the knowledge of these three chapters five things are asked here.

The first is, What is the condition impeding marriage? The second, Whether servitude impedes marriage? The third, Whether it impedes by natural, or positive, or divine, or human law? The fourth, What of the slave of one contracting with the maidservant of another? The fifth, Concerning the condition which supervenes upon marriage.

Articulus 1 — What Is A Condition Impeding Marriage

What is the condition impeding marriage?

§ To the first, namely what is the condition impeding marriage, it is objected:

§ The Laws say that the condition impeding marriage is servitude; now servitude is a condition of subjection, by which a person according to himself and his things is in the power of a superior.

§ But it seems that such a condition ought not to exist in the human race: because § 1. Gregory says that nature begot all humans equal: therefore it is against nature for one human to be inferior to another, and to be in the power of another according to himself and his things. But those things which are against nature can be established by no law: therefore by no law can the condition of servitude exist among humans.

§ 2. Also, Gregory says that it is to be proud against nature to wish for a human to preside over a human: therefore the same as before.

§ 3. Also, the Apostle says that in Christ Jesus there is neither slave nor free: [702] therefore in the faith of Christ all are equal. Therefore it is false that one is the lord of another: therefore there is no condition of servitude.

§ 4. Also, in the first ordering of the human race it was said to humans before sin and after sin that they should cultivate the earth, and subject it to themselves; but nowhere that they should rule over another. Therefore it seems that it pertains to the dignity of human nature not to be of servile condition.

§ 5. Also, Cicero says in the Rhetoric that all right proceeds from nature: therefore what does not proceed from nature is an injury. But this right concerning the condition of servitude does not proceed from nature: therefore it is an injury. Proof of the minor premise. Nature is equally worthy in the slave and in the lord: therefore it is impossible that one should be placed before another from the participation of nature: and thus the proposition is established.

§ If perchance you say that Cicero lies. To the contrary: Positive law necessarily must have some reason of equity. Therefore that reason necessarily reasons from some habit ruling it, and it has some exemplar to which it looks. But that exemplar is necessarily prior to positive law

[...positi]ve: but what is prior to positive law is not positive law: therefore, the exemplar which reason imitates when discovering positive law does not belong to positive law. But nothing is prior except natural and divine law: therefore, it is necessary that this exemplar be natural and divine law. But every exemplified thing is perfected by its exemplar: therefore, positive law is perfected by natural and divine law: and this is what Tully says.

To the contrary of this is: § 1. What Noah said: Cursed be Canaan, a servant of servants shall he be unto his brethren. If, therefore, servitude was introduced by the Patriarchs having the inspiration of God, therefore it belongs to divine law.

§ 2. Also, concerning Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob it is read that they had menservants and maidservants: since, therefore, they had the inspiration of God, and did nothing against nature or law, servitude belongs to natural and divine law, as it seems.

§ 3. Also, in the New Testament, and in many other places, servants are commanded to obey their masters in all fear, not only the good and honest and gentle, but also the froward: therefore, the condition of servitude belongs to the law of Christ: and thus it is neither against nature, nor against divine things: therefore neither [is] servitude [evil].

§ 4. Also, I see that on account of sin man is handed over to be in the power of the devil: therefore much more will he be handed over into the power of a man: therefore, by the just judgment of God, one can be made the servant of another.

Response. It must be said that the condition of servitude is present in the human race: because if it were not, it would not impede marriage.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that servitude is not derived from an inequality of nature, but rather it is introduced as a punishment from an inequality of deeds: and therefore it is not favorable, but rather among those things which are avoided in themselves, as the Philosophers say.

To that, however, which is objected, that it is against nature, etc., it must be said that nature is spoken of in two ways, or rather in three ways: for sometimes nature itself means the species communicable to individuals, and participated by them, just as all human beings are called human beings by nature. Nature is also sometimes called natural reason: and this in two ways, namely proceeding from natural things, and consisting in natural things, or proceeding from natural things to the ordering of those things which occur contrary to nature, insofar as it is possible for them to be ordered. And in the first way, indeed, what is against nature cannot stand: and in this way servitude is not against nature, but rather it is personal, and against the state of the person. But in the second way, again, it is not natural: because thus nothing is natural except that right which nature teaches all those things which belong to that nature. But in the third way servitude is natural: because through it the fault which was introduced into nature from the vice of the person is ordered.

And through this the solution to the following is also clear: because Gregory calls "against nature" what is against nature spoken of in the first way, but not in the third.

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702. Galatians 3:28.

To the next it must be said that a servant is considered in two ways, namely according as he is a participant in grace or glory, which are the greatest perfections of the soul, and in such things he is equal to his master, or even sometimes placed above him. He is also considered according to his work and capability, and in such things he is in the power of his master. And the Apostle speaks in the first way.

To the next it must be said that the solution is clear from the distinction introduced earlier: because servitude is introduced from an unnatural thing, which is sin: but yet by reason both the sin and the punishment for sin, which is servitude, are ordered.

To the next it must be said that Tully takes nature for natural reason, the habit of which rules in all positive law: and thus it is drawn from it like the exemplified from the exemplar, as the objection proves: and thus from thence the order of sin is drawn through the punishment which is servitude: for sin is ordered in punishment and through punishment.

Articulus 2 — Whether Servitude Impedes Marriage, And By What Law

Whether servitude impedes marriage, and on what grounds?

Whether servitude impedes marriage, and on what grounds?

Secondly it is asked, whether servitude impedes marriage?

It seems that it does not: § 1. For every impediment to something has some contrariety to another: but servitude has no contrariety to marriage: therefore it does not impede it. The first premise is proved: because nothing impedes another, except what operates or acts to the contrary: and what acts to the contrary is necessarily contrary. But the second premise is evident: because a servant can have faithfulness, offspring, and the sacrament.

§ 2. Also, if it impedes: either it impedes from the genus, or from an added difference. If from the genus: therefore every condition would impede marriage, which is false, since the condition of liberty does not impede. But if from a contracting difference. On the contrary: Therefore every servitude impedes, and always: therefore a male servant cannot contract with a female servant, which is false: therefore the servile condition does not impede marriage.

§ 3. Also, according to nature it is so, that if something of its nature impedes something, that thing multiplied impedes more: therefore if servitude impedes marriage, multiplied servitude impedes it more: but this is false, because a male servant can contract with a female servant, although yet in them the servitude is multiplied: therefore it is false that servitude impedes marriage.

§ 4. Also, the punishment of servitude supervenes upon the previously existing state of marriage from the vengeance for sin, just like other punishments: but I see that other punishments do not impede: therefore neither should this impede.

§ 5. Also, in the signified marriage, the contract of a handmaid with a freeman is greater than that of a freewoman with a freeman: therefore also in the sign, the marriage of a handmaid with a freeborn man should be more ratified than that of a freeborn woman with a freeborn man: therefore the condition does not impede marriage, but even promotes it. The

first premise is proved from the fact that the most noble Word of God the Father married our nature in the one person of the Son in the bridal chamber of the virginal womb, although yet the Philosopher says in the first book of the Metaphysics that in many ways our nature is a handmaid. But the second premise is evident.

To the contrary of this is that: § 1. All deception and fraud rescind a contract: but if a freeborn man contracts with a handmaid in ignorance, there is deception there: therefore the contract must be rescinded.

§ 2. Also, marriage is among goods to be sought partly for themselves, and partly for the sake of something else, as the Philosopher says: but liberty is among things to be sought for themselves, while servitude is among things to be avoided: therefore liberty agrees with the character of an appetible good for marriage, and servitude is contrary to it: but a contrary impedes: therefore servitude can impede marriage.

§ 3. Also, there are many burdens of marriage from itself; therefore a burdening from an alien source ought not to be added to the burden of marriage, because it would be made too heavy: but servitude burdens from an alien source: therefore it ought not to be added to marriage: but rather if a contract is made in ignorance, it ought to be reputed as null by law, lest the burden of marriage be made too heavy.

Response. It must be said that by civil and Church constitution in favor of liberty, unknown servitude with the opposite condition, namely of liberty, impedes a marriage to be contracted, and invalidates a contract, unless they wish to remain together willingly, after the freeborn spouse knows about the condition of servitude in the other.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that this has some contrariety not to the essence of marriage, but rather to the consequents, namely to the rendering of the debt,

and to the good status of the offspring: and therefore a marriage with that condition is too heavy: on account of which it has been established that it is an impediment to it.

To the next it must be said that it impedes from the difference, and the argument does not follow: because a difference does not have contrariety to itself in another individual, but rather to the opposite difference: as it is clear that rational in Plato is not contrary to rational in Socrates, but it is contrary to irrational. So the condition of servitude is not opposed to the servitude of marriage, but rather to liberty, and with that it impedes marriage.

To the next it must be said that this is true of that to which it has a contrary, but its like rather increases: and therefore if servitude could be multiplied against liberty in marriage, it would well have to be conceded that it would impede more: but this cannot be, since one belongs to one only: and therefore that argument does not compel.

To the next it must be said that other punishments belong to both spouses, and do not increase the burdens of marriage, nor make it of a viler condition in its goods: but servitude does all these things: and therefore it is not similar.

Moreover, other punishments followed original sin, and this one followed a personal vice: and therefore it is not equally in all: and therefore again it is not similar.

To the last it must be said that our nature is a handmaid in this, that it is not the total cause of its own works: but that handmaiden status does not hand it over into the power of a contrary master: and therefore there is an equivocation in the argument: whatever, however, may be in us who have frequently sinned, and therefore are servants of sin in some way. Yet our nature as it was assumed by Christ, was most free: and therefore the objection supposes a falsehood: and it is clear how the saying of the Philosopher is understood.

Articulus 3 — Whether It Impedes By Natural Law Or By Positive Law

Whether it impedes from natural or positive law?

Thirdly it is asked, whether it impedes from natural, positive, or divine law?

§ 1. But it seems that it does not from natural [law]: because this, as is said in the Old Digest, is what nature teaches all animals: but it is evident that nature does not teach servitude: therefore it seems that this condition does not belong to natural law: therefore neither does it impede marriage by natural law.

§ 2. Also, if it impeded by the force of natural law, it would be necessary that it be contrary to some of those things which belong to marriage in the conjunction of male and female: but this is not easily found: therefore it does not impede by the force of natural law.

§ 3. But it seems that it is not from divine law either: because this rather persuades humility than exaltation. Whence also it is said:[703] Art thou called being a servant? care not for it: but if thou mayest be made free, use it rather. Therefore, even by divine law it is persuaded concerning servitude, that a freeman remain with a handmaid, or conversely; therefore it does not impede marriage from divine law.

It seems that it does not impede from human positive law either: because all human law arises from divine or natural law: but this arises neither from divine nor from the other: therefore it is not an impediment by positive law.

Response. It must be said that this impediment has its force from positive law, which is a statute of the Church having the authority and inspiration of God for the ordering of sin through punishments, as was held earlier.

To the objection in contrary, it must be said

that as to this it is natural, that nature rises up against and punishes the harmful: and therefore the punishments of sin are established by natural law: and in this way it is reduced to nature: but it is not necessary that it be natural or divine like one of the natural or divine precepts, but rather a judicial statute for the punishment of those sinning, and in favor of liberty, which first arose from the liberty of the soul from the nobility of virtue.

Articulus 4 — Whether The Slave Of One Can Contract Marriage With The Handmaid Of Another

Whether the male servant of one master can contract with the female servant of another?

Fourthly, it is asked about the male servant of one master contracting with the female servant of another. And this is asked on account of those things which are said in chapter B, It is also asked, if a servant, etc.

But it seems that this cannot be: because § 1. The servitude of one makes marriage burdensome: but here there is triple servitude, or even quadruple: therefore the marriage is made excessively burdensome: for here there is the double servitude of the two masters of the spouses, and the servitude of the husband to the wife, and conversely.

§ 2. Also, Matt. 6:24:[704] No man can serve two masters. Therefore neither here: therefore those of servile condition cannot be joined to two masters.

If perchance you say, that this is true when contrary things are commanded. On the contrary: Let it be that the wife asks for the debt, when the master demands service: for then they command contraries: therefore this man is in perplexity: but no one ought to be perplexed: therefore no one ought to contract such a marriage.

§ 3. Also, let it be that the master commands him that he never render her the debt, but always remain in the master's house to watch over the master's acts: and similarly the handmaid's master commands her: it is evident that they are bound to obey, because the Apostle commands this: therefore it seems that there is never a time of demanding or rendering the debt: therefore neither can marital society exist between such persons: therefore neither can marriage.

§ 4. Also, suppose that the master commands him not to consent to marriage: it is evident that he must be obedient, otherwise the master would punish him: therefore it seems that he cannot consent: therefore neither can he contract marriage.

§ 5. Also, whatever belongs to the thing which is in my possession, is mine along with my thing: but this servant belongs to his master: therefore also whatever belongs to the servant belongs to the master: but the servant's wife belongs to the servant: therefore the servant's wife belongs to the master: but one woman cannot belong to two men who have nothing in common: therefore the servant's wife ought to be the handmaid of that master whose handmaid she had been before. The same objection holds for the male servant in comparison to the handmaid's master. Since therefore all these things are absurdities, it seems that there is no marriage between a male servant and a female servant of diverse masters.

§ 6. Also, the children of such servants are ambiguously generated: for although according to certain laws the offspring follows the womb, yet the customs of different lands concerning this are ambiguous: because as was proved above, man is an animal whose both sexes are solicitous for the education of children, but the substance of the father is more principal in the generation of the son, than even of the mother: therefore it seems that more of the offspring

703. 1 Cor. 7:21.

pertains to the father, than to the mother: if therefore these generate one infant, he will belong to two masters, and perhaps ones commanding contraries, which would be a great absurdity. Since therefore many absurdities follow from such a marriage, it seems that such a marriage is illicit.

Response. It must be said that such marriages, although they are difficult, nevertheless are licit.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that the servitude of the husband to the wife, and conversely, is equivocal to the servile condition: because a wife is not the handmaid of the husband, nor is the husband the servant of the wife: and therefore that objection does not conclude to an absurdity.

To the next, a distinction must be made: because either the servant contracted marriage with the consent of the masters, his own and his wife's, or with them dissenting, or with one consenting and the other dissenting. If however in the first way, then the conjugal debt must be paid: because he who consents to the principal, is understood to have consented to the accessory. And thus when they consented to the marriage, they are understood to have conceded also the time to pay the debt. If however both dissent, then it still seems a distinction must be made, namely either because it is not the hour of paying the marital debt, or of serving the masters. If in the first way, if it is night, and he is in a secret bedchamber with his wife, I think that he is bound to pay the debt. If in the second way, then I think they ought to serve the masters. If however in the third way, then under the same distinction they will not consent to serve.

To the saying of the Evangelist, however, it must be said that it matters how someone uses his property: and therefore there are laws regarding what the masters ought to do for their servants. Whence the Apostle says: Masters, give unto your servants that which is just and equal, knowing that ye also have a Master in heaven.

To the next it must be said that the master cannot command that the servant never attend to himself: because this would be against natural care and providence. Whence just as he cannot prohibit him from attending to the sustenance of the species, for there is a time of working and of resting in one natural day, just as night comes, when no man can work, as is said: And similarly it is in one week, like the time of feast days: and then the servant cannot be suspended from the rendering of the debt. But it is true, that he can well be impeded by the command of the master from continuous cohabitation.

To the saying of the Apostle the response is clear through what was said before.

To the next it must be said that as to this consent, the servant is not in the power of the master: because that consent has the condition of liberty from itself, as was clear above in the question concerning the impediment of violence or coercion. And the cause of this is, because what nature conceded for the permanence of nature as a solace for mortality, ought not to be

704. Matt. 6:24.

placed in the power of anyone: and therefore even if the master contradicts, provided that the servant otherwise wishes, he can freely consent to marriage.

To the next it must be said that it deceives according to the equivocation of that which is "his" or "mine": because it is one thing for the husband to belong to the wife, and conversely, and another for the servant to belong to the master, as is clear from what was held previously: for the most extraneous mode of possessing is that by which a husband possesses a wife, and is possessed by her, and the most proximate is that by which a servant is possessed by a master, like a possession: and therefore that reason is not valid.

To the last it must be said that if several such persons were to generate children, then they are divided by the masters in certain parts of Germany: but if only one, then it cannot be divided, but one receives a price from the other, and then it belongs to one only.

Articulus 5 — Whether A Husband Can Give Himself Into Servitude To Another Without The Consent Of His Wife, And Be Absolved By This From The Rendering Of The Debt; And The Like Is Asked Concerning The Wife

Whether a husband can give himself as a servant to another without the consent of his wife, and by this be absolved from rendering the debt? And similarly it is asked about a woman.

Fifthly, it is asked about the condition which supervenes upon marriage: and this by reason of the third chapter, where this is raised in the Letter.

But it seems that the law which is determined in the Letter is not according to reason.

§ 1. For Bernard says: What was instituted for the sake of charity ought not to militate against charity. Therefore by similarity what was instituted in favor of liberty ought not to militate against liberty: but that this man makes himself a servant is against the free use of the wife, by which she ought to use her husband: therefore it seems that she ought to rescind the marriage, so that she being free might contract with another, of whom she could have free use.

§ 2. Also, in every nature it is so, that the same thing impedes the generation of a thing, and destroys the generated thing, as is clear in cold, and hot, and in all mixed and simple things: but servitude impedes the generation or contract of marriage: therefore it also destroys the already contracted marriage if it supervenes upon it: therefore it is badly determined in the Letter.

Also it is asked, whether he can give himself as a servant to another?

It seems that he cannot: because § 1. He does not have power over his own body, as the Apostle says:[705] but he who does not have power, cannot give himself to another: therefore this man cannot give himself to another as a servant.

§ 2. Also, what is done with prejudice to another, cannot be done by law: but this is done with prejudice to the woman, because the husband is impeded from the payment of the woman's debt, which she sought in the husband: therefore by law it cannot be done: therefore he cannot give himself to another.

§ 3. Also, he himself cannot give himself to God to serve in a cloister without the consent of the wife: therefore much less can he give himself to a man: because divine servitude is more favorable than human.

§ 4. Also, since two things are favorable, and a third not favorable, the laws ought to be for the two favorable things against the third: but in marriage there is the liberty of the persons, and the marriage, both of which are favorable: and servitude is the third, which is not favorable: therefore the laws ought to be for the liberty and honorableness of marriage: therefore it ought not to be conceded that he can make himself servile to the prejudice of the marriage and of liberty.

§ 5. Also, as the law says in the Old Digest, book four, Concerning those things which are done by cause of force or fear: If fear falls upon the wife or children, it is reputed to fall upon a constant man: because it belongs to a good man rather to want to suffer in himself, than to suffer shameful things in his wife or children. Therefore by similarity since a wife who remains free, much more abhors servitude in the offspring than in herself, nothing ought to be admitted in law which places her offspring under servitude, since she contracted with a freeborn man to this end that the offspring might remain freeborn. Since therefore the servitude of the offspring is caused from the servitude of the husband in most lands, it seems that it ought not to be admitted in law that a husband can give himself as a servant.

Further it is asked, whether a woman can similarly give herself as a handmaid?

And it seems that she can: because husband and wife are judged as equals: therefore also what the husband can do, the woman can do.

To the contrary is that: § 1. From this the servitude of the offspring expressly follows: because according to the laws the offspring follows the womb.

§ 2. Also, the husband is the head of the woman: therefore she cannot do anything, to which she is not directed by the husband: therefore neither without the consent of the husband can she make herself a handmaid.

Response. Without prejudice it must be said, that if a husband gives himself as a servant against the will of the woman, in no debt by which he is bound to the wife can the master impede him: because that in him which belonged to the wife, he cannot give to another master, while she is living:

and therefore also it is conceded that the marriage stands: for in this way God has joined them, and it is not lawful for man to separate them on account of any trouble, whatever may supervene.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that this does not militate against liberty: because the woman remains free, and in the free use of the husband in every debt of hers.

To the next it must be said that this is so in nature, because natural things act and suffer by the necessity of nature. But it is not thus in moral things: whence faults in morals are curbed

705. 1 Cor. 7:4.

by punishments, which have no contrariety to them, although they are contrary to the delights and appetites of those sinning: and therefore also on account of the institution of the Church something impedes it from being contracted, which does not dissolve the contract.

Nevertheless, concerning this another solution was had above, which is better than this one, and let it be looked at there.

To the next it must be said that this man can give himself as a servant saving every right of the wife, as well in body, as in goods, and in children: otherwise I think that it is a mortal sin for the masters if they receive him: and therefore the objection ceases, because the wife incurs no prejudice.

Through this the solution to the following is also clear.

To the next it must be said that divine service in the cloister is annexed to the vow of continence, which prejudices the debt of marriage, and therefore it cannot be done without the consent of the wife: but the service of a carnal master is not such: and therefore the argument is not valid.

To the next, without prejudice it seems to me, that without mortal sin children are not subjugated to servitude, if the mother before she gives birth to them, does not consent to the servitude.

To the next it must be said that a woman, in my judgment, cannot give herself as a handmaid: because in this they are not judged as equals.

Articulus 6 — Whether Males Before Fourteen Years And Girls Before Twelve Years Can Enter Into Marriage

Whether males before fourteen years of age, and girls before twelve years of age, can enter into marriage?

Whether males before fourteen years of age, and girls before twelve years of age, can enter into marriage?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, D, This also must be known, that boys before fourteen years, etc.

For this seems to be absurd: because § 1. According to the laws they receive a tutor up to the twenty-fifth year: therefore it seems that up to that time reason is not strengthened for the discretion of consent: therefore it seems that the constitution ought to place the time of contracting at twenty-five years.

§ 2. Also, those who enter religion, cannot make profession up to the eighteenth year, as the new constitution says: therefore since it is greater to be obliged to God than to man, even for the obligation which is made to man in marriage, it seems that nineteen years should be expected.

§ 3. Also, to the office of preaching and priesthood no one ought to be assumed before the thirtieth year: since therefore the bond of marriage is perpetual while the spouse lives, and

has many tribulations adjoined to it, as the Apostle says,[706] it seems that the time of thirty years is to be expected.

Also, why is the time determined otherwise in a male than in a girl, so that two years are cut off?

Response. It must be said that the things asked here were partly determined above, where betrothals were treated.

For having the determination of all these things it must be known, that the augmentative power for the most part stands perfect in the thirtieth year: and this happens, because the natural heat is weakened from the much ingestion of extraneous moisture acquired from nutriment. But the heat is weakened from evaporation insofar as it draws with it natural moisture, and the body remains dry, not extensible in its radical members beyond what it has been extended: and therefore growth stops according to the physical cause. But the mathematical cause is, because the celestial mover which moves singularly to the perfection of the individual, is completed in no less than thirty years. For if the ultimate motion of the planets is taken, then it is completed in thirty years: because Saturn completes its course in so many years, with which all others are joined, and itself with none of the others, as the Philosophers say, and all other Doctors of the stars.

Still further, the motion of the dragon's head is completed in a lesser [time]. Similarly the minor conjunction of Saturn and Jupiter is completed in thirty years minus an eighth part of a year: and the great conjunction of Saturn and Mars in the sign of Cancer is completed in thirty years. But the conjunction of Jupiter and Saturn from triplicity to triplicity, and the conjunction of the same from circle to circle, happen in a greater time: but these cause general accidents of the world and provinces, and not personal ones except in a qualified sense. And therefore the ultimate span of human perfection is in thirty years, and within that the increase begins to be declared, and similarly the superior motion to be joined to it, so that the intellect begins to dominate perfectly for the regimen of life and body: and this by five years: and therefore another limit is placed by the laws over thirty-five years. But the perfect motion of the head and tail [of the dragon] is in eighteen years, in which all conjunctions are completed, and preventions, and eclipses of the sun and moon, which among all stars have a greater effect upon our bodies: and therefore a third limit is placed at fourteen years. The mode

of the period or giver of life which the Ishmaelite mathematicians call [it], is according to the number of the signs of the circle of the nativity which is twelve years, as Albumasar says: and therefore a fourth limit is placed at twelve and fourteen years. And because in the period of nativity seven signs see each other, as Abraham and Albumasar say, therefore a fifth limit is placed in betrothals at seven years.

Therefore it must be said, that these acts are ordered to be able to please in betrothals, and to be able to generate, and to discern spiritual things and their force, and to be able to govern oneself and a family sufficiently, and to be able to have perfect knowledge for the instruction of others: because always one is higher than another: therefore the limit of betrothals is placed

at seven, and marriage at twelve in a girl, and in a boy at fourteen: the reason of which is assigned above: and entrance into religion in the eighteenth year, and of the regimen of a family and provision in the twenty-fifth, and of the authority to teach in the thirtieth.

And through this the solution of all the objections is clear.

DISTINCTIO XXXVII

Divisio Textus

There are therefore certain orders, etc. Here he treats of the impediment of Order: and there are in this distinction only two small chapters, the first of which is about the impediment of Order: the second, about the killers of their own spouses, and begins there, B, To these must be added concerning the strikers, etc.

But concerning the first chapter seven things are asked. First is, whether Order impedes marriage to be contracted, and invalidates the contract? Second, whether it is a local and temporal impediment, or perpetual and general? Third, whether every order does this, or certain ones, and which is that one? Fourth, concerning him who having a wife, with the wife consenting, is ordained, whether the wife herself is bound to enter religion? Fifth, concerning him who is ordained with the wife not knowing or reclaiming, whether any prejudice is done to the wife? Sixth, concerning Oriental clerics who are ordained, whether they can be ordained with their wives reclaiming? Seventh, concerning the wives of Orientals, who are ordained with their wives willing, whether after the death of the cleric husband they are bound to perpetual continence?

Articulus 1 — Whether Order Impedes Marriage

Whether Order impedes marriage?

To the first one proceeds thus: § 1. A sacrament is not contrary to a sacrament: but nothing impedes another, except what is contrary to it: therefore it seems, that a sacrament does not impede a sacrament: therefore neither does Order [impede] marriage.

§ 2. Also, either Order impedes from itself, or from an adjunct. Not from itself: because thus every order would impede, which is false. But if it impedes from an adjunct, this is nothing else but the vow of chastity: therefore it should not be assigned as a special impediment of marriage, but be contained under the vow: therefore a special tract should not have been about this impediment, but in the following distinction it should have been contained under the impediment of vow.

§ 3. Also, the type and the truth correspond to each other: but the order of the old law was a type of the order of the new law: therefore it responds to it: but it is evident that the priests

706. 1 Cor. 7:28.

of the Old Testament had and took wives while existing in order: therefore also in the New they can do this: therefore Order is not one of the impediments of marriage.

§ 4. Also, if Order impedes marriage, either this is by reason of offspring, or by rea-

...by reason of faith, or of the sacrament, or by reason of the intercourse which is in marriage. If by reason of offspring: then offspring would have a contrariety to orders, which is false, since it is commanded by the Lord that men increase and multiply. Similarly it is evident that it is neither by reason of faith, nor by reason of the sacrament. If it is said that this is by reason of the act, this also is not so, except because the divine act is contraried. But on the contrary: It is most especially not contrary to the divine [act], namely the participation of the Eucharist, because those joined in marriage receive the Eucharist: therefore a lesser divine [act] is not contrary to it: therefore it is not contrary to it: therefore orders do not impede marriage.

§ 5. Again, it seems that it even promotes it: because orders establishes one in the right of Christ, who is the spouse of the Church, fecundating her with grace for good works: therefore it is fitting to express this in a figure: but the figure of this is the condition (habitus) of a wife, as is said in Ephesians 5:22 and following. Therefore it seems that it is fitting for those ordained in sacred orders to have wives: therefore orders do not impede marriage, but rather marriage makes the ordained person better.

On the contrary to this is: § 1. What is said in Isaiah 52:11: Be clean, you who bear the vessels of the Lord. For if this was commanded in the Old Testament, much more must it be held in the New: but marital intercourse is mixed with a certain uncleanness: therefore he who bears the vessels of the Lord and the Lord Himself ought not to be subject to intercourse: therefore neither ought he to be joined in marriage.

§ 2. Again, to think only on the things that are of God, and to be divided toward thinking how to please a wife, and the things that are of the world, and the things that are said, do not fittingly exist together: but one deputed to divine services ought to think only on the things that are of the Lord: therefore he himself ought not to be subject to thinking on the things that belong to a wife and the world: but those existing in sacred orders are mancipated (dedicated) to divine services: therefore, etc. Therefore they ought not to have wives, because he who has a wife is thus divided, as the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 7:33.

§ 3. Again, as is evident in Numbers 16:8 and following, the Lord forbade the Levites to have possessions, but rather the labors of others were to minister to them freely, lest, hindered by labors, they might be less able to devote themselves to divine services: but the care of a wife and house abstracts from divine service more than the care of cultivating fields: therefore, since there is a necessity of time, it is more fitting that the care of a wife and house be forbidden to the ministers of the altar than the care of cultivating lands: but in the New Testament there is no necessity to propagate oneself further, as was proved above: therefore in the New Testament it is fitting that the law of continence be imposed on the ministers of the Altar.

§ 4. Again, as the Philosophers say, the study of the highest sciences requires abstraction from the flesh: but the highest science is the divine law: therefore those studying it ought to be abstracted from the flesh: but all ministers of the altar are bound to study in it: therefore, etc. But there is no better way of abstracting oneself from the flesh than through the law of continence: therefore it seems that it is fitting to impose the law of continence upon them.

§ 5. Again, Augustine in the book On the City of God adduces Apuleius saying that scarcely anyone can perceive the God of gods with the mind unless he is maximally separated from the flesh: but it is evident that a priest ought maximally to perceive God with his mind: therefore through the law of continence it maximally befits him to be abstracted from the flesh.

§ Response. It must be said that the ultimate reasons prove that it is congruous (fitting) that sacred orders impede marriage; but nevertheless it is not necessary: and this must be conceded. Hence orders of itself has a congruity to continence: but the necessity...

...of continence is caused by the rational constitution of the Church.

§ To the first, therefore, it must be known that orders, insofar as it is a sacrament, does not impede marriage, but from what is annexed to it, namely the uncleanness of intercourse, and the distraction toward the care of a wife and children. Hence, although a sacrament is not contrary to a sacrament, nevertheless what is annexed to one sacrament can be unfitting for the act and office of another sacrament, and thus impede it.

§ To the next it must be said that orders has something of the nature of impeding even besides the vow, because it has an incongruity, as is evident in all the reasons introduced last. And thus it is evident that it is a special impediment, drawing its force from the institution of the Church. Nor is it similar regarding non-sacred orders: because by reason of the holiness of this order, this order has an incongruity toward the things which belong to marriage: although, however, that holiness is substantial to the order, because it is the holiness of the office, and of the act which is about the altar.

§ To the next it must be said that the truth is more perfect than the type and figure: and therefore more is found in the truth than in the type. And that objection holds well concerning a perfect figure: but there was not a figure in all things, because orders in the Old Testament was only a figure of the order of the New, and the ordained was not a figure of the ordained, because those priests served in the propagation of the flesh in a time of the paucity of the faithful: but these are in a time of spiritual propagation.

§ To the next it must be said that it does not impede marriage by reason of its substance, or of its effect which is the threefold good of marriage, but by reason of that which has been said.

§ To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that it is much less to communicate [i.e., receive communion] than, by consecrating, to effect the body of the Lord, and to attend to divine things for the people committed to oneself: and therefore that objection does not proceed.

§ To the next it must be said that it does not promote, but impedes, as has been said: and this which is objected fails according to equivocation: because that similitude is metaphorical, and not to be referred to the letter, and it is as if one were to object: a laughing one is joyful; the meadow laughs; therefore the meadow is joyful.

Articulus 2 — Whether Order Is An Impediment Of Marriage Local, Temporal, Particular, Or Universal, Everywhere And Always

Is order a local, temporal, particular, or universal impediment, everywhere and always?

§ Secondly it is asked: Whether this impediment is local, temporal, particular, or universal, or everywhere and always in general?

§ Now, it seems to be local: because it does not impede everywhere, but only in the Western Church: therefore, etc.

§ Similarly it seems temporal: because it did not always impede, since Peter is read to have had a wife, and Philip, and certain other Apostles and Bishops.

§ Similarly it seems to be particular: because not every order impedes, but certain ones: for the first four [minor orders] do not impede marriage: therefore it seems that it is local, temporal, and particular.

On the contrary to this is: § 1. Because what is natural to something, as Aristotle says, befits it everywhere, just as fire burns in Persia and in Greece: but it is natural for orders to impede marriage: therefore it ought to impede everywhere. The first is proved through Aristotle in the second book of the Ethics. The second, moreover, is proved through all the reasons introduced in the preceding article to the effect that orders impedes marriage.

§ 2. Again, as the Gloss on the epistle 1 Corinthians 14:33 says: The statutes of the Church have their authority from universality: but this is a statute of the Church having authority: therefore it is general: therefore it is not local. For on account of this the Apostle says

in 1 Corinthians 14:33: As also I teach in all the churches of the saints.

§ 3. Again, Boethius in the prologue of the book On the Trinity says that the Church is called Catholic from universality, inasmuch as it is diffused everywhere: therefore it seems that even that which impedes in one part and at one time, ought always and everywhere to impede marriage.

§ Furthermore it seems that every order ought to impede: because even exorcists receive the power of expelling demons, and lectors the power of expounding prophecies: but for the first of these, spirituality is required, with which the carnality of the marital debt does not fit: and for the second, study is required, with which the care of a house and wife does not comport: therefore it seems that it is not lawful for such persons to contract [marriage]; and the same is the reason concerning the others.

§ Response. To the first it must be said that insofar as it is of congruity, that impediment is everywhere and always: but because this congruity bespeaks only an aptitude and not a ne-

cessity, but rather this necessity is caused by the institute of the Church, therefore, as to the necessity of separating a marriage, it is local and temporal.

§ And thus the solution to all the objections except the last is clear: because the arguments prove nothing but an aptitude. But that the Church instituted this particularly, and after the time of the primitive Church, the reason is because particularly and temporally, and not from the time of the primitive Church, certain subjects chose it and from then on bound themselves to it.

§ To the last it must be said that those [minor] orders do not impede from maximal congruity, but from remote congruity.

§ To the objection it must be said that exorcists do this more by the force of the exorcisms which they hold in memory, than by the force of a holiness which is in the office of the order: because their act is not upon the true body of Christ, but upon the mystical, and with respect to the possessed (energumens), who are not truly of the mystical body, but in potency. And similarly lectors recite prophecies, which are the light of truth overshadowed by figures. And therefore it is not necessary to impose the law of continence upon them.

Articulus 3 — Whether Every Sacred Order Impedes Marriage

Does every sacred order impede marriage?

§ Thirdly it is asked: Whether every sacred order impedes the contracting of marriage, and diriments [invalidates] it when contracted?

§ Now, it seems that it does not: because § 1. Just as order relates to holiness, so it relates to impeding marriage: but it relates differently to holiness: therefore it relates differently to impeding marriage. The first is proved from this, that order does not have a reason why it impedes marriage, except from the holiness of its act and office. The second, moreover, is self-evident: because a priest is bound to a greater holiness than a deacon, and a deacon than a subdeacon: since therefore the priesthood impedes the contracting and diriments the contract, it seems that the diaconate should impede the contracting, and not diriment the contract, and the subdiaconate should neither impede nor diriment.

§ 2. Again, all holiness which is in the sacraments is from the form: but the subdeacon and deacon do not receive an order toward the form of the Eucharist, but only upon the matter to be received from the people (the subdeacon), and to be ordered on the altar (the deacon): therefore they touch nothing of the holiness of the sacrament: therefore it is not necessary that they impede marriage on account of this.

§ 3. Again, none stand more in need of medicine against concupiscence than the ministers of the altar: but marriage is a medicine against concupiscence: therefore they maximally need marriage: therefore marriage ought maximally to be conceded to them.

§ 4. Again, it does not pertain to the subdeacon to read the Gospel, but the Epistle: but it pertains to the deacon to read the Gospel, and not to confect the sacrament: but it pertains to the priest to confect the sacrament: therefore these orders relate to one another in degrees of

higher and lower power: therefore this power ought to ascend by certain degrees of holiness: but this holiness is not well expressed unless an unequal mode of continence is imposed upon them: therefore it seems that not all three of these orders impede the contracting of marriage and diriment the contract.

On the contrary to this is that all these orders are called "sacred" from an excellent holiness above the common people: therefore they are bound to something to which not all the people are bound: but this cannot be anything other than perpetual continence: therefore they are bound to perpetual continence.

§ Response. It must be said that by congruity all these three orders impede the contracting of marriage, and diriment the contract: and this congruity is reduced to act through the institution of the Church, as was said before.

§ To the first, therefore, it must be said that that differing holiness is not in removing oneself from venereal delights, but rather in attaining a higher mode of perfection: hence anyone [in these orders] is bound to continence: but continence in the subdeacon is like a simple virtue, in the deacon like a purgatorial virtue, and in the priest like the virtue of a purified soul: because also the intention of the virtues is not principally in receding from evil, but in approaching good.

§ To the next it must be said that holiness is in the sacraments in two ways. One is as the form of the sacrament itself. The other is that which is not the form in the sacrament, but rather in the soul in which it is effected. I say therefore that the holiness which is formal in the sacrament is in the matter of the sacrament as a certain disposition, and in the place, and in the nod, and in the words, and in other things of this sort, and it is not only from the form of the sacrament. But the holiness which is the effect of the sacrament in him who receives it, that is from the form of the sacrament in such matter. Hence since holiness is as a disposition in the matter of the sacrament, and in the place, and in the words, and in the rite which is called teleta by the blessed Dionysius: it is necessary that all those approaching the cult of the sacrament be perfectly separated from the contagion of incontinence: and therefore perpetual continence is imposed upon all of them.

§ To the next it must be said that marriage is an indirect medicine, receiving the disease rather than curing it. But the ministers of the Lord ought to be cured from concupiscence: and therefore they receive another true and direct cure, which is spiritual grace cooling the heat of concupiscence, and the exercise of spiritual things which abstracts the mind from the thought of concupiscible things.

§ To the next it must be said that that differing degree presupposes for its minimum a perfect withdrawal from impurities which depress reason beneath the flesh: but in exaltation they differ as purifiers, and illuminators, and perfecters, as Dionysius says. For what he refers to the order of deacon, and priest, and Bishop, calling the deacon a purifier inasmuch as he ejects the unclean from the sacred place, and the priest an illuminator on account of doctrine, and the Bishop more perfect on account of his consummated power in confirming and consecrating—this we can refer to the subdeacon, and deacon, and priest, saying that the subdeacon

purifies through the doctrine of the Epistles, the deacon illuminates by Evangelical light, and the priest perfects by conferring the Eucharist.

§ And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 4 — Whether One Having A Wife, If He Is Ordained With The Wife Consenting, The Wife Herself Is Bound To Enter Religion

If one having a wife is ordained with the wife's consent, is the wife herself bound to enter religion?

If one having a wife is ordained with the wife's consent, is the wife herself bound to enter religion?

§ Fourthly, it is asked concerning him who, having a wife, is ordained with the wife's consent, whether the wife herself is bound to enter religion?

§ Now, it seems that she is not: because § 1. It is up to her to consent as much as she wills: but this ordained man is not bound to chastity except while he lives: therefore if she consents to live chastely while her husband lives, it seems that this suffices for the husband to be ordained: therefore after the death of that husband she can marry another: therefore she is not bound to enter religion.

§ 2. Again, if the husband had fornicated, and was dismissed on account of fornication, she would not be bound to remain continent except while the husband lived: therefore it seems that this suffices for the ordained husband, that she remain continent while he lives: therefore she is not bound to enter religion.

§ 3. Again, this woman is not bound to chastity from the fact that he receives an order, except by that bond by which she is subject to the law of the husband: but as the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 7:39: A woman is bound to the law as long a time as her husband lives: but if her husband falls asleep, she is freed, namely from the law. Let her marry to whom she will, only in the Lord. Therefore, since in that part of life in which she lives after the death of her husband she is not subject to the husband, it seems that in that [time] she is not obliged to chastity by the fact that her husband receives an order: therefore she is not bound to enter religion.

On the contrary is that: § 1. The vow of chastity of the husband is in a certain way solemnized through orders: but a husband and woman cannot be perpetually separated except by a vow solemnized on both sides; therefore such a woman is bound to a solemnized, or quasi-solemnized, vow of perpetual continence.

§ 2. Again, as long as she has not vowed perpetual continence, so long is there fear concerning her chastity, because she would make this vow if she did not fear concerning her chastity: but as long as there is such fear, he cannot vow continence: therefore neither can he receive an order to which it is annexed: but he does receive an order: therefore he no longer fears concerning the chastity of his wife: therefore she has vowed perpetual continence, quasi-solemnly.

§ Response. It must be said that such a woman is bound to chastity as long as she lives, that is, to perpetual chastity: but if she is young, concerning whose fall there is fear, she is bound to enter religion: but if she is not such, she ought to remain in an honorable place in perpetual chastity.

§ To the first, therefore, it must be said that it belongs to her will to vow or not to vow: but nevertheless in the manner in which she gives license to her husband, she herself is also understood to vow. Moreover, the vow of the husband is solemnized and perpetuated through the order: and therefore she herself is also understood to perpetuate and solemnize her vow. And this is so because they are of equal bond: and therefore concerning something similar, it is necessary that they absolve each other by common consent.

§ To the next it must be said that it is not similar: because the husband then loses the right which he possesses in the body of the woman on account of his sin: but the woman is, on the contrary, retaining the right in the body of the husband, and therefore remains free. But here he does not lose it except by a voluntary consimilar vow in both: and therefore it is necessary to perpetuate her vow.

§ To the last it must be said that the woman impedes by that bond by which she is subject to the law of the husband regarding the carnal debt: but that debt is not absolved by just any vow whatsoever, but

only by a perpetual vow which is understood to be solemnized.

Articulus 5 — Whether One Ordained, With His Wife Objecting, Is Bound To Render The Debt Notwithstanding Orders

Is one ordained against his wife's protest bound to render the debt despite the order?

§ Fifthly, it is asked concerning him who is ordained while his wife protests, whether any prejudice is done to the wife?

§ Now, it seems that there is: because § 1. He in every way has the order: but a solemn vow of chastity is annexed to orders: therefore he is bound to perpetual chastity: but he cannot be bound to chastity unless she loses the debt in the husband's body: therefore prejudice is done to the wife regarding the bodily debt of the husband.

§ 2. Again, the stronger prejudices the less strong: but a solemn vow in orders is stronger than marriage: therefore it prejudices it: therefore it diriments the contracted marriage: therefore prejudice is done to the woman.

On the contrary is that: § 1. When the husband received the order, he did not have his own flesh in his power: therefore he could do nothing concerning it through a vow: therefore he must still be returned to his wife.

§ 2. Furthermore, if he were tonsured in religion without the consent of his wife, he would be returned to her: therefore much more will he be returned to her when he only received a sacred order without the consent of his wife.

§ Response. It must be said that such a man must be returned to his wife, but he does not have the power of demanding the debt, but only of rendering it. And he sinned mortally by receiving the order in this way: and even after the death of his wife he is bound to perpetual chastity even if he survived her.

§ To the first, therefore, it must be said that the vow was null and foolish: because no one can vow concerning what belongs to another, and it belonged to another regarding that which the wife possessed in his body.

§ To the next it must be said that there was not a vow there, but rather a certain foolish promise concerning what belongs to another.

Articulus 6 — Whether Eastern Clerics Can Be Ordained With Their Wives Protesting

Can Eastern clerics be ordained if their wives protest?

§ Sixthly it is asked: Whether Eastern clerics can be ordained if their wives protest?

§ It seems that they can: because § 1. No prejudice is done to them, since after the order they can render the debt and live together as before.

§ 2. Again, since there are three things in marriage, namely the essence of marriage, and the act of the carnal debt, and the good, the order of the Easterners impedes none of these: therefore it seems that it cannot be impeded by the contradiction of the wife. And the first is indeed self-evident.

§ 3. Again, if a wife contradicts, a husband is not impeded from the vow of the Holy Land, where it happens that he is absent from his wife for several years: therefore much less among the Easterners, if a wife contradicts, is he impeded from an order by which she is never deprived of her debt.

§ 4. Again, a protest against amendment saving the right of the wife is null if it is made by a wife against a husband amending his life: but through the reception of orders the husband is amended, because a greater grace is conferred upon him: therefore it seems that it can be done with the wife protesting, provided the right of marriage is saved.

On the contrary, But against this is: § 1. What the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 7:5: Do not defraud one another, except perhaps by consent for a time. Therefore if there is not

equal consent on both sides, nor even for a time can they absolve themselves from the payment of the debt: but the Eastern during the time of his turn (vicis) is bound to chastity, which he cannot observe unless the wife consents: therefore it seems that he cannot consent to receive the order, to the reception of which such an obligation of chastity follows.

§ 2. Again, the wife of an ordained man among the Easterners, according to many, is bound to perpetual chastity after the death of the ordained man: therefore prejudice is done to her liberty through the order received by the husband: therefore the order cannot be received except by the will of the wife.

§ Response. This last proof seems to me to be convenient, although certain ancients said the contrary.

§ To the first, therefore, it seems it must be said that although no prejudice is done to her in the substance of the debt, nevertheless prejudice is done to her for a certain time, namely the time of his turn, and prejudice is done to her in her future state of liberty, as the ultimate objections prove.

§ To the next it must be said that it contraries the act in a certain way: because it deprives her in time, although not simply.

§ To the next it must be said that this vow [of crusade] is necessary for the liberation of the Holy Land: yet if he knew with probability of future danger to his wife, I believe that he would do better by not going on pilgrimage.

§ To the next it must be said that not the whole right of the wife remains saved, as was clear from the aforesaid.

Articulus 7 — Whether The Wives Of Easterners, Consenting To The Ordination Of Their Husbands, Are Bound To Continence After Their Death

Are the wives of Easterners, consenting to the ordination of their husbands, bound to remain continent after their death?

§ Seventhly it is asked: Whether the wives of Easterners consenting to the ordination of their husbands, are bound to remain perpetually continent after the death of the husbands?

§ It seems that they are not: because § 1. A woman after death is freed from the law of her husband: therefore let her marry to whom she will, according to the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 7:39, only in the Lord.

§ 2. Again, what would be the cause why she could not marry? For her husband, from the moment he is dead, does not contract bigamy, nor was this woman bound to him except by reason of the marriage: therefore it seems that when the marriage is dissolved she can join herself to whomever she wills.

On the contrary is that husband and wife are judged as equals in continence and the debt of marriage: therefore of whatever sort the vow of the husband is, of such sort necessarily is also the vow of the woman: but the vow of the husband is such that after his wife he cannot marry another: therefore by a similar reason the woman after the death of the husband cannot marry another husband.

§ Response. It must be said that the wife after the death of the priest (as they say) cannot marry another husband: for when she consented to the order of the husband, she also consented or is understood to consent to the consequence of the order: and this is the vow of perpetual continence, which some say is caused by the institution of the Church, but others from the force of the vow, which I believe is better, because it is understood to be solemnized in the manner in which the vow of the husband is solemnized, so that namely after the death

of the husband she never accepts another: just as neither can he marry another after the death of the wife.

§ To the first, therefore, it must be said that she is freed from the law of the husband after his death, but not from the vow, which she is understood to have solemnized when she consented that her husband should receive the order.

§ To the next it must be said that the interpreted vow is posited for the cause: and thus the solution is clear.

§ However, Hugh [of St. Victor] said the contrary, namely that it is lawful for her to marry another: [but] the said opinion is more renowned.

Articulus 8 — Whether It Is True That In Some Orders One Can Contract Marriage, Unless The Habit Of Religion Is An Obstacle

Is it true that in some orders marriage can be contracted, unless the habit of religion stands in the way?

Is it true that in some orders marriage can be contracted, unless the habit of religion stands in the way?

§ Then it is asked concerning what he says there, at A, after the beginning: But in others it is permitted, etc.

§ For this which he says, or have made a vow of continence, cannot be understood except of a simple vow: because otherwise the disjoined alternatives would be null: but a simple vow does not diriment the contract: therefore it seems that in a simple vow a marriage is permitted to be made: therefore the cause which he posits in the Text is null.

§ Response. It must be said that it is understood of a simple vow, and this impedes the contracting and prohibits sortition (the obtaining) of marriage: because one obtains a thing when it is first acquired, not when one uses a thing already acquired.

§ And through this the solution to the objection is clear.

Articulus 9 — Whether Any Of These Is Bound To Take A Virgin To Wife

Is any such person bound to marry a virgin?

§ Then it is asked concerning what he says there, at A, after the beginning: To marry a virgin wife, etc.

§ It seems to be nothing: because he can take a virgin or a non-virgin, as seems good to him.

§ Response. He speaks hypothetically, if the cleric intends to become a priest: because if he were to marry a non-virgin, bigamy would stand in the way of his being made a priest.

Articulus 10 — Whether Any Of These Can Take A Widow Or A Repudiated Woman

Can any such person marry a widow or a repudiated woman?

§ Then it is asked concerning what he says there, at A, a little after: Not a widow or a repudiated woman, etc.

§ For in the New Testament there is no repudiated woman: therefore he seems to say that for nothing.

§ Response. It must be said that a repudiated woman is one dismissed in whatever manner, even if she was not a true wife, because bigamy is induced in whatever manner a corrupted woman is married.

Articulus 11 — Whether Crime Is An Impediment, And Of What Force

Is crime an impediment, and of what force?

§ Then it is asked concerning what he says there, at B: To these must be added concerning killers, etc.

§ For it is asked here concerning the impediment of crime.

§ And four things are asked. First is: Of what force is this impediment? Second: Which and how many are the crimes impeding marriage? Third: Concerning the three cases in which a contracted marriage is divided through a committed crime. Fourth: Whether it is lawful for husbands to kill adulterous wives, as the Text seems to say, or not?

§ To the first one proceeds thus: § 1. No impediment is as worthy of punishment as crime: therefore none ought so efficaciously to impede marriage: therefore crime ought to impede the contracting, and diriment the contract.

§ 2. Again, crime is directly contrary to the conjunction of the soul with God: since therefore marriage is a sign of such a conjunction, crime frustrates the signate in marriage: therefore it takes away from marriage the good of the sacrament: but with that taken away, marriage is taken away, as was held above: therefore it seems that crime impedes the contracting, and diriments the contract.

§ 3. Again, in all other sacraments crime impedes the effect: therefore also in this one: therefore it seems that it diriments the contract.

§ 4. Again, there is no impediment which is so directly contrary to marriage as crime: but certain other lesser contrarieties diriment the contract: therefore this one also will diriment it. The first is proved: because others are frequently without the sin of the person who contracts marriage: but this one never. The second, however, is self-evident.

On the contrary is that: § 1. Marriage is a medicine: but...

the more infirm someone is, the readier the medicine ought to be for him: therefore, since crime is an infirmity, the more criminal someone is, the less he ought to be impeded from marriage, lest through concupiscence he fall headlong.

§ 2. Also, let us posit that this [impediment of crime] supervenes upon a marriage: it is established that it does not impede on account of a danger; therefore it should not impede even then, since the same danger of incontinence exists.

§ 3. Also, other impediments frequently impede with respect to one person and not with respect to another, and in those the medicine is not removed: but this one impedes with respect to all: therefore it removes the medicine: therefore unless it is moderated, the sick person will despair: therefore it must be moderated by the Church, such that although it impedes contracting [marriage], it does not however dissolve a contract [already made].

WHAT MUST BE CONCEDED is: that no impediment of crime so impedes contracting such that it also dissolves a contract except adultery in a threefold case, just as was partly said above, and will again be said below.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that it most greatly impedes from the rationale of guilt, but on account of this it does not contract the strength to impede, but rather from this, that it destroys the essentials for marriage, such as consent, or the rendering of the debt, or something such: but a crime destroys none of these: and therefore it is not so violently impeding as others.

To the other it must be said that it is contrary to the conjunction from the fact that it destroys the cause of conjunction which is merit, and not from the fact that it destroys the sign. Hence it is not true that that which is contrary to the signified is contrary to the sign, unless it is understood per se and formally, namely that it is contrary to the signified insofar as it is the signified of that [sign]: but in this way a crime does not contradict the conjunction of the faithful soul with God: hence the argument does not stand.

To the other it must be said that it impedes the effect of marriage which is grace: but nonetheless it does not impede the effect of marriage, that is, that the marriage is effected: just as also a crime in other sacraments does not impede the sacrament, but the effect of the sacrament, which is grace.

To the other it must be said that this is false: because no impediment is so contrary to marriage as a crime, as is clear from the aforesaid.

Articulus 12 — How Many And Which Are The Crimes Impeding Marriage

How many and what are the crimes impeding marriage?

Secondly it is inquired, What and how many are the signs of crime impeding marriage?

And they are accustomed to be posited as six, namely the killing of one's own spouse, incest, the rape of another's betrothed, plotting against the right or debt of a wife, like him who raises his own son from the font, so that by this having been made the godfather of his wife, he is not bound to the debt: the killing of a presbyter, and solemn penance.

§ 1. But it is objected concerning the first: because one killing his own spouse does not sin except against the marriage which was between him and his spouse: therefore he ought not to

be punished except in that marriage: therefore it seems that it is permitted to him to contract another marriage, against which he has not sinned.

§ 2. Similarly it is also objected concerning incest: for in that the burning of concupiscence appears: since therefore the medicine of that is marriage, it seems that he should maximally be invited to marriage by the Church: therefore it should not be established by the Church that this crime impedes marriage.

§ 3. In the same way it is objected concerning the third. For it seems that one raping a betrothed ought to have her: because between her and the first there are nothing but betrothals, and between her and the second carnal commerce intervenes: and by this the betrothals are dissolved, as was held above: therefore it seems that from this very fact that he rapes her, she is made not the betrothed of another: therefore it does not impede marriage from this, that he ravished the betrothed, but he can have her as a wife.

§ 4. Further concerning the fourth: because he in no way sins against every marriage, but only against his own spouse: therefore just as one sinning in the contract of one marriage is not on account of this impeded from another, so neither should this one be impeded from contracting another marriage after the death of his spouse.

§ 5. But concerning the fifth it seems that it is entirely irrational: because a presbyter is not a person pertaining to marriage: therefore one killing him sins nothing against marriage: therefore he is unjustly punished in marriage.

§ 6. The sixth also seems to have no reason: because one solemnly repenting is praiseworthy: because not even open blame draws him back from penance: but it has no reason that anyone should be punished in that in which he is praiseworthy: therefore for that penance the solemn penitent ought not to be punished: but to be impeded from marriage is a great punishment: therefore a solemn penitent ought not to be impeded from marriage.

Further it is inquired, Since heresy and apostasy from the faith and infidelity itself are graver crimes than these, why are they not posited among those impeding marriage?

For it seems that they ought to be posited: because they are enormous, and they sin against the foundation of marriage: therefore they ought to impede marriage.

Solution. It must be said that the six mentioned by the ancients are posited as crimes impeding the contracting of marriage from an interdict of the Church, but they do not dissolve the contract, nay rather they said that if they are youths committing such crimes, the Church ought to dispense with them even concerning contracting marriage, lest any occasion of ruin be given to them from the fire of concupiscence.

It must be said therefore to the first, that this statute is for a punishment: for it is sufficiently equitable that one killing a spouse should not find a spouse for the rest, although he has not sinned except against one: for it is feared that a similar fury should rouse him also against another, so that he should also kill her. Hence this is done, not therefore because he has sinned against the second marriage, because it does not yet exist, but in detestation of the crime, and on account of the fear of a similar one in a subsequent marriage.

To the other it must be said that although incest signifies an excessive heat of concupiscence, nevertheless it also renders the person in some way illegitimate for marriage, insofar as he does not heed or it is feared he will not heed the honesty of marriage, who does not heed the degrees of nature: but chiefly nevertheless the Church heeds, that these crimes be more avoided on account of the fear of the adjoined punishment.

To the third it must be said that one is called the raptor of another's betrothed, not because she remains a betrothed if he so willed, but because he raped her who was a betrothed: for on account of some inchoation of marriage which occurs in betrothals (as was held above) the Church wills that anyone should detest this crime, and therefore adjoined such a punishment.

To the fourth it must be said that it is not similar concerning the contract of marriage: because there only temporal damage occurs, but here damage and plotting also of spiritual things occurs, such as of faith, and the like: and therefore this is detestable.

To the fifth it must be said that the enormity of the crime demands long and most severe penance: and therefore marriage is interdicted for him, so that occupied by nothing else he may be able to weep for his sins: for it must be counseled for such a one that he enter religion: and this is the reason of the ecclesiastical institution.

To the other it must be said that a solemn penitent cannot for the rest be vacant for delights; because a solemn penance is not done except for a crime which moved a whole country or city, as was said above in the tract De Poenitentia: and therefore it is not congruous for him to be vacant for delights further with a wife: and therefore the contracting of marriage is interdicted for him.

To that which is further inquired, it must be said that to many other crimes the Church could adjoin this as a punishment, that they might not contract if he wished: but nonetheless it has done so in those previously had: because they sinned more against marriage or by their enormity demanded perpetual mourning, as the last two. And I well believe that this should be counseled for an infidel and an apostate: nevertheless because such sins are mixed with error and ignorance, although they are enormous in themselves, they more easily obtain pardon before the Church: because they proceeded not so much from malice, as from ignorance. Hence, 1 Timothy 1:13: I have obtained the mercy of God, because I did it ignorantly in unbelief. Acts 3:17: And now, brethren, I know that you did it through ignorance, as did also your princes.

Articulus 13 — Whether In Three Cases One Who Has Defiled A Woman By Adultery, After The Death Of His Wife, Cannot Take Her In Marriage

Whether in the three cases he who polluted a woman through adultery, cannot marry her after his wife's death?

Thirdly, it is inquired concerning these three cases in which he who polluted some woman through adultery cannot marry her after the death of his spouse: for as was clear above, they are, if he plotted with effect for the death of his spouse, if he gave a pledge concerning contracting, if he contracted de facto.

§ 1. But it is objected concerning the first: for let it be that out of anger or out of enmity he plots for the death of his prior spouse, and not for this, that he may contract with the adulteress, it seems then not to impede: because such angers do not make any special danger for the spouse, because even without adultery such things can happen: therefore it seems that this is general.

§ 2. Similarly let us posit that when he gave a pledge concerning contracting or even contracted, she did not know that he was married, but thought him free: for then ignorance excuses the whole sin: therefore she would be unjustly punished, if after the death of the other spouse it were not permitted to her to contract with him.

§ 3. Also, I posit that it was not a true marriage, but nevertheless before separation by the judgment of the Church he gives a pledge or contracts with another: for it seems that he is not impeded: because since there is no impediment except from a marriage, and that is null, it will make no impediment: therefore the second contract will be made.

§ 4. Also, further I posit that he gives a pledge concerning contracting or contracts, before he pollutes her through adultery, and afterwards he pollutes her through adultery. It seems that this does not impede: because the law is not except concerning him who married her whom he first polluted through adultery: but this one did not do so: therefore this does not impede.

Response. It must be said that in all these cases except the last, those three cases which were adduced have an instance [i.e., apply].

But concerning the last it must be said that it is determined from new law that whether he gave a pledge before adultery, or after, that it impedes contracting with her to whom he gives a pledge, and dissolves the contract: because similar plots are made by both against the first marriage: and therefore they determine similarly concerning both.

But in the others it must be held as the objections prove.

Articulus 14 — Whether It Is Lawful For Husbands To Kill Adulterous Wives

Whether it is permitted to husbands to kill adulterous wives?

Whether it is permitted to husbands to kill adulterous wives?

Fourthly it is inquired, Whether it is permitted to husbands to kill adulterous wives, as seems to be said in the Text in the decree of Pope Nicholas?

It seems that it is: because § 1. The law commands an adulteress to be stoned: but what divine law commands, man is bound to execute: since therefore no one is so offended by an adulteress as a husband, he himself can stone her.

§ 2. Also, the law says: Thou shalt not suffer evildoers to live: but the adulteress is maximally an evildoer: therefore it is even a sin for the husband if he suffers her to live: therefore he is bound to kill her.

§ 3. Also, by human laws a husband is pardoned if with one wound he pierces both, both the adulterer and the adulteress: therefore since human laws are modeled from divine ones, it seems that according to divine law the same ought to be done: therefore if he kills her, he ought to be pardoned.

To the contrary is what is said, Ezekiel 33:11: I will not the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live. Therefore a man ought to await her for penance, and not immediately kill.

Response. It must be said that by ecclesiastical judgment no one is killed: but if an adulterer makes her to be killed by civil judgment, let him see to it: for I well think that if human law is preserved in such matters, it is not a sin.

To the first therefore and the second it must be said that the law of fear was the old law: and therefore it punished crimes atrociously, and condemned adulterers and other criminals: but the new law is a law of love: and therefore the Lord, John 8:3 et seq., freed the adulteress.

To the other the solution is clear through what was said: because if the civil law is preserved, no sin, as I think, is incurred: but nevertheless out of mercy it must be dissimulated, just as the Lord Himself exalts judgment with his mercy, dissimulating the sins of men on account of penance.

DISTINCTIO XXXVIII

Divisio Textus

Now let us inspect concerning the vow, etc. In this distinction three things are inquired, namely first concerning the vow. Secondly, concerning the quantity of the guilt of adultery, there, D, When a man and a woman, etc. Thirdly, it is inquired concerning women contracting after a long expectation of a husband, who was believed to be dead, there, E, Here it is inquired concerning those women, etc.

Circa the first the Master determines two things, namely concerning the vow, and the differences of vows: and this second begins, there, B, It is to be known, that one vow is common, etc.

Now circa the first six things fall to be inquired, namely first what is a vow? Secondly, Concerning what is a vow? Thirdly, Who can vow? Fourthly, Whether it is of necessity to render a licit vow? Fifthly, Whether a vow is more obligatory than an oath, or conversely? Sixthly, What is that from which a vow has the force of its obligation?

To the first let whatever definitions are found be taken up.

Now this one is contained in the Text: A vow is a certain testification of a spontaneous promise, which properly ought to be made to God and concerning those things which are of God.

Hugh of St. Victor in the book De Sacramentis, thus defines a vow: A vow is a voluntary pledge of the mind.

And certain Jurists thus: A vow is a promise of some good made with deliberation.

But the ancient Doctors of Theology thus: A vow is a conception of a proposed good firmed by deliberation, by which someone obligates himself to God to do or not do something.

But others thus: A vow is a promise of a better good firmed from deliberation.

Articulus 1 — Whether The Definitions Of A Vow Are Well Assigned

Whether the definitions of a vow are well assigned?

But it is objected against the first, thus: § 1. Every testification is before certain persons who can be witnesses: but not every vow is thus: therefore not every vow is a testification. The first is clear from the rationale of testification, which is nothing else than the invocation of witnesses to the assertion of truth. But the second is proved by this, that a certain vow is private, which is made only before God.

§ 2. Also, a testification is either through a sign, or through witnesses. Through a sign, as we say that the word is the witness of the heart. If through a sign. Against: A certain vow is made only in the heart, which never proceeds to any sign. But if through witnesses: then it would not be a vow unless it could be proved through witnesses, which again is false.

§ 3. Also, testification is one thing, and that concerning which testimony is borne is sometimes another: therefore it is not a testification: therefore it is badly defined through testification.

§ 4. Further it is objected concerning this that it says, Of a spontaneous promise. For this does not seem generally to apply to a vow: because certain Jurists divide the vow saying that one of vows is of will, another of necessity: therefore some vow is of necessary exhibition, rather than of spontaneous promise: therefore it is badly defined.

§ 5. Also, a spontaneous promise is a vow: because spontaneous promise is the essential predicate of a vow: therefore it seems that it ought to be posited in the nominative case, not in an oblique case in the definition.

§ 6. Further it is inquired concerning this that it says, Which ought to be made to God. Because vows are frequently made to the Saints: therefore it seems that a vow is not always made to God.

Further it is objected against the second. Because § 1. Every pledge made even to a man is voluntary, because not coerced: therefore every such pledge is a vow.

§ 2. Also, betrothals are voluntary pledges of nuptials: therefore they are vows, which it is a derision to say: therefore it seems that the definition is bad.

Further it is inquired concerning the third. Because § 1. There is some good of nature: therefore a promise of that good firmed with deliberation is a vow, which is absurd.

§ 2. Also, a promise which is made to a man firmed with deliberation, if it is of some good, according to this would be a vow: and thus many vows would be made between associates and fellow citizens and friends all day, which is false: therefore the definition is worth nothing.

Further it is inquired concerning the fourth. § 1. For a conception of a good has not yet proceeded into a promise: since therefore a vow is a promise, as is said in the Text, it seems that it badly and imperfectly defines through conception.

§ 2. Also, a conception by nature and time is before a proposition: therefore it is not a conception of a proposed good, but rather a proposition of a good conception: therefore again it is badly defined through this mode. But the first is proved by this, that nothing is proposed which is not conceived in the heart beforehand: but many things are conceived which are not proposed to be done.

§ 3. Also, deliberation is not of every thing according to the Philosopher: but rather deliberation is on account of counsel while it is in doubtful matters only: therefore deliberation is also only in doubtful matters: but a vow is frequently concerning those things which are with certitude good: therefore not every vow is firmed by deliberation, but rather about the supposition of a good.

§ 4. Also, a vow is not firmed by deliberation, but rather by promise and publication and solemnization: therefore it seems that it does not say well, Firmed by deliberation.

Further it is inquired concerning the last. It seems that a vow is not always of a better good, because a vow of necessity is not of a better good, but of a common one: therefore it is not well thus defined.

Moreover, since to one thing it belongs to be one, and a definition declares the being of the defined, it is inquired, according to what are so many definitions assumed?

Response. It must be said to this last one, that a vow is spoken of in two ways: commonly, and properly. Commonly, however, any promise made to God concerning those things which pertain to the Christian religion is called a vow, and thus a vow is a promise made in baptism and in penance, and in other divine precepts without which there is no salvation, and this vow is called chiefly by certain Jurists a vow of necessity: because will he nill he, a man must observe them if he wishes to be saved.

A vow is also spoken of as a promise made concerning those things which are above precept, which God does not require from us, unless we spontaneously obligate ourselves to them: and concerning those Augustine says that to vow is of the will, and to render is of necessity: and thus a vow is spoken of properly.

Let it be said therefore that the first definition which is posited in the Text, touches upon the genus and the proper matter of a vow in common, and to whom it must be made. But the second touches upon nothing except the form of a vow in the genus of a common vow. But the third touches upon the proper efficient and matter: because deliberation effects, and the good is the matter. The fourth indeed touches upon the remote and proximate efficient, and to

whom it is made and for what, that is, the end, because it is made for obligating oneself to God. But the fifth and last is given concerning a vow most properly so called: because that is not except concerning a better good: and it touches the form in genus through a promise and the effective which is spontaneous deliberation: and therefore this last is better among all.

To the first therefore it must be said that this testification is through a sign proceeding from deliberation, which is a promise which is the witness of the heart: and therefore it can be made between oneself and God: because then his promise will be a witness either against him if he should be a transgressor of the vow, or for him if he should observe it.

To the other it must be said that in the heart there is also a promise, which is a witness between oneself and God: and therefore the solution is clear.

To the other it must be said that the Master here does not define except a vow properly taken. Or it can be said that a divine precept can be attended to in two ways, namely in comparison to the end which is salvation, and thus it is necessary: or absolutely regarding observation, and thus it is voluntary, because voluntarily fulfilled: and thus it is not repugnant for something to be voluntary and necessary.

To the other it must be said that a vow properly is of a confirmed will: and therefore a promise properly speaking is consequent to a vow, as testifying and confirming it: and therefore it falls obliquely in the definition of a vow: but because a promise is materially accepted for the thing promised, because that is willed of a confirmed will: therefore materially a vow is sometimes said in the nominative case, but nevertheless it is more properly predicated obliquely of a vow.

To the last it must be said that a vow is not made to the Saints, except through this, that God shines in them as to suffrages: and therefore every vow is referred to God.

To that which is further inquired concerning the second definition.

To the first it must be said that a pledge is accommodatively accepted by Master Hugh, such that it is concerning those things which pertain to religion.

To the other it must be said that betrothals are ordained to marriage, which does not only pertain to religion, but according as it is an office of nature.

To that which is opposed concerning the third definition, it must be said that this is of a vow in common: and it is understood as a pledge made concerning those things which pertain to religion.

And through this the solution is clear to both of those objections.

To that which is objected concerning the fourth, it must be said that conception is spoken of in two ways. In one way when something is in whatever way cogitated: and this is improperly called a conception. In another way a conception is spoken of when it is enclosed in the heart, and formed toward act and toward work, just as an infant which is formed is called conceived. And in this way conception is posited in the definition of a vow. And it is clear that in this way a conception designates something perfectly willed.

To the other it must be said that conception spoken of in the first way precedes by nature and time the proposition, but spoken of in the second way it follows it: because nothing is formed in the aforesaid way, except what is beforehand proposed for willing and acting.

To the other it must be said that although the matter of a vow is most certainly good, nevertheless the mode of execution is doubtful, and the power of the vower, and the exit of the vow: and regarding those deliberation has a place, and is necessary.

To the last it must be said that deliberation firms a simple vow, but promise and publication and solemnization firm a certain vow also regarding another aspect.

To that which is opposed concerning the fifth, it must be said that that is more proper among all, and is given concerning a vow most properly so called, which is always of a better good than is any good which falls under a precept.

Articulus 2 — Whether A Vow Is Of Those Things That Are Under Counsel

Whether a vow is of those things which are under counsel?

Secondly it is inquired, Concerning what is a vow made?

But it seems that of every good: § 1. For since every actable good is voluntarily done, and a vow is a spontaneous pledge, it seems that it is of every good.

§ 2. Also, Genesis 28:20 et seq., Jacob vowed a vow concerning those goods which were of necessity, namely that God should be to him as God, and that he would offer tithes and peace victims: therefore it seems since this is of necessity, that a vow is of a good necessary for salvation.

To the contrary of this is, that § 1. Augustine says that to vow is of the will: therefore a vow falls upon a good which God does not require from man: but this is a good of counsel: therefore a vow is of a good of counsel only.

§ 2. Also, a vow properly is of a better good, as was held: but a better good is of counsel: therefore a vow is of a good of counsel.

§ 3. Also, we see that only they are said to have vows upon themselves, who obligate themselves to counsels, as religious, pilgrims, and the like: therefore it seems that a vow is of a good of counsel only.

But again further it seems that it is also of an illicit thing, as was clear in the vow of Jephthah, who vowed that he would first offer to God what met him returning home from victory, and he offered his own daughter: therefore it seems that it is not only of a better good concerning which there is counsel.

If you say that it was a foolish vow, and therefore not accepted. Against: Hebrews 11:32, Jephthah is numbered by the Apostle in the catalog of Saints: but this would not be done, unless his vow and other things which he did had pleased God: therefore that vow was not foolish, nor impious.

§ 2. Also, we see certain ones and chiefly women vow that they will not comb their head on such or such a workday when it is permitted to work, or that they will not eat this food, like eel, or something similar: and concerning these there is neither counsel, nor precept: therefore it seems that a vow is not always of a good concerning which there is counsel.

§ 3. Also, certain ones vow for themselves perilous things, like two-day or three-day fasts, or with bread and water: and a danger is generated for them in such a life either from infirmity, or from poverty: but it is established that concerning perilous things there is neither counsel, nor precept: therefore it seems that a vow is not always of a better good concerning which there is counsel.

Response. It must be said that a vow properly so called is not except concerning those things which fall under counsel: but a vow commonly accepted is concerning those things also which fall under precept: and through this the solution to the first is clear.

To the second it must be said that Jacob's vow was of a good of counsel: for when he says, The Lord shall be to me for a God, it is understood through special worship to which others in common were not bound, such as the erection of an altar, the preordination of a place for the future building of a temple. And when he says, Tithes, etc., this was counselable: because there were not yet ministers to whom tithes were due, nor even many poor, because the inhabitants then were rare: and therefore they fell under counsel.

But those which are objected to the contrary are to be conceded.

To that which is further inquired, it must be said that as the authority says, Jephthah was foolish in vowing, and impious in rendering.

But to the objection it must be said that by reason of the victory which he had by God's help, he is posited in the catalog both of Saints, and of those who by great virtue of faith did things, and not by reason of that which he foolishly vowed, and impiously paid: because Isidore says concerning such: In evil promises rescind faith, and in a base vow change the decree.

To the other it must be said that all such vows are rather certain sortileges than vows, and are relics of the vanity of pagans, who to the images of heaven or lords of hours or days said these or those things were not to be done. Hence concerning such the Apostle said, Galatians 4:10: You observe days, and months, and times, and years. And if anyone should do these things even in honor of God and his saints, nevertheless they are to be prohibited, nor held as vows on account of the similitude of idolatry: because as Jerome says on Hosea: Not only is idolatry to be fled, but also the similitude of it. And it is said, 1 Thessalonians 5:22: Abstain from all appearance of evil.

To the other it must be said that into the danger of his health and life no one can vow anything: and therefore when there is danger, a vow is rather to be fled, or held for a non-vow. It is safe nevertheless that in such things a dispensation of a superior be sought: but if that is had late, even without dispensation in time of danger it is to be broken. But it seems to me that a sufficient cause of danger is poverty or infirmity. Poverty indeed, as if he vowed not to eat meats, and when he begs, nothing is given to him except meats, or those things which are

with meats, which if he does not eat, he will be consumed by starvation. But infirmity, as if he vowed not to eat this or that, and afterwards is debilitated unless he eats, then I think the vow can be loosed.

And thus the solution is clear to all the things inquired.

Articulus 3 — Who Are Those Who Can Vow

Who are those who can vow?

Thirdly it is inquired, Who can vow?

But it seems that anyone: for if he is impeded, this will not be except because he is bound to a man to the contrary of the vow.

But against: § 1. No one is so bound to a man as to God: therefore a vow to God is never to be dismissed on account of an obligation to a man: therefore anyone can vow.

§ 2. Also, an inferior lord cannot prohibit the obsequy of a superior lord: but every man with respect to God is inferior: therefore he cannot prohibit or impede the obsequy of God: therefore a vow to God which is concerning divine obsequy is never to be dismissed on account of a man: therefore anyone can vow.

§ 3. Also, to a carnal lord who has power over someone, spiritual obsequy exhibited by an inferior profits more than carnal: therefore on account of carnal he ought not to draw him back from spiritual: but a vow is spiritual: therefore he ought not to draw him back from a vow on account of carnal.

§ 4. Also, it matters how anyone uses his own thing, as the law says: but it is established that he can never use it better than to the obsequy of God: therefore it seems that a lord can never use a servant better, than that he fulfill a vow: therefore he cannot impede one vowing.

Further it is inquired, Whether a monk can vow?

It seems that he can: because in many things he has his own will: but what is of his own will in something and he is arbiter, he can vow: therefore a monk can vow. The first is proved through the saying of Bernard in the book De Dispensatione et praecepto, where he says: Let the Prelate exact nothing of those things which I have not promised. But the second is established from this, that no monk promises that he will observe all good things.

To the contrary is that he promises to live obediently unto death: therefore in nothing does he have his own will: therefore he can vow nothing.

Further it is inquired concerning a wife.

For it seems that she could vow many things: because she herself is not a handmaid, and in many things is judged on a par with the husband: therefore she can vow in many things just as the husband.

To the contrary of this is, § 1. What is said, Numbers 30:4 et seq., where none of her vows are approved, unless the husband is the author.

§ 2. To the same the saying of Augustine posited above makes: It is manifest that the law willed thus, that the woman is under the husband, etc.

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§ 1. Further, it is asked about a son and daughter of a household (filius et filiafamilias). § 2. For it seems that neither can they vow: because the same law forbids it: and what the law forbids ought not to be done: therefore such persons cannot vow by themselves. § 3. To the contrary is that we see sons of a household flock to religion against the will of their parents, and their vows are ratified: therefore they can vow, as it seems. § 4. Response. It must be said that a slave insofar as he is a slave, and a monk insofar as he is a monk, and a wife insofar as she is a wife, and a son or daughter of a household insofar as they are such, can vow absolutely nothing by their own authority: but with their superiors confirming their vows, or when they know of them and do not contradict them when they can, the vows of such persons receive force. The cause of this is because a vow is a voluntary pledge, and such persons do not have a free will in such things, and therefore they cannot vow. § 5. To the first, therefore, it must be said that although every man is more obliged to God than to man, nevertheless God does not require that obedience which is done to the prejudice of human right: and therefore God wills that he render to man what is his, and in this he mostly obeys God. § 6. To the other it must be said that this is true, when the obediences of the inferior and the superior are contrary: but when it is one obedience of both, then often someone is drawn back from the obedience which is only of the superior by the obedience of the inferior which is from the ordination of the superior: and so it is here in the proposed case. § 7. To the other it must be said that although spiritual obedience might perhaps profit a carnal lord more than corporal obedience, nevertheless God does not require this of him, that he lack the carnal for the spiritual, unless he freely wills this: and therefore he can draw him back if he wills. § 8. To the other it must be said that that law does not restrict someone to the best possible use of his thing, but only to a licit one: whence provided he uses it licitly, the lawmaker does not intermeddle whether he uses it for a better use, or a less good one. And God also acts thus: because he wills that man should rejoice in the goods granted to him. § 9. To that which is asked about monks, it seems to me (saving the counsel of elders) that as long as he remains in his order, he can introduce nothing special through his vow: because prejudice would be done to the community: because if he were to vow concerning abstinence, there would be no one to prepare food for him outside the hour, and an abuse of eating separately would be introduced, which must be especially avoided in cloisters, and many other inconveniences. § 10. To the argument therefore it must be said, that he has not retained his will in anything that would derogate from the common life, but perhaps in praying beyond the common course of the order: and in this way he can do or vow something special. § 11. To that which is asked about the wife, it must be said that she is under the power of her husband: and therefore perhaps she can vow nothing, except in some prayers, without the consent of the husband: and I well believe that neither can the husband without the consent of the wife, except in a favorable vow for the Holy Land. § 12. To the last it must be said that no person ought to be
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received in the cloister except one who is of his own right according to age: and a son of a household is not such by age, although perhaps he is under the care and regime of his father.

Articulus 4 — Whether The Fulfillment Of A Vow Is Of Necessity

Whether it is of necessity to render a vow? § 13. Fourthly it is asked, whether it is of necessity to render a vow?

§ 1. It seems that it is: because § 2. Augustine expressly says this. [707] § 3. Also, Proverbs 20:25: It is ruin for a man to devour holy things, and after vows to retract. § 4. Also, Deuteronomy 23:21: When you shall have vowed a vow to the Lord your God, you shall not delay to pay it, because the Lord your God will require it: and if you delay, it shall be reputed to you as a sin. § 5. Also, ibid., v. 23, thus: That which has once gone out of your lips, you shall observe, and you shall do as you have promised to the Lord your God, and with your own will and with your own mouth you have spoken. § 6. Also, on the same, the Gloss: "You are bound by right, because you promised of your own will": [708] but what someone is bound to, he must render: therefore to render is of necessity. § 7. Also, Psalm 75:12 (76:11): Vow, and render to the Lord your God, all you who, etc. There the Gloss says: "Certain vows are proper to individuals, such as chastity, virginity, and the like. Therefore to vowing these he invites us, he does not command that we vow, but that we render vows: for to vow is counseled to the one vowing, but after the promise of a vow, necessary rendering is exacted." [709] From this it is gathered that rendering is of necessity. § 8. Also, another Gloss on the same: "If you vow, render: otherwise they are held guilty concerning the vow and have damnation, because they have made void their first faith." [710] From this is gathered the same as before. § 9. Also, Psalm 65:13 and 14 (66:13-14): I will render to you my vows, which my lips have uttered. § 10. Also, by a promise confirmed by deliberation which is made to a man, someone is bound to render: therefore much more is he bound by a promise made to God: therefore the vower is bound to render. § 11. To the contrary is that 1. Sometimes it is impossible to render, just as when a woman vows virginity and is corrupted: therefore it is impossible to render: but no one is bound to the impossible: therefore it seems that we are not always bound to render vows. § 12. 2. Also, one cause is assigned by the ancients why God is not bound by a promise, because He is not bound out of necessity, but out of His free will: therefore by similarity since in vows we are bound out of our free will, it seems that we are not necessarily bound to rendering. § 13. 3. Also, among men it is considered wicked if someone promises another out of friendship, and he afterwards coerces him to necessarily pay the whole: therefore much more is this the case with God, who is wholly goodness itself: therefore it seems that God does not restrict one to necessarily paying a vow to Him, which was promised to Him out of a free will. § 14. Response. It must be said that necessity is twofold, namely of inevitability or absolute coercion, and of conditional necessity. The first is a necessity such as it is necessary for a heavy body to descend. The second, however, is such as a sick man has a necessity to take medicine if he wishes to be freed from disease: and in this mode of necessity it is necessary to render vows, because otherwise the cause of damnation of the soul is incurred, that is, mortal sin. § 15. And therefore the first part of authorities and arguments is conceded. § 16. But to that which is first objected to the

contrary, it must be said that that which is lost in the quantity of the promise through corruption, must be restored in the quantity of sorrow in penance: because it is well rendered, what is rendered through an equivalent according to the estimation of God, although it may not be equivalent according to the value of the thing: for the sorrow of penance is thus equivalent to all that which is lost through sin: and therefore through penance every sin is pardoned. § 17. To the other it must be said that it is not similar concerning God and men: because God neither owes man, nor can He owe: but man owes to God all that he is, and can do, and does, although God may not require all this from man: and therefore because nevertheless he owes, he is bound to necessarily pay-

Articulus 5 — Whether A Vow Is More Obligatory Than An Oath, Or Conversely

-ing out of a promise made to God, unless a compensation is made which is then considered the payment of the vow, as is determined below on the compensation of a vow. § 2. To the last it must be said that it is not similar, as is already evident: because man owes nothing to man from what is committed, but owes his whole self to God: and therefore, if concerning this which he nevertheless owes of condign right, he obliges himself by a vow, God exacts this from him, and he will be guilty if he does not pay.

Whether a vow is more obligatory than an oath? § 3. Fifthly it is asked, whether a vow is more obligatory than an oath, or conversely? § 4. But it seems that it is more obligatory: because 1. If someone by a solemn vow were to vow that he would enter religion, he is compelled to enter, nor can he be absolved by marriage, nor by any other mode, unless he fulfills it: but if he had sworn an oath, he would be absolved in many cases, and penance for perjury would be enjoined: therefore a vow is of greater obligation than an oath. § 5. 2. Also, if two bonds are joined to one thing which bind in opposite directions, and one is broken by it, while the other is not, but rather breaks it: it is evident that that which breaks is stronger than that which is broken by it: but this is how a solemn vow and an oath of chastity relate to marriage, that the oath is broken, and the vow breaks it [marriage]: therefore a vow is of greater obligation than an oath. § 6. If perhaps you say that this is true of a solemn vow, but not of a private one. Against this: It is commonly said that a solemn and a private vow are of equal obligation with respect to God: therefore the proposition stands concerning both vows. § 7. 3. Also, a vow properly binds to a more excellent good: but an oath is only a confirmation of the truth in a statement, and sometimes it binds to nothing, but confirms the truth concerning the past: therefore to bind is accidental to an oath, and substantial to a vow: but that to which binding is substantial, binds more strongly than that to which it is accidental: therefore a vow is of stronger obligation than an oath. § 8. To the contrary of this is that 1. That which binds from divine truth binds more strongly than that which binds from human truth: but an oath binds from divine truth, and a vow from human: therefore an oath binds more strongly than a vow. The first is self-evident. But the second is proved by what the Apostle says, Hebrews 6:16: For men swear by one greater than themselves, and an oath for confirmation is the end of all their

707. Cf. Augustine, Epistolae or similar works.

controversy. Now it is evident that they do not vow by one greater than themselves. § 9. 2. Also, a simple promise and an attestation relate to each other as binding less and binding more: but a vow is a simple promise of one man, while an oath is like an attestation: therefore an oath binds more than a vow. § 10. Response. It must be said that an oath applied to a pledge and a vow can be considered in two ways, namely, according to that from which they bind, and according to the nature and mode of the bond itself. If in the first way: then there is no doubt that an oath binds more than a vow: because it binds from the attestation of divine truth. If in the second way: then a vow binds more than an oath: and this is because the bond has strength from the good to which it binds, and from the firm deliberation of the one vowing or binding himself, and a vow is always from deliberation, and a greater good, which an oath is not always: however, if sometimes an oath is also added to a vow, that is obligatory above all.

Articulus 6 — Whence A Vow Has The Force Of Its Obligation

§ 1. The solution to the first part of the objections is therefore clear, except for the last. § 2. And I concede that one: because it proceeds from the nature of the bond which is accidental to an oath: and therefore it is not in every oath, but only in that which concerns something to be done in the future. § 3. Similarly the solution to the two things introduced to the contrary is clear: because they proceed according to that from which an oath binds: and this is plainly greater than that from which a vow binds.

Whence a vow has the force of its obligation? § 4. Sixthly it is asked, What is that from which a vow has the force of its obligation? § 5. For it seems to be extremely weak: because in the one promising there are only three things, namely the purpose of doing, deliberation, and promise. Either therefore the vow draws its force from one of these, or from two together, or from all three. If from one: it is evident that this is extremely weak: because human purpose is contingent, as the Philosopher says, and a necessary effect is never produced from a contingent cause: therefore a vow never becomes inviolable from the human purpose alone. § 6. The same follows if it is said to be caused by deliberation alone: because, as is said in the book of Wisdom, 9:14: The thoughts of mortals are fearful, and our counsels uncertain. Now it is evident that all our deliberations are founded upon our thoughts. Therefore all our deliberations are uncertain: therefore nothing certain is caused by them: therefore neither the immobility of a vow. § 7. But if it is said that it is from the promise. Against this: Our initial promise is caused by something uncertain, because it is from purpose and deliberation: therefore it is itself also uncertain. § 8. Also, a promise made to a man is uncertain to such an extent that man even seeks from man greater confirmation through a pledge, or guarantors, or an oath: therefore neither is it sufficient to make a vow. § 9. But if it is said that it has its force from two or all three. Against this: If all three, since they are contingent, are joined together, nothing inviolable is generated: therefore neither do they generate an inviolable vow: therefore it seems that there is no firmness of a vow. § 10. To the contrary of this is that 1. Everything which is in the effect, must necessarily be reduced to something which is in the cause: but the

708. Glossa ordinaria, on Deut. 23:23.

immobility and necessity of rendering is in a vow: therefore it is necessary that it has some cause which causes this necessity. § 11. 2. Also, where the Apostle speaks of the immobility of the divine promise, there he reduces the firmness of our consolation to the immobility of the divine word and oath, speaking thus, Hebrews 6:17-18: Wherein God, meaning more abundantly to show to the heirs of the promise the immutability of his counsel, interposed an oath, that by two immutable things, in which it is impossible for God to lie, we may have the strongest comfort. Therefore by similarity if the firmness of rendering follows the vow, it is necessary to reduce it to some firmness which is in the cause of the vow. § 12. This seems to me necessarily to be conceded. Whence it must be said that it is in the cause of the vow which is deliberation: because it is firmed up by deliberation, as was said above, and in the definitions of a vow two things are considered, namely the very rectitude of the deliberation in itself, and its relation to the exemplar which it imitates. And in itself indeed it does not have firmness, but related to the exemplar which is the first rectitude, by which everything right which is promised is held to be deliberated, and especially what is promised to God,

Articulus 7 — Whether Vow Is Said Of A Vow According To One Notion

to Whom even without a promise we can never answer one for a thousand. Thus related, I say, it is most firm: because this justice is immortal and remains forever and ever. § 2. To that therefore which is first objected, it must be said that it is founded upon all those three things related to the exemplar of the first rectitude, from which they contract that firmness. § 3. And through this the solution to all is clear.

Whether "vow" is predicated of a vow according to one rationale? § 4. Next it is asked concerning this which he says, there, B, But it is to be known, that of vows one is common, etc. [711] § 5. And four things are asked here. The first is, Whether according to one rationale "vow" is predicated of a common and a proper vow? The second, Whether the transgression of a common vow constitutes a special sin, or a deformity of sin, just as the transgression of a singular vow does? Thirdly it is asked, Why is it called common and singular? Fourthly, Whether a common vow admits of dispensation and commutation, just as a singular vow sometimes does? § 6. To the first it is objected thus: 1. Whatever things divide one common thing, those are of one rationale in the name of that common thing: but common and singular vow divide one vow in common: therefore they are of one rationale in the name of vow: therefore vow is of one rationale insofar as it is said of the common and of the proper or singular. § 7. 2. Also, each is a votive pledge of the mind concerning those things which pertain to religion: and this was above the definition of a vow in common: therefore by one rationale "vow" is predicated of both. § 8. To the contrary of this is that 1. Whenever some things participate a genus in one rationale, one does not more properly receive the predication of that genus than another: but a singular vow more properly receives the predication of "vow": therefore it is not said univocally of a common and a singular vow. The first is self-evident. The second is proved from this, that a common vow is not concerning voluntary things, but concerning necessary things:

709. Glossa ordinaria, on Ps. 75:12.

but a vow (votum) is named from the will (voluntas). § 9. 2. Also, it is of the rationale of a vow, that it is confirmed by the deliberation of the one vowing: but a common vow is not confirmed by the deliberation of the one vowing, but by the authority of a precept: therefore "vow" is not predicated of the common by a full rationale, but of the special: therefore the common and singular are not univocal in the rationale of a vow. § 10. Furthermore, however, it is asked concerning the vow of fools, of which he previously made mention in

Articulus 8 — Whether The Transgression Of A Common Vow Makes A Special Sin

the Letter: for that seems to be called a vow entirely equivocally with these two: whence the act of a vow which is to oblige to doing, is not in it. § 2. But to the contrary of this is that the vow of fools is also a deliberate promise, just as a singular vow: therefore it seems that it receives predication by one rationale with a singular vow. § 3. Response. It must be said that "vow" is predicated of the common and of the singular according to prior and posterior: and it is a division of an analogue and not of a pure univocal term. § 4. To the first therefore it must be said that division is spoken of in two ways: for some things divide a common term by differences, which are in that common term in potency: and the first proposition is not concerning those. But some do not divide it properly, but state diverse modes of it: and such are analogues in the name of the divided term: and such a division is here. § 5. To the other it must be said that a pledge is not in one mode in necessary things and in voluntary things: and therefore that rationale also according to diverse modes belongs to the common and singular vow. § 6. But the two reasons which are to the contrary, are simply to be conceded. § 7. But to that which is asked further concerning the vow of fools, it must be said that it has less among the three things concerning the rationale of a vow: nevertheless, by posteriority and not entirely equivocally does it receive the predication of "vow". § 8. To the objection it must be said that it does not oblige, for the reason that it is not truly a vow: but nevertheless the vow is mutated on the part of the one vowing.

Whether the transgression of a common vow constitutes a special sin? § 9. Secondly it is asked, Whether the transgression of a common vow constitutes a special sin? § 10. But it seems that it does: because 1. Every corruption of a good is a special sin: but a common vow is a good: therefore its corruption is a special sin: but transgression is its corruption: therefore it is a special sin. § 11. 2. Also, as the Apostle says, Romans 7:7 and following, and the Gloss there, by the written law sin was made a transgression: [712] therefore by similarity through a vow added to a mandate, sin becomes a prevarication of the vow: therefore the corruption of a vow constitutes a special deformity. § 12. 3. Also, if a special vow is corrupted, it is reputed to be and is apostasy: therefore a corrupted common vow also generates apostasy: but apostasy is one of the greatest sins: therefore the corruption of a common vow is a special sin. § 13. 4. Also, it is more detestable to transgress that to which all are bound, than that to which few are bound: but all are bound to the common, as is said in the Letter, while few who have spontaneously bound themselves are bound to the singular: therefore it is more detestable to

710. Glossa ordinaria, on Ps. 75:12, quoting 1 Tim. 5:12.

transgress a common vow, than a proper one: but a singular transgression constitutes a special deformity: therefore also the transgression of a common vow, and much more so. § 14. To the contrary is: because according to this every man by any sin would sin doubly or triply: because he sins against the good of morals by the deformed act itself, and against the divine precept by disobedience to the law forbidding sin, and against his vow and through apostasy: therefore for any sin a triple penance would have to be enjoined, which is false. § 15. Response. This last is to be conceded, and it must be said that there are not three things in the sin, but one in a triple deformity: and Praepositinus called this sin one triple sin, or one double sin if it had a double deformity: whence penance is to be enjoined only for one, and he is to be admonished that he subject himself to the precept, and remember his vow: and no

Articulus 9 — Why Some Vow Is Called Common, And Some Singular

other special penance is to be enjoined. § 2. To the first therefore it must be said that when the transgression of a vow is separated from the transgression of a precept, and from that which is a sin in itself, then that objection holds: as it is in the singular vow concerning living without personal property: for to have property is not a sin nor against the law of God: and therefore if it is vowed away, property will be a sin, which is nothing but against the vow: and then the apostasy of the vow is a special sin. But it is not thus in a common vow, which is always joined to a good in itself and to a precept: and therefore apostasy does not constitute a special sin, although it brings some rationale of deformity to the act of sin which would not be without it. § 3. To the other it must be said that this proves nothing, except that it constitutes some special deformity in the act: and this is to be conceded. But not every special deformity constitutes a special sin: because the corruption of any circumstance constitutes a special deformity, yet not a special sin. § 4. To the other it must be said that it is not similar: because a special vow is concerning an act separated from the act which falls under a precept, but a common vow is not, as is clear from the aforesaid. § 5. To the other it must be said that the detestability of a sin is considered from two things, namely from the bond obliging to do something, or from the state of the one obliged. And if the detestability of sin is considered in the first way, it is more detestable to transgress the common than the singular: because three things are binding to it, namely the good in itself, the precept, and the vow. But if it is considered in the second way; then it is more detestable to transgress the singular, because the higher the state, the more disgraceful the fall.

Why is some vow called common, and some singular? § 6. Thirdly it is asked, Why is it called common and singular? § 7. 1. For it seems that it is meaningless to say a common vow: for either it is called common by the community of that which is vowed, or by the community of the one vowing. If by the community of that which is vowed. Against this: That is common which is vowed by a singular vow, just as that which is vowed by a common one: therefore it seems that this is not the rationale of these names. But if it is called common by the community of the one vowing: still this does not seem to be the rationale, because singular

711. Peter Lombard, Sententiae, IV.

vows are commonly made, just as common ones. § 8. 2. Also, it seems that it would be better called a universal vow, than a common one, because all are bound to that vow: therefore it ought to be called universal. § 9. 3. Also, a vow is willed (volitum), that is, chosen to the will: but what is chosen to the will does not receive any community, but rather singularity: therefore it is against the rationale of a vow that some vow be called common. § 10. Response. It must be said that a common vow expresses a community of obligation: because that concerning which the vow is obliges all in common, for this is that concerning which is the faith and the decalogue, because this we are commanded to confess in baptism. § 11. To the first therefore it must be said that by the community of that concerning which the vow is, it is called a common vow. § 12. To that which is objected against it, it must be said that it is false in that sense of "common" which was stated, if it is common because it belongs to many: and therefore there is a sophistical place of equivocation there.

Articulus 10 — Whether A Common Vow Receives Dispensation

§ 1. To the other it must be said that it is not as well called universal: because although by debt it is universal, because all differ (or all owe it); nevertheless it is not universal by observance, but common: and therefore it is better called common, in which both debt and observance are preserved. § 2. To the other it must be said that in a common vow two things are considered, namely obligation and fulfillment. And obligation indeed does not fall under the will, but rather under necessity: but fulfillment is voluntary, because otherwise it would not be laudable. And as to this it is called a vow: whence it is false that this vow is said to be voluntarily chosen: for this mode of interpretation does not apply to a vow except when it is taken most properly.

Whether a common vow admits of dispensation? § 3. Fourthly it is asked, Whether a common vow admits of dispensation? § 4. But it seems that it does: because 1. As Hugh says in Book I of De Sacramentis: "He who has vowed any good whatsoever, but afterwards either could not fulfill it, or was unwilling to fulfill it for the greater part, his vow, according to the license of those to whom dispensation over him is entrusted, can either be relaxed or changed, such that it does not rest in his own judgment either to abandon what he vowed to do, or to do another thing for it, even if what he did not vow is greater." [713] Since therefore Hugh speaks generally here, it seems that it is understood of every vow. Therefore every vow admits of dispensation: therefore the common vow as well. § 5. 2. Also, we see that sometimes dispensation was granted concerning that to which all are bound, namely that one woman should belong to one man, and concerning this a dispensation was granted: therefore since the Church is of no lesser power now than then, it seems that it can also dispense concerning common vows. § 6. 3. Also, even concerning the form of baptism a commutation was made for a time, as was held above in the tractate on baptism: which however is from divine institution: therefore divine institution does not prejudice in other things as well, such that a commutation and dispensation could not be made: now it is evident that all the power is in the Church which ever was: therefore today whatever vow can be dispensed or changed, even

712. Glossa ordinaria, on Rom. 7:7.

a common one. § 7. 4. Also, the vicar of a king who is of full power in a part of his kingdom, can do in that part of the kingdom everything that the king can do: but it is evident that the vicar of the heavenly king on earth in full power is the supreme pontiff: therefore he can do what Christ can: but Christ dispensed on earth with the Israelites taking alien goods, and with Hosea taking a loose woman, as Bernard says, and with Abraham whom he also commanded to sacrifice his son: therefore it seems that his vicar can do the same: therefore dispensation and commutation falls in a common vow. § 8. 5. Also, 1 Maccabees 2:39 ff., Mattathias dispensed concerning the breaking of the sabbath, lest both the law and the worshipers perish together: and they said that they would give battle to every man who fought against them: and this however is from the first table: therefore now too it can be dispensed concerning those things which are contained in the divine precepts of the first table: because it is evident that the supreme pontiff is of greater power than Mattathias ever was. § 9. 6. Also, he can dispense against the Apostle, as all say: now it is evident that the whole Church supposes that this is antecedent to our faith, that what they write is received as authentic-

-which the Apostles write: therefore he dispenses concerning those things which are antecedent to the faith: but these draw their strength from divine authority which promulgated them through the Apostles: therefore he can dispense against what God has instituted. § 2. To the contrary of this is that 1. An equal has no power over an equal: therefore much less an inferior over a superior: but the Pope is inferior to God: therefore he cannot dispense or commute in those things which God has instituted. § 3. 2. Also, if this were said, it would follow that he could change the whole Christian religion, which is incongruous: therefore he does not have the power of dispensing in such things. § 4. 3. Also, a king did not have the power of leading the people back into Egypt: but this would be to lead the people back into Egypt: therefore our king the Pope does not have power concerning this. § 5. 4. Also, 2 Corinthians 13:10: According to the power which the Lord has given me unto edification, and not unto destruction. Therefore neither does the Apostolicus have power unto destruction: but this power would be ordained unto destruction: therefore the Pope does not have power concerning this. § 6. Response. It must be said that in no way does he have power concerning this, that he should dispense in a common vow, as was last proven. § 7. To the first therefore it must be said that Hugh speaks of a singular or proper vow, which is properly called a vow. § 8. To the other it must be said that for one woman to belong to one man is not one of those things to which all are bound according to every state, just as neither is it that a daughter not take her father, nor a brother his sister: and therefore in such things divine dispensation had place, and a man of whatever authority, who was not specially inspired by God, would not have had the power of dispensing even in those things. § 9. To the other it must be said that concerning the form of baptism there was no dispensation: because in the name of Christ the Trinity is understood: and if it had been dispensed with, it was shown above that there it behooved there to be a special showing of the divine will: and this is not denied since God can do what He wills: for He himself could abolish and change baptism, if He willed: but a man of however great authority cannot do this. § 10. To the other it must be said that a vicar cannot

713. Decretum Gratiani, C. 25, q. 1, c. 6 (Urbanus Papa).

do all that the king can do: because the king can change the laws of the kingdom, which the vicar cannot do. Whence that is founded upon a falsehood. § 11. But if you say that he can also do this if the king were to give him power concerning this, it must be said that then it is not similar: because the heavenly king gave no man power concerning this, that he might change the laws laid down by Him concerning faith and morals. Whence Pope Urban says thus: "There are some who say that it has always been licit for the Roman Pontiff to establish new laws: which we not only do not deny, but even strongly affirm. But it is to be known above all that he can establish new laws concerning that about which the Evangelists and Prophets have by no means spoken. But where the Lord or His Apostles and the holy Fathers following them have openly and finally defined something, there the Roman Pontiff cannot give a new law, but rather he ought to confirm what has been preached, even unto his soul and blood. For if he strove (which God forbid) to destroy what the Apostles and Prophets taught, he would be convicted not of giving a sentence, but rather of erring. But far be this from those who have always optimally guarded the Church of the Lord against the snares of wolves." [714] These are the words of Urban, and they are placed in the Decree, cause 25, question 1: and from these this determination is confirmed. § 12. To the other it must be said that the determination of the seventh day was not moral, but judi-

§ 1. ...[judi]cial or ceremonial, although the sanctification itself was moral: and how this is so, is explained in the third book of the Sentences, on the precepts, in those notes.[715] And therefore this does not serve the proposition: because even the Pope can change the mode or even dispense from resting on Sunday, if he has a cause of utility or necessity.

§ 2. To the last point, it must be said that against the Apostle, where he spoke as a man, he can dispense: because there the word of the Apostle is the word or counsel of a man: but where he spoke by reciting the word of God in faith and morals, he himself cannot dispense: because by dispensing against the Apostle in this way, he would dispense against God, and it is absurd to say that a man can do this, no matter of how much authority he might be.

Articulus 11 — Whether The Division Of The Singular Vow Into Private And Solemn Is Good

Whether the division of a singular vow into private and solemn is a good one?

§ 3. Next, it is asked concerning what he says there, at B, after the beginning: Likewise, of singular vows, one is private, the other is solemn, etc.

§ 4. And four things are asked here.

§ 5. The first is about this division: what kind it is, and whether it is sufficient? The second is about a private vow: whether it is of equal obligation with a solemn vow, as is commonly said? The third is about the modes of solemnizing a vow. The fourth is whether a solemn vow consists in one vow or in many?

§ 6. To the first, it is thus objected: 1. Private and solemn do not differ by the substance of the vow, but by accident: therefore it is a division of a subject into accidents.

§ 7. 2. Also, substantials are not changed into one another: because, as is said in the last chapter of the book of Meteorology: "Let the artisans of alchemy know that species cannot be changed." But one of these vows is changed into the other: therefore they do not differ by substance, but by accident, as it seems. Therefore it seems that this division is of a subject into accidents.

§ 8. 3. Also, "public" is that which proceeds to the notice of another, and this is called "solemn" in the Letter: but for something to be in the notice of another is accidental to it. Therefore, to be solemn is accidental to a vow: therefore, as before.

§ 9. To the contrary of this is that: 1. Things whose substantial acts are different, themselves differ by substance: but the acts of these vows, namely of the private and solemn vow, differ by substance: therefore the vows themselves differ substantially. The major premise is written by Damascene, who says that substances differ by their proper operations. The minor premise is extracted from the Letter, where it says that a solemn vow breaks a contracted marriage, and a private vow does not do this.

§ 10. 2. Also, in all powers where one power can do what the antecedent does and more, the difference is according to species, such as vegetative, sensitive, rational, and intellectual, each of which is in the other like a triangle in a quadrangle. Therefore it will be similarly the case in vows: therefore the solemn can do what the private can do and more: therefore they differ in species and substance.

§ 11. 3. Also, in holy orders I see that it is thus: that a subsequent order can do whatever a preceding order can do and more, and according to this they differ in species: therefore it will be similarly so in vows. Therefore the private and solemn vow differ substantially.

§ 12. Further, it is asked concerning the sufficiency of that division.

§ 13. For it seems to be insufficient: because

§ 14. 1. Between solemn and private there is the "public" [vow]: which can indeed be proven by witnesses, but is not according to the profession of a rule and of an approved habit: therefore it seems that there ought to be three vows.

§ 15. 2. Also, in the Letter it says that a private vow is that which cannot be proven, and which does not cause scandal: but a public vow causes scandal and can be proven: therefore it is not private. Similarly it is not solemn: because a solemn vow is not solemnized by witnesses, but by habit and profession: therefore it seems that there are three vows. Therefore the division is insufficient.

§ 16. To the contrary is that all the Jurists say that every vow is called private which is not solemn.

§ 17. Response. It must be said that solemnity is added upon a vow, confirming the obligation of the vow. But privation adds nothing upon it that would make the obligation stronger: and for this reason the solemn and the private vow differ as having an obligation simply, and

714. Decretum Gratiani, C. 25, q. 1, c. 6 (Urbanus Papa).

having a confirmed obligation. Hence solemnization is said in a certain way to make a certain species of vow under this common genus which is the vow: but the private vow does not make a species, because it does not add anything of this sort. Hence the division is not properly of a genus into species, but is like the division of a potential whole into parts, as was proven in the objections.

§ 18. To that which is first objected, therefore, it must be said that the solemn vow adds a form adding upon the obligation in the genus: and therefore it is a substantial species of a vow, and not an accident.

§ 19. To the other it must be said that there is a transition of a private [vow] into a solemn [one], just as the transition of potency to act and privation, and not as a mutation by accident. And it is established that the private vow does not properly name a species except according to a mode: because it adds nothing to the genus that would be a confirmation or determination of the obligation.

§ 20. To the other it must be said that it is not on account of this called a substantial form, because it proceeds to the notice of another, but rather because it is specifying and strengthening the obligation, which is the genus and general nature of a vow.

§ 21. To that which is further asked, I think it must be conceded that there are necessarily three vows: a first which is in potency to the second, and a second and first which are in potency to the third: and in the third the obligation of the vow is completed. But in the Letter, the Master speaks with respect to the determination of law: because the same law with respect to the impediment of marriage exists in the private and public vow: and therefore they are called and accounted as one.

Articulus 12 — Whether A Private Vow Is Of Equal Obligation With A Solemn Vow

Whether a private vow is of equal obligation with a solemn one?

§ 22. Secondly it is asked: Whether the private vow is of equal obligation with the solemn one?

§ 23. It seems that it is: because 1. A public vow obliges from the same source as a private one, namely from a promise made with deliberation: but those things which oblige from the same source, oblige equally: therefore the private and solemn vows are of equal obligation.

§ 24. If perhaps it is said that the publication or solemnity itself contributes to the obligation. To the contrary: Publication and solemnity are only in relation to one's neighbor: therefore they neither increase nor diminish the obligation, which is to God in itself: but every vow obliges from a promise which is to God: therefore every vow, namely private, public, and solemn, are of equal obligation before God.

§ 25. 2. Also, I Kings 16:7: Man sees those things that appear, but the Lord looks into the heart. But those things that are in the heart are equal in the private, public, and solemn vow: therefore those things that are before God are equal: therefore they are of equal obligation.

715. Decretum Gratiani, C. 25, q. 1, c. 6 (Urbanus Papa).

§ 26. 3. Also, the strength of the obliging bond in a vow is from the quantity of the good that is vowed. Let this therefore be equal in a private vow and a solemn vow: therefore it seems that then the obligation would be equal in both vows.

§ 27. To the contrary of this is that: 1. A solemn vow impedes and breaks a marriage, but a private vow only impedes it: therefore they are not of equal obligation.

§ 28. 2. Also, in the Letter it is said that a transgressor of a solemn vow sins and causes scandal: but a transgressor of a private vow does not scandalize, but only sins: therefore they are not of equal transgression: therefore neither of equal obligation.

§ 29. Response. It must be said that, simply speaking, there is an unequal obligation in these vows: for it is maximal in the solemn vow, in the middle mode in the public vow, and minimal in the private vow. As to the fact that certain laws say that one does not oblige less than the other, some gloss this, meaning, not for a lesser time, or not less in genus, although less in species. But it is better that it be said that there are certain things in a vow from which it obliges as being substantial to the obligation: and there are certain things in it from which it obliges as bearing witness to and proving the obligation. And those things which are in a vow in the first way are equal in the private, public, and solemn vows: and in this way are understood the laws which say that these vows are not of lesser obligation. But with respect to the other things they are of unequal obligation: and these also work toward the obligation, although not as substantially as the first.

§ 30. To that which is objected, therefore, it must be said that the breaking of marriage is caused from that which is in the vow in the second way, and not in the first way.

§ 31. To the other it must be said that scandal is in a twofold vow according to those things which are ordered to the notice of one's neighbor, and not according to those things which are substantial to the promise.

§ 32. And thus the solution is clearly manifest to all the questions concerning this article.

Articulus 13 — What Is The Mode Of Solemnizing A Vow

What is the mode of solemnizing a vow?

§ 33. Thirdly, it is asked concerning the mode of solemnizing a vow?

§ 34. For it seems that it may be solemnized in many modes: 1. For each thing is solemnized in as many modes as solemnity is applied to it: but solemnity is applied to a vow in many modes: therefore it is solemnized in many modes. The first premise is proven through the definition of solemnity. The second is proven from this: that the authority of the person in whose hand the vow is deposited pertains to solemnity, and the taking of a habit, and the profession of a certain rule, and likewise for many other things which can be done.

§ 35. 2. Also, in the Letter it is held that a private vow does not break a contract: because what is done secretly cannot be proven. Therefore, conversely, whatever avails to the publication of the vow avails to its solemnity: but there are many such things: therefore there are many things which solemnize a vow.

§ 36. 3. Also, in all the other sacraments those things are said to pertain to the solemnity of the sacrament which decorate it, and do not pertain to its substance: therefore in a vow it seems that every decoration of the vow pertains to the vow's solemnity, and not to its substance, such as the invitation of many on the day of the vow, and the confession of the vow before many, and so of others.

§ 37. If perhaps it is said that according to the Jurists a vow is not solemnized except in one mode, or in three, according to diverse opinions: let it be asked about that statement: because what the Jurists say contrary to reason is not to be held, because it is rather an injury than a law, since all law rests on reason, which is the first rule of law. Some, therefore, say that a vow is not solemnized

through the taking of a habit, nor through entrance into religion, nor through the fact that it is made into the hands of an authentic person, but through profession alone to a certain rule, whether one makes this when one assumes the habit, or before taking the habit, or even after.

§ 39. But this seems to be nothing: because 1. It is established that from the beginning the vow was solemn: but profession to a certain rule did not exist from the beginning, because before the rules of Basil, Benedict, and Augustine, no certain rules are found: therefore a vow is not always solemnized through profession to a certain rule.

§ 40. 2. Also, it is accidental to a vow that it be to a certain rule; but nothing is perfected through what is accidental to it: therefore neither is a vow [perfected] through profession to a certain rule: but solemnity perfects it, as was established previously: therefore solemnity is not brought about through profession to a certain rule.

§ 41. 3. Also, let it be that someone vows continuous continence upon entrance into religion (for it is established that this is free for him to do), according to this opinion he could never solemnize his vow, which seems incongruous, since solemnity is of those things confirming a vow.

§ 42. Further it is asked concerning another opinion, which says that there are three things solemnizing a vow, namely the hands of an authentic person in which it is deposited, the taking of a habit, and profession to a certain rule: do these taken divisively solemnize the vow, or taken conjointly?

§ 43. If divisively: then 1. Whoever would vow into the hands of any abbot, and afterwards contract marriage, the marriage would be broken: and this is not true.

§ 44. 2. Also, whoever would take a habit, his vow would be solemnized: and this again is false, because during the time of probation he can set aside the habit and contract marriage, or if he contracted it de facto, it would be broken [if the premise were true]: and all this is false.

§ 45. If conjointly. To the contrary: Only that which proceeds from the free will of the one vowing solemnizes the vow: but neither the authentic person nor the habit is this: therefore they do nothing for a solemn vow.

§ 46. Response. It must be said that, as is commonly said, nothing makes a vow solemn except profession itself to a certain rule, in which a mode of living approved by the Church is contained. And the cause of this is because that alone makes a return to secular life impossible.

§ 47. To the first, therefore, it must be said that the solemnity which is approved by the Church and which makes the vow stronger, is profession alone. The other things do not bring about solemnity, unless solemnity is taken equivocally, namely as a festivity before men.

§ 48. To the other it must be said that publication and proof are twofold. For one kind is from things substantial to the vow, and confirming or perfecting it: but the other is from accidentals. And in the first way nothing is proven except the solemn vow: because that is proven from the profession confirming and perfecting it. But in the second way it is proven through accidentals, that is, because it proceeded to the notice of some, yet this notice does not cause the vow itself to be of greater confirmation and perfection.

§ 49. To the other it must be said that the case is not similar between the sacraments and a vow: because the sacraments have virtue from the divine operation which occurs in them, as was frequently proven above: and therefore the solemn acts of men are accidental to the sacraments. But a vow draws its strength from human authority: and therefore an added solemnity which expresses a mode of express will approved by the Church, is substantial to the vow itself and perfects it.

§ 50. To that which is objected concerning the opinion of the Jurists, it must be said that that opinion seems to be judged true which says that it is solemnized in one mode.

§ 51. To the objection to the contrary, it must be said that from the beginning there were modes approved by law by the synagogue or the Church, such as the mode of the law of the Nazirites, who vowed a perpetual vow,

and of the Rechabites: and modes of this sort were in the place of a certain rule.

§ 53. To the other it must be said that it is not accidental to the vow by accident, but rather it happens to it as a perfection confirming and corroborating the vow, as was said before.

§ 54. If, moreover, it is asked: How can the Church establish that mode of solemnity?

§ 55. It must be said that the care of all Churches and persons falls upon the Supreme Pontiff, and all power of ordaining in the Church those things which exclude heresies and schisms and scandals: and therefore he established certain modes of living, because if anyone could make conventicles, then since everyone strives to defend their own deeds and words (as the Philosopher says), schisms and heresies would be generated. Moreover, if any given vow were reputed to be solemn, there would be persons obliged by solemn vow living among seculars, and they would be corrupted by a depraved and perverse nation, and scandal would arise, and a worse damage would be introduced in common from such a profession than any personal sanctity could be of benefit: and therefore this statute is reasonable.

§ 56. To the other it must be said that without profession a vow is not reputed as solemn on account of the causes stated: and this argumentation contains nothing incongruous.

§ 57. To that which is objected against the other opinion, I think it clearly must be conceded.

Articulus 14 — Whether A Solemn Vow Is Made In One Way Or In Several

Whether a solemn vow is made in one mode or in many?

§ 58. Fourthly it is asked: Whether a solemn vow is made in one mode, or in many?

§ 59. It seems, however, that it is made in many modes: because any good that is better than a precept falls under a vow, and any such good can be solemnized: therefore a solemn vow can be made in many things.

§ 60. Also, profession is not made of one thing, but of many things, namely of obedience, of chastity, of poverty, of living without meat, and things of this sort: therefore that vow is solemnized in many modes.

§ 61. To the contrary of this is that it breaks a marriage: but it does this by reason of nothing except by reason of the vow of chastity: therefore it seems that only the vow of chastity is solemnized.

§ 62. Response. It must be said that every perpetual vow can be solemnized in the first mode stated above: but a temporal vow cannot be solemnized, because profession intends to be perpetual, and it is solemnized through profession alone: yet a greater confirmation can be applied, but perpetuity never accrues as long as it remains temporal.

§ 63. To that, moreover, which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that this effect is not of a solemn vow in its genus, but in a species, namely of a solemnized vow of chastity.

Articulus 15 — Whether A Private Vow Of Continence Impedes Marriage; And Whether Those Contracting Thus Can Render The Debt

Whether a private vow of continence impedes marriage? And, whether those contracting in this way can render the debt?

§ 64. Next it is asked concerning what he says there, at B, after the beginning: Those who make a private vow of continence, etc.

§ 65. For it seems to be false: because if the marriage stands, then it is necessary that the bond of the vow be broken: but this is not broken: therefore the marriage does not stand. Proof of the minor premise: the bonds of the Church do not bind except by reason of the quantity of the good which is in them: but there is a greater good in the vow than in marriage: therefore it binds more: therefore if one has to be broken by the rest, the marriage

will be broken by the vow rather than conversely.

§ 67. If perhaps you say that marriage is a greater good. To the contrary: This is the heresy of Jovinian, as Augustine says, that he wished to equate marriage to virginity and widowhood: therefore he is much more a heretic who wishes to prefer it: but he who says marriage is a greater good, prefers it: therefore he who says thus is a condemned heretic.

§ 68. Further it is asked concerning someone contracting in this way: Whether afterwards he can render the [marital] debt?

§ 69. But it seems that he cannot: because 1. He who retained nothing of himself for himself, could give nothing of himself to anyone: but this man by his vow retained nothing of himself for himself: therefore he could give nothing of himself to anyone: therefore he is not bound to render anything to anyone.

§ 70. 2. Also, it is established that this man gave himself wholly to God through a vow: let it be asked, therefore, by what is he absolved from it? It seems that by nothing: therefore he is still bound.

§ 71. If it is said that he is absolved by marriage. To the contrary: He sinned mortally through the act of marriage in carnal copulation: but one ought not to reap an advantage from a sin: therefore he ought not to be absolved from the vow on account of this: therefore he is still bound not to render it.

§ 72. Also it is further asked: Whether he can exact the debt?

§ 73. It seems that he cannot: because 1. As much as is in him, he vowed away carnal copulation: therefore he cannot exact it afterwards.

§ 74. 2. Also, to exact is to will coition: and this is directly against the vow: therefore it cannot stand with it: therefore he cannot exact it.

§ 75. To the contrary of this is that the vow is just as repugnant to the giving by which one gives the right over one's body to another, as it is to the exaction of the debt: but the former stands and one is bound to render it to the one to whom he gave the right over his body: therefore it seems that he can also exact it.

§ 76. Response. To the first it must be said that a private vow is of lesser obligation than a solemn one, as was sufficiently and reasonably proven earlier. And I well concede that marriage is in itself a lesser bond than a vow, and therefore it impedes the contracting [of marriage]: but marriage instituted with solemnity by the Church is made more powerful than a [private] vow: and therefore that private vow does not nullify the contract. For although chastity is a better good, nevertheless a lesser good in genus, when it becomes common to the Church, prejudices a better private good: and a good of the Church of this sort is the justice which is overt on behalf of a marriage before the Church, and the caution and edification of other living persons, that a promise be kept.

§ 77. To that which is further asked, it must be said that someone contracting in this way is bound to render the debt.

§ 78. To the objection to the contrary, it must be said that any person is considered in a twofold way, namely in himself, and insofar as he is a common member of the Church. Insofar as he is considered in himself, he can do with himself whatever he wishes that does not cede to his own prejudice insofar as he is a member of the Church: because this would cede to the prejudice of the community. Hence it must be said that that person did with himself what he wished, insofar as he is considered in himself, but not insofar as he is a member of the Church: for in this way the ordination of the Church still falls upon him, and thus by the right of an institution made for the common utility he gives himself to the other, even though he sins mortally by doing this: for it often happens that someone sins mortally by contracting, and yet the contract stands: and this is because there is no vice in the contract itself, but rather in the one contracting, who obliged himself to the opposite.

§ 79. To the other it must be said that he is absolved through the right which is acquired by the other by virtue of an ecclesiastical institution, and the objection does not proceed against this, because it is well conceded that he is not absolved through coition.

§ 80. To that which is further asked, it must be said that he cannot exact the debt: because in all things which regard the person in himself, he is obliged by the vow, and to exact is such a thing: but he is not obliged in those things which regard him as he is a member of the Church: and thus it is evident how the vow is not repugnant to the one in the same way as to the other.

Articulus 16 — Whether Every Vow Receives Dispensation

Whether every vow admits of dispensation?

§ 81. Next it is asked concerning what he says there, at B, around the middle: Not only to undertake nuptials, etc.

§ 82. For by reason of this, three things are asked here. First, whether every vow admits of dispensation, or not? Second, by whom can it be dispensed? Third, with what ought it to be dispensed?

§ 83. To the first it is objected thus: 1. Augustine says that to vow is of the will, but to render is of necessity: but what is of necessity does not admit of dispensation: therefore it seems that no vow admits of dispensation.

§ 84. 2. Also, a cause is assigned why the precepts of the Decalogue do not admit of dispensation: because the Lord Himself commanded them, and an inferior does not have the power of dispensing in the precept of a superior: therefore by a similar reasoning, since the Lord commanded, Deut. 23:21, that whatever anyone vows he shall render, it seems that no one can dispense concerning what someone has vowed.

§ 85. 3. Also, it is commonly said that a vow, a precept, and an oath do not differ in their fulfillment, but only in their mode of obliging: therefore since a precept cannot be dispensed, it seems that neither can a vow be dispensed.

§ 86. To the contrary of this is what Master Hugh says, who states: "Whatever anyone has vowed can be dispensed, or changed, provided that it is not in his own power or will how it is dispensed or changed," and the authority for this is induced above: therefore it seems that every vow admits of dispensation.

§ 87. Further it is asked here concerning the vow of continence: Whether it can be dispensed?

§ 88. But it seems that it cannot: because 1. No weight is worthy of a continent soul: but every dispensation repays that which is vowed by dispensing it into something equally useful or more useful: therefore the vow of continence cannot be dispensed.

§ 89. 2. Also, Luke 10:42: Mary has chosen the best part, which shall not be taken away from her. But this is the part of the continent, who do not think of the things of the world, but only of the things of God, and how they may please God, and be holy in body and spirit. Therefore it seems that it cannot be commuted into anything better and more useful: therefore neither can it be dispensed.

§ 90. To the contrary of this is that: 1. Marriage was even sometimes commanded, when it was said: Increase and multiply. Therefore then it was not permitted to be continent. But it is established that God would in no way have commanded this, unless marriage had been more useful at that time than continence. Therefore in a similar case and for a similar cause, a vow would still admit of dispensation.

§ 91. 2. Also, let it be that through marriage many could be converted to Christ and to the power of the Church: since therefore the common good of the Church is much better than a personal one, it seems that then, when by the copulation of that person so many good things could be done, it would be licit to dispense.

§ 92. Response. It must be said that there are two things in vows, namely a temporal vow, and a perpetual vow. But a temporal vow, such

as a pilgrimage, or a fast, or something else of this sort, can lightly be commuted into something more useful. But a perpetual vow can be commuted in two ways: for it is either commuted into an act contrary to the rendering of the vow, or into a non-contrary act, which is nevertheless besides that by which the vow is rendered.

§ 94. It therefore seems it must be said that that vow which cannot be changed except into an act contrary to the rendering of the vow, cannot be dispensed: because this is to go directly against the vow, and to break the vow: and this was never licit for anyone, nor will it ever be licit: and the solemn vow of continence is such a vow, which can never be changed: and this is the cause of the saying of Ecclesiasticus 26:20: No weight is worthy of a continent soul. But a vow whose change does not bring about the breaking of the vow, but only a mutation, can be dispensed, as Master Hugh says: such as that a religious may have personal property, because he does not have it in his own name, but in the name of the Church or chapter: and this is not against the vow, because even previously he could have such power in his order: similarly that he may accept pastoral care, he who is a monk, because in pastoral care there is also the

custody of one's own self, from which the term "monk" is derived. Nor do I approve of that solution of the Jurists, who say that a religious cannot be dispensed so that he can have personal property, but rather he is dispensed so that he is not a religious, and then it is licit for him to have personal property. For these are merely words: because he who can do what is greater, can also do what is less: but it is a greater thing for a religious to become a non-religious, than for a religious to have personal property: therefore if the Pope can do the first, he can also do the second. Hence although there may be a sophism of composition and division in such a solution, nevertheless to me it seems rather the contrary must be said, that it is not licit to break religion, but to change it into that which is besides it, and not contrary to it, as has been said.

§ 95. To the first, therefore, it must be said that rendering is preserved in an equivalent simply speaking, or according to time. But I say "equivalent" in two ways, namely in the genus of the good, or in recompense. An equivalent in the genus of the good to a vow is when it is changed into another good equally good, as if a fast is changed into almsgiving. But an equivalent in recompense to a vow is as when a greater personal good is changed into a lesser common good, which by its commonality recompenses for the personal good, just as the contemplation of one person is changed into an action serving the community, even though the state of contemplation is better than the state of action. And an equivalent according to time is as when a vow which is greater in its genus, is changed into that which is more useful according to that time for the Church, even if in itself it is less, just as a vow of the Holy Land is changed into a vow of another crusade.

§ 96. To the other it must be said that the case is not similar, because the precepts of the Decalogue belong to the natural law: and therefore they cannot be changed even by God, as Augustine says: because if God acted against that which He Himself made right, He would be acting against His own proper rectitude: but nothing makes a vow right except the will: but the will is a variable cause, and its effect also is in a certain way more variable than the exemplar and image of divine justice.

§ 97. To the other it must be said that in a certain respect those three are similar in their rendering, because namely they oblige one to render: but in the mode of rendering they are not equal, because some of them can be rendered in an equivalent with the authority of a superior, but others cannot, as has been said.

§ 98. To that which is further asked concerning the vow of continence, it must be said that it does not admit of dispensation for the reason stated above: because its dispensation would result in the breaking of the vow, not a commutation.

§ 99. To the objection to the contrary, it must be said that marriage was a divine precept, and in such a case a license for marrying could still be given: because in such a case the vow would be...

an irrational promise, because nothing can be vowed that is contrary to a divine precept; but this cannot be done by a human being.

To the next it must be said that this would be nothing, because evils are not to be done so that good things may come about. Hence in the times of blessed Matthew, the virgin Iphigenia refused to marry the king, to whom she promised that he would become a Christian with all his people, to which blessed Matthew also refused to consent, such that he even suffered death instead.

Articulus 17 — By Whom Dispensation Can Be Made

By whom can a dispensation be made?

Secondly, it is asked: By whom can a dispensation be given?

It seems, moreover, that [it can be given] by any Prelate: because 1. In the aforementioned authority of Master Hugh, it is said that [it is given] by those to whom dispensation is entrusted in the Church: but dispensation is entrusted to any prelate: therefore any prelate can dispense.

1. Also, a Prelate exists for this purpose, that he may consider those things which are expedient for the utility of his neighbor; but the necessity of dispensing is for this purpose: therefore any prelate ought to have the authority of dispensing.

ON THE CONTRARY to this is that: 1. In the human body, the head so retains certain functions in the natural body that it does not commit them to other members; therefore it ought to be so in the mystical body. But this especially seems to be required in dispensations. Therefore, the power of dispensing must reside with the head, that is, the Pope alone.

1. Also, the ruling power of life is reason, and it has no seat except in the head; therefore it ought to be similarly in the mystical body. Since, therefore, the power of dispensing is quite principal in governance, it seems that it resides only with the Pope.

Response. It must be said that without a doubt all power of dispensing fully is in the head of the Church, as the last arguments prove, and in other prelates only as much as is granted to them. And therefore they can dispense in those things in which they are not prohibited by express law. Now they are prohibited from dispensing in a vow of the Holy Land, and not in other temporal vows. And therefore in all temporal vows, having weighed the quality of the persons and the cause of necessity or utility, Bishops and Archbishops can dispense. But in perpetual vows which belong to religion, and the like, I do not believe that they have the power of dispensing.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that Master Hugh understands that the power of dispensing resides with superiors; but he does not deny that it resides with them differentially, as has been said.

To the next it must be said that governance is twofold, namely universal and particular. And therefore in great matters the power of dispensing is not committed to one having particular governance; because from this it would happen that sometimes a deformity of the members would arise against the head. For order must be preserved in the members in relation to

the head. And therefore it is established in law that in some matters the recourse of all the members is to the head of the Church, just as the recourse of all the members with respect to motive and sensitive power is to the head in a physical organic body.

Articulus 18 — Whether One Can Be Dispensed With Respect To All

Can a dispensation be given to everyone?

Can a dispensation be given to everyone?

Thirdly, it is asked: With whom ought a dispensation be given?

It seems, however, that with no religious: because 1. The state of contemplation has nothing more secure and better; and such is the state of every religion. Therefore a dispensation can never be given with any of them.

1. Also, all power, as the Apostle says, is for edification, and not for destruction; but there is no edification when the better thing is destroyed so that a lesser good may be built up. But this happens when someone is taken from religion into an office of action. Therefore it seems that such a dispensation can never be made.

On the contrary to this is that: 1. The Holy Fathers in several decrees establish and concede that monks, when they are worthy, can be appointed even as plebans and as parish priests. Therefore much more to lesser offices.

1. Also, in Genesis 41:6, Pharaoh says to Joseph that if he knew his brothers to be industrious men, he would set them over his cattle. Therefore in spiritual matters much more should industrious and good men, wherever they are, be taken up for the custody of the Lord's flock.

Furthermore, it is asked concerning temporal vows: Whether a vow of the same species is to be dispensed in the same way, such as a vow of abstinence?

And it seems so: because 1. The compensation of one good in a species is made through one thing. But a vow of abstinence is the same in species in whomever it is made. Therefore it must be compensated in one way.

1. Also, God in His benefits and dispensations does not distinguish between persons; therefore neither ought a human ecclesiastical judge to distinguish in such matters.

BUT AGAINST THIS: A certain rich man is afflicted more by abstinence than by the greatest conferral of alms, and conversely for a certain poor man. But diverse qualities are to be considered in dispensing; therefore the abstinence of a rich man and of a poor man ought not to be compensated by the same thing.

RESPONSE. It must be said to the first that a dispensation can be made, in such a way that the vow is commuted and not broken, as has been said. And I well concede that wherever a person may be, if he is useful for governance, he ought to be taken up and is bound to obey:

because the common good is better than any particular good. Hence, what is objected is true when state is compared to state; but when the community of the good is added in the other state, that state becomes of a better good than the other which belongs to the singular good of an individual human being.

To the next it must be said that there is great edification when his good is not broken off, but is sometimes interchanged so that he can be of use to many, as was said to Jeremiah (Jeremiah 1:10): Behold, I have set you this day over nations and over kingdoms.

To what is further asked about temporal vows, it must be said that vows of pilgrimage can also quite easily be dispensed, because in such pilgrimages there is no great correction of the pilgrims. But in a vow of abstinence one must act cautiously, and it is not to be dispensed with a rich man as with a poor man; for the poor man does not have the means to satisfy for himself, but the rich man abounds too much in these things. Hence, if a dispensation is given to a rich man, great alms must be imposed, or

some great thing must be enjoined that would compensate for the pain of hunger which he ought to have endured in abstinence.

To the objection to the contrary, it must be said that, all other things being equal, what is objected is true. But these conditions are exceedingly disparate.

To the next it must be said that God looks at hearts, and therefore He infuses hearts diversely prepared with diverse gifts, sometimes giving more to a rich man, and sometimes less to a poor man. But an ecclesiastical judge sees only the face, and therefore diverse circumstances in the diversity of the face ought to diversify the dispensation in his eyes.

Articulus 19 — Whether A Conditional Vow Ought To Be Fulfilled Simply, Or Only When The Condition Stands

Ought a conditional vow be fulfilled absolutely, or only while the condition stands?

Next, it is asked concerning what he says, there at C, Now concerning virgins who are not veiled, etc.

For here it is asked about a conditional and interpreted vow.

Concerning the first, we proceed thus: 1. Suppose that someone vows with a condition attached, just as Jacob seems to have done (Genesis 28:20) when he said: If God shall be with me, and shall keep me in the way, etc. It seems that even notwithstanding the condition the vow ought to be fulfilled, for we owe our being and our capacity to the Lord without condition. Therefore, whether a condition is attached or not, it seems that what is promised ought to be fulfilled to the Lord.

1. Also, mercenary servitude is not pleasing to God; but conditional [servitude] is mercenary. Therefore it is not pleasing to God. Therefore either a condition is not to be attached, or, if attached, not to be heeded.

ON THE CONTRARY is the fact that a vow does not oblige out of necessity, but out of the will. Therefore it does not oblige further than as the will promises; but the will does not promise except under a condition.

WHICH MUST BE CONCEDED; and therefore unless he who vowed wishes it, if the condition is not present, he himself is not bound to the vow.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that although we owe to the Lord all that we are, nevertheless this entire whole is not required of us; and therefore we are not bound except with a condition or by an absolute promise.

To the next it must be said that it is not a mercenary servitude, because this is understood of those who do not even do those things which are necessary for salvation except for the sake of a temporal reward. But this condition is placed on that which is not necessary for salvation.

Articulus 20 — On The Interpretative Vow. Whether Someone Entering Religion And Remaining Beyond The Time Of Profession Is Professed; And Whether He Is To Be Compelled To Remain And To Make Profession

Concerning an interpreted vow. Is someone who enters religion and remains beyond the time of profession professed? And, is he to be compelled to remain and profess?

Concerning an interpreted vow. Is someone who enters religion and remains beyond the time of profession professed? And, is he to be compelled to remain and profess?

Secondly, it is asked concerning an interpreted vow, namely when someone of age does not make a vow in religion, but delays longer than the time of probation: whether he can leave if he does not profess by word, or if he is to be compelled to remain there?

But it seems that he can leave: because 1. A vow is made by the promise of a word; but he promises nothing by word. Therefore he can leave.

1. Also, the Church permits many women in the parts of Germany to leave in this way, and to marry husbands: which would not happen if by that time the vow had been solemnized.
2. Also, in certain cloisters of the Black Order [Benedictines] there exists no memory that the rule was ever observed there in its entirety, but only certain parts, such as the nocturnal and diurnal office, and not the mode of fasting. And certain persons do not enter with this intention, except to observe what they find. Since, therefore, they do not profess anything more, it seems they are not obliged to anything more.

ON THE CONTRARY to this is that the customs and institutions of Churches cannot be changed without the authority of a superior; but we know those Churches are assigned to the order of Saint Benedict, and have been changed by none of the superiors. Therefore they are bound to observe the order of Saint Benedict, as it seems.

I ANSWER without prejudice that every person makes an interpreted vow and profession when he stays beyond the time commonly assigned for probation, having the liberty of departing if he wished. But this can be prolonged in certain cloisters according to what seems expedient and convenient to the community for the time. Hence it also seems safe to me that in cloisters where nuns live in danger to their chastity, it is delayed greatly until they despair of someone taking them in legitimate matrimony; and therefore the delay is overlooked [dissimulatur] in the cloisters of Germany.

To that which is contrary, therefore, it must be said that such Churches belong to the order of Saint Benedict, and the change is introduced in the observances from the dissimulation of the Prelates: for what the Prelates see and yet overlook, they seem to concede or indulge.

Articulus 21 — Whether Adultery Is More Serious Than Homicide And Other Sins

Is adultery graver than murder and other sins?

Next, it is asked concerning what he says, there at D, after the beginning: What among all sins is to adultery, etc.

For it seems false: because 1. Murder in the genus of morals is graver than adultery, and infidelity is graver simply speaking.

1. Also, adultery is a sin arisen from the infirmity of the flesh; but a sin against the Holy Spirit is graver than that. Therefore adultery is not graver among all sins.

Also it is asked: Why does it hold the second place in punishments?

For if you say that it holds the second place because it transgresses the second commandment. ON THE CONTRARY: There are three commandments in the first tablet, of which it transgresses none.

If you say that it holds the second transgression in the second tablet. ON THE CONTRARY: The second commandment is: Thou shalt not kill; and adultery is not against this.

If perhaps you say that it has the second transgression among the negative precepts. ON THE CONTRARY: This will be against the text; for he says that those who stray from God have the first place, which he would not say if he understood it in the aforesaid manner, but rather that murderers would hold the first place.

If indeed you say that it holds the second place in punishments because they are stoned like one straying from God. ON THE CONTRARY: The law ought to punish a greater sin more; but murder is a greater sin than adultery. Therefore by the law of justice it ought to be punished more.

Also, she who fornicates in her father's house is stoned, as it is said in Deuteronomy 22:23-24.

Also, a stubborn son is stoned because he does not want to hear his father's admonitions.

Therefore it seems that it holds the second place in punishments in no way.

Response. Without prejudice it must be said that one straying from God breaks the faith of the unity of spirit which he has with God in the signification of matrimony regarding the good of the sacrament. Now the adulterer breaks the faith of the marriage bed and of the indivisibility of matrimony, which signifies the fellowship of the soul with God. And therefore, exemplarily and with respect to the quantity of guilt, the one straying from the faith is in the second place. And therefore the Lord through Isaiah speaks to the one straying in the manner of an adulteress, Isaiah 28:20: For the bed is straitened, so that one must fall out: and

a short cloak cannot cover both. And, in the same book, 57:8: Near me thou hast uncovered thyself, and hast received an adulterer.

And similarly, Ezekiel 16:1 and following, and Hosea 3:4, and in many other places.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 22 — What Is To Be Done For Women Who Think Their Husbands To Have Been Killed, Or To Be In Captivity, Or Never To Be Freed From Unjust Domination

What is to be done by women who think their husbands have been killed, or are in captivity, or will never be freed from an unjust domination?

Next, it is asked concerning what he says, there at E, Here it is asked concerning those women, etc.

For it seems that it should be conceded to those women that they may marry others in the meantime: because

1. Matrimony is as a medicine, and the disease of concupiscence cannot lack medicine for so long.
2. Also, the good of nature, which is offspring, is impeded. Therefore it seems that matrimony with a second man ought to be conceded.

Response. In the preceding [distinctions] enough has been established concerning this: because all hardships supervening upon matrimony are to be tolerated on account of the faith of the marriage bed. And therefore a long captivity is to be awaited with patience.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that it is an indirect medicine, because grace medicates more. Hence, if she turns herself to the faith of the marriage bed, she will be aided more than in matrimony; and if that faith is set aside, then she lives rather in concupiscence than in the honesty of matrimony.

To the next it must be said that the good of offspring has in its formal notion that it be received by the honesty of matrimony; and since this cannot be the case here, she cannot procure such a good of offspring through intercourse.

Articulus 23 — Whether, The Husband Returning, The Other Man Can Remain With Her Whom He Thinks His Wife, On Account Of Scandal

When the husband returns, can the other man remain with her whom he thinks is his wife on account of scandal?

Next, it is asked concerning what he says at the end of the distinction, there at E, a little before the end: From which, wishing to return to the first but not being able, etc.

For this seems to be false: because for the sake of no scandal must anything be done against the truth of life. But to be with another woman, having set aside his own, is against the truth of life; therefore he ought not to be with her on account of scandal or even the fear of excommunication.

To this I answer that the Master errs here, and what he says is false; because this man ought rather to die excommunicated than cohabit with her who is not his wife.

DISTINCTIO XXXIX

Divisio Textus

§ 8. Division of the Text

After these things we must consider disparate worship, etc. Here it treats of an impediment that impedes on the part of the foundation which it destroys.

Now the Master touches upon four things in this distinction, namely, why does disparate worship make persons illegitimate? Secondly, what is spiritual fornication? And thirdly, whether a dismissed faithful party can join himself to another? And lastly, whether there can be true matrimony among infidels?

And it is self-evident where these begin.

Concerning the first, however, he introduces two things. For the first opinion is that disparate worship impedes matrimony from being contracted and diriments [nullifies] the contract. Secondly, however, he objects against it and resolves it; and again it is clear where he does this.

Now here three questions begin to be asked. The first is, Does disparate worship make a person illegitimate? Secondly, Why does the opposite of faith do this rather than [the opposite] of another virtue? Thirdly, By reason of which article does faith have the power to make a person legitimate?

Articulus 1 — Whether Disparity Of Cult Makes A Person Illegitimate

Does disparate worship make a person illegitimate?

Now IT IS OBJECTED to the first as follows: 1. Of any two things, if one was sometimes without the other, neither of them has an essential dependence on the other. But matrimony and the faith of Christ are two such things. Therefore, etc. PROOF of the minor premise is that before Christ there was matrimony, and today it exists among infidels, as is proved by the last part of this distinction.

1. Also, that which is contrary to no good of matrimony does not seem to make a person illegitimate for contracting [it]. But infidelity is such a thing. Therefore, etc. PROOF of the minor premise: because one woman belonging to one man can be an infidel observing the faith of the marriage bed, and generating children who can be nourished for the religion of God.
2. Also, it was not said from the beginning: "They shall be two in one faith," but rather in one flesh. Therefore, a disparity of faith ought in no way to impede matrimony, as long as the unity of the flesh can be saved there.
3. Also, the friendship of matrimony binds more closely than any other. Therefore it seems that such marriages should even be advised, because by this occasion infidels will be converted to the faith.

ON THE CONTRARY to this, many things are adduced in the text concerning Ezra and others.

But by reason it is objected thus: 1. Where there is not the foundation of the sacraments, there is not any ratified sacrament. But baptism and faith are the foundation of the sacraments. Therefore where this is not present, there is not any sacrament. But in disparate worship it is not present. Therefore, etc. Therefore neither is the matrimony a sacrament.

1. Also, Malachi 2:11-12: Judah hath profaned the holiness of the Lord, which he loved, and hath married the daughter of a strange god. The Lord will cut off the man that doeth this, the master, and the scholar, out of the tabernacles of Jacob. Therefore, a matrimony in which there is the daughter of a strange god is to be cut off. Therefore disparate worship makes a person illegitimate.

Response. It must be said that what is said in the text seems entirely to be held.

Now to what is objected first, it must be said that matrimony was never ratified without the implicit or explicit faith of Christ, in such a way that "ratified" is said to be entirely indissoluble. Hence in the natural law, Genesis 27:46, Rebecca says: I am weary of my life because of the daughters of Heth: if Jacob take a wife of the stock of this land, I choose not to live. Although therefore it is said below that there can be a true marriage among infidels, it is not, however, entirely ratified; because if some case intervenes, it could be dissolved.

To the next it must be said that it is contrary to the good of offspring; because as regards one of the parents, it is not received in the fear and piety of Christ. Similarly, one who does not keep faith toward Christ can never keep true faith toward a human being. Moreover, the good

of the sacrament is in potency only in such cases, and it does not lead in act to the conjunction of the faithful soul with God, but only in potency. And therefore all those goods of such a matrimony are imperfect.

To the next it must be said that although it was not explicitly stated, nevertheless it is pre-understood, just as a foundation is pre-understood for a building.

To the next it must be said that such a friendship is dangerous where a Christian is bound to an infidel, because perhaps he could be perverted, and therefore it is prohibited by the Lord for such persons to be confederated.

Articulus 2 — Why This Belongs Rather To Faith Than To Another Virtue

Why is this proper to faith rather than to another virtue?

Secondly it is asked: Why does faith have this rather than another virtue, and infidelity rather than any vice?

1. For Augustine says that any vice whatsoever separates from God; therefore it is contrary to that which by its indivisibility signifies that conjunction. But this is matrimony. Therefore any vice whatsoever makes a person illegitimate for matrimony.
2. Also, below in the text it is said that theft, avarice, and many other vices do this same thing; therefore the proposition is established.
3. Also, faith is not unitive, but rather charity; because as the Apostle says, 1 Corinthians 6:17: He who is joined to the Lord, is one spirit. Therefore the opposite of charity ought rather to make a person illegitimate, inasmuch as it is opposed to the conjunction and union of the faithful soul with God, which matrimony signifies.
4. Also, the sin against the Holy Spirit is the gravest, which shall not be forgiven either in this world, or in the world to come. Therefore it struggles against the copula of the soul with God both in this world and in the future; and matrimony prefigures this. Therefore a sin against the Holy Spirit rather makes a person illegitimate for matrimony than disparate worship.

On the contrary to this are: 1. Those things which are said in the text.

1. Also, it is further objected by reason: As the Apostle says, Hebrews 11:1: Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for; because, as the Gloss says, it makes the things to be hoped for subsist in us. Therefore without faith nothing of the things to be hoped for subsists in us. But nothing is firm that does not subsist with the things to be hoped for. Therefore what subsists without faith is not firm. Therefore also matrimony subsisting without faith does not have perfect firmness. Now that nothing is firm which does not subsist with the things to be hoped for, is proved from the fact that the things to be hoped for are eternal; and what is neither eternal nor with the eternal, this is only temporal; existing only temporally, it has no firmness.

2. Also, what does not please God, ought not

to be firm in human contracts; but without faith it is impossible to please God, as the Apostle says, Hebrews 11:6. Therefore it has no firmness. Therefore also the matrimony of an infidel ought to lack firmness.

1. Also, there could be no contract in which the legislator is excluded, and the law rectifying the contract. Therefore also in spiritual matters, no contract holds where God and divine law are excluded. But in the matrimony of an infidel, God and divine law are excluded in this way. Therefore such a contract is not fully ratified.

Response. According to the last arguments it must be said that it is most equitable that matrimony is not ratified where there is disparate worship.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that although any vice separates from God, nevertheless not any vice entirely dissipates the foundation of good and of the sacraments, but only infidelity. And therefore nothing of the building stands where there is not the foundation of faith; because Augustine says that infidelity is the vice and sin by which all other sins are held.

TO THE NEXT it must be said that moral vices which are not against matrimony do not impede matrimony from being contracted, nor do they nullify the contract, but they can dissolve cohabitation. For it is not necessary to cohabit with a thief who does not want to repent, or even with a usurer. And in this regard, those things which are said below in the text are understood. However, it was established above which vices impede matrimony and which do not.

To the next it must be said that the perfection of the conjunction of the soul with God is in charity, but the betrothal and first conjunction is in faith. And therefore the contrary of faith dissolves the whole that follows, but not the contrary of charity, because the preceding part of a building is not destroyed when the posterior part is destroyed, but rather conversely.

To the next it must be said that a sin is said to be greater than another in many ways, as was noted on the Second Book of the Sentences. But insofar as pertains to the present proposition, it must be said that infidelity is the greatest sin by reason of the harm, and of that against which it is, and by reason of the act. But the sin against the Holy Spirit [is greatest] by reason of the root. And therefore infidelity is the greatest sin simply speaking. Yet a sin does not have the power to impede matrimony from its magnitude, but rather from the contrariety which it has to the foundation or the act.

Articulus 3 — By Reason Of Which Article Faith Makes A Person Legitimate

By reason of which article does faith make a person legitimate?

Thirdly it is asked: By reason of which article does faith have the power to make a person legitimate?

1. It seems that it is by reason of that which is, "Life everlasting"; because eternal life will be in the conjunction of the soul with God, and matrimony signifies that.
2. But again it seems that it is by reason of the "Communion of Saints"; because the communion of Saints will be in the indivisibility of life and fellowship, which matrimony again prefigures.

To this it must be said that it is by reason of that article which is, "The Holy Church," that faith makes a person legitimate. Because it is understood thus: that is, "I believe in the Holy Spirit," namely sanctifying and uniting the Church. For just as it is said, Ephesians 5:32: This is a great sacrament: but I speak in Christ and in the Church.

To the FIRST, therefore, it must be known that eternal life is not the union of the faithful soul with God, but rather the vision, and union follows the vision.

To the next it must be said that the communion

of Saints consists in the communion of goods mutually. But the signification of matrimony is rather in relation to God; and therefore it is not by reason of that article that faith makes a person legitimate.

Articulus 4 — Whether If Someone Takes A Baptized Heretic To Wife Who Is Unwilling To Abandon Her Heresy, He Ought To Dismiss Her

If someone marries a baptized heretical woman who refuses to give up her heresy, ought he to dismiss her?

Next, it is asked concerning what he says, there at A, a little before the end: Or a foreigner, that is, a heretical woman, etc.

1. For let us posit that someone knows a certain woman to be a heretic, and yet baptized, and marries her, and she afterwards refuses to dismiss her heresy. It seems that such a man, according to those things which are said in the text, can dismiss her.
2. Also, it is a greater thing to be segregated from the consortium of the faithful, than from the society of a husband. But a woman is segregated from the consortium of the faithful on account of heresy; therefore much more from the consortium of a husband.

On the contrary to this is that: 1. One baptized by a heretic is baptized. Therefore one joined in matrimony to a heretic has true matrimony. Therefore it is not to be separated.

1. Also, baptism is the foundation of the sacraments; but whatever is built upon an immobile foundation, that is a firm building. Therefore this is firm matrimony; therefore it is not to be dissolved.

ALSO, let us posit that some Jew, or heretic, or pagan, wishes to be baptized, and he does not find water, or a baptizer to baptize him, and in that state he contracts [matrimony]. It seems that the matrimony stands; because by the baptism of desire [flaminis] even if not of the river [fluminis] he has obtained the remission of all sins. Therefore no sin is repugnant to his matrimony which he contracts with a Christian woman. Therefore the matrimony stands.

On the contrary to this is that baptism is the foundation of the sacraments; and this man does not have the baptismal character. Therefore he does not have the foundation. Therefore it is not a firm building.

Response to this is that as Hugh says, in the first case the matrimony stands on account of baptism, and he seems to me to speak reasonably.

To the objection to the contrary, it must be said that Ambrose in the text is speaking of a heretic not baptized in the form of the Church.

To the next it must be said that although it is a greater thing to be segregated from the consortium of the faithful than of a husband, nevertheless not everything segregating from the consortium of the faithful is ordained from contrariety against the foundation of matrimony, and therefore it does not dissolve contracted matrimony. But it is true that it ought not to be contracted.

To that which is asked concerning the second case, it must be said that it is not ratified matrimony; because he does not have the baptismal character, although he has the reality of baptism [rem baptismi].

To that which is objected against this, it must be said that immunity from sin does not lay the foundation of the sacraments, but rather the impression of the character. Hence one not baptized, though immune from sin, if he were ordained, would receive nothing of the order; and one having the baptismal character, and not immune from sin, if he is ordained, receives the order.

Articulus 5 — Whether Disparity Of Cult Supervening Upon Marriage Dissolves The Marriage

Does disparate worship supervening upon matrimony dissolve the matrimony?

Next, it is asked concerning what he says, there at B, To this however what the Apostle [says] seems to oppose, etc.

For it seems, according to those things which are said in the text of this chapter, that disparate worship supervening upon matrimony dissolves the matrimony: because

1. Disparate worship supervening upon matrimony is of equal or greater danger as antecedent [disparate worship]. Therefore it does the same or more for the separation of matrimony than the antecedent, as it seems.

2. Also, such a person does not cohabit except to the contumely of the Creator; but this is assigned as a cause of separation in the text. Therefore on account of such disparate worship the matrimony is to be separated.

3. Also, such a person sins against the author of matrimony; and this again is said to be a cause of separation. Therefore such persons can be separated.

§ 1. To the contrary is the rule that says, that 1. No impediment supervening on matrimony dissolves a contracted matrimony; therefore neither does this one. 2. Also, the faith of a Christian once given, is to be firmly kept: but faith is given to her who becomes a heretic: therefore it ought not to be made void: therefore the matrimony is to be held firm.

§ 2. To this it must be conceded, and it must be said to the first, that there is no danger: because a separation from bed can be made, if she is pertinacious in heresy.

§ 3. To the other it must be said, that although she communicates only to the reproach of the Creator, if she is pertinacious, yet from the first reception of faith she is subject to ecclesiastical censure: and by that she can be prohibited, or even separated from the assembly of the faithful, so that it is free for the secular judgment to avenge itself on such a one.

§ 4. To the other it must be said, that in truth such a one sins against the author of matrimony, and therefore is punished in matrimony as to separation from bed: but nevertheless by merit of the foundation the matrimony stands, as long as both live who contracted in the faith of Christ.

Articulus 6 — Whether Someone In Paganism, Having Several Wives, If He Is Converted With All Of Them, May Have All Or One, And Which One Can Be The Wife

Whether someone in Paganism having multiple wives, if he is converted with all of them, all or one, and which one can be his wife?

§ 5. Then it is inquired concerning this that he says, there, B, after the middle: Therefore by merit those whom they had married to the Lord, etc.

§ 6. For suppose that someone in Paganism or Judaism had multiple wives, and is converted with all of them: and it is asked, Whether all, or one, or which of all can be his wife?

§ 7. For it seems, that all: 1. For it is held below, that between infidels there is true conjugal union: therefore since according to his rite he could have multiple, any one of them is a true wife: but, as Augustine says,[716] baptism does not dissolve conjugal unions, but sins: therefore it seems, that any one of them still remains his wife: therefore after baptism he can have multiple. 2. Also, baptism adds greater liberty to him, and does not take any away: therefore since before baptism it was free for him to retain multiple, this same thing will also be free for him after baptism. 3. Also, if they are separated, then it seems, that this would generate an impediment to conversion: because they would already hate baptism on account of the horror of separation from their spouses: therefore they ought not to be separated, but all permitted after baptism.

§ 8. To the contrary of this is what Innocent says:[717] "Since from the beginning one rib was formed into one woman, it was never permitted to anyone to have multiple wives, except by divine dispensation and for a time out of necessity;" therefore it was neither permitted to him before baptism, nor is it permitted to him after.

§ 9. But then it is asked, Which of them is the wife? It seems, however, that 1. He can choose: because he himself is the head. 2. Also, because his conversion is worthy of favor: and therefore the choice ought to be permitted to him.

§ 10. Further it is asked, Suppose for instance that someone in his law gave a bill of divorce to the first wife with whom he contracted, and after her contracted with another according to the rite of his law, and with her is converted to the faith of Christ. It seems, that he must dismiss the second: because she was never his true wife: therefore it is necessary, that both these converts be separated.

§ 11. To the contrary of this is, that this would generate disturbance and an impediment to conversion.

§ 12. Response. It must be said, that in the first part of the question there is no doubt that he cannot have multiple, [but] only one: nor was it permitted to him before to have multiple according to divine law, but rather according to the error of human perfidy.

§ 13. To the first therefore it must be said, that what is said below, is understood of licit matrimony: and this is not against divine law: and this is of one with one.

§ 14. To the other it must be said, that to have multiple is not liberty, but servitude: because whoever commits sin, is a slave of sin. And Anselm says,[718] that even the potency of sinning, is neither liberty, nor a part of liberty: because added to liberty it diminishes it, and taken away it increases it.

§ 15. To the other it must be said, that what belongs to the truth of life, is never to be dismissed on account of anyone's disturbance or scandal, especially out of love for Christian honesty: but that one is of one, ought more to draw to conversion, than the love of little women is able to entice.

§ 16. To the second part of the question it must be said, that none is his wife except the first with whom he contracted; and therefore when all are converted only she will remain. But if she herself did not want to be converted, then I think, that it would be free for him to choose from the other converts whom he wanted, and to contract anew with her: because the prior contract was not valid, for the reason that among all those with whom he contracted secondly in his rite, none has more than another, because none of them was truly his wife.

§ 17. But to the objection it must be said, that the man is the head in governance, but not in contract: because in that the man and wife are judged on par, since the consent of both is required.

716. Augustine, De adulterinis conjugiis.

§ 18. To the other it must be said, that there is no favor in the man, especially since he receives baptism, so that he may be freed from vices.

§ 19. To the third part of the question it must be said under a distinction, that either the first to whom he gave the bill of divorce, wants to be converted, or not. If yes, he is bound to have her. If not, then he can contract anew in the faith of Christ with the second: and then even if the other is converted afterwards, she does not have the right of demanding him, for the reason that she lost her right by merit of infidelity, since in nothing ought she so to follow her husband as in conversion to the faith of Christ.

Articulus 7 — Whether On Account Of Unbelief A Wife Can Be Dismissed

Whether a wife can be dismissed on account of infidelity?

§ 20. Then it is inquired concerning this that he says, there, C, Yet he can licitly dismiss, etc. It seems that what he says is not valid: because 1. He himself said in the third book of the Sentences, that one must not argue from tropes: but it is evident, that infidelity is not fornication except by speaking tropically. 2. Also, faith is not the foundation, except that which works through love, as the Gloss says:[719] therefore for the husband to object the sin to her, it is necessary that he himself has charity: and this would be heavy. 3. Also, from this it follows, that every matrimony contracted outside of charity, would be without a foundation: therefore separable, as it seems.

§ 21. Response. It must be said, that he does not argue from tropes, although the saying is tropical: but what he says follows, because infidelity has contrariety to the foundation.

§ 22. To the other it must be said, that faith founds two things, namely merit, and sacrament. And as to the founding of merit that Gloss is understood: because charity informs every merit. But as to the founding of the sacrament alone without the sacramental reality [res] and effect both in baptism and in others, unformed faith suffices.

§ 23. And through this the solution to the following is evident.

Articulus 8 — Whether On Account Of Mortal Sin One Of The Spouses Can Dismiss The Other

Whether on account of mortal sin one of the spouses can dismiss the other?

§ 24. Then it is inquired concerning this that he says, there, D, But if you ask, Whether on account of another, etc. For the whole of what is said here in the Letter seems false: since, 1. According to this, divorces would happen all day long, which is false. 2. Also, he either understands of these vices before matrimony, or after. And it is evident, that he understands it in neither way, because with both or one existing in mortal sin, they contract, and are not separated, and are compelled to cohabit by the Church: therefore what he says is false. 3. Also, it is expressly against the Gospel, where it is said,[720] that whoever dismisses his wife, except for the cause of fornication, etc. And it is evident, that it speaks only of corporal and literal

717. Innocent III, Decretals.

fornication. Also, in Luke, where it says,[721] that two will be in one bed: one will be taken, and the other left. Therefore the one bed is of one good, and the other bad.

§ 25. Response. It must be said, that if the Letter ought to be sustained, it must be referred to betrothals: because I well believe, that those can be severed on account of mortal sin existing in one of the betrothed, especially if it is appended in a condition, as the Letter seems to say: and if he does not want to be converted from sin. And this is noted above in the question on betrothals.

Articulus 9 — Whether One Faithful Spouse Can Dismiss The Other Before The Death Of The Other

Whether one faithful spouse can dismiss the other before the death of the other?

§ 26. Then it is inquired concerning this that he says, there, E, Here it is asked, If a faithful dismisses an infidel, etc. For the determination of the Master seems not to be true thus: 1. In every true and legitimate matrimony each of the spouses is obligated to the other until death: but between infidels there is true and legitimate matrimony: therefore each of the spouses is obligated to the other until death. The first is proved, where it is said,[722] that a woman is bound to the law, namely of her husband, as long as her husband lives. The second is written in the Letter. 2. Also, the matrimony of infidels is perfect in signifying and causing: but what is perfect obligates until death. 3. Also, there is a lesser bond between master and slave, than between husband and wife: but the first is not dissolved through the conversion of the other: therefore neither the second. 4. Also, Ambrose says,[723] that in baptism sins are dissolved, not conjugal unions: therefore through baptism the wife is not de-obligated from the husband: therefore she cannot contract before his death. 5. Further it seems, that if the dismissed infidel contracts, the matrimony holds. For either the faithful can contract, or not. If not, this will be against the Letter. If yes, he cannot contract unless absolved from the matrimony by which he was previously obligated: but since matrimony is a certain relation, and a relation is not dissolved in one unless it is dissolved in both relatives, the infidel will be absolved from the matrimony: but one who is absolved can contract: therefore an infidel thus dismissed can contract. 6. Also, it is unjust if someone should owe from the right of another and it should not be owed to him from the same: therefore no right of matrimony obligates an infidel to a debt, such that it is not owed to him from the same: but it is not owed to him, as is said in the Letter: therefore neither does he himself owe anything, as it seems: therefore it is licit for him to contract just as for the faithful. 7. Also, let us posit, that he is converted: for then by merit of faith he ought not to be deprived of the liberty of contracting: suppose therefore, that the other already contracted with another: therefore she too after being converted can contract with another. 8. Also, penance restores entirely, as was held above: therefore it also restores the liberty of contracting: and thence as before. 9. Also, if it were not licit to contract after being converted, many would be drawn back from the faith: therefore it seems, that it ought not to have been instituted by the Church, that afterwards it is not licit for them to contract.

718. Anselm of Canterbury, De libertate arbitrii.

§ 27. To the contrary of this, however, is that 1. The Apostle says:[724] If the infidel departs, let him depart: for a brother or sister is not subject to servitude in such matters. And he does not say, that the faithful is not subject to servitude: therefore he hints that the infidel is still held by the servitude of matrimony. 2. Also, no unratified matrimony has sufficient stability: but the matrimonies of infidels are not ratified: therefore, etc.; therefore they can be dissolved.

§ 28. Response. It must be said, that those things which are said in the Letter, have the firmness of law.

§ 29. To the first therefore it must be said, that the matrimony of infidels is not entirely legitimate, for the reason that it is not entirely between legitimate persons: and therefore upon the intervention of some case it can be dissolved.

§ 30. To the other it must be said, that it is not perfect in causing and signifying except in potency, as was said above: but the faith of Christ is that from which it draws firmness.

§ 31. To the other it must be said, that although the bond is of one servitude, nevertheless it is not founded upon the faith of Christ: and therefore from faith it neither contracts strength, nor weakness from its contrary: but matrimony insofar as it is a sacrament, is founded upon the faith of Christ, and when that is lacking it does not have perfect ratification.

§ 32. To the other it must be said, that baptism does not dissolve conjugal union, but confirms it, provided the person is legitimate: whence that it dissolves, this is from a defect of person or matter.

§ 33. To that which is further objected, it must be said that an infidel cannot contract by right: because in punishment for infidelity he remains under servitude.

§ 34. And to the argument to the contrary, it must be said that the bond does not remain: but in punishment that is inflicted on him by which he loses his right in the liberty of contracting.

§ 35. And through this the solution is also evident to the following: because anyone can lose his right from sin, and become an outlaw.

§ 36. To the other it must be said, that if he is converted, he is still bound by the punishment of not contracting as a punishment for obstinacy. I believe however, that the Church can and ought to dispense with such a one in favor of others.

§ 37. To the other it must be said, that penance restores as to immunity from fault, but not as to immunity from every punishment.

Articulus 10 — Whether Among Unbelievers There Is True Marriage

Whether between infidels there is true matrimony?

§ 38. Then it is inquired concerning this that he says, there, I, Therefore marital copulation, etc. For it seems, that it is not a true conjugal union: because 1. No superstructure is without a foundation: but matrimony is a certain superstructure: therefore it is not without a founda-

719. Glossa Ordinaria on Galatians 5:6.

tion: but that is faith: therefore without the faith of Christ no matrimony is true. 2. Also, other sacraments are of greater spirituality and efficacy, than matrimony: and those cannot be without faith and baptism: therefore neither this one.

§ 39. To the contrary of this is, that if there were not true matrimony between infidels, by every act of concubitus they would be fornicators: and this would be heavy to say.

§ 40. Response. It must be said, that the matrimony is true, but not having ultimate firmness: because it has a contrary disposition in the matter.

§ 41. To the first therefore it must be said, that it is called true from the honesty of the contract, but firm from the foundation: whence faith does not found the truth of the conjugal union, but its immobility.

§ 42. To the other it must be said, that this is rather the cause why it can be without faith, than that it always demands it as to its truth: because insofar as it is a human duty, and not only spiritual, it can be effected by contract, and obtains truth from human consent.

DISTINCTIO XL

Divisio Textus

Now it remains concerning cognation, etc. § 43. In these three distinctions it is inquired concerning the impediment proceeding from the vicinity of cognation: and therefore here first he treats of carnal cognation. Secondly, of affinity, namely in distinct. XLI. And thirdly, of spiritual cognation, namely in distinct. XLII. Fourthly, of legal cognation, there, Dist. XLII, D, But that spiritual or adoptive children, etc.

§ 44. Further this distinction is divided into three parts. First it is inquired, In how many degrees is it licit for someone to be joined matrimonially? Secondly, he renders the cause why in so many, there, C, § 1: But why he computes six degrees, Isidore, etc. Thirdly, he objects certain things and solves them, there, C, § 2: But to these it occurs, etc.

§ 45. In the first there are two chapters. In the first it is shown in how many degrees matrimonial copulation is considered. In the second, he shows a twofold mode, namely of Isidore, and of others, how those degrees are to be computed, there, B, But how the degrees of consanguinity, etc.

Articulus 1 — What Consanguinity Is

What is consanguinity?

§ 46. Around the beginning of these chapters five things are inquired. The first is, What is consanguinity? The second, Whence is it so called? The third, What is a line? The fourth, What is the division of a line? The fifth, What is a degree of computation in a line?

720. Matthew 5:32; 19:9.

§ 47. But other things of this question will be inquired below in their own places.

§ 48. To the first let this definition of the Jurisconsults be posited: Carnal cognation is a bond of persons descending from the same stock contracted by carnal propagation.

§ 49. But it is objected against this: because 1. According to this all men would seem to be consanguineous: because all men descended from one stock, namely from Adam and Eve, and are mutually joined to each other, and sown through carnal propagation from Adam and Eve: therefore it seems, that all men are consanguineous. 2. Also, original sin is a bond of persons, etc.: therefore original sin is carnal cognation. 3. Also, just as a collection of many descending from one, makes one genus, as Porphyry maintains,[725] so also it makes carnal cognation: therefore carnal cognation is more a collection of many, than a bond. 4. Also, it is evident, that bond is equivocal to a corporeal bond, and to a spiritual one: therefore it ought not to be posited in a definition before distinction. 5. Also, as is said below by Isidore,[726] consanguinity tears itself apart gradually, so that propinquity ceases to be: but descent from the same stock never tears itself apart nor is it finished: therefore it seems, that the definition is insufficient, because finished consanguinity is not posited there. 6. Also, when it is said, By carnal propagation, etc., it is either understood of active propagation, or passive, or both. If in the first way: then the father will be consanguineous to the son, and not conversely. If in the second way: then a diction posited once in a definition must be used equivocally: and this is against art according to the Authors.

§ 50. Response. It must be said, that the said definition is suitable concerning consanguinity, which is treated here. Because it is treated here as it generates an impediment to matrimony: and there bond is posited as a genus: but of persons is posited as matter. The difference contracting the matter, however, is descending from the same stock: but by what is said, contracted by carnal propagation, the proper efficient cause is posited. And thus this definition is real, touching upon three causes of consanguinity, the formal, the efficient, and the material. But the final cause which is the nexus of friendship, is outside its essence, and therefore is not posited in the definition.

§ 51. To the first therefore it must be said, that all who are in the line of ascendants and descendants directly, are called consanguineous according to this definition: but in the transversal line although anyone is referred to the stock, nevertheless on account of the variation of the line, his proximate stock is also varied: and therefore they are not called consanguineous here beyond the fourth degree: but there it is varied.

§ 52. To the other it must be said, that original sin is not an existing one bond of diverse persons, but existing only as one in species: but carnal cognation is one relation in one whole genus. Furthermore, original sin follows propagation by accident, namely from corrupted nature: but consanguinity is the per se effect of propagation through the propagated flesh itself.

§ 53. To the other it must be said, that a collection to one does not express anything but the habitude of inferiors to a superior: but consanguinity is equally in the habitude of an inferior

to a superior, and of inferiors to each other: and therefore it is better defined through a bond than through a collection.

§ 54. To the other it must be said, that although bond is equivocal, nevertheless it is determined through the following adjunct, just as if one says "a barkable dog" [canis latrabilis]: and therefore it does not generate a confused intellect in the definition.

§ 55. To the other it must be said, that consanguinity tears itself apart: but this is not from consanguinity, but from the distance of degree, as will be said below: and therefore the severing itself is rather to be posited in the determination of the number of degrees, than of consanguinity. But that severing is not essential to consanguinity, is evident: because if it were essential, then in every line it would be severed: and this is not true, because in the line of ascendants and descendants it is never severed: and the cause of this will be said below.

§ 56. To the other it must be said, that active carnal propagation is taken here: but what is inferred does not follow: because consanguinity is not the essence of the action, but rather an effect which follows both in the propagator, and in the propagated, and in other propagated things from the habitude of the substance from which the severing is made to those which are severed.

Articulus 2 — Whence Consanguinity Is So Called

Whence is consanguinity so called?

§ 57. Secondly it is inquired, Whence is consanguinity so called? And it is commonly said, that it is so called from the composition of the word, as if a society of blood on account of propagation from one.

§ 58. But it seems, that this is nothing, of which there is one reason: because 1. Generation or propagation does not happen from blood, as the Physicists say,[727] but rather from the superfluity of the fourth digestion: therefore neither can consanguinity be called on account of blood. 2. Also, Laban said of Jacob:[728] You are my bone, and my flesh. And Judah to his brothers concerning Joseph: He is our brother and our flesh. Therefore it ought rather to be called con-carnality, than con-sanguinity.

§ 59. Response. It must be said, that it is optimally called consanguinity; because what is most proximate in ultimate potency to the body and to the nature of man, is blood.

§ 60. To the first therefore it must be said, that that is materially and through vicinal dispositions blood well deputed, but through more ample digestion it becomes white, and through the admixture of spirit it is made frothy, and appears more white.

§ 61. To the other it must be said, that generation does not happen from flesh: but flesh and bone are posited there for the matter having in itself the formative virtue of flesh and bone: for the sons of one father receive this from one.

722. 1 Corinthians 7:39.

Articulus 3 — What The Line Of Consanguinity Is

What is the line of consanguinity?

§ 62. Thirdly it is inquired, What is a line? And it is commonly said, that a line is an ordered collection of persons joined by consanguinity, descending from the same stock, containing diverse degrees.

§ 63. But it is objected, 1. Concerning this that is said, Ordered collection: because this ought to be understood of one order: and this is not suitable, because there are three orders in a line. 2. Also, a line is also between persons not consanguineous, like affines, and adopted ones, and those joined by a spiritual bond: therefore it is badly said, Of those joined by consanguinity. 3. Also, it seems to be badly said, Descending from the same stock: because those who are in transversals insofar as they are transversals, are in a line not related to the stock: therefore descent from one stock is not always attended to there. 4. Also, since every line is between two terms only, there seem to be only two diverse degrees: and this again is false.

§ 64. Response. It must be said, that there is no great force in these things, provided the virtue of law concerning lines is attended to.

§ 65. Nevertheless it must be said first, that the line is sufficiently commonly defined: and this that is said, Ordered collection, is the genus according to which line is taken here. But the matter or subject of the form of the genus is touched upon by this that is said: Of persons joined by consanguinity, etc. But the efficient cause is touched upon by this that is said: Descending from the same stock: because, just as in mathematics according to Alfarabi,[729] the motion of a point makes a line, so the motion and a certain quasi-multiplication of the stock here makes the line, concerning which it is treated here: but this that is said, Containing diverse degrees, is the ultimate difference completing the being of a line taken civilly.

§ 66. But to the first that is objected to the contrary, it must be said that order is taken here for the general habitude to one, that is, to the stock: and that habitude is saved in all lines: nor is it necessary in the definition of a genus to descend into the differences of a species: because those are posterior to the genus, and do not define it.

§ 67. To the other it must be said, that the line of consanguinity is defined here, and not a line in genus, unless the proximate genus is taken, namely of consanguinity.

§ 68. To the other it must be said, that there would be no transversal line, unless there were a descent from one stock: because he who is in a transversal line on one side, would in no way regard him who is in another line, except mediating the stock from which both descend: whence a falsehood is supposed in the objection.

§ 69. To the other it must be said, that this line is like a designated line in geometry which is divided into parts: and therefore it can contain diverse degrees.

723. Ambrose (Ambrosiaster), In 1 Cor. 7.

Articulus 4 — What The Division Of The Line Is

What is the division of a line?

§ 70. Fourthly it is inquired, What is the division of a line? And it is commonly said, that it is divided into three, namely of descendants, ascendants, and transversals. And of ascendants is like father mother, grandfather grandmother, great-grandfather great-grandmother, great-great-grandfather great-great-grandmother, sub-grandfather sub-grandmother, etc. But of descendants like father mother, son daughter, grandson granddaughter, great-grandson great-granddaughter, sub-grandson sub-granddaughter, tri-grandson tri-granddaughter. But of transversals like father mother, brother sister, son of a brother daughter of a sister, who are called cousins: grandsons of brothers or sisters great-grandsons of cousins, and their tri-grandsons, and so on of the others.

§ 71. But this division of a line seems insufficient: because 1. Just as there is a transversal habitude to the stock, so there is a habitude of the same to a descendant from himself: therefore there are two lines in a transversal, namely one transversal, and another descending. 2. Also, there seems to be a certain straight lateral: as there is a habitude in the tree of the sons of two brothers, for they regard each other directly: therefore mention ought to have been made of that line. 3. Also, it seems that it is an abundant division: for those who transfer transfer themselves according to some similitude (as the Philosopher says):[730] but in mathematics where lines are properly taken, there are only two species of lines, namely a simple one which is straight, and a composite one which is curved, for the reason that the simple is of a simple form, but the curved has one form in the concave, and another in the convex: therefore the law transferring lines, ought to posit two to the similitude of the others, and not three.

§ 72. Response, that this division according as it pertains to the proposition, is good.

§ 73. To the first therefore that is objected to the contrary, it must be said that every line must be referred to its term, and that is the stock on one side: and without respect to it no habitude is found between persons: and therefore there is no line of descendants in the side: because it must be directed to the stock, and then it will be transversal.

§ 74. And through the same the solution to the following is evident.

§ 75. To the last it must be said, that in the tree of consanguinity there cannot be a curved line: for either it would be regularly curved, or irregularly curved. If in the first way, thus it could not be except circular, and thus matrimony would return from the branches to the stock: and this cannot be, because the sap descends into the branches from the stock, and not conversely. But if irregularly, then it neither is subject to art in mathematics, nor here: because the irregular does not obey art. And thus it is evident, that translation cannot be made except from straight lines referred to one: and this cannot be except in ascending, or in descending, or laterally, not indeed at a right angle, because a son and daughter do not stand equally high with the parents, but at half a right angle, as is evident in the tree of consanguinity.

724. 1 Corinthians 7:15.

Articulus 5 — What A Degree Is

What is a degree?

§ 76. Fifthly it is inquired, What is a degree, according as it is computed in a line? And they say, that a degree is a habitude of distant persons, by which it is known by how much distance of cognation the persons differ among themselves.

§ 77. But the definition seems to be inconvenient: because 1. Degree sounds of a habitude of inferiority and superiority of distant persons, etc.: therefore it is badly defined through a simple habitude of distant persons, etc. 2. Also, from a degree insofar as it is a degree, it is not known how much the distance is, etc.: but rather from a degree insofar as it is an aliquot, either second, or third: therefore this is badly attributed to a degree in genus. 3. Also, in material degrees of wood or stone it is not known how much the distance is from an inferior or superior place, unless it is known what number the degree is from

a lower or an upper [degree]: therefore neither in these degrees is the distance known from the degree insofar as it is a degree, but rather it is known from it insofar as it is an aliquot [part].

§ 4. Item, what is known and the principle of knowing are not the same, as the Philosopher says. But the degree is what is known in these things: for those asking about consanguinity must know the degree which is between the persons. Therefore the degree is not the principle of knowing. Therefore it is badly attributed to it to be the principle of this kind of knowing from the mode of speaking, when it is said: By which it is known.

Reply. It must be said that a degree is appropriately defined here: for it is a general habitude or form, of which the proper subject and matter are the distant persons; but the proper act is the difference by which it is known, etc.: and the known is expressed through this which is said, How much distance of kinship, etc.

Whence it must be said to the first, that a degree in general does not signify inferiority or superiority, but abstracts from both, and so it is defined here: and through this it is clear, that there is a lower degree and an upper degree: and this division is into species of degree. And therefore degree in general, as abstracting from both, is prior to both: however, the state or site of superiority and inferiority is imported in general through the mode of distance of persons.

To the next it must be said, that from the degree insofar as it is a degree, habitude is known in general, but habitude in species is known from the degree determined in species: and because cognition in general is imperfect cognition, therefore one does not stop in it, but asks about the species. However, when degree is defined in general, it ought not to be defined except through the cognition which it causes in general.

To the next it must be said, that the same is true in material degrees: but because one does not stop there, therefore the process seems to be toward the species.

To the next it must be said, that a degree as degree is never the thing sought, nor the known as that which was before sought or doubted: but rather whether there is consanguinity

or not, that is sought, and is found from the degree. Whence that a degree is sought, this is only insofar as it is a principle of concluding consanguinity, just as also in syllogisms and theorems one thing is concluded accidentally, so that afterwards through it the intended conclusion may be concluded: for one does not always proceed from things known per se, but also from those things which have received faith through first and true things.

Articulus 6 — Whether There Are Three Ways Of Counting Degrees

Are there three ways of computing degrees? And which is stronger among them?

Then it is asked about what he says there at B, But how the degrees of consanguinity are to be computed, etc.

There are indeed three modes of computing here: and we ask, Which mode is more reasonable? And, concerning the consonance and contrariety between them.

And two modes of degrees are indeed according to the canons, each of which is mentioned in the Text. For Pope Zachary computes thus, saying: We compute the degrees of kinship in this way: I and my brother are one generation, and make up the first degree. Again, my son and my brother's son are the second generation, and make up the second degree, etc. And this way is considered more famous.

Isidore, however, thus: Let the son and daughter, who are brother and sister, be the trunk itself. With them set apart by themselves, from the root of this trunk these little branches go forth, grandson and granddaughter, the first [degree]; great-grandson and great-granddaughter, the second, etc. And so on for the others.

But according to the laws it is computed thus: Father and mother are the trunk; brother and sister, the first degree. And the second, the son

of the brother and the daughter of the sister, who are the grandson and granddaughter. The third degree and fourth, the great-grandson and great-granddaughter. And the fifth and sixth degree, the great-great-grandson and great-great-granddaughter. The seventh degree and eighth, the great-great-great-grandson and great-great-great-granddaughter. The ninth degree and tenth: and so on for the others.

From these it is easy to see, that that person who according to the first computation is in the fifth [degree], that is, outside the prohibited degree today: according to the second is in the fourth, that is, inside the prohibited degree today: and according to the laws in the tenth on one side, and in the ninth on the other. Therefore there seems to be the greatest contrariety between these laws, which speak thus.

But it is objected against the first mode of computing and for the last thus: § 1. Just as the descent of generation is on one side through the son, so on the other side through the daughter: but a double descent demands a double degree. Therefore the grandson through the son, and the granddaughter through the daughter, are in two degrees. Therefore the first

726. Isidore of Seville, Etymologies.

opinion which says that they are in one, speaks falsely: and the last which says that they are in two, speaks the truth.

§ 2. Item, In natures, if two things are moved by contrary motions from each other, there will necessarily be a double distance there, and a double degree, just as if A is moved upwards, and B downwards: but a double descent is like a double motion in nature. Therefore in the generation of sons or of a son and a daughter there is a double distance and a double degree. Therefore the first computation is false, and only the second and third are true.

But it is objected specially against the second thus: § 1. A son and a daughter, who are brother and sister, are united in nothing material or formal intrinsic to themselves: therefore one trunk cannot be posited, but rather the father and mother who are one flesh. Therefore the first is true, and the second and third are false.

§ 2. Item, Everything that is distant through generation from some one thing, has more the likeness of a little branch and a degree, than of a trunk: but a son and a daughter, who are brother and sister, have descended through generation from one, as is imported by the very name, since a son is not a son except a son of a father. Therefore the son and daughter, who are brother and sister, do not make a trunk or stock, but degrees. And from this as before.

But it is objected for the first and second against the third thus: § 1. Material diversity alone in no way makes a different species of degree: but generation through two is a material diversity only. Therefore it does not make a different species of degree. Therefore these are distant from the trunk in one degree, although they are two materially.

§ 2. Item, In natures things which are moved by one mode of motion from one, are equally distant, and have one degree of distance: just as B is moved from A, and in the same mode of motion C is moved from the same A. But a brother and a sister are moved by one mode of motion from one trunk. Therefore they are distant by only one degree, and not by two. Therefore the first and second opinions are true, and the third is false.

Reply. It must be said that all these opinions have something of reason: but yet the first is more reasonable: and therefore the Church has adhered to it. For it considers that the person from whom there is descent has one habitude, and does not descend according to the rationale of his name, just like a father and a mother: because those names express those from whom another is, and do not express that they themselves are from another, although sometimes according to the truth of the thing they are from another. It considers also that the one descending by one descent has one habitude, and the one descending by multiple descents has another: and according to this it locates the trunk and the first and second and third and fourth degree, so that the first is called by one descent, the second by two, the third by three, and the fourth by four: and in that consanguinity is ended today.

But the second considers that the trunk arises from a certain other thing which is the root, and therefore it locates the trunk, the brother and sister, upon one root of the father and

721. Luke 17:34.

mother: and there is no diversity, except in rationale, as is said in the Text, between the first opinion and the second.

But the third considers those two reasons which were posited for it, and against the first and second opinions: and these it is not necessary to repeat.

And thus it is plain how to answer all the objections: because the ones introduced last solve the first two: and that which is objected against the second is plainly solved through those things which the second opinion considers: because it takes another rationale of a trunk than the first.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 7 — Whether All The Forbidden Degrees Are Prohibitive For Contracting Marriage

Are all the prohibited degrees for contracting matrimony?

Then it is asked about what he says, there, at B, after the beginning: Note, that Isidore computes six, etc.

For three causes are found assigned here concerning the number of degrees, in which it is permitted or not permitted to contract: for according to the computation of Isidore, and according to the ancient laws, the sixth degree is prohibited, and the seventh granted: and he assigns the cause, because there are six ages of the world, and six states of man, namely infancy, childhood, adolescence, youth, mature age, old age and senility, which Isidore takes for one, because then bodies begin to dry up and putrefy, and become unfit for the use of matrimony.

According to the computation of Zachary the seventh degree is prohibited, and the eighth granted: and he assigns the cause, because all time is enacted in seven days, after which the Church also will be joined in body and soul to the spouse Christ.

But according to the new laws, by which all the ancient ones are abrogated, the fourth degree is prohibited, and the fifth granted: and Innocent assigns the cause of this (Extra, De consanguineis et affinibus), because there are four elements, out of which the four humours are composed, out of which the human body is constituted and complexioned.

§ 1. But these causes seem ridiculous, and to do nothing to the proposition, because no habitude of the caused to the cause seems to exist.

§ 2. Item, What is the cause that Innocent assigns the four elements rather than the Gospels, or the four corners of heaven, or the four Evangelists, or the four animals of Ezechiel? For in all these the same affinity to the caused seems to exist. Whence it is said, that not without shame for the Church did the Pope allege that for a cause, since by such a great man only reasonable things ought to be done.

§ 3. Item, What shall we assign for a cause, that according to the consonance of the laws to the canons today the eighth degree according to the laws is prohibited, and the ninth and

tenth granted? Unless indeed the eight men who were in the ark of Noah are assigned, or the eight beatitudes enumerated (Matt. 5:3 et seq.).

Similarly regarding the cause of Isidore concerning the six ages of the world: for the six ages of the world do not seem to do more than the six water jars placed in Cana of Galilee for the purification of the Jews.

Similarly the septenary of days in the computation of Pope Zachary does not seem to avail more than the seven gifts, or the seven stars having an aplanes (fixed) motion in heaven.

But it seems that it would be better not to assign such causes: because literate men reading such things despise them, and judge the Church to found its institutes upon nothing or very little.

Reply. It must be said that in truth in such things there is not great force: because they have no force except from the position of the Church: nor do the Saints assign a number of this kind for a cause, but for a sign that Scripture uses such a number: and therefore it is more fitting for instituting something in it.

If someone however wished to subtilize here, then for a cause there could be assigned the prohibition of the fourth degree: because up to the fourth degree many men see themselves and their succession, and it is abominable that a man should see his succession torn apart: just as the Lord also said according to the exposition of the Saints, Exod. 20:5: Visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me.

But to the cause of Innocent it must be said, that in every new generation there is a mixture of blood with foreign blood, and insofar as it is mixed with another, to that extent it recedes from the first, and from each other. But the elements are easily and difficultly mixable: for the maximally subtle (as the Philosopher says) is well mixable, and this is fire, which is alienated as it were in the first mixture, and in the second air, and in the third water, and in the fourth earth; and so the components of the human body recede from previous dispositions, and consequently from consanguinity: and this is clear also in seeds, which are sown in earth not natural to them: because in the fourth generation they cross over to another species entirely: and this the Pope intends.

But to this which Isidore and Zachary say, it must be said that it is not a cause, but an adaptation, as has been said.

But to that which is objected concerning the laws, it must be said that the eighth according to the laws is the same as the fourth according to the canons: and therefore it is not necessary to assign another cause in that.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

C. Why are six degrees computed?

But why Isidore computes six degrees, he himself reveals, saying: While consanguinity, separating itself little by little by the orders of shoots, has drawn itself out to the ultimate degree, and

728. Genesis 29:14; cf. Genesis 37:27.

propinquity has ceased to be, then first the law will receive it into the bond of matrimony, and will somehow begin to call back the fleeing thing. But therefore consanguinity is constituted up to the sixth degree of the genus, so that just as the generation and status of man is finished by the six ages of the world, so the propinquity of the genus may be terminated in as many degrees. In these six degrees all names of propinquities are contained: beyond which neither affinity can be found, nor can succession be prolonged further. According to others, seven degrees are computed for this reason, so that after seven degrees the groom may be joined to the bride: just as after this life which is enacted in seven days, the Church will be joined to Christ.

But to these occurs that which Gregory writes back to Augustine the Bishop of the Angles, by whom he had been asked in what generation they ought to be copulated, thus: A certain Roman law permits, that the son and daughter of either a brother, or a sister, or of two full brothers, or of two sisters, may be mixed. But we have learned by experience that from such a marriage offspring cannot grow up. Whence it is necessary that the fourth or fifth generation of the faithful be joined to each other licitly. But after a long time the same Gregory, asked by Felix the president of Messina in Sicily, whether he had written to Augustine that marriages contracted by the Angles in the fourth generation should not be dissolved, among other things rendered such a reason: What I wrote to Augustine, the Bishop of the Angles, and to the very nation of the Angles which had recently come to the faith, lest it should recede from the good which it had begun by fearing more austere things, you must recognize that I wrote specially and not generally. Nor therefore did I write these things to them, so that after they had been solidified in the faith, if they were found within their proper consanguinity, they should not be separated, or should be joined within the line of affinity, that is, up to the seventh generation.

Articulus 8 — Whence The Church Has The Boldness To Prohibit From Marriage According To These Degrees

From whence does the Church have the audacity of prohibiting from matrimony according to these degrees?

Then it is asked about what he says, there, at C, § 2: But to these occurs that, etc.

§ 1. For since the Lord did not prohibit from matrimony except twelve persons, who all are either the trunk, or in the first, or in the second degree: from whence comes such great audacity to the Church, that it should dare to prohibit over and above this, since up to the eighth exclusively or inclusively, and now up to the seventh exclusively?

For since according to the law of the Lord those who are in the third are legitimate persons, it seems that if they contract, that God has joined them: therefore a man is prohibited from separating them.

§ 2. Item, This seems to make for peace and society and a joyous life: because there will be two reasons of love between such persons, namely marriage, and consanguinity: therefore matrimony ought rather to be promoted, than prohibited.

729. Alfarabi, Commentary on Euclid's Geometry.

To this it must be said, that the Church did this inspired by the Holy Spirit, so that friendship might be more lasting, and there might be more reasons binding men in love and peace, when many were reputed within consanguinity. And thus the solution to the first is clear: for God never joined those who are joined against the inspired Church.

To the other it must be said, that this was when the propagation of the faithful was carnal, and a small grace of love had been shown to men: but now the great love of the Son of God has been shown, and an alien nature has been espoused to the divine: and therefore the bonds of love are extended to them diverse and wide in consanguinity.

And thus the solution to the whole is clear.

DISTINCTIO XLI

Divisio Textus

Now we must see concerning affinity, etc. Here he treats of affinity, and touches upon four things in this distinction.

For first he teaches the degrees of affinity. Secondly he asks, Whether there was true matrimony between those who are separated on account of consanguinity and affinity? And it is also asked, by what accusers is the separation made, and how many? there, at C, This is to be known, that the Church, etc. In the third, he incidentally introduces about fornication and its species, there, at D, § 1: Here it must be said, that fornication is one thing, etc. Fourthly, he touches upon the proper names of certain affinities, there, at D, § 2: That must also be added, etc.

About the first he introduces two chapters, of which the first introduces the ancient law concerning the degrees of affinity. But in the second he introduces certain things which seem contrary to those, and solves them, there, at B, But others seem to concede, etc.

Articulus 1 — Whether Affinity Exists

Whether there is affinity?

But here three things to be asked fall in. The first is, Whether there is affinity? The second, What is it? The third, How many kinds of affinity are there?

But to the first it is thus objected: § 1. Things which were one, after they have been separated from each other, it does not follow if something is united to the one, that it is united to the other also: but consanguineous persons are separated from each other out of one: but if some person is united to one, she is not on this account united to the other: but for there to be affinity, there must be such a union: therefore it seems that there is no affinity.

§ 2. Item, No one is united to anyone, who is not reunited to him conversely: but no one of the consanguinity is united to the added woman except her husband: therefore she is not

730. Aristotle.

reunited to anyone of them except to him: therefore no affinity is contracted to anyone, as it seems, except to him.

§ 3. Item, If a union of blood, as is said in the Text, is the cause of consanguinity, it seems that where there is the greatest union of the added person, there is the greatest affinity: but between the husband and the added woman there is the greatest union: therefore between them is the greatest affinity: but there is no affinity between them: therefore by destruction of the consequent, neither between the others and her.

§ 4. Item, That on account of which each thing is such, is itself more such, as the Philosopher says: but on account of this one who is the husband of the added woman, there is affinity between her and all the other consanguineous persons: therefore between him and her there is much more affinity: but it is not between him and her: therefore neither between the others.

§ 5. Item, It is agreed that if affinity is anything, it is a certain relation: but relations arise from some mutation, as the Philosopher says: therefore where there is no mutation, by the topic from the cause, there is no relation: but in the whole affinity except in the man there is no mutation: therefore there is no affinity except in him, if there is affinity: but in him there is no affinity: therefore neither in anyone else, as it seems.

Reply. It must be said that affinity is, and what it is, will be plain in the following article of the question.

To the first however it must be said, that there is absolute unity, and unity of relation. Concerning absolute unity what is objected is true, but concerning unity of relation it is false, as will be plain in examples: for I and my sister are divided from one: and therefore the son of my sister will still hold to me in respect of blood. And the same is true of affinity.

To the next it must be said, that by a union of relation all the consanguineous persons are united to the added person, and she is reunited to all: and the objection does not proceed except concerning the union of flesh in coitus.

To the next it must be said, that it does not follow, unless the union were the per se cause of affinity: and this is not true, because a relation does not have a per se cause, but arises by accident, just as also filiation arises in the begotten from this that the one is begetting and the other is begotten. And there is an instance [counterexample]: because that which whitens is the cause of whitening, and a likeness to itself does not necessarily arise, but rather to other white things.

To the next it must be said, that this is not true, except in per se causes participating in that which they cause in others, just as if fire is the per se cause of heat, fire will be maximally hot: otherwise an instance is customarily made in drunkenness and wine, because on account of one [wine] someone is drunk, and yet the wine is not more drunk.

To the next it must be said, that affinity is a relation: but it is not necessary that relations always arise from a mutation of both relative terms: but a mutation of one suffices, just as

725. Porphyry, Isagoge.

from passive nativity a son born from my father is made my brother, with no mutation having been made in me, so it is here: for a mutation is made in the added person, and this suffices for the relation of affinity to arise in the whole consanguinity.

Articulus 2 — Whether The Definition Of Affinity Is Well Assigned

Is the definition of affinity well assigned?

Secondly it is asked, What is affinity?

And it is commonly said, that affinity is the propinquity of persons coming from carnal copulation, lacking all parentage.

But against this it is objected: § 1. There is no greater propinquity than the union of flesh to flesh, such as is between husband and wife: and this cannot be called affinity: therefore neither can any other.

§ 2. Item, Carnal copulation does not intervene except between two: therefore neither does affinity.

§ 3. Item, Carnal copulation is in a fornicatory manner just as in a legitimate one: therefore affinity is contracted from it: and this seems to be inconvenient, since affinity is about honest things pertaining to urbanities [social customs], while fornication is about detestable things.

§ 4. Item, Let us suppose that someone has invaded and opened the cloisters of modesty of some woman, but has not arrived at the perfection of the work: it is agreed that there flesh was united to other flesh through contact: therefore affinity would be contracted according to this: therefore no one of his consanguinity could afterwards have as wife her who was thus attempted in fornicatory concubinage: and those who know the laws do not say this.

§ 5. Item, Let us suppose that through sodomy he polluted her by hand or by his own instrument: it is agreed that there was a foul carnal copulation: therefore affinity would be contracted to his consanguineous persons: and this again the laws do not admit.

§ 6. Further it is objected concerning this which he says, Lacking all parentage. For this seems to be false: for let someone be my brother from my father alone, and some woman my sister from her mother alone: it is agreed that that brother of mine can legitimately be joined to that sister of mine: and that sister of mine will be to me consanguineous and affined: therefore it is not necessary that affinity lack all parentage.

Reply. It must be said that affinity is conveniently defined: for propinquity is the genus and the proper subject of the persons. The cause however is carnal copulation. And the difference distinguishing it from consanguinity is understood through this which is added, Lacking all parentage: for to that privation there is pre-understood an affirmation, which is in the person added to the consanguinity: because she cannot be added to the consanguinity, unless she is not consanguineous.

To the first therefore it must be said, that affinity is a propinquity in the genus of relation, as has been said: and it does not follow, if a union of flesh makes it in others, that it makes it in

those carnally united, as was clear before, but there it makes another relation which is the indivisibility of husband and wife.

To the next it must be said, that it does not follow, unless it were a per se and essential cause, as was said before.

To the next it must be said, that by fornicatory concubinage affinity is indeed contracted just as in legitimate.

To that which is objected against this, it must be said that there are two things in fornicatory concubinage, namely the union of flesh to flesh: and this is not foul, because it is similar to that which is in matrimony. Another thing is the perverse act and evil end: and those are not in matrimony. It must be said therefore, that from the first fornicatory concubinage makes affinity, and not from the second: whence the foul insofar as it is foul, can be the cause of the honest, especially the per se accidental cause, just as relations admit a cause.

To the next it must be said, that such a concubinage does not make affinity: because the union of flesh to flesh is not made through contact, but rather through the commixtion of seeds: and therefore unless such a thing is made, no affinity is contracted.

To the next it must be said, that in sodomy when a due instrument is not used or not the proper vessel, there cannot be a commixtion of seeds, nor even affinity: nor is there a union of flesh to flesh, as was clear before.

To the last it must be said, that that locution is understood per se, namely lacking all parentage, according to the fact that it is affinity, although in another respect there can be a propinquity of blood to the affine.

Articulus 3 — How Many Kinds Of Affinity There Are

How many kinds of affinity are there?

Thirdly it is asked, How many kinds of affinity are there?

For it seems that there ought to be more than one: because § 1. If on account of propinquity of blood the added person is made affined to me, it is agreed that when my consanguineous relative is dead, the affinity remains in the added person: therefore he who is united to her, is united in a certain way to me: therefore if she then takes a husband, he is made affined to me: therefore there will be two kinds of affinity.

By the same objection it is proved concerning a son who is born from the second copulation, that he is made affined to me.

§ 2. Item, It is often seen even in birds, that the disposition of a preceding copulation remains in the second, and that a female makes an egg from which a chick similar to the first male comes forth: and this is especially experienced in doves: therefore it is so also in men: therefore the propinquity seems to pass over to the subsequent copulation: therefore the

727. That is, the natural philosophers and medical authors.

husband of my female affine and the one born from the non-consanguineous seem to have affinity to me: therefore there seem to be multiple kinds of affinity.

In contrary to this is, that affinity is not caused from affinity, but from consanguinity: but of this one to me there is no consanguinity: therefore no affinity to me is caused in such a case.

Which must be conceded. And it must be said to the first, that affinity remains there, as is had below in the Text: but that does not generate another affinity, because there is no affinity, except from consanguinity which is not here.

To the next it must be said, that such dispositions are weak, and are made from a long infusion of the matrix from the seed of one disposition, and then they do not cause anything in the birth, except some qualities, such as color, and do not cause the substance: and therefore in substantial things the propinquity to the first affine does not remain, although some weak one remains to the first: and therefore the husband of any woman cannot take as wife the daughter of that woman from another husband.

It must be noted therefore, that although in antiquity there were three kinds of affinity, nevertheless now there is only one in the person added to consanguinity by carnal wedlock: and therefore she alone is interdicted to the consanguineous, and not her sister, or her other consanguineous relative, or a daughter from another husband.

Articulus 4 — How The Degrees Of Affinity Are Computed

How are the degrees of affinity computed?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, at A, a little after the beginning: Wherefore I and the sister of my wife will be in one and the first degree, etc.

For it is asked here concerning the computation of the degrees of affinity: § 1. For every propinquity having a nearer and remoter distance, has degrees to be computed in itself: but affinity is a propinquity of this kind: therefore it has degrees in itself: therefore they are not to be computed by degrees of consanguinity, as is said in the Text, but by proper degrees.

§ 2. Item, Commonly one is called an affine in the first, and an affine in the second degree: therefore there are some proper degrees of affinity.

Further it is asked concerning the rule which the Jurisconsults give, that a person added to consanguinity through whom affinity is contracted, changes the genus of relation, not the degree, but a person generated in consanguinity changes the degree, and not the genus of relation: whence the verse: Mutat nupta genus, sed generata gradum. [The bride changes the genus, but the generated woman changes the degree.]

For this seems to be false: because a person joined to consanguinity, causes diverse degrees of affinity.

Reply. It must be said that just as affinity is caused from consanguinity, so the degrees of affinity are found and caused from the degrees of consanguinity, as is said in the Text.

To the objection however it must be said, that it has proper degrees, but caused from elsewhere...

...begotten: and therefore, since a thing properly has to be known from its cause, it is necessary when coming to know the degrees of affinity to have recourse to the degrees of consanguinity.

§ 1. To the next it must be said that it does have degrees, but not ones knowable in themselves, as has been said.

§ 2. To the next it must be said that the rule is true and good: because a person added to a consanguinity never changes the degree; rather, by the very degree of the blood-relation whose wife she is made, she is joined to the whole kin group. Thus the wife of my blood-relation in the second degree is related to me by affinity in the second degree, and so for the rest. And my blood-relation who through my affine is added to the kin group of his wife, is joined to everyone of his wife's kindred in that degree of affinity by which that wife is joined to them in the degree of blood. And through this both the truth of the rule and the understanding of the Letter are easily evident.

§ 3. Moreover, the objection is invalid: because it is not understood in such a way that she does not bear with her diverse degrees in diverse persons, but rather that she herself does not create a different degree than the one in which he to whom she is joined is situated. Instead, she changes the genus of relation, because she is my affine, since her husband is my blood-relation. But a person begotten of my blood-relation in the third degree becomes my blood-relation in the fourth degree, and thus a person begotten from a blood-relation changes the degree, but not the genus of relation, because she is a blood-relation, just as the begetting person is.

Articulus 5 — Whether In Equal Degrees Affinity Is Prohibited And Admitted As Consanguinity

Is affinity prohibited and admitted in equal degrees just as consanguinity is?

Next, it is asked concerning what Pope Julius says, there at A, after the middle: We permit none in either sex, etc.

For this seems to be unfitting: because:

§ 1. Affinity is a lesser bond than consanguinity. Therefore, it ought to be ended at fewer degrees. Therefore, it seems that in antiquity it should not have been posited up to the seventh degree, nor presently up to the fourth degree inclusively.

§ 2. Again, let us suppose that someone is a blood-relation or affine in the fifth degree on one side, and in the second degree on another side, and let us ask: Can they be joined? It seems not: because the second degree is prohibited; but it validly follows: "These persons are in the second degree on one side; therefore they are in the second degree; therefore they cannot contract marriage."

To the contrary of this stands the custom of the Church.

§ 3. To the first motivating argument it must be said that, in equal degrees, consanguinity and affinity are prohibited and permitted both in antiquity and presently.

§ 4. To the objection, however, it must be said that affinity is indeed a lesser bond than consanguinity; nevertheless, on account of the mingling of blood that occurs, a breaking of that mingling cannot be presumed to exist, except in the same degree in which the consanguinity itself is broken. If, however, it were pleasing to the Church to set fewer degrees both in consanguinity and especially in affinity, it seems to me that she could do this quite fittingly.

§ 5. To the next it must be said that, in the computation of consanguinity and affinity, one must stand by the further degree. The cause of this is that no degree exists unless caused by a trunk; and therefore, the respect of no person to another exists—whether in consanguinity or affinity—except through the trunk. Whence one who is distant from the trunk in the fifth degree is distant from any of the descendants in the other line in the fifth degree or more. And when it is said that these persons are in the second degree on one side, it is understood as being in the second degree not from themselves, but from the trunk; and therefore, between themselves they are distant further than even in the fifth degree; and therefore they can contract, because the fifth degree from the trunk is permitted.

And through this the solution to the objection is evident.

Articulus 6 — Whether Affinity Remains After The Death Of The One For Whose Sake It Is Contracted

Does affinity remain after the death of the one on whose account it was contracted?

Next, it is asked concerning what he says, there at B, around the middle: That also must not be passed over, which Gregory, etc.

For this seems to be irrational: because

§ 1. When a cause ceases, its effect ceases. But the joining of carnal copulation is the cause of affinity, as was held earlier. Therefore, when it ceases, the affinity also ceases. But it ceases through death; therefore affinity does as well.

§ 2. Again, no person is an affine unless adjoined. But after death she is not adjoined. Therefore, it seems she is not an affine. The first premise is established from things previously held. The second is proven from the fact that if she were still adjoined to him, she could not be adjoined to another; and this is false, because through a second marriage she can be adjoined to another.

§ 3. Again, in all relative things it is the case that when the mutation inducing the relation ceases, the relation ceases; just as if the whiteness which was induced through whitening were destroyed, the similarity to white things ceases. Therefore, here it seems to be similar. But it is established that marriage was the cause of this relation; therefore, when it ceases, the relation which is called affinity is destroyed.

§ 4. Response. It must be said that, just as it is said in the Letter and in the Gospel of Matthew , affinity remains after death: and for this reason John rebuked Herod on account of Herodias, the wife of his brother Philip, who had married her.

§ 5. To the first, therefore, it must be said that this holds nowhere, except in the case of an essential and immediate cause; but it does not hold in an accidental and remote cause, because when the builder is destroyed, the building is not thereby destroyed. However, from the foregoing it is evident that carnal copulation is not an essential cause of affinity in this way.

§ 1. To the next it must be said that, although she is not adjoined to the husband who no longer exists, she nevertheless remains adjoined to the consanguinity.

§ 2. To the proof, it must be said that one adjoined to a husband cannot be adjoined to another: but one adjoined to a consanguinity and released from her husband can well be adjoined to many others successively through the deaths of husbands and subsequent marriages.

§ 3. To the last it must be said that the case is not similar: for whiteness is a form upon which similarity is founded, but marriage is not a form upon which affinity is founded, even though it is caused by carnal copulation. Rather, it is because she had become one body with someone belonging to the consanguinity: and this fact remains even after the death of the husband; and therefore, the relation of affinity stands.

Articulus 7 — Whether The Definition Of The Justice Of Public Honesty Is Well Given By The Master

Was the definition of the justice of public propriety well given by the Master?

Next, it is asked concerning what he says, there at B, after the middle: But neither the offspring of another conjunction, etc.

Although what he says here concerning the offspring of another conjunction is abrogated by the new laws, nevertheless, for the sake of this, we will inquire concerning the justice of public propriety, regarding which we will ask three things: namely, what is it? And, whether it has degrees or not? Third, what is its status in law?

§ 1. To the first, they commonly say that the justice of public propriety is a proximity proceeding from betrothal, drawing its strength from the institution of the Church on account of its propriety.

But objections seem to be raised against this: because

§ 2. 1. Betrothal does not effect the union of marriage or of flesh. Therefore, since every proximity proceeds from some one thing, it seems that no proximity is derived from betrothal.

§ 3. 2. Again, in natural things it is the case that because some matter has merely been inclined to receive one form, it is not thereby hindered from being able to be joined to another, and to one neighboring it more quickly than one remote. Therefore, since female is to male as

matter to form, it seems that from betrothal—which is an inclination or disposition to marriage—nothing is introduced whereby this woman is more prohibited from the blood-relation of her betrothed than from anyone else. Therefore, it seems that there is no such proximity.

§ 4. 3. Further, it is asked here concerning what he says, Drawing its strength from the institution of the Church. For an institution of the Church ought not to be irrational. Therefore it is founded upon some reason. But if one asks what that is, it is not found, neither in the Old Law, nor in the New, nor even in civil law. Therefore, it seems that it should rather be called an injustice of public propriety, than a justice.

§ 5. 4. Again, why does he say, On account of its propriety? For no propriety seems to be generated for the Church in this; but rather many inextricable snares are procured for souls from this.

§ 6. 5. Again, since this pertains more to continence than to justice, it ought rather to be called the modesty or continence of public propriety, than the justice of public propriety.

§ 7. Response. It must be said that the stated definition is quite fitting, and it touches upon the genus, the cause, the confirming principle, and the end; and these are evident in order in the definition.

§ 8. To the first objection, therefore, it must be said that there is a certain union there, just as was said above in the question concerning betrothal: and therefore a certain bond is contracted there. And because the Church also loves the propriety of chastity in itself, she readily seizes the occasion of not contracting marriage with some person or persons.

§ 9. To the next it must be said that betrothals are like proximate dispositions to marriage: whence, just as matter having a proximate disposition to a certain form is not united to another unless there first occurs in it a corruption of the prior disposition, so too a betrothed person cannot contract marriage with another unless the betrothal is first broken; and this is not broken without sin or just cause, because it creates a certain bond of union.

§ 1. To what is asked further, it must be said that the Church always has sufficient reason when ordaining the bonds of love and proximity. Leviticus holds an argument for this, where it is said that the nakedness of one's relatives is the nakedness of the other; and therefore it is not to be uncovered. And so here, a betrothed woman is in a certain manner made adjoined to the consanguinity; and therefore no one belonging to that consanguinity can have her.

§ 2. To the next it must be said that it is not an injustice: because it pleases God that human beings be federated and confirmed through whatsoever affinities.

§ 3. To the last it must be said that every work of virtue, insofar as it is ordained by law, is a work of justice, which Aristotle calls legal justice. And because this has strength only from the law of the Church, therefore it is more properly called the justice of public propriety than modesty.

Articulus 8 — Whether This Propinquity Has Any Degrees, And Which They Are

Does this proximity have any degrees, and what are they?

Secondly, it is asked whether this proximity has degrees?

And it seems that it does not: because

§ 1. 1. It is weak. Therefore it is preserved only in one person. Therefore it seems that it does not have degrees in other persons.

§ 2. 2. Again, affinity has degrees accidentally—namely, through consanguinity, as was said before; whereas consanguinity has degrees essentially. Therefore, since the proximity of the justice of public propriety is weaker than both, it seems that it has degrees neither essentially nor accidentally. Therefore it has no degrees at all.

To the contrary of this is the fact that:

§ 3. 1. In whatever degree he is through whom this proximity is contracted in betrothal, in that same degree his betrothed seems to be conjoined. But diverse are the degrees of the blood-relations of the one betrothing; therefore they are adjoined to the betrothed woman in diverse degrees.

§ 4. 2. Again, the degree regards the ones contracting the betrothal rather than the contract itself. But those contracting are of diverse degrees in consanguinity; therefore the betrothed woman is also in diverse degrees of the proximity of the justice of public propriety.

§ 5. Response. It must be said that there are diverse degrees of this proximity, just as there are of affinity: because in whatever degree a blood-relation contracting a betrothal is joined, in that same degree the betrothed woman is joined in the justice of public propriety. And for this reason she is prohibited from contracting marriage with anyone of that consanguinity. Whence certain ancient authors used to say that this proximity was an affinity, although in truth it is not an affinity, but almost similar to it.

§ 6. To the first, therefore, it must be said that if the degree were extended from the adjoined person as adjoined, then the objection would be valid; but this is not true, because it possesses only the degrees of consanguinity, and it never changes that degree, but rather changes the genus of relation, just as affinity does.

§ 7. To the next it must be said that it does not follow: because it is a middle term between affinity and consanguinity, agreeing more with affinity, since it agrees with it in that it does not change the degree, but rather the genus of relation; but it agrees with consanguinity in that, in a certain way, it has degrees. Furthermore, the argument is formally invalid: it does not follow that if one thing is weaker than another, it must be weaker in this determinate respect. But it would be valid conversely; thus the fallacy of the consequent occurs.

Articulus 9 — What The Law Is Concerning This Propinquity

What is the rule of law concerning this proximity?

Thirdly, it is asked: What is the rule of law concerning this proximity?

And it is commonly said that a betrothed person cannot become the spouse of anyone belonging to the consanguinity of the one betrothing her, nor conversely can a betrothed man marry anyone of the consanguinity of his betrothed. But then it is asked:

§ 1. 1. Let us suppose that the betrothal was contracted before seven years of age; for then the betrothal is invalid. Therefore, it does not prevent them from being able to be joined to others of their consanguinity if the betrothal is broken.

§ 2. 2. Again, suppose that a eunuch having come of age contracts a betrothal with a woman having come of age, or one who is perpetually frigid, or perpetually bewitched. It is established that this man has an impediment to marriage, and therefore also to betrothal. Therefore, the betrothed woman is not prevented from being validly joined in matrimony to another of his consanguinity.

§ 3. Response. It must be said that the first case is clearly to be conceded. Concerning the second, they say that from such a contract of the betrothed woman an impediment is generated to contracting with another blood-relation of the betrothed man: because there was not yet an impediment in the act of impeding on account of age; and therefore such a betrothed man is separated from the one having an impediment of this sort.

And through this the solution to all questions is evident.

Articulus 10 — Whether And Which Children Are Legitimate

Whether and which offspring are legitimate?

Next, it is asked concerning what he says, there at C, after the beginning: Where their copulation was a marriage, etc. For it is asked here: Which offspring are legitimate? And three things are asked: namely, which offspring are legitimate? Secondly, how are they legitimized? And thirdly, what value does legitimation hold for them?

§ 1. To the first it is commonly said that a legitimate offspring is one who is born from a legitimate marriage, or from one that is reputed legitimate in the face of the Church.

Against this, however, it is objected: For it seems that every offspring is legitimate: because

§ 2. 1. The law of nature is more excellent and stronger than positive law. But by the law of nature every offspring is legitimate. Therefore, etc.

§ 3. 2. Again, let us suppose that they contract marriage in the face of the Church knowing of an impediment, and they keep silent about this. It seems that on account of this their offspring ought not to be called legitimate, because fraud ought to protect no one.

§ 4. 3. Again, let us suppose that they contract secretly, being ignorant of a matrimonial impediment. It seems that their offspring are legitimate, because ignorance excuses, as is held in Genesis , concerning Abimelech who took the wife of Abraham, and excused himself through ignorance; and the Lord accepted his excuse.

§ 5. To this it must be said that, according to the laws, there is a fourfold status of children: namely, natural and legitimate, procreated from a legitimate wife. Others are merely natural, such as the children of concubines who could be wives if they were married. Others are legitimate only, such as adopted children. Others are neither natural nor legitimate, such as spurious children, namely those born from adultery or incest.

§ 1. Therefore, to the first it must be said that nature is twofold, as was said above: namely, of the genus of human beings, and of the specific difference. And children are not commonly born by the law of nature, except in the first sense; and that is animal in nature. And therefore, with regard to the good of a human being, which is the good of reason, they are not reputed legitimate out of that law.

§ 2. To the next it must be said that in that case they are not legitimate.

§ 3. To the next it must be said that such a contract is against the interdict of the Church; and therefore, if one is ignorant, such is reputed an affected ignorance which does not excuse. Thus their children are reputed illegitimate, because neither is the marriage reputed legitimate. Nor is it similar regarding Abimelech: because in his case there was no ignorance of the law, but of fact, because he believed her to be unmarried who was actually married.

Articulus 11 — What The Mode Of Legitimating Is

What is the mode of legitimizing?

Secondly, it is asked concerning the mode of legitimizing: because

§ 1. 1. It is against reason to repute as legitimate what is illegitimate. Therefore it ought not to be done according to the laws, because according to law nothing is done against reason.

§ 2. 2. Again, in acts, an illegitimate act does not become legitimate: because an illegitimate act is vicious, and a legitimate act is ordered by civic virtue. Therefore it ought not to be done in offspring either.

§ 3. 3. Again, it seems to be against the order of nature that nature would ever make legitimate what is illegitimate by the law of nature, or conversely: since it always reputes monsters as defects (sins), and it decorates and adorns what is well-born. Therefore, in civil matters either, the illegitimate ought not to be legitimized.

§ 4. 4. Again, just as there is motion from one of the contraries into the other, both in natures and in motions, so there is the converse. But a legitimate one never becomes illegitimate; therefore conversely, neither ought an illegitimate one to become legitimate.

To the contrary of this is the fact that: § 5. 1. Both according to the canons and according to the laws, illegitimate persons are legitimized.

§ 6. 2. Again, without any fault of the one born, he himself is born illegitimate. But in those things which happen by necessity (according to the Philosopher and the legislators) they merit innocence and mercy. Therefore, such an error can be mercifully corrected. Therefore they can be legitimized.

§ 7. THIS MUST BE CONCEDED, and it must be said that illegitimate persons are legitimized in six ways: two according to the canons, and four according to the civil laws. The first according to the canons is through subsequent marriage contracted with the mother of the illegitimate children. The second, however, is through special indulgence and dispensation of the Lord Pope. And these two ways are contained in Extra, Qui filii sint legitimi, cap. Conquestus est nobis.

§ 8. The first way according to the civil laws is if a father offers his natural son to the court of the Emperor; for then, on account of the dignity of the court, the son is made legitimate, whether the father has legitimate sons or not. The second is if a dying father names him a legitimate heir in his testament, and he himself later presents the testament to the prince desiring to be made legitimate. The third is if, with no legitimate son existing and the father being deceased, the natural son himself offers himself to the prince. These three ways are held in the Authentic: By what ways are natural sons made legitimate heirs? § Quoniam de suis. The fourth way is if the father names him legitimate in a public testament, or with the reception of three testifying men, and does not append the word "natural": for then he is made legitimate, as in the Authentic, Non liceat, etc.

§ 9. To the first, therefore, it must be said that it is not against reason concerning the substance, that

is, to make what is legitimate from non-legitimate matter for legitimate acts: but it would be true concerning the form, because a contrary cannot be made from a contrary, but a subject can exist under either of the contraries.

§ 1. To the next it must be said that it is not similar: because such an act is inseparably conjoined to perversity, and therefore can in no way be corrected; but it is not so in subjects.

§ 2. To the next it must be said that in the illegitimate things of nature, there is inseparably either a defect or a superfluity in monsters, and therefore they cannot be corrected. And it is not this way in human offspring, because through acts of the will a defect of natural things can be corrected which is called thus because it is not according to positive law.

§ 3. To the next it must be said that legitimate persons are often punished with the punishment of the illegitimate through disinheritance for the sin of their father or for their own; nevertheless, the argument is invalid, because a legislator is readier to grant indulgences than punishments. But in natural motion a subject holds itself equally to both contraries, and therefore it is moved equally from one into the other, and conversely.

Expositio Textus

Exposition of the Text

Next, by reason of what he says, there at D,

Here it must be said that fornication is one thing... it is asked concerning lust and all its species and daughters.

Articulus 12 — What Does Legitimation Profit

Of what value is legitimation?

Thirdly, it is asked: What does legitimation profit?

It seems, nothing: § 1. 1. For God bestows natural goods equally on natural, legitimate, and spurious offspring alike. Therefore, since human justice is modeled on divine justice, it seems that according to human law they ought to succeed equally in temporal goods and be admitted to legitimate acts.

§ 2. 2. Again, one is treated unjustly to whom that is imputed as a punishment in which he had no fault. But no one ever had a fault in their illegitimate birth. Therefore, it ought not to be imputed to anyone as a punishment: therefore all children ought to succeed their father equally.

§ 3. 3. Again, according to the Philosophers Aristotle and Avicenna, a son going out from his father's house is similar to seed going out from his father's body. But I see that in the egress of seed, the substance of the father equally distributes radical moisture to the natural and legitimate son, upon which the formative power subsequently operates to perfect the substance of the conceived. Therefore, also to a son going out from his father's house, whether he be natural or legitimate, an equal part of the resources ought to be distributed, from which he might operate the management of his own house. Therefore they ought to succeed equally, as it seems.

§ 4. To this it must be said that in truth legitimation profits toward two things. One of them is that he can succeed his father in inheritance by legitimate right. The second, moreover, is that he is admitted to legitimate acts. Natural sons, however, can succeed only to a sixth part; but spurious sons and those born of a damnable intercourse succeed in nothing at all. It will be the concern of the Bishop's solicitude, however, to ensure that both parents procure the necessities for such children according to what their means afford.

§ 5. To the first, therefore, it must be said that it is not in voluntary things as it is in natural things: because natural things run on a necessary course, and therefore they do not possess sin: and thus God operates in nature. And this is not drawn as an example in voluntary things; but rather this which he says: I am the Lord your God, mighty, jealous, visiting, etc. for this is understood of temporal punishment. And so does the law which punishes the birth of one, so that such illicit intercourse might be avoided by another.

§ 1. To the next it must be said that this is not done as a punishment of the son, but as a punishment of the father, so that he may be punished in his son: and yet the punishment is good for the son, if he uses it for humility. As the Apostle also says, 1 Corinthians 7:21: Were you called as a slave? Let it not be a concern to you: but even if you can become free, make use of it instead.

§ 2. To the next it must be said, just as was said before, that the case is not similar between natural and voluntary things: and the cause was assigned above.

DISTINCTIO XLII

Divisio Textus

Division of the Text

Now let us add concerning spiritual relation, etc. Here he says four things about spiritual relation, the first of which is: What is spiritual relation? Second, however: Who are the spiritual children, and in how many sacraments is spiritual relation contracted? Third, he touches upon the law which exists concerning such persons. Fourth is an objection and solution which seems opposed to such matters.

Articulus 1 — Whether There Is Any Spiritual Kinship

Is there any spiritual relation?

Three questions arise here around the beginning: namely, is there any spiritual relation?

The second is: What is spiritual proximity? The third is: Does it impede a marriage to be contracted, and dissolve one already contracted?

§ 1. To the first we proceed thus: 1. Either a union of spirit passes over into a union of flesh, or it does not. If it does: then in all those in whom there is a union of spirit, it passes over to a union of flesh. But between all those possessing charity there is a union of spirit; therefore, between all those possessing charity it passes over to a union of flesh. Therefore, no man possessing charity could copulate with a wife possessing charity, which is false. But if it does not pass over, then spiritual proximity does not impede marriage.

§ 2. 2. Again, as Dionysius says in book II of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy: A coparent (a spiritual sponsor is not effected for the child here) but the office of a sponsor is the office of imbuing and instructing. Therefore, one holding the office of imbuing and instructing could not be joined in matrimony to a girl whom he teaches and imbues, which again is false. Therefore it seems that there is no spiritual proximity.

§ 3. 3. Again, what makes flesh proximate to flesh is propagation from one flesh. Therefore, where there is no propagation from a single source, there is no proximity. But one spirit with another is not propagated from a certain single source. Therefore there is no proximity in such things.

§ 4. 4. Again, it is established that if spiritual proximity exists, it emanates from some generation, just as every other proximity does. Therefore it is either the case that this generation is according to existence (esse), or according to well-being (bene esse). If in the first way, it is established that this is false: because in this way carnal parents, not spiritual ones, generate their spiritual son. If in the second way: this is either as regards the well-being of virtue, or of knowledge. Not in the first way: because such a habit (as Augustine says) is given by none save God. If in the second way, then any teacher would have a spiritual proximity to

his male and female disciples, and this again is false. Therefore it seems that there is no spiritual proximity.

§ 5. To the contrary, however, are: 1. All the things which are said in the Letter.

§ 6. 2. Again, Ephesians 3:14-15: I bow my knees to the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, from whom all paternity in heaven and on earth is named. But it is established that paternity in heaven is nothing but spiritual. Therefore, spiritual paternity is something.

§ 7. Response. It must be said that spiritual proximity exists.

§ 8. To the first, therefore, it must be said that the flesh of a human being, especially of a Christian, is not taken merely as the flesh of a human being, but insofar as it is a dwelling-place of the Holy Spirit. And therefore, the bond of the spirit has a place in the flesh; and therefore those who are one are not judged by the Church as divided. But all who are joined in marriage are taken as divided; and therefore it must be said that there is a passing over to a union of flesh—which is or ought to be a dwelling-place of the Holy Spirit—through the union of spirits.

§ 9. To what is objected to the contrary, it must be said that there is a sacramental union, which is by way of generating spiritual existence or the confirmation thereof, and there is the habitual union of charity. The first union does this, but not the second.

§ 10. To the next it must be said that the sponsor, from the office of godparenthood, does not have merely the voice of a teacher, but also of one operating toward the spiritual existence of the one who is regenerated.

§ 11. To the next it must be said that although a spirit does not come from a spirit, etc., nevertheless, according to the reality and character of the sacrament, it can be brought about ministerially by someone; and thus in a certain way a spiritual proximity is generated, because the existence of the spirit according to the good of the sacrament is in a certain way from a spirit.

§ 12. To the next it must be said that it emanates from a spiritual generation; but that is sacramental, as was said before. And the objection only concerns cooperation toward some well-being by way of alteration, and not

through a generating minister, just as generation takes place in the spiritual sacraments.

Articulus 2 — What Spiritual Kinship Or Proximity Is

What is spiritual relation or proximity?

Secondly, it is asked: What is spiritual proximity?

And it is commonly said that spiritual proximity or spiritual relation is a spiritual propinquity arising from the giving of a sacrament, or from holding one for it.

But it seems that this definition is not fitting: because § 1. 1. Through the reception of a sacrament, a person is united to the whole Church, and not specially to one person. Therefore, if

he contracts a propinquity, he contracts it to the whole Church, and not specially to one person.

§ 2. 2. Again, in the sacraments man does not operate, but God alone, as Augustine says. Therefore there is no action of man toward man there. But propinquity to a man is not contracted except from some action of a man. Therefore it seems that in the reception of a sacrament no propinquity to a man is contracted.

§ 3. 3. Again, an operation inducing grace in a person is more efficacious than a ministerial operation in a sacrament externally, which does not induce grace. But a prayer that is made for another, as Gregory says, aids predestination by inducing grace in the one for whom it is prayed. Therefore, it is a more efficacious operation than the ministerial operation in a sacrament; but prayer does not induce propinquity. Therefore neither does the operation in a sacrament.

§ 4. 4. Again, spiritual propinquity is either from the vicinity of the essence of one spirit to another spirit, or from the vicinity of the origin of one spirit to the origin of another spirit, or from the vicinity of the consonance of one spirit with another spirit toward a single end. But it is established that it is not in the first way: because the spirit of one is not more neighboring to one according to essence than to another. Nor even in the second way: because the origin of spirit is God, who relates Himself in one way to all spirits. Nor even in the third way: because coparents frequently discord, and one wills one thing, and the other wills another, and one wills good, and the other evil. Therefore it seems that there is no spiritual propinquity between them.

§ 5. 5. Again, those things which are natural occur frequently, as the Philosopher says. Whence, since carnal propinquity is natural, it frequently happens that a son imitates his father. Hence the poet: A son is often accustomed to be similar to his father. But it is established that spiritual grace is more efficacious than nature. Therefore it seems that if there is a spiritual propinquity between some persons, it ought to be manifested at least frequently in spiritual imitation. But none of these things is seen. Therefore there seems to be no spiritual propinquity from the giving of a sacrament.

§ 6. 6. Furthermore, an objection is raised concerning what is said, Or from holding one for it. For the one giving and the one holding operate equivocally toward the perception of the sacrament. Therefore, an equivocal spiritual propinquity is contracted between them and the one receiving the sacrament. Therefore it is badly defined.

§ 7. And it further follows that a baptizer is called the spiritual relative of a child in one sense, and the one holding him up from baptism in another sense: just as urine is called healthy in one sense, and an animal is called healthy in another.

§ 8. Response. It must be said that spiritual relation is fittingly defined by the above definition: because the genus or form is posited there, and the cause on account of which one contracts it acts as the specific difference. For it is a definition stating what a thing is and why it is, as is easily evident to one considering it.

§ 9. To what is objected first, therefore, it must be said that a union is contracted in two ways.

namely by conformity of grace, and by the operation of that conformity. And by conformity of grace, the one receiving the sacrament contracts a union to the whole Church: and this does not make proximity, but likeness. However, by the operation directed to the existence of that grace, he has proximity to the one giving him the sacrament and holding him in it when he perceives the sacrament: and this proximity is as it were of propagated grace: just as carnal kinship is of propagated flesh, although differently in one case and the other: and therefore this induces spiritual proximity.

§ 2. To the other it must be said that God alone operates as the efficient cause, but nevertheless a human being also operates toward grace: just as also in the generation of a human being, a human being does not generate the soul, but by generating he operates toward the soul: and therefore he is made by birth naturally proximate, and similarly there he is made spiritually proximate.

§ 3. To the other it must be said that a falsehood is supposed in the first proposition: because operation in a sacrament is never impeded except per accidens, namely if the one who receives the sacrament is feigning: and even then he is not frustrated from the reception of the sacrament: and therefore when the feigning recedes, it is not restored to him. But a prayer for another for obtaining grace is often impeded. If however no force is made on this point [i.e., if one does not press this point], then it must be said that the operation in a sacrament and through prayer are dissimilar: because the operation in a sacrament is as it were by propagating spiritually in ministry, but the operation of prayer is as it were inductive of another by entreaties: but no operation makes proximity, except that which is a propagation, or joined to propagation.

§ 4. To the other it must be said that a union making proximity is not taken in this way, and does not happen by way of such agreement: but rather just as a principle and what is principled agree, because what is principled has its being from the principle: and so it is here, except that they are not an effective principle, but as it were an instrumental and ministerially operating one: and such a mode of derivation is sometimes followed by agreement, sometimes not: because it is possible for what is principled to be altered after separation from the principle: hence not always is what is drawn forth bodily similar in flesh to the one deriving it: but unless there were alterations, it would be similar. So it is here: because he has the substance of sacramental grace from those very ones operating in ministry, and he would be similar, unless on both sides alterations of affections made a dissimilarity: hence this similarity would be in habit, if it were perfected and manifested in the conformity of wills and a single end.

§ 5. To the other it must be said that the alteration of affections on either side impedes conformity, not in the efficacy of grace.

§ 6. To that which is further objected, it must be said that all operations in the reception of the sacraments agree in one common thing, namely that they operate in ministry: and as to this there is a single reason of spiritual kinship.

Articulus 3 — Whether Spiritual Proximity Impedes The Contracting Of Marriage

Does spiritual proximity impede the contracting of marriage?

§ 7. Thirdly it is asked, Does it impede the contracting of marriage and dissolve a contracted one?

§ 8. Now it seems that it does not: because 1. Where there are more bonds of friendship and fellowship, there is greater indivisibility of life: but spiritual kinship unites spirits, and marriage binds bodies: therefore in such a marriage there would be greater indivisibility: therefore this is better than otherwise, and sorts a better outcome, and they remain together more delightfully: therefore it ought not to impede marriage.

§ 9. 2. Also, Marriage consists in both unions, namely of spirits and of bodies: therefore what cooperates toward the union of spirits, promotes marriage: but spiritual kinship promotes toward the union of spirits: therefore it promotes marriage: therefore it ought not to be posited as an impediment.

§ 10. 3. Also, All the goods of marriage between such persons are preserved, namely faith, offspring, sacrament: therefore it seems that it does not impede, but expedites.

§ 11. ON THE CONTRARY to this are all the things that are said in the Text.

§ 12. Response. It must be said that it impedes the contracting of marriage, and dissolves a contracted one, just as the Text says: because it does not please God that the spiritual union which is between such persons be reputed as non-union: for those who are united in marriage are reputed as distant: and looking to this, the Church established that that impediment have force, especially since civil law also on account of adoption forbids coming together in marriage.

§ 13. Furthermore, This is against the order of nature, that a shoot that ascends from some root should again be united to the root to propagate another: but spiritual propagation is no less worthy than carnal: and therefore the Church established both kinships to be an impediment.

§ 14. To the first therefore it must be said that this argument is not valid: because if this were attended to in marriage, then a son ought to take his mother, which is absurd: but in marriage what is attended to is the conjunction of those who are distant, so that a fleeing degree may again be reunited, and the covenant of the human race may remain, and civil urbanity in such persons thus conjoined.

§ 15. And through this the solution to the following is also evident.

§ 16. To the other it must be said that this suffices, but it is necessary that they be legitimate persons for contracting, as has often been held above.

Articulus 4 — How Many Species Of Spiritual Kinship There Are

How many are the species of spiritual kinship?

§ 17. Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, A, at the end: "There is also between the carnal and spiritual children of the same man."

§ 18. And it is asked here, How many are the species of spiritual kinship?

§ 19. Now it seems that there are only two: because 1. He makes mention of these only in the Text, namely between the one receiving and the one received in baptism, and between the carnal and spiritual children of the one receiving.

§ 20. 2. Now it seems that there is only one: because those not communicating in spirit, do not communicate that communication even in consequence: but a carnal father receiving, and his carnal son, do not communicate in spirit as regards the ministerial operation in the sacrament, when the carnal father receives a spiritual son: therefore they do not communicate that spiritual operation even in consequence, which is spiritual kinship: therefore there is no kinship between carnal and spiritual children.

§ 21. 3. Also, If it is said that there is a spiritual kinship between them: it is certain that it would not be according to one degree, but two, or the trunk and a degree: but this has never been heard from the Saints, that they determine degrees in such kinship: therefore it seems that there is no spiritual kinship between carnal and spiritual children.

§ 22. 4. FURTHERMORE, It seems that there are three, namely compaternity, paternity, and spiritual fraternity: because this is commonly said by all who know: and also these are gathered from the Text.

§ 23. 5. Also, By the same reason by which the son of a spiritual father contracts fraternity, the father of a spiritual son also contracts compaternity: therefore necessarily there will be three.

§ 24. 6. FURTHERMORE, It seems that there are four: because the spiritual vicinity to a spiritual one is not less than the carnal to a spiritual one, but greater: but the carnal children of a spiritual father contract spiritual kinship with a spiritual son: therefore much more do the spiritual children of the same man have spiritual kinship with all the spiritual ones: therefore all the spiritual children of the same man are spiritual brothers among themselves: but this genus is not determined in the Text: therefore there are four species of spiritual kinship.

§ 25. 7. Also, The propagation of flesh from one makes carnal kinship among the propagated: but the propagation of spirit from one is better: therefore the propagation of spirit from one makes spiritual kinship among all those spiritually propagated: therefore as before, there seem to be four species of spiritual kinship.

§ 26. Solution. It must be said that there is only a threefold species of spiritual kinship, namely paternity, compaternity, and confraternity.

§ 27. Paternity is contracted in two ways, namely directly, and indirectly. Directly through a proper act, which is done in giving the sacrament, or holding the one receiving it. Indirectly,

however, when it is contracted not by a proper act, but by the act of that one with whom one is one flesh, just as when a husband receives someone, this reception makes him a spiritual father directly: and because a husband and wife after they are made one flesh, communicate their actions to each other, therefore what the husband does directly, passes indirectly to the wife, and she too is made a spiritual mother. But I say, "after they are made one flesh": because if the husband before he was the husband of the wife, namely before the contract of marriage, or after the contract before carnal copulation, were to receive someone in a sacrament, it would not pass to the wife: and therefore she would not be made a spiritual mother. Just as I have said, however, that because the husband directly and the wife indirectly are made spiritual parents, so it is conversely when the woman directly, and the man indirectly.

§ 28. But compaternity is contracted between the carnal father and the spiritual one, and between the carnal mother and the spiritual one: hence the verse:

"One will always be the spiritual of the coparents, The other the carnal: nor does such a rule fail."

§ 29. And it is contracted in two ways, namely directly and indirectly, just as spiritual paternity also: because after a man and a woman are made one flesh, they communicate their children to each other.

§ 30. But confraternity is not contracted, except between the boy and girl, who is received or held in the sacrament, and the carnal children of the one receiving, whether they are born before or after: and it does not pass to the brothers or sisters of the one who receives the sacrament, whether they are born before, or born after: for all those, if no other impediment stands in the way, can licitly be joined to the brothers and sisters of the one to whom the sacrament is given, or who is held in the sacrament, as will be said below in the Text.

§ 31. THESE THINGS BEING HELD, one must respond to the objections, saying to the first, that for contracting kinship it is not necessary to communicate in the act mediating which it is contracted. And there is an instance [i.e., a counter-example]: because a first son does not communicate with the father in the generation of a second: and yet because the second is derived from the same one from whom the first took his origin, therefore the second is made over [i.e., related to] the first. Similarly I do not communicate with my brother in the act of generation: and yet his son is made related to me in the second degree through the relation of me and my brother to the trunk from whence we descend. Similarly also it is here in the proposed case: because through relation from the same one from whom the former descend carnally, and the latter spiritually, they are made spiritual brothers.

§ 32. To the other it must be said that degrees in this kinship are not distinguished for this reason, that it never is distant except in the first degree, which is between brothers: for between the trunk and the first degree there is no distance of degree. But a coparent has no distance of degree either to the father or to the boy received in the sacrament: because to the carnal father he stands as the trunk, and to the boy as to that which emanates immediately from the trunk: but the boy to the carnal or spiritual children of the father stands as brothers who are in the first degree, nor is it ever derived further.

§ 33. To the two following it must be conceded outright.

§ 34. To that which is further concluded, that there are four species, it must be said to the first that it is well conceded that spiritual kinship is greater as to dignity than carnal, but as to dependence upon one it is not so: hence in a kinship propagated to another, it is always necessary that carnal kinship be present, as is evident when spiritual [kinship] is propagated to the carnal children of the one receiving in the sacrament, and to the parents of the one received: and this is for this reason, because spirit cannot be propagated from spirit, but rather flesh from flesh. Hence since between the spiritual children of the one giving the sacrament or holding [the child] in it, and the one held in the sacrament, there is no conjunction of the propagation of flesh, there will be no spiritual kinship between them. For it is certain that direct [kinship] is not present: and indirect cannot be without a carnal dependence: and thus this kinship does not pass to spiritual children.

§ 35. To the other it must be said that through the same the solution is evident.

Articulus 5 — By The Mediation Of Which Sacraments This Spiritual Kinship Is Contracted

By means of which sacraments is this spiritual kinship contracted?

By means of which sacraments is this spiritual kinship contracted?

§ 36. Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, B, "Spiritual children, etc."

§ 37. And it is asked here, By means of which sacraments is this spiritual kinship contracted?

§ 38. Now it seems that 1. Through the preaching of the Gospel: because the Apostle says, I Corinthians 4:15: "In Christ Jesus through the Gospel I have begotten you." And, to the Galatians 4:19: "My little children, of whom I am in labor again, until Christ be formed in you." But in spiritual generation spiritual kinship is contracted. Therefore a preacher has spiritual kinship with those to whom he has preached.

§ 39. 2. Furthermore, It seems that in penance: because Pope Symmachus says in the Text: "All whom we receive in penance, etc."

§ 40. Also, In a letter of Pope Sylvester it is written: "All whom we receive in penance, etc."

§ 41. 3. Also, From the Text it is held that in catechism, because this is said here in the Text.

§ 42. Also, 30, quaest. 1, more things are held concerning this.

§ 43. Also, Catechism by instructing generates to faith: therefore it causes spiritual kinship to be contracted.

§ 44. 4. Now it seems that in all the sacraments: because in any sacrament whatsoever the minister operates toward the spiritual generation of the one receiving the sacrament: but such an operation causes such a spiritual kinship to be contracted: therefore anyone operating toward the reception of whatever sacrament contracts spiritual kinship with the recipient.

§ 45. Response. It must be said that concerning this there have been various opinions among different people. For some have said that such kinship is contracted in all the sacramentals of baptism, namely catechization, exorcization, the immixture of salt, and the like. But because it relies on no reason, since baptism is the first sacrament and the door of the sacraments, and nothing of the antecedents regenerates a human being, others say otherwise, namely that three sacraments alone make spiritual kinship, namely catechism, baptism, and confirmation: but these are the Decretists, because they call catechism a sacrament, which in no way is true, because before baptism there is no sacrament: and if a Saint calls it a sacrament, sacrament is posited for a sacramental.

§ 46. Therefore it must be said that only two sacraments make spiritual kinship, namely baptism and confirmation. And the reason for this can be elicited from what was noted above concerning those sacraments: because one imprints a character distinguishing one to faith into the lot of the Lord: and the second the strength of the same character; and therefore they make generation and the completion of the one generated spiritually, and therefore they make spiritual kinship.

§ 47. But if it is asked concerning Orders, since it imprints a character, why does it not make [it]? It must be said that there are two reasons why it itself does not make [it]. One is, because it does not imprint the character of faith, but rather of excellence and prelacy: and that does not regenerate. The other is, because it is not given except to men: and therefore it can procreate no impediment to marriage, since no one receives another in that sacrament itself.

§ 48. But concerning the Eucharist and extreme unction it is self-evident, that they imprint no character, nor can they procreate any impediment to marriage from the mode of their reception.

§ 49. But to the first it must be said that a word, as Aristotle intends, has only a persuasive virtue; and therefore it does not regenerate , but only disposes toward this: but in a sacramental operation there is grace from the very work worked (ex ipso opere operato).

§ 50. Through this also the solution to the following is evident.

§ 51. To the other it must be said that penance draws its strength more from the devotion of the penitent, than of the priest: and therefore it does not imprint a character. And what is said in the Text, it must be said that they ought not to contract: but nevertheless if they have contracted, the marriage will stand.

§ 52. To the other it must be said that catechism is not completed except in baptism, and therefore it does not impede except existing with baptism. And through this the solution of the Text is evident.

§ 53. Nevertheless the Decretists say otherwise thus, that baptism and confirmation impede and dissolve, but the kinship which is from catechism is so exiguous and weak, that it scarcely impedes contracting, and does not dissolve a contracted one. But the first solution is truer: because it has reason, and saves the Text.

Articulus 6 — Which Godmothers And Which Godfathers Can Marry

Which godmothers and godfathers can contract?

§ 54. Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, B, after the beginning: "But that a godfather and godmother cannot be joined to each other, etc."

§ 55. For it seems false: 1. For let it be that some woman is the godmother of some woman from her son, or from that one's: and afterwards she contracts with a man having nothing in common with either of them: afterwards his wife dies, and he takes her whose godmother she herself was. Laws say that the marriage stands, and yet this man had two godmothers.

§ 56. 2. Also, Let it be that someone takes a pregnant wife from another man: and afterwards she gives birth after she has been known by her second husband, and another woman receives that boy in the sacrament. Laws say that, his [wife] having died, he can marry the godmother of her who thus was made a godmother. And the same is if she gave birth after consent about the present, and before carnal copulation.

§ 57. Response. It must be said that the laws determine well and reasonably: because spouses do not communicate their acts to each other except in that in which they are one flesh, and after they are, as was said concerning indirect compaternity. And the truth of this question is in these verses:

"She who lifted from the font my child or the child of her who is mine, This my godmother cannot become my wife. If any woman lifted from the font a child of my wife not from me, I shall not be forbidden to have her after the fates of my [wife]."

Articulus 7 — What Adoption Is

What is adoption?

§ 58. Next it is asked concerning what he says, there, D, "But that spiritual or adoptive children, etc."

§ 59. And here a question is posited concerning spiritual kinship. And because adoption falls into its definition, therefore let us ask six things concerning adoption. The first is, What is adoption? The second, What and how many are the species of adoption? The third, Who can adopt? The fourth, Who can be adopted? The fifth, What is the effect of adoption? The sixth, How many and what are the species of the adopted having kinship among themselves?

§ 60. But around the legal kinship itself we will ask two things, namely what it is, and how it impedes marriage, and how not?

§ 61. And thus there are eight things in total which are asked concerning this.

§ 62. To the first of these it is proceeded thus: It is commonly said that adoption is the legitimate assumption of an extraneous person into a son or grandson, or so on.

§ 63. But it seems that it is not always of an extraneous person: because 1. A non-extraneous person has greater right in the inheritance: therefore that one ought rather to be adopted.

§ 64. 2. Also, Proximity of nature makes degrees in the order of charity: therefore much more in the order of adoption: therefore it seems that a non-extraneous person ought more to be adopted, than an extraneous one.

§ 65. 3. Also, Some right in the inheritance as to succession is given to proximates: therefore without their injury an extraneous person cannot be introduced into the inheritance in whole or in part: therefore adoption is not always of an extraneous person.

§ 66. FURTHERMORE it is asked, Why does he say, "Into a son, or grandson"?

§ 67. 1. Because it is certain that the adopted does not differ by degree from the adopter: therefore anyone is adopted into a son, and no one into a grandson.

§ 68. 2. Also, It is one adoption making a son from an extraneous person who is maximally distant: therefore since from the maximally distant there is made by adoption nothing distant, for the reason that between a father and son there is no distance, it seems that there are no degrees in it: therefore nothing is said [when it is said], "Into a son, or grandson, or so on."

§ 69. Response. To this it must be said that adoption was introduced for the solace of lost chil-
dren. And because it happens that grandsons and great-grandsons and so on are also lost, therefore for their solace also the adoption of grandsons and so on was introduced.

§ 70. And through this the solution to the last two brought in is evident.

§ 71. But to the first it must be said that adoption makes a successor from one not conjoined by the right of succession: and therefore it is necessary that it be an extraneous person, because otherwise he would have some right, namely of consanguinity, in the inheritance to be perceived.

§ 72. To the other it must be said that it is not similar: because charity perfects nature, and therefore it conducts any degree to the proper effect of charity: but adoption was introduced into solace as it were of nature in that part by which it has to be perpetuated, lest the name of someone from his posterity be deleted: and therefore it is not founded upon successors, but extraneous persons.

§ 73. To the other it must be said that a husband as long as he is in the power of his own goods, with the consent of his wife and the prince, can ordain concerning his goods what he has willed: and therefore proximates cannot impede adoption.

Articulus 8 — How Many Species Of Adoption There Are

How many are the species of adoption?

§ 74. Secondly it is asked, What and how many are the species of adoption?

§ 75. And it is commonly said that they are two, namely arrogation, and simple adoption. But arrogation is adoption made by the authority of the prince concerning him who is of his own right (sui juris), either by the death of the natural father, or by emancipation by which he passes into the power of the adopter. But simple adoption is adoption made by the authority

of a magistrate concerning him who is not of his own right, nor does he pass into the power of the adopter. Hence the verse:

"I arrogate him who is his own, and it is necessary that he be mine. I adopt the 'his' of a father, and he does not cease to be the father's."

§ 76. But against this it is objected: because 1. Arrogation seems to be against the order of nature: because nature never calls back into the imperfect that which it perfects in being and capability (posse): therefore neither ought the civil [order] to do this: but one who is his own is perfect in his own governance, but one who is not his own is imperfect: therefore from his own order of right he can be made not his own: therefore arrogation through which this happens is against the order of natural right.

§ 77. 2. Similarly it is objected concerning simple adoption: for every son is his father's: therefore also an adopted son is his adopting father's: therefore when he is adopted, he himself ceases to be his natural father's, and begins to be the adopter's: and this is contrary to what the induced definition says here.

§ 78. 3. Furthermore, It seems that there are more species of adoption: because one who is not his own can by the consent of the natural father pass into the 'his own' of the adopter: and this species is not touched upon here: therefore the species are insufficiently assigned.

§ 79. FURTHERMORE it is asked, Whether adoption is said univocally of those two species?

§ 80. And it seems that it is not: because 1. One retains the name of the genus, for the reason that it adds nothing to the genus: but the other adds something: but such things never participate their genus univocally: therefore neither do these.

§ 81. 2. Also, When simple adoption is said, it seems to be intimated by simplicity that it has nothing common except a simple nature: but arrogation has more: therefore it is not said univocally of them.

§ 82. On the contrary is, that 1. In both a son is made from a non-son: but this is the reason of adoption: therefore by one reason it is said of both species of adoption.

§ 83. 2. Also, They do not differ except materially, because being emancipated, or being a son-in-power (filiusfamilias), are accidental differences: but a difference by accident is matter; therefore these two species are material, as it seems.

§ 84. Response. It must be said that the definitions introduced are very good, and in them are contained the agreements and differences of the two species of adoption: and anyone can plainly see this.

§ 85. Therefore it must be said to the first, that one and the same thing cannot be perfect and imperfect according to the same respect according to nature, nor even according to civil matters: but in nature indeed the adopted is perfect, but in the right of succeeding in other goods he is imperfect: and as to this he passes into the power of the adopting father.

§ 86. To the other it must be said that the 'his own' of a carnal father can be the 'his own' adopted of an adopting father, because he cannot be in the power of two, and therefore he does not pass into the power of the adopter.

§ 87. To the other it must be said that there are not more. But to the objection it must be said that when this does not happen, then the natural father emancipates him from his power: and then it is the species which is called arrogation.

§ 88. To the other it must be said that just as the two prior reasons prove, adoption is said by prior and posterior of arrogation and simple adoption.

§ 89. To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that the reason of the genus is in both species: but in one nothing is added to it, namely in simple adoption: but in the other a difference is added: and therefore the latter more strongly participates the being of adoption, than the other.

§ 90. To the other it must be said that in natural things they are accidents: nevertheless according as civil rights fall upon them, they are made substantial differences: and therefore civilly speaking they are species of adoption.

Articulus 9 — Who Can Adopt

Who can adopt?

§ 91. Thirdly it is asked, Who can adopt?

§ 92. And it is commonly said that three things are required for someone to be able to adopt, namely, that he be 'his own', that is, existing in his own right (sui juris), and capable of generating, and having an age beyond twenty years. And concerning the first indeed there is no doubt, but concerning the second.

§ 93. 1. For if adoption is in solace of children: and one not capable of generating is more destitute from the impossibility of offspring, than one capable of generating, it seems that adoption ought more to be conceded to one not capable of generating, than to one capable of generating.

§ 94. 2. Also, In children is the succession of the nature of the father and of inheritance: but both these are deprived from him who cannot generate: therefore to that one more than to others it ought to be conceded that he adopt.

§ 95. 3. FURTHERMORE, It is asked concerning the third member, namely having an age beyond twenty years.

§ 96. Now it seems that in the eighteenth year adoption ought to be done: because then he can generate naturally therefore also adopt.

§ 97. 4. Also, Being able to adopt follows upon being able to generate: therefore also time to time: but the time of generation is in the fourteenth year: therefore also the time of adoption.

§ 98. Furthermore it is asked, Whether a woman can adopt?

§ 99. It seems that she can: because a woman is saddened in the desolation of children: but adoption is conceded to such in solace: therefore also to a woman it ought to be conceded.

§ 100. BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. A woman is never perfectly of her own right, but in the power of her husband: therefore she can never adopt.

§ 101. 2. Also, She never generates actively, but only passively: therefore she cannot adopt either, unless perhaps by helping her husband.

§ 102. Response. It must be said that those three things which are posited, are required: hence a slave who is not his own cannot adopt, nor one existing in the power of tutors, nor a son-in-power.

§ 103. To the first therefore it must be said that the extreme kind of unhappiness (as Boethius intends) is to have once been happy: and therefore one who is incapable of generating is not rendered destitute just as he who is bereft of some son, or does not have them: and therefore it is conceded to the latter [those bereft] what is not to the former, because in the former the very impossibility diminishes the desire for children.

§ 104. To the other it must be said that although both are deprived in him who cannot generate, nevertheless there is no anxiety of desire, because anxious desire is not except for a possible thing.

§ 105. To the other it must be said that although in the fourteenth year generation is possible, it is not however perfect and stable, but rather in the twenty-first year, as the Philosophers say.

§ 106. To the other it must be said that it can plainly be conceded concerning perfect and stable offspring, in which the succession of inheritance and nature can stand.

§ 107. To that which is further asked, it must be said that a woman cannot adopt, except in one case, namely, by a rescript of the prince and in solace of lost children.

§ 108. To that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that those two reasons sufficiently prove that in herself a woman is not sufficient, but there is a supplement from the rescript and dispensation of the prince.

Articulus 10 — Whether Anyone Whatsoever Can Be Adopted

Can anyone be adopted?

§ 109. Fourthly it is asked, Who can be adopted?

§ 110. And it is commonly said that a male and a female minor in age than the adopter, by as much as [a child] could be his natural son.

§ 111. Now it seems that this is nothing because, 1. As was said, someone can adopt when he is major than twenty years: but perfect adoption is arrogation: therefore then he can arrogate: but no one can be arrogated, except one who is of his own right: therefore then he can arrogate him who is of his own right: but that one is twenty-five or more years according

to the laws: therefore he who is twenty years can adopt him who is twenty-five or more years: therefore a minor in age can adopt a major in age.

§ 112. 2. Also, It seems that a female cannot be adopted: because adoption is given in solace of children, or to him who has few or no children: but, as the Philosopher says, a female is a misbegotten male, not finally intended by nature: therefore the solace of posterity is not in a female: therefore she cannot be adopted, as it seems.

§ 113. Response. It must be said that the aforesaid persons can be adopted in the aforesaid mode.

§ 114. But to the first objection it must be said that no one except a major in age can adopt: hence one who is twenty-one years old cannot arrogate someone major in age: and if he arrogates someone, it is necessary that it be a boy whose father, already defunct, according to custom has made him to be his own, when he was of the years ...

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thirteen or fourteen: because then by custom they are said to be of their own right, whose father has died.

To the other it must be said that although a female is not intended by a particular nature, she is nevertheless intended by universal nature: and therefore adoption can be made of her.

Articulus 11 — What The Effect Of Adoption Is

What is the effect of adoption?

Fifthly, it is asked: What is the effect of adoption?

And it seems that the effect is different in simple adoption and adrogation: because one simply adopted does not succeed the adopting father, unless insofar as he determines, or even in nothing: but one adrogated succeeds an intestate [father] in all things, just like a natural son: but if the adoptive father emancipates him, he is bound to assign him a fourth part of all his goods. Similarly, if he dies making a will, he is bound to leave him a fourth part: and this is because an adrogated person yields into the power of the adrogator with his non-emancipated sons and grandsons, but not one adopted by simple adoption.

But against this it is objected for the first part: because § 1. Simple adoption ought to be worth something to the adopted: therefore by reason of adoption he is bound to leave him something.

§ 2. Also, as the Apostle says, 2 Corinthians 12:14, parents ought to lay up treasure for their children: but this adoptive father is a father: therefore he is bound to lay up treasure for the adopted son: therefore he is bound to leave him something of his goods.

§ 3. Furthermore, it is asked by reason of the other part: because it seems unjust that an adrogated person succeeds an intestate in all things. For there is a great difference between a natural and legitimate son, and one adopted by adrogation: but a natural and legitimate son

has no more, except that he succeeds in all things from an intestate: therefore one adopted by adrogation has less: therefore it seems that he ought not to succeed in all things.

§ 4. Also there is a question, why a fourth is given to him if he is emancipated or the adopting father dies making a will?

Response. It must be said to the first, that simple adoption has the least that can be of the being and rationale of adoption, and it is not contracted under the genus of adoption in common by a specific difference, but by a mode, as was said before: and therefore it is rather a disposition to perfect adoption than perfect adoption: and therefore the adopting father is not perfectly obligated to him, because he never passed into his power, so that he might make him as his own. But it is true that it is equity and civility that he leave something to him: and he has this from the effect of adoption.

To the other it must be said, that he is not yet a father perfectly, since this one is not his own: and therefore by strict law he is not bound to lay up treasure for him.

To the other it must be said, that the adopted has from good pleasure what the other has from nature: for nothing prevents good pleasure from confirming for someone in the right of succession, what another has from the fact that he was born to it: and the latter somehow has it by a stronger right, because a natural one, than the former: and this is the difference between natural and adoptive filiation in this case.

To the last it must be said, that a fourth is given to him in common: because one [fourth] yields to himself, and one to his wife, and one to blood relations or a natural son, and then a fourth remains which is given to the adrogated. And because this division of goods is more common and general, therefore the law places in a fourth the things that are to be given to the adrogated.

Articulus 12 — How Many Are The Species Of Adopted Persons

How many species of adopted persons are there?

How many species of adopted persons are there?

§ 64. Sixthly it is asked, What and how many are the species of adopted persons?

§ 65. And it seems that there are three, namely of descendants, of collaterals, and of those legally joined. The species of descendants is considered between the adopter and the adopted as son or grandson, and so forth. That of those coming collaterally is considered between a natural son and an adopted daughter, or conversely between a natural daughter and an adopted son. But legal affinity is said to be considered between the wife of the adopter and the adopted, or conversely between the wife of the adopted son or grandson and the adopting father.

§ 66. But against this it is objected thus: 1. The propinquity of descendants cannot be except through the affection of the adopter and the adopted: but these are not to be derived to the flesh: therefore it seems that there is no propinquity of the flesh between them.

§ 67. 2. Likewise, Just as there is a line of descendants, so also there is one of ascendants: therefore it seems that there ought to be more of one line than is determined.

§ 68. 3. Likewise, There seems to be no cognation between those coming collaterally: because it is certain that there is no affinity of the flesh there: similarly children do not communicate with parents in the acts of the soul and exterior acts: therefore from the fact that someone adopts someone, no propinquity is contracted between the adopted and the son of the adopter.

§ 69. 4. Furthermore it is objected concerning the third: because a man and woman are not one, except in those things which pertain to matrimony: but adoption is not of those: therefore it seems that no propinquity is contracted from the fact that someone is adopted, between the adopted and the wife of the adopter, or conversely.

§ 70. Furthermore it is asked, whether this affinity passes further into the father, and mother, and brothers, and sisters, and so forth, of the adopter and the adopted? If so: then there will be degrees in adoption just as in generation, which seems inconvenient, since adoption is much less than carnal consanguinity. But if it is said that it does not, that seems inconvenient, since it passes to the wife by mode of affinity, and not to cognates, because cognation is greater than affinity.

§ 71. Response. It must be said that there are three lines of adoption, as was said, and sufficiently explained at the beginning.

§ 72. Therefore to that which is first objected, it seems it must be said, that adoption is on account of the succession of the flesh, and therefore it looks to the posterity of the flesh, and posits propinquity to it: but if it were only in the spirit, then what is objected could be valid.

§ 73. To the next it must be said, that adoption does not exit the house of the adopter and the adopted, as will be said below: and therefore in those who constitute the house, such as the wife of the adopter or the adopted, it contracts a perpetual propinquity. But those coming collaterally, because they are only for a time in the house, do not have anything but a temporal cognation, namely as long as the adopted and natural son remain in the house of the adopter: and therefore it does not ascend.

§ 74. To the next it must be said, that cognation is as long as they are indistinct from the adopting father: because then they are in a certain way one, and communicate with him in acts: because they do not have their own acts, but existing in his house they are moved at his nod.

§ 75. To the next it must be said, that just as it is in spiritual cognation, that the man and woman communicate their acts to each other after they have been made one flesh, so it is in adoption, both active and passive. Hence it is

false that it is only in those things which are of matrimony that the man and woman communicate their acts to each other, but they communicate them to each other also in other things: however adoption in a certain way looks to matrimony, because the adoption of children in a certain way pertains to the good of offspring.

§ 76. To the last the solution is clear through the things said before, because it does not pass further: and the reason for that has already been said before.

§ 77.

Articulus 13 — What Legal Kinship Is

What is legal cognation?

§ 78. Seventhly it is asked, What is legal cognation?

§ 79. And they say that legal cognation is a certain proximity proceeding from adoption.

§ 80. But it seems that this definition is bad: because 1. Every proximity by accident is rooted in some per se proximity, just as an accidental cause is reduced to a per se one, as the Philosophers say: but this is not rooted in any per se proximity: therefore it is not a proximity.

§ 81. 2. Besides, why does it say "a certain" (quaedam)? For a particular sign does not define, but consignifies when it is partitioned: therefore it ought not to be posited in a definition.

§ 82. 3. Likewise, A particular sign wishes to stand for a part: but a definition ought to contain essential parts only: therefore it is badly posited in the definition.

§ 83. But the other things which could be objected concerning the following part have already been objected in the preceding problem.

§ 84. Response. It must be said that that propinquity is rooted in a per se propinquity, which is natural in collaterals, and affinity in legal affinity, also in the line of descendants is founded on the carnal, not which is, but it was introduced as a solace for it on account of the privation or paucity of natural children: and such a reduction suffices in positive things.

§ 85. And through this the solution to the first is clear.

§ 86. To the next it must be said, that it is not a definition, but a description: or let it be said that the word quaedam does not compel the term to stand for an individual part, but for a species taken under this common thing which is proximity: and this which is added, "proceeding from adoption," states the cause which supposes the what, and states the why.

§ 87. And through this the solution to the following is also clear.

§ 88.

Articulus 14 — How Legal Kinship Impedes Marriage

How does legal cognation impede matrimony?

§ 89. Eighthly it is asked, How does it impede matrimony?

§ 90. And it is commonly said that in the first and third line the impediment is perpetual: but in the middle one, which is of those coming from the side, it does not impede except as long as the natural son and the adopted daughter or niece are in the power of the natural and adopting father: for when this is dissolved by death or emancipation, the impediment is also dissolved.

§ 91. Similarly only he who is adopted and those who are annexed to him, as son, and wife, and niece, and so forth, are made cognates of those who are in the power of the adopter, and not of others.

§ 92. But it seems that this right is irrational: because 1. Since God does not accept these persons, it seems that the Church ought not to approve these laws.

§ 93. 2. Likewise, the greater the covenant, the firmer the friendship: but the covenant would be greater

if the adopted son were to marry the natural daughter, than that it should not be lawful for him to marry her: therefore it seems that this ought to be established for the sake of the firmness of friendship.

§ 94. Solution. It must be said that the laws will it thus, as was said, and the canons confirm it.

§ 95. Therefore to the first which is to the contrary, it must be said that God by inspiration conceded many things to the Church to be promulgated for a time, which He Himself did not promulgate: because the state of the primitive Church could not suffer such things, since at that time persons were joined according to diverse rites, and God willed all to be gathered into one Church, and to make the approach to the faith difficult for no one. But afterwards many persons were prohibited, when the faith was confirmed, as much in the degrees of consanguinity as of affinity and of spiritual and legal cognation.

§ 96. To the next it must be said, that any covenant with another through something proper has a contrariety, such as to be a son and to be joined to the daughter: because no one is joined to the daughter except a stranger: and so is this impediment. And according to the order of nature we see that things proceeding from one proceed by separating themselves, but distant things returning to one proceed by conjoining themselves: and the laws imitate this order, because the natural son and the adopted daughter proceed as it were from one: and therefore they ought to go separating: and it is thus also in the other two lines.

§ 97.

Articulus 15 — Whether Those Begotten Before Or After Co-Parenthood Are Illegitimate, Or Only Those In Co-Parenthood

Are those born before compaternity or after illegitimate, or only in compaternity?

Whether those born before or after spiritual kinship are illegitimate, or only in spiritual kinship?

Then it is asked concerning what is said there, E, "However, some wish to understand this," etc.

For it is asked, What is true concerning these opinions?

For it seems that all born before and after are illegitimate for contracting: because

1. They are one flesh from whom they descended: therefore, just as one is illegitimate, so also the other.
2. But it seems that only those born later: because before them the father was not joined to the spiritual child: therefore, kinship could not pass to them, but only to those born later.

Response. It must be said that no one is illegitimate, except the one through whom spiritual kinship is contracted: and to him, both previously and subsequently born, is illegitimate: and all other opinions of the ancients which were on this matter are abrogated.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that it is true concerning him with whom paternity is contracted, and not concerning another brother or sister of his.

To the second, it must be said that spiritual kinship cannot pass to a non-brother: however, he who is not received in the sacrament is not a spiritual child: therefore, not a brother of the children: therefore, not a spiritual brother: and thus he can provide no impediment in marriage.

Articulus 16 — How Many Ought There To Be In The Reception Of A Child; And Whether One Not Baptized Can Sponsor One Baptized, And One Not Confirmed One Confirmed

How many ought to be in the reception of a child? And, Can one not baptized receive one baptized, and one not confirmed receive one confirmed?

How many ought to be in the reception of a child? And, Can one not baptized receive one baptized, and one not confirmed receive one confirmed?

Then it must be discussed concerning what is said there, H, It is also customary to ask, If a wife with her husband, etc.

For it is asked here, How many ought to be in the reception of a child?

And it seems that one alone; because 1. Dionysius says that there was one alone as sponsor in the primitive Church, who received the child for baptism, who pledged sacred confessions and renunciations for the child.

1. Likewise, Pope Leo established the same, as it is held, in De Consecratione, dist. 4: Let not more approach to receive the infant from baptism than one, whether man or woman. The same should be done in confirmation.

On the contrary, however, is 1. Almost the entire custom of the Church.

1. Likewise, Because when the husband receives, the co-maternity passes to the wife: therefore if she also receives, she is made co-mother twice, which is superfluity and an injury to the sacrament: therefore husband and wife ought not to receive together.

Likewise, it is further asked, Whether one not baptized can receive another in baptism, or one not confirmed in confirmation?

And it seems that yes: because one not baptized can have faith and grace through the baptism of water: therefore he can be a sponsor for another to receive baptism.

On the contrary of this is what is said, in De Consecratione, dist. 4, where the Council of Mainz thus prescribes: In baptism or chrismation, one who is not baptized or confirmed cannot receive another as a godchild.

But I remain, that he receives, and it is asked, Whether spiritual kinship is contracted?

It seems that yes: because

1. God approves all that is done for the reconciliation of men: therefore also this.
2. Likewise, Just as baptism only removes sins: so it seems that sacramentals have place equally before and after baptism: as it is evident in marriage, which remains before and after baptism: therefore it seems that it is contracted.

On the contrary of this is that 1. Baptism is the gate: therefore before it there is no entrance into anything spiritual.

1. Likewise, Dionysius objects thus in the theory of baptism: Just as in natures one cannot operate who has not yet subsisted through generation: so in sacramentals and divine things nothing operates, to whom it is not given to subsist spiritually through the sacrament of regeneration: to operate something spiritual is to receive from baptism and to contract spiritual kinship: therefore one who is not baptized cannot do this.

But then further I posit one spouse to be baptized, and the other not baptized, and the baptized one receives someone as a godchild. And it is asked, Whether spiritual kinship passes to the remaining one who is not baptized?

And it seems that yes: because he is made one flesh with him: therefore they communicate their acts to each other: therefore co-paternity passes to the other.

On the contrary of this is that he does not have the foundation and gate of the sacraments: therefore nothing adheres to him from the sacraments or sacramentals: but spiritual kinship is something of the sacramentals.

Therefore spiritual kinship does not pass to him.

Further it is asked, Whether it is lawful for all indiscriminately to receive godchildren in the sacrament?

However, it seems that not: because it is said, in De Consecratione, dist. 4, from the council of Auxerre: It is not lawful for an abbot or monk to receive godchildren from baptism, nor to have co-mothers.

Likewise, From the book of chapters: Let monks not make themselves co-fathers or co-mothers, nor kiss women.

On the contrary of this is that it is theirs to instruct in the creed and the Lord's prayer, who are especially instructed: but such are monks and religious: therefore it is theirs to instruct others: but this is the office of godparents: therefore monks and religious can be godparents. That this is the office of godparents is proved by Augustine in a certain sermon after the Lord's Easter, which begins thus, The present day: in which he says thus: I admonish you above all, both men and women, who have received children in baptism, that you recognize yourselves to have stood as sponsors of faith before God for those whom you have been seen to receive from the sacred font. Therefore always admonish them to keep chastity, love justice, hold charity: above all, hold the creed and the Lord's prayer, and show them to those whom you have received from the sacred font.

But from this it further seems that it is not lawful for women to receive anyone from baptism: because, as the Apostle says, 1 Timothy 2:12, it is not permitted for a woman to teach in the Church, but the office of godparents is to teach, as is proved from the word of Augustine introduced, and from the theory of baptism, and the last chapter of the ecclesiastical hierarchy.

Response. It must be said to this that is first asked, that one holding suffices, especially in confirmation: but also in baptism this suffices and is safe: and if there are more, this is rather permission than a statute that ought to be approved: it is permitted, however, by reason of the friendship that ought to be contracted among such.

To the other it must be said, that husband and wife ought not to receive the same godchild together. But if it happens, then it does not follow that co-maternity is contracted twice, but rather spiritual kinship is contracted for different reasons, namely directly and indirectly, and this is not inconvenient.

To what is further asked, it must be said that one who is not baptized cannot receive.

To what is objected against, it must be said that although he may have faith and grace, yet he does not have it as a Christian, but as disposed towards it: and therefore he cannot rightly teach a Christian.

To what is further asked, it must be said that no kinship or co-paternity is contracted.

To what is objected, it must be said that God approves things done in order and according to the rule of law, since He is the highest order ordaining all things, as Augustine says. But no order permits that in matters of faith a non-Christian should instruct a Christian.

To the other it must be said, that baptism does not dissolve good things found, but evil things: but yet it establishes all good things: and therefore in one not baptized as such, nothing of good things is established.

To what is further asked, it must be said that spiritual kinship does not pass.

To the objection against, it must be said that although they are one flesh, yet the communication of spiritual acts does not pass: because there is no foundation in him but there is also another as to the foundation of marriage, the person is not sufficiently legitimate, nor is the marriage sufficiently ratified among such, as was evident from the above said.

To what is further asked, it must be said that it is not lawful for religious, in my judgment, to receive godchildren, lest too much familiarity be generated between them and women, dissolving their religion, as the decrees of the Fathers say.

To the objection against, it must be said that it is one thing to be instructed and able to instruct from the habit of knowledge, and another from the office of pastoral care. In the first way, monks are sometimes more instructed: but in the second way they ought not to instruct, unless clerics to whom it is committed.

To what is objected concerning women, it must be said that they can receive: because their instruction is by way of exhortation, and not from office or authority: and this same is not granted to religious, lest they have occasion for wandering.

Articulus 17 — Whether Second Marriages Are A Sacrament

Whether second marriages are a sacrament?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said, there, I, It must also be known, that not only first, or second marriages, etc.

And two things are inquired.
The first is, Whether second marriages are a sacrament?
The second is introduced by reason of all preceding impediments, namely whether a marriage contracted against the prohibition of the Church should be dissolved?

To the first, it is objected thus:
1. A sacrament is a sign of a sacred thing: therefore, what fails in signifying, fails in the name and reason of a sacrament: but second marriages do not signify, therefore they do not have the name and reason of a sacrament. The sign of marriage is, that there is one unique both in spirit and in incarnate person, as was evident above: and this is not preserved in second marriages, as was evident above in the question of bigamy.

1. Likewise, Every sacrament is made by the blessing of priests: but, as it is said in the Letter from the words of Ambrose, second marriages are not made by the blessing of priests: therefore second marriages are not a sacrament.
2. Likewise, Every sacrament is instituted by the Lord, as was proven above in the common treatise on sacraments; but second marriages are not instituted by the Lord, as it is said in the Letter: therefore second marriages are not a sacrament.
3. Likewise, In certain animals it is said there is such chastity, that they do not couple a second time, as in the turtledove: therefore much more should this be in man, since

chastity according to the Philosopher is a good of nature: but nothing existing against nature is a sacrament: therefore second marriages are not a sacrament.

4. Likewise, No sacrament is a sin: but second marriages, as it is said in the Letter, are something for which man is punished: therefore they are not a sacrament.

On the contrary of this is everything that is said in the Letter. And the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 7:39: If her husband sleeps, and, 1 Timothy 5:14: she is freed. Whom she wills to marry, only in the Lord I wish. Therefore second marriages are a good: and it is evident, that they are only a good of the sacrament: second marriages are a sacrament.

Response. It must be said, that they are a sacrament, but not of so perfect a signification.

And through this the solution to the first is evident.

To the other it must be said, that there is a twofold blessing, namely that which is done in the face of the Church, and that which pertains to solemnity. However, second marriages have the first: because they are contracted in the face of the Church with the priests approving. However, they do not have the second: because they are a sign of concupiscence, to whose sign it is not fitting for priests to be present.

To the other it must be said, that divine institution in sacraments is of the substance of the sacrament, and not of the mode: however, second marriages are a certain mode of the sacrament: and therefore marriages are not instituted insofar as they are first or second, but simply: and this suffices for first and second, and thereafter marriages.

To the other it must be said, that this is fitting for those animals by reason of species, and not of genus: and therefore it is not necessary that it be fitting for man: because man and horse desire coitus more than others: and therefore more is given to man as a remedy: although chastity is a good of reason, nevertheless chastity is not cast aside by marriage, but rather is kept holy and pure in it.

To the other it must be said, that second marriage is not punished by direct penalty: but bigamy is followed by irregularity from the defect of the sign, as was sufficiently explained above in the question of bigamy.

Articulus 18 — Whether A Marriage Contracted Against The Interdict Of The Church Ought To Be Separated

Whether a marriage contracted against the interdiction of the Church should be separated?

Secondly, it is asked concerning a marriage contracted against the interdiction of the Church, whether it should be separated?

It seems that it should: because

1. As Augustine says on that passage of the Psalms, "The sparrow has found a house for itself," wherever someone places the offspring of works, unless in the nest of the Church, they

are trampled: the interdiction of the Church is outside the nest of the Church: therefore it ought to be trampled and considered as nothing.

1. Likewise, "He who despises you, despises me," as it is said in Luke 10:16: but he who despises the interdiction despises the prelate of the Church: therefore he despises God: but nothing is valid that is done with contempt of God: therefore such a marriage is not valid.
2. Likewise, every sacrament consists in the dispensation of the ministers of the Church: therefore from the destruction of the consequent, that which does not consist in the dispensation of the ministers is not a sacrament: but that which is done against the edict of the ministers does not consist in the dispensation of the ministers: therefore it is not a sacrament.

On the contrary, it is said that only consent makes a marriage, as was held above, and that can even be interdicted: therefore it makes a marriage: therefore it is not to be separated.

Response. As it is established in the general council, as it is said in the Decretals, concerning marriage, those contracting against the interdiction of the Church are not to be separated unless perhaps for a time so that they may perform penance for disobedience, unless they have some other legitimate impediment, on account of which they ought not to remain together. And therefore it is instituted that priests before the contract should pronounce such a marriage: so that if anyone wishes to say something, they may. And a priest who does not pronounce, but joins otherwise, ought to be suspended from office for three years. However, one who maliciously pronounces something against those to be joined, on account of penance for sin, ought to undergo canonical punishment.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that the offspring are not outside the nest: because they are in the form of the Church and faith, although there may be excess in morals among such, which ought to be punished and corrected by penance: especially since Augustine says that even sacraments given by heretics in the form of the Church are in the nest of the Church and hold.

To the other, it must be said that such do not despise the substantial form of the sacrament, but something concerning the sacrament, such as time or manner, which are not substantial to the sacrament, but accidental.

To the third, it must be said, as shown above, that this sacrament does not consist entirely in the dispensation of the ministers: and therefore it can be effected without them, but it ought to be publicly declared by them to the people.

And let these things said about marriage suffice.

DISTINCTIO XLIII

Divisio Textus

Finally, concerning the condition of the resurrection, etc. This is the part concerning the sacraments, in which the signified effect is touched upon, and not caused or contained by them, namely concerning the glory of the resurrected, for whose sake finally is added concerning the punishment of the wicked, and judgment.

The Master, however, divides the distinction into two; in the first of which he touches upon the state of the resurrected. In the second, he deals with judgment, which begins in distinction XLVII.

Likewise, the former is divided into two. In the first, he deals with the circumstances surrounding the resurrection in some reasoning of causality. In the second, concerning the resurrected themselves according to the quantity and quality of their bodies: and this begins in distinction XLIV.

This distinction is divided into two: namely into the treatise concerning the cause, and the treatise concerning doubts about the cause, and it begins there, "D, Here it is asked whether for the elect," etc.

Likewise, in the first he places two parts: for in the first chapter it is proven by authorities that there will be a resurrection: and in the second, he touches upon the cause.

Articulus 1 — Whether The Resurrection Of The Dead Will At Some Time Occur

Whether the resurrection of the dead will at some time be future?

Questions are asked before the Letter, namely: First, Whether there will be a resurrection? Second, What is resurrection? And third, Whether it is natural or miraculous?

To the first, it is objected by authorities and reasons.

Besides those which are in the Letter, three are more express.

The first is Daniel 12:2: "Many of those who sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt." For indeed, since none sleep in the dust of the earth except the dead, it is evident that it speaks of the dead. But if it were also granted that someone sleeps in the dust, it is evident that no one awakes to everlasting life unless a resurrection is to be future.

The second is more express, Ezekiel 37:4 and following, where it says thus: "Dry bones, hear the word of the Lord. Thus says the Lord God to these bones: Behold, I will cause breath to enter you, and you shall live," etc., up to "for I am the Lord."

The third is most express, Job 19:24: "I know that my Redeemer lives," etc.

Besides the aforementioned, there are arguments of the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 15:3 and following.

And they are three in number. The first is from the efficient cause, as the Gloss says: namely, that Christ has risen: therefore the dead shall rise: or if the dead do not rise, Christ has not risen. And it is founded on this, that the cause being posited in act, the effect is posited in the same way as the effect is, namely, in the future or in the present. In the present indeed, as if a builder in act is building, his building is. In the future, however, as if the order of the sun's motion in the oblique circle is, which cuts the equinoctial, there will be an equinox at two points of intersection. Thus Christ's resurrection is the cause of our resurrection according to the Gloss.

The second is founded on this, that falsehood is not subject to faith: and therefore he says, "If the dead do not rise, your faith is in vain which believes this": but it is impossible for faith to be in vain, since falsehood is not subject to faith, as is clear in Hebrews 11:1, where it is said to be the argument of things not seen. It is, however, an argument, as John the Bishop says, as a principle, and it is of immovable truth.

The third is from the truth of preaching: because if the dead do not rise, the preaching of the Apostles is in vain, because they are found false witnesses: therefore everything they said about Christ is suspect, which is inconvenient, since the thing preached has had proof through miracles, and authority from the voice of the Father and the testimony of John, and many others, as five testimonies are read in John 1:19 and following, which give strength to the doctrine of the Gospel.

The fourth is assumed from the life of the Saints: because they are more miserable than all men, if the dead do not rise: because they are hoping only in this life in Christ, in which the good have nothing but struggle and tribulation, as the Apostle says, 1 Corinthians 15:32: "I fought with beasts at Ephesus (according to man)." And this reason is founded on providence: because as Boethius says in the book of the Consolation of Philosophy, "Providence does not govern the world by chance." It is unjust that he who suffers for His name in this life should not be rewarded: therefore it is necessary that another life be manifested in such through resurrection.

The fifth reason of the Apostle, Ephesians 2:1 and following, is from the works of nature: because if nature can make something from the dead in a certain respect, alive simply and does, much more is it to be believed that God can do this: but in nature what is sown is not quickened unless it first dies: and it dies, and is quickened: therefore God also quickens that which is sown dead. And concerning this, Damascene says thus: "If blindness does not permit belief in the words of the Lord, at least it will believe in the works. For what you sow is not quickened unless it first dies: and what you sow, you do not sow the body that shall be, but bare grain, perhaps of wheat, or of some other seeds. But God gives it a body as He wills. Consider in the furrows as if you had buried seeds covered: who imposes roots and stalk and leaves, and the most subtle stems on them? Is it not He who is the creator of all, who constructed all by command? So similarly believe that the resurrection of the dead will be by divine will and command: for it has power concurrent with will."

The sixth reason of the Apostle is taken from the difference of the nature of man to other animals, which are not in the image of God. Hence, just as the soul is capable of the image of God and immortality of itself, so it influences the body with a certain order of power to attain the state of immortality. And he hints at this when he says: "Not all flesh is the same flesh." And this has two branches.

One concludes from the difference of man to lower beings: the second from the convenience of man with higher beings. And he first posits saying that not all flesh is the same, but one indeed of men, another of beasts, another of birds, another of fish. And it is to be formed thus: The diversity of matter according to nature is caused by the difference of form, but beasts, birds, fish, and men differ according to the nature of matter which is flesh: therefore that is caused by the difference of form which is the soul: just as therefore to the mortal soul drawn from the potentiality of matter, a mortal body only corresponds through conjunction: so to the immortal soul not drawn from matter, but coming from outside, a body having an order to immortality through resurrection corresponds, although it dies through sin.

Another branch is hinted at when he says: "There are celestial bodies, and terrestrial bodies," etc. And it is founded on the saying of the Philosopher: because Plato says that according to the merit of matter, form is infused by the giver of forms: heaven, itself in nature approaches the nature of heaven: but the form of heaven, as the mover of heaven, is intelligence, of which a certain likeness is the intellectual soul in us: therefore the body of which it is the perfection, approaches the nature of heaven, although it differs from it by some difference: since therefore heaven, as Boethius says in the book on the Trinity, is an immortal body remaining, the body of man not remaining, but rising again, ought to attain immortality.

And these are the reasons of the Apostle and they are good.

He also induces the faith of witnesses over the resurrection of Christ, because He rose on the third day according to the Scriptures: and because He was seen by Cephas, and after this by the eleven: then He was seen by more than five hundred brethren at once, of whom many remain until now, but some have fallen asleep: then He was seen by James, then by all the Apostles: lastly, as to one untimely born, He was seen also by me.

Damascene, however, adduces some of these, like the penultimate, and some of his own in the book IV of the Orthodox Faith, in the last chapter.

He goes by four ways to prove.

And the first is from the authority of Scripture, and he induces that which is Genesis 9:5: "I will require your lifeblood; from every beast I will require it, and from man, from his fellow man I will require the life of man." How will He require the blood of man from the hand of all beasts, unless because He will resurrect the bodies of dead men?

The second is from the New Testament, Matthew 22:32: "I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob: He is not the God of the dead, but of the living."

The third he adduces, John 5:28 and 29: "The hour is coming, in which all who are in the graves shall hear the voice of the Son of God: and shall come forth, those who have done

good, to the resurrection of life: and those who have done evil, to the resurrection of judgment."

The second way is from the works of the Lord: because by raising certain dead, He proved that He will raise all by the power of His divinity. And these are the words: "How would the resurrection of the dead be known or believed, unless by signs of individual properties, from which that was evident? But He raised Lazarus indeed to show His own divinity and the belief of His resurrection and ours."

The third way is through the order of justice and divine providence, and this way induces three inconveniences over denying the resurrection. The first is concerning justice and providence, which orders each nature according to the degree of its dignity. The second is concerning providence governing more worthily in nature in greater good, than less worthily. The third is concerning justice and providence rendering to each according to merits. And these are the words: "If there is no resurrection, in what do we differ from the irrational? If there is no resurrection, let us bless the rustic life without sadness. If there is no resurrection, neither is there God, nor providence, but all things are done by chance: for we see many just ones hungry, and suffering injury in the present life, having no protection: but sinners and unjust ones, abounding in riches and all pleasure. But who ever, who is wise, would think this the work of just judgment and wise providence? Therefore there will be, there will be a resurrection: for God is just, and He becomes the rewarder of those who endure with Him."

But because someone might respond that providence and justice are preserved: and this when the unjust are punished in the soul, and the just are rewarded in the soul, although the body does not rise. Damascene objects against this saying thus: "If indeed the soul alone fought in the contests of virtue, it alone will be crowned: and if it alone was involved in pleasures, it alone will be justly punished. But because it neither subsisted separated, nor did it perform virtue, nor malice without the body, rightly both together will enjoy retributions."

The fourth way is from the works of nature, concerning seeds, which above from his words and the Apostle's were posited.

The Apostle places two other ways of proving the resurrection, Romans 8:18 and following: one of which is from the expectation of creation. And it is founded on this, that nothing vain is instilled by God into nature: but the desire of the revelation of another state which is fitting to glory is instilled into nature by God: therefore it is not vain: therefore that state will be revealed: but it cannot be revealed except through resurrection: therefore there will be a resurrection: and this the Apostle intends, Romans 8:19, when he says: "The expectation of creation awaits the revelation," etc., up to "the sons of God awaited from the bondage of corruption."

The second way is from the groaning of those having the firstfruits of the Spirit: because the Holy Spirit does not cause the Saints to groan for something, unless it is to be acquired: but the Saints groan for the glory of the resurrection: therefore they will have it. And this he intends when he says, ibid., v. 23: "Not only that, but we ourselves who have the firstfruits of the Spirit," etc.

These then are the ways by which the Saints have proved the resurrection.

But so that there may be something of ours there, we will object to the same thus:

1. Every mover according to nature has some mobile proportioned to its power of moving: the rational soul is a mover according to nature: therefore it has a mobile proportioned to itself according to the power of moving: but the power of moving in the rational soul is to perpetual motion: therefore the mobile must be proportioned by something to perpetual motion: and this cannot be done in it according to this state: therefore this will be according to another state given to it by the power of the first cause: and this we call resurrection. The major of this reasoning is written above XI of the first Philosophy, in the commentary where the Commentator says that movers are proportioned to mobiles.
2. Likewise, it is supposed in II of the Heavens and the World, where Aristotle solves why the lower spheres have only one star, and the eighth many: and he says that this is because of the proportion of the power of the movers to the mobile. The second is proved from this, that the rational soul is the mover of the body, and alone is separated as perpetual from the corruptible, as the Philosopher says in II of the Soul.
3. Likewise, whatever things differ from each other according to degrees of nature, and also differ in acts consequent to those degrees according to nature: vegetative and sensitive things differ from each other in degrees, as is evident to anyone by itself: therefore they will differ in acts consequent to those degrees according to nature: it is evident, however, that the vegetative is the principle of life without sense and motion, but the sensitive with sense and motion: therefore the rational will be the principle of intellectual life with some incorruption, because those acts follow these differences: but it does not happen to attain incorruption according to this state: therefore it happens to rise to another state.
4. Likewise, whatever perfection of something is separated from it according to two or three works, and it operates in the perfect one of those works, it will also operate...

all other things in the same according to some state: the rational soul is the perfection of man, separate according to that which is understanding, willing, and incorruptible being. Therefore, if it operates something in man [like] understanding and willing, it will also in some state operate incorruptible living in the same [subject]. But it is established that it operates understanding without any organ of the body, and also willing sometimes. Therefore, it will operate incorruptible living, and it cannot do so except through the resurrection. Therefore, the resurrection will be.

§ 5. Also, "living in living things is being," as the Philosopher says, and sensing in sentient things: therefore also understanding in intelligent things, because the reasoning is the same. But it is plain that the being of living and sentient things is according to the period of the vegetative and sensible soul. Therefore, the being of intelligent things will be in some way according to the measure of the rational soul. But it is perpetual. Therefore, it infuses a

potency for some perpetuity, and this cannot happen except through the resurrection, since it has once been lost. Therefore, the resurrection will be, as it seems.

§ 6. Also, a stronger objection is made by another way, which the Philosopher hints at in the first book of the Ethics: because there is some good of man insofar as he is man. For it is established that this, as he himself says, does not belong to man according to the vegetative and sensible [soul], but according to reason. From this I object thus: Every good proportioned to some species is perceivable by that species according to the perfect nature of that species; but some good is proportioned to the human species: therefore, according to its perfect nature it is perceivable by it. But the perfect nature of the human species is in the conjoined body and soul. Therefore, man will perceive some good in the body conjoined with the soul. But that good is eternal beatitude or happiness, as Boethius proves in the book The Consolation of Philosophy. Therefore, he will perceive it with body and soul, and he cannot do so except through the resurrection. Therefore, the resurrection will be.

§ 7. Also, whatever species according to some power of its nature is capable of perceiving some good, the same is capable of perceiving the highest in that good. But man through his rational power is capable of perceiving the good of the rational soul, as is held by the Philosopher in the Ethics. Therefore, he is capable of perceiving the highest good according to the same [power]. But the highest good of the rational soul is to be continuous through intellect and will to the first mover, as the Commentator says upon the XIth book of First Philosophy [Metaphysics]. Therefore, man will perceive that. But it is established that the nature of the human species is not the soul alone: therefore, the soul alone does not perceive that. Therefore, the body must be united to the soul through the resurrection.

Perhaps Gregory was attending to these objections when he said in the Morals: "If we attended to the works of nature, the future resurrection would be more certain to us than that the sun will rise tomorrow."

§ 8. Therefore, this part being supposed, let us proceed to the contrary in this way.

§ 1. Job 14:7 et seq., it is said thus: "A tree hath hope: if it be cut, it groweth green again, and the boughs thereof sprout. If its root be old in the earth, and its stock be dead in the dust, at the scent of water it shall spring, and bring forth leaves, as when it was first planted. But man when he shall be dead, and stripped, and consumed, I pray you, where is he?" Here he makes a comparison of the death of man to the twofold destruction of wood, namely cutting down, to which the accidental death of man is similar, and putrefaction, to which natural death that comes through old age is similar. And he seems to say what the Philosopher had also said, that to wood destroyed in either way its life and youth returns, but to man never. Therefore, he will not rise again.

§ 2. Also, in the same place, vv. 11 and 12: "As if the waters should depart out of the sea, and an emptied river should be dried up: so man, when he is fallen asleep, shall not rise again, till the heavens be broken,

he shall not awake, nor rise up out of his sleep." Therefore, just as it is impossible for the waters of the sea to return if they have receded from the sea, and for emptied rivers to flow

again, and for the heaven to be worn down, so it is impossible for man to rise up from the sleep of death. But that it is impossible for the heaven to be worn down according to substance and motion, is supposed by the sayings of the Philosophers, and we disputed concerning this in II Sentences, where treating of the eternity of the world and motion: let it be sought there.

But you should know that in that authority of Job two heresies are rooted concerning the resurrection, of which one is of the Jews, namely of Rabbi Nasse, who composed the Talmud, who says that Job did not believe in the resurrection and denied it. And since he also says that Job was never a [historical] man, but Moses fashioned Job as an exemplar for a form and example of living, it amounts to this that Moses did not believe in the resurrection, and denied it in that place.

Another is the heresy of the Philosophers who say that there is no resurrection, such that the identical man in number should rise, namely of a similar complexion. For just as the sea, as the Philosophers say, is changed from place to place according to the mutation of the spaces by which the images of the signs in the motion of the firmament are moved—that is, of the eighth heaven—and in thirty-six thousand years they return to the first state according to Ptolemy and Aristotle in the book On the Causes of the Properties of the Elements; and then they cause things similar to those first created on earth, and the sea returns to its first channel, and the rivers flow as before. And this some Philosophers called the first great year, and half of it the great year of one habitation, namely eighteen thousand years, in which the axis of the sun is moved in the northern signs with respect to the habitation which is now inhabited. And then that will be destroyed, and it will be the year of southern habitation for eighteen thousand years, in which the axis of the sun will run through the southern signs. And Empedocles seems to have posited this, who said that all things in that great year go out of the mixture, and all things in the great year return to it. All of which the Church rejects: and we shall make a special tractate against all this, but yet touching upon it we shall solve what suffices for this work.

§ 3. Returning, however, now we object further through that [passage] of Psalm 1:5: "The impious shall not rise again in judgment." But the reasoning is the same regarding sinners with respect to nature and justice rendering punishments, and regarding the good with respect to nature and justice rendering rewards. Therefore, it seems that no one will rise again.

§ 4. Also, the argument of the Apostle does not seem to be valid: because a grain falling into the earth being sown does not die, except according to the being of a grain, but it lives according to the generative and formative [power] which forms in it the plant, grass, leaves, and such like. But man dies entirely.

§ 5. Also, further, the argument of the Lord does not seem to be valid: because it does not follow, if He is not the God of the dead, but of the living, that because of this Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob live, except in the soul only. And then it does not necessarily follow from this that the resurrection will be.

§ 6. But by reason it is objected thus: Of whatever things the causes are perpetual, the caused itself must necessarily be perpetual. But all the causes of generation and corruption are perpetual: therefore it is necessary that generation and corruption be perpetual. The first is clear from the definition of a cause. The second is proved in II On Generation and Corruption by Aristotle. For the efficient cause is the motion of the sun in the oblique circle. But the material is unfailing, since the generation of one is the corruption of another, and conversely. For thus generation will never stand still: for water is generated from air, and air again from water: and thus it is circular and unfailing.

And since everything participates in divine being always as much as it can, thence with generation and corruption running thus the state of resurrection will never begin, as the Saints say. But generation and corruption will run forever, as the Philosophers say: therefore, there will never be a resurrection.

§ 7. Also, the Philosopher in II On Generation and Corruption, at the end: "Whatever things have corporeal substance, being moved they are not reiterated identically in number." Man is a corporeal substance: therefore, having been corrupted he is not reiterated identically in number. But the resurrection is identically in number: if therefore it will not be in number, there will not be a resurrection. But it will not be identically in number, as has been proved. Therefore, there will not be a resurrection.

Response. It must be said to this, that it is more certain for us according to Catholic faith that the resurrection of the flesh identically in number in which we now live is future, and that everyone will receive in the same [flesh] good and bad things according to what they merited, than that the sun will rise tomorrow. For that the sun will rise will sometime fail, namely on the last day, when it will stand still. But that [the resurrection] is accepted from divine truth, which does not fail, nor has it failed, nor can it deceive nor be deceived.

Therefore, we concede the arguments first brought forward: for although reason does not suffice for accepting this without revelation, nevertheless once accepted it strives to confirm it, and refutes the contrary. Thus it is also in all the articles of the creed.

But to that which is first objected to the contrary, it must be said that Job did not intend to deny the resurrection, but indeed to assert that man will not rise from an intrinsic seminal power, just as in a plant there remains a seminent power, through which its life and youth returns to it, as the Philosopher says. And this indeed he does in the first part.

But in the second part he intends to assert that he will not rise by the moving rays of the images of the stars, but by divine power alone, which wears down the heaven and all the reason of heaven and the vigor which it has in moving to generation. For since there are two moving causes in generation, namely proximate ones which are in matter, and universal ones which are in the stars and their images, which they describe in heaven, Job denies that the resurrection will be by moving causes of this sort. Whence after that place, in chapter 19:25, he says: "I know that my Redeemer liveth." And Rabbi Nasse did not attend to this when he said Job denied the resurrection.

But to that which is objected concerning the heresy of the Philosophers, it must be said that it is folly: because if what they say is true, I show that not even then will there be anything of similar complexion: because the Philosophers say that a sign without a planet in causing is like a body without a soul, imperfect. But it is established to all who know the motions of the superior [bodies] that the eighth sphere returning to the same point from where it began, the planets are not reverted to the same place from where they themselves began. Therefore, nothing similar to the prior will be caused. And let this suffice for the present, because that error has a special difficulty.

To the next it must be said that the resurrection is aptly called a changing to the form of glory: and it is true that in this way [the impious] will not rise, because they will fall into eternal death.

To the next it must be said that nothing in nature is totally similar to the miracles of God: because otherwise nature could do as much as God could. But the Apostle argues from the lesser: because if weak and feeble nature can restore a nobler life to what is dead in a certain respect, much more can the creator of men do this to the human body, which is united to a soul marked to His image.

To the next it must be said that the Lord argues most subtly: because if the soul lives, which is substantially the form of the body, it is necessary that it itself be truly unible to the body. Therefore, since God leaves nothing imperfect,

because, as Moses says, "the works of God are perfect," He Himself will unite it to an indissoluble body: and this will be in the resurrection.

To the next it must be said that generation and corruption, compared to proximate causes, have the character of perpetuity: and the Philosopher attended only to this, because through philosophy he could not know the higher cause. But it is the will of God, which is the cause of all causes, by which it will stand still, when God wills. And an argument of this sort is found disputed upon the second book of Sentences.

To the next it must be said that the Philosopher speaks there of the substance of the matter of the elements, from whose forms there remains no relation to the same form in number, because it itself is destroyed: and of those it is true what he says. But in the corruption of man there remains a relation to the same form remaining in number, because that body is associated with the soul: and therefore the man who dies will revert identically in number.

Articulus 2 — What Resurrection Is

What is the resurrection?

Secondly it is asked, What is the resurrection?

But Augustine says upon Genesis literally "Resurrection is nothing else than restitution into a consimilar life."

But Damascene in the book On the Orthodox Faith "Resurrection is the second uprising of that which fell." And a little after: "Resurrection is the copulation again of soul and body: and the second uprising of that which was dissolved and fell, of the animal."

But against the first it is objected thus: § 1. Consimilar life: it is either similar to the life before sin according to the state of innocence, or similar to this [life] according to the state of penalty and fault. If in the first way: therefore that life will need foods and mingling of sex, which is against the Lord in the Gospel saying that in the resurrection "they neither marry, nor are given in marriage, etc." If in the second way: therefore the future life will be in penalties of hunger, thirst, and such like, which is absurd. Therefore, the resurrection is not a restitution into a consimilar life.

§ 2. Also, Augustine upon Genesis says thus: "The return to that which we sense, we call rising again." But we already sense labors and miseries, and before sin we sensed an animal life. Therefore the return through the resurrection will be to such a thing: therefore no resurrection will be glorious.

§ 3. Also Augustine in book IV of The Trinity: "To rise again is nothing else than to revivify, and to return from death to life." And from this follows the same thing as before.

But from all these things it is concluded, since as much in the first state as in the second there was a life with the potency of dying, that in the future resurrection there will be the potency of dying, which is false.

IT IS OBJECTED moreover concerning that which is of Damascene, because: § 1. It is not a "second" resurrection, unless a first has preceded: but first the body of man never rose before the day of judgment is. Therefore, neither then will it rise secondly. Therefore, he says badly, "second resurrection."

§ 2. Also, "second" does not denote number and order, except of acts of the same kind. But the elevation of the body of man to this life, and its elevation to the form of glory, are not of the same kind. Therefore, the body will not rise secondly then.

§ 3. Also, according to the Philosopher in VI Topics: If some common thing is found in the definition and the defined, that is neither part of the definition nor of the defined. But "surrection" is commonly found in the definition and the defined: therefore it is part of neither. Therefore, the whole of what Damascene says in both of his definitions does not explain anything except the habitude of the preposition which is in the composite, when it is called "re-surrection".

Also, it is objected concerning the second, because "what is dissolved" seems to say the same thing as "what fell": therefore, the definition seems to have a nugatory repetition.

§ 4. Also, the definition of resurrection ought to convene to every resurrection: but this definition does not convene to the resurrection of the Lord, because His body was not dissolved: therefore, it is not general, nor good, as it seems. But that it does not convene to the resurrection of the Lord is clear through what Damascene says: "phthora, that is, the name of corruption signifies two things: for it signifies passions of this sort, hunger, thirst, labor, the

piercing of nails, death, that is, the separation of the soul from the body, and whatever are such. According to this signification we call the body of the Lord phtharton, that is, corruptible. For all these things He voluntarily assumed. It also signifies phthora, that is, corruption, the perfect dissolution and destruction of the body into those elements (from which it is composed), which is rather called and named corruption by many. The body of the Lord did not have experience of this, as the Prophet David says: Because Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell, nor wilt Thou give Thy holy one to see diaphthoran, that is, corruption."

§ 5. Also, it is objected concerning this that he says, "of the animal." For he ought rather to have said "of man" than "of the animal": because that which will rise has it from that which is man, and not from that which is animal.

§ 6. Also, according to all these definitions man will not rise, but only the body, as it seems: when nevertheless to rise again is the proper act of man, and not of a part of man.

Against which Damascene seems to speak, thus: "Mortal animals exist." And below it is clear how they will rise: "The very body which is corrupted and dissolved, the same will rise." Therefore, it seems that to rise again is not of man, but only of the body, which is not man.

§ 7. Also, he seems to have had to say the contrary: because an action is rather of the agent than of the patient. But the soul will act the resurrection by perfecting and moving the body: therefore, the soul will rather rise, than the body: and thus Damascene speaks and defines resurrection badly.

SOLUTION. It must be said that all these definitions are good enough: but Augustine, speaking of the resurrection, accepted all words commonly and not strictly. And to understand this, it must be known that resurrection is spoken of in two ways, namely commonly and properly. Commonly taken, resurrection contains under itself a relation to the state of glory, and to the state of animal life, just as we say Lazarus rose again: and in this way we do not seek its definition here. Properly it is taken exactly as it divides with resuscitation this common thing which is to be restored to an extinguished life: and thus it does not pertain to resurrection except to an inextinguishable life, whether it be in penalties or in glory.

To that therefore which is first objected, it must be said that if we wish to concede that Augustine is speaking strictly of resurrection, a consimilar life is spoken of in the species and truth of human life, although it differs from this [life] and from that which was in the state of innocence, in state and property.

To the next it must be said that "to sense" in the word of Augustine is put for to experience with respect to the substantials of human life: because we will experience the same things also in the resurrection: because otherwise we would not rise again: and it is not called "to sense" to suffer the same things through the senses which we suffer now.

To the next it must be said that there is no return from death to life perfectly unless life perfectly conquers death: and this is not except when every cause of natural death is excluded, which is the combat of contraries: and in this way there will not be a resurrection, except after the course of the world in the end of times.

To the next it must be said that there are two elevations of corporeal matter. One to the form which is the rational soul: and this happens in generation. And another of the same to the indissolubly reunited soul: and this is called regeneration. Matthew 19:28: In the regeneration, when the Son of man shall sit, etc. And therefore it is false that there are not two surrections of the body of man there.

To the next it must be said that it is not necessary that those things of which the word "second" denotes an iteration be of the same accident, but only that they be of the same kind: just as when I drink a second time, it is not necessary that the second drink be similar to the first in accident. And so it is of the twofold life to which the body rises, that it is of the same species, and not of the same accident.

To the next it must be said that that which Aristotle says is understood of those things which are assumed in the same way in the definition and the defined: just as if I were to say, a white man is a white rational animal. But it is not so: for when "re-surrection" is said, "surrection" says the habitude of the body to receiving the soul, and the preposition denotes the iteration of the surrection. But in the definition it denotes the terminus of the motion of resurrection: because resurrection is a motion, and is defined through two termini, of which one is the fall and dissolution, but the other is the altitude of immortal life in the good and the bad commonly. And that is imported through the word "surrection" posited in the definition: because it is compounded from "upward" and "I erect", due to the fact that it is a decompounded figure.

To the next it must be said that that definition does not convene to the resurrection of the Lord. And he himself gives another in the same chapter which convenes to the resurrection of the Lord, saying thus: "The resurrection of the Lord is the union of the holy and incorrupt body and the soul."

To the next it must be said that "of the animal" [animalis] is there an adjective, and is the genitive of that which is said hic and haec animalis, and hoc animale: and it says the condition of the body falling into death. And the sense is, "of the animal," that is, of the animally living body, which fell through death, and was dissolved through incineration.

To the next it must be said that the resurrection is of man according to the body: and this Damascene intends to say, and not something else.

To the next it must be said that resurrection is not spoken of here as of a mover, but as of that whose act it is to rise, or of what is moved in that act. And therefore it properly convenes to man according to the body, but not according to the soul.

Articulus 3 — Whether Resurrection Is Natural Or Miraculous

Whether the resurrection is natural, or miraculous?

Thirdly it is asked, Whether it is natural, or miraculous?

But that it is natural, seems to be shown thus:

§ 1. Damascene says: "What is commonly inspected in all, does not characterize [individuate] in those things which are its atoms [individuals]" [731]. But the resurrection is inspected in all the atoms [individuals] of man: therefore it characterizes none. Therefore it itself is natural.

§ 2. Also, a Miracle, as Augustine says [732], is something arduous and unusual, appearing beyond the expectation and faculty of the admirer. But the resurrection will not appear beyond expectation: therefore it will not be miraculous, but natural.

§ 3. Also, what substantially convenes to all individuals of the same species, must be caused by the common nature. But resurrection substantially convenes to all individuals of man: therefore it is caused by the common nature of men. THE PROOF of the major is: because since there is nothing in individuals except the common nature with matter and individuating principles, and they differ by their matters and individuating principles, it is necessary that that in which all convene be the common nature, or caused by it. But THE SECOND is proved from this, that the resurrection will be according to substance, and not according to accident.

§ 4. Also thus, whatever is caused by the common nature of the species is natural to all its individuals. But the resurrection is caused thus, as has been said: therefore it is natural.

§ 5. Also, the appetite of matter to a form, even a remote one, is natural: therefore much more the appetite to a proper matter, and a proper form. But that appetite remains to the body: therefore that is natural. But the reduction of a natural appetite to act is natural: therefore since the resurrection is also reduced to act, the resurrection will seem to be natural.

§ 6. Also, whatever matter after the separation of the form from it, remains such that it is not conjoinable to another form in number or species: nor does this happen except from dispositions ordaining it to the first form, and impeding it from conjunction with another form. But it is impossible for the body of anyone to be united with another soul, because otherwise he would rise again in two [bodies]. Therefore the disposition to the first soul remains. But a disposition having been reduced to necessity and to species, nothing is done except what is natural. Therefore since in the resurrection this is done, nothing is done in the resurrection except what is natural.

§ 7. Also, every matter naturally ordained to some form is naturally ordained also to the highest state according to that form. But the matter of the human body is ordained to the rational soul, as to a form. Therefore it is naturally ordained to the highest state according to the form: therefore naturally it perceives its state: and that is not except in the resurrection. The first is proved from this, that if the opposite were given, nothing would naturally attain the perfection of its nature, which is absurd. The second is plain through itself.

§ 8. Also, it is natural for matter that it obey its mover, because God implanted this in it, as Augustine says upon Genesis [733]. But it is established that matter relates itself more naturally and immediately to the motion of God, than to the motion of heaven. But I see that every effect goes out from matter naturally through the motion of heaven. Therefore much more

naturally will it itself go out into every motion of God. But God moves by will and power to the resurrection: therefore matter will be moved naturally into the form of the resurrection: therefore the resurrection will be natural.

§ 9. Also, natural things are also called those which we are innately apt to receive, although the perfecting be from some agent, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics, and in this way we say natural virtues. But it is established that from

the rational soul we are innately apt to receive the form of the resurrection, as was clear above: therefore the resurrection will be natural to us.

§ 10. Also, Rabbi Moses says that only natural things delight and remain for a long time: but the resurrection will be remaining always according to the form which will be given then, and it is delectable unless it be impeded by fault. Therefore it seems that it itself is nothing but natural.

§ 11. Also, the ancients objected thus in this question: The effect of a power collated to someone by God is natural, as is clear in a blind man illuminated by God, for whom to see is natural. But the resurrection will be the effect of the voice of God, to which God will give the power of resuscitating bodies: therefore it will be natural. The first is established by the example [734]. The second is written in Psalm 67:34 [68:33]: He will give to his voice the voice of power.

§ 12. Also, to every natural dependence of two things mutually there corresponds a natural conjunction. But the body and the soul depend mutually naturally: therefore a natural conjunction responds to them. The first is plain through itself. But the second is proved from the desires of souls, which desire to receive bodies [735].

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: § 1. Every motion to a form which is from nature, is from some mover in the matter. But resurrection is a motion to a form: therefore if it is natural, it is from some mover in the matter. But nothing moves in the matter to the form of a glorious body: therefore the resurrection is not a natural motion. But the first is PROVED in VII and XI of First Philosophy, where it is said that nothing transmutes matter, except what is in it. But the second is plain through the definitions induced above.

§ 2. Also, nothing of those things which are natural is done in a contrary way to natural things. But the resurrection is done in a contrary way to natural things: therefore it itself is neither from nature, nor natural. The first is plain through itself. But the second is proved from this, that the way of nature is from potency to act, and not from the privation of a natural habit to the habit: but in the resurrection there is a regress from privation to habit.

§ 3. Also, the Philosopher says in II On Generation and Corruption, at the end, that the generation of men is not circular, but straight, but of the elements is circular. Therefore if from man an element is made through corruption, man ought not to return from elements naturally. But in the resurrection he returns from elements: therefore the resurrection is not natural.

731. The term atomis here translates to indivisibles, i.e., individuals.

§ 4. Also, Chrysostom says that in whatever things the sole will of God is moving, those are miraculous. But as Damascene says, the will of God alone is moving in the resurrection: therefore it itself is miraculous, and not natural.

§ 5. Also, Dionysius in the book On the Divine Names: "And what is indeed more divine, is that He promises to translate us whole, I say souls and conjoined bodies, to perfect life and immortality. A thing indeed to antiquity appearing beyond nature, but to me and to you and to the truth both divine and appearing above nature. But above nature I say seen according to us, not [above] the omnipotent divine life" [736]. From this it is accepted that the resurrection is not natural: for it is caused above nature, although to resuscitate the dead is the highest operation and of divine nature.

Response. It must be said to this, that it seems to me that the resurrection is not natural. For a natural thing according to its nature, as is said in IV Physics, necessarily follows the nature of some form, as fire to be borne upward. But the resurrection of bodies does not follow the nature of man thus, but rather it is done by divine will, that it may be rendered to everyone according as...

he merited in the body, whether good or evil.

§ 1. To that, therefore, which is first objected, it must be said that Damascene understands [this] concerning those things that are consequent upon the substance. And there is a counter-instance: for suppose that every human being is white, then whiteness is found in all individuals, and yet it does not characterize the substance or nature. And therefore it is necessary that it be understood in the aforesaid manner: and in this sense the major premise is proved.

§ 2. To the next it must be said that if force is placed on this point, the resurrection will be wondrous, and not miraculous, as some say. However, it seems to me that the hope which falls into the definition is the hope of nature: just as the Gloss says on the Epistle to the Romans 4:18, on the text: Who against hope believed in hope and thus the resurrection will be miraculous, because it is beyond the hope of nature, although it is not beyond the hope of grace.

§ 3. To the next it must be said that "to belong substantially" is said in two ways. In one way, something belongs substantially because it is caused by a substantial formal or material cause: and in this way the resurrection does not belong substantially. But in another way, something is said to belong substantially because it happens to the substance: and this improperly belongs to the substance. And in this way it is not necessary that that which belongs substantially be natural: and thus the minor premise is proved.

§ 4. To the next it must be said that appetite in matter is twofold. One of these is merely the susceptibility of form, and this properly is not an appetite, because Boethius says in the book De Hebdomadibus[737] that nothing appetizes anything else, except that which in some way is similar to it, because appetite does not sound merely passive, but also active in some way. But this susceptibility adds nothing over the substance of matter, and therefore, since it is ordered to anything at all, it can be reduced to act by the divine will: and then it is a miracle, because

732. Cf. Augustine, De civitate Dei, referring generally to his definition of miracles.

there is no such thing in matter, except the power of obedience, so that what God wills may be done in it: and from this a natural eduction is not caused. Again, there is an appetite in matter which is the inchoation of form in a genus or species: and that appetite is only of a form owed to it in genus or species, and it is co-active, not merely passive, because it is one of the principles of generation, and this becomes natural when it is educed. But the form of the resurrecting body is not in the ashes in this manner, but only in the manner of obedience.

§ 5. To the next it must be said that it is not from some disposition that a dead body resolved into ashes is not joinable to another soul, but rather from its relation to the soul which first animated it, as Augustine says: for a disposition speaks of a quality transmuting to a species, but this is a relation of reason, which is caused from the good or evil merit of that body with this soul: and from this indeed is caused its order to punishment or reward with the same soul. And therefore divine justice does not permit it to be joined to another.

§ 6. To the next it must be said that the highest [attainment] of nature is twofold: namely, that which can be attained by the operation and goodness of nature, and that which is elevated above nature and is acquired by the order of divine justice. The first is natural, and not the second: and such is the perpetuity which the bodies of the resurrecting have.

§ 7. To the next it must be said that "natural" there only means the order of the creature to the Creator. But the natural, according to the running of the natural course, is the order of seminal causes, according to which one is in another in potency—and not merely material potency, but also that which is some inchoation of form.

§ 8. To the next it must be said that those things which we are innately apt to receive, in such a way that the power of nature attains them by one, or several, or all operations, are natural: just as by one operation the seed attains to the species, by several operations political action attains a habit, and by all operations the generation of a species attains perpetuity. But in no way can that which is attainable by no operation of nature, such as the form of the resurrection, be called natural.

§ 9. To the next it must be said that the statement of Rabbi Moses is understood of those things which are caused by nature, with the form of nature transmuting [them] into another state, and of these it is true. But the form of the resurrection will be [caused by] divine justice transmuting us into another state.

§ 10. To the next it must be said that God can give an effect in two ways: namely, one that follows the species and nature of a thing, just as He gave sight to the blind man by giving him the visual power: and that act is natural. He also gives an effect which does not follow the nature of the species of that thing which effects it: and in this way the power of resuscitating the dead will be given to the voice, and therefore it will not be natural. And it is like as if it were given to you to see by means of your elbow, or hand: for the act would then be miraculous.

733. Cf. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram.

§ 11. To the next it must be said that there is no natural dependence of the corrupted body upon the soul, but only a dependence of divine justice: and therefore that argument does not hold.

§ 12. From this question it is clear that those are out of their minds who reprove the philosophers for not speaking of the resurrection, because the resurrection cannot be proved by philosophy, but rather by the principles of faith.

Articulus 4 — Whether The Cause Of The Resurrection Will Be The Voice Of The Trumpet

Whether the cause of the resurrection will be the voice of the trumpet?

§ 13. Then it is asked about what he says, there, B, For the cause of the resurrection of the dead will be the voice of the trumpet, etc.

§ 14. For against this it is objected: 1. Since there is nothing superfluous in nature, much less will there be in the divine works. But whatever is added beyond a cause that sufficiently causes the whole is superfluous. Therefore, if in the resurrection something is added to such a cause, it seems that it will be superfluous. But Damascene says: Believe that the future resurrection will be by divine will and power and nod. And it is evident that these three are most sufficient to cause the whole. Therefore, the voice of the trumpet is superfluous.

§ 15. 2. Also, there are three ordered works, namely creation, re-creation, and the state of the resurrection. And God worked two by Himself, not through any creature. Therefore, He will also work the third by Himself, which is not lesser than the second.

§ 16. 3. Also, although a superior power works with an inferior one in the proper act of the inferior, this is nevertheless not convertible. But it is evident that to raise the dead is among the highest acts. Therefore, in that [act], the inferior power will not work with the superior power. Therefore, neither the voice of the trumpet, nor any created thing [will work], as it seems.

§ 17. 4. Also, it is of greater power to restore a habit from privation than to educe from potency: which is evident from this, that the second is natural, while the first is not. But no one except God joined the soul to the body in the eduction of man from potency. Therefore no one, except God, will raise man from death when the soul is joined to the body again.

§ 18. 5. Also, Damascene posits nothing as a cause, except three things, which are all in God: namely, will, power, and nod. Therefore it seems that those things which the Master touches upon here, namely the ministry of the Angels and the voice of the trumpet, do nothing among the causes of the resurrection.

§ 19. 6. Furthermore, it is asked: What in the resurrection corresponds to the three, namely will, power, and nod, which Damascene posits in the cause of the resurrection?

§ 20. 7. Also, since God, and the man Christ, and the Angels work in the resurrection, let it be asked: what corresponds to the operation of each?

734. Refers to the example of the man born blind.

§ 21. 8. Furthermore, it seems that the voice of the trumpet is useless: for where it is impossible to hear, there the trumpet sounds for nothing. But it is impossible for ashes or the dead to hear. Therefore the trumpet sounds to them for nothing.

§ 22. 9. Also, since in Numbers 10:1 ff., a threefold use of the trumpet is determined, let it be asked: what three things in the resurrection correspond to those three?

§ 23. RESPONSE. It must be said that various opinions are posited in the Letter concerning the voice of the trumpet. However, according to the more probable opinion, it seems we must consent to Gregory, who says that for the trumpet to sound is nothing else than to demonstrate the Son as Judge to the world. Just as it is said in Matthew 24:27: As lightning comes forth from the East, and appears even unto the West, so shall also the coming of the Son of man be. And this evidence is called the voice of the trumpet awakening the dead.

§ 24. Therefore, it must be said to the first [objection] that it is not superfluous: because God is the cause of the resurrection outside of a genus, but Christ coming as judge is making and showing a cause within a genus through the form of his own resurrection for ours. Because, as the Gloss on 1 Corinthians 15:4 ff. says, it is evident that Christ rose, who is the efficient cause of the resurrection of the dead. But according to the exposition concerning the ministry of the Angels, then the voice of the trumpet is a ministering and commanded cause. And thus, again, it is not superfluous, because although the primary cause is sufficient for all things, nevertheless, on account of congruity and the acquisition of merits, He works through ministers.

§ 25. To the next it must be said that it is not similar, because those two works proceed from the highest to the lowest, and therefore it was necessary for the Most High to work in them. But the resurrection proceeds from the lowest, namely the collection of ashes, to the highest, and therefore in it, as to the antecedent things, inferior creatures can work somewhat by ministering, but in the highest, the consummator is God by Himself.

§ 26. To the next it must be said that this is true in that this work is in the highest, but in that it proceeds from the lowest, something below Him can work ministerially, namely as to the terminus from which the resurrection is, although not as to the terminus to which, and in which is the consummation of the resurrection.

§ 27. To the next it must be said that the joining of the soul to the body will be the work of God alone; but there are certain works antecedent to that, just as in nature the coagulation of blood, the gathering of similar members, and the formation of members, and the composition of them, which the formative power in the seed works: so too in the resurrection there is the collection of ashes, and their mutation into the form of similar members, and the gathering of organs, and their composition in the body: and this God will work through the ministry of Angels and of the man Christ.

§ 28. To the next it must be said that Damascene considers only the efficient cause by authority, and not that which works in ministry.

735. Cf. Bernard of Clairvaux or traditional views on the soul's desire for reunion with the body.

§ 29. To the next it must be said that in those who resurrect there are three things, namely the participation of divine incorruption, the eduction of a habit from privation, and the facility of the work. And the will, which communicates goods, properly regards the first; power the second, because it is of the greatest potency; and the nod the third, because He works by a nod rather than by labor.

§ 30. To the next it must be said that it can be probably said that the collection of ashes, which is the lowest work in the resurrection, will be done by the power of the Angels; but the formation of the human body by mutating ashes into similar members, and forming organs, and composing [them], is attributed to the man Christ, who will reform the body of our lowness, configured to the body of his glory, as it is said in Philippians 3:21; but the mutation into incorruption and the animation will be a divine work.

§ 31. To the next it must be said that, as Isaac says, the senses are twofold, namely natural and animal. And in likeness to the natural, not the animal, sense, we can say that any creature can perceive the nod of the Creator: thus, Matthew 8:26: He commanded the winds and the sea, and there was a great calm. And therefore such a hearing, that is, a perceptive power of the nod and will of God, is in the ashes and the dead.

§ 32. To the next it must be said that the use of trumpets was to gather an army, and that will [also] be in the gathering of the dead for judgment.

§ 33. Also, the voice of the trumpet used to stir to battle, and this will be [seen] in this, that the whole world will fight for the Judge against the insensate, as is said in Wisdom 5:21.

§ 34. There was a third use of trumpets, the calling to a feast, and to that corresponds the calling of the saints to joys, when it shall be said to them: Come, ye blessed of my Father, possess, etc.

Articulus 5 — Whether Christ Is The Cause Of Our Resurrection

Whether Christ is the cause of our resurrection?

§ 35. Then it is asked about what he says, there, B, after the beginning: The hour cometh, wherein all that are in the graves, etc.

§ 36. For from this it seems to be elicited that 1. Christ is the cause of our resurrection.

And this also seems to be elicited from the Gloss on the First Epistle to the Corinthians 15:16, on the text: If the dead rise not, which says that Christ's resurrection is the efficient cause of our resurrection.

§ 37. 2. Also, it is argued here from the text: because if something posited posits another, and destroyed destroys it, it is the immediate cause of it. But the resurrection of Christ does both of these for our resurrection. Therefore the resurrection of Christ is the immediate cause of our resurrection. The proof of the minor is taken from the text, because both of these are written: if Christ rose, the dead rise, and if the dead rise not, neither is Christ risen.

736. Pseudo-Dionysius, De Divinis Nominibus, 6.

§ 38. 3. Also, it is said in Romans 4:25, that Christ was delivered up for our sins, and rose again for our justification. And there the Gloss intimates that the death of Christ is the cause and sacrament of our spiritual death, when we die to sin, so that we might live to justice; but it is the cause of our resurrection of soul and body, but not the sacrament. But Christ's resurrection is a cause, not a sacrament; while His death is the cause and sacrament of justification and of resurrection. From this it is argued that the resurrection of Christ is the efficient cause and exemplar (in the manner of a sacramental sign) of our resurrection. And from this the same as before is argued.

§ 39. 4. Also, as Ambrose says, and as is held in the third book of the Sentences: Our works of justification receive their power and efficacy from the works of Christ, and otherwise they would not be pleasing. But ashes have less capability for glory and incorruption than even free choice has for grace in the resurrection. Therefore, in the resurrection the dependence of the ashes on the resurrection of Christ will be even greater than that of free choice on the works of justification; but Christ is the cause of the justification of works; therefore His resurrection will be the cause of our resurrection.

§ 40. ON THE CONTRARY to this, many object thus: 1. A cause is that which the effect necessarily follows. But the effect of our resurrection did not follow Christ's resurrection. Therefore it is not the cause of our resurrection.

§ 41. 2. Also, the caused thing cannot be without the cause, that is, unless its cause has existed, or exists. But our resurrection can be without Christ's resurrection. Therefore our resurrection is not caused by the resurrection of Christ. They prove the minor premise in two ways. First, thus: Augustine says that another mode of our liberation was possible; and then it is evident that our resurrection would have followed without the resurrection of Christ. Therefore the proposition is evident. Second, thus: Suppose that Christ had not risen, it is still true that the holy Fathers believed the resurrection of the flesh would come. And falsity cannot underlie faith. Therefore the resurrection of the flesh was immutably still future, and not through the resurrection of Christ. Therefore, again, the previously held proposition is evident.

§ 42. 3. Also, the maker of one work in a whole single species is the same. But the resurrection is a certain work, which was perfected in Christ, and will be done in us. Therefore it will have the same maker both in Christ and in us. Therefore His resurrection is not the cause of our resurrection, but rather ours and His have one cause, whatever that may be.

§ 43. 4. Also, that which is a universal cause in some genus is not caused according to that which it causes in others. But Christ's resurrection is the universal cause in the genus of the resurrection of men, as the adversary says. Therefore it is not caused according to that which it causes in others. But this is the resurrection. Therefore He did not have a cause of His own resurrection, which is heretical. Therefore also that from which this follows, namely that Christ is the cause of universal resurrection [is false]. The major premise is proved in all of

737. Cf. John Damascene, De Fide Orthodoxa.

nature: in the sun which is the universal cause of all generable things, in the agent intellect, and in all others. The minor premise, however, is taken from the adversary.

§ 44. 5. Also, if it is a cause: it is either a necessary or a voluntary cause. If necessary: then, upon its existing, the effect would immediately follow, which we do not see. If voluntary: then either by a divine or a human will. If divine, it is evident that this is the same for the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Therefore then the resurrection is not to be attributed to the resurrection of Christ as a cause, but rather to the divine will, and this is what we wish. If, however, [by a] human [will]. On the contrary: this is weak and needs another. Therefore it cannot be the cause of the resurrection, which is the most excellent of works. And thus again it is evident that the resurrection of Christ is not the cause of our resurrection.

§ 45. These same people respond to the objection of the Apostle introduced above, saying that the argument is from hypothesis: for since Christ is man in such a way that human nature is in Christ, this same thing will belong to the same nature in all; or if this of human nature is not in all, then this also was not of human nature in Christ.

§ 46. But against this it is also objected again; 1. For whatever things agree to all that are of that nature through one nature, one of them is not said to be prior to another in that [nature]. Therefore, from the destruction of the consequent, since Christ is called the first in the resurrection, He Himself does not participate in the resurrection in the same way as others. Therefore it was not an argument from hypothesis. The major premise is self-evident. The minor is written in 1 Corinthians 15:23, where it is said: The firstfruits, namely of them that sleep, Christ: then they that are Christ's, who have believed in his coming. And in Revelation 1:5: The first begotten of the dead, and the prince of the kings of the earth.

§ 47. 2. Also, one having the power to raise himself, and one not having it, do not relate in one way to the resurrection. But Christ had the power, others do not. Therefore they do not relate in one way to the resurrection. Therefore the argument from hypothesis was worth nothing; and if the Apostle argued thus, then he knew absolutely nothing of the art of arguing. The first is evident. The second is written in John 10:18: I have power, etc., where Augustine says that the flesh had the power to raise itself by the power of the divinity latent in it.

§ 48. 3. Also, in the Psalm He alone is said to be free among the dead. Therefore He stood differently in relation to the resurrection than others.

This same thing is argued from Acts 2:24, where Peter says: Whom God hath raised up, having loosed the sorrows of hell, as it was impossible, etc. And it is evident that this could not be said of others. Therefore, etc.

§ 49. 4. Also, what cause could be imagined that Christ should cause our justification and deliverance from hell, and not cause the resurrection through His resurrection?

§ 50. RESPONSE. In this question, reason by itself is worth little or nothing. And therefore it seems we must entirely consent to the Saints who have divine inspiration. And because they say that Christ's resurrection is the efficient and sacramental cause of our resurrection, therefore I also say this, changing nothing of their words.

§ 51. Whence it must be said that the cause of our resurrection is threefold, namely an equivocal efficient, a habitual univocal efficient, and an actual univocal efficient. It is called an equivocal efficient cause when the cause is not of the same species as the effect, just as it is said that the sun generates man; and in this way the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are the efficient cause of our resurrection. A habitual univocal efficient cause, however, is called one that effects something similar to itself in species, just as man generates man; and in this way Christ rising is the efficient cause of our resurrection according to habit only. But the univocal efficient cause according to act, or actual, will be Christ in judgment bearing the insignia of our redemption; whence our resurrection immediately follows there. Therefore there is a threefold efficient cause of our resurrection, namely the equivocal efficient cause, the habitual univocal efficient cause, and the actual univocal efficient cause. In the first way, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are the causes of our resurrection, by will, power, and nod, as was previously held. In the second way, however, Christ rising is the habitual cause of our resurrection. And in the third way, Christ in judgment bearing the insignia of our redemption, and as a judge demonstrating them by judging the world, will be the actual cause of our resurrection.

§ 52. Consenting, therefore, to the first and last authorities and reasons introduced, it seems it must be said to the first [objection] which is against this, that Christ's resurrection is called here Christ rising. Because the resurrection of Christ in the abstract is the formal cause of nothing, unless perhaps of Christ rising. But Christ rising is a cause in habit, and the effect does not necessarily follow it; just as one knowing in habit is a sufficient cause of consideration, but yet he does not necessarily consider, but he will consider when he wishes. So it is also with Christ rising in relation to our resurrection.

§ 53. To the next it must be said that power is twofold, namely absolute, and ordered under the immobile disposition concerning future things, by which disposition the divine counsel, which He foreordained from eternity, is explicated through times. Now, according to absolute power, another mode was possible, and thus it is evident that the proposed proof is invalid. And there is a counter-instance: because if God had permitted that first little cloud to stand, which created the first three days, it would have created all the days; and therefore the sun could have not been the cause of the day upon the earth. And yet if it is inferred, "The sun could not be the cause of the day; therefore it is not the cause," it is evident that the fallacy of the consequent occurs. And it is so in the proposed case. To the other proof of the proposition it must be said that the Fathers believed our resurrection would be through the efficacy of Christ's resurrection. If, however, God had ordained otherwise, then it could have been otherwise; but from this it does not follow that it is not a cause, as has already been held.

§ 54. To the next it must be said that Christ's resurrection is not entirely univocal with ours, as was evident above in the question, What is the resurrection? But if it were of entirely the same notion, then the argument would be worth something: because Christ rose by His own power, and we do not, but by the power of Christ rising.

§ 55. To the next it must be said that if that genus were one in all things, then the proposition would be most true: because then that act would flow from some one [source]

into the whole genus. And it is not so concerning Christ: for although Christ is true man, nevertheless Christ is not a mere man, and so He has some influx over other men, just as a cause over the caused.

§ 56. To the next it must be said that He Himself is a voluntary cause, having the form of the caused within Himself: because He will reform the body of our lowness, etc.

§ 57. To that which is further asked, it must be said that there is the will of God in the resurrecting man, and it is united to the human [will]: and thus it is evident that what is inferred is invalid, because that [will] belongs solely to the resurrecting Christ.

§ 58. Moreover, their responses to the saying of the Apostle seem to be sufficiently disproved.

Articulus 6 — Whether The Voice Of The Trumpet Will Be Of One Or Of Many Angels

Whether the voice of the trumpet will be of one, or of many Angels?

§ 59. Then it is asked about what he says, there, B, in the middle: The voice will be of one or of many Angels, etc.

§ 60. The same is also said in 1 Thessalonians 4:15.

§ 61. And it is asked why he says, Of one, or of many?

§ 62. For it seems that it is in no way of one, but of many:

1. For there were many who ministered in guardianship. Therefore there will also be many ministering, so that they may rise for judgment, and render an account of how they obeyed the guarding Angels.

§ 63. 2. Also, it belongs to the Virtues to do wonders. But the resurrection is the most wondrous of all. Therefore it seems that for the resurrection to take place, all the Virtues would assemble. Therefore, many.

§ 64. 3. Also, Matthew 24:29 does not speak of one, but of all in common, for it is said there: The powers [Virtutes] of heaven shall be moved; and this is expounded of the choir of Virtues by Blessed Bernard in book V of De Consideratione to Pope Eugenius.

§ 65. RESPONSE. It must be said that it is of one and of many. Of one, as in the provost of the Church, because Michael is the provost and prince of the Church, as is said, Daniel 12:1. But of many complying regarding the accounts of individuals, as was held above.

§ 66. And through this the solution to the whole is evident.

Articulus 7 — Whether The Time Of The Lord's Coming To Judgment Is Knowable

Whether the time of the Lord's coming to judgment can be known?

§ 67. Then it is asked about what he says, there, C, But at midnight He is said to be coming, etc.

§ 68. Now three things are asked here: namely, whether the time of the Lord's coming to judgment can be known? Second, What hour is more fitting for coming? Third, Why no citation precedes this hour, since this seems to belong to the form of justice?

§ 69. To the first it is objected thus: 1. The end of the principles of any thing is known, and its end will necessarily be known. But the end of the principles of the world is known. Therefore the end of the world itself will also necessarily be known. The proof of the major premise: because when the first principles are corrupted, it is impossible for any of the principled things to remain. The minor premise is taken from the fact that the principle of all generation and corruption is the bringing-to of superior [bodies], as the Philosophers say: and the end of those is known, as is taken from the proper doctrine of mathematicians. Therefore both premises are established. And since the end of the world is the day of judgment: therefore it is established that it is knowable.

§ 70. 2. Also, the Philosophers wrote about the great year, in which all things would revert to the first chaos, and they handed down to us the principles for finding the first, middle, and last [parts] of that year. Therefore it is also knowable to us when all things will return to the first chaos. Now it is evident that this is the end of the world and the day of judgment. Therefore it seems that the day of judgment is knowable to us.

§ 71. 3. Also, whatever has a principle that is determinate and finite in something, its end is known from the same thing, because [it is known] from the end of the principle. But the principle of the inferior world is in the determinate and finite motion of the heaven. Therefore its end is known from the same thing. And thence as before. The major premise is self-evident. The minor premise is written by Aristotle: because whatever has a principle in time as in number, its end will be in the same: and this is on account of the end of the period, as mathematicians say.

§ 72. 4. Also, Daniel and the Apostle write about the day of judgment. But it is not written that it is unknown. Therefore it seems that the day of judgment is knowable.

§ 73. 5. Also, there are many who speak of this through revelations, which they say were made to them. But what is known through revelation is known most truly. Therefore it seems that it is known.

§ 74. 6. Also, even the Philosophers, as is evident in the Timaeus of Plato, speak of a deluge by fire. But it is evident, according to the sayings of the Saints, that this judgment will be by fire. Therefore it seems that since this is known, the day of judgment is knowable.

§ 75. ON THE CONTRARY to this is that 1. The motion of every circular movable and of the mover of perpetual things is perpetual as regards the principles of motion. But such is the motion of the heaven. Therefore, as much as depends on the principles of motion, the motion is perpetual. The major premise is evident from book VIII of the Physics. And similarly the minor is evident from those things which were disputed by us on the second book of the Sentences. Thence thus: While the motion of the heaven stands, there will not be the day of resurrection and judgment, as is said, Job 14:12: Till the heavens be worn out, he shall not awake, nor rise up out of his sleep.[738] But as much as depends on the principles of motion, it will never not stand. Therefore, from those principles the end of the world, or the day of judgment, will never be known. Now it is evident even to all who know a little, that the Philosophers cannot know anything of future things except from those principles, namely of the mover and the movable. Therefore the day of judgment cannot be known through natural or mathematical reasons.

§ 76. 2. Also, none of the Philosophers wrote physically about the end of the world. Therefore it seems that they could know nothing.

If perchance someone says that it is known through revelation. On the contrary: It is probable that what God does not wish to reveal to the greater ones, He also does not wish to reveal to the lesser ones by this same token. But He refused to reveal this to the Apostles. Therefore He will not reveal it to any lesser ones. The proof of the minor. Acts 1:6: They therefore who were come together, asked him, saying: Lord, wilt thou at this time restore again the kingdom to Israel, etc.[739]

§ 77. 3. Also, from that which He said, Matthew 24:36: But of that day and hour no one knoweth, not the Angels of heaven, but the Father alone.[740] Therefore they seem to be impostors who intermeddle themselves concerning that revelation.

§ 78. RESPONSE. It must be said that I think it is in no way possible for anyone to foreknow the day of judgment. And the cause is rendered in the Letter by Augustine, namely because the Judge wishes to come unexpectedly. But a reason can also be rendered: because it cannot be known through the disposition of the superior motion; but through revelation God does not wish anyone to know. And thus it can in no way be known.

§ 79. But why it cannot be known from the disposition of motion, will be evident below in the solution of the objections.

§ 80. Therefore it must be said to the first [objection] that the end of the world cannot be known from the motion of the heaven out of the proper science of mathematicians. But the end of the habitation of the kingdom of the city and of our habitable earth is well known from the proper science of mathematicians, but not of the whole earth: because when one fourth part of the habitable [earth] is now rendered uninhabitable on account of the shortness of the diameters of the planets, and especially of the sun, then by that very fact the longer length of the other part of those same diameters will be in the other side of the fourth part: and that [part] is rendered habitable, the inhabitant and habitability crossing over from one fourth part

into another. And nothing more can be taken from the proper science of mathematicians, as all who have perfectly known something of the art know. And the authors Ptolemy, Malarba [Masha'allah], and Albumasar write these things in the book On the Great Conjunctions, and Abraham [ibn Ezra] in the book of Conjunctions...

...actions of Saturn and Jupiter, and Messalah in the book of the Conjunctions of the Planets, Aristotle also by objecting hints at this in the end of the first book of Causes concerning the property of elements and planets.

To the other it must be said, that the Philosophers have handed down different things about the great year according to its different acceptance: for it is called the great year of the planets, and this in many ways, namely as to the signification of one planet which instills the age, and thus there are other greatest years of Saturn and other planets, as the Authors say. And according to this, there are said to be middle years in which the signification of the planet lasts in a city or village: and the least in which its signification lasts in a birth, and other sidereal years of its honor. Sometimes, however, the great year is said with respect to the restorations of the planets to their places and origins, so that each progresses from its origin, just as it progressed from the beginning of its creation: and this is called the great year by the Philosopher Virmitius in the book of the Significations of the Stars. Sometimes, however, the great year is said according to the return of the entire starry sphere. In all those years, however, the state of motion is not taken, and there is no ultimate revolution, after which there is no other: and therefore the end of the world is never taken, as was clear before, but the end of this age or habitation, as we have had, and not the end of the world simply.

To the other it must be said, that the lower things are in number and time, but they are taken in two ways, namely according to their entire succession, or according to the special duration of this or that. In the first way, however, they are in the whole time, whose end is not comprehended by philosophy. In the second way, however, they are in a certain part of time that is known: and thus is understood the saying of Aristotle saying that the lower things are in time as in a certain number: whence he says there, that to be in time is nothing else than to be measured by a certain part of time.

To the other it must be said, that to the Saints a revelation was made about the preceding signs: but, as I think, the determined time was never revealed to anyone in whole, so that he would know how much from today or another determined day is until the day of judgment. And Daniel seems to say determinately the time that will be between the death of Antichrist and the judgment, but what is until the appearance of Antichrist he did not say.

To the other it must be said, that all who have hitherto involved themselves in such things have appeared foolish: and therefore that objection is founded on nothing stable.

To the other it must be said, that the Philosophers consider the causes of particular floods according to the elevations and depressions of the planets in hot and cold signs, and according to the dominions of the hot and cold: yet no one determines the day of judgment.

738. Job 14:12

Among the things which are objected to the contrary, none needs a solution, except this which says, that not even the Son knows the day.

And to this it must be said, that (as the Gloss says) the Son is said not to know, because he does not make us know. Or better it should be said, that he speaks of the Son of man as man: because from human nature he did not know this, but from the divine in which he was the same as the Father.

Articulus 8 — At What Hour The Judgment Will Be

At what hour will the judgment be?

ARTICULUS VIU.

At what hour will the judgment be?

Secondly, it is asked, Which hour is more fitting for coming?

1. It seems, however, that it is midday: because external things ought to agree with internal things: but on the day of judgment all internal things will be illuminated: therefore all external things ought then to be illuminated: and this is at midday: therefore that time is most fitting.

1. Likewise, there seems to be no reason which is placed in the Letter, namely when it will be very dark, that is, hidden: for the judge ought not to come hidden, but rather manifest: therefore it is more fitting that he comes in the day, than in the night.

Response. It must be said that reasons of fittingness can be assigned diversely, nor is there great force in them: therefore it seems to be agreed with the fathers, that it is fitting for him to come in the middle of the night from the mystery which he adduces: and from the fittingness of those to be judged, who deserve this, so that being uncertain of the hour they may always be solicitous.

To the first objection, it must be said that that fittingness is taken from the condition of the judge alone, who always inhabits the inaccessible light examining all things: but the quality of the time of judgment (as is clear in the Letter) is more taken from the side of those to be judged: and this is done for this reason, because judgment is for the sake of the judged, not for the sake of the judge.

Through this also the solution to the remainder is clear.

Articulus 9 — Why Citation Does Not Precede Judgment

Why does citation not precede judgment?

Thirdly, it is asked, Why does citation not precede?

739. Acts 1:6

For since the judge is supremely just, he omits nothing from the order of law: but it is of the order of law to cite for judgment: therefore this ought not to be omitted.

To this it must be said that all preachers have cited: however, the chief and final citation will be by Elijah and Enoch: and in this respect, the order of law will be observed there.

Articulus 10 — How Consciences Are Called Books

How are consciences called books?

Then it is inquired about what is said there, C, after the middle: Books are the consciences of individuals, etc.

However, four things are inquired here, namely, how are consciences called books? Secondly, whether those books contain all sins or certain ones? Thirdly, whether their own and others' sins will be revealed to them or only their own? Fourthly, about the torment or consolation following such manifestation.

To the first: 1. It proceeds from the manner, where it is said that the books are the consciences of individuals, which are then opened to others.

1. Likewise, Richard of Saint Victor in the book on Judgment says thus: What are the hearts of those to be judged, if not certain (so to speak) actions of Scripture? But what are the hearts of the judges, taught in all divine truth, if not certain quasi-decrees of canons? From this double scripture, therefore, every sentence is drawn, whence each of those to be judged is absolved or condemned. Both the consciences of those to be judged and of the judges are called books: but the consciences of those to be judged present the causes for judging, and the consciences of the judges exhibit the canons of the sentence to be passed in such cases.
2. Likewise, [in the same place, it is said thus: Judging, therefore, is nothing other than opening the records of their actions before the judges, than that they cannot hide their consciences from them.

1. Likewise, as the judgment of man is to the external face, so is the judgment of God to the heart, as is suggested in 1 Samuel 16:7: but the judgment of man is according to the face, and through witnesses, or the manifestation of evident fact: therefore, the judgment of God is to the heart according to the opening or manifestation of the heart: therefore, hearts ought to be opened there as certain books.

740. Matthew 24:36

On the contrary, it is objected that 1. Sins have passed in act from memory, at least many of the sins: therefore, they are not written in the conscience: therefore, concerning those, it cannot be a book.

1. Likewise, a book does not need illumination: but the hearts of the damned are most obscure: therefore, they cannot be books manifesting crimes.

Response. It must be said that, as the Gloss on the Epistle to the Romans 1:18 says, certain notes of sins remain in the conscience: and I think those notes to be guilt: and through that, each represents his sin. Similarly, the Saints rectified according to the form of first justice in their rectitude of conscience are a certain rule and canon: whence all dissimilar consciences are judged to condemnation, and congruent ones to absolution and salvation, as Richard says. And from those two proceeds judgment: and this is what is said, Wisdom 1:8: He who speaks wicked things cannot hide, nor does the reproving judgment pass him by.

To the first objection, it must be said that it passes both in act and memory: and yet it remains in guilt, unless it is erased by penance.

To the other, it must be said that they see in a double light, namely, of natural justice which is written in their hearts according to synderesis, because the obscurity of evil merit does not oppose it, but is preserved with it: and in the light of God and the Saints shining from above, as it is said in Zephaniah 1:12: And it shall be in that time, etc. I will search Jerusalem with lamps, and I will visit upon the men settled on their lees: who say in their hearts...

Articulus 11 — Whether The Books Contain All Sins Or Certain Ones

Whether all sins or some contain books?

Secondly, it is asked, Whether all sins or some contain those books?

It seems that not all: because
1. Everything that is recalled to the heart is either received through a new sense or brought forth from memory as from a treasury: but in neither of these ways do all sins come to the hearts of those to be judged: therefore it seems that not all sins will be manifested there. The first is evident in itself. The second is proven: because there is only a twofold way of knowledge, as the Philosophers say, namely the direct which is through the senses, and the reflexive which is from memory: but in neither way are all sins present.

1. Likewise, Jeremiah 17:9: The heart is perverse and inscrutable, who can know it? Therefore it cannot be fully known there: therefore the heart will not manifest all sins there.
2. Likewise, it is not for the judge sitting in judgment to uncover what is hidden: since therefore he is the most just judge, he will not uncover anything hidden: therefore hearts will not manifest sins, except those which are manifest.
3. Likewise, much of sins has been erased by penance, even if it was not final with perseverance, because every true penance erases sins: therefore it seems since those are

erased in guilt and act, that then they will not be manifested: therefore the heart will not manifest all sins.

On the contrary of this is that
1. Every sin will receive the just condemnation of its deformity: but nothing is universally condemned unless it is manifest in judgment: therefore every sin will be manifest in judgment.

1. Likewise, II Corinthians 5:10: For we must all appear, etc. Therefore all our sins must be manifested before the tribunal of Christ there.

Response. This last must be conceded, namely that all sins will be manifest there: but those which are erased by penance are not sins: and therefore those are not recalled to conscience as to be judged, although perhaps they are recalled to participate in the quantity of ingratitude, namely from how great a gift it fell, so that on account of the following, the sin may be punished more severely.

And through this the solution to the last is evident.
To the first it must be said, that if there is the mark of sin which is guilt, the heart will be informed to know the sin to be manifested to another.

To the other it must be said, that it cannot be known now: but then it will be known by divine power for greater confusion, and the commendability of divine justice.

To the other it must be said, that this is true, where the witness is external from the face: but where the witness is internal, whose testimony is stood by, then it is for the judge (when he gives the sentence) to manifest the words of the witnesses, so that the sentence may appear just: and thus it is for God to show the interior words of the witnesses, namely of the accusing or even defending consciences.

Articulus 12 — Whether One's Own And Others' Sins Will Be Manifest To All

Whether one's own and others' sins will be evident to all?

Thirdly, it is asked, Whether one's own and others' sins will be evident to all?

It seems that others' sins will not be evident: because

1. A cause ought not to be known, except to judges, that is, to the judge and his assessors: therefore it seems that even that cause will be known only to God and to the Apostolic men judging with the Lord: therefore others' sins and one's own will not be evident to all.
2. Likewise, What utility is there in this that they are manifested to all? It seems that there is none: because the manifestation of guilt is now evil: therefore it is better there to punish secretly than to manifest to all one's own and others': therefore as before.

On the contrary: 1. 1 Corinthians 4:5, on this:

Until the Lord comes, who will also illuminate the hidden things of darkness, and will make manifest the counsels of hearts. Then all things will be open and known to all, and they will be able to judge about themselves and others.

1. Likewise, a verse is said by the ancients:

And all the secrets of all will be evident to all.

1. Likewise, just as all good things are manifested to the good for their glory, so it is just that in the wicked all their own and others' evils are manifested for their confusion: but everything that is fitting and just to be done, will be done: therefore all one's own and others' evils will be manifested there.

Response. It must be said that all one's own and others' sins will be manifested there, as was lastly proven.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that not only God judges there, but the Saints will also judge the nations, as it is said, Wisdom 3:8: but it is true that only God will judge authoritatively there. However, there will be a question about this in its place below. Nor are sins manifested there only for the evidence of justice, but also for the confusion of sinners, as was lastly proven.

To the other, it must be said that there is this utility of vengeance through the punishment of shame: and that now the manifestation of guilt is evil, is because of the fear of scandal of imitation: and this will then be completely removed: and therefore only utility remains in the manifestation of guilt.

Articulus 13 — Whether From The Opening Of Those Books There Will Be Some Torment Or Consolation

Is there from the opening of those books any torment or consolation?

Fourthly, it is asked, What results from this, torment or consolation?

It seems, indeed, that the punishment from the repentance of evils is more bitter than from hell.

1. Hence Hugo: With the coming of the judge, the conscience of each one will be brought to the forefront: then every fault will be brought before the eyes, and the mind will be tormented more grievously by its own fire than by the fire of hell. From this is taken what was said.
2. Likewise, Luke 23:30: Then they will begin to say to the mountains: Fall upon us: and to the hills: Cover us. It is evident, however, that those saying this do not seek to escape, except the external vision of the angry judge in the accusation of conscience, not the internal torment. Therefore, something is harsher than the torment of hell: but the accusation of conscience is graver than the vision of the judge: therefore, the accusation of conscience is a graver punishment than hell. That the accusation of conscience is

graver than the vision of the offended judge is clear: because the vision is not penal, except on account of the accusation of conscience, and because of which each thing is such, and it itself is more such.

3. Likewise, Wisdom 5:2, it is said that from the anguish of spirit they will say groaning: These are they whom we had once in derision. And it is not said there from the anguish of hell: therefore, the anguish of spirit seems graver than hell.
4. Likewise, in the blessed, the most delightful object is within, namely God filling the innermost for enjoyment: therefore, also in others the worst and most sorrowful is within, namely the affliction of spirit.
5. Likewise, what is most evil to someone is most afflictive: but one's own evil is most evil to someone: therefore, it is most afflictive: but this evil of the soul (as Dionysius says) is to be against reason: therefore, it seems that then this afflicts it most.

On the contrary of this is that the punishment is lesser in the agent against, than in privation alone: but fire is the agent against, and the accusation of conscience is of the privation of good alone: therefore, it is a more vehement punishment than the accusation of conscience.

Response. It must be said that there is the punishment of loss, and the punishment of sense. The punishment of loss is the greatest, being the privation of the uncreated good and the created natural good because of the deformity of sin. But the punishment of sense is twofold, namely the interior remorse of conscience, and the exterior fire with other afflictions. And among these, I believe the exterior fire to be more vehement: because the interior remorse is either about the loss, or about this that through sin it subjected itself to the afflicting corporeal, as is fire, or the like.

To that which is first objected from the saying of Hugo, it must be said that it is graver in a certain respect, namely as to indignation: because one is more indignant with oneself, because it was the cause of punishments: but nevertheless one is more sensibly tormented by fire.

To the other, it must be said that they say this in order to avoid one punishment, not that they consider this or that greater: for I well think that among their small punishments there are some which surpass the oppressions of mountains by their affliction: and therefore they would gladly exchange greater oppressions for the oppression of mountains.

To the other, it must be said that they groan from the anguish of spirit: and this is especially mentioned, because it is the cause of other punishments.

To the other, it must be said that it is not similar: because the enjoyable good is within not enclosed, and without not excluded: and that does not have a contrary: and therefore the evil opposed to it is not the most afflictive within, but rather the fire which is not evil in itself, but to them inasmuch as it afflicts the good nature, as Augustine says.

To the other, it must be said that if evil sounds like privation and loss, that is, which most takes away good: then the proposition is not true: because the most afflictive is the agent against, and the greatest evil is the privation of one's own and greatest good. But if it says the

evil of punishment from the agent against: then it is true: and then that is false which says that the greatest evil is to the soul to be against reason in the same sense: and in the first sense it is true. And the deception is there through equivocation.

Articulus 14 — Whether The Final Judgment Will Occur In A Moment

Whether the final judgment will occur in a moment?

Then it is inquired concerning what is said there, C, shortly before the end: And with the gaze of the mind with wondrous swiftness, etc. And three things are inquired, namely, whether the judgment will occur in a moment? Secondly, whether it is possible for all evils to be accused in a moment by conscience? And thirdly, whether the future judgment will be in a moment?

Concerning the first, it is objected thus:
1. The Apostle, 1 Corinthians 15:52, says thus: In a moment, in the twinkling of an eye. But a moment is indivisible, and the twinkling of an eye is in the indivisible, as Jacob, son of Alkindus, proves, and also Aristotle in the book On Sense and Sensible: therefore the resurrection will be in a moment.

1. Likewise, the Gloss there: We believe from this the same is taken in the twinkling of an eye the future resurrection, and in the members destined to live without end, the dust of the most ancient corpses will return with such speed.
2. Likewise, as the Philosopher proves at the end of Book VIII of the Physics, infinite power moves and operates in the indivisible of time: but the cause of the resurrection, which is the power of God, is of infinite power: therefore the resurrection, which is His work, will be in the indivisible of time.
3. Likewise, if He were to operate the resurrection in time, it would be necessary that this time be according to the suitability of the resurrecting, and not according to the suitability of the cause of the resurrection: but the resurrecting, just as the being born, require different times for formation and for nourishment: therefore it would be similar there, and thus twenty years at least would be required, which is false: therefore it seems that the resurrection will not be in time, but in a moment.
4. Likewise, the divine work ought to be distinct from the work of nature in the speed of motion: but the work of nature is in time: therefore the divine work ought to be in the indivisible of time, as it seems.

On the contrary of this is,
1. What is said, Ezekiel 37:7-8: The bones came together, bone to its bone, etc.: and finally to its joint. And I saw, and behold, sinews and flesh came upon them, and skin was stretched over them, and they did not have spirit. These, however, do not occur in a moment, but in the

succession of time. Therefore the resurrection will not be in a moment, nor in the twinkling of an eye.

1. Likewise, of many acts succeeding each other, there is not one indivisible measuring them: but the gathering of dust, the formation of bodies, their animation, are many acts succeeding each other in the resurrection; therefore there is not one indivisible measuring them: therefore the resurrection will not be in the indivisible of time.

Response. It must be said that the first part of the objections seems to be conceded.

To what is objected against, it must be said that Ezekiel was speaking to a rude people. Therefore, what was done simultaneously, he explained according to the order of nature, not of time, just as Moses explained the works of six days, which, however, according to Augustine, were done simultaneously in one moment.

To the other, it must be said that those acts do not succeed each other in time, but in the nature of matter: just as also the creation of the soul and its infusion and infection by original sin are three acts having an order: of nature, not of time: whence gathering the dust by the Angels, God converts and forms and animates them.

Articulus 15 — Whether It Is Possible For All Evils To Be Accused In A Moment

Whether it is possible for all evils to be accused in a moment?

Whether it is possible for all evils to be accused in a moment by conscience?

It seems, however, that it is not: because
1. That which is not considered according to act is not accused: but it is impossible to understand many things at once according to act or to consider them: therefore it is impossible to accuse many things at once, but rather one after another. The first is evident in itself. The second, however, is written in the Topics, where it is said that we can know many things, but not understand them at the same time.

1. Likewise, Wisdom 5:8, they accuse themselves of sins individually, saying: "What did pride profit us," etc.: but such an accusation made individually does not occur in an indivisible moment of time: therefore such an accusation does not occur in a moment.
2. Likewise, Augustine says on the Literal Interpretation of Genesis that God moves the spiritual creature through time. Therefore, much more does He do this in man: therefore through time, and not in a moment, will be the turns of thoughts accusing or defending on the day when the Lord will judge the secrets of men.

On the contrary of this is,
1. What is said in the Text.

1. Likewise, the movement of the spirit in thinking is swifter than any movement of bodies: but bodies are moved in a moment to rise again, as has already been estab-

lished: therefore also the movement of the heart or spirit will be in accusing or defending much more in a moment or in an indivisible moment of time.

Response. It seems to me that it must be said that there will be a twofold accusation. One concerning sins in general returning to memory. The other, however, in species and number. And the first suffices for condemnation in judgment and absolution: the second, however, serves the worm of conscience. And the first will be momentary: the second, however, successive. I choose this solution because I in no way believe that it is possible to understand or consider many things at once according to act in species and number: but this is possible in that in which many are one, that is, in the universal. Others, however, say that it is possible to understand many things at once, and they solve it differently. But because the Philosopher denies this, and no one can experience it in themselves, I think it is false.

Therefore, it must be said to the first, that the accusation will be in a moment: because it will be concerning sins in general, and not in species and number.

To the other, it must be said that the damned there will rather manifest the worm of conscience than the accusation of their damnation.

To the other, it must be said that Augustine speaks of the mode of understanding concerning intelligibles considered in species and number: and in this way it is also well conceded by us: but in this mode, there will not be an accusation on the day of judgment.

Articulus 16 — Whether The Whole Judgment To Come Will Be In A Moment

Whether the entire future judgment will be in a moment?

Thirdly, it is asked, Whether the entire future judgment will be in a moment?

And it seems that it will not: because 1. To judge quickly is a deformity of judgment and against the discretion of the judge: but that judge will be most discreet: therefore it seems that he will not judge momentarily.

1. Likewise, Matthew 25:32 and 33: "And all nations shall be gathered before him, and he shall separate them one from another, as a shepherd separates the sheep from the goats, and he shall set them." But it is clear that the order of divine judgment is expressed there: since therefore it is impossible for all these things to happen in a moment, it seems that the judgment will in no way be in a moment.
2. Likewise, Joel 3:2 says: "I will gather all nations, and bring them down into the valley of Jehoshaphat, and will plead with them there." But the pleading of judgment will not be in a moment. Therefore it seems that neither will the divine judgment.
3. Likewise, Matthew 25:44 says that they will ask the judge when they saw him hungry or thirsty and did not give him drink: but these questions and answers occur in the succession of time: therefore it seems that the judgment also will.

4. Likewise, Matthew 25:11 says: "Lord, Lord, open to us." And it is answered to them: "I do not know you." But all these things require time. Therefore that judgment will be in time.

On the contrary of this is that 1. Judgment follows the discretion of intellect and cognition: but divine cognition does not require time for discerning and knowing: therefore neither for judging.

1. Likewise, nothing of imperfection is to be attributed to God: but imperfect judgment is that which is with inquiry and time, because it proceeds from doubts to certainties: therefore it is not to be attributed to God: therefore it is not to be said that divine judgment requires time.

Response. It seems to be conceded that the judgment will be in a moment, as was lastly proven: because it is not fitting for God to judge with succession.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that this is in human affairs, insofar as human judgment is imperfect: because when the cause is under doubt and to be decided from allegations, it is rash to suddenly pronounce sentence: but it is not so in divine judgment, as has already been shown.

To the other, it must be said that Matthew speaks humanly, so that it can be understood by the unlearned: but that order is only of nature, not of time.

To the other, it must be said that as Bernard says: God will not plead with a bodily voice with those to be judged, but rather with an interior voice through the accusation and defense of their own conscience: because He moves this through the form of rectitude first to which all dissimilar is then reprehended, for this reason He is said to plead.

To the other, it must be said that all those questions will be in conscience and in the rectitude of justice responding, and they will be about the cause of the sentence after condemnation: and therefore they do not introduce succession in judgment, but rather in the thoughts of the judged after the sentence of their condemnation.

To the other, it must be said that all those knockings speak of the movements of the heart from the consideration of certain works of the kind of good, and the response of the judge is nothing other than the natural response of the judgment and the natural law, which convicts them of the justice of their condemnation after judgment.

Articulus 17 — Whether Memory And Recollection Of Sins Will Be Present To The Elect

Whether memory and recollection of sins are present to the elect?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said, there, D, § 1: Here it is inquired, Whether memory is present to the elect, etc.

And three things are inquired, namely, whether memory is present? Second, Whether it is practical or speculative? Third, How the divine judgment proceeds from the deposition of one witness, which is conscience?

To the first, it is objected thus: 1. The Philosopher says that it is better not to know evils: therefore it is also better not to remember evils: but in the Saints, whatever is better will be done: therefore it seems that the Saints will not remember past evils.

1. Likewise, the best disposition of man for merit is to be wise in good and simple in evil, as is held by the Apostle, to the Romans xvi, 19: but the state of glory is better than that of grace: therefore in the state of glory this will be according to greater perfection: therefore it will be there according to not knowing evils and not remembering them.
2. Likewise, the knowledge of evils is not useful except to avoid them: therefore where it is impossible to fall into evil, there the thought or memory of evil will be superfluous: but in the homeland it will be impossible to fall into evil: therefore the thought of evil will be superfluous, as it seems: but it is certain that there is nothing superfluous there; therefore there will not be any recollection of evil there.

For this part, there are authorities in the Letter introduced from Jerome.

On the contrary of this is: 1. The saying of Gregory, which has the force of an objection from the Psalm ?, as is clear in the Letter.

1. Likewise, the glory of the Saints is in the Redeemer insofar as the Redeemer is the savior according to the act of redeeming and saving: but this does not happen without the recollection of the danger from which he saved: therefore there will be a recollection of the danger: but every danger is from sin: therefore there will be a recollection of sins.
2. Likewise, the Prophet blessing God gives the reason: Who heals all your infirmities, who redeems your life from destruction. It is certain, however, that the Saints in the homeland are most grateful for all the gifts given to them by God: since therefore the chief gift is salvation from sins, it seems that they will be grateful for this: but they would not be grateful unless they remembered: therefore it seems that they will remember their sins.

Response. It must be said that it is to be agreed with Gregory saying that there will then be a recollection of sins.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that the Philosopher says this because of the evil inclination attached to certain knowables, not because of the knowing itself: because knowing is always good, even when evil is known.

To the other, it must be said that it is to know that practical thing which Priscian teaches, saying that proheretic verbs desire the infinitive: whence to know evil this, the sense is, to know to do evil: but to know, that is, to have simple cognition about this, just as to know evil,

is good, and also about things to be sought for their own sake: and in this way the Apostle does not speak.

To the other, it must be said that something false is assumed in the proposition: because it is also beneficial that the mind delights in that knowledge, and especially in prophetic wisdom which results in that knowledge: whence by Tully knowledge is placed among things to be sought for their own sake: and one part of contemplative happiness is knowledge and wisdom.

Articulus 18 — Whether That Knowledge Which The Elect Have Of Their Sins Is Practical Or Speculative

Whether that knowledge which the elect have of their sins is practical or speculative?

Secondly, it is asked, Whether that knowledge is practical or speculative?

And it seems that it is practical: because

1. It is with the affection of thanksgiving and joy, as it is said in the Letter: but such knowledge which is with affection is practical and motivational, as the Philosopher says: therefore that knowledge is practical.

1. Likewise, speculative knowledge is contemplative of the differences and passions of that about which it is: but the Saints do not consider thus concerning sins, so as to dispute about their passions and differences, therefore they do not have speculative knowledge about sins.

2. Likewise, speculative knowledge about something is not about the particular, but about the universal abstracting from every particular: but the knowledge of the Saints is not about sin in the universal, but in the particular, because it is about their own sin: but sin in the universal is neither theirs, nor yours, nor mine: therefore it seems that the Saints will not have speculative knowledge about sins, but practical.

On the contrary of this is that

1. Practical knowledge moves according to the apprehended species to imitation or avoidance, as the Philosopher says: the Saints are not thus moved by the apprehended species of sin: therefore they will not have practical knowledge about the sin itself.

1. Likewise, in art I see that it is practical, which explains the species of art in matter: therefore also in morals where practice is, the apprehended species is explained in work; but the Saints do not apprehend sin thus: therefore they do not have practical knowledge about it.

Response. It must be said that a twofold knowledge can be had about sin: in one way about the sin itself according to itself, and in another way about the event following the sin. And in the first way indeed the Saints will not have knowledge about sin except speculative, which is called the knowledge of simple notice. But about the following event, which is care and pardon and healing and liberation through the mercy of God, the Saints will have practical

and affirmative knowledge: and this is suggested in the Letter, when it says, that we remember pains without pain: and from there we are more joyful and grateful.

And through this the solution to almost both parts of the objections is clear: because to the first it must be said that the knowledge of sin does not have the affection of joy according to itself, but through the following event.

To the other it must be said that the Saints have both kinds of knowledge: but nevertheless practical or exercitative knowledge of joy is about the particular, and not about another.

But to those things which are objected on the contrary, the solution is clear: because those proceed from the knowledge of sin according to itself, and not by relation to the following event.

Articulus 19 — How The Divine Judgment Proceeds By The Deposition Of One Witness

How does the divine judgment proceed through the deposition of one witness?

How does the divine judgment proceed through the deposition of one witness?

Thirdly, it is asked, How does the divine judgment proceed from the deposition of one witness?

As is evident, in Romans II, 15:

Who, namely men, show the work, etc., of the law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness to them, and their thoughts accusing or even defending them among themselves, each one is either absolved or condemned by the testimony of conscience: but this seems to be against the law, which says, that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word shall stand: therefore, since this law was given by the Lord who will judge, it seems that it ought to be observed by Him most of all.

Response. It must be said that the true cause of this is that the testimony of conscience is confession: and in human law after confession of guilt no other testimony is required, especially if the confession is made in law, because that prejudices the confessor. Similarly, it will also be in good things in the future judgment: because that judgment will be there of the inspector of the heart, who will also be judge and witness: but the law of the Lord was given concerning the judgment which is according to appearance, in which there are many doubts: and therefore the words of several witnesses are required for the proof of truth.

Articulus 20 — Whether The Sins Of The Elect Ought To Be Made Public In The Judgment

Whether the sins of the elect ought to be revealed in judgment?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said, there, D, §2: If indeed it is asked, Whether the sins which the elect have committed, etc.

For it seems false what is said here: because
1. It was previously held that they will remember their miseries, and therefore they sing of

their miseries: but through song they come into the knowledge of another: therefore others will know their sins,

1. Likewise, If they are erased through penance, then they themselves will remember their sins: but the contrary was previously held in the sayings of Gregory: therefore the text is contrary to itself.
2. Likewise, Nothing of those things which contribute to joy and thanksgiving ought to be taken away from the Saints: but to see the mercy of the Lord in the liberation of all sins contributes to joy and thanksgiving: therefore it ought not to be taken away from the Saints: therefore they themselves will see their sins, and also all others.

On the contrary of this is that
1. Then either they will wish to have sinned, or they will not wish. If they wish: then their will is perverse: because, as Augustine says, he who wills something evil is not blessed: therefore they themselves are not blessed, which is incongruous. If they do not wish: therefore there is something they do not wish: therefore they do not have everything they wish: but, as Augustine says, he is not blessed who does not have everything he wishes: therefore they again are not blessed.

1. Likewise, Delight and sadness (as the Philosopher says) occur in three ways, namely from the present, past, and future: but a well-ordered mind is saddened by a perverse work: therefore if it remembers a perverse work in the past, it will be saddened: but as the adversary says, the Saints will remember the perverse work in the past: since therefore they have a well-ordered heart, they will be saddened: and this is most incongruous.

Response. It must be said that the text can be sustained. Or it is better said through a distinction, that there is a revelation of sin as sin, and a revelation of sin remitted through pardon and penance. And in the first way, the sins of the Saints are not revealed, and thus the text is understood. In another way, however, the Saints will remember their sins, and they are also revealed to others for the increase of congratulation. And this is what the Gloss says on that of Psalm 31:1: Blessed are those whose iniquities are forgiven, etc. Thus they are erased, so that elsewhere, as the Lord does not see, that is, does not eternally punish: for to see of God is to punish sins. Turn away your face from my sins, etc.

As for what is objected against this, it must be said that they do not take pleasure in having committed sin, but nevertheless they rejoice in the remission: and therefore that will is not followed by anguish, which would obscure their beatitude. But what Augustine says is understood of those things which pertain to beatitude: because even now they do not have everything they wish, because they wish for the conversion of all nations, and yet they do not have it. However, some say that they do not wish to have sinned simply, but under the condition, namely if it pleased God. But I consider this frivolous: because it pleases God well that they had not sinned, since sin can never please Him.

To the other it must be said that sadness is not left from that memory because of the abundant matter, which appears in the remission, in which they glory in place of innocence.

And thus the solution to the whole is clear.

K. Concerning those who will be found alive.

It is also usually asked, Whether those whom Christ will find alive, if they are never to die at all, or at the very moment of time, when they will be caught up to meet Christ, will they be transformed to immortality with miraculous speed? For it is not to be said that it is impossible for them to be carried through the air into the heights, in that space both to die and to revive. To this sense, however, in which we think that they will in a short space both suffer death and receive immortality, the Apostle seems to urge us, where he says: As in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive. And elsewhere, What you sow is not made alive unless it dies first. Why should it seem incredible to us that that multitude of bodies should be sown in the air in some way, and there immediately be revived immortally and incorruptibly, when we believe that the resurrection will occur in the blink of an eye, and that the dust of the most ancient corpses will return with such speed to limbs destined to live without end? But I would rather hear from the more learned about these things. If therefore we believe that the Saints who will be found alive at Christ's coming, and will be caught up to meet Him, will in the same rapture depart from mortal bodies, and soon return to the same immortal bodies: we will suffer no distress in the words of the Apostle, generally accepting what was said: We shall all indeed rise again, namely both good and evil, but we shall not all be changed, namely in the solemnity of the resurrection. Concerning this also Ambrose says: In the very rapture of those who will be found alive, there will be death and resurrection: where the soul, as if through sleep, having departed from the body, is returned to the same in a moment. On the contrary, however, writing to Marcella, Jerome seems to testify, saying that some at the end of the world, with Christ coming, will not die, but being found alive will suddenly be changed into immortality. But what is truer of these things is not for human judgment to define.

Articulus 21 — Whether Some Remain Alive, And Are Supervested With Immortality In The Resurrection

Whether some remain alive, and are clothed with immortality in the resurrection?

Whether some remain alive, and are clothed with immortality in the resurrection?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, E, It is also usually asked, Whether those whom Christ will find alive, etc.

And it is asked here concerning the term of the resurrection from which is the resurrection.

And three things are asked here.
The first is, Whether some remain alive, and are clothed with immortality in the resurrection?
The second, Whether the resurrection is from death or from ashes in all?
The third, Whether the same is the term of the resurrection from which in the good and in the evil?

To the first, it is objected thus:

1. Both in the symbol of the Apostles and in the symbol of the Nicene synod, it is said to judge the living and the dead: therefore those to be judged differ by life and death: either therefore by present death, or past. Not present: because then all will live the life of the resurrection: therefore by past: therefore some were dead in the past, and some not: not therefore all will rise from death, but some will be clothed.
2. Likewise, 1 Thessalonians 4:16: Then. Therefore those who will then live, we who live, who remain, will be caught up together with them to meet Christ in the air: and thus we will always be with the Lord, therefore they will remain with the Lord: therefore they will be clothed.
3. Likewise, 1 Corinthians 5:4: We do not wish to be unclothed, but to be clothed, so that what is mortal may be swallowed up by life. However, it is evident that in the Saints there is no useless desire, and therefore it will have effect in some: therefore some will be clothed, as it seems.
4. Likewise, Jerome expressly says this in the authority which is introduced in the Letter, namely that some at the end of the age, with Christ coming, will not die, but found alive will suddenly be changed into immortality.
5. Likewise, In everything that acts orderly, the shorter way is more desirable: but the shorter and briefer is to be clothed, than to be one transition from life to death: therefore since God acts most orderly, it seems that such will not die, but will be clothed.
6. Likewise, Man is especially of greater dignity than other creatures: but some of the other creatures will be clothed: therefore much more man. The proof of the middle is air and heaven and others which will not be corrupted first, so that afterwards they may be glorified.

On the contrary of this is,
1. What the Lord said concerning those sinning originally: On whatever day you eat of it, you will die by death. Therefore it is necessary for all to die by the law of concupiscence born: but all are such except Christ: therefore it is necessary for all to die.

1. Likewise, 1 Corinthians 15:36: It is not vivified, unless it first dies, it stands, that all bodies will then be vivified. Therefore they will then die.
2. Likewise, In the definition of resurrection, it is, the second of that which fell and was dissolved: therefore it is necessary for all to fall by death, since the resurrection will be future generally, as the symbol says in that article, the resurrection of the flesh.
3. Likewise, Those who will then be found alive, will not be of better condition than the Apostles: therefore it would not be just, that it be granted to them, which was not granted to the Apostles: but the Apostles are all dead: therefore it will be necessary for them to die.

1. Likewise, Daniel 12:2: Many of those who sleep in the dust of the earth will awake. Therefore from the dust of the earth and not from those who sleep in the dust of the earth will rise to life.
2. Likewise, Isaiah 26:19: Your dead will live, Lord, my slain will rise. Therefore all will be dead.
3. Likewise, John 5:28: All who are in the tombs will hear the voice of the Son of God. Therefore all the dead will rise.

Response. It must be said that all will rise from the dead, and none will remain alive, as Zidéera says, from the words of Augustine.

To the first, therefore, it must be said, that they are not called living, because they remain alive, but because the time of the common judgment will apprehend them alive: but then they will die in that time by the fire of the conflagration of the world.

To the other, it must be said, that the Apostle similarly says living, whom those times will apprehend alive: but nevertheless either in the very rapture (as it says in the Letter) they will die, or even in the very conflagrating fire, which some probably estimate.

To the other, it must be said, that there is a double desire, namely natural conditioned, and natural perfected by grace. The first is of impossibilities, as the Philosopher intimates in the Ethics, where he says, that the will is of impossibilities: for we wish to be immortal: and of this the Apostle speaks. The second, however, is ordered: and by this he proves the future resurrection, as was said above.

To the argument it must be said, that the desire which is in the Saints insofar as they are saints, is not vain: but because they cannot lay aside nature, there are many conditioned vain desires in them, as in Peter, that another girded him, and led him where he did not wish: although God wished him to be led thus.

To the other, it must be said, that if Jerome is sustained, then he wishes to say, that they are not to be called dying, because without delay they are to be transferred to life: because they do not await the glory of the body, as those who die now.

To the other, it must be said, that it is a shortcut, that they die first: because just as in natural motion it is a shortcut, that dispositions and contrary forms be removed before the form is induced: so it is in the resurrection: and therefore by death it is necessary to remove the debt of Adam, and other conditions of sin, and then first to be clothed with the glory of the resurrection.

To the other, it must be said, that man is of greater dignity: and therefore all indignities must be diligently removed from him, so that he may be clothed with greater glory than any creature: and for this he needs death, as was said.

Articulus 22 — Whether The Resurrection Is From Death Or From Ashes

Whether the resurrection is from death, or from ashes?

Secondly, it is asked, Whether the resurrection is from death, or from ashes?

It seems, however, that it is from death alone: because 1. As the Gloss says on the Epistle to the Romans 4:25, on that: "He rose again for our justification," therefore the resurrection of Christ is the exemplar of our resurrection: it was from death alone, and not from ashes: therefore ours will be so.

1. Likewise, In fewer things is the way greater, as Aristotle says: but it is in fewer things that it is from a dead body, than from a body reduced to ashes, and afterwards reintegrated: therefore it will be from death alone, and not from ashes.
2. Likewise, The reason for the resurrection is the same in one and in the other: but those who will die in the very moment of their rapture will not be reduced to ashes: therefore neither should others be reduced to ashes, as it seems.
3. Likewise, The resurrection was prefigured in the raising of the dead: but no one was raised from ashes: therefore no one ought to rise from ashes.

On the contrary of this is what is said, 1. Genesis 3:19: "Dust thou art, and unto dust thou shalt return." Therefore it is necessary for the body conceived in original sin to return to dust; but it does not go to dust, except through incineration: therefore it is necessary to be reduced to ashes.

1. Likewise, Haymo: All born in original sin are held by this sentence: "Thou art earth, and unto earth thou shalt go."
2. Likewise, Damascene distinguishes a twofold corruption, namely divisibility, and putrefaction: and according to the first mode the body of the Lord saw corruption, but in the second mode it did not see: but it is evident, that there is nothing in the human body, which is not reduced to something preceding according to cause: but before corruption there is nothing, except matter composed of contraries, and sin: but the Lord did not assume sin: therefore His corruption was ordered to the nature of contraries as to cause, and not to sin: but in us there is sin: therefore it is necessary, that the second corruption be caused by it: therefore all who are conceived in sin will be reduced to ashes.
3. Likewise, In the acquisition of every form and state it is necessary first to purge the matter from contrary dispositions: but the dispositions contrary to glorification are dispersed throughout the whole body: therefore it is necessary to purge them throughout the whole body: but this cannot be done except through incineration: therefore it seems, that all will be reduced to ashes.
4. Likewise, The whole structure of man is corrupted by the corruption of vice and passibility: therefore it is necessary to dissolve in all before the form is induced.

5. Likewise, There are many things in the human body not of the truth of human nature: but all those will be removed, therefore it seems, that it is necessary to dissolve all bodies.

Response. It must be said, that in truth in my judgment the common resurrection will be from ashes, as the last reasons prove: however, on account of the perfect and complete immunity from sin and concupiscence, the resurrection of the Lord was not so, and on account of the vehement purgation of the fomes I believe, that it was also so in the body of the glorious Virgin, and the body of the blessed John the Evangelist.

But perhaps a place will offer itself for discerning these things. I think, however, that in objecting from the words of Damascene the cause is stated, because I do not believe it possible to make a sufficient purgation of the infection of the fomes for glory, except through incineration: and this I think the Apostle intended, 1 Corinthians 15:50: "Flesh and blood cannot possess the kingdom of God."

To the first, therefore, it must be said, that the resurrection of Christ, as Augustine says in the book on the Trinity, is the exemplar of our resurrection as to the terminus to which, and not as to the terminus from which.

To the other it must be said, that when the way is possible in few, then it is in few: for although all things are possible to God, yet on the part of matter this does not suit, except by a transmutation first made from a contrary form, as was evident in objecting, and is proved in every nature, which always first purges matter from contrary forms before it induces the intended form.

To the other it must be said, that the reason for the resurrection is not the same in all, as was previously evident: but yet it is the same in all who are pure men, except in those in whom there is a special access to perfect immunity from sin: and all those in my judgment will be reduced to ashes, as Haymo wishes in the commentary on the Apostle.

To the other it must be said, that the raising of the dead does not prefigure the resurrection of the dead, except in part: because no sign is such that it suits in all, because thus it would be the same, not similar: but it prefigures as to the restitution of life, and not as to the terminus from which.

Articulus 23 — Whether The Terminus A Quo Of The Resurrection Is The Same In The Good And In The Evil

Whether the same is the terminus a quo of the resurrection in the good and the wicked?

Thirdly, it is asked whether the same is the terminus a quo of the resurrection in the good and the wicked?

It seems, however, that it is not: because

1. Those whose terminus ad quem of the resurrection is not one, their terminus a quo ought

not to be one: but in the good and the wicked there is not one terminus ad quem: therefore neither is there one a quo.

1. Likewise, those whose resurrection is dissimilar in cause, their resurrection ought to be dissimilar in termini: but the good and the wicked are dissimilar in the cause of resurrection: therefore also in termini. This is proved by Daniel 12:2: "Many of those who sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and others to reproach," etc.
2. Likewise, this sentence: "You are dust, and to dust you shall return," was introduced because of sin, as Haymo previously said: but the good and the wicked differ in sin: therefore they also differ in sentence: therefore they also differ in the terminus a quo of the resurrection, because that sentence indicates this terminus.
3. Likewise, in the good, the soul contains the body: but every merit of the soul ought to result in some effect in the body: therefore the effect of that containing in the body ought to result: but it results in no better way than that it is preserved from incineration: therefore it seems that the resurrection of the wicked ought to be from ashes, and not the resurrection of the good.
4. Likewise, it seems inconvenient that the temple of the Holy Spirit should be made similar to the habitation of the devil: but the bodies of the blessed are temples of the Holy Spirit, as it is said in 1 Corinthians 6:19: therefore they ought not to be made similar to the bodies of the wicked, which are the habitation of the devil: therefore it seems that when those are incinerated, these ought not to be incinerated.
5. Likewise, the infection of concupiscence is weakened by the exercise of justice: therefore in the good and the wicked the infection of concupiscence is not equal: therefore neither is the punishment of that infection equal: but this punishment is dissolution: therefore since the wicked are dissolved by incineration, it seems that the good ought not to be incinerated.

On the contrary of this is that
1. To all who were in Adam by the law of concupiscence it was said: "You are dust, and to dust you shall return": the good and the wicked were there: therefore the good and the wicked will equally go into the dust: therefore they will equally be incinerated.

1. Likewise, Ecclesiasticus 17:1-2: "God created man from the earth, and made him according to his own image. And again he turns him into it." Since therefore this is said generally, it seems that all will return to the earth through incineration.
2. Likewise, Ecclesiasticus 12:1: "A great occupation is created for all men," etc. From this it is taken that all will return to the earth which is the mother of all.
3. Likewise, Romans 14:8: "Whether we live, etc." From this follows the same as we said before.

Response. It must be said that the last of the authorities introduced seems to me to be conceded, since there are four, in my judgment, dispositions and differences of those rising, namely of Christ, and of those joined to Christ by the approach of holiness, and of those rising with Christ, and of those rising at the end of the world. For Christ has four things in his own resurrection, as Gregory says in the book XLV of Moralia, "For our resurrection is delayed to the end of the world, but his was celebrated on the third day." And we rise through him, but he through himself: for he exhibited the power of resurrection with the Father and the Holy Spirit as God, which nevertheless he alone perceived in humanity.

Whence it is clear that in four things his resurrection differs from the resurrection of others. The first is that he rose by his own power. The second is that on the third day, as the Gloss says on that: "But you, O Lord, have mercy on me, and raise me up," etc.: because if he had not risen quickly, the resurrection would not have profited them: because the disciples would not have believed. The third is that he was not incinerated, nor could he be incinerated, as the Gloss says on that of Psalm 16:10: "Nor will you allow your holy one to see corruption," Damascene in the authority previously introduced. The fourth is that his resurrection is the cause of our resurrection, as the Apostle says, 1 Corinthians 15, passim, and in the authority of Gregory already introduced. But those specially approaching his holiness according to the more probable opinions, like the Blessed Virgin and John, in two things by privilege approach the resurrection of Christ, namely that they rose suddenly, and because not from ashes. But those rising with Christ agree in this: because their resurrection is not delayed to the end. But the resurrection of others will agree in nothing except in the incorruption of those rising. Therefore, speaking of the resurrection in common delayed until the end of the world, I say that all will rise from one terminus a quo of the resurrection, namely from ashes.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that no motion is specified by the terminus a quo, but rather by the terminus ad quem: for two can be moved from the same terminus a quo, and one to white, and the other to green: and yet they are not moved by one motion. And so it is not necessary that the difference of those rising be taken from what is cast off, but only in what is acquired through resurrection: and in this they differ, because the Saints will be changed into glory, and not others. Whence, 1 Corinthians 15:32: "The dead will rise incorruptible, and we will be changed."

To the second, it must be said that they are dissimilar in cause: but it is not necessary that this dissimilarity be in the terminus a quo, because that is cast off: but only in the terminus ad quem, because in that the state is made.

To the third, it must be said that penance does not remove concupiscence according to essence, but incineration corresponds to concupiscence according to essence: and therefore all will be incinerated.

To the fourth, it must be said that nothing corresponds to continence on the way, but in the homeland, namely the obedience of the body to the spirit, since in the wicked the flesh remains resisting the spirit, just as it was not content under the spirit.

To the fifth, it must be said that in that in which it is not the temple of the Holy Spirit, it can be made similar to the habitation of the devil, namely inasmuch as it is conceived and born in sin: but consequent merit makes dissimilarity in the terminus ad quem.

To the sixth, it must be said that the exercise of justice does not extinguish concupiscence: because, as it was held in the third Sentences, it is not extinguished except by divine miracle: and because incineration corresponds to concupiscence according to essence, therefore all must be incinerated.

Articulus 24 — Whether The Evil Will Rise Again With Mutilation Of Limbs

Whether the wicked will rise again with mutilation of limbs?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said, there, G, "And when from the aforesaid it may be believed," etc. And three things are inquired. The first is, Whether the wicked will rise again with mutilation of limbs? The second is, Whether the pains which are caused by the inequality of humors will remain in them? The third, What concerning the resurrection of Christ appears in all, since His resurrection is the cause of our resurrection?

To the first, it is objected thus:
1. No punishment is to be corrected in sinners: but mutilation is a punishment: therefore, in sinners it is not to be corrected.

1. Likewise, they did not sin with mutilated limbs: but it is unjust that someone be punished in that in which he did not sin: therefore, they will not rise again in mutilated limbs.
2. Likewise, the Philosopher says in the second book of "On the Soul": "As the whole soul is to the whole body, so is a part to a part": whence if the eye were an animal, sight would indeed be its soul. One who is born with diminution was never animated: since therefore the body has from the soul that it rises again, it seems that that part ought never to rise again.

On the contrary of this is that
1. The error of an instrument is to be corrected by the artificer: but nature is the instrument of God: therefore, the error of nature is to be corrected by God the artificer: but the error of nature is diminution and superfluity: therefore, God will correct these in the resurrection.

1. Likewise, the soul is principally the cause of sin, and according to itself wholly: therefore, that it does not sin in the diminished part is not from a defect of will, but from a defect of the organ: but the will in the wicked is especially considered for the deed: therefore, it sins as much as if it had the organ: therefore, it sins with the will in the organ: therefore, it ought to be punished in the diminished organ: therefore, it is necessary that it be restored to it in the resurrection.
2. Likewise, as diminution is in

to merit in good things, so in evil things to demerit: but to the good, for the will of meriting which they had in that organ, the organ will be restored glorified: therefore also to the evil, for the will of demeriting in the organ, the organ ought to be restored damned.

Response. As the Letter says, so it is to be held.

To the first, it must be said that punishment is caused in two ways, namely from nature, and from the fault of the will. The first punishment is corrected, because it is not to be imputed to man. The second, however, is not. I say, however, from the fault of the will remotely or closely: remotely, as is the disobedience of the flesh to the spirit, which remains in the damned: closely, however, as is the fire, and the worm of conscience, and the like, which are caused from voluntary sin insofar as it is voluntary by the will of the person, and not of nature.

To the other, it must be said that although instrumentally in such a member as in an instrument they did not sin, yet by will they sinned in it: and therefore it is just that they be punished in it.

To the other, it must be said as Augustine suggests in the twenty-second book of the City of God: A member is said to be twofold, namely what is present by virtue, and what is present by mass: so also a soul can be said to be twofold, namely by virtue, and in act. What is animated by virtue will rise again, as Augustine says, and from such a mode of animation the member has the power of rising again, and not from actual animation: because many animated parts are not of the truth of human nature.

Articulus 25 — Whether Pains Caused By The Inequality Of Humors Will Remain

Whether pains caused by the inequality of humors remained?

ARTICLE XXV,
Whether pains caused by the inequality of humors remained?

Secondly, it is asked whether the pains caused by the inequality of humors will remain in the damned?

It seems that they will: because
1. No painful thing ought to be removed from a body that is destined for perpetual pain: but fevers, leprosies, and the like, are painful: therefore, they ought not to be removed from the bodies of the damned, which will be destined for perpetual pain.

1. Likewise, with the destruction of the natural impotence of suffering, pain will cease: therefore, from the destruction of the consequent, if pain does not cease, the impotence of suffering will not cease: but this impotence is in the inequality of humors in every complexioned body: since, therefore, the bodies of the damned are complexioned, it seems that such impotence of suffering will not be taken away from them: therefore, neither will the consequent pain.

2. Likewise, every complexioned thing suffering from external heat is possible to suffer from its own, if it is intensified beyond the harmony of its own crisis: but the bodies of the damned will suffer from external heat: therefore, it will be possible for them to suffer from their own, if it is intensified beyond harmony, etc.: but it is evident that it is possible to be intensified, since there is no grace prohibiting it: therefore, it is possible for those bodies to become feverish, leprous, epileptic, and the like.

On the contrary of this is that
1. As the Philosopher says, every passion more made casts away from substance: but it is evident that such passions are more made by intense complexional qualities; therefore, they cast away from substance: therefore, it is possible for those bodies to perish, which is against Scripture, because they will desire to die, and death will flee from them: and Bede says that they die in such a way that they never perfectly die.

1. Likewise, Bernard says that fire and because guilt is inseparable, hell follows guilt, not nature: therefore, the fire will be perpetual: therefore, it is necessary for them to be perpetuated in fire: but this could not happen if the complexion were destroyed due to inequality: therefore, it is necessary that equal complexion be preserved: therefore, they will never have infirmity caused by the inequality of humor.
2. Likewise, corrupted flesh suffers less: therefore, since the impious suffer most according to sense, it is necessary that living and incorrupt flesh always endures: therefore, it is impossible for it to be corrupted by the corruption of the complexional elements.

Response. It must be said that as the last part of the objections proves, so it must be held: hence, just as contraries will then stand in the greater world, so their struggle will stand in the lesser world, that is, in man.

However, how they will suffer from external fire will be a place for discussion below.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that no painful thing caused by will, and not diminishing pain, is removed from the damned: but fevers, and the like, are not caused by will, and also diminish external pain, because a distempered mixture does not feel the touch of external fire as much as a tempered one.

To the second, it must be said that simple impotence of suffering will not be destroyed, but in something that would impede perpetual pain: for the cause of impotence of suffering externally is the excess of the agent beyond the harmony of touch: for a thing similar to the mixture of touch, insofar as it is similar, placed upon touch, is not felt, but the excellent: and therefore, it is felt more quickly and strongly, the more tempered the touching flesh is: and this is not removed, but the dyscrasia of the mixture from putrefaction bringing internal pains is removed for their greater punishment, as has been said.

To the other, it must be said that the instance is in the future state: because all things that are of the mixture of bodies will stand in the harmony in which God placed them, so that the artisan can contemplate in the works of wisdom: and therefore, there will then be affliction

beyond the possibility of the intensity of internal qualities, and beyond the corruption of complexion.

Articulus 26 — Whether The Resurrection Of Christ Will Appear In All Who Rise, Since He Is The Cause Of Our Resurrection

Whether the resurrection of Christ appears in all those rising again, since it is the cause of our resurrection?

Thirdly, it is asked, What of the resurrection of Christ appears in all, since His resurrection is the cause of our resurrection?

For it seems that nothing of His resurrection appears in the damned: because

1. They did not bear His image in life: therefore they ought to be conformed to Him in nothing in the resurrection.
2. Likewise, the Apostle, to the Philippians 3:21, says that He will reform the body of our humility. However, it is evident that He will not thus reform the bodies of the damned, conformed to the body of His glory. Therefore it seems that they have nothing of His resurrection.

On the contrary, the incorruption of the bodies of the damned (as is said here in the Text) is some good: however, it is evident that they do not have this from the merit of the will, because from this they merit no good: therefore either this is caused by nature, or by the resurrection of Christ: however, it is evident that not sufficiently from nature, because nature of itself is mortal and corruptible: therefore it is caused by the resurrection of Christ as by its proper exemplary cause.

Response. This last seems to me to be conceded: because incorruption in all bodies is exemplarily and effectively from the resurrection of Christ, or from Christ rising: but from divine justice containing them in punishments it is also as from an efficient cause only.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that the image from the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 15:49, where he says: As we have borne the image, etc., is called imitation through work, to which glorification responds: and this the damned will not have: yet through the order of justice continuing them in punishments they will have incorruption.

To the other, it must be said that there the Apostle speaks of perfect reformation, which is through transformation into glory: and not of that which is conformity in a certain respect.

DISTINCTIO XLIV

Divisio Textus

Some are also accustomed to inquire, etc. This part, which is about the circumstances of the resurrected in quantity and quality, is divided into two parts. In the first, quantity, quality, and place are touched upon. In the second, it is about the suffrages which are made for the deceased before the resurrection: and this begins in distinction XLV, there, A, "Nor is it to be denied, as Augustine says," etc.

In this distinction, however, there are five special questions touched upon in the Letter. The first is, On the quantity of the resurrected. The second, On the truth of the human nature of the resurrected. The third, On the mode of punishments both according to the body and according to the spirit. The fourth, On aborted fetuses. The fifth, On the diverse receptacles of souls. And it can be clear to anyone where these begin in the Letter, and where they end.

Articulus 1 — Whether There Will Be One Or Diverse Stature For Those Rising

Whether for those rising again there is one stature or diverse?

There arise, however, around the first four difficulties.
The first is, Whether for those rising again there is one stature or diverse?
The second is, Whether a glorious body can exist in a smaller place than the quantity of its stature?
The third, Whether it can exist with another non-glorious body in the same place?
The fourth, Whether it can exist with another glorious body in one and the same place?

To the first, it is proceeded thus:
1. Of those whose agent is one in species and number, and the matter equally disposed to receive the action of the agent, there is one production according to figure and quantity: but the agent of those rising again, etc.: therefore, of them, there is one production according to figure and quantity. The first is evident in every nature and art by induction. The second, however, is proven from this, that the agent (as is clear from the aforementioned) is God or the Son rising again, and the ashes are receiving the action, as was evident from the aforementioned.

1. Likewise, of whatever things the production is from one according to its whole genus, all have the power of that one to figure and quantity, unless by error it deviates from that: but the production of all men is from one, namely Adam: therefore, in all there is one power to figure and quantity of stature, unless it has deviated from that by the error of nature: it is evident, however, that every error is corrected in the resurrection, as has already been held: therefore, it remains in all one figure of Adam and stature: therefore, they will not be in diverse quantity and figure.
2. Likewise, the Philosopher says that of those whose substantial form is one, their figure is also one: therefore, also the quantity of perfection according to figure: but of all those rising again, there is one form: therefore, also one figure: therefore, also one stature, insofar as it is the perfection of that figure.
3. Likewise, in I De Anima, it is said that of all natural constants, there is a limit and reason of magnitude and increase: however, this limit must be set by some power: it is

evident, however, that that power is of the form: therefore, of those whose form is one, their magnitude is one according to nature, unless there is an error: but error is corrected: therefore, in the resurrection, since the form of all is one, the stature of all will be one.

4. If perhaps someone says that the second according to nature is smaller than the first generating, because the matter from which generation is made is divided: and again the third smaller than that. Against: It is evident that this division is made by equals or by unequals. If by equals: then the second should be half smaller than the first, which is false: for long ago men would have been of no or insensible quantity. If by unequals: then that inequality is either according to a determined part of quantity, which measures the whole: or according to the reason of the continuous, which always remains divisible. If the first part is given: then the second in the whole part should be smaller than the first, and the third than the second: and thus it would follow the same as before, namely that the division would have stopped. If it is said in the second way: then the second will always be smaller than the first, and the third than the second, and so on: and although the division does not stop, yet it comes to the insensible: and this is absurd.

And this is the response of some knowing nothing of the nature of seed: because the natural body according to philosophy is not divided into infinites. And furthermore, they can feign no reason why the second is generated from a smaller part than the first, and the third than the second. And the third inconvenience is that from the same something signified both the first is formed, and the second, and the third, which is absurd in natural philosophy. And therefore, this response, although of many, is rejected by us as absurd.

To the contrary, however, this is objected thus:
1. The stature of every generated according to nature is taken from the quantity of extending heat and extensible moisture: but these are unequal in all: therefore, their quantity is unequal according to nature: but on the day of judgment nothing will be added to the natural quantity of each: therefore, on the day of judgment, those rising again will be unequal in quantity.

1. Likewise, from the Letter it is held that some are smaller, and some larger.

Response. It must be said that each of the bodies will then receive the quantity in length, breadth, and thickness, which it would have had in the measure of the fullness of the age of Christ, if nature had not failed through death or infirmity or the subtraction of nourishment, or erred through superfluity or another error. However, that quantity must be measured by the two things said in objecting, namely the extending heat and the extensible moisture according to the perfection of the organs and quantity. And because this is impeded in many ways on the part of matter, and on the part of power, and on the part of exercise or labor in which youths are occupied, and in all these ways according to defect or abundance: therefore, multiple errors occur in the quantity of men, of which it is treated in natures: and this is not the place to inquire into these errors.

Therefore, it must be said to the first, that the agent is one, but the disposition is not one: because it was previously held that in the dust remains a relation to the soul, and to the natural instruments by which it perfects the body, which are hot, cold, moist, and dry, capable of being complexioned: and according to the reason of these, quantity will be given to it: because this is properly its quantity.

To the other, it must be said that it is one thing to deviate nature, and another for it to be other: because it is other and other in one man and another: but it deviates when it does not perfect that which is already in by the active and passive principle sufficiently for the perfection of quantity, whence although the production of men is from one, because, however, nature is other and other according to proximate principles, it does not deviate by constituting another and another quantity, but rather rightly attains the end according to principles accepted for the operation of quantity: and therefore in this it does not need correction.

To the other, it must be said that just as there is one form, so one figure and one quantity: whence since the form is only one in species, it cannot be had, unless the quantity is one in species and similarly the figure.

To the other, it must be said that this is true what the Philosopher says: but the reason of magnitude is taken from the principles which are in the seed, and are instruments of formative power, namely hot and moist, and these are diverse in diverse embryos and conceived seeds: and therefore naturally diverse quantity and diverse figure arise.

To the other, it must be said that that solution is absurd, as has been proven.

Articulus 2 — Whether A Glorious Body Can Be In A Place Smaller Than It Is, Or Requires A Greater, Equal, Lesser, Or Even No Place

Whether a glorious body can be in a smaller place than it is, or requires a greater, equal, smaller, or even no place?

Secondly, it is asked, Whether a glorious body can be in a smaller place than it is, or requires a greater, equal, smaller, or even no place?

It seems indeed that it is in a smaller place: because

1. Glorious bodies (as the Apostle says) will be conformed to the body of Christ: but the body of Christ can be and is in a smaller place, as is evident on the altar in the small species of bread; therefore, our bodies also.
2. Likewise, every subtle thing applied to the glorious is in a smaller part of the gross body: but glorious bodies are most subtle: therefore, applied in the place of a gross body, they can be in a smaller part of the gross body.
3. Likewise, a spirit is not compared to a place divisibly, but indivisibly: but gross bodies are in a place divisibly according to equal commensuration: therefore, a spiritual body, which is a medium between spirit and body, will indeed be in a place divisibly, but yet

according to a smaller dimension than a gross body: therefore, it will be in a smaller quantity of place than it is itself.

But on the contrary, it seems that it is according to a greater dimension than its natural place: because

1. Every subtle body in nature is rare: and every rare thing occupies more of a place (as the Philosopher says) than a gross body: therefore, a glorified body will occupy more of a place than the same non-glorified: but the non-glorified occupies a place equal to itself: therefore, the glorified will occupy a greater.
2. Likewise, the more formal and spiritual a body is, the greater place it occupies, as the Philosophers say: and therefore, the place of water is greater than that of earth, and of air greater than that of water, and of fire greater than that of air, and the place of heaven is the greatest concerning those heavens which are in place: but it is evident that a glorified body is more formal and spiritual than a non-glorified one: therefore, the same glorified body occupies a greater place than itself non-glorified: but the non-glorified occupies a place equal to its dimensions: therefore, the glorified occupies a greater than its dimensions.
3. Likewise, from one handful of water (as the Philosopher says) ten handfuls of air are made: therefore, air is in a tenfold proportion to water: but the distance of subtlety between a non-glorified and a glorified body is greater than between air and water: therefore, a glorified body occupies more than in a tenfold proportion a greater place than the same non-glorified: since, therefore, the non-glorified occupies a place equal to its natural dimension, it seems that the glorious occupies a greater than the dimensions it had naturally.

Further, it seems that it requires an equal:

1. For everything that is in a place is in a place equal to itself, as the Philosopher says: but a glorious body is in a place: therefore, it is in a place equal to itself.
2. Likewise, everything that is in a place, its particles are joined to the same boundary as the particles of the place: but a glorious body is in a place: therefore, its particles and the particles of the place are joined to the same boundary.
3. Further, it is objected thus: Everything whose particles are joined with the particles of the place to the same common boundary has a place equal to itself: but thus the particles of a glorious body are joined with the particles of its place: therefore, it seems that its place is equal to itself.
4. Likewise, everything located by its dimensions makes the dimensions of the place distant, as Aristotle says in the fourth book of Physics, where he speaks of the distance of a wooden cube: but everything that makes the distance of the place by its dimension has a place equal to itself: therefore, glorious bodies have a place equal to themselves.

5. Likewise, everything circumscribed by a place has a beginning, middle, and end, according to the beginning, middle, and end of the place: but everything such has a place equal to itself: therefore, what is circumscribed by a place has a place equal to itself: but a glorious body is in a place and is circumscribed by a place: therefore, it has a place equal to itself.

Further, it seems that a glorious body is not in any place, thus:

1. Everything that is in a place has dependence on the place: but a glorious body does not have dependence on any place: therefore, it is not in a place.
2. Likewise, as the Philosopher says, a place is the preserver of what is placed: but a glorious body needs no preserver: therefore, it needs no place: but it is evident that nothing superfluous is in nature, nor in the works of God: therefore, no place is fitted by nature or by God to a glorious body.
3. Likewise, every container is nobler than the contained: but no body is nobler than the glorious: therefore, a glorious body has no containing body: but every place is a container: therefore, by superior negation, no glorious body has a place.

Response. It must be said that a glorious body has a place in some way, and in some way not. For the conditions of a place are to be more formal than the contained, and containing, and preserving, and immobile, to which there is natural motion, and to be the principle of generation, as the Philosopher says: and if these conditions of a place are all taken together, a glorious body does not have a corporeal place: for nothing is more formal, containing, and preserving, nor immobile to which its motion is as it is glorious, which has influence over it, as the principle of generation: and in this way also the lower orbs are not in a place, as the Commentator says on the physics of Aristotle. But if it is taken as the surrounding which is more congruent in the genus of bodies: then also the place is said more broadly: and thus a glorious body will be in a place in the empyrean heaven. But if place is taken most broadly: then it will be only the surrounding equal to that which is surrounded: and then a glorious body will be in a place wherever it wills, sometimes around us, sometimes in the empyrean heaven according to the will of God.

And therefore, the last part of the reasons is solved: because that does not hold, except of a place physically and properly taken. But according to what is given to mathematical and divine bodies, they do not conclude.

But all those which are penultimate I plainly concede, that no one rightly thinking can deny that they have places equal to themselves.

To the first part of the reasons, it must be said that the body of Christ is not under such a species of bread or wine as it is glorious, but rather as it is the food of the faithful, to be taken by faith, not by tooth, as we said in the treatise on the Eucharist: and therefore, our body will not be conformed to it in this, but only in that in which it is shown glorious.

To the other, it must be said that this is not true, except of the subtle which can be folded and compressed in parts, because this is the folding of parts, as the Philosopher says: but such folding and compression, since it changes the position of parts and corrupts the figure, cannot be in a glorious body, because otherwise it would take on a new figure in every new place, and its quantity would be compressed: and this is absurd to say of a glorious body.

To the other, it must be said that a spiritual body is a body according to nature, and has three dimensions: and this is not a medium in participating in place between spirit and non-glorified body, but rather an extreme: because the more spiritual it is according to the Philosophers (unless something reforms the agreement) the more it occupies a larger and greater place: and therefore, it is supposed false in the argument, namely that it is a medium in participating in place: because at least since the glorious is a body determined by its own figure and quality, it happens to it to have a place by that which happens to a gross body: and therefore, it is not necessary that it is in a larger place.

To the other part of the objections, it must be said that this is not true, although some less skilled have said it: but it is in a place equal to itself. And the three arguments introduced there do not hold, except of a body that is rare, subtle, formal, spiritual, by rarefaction: but it is not so of a glorified body: for if it were rarefied, then it would not retain its own figure, nor the stature of the fullness of the age of Christ: but its subtlety and spirituality is by the removal of ignoble qualities, which are grossness and materiality, with the same substance remaining not rarefied: as some have said of the sun, that it has parts conglobated in figure, and yet it is a subtle spiritual body: and such a gross and subtle body is in one stature, and one figure. And by this, the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 3 — Whether A Glorious Body Can Be In The Same Place With Another Non-Glorious Body

Whether a glorious body can be in the same place with another non-glorious body?

Thirdly, it is asked whether a glorious body can be in the same place with another non-glorious body?

It seems that it can, because: 1. In John 20:19, it is read that the Lord, having entered with the doors closed to the disciples, said to them: Peace be with you. But if He entered with the doors closed, at some point He was in the place of the door or wall, and did not break it. Therefore, He was then with it in the same place: but all glorious bodies will be conformed to His body: therefore, glorious bodies can be in the same place with another non-glorious body.

1. Likewise, almost all explain the subtlety or spirituality, which is one of the gifts of the body, to be such that it can pass through any body without dividing it: it is evident, however, that all glorious bodies will have such a gift: therefore, all glorious bodies can be in the same place with non-glorious ones.
2. Likewise, some object by saying that mathematicians teach that the body of the sun and other planets pass through their circles, and yet do not divide them: it is evident, however, that glorious bodies will be much more noble than celestial ones: therefore,

they can do this, and they do: but this cannot be done unless they are in the same place with them: therefore, glorious bodies can be in the same place with non-glorious ones.

3. Likewise, a body is said in two ways, namely by corporeity and corpulence. By corporeity, it has dimensions: by corpulence, however, it has the filling of a place. Therefore, a body having only corporeity does not have to fill a place: but such is a celestial and glorious body: therefore, such bodies do not have to fill a place: therefore, they can be in the same place with another body.

4. Likewise, a spiritual body, which is light, is in the same place with any other body: but it is evident that those bodies are of the nature of light: therefore, they can be in the same place with any other.

These are the reasons of some that are found concerning this.

On the contrary, it is objected thus: 1. There is one distance of quantity between the same terms: but the same term is the place: therefore, between the dimensions of the locating surface, there is only one distance: if, therefore, it is granted that there are two bodies in it, there will be two bodies of one and the same distance according to quantity, which is impossible: and therefore, two bodies cannot be in the same place.

1. Likewise, let a wooden cube be immersed in water: it is evident that the water will be as distant as the distance of the quantity of the cube: either, therefore, there is one distance of the place and the cube, or two. If one: then whatever is the same to one, is the same to the other: but the distance of the quantity of the located cube is the same as the distance of the place of the cube: therefore, if something is located in the same place, it will also be the same with the distance of the place: therefore, that located thing will be the same with the quantity of the cube: therefore, two located things are one located thing, which is impossible.

But if you say that they are not the same, but two distances of the water and the cube. On the contrary: Among the distances of the locating water, there is nothing filling except the cube. If, therefore, there is something not the quantity of the cube, since this cannot be unless it is a place lacking any body, it will be a vacuum: therefore, a vacuum is something, which is impossible.

And to see this better, let the distance of the locating be a, the distance of one of the located be B, and the distance of the other be c: if it is possible that two bodies are in the same place, then thus: Whatever are one and the same to one, are the same: but according to the preceding demonstration, and Aristotle's words in the fourth book of Physics, and the exposition of the commentary in the same place, one and the same is the distance a and B: and one and the same is a and c for the same reason: therefore, one and the same is c for this maximum: Whatever are one and the same to one, etc.: is the distance in number and the same, they are

the same: therefore, they are the same through c, which is impossible: because thus two bodies would be one body.

1. Likewise, it is evident that to the same common term of the place and the located, the particles are joined, as the Philosopher teaches in the Categories: if, therefore, there are two located in one place, each of them is joined to one common term with it: but they are one, whose term of conjunction and continuation is one: therefore, two located bodies in one place are one, which is again impossible.

If perhaps you say that this does not follow: because even the term of conjunction of the place and the located is one: and yet the place and the located are two. On the contrary: The term of the place and the located is the same, because according to Aristotle, one distance in number is of the place and the located: and they do not differ in distance nor in quantity, except that one is terminating, and the other terminated: but according to this, also two bodies will be both of one number of distance, and of one term to which they are joined, and they do not differ as terminating and terminated, but each is as terminated: therefore, it necessarily follows that they are one in number.

To this, some have said that this holds only for a gross body, and of that are the physical demonstrations. On the contrary: If this were true, then these demonstrations would not be taken from what is common to both gross and subtle or formal body, but they are taken from what is common to both: therefore, they hold for both: it is evident, however, that the distance of quantity is common to both: or if it agrees more with one, then it agrees more with the formal than the gross, because it has greater distances as it is formal.

1. Likewise, Avicenna objects thus: Let there be two bodies, however formal you wish, A and B: and let them be in the same place which is C: and let the center of that place be P: and let lines be drawn to the place above, which is P, and to the middle PR, and to the end PT: and let the whole place be CG FM: therefore, either the line PO is one line, or two. If you say that it is one line: therefore, of the two bodies, there is one line, and also the distances of the place: therefore, the distance of the place and the distance of the two bodies are one distance: therefore, also one quantity, and one quantum, therefore, also one thing, and one body, which is impossible.

But if you say that the line is not one: therefore, between two points, there are more straight lines than one, which is most absurd. To this, some marvelous men say that these determinations hold of mathematical quantity, not of quantity according to physical being: and they concede that two mathematical things cannot be in the same place, but two physical things can well be in the same place. But it will be shown in many ways that this is the greatest foolishness. In one way, if we compare the sayings of these, one of which is that a body does not fill a place by corporeity, but by corpulence and grossness: and another, that the mathematical cannot be in the same place with the mathematical. It is evident, however, that the mathematical has nothing of corpulence or grossness, but only corporeity. Therefore, it has nothing of the filling of a place: therefore, no other mathematical thing prohibits it from being

in the same place with it. And now they say that the mathematical cannot be in the same place with the mathematical, but the physical can be with the physical. These sayings, therefore, are contradictory, and it follows against them that contradictories are simultaneously true, namely, that corpulence is the cause why two can be in the same place, and the same is not the cause of the same. In another way: because this physical demonstration is not taken according to the essence of abstract quantity, but rather according to the being it has in the quantum: and therefore it takes the line of this body and this distance, and suchlike: therefore, it is evident that that fiction is nothing. In a third way, because no Philosopher ever went this way: but they alone are men, and with them alone will this wisdom die. In a fourth way: because since all quanta are imaginable according to the Philosophers, what they say is impossible to imagine: for when two bodies are in the same place, either one is in one part of the place, and the other in another: or each is diffused through all the particles of the place. If in the first way: therefore, they are not in one proper place, but in a common one: and thus nothing prohibits a hundred men from being located in one place, because in one house, or one theater. If in the second way: then each is diffused through each: therefore, the parts of one pass through the parts of the other: and thus each is mixed with the other, which is absurd, since bodies are whole and indivisible.

Response. It seems to me to be said that in no way is it intelligible how two bodies are in the same place: and therefore I say that this according to nature and imagination is impossible to the intellect: but the contrary to the intellect and nature does not compel us except faith to pos-
it: and therefore I say that the glorious body, by the fact that it is glorious, does not have the power of being with another body in the same place.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that this is fitting to the body of Christ: not by the fact that it is glorious, but by the fact that it is divine, whose divinity uses all that is at its command: whence when it was not glorious, thus it came forth from the womb of the Virgin Mother, that it did not open the seals of modesty: and yet other bodies do not have this.

To the other, it must be said that it is not by all by whom spirituality is thus expounded, that it is badly expounded: but rather because they are not spirits, they have the properties of spirits: and therefore they fill a place because of the distance of quantity which they have: but they are spiritual subjects to the spirit, from which what is animal and corporeal and ignoble is taken away.

To the other, it must be said that the books of those mathematicians in which those things they say are contained, have reached no one except them, since Ptolemy, Abbatemo, Thebit, Geber, Alpharabius, and others write nothing of these. Whence it is certain that they have fabricated this in their usual manner, and imposed it on the Philosophers for the establishment of their opinion.

To the other, it must be said that the distinction is valid for the proposed: because a body has to fill a place by corporeity, even with no corpulence existing, as has been proven: whence the Philosopher says that place is given to the mathematical.

To the other, it must be said that this is false, light is a body, as all authors say: and we have said something of this in the second Sentences.

Articulus 4 — Whether Two Glorious Bodies Can Be In The Same Place

Whether two glorious bodies can be in the same place?

Fourthly, it is asked, Whether a glorious body can be in the same place with another?

It seems that it can, from the sayings of the Masters: because
1. The ancients say that a glorious body has its quantity at the beck of the will: therefore, if it wills, it fills the place by it; and if it does not will, it does not fill it: therefore, it can be in the same place with another if it wills.

But that it has quantity at the beck, they prove thus: because the blessed are glorified: therefore they have all things at the beck: therefore also quantity.

1. Likewise, they have their visibility at the beck: therefore also quantity: for they are seen when they will, and when they will, they are not seen.

Against this, it is objected thus: because with the quantity remaining, it is impossible for the quantity to be made smaller without its contraction, or to be made larger without extension: therefore it is impossible for quantity to have at the beck, that it is greater and smaller, and with another body in the same place, and by itself in a place.

Response. To this, I think it must be said that glorious bodies do not have quantity at the beck in such a way that they can vary it when they will: but they have quantity and quality at the beck in such a way that nothing is contrary to their will concerning them.

To the proposition, it must be said that when it is said that the blessed have all things at the beck, it is understood of those things which are of the substance of beatitude: and others have in such a way that nothing will be contrary to their will concerning them.

And by this, the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 5 — What The Truth Of Human Nature Is

What is the truth of human nature?

What is the truth of human nature?

Then it is inquired concerning what is said, there, B, "For earthly matter does not perish for God," etc.

Here it is necessary to inquire about the truth of human nature, and three things are inquired before the Letter, namely, what is the truth of human nature? Secondly, whether it is one in all humans? And thirdly, whether something from nourishment is converted into human truth?

To the first, it is objected thus:
1. Anselm says that truth is a rectitude perceptible only by the mind: since this definition of

truth is of all truth, but human truth or the truth of human nature is a certain truth, it seems that it is not convertible with this definition.

1. Likewise, the truth of the human race is said, which is not perceptible only by the mind, but also corporally: therefore it seems that this definition does not suit it.
2. If for this reason it is said that truth is taken according to what Augustine says, that truth is the true entity of a thing: but this again does not seem to fit: because the true entity of a thing is everything that is in the body of a human, and yet this will not all appear in the resurrection: but whatever is of the truth of human nature, all will appear in the resurrection: therefore it seems that the aforementioned assignment of Augustine does not fit it.
3. But if it is said that truth is taken according to the Philosopher Avicenna saying that truth is the indivision of act from potency: but this truth of human nature is not after death, because then act is divided from potency: but the truth of human nature always remains, and will appear in the resurrection: therefore the said definition does not fit the truth of human nature.

Response. It must be said that the truth of human nature is said in two ways, namely abstractly and concretely. Abstractly, according to this, it is the indivision of potency and act: because this makes a thing have a true nature according to act, that is, according to the completion of its form, just as the truth of a stone is that by which the true being of a stone is, and the truth of a human is that by which the true being of a human is. However, taking it concretely, then the truth of human nature is the true nature of a human: and this is what is completed by the natural form of a human, which is the rational soul, by substantial completion, not accidental, just as something is in the nature of a human by accidental augmentation, and something falls away from the nature of a human by violence and accidental detriment, as will be clear below: and what indeed inheres by accidental augmentation is not of the truth of human nature. But what it has by violence or detriment of matter, it is present by virtue and nature, although it is absent by accident: and therefore it is of the truth of human nature by power and virtue, as Augustine says: and in this way, it is inquired here about the truth of human nature: and this is true according to what is opposed to being mixed with foreign nature, just as we say true gold is unmixed with other metal.

That truth is thus taken is clear from Hilary in Book V on the Trinity, where he says thus: "It is not doubtful to anyone that truth is taken from nature and from virtue, as for example it is said: True wheat is that which, structured in the ear, surrounded by awns, and threshed from the husks, and ground into flour, and baked into bread, and taken as food, has rendered from itself both the nature of bread and its function." Therefore, it is sometimes said to be true from its true nature perfected according to virtue and operation. Hence the same: "It is not taken from this that the same is understood by this word if it is said to me, 'fire is,' but it is not true fire: or 'water is,' but it is not true: and I ask, in what does the truth of the same genus differ from the truth of the same thing? For what is fire cannot be unless it is true, nor can

water, remaining in nature, lack being true. Destroy the water, which is water, and by that, you can abolish that it is not true."

Therefore, it must be said to the first that Anselm's definition does not fit except in the genus: and therefore it is necessary to add that it is the rectitude of human nature perceptible only by the mind.

To the other, it must be said that although it is in the body, it is not corporeal, but rather spiritual and formal: and therefore perceptible only by the mind, and not by sense or imagination: because the exclusive term placed in the definition of truth excludes the perception of sense and imagination.

To the other, it must be said that the true entity of a thing is only that in which, as in a substantial form, entity is rooted according to act and truth: other things are accidental influences and effluences.

To the other, it must be said that the truth of human nature is not after death, except as human nature itself, namely in potency, and therefore that argument concludes nothing inconvenient.

And by this, the solution to all is clear.

Nor should it be inquired here about the definitions of the truth of a sign or speech: because we speak here of the incomplex truth by which a human is called a true human.

Articulus 6 — Whether One Truth Of Human Nature Is In All Human Beings

Whether one truth of human nature is in all humans?

Secondly, it is asked, Whether one truth is in all humans?

It seems that it is so: because

1. Whatever things proceed from one naturally, are one in that: but all humans proceed from one naturally: therefore they are one in that: but that part of matter which will always appear under the nature of man, is true by the truth of human nature: therefore it seems that the truth of human nature is one in all.

1. Likewise, By one act nothing is done except into one: but by one act, all who were in the loins of the tither were tithed: therefore they were one in his loins: but here this is called the truth of human nature: therefore all the matter of man was in his loins: therefore the whole human race was one nature of matter in the loins of Adam: but by the nature of matter they were in his loins: therefore all humans are one truth of human nature, or have one truth of human nature.
2. Likewise, Human nature could not be infected, unless where it was wholly one: but by one and simple infection it was infected in Adam: therefore in Adam it was wholly one and simple: but all have that for the truth of human nature, which thus descended from Adam: therefore, etc.

On the contrary, whatever natural signate is not divisible into infinity, although the mathematical is divided into infinity: but the signate seed was natural: therefore, etc. And because we have disputed much about this in book II

of the Sentences, these suffice for the present: because there both it is discussed, and the opinions which are around this, namely if matter not understood by quantity is divisible, as some have said, and whether it is possible for it to be multiplied in itself without the addition of nourishment, and other such things.

Therefore, it must be said to the question, that the truth of human nature by reason is one in all humans, but in reality and subject it is many.

To the first objection, therefore, it must be said, that humans are not in some signate individual of which each has taken a part, but they are from one originally, as was said in the second of the Sentences.

To the second and third it must be said, that by one act it was tithed and infected, which was originally one, and not by some assigned part of matter: for I consider this frivolous, that according to this the whole work of nature would be miraculous, and it is directly against Augustine in book XXII of the City of God as will be clear in the following problem.

Articulus 7 — Whether Anything From Nourishment Is Converted Into Human Nature

Whether something from nourishment is converted into human nature?

Thirdly, it is asked, Whether something from nourishment is converted into human nature?

It seems that it is not: 1. For in Matthew 15:17, it is said: "Everything that enters the mouth goes into the stomach and is expelled into the latrine." But what is expelled is not converted into the truth of human nature. Therefore, etc.

1. Also, in the same place, the Gloss of Bede says thus: Any very thin humor or liquid food, when it has been cooked and digested in the veins and limbs, is expelled through hidden passages, which the Greeks call pores, into the latrine.
2. Also, the same reasoning applies to a certain thing and to all nourishment: but it is evident that something is expelled into the latrine: therefore, all nourishment is expelled into the latrine.
3. Also, the soul is owed to the organic body by itself: but the organic is not made from nourishment, but rather from radical and seminal moisture: therefore, the soul is not owed to the nutritional by itself: but there is no other truth of human nature: therefore, such nourishment is not of the truth of human nature.
4. Also, it seems harsh if that which is flesh of an ox by substance, rises again: but this follows, as some say, if nourishment is converted into the truth of human nature. For the flesh of an ox is eaten: if therefore nourishment is converted into the truth of human

nature, the flesh of an ox is converted into it: but whatever is of the truth of human nature will rise again: therefore, the flesh of an ox eaten will rise again.

5. Also, the resurrection will be according to that which we were in the loins of Adam: but we were not in the loins of Adam according to nutritional substance: therefore, the resurrection will not be according to nutritional substance.

6. Also, the mode of the truth of human nature is the same in all humans: but in infants recently born, nutritional flesh is not of the truth of human nature: and yet they will rise in the quantity of the age of thirty years: therefore, it seems that neither in others is nutritional flesh of the truth of human nature.

On the contrary, it is objected thus:

1. On that passage of the Epistle to the Philippians 2:7: "And being found in appearance as a man," Augustine says that some food changes a man and is changed, just as food which is changed into the body and changes it into strength: therefore, not all is expelled through the latrine.

2. Also, whatever is exhaustible by hunger and restorable by the refreshment of food, with the substance of the body remaining one and the same, that is nutritional flesh: much flesh of man is thus exhaustible and restorable: therefore, much flesh of man is nutritional. This is evident by itself, and from the hypothesis of those saying nothing is converted into the body from food, because if it is converted, then that into which it is converted will be nutritional. This is written in Book XXII, by these words: "Of the City of God." From this the proposition is evident. For whatever flesh hunger exhausts, it is certainly exhaled into the air: whence we said that the omnipotent God can recall what has fled.

3. There Augustine asks: If someone is fed on the flesh of another, and changes it into his own flesh, in what will that flesh rise again? Which question is none, if nourishment does not pass into the body of man.

4. Also, just as it is of the truth of water, according to the saying of Hilary, of which I can say, this is water or true water: so it is of the truth of human nature, of which I can say, this is the nature of man, or true nature of man: but such is flesh generated from this nourishment: therefore, nutritional flesh is of the truth of human nature. The minor is evident there by the words of Augustine.

5. Also, if the nature of man which is matter is multiplied in itself, as they say, this cannot be except in one of three ways, namely by the addition of something extraneous, and by the creation of matter in which the form is multiplied, or because it is so naturally that one is drawn from another as a part from a part. If in the first way: then it does not differ whether the substance of food or another is added, and thus food can be converted into the body and into the truth of human nature. If in the second way: then matter would be continuously created for it, and again that would be alien, and insofar as it is alien it does not differ even if the already created matter of food is added. But if in the

third way. Against: What makes something from itself, always makes it: human nature multiplies itself from itself: therefore, it always multiplies itself: therefore, its multiplication from itself will never stop, which is false, because if it were so, even growth would never stop, and we see that this stops.

6. Also, it seems according to this, that growth should be more intense in time when it stops, than when it begins: because when something is drawn from itself, less remains there than was before, and thus it resists less the action of multiplying: therefore, it will be more rapid then in multiplying, which is absurd.

But if you say that it multiplies without its diminution. Against: That one part becomes two equally first cannot be, except by the exit from potentiality to act: potentiality, however, does nothing: therefore, some agent would be posited there besides what is already there, whatever that may be.

If it is said that this is heat. Against: It acts only by rarefying and dispersing: therefore, the body multiplied in itself is rarer and more subtle than not multiplied: therefore, rarer and more subtle are the bodies of the old than of infants, which is absurd.

1. Also, what similar is found in the whole of nature, where act is drawn from act by multiplication, that is, flesh from flesh without any change, and many equal quantities from one smaller than themselves without addition?

2. Also, if there is any truth in natural philosophy, then generation is from the surplus of nourishment, which is separated by the fourth digestion: but none of such things is converted into human nature, as the adversary says: therefore, from none of such things is anything generated: therefore, it has been philosophized in vain, whatever has ever been said by Philosophers according to the marvelous philosophy of these.

3. Also, in the first book of Generation and Corruption, in the chapter on growth, the Philosopher says that food nourishes insofar as it is potentially flesh, but increases insofar as it is potentially as much flesh: therefore, it must be that it is converted into the human body.

4. Also, according to this, the whole work of nature would be miraculous, which is absurd.

5. Also, to what does natural heat in the body avail? For according to the marvelous wisdom of these, it does not act by increasing, and food is not placed in the body, except to be the matter of heat, lest the subject be burned: therefore, it would be better if heat were not there: because thus we would not need food, and then God would have perfected His work in a shorter way, which is ridiculous.

6. Also, everything that is made here by some active and heat, does not act by increasing: therefore, something else acts it: not coldness, because that motion is towards the center rather by diminishing through constriction within, than by increasing through multiplication outward.

If you say that it is from the substantial form, this is a new philosophy, that the substantial form acts in nature, when it is nothing and its contrary.

1. Also, if the saying of Bede is considered valid, saying that nourishment does not pass into the body of man, why is it not as valid to seek from him a remedy against dropsy, with Galen being despised? For Bede says that dropsy is a humor under the skin born from the defect of the bladder: but curing the bladder, cures dropsy. Galen, however, says that the liver should be cured, because it is born from the defect of the liver. And I wonder if these inquire, making the cure of Bede, with Galen being despised.

Response. It must be said that it is ridiculous to say that nothing from food is converted into the human body, and such sayings of certain theologians make theology laughable among the learned.

Therefore, it must be said to the first, that "everything" is distributed for subjective parts, not integral: because whatever species enters the mouth there, has much impurity and little purity: and therefore, every species is expelled into the latrine, although not entirely.

To the other, it must be said that it seems to me little to be cared about the sayings of Bede, where he does not speak of faith and morals: because he was ignorant of natures. Yet, lest we seem to flee, it must be said that he speaks of the part of food according to the matter of nutritional flesh and not according to the species: because the Philosopher says that every flesh is increased according to the species, and not every is increased according to the matter: because the matter of similar members flows in and out, but not the species: and in this way, after digestion, every is nourished and increased according to the species, as is proved in the first book of Generation and Corruption.

To the other, it must be said that it is not the same reasoning about one and about all: because one is according to nature by accident, and one is completing quantity, and the other is restoring only what is lost: and therefore it is false that the same reasoning is about one and the other, as will be evident below.

To the other, it must be said that the soul is first owed to the organic body, and secondly it is owed to the adjunct organic for the completion of the quantity of the organs, and thirdly it is owed to restoring only what is lost, and fourthly to that which is united to the organic and material: and according to all these modes, it is said to be the truth of human nature, and the first which is from radical moisture, will all appear in the resurrection. The second, however, is there actually in the living, and potentially in infants, and also all will appear, unless it is taken from the feeding of human flesh, as will be said below.

Of the third, however, there will appear as much as is fitting: and of the fourth, nothing: because it has only an accidental and unnatural union to the immortal soul.

To the other, it must be said that this seems harsh to the unskilled, who say there that the flesh of an ass as an ass changes them, not knowing the sayings of the wise, that nourishment is first dissimilar, and finally similar, and then it is not the flesh of an ass, but proximate potentiality to the flesh of man. And in their argument, there is a fallacy of the figure of

speech, as is this paralogism: Whatever you eat, is converted into nourishment: but you eat raw flesh of an ass: therefore, raw flesh of an ass is converted into your nourishment.

To the other, it must be said that in the loins of Adam we were not according to any designated matter, but according to original matter, as has been said.

To the third, it must be said that in infants is all the nourishment, which was to lead to the perfection of quantity, potentially: actually, however, as Augustine says, the power of creating and glorifying will supply.

And by this, the solution to the whole is evident.

Articulus 8 — How Many Are The Modes Of Dissolution; And In Whom Will The Rib Rise Again, In Adam Or In Eve; And How Will Those Who Eat Human Flesh Rise Again

How many modes of dissolution are there? And, in whom will the rib rise again, in Adam or in Eve? And, how will those who consume human flesh rise again?

Then it is asked concerning what is said there, B, shortly after the first words: But into whatever dust or ashes it may be dissolved, etc.

First, it is asked why in the Text so many modes of dissolution of the human body are posited, namely dust, ashes, habit, air, the substance of other bodies, elements, food of animals and humans, and the flesh of animals and humans?

Further, it is asked concerning the rib of Adam, whether it will rise again in Adam or in Eve?

It seems that it will rise again in Adam by the rule given in the Text: because namely the soul of Adam first vivified it in the part of the human body: therefore it will rise again in Adam, as it seems: but if this is true, then Eve will not rise again, because she was entirely taken from that rib.

Further, a grave question of Augustine is asked, namely concerning him who is nourished by human flesh, in whom will that flesh rise again?

It is said that it will rise again in him who first animated it, because it is as if borrowed from another: then it is asked, What will rise again in him who was fed with that flesh?

1. For it seems that he will rise again with defect, which is false: because, as was previously held, they will rise again incorrupt.
2. Likewise, suppose that he who is fed with human flesh generates a son from the surplus of that food: then it is certain that from the moist seed the organic substance of the born is formed. Therefore, if this is restored first, then no organic substance will rise again in such a born: therefore it will not rise again, which is inconvenient.
3. Likewise, the question is aggravated thus: Suppose that someone is nourished from animated members in which there is nothing except organic substance, and generates from that surplus: for it is certain that it is first in truth in both, namely in him who is

taken as food, and in him who is born from such food. But it is certain that it cannot rise again in both: therefore one of these will not rise again, which is inconvenient.

4. To this, some have said that such a...

The manner of food is impeded by the order of nature: because man ought to be nourished by vegetables and beasts, and not by human flesh: and therefore it cannot be food from such. But we see this to be nothing. For Aristotle says in the Ethics concerning the feral ones, that they are nourished by human flesh, as Medea who incorporated her two own sons in one meal: and in the Lamentations of Jeremiah, iv, 10: The hands of compassionate women have boiled their own children: they became their food, in the destruction of the daughter of my people. Therefore, the position made seems possible.

Response. To this it must be said, that in truth, as said elsewhere, there is a twofold moisture, namely radical and nutritive. The radical, however, is that which is in the substance of the seed which is formed by the formative power into organs. The formative power, however, is in the seed from the soul of the father alone, having heat as an instrument with a threefold heat, namely of the soul, of the heavens, and of fire: and from the heat of fire is dissolving and distending, but from the heat of the heavens moving into form and inducing form, and from the heat of the soul it moves to life and soul. Similarly, there is also cold there in a threefold power: for the cold of the element is coagulating, and the cold of the heavens terminating to form, and insofar as it is an instrument of the soul, it contains the complexible vivifiable. And similarly it is with the moist and dry, as the Authors say. This moisture, however, is nutritive superfluous in the generator, and radical or seminal in the generated: and therefore it is substantial to the generated, and accidental to the generator. The nutritive moisture, however, is twofold. One which by the power of nature is drawn to the nourishment of the seminal moisture, and this among others is more substantial after the seminal moisture. The other, however, which is acquired externally through food, and this is for a threefold use, namely for the nourishment of quantity according to the perfection of stature, and for restoring what is lost so that being and life may continue: and the third which is accidental, which arises from the excess of food, and is called by the Philosopher unnatural augmentation, as those who cool the places of digestion or have them cold become ventrose: for in these the natural heat is converting, not consuming: and much viscosity and fatness arises in them beyond nature. Therefore, the general rule in the resurrection is that the nourishment taken from these moistures will rise in that in which it is more nobly animated to life.

And this being supposed, it must be said to the first, that he posits so many, because the modes of resolutions are either natural, or through violent corruption into another body. If in the first way: then either the resolution is complete, or incomplete. If complete, then it is into the elements. Incomplete, so that something still remains, either as to the subtle parts, or as to the gross parts. If in the first way, then in two ways: for either it is a part more closely spiritual, or remote. And in the first way, breath: in the second way, aura, because both parts are airy vaporous due to the vaporous moisture exhaling from the body and expiring, and the

grosser is more called breath, but the more subtle and approaching air is called aura. But if as to the gross parts, either this is by the desiccation of the continuing moisture, or by the exsiccation of the moisture extracting moisture. And in the first way it is dust, in the second way ashes. But if it is through violent corruption, it is the incorporation of man into another body of man: either this is as to the vegetable, or as to the sensible. If in the first way, it is that which passes into the substance of other bodies like vegetables, as the poet says:

The soil luxuriates with Phrygian blood. And roses planted in soil manured with human blood bring forth roses more quickly, as Hermes says in Alchemy

as to the sensible: either according to the way of incorporation, or according to the terminus. And indeed in the first way it is what he calls the food of animals or men: in the second way it is what he calls the flesh of men or animals: and from this also it is taken, that food is converted into the flesh of men.

To the other it must be said, that Adam was made in two ways, namely according to those things which are required for the individual, and according to those things which are required for the principle of the human race which he was. And in the first way indeed the rib was never of the truth of human nature in Adam, but in the second way; and therefore it will rise in what is originated from him, and yet Adam will rise without diminution.

To the other it must be said, that one nourished from human flesh can be nourished in two ways. In one way indeed from that which is from the power of human nature in the first or second or third or fourth, and this whole will be restored in the first. Or he can be nourished from that which was in the fifth way from the truth, and this remains in the nourished, because it was never of the integrity of the first except by accident, and therefore it has a nobler being in the second than in the first.

To what is objected, it must be said that no one suffers defect from his own: and if it is, God will supply, as Augustine expressly says about dead infants.

To the other it must be said, that this will rise in the second: because it has a nobler being in the second, than in the first, because in the first it is from nutritive moisture: and in the second from radical and spermatic or seminal moisture.

To the other it must be said, that that case is difficult: yet without prejudice I say, that when the second is nourished by such offspring whose members are formed and animated, I say that there is a twofold moisture, namely seminal, and nutritive drawn in the womb: and because the species is not converted, but rather much is cast off from the matter, it seems to be said that from the cast off as impure the body of the first is restored: but from the drawn and sown the body of the second is restored by the omnipotent God, to whom by dying our bodies do not perish, but are transformed for the better: and thus it is clear, that both will rise, and what is lacking, the divine hand of wisdom, which created all things, supplies.

To the conclusion, however, induced it seems to be conceded, as it was proven by objecting to the contrary.

Articulus 9 — Whether A Man Will Rise The Same In Number With Respect To Matter, Such That The Matter Of Each Member Returns

Whether man rises again the same in number with respect to matter, such that the matter of each member returns?

Then it is asked concerning what is said there, B, after the beginning: "Therefore the earthly matter which becomes a corpse when the soul departs, etc."

For it seems false what is said here: because

1. The Philosopher says that just as the whole soul is related to the whole body, so a part is to a part: therefore the matter perfectible by sight is not perfectible by hearing: therefore it will be incongruously ordered if it returns to hearing: but nothing will be incongruous there: therefore the matter of each member returns to itself: therefore it is false what is said in the Letter.
2. Likewise, it seems that it is not necessary for all the matter to return as the Letter says: because spiritual bodies need less of matter: but those will be spiritual especially with respect to the good: therefore they will have less of matter: therefore it is false what is said, that all the matter will return.
3. Likewise, the acts of different merits are made through different organs: therefore it is just that the matter of those organs be reiterated in those members in which they exercised meritorious acts: therefore it is necessary that it returns to the same members.
4. Likewise, just as there is a certain truth of the universal body, so there is a truth of the particular member, of which it can be said, "this is the true nature of a hand or foot": therefore just as by the power of universal truth all the matter will return to the whole, so by the power of the particular member the middle part will return to the determined part.
5. Likewise, one member is nobler than another; therefore it is incongruously done if the nobler is converted into the ignobler, or vice versa: therefore it seems that it is necessary that to each member its own matter be returned.

Response. It must be said that each part has its entity from the form: and therefore whatever variation is made in matter, or confusion of parts of matter, always one truth remains from the act of one form: and this is what Augustine intends. Hence, although conversion could be made, I nevertheless think, saving better judgment, that each will return to the same member in which it was: but yet it is possible to be otherwise, as is said in the Letter.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that this only makes for the congruity of return: but there will be another harmony of parts in the resurrection: and therefore this objection does not hold.

To the second, it must be said that, as was previously evident, glorification will not be by way of subtraction of parts of matter, but rather by way of subtraction of properties pertaining to the state of ignobility.

To the third, it must be said that merit is not of the member except instrumentally: but just as the act is of the whole, so also is the reward: and therefore no injury will be done to anyone, in whatever way they are rewarded.

To the fourth, it must be said that the truth which will appear in the resurrection is especially from the immortality of the soul, and the soul does not have this from the parts, but from the whole, namely from itself and from God: and therefore the parts do not confer this kind of truth except in a certain respect, namely insofar as they are united to the whole: and therefore also in whatever part it rises again, it is well done with it.

To the fifth, it must be said that if the harmony which now is were to remain, and the nobility of perpetuity were from the members, then that reasoning would proceed: but, as was evident above, neither of these is true: and therefore variation can be made in the parts of matter, as Augustine clearly says in the Letter.

Articulus 10 — Whether All Hairs And Nails Return In The Resurrection; And Whether The Truth Of Human Nature Is An Accident

Whether all hair and nails return in the resurrection? and, Whether the truth of human nature is an accident?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said, there, B, around the middle: Otherwise if hair returns, etc.

1. For it seems this is against the Gospel of Luke, xxi, 18, where it is said: And, etc. Therefore it seems, the hair from the head that all will return.
2. Likewise, in the text it suggests, that although hairs do not return to hairs, nevertheless the matter of hairs and nails will return to the mass of the body: and this does not seem to be necessary since the whole integrity is preserved without this.

Further, it is asked for the sake of this inseparability, Whether the truth of human nature is substance, or accident?

However, it seems that it is an accident: because 1. The substance of each thing is in one way: but truth is in a diverse way, as it has been held according to five ways above: therefore it is an accident.

1. Likewise, everything that follows the being of man, is of the genus of accidents, as Boethius says: but truth follows the being of man: therefore it is of the genus of accidents.

On the contrary, the true entity of a thing can never be an accident: but truth is the true entity of a thing: therefore, etc.

Response. It must be said, that hairs are generated from the dry vapor of nourishment, which is dried when it reaches the air through the pores. Nails, however, are from the dry earthly matter expelled to the surface by the heat of the heart. And therefore, as Augustine

says, they are not of the truth according to themselves, but insofar as they contribute to beauty: and therefore also insofar as they perfect beauty, they will rise again, and the rest will be cut off.

To the other it must be said, that it does not intend that they return to the mass, but it is an example, that it is not necessary that all material parts return to the same members, since what seems less, even certain parts can be discarded.

To what is further asked, it must be said that truth is said to be twofold, namely essential, and participated. Essential is the substantial form differing by reason: because truth is said insofar as it is the principle of cognition in act or habit: form however insofar as it gives being. Participated truth, however, is that which is had from the members from the perfect parts of the form, and this also is substance or potency following the substance of the form: and if it is such a potency, then indeed it is an accident, which is a natural potency, and is rooted as in its cause in the substance of the form, which perfects the matter and the parts of matter.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 11 — Whether The Same Man Who Died Will Rise Again

Whether the same man who died will rise again?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says there, B, shortly after the middle: It would not matter to his integrity, which is a part of the material, etc.

For from this it seems to follow that not the same man in number will rise again who died: because

1. The image which is restored is not the same in number.
2. Furthermore, whatever things do not have the same substantial form in number, those are not the same in number: but the substantial form of the dying and rising man is not the same in number: therefore the dying and rising are not the same in number. The first is evident per se. The second is evident from this, that the substantial form is humanity, and that perishes in death, because a dead man is not a man: but the form which has passed into nothing does not return the same in number, because the Philosopher says that the health in the morning is not the same as in the evening.
3. Likewise, the Philosopher at the end of the book On Generation and Corruption: Whatever things have a moved corporeal substance, are not repeated the same in number: but man thus has a moved corporeal substance: therefore he is not repeated the same in number.
4. Likewise, whatever things are generable and corruptible do not participate in divine being in the individual, but in the species: but man is generable and corruptible: therefore, etc.: therefore it does not happen that he returns according to the same individual, but only according to the identity of the species.

Response, It must be said that the likeness which Augustine adduces is similar in part:

because in bronze the same form, which is the figure, does not remain: but in the rising man the same form, which is the rational soul, remains.

To the other it must be said that there are two ways to respond to this. For if we say with Avicenna that the form of the whole is other than the form of the part which is the soul, just as the form of the whole is predicable as man and animal of this man and that: then that form is abstractly signified, although improperly, by what I call humanity, and that does not remain except in potency after death in the principles composing the whole, of which it is the form: and by reason of that form the individual does not have that it is the same in number, but it has the species only which is indifferent to the same in number and different: but from this soul thus completing the matter and from this matter it has that it is the same in number: and therefore it does not follow, if it does not have the same form of the whole which is of the species or genus or being, that it is not the same in number.

Furthermore, the same species is, although the being is not the same which it had before and after in this individual: and therefore it is the same in number in species with the prior man, nor is the species destroyed by death except accidentally, namely according to this being which it has according to this state in this.

But if we agree with Averroes and Aristotle that the form of the whole is the form of the matter, differing however by reason, as he seems to wish in the seventh of the first Philosophy: then it is clear that it is the same in number, and the form is not destroyed according to itself, or according to its being, but only with respect to the reason of predication of the composite, because the composite is dissolved.

To the other it must be said that this is understood of those things which altogether have a corruptible substance: but such a thing is not man, because the soul is perpetual, and from it the body acquires a certain potency for incorruption.

To the other it must be said that this is understood of those things which are generated according to themselves wholly, that is, whose form according to itself wholly is brought forth by the act of nature from the matter: and such a thing is not man, whose rational soul is made by creation, as Aristotle says in the first of the Causes of the properties of the elements and planets, and in the book XVI of Animals he says that the intellect is not brought forth from matter, like the vegetative and sensitive, but enters from outside.

Articulus 12 — Whether Mutilated Thieves Will Rise With Bodies Whole

Whether mutilated robbers will rise with whole bodies?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said, there, C, §1: "This, however, is to be understood in the bodies of the saints," etc.

For it is inquired concerning those who are first robbers and are mutilated in robbery, and afterwards are converted and become saints, whether the mutilated parts will be restored to them glorified?

It seems that they will not: because this member will never cooperate with sanctity: therefore it ought never to be rewarded in glorification.

To this it must be said that they are glorified, and the reason is the opposite of what was said above concerning the wicked: because merit belongs to the whole man according to the soul: and therefore the will to merit in that member, if it is had, will be reckoned as an act, by reason of which that power of the soul will be glorified in its member restored to it.

Articulus 13 — Whether After The Resurrection The Bodies Of The Saints Are Impassible

Whether after the resurrection of the dead the bodies of the saints are impassible?

Then by reason of what he says, there, C, § 1, after the beginning: Without any vice, without any deformity, just as without any corruption, etc.

The question is about the impassibility of the bodies of the Saints.

And four things are asked, namely, whether they are impassible? And secondly, In what manner are they impassible? Thirdly, Whether all are equally impassible? And fourthly, What is the difference between being free from vice and deformity and corruption? All of which he sets forth in the Letter,

Against this it is objected thus:
1. Whatever has the same potency with passible things, those are passible: the bodies of the glorious have the same potency with passible things: therefore they are passible. The first is evident by itself. The second is proved by this, that the glorious and the non-glorious are of the same nature, which is passible in the non-glorious.

1. Likewise, Every composite of passible things is passible: the glorious body is composed of passible things: therefore it is passible.
2. Likewise, Every heterogeneous thing in parts is composed of parts suffering differently: every human body, glorious and non-glorious, is heterogeneous in parts: therefore it is composed of parts suffering differently: therefore it is passible in its parts.
3. Likewise, If anyone says that they are impassible by grace or glory, but passible by nature. On the contrary: Everything is more denominated by natural disposition than by actual, and by nature rather than by another form: therefore they ought rather to be called passible than impassible.
4. Likewise, Since every accident flows from substance, an accident contrary to the substance itself cannot flow from substance: therefore from a passible substance never flows an accident that makes that substance impassible: therefore no accident can be in such a substance by which it is said to be impassible: therefore since grace and glory are accidental, it seems that those bodies cannot be said to be impassible by grace or glory.
5. Likewise, Grace and glory are perfections of nature: but perfection never opposes the perfect: therefore, since the perfect is passible, impassibility will never be caused by perfection, because passible and impassible are opposed.

6. Likewise, The Philosopher says that every natural substance is passible, especially composed of contraries: if therefore that substance remains, it will always be passible: but that substance will remain in the resurrection: therefore in the resurrection it will always be passible.
7. Likewise, Every complex is informed and distinguished by passible qualities: therefore it will remain passible.

On the contrary of this is what is said,

1. 1 Corinthians 15:54: Death is swallowed up. But death is not swallowed up in victory unless passibility is swallowed up. Therefore the bodies of the saints will not be passible then.
2. Likewise, Revelation 21:4: And death shall be no more. From this the same is taken that neither mourning, nor crying, nor pain shall be anymore, because the former things have passed away.
3. Likewise, 1 Corinthians 15:42: It is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption. But everything incorruptible is impassible. Therefore the bodies of the saints will be impassible.
4. Likewise, Matthew 13:43: Then the righteous will shine like the sun, etc. But the sun is impassible. Therefore also the righteous.

Response. It must be said that the bodies of the saints are impassible contrary to lesion.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that the potency of passibility is twofold, namely disposed and indisposed. And indisposed is twofold, namely disposed to either, and joined to the necessity of the contrary act. And disposed indeed is in the mortal body. Indisposed, however, was in some way in Adam, although it was somewhat disposed to the contrary, namely if he did not sin, he would not suffer. Joined, however, to the necessity of the contrary, is in the glorious body, where there is no potency of suffering except in the root: and the impossibility of suffering is from the perfection of the form to glory.

To the other, it must be said that the components of the human body will not retain active and passive qualities, except as they are constituting complexionality, but not as to this that they act or suffer in the discourse of complexion: and therefore they will never induce any lesion. However, some have said that the elements will be there in the elemented as to the first being of the element only. And elemental qualities will be there as in the root and potency, and not as to any action. But the first is truer and more natural.

To the other, it must be said that that heterogeneous body has suffered all those things which it was necessary to suffer for complexion and formation: but thereafter passion is removed from it because of the victory of the form from glory over matter, because matter is not possible for the reception of any violent act of lesion, just as neither is the matter of celestial bodies from the victory of the form over matter: for every passion is of matter or

composite, whose matter by the form is not removed from passibility and led to the impassibility of the form.

To the other, it must be said that from the natural which is the form, denomination ought to be, unless it is so that the form cannot perfect and convert the matter to itself in whole, as now the form of those things which are generated and corrupted imperfectly obtains the matter, but then it will obtain through the habit of glory in whole: and therefore from the act of that form they will be impassible, because it cannot act to the separation of the form from the matter in whole or in part.

To the other, it must be said that there is a twofold accident, namely caused by the substance in which it is, and that is not the perfection of it: and there is an accident caused by a superior substance to the perfection of the inferior, as is grace and glory: and this does not flow from the substance in which it is, nor is it contrary to it, but rather is the final perfection of it, and agrees with the form, and is not contrary except to materiality and privation: and therefore nothing prohibits denomination from it.

To the other, it must be said that as it was evident, grace and glory do not have contrariety to the perfect from them, but rather agreement, because they help the form to that which it is and cannot from natural things: for it is the form to remove privation from matter, and it removes it: but it cannot remove the potency of returning privation because of dissolving the complexion, except through grace and glory: and therefore grace and glory are added to it by God: because they raise nature to a higher state in which the continuity of the body cannot be dissolved.

To the other, it must be said that this is true as to the first components: but those are never overcome by the perfection of the mixed, so that they cannot further act and suffer to the destruction of the mixed.

To the other, it must be said that complexional qualities cannot act there, except to the state of the mixed, and not to the excess of one over the other, as has been said often: and this is effected in such a body through grace and glory.

Articulus 14 — How The Bodies Of The Saints Are Said To Be Impassible

How are the bodies of the saints said to be impassible?

Secondly, it is asked, In what mode of impassibility are they said to be impassible?

1. For either impassibility denotes the privation of the act of suffering, or the privation of potency. If in the first mode: then this gift was also had by the body of Adam in paradise, which is false. But if it deprives potency, since that is rooted in nature, it seems that it also deprives nature, and thus those bodies would not be of the same nature as these, which is false.
2. Moreover, Passion is said from the Greek "nafsiv," which is to receive: but those bodies are or seem to be susceptible, in that they are at least altered according to the senses,

since they see and hear, and are affected according to other senses: therefore it seems that not all impassibility is removed from them, but some.

3. Moreover, Passion is twofold, namely of the division of the continuous, and of the sense of pain without division, as when the hot touches the cold. Therefore, either those bodies are said to be impassible according to the first mode, or according to the second. If it is said that in the first mode, even the bodies of the damned will be impassible: because they cannot be cut, nor divided, nor corrupted. But if in the second mode: then also the body of Adam in the first state had the impassibility of the gift, which is false.

4. Moreover, it seems that this mode of impassibility cannot agree with a complexioned body: because touch perceives only the excellent qualities of touch: but the excellent acts upon that which it touches, and suffers excess: therefore if the glorious body feels according to touch, of necessity it can suffer according to touch, if that which is touched is intensified.

1. Moreover, Either this impassibility follows the will, or the necessity of nature. If the will: then it is such as Adam's, namely that it does not suffer if he does not wish to sin, and if he wishes to sin, he suffers. But if the necessity of nature: then it must be rooted in an impassible nature, which is false.

2. Moreover, The will is nobler than nature, because the will is free, and not bound to necessity: therefore the impassibility which follows the will is nobler than that which follows nature: but the glorious body has the noblest impassibility, therefore it seems that it has that which follows the will. And if so, again further it follows, that it is of the same reason with the impassibility of Adam.

3. Moreover, A habit perfecting nature perfects it according to the mode and act of nature: but that impassibility does not so perfect the glorious body: therefore it does not follow nature. The first is evident by itself. The second, however, from the comparison which Augustine makes of the states of free will and immortality, which is had in the book of the Sentences: because the ability not to sin follows the ability not to die, and to necessarily sin is to necessarily die, and to not be able to sin is to not be able to die.

Response. It must be said that all passibility is from matter, and impassibility from form: and therefore habits exalting form over matter to remove privation and dispositions contrary to form perfect impassibility, and in man they cannot be except by grace and glory, thus containing agents and patients, so that they never act to the discursive of complexion or division of the composition of parts.

However, how this is done can be understood as Aristotle suggests and the Commentator explains. Elements are preserved in the mixture according to their substantial forms: but the elemental properties, namely the active and passive primary qualities, are in the mixture not according to their proper act, but according to the act of the mixture: for each of the contraries is altered by the other to the act of the mixture. However, that which contains the act of the

mixture is everything that impedes the intensification of one contrary over the other in the act of the mixture and the union of the mixables, as medicinal things preserving health do: but in place of those, let us imagine a habit placed in the body making another state, and not another nature, namely in which state the act of the mixture so prevails that it completely dominates the powers of the mixables, so that they can never be intensified or diminished, neither by an internal cause nor an external one, and then the mixture is unalterable and impassible: and this is the impassibility of the glorious body.

Therefore, it must be said to the first, that it denotes the privation of the potency disposed to suffering, namely, not the privation of the root which is only in this, that the elements are present as to their first being, which would suffer if the form making another state did not impede. Whence it is clear that the objections are worth nothing against this.

To the other it must be said, that perhaps the bodies will not be receptive according to sense. But whatever may be of this, it will be determined below in the question concerning the senses of the glorious body. But as far as pertains to the present, if they are conceded to be receptive: then it must be said that they do not receive the agent in the mode of nature, but the agent through spiritual intention in the manner of the soul: and from this no harmful passion arises. And what this is to say will be explained below when it is treated of the senses.

To the other it must be said, that in both ways it is said to be impassible, and it differs from that which was Adam's in the habit making and in the state. For the habit making impassibility...

In Adam there was the grace of innocence, but in the glorious there is glory. And the state of Adam was to be able not to suffer; but here it will be to be able to suffer.

To the other it must be said, that this does not follow except for those things which act in touch by the action of nature: but then the qualities of the touching will not be perceived, except by spiritual action and of the soul: and it is rather an intentional perception than a corporeal one, as will be determined below.

From Attup it must be said, that this impassibility is by nature, and yet it is caused by the merit of the will. But that objection and all objections up to the end prove nothing else. But how it differs from the immortality of Adam is clear from the things previously stated.

Also, how it is one and how it is diverse, let it be referred to those things disputed upon the second of the Sentences, where it is treated of the state of Adam before sin.

Articulus 15 — Whether All Glorious Bodies Are Equally Impassible

Whether all glorious bodies are equally impassible?

Thirdly, it is asked, Whether all glorious bodies are equally impassible?

It seems, however, that they are equally so: because

1. Privations do not admit of intensity and remission: but impassibility is said from the

privation of passibility: therefore it does not receive intensity and remission: therefore it is equally in all the glorious.

1. Likewise, there cannot be a greater impassibility than the privation of passion towards harmful internal and external things: and this is in all the glorious: therefore all are equally impassible.
2. Likewise, white is more unmixed with black: but if it is in no way mixed, then it will signify its thing in the term, and it is impossible for there to be intensity upon this. Similarly, the impassible does not seem able to be intensified beyond separation from all passion. Thus, however, all glorious bodies are impassible. Therefore, it seems that they are equally impassible.
3. Likewise, the Gloss on 1 Corinthians 15:42 says: "Equally all have that they cannot suffer."

On the contrary,
1. Impassibility is a reward: but rewards are not equal: therefore neither is the impassibility of the bodies of the saints and the glorious.

1. Likewise, the same reasoning applies to one dowry as to another: but the others are possessed unequally: therefore so is this one.

Response. It must be said that impassibility is possessed unequally.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that although impassibility according to the name signifies privation, yet it is founded upon a habit making that impassibility, as was said in the preceding problem. Moreover, in comparison to its cause, it can be intensified, even if in itself it is a privation.

To the second, it must be said that although it does not deprive more in one than in another, yet a more strongly resisting habit deprives in one than in another, and according to this, one is more impassible than another.

To the third, it must be said that it is equally in all in the mixed proportion of suffering: but yet from inequality it does not resist, as has been said.

To the fourth, it must be said that the Gloss is understood with respect to the exclusion of things causing passion: but yet there is inequality from the resisting, as has been said.

Articulus 16 — Whether It Is The Same To Be Free From Vice, Deformity, And Corruption

Whether it is the same to be without vice, deformity, and corruption?

Whether it is the same to be without vice, deformity, and corruption?

Fourthly, it is asked, What is the difference between being without vice, deformity, and corruption?

1. Because Augustine says thus in the book XXII of the City of God: "I do not know how we are so affected by the love of the blessed martyrs, that we wish to see in that kingdom the scars of wounds in their hearts, which they endured for the name of Christ, and perhaps we shall see them. For there will not be deformity in them, but dignity: and a certain beauty, although in the body, will shine forth, not of the body, but of virtue: nor, however, if some members were amputated and taken away from the martyrs, will they be without those members in the resurrection of the dead, to whom it was said: 'Not a hair of your head will perish.'"
2. Likewise, in the body of Christ the scars will appear, as is evident, John 20:27: therefore also in the bodies of other martyrs.

Response. It must be said that vice signifies a mutilation which is in the diminution of a member: deformity, however, signifies an incongruent proportion of the members to each other and of color to figure: corruption, however, signifies the potency of passion, and all these will be removed there.

To the objection, however, it must be said that scars will not appear insofar as they are corruptive of continuity, but rather insofar as they are signs of the most constant virtue, by which they suffered for justice and faith: and this is gathered from the words of Augustine introduced.

To the last, however, it must be said that the wounds of Christ will not appear, except in demonstration of the resurrection.

Articulus 17 — Whether Agility Befits Glorious Bodies

Does agility pertain to glorious bodies?

Then, it is inquired by the grace of this which is said, there, C, $4, shortly after: Burden, difficulty: in which there is such ease, etc.

It is inquired concerning the agility of glorious bodies, which is one of the endowments of the blessed.

And six questions are asked. The first is, Does agility pertain to glorious bodies? The second is, What is agility or the virtue which is posited as an endowment? The third, From what is the virtue of that agility caused? The fourth, Whether it is present in the saints in one way or in a different way? The fifth, Whether glorious bodies are moved? The sixth, Whether they are moved in time, or in an instant?

To the first, it is proceeded thus: 1. Every motion of some bodily organ having a contrary motion to the mover induces weariness and pain: such is the motion of progression of every man: therefore it induces weariness and pain: therefore glorious bodies will never be so agile that they are not burdened and wearied by motion. The first is evident by itself: because the

cause of the predicate is in the subject. The second is proved from this, that as the Philosopher says in II of Generation and Corruption, in every mixed body earth dominates: but its motion is to the center, and not before, and back, to the right, and to the left, according to the appetite of the will which moves in progressive motion.

1. Likewise, Every motion causing distance from a principle is inductive of corruption: but such is every motion of an elemental body: therefore every motion of such a body induces corruption: but glorious bodies will be incorruptible: therefore they will not have a disposition to such motion: therefore they will not be agile, because agility signifies disposition.
2. Likewise, Every incorporation of an intellectual nature depresses it: but after the resurrection, the rational soul is incorporated: therefore the body depresses the soul: therefore it retards: therefore it is impossible for the body to have a disposition in which it attains the speed of the soul: therefore it is not agile, because such an endowment is posited by all to be agility.
3. Likewise, Indeterminate motion of a voluntary or violent terminus is only through an element which is also light in some way, such as air and water, as is proved in IV of Heaven and World. Therefore such motion cannot be in heaven: therefore agility would be given in vain for such motion.
4. Likewise, Every voluntary and violent motion is diminished at the end: however, it is evident that there is some cause of that diminution, and not unless it is the heaviness of the organ: therefore the organ is never sufficiently agile: therefore it will not have agility as an endowment.
5. Likewise, If someone says that it is not diminished. On the contrary: To whom its proper passion belongs, to that belongs the subject: but the proper passion of natural motion is not to be diminished at the end: therefore that motion of the glorious body is natural: therefore the natural motion of the same body is to different places, before, and back, to the right, and to the left, and downward, and upward, which is absurd and impossible.

On the contrary of this is what is said, ;. .

1. Isaiah 40:31: They shall run, and not be weary, etc.
2. Likewise, In the Letter it is said, that there is as much ease as there is happiness. But that happiness is agility for motion: therefore they will have agility: and these are the words not of the Master, but of Augustine[741].
3. Likewise, 1 Corinthians 15:43: It is sown in weakness, it rises in power. But by power, as a certain Gloss says there, mobility is understood which is called agility.
4. Likewise, It is of the nature of beatitude to have those things which are of the perfection of power in the mode of possession, that is, at will: but of the perfection of mobile

power in that which is moved, is agility: therefore glorious bodies ought to have that in the mode of possession, that is, at will.

Resolution. It must be said that bodies will be agile not only for local motion, but in all works whatsoever the appetite which moves the organs will wish to accomplish, as will be evident below.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that the heaviness which would be in the organ for the depression of the motive power if it were not glorified, is from materiality, and since then matter is entirely overcome by the glory of the resurrection, that heaviness will entirely cease, so that it will induce no labor to the motive power.

To the other, it must be said that motion which changes something in the subject causes the mobile to be distant from its principles: but in which the subject in one way remaining, passes to another place from another, is not such motion: and therefore local motion can pertain to perfect and immortal bodies, and such is the motion of organs in glorious bodies at the will of the motive power, and therefore it will never induce weariness and pain.

To the other, it must be said that the body is that whose motion reaches to the soul, so that from it the perfection of knowledge and work is received, as is the animal body, in which the soul is perfected by sciences and virtues: and of such it is true that it depresses the soul in the mode of thinking and working: and this is intended, Wisdom 9:15, where it is said: The corruptible body weighs down the soul. There is also a body or rather the state of the body, in which the soul receives nothing from the body, but rather all the glory of the body is a certain redundancy of the glory and splendor of the soul, and that body in no way depresses the soul, but will be apt to obey at will, and that aptitude is its agility.

To the other, it must be said that this is true of motion which is for the sake of the need of food or other solace, which is sought in different places by the heavy animated body: but motion which is in the demonstration of glory and beatitude is more fitting in heaven, than in another body or element.

To the other, it must be said that that motion is at will, and therefore it is not diminished, except as the will's command dictates: but the object holds of motion in which the mobile finally overcomes the power moving it: and this can never be in a body, whose mobility is entirely caused by the happiness of the will: and this is what is said in the Letter, that there is as much ease in them as there is happiness.

To the other, it must be said that the passion of natural motion is to be intensified at the end from the victory of the generator over the generated: for as much as is given to the generated from the form of the generator, so much also is given to it from the motion of the generator. And because by greater access the form of the generator overcomes the privation of the generated thing, and the form of the generator is strengthened in the generated, therefore it has more of motion. But it is not so with the motion of the organs of the glorious body: because that is at the beginning and at the end intense and remiss at the will of the motive

741. Augustine, presumably referring to a work by Augustine of Hippo.

power, so that its agility is possession: because according to the Philosopher nothing is part of happiness and in the mode of beatitude of habit, unless this which is had in the mode of possession at will.

Articulus 18 — What The Dowry Of Agility Is

What is the dowry of agility?

Secondly, it is asked, What is this dowry which is called agility?

For it seems that it should not be so named: because in 1 Corinthians 15:43, it is said; "It is sown in weakness, it will rise in power." The Gloss there says, "in weakness," that is, immobile, and "it will rise in power," that is, mobile, alive, and invigorated, and powerful, to which nothing is harmful: therefore it seems that this dowry should be called virtue.

1. Likewise, from that Gloss it is further shown that this dowry is the same as impassibility: because one act belongs to one habit: but one act is to resist, and that belongs to impassibility and also to virtue: therefore virtue is impassibility.
2. Likewise, it is asked, Why does the Apostle call this dowry virtue rather than another?

For it seems that incorruptibility is more similar to virtue than agility: because the former denotes the strength of nature, which is virtue: but the latter does not denote such strength: therefore the former is more properly called virtue than the latter.

1. Likewise, virtue denotes its own thing in the end: because, as it is said in the first book of On the Heavens and the World, virtue is the ultimate of potency in a thing: but what is differently possessed by different beings cannot be possessed by anyone in the end: therefore it seems that what is differently possessed by different beings cannot be called virtue: but agility is differently possessed by different beings: therefore it cannot be called virtue as it pertains to each one, as it seems.
2. Likewise, since agility denotes a disposition or natural potency for local progressive motion only, and the members of glorious bodies are going to be suitable for all acts, why does this dowry take its name more from the natural potency for progressive motion than from another exercise of the official members?

Response. It must be said that this dowry is properly called agility, as the ancients named it: and I well concede that agility is called the free possession and ability of all similar and official members to execute every act of the soul, so that in all things the body obeys the mover and is not hindered in any way.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that in 1 Corinthians 15:43, this dowry is not called by its essence, but rather by the end which it can have according to the most perfect state of human nature: because thus it is called virtue in the way that the blessed Dionysius says that it is the virtue of having strength in all according to diverse operations, strong and unchangeable, and to have no weakness in any indicated divine illuminations. Thus it is said of all

organs in fulfilling every will of God according to the command of the soul: and from this property, the Apostle names it.

To the second, it must be said that it differs from impassibility: because the latter is the potency not to suffer, but the former is the perfection of active potency to act. And what the Gloss says: "To which nothing is harmful," must be understood concerning harm that withdraws potency from operation because the organ would not be unimpeded.

To the third, it must be said that none of the others denotes the ultimate state of potency for acting as this one does, and therefore it is called virtue. Impassibility, however, does not denote the ultimate for work, but rather resisting harmful and injurious things. Virtue, however, is especially the ultimate of active potency, whose ultimate is determined in the greatest, as the Commentator says there, just as Hercules' virtue is in conquering thirty, if he cannot conquer more: but the ultimate of passive potency is determined in the least.

To the fourth, it must be said that the ultimate simply cannot pertain except to one alone: but the ultimate according to state pertains to all who obtain that state, and such an ultimate is called virtue when it is said that bodies will rise in virtue.

To the fifth, it must be said that although agility denotes the readiness of the whole body to fulfill the operations of the soul, it is nevertheless most known in progressive motion: and therefore this dowry is named from the perfection of natural potency for that motion.

Articulus 19 — By Whom The Dowry Of Agility Is Caused

From what is the dowry of agility caused?

Thirdly, it is asked, From what is this dowry in the glorious body caused?

And it is objected thus:

1. Every natural power for bodily action is caused by the disposition of the members: agility is such a power: therefore it is caused by the disposition of the members. The first is proven from this, that God is more subtle than nature, and nature contrives everything in the best and most fitting way it can be. The second is evident in itself: because agility is especially in the natural power for progressive motion.

1. Likewise, Nature does not give instruments of the same disposition to the slow and the swift: therefore it seems that neither does God. For we see that to the slow, nature gives gross and short instruments, namely legs, as to women: but to the swift, it gives long and subtle ones: therefore it seems that thus also God gives agility.

1. Likewise, as Aristotle says, walking is never without feet: therefore neither is the disposition for walking without the disposition of the feet: therefore the motion of speed is taken in the disposition of the feet, as it seems.

On the contrary of this is that

1. All will be agile in this way: therefore all will have the disposition of body and legs for

agility, which is false: because those who now naturally have gross legs will also have them then, because the natural form of the members will also remain then.

1. Likewise, that agility will be caused by the merit of the will: therefore it will be manifested more in the disposition of the will than of the bodily nature.

Response. It must be said that that agility consists in the will and soul, and not in the disposition of the members.

To the first part, however, it must be said that there is agility for the motion of natural need: and from this proceed the first arguments. And there is agility of all the members together in demonstration of glory, and that the mover possesses the mobile at will: and this is caused by the disposition of the merit of the will.

And through this, the solution to the whole is evident.

Articulus 20 — Whether Agility Is In One Way In All The Saints

Is agility in one way in all the saints?

Fourthly, it is asked whether it is present in one way in all the saints? It seems that it is so, because

1. To each is present that which is a mobile body at the nod of the mover: and this is the whole agility and as much as it can be in corporeal nature: therefore it seems that all the saints have equal agility with all.
2. Likewise, if their local motion is considered, each of the saints will be moved in an imperceptible time: but this is the minimum time as far as we are concerned: therefore each of the saints is equally swift in motion with another: therefore they have equal agility for motion.
3. Likewise, although one star differs from another in brightness; nevertheless, the light of one comes equally swiftly from the sky to the center as that of another: but the resurrection is in this way, as the Apostle says: therefore, although they differ in brightness, they do not differ in agility.
4. Likewise, Mezeallach in the book on Orders says that every star is moved equally swiftly with every star: but that one seems slower than another, this is from the quantity of its orbit: just as the orbit of the Sun is to the Moon in a multiple duodecuple proportion, and the orbit of Mars to the orbit of the Sun in a sesquialtera, and the orbit of Jupiter to the orbit of the Sun in a duodecuple, and of Saturn to the orbit of Jupiter in a decuple sesquialtera, and to the orbit of the Sun in a tricenaria. Therefore it seems that since the resurrection of the dead will be thus, all the glorious have equal motion with others, although they differ in brightness.

On the contrary of this is that

1. The crown of the month for the showbread was interwoven, and signified the reward of the blessed: therefore since agility is a reward or part of the reward, it is interwoven: but interwoven signifies that it is held unequally: therefore agility will be held unequally in the Saints.
2. Likewise, the gifts of the soul are better and nobler than the gifts of the body: but the gifts of the soul will be held unequally: therefore also all the gifts of the body: therefore also agility.

Response. It must be said that they will be agile unequally as was lastly proven.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that although the time is imperceptible, nevertheless because time is divisible infinitely according to the increase of the power of the mover: because the swift, as Aristotle says, divides time, but the slow divides magnitude: and therefore even in imperceptible time one will be moved more swiftly than another if he wills.

To the other, it must be said that each has as much as he wills, in this that he does not will more than he has and than God wills him to will: nevertheless one does not have as much as another. And it is similar because if there are two equally just, each has as much as he wills, because he does not will more than he has: but they do not have equally, because one can be richer than another.

To the other, it must be said that this is not similar: because that motion is of illumination, and not of the illuminators: and we speak of the motion of the luminous ones themselves.

To the other, it must be said that this is because according to nature no body is moved in its own place, as the same Philosopher says, that the motion of the orb is rather the motion of the wise than of nature: for if it were moved according to nature, it would be impossible that the motion of that nature would not be moved more swiftly, just as a greater fire ascends more swiftly than a lesser. Therefore, since the stars are thus moved by the command of their mover, whether that be God or not, they can have whatever motion, although different space makes different distances of the movables. But in the Saints the whole force of motion will be from the quantity of sanctity: and since that is different, so will the agility be different.

Nevertheless, in the word of the Philosopher introduced, there is doubt, nor is this word sufficiently proven by him or by another.

Articulus 21 — Whether Glorious Bodies Will Be Moved

Whether glorious bodies will be moved?

Fifthly, it is asked whether glorious bodies will be moved?

It seems, however, that they will not: because
1. Every motion occurs on account of need: but there is no need there: therefore, there is no motion there.

1. Likewise, no place will be found in which something new is found that was not had in another: but where no renewal can be, there no motion can be: therefore, no motion can be in glorious bodies.
2. Likewise, Aristotle in VII Ethics says that every motion is on account of defect: there is no defect there: therefore, no motion.
3. Likewise, Aristotle says that to participate in goodness without motion is more noble than with motion: but the best is to be given to glorious bodies: therefore, it seems that they will participate in beatitude without motion.
4. Likewise, the most mobile of heavens, which is the empyrean, is posited not to be moved on account of the state of contemplation which is in it, to which rest is more fitting than motion: therefore, since the bodies of the saints are more noble in themselves and better ordered to contemplation, it seems that immobility ought to be given to them rather than motion.

On the contrary of this is what is said, Wisdom 1:7: "They shall shine," etc., in which, as almost all say, the just, and as sparks among reeds, the agility of the motion of the Saints is noted, which will be at the speed of light: therefore, they will be moved then.

1. Likewise, it seems less that purely spiritual creatures are moved locally than corporeal ones: and they are moved, as is proven by the motion of Angels; therefore, also corporeal creatures are moved: therefore, the Saints will be moved in the homeland.
2. Likewise, it is of the perfection of a movable thing to be moved: it is evident, however, that every animate substance having a motive power is movable: therefore, it is of the perfection of that to be moved: therefore, since all the saints have perfections in the homeland, it seems that the saints will be moved.

Response. It seems to be said that the Saints will be moved when they will, and wherever they will, without any need. For motion is twofold with respect to the end of motion: for one is to relieve need, and another to demonstrate motive power, as runners frequently run to show their ability to run, and without any need: and thus the saints will be moved, so that divine wisdom may be praised in such agility bestowed upon them. And through this, the solution to the first is clear.

To the other, it must be said that there is renewal of position at least: but it is true that nothing is found of God in one place as to the participation of beatitude, which is not found in another, although it may shine more in one than in another: but motion is made in demonstration of motive power, so that the wisdom of the Creator ordering the members to motion may be praised.

To the other, it must be said that this is understood of natural motion which is made on account of need.

To the other, it must be said that the Philosopher speaks of the good which happens to be acquired through motion: for a thing which acquires goodness through motion is not perfect, but needy. However, glorified bodies do not acquire such goodness through motion: but what they already have, they demonstrate through motion.

To the last, it must be said that this is because they do not have motive power: but if they had motive power and were blessed, it would be necessary that in their act and motion they demonstrate the wisdom of the Creator.

Articulus 22 — Whether The Motion Of Glorious Bodies Will Be In Time Or In The Now

Whether the motion of glorious bodies will be in time, or in the now?

Sixthly, it is asked, Whether that motion is in time, or in the now?

It seems, however, that it is in the now: because
1. Jacobus Benalchindi demonstrates in the book on the Diversity of the appearance of the moon that everything whose motion is equally imperceptible to the distant and the near, moves in the now: but in this way, as they say, is the motion of glorious bodies: therefore it is in the now.

1. Likewise, it is established that agility differs among the saints: but he who has lesser agility moves in imperceptible time: therefore he who has double moves in subdouble time: and he who has quadruple, in subquadruple time, and so on with others. Therefore it happens that finally someone will move in the now.
2. Likewise, the agility of the glorious is swifter than that of any non-blessed body: but the motion of non-blessed light is in the now, as the Philosopher says: therefore also of the glorious body.

On the contrary of this is that every corporeal quantum, if it moves, moves by measuring itself to the space through which it passes according to the terminus from which and to which, and it takes the first and last in space: but from the first and last in space (as the Philosopher says) is caused the before and after in time: therefore it moves in time composed of before and after: therefore it cannot move in the now.

Response. It must be said that it moves in imperceptible time.

To the last objection, therefore, it must be said that such a process is not valid, unless it would happen to arrive at a body that would have infinite agility: for this would move in the now according to the teachings which Aristotle delivers before the end of the VIII Physics: but because it does not happen to come to such a thing, therefore whatever is of greater speed will move more quickly: yet whatever will move in time, because the increase of speed is divisible into infinity, yet so that whatever moves in time.

To what is objected from the authority of Jacobus Benalchindi, it must be said that he speaks of illumination: for this happens in the now, as Aristotle wills: and the Commentator gives the reason for this, because it is not motion, but the end of motion: just as generation according to which it is only change, and not motion.

Thus through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 23 — Whether Subtlety Befits The Glorious Body

Whether subtlety is fitting for a glorious body?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said, there, C, at the end § 1: For which reason also they are called spiritual, etc.

The inquiry is about the third gift, which is subtlety, or spirituality.

And four questions are asked. The first is, Whether subtlety is fitting for a glorious body? The second, Whether it is the same as spirituality, or what it is? The third, How great it is? The fourth, Whether it is equal in all the glorious?

To the first, it is objected thus: 1. The gross in nature does not become subtle, except through the rarefaction of matter: the human body by nature is gross: therefore it does not become subtle, except through the rarefaction of matter: but matter is not rarefied, as was proven above: therefore the human body in the future resurrection will not be subtle.

1. Likewise, the subtle is not found in bodies, except in two ways, namely by the disposition of matter, or by being well-mixable. And by mixture, the glorious body cannot be called subtle: because those bodies will not be mixable. However, by the disposition of matter, it is also not called so: because this is rare, and those bodies will not be rare, because thus they would be extended beyond their proper stature and the natural figure of the members.
2. Likewise, the Philosopher says that the subtle is the filler of parts, and of the part of parts: however, this does not suit the subtle, except insofar as it seeks a foreign boundary: but every body seeking a foreign boundary holds its own poorly: but glorious bodies hold their boundaries best, even better than natural ones: therefore glorious bodies will not be subtle.
3. Likewise, in the life of blessed Pope Gregory it is read that he was sent as an apocrisiary to refute the patriarch of Constantinople, who had taught that our bodies in the future resurrection would be thin like winds: therefore to say this is heretical: but it is clear if they are so subtle that they are called spiritual, that they are thin like winds and vapors: therefore to say in this way that the bodies of the saints will be thin is heresy.
4. Likewise, in the book on Crepuscules it is written that a subtle spiritual body cannot be actually shining or luminous: but the bodies of the saints will be shining and luminous: therefore the bodies of the saints will not be subtle.

On the contrary of this is that 1. The Apostle says, 1 Corinthians 15:44: It is sown a natural body, it will rise: but every spiritual body is subtle: therefore the bodies of the saints will be subtle.

1. Likewise, to the Philippians, as in 21:
   Refor: but
   he will transform the body of our lowliness,
   configured to the body of his glory; his body was so subtle that
   it entered with the doors closed: therefore, ours
   will be so subtle.
2. Likewise, glorious bodies are not
   subject to sight, unless miraculously, as
   is commonly said: but this cannot have
   a cause, except subtlety: therefore they are
   as subtle as air, or more.

Response. It must be said that glorious
bodies will undoubtedly be subtle:
but this subtlety is different from
the subtlety of the elements. For there is a twofold
subtlety, namely of matter, and of rarefaction.
Matter is when a body is composed
of noble subtle parts: as
we say the sun is subtle, and the stars,
and other ethereal bodies: and in this way
glorious bodies will be subtle. In the second
way, however, it is subtle, which is rarefied
or subtly comminuted: and in this
way they will not be subtle.

And through this the solution to the first
part of the objections is clear: because all those
conclude about subtlety through rarefaction,
or through the comminution mentioned: and in this
way it is well conceded that they will not be subtle.

Although the objections made to the contrary
conclude truth, yet only
the first is valid: for I do not think it
should be conceded that our bodies can enter
with the doors closed: and this divine body had
insofar as it is divine: and the reason for this
has been explained above.

To the other it must be said that they are not invisible from this, but rather because the non-glorious eye according to its non-glorious power cannot see into a glorious and blessed body, except as much as God permits.

Articulus 24 — Whether Such Subtlety Is The Same As Spirituality

Whether such subtlety is the same as spirituality?

Secondly, it is asked, Whether it is the same as spirituality, or what it is?

It seems that they will not be spiritual: because

1. That is not spiritual which has no property of spirit: but those bodies will have no property of spirit: therefore they will not be spiritual. The first is evident by itself. The second is proved: The property of subtlety is not to fill a place: and this does not pertain to glorious bodies: just as neither do other properties of spirit.
2. Likewise, if according to the Gloss which is upon the first epistle to the Corinthians xv, 44, they are called spiritual because they do not need food: therefore also the bodies of the damned will be spiritual, because they do not need food, which is inconvenient.
3. Likewise, the bodies of children in limbo also do not need food: therefore according to that Gloss, they would be spiritual.
4. Likewise, if according to Augustine, someone says that they will be called spiritual because they are subject to the spirit in all things. On the contrary: Here the bodies of the Saints obey the spirit: therefore they have the gift which is called spirituality, or subtlety. Proof of the first. In Psalm lxii, 2 "My soul thirsted for you: how many, etc." And, 1 Corinthians ix, 27: "I chastise my body, etc."
5. Likewise, in the bodies of the saints there will remain heterogeneous and homogeneous parts: therefore bones will remain there: but bones, as Empedocles said, are composed of eight parts, some of which are of fire, and others of earth: therefore they will never be spiritual if bones remain: and bones will remain; therefore they will never be spiritual.
6. But if it is said according to Aristotle and other Philosophers, that a spiritual, vaporous body. On the contrary: Such a body is not capable of figure: but glorious bodies will retain their natural figure: therefore they are not thus subtle or spiritual.

On the contrary of this is what is said, Matthew xxii, 30, that in the resurrection men will be like Angels: therefore spiritual in the body in heaven.

1. Likewise, 1 Corinthians xv, 44: "It is raised a spiritual body."

Likewise, the Gloss there says that they will be spiritual.

Likewise, Augustine in book XXII of the City of God says this: therefore it is so.

Response. According to the Gloss on the first epistle to the Corinthians xv, 44, the body is called spiritual because it does not need food. The same is also suggested according to the manner of speaking by the Apostle, because spiritual is opposed to animal: and animal is that which needs food for its sustenance. To this must be added what Augustine says in book XXII of the City of God, namely that it is spiritual, which does not contradict the governance of the spirit: from a certain ability of the body it is made, because the stimulus of lust is extinguished in it, and the form of spirituality is induced, which is subtlety thus called, as was said in the preceding problem. Hence if anyone wishes to define it, I think it can be conveniently said thus: Subtlety is the gift of the body making the body able to be moved by the spirit, from the complete removal of the fomes, and the grossness of the parts of matter.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that spiritual is here said according to the authorities introduced, not from the property of spirit, but because it is perfectly possessed by the spirit for use, nothing resisting, but in all ways obedient.

To the other, it must be said that the lack of need for food in the damned is not caused by any noble form, but rather by divine justice even among punishments containing bodies according to themselves gross and ignoble, lest the punishment in them be finished. Hence if the external containing ceased, they would not be sustained by the internal containing without food.

To the other, it must be said that children do not have this from a gift, but from the internal containing: because otherwise in them the punishment of loss would fail, which is the lack of the vision of God according to which the vision is the reward of the blessed.

To the other, it must be said that the good on the way do not have perfect obedience of the flesh to the spirit: because the flesh murmurs both from the fomes and from weakness: but this gift gives the spirit the body for use, which is rightly called possession.

To the other, it must be said that without prejudice I well concede that the bone will always be grosser than the flesh: but nevertheless with the ignoble dispositions removed, which are now, such as the excessive grossness of the parts, and indigestion, and not well mixed, it will have more the subtlety of nature: just as we say the sun is of a subtle nature, and gold is of a subtle nature, although it is more compact than any metal, because it has more subtle parts than metal, and is more subtly mixed and better digested.

And it must be noted that it is directly against the sayings of the Saints, if it is said subtle as a small body is called subtle and rare: because such a body in truth is not organic, nor can it be animated by a rational soul.

To the last I well concede that it is not called subtle in this way.

Articulus 25 — Whence This Subtlety Is Caused

Whence is this subtlety caused?

Whence is this subtlety caused?

Thirdly, it is asked, Whence is this subtlety caused?

And this question is necessary because of the diverse opinions concerning this gift.

However, it seems that 1. It is caused by the removal of fullness from matter: because it is said that the subtle is that which will pass through a mountain without dividing the mountain: and it is agreed that then glorious bodies (as they say) will move in heaven without dividing the heaven: and this could not be unless they were so subtle that they could be in the same place with any body: and this further could not be unless fullness were removed from those bodies: therefore it seems that this subtlety is caused by the removal of fullness.

1. Likewise, All ignobility will be removed from the elements: therefore also from man, and much more: but from ignobility it has fullness: therefore fullness will be removed from it: therefore from its removal it has subtlety, as it seems.
2. Likewise, Place and the placed will be proportionate: but the place of glorious bodies is the empyrean heaven: and this is the most subtle of bodies, least (as they say) filling the place: therefore so also will be the glorious body: therefore as before.
3. Likewise, Avicenna says that man therefore receives a soul which is a participant of the light of intelligence, because from natural mixture it most closely approaches the equality of heaven: but this approach with nature cannot perfect it, it must be perfected by God in glory, because then nothing imperfect will be left: therefore then we will have heavenly bodies: therefore as before.
4. Likewise, The Apostle says this, 1 Corinthians 15:40: There are also celestial bodies, and terrestrial bodies: but the glory of the celestial is one, and that of the terrestrial is another. Therefore since the celestial are said to be spiritual subtle from the removal of fullness from them, it seems that thus the bodies of the Saints will also be spiritual and subtle.
5. Likewise, This gift is meritoriously acquired through the spirit filling no place: therefore it seems that such a likeness of spirit is left in the body: therefore the body then will lack fullness of place.

On the contrary, it is objected thus: Luke 24:39, it is said: Handle, and see, for a spirit does not have flesh and bones, as you see me having. But a spirit not having fullness of place does not resist touch, which is proven by the fact that even a thin filler does not resist touch, but yields, like air. Therefore, since glorious bodies will be palpable, it seems that their future subtlety is not to be caused by this, that fullness is removed from them.

To this I say without prejudice to others, that I cannot in any way understand how a body can be a body and not fill a place: for according to all reason and philosophy I am certain that it is considered absurd by the Philosophers, who from the very quantity give to the body to fill a place, as it must according to reason. Hence it seems to me, that although it has been said by many hitherto, and even by me sometimes, that the subtlety of glorious bodies is such that

they do not fill a place, because the power of filling a place is removed from them: yet it is false. And it seems to be said that they fill a place, as was proven above, and bodies have spirituality rather by the removal of the fuel and ignoble properties of matter, which are especially three causing by their removal and the position of opposites subtlety in all that is naturally subtle, of which one is the grossness of mixed parts, not obeying the mixture and continuation of the body, Another is the imperfect agent for digestion and continuation of the mixable. And the third is imperfect mixture and continuity. Hence glorious bodies will have parts subtle mixed and continued by God Himself, and best mixed to the equality of complexion. For these reasons in some way it can be understood to posit the human body as subtle: because thus flesh is said to be subtle, gold subtle, and other animate and inanimate corporeals which are noble.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that the argument relies on a falsehood, namely that the power of filling a place is the grossness of matter. This reason was clear above.

To the other it must be said that it is not the condition of ignobility to fill a place: but rather it is a condition consequent to the quantity of that body, which is contained in another body as in a place.

And it must be said that the empyrean heaven therefore does not fill a place, it is not in anything: but if it were contained, it would fill a place: and therefore it does not have this from nature, but because it is not encompassed by another body: and therefore it is not necessary that its placed be conformed to it in this.

To the other it must be said that the lower orbs of the heavens fill a place, and the supposition is false, and against the Philosophers, as was shown above.

Therefore this solution is also clear to the following.

Again it must be said that it is meritoriously acquired for the body, not so that the body is changed into a non-body, and according to its nature cannot be a human body: but so that it is made spiritual in following the spirit, as a mobile obedient through all follows its mover, not retracted by any gravity of the body.

Articulus 26 — Whether This Endowment Is Equal In All Glorious Bodies

Whether this dowry is equal in all glorious bodies?

Fourthly, it is asked, Whether this dowry is equal in all glorious bodies?

It seems that it is so:
1. For to all indeed the flesh will be perfectly subjected, and none of them will need food: therefore it seems that all bodies will be equally spiritual.

1. Likewise, the defect of nature is corrected by God in the resurrection: but a certain formal defect of nature is that it cannot sufficiently make matter subtle and spiritual: therefore then it will be corrected: therefore what is natural is present equally in all: therefore subtlety will be present equally in all.

2. Likewise, in the opposite way they are equal, because our bodies are equally animal: therefore also in spirituality the bodies will then be equal.

On the contrary,
1. In no other dowry are glorious bodies equal: therefore neither in this one.

1. Furthermore, this dowry is part of the reward: but all rewards will be had differently and not equally by the Saints: therefore also this dowry.

Response. It must be said that this dowry, like others, is had unequally, as was lastly proven.

Therefore, it must be said to the first, that although in all this dowry could suffice for the aforementioned acts, yet those acts do not proceed equally from habit: and therefore the acts in goodness and virtue are not equal.

To the other, it must be said that it is not a defect of nature, but a certain nature which will be exalted on account of merit, just as in other things nature is exalted: for it is not too subtle for the human soul to have a body.

To the other, it must be said that even in the opposite they are not equal: because one is more animal than another, if animality is compared to the act of animality. Or it could be said that animality in man is rather a privation and defect than a habit: and then it does not follow, if some are equal in privation, that they are also equal in habit: for those who are equal in blindness do not have to be equal in sight, if it happens to receive sight.

Articulus 27 — Whether Luminosity Can Befit The Human Body

Whether luminosity can befit the human body?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said, there, C, at the end of §2: The bodies of the saints will also rise shining like the sun, without any defect, etc.

Concerning luminosity, which is the fourth gift, five questions are asked here, namely, whether luminosity can befit the human body? Secondly, what is that luminosity? Thirdly, how great is it? Fourthly, whence is it caused? And fifthly, whether it befits them equally or unequally?

To the first, it is objected thus: 1. No body in which an opaque nature dominates can become exceeding in light: the body of man is of this kind: therefore it can by no means become exceeding in light. The first is proved: because light is impeded by the nature of opacity. The second is written in the second book of Generation and Corruption, where it is said that in every mixed composite body, earth dominates.

1. Likewise, between a luminous and an opaque body, there is a double medium, namely, nearer to the luminous, and this is the diaphanous, which according to Aristotle, is colored by light on the surface and in depth: and it is nearer to the opaque, which is colored with white and black, and intermediate colors. However, it is evident that the body of man in the nature of matter approaches more to the opaque. Therefore, it can

never be luminous, but will always remain colored. Therefore, it seems that luminosity is not its gift.

2. Likewise, Avicenna says in book VI of the Naturals, that every luminous body consists only of pervious parts: but the body of man will never consist only of pervious parts: therefore, it will never be perfectly luminous.
3. Likewise, as the Apostle says, 1 Corinthians 15:41, their resurrection will be like the brightness of the stars: but according to the more probable opinion, which is of Aristotle, Avicenna, Ptolemy, and his Commentator, and Mezeallach, the bodies of the stars are not luminous in themselves, but colored: therefore neither will the bodies of the resurrected saints: therefore they will never have the gift which is luminosity.
4. Likewise, of different bodies by kind and nature, there are different properties, but celestial and human bodies are different by kind and nature: therefore their properties will be different: therefore, since celestial bodies are luminous, it is impossible for human bodies to be luminous. The first is evident in itself. The second is proved from what Aristotle says in the twelfth book of the Metaphysics, that celestial and terrestrial bodies are not in the same proximate genus.
5. Likewise, a body of one quality and property on the surface is homogeneous: but the human body is never homogeneous: therefore it is never wholly luminous.

On the contrary of this is what is said in Matthew 17:2, concerning this: His face shone like the sun: where the Gloss says thus: He did not lose the substance of the flesh, but showed the glory of the future resurrection. Therefore, the saints will then shine like the sun.

Likewise, Judges 5:31: Those who love you, like the sun in its rising, so shall they shine.

Likewise, Matthew 13:43: Then the righteous will shine like the sun in the kingdom of their Father.

Likewise, Wisdom 3:7: The righteous will shine, and run like sparks through the reeds.

Likewise, 1 Corinthians 15:40: There is one glory of the celestial, and another of the terrestrial, etc.

Response. It must be said that the bodies of the saints will be luminous.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that opacity will be removed from the earthly nature through merit which shines in the will: and then the earthly nature will be full of splendor.

To the second, it must be said that this holds in the distance of bodies, which nature can make: but merit is of greater potency than nature: and therefore, with opacity removed, it makes exceeding in light, and beyond what is luminous by its nature, and has no merit.

To the third, it must be said that Avicenna speaks of a body which has luminosity from the nature of its component parts, and not of that to which it is given miraculously through merit.

To the fourth, it must be said that the stars, in truth, in my judgment, are naturally colored, but are receptive of light from the sun: and the Apostle does not speak of the brightness which

they have naturally, but rather of that which they have from the sun: because in that, the bodies of the blessed will be similar to them, although they will exceed in light.

To the fifth, it must be said that this is true if the property is from the same cause: but nothing prohibits that of different bodies by kind and even nature, there be one property, one naturally, and the other through merit.

To the sixth, it must be said that this is understood of a body whose accidents flow from its substance as subject and cause: but it is not so in the light of glorious bodies, but rather splendor will be given to them by God.

Articulus 28 — What Luminosity Is In Human Bodies, And Whether The Interior Members Will Shine

What is luminosity in human bodies? And, Will the interior members shine?

Secondly, it is asked, What is that luminosity?

For in lower bodies, luminosity is the form of light altering the permeable on the surface and in depth, and terminated in depth only: but such does not seem to be the luminosity in the glorious body, because

1. Thus the glorious body would appear as luminous: and this is not true: therefore it seems that the glorious body is not luminous with corporeal light.
2. Likewise, every luminous body makes itself and other surrounding bodies actually visible: the glorious body does not do so: therefore it is not luminous with corporeal light.

If perhaps you say that luminous and most noble things are not subject to sight, as Alpetragius says: like the first noble according to the natural philosophers, and the empyrean heaven according to the Theologians: and so it is with the blessed bodies. On the contrary: The cause of this, that the light of something luminous is not subject to sight, as is rendered in the book on Twilights, is that such a luminous thing is permeable and rare: but such will not be the glorious bodies, as was evident above from the premises: therefore this does not prevent them from being seen.

1. Likewise, further it seems that they will not universally be luminous with corporeal light: because the proportion of the members to light is not one, because one is more earthy, like bone, and nail, and at least like flesh: therefore they will not be equally luminous, but less according to the earthy, and more according to the airy.
2. Likewise, the elements outside the human body will not shine equally in light: therefore neither will the members themselves inside shine equally in which the opaque or permeable elements dominate more or less.

3. Likewise, it is of the beauty of the organic body that one part is shadier than another: but whatever is of beauty is not subtracted in the resurrection: therefore there too one part will shine more than another.

Further, it is asked here, Whether the interior members will shine, like the heart, and liver, or not?

If so. On the contrary:
Every actually luminous thing, as sight proves in the sun, stars, and flame of fire, and the Philosopher says, covers bodies existing behind it: but the exterior surface of glorious bodies will shine actually: therefore it will cover the interior: therefore their luminosity will be useless.

But if they will not shine: then the body will not shine universally in all members. Moreover, this is inconvenient: because the interior principal parts ought to be in reward, just as they are principal in meriting: therefore they ought to shine more than the exterior.

1. Likewise, according to the nature of animal spirits, they ought to be lucid, and blood red, and veins white, and so of others: therefore they ought not to be equally disposed in light.

Response. It must be said that that light is a corporeal form, by which glorious bodies will be luminous.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that the bodies of the Saints will have in their power to contain and emit their light when they wish, just as they have in their power to be seen and not seen by the non-glorious: but they are always seen by the glorious. And indeed some ancients said this before me, and well as I think: because according to this saying fewer inconveniences seem to follow. They have this in their power because it is caused by the merit of the will: and therefore when they wish, they are seen, and when they do not wish, they are not seen, and they alter bodies when they wish, and when they do not wish they do not alter, whether in depth, or only on the surface.

To the other, it must be said that this is true of that whose light acts according to the necessity of nature: and this is not true of the glorious body, as it seems to me.

To the other, it must be said that I well concede that that solution at least does not agree with philosophy, although some fond of fictions have sometimes given it.

To the other, it must be said that I well think it must be conceded that they will shine equally in all members to preserve proportion: and more cannot be had by force of argument.

To the other, it must be said as to the immediate preceding.

To the other, it must be said that none of the members will be shadowy, nor does the shadow of the members now seek, except because of the dishonesty of its act: and this dishonesty is not then.

To the first which is further asked, without prejudice it seems it must be said that the interior will have different light: for the blood will be like polished red gold, and the spirits lucid like light, and the nerves like polished silver, and the exterior body permeable like porous, and not like diaphanous: for to be permeable like porous is not opposed to luminous.

And by this the solution to all the questions is clear.

Articulus 29 — How Great The Luminosity Of Glorious Bodies Is

How great is the luminosity of the glorious bodies?

How great is the luminosity of the glorious bodies?

Thirdly, it is asked, How great is this luminosity?

It seems, however, that it is like the sun's: because it is said thus, Matthew 13:43: Then the just, etc., will shine like the sun.

Likewise, Apocalypse 12:1: A woman clothed, etc.: therefore it will be like the light of the sun, and the moon, and the stars.

Likewise, like a spark that light seems to be, as it is said, Wisdom 3:7.

Likewise, it seems the Apostle wants this, 1 Corinthians 15:41: One glory of the sun, etc.

In contradiction to this is what is said, Isaiah 30:26: And the light of the moon will be like the light of the sun. Therefore it seems, the light of the sun will be sevenfold like the light of seven days when man will be better, that the light of man will exceed the light of the sun more illuminated than now.

Response. It must be said that in truth it is commonly held that the sun will return to the light of the first seven days, when it shone more than now, before Adam sinned, and because of the renewal of the world it will still exceed sevenfold, and the full moon will stand: and then man who will not have the impediment of sin will still exceed the sun sevenfold in light: what, however, is true about this, I think no one knows diligently, except he who will then merit to see what will happen.

To those things, however, which are first introduced, it must be said that the Gloss on that of Matthew 17:2: His face shone like the sun, does not compare to the sun, because there is no greater glory of the resurrection, and similarly to the stars and moon: but because he did not have greater things known to men, to which he could compare.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear, except for what is said about wisdom: to which I think it must be said, that it compares to sparks because of the fervor of charity elevating the Saints as fire elevates sparks. And almost in the same way Gregory explains that of Ezekiel 1:7: Sparks as the appearance of glowing brass.

Articulus 30 — Whence That Luminosity In Glorious Bodies Is Caused

Whence is that luminosity in glorious bodies caused?

Fourthly, it is asked, Whence is it caused?

For it seems that the Philosopher says in the second book of On the Soul, chapter on vision, that every luminous or shining thing has its shining being from agreement with the perpetual higher body: therefore, glorious bodies also seem to have light in this way: but.

1. It is established that a complexioned element composed of heterogeneous parts cannot agree with the perpetual higher body, which is the fifth from the elements, and simple, and homogeneous: therefore it seems that our bodies will not receive light from this.
2. Likewise, we see that among the elements some receive light because of the parts of fire that are in them, such as the glowworm, and the scales and spine of certain fish, and even the flame of fire itself: and again it seems that this cannot be the cause of light in man, because fire does not abound in man in this way.
3. Likewise, as Avicenna says, from the parts of the diaphanous gathered according to a good mixture something shining is caused, as appears in crystal, beryl, diamond, ruby, and certain others: and again it is established that man is not gathered from such parts: therefore neither is this the cause of shining in him.
4. Likewise, we see in inferior nature that the greater the distance of bodies from the center, the more they have of diaphaneity and light: but it is established that the human body will never be freed from those things which are around the center: therefore it will never have in itself a cause of light.
5. Likewise, in the book which distinguishes the sentences of the Greeks on heaven and the world in sixteen chapters, it seems to be said that the sun has four causes of its greater light than other stars, namely the purity of its parts, the magnitude of its body, the constancy or compression of its parts in continuity, and nobility: but it is established that man will never have these four causes: therefore he will never have a cause of shining sevenfold above the sun.

On the contrary of this is that 1. The just will shine like the sun, etc. Therefore justice is the cause of light,

1. Likewise, in Apocalypse 21:23, it is said of the holy city that the brightness of God illuminated it, and its lamp is the Lamb. Therefore that splendor is divine, caused by God.

Also in Isaiah 60:2, it is said: Upon you. From which the same is taken that. The Lord will arise, and His glory will be seen upon you first.

Response. Almost all the more subtle ancients were accustomed to say concerning this question that man consists of four elements and a fifth body which is heaven: and in the resurrection, the four elements will not be in him in the act of their active and passive qualities, but only in the act of the fifth body which is to shine: and yet they say that light will come to us in the resurrection. But because this is absurd both in mathematics and also in

natural philosophy, that the fifth body is mixed with a complexioned body through substance, but only through power: therefore it seems otherwise to be said, namely that all that light will be caused by the merit of the will, and therefore it is also subject to the will: for the endowments of bodies are caused by the endowments of souls: and the light of divine cognition in the soul causes brightness in the body, in which it will also be seen by the affection of the mind, just as now in glass the color of wine is known, as Gregory says on that Job 28:17: Gold or glass will not equal it.

What, however, is true about this will be inquired below.

Therefore, it must be said to the first, that through the change of glory by which glorious bodies will be changed, they will receive agreement with the perpetual higher body, not however in such a way that they are changed into stars or into heaven, but that ignoble dispositions will be removed from them which are from the lower elements, and the dispositions of the higher as much as possible with nature preserved will be assumed.

To the other, it must be said that the Lord will then cut off the flame of fire, as Basil says, and will separate the shining light from the burning heat: and as for such a shining, nothing prevents the parts of fire from being more manifest in man then.

To the other, it must be said that human bodies will never be, in my judgment, transparent: because thus it would be necessary that the composition from other elements in them be destroyed. But they will be shining like porous things that shine brightly, in which their interiors are evident externally: and therefore there is not in them such a cause of shining.

To the other, it must be said that in nobility and the treading of light they agree with the sun, but not in other things.

To the other, it must be said that in nobility they agree with the higher, although not in the nature of matter.

Articulus 31 — Whether Glorious Bodies Will Be Equally Luminous

Whether glorious bodies will be equally luminous?

Whether glorious bodies will be equally luminous?

Fifthly, it is asked, Whether they will be equally luminous?

It seems that they will: because
4. Whatever things are reformed to one through similarity, are reformed equally, unless the nature of the things reformed impedes: but all glorious bodies are reformed to one, namely the body of Christ, as it is said in Philippians 3:21: "He will reform the body of our humility, configured to the body of His glory," and the nature of the reformed does not impede, because all are of the same nature: therefore it seems that they will be equal in light.

1. Likewise, this light follows the nature of the human body: but this nature agrees equally to the Saints: therefore the consequence of light is equal in them.

2. Likewise, the merit of the Saints is in the soul: therefore also the difference of merit: therefore they ought to differ in reward only in the soul: but this light is in the body: therefore in light they ought not to have a difference.

3. Likewise, in the opposite there is equality, because the damned will equally have opaque bodies: therefore also in the proposed, namely in the light of the Saints, there ought to be equality.

On the contrary of this is what is said in 1 Corinthians 15:41-42:

"The glory of the sun is one, the glory of the moon is another, and the glory of the stars is another: for star differs from star in glory. So also is the resurrection of the dead."

1. Likewise, the Gloss there says thus:

"Indeed, this is signified by the denarius, which all will have in common, just as eternal life itself, the kingdom of heaven itself, the glory of the resurrection itself: and yet one will shine more, another less."

Response. It must be said that the Saints will receive different clarity according to the different merit of the will.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that they are reformed to the same unequally, but similarly, not with the nature impeding the equality of reformation, but with the merit of the will impeding.

To the other, it must be said that it follows the nature of the human body as a subject, but the merit of the will as a cause.

To the other, it must be said that different merit makes a different effect both in the soul and in the body.

To the other, it must be said that it is doubtful whether the damned differ in opacity or agree: but I rather believe that they differ according to more and less. If, however, they agree, then the argument does not follow: because God is more inclined to have mercy than to punish: and therefore He bestows even in the body more abundant light for abundant merit, although He does not inflict greater darkness for greater iniquity.

Articulus 32 — Whether It Is Fitting That There Be Four Endowments In Glorious Bodies

Whether there are fittingly four dowries in glorious bodies?

After all the aforementioned beyond the Letter, it is necessary to inquire about the number of these four dowries.

It seems, however, that there is only one: because
1. Only one dowry is conferred upon the bride: therefore, since those transferring themselves according to some likeness transfer themselves, it seems also that in spiritual matters only one dowry ought to be posited.

1. Likewise, it seems that there are only two: because there are two things that can be endowed, namely the body and the soul: therefore, also two dowries.
2. Likewise, it seems that there are three by appropriation of the three persons.
3. Furthermore, it seems that there are more than four: because Anselm says thus in the Proslogion, before the end: What do you love, O my flesh, what do you desire, O my soul? There is, there is whatever you love, whatever you desire. If beauty delights, the just will shine like the sun. If speed, or strength, or freedom of the body, to which nothing can resist, they will be like the angels of God: because the natural body is sown, and it will rise a spiritual one, by power indeed not by nature. If long and healthy life, there is healthy alternation, and eternal health: because the just will live forever, and the salvation of the just is from the Lord. If satisfaction, they will be satisfied when the glory of God appears. If intoxication, they will be inebriated from the abundance of the house of God. If melody, there the choirs of angels sing to God without end. If any pure, not impure, pleasure, you will give them drink from the river of your pleasure, O God. If wisdom, the wisdom of God itself will show itself to them. If friendship, they will love God more than themselves, and each other as themselves, and God more than they themselves: because they will love Him, and themselves, and each other through Him, and He will love Himself, and them through Himself. If concord, there will be one will for all of them: because there will be no will for them except the will of God alone. If power, they will be omnipotent of their will as God is of His: for just as God can do what He wills by Himself, so they will be able to do what they will through Him: because just as they will not will anything other than what He wills, so He will will whatever they will: and what He wills cannot not be. If honor and riches, God will set His good and faithful servants over many things: indeed they will be called and will be sons of God: and where His Son will be, there they will be also, heirs indeed of God, co-heirs however of Christ. If true security, certainly they will be as certain that this or rather this good will never and in no way be lacking to them, as they will be certain that they will not lose it of their own accord, nor will God take it away from unwilling lovers, nor will anything more powerful than God separate God and them unwillingly. But what joy or how great is it, where such or so great a good is. It is clear that there are many things which the bride will perceive in eternity more in the body than in the soul: therefore, there are not only four dowries of the body.

Response. It must be said that there are only four dowries of the body, and it seems possible to assign the number of them by those intending. But a double acceptance suffices: for either the dowry of the body is taken from the part of the form, or from the part of the matter, or from the part of the composite, or from the part of that which follows the composite from form and matter, which is natural power. And in the first way indeed brightness is taken. In the second way, however, subtlety, which consists in the subtilization of the parts of matter. And in the third way impassibility. In the fourth way, however, agility. They can again be assigned and better according to motion towards God: and then either it is a dowry inclining to motion, or

indicating the terminus of motion, or the motion itself. And in the first way it is subtlety. In the second way, however, it can be taken in two ways, namely the terminus in the composite, and the terminus in the form. And in the first way it is impassibility taken to the likeness of God by the change by which the Saints will be changed to glory: and according to this it is brightness: but according to the motion itself it is agility.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that this argument only proves that there is one dowry in common: but nevertheless in particular many things are given for a dowry.

To the other it must be said that this proves that man is endowed according to two: but it does not follow that his dowry is in only two.

To the other it must be said that the fourth is required which is to be consequent, namely the proper passion: because otherwise there would not be full perfection: and then there will be four dowries, as was evident in the first assignment.

To the other it must be said that Anselm rather enumerates the matters of joys in the kingdom, than dowries: because this is called a dowry, except that which is given to the bride to perfect her conjunction with the bridegroom, as was evident in the second assignment of the number of dowries.

Articulus 33 — Whether Natural Defects Remain In The Damned

Whether in the damned natural defects remain?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, D, Concerning the reprobate it is usually asked, etc.

For it seems that natural defects remain in them thus:

1. A body composed of contraries does not contain such corruptions, except by grace: but they will never have grace: therefore they will be subject to such defects.
2. Likewise, the damned have merited no good: but it is unjustly given, which is given beyond merit: therefore no good is given to them: but one of the principal goods is incorruption: therefore that is not given to them: therefore they will be corruptible in bodies from the corruption of complexion: and so as before.
3. Likewise, what is induced from sin ought not to be diminished by sin: but corruptions of this kind are induced from sin: therefore since many sins are added to original sin in the damned, such corruption of humors, which induces bodily infirmities and deformities, ought not to be diminished in them.
4. Likewise, this seems, Isaiah xiv, 41: Beneath you the moth will be spread, and your covering will be worms. And, in the same place, v. 19: As a useless root polluted, and wrapped, etc.

On the contrary of this is that every body having such corruptions will eventually be destroyed: but the bodies of the damned will never be destroyed: therefore they are not subject to such corruptions.

1. Likewise, such corruptions are from a defect of nature: for the author of nature will correct every defect of nature: therefore also that one: therefore he will not permit it in the damned.
2. Likewise, the Apostle, 1 Corinthians xv, 32, says that all the dead will rise, but only the elect will be changed into incorruption, as was held above: therefore there is no corruption in the damned.

Therefore it must be conceded that the damned will have no febrile corruption from the vice of complexion, nor defect from the vice of the composition of the body's members.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that the justice of God contains their bodies in punishments: whence what is objected is true of the good, or the objection is founded upon a falsehood.

To the other, it must be said that although they have merited no good, nevertheless they have being, living, and sensing, and reasoning, which are goods: and so they have the incorrupt permanence of substance, which is good: but it is to the increase of their punishment: and therefore although it is good, it is not given to them for good, except in this way in which the good of justice is good simply, although penal evil is to the thief.

To the other, it must be said that it is not diminished as a reward of sin, but as a punishment, and this is fitting to justice: but that it would be diminished as it is a certain reward, would be inconsistent with justice.

To the other, it must be said that Isaiah speaks of the temporal punishment of Nebuchadnezzar, who was cast out of the tomb to his confusion and given to worms to be devoured: but according to the mystery it refers to spiritual, not bodily, punishments.

Articulus 34 — Whether The Bodies Of The Damned Burn And Are Not Consumed

Whether the bodies of the damned burn and are not consumed?

Then it is asked concerning what is said there, "If, however, it is asked concerning the bodies of the wicked," etc.

It seems to be impossible what is said, that the bodies burn and are not consumed.

1. For the Philosopher says that every passion more intensely made casts off from the substance: but that passion is most intensely made, because the agent surpasses every passion: therefore it most intensely casts off from the substance: therefore it will eventually consume the substance.
2. Likewise, the same says that every action is through assimilation, because the agent wishes to assimilate the patient to itself: but there is action between the fire and the

body of the damned: therefore eventually the fire will assimilate the body to itself: therefore it seems that it will be converted into fire.

3. Likewise, it is evident that fire moves the body: but the motion of fire is finite: therefore that motion will eventually come to an end: but no end can be unless the moved assumes the species and form of the mover: therefore at some time the bodies of the damned will receive the species of fire: therefore at some time they will be fire and not human bodies.

4. Likewise, everything receiving the quality of some agent disposing another to the species, if that quality is completed in it, of necessity it will receive the species: but the bodies of the damned receive heat, which is a quality disposing to the species of fire, and that quality will be completed in them: therefore necessarily they are changed into fire: therefore they are changed from the human species and nature.

5. Likewise, every agent dividing a physical body, of necessity will corrupt it, if the action is strengthened: the heat of fire acts by dividing the physical body of man: therefore if the action is strengthened, of necessity it will corrupt it. The first is proved from this, that no physical body is divisible into infinity without being divided from the physical form. The second is assumed: because otherwise the fire would not harm within unless it divided the bodies: and it is evident that the action of fire is greatly strengthened: therefore it will consume the substance of the bodies of the damned.

6. Likewise, the bodies of the damned are the matter of the fire of hell, either proper or alien. If proper: then the bodies of the damned are fire, because the proper matter of fire has the species of fire for its form. If alien: then it is objected thus, every alien matter of fire is transformed by fire if it acts upon it: but the fire of hell acts upon the bodies: therefore it transforms them: therefore it acts upon them by corrupting.

7. Likewise, every agent acts as much as it gives to the passive of the species: but the fire of hell acts most intensely: therefore it gives most of its species to the damned: therefore it most intensely transforms them from their proper species, that is, human: therefore they will not remain humans.

On the contrary, it is said, Apocalypse ix, 6: "Men will seek death, and death will flee from them."

Therefore it seems that they can never be consumed to death: therefore it seems that their bodies will always remain incorrupt.

1. Likewise, Bernard says that thus the damned die, that they never completely die. And from this follows the same as before.

2. Likewise, Isaiah lxvi, 24: "Their worm will not die, and their fire will not be extinguished." Therefore they will always be burned in fire without consumption.

Response. It must be said that in truth those things which are said in the Scripture are faithful and true, and must be held without doubt. But the preservation of the bodies of the damned is

the justice of God in punishments: and these must be believed rather than discussed. However, lest we seem to say nothing at all, it must be known that sensibles act in two ways upon the organs of the senses, namely by the action of nature and by the action of the soul. The action of nature is with consumption and contrariety: and I think well that such cannot be in any body unless the body itself is consumed. But the action of the soul is through the reception of intention to the affection of pain or delight: and we will speak of this according to our possibility in the question concerning the senses of resurrected bodies below: and such is the action in hell, which is for the alteration of the senses, without the consumption of substance.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that the Philosopher speaks of the action of nature, which is not merely an action for the alteration of the senses: and not of the action of the soul, which casts off nothing from the substance.

To the other, it must be said that there is such assimilation as there is between the sense and the sensible, that is, that the sensible species is in the sense through the intention of the one causing distress, but not through the being it has in matter.

To the other, it must be said that the motion is made to the impression of intention, and is finite, but not to the form giving being: because otherwise those bodies would be converted into fire.

To the other, it must be said that they receive the intention of quality as it is the excitation of pain and sadness from heat: but not as it is the form transforming matter to the rejection of the species and the induction of another form.

To the other, it must be said that the agent by the action of the soul does not act by dividing, as is evident in all sensible agents acting upon the organs of the senses, if the action of the soul is divided from the action of nature.

To the other, it must be said that the impious are alien matter dissimilar to the species of the agent, just as the sense in potency receives the species of the object for sadness or delight: and from this no change of bodies follows.

To the other, it must be said that it gives the species according to the action of the soul, and not of nature: and therefore it does not follow that it converts into fire. This solution is better according to reason, which can be in this matter: and therefore it must be diligently noted.

Articulus 35 — Whether The Soul Suffers In The Body, Or From The Body

Whether the soul suffers in the body, or from the body?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, E, in the middle: As the soul by whose power the body lives, etc.

For from this likeness Augustine seems to imply the previously held mode of solution.

However, that it may be better understood, two things are to be inquired here, namely, how does the soul suffer in the body?

And secondly, why to the damned body can only one mode of suffering be attributed, when there are two modes of suffering of the animated body?

To the first, it is objected thus:
1. Every agent is stronger than the patient: but no body is stronger than the suffering soul which is spiritual: therefore no corporeal thing can act upon the soul. The first of these is written by Augustine in book XII on Genesis literally: and the second, and also the conclusion.

1. Likewise, the body and soul relate as mover and moved: and the soul is the mover, but the body is the moved: but every mover acts upon the moved, not suffering from it as such: therefore the soul acts upon the body, not suffering from it as such: therefore it cannot suffer in the body, as it seems.
2. Likewise, that which is susceptible of no change, is susceptible of no suffering: but the soul is susceptible of no change: therefore it is susceptible of no suffering: therefore neither does it suffer from the body, nor from anything else. The first is evident: because every suffering is according to some change. The second is written in the first book of On the Soul, where the Philosopher refutes the sayings of Plato.
3. Likewise, that which has no contrary at all, is impossible to suffer at all: but the soul has no contrary: therefore it is impossible for it to suffer, whether in the body, or outside the body.

The contrary of this is, that

1. We experience fears and sorrows which those not having sensitive souls do not experience: therefore the soul seems to be subject to sufferings.
2. Likewise, Damascene says, that the soul sympathizes with the body, although it does not die with the body: therefore it suffers.
3. Likewise, the Philosopher wishes that in some things the motions of the body reach the soul and change it: therefore also the body impresses sufferings upon souls.

Response. It must be said that in truth it is so, and Augustine seems to determine thus, that the soul does not suffer from the body incorporeally: but with suffering made in the body, the soul punishes itself with the affection of pain and compassion.

How this is to be understood, it must be known that no motion, or passion of any affection is in the soul, unless first there is apprehension of the thing causing that passion, or affection: but apprehension through the reception of the species is sensible through sense or imagination: and therefore in the body there is no passion of pain, unless through sense or imagination: but that which is in the sense, or in the imagination of the soul, is a simple spiritual species and not a corporeal form: hence the immediate cause of pain in the soul is the spiritual intention of the saddening thing received in some power of the soul: and therefore Augustine says, that it does not suffer from the body, but from itself receiving such a species of the saddening thing.

And through this the solution to the first is clear: because although the first agent is the body, yet the proximate is the spiritual intention apprehended by the soul.

To the other it must be said, that the soul is not moved by the body as it is a body: yet the motions of the body reach it through the operation of the soul, in this way that a certain operation is to apprehend the forms of surrounding things.

To the other it must be said, that the soul taken in itself, that is, stripped from the body, naturally has no change: but in the body it is changed accidentally, namely by the change made in the body. It is changed, however, in the aforementioned way: and in this way Aristotle does not deny, but rather proves, that the soul is moved by itself.

To the other it must be said, that the soul in itself has no contrary, nor does it suffer in itself, yet insofar as it is the form and mover of the composite, it receives as contrary that which dissolves the composite: and in the apprehended species of that it is punished and grieves.

Of what is objected in the contrary, the solution is evident by itself. Yet it must be known, that although this solution is according to Augustine, it is somewhat against the sayings of Aristotle: because he does not wish that apprehending is acting, but rather suffering: and according to him it must be added, that the motion which is made through the body, materially relates to the soul, and not as an agent: but because it provides the matter of cognition, and the soul applies the form, therefore it is true what was said in the solution throughout. This also was noted above.

Articulus 36 — Why Another Mode Of Suffering Cannot Be Attributed To The Bodies Of The Damned

Why cannot another mode of suffering be attributed to the bodies of the damned?

Secondly, it is asked, Why cannot another mode of suffering be attributed to the bodies of the damned?

For it seems that either could be: because 4. The bodies of the damned are hot: but if the hot acted only by the action of the soul, and not by the action of nature, it could not be said that they were hot: therefore the hot acts in them by the action of nature. The first is proved by faith. The second, however, is evident through philosophy: because the soul is not said to be hot from the apprehension of the hot, or even from the affection of the hot: and thus the proposition is evident.

1. Likewise, If it acted only by the action of the soul: then the suffering of those bodies would be as suffering in sleep at the imagination of terrible things presently afflicting a man: and thus they would not truly suffer, but only fantastically, which is absurd, because this would generate heresy: therefore they suffer by the action of nature.
2. Likewise, If they suffered by the action of the soul and not of nature: since the action of the soul occurs equally with the thing present and absent, it would not be necessary for there to be fire where they suffer, but the imagination of fire would suffice: and this again is absurd: therefore it seems that they suffer by the action of nature.

The contrary of this is the objections previously introduced: because those necessarily seem to conclude that they do not suffer by the action of nature, or even if they suffer by both actions, namely of nature and of the soul.

Response. Without prejudice, it must be said that I think no one knows the truth of this question, except to whom God has revealed it, as is said in the following chapter from the words of Augustine. Without prejudice, however, I say that they suffer only by the action of the soul, I say by the action which is sensation: because there the organ must be actually changed, and also the species of the sensible must be made in the soul.

And how this may be, we can imagine by a likeness: as if we suppose by the impossible that the action of the soul in the qualities of touch is separated from the action of nature: for if then the hot acts on the touch, it will necessarily be present touching: because otherwise there would not be touch, and a change of the organ would have to occur: because otherwise the species would not be conveyed to the power of the soul, which is touch, and the species as contrary to the conjoined would have to be received by the soul: and yet because the agent would be spiritual, it would cast nothing from the substance, and in one way its substance would remain if the suffering remained.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that this would be true if there were not here an action through sensation: for in that which is through sensation, the body is disposed by the quality of the sensible, and is denominated by it, especially in touch: but if it were done only by imagining, which imagination does not require the touch of the present thing which causes suffering, then the objection would hold.

To the other, the solution is already clear, that a dream is not through sensation: and in this the position of this faith differs from the sayings of certain Philosophers who attributed such a dreamlike suffering to souls and sinners.

To the last, the solution is also clear, because the sensation of a thing requires experience and presence.

Articulus 37 — Whether Corporeal Fire Torments The Demons

Does corporeal fire torment demons?

Next, it is asked concerning this which is said, there, F, "It is also usually asked, Do demons burn with corporeal fire?"

However, it seems that they do not, because

1. Damascenus says that that fire is not corporeal, but of such a kind as God indeed knows: therefore they do not burn with corporeal fire.
2. Likewise, Boethius says in the book on the Two Natures in One Person of Christ, that there is no action and passion of those whose matter is not one: but in the corporeal fire and demons there is not one matter: therefore that fire does not act upon demons.

3. Likewise, every action is through contact, as Aristotle says in the first book of Generation and Corruption, and in the sixteenth of the Animals: but between fire and demons there is no contact: therefore fire does not act upon demons. Contact is of those whose extremes are together: but demons, since they are spirits, do not have extremes: therefore the proposition is established.

1. Likewise, physical contact is when each of the touching things is changed by the other: and it is established that fire is not changed by the demon.
2. Likewise, every action is between contraries; but between fire and demons there is no contrariety: therefore no action: therefore there will be no action or passion between them.
3. Likewise, that which is insusceptible to the species of the agent receives nothing from its action, and suffers nothing from it: but the demon, since it is a spirit, is not susceptible to the species of the agent, because it can never be said that a spirit is hot: therefore it receives nothing from the action of fire, and suffers nothing from it.

In opposition to this are those things which are said in the Scripture, and they suffice: because in the Scripture it is said that the lake of fire and brimstone will be corporeal fire, etc.

Response. Without doubt corporeal fire torments demons: which I hold by faith: although it is not fully intelligible, yet it can be said thus for understanding, that that corporeal fire can be taken in two ways, namely as an instrument of divine justice avenging sin committed against God: and as a corporeal element. And in the first way indeed corporeal fire has the incorporeal power of afflicting even a nature more noble than itself, provided it is under sin. In the second way, however, it does not have this. And in the first power indeed, which is given by divine justice, it acts upon the spirits of demons.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that Damascenus understands concerning the immediate afflicting, of which, as was said before, the afflicting is in the corporeal species, which is the intention received in the spirit apprehending its affliction: yet the first agent is corporeal.

To the other, it must be said that it is true concerning the agent according to the power of the element only, or according to the power of a simple natural body: but the agent in the divine power, which is the power of the instrument of divine justice for the vengeance of iniquity, is of greater power: and therefore it will act even upon that which does not share matter with it.

To the other, it must be said that contact is twofold, namely by way of definition, and by way of corporeal conjunction. And in the first way it is said to be touched which is essentially joined, and is contained present in something: and in this way demons touch fire, because they are included present in it: but not in the second way.

However, the other proofs suppose contact to occur in the second way.

To the other, it must be said that there is contrariety here to fire insofar as it is an instrument of God's justice: because thus its contrary is contrary to divine justice, just as theft is said to be contrary to the gallows or scaffold.

To the other, it must be said that in truth an intellectual substance is not properly said to be hot, but more properly said to be scorched rather than hot, unless it is said to be hot by the apprehended intention of heat: and this is improperly said, because that intention is spiritual. Or perhaps it can be said that as fire is an instrument of divine justice, it can imprint its quality on an intellectual substance. But it is better that it is not hot, but rather scorched by fire, as it is an instrument of avenging justice in punishments: because since heat is a corporeal form, it cannot be understood how it is in a purely spiritual substance: and perhaps constrained by this necessity Augustine said in the Scripture that demons have aerial bodies in fire: which, however, the Church does not hold: and therefore it must be said in the first way.

Articulus 38 — Whether The Infernal Fire Is Corporeal

Whether the infernal fire is corporeal?

ARTICULUS XXXVIIE. Whether the infernal fire is corporeal?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says,

There, F, at the end: Eternal fire, of what kind it may be, etc.

It seems this is false by reason of the first part and the second.

1. Indeed, by reason of the first part: because immediately in the following chapter it will say that it is evident that souls are to be tormented by material fire with corporeal flames: therefore it is known of what kind it is.

For the second part, however, it is said, Isaiah 14:9: Hell beneath is troubled. Therefore hell is beneath in the encounter of your coming: therefore it is in the earth.

1. Likewise, there the Gloss says that hell is a place of punishments, and it is beneath.
2. Likewise, Ecclesiasticus 24:45: I will penetrate, and inspect all the lower parts of the earth and all the sleeping. And it speaks of the descent to hell: therefore it is in the lower parts of the earth.
3. Likewise, Isidore in the book of Creatures: The moon is accustomed to set, not to rise. Therefore the impious are placed beneath the earth, lest they enjoy its light. But the impious are in hell: therefore hell is beneath the earth.
4. Likewise, Job 16:16: All my things will descend into the most profound hell, etc. There the Gloss: As to the height of heaven, this air is lower, as to the height of the air, the earth lies lower, but as to the height of the earth, those places of hell which are superior to other receptacles of hell, this place is called the most profound hell. The limbo of the fathers is beneath the earth, and still lower than that is hell, and thus again the proposition is held.

5. Likewise, all ignobility ought to retain the lowest place: but all ignobility is in hell: therefore hell ought to be in the lowest place: therefore it ought to be in the middle of the earth.

6. Likewise, contrary merits are in the Saints and the impious: but the Saints by merits ascend to the highest place: therefore the impious by the contrary ought to descend to the lowest place: but this is the middle of the earth: therefore the damned ought to be disposed in the middle of the earth.

7. Likewise, the wicked loved the earth, just as the Saints loved heaven: therefore it is equally just that they be placed in the middle of the earth, just as the Saints are placed in the middle of heaven.

On the contrary of this is that it pertains to the decorum of justice that one be punished in the same place where he sinned: but they sinned here: therefore it seems that hell ought to be here.

Response. It must be said that in this question beyond the sayings of the Saints nothing is to be said: because reason does nothing at all here, but in all things the sayings of those who received revelation from the Holy Spirit must be adhered to. They, however, say that the fire is corporeal, and hell is in the earth: and this is to be held and believed.

To the saying of Augustine, it must be said that he speaks not by asserting, but yet he himself thinks it more likely to be so than otherwise: and perhaps what was not fully revealed to Augustine was fully revealed to other Saints. And according to this, there is no contradiction in the Letter.

Or it may be said that Augustine says there is no doubt about the species of fire, but about the mode and power by which it afflicts souls: because that is very hidden.

To the other part, I concede well that it is beneath the earth, as has been proven: but the saying of Augustine is understood about the determined place, whether those places are in the center or outside the center: because even according to the poets there is doubt about this. And Isaac seems to want that sinners are pressed down beneath the sad orb, and their sins will weigh them down there. The orb of Zriséis is called by the Philosophers the left part of the orb, which is spread over the fourth part of the earth, which is supposed to be the fourth habitable part: and Isaiah seems to be of this opinion, as will be clear below.

To what is objected against, it must be said that it cannot be: because all the habitation of the Saints will then be purified: and therefore the world as to this habitation in which the Saints merited will be renewed: and therefore the fetid corpses of the damned will be cast away from it, so that justice may also be deepened in the place which is fitting for the sin of the damned, as has been proven in the objection.

Articulus 39 — Whether A Corporeal Fire Can Exist In Such A Way That It Is Not Destroyed

Whether corporeal fire can exist so as not to be destroyed?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, G, after the beginning: "We say that the spirit is held by fire," etc.

And two things are inquired, namely, whether corporeal fire can exist in such a way that it is not destroyed?

And secondly, whether it is true that this is their torment, that they see and feel the fire?

To the first, it is objected thus:

1. A place is preservative of what is placed, as the Philosopher says: therefore everything that is naturally in some place, if it is long outside its place, where it is, will be destroyed: but the fire of hell is true fire, and it has been outside its place since the beginning of the world: therefore it will be destroyed.

1. Likewise, Avicenna says in the first Philosophy, that there is no cause why this part of matter is made earth, and this part air, and another part fire, except that coldness or heat finds it in such or such a place naturally, and converts it into air or into earth: but it is evident that no coldness of the earth is as natural as that which is in the middle of the earth: therefore it will convert into earth whatever is in the middle: and consequently, it will convert the fire of hell into earth.
2. Likewise, elements are converted into each other, and are converted into the power and species of the dominant: but it is evident that in the center of the earth no element dominates as much as earth: therefore everything that is there, earth will convert to its nature and species: therefore the fire of hell will necessarily be converted into earth.
3. Likewise, Aristotle necessarily proved that as much as is given to something of the nature of a species, so much is given to it of the place of that nature and of the motion to that place: therefore, conversely, as much as is given to something of the place of some nature, so much is given to it of the species and nature of what is placed and in that place: but no place is as natural to earth as the place of the middle of the earth: therefore whatever is there will take on the nature and species of earth: therefore it will be converted into earth.
4. Likewise, no violence is perpetual, because either the thing will be freed, or it will be corrupted: but it is evident that fire is violently downwards: therefore it is not perpetually there, because either it will be corrupted, or it will fly away if the hindrance ceases: and from this follows the same as before.
5. If perhaps you say that it is not there violently, but naturally: because there is a twofold motion of fire. One which it has according to the nature of form: and that is to ascend upwards. There is another which it has according to the nature of matter: and that is sometimes downwards, and then also fire is moved downwards, because it follows its matter, just as inflamed wood is moved downwards. Against: That is not the proper matter of fire, but alien: because the proper matter of fire ascends: therefore it begins to prevail when it comes to the center: and thus again fire will perish.

Further, it also seems here that that place in capacity is not sufficient: because

1. The rarer an element is, the greater place it seeks: but fire is the rarest of the elements: therefore it seeks a place greater than all the elements: but the middle of the earth is the smallest place: therefore it seems that fire cannot be there,
2. Likewise, since that place is of the least capacity, it seems that it cannot contain a greater part of men: and thus it seems that there is nothing of what is said about that place.

How that fire can act upon souls, it has been previously treated in a similar manner, how it can act upon demons.

Response. It must be said that the fire is there in the strongest heat, to which no heat is comparable: and this is to be understood thus: Fire which is surrounded by natural cold and is in solid matter, is always gathered together, and has heat pressed and gathered more than that which is in rare matter: and such is the fire of hell.

To the first, it must be said that God Himself conserves the fire, according to which it is an instrument of avenging justice. And this is what is said in Isaiah 30:33: "The breath of the Lord, like a torrent of brimstone, kindling it."

To the other, it must be said that that fire is not naturally generated there, but rather all the ignobility of the world's matter is gathered there by divine power.

To the other, it must be said that it would follow that this would be true if the power of divine justice did not conserve that fire.

To the other, it must be said that violence cannot be done to any creature by God: because to every creature is innate obedience to its Creator: and in such a way that fire stands in the middle.

To the other, it must be said that that fire, as it is considered as an instrument of divine justice avenging sins, then the most proper matter of fire is the damned: and therefore it also most effectively prevails in them, and is not extinguished; and this is the proper consideration of its conservation.

To what is further inquired, it must be said that this is not true, except of fire considered according to the nature of the element: for that which has the power of avenging sinners seeks more the matter in which its parts stand and are gathered, so that it becomes hotter, as has been said: and therefore it seeks a narrow place.

To the other, it must be said that in the necessary amplitude hell will never be lacking: because it has expanded its soul without any limits: but yet I well believe that the damned will lie constrained and massed together in it, and this capacity of the earth's concavity is well sufficient.

Articulus 40 — Whether It Is The Same For The Damned To See The Fire And To Be Tormented In The Fire

Whether it is the same for the damned to see the fire and to be tormented in the fire?

Secondly, it is asked whether it is true what is said, that it is the same for them to be tormented in the fire as to see and feel the fire?

However, it seems that it is not:
1. For intention does not have the power to burn that in which it is present: which is evident when we see fire, because the species of fire in the eye does not burn the eye. Similarly, when we understand fire, the species of fire does not burn the intellect. And it is similar with imagination. Therefore, it seems altogether incorrect to say that it is the same for them to be tormented in the fire as to see the fire.

1. Likewise, if the intentions of the soul are only and per se not related to things, they will not move to pain or sadness, as Aristotle says: but these intentions cannot be referred to things without bodily senses, which are not there: therefore, it seems that they do not move souls to pain or sadness.
2. Likewise, sense in act does not occur except through the harmony of the complexioned: but these are not in the soul separated from the body: therefore, they do not have sense in act: therefore, nor vision: therefore, they do not see the fire.
3. If perhaps you say that it is understood of intellectual vision. On the contrary: Intellectual vision occurs through species abstracted from all consideration and appendages of matter: but such species do not transmute anything: therefore, by such vision the soul is never transmuted: therefore, it seems that it neither suffers nor grieves from such vision: and thus there is nothing that seems to be said otherwise.

Response. It must be said that this, in my judgment, is understood of intellectual vision with the presence of the thing in which the seer is held. And I say that the apprehension of fire is twofold, namely as of such a nature or element, and this does not punish: and as of an instrument of avenging justice, and thus it is apprehended as contrary to iniquity: and when it is held by the power of God in the fire, it is afflicted in it.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that intention does not burn, but rather afflicts the spirit according to how it is accepted by the presence of fire and containing the spirit, which power the fire has insofar as it is an instrument of divine justice, as has been said: just as also matter, as long as the soul is in the body, intention does not afflict: but the intention of the agent present and rushing into the body afflicts the soul, as has been said above.

To the second, it must be said that this intention is referred to the thing, namely to the fire, which presently holds and acts in the spirit by the aforementioned power.

To the other, it must be said that sense is not taken here properly: for in the soul separated from the body there is no sense, except in the root of the sensitive power: but it is taken

according to the experience of affliction which is through fire, just as also demons who do not have a sensible soul feel the fire, that is, experience it, as was previously held.

To the other, it must be said that this is true of speculative intellect, but not of practical or affective, which takes as sad the species apprehended of the thing having the power to hold the spirit, and acting contrary to the spirit is made: because to that vision follows the greatest affliction.

Articulus 41 — Whether The Soul Is Shaped Like A Body

Whether the soul is shaped like the body?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, G, around the middle: To profess that the soul can have the likeness of the body, etc.

It seems to lie and to speak heresy: because
1. Tertullian was condemned for this, because he said the soul is shaped like the body, and the inner man is formed like the outer: and this seems to be expressly said here: therefore it seems here to be the heresy of Tertullian.

1. Likewise, it seems impossible: because whether the body is taken naturally, or artificially, or mathematically, the figure is always its form: and everything figured is a body: therefore if the soul has the figure of the body, it is a body.
2. Likewise, no body is the perfection of a body: but every soul is the perfection of a body: therefore no soul is a body: but figure is the terminus of a surface or body: therefore no soul has the figure of a body: therefore it says falsely in the text.

1. Likewise, there is no proof in the text: because the soul does not see such dreams, but the man: and it is not inconvenient if he sees bodily acts of himself, since he is corporeal. But that the soul does not see this, it is not hidden from anyone knowing something of natural philosophy. Moreover, if the soul were to see such things, then even when separated it would see such dreams: and it is ridiculous to say that separated souls dream.

Response. Augustine in truth does not assert this: because it is said doubtfully, and it appears more absurd and false than true. However, if someone wishes to sustain it, he could say that to have the figure of the body happens in two ways, namely by being, and by intention. In the first way, only the body has the figure of the body: and therefore Tertullian erred, who attributed the figure of the body to the soul in such a way. But by intention in the power which is called imaginary, the sensitive soul has the figure of the body when bodies are imagined, as it says in the text: and thus the text is understood: for the figures of all quantities are described formally or imaginatively.

And through this the solution to the first is clear.

To the other it must be said that figure according to being is considered in that objection, and also in the following, but by intention it is fitting to the soul.

To the other it must be said that Augustine does not intend that souls carry with them images received from things as they are in the interior senses, but rather they carry with them infections or merits contracted from such things: and these will be better explained below, and through such infections they will be subjected to punishments.

Articulus 42 — Whether Spirits Are In Non-Corporeal Places

Whether spirits are in non-corporeal places?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, G, a little before the end: Thus also in places it seems to be non-corporeal, etc.

For this seems absurd: because thus neither hell nor the empyrean heaven seems to be a corporeal place, which our faith abhors.

Response. It must be said that he does not understand concerning place according to its substance, but rather according to the act of placing: because a spirit cannot be contained corporeally in a place, but rather definitively, as Damascene says: and this is as if to be contained spiritually.

Articulus 43 — Whether It Is True That Souls Are Deprived Of Senses And Affections

Whether it is true that souls are deprived of senses and affections?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said there, G, at the end: Whence it is proven that the souls of the deceased are not only not deprived of their senses, but neither of their affections, etc.

For it seems to be false thus: 1. Those whose essential act is corrupted, they themselves are necessarily corrupted: but the essential act of the senses is corrupted in death: therefore, the senses themselves are corrupted. The first is evident through Damascene saying that nothing is deprived of its proper and essential operation. The second is evident in itself: because after death, neither does one see, nor hear, nor do any of the other things which are exercised through the senses.

1. Likewise, Aristotle in the ninth book of the first philosophy says thus: If something remains to be examined: for in some cases nothing prevents, namely that such a soul, not every soul, but the intellect: for it is perhaps impossible to accept that the sensitive soul remains in no power after the body: therefore, it is false what is said in the Letter.
2. Likewise, Aristotle in the first book of On the Soul: If indeed there is something of the soul's works or proper passion, it is possible for it to be separated: but if nothing is proper to it, it will not be separable. However, it is evident that no operation or sensitive passion is proper to the soul without the body. Therefore, no part of the sensitive soul is separated: therefore, it does not remain after death.

3. Likewise, thus: Eustratius says in the Commentary on the sixth book of the Ethics: From this it is expressly accepted that the rational soul, not by nature immediately, but by a certain other life, namely the sensitive and vegetative, which is entelechy, are inseparable from the body existing, and proper to them coming to the complexions, and with these dissolved, departing.

4. Likewise, Aristotle in the sixteenth book of On Animals says thus: If the operation of any of these principles cannot be without the body, such principles will not be without the body. For example: walking does not occur without feet: and therefore the walking power is never without feet. It follows concerning the operation of the senses, since they themselves are not operating without a bodily organ, they cannot remain without a bodily organ: therefore, with that dissolved, they themselves are annihilated.

5. Likewise, whatever requires a subject for its being, after the corruption of the subject, does not have permanence: every organic power thus requires a subject for its being: therefore, with the subject corrupted, it does not have permanence: but every power of the sensitive soul is an organic power: therefore, it seems that every power of the sensitive soul, with the subject corrupted, has no permanence.

6. Likewise, we see that with the subject weakened, every power of the sensitive soul is weakened: therefore, with it destroyed, it is destroyed.

On the contrary, it is said that 1. If something is not destroyed according to substance, no part of its substantial part is destroyed: but the rational soul is not destroyed according to substance: therefore, its substantial part is not destroyed: but this is the sensitive soul, because the Philosopher says that just as a triangle is in a quadrilateral, so the sensitive is in the rational: therefore, the sensitive soul is not destroyed after death.

1. Likewise, it is evident that in the resurrection the body will rise according to the nature of the organs: but the organs will not be without their powers perfecting them: therefore, the powers will then be: but they will not be unless they remain: therefore, the powers of the sensitive soul will remain: therefore, they are not destroyed.

2. Likewise, in the Letter, the tongue and finger are named: and it is evident that those members were not there corporally: therefore, it is necessary that the virtues or powers of the soul were there at least: therefore, they remain in the soul after death.

Response. It must be said that the virtues of the sensitive soul and the sensitive soul itself can be considered in three ways, namely in act, in being, and in root. And in the first way, they do not remain after death, namely as to hearing, seeing, and imagining, and the like. In the second way, again they do not remain: because the being of an organic virtue is in the organ: whence there is no vision in being, which is not in the eye according to habit at least: and so it is also in the other powers of the sensitive soul. In the third way, however, they remain: because the substance of the rational soul is the root of all its rational, sensitive, and vegetative powers, and from it they arise and proceed as properties from a subject. And

because that remains, therefore also those powers will remain: and just as now they proceeded from it into the organs as to being and acting, so also after the resurrection they will proceed.

And through this, the solution to all is evident.

To hear and imagine is the essential act of the senses according to being accepted, and not as they are taken in the root: and it is well conceded that according to this being they are destroyed.

To all others, the mode of solution is the same.

Note, however, that some wish to introduce a new philosophy, that the soul, stripped, sees and hears and imagines, and carries with it the imaginations of the body which it receives in the body: how they prove this, it is not necessary to say, because it is rather nearly said.

To the first, it must be said that it is a derision, not a sentence of truth.

Articulus 44 — Whether Aborted Fetuses And Monsters Will Rise Again, And Whether Such Will Have Endowments

Whether aborted fetuses and monsters will rise again,
and whether such will have gifts?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said,
there, H, Mlud also to be investigated, etc.

For it seems that such will not rise again: for resurrection is a certain regeneration: but regeneration is not, except of those already born: since therefore these are not born, it seems that they will not be reborn: therefore neither do they rise again.

Likewise, further it is asked, Whether such will have gifts?

It seems that they will: because
1. They will be immortal: therefore they will have the gift of immortality or impassibility.

1. Likewise, Since these are preserved from injuries, it seems that a body composed of contraries cannot be preserved from injuries except by grace: therefore it seems that such will have grace.

Response. It must be said that there is a twofold nativity, namely in the womb, and from the womb. In the womb is animation, which is here called the formation of the fetus. However, from the womb they do not have nativity. But resurrection follows the first nativity, and not the second only.

To the other it must be said that such children will not have gifts: nevertheless they will rise again in the age of thirty years.

To the objection, however, it must be said that, as I think, they can be harmed by no agent: and this with divine goodness being aware, the material bodily composition will resist in this way, as it would have resisted in Adam, if he had not committed sin: and yet he did not have the gift for it.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 45 — Whether There Are Five Receptacles Of Souls After They Are Separated From The Body

Whether there are five receptacles of souls after they are separated from the body?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said, there, 1, Furthermore it must be known, that all souls, etc.

For it seems that these receptacles are five: because
1. According to the number and mode of merits, there ought to be the mode and number of receptacles. However, there is mortal sin, original sin, venial sin, and the merit of charity. It is evident, however, that to the first corresponds hell, to the second the limbo of children, to the third the limbo of the fathers before the advent of Christ, and now the kingdom of heaven. Therefore, some special places of receptacles ought to correspond to the fourth and fifth.

1. Likewise, there is a receptacle with darkness and sensible punishment purging, and with darkness only not purging: therefore, there is something with darkness only and purging, and with sensible only and not purging: therefore, there will be six differences of these receptacles.
2. Likewise, this air according to Peter, is a gloomy prison of demons?: therefore, it is one of the receptacles: therefore, there are more than are commonly posited.
3. Likewise, it is evident that the devil is everywhere, he is in punishments and in fire: therefore, also here in this prison: but it has been held, that that fire is corporeal: therefore, here is corporeal fire: but corporeal fire especially most hot, heats and burns nearby bodies: therefore, this fire ought to burn houses and nearby men: and this we do not see.

To this it must be said, that there are diverse receptacles of souls, and thus they are diversified. For they are either as a terminus, or as a way. If a terminus: then there are two, namely according to evil merit hell, and according to good merit the kingdom of heaven: but the terminus according to evil merit or hell is twofold, according to one's own merit, and alien contracted with nature: and to the first corresponds the lower hell of the damned, to the second, however, the limbo of children which is the upper hell: and concerning the punishment of these it is to be inquired in the second of the Sentences, in the treatise on original sin. If, however, it is according to the way: either this is from the defect of one's own merit, or from the defect of the payment of the price: because these two are required for perfect satisfaction, as noted above in the third of the Sentences. If in the first way: then it is purgatory. If, in the second way: then it is the limbo of the holy fathers before the advent of Christ.

To the first, therefore, it must be said, that mortal and venial are punished in hell because venial by accident has eternal punishment, namely on account of conjunction to mortal, as noted above in the second of the Sentences. However, the conjunction of original and venial,

in my judgment, is impossible: because by omitting he will sin mortally, when he can sin venially: or even venial is not considered. You will also find this there.

To the other it must be said, that sensible punishment cannot be without darkness: because darkness follows from aversion, and sensible punishment from conversion: and therefore there is no place of sensible punishment only, just as there is no mortal sin having conversion only. Similarly, there cannot be purging darkness: because it does not make purgatory, except in him who has the light of grace, and through the punishment of sense. And it is clear from the aforesaid, that also other differences are not possible.

To the other it must be said, that this air is not a place of punishment, except comparatively, namely with respect to heaven, but it is a place of exercise: and concerning this you will find in the second of the Sentences, in the treatise on the fall of the devil.

To the other it must be said, that it does not heat nearby bodies: because as it is said, that fire acts only by the power of the instrument of divine justice: and therefore it does not burn except that which is directed by divine justice, as condemned for sin.

DISTINCTIO XLV

Divisio Textus

Nor is it to be denied, as Augustine says, etc. Here he discusses the suffrages of the dead.

And he touches on two things, namely concerning the suffrages themselves, and the consequent questions: and the second begins there, "Solet moveri questio de duobus," etc.

Likewise, in the first he introduces two things. First, indeed, he touches on whether the suffrages of the Church avail.

And secondly, concerning the pomp of funerals, there, B, Concerning the pomp of funerals, etc.

Concerning the first, in various places arise nine, which all are touched upon in Liélera: of which the first is, Whether the suffrages which one person makes for another avail? Second, Whether they avail for the deceased? Third, Whether they avail for those dying in mortal sins? Fourth, Whether they avail for those who are in purgatory? Fifth, Whether they availed for the fathers who were in limbo before the advent of Christ? Sixth, Whether they avail for children who die in original sin? Seventh, Whether they avail for the Saints in the kingdom of heaven? Eighth, Which suffrages avail more? Ninth, By whom ought they to be made?

Articulus 1 — Whether The Suffrages That One Performs Avail Another

Whether the suffrages which one makes, avail another?

To the first, it is objected thus:

1. The Apostle says, 2 Corinthians 5:10: "We must all be manifested before the tribunal of

Christ, that each one may receive the things done in the body, according to what he has done." Therefore, each one will receive his own: therefore, as it seems, the works of another avail nothing; therefore, what one does does not avail another.

1. Likewise, whether the work of nature or of art is considered, the work of one is never derived into another, but always consists around its own matter: therefore, it is also thus in meritorious works, that what one does cannot be derived to another.
2. Likewise, in sins, one is not punished for another: therefore, neither in suffrages is one liberated for another.
3. Likewise, if a work is considered according to affection, it cannot effect a good habit except around the one acting: therefore, it seems that it does nothing around another person: and thus as before.
4. Likewise, what is from another, insofar as it is from another, is not worthy of praise or blame: therefore, he for whom intercession is made, from the fact that another acts well for him, is not worthy of praise or any good: but it is unjust to give to the unworthy: therefore, it is not fitting to give him indulgence from the fact that suffrages are made for him.

On the contrary of this is that
4. One satisfies for another in human judgment: but divine judgment is more mild and merciful than human; therefore, in divine judgment, one can suffrage for another.

1. Likewise, Christ satisfied for all: therefore, also the members of Christ can suffrage for one another.
2. Likewise, Psalm 118:63: "I am a partaker with all those who fear you." But it is evident that such a great Prophet would not pray in this way unless he knew it to be possible that he would obtain.
3. Likewise, Genesis 25:21: "Isaac entreated the Lord for his wife, because she was barren: and He heard him, and gave conception to Rebecca, and the merit of one is derived into another."
4. Likewise, the Gloss of Gregory says there, that the predestination of the Saints is helped by prayers. Therefore, as before.
5. Likewise, Acts 12:5: "Peter was kept in prison. But prayer was made without ceasing by the Church to God for him." The Church would not have done this unless one was helped by what another does. Therefore, as before.

Response. Without any ambiguity, it must be believed and said that prayer and merit avail another: for this is what is said in the Creed in that article, "the communion of Saints": because here it is thus understood: I believe in the Holy Spirit, namely, communicating goods in the Church.

And the Apostle, 2 Corinthians 8:13-14: "That by an equality, your abundance may supply their want, that their abundance may also supply your want, that there may be equality."

To the first, therefore, it must be said that "own" is said in two ways, namely, what I have done by myself, and what I have made my own. And in the first way, indeed, works done by me are called my own. But in the second way, also what I have done by my charity is called my own: and thus the saying of the Apostle is understood.

To the other, it must be said that nature does not operate in the form of will which communicates goods, nor art, but rather they are divided by matters: but there is one principle in the Church, which is the Holy Spirit: and He also makes common goods through the whole body which He inspires, namely, the mystical body: and this is rather assimilated to the work by which one member helps another in the organic body, than to the work of nature or art.

To the other, it must be said that sins do not have one principle nor one form, as was noted above in the distinction on penance, the question on dead and mortified works: but good works have both a common form and a common principle: because of which all good people are one body connected by charity, but not the wicked. And therefore, it is not similar concerning good and evil works.

To the other, it must be said that that help is not by way of effecting through the work, but rather by way of suffraging with the author of all good, that He may effect good in another by the merit of one.

To the other, it must be said that even in civil matters, one is both liberated and rewarded for another, although he is not made praiseworthy or blameworthy: because when something is done to him whom I love, on account of me, I understand it to be done to me.

Articulus 2 — Whether Suffrages Avail The Deceased

Whether suffrages avail the deceased?

Secondly, it is asked whether suffrages avail the deceased?

It seems that they do not: because
1. As the Philosopher says, there is no communication of the living with the dead. But for the value of suffrages, there must be communication. Therefore, it seems that suffrages of the living do not avail the dead.

1. Likewise, the dead are not of the forum of the living. Therefore, it seems that those things which are done in the forum of the living cannot avail them: but all suffrages are made among the living: therefore, it seems that they avail nothing to the dead.
2. Likewise, the dead are under necessity: therefore, it seems that the possibility of aid is removed from them: therefore, also the help of suffrage is removed from them.
3. Likewise, Ecclesiasticus 14:17: Before your death, work justice, for there is no finding food in the underworld. It seems that there is no refreshment there through suffrage.

4. Likewise, Apocalypse 14:13: Their works follow them. Therefore, it seems, since nothing is added, that nothing follows them from another's work. Therefore, they receive nothing of the solace of refreshment.

5. Likewise, Psalm 74:3: When I shall take the time, I will judge justices. But after death, God takes the time. Therefore, then He judges only according to justice. Therefore, it seems that there is nothing there of mercy through suffrages.

On the contrary, there is an entire treatise on this, which Dionysius made in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, last chapter, concerning the holy sleepers. And among other things which are there, he thus says: For truly the prayers of the just, both according to this life and how much more after death, work in those who are worthy of sacred prayers, only the traditions of the words truly teach us.

This same thing Gregory proves in the fourth Dialogues through many examples.

Likewise, Bede in the history of the English.

Likewise, II Maccabees 12:44: For if he did not hope that those who had fallen would rise again, etc.

Likewise, in the same place, verse 48, it is said: Judas, etc., and having made a great collection, he sent twelve thousand drachmas of silver which are noted there.

Response. There is no doubt that the suffrages of the Saints benefit the deceased.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that Aristotle speaks of communication, which is in living together through the communication of contracts and societies, and not of the communication of charity, which in one body unites the dead and the living, as many as have charity: and this suffices for the value of suffrages.

To the second, it must be said that the dead who are in purgatory are in some way still of our forum, namely inasmuch as they are not at the end: but according to the fact that they are in security, they differ from those who are in the forum of the Church.

Or it may be said that not being of the forum does not impede suffrages: because the communication of charity is the cause of suffrages, and not the identity of the forum.

To the third, it must be said that there is a twofold necessity, namely the state according to the quantity of merit, and purity. According to the first mode, they are under necessity, because they will never have less merit than was the quantity of charity in time: but according to the other mode, they are not under necessity, because they can be purified from day to day.

To the fourth, it must be said that it speaks of the hell of the damned, and not of those who are in purgatory.

To the fifth, it must be said that, as is hinted in the letter from the words of Augustine, our works, as was said before, even those which we did through our merit, by this that we communicate in charity, which is the form of the work making common such works.

To the sixth, it must be said that justice is that to him who communicates with the Church in charity, the goods of the Church are communicated: and therefore that saying is no obstacle.

Articulus 3 — Whether Suffrages Avail Those Dying In Mortal Sin

Whether suffrages avail for those dying in mortal sin?

Thirdly, it is asked, Whether they avail for those dying in mortal sin?

And this is to ask, Whether they avail for those damned in hell?

It seems that they do: because

1. In the text it is said that for whom they avail, they either profit for full remission, or for making their damnation more tolerable. Therefore, they profit the damned for a more tolerable damnation.

1. Likewise, Mercy exalts, as it is said, James 1:13. Therefore, judgment exalts every judgment of condemnation: therefore, it seems that from mercy some help is granted to the merits of the Saints suffraging.
2. Likewise, in 2 Maccabees 12:40, it is said that under the tunics of those for whom Judas Maccabeus prayed and offered, was found from the sacrifices of idols. It is clear, however, that to sacrifice to idols is a mortal sin. Therefore, he prayed and offered for idolaters damned in mortal sin. And it is clear that he would not have done so unless the suffrage availed them: therefore, even for the damned and idolaters, the suffrages of the Church avail.
3. Likewise, Dionysius in the authority previously introduced says that prayer avails more for the dead than for the living: but for the living existing in mortal sin, prayer is made, and often the prayer is heard: therefore, much more should prayer be made for the damned dead, if the prayer will avail them.
4. Likewise, the damned who was faithful was of the number of the Church, although not by merit: therefore, something better should be for him after death than for him who was neither by number nor by merit of the Church: but it is clear that for those who are by number and merit of the Church, suffrages avail for remission, but for those who are neither by number nor by merit, they avail nothing: therefore, for him who was by number not by merit, they avail for a more tolerable damnation.
5. Likewise, in 1 Timothy 4:8: Piety is useful for all things, even if it suffers the slipperiness of the flesh, without doubt it will be punished, but it will not perish. Either this is understood of venial slipperiness, or mortal. If of venial: then it says nothing, because this is expiable by itself, and not only by the merit of piety: therefore, it is clear that it speaks of mortal slipperiness: therefore, someone dying previously in mortal sin can be helped by the Church to full remission: therefore, much more others can be helped to a more tolerable damnation.

6. Likewise, every unjust judge would be considered who would rather choose the obstinacy of the guilty than their amendment: therefore, God also wishes the guilty to be amended: but if He mitigates the guilt and punishment through the suffrages of the Church, they are amended: therefore, it seems that He permits suffrages to avail them.

7. Likewise, man sinned remediably, not the Angel: therefore, every man ought to find some remedy in any state: therefore, also the damned: therefore, the merits of the Saints ought to suffrage for them.

8. Likewise, God is infinitely more merciful than man: but I see that man can never sin so much against man, that he would not temper the punishment if the whole Church interceded: therefore, much more at the intercession of the whole Church will God temper the punishments for the damned: therefore, the suffrages of the Church avail them.

On the contrary,
1. Dionysius says there: For which reason the high priest does not pray for the unclean here sleeping: because not only would he be averted in this by the prophetic order, and what of the hierarchs would dare proudly to be admonished by the prince of perfection. The high priest does not pray for the damned: because he would oppose the divine order in this, and would be admonished as proud by the prince of perfection, God.

1. Likewise, Maximus in the commentary there: He does not pray for the remission for sinners: because he would not be heard for them.

2. Likewise, Augustine in book XXI of the City of God: If I knew my father to be in hell, I would not pray more for him than for the devil.

3. Likewise, on that of Job 12:23: He will esteem the abyss as if aging, etc., Gregory says in book XXXIV of the Morals: The Saints in eternity recognize themselves to be more debtors to divine grace, as they see in eternity the evils punished, which they could avoid by His help. But, they say, and where is it that the saints are, if they will not pray for their enemies whom they then see burning: to whom indeed it was said: Pray for your enemies? But we answer more quickly: They pray for their enemies at the time when they can convert their hearts to fruitful repentance, and save them by that conversion. For what else is to be prayed for enemies, except what the Apostle says, 2 Timothy 2:25-26: That God may grant them repentance to the acknowledgment of the truth, and they may recover themselves from the snare of the devil, by whom they are held captive? And how will it be prayed for them then, when they can no longer be converted from the works of iniquity to the works of justice? Therefore, the same reason is why it is not then prayed for men damned in eternal fire, which is now also, that it is not prayed for the devil and his angels assigned to eternal punishment. Which is now also the reason why the saints do not pray for infidel and impious men deceased, because indeed they know those assigned to eternal punishment, they refuse before the sight of the just judge to have the merit of their prayer annulled. But if now also the living just do not pity the dead and damned unjust, when they still know that they themselves

also suffer something judgable from their flesh, how much more strictly will they then regard the torments of the wicked, when they themselves, stripped of all vice of corruption, will adhere more intimately and closely to justice. It is understood that prayer avails nothing for the damned.

4. Likewise, Augustine is introduced in the text saying thus: Souls which departed from the body without faith working through love and its sacraments, such offices of piety are bestowed upon them in vain by their own.

5. Likewise, the Church commonly sings: In hell there is no redemption. Therefore, neither is there relaxation through suffrages.

Response. It seems to me that it should be said that since in hell there is a twofold punishment, namely of sense, and of the worm of conscience: as to the punishment of sense, suffrages avail nothing at all for the damned. But the worm of conscience gnaws concerning three things, namely of committed, and omitted, and that he was not deemed worthy that another should do any good for him. As to the first two, the worm is not mitigated: but as to the third, it can be mitigated, because when good is done for him, he cannot say that he was not deemed worthy that at least some good should be done for him by another.

However, below, in the following distinction, we will return to this question, and there we will dispute concerning all the opinions of the ancients, and concerning the text.

Therefore, I simply concede the authorities introduced, saying to the first, that damnation in the text is taken broadly for punishment: because thus suffrages avail for those who are in purgatory, either that they may be absolved, or that they may not be immediately absolved, but the punishment may be mitigated or shortened.

To the other, it should be said that there is a twofold mercy, namely liberating, and relaxing. But the damned do not feel the liberating, but the relaxing, and not in suffrages, but in this that they are punished less than they deserve.

To the other, it should be said that it was not as if idolothytum was found among the idolaters under the tunics of those soldiers, but rather as among those who by venial avarice took the gold which had been offered for the adornment of idols, as victors take by the right of war. And the circumstance of the text proves this to be true: and because they sinned venially, the suffrages of Judas could profit them.

To the other, it should be said that Dionysius speaks only as to the condition of the gift of perseverance: because in this the deceased in good is better than the living: and therefore what is further inferred does not avail, because the living can be amended, and not the dead, as is clear in the authority of Gregory introduced.

To the other, it should be said that from the fact that he was in the number of the Church, he obtains many other goods, namely the remission of original sin, and perhaps of many others, and retraction from other sins, and especially what is the greatest of all, the avoidance of infidelity: but I do not think that anyone has more from suffrages than another: and in the

argument there is a fallacy of the consequent, as if it were argued thus, something follows: therefore, that.

To the other, it should be said that it speaks of mortal slipperiness and temporal corrective punishment, for which penance must be endured: and if it speaks of future punishment, then it speaks of venial slipperiness: and then the argument against does not avail, because although that is remitted, yet by the virtue of piety it is remitted sooner and more lightly.

To the other, it should be said that then the impious will be in a state where they cannot be amended: and then the punishment is just for them. Hence, just as it would be unjust for a judge to change a just punishment deserved by sentence, so it would be unjust then to change their obstinate will: and therefore the suffrages of the Church are not ordained for this.

To the other, it should be said that the remediability of sin avails man as to the state of amendment, which the devil never had, and not as to the state of future damnation: and this is what Damascene says that it must be known, that what is fall in the Angels, is death in men: because just as there is no return to grace for Angels after the fall, so neither is there a return to penance for man.

To the last, it should be said that if the punishment were justly declared, unless the judge would deny his justice, he would not change it for the whole world: and thus God cannot deny Himself or His justice, as the Apostle says, 2 Timothy 2:12-13: If we deny Him, He also will deny us: if we are faithless, He remains faithful; He cannot deny Himself. Therefore, He does not receive any suffrages of the Church for them.

Articulus 4 — Whether Suffrages Profit Those Who Are In Purgatory

Whether suffrages benefit those who are in purgatory?

Fourthly, it is asked, Whether they benefit those who are in purgatory?

It seems that they do not:
1. For it is the part of a just judge not to remit a punishment justly inflicted: but the punishment of purgatory is justly inflicted: therefore it ought not to be remitted.

1. Likewise, for something to act upon another, it must reach to its use: but the power of the living does not reach to the dead: therefore it seems that it does not act upon them: therefore suffrage does not avail them.
2. Likewise, they are not of the forum of the Church: therefore the works of the Church do not avail them if they are done for them.

On the contrary is everything that is said in the Letter.

1. Likewise, those whose charity is uniting in one body, have a communication of goods with each other: but the charity of the Church militant is one with those who are in purgatory; therefore there is a communication of goods: therefore necessarily goods are communicated to them in purgatory by way of suffrage.

2. Likewise, it seems less that those who are in purgatory should suffrage for the living, than conversely: and they do suffrage for them: therefore, etc. The first is proved from this, that the living are in a state of meriting a greater crown, and they are not. The second is written in the fourth Dialogue of Gregory, who says that Paschasius, when he was in hell, still performed a miracle, healing a certain one who called upon him and touched his bier.

Response. Without ambiguity, it must be held that suffrages benefit those who are in purgatory, as is said in the Letter.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that that punishment is not so confirmed that it cannot be divided to another: and therefore it can be remitted in whole or in part.

To the other, it must be said that it reaches by power, not in act, and making it reach is charity communicating all goods whatsoever are in the mystical body.

To the other, it must be said that this does not impede, as was said above in the second article of this question.

Articulus 5 — Whether Suffrages Profited The Fathers In Limbo

Whether suffrages benefited the fathers in limbo?

Whether suffrages benefited the fathers in limbo?

Fifthly, it is asked, Whether they benefited the fathers in limbo?

It seems that they did: because
1. They were not very evil, and suffrages benefit such: therefore they also benefited the fathers then.

1. Likewise, While they lived, they made themselves worthy, so that these could benefit them: therefore they benefited them.
2. Likewise, They were in a place where they were in need, and they were worthy that such things could benefit them: therefore it would have been cruel not to receive suffrages for them.

On the contrary: because
1. It is impossible for them to be purified: because there was nothing to be purified, who had nothing to be purified that is personal sin: but in such there was nothing to be purified: therefore they were not purified by the suffrages of the Church.

1. Likewise, It is not necessary to offer suffrages for one who experiences no punishment from the judge on account of himself: but such were the fathers in limbo: therefore suffrages did not benefit them.

To which it must be conceded: and the reason for this is, because they satisfied in all things that could be done by man: but nevertheless because the price for the debt of Adam was not

paid, they awaited the payment of that price with happy hope, as was said in the beginning of this book, in the treatise on circumcision.

To the first, therefore, it must be said, that it is true, that they are not very evil, because they were very good, who did not need such things.

To the second, it must be said, that the dignity of the fathers in this life exceeded such need of suffrages: whence they could rather help others in purgatory, than be helped by them.

To the third, it must be said, that there is a twofold need, namely of nature, and of person. The need of nature was the impossibility of the payment of the price for the whole nature which Adam corrupted and lost: and no one could remove this need except Christ, the mediator of God and men, and in that were the fathers, and against this the suffrage of the Church was not ordained, because this was impossible for a mere man. Another need is posited of the person from personal defect and insufficiency of one's own merit: and for its aid the merit and suffrage of the Church is ordained: and in such need the fathers were not, but rather they entered the grave in abundance, and buried they slept securely until the advent of Christ, as it is said, Job 21:24 and 22.

Articulus 6 — Whether Suffrages Profit Unbaptized Children

Whether suffrages benefit children not baptized?

Sixthly, it is asked, Whether suffrages benefit children not baptized?

It seems that they do: because
1. They have only original sin: therefore, some merit should also benefit them: but this happens through the suffrages of the Church: therefore, suffrages ought to benefit such children.

1. Likewise, alien sin is less than any personal sin, however small: and personal venial sin does not obstruct suffrage: therefore, neither does alien sin: therefore, they benefit such as have only alien sin: such are children: therefore, suffrages benefit children.
2. Likewise, they can in no way be called very evil: but suffrages benefit such: therefore, they also benefit those.

On the contrary, they die without grace: but one dying without grace is imperceptible to the perception of grace, therefore they will never be able to perceive grace hereafter: but sin is never remitted without grace: therefore, their sin is not remitted on account of any suffrage.

And this must be conceded.
To the first, it must be said that as long as they are in the state of meriting, then alien merit can benefit them, and especially the merit of Christ in the sacrament of regeneration: but in another state they are confirmed: and therefore sin becomes immobile, not from the magnitude of the sin, but from the state and divine sentence.

To the other, it must be said that, as stated, sin does not cause this, but the divine sentence and state.

To the other, it must be said that it is understood of those not very evil, who while living made themselves worthy that such things could benefit them: and this those little ones did not do, who did nothing at all good or evil.

Articulus 7 — Whether Suffrages Profit The Saints In The Homeland

Whether suffrages benefit the Saints in their homeland?

Seventhly, it is asked, Whether they benefit the Saints in their homeland?

It seems that they do: because 1. The more worthy someone is to benefit from it, the more the intercession made by another for him is effective: but the Saints are most worthy: therefore the intercession of the Church is most effective for them.

1. Likewise, human piety receives intercession for increasing the inheritance of a friend or son: but love is divine piety: therefore the Church more quickly receives intercession so that the reward may be increased for them in their homeland: therefore intercessions are effective for them.
2. If you say that they do not need it. On the contrary: Their reward can increase, because it is not at its highest: therefore this can be made greater by the suffrages of the good.
3. Likewise, it is greater in natures to give the being of substance than to increase what is given: therefore it is similarly in divine matters, if someone obtains for another the first grace which gives spiritual being, he can also obtain an increase of such grace in the homeland: therefore the suffrage of the Church also has a place among the Saints.

On the contrary of this is, 4. What is said in the Letter: because the Saints who are in their homeland do not need it: therefore they are not helped by such things.

1. Likewise, the lesser does not help the greater, but conversely: since therefore the least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than the greatest who is in the militant Church, it seems that in no way does it benefit one existing in it.

And this is to be conceded: and the reason is, because they are confirmed and cannot grow even by their own merit henceforth in substantial reward.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that although they are most worthy, they do not receive the suffrage of the Church, but rather from their dignity they have that they can bestow suffrages on others.

To the second, it must be said that this is done by human piety: because none of the sons can be sufficiently endowed without needing more: but each in the kingdom of heaven is so endowed that he does not wish for more than he has, and he is confirmed in that.

To the third, it must be said that he does not need it: and this is what is said, that the substantial reward cannot grow: because although it can be greater, it cannot be greater in one who is confirmed.

To the fourth, it must be said that both fall under the merit of another in the state of the way, but after this state neither falls under the merit of another.

Articulus 8 — Which Suffrages Avail More

Which suffrages are more efficacious?

Which suffrages are more efficacious?

Eighthly, it is asked, Which suffrages are more efficacious?

1. It is said in the Text, that they are aided by prayers, the salutary sacrifice, and alms: therefore it seems that these are the principal ones.
2. Likewise, these three are rightly ordered against the sins of the spirit: because Bede says that the plagues of the spirit are cured by prayer, and those contracted from the love of things by alms: however, the sacrifice is received for debts, because Christ paid the price for us: therefore it seems that these are the principal ones.
3. But then it seems that it is stated incompletely: because the plagues of the body ought to be cured by fasting: and those are not named here: therefore, etc.
4. Likewise, it is the custom of the Church to enjoin pilgrimages of the cross especially to the Holy Land for the entire purgatorial punishment for one, or ten souls, or fewer, or more: therefore it seems that this is most efficacious for them.

Response. It must be said that in truth, according to the sayings of Gregory in Book IV of the Dialogues, souls desire nothing so much to be done for them as the salutary sacrifice. And Bede says the same in the Ecclesiastical History of the English. And then prayers and alms, and other things which the Church enjoins. Hence the Text does not touch upon all, but the principal ones.

To that which is objected concerning fasting, it must be said that fasting rather cuts off the plagues in the body of the one fasting: and because the dead no longer have to subdue the flesh, therefore fasts are not much to be done for them, but those things which have been said: for prayer is to God, and alms to the poor, in whom God is consoled and fed: and thus God, being induced, relaxes the punishments of the deceased.

To the other, it must be said that the Church does this from the power of the keys rather than by the virtue of suffrage: and therefore it then derives its treasures to the deceased, so that the faithful may be more quickly induced to devotion.

And more about this must be sought above in the question concerning Indulgences[742].

Articulus 9 — Who Are Those By Whom Suffrages Ought To Be Performed

Who are those, through whom ought suffrages to be made?

Ninthly, it is asked, Through whom ought they to be made?

It seems that it ought to be through those existing in charity: because

1. It is said, John 9:31: We know that God does not hear sinners. Therefore, if alms are given by one who does not exist in charity, or prayer is made by such a one, it seems that the suffrage is not valid.
2. Likewise, Gregory: When one who displeases is sent to intercede, the mind of the angry judge is provoked to worse. Therefore, it seems that when such persons offer suffrages, the penalty rather increases for them than diminishes.

On the contrary, according to this, it would be necessary to inquire when alms are given to the poor to pray for someone, whether they are in charity or not: and this would be difficult.

Response. It must be said that suffrage, although executively it is of the living, nevertheless as an inductive cause it is the work of the dead: and therefore I think,

because according to charity the dead are informed: and therefore if it is done by one who is not in grace, it is valid: but nevertheless it would be better if it were done by one who is in grace.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that sinners are not heard praying for themselves.

To the other, it must be said that Gregory speaks in another case, when someone strives to intercede from their own confidence and their own acts, and not when they are as an instrument moved by another, as was said before.

Articulus 10 — Whether Those Who Put On The Pomps Of Funerals Sin

Whether those sin who make pompous funerals?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said,
there, B, Concerning the pomp of funerals,
etc.

And it is asked, Whether those sin who make such pomp?

It seems that they do not: because
1. Holy men did this, as it is said, 1 Maccabees 12:27-28, Simon built over the tomb of his parents a building visible to others. And he set up, etc., seven pyramids.

1. Likewise, Isaiah 11:10, it is said: And his sepulcher shall be glorious. Therefore, it seems that this ought to be done even concerning the bodies of the saints.
2. Likewise, such things were done concerning the sepulcher of the Lord: therefore, they ought also to be done concerning the sepulchers of others.

Further, it is asked, Whether it is a sin to do such things for the wicked, namely, to bury them in a holy place and to adorn their sepulchers?

742. Reference to a previous discussion on Indulgences.

It seems that it is: because
1. A profane body is not to be placed in a sacred place: therefore, he sins who places it.

1. To the same point, Gregory narrates in the book of Dialogues, that a certain wicked man buried in a holy place was cast out by demons.
2. Likewise, he is more unclean than filth: and it is evident that if someone were to place filth there, he would sin: therefore, also he who places the impious there.
3. Likewise, according to the laws, only the burial of an ass is owed to the impious: therefore, they sin who bury them otherwise.
4. Likewise, Isaiah 14:20, it is said concerning the wicked king of Babylon, that he will not have fellowship with kings even in burial: therefore, as before.

On the contrary,
4. Alms are to be given to all for the sustenance of nature; but burial is a species of alms, as it is said, Job 7:24: therefore, it is to be denied to no one.

1. Likewise, a certain natural dignity is inherent in the human body: therefore, it is not to be left unburied to horror: therefore, every man, however unworthy, is to be buried.

To the first part of these objections, it must be said that the sepulchers of the good and the saints are to be adorned for the manifestation of their glory of resurrection: and therefore I well concede the things introduced.

To the OTHER part, it must be said that burial of an ass or a man is granted to every man, as the laws say: and I well concede that unless it is done for the terror, every man's body ought to be buried: for out of horror, thieves and such wicked men are not buried.

And thus the other objections introduced are understood.

Even the excommunicated are not buried in a sacred place, although they are buried with the burial of an ass because of the stench.

And through this, the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 11 — Whether The Condition Of The Rich Man Is Preferable To That Of The Poor Man

Whether the condition of the rich is better than that of the poor? And, whether it is better to make common suffrages than special ones?

Then it is asked concerning what is said there, "C, A question is usually raised," etc.

For from this it seems that the condition of the rich is better than that of the poor: and this is false, because poverty is praised, and riches are blamed.

Further, it is asked, whether it is better to make common suffrages than special ones?

It seems that it is better to make common ones: because 1. Particular suffrages draw their force from charity, since charity communicates goods: therefore, the more common they are, the better.

1. Likewise, Jerome says that common things are better than private ones.

On the contrary of this is that 1. Gregory instituted special prayers for a servant and a maidservant: therefore, those are more valuable than common ones.

1. Likewise, in the Letter it says that special ones are more valuable for a more special redemption, although not for a fuller one: therefore, they are more valuable.

To this it must be said that since suffrages are by way of satisfaction for sin, and sins are proper, not common, it seems to me that special and proper suffrages are more valuable: and therefore also in the Letter it says that he who has many special ones is freed more quickly. Private ones are better with respect to amendment of sin.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that the comparison is understood among those who have other things equal. And nothing prohibits the condition of the rich from being better in a certain respect than that of the poor, although simply it is the reverse.

To the other it must be said that charity is the form of every good, whether common or private: and therefore in that objection it is not proven that common ones are better.

Or it must be said that common ones are better with respect to the eternal crown, but not with respect to the amendment of sin.

To the other, the solution is clear: because the saying of Jerome is understood with respect to the attainment of the crown.

Articulus 12 — Whether The Saints Hear The Prayers Of Supplicants

Whether the Saints hear the prayers of the supplicants?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, EH, But perhaps you ask, Whether the prayers of the supplicants, etc.?

1. For it seems, if the Saints do not hear the prayers of men naturally, but only through the revelation of the word, that they are more imperfect than we: because we hear the vows of others both through revelation and naturally: however, the souls existing in purgatory do not hear, except through revelation, as it says in the Text.
2. Likewise, If they hear or perceive naturally, it is asked, what is that knowledge? For acquired knowledge does not remain in them, as was held above in the third Sentences, and they do not have the organs by which abstraction would occur: therefore it seems that the vows of men cannot become known to them by nature.

Response. It must be said without prejudice, that souls stripped of bodies have the forms of creation like Angels, and with them they speak and hear like Angels. And what this is, is

noted above in the second Sentences. However, the Master in the Text does not make mention of that mode: because it is not an act of glory, nor the most sublime in the soul, but natural: but that the soul is not now in that knowledge, is because of the cognition of the senses, around which it is occupied, as Augustine says.

DISTINCTIO XLVI

Divisio Textus

DIVISION OF THE TEXT,

But it is asked here concerning the very wicked, etc. In this distinction, two questions are posed. One from intention, namely, whether suffrages benefit the very wicked? And another incidentally, namely, whether in every work of God there is mercy and truth, there, C, But how the justice of God and piety, etc.

As to the first, he says two things, namely, whether any mercy is shown to the very wicked. And secondly, he determines in the contrary direction from what was introduced, there, B, What therefore was said, etc.

However, the text of the first part is clearly disputed in the Text: for understanding which, three things must be inquired, namely, first, concerning that division which it supposes, that there are the very good, etc. Secondly, concerning the opinion of the Doctors about the very wicked. And thirdly, whether in every work of God there is mercy and truth?

Articulus 1 — Whether The Division Which The Master Supposes, Namely That Some Are Very Good And Some Very Evil, Is Good

Whether the division which the Master supposes, namely that some are very good, and some very evil, is good?

To the first, it is objected thus:
1. Every division ought to be through opposites: but the fourfold division above is held: therefore among themselves the members are at least disparate: therefore moderately good and moderately evil are different kinds of men.

1. Likewise, the fourfold difference is found in those to be judged, as will be had below: for those to be judged are perfect: and judged condemned, who are as moderately evil: and not judged condemned, who are as very evil. Since therefore these kinds of men differ in the order of judgment, it seems that here they have a difference: therefore moderately good and moderately evil differ.
2. Likewise, in morals this diversity is found: for there are infidels, whose malice exceeds every other which is only in morals: and there are infidels who at least in number are of the Church: and there are imperfect good and perfect good: and it is evident that the

first are very evil, and the second moderately evil, and the third moderately good, and the fourth very good: therefore all these states differ among themselves.

3. Likewise, when it is said, "he is moderately good," either it can be inferred that he is simply, or not. If so: therefore since in this it could be inferred that he is simply good, by the same reason in another it would be inferred that he is simply evil: but it is evident that good and evil differ: therefore these simply differ. But if it cannot be inferred that moderately good is simply good: but no one is saved unless he is simply good as to immunity from all mortal sin: therefore moderately good is not saved, which is false: therefore also this is false, that moderately good is not simply good.

On the contrary of this is that
1. Moderately good is not said except by distance from good: but it cannot be distant except by the admixture of evil: therefore moderately good is mixed with some evil. Similarly, moderately evil is not said except by greater access to good: but the same is moderately approaching and moderately receding in reality, although they differ in reason: therefore these two states suppose one kind of men.

1. Likewise, in intermediate colors the same is moderately white and moderately black: therefore similarly it will be in the middle between good and evil.
2. Likewise, the same in the Letter from Augustine is attributed to each state, namely to be able to be helped by suffrages: but of whom the same attribute is, those are the same in supposing themselves to that attribute: therefore these two states are one state.
3. Likewise, in the Letter it is held that suffrages avail none unless he has made himself worthy that these can benefit him. Therefore both moderately evil made himself worthy, and similarly moderately good: but no one makes himself worthy except by grace: therefore each of these has grace: but moderately good and evil, grace being supposed in the subject, make only one state: therefore these two states are one state.

Response. It must be said that this problem ought to have been disputed before the following: because otherwise the following would not be intelligible. Hence different opinions solve differently: for those saying suffrages benefit the damned concede the first part of the objections.

For the first which is against, they say that distance from good is not through the admixture of evil, but rather through the state of imperfection of venials, as those are distant who build wood, hay, stubble, of which it was held above in the treatise on penance. And access to good in moderately evil is through goods which are said to be gratuitously given and of the kind of goods, as is unformed faith giving alms, and fasts, and the like, in mortal sin: and thus they do not make one state.

To the other they say that it is not similar concerning intermediate colors: because those are constituted through the participation of two contraries: but here it is not so: because the middle between simply good and evil is not by participation of two through different reces-

sion from the same, but through the state of imperfection, and through the act of mortal sin with the participation of goods enabling to grace.

To the other it must be said that according to them nothing prohibits the same from being attributed to different things through different reasons: and thus they say here that by reason of the good enabling to grace, suffrages avail the moderately evil for a more tolerable damnation. And by reason of the grace of the imperfect good, they avail the moderately good for a quicker absolution from penalties.

To the last they say that there is a double merit, namely of congruity and of condignity. The merit of congruity that suffrages may avail them the moderately evil have: and the merit of condignity that they may be freed more quickly through suffrages, the moderately good have. They also say that this opinion of theirs is more pious and inductive of the Church to many goods: and therefore more to be held and chosen.

On the contrary, others say, with whom I agree, that the second part of the objections truly concludes.

And to the first they say that this division is not through opposite things, but through opposite modes of the thing: for the middle modes are of the same thing, and yet of different reasons.

To the second, however, they say that the order of those to be judged is different from those to whom the Church suffrages: for those to be judged (as the Apostle says) are judged according to the difference of their works: and these are fourfold according to the kind of works: but the Church suffrages none unless whose penalty is soluble and diminishable: but it is evident that no penalty of hell is diminishable while the guilt remains according to being and quantity, which is the whole and sole cause of infernal penalty. And it is evident that guilt in them will never be diminished, since guilt is never dissolved or diminished except by grace: and they are not susceptible of grace: therefore it is evident that the Church suffrages none of the damned.

Through this also the solution to the following is clear: because the kinds of works are different, and the order of those to whom the Church suffrages is different, as has been said.

To the last it must be said that very good is said here from the state of perfection: and therefore it says excess beyond simply good. But moderately good is said from the state of imperfection, and similarly moderately evil. And if it is conceded that simply good is inferred from moderately evil: yet simply evil cannot be inferred from moderately good: because simply evil is he who has nothing of the good of grace making pleasing: but moderately evil is not said from an act or habit simply evil, but from a state to which venials are mixed, which are wood, hay, stubble.

Articulus 2 — How Many Opinions There Are Concerning Suffrages With Respect To The Damned

How many opinions are there concerning suffrages with respect to the damned?

Secondly, it is inquired about the opinions of the ancients concerning this matter.

There were indeed ancients who said that suffrages of the Church benefit the damned who are moderately evil, that is, the damned faithful.

And three modes of their opinions are found.

For Praepositivus said that a single suffrage diminishes some part of the penalty, and according to the equal of the first, it diminishes an equal part of the penalty: and thus with suffrages multiplied, the whole penalty could be removed. However, lest he should say that they are liberated, and their penalty would have an end, and thus fall into the error of Origen, he said that the penalty is suspended by the suffrages of the Church until the day of judgment, and then they will fall back into hell in body and soul together to be tormented eternally.

Others said, like the Porretani, that this diminution is geometric, so that a part of the same proportion is removed by the second suffrage, and not always of the same quantity: so if the first suffrage removes a hundredth of the penalty, the second suffrage equal to the first removes a hundredth of the remainder, and the third a hundredth of that remainder: and thus the penalty always remains, because it is divisible into infinity.

Antisiodorensis found another mode, and said that the penalty is not diminished: because with the cause remaining, the effect remains, that is, with the guilt remaining, the penalty remains: but the one sustaining is strengthened by the suffrage, so that he can more easily sustain the penalty: and he gave a likeness of this, as if a man carries a heavy burden: and when he is in weight and sweat, his face is bathed with cold water, he is strengthened to carry it better, and yet his burden is in no way lighter.

However, it is objected against the first:

1. As Gregory says, there is no greater passibility of the soul and man from eternal fire, unless it is made by guilt. With the passibility which is from guilt remaining in the same way, and with the fire acting in one way, there will always be one passion. However, it is evident that guilt remains in all the damned in the same way always immobile. Therefore, if there is diversity, it is on the part of the acting fire: but this is false, because Gregory says that it acts in one way, just as one sun acts in one way on those who are exposed to it for different causes of infirmity: and yet these do not suffer in one way. Therefore, it is evident that this opinion is false.
2. Likewise, this is against the sayings of the saints Dionysius, Augustine, Gregory, previously introduced.
3. Likewise, since nothing should be dared to be said about such matters unless it is proven by the sayings of the Saints, it seems that it was presumptuous to say such things, because they have neither reason nor authority proving them.

Against the second, it is plainly objected:

1. When two are equal in active power, but the patient is stronger and weaker in suffering and resisting the agent, it acts more on the patient which it finds weaker to resist, than that which it finds stronger: but two equal suffrages are agents, and the damned can resist the first more than the second: therefore the second removes more of the penalty than the first: and thus there is no fiction in that.
2. Likewise, let it be asked of them, why does the second, being equal to the first, remove less than the first? And they will not be able to assign a cause: therefore, since the statement is irrational, it is to be rejected.
3. Likewise, they fall into the inconvenience which they wish to avoid: because although the second diminishes similarly in proportion and not equally, yet so many suffrages can be made that the penalty will become insensible: and they wished to avoid this, because according to them something always remains of the sensible penalty.
4. Likewise, let it be asked, in what art did they learn that the penalty would be divisible into infinity: for this is false, because even a natural body is not divisible into infinity: therefore much less the disposition of the body or soul: but it has only been proven of the mathematical that it is divisible into infinity.

Similarly, it is objected against the third:

1. For souls do not receive strengthening, unless through grace making them pleasing or freely given: and it is not in the state of receiving grace: therefore there is no such strengthening.
2. Likewise, the likeness of the body does not have a place in the spirit, because the spirit does not have passibility, unless from guilt: therefore no strengthening will be made in it, unless through the alleviation of guilt: but this is impossible to alleviate: therefore no damned will receive any consolation.

However, I do not think all these are to be conceded, except in the way it was said above concerning the worm of conscience. And whoever wishes to follow these opinions or rather errors, which do not agree with the Saints, let him labor to determine these.

Articulus 3 — Whether In Every Work Of The Lord There Is Mercy And Truth

Whether in every work of the Lord there is mercy and truth?

Thirdly, it is asked whether in every work of the Lord there is mercy and truth?

It seems that not: because

1. In the work of creation neither justice nor mercy appears: because as Augustine says in the Letter, in heaven there is no misery, therefore neither is there mercy: therefore, since before the world there was no misery, there was no mercy: but neither justice, because that distributes to

each according to merits: justice, however, is called truth: therefore neither mercy nor truth were in the work of creation.

1. Likewise, in the justification of the impious, truth or justice does not seem to be present, but only mercy: because God ought not to justify the impious: therefore justice does not appear there.
2. Likewise, it seems that in none of the works of God does justice appear: because justice obliges to what is due: but God is not bound by debt: therefore in none of the works of God does justice appear.
3. Likewise, in the condemnation of very evil prelates, mercy does not appear: because it is said, Wisdom 6:7: "Mercy is granted to the small, but the powerful will suffer powerful torments."
4. Likewise, according to what has been said, in the punishments of the very evil, mercy does not appear, but truth.

On the contrary are those things which are said in the Letter, and what is said in Psalm 25:10: "All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth."

Response. It must be said that this disputation is of little value and is much prolonged in the Letter, and is resolved: and the saying of the Psalmist is expounded in three ways in the last chapter of this distinction. And at the end of the penultimate, it is said in the Letter that mercy is often taken for goodness, just as truth is for justice. And then it is easier to see: because according to which mercy is put for goodness, mercy appeared in the works of creation: truth, however, because there He produced what He foresaw from eternity shining in His truth and art, because otherwise it would have been false to foreknowledge and predestination. But if truth is put for justice: then justice is taken, as Anselm says in the Proslogion, for the decency of divine goodness: because it was just that He should manifest Himself thus.

And through this the solution to the first question is clear: and in those arguments there is deception of equivocation: because each of these is taken in different senses.

To what is objected about justification, it must be said that there mercy results principally, and also the truth of the promise: because He promised this: whence in Psalm 51:6: "That you may be justified in your words," etc. There is a Gloss: "That you may be justified in your words, by which you promised pardon to sinners." For justice is there, which is the decency of divine piety. Whence Anselm in the Proslogion: "If you spare sinners, it is just, for it befits you."

To what is asked about the punishments of very evil prelates and others, there is a solution which lies in the Letter at the end of this chapter: because there is a twofold mercy, namely liberating, and this they do not experience: and there is relaxing mercy, and this they have, because they are punished less than they deserve. And this notes "to suffer powerful torments," which do not receive diminution after they are inflicted.

The authority of James is resolved in the Letter.

But concerning all those things which are said in that chapter, "But how the just," it is expedited in the first book of the Sentences.

And concerning the last two, whatever can be doubted is expedited by the said things.

Articulus 4 — Whether There Is Eternal Life

Is there any eternal life?

Incidentally, however, by reason of what he says, there, A, shortly before the end: Thus will remain the common eternal life of all the Saints.

Here it is inquired about eternal life, and by opposition about eternal death. And concerning eternal life, four things are inquired, namely, whether it is? Secondly, what it is? Thirdly, whether it is by reason of essence or power? And fourthly, whether the damned angels and men have eternal life?

To the first, it is objected thus: In the reason of anything, one opposite falls, the other can in no way befit it: but in the reason of life beginning or created, the opposite of eternity falls: therefore, it cannot befit created life that it is eternal: but the life of man and angel is created: therefore, it is not eternal. The first is evident by itself. The second is supposed by the reason of the created, which has a beginning: and eternity is defined by not having a beginning, whence Augustine says that true eternity is true incommutability: but no creature is incommutable, as the same says: therefore, the life of no creature is eternal.

The contrary of this is, 1. What is said, John 3:15: That everyone who believes in him may not perish, but may have eternal life.

1. Likewise, John 10:28: I give them eternal life.

Likewise, it is against the Apostles' Creed, where the last article says, And eternal life.

To this, it must be said that eternal life is threefold in the best mode of being.

In one way, by the essence of life and eternity: and thus God alone, who is life above all life, and eternity above all eternity, as Dionysius says, is eternal life.

In the second way, it is said as in the object of living beings, eternal life: and thus again God is eternal life: because he alone is the object, which, exhibited as it is, moves the saints to eternal life, according to what Aristotle says, that outside the heaven there is nothing except blessed life: which cannot be true, that there would be eternal or blessed life there, except as in the object, which is not included within the orb of heaven, nor enclosed outside.

In the third way, it is said eternal life by participation of living beings: and thus the Saints have eternal life.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that it is not the best in the reason of life said in the first and second way: and this same participated makes the third. Whence, although the participation began, nevertheless the participated, which is called eternal life, did not begin.

To the proof, it must be said that all creatures are changeable by nature: but nevertheless, by participating in the immutable substance, they never exert their change, as Augustine says in book XII of the Confessions: and therefore, insofar as they live eternal life, they are made immutable.

Articulus 5 — What Eternal Life Is

What is eternal life?

Secondly, it is asked, What is eternal life?

It is said, however, in the book On the Motion of the Heart, that life is the continuous act of the soul in the body, but in the book of Causes, in the commentary on proposition 417, it is said that life is a procession from the first being, which is unmoved, eternal, and the first motion.

1. Therefore, it is either taken here in the first or second way. If in the first way: then it must be that eternal life is from an intrinsic principle essentially conjoined: and this is false: because it is from God: and He is not essentially conjoined to anything. If in the second way: then life is taken according to what is caused by the first life: but this is in all living things: therefore it seems that by the same reasoning it would be the principle of eternal life and natural life in all living things: and this is false.
2. Likewise, in both of these ways, Aristotle says that to live in living things is to be: but this is not true of living things with eternal life: therefore it seems that eternal life is not properly called life.
3. If perhaps it is said that life is taken according to well-being. On the contrary: According to well-being is accidental: but no accident by accident is eternal: therefore eternal life is not eternal, which is ridiculous.

If perhaps you say that it is not an accident by accident, but per se. On the contrary: An accident per se always follows the subject, therefore a man who would be in eternal life would always be in eternal life, and would never have been without eternal life: which again is ridiculous.

1. Likewise, eternity is defined by life: because Boethius says that eternity is the interminable possession of life all at once and perfect. But a thing falling under the definition of another is not denominated by it. Therefore, it should not be called eternal life.
2. Likewise, John 17:3: This is eternal life, that they may know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent. Therefore, eternal life is a certain knowledge: and in this way, it is not called life in natures.

Response. It must be said that life is said in two ways, namely according to being, and according to well-being.

According to being, again in two ways, namely properly and improperly.

Properly, again in two ways: and in the first way, life is said to be the act by which the spirit is in that which it is: and in this way, the soul is said to live, and the Angel to live. In another way, it is said to be the continuous act of the soul in the body: and in this way, an animal is said to live: and in this way, all created life is exemplarily and efficiently from the first life: and thus the statement from the book of Causes is understood: because, as the Philosopher says, Every being is from the first being, so also Dionysius speaks of life, chapter 6 of the Divine Names, where he says thus: The immortality of the Angels is from the first life, and the indestructible eternal motion of the Angel is from it, and for the sake of life itself, which is above all life. In this way, the statement from the book On the Motion of the Heart is understood.

Improperly, however, life is said to be the perfection of each thing from its proper form to being, and the act which follows being: as a stone is said to be alive, and water, when it can perfect what is of the stone, and what is of the water.

According to well-being, however, life is said to be according to the well-being of the senses, and the well-being of reason. According to being in the senses, it is said to live, living delightfully and voluptuously, according to what the Apostle says, to the Colossians 3:5: Mortify your members which are upon the earth, fornication, etc. And, to Timothy 5:6: She who lives in pleasure is dead while she lives. According to the well-being of reason, it is said in two ways, namely according to the good of reason in the homeland and glory. And in the first way, it is said, to the Galatians 2:20; I live, yet not I: but Christ lives in me. And in the second way, it is said, Matthew 22:32: He is not the God of the dead, but of the living. And in this way, eternal life is taken here.

And by this, it is clear that if it should be defined, it will be the procession or act of the first life in the blessed, according to the well-being of glory or beatitude, and act.

And by this, the solution to all except the last is clear: to which it must be said that there eternal life is defined by the cause, because the immediate knowledge of God is the cause of this life according to the well-being of glory.

To what is objected that it is...

accident, it must be said that it is not an accident, but rather a natural perfection: for our nature is directed to that act which is eternal life, and glory is its disposition towards it: and in such matters Aristotle says that man is not altered, but rather perfected, especially because it is not an accident that flows from the subject, but rather from God essentially in the manner of glory vivifying us.

Articulus 6 — Whether Eternal Life Belongs To Blessed Spirits By Reason Of Essence Or By Reason Of Power

Whether eternal life pertains by reason of essence or by reason of power to blessed spirits?

Thirdly, it is asked, Whether it pertains by reason of essence or by reason of power?

It seems, however, that it is by reason of power: because
1. Knowledge is eternal life: and that is only by reason of power: therefore also life.

1. Likewise, Life is not said here according to being, but according to well-being: but well-being is according to the true and uncreated good: and both of these are perceived by reason of power: therefore also life is present by reason of power, as it seems.
2. Likewise, In this way life is a movement in the spirit from God who is the first life according to the perception of glory: but this is according to which He is the highest good and the highest truth: and it is evident that this is by reason of power: therefore first.

On the contrary, it is that
1. Life always proceeds from the interior: therefore it is first in essence, than in power.

1. Likewise, Grace perfects essence before power: therefore also glory: but this life is according to the well-being of glory: therefore it is first perceived by essence, than by power.

Response. It must be said that the life of glory and also grace is first in essence. For this life, as has been said, is the act of the first life in the spirit according to the influx of glory and beatitude: and thus it proceeds from it according to which it is in blessed spirits through glory: and in this being, the spirit is first, and secondarily power.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that that knowledge is not taken externally, as interior knowledge: because it is not through abstraction, but it is of that which manifests itself inwardly in the soul through the experience of life, that is, the act in the spirit from the first, quiet, eternal life, which is essentially in the blessed spirit.

To the other, it must be said that that good is taken in two ways, namely as distinct, and indistinct. And in the first way, acting in the spirit, it is called life. In the second way, however, it is as if life of power according to the reason of the true and good. And this must be imagined thus: Let us understand the first not to be true and good, and yet through glory to be in the created spirit: still it lives blessedly in its essence in that, through this that it infuses into it the most noble life, which is through glory.

Through this also the solution to the following is clear.

Articulus 7 — Whether The Damned Live An Eternal Life

Whether the damned live an eternal life?

Finally, it is asked, Whether the damned live an eternal life?

It seems that they do: because they live without end in punishments: therefore eternally.

On the contrary, it is that

1. Eternal life is the reward of the blessed: therefore it does not pertain to the wicked.

1. Likewise, eternal life and eternal death do not pertain to the same: but eternal death pertains to the damned: therefore they do not have eternal life.

Response. It must be said that the damned do not live an eternal life, nor do they have eternal life: for to live is to have the principle of life: and this the damned do not have, but rather through separation from that principle: and therefore they are dead simply, but in a certain respect alive, namely according to the miserable life of nature.

But if it is conceded that they live, it should not be conceded that they live an eternal life: for it has been said that eternal here is said participatively. And because thus a creature participates in eternity, as Augustine says, inasmuch as it nowhere exerts its mutability, but rather has its whole life and perfection at once in one, in which nothing passes and nothing is expected in the future. And thus they do not live, except in punishments: because they are subjected to vicissitudes in them. But it is well conceded that they will not see destruction, and they will live still to the end of consumption according to the vicissitude of punishments.

But if it is found improperly said that they live an eternal life because of the lack of end in punishments, it should not be conceded that they have eternal life: because this implies possession: but no one has a mobile participation by way of possession (as has often been said above) except he who has it at will: and this the damned do not have, who desire death, and death flees from them.

To the first, therefore, it is said that it is not the same to live without end, as has already been said.

Articulus 8 — What Eternal Death Is

What is eternal death?

ARTICLE EIGHT

What is eternal death?

Then it is inquired by opposition concerning eternal death:

1. For if death and life are opposites, it seems eternal death is separation from such a life.
2. Likewise, death opposed to natural life is the separation of the soul, which is the cause of life, from the body, as the Philosophers say: therefore, there also eternal death will be separation from such a principle of life.
3. Likewise, Dionysius reproves in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy those saying death is other than separation from life: therefore, as before.

On the contrary of this is that
1. Separation from any life is in a moment: therefore, there will be no eternal death.

1. Likewise, the eternal is unchangeable essentially, or participatively, as has been said: but in neither of these ways can eternal death be said: therefore, it is not eternal.
2. Likewise, if death is nothing but separation, and separation signifies nothing but the punishment of loss: therefore, those who are dead by eternal death have only the punishment of loss: therefore, they have no punishment of sense, which is false, since they suffer extreme heat and extreme cold.

To this it must be said that death in itself signifies nothing but separation, as was first proven.

To this, therefore, which is objected against, it must be said that death is not properly called eternal: because eternal is put for perpetual when eternal death is called: and this is similar to the eternal in the lack of an end, and not in another. And I well concede that this separation lasts without end.

To the other it must be said that the cause of separation is continuously present, which is confirmed and damned malice, and this causes the ability to suffer punishments: and therefore the suffering of punishable punishments is rather a consequence of such death than death itself: because just as with the soul departing the body withers and expires, and the departure of the soul is death, expiration and putrefaction are consequences of death, because the body is not contained by the soul; so the separation from the eternal principle of life is eternal death, and the consequence of this death is the suffering of fire, because the condemned spirit is not contained by the principle of eternal life.

DISTINCTIO XLVII

Divisio Textus

DIVISION. OF THE TEXT.

It is also customary to inquire, How will it be given, etc. Here it treats of judgment.

And it is divided into three parts. In the first, it treats of judgment. In the second, of the judge, and it begins in the following distinction. Third, of the things consequent to judgment, and it begins in the penultimate distinction of this book.

In the first of these parts, five things are inquired, namely, how will the sentence of judgment be given? Secondly, concerning the saints who will judge with the Lord. Thirdly, concerning the order of those to be judged. Fourthly, concerning the ministry of the Angels in judgment. And fifthly, whether demons preside over the wicked in hell?

And these are introduced here in the Letter in five chapters according to order.

Articulus 1 — Whether The Sentence Of The Judge At The Last Judgment Is Vocal Or Mental

Whether the sentence of the Judge in the final judgment
is vocal or mental?

Whether the sentence of the Judge in the final judgment
is vocal or mental?

Concerning the FIRST, it falls to be asked,
Whether § that sentence is vocal or mental? And about this the Master also inquires in the Text.

However, it seems that it is mental: because
1. There will be a very great multitude in that place:
but a very great multitude could not hear one corporeal voice: therefore
it seems that that corporeal voice is not.

If anyone says that by miraculous divine power
it will be done that all hear that voice. On the contrary: Every nature and every wise operator chooses the simplest way:
but it is simpler that it be done by divine power in the mind than in speech;
therefore it seems that the sentence is expressed in the mind, not by an external voice.

1. Likewise, although in the Gospel of John,
   v, 28, it is said that all who are in the tombs will hear the voice of the Son of God,
   it is not understood of a vocal voice, but a mental one: therefore by similarity it seems that although the Gospel may say that this sentence is vocal, it should be understood mentally.
2. Likewise, above, it was held in the authorities introduced by Richard that
   that sentence is mental: therefore so is this one.
3. Likewise, witnesses will not testify
   vocally, but mentally: therefore the sentence is in the mind. The first is proved by this, that conscience will be the witnesses.

In opposition to this is that
1. The Gospel expressly says, Matthew
xxv, 44. Then the king will say to those who are on his left, etc. Therefore it is to be held thus.

1. Likewise, as will be evident in the following
   distinction, the judge will judge in the form of a servant: but it is of the form of a man to judge by human judgment: this, however, is that the sentence be pronounced in writing, and
   expressed by the voice of the sitting judge after
   counsel or hearing of witnesses made in the ear: therefore it seems that that sentence will be vocal.

Response. It must be said that concerning this question nothing is clear to say: and yet I believe better that it will be mental rather than vocal.

To what is objected in opposition, it must be said that the Gospel speaks to the unlearned, who do not grasp spiritual things unless they are expressed by corporeal similitudes: and yet they ought to be understood spiritually, just as the voice of the trumpet, which will be in the resurrection, and other things which are expressed corporeally concerning the resurrection; about which it was held above.

To the other it must be said that he will judge in the form of a servant, so that he may be seen and recognized as judge: not for this that he may exercise judgment as a servant or man, rather he will exercise judgment according to the secrets of hearts, and this is divine judgment and not human: and therefore this argument is not valid.

Articulus 2 — Whether Some Saints Will Judge With The Lord

Whether some Saints will judge with the Lord?

Then it is inquired concerning what is said, there, B, "Not only Christ will judge," etc.

And concerning this, in this chapter, three things are inquired.

First, Whence some Saints have to judge?

Second, Concerning the manner of the judgment of the Saints.

Third, Whether other Saints in some way relate to the judgment by confirming or judging?

To the first, it is objected:

1. By what is said in Lidlera; that those who, having left all things, followed Christ, will judge with the Lord: therefore those Saints from voluntary poverty have, that they will judge with the Lord.
2. Likewise, Job 36:6: "God... does not save the wicked, and gives judgment to the poor." Therefore, as before.
3. Likewise, This seems from the manner of speaking in Matthew 19:27 and 28, where Peter alleges this merit, saying: "Behold, we have left all things and followed you: what then will there be for us?" And Christ joins: "Amen I say to you, that you who have followed me," etc. Therefore it seems, that from the poverty of spirit they have, that they will judge with the Lord.

4. Likewise, the Gloss there says: "Those who have left all things and followed Christ, they will be judges, who having lawful things, used them rightly. Therefore they will judge." From this follows the same as before.

On the contrary,

1. What Richard of Saint Victor says: "The opening of the books is the manifestation of consciences: in these books is inscribed whatever is retained by them in memory: in these books, as if inscribed, is held whatever is comprehended by them with full understanding. In other such books, human merits, in others indeed divine judgments, in those the quality of actions, in those indeed also the quality of retributions, for each one indeed carries in his conscience as if written, whence his conscience either accuses or defends him. But those who stand by divine contemplation, who read daily in the book of wisdom, as if transcribing in the volumes of hearts whatever they now comprehend with clear understanding of truth. What therefore are the consciences of those to be judged, if not certain, so to speak, actions of Scripture? Or what indeed are the hearts of those judging, divinely taught in all truth, if not certain decrees of canons? They will judge from the merit of contemplation, by which they are made examples of the canons of divine justice, and not from voluntary poverty.
2. Likewise, it is commonly said, the Apostles and Apostolic men will judge. But the Apostles were those who gave decrees of life and had authority in the Church: therefore from apostolic doctrine and life and authority in them is the judicial power: but this is not poverty of spirit as such, therefore poverty is not a proper merit by which they merit judicial power.

Response. It must be said that three things are required, in my judgment, to merit judicial power. The first is the renunciation of temporal cares, so that one may be able to study wisdom according to which the sentence of judgment is to be dictated. The second is the habit of light, justice, and wisdom, which establishes and observes judgment. And the third is the merit, which is acquired in the promulgation of that justice through preaching.

And the first of these is touched upon by the first objections, although the other two are presupposed: and for this reason the Lord says: "You have followed me." Hence Jerome says that it is imperfect to leave all things: for this even Socrates the Philosopher did: and therefore he joins what is perfect, saying: "And we have followed you."

The following is touched upon by Richard.

And the third is touched upon by the last objection.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 3 — What The Mode Of The Saints' Judging Will Be

What will be the manner of judging of the Saints?

Secondly, it is asked concerning the manner of the judgment of the Saints.

And it seems that they will not judge, except as those who show the sentence, because 1. Richard says thus: Twelve
From this expressly
and judges before those to be judged open the books of their decrees and admit to the sight of the inspection of the hearts of any inferiors, and reveal their understanding in those things which pertain to the reason of judgment. Truly, while reading in such a Scripture as if decrees of canons, they find the sentence of retribution and the reason of the sentence which each one deserves. Therefore, to read such a Scripture, this will be to have received the sentence of the judge. However, this will be that apostolic men judge anyone to be judged, which is to bring the reason of the sentence to be given before their eyes. It is understood that they will not judge except as books.

1. Likewise, in the same place, a little below:
   The sentence of the judge, therefore, to have seen and understood to the inspection of his heart, this is to have learned and received the judgment. This is understood the same as before.

But against this is that this is an imperfect manner of judging: but an imperfect manner of judging ought not to correspond to the most perfect merit, which is the apostolic merit: therefore, it seems that this manner of judging does not befit them.

Response. It must be said that in truth there is more there than the manner of inspection as in a book: and this Richard signifies when he says: To bring before their eyes the word indeed of bringing signifies a certain command to those to be judged, which is equivalent to a certain proof and infliction of sentence: which is also signified in the Scripture, where it is said, Psalm 149:6, "Two-edged swords in their hands."

And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 4 — Whether Other Saints Will Conduct Themselves In Various Ways

Whether other Saints will conduct themselves in one way and another?

Thirdly, it is asked, Whether other Saints have themselves in any way towards judgment by confirming or judging?

It seems that they do not: because 1. It is not the same person judging and judged in any one judgment: but other Saints will be judged: therefore they will not judge in the same judgment.

1. Likewise, there is not one mode of judgment for the accuser and the accused in human judgment: but human judgment is modeled after divine judgment: therefore in divine judgment also there is not one mode of judgment for those two persons. But the same mode exists if the judged Saints will be judging in the same judgment: therefore other Saints will not judge in the same judgment.

On the contrary, 4. It is said, Wisdom 6: "They shall judge the nations, and have dominion over the peoples." And there no one is excepted: therefore the Saints will judge the nations, and have dominion over the peoples, they will judge all.

1. Likewise, Matthew 12:42: "The Queen of the South shall rise in judgment." And above, verse 41: "The men of Nineveh, etc." But the Saints are better than the Queen of the South or the men of Nineveh: therefore much more will all the Saints judge and condemn the damned.

Response. It must be said that all the Saints will judge by the judgment of approval and confirmation of the sentence, as has been proven: but not as by imposing the sentence dictated and inflicted in the light of their heart: because thus only Apostolic men judge.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that by a different species of judgment one person can be both judging and judged with respect to different things. [By different species of judgment, I mean the judgment of approval and infliction of the sentence, and the different respects of whom it is, because they will be judged by God and Christ and Apostolic men, and they will judge only the damned.

And through this, the solution to the following is also clear.

Articulus 5 — Whether There Will Be Four Orders Of Those To Be Judged In The Judgment

Whether there will be four orders of those to be judged in the judgment?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said, there, G, "There will be four orders in the judgment."

For previously in the Text from the word of Gregory it is held that there are four orders of those to be judged.

But against this it seems that
1. It is said in the Apostles' Creed, that Christ is to judge the living and the dead: therefore all will be judged: and thus there is only one order.

1. Likewise, the same is taken from II Corinthians 5:10: "We must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ, that each one may receive the things done in the body, according to what he has done, whether good or bad."
2. Further, it seems that there are three orders: because Richard says thus: "All will indeed be judged or to be judged: and of those to be judged, some are to be saved, others to be damned," which in that future judgment there will be only three orders.
3. Further, it seems that there are five: for there are those whose salvation is certain, not to be judged, such as infants dying after baptism: and there are those whose salvation is uncertain, to be judged: and there are those whose damnation is certain, not to be judged: and there are those whose damnation is uncertain, to be judged: therefore five orders in the judgment. Richard also posits these five orders.

Response. To all these it is resolved by distinction, saying that there is a threefold judgment, namely uniform, multiform, and omniform.

Uniform judgment is said to be of the present Church, in which it is thought of the future judgment, to which nothing is known of that judgment except the quality of the cause and retribution in general, namely because good things to the good, and evil things to the evil. But multiform is the particular judgment, which each one receives at death, which is according to quality and quantity: because one receives as much as he has merited, and such as he has merited; but not in all things, because not in the body: and therefore it is called multiform, and not omniform. But omniform is the future judgment: because such things will respond to such, and as much to as many, and in all things, because in body and soul: and therefore it is called omniform.

But concerning that last judgment, which is called omniform, it is to be said that it is considered in two ways, namely according to the cause, and according to the effect.

And if indeed it is considered in comparison to the effect: then there are only two orders and both to be judged, namely the living and the dead: saved or damned: and thus is understood the saying of the Apostle, II Corinthians 5:10, and that which is brought from the Creed.

But if it is taken in comparison to the cause: either therefore it is taken in comparison as now, or as then. And if in the first way: then there are five orders which Richard touches upon, as is evident to anyone: nor can one order in the sixth place be made by children dying in original sin, because they have nothing of their own for which they would come to the tribunal: nor do they come to the tribunal, unless having their own, or rejoicing in salvation by the benefit of the judge, like children who die after baptism.

But if it is considered as then: then there will be four orders, as Gregory says, because the merit which is the cause of judgment, then will either be excellent in good, or in evil: or moderately good, or moderately evil: and these four considerations of merit complete the four orders of those to be judged.

But if the judgment is considered according to how it will be exercised and appear in act: then there are three orders, as Luke says, because the Apostles will judge, and others will be judged all either to life or to death, because by the right sentence inflicted by the light of the Apostolic heart, they will receive either eternal death or eternal life.

And through this the solution to all the questions and many others that can be asked is evident.

Articulus 6 — Whether The Fire That Will Precede The Judgment Is Of The Same Species As Elemental Fire

Whether the fire which will precede the judgment is of the same species as elemental fire?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said, there, D, after the beginning: For the Lord coming to judgment, etc.

For what is said about the ministry of Angels is clear through those things which are said in distinction XLII.

However, concerning that fire, six things are inquired, namely, whether it is of the same species as elemental fire? Secondly, what is its effect in the world? Thirdly, what is its effect in men? Fourthly, where will it go after its office is completed? Fourthly, whether it will bring any harm to the good? because this is spoken of in the Text. Sixthly, whether it will precede or follow the resurrection?

To the first, it is objected thus:
1. The power of fire dominating over other elements is only in its own sphere: therefore, if another fire dominates outside its own sphere, it is not of the same species as the fire which is an element: but that fire will dominate outside its own sphere: therefore, that fire will not be an element. The first is proven by Aristotle, who says that a thing in perfect form and action is in its proper place, the second is assumed from what is said in the Text and from faith.

1. Likewise, in the circular generation of elements, Aristotle proves that one element acts upon another, and never acts beyond its species: but that fire will act beyond its species: therefore, it is not an element. The second is proven from this, that it will act for the glorification of the world: which glory is much better than the form of fire.
2. Likewise, the action of elemental fire is only upon a body having matter univocal to itself: but that fire will also act upon non-univocal matter: therefore, it is not elemental fire. The first is given by Boethius at the end of the book on the Two Natures in one person of Christ: because there is no conversion of things to each other unless they have one matter. The second is written, 2 Peter 3:12, thus: The heavens being on fire shall be dissolved, and the elements shall melt with fervent heat. And Aristotle proves that the heaven with the elements does not have one nor univocal matter.
3. Likewise, fire does not act upon something stronger than itself according to the power of elemental fire: but that fire will act upon something stronger than itself, because upon the heaven: therefore, it is not elemental fire.

On the contrary of this is: because
1. Those which have one essential act, have one essence according to species: but the operation of that fire and the element is one natural operation: therefore, they are of one essence according to species. The second is proven: because to burn is one action according to species. And the first is written by Damascene.

1. Likewise, the water in the flood purging the world was of the same nature as other water: but there are two divine judgments, one by fire, and another by water: therefore, the second judgment will be by fire of the same species as elemental fire.

Response. It must be said that that fire will be of the same species as elemental fire.

To all the objections in this question, there is almost one solution.

Therefore, it must be said to the first, that that fire, like the fire of hell, acts in a double power, namely, of the element, and as an instrument of divine justice. And in the first way, it has to burn. But in the second way, it has to be carried upwards, downwards, to the right and to the left, wherever it finds something combustible by divine justice, and to dominate it.

To the other, it must be said that it acts only by burning and disposing, and not by inducing a species: because God will induce the species, I say the species which is the glorification of the elements and the world.

However, some have said that fire enclosed in a vessel would act to induce the species of heaven: and they say this is experienced among alchemists. But this is false, and alchemy neither says nor proves this experiment.

To the other, it must be said that all creatures infected by sin have the matter of fire according to which it is an instrument of divine justice: just as it is also said of the fire of hell. And what Boethius says must be understood of fire acting in the power of its own nature only.

To the last, it must be said that as it is said in the Text, this heaven is called the heaven of the air: and this is not stronger than fire, because this is to be dissolved by it.

Articulus 7 — What The Effect Of The Conflagration Will Be In The World

What will be the effect of the conflagration in the world?

Secondly, it is asked, What will be its effect in the world?

It seems, indeed, that the fire will consume two elements:
1. For as Bede says in the Gloss on Peter: That last fire will consume two elements entirely: but it will change two into a better form.

1. Likewise, Apocalypse 21:1: From this it seems that that fire will consume three elements, namely earth, air, which is understood by heaven, and the sea which stands in the place of water. Therefore, it seems that none of the elements will remain except fire.
2. Likewise, Aristotle, at the beginning of the book says: IV Meteororum For all these materials will be for fire. Therefore, it seems that the fire will consume all three elements.
3. Likewise, this seems according to reason: for in that conflagration of the world, fire is as the agent, and the three elements infected by fire as the patients: but the patient must be changed by the agent: therefore, the three elements will pass into fire: therefore, it seems that three will be consumed.
4. Likewise, these three elements are contiguous in the place of generation: therefore, they are infected by the sins of men: but all infected things ought to be consumed by fire: therefore, those three elements ought to be consumed.
5. Likewise, the Gloss on the Epistle to the Romans 8:21 and 22, says that in a better...

The matter will change the form of the elements: but the form of the lower elements cannot be better, unless they receive the form of the higher elements: therefore the three lower will receive the form of fire: therefore the three will be consumed, and only fire will remain.

In opposition to this is, 1. What the Gloss says on the Epistle to the Corinthians, 1 Cor. 7:31, on the passage: "For the fashion of this world passeth away." Gloss: Not the substance. Therefore the elements will not lose their substance, but their form. However, it is evident that if they were to lose their form, they would lose their substance: therefore they will not lose their form.

1. Likewise, the Gloss on Apocalypse 21:1, on the passage: "The first heaven," etc., says thus: That state in which they were before, Therefore it seems, they pass according to state, and not according to substance.
2. Likewise, the Gloss on the passage: "And the sea is no more," says thus: According to the higher state. Therefore as before.
3. Likewise, the marginal Gloss there: The change of air and earth is not doubtful but that it will be through fire: but concerning water it is doubted, for it is believed to have purification in itself.
4. Likewise, in the Letter it is said that heaven and earth will perish not according to their substance, but according to their form which will be changed.
5. Likewise, from the Letter it is held that that fire will not ascend except as far as the waters of the flood ascended: therefore it will not burn the whole world: therefore the airy heaven will not entirely pass away.

Response. It must be said that in truth this is more divination than a question having any knowledge: because I think no one knows how this will be, except he who will see when it happens: nevertheless, I do not think that any of the elements will be entirely consumed.

But there is a twofold form of the elements. One is according to specific being, and thus it will remain. The other is according to the power of active and passive qualities, and that will not remain, except as the passion remains in the root of the subject which cannot come into act. The cause of this is: because the primary active and passive qualities are given to the elements for generation and corruption, which succeed each other in the world, until so many of the elect are gathered that the number is fulfilled which God foresaw from eternity to be fulfilled: and when that is fulfilled, the elements will stand in another state without mixture with each other, and without action and passion in full light.

However, there are different people saying different things about the passing of the elements. For some say that water and fire will pass: and this because these have active and passive powers in excellence: and then there will be no action and passion. Others say that air and water will entirely pass: and this, as I think, because those two existing media do not have a determined motion and state: and many motions flow in them, because water follows the change of the planets of the moon which is very swift, and air follows the orbits of the five

planets, in which there is much diversity of motions: and then these will not be, and therefore they say they will be taken away. But the truth is, as I think, that they will not be taken away, but will be changed, as has been said: so that the elements will be continuously luminous, and the earth on its outer surface will be transparent like glass, and water like crystal, air indeed luminous like heaven, and fire will seem to be like the very light of heaven then.

And through this the solution of all objections made through authorities is clear: and this solution is gathered from the Gloss on Apocalypse 21:1, and 1 Corinthians 7:31, and Romans 8:21-22.

To the first argument, it must be said that all other things will be matter for fire: because fire has an active quality simply, and others in a certain respect.

To the other, it must be said that fire acts only by consuming the infection of sin, and not by inducing the form of glorification, as was said before.

And through this the solution to the last is also clear: because the glorification of the world is not according to the form of the element, but according to the form of glory which will correspond to man according to the state of the glory of the resurrection.

Articulus 8 — What The Effect Of The Fire Will Be In Human Beings

What will be the effect of fire on men?

Thirdly, it is asked, What will be its effect on men?

However, it is said in the Text, that for the wicked it will be consumption, etc.

And it seems that it is said insufficiently:
1. For it is established that after the day of judgment the gate will be closed: therefore it seems that none will remain in purgatory: therefore that fire will also purge those to be purged. But then it seems that this is impossible: because there are many who have many things to be purged: but that fire is momentary: therefore it will not be able to purge vices in a short space of time.

1. Likewise, it seems that for the good there is consumption just as for the wicked: because it will burn them and reduce them to ashes, as was previously held: therefore it is not true to say that for the wicked alone it is consumption.
2. Likewise, the elements will be set ablaze: but the mixed elements in the body of man need purgation more than those outside: therefore it will also purge those things which are in the body of man: therefore it will burn both the good and the wicked.
3. Likewise, in the Text it says that it will burn the infection of sin: but the tinder is the infection of sin: therefore it will burn the tinder: but it cannot burn this unless it sets human bodies on fire: therefore it will set human bodies on fire.

Response. I think it is true, as it has been proven, that it will set on fire the bodies of all, both the good and the wicked, so that the tinder of sin may be entirely consumed through the incineration by fire, which in others has been consumed through the putrefaction of bodies.

To the question concerning the purgation of those to be purged, it must be said that by the power by which it acts as an instrument of avenging justice, it will act upon the souls of such, and will suddenly purge them.

To the objection against, it must be said that there are three causes why it can purge suddenly. One, because it will find few things to be purged in the elements: for so many terrors and signs and persecutions will precede, that few things will remain which need to be purged by that fire, due to the fervor of present penance. The second is that the living will voluntarily endure, and the punishment of the living purges more, even necessarily, than the punishment of the dead. The third is that its heat will recover in intensity what it omits in the prolongation of time. And therefore it will be able to accomplish suddenly what the purgatorial fire does more prolongedly.

Articulus 9 — Whither The Fire Of The Conflagration Will Go

Where will the fire of conflagration go?

Fourthly, it is asked, Where will the fire go after its duty is completed?

It seems, however, that it ought to be rewarded with the Saints: because

1. It served God in the conflagration of the world. And the Gloss on the Epistle to the Romans viii, 21 and 22, says that every creature which performs duties with its labor will then be rewarded.
2. Likewise, fire is the most noble element: because Aristotle says that fire is the most subtle of the bodies of the sphere: but everything noble will be glorified with the Saints above; therefore that fire will remain above.

1. Likewise, it has properties suitable to a glorious body, namely luminosity, subtlety, and being above in place: but God will not depress the noble in the renewal of the world, but rather exalt it: therefore He will glorify the fire in a place above.

On the contrary, it is said,

1. That the Saints say it will envelop the impious: therefore it will remain in hell, as it seems.
2. Likewise, the affliction of the impious ought to be in a place suitable to the impious: but the affliction of the impious is fire: therefore it will remain in the place of the impious, that is, in hell.

I respond to this, that as Basil says on that: The voice of the Lord dividing the flame of fire*, the Lord will divide the fire, as well as other creatures, and will make the hot burning descend

with the dry by that motion of fire by which it follows its matter, according as it is an instrument of judging justice to the place of the damned: and as to these two and the matter which underlies them, it will remain in hell.

And through this the solution to the last two objections is clear.

But as to the luminous, subtle, and light, He will make it ascend above, and there it will be clarified with the other elements for the adornment of man: because it is fitting that with the glorified inhabitant, his house be glorified: but man is in the world as an inhabitant, and the world as a house.

And through this the solution to the first part of the objections is clear.

Articulus 10 — Whether The Fire Of The Conflagration Will Inflict Any Trouble Upon The Good

Whether the fire of conflagration inflicts any trouble upon the good?

Fifthly, it is asked, Whether it inflicts any trouble upon the good?

It seems that it does not: because
1. It is said in the Text, that this will be the fire of the world for the Saints, as the furnace was for the three youths. But it is written of them, that the fire did not touch them at all, nor did it sadden them, nor did it inflict any trouble*: therefore, it will not inflict any trouble upon the Saints, as it seems.

1. Likewise, that fire pursues nothing except the infection of sin, as it is said in the Text: therefore, it will find nothing upon which to act in those who are without sin: therefore, it will not harm them.
2. Likewise, it acts insofar as it is an instrument of divine justice: but according to divine justice, the Saints are not to be punished: therefore, it will not harm them.

On the contrary, the bodies of the Saints who will be found alive at that time will be infected with habitual concupiscence at least: therefore, it is necessary that they be purged: but there is nothing purging except fire: therefore, they will be purged by fire.

Response. This last seems to me to be conceded.

To the first, it must be said that it is understood of this act which it will have after the judgment when it will envelop the damned: for then it will not harm the Saints, because nothing combustible will be found in them.

To the second and third, it must be said that it will find in the body habitual concupiscence which it will exterminate.

Articulus 11 — Whether The Fire Of The Conflagration Will Precede The Judgment Or Follow It

Whether the judgment of the fire of conflagration will precede or follow?

Whether the judgment of the fire of conflagration will precede or follow?

Sixthly, it is asked, Whether the judgment will precede or follow it?

It seems that it follows: because
1. Augustine says that it follows the judgment and resurrection: therefore it seems that it is so.

1. Likewise, Augustine in book XXII of the City of God asks why the fire does not consume the good? and he gives the reason: because their bodies will be impassible, to which the fire cannot harm: and that reason of Augustine would not stand if the fire preceded the resurrection and judgment: therefore it seems that it follows both the resurrection and judgment.
2. Likewise, that fire will envelop the impious, as the Saints say: but the impious will not be enveloped except after the sentence of judgment: therefore it seems that it follows the judgment.

On the contrary,
1. By burning it will reduce the living to ashes: but this will happen before the resurrection: therefore that fire will be before the resurrection and judgment.

1. Likewise, in the Letter it says that it will precede the face of the judge: therefore also the judgment.

Response. It must be said that with respect to the burning of the world it will precede, but with respect to a certain act it will follow, namely with respect to the enveloping of the wicked: for it, as Chrysostom says, will be gathered around the throne of the judge: and it is that fiery river of which it is read in Daniel 7:10, which is around the seat. And it will drag the impious with it into hell. And because of this, it is ordered by Augustine after the judgment.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Concerning the following chapter, it is treated in book II of the Sentences, in the question about the choirs of Angels, and also in the treatise on penance, in the question about purgatorial fire.

DISTINCTIO XLVIII

Divisio Textus

It is customary, however, to ask, In what form will Christ judge?

In this distinction, it treats of the judge.

And three things are asked in it by the Master, namely concerning the form of the judge, of which he touches upon two, namely the form in which he will judge, and the form in which

he will raise the dead. Secondly, it is asked concerning the place in which he will judge. Thirdly, it is asked concerning the state of the blessed after the judgment.

And these are evident in order in the four chapters of this distinction.

Articulus 1 — Whether Christ Will Judge In The Form Of A Man

Whether Christ will judge in the form of a man?

Concerning the first chapter, consequently, he inquires two things.
First, whether He will judge in the form of a man?
And second, whether in a glorious form or not glorious?

And this is all that he inquires in the Letter.

However, the question begins concerning the first.

It seems that He will not judge in the form of a man.
1. For to judge is of a superior according to dignity: but the superior nature is divinity: therefore, according to divinity, judgment is fitting to Him: therefore, it is false what is said in the Letter.

1. Likewise, judgment presupposes invincible power in the judge. Hence, Ecclesiasticus 7:6: "Do not seek to be made a judge, unless you have the strength to break iniquities." But such power is only in divinity. Therefore, judgment is not fitting to Him except according to divinity.
2. Likewise, it is not of the same form or nature to judge and to be judged: but the human form will be judged there: therefore, it seems that it is not fitting to Him to judge: therefore, He will exercise judgment according to the divine nature.
3. Likewise, the power of judging descends in order from the first authority which is in God: but it is more fitting to the Son insofar as He is God, than insofar as He is man: therefore, it ought to be attributed more to God Christ according to what He is God, than according to what He is man.
4. Likewise, Aristotle in the fifth book of the Ethics says that God is the judge of the just. But inflexible justice is more in divinity than in humanity: therefore, it is more fitting to Christ to be judge according to divinity, than according to humanity.

On the contrary, it is said that
1. It is of the judge to be merciful to know by experience the infirmities of those to be judged: but this is not fitting according to divinity, but more according to humanity.

1. Likewise, it is of the same one to judge whose it is to establish the law: but according to the human form He established the law: therefore, according to the same He will judge.
2. Likewise, in the form of a servant He merited judicial power: therefore, according to the same He will have to judge.

Response. It must be said that what the Master says in the Letter are the words of Augustine, and they must be held in all respects. However, it must be understood that two things are considered concerning the judge, namely the power of judicial authority, and the form of the judge, as he is the proper judge of those to be judged. And the first indeed is fitting to Christ according to divinity, and the second is to be done in humanity. And that it is so, is evident from the words of Augustine which he introduces, where below in the same place he says: "Not that He will judge by the power of man, or that He alone," etc.

And through this, the solution to all objections is clear: because the first part only proves that the power of judicial authority is from divinity. But from this it does not follow that that form appears: because it appears in the form in which He is the judge of these, as they are men, to whom He established the law in the form of a man, so that they may be convicted of the transgression of His law, and of the evils which they have done against Him.

Articulus 2 — Whether The Divinity Can Be Seen Without Joy

Whether the divinity can be seen without joy?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said, there, A, at the end: For the divinity cannot be seen without joy.

For it seems that this is false:
1. For it is either understood of intellectual vision or sensible vision. If of intellectual, it is false: because many now see God with natural intellectual vision, who do not have the joy of the blessed. But it cannot be understood of sensible vision: because the divinity is not seen by sensible vision.

1. If someone were to say that this is to be understood of the vision which is in the very presence of the divinity. On the contrary: Augustine says that those things which are present to the intellect are better seen: but God is now present to the intellect by His essence: therefore He is also now seen by essence: and yet joy does not arise from this: therefore what is said is false.
2. Likewise, let us suppose that the devil sees the divinity as just and judging: it is certain that he will tremble: and yet the divinity is in its justice: therefore it will be possible to see the divinity with fear and trembling: not therefore always with joy.
3. Likewise, in natural vision, the vision which extends itself becomes practical, and causes motion in the appetite, and is equally disposed to joy and sadness according to whether the thing seen is announced as friend or enemy: but it cannot be announced thus concerning the divinity seen: therefore the vision of the divinity can equally be with sadness as with joy.

Response. It must be said that this is understood of the vision through the species of glory according to which it is the object of the blessed: for no creature can perceive this species, unless according to which it is perfected by glorification.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that it is understood of such intellectual vision: but no one now has such, unless blessed and glorified.

To the other, it must be said that although God is present in the soul, He is not there through the species of glory, unless in the intellect perfected by glorification: and therefore what is present by essence is received in a mirror and enigma: because, as Augustine says, the gaze of the human mind is not fixed in such excellent light, unless it is purified by the justice of faith. It is said that the pure in heart will see God.

To the other, it must be said that such vision is in shadow, because the intellect does not have the species of glorification: and therefore it is also called by Dionysius the intellect of demons and perverse imagination. Whence it is clear that the objection does not hold.

To the last, it must be said that it is not similar: because in such vision motion is not made, except according to the apprehended species: and that is commonly disposed according to what is received in general. Here, however, it is received in species, as it most moves to joy in the species of glory, in which it is shown to the blessed: and thus the Letter is understood.

Articulus 3 — Whether All, Both Good And Evil, Will See The Form Of The Glory Of The Humanity Of Christ

Whether all, both good and evil, will see the form of the glory of the humanity of Christ?

Then it is asked concerning what is said there, B, after the beginning: But Augustine openly says the form of the servant glorified, etc.

For it seems that this is impossible: because 1. Every vision occurs according to the power of the one seeing, and not according to the power of the thing seen: therefore also this: but a non-glorious eye does not have the power to comprehend the form of glory: therefore it is impossible that it sees the glorious body.

1. Likewise, the impious will not have eyes of greater power then than they have now: but now, although an eye is near the greatest glorious body, nevertheless it does not see it in the form of glory: therefore neither will the impious then see Christ in the form of glory.
2. To this some have sometimes said, that Christ will present himself to them in the form of glory: but they will not see him, except in a non-glorious appearance: just as he exhibited himself to the disciples as glorious, but they saw him in a non-glorious appearance, like one having a colored face and the habit of a pilgrim.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY of this is that 1. It is not the power of the glorious or non-glorious eye, that it sees the luminous under the appearance of the colored: because we now see the luminous in the form of light, and not the luminous in the form and appearance of color:

therefore it seems that even the impious will then see the luminous in light, and not in color: therefore that solution is null.

1. Likewise, the three disciples before whom Christ was transfigured saw his face in light, and yet their eyes were not glorified: therefore it seems that this is not a property of the non-glorious eye which was said.

Response. It seems to be conceded, that all, both good and evil, will see the form of the glory of humanity. And among all the ways, it seems to me that the one which says the glorious body has the power to be seen or not to be seen has fewer inconveniences, as was noted above.

To the first, therefore, it must be said, that it indeed has the power: but it has the power to be seen or not to be seen.

To the second, it must be said, that now glorious bodies cannot be seen as far as the power of the one seeing is concerned: but on the part of the thing seen, the vision can be impeded: and Gregory directly says this opinion in a certain homily.

To the other, it must be said, that the disciples saw him as he exhibited himself, namely in the color following the complexion.

But why he exhibited himself as such, Gregory gives the reason: because in their minds he was such: and therefore it was not fiction, but instruction.

Articulus 4 — Whether The Vision Of God In The Homeland Ought To Be Called Eternal Life

Whether the vision of God in the homeland ought to be called eternal life?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, B, around the middle: That it will be for them eternal life, etc.

1. For eternal life does not consist in vision, but also in love and fruition: therefore vision alone will not be eternal life.
2. Likewise, Vision is a passion and eternal life is a certain act of perpetual life in the blessed soul, as was said above: therefore it seems that vision is not eternal life.
3. Likewise, Life consists more in the motive power than in the intellective: therefore it seems that love is rather eternal life than vision.

On the contrary is what Augustine says, that vision is the whole reward.

Response. It must be said that concerning the vision of God in the homeland, what it is, and whether it is possible for a creature, and other such things, have been disputed in Book I of the Sentences, concerning that: to use and to enjoy. We enjoy known things, etc.

Here, however, it must be said that eternal life is considered in two ways, namely according to that which underlies in it, and is as it were material: and according to that which

informs, and is as it were formal. And in the first way indeed vision is eternal life because of the cause which was said above in the question concerning eternal life. In the second way, however, the delight following the love of the divinity possessed is eternal life. Hence that which is the cause of eternal life is love feeding or fed in the vision possessed.

And through this distinction the solution of all objections is clear.

Expositio Textus

Exposition of the Text

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, C, Het as Christ is said according to the form of a servant, etc.

It must be known that all this has already been disputed in distinction XLHF, where it was asked concerning the causes of the resurrection*.

Articulus 5 — Whether Christ, Judging In The Form Of A Servant, Will Be Seen By The Good And The Evil

Whether Christ judging in the form of a servant will be seen by the good and the wicked?

Then it is asked concerning what is said there, B, after the middle: In the form of a servant judging, he will be seen by the good and the wicked.

For it seems that even according to the divinity he ought to be seen with bodily eyes, especially by the good: because Augustine says thus: And through those eyes God will be seen in such a way, that he will have something in such excellence similar to the mind, by which he may be discerned in corporeal nature, which by any examples or testimonies of divine Scriptures is either difficult or impossible to show. Or what is easier to understand, God will be known and conspicuous in such a way, that he will be seen by the spirit by each of us in each, he will be seen by one in another, he will be seen in the new heaven and in the new earth, and in every creature that will then be, he will be seen.

Response. Concerning this also in the first distinction of the first book of the Sentences it is held, whether sense is converted into reason. And it must be said, that it is not: nor does Augustine say, but intends, that the corporeal creature received through the eyes in a nobler and more evident form than now, will manifest God: and thus our spirit will more easily know in the seen things than now.

Articulus 6 — Whether There Is Some Place In Which God Will Judge The World

Whether there is some place in which God will purify the world?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, D, Some think the Lord will descend, etc.

1. For it seems that He ought to sit in the air not against the Mount of Olives, but against the place of Pilate's praetorium, where He was judged: because it is fitting that He judges there, where He was judged.

1. Likewise, it seems false what he says, that the impious will remain on the earth: because the element of fire is more fitting for affliction and burning: therefore, they ought to be placed over the Saints in fire rather than on the earth.

Further, it is asked concerning the clouds in which the just will be elevated: because clouds are made by the resolution of earth and water: and then evaporation or resolution will be made by none: therefore, there will be no clouds.

Response. To dispute about this matter is more to divine than to discuss.

Nevertheless, it must be said that it is fitting for it to be as they say: and then He will sit against the Mount of Olives, to signify that mercy relaxing from that judgment is not alien: the contrary of which would be signified if He sat against Golgotha or the praetorium of Pilate.

To the other, it must be said that the fire in which the wicked will be, by the motion of its matter's pursuit, will descend downward, as was said before: and therefore I well think that the wicked will stand on the earth in fire enveloping them and drawing them into hell.

To the last, it must be said that in my judgment the cloud here is called the density of light shining from the bodies of the Saints, and these are not called clouds here obscurely, which are made from the evaporations of earth and water.

Articulus 7 — Whether At The Last Judgment The Sun And Moon Will Suffer An Eclipse

Whether in the final judgment the sun and moon will suffer an eclipse?

Then it is asked concerning what is said, E, shortly after the beginning: The sun and moon will suffer an eclipse, etc.

For it seems impossible: because the sun and moon can never suffer an eclipse at the same time: but the sun suffers an eclipse in conjunction, and the moon in opposition: therefore it is false what is said.

Response. To this it must be said that Jerome says many signs ought to precede the day of judgment, which because I do not know if they are true, I therefore do not state. But it seems this must be said, that if the sun and moon will be darkened at the same time, as Jerome seems to wish, this will not be through the natural cause of their conjunction or opposition, but rather by divine power, so that terror may be instilled in men, as Luke suggests, 21:25: And there will be signs in the sun, etc. It follows: and the moon and on the earth distress of nations, etc.

Or perhaps, because by the light of the sun and moon all things are generated and live: and then generation will cease: therefore also the defect is said to be of the luminaries.

Articulus 8 — Whether The Light Of The Sun Will Be Greater After The Judgment Than It Was Before

Whether the light of the sun will be greater after the judgment than it was before?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said, E, a little before the middle: "The light of the sun will be sevenfold," etc.

For it seems that this is against reason: because the light of the sun is given to move towards the generation of lower things: therefore, with generation taken away, its light ought to be removed: it ought not, therefore, to shine more then, but less.

To this they say that the sun will be rewarded on account of the dignity of man, for whose generation it moved, so that the number of the elect might be fulfilled.

However, they say concerning the objection, that the light will no longer move towards generation, but will stand still: because it caused generation through motion. They say, moreover, that the sun shone more in the first six days before the sin of man than it does now, and then it will return to that light, and in addition seven times as much light will be added to it as it had in the first six days. However, men will be seven times more than the sun in those days, namely after the judgment. And what is true about this, no one knows except God.

Articulus 9 — Whether Then There Will Be Alternations Of Day And Night

Whether then there will be alternations of day and night?

ARTICULUS FX.
Whether then there will be alternations of day and night?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said, there, E, around the middle: And then there will not be alternation of day and night, etc.

This seems impossible: because the earth will always give a shadow to the opposite place of the sun: and the shadow of the earth is night: therefore then there will be night.

To this it must be said, that nowhere then will there be night, except in the center of the earth: because although the sun stands with the elements and stars and moon, nevertheless so much will be added in light, that the hemisphere opposite to it will be illuminated, just as that in which the sun stands: and therefore it is said that there is not alternation of day and night.

Articulus 10 — Whether The Sun And Moon Will Provide Light To The Blessed

Whether the moon will provide light to the blessed?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said, there,
Ki, shortly after the middle: But it signifies
those who will be in eternal beatitude, etc.

It seems false: because they will have the greatest
use of light: because otherwise it would be in vain.

To this it must be said that it is understood that
the use of light is not the same as it is now:
for then it will be for the admiration
of the wisdom of the creator, and not for illuminating

darkness, which will be none except in hell,
and those are not illuminated.

Articulus 11 — Whether Hell Is On The Surface Of The Earth

Whether hell is on the surface of the earth?

Whether hell is on the surface of the earth?

Then it is inquired concerning what is said, there, a little before the end: "Lest the wicked placed under the earth in torments enjoy the light," etc.

And two things are inquired here concerning hell, namely whether it is on the surface of the earth, as Isidore seems to want here?

And secondly, whether there is any air in hell or not?

To the first, it is objected thus:
1. As Philosophy says to Boethius in the book "The Consolation of Philosophy": Ptolemy proved that only the fourth part of the world is habitable. From this it follows that the lower fourth of the earth is not habitable by humans: but it is certain that nothing is made without cause: therefore it seems that there is the habitation of the damned, since it does not seem to pertain to anything else.

1. Likewise, Isaac says that the sinner is pressed down by his sins under the sad orb, and he will be there in the greatest fire: and this is his hell. But the sad orb is the lower part of the orb according to the Philosophers. Therefore it seems that hell is there.

2. Likewise, Isaac says that the lights will not rotate, lest the wicked placed in Tartarus enjoy their light: therefore if they were to rotate, the wicked would enjoy their light: but this could not be if hell were in the center of the earth: but it is impossible that it is in another part of the world: therefore hell is in the lower part of the world.

Response. It must be said that hell is not in another hemisphere of the world. However, that it is in some hemisphere, I do not think anyone knows: because according to the philosophy of Theodosius, where he issued geometrical demonstrations about habitable places, that hemisphere is equally temperate as this one: but it is true what Ptolemy says, that there is not.

The observation of stars or eclipses of any inhabitants in those places, which has reached us, has not been seen. And this Philosophy intends to say in the book "The Consolation of Philosophy." What the cause is, in the book I of the Sentences, in the treatise on paradise, according to Augustine, is noted.

To the other, it must be said that Isaac calls the sad orb there the depths of the earth, where the damned will be enclosed in Tartarus.

From the other, it must be said that Isaac did not prove what he said, nor are they of faith: and therefore they are condemned with the ease with which they are said.

Or, if someone wishes to defend him: then it can be said that it happens in two ways to enjoy the light of the luminaries, namely according to itself, and according to effect. And indeed, according to itself, it does not happen to enjoy, even if they were to rotate, as the objection proves. But according to effect, it would happen: because as Ptolemy says, the rays of the stars are not united except in the center of the earth, as long as by their rotation they move the earth to generation: and when they will stand still, then they will no longer move: and then with respect to this effect, they will not enjoy.

Articulus 12 — Whether There Is Any Air In Hell

Whether there is any air in hell?

Secondly, I ask, Whether there is any air in hell?

It seems that there is: because
1. Nothing is void: however, it is evident that the damned do not fill that entire place, nor any gross element, nor is there fire there except in the damned: therefore it seems that air is there.

1. Likewise, Man is a breathing animal: and he cannot live by breathing any element except air: therefore it seems that air is there.

Response. It must be said that these questions are frivolous, nor can they be determined by human intellect: however, I think more that there will not be air there, but only fire, and cold, and the damned.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that that place is full of fire, and cold materials, and the damned.

To the other, it must be said that inspiration and expiration are now on account of the heat of the chest and heart, lest the moisture of the heart be set on fire from motion: but then there will not be alterable moisture: and therefore there will not be respiration. But yet I say this without prejudice.

However, how it is in the empyrean heaven will be made clear below, when it will be spoken of the senses of the glorious body.

DISTINCTIO XLIX

Divisio Textus

After the resurrection indeed, etc. Here begins the part which is about the things following the judgment.

And it has two parts, in the first of which it treats of the things following the judgment on the part of the good; in the second, of the things following on the part of the wicked.

In the first part, however, on the part of the good, six questions are introduced, namely, first about the difference of mansions; second, about beatitude; third, about the difference of the knowledge of the blessed; fourth, about the difference and equality of joys; fifth, Whether beatitude is increased after the judgment; and sixth, Why souls resume bodies, since they can have beatitude without them?

And these are evident in the beginnings of the chapters of this distinction in order.

Concerning the first chapter, three things are to be inquired, namely, what is a mansion? Second, What is the cause of the mansion? And third, Where is the mansion?

Articulus 1 — What A Mansion Is

What is a mansion?

To the first, it is objected from Lidfera where it says that mansions are the differences of rewards.

For it seems this is false: because
1. Mansion, according to its name, signifies something of a house; however, reward, according to its name, signifies nothing of a house: therefore, the definition is unsuitable, because it ought to be given according to the name.

1. Likewise, one thing being in one way, will be the reward of all: but one thing being in one way, does not have a difference: therefore, that which will be the reward for all, will not have differences of rewards: but it will have differences of mansions, as the Gospel of John says, xiv, 2: In my Father's house are many mansions. Therefore, it is granted that mansions are not the difference of rewards.

2. Likewise, in lower things, a mansion is said to be a place prepared for the habitation of men, in which they are defended from infestations and the intemperance of the air: therefore, since it is said according to translation in heaven, it seems that in this way it is also in heaven. And this is proven false in many ways. First indeed, because there are no infestations there: however, a man's mansion is built against infestations. Secondly, because one mansion in lower things is of many, but in heaven in no way: therefore, a mansion is not taken there by similarity to this.

3. Likewise, one mansion of one man has many distinct places, namely a dormitory, cellar, refectory, and suchlike: but in heaven there is nothing of such: therefore, it is not well said to be a mansion, as it seems.

4. Likewise, of one always changing, there is no mansion: but in heaven the blessed always change themselves: therefore, there is no mansion of them. The first is evident by itself. The second is proven from this, that they are continually illuminated in new ways, and ascend higher in the contemplation of God, as Dionysius suggests.

Response. It must be said that mansions are in heaven in the house of the Father. For the joy of that beatitude is considered in two ways, namely as the joy of infinite good: and thus the finite

enters into it: and in this way, it is called a house surrounding us on all sides, and overflowing in measure, as it is said, Matthew xxv, 21: Enter into the joy of your lord. In the second way, it is considered as participated according to the proportion of our merit: and thus it is called a mansion, because that participation is according to the manner of any merit: and because there are many such participations, therefore in one house there are many mansions.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that Augustine speaks of the thing of the mansion, and not of the name: because the thing is the same as the difference of reward, although the notion of the names of mansion and reward is diverse.

To the other, it must be said that although God is in one way, and thus is a house: nevertheless, the Saints are not in one way in the participated: and thus on the part of the participants, mansions are distinguished.

To the other, it must be said that the translation is well and fittingly made: because although there are no intemperances there, nevertheless they would be, unless there were a mansion: and it is like a holy mansion, so that there are no tempests of the air there.

To the other, it must be said that one mansion is not commensurated to many according to quantity and convenience, but one house can be of many. However, from the commensurated mansion, the translation to the heavenly mansion is taken.

To the other, it must be said that those distinct places are called or said to be mansions: and that in which they are distinguished has the likeness of a house.

To the other, it must be said that although the Saints receive a new revelation, nevertheless they do not change the state of their lot in beatitude: and to that state alone corresponds the mansion.

Articulus 2 — Whether All The Blessed Have Distinct Mansions

Whether all the blessed have distinct mansions?

Secondly, it is asked, What is the distinction of a mansion?

It seems that it is a different act: because
1. A mansion corresponds to merit: but all merit is in acts: therefore a different act makes a difference of mansions.

1. Likewise, in the damned evils there is nothing distinguishing except the act of evil merit: therefore by opposition also in the good there is nothing distinguishing mansions except the act of good merit: therefore as before.

2. Likewise, it is said of every Saint:

There is none found like him.
It is evident, however, that this is not understood of the essence of virtue, as the holy Doctors say, but of its use. Therefore it seems that according to the use of virtue each differs from another: but according to such a thing a mansion must be distinguished, because the mansion

of each one differs from another: therefore it seems that according to the use of virtue it is distinguished: but the use of virtue is a meritorious operation: therefore according to the meritorious work the mansions are distinguished.

1. Likewise, no good is unrewarded: it is evident, however, that this is understood of a good work: therefore the differences of rewards are according to the difference of works: but these are the mansions, as it is said in the Letter: therefore according to works the mansions are distinguished.

On the contrary of this, it seems that it is according to nature: because
1. Angels, as the Master says in the second book of Sentences, are distinguished according to nature: but the mansions of men are according to the mansions of Angels: therefore the mansions of men have to be distinguished according to the natural grade.

1. Likewise, Matthew 25:15: He gave to each according to his own virtue. Where it is evident that he speaks of the goods of grace, before which there are none except natural ones: therefore the gifts of grace are given according to the virtue of nature: and the gifts of glory are gifts of grace: therefore the gifts of glory are distinguished according to the gifts of nature: therefore also the mansions.

Likewise, on the contrary of both of these, it seems that it is according to the quantity of charity: because

1. This is distinguishing, to whose height a higher mansion responds, and to whose lower a lower mansion: but this is only according to charity: therefore the difference of mansions is taken according to the difference of charity.
2. Likewise, the quantity of all merit is according to the quantity of charity: therefore the quantity of reward: therefore also the difference of mansions. The first is proved: because as the Saints say, not having more works, is of greater merit, but having a greater root of charity.

Response. It must be said that charity and the quantity of charity distinguish mansions, as was ultimately proven.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that merit is not in acts, except according to the quantity of charity: because the substance of merit is not of the one having a greater work, but from the greater charity of the one working, as is taken from the first epistle to the Corinthians 13:1 and following, where it says that if I do not have charity, the rest profit me nothing, even excellent works.

To the other, it must be said that in evils it is not similar: because evil works are not united in any one form as good ones are: and therefore also the mansions in hell are well distinguished according to works, but not in the house of the heavenly Father.

Concerning this, however, how evils do not have any one form, you will find noted in the second Sentences.

To the other, it must be said that this makes the difference of accidental reward, which is in the quality and multitude and magnitude of works: but the difference of mansions is considered according to the substantial reward.

To the other, it must be said that everything is rewarded with a substantial or accidental reward.

To the first objection on the contrary, it must be said that mansions in Angels are not formally distinguished according to nature: but nature places a natural disposition for this, and the formal is perfected by the gift of grace and glory. And this is also noted on the second Sentences.

Moreover, it must be said that this donation is by way of congruity, and not by way of debt: and therefore it cannot be further inferred that a mansion is distinguished according to it, but rather according to the quantity of that which among the gifts of God is most noble, which is charity.

Articulus 3 — How And Where The Mansions Are Distinguished

How and where are the mansions distinguished?

Thirdly, it is asked, Where are the mansions distinguished?

And it seems that it is in purgatory: because 1. There are different punishments there: therefore also of mansions.

1. Likewise, of those who are in purgatory, charity is different: but the difference of charity is the cause of the difference of mansions: therefore of those who are in purgatory, the mansions are different.
2. Likewise, in the limbo of children there is a perpetual habitation: therefore it seems that there are different mansions there.
3. Likewise, everyone has his own there: and they themselves are diverse: therefore also the habitations are diverse.
4. Likewise, in the limbo of the fathers there was different charity and different merit: therefore different mansion, as it seems.

Response. It must be said that the difference of mansions is only in the hell of the damned, and in the heaven of the saints.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that mansion by its name signifies a perpetual habitation: and this is not in purgatory.

And by this, the solution to the following is also clear.

To the other, it must be said that since children have only original sin, and that in as much as it is propagated alien from the fathers, the children do not have this difference of mansions in limbo.

To the same, it must be said that this only makes a material multiplication of mansions: and such is not sought here.

To what is objected about the limbo of the fathers, the solution is clear from the aforesaid: because it was not a perpetual habitation.

Articulus 4 — What The Clarity Of The Soul Is

What is the clarity of the soul?

Then it is inquired concerning what is said, there, A, shortly before the end: To have now, is to see life, etc.

For two things are inquired here.
First, it is asked, What is the clarity of the soul of which it speaks in the Text?

And secondly, What is it to see in species? of which mention is also made in the Text.

But the rest can be inquired here in the first of the Sentences, and above in the preceding distinction concerning the vision of God in the homeland.

It is objected, however, to the first as follows:
1. By seeing, nothing is made clear: therefore clarity is not vision, as it seems to say in the Text.

1. Likewise, Clarity in the body consists in the light penetrating and illuminating the substance of the body, and not in the vision of the light: therefore similarly the clarity of the soul consists in some spiritual light: and thus it is nothing of what it says concerning vision.
2. Likewise, The soul is of itself obscure in two ways, namely from sin, and from this that it is from nothing and changeable: therefore it needs a double glorification, if it ought to be made blessed: but neither of these is removed by vision: therefore the clarity of the soul in no way consists in vision.
3. Likewise, In Angels there is another clarity, than the vision of intelligence: therefore also in the soul there will be.

Response. I well concede, that clarity will be in the soul even in substance,

as the objections prove: but what is said in the Text, is said by cause: because through vision the clarity of wisdom is received, which penetrates the whole soul by glorifying: and its imagination is, as if someone by seeing the light, would draw it into himself through the eyes, which having entered into him would make the whole clear.

And through this the solution to all the objections is clear.

Articulus 5 — What It Is To See Through A Species

What is it to see through a species?

Secondly, it is asked, What is it to see in a species?

For to every intellect information is required: therefore to the intellect of God: therefore, if God is to be seen by the intellect, it is necessary for the species of God to be in the intellect as a form in a subject, and as a certain passion of the soul in the intellect: therefore it seems that God is not seen through the species which He is, but through a species received from Him.

If you say that certain things are in the soul by themselves, like God, and the intellect itself, and suchlike: - and in those things such abstraction is not required. On the contrary:

1. The Philosopher says that the intellect understands itself, as it understands other intelligibles: but it understands others through abstraction: therefore also itself.
2. Likewise, according to the Philosopher, it is one thing to be in the soul as a part in the whole, and another to be in the soul as the understood in the intellect. For in the first way, what is in the soul is not necessarily understood, but in the second way it is necessarily understood. Therefore it does not follow that those things which are in the soul by essence are necessarily understood. Therefore that solution seems to be nothing.

On the contrary of this is that it is impossible to receive a universal species of that which has none: but God has no universal species: therefore it is impossible to receive His universal species: therefore nothing is in the intellect from Him, as it seems, because the species received by the intellect is universal.

Response. It must be said that in the book III of the Sentences there are many things about this. Here, however, noted in the treatise on faith, it can be said that God in the homeland is otherwise in the soul, and otherwise on the way and in all things: because in the homeland He is in the intellect filling the whole soul with the light of glory, and infusing eternal life into it, according to which He is the object of beatitude, as was said above: and under that clarity the soul is immediately converted into God, not receiving anything from Him other than what He is: but in this way united to Him in one spirit it will understand Him: and therefore for this intellect the formal assimilation of a species is not necessary when He is substantially present.

To the point of both Philosophers it must be said that they speak truly of the material intellect, which goes from potency to act: nor can anything other than what they say be understood, provided that a man knows what he says or understands. But in the homeland it will not be so: for there the uncircumscribed light of the deity, which is God Himself, is united to the agent intellect, and thus it is poured out substantially over the whole soul and fills it: and in this way the soul will be full of God Himself who is its beatitude. And this is what the Philosophers obscurely said, that: if the soul after death were to be united to the first mover, this would be by reason of its prosperity. And through this the solution to all objections is clear.

Articulus 6 — Whether Beatitude Is Well Defined By The Philosopher

Whether beatitude is well defined by the Philosopher?

Then it is inquired concerning what he says, there, B, It is also customary to inquire about beatitude, Whether all wish for it, etc.?

And for the understanding of this chapter, two things are inquired, namely, what is beatitude?

And, Whether all wish to be blessed, as it seems to prove in the Letter?

To the first, however, let the definition of Aristotle be set forth first, which is contained in the first of the Ethics thus: Happiness or beatitude is an act or operation according to the perfect virtue of the soul. It is objected: because it does not happen that the virtue of the soul is perfect on the way, since perfect is that to which nothing is lacking: therefore it does not happen that anyone on the way is happy or blessed.

1. Likewise, according to the same Philosopher, as he seems to say, no one seems to have perfect virtue, unless he has nothing delaying in himself or in another: but no such one is found in this life: therefore no one is found blessed in this life. The first is proved from the proofs which are in the first of the Ethics, where he says, the blessed do not need external things, and rejoice in the fortunes of descendants and the like.
2. Likewise, the perfection of the soul is not in one virtue nor in the subject: because one swallow does not make spring, nor does one beautiful day make summer: but beatitude, which is an act, is an act of one thing, as the Commentator says: therefore beatitude is not according to the perfect virtue of the soul.
3. Likewise, as is taken from the tenth of the Ethics, perfect virtue cannot be according to an unnatural habit or operation, nor even according to a common habit and operation: therefore when the Philosopher says that happiness is an act according to perfect virtue, it cannot be understood of the common habit of virtue: therefore it seems that he ought to have specified this. The first is proved: because in perfect virtue and operation, which is happiness, the human good is sought as human: and this is not according to an unnatural habit, nor even according to the common habit which is held from the genus: because that is common to us with beasts: and this is not human as human: and thus the proposition is clear.
4. Likewise, if happiness or beatitude is an act or operation, as Aristotle and his Commentator say, then no one is blessed according to habit: but this seems difficult to some, because it is said, Blessed is the man who fears the Lord. And, Blessed is the rich man who is found without blemish. And, Blessed are the poor in spirit. And so of others. All of which are according to habit, and also according to acts not human, as is to fear, to hope, and the like.
5. Likewise, one is not said to be blessed having one virtue however perfect: but one act is the act of one virtue: therefore beatitude is not one act, unless of one virtue: therefore it is not according to the perfect virtue of the soul, but rather according to perfect virtues: nor is it an act, but rather many actions and operations: and thus again it seems inconveniently defined.
6. Likewise, the perfection of each nature is according to how it attains and communicates the operation of a superior nature as much as possible: therefore also the perfection of

the soul is according to how it communicates the operation of superior natures, which is angelic or divine: therefore in such an operation happiness was more to be placed than in the perfect virtue of God. The first is proved from Dionysius and Aristotle. For Dionysius calls the contact of the inferior nature to the summit of the superior in the Celestial Hierarchy. Aristotle, however, speaking of contemplative happiness in the tenth of the Ethics, says that it is the highest and most acceptable to the gods, which they themselves exercise, as is the contemplation of theorems, as those who have marvelous delights exceeding all others in firmness and purity: and thus the proposition is clear.

But Boethius seems to define otherwise, saying that beatitude is a state perfect with the aggregation of all goods: but a state is not an act: therefore one of them defines badly: because one places it in the genus of act, and the other in the genus of state.

1. Likewise, that which is Boethius' seems inconvenient: because beatitude is something one: but nothing one is made from the aggregation of all goods: therefore beatitude is not a state, etc. The first is clear by itself and from the sayings of the Commentator on the first of the Ethics saying that beatitude is one act. The second is proved from this, that all goods are not of one genus, nor of one species, as Aristotle says: and therefore they are not gathered to constitute one.
2. Likewise, even according to this definition, no one would be blessed in this life: although Scripture seems to say this.
3. Likewise, the Philosophers said that in this life there is beatitude among many perfect in moral virtue, and perfect in contemplative virtue.
4. Likewise, Aristotle in the first of the Ethics reproves Solon the Athenian, because he said that beatitudes are after death. Therefore the said definition is inconvenient.
5. However, Augustine says in the Letter that he is blessed who has all that he wills, and wills nothing badly. Therefore beatitude is a habit, in which all that a man wills are had, and no one will will anything bad in it. But against this again it is objected: because in this life no one has all that he wills: therefore he is not blessed.

If perhaps it is said that he is blessed now, and miserable now. Against this: Bernard thus says: Moreover, misery and happiness cannot be together. Therefore if someone is miserable, he is by no means blessed.

1. Likewise, as grace making one pleasing is to guilt, so happiness is to misery: but grace never suffers guilt with it: therefore neither does happiness suffer misery with it.
2. Likewise, opposites cannot be together: therefore no miserable person is blessed: but every man on the way is miserable: therefore no man on the way is blessed: the contrary of which the Saints say.

Solution. To solve these, it must be noted that beatitude is said in many ways, and not equivocally, but according to prior and posterior. It is said according to the state of perfection of the way, and according to the state of perfection of the homeland.

According to the state of the way, it is said in three ways, namely properly, broadly, and by cause.

Properly, however, it is said in two ways, namely according to moral virtue, and according to intellectual virtue: and therefore Aristotle in the Ethics makes two books on happiness: for he made the first on moral happiness, and the second on intellectual happiness. Moral happiness, however, is still said in two ways, namely according to its being and according to its maximum potential. According to its being, happiness indeed is an act according to the perfect moral virtue of the soul. The understanding of which definition according to the Commentator is this: The virtue of the soul is nothing but the virtue perfecting the soul in acting: but since the soul is the same as the mind, as it is taken there, the perfect virtue of the soul will be the perfect virtue of the mind: and this is what places the soul in the highest: this, however, is the virtue of prudence in such sufficiency that it suffices to rule itself and others. Aristotle, however, proves that prudence cannot be perfectly had according to a perfect act, unless all other moral virtues are had, as is read in the sixth of the Ethics. Therefore the perfect operation of prudence supposes the perfection of all other moral virtues: because prudence rules and orders all. And this understanding is easy to elicit from the Commentary, if one diligently inspects it. If, however, it is taken according to its maximum potential, this happiness will then be in the greatest good of man, the operation of prudence not impeded: this good, however, is the good of the people, not only of man, or of the city, with impediments removed which are three, namely the impotence of power, and poverty, and misfortunes of dangers, or of death in oneself or in friends. And thus the Commentary says that it is translated from Greek, that power and riches and the fortune of friends serve to happiness organically. And Alpharabius in the Arabic commentary says that impotence and poverty and the misfortune of a descendant sadden happiness, and thus impede the best act of the blessed. And this is easily gathered from the letter of Aristotle, if one diligently investigates it, and not according to the false notebooks of some who corrupted that book rather than explained it. For contemplative happiness is said in two ways, namely according to being, and according to its maximum potential. And according to being, indeed, it consists in the perfection of the act of speculative intelligence with the delight of contemplation which has no contrary, as is expressly proved in the last chapter of the book X of the Ethics: the perfection, however, of speculative intelligence is especially in the speculation of simple substances and of the first substance. According to its maximum potential, however, it has the aforementioned speculation with the removal of impediment within and without: and thus moral virtues contribute to contemplative happiness, and the abundance of externals, and a solitary and free place, and the like. And for this reason Averroes says in the commentary that it is the happiness of hermits.

Broadly, however, beatitude or happiness is said, according to what consists of desirables: because nothing can move the appetite except according to this true or shadowy species of

some of those things which beatify, as will be evident through the authorities of Augustine and Anselm in the following article of the question: and thus all men wish to be blessed, although they do not seek beatitude where it is, as will be evident below.

By cause, however, beatitude is said in three ways, namely commonly, properly, and most properly. Commonly, beatitude is said by cause to be everything that is a cause of beatitude to be obtained, like the fear of God, mourning, and the like. Properly, beatitude is said by cause to be the more excellent acts of merit, as it is said in Matthew 5:3: Blessed are the poor in spirit, etc. Most properly, according to cause, beatitude is said to be perseverance in every good merit and excellent according to act: and thus beatitude is taken from Basil on the beginning of the Psalter, where he thus says: Blessed is the man who does not go, not who goes: for he who still lives in this life cannot yet be beatified because of the doubtful outcomes of life. He who, having fulfilled all that is commanded, has completed the end of peace with works of justice, this one can now be beatified without any discrimination or ambiguity. Why then does he say again, Blessed are the immaculate? For he does not bless those who have walked, but those who walk in the law of the Lord. Therefore I think that those who work what is common good, in that very thing that they work, they embrace beatitude, and both they and their work merit the praise of beatitude. Yet those who have begun to flee evil, and have turned away from sin once or twice, are not immediately to be called blessed, unless when they can in all things, either in words or in deeds, flee evil so that they are never apprehended by it, and adhere to good.

Beatitude, however, according to the state of the homeland, is to adhere to God, and in Him to have all that is desired: and thus beatitude is defined by Boethius.

With these things established, it is easy to respond to the objections.

For it must be said to the first, that the perfection of the way can be had on the way, and to some things, although not to all, as to moral happiness, or contemplative happiness, although not to the happiness of the homeland.

To the other it must be said, that this was said of happiness according to its maximum potential: and this perfection can be had according to the mode of the way.

when someone is powerful in honors, and decently abounds in external things: and rejoices in the fortunes of friends, perfectly operating according to the virtue of the soul, as has been said, in the good of the people which is the kingdom, in which the people is contained and governed in moral or civil good, etc.

To the other it must be said, that happiness is one act: but other things work towards it necessarily or organically, as has been said: and therefore the Philosopher says, that it is not in one, nor is it acquired suddenly.

To the other it must be said, that there Aristotle speaks of the perfection of contemplative happiness, which is according to the act of that virtue, which perfects man, not as man is, but as something divine exists in him, that is, intellectual contemplative, and especially that virtue is wisdom, as he proves there: but the definition introduced is of moral happiness, which is a

certain potency towards intellectual happiness, as the Commentator says. And this is thus specified by this, that it is called the act of the virtue of the soul: because the soul is only human, as was evident above in the explanation of the definition.

To the other it must be said, that it is well conceded, that someone is not called happy according to habit properly speaking: because, as the Philosopher says, if someone were said to be happy according to habit, according to half of life he would not differ from a sleeper.

And to the proof the solution is evident through the distinction placed above: because in those authorities happiness is taken according to cause, and commonly, and not properly.

To the other it must be said, that many things are required for virtues as serving and assisting towards happiness: and yet it itself is one act.

To the other it must be said, that it is true of contemplative happiness: but moral is taken in human acts, which do not agree with a superior nature, as Aristotle proves in the tenth book of the Ethics, where he shows the four cardinal virtues to be human, not divine: and therefore civil happiness cannot be taken in this way.

To the other it must be said, that Boethius defines happiness according to the manner of the homeland.

To this which is objected against, it must be said that happiness is only in the genus of act, and the summit of that act is called a state, and state is taken according to that manner in which anything when it is at its summit, is said to have a state.

To the other it must be said, that the congregation of goods is not necessary in happiness, like mixables in a mixture, or essentials in a composite from them: but rather they are like things pertaining to the state of the highest act according to contemplation: which summit cannot be, if something is lacking to perfection which delays or saddens the happy, as Boethius himself proves there.

To the other it must be said, that happiness is taken equivocally or according to analogy: and therefore in the argument there falls a fallacy of equivocation.

To the other it must be said, that this Solon was a legislator and praetor of the Athenians: and he said that civil happiness is hindered by the misfortunes of the dead: and for this he is reproved by Aristotle, because it is false. But he is not reproved for this, that he said some happiness is after death.

To the other which is objected by Augustine it must be said, that he does not define the happy, but introduces the proper passion of the truly happy: because he who is truly happy, has all that he wills, and wills nothing badly, as will be shown in the following problem.

If however some definition is conceded: then through the aforementioned it is evident, that the argument made to the contrary is not valid.

To the other it must be said, that true happiness and misery cannot be in the same: but happiness according to cause, or commonly called happiness of the way, well endures misery with itself.

And through this the solution to the two following is evident, which proceed in the same way.

And note, that others say entirely otherwise, but it is not to be cared for.

Articulus 7 — Whether All Wish To Be Happy

Whether all wish to be blessed?

Secondly, it is asked, Whether all wish to be blessed?

It seems that they do: because 4. Dionysius says in the book On the Divine Names, that all things desire the good and the beautiful: and on account of that, they do whatever they do. Therefore, all men wish to be blessed.

1. Likewise, Anselm in the book On the Fall of the Devil: From a certain advantage, it is evident that happiness, which every rational nature desires.
2. Likewise, [in the same place, a little below: All wish well for themselves, and do not wish ill for themselves.
3. Likewise, Augustine in book II of the Confessions: There is a certain defective species, and shadowy with deceiving vices. For pride imitates loftiness, when you are one above all, God most high. And ambition seeks honors and glory, when you alone are to be honored above all and glorious forever. And cruelty wishes to be feared for power. But who is to be feared, except one God? from whose power can anything be snatched away, or withdrawn, when, or where, or by whom can it be? And the flattery of the wanton wishes to be loved: but nothing is more charming than your charity, nor is anything loved more healthily than that most beautiful and luminous truth of yours. And curiosity seems to desire the pursuit of knowledge, when you know all things supremely. Ignorance itself and foolishness are covered under the name of simplicity and innocence, because nothing simpler than you is found. But what is more innocent than you, since your works are hostile to evils? And sloth seems to desire rest. But what certain rest is there except in the Lord? Lust wishes to be called satisfaction and abundance, yet you are the fullness and unfailing abundance of incorruptible sweetness. Thus Augustine introduces there. Therefore, nothing moves the appetite, except insofar as there is something of the species of the beatifying in it.
4. Furthermore, Augustine, in the same place:

All perversely imitate you, who make themselves far from you, and exalt themselves against you. But even so, by imitating you, they judge you to be the Creator of every creature, and therefore there is no way to depart entirely from you. From this it is taken that every man desires the likeness of God: and for the sake of that, he does whatever he does: but only such a species blesses: therefore, every man desires happiness.

1. Furthermore, Nothing desires anything except under the aspect of something desirable: but there is no aspect of the desirable, except the species of something beatifying:

therefore, nothing desires anything except under the aspect of the beatifying: therefore, whatever it desires, it desires happiness in some way.

2. Furthermore, The opposite of what every desirer flees, every desirer desires: but what every desirer flees is that which makes miserable: therefore, every desirer desires the opposite of that which makes the desirer miserable: but this is what makes blessed or happiness: therefore, every desirer desires happiness,

On the contrary of this is,

1. Augustine in book II of the Confessions who says thus: I loved my own defect, foul soul, and leaping away from your firmament into destruction, not desiring anything of beauty, but desiring disgrace. From this it is taken that it is possible for a man to desire disgrace, and not anything of beauty: therefore, he desires that which makes miserable; therefore, happiness is not always desired.
2. Furthermore, Augustine, in the same place: I plucked those apples only to steal. For having plucked them, I threw them away, having feasted only on iniquity, in which I rejoiced enjoying. For even if any of those apples entered my mouth, the crime was the seasoning there. From this the same is taken as before.
3. Furthermore, In all the arguments introduced in the Letter, there seems to be a fallacy of accident, as is clear when it argues, To live blessedly is to live according to the virtue of the soul: but every man wishes to live blessedly: therefore, he wishes to live according to the virtue of the soul. And so with other reasons, which even to one slightly knowledgeable seem to be of no value.
4. Furthermore, In the Letter, he seeks the cause of error: and it seems in this to agree, that all know happiness and desire it, but do not seek where it is: and therefore error falls into their works. However, this seems to be nothing especially according to him: because if they know it, then they know the true and uncreated good: therefore, they know where to seek happiness: and thus his reasoning is null.

Response. It must be said that the first part of the authorities and reasons must be held: and not only that every man desires happiness, and for its sake does whatever he does: but also, as Dionysius says, everything that desires, and everything that is, and even that which is not in act, but is in potency, desires to be in the beautiful and good beatifying things.

This, however, must be understood in this way: Happiness can be considered in two ways, namely in essence, and in the aspect of the beatifying, which are in some way in it. If indeed it is considered in essence: then it is twofold, namely created, and uncreated. Of the uncreated, Basil says over the beginning of the Psalter thus: There is indeed one first and true and proper happiness, just as there is one good which is God, as Paul also mentions saying:

Awaiting the blessed hope and the coming of the glory of the great God, and our Savior Jesus Christ. For in truth that is the blessed light, which is also the only good, to whose help all things look, which all desire, which is the only immutable nature, the unperturbed life,

where no sorrow will approach, in which there is no change, which no confusion will happen, the perennial fountain, the unfailing grace, or the treasure of knowledge.

But created happiness is that of which it was previously spoken, both according to the state of the way, and according to the homeland. If, however, happiness is considered in the beatifying themselves or in their aspect: then each beatifying thing has an imitation of uncreated happiness: and from this which is exemplified by it, it has the power to move the appetite: and thus everything that is, desires happiness, according to which it is exemplified by the first happiness: and this is what Anselm says in the book On the Fall of the Devil thus: I say now happiness, From this it is expressly clear that not happiness with justice, but which all even the unjust wish. For all indeed wish well for themselves. Except for this, that all nature of good is divided into two goods, and two contrary evils are said in use: one good is what is called justice, to which the contrary evil is called injustice: the other good is, which seems to me to be able to be called advantage, and to this evil is opposed disadvantage. But justice indeed not all wish, nor do all flee injustice: but advantage not only every rational nature, but also everything that can feel, wishes, and avoids disadvantage. For no one wishes, except what he thinks in some way advantageous. In this way, therefore, all wish well for themselves, and do not wish ill for themselves, as has been said.

To the same effect is what Basil says over the beginning of the Psalter thus: Unskilled men, while they are ignorant of the blessed nature, and love, sometimes think to be blessed, which are to be said of no moment, namely riches, or health of the body, or glory of honor: of which nothing at all is good according to its nature, not only because it easily suffers change into contraries: but because they are by no means to be believed to be good, which cannot make good those who possess them. For who has been made just by wealth? Who chaste by health? On the contrary, indeed, sometimes they have provided the opportunity to sin to those who did not know how to use health or wealth properly.

This is more clearly evident through the authorities of Augustine introduced in book II of the Confessions. Therefore, in this way, all wish to be blessed, not only all men, as both Philosophers and Saints prove.

Therefore, it must be said to the first objection that is against this, which Augustine below solves what in that theft having the shadowy species of the beatifying he desired, thus saying:

Did it please to act against the law, at least by a fallacy, because by power I could not, to imitate captive freedom by doing with impunity what was not allowed, with a dark likeness of omnipotence? as if he were to say: So it is. Whence it is evident, that the first seeking he said, and the motive to the act of theft was the likeness of omnipotence, which has some aspect and species of the beatifying.

To the other objection, it must be said that Augustine disputes against the position, and his argumentation is more to the man than to the reason. However, the position was threefold, namely that happiness is the virtue of the soul, and that it is pleasure, and that it is God; and all those posited that happiness is that according to the intention of the beatifying, and according to being at the same time, and according to this their reasons proceed well. If,

however, the intention of happiness and the thing supposed by happiness are taken differently: then the fallacy of accident occurs, as has been said.

And through this, the solution is clear both to the Letter and also to all that was asked.

Articulus 8 — Whether One Of The Blessed Knows Something About God Which Another Does Not Know

Whether one of the blessed knows something about God that another does not know?

Then it is asked concerning what is said there, CG, "It is also customary to ask, whether someone knows something about God," etc.

It seems that he speaks falsely: because
1. According to the saying of blessed Dionysius in the Celestial Hierarchy, illuminators are superior to inferiors: but this could not be unless the superior knew something about which the inferior did not know: therefore, since the beatitude of men is according to the beatitude of angels, a more meritorious man knows something about God that a less meritorious man does not know.

1. Furthermore, it seems that the argument he makes in the Text is not valid: because from the fact that someone sees more, it does not follow that he sees less, unless the less follows from the greater: just as one who knows metaphysics, it does not follow from this that he knows geometry, although this is less than that: therefore, similarly, it does not follow, if God shows Himself to them as three and one and they know this, that because of this they see all other things.
2. Furthermore, what pertains to beatitude that he says men see? For this does not seem to be unless it is the highest good: therefore it seems that they do not see in Him all unless because He is the highest good: but the superiors see many other things: therefore they do not have equal knowledge.
3. Furthermore, in earthly intellects it is so, that the clearer and more subtle comprehends more: therefore also in the superiors it will be so: therefore they do not have equal knowledge, as it seems.
4. Furthermore, in the Text it is said that they differ in mode: and it is asked, what is that mode? For it seems that all see in one mode, because all immediately and through the species: therefore it seems false what he says in the Text.

Response. It must be said that what is said is understood concerning things pertaining to beatitude: and this is knowledge through the species which succeeds faith with respect to all articles: for in other things they will have, and have, different knowledge, as the first objections prove, and also one from himself differently, because successively more is revealed to him of the secrets of divine knowledge.

From the argument that he said in the Text, it must be said that through this he proves that nothing will be hidden from them concerning things pertaining to beatitude. And it is an

argument from the lesser: just as it seems less that the greatest and most difficult is revealed, than any other lesser things pertaining to beatitude: but the greatest is revealed: therefore any other is revealed.

And through this the solution to all is clear.

Articulus 9 — Whether Joy Is Well Defined By Augustine

Whether joy is well defined by Augustine?

Then it is inquired concerning what is said, there, D, It is also usually asked, Whether in joy there are disparities, etc.

And two things are inquired, namely, what is joy? And, Whether it is equal in all?

To the first, let the definition of Augustine be taken, who says that joy is the diffusion of the mind in the conception of good: joy, since it is in the genus of passion,

1. It seems that it does not pertain to the intellectual nature, because passion according to Aristotle is something that is brought upon or inflicted upon the sense and the sensitive soul.
2. Furthermore, to be diffused does not pertain except to the material and passible: therefore it does not pertain to the intellectual nature, such as an angel, or the rational soul: therefore joy ought not to be attributed to them, as it seems.
3. Furthermore, delight is also attributed to the blessed: and it is asked, In what does joy differ from delight? It seems, in nothing: because delight is the diffusion of the mind in the conception of good: therefore it is the same as joy.
4. Furthermore, since according to Augustine and Boethius there are only four natural passions, namely joy, sadness, hope, and fear, and yet delight can be reduced to others, it is evident that it will be reduced to joy: therefore it is the same as it.
5. Furthermore, it is in the conception of present good inferring the passion of good: similarly joy: therefore joy and delight are the same in reality.

Response. It must be said that joy is quite suitably defined by Augustine.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that it is a spiritual passion, and thus it well pertains to the spiritual nature, as Aristotle proves against Plato who said that all delight was generation in the sensitive soul: and he shows that there are certain spiritual passions simple and of the simple, such as the delights of contemplations, such as that the diameter is asymmetrical.

To the other, it must be said that to be diffused by the extension of spirits, and the elevation of subtle blood, pertains to the passible nature and the power which operates in the organ: but thus the spiritual nature is not diffused, but metaphorically, when it is spiritually extended into all the differences of good.

To the other, it must be said that the difference is in the reason of the names: because joy arises from delight: for delight (as Aristotle proves in the X Ethics) is the flourishing of nature in the operation of its own and natural habit not impeded: but joy is the manifestation of that in the delight of the conceived good: and thus it is clear that joy arises from delight, as its effect: and this difference the names themselves also show.

To that which is objected, it must be said that the objection is founded upon a false understanding of that which delight is diffusion: because that diffusion is its effect.

To the other, it must be said that it does not follow, if it is reduced to that, that it is the same as it: because it is not reduced to it except as to a cause, and not as existing of the same essence.

To the other, it must be said that from this it is not proven, except that they are of the same; and this is true. But it does not follow that they are the same: because they are of the same in a different mode.

Articulus 10 — Whether There Is Equal Joy In All The Blessed

Whether in all the blessed there is equal joy?

Secondly, it is asked, Whether there is equal joy, as it says in the Text? It seems that not:

1. For it is natural that joy is not equally intense concerning another's good as concerning one's own: but grace and glory do not take away nature, but perfect it: therefore it seems that even in the homeland joy is more intense concerning one's own than concerning another's: therefore his reasoning by which he proves in the Text that there is equal joy is worth nothing.
2. Furthermore, there is no equality among Angels (as Dionysius wishes) with another: therefore neither among humans: therefore there will not be equal joy either.
3. Furthermore, it is false that concerning all things about which one rejoices, another also rejoices: because one does not perceive what another perceives: therefore since one rejoices about what is perceived, not about what one rejoices, another also rejoices.

Response. It must be said that I see no true reasoning here, except that which he lastly introduces in the chapter, namely that it is equal on the part of the object, not on the part of the subject, namely because it is about the equal, because all rejoice about one and the same.

To the first objection, it must be said that here he considers joy on the part of the rejoicing subject: and there it is well conceded that there is not equal joy.

To the second, it must be said that in dignity and perception of gifts all are unequal as to the mode of perceiving: because one sees more clearly than another, and therefore rejoices more intimately: but on the part of the object of joys there is no inequality, because the highest good presents itself equally to all.

To the other, it must be said that they perceive the same, although the mode is not the same on the part of the perceiver.

Articulus 11 — Whether The Beatitude Of The Saints Will Be Greater After The Judgment Than Before The Judgment

Whether the beatitude of the Saints will be greater after the judgment than before the judgment?

Whether the beatitude of the Saints will be greater after the judgment than before the judgment?

Then it is inquired concerning this which he says, there, E, After these things it is usually asked, If beatitude, etc.

For it seems false: because
1. However pure and clear the body may be, it is more ignoble than the soul: but the more noble is hindered by the more ignoble when joined; therefore it seems that the soul will be hindered by the body: therefore its joy will be diminished after the resurrection: and the contrary of this is said in Lidlera.

1. Furthermore, in the book of Causes it is said, that every power, the more it is united, the more it is infinite: but the power of the soul is more united outside the body than in the body: therefore more infinite: therefore outside the body it is perceptive of more and greater joys than in the body.
2. Furthermore, when it is joined to the body, it is joined to potency: but every form is the more depressed, the more it is joined to potency; therefore since the soul is a form, it is depressed when it is united to the body: therefore as before.
3. Furthermore, the separated soul, as such, has a greater suitability to simple and therefore spiritual light than the soul united to the body: but among more suitable things there is greater joy: therefore it seems that the separated soul rejoices more in conjunction with God than when united to the body: therefore its joy is not increased by union with the body, but rather diminished.

Response. It must be said that the increase can be understood extensively as concerning more things, or intensively. And in the first way, I concede that it will be increased. However, in the second way, it does not seem that it is increased, unless in the way which he will say in the following chapter, namely that with the natural desire by which it depends on the body being quieted, it will be more strongly turned in intention to the contemplation of God.

Therefore, to the first, it is said through Augustine, that the high adhering to the low in its substance is not harmed: but that is much elevated by humility: whence the body in that state is elevated by the glorified soul to glory: and then in no way does it retard, as above in the gifts of the glorified body it is expeditious.

To the other, it must be said that the intellect is not a bodily power even when the soul according to its substance is united to the body, and through it the soul is capable of God: and therefore since it is not united, it is not multiplied in organs: and therefore in no way is it limited or obscured.

To the other, it must be said that this is true when the soul follows the body, and this is on the way: but then the body follows the soul to formality and spirituality: and therefore it will not retard it.

To the other, it must be said that the intellect is not joined to an organ: and therefore even when the union is made, the suitability remains, as has been said.

Articulus 12 — Whether The Soul Again Desires To Be United To The Body

Whether the soul again desires to be united to the body?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, E, shortly after the beginning: If anyone is moved by what need, etc.

For according to this it seems that the more noble desires the less noble: but this is against nature, as Aristotle says.

To this, however, it must be said that Aristotle speaks of the appetite for perfection: because that is always in the less noble with respect to the more noble: and in this way the soul does not desire the body, but rather as a companion of sufferings and merits, so that it may perceive consolation and retribution with it.

DISTINCTIO L

Divisio Textus

Here arises a question from the premises, etc. Here, in the last distinction, it is discussed concerning the state of the wicked after judgment and resurrection.

And the Master inquires three things, namely, whether the damned sin in hell? And secondly, concerning the outer darkness. And thirdly, how do the blessed and the damned relate to each other?

And it is clear that the first is in the first chapter, the second in the second, and the third in the third.

However, three things are to be inquired by reason of the first chapter, namely, whether the damned sin in hell? Secondly, whether the demons sin? Thirdly, whether the damned can will anything good?

Articulus 1 — Whether The Damned Sin In Hell

Whether the damned sin in hell?

To the first, it is objected thus:
1. Every disordered movement of a rational nature is sin: but in hell there are disordered movements of rational souls: therefore, also in hell sin occurs.

1. Furthermore, the more obstinate the will, the more it sins in this life: therefore, obstinacy does not diminish sin, but increases it: but the damned do not differ from the non-damned in terms of the power to sin, except in obstinate will: therefore, the damned sin more than the non-damned.
2. Furthermore, God does not compel them to evil, nor does nature: therefore, neither from God nor from nature, but from freedom proceeds their disordered act: therefore, it seems that they sin just as the non-damned.
3. Furthermore, if someone makes a necessity for themselves to sin through an illicit act, in the second act they are not excused, but deserve double curses: but in this way the damned have procured necessity for themselves: therefore, they are not excused by obstinacy, but deserve double curses.
4. Furthermore, the state of the damned should not be better than that of the non-damned: but if they could not sin, that state would be better than this one in which they can sin: therefore, it seems that they can sin.
5. Furthermore, a cause is assigned by the Saints, that Lamech sinned more than Cain: because seeing his punishment, he did not correct himself: therefore, he sins most who, having experienced his own punishment, is not withdrawn from sin, that is, from disordered will: but such are the damned: therefore, they sin most.

On the contrary of this is that
1. No guilt extends beyond the sentence of condemnation of the same guilt: but the damned have received the sentence of their damnation: therefore, beyond that, guilt does not extend: therefore, neither do they sin in hell.

1. Furthermore, evil and sin (as Augustine says) are ordered by divine justice, because otherwise something disordered would remain in this world: but what is ordered must have a state and end beyond which it does not progress: therefore, the sin of the damned must also receive an end: but that end cannot be more fittingly imposed than in death, when the order of condemning justice begins: therefore, they do not sin beyond in hell.

Response. It must be said that evil men or souls do not sin in hell, as the objections ultimately prove.

To the first, it must be said that a disordered act is sometimes as punishment, sometimes as guilt. In free will, it is as guilt: but in obstinacy from the condemnation of justice, it is as punishment, and thus it is in the damned.

To another, it must be said that obstinacy is said in two ways, namely, an immovable will from a conceived evil out of the pertinacity of malice alone, and an immovable will from a conceived evil out of confirming justice. And in the first way, it does not excuse, but accuses. But in the second way, because it is so that divine justice has ordained, that whatever the free will finally wills, it cannot be turned away from that by death: and therefore the evil are not turned away from the conceived evil: and therefore it is said, Ezekiel 30:27: "They have descended to hell with their weapons, and have placed their swords under their heads, and their iniquities were upon their bones," not as guilt.

To another, it must be said that divine justice causes this obstinacy, but the impious as a meritorious cause: just as divine justice causes death by inflicting it, but the impious have summoned it by their hands and words. And it is similar to how a thief first voluntarily handles another's property, and when condemned, for the demonstration of the judge's justice, he is immovably bound upon his neck, so that he is separated from it even unwillingly.

To another, it must be said that this is understood of those sins of which one leads into another, like drunkenness into fornication or homicide. But here it is not so: because the immobility of the will is caused by the infliction of punishment.

To another, it must be said that there is no place for amendment, as it says in the Letter: and therefore the punishment experienced there does not aggravate.

Articulus 2 — Whether The Demons Sin In The Lower Regions

Whether demons sin in hell?

Secondly, it is asked, whether the same reasoning applies to demons?

And it seems that it does: because

1. Damascene says that it must be known that what is a fall in Angels, this is death in humans: because just as Angels after the fall are not susceptible to repentance, so neither are humans after death. Therefore, it seems that on account of this obstinacy, the sin which they now commit should not be imputed to them.

1. Furthermore, the demon is condemned by the Lord in whole, and man in part, namely in the soul: if therefore condemnation causes,

that sin ought not to be imputed to man, much more it follows that it ought not to be imputed to the demon.

1. Furthermore, he cannot correct the will: but what cannot be otherwise does not have praise or blame, as Tullius says: therefore it is unjust, as it seems, if this were imputed to him as sin.

On the contrary, the author of evil ought not to be in a better condition than the one persuaded in evil: but I see that man is already persuaded in evil by the demon, and such sin is imputed to man: therefore much more ought it to be imputed to the demon.

To this it must be said that each part has opinions for itself: and in the second Sentences more is found about this question than here. However, the way of those saying that they sin until the day of judgment, when they will receive final condemnation with respect to greater punishment and imprisonment, seems safer: and then they will no longer be able to sin.

To the first, it must be said that it is not similar: because man after death does not receive time by chance, but this time is given to the demon, in which he may exercise the elect: and therefore in that time sin and also punishment increase for him. From the saying of Damascene, nothing else is understood except that in this they are similar, that they are insusceptible to repentance.

To the other, it must be said that he does not yet have final condemnation, as man has final condemnation in soul and in body, although according to the other part man does not yet endure punishment.

To the other, it must be said that although he cannot correct the state of his confirmation in evil, nevertheless each singular act is voluntary for him: and therefore he is blamed.

Concerning this mode of confirmation, you will find a better statement in the third Sentences than here.

Articulus 3 — Whether The Damned Are Able To Will Any Good

Whether the damned can will any good?

Thirdly, it is asked, whether the damned can will any good?

It seems that they can: because

1. Evil, as Dionysius says, is involuntary and uncaused and unfruitful and sluggish: therefore, since they will something, and this is not evil, and it is good or evil, it seems that they will nothing except good.

1. Furthermore, that which is absolutely and in itself a privation can move no appetite: but evil in itself and absolutely is a privation: therefore it can move no appetite by itself: therefore neither the appetite of the damned: therefore it seems as before, that they will good.
2. Furthermore, nothing desires its own destruction: but evil is the destruction of every thing: therefore nothing desires evil: therefore neither the damned: therefore as before.
3. Furthermore, Dionysius says in the book On the Divine Names, concerning demons, that they desire to be good and best, to live, and to understand: but the damned are not more obstinate than demons: therefore they desire good: and thus the proposition is held.

On the contrary of this is,
1. What Bernard says in the Canticles concerning the damned: In eternity he will not obtain what he wills: and yet he will endure perpetually what he does not will. He wills the iniquity which he committed while living in the age.

1. Furthermore, a will obstinate in evil can will nothing except evil: therefore, etc.

The response to this is, that their will is twofold, namely natural and deliberative. However, the natural has rather an actual velleity: but the deliberative proceeds into act.

Therefore it must be said, that by natural will they will good, and by deliberative will they will evil: and this solution is according to Dionysius in the book On the Divine Names. Others, however, here propose another distinction, which has been set by us upon the second of the Sentences.

To the first, therefore, it must be said, that Dionysius does not speak of that which is evil in the interior or exterior act, but of malice itself, that is, of evil insofar as it is evil: for this is truly involuntary, as Aristotle proves in the third book of the Ethics. But this can in no way be voluntary.

And through this the solution to the following is clear: because it is not pure privation.

Furthermore, it must be said that destruction is consequent to the appetible just as in mode: because he who fornicates does not intend to diminish the natural good in himself and to destroy the gratuitous: and yet both of these follow from the fornication which he commits: and thus it is there, that the appetite falls upon the act, and destruction follows.

To the dictum of Dionysius it must be said, that as he himself says, he speaks of the will of demons according to, not the nature of evil, but insofar as they are, they desire good and best, just as every nature desires good insofar as it is.

Articulus 4 — Whether In Hell There Will Be Perpetual And Outer Darkness

Whether in hell there will be perpetual and exterior darkness?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said, there, B, Here it can be asked, Why those darknesses, etc.

For the understanding of this chapter, three things are inquired, of which the first is concerning the exterior darknesses. The second is, Whether the damned are entirely outside of God, as it is said in the Text? The third, however, is, Whether they hate God, as again in the Text it seems to be proven through the Psalm.

Concerning the first, it is objected thus:
1. Every creature serving God merits some clarity from Him: but the place of hell and fire

have served God from the beginning of the world: therefore they merit some clarity from God like other creatures: therefore there will not be perpetual and exterior darkness there.

1. Furthermore, Fire which gives light to something does not make complete darkness: but the fire of hell gives light to something: therefore it does not make complete darkness. The first is evident by itself. The second Gregory writes in book IX of the Moralia upon that: And eternal horror inhabits there. Although there the fire does not shine for consolation, yet it shines for greater torment, for the reprobate will see each of their followers with them in torment by the illuminating flame, those whom they sinned for love of: so that those who loved their life carnally against the precepts of the Creator, might also be afflicted by them inwardly in the increase of their damnation. Therefore, it is to be believed that the fire which torments in darkness preserves light for torment.
2. Furthermore, Nothing seems without light: but in hell the damned will see each other and their punishments: therefore it seems that there is light there: and therefore there is not a lack of interior and exterior light, as it seems to say in the Text.

Response. It must be said to this, that the disposition of that place is perfectly known only by God, and those who are there: but we in this world cannot fully know, except only as much as we have received from those who have received revelation about this.

Therefore, it seems it must be said according to the sayings of Gregory, that that place is simply dark, and in a certain respect luminous. However, it is simply dark: because the flame which is there and the fire, simply obscures, and does not shine except for greater torment, and not for anything else. Hence in this the fire serves God, that it does not show all things with its obscure light, but only those which exaggerate torments: and this is what Gregory says a little before the aforementioned authority in book IX of the Moralia thus: Therefore it becomes for the wretched. And there, a little before: death without death, end without end, defect without defect: because both death lives, and the end always begins, and defect does not know how to fail. Because therefore both death is similar and does not extinguish, pain torments, but in no way does it flee fear, flame burns, but by no means does it dispel darkness, as far as can be gathered through the knowledge of the present life, the punishments do not have order: because they do not hold their quality in all things. In a horrendous manner then will be pain with fear for the reprobate, and flame with darkness. These things being compared to what was previously introduced, it is clear what was said.

To the first, therefore, it is said, that those creatures are glorified in this in their natural way: because they obey the justice of God, and those qualities are most precious to them, by which they can most perfectly accomplish these things, like immense opacity, and excessive heat, and excessive cold, as it is said, Wisdom 5:21: He will sharpen hard wrath into a spear, and the world will fight with him against the senseless. Thus God will arm the creature in vengeance of enemies: just as on the contrary the creature which will be in the higher places with the good, receives qualities for glory, which are fitting to the beatitude of the Saints, like light, rest, and such things.

The solution is evident through the distinction introduced.

Articulus 5 — Whether The Damned Are Wholly Outside God

Whether the damned are entirely outside God?

Secondly, it is asked, Whether the damned are entirely outside God?

It seems, however, that they are not: because
1. God is everywhere: therefore nothing is outside Him. Augustine: Because he withdraws from you, where does he go? from you placid to you wrathful. Therefore no one is outside God.

1. Furthermore, God is in all things containing all in being: therefore He is in the damned: therefore they are not entirely outside Him.

Response. Much has been said about this in the first book of the Sentences: it must be said, however, that God signifies providence, as Dionysius says in the book On the Divine Names. Providence, however, signifies care and the influence of benefits: and because He does not influence benefits, but punishments to the damned, therefore they are said to be outside God. And this solution (as I think) is according to the intention of the Letter.

It could also be said that with respect to the wicked, the damned are outside God: because they do not consent to Him in any way, but with respect to dominion they cannot escape Him.

And in the first way, it speaks in the Letter. In the second way, however, the objections proceed.

And through this, the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 6 — Whether The Damned Hate God

Whether the damned hate God?

Thirdly, it is asked, Whether the damned hate God?

It seems that they do not: because
1. Dionysius says that all things love the beautiful and good which is God.
Therefore, even the damned.

1. Furthermore, Augustine says that
whatever can love, loves God.

Response. It must be said to this that
God can be considered in two ways,
namely absolutely, and under justice judging
according to merits. In the first way, indeed, nothing
hates God, but in the second way the damned and demons hate
Him.

And through this the solution to the objections is clear.

Articulus 7 — Whether The Evil Have Knowledge Of The Things That Are Done Here

Whether the evil have knowledge of those things which happen here?

Then it is inquired concerning this which is said, there, C, Furthermore it is accustomed to be asked, If the souls of the righteous, etc.

And two things are inquired here.
First, concerning the evil, Whether they have knowledge of those things which happen here?
Second, concerning the good, Whether they themselves have knowledge of those things which happen here?

To the first, it is objected thus:
1. No knowledge ought to be taken away from the evil, which contributes to the accumulation of damnation, but the knowledge of those things which happen here contributes to the accumulation of damnation: therefore it ought not to be taken away from them. The first is evident in itself from the sayings of Gregory previously introduced. The second is proved thus: For either the things which are here are prosperous or adverse. If prosperous, they are punished more from the abandonment of them. If adverse, they are punished more from the care which they have concerning their own, because it is said here in the Text that they have care of their own: and thus the proposition is established.

1. Furthermore, the soul separated from the body either has the mode of understanding which the angels have, or the natural mode of man. If in the first mode: therefore it understands through forms concreated to it which are the ideal forms of the whole universe and the whole course of nature, therefore just as an angel knows absences and distances through place by those forms, so also the soul. But if it understands in the mode of man, it is evident that that cognition does not even apprehend present things except through abstraction and operation of bodily organs: therefore that soul does not even know present things before the resurrection, which is false: therefore it remains, that it knows in the first mode: and then it follows, that it knows those things which are done here.

If perhaps you say, that this mode is proper to the good angels, and not to the evil. On the contrary: This mode is natural: therefore it is common to the good and the evil: and this is supposed from the disputes on the second Sentences.

If perhaps you wish to say, as some have fabricated, that the soul departing from the body carries in its sensible part sensible forms, and by means of those forms uses senses after death. On the contrary: It is evident, that sensible forms are only in the organ of the body, as all Philosophers say, nor does the sensible power of the soul receive them except mixed and united to the body, because in this way also the motions of the body reach it: but the soul after

death carries no organ with it: therefore nor a form, which is only in the organ of the body: therefore this fiction is nothing.

1. Furthermore, let it be granted, that it carries such forms with it: it is evident, that they lead only to particulars, of which they were forms: therefore through them they can know nothing else: therefore they do not know those things which are done here now: therefore it is evident, that this mode is impossible and entirely lacking in reason.

On the contrary of this is,
4. What is said, Job 14:21, concerning the evil dead thus: Whether his sons are noble or ignoble, he will not understand.

1. Furthermore, Gregory says on the same in the Gloss: Just as the souls of the dead living do not know in what place they are, so the dead who lived carnally do not know how the life of those placed in the flesh is disposed after them.
2. Furthermore, Augustine in the Text seems to wish, that the rich man knew concerning his brothers indirectly and through conjectures, namely because he neither saw them in hell with him, nor even in rest with Lazarus. Therefore from the Text, it is not held, that the evil know those things which are done here.
3. Furthermore, Aristotle says, that the deeds of the living do not change the dead, whether misfortunes or good fortunes. Therefore it seems, that they do not come to the knowledge of them.

Response. It must be said without prejudice, that the evil dead could naturally know the present things which are done here, just as demons, if it were permitted to them: but according to the sayings of the Saints it is not permitted to them. And the cause of this can be; because even the good of interior natural cognition they deserved to be obscured in them. But that demons are now permitted to know, this is done by reason of the exercise in which they are here useful to the good through temptations.

And thus the response to all is evident except the first, to which it must be said, that that knowledge would not directly be a cause of punishment to them: whence greater is the punishment of the obscurity of the natural habit which they received from creation.

Articulus 8 — Whether The Good Have Knowledge Of The Things That Are Done Here

Whether the good have knowledge of those things which happen here?

Secondly, it is asked, Whether the good have knowledge of those things which are done here?

It seems that they do: because
1. In them, such a natural habit is not obscured: therefore, since nothing would impede except this, it seems that the good know all present things whenever they wish.

1. Furthermore, the Saints are prayed to by those who are here: and they would be prayed to in vain if they did not hear, nor know our necessities: therefore it seems that they know them, and by the same reasoning, all other things.

On the contrary, it is
4. What is said in Isaiah 63:16: "Abraham did not know us, and Israel does not acknowledge us." However, it is certain that Abraham was good. Therefore, neither do other good ones know those things which happen here.

1. Furthermore, Augustine understands the same:
"The dead, even the Saints, do not know what the living, even their children, do."

Response. I do not see how the good do not know those things which happen here, provided they wish to know.

However, concerning the opinion of Augustine, it seems to be said that Augustine speaks of the mode of knowledge, or because they pretend not to know, except as much as God wills to assist them.

Articulus 9 — How It Is Understood That The Rich Man In Hell Had A Tongue

How is it understood that the rich man in hell had a tongue?

Then it is asked, concerning what is said there, D, If anyone should ask, How is it understood, etc.

1. For since it has been disputed above concerning the remaining of the sensitive soul of men after death, it remains here to be asked, what is called the tongue of the rich man, since it is evident that he did not have the tongue of flesh there?
2. Furthermore, why does he rather ask for his tongue to be cooled than another member?
3. Furthermore, what is the tip of the finger of Lazarus, and what was the drop of water which he requested?

And it must be said that the tongue is called the power of the soul, which perfects the tongue for the power of taste and the motion of speech, as Gregory says.

To the other it must be said, that according to Gregory, the sin of the rich man was gluttony, and loquacity which is the companion of gluttony: and therefore he grieved for the tongue above the other members.

To the other it must be said, that by the finger is made a showing, and the finger of mercy signifies a showing: but the tip of the finger signifies the extreme mercy liberating from depravity which will not be there.

And the drop of water signifies a small refreshment, which the damned do not obtain in the pit where there is no water.

Articulus 10 — Whether The Good And The Evil Will See One Another

Whether the good and the evil will see each other?

Then it is asked concerning this which is said, there, E, It is also accustomed to be asked, Whether, etc.

However, it seems that they ought always to see each other: because
1. From this the evil are tormented more, as it is said, Wisdom 5:2, Seeing they shall be troubled with terrible fear, etc. And, Micah 7:10: My enemy shall see, and shall be covered with confusion. And, Psalm 112:10: The sinner shall see, and be angry: he shall gnash with his teeth and pine away.

1. Further, after the day of judgment the evil ought rather to see the good, than conversely: because it is more harmful to the evil in the sight of the goods of others: and this befits the state of the damned: but it is of a good and well-ordered heart to be harmed in the evils of others: therefore, the sight of the punishment of the evil, since the good are most excellently disposed, by compassion their beatitude will be obscured.

Response. It must be said, that as it is said in the Text, before the judgment both see others, and after the judgment only the good see the evil: because not even then will they be deemed worthy to see the good.

From the aspect it must be said, that then they will be so burdened by punishments, that their intention can be turned nowhere else than to the punishments: and therefore the thought of the rewards of the good in heaven will be closed to them.

To the second it must be said, that then nature will be glorified, so that it can neither suffer nor sympathize: for to sympathize is not of a perfect nature, but rather of an imperfect and passible one, and that is a good disposition.

However, such a confirmation of nature is said to be chaos in the Text, which is established between the good and the evil.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 11 — Whether The Blessed See All Things That Are Done In Creatures

Whether the blessed see all things which are done in creatures?

Then it is asked concerning this which he says, there, G, a little before the middle: Because they see the brightness of God, nothing in the creature, etc.

However, two things are asked. The first is concerning the truth of what is said. The second is concerning the senses of the glorious body, namely concerning sight, and others which the Saints will use in the homeland.

For the first seems false: because 1. All see the brightness of God: yet one does not see what another sees: therefore not all see all things which are done in creatures.

1. Furthermore, according to this, one would not illuminate another, and this is false.

Response. It must be said that vision is taken in two ways, namely on the part of the object, and on the part of the medium through which there is sight. On the part of the object, he who sees the brightness of God does not see all things, but sees as many as God wills to manifest to him. However, on the part of the medium, there is nothing which he who sees the brightness of God does not see: because God is the medium sufficiently demonstrating whatever is created or uncreated.

And through this the solution to the whole is clear.

Articulus 12 — What Are Said To Be The Feet And The Head Of The One Sitting Upon The Throne

Who are called the feet and head of the one sitting upon the throne?

These things concerning the feet of the one sitting upon the throne, etc.

This is taken from Isaiah. And although it is otherwise expounded by blessed Dionysius both in the Celestial and in the Ecclesiastical hierarchy, here, however, the head and feet are understood as certain hidden things of divinity: the head as eternal, and the feet as the hidden judgment of subsequent works. And they are the intermediate works of creation and recreation, both in the mediator and in the sacraments: and that is indeed a brief epitome of the whole book of Sentences, in which it is concluded to the praise and glory and honor of our Lord Jesus Christ, to whom with the Father and the Holy Spirit is honor and glory for ages of ages. Amen.